Evening star., 1945-12-13
Pearl Hurbor
Continued From First Page.

positions in the harbor. are very
significant now, in view of what
happened" Gen Marshall admitted
adding:
Certainly no one at the War De-
partment was trying to avoid max
ing an eValuation of where the Jap
anese were going to strike
You do not excuse yourself for
failure to send those messages tc
Gen. Short?" Mr.. Gearhart sug.
gested.
NO, sir" said the general. Tn
speaking of their evaluation."
Expected Compliance.
Don't you think now that you
should have sent those seven mes
sages?" the Californian demanded
That is asking a very definite
backsight," Gen. Marshall replied
Il do not think So l still think
when you give a command to a
high officer you expect that com
mand executed"
He referred to his alert order
Of November 27, l94l, to Gen. Short
Gen. Macarthur in the Philippines
and the commanders in other out
posts.
Can you state Mr.. Gearhart
persisted. why you didn't consider
that information vital to Gen.
Short?"
L don't recall these specific mes
sages," Gen. Marshall replied. Il
can only assume I read them No
evaluation of the character you in
dicate was brought to me by G-2
Intelligence). l can only say CO
did not and l did not evaluate them
in the way you do now. 1 only saw
the entire messages when they were
important, so that 1 could check the
evaluation which ca had given
them
Had Many Other Duties.
That didn't relieve you of the
entire responsibility for them?" Mr.
Gearhart wanted to know.
Certainly not" said Gen. Mar
shall with some heat, adding:
II I had read all the messages
which came in to G-2 would have
ceased to function as Chief of Staff
in any other particular"
But you as Chief of staff and
Admiral Harold R. Stark as Chief
of Naval Operations had this in
formation on your desks when it was
translated" Mr.. Gearhart per-
sisted.
That is the presumption" Gen.
Marshall said.
Don't you think Admiral Kimmel
and Gen. Short would have been
better informed as to Japan's in
tentions if they had received this in
formation?"
4 am not at all certain of that, ="
Gen. Marshall replied. Gen. Short
was given information from time
to time. He was given an alert order
November 27.''
He was given a circular message
which also went to the commanders
in the Philippines, Panama and to
other commands" Mr.. Gearhart
corrected I'm your messages to
Hawaii there was no reference to
the special interest which the Japs
had displayed in Pearl Harbor?"
Il do not recall that there was
Yet these intercepted messages
pointed directly to Hawaii as the
probable point of attack" Mr.
Gearhart suggested.
That is your view, sir" Gen. Mar
shall snapped.
Not Confined to Pearl HarbOr.
1T is not my view 1 am trying to
bring OUT Mr.. Gearhart retorted,
rs that your view?"
There was the same japanese in
terest in shipping all over the world
the reports reaching Tokyo were
not confined to Pearl Harbor, Gen.
Marshall replied.
Mr.. Gearhart pointed out, in his
long hypothetical question, that the
first of the seven intercepted mes
sages had been decoded and trans
lated in Washington October 10,
l941. The series, he explained, COW
cred instructions for Japan's repre-
sentative at Pearl Harbor to send, in
effect, corrected chart at least
twice a week on shipping. He was to
notice particularly the movements
of battleships, cruisers and car
riers.
Gen. Marshall conceded, in re-
sponse to further questions along