The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-11-19

Inglis said some substantial changes" had been made on the basis of information received last night.
 Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto, chief of the combined fleet addressed the group, saying that although Japan never wanted to fight the United States they were forced to because they would be defeated regardless" if the United States continued aid to China and the oil embargo.
 Yamamoto was quoted as saying the United States fleet was "Japan's greatest enemy"
 In a second deviation from his prepared statement, Inglis said evidence indicates that as late as Nov. 29 (Japan time) Japanese forces expected to find six U. s. carriers in Hawaiian water"
 On Dec. 6 (Japan time), he con- tinued, the Japanese had word that there were no carriers in Pearl Harbor "but eight battleShipS and IS cruisers" were there.
 Japanese pilots were briefed Dec. 5 (Japan time) each one being giv- en a photographic may of Pearl Harbor on which they made target notes.
 Inglis testified that Japanese pilots said that lat no time" were visual land signals used by Jap anese agents in Hawaii to assist the attack. Inglis added that there was an espionage system in Hawaii using uncensored cables.
 Code Use Explained
 He read another account telling how a NiSei Ca Japanese born in the U. S) A Japanese officer aboard the Carrier Agaki-was giv- en the special job of listening to Honolulu broadcasts and decoding them for information about fleet movements into and out of Pearl Harbor.
 If the broadcast said the Ger man attache had lost one dog 1t might mean that 8 carrier had left Pearl Harbor, he said.
 "If he wanted a cook or a house. boy, that might mean a battleship or cruiser had entered"
 IngliS said that according to this officers account, the coded mes sages were broadcast just follow ing news broadcastS at 6:3O a. m., noon and p. m.
 Inglis said however, that FBI and Army authorities in Hawaii report ed they could not find any reason to believe that such a plan was actually used.
 Message Sent From Homeland
 Ingls said his statement that the Japanese ambassadors here had no advance knowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack was based "only on a single report" of a Japanese of- flcer's "recollections."
 Inglis said that when the attack ing Japanese force was 300 miles north of Hawaii 1t. received a mes- sage from the Japanese Navy head quarters - Climb Mt. Niitaka,' D which was the signal for the at- tack.
 Inglis also interpolated that it had been planned that the Japanese force would be protected by a com bat air patrol of IS fighters to take oft about 5:45 a. m. Dec. 2. He said they presumably were in addi- ton to the planes in the attack group"
 Inglis reported that new inform ation also revealed that one Jap- anese seaplane took off at 4:30 a. m. to make observations from an al- tittude of over 14,000 feet.
 He revised his oiginal estimate of U. s. Navy plane losses at Pearl Harbor downward from 105 to 92. He said the figures had been band led about among my aides" and during the last 48 hours we decided on 92 as our best estimate"
 200 Planes Lost
 Thielen said about 96 Army planes were destroyed, whereupon Inglis said that 'in round numbers prob ably POO planes was the total of U. s. plane losses.
 Assistant counsel Gerhard GeSell examined Inglis on the meaning of his report.
 c. By Nov. 5 Clap time) the Japs had worked out how they were going to attack but hadn't reached a binding, final decision? A. That is correct, sir. e. When was the Climb Mt Niitaka" order received? A. On the 9th of December Jap aneSe time or the 5th of December United States time.
 Inglis said he had to "the best ot his knowledge" given all the Navy has concerning preliminary air scouting by the Japanese for the Pearl Harbor attack.
 Gesell asked If the Japs in any way reported that more than one o1 the five midget subs got into the harbor. Inglis said they did not.
 The session ended at l2:45 p. m and the committee recessed until 1( a. m. Monday.
 Timetable Given Washington, Nov. IT. (UP) - Navy testimony before the Pear Harbor Investigating committee to. day offered the following Japanest timetable of plans for the Dec. l94l, attack Gall dates and time. converted to Hawaiian time):
 January, 194l-The idea of sur prise attack on Pearl Harbor wa conceived by Admr. Isoroku Yama' moto. commander in chief of thu combined Japanese fleet. Sept. 1-l2. 194l-It was studied and approved by war plans con ference at the Naval War college Tokyo.
 Nov. 4, 1941-The combined flee top secret operation order No. including the Pearl Harbor attack was promulgated to all fleet an,
 task force commanders. It pro. vided for subsequent designation O Y-day as the approximate date fo the attack and X-day as the actua date.
 Nov. 6, 194l-Yamamoto desig