Evening star., 1945-10-29
Ebersfadt Proposes
Secretary for Air,
u. ). Defense Council


York banker and former War
Production Board official, today
recommended creation of an air
department with Cabinet status
and a national security council
integrating all branches of the
Government concerned with
war.
He held that a unified War and
Navy Department would not nec-
essarily have prevented the Pearl
Harbor disaster.
Mr.. Eberstadt's study, undertaken
at the request of Secretary of the
Navy Forrestal, was made public by
the Senate Naval Affairs Committee
to which it had been submitted last
week. The Navy Secretary said then
that he could not approve all its
recommendations.
Opposes One-man Control.
The banker -industrialist, who was
chairman Of the Joint Army Navy
Munitions Board during the early
part of the war before becoming
vice chairman of the WPB, opposed
unification of the Army, Navy and
Air Forces under a secretary of ma
;ional defense on the grounds that
no one man could effectively super
wise SO many activities.
The security council which he
proposed as an alternative would
include the Secretaries of State, War,
Navy, the proposed secretary of air
ind the chairman of suggested ma
tional security resources board,
which would study and formulate
plans for industrial mobilization.
Also, Mr.. Eberstedt said, the three
armed services-Army, Navy and Air
should be "tied together by strong
ligaments of co ordination ex-
pressed by formal -organiza-
tional links"
Criticizes Chief of Staff.
Taking note of contentious that
Army-Navy unity might have pre-
vented the Pearl Harbor disaster,
Mr.. Eberstadt declared both services
were at fault in failing to keep area
commanders informed and added:
Transmission to both the Army
and Navy area commanders of the
danger warning of a final break in
diplomatic relations with Japan was
left to the Army Chief of Staff in
Washington. The serious delay in
this transmission. was in effect a
failure of unified action. Possibly
if each service had acted independ-
emily the results might have been
different"
The report made these additional
points:
l. "The system of unified COM
mand under a theater commander
supported by a joint staff has met
the test of war" Mr.. Eberstadt said,
Confusion extending to both the
conduct of operations and to logisti-
cal support" resulted near the end
of the war from the dividing of
commands among Admiral Nimitz,
Gen. Macarthur and Gen. Spaatz.
Wartime Waste Cited.
2. Lack of collaboration between
the Army and Navy in planning and
tying together their procurement
requirements caused wartime waste.
"a better interchange of planning
information between the theater
stats and headquarters would have
diminished this evil"
3. Training of future Navy and
Army officers should be broadened
by contacts with scientific institu-
tions. Higher officers felt the
scientist was telling them how to
run the war and the scientist felt
the officer was telling him how to
run research"
The section on Pearl Harbor con-
cluded that the disaster did not
expose a system that failed, but
rather the failure Of key individuals
to discharge with imagination and
foresight the military-naval defen-
sive responsibilities which rested
upon them.
"It cannot be validly contended
that the parallel failure of two key
individuals prove that there would
have been no failure if only one
key individual had been involved.
Indeed, in Washington at one stage
mentioned above only one key in
dividual appears to be involved"
Mr.. Eberstadt said there were
four types of responsibility" for
Pearl Harbor:
1.Inade dequacy of forces and
equipment in Hawaii which can
properly be shared by our armed
services, our government, and the
American people"
2. Inadequate relationship be-
tween the State Department and
military services which were said to
indicate need for closer co-opera-
ton"
8. Failure to keep area COM
manders informed.