Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-12-09
Kings Report Credits Navy With Jap Defeat
Continued From First Page)

dilpllfplOuS operations uIQeTIdk6I
against the Axis-and "all were sue.
cessful."
There Is no overall paramount
capability' among the joint chief.
of staff to warrant elevating one Of
their members to position of mill.
tary commander of all the armed
forces-nor, in my opinion, is there
any known system or experience
which can be counted upon to pro.
duce the man qualified for such 6
position" Admiral King declared.
Fiexibility Aided Operations.
! He stressed the value of united
Judgment and agreed decisions" Of
all the members of the joint chiefs
of staff in the strategic direction OF
the war.
{ Instead Of rigid rules, he added, /,
was fortunate that the Army ano
Navy had developed "set of prin-
eiples of joint action in the field
which proved sufficiently flexible tc
meet the varying conditions that
were encountered during the war
. The report revealed that the Navy
established more than 400 bases in
the Atlantic and Pacific in the long
process of taking the war to Ger
many and Japan. Altogether, $780,
600 men, about one-fifth of the
Navy personnel, were used in estab-
fishing and maintaining bases in
the Pacific alone.
? Navy Strangled Japan.
: Admiral Kings report reviewed
the last phase of the fighting in the
Pacific, describing how Japan was
strangled by naval blockade as cap
ture of one island base after an
other enabled American bombers to
destroy her cities.
Never before in the history OF
war" he declared, "had there been
q more convincing example of the
effectiveness of sea power than
when a well-armed, highly efficient
and undefeated army of over 1,O00,-
900 men surrendered their home.
land Internationally to the invader
without even token resistance"
. He concluded his report by ex.
pressing the sincere hope-and ex-
pectation-that the United States
will hereafter remain ever ready tc
back up its words with deeds"
Text of Introduction.
! The text of the introduction tc
Admiral Kings report follows:
My two previous reports carried
to March l, 1945, the account oil
the development of our nava'
Strength and the participation Of
the United States Navy in combat
operations. The present report is in
tended primarily to cover the period
of the succeeding seven months
during which Germany surrendered
and the war with Japan came te
an end.
This being my last report, how
ever, I am including herein my con.
sidered general comment and OBJ
servations on the war as a whole
The major strategic decision OF
the war provided first for the defeat
of Germany and then for the de-
feat of Japan. Both of these tasks
have now been accomplished and
we can view in clearer perspective
the two major campaigns which LED
to victory. The contrast between
them is at once apparent.
Two Fronts Contrasted.
The war in Europe was primarily
q ground and air war with naval
support, while the war In the Pacific
was primarily naval war with
ground and air support.
In the European war, sea power
was an essential factor because of
the necessity of transporting our
entire military effort across the
Atlantic and supporting It there.
Without command of the sea, this
could not have been done.
Nevertheless, the surrender of the
land, sea and air forces of the Ger
man Reich on May 8, 1945, was the
direct result of the application OF
air power over land and the power
Of the Allied ground forces.
Japan's Armies Were Intact. .
IN the Pacific war, the powers Of
our ground and strategic air forces
like sea power in the Atlantic, was
an essential factor. BY contrast
with Germany, Japan's armies were
intact and undefeated and her all
forces only weakened when she sur.
rendered. But her navy had beer
destroyed and her merchant fee
had been fatally crippled.
Dependent upon imported fooe
and raw materials and relying upor
sea transport to supply her armie.
at home and overseas, Japan lost thu
war because she lost command Of
the sea, and in doing so lost-to us
the island bases from which hel
factories and cities could be de.
stroyed by air.
From the earliest days of the wal
our submarines, operating often
sively in the farthest reaches of the
Pacific, exacted heavy toll of Jap.
anese shipping. At a conservative
estimate, they sank, in addition tt
many combatant ships, nearly two.
thirds IF the merchant shippine
which Japan lost during the war.
Task Forces Carried War to Japan.
Our surface forces - fast task
forces composed of aircraft carriers
fast battleships, cruisers and de-
stroyers-carried the war to the en-.
envy homeland and destroyed i'm.
pressive numbers of naval vessels
and merchant ships.
Our amphibious forces, operating
initially behind air offensives ane
under air cover launched from car
fiers, seized the island bases which
made possible the achievements Of
land-based aircraft in cutting en-.
envy lines Of communications and in
carrying devastation to the Japa-
nese home islands.
Thus our sea power separated the
enemy from vital resources on the
Asiatic mainland and In the islands
which he had seized early in the
war, and furnished us the bases es-
sential to the operations of shore
based aircraft from which the
atomic bombs finally were dis
patched, and on which troops and
supplies were being massed for the
invasion of Kyushu and of Honshu
The defeat of .Japan Was directly