Evening star., 1945-09-13
Congress Probe Urged
Into Okinuwu Trooedy
Writer Compares Mistakes There
to Those at Pearl Harbor
BY David Laurence

vestigate the Pearl Harbor disaster but
there would be more of a constructive
value If, In addition, complete inquiry
were launched into the Okinawa tragedy.
Lack of coordination between the
armed services is major factor in
both episodes. Likewise men high in
the armed forces seem to have a curious
tendency to whitewash each other and
defend mistakes, whereas in the public
interest responsibility should be definite-
ly fixed and blame assessed regardless
Of whose personal feelings are hurt.
Most important Of all Is the subject
OF divided or unified command. Theo-
retically the United States had unified
command at OkinaWa but this did not
prevent the selection of incompeteni
commanders nor a miscalculation as +,
the proper use Of the different branche,
OF the service, nor did it prevent inter.
service jealousies from cropping out.
whole division Of marines was ready t,
disembark at Okinawa in mid-April ant
was sent back to it's base 300 miles
away, only to have some OF its unit,
the division might have been readil-
used earlier to relieve tired Army di.
visions ashore.
Figures Disclosed.
The Navy has at last disclosed tn,
figures about losses. Not only were al.
most as many men killed aboard tn.
ships as were killed on shore, but tn.
total damage done to our ships crippled
for the time being a substantial par
of the feet. 1t was the worst blow O.
the entire war to the Navy from tn,
viewpoint OF ships damaged in a singh
campaign. More than 30 combat ship,
were sunk and 223 damaged with /.
large number of battleships and air.
craft carriers put out of commission al
a critical time. If we had invaded jail
pan, it is the belief of some well-iu
formed officers here that we would haw
had another Okinawa on a larger scalal
The function of the Navy, to be sureN
is to put the Army ashore and protect
the landings. But the idea that the
Navy must provide air cover for ground
OkinaWa, or that the Army would take
as long as it did to capture airfields
and put them into operation so as to
gain supremacy in the air is surprising.
America has boasted of a great Armv
Air Force but this force was unable to
protect the ground troops in tactical
operations because it had no bases. and
the strategic air units failed to relieve
the Navy by getting at the bases from
which japanese suicide planes were
launched. If it is the function of the
Navy to provide air cover for 90 days
after landings, then the Nays air arm
and protective weapons should be mate
rally increased in the future and all
thought of a separate air force, which
is not beholden to the Navy for orders
in amphibious operations should be
eliminated
Unified Command"
There is very critical point involved
in relation to unified command" at
Okinawa. Two schools of thought pre-
vail here in military circles. One con-
tends that Admiral Nimitz at his base
In Guam was responsible for what the
ground commanders of the Army were
doing at Okinawa and that he should
have removed any one who did not make
effective and prompt use of the ground
forces available to him especially for
certain amphibious landings.
Another school of thought insists that
Admiral Nimitz was in no position to
give instructions to the ground COM
manders any more than an eye and
throat specialist can tell dentist how
to fill tooth just because both happen
to be called doctors. This school of
thought holds that the United States
Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington
had the responsibility for selecting the
right commander in the first instance
and that it made mistake in not put
ting in Maj. Gen. Geiger of the Marine
Corps, who had had more experience
with amphibious warfare than any one
else available.
There is some reason to believe that
! there were differences of opinion be-
tween Army and Marine Corps comman-
ders on how the Okinawa operation
should have been conducted from the
start. Naturally after certain commit
ments were made, it was difficult for
Admiral Nimitz to do anything but con-
cur in the steps already taken. 1t is not
a question of Marine Corps VS.. Army
concepts, for everybody agrees that sue
ceSsful amphibious operations have been
conducted by Gen. Macarthur in this
war.
Whitewash for Harmony.
Admiral Nimitz. according to the view
of some high officers here, need not
have gone as far as he did last June in
whitewashing what was done at Okinawa
and the belief prevails that he did so
primarily to keep harmony among the
armed service commanders and pro-
mote good feeling. If this is correct,
then an inquiry into what happened Is
more than ever essential because now
that the war is over nobody can use
again the same smokescreen that has
kept the Pearl Harbor facts from the
people, namely, that to expose the whole
truth is to give aid and comfort to the
enemy.
The inside story of the mistakes on
shore at Okinawa, the fatal 10-day delay
at the outset, the failure to use tn,
Marine Corps properly and the procras-
tination while the Navy took terrific
beating from the Japanese suicide plane.
should be thoroughly investigated espe.
cially if Admiral Nimitz-who is a very
fine officer and has made q creditabl,
record in all other respects-is soon t.