Evening star., 1945-12-19

1t will never be possible to achieve
absolute coordination of the sup
ply and service functions of all serv-
ices. Neither the War Department
nor the Navy Department has been
able to eliminate all, duplication
even within its own organization.
But there is no question that the
extent of waste through 1aclSof CO.
ordination between the two depart
ments is very much greater than the
waste resulting from faulty CO.
ordination within each. If we can
attain as much coordination among
all the services as now exists within
each department we shall realize ex-
tensive savings.
Reduce Volume Of Supplies.
Consolidation of the departments
will, for example, reduce the volume
of supplies that need to be pro-
cured. Supply requirements, for ex-
ample. begin with a calculation of
SO many items per man to be sup
piled. But to this basic figure must
be added margins of safety, to ac-
count for items in storage, trans
portation lags, breakdowns in deliv-
cry, emergency demands, and so
forth, In these margins savings can
be made through unified systems of
supply. AS the volume handled in
any supply system grows, the per-
centage factor which has to be
added for reserves Is reduced.
In the same way, both the Army
and the Navy must add a margin
of safety to their requirements for
production plants, depots, hospitals,
air training fields, and other types
OF construction common to both
services. When the requirements
are pooled, the total amount of
margin may be reduced. The same
is true of personnel. Each service
must add margin of safety in
estimating its requirements for doc
tors, nurses, skilled mechanics, and
other types Of specialists. The total
margin is greater il the computa-
tions are made separately. Another
source of economy will be the pool
ing of facilities and personnel in
localities where at present both
services have to operate, but where
from the nature of the circum-
stances. facilities and personnel are
not fully used.
Other examples of duplica ton
could be cited. Businessmen have
to deal with separate buyers, who
may use separate specifications for
items which could as we'll have the
same specifications. Separate in
spectors are stationed in their
plants. During this war, instances
occurred where the purchase of all
available quantities of certain items
by one service resulted in acute
shortages in the other service.
Parallel transportation and storage
systems required extra overhead.
AS the war progressed, it Is true
that increased cooperation reduced
the extent of waste and conflict
But voluntary cooperation in such
matters can never be expected to
be fully effective. A single authority
at the top would inevitably achieve
a greater degree OF economy than
would be obtained under divided
direction.
Many Aspects in Program.
3. We should adopt the or
ganizational structure best suited
to fostering co-ordina ton be-
tween the military and the re-
mainder of the Government.
Our military policy and program
are only part of a total national
program aimed at achieving our
national objectives OF security and
peace. This total program has many
aspects, and many agencies of the
Government must participate in its
execution
Our military policy. for example.
should be completely consistent with
our foreign policy. 1t should be
designed to support and reflect our
commitments to the United Nations
Organization. 1t should be adjusted
according to the success or lack of
success of our diplomacy. 1t should
reflect our fullest knowledge of the
capabilities and intentions of other
powers. Likewise. our foreign policy
should take into account our mill
tary capabilities and the strategic
power of our armed forces.
A total security program has still
other major aspects. A military
program, standing alone, is useless.
1t must be supported in peacetime
by planning for industrial mobili-
zation and for development of in
dustrial and raw material resources
where these are insufficient. Pro-
grams OF scientific research must be
developed for military purposes and
their results woven into the defense
program. The findings of our INTEL
ligence service must be applied to
all of these.
Formulation and execution of a
comprehensive and consistent ma
tional program embracing all these
activities are extremely difficult
tasks. They are made more dim
cult the greater the number of de-
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