The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-12-04

of the Roer were seriously inhibit- ing General Eisenhower's prog- ress. He wrote:
 "He (the enemy) is assisted in that area, however, by the flood ed condition of the Roer River and the capability he has of pro- ducing a sudden rush of water by blowing the dams near Schmidt. Bradley has about come to the conclusion that we must take that area by very difficult attack from the west and southwest.
 There can be no question of the value of our present opera tions. The German is throwing into the line some divisions with only six weeks training, fact that contributes materially to his high casualty rate. As explained in my most recent appreciation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, our problem is to continue our attacks as long as the results achieved are so much in our favor, while at the same time preparing for full-out heavy offensive when the weather conditions become favorable, as- suming the enemy holds out. Un- less some trouble develops from within Germany, a possibility of which there is now no real evi- dence, he should be able to main- tain a strong defensive front for some time, assisted by weather, floods, and muddy ground"
 General Eisenhower was deter mined to give Germany no chance to recoup from the blows already delivered. Despite shortages in troops and supplies, his attitude was offensive, and, consequently, he was compelled to hold some sectors of the front with compara- lively weak forces in order to gather strength at his points of attack. To the 75 miles between Monschau and Trier he could as- sign only four divisions of the First Army or sacrifice his effort to bring about a decision else- where. It was here that the Ger man armies of the west, com manded by Field Marshal von Rundstedt and acting on the direct orders of Hitler, made their last desperate efforts to stave of the disaster.
 The Wehrmacht's Last Blow
 On Is December von Rundstedt attacked with a force of 24 divi- s1ons, He had been able, because of heavy fog which continued for days, to assemble his forces in secrecy in the heavily forested foreground. When the blow came. eight panzer divisions broke through our VIII Corps line on a 4O-mile front. Diversionary att jacks in other sectors and con- siderable air and artillery support assisted the main offensive in Luxembourg.
 General Eisenhower reacted promptly and decisively and sub sequent results have proved the eminent soundness of his plan. All available reserves in the Gen. tral Army Group were used to strengthen the northern and southern Hanks of the penetration and the XXX British Corps of the Northern Army Group was deployed to hold the line of the Mouse and the vital Liege area. With communications seriously disrupted, Field Marshal Mont gomery was charged with the op- eratton of e forces. north of the penetration, involving temporary operational control over most of the U. S. First and Ninth Armies while General Bradley coordinat- ed the effort from the south. The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were brought Up from theater re- serve to retard the momentum of the enemy thrust, with the 1O1st, reinforced by armor and artillery, holding the important road center at Bastogne. The shoulders of the penetration at MonSchau and Ech- ternach were stubbornly held by infantry divisions moved in from the north and from the south, outstanding amoug which were the 1st, End. 4th. and 99th Divi- vions.
 The Ardennes battle deserves a prominent place in the history of the U. s. Army. The splendid stand of the 7th Armored Division at St. With. the tenacity of the 1O1st Arborne and elements of the 10th Armored Division at Bas- togne, and the numerous exam ples of superb fighting qualities shown by the troops of other units