Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-11-16
Sharing Atomic Secrets

President Truman and Prime Min
listers Attlee and Mackenzie King
have offered to share this knowledge
with all nations willing to adopt
effective, reciprocal and enforceable
safeguards" designed to protect
mankind from the all-encompassing
disaster which would attend the
direction of this new and deadly
force into destructive channels. The
proposal is an evidence of states
manship on the highest plane, and
no nation can reject it without auto
matically becoming an outlaw and
a menace to the security of all
peoples.
1t will be evident at the outset
that President Truman, in sub
scribing to this joint declaration,
has substantially and significantly
modified his former stand in this
matter. Heretofore, his position has
been that the English-speaking
democracies would keep to them
selves the secrets of the "know-how,"
the practical industrial application
OF atomic energy. But now that
position has been changed. In the
future, once mutually satisfactory
arrangements have been made to
guard against the use of atomic
energy for destructive purposes, we
will be willing, on a reciprocal basis,
to divulge detailed information
concerning the practical industrial
application of atomic energy"
Whether this includes all of the
secrets of the atomic bomb and its
military use is not entirely clear.
But the joint declaration says that
1.-The military exploitation of atomic
energy depends, in large part, upon
the same methods and processes as
would be required for industrial
uses" Hence, the inference is that
II we divulge the practical methods
and processes governing the indus
trial application of atomic energy,
we will, in effect, be divulging all or
nearly all of the secrets actually
involved in the production and use
of the atomic bomb.
Certainly, the logic of the situation
points to this conclusion, and despite
the considerable body of opinion in
the United States which presently is
opposed. to sharing these atomic
secrets, events will make it increas-
ingly clear that, in this matter, we
must be prepared to turn up all of
our cards or none of them.
Soviet Russia is not mentioned
by name in the joint statement. It
is nonetheless evident, however, that
the statement is addressed primarily
to the Russians. And in substance it
says this to them: If you are willing
to reveal the progress which you
have made in the development of
atomic energy, and if you will agree
to appropriate safeguards, including
an effective system of international
inspection to prevent the hidden
development of atomic weapons, we
will divulge to you the methods by
which we have been able to make a
practical industrial application of
atomic energy. Obviously, If this
proposal is made in good faith, as
undoubtedly is the case, and if we
expect a favorable response from
Russia and the other members of
the United Nations Organization, it
must include. the actual processes
of producing the atomic bomb. For
otherwise we would be asking them
to disclose their secrets while per-
hitting us to retain the most i'm
portant of ours-a proposal which
almost certainly would be rejected.
The overriding hope now must be
that the Soviet Union and the other
powers will recognize this Joint
declaration for what it is-an
earnest and an entirely feasible bid
for an international agreement de-
signed to reduce to minimum the
danger that this world of ours will
be subjected to the frightful ordeal
of an atomic war. Because so much
is at stake for every one, it is hardly
conceivable that any nation. will
refuse to enter into the proposed
agreement. Yet the making of an
offer must not be confused with it's
acceptance. If this proposal should
be rejected by any nation, great or
small, we must be prepared to face
the implications of such a refusal
and to plan our future course &C
cordingly. Most assuredly, 1t is no
longer an exaggeration to say that
we of this generation, having discov-
cred the means of our own destruc-
ton, must soon decide whether we
will live or perish.
0e