Evening star., 1945-10-05
Nimitz S Address to Conqress


ended, Japan's air force had In
creased by approximately 100 per
cent to total of 1900 planes. of
which approximately 5000 were
combatant types.
Why, then, did the enemy have no
alternative but to surrender? And
why did he sue for peace before the
introduction of the atomic bomb and
before the entry of Russia into the
war?
BY early August, Japan's fighting
feet had ceased to exist. OF a once
great navy of this year. Japan had
still af1oat one battleship. damaged; !;
four aircraft carriers, all damaged; !;
two heavy cruisers, both damaged; !;
and two light cruisers, one damaged.
Not one Of these ships had a crew
aboard. Thirty-nine of Japan's once
large force of destroyers remained.
but six of these were damaged and
ten were without crews Fifty-o
enemy submarines survived. and
ninety-five small patrol craft. In ad-
dition there were a couple of mine
layers. two old training cruisers and
a submarine tender. BY the middle
of 1945, Japan might as we'll have
scuttled this remnant of her navy
for all the good 1t could do against
our own powerful sea-air forces.
The picture of Japan's merchant
marine was equally as grim. Consid-
erably more than a year ago, our
intelligence gave us this informa-
ton on the toll we were then taking
on Japanese shipping between Ma
laya and the home islands. OF each
five Japanese merchant ships which
sailed from Singapore, the Japanese
counted themselves extremely lucky
II three Of those five ships stayed
af1oat to complete their Journey.
Our enemy was forced to surren-
der because Japan, maritime ma
tion. depended on food and mate
rials from overseas, was stripped of
her seapower. On the other hand, we
had the seapower which made it
possible to capture-and hold-the
bases within Japan's system of inner
defenses from which our Army S
long-range bombcrs and other air
craft operated.
Communication Lines Cut.
We had seapower which made It
possible to cut the enemys lines of
overseas communications to points
on the Asiatic continent and in the
Southwest Pacific, denying him ac-
cess to needed resources. His in
dustry was strangling and his peo-
pie were at the point of starvation
He lacked oil for his ships and
gasoline for his aircraft. We had
seapower which made it possible to
protect our own lines of communi-
cation and move vast quantities OF
/ men, materials and munitions to
our forward bases and also to the
Russians. We had seapower to pre-
vent an enemy effort to launch am
phibious counterattacks on oul
f1anks or In the rear. We had sea
power to cover and support every
amphibious landing of the Pacific
war. We had powerful carrier
forces which had struck strategic
and tactical targets in the inner
most recesses of the empire. We
had seized forward bases and built
the air1elds which made possible
the wonderfully successful B-2s
bombing and mining missions, and
eventually the atomic destruction oil
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With oul
seapower making possible the use Of
all our other resources, we gave
Japan the single choice OF surrender
or slow but certain death. And fol
the final wise decision, to surrender
and spare us the terrific cost In
lives OF an invasion, we can all
breathe a fervent thank God"
| In StreSSinr the iynrort ance n