Evening star., 1945-07-23
Baldwin Article Cited
On Okinuwu Bottle
Lawrence Sees Press Obligated
To Reveal Facts Behind Losses
BY Dapid Laurence


BY Dapid Laurence
Back copies of New York newspapers.
previously not available because of the
deliverymens strike, reveal some items
that are still news.
One of these is the disclosure on July
13 by Hanson Baldwin, military expert
of the New York Times, that an entire
Marine division came all the way to
Okinawa in the first days of that
memorable struggle when American
troops were outnumbered and yet was
not disembarked but was sent back to
camps in islands 300 miles in the rear.
Mr.. Baldwin has excellent sources of
information in official quarters and is
we'll acquainted with conditions in the
Pacific. He declares that while the
Okinawa victory was decisive in that it
unlocked the door to Japan" his in
vestigation Of the campaign causes him
nevertheless to conclude that there were
four valid points of criticism"
These were faulty estimates on our
side as to the Japanese strength, the
sending back of the Second Marine Di-
vision fully equipped and with landing
craft when 1t might have been used for
landings behind the Japanese slines in
support of operations already begun,
the failure to use the Second Marine Di-
vision for relief" even if not landed
behind the enemy lines, and Shnally, the
use of type of tank not as suitable for
the situation as the type we had used
in Europe. Mr.. Baldwin writes:
"The original intelligence estimates Of
the strength of the enemy garrison on
Okinawa were wrong, as they have beer
in SO many of our past island cfnpaigns
in the Pacific. We anticipated $4,000 to
5000 Japs on the island; The most
incomplete estimate of enemy strength
now put the original garrison at more
than 10000 combat and land troops.
Because of the lack of opposition to
our landing and the easy successes of
our early days on Okinawa, the Second
Marine Division-one of the seven divi-
Sions, three Marine and four Army
allocated for the Okinawa- -Kerama
operations-was detached as not needed
and sent back to camps in rear areas
on islands 1900 miles away"
What Mr. Baldwin omitted to explain,
doubtless inadvertently, was that this
decision and the turn-around movement
were actually made within the first Is
days after the initial landings, which
occurred on April l. and it will be re-
called that the fighting lasted 80 days.
In the closing days of the campaign
continues Mr.. Baldwin, about one-third
of the division-the 9th Marine Regi-
mental Combat Team-was returned to
the Okinawa area and its fresh troops
'sparked' the final mop-up drive of the
campaign. But if the entire I'd Ma
rine Division had been available earlier
in the campaign when the heaviest
fighting of the Pacific war developed.
along the 'Shuri Line, it could have been
employed usefully, if only as a relief
for divisions drained by casualties and
tired by fighting"
AS to whether we should have made
landings behind the Japanese lines, as
intimated by Homer Bigart, war cor
respondent of the New York Herald
Tribune, who was at the Okinawa front,
Mr.. Baldwin says such landing would
have been costly and success not certain
but he adds significantly: Nevertheless.
it is possible that such landing might
have been accomplished had the ID
Marine Division been available together
with more landing craft"
Some day the official report on
Okinawa will disclose faults and mis-
takes other than those emphasized by
Mr.. Baldwin. For 1t was a campaign
which. strangely enough, cost the Navy
personnel aboard ships almost as many
casualties from suicide planes as eithe5
the Army or the Marine Corps separately
lost in ground operations. The un-
precedented loss to the Navy in personnel
and ships, sunk and damaged, in single
campaign was because of the length of
time the ships were kept off shore watt
ing for ground operations to be con-
cluded and because of somebody's failure
to neutralize suicide bases in Formosa
and Kyushu.
Failure to define clearly the respon-
sibility as between the Army and Navy
has plagued us ever since Pearl Harbor
though Okinawa cost us far more than
Pearl Harbor. That's the real point in
comparing these two painful episodes
and the problem has by no means been
solved, as recent dispatches from the
Pacific area indicate.
The full details of what happened at
Okinawa and who was responsible from
the lower levels to the commands here
in Washington are yet to be disclosed.
Official studies are still in progress.
Their Importance lies not in raking up
the past but in determining whether
the lessons have been learned and taken
to heart so that mistakes will not be
repeated when the all-important land
ing operations occur on the coast of
Japan.
The press in this respect has an
obligation to represent the public in
terest by insisting that no considerations
of past prestige or fellowship among
military men or rivalries between
services should be permitted to stand in
the way of constructive efforts to prevent
unnecessary loss Of life in all branches
of our armed services in the future when
they are again engaged in a joint cam
paign.
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