The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-11-23

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 naents of material selected from
 General Marshalps report on the winning of World War II.
 X
 TOWARD ROME
 There were now Il Allied divisions angthe Italian line, but the Germans had at least 24 on the Italian main- land. Although IA of these were ill Northern Italy outside the combat zone, the enemy was in a position to build up a considerably greater defensive force than General Eiser- hover had available for his attack. The additional Allied air power and the threat of landing further north hy General Pattons Seventh Army Were counted on to deter the enemy from moving his divisions south from the Pc Valley. This threat was exploited by skillful use of General Patton and his headquarters. Fol owing the Sicilian campaign, the Seventh Army head dquarters, which no longer had any divisions assigned 70 it, was moved to Corsica. General Patton's mysterious movements 4hroughout the Mediterranean area Kept the Germans guessing where fine Seventh Army, which they had aearned to fear SO much in Sicily, might strike next.
 Early in November the II Corps, Then commanded by Maj Gen. Geoffrey Reyes, moved to the mainland of Italy from Sicily. Ger man plans to hold the line of the Volturno were frustrated when on &l1e night of 12-13 October the II Corps and the VI Corps. now com snanded by Maj. Gen. J. P. Lucas, Of the Fifth Army forced crossings of that river. Destroying every bridge and culvert en. route, the Germans withdrew to the winter fine" which they had been prepar- ing feverishly since the Allied land- angs on the mainland. This defen- eive position stretched across the peninsula, following generally the Hines of the Carigliano and Sangro Rivers, about 75 miles south of Rome.
 Winter had arrived Heavy rains were falling and streams were in constant flood. The resources of our engineers were taxed to keep in place the temporary bridges on the vital supply routes. Vehicles and men mired deep in mud
 Hardest Kind of Fighting
 Despite the difficulties there was no relaxation of pressure. The purpose was to seize Rome as quickly as possible and engage the maximum number of German di- visions. The offensive was a series of attacks and pauses, the immed- late objectives being key terrain features. It was the hardest kind ot fighting. The Germans had mined tl1e roads, trails, natural cross-coun- try routes of advance, and even the stream beds. To reinforce terrain barriers the enemy constructed strongpoints in which he skillfully employed mine fields, wire entan- elements, log g-and-earth emplace- anents. and automatic weapons. Ma cl1inegun and mortar supplements many of them dug four or five feet into solid rock, covered every ap- proach. To deal with them the ar hllery was heavily reinforced by Batteries of the heaviest field pieces we had produced. The 240-mn Howitzer and the 8-inch gun were rushed from the United States.
 Tn December the Fifth Army ar rived before the entrance to tht Casino corridor to Rome. The % Moroccan Infantry Division arrived in Italy at this time and was as- signed to it. The United States hao agreed to equip eight French infan- try and armored divisions including supporting troops. The Moroccan di. vision was the fore-runner of tht Corps Expeditionaire Francai which, under the leadership of Gen Alphonse Juin. greatly distinguished itself in the hard fighting of tht months that followed.
 Allied interest in the Eastern Med. &terranean shifted to the Balkan! following the conclusion of tht North African campaign. Maj. Gen Lewis H. Brereton's Ninth Air Fore based in Northeast Africa bombed strategic targets there, including thu Ploesti airfields and, with elements of the Royal Air Forces Middle EaS Air Command, dropped supplies tt the hard-pressed patriot forces.
 The Eastern Mediterranean hac constituted separate theater under British Command until December 1943 when the entire offensive ir the Mediterranean was brought un- der one command. On that date the GQnhined Chiefs of Staff delepafao