Evening star., 1945-12-19

10 cO-OfOlnate the Army ana navy
and Air Force. With all the other
problems before him, the President
cannot be expected to balance either
the organization, the training or the
practice OF the several branches of
national defense. He should be able
to rely for that coordination upon
civilian hands at the cabinet level.
6. We should establish the most
advantageous framework for a
unified system OF training for
combined operations of land, sea
and air.
Whatever the form which any fu-
ture war may take, we know that
the men of our separate services will
have to work together in many
kinds of combinations for many
purposes. The Pacific campaign of
the recent war is an outstanding
example of common and joint effort
among land, sea and air forces.
Despite its successes, that campaign
proved that there is not adequate
understanding among the officers
and men of any service of the cap
abilities, the uses. the procedures,
and the limitations of the other
services.
This understanding is not some
thing that can be created overnight
whenever a combined operation is
planned and a task force organized. 1.
The way men act in combat is de-
termined by the sum total of all
their previous training, indoctrina-
ton and experience.
Integration Sought.
What we seek Is structure which
can best produce an integrateo
training program, carry on merged
training activities where that is ap-
propriate, and permit officers to be
assigned in such a way that an in
dividual officer will learn first-hand
of other services besides the one in
which he has specialized. The Or
ganizational framework most con-
ducive to this kind OF unified train
ing and doctrine Is unified depart
ment.
7. We should allocate system
atically our limited resources for
scientific research.
No aspect of military prepared
ness is more important than scien-
tifIc research. Given the limited
amount OF scientific talent that will
be available for military purposes
we must systematically apply that
talent to research in the most prom
ising lines and on the weapons with
the greatest potentiality. regardless
Of the service in which these weap-
ons will be- used. We cannot afford
to waste any OF our scientific re-
sources in duplica ton OF effort.
This does not mean that all Army
and Navy laborat tories would be i'm
mediately or even ultimately con-
solidated. The objective should bt
to preserve initiative and enterprise
while eliminating duplication anc
misdirected effort This can be ac'
complished only if we have an or
ganiZational structure which viii
permit fixing responsibility at th'
I Top LOT CO-Of ulild tlol dhioiis sh'
services.
g. We should have unity OF
command in outlying bases.
All military authority at each o
our outlying bases should be place.
under a single commander. who viii
have clear responsibility for secur
ity. who can be held clearly account
able, and whose orders come from
a single authority in Washington
Reconnaissance planes, radar set
and intelligence and counterintelli
gence measures at a United States
outpost are not intended to serve
separate services for different pur
poses. Uniication of the service!
offers a far greater guarantee O
continued unity in the field thar
does our present organization.
Equitable Personnel Policy.
g. We should have consistent
and equitable personnel policies.
There have been differences il
personnel policies between the Arm!
and the Navy during the war. The.
began with competitive recruitmen