The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1945-03-20
interpreting
The War
BY KIRKE L, S1Npso,.
Associated Press w., 'VN

Nh $500 iess war ANALYST
=, me extent to which colla1ss"
the bridge over the Roirs :. re Of
megen may delay exec14f :. Re.
Allied plans for striking Wv. o.
heart of Germany is unore ,l.,a NJ
although field dispatches -.,aoIe
it can and will be quickly rs ,spo.,
to service. -S''VSed
The structure has aIread,,
ed its primary purpose NJ t se5T'
tating establishment of a o.id t''lI-'
deep east bank American br;S aao
head. No uneasiness at Fi,st i s
or Allied Supreme Headous1r..,aly
on that score is indicates ~
very terrain difficulties east a
the river which have made avn. VI
sion of the bridgehead a Slow ,g as,
difficult business now must so r,D
to deny the foe an opportuni+, =
take advantage of the mie5.~ "
Even II the German comman5 h.,
the forces available for a NAH.
counter attack. as it obvior,,r
has not, it could hardly bons :,
throw the powerful Allied foros,
already massed on the east bsr,.
back into or beyond the Rim
without exposing other sectors NJ
the east Rhine defenses to A]re5
crossing attacks.
The fall of the main bridge srs,
therefore, seems likely to effpc,
only the time element in AlTos
plans. 1t could delay the nome.
when sufficient men and materja
have reached the east bank ia,
the mounting of power drives I'd
or down the river.
Some field reports suggests :
possible major drive eastward
from the Remagen take-off 4
glance at any Typographical mao
of the region raises doubt that
such a movement would be prac.
ticable. There are few east-wes.
communication laterals north If
Coblenz or south of the Cologne.
Dusseldorf stretch of the lowe,
Rhine to invite 1t.
The Remagen bridgehead. how.
ever, is a dangerous rip in Nazi
east Rhine bank defenses because
it potentially outflanks more crit,
cal crossing areas both to tle
north and the south 1t threatens
to roll up more or less improyised
enemy defenses in either Or both
directions to facilitate new Rhine
crossings at points where the ter
rain is far more favorable for
eastward drives and where good
road and rail communications exist
along which Allied armies could
be supplied as they drove on into
the German heartland
Loss of the bridge could ten,
porarily delay full exploitation Of
the east bank bridgehead for that
purpose. With two American arm
les sweeping at express speed
through the Saarland and Pala'
innate to the north, however, and
west bank Coblenz in American
hands. the center of immediate
interest on the Rhine has shifted
up river.
The double or triple trap being
developed so swiftly by the Third
and Seventh American armies IN
the Rhine-Moselle-Saar triangle
is doing far more than put an es
timated 10000 Nazi troops to con-
fused and harried flight. 1t bids
fair to place Allied forces alons
the most vulnerable stretch Of me
Rhine from Coblenz to karlsruhe
in matter Of days. at most
The forcing of the Rhine at any
point between those two clre5
would expose all south centI4
Germany to immediate invasion
And there are no high banks Or
rising ridges east OF the river IT..
help balk such crossing or %
contain it once the river ltSell na0
been spanned.