The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1945-11-18

IL is a special responsibility 1OI
the Uni ed Nations only in so far
as the plight of the Jews is worse
Chan that of other innocent victims
Of Nazi oppression and of the de-
vastation of war. But it is prob
lem of relief and rehabilitation, and
of the restoration of law and order
based on the equal rights of men.
1t is a part of the problem of Eu-
rope, and is soluble finally only by
solving the European problem.
But as respects Palestine the
British and American responsible
ties have not yet been made equal.
For the United States is not now
a Middle Eastern power. Ameri-
can oil concessions, American
missionaries, do not make us a
Middle Eastern power equal with
Britain. The Middle East is a
British sphere of influence If
may use this accurate but taboo
phrase - because Britain alone can
take military and administrative
action.
Therefore, in the inquiry about
Palestine, the solution selected is
bound to depend on whether the
United States is to become in fact,
not by virtue of its influence in
London but by its presence in the
Middle East, a principal power in
that part of the world. The Pales-
tinian solution will be one thing if
our role is limited to recommend
ing what Great Britain, which is
on the top, is to carry out. 1t can
be quite different solution if the
United States makes the mo-
mentous decision that the whole
Middle East is region of such
vital interest to the peace and pros.
perity of the world, that we must
be present in the Middle East -
present somewhere, for example at
the port of Misunderstanding not
only influence from the distance of
Washington but influence radiating
from some local point of actual
American power.
The decision that has to be taken
by President Truman and Secre.
tary Byrnes, and of course approx.
ed by Congress and the people, is
comparable in its importance with
that taken in 1900 by President Nc.
Alnley and Secretary Hay in regard
to China. That was the begin
ming of the chain of events which
led us into the Philippines, and into
Eastern Asia, and through Pearl
Harbor to General MacArthur's &C.
cupation of Japan. If we now find.
as l am afraid We must, that in
the Middle East, as in the Far
East, we have vital interest that
cannot be neglected, then let us be
sure we have earned the grim
lesson of being committed but not
being clear how much we were
committed, and of having commit.
ments, as in the Philippines, which
We refused to pay the price of SUD-
porting effectively.
We could enter the Middle East
as poWer-as distinguished from
an influence or as ultimate hackers
Of the British position - only in
open agreement with the British
government and the Soviet govern.
ment. For strategic reasons there
would have to be high priority for
an agreement providing the guar
antles-given and taken and can.
able OF mutual enforcement
about the Dardanelles, the accessi-
b1lity and the security of the Black
Sea and the Mediterranean.
The question whether We wish
to become Middle Eastern power
IS, OF course, ultimately our own
decision. But if we are to become
such a power, the question of how
and under what conditions, is one
which will have to be negotiated
at the very highest levels of, di.