Evening star., 1945-08-29

mary of information available in
Washington, particularly in re-
'pect of:
Cd The State Department reply
Of 26 November 1941 to the Jap
aneSe, which was a definite step
toward breaking relations,
ca Certain information indicating
Japanese interest as to the DISPOSE
ton of the ships within Pearl Har-
Dor;
90 In failing to appreciate the
of the information
which he received on the morning
Of 7 December indicating that a
was to be given to the
Secretary of State at l pm. and
in failing to transmit it to Admiral
Kimmel by the quickest means
"a Finally, it is pointed out in
this section of the Second Endorse
ment that there is certain same
ness of tenor in the communica-
tons sent by Admiral Stark to Ad-
miral Kimmel which failed to con-
vey the sense of mounting intensifi-
cation of critical relations between
Japan and the United States.
l concur generally with these.
Concerning the other comments
by the Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet, it might be added that
Admiral Stark's omission consisted
not only in the failure to transmit
fully to Admiral Kimmel certain
of the available information, but
also in the failure properly and
speedily to evaluate that informa-
ton, particularly on 7 December,
194l. Although it was not known
on 6 December precisely when or
where the attack was to be deliv-
cred, there was ample evidence to
base the conclusion that a surprise
move was due within narrow limits
of time
On the morning of December
by 1890 Admiral Stark had infor-
nation indicating that a message
was to be given to the Secretary of
State at l pm. Eastern standard
time, and there was information
available to him that this time cor
responded to dawn at Oahu and
the middle of the night in the Far
East. Although, no one stated that
this indicated an air attack at Pearl
Harbor, yet all of these factors
pointed to the possibility of such an
attack. An acute sensitivity to the
tautness Of the situation would have
dictated at least a plain Language
telephone communication to Ad-
rniral Kimmel, which might have
provided a warning sufficient to
bring about some material reduction
in damage inflicted by the Japanese
attack.
l concur with the comments set
forth to the Naval Court of Inquiry
record. 1t is there stated that Ad-
miral kimmel, despite the failure
OF Admiral Stark to keep him fully
did have indications of
the increasing tenseness of relations
with Japan. In particular, it is
pointed out that he had the war
warning" message on 27 November
the hostile action possible at any
moment message on % November
the 3 December message that the
japanese had ordered destruction of
codes, and the messages of and 6
December concerning destruction of
United States secret and confidential
matter at outlying Pacific islands
Personal Letters in Record.
In addition. it might be pointed
out that Admiral Kimmel in his
personal letters, which are a part of
the record before the Court, as well
in the war plans approved by him.
explicitly recognized the possibility
of attack upon Pearl Harbor by air:
and, that the information received
by Admiral Kimmel concerning the
location and movement of japanese
naval forces after 27 November l94l
should have been evaluated, as pre-
viously pointed out, as indicating the
continued and increasing possibility
of such an attack. y"
The evidence indicates clearly
however, that Admiral Kimmel's
most serious omission was his
failure to conduct long range all
andior sea reconnaissance in the
more dangerous sectors from Oahu
during the week preceding the at
tack. That this is so is manifest
from the evidence obtained by Ad-
miral Hewitt.
On the basis of the record, find
ings. opinion, and recommendation
OF the Court of Inquiry, the First
Endorsement of the Judge Advocate
General thereto, and the Second
Endorsement of the Commander in
Chief, United States Fleet, thereto;
and the evidence obtained by Ad-
miral Hewitt, and on the basis of
the foregoing comments, I conclude
that:
Ca Then Rear Admiral Claude C
Bloch discharged his duties ade-
quately.
CD Then Admiral Husband E
Kimmel and Admiral Harold B
Stark, particularly during the period
from 27 November to 7 December
1941, failed to demonstrate the su-
perior judgment necessary for ex-
ercising command commensurate
with their rank and their assigned
duties.
(c) Both of these officers having
been retired, appropriate action
should be taken to insure that
neither of them will be recalled to
active duty in the future for any
position in which the exercise of
superior judgment may be neces-
sary.
I'D The appropriate committees OF
Congress should be fully acquaint-
ed with the Nays Investigations
into this matter, and public dis
closure of the facts concerning the
Japanese attack OH Pearl Harbor
obtained in these investigations
should be made to the extent that
such action can be taken without
injuring current military operations
or the national security.
Accordingly, I direct:
(a) Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, u: S. N. Retired), shall
MT hold anv r,nSitfnr, II, tha rI,,itnd