Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-09-16
Japanese Defeat Enhances
Unified Defense Prospects
Leaders Here, Rejecting on What Might Have
Happened Had Enemy Army and Navy Been
Team, Seek Centralized Authority
BY Constantine Bro,On


foregone conclusion. Congress had IA
vored this idea for some time, but there
was good deal of opposition from some
of the orthodox thinkers" in the armed
services, particularly in the Navy, who
have opposed any drastic changes But
even these few high-ranking officers are
approaching the subject with open
minds since the end of the war, and
are said to favor a merger of the armed
services.
The astounding defeat of Japan has
been more of an eye-opener to our
military and naval officers than the
Pearl Harbor disaster which, whatever
may be said for or against Admiral
kimmel and Gen. Short, was caused to
some extent by lack of correlation be-
tween the two services and especially
their intelligence branches
From available information in the
possession of the American armed
forces, this country was saved from dis
aster after Pearl Harbor by an unex-
pected lack of cohesion and fierce jeal-
ousy between sthe Japanese Army and
Navy.
American strategists cannot figure out
how the Japs missed the greatest bet
in the history of any country. The
American Army was so utterly unpre-
pared at the time of the attack on Pearl
Harbor that had the japanese followed
up their initial success with a landing
force anywhere in the Northwest, there
would have been little we could have
done to oppose them. The National
Guard divisions were poorly equipped,
there were no mobile 150-mm. guns
which are essential to coastal defense.
1t is highly doubtful that the remaining
units of the American fleet, cruisers,
destroyers and the few carriers, could
have done much against the japanese
Navy had the Japs decided to play their
main card on Americas West Coast.
Planes were few and lacked the neces-
sary ammunition.
Irked by Army Glory.
But there was a rivalry dating back to
the Sino-Japanese War which appar-
emily prevented the well-oiled japanese
military machine from working smooth
ly. The imperial navy was irked because
the army had obtained all the glory of
making Japan into the greatest empire
in the world while the naval units
were mere adjuncts to the army. Ac-
cording to available information, the
attack on Pearl Harbor had been a
navy show in the real meaning of the
word show The army did not CO.
operate in any way. No transports
with soldiers accompanied the task feet
which attacked us on December Z, l941
And soon after that mortal blow was
delivered by the Japanese naval forces,
the army proceeded with its plans to
grab more land in the Southern Pacific
When American generals and admirals
now favor consolidation of the armed
forces, their minds run to the vitality
important intelligence services which
in the past were so well separated that
the Nays "eyes and ears" never met
those of the Army.
There was a quiet rivalry between the
two services up to the Pearl Harbor
disaster and this was protracted to a
certain extent during the first two years
of the war. Neither of these services
in turn co-operated with the State
Department intelligence staff.
Japanese Situation Similar
Yet the intelligence branches had a
vital role in the war and were able to
unmask for their commanders all the
movements of the Japanese. The same
situation is said to have existed in
Japan.
BY using certain methods which have
not yet been fully revealed to the gen.
eral public the Army intelligence serv-
ices were able to forecast correctly the
moves of the japanese general staff.
Thus we had definite information
about the formations which had been
ordered to attack Midway Island in the
spring of 1912. Not only did we know
how many ships and carriers would
participate in that attack but we also
knew the names of the ships detailed for
the operation and the number of men
each transport carried for landing pur-
poses. In order to meet that threat to
the Nations security, the defenses on
the West Coast were greatly reduced as
planes were shifted to defend that tiny
island which was highly important
strategically to the defense of this
country. The result is we'll known. The
Japs suffered their first major defeat.
We gambled on the inefficiency of the
Japanese intelligence service which was
good as far as spying was concerned but
ineffective operationally.
Had the Japanese discovered that the
West Coast had been stripped of its air.
planes, they might have changed their
plans and the target Of their attacks
with probably disastrous consequences
for us. But fortunately they were un-
aware that the Americans who had been
caught mapping at Pearl Harbor had
means to detect their movements. They
believed that the air forces available
at Midway at the time of the attack on
Pearl Harbor had not been materially
increased and went ahead with their
plans fully convinced that they would
be successful.
B0rneo Limit of Plans.
But even after this first major set
back of the imperial forces, the Japa-
nese could have continued to fight for
a long time had the rivalry between the
army and the navy not been bitter.
The Japanese, according to responsible
military observers, were carried away by
their own momentum in the Pacific.
From reading their instructions to the
various commanders in the field, which
were also known to the American chiefs