Evening star., 1945-02-25
Admiral Barbey's Amphibious Strateg,
Is Now Backbone of Pacific Campaigns

to the Southwest Pacific In January,
l943, the 7th Fleets amphibious force
consisted Of little more than this title.
Eventually he got some ships-and some
problems.
He had no facilities for maintenance.
He sent to Australia for machinery
which he put on two LISTS and con-
verted them into floating workshops.
His ships lacked medical facilities. He
put medical units on LISTS and, as
troops and supplies were unloaded, the
ships quickly were turned into first-aid
units. Often wounded were treated
within 10 minutes after they were picked
up on the beach.
At Leyte he created an Lei fire.
fighting unit. which put out 80 per cent
of the fires started by Japanese planes
in Leyte Harbor. Barley credits the
unit with saving dozen ships.
Amphibious Chief
Such tinkering was nothing new to
Uncle Dan" He had done plenty Of it
in 1912 as head OF the Navy's Amphibious
Warfare Section. His Unsuitable curl
osity keeps him constantly probing into
the task at hand.
At Lac, he discovered something was
needed to blast snipers out of foxholes
and trees on the beach. The Lei rocket
boat was born Tried out at Arawe in
December, 1943, Barley converted a
half dozen more LCIs into rocket boats
for the Marine landing at Cape Glou-
cester 10 days later.
Two distinct amphibious tactics sprang
up in the Pacific. There was Barbey's
and there was the Central Pacific's.
The Central Pacific amphibious wars
were waged, after long sea hops to small
coral atolls where the Japanese could
make a concerted defense of the beach
but the attacker had the superiority
in the air, on the sea and on the ground
once he got there. There wasn't much
to worry about from the air and sea
for adjoining atolls were too far away
and their airfields had been knocked out
In the Southwest Pacific
The opposite was true of the South
west Pacific. Large land masses enabled
Americans to pick their landing spots,
but it also permitted the japanese to
develop enough air bases up and down
the coast to assure local air superiority.
Therefore" Barley explains, "our
tactics required landing where they
weren't and getting out in hurry"
He used smaller craft, such as LCIs,
Lists and Let's, and unloaded them
about as quickly as the troops could get
themselves ashore. At Hollandia and
Aitapo. New Guinea, he put $1,000 troops
on the beach in four hours.
Probably nothing else is so punctual
as such a beach landing. Troops,
brought in conveys as far as 5000 miles.
storm ashore at the exact minute picked
out sometimes weeks before.
All Done on Paper
There is nothing mysterious about it.
nothing spectacular. 1t is done on paper
by businesslike naval officers
Barley furnishes only the ride plus
assurance that he will get the troops
on the beach and help them stay there
until they are able to take over.
Foremost, when plan is laid. he
wants to know how many troops are to
be landed, what sort Of equipment and
supplies are going along
A few pencil marks on some scratch
paper give him a rough idea how many
transports and cargo vessels are needed.
As Navy man he doesn't want to risk
any more ships in an unhealthy harbor
than he has to-. The Army wants to be
sure that it has sufficient supplies to
take care of all the contingencies. The
final answer is compromise, saws
Barley.
When the outline is settled, Barley
calls in his experienced staff. They are
used to working with each other Most