Evening star., 1945-12-09
Admiral Kings Report


After its magnificent achieve
ments in this war, there is no need
to sell" the Navy to the American
people, and Admiral King, in his
final report as the directing head of
fighting fleet, is wisely content, for
the most part, to set forth the facts
and let them speak for themselves.
The report deals primarily with
the Seven-month period ending last
October 1.-The period which saw
both Germany and Japan 60 down
In total defeat after the hardest,
bitterest and costliest fighting that
the world has ever known-and
also treats in broad outline the more
important aspects of the manner in
which the Navy was built and fought
throughout the war. There is no
occasion to review these matters
here, nor to attempt an evaluation
OF the Navy's role in achieving final
victory. 1t seems pertinent, how
ever, to present Admiral Kings own
summarized conclusion, based on
information obtained after our entry
into Japan. This is what he said:
Never before in the history of war had
there been more convincing example
OF the effectiveness of sea power than
when a well-armed, highly efficient and
undefeated Japanese) army of over a
million men surrendered their homeland
Internationally to the invader without
even token resistance. True, the devas-
tation already wrought by past bomb
1ngs, as well as the terrible demonstra-
ton of power by the first atomic bombs,
augured nothing less for the Japanese
than total extinction; yet without sea
power there would have been no possess
sion OF Saipan, Two Jima and Okinawa
from which to launch these bombings.
True. the Japanese homeland might
have been taken by assault in one final
amphibious operation of tremendous
magnitude. yet without sea power such
an assault could not have been at
tempted.
Those who desire to debate the
question of which arm of the service
won the war, or contributed most to
winning the war, may challenge this
statement. There will be few to
contend, however, that we could
have won this war without command
of the seas, nor to deny that this
control of the oceans was primarily
dependent upon our own naval
power.
Admiral King also spoke out
bluntly against the proposals for
unity Of command in Washington,
his most pertinent observations
being presented in these words:
Unity of command at the highest mill
tary level in Washington (as an exten-
sion of the principle of unity of COM
manO, was never attempted. nor, in
fact, seriously considered during the
war;. 1t is a matter of record that the
strategic direction Of the war, as con-
Quoted collectively by the joint chiefs
of staff, was fully as successful as were
the operations which they directed. The
joint chiefs of stan system proved its
worth. There is no overall paramount
capability" among the joint chiefs of
staff to warrant elevating one of the
to position Of military COM
mander Of all the armed forces-nor in
my opinion, is there any known system
or experience which can be counted
upon to produce the man qualified for
such position. This war has produced
no such man-for the records of the
joint chiefs of staff will show that the
proposals or the convictions of no one
member were as sound, or as promising
of success, as the united judgment and
agreed decisions of all of the members
This is statement by the head of
our wartime Navy which bears di-
rectly on the debate now revolving
around the question of unifcation
of the armed services. Admiral
King refers to certain records in the
belief that they support his views
in opposition to unity of command
in Washington. Why should not
these records be made available for
public examination in a matter of
such Importance as this?