The midland journal., 1945-02-02
WNU Service, Union Trust Building
Washing ngfOn. ID. G..

| WdSHDS tUH, Ds W
What is wrong with the American
war effort on the home front?
Why all this excitement over a
new draft of manpower?
Didn't War Mobilizer Byrnes say
that our war production almost
equalled the production Of the entire
world?
These questions are being asked
in many minds. I have asked them
Of the men whose job it Is to get
things done in Washington, and I
want to try to put their answers
before you.
Let me quote one sentence spoken
by War Mobilizer Byrnes himself:
"Critical production no longer
feeds pipelines or goes into strate-
gic reserves-it is going right into
battle"
If we compare "critical produc-
ton" with fighting units, perhaps the
recent German counter-offensive
will help us see the picture.
When Won Rundstedt's drive
started, men and tanks and guns
and trucks, "critical production" in
other words, all had to be poured
into actual battle. The result was
that there were just not enough Of
them in the right place at the right
time and our line crumbled. There
were no immediate reserves to
throw in and bolster the defense.
Later on, when the veterans from
the Third army and the First army
and the British troops arrived, the
tide was turned. They represented
the reserves of "critical produc-
ton" which should have been there
all the time.
For many months on that particu-
lar front only the men In the front
lines were needed. There were
enough men there to take care Of
the normal enemy opposing them. It
was minimum force without
enough reserve to take care Of
maximum need and they were
thrown back.
That is the situation in war pro-
duction today. Certain critical sup
plies (airplanes, tanks, other vehi-
cles and their accessories, certain
types of ordnance, certain types Of
ammunition) are being used so
fast in battle that if an extra strain
developed at a certain point there
would not be any reserve to call
upon.
Changing Conditions
Alter Planning
Why are these things lacking?
Why didn't we pile them up, as we
do other things, until we had enough
to take care Of an emergency?
Chiefly, because their greatest need
developed after we started our war
programs. Reserves for the future
can only be based on present infor-
nation or estimates based on previ-
Gus knowledge, or lucky guessing.
When the war began nobody, not
even the Japs who used amphibious
warfare in the early stages to the
best advantage, had any idea Of
the type and number Of landing
craft, to say nothing Of the tech
nique of operating them, which are
used in the latest Allied operations.
The contrast between the Japanese
landing in Lingayen bay and the
American landing three years later
in the same place is astounding.
Byrnes used as examples of other
"unpredictables," inventions and
improvements over old models, jet
planes, new types Of radar and the
like.
Today, IS per cent Of our war
production does not need to rise.
Some Of it is properly declining.
But there are other parts Of the
program which are tagging that
should mount, because they are
"critical production" OF course,
some plants making such goods are
temporarily closed while re-tooling
for new models. Others are under
construction. But many plants lack
nothing except manpower, those, for
example, making certain types Of
planes and tanks and ships. Tires
are being ground to pieces by shell
splinters in the mud Of Luxem-
bourg and Belgium. Tanks are roll
ing from New Guinea to the Philip
pines to the Rhine, and bigger and
better ones are demanded. There Is
a constant need for all kinds Of am
munition, but there is critical need
for certain types Of ammunition,
both heavy and light.
And so we come to the main prob
lem which is really the only prob
lem today-manpower. We have the