The Wilmington morning star., 1945-06-04
War Cabinet
By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON - Despite the fact that the
central executive governments of other bel
ligerent nations, particularly Great Brltain's,
were being conducted and coordlnated by War
Cabinets, and with notable efficiency, Presi-
dent Roosevelt would never agree to adopt the
method for the United States. He was urged
to do so for years, and was the target OF in
Vulnerable memoranda, some OF these also
pointing out that this Government employed
the system successfully during World War 1.
But Mr. Roosevelt steadily declined to au-
thorize the Setup
Soon after President Truman took the oath
of office the suggestion was renewed, and
charts of several methods - but generally
founded on the Wilsonian and British estab-
lishments were drawn up Tor his lnspec-
tion The authors Of these charts do not know
whether the President will reorganize the ex-
ecutive upper level in this fashion, or, if he
WILL when he will do so. But the impacts OF
new problems growing out OF Germany S
surrender have intensified their belief that the
new system should be promptly instituted, and
the President has the power to act in this
instance without additional legislation
Those who have long been committed to the
idea of War Cabinet with Cabinet commit
tees, have produced three plans. One pro-
vides for fixed Cabinet group with an execu-
tive vice-chairman who is not member OF
the regular Cabinet. The second also out
lines a fixed Cabinet group with three extra
members without portfolio, selected from the
|nation-at-large), but dealing only with econo-
mic problems that are current and will arise
until the war-engendered period of emergency
is over The third is modelled almost precisely
on the British establishment, which stems
from the Committee of Imperial Defense that
was formed forty years ago as result OF
the lessons of the Boer War. Broadly, how
ever, the plans have the same basis and OBJ
jectives and provide the same type of execu-
tive machinery. And in each chart the Presi-
dent acts as chairman and the source of final
decision.
It would be possible for Mr.. Truman, if he
should decide on War Cabinet setup, to use
the outlines of all three plans except that part
of the second which would limit the scope OF
the group to economic problems. Should he
fix that limitation he would be obliged to de-
part fundamentally from the British model
That establishment, however, has support from
members of the Presidents own Cabinet who
have given it study and think the present war
government too loosely organized at the top.
1t was in 1916 that the British War Cabinet
laid the basis of the current system by annex
ing the Office and Secretariat of the Commit
tee of Imperial Defense. This joined the civil
and military units dealing with defense, estab
llShed speedy and complete coordination Of
all executive departments and acknowledged
as does our government plan - the domi-
| nance of the civil authority. The aims in view
were continuous direction by the head of the
government, a strong and visible chain of
command, and close and constant contact
among all executive units. These were
achieved in World War l and World War II
in Great Britain they definitely lave not
been in the United States during World War IL
The British War Cabinet decides all issues
and questions of policy. Cabinet committees,
operating in each area of subordinate policy
are acquainted by the Ministers concerned
with the general line that they may adhere
to it. Ministers who are not regular memb rs
of the War Cabinet attend all meetings where
matters under their jurisdiction are concerned
| in order that all the Cabinet committees may
be thus guided. As new conditions and topics
arise, existing minor committees are disband-
| ed and new ones formed, making the ma
chinery very flexible. And each of the i'm.
portant committees has member of the
War Cabinet as chairman.
The Chiefs of Staff meet with the War
Cabinet when their presences required
| and they or their subordinates attend meet
ings of the committees in similar circum.
stances. Thus the civil and military aspects
of problems are steadily coordinated The
| Secretariat, or Office, is concentrated under
one roof, and this unity permits the immediate
transmission of a decision to the executive
when it should be. When secrecy is required.
the Office personnel confines the notice to
those units which must put the decision into
effect. 1t was this system which enabled the
British to balance manpoWer claims with sup
ply, and come quickly to quotas of distribu-
ton between the combat and production fronts
"a problem which was mishandled for years
under the loose organization of the executive
in Washington.
Whenever, after plan has been formulated
on the lower level, military or civil chief
believes that its effects will be inefficient or
dangerous, he sends memorandum to the
War Cabinet. general solution is found,
which the Office then puts into definite form
for final disposition by the War Cabinet The
result is set down in the minutes which serve
as directive for all concerned and become
a matter of record.
The formation and work of the Cabinet COM
mittees are extremely interesting and effec-
tive, but there is no space to describe these
here In general, however, this is the modus
operandi of concentrated and coordinated
executive method that has functioned admir-
ably and has been commended to Mr.. Truman.
New York Times.
Editorial Comment