The daily monitor leader. [volume] (Mount Clemens, Mich.) 1942-19??, 1945-04-03
. BEHIND THE SCENES
IN WASHINGTON .

and perfect before they put il in
their textbooks on military sci
ence, yet 1t only one of a
number of surprising new tactics
which today dictate the writing
of these textbooks on a loose
leaf principal, SO that some pages
can be torn out easily and re-
placed with later tactical doc
trines. Here at the Orlando uni
versity of aerial warfare the
te a h ers must change their
courses almost daily, and even
the teachers must be replaced
constantly with fresh fighting
professors from the front, VINO
know all the latest stuff through
actual practice and so are able
to teach the theory.
STEPS FORWARD
Here are just a few Of the
factors indicating that air war
fare Of the future is just begin
iililS W uIllOlQ.
/. The amazing advances in
tri-phibious air-land-sea cooper
ton.
2. The still developing use Of
airborne glider and paratroops.
3. The gas turbine, or jet pro-
pulsion airplane which even to-
day threatens to make all inter
nal combustion engines obsolete
for aircraft.
4. The use of rockets and robot
bombs for replacement of long
distance bombing planes, for ex-
tended middle distance replace
ment Of artillery, and for short
range use in close combat.
5. The use of new radio and
electronic devices for locating
targets and for remote control of
bombs or rockets fired against
them.
In 1916 one Maj. Gen. Fuller
of the British General Staff set
down for his own guidance what
he called the nine basic princi-
Piles of war. They were first pub
lished in 1929 and the next year
the U. S. General Staff stated
them without endorsing them for
the guidance of its officers. In
1886 the U. S. Navy Incorporated
Fuller's principles in its manual
on Sound Military Decision"
and in 1913 the U. S. Marine
Corps adopted the nine princi-
piles flat and without reserva-
ton.
AIR POWER OMITTED
The surprising thing about
General Fuller's doctrine is that
it makes absolutely no mention
Of air power. Over-simplifying,
the nine principles may be stated
briefly as: the determination Of
the objective, taking the often
sive, attainment Of mass superb
GRITTY, economy in the use of
force, maintenance Of movement,
the use of surprise, the obtaining
Of security, simplicity of opera
ton. the cooperation of all for
ces.
Is air power just another wea-
pom whose use can be incorpor-
ated within these principles? Or
has air power with all its potter
t.alities and unknowns of the
future made General Fuller's
principles of warfare something
that must be revised? Are there
additional principles that must
be stated for future wars that
may be fought largely in the
skies?
Use of some Of the new radio
detection devices since Pearl
Harbor have made strategic sur
prise by 1910 weapons next to
impossible of attainment - but
robot bombs have made the ele-
ment of surprise worse than it
was before. General Montgom-
ery's famous dictum that Air
power must not be used in penny
packets" has made the principle
OF economy in the use of force
almost obsolete. And SO on.
After this war is all over the
students and theorists Of warfare
will sit down to determine how
1t was won. Then they may be
able to write their new text
books for future generals.