Evening star., 1945-09-11
Okinowu Truth Seen
Slowly Coming Out.
50 Per Cent u. S. Warships Put
Out of Action, Writer Estimates
BY David Laurence


Out of Action, Writer Estimates
BY David Laurence
The truth about the Okinawa CAM
paign Is slowly coming out. 1t was by
far the most costly of the whole Pa
cific war. 1t involved the biggest loss
In ships sunk or damaged during the
entire war and perhaps the biggest
naval loss in American history.
For nearly 80 days the American
Navy stood of Okinawa and lost 80
combat ships while 223 were damaged.
Among those damaged were 10 battle
ships, 8 big aircraft carriers, escort
carriers. 3 heavy cruisers, light cruisers
and 81 destroyers.
This means that so far as major
units of our Navy are concerned, so
per cent of our battleships were put
out of action and nearly 33h per cent
OF our big carriers, and about 20 per
cent Of our light aircraft carriers.
Censorship has been removed so it
can be told that our shipyards were
clogged with an unexpected jam of
repairs.
Here was campaign in which enemy
air poWer-mostly suicide planes-in-
flicted on surface ships a devastating
blow. It the Japanese had started these
tactics earlier in the war, they might
have inflicted much more damage and
delayed our schedule considerably.
Assumption Erroneous.
The American people had been led
to believe that our air power was so
great that we attained superiority over
the enemy, but the fact remains that
our Army Air Forces were not in
position to protect the American naval
fleet at Okinawa. The assumption that
troops can be landed and airfields built
quickly to defend the troops proved
erroneous in this case for our Navy
had to provide air cover for the tactical
field operations as we'll as for the supply
ships landing munitions and food from
April to the end of June.
Could this operation have been
handled more expeditiously?
The late Gen. Buckner, who was in
on June is last, as reported by New
York Herald Tribune correspondent:
I'VE had superior fire power. We
gained air superiority. We could take
time, without taking too much time.
We were in a position to keep our
casualties as low as possible. We didn't
need to rush forward because we had
oir 70
development mission
In jocular vein, the commanding
general also was quoted in an inter-
view on May 18 with the New York
Times correspondent, as spurning sug-
gestions that the drive be Speeded up
and as adding: 1T might be lots more
fun killing them rapidly but if you
want to prolong the enjoyment you take
a little longer to kill them"
Meanwhile, the bloodshed on the
decks of the American naval vessels
which were waiting for our air power
to take over the job of protecting the
islands was frightfully large Nearly
5000 officers and enlisted men on the
American naval vessels were killed dur
an equal number were wounded
! The Army and Marine Corps lost
about 1000 in killed and missing.
! Situation Unprecedented.
Thus the Navy on board ship had
losses comparable to those on land-a
rather unprecedented situation. Spokes-
| men for the military have constantly
| emphasized the small losses ashore but
have seemed to ignore the losses on
| the ships.
Were the tactics used on land the
right ones? Opinions in high quarters
! differ and it is known that certain
high Navy officers here feel that a
major mistake was made in handling
the Okinawa campaign. AL hands, how
ever, are agreed that the victory was
decisive and that the campaign was a
turning point in the war that afforded
US major base from which to launch
air attacks against Japan.
Did the Army officers who handled
the campaign adopt a slow course
thinking only OF the land operations
Were there other landing places tina,
could have been used? Why were the
Marine Corps generals, who had had
far greater experience in handling am.
phibious operations, not given an op-
portunity to carry on another type ot
campaign that might perhaps hav,
meant larger land casualties at tn.
outset but in the end a quicker all.
around result for the armed forces a,
whole?
Before Congress can act intelligently
on the problem of single department
of national defense, it might study
objectively and dispassionately what
happened in the Okinawa campaign
and just how each branch of the armed
services functioned. 1t might ascertain
why the Japanese suicide bases in For
mosa and Kyushu were not leveled ir
| advance by our long-range bornberx.