Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-12-11
Loon to Britain

AS ~6A SSAISAo W1AACA1 was WOlkCU
out after painstaking negotiations
for extension by this country of
financial aid to Britain ought to
prove beneficial to the immediate
parties to the agreement and quite
possibly to the world at large.
Under the announced terms, the
United States will write off about
$4,000, 100000 of lease-lend aid to
Britain, the theory being that this
is a reasonable financial contribu-
ton for this country to make to the
common victory. This is great
deal OF money and it represents only
a fraction of the war costs of the
United States. Yet it is to be ex-
pected that this settlement will be
accepted without serious complaint,
if for no other reason than that 1t
would be economic madness to in
sist on repayment in any form from
an impoverished Britain.
Beyond this, under the agreement,
the United States will extend to the
British line Of credit aggregating
$3,750,000,000 which may be drawn
upon up to the end OF 1851, plus a
loan which may run to 100000 900
to be used in final settlement of
lease-lend balances and to pay for
surplus American war goods in the
United Kingdom. These sums, or
such part of them as may be used,
are to be repaid in fifty annual in
stallments. Interest is fixed at 2 per
cent, with the possibility that it may
range down to 1852 per cent, and
there Is provision for waiver OF in
terest in any year in which Britain's
financial position warrants such
action.
The British negotiators are said
to have come here seeking an out
right gift or grant of five or six
billion dollars, their contention be-
ing that Britain's economic distress
resulted from the fact that she had
sacrificed her export trade and her
overseas investments to carry on the
fight against the Axis, and that,
therefore, she was entitled to a gift
rather than loan. This contention
was rejected by the American ne
gotiatorS-first, because it implied
an obligation on our part which they
did not believe to be valid; second,
because such proposal would have
had slight chance of acceptance in
this country, and, finally, because
the true justification for American
aid to Britain in peacetime has
nothing to do with any real or
fancied obligation arising out of the
war.
We should extend all feasible as
sistance to the British because it is
in our own interests to do so. Lack
ing this assistance, the British, for
purely economic reasons If for no
other, will be driven to destructive
form of competition with the United
States. Perhaps this country could
win such an economic war and break
Britain in the process, but no
thoughtful American would advocate
such a policy, for it would surely
revive throughout the world COM
petitive conditions which could and
probably would lead to another war.
Certainly, our earnest hope must
be that this agreement will pro-
mote rather than impair good rela-
tions between Britain and the United
States. To large extent this de-
ponds on whether the British, even
with the assistance contemplated by
this agreement, can stage an eco
nomic comeback. 1t is not en-
couraging to find such a respected
British publication as the Weekly
Economist proposing reluctant &C
ceptance of the cruelty hard" Amer
lean conditions and asserting that
I'VE are not compelled to say we
like tit is for Americans to say
what pleasure they take in bar
gaining victory over their best
friends at such a price,"
Possibly, as the inevitable eco
nomic pressures bear down more
heavily on the British people, they
will come, as they have done before,
to blame the United States for their
plight and to regard their annual
payments on the loan as nothing
more than further exactions by
Uncle Shylock." This is a chance
which must be taken, however, and
it is to be hoped that Congress will
approve the agreement without do
ing anything to upset the progress
which the negotiators have made.