Evening star., 1945-09-27
Army Plot in Argentina


tary plot to overthrow the Argen-
tine dictatorial regime headed by
General Edelmiro Farrell and Colo
mel Peron can be interpreted in two
ways. From the Short-term aspect
it demonstrates the firm grip of the
ruling clique upon the army, since
the only major center of disaffec-
ton seems to have been among the
garrison of Cordoba, a provincial
capital distant from Buenos Aires,
and even here the movement was
squelched without much trouble.
However, from a long-range view,
the mere fact that revolutionary
agitation is permeating the armed
forces indicates the growing isola-
ton of regime which depends for
it's continued existence almost who'll
ly upon the disciplined loyalty of
the military. Last weeks monster
demonstration through the heart of
Buenos Aires must have deeply i'm
pressed every thinking officer and
soldier with the governments wide
spread unpopularity and the peoples
mounting determination to get rid
of it in one way or another. The
growing pressure of public opinion
upon army loyalty is evidenced by
an address made the evening before
the breaking of the plot by one of
the most influential leaders of the
Union Civica Radical, Argentinas
largest political party Speaking at
the provincial capital of Parana, he
pleaded with the army to "remain
neutral" leaving the people "alone
face to face with the clique of die
tatorship. The. people shall have
arms if necessary for the struggle
already joined"
1t is not improbable that this ci-
william leader was privy to the mill
tary conspiracy, which appears to
have had political connections. The
two outstanding leaders of the plot
are Generals Arturo Rawson and
Osvaldo Martin. Rawson was the
leader of the 1943 "putsch" which
overthrew the constitutional govern
ment of President Castillo, thereby
initiating the cycle of military die
tatorship which has persisted ever
since. Rawson was, however, de-
posed after only two days of power
by the ultramilitarists who were dis
satisfied with his relative modera-
ton. General Martin was, until a
few days ago, in command of the
army division stationed in the Cor
doba district. His sudden replace
ment by the energetic action of
Colonel Peron, who had got wind
of the plot, was the deciding factor
in the affair. Arrests of consid-
cradle number of junior officers at
Cordoba and elsewhere indicate that
disaffection to the dictatorship is not
confined to a factional split among
the ruling clique, but is permeating
the lower grades.
Under these circumstances it is
fair to assume that army solidarity
is being undermined. Such solidar-
ity is an absolute prerequisite for
the dictators. because the Argentine
Army is relatively small force. It's
normal peacetime establishment is
about 10000, with some 100000
trained reserves who can be called
to the colors in time of foreign war
or other national emergency. In
addition, there is an efficient police
force and a semimilitary constabu-
larry, together with navy establish
ment numbering some 10000. These
are not excessive in a country with
an area of more than 100000
square miles and a population in ex-
cess of 100000 Obviously the die
tatorship must retain full control
over all these forces If it is to main
tain itself in power against we'll
nigh universal civilian unpopularity