Evening star., 1945-01-07
BY Edscard A. Harris

d EUQUfQ n. HQfffS
In Great Britain, as in the United
States, there is a sharp division of
thought on control program for post
war Germany. But there the advocates
of hard" peace, of prolonged military
occupation, swift punishment of the war
guilty, severe reparations and a COM
prehensive long-range system of rigid
economic and political controls seem to
have gained an ascendency not yet
reached by the comparative school of
thought in America.
Several reasons are advanced for this
predominate tough -mindedness in Eng
land. The utter catastrophe that loomed
after Dunkerque and the devastation
visited upon the British Isles by the
NaziS in the Battle of Britain early in
the war brought the pain of German
aggression home to them in literal and
fgurative sense unmatched in America.
Each afraid warning, every robot
bomb helped crystalize their grim de-
termination to end once and for all the
German menace.
Britain, hardened against propaganda
lines and recalling its onetime vulner-
ability to them with deep chagrin, feels
a sense of responsibility for the scrap
ping of the Versailles Treaty. More and
more Germany was permitted to abro-
gate the treaty's provisions and British
liberals censure their own country for
not taking the initiative in seeking to
block German rearmament.
The Versailles Treaty, of course, made
extensive provisions for the disarma-
ment of Germany. The German gen.
eral staff was formally abolished, and
the army was restricted to 100000 men
No war material was to be exported or
imported; the manufacture of arma-
ments was also strictly limited. Naval
provisions were drastic, Germany being
permitted to retain only battleships,
6 light cruisers, destroyers and II tor
pedo boats. The Allies were to appoint
commissions of control to supervise the
execution of the disarmament clauses,
and did so.
All of the commissions, however, had
been abolished by 1927. From the mo-
ment the treaty was signed, the Ger
mans conspired to evade the restric-
tions imposed upon theS. German
Army leaders, aided by industrialists,
carefully built up an industrial base for
full-scale rearmament. When Nazi
stormtrooperS triumphantly re-entered
the highly y-industrialized Rhineland, so
necessary to renewed program of ag-
gression, only few voices were raised
IN protest-and no nation was willing
to take the lead in blocking the reoc-
cupation by force of arms.
Blame Failure to Act.
1t Is apparent that most British lead
ers do not ascribe the failure of the
Versailles Treaty to its "harshness" or
mildness. 1t is attributed, simply
enough, to the unwillingness of the
great powers to enforce the provisions
by weight Of arms, to act in concert to
the end that Prussian militarism be
suppressed when such suppression would
have cost relatively few lives
British spokesmen and the leaders of
other Allied nations have emphasized
their resolve to avoid repeating this
mistake. They regard the problem of
controlling postwar Germany as a sep
arate task from that of forming an en-
during international organization to
maintain the peace of the world, but
they are well aware that the attain
of oh IL,
precariously on the ability of the great
powers to cooperate harmoniously.
That is why so many liberals in
Britain and in other United Nations are
alarmed over the ill-will generated by
British policies in some of the liberated
countries, notably Greece and Italy.
They feel that if the British plan to en-
gage in bitter spheres of influence"
feuds with the Soviet Union the whole
structure of international cooperation
will fall apart bringing down with it
the most carefully devised proposals to
prevent the resurgence of Germany.
IF those four (the United States.
Great Britain, Russia and China) can
not agree to work together for peace.
then there can be no guarantee of
peace" said Harold Butler, British
Minister to Washington, in a recent
speech. Marshal Stain also warned
that the Dumbarton Oaks proposal will
be effective "only if the great powers.
which have borne on their shoulders
the main burden of the war against
Germany, will act in the future also in
the spirit of unanimity and concord"
Secondary Line of Insurance.
Basic fear that an international peace
organization may not work due to dis
agreements among the big powers is
clearly reflected in the formation of mil
itary alliances among the European ma
tions. The British-Soviet pact of 1941
has been followed by the recent Franco
Russian pact, both for 20 years, and
there is authoritative talk now of an
impending British-French alliance.
This reversion to the old-time coalitions
is viewed as an ill-omen in many quar-
tiers. At best it may be regarded as
merely a secondary line of insurance
against German aggression.
In England the main spokesman for
a hard peace and rigid control sys-
tenn is Lord Robert Gilbert Vansittart,
former permanent undersecretary of the
British Foreign Office and chief diplo-
matte adviser to the Foreign Secretary
from 1888 to 1941. Since publication of
his book, BLACK Record" in 1912, an
ever-expanding school of thought has
arisen in support of what has become