Detroit evening times., 1945-04-18
WORLD IN
REVIEW
BY Mai. Gen.
D. P. Barrows
PART III
PART III

PART III
IN THE previous article I
i urged the immediate necessity
of establishing a military gov
ernment in Germany for the
protection of our own armies
and the civilian population.
l recalled something of our
own experience in military gov
ernnnent and warned against
substitute expedients and pro-
posals.
1t is TO an analysis of these,
and a comparison of them with
purely military government
that this article is devoted.
There are several characteris-
tics of purely military governs
ment that recommend it above
any other substitution.
It's task is wholly administra.
tive.
1t has nothing to do with the
politics or political future of an
occupied country. except, that
in the present case il must root
out the leaders Of national So
cialism, and suppress this revo-
lutionary movement.
l. prepares the way for civil
government, but II cannot set
II up.
This is a responsibility OF the
highest civil authority 10 which
the armies themselves owe
obedience.
Under American law and
~ practice occupying armies
may not implant national
civil regime in a foreign coun-
try. nor take responsibility
for II.
They may not favor any par
ticular group or party that is
naturally desirous OF succeeding
TO civil power when the military
regime ends
This, OF course. contrasts with
the present r ssian method.
which has set up in Bulgaria.
Rumania, Hungary. Poland and
in Silesia and Pomerania, civil
governments that are friendly or
subServient 10 Moscow
We cannot do this ourselves.
If we cannot alter Russian ar
rangements elswhere. we can
prevent such action in Germany
and in Austria
FUTURE military government
Il in Germany will be psrtieu-
larly difficult. beyond its inher-
ent difficulties, because il is con.
fronted by two embarrassments.
The first is that II is 10 be
multlform in responsibility.
At least four Allied high COM
manders are 10 constitute its
headShlp.
There does not promise 10 be
unity of authority in the diff
cult task of administration.
This fact imposes upon the
heads of the military govern
ment a great test of patience,
tact and resolution.
We cannot sec yet how this
difficulty will be resolved.
Great Britain. which has
shown admirable confidence in
Gen. Eisenhower, would prob
ably accept him as the military
governor and continue TO fur
nish an important part OF his
staff. But we do not know that
Stain would agree 10 such an
arrangement.
In the second place, the mill
tary authority IN Germany.
which should be, but may not be.
single, threatens 10 be disturbed
by the intrusion Of officials sent
in by other departments than
that 10 which IS entrusted the
conduct Of war.
II is impossible 10 conduct
military government If the field
is occupied also by a multitude
Of civilian representatives. re-
SponSlble. not 10 the military
governor, but 10 departments or
ministries in one or more foreign
countries.
Inevitably. this breeds rivalry,
confusion and tangle of con-
flicting authority.
IN OUR own case. military
L government should be con.
Quoted through only one Depart
ment in Was ton. and
through only one cabinet head
the secretary of war.
We are fortunate. in this
case. in having in Mr.. Stimson
an official who has gone through
this experience of a military
regime, and who was governor
general of the Philippines in a
period when -that-task- ad-
minlStered by the war depart
ment.
He should be the only avenue
of communication between the
government AT Washington and
our military government in
Germany.
Other departments OF our
administration have contribu-
tionS TO make, but they should
be performed at Washington.
If sent 10 Germany in this
difficult and trying time. repre-
sentativcs from these depart
ments should be- accredited by
the secretary of war 10 the
American military commander.