The Waterbury Democrat., 1944-04-01

Italy. U. S. Army chiefs p
The British, on the other hand,
point a finger at General Mar
shall.
AS nearly as an impartial OBJ
server can ascertain, there was
some blame on both sides, with the
fact reasonably clear that neither
the United States nor England
actually wanted to strike the
peninsula of Italy. 1t was
pointed out one year ago that
campaign up the italian PENN
sula would land us exactly where
we are now-in trap. 1t was
even freely said in high military
circles, last spring, that Hitler
could want nothing better than
to have us invade Central and
Northern Italy.
Nevertheless, that is exactly
Where we are now.
AS far as this observer can piece
the story together, here is how
it happened.
At each conference between
Churchill and Roosevelt, the
question of a second front in
Western Europe has arisen, and
each time Churchill has said
no. This was true at Casa
blanca in January, 1913, and
again during the Washington
conference in the following May
and June.
During the May-June confer
ence, the Allies were cleaning the
last remnants of the Nazis out
of Tunisia, and the big question
was whether to strike next into
western Europe Or into the Bal
kans. American war chiefs fav-
ored the cross Channel drive,
which the Russians had so long
demanded. The British favored
the Balkans. Both sides agreed
that Sicily and the extreme
southern boot OF Italy c1ust be
taken in order to clean out NaI
submarines and protect Allied
shipping in the Mediterranean.
ALL AGAINST THE
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN
But the plain, unacceptable fact
is that neither side wanted to in
wade Italy proper. There was
talk Of striking through the
islands of Sardinia and Corsica to
the French Reviera, but no one
wanted to 60 up the italian pen
insula and risk being trapped in
a narrow area, with no room to
maneuver. and with the Alps
to cross even after Italy was
taken.
So, after some rather tough
talking on both sides, it was fin
ally agreed that Germany would
get additional months of pounding
from the air and that the second
front would be postponed until
German airplane factories could
be softened. This was a victory
for Churchill.
However, it was also decided
that we should not invade the
Balkans. This, in turn, was
victory for General Marshall.
had argued that any diversion
Of troops away from England
for Balkan campaign would
only slow up the main objective
the second front straight at the
heart of Germany.
Furthermore, Marshall was re-
ported quite piqued at the Brit
ish for transferring SO many COM
bat troops out of England to the
Near East between the Casablanca
meeting in January and the
Washington meeting in May and
June.
FARLEY RESULTS
IN COMPROMISE
Out of this May-June confer
ence, therefore. came the compro-
mise of no second front, no Bal
kan invasion, but more air pound
ing of Western Europe, plus the
conquest of Sicily and the south
ern boot Of Italy.
After the May-June conference,
Churchill flew from Washington
to Agiers, and President Roose-
welt ordered General Marshall to
go with him. The word in high
Army circles at the time, in part
facetious, was that Marshall was
going to keep an eye on Churchill
to see that the Prime Minister
did not use this persuasive charm
on General Eisenhower and go in
to the Balkans, after all.
At any rate, once Churchill