Evening star., 1945-09-24
Policy and Macarthur


general initial postsurrender policy
for Japan should serve to remove
much of the misunderstanding
caused within recent days by vary
ing interpretations Of General Mac
Arthur's remarks on the prospective
size of our occupational forces and
by General Eichelberger's assertion
that we might be able to withdraw
those forces within a year.
To begin with, there is nothing in
the statement to suggest that the
views of the two generals are neces-
sarily in conflict with Washington.
On the contrary, in an Introductory
paragraph. the White House makes
clear that the statement itself,
which was drawn up by the State,
War and Navy Departments and ap-
proved by the President, was sub
stantially in MacArthur's hands as
early as August 20 and that the
whole of it was delivered to him as
a guiding directive on September 6.
In the circumstances, since all his
actions to date can be reconciled
with it. there seems little justiflca-
ton for the fears expressed in some
quarters that he Is not adhering to
the policy laid down.
Much of that policy, as now re-
vealed by the White House, is merely
a particularized elaboration OF the
generalized and now-familiar terms
set forth. in the Potsdam ultimatum.
In two important respects, however,
the statement amply clarifies mat
ters which have been subject here
tofore to doubt and speculation The
first of these is that although Allied
occupation forces will be welcomed
and expected" and although every
effort will be made to achieve a
common approach to the problem,
the views Of the United States are
to prevail in case OF any inter Allied
differences Of opinion. And the Sec
ond is that General Macarthur, as
supreme commander is to permit
and favor government changes mod
flying Japan's feudal and authori-
tartan tendencies and that in case
such changes involve the use of force
by the people, he Should intervene
only where necessary to insure the
security of his forces and the attain
ment of all other obiectives OF the
occupation"
The ultimate objectives are two:
First, to guarantee that Japan will
never again become a threat to the
United States or to world peace, and
second, to promote, according to the
freely expressed will of the people,
the eventual establishment of
peacefully inclined japanese gov
ernment which will support our aims
as reflected in the United Nations
Charter. To this end. as he himself
has strongly declared he will. Gen
eral Macarthur is to carry out a
stern but just political and economic
program involving complete disarm-
ament and demilitarization, the
punishment of war criminals, the
encouragement of democratic proc
esses, the breaking up of great
industrial monopolies, reparations,
restitution and such other measures
as the control of trade and financial
relations.
1t may be argued that 100000
troops and year of occupation will
not be enough to effectuate such a
far-reaching program. But the Mac
Arthur-Eichelberger estimates were
carefully qualified when made, and
considering Japan's relatively tiny
size and complete dependency on
imports, they may yet prove to be
right-in the sense that small con-
troll commissions, plus an external
sea and air watch, may be able to do
the job when our forces withdraw.
In any case, we have definite
initial policy, and up to now the
supreme commander for the Allies
seems to have been ably and faith
fully applying it.