Evening star., 1945-12-29
New Control for japan

Last August. in it's directive
to General Macarthur, the White
House declared that it expected and
welcomed Allied participation in the
control and occupation of Japan but
that United States policy would pre-
vail in case of inter-Allied differ
enceS.
Similarly, as recently as last
month, Secretary of State Byrnes
asserted that our Government was
firmly opposed to establishing a
Berlin like Allied council in Tokyo,
holding that the unanimity or veto
rule had begged down the effective
control of Germany and that the
Allies ought therefore to avoid the
same sort of setup for Japan.
Viewed against this background,
the new Moscow agreement on jap
anese control would seem to repre-
sent considerable retreat by the
United States, but two facts are
worth noting: First, that the August
directive to General Macarthur was
officially described as "a statement
of general initial policy" phrase
suggesting that it might be changed
or abandoned at some later date,
and second, that the machinery
worked out at Moscow - however
serious it's shortcomings may prove
to be-differs markedly from the
machinery operating in Berlin.
Under the agreement, two organs
are created-the Far Eastern Com
mission, with headquarters in Wash
ington, and the Allied Council for
Japan, with headquarters in Tokyo.
Of the two, the commission will be
the real power. The council will
serve merely to consult with and
advise the American supreme COM
mander, who will be it's chairman.
The commission, on the other hand
except as regards military opera
tions and territorial adjustments,
which presumably will receive spe-
cial handling-will make the policy.
The directives to General MacAr-
thur to implement the policy will
continue to be issued by the United
States but they must be in accord
with the commissions decisions.
Moreover, in a kind of double
talk, the Moscow agreement declares
that "the commission may take ac-
ton by less than unanimous vote
provided that action shall have the
concurrence of at least majority
of all the representatives including
the representatives" of Russia,
China, Britain and the United
States. A Philadelphia lawyer might
interpret it otherwise, but this less
than candid or fortnight language
actually means that all of the Big
Four will have to agree before the
commission can act. This may serve
American interests as well as the
interests of others. yet. in effect, it
looks like the Berlin veto in disguise,
and the failure to be frank about it
is none too reassuring.
Nevertheless, the overall arrange
ment is a lot different from the
Berlin machinery. The American
supreme commander remains the
"sole executive authority for the Al
lied powers in Japan" and whenever
necessary, with certain exceptions,
he may take action independently Of
the commission. Similarly and also
with certain exceptions, the United
States Government may issue in
terim directives to him to take what
ever steps it deems advisable in
urgent matters not already covered
by commission policies.
American authority in the Setup
thus seems to be the strongest of all
the eleven powers represented. AS
for our Governments retreat from
its earlier position. the fact is clear
enough that control of Japan could
not remain indefinitely and exclu-
sively our business. Sooner or later,
because of their Far Eastern ge-
ography' or other direct interests,
Britain, China and Russia had to
come in.