Evening star., 1945-06-04

more important members of the
Cabinet and the heads of the big
war agencies. 1t met almost every
day and the President presided. At
Its sessions the issues Of real i'm
portance were brought up and dis
cussed. If two agencies or depart
ments were in conflict, the head Of
each presented his side in the pres
ence Of the other. There was gen.
eral debate. The President made
the decision. and from it there was
no dissent.
That system worked beautifully.
It prevented undercover quarrels,
nullified waste of energy, time and
material and got results. Once a
controversy had been brought out
in the open and the President had
clearly said what he wanted done,
the members Of the council just
went out and did it. There was
argument within the meetings, but
none outside. Differences of opin-
ion were not aired in public. There
Is reason to believe that had Mr..
Roosevelt put into operation this
proved plan three years ago, much
of the nuddling and confusion
OF those years would have been
avoided.
Co. ordination Needed.
Obviously, during war this coun-
Gil is of far more use than the nor
NAL Cabinet. AS at least four of
the regular Cabinet members have
little or nothing to do with the
great problems created by the war,
it is foolish to call them together.
Heads of the great war agencies,
such as the War Production Board,
the War Labor Board, the eco
nomic stabilizer, the food and price
administrators, have become much
more important. Complete co-ordi-
nation between these and the Cab
met members directly concerned
with war problems is clearly essen
tial.
Unwilling to adopt the Wilson
plan, Mr.. Roosevelt finally tried to
meet this need by creating the Of
flee of War Mobilization. But that
did not provide the two things that
made the old war council so sue
cessful-first, the face-to-face dis
cussion; second, the personal presi-
Dental decisions from which there
was no appeal.
With the Japanese war stretch
ing more or less indefinitely ahead
and the tremendous postwar do
mestic problems looming large, it
seems particularly sensible that
something on the old war council
lines should appeal to Mr.. Truman
1t is pointed out that it is the one
effective way in which the Presi-
dent can cut through the red tape
in which all departments and agen-
cies inevitably become entangled
and give effective direction to gov
ernmental management. It Is the
one means by which he can bring
about genuine coordination and
cooperation. 1t is the one way,
without loading himself down with
impossible burdens and personal
interviews, in which he can keep
on top Of the whole situation.
What is now urged is the creation
by Mr.. Truman of a council on
which would sit the four or five
Cabinet members who have dealings
with war and economic problems,
and also the three or four heads of
the larger war and postwar agencies.
In addition, it might be helpful to
have two or three men, without
portfolio, selected merely for their
wisdom and experience.
Benefit Of Best Advice.
Such group would be of enor-
nous benefit to Mr.. Truman not
only in concluding the japanese war
as speedily as possible but in re-
storing the economic stability Of the
Nation-and handling the serious
domestic crises with which we are
sure to be confronted. His regular
Cabinet cannot provide the kind Of
advice and support the President
needs. For example, no one will
contend that the new Postmaster
General, Mr.. Hannegan, is equipped
as a counselor in this period; nor the
new Attorney General; nor the new
Secretary of Labor; nor several
others whose names might be men,
toned.
These may operate their respec-
tive departments with reasonable
competency, but in the matter of
handling or advising about war and