Evening star., 1945-09-13
By 1t. COL. THOMAS G.
LANPHIER, Jr..

able timetable, I had a hunch VIII,
Maj. Mitchell and I had been callee
into the conference. My hunch wa.
confirmed by the ranking naval off.
Ger present, who told us that every
plane and every weapon on Guadal
canal would, if necessary, be devoted
to accomplishment of the directive
from Washington, but that the
actual destruction of Admiral Yam.
smoto and his party could only bt
attempted with some guarantee OF
success by long-range fighters.
Fighters would have to be usee
to get in close enough to the target
whether he was afoot, at1oat or ir
the air when contacted, and assure
attack from point blank range de.
spite any elusive maneuver he might
make
And since surprise would have tt
be the basic operating factor in the
strike, that surprise could only be
obtained by long-range fighters be.
cause the Kahili area was over 30i
miles from Guadalcanal and ar
additional hundred miles or so WouiG
have to be flown in a low, circuitou;
approach to the target in order to
escape detection by enemy radal
or observers.
Both requirements put our Army
P-38s in the drivers seat, since they
we're the only fighters on the islano
capable of such extended range.
Many Ideas in Discussion.
A lengthy discussion by all pres
ent then ensued on the tactics to be
used Although this was to be a
mission that any pilot on the island
would have relished above all others
no Navy or Marine pilot present HhC
had been left out of it because OF
the limitations of his fighter equip
ment showed the slightest sign OF
sour grapes. Every one pitched into
the discussion. In fact. so manY
ideas were brought into that
cramped room that Mai. Mitchell
and l were almost crowded out of
the conversation.
Soon after the argument began we
started to lose ground to officers Of
higher rank who kept dropping in
and interposing their suggestions for
our conduct of the mission, until we
wound up on the outer fringe of the
milling crowd, unable to see either
the message or the Marine major
holding it.
Just about the time some of the
ideas flying through the room got
pretty far-fetched, the ranking
naval officer in the room called a
halt. Drawing us back within read
ing range of the cablegram, he asked
us to consider two possible methods
from among the many suggested.
Some of the naval officers favored
our trying to catch Yamamoto while
he was moving across Shorthand
Harbor On the submarine chaser
They reasoned that he would then be
an isolated target caught in a spot
where his maneuverability for
escape was limited.
Maj. Mitchell and I opposed that
idea. We explained to the Navy
people present that no one of us in
our Army outfit was qualified tc
identify a submarine chaser from
among the many ships, large and
small plying the Kahili waters,
that. even if we did find sub
marine chaser and it proved to be
the right one, we could hardly hope
to sink it in the one or two passes
We would have time to make on it
before the hundred or more Jap
fighters in that area fell on US; that,
even if we did sink it, we could not
be sure of killing every man on
board and thus guaranteeing Yama-
moto's death in the strike, anc
finally, the chances of any of US
getting in and out of the hornets
nest in that harbor during the JAP
leaders visit were exceedingly re-
mote, with every antiaircraft CUR
aship and ashore alerted and every
combat aircraft in the area aproWl
Midair Interception Planned.
Our arguments we're needed, and
our alternate suggestion, a mldalr
interception, was adopted. Since we
we're the ones who were going to
have to do the job, it was agreed
that our choice should rule. 1t was
decided that an attempt Wculd be
made to contact the Jap formation
st a point west of Kahili, on .he
airline from Rabaul to the airbaSe
at Ballale.
We assumed the admiral would
be riding in fast transport or in
a bomber and that his flying speed
therefore would average between
80 and miles a minute. We esti-
mated his altitude would be sUme-
where under 10000 feet-anything
higher than that would have forced
him to wear an oxygen mask, most
uncomfortable gadget even when
necessary.
knowing his arrival near Kahiil
was scheduled for GAS am. the next
day, we decided to meet Yamamoto
at a point 35 miles back of Kahili
10 minutes earlier. 1t was at this
point, we felt, we had the best
chance of hitting him when he was
least protected For we had to have
minimum of resistance and a
maximum of surprise in striking our
quarry. We had only 1S P-38s avail
able for the mission and they prom
lsed to look mighty puny against
the hundred-odd fighters we an
ticipated would be milling about the
skies Of Kahili to cover the arrival
and landing of the admiral's party
We had to find him, hit him ano
get out fast before we were discov-
cred if we all hoped to vote in the
next election.
lS Lightnings in Two Sections.
1t was decided that our 18 Light
nings would be divided into two sec
tionS for the mission-an attacking
section and covering section.
The attacking section, which was
to be waiting for the admiral at
10000 feet and which was to get
through his six escorting Zeros ano
destroy him, was to consist of my
night of four In addition to my.
1lsiNRshoniing
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