Evening star., 1945-10-30

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on Germany's war production.
Critically analyzing the declines
and recoveries In German war pro-
duction under constant aerial ham,
mering, the report stressed: 1.-The
attack on transportation was the
decisive blow that completely disor-
ganized German economy" Second
in Importance were the attacks on
oil supplies, which the Germans
viewed as catastrophe"
The survey was made by II civil
ians appointed by former Secretary
of War Stimson at the direction OF
the late President Roosevelt, who
sought an impartial" study OF the
air war. Franklin D'Olier of New
York. president of the Prudential
Life Insurance Co, headed the
group.
Mr.. D'Olier now is in Japan, it was
announced, to make a similar survey
for President Truman on "the ef-
fects of all types Of air attacks in
the Japanese war, including atomic
bombing. This survey will be COM
pleted in December.
Here is the overall conclusion of
the findings in the report:
Allied air power was decisive in
the war in Western Europe. Hind
sight inevitably suggests that 1t
might have been employed differ
emily or better in some respects.
Nevertheless, 1t was decisive.
Air Victory Complete.
"In the air, its victory was COM
plete. At sea, its contribution, COM
bined with naval power, brought an
end to the enemy's greatest naval
threat-the U-boat; on land, 1t help
ed turn the tide overwhelmingly in
favor of Allied ground forces. Its
power and superiority made possible
the success of the INVASION
The staff of the strategic bomb
ing survey group included 300 civ
ilians, $50 officers and 500 enlisted
men. They followed in the wake of
the advancing armies. Their most
helpful" find was Albert Speer,
Nazi Minister of Armaments and
War Production.
They questioned industrialists. top
Nazi generals; turned German docu-
ments inside out to explore the ex-
tent of air attacks on the industrial
and economic structure. Some 200
detailed reports were made to the
War Department.
Some of their findings were sur
prisingly at variance with popular
estimates. especially with respect to
damage done to certain vital indus
tries. However, the weight of favor
able evidence was so proponderous,
the board said:
The German experience suggests
that even first-class military pow
er-rugged and resilient as Germany
was-cannot live long under the full
scale and free exploitation of air
weapons over the heart of its terri
tory"
Had Short-War Complex.
Henry w. Alexander, associate OF
the j. Pierpont Morgan Co., who was
vice chairman of the survey, told a
press conference that Germany did
not begin to mobilize dictatorship in
industry until after her defeat at
Moscow. She was handicapped by
a short-war complex"
Even with all-out mobilization
studies showed that throughout the
war great deal of German industry
was on single-shift basis, fewer
German women were drawn into in
dustry than during the World War
and the average work week was be-
low British standards
A three-fold increase In armament
production occurred, but the report
concluded that it suggests the de
gree of industrial undermobilization'
in the earlier years rather than
efficiency in dictatorship
OF the results of Allied strategic
bombing. the report said:
1.-THE practicability of going un-
derground as the escape from full
and free exploitation Of the air is
highly questionable; it was so con-
sidered by the Germans themselves. .
Dispersal of industry brought a
measure OF immediate relief, but
eventually served only to add to the
many problems caused by attacks on
the transportation system"
Individual Attacks Futile.
The study disclosed that individ-
ual attacks on industry are futile
and must be repeated again and
again to become effective.
The German experience showed
that, whatever the target system,
no indispensable industry was per-
manently put out of commission by
a single attack" 1t said.
The air victory cost the United
Calij