Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-12-08
Marshall Says
Army Feared
Attack on u. ).
Expected Jops to
Bomb Plants at
Seattle, Son Diego
BY ]. A. O'LEARY and
CARTER BROOKE JONES.

Shortly before the attack on
Pearl Harbor the War Department
felt that there was more danger
Of a japanese attack on the air.
plane plants of Seattle and San
Diego than against Hawaii, Gen.
George C. Marshall told the
Pearl Harbor Investigating Com
mittee today.
You thought the japanese move
would be in the Far East and had
no attack on Hawaii in mind?"
asked Representative Gearhart, Re-
publican, of California.
MY thought" Gen. Marshall re-
piled, was that their campaign
would be southwark in the China
Sea. assumed that Guam would
be captured and probably Wake Is
land. We had in mind the posi-
bility of an effort against the Pam
anna Canal.
I'VE thought they might strike .
blow at our airplane plants in Seat
tie and San Diego and possibly the
Central Pacific and Hawaii"
Pearl Harbor "Most Improbable"
Gen. Marshall added that he
thought the attack on Hawaii was
"the most improbable" of the various
Japanese plans which had been dis
cussed.
you thought Pearl Harbor was
impregnable?" Mr. Gearhart asked,
referring to a War Department
memorandum to the President which
was placed in evidence earlier in
the hearing.
I'VE thought it impregnable
against landing expedition" Gen.
Marshall corrected.
Mr.. Gearhart repeatedly asked
yesterday why Gen. Marshall did
not take more notice of Maj. Gen.
Walter C. Shorts message that he
had placed the Hawaiian garrison
on only sabotage" alert Novem-
Der %, 1941. Gen. Short gave this
information in replying to message
on November q that hostile action
was possible.
| oRPOA w AhsSA VIM
THAT was my opportunity to in
tervene and I didn't take it," Gen.
Marshall replied frankly. Just why,
I don't know
He observed that 1t. Gen. Leon
ard T. Gerow, former chief of the
War Plans Division, had assumed
full responsibility for any War De-
partment failure to send additional
warnings to Gen. Short.
Il greatly admired his attitude"
Gen. Marshall commented.
. II, too, admired his generosity"
Mr.. Gearhart remarked.
Later, when Senator Ferguson,
Republican, of Michigan took up the
questioning, the subject of re-
sponsibility came up again.
1t was in Gen. Gerow's division
where the details of the situation
rested, Gen. Marshall said, "but the
responsibility was mine as well as
Gen. Gerows."
Precautionary Move.
Gen. Marshall testified that the
> Hawaiian command was ordered on
November n to carry out the alert
, under wraps" because it was i'm
:. perative not to give the japanese an
excuse to say I'VE forced them to go
to war"
at was the strong desire of the
War Council, and certainly of the
President, that no overt act be
/ taken that would create a situation
: that would cause the japanese, how
ever unjustly. to claim we had
forced them to go to war" Gen
Marshall said.
Brewster Called Away.
Gen. Marshall also testified that
if 100 four-engined bombers could
have been sent to the Philippines in
the fall of 1941 the Japs would have
v been discouraged from attacking OF
i moving southwark in the Pacific.
4 He made the statement when
Representative Gearhart asked if he
2 and Admiral Harold r. Stark, for
e mer chief of naval operations, held
e the view in 1941 that if war could
o be delayed long enough, Americas
: preparedness program would have
s (See PEARL HARBOR, Page A-2.)