The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1945-01-06
Interpreting
The War
BY KIRKE L. SIMPSON
Associated Press War Analyst

Plagued by appalling winter
weather. the battle of the Belgian
bulge is building toward climac.
tic clash.
German and Allied observers
alike have heralded it as the most
decisive action of the war in the
west.
On its outcome largely NAV
hinge the duration Of the war in
Europe. Belated disclosure from
Allied Supreme Headquarters Of
British as well as American forces
now engaged, and of shift in
highest field assignments that di.
vides the bulge front into north
and south flank sectors, the one
under British and the other under
American top operational COM
mand, definitel: changes the whole
strategic picture.
1t goes far to confirm the view
that the great Allied pincer op-
Grafton against the narrow and
vulnerable waistline of the Nazi
bulge into Belgium marks far
more than an attempt to regain
lost ground and restore the situa.
ton prior TO the German break.
through smash in mid-December.
It looks now as full scale Allied
offensive not merely as counter
attack.
1t now is disclosed, that British
troops have arrived to back I'D the
shaken American First Army on
the critical northern flank of the
German break-through within 48
hours Of the first German onset
The assignment of British Field
Marshal Montgomery to command
Of all Allied forces on that flank
as well as the whole northern end
of the Allied lines came at the
same time.
The situation then developing in
Belgium warranted the command
shift. Deepening enemy penetration
of American First Army lines near
the left center of its previous wide
front had made, quick communica-
tons difficult. Division of the bulge
front enabled the two top field
commanders to concentrate on
their own specific tasks, not only
for the defensive phases Of the
fight but in preparation for the
concerted offensive now develop
ing
1t seems clear that more than
routine emergency shift in com
mand cue to communication diff
culties was involved. The fact that
it took place within 48 hours after
the foe struck and when the full
scope and weight OF his blow and
the size and nature OF the forces
he had committed to the attack
was becoming apparent is prob
ably significant. That word of the
command change and also OF the
arrival of British troops was so
long withheld at supreme head
quarters is also important.
Out of all circumstances nov
revealed can be deduced the I'M
preston that major policy deci'
sion was made by the highest Al
lied military command even be-
fore the German drive had begun
to slow down. While it was limited
at in Eisenhower subsequent con-
fident order to all his troops, only
now does glimpse OF its far
reaching nature begin to appear,
and of the moves made behind
the lines to implement that change
in plans promptly and effectively.
There seems no longer question
that all previous winter offensive
plans were shelved by the Allies
as soon as the true nature OF the
German thrust was revealed. The
risk that foe was taking as we'll as
the grave threat his deep but mar
row drive into Belgium held for
vital Allied communications muse
have been the dominant factor con.
sidered in Allied councils.
The judgment, later expressed
by Eisenhower and now well blue
printed in the about nature OF
the Allied counter offensive, was
that the chance presented to come
to grips with the enemy in the
open, not against his deeply for
titled Siegfried Line positions
should not be lost. Destruction Of
enemy armies, not capture of key
towns or forts, is the objective Of
all warfare. Enough of the flower
OF the German army in the west
has been committed to the Belgian
bulge operation to warrant ma
jor Allied effort to smash it utter
ly.
Nazi commentators so interpret
Allied offensive moves. They say
with good reason that the most
titanic battle of attrition ever
fought in western Europe is taking
shape in that limited bulge area,
-V