Evening star., 1945-06-16

of very large divisions, which as
you know, are twice the size of
ordinary ones-British. American,
French divisions are all organized
roughly the same and are twice the
size of all other divisions-but it
was in the integration of ground
and air. with the air capable of
intervening effectively at any point
even to that of supply.
For many days from the time
after we crossed the Rhine. the
thing that made possible the ad-
vance was air supply. Most of our
freight, it is true, was going by
train but the 1000 tons day that
We averaged flying by air left us
the margin that let the advance
60 with the speed that it did. The
air and the ground together knew
the supply details for the plan.
AS you know. the double envel-
opment of the Ruhr was by a direct
speedy thrust to cut Germany In
the heart into two portions and
then to turn toward the fianks,
with the next job that of cutting
the southern half into another two
parts so that there could be no So
called fortress or 'redoubt" and
to join the Russians again in the
Austria area. After that, we had
them completely isolated. Without
any contact with one another, 1t
was not much work to clean up the
remnants.
! I have talked SO often about Allied
integration that l am afraid it would
merely be a bore to you to listen to
my story on that again. 1 merely
wanted to say that the service inte-
grafton is fully as important as is
Allied integrations in waging a war.
Soldiers Tired Of War.
From the standpoint OF soldiers,
, they are tired of the war, they are
tired of it, of courSe-all of them
British. American and French. They
are not articulate about it, but I
know one thing; they have got an
earnest hope for peace. 1t is my
conviction that they believe If the
same forebearance and good will is
applied all through our countries,
the United Nations, in meeting the
problems of peace, we ought to be
fully as successful in peace as we
we're in war.
Now there is one thing you have
IN war that you do not have in
peace. You have unification, COM
PEELED by very threatening danger.
In other words. Franklin's old say
ing. IF we don't hang together.
we'll hang separately" applies in
war more definitely than it does In
peace.
But If he (the Allied soldiers can.
he will express to you-in dozens OF
different ways-that he really be-
lieves he has won peace that he
is certainly praying will be pre-
served.
I have been in Europe since May,
1912, something over three years.
During that time, of course, I have
been party to great many Incl
dents, some of them most contro-
verslal. This may be the last chance
you people will have with me and
it may be you have got some curl
oSity about those three years. If
you want to attack me I shall tell
you about any one of them or an
swer any questions on anything that
can possibly throw any light upon |
over those three years. I am ready |
to try to do it.
Tells of African Invasion. |
@. What was the most worried
night you had in the last three
years?
A. Well, to tell you the truth, I |
believe it was the night we first
attacked in North Africa. There
were so many confusing factors in
volved. Remember, we went in!
there as friends. We hoped to make
an ally. But we had to 60 pre-
pared to fight, if necessary for us
to make a great show of strength.
We hoped that if we made show
of overpowering strength the Ger
mans would not hold that part of
France that was then unoccupied
and would let it alone In other
words, if the French could show
that it was impractical for them
to make a great fight down there
it would give them an out. That
was one thing.
The next. it was the first ambhibi-
Gus operation I undertook and all of
us were more nervous about it, I
think, than later We became. Last
ly, we were trying to do lot with
very little and the weather on the
west coast was obominable and we
did not know what we were going to
run into over there. And fourth
reason - communications were so
poor In the Mediterranean we
found that the radio practically does
not work. I should say the most
worried night I spent during the
war was the night of November or
B-November 7, believe, 1912.
Questioned on Salerno.
@. You spoke of Salerno If you
had it to do over again would you
go in there again?
A. Yes, indeed, in spite of the
fact that we knew the Germans |
could pick out almost the exact spot
we'd have to come. When we went
up into Italy there were two places
to go. Just jumping across the Mes
sina Straits was one. The other
was to go as far up the coast as we
wanted to. If you are going to make
one of these so-called left hooks"
then you could 60 as far as the
fighters could cover At that time
we only had short-range fighters.
Salerno was indicated. If you mere
ly put your troops into the toe of
Italy the enemy could see that you
could come no further, that you were
committed. He could have blocked
us there and we probably would not
be to Naples yet.
There was not any question in my
mind that the Salerno attack was
absolutely necessary. 1t was a good
formation There was one American
division taken somewhat by surprise
and. due really to no fault of its
own, that suffered more losses than
it should have. The losses were
heavy on the 18th. But it was un-
nlIeStiOnablv necessary Tn attack As