Evening star., 1945-02-26
Bottle of Two Jimu
Toughest of the War
Writer Says Circumstances Pre-.
vented Surprise Move
By David Laurence

WItcT DAYS circumstances fres
vented Surprise Move
By David Laurence
There should be no comparisons as to
the bravery Of any of our fighting men
in all branches Of the service, but with
out minimizing any other action it can
be said that the battle of Two Jima,
fought by the marines, has been the
toughest and bloodiest of the war.
This is because there was no element
Of surprise, the enemy being able to see
the approach of landing vessels and be-
ing able to spot every square yard Of
| ground for artillery and machine-gun
fire.
For 20 years the island has been forti-
fed by the Japanese. Trenches were
built and concrete pillboxes and gun
| emplacements hidden in the rugged
| terrain. The island is only five miles
long and less than two miles wide. Just
imagine an assault on the Rock of
Gibraltar and you get an idea of what
the marines were up against.
The order to take the island came
not from one service but from the
United States Joint Chiefs of Stats.
The two airfields were needed to shorten
the distance for our B-29s and other
planes in their attacks on Tokyo, 750
miles away, but Two was also needed
to put an end to the observation for
Tokyo which went on from the island
base as previous flights of B-29s went
by.
1t enabled japanese forces to inter-
cept B-29s going and coming. Two was
vital objective and from military
viewpoint more necessary than any
other single objective in the whole
Pacific at this time.
| Were the heavy losses avoidable?
The Navy and Army Air Forces did
their work of preparation splendidly
The advance bombardment was all that
could be desired, as motion pictures
of the action of the first two days flown
here already clearly show The landings
were executed efficiently.
Losses Unavoidable.
Losses had to be taken and it seems
a miracle that the marines fought their
way successfully up the cliffs to a
plateau $50 feet above and to the crater
rim of the volcano. more than 300 feet
high. We needed to reach the airfields
on the former and the observation posts
Tor artillery on the latter.
When the Army landed in Leyte or
the Philippines, the choice of landing
places was wide. The element of sur
prise was possible. The opposition on
shore was light because the Japanese
couldn't concentrate in time to meet
the attack. When an island is several
hundreds OF miles long, the landing
force can pick desolate spot. But
on Two Jlma the enemy knew it could
reach with artillery fire to any or all
beaches.
The planners did achieve some sur
prise. They didn't land on the side
where the largest number of japanese
trenches were, but wisely took chance
on the other side of the island, where
1t was hoped the weather would be bet
ter. 1t wasn't much choice but 1t did
confuse the enemy.
Were the marine losses heavier than
those experienced by the Army In its
island landings? There is only one
comparable instance where the terrain
was rough and the experience can be
appraised on comparative basis This
was at kwajalein, where the Army took
certain islands and the marines took
some.
The losses were about the same. Like
wise, the Army losses at Normandy in
its landings were in somewhat the
same ratio where the Germans hap
pened to have division at one spot.
1t is simply impossible to land troops
even after heavy naval bombardment
and avoid heavy losses where the shores
are rocky and the enemy has a chance
to prepare fixed defenses.
American Youths Tough.
But the Japanese Army and Navy
know today that American youths are
not soft and that when 1t comes to
landing on Japan itself to take Tokyo
and the surrounding plains, the ma
rines. plus those amphibious units of
the Army. trained in the tactics of the
marines. will take the losses and 20
to the heart of the Mikado's homeland.
While the losses at Two are heavy
they are not heavier than officially ex-
pected. Incidentally, the number killed
Is relatively low. The wounded have
been evacuated in unprecedentedly fast
time. Names of casualties do not usu-
ally come in till five or six days after the
fighting begins. The names of those
killed come by radio or cable first. The
names of wounded come by air mail
later
Those listed as missing" may turn up
later among the wounded, so relatives
are not notified for a long time about
the missing even though the press
reports may speak of some casualties in
that category. Meanwhile, those unhurt
or slightly wounded may get letters
through to relatives faster than the
official notification.
It's tragic business for all concerned
but the conquest of Two is q turning
point in the entire Pacific war. 1t will
be known in military history as the first
truly offensive stroke-the first landing
on territory near the homeland held by
Japan before the war started.
We were not recapturing ground which
the japanese wrested from us. We were
capturing an island fortressAa citadel
that can well be called the front-line
defense of Japan itself. 1t was task