The Wilmington morning star., 1945-08-02

The War
Nv JAMES d. WHITE


.ciated Press Staff Writer)
CAN FRANCISCO, Aug. 1.-R-
~ 7.pan's Premier Suzuki reject
~ Allied surrender ultimatum
outright?
NAV question the general assump'
inn that he did.
Ne probably meant to give that
,,nression-that he threw it in the
..tebasket and forgot about it
ND went back to his war-making.
m.+ would be for the Japanese
people and anyone else interested
n believing him.
- ror Allied governments, how
.r l his remarks contain over
. .saes which easily can add up to
.u;,'' YOURS of July 18th receiv-
s,i' and contents noted. No reply
.aw due to pressure of business,
&C."
What Suzuki actually may have
,.;d if anything, was filtered
s ssrouah the Tokyo Radio. The
srosdcast was heard by the Fed
ersl communications Commission
eo, o1o.sod in part by the Office
f. War Information. Assuming
tbe owl gave out all important
nsrts here's the gist OF what
sunIki said of the solemn Ameri-
csn Chinese-British warning to
surrender now before it's too late:
"The Imperial Japanese Gov
,unent . will take no notice
NJ the declaration"
There is no change whatso-
aver in the fundamental policy
If our government in regard to
the prosecution of the war"
The Joker here is the difference
between what the japanese gov
ernment actually intends to do
about prosecuting the war and
what it says it will do.
The stated policy is to fight to
The last The actual policy, &C.
cording to the most expert Ameri-
can analysis based on Japan's ac-
lions rather than her statements,
is 10 drag the war out in the hope
Of getting a peace softer than the
unconditional surrender which,
since the Cairo Declaration of
1943 informed Japanese have
known they face. T.
japanese strategy and tactics
bear this out. So do japanese
individuals who have surrendered
recently.
This actual policy to drag the
var out is to be carried on be-
had a smokescreen of the fiercest
possible show that the determina-
ton to fight to the last is the
real thing.
And it may well be the real
thing.
Japanese leaders, having talked
themselves and everyone else con-
cerned into believing that the
Japanese people have the spirit
to fight to the last, now have little
choice but to carry that idea out
in their every word and action.
They know that the japanese
people either will or will not bear
up under the stNin that cracked
the Germans.
If the people can take it, thai
suits japanese leaders, because
they know personally they're not
going to be around very long il
Japan loses the war. Should the
Japanese people crack, then the
militarists can say we've beer
let down. which will satisfy some
remote corner of their prideful
personalities.
Premier Suzuki could hardly
have given his people any intima-
ton that he might be thinking
about surrender. But nowhere in
the statements attributed to him
did he say specifically that his
government rejected the details
listed by the Allies as to just what
unconditional surrender is going to
mean.
It's worth remembering that the
ultimatum followed Japanese
propaganda broadcast complaining
that the Allies had not yet said
exactly what unconditional sur.
render would mean to Japan.
Now Japan knows.
And even knowing, her ruling
elaSses-the Imperial family, the
wealthy clans, the military anc
naval cliques-can give no sigr
how that they can even entertain
such ideas as the Allies list:
Japans standardization, occupa
non, and Reconsideration a!
lar as war potential is concerned
10 the japanese, coming roune
=" TINS point of admitting the in
tvl'aole is one of the most pain
1ol mental processes any segmen
o. Inc human race has ever I'm
dergone.
Never in history has any people
seen SO woefully unprepared for {
seleat which their own leader:
nave led them into.
germany had been defeated be
nre. Japan, never.