Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1945-01-18
'THEWORLD
IN REVIEW
BY Maj. Gen.
D. P. Barrows

can be knocked out.
Estimates have varied from
two TO 10 years.
The initial grand strategy of
the war, determined by Prime
Minister Churchill and Presi-
dent Roosevelt, was to leave
Japan pretty much alone until
Hitler was utterly defeated.
But military events have
moved faster than these political
decisions. In naval and air war
fare the Japanese have been
outmatched and defeated.
Admiral Halsey's feet is said
to be waiting in the China Sea,
off Luzon, covering MacArthurs
LuZon landing, but also hoping
that the Japanese feet will
come out for last desperate
battle, in which it may be ami
hilated.
Our air power, both naval and
army, in the Pacific, seems to
have played more decisive
battle role than it has in
Europe.
The widely scattered positions
Of Japan throughout the islands
of the great ocean may have
given II this opportunity.
JAPANESE ground forces have
% been repeatedly overwhelmed
by the Australians, the u. S.
army and the marines.
Japan still has an army Of
almost undiminished strength.
It's weakness lies in the way it
is distributed.
A great part of IL is buried
deep in indecisive operations in
China.
Eleven months ago ] sug-
gested in this column that Japan
nigh collapse before Germany.
This may not be probable, but
1t looks more and more possible.
The answer lies in what we
may find to be the real charac-
ter of the Japanese and the
hardihood of their military
spirit.
If a great battle is fought be-
tween Americans and Japanese
on the central plain of LuZon,
we may learn shortly just how
tough the Japanese army is, or
how susceptible it may be 10
those subtle influences that de-
stroy the martial spirit.
MY DOUBT of the real mill
Nl tary strength of the Jspa-
nese is not wholly theoretical.
1t is partly based on a years
experience with the Japanese
army in Siberia in 1917-1S.
They had in that interven-
ton, some $4,000 troops, includ-
ing three OF their typical
divisions, the Third, Fifth and
Twelfth, probably the best of
their cavalry, and a large num-
Der of special units, including
those of the lines of communica-
tons.
This was q years ago, and in
the subsequent period the Japa-
nese army was undoubtedly
much improved. Siberia revealed
to the japanese their own weak
nesseS, and they made very in
dustrious efforts TO remove
them.
But / think / can say that the
character of that Japanees army
in Siberia was an almost shock
ing disappointment 10 all Ameri-
can officers who observed it.
One of the most unexpected
things was its intolerably poor
discipline: the inability of the
Japanese high command TO get
its orders respected, and the
general insolence and barbarity
of the lower ranks of officers
and Of the men. | could make
a long story of this but refrain.
I had some staff experience
Il with the command and staff of
the Japanese, and am one of
small number of American off,
GERS who had the experience of
serving under Japanese gen.
eral in the field.
These operations did not con-
tinue long, they were of minor
character, and as far as our
own policy was concerned, they
were futile, but they did lead
to some conclusions of Japanese
military character, which may
be inherent and not easily inn
provable.
First, their planning was
over-elaborate. pedantic. and
too slow. / shared a little of
their staff work; was furnished
with their position sketches;
saw some of their combat
orders.
These had all been patiently
done, seemed TO be technically
correct in most respects, and
were OF the German instruction.
But these orders could not
always be carried out, and the
officers upon whom response
bility fell, had no gift OF ex-
temporization.
THE troops were brave and
Il had great "cockiness" when
things went well and they were
advancing, but they had no
spirit for meeting reverses, no
matter how small.
Ultimately, Russian guerillas
took full advantage OF their
Door resolutions: made surprise