Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-08-19

for vast territorial changes in the Pa
cific area from which the United States
undoubtedly will emerge as Far East
ern power of much greater magnitude
than ever before in its history.
But before this status is legally solidi-
fed, some complex problems must be
solved. They arise out of Americas
often affirmed policy of desiring no
territorial ACKNOWLEDGMENT" from this
war, its prominent role in promoting
system of international order through
the United Nations organization at San
Francisco and its desire to continue cor
dial relations with Great Britain and
Russia, which also are major Pacific
powers.
The buccaneering technique of 10th
century Imperialism can hardly be rec
onciled with such documents as the
Atlantic Charter or the United Nations
Charter. Yet the United States is de-
termined that there shall never be an
other Pearl Harbor,' resulting from
military unpreparedness in the Pacific.
Consequently the diplomatic problem
before us is to work out system of
complete security in the Pacific, but to
do so in an atmosphere of cordial under
standing with the other powers having
interests in that area.
Plan Worked Out at Cairo.
Americas new position in the Pacific
will be carved out as part of general
dissolution of the japanese Empire, built
up over half century as a result of
territorial theftS from weaker neighbors.
The general pattern of this redistribu-
ton was cut out at the Cairo Confer
ence, which provided that China should
recover the millions of square miles
Japan had taken from her-notably in
Northumberland also for the eventual
restoration of Korea as an independent
nation.
The Cairo formula may be modified
to some extent, however as result of
RusSias entrance into the war and the
two series of conversations carried on
IN Moscow between Premier Stain and
Premier Soong which resulted in the
last week. The terms of this compact
have not been announced and are not
yet known in detail to Government
officials here. The whole Far Eastern
picture will be clearer once we know
the details of this agreement.
Diplomatic observers would not be
surprised if it affects Russia's known
desire to recover the Chinese Eastern
Railroad, which affords a route between
the Lake Baikal area and Vladivostok
some thousand miles shorter than the
an-Russian route of the Trans Siberian
Railroad. 1t may also reflect Russia's
interest in recovering Port Arthur, as
well as the conflicting interests of
Moscow and Chungking in Mongolia.
Conference May Be Called.
Officials here are not able to say at
this early postwar stage whether a
general conference of Far Eastern DOW
ers will be called to remap the Orient
or whether settlements will be made
through diplomatic channels. Undoubt-
eddy the spadework on an agreement
will be done in bJateral conversations,
but it seems likely that at some time
within the next year or Is months a
parley similar to the Washington Con-
ference of 1922 may oe called to
effect a final ayr ement
Americas direct interest in the post
war Orient is to establish naval and
air bases to protect its trade routes
and checkmate any possible resurg-
ence of Japanese aggression. In the
coming "air age" we are interested, too,
in establishing intermediate landing
fields along routes connecting the West
Coast with the Asiatic mainland, Japan,
the Philippines and Australia.
The main bastion of American naval
and air strength in the Pacific will
undoubtedly be in the future as it has
been in the past, the Philippine Islands.
Our position there involves no inter-
national problem as political leaders in
the lippines-soon to become an
independent republic - already have
agreed to the establishment of any
bases America considers necessary.
Since the Japanese occupation of
1941-44, the Filipinos have accepted the
doctrine that American military, naval
and air strength in the Far East is as