Detroit evening times., 1945-08-30
CONTINUED from Page One

and determine the state ot
readiness ~ the Hawaiian com
mand between Nov. - and Dee.
3. 1871. despite the impending
threat ~ war"
xIn defense of Gen. Marshall
f. Secretary of Maf SiimSon filed
+ A special statement IN which he
declared in my opinion. this
/ criticism is entirely unjustihed.
Sumson declared that tn .
army Pearl Harbor board ap.
parcntly had been led 70 its criti.
Ci>m Of Gen. Marshall because oi
tho fact that the war plans di.
vision like other divisions and
activities of the general staff in
Washington was under the gen.
ersl direction and supervision oi
the army chief Of staff.
NOT HIS FUNCTION
StimSon declared the criticism
Of Marshall arises from a funda
mental miSConception of the d.
ties Of the chief OF staff and Of
his relations with the divisions
and activities of the general staff.
1T i not the function 81 the
chief OF Staf specifically to di-
rect and personally supervise
the exception in detail of the
duties Of the various sections ot
the general STAFF"
l.. A..
any part of the general stan Ia
perform its duties efficiently
may be of such n kind or reach
such an extent a. 10 become
the responsibility Of the chief
of stan for not having estah-
liShed = more effective organi-
Lation," SumSon observed But
! do not hnd any such situa-
ton In this case.
PRAISES MARSHALL
"The shortcomings have
pointed out thus cannot in amy
fairness he attributed 10 the
chief ~ stan. On the con-
trary, throughout this matter.
believe that he acted with
his usual great skill, energy,
and efficiency"
The war department report
criticized the then Secretary Of
State Cordcll Hun for his issuance
on Nov. 26, 194l. Of counter
proposals 10 the japanese which
was used by them as the signal
10 begin the war by the attack
on Pearl Harbor."
"TO the extent that u
hastened such attack" the army
Pearl Harbor board declared,
"lt was In conflict with the
efforts the-war- and-navy
departments to gain time for
preparations for war"
9f17e report added:
However. war with Japan
was inevitable and imminent be
cause Of irrecOnCiliable disa-
greements between the Japa-
neSe empire and the American
government"
Dealing with the responsibility
OF Mai Gen. Short. the army
board report admitted that "the
information which he had was in
complete and confusing, but
added that 1T was sufficient 10
warn him OF the tense relations
between our government. and the
japanese empire and that hos
tilities might be momentarily eX-
pected.' -
FAILURES CITED
The army board found that
Gen. Short had failed in his du-
ties" in four particulars. They
were.
. That Short failed To place
his command "in state of
readiness for war In the face
Of a war warning by adopting
an alert against sabotage only"
. That Short failed TO "reach
or attempt To reach an agree
ment" with Adm. Kimmel for
"implementing the Joint army
and navy plans and agreements
then In existence which pro-
vided for joint action by the
two services"
Q That Short failed to inform
himself Of the effectiveness Of
the long distance reconnaJs-
sance being conducted by the
navy"
. That Short failed ~ replace
inefficient stan officers"
GEN. GERoW BLAMED
The army Pearl Harbor board
also cited the fact that the then
MAJ. Gen. Leonard r. Gerow, as
'hief of the war plans division,
failed in his duties" in four par
ticulsrS. Gen. Gerow is now
lieutenant general in command Of
he Fifteenth Army in the Euro
oean theater, where he fought
iuring the climatic phase of the
var against Germany last spring.
Allegations against Gerow were:
. That GerOw failed to keep
Gen. Short adequately informed
on the impending war situation
by making available To him the
substance of tho data being
delivered n the war plans d.
vision nv the assistant chief
of stan, G-2 Intelligence di-
vision"
DIDN'T CORRECT ERROR
That Gerow failed ~ send to
Gen. short on Nov. 81 a clear
concise directive and that. op