The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1945-07-16
Interpreting
The War
By ELTON C. FAY

Associated Press News Analyst
Although the mounting fury OF
Naval and air attacks may su3. sss
preparatory operations for invasion.
D-Day in Japan probably is sew.
eral pages away on the calendar
What appears to be happening il
enlistment of Naval surface forces
along with the air arms OF Arrnv
and Navy, in strategic attack.
The reported target of the bonn
bardment guns of the superbattle-
ships and their supporting Graf! in
the attack on Muroran. on Hokkai-
do Island, is iron and steel produc.
ton. This is strategic target. the
same type of objective that tho
Army Air Forces B-29 have
been working over for a year
Hokkaido, however, is beyond the
practical operating limit of Super
fortresses based on Saipan and
presumably will remain beyond
their range until bases on Okinawa
or possible bases on the Asiatic
mainland are in use. Therefore, it
seems likely that the Navy, with
a daring unprecedented even for
that steel-nerved service, IS lend.
ing a hand in carrying the attack
directly into the harbors of Hok.
kaido.
Concurrently with the Naval sur.
face attacks runs the intensified
pounding of Japan by carrier-borne
aircraft as well as the Army's
planes. Part of this is tactical at
tack, directed at airfields and air
installations and designed to keep
grounded as much japanese avia-
ton as possible.
But a large part of it represents
a second phase of strategic at
tack. For months, the primary and
virtually the only targets of strate-
gic bombers were factories, parti-
cularly aircraft plants. Now there
is increasing attention to Japan's
transportation system.
AS in the case Of the air war
against Germany, the overall plan
is two-fold: destroy productive
ability; destroy the means of NOV
ing what goods have been produce
ed.
The Naval air strike at the ferry
route between Hokkaido, one Of
the great food producing areas OF
the Japanese home islands. and tue
industrial island of Honshu. is an
example.
More and more there appears re-
ference to attacks on Japanese rail
lines. Japan's railroads are Pc
culiarly vulnerable to such attack.
They average four bridges mile
and bridges are good bomoer
targets. The railroads Of Nippon are
electrified extensively, this for
two reasons: The abundance of n.y.
droelectric power and shortage OF
coal or diesel oil. Power plants and
transmission facilities provide an
added number Of targets. II this
country, however, (and presunn-
ably this is true OF Japan these
electrical transmission systems
are interlaced, so that if one fails
another takes over the load.
In addition to the obvious stra-
tegic aspects Of the current attack,
there seem to be other reasons for
believing that landing on Japan
is not imminent. There have been
no reports by the enemy Of Ameri-
can troop transports or landing
craft in company with Naval for.
ces moving into japanese waters
The redeployment of American
Army forces from Europe to the
Pacific still is in it's initial stage.
That the army believes a major
land force must be assembled for
the final attack on the enemy's in.
ner citadel is implicit in the. state
ment Of Undersecretary of War
Patterson:
We must be prepared to win tho
war the hard way by killing Jap
anese soldiers right through the
ruins of Tokyo.