Evening star., 1945-07-07
Two, Okinowu Bases
Seen Justifying Cost
Seizure Paves Way for Air Blows
Against Japan, Writer Points Out
By David Laurence

By Dapid Laurence
The wisdom of the United States Joint
Chiefs of Staff in selecting Two Jima and
Okinawa as the two major Jobjectives in
the central Pacific for the first six months
of 1945 has been fully justified by the
use already being made by the Army
Air Forces of these two all-important
bases.
Some people have wondered whether.
in view of the larger size of Okinawa.
the Two Jima campaign was necessary
but the timetable of operations this year
clearly reveals that the two efforts dove
tailed. Thus If Two Jima had not been
conquered, the flank of the American
forces in the Marianas would have been
exposed to attack. Likewise the bonn
bardment which has been carried on by
the B-29s from the MarianaS, with Two
Jima as way station for refueling and
for emergency landings, has made posi-
BILE the striking of some devastating
blows against industrial Japan in the
first half of 1915.
Lives Saved by Landings.
Already the lives of pilots saved by
landings in Two Jima exceeds in number
the loss of Marines in that campaign.
The Two Jima base was acquired in the
nick of time and made possible such
sustained air attack as Japan has never
before experienced. 1t also released the
United States Navy carrier fleet to con-
duct operations closer to Japan and to
help with the capture of Okinawa.
The true meaning strategically of Oki-
nawa will become apparent as the events
of the war unfold. The island will prove
in some respects even more important
than the Philippines because the latter,
while useful as supply base, is too far
away for fighter planes to use in air
attacks against the japanese homeland.
Okinawa is pivotal point. American
forces can be deployed from there to
assist in opening supply route into
China as well as in launching an inva-
sion against certain parts of Japan. The
Japanese were well-advised to adopt
desperate measures to delay its capture,
and while there are differences of opin-
ion as to how well our own strategy was
executed there, no doubt exists as to the
value of Okinawa in military sense.
There is also another gain which Is
entirely apart from the strategic side.
1t is the experience gained by our troops
in Okinawa and Two Jima as well as in
the Philippines. About Is Army divi-
sions and six Marine Corps divisions
I1a ~
in the Pacific campaigns. These divi-
sions can form the nucleus of the big
land armies which must eventually con-
quer Japan itself. They are crack troops
and well seasoned now.
1t is not generally realized that Amer
lean divisions which come from Europe
have been fighting different kind of
war and will have to be given special
training before they can match up with
the 81 divisions referred to above. 1t
will be necessary for the commanding
officers who distinguished themselves in
Europe to learn the Pacific war strategy
In Style of Savages.
There are officers who say, for in
stance, that fighting the Germans is not
the same thing as fighting the Japs.
The latter fight more on the style of
the Savage-that is, from behind trees
and from underground hiding places.
Unless American troops arriving from
Europe are trained to meet the Japanese
methods, there will be heavy casualties.
This is one reason why the brave men
- li,,ic i,, kkn No
which have taken the measure Of the
japanese in the Marshalls, Two Jima,
Saipan, Guam, Okinawa and the Phil
ippines cannot be brought home but
will have to stay on in the Pacific for
considerable period while new divi-
Sions learn the game.
The Allied troops fighting in the South
Pacific are getting some valuable expert
ence cleaning up the so-called by-passed
areas. But these troops will be quite
busy there for many months to come.
The principal manpower for opera
tions in China, therefore, will be sup
piled by China, with a sprinkling of
American troops, and by Russia if she
decides to enter the war. AS for the
main assault on Japan, this would ap-
pear to be task almost entirely for the
United States Army and Marine Corps
after the air forces have done a soften
ing-up job even more devastating than
that which demoralized German COM
munication lines and made possible the
ultimate land army victory in Europe.
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