Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-08-19

the future course of the war, the Navy
and the air and ground forces-Marine
or Army-were acquiring greater pre-
cision, greater striking power, greater
know how" in the business of am
phibious warfare. BY November, 1912,
the problems of assault landings were
SO clearly understood that the Navy
was prepared to tackle them with car
rier planes supplying the entire air
cover from preliminary reconnaissance
through preinvasion bombardment to
protective patrols until local arstrips
could be put in operation.
On November 10 naval task forces
began the softening-up bombardments
by carrier planes ana surface Units of
the important atolls of the Gilbert Is
lands, prior to the landings (Novem-
Der 22b at Tarawa and Maxim The
land fighting was bloody, but no units
of the Japanese feet appeared to make
the problem more difficult
Two months later, after almost con-
slant neutralizing strikes at all enemy
airbases in the area, Marines were
landed on February 2, i943, on the i'm
portant atolls of the Mar5halls, Kwale-
lein, Roi and Namur. Once again there
was strong ground and cir opposition,
but once again the Japanese declined
to commit any of their feet to try to
stop the American drive.
The Blasting of Truk
With these unsuitable carriers in its
hands the Navy proceeded to search
even more diligently for something that
would sink. On February II and l3
the Navy carried this search into the
great japanese bastion Of Truk, where
carrier aircraft blasted enemy ship
ping, sinking eight ships, while battle
ships, cruisers and destroyers steaming
close of1shore bombarded land installa-
tons.
If the Japanese were unwilling to
tious with their aircraft--army or navy
and every strike of an American task
force accounted for a satisfactory num-
Der of enemy planes. The Battle of
Midway had accounted for many, if
not most, of japanese trained navy
flyers, and they were to lose almost all
the rest soon enough in the famous
'Marianas turkey shoot"
Meanwhile, as an indication of the
caution with which they were attempt
ing to horde their surface vessels, at
tentiQn may be called to the Battle of
Z Tel
American group-one heavy cruiser, two
light cruisers and four destroyers-
turned back japanese force twice it's
size when the latter sought to rein
force and supply garrisons IN the Aleu-
tians. No ships, Japanese or American,
were sunk in the engagement. With
clear numerical superiority the Jap
anese refused to push the fight to any
real conclusion, but broke off and
steamed back to safer waters Shortly
after this, on May II, 1913, Navy task
force landed the Army on Attu, and
Two months later on Kiska in the
Aleutians.
Submarines Make Big Score
WING GIL tllcoc Opcl dtlOIlS we're going
m, significant portion of the Navy,
mall in tonnage but mighty in lethal
aggresslveness, was carrying the war
deep into enemy waters. These were
the submarines, which, from the start
of the war to its triumphant close,
harassed the japanese necessarily. es-
tablishing highly effective blockade
tight around every supply route, clear
into the enemy's home waters. Navy
submarines accounted for more than
l46 combatant ships and 1O4l nom
combatant ships sunk.
With the capture of the key islands
in the Marshalls the pattern of this
stage of war in the Pacific was clear.
The United States could strike vir-
tually anywhere it chose with its fast