Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-12-21
Merger Uncertainty
Attributed to Trumun
Writer Says Revisions Indicate
President Being Pushed Around

Writer Says Reyislons Indicate
President Being Pushed Around
By DaDid Laurence
Did the United States Joint Chiefs
OF Staff lose the war against Japan
and Germany?
Judging by President Truman's mes
sage to. Congress, In which he pro-
posed that the Institution be abolished,
1t must have been ineffective. Here ID
what the President says:
Nov that our enemies have sur
rendered, urge the Congress to pro-
coed to bring about reorganization
OF the management of the armed
forces"
This can only mean that the VIC
tory was not won by the Joint Chiefs
Of Staff and that they blundered woe
fully to the point where they now
must be stripped of the authority they
exercised In wartime. This could be
construed as reflection on Gen. George
c. Marshall. Admiral Ernest j. King,
Gen. H. H. Arnold and Admiral William
D. Leahy, who alone constituted the
stan. They worked together through
out the war as the top stan authority
In directing our armed forces.
After proposing the abolition OF the
joint chiefs, the President says:
THE Joint Chiefs of Staff are not
a unified command. 1t is committee
which must depend for its success upon
the voluntary cooperation of its menu
Der agencies. During the war period
of extreme national danger, there was,
of course, a high degree Of co-opera-
ton. In peacetime the situation will
be different"
Last Minute Changes.
II something works well in war,
why Is 1t necessary to abolish 1t In
peacetime and try a different plan
which will then become our plan In
WARP Mr.. Truman apparently has been
confused by his Army advisers, whose
program he accepted almost without
modification. He tells the public that
further studies Of the general prob
lem would serve no useful purpose"
and yet all Washington Is talking today
about the substantial changes made
at the last minute by the President In
altering his prepared message when
the War Department chieftains had
an opportunity to revise It for him.
The first draft of the message is re-
ported to have been prepared by Judge
Samuel I. Roserman and was consid-
cred q much more balanced presenta-
ton. The second draft was an improve
ment toward reconciling the views of
the Army and Navy on certain points.
Then came the third draft, which the
War Department people revised.
Mr.. Truman apparently did not know
his own mind and is being pushed
around by this or that group of advisers
a situation which the American peo-
| pie will not feel happy about. They
| want q man In the White House to
make up his own mind after thorough
study and not to accept versions fur
nished by interested parties.
- Navy Air Arm Affected. 49,.
In the so-called second draft 1t had
\ been provided. that traditional chan
,nels Of communication through civilian
members of the cabinet should be re-
| stored. But in the final draft, the
message reads that Responsibility for
civilian control should be clearly fixed
in single full-time civilian below the
President"
In the second draft it was specifically
| stated that "ta1e Navy should of course,
retain its own naval air force which has
| proved so necessary for efficient feet
| operation" But in the final draft the
naval air force is curtailed and a sub.
| stantial part Of its functions removed.
The sentence was made to read: The
| Navy should, Of course, retain its own
| carrier, ship and water-based aviation,
which has proved SO necessary for Ell.
cient feet operations"
Thus, by few strokes Of the pen
without q hearing by the Nays air
forces-land-based reconnaissance was
taken away from the Navy. Mr.. Truman
innocently let that pass by. Can 1t be
said that further studies of the gen.
eral problem would serve no useful pur-
pose" when the President himself
changes his mind on such an important
factor in the problem between drafts
Of his own message? g
Again, in the second draft, provision
was made 20 that "the heads of the
Army, Navy and air forces would be
heard" on questions Of basic military
strategy and policy and the division Of
the budget" In the final draft, how
ever, this right was abolished, and 1t
was stated that "there should be MOTH
ing to prevent the President, the Secre-
tary and other civilian authorities from
communicating with the commanders Of
any Of the components Of the depart
ments on such vital matters as basic
military strategy and policy and the
division Of the budget"
There never has been anything to
prevent the President or civilian au-
thorities from communicating with the
military and naval men. But there now
is to be barrier to prevent the naval
and military experts from expressing
themselves unless asked, which Is far
different thing than was provided In
the second draft. This can demoralize
the planning by the armed services.
Mr.. Truman has made q hodgepodse
of an important national problem. {
Congress more than ever now must
accept full responsibility for thorough
inquiry into the whole question of ma
tional defense. Within four months
after WI day and before all the naval
| officers who fnilpht the war can oct