Evening star., 1945-08-29
Pearl Hurbor


security.
Pearl Hurbor d..
Continued From First Page)
were relieved of their commands
Immediately after the Japanese at
tack.
Mr.. StimSon, in his statement, as
serted the underlying reason for the
Japanese success was Gen. Shorts
confidence that Japan would not
then attack Pearl Harbor," and his
concentration on defenses against
sabotage.
In dealing with the part played
by former Secretary Hull, who was
in consultation with japanese rep
resentatives here when the Pearl
Harbor attack was launched, the
Army report said:
The responsibility apparently as
sumed by the Secretary of State
tand We have no other proof that
any one also assumed the response
bility finally and definitely was to
determine when the United States
would reach the impasse with Japan.
1t was the Secretary OF State who
was in charge of the negotiations
with the Japanese: it was the Sec
retary of State who had long nu-
merous conferences with the Japa-
nese. He was the contact man and
the responsible negotiator."
1t adds that at this time Gen.
Marshall and Admiral Stark had
drafted joint memorandum to the
President saying the most essential
thing for the United States to do was
TO play for time, because the Army
and Navy were not ready for war
and that further attention was
called to the desirability of counter
military action against Japan in
event she engaged in specific acts
of aggression"
Not Ready for War.
Undoubtedly, the report continues,
the Secretary of State knew that
the Army and Navy were not ready
for war"
On November 25, the report said,
Mi. Hull-according to Mr.. Slim
sons testimony before the board
said he proposed to lay a proposal
for three months truce before
the japanese negotiators. Mr.. Stim-
son did not think the japanese
would accept because 1T was so
drastic"
The following day, according to
the Stimson testimony. which in
cluded a diary the Secretary of
War kept at the time, Mr.. Hull
called in to say he had made up his
mind not to make the proposition to
the Japanese but to kick the whole
thing over and tell them he had no
other proposal at ALL"
Apparently. the board said. Mr..
Hull had made up his mind not to
go through with the three-months
truce plan and evidently the action
to kick the whole thing over was
accomplished by presenting to the
japanese the counter proposal of
the 10 points which they took as
an ultimatum."
Hostilities Were Imminent.
The report said that to the ex-
tent the Secretary's counter pro-
posal fastened the Pearl Harbor at
tack lit was in conflict with the
effort of the War and Navy De-
partments to gain time for prepara-
ton for war, but it added, how
ever. war with Japan was inevitab BILE
and imminent because of irreconcil-
able dlsagreements between the
japanese empire and the American
Government.
Mr.. Srlmson, in his report, COM
mented on this aspect of the Army
boards report as follows:
1T is suggested that in his (Mr.
Hulls) conduct in the negotiations
with the japanese ENJOYS different
procedure might have prolonged the
negotiations until such time as the
Army and Navy were better pre-
pared for hostile action"
Not only do I strongly disagree
with what amounts at best only to
conjecture, but I feel that the
boards comment in this respect was
uncalled for and not within the
scope of their proper inquiry"
Both Army and Navy reports
stressed that official belief here was
that hostilities would start in the
Far East rather than elsewhere.
The Army report said there was
belief both in Hawaii and in WASH
mgton thai war was on our door
step, but not on Hawaii's doorstep.
rms resulted in the main considera-
ton being given to Gen. Macarthur
and the Philippine Islands and the
resulting second consideration dur
ing this critical time to Hawaii.
The unfortunate thing was that the
Japanese crossed us up with a
daring surprise attack"
Lack of Judgment Charged.
In ascribing lack OF judgment to
Admiral Stark, the Navy report said
he did not send to Admiral Kimmel,
then commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet, important information
that had come to his attention be-
tween the very critical period" of
November 26 to December Z, par
ticularly in regard to the japanese
situation.
Further, it said, on the morning Of
December Z "he did not transmit i'm
mediately information which ap-
peared to indicate that break in
diplomatic relations was imminent