Evening star., 1945-10-10
General MorshuIIs Report

VI d ldIeWeI aQQreSS TO the Nation
from a great wartime Chief of Staff.
Most of the text of the report is
devoted to an excellent review of the
strategy, the military organization
and the hard-fought campaigns
which led us to victory in this
greatest of all wars. But this is of
secondary Importance. The real sig
nificance OF the report lies in Gen
eral Marshall'S analysis of our mis-
takes before and during this war,
and his application of the lessons
learned to the all-important prob
lem of insuring our future national
security, which "is entirely in our
own hands"
1t is no secret that General
Marshall will retire in the near fu-
ture. His job is done. When he be-
came Chief of Staff in 1899 this
country was in the impossible posi-
ton of attempting to play the role
OF great power in troubled world
with only the merest shadow of an
army-"three and a half divisions
scattered in small pieces over the
entire United StateS"-to sup
port its diplomacy. Inevitably, our
efforts in behalf of peace ended in
failure. Then came the heartbreak-
ing task of building a great mill
tary organization and deploying it
around the world Having lived
through that experience at its very
center, and having known better
than most of us how narrowly we
escaped disaster. General Marshall
is exceptionally qualified to point out
mistakes of the past and offer un-
selfish counsel for our future guild
ance. This he has done in his last
report as Chief of Staff, and he has
done it with degree of frankness
that is compatible with the greater
freedom which his own prestige has
won and which has come to him
with the end of the war and his
pending retirement from active
service
General Marshall begins his report
with the blunt statement that in
the dark days of 1912 Germany and
Japan came so close to complete
domination of the world" that we
do not yet realize how thin the
thread of Allied survival was
stretched. I'm good conscience" he
adds, this Nation can take little
credit for staving off disaster in
those critical days" The things that
saved us then, in his judgment, were
the refusal of the British and the
Russian peoples to accept what ap-
peared to be inevitable defeat, and
the failure of our enemies to make
the most of the opportunities which
Allied weakness presented to them
in 1942. Then came the Russian
victory at Stalingrad and the defeat
of Rommel at Ell Alamein-Allied
triumphs which turned the tide of
the war against Germany and which,
coupled with the tremendous Amer
lcan power that was beginning to
build up after two years of frantic
effort, paved the way for the final
entries into, Rome, Berlin and Tokyo.
But General Marshall makes very
clear his belief that we can never
again rely for security on the factors
of distance, allies and enemy mis-
takes. There is no alternative" he
says. "but that this Nation must be
prepared to defend it's interests
against any nation or combination
of nations" Until some trustworthy
system of cooperative security is
evolved "a rich nation which lays
down its arms, as we have done
after every war in our history, will
court disaster. The existence of the
complex and fearful instruments of
destruction now available make this
simple truth which, in my opinion,
is unbeatable.
General Marshall does not mini
mize the Importance of diligent
search for chronological improve
mentS, and he urges that no effort be
spared in the development of such
things as electronics, atomic explo-
Sives and the superSonic rockets
which will make another war thing
of horror for every American town
and city, Ocean distances are no
longer a vital part of our defense,
he says. Therefore we, must have
ever ready for quick mobilization an
adequate force of trained men-a
force which, in his opinion, can be
provided only through adoption of a
system of universal military training.
Upon this system of universal
training would be built volunteer
National Guard, ready to take the
field in the first few weeks of an
emergency. and an Organized Re-
serve. These forces. coupled with a
regular military establishment whose
size would be determined by the
nature of the peace settlements,
would constitute the backbone OF our
postwar military establishment. In
event of an emergency the existence
of these units, together with civilians
who had learned the. rudiments of
war through universal training and
who would be available for induc-
tion as Congress might determine,