The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1945-06-05

The position Of England in 1915
after the Battle of Waterloo was.
enough like our own today to be
worth attentive study. England be-
longed to an alliance of four great
powers which had defeated Napo.
Icons attempt to conquer Europe;
the problem of her foreign minis
tiers in the five or six immediate
postwar years, was how 10 keep
the alliance together in order, as
Castlereagh put it. ito bring back
the world to peaceful habits
Then, as now, there was a ten
dency for the victorious great pow
er alliance to break up into hostile
combinations. The Russia of the
Car Alexander and the Austria OF
Count Metternich were the two
chief contenders. The situation was
complicated further by the fact
that all of Europe was in the grip
of a vehement conflict between
revolutionary Jacobinism and
legitimacy.
In this dangerous confusion the
English statesmen quickly saw
what was the vital interest of Eng
land. 1t was to hold the alliance
together, and this, they realized,
would not be done if England be-
came so entangled with one ally
that she would be embroiled with
the other. They saw no less clearly
and certainly that England must
not become a partisan in the idec-
logical quarrel of the Continent
and that to restore peace in Europe
and peace of mind among men she
must be identified neither with the
reactionary nor with the revolu-
tionary forces.
Deliberately and consciously
Castlereagh chose for England that
role in Europe which the great
French writer, Montesqueu, had
called puissance mediatrice-the
mediating power. 1t is not to be
confused with isolationism. Caste
REACH and his successor Canning
did not wash their hands OF Eu-
rope. On the contrary, they partici-
pated actively in all important Eu-
ropean questions. But in partlcl-
pat:ng they followed a line OF pol
icy which was their own, seeking
to pacify the turbulence by refus-
ing to become the supporters OF
any one of the particular causes,
in the field of power politics or OF
theology, which were disturbing
dividing Europe.
The role CT the mediating power
fitted England's position as coun-
try concerned with Europe but not
part of it, as a country having
great weight and influence IN Ell
rope but no special interest in the
boundaries and dWasties OF Eu-
rope. 1t suited her vital interest,
which was to restore peace after
long and devastating war. the
success of this policy did much to
shepherd Europe through the dis
orders and hysterials of the post
war years and to usher in that
long peace which for about a hum
dred years was u1broken by any
great and universal war.
A foreign minister who was less
clear-sighted tn an Castereagh,
less prompt and firm in his Judg-
ment, could easily have bunglled
the whole business. The Cambridge
history of British foreign policy
tells us that in 1915, in the weeks
Immediately after Waterloo and
the Congress of Vienna, the "en1g'
matte attitude Of the Car, not TO-
wards the question of Turkey only
kept the European chancerles n
a flutter of excitement and app~e-
hension. he preached unctuously
the gospel of fraternity and mutu-
a trust: but his agent were mean
while carrying on dark 1ntrlguss
in every court and country in Eu-
rope: and it is not surprising ina
to Austria. he seemed, to quote
Baron Vincent, to be 'disgulsln@
under the language of Eva1sellcal
selfabnegation schemes OF far
reaching ambition
Castlereagh found that British
envoys abroad shared this view OF
his (the Cars designs. and the
dispatches sent home by them