Evening star., 1945-11-17

Army and Navy. Therefore in him
dwells the right to exercise unity
OF command or to delegate it to
selected individuals. One President,
Abraham Lincoln, exercised this
command during certain phases of
the Civil War. The late President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and President
Truman exercised their command
through and with the assistance of
the joint chiefs of staff. BY author
ity of the President and the United
Nations concerned, unity of COM
mand during the war just ended
was exercised by men in the North,
Central and South Pacific areas.
This meant that forces were pro-
vided to me by the War and Navy
Departments-and by the govern
ments of Australia, Great Britain
and New Zealand--and that I CO.
ordinated and used those forces to
fight the war effectively. The War
Department had its special func-
tions in the procurement, training
and equipping of the forces normal
ly under Army jurisdiction, while
the Navy Department had similar
functions for the forces usually pro-
vided by the Navy. The result was
that troops, ships and planes-the
tools of our War-came to me ef-
ficiently prepared for the tasks to be
assigned them, and unity of COM
mand in my area PERMITTED the ef-
ficient use of these tools.
Since that system succeeded so
well in meeting the hard tests of
war, the burden of proof would ap-
pear to lie more heavily than be-
fore with those who would discard
it.
People Must Be Shown.
Our people must be shown that a
single department will improve upon
the record of the past years oper-
alton in the Pacific. For my part, I
am now convinced that single de-
partment will not work as efficiently
as two separate departments have
proved they can work in producing
the kinds of forces required for mod
ern war. I am also convinced that
the merging of the War and Navy
Departments into single depart
ment cannot help, and may hinder,
the adequate provision and efficient
use of our seapower
There has been considerable men,
ton of the principle of a merger,
with the assertion that once the
principle is accepted, the details of
the method can readily be deter
mined. I am not prepared to con-
form to the belief that the merger
is principle I believe that the
principle is the assurance of the
national security including the de-
fense of national policies) and the
merger is but one of several meth
DDS of assuring it. AS a method
then the consideration of the
merger cannot be divorced from its
details and it must be analyzed in
comparison with other methods in
order to determine its practicable
ity, its relative efficiency, and hence
its desirability of adoption. Only
when one is satisfied that the new
machine will work should one aban-
don an operating plant of proven
efficiency. Improvements to the ex-
isting plant are desirable, but not
its abandonment until every analy-
sis and test possible Of the proposed
new plant has been made.
War Won by Combined Forces.
1t should not be necessary to
argue about the part played by the
different arms and services in con-
quering Japan. 1t has been my
unvarying and often publicly ex-
pressed belief that the war in the
Pacific was won by the united eff
forts of all arms, and not by any
one of them. Indeed if claims must
be made for one form of service
to our country above another, MANY
civilians who worked faithfully and
made sacrifices cheerfully should
also be heard. I do not wish to
detract from any service. I believe
there is credit enough for all. In
particular I wish at all times to
give full credit to air power, which
have consistently held to be as
essential in war as ships or troops.
The war in the Pacific Ocean
might have been different if Japa-
nese seapower had continued su-
perlor to ours as it was in the initial
stages of the war. Without ade-
quate naval power our air and
ground forces might have held the
West Coast but would have stopped
right there, no matter what their
numerical expansion. EVERYWHERE
else throughout the Pacific our gar
rlsons would not have been rein.
forced and our air forces woulc
have been grounded for lack of fue
and maintenance and depleted fol
lack of replacements. Each islanc
group would then have been isolated
by the japanese Nays air ane
surface power exactly as theil
islands were isolated by our NAVY,
air and surface power. In the end
from Seattle to San Diego we woule
nave been challenging the Japanese
to come over and fight, but through.
out the rest of the Pacific from the
Aleutians to New Zealand, and moi
excluding Hawaii, the japanese
would have been in possession.
Possibilities of Future.
I do not, of course, believe that We
should base our thinking solely on
past experience. We must take into
account the possibilities of the fu-
ture. Some air enthusiasts have
Vlsualized great fleets of cargo
planes which would supplant surface
vessels in the delivery of supplies
and reinforcements in the combat
areas, and thus not only frustrat&
the submarine but make a Navy o1
any kind superfuous. There is M
question but that we can builc
planes of greater size and range
than any we have today. Thos.
that we can foresee, however, ar,
going to need a correspondent,
greater hip-borne tonnage to main.
tain them at distant bases. Tht
commanding general of the Arm,
Air Forces has described how diff.
cult it was for the B-29s in China
to be adequately supplied by ali
across the hump" with gasoline
boY1ahS and ao,,inpoa,,t onl I.x, !;