The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-02-17

MMDnN Ulllo COU1lUIy dDOuL
 Germany can be bombed to defeat" is at last reduced to it's true and negative importance.
 In planning the combined Amer ican and British attack on Germany the Royal Air Force was given the assignment of dislocating German industry and the housing of the German worker population to lower German morale, while the U. s. Army Air Forces were given speci'' fic targets for strategic bombing oi. highly induStrialized areas.
 In three years of concentrated at- tack, however, the RAF has been able to destroy only about 15 per cent of Germany's industrial capa- city for war production.
 On the other side of the picture, Germany's combined air and ground attack knocked out third of Rus sia's industrial capacity and took over 60 per cent of Soviet coal and coke output, yet Russia came back. JAPAN KNOCKED,
 BUT NOT OUT
 The U. s. combined air, sea, sub marine and ground attack on Jap ans shipping has in three years re- duced this maritime nations ship ping from seven million tons to four and-a-half million tons a year ago and an estimated two million tonG today. This has put the Japs up against the tough decision of Whe- ther to stop imports of raw mater ials or cut down on supplying her troops in the field, but 1t has not knocked Japan out of the war.
 These results support the Amer 1can strategical belief in the bomb- ing of selected bottleneck targets which will most seriously cripple ar enemy's war production capacity. One-third of Germany's aircraft ball bearings and tWo-thirds of her industrial ball bearings being con- centrated in the SchWeinfurt area, this was natural target. Nearly 95 per cent of Japan'S coal, coke and power production being concen- trated in six main areas, they have been natural targets.
 Tn years strafing of German railroads, Allied planes were able to knock out some 1,700 locomotives. It sounds like lot until measured against Germany's capacity to build new locomotives, which was 1,200 a year. The net loss was therefore only 500 locomotives year. That made the bombing of locomotives not so good from a strategic standpoint, thought it was good tactically If 1t tied up supply line to the front for even short time. But as the Ger mans became pretty proficient in patching their rail lines that made the game still less worth the candle RECUPERATION A FACTOR
 The ability of an industry to re- cuperate from bombing loss is still another factor in determining Whe- ther it will pay to bomb it. In at tacking the German aircraft indus try the Army Air Forces let the final assembly plants more or less alone because they were easy to re- place. Instead U. s. bombers were sent after the engine assembly plants which, because of their spe- cialized tooling, were harder to re- place.
 Since the German single-engine fighter craft losses in recent months have been running as high as 50 per cent month, If this aircraft production could have been stopped for two months 1t could have been stopped completely. Yet 1t never was.
 All these facts are analysed here at the Orlando Tactical Center not to minimize the part the Army Air Forces have played in this war or will be capable of doing in the next But they do show that the aerial branch of military science is still in the process of development, and many of the early and fantastic claims made for airpower have noi been realized.