Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1945-01-05
By Maj. Gen.
D. P. Barrows

y
only two possible grounds for
this proposal. The first is that
Cen Eisenhower has met with
a reverse and should be super
ceded by another officer of
greater experience and cOmpe-
tence. The other is that, as
supreme Allied commander, he
should not also be in command
of one of the elements in his
overall responsibility.
The first assumption is wholly
without grounds, and it is diff
cult TO believe it could be the
basis Of the proposal, which
suggests either Marshal Mont
gomery or Gen. Alexander as
the field commander of the
eight Allied armies on this front.
MO OFFICER in the European
~ or Mediterranean theaterS
has record of continuous sue
cess that compares with Eisen-
hower's.
His direction of the operations
in Africa and Sicily and the re-
markable and rapid liquidation
of the German military hold on
France speak for themselves.
Won Runstedt's plunge into
the ArdenneS may be a setback,
but no one can say II is a dis
aSter. nor can its effects be APP
praised until the battle is fin
lShed
There are other Allied COM
manders who have served longer
in this war, but their records
contain some disasters as we'll
as successes. And in the type
of war now being waged against
the German front, none of them
has had more experience than
Eisenhower himself.
GENERALLY il may not be
NJ wise for general. or any
lesser officer, 10 take direct
command of an element within
his highest command. But the
nature of the organization Of
the supreme Allied command
has changed since the European
invasion began.
When Gen. Eisenhower was
made supreme commander, his
three deputies for sea. air and
land forces were all British.
AS to naval forces. the deSig-
nation of British admiral was
logical. for British vessels in the
European theater must consid-
erably outnumber American,
and they are all based on Eng
llSh ports.
While the invasion was an
amphibious operation, II was i'm
portant that the naval arm
should be under the direct COM
mand of an Allied supreme
commander because II de-
manded his primary attention.
The war has now changed TO
land operations, supported by
air power. Practically, if not
technically, the navy has re-
turned 10 its historic task Of
holding the British Channel and
the North Sea.
before the invasion, the AL
ID lied air force was predomi-
nantly British and was engaged
in strategic bombing. Since the
landing in Normandy it has be-
come primarily tactical force,
operating in aid Of ground
troops. and as such. it should
be under the direction of the
commander of ground forces.
Thus the present position OF
Eisenhower as field commander
does not seem Instantaneous.
He has little concern now with
the British fleet. He must d.
rectly command the air power
in close support of the ground
forces.
The Importance of a supreme
commander over fleet, air and
army has diminished as the inn
portance of the field command
has steadily grown.
These are practical conSidera-
tons. and with the indispenS-
able qualities of Eisenhower a.
a field commander should pre-
vail over theoretical premises.
HOW F. We r, if Eisenhower
H should wish 10 appoint a
a deputy field commander, he
should appoint an American
rather than a British general.
II is recognized that in CO.
operative Allied operations. the
nation providing the preponder-
ant force should have the COM
mand of the Joint enterprise.
Only when no competent
commander is thus available
should an officer from a minor
ity force be placed in command.
Certainly no one need as
sumo that there are no ade-
quate commanders among the
American generals in this the
alter There are several.
| regard the political implica-
tons of this London proposal as
untimely because BritiSh-Amer-
lean relations at the moment
are not wholly harmonious and
should not be aggravated by
any fuSSing 10 get a British
commander placed over force
in which American soldiers
greatly predominant.