Evening star., 1945-07-22
Nippon Can Survive
Without an Empire
Self-Sufficiency Not Impossible
in Small Home Islands
By William H. Harrison.


laration of December, 1943, must realize
that his country, territorially speaking,
will in the not too distant future be
back to about where it was when Com
modore Perry opened it up to the
Western World in 1853 1t is a prospect
that must make many a person wonder
whether the homeland will be able to
subsist under such drastic contraction
of empire.
At Cairo China, Britain and the
United States solemnly declared that
Japan shall be stripped of all. the
islands in the Pacific which she has
seized or occupied since the beginning
of the First World War in 1914, and
that all the territories Japan has stolen
from the Chinese, such as Manchuria,
Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be
restored to the Republic of China. Japan
will also be expelled from all other
territories which she has taken by
violence and greed" and "in due course
Korea shall become free and inde-
pendent"
In other words, the Empire of the
Rising Sun, in addition TO losing every
thing acquired by force during this war,
is to lose a vast pre-1941 domain more
than four times the size of the home
islands. 1t Is to lose the IS 900 square
miles of Korea, the 13,90o square miles
of Formosa and the 503,000 square
miles of puppet Manchuria. AS matters
stand, assuming that the Cairo dec
laration is to undergo no substantial
revision, imperial Japan is thus to be
cut back virtually to Japan proper,
made up of the main islands of Honshu,
Shikoku, Kyushu and Hokkaido-an
area of only 148,0 square miles.
In 1883, when American warships
reused 1t from its long feudal sleep,
Japan proper had population of not
much more than 26,0o0,00o, but today
its population is estimated to be in
excess of 100000. At first glance,
therefore, it may seem that in such
markedly confined area the Japanese
in the postwar period should find 1t
impossible to keep on feeding them
selves and continue their existence
as nation. Actually, however, the
prospect they face though bleak enough,
is not so grim as that. Shorn of their
plunder and compressed into a region
roughly the size of Montana, they OBJ
viously can have precious few luxuries,
but they nevertheless should be able
to survive.
It Is worth noting in this connection
that stripping Hirohito of his ill-gotten
empire will not involve the return
of great hordes Of colonists from out
lying regions to the home islands. Be-
| fore Pearl Harbor only small fraction
of Japan's 72,000, 900 lived outside Japan
| proper. In prewar days fewer than
100000 japanese lived among the 2l,-
| 100000 Koreans, only relative handful
| of them could be counted among the
| 100000 Formosans, and in the early
| 1930s-apart from troops-there were
| probably not a million of them among
the 100000 inhabitants Of Manchuria.
Accordingly, when these places are taken
| away from them, the loss will be not
SO much loss of living space as
| loss of exploitable agricultural and in
| dustrial resources.
From the standpoint of feeding itself,
of course, Japan proper. deprived of such
resources, may be hard put for while to
| produce three square meals a day. In
recent times the home islands have not
been sufficient. In 1886, for instance,
the year before all-out aggression began
in China, they were able to grow only 81
per cent of their total food requirements,
importing the balance from Formosa,
Korea, Manchuria and other outside
sources. Yet. considering the size of the
country and the character of the terrain.
this is very substantial figure, and,
given the fact that the Japanese-about
| so per cent of whom normally till the
soil-are excellent farmers, it is not be-
yond possibility that they can achieve
self-sufhciency If they find themselves
forced to do so to live.
1t is fact, after all, that the people of
Japan have long existed on diet noto-
riously Spartan compared to ours. They
| are not meat-eaters. In normal times
they had in their homeland not more
than 1900, 900 head of cattle, as against
something like 10000 900 in the United
States Their chief foods are fish and
rice, supplemented by vegetables and
edible seaweeds. Under ,lonwar condi-
tions they can catch enough fish not only
| to meet their own needs. but also to
provide surplus for expord. AS for rice,
| although they have had t. import some
20 per cent of their requirements in the
past (the average japanese consumes
about five bushels year,, authoritative
studies indicate that they could raise
domestically, through intensified cultiva-
ton and utilization of neglected acreage,
enough to satisfy the demands of a
population of 100000.
- *&
In view of the uncessing fury of our
sea and air attacks and because many
! japanese farmers have been called away
to war, the latest "self-sufliciency" food
program recently announced by the
Suzuki government is likely to fall far
short of success. But when the shooting
stops, Japan, within the confines of the
home islands, may well be able to take
care of all its essential food needs, draw
ing upon no agriculture other than its
own. In any case, even If this is not
possible, there is no reason to suppose
that it will not be able to import what
| avay. yoou t,e ,or,s;rad - oR~oA a .saA