Evening star., 1945-06-16
Explains Some Point!
Which He Says Have
Been Bothering Him
BY the Associated Press.

Been Bothering Him
BY the Associated Press.
SUPREME ALLIED HEAD
QUARTERS, Paris, June 16.-
The complete tert of Gen. Eisen-
hower's press conference re-
marks here yesterday tollo,Ds:
I am not so certain that I hav,
anything worth while to talk tt
YOU about this morning, but I an
going away on short trip and
thought that, in view of the man!
things that happen to newspaper
men, that many of you would b'
gone, and I have been with vol
quite a while, and, really, it's JUS
my chance to say good-by to you.
However, it does give me a chance
to clear up one or two points tha'
have been bothering me just little
One was that I sent word down
instructions regarding censorship
that I thought were perfectly clear
Later I found that some people
didn't understand what I meant.
Fundamentally there is no cen
sorship. Here is the only point:
cannot hand back to my bosses my
own responsibilities. l cannot Sa,
that nothing would happen which
wouldn't censor. 1t might be thai
some little difficulty could arise some
where, where keeping it quiet a day
or two would solve the situation.
had something like that in mind.
don't know what it could be, but
that was what I had in mind.
merely said that there could be nc
censorship unless the officers COM
ing in contact with the story felt
that it had such Importance to bring
1t to me.
Value Of Integrated Power.
Well, thought every newspaper
man would understand that. l could
see nothing misunderstandable about
it. I knew there would be few things
which it would be necessary to bring
to me, and so far none have
heen brought to me. So won't ex-
pect any to happen in the future.
If there are any questions lurk-
ing in your minds about that, be-
fore I go further. would like to
have the questions right now.
Okay. we understand that, then.
There is going to be lot written
about this war. Many OF you
people here present are going to
analyze various methods through
your aHuaintanceship with staff
officers and with what has hap
pened, you are going to know
much about the basis Of decisions,
when they were taken, why they
were taken, and other things that
other people don't know. You will
then, unquestionably, write much
that will be useful to the military
student of the future. If I could
urge upon you one thing to study
carefully it is this:
The value of integrated tactical
power in war.
Now, I don't mean to use ten
dollar expressions. What am try
ing to get at is this: There is no
such thing as a separate "air" war,
as a separate ground" war and as
a separate sea" war or "logistic"
war or any other branch.
Nations Decide General Areas.
Great nations determine the po-
litical purposes of war. The gov
ernments determine the general
areas in which they choose to ap-
ply their tactical power, and then
they begin to make resources ready
of the general nature needed; they
turn the problem over to COM
mander and his staff and subor-
dinate commanders and they fill
out the resources on the recon-
mendation of those people in the
field who have a chance to study
the problem at very close range.
But in all cases it is the integra-
ton of all types of those powers
and forms of war that bring you
YOUR answer in the quickest pos
sible way
1t is perfectly true that your air.
for example, has to wipe the other
fellows air off the earth before he
can 60 ahead and use his full power
in an offensive way. That is merely
the job he does in order to do his
main task of advancing your own
cause. When YOU put sea. ground
and air together the result you get
is not the sum of their separate
powers
You multiply their power rather
than add
The whole basis of thought that
led to the attack across the Chan
mel was this: That air power in
overwhelming strength applied to
particular area could paralyze
traffic, could immobilize the enemy,
could soften up his defenses. could
make possible operations that
would otherwise be and remain in
the realm of the fantastic.
Many Doubted Success of Invasion.
Many experienced soldiers did not
believe that the attack across the
Channel was feasible. We had in
the Mediterranean some chance to
prove the point that air could pre-
pare the way and could sustain you
after you got there in very, very
effective fashion
Pantelleria was not a good test
because the defenders of Pantelleria
wanted to quit. But Salerno was a
very good test, not so much in the
preparatory phases there as in the
supporting capacity after we once
got ashore. We had few landing
craft and our turn around was very
slow. so that our buildup was slow.
We knew there was going to be a
very dangerous period, running from
September 13 to September 18, and
1t was faith that the Air and Navy
together could render the support
necessary that made that attack
reasonable.
That lesson was derived with only
a fraction of the air power we had
available in England and we be-
lieved that it could do the same
thing in the preparatory and, let
us say, the sustaining states.
All through the campaign from
June 6, 1914, to the date of the final
collapse, the chief characteristic in
my mind was the complete and con-
slant coordination between the air