Evening star., 1945-03-25
After We Day

AT(eT We 10y
Unless all hopes and plans are to
meet with cruelest disappointment,
the last great offensive of the Euro
pean war is under way. In the not
too distant future-one guess is as
good as another as to precisely when
organized resistance in Germany
will collapse under the enormous
weight of Allied power, and, in some
form, the long awaited We day will
be at hand. This much is as certain
as anything can be in war. But
there is less certainty as to what
will follow.
After We day the dominant, over
riding consideration of our top mill
itary commanders will be the war
with Japan. If that wal is to be won
as quickly as possible, with the
smallest loss of life, there can be no
letup in our military effort. The
pressure is on Japan, and 1t must
not only be kept on, but it must be
increased by every means at our
disposal. To do this the necessities
of war must prevail over all other
considerations.
Those Americans who have come
to the belief that We day will be
followed by a substantial measure
of rehabilitation are going to be
disappointed. Many of the boys
who have been fighting the Ger
mans are going to be sent directly
to the Pacific. Others will be
brought back to this country for
retraining, and probably furlough,
but they, too, will be sent on to the
Far East with all possible speed. A
number, unknown but probably not
large, will be honorably discharged.
But their homecoming will be
delayed by demands for shipping,
which will have to take precedence
over the return of veterans who
have done their share of the fight
ing. There are vast quantities Of
equipment in Europe which will
have to be transshipped, some COM
ing to this country and some going
to the Pacific. Europe, when victory
comes, will be close to starvation
and more ships will be needed to
take food to the hungry. Another
side of the problem has to do with
war production in this country.
We day will not bring any extern
sive reconversion. In fact, there
may not be any substantial over all
cutback in production for war until
some time after the necessarily slow
job of redeployment has been COM
pleted. This may prove disappoint-
ing, but it cannot be helped.
1t is along these general lines that
the top men in the Army are think
ing. They know what has to be
done and, broadly speaking, they
know how it will be done. But con-
siderations of military security and
the unknown quantities of the
fighting which remains to be done
in Europe preclude any statement
on such things as what men, and
how many, will come home, or when
they may be expected to arrive.
These officials, because of their diff
ferent problems, cannot speak out
definitely and specifically, as Ad-
miral King has done. The most
that the Army people can do is to
caution against unwarranted hopes;
to stress the point that, after Ger
many falls, we will still have to deal
with a Japanese army of 100000
men.
This is a matter which has to be
left to the good sense of the Amer
lean people. The detailed story will
be made available to them as quick
ly as possible. But that will take
time and must await developments.
Meanwhile, sound Judgment must
operate as a curb on undue opti-
mism. AS long as Japan remains un-
beaten, this will continue to be a
tough, total war.