The Wilmington morning star., 1945-11-24
Product OF Isolation
BY ARTHUR KROCK

atomic bomb manufact ure it is seldom noted
that our current policy n this matter is a
continuation of the system Of non-exchange
that governed military relations between the
Anglo-Americans and the Russians during the
Second World War. There was simply no free
exchange at any time, although all three
nations were engaged with Germany in what
for time was dubious battle.
Until all pertinent data is available, if it
ever is, no fair public decision can be reached
in fixing chief responsibility for this condition.
Some contend that the Russians would have
opened their military and industrial establish.
ments completely if the United States and
Great Britain had admitted Soviet command.
ers to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, an Anglo.
American high command that sat in Washing.
ton; and it is a fact that Maj. Gen. William
]. Donovan urged this extension President
Roosevelt several times and that the counsel
was rejected. Others hold that the rejection
was the consequence of certainty that, even
if admitted to the Combined Chiefs the Soviet
authorities would have continued to keep their
military affairs secret.
A later generation of historians may be able
to decide the merits of this issue. But suffi-
cient proof exists already to support the fact
ua1 statement that, in withholding technical
details concerned in the atomic bomb. Russia's
recent allies are merely following related pro.
cedure by Moscow while the war alliance was
in effect.
Inquiry among military sources in Washing.
ton today developed these statements on that
point, and Russia's High Command is in a
position to know how they conform to the
actual record.
The Soviets developed little or nothing in
war-making that we did not have or needed
technologically But they could have been most
helpful to Anglo-American campaigns against
the German armies if they had given us what
is known as order-of-battle information. Since
they were fighting 300 German divisions most
Of the time, they had these facts in great de-
tail-the disposition of troops the identity and
fighting calibre Of units whether regulars or
reserves, her state of morale and their pro.
portion iE the field of combat strength, We
got some of this information from the Rus
slams, but, because there was never a work.
ing arrangement, it was spotty.
The Russian naturally knew all absut the
tactics and technique of their ground forces,
and American and British commanders could
have put this knowledge to good use. But we
were allowed no military observers in the field
on the Russian side, or at any rate not
for long time; and we could get nothing
much when we inquired directly. Therefore we
knew very little about these matters, which
prevented better coordination when the Allied
armies were pushing toward Berlin.
AS the time neared for the junction of the
Department wanted to transmit to ours all the
useful information it could to assure identifi.
cation, etc. But the facts we had on the char
acteristics of Soviet tanks, for instance came
from the Germans. And it was decided that
We could not properly use knowledge from an
enemy source, even for this good purpose
What the War Department knew of such mat.
tiers otherwise it had to acquire from the Rus
SLAMS military journals that came to hand.
lie
military laison as well as coordination of
command was being accomplished through the
Combined Chiefs of Staff. And, in ADDITION,
the British maintained an order-ofbattle team
IN the Pentagon and we in the War Office in
London.
The sources questioned by this correspon-
dent today searched their memories for in
stances when the Russian shared their war.
making designs. All they could recall was that,
in 1912, delivery was made of a medium and
heavy tank used by the Soviet armies, &C.
companled by manuals explaining their con.
structlon and use. and that from this exhibit
we learned one important detail of propulsion
1t that was all, it is very small balance
for the material and technicians furnished by
the United States and Great Britain to Mos
cow. And Russia's back was to the wall in
1912.
The record is subject to upward revision by
the Russians, if they have broader set OF
1acts and are disposed to cite them. But
awaiting that, it should be added that Wash
lngton military men recalled occasions when
we offered chronological discoveries to Moscow
and they were declined because we required
certain information before they could be gear
ed to Soviet use. One such occasion concerns
the VT fuse
This miraculous device is an electronic fuse
that is screwed into the cap of shell. It can
be timed to explode the shell at chosen
moment, at any distance, so that-for example
the target can be men hiding in trench
instead of the ground beyond or behind them.
We asked the Russians for balstic data so
that we could manufacture these fuses to fit
their weapons at the same time We were fit
ing our own. It was not forthcoming, and
the impression created was that Moscow did
not wish these details to be known abroad.
Great Britain and France furnished them and
got the fuse.
That is only a part Of the background
against which must be viewed the conditions
recently put on atomic bomb information by
President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee
and King.-New York Times
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