Detroit evening times., 1945-03-13


At Two, like Tarawa, the Japs
had long-prepared, perfect posi-
tions. and a defensive plan. At
Two they had to make their
best possible fight because its
seizure placed their mainland in
jeopardy. They built concrete
pillboXeS, established concrete
artillery and mortar positions.
THEY cannot possibly h We
Amy better defensive posi-
tionS at home. SO if they could
not successfully defend Two it
is unreasonable TO anticipate
much greater hidden power in
Japan.
In the Luzon and Leyte fights
for the Philippines they seemed
broken, They were supposed to
have a force of 100000 to 150,-
600 on Luzon and they had 100,-
600 or more. But they so dis
perSed their forces as TO permit
picccmeai annihilation- without
a major fight. On Leyte they
put up a better struggle, but we
counted $4,000 dead.
They had plenty Of time for
preparing defense of both places
and plenty of warning But both
fights involved mobility of ac-
tion primarily, and in this factor
they seemed completely lost and
demoralized.
As a result. our people are
saying now that the Jap reputa-
-tieR for suicidal resistance and
hard, tricky opposition does not
hold true when they must fight
in the open. They are appar-
emily not equal to maneuvering,
but only to static defense.
This discovery furnishes a
happy portent for the final
stages of the attack on Japan
now approaching. The assault
naturally is to be cooperative
army-navy venture in accord
ance with plans long ago formu-
lated. (You may have noticed
only our marines and navy were
involved at Two, allowing pre-
parations TO be made even dur
ing that fight for the next
stage.)
A SUGGESTION has b e n
n published that the navy is
likely to lead the final stages
to the exclusion of Gen. Mac
Arthur, and indeed, l have
heard some unofficial talk that
some of MacArthur's subordl-
mates are likely to handle SUBJ
ordinate end of it, while he
remains in the Philippines. 1
do not accept either suggestion.
A Joint command is no doubt
called for by the requirements
of large landing forces. Avail
able marines could not handle it.
Furthermore, there is nothing
in the Philippines to require
MacArthur's presence-only the
bands of Japs which lie in the
hills east of Manila, west of
Clark Field and in northern
Luzon. Filipino guerillas are
adequate for these, leaving both
Macarthur and his forces no
doubt available for further as
signments.
AS for the supposedly prom
ised Stain declaration of war
on Japan to give us Siberian air
bases, some authorities now
think these are not needed by
us. We are getting our own air
bases, ones we can better sup
ply than those in Siberia; to wit
Two. Certainly the Siberian
bases are becoming less vital to
us (they were most important
at the outset of the war, when
we had nothing).
Stain. however, is less likely
TO be guided by our necessities,
than his own, and he will hardly
overlook the political necessity
of edging Russia into new po-
litical lineup of Asia, by declar-
ing war on his own account.
TIIE split situation in China is
Il known TO him. Three capi-
tails of that country have been
functioning throughout the war,
each playing with foreign
power for control. and each eX-
pecting that its foreign ally will
ask no colonies, bases or special
privileges for winning the war
for its respective capital.
The three are Chungking, re-
lying on the Americans largely
(our air supply is about all il
has); Yenan, representing the
Communist element which has
not received much aid from
Moscow but would like TO, and
Nanking, the pro-Japanese pup
pet Chinese capital.
Statesmen of the world will
have TO rattle their wits harder
than they did in Europe TO find
a working arrangement after we
ge. there, which, apparently, we
soon will.
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