Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-09-16


elements of the German armies which
were to break through the British de-
lenses in Egypt and through the Middle
East. 1t is not yet certain whether this
plan was changed because of the diff
culties the Germans encountered in
Africa or whether Hitler decided not to
support effectively Field Marshal Rom
mel's forces because the Japs had de-
cided to abandon that operation.
But it is certain, so far as the Amer
lean high command in Washington is
concerned, that at no time did the Japa-
nese initial strategic master plan provide
for conquest of the Celebes, New Guinea
and the Solomon Islands
Nays Ambition Fatal.
1t was the navy which was thirsting
for more victories after the success at
Pearl Harbor and the defeat at Midway.
1t wanted to show the japanese people
that it, too, could conquer lands and
enlarge the empire beyond the widest
dreams of the most inveterate imperial
lists
The supporters of the imperial navy
in Tokyo compelled the army to approve
of the safe" plan to extend the Japa-
nese lines to the Solomons. This re-
quired not only diversion of important
military forces to that area but also
the use Of large number of transports
and supply ships which Japan seemed
able to afford at that time. 1t required
above all the use of Japan's air force,
which was brilliant SO long as it met
with no real opposition from the Allies.
This originally uncalled-for extension
was a vital contributing factor to
Japan's ultimate disaster. Merchant
ships had to be used to provide men
and supplies for these far-away islands.
They were badly reduced by the Amer
lean submarine force which had not
suffered at Pearl Harbor, by the new
American PIT boats and by new Amer
lean aviation. 1t was in this area also
that the japanese air force suffered
its death blow because all it's first-line,
experienced pilots were exterminated in
combat with American airmen.
The japanese Navy general staff re-
fused to admit its blunders. Instead Of
abandoning the Inflated adventure, it
became stubborn and poured more men,
ships and airplanes into that area which
the United States could defend with the
"shoestring" force it had in 1912 and
early in 1913
There is little doubt in the mind Of
the American war planners that had the
japanese exploited intelligently the sur
prise of Pearl Harbor, or had they stuck
by the master plan which provided for
rounding up part of Greater Asia and
a move in force toward India and AZ
ghanistan, the war might have lasted
much longer and our victory have been
far more costly. 1t is also possible that
the whole picture across the Atlantic
might have been totally different if, by
a landing force in the United States,
the Japs had compelled us to fight to
save our own territory, very little lease
lend and few American troops would
have been available for a campaign in
Europe
Cost Japs Great Victory.
These plumbers which have cost Japan
the greatest victory in the history of
any nation are laid directly by Amer
lean military experts on the doorstep
of the rivalry between the japanese
Army and Navy. Both boasted of strong
supporters at court and in the govern
ment Not even Prime Minister TOTO,
who was supposed to be the virtual
dictator of the country, was able to
interfere effectively.
Because of this rivalry the japanese
intelligence services were equally at
loggerheads and were frequently trying
to present reports to uphold their re-
spective general stats. The navy in
telligence, for instance, is known to
have painted a rosy picture of the lack
of preparedness of the Allies in the
area between New Guinea and the Solo,
mons. 1t was difficult for TOTO to re-
fuse the navy such simple operation
which, the naval men said. would seal
off any further support from America
to Australia. After the japanese defeat
at Guadalcanal, the imperial staff.
mindful OF the well-known Oriental
face" could no longer withdraw with
out fear of causing undue uneasiness in
the homeland.
The lessons of the strife within the
armed forces of Japan will not be over
looked in the United States. Our own
past mistakes are still sufficiently vivid
in the minds of those who knew better
than the general public how close we,
ourselves, were to disaster. The result
is the willingness of the Army and the
Navy high-ranking officials to have one
department of national defense which
would place in the hands of a cohesive
organization the threads of all the
branches which are concerned with the
defense of the United States.
Henceforth, there will be full co-or-
dination between the Army. Navy, air
forces and the scientific services which
will have No. priority in future de-
Tense planning. Moreover, the intelli-
gence services, which will be far more
important than in the past, will have to
be organized under one head, be re-
sponsible directly to the top man in the
new department of national defense.
Naval and military information in the
strict sense of the word is obsolete to-
day. The important things to rout out
of foreign countries will be their tech
meal developments in atomic warfare,
their industrial and scientific develop
ments, their economic and financial
situation and the frame of mind of their
people. These will be far more i'm
portant in the coming years than the