Evening star., 1945-11-17

after the World War due to inabil.
ity to get newsprint.
Pearl Hurbor
Continued From First Page)
ferable for the purposes of refueling
at sea, the chances of being discov-
cred by patrol planes were great
because the routes lie near Wake
Midway, Palmyra, Johnston Islands
ETC."
Thus the striking force passed
between Midway and the Aleutians
and never was detected, Admiral
Inglis said. He described these as
the data used in planning the Pear
Harbor attack:
American public broadcasts from
Hawaii.
Reports of japanese nava,
attaches in Washington.
Reconnaissance submarines ir
Hawaiian waters prior to the attack
Information obtained from ships
which had called at Hawaiian ports
in November.
Espionage network in Hawaiian
islands using uncensored cable
communications with Japan"
Surprise Blow Assured.
Based on these sources of infor-
nation, the Japanese high COM
mand, Admiral Inklis added, was
able to assume:
That the main body of the
United States Pacific Fleet would be
at anchor within Pearl Harbor on
December 7, Sunday, Hawaiian time
That a carrier force could be
moved from home waters across the
Pacific to within striking distance
of the main islands Of the Hawaiian
group without undue risk Of detec-
ton by American defensive recon-
naiSsance"
Should these assumptions prove
in error, the japanese said, "a re-
serve group OF heavy naval units
could sortie from the Inland Sea to
give support to the carrier striking
force in a decisive engagement with
the American fleet" This latter
theory was based on the idea that, If
such battle were fought, "the COM
bined strength of the bulk of availa-
BILE japanese major feet units would
be sufficient to defeat the. American
fleet"
1t was assumed that "a power
|sful carrier air force strike directed
against the American forces based
in Hawaii could, If tactical surprise
were effected. achieve the strategic
result of crippling the American
fleet; that such a strike could
achieve also the destruction OF
American land-based air power and
thus permit the Japanese striking
force to withdraw without damage y
No Order for Landing.
Admiral Inglis added irr his sum-
ming up of Japanese reports: "The
omission from Japanese plans OF
provision for landing on Oahu was
decided upon during discussions
held on September and Z when
Operation Order No. was being put
together.
1t was decided that no landing
operation should be included be-
cause it would have been impossible
to make preparations for such q
landing in less than a month aftel
the opening of hostilities; it was
further recognized that the prob
lens of speed and Of supplies for ar
accompanying convoy would have
made it unlikely that the initial at.
tack could be accomplished withou,
detection; it was further recognized
that insuperable logistic problem.
rendered landings on the island i'm.
practical"
The complete plan of the Pear
Harbor attack was known in ad.
vance by members Of the Japanes.
general staff, the commanders IL
chief and chiefs of stats and stat
members Of the combined flee
headquarters and 1st Air headquar.
ters.
Part of the plan," the Japanesl
sources indicated, was known In ad
vance by the navy minister, nav,
vice minister and other rankinl
naval officers. It is also reportet
that the Emperor knew in advanc,
only the general outline Of the plai
! and that none of the japanese Of
ficials who were in the United States
including Ambassadors Nomura ant
Kurusu. knew anything about tn,
plan in advance"
/ Approach Of Crisis.
About November 81, the Japanes,
reported, "the situation seemed to b,
approaching a stage where the com
mencement Of hostilities was In
evitable."
i Even then, however, the Japanes
insisted that an order OF Novembe
las from their commander in chic
stated:
/. Should 1t appear certain tha
Japanese-American negotiations will
reach an amicable settlement prio
to the commencement of hostile &C
ton. all the forces Of the combined
/ feet are to be ordered to reassem
BILE and return to their bases"
4 Admiral Inglis told the committee
The aims of the entire Japanes,
campaign, including the attack ol
Pearl Harbor, were predicated on tn
! desire Tor military conquest. secairft,
and enhancement Of the empire b.
occupation Of areas rich In natura
resources 2
4 In regard to the Pearl Harbor at
tack he cited the order for It, stat
i ing: In the east the America,