Evening star., 1945-07-27
Memoirs Of Paul Reynoud
Eighth in a Series.)
BY PAUL REYNAUD,

BY PAUL REYNAUD,
War Premier of France.
| North American Newspaper Alliance.
On September l, 1889, when Ger
many marched into Poland, Gen.
Maurice Gamelin, as commander in
chief, had advised the then Prime
Minister, Edouard Daladier, that
'the present attitude of Belgium
strongly favors Germany He
pointed out that the Belgians flack
the numbers and materiel to pre-
vent breach of their front" If the
Germans should attack before Bel
GUM invited Allied help.
One month later, at meeting OF
the Supreme War Council, British
Prime Minister Neville Chamber
lain stressed the Importance OF
pushing forward as far as possible
into Belgium If she were attacked
Gen. Gamelin and Gen. Sir Ed
mund Ironside, chief of the I'M
perial General Staff, were instruct
ed to prepare plan to carry this
out, and the Belgians were in
formed. In return, Gen. Gamelin
stipulated that: The Belgian Army
must be kept permanently mobi-
lized; the valleys of the Dyle and
the Nethe we're to be flooded i'm
mediately; an antitank ditch was
to be established from the Dyle tc
Namur, and a line from Namur tc
Givet was to be fortified.
(That is to reinforce and man
fortified line running roughly
diagonally across Belgium, from
Antwerp to the Ardennes. This
was done. But the German
thrust through Holland turned
the flank of this line before the
Allies could reinforce it, trap
| ping the units manning these
Notifications.
Understanding Reached.
We also came to an understand
ing with the Dutch commander in
chief that If Holland were invaded,
we would occupy the Dutch islands
OF iceland and the Dutch Army
would withdraw on to line. run
ming from Breda to the bridge OF
Maesink, on the Meuse.
Gen. Gamelin, however, continued
to urge the Belgian high command
to allow the Allies to send troops
into Belgium TO anticipate the Ger
man attack. At last, on January
l3, 1910, the King of the Belgians
who was also commander in chief
agreed.
At about 4 that afternoon, Dala.
dier telephoned Gamelin:
chamberlain says the King O.
the Belgians is ready TO call immed.
lately upon the Allies-provided vol
are ready for an immediate entr,
into Belgium. We must have al
answer right away"
I'VE should accept" Gamelin re.
piled. The German forces ar,
not ready and the state of tn,
roads and the weather are agains
them"
Gen. Alphonse Georges (fiels
commander in chief in Northeast
ern France) also agreed, and {
night march brought Allied troop.
close to the frontier, ready to marcf
into Belgium.
Muddle Evident.
At IL the following morning
Gamelin telephoned Daladier: "Th,
Belgians cat the frontier) have no
received orders to allow us through
II we don't enter Belgium at once
we shall lose all benefit of sur,
prise"
Daladier sent for the Belgian
Ambassador, but the latter had no
been informed. He then telephonet
to London, but London was with
out news.
! At $50 pm. Daladier rang VI
Gamelin. London tells me it's al
of. The King has been unable Il
get his ministers to come to AM
decision.
The Belgian cabinet had me-
seven times that day and the pre-.
vious night and in spite of the
Kings formal promise. had de.
cided to revoke Leopold's decision
The Allied armies turned about
An opportunity had been lost
Needless to say, the Germans knew
all about it.
On May 10, 1910, at 1:30 am.
the French command learned that
the German forces had been alert.
ed and had probably begun to ad-
vance. At about am, the Bel
gian Ambassador rang me up te
say that Belgium had been at
tackled and that the government
was appealing to France. At the
same time, Gen. Gamelin received
a similar message from the Bel
gian Military Attache in Paris.
Allies Start Moving.
At 7 o'clock In the morning, the
Allied troops stationed between
Montherme and the North Sea
started moving.
Only when the orders issued BY
the military leaders are all pub
lished, will it be possible to write d
complete history of the military op-
erations. But the statements oil
Gen. Gamelin, records of debate:
of our War Committee and the Su-
preme Council, together with infor.
nation I received as head of the
government. are already sufficient
believe. to establish the military
causes of our defeat.
We shall see that It was not 9
case of accident. but of deep-rooteo
causes. The official doctrine ex.
pounded Thy Petain) in the Cham.
Der of Deputies was the primary
cause of our defeat.
AS for the part played by the
Dutch and Belgian armies, give
the facts as they appear from re-
ports made to the French com
mand The story which follows is
therefore, necessarily one-sideo
where 1t concerns the Dutch and
Belgians.
The roads having been cleared or
Belgian orders, our motorized spear
heads reached the Namur- Antwerp
| line the same day.
/