The Wilmington morning star., 1945-07-01

1TonI WIN 1tS vast m1lltary power
there will be no reason left why
Japan should not make an offe1
which falls clearly within the for
mula of unconditional surrende:
and yet is far short of and ia,
different from suicide and ex
termination. And then there will
be no reason why the Unitee
Nations should refuse to conside:
such an offer from any japanese
authority capable in fact of sur
rendering Internationally and o
executing the terms of the sur
render.
The formation of this united from
will require craftsmanship at thu
level where military and politica
policy have to be determined to
gether. The territorial settlement
which we intend to impose on ia
pan is known: it was announced a
Cairo on December l, 1913. In or
der to make these terms durable
and to lay the foundation of peace
in the Far East, the unification o
China and an international trustee
ship of Korea are necessary.
An understanding with China ant
about China has the first and high
est priority. There was open civil
war in China for many years be
| fore the Japanese invasion. There
has been latent civil war during
the Japanese invasion. There viii
be no peace in Eastern Asia if ci
vii war breaks out after the de
feat of Japan.
The Chinese civil war is not ,
purely Chinese affair: it is threa
to the peace of the world. Thu
United States, out of loyalty to al
ally, as a matter of good faith, ane
for military reasons in this war, il
giving full support to the Chung
king government. 1t is committed
to taking a leading part in assist
ing the reconstruction of China ant
its ind1strialization.
But the United States can hav'
no interest in building up the mill
tary power of Chungking in orde,
that it may then wage civil wa.
after the Japanese war is conclud
ed. That could hardly fail to bring
Chungking into conflict with thu
Soviet Union, and to entangle thu
United States in that conflict. Fol
Communist China lies between ma
tionalist China and the Soviet I'm
ion. An effort by Chungking to set
tie its differences with Yenan by
military force would bring Chang
Kai-shek's armies face to face with
the Red Army. 1t is, therefore
necessary that Chungking and Ye
nan settle their differences with
out fighting. On that the United
States will have to insist.
Whenever the Soviet Union inter
veres in the Japanese war, the
right flank of its forces will res
upon that part of China which i:
under the control of Yenan. There
fore, we are confronted with a sit
uation in which Chinese civil wal
would find the United States sup
porting one side and the Sovie
Union the other. 1t follows tina
just as we must insist that Chung
king negotiate a Chinese settle
ment, so the Soviet Union must in
sist that Yenan negotiate a settle
ment.
The substance of the agreemen
then will have to be reciprocal I'm
dertak;ngs by the Russians, thu
Chinese, and the Americans to U.s.
their influence unequivocally tt
prevent civil war and promote
Chinese settlement. The formul;
for that settlement is clearly in
Dictated, and is in principle like tina
made at Yalta for Poland. It is t.
''reorganize on a broader democra
tic basis" the Chungking govern
ment by ''the inclusion of demo
cratic leaders, from Yenan ant
from other parts of China. For Mos
COW must agree that in this cas-
the Chungking government is tn
core around which a more repre-
sentative government has to be or
gained.
If such an agreement can b.
reached with the Chinese-Mr. I
V. Soong being now in Moscow
and by Stain, Churchill, and Tru
man, a united political front Il
Asia will have been established
With this much Unity achieved al
international trusteeship for Korei