Evening star., 1945-07-25
Memoirs of PouI Reynuud
(Sirth In a Series.)
BY PAUL REYNAUD,

War Premier OF France,
North American Newspaper Alliance.
Did the Allied High Command
learn anything in September, 1899
from the three-week war which hao
just taken place under our eyes ir
Poland?
Here is a report by our Military
Attache in Warsaw, which was made
a part Of army instructions:
THE combat methods used by the
German Army in. Poland met q
specific situation-a very long front
large differences in numbers, absence
of continuous and fortified frontiers
superiority of technical equipment
On the western front, operations
will no doubt take another form
- although 1t is possible that on
certain parts of the western front
the Germans may again apply the
methods of the Polish campaign"
Gen. Charles de Gaulle, then a
colonel commanding the tanks of
the 5th Army, drew quite different
conclusion.
On November II, 1899, he sent a
report to the high command under
lining the decisive role played in
this short war by the panZer divi-
sions, and asking that armored divi-
sions be former Immediately from
the infantry's supporting tank bat
talionS.
The records of the Riom trial re-
veal that Gen. AlphOnse Georges
wrote in the margin of this report ::
Interesting but the constructive
idea does not equal the criticism.
To be studied"
I have since asked Gen. Maurice
Gamelin, commander in chief at
that time, what happened, and what
was the meaning Of Gen. Georges
comment.
De Gaulle Replies.
Col de Gaulle did in fact send
this report" he replied. 1T reached
the high command through normal
military channels. Gen. Bourret,
commanding the 5th Army, sent it
on to Gen. Pretelat, commanding
the Army group, with reservations,
and the latter, in his turn, trans
mitted it with reservations TO Gen.
Georges (who was commander in
Northeastern France, the first high
French general to feel the might Of
Germany's Panzers).
Gen. Duffieux, inspector general
for tanks and infantry, was hostile, "
Gen. Gamelin went on. He had
always maintained that tanks
should be formed into supporting
battalions for the infantry.
ut was not, however, possible to
create the armored divisions De
Gaulle proposed merely by putting
together the infantry-supporting
tank battalions-this mainly be-
cause the Renault 1885 tanks of the
supporting battalions did not have
the gasoline capacity, radio equip
ment, speed or armament for indie
pendent action as a tank division" p"
I asked Gen. Gamelin If we could
not have grouped our 40 battalions
of supporting tanks into massive
armored force which, without much
range, might still have counter
attacked in the rear Of the invasion
corridors at Sedan and Dinant.
I'VE could not entirely deprive
the infantry Of its supporting
tanks"
Petain Plan Cited.
Even the infantry behind the
Maginot Line and the Rhine?"
The infantry occupying the west
ern segment of the Maginot Line, y
Gen. Gamelin replied, was 25 Kill
ometers Us niles in front of the
| Notifications, in accordance with
Marshall Petains plan, sacrificing
the strategic concept of maneuver
to the holding of the best defensive
position available. Tanks were
therefore needed there.
The commander of each army
was, however, free to use the sup
porting tank battalions of his in
fantry regiments as one mass,
grouped under the army tank COM
mander."
why did not any of them do
that?"
Il have no idea" replied Gen
Gamelin. Gen. Charles Huntziger
commander of the French I'd
Army. for instance, could have
grouped his tank battalions west OF
the Meuse for massed use south OF
Sedan BLOCKING the first German
breach of the Maginot Line.
Gen. CASTOR Billotte, command
ing the northern army group (who
had also recommended independent
tank divisions), was no doubt over
taken by events" said Gen. Game
lin. With Gen. Andre Coraps
tanks he could have formed an i'm
portant armored group west OF
Dinant"
But in fact" I repeated, "the
supporting tank battalions were
everywhere used on their own?"
Eyes"
Leader Criticized.
Thus the responsible leaders on
the northeastern front in Frahce
could have opposed the nine, and
later, ten, panzer divisions which IN
vaded Belgium on May 10, 1940 by
means which, though improvised
might all the same have been useful
But they believed in systematic de-
fense: that the continuous front
was invulnerable; that, as in the
last war, the enemy could only at.
tack after a lengthy accumulation
of troops and material.
. LoBE's S,