The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1945-01-05
Interpreting
The War
BY KIRKE L. SIMPSON
Associated Press War ANALYST

l.
Seventeen days from the onset
Of the German counterattack reSar.
gent American armies are strk.
ing full force, not merely to regain
lost ground but to convert defeat
of limited effect into d decisive
victory.
That was the gGttering possibi,
lily held out to his armies by
General Eisenhower, Supreme All.
lied commander, in the only order
of the day he had issued since the
Nazi surprise blow fell on his lines
in Belgium. Potentially caught be-
tween the jaws of the First and
Third Army wise closing down from
north and south simultaneously
are an estimated 20 or more Nal
divisions. If that is correct more
than a fourth Of Nazi field force
electives in the west, including the
bulk of German armor on that
front, is in jeopardy. Whatever
Allied errors may have contribut.
ed to success of the Nazi break.
through lunge into Belgium, there
is no hint that the overall estimate
of German strength in the west is
at fault.
The assumption that the Nazi
commander, Won Rundstedt had
some 70 field divisions at his dis.
posal, exclusive of ''people'a
army organizations, has been sub.
stantially confirmed by Russian
estimates. Success Of Eisenhower S
effort to turn the enemy Belgian
gamble" into his worst defeat
by trapping or badly cutting up
any substantial part of the still
powerful German forces in the
bulge certainly could wholly alter
the military situation in the west.
1t could make the Nazi counter
attack. despite heavy American
casualties and material losses in
volved, new basing point for AL
lied strategy. The foe has commit
ted so much of his total strength
in the west to that action his front
elsewhere, particularly in the Ne
der Rhine salient in Holland, must
be relatively thin.
NaZi military commentators free
ly admit that the crisis in the
Belgian bulge only now is devel-
oping as American armies press
home full powered concerted PIN
Ger attack on it's waist line nerve
center. They offset that for Ger
man listeners by asserting that in
any case the Nazi drive into Bel
GUM has achieved its prime pur-
pose and hamstrung the Allied
winter campaign to reach or cross
the Rhine.
That may be true. Too many fac
tors in the military equation in
the West-and along the Russian
front in Poland also-remain I'M
known for any very intelligent
long range appraisal at this cri-
teal stage Of the fight. In this
corner, however, the prolonged in
activity Of British and Canadian
armies on the Dutch flank of the
Allied line, has seemed signif.
cant. It has suggested that General
Eisenhower and his field conman.
ders might have more than one
string to their assault bow; that
keyed in with the pincer attack
On the Belgian bulge might come
aggressive developments ell e..
where to refute German conclu-
sions that the winter offensive has
been definitely stalemated.
There has been no confirmation
from Allied sources of repeated
Nazi assertions that Ninth Army
of British or Canadian elements
have been drawn into the bulge
fighting. German broadcasters
may have been fishing for infor-
nation on that point. Certainly il
the Allied High Command has nos
drawn heavily upon the north flank
of the line on the Roer, the Meuss
and the Nedcr Rhine for troops to
power the First and Third Army
pincer squeeze in Belgium, the
possibility of Allied resumption Of
offensive action to the north at
some moment cannot be overlook