Evening star., 1945-09-06
No Defense Called For

Lie FItSlQeuC EXPLAINED 10 IllS
press conference the other day that
his failure to defend Mr.. Hull while
defending General Marshall in con-
nection with the Army Pearl Harbor
report was because he had not read
the report carefully enough to note
its criticism of Mr.. Hull. Later on,
when the President was asked for
comment on Representative Mays
statement that the report was a
"whitewash," the President said he
did not think Mr.. May had read the
report.
Secretary of State Byrnes' criti-
ciSm of the Army board for its
criticism of Mr.. Hull likewise raises,
in some minds at least, the question
whether Secretary Byrnes has read
the report. For it is difficult to dis
cover, from a careful reading OF the
report, where the Army board went
beyond It's Jurisdiction" as Mr..
Byrnes put it, land criticized the
Secretary of State for his policy
making and policy execution"
In the first place, the congress
sional joint resolution directing the
Army and Navy inquiries prescribed
IAN investigation into the facts sur
rounding the catastrophe" and in
this connection makes specific ref
erence to civil as we'll as military
persons involved.
In the second place, and most i'm
portant, the Army boards state
ments in reference to Mr.. Hull, like
those concerning General Marshall,
are not, strictly speaking, criticism.
They are more in the nature of a
narration of facts, or what the
board believed at the time of its
inquiry to be facts, in connection
with events leading to Pearl Harbor.
While it is easy to infer criticism
from some of the facts, such an
inference results more from the
boards studied failure to enter
defensive explanation of what oc-
CURED (which would have been in
appropriate in such an investiga-
tom, than from any positive fault
finding or criticism, in respect to
Mr.. Hull and General Marshall.
In reference to the much-dis-
cussed "ultimatum" from Mr.. Hull
to the Japanese, the board does not
call Mr.. Hull's counterproposals an
ultimatum, nor suggest that the
counterproposals were improper.
The board very correctly calls at
tention to Mr.. Crews belief that the
contemporaries touched the but
ton" which sent Japan to war, while
stating its own opinion that Japan
already had decided on war. It also
points out that the counterproposals
were delivered at the very time when
General Marshall and Admiral
Stark were at work on a joint warn
ing to the President of our military
unreadiness to support an ulti-
matum. It also brings out that
it was telephone call, on his own
Initiative, from Secretary Slim
son to Secretary Hull that ac-
quainted the War and Navy De-
partments with the fact, as stated
by Mr.. Hull, that II have washed nv
hands of it, and it now is in the
hands of you and Knox, the Army
and Navy"
There are explanations of Secre-
tary Hull's actions which call for
no defense of what he did. There
are, likewise, explanations of GER
tain failures attributed to the Chief
OF Staff which minimize the implied
criticism OF the Army board. In
view of the whole tenor of the re-
port, 1t Is unnecessary to rush to the
defense Of Secretary Hull and Cen
eral Marshall. The place in history
OF both these men is secure, unaf-
fected by the findings OF the Army
board. Defense Of either assumes
the nature OF embarrassing su-
pererogation. There are certain
weaknesses in the boards report, but
they do not lie in the boards at
tempt to tell the facts as they found
them.