Evening star., 1945-08-29

carrier traffic is at low ebb" and
that the daily summaries delivered
to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and
prior to the attack, indicated that
there was no information as to jap
anese carriers.
In view of the foregoing, do not
approve the above findings by the
Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur
entirely in the comment of the Com
mander in Chief, United States
Fleet, concerning this finding. I am
of the view that the information as
to the. location and movements of
the japanese naval forces which was
received by Admiral Kimmel during
the week preceding the attack,
coupled with all the other informf..
ton which he had received, includ-
ing the war warning" and other
messages from the Chief of Naval
Operations, should have been inter-
preted as indicating that an attack
on Hawaii was not unlikely and that
the time Of such an attack could be
predicted within fairly narrow
limits.
(mD Court of Inquiry Finding
XIII. 1t is here stated that Admiral
Kimmel's decision not to conduct
daily long-range reconnaissance
was sound that there were INSULT
cient planes for this purpose; and
that such use of the available planes
was not justified
Comments Added.
In addition to these comments
with which I concur, the following
point may be noted:
% Admiral Kimmel himself had
maintained partial long range pa
troll in the summer of 1941 on the
basis of intelligence received ano
reported by Admiral Bloch at that
time.
(2) Admiral Kimmel testified be-
fore the Naval Court of Inquiry that
he decided on November 27 that
there should be no distant recon
naissance.
80 There is no evidence of any
specific discussion between Admiral
Kimmel and members of his staff
on or after the receipt of the war
warning" as to the advisability OF
practicability of long range recon.
naissance from Oahu. The Wal
Plans officer thought that the SUBJ
ject must have been discussed, but
could recall no specific discussion
The commander of the fleet patro
planes, who had not been informed
Of any of the significant warning
messages, testified that Admira,
Kimmel had no such discussion with
him.
"a The feet patrol planes avail.
able at Oahu in the week preceding
the attack were not sufficient te
have conducted $50 degrees recon.
naissance daily for more than few
days.
(5) There were sufficient Flee
patrol planes and crews in fac,
available at Oahu during the weel
preceding the attack to have flown
for at least several weeks, a daily
reconnaissance covering 1913 degrees
to a distance of about TOO miles.
(6) The sectors north of Oahu
were generally recognized as being
the most likely sectors from which
japanese attack would come, II
the Japanese were to attack Pear
Harbor.
CD If daily distant reconnais.
sance had been flown from Oahu
after 81 November 1941, with the
available patrol planes, the northern
sectors probably would have beer
searched.
/ 90 The Japanese carriers Launched
their planes from a position 20t
miles due north of Oahu.
Radar System Fails.
(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV
This states in substance that tn.
Army radar detection system wa!
ineffective.
The evidence supports the sub.
/ stance of the comment on this find.
ing, is that although the radar de-
lection system in operation at Pear
Harbor was in an embryonic state
nevertheless, even in its then con.
dition it could have and should have
served to give at least an hours
warning of the attack.
(o) Court Of Inquiry Finding XIV
This states that the best profes.
sional opinion in the United State.
and Great Britain, prior to 7 De.
cember, l941, was that an aircraft
torpedo attack under conditions o1
shoal water and limited approach
such as those which obtained al
Pearl Harbor, was not practicable
and that the Japanese attack was
successful principally because of the
employment of specially designed
torpedo, which was a secret weapon
There is evidence in the record
to indicate that nearly a year prior
to the actual attack, the feasibility
and even the probability of an air.
plane torpedo attack upon Pear
Harbor was contemplated. Secre-
tary Knox's letter of January, 1941
listed an air torpedo attack as Sec
ond only to air bombing in order to
probability in a list of the types OF
attack upon Pearl Harbor which he
considered likely. His letter had
been previously cleared with Admiral
Stark, and was received In February
by Admiral Kimmel.
In view of the foregoing, the find
ing OF the Court Of Inquiry is moi
approved.
Kimmel Decision Upheld.
(p) Court Of Inquiry Finding XVI
The Court here finds that Admiral
Kimmel's decision to continue prep
aration of the Fleet for war, made
after receiving the "a November dis
patch, was sound in light (a) of the
approval of the steps which he had
taken after the dispatch Of 1f
October which advised that fostili-
ties were possible, and CD the in
formation then available to him
including Admiral Starks letter OF
II October 1941 and the dispatch
Of "a November 1941, which stated
that q surprise aggressive move-
mAnt In anv d{rArtinS. iyerlitdino A.