Detroit evening times., 1945-04-25
BEHIND
NEWS
BY Paul
Mallon

GAN FRANCISCO, April "a
- RussiaS 5 excuse for at first
deciding 10 send an inferior
ranking diplomat TO this world
conference was never made pub
lie, but il was passed privately
and officially to Mr., Roosevelt
and State Secretary Stettinius.
The Kremlin pointed out to
them that Molotov was not only
the foreign minister in the
Soviet Setup but the second man
of the Stain government. Stain
we'll knew the conference prob
ably would last couple of
months instead of the adver-
tiSed four or five weeks. and he
said he could not spare MotoloV
from his side for so long a
period Just at the critical time
of victory in Europe. and be-
cause his government is desper-
ateiY short handed on diplomats.
When he took this position.
Churchill also assumed it and
said he could not spare his
Foreign Minister Eden either.
NOW il has been assumed Mr..
~ Truman caused Stain and
Churchill 10 change their minds
later about the necessity of
sending their top-ranking men
10 this meeting. This is not
true.
Actually, Mr.. Roosevelt got
Churchill 10 change before his
death, or his State Secretary
Stettinius did. Several days be
fore EdenS coming was made
know Churchill had been
persuaded TO send him.
No announcement was made,
however. and Eden came over
10 the funeral and proceeded to
San Francisco as if he had eX-
pected TO come all along. An
nouncementS on the matter
were Smothered and deliberately
made obscure in order that the
change not be conspicuous.
After Mr.. RooSevelt'S death.
Stettinius and Truman decided
TO send a personal message to
Stain asking him also 10 recon-
slider and send Molotov and
their strategem worked. Stain
may we'll have reasoned the
changes forecast by Mr.. Roose-
veh'S death and the coming of
Mr.. Truman might we'll Justify
the long sacrifice Of his right
hand man in order to establish
fresh contacts.
NOV I have learned on un-
~ questionable authority that
Stain did not present in this
case any position against the
small nations which are now
being assembled in full here for
the first time in postwar plan
ming. Indeed, l am told. that IN
none of the previous American
negotiations with Russia, has
she offered such a course as
representing officially her pol
iCV. Neither has Churchill gone
that far.
At the same time. both have
said by every action. if not by
word, that they expect the Big
three 10 run the world. This
attitude has not startled the
principals apparently
The Big Three mote well this
is not the big five, but only
Russia, Britain and the United
StateS) controls not only the
military but the industrial
power Of the postwar world.
Russian emphasis has been on
this point in all dealings. al
though she has presented no
concrete proposition on it.
uER idea is that no matter
IL what is done otherwise, the
Big Three necessarily must con-
troll anyway. She seems to say:
I'VE have the power and we
will use u In the interest of the
a r,a m affnns. M aasu,, nffnx, of
position in the matter Is neces-
sary."
Our principals have been in
clined to accept this as true,
yet in the case Of Poland. the
b a kanS. and indeed every
small nation, we have pursued
the cause of democratic freedom
for small nations in contrast to
Russian action inclined TO fold
them under her wing.
At any rate, l can report that
this is the way officialdom, as
sembling for the conference
Wednesday, looks at these mat
ters which have been disturbing
the public and confusing public
opinion and establishing an APP
: rent cleavage between the
A & o-Russian and American
positions.
7 CAN report further that
Il American officialdom has seen
no evidence that the British
have been drawn any closer 10
the Russian ideas Of under-the-
wing liberty for small nations
in resent months.
Although news developments
(Eden's initial withdrawal. ETC.
have hinted of closer contacts
between Churchill and Stain, it
is true the British position on
the foremost case in point,
Poland, has supported our view