Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-12-11
Testifies 1910 Alert
Followed Tip Of
Attack on Hawaii
By ]. A. O'LEARY and
CARTER BROOKE JONES,

struct them to wait for an over
act by Japan, Gen. George C
Marshall testified today before
the Pearl Harbor Investigating
Committee.
1t was the late President who
personally ordered the warnings te
state that the United States wants
Japan to commit the first overt act,
the former Chief of Staff said.
Gen. Marshall also testified that
the reason the 1910 alert which he
ordered in Hawaii was more def
nltely a warning against attack
than the message of November 81,
1941, was that the first alert was
based on information from some
source" that Hawaii was in specific
danger of an attack.
Second Was General Warning.
The second warning, sent as a
Japanese task force was steaming
toward Hawaii, was merely a gen.
eral warning, sent alike to the Phil
ippines, Alaska, the Panama Canal
and other points, Gen. Marshall ex-
planned. He pointed out that before
Pearl Harbor there was no definite
information that the japanese in
tended to strike there.
Regarding the cautious nature of
the final warnings which the armed
forces sent to their commanders in
the Pacific and elsewhere, Gen.
Marshall told the committee:
Il think I probably got direct in
structions from the President to put
in our message that the United
States desires Japan to commit the
first overt act But I don't recall
definitely
This testimony was brought out
under cross examination by Senator
Ferguson, Republican, of Michigan
You cannot now recall" the Sen
ater asked, whether you discussed
the matter with the PRESIDENT"
Phrasing Was Discussed.
II don't recall" Gen. Marshall re-
peated Il assume I did. / am spe-
cific in my recollection that he gave
the direction. I think he gave it
to me in person, but I'm not sure
of that. l know it came from him
and it had to go into the message
I know there was discussion of how
we would phrase it as we wrote the
message"
Regarding the 1910 alert in Ha-
wall, which has come in for wide
discussion during the hearings,
Senator Ferguson referred to the
text of the message sent 1t. Gen
c. D. Heron, predecessor of Maj
Gen. Walter C. Short as command
er of the Hawaiian Department
This message stated:
Immediately alert complete de-
fensive organization to deal with
possible trans-Pacific raid, to great
est extent possible without creating
public hysteria or provoking undue
curiosity of newspapers or alien
agent. Suggest maneuver basis ~
do you know" Senator Fergu-
son asked, why such an alert was
not sent to Hawaii on November
n. 1941?"
mo, sir" said Gen. Marshall, Tex
cept that in 1910 Hawaii was being
alerted. by information from some
source which indicated danger of
raid specifically against Hawaii.
The l94l warnings were general in
nature
On November 27, 10 days before
the japanese attacked. the Chief of
Staff sent this message to Gen.
Short in Hawaii: Negotiations with
Japan appear to be terminated to
all practicable purposes, with only
the barest possibilities that the Jap
anese government may come back
and offer to continue. Japanese fu-
ture action unpredictable, but hos
tile action possible at any moment"
Navy Was Not Alerted.
did you know the Navy was not
alerted in Hawaii when you sent
the 1910 warning to Gen. Herron?"
Senator Ferguson asked.
Gen. Marshall said he could re-
call nothing about that at the time,
though since these hearings began
he had learned something of the
sort through having his attention
called to the testimony of Admiral
James o. Richardson, commander
of The United States Fleet in 1910.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board
held that the pre-Pearl Harbor at
tack warning was inadequate, as
sorting that sit did not convey to
Z Short the full import of the in
formation concerning the American
Japanese relations which was in the
hands of the War Department"
why did you put the 1910 alert
on maneuver basis?" Senator Fer
guson inquired.
Gen. Marshall said the idea was
to avoid public hysteria.
Senator Ferguson referred to Gen.
Shorts answered. the 1941 alert, in
which the Hawaiian commander
merely reported, Department alert
ed to prevent sabotage. Liaison
with Navy" Gen. Marshall had tes-
titled that he could not recall this
reply, but assumed he read it, adding
that he took whatever responsibility
attached to failure to consider its
significance
Shorts Reply Discussed.
When an overseas commander.
Senator Ferguson continued, is
ordered to do something and he re-
plies stating what he has done and
/ there is no further word from the
War Department, would it not be
logical for him to assume he has
carried out the order?
II assume SO" said Gen. Marshall.
sThat would be Army practice?n
81 think So"
Senator Ferguson then went into
Gen. Marshall's recollection of an
intercepted and decided message
from Tokyo to the Japanese Am
bassador in Washington directing
lsee PEARL HARBOR, re. A-I65
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