Evening star., 1945-11-17

pTOV6HlcIlG.
In theory the merging of both
services under single department
has much to recommend it. 1t has
been claimed that this consolidation
would bring about more efficient pro-
curement and use of supplies and
would prevent duplication of facili-
ties and services. I concede that
there is room for improvement in
this respect, but gratifying progress
has already been made without
merging the departments. There is
yet to be proved that such a merger
will result in better conduct Of op-
erations in war, and it is primarily
for the conduct of war that our War
and Navy Departments exist. In the
conduct of war, logistics plays very
| important, but not the controlling
part. 1t seems to me that an agency
can be set up in time of peace by
appropriate legislation with the re-
sponsibility and authority to correct
any overlapping or waste in procure
ment. To achieve this single end il
is certainly not necessary to merge
the War and Navy Departments into
one.
Out of Proportion.
Each of the departments is now
very large, and the administration
of each requires the full attention
of the civilian Secretary appointed
! bv the President. I believe that If
they are merged into one depart
ment we shall find that we have
created a responsibility and an ad-
ministrative problem far out of pro-
portion to that of other cabinet
members. The new department
would prove to be cumbersome ad-
ministratively. I am convinced that
there would be a lessening of civil
ian control. The civilian Secretary
of the department, man not elect
ed by the people, could scarcely
avoid having a political power and
an Importance that our form of
Government has always, and I be-
lieve correctly, withheld from the
military services.
| Unity of command as exercised
during the war in the European the
ater, in the Southwest Pacific, and
in my own area of command should
be continued in peacetime, but it is
not necessary to consolidate the de-
partments for that purpose. I be-
lieve that such unity of command
should be maintained. If legisla.
ton is required to permit the Presi-
dent in time of peace to delegate
to individuals unity of command
in any area, that authority should
be provided.
! Our Government has always re.
lied on internal checks and balance.
for its vitality in peace and war. We
have a flexible system, and one ex.
ample of it is the manner in which
Congress has always controlled the
relative sizes of the Army and Navy
according to the desires of the peo.
pie and the situation of the Unitec
States. With single department il
Is more than possible that the rela.
tive sizes of the services, within the
overall defense budget, will have
been predetermined within the de.
partment and the Congress will be
confronted with a specific ALLEGATION
OF funds. To alter this ALLEGATION
and remain within the budget, viii
mean process of robbing Peter t.
pay Paul. Thus to some extent thu
size OF the component services will
be less directly responsive to tht
control of Congress or the needs O
the time. or again the sentiment O
the people at large. This canno
fail to be detrimental to both serv
ices and to the Nation.
Less Drastic Means Proposed.
I believe that arrangements cal
be made to provide the Congress al
integrated military program-al
overall picture of the requirement.
of each of the services-without re-
sort to merger.
For all these reasons I believe tha
the efficiency sought by the pro
ponents of the single department
will turn out to be illusory and tina
every real benefit implied by tha
term can be gained by simpler ant
less drastic means.
| The foreign policy of the Unitet
States has two principal aims. On,
is the construction and support O
an international authority capabl
of adjusting affairs between nation
to keep the peace, the other, whicl
is both an end in itself and a corol
larry of the first aim, is to safeguar,
the power of the United States il
order that power may be used TO
our own security and for worl
peace. The ability to command tn
oceans is indispensable to any col
lective authority that seeks to en-
force peaceful collective procedur,
1t would likewise be indispensable t
!, us should that collective authorit
fail.
Command of the sea is reouisit
for the application of power. Com
mand OF the sea is the province @
the Navy, for which the Navy is de
signed and trained and skilled by
century and half of experience.
believe that the integrity of the Nav
should be preserved. The Nav
should be free to continue its use q
the airplane as one of its princips
weapons. Consolidation into one de
partment might lead to the discoy
. cry, when the application of powe
became necessary, that one kind @
, power had been inadequately pro
! vided by those who controlled tn
, policies of the single department.
Cites War Experiences
Most of what I have said thus ia
have already stated publicly. Be
fore your committee I should like t
add certain points and amplif
others.
,, When appeared before the Rich
! ardson Committee, my opinion O
the merger of the departments wa
influenced by my opinion on anothe
matter. inclined then to the vie,
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff organ
ization as we had it during the wa
could be improved by making on
man responsible for decisions as tn
commander of the armed forces {
the United States because decision
might be more speedily reached. TIL
, opinion also is one that I am now in