The Wilmington morning star., 1945-07-17
Interpreting
The War
BY KIRKE L. sINpSo,
Associated Press Ne,r. oN

Conjecture varies as +ba "'yS
polling reason for japanese ' sa
ure to react in any suSS.,. 'as!'
way to close range naval 9,aAaaI
as air bombardment of bas wen
portant northern coastal o;. M
but failing fuel supplies fo S."ss;
envy ships of air and sea eA'
good guess as any. as
Nor can it be DOUBTED ,b,.
from Admiral Halsey's bon aS'ae
bringing japanese fleets Of Of
categories to action, further V ;r
palrment of enemy gasoline s ,,,
fuel resources was prime aLa
jective of the bold venturinu W,
Halsey's mighty Third Flee Si. VI
in easy medium gun range Of ,5
japanese coast. "'e
Recapitulations from Guar,
the results of sustained sea W;
strategic attack stress the ts s'
three of the cities erased in ~
operation were oil centers Tvins
far to the North on Hokkaido I.
land, the three cities blasted Nv Nv
Third Fleet guns or planes.-Nnr
oran, Sapporo and Kushiro-woro
not only steel production centpw
but links in Japans oil reserya
line never before brought undo,
American fire. Oil reserves aIso
were the main targets of far rano.
ing simultaneous air attacks bv
land-based bombers in central and
Southern Japan.
That what is left of Japans
once great surface fleet failed 10
put in an appearance to dispute
Halsey's sea attack is not par.
ticularly surprising. There is ev.
cry indication that the ships are
holed-up in the Inland Sea far to
the South. Its waters are deep to
the shore line, serving much the
same purpose as did deep and
narrow Norwegian fiords in offer.
ing concealment for big German
battleships and cruisers. They
could lie close to high shores,
screened from air scouts, and in
channels too narrow for torpedo
planes attacks if spotted.
Persistent mining of the en-,
frances and exits from the inland
sea by American mine-laying Sup.
efforts represented further OBJ
stacle to Japanese fleet emergency
is apt to come only when amphibi-
Gus invasion starts and the JapS
obviously expect that to happen
in the South, not the North,
Lack of fuel and conservation Of
air and sea power against invasion
day can therefore partially account
for lack of any reaction. 1t does
not cover failure of enemy coastal
guns to open up when Third Fleet
battleships drove into land-rin9'
ed bay on Southern Hokkaido to
batter Muroran. Eyewitness ac.
counts say the big ships loosed
their 16-inch gun broadsides from
positions only 1000 yards off shore
and with land in close sight Of
three sides Of them.
It is possible that japanese de.
tense concepts in the North relied
so completely on air and sea cut
posts in the Kuriles to deal with
any enemy advance on HokkaIdo
that shore batteries were never IN
stalled around Mororan bay or the
great gulf that leads to it. Halsey
ships were in easy range OF even
light and medium enemy moolle
field guns, however, and why they
remained silent is difficult to eX'
plain. 1t could indicate that Jap
anese ground defense forces nave
| been heavily concentrated to the
South where invasion is expected
and thus were caught mapping by
the Fleet raid.
Whatever else can be reao Oh
the purposes prompting that most
striking demonstration to date Oh
American sea-air domination even
of Japan's own inshore waters
! it adds to the ever increasing
strain on japanese war nerves
Its psychological effect could Dc
even more important than It's a.,
rect military results. It ofousn.
home to the people of Nof,nern
Japan what those of Sou'nel "
Tokyo boasts of japanese M III.
munity to attack by sea or an u ..
japan have already learned !na'
amphibious invasion are meaii"9
1ace