The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1945-05-23
Looking Ahead
Nv ANNE o,HARE MCCORMICK

1ize that drafting covenant to keep the peace
| is the first and easiest OF their tasks NO oil
ference of opinion exists regarding the aim
of the Security Conference. It is called togeth-
or to organize an overwhelming front against
future aggression, and with much argument,
with many points left unsettled. it will accom-
plish its purpose, because that purpose is de-
sired by all the representatives present and
demanded by all the peoples they represent
But also they have to make peace. They
will go home to face the immediate problems
external and internal, posed by the end of
the war. Most of them are more worried and
distracted by these problems than by the diff
culties of writing a security charter. One OF
the chief spokesman of a great power, caught
gazing out the .window of his hotel suite on
top OF Mob Hill the other day, admitted he
was not figuring out solution OF the trustee
ship or feasting his eyes on the superb pros
pect spread out before him.
my thoughts are far from here" he said
II am thinking of Trieste. am anxious about
the confusion that exists in the occupation OF
Germany We have time to debate the differ
ences that arise in this conference and we
have a common objective, but decisions in the
war zone can't wait or they will settle them
selves in a way to nullfy what we are agreed
on here"
The newspapers west of the Rockies give
little space to San Francisco and headline
lpost-wa. dissensions in Europe. Even S u n
southwark looking states as New Mexico
Texas and Oklahoma appear less interested
| in the dispute involving the inter American
region than in Stalins statement on Poland.
| the exchanges between Marshal Alexander and
Marshal Tito on Trieste and the disposition of
the occupying forces in Germany. From sarnp-
| ling the local press transcontlnental jour-
ney it is evident that these matters seem more
urgent than what is happening at the Golden
Gate.
The discussions at the Security Conference
are on questions of structure, on the apportion-
ment of representation in the Council, on long
term detectives. Despite the misgivings and
reservations Of the lesser nations the princi-
pie that the great powers have the response
bility and therefore must WELD final authority
in maintaining peace is generally accepted
as the basis of world organization But the dis
putes in Europe suggest to the ordinary citizen
| that tn great powers are not yet In agreement
on the terms of the present peace.
Americans have been persuaded by the ex-
perience Of this war that the only safe policy
| for this country is to combine with our allies
in an organization to maintain peace. San Fran
cisco is the proof of our commitment to this
policy. The strangest impression one carries
away from the conference is that the United
States, through its bipartisan official delega-
ton and scores of unofficial groups represent
ing all sections and the most diverse inter-
ests, is not only strongly backing a collec-
tive-security system, it is taking the lead
and doing everything in its power to achieve
it. There is no question that our interest in the
joint enterprise, if not greater than that of
other major powers, has been and is more
active and more Urgent
This support is so essential to our own
peace and that of the world that it is of para
mount importance to maintain it. To this end
some show Of Allied agreement is necessary
OF Poland. the occupation Of Trieste and &C.
cess to information in any part of liberated
Europe.
Stalin's statement declaring there is no con-
nection between the arrest of the Polish I'M
dergrornd leaders and the reconstruction of
the Provisional Government is especially sig
nificant, because it follows the return of Molo
toff to Moscow and dispels the hope that
democratic opinion as plainly expressed in
San Francisco might influence Soviet policy
on this Issue. It also has direct bearing on the
larger issue of the news blackout in Russian
| occupied territory. Until outside correspond
| ents are admitted into Poland, the public has
no means Of knowing and judging the facts.
l The case of Trieste is another attempt to
make decisions by force majeure in advance
of the war settlements. This is dangerous, be-
cause Trieste is one of the neurotic points of
Europe. It is an overwhelmingly italian City
irrespective of party, and unless it remains
! in Italian hands it must be nternationalized
if there is to be any prospect of peace in the
Adriatic
But the final fate of Trieste or any other
place is not the main point. If Yugoslavia,
Russia. Britain, France, the United States or
any other power is permitted to seize liberated
territory or dispose Of liberated peoples out
side of a general settlement and without the
agreement Of its war Allies, then the hope
of collective peace and still more Of collec-
tive system to maintain peace goes glimmer
ing. There is a growing demand for another
meeting of the Big Three, preferably Of
the Big Four, since France has the greatest
stake in the future of Europe; but more hope
could be placed in such conference if present
contentious were not due to rnisunderstand
ngs of agreements" reached by the E
Three at Yalta. Yet agreement must be found
if the policy pursued by President Roosevelt
carried on by President Truman and supported
by the American people as the expression of
vital American interest is to be realized Other
wise there is real danger of fatal reversal
of American sentiment.-New York Times
-V
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