The Wilmington morning star., 1945-03-13
interpreting
The War
BY KlRKE L. SIMPSON
Associated Press War w.,

AolNN
German reaction to the surprj,.
preaching of the Rhine de...
moat at Remagen by Amer;o.s
forces has been on too restrio,s,
a scale thus far to indicate su.,
plans for dealing with the ,i+,'
ton. No sizable counter attack w..
even concentration Of den,s,..
Nazi air power has been rano 1e.eo
since the first American natrs sa
reached the east bank. V"
That might be due in mart
desire of Nazi commanders !. 70
await clearer evidence than is w,
available as to just how and ' :;
what direction Allied leaders,;;A
would attempt to exploit what cs.
talnly was an unexpected succs,.
For the first three days after IN.
east bank Judgement was gainss
First Army efforts appeared aims,
more at widening the bridpehsss
than at deepening it. Presyr.
seemed greater northward, I'm ,r
er, also, than southwark altboush
more favorable terrain for expanS
ing the bridgehead lies down rive.
In any event, Nazi sensitjvitv
to the extreme north flank Of n.
line along the Rhine obviously !,
unrelaxed. 1t is in that area from
Vessel to Emmerich or Arnhem
Berlin broadcasts now locate IN,
missing British Second Army I'm,
mentioned for many days in Al,
lied official reports or field dis.
patches.
Nazi commentators say a TIE.
mendous Allied build-up for new
Rhine crossings in the north is IN
progress, which may be true. II
has always seemed probable that
General Eisenhower's main effort
to jump the river would fall in that
sector. The flat, open ground Of the
Hanoverian plain east Of the low.
err Rhine offers better prospects
of maneuver warfare than the billy,
largely wooded terrain back of the
Coblenz-Cologne stretch OF the riv.
err. With the odds in numbers,
motorized equipment and particu.
larly in air in EisenhoWers favor,
maneuvers to come to grips with
and destroy German armies in The
field must be a prime Eisenhower
objective.
1t is likely, therefore, that the
German command is unwilling 10
pull heavy forces out Of the line in
the north to meet the Rsmagen
bridge threat until convinced that
the Allied success there has
brought about 3 complete revision
of previous plans. An even more
dangerous situation could result
from an Allied crossing Of the
Rhine in the north where no natural
obstacles exist to help contain it
than has yet developed from Amer
lean seizure of the Reragen
bridge.
That bridge is too vulnerable 10
sustain securely a powerful strik.
ing force on the east bank, Judged
by field reports, the first imme'
date need after its seizure was to
rush sufficient troops and guns
over to widen the east bank foot
ling up and down stream IN order
that numerous other means OF
crossing the river by boat or by
pontoon bridges could be establish
ed to supplement the bridge. A
lucky hit by bombs or heavy shell
on the Remagen structure other
wise could have converted the east
bank position into something like a
trap.
Nazi reports credit the First
Army with having put up to Two
divisions east of the Rhine IN tns
first three days. That would imply
total of anywhere up to NOVu
men with auxiliary elements II
would take much greater forces
both to secure and consolidate
bridgehead now substantially doz
en- miles wide and three to toul
miles deep and also to furnlSl
ample striking power for strategy
exploitation Of the unexpected op
portunity. No commander would d. d.
willing to risk an army OF SUI
size with only single, vulneraOl'
bridge behind it to insure Its COM
munications.
If Nazi military comneh1a,oi'
are to be taken at face value
however. General Eisenhower oe
spite the Remagen crossing whlcl
changed the whole tactical an
strategic picture of the Rhine over si
night has not yet abandoned nj
original plans for forcing the l'''
in the north.