Evening star., 1945-08-29
Stimson Report Clears
Marshall Of Blame
For Faults Of Staff
Continued From First Page.l

received the message on December
6 did not deliver it to the Army
persons mentioned until after am
ON the morning of December 7.
When the chief of staff received
the above mentioned information on
the morning of December T. together
with information which had since
arrived to the effect that the Japa-
neSe ENJOYS were to deliver the reply
to the American Government at l
pm. and the japanese Embassy
was to destroy its remaining cipher
and code machines and secret pa
pers, he sent to the overseas COM
manders message giving these
latest developments Gen Marshall
gave directions that this message
be Immediately dispatched to the
theater commanders. This was the
message, which in the case of Gen.
Short, did not arrive unit latter
the attack
Another item of information in
the possession of the War Depart
ment which Gen. Short denies re-
ceiving was that the Japanese had
circulated from Tokyo about No.
vember 20, 1941, to their representa-
tives abroad, a plan to the effect
that in case of severance of diplo-
matte relations or war with the
United States, Great Britain or Rus
sia a certain signal in the form of
a false weather report would be
broadcast in a news message and
that all code papers were then to
be destroyed. l find that this in
formation was available to Gen.
Short or his command prior to
December Z 1941.
Confusion Regarding Signal.
The evidence as to whether the
agreed signal indicating severance
of relations or war with the United
States was subsequently given and
made known to the War Depart
ment is confusing and contradictory
No written evidence of such signal
has been found But in any event.
information was available to Gen.
Short of the orders to destroy codes
as above discussed.
With regard to the information
available in the War Department, l
believe the War Plans Division made
a mistake in not transmitting to
Gen. Short more information than
it did. A keener and more imagina-
tive appreciation on the part of some
of the officers in the War and Navy
Departments of the significance of
some of the information might have
led to a suspicion of an attack Spe
cificaljy on Pearl Harbor. l do not
think that certain officers in the War
Department functioned in these re-
spects with sufficient skill.
Xxx X
Again, as have pointed out, Gen.
Short in response to a message
which had been sent out containing
a warning of possible hostilitieS and
a request for report OF action
taken, had sent message to the
War Department which was sus-
ceptible of the Interpretation that
he was on the alert against sabotage
only and not on the alert against an
air raid or other hostile action
While this Interpretation was not
necessarily to be had from the word
ing of his message, nevertheless a
keener sense of analysis and more
tncisiVe comparison of the messages
ther inquiry by the War Plans Di-
vision of Gen. Short, and his fail
ure to go on the necessary alert
might well have been discovered
Unit Completely Reorganized.
The chief of this division and
certain of his subordinates knew
that report of the measures taken
by Gen. Short had been asked for
Gen. Shorts reply was brought to-
the attention of the chief of the
division. A clear and satisfactory
reply should have been required **..
Since Pearl Harbor, the War Plans
Division has been completely re-
organized and the officers involved
IN the matters in question have
either died or received other assign
ments where they have already
distinguished themselves in the per-
formance of important duties in the
field I am satisfied that proper
steps were taken to correct such
inadequacies of either personnel or
organization as were shown to exist
either in the War Department or in
the field at the time of the Pearl
Harhor disaster.
The War Plans Division like the