Evening star., 1945-10-29
SoIvo Against Unificotion

SuiNo SSuiHSt OHtTiSutlOH
Revived proposals for unification of
the military services under single
defense department tend to put the
Navy on the defensive. The Navy
believes it would be absorbed into,
rather thaS merged with. the War
Department. There is distinct i'm
preston that the unification idea
has been advanced by the War De-
partment as an alternative to an
eventually separate Air Force. And
finally, the public having accepted
the proven concept that unified
military command in the field is
necessity, it logically may assume
that such unity should begin at
home, in merger of the War and
Navy Departments.
Thus placed on the defensive, the
Navy has resorted to sound military
strategy in seizing the advantage of
attack. The release for today's pub
lication of the findings of the Eber-
stadt study of the whole question of
how best to provide for our national
security represents a broadside of
considerable weight. 1t has been in
preparation since last June. when
Ferdinand Eberstadt was requested
by Secretary Forrestal to study and
answer three questions: Would uni
fication improve our national secu-
rity? If not, what changes in exist
ing relationships between the serv-
ices would improve it? What form
of postwar organization should be
established to provide for national
security?
The results of the study are
presented in three mimeographed
volumes which contain, in addition
to the conclusions, an excellent
digest of about everything that has
been said and done in the past con-
corning unification and organization
of the existing services. One Incl
dental shot in this barrage is the
resurrection of a letter from General
Macarthur, written in 1882, in which
the then Chief of Staff, discussing a
comparable merger plan, said that
mo other measure proposed in re-
cent years seems to me to be fraught
with such potential possibility of
disaster for the United States as
this one. = = Not only the military
history of this country, but of every
country, gives indisputable proof of
the advantages of maintaining 80
integral control over . the Army
and the Navy. Pass this bill and
every potential enemy of the United
States will rejoice"
Mr.. Eberstadt's conclusions are
that while theory and logic NAV
make unification plausible, actual
experience in other countries as we'll
as the tests in war of our existing
arrangement argue against 1t. He
doubts that single civilian Secre-
tary, with limited tenure, could sue
cessfully administer the huge and
complex structure" of single de-
partment without becoming the tool
OF the military men, thus endanger-
ing the principle of their subordina-
ton to civilian authority. He argues
that merger tends to complicate
rather than abolish faulty admins
tration and that before abandoning
our present system we should be
sure we cannot cure our ills within
existing framework and equally sure
that unification will cure them with
out bringing about even more serious
ailments.
He finds that most of our difficult
ties In the past war resulted from
detective coordination, the means
Tor Improvement of which-such as
the Joint Chiefs of Staff principle
are readily available without merger
and he describes as the policy and
planning agency new National Sc
curlty Council, headed by the Presi-
dent, with representation of the
State, War, Navy and "Air" Depart
ments and a new National Security
Resources Board. This organization
was Endorsed in testimony by Sec
retary Forrestal, who is not yet
ready, however, to agree with the
separate Air Department idea.
In short, Mr.. Eberstadt's concep-
ton OF the need Is for machinery to
lntegrate all elements of Govern
ment concerned with National secu-
rity rather than to seek centralized
direction of the military establish
ment. He presents a persuasive
case, with more complete documen-
tation of the whole question than
ever assembled in the past.