The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1945-07-08
Grew On Hirohito

In discussions of probable changes in the
State Department the name of Joseph C..
Crew. former ambassador to Japan and now
under-secretary, is generally listed among
those due for removal and the reason most
often assigned is that he wants to do business
with Hirohito.
We hold no brief for Mr.. Grew but feel
that is is only just to let him make his posi-
ton clear, which he did before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Telling the
committee that 1--WE have no yardstick 10
measure the eventual impact on the Japa-
nese mind of the cataclysm OF destruction
and defeat" he added (and we quote from
his prepared statenent):
'We shall have to be governed by acts
and realities rather than by theories when
the time comes to act and in taking meas
ures for the attainment of our detectives, We
shall wish to avail ourselves of whatever may
appear to be assets and to eliminate. as far
as practicable, whatever may prove to be
liabilities. This seems to me to be plain COM
mon sense.
"Now with regard to the institution of the
emperor, I do not think that anyone is yet
in position to determine definitely whether
it is going to be an asset or a liability.
Whatever decisions are made they should GER
tainly be made on a purely realistic basis
and on the basis of intimate contact with the
various current factors involved in the prob
lem. It must be remembered today, if we
japanese attitudes and reactions have not
confronted in a single important respect any
universal pattern or standard of behavior. We
shall have learned nothing from the past if
we assume that japanese reaction in any spe-
ciflc instance is going to conform to a uni
versal pattern. I have never held and have
never stated that the Japanese Emperor
should be retained after the war nor have
ever held or stated that the japanese EN-
peror should be eliminated after the war.
believe that the problem should be left fluid
until we get to Tokyo and Our authorities and
those of the United Nations directly concerned
can size up the situation and can determine
what will best conduce to the attainment of
our detectives. I do not believe that the so1-
ton OF this problem can intelligently or help
fully be reached until we get to Tokyo.
Il have feeling that the importance of
the emperor institution, especially as a factor
in the dynamic aspects of Japanese policies
and ACTORS, has been greatly exaggerated It
is argued that it is the existence of this in.
stltutlon that made possible Japanese mill
tarism and aggression. This argument must
he examined in the light Of the fact that
during the preceding period of Japanese ag
erosion in the 18th century, VIZ en- the ruling
Warlord tried to conquer Korea and China,
the imperial family had been barely main
turtles Unlike the warlords of today whose
conquests they proclaim, are due to the 'au-
gust virtues of the emperor whose instru.
ments they proclaim themselves to be, it was
Hldeyoshl the shotgun or military dictator
and not the emperor, who said that when he
had conquered China and Korea he would
make himself and not the emperor the mas
ter OF the world The emperors in those days
were completely overshadowed by the sho-
guns ana were usually hard put to it to main
tain bare living. My point u.s. therefore,
that the japanese do not need to have an
emperor to be nlilitaristic and aggressive nor
IS 1t the existence, of an emperor that makes
them mihtaristic and aggressive. There are
conditions more deeply rooted in the social
structure and concepts growing out of that
social structure which will have to be excised
IN one way or another. 1t will be one of our
fundamental detectives to remove those con-
ditions. As I have said, no one today can
predict what the impact of the cataclysm of
defeat will have on the japanese mind There
might be a complete revulsion from all the
archaic concepts of the past. The emperor
institution might, on the other hand, be the
only political element capable of exercising a
stablizing influence