Evening star., 1945-10-06

I
radio address last night on the Hrst
session OF the Council OF Foreign
Ministers
The first session of the Council Of
Foreign Ministers closed in stalemate.
But that need not, and should not, de-
prive us Of a second and better chance
to get on with the peace
In the past I have been both criticized
and commended for being COM
promiser. I confess that do believe
that peace and political progress in in
ternational affairs as in domestic af-
fairs depend upon intelligent COM
promise. The United States delega-
ton acted in that spirit at Berlin We
acted in that spirit at London. And we
shall continue to act in that spirit at
future conferences
That spirit is essential in interna-
tional conferences where action can be
taken only by unanimous agreement.
When any one member can prevent
agreement, compromise is necessity.
Men and women, who have served on
jury, can appreciate that.
Compromise, however, does not mean
surrender and compromise, unlike sur
one party.
The difficulties encountered at the
London conference will, hope impress
upon the peoples of all countries, in
cludlng our own people, the hard reality
that none of lis can expect to write the
peace in our own way. If this hard
reality is accepted by statesmen and
peoples at an early stage of the peace
Ri - I-xA 3d.
save us and save the peace of the world
from the disastrous effects of disillu-
sionment and intransigences.
Foreign Policy Unity.
Regardless of how Americans may
differ as to domestic policies, they desire
unity in our foreign policies. This unity
will be essential in the days ahead of
us when we may expect differences in
views by various governments as to
peace settlements. However, the politi-
cal party In power cannot expect this
unity unless it freely consults repre-
sentatives OF the opposing political
party.
Believing this, I requested Mr. John
Foster Dulles, one of the best-informed
Americans in the field of foreign rela-
tions and loyal Republican, to ac-
company me to London in an advisory
capacity. He has been more than an
adviser; he has been partner. Be-
tween us there have been no secrets.
At the council table and in private con-
ference he has participated in the max
ing Of all decisions. Our accord serves
to show that in foreign affairs Repub-
licans and Democrats can work together
and that in vital matters of foreign
policy we Americans are united.
When 1t was agreed at Berlin to es-
tablish the Council of Foreign Ministers
I think we all had in mind the prece-
dent Of the Dumbarton Oaks Confer
ence. There, representatives of Great
Britain, the Soviet Union, China and
the United States worked together to
prepare draft proposals for the United
Nations Charter as basis for dis
cussion with other nations. France was
not present at Dumbarton Oaks only
because France had not yet been liber-
ated. Her right to permanent member
ship on the United Nations security
council was not questioned.
Experience reveals that a certain
degree Of understanding among the ma
jor powers is essential to secure general
agreement among many nations When
understanding among the great powers
is not achieved in advance of a con-
ference participated in by many ma
tions, it usually has to be secured in
formally during the conference.
At the Versailles Conference, for ex-
ample, it took the Big Three and the
Big Five so long to agree among them
selves that the complaint was made
that the smaller powers had little more
time to consider the treaty than was
given to the Germans.
The Berlin agreement envisaged the
naming OF high-ranking deputies who
could carry on the work of the council
in the absence of their chiefs, the for
eign secretaries. The council, as Presi-
dent Truman and I understood it, was
to be sort of combined staff to explore
the problems and prepare proposals for
the final peace settlements.
At Berlin it certainly was never in
tended that the three powers present
or the five powers constituting the
council should take unto themselves the
making of the final peace. The Berlin
declaration setting up the council be-
gins with the statement "the confer
ence reached the following agreement
for the establishment of a Council of
Foreign Ministers to do the necessary
preparatory work for the peace settle
ments"
Final Treaty Not Contemplated.
The council was not to make the peace
settlements, but to do the necessary pre-
paratory work for the peace settlements.
1t certainly was not my intention to
agree to any final treaty without first
getting the views of the Foreign Rela-
tionS Committee of the Senate which
must pass upon all treaties before rati-
fication
The first session of the council, so far
as the personal participation of the for
elgn ministers was concerned, was in
tended to provide directiyes for the dep
uties in the preparation of treaties for
Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and
Finland.
This work was exploratory-tof find out
on what points We were in agreement,
on what points we differed, and on what
points further study and data were re-
qulred. 1t is little naive to suppose
that when really vital differences
emerge, one nation or another is likely
to abandon its position on the first
interchange of views.
At this stage it is as important to
know and understand wherein we and
our Allies differ as wherein we agree.
We must understand our points of diff
ference before we can intelligently con-
slider means of reconciling them.
So far as the Italian treaty was con.
cerned think we made very good prog
ress toward agreement on directiyes to
govern the work of our deputies.
There was ready acceptance of our pro-