Evening star., 1945-01-03
Seeking a Scapegoat
By Mai. Georee Fieldinp Eliot

plans are to be held up for every doubt
and uncertainty, nothing will ever be
accomplished. Here is where the
element of calculated risk comes in
The point to be made is this: 1t is not
for G-3 to assume the responsibility of
taking risks. That responsibility belongs
to just one man: the commanding
general. When his staff officers have
each contributed their proper part of
the overall estimate of the situation,
that estimate is co-ordinated and
whipped into final shape by the chief
of staff. the generals right-hand man
who oversees all the staff sections.
Then the general must decide. If risks
are to be taken, it is up to him. If the
risks outweigh the advantages of the
proposed action, he must so decide
In the last analysis, therefore, great
deal depends not only on the generals
ability and mental qualities, but on the
state of his mind and health, on the
amount of time he has to give to a
particular decision as against other pres
sures on his time. and even to the con-
ditions under which the matter is pre-
sented to his attention.
-
perhaps lie behind much that is now
being written about the need for reliev-
ing Gen. Eisenhower of the pressure of
political and other nonmilitary business
at his headquarters. Inevitably, the
task of a commander in chief of a
great Allied fighting force is compli-
Gated by much business that is not di-
rectly concerned with the military oper-
OF u,t, hn in, hor hoS
only to read Prime Minister Churchills
admirable biography of his great an
cestor, the Duke of Marlborough, to
understand the infinite complications
that beset an officer in such a position.
But it is not the opinion Of this
writer that 1t would therefore be a
good idea to appoint commander of
Allied ground forces, as has been sug-
gested. for this would tend to take
away purely military duties from Gen.
Eisenhower, who is probably better
qualified to perform those duties than
any one who could be substituted and
it would put an additional and hamper
ing echelon of command in between
the Commander in Chief and his Army
group commanders, with whom he
should be in the closest possible touch.
If his burdens are too great to be
borne, as seems possible, then relief
should be sought on the political and
non-military side of the picture. If the
military burden is still too great, there
may be. some worth in the suggestion
that a deputy commander in chief for
ground operations be appointed, who
will be able to give his whole time Gun
der Gen. Eisenhower's immediate direc-
tion) to the ground situation, permit
ting Air Chief Marshal Tedder, the
present deputy, to devote his whole
time to the air situation.
Meanwhile, if 1t should appear that
there has been incompetence or break
down anywhere, the individuals who
have failed will of course be suitably
dealt with; but 1t might be well for
us to remember that no war can be
fought without q certain number OF
disappointments and reverses, and that
even the great Napoleon was wont to
say that victory will usually 60 to the
general who makes the fewest mistakes
not none, for there were no such gen-
erals in Napoleon's time, nor In ours.
dcopyrisht le45.)