Detroit evening times., 1945-02-13
M9ARTHUR
STRATEGY
BY Lee
Van Alta

IN. MdCRk III n = IlNR' ~
" LUZON, Feb. y ClNSD-
Two Of Gen. Douglas MacAr.
thurs most frequently over
looked characteristics are, IN
simple fact, two Of his most out
standing military virtues.
The FIRST is a knack Of timing
each operation with what
amounts TO almost psychic pre-
CiSlon; the second is his repeat.
edly demonstrated pe"sonal
courage which has dominated
not only his physical actions IN
World Wars ] and ii but which
has had profound impact on
his whole victoTy-studded Mir
tary pattern.
HIS timing conception evolves
into a procedure which Is
roughly this. Tn-krToW the
enemNso- well, 10 know his IN
heren, tactical weaknesses so
perfectly. 10 realize his own
strategic advantages 80 COM
pletely that a single unexpected
and audaclouS military gamble
can alter the entire war picture.
I OOK at the times MacAr-
II thurs timing has disrupted
the Jap military machine AT
Buna. al Cape Gloucester at
the Admiralty Islands, AT Hol-
landia, at Leyte and AT Luzon.
His decision, for example. 70
plt his pItiful two divisions
against the Japanese total OF
seven divisions in the Bismarck
Archipelago for the battle OF
Buna was a prime example of
timing.
The JapS believed the last
thing IN the world Macarthur
dared TO do would he attack;
why every book said that de-
iense was the only strategy
possible for him To employ.
When he attacked they were
caught off balance so badly
that by the time they were able
10 muster sufficient ships 10
carry reinforcing divisions into
the battle. Buna was past his
tory
That same thing was true in
the Admiralty Islands when
Macarthur literally stole Manus
from four-thousand strong
garrison OF NipS with fifteen
hundrp d First Cavalrymen.
They scored such an over
whelmIng tactical surprise that
the NipponeSe commander didn't
even have time 10 dig IN for
suicide stand
Look Al the great Hollandia
victory. For weeks and months
the Japs had stoically planned
that Macarthur would take out
Hansa Bay and Wewak before
he could even begin 10 threaten
their mighty supply and alrbase
at Hollandia
THE success Of his Admiralty
l. timing left him with so
much naval and ground air
forces for the Hollandia attack
that within SIX weeks after the
Admiralty campaign was won,
American troops leap-froCged
400 miles past the two power
ful remaining Jap StrongholdS
in New Guinea 10 take up resi-
dence in Hollandia. His timing
was so exact that there was
neither air, naval nor ground
intervention from the JapS.
Leyte was the straw which
broke the enemy'S hack They
knew Macarthur couldn't in
wade that island Just before the
rainy season logic said that
Why, rains would ruin engi-
neering construction and make
field maneuvcr virtually lmpOs-
Sible.
But Macarthur turned up two
weeks before the rains began,
consolidating his footholdS. and
seven weeks after the Leyte in
vaSion. he had landed on MIN
doro where he was in the dry
belt and could construct air
dromeS at will. Planes from
these fields could protect all Of
Lcyte even as they destroyed
all Of LuZon
FINALLY, in any assessment
L Of Macarthur must come his
personal courage
The old axiom that he never
asked soldier TO do what he
wouldn't do himself applies 10
Macarthur Just as closely As It
applies 10 any other American
field commander.
He narrowly has escaped
being torpcdoed aboard vessels
and ne was the object Of A Jap
suicide attack DY homh-loaded
small boats in Lingayen Gulf.
Small vessels next 10 his flag
ship were sunk the first night
within 100 yards from him
Few people realize that when
his field headquarters on Leyte
were set up, Macarthur re-
y,,,,,rI ~ tbor,, minus = slit
trench or any other shelter,
during the 600 Jap raids which
rocked American positions on
Lcyte during October and No
Vcmbcr.
SIMILARLY few people know
y that moro than S. pcr cent