Evening star., 1945-08-29

and Navy intelligence agencies there
was no organized system to ensure
such exchange.
The evidence obtained by Admiral
Hewitt indicates that there were
informal arrangements for the ex-
change of intelligence by the Army
and Navy at Hawaii, which included
the transmission to the Army OF
some information concerning jap
anese ship movements. The evil
dence obtained both by Admiral
Hewitt and by the Naval Court OF
Inquiry indicates, however, that
neither Admiral Kimmel nor Gen
Short was sufficiently informed OF
the degree of readiness put into ef-
feet by the other. 1t appears that
after receipt of the war warning
and prior to December 194l, Ad-
miral Kimmel and Gen. Short con-
ferred on several occasions. They
discussed the reinforcement of Mid
way and Wake. 1t does not appear
that they discussed the conditions
of readiness placed in. effect or to
be placed in effect, or the question
or advisability of placing in effect
air reconnaissance.
That there was not full mutual
exchange of intelligence also appears
from the evidence. Admiral Kim
mel received dispatches after q
November 1941 relating to Japanese
destruction of codes and instruc-
tions to United States outlying
islands to destroy classified mate-
rial. He testified before the Naval
Court that he did not direct that
these be furnished to Gen. Short,
and he did not know whether or
not they were furnished to him.
Gen. Short testified that he had not
seen these dispatches.
In view of these facts, I cannot
agree with the above finding by the
Naval Court of Inquiry. The sys-
tenn of mutual cooperation, of joint
command, was not working effec-
tively-it failed.
(e) Court of Inquiry Finding vi.
This states in substance that un-
avoidable deficiencies in personnel
and material had a bearing on the
effectiveness of the local defense of
Pearl Harbor.
The Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet, points out however,
that the pertinent question is
whether Admiral Kimmel used the
means available to the best advan-
tage. 1 concur in. this comment of
the Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet.
Japs Had Advantage.
(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII.
The Court finds that Japan had an
initial advantage because of the
japanese Fleets numerical superior
ity, and the superiority of japanese
espionage.
This finding, of course, in general
was correct. Nevertheless, as ap-
piled to the specific issues here pre-
sented, 1t overlooks the fact that:
The numerical superiority of the
Japanese fleet was well known to
Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kim
mel, and this fact was taken into
account in the war plans;
Although unquestionably the
United States was placed at a dis
advantage in restraining japanese
espionage activities, the Navy and
War Departments were nevertheless
not without important intelligence
advantages of their own which were
not availed of to the fullest extent.
(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII
This states that it was the direct re-
sponsibility of the Army to defend
Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that
the Navy was to assist only with the
means provided the Naval District
The Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet points out that Admira
Kimmel was fully aware that In
view Of the weakness of local de.
lenses, the ships of the feet in port
had to be employed to protect Pear
Harbor. With this I concur. It is tc
be noted, moreover, that under the
defense plan the Navy was respon.
sible for the maintenance of dis.
tant reconnaissance.
(h) Court of Inquiry Finding TX
The court finds that the air defense
plans were defective because of the
necessity for reliance upon feet
aircraft which could not be made
permanently available for local de-
fense.
I concur in the comments of the
Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet, with respect to this finding.
Bloch Cleared.
ID Court of Inquiry Findings ~
VIII, TX. Based on these findings
the conclusion of the Court is that
Admiral Bloch satisfactorily per-
formed his duties.
The Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet, concurs. This conclu.
sion is approved.
Cd Court of Inquiry Finding X
This holds adequate and effective
Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the
security of the fleet at sea.
The Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet, concurs. This findine
is approved.
(D Court of Inquiry Finding XI
The substance of this finding is thai
Admiral Kimmel was maintaining
the highest condition of READINGS.
called for by the information avail.
able 10 him, and that higher con.
dition of readiness would have add.
ed little to the defense.
1t is pointed out that in fact thu
condition Of readiness being main.
tained at the time of the attack
was only that condition which is
normally maintained when in port
This is maintained on the assump.
ton that the shore defenses are
adequate to protect the Fleet. Such
was not the case at Pearl Harbor
as Admiral Kimmel knew.
The Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet, further states that he
does not agree with the conclusion
of the Court that higher condi-
tion of readiness would have added
little to the defense, and is of the
view that the information available
to Admiral Kimmel called for a
Tightening up of the defense pre-
po11fipnc oc Y noooy,obar a r>oroo al, al