Evening star., 1945-07-20
last OF FiUe Articles.)
BY GEN. MAURICE -GUSTAvE
rAMELIN


PARIS.-From the first, ! was
believer in armored divisions and
I directed all my efforts toward
getting them for the French Army
as rapidly as possible. was very
pleased with the campaign waged by
De Gaulle and Reynaud to have
such divisions created In the army.
But two things caused 1t to be
mistakenly believed that I was op-
posed to them.
First was that I didn't agree to
the appellation "armored corps" for
all our tanks. In French military
terminology, that would have en-
tailed the idea of forming them into
a single group which would have
been clumsy and nonmaneuverable,
especially considering the powerful
air force the Germans had.
In the second place. I refused to
agree to the composition of pan
ger divisions" such as the Germans
had conceived, as corresponding to
the necessities of our strategy. Ac-
tually In their battalion they had
out of total of 70 tanks, SO Of
type one (six tons), which were no
more fighting machines than our
Whippets, with
automatic machineguns. This bat
talon also had "a tanks of nine-ton
types, armed only with 20-milli-
meter machineguns, with no power
against armor.
Fooled by Panzer Power.
We thus thought that the panzeI
division was maneuver formation
for the invasion of Poland and Bel
gium, for exploitation once breach
was made, but not for attacking an
organized position much less a per-
manent fortification. And I remain
convinced that / was right, because
after their experiences In Spain
they renounced tank type /. After
their Polish experiences, they con-
sidered type 2 nothing more than q
reconnaissance car. During the win
ter of 1939-40, they changed the
tank disposition of their battalions
AS for me, as soon as I succeeded
Weygand in 1885. I asked Minister
Gen. Maurin to equip the light
mechanical divisions we were organ
izing not only with automatic ma
chine-gun carriers but with tanks
We designed such formations similar
in conception to the panzer division
since these formations had theil
infantry motorized troops, theiI
artillery and their engineers as well
as reconnaissance regiment - all
motorized.
Three Armored Units Created.
After 1896. the Supreme Wal
Council decided unanimously, and
Daladier, then Minister Of War, ap-
proved the creation of three armored
divisions capable of attacking an
organized front and even permanent
Notifications. At that time Ger
many already had occupied the
Rhineland, and Belgium had ceased
to be allied with us in order to be-
come neutral. If we had to take the
offensive to 60 to the aid of oul
Allies, we would thus have to attack
between the Rhine and Moselle on
a limited front in difficult terrain
And we had to suppose that the Ger
mans would build Notifications
there, which they did in 1887 (the
Siegfried Line.
Within the possibilities or tech
niques then existing, we believed
that tanks necessary for this role
had to be our type B of 80 tons, and
we planned on IL battalions to con-
stitute the three divisions.
We thus envisioned three mechan-
lied divisions and three heavier
armored divisions. The Germans al
that time were preparing six panzer
divisions, of which only five were
ready in September of 1899. Later
improvement of techniques permit
ted us to plan on putting in these
armored divisions lighter tanks, such
as our 80 Hotchkiss model, armed
with new 37-mm. cannon which
pierced 40 nm. of armor.
Fourth Division Late.
Thus, at the end of 1899, we de-
cided to constitute for the spring OF
1910 a fourth armored division OF
the type decided upon. On the
other hand, our British Allies were
planning on sending us at the same
time two tank divisions. The Ger
mans attacked us with six panzer
divisions. However. as result OF
a series of delays during May. our
fourth mechanical division was still
in the process of formation and the
NuMnu -