The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-12-31

them"
 2. "They had received ade- quate information and directives to be on guard"
 3. "The danger of war with Japan and possible surprise attack on Pearl HarbOr" was well known to Navy officers, includ- ing Kimmel, and methods of meeting it had been fully con- sidered."
 Service Reviewed
 Stark outlined his position in an 80-page prepared statement review ing his service as chief of Naval Operations from Aug. 1, 1889, to March 25, 1922. He described his efforts to ex- pand the strength and efficiency of the entire naval establishments, plans for its use in the event of war and the methods he used to keep fleet commanders informed of m- portant political and military devel- opGnents affecting them.
 He quoted at length from letters and dispatches between himself and Kimmel during the period before Pearl Harbor. Copies of the cor respondence were made 8 part of the committee record.
 Roosevelt'S Strategy Told
 1. The late President Roose- welt ordered Stark six months be- fore Pearl Harbor to assemble 8 25,000-man task force to seize the Portuguese owned Azores. The order was cancelled before the June 9 deadline set by the Presi- dent for assembly of the force.
 2. MT. Roosevelt also contem- plated sending a carrier load of planes to Russia via the Pacific when the Russo German war started in July, 1941, but cancelled it and sent aid via other routes
 3. Stark felt that the U. s. actually was at war in the Att lantic, through its aid to Britain, at least a month before the at tack on Pearl Harbor. He wrote then that whether the country knows it or not, we are at war;
 4. Stark thought some State Department suggestions were nothing less than childish" and successfully opposed State De- partment proposal to send part of the Pacific fleet from Hawaii to Manila where 1t would be clos CT to possible Japanese attacks.
 T considered that the letters and dispatches I sent to commander in-chief, Asiatic Fleet, and conn., mander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet, were sufficient to keep them informed on the important military and political developments in the Pacific as we knew them, and that they had re- ceived adequate information and directives to be on guard" Stark testified.
 My correspondence with the commanders-in-chief in the Pacific during the years 1940 and 1941 in- dicated that for almost two years before the attack on Pearl Harbor the lack of physical resources was fully known to all the Navy officers in critical positions, and that the danger of war with Japan and a possible surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and methods of meeting it had been fully considered"
 Specifies Warnings
 AS for the critical period from October to the date of the attack, Stark called particular attention to-:
 1. A secret dispatch Oct. 16, 1941, regarding a Japanese cabi- net change including the com- ment that "since the U. s. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers
 2. A letter to Kimmel Oct. 17 in which he expressed personal doubts that Japan would attack the United States but said White House conference devel- oped the decision that i've should be on guard at least until some thing indicates the trend"
 B. A letter to Kinmel Nov. advising him that things seem to be moving steadily toward crisis in the Pacific. a month may see, literally, almost any, thing. ."
 4. A letter to Kimmel Nov. 14 commenting on differences be- tween the United States and Japan and observing that 'it will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view" He en- closed joint Army-Navy memo randum to the President Nov. 5 | from cold.