The Wilmington morning star., 1945-03-10
FRANCE AFTER YALTA


The relation of France with the
Yalta powers is much too serious
a matter to be dealt with by ges'
lures in Paris and quips in Wash.
ington, by rumor, inspired stories
and international repartee. There
is a problem here which can be
resolved only by high statesman.
ship-that is to say by a deter.
mination to look beneath and be.
yond the incidents, which are only
the symptoms of the trouble.
The problem is how to make the
transition from the Big Three to
the Big Four. In conducting the
war the decision in fact lies with
the three because, having made a
decision, they are able to issue the
necessary orders to the great
armies, air forces, and navies
which they command. In other
words Stain, Churchill and
Roosevelt can, and no one else can
make military decisions. But when
they come to the pacification and
settlement of Europe over a long
period of time, the Big Three do
not have anything like the same
France as a full partner from the
beginning and through all stages.
The principle of the Big Three
for war and a Big Four for the
postwar was recognized at Yalta.
But the application of this prin-
ciple has proved TO be difficult,
and will undoubtedly continue to
be vexatious of worse, until in the
four capitals the difficulty is
treated as a problem to be clarified
rather than as an occasion for
diplomatic maneuvering.
For that it will be necessary to
speak plainly and to say that first
in Washington and then in Paris
there has been a fundamental mis-
judgment of the French position
in the closing phases of the Euro
pean war and the opening phases
Of the European pacification.
Mr.. Roosevelt's rnisjudgment, to
begin with him, was, as has so
often been said, not to have seen
soon enough that strong France
was impossible except under De
Gaulle, and that a strong France
is indispensable to any settlement
with Germany, and therefore to
the reconstruction of Europe. 1t
is however, true that before Yalta,
and indeed since last summer, Mr..
Roosevelt has agreed intellectu-
ally, so to speak at the top of his
mind, that for the postwar there
must be Big Four. Before Yalta
he had come around to the opin-
ion that France should participate
in the political decisions which
would follow after the military de.
cisions CT the Big Three.
But there is difference be.
tween an opinion which has been
accepted without personal enthus-
iasm and a real conviction that
for act two of Yalta it was vitality
important to have France partici-
pating. So the matter, it appears,
was not pressed when Stain. who
is disposed to count army divisions
in international affairs, preferred
to confina the conference to the
great military powers and not to
complicate the conference by Gen
eral de Gaul1e's presence. 1t was
then assumed, much too casually,
that the consequences Of exclud-
ing France could be patched up by
a little talk on the President S
warship in the harbor of Algiers.
It is by no means certain that
the matter would have been
patched up if they had met in
Algiers, or even if Mr.. Roosevelt
had listened to better advice and
had suggested a meeting at some
port in southern France. For Mr..
Roosevelt's old error of waiting so
long to recognize the France of
De Gualle, thus leaving France to
brood in isolation, has had a very
serious effect on General de
Gaulle's own conception of French
foreign policy. He in his turn has,