Evening star., 1945-01-18
Pacific War Seen
Behind Schedule
Philippine Campaign Delayed
Attack on Japan, Says Writer
BY David Laurence

By David Laurence
Notwithstanding the good news from
the Pacific war, America is behind and
not ahead of Schedule If there can be
such a thing as a Schedule" in fighting
the enemy.
This would seem to be paradox, but
it is explained by the fact that the
decision to launch the campaign in the
Philippines necessarily prevented the
early seizure of Formosa and absorbed
so much of our Navy and military
forces as to postpone the direct attack
on Japan which is felt by many OBJ
servers to be absolutely imperative be-
fore unconditional surrender can be
achieved
The brilliant operation by Gen. Mac
Arthur and his forces and the splendid
work done by the United States Navy in
making possible the landings on Leyte
and later Luzon are not in the slight
est degree disparaged by the comment
that the Philippine expedition might
well have happened after Formosa in
stead of before. The same result might
have been anticipated so far as liberat-
ing the Filipinos is concerned. though
not tying up so much of the American
Navy and Army.
What is overlooked by the public is
that the United States Navy suffered
severe damage not only in the battles
off the Philippines but in escorting con-
voys and protecting the landings on
Leyte and Luzon. Much more destruc-
ton and damage, Of course, was inflicted
on the Japanese naval vessels and
especially on their aircraft carriers and
pilots. But the important thing in war
is to catch the enemy off balance and
keep the enemy from regaining the
initiative or from making an effective
defense.
Time Gained by Japs.
AS matters turn out now, the time
that will be consumed in escorting sup
ply ships and protecting the military
operations on the Philippines will keep
our Navy from proceeding northward
toward Japan, and the interval betoJ
that work is finished so the Navy can
be free to go forward, win necessarily
give the Japanese valuable time for
recuperation and especially for the
training of more naval pilots and the
repairing of damage to ships.
1t is not realized by many who read
headlines that Manila is still 1900 miles
from Tokyo and that the cities now
being bombed on the China coast
Annoy, Foochow and Swatow-are close
to 1,500 miles from Tokyo. This means
that the war against the people in ia
pan-with the exception of occasional
air raids-is almost as far nowadays
from Tokyo as the coast of Venezuela
Is from New York City.
There Is not much point in arguing
whether that school of thought was
right which favored occupation of For
mosa with about the same sized arny
as went to the Philippines and whether
this would have put our forces further
ahead toward the goal of victory. It
may turn out that the plan actually
adopted was better in the sense that it
involved less casualties The question
really will always be: What effect did
the Philippine operation have in delay
ing the offensive against Japan?
The custom is not to disclose the
amount of damage done to our Navy,
because this gives information to the
enemy as to the time when repairs can
be made. Only in the case of vessels
sunk are announcements made. But
in President Roosevelt's message Just
transmitted to Congress urging a ma
tional service act to help the manpower
situation the Navy reveals that "the
operations of the fleet in support of
the Philippine operation has resulted
in extensive damage to naval vessels,
many Of which will require major re-
pairs" and that more facilities and man.
power than hitherto available are now
needed.
Inkling of Damage.
This alone gives an inkling of what
the japanese must have been able to
do with their airplane attacks on our
vessels off the coasts of the Philip
pines. The damage done by our fliers
against japanese shipping is extensive
and the damage to their aircraft car
rlers in the battles off the Philippines
last October was undoubtedly consid-
erable. If our expenditure in the Philip
pine area had been made to get bases
closer to Japan. Army planes might
have been bombing Japan continuously
this year from short distances.
But the most important fact to be
ascertained now is how much the Jap
anese have been able to do by way of
repairs to their aircraft carriers and by
way Of training new pilots in the time
afforded them since last October and
in the weeks or months ahead before
another sizable expedition can be
landed by us on bases closer to Tokyo
than the Philippines.
The purpose of this analysis is to in
dicate that the news from the war
zones in the Far East should not lead
tc overconfdence or undue optimism
such as grievously misled the home
front with respect to the tide of events
IN Europe. The war against Japan is
being pressed, but there are not enough
ships ano manpower available to us
IN the Pacific to enable us to digress
and take the Philippines without loss
OF time and move ahead ~ direct
attack on Japan, too. all In the same
few months.
Hence 1t may be some. time in the
latter part of this year or the spring
OF 1946 before really decisive blows can
be levelled at Japan from airbases that
must be captured close to Japan. From
these bases OJlr ARMY rlapeS opd aS,>a