Evening star., 1945-02-02

petent Mr..
Jones.
Aside from its Frank R. Kent.
effect on the personalities engaged
friction and bad feeling between
administration and antiadminis-
tration Democrats as between ad-
ministration and Republicans un-
doubtedly has been increased.
1t will be generally agreed thai
this is particularly unfortunate
thing to happen upon the threshold
of the Stain, Roosevelt, Churchill
conference and at the moment when
the Germans are staggering under
the Russian blows on the eastern
front and there are signs that the
collapse may be lot closer than was
hoped for few weeks ago.
In the big three conference sc
close at hand; in the peace confer
ence when it comes; in the intricate
business of reconversion of indus
try which will follow the end of the
fighting in Europe; in all the vital
steps that must precede the stablll-
zation of the liberated countries and
the establishment of a collective
security organization to insure
against another warm all these
things it is clear that unity at home
would buttress the Presidents posi-
ton and strengthen his hand in the
difficult negotiations ahead.
No LOgic in Move.
In these conferences and deal
ings abroad nothing could be better
for Mr.. Roosevelt and for the coun-
try than a demonstration of nom
partisan solidarity behind him at
home.
In his brief inaugural address and
in the message he sent to the din
ner of the Democratic electors. he
seemed to be seeking to insure
exactly that. He spoke of the gray
ity of the hour and the necessity
for unified thought"
Certainly, at the beginning OF his
fourth term, no President was ever
in better position to rise above party
politics and ask for united support.
Certainly, the need for such support
was never greater. Certainly, highly
encouraging evidences OF support on
foreign policy were recently given
him by outstanding Republican
Senators as we'll as by leading anti
New Deal Democrats.
Yet, in the face of all this, he
Gusts a man from highly important
post in which he tells him he has
rendered splendid service" substi-
tuting another whose qualifications
are, ait least, dubious and excusing
himself in his letter by saying that
he had to pay political debt.
1t is difficult to explain or defend
this action on any logical or credita-
BILE ground. The revolt in the Senate
was natural and inevitable and the
unfavorable reaction in the country
great. One would have thought that,
above all else, these were the things
the President would have been espe-
cially anxious to avoid. He must
have known that bitterness and re-
sentiment were certain to ensue.
Two suggestions as to the reasons
for the act and for the manner IN
which it was performed have been
advanced. One is that the President
wanted to get rid of both Mr.. Jones
and Mr.. Wallace, knew that the
Senate would revolt - particularly
after he had made it plain that the
appointment was political reward.
1t is suggested that he has had an
other man for Commerce Secretary
up his sleeve all the time.
Hardly Credible.
The idea has been widely printed,
but it is hardly credible For one
thing it is much too subtle, for an
other 1t involves too low degree of
calculated treachery and deceit. To
believe the President guilty of this
is to believe he would be guilty Of
almost anything.
The other suggestion is that he
personally regards Mr.. Wallace as
highly competent and is anxious to
have him by his side. But that, of
course, cannot be reconciled either
with his letter to Mr.. Jones or with
his own action last July in blocking
Mr.. Wallace's denomination as his
running mate, upon which Mr.. Wal
lace had set his bleeding Iowa heart.
Easier to believe than either of
these theories is that Mr. Roosevelt
yielded, as he generally has in the
past, to the pressure of his labor
leader friends and that the political
debt he was paying was not to Mr..
Wallace but to the CIO and Mr.
Hillman's PAC, who sponsor Mr..
Wallace politically.
At any rate, whether in the end
Mr.. Wallace is confirmed or rejected
it is to be hoped the animosities
engendered by his appointment will
have subsidized before the time for
action on the peace treaty arrives.
Demonstration of the inability of
Mr.. Roosevelt to command the sup
port Of the Senate on such a matter
as confirmation of a member of his
cabinet is not calculated fo enhance