Evening star., 1945-11-04
World Skies Are Clouded
By Appeasement Policy.
Series of Concessions to Russia During Wartime
Expediency Period Make Difficult Diplomatic
Reconversion to Straight Thinking
By Constantine Bro,on

BY L0nSfa,
The political chickens from Teheran,
Yalta and Potsdam are coming home to
roost.
The end Of the war has brought forth
such wide divergence of views be-
tween the western democracies and
Russia that even the most inveterate
optimists, who have specialized in hid9
ing their heads in the sand, admit that
the international situation today Is pre-
carious"
The difficulties we are encountering
at the gatherings of the representa-
tives of the United Nations and in our
direct dealings with Moscow are not
surprising. They are a logical sequel
of policy of expediency started in the
fall of 1943 and continued until V-J day
A policy Of utmost secrecy, adopted
in the name of military security" pre-
vented the people of this country from
learning everything we surrendered to
Russias desire for expansion.
When the war ended situations which
in the past could be concealed came
out in the open, and the American and
British governments were unable to
hide the truth from their own people.
These new conditions resulted in an
inevitable stiffening on the part of
Washington and London to the in
creasing Russian appetite for more ter
ritories and further infiltrations in the
lands of her neighbors, far and near.
Expediency Policy Breeds Trouble.
The Russians had been spoiled chill
dren and had become accustomed to
thinking that their wishes had to be
followed without discussions by the
nations which the Red armies claim
to have saved.
The propaganda that the Russian
armies contributed 80 per cent to the
defeat not only of Germany, but also
Russian policy trainers themselves have
begun to believe it.
The trouble we are now meeting is
the sequel to a policy which began at
Teheran and ended at Potsdam. It is
the result of policy of expediency
which was best illustrated by the state
ment of Secretary Hull before the Sem
ate Foreign Relations Committee when
he said that Americas main foreign
policy (at the time of his statement
at the end of 1943) was to defeat the
enemy.
1t is the result of an honest belief
| which, however, shows how little our
| leaders understand foreign mentality,
that all nations which had gone through
the war would be only too eager to CO.
operate with one another after the
war. It is the result of the Yalta Con-
ference at which President Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Churchill saxesup
the last sfreds of practical theology
as contained in the Atlantic Charter
in order to purchase" Russia's adher-
ence to the United Nations Organiza-
| ton.
The trouble is also the result of the
Potsdam Conference, where President
Truman, repeatedly against his better
| Judgment, allowed Russia an entering
wedge in our Pacific defense by yield
ing the Kurile Islands, and did not
| insist on a cut-and-dried agreement
regarding Americas preponderance in
| the Pacific.
| Personal Communication Phase.
| It is true that Premier Stain agreed
that the supreme command in Japan
would be intrusted to an American
general, Douglas Macarthur. But the
civilian representatives of the Amer
lean Government did not bother to have
everything in black and white in clear
language, so that repetition of the
infringements of the Yalta agreements
regarding Poland and the Balkan states
should not recur.
We are once more in the personal
communication" phase which preceded
the other wartime conferences among
the Big Three. MIR. Truman Is writing
letters to Premier Stain and few init
mates know what they contain. The
Russian Premier is answering in the
same secretive manner. And the chances
of an improvement in the general situ-
alton appear slim unless the administra-
ton is willing to continue on the road
to further concessions" Such a pol
icy is not likely to be successful because
the wartime secrecy can no longer be
maintained and the American public
keenly aware that something is wrong
in the international machinery be-
come alerted as soon as new concessions
are translated into fact.
Moreover, President Truman in his
Navy Day speech has shown a definite
trend toward reverting Americas for
eign policy to the practical idealism
contained in the Atlantic Charter.
/ How these principles can dovetail with
Russia's insistent demands for greatly
increased zone of influence" from the
Mediterranean to the Pacific is difficult
to perceive.
/ Expediency Era Over.
BY enouncing his IL points-whicr
contained nothing new but reasserted 9
traditional American policy-President
Truman served notice on the rest o1
the world that the era of expediency
was over and that the spirit and the
letter Of the principles contained no,
only in his speech but also in the United
Nations Organization must be followed
Clouds darker than those between the
spring and fall Of 1899 are covering the
international horizon. Today we know
that we win be affected by whatever
happens in the rest Of the world.
| In agreement with all our wartime
Allies we have created new machinery
for peace, the United Nations Organi-
zation. When its creation was being
i discussed and It's friendly critics re-