The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-01-30

saving the nation. For instance the War Department finally de- manded that rubber be rushed from Dutch East Indies in the summer of 1941, the Navy wanted to un- load rubber-laden ships at San Francisco, instead of taking them all the way thorugh the Panama Canal to New York. This meant a more expensive rail haul over the Rockies, but it also meant saving about month ln getting the ships back to Singapore. Lack of shipping was hte big bottle neck.
 But Banker Jones wouldn't pay the extra rail charge from San Francisco to New York. He insisted that the ships go all the way through the canal. He had made the loan to buy the rubber, and so he was boss. As result, he saved cents a pound on the rubber. But he cost the American people thou sands of tires one year hence. And only a few months later he was paying at rate of more than S1 pound to get rubber from Brazil.
 Again in Mexico, Banker Jones refused to pay more than $lOO flask for mercury. Japan was was paying as high as $230 flask, and mercury was vitally needed for making shells. But Jesse wouldn't go cent higher. Fur thermore, Jesse wouldn't buy the mercury except through the banks in Mexico City, who took com mission from the natives, with the result the natives preferred to sell direct to the Japs. So until Mexico declared war, the Japs got more of MeXico'S mercury. JONES AND BIG BUSINESS
 Because he always plays ball with banking and big business circles, Jesse is considered safe by the Georges, the Baileys, and the Vandenburgs who rushed franti- cally to his support in the Sen- ate. He has always cooperated with their friends. That is also one reason why there has been such a concentration of wealth in the hands of a few companies during the war. This has been true of aluminium, rubber, water power, magnesium, and tin.
 Take for instance, rubber. There were two reasons why Jones was SO tragicaIly slow in producing synthetic rubber. First reason was that he bucked the frantic, persistent recOm- mendations of Ed Stettinius and the National Defense Council who naggcd him for IS months prior to Pearl HarbOr to start building rubber factories. Jones now alibis that no one could fOresee that the Japs would at tack. But the National Defense Council fOrcsaw 1t and warned him repeatedly.
 The second reason for the delay was that even after Jesse started the synthetic rubber factories, he put all his eggs in one basket that of the big companies. He put all his rubber production 1n the hands of the Standard oil of New Jersey patent pool, headed by his old Texas friend, the late William Parish. And despite the fact that the 31 rubber factories to be built by the Standard group were not to be even completed un- til 1944, Jesse stuck to them un- til blasted loose by the Baruch report on rubber.
 The Barush report, incidentally, severely criticized Jones for put ting all his eggs in one basket and for not accepting the Rus sian offer to lend us their rubber patents.
 Jones, however, was playing with his old friends. And big companies had their eyes on the postwar world. After the war they knew that aviation would be a booming industry, would demand high Octane gasoline, which is a by-prOduct of synthetic rubber. They would have the high Octane refineries.
 Also they know that the post
 war automobile will feature
 small engine using high Octane.
 So the Standard of N. J. group
 and other favored by Jesse
 with lush rubber contracts will