Evening star., 1945-12-01
Lag in DECIDING
Jap |ntercepts
To BeProbed
GeseII Asked to Get
Explonotion; Hearing
In Recess Today
BY J. A. O'LEARY and
CARTER BROOKE JONES,

OASAGAs OAeOOAE JONES.
More light was sought today
by counsel for the Pearl Harbor
Investigating Committee on the
time required in DECIDING and
translating secret japanese mes
sages intercepted just before the
attack on Pearl Harbor Decem-
ber Z, 1941.
AS the committee was recesSing
late yesterday until Monday, Sena-
tor Ferguson, Republican, of Michi-
gan asked Gerhard Gesell, associate
counsel, to obtain more information
about the lapse of time between in
Perception and DECIDING irf the criti-
cal last days before the war. 1t was
made clear that committee men,
bers have no desire to inquire into
or reveal methods of DECIDING, but
merely want an explanation Of the
long delay in many instances.
Representative Cooper, Democrat,
OF Tennessee began questioning Maj.
Gen. Sherman Miles, former head of
Army intelligence. on this point late
in the day. Mr.. Cooper pointed out
that there was lapse of between
two and %, days in the DECIDING
and translation of some of the Japa-
nese messages intercepted in the
week preceding the Pearl Harbor
attack. The Tennesseean said he
naturally felt disturbed" when he
noted this, and added: II was Won
dering how Gen. Marshall could act
with a full understanding if % days
elapsed in some cases."
Under Signal Corps Branch.
Gen. Miles had explained that the
actual translation and DECIDING was
under a branch of Signal Corps
rather than intelligence. He testi-
fled that usually the messages were
delivered to the intelligence division
on the same day they were trans
lated.
At this point Senator Ferguson
asked Mr.. Gesell to get information
from those who had charge of the
DECIDING to show the time interval
between their receipt in Washington
and when they were decoded. Mr..
Gesell said spokesman for the
Signal Intelligence Service would
testify later and that these ques-
tions might be cleared up at that
time.
It had been brought out earlier in
the hearing that some of these mes.
sages intercepted before December
Z, but not decoded until after the
attack, were conveying to Japan de-
tailed information from agents in
Honolulu about the military defenses
of Pearl Harbor.
Mr.. Gesell, questioning Gen. Miles
closely about what happened to in
tercepted messages after they were
decoded, brought out that secret in
structions from Tokyo, considered
a war warning, were sent out from
Washington by the Navy to all its
commanders, but were not relayed
to the Army commander in Hawaii.
Order to Jap ENJOYS.
The message was an order dated
December /, 1941, for japanese en-
voys in all capitals to destroy their
secret codes.
Gen. Miles admitted that he had
seen this message before the Navy
sent it out December 3.
Asked whether he or any one at
the War Department had sent this
information to Maj. Gen. Walter c.
Short, Hawaiian commander, Gen.
Miles said no.
What is the explanation for
that?" the attorney asked.
Gen. Miles replied that the main
reason was "the code experts said
the Navy's code was much more Sc
cure than ours and so we preferred
for messages to go out through the
Navy" He added that I'VE had every
reason to believe the Navy would
promptly transmit it to the Army"
In response to further questions,
Gen. Miles said he had no specific
information as to whether Gen.
Short actually saw the message, but
at the time had assumed he did.
Asked what Interpretation he had
placed on the message, Gen. Miles
said it had led him to believe that
the japanese either had planned for
an outbreak of war or feared war
was coming suddenly"
Mr.. Gesell asked whether the gen.
eral was consulted about this par
ticular message, and the witness
said II believe So"
Gen. Miles said later he felt it
only tair to state three reasons why
he believed Navy messages to Ha-
waii were reaching the Army, and
vice versa. 4
The first reason, he said, was his
knowledge that close liaison was al
ways emphasized; second, his knowl-
edge that Gen. Marshall alwavs