Imperial Valley press., 1945-08-30
THE ARMY NAVY BOARD
REPORTS ON PEARL HARBOR


Congress and the American public
have before them the findings of an ar
my and navy board on the events lead
ing up to the sneak attack on Pearl Har-
Dor December 7. 1941 Declared by Pres
idCnt Truman "tO Ec the facts the re-
port is an indictment against men IN
high places that can bring only shame
1t does not spare navy and army OIL
GERS; it places a share Of the blame upon
war and navy department heads, the
former head of the state department and
reaches even to the White House.
Outstanding in the boards report is
the showing of complete lack OF cOor-
dination among officials and depart
mcnts at Washington. That the board
did not recommend court-martials may
be seen in the wide sweep of charges
Some upon whom the blame is attached
are not subject to court-martlal.
The report shows the biased and s''-
pcrficia report turned in by the Presi-
dents personal investigators, former
Justice Of the supreme court of the
United States which came a few months
after General Short and Admiral Kim
mel summariIv had been relieved of
their commands at Honolulu burdened
Nltu lIlt luIl p4dlIlC 1OI Il al
Sharp disagreements and criticism of
the report came Immediately from the
President and Secretary Of War Slim
son for the boards placing a share of
the blame on Chief of Staff Marshall
Stimson openly asserted that the chief
of staff could not be held to blame in
aSmuch as it was not Specifically his
duty to direct and personally supervise
H., IN, 1ata1 hp Of
various sections Of the general staff"
And further Stimson sought to absolve
the chief of staff of blame by assert
ing that 1T was his paramount duty to
advise the secretary and the President
and 70 make plans for, and supervise
the organization. equipment and train
ing of a great army for a global war"
All of which is on the technical side and
fails to carry much weight.
Gross carelessness, negligence if not
ignorance, according 70 the findings,
marked tfa procedure of affairs as late
as November 25, only a little more than
week before the attack. Here former
Secretary Of State Hull draws sharp
criticism for his part. Briefly, it ap-
pears that Hull threw all precautions
to the wind, forgot about the armv and
navy and as it was testified by military
leaders "dCcided to kick the whole thing
over" He had been advised, the report
goes on to say. by NAVY and ARMY leaders
that more time was needed to prepare
for the Imminent war;.
In eXcusing Marshall. StimsOn tacitly
admitted his own shortcomings and in
ferentially brings the White House into
the whole affair. Included in the re-
port gre StimSOn'S notes on a White
House conference in which he. Admiral
Stark, Hull and Knox participated. That
was November 25 and Stimson says the
President warned that Japan might at
tack in the next few days. And the next
StimsOn notation on the conference says
"Thc President brought up the rela-
tiOnShip with the Japanese 1t is i'm
pOrtant to observe that the President
had henn very careful to be sure that
the United States did nothing that could
be considered an overt act or an act of
war against the Japanese"
These statements from Stimson's
diary are Of more significance when
considered in the light of the fact that
on numerous occasions mention was
made of the likelihood of treachery on
the part Of Japan and the admonition
passed among the leaders that the Japs
could not be trusted
Another instance of the failure of the
Washington leaders to be consistent is
found in the statements that no one
feared an attack on Honolulu that if