Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-03-13
Letters to The Star
Veteran Observer Sees the War
With Japan Lasting Until 1947

Veteran Observer Sees the War
! With Japan Lasting Until 1947
To the Editor Of The Star:
The duration Of the war against Japan
is subject which Is uppermost in the
thoughts Of millions OF Americans. It
| is therefore important to analyze the
| strength Of Japan, rather than to en-
| phasize her weakness and potential col
lapse.
In considering the strengths Of the
Japanese, it Is the course Of wisdom to
weigh their assets against their liabili-
ties, and then 1t may be possible to
hazard a guess as to how long they will
tight and just when and why they will
capitulate. First, 1t must be realized
that the japanese have nearly 80 million
people unified as perhaps are no other
people on earth. Next, there is almost
no illiteracy in Japan, and it Is
creditably reported that So per cent of
the people read and write, and as their
minds are fed only with official informa-
ton, they practically all think alike and
simultaneously. Thus we have as near
complete unity as is possible. Perhaps
this general acceptance of all their
traditions as realities tends to weld them
into the most stubborn of enemies that
the world has ever seen.
1t also is essential to consider that this
vast mass of humanity in their island
fortress is crowded into an area no
larger than our State of Montana and
that so much of it is not arabic that the
enormous population is trying to main
tain itself in culturable area no larger
than the State of West Virginia.
Naturally, this can be done only by
imports, both Of food supplies merely to
maintain life, and of raw material, both
agrarian and mineral, to supply the in
dustrial system. Materially, they have
to Tight. Unconditional surrender would
deprive them of any future they can
foresee.
From strategic point of view, they
must hold Korea as the most vital ele-
ment of their defense, for Fusan is but
30 miles from the Inland Sea, and Port
Arthur is vital naval base for any Far
Eastern power. That they would lose
both by unconditional surrender is OBJ
vious. Port Arthur has become an epic
to the Japanese. It cost the japanese
100000 casualties to take Port Arthur
and with 1t and the destruction of the
two Russian fleets they sealed the doom
of Russia in East Asia and Manchuria
for generation. So 1t seems clear that
while there is a soldier who still can
fight the japanese will not surrender
the fruit Of 40 years struggle. So we
can fairly conclude that the end will
come only when their whole army, their
navy, their air bases and, last but most
important, their very means of subsist-
ence are destroyed.
II Russia Fights.
When or if Russia enters the war,
what will the Japanese do?
The Japanese will find, as the obvious
course, that an attack is the surest
method of defense. If one studies the
mass of Japan, Korea and Manchuria,
with special reference to the railroads
constructed there since the Russo Jap
anese war, it will be seen that their
capacity to move troops and supplies
in campaign in any of these places
Is excellent. After 1908 the Japanese
built railroad from Seoul to little
fishing village on the Sea of Japan
now known as Gensan. Prom Gensan
north runs another line of railroad to
the frontier of Manchuria and barely
score Of miles from Vladivostok. The
Japanese can move at least 10000
troops day. with equipment, from
Gensan to the Manchurian border.
Just across the Sea of Japan is the
little visited port of Tsuruga, connected
with the main arteries of rail travel by
an excellent railroad. Thus Japan can
readily move troops, via this route, for
an attack on Vladivostok, without in
terrupting tFafhc from their other line
OF communication via Shimonoseki,
Fusan and Seoul, over an even better
line with almost no grades, which runs
through Ping Yang. Antung on the
Yalu, to Mukden and beyond. Thus, it
Is physically possible to support two
armies against Russian attack, one in
Korea and the other based on Mukden
and fighting in the north.
Half way between Fusan and the
mainland Of Japan lies a large island
which Is some 40 miles from Shimonoseki
on the east and Fusan in Korea on the
west. With Is or Is inch naval rifles
on both ends Of this island, and similar
guns on both mainlands, the Straits of
Tsushima would be as effectively DOM
mated as are the Straits of Gibraltar
by the fortress of that name. Obvious
ly, the Straits of Tsushima must be
held If the japanese hope to hold the
Sea of Japan, and without its control
their future is sealed. 1t is fair guess
that the japanese fleet now or soon will
be in the Sea of Japan, and that is,
in all probability, where the final naval
action will take place.
Fleet Guided by Necessity.
The view now so currently accepted
that the japanese Navy is hiding be-
cause 1t is afraid to fight seems q
rather tar-fetched conclusion. Nothing
could be more stupid than for the
grand fleet to come out in the Pacific,
or in the South Seas for that matter,
and engage a superior enemy with no
chance whatever of success. It Is OBJ
vious, then, that the Japanese will fight
for the strategic necessities, which are