Evening star., 1945-06-04
Writer Calls for Truth
On Okinuwo 'Fiusco'
Says High Command 'Bunslins'
Has Been Ignored by Congress
By David Laurence

Has Been Ignored by Congress
By David Laurence
Why Is the truth about the military
hasco at Okinawa being hushed up?
Why has no one in the high command
OF the United States disclosed the mis-
takes that appear to have made the
Okinawa affair a worse example Of
military incompetence than Pearl Har-
Dor? Congress is still talking about
Pearl Harbor but 1t has totally ignored
Okinawa.
The true story is beginning to leak
out in the figures Of casualties These,
of course, could not be suppressed. They
show that Okinawa, while victory in
the sense that we have obtained our
objective finally is the worst setback we
have suffered in the Pacific.
President Truman revealed the facts
about losses in his message last week
to Congress. He said that from March
18 to May % at Okinawa, the Army lost
3,603 in killed and missing, the Marines
lost 1889 in killed and missing, and the
Navy and Coast Guard lost 4,729 in
killed and missing on board ships sup
porting the ground operations.
It will be noted that the number Of
American boys killed aboard ships due
to Japanese air attacks was larger than
those of the Army on shore and almost
as large as the combined Army and
Marine Corps losses in killed and miss
ing in the shore fighting. This Is an
unprecedented ratio. 49,
Ground Chiefs Bungled.
What it means in nutshell Is, that
the ground commanders bungled and
failed to take and establish Okinawa
air bases quickly enough to permit the
fleet to 60 unmolested in its work of
landing supplies and men to operate
such air bases. For two months-a
painfully long time-a substantial part
of the fleet has had to stand by day
after day making easy targets for Japa-
nese suicide planes because the Army
command on land failed to accomplish
its objectives with sufficient speed to
get air defenses into effective operation.
The figures above were only those
killed and missing. The total number
wounded is even worse. The Army had
1861 wounded, the Marines 8,403, and
the Navy and Coast Guard ships had
4640 wounded-an unprecedented ex-
perience also for men aboard ships. Ac-
tually the United States Navy in each
operation heretofore in lending its as
sistance to landings elsewhere in the
Pacific lost far less than at Okinawa,
in fact the Navy lost far less even In
protecting for several weeks the Army's
landings in Normandy.
But this is not the first time the bum
Cling has occurred. 1t happened at Sal
| pan, too, and it was thought by some
| observers that our high command had
learned lesson. 1t turns out, however
that medals and decorations were given
| to some of the officers who were a part
of the bungling at Saipan and now the
same mistakes in strategy have been
| repeated, presumably because of the in
| evitable Indifference of the American
| people who have not been told the facts
due to the customary excuse that covers
up incompetence.
If Okinawa is sample of the tactics
our high command expects to use in
invading China or Japan some day.
then the American people might as
well be prepared for long. long war
and big casualty list.
Mistakes in Strategy.
What were the mistakes of strategy
| in Okinawa? The first public intimation
| came last week from Homer Bigart, who
| reported to the New York Herald Trib-
une an amazingly frank analysis Of what
happened. He says, for instance, that
the Army general in command got
begged down with his troops in the
south end of the island while the Ma
rines quickly cleaned up the northern
end and then instead of using the Ma
rines for amphibious landings to the
rear of the japanese lines by coming
| up from the south coast the Marines
were thrust into the middle of the line
to pound away as if time were not of
the essence. Instead of an end run,
we went down the middle of the line, -
was the plaintive comment of the war
correspondent on the ground.
Amphibious warfare tactics is the
prime business and speciality of the
Marines. Years of training and study
have taught them to land on every
available coastline, storm the enemy,
take losses quickly and get the job
done promptly so Army Air Forces can
move in and, together with antiaircraft
installations on the ground, make the
place secure against further attack from
the air
The Army commanders on the other
hand, appear to have taken the slow
and so-called conservative approach
which temporarily and only theoreti-
cally saves lives, as the Okinawa over
| all experience now proves. An island
battle cannot be fought by massing
artillery or deploying troops as would
| be done on vast terrain in Europe
The Marine Corps amphibious warfare
concept, which is integrated in the
operations of the Navy. has come into
sharp conflict with the Arny's orthodox
concept of ground operations against
the enemy. Too many American lives
have been lost because somewhere in
our high command the lesson Of Sal
pan, which showed that unity Of COM
mand on paper is valueless without
unification Of military concepts In the
actual operations, was not taken Sc
riously.
No matter whose personal feelingc
may be hurt by blunt truth-telling and
exhaustive investigation, disinterested