Evening star., 1945-07-22
America Off BuIunce :
For Sudden VI Duy
Observer Sees Difficulties Aheac
if Japan Collapses Soon
BIZ ODen L. Scott.

islands is receiving consideration again.
and the prospect is heightened by that
nations evident weakness under naval
and air attacks that are sure to continue
for several more months before actual
invasion.
A collapse of Japan, in turn, would
catch this country off balance. The rea-
son is that there has been no prepara-
ton for such an eventuality. The Army
and the Navy are continuing to pile up
vast inventories of war materials. Cut
backs of military production since the
defeat of Germany have been relatively
small and will continue to be relatively
small for the next four or five months.
The result Is that surrender by Japan
suddenly would cause the collapse of
munitions business that is running at
the rate of nearly IS, 900 100000 month.
| If surrender should come in September
or October, munitions output still would
be at rate of around $4,000, 100000
month, or $48, 900 900 900 year. There
| inevitably would be severe shock and
a good deal of confusion from sudden
development of that kind.
An end of war business would throw
several millions of workers out of jobs,
at least temporarily. At the same time,
the Army and the Navy would be under
intense pressure to demobilize most Of
their forces at once. 1t Is improbable
that the services could resist pressure
to release men inside the Unite9 States
without waiting to let out veterans with
overseas service.
Surrender by Japan any time in the
next four or five months would trans
form the whole situation here. Pressures
of def1ation would at least temporarily
replace the imitation pressures OF the
present. Surpluses would tend to re-
place shortages in many lines of goods.
as well as in the labor force. The
scramble then would be to speed recon-
version where now it is to restrain re-
conversion and to build up supplies for
one war on something approaching the
scale for two wars.
OF course, nobody can know whether
Japan is or is not to collapse short of
invasion of her home islands and defeat
| VI Lie llOlle JdpdIlSSE AIuly.
There are growing signs, however,
that something very serious is wrong
inside Japan. Military observers are
amazed by the weakness being displayed
| by Japanese air and shore defenses,
where vital military installations are in
| volVed. Either Japan was wholly unpre-
pared for any attack on her home islands
rIo Ioae kao t1rf avid l1,,4 4l.o,
imagined by air and naval attack. 1t
/ may be that both of those conditions
| prevail
| AS an island empire, Japan's defenses
rested primarily upon navy that could
keep open lines of supply to the out
| lying areas. The home islands of Japan
| lack almost all of the elements that per-
NIT f-suf1ciency. Those islands do
not produce food enough to prevent star
vation. Japan must import rice and she
must depend heavily upon her fishing
feet to keep her people alive. She lacks
oil in any important quantity and it is
necessary to import coal from China.
Iron ore must be imported for what is at
! best small steel industry.
1
ing very apparent.
The Japanese radio is instructing the
people of that nation in preparation of
tomato vines and mulberry leaves as
foodstuffs. People are being told that
the gasoline shortage can be relieved
from making of fuel out of pine cones.
There is stress on the imminence of in
Va sion with Soroe efLipo of biy,t Tho ,
invasion would be welcomed as means
of ending the agony at home. People
are being criticized for failing to show
the proper energy in building afraid
shelters.
&
All OF this evidence of weakness Is be-
ing shown at time when the blockade
by American air and naval forces is just
beginning to tighten. In the months
ahead, Japan is likely to be Theoretically
sealed both from her island empire and
| from the mainland of Asia Air attack,
too, is only beginning to be organized On
the scale planned. BY late 1945, there
may be a shortage of targets in Japan.
Invasion is unlikely to come until the
Japanese islands are softened up by
number of months of intensive block
| ade and air bombardment.
There are two views concerning the
Japanese reaction to the present uncom-
Portable situation in which Japan finds
! herself
One view is that there can be no ex-
| pectation of surrender until the Japa-
nese armies have been defeated both at
home and on the Asiatic continent. This
view is that military leaders in Japan
will be able to hold the people In cheek
and viii insist upon holding out until
they can show their ability or inability
| to throw back an invasion.
The other view is that Japan would
give up now If allowed any terms other
than those of outright surrender. Sur
| render is supposed to represent an ac-
ton to which the japanese, individually
and as nation, cannot bring them
selves. 1t is argued that If some term
| could be devised that would represent
| surrender but would not actually be
called surrender, Japan might give up
quickly.
The answer to this line of argument,
however, is that failure to impose harsh
terms on Japan and to force admission
that there has been a surrender would
only give the Japanese leaders an OPEN
ing through which they later could try
again to assert their leadership in Asia
and to challenge the position of the
United States.
Actually, Japan's position is becom-
| inc 1aSnarafa that ony8hinO GOULD