Evening star., 1945-08-29

iii LIllIIIyIIl VI
Stark and Kimme|
Excerpts from Secretary of the
Many ForrestaPs.. fourth indorSe-
nent to the proceedings of the
Pearl Harbor court OF inquiry
tolloU::
The net result of the findings OF
fact and opinion of the Pearl Har-
Dor Naval Court of Inquiry, as re-
viewed by Judge Advocate General
of the Navy, and the Commander IN
Chief, United States Fleet and Chief
of Naval Operations and by me. was
that the evidence secured by the
Court did not warrant and would not
support the trial by general court
martial of any person or persons in
the Naval Service.
In my Third Endorsement to the
Record of Proceedings of the Pearl
Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated l
December 1914, I found that the
evidence obtained indicated that
there were errors of judgment on
the part of Admiral Kimmel and
Admiral Stark, but that the inquiry
had not gone to the point OF ex-
haustion of all possible evidence.
Accordingly, I directed that further
investigation would be conducted by
an investigating officer and that
pending the completion OF the nee
essary further investigation 1 would
withhold decision as to the instltu-
ton of any proceeding against any
naval officer involved.
Findings Approved.
The comments of the Judge Ad-
vocate General and of the Com
mander in Chief, United States
Fleet and Chief of Naval Opera
tions, in their Endorsements to the
Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry rec
ord are approved subject to the fol-
lowing remarks:
ta) Court of Inquiry Finding III.
This finding states, in substance,
that the presence in Pearl Harbor
on 7 December 194l of Task Force
l and the battleships of Task Force
2 was necessary.
The essential point here rests In
Admiral Kimmel's statement to the
effect that he would not have had
the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he
anticipated an air attack. The Sec
ond Endorsement indicates that the
Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, does not entirely go along
with the opinion of the Court that
the information available to Ad-
miral Kimmel cid not require any
departure from his operation and
maintenance schedules. The Com
mander in Chief, United States
Fleet. states further in this con-
nection that Admiral Kimmel could
have rotated the import perlods
of his vessels in less routine man
ner, so as to have made it lmpos-
sible for the Japanese to have pre-
dicted when there would be any
vessels in port, and this would have
made the japanese task less easy.
I concur in the comments OF the
Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, as to this finding.
(b) Court of Inquiry Finding III.
This finding states that, "Constltu-
tional requirements that war be de-
clared by Congress make II
difficult to prevent an attack and
precluded offensive action as a
means of defense, and that Admiral
Kimmel had the responsibility OF
avoiding overt acts.
The Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet, comments that this
gives an unscrupulous enemy great
advantage, and that the Constltu-
tional requirements preventing Of
fensive action as a means of de-
fense was a definite handicap,
Though, in contrast with our Con-
stitutional principles, the surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor was but a
repetition OF the historically treach-
erous japanese method OF inaugur-
sting hostilities and. commencing a
war, yet it does not appear that
there was any proximate casual
relationship between the Constltu-
tional requirement and the instant
disaster. The Constitutional lnhlbl-
ton and the injunction as to overt
acts did not preclude either long
distance reconnaissance or sortie
bv the Fleet. Further, it appears
that prior to December, 194l, Ad-
miraI Kimmel did not regard this
Constitutional provision or his re-
sponsibility to avoid overt acts as
sufficient to prevent the issuance OF
orders to bomb unidentified subma-
rines found in operating areas.
(c) Court of Inquiry Finding w.
This states that Admiral Bloch was
subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and
was charged with the task of assist
ing the Army in the defense OF
Pearl Harbor and, consequently
Admiral Bloch had responsibility
for naval measures concerned with
local defense.
Evidence Summed Up.
Upon the basis of all evidence in
cluding Admiral Hewitt's investiga-
ton it appears that:
No patrol planes were under the
command of Admiral Bloch. The
only Navy planes suitable for long
distance reconnaissance were the
Pacific Fleet patrol planes.
The Pacific Fleet patrol planes
were under the control of Admiral
Kimmel, and he had the RESPONSE
kility for their utilization. They
S7ere operated after November %,
1941, in accordance with schedules
approved by him at that time, which
were not revised prior to the attack.
The schedules stressed training op-
erations. They did not provide for
distant reconnaissance from Oahu.
Id Court Of Inquiry Finding v.
The court here finds that relations
between Admiral Kimmel and Gen.
Short were friendly, cordial and CO.
operative; that they invariably con-
ferred when important messages
were received, and that each was
sufficiently cognizant of the meas
ures being taken by the other.
In this connection upon all the