Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-08-19

supremacy in any portion of the Pacific.
The japanese still retained the initia-
tive and in less than months time
after their defeat in the Coral Sea they
had mounted a full-scale invasion aimed
even more directly at the United States.
This was drive through the Central
Pacific aimed at Midway Island, and,
in all likelihood at the more easterly
important islands Of the Hawaiian
group. The Japanese force was for
midable, consisting, according to the
best estimates made on the spot, of five
carriers, at least four battleships, 10
cruisers, "a or more destroyers, 8 to IL
troop transports and to cargo vessels.
Potentially, this was the greatest threat
ever poised against the United States
during the war.
From June through June 6, the
Navy met this threat, fought 1t and
turned it back. Assisted by four Army
B-24s and Is Bits and 20 Marine
manned Navy planes based on Midway,
some 240 Navy planes from the U. S. S.
Hornet, U. S. S. yorktown and U. S. S.
Enterprise, sank four enemy carriers
with the loss of all their planes and
many of their personnel; sank two
heavy cruisers, three or possibly four
destroyers and one or more cargo or
transport ships. In addition they heav-
lily damaged two or possibly three bat
tleships, three or more heavy cruisers
and one light cruiser. At conserva-
tive estimate the enemy lost 1890 per-
sonnet. But, most important of all, he
lost the initiative. The japanese inva-
sion force which fed the scene was
thoroughly beaten group, and it was
the last of its kind the enemy ever tried
to send against us.
Guadalcanal and Tulasi
Once the power of choice as to when
and where to strike was in the Nays
hands it was not slow in making use
of it. On the morning of August 7,
two months to the day after the beaten
japanese invasion force had disappeared
in disordered flight into the rain squalls
northwest of Midway, the Marines,
transported and supported by the Navy,
landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi Is
AL Tie OOlOillOI1S. lie ldIlQlIlRS
were effected in cooperation with the
Army Air Force under General of the
Army MacArthurs command which
bombed Jap landing fields throughout
the general Solomons- New Britain-New
Guinea area
From the point of view of the feet
a sea- and. to certain extent from
Va int IF vic ~
too, the landings were simply the begin
ming of the engagement rather than
an end in themselves What followed,
so far as the destruction of the Japa-
nese fleet was concerned, was a series
of engagements in which they tried to
reinforce their troops on Guadalcanal
and later, in further advanced islands
in the Solomons and in which they were
uniformly and extensively unsuccessful.
These engagements took place over
almost a year from the Battle of Savo
Island on August 9, 1912, to the Battle
of Vella Gulf on August 6, l943), but
they all partook of the same nature, an
attempt by the Japanese to hamper
our troops ashore in the Solomons and
ground forces
Naval Battle for the Solomons
Actually. all the engagements might
be called the Naval Battle for the Solo,
mons; chronologically they are easily
divided as follows: % the Battle of
SavO Island, night of August 9, 1912;
~ Battle of the Eastern SOlOmons, Au-
gust % to Is, 1912; 90 Battle of Cape
Esperance, October 11-l2; ~ Battle of
the Santa Cruz Islands, october &c; 60
Great Battle of Guadalcanal, November
10, IA, Is; t6) Battle of Tassafaronga,
November 80; Cd First Battle of Kula
Gulf, July 6, 1943 90 Second Battle of
Kula Gulf, July 10; 80 Battle of Vella
Gulf, August g.