The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-11-07
By Dre1C Pearson

Hulls final peace proposal of Nov 2S requiring the JapS break with the Axis and remove their troops from China. The message to Hitler further stated that the United States considered Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy. -
 Col. Sadtler next appealed to Col. Beden smith. a lieutenant-general on Gen. Eisenhowers staII in Germany but then secretary to the General StalI and rght-hand man to Chief of Staff Marshall.
 Smith also unreceptve to suggestions that further warnings be given Army leaders in Pearl Harbor according to the secret Army report when he learned that the matter already had been taken up with the War Plans Division, he declined to discuss the matter further"
 Reason behind this involved plan, presumably, vas the fact that Admr Kimme not Gen. Short, was responsible for the main defense of Pearl Harpor Under Army-Navy rules, Army planes were not per per mitted to fly out the water from Pearl Harbor more than 100 miles and it was up to the Navy to do long-range scouting for the enemy. Admr kmmei, despite the war warning given him on Nov. 28, was not sending out scouting planes
 On Dec 6, one day before Pearl Harbor, came the final chapter in the fantastic drama Late that night, Tokyo sent another coded message to the Jap anese ambassador in Washington giving Tokyos reply to Hull's peace proposal ot Nov 28
 Meanwhile our own code experts were at work on the message and decoded it almost as fast as 1t was received by the Jap embassy. And according to the Army's top secret report, when they got to the fourteenth part of the message, the tone was considered so hostile and unequvocal as to be virtual declaration of war.
 Early in the morning of Dec. T. Ambassador Nomura received his final message It was an in- struction present the long 14point reply to Secy Hull INN PM"
 This was the hour of the Pearl Harbor attack
 At about 8:3O Sunday morning, Col. Bratton trie; to reach Gen. Marshall The chief of staff was ou horseback riding He did not return until ll:25. So, at about noon Marshall finally sent message to Gen Short which went by RIGA and did not reach Pearl Harbor until 9 minutes before the Japs struck It was not decoded and handed to Short until after the days fighting was over
 However, when Capt Edwin T. Layton informed Kimmel on Dec 2 that four Jap airplane carriers had broken away from the rest Of the fleet were un locatable, and might even be rounding Diamond Head of Pearl Harbor, Kmmel took no steps to scout for them or to be the alert These were the car riers from which five days later were launched the planes that sank the backbone of the U s. fleet at Pearl Harbor
 An impartial reading of the facts, both those stll secret and those hitherto published, shows conclusive y that Kmmel and Short received ample warning even as early as Oct. 16-that Japan might attacs the United States U. s. policy was that it was de sirabe for Japan to commit the first overt act II case hostilities could not be avoided" Finally, It IS clear that everyone both in Washington and Hawai-, expected Japan to attack the Philippines or the Dutch East Indies.
 No one expected the attack to come at Pearl Harbor And when Franklin Roosevelt, who had taken such pride in building up the Navy received the crushing news the afternoon of Sunday. Dec. ', he put his hands to his head and said: My God, my God how could it have happened?"