Detroit evening times., 1945-03-05
THE w WORLD
IN REVIEW
By Maj. Gen.
D. P. Barrows
TIIERE seems to be a great


that Soviet Russia will soon de-
clare war upon Japan and join
with us in the defeat Of that
aggressive and barbarous en-
pire.
Some believe this matter vas
arranged with Stain at the re-
cent Crimean conference.
Others point to the opening
on April 25, of the interna-
tional conference at San Fran
cisco. as the date of Russian
belligerency.
We are led to hope for this
by the advantage to American
air power of having access 10
Russian air fields on Avacha
Bay, or at Nikolaievsk, near
the mouth of the Amur River.
or particularly at fields north
of Vladivostok, of which Russia
might give us .uSe-in bringing
down her old enemy, Japan.
While nothing is publicly
known of Stains purposes. I
do not think that under present
conditions he will initiate war
with Japan.
My reasons Tor this disbelief
in early Russian belligerency
arc several. I will mention two
that are military.
THE first is that Russia is
L physically unable TO wage
war on two fronts at once.
This is A situation that al
ways battles a great continental
power.
The threat of war on both
Western and Eastern fronts si-
multaneouSly was the tradi-
tlonal dread of the German
military mind.
Through Hitler's folly this
impossible military situation
has now befallen Germany and
promises her early defeat
Russia is country with a
great population and with
enormous economic possibilities.
But it will tax her full
strength to crush Germany on
the Eastern Front while our own
armies simultaneously drive on
into Germany from the Rhine.
Until Germany collapses, Rus
sian armies can not be spared
for war In the Far East.
TitE second reason is What is
L called "logistical" 1t is the
enormous distance OF eastern
Siberia from European Russia
and the paucity OF the military
communications. The distance
from the Ural Mountains 10
VladivoStok is $500 miles-50
per cent greater than the dis
tance from San Francisco to
New York. There is only one
railroad connecting these dis
tant positions the Great
Siberian.
This single line of commune
cation may be contrasted with
the seven or eight great con-
tinental railroads that unite the
eastern and western coasts of
North America.
These have proved their
adequacy for great shiftings of
troops and supplies in this war.
But no one could conceive OF
anything OF this kind being
done If there was only one rail-
road connecting Pacific ports
with those of the Atlantic.
Furthermore. for the past %
years the railway service of the
Siberian road has been de-
plorable.
It's rolling stock. and particu-
larly its locomotive power, are
not only equate but
greatly deteriorated.
IF WAR suddenly breaks out
Il between Russia and japan
we may expect the Japanese 10
attack.
This IS the role long as
signed TO their large force in
Manchuria, the Kwang Tung
army, the best and most power
ful army Japan has.
1t is in close COMMUNICATIONS
with Japan by railroad lines,
through Korea.
It holds a central position
with respect TO Russian resist
ance which follows the long arc
of the Amur River from Trans
Baikalia 10 Habarovsk and then
goes south to the famous city
and harbor of Vladivostok.
From its central position in
northern Manchuria. the Japa-
neSe army can strike any point
in this long, enveloping, Russian
line and probably cut II before
effective resistance could con-
centrate.
In the event Of war the Japa-
ncse would certainly strike at
VladivoStok and / think would
capture this port and city.
Nt1dlvoStok has only one line
of access, the Ussuri River rail-
road everywhere close 10 the
Manchurian frontier held by
the japanese army.
ON It's maritime side Vladi-
voStok may be too strong to be
taken from the sea. but by
superior forces il can certainly
be taken from the land.
This is due 10 its remoteness
from any Russian support, and
its closeness 10 both Korea and
Manchuria.
Its fall would not only be a
disaster 10 Russia and 10 Rus