Evening star., 1945-11-26
Letters to The Star
Cites History Against Proposed
Army and Navy Mercer

The proposed unifcation of the armed
forces, under single department with
single head, is represented as a for
ward step, shaking off Of the dead past
in the interests of a progressive future.
Even Maj. Eliot, who does not favor the
scheme, speaks of it as something new
and untried." Actually, this is not so;
it was tried once and proved a dismal
failure. The very name War Depart
ment" is relic of an experiment which
after nine years trial was discarded as
unavoidable.
Although there was continental Navy
which, functioning as separate service
under separate department. played a
highly important and successful part in
the American Revolution, it was dis
banded at the close of the struggle and
completely disappeared. The Articles
of Confederation authorized the build
ing and equipping of navy, but moth
ing transpired beyond the authorization.
Under the new Constitution single
Department of War" was set up,
charged equally with the conduct of
military and naval affairs, and from
1889 to 1893 was solely responsible for
all matters pertaining to national de-
fense and security.
During this period, various problems
developed which were settled in ways
not specially creditable even to very
young and impoverished nation, includ-
ing bribery, ransom and tribute, leading
President Washington to express the
heartfelt: would to God we had
Navy" When finally trouble with
France became so acute as to make
navy imperative, some means had to be
found to go about getting one.
1t was first proposed to establish a
commissioner of Marine" within the
Department of War and create two SUBJ
divisions under one superexecutive de-
partment. Congress rejected the plan
after mature deliberation, and instead
created the present Navy Department
on April 80, 1798. In separating the
Army and the Navy Congress neglected
to change the name of the original de-
partment, which thus stands as mute
and unfortunately disregarded evidence
of failure which we are now proposing
to repeat.
Coordination Failed in Past.
This of course, was a century and a
half ago; perhaps it could be made to
work better now, though only time
could prove whether this generation is
more astute and far-seeing than that
which founded our country and gave
us our Constitution or that it is easier
to solve the multiplicity of intricate and
complex problems of today thansthe two
relatively simple ones which confronted
them then. In any case, the record
stands: In nine years of a single de-
partment, specifically charged with con-
Quoting naval affairs, including naval
forces and ships" and in spite of ex-
panding foreign trade, interests and diff
f1culties, the Department of War never
produced navy but brought us to the
brink of war without ship in commits
sion, without trained officers or per-
sonnel.
Today we do have a Navy 1t is not
what it was three months ago but it is
u
body of men trained to perfection and
some of the ablest, indeed most brilliant
officers ever known: 1t Is still made up
of ships and establishments completely
modern as of today. The new depart
ment would not have the problem Of
creating naval force, simply of taking
over and running one already in ex-
istence.
But armed forces, like time and his
tory, do not stand still. If they do not
progress they retrogress. The problems
peculiar to any one of them and to the
special element in which it operates are
best dealt with by those who best un-
derstand them. Gen. Eisenhower dis
counts the idea that no man is qualified
to administer all the armed forces, on
the grounds that no one man would
then be qualified to be President The
fact Is that under some of our~Presi-
dents the Navy, for that matter the
Army, too, have deteriorated almost to
the point of impotence, from disinterest
if not from incompetence. Fortunately.
in such periods, under separate depart
ments devoted to their interests, they
were able to preserve at least a certain
continuity, so that there remained a
framework on which to rebuild.
Qualified Commanders Rare.
Gen. Eisenhower himself is perhaps
as well qualified as q man could be to
administer all the armed forces; but we
cannot count on an Eisenhower in each
succeeding period; furthermore, some-
thing considerably more than admin
istration is required to produce main
tain and develop each of the services
perfect in its own sphere.
There is a fundamental difference be-
tween joint operations under a single
command in the field and unification
under single department charged with
development and maintenance. The
field commander for given operation
| is chosen from the service which, by
the nature of the objective, must play
the leading role; he employs the other
elements appropriately in supporting
roles. But each unit is letter-perfect
| in its own part when it comes to his
L AioA1N' AAAC AldFo@ SoLlAiloAlSACA OCo16AdG-
ing ground objectives to be taken by
army units is not responsible for their
being good soldiers or performing as
such. Likewise the military commander
calling for naval gunfire in support of
landings is not responsible for the ships
or the handling of them. Maneuvering,
gunners, how close inshore they may go,
| s1I> I,
not have to concern himself.