The Waterbury Democrat., 1945-12-06

- April, l941.
 Prepared for War
 Asked whether there was any at- tempt at any of the conferences to commit the Knitted States to war, Marshall replied:
 No, our efforts were to be pre- pared for any eventuality."
 Asked whether there was any special deployment of American troops as a result of any of those conferences, Marshall said:
 T don't think so unless 1t was Iceland, but I don't remember"
 U. s. troops landed in Iceland in the fall of 1941, before the Pearl Harbor attack. It was explained at the time as 8 move to protect United States interests against a posisble move by Germany.
 Marshall was expected to defend himself against charges leveieo at him by an Army board which m- yestigated the Pearl Harbor disas- ter a year ago. President Truman and former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson both denounced the boards criticism of Marshall.
 Four Points Listed
 The Army board, in 8 report s- sued last August, charged that Marshall failed in four particularS' It claimed that he failed:
 1. To keep the commanding general of the Hawaiian Depart ment (Maj. Gen. Walter c. Short) fully advised of the grow ing tenseness of the Japanese |. situation which indicated an in- creasing necessity for better pre- paration for war, of which 1n- formation he had an abundance and Shortt had little.
 2, To send additional in- Structions to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Depart nent on Nov. 28, 1941 when ev- idently he failed to realize the import of General Shorts reply of Nov. 27th which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of Nov. 27 and had not adequately a1erted his com- mand for war.
 3. To get General Short on the evening of Dec. 6 and the early morning of Dec. ' the crit ical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.
 4. To investigate and deter mine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian command between Nov. 2 and Dec. '. l941 despite the impending threat of war"
 Mai. Gen. Sherman Miles, who was chief of Military Intelligence at the time, told the committee Short didn't get all the information Marshall had because much of It came through interception of Jap anese messages. He said the Army didn't want Japan to know about the interceptions.
 Gerow Takes Blame
 Miles testimony also developed that interrepts of Dec. 2, indicating the almost immediate break with Japan, were in War Department hands at Washington four hours before a warning was dispatched to Short. It had taken more than two hours to contact Marshall, who was horse back riding. The message reached Short after the attack had occurred.
 It. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, who was assistant chief of staff in charge of the War Plans Division at the time. accepted any War Department responsibility for fail- ing correctly to interpret Shorts reply to a warning Marshall sent him on Nov. 27, 1941.
 Testifying beforee the committe late yesterday, Gerow said:
 "1f there is any responsibility to be attached to the War Depart ment for failure to fully interpret the Short report 1t must rest on the War Plans Division. And as chief of that division I accept that re- Sponsibility.
 If an inquiry was necessary, the War Plans Division should have drafted such an inquiry and pre- sented 1t to the chief of stoff for approval. I repeat that I accept such responsibility"