Detroit evening times., 1945-07-07
GENERAL
BARROWS
WorId
In Review

Il ties obviously are consolidate
ing their strength TO meet the
overwhelming tia c k that is
being organized by this country.
They are Withdrawing their
armies from South China and
abandoning their land connec-
ton with their forces in Malaga
Siam and fndo-China.
Eventually the Japanese may
abandon the valley of the Yang
tSe and consolidate in North
China and Manchuria.
Japanese- reports state that a
great transfer Of war-produclng
machinery from Japan to Man
churia is under way.
American b o m b er attack is
rapidly reducing 10 ruin the war
potential within Japan proper.
They must re-establiSh il on
lllc con uNlIltllNs
All these things indicate that
the final overthrow of Japan
may occur in northern Chinese
territory. 1t may have 10 be
accomplished largely by Amer
lean armies.
THlS does not minimize ths
Il mission of the United States
Navy.
lis ships and air power have a
task no less difficult and dam
gerous than that of the army.
The traditional theory of sea
power is TO keep the seas open
for the movement and advan-
-tage of its own nation and COM
pletely deny all waters TO the
enemy.
1t is a doctrine of blockade.
complete and effective in iSolat-
ing and paralyzing the war
activity of the enemy.
Our navy and army have
already succeeded in destroying
the connections and lines of
supply between Japan and the
important island, world 10 the
south.
There still remains the task
Of severing all sea communica-
ton between Japan and the con-
tlncnt.
is a Acknowledgements be-
cause the penInsufar of Korea
which is Japan'S connection with
ASIA, projects southeasterly so
close TO Japan itself.
TIIE famous Straits Of TSu-
Il shima are only 135 miles
wide between Shimonoseki and
the port of Fusan, Korea, which
Is connected by the main rail-
road line with Mukden in Man
Churia.
Beyond these straits lies the
broad Sea Of Japan, which is
almost entirely enclosed by the
bow of the japanese islands.
The Japanese have another
route across this sea from Tsu-
ruga 10 RaShin at the extreme
northern point Of Korea, dis
tance of about 535 miles.
Both of these routes should
be dominate d d by American
naval power if the connection
between Asia, the mainland,
and Japan is 10 be broken.
If this is now the immediate
or early task of the United
States Navy, II would appear
TO be a hazardous one.
The Straits of Tsushima are
not only guarded by naval and
air bases on both sides but the
fortified island of TSuShima,
midway in the straits, is for
midable obstruction.
Probably only our suhma-
rines. which have alrea d y
played a large role in the de-
struction of japanese seapower,
can at present traverse the
Tsushima Straits or enter the
Sea of Japan.
The straits undoubtedly are
heavily mined, and so probably
are all the other pasSagewayS
between japanese islands into
the Japan Sea.
w @ h er submarines can
carry their dangerous opera
tionS into these waters is
strictly a matter of naval
judgment.
THE only other way to isolate
Il Japan from the continent is
by penetrating the Yellow Sea,
between Korea and the penln-
sula of Shantung, and landing
amphibiouS forces on one side
or the other.
It is perhaps here that the
great combined army and navy
operation will finally be staged.
This in every way would he
an operation comparable 10 the
invasion Of Normandy.
1t would be even more diff
cult and costly.
First, because the distance 10
be traverSed by troops at sea
are so many times greater.
Second. because the Japa-
neSe armies will be better con-
Ccntrated 10 meet the attack
than were the German armies
in France.
Third. because il will be AL
most impossible TO cover landing
operations with adequate tacti-
Cal support
Extremely difficult though
these attacks seem. they are the
only thrusts which would inn
mediately penetrate the vitals