Evening star., 1945-04-07
Pacific Base Defenses
Seen Future u. S. Need
Strategic Bases North of Equator
Should Be Held, Writer Believes

Strategic Bases North of Equator
Should Be Held, Writer Believes
By David Laurence
Shall the sacrifices which American
youth have been making in the Pacific
to win such islands as Two Jima, Oki-
nawa and Tarawa be rendered futile
when the time comes to settle the prob
lem of naval bases for our warships,
planes and submarines?
This question, which has been wisely
raised by Admiral King, commander in
chief of the United States Fleet, is one
to which little thought has been given
thus far by the American people. The
Atlantic Charter, of course, pledges its
signatories against territorial aggran-
dizement," but by no stretch of the
Imagination can the tiny islands cap
tured by our armed forces in the Pacific
be regarded as in that category. For
they represent no opportunity for eco
nomic expansion and the total square
mileage involved is negligible.
What America needs are security
bases-bases for the defense of the
United States against any possible in
vasion by any modern weapons or by
devices likely to be perfected In the
| foreseeable future.
To ask for bases for defense is not to
seek territorial aggrandizement or to
| offend any other power except our
enemies The United States, therefore,
should have all the strategic islands in
| the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator.
i All of these will have been Wrested from
| Japan when this war is won. Here and
there are some islands owned by Allied
powers which will be needed by the
! United States to complete the American
system of bases. and in these instances
doubtless lease arrangements can be
made.
Pacific Ocean Police.
Certainly the "lease-lend' bill which
will be tailed up when the war is over
will have big credit for America on
the books of some of our Allies, and the
| chances are that they will be glad to
work out arrangements so that the
! United States Navy with its surface,
air and submarine forces, can police
! the Pacific Ocean and stop any aggres-
| sor navy in its tracks.
Never again should it be possible for
! an attack to be made as close to
| continental United States as Pearl
Harbor. The purpose of the Navy in
| seeking outlying bases is to keep sufi-
cient forces at points far from conti-
| mental United States so as to minimize
! the damage from future attacks.
The problem of rockets will come in
/ for much consideration in figuring out
the need for bases. The best defense
against the rocket is "seapower," which,
as Admiral King defines it, means sur
/ face ships, plus submarines, plus air
craft, plus merchant ships, plus naval
bases, plus trained personnel, plus the
productive capacity to build, equip,
operate and fight them
/ If any nation can send out aircraft
carriers or submarines or other war
ships capable of shooting rockets at our
island possessions or against the United
! States itself, it means that strategic
bases near enough to get at the source
of such rockets will be essential to us.
Scope of Warfare Changed.
The whole scope and scale of naval
| warfare has been changed from what it
| was in the World War. Amphibious
warfare has come to be recognized as
cutting through all previous concepts
of military organization on land While
certain consultations will be possible
in Army and Navy operations through
the use of the task force idea. 1t is
! too early to call for merger of the
Army and Navy.
The duplication in some respects. such
as in purchasing or contract admins
tratiOn, can be avoided but even the
much criticized rivalry between the
services cannot be regarded as without
some advantages. The stimulus in the
competitive sport world has been a
dominating factor in the development
of athletes While rivalry that breaks
down cooperation will be condemned
as deplorable rivalry that stimulates
each of the armed services to do its
utmost for the common cause can be
wholeheartedly commended.
The tendency to think in jurisdictional
lines, however, is just as bad when it
serves to build separate services for
each new weapon of war as the in
clination to oversimplify the problems
by putting all armed services together
into one force so that all sense of indi-
viduality and specialization is lost.
Postwar plans for our Army and Navy
and their respective air forces will come
in for much discussion, but the more
important question now is the settle
ment of the matter of naval bases.
"Trusteeships" may be the formula used
where large territories are involved but.
even so. in those instances the United
States deserves to be awarded either by
lease or by treaty the use of strategic
bases for security.
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