Evening star., 1945-05-02
Order by Eisenhower
To Halt Allied Drive
Al EIbe Is Disclosed
By IVES GALLAGHER.


WITH THE UNITED STATES
9TH ARMY IN GERMANY, April 26
delayed by Censorship A direct
order from Supreme Allied Head
quarters halted the United States
9th Army's drive to Berlin at the
Elbe River at time when the most
pessimistic officers were predicting
1t. Gen. William H. Simpsons forces
could reduce the German capital in
10 days even if the Germans fought
hard"
Gen. Eisenhower S order stated the
9th Army would halt on the Elbe and
await the arrival of Russian forces
from the east, thereby leaving the
capture of the capital to the Red
Army.
1t also was understood the Amer
ican 1st and Sd and British and Ca
madam Armies received similar or
ders to halt at the Elbe.
Reasons Not Clear.
1t was not clear whether Gen.
Eisenhowers order was dictated by
political policy agreed on by the
great powers or in a belief that it
was military necessity.
1t was felt by high staff officers
in the field, however, that the 9th
and other American forces could
push on to the capital without great
difficulty. While the order disap-
pointed some staff officers, it was
not altogether unexpected. 1t was
known that the 9th Army had
pushed past the eventual British
American occupation area when 1t
crossed the Weser River.
While the staff officers were dis
appointed, the American Doughboys
and tankmen who had to do the
fighting and dying to get to Berlin
expressed no regret. Almost to a
man they felt they could do without
the final glory" of getting to Ber-
lin and the resulting expense in
casualties.
Besides whatever political aspects
the situation had-and there are
not apparent at this level, although
there is great deal of guessing
there also were definite military
considerations.
Confusion Feared.
Neither the Americans, British
nor Russians could afford having all
their armies driving toward one an
other at the speed of the past few
weeks. The resulting head-on meet
ing of the opposing forces would be
certain to result not only in a great
deal of confusion, but also unfortu-
nate incidents, in that American and
advance units might clash
with one another before establish
ing their identity, not to mention
shelling or bombing one another.
with no certainty where the exact
front lines might be-
Either the eastern or the western
front had to halt on some fixed line
agreed on by the western powers
and Russia and let the opposing
forces come up, driving the Ger
mans before them. In other words,
both fronts had to be co-ordinated
INTO one battle. with one force acting
as the anvil and the other as the
hammer.
1t was a fundamental textbook
operation carried out on a smaller |
scale many times on the western .
front. where one division cut off an
enemy force and another division
cut it to pieces while the first held |
firm.
Opinions Differ.
1t is not known on this front who T
decided what force should halt or
when the decision was made. But
t is apparent that the Elbe was the
stopping line.
One school of thought holds that
he Americans and the British
should have driven on and captured
Berlin for eventual postwar prestige
maintaining it was worth
he risk of confusion with the Rus
ian forces and the resulting casual
les. Others believe it would not
lave been worth it.
The decision to halt the Allied
orces in the west was withheld by
on security grounds
hat the Germans might gain a def
lite military edge by knowing the
orces of the west were stopping
md that they could concentrate
t,~