Laurel outlook., 1944-08-23

Headquarters, Sind Airborne Di-
vision, NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. of one
parachute infantry regiment, S2nd
airborne division, dropped over a
wide area on D-Day and were I'M
able to assemble as a tactical unit
until the fourth day of the invasion.
The regiment, nevertheless, play
ed a brilliant role in carrying out
the mission of the airborne troops,
which was to prevent the Germans
from interfering with the ground
assault force until the beach land
ings had been accomplished.
To achieve this, the SIND captur-
ed the town of Ste. Mere Eglise and
fought for and held bridges over
two rivers, the Merderet at La
Fiere and at Chef du Pont, and the
Douve at Pont Fable and at Beuze-
vile la Bastille.
A large pocket of Allied resist
ance within enemy lines was set up.
During the campaign it stretched
from Ste. Mere on the east to st.
Sauveur lie Vicomte on the west,
and from LIE Ham on the north
almost to La Haye de Puts on the
south.
This was accomplished in 33 days
of action, without relief and with
out requirements. Every mission
was accomplished. No ground was
ever relinquished. For nearly "a
hours, OF until noon of the day after
D-Day, the paratroopers were with
out contact with friendly forces.
And though heavy casualties were
sustained throughout the campaign,
nothing stopped the troops for long.
The paratroopers of this regi-
ment were dropped in several
groups and at first these groups
fell in with other units of the di-
vision rather than their own. 1t
was not until four days after D-Day
that the regiment assembled as a
tactical unit. Before this, however,
they struck terrific blows.
With other units of the division
they forced the enemy west of the
Merderet River at the start. An
other element joined in the heavy
fighting at Chef du Pont, finally
contracting an isolated battalion and
establishing a ~bridgehead on the
west bank of the Merderet opposite
Chef du Pont. Other elements
went south to clear out C%arquebut,
crossed the river at La Fierre and
assaulted Guetteville. The latter
action was assisted by a naval bar
rage from the sea arranged by a
naval liaison officer with the reg
iment.
After being pulled together as a
unit, the regiment jumped off for
the attack on Bonneville la Bastille.
After crossing the Douve, it swept
on through the Cretteville- Baupte
area. During this drive many
enemy tanks were encountered and
many were knocked out. Trucks
moved the regiment to Pont PAbbe
for the general attack toward st.
.Sauveur. The regiment followed
another of the division, driving the
enemy west, north and south.
Participating in the drive on Pre-
a squad encountered a Mark
" tank 600 yards north of the
own and succeeded in knocking it
tut with a hand-thrown British
The regiment took up a
defensive position at Vindefontaine {
,efore joining in the drive toward j
"a Haye de Puts. Heavy fighting j
vas experienced in the Bots de Z
and one element which t
ventually took Hill 95 sustained =
leavy casualties.
Colonel Roy E. Lindquist of Pitts c
ield, Me-, the commanding officer, r
made a lucky guess which kept the t
nemy force on this hill from being
reater than it was. He often di- {
ected the artillery fire, according !
o an artillery officer, on the theory
f catching the Germans doing what
e would have done under similar
Accordingly, he swept
n orchard with fire. Later a v
told that a German force t
repairing for an assault On Hill 95 d
ad been virtually wiped out by this 0
it. "
The hard training, Incompatible S
elf-reliance and bravodo of all of c.