The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-01-05

In Belgium, it is now recog- niZed, the U. s. Command was not sufficiently aware of the massing of German troops ready for the counter-attack. The re- suit was tragic.
 But in Italy, Military Intelli- gence spotted Nazi preparations againstt he All-Negro 92nd Divi- sion in advance. So when the enemy attacked, the 92nd was prepared. They had thrown up strong defenses to fall back on, withdrew to these and then held firm.
 It had been figured, bothh in Washington and at General Clark'S headquarters ill Rome, that if the Nazis counter attacked they would center on this Negro division.
 In Belgium, however, some one not only was off guard, but apparently was ver-cOnfdient. The Division against which the NaZiS aimed their drive was completely green and raw divi- sion never before under fire, and it was only natural they picked this spot. Possibly Nazi Intelligence was so alert it spotted this Divisions arrival in Europe, for it was in France but 8 few weeks when 1t went up to the line.
 Meanwhile the 92nd Division in Italy had been under fire since last August. The first day it went into the line, incidentally, the Negro troops got 8 2-hour pasting from German artillery and stood up very well. There was no Nazi counter-attack at that time, however.
 LONG WEAK G2
 For long time, it has been ad- mitted ill high-up Army circles, that G-2 or Military Intelligence has been one of the weakest branches of the Army. Several bonehead plays have been chalked up to it:
 l. The prediction in 194O that France would hold (she folded in & few Weeks); 2.-The predic- ton in the summer of 194O that England would be taken (she hasn't been taken yet); 3.-the prediction in June l94l that Mos COW wound fall in a few weeks.
 Another bOner credited to G2
 is not knowing that three Di- SiOns were lying in wait for AL
 lied forces when we landed at
 SalernO. There was another
 bad Intelligence bOner at Kiska when we bombed the island for days after the Japs had left, but
 Naval Intelligence will have to bear the hcicf blame for that.
 Reason for intelligence mistakes in both the Army and Navy is attributed to their closed-shop policy, whereby preponderant number of bluebloods, bankers, and socially elite verne permitted to pass tke pealry gates to join up in their coveted jobs.
 As a result of some of these mistakes, the Army last spring undertook a shakeup of Military Intelligence, under the leadership of forth-right Assistant Secretary John McCloy. Since then it was hoped that G2 operations would be better.
 COY DAN TOBIN
 Dan ToDin, head of the team sters union, IS in unique posi- tion. Back In 1882 he wanted very much to be Secretary of La- Dor but couldn't get the appoint ment. Now he could get it, but doesn't want it.
 In the Roosevelt Herbert HooV- CT campaign, Tobin was just as energetic in his support of the President as he was last Novem- Der. After the election Jim Far ley was to help him get the Cabi- net post of Labor Secretary. That was l2 years ago. Tobin was younger then, and wanted the job.
 The President elect actually talked to him about it, but later Miss Perkins was appointed, and Jim Farley explained that Mrs. Roosevelt had contended the Wo- mems vote was so strong some thing had to be done to recog- nize the women.
 TObin ttOk the decision with