Evening star., 1945-12-13


had received more specific informa
ton.
The former Chief of Staff pointee
out, however. that virtually tn,
same information and the sam,
warning messages had gone to th'
Philippines and Panama and the,
were fully alerted on December
Due to End Testimony Today.
At the outset of what is expected
to be his final day on the stand
Gen. Marshall testified that thu
order that the United States wantee
Japan to commit the first overt ac
in l94l would not have prevented
American planes from bombing the
Japanese task force if found in Ha
waiian waters on the morning o1
December 7.
The sudden and unannouncec
appearance of a carrier force il
those waters would have been ar
overt act" he said. American
planes would have been justified ir
bombing them, and would have beer
backed up by the country"
There isn't any question that
they would have been backed up by
the country" observed Representa-
tive Keefe, Republican, of Wiscon-
sin, who had been questioning Gen
Marshall about the effect of the
overt act restriction in the warning
sent to American outpostS on No.
vember 27.
No Restriction on Commanders.
Gen. Marshall pointed out that
the admonition to have Japan COM
nit the first overt act was followed
by statement that this was not
to be construed as restricting COM
manderS to course of action that
would jeopardize their defenses.
The general added that it certain
ly would have jeopardized Hawaiian
defenses to have Jap planes flying
over the island under the relations
that existed late in l94l.
Mr.. Keefe asked Gen Marshall
why he didn't use the same language
in the 1941 alert that was used on
June IT, 1910, when an earlier fear
of Jap raid had caused him to
alert the islands. The 1910 alert
no reference to Japan
committing the first overt act.
Gen. Marshall told Mr.. Keefe that
in l94l he Mad the instruction from
President Roosevelt about wanting
Japan to commit the first overt act.
Representative Keefe asked Gen.
Marshall late yesterday if it is fair
to conclude from his testimony that
he fixes the responsibility for what
happened at Pearl Harbor on Gen.
Short.
Il have never made that state
ment,' Gen. Marshall replied. Il
have felt that Gen. Short was given
a directive to put the command on
an alert against possible japanese
attack. The command was not so
alerted."
Admits Responsibility.
DO you accept any of the respon-
slbility?" Mr.. Keefe continued.
Gen. Marshall reminded Mr.. Keefe
that he had already stated that he,
as Chief of Staff, was responsible for
what the general staff did, in pass
ing on Gen. Shorts reply to the
warning.
The general was referring to the
brief message received from Gen.
Short on November % stating that
the Hawaiian command had been
alerted against sabotage.
Gen. Marshall recalled testimony
last week in which 1t. Gen. Leonard
T. Gerow, 194l chief of the war
plans division, accepted responsible
ity for not following up Gen. Shorts
reply. Gen. Marshall said that while
Gen. Gerow had a direct RESPONSE
bility to handle the details of the
he, as Chief of Staff, was
responsible for the action of the gen.
eral staff, of which Gen. Gerow was
a member.
Mr.. Keefe asked Gen. Marshall
it, when he appeared before the
Army Board of Inquiry last year,
and was questioned as to why he
did not telephone the final warn
ing to Hawaii on the morning of
December, he said "it would mean
getting these fellows out of bed"
Points to Time Needeq.
Il think you put too much en-
phasis on the word bed," Gen.
Marshall replied, explaining that
ne was telling the Army board about
The time it would take to get each
of the field commanders on the
phone and talk to them.
Mr.. Keefe asked the general if
ne did not get call from Hawaii