Evening star., 1945-04-01
StuIin Must Decide

1t is extremely difficult to fathom
the reasons and the motives under
lying the eleventh-hour Russian de-
mand that the Lublin Polish gov
ernment be invited to send delegates
to the San Francisco Conference.
There is no difficulty, however, in
fully indorsing the decision of this
Government and the British govern
ment to reject the demand.
An agreement covering the thorny
Polish problem was worked out at
Yalta and announced in formal
statement signed by Marshal Stain,
President Roosevelt and Prime Min
lister Churchill. The relevant Sec
tions of that agreement called for
the setting up of new, broadened
provisional Polish government, to be
composed of Representatives of the
Russian-recognized Lublin regime
and including democratic leaders
from Poland itself and from Poles
abroad" Although more than six
weeks have elapsed since publication
of the Yalta agreement, this has not
been done. In fact, there has not
even been evidence of any serious
attempt to work out this agreed-on
solution.
1t was in these circumstances that
news of the unexpected and unex-
planned Russian demand was re-
ceived in Washington and London.
In effect, Russia was asking in rather
peremptory fashion that the Amer
ican and British governments aban-
don the agreement for. setting up
broader provisional government in
Poland, for if delegates from the
Lublin regime had been invited to
San Francisco as the representatives
of Poland that would have amounted
to at least de facto recognition of
that group as the government of
Poland. Perhaps, in the technical
sense, this would not have been a
Reputation of the Yalta agreement.
But it would have been in plain con-
travention of the spirit of that
agreement, and it could not have
been made to appear otherwise. This
Government could not have yielded
to the Russian demand without ap-
pearing to act in bad faith or with
out a sacrifice of national self
respect.
The proper decision to reject the
demand, however, does not remove
the doubts raised by the tactics
which the Soviet government has
adopted, nor does it answer the ques-
ton as to what Russia viii do next.
The Soviets published the fact that
the demand on behalf of the Lublin
Poles had been made before the re-
plies from this Government and the
British government had been re-
ceived. And in this public statement
it was announced that the Soviet
government fully supports" the as
serted right of the Lublin regime to
speak for Poland at San Francisco.
In view of that, the prompt rejec-
ton of the Russian demand-a re-
lection that was consistent with the
earlier refusal to invite representa-
tives of the rival Polish government
in exile-would seem to leave the
next move up to Moscow. Pending
it's disclosure there is nothing to be
gained from speculation as to its
probable nature. But it is not too
much to say that the fervent hope
for truly effective and compre-
hensive postwar security organiza-
ton hangs in the balance. Britain
and the United States have gone far
beyond the halfway mark to meet
the demands of Marshal Stain. But
there is a point beyond which these
governments cannot go, and, In the
Polish matter, it would appear that
the limit has been reached. That
being so, it is now up to Stain to
determine whether the bright prom
ise of Moscow, Teheran, Dumbarton
Oaks and Yalta is to give way to
Illustration and futility.