The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-12-31

urging that war with Japan be avoided while Far East defenSes were being built up and until Japan attacked or threatened ter ritory of great importance to the United States.
 5. A secret dispatch Nov. 24 saying that chances of agreement with Japan were "very doubtful" and informing Pacific command CTS that Japanese movies 'indi- cate in our opinion that a Sur- prise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possi- bility."
 6. The Navy's Nov. 2 "war warning" which told Pacific com- manders that diplomatic negotia- tions have ceased and an aggres- sive move by Japan is expected within the next few days" It instructed fleet commanders to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carry ing out the tasks assigned in WPL-46" (the War Plan).
 2. Two secret dispatches Dec. 3 informing Pacific commanders that Japan had ordered diplo- mats to destroy most of their codes and secret documents at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London.
 8. Secret dispatches Dec. and 6 ordering destruction of confi- dential documents at Guam and telling Ki1nmel he could order similar action at other outlying islands "noW or under later con- ditions of greater emergency
 Stark recalled that the European war began shortly after he became chief of Naval Operations. He de- scribed his appeals to the White House and to Congress to strength en the Navy.
 Did Most on Personnel
 Everything I said and did to tn- crease the size, strength and ef- ficiency of the Navy as fighting force was motivated by what con- sidered the absolute necessity of preparing as quickly as possible for war;" he testified.
 Stark revealed that he had trou- ble, however, in getting the late President Roosevelt to authorize more personnel. He told Kimmel about 1t in 8 letter dated Feb. 10, 1941.
 T am struggling, and I use the word. advisedly," he wrote, "every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for addi- tional men. It should not be neces- sary and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possibly could, the president just has his own ideas about men.
 T usually finally get my way but the cost of effort is very great and of course worth it."
 Denied By White House
 Stark expressed confidence that he could get congress to authorize all the men he wanted If he could get White House approval. He said the increases up to that time were obtained only because he got the presidents permission to take his arguments before congress with a promise that T won't veto anything they agree to-"
 Stark said his problem was par ticularly acute because the nation was confronted with the possibility of war on two fronts-in Europe and in the Pacif1c-and didn't have enough ships or men.
 we were not able to give the commander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet, all the ships and men he wanted" Stark said. "But neither were we able to put in the Atlantic or in the Asiatic Fleet the strength we knew they wanted"
 Considered Forces Adequate
 AS for the strength of forces at Hawaii, Stark had this to say:
 "There were shortages and def1- ciencies in material and manpower, both for the Navy and the Army forces in Hawaii, beyond our ability to remedy, limited as we were by considerations of industrial capa- city and time.
 However, the ships and planes available were allocated to the fleets and forces according to the tasks assigned to them in the war plan. I considered, ar did by principal ad- visers, that the forces allocated to the Pacific Fleet were adequate for the execution of the tasks assigned" {"
 That brought him to the question of why the Hawaiian forces were caught by surprise.
 He called attention to an agree ment between Army and Navy com- mandants as Pearl Harbor April 25, 1941, as a Joint coastal frontier de- fense plan.
 Neither Service Operated
 Among other things" Stark said. "this agreement assigned responsi- bility for the aircraft warning serv- ice and anti-aircraft and fighter defenses to the Army, while respon- sibility for distant reconnaissance was assigned to the Navy"
 Previous testimony has shown that the Army aircraft warning service was not in operation when Japanese planes struck at 7:55 a. m. on Sunday, Dec. ', 1941. Nor was there any long-range recon naissance by Navy patrol planes or service vessels.
 Stark also called attention to the