Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-12-12
By ]. A. O'LEARY and
CARTER BROOKE JONES.


CARTER BROOKE JONES.
A naval intelligence officer was
reported today to have told the
late Secretary Knox, when an
intercepted japanese note was
delivered to the cabinet officer
several hours before Pearl Har-
Dor was bombd, that this means
a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor
today and possibly a midnight
attack on Manila"
The congressional investigating
committee learned of this evidence
when the "top secret portion of the
Army Pearl Harbor Boards report
was placed in the records.
The prediction that Pearl Harbor
would be attacked that day was at
tributed to Capt (then Comdr) Al
win D. Kramer of naval intelligence,
by Capt. L. F. Stafford of naval COM
munications.
Testimony Summarized.
The Army boards summary OF
this portion of the hitherto secret
testimony stated:
Capt. Stafford testified that
Comdr. Kramer told him in 1943
that when he submitted the
message to the Jap Ambassadors to
present the Japanese reply Ito Sec
rotary of State Hull at l pm, to
Secretary Knox, he sent note
along with it saying, in effect, This
means sunrise attack on Pearl
Harbor today and possibly mid
night attack on Manila.
Capt. Kramer is slated to be a
witness before the congressional
committee later.
Capt. Kramer recently has been q
patient at Naval Hospital in Be-
thesda, Md, and while there he was
interviewed by two Republican
members of the congressional Pearl
Harbor Committee, Representatives
Gearhart of California and Keefe
of Wisconsin. They told the House
the officer had important informa-
ton which they hoped to bring out
at the hearings, but did not disclose
the nature of this evidence.
winds" Message Brought Up.
The secret evidence disclosed am
pie testimony at the Army Boards
hearings of the disputed winds"
messages, code by which the Jap
anese had arranged to inform their
diplomats in various capitals when
relations were broken with America,
Britain or Russia. Doubt since has
been cast on whether any message
based on the winds code ever was
Previous to the hear
ings, Republican members of the
congressional investigating commit
tee charged that wing message
was missing from the Navy files.
The Army board stated in it's
secret summary that Rear Admiral
Leigh Moves, chief of naval COM
munications, phoned Col Otis K.
Sadtler, in charge of Army codes
and ciphers, on December S, 1941,
two days before Pearl Harbor, say
ing "the message was in" Asked
what message, Admiral Moves was
reported to have said he believed it
meant war between Japan and Great
Britain. The code for this was,
west wind, clear" Rupture be-
tween Japan and the United States
would have been, least wind, rain"
Capt. Stafford, according to the
summary said the activating
winds message came in Deem
Der 4 and was sent to him in tele-
type. Capt. Kramer was said to
have written on the bottom of it.
War with England, war with Amer
lea, peace with Russia" The sum-
mary of the message was given
Immediately to Admiral Noyes."
Conflicting Accounts Found.
Later, however, 1t. Col. Henry c.
Clausen of the judge advocate
generals division, appointed by Sec
rotary of War Stimson ito continue
the Pearl Harbor investigation" aft
er the board had reported, found
conflicting accounts of the winds"
in affidavits which he OBJ
tanned from witnesses.
Although the Army board was
told two copies of the winds in
Perception was sent to the Army,
Col. Roy w. Minckler, in charge of
the Signal Intelligence Service at
the time, said in an affidavit to Col.
Clausen:
Il never saw or heard of an au-
thentic execute winds code) mes
sage of this character either be-
fore or since December 7, l941. It
is my belief that no such message
was sent
Capt. Edwin T. Layton, intelli-
gence officer of the Pacific Fleet,
deposed that no such message ever
reached Pearl Harbor.
Gen. Cramer's Summary.
Maj. Gen. Myron c. Cramer, for
mer judge advocate general of the
Army. who reviewed the Army
boards findings and Col. Clausen's
inquiry for Secretary Stimson, stated
in his summary:
ct is admitted by all that this
first winds message, setting up a
code or signal to be given later,
was received by the War Depart
ment around November 20. 1941.
However, the testimony before the
Pearl Harbor Board left in doubt
whether second or activating or
execute winds message was ever
received and If so by whom.
"Col. Clausen,s, subsequent il1ves-
tigation fails to disclose any testi-
mony that an activating or nipple.
menting winds message indicating
breach Of Japanese relations with
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