Detroit evening times., 1945-06-22
GENERAL
World
In Review

cesled within his Asiatic char
acter.
Faced by inescapable defeat
he continues 10 fight with des-
peration until he is annihlated.
But in warfare. valor alone IS
not enough 10 win.
Battles and campaigns are
won by intelligence, by head
work.
And tins intelligence is of A
special character, because II
does not operate simply IN the
security of library ar a re-
mote headquarters, with abun-
dant time.
In the field of battle IL must
operate in extreme danger, in
moments surprise and re-
verses, when plans have 10 be
Immediately altered, instant de-
cisionS made, and nothing over
looked or forgotten that might
retrieve disaster or assist in VIC
tory.
The intelligence must be re-
joined 10 something else that is
more than trained knowledge.
This is the quality of remain
ing cool In excitement so that
the intelligence can function.
1t is this combination of quail
tiles that makes a great soldier.
The Japanese do not possess
this combination of qualities.
THE japanese command was
= trained on the German
model.
1t learned the careful tech
nique of the Germans
Gus study; practice of checking
and rechecking- every contein.
plated plan, adherence to forms.
Such methods do not avail
where time is lacking.
Habits OF the mind formed
upon them do not make for
quick decisions.
They do not permit instant
reversal or alteration of plans.
IL action shows them TO be
faulty.
There is a flexibility lacking
in -tAe-JaPa+4@sr.,- arI dbTtTry 70
make a quick recovery. and
above all, an ignorance. born Of
dlSdain, Of the tactics Of retire
mcnt and defensive warfare.
The result is that on all their
fighting fronts the japanese
have lost.
They have lost in New Guinea
and the Solomon Islands: they
have lost the Philippines and
OkinaWa; they have lost in
Burma they have lost in south
| China in their purpose TO over
I run tins territory and establish
land connections through Indo-
( China and Siam with Malaga;
/ presently they viii lose Borneo.
Their losses began even when
they had superior military
power on the sea and IN the
air as well as on the land
The almost certain induction
from this is Japanese made
quacy in its highest command
and staff thinking. 50
WE ARE now approaching the
w final phase in the defeat Of
Japan, and unless their sur
render comes first. the war Will
end on the continent of Asia,
in China, Manchuria and Korea.
Here for A while our Allied
armies must meet and defeat
japanese armies that are nu-
merically superior.
How hard and how long will
this fighting be? This cannot
be exactly measured, but all
light we can get on the pro-
ficiency Of our foes is valuable.
/ have just received letter.
dated the 18th of June, from an
officer in our navy, who has
participated in operations IN
Gulf of Lingayen, and at Two
Jima
He has seen most of the main
islands of the Philippines.
He speaks OF the battle Of
Leyte as;
Bitter and hard-fougbt. our
air operations hampered by bad
weather. and the Jap air force
tougher than they should have
been.
"Our shipping took a beating
but was able tn rise above II.
"Ground operations progressed
In spite Of the most terrible
mud conditions.
81 ZAP strategy for the overall
- campaign was good, but
when ID came to actual tactical
movements I'm the field, they
failed miserably. There were
times when good, determined
counter-offensive might have
turned the tide Of battle, at
least temporarily, but always
the Jap failed to take advantage
Of his opportunities. The Japs
even showed surprising lack
OF knowledge of terrain they
had occupied for two To three
years. The Mindoro invasion
was relatively simple from the
ground poinN of view. However,
air attacks were frequent and
not easy TO contend WITH As
was usual the Japs now d
slowly. A determined eftOrtfa Pat
-AIindere-..ouid -i,nvr made n a
very costly operation"
Our strategy on LuzOn ap-
parently had the Japs COM
pleteiy baffled. Once they were
! off balance they CouId not seem