Evening star., 1945-11-20

throughout 1910 and early 1941. In
these letters Admiral Richardson
did not hesitate to discuss the trend
of world affairs and his own view
of how the Navy should be dispersed
and strengthened.
In one of the first of these let
ters. dated January 26. 1910, Ad-
miral Richardson revealed the con-
cern that existed in naval circles
over possible trouble in the Pacific
1t read in part:
The remarks in your letter of
January 18 about the situation in
the Far East. the possibility OF
something breaking without warn
ing. and of my need to be mentally
prepared, are somewhat diSquieting
when the China incident started
and on every opportunity until after
1 left the job as assistant CNO
Cchlef of naval operations I used
to say to Bill Leahy, BE sure to
impress on the boss that We do not
We have allies so bound to us that
, they cannot leave us in the lurch =
Further on in the same letter he
added:
Il strongly feel that you should
repeatedly impress on the boss that
an Orange war would probably last
some years and cost much money
my guess is 5sto 10 years, IS to 7C
billion dollars. He explained that
Orange" is a code name for Japan
used in the Navy
At another point he wrote:
L hesitate to write YOU because
the written word is so easily mis-
understood. also l do not know what
your ideas are, what you are telling
! the boss. what is the meaning ol
our diplomatic moves or our Sena-
tors talks, or our neutrality patrol
But you are the principal and only
naval adviser to the boss and he
should know that our feet cannot
just sail away, lick Orange and bt
back at home in year or so. =
/ On September II. 1910, Admira
Richardson prepared a memoran'
dunn for Secretary Knox. who wa.
visiting the feet at the time. hav,
ing become Secretary only few
months before. In this he gave hi!
objections to having the bulk of tn,
fleet remain in Hawaiian waters.
! In substance. his reasons were the
difficulty. delay and cost of trans.
porting men, munitions and sup.
plies to and from Hawaii: the in.
| adequacy of Lahaina as an operat.
ing anchorage; the inadequacy Of
Pearl Harbor. due to difficulties ot
berthing large ships. He also men
toned that the whole operating
area was con2ested and restricted
in the air and on the surface. HI
also spoke of the prolonged alb.
sences of officers and men from the
mainland in times of peace as ad.
Versely affecting morale.
In case of war, he pointed out. j,
would De necessary for the fleet tt
return to mobilization ports on the
West Coast ''or accept partial anc
unorganized mobilization measures
resulting in confusion and a net los.
of time
At the outset OF his testimon,
! Admiral Richardson explained that
in 1910 he was commander An chic,
OF the United States Fleet. pos
from which he was relieved ir
February l94l. at which time the
command Of the Atlantic and Pacific
naval forces was divided. Admira
kimmel was sent to command the
Pacific Fleet and was at Pearl Har.
Dor when the attack occurred.
Notes Change in Outlook.
Admiral Richardson wrote, in 6
letter to Admiral Stark from thu
West Coast on October o. 1910
that he had noted a decided change
in the outlook for trouble in tn.
Pacific between his first and seconc
visit to Washington. He had JUS
returned to Bremerton Navy Yarc
from the october visit.
He said that on the first visit ir
July, 1910, he stressed his firm
conviction that neither the Navy