The Wilmington morning star., 1945-09-12
Pearl Harbor Probe
BY ARTHUR KROCK

BY ARTHUR KROCK
WASHINGTON,-A joint committee of Con-
sress is soon to begin an inquiry into the
disaster at Pearl Harbor and those Immediate
w subsequent in the Pacific which only the
previous state of war deferred so long. Since
the record of Congressional investigations is
spotty with reference to fairness and ability of
procedure, concentration on the main point
and the exclusion of partisan and personal
aninations, the forthcoming inquiry begins
under handicap But by its procedure and
the nature of its report the joint committee
can dispel that and the gravity and irnpor-
lance of the task require it.
Senator Barley, moving with the approval
of the President, laid down admirable set
of standards for the committee in his remarks
today, Whether the Roberts inquiry did not
attain these standards because of the timing
and the limitations officially put upon it is a
matter of opinion. And the reasons why the
reports of the Army and Navy boards and
the comments of Secretaries Stlnson and For
restal and Admiral King failed also to reach
the completeness and objectivity stressed by
Mr. Barley are also in the realm OF opinion.
But none of these considerations. real or mag
ined need hamper the Congressional Com
mite, or at any rate some of its members.
That is why the chapter in American history
that contains the fateful date of Dec. 7, 1871,
can for the first time be fairly narrated and
closed it the committee will meet its respon-
sibility to the people
The principal questions 1t must determine
are these, and, in all testimony is directed
and held to lines leading straight to the
swers, the report should be clear and satisfac-
tory:
/. What factors. human and material mill
tary and political, were responsible directly
or indirectly, for the highly successful time
element of surprise in the attack; for the
general unpreparedness of the base, even it
there had been several hours of warning; for
the concentration of the fleet in the harbor.
the airplanes on the ground and the ammuni-
ton under lock and key?
q Was high policy, or military and admins
trative incompetence or neglect - or all of
them in CONFERENCE.-The chief cause of the
poor Naisons among high officials in Wash
ington who were fully informed of the Japa-
nese crisis and the equally poor Ialsons be-
tween the Washington headquarters of the
services and their commanders in the field?
3. Who were the individuals most responsible
for these poor liaisons?
4. To what degree was high policy respon-
sible for the military lapses of the comman-
ders in Hawaii at time which, despite poor
liaisons, common report revealed as critical
and the verge of war?
S, To what extent were these lapses, and
those attributed to Washington authority by
the Army and Navy boards, the result of the
public's anti-war state of mind?
There are other questions, but they are in
the category of subdivisions. If the Congress
sional inquiry concentrates on the five major
points, gets the available testimony efficiently
and fairly, and Sits it by the same methods,
the answers will be clear, and Pearl Harbor
can be relegated to history except for such
partisan and personal ammunition as it may
supply for while. But If the committee, or
its majority, even any individual member
sets out to protect or defend any individual
proved to have been concerned, or obviously
connected, then the inquiry will resemble GER
tain others which have damaged the reputa-
ton Of Congress and confused, hoodwinked or
disguised the public.
The committee if it chooses can take up
the issue Of why or how the United States got
into World War H. Yet to achieve its real
purpose it will not need to concern itself over
whether the diplomatic negotiations with ia
pan were well or i'll handled in Washington
or in Tokyo. That is legitimate subject for
inquiry and for national debate. But the COM
mittee's principal reason for existence is to
find out why Pearl Harbor and Hawaii were
so thoroughly surprised and so heavily pun
ished.
The argument Of the previous Administration
that the people, must bear large share of
blame for a military disaster at scene
vived. The Army board asserted that the
Army was influenced by public opinion"
and the state Of the public mind" Echoing
this, President Truman commented, Il think
the country is as much to blame as any in
divdual in this final situation that developed
at Pearl Harbor''
But the committee is instructed to inquire
into the particular development. And surely
unusual talents will be required to prove that
the civilian state of mind prevented Govern
ment authorities from keeping one another in
formed, units Of War Department from keep
ing others informed and commanders from in
voking sound defense measures at an outpost.
In April 1910, the public had heard from
Secretary Stimson that 1--WE believe the base
in Hawaii 'is now impregnable." On the morn
ing Of Pearl Harbor it had read report OF
Secretary Knox that the Navy was never more
powerful In the third-term campaign Of 1910
it had been assured by both Presidential can
didates that each would be more likely to
keep the nation out of war. In 1941 it was
solernnly told that Lend-lease which actually
made war inevitable, move to assure
exactly the reverse. And in the fiscal year
ending in June, 1941 the public. through Con-
gress, had assigned more than $40 billions ad-
ditional to national defense.-New York Times.
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