The Omaha guide., 1945-11-03
The World Abroad

IOIiS Ii uIIIICulCIoS.
The peoples of Southeastern Asia are stirrino
with revolt against the re-establishment Of Colonial
rule by the W~estern-European nations. The Brit
lsh are making little or no progress in solving the
Indian problem. The peoples Of Indo- China are
openly resisting a return to French domination.
An deven IN the tranquil Dutch East Indies strong
independence movements have arisen to resist con
tlnued Dutch rule or even inclusion IN a new Dutch
Commonwealth.
In the Argentine, the Fascist Government Of Far
rell and Peron has ~re-imposed a state Of siege and
fesorted to mass arrests in order to suppress the
ring tide Of democratic discomfort.
In Germany, General Eisenhower was compelled
20 relieve General Patton of his command in order
10 enforce a more determined plan of Identification
Ia the zone Of American occupation.
AT London, the first session Of the Council of
Foreign Ministers ended, as forecast last week in
dismal failure. The Ministers were not even able
to agree upon a joint communicate: each issned his
own statement to the press.
Chief cause Of the failure is to be found IL tba
ambiguity 0 1.-THE arrangements made by the Big
Three at Potsdam and in the lack Of adequate prep
aratlon for the Conference.
When the Big Three created the Council tbov do
termlned that it should consist of five permanent
membership foreign ministers Of the United
States, Britain, the Soviet Union. France and China
1hey announced further that in the discussion Of
PN"NC uNooICO WILL ICdly III Tie AXIS Satellites
those additional countries should be invited whose
vital interests were affected
On the other hand, the Big Three also declared
that only those countries should participate In peace
treaty discussions which had participated IN armis-
tics talks and surrender.
When the Council of Foreign Ministers met on
September IL. it voted unanimously to have the Big
Five participate in the discussion of all the peace
treaties. In addition Italy and Yugoslavia were
invited to attend the italian discussions, and, upon
the urgent demand of Foreign Minister Evatt of
Australia, the British Dominions were likewise in
vlted, since they hal helped in bringing about the de
-feat OF Italy. The same reasoning could have an
piled to Poland and Brazil, since Polish and Brazil
ian troops also fought in Italy. The Russian dele
cation did try to have Poland invited, but nobody
seems to have thought Of Brazil. More curious still
Greece, which had heroically resisted the Italian on
slaught In 1910, was not invited to participate.
When it came to the treaties with Bulgaria and
Rumania, the Soviet Union moved to exclude
France and China on the rgounds that they had not
contributed to the defeat Of these nations and had
no vital interest in the peace treaties. France pro-
tested energetically, and out Of the ensuing debate
came the final Russian demand upon which the Con
ference foundered.
This demand was that the Council should rescind
It's unanimous vote OF September II, by which the
Big Five were to sit in on all treaty discussions, and
expunge it from the record. Britain, France,
China and the United States presented a united
front against this demand. The resulting dead
lock remained unbroken.
Undoubtedly there are reasons for what seems an
unreasonable attitude on the part Of the Soviet
delegation. One of these reasons, as pointed out
last week, may be the exclusion of the Soviet Union
fro mthe secrets Of the atomic bomb. Another rea-
son may be Soviet fear Of British Imperialism. And
a third reason may be Soviet apprehension over a
possible "soft" treatment of Japan by the United
States.
These "~reasons'' would not, even if correct, JUST
fy the Soviet demand to revert to Big Three power
politics. But they might explain the demand.
In any case, the Big Three themselves have by
their ambiguity at Potsdam and their lack Of prep
aration since Potsdam, wrecked their own handi-
work. 1t now seems doubtful whether the Council
Of Foreign Ministers, which was at best a make
shift, can survive as the chief peace-making instru-
ment. If the result Of the failure at London is the
creation of more democratic machinery and more
careful preparation for the next attempt, that fail
ure may yet turn out to be a blessing.
Another lesson which may be learned as the re
suit Of the London fiasco is the danger Of conduct
ing peace negotiations in secrecy. 1t was the Rus
sian delegation which insisted most strongly upon
secrecy, but here again this ~insistence must be judg
ed in the context Of twenty-fives Of isolation. The
Soviet Union has not yet learned to trust its neigh
bors. any more than we have learned fully to trust
the Soviet Union. Mutual confidence is more like
ly to result from "open covenants openly arrived