Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-02-27
Letters to The Star
Mr.. STREET. Explains His Views
On Yalta Conference Policy

On Yalta Conference Policy
To the Editor Of The star,
| What should one say about the mix
ture of good and bad In the Yalta COM
munique? Many say the good offsets
the bad. would like to say that, too
But what If the bad is deadly virus7
Shall one still recommend the milk in
which 1t hides, because the milk out
weighs the microbes?
For my part I find a deadly virus in
the Yalta milk.
In essence, the Crimean policy is to
seek peace by dividing world power in
the hands of three men, while keeping
each OF them In position to draw gun
on the others, and every one else
One inevitable result OF this policy
| II continued-is to concentrate more
and more domestic power in each of
these three executives even in peace
time. That is poison both to democracy
and peace.
Another inevitable result of this pol
icy-f continued-is to force other
democracies, particularly France, to 60
still further and faster in this direc-
ton, partly to protect themselves, partly
to protect their dignity. In 1899 when
France was heavily armed 1t had a full
voice in Big Power meetings Now it
is weak, and snubbed. Though much
OF the war is fought on its SOIL decisions
| OF vital interest to it are taken with
out consulting 1t.
The lesson Is plain, to every French
man. and to others: If you would have
the position you had before. then arm,
arm, arm. Sacrifice butter to cannon.
Sacrifice democracy to dictatorship, for
Hitler and Stain have both shown how
rapidly impoverished nations can arm
under dictatorship. II you cannot equal
the United States in power, you can
hope to equal Britain. 1t does not mat
ter what you do to gain power, how
many opponents you purge or how much
hatred OF democracy you propagate in
the process. If the end result is to give
you great armed power, then Uncle
Sam and John Bull will come knocking
deferentially at your door, That is the
lesson Yalta teaches, and to peace it
is poison.
Consider now the Yalta Polish set
tlement." Some defend it as a just de-
cision-the Curzon Line was not drawn
by Russia, and the Poles do not have
clean hands
League Opportunity Missed.
But the more one proves that in jus
tice this land really should 60 to Russia,
the more one proves that Russia had
much to gain and nothing to lose by
leaving the decision to some impartial
machinery, such as that which it had
| just helped devise at Dumbarton Oaks.
By so doing it would have gained not
only the land but great moral prestige,
and given the new league machinery
most suspicious Inauguration. The
more one proves that Yaltas Polish
decision was just the more one must
condemn President Roosevelt and Pre-
mier Churchill for turning so golden
an opportunity for the league into a
| prenatal curse.
The realists. who scorn considerations
OF justice or morality, argue that self
interest required us to accept the Soviet
method of deciding the Polish issue.
| They say We got good deal in return,
| that we forestalled the threat of Pre-
mier Stain installing made-in- Mos
COW government in Berlin as at Lublin,
and they hint that we assured Russia's
entry later in the war against Japan.
If these beliefs are well founded, it
merely proves that we are now doing
what we condemned the British and
French for doing at Munich, and sug-
gests we are likely to suffer the same
results.
The parallel that l945 is drawing with
1899 Is much too sharp total to serve
aggressors again and again. In 1899
Hitler sought to take Polish territory
In the west and gave Russia Polish
territory in the east in compensation,
to buy its neutrality. We Americans
held up our hands in horror then, and
the British thought the Nazi act so
heinous that they went to war against
Germany. In l945 Stain seeks the same
territory in the east, and offers to COM
pensate Poland with German territory.
And the President of the United States
and the Prime Minister of Britain ap-
prove this, and gain considerable sup
port for it at home.
AS correspondent of the New York
Times at the League of Nations through
out the Manchurian, Ethiopian and
Rhineland affairs, had ample occasion
to observe how the Japanese. Fascists
and Nazis pointed to the record of others,
particularly the British and Americans,
| to justify themselves abroad, and unite
their people behind them. They had
no such fragrant precedent then to
encourage them as Yalta offers now to
| every future aggressor.
Balance of Power Again.
The Crimean agreement to foster
democratic" regimes in the liberated
countries hides a profound conflict
between the Soviet and the United
States conception of what democratic
means. To hide real conflict under
apparent agreement is to enable both
sides to cry bad faith!' when an
attempt to apply the agreement to a
concrete case brings out the opposing
interpretations of It,
The new league is another embodi-
ment of the basic Crimean policy.
This is simply the old balance-of-
power theory with the balance no longer
between two scales. but more intricately
divided among three. No housewife
| fr11c CT IL I1o1