Evening star., 1945-10-28

change it and that as the first step.
we accept the single department as
correct in principle. I repeat that I
can neither understand nor concur
IN such a recommendation. e
% Strictly as a matter of how the
profession of arms can be most ef-
fectively developed, I am appre-
hensive of the single-department
organization because I think it
would lend itself to the dangers of
orthodoxy. The orthodox idea of
liked Notifications led to the collapse
OF the French Army. The orthodoxy
of the German Wehrmacht made
the English Channel an insuperable
obstacle. The orthodoxy of jap
anese religio-military training was
a distinct asset to us when it led to
self-destruction of irreplaceable of
Ulcers, and to clinging to operational
errors because a sense of shame
would not permit acknowledgment
OF earlier errors. One of the biggest
peacetime jobs of any military or
ganization is the continuous day.
to-day fight against this paralyis of
orthodoxy.
Must Maintain" Navy.
(k) If it should be decided by the
Congress that there shall be three
Ico-ordinated armed services the
matter is basically-and should be
handled as-a question of dividing
the War Department into two parts
To that extent the problem is
chiefly concern of the War De-
partment. Such action would re-
suit in three departments of cab
met rank, a solution of the prob
lem which I do not advocate, but
which, in my opinion, would be
preferable to the proposed single
department we are discussing to-
day. ..-
Cd Under the constitution it is
the duty of the Congress to pro
vide and maintain a Navy"
Accordingly, the Congress is en-
titled to full and public exanina-
tion of all considerations which
have a bearing on the question
The needs of the Navy should not
be subject to review by individuals
who do not have informed respon-
sibility in the premises.
(m I am apprehensive that such
an organization would permit re-
duction in maintenance and use OF
our seapower by individuals who
are not thoroughly familiar with
its potentialities, as has happened
in several other countries. This is
risk we should not take. France
never used her Navy to good ad-
vantage. The German general staff
failed, in two wars, to appreciate
the potency of seapower. The alb
sorption of Britain's efficient Royal
Naval Air Service into an inde-
pendent Royal Air Force (afteI
World War y and the consequent
whitening of her naval aviation left
her in 1941 relatively a second-rate
Navy as compared with our own
Another significant fact is thai
Japan's collapse was coincident with
the reduction of her seapower.
National Defense.-My views or
general organization for nationa
defense are, I believe. constructive
and practicable. I recommend the
steps that are necessary to accom-.
pnsf1 them.
(a) The Navy should continue tc
be a separate service, unhampereo
in function and operation by mill
.tary control exercised by officers un-
familiar with naval operations.
(b) The two-department system
should be retained, each department
with a civilian secretary of cabinet
rank.
(c) My experience in Washington
has been that overall military con.
troll of the armed forces can best
be exercised by a body such a.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . Tht
strength of the Joint Chiefs of Stat
lies in the combined knowledge pos,
sessed by the members and in th'
checks and balances" that tend t.
prevent domination by any on,
person.
Prewar Plans Effective.
(d) A number of organizations
interconnections and systems o.
| joint command we're initiated by tn,
War and Navy Departments many
years before World War II began
| These measures were improved anc
augmented during the war as ex.
perience dictated. and the applica'
ton Of their basic principles LEI
us to victory in the recent war
They have been proven effectiv'
| by the tests of actual warfare. :
(e) AS ! have already said, war,
are no longer fought solely b.
armed forces. Civilian agencies
4 and fhp uhole rifiznr,ru ure in.