Evening star., 1945-07-26
Memoirs Of Paul Reynoud
BY PAUL REYNAUD,
War Premier of France.

| North American Newspaper Alliance.
Strange as it may seem of a
country whose national industry is
war. Germany's most serious def
cheney is in metal to manufacture
weapons. In 1898. the last year for
which complete statistics are avail
able, the Reich extracted from its
soil Is, 5,000, 900 tons of iron ore, which
represents $500, 900 tons of pure iron.
It's imports, on the other hand,
amounted to l3.500000 tons of pure
iron. OF this total. 100000 tons
came from the Swedish mines.
II we could block this source.
Germany would only have been able
to satisfy one fourth Of her needs.
There were two possible solutions:
Either prevent the ore being ship
ped, or intercept the shipments.
AS to the first, Soviet Russia, then
allied to Germany, attacked Finland
on December l, 1899. The blessed
! formula of ''nonintervention" (de-
fined by Talleyrand as equivalent
to intervention,o allows many things
to happen. If we were to send a
force to Finland-by way of Norway
and Sweden-it might in passing
seize control of the iron mines!
Though the British refused to 60
beyond supplying arms to Finland,
Edouard Daladier, as Prime Min
lister, on January 8, 1910, gave or
ders to equip special force for this
purpose: The Audet Division.
Blockade Considered.
Nor did Daladier lose sight Of the
second method-that of blocking
shipments. Norwegian territorial
waters had already been violated
by Germany. On January 7. the
Allies therefore declared their in
tention of patrolling these waters.
But following vigorous protest
from King Haakon, the British gave
up this plan in spite Of Daladier's
disapproval.
(Finland was forced to sue for
peace, and on March 81, 1910,
Premier Daladiers government
fell. Reynaud was asked to form
a government. Daladier became
Minister of War. The war of
nerves" was at its height. Un-
ease was spreading through
France)
I left for London on March 27
to attend meeting of the Supreme
Council. The, question of a block
ade in Norwegian waters was again
on the agenda. was resolved to
press the question and to gain my
point.
The Supreme Council decided the
following day that mines should
be laid in Norwegian waters, and
that we would inform the Scan
dinavian government of our inten-
ton.
Unfortunately the French War
Committee refused to ratify q
trif1ing concession I had made to
gain my point, and so on April 8
the British government informed me
that the mine-laying operation
planned for the next day would rot
take place.
Churchill in Paris.
Winston Churchill (then first
lord Of the admiralty arrived in
Paris on April S. and it was finally
decided that the mines should be
laid after all But the operation
had been put back to the seventh,
and this delay allowed Hitler to
learn of the affair and to prepare
a counterblow.
On the night of April the Ger
mans invaded Denmark and Nor
way.
(The Germans claimed they
were protecting" these coun-
tries from Allied invasion. Al
lied indecision had given them
their excuse)
At 7 am. that day I called a
meeting of the military leaders at
the Quay d'Orsay, where Gen.
Maurice Gamelin, the commander
in chief, reported that the only
force available for the Scandinavian
theater was the Audet Division.
But it was not at Brest, the port
of embarkation. 1t was in the Jura
region lover 500 miles away! The
general argued that, after all. the
English were those responsible for
the operation.
Not only had no other forma-
tions been earmarked than those
previously suggested for Finland,
but the two British divisions chosen
for that operation had been sent to