Evening star., 1945-10-28

nIss1 immediate at ,.Dsa decision an TN in the the ~
lowing concept G1"1HAL aA"ohAAA'
We have know through the hard experience OF
World War that the future peace of the world will largely
depend only the international policies OF the United
States practical ability to endow those
policies with strength command international respect
This ability is determined by the military posture OF this
in time of and in turn governed both
now and increasingly through the ahead by the
public congressional reaction to the appropriations
quired for armed forces.
The Need for Unifcaton
The national security is measured by the sum- or
rather the combination the three great armshe land
naval forces The urgent need is for an OVERALL
piecemeal appraisal of what required to solve the
single problem of national security with the greatest econ
omy compatible with requirements
am strongly that unless there single de-
partent the forces within which the difficult
complexities be ironed out prior to
requirements the President and the Congress-
be little hope that will be able to maintain
through the years military posture that will secure for
lasting peace
Unfication Cooperation.
the light of wartime experience with combined
operations will suggest that should revert
to the complete separation of the ARMY and Navy which
prevailed years before this 1t will be agreed that
must be coordination between the War and Navy De-
partents and between the which these depart
separately preside However will be contend
that coordination be satisfactorily accomplished
without integration of the two departments.
The proposal has already been made that we depend
Joint Chiefs of Staff and other joint committees for
the necessary coordination and the elimination of
tapping duplication.
do not consider that such proposal provides
fective substitute for the necessary unified direction COM
mttees at best cumbersome agencies especially when
membership loyalty and advancement to chiefs
installed in completely separate governmental departments
Local enthusiasms become of weakness in
of strength Resulting diversity of opn-
ions Americans almost all subjects present
increasing difficulties when they must be resolved in public
debate.
Agreements Long Delayed
Even under the stress of war, agreement has been
reached in the Joint Chiefs OF Stah at times only by nmer
compromises after long delays and coordination
material and administrative matters has largely been
forced by circumstances arising out of the war; and then
only incompee. During the past the voluntary CO.
operation Army Navy under the impetus of
level which it would be extremely difficult
think impossible to continue in peacetme under var-
alton of the present twodepartmen organization With the
of the there is longer compelling necessity to
reach at least compromise agreements major matters
Current events have reinforced my that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff could be genuinely effective in peacetme as
co-ordnating agency.
example the Congress Is seriously considering
legislation covering the postwar strength of the Navy and
the Marine Corps which the War Department has been
neither consulted informed In other words this
first important postwar matter of Joint lack of de-
partmenal coordination clearly evident And what is
important to observe the dcussons and
mendaons presented the Congress support of this leg
sation lack fundamental basis for the determination of
postwar establishment Such procedure inevitably re-
suits confusion of congressional thought with the
con-
clusions.
In expressing the view that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
cannot take the place of unified department for the
armed forces do not wish to imply that there no need
organization similar to the Joint Chiefs of Staff if
the principle unified department is adopted.
slider very important that such agency should be
nued for the purpose of submitting in compliance with
legislative direction recommendations on matters affecting
policy strategy consequent budgetary requirements to
the Commander in Chief but through the civilian head of
unified department. In time of they should have
operating responsibilities the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
be of nestmable value to the Nation in the formulation of
basic military policies and the development of balanced
security establishment
Importance of the Principle of Unication.
The important consideration is recognition of the
soundness of the principle single executive department
responsible for the national security There OF
evident complications resolved in bringing the War and
Navy Departments directing hand but most of
these matters detail feel that entirely
isfactory solution for difficulties would be readily found
under the directing head of single department The
development in opinion should be evolutionary
bass report to the President and the Congress at stated
periods for example of the made to be approved by
the President Congress acquiescence
to be amended disapproved by appropriate action
My experience in resolving difficulties of unity
direction and of unity of in this been
that the problem of the details at first obscured the funda
mental principles but favorable decision was reached
regarding the latter the dcues could usually be quickly
resolved hope that your deliberations you will not al
low disagreement details cloud confuse the pri
goal which is the adoption of the principle of single
! department system for the armed forces
| 90 Conclusion.
In considering the proposal for single department IL
appears appropriate squarey past experience
There has been natural tendency in each department. War
and Navy, to aim at efsuhciency in its military
chine Duplication and waste the inevitable result o
/ such system
During the war, time was the compelling factor-noi
money In peace money will be the dominating factor
the most dcu factor in the maintenance of security
| ------ 1see MATsIIAII, page f.-I01