Evening star., 1945-12-16

tine BrOOn
of occupation are withdrawn and the
present self Imposed dictators can no
longer rely on the support Of foreign
bayonets.
But the real reason for the difficult
American-Russian relations rests In the
fact that the U. s. s. r. wishes to have
a controlling voice in Japan and the
administration is definitely opposed to
this. Whether the attitude of the Soviet
government can be softened by some
wide concessions in Europe and the
Middle East Is matter which Secretary
Byrnes will have to discover at the
Moscow sessions.
1t will be difficult for the administra-
ton and for the American delegates who
are accompanying Mr.. Byrnes to yield
on this matter.
President Truman has made it very
clear on several occasions that our posi-
tion in the Pacific was thoroughly re-
viewed at the Potsdam Conference where
Premier Stain himself approved the
policies outlined to him by President
Truman and the other American repre-
sentatives.
After having won his point regarding
the Kurile Islands, which the American
military advisers wished to place under
the UNO trusteeship, while Russia
wanted their outright annexation,
Premier Stain agreed to the other re-
quests placed before him by the Amer
ican delegation.
Agreed to Macarthur Role.
For instance, he accepted the Ameri-
can thesis that Japan and the area in
cluding the Philippines should be ad-
ministered exclusively by an American
officer whose title would be Allied su-
preme commander. Stain also ap-
proved the nomination of Gen. Douglas
Macarthur to that post. Moreover, he
agreed that during the occupation pc
riod the Allied supreme commander
should have free hand. Delegations
representing all the other Allies with
interests in the Far East were to have
representatives at Gen. MacArthur's
headquarters. These representatives
were to take care of matters directly
concerning their respective govern
ments
In the event of some ma jor misunder-
| standing Allied representatives could
appeal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Washington or to President Truman
| directly. At no time was there any sug-
gestion, after Mr.. Truman complied
with Russia's demand for the Kurile
Islands. that the Pacific powers set up
either consultative committee or a
control committee which would have
equal authority with the Allied supreme
commander.
The request of Commissar Molotov
that control committee be organized,
with each delegate Of the big powers
having a veto right, fell like bomb
shell on the Foreign Ministers gathered
in London. But President Truman Is
said to have been more astounded than
any one else. He was convinced that
Stalin's word was as good as his bond
and he could not understand the
change in Russia's attitude.
Korean Note Unanswered.
The only plausible explanation offered
him by the professional diplomats was
that this was the manner in which great
powers do their bargainings In order
to obtain concessions which are vital to
them, they demand something which is
vital to their partners. The sequel is a
series of negotiations in which every
power tries to obtain its desires. This
IS the way power politics has been
played for centuries and will continue
to be played so long as it remains para
mount in international relations
Mr.. Truman neither likes nor under
stands power politics Before the Lon
don conference folded up, he reluctantly
agreed to create consultative board
for the Far East. The Russians, who
thoroughly understand the diplomatic
game, refused to be represented in that
innocuous committee which is holding
perfunctory and meaningless sessions in
Washington. All the efforts of the
State Department to get them out of
the Achilles tent" have been futile.
An American note suggesting the uni
fication of Korea and placing the coun-
try under the UNO trusteeship for five
years remained unanswered At present
Korea is occupied in the north by the
Red armies, while the south is under
the control of three American regi-
ments Washington wanted to put an
end to this situation, which works
against the interests of the Korean peo-
pie. But the Russians were still in
sulking mood four weeks ago and re-
fused to accept our suggestion.
Byrnes Tries Again.
Although his conversations with the
Russians did not succeed at London,
Secretary Byrnes persuaded President
Truman to allow him to try again. We
have placed all our diplomatic eggs in
one pasket-the United Nations Security
Organization. Our entire postwar struc-
ture revolves on the question whether
the UNO is a success or failure. Mr..
Byrnes strongly feels that unless we can
purchase Russia's cooperation in the
same mannerfwe purchased her accept.
ance of an invitation to the preliminary
meetings at San Francisco the United
Nations Organization will remain only
an expression of pious wishes.
It is with this thought in mind that
our Secretary of State is confering at
Moscow. He has number Of conces-
sions up his sleeve mostly in connection
with the European situation. But it is
highly doubtful that he will be able to
make any concessions in regard to the
Far East and Japan.
It Is not likely that President Truman
| or tho cbiof militia nv ond ,,oI;ttool !, :,