Evening star., 1945-08-29

tack on the Philippines or Guam,
was possibility.
The Court refers in its findings
to part of a personal letter sent
by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kim
mel on II October, in which Admiral
Stark stated: Personally, 1 do
not believe the Japs are going to sail
into us and the message I sent you
merely stated the possibility; in fact,
1 tempered the message handed me
considerably" However, the letter
also continued: Perhaps I am
wrong, but hope not. In any case,
after long pow-wows in the White
| House, it was felt that we should be
on guard, at least until something
indicates the trend" To the letter
was annexed a postscript stating in
part: General Marshall just called
up and was anxious that we make
some sort of reconnaissance so that
he could feel assured that on ar
rival at Wake. Japanese raider at
tack may not be in order on his
bombers I told him that we could
not assure against any such con-
tingency, but that felt it extremely
improbable and that, while we keep
| track of japanese ships so far as
we can, carefully planned raid on
any of these island carriers in the
| Pacific might be difficult to detect.
However, We are on guard to the
best of our ability, and my advice
to him was not to worry"
(q) Court of Inquiry Finding
XVII. The Court here finds that
there were good grounds for believ
ing that the Japanese would attack
in the Far East
4 In respect of this finding, the
Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet. points out that the Far East
was the most probable scene for the
initiation of japanese operations,
and that they we're in fact initiated
there. He notes further that all
concerned recognized the possibility
that such commencement of hos
tilities would be accompanied by an
attack upon Pearl Harbor He adds
that this latter possibility was con-
siderably strengthened by informa-
ton available at Washington, not all
of which was available to Admiral
Kimmel
Stark Criticized.
| r) Court of Inquiry Findings
XVIII and XIX. These state in
substance that Admiral Stark's fail
ure from November 26 to December
i Z, 194l, to transmit to Admiral Kim
mel Important information in his
possession constitutes military
error.
The comment of the Commander
in Chief, United States Fleet. as to
this finding was to the effect that
Admiral Stark was at fault in fail
ing to give Admiral Kimmel an
adequate summary of information
available in Washington So.
u Information was promptly and
efficiently obtained by the United
States Navy and Army intelligence
organizations in Washington, con-
corning the japanese governments
actual views as to the diplomatic
negotiations and its intention to
wage war.
/ 90 The information which was
obtained in Washington by the War
and Navy Departments was fully ex-
changed.
80 The information obtained by
the Navy Department was ade-
quately disseminated within the
Navy Department.
| "a Although Admiral Kimmel
some months before had made re-
quests that he be kept fully inform
ed on subjects of interest to the
Fleet and as to all important de-
velopments, the Chief of Naval Op-
: erations did not communicate to him
important information which would
have aided him materially in fully
evaluating the seriousness of the
situation. In particular, the failure
to transmit the State Department
message of November 26th and to
send, by telephone or other expedi-
tious means certain information in
dicating the imminence of an attack
by the japanese that was available
at Washington on the morning of
December 7, were unfortunate.
i 60 Admiral Kimmel, neverthe-
less, did have sufficient information
IN his possession to indicate that
the situation was unusually serious,
and that important developments
with respect to the outbreak of war
were imminent. This included the
war warning message and similar
important messages which were sent
by the Chief of Naval Operations.
60 The available information in
the possession of the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the exist
ing situation, particularly the war
warning message, was not dissem-
mated to all of his important sub
ordinate commanders whose cog
nizance thereof was desirable. Thus
Admiral Bellinger, who commanded
the patrol planes, and Admiral
Newton, who was at sea with a car
rier and other units, were not in
formed Of this and other important
messages.
From the evidence obtained by
Admiral Hewitt it appears that prior
to the attack the telephone lines of
the Japjanese Consul General at
Honolulu were tapped and that
various of his cable messages were
secured at Honolulu but no infor-
nation was obtained prior to De-
cember 7th which indicated the
likelihood of japanese attack. The
legal restrictions which denied ac-
cess to such cable messages were
definite handicap to the intelligence
agencies in the Hawaiian area.
In its final opinion and recon-
mendation, the Court of Inquiry
finds that no offenses have been
committed or sevious blame in
Cured on the part of any person or
persons in the Naval service. and
recommends that no further pro-
ceedings be had in the matter.
Stark Errors Listed.
In the Report of the Naval Court
OF Inquiry, it is pointed out that
Admiral Stark failed to give Ad-
| miral Kimmel an adeul1atn siIr,, (