Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-08-19

the Hollandia area of Northern New
Guinea late in March, 1914, transported
and supported by the Nays 7th Fleet.
This close teamwork set the pattern
which was to be so successfully followed
six months later at Leyte and Luzon.
The Mariannas
With the great land mass of New
Guinea in Allied control, the next OBJ
jectives of the United States Fleet were
the strong bases of the Marianas, with
their excellent anchorages and great
potential landing fields Even then,
these islands-particularly the largest,
Guam, Tinian and Saipan-were a
must for the Army Air Force, if they
were to put their B29s to quick use
against the Japanese home islands
They were a must, too, for a Navy
which had fought its way across the
Pacific from battered Pearl Harbor
and was not going to stop until it
anchored in Tokyo Bay.
The japanese realized the importance
of holding these islands, for on the
on Saipan-June Is, l944-the naval
command was notified that the Japa-
nese feet was at last venturing out to
sea. The result was a twofold disaster
for the enemy; on June 10, in a series
of air engagements over our landing
areas, the Japanese lost 400 planes
out of a possible 545 seen. This elimi-
he oF DIV OH
on our landings and freed the United
States naval covering forces to hunt
down the japanese fleet.
Our Navy carrier-based planes found
it. after arduous search, late on the
afternoon of the Goth, and Immediately
attacked, sinking two carriers, two de-
stroyers and a tanker, and severely
damaging three carriers, battleship.
three cruisers, one destroyer and three
tankers. During this engagement, Is
American planes we're lost and the only
reason it was broken off was that our
aircraft were dangerously low on fuel
with darkness rapidly approaching.
The story of the return of the remain
ing flyers to the carriers in the dark
and of the decision to light up the car
riers to assist their landings is one
which has been told before, but can
never be told too often
The capture of Guam, Tinian and
Saipan meant bases for the Armys
very long-range bombers for their at
tacks on Japan. The fast carrier task
force, with all its great weight of COM
l,oto ont L-+
as well as carriers, came into its own,
ranging the seas from the Kuriles in
the north to the Sulu Sea in the south,
striking where and when it pleased
probing every mile of the enemy's
defenses.
Recapturing the Philippines
A weak point in those defenses was
soon discovered and it was found at
place particularly important to Amer
leans, emotionaly as we'll as STRATEGY
cally. After successful assaults on the
Western Carolines-Peleliu, Angular and
Morotai in -September-planes from
Navy carriers encountered surprisingly
little air opposition in the Leyte-Samar
dled u Tie FlllllpplneS. his was re-
ported to General of the Army Mac
Arthur by Fleet Admiral Nimitz and
together they agreed to advance the
planned date of the assault on the
Philippines to the middle of October.
So gigantic an undertaking as the
recapture of the Philippines obviously
was matter for complete cooperation
between all branches of the armed
forces. And, equally obvious, that CO.
operation was firm from the start
Navy carrier planes swept distant
airfelds on Okinawa, Northern Luzon
and Formosa to prevent them from
being used as staging areas for enemy
Continued on Page C-6.)