Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-09-16

shuddered at the same possibility. And
as for the Royal Air Foree-it was as
independent as one of its pilots in the
wide blue yonder. Was this independ-
ence to be jeopardized by making the
Royal Air Force part of command ex-
ercised by ground forces or naval
man?
one gathers from an account by an eye
witness that the applause, if any, was
restrained He left the room. At the top
of the broad, marble stairway for the
accommodation of ascending and de-
scending bankers the late Admiral Wal
ter r. Sexton, then chairman of the
Navy General Board, caught up with
Marshall and put hand on his Shout
der. You are dead right" he said.
And halfway down the steps the late
Field Marshal Sir John Dill grasped
Marshall by the elbow. You are on
the right track" he said. ITS got to
be done"
But it could not be done unless the
President and the Prime Minister
agreed. Harry Hopkins heard from
some one else of Marshalls talk about
unity of command. He requested Mar
shall to see Churchill the next morn
ing-in Churchill's bedroom at the
White House-and repeat the talk to
Churchill that had been made to the
military men. Unless Gen. Marshall or
Mr.. Churchill is willing to tell the story
some day, it will never be known what
went on between these two men.
Churchill apparently had expressed
skepticism as to whether the British
public would accept the idea of a SUI
preme commander over British naval
forces If the commander were not a
navy man. But when they parted the
Prime Minister was agreeable 1t was
soon thereafter that there was organ
lied method for the strategical COM
mand and control of British and Ameri-
can military resources through the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting under
the direction of the civilian leaders on
both sides of the Atlantic This decision
to set up the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
with the unity of command which re-
suited and the selection of supreme
commanders for theaters of war, exer-
cised a more profound effect on the con-
duct of the war than any other single
step.
One great advantage of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff organization was that its
creation established buffer between
strategic conceptions born in the fer
tile brains of Mr.. Churchill and Mr..
Roosevelt and the execution of such
conceptions by the armed services. Mr..
Churchill might buck his own military
men. He could not buck the Combined
Chiefs of Staff. Nor could President
Roosevelt. While the chiefs of state
controlled the political decisions, the
military decisions required the assent
OF the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
1t was Gen. Marshall who put it
across. And one of his great accom-
plishments in this respect was the part
ne played in persuading President
Roosevelt to select Admiral Leahy-able.
wise and trusted-as the Presidents
own chief of staff and presiding officer
of the United States Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
His powers as an advocate had been
used before in one of the most dan
gerous periods affecting our national
security.
In the spring and early summer of
l941 the Germans were overrunninp
vast portions OF Russian territory while
deploying strong divisions along the
Channel coast across from the British
Isles. The Italians were massing troops
IN Africa. The preparations in Japan
indicated that Japan was going to get
into the war soon-and on the wrong
side.
In the United States there was tall
talk on Capitol Hill about deferments
from the draft and legislative action
was approved by tremendous margins
giving the President authority to grant
deferments. It was pleasant and safe
politically if not from the standpoint of
national security-to talk about defer
ments. But Gen. Marshall was faced
with the immediate prospect OF seeing
an Army Of about 100000. thrown to-