Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-06-29
Naval Air Wing Hailed
For Job at Okinuwu

VI SOO VI ONlIbOWO
Carrier Planes Support Of Troops
Was Amazing, Says Writer
By Dapid Laurence
The full story Of the Okinawa cam
paign remains to be told, but there are
segments Of it becoming available now
which reflect great credit on the SOL
diers, sailors, marines and airmen who
fought the battle ashore and from the
decks Of ships
The latest disclosure. for instance, Of
the part played by the naval air forces
in operating virtually as tactical air
force in support Of ground troops for
nearly three months reveals an an1az,
ing achievement. 1t has never been
intended that airplanes flying from the
decks Of ships should be able for so
long time to support ground troops
firing away at communications on
shore, artillery emplacements and other
enemy installations.
ut was the kind of job we didn't
know we could do" said Admiral G. r.
Durgin, commander of escort carrier
forces at Okinawa. This is but another
way Of saying that the naval air forces
never expected to be called on to do it.
1t has always been the primary Job OF
the Navy, of course, to protect the
Army and Marine Corps troops until
such time as they can provide their own
air cover from conquered airfields, but
it never has been believed that the
Navy could be required to provide air
| protection for q land base for three
months.
$4,000 Carrier Sorties.
1t has been made known from Guam
also that more than $4,000 sorties were
| flown by the escort carrier planes
more than at any other time in the
| present war by this type of aircraft.
But the $4,000 sorties were not all. The
| combat air patrols from the larger air.
craft carriers must be added, 80 that
the number of sorties must have been
many thousands larger in number for
the whole three-month campaign.
Pilots few as many as four missions
every day, which, Admiral Durgin said,
meant nine hours in the air of con-
slant fighting, and he added, That's
too much
The fact that the Naval Air Forces
accomplished this feat of tactical air
support is evidence, however, of the
wisdom of the United States Navy lead
ers in past years who insisted that the
air arm must be trained to work with
the fleet rather than separately. It is
evidence also that in areas where shore
based aircraft cannot be used, because
airfields haven't been built or because
our available shore bases are out of
range, the Navy must provide floating
bases for an indefinite period of time.
1t is confirmation. too, of the foresight
Of the Marine Corps in this war in
training their own air wing in support
of ground-troop operations
The Astonishing thing about the
Okinawa operation is that when the
landings were made the tactical air
force was actually directed and COM
manded from the shore by naval officers
who co-operated on the ground with
| Army commanders. The team worked
daily to bring in from the feet con-
stantly from dawn to dusk the necessary
air strength to assist the movement Of
troops on the ground.
Versatility Of Flattop.
This is entirely apart from the &C.
tivities of the naval air forces in what
are known as strategic operations, that
Is. IN neutralizing bases several miles
distant from which shore based planes
OF the enemy could come in to harass
our troops on Okinawa.
Altogether, the operation of the naval
and Marine air forces in close conjunc.
ton with ground commanders shows the
versatility Of the modern aircraft carao
r1er, which at the start of this war waSi
expected to be used chiefly as a weapon
OF ohense to strike at or neutralize
enemy bases and not so much to provide
air cover against shore-based planes for
long periods of time
The next lengthy record which the
naval air forces have made in this war
IN similar operation was at Leyte,
where they protected Gen. MacArthur's
troops for nearly five weeks and saved
the Macarthur divisions from heavy
losses from enemy bombers, and espe-
cially covered the supply ships which
had to stand by for long time till coral
could be found with which to construct
| the airfields.
The Importance of the use of tactical
air forces from the decks of warships
to support ground troops is that it illus
trates concretely how Army and Navy
units can be integrated effectively when
their operations are well planned and
when specialists are assigned to the
task in hand
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