Browning chief. [volume] (Browning, Mont.) 1941-1953, 1945-02-09

raw material and will have the
manufacturing facilities in time.
Undersecretary of War Patterson
told the house military affairs COM
mittee that in the first six months
of 1945, 100000 men would be needed
for war production and industry
necessary to the war effort.
have talked with the War Man.
power commission experts and they
break down those figures something
like this:
One hundred and fifty thousand
men needed Immediately for critical
war production.
One hundred and fifty thousand
more for other war production to
take care of the normal turnover,
expected requirements, etc. The
remaining 100000 must be retained
in civilian production and services
which have to be continued in order
to maintain the total war effort.
The situation is summed up in
general terms this way: The man.
power mobilization problem is not
as large as it was in 1912 and 1913
but 1t Is more acute in certain
lines. Two things contribute to max
ing it more acute. One is the fact
that we haven't the pool of either
civilian production or the unem-
ployed from which to draw as we
had at the start. Second, because
the needs are "critica" (battle
needs) they must be satisfied i'm
mediately or the actual front-line
activities may be Immediately af-
fected.
One thing which must be consid-
cred is the geographical shift of
the American labor force, a point
which affects the general situation
for it involves moving a worker
from place to place. And in the pres
ent need, although the West coast
(where labor is concentrated) is
still the most critical area, the
building of new factories to meet
new needs and the change in the
type of needs from one established
factory in one place to one in an
other place involves the question Of
suasion or force on the worker.
For instance, there is a great need
in Utah and Wyoming for work.
erS in coal mines. The scattered
foundry sections from Michigan and
Ohio, through Pennsylvania and
New York to New England are
critical areas. Even plane produc-
ton, concentrated in the West, has
its problems. for, although some air.
plane factories on the Pacific coast
have closed down, many of the new
factories for the flying fortresses
and other new models are in areas
other than the West coast.
We have the man and woman
power in the nation to take care of
the need. It is a question of getting
the right man in the right place.
OUeroptinisn1
Causes LetdoUn
There are several reasons why
the right man (and woman) is not in
the right place now. One is due to
an error il judgment which may,
or may not, be blameworthy. Ger
many's Comeback" power, for
which I attempted to set forth GER
tain reasons in two preceding COL
umns, was underestimate.
This caused a shortage in certain
types of weapons Superabundance
in others. The latter put men out
of work and caused them to seek
non-war jobs. We had counted on a
more mobile type of warfare. We
did not think we needed the heavy
artillery to blast Germany out Of
powerful defenses We counted too
heavily on enemy vulnerability to
the bombing of German cities. That
was both psychological and stra-
tegical error
Understanding the length of the
European war also had a bad psy-
Geological effect. It caused many
workers to quit war work for what
they thought would be more per-
manent employment. It caused
great pressure on Washington to be-
gin reconversion, as War Mobilizer
Byrnes admits was wrong. He said:
g. we could not do two things
at once could not pursue an
about war production effort while
simultaneously releasing materials,
facilities and manpower for civilian
production"
The man and his job were sepa-
rated, too, by the improvement of
models and creation of new equip
ment. No one can be blamed for
this. But frequently, as l have
shown, 1t tended to place the job
and the man miles apart.