Evening star., 1945-05-30
Critics in Capital Hit
Okinowu Mistakes
Writer Urses Study of Problem
to Avoid Big Future Losses
By D0vid Laurence

BY David Laurence
Criticism Of the manner in which the
Okinawa operation has been handled
has been buzzing about the National
Capital for some time, especially since
the killed and missing aboard ships
have been approximately equal to the
number killed in the ground fighting.
Also, while no facts have been re-
Healed as to the number of American
ships damaged, the extraordinary num-
Der OF casualties announced by the
Navy as having occurred on these ships
has indicated that the damage must
have been unusual
Now comes confirmation from Oki-
nawa itself that American strategy has
been faulty. Homer Bigart of the New
York Herald Tribune telegraphs as
follows:
There were two ways of employing
the Marine Sd Amphibious Corps after
its speedy cleanup Of Northern Okinawa.
1t could be landed behind the Japanese
lines in the south, or it could add power
to the frontal assault on the Shuri line
Japs Could Call Turn.
"Our tactics were ultraconservativo.
Instead Of an end run we persisted in
frontal attacks. 1t was the hey-diddle-
diddle straight down the middle. Our
intention to commit the entire force in
general assault was apparently 50 obyi-
GUS that the japanese quickly disposed
their troops to block our advance
Without fear Of an amphibious assault
on his rear, the japanese commander
apparently moved the bulk of his force
from Southern Okinawa into the Shuri
defenses. Thereafter he could fight on
terrain Of his own choosing, always con-
solidating his forces on the narrow front.
Always he could call the turn just as
Field Marshal Kesselring in Italy did,
The foregoing indicates that an am
phibious operation should have taken
place on the south or southeast coast
of Okinawa. 1t indicates also that the
operations on Okinawa itself proceeded
80 slowly that the Japanese suicide
planes had ample opportunity to sink or
damage the American ships that were
standing by offshore with supplies and
providing protection for the ground
troops.
Unhappny, the eposide brings into
sharp relief the differences that have
prevailed among some of our COM
manders on how amphibious warfare
should be conducted. 1t will be re-
called that q Marine Corps general
removed from command at Saipan an
Army general because the latter was
not carrying on the operation with
sufficient speed to win the objective
1t will be recalled also that Gen
Buckner, who is in command at
Okinawa Of both Marines and Army
never had any combat experience in
volving amphibious warfare such as has
been encountered at the Gilbert and
| Marshall Islands, Two Jima or in New
| Guinea.
The question naturally arises why
Admiral Ninitz, who Is the commander
in chief Of the overall operation, didn't
order amphibious landings anyway, and
the only inference is that, since Gen.
Buckner was in command on the spot,
the custom was followed Of letting
the local commander In the fighting
zone itself make the decisions.
Inquiry Warranted.
The whole episode will well warrant
inquiry by some competent military
tribunal of disinterested members. For
what has occurred does not appear to
be happy augury Of what can be
accomplished when larger amphibious
operations must be carried on in the
later stages of the war.
| 1t may well be that there Is no oues-
ton Of personal competence of the
commanders involved but differences
OF opinion as to what strategy should
have been employed The orthodox
| Army concept evidently has been fol-
lowed, which means that artillery has
been massed in large quantities and
there has been resort to pounding by
| frontal attacks. This, of course, Is not
the type Of strategy that has won for
us important island bases thus far in
| the Pacific war.
It would appear that there should
have been selected for Okinawa either
an Army general or a Marine general
SO familiar with amphibious operations
that these could have been conducted
| aggressively and in less time. This
| would have enabled the feet to escape
no more damage than customary with
landing operations and might have
permitted Army air fields to have been
established more quickly to take over
the defenses
The critical period has been passed
at Okinawa and the island is in process
Of being made secure. But the loss
of American lives on sea and on the
land and in the air. plus large lists of
wounded, is problem which, together
with the serious loss of time incurred
for fleet operations, should be ex-
amined with a view to avoidance of
similar mistakes in the future.
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