Evening star., 1945-11-25
Withdrawal Of Fleet
Would Have Spurred
laps, We||es Says
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Continued From First Page.)
fairly and squarely the dire char
acter of a further aggressive step.
Would Take Similar Action.
II beg you to consider whether,
at the moment which you Judge
right, which may be very near ]
you should not say that amy further
japanese aggression would compel
you to place the gravest issues
before Congress or words to that
effect.
1--WE would, of course, make a SIM
liar declaration or share in q Joint
declaration, and in any case ar
rangements are being made to syn
chronize our action with yours.
Forgive me, my dear friend, for
presuming to press such a course
upon you. but am convinced that
it might make all the difference and
prevent a melancholy extension of
the war"
Mr.. Hull's final note to Japan
had been sent four days earlier,
and this Government was awaiting
"a reply which was not delivered
until the hour of the attack on
December 7. President Roosevelt,
however, dispatched final appeal
Ito Emperor Hirohito on December
Is, urging him to avoid "the tragic
consequences" which continued
Japanese aggression would bring.
Suggested at Charter Meeting.
Mr.. Churchill first suggested par
allel warnings by Great Britain
and the United States to Japan
August 10, 1941, at the time of the
Atlantic Charter meeting, and many
of yesterdays questions to Mr..
Welles were aimed at trying to de-
termine to what extent these two
governments had agreed on joint
action before Pearl Harbor.
Gerhard Gesell, associate COM
mittee counsel, asked Mr.. Welles If
he knew whether the parallel warn
ing as suggested by Mr.. Churchill
was agreed on.
Il have no reason whatever to
thing So" said Mr.. Welles. "On the
contrary, the President told me the
promise he made to Churchill was
limited to the statement a warning
would be given"
When Senator Lucas, Democrat, of
Illinois repeated the question later
in the day, Mr.. Welles said the only
agreement the President made to
Mr.. Churchill was that the United
States, in its own words and it's own
way. would issue a warning, as was
done on August IT." In this he
referred to message given the jap
anese Ambassador on August IT,
which was a 'Watered down" version
of the Churchill suggestion.
Walkers Talks "Hearsay."
Mr.. WelleS named former Post
master General Frank Walker as
one of the influential persons"
with whom japanese Ambassador
Nomura and Special Envoy Kurusu
were dealing in the critical days
Immediately before the war. He
said, however, that the report as to
Mr.. Walker was only "hearsay" so
far as he was concerned.
Earlier in the hearings, the COM
mittee had been given a copy of a
dispatch from Nomura and Kurusu
to Tokyo advising that they were
talking with influential" individ-
uals behind their frontal nagotia-
tons with Mr.. Hull and President
Roosevelt.
They told Tokyo to keep it secret.
not knowing that the United States
had broken their code and a COPY
of their dispatch would be laid on
Mr.. Hull's desk the following morn
ing.
Did Walker ever confer with
you?" Senator Ferguson asked.
mot at any time"
''Was there anyone else-did you
ever hear the name of Jones-the
Rev. Stanley Jones?"
Sees Value in Charter.
II never understood that he took
part" Mr.. Welles replied. Senator
Ferguson did not press that line of
questioning and, to questioning re-
porters later, would identify Mr..
Jones only as Methodist bishop"
Mr.. Welles, who was present at
the mid-Atlantic meeting, insisted
that the much-discussed Atlantic
Charter is none the-less valuable
even though it was issued merely as
a joint communique and not actu-
ally signed by Mr.. Churchill and
Mr. Roosevelt.
Representative Keefe, Republican,
of Wisconsin sought to bring out
that there is now in existence q
binding agreement.
Not in the sense that it was an