Evening star., 1945-03-18
Shift to Pacific Awaits
Troops in Europe
Observer Tells Why Nazis' Fall
Will Not Mean Return Home
BIZ OtUen L. Scott.

BIZ O1Cen L. Scott.
Very many families in this country
will be acutely disappointed by the
slowness of rehabilitation when the
German war ends. There Is widespread
expectation that, at that time, men in
Europe will come home quickly to be
discharged from service.
Actually, the situation is to be far
from that simple. Out of about 100000
men in Europe, at least SOC, 1000 will be
needed to occupy part OF Germany.
Those will not come home for several
months at least, pending possible re-
placement. Then as many as 100000
more will be slated for transfer but
not for demobilization. Their destina-
ton will be the Pacific war theater,
often with a stopover and a furlough
in the United States. Movement Of
that group will have priority over the
return home of the 100000 who may
be slated for demobilization when they
can get back to this country.
The result is quite likely to be q
rather slow-motion release Of men,
much slower than the public will expect.
1t is complicated by the fact Of a con-
tinuing war in the Pacific with its
growing demand for men with Army
training.
Very few from the Navy can expect
to be let out of service until the Japa-
nese war Is won. The outlook for the
air forces Is less clear, but in this case,
too, it is probable that demobilization
will be slow and the shift Of forces to
the Pacific will be large.
It is to be difficult for armies that
have Just won one war, and that expect
release, to be given job of winning
another war in another part Of the
world Yet the plans appear to call for
use OF very large numbers of men In
the Pacific with the result that there
is not to be an alternative to large
scale shifting of forces. The ofncial
suggestion of few months ago that
| $50 900 men a month would be brought
home from Europe for discharge now
is heavily discounted by Army planners.
At present, the Army's size, including
| air forces, is about 100000 men.
Plans apparently call for a force Of
between 5000 900 and 5000 900 men for
the Pacific war alone. At present about
| 1,50O 900 Army and air forces men are
| in the Pacific. That number will be
| increased from units training in the
| United States but it will call for Use
of veterans from Europe in large
numbers.
| The heavy demand for men in the
| Pacific relates to the fact that two in
vasions may be required. One is the
invasion of the Chinese mainland to
gain airbases and to cut the COM
munications of large japanese forces in
China. The other Is direct invasion of
Japan itself. Invasion OF Japan is likely
to be a dificult venture because of the
need to expect fanatical resistance both
| from the army and from the civilian
population.
Direct invasion of the Japanese main
land almost surely will be necessary.
however, If the Pacific war is to end
within a reasonable period. Both the
Army and the Navy now recognize that
the public will insist upon an effort to
get that war won quickly. To win quick
| ly will call in turn for use of large in
vasion forces and to get those forces 1t
will be necessary to call on many Of the
veterans from Europe.
The overall squeeze on manpower Is
likely to end with the German war.
however. At that time the draft Of
men is to come near to a stop for all
| except 17-year-olds becoming 18. That
group will be needed for requirements.
Order cancellations will close down
many war plants with the result that
about 100000 workers and men in
service are expected to lose their jobs
in the first six months, even with the
japanese war going on.
There still are about 2,500 900 men In
the Army inside the United States, many
of whom can be shipped to the Pacific
| in order to relieve in part the demand
for men who will be returning from
Europe. The men coming from Europe
probably will be sorted out on this side,
with those entitled to demobilization
being taken from units that are brought
back here for re-equipment and refrain
ing for the Pacific war.
X
The one uncertain factor in this whole
situation is the effect that political pres
sure may have upon Army plans.
At present, the intent is to place all
emphasis upon a rapid shift of forces
from one war to the other in the interest
of a speedy termination of the war
against Japan. This is going to be dis
appointing to two or three million men
who may think that they are in line for
early discharge but who find that they
are stranded in Europe. Under those
circumstances, Congress may put on the
heat to get quicker return of veterans
to be demobilized. This, In turn, could
result in diversion of ships from the job
OF moving men to the Pacific to the job
Of moving men from Europe back home.
Planning, however, is based upon
speedy transfer of forces to the remain
ing war and that planning is likely to
prevail. It will be difficult to answer
the Army argument that the main Job
will be to get the Japanese war won,
even If that does mean a few more
months of service for veterans who may
be entitled to get out. Even after the
japanese war is won, there will be q
long occupation job to carry out and
one that will involve large numbers Of
men. Many troops in Europe and in the
Pacific are likely to find that the end
OF fighting will not mean the end of