Evening star., 1945-10-08
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welt and had accepted the post of
commander in chief of the Philip
pine Army.
Macarthur Then Field Marshal.
MacArthurs rank then was field
marshal of the Philippine Army.
With the aid of the Philippine gov
ernments conscription act he was
slowly putting together the army
that was to take over the defense
Of the islands after the American
forces withdrew in 1916 under the
terms of the Philippines Independ-
ence Act.
1t was slow and tedious work for
Macarthur, handicapped by lack of
funds and equipment. Macarthur
was training two installments Of
Filipinos each year, devoting five
and a half months to each group.
Their training was largely indi-
vidual. There was not much field
training for these men, nor any
great deal of training in the use Of
weapons. In fact, it was not until
the summer of 1941 that any unit
training was attempted and that
was only. for a period of about two
weeks and was only in the smaller
units. The mass Of them-so soon
to fight-had none of the co-opera-
tive training so necessary in the
building of the infantry artillery
team.
| MY chief association with Mac
Arthur during this early period was
social, plus the fact that furnished
his Philippine trainees with drill
grounds and rife ranges al Fort
Mckinley, the post I commanded
In my talks with Macarthur that
winter of 1904 the question of
war with Japan rarely arose. He
had no information at that time to
indicate the approach Of Japan S
attack, and I certainly had none.
1t was not until the spring of l941
that I got the feeling in my bones
tElat war was 1neVlIdDle.
Schooled to Fight Japan.s
Of course both of us had been
schooled for years before that in the
theoretical problem of fighting ia
pan, just as all graduates of the
War College and the Command and
General Staff Schools are instructed
We were thoroughly familiar with
War Plan Orange, No. 3 (Or WPO-
3, as it was condensed).
WPO-3, variation of a plan about
20 years old. was this: In the event OF
a successful japanese landing on the
main island of Luzon the Philippine
Division and the Philippine Army
| if unable to beat off the landings
and subsequent advances of the
| theoretical enemy, were to fight de-
laying actions and withdraw into
Bataan Peninsula. The plan en-
visioned six-month stand on Ba-
taan, by which time aid from the
United States would arrive.
| Macarthur and I agreed that Il
was defeatist plan, but our feeling
in the matter did not change it
The sparkle went out of Manila
in the spring of 1941. War was COM
ing and we all knew it. Maj. Gen
George Grunert. then commander Of
the Philippines Department, begar
making determined efforts to pry
more supplies out of Washington
and to bring my complement o1
Philippine Scouts up to the full
statutory strength of $4,000.
Dependents Are Evacuated.
Another sign of uneasiness came
late in the winter when the Wal
Department directed that the de.
pendents of all military personne
in the Philippines be evacuated
This followed on the heels of 6
similar order by the Navy. .
/ Like most of the other wives, Mrs
Wainwright did not want to go
Like most of the other husbands
guess. lied to her and told hel