Evening star., 1945-08-30
Gy the Associated Press,

Z
port made public today narrowed
own to two causes the extent ol
the Pearl Harbor disaster. They
are:
Il. The failure of the command
ing general of the Hawaiian Depart
ment Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short
adequately to alert his command fol
war and,
%. The failure of the War De-
partment. with knowledge of the
type of alert taken by the COM
manding general, Hawaiian Depart
ment, to direct him to take an ade-
quate alert, and the failure to keep
him adequately informed as to the
developments of the United States
japanese negotiations, which in
turn might have caused him to
change from the inadequate alert to
an adequate one"
Assessments of Responsibilities.
1t made these assessments of re-
sponsibilities:
Il. The Secretary of State-the
Hon. Cordell Hull. The action OF
the Secretary of State in delivering
the ceunterproposalS of November
26, 1941. was used by the japanese
as the signal to begin the war by
the attack on Pearl Harbor. To
the extent that it hastened such
attack it was in conflict with the
efforts of the War and Navy De-
partments to gain time for prepara-
tions for war. However, war with
Japan was inevitable and imminent
because of irreconcilable disagree
ments between the Japanese Empire
and the American Government.
%. The chief of staff of the Army
Gen. George C. Marshall, failed in
his relations with the Hawaiian
Department in the following par
ticulars:
"(AD To keep the commanding
general of the Hawaiian Depart
ment fully advised of the growing
tenSeneSs of the japanese situation
which indicated an increasing
necessity for better preparation for
war, of which information he had
an abundance and Short had little.
"(B) To send additional instruc-
tlons to the commanding general
of the Hawaiian department on
November %, 1941, when evidently
he failed to realize the import of
Gen. Shorts reply of November 81,
which indicated clearly that Gen.
Short had misunderstood and mis-
construed the message of November
q and had not adequately alerted
his command for war.
Ample Time to Act.
"(C) To get to Gen. Short of the
evening of December and the early
morning of December 7, the crit
ical information indicating an al
most immediate break with Japan,
though there was ample time to
have accomplished this.
I'D To investigate and determine
the state of readiness of the Ha-
walian command between Novem-
ber y and December T. 1941, despite
the impending threat of war.
There was failure of understand
ing at Doth ends of the line. The
Washington officials had full knowl-
edge of impending events. which
full knowledge was not available to
Short.
A cardinal principle in good man
agement is the necessity to follow
up" on directions. The War De-
partment had nine days in which
to check up on the state of defense
in Hawaii, which it did not do.
Repeatedly, after Gen. Short took
command in Hawaii in February,
194l, Gen. Marshall during this
peacetime had written to him at
length, advising him on details of
operation and here, late in Novem-
ber, with war expected almost daily,
he communicated none of those per-
sonal messages containing needed
inside information.
Deputies Not Informed.
The evidence indicates that the
manner IN which authority to act
was delegated or not delegated had
its influence on this situation. The
Chief of Staff had three deputies,
Gems. William Dryden, H. H. Arnold
and Richard c. Moore. None of
these three was given the secret in
formation concerning the known Jap
Intentions
When Gen. Marshall went away
On November 27 he had, prior to de-
parture, prepared a first draft of
the November 27 message. 1t was
the Secretary of War who initially
followed through on it on November
81. Then it was given to Gen. Gerow
to complete. Complete authority to
act in Gen. MarShalls absence does
not seem to have been given to any
one subordinate Had there been
an officer either with authority or
With courage to act on the informa-
LION that was in the War Depart
ment on the evening of December 6.
and had he sent message to Gen.
Short Hawaii should have been fully
alerted.
azure al DOM EnQS.
AS has been repeated so many
times, there was positive evidence
in the War Department that it was
only matter of days before war
would ensue and the War Depart
ment had notice that Hawaii was
on only a sabotage alert, inadequate
for full warfare. Had a full war
message, unadulterated, been dis
patched or had direct orders for a
full, all-out alert been sent Hawaii
could have been ready TO nave met
the attack with what it had. What
resulted was failure at both ends
of the line.
'3. Chief of the war plans divi-
sion, War Department general staff
Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, failed
in his duties in the following par
ticulars:
"(A) To keep the commanding
general, Hawaiian Department, ade-
quately informed on the impending
war situation by making available to
him the substance OF the data being
delivered to the war plans division
by the assistant chief of staff, Co..
"(B) To send to the commanding
general of the Hawaiian Department
on November q, 1941, a clear. con-