Evening star., 1945-06-10

1t would be a great mistake to hide
our heads in the sand and not recognize
openly what has been known for some
time in high Washington quarters
that our relations with Russia are far
from satisfactory. The same situation
exists between Great Britain and a few
other of the United Nations and this
great new power which has risen over
many of the ruins of Europe as result
of the war
The fundamental reason for this un-
fortunate situation rests in the basic
suspicion of the Moscow government
Of its Allies. This suspicion created a
reciprocal atmosphere" in American
and British quarters which has increased
rather than decreased in the years
which have followed Hitler's attack on
Russia
This reciprocal atmosphere" has been
particularly heightened since early in
1914 because of the cynical attitude
Russia has taken toward agreements
signed with the other United Nations
While this unhealthy frame of mind
prevailed among some of the policy
trainers in Washington and London, the
public in both English-speaking coun-
tries was never taken into the confidence
of their leaders. On the contrary, the
people-particularly in the United
States-were subjected to a barrage of
propaganda.
Wanted Moscow Happy.
This propaganda tended to point out
that everything Russia did and which
was secretly disapproved by the Ameri-
can Government-was perfect and that
without her effort the Germans would
win the war The watchword passed
along by our propaganda services was to
educate the public to the idea that all
the sacrifices would be in vain unless
the Russians remained on our side No
price was too high, it was intimated, to
keep the Moscow government in good
humor
Our real objective-the desire to de-
stroy totalitarianism, to secure free
life for all and to give the overrun
countries of Europe a chance to recon-
struct themselves as fully independent
and sovereign states-became observed
for reasons of expediency. We had to
win the war and were told in so many
words that it would be too costly an af-
fair if we lost the support OF the
U. S. S. r.
That even the highest in the land had
some suspicious of Moscow's intention
to cooperate with us as Fundamentally
as we were cooperating was evidenced
in the surrender of many of our funda-
mental principles as were expressed
in the Atlantic Charter. Russias po-
Htical desire for territorial aggrandize-
ment, concealed under the formula OF
cepted lest Russia abandon the common
tight.
Russia's Suspicious Old.
The writer had an hereford
conversation last year with one of our
principal policy trainers who volun-
teered the informa ation-not for publica-
ton at that time-that had the Amer
lean and British representatives not
gone to Moscow in November, 1945, no.
body knows what tempting terms Hitler
might have offered the Russians to get
them out of the war.
From such statements and others it
would appear that while we were fight
ing this war for an theology, the Rus
slams were thinking in terms of world
power and aggrandizement of a coun-
try which is already the largest, and po-
tentially the wealthiest, in the world.
Whether the Russians really had such
intentions, it is hard to believe. But
there seems to be no question that the
American and British statesmen were
convinced that wide concessions had to
be made to obtain the continued CO.
operation of the Red armies in the war.
The Russians suspicion of the West
ern World dates back to the period after
the World War when all the states west
Of the Vistula River got together to
support the counterrevolutionary move
and blackballed Russia from the con-
cert Of civilized nations for many years.
The United States was the last of the
great powers to recognize the u S. S. R.
in November, 1888, when diplomatic re-
lations were resumed. The Russians,
who joined the Germans at the out
break of the Second World War, re-
manned suspicious of the west and par
ticularly of Great Britain.
Feared British Attitude.
A few Soviet citizens who once were
in the confidence of Premier Stain, but
who have sought refuge abroad since
the fall of 1941, say that when the Ger
mans attacked Russia in June, 194l,
Stain was convinced that they would
be joined by Britain in a short while.
Russia, they say, made preparations to
defend Kronstadt against the British
fleet. Thus Russias suspicion of the
British was weep. Stain is said to have
been amazed when he received Prime
Minister Churchilrs message that
British was deep. Stain is said to have
this demonstration did not calm the
fears of the Russian leader who saw in
this action another move dictated by
expediency.
Despite the demonstrations of friend
ship and the large quantities of lease
lend we were pouring into Russia, the
Soviet Premier turned his suspicious
toward us. On orders from the White
House, the lease-lend requirements of
Our ally were never questioned or cur
tailed. Everything requested was sent
across the Atlantic as speedily as pos
sible But for some reason or other.