Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-12-12

| ~fSAAA 1oAAA 4ANo t&lV IA1OlNS "a 4VlCs
Ing America to 60 to war II she
wanted to protect Chinese, British
and Dutch interests in the Far East
and refraining from setting OF the
explosion herself.
However, Gen. Miles said, the Pa
cific commands had been sent q
war warning nine days before, and
1t was known in Washington that
the situation was extremely critical
and that japanese diplomats in
world capitals were burning their
codes. Then, he recited, the first
Japanese pilot message" was inter-
cepted and decided that Saturday,
the day before the attack.
Second pilot Message"
But this message, Gen. Miles in
sisted, told the War Department
virtually nothing it didn't know. It
advised the two japanese ENJOYS
who had been negotiating with Sec
rotary Hull that = long message
from Tokyo would reach them soon,
perhaps the next day, and when
they got 1t they were to hold 1t for
further instructions. A definite hour
for delivering it would be given
them.
''1t simply meant they were to
place 1t in the safe and await fur
ther ORDERS" Gen. Miles pointed out
The note itself, Is parts of it, be-
gan coming in that night, Gen
Miles AIDED. He said it repeated
well-worn japanese arguments about
how they had wanted peace and
American and Great Britain insisted
on opposing Japans peaceful poll.
cies in the East and now had EN-
circled Japan" 4.
The final portion of the note, the
second pilot message" instructing
the ENJOYS to deliver it to Secretary
Hull at exactly l pm. Sunday, De-
cember approximately the hour
at which bombs began to fall on
Pearl Harbor-was not decoded I'M
til between $50 and 8 a m. that day,
he said.
Meant Trouble Somewhere"
The last part of the message de-
ciphered during the night made 1t
clear the Japanese were breaking
of relations with this country and
the added instructions to the en-
voys on the hour of delivery meant
trouble" Gen. Miles conceded, but
added:
1T meant trouble somewhere, but
not necessarily against the United
States"
Gen. Miles said that, although
magic" term used for the de.
coding Of Japanese messages, played
an important part in Army ano
Navy intelligence, he thought 1t hac
been overemphasized at the hear.
ings. Army intelligence had much
information, aside from magic" hi
said, and had been able to give fiele
commanders clear picture of what
was going on without repeating tn.
intercepted Japanese messages.
The witness cited that Gen. Doug.
las Macarthur said in an aflidavit
} he saw few Of the magic" message.
and yet had obtained from the Wa
} Department sufncient Information
to alert his command fully before
the Japanese started the war.
HE had not found magic neces.
!. sary to true understanding of tn.
!. situation" Gen. Miles held.
In response to a question by Sen.
ator Ferguson, Gen. Miles said h,
had heard Gen. Marshall testify
|, that he saw no part of the las
7 Japanese "intercepts" before tn,
war-the 14-part note and its tvs
pilot messages-mtil the Sunda.
morning Of the attack.
|. II think Gen. Marshall is mis-.
taken" the former Ga chief said
Il have every reason to believe h
saw the first pilot message on tn,
, afternoon of December g."
: He referred to the message in
! forming the ENJOYS the note wa
on the way.