Evening star., 1945-07-17
Petoin to Blame for frances
Poor Defense, GomeIin Says
Marshal Accused of
Having Complex and
Negative Character
Second OF a Series.)


Negative Character
Second OF a Series.)
BY GEN. MAURICE-GUsTAvE
GAMELIN.
Copyright. I945, by the Associated Press.)
PARIS.-Since Marshal Petain's
return, the question frequently Is
asked of me: did Petain interfere
with your administration while you
were supreme commander"
My answer at once Is simple and
complex. 1t is simple because, If it
Is question of direct interference,
I can say he never at least openly
opposed me. Quite the contrary, he
consistently approved of what did.
He was the last of three COM
manders in chief of the French
Army, Joffre and Foch, unfortu-
nately for us, having passed away.
Those who. like myself, understood
the situation In its entirety, knew
that public opinion was under an
illusion about him. He belonged to
the procession of our glories.
I never thought he would be
called to reappear in the domains
of action. His authority was very
great in the army and throughout
the country; there was every reason
to use 1t for the cause / had to de-
fend. I therefore kept him fully
informed about by intentions and
actions and he always expressed
agreement. The strangest paradox,
If it were not explicable by political
reasons, is that he brought me be-
fore the court Of Riom, condemned
in advance by the very opinions he
had approved and even advised.
But my answer also Is complex
as complex as Marshal Petain's
character. It weighed heavily on
the destiny Of France ever since
1918.
Criticized by F0ch.
To define his mentality you can
turn once again to the opinions Of
Marshal Foch. From his own mouth
I one day heard the following for
mula recited: when there is moth
ing to do it's Petain's job" AS for
Marshal Joffre, he made no effort
in his Memoirs" to conceal what
he thought of Petain. What Poin-
care and Clemenceau wrote Is also
well known.
To be sure Petain was the victor
Of Verdun." But If his demands for
reinforcements had ever been sat-
isfled the whole French Army would
have been squandered in that one
defensive battle. We would not
have been able to retake the inia-
tive on the Somme. And 1t was
the Somme counteroffenslve that
freed Verdun. In 1918 was not
Fochs intervention necessary to re-
store the situation at the end of
March, after the British front was
broken, at the end of May after
the fall of the Chemin Des Danes
and the German drive to the Marne,
and finally in the battle Of July
IT? These questions are well known
to you, because your American
troops played a glorious part in
them. am one of those who are
convinced that If at that time We
had had Petain as supreme cons
msnder we would not have bee1l
victorious. HI
Petain-a Negative.
1t is simply that his Is a de
fensive" mentality, whereas Joffrel
and Foch were essentially often
sive." Now, If there are moments in
war when you can only defend
yourself, it is necessary as soon as
you are ready to regain the initi-
ative. On the field of battle one is
IAN animal who fights for his life
You are defeated in advance If yoH
simply absorb blows without hitting
back. Moreover, Petain is what !
would call a "negative"-he is the
exact opposite Of what you are, you
Americans.
He only knows how to take mega
tive decisions. He does not like
to shoulder responsibility. When
things go badly, it is always the
fault of his subordinates. Since
1910, with some rare exceptions, he
has successfully dropped all those
who served him. His ideal from
1910 onward, as he himself present.
ed it, would have been for France to
do nothing more, turning on its
back, playing the tortoise that with
draws into its shell or the ostrich
that sticks its head in the sand.
Personal Ambitions Great.
AS If France could remain neutral,
content to wait or just to hope,
while the tremendous drama was
being played out between Fascism
and Hitlerism on one side and
human liberty on the otherl The
Germans quickly demonstrated to
him that you cannot remain in
deterrent and, moreover, that as
soon as you range yourself beside
them, 1t is to become their slaves.
He submitted, only too happy to re-
tain power. For his personal am
bitions were very great.
So you would say to me: From
what does his prestige derive2
From the beginning he was the
proponent of two good causes. AS
professor Of infantry studies in our
War College, he often used to say:
Let us not forget that gunf1re is
killing" He insisted that the all-out
offensive, If you do not have the
means for it, leads to useless and
often irreparable losses.
We tried some audacious but i'm
prudent attacks at the beginning of
the war and they cost us dearly. He
presented himself as the chief con-
server of the blood of our soldiers.
In 1917, after our April defeats when
he became commander in chief of
our northeastern armies, he under
stood how to restore the morale of
troops who had suffered terribly.
He was a commander who concerned
himself with the soldier, with his
well-being and-better still-with
his spirit.