Evening star., 1945-10-30

states the lives OF 1853 flyers and
$4,000 planes lost or damaged be-
yond repair. The Raj lost 1921
airmen and $4,000 aircraft.
The number of German aircraft
destroyed or probably destroyed
exceeded $1,000.
Air attacks took 3O5,OOO German
civilian lives; wounded and injured
10000. They destroyed or damaged
100000 dwellings; laid waste ap-
proximately so cities; rendered
homeless 100000 civilians. But
some 5000 900 people needed in labor
and on the farms were kept en-
ployed repairing bomb damages in
cities and industrial plants.
Early in 1914. the survey reported,
two-thirds of the German civilians
knew the war was lost. They were
held in line against revolt only by
the increasing severity of German
terror" One of every 900 German
adults was arrested for political"
offense.
At the same time, the increased
tempo of tactical air action was hav-
ing decided effect on enemy mill
tary casualties. According to Ger
man reports, combat casualties from
aerial weapons moved from third
place in 1912 to first place in 1943-
44-45. Next in order were the casu-
alties inflicted by the artillery and
the infantry.
Plane Production Bounced Back.
Here are some of the paradoxes,
the successes and failures of stra-
tegic bombings summarized by the
survey:
/. Although the Luftwaffe was
beaten decisively in the air and
eventually grounded for lack of
aviation gas. production bounced
back after attacks on aircraft fac
tories and never was seriously i'm
paired. The Germans showed Ca
pacity for improvising their way
out"
Aircraft production reached a
peak OF 39,807 planes in 1914, COM
pared with 1886 in 1912 before the
plants suffered any attacks.
2. Heavy attacks in the Ruhr re-
duced steel production and it was
critically short" In 1914, but Ger
many was so well stocked the in
yentories of plants ranged from
comfortable to generous.
3. Had the Allies concentrated
earlier on oil, rail and WATERWAYS
communications, the war might have
ended sooner.
4. No indication was found that
the rubber shortage had become a
limiting factor on German war pro-
duction or the movement of the
German Army before the war ended.
S. The Allied air forces dropped
2,700, 900 tons of bombs on all kinds
of targets. but popular conceptions
OF pin point" and pickle barrel"
bombing accuracy received a Jolt
from the report.
Bombing Aim Poor.
Survey studies showed that only
about 20 per cent of the bombs
aimed at precision targets fell within
the target area of 1000 feet around
the point OF attack. AS the war
progressed, aiming improved and
reached a peak OF 10 per cent ac-
curacy for the month of February,
l945. Varying battle conditions,
such as target dissertations, fog,
smoke screens and enemy fighter.
opposition spelled the difference be-
tween training accuracy and COM
bat accuracy.
s. A mistaken Allied theory that
the German electric power system
was connected with highly devel-
oped power grid, left it unattached
except for isolated raids. German
electric power was, in fact, in a pre-
carious condition throughout the
war. So critical was the shortage
that "any considerable loss of out
put would have had serious direct
effect on essential war production.
7. Despite the most costly of all
Allied air raids on the bal-bearing
plant at Schweinfurt, there was no
evidence that this and other at
tacks on the ball-bearing industry
had any measurable effect on pro-
duction.
8. Bombing studies showed that
machines and machine tools were
n f4r