Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-12-08
Pearl Hurbor
Continued From FIRST Page. y

deferred the Japs from starting hos.
tilities.
Senator Brewster. Republican, of
Maine bad planned to cross-examine
Gen. Marshall today, but was called
away suddenly by the death of his
father at Dexter, Me.
II the Japanese could have made
out . plausible case, however false,
Gen. Marshall added. we would
have had 4 divided country, and
that would have been tragic in time
of war"
The general continued: cat that
time there was divided opinion In
the country. The people could not
know all the facts, particularly
about aggressive acts which the
japanese were carrying out in the
Far East.
Message Explained
I'VE labored under the compul-
sion of not committing one act that
would permit the japanese to claim
We had started the war"
Gen. Marshall explained that
was why. in his message to Hawaii
which differed in particulars from
the warning sent the Philippines,
Panama and other commands-he
stressed the necessity of not alarm
ing the mixed population, which
might have caused incidents.
Il agree with you entirely. gen.
eral," said Mr.. Gearhart. And I
have in mind the constitutional pro-
vision that only Congress can de-
clare war. I sympathize with your
determination not to do anything
that would provoke war. But had
in mind the question of whether
the warning you sent Gen. Short
was adequate to advise him Of the
critical situation
II think it was said Gen.
Marshall.
If Gen. Short had ordered an all
out war alert. No. ; alert. Is
he has classed 1t, wouldn't it have
been necessary for the air to be
filled with planes, with soldiers fill
ing the streets in full war regalia?
Wouldn't that have alarmed the
populace? Mr.. Gearhart asked.
Not necessarily" Gen. Marshall
replied. I'VE had done that sort
Of thing before in maneuvers."
1t would not have been necessary
he added, for ali the planes to be
In the air-in fact, highly unde-
sirable-and the soldiers would
necessarily have had to be con-
spicuous.
But they would have had to &c
to their battle stations?" Mr.. Gear
hart suggested.
That's true"
Then you feel that Gen. Short
could have carried out the alert
and at the same time observed your
instructions?"
1t seems to me he could have
said Gen. Marshall, with some
notifications.
You did not direct 4 No. 3 alert?'
Il did not direct Z No. !, 2 or g.
the general replied. THAT was the
responsibility of the commandins
general in Hawaii"
On Sabotage Alert.
Evidence has indicated Gen. Short
was on No. 3 alert. which placed
the command on guard only against
sabotage, not against attack, from
outside the islands.
Mr.. Gearhart pointed out the so.
called 14-point Japanese note tt
Secretary Hull breaking Oh negotia.
tons and directing the Japanes,
emissaries In Warrington to dc.
liver 1t ut ! p.m., December 7, thu
approximate hour Of the attack, hae
reached the War Department, a
least In part, the night before Pear
Harbor was bombed.
How do you explain the fact 70,
did not see any part Of 1t that Satur,
day night" Mr.. Gearhart asked
that you read none Of 1t until sun
day morninss"
THE first 13 parts," Gen. Mar
, shall replied. were not as vital q
, the 18th part. Tho earlier portion
were Of direct importance to tn
Secretary Of State. not the military.
i The general paused and added
"The fact Of the matter Is that
was not brought to my attention
Saturday"
You did not feel Gen. Short wa
entitled to have the information