Evening star., 1945-01-21
Our Merchant Murine
A Postwar Problem
Merit Seen in Arguments for
Transfers to Allies
By Joseph H.. Baird.

By Joseph H.. Baird.
The revelation that came from high
government source this week that the
United States probably would sell or
otherwise transfer to Great Britain and
other friendly maritime nations siz-
able part of its postwar merchant fleet is
the result of some long-range thinking
on problem that may become a
heated political issue in postwar days.
For it may be supposed that, as after
the World War, some American ship
pers may oppose any reduction of the
national merchant marine.
Therefore, 1t may be interesting to
go into the logical processes which have
convinced some officials in the State
Department and Maritime Commission
that, even from selfish point Of view,
the United States would be wise to
dispose Of part of the tremendous
tonnage which it certainly will have at
the end of the war.
The figures on the growth of the
American merchant marine are as i'm
pressive as those which show a three
fold expansion of the American Navy
since 1910. Starting with a merchant
feet of some 100000 tons at the be-
ginning of the war, the United States
already has constructed some $4,000 900
tons additional Government econo-
mists estimate that even allowing for
inevitable losses, this country will have,
at the end of the conflict, about 5,000,-
900 tons of shipping.
Our likely position in the world mari
time picture is even more arresting. At
the beginning of the war, the United
States had about II ,000, 900 of the IT,
100000 tons then af1oat or little more
than one-seventh, although we ranked
second to Great Britain as a maritime
nation. When peace comes again, 1t is
estimated, this country will have prob
ably 55,000000 Of total of between
s5,0O0,OOO and 1oo,0O0,o0o tons, or we'll
over half This means, of course, that
we will have more merchant tonnage
than the rest of the world combined
While some shipping men may view
this prospect with elation. others with
whom Government officials have con-
ferred readily see some unpleasant long
range problems arising from the situ-
alton.
One Is that unless the United States
Is ready to sell some of its surplus ves-
sells to such countries as Great Britain,
Norway, Holland and other traditional
seafaring nations. they will of neces-
sity start large postwar construction
programs. As a result, their vessels will
be newer and probably more efficient
than the bulk of those in the American
merchant marine
And after the immediate heavy de-
mand for shipping IN early postwar days
subsidies, this increased total of world
tonnage will intensity the inevitable
slump in sea transport. They foresee-
as this writer has seen-the unpleasant
spectacle of hundreds of good ships idly
rusting at anchor In the James River,
off Solomons Island and In the Missis-
sippi.
The likely postwar position of Great
Britain in the shipping world is re-
ceiving special study here. The British.
large part of whose national income
for centuries has come from shipping.
entered this war with some 17,500000
deadweight tons Of ships of 1000 gross
tons or over. Despite the building Of
some 100000 tons of shipping in British
yards from 1889 through 1943, captures
and the leasing of large amount Of
tonnage from other nations, the British
el.ded l943-the last year for which
figures are available-with only l5,50O,-
900 gross tons of ocean-going vessels.
British sources, however, estimate that
when allowance is made for leased ships
which must eventually be returned to
their own flags, the total as of the end
of 1943 was only l3,500,000 or a decrease
of % per cent since the outbreak of war.
Due to the effective curb on the sub
marine menace in 1914, the British po-
sition then was probably better than at
the end of the previous year, but au-
thorities regard 1t as certain that the
British will end the war with merchant
fleet reduced well under its prewar ton
mage.
The British position will be compli-
Gated further by the fact that the nation
will end the war with an extremely diff
cult exchange problem due to the
liquidation of the bulk of its foreign
investments and the fact that 1t must
assume service on millions of pounds of
blocked sterling now due other parts of
the empire, particularly India.
Income from shipping always has
been one of the main sources of British
revenue and has provided large part
of the foreign exchange which enabled
it to buy large volumes of goods abroad
1t has been for many years Americas
number one customer, buying in 1888,
the last prewar year, some $521 100000
worth of supplies in the United States,
compared with $418000,000 worth pur-
chased by Canada and S240, 0,000,0 900 by
Japan, this country's second and third
best customers.
Among Government economists the
proposition that the United States in its
own self-interest, must bolster British
economy until that country has recov-
cred from the worst immediate effects
of the war has become automatic. Aid in
the prompt revival of British shipping
by no means will solve the whole prob
lem. Long-term credits to enable the
British to buy raw materials and
strengthen their exchange position are
now under study. But the sale to
Britain of enough shipping to take care
of its normal trade routes is regarded