Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-05-05

the Mouse and seize Leige. Actually
the forces under (Field Marshal
Walther) Won Model got within S
kilometers g miles, of the Meuse.
Had to Shift to East.
eve succeeded in surprising you
but our reinforcements had to be
brought up without the aid of
railways, many even on foot. Pat
ton could conduct his skiilful count
eroffensive with complete mobility"
The bulge offensive was Ger
many's last chance and Won Rund-
stedt said so in an order of the
day. That I was right may be
seen from the fact that when the
Russian offensive began we had to
shift all our mobile equipment to
the east"
To a question why the war con-
tinues, Won Rundstedt said: 1T Is
a fight to be or not to be. Ac-
cording to all utterances from the
east and west, we have no choice
but life or death. I do not know
how long resistance will continue
for I have been out of touch with
the situation for weeks"
The Wehrmacht, Won Rundstedt
said, made no serious effort to in
wade England after the fall of
France because "for an assault on
England it was necessary to select
the closest point from the mainland
Now, to the north of that point
was the North Sea, to the south the
Atlantic. We did not have fleet
capable of standing by to protect
us from those two sides. Moreover
our landing equipment CVon Rund-
stedt used contemptuous German
term "aeppelkaehne," meaning mere
barges for hauling apples) was to-
tally inadequate as experiments with
them showed"
Could Not Bring Up Reserves.
Discussing D day, Germany's
supreme commander for the west
explained that he was not in COM
mand after July S, 1914, and hence
declined to answer why the troops
were so quickly pulled back from
the Atlantic.
Abouts events before then, Won
Rundstedt said: I'VE naturally ex-
pected a landing attempt but could
not tell where it would come,
whether in Holland, Central France
or Southern France. So could not
put all my reserves one place. Yet
our reserves were so dispersed and
placed that I could have met the
D day landing even though it sur
prised us except for the fact We
had no mobility, and could not bring
up our reserves. Between Paris anc
Rouen there was not a single bridge
across the Seine.
Furthermore, your naval artillery
was terrific. Also we could move only
by night. We knew you wanted tt
get to the Rhine, hence we had re.
serves ready for an attempt some
where between the Seine and the
Sonme even though we did not know
in advance when nor exactly where
you would land"
Praise for American Generals.
Asked what he thought of Ameri.
can generals. Won Rundstedt unhes.
itatingly replied:
During the last war I had the
feeling your generals were new anc
untried and therefore paid for theil
mistakes with big losses. This time
T am simply amazed at what vol
have learned meanwhile. 1t Is ter.
rife. Your mobility, your ability tt
detect and exploit the enemy's weak.
nesses is as modern as were our oper.
atoms in France in 1940."
Japan's entry into the war had nc
effect upon the German military
fate, the field marshal said, since
Russia and Japan did not come tc
blows.
I'VE knew you had enough to fight
a war in the Pacific and the Atlantic
but If pressure on our eastern front
could have been relieved by Japan's
becoming involved in a war with
Russia, that would have helped" he
explained.