Evening star., 1945-10-09
Macarthur Didn't Expect Jops to Lounch War
Before April 1912, Gen. wainwright Declares
Continued From First Page.)

those troops" I knew Macarthur
was talking about war.
Looking back on that prediction,
and remembering hindsightedly
that the Japs were even at that
hour massing to hit us, I'd like to
stress this thought: Macarthur be-
lieved that nothing was going to
happen before April of 1912. He
believed it because he had no Off
| cial information which would have
led him to believe otherwise. He
was, I'm sure, completely in the
dark about the gravity of ,diplo-
matte messages then being ex-
changed. If Macarthur had known
anything, he would have given me-
certain to be hit first-what he
knew. His April, 1912, prediction
was fair one, I thought.
I drove back to Fort Mckinley
for the night and on the morning
of November % went on up to
Stotsenburg. which lies IS miles
above Manila.
I thought lot about Macarthur
April guess. But I knew that even
If the Japs held off that long it
would still be tight squeeze. 1t
takes time to turn mass of con-
scripts into the kind of army we
would need. The minimum in our
Army for training a division is one
year, and that presupposes good
training conditions and all the nee
essary gear and able instructors.
On my arrival at Fort Stotsen-
burg that afternoon to take over
my duties, discovered that Gen.
King had been able only to scratch
the surface of organizing things
for me. The headquarters of the
North Luzon forct was just about
nil. All I had to start with were
Kings post adjutant, to serve as ad-
jutant general of the new field
force, a supply man and surgeon.
Brought Old Aides.
I dipped into my old Philippine
Division and brought out Col. Will
liam P. Maher as my chief of staff,
got the old division quartermaster,
1t. Col. Alfred Balsam, the COM
manding officer of the 14th Engi-
neers, 1t. Col. Harry Skerry, and
the divisions signal officer, 1t. Col
Josh Stansell.
And we went to work. Col Maher
reported promptly and was of ines
Unable value in the organization of
such headquarters as We were
able to scrape together before the
war began In the last days of
November, while Col. Maher en-
deavored to get equipment, I paid
quick visits to the four divisions as
signed to me.
They were the 18th Division, then
mobilizing in the Lingayen Gulf
area. the 2lst Division, mobilizing
just north of Tarlac; the list Divi-
sion, mobilizing at Camp ODon-
nell-later place of unspeakable
horror-snd the 31st Division, form
ing itself on the coastal plain west
of the zambalies Mountains just
north of Subic Bay. The 91st Divi-
sion, then mobilizing at Cabanatuan,
was attached to my command for
training and administration, but
actually belonged to MacArthur's
strategic reserve.
Let me give you a sample of the
training status of those divisions
on the eve of the attack. Nearly
year later, when Brig. Gen. Cliff
ford Bluemef and I were sitting in
rags in a Jap prison camp near
Tarlac-ghere I had futfleIy planned
to stage my December, 1871, maneu-
vers-he told me the conditions
under which his 31st Division was
formed.
Began Mobilization Sept. 1.
tt began mobilization on Sep
tember l.. a little over three months
before it was thrown into tremen-
dous action. sThe 31st's Engineer
Battalion was mobilized on October
l. Its I'd Infantry Regiment was
mobilized November l; the Sd In
fantry Regiment on November 25.
Some of this artillery came into
being the same day. The majority
Of its artillery-two battalions of
75-mm. guns-Was modified after
December 8.
Bluemel's infantrymen trained on
an average of three or four weeks
before being forced to fight. His
engineers got no training at all.
His artillery never fired a practice
shot; indeed, its first shot was
aimed in the general direction OF
the approaching enemy.
His infantry had no combat prac-
tice, no combat training, little or no
rife or machine-gun practice. There
was no infantry-artillery team
training.
AS was the case with all other
Philippine Army divisions which
fought under me, the 31st Division
did not have a full complement of
artillery. What guns it had-British
75mnls and 2.95-inch mountain
hOWitZerS-Were obsolete There was