Evening star., 1945-08-30
Military, Diplomatic
Tieup Seen Lacking
Pearl Harbor Report Shows Need
of Coordination, Says Writer
BY David Laurence

of Coordination, Says Writer
BY David Laurence
Careful reading of the voluminous
reports on the Pearl Harbor tragedy
may establish in the minds of readers
just what should have been done by the
military and naval personnel, but no.
where In the reports will anything be
found about the part played by the late
President Roosevelt, who was the COM
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy
at the time and also the man who
controlled our diplomatic policy In the
Far East and relations with European
countries.
Assuming that the military men should
have been on the alert and assuming
that the Army and Navy, respectively,
had done what they could with the
available forces and equipment in Ha-
wall at the time, would the result have
been very much different?
This war has revealed that aircraft
carriers can make sudden attacks on
islands and unless an adequate defense
by land-based forces is available, the
naval aircraft can do about as much
damage as Admiral Halseys feet has
recently done to Japans islands.
The truth is the United States did
not have an adequate Navy in the Pa
| clflc on December 7, 194l, and the re-
sponslbility for this must be placed
squarely on members of the House and
Senate who were in Office in the several
| years prior to that date. At time when
billions were being spent for leaf-raking,
| relatively small sums were spent for
armament to defend the United States
and particularly for the building of air.
| planes and aircraft carriers
Other Probes Seen Needed.
An investigation into the history Of
the Army and Navy personners recon-
mendatlons to Congress and what the
committees of Congress did about them
is as essential to full understanding
OF the Pearl Harbor problem as a read
ing OF the lengthy reports on what hap
pened IN the months Immediately pre-
cedlng the Pearl Harbor attack.
Also, it is pertinent to know why the
American fleet was divided so that much
OF our naval force was in the Atlantic.
1t is pertinent to know, too, why our
diplomacy was SO aggressive at a time
when our defenses in the Pacific were
| confessedly so weak.
The ship and personnel losses at Pearl
Harbor might have been smaller, but
the dan fn chirc
oeen almost as extensive even if all the
alerts had been given at Pearl Harbor.
Even If our battleships had been out
to sea, they might have been easy prev
| Tor the Japanese naval aviators from
their aircraft carriers. The British sent
| out big battleshlp to the waters near
singapore and it was an easy mark for
Japanese airplanes.
A modern task force must have anti
/ aircraft guns from destroyers and cruls-
ers as we'll as battleships to protect the
/ aircraft carriers The United States had
/ enough trained aviation personnel. but
not enough carriers to defend the Pa
| ciflc in December, 194l.
Surprise in Philippines.
! Many people are reading about Pearl
! Harbor today, but they do not realize
that Gen. MacArthurs forces in the
Philippines were also caught by surprise
ana that many of our planes were de-
! stroyed on the ground near Manila bv
the same sort of sudden airplane at
tack that We suffered at Pearl Harbor.
| All the data on this should be made
available to the public, too.
But what is important to ascertain il
the inside story of the diplomatic COM
munlcatlons between Great Britain and
the United States in the months pre-
cedmg Pearl Harbor when America was
! sending Britain over-age destrovers and
doing number of things that kept our
own Navy busy between our shores and
| Europe, although the British feet was
supposed to be adequate to take care of
the developments in the Atlantic.
1t has always been assumed that Mr.,
Roosevelt felt that America had to as
slst the British and French by measures
short OF war" and this caused most OF
| our attention to be centered on the At
lantic. AS for the Pacific, the military
and naval men knew we were not pre-
pared and said so, but our diplomatic
correspondence with Japan indicates
that we were as firm in the year ls4l as
II we were ready for combat
1t is this lack of coordination be-
tween military and diplomatic policy.
now revealed in sensational detail, that
is even more important to examine for
the future safety of the United States
than what admirals or generals did in
the few days preceding the Pearl Harbor
| tragedy.
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