The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1945-07-31
Interpreting
The War

- AA w IVA
(This is Kirke L. Simpsons last
column. He is retiring on a pension
after 81 years with the Associated
Press. The column tomorrow will
be taken over by James D. White
Of the AP San Francisco staff.)
BY KIRKE L. SIMPSON
Associated Press News Analyst
The major fact Of the war in
Asia at the end of July, aside from
what may come out Of the Pots
dam tripartite conference to AFFECT
its duration, is that the Japanese
Highseas Fleet has ceased to exist.
That fleet which ruled the West
ern Pacific almost unchallenged
after the Pearl Harbor disaster
has paid the full price for that
day Of infamy". What remains
Of it has no more than nuisance
value. 1t can be written off STRATEGY.
cally although its submarines, light
surface craft and suicide" notil
las are a potential menace yet tc
Allied invasion armadas when they
move ION to Tokyo"
That is the substance Of press ad
vices from Guam rejecting high
est naval opinion in the Pacific
Command. 1t means that in blast
ing enemy capital ships at theil
Inland Sea moorings, Admiral Hal
sey's mighty Third Fleet sea-air
armada has fulfilled its first es.
sential mission of the developing
invasion campaign.
BY every available sign it is well
ahead OF the timetable mapped
for the operation and Halsey's
bold and sustained activities ir
Japanese waters have been carried
out with no ship casualties and
substantially no enemy resistance
afloat and little in the air.
It still seems improbable in the
face of the typhoon season in Jap
anese waters, however, that the
invasion advance against Japan.
home islands could be greatly ex
pedited. The way is too long to &
with vast landing expedition fleets
to risk typhoon interrogation.
The practical destruction Of VIVA
was left Of Japan's deep sea fight
ing strength, of ships big and pow
erful enough to ride out typhoor
weather and even give battle il
the midst Of storms apparent,
does away with one element Q
speculation as to enemy strateg,
in keeping that fleet in harbor de
spite inshore raiding by Halsey'
heavy ships. There has been NJ
intimation from any source Of
Japanese attempt to venture
against the Third Fleet or any par
of it although the enemy Higl
command must have had reason
able accurate information fire
quently as to its whereabouts ant
strength.
In some naval circles it has bee
argued that the surprise retalia
ton blow so often promised b.
Radio Tokyo but never struck wa
keyed to weather. A study Of wha
is known of Japanese fleet ma
neuvers prior to the war has con
WINGED some observers that the.
involved special training for ba'
naval strategy counted on a sur
weather operations. That has LEI
to an assumption that Japanes,
prise sortie even with limite'
forces in the midst of typhoon tt
catch Allied fleets towering off tn
Japanese coast at disadvantag
and deal them a critical blow.
If that did in fact play any par
in Japanese planning after tn
battles Of the Philippine sea hat
whitfield enemy fleet strength dow
to little more than a substantial
task force, Halsey's carrier plane
backed up by Army bombers from
Okinawa have utterly married tn
conception. They have put out o
action, according to available OF
fetal Allied reports, virtually al
enemy battle craft able to keel
the sea in typhoon weather. VIVA
remains of Nipponese nava
strength is strictly limited to in
shore operation in bad or threaten
ing weather. It represents no threa
to Anglo-American sea power ant
little or none to Allied communi
cation lines in the Pacific asid'