Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1945-12-22
Pearl Hurbor
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Pearl Hurbor
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reconnaissance in the South China
Sea.
When Senator Ferguson said this
suggested an agreement with the
British before the war started on
December 7, Admiral Turner
pointed out that such reconnais-
sance as that message contemplated
was not an act of war.
Admiral Turner related to the
committee the story of how a Jap
anese naval attache at the embassy
here, whom the Admiral had met
in the Orient in 1889, made efforts
to contact him early in 1941, pre-
sumably for the purpose of pump
ing" him, the admiral later told a
reporter.
Reported to Navy
He said he reported the matter
to the chief of naval operations
and the Office of naval intelligence,
and in March, 1941, was asked to
call on Ambassador Nomura. He
made the call and reported the
results to his superiors. His memo
randum also was sent to the White
House.
ut put me in an embarrassing
position" Admiral Turner told the
committee, but I felt I should
continue the contact for what it
was worth"
In response to further questions
by Senator Ferguson, Admiral
Turner said he told the Ambassador
in July he believed Congress would
declare war if the japanese at
tackled the British or Dutch.
Personal Opinion.
When Senator Ferguson noted
some similarity between this state
ment and the warning the late
President Roosevelt gave the JAP
anese Ambassador against further
aggression in the Pacific, following
the Presidents Atlantic conference
with Winston Churchill in August
Admiral Turner pointed, ont that
the difference was that his was
sonal opinion.
Senator Ferguson recalled that
at the direction Of the President
Admiral Hart had been ordered ir
the fall of 1941, to send three small
vessels out into Asiatic waters te
see if the japanese were moving
toward the Kra Peninsula. The
Senator wanted to know why a sim
liar order had not been sent tx
Admiral Kimmel to send observa'
ton craft out from Hawaii.
Admiral Turner replied that al
least three times during 194l the
Pacific Fleet was informed 1t woule
be advisable to send out small Graf
to be on the lookout for raiders.
Would Not Have Sent Order.
Admiral Turner explained that
If it had been up to him, he would
not have sent the order to Admira
Hart. He argued that when fee
commanders have been given gen
eral orders, it is better to leave
them the greatest possible leeway
rather than give them detailed in
structions.
He made this answer when asked
if he had ever communicated tt
Admiral Kimmel his belief that tn,
approach of a japanese task fore
within 500 miles of Hawaii woult
be an overt act.
Senator Ferguson pointed ou
that after Admiral Kimmel got thu
war warning message of Novembe
81, he was directed to send two car
riers with planes to Wake and Mid
way, and asked what effect tina
might have had on his interpreta
ton of the war warning.
IT think it would have no effect
because we would have to defent
those places wake and Midway.
Also" Admiral Turner replied.
Left without Carriers.
"Is it true that left Kimmel with
out carriers, so that if he took hi
battleships out of the harbor he hat
no carrier air protection?" tn
Michigan Senator inquired.
Admiral Turner agreed tina
meant that if Admiral Kimmel hac
taken the battleships out he woult
have had to stay close to shore II
get fighter plane protection. HI
suggested that Admiral Kimme
might have moved the fleet unit
to point southeast of Pearl Harbor
since the greatest danger of a Jap
anese raid was from the north.
Earlier, Representative Murph.
questioned Admiral Turner as t.
why a proposed joint Army-Nav.
intelligence committee, organiza
ton of which was begun in the fal
of 1941, did not start to function
until after the Pearl Harbor attack
4 Study Made in 1941.
/ Admiral Turner said a planning
committee began studying the pro
posal for joint intelligence groul
early in 1941 and made a report tt
the Joint Arrny-Navy Board II
4 September. He explained that Their
was unanimous opposition to en-
Ilarging the membership of the join
board.
| Later, plan was worked out TO
a joint intelligence committee con
sisting of four representatives from
the Army and three from the Navy
j but he explained that there wa
some further delay over haw tn
problem Of estimating the enem,
situation should be handled. be
cause Army and Navy practices OF
this subject differed.
i Senator Brewster, Republican, Q
Maine, quoted from the report Q
the Navy Court Of Inquiry a state
ment that Admiral Kimmel ha
I taken the responsibility Of orderin