Evening star., 1945-06-01

Coast Guard Photo.
completes his training, or, if he is
fulfilling an essential administra-
tive or service job, as soon as he can
be replaced by a returning veteran.
This has been the Army's policy
since the beginning of the war. 1t
will be rigidly adhered to in the
redeployment period.
Ascendancy of Planes
And Ships Is Cited.
If it were not for the overwhelm-
ing ascendancy established by our
air and feet units, we should have
to send many more men to the
Pacific than we now intend. The
Japanese have more than 100000
troops under armS-a force larger
than the Germans were ever able
to put against us on the western
front. To back up this army, they
have several million additional men
of military age who have not yet
been called to the colors. We have
not yet come up against the main
strength of this japanese military
force. The Japanese Army is Or
ganized into 100 combat divisions
It's air force, despite the heavy
losses it has suffered, still COM
prises over 5000 combat planes. We
are cutting heavily into japanese
aircraft production through our Su-
per Fortress raids, but Japan re-
mains capable of producing planes
at the rate of 1850 to 1900 a
month.
Army casualties on Okinawa from
March l8 to May % totaled 3,6O3
killed and missing and 1861
wounded. The Marines in the same
period reported 1889 dead and miss
ing and 8,403 wounded. Navy and
Coast Guard losses were 4,729 killed
and missing and 4,640 wounded, an
overall total for all services Of 10 ,22l
killed and missing and q 7,704
wounded. Japanese deaths were
nearly six times as great as our own
On May %, the total Of Japanese
killed on Okinawa was 61,o66.
That is an example of the increas-
ing toughness of this war as our
troops get closer to Tokyo.
1t is this kind of fighting we must
be prepared for in our future cam
paigns. All of our experience indi-
Gates that no matter how hard we
hit the enemy from the air or from
the sea, the foot soldier will still
have to advance against strongly
entrenched and fanatical troops,
through sheer grit and fighting skill,
backed up by all the mechanical su-
periority in flamethrowers, tanks
and artillery we can put at his dis
posal. There is no easy way to win.
Policy for Japan's
Defeat Is Outlined.
Our military policy for the de-
feat of Japan calls for:
% Pinning down the japanese
forces where they now are and
keeping them divided so that they
can be destroyed piece by piece.
90 Concentrating overwhelming
power on each segment which we
attack.
90 Using ships, aircraft, armor
artillery and all other materiel in
massive concentrations to gain VIC
tory with the smallest possible loss
of life.
(D Applying relentless and in
creasing pressure to the enemy BY
sea, air and on the land, so that
he cannot rest, reorganize or regrour
his battered forces or dwindling sup
plies to meet our next attack.
Of course the differences between
the war in Europe and the war In
the Pacific will cause differences ir
war production. The composition OF
the Army will be different, as will
the equipment issued to troops
There will be changes in strategic
plans and in replacement factors.
Until the expanded pipelines fol
the Pacific war are filled, and until
equipment arrives in substantial
amounts from the European theater
war production must continue at 9
high rate.
The Navy program will continue
on an even keel.
There has been sharp reduction
In the program Of the Army All
Forces.
Similar sharp cuts in the program
of supplies for our ground troops are
now being put into effect. Some
new items Of equipment will be
added. The emphasis will be shifted
in others.
Thus, there will be a decreased
production in heavy artillery, artil-
lery ammunition, trucks, tanks and
small arms.
There will be increased production
In aircraft bombs, atabrine, steel
barges, wire and insect screening
cloth, combat boots, cotton uni
forms, amphibious trucks, raincoats,
distillation units. radio relay units
special railway equipment and mo-
torized shop equipment.
Little Change in Demand
For Important Items.
In a number of important items
there will be little change in demand
for an indefinite period. These in
clude food, clothing. petroleum
products, lumber and certain chem
icals. 1t is likely that all these will
remain on the critical list. Leather
is tight. So are textiles. There is
a shortage of cotton duck and fab
RIGS for clothing. The food problem
has been accentuated by the
steadily increasing numbers the