Evening star., 1945-09-13
Milifarisfs Thwarfed
Talk With Roosevelt,
Konoye Declares
Continued From First Page.)

Konoye asserted, but by October
Tojo's attitude changed, and when
my cabinet fell on October 16, 194l
knew that war was inevitable, but
I did not know just how or when it
would come"
In the one-hour interview, In
which talked alone to Konoye, he
said his resignation actually came
about in a controversy with Toto
over whether negotiations should
continue.
Konoye, who has been premier
three times, said that he had per-
sonally fought the militarists since
1887, when he first became premier,
and that throughout the Pacific war
he made every effort" he could for
its termination.
Jingoists constantly threatened
him and the police trailed him be-
cause OF his political activities, he
added.
The conversations with the United
States were inaugurated by Konoye
In April, 1941, he said, with full
confidence that war could be
averted."
Honolulu Tentatively Chosen.
Shortly thereafter he officially
suggested to the United States that
he and President Roosevelt meet
personally. Washington agreed and
Honolulu was tentatively mentioned
AS the scene, with Juneau, Alaska,
subsequently mentioned as a possi-
bility.
Meanwhile, Konoye said, the nego-
tiations became entangled with the
unsolved problems of Japan's activi-
ties in China.
Finally" he said, Washington
made clear that such a meeting
would be useless unless three prob
lens were settled:
First, Japan's adherence to the
Tripartite (Axis) pact; second, re-
moval of japanese forces from
China, and third, financial and eco
nomic problems in China.
In the controversy with the mill 1
tarlsts, had one remaining weapon
an appeal through the throne. If
l had been able to converse with
Mr.. Roosevelt am confident could
have brought back enough assurance
OF prospects of peace-even if the
basic problems were then unsolved-
TO convince the throne to intervene.
konoye said that when the Japa-
nese surrender decision finally was
made, the Emperor made it "on his
own esponsibility." He contended,
however, that Intervention by the
Emperor in 1941 would have been
much more difficult" because there
was rising clamor for war. espe-
clally by younger army and navy
men who would have been hard to
control.
There was no such clamor when
the surrender was negotiated"
Konoye observed.
Tojo's attitude toward negotia-
ton hardened and the army de-
clded not to get out of China,
mainly because of this clamor of
the young militarists, "who were
convinced then that they could de-
feat the United States"
Konoye said he personally re-
celved the ultimate surrender news
with mixed emotions-in one sense,
was glad, for I long had battled
the militarists and this means their
end"
Discussing the 1887 outbreak of
the China war, when he was Pre-
mier for the first time, Konoye said,
AS happened several times before,
the militarists in the field started
the Peking incident without knowl-
edge of my government, and the
government had to chase after them.
Ever since the China conflict be-
gan I regretted it. I made every
possible effort to end it by first at
tempting to keep it localized Incl
dent in North China and then by
attempting mediation through Ger
many.
Finally, I turned toward i'm
proved relations with the United
States. In the final analysis, the
basic cause of the Pacific War was
the refusal of the japanese militar-
lists to remove troops from China,
but I don't think the China incident
led inevitably to the Pacific conflict"
Konoye, who originated the I'm