The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-06-12

government had approved the in- clusion of certain London Poles in the Lublin Government, but that the London Poles were not agreeable. He referred to Stalin's note of April 2, in which the Rus sians said they would welcome
 ex-Premier MikolajcZyk and oth- CTS.
 Anthony Eden immediately pro- tested that he didn't like the un- lateral way the Russians had been operating in regard to Poland. (At Yalta it was agreed that the future of Poland was to be de- cided by U. s. Ambassador Har- riman and British Ambassador Clark Kerr, acting with Molotov. instead of Moscow's writing notes on it's own to the Poles.)
 To this Molotov replied: You must not forget that the security of Russia in the future is in- volved in this matter. And we can't take a casual attitude"
 Eden said that it was imperative for the interests of the San Francisco Conference that some unity be reached on Poland be- fore the Conference started. With this, Molotov concurred. He suggested that the way to get agreement was to follow the same procedure as in the Yugoslav situation, where, he said, Tito first had been accepted as the head of Yugoslavia and the Allies then agreed on the political elements headed by Dr. Subasic (the For eign Minister) who were to join the Government later. Molotov said there had been no trouble in Yugoslavia and described this as a very excellent plan. T his was before trouble started with Tito over Trieste.)
 Stettinius then said that the United States could not concur with any plan for Poland which did not give full representation to all democratic elements in Po- land.
 MOLOTOV GETS TIRED
 At this point Molotov said he was tired from his long airplane trip, needed rest and time to think things over.
 Next day, Secretary Stettinius opened the discussion again by repeating that it was urgent that agreement on Poland be reached by the Big Three.
 MolOtOv shot back that agree
 ment would be simple if the
 Yalta formula were followed. All
 the Allies would have to do, he
 said, was to accept the Lublin
 Government as a nucleus for
 the Government of Poland, as
 agreed to at Yalta by Churchill and Roosevelt.
 Foreign Minister Eden imme- diately questioned this interpre- tation as what was agreed to at Yalta. Stettinius, however, said nothing. Molotov stood firm, saying that he was at Yalta, as were the other two, and this was his interpretation of the Polish Agreement.
 At this point, the conferees gave the Polish question up as a bad job. They then turned to preliminary San Francisco prob- lems.
 TRUMAN LECTURES MOLOTOV
 The last and final talk which Molotov had with Truman was equally inconclusive. The Pres ident gave the Foreign Minister a mild lecture, saying that the United States was determined to go through with the San Fran cisco Conference regardless of what happened on Poland, adding that the United States was deep ly pained by the Soviet ap- proach.
 Molotov then reviewed for Tru- man the Russian interpretation of the Yalta Agreement and ob- served that Truman might do we'll to check on Roosevelts under standing of the Yalta Agreement If he, Truman, had not already done so.
 Truman replied that he had al- ready been informed on the ques- tion. He did not add that the United States could approve no Polish Government which gave