Evening star., 1945-11-04

tine broom
requests, it is feared that Russias atti-
tude toward international cooperation
will remain lukewarm. Ostensibly this
already has been demonstrated. since
the failure of the London Conference,
by the fact that the Soviet representa-.
tives at the International Food Confer
ence left Quebec without signing any
agreement and by the hesitancy of
Russia to send delegate to fhe meet
ing here of the consultative committee
for the Far East. The meeting was
scheduled for October %. 1t was post
poned at the request of Secretary of
State Byrnes until October 80 in the
hope that the cooling-off period might
create change of heart in Moscow.
Our choice today lies between either
accepting the Russian thesis or oppos-
ing it and taking whatever consequences
might follow. Most of the intimate
advisers of the overworked and some
what disheartened Secretary Byrnes IN
the State Department still believe
that policy of concessions should be
followed by this country.
They argue that if we appease Rus
sia further by complying with all her
present demands the UNO will become
reality. And while it may appear to
the uninitiated that Soviet wedge in
Japan, for instance, might endanger
our future security, the fact that the
UNO will become living reality should
offset such fear. The security of the
United States. such men as Ben Cohen,
counsellor of the State Department.
and Undersecretary of State Dean
Acheson believe, can be much safer
if the UNO becomes workable organ
ization than if we have to rely exclu-
sively on Americas forces
But If we adopt strong policy"
as Mr.. Truman's speech seems to in
dicate, the UNO will be doomed and a
rearmament race will take place, with
unpredictable consequences. Hence,
Mr. Byrnes is being advised, some of
his well-informed friends say, to leave
nothing to chance and do his utmost to
reconcile Russia.
Attempts straight Talking"
Others outside the State Department
and close to the White House believe
that this policy of continually humor-
ing the U. S. S. R. without our ever being
humored in matters which affect our
own security must come to an end.
These men admit it is difficult to make
| diplomatic reconversion from ap-
| peasement to straight talking" but
| 1t can be done. Mr.. Truman attempted
| it at Potsdam and almost got away
with it. 1t was only when his political
advisers. convinced that the people of
| the United States would be disappointed
| if he came home empty-handed, that
| he changed his mind and accepted
| some of the Russian demands which
will come to light in the near future.
| Mr.. Truman's advisers are as firm
believers in the UNO as the advisers of
Mr.. Byrnes in the State Department.
Those men who prevailed on the
President to make his strong Navy
| Day speech say the UNO can work
| even if Russia sulks. Her place will al
ways be open to her when she thinks
the time has come to enter into the
work of the organization but we must
| not continue to yield to all her de-
mands.
For diplomatic reasons, little is be-
ing said in this country, from official
/ quarters, about the present state of the
/ Red armies. Numerically, they are
larger than the combined forces of the
other Allies. Redeployment has been
much slower than in this country or in
Britain. and the men who have been
sent home have been quickly replaced
by the new classes of youngsters be-
tween the ages of 18 and 81 who were
| due fol- compulsory military service.
| But the end of the war has produced
new end unexpected conditions in the
Red armies. The stern discipline so
essential in force which still con-
tains large proportion of illiterates
resulted. The Soviet high command is
reliably reported to have given drastic
orders, including the execution of off,
GERS. in order to erase these conditions.
Russian Strength Limited.
The Red Army still has stable
quantity of American weapons, jeeps
and trucks. But because of the lack of
experienced care, the motorized equip
ment is less effective than formerly,
and no requirements are forthcoming.
Russian aviation never has been really
efficient. The Red Army is not me-
chanically minded, and this has been
felt in the Red air forces.
The Russians have enough strength
and lease-lend material for another
military effort of short duration. But
their able leader, Premier Stain, is
fully aware that an attempt to force
the pace by violence would jeopardize
all the gains he has obtained for his
country since he joined the Allied
camp.
This brief sketch of Russia's war
potential does not mean in the least
that there are those in this country
who favor using coercive methods
against Russia to make her understand
the path of conquest heads to disas-
ter. But 1t serves as an illustration for
some of our policy-framers to show
that while some further minor conces-
sions might be made to the U. S. S. R..
provided they do not conflict with the
policies set forth by President Truman.
policy Of appeasement as we have
followed in the last two years would
i constitute mlIch croofor rnoraoa -