Evening star., 1945-11-17
Text Of Admiral Nmitz' Statement Opposing Merger

NlClSSi
mander, his position would be hard
to reconcile with the authority and
responsibility Of the President, who
! is commander in chief under the
Constitution. For these reasons II
believe we should 60 slow in carrying
out the principles OF unity OF COM
mand above the level of the joint
chiefs of staff or whatever perma-
nent organization of that kind the
Congress may approve.
Two Different Things.
In any case, unity of operational
command and the question of merg-
| ing the departments are two diff
ferent things We can and should
continue to have unity of opera
tional command in particular areas.
My experience convinces me that
this system is superior to anything
we may obtain from merging the
departments. My first additional
point, then, is that unity of op-
irrational command, whether desira-
BILE or not at the highest level, is
a separate issue from the issue of
merging the administration of the
two departments and should be set
tied separately.
The second point that I wish to
amplify before your committee has
to do with logistics and proper
economy in the use of our resources.
7 concur with the views of the Sec
retary of the Navy and those of
Admiral King on this Subject-views
which I understand have already
been placed before you. I admit
there are faults in the present sys-
tenn. But here again I believe the
remedy proposed-a merger of the
two departments-is not only un-
nessarily extreme but it gives no
assurance of an adequate solution
No one has yet been able to show
that this is the best way to solve
the problem. I speak tentatively,
but with three years of experience
in fighting a war of supply in the
Pacific.
In my area, under my truly joint
staff Of Army and Navy officers, the
resources of all services were in
effect joint resources and were
pooled and used efficiently to sup
port our operations and develop our
bases as NEEDED. 1t is possible that
a joint logistics staff under the Joint
chief of staff, composed perhaps of
qualified civilians and officers who
would be freed from any duties in
either the War or Navy Departments
could coordinate procurement in
Washington to eliminate duplication
and waste. I believe, rather, that
what we really need is a national
agency of much broader scope to CO.
ordinate the intelligent use of allo-
cation of all our national resources.
In either method, primary estimates
OF the needs in strategic materials,
weapons, facilities and equipment
can best be made by each service
for its own special functions. After
the estimates are made. they can be
squared with each other and. if
necessary, reduced or enlarged after
thorough analysis and study. Under
any system We will have to have
some division of labor such as this.
i Should Not Stand Aloof.
I do not mean that the War and
Navy Departments should stand
aloof from each other or that one
should do its thinking without con-
sultation with the other. On the
contrary, I believe we have had
many lessons in this war as to the
advantages of mutual understand
ing and teamwork - lessons we
should not forget now the hostilities
are over. We should take positive
steps to see that each service il
trained in teamwork. But it is oper
to serious question that a merger
OF the War and Navy Departments
would actually produce greater
! teamwork between the Army anc
Navy. If either service felt that the
merger threatened its ability to dis.
charge its peculiar functions, the re.
suit would not be teamwork, but dis.
cord within the new department
> Competition between the services
for example, in the development o1
aircraft engines-has been healthy
and will continue to be as long as il
is In the open. To stif1e it might
well have unhealthy effects.
Such a prospect was obviously
,, troubling to the majority of the
: Richardson committee, who in theil
, report had this to say on the sub.
. Ject: Because of the widely differ.
, ent characteristics of each compo.
nent, operating responsibility shoule
! be decentralized in each component
, to the greatest possible extent ane
; the components should retain a.
! much autonomy as is consistent
q with teamwork and the effective.
ness and economy of the depart.
ment as a whole" This sounds al.
most Like an admission that two de.
, partments are needed though theh
' argument calls for one.
Strategic Air Force.
e This brings me to the third point
: Whether or not there should be &
f separate strategic air force either a.
one of three components of a single
4 department of national defense o,
I as a separate third department O
Y our armed forces. I believe it |.
Y proper for me to discuss this befor,
+ this committee, inasmuch as tn,
i subject bears directly on the Navy
: responsibilities in national securit,
: and the support of our nationa
r policies. The part of our nationa
budget which the Congress appro.
: PIRATES for national defense mus
be shared by the Army, Navy ant
Air Forces. The apportionment O
these funds between the services. a,
r well as the efficiency in their us,
: by any one branch, is surely of di
0 rect concern to all.
y Naval aviation is an inteprate,
part OF the Navy supported by tn
logistic system and services whicl
serve all the Navy. A separat
strategic air arm will require simila
r loglstic support. During the wa
y with Japan this support for tn
strategic air forces was provide,
r to very large extent by the com
O blned efforts of the Armv and Nov,