Evening star., 1945-11-18

1 WILL WdS uScQ dS Vic SlBlldl W L
begin the war"
feet ordered Rear Admiral Takijirc
Onishi, then chief Of staff of The
18th Air Fleet, to study the opera
ton.
The Japanese chronology showed
that the following August-more
than three months before the at.
tack-Admiral Yamamoto ordered
feet commanders and key staff of.
ficers to Tokyo for war games pre-.
liminary to making final plans fol
a Pacific campaign, including th'
air assault on Hawaii. There were
days of war plans conferences II
September, and at the close tht
commander issued an outline of how
the operation was to be carried out
Order Issued November !.
Then, November 7, Admiral va
mamoto issued Top Secret Opera
ton Order No. l." the actual ordel
for the Pearl Harbor attack.
If an American fleet unit had
detected the Japanese strike force
as it moved across the Pacific
within two days or more of the time
set for the attack, the reports in
dicated, the orders were for the
carriers and escort ships to abandon
the plan and return to home waters
If the force was detected within a
day Of the zero hour, "the question
Of whether to make an attack or
to return would have been decided
in accordance with local condi-
tions"
If the Pearl Harbor attack had
failed, it was planned to bring out
the remainder Of the japanese naval
strength for a quick decisive en-
gagement" with the American feet.
The date the attack was made,
December 7 CHawaiian time, which
was December in Tokyo had been
made tentatively before November
Z, Admiral Inglis said.
For a dawn attack in the Hawai-
ian area in December" his summary
added, "the 10th would have been
suitable from the standpoint Of the
dark of the moon. However, it was
expected that the United States
Pacific Fleet, in accordance with its
custom during maneuvers, would
enter the harbor on Friday and leave
on Monday. Therefore, Sunday was
decided on"
The striking force took the north
ern route, between Midway and the
Aeutians, figuring that, despite less
favorable weather. there would be
less chance of detection than in the
preferred middle or southern routes.
361 Planes Launched.
The japanese task force launched
361 planes for the attack. enemy
tsources stated. American estimates
had run from los to 210.
Twenty-seven Of these planes
were shot down. The japanese also
lost all five of the midget subma-
rines which were sent into Hawaiian
waters from mother" submarines
| One of the two-man submarines
succeeded in slipping through the
channel nets and entered Pearl Har-
Dor but was struck and beached
Senator Brewster asked Admiral
Inglis if any more submarines en-
tered the harbor.
"A second one may have" the
admiral said, 'but from all the evi-
dence I rather think it did not"
The others, he thought, were de-
stroyed outside the harbor.
The Japanese sources indicated
THE operation plan provided that
In the event of virtual destruction
of the American feet at Pearl Har-
Dor, one submarine division or less
would be placed between Hawaii
and North America to destroy sea
traffic; in fact, at least one sub
maine (the LID was dispatched tt
the Oregon coast on or about De.
cember A."
japanese interviewed still insisted
that should word have been received
that "Japanese-American negotia.
tions will reach an amicable settle
ment prior to the commencement o1
hostile action" the task force wa.
to withdraw and return to its bases
1t also still was contended that
only a limited number of officials
and high naval officers knew of the
attack plan; that the Emperor knew
in advance only its general outline
and that ENJOYS Nomura ane
Kurusu, then negotiating with Sec.
tretary of State Hull in Washington
knew nothing of it.
Senator Lucas Statement.
4 The statement issued last nigh
by Senator Lucas, regarding tn.
first three days of testimony b,
Admiral Inglis and Col. Bernard
Thielen, follows:
''I had been In the Congress TO
, 10 years. I have served on variou
. standing and sub committees.
have examined many witnesses an
, have witnessed the examination O
many others by members of tn
. United States Senate. We hav
before us witnesses from both tn
Navy and Army, who were calle,
; by Mr.. Mitchell and his assistants t.
relate the physical, non-controyersa
facts before and following the attacl
lon Pearl Harbor. They are officer
, with special knowledge who wer
, delegated to present these facts
YOTR