Evening star., 1945-12-04

! you LOld MIN you tnOught we should
send out a warning as indicated
above. After Admiral Stark re-
piled, you put down the telephone
and said that the admiral did not
think any further warnings neces-
sary. since all the forces had already
been several times alerted. Col.
Bratton and I nevertheless urged
that the warnings be sent.
Message to Stark.
"You then wrote out the warn
ing message. There was some dis
cussion as to whether the Philip
pines should be included or not,
but I am not quite clear when this
discussion occurred. You again got
Admiral Stark on the telephone
and read the message to him. He
apparently concurred and asked
that naval forces be informed. You
added that at the bottom of your
message.
AT about this time Gen. Gerow
(chief of the War Plans Division)
and Col. Bundy arrived. You asked
us In succession, beginning with me,
what We thought the Japanese reply
and timing meant"
Il said l thought it probably
meant Thaland, but that the tim
ing had some significance and warn
ings should be sent. Gen. Gerow
and Coils. Bratton and Bundy con-
CURED. The message in your hand
writing then was given to Col. Brat
ton to take Immediately to the mes
sage center.
Message by Commercial Radio
There was little discussion here
as to whether it should 60 to Gen.
Gerow's office for tipping first, but
time was then pressing and gave
1t to Bratton for immediate delivery.
Gen. Gerow said as Bratton was
leaving, Tell them to give first
priority to the Philippines If there
is 4 question OF priority, or some-
thing to that effect.
"Bratton returned in a few mo-
ments and you directed him to find
out how long it would take for the
delivery of those messages. Again
he went to the message center and
returned and reported to you that
they would have been encoded in
three minutes, on the air in eight
and in the hands OF recipients In
Il think 20.
Col. Bratton states that he look
led 1T his watch on delivering your
message to the Signal Corps, and
the time was 11:50 am. He further
states that the message center rave
him no intimation that all four
messages would not 90 over Army
radio direct to the four Army head
quarters
! 1t was this message which did not
reach Hawaii until after the at
tack. The Army Pearl Harbor
Board criticized Gen. Marshall for
failure to send it through Army ia
cilities or over the telephone.
The actual log of the warning
message, recorded in another memo
by Col. w. B. Smith, secretary of
the general staff, stated it was filed
with the War Department message
center at noon. or $50 am. Homo
lulu time, about one hour and 20
or rs minutes before the first Japa-
nese bombs were dropped.
The rest of the log was:
Sent Western Union. 1917 pm.
washington time).
Received RCA, Honolulu, 7::33 am.
(Honolulu time).
Delivered to signal officer, Homo
lulu, 11:45 am. CHonolulu time).
Delivered to AGO (Adjutant Cen
erals ONCE, Hawaiian Depart
ment. 2:58 pm.
The message center reports" Col
Smith added, that a check from
Honolulu indicates that on receipt
this message was handed to an
Oriental messenger for delivery by
hand to Armysheadquarters."
The chronology of events as de-
scribed to the committee in a
memorandum written June 8, 1912
by Col. j. r. Deane, at that time
secretary of the general staff
stated:
"On the morning Of December 7,
was on duty in the office of. the
chief Of staff doing some special
work that I had been directed to do
by Gen. Marshall. He arrived at
the office at about II o'clock or
shortly thereafter and had a series
of conferences with staff oficers
from Ga and the War Plans
Division.
AT about IL o'clock he called me
to his office and informed me that
he expected to see the President
that afternoon at about 3 o'clock
and for me to arrange to keep the
oflce open and have some of the
commissioned and civilian personnel
report for duty.
AT about 1880 pm. an enlisted
man from the Navy rushed into my
office out of breath, with a penciled
note which was supposed to have
been message from the Navy radio