Evening star., 1945-10-10

Dear Mr.. Secretary:
For the first time since assuming
this Office six years ago, it is possible
for me to report that the security OF
the United States of America is
entirely in our own hands. Since
my last formal report to you on the
state of = the Army, our forces in
Europe, cir and ground, have con-
tributed nightly to the complete
destruction of the Axis enemy. In
the Pacific, Japan has been COM
PEELED to sue for an end to the war
which she treacherously started. For
tVo years the victorious advance OF
the United States sea, air and land
forces, together with those of our
Allies, wfs virtually unchecked
They controlled the skies and the
seas and no army could successfully
oppose them. Behind these forces
was the. output of American farms
and facseries. exceeding any similar
effort of man, so that the peoples
everywhere with whom we were
joined in She fight for decency and
justice were able to reinforce their
efforts through the aid of American
ships, munitions and supplies.
Never was the strength of the
American democracy so evident nor
has it ever been so clearly within
our power to give definite guidance
for our course into the future of the
human race And never, it seems to
me, has it been so imperative that
we give thorough and practical con-
sideration to the development of a
means to provide reasonable guar
antee for future generations against
the horrors and colossal waste of
war as well as security for that free
dom we recently left to the hazard
of mere hope or chance.
The Nation is just emerging from
one of its gravest crises. This
generation of Americans can still
remember the black days of 1912
when the japanese conquered all of
Malaysia, occupied Burma and
threatened India while the German
armies approached the Volga and
the Suez. In those hours Germany
and Japan came so close to COM
plete domination of the world that
we do not yet realize how thin the
thread of Allied survival had been
stretched.
Recognizes British, Soviet Aid.
In good conscience this Nation can
take little credit for its part in
staving off disaster in those critical
days. 1t is certain that the refusal
of the British and Russian peoples
to accept what appeared to be in
evitable defeat was the great factor
in the salvage of our civilization
Of almost equal Importance was
the failure of the enemy to make
the most of the situation.
In order to establish for the his
torical record where and how Ger
many and Japan failed I asked Gen.
Eisenhower to have his intelligence
officers promptly interrogate the
ranking members of the German
high command who are now our
prisoners of war. The results of
these interviews are of remarkable
interest. They give picture Of
dissension among the enemy nations
and lack of long-range planning that
may well have been decisive factors
of this werld struggle at its most
critical moments.
AS evaluated by the War Depart
ment general staff, the interroga-
tions of the captured German COM
manders disclose the following:
The available evidence shows that
Hitler's original intent was to create,
by absorption of Germanic peoples
in the areas contiguous to Germany
and by the strengthening of her new
frontiers, a greater Reich which
would dominate Europe. To this
end Hitler pursued a policy of op-
portuniSm which achieved the occu-
patton of the Rhineland, Austria
and Czechoslovakia without mill
tary opposition.
No evidence has yet been found
that the German high command
had any overall strategic plan.
Although the high command ap-
proved Hitler's policies in principle,
his impetuous strategy outran Ger
man military capabilities and ulti-
mately led to Germany's defeat.
The history of the German high
command from 1888 on is one of
constant conflict of personalities in
which military judgment was in
creasingly subordinated to Hitler's
personal dictates. The first clash
occurred in 1888 and resulted in the
removal of Won Blomberg, Won
Fritsch and Beck and of the last
effective conservative influence on
German foreign policy.
Hitler Views Prevail.
The campaigns in Poland, Nor
way, France and the Low Countries
developed serious diversions between
Hitler and the general staff as to the
details of execution of strategic
plans. In each case the general
staff favored the orthodox offensive,
Hitler an unorthodoX attack with
objectives deep in enemy territory.
In each case Hitler's views prevailed
and the astounding success of each
succeeding campaign raised Hitler'S
military prestige to the point where
his opinions were no longer chal-
lenged. His military self confidence
became unassailable after the victory
in France, and he began to dis
parage substantially the ideas of his
generals even in the presence of
junior officers. Thus no general
staff objection was expressed when
Hitler made the fatal decision to
invade Soviet Russia.
When Italy entered the war Mus
solinis strategic aims contemplated
the expansion of his empire under
the cloak of German military sue
cess. Field Marshal Keitel reveals
that Italy's declaration of war was
contrary to her agreement with
Germany. Both Keitel and Jodl agree
that it was undesired. From the
very beginning Italy was a burden
on the German war potential. De-
pendent upon Germany and Ger
man-OcclIpied territories for oil and