Evening star., 1945-11-17

elements Of the strategic air forces
themselves, and every one Of these
men required the same amount Of
ship-borne food, clothing, shelter
and facilities as did his brother In
the infantry or In the artillery.
This was for his personal needs
only and does not include the vast
fiow of supply, greater relatively for
the plane than for any other wea-
pom, required for air force opera
tions and maintenance.
All this will be required in any
overseas campaign-which is the
only kind Of campaign that will
keep an aggressor at proper dis
tance.
Should the strategic air force be
set up as 4 separate entity, with
its own administrative and supply
systems, the duplication in services
and facilities which is frequently
advanced as a reason for merging
the Army and Navy, would become
a possibility of triplication. The
procurement problem would be just
that much more complicated. The
available funds for national defense
would be stretched to cover not du-
plicate, but triplicate administra-
tion.
A strategic air force has a proper
place in any organization for the
conduct of a land-sea-air campaign.
1t may be pointed out, however, that
the Navy's submarine forces oper-
ate strategically in as separate and
individual a manner as do the
strategic air forces. Yet the SUBJ
marine force is completely in
tegrated into the Navy's logistic and
administrative system. We have not
yet adopted any suggestion that we
establish an independent submarine
force, distinct from the rest of the
Navy, although such ideas have
been advanced in earlier years of
the submarines development.
Upholds Present System.
The third additional point which
wish to make then is that I be-
lieve the strategic air forces can
be militarily efficient and effective
as part of the present War De-
partment and integrated into the
services of administration and sup
ply of that department.
All of the foregoing considera-
1ot fn y,
most important point, which is my
doubt that a single department
would assist the adequate provision
and efficient use of seapower. ]
have drawn attention to the i'm
portance of seapower in the war
against Japan, and the committee
Is also aware of its importance in
the war against Italy and Germany
l have said that since the seapower
that served us so well in this wal
and all our past wars was built up
by the Navy Department, it seemed
reasonable to conclude that the
Navy Department is essentially
sound, and I have said that oul
successes in the war placed the bur-
den of proof more heavily on those
who would make drastic change
in our present system.
I do not oppose change out oi
feeling that the old ways are the
best ways. If I were a conservative
of that kind I could not have formed
and stated the opinions I held 8
year ago. If the Navy were con.
servative in that way, it would nevel
have developed effective amphibiou.
and carrier warfare. I do value thu
history and tradition of the Navy
That, however, is no superficial af.
fection for sea-going vocabulary ane
customs, but a deep sense of wha
Seapower has meant to our countr!
and to England in controlling vita
sea areas in time of war. I do no
believe our people are sufficient,
aware of the Importance to Americ'
of the control of the seas. Perhap
this is something well understoo.
and valued by the Navy's siste
services, but if so we are not oftel
SltC1 tAldt osoSSo a1 dllCC.
Sea and Air Relationship.
In my public statement, I felt
might properly discuss the rela
tionship between the strategic ali
forces and the lines of martini,
supply, adequately protected by ses
power, which enabled them Il
operate overseas. In their natura
pride in the achievements of theil
service, some air force spokesmer
have been reported in the press a!
saying that Japan could have beer
knocked out by air power alone.
The tinder box cities and the fac
tory system of Japan may hav'
made such victory seem plausible
but only after the Navy and tn
Army ground forces and the Ma
rines had fought across the Pacifi
to win bases for them. Who can pre-
dict whether or not the nationa
economy and strength of a futur
enemy is one which can best be at
tackled by air power, sea power O
land power or a team composed O
all three?
Fears Navy Made Secondary.
A single department OF nationa
defense will have one of two conse
quences for the naval component
Either the Navy will retain all tn
autonomy, integrity and prestig
necessary to carry out its function.
in which case it might as well re
main separate department, or
will lose these advantages, eithe
gradually or at once, and become
secondary service. This may not b
in accord with theory. but I be
lieve it will be the fact. From m
point of view, therefore, and in re
spect to maintaining the seapowe
lof the United States, a merger O
the two departments means, at best
no more advantages than we hav
now; at worst it means that tn
Navy and the command of the sea
SO vital for our country will suffel
The determination of the size G
the. naval Establishments of tn
Army-is responsibility of tn
Congress in accordance with Its ow
judgment of world conditions an
the policies of the United State.
This responsibility may be shifted
a single department presents re
quests for appropriations for ma