Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-12-21
U.S.. Fleet Was Based
in Hawaii 70 Fight
paps, Turner Says
Continued From First Page. J

age" on the Japanese neet.
/ Representative Cooper, Democrat,
sof Tennessee, ASKED did you corr
lsider the Pacific Fleet bis safe at
Pearl Harbor as at any other place
1T could have been based?e
/ THE reason for the feet being In
Hawaii" the admiral replied, was
mot for it's own safety. The reason
was for the security of Hawaii and
the security of the United States.
] Under war conditions, it was q
dangerous place. The fleet would
have been safer on the Pacific Coast
sor on the Atlantic. It was out there
for the purpose Of engaging In a
hight with the Japanese and of win
ming the fight.
There are two opinions as to
whether 1t, would have been safer
in port or ct sea. Since then we
have maintained ships in port un-
der very heavy air attacks, and at
other times we have maintained
them at sea under such attacks.
Il personally feel that the feet
In Hawaii would have been safer at
sea, but that statement is subject
to challenge" -.
did you think Mr.. Cooper
asked, that in view of the world
situation at the time, the proper
place for the fleet to have been was
at Pearl Harbor?''A
Il did," said Admiral Turner.
Denies Kimmel Obeyed Order.
In response to questions by Mr..
Cooper, Admiral Turner said he did
not think Admiral Kimmel obeyed
the order contained In the war
warming Of November 81, adding
that if the command had been COM
pletely alerted, with a considerable
number Of fighter planes in the air,
he believed "the Japanese attack
would have been very much less
severe in results.
It would have been dificult, he
conceded, for the Jap planes to
have been stopped from. coming into
Pearl Harbor, but if the Navy and
Army had used the equipment they
had, the United States would have
damaged the enemy severely, in
ficting considerable damage on its
carriers.
The outspoken commander of sew
eral important amphibious landings
in the Pacific continued to add new
angles to the story being unfolded
before the committee.
Erroneous Belief Explained.
High lights Of his testimony were:
1. That Rear Admiral Leigh
Noyes, chief Of naval communica-
tons in 1871, was the source Of his
erroneous belief that Navy COM
manders in Hawaii were in q posi-
ton to decode the Japanese secret
diplomatic messages which were be-
ing decided In Washington. He at
tributed this to q misunderstanding.
He insisted, under sharp cross
examination by Committee Counsel
William D. Mitchell, that in draft
ing the Nays war warning mes
sages in 1941 he had no instruc-
tons such as the Army reported
having, that the late President
Roosevelt wanted to emphasize that
Japan should commit the first overt
act.
2. That Vice Admiral, Theodore 8.
Wilkinson, then chief of naval in
telligence, disagreed with him IS
late as Saturday, December 8, In
his belief that Japan would at
tack the Omitted States.
Admiral Turner told Representa-
tive Cooper that for "quite q num-
Der of years" he thought war with
Japan was inevitable and that In
June or July of 1941 he decided 1t
was "a matter of q few months"
Held Warning Adequate.
this belief with both Navy and Army
officers and testified he felt the war
warning sent out on November n,
1941, was adequate, especially In
view Of the later message informing
feet commanders that Japanese
consulates were burning codes and
papers.
Mr.. Cooper asked the witness if
Admiral Wilkinson agreed with him
In his belief war with Japan was q
matter of months.
81 knew then that Admiral VIII
kinson did not agree with that
view" Admiral Turner replied, 'be-
cause on December he informed
: me he thought I was mistaken.
said, Mistaken in what?' And he
said In the conviction that Japan
would attack the United States"
Committee Counsel Mitchell told
Admiral Turner MY curiosity has
been aroused by the fact that Presi-
dent Roosevelt insisted that ref
erence to Japan committing the first
overt act should 60 In the Army mes
sage, and you say the President
OKd Navy message without any
such reference" Mr.. Mitchell was
+, referring to testimony by Admiral
Turner yesterday that the Nays
war warning of November ~ went
to the White House before 1t was
sent.
No Evidence Of Instructions.
Mr.. Mitchell drew from the wit
ness an admission that he did not
talk with the President about the
messages and suggested his testi-
mony was based on what others
may have told him.
Admiral Turner replied that he
could say from personal knowledge
E that he was never told that the
President required such q phrase
about Japan committing the first
overt act, included in Navy mes.
sages He added that, as far a,
he knows, there is no evidence ir
the current hearings that the Nav
was given such instructions.
Mr.. Mitchell then pointed ou
that, while no mention of "over
acts" was put in the message Il
Admiral Kimmel, the reference wa
included in other Navy messages
= day later to Navy coastal com
mands He asked the admiral VIII,
that was done.
Admiral Turner said that wa
because the coastal commander
were ashore at bases where he knew
the Army commanders had beel
cautioned about the desire to hav'
Japan commit the first overt &C
and he wanted the orders to b.
!