Evening star., 1945-07-18

The present whereabouts of the bulk
Of the Japanese Army may prove one
of the most important factors in deter
mining the immediate future course of
the war in the Far East.
There seems little doubt that at the
beginning of this year the Japanese
forces on the mainland of Asia were not
only much larger than those in the home
islands, but included most of the we'll
equipped well-organized divisions. Most
of the home forces were training units
or second-line reserves composed of
older men, lacking full equipment.
Have the Japanese been able to cor
rect this situation by shifting troops
from the mainland to the home islands?
There can be no doubt that they have
tried to do so, as pointed out in my
article Of July 2; but how far have they
succeeded?
There are very large numbers Of troops
which they can never move. For exam
pie, there are some 100000 Japanese
troops in Burma, Thailand, Malaga and
Sumatra, pinned down by the British
forces of the Southeast Asia Command.
There are $4,000 or more in Indo-C China.
Garrisons In the Netherlands Indies Cn-
cluding all of Borneo but excluding
Sumatra) account for another 100000.
In the various Pacific island groups tthe
Marshalls, the Carolines, the Japanese
held part of the Palaus, Bougainville,
New Britain and the remaining Japa-
nese pockets on New Guinea there are
probably 250.000 Japanese all told. Ger
tainly the Kuriles and the Bonins ac-
count for another 100000 more. Finally
there are 100000 to 250,000 on Formosa.
This adds up to total of 1000, 900
i,20O, 900 Japanese troops who are def
nitely cut off from their homeland, who
cannot possibly get back there because
Of Japanese loss of sea control
II we assume, as do most sources of
reliable information, that the size of the
Japanese Army is about 100000. we
have already accounted for one-fourth
of it. Where are the other 100000
Japanese troops?
They are distributed in four major
groupings:
U) South China, actively engaged with
Chinese and American forces; these
troops are slowly withdrawing north.
ward, leaving some garrison forces
behind
(2) Garrison and security forces in
North China.
go The Kwangtung army in MAN.
churia and Korea facing the Red Army.
"a Home forces.
1t would seem probable that the Japa-
nese purpose is. ultimately, to evacuate
South China altogether save for de-
laying forces in such crucial areas as
the Canton Hong Kong region; to re-
duce the forces in North China TO the
minimum necessary to hold the railways
and key centers: to bring the kWang-
tung Army to sufhcient eStaDiish-
ment to deal with any possible Russian
attack and to get the rest OF the
japanese mainland forces into the home
islands. and so distribute them as 10
be able to offer the maximum resistance
to invasion from the sea.
The question which remains un-
answered is: Did the japanese begin
this redeployment at sufficiently early
date?
There are beginning to be some in
dications that they did not; that the
effectiveness of our blockade operations
has taken them by surprise, and that
they are not able to move troops from
the mainland to the home islands as
readily as they had counted on.
1t should be noted that recent block
ade operations have included attacks
on the Korean railways, and very
steady attrition of shiRing of the
coasts of Korea and. in the Korean
Straits; mine operations at the en-
frances OF west coast Japanese ports.
including the western entrance of the
Inland Sea; heavy damage to japanese