The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-02-13

put it in their textbooks on military science, yet 1t is only one of num- Der of surprising new tactics which today dictate the writing of these textbooks on a loose leaf principle, so that some pages can be torn out easily and replaced with later tacti- cal doctrines. Here at the Orlando University of aerial warfare the teachers must change their courses almost daily, and even the teachers must be replaced constantly with fresh fighting professors from the front, who know all the latest stuff through actual practice and so are able to teach the theory.
 STEPS FORWARD
 Here are just few of the factors indicating that air warfare of the future is just beginning to unfold:
 l, The amazing advances in tri- phibious air-land-sea cooperation.
 2. The still developing use of air. borne glider and paratroopS.
 3. The gas turbine, or jet pro- pulsion airplane which even today threatens to make all internal con- bustion engines obsolete for aircraft
 4. The use of rockets and robot bombs for replacement of long dis tance bombing planes, for extended middle distance replacement of ar- tillery, and for short range use in close combat.
 5. The use of new radio and elec- tronic devices for locating targets and for remote control of bombs or rockets fired against them.
 In 1916 one Major General Fuller of the British General Staff set down for his own guidance what he called he nine basic principles of war. They were first published in 1920 and the next year the U. S.. General Staff stated them without endorsing them for the guidance of its officers. In 1936 the U. s. Navy incorporated Fuller's principles in its manual on Sound Military Deci- sion" and in 1943 the U. s. Marine Corps adopted the nine principles flat and without reservation.
 AIR POWER OMITTED
 The surprising thing about Gen. eral Fuller's doctrine is that it makes absolutely no mention of air power. Over simplifying, the nine principles may be stated briefly aS: the determination of the objective, taking the offensive, attainment of mass superiority, economy in the use of force, maintenance of move ment, the use of surprise, the ob- taining of security, simplicity of op- eration, the cooperation of all forces.
 Is air power just another weapon whose use can be incorporated with in these principles? Or has air power with all potentialitieS and unknowns of the future made Gen. eral Fuller's principles of warfare something that must be revised? Are there additional principles that must be revised? Are there addition al principles that must be stated for future wars that may be fought largely in the skies?
 Use of some of the new radio de- lection devices since Pearl Harbor have made strategic surprise by 1940 weapons next to impossible of at tainment but robot bombs have made the element of surprise worse than it was before. General Mont- gomery's famous dictum that Air power must not be used in penny packets" has made the principle of economy in the use of force almost obsolete. And so on.
 After this war is all over the stu- dents and theorists of warfare will sit down to determine how it was won. Then they may be able to write their new textbooks for future gen. erals.