Evening star., 1945-08-30


hostilities might be momentarily
expected. This required that he
guard against surprise to the ex-
tent possible and make ready his
command so that it might be en-
ployed to the maximum and in
time against the worst form of at
tack that the enemy might launch.
No Agreement Attempted.
"(B) To reach an agreement with
the admiral commanding the Pa
cific Fleet and the admiral COM
manding the 14th Naval District for
implementing the joint Army and
Navy plans and agreements then in
existence which provided for joint
action by the two services. One OF
the methods by which they nigh.
have become operative was through
the joint agreement of the RESPONSE
BILE commanders.
"(C) To inform himself of the
effectiveness of the long distance
reconnaissance being conducted by
the Navy.
I'D To replace inefficient staff
officers.
The report, signed by 1t. Gen.
George Grunert, the president Of
ficer; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell
and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank,
made no recommendations
The "304-page report is divided
into seven chapters, as follows:
I, preamble; authority for the Army
Pearl Harbor board and its action
taken; II, background; III, the story
of Pearl Harbor; w, responsibilities
in Washington; V, Col. Wyman and
construction delays in Hawaii; VI
conclusions: VII. recommendations
/ Chapter II, relating to Col. Theo-
dore J, Wyman, jr.. was omitted
from the report. An accompanying
statement oy Secretary of War
Stimson, said that his review did
not find that any alleged miscon-
duct or disloyalty on the part of
Col. Wyman or Hans Wilhelm Rohi,
a German contractor who had
contracts for defense installations
at Pearl Haroor."
Three Groups in War Council.
The chapter Responsibilities in
Washington deals with the War
Council, the Secretary of State, the
War Department, conflict between
the Army and Navy messages" Mil
itary Intelligence Division, War
Plans Division, Navy Department
and the Chief of Staff.
The War Council was described
as three groups: One within the
War Department: one, the Secre-
taries of State, Navy and War, the
Army chief of staff and the Navy
chief of operations. and the third,
the President, Secretaries of State.
War and Navy, usually the chief
OF staff and the chief of naval op-
erationS, and occasionally COM
manding general, air force. Gen
Arnold"
"All three of these bodies were
informal said the report and
constituted simply a group of men
exchanging ideas and attempting
to determine policies without regu-
larity of record of what they did, as
far as this board has been able to
determine.
The index of the portion devoted
to former Secretary Hull refers to
''indecision of the Secretary of
State November 1926" The Sec
ton also quotes the diary of Secre-
tary of War Stimson that President
Roosevelt bad predicted the Jap
aneSe might attack as early as the
Monday after November 25, l941.
Excerpt From Diary.
The diary passage:
Then at IL o'clock I went to the
White House. where we were until
nearly half past one. At the meet
Ing were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark
and myself. There the President
brought up the relationship with
the Japanese. He brought up the
event that We were likely to be at
tackled perhaps as soon as-perhaps
next Monday, for the Japs were
notorious for making an attack
without warning, and the question
was what we should do. We con-
ferred on the general problem.
Apparently said the report. at
that time no decision was reached
and the entire matter was left for
further consideration
Dealing with the Secretary of
State. the report said the RESPONSE
bility apparently assumed by the
Secretary of State (and we have no
other proof that any one else as
sumed the responsibility finally and
definitely was to determine when
the United States would reach the
impasse with Japan.
He was doubtless aware of the
| fact that no action taken by him
should be tantamount to a declara-
ton Of war, That responsibility
rests with Congress. 1t is impor-
tant to observe that the President of
the United States had been very
careful, according to the testimony
of the Secretary of War, to be sure
that the United States did nothing
that could be considered an overt
act of war against the Japanese.
Hull's Proposal Drastic.
On November 25, the first of two
days described by the report as
times of ''indecision" by Secretary
Hull, the Stimson diary relates:
Hull showed me the proposal
for a three months truce which he
was going to lay before the japanese
today or tomorrow. 1t adequately
safeguarded all our interests,
thought, secured it, but I don't
think that there is any chance of
the japanese accepting it because it
was so drastic"
The Stimson diary again was
quoted on the next day, November
26:
Hull told me over the telephone
! this morning that he had about
made up his mind not to make the
proposition that Knox and I passed
on the other day tthe 25th) to the
japanese, but to kick the whole
thing over and tell them that he
had no other proposal at all"
Apparently on the 26th in the
morning. the report said, Mr.. Hull
had made up his mind not to 90
through with the proposals shown
/ -. L