Evening star., 1945-10-14
Diplomats Ponder Purpose
Behind Russian Attitude
Review Recent Events to Decide Whether Intent Is
to Gain More Concessions or Discard Treaties
Signed With Others of Big Five
By Constantine Broom

pledges made in treaties signed with
Great Britain, France and China, or has
she adopted her present spoiled child"
attitude as diplomatic strategy in order
to wrest more concessions from her war
time Allies? This is a question which
the diplomats of the western democracies
are asking themselves today and for
which they can find no adequate answer
at this time.
Ever since Russia joined the ranks of
the Allies in June, 1941, she has been
treated with the utmost consideration.
The Soviet armies were standing the
brunt of the Nazi onslaught and their
resistance gave America and Britain
time to organize themselves for the final
kill. Hence, no request from Moscow
for lease-lend goods or demands for
territorial advantages to consolidate"
the boundaries of the empire were
refused.
The western democracieS' attitude gave
Premier Stain prina donna complex.
He became so used to having all his
demands met SO quickly and eagerly
that the slightest observations from
Washington and London were accepted
with i'll humor. The people of Great
Britain, and particularly America, were
SO enthusiastic over the victories of the
Red armies that they accepted Russias
insistance that she should dominate ma
tions such as Poland, for which the
western democracies went to war in 1889.
rr;@;,s A. A@@ool
This reached such height that it was
said in Moscow that when Stain had a
cold his enthusiastic admirers in Amer
lea sneezed, and when he had indigestion
they burped. Under the impact of the
war, new so-called liberal philosophy"
developed among these admirers, who
adopted the slogan Russia can do no
wrong"
A vociferous and well organized mi
nority was shouting loudest in a number
of American newspapers, while some
radio commentators also adopted the
view that anything that Russia did was
for the good of the world. They never
bothered to make a dispassionate
analysis of the motives which prompted
the Kremlin to discard the many pledges
1t has assumed when it indorsed the
Atlantic Charter in January, 1912.
Any impartial observer who attempted
to point out that the policy of satisfying
all RuSsia's demands, regardless of
whether or not they were in keeping
with our national policy, was described
as "the voice of Goebbels" Later, after
Hitler and his gang joined their an
cestors, those who asked for a scrutiny
Of Russia's policies were described by
both Moscow and by its voices" in this
country as fascist reactionaries who
were delaying the progress of the world.
1t is in this atmosphere that the For
eign Ministers of the so-called Big Five
met In London. The shooting war was
over. But it had not reacted on the
Moscow policy trainers who, like all the
prina donnas, could not conceive that
all their fancies and demands would
not be eagerly accepted by their faith
full admirers.
Molotov's Hands Tied.
Foreign Commissar Molotov arrived
In London with far less freedom of
action from his chief, Premier Stain,
than he had at San Francisco. At San
Francisco he had a certain amount of
bargaining leeway. The conference
there dealt with ideologies and ar
rangements for the future which did
not necessarily affect Russia's actions.
In London, however, the five Foreign
Ministers were dealing with stark real
tiles such as delimitation of frontiers,
trusteeships and actual governments
such as those in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania, which the western Allies re-
fused to recognize because information
in their possession proved that they
were as bad as those installed previously
by Hitler.
1t is now apparent that Mr.. Molotov
could not yield to even a temporary
compromise. The requests for instruc-
tions he was sending to Moscow when
1t was obvious that the conference
would adjourn without agreement are
said to have been answered with a
positive. "niet" (no) from the Premier.
The conference broke up with the
Russians practically banging the door
in the face of the other Foreign Min
listers and all the other minor appease-
ments offered Moscow by Secretary of
State Byrnes received no consideration.
Hope to Change Views.
Some American diplomats and po-
litical observers who have had a good
deal of experience with the Russians at
previous conferences are inclined to
believe that the Russian government
has adopted this adamant attitude be-
cause it feels that circumstances might
compel the western Allies to reconsider
their position and go to Moscow in q
chastised mood.
Premier Stain is said to believe that
the groups in the western democracies
which have so enthusiastically accepted
the Soyiets moral leadership in the
world Will eventually exercise suf1-
cient pressure on their respective gov
ernments to persuade them to accept
Russia's views integrally.
Other diplomats and observers, par
ticularly in the military groups, believe
that with the end of the war Premier
Stain sees no further advantage in
compromising with his wartime allies.
They suspect that the Premier, who
has given only lip service to the United
Nations Organization, believes implicitly
only In power which he desires to share
with as few other nations as possible.
The circumstances which detached him
from the Axis and brought him into
the war on the side Of the Allies COM
pelled him to make a few cornnrornises