The Wilmington morning star., 1945-04-09
TODAY and TOMORROW
By WALTER LIPPMANN-

In the highest quarters, the
White House, State Department
and the chiefs of staff, a princi-
pal anxiety has long been that the
Soviet Union would be drawn into
the Pacific War prematurely. Two
weeks after Hitler attacked Russia
and five months before Pearl Har-
Dor Gully 6, 194D Ambassador
Grew delivered a statement to
Prince Konoye asking for IAN as
surance' that 1.-The reports of
Japan's decision to enter upon
hostilities against the Soviet I'm
ion are not based upon fact"
The President, who has proved
himself to be a remarkable strate-
gist, saw then that if Japan struck
at Russia in Siberia while Hitler
was striking in Europe, it was more
than probable that Russia would
be knocked out of the war. Had that
happened, the task of liberating
Europe and of ejecting Japan from
China and the mainland of Asia
would have required forces great
er than Britain and the United
States could hope to raise. In fact
if Germany and Japan had sue
ceeded in making junction across
PROSTATE Russia, it is hard to
see how they could ever have been
defeated decisively.
Fortunately, the japanese laid
their plans on the mistaken as
sumption that Hitler would take
Moscow, and thus paralyze the
Soviet power, a few days after
they attacked Pearl Harbor, and
paralyzed our capacity to take
the offensive.
But even after that lucky break
the dominating consideration has
continued to be how to keep the
Germans and Japanese from fight
ing a combined war, and to gain
time until Russia, Britain, and the
United States were prepared to
support one another both in Europe
and in the Far East. In the days
when we were fighting with rela-
lively weak forces way down
around Guadalcanal, and the Sow
lets were fighting for their lives
around StaIngrad, and the British
were in dire peril at the gates OF
Cairo and Suez Canal, it would
have been a disaster, not an ad-
vantage as some over here mag
ined, if in one way or another the
much talked about Ru S S n
"bases" in Siberia had become in
volved in the war.
For not at that time, and indeed
at no time until now, was it GER
tain that the Soviets could cYfend
those bases; it was absolutely GER
tain that we could not make the
slightest use of them. We could
not have used them because there
was no way to get to them with
the gasoline, the bombs, and all the
heavy ground equipment that an
air force must have.
|
What had above all to be pre-
vented was that the Japanese
would seize the bases while the
Soviets were SO busy with Hitler
that they could not defend them,
and while we were SO far away
that we could not use them. This
can all be said now because Stain
would not have denounced the neu-
traGty pact unless he felt reason
ably certain that he is now strong
enough, that the American forces
at Two Jima and OkinaWa are now
near enough to deal with, and
that the Japanese are now too
weak to undertake, preventive
war against the Soviets.
THE management of this whole
affair by Churchill, Stain, and
Roosevelt is as fine an example of
military-diplomatic strategy in
global war as one could imagine.
They have succeeded in dividing
our enemies and in driving them
to fight separate wars while they
gathered and advanced their own
forces, with well-nigh perfect tim
ing, for unified conclusion to the
whole war. In Europe the juno
ton of Eisenhower armies with
the Red Army and, let us not for
get, with Alexander's, is imminent
and will destroy the possibility Of
a PROLONGED Oroanized German re-
slstance: in Asia the stage is set
for another junction which will
make it impossible for Japan to
make a successful stand either in
her islands or on the Asiatic main
land.
Here is the real accomplishment
OF the conferences at Casablanca,
quebec, Moscow, Cairo, Teheran,
ana Yalta: the forging of a cSn-
I