Evening star., 1945-12-24
Recognition for Tito

NOJ long DeIOre the November IL
election in Yugoslavia, when it be-
came clear that the voting would
not be free or broadly representa-
tive, the United States indicated to
Marshal Tito-who had made cerr
tain that his party would win-that
his regime should not expect to be
recognized by us. Since then, how
ever, our Government has changed
its mind, and today Tito has our
recognition. although it has been
extended with the clear understand
ing that it does not imply approval
of his policies. his methods of
achieving power and his failure to
make good the guarantees of per-
sonal freedom promised the Yugo-
slav people.
These reservationS-con in
instructions to our Ambassador in
Belgrade-modify to some extent the
about face made by the State De-
partment. In effect, they mean that
we recognize the new Yugoslav gov
ernment more or less as we recog-
nize Spain or without
enthusiasm, without liking the re-
gime's dictatorial character, merely
because we find nonrecognition in
expedient and because we may at
least hope that there will be
change for the better some day.
After all, as has been shown in the
case of Argentina, it is debatable
whether nonrecognition is a sound
or productive policy; possibly recog-
milton of the qualified sort extended
to the YugoslavS can be more con-
structive, especially if it helps to
improve our relations with the Rus
slams who are big brothers to Tito.
Indeed, there seems good reason to
believe that our change Of mind on
Yugoslavia, together with Britains
simultaneous recognition, can be
linked with the current Moscow
Conference as a friendly concession
to Foreign CommiSSar Molotov by
Secretary Byrnes and Foreign Min
lister Bevin. At any rate, it does not
appear unlikely that Messrs. Byrnes
and Bevin may have agreed that it
would be more useful in the long
run, from the standpoint of smoother
international relations, to recognize
the Tito regime than to keep on
ignoring it as if it did not exist.
Looked at in this light, the develop
ment takes on a less discouraging
hue.
All things considered, however the
fact remains that Tito's government
has come into existence in violation
of the principles agreed upon by the
Big Three at Yalta-principles de-
signed to promote the growth of
democracy in Eastern Europe and
the Balkans. Perhaps this may be
described as another example of
ideals being frustrated by stubborn
realities, and perhaps recognition is
the best course to follow in the cir
cumstances. Nevertheless the over
all picture is not very inspiring, and
If we have conceded something to
Russia in this instance, logic would
seem to compel us to concede much
the same thing in the case of Ro-
mania and Bulgaria, despite their
suspect political setups.
1t may be, of course, that conces-
sions of this sort. by promoting bet
ter relations with Russia, will do
more good than harm. But the big
question is whether or when the
concessions are likely to become
mere appeasement. We must hope
that the Big Three are agreed that
the line must be drawn somewhere
and that they know exactly where
to draw it before the process of give
and-take becomes completely, and
dangerously, process of one side
taking all and giving nothing.