Evening star., 1945-11-24
Mr.. HuII's Views

With the death of the late Pres
ident Roosevelt, no man is better
qualified than Cordell Hull to discuss
the hopes and the fears which
directed the course of this country's
foreign policy in the critical years
preceding the advent Of World
War II. Consequently, his state
ment to the Pearl Harbor Investi-
eating Committee deserves the most
careful consideration.
Considerable attention has been
centered on Mr.. Hulls denial that
his November 26 note to Japan was
an ultimatum which pushed the
button" for the launching of the
war. The Star fully agrees that this
note was not an ultimatum. But
the fact of the matter is-and Mr..
Hull's testimony confirms it-that
the course of events would not have
been altered at that time in any
significant respect by anything that
Mr.. Hull might have said or re-
Trained frow saying in his note to
the japanese.
BY November 26, 1941, war in the
Pacific was inevitable. It is con-
ceivable that a policy of total ap-
peasement might have postponed
the war. But it could not have pre-
vented it, for by that time the fatal
collision of national interests could
not be averted, and the japanese
thought that they were strong
enough, and that we were weak
enough, to risk the challenge.
The essence of Mr.. Hull's testi-
mony is to be found in this excerpt:
ITO have accepted the japanese pro-
posal of November 20 Ito which his
note of November 26 was a reply
was clearly unthinkable. It would
have made the United States an
ally of Japan's program of conquest
and aggression and of collaboration
with Hitler. 1t would have meant
yielding to the japanese demand
that the United States abandon its
principles and policies. It would
have meant abject surrender of our
position under intimidation.
In this situation, and with the
war in Europe pressing upon us, it
was determined to adopt a firm but
cautious policy with respect to
Japan. Our military leaders were
pleading for time in which to gain
strength. They knew that we were
weak, and they knew that Japan
knew it. Accordingly, in August,
1941, the President handed the
Japanese "watered-down" version
of a strong note of warning which
had been proposed by Prime Min
lister Churchill. The fleet was kept
based at Pearl Harbor in the hope
that its mere presence there would
restrain Japan. Mr.. Hull persisted
in negotiations which he knew to be
futile, hoping only to defer the
inevitable.
But this effort failed, and it failed
primarily for two reasons. First,
because we had not the military
strength to support the vital foreign
policies to which we were necessarily
committed. And second, because the
japanese, in the decade from
1914, knew that we were lacking
in military strength.
1t is easy to say that all of this
is water over the dam, and that
since we won the war it matters
little now. But that, really, is the
greatest danger, for if we do not
take to heart the lesson implicit in
Mr.. HulIs statement, the chances
are that some future crisis will find
us once again trying to support an
international political policy which
is vital to the preservation of our
national interests without the requi-
site military strength. And the next
time we might not have the good
fortune and the good allies which
contributed so much to our success
in World War II.