Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-12-31

SOAllld1iy, OC1iOCId az, VI 4CAdS,
illus, jr., permanent member of tn
or Roosevelt. 1Story on Page l..
the limit, but I cannot guarantee
the outcome"
The admiral observed to the COM
mittee: Everything I said and did
to increase the size, strength and
efficiency of the Navy as a fighting
force was motivated by what ]
considered the absolute necessity of
preparing as quickly as possible for
war"
He cited letter dated November
Is, 194l in which Admiral Kimmel
pointed out that he could not fight
an about war in the Pacific with
the forces allocated to him"
In reply, Admiral Stark wrote
that he was working Is hours a
day in an effort to meet the needs
of the Pacific, Asiatic and Atlantic
fleets.
He wrote that Admiral Ernest j
King, then commander of the At
lantic Fleet, had strongly recon-
mended his taking the destroyers
which we now have in our West
Coast ports, and the Secretary was
sold on it; however, it has been
successfully resisted to date"
Indicating he favored basing at
least portion Of the feet in Hawaii
in 1910, Admiral Stark cited letter
he wrote Admiral Richardson,
March Is, 1910:
II still think that the decision to
send the detachment to Hawaii
under present world conditions is
sound. No one can measure how
much effect its presence there may
have on the Orange (Japanese) for
eign policy. The State Department
is strong for the present set-up and
considers it beneficial"
Departure Delayed.
Admiral Stark told the committee
that after the feet held spring ma
neuvers in the Hawaiian area in
1910, it was thought its delay in re-
turning to the West Coast would not
be more than two weeks, but its
stay was extended from time to
time. In reply to letter from Ad-
miral Richardson asking why the
fleet was there and how long 1t
would stay, Admiral Stark wrote:
You are there because of the de-
terrent effect which it is thought
your presence may have on the Japs
going into the East Indies ."
Admiral Stark testified: Admiral
Richardson pointed out the def
ciencies of Pearl Harbor as a naval
base. These deficiencies were ap-
preciated, both by the Navy De-
partment and by the President, but
it was decided as matter of policy
to keep the Pacific Fleet in the
Hawaiian area. During 1910 and
1941, many of the shortcomings of
Pearl Harbor as base, disclosed
by the long stay of the Pacific
Fleet, were remedied."
Admiral Stark recalled that he
wrote Admiral Hart October %,
1910:
II do not believe Japan will attack
us If she can avoid doing so. In
fact. I believe she will go far to
avoid hostilities with the United
States ="
Yet, December % of that year
Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Rich
ardson:
There is little that I can ado
which is not repetition, but I shall
repeat just the same that every "a
hours past is just one day nearer to
actual hostilities and that your flag
officers and captains should be COM
pletely in the frame of mind that
we will be in the fighting business
most any time, and, purely as a
guess on my own part, I would say
at any time after the next 80 days.
Saw War Unavoidable.
January 10, 1941, just after Ad-
miral Kimmel had been selected to
preceded Admiral Richardson in
command of the fleet, Admiral Stark
wrote the incoming commander
II have told the gang here fol-
months past that in my opinion we
were heading straight for this war
that we could not assume anything
else, and personally I do not sec
how we can avoid either having it
thrust upon us or of our deliberately
going in many months longer"
The chief of naval operations
wrote Admiral Kimmel May "a,
1941:
DAY before yesterday the Presi-
dent gave me an overall limit of
30 days to prepare and have ready
an expedition of $4,000 men to sail
for and take the Azores. Whether
or not there would be opposition I
do not know, but we have to be
fully prepared for strenuous oppo-
sition. You can visualize the lob,
particularly when I tell you that
the Azores have recently been
greatly reinforced. The Army. of
course, will be in on this, but the
Navy and the Marines will bear the
brlnt."
In Touch With Hull,
Admiral Stark pointed out that
on November Is he wrote Admiral
Kimmel:
Il held this up pending meet
Ing with the President and Mr.. Hull
today. I have been in constant
touch with Mr.. Hull, and it was
only after long talk with him that
sent the message to you a day
or two ago showing the gravity of
the situation. He confirmed it all
IN today's meeting, as did the Presi-
dent.
Neither would be surprised over
Japanese surprise attack. From
many angles, an attack on the
Philippines would be the most en,-