Evening star., 1945-11-17

statement which follows reiterates
and amplifles those views.
The organization of the fighting
services is matter to which have
given continuing attention. In late
1914, the Richardson Committee,
appointed by the joint chiefs of
staff to study our postwar organiza-
ton for national defense, visited
the Pacific and discussed with me
various aspects of the present or
ganization of the War and Navy
Departments as compared with a
single department in which the
Navy would retain its own aviation
and Marine Corps unimpaired. At
that time the advantages claimed
appeared to be attainable, and,
without opportunity for adequate
study, 1 expressed to the commit
tee my approval of a single depart
ment, in substance as follows; II
have studied the memorandum of
the committee showing the origin
of the committees present tenta-
tive views and three possible solu-
tions to the problem. I am in
favor of the single department as
presented in chart A."
Changes His Opinion.
With the passage of time and
with greater war experience I must
revise the foregoing statement, since
r no longer favor the single depart
ment. I now believe that the theo-
retical advantages of such merger
are unattainable, whereas the dis
advantages are so serious that it is
not acceptable.
For this change of opinion I make
no apology, since it represents my
conviction based on additional eX-
perience and further study of the
proposal and its current implica-
tionS.
Since I talked to the Richardson
Committee, Japan has been forced
to surrender unconditionally. At
the time of the surrender of Japan
had not been invaded by a single
soldier or marine in assault, al
though she had in the home islands
upward of 100000 well-armed and
well-equipped men plus numerous
other troops of one kind or another
She also had upward of 1000 air.
planes, most of which were of the
combat type. Some were serviceable
and some were not. What hap
pened in that year to bring about
the Japanese surrender?
Defeat of the japanese.
First, year ago, there were the
landings in the Philippines, carried
out with continuous support from
the feet. When the Japanese Navy
at last came out in full strength
intending to destroy our transports
and cut off the forces we had ashore,
our naval forces defeated it in a
series of decisive actions at sea
known as the battle for Leyte Gulf
There followed the swift ground and
amph1bious campaigns of our troops
through the Philippines, whereby
Manila was liberated and the chief
islands became bases for further air
and sea operations against the
enemy. In February, the Marines
took Two Jima, located at a halfway
point on the route of the B-29s
to and from Japan. Its capture was
necessary for the safety and eff
cheney of the BIG attack.
In April, Army and Marine troops
1orInd dn0 y,,jlac froy,, Ioroy, ~, tl,o
larger island of Okinawa. With
their transports defended against
enemy suicide attacks by integrated
teams Of planes and fighting ships.
they won the island as an air and
sea base and as staging area for
the final attack we planned against
the Japanese Empire. Holding the
Philippines and Okinawa we has
tined the complete ruin of Japanese
shipping and cut the line of supply
between Japan and her conquests to
the south, even between Japan and
China. by May of this year." Pre-
mier Higashi-Kuni said in his ad-
dress to the Japanese Diet on Sep
tember S, "our carrying capacity by
steamboats, had dwindled to about
one-fourth of what we had at the
beginning of the war" Meanwhile
the B-29s stepped up their extremely
destructive raids on Japanese cities
We now know, Japan was thor
oughly beaten in July before the
atomic bombs and before Russia
entered the war.
Operations Closely Integrated.
1t is clear from this brief sketch
of the last year that many opera
tions by many forces-land, sea and
air-were closely integrated in oul
strategy. 1t Is also clear that tn,
defeat Of Japanese sea power ane
the preponderance of our own see
power played a tremendously i'm.
portant part in the result. I fee
that the successes which led to this
result are convincing evidence o1
the merit of the system under which
they were accomplished. Our sue.
cesses were more rapid than I had
believed possible a year ago. I be-
lieve we should have very good rea-
sons-better reasons than any Of
fered so far-before we change 6
system that has proved itself sc
effective. Certainly, in our conduct
OF the war, can see no fault sc
grave that only a drastic reorgani-
zation can correct it-a reorganiza-
ton undertaken when many othe,
complex problems are facing oul
country.
The overwhelming sea power
which we have developed in the past
two years and which made possible
the series of rapid and successful
amphibious operations against the
enemys bases was designed and bull
up by the Navy Department as il
exists today. + seems to me rea.
sonable to conclude from this thai
the Navy Department as now organ.
lied is essentially sound. The Navy
Department organization ha!
changed internally from time to time
as circumstances required, but it ha.
remained a Navy Department, ane
with progressive improvement ha.
successfully met the test of war fol
almost $50 years.
Single Department History.
Our founding fathers, in framin,
our Constitution and setting up oul