Browning chief. [volume] (Browning, Mont.) 1941-1953, 1945-04-06
Relief for u. S.
Bankers Risks

Keller FOR u. ,.
Bankers Risks
One of the chief arguments as to
the direct value of the program for
the United States is this: it is esti-
mated that in the postwar pc
riod, the United States bankers will
have to do the bulk of the world
lending. Estimated on the amount
we did after the last war, perhaps
as much as 80 per cent. Rather
than have the lenders risk the loss
as they did last time, it would be bet
ter to have the government and the
governments of the rest of the ma
tons bear two-thirds of the risk.
This they would do under the inter-
national bank. 1t is pointed out by
treasury officials that not only will
most of the money be borrowed
from private bankers in this coun-
try for the next five or ten years
(since we have most of the money to
loan) but most of it will likewise be
spent here since we have most of
the things foreign countries need.
There are two chief reasons why
such an international financial pro-
gram will be to the disadvantage of
the private banker although by no
means all bankers oppose it. One
is that the governments of nations
will control the world fiscal policy
and not the leading private inter-
national bankers who had the con-
troll before. The second is that in
the long run, as sponsors of the plan
admit, it will lower interest rates.
Those two reasons are not stressed
by the vocal opponents of the
measure before members of con-
gress. Many other objections, some
highly technical, are set forth. The
main suggestion in the report of a
committee of the American Bankers
association is that because of un-
settled political conditions through
out the world, any action ought to
be postponed until these conditions
stabilize. They say that the nations
should agree to certain changes in
the program before it is presented
to the congress.
Some of the changes suggested are
prompted by honest conviction,
some are due, according to treasury
officials, to a misinterpretation of the
program. There is a group in the
United States which says that the
United States will come out of the
little end of the horn under the ar
rangement and that the British sold
us bill of goods. There is group
in England which says that Brit
ain will come out of the little end
of the horn and that the United
States sold their representatives a
bill of goods.
That is one thing which, quite
aside from the arguments pro and
con on the various disputed parts of
the program, demonstrates that it
must be pretty good.
Some weeks ago in this column
tried to explain why Germany
came back" after its defeats in
France.
May l be permitted to explain
why the Nazis couldn't come back
for the second time?
Once again we have to consider.
not the military organization of Ger
many alone. but the civilian or
ganization as we'll Nazi discipline,
because it was built on an entirely
anti-human foundation, finally col.
lapsed. 1t was discipline of u de-
ceit, (2) force. Both we're bound to
fail in the end because it failed
to AXE into consideration one thing
which the Nazis refuse to admit
exists-the human soul.
Naziism with threats, brute force,
and an organization which could
carry out the threats and exercise
the force, was effective up to GER
tain point. Then it failed.
Its strength was in blending the
twig," as tried to point out in my
earlier analysis. Youth worshipped
the false god of Naziism as long as
it's clay feet could be concealed.
Youth knew no other god. But the
moment the clay feet crumbled in
the defeat of its armies lie. force
failed) youth deserted.
Even the older people, despite the
numbing fear of the espionage of the
gauleiter, the fear of the concen-
tration camp, fear of the firing
squad, began passive resistance.
The Volkssturm (the military unfit
drafted by Himmler) refused 10
fight, refused to assemble when or
dered, hid. Regulations were eva6ed.