Evening star., 1945-06-04
Policy in Germany


Until an overall Allied control
commission is set up in Berlin and
until Russia lifts the curtain on the
areas it occupies, it will be impossible
to obtain a reasonably clear picture
of how Soviet policy in Germany is
fitting in with British and American
policy.
From the bits of news that have
filtered out of the Russian zone,
however. there seems to be some
ground for the belief that Moscow's
approach to this tremendously COM
plex problem differs from the Anglo
American approach in that it tends
Surprisingly enough-to be some
what softer. Apparently action of
unmitigated severity is being taken
against suspect elements, and
through the mayor of Berlin notice
has just been served that fifty former
Nazis, plus the perpetrators them
selves, will die for every Red Army
soldier attacked or for any act of
disorder or arson committed out of
hostility to Russia. But such IRON
handed measures appear to be con-
siderably offset by policy designed
to win the friendly collaboration of
the average run of Germans.
Thus. according to reports, the
Russians are making a special effort
to provide adequate food supplies for
the population and to arrange for
public entertainment Moreover, the
occupying troops evidently are per-
mitted to fraternize with the people.
and the general indication is that
the program as a whole Is meant to
create as cordial an atmosphere as
is possible in the circumstances. If
this is true, then it must be said
that the policy of nonfraternization
and aloof severity in the British and
American zones is tough by contrast
which seems odd in view of what
the Germans did to Russia and in
view also of the fears expressed by
some Moscow commentators about
the possibility of our being soft"
Speculation can range far afield
over the reasons for such a differ
ence in policy, if the difference really
exists. One might read into it, for
example, desire to win over the
German proletariat to the Soviet
way of doing things, but it may be
plausibly argued at the same time
that Moscow would not care to COM
munize Germany because a commu-
nlzed Germany, maintaining tradi-
tional natural efficiency and military
talent. might eventually become a
grave threat to Russia. Possibly the
simple explanation is the soundest
one-namely, that the Stain gov
eminent and the Red Army find the
softer" approach more effective in
carrying out the task of pacifica-
ton and that they feel it may pay
dividends years from now to have
the neighboring Germans remember
that the Soviet Unions occupation
measures were not unduly stringent.
Actually, OF, course, talk about
"softness" and hardness" in dealing
with Germany tends to befog and
distort what should be the basic
joint objective of all the victors.
That objective is to restore order. to
get Europe back on it's feet as
promptly as possible. to eliminate
the danger of Prussian military re-
surgence and to lay the foundations
for an enduring peace. Whichever
policy - soft" or hard" is more
likely to achieve this is the policy to
be followed. and the sooner Britain,
Russia and the United States reach
an understanding on this point, the
better it will be for all of us.
The co-ordinating Allied control
commission cannot be established too
soon. AS long as we have to wait for
it and as long as there is blackout
of information from any occupation
zone, we are going to have confusion
over Germany and we are going to
stumble uneasily in the semidark