The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-08-14
By DrezC Pearson

Dean Acheson. on the other hand, argued thab the Emperor had stood for system ot conquest which, had enslaved large part Of Asia. that he was permanently identified with this system and we could not be identified with him or it. Acheson felt that the democratic movements inside Japan, the labor and farm groups, should be given chancs to work out new type of government that they could not do this with the Emperor on the throne and that unless Japan had new governmental system we might have to fight another war in future years
 Finally, in order to convince Truman, Achescn asked him to discuss the matter with Owen Latt- more one of the foremost American authorities on China and former adviser to Chiang Kai-shek ],
 Lattimore talked to Truman for 90 minutes just two days before he departed for Potsdam The PreS- ident listened most carefully but made no comment. It appeared however, that he leaned toward the Grew theory of using the Emperor as an American puppet.
 Note-Lattimore is chiefly famous for having been an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. He lived in China and all his work has been closely identified with China But while he and Grew were in the White House anteroom waiting to see Truman, GreW remarked: How long since you were in Japan MT. Lattimore?n
 There has been a lot of talk about how Russis was argued into the Japanese war at Potsdam. The real fact however, is that Stalin made his initial commitment to President Roosevelt at Teheran The details of what happened can now be revealed TOT the first time.
 ~ At Teheran the Big Three held their first get, together The atmosphere warmed very slowly. Roosevelt had never met Stan before, but they got
 
 almost at daggers point.
 Roosevelt was unable to bring up the subject of Japan while Churchill present; but in several private discussions he emphasized the point that Russa's entry into the war would materially shorten the Far Eastern conflict.
 Stalin not only agreed, but pointed out that Japan being Fascist nation, was natural enemy of the Soviet Union and of all the Allied anti powers. He begged off from detailed discussions however on the ground that Russia had only then begun to push the Nazis from the vicinity of Mos- COW.
 However Stan's assurances were such-especial- ly after Roosevelt sided with Stalin regarding the returned from the Teheran Conference he was cer- tain that barring unpredctabe difficulties, Russia would fight Japan
 So at Yalta, Roosevelt again preached the ques- tion to Stalin. This time, Staln made flat and uneuuivocal commitment that at an early date after Germany's defeat, Russia would fight Japan. The conversations at Yata the political aspects of the Far Eastern situation fairly detailed However, Staln did not bring his Far Eastern military experts to Yalta But he did agree that immediately alter VIE Day. the Big Three would meet agaan and hold detailed staff conversations to decide on final blows against Japan.
 Stalin pointed out, however, that it would take three months to transfer large numbers of the Red Army to the Far East after Germany was defeated. He also revealed that during the war with Germany, he had constructed 30000 miles of new railroad tracks to the Russian Far East, despite the heavy drain on transportation facilities for the in the west.
 Thus while President Truman and Churchill were en route to the Potsdam Conference hundreds of thousands of Red Army men were moving toward the Eastern front. And when Truman made his pro- posal that Russia join the war, Stalin was prepared