The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-12-14

It had aiwayx been the concep, of the United Chiefs of Staff that Japan could best be defeated by A series of amphlbsous attacks across the far reaches of the Pa- cifSc, Oceans are formidable bar F4erS but for the nation enjoying naval superiority they become highroads to invasion.
 Japan's AttAsk on our fleet ai Pearl Harbor gave her A tre- mendous but nevertheless, tenn porary advantage The Japsnese had reckoned without the ship yards Of America and the fighting tradition of the United States Navy. Even before parity with the Japanese fleet had been re- gained, the Navy successfully maintained communications with Australia and had undertaken limited offensives in the Solomons to halt the enemy advance. A desperate courage stopped the Japanese before Australia in the now historic battle of the Coral Sea and then shortly afterward utterly smashed the Japanese ad- vance toward the United States itself in the decisive action at Midway.
 The broad strategic allocation Of resources among the theaters was controlled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. but the actual con- trol of operations in the Pacific had been retained by the U. S Chiefs of Staff. At the Casablanca Conference, the Combined Chiefs agreed that Japan must be pro- hibited from further expansion and from consolidating and ex- plotting her current holdings. This resolution was agreed upon even though we were at the very mo- ment having great difficulty in concentrating sufficient resources to defeat the European Axis.
 Global Warfare
 It has been declared automatic that nation cannot successfully wage war on two fronts. With a full appreciation of the difficulties and hazards involved. we felt compelled to wage war not only on two fronts, but on many fronts Thus we arrived at the concept of global war in which the vast power Of American democracy was to be deployed all over the earth.
 At the TRIDENT Conference of May 1943 in Washington when the specific strategy of the global war was conceived, 1t was determined to step up the pace of the advance on Japan. Then few months later, in August 1943, at the QUADRANT Conference in Que- bee, the specific routes of the ad- vance on Japan were laid out. Zen. Douglas Macarthur was di- tected to continue his operations hp the New Guinea coast to reach the Philippines by the fall of 1914. Operations in the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and the Marianas were agreed to, and 1t was forecast that by the spring of 1945 we would be able to secure a lodgement in She Ryukyus on the threshold of khe Japanese homeland.
 Admiral King was confident that somewhere during the advances, probably during the Marianas or the Philippine campaigns, the United States fleets would meet and decisively defeat the Japanese Navy. No long-range military forecast could have been more accurate,
 At the QUADRANT Conference General Arnold proposed an air plan for the softening of Japan It was later approved and carried into execution. It called for the establishment of bases in China, in the Marianas, and other Pacific Islands from which would operate the hugh B-29 superfortresses then snly just going into production.
 Pacific Pincers
 At the turn of the year 1943 Army forces in the South Pacific area were added to General Mac Arthur's strategic command. It was the intention of the Joint Chiefs of staff to maintain the initiative, advancing by amphibi- ous hanking actions on the Philip pines and the Japanese Islands from the south and from the east. The advance across the tremen- dous reaches of the Central Pacific was placed under the command of Admiral Chester W. Nin,itz. There were two axes of the op- erations on the southern flank one in New Guinea commanded by It. Gen. Walter Krueoar tha