The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1945-01-10

AIthOuSh llle Z leS1oeHt spohe Va
" in the most cautious general
terms. he certainly indicated-and
in view of the coming meeting OF
the Allied leaders he probably
meant to announce-the beginning
of new phase in our diplomacy.
I've shall not hesitate, - he said,
''to use our influence-and to use
if now. We can not and Will
not shrink from the political re-
sponsibilities which follow in the
wake of battle Hitherto, the guild
ing rule of our diplomacy h S
been to use our influence to post
pone the exercise of political re-
sponsibility until after the war is
over.
A very large part of our present
difficulties may be traced to the
policy of reiterating high princi-
pies and of postponing the settle
ment of concrete issues. The Pres
ident admitted concern about the
Greek and Polish situations: the
one certain thing about both OF
them is that it was impossible to
postpone until after the war the
concrete issues which they pose.
Decisions had to be taken.
Greece had to have a provisional
government from the day of liber-
alton. Poland and the Soviet Union
had to be allies in order to con-
clude the war against Germany.
The Russians, who have military
responsibility in eastern Europe,
and the British, who have it in
the eastern Mediterranean, had to
decide, even if they decided wrong
ly. Our effort to postpone the de-
cisions which these necessities pre-
scented has inevitably meant that
we did not participate in the deci-
sions, and that, therefore, they be-
came ''unilateral." What is more
they became embittered. For the
effect of our urging postponement
in the name of high principles has
been to encourage the irreconcil-
able extremists and to nullify our
own influence in favor of modera-
ton and compromise. Thus the
more we preached high principles
and postponed settlements the
greater became the gap between
our principles and what was hap
pening.
If now it is to be our policy to
accept responsibility in settling
such concrete issues, we shall do
well to recognize that Greece and
Poland are exceptionally difficult
cases to deal with under the prin-
ciples of the Atlantic Charter.
They are just about the hardest
cases ginable by which to test
the meaning, the value, and the
sincerity of the Atlantic Charter.
In Greece. for example, the rele-
want principle of the Atlantic
Charter is that they respect the
right of all peoples to choose the
form of government under which
they will live" Now the fact OF
the matter is that for twenty-five
years the Greek nation has been
divided and has had no form OF
government which united the PEG.
pie.
Thus IN 1917. Constantine, a
brother-in-law of the Kaiser, was
King of Greece He was over
thrown and dethroned by Venize
los, and his son Alexander, became
King. Alexander died in 1919, Ven.
izelos was defeated in the cleo.
tons, and Constantine returned tc
the throne In 1922 Constantine was
again dethroned, and h S eldest
son, George II, succeeded him. In
1924 George II was driven into
exile, and Greece became repub-
lie. The republic was overthroWn
by General Pangalos. In 1927 Pan
ealos was overthrow and impris-
oned. Elections took place n d
showed that the Republicans and
Royalists were evenly balanced.
From about 1923 to 1885 there was
constitutional republic. After the
1885 elections there was mon.
archist revolt which led to pleb-
iscites recalling the exiled King
George II. Shortly thereafter, in
1886, General Metaxas set up a
Fascist dictatorship. The under