The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1945-07-06
Interpreting
The War
BY KIRK L. SIMPSON,
Associated Press News Analyst

Associated Press News Analyst
General Macarthur Fourth OF
1ulv declaration that the whole
Philippine Archipelago has been
freed of the Japanese except for
few thousand scattered guerillas
in remote mountain sectors if
onvtbing understates the strategic
results flowing from the victory
for American and Filipino arms.
1t was more than tine greatest
disaster" in war Japan has ever
suffered as the Macarthur review
NJ the campaign said. It has paved
the way for earlier total defeat
of Japan than possibly could have
been foreseen when the critical
decision to strike into the Philip
mines with the limited forces then
available was reached at the Pearl
Harbor Conference between Presi-
dent Roosevelt and American
Army-Navy high commanders in
the Pacific.
There has been much to indicate
that at that meeting Macarthur
almost single handed fought hard
for his own strategic conception
against opposing views of some
of the high ranking Navy personnel
nresent. What the alternative may
have been is not so clear but the
achievement of the major objec-
tives Of the campaign to regain the
Philippines as Macarthur cited
has utterly changed the face OF
the war since then.
That battle has cost the foe a
minimum of half a million known
casualties, and a probable maxi
mum of twice that figure. 1t has
cost him, too, the bulk of mis- once
powerful Navy plus staggering air
losses that have laid Japan itself
open to virtually unopposed Ameri-
can strategic bombing and ultimate
invasion. The Macarthur reference
10 the reconquered islands as, "a
great land, sea and air base for
future operations comparable to
the British Isles in the war against
Germany" points up that situation.
Whether Okinawa, .Formosa or
any other japanese outpost island
in the China Sea could have been
taken without first retaking Luzon
may be open to professional dis
putes. There can be no question,
however, that with both in Ameri-
can hands, not only has the foe
been cut OF from his trapped arm
les in the South but also substan-
tally isolated from his main forces
in China.
The Philippine victory cut 1.-The
enemy's center so as to divide
him into North and South seq
ments, Macarthur pointed out.
Each half could then be envel-
oped and attacked in turn" he ad-
ded, in recalling the detectives of
the Philippine campaign.
Okinawa has served the same
purpose. 1t has split the Northern
half in two again into the Japanese
homeland and enemies deploy-
ments in China. The enlightenment
of the japanese Islands themselves
has reached a point where effec-
tice contact between Japan and
China has ceased to exist.
The Manila recapitulation re-
veals for the first time that %
Japanese divisions, nearly half
million men, were deployed in
the Philippines and have been
'annihilated" by the II Ameri-
can divisions sent against them.
That is lone of the rare instances"
in military history, Macarthur
noted, in which during a long cam
paign "a ground force superior in
numbers was entirely destroyed
by numerically inferior oppon-
emit" Overall enemy casualties ran
at least ten-to-one above Aneri-
can losses and probably were al
most double that figure if lost Jap
anese garrisons. trapped Southeast
and Southwest CT the Philippines
are included.