Detroit evening times., 1945-03-09

association which Is not
feactte.
Mr. Roosevelt in his speech
on LiVadia. acutely described
the deal there as proposing to
bring as much democracy as
possible TO Europe with cleo
tionS as soon "as possible. "
Practically everything was as
good "as possible. .
THE diScernlble danger of the
l. plan is that its limitations
may not be understood. guarded
against, prepared for. Confusing
interpretations are already be-
ing made. The official explana-
tions are worded so that few
people generally will understand
the proposition.
The text inter-relateS proVi-
sionS between paragraphs and
SubSectlonS so only lawyer
who studies it. can form his
own conclusions and the an
nouncementS contain such
phrase AS quasi juridical,' y etc.
Simplicity in full explanation
seems nowhere available yet.
This plan is more on the
Borah, if not the original Lodge
line and definitely Swprves away
from the administration line
fixed by Ball, Burton. Hatch.
-Weiies- and -Waiface-trc- one
worlders.
Now this has come about, not
because M. Roosevelt became
an isoiatronist, but because
Stain and Russia have taken
what we in this country have
enormously called an isolation
ist position and insisted upon it.
IT SEEMS clear Mr.. Roose-
l. welt has been required TO
accept the Russian position now
in order TO get any basic work.
ing arrangement at all. He
could have gotten this same
deal at Dumbarton Oaks.
The Russians withdrew there
because both Britain and the
United States stood for united
action even against themselves.
Stain bided his time thereafter
until a popular demand for set
tlement arose in this country.
While Mr.. Roosevelt wrote
this compromise it is what
the Russians demanded at Dunn
barton without success.
Indeed, the whole Livadia ar
rangement POLAND, reparationS,
ETC. is baSically the announced,
known Russian position, with
noncritical moderationS (Such
as electionS). This then repre-
sents a strong departure in
Roosevelt policy. forced by Rus
Sia, but the changes have made
it more popular in the Senate.
OffiCialdom itself is now
proudly proclaiming that it will
enable us to veto any Russian
or European military action
against South America, and pro-
tect the Monroe Doctrine-and
il will. Yet il will still allow
an American representative 10
declare war without consent Of
Congress. in cases in which the
eleven council members are
unanimous, disputes involving
small nations.
THUS Russia and Britain could
Il 60 into South America ag-
greSSively. unless he vetoed IT.
His powers in this and other re-
spects will surely be hedged by
Congress.
This settles no existing inter
national political troubles but
throws all into the field for fu-
ture controversy in the council.
To take up any of these ques-
tlonS, a majority Of seven Of the
II council members is required,
nearly two-thIrdS
As six representatives will ro-
tatingly represent small nations,
any ono Of the big five. Joining
with the smaller nations can
force consideration of a contro-
vcrSy, hut cannot do more be-
cause any other one Of the big
five can prevent a decision.
In the normal course of such
provisions, tho constant reap
pearance Of opposing interests
Of the United States and Russia
(already 50 wildly apparent in
the negotiations can hardly fail
10 become the primary world
controversy.
Pressure politics can hardly
he abandoned, although il may
become more subtle with little
nations all tying in secretly
with each Of the big five. There
IS not the slightest reason vet
10 expect Russia will open up
her country from nor isolation
ISt position on armamcnts or TO
alrplancS
She duCkCd out on the Chi
caCo alrplanc Agreement I and
has reserved veto rights on
armamcntS Apparently We. and
the British will live openly, with
free air transport and public
armament appropriations.
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