Imperial Valley press., 1945-08-29
Marshall Shares Blame
For Pearl HQrbor

IL QT00H
Stark and Kimmel did not do the
! necessary things to prevent jus
such a defeat as occurred and that
! they failed to demonstrate superior
/ judgment.
! Fleet Adm. Ernest j. King, com
mander- in chief Of the U. S. fleet
who replaced Stark as chief Of nav
al operations Immediately after
t Pearl Harbor, said in an indorse-
ment to the navy boards report
! that:
FAULTS OF OMISSION
The derelictions on the part of
/ Adm Stark and Adm. Kimmel were
| faults of omission rather than
faults of commission
IN the case in question, they in
/ dicate lack Of the superior judgment
necessary for exercising command
I commensurate with their rank and
their assigned duties, rather than
/ culpable inefficiency.
Since trial by general court mar
f, tial is not warranted by the evi-
! dence adduced, appropriate admin
istration action would appear to be
| the relegation of both of these Off
/ GERS to positions in which lack of
superior judgment may not result
/ in future errors"
Forrestal concurred in this ap-
I
\ Stark nor Kimmel should ever be
/ recalled to active duty in the fu-
ture for any position in which the
4 exercise Of superior judgment may
\ be necessary"
4 COUNTS AGAINST MARSHALL
/ The army boards charges against
Marshall, TO which Stimson and
Mr.. Truman objected, were that he
failed in his relations" with the
Hawaiian department Oh four
counts:
/ |. He failed to keep Short fully
advised of the growing tenSeneSS
Of the japanese situation which in
dicated an increasing necessity for
better preparation for war" Mar
shall, the board said. had tan alb
undance" Of such information while
Short had little"
( 2. He failed to send additional
instructions to Short on Nov. %,
l94l, when U. S.-JapaneSe relations
were deteriOrating rapidly, and 'ev-
identity failed to realize the import"
OF a message from Short on Nov.
q which indicated that the Hawai-
ian commander had misunderstood
and miScOnStrued" a previous mes
sage from Marshall.
the evening Of Dec and the early
morning Of Dec. Il l94I, with crit
ical information indicating an al
most immediate break with Japan.
though there was ample time to
have accomplished this"
t. He failed to ''investigate and
determine the state Of readiness of
the Hawaiian command army be-
tween Nov. q and Dec Z, 1941, de-
spite the impending threat Of war. /"
Under responsibilities" the army
board listed Hull. Marshall, Mai
Gen. Leonard T. GeroW. former
chief Of the war plans division Of
the war department general staff
and Short.
HULL CRITICIZED
The board said Hull's counter
proposals to the japanese during
the tense American-Japa diplo-
matte dueling Of November, 194I
were in conflict with the efforts
Of the war and navy departments to
gain time for preparations for war. f"
The board emphasized in refer
ring to Hull, however. that war
with Japan was inevitable and i'm
minent because of irreconciliable
dIsagreements between the Japan
eSe empire and the American gov
ernment"
Hulls contemporaries to the
japanese on Nov. 26, 194l, the
board said. were used by the Jap
anese as a signal to begin the war
by the attack on Pearl Harbor"
CORDIAL RELATIONS
The report described relations
between Kimmel and Short at Pearl
Harbor as cordial" and said thev
tried honestly and earnestly to weld
the two services into one protective
unit
The interchange of information
between the war and state depart
mentS at that time was apparently
complete, the army board said. and
the army was kept in close touch
with international developments. \
The state department, it added
knew Of the army's progress and
lis preparations for war.
= The army board found that Short
failed to place his command in q
state Of readiness for war in the
tace OF a war warning by adopting
an alert against sabotage"
SHORTS FAILURE
Short also failed ito reach or at
tempt to reach" an agreement with
klmmel to implement joint army
navy plans, the board said. and he
failed to keep informed on the eff
tectlveneSs Of the navys long range
reconnaissance
Short also failed to replace inef-
teclent staff officers in his com
mand. the army board said.
The navy board report producel
sharp disagreement from Adm
King with its finding that the pres
ence OF the fleet III Pearl Harbol