Evening star., 1945-09-13
BY 1T. COL. THOMAS G.
LANPHIER. Jr..

able time table, had hunch why
Maj. Mitchell and I had been called
into the conference. My hunch wa.
confirmed by the ranking naval Off.
Ger present, who told us that every
plane and every weapon on Guadal.
canal would, if necessary, be devoted
to accomplishment of the directive
from Washington, but that the
actual destruction of Admiral Yam
amoto and his party could only be
attempted with some guarantee o1
success by iong-range fighters.
Fighters would have to be useo
to get in close enough to the target
whether he was afoot, afloat or IL
the air when contacted, and assure
attack from point-blank range de-
spite any elusive maneuver he might
make
And since surprise would have tt
be the basic operating factor IN the
strike, that surprise could only be
obtained by long-range fighters be.
cause the Kahili area was over 30t
miles from Guadalcanal and ar
additional hundred miles or so woulc
have to be flown in low, circuitou;
approach to the target in order tt
escape detection by enemy radal
or observers.
Both requirements put our Army
P-38s in the drivers seat, since they
were the only fighters on the island
capable of such extended range.
Many Ideas in Discussion.
A lengthy discussion by all pres
ent then ensued on the tactics to be
used. Although this was to be a
mission that any pilot on the island
would have relished above all others
no Navy or Marine pilot present who
had been left out of it because OF
the limitations of his fighter equip
ment showed the slightest sign OF
sour grapes. Every one pitched into
the discussion. In fact, so many
ideas we're brought into that
cramped room that Maj. Mitchell
and I were almost crowded out of
the conversation.
Soon after the argument began we
started to lose ground to officers of
higher rank who kept dropping in
and interposing their suggestions for
our conduct of the mission, until we
wound up on the outer fringe of the
milling crowd, unable to see either
the message or the Marine major
holding it.
just about the time some of the
ideas flying through the room got
pretty far-fetched, the ranking
naval officer IN the room called a
halt. Drawing us back within read
ing range of the cablegram, he asked
us to consider two possible methods
from among the many suggested.
Some of the naval officers favored
our trying to catch Yamamoto while
he was moving across Shorthand
Harbor on the submarine chaser
They reasoned that he would then be
an isolated target caught in spot
where his maneuverability for
escape was limited.
Maj. Mitchell and I opposed that
idea. We explained to the Navy
people present that no one of us in
our Army outfit was qualified to
identify a submarine chaser from
among the many ships, large and
small, plying the Kahili waters;
that, even if we did find a sub
marine chaser and it proved to be
the right one, we could hardly hope
to sink it in the one or two passes
we would have time to make on it
before the hundred or more Jap
fighters in that area fell on us; that
even if we did sink it, we could not
be sure of killing every man or
board and thus guaranteeing Yama-
moto's death in the strike, ano
finally, the chances of any OF us
getting in and out of the hornets
nest in that harbor during the JAP
leaders visit were exceedingly re-
mote, with every antiaircraft CUR
aship and ashore alerted and every
combat aircraft in the area aprowl
Midair Interception Planned.
Our arguments were needed, and
our alternate suggestion, midair
interception, was adopted. Since we
were the ones who were going to
have to do the job, it was agreed
that our choice should rule. 1t was
decided that an attempt would be
made to contact the Jap formaUiol
st a point west of Kahili, on .he
airline from Rabaul to the airbase
at Ballale.
We assumed the admiral Woulc
be riding in fast transport or ir
a bomber and that his flying speed
therefore would average between
31a and miles a minute. We esti-
mated his altitude would be sUme-
where under 10000 feet-anythine
higher than that would have forced
him to wear an oxygen mask, a mosl
uncomfortable gadget even when
necessary.
knowing his arrival near Kahiil
was scheduled for 9:45 am. the next
day, we decided to meet YamamotC
at a point IS miles back of Kahili
10 minutes earlier. 1t was at this
point, we felt, we had the best
chance of hitting him when he was
least protected. For we had to have
a minimum of resistance and a
maximum of surprise in striking ou1
quarry. We had only 18 P-38s avail
able for the mission and they prom
ised to look mighty puny against
the hundred-odd fighters we an
ticipated would be milling about the
skies of Kallili to cover the arriva
and landing of the admirals party
We had to find him, hit him ant
get out fast before we were discov
cred if we all hoped to vote in tn,
next election.
IS Lightnings in Two Sections.
1t was decided that our Is Light.
nings would be divided into two sec.
tions for the mission-an attackin,
section and covering section.
The attacking section, which wa
to be waiting for the admiral a
10000 feet and which was to ge
through his six escorting Zeros anc
destroy him, was to consist of m,
flight of four. In addition to my
DaiWRatIoniino