The Wilmington morning star., 1944-03-17
TODAY and TOMORROW
BY WALTER LIPPMANN

have made such a muddle Of our
relations with Poland and Yugo.
slavia if France, which is their
historic friend, had been our in
termediary.
Our relations with Russia must
be considered in relation to the
whole Wharf.-The war in Europe and
in eastern Asia. In the long run
the controlling fact, believe, will
be that in the European H7eater
the Russians carry the main bur-
den and look to the British and
ourselves for the additional force
needed to reach an early military
decision; but in the Pacific thea
ter we carry the main burden and
shall be looking to the Russians for
the additional force to bring about
an early decision.
In Europe the Russians are
wholly committed to the defeat OF
Germany. But if we hold back and
let them win the German war for
us, they would not only dominate
Europe. They would also hold back
because they would be war-weary
and because they would be resent
full while we won the war for them
in Asia. If we interviewed in Europe
only to share in the victory that
the Red Army had done much the
most to achieve, Russia would nat
urally intervene in Asia only when
she could capitalize the victory
which we had done the most to
achieve.
To say this is to say only what
every student of the history of
war knows: That the kind and the
degree of military collaboration
during war will inexorably de-
termine how much political COLA
boration there is in settling the
war. The final and full military
collaboration Of the western Allies
and Russia in the settlement Of
the whole war is as yet only a
pledge and a promise.
That, and not the lack of the
machinery Of Observation-Disclosures
that lack could and should be met
is the real reason why the Mos
COW agreements have not yet be-
come more substantial. This is no
time, then, to pass judgment on
what those agreements will mean.
That time will not come until we
get the consequences of the inva-
sion Of Europe by the British and
ourselves and of the Soviet inter-
vention in the Pacific.
There is no doubt, unless the
Germans collapse and surrender
first, of our. Invasion of Europe.
There is no doubt of the Soviet
intervention in Asia.
What is in doubt is the time and
the magnitude Of the Soviet inter
vention. 1t could be withheld until
Japan was virtually down and out.
It could come sooner and it would
then decisively accelerate the de-
feat of Japan. But it will surely
come. A great deal of the future
Of Russia is in Siberia and it is
inconceivable that Russia will not
seize this opportunity to make it
forever certain that Japan cannot
interfere with Siberia and block its
development.
Russia's real attitude toward
general collaboration with us will
be shaped by the effectiveness of
our invasion and the far sighted
ness of our political conduct in
Europe. Our real attitude toward
general collaboration with Russia
will be shaped not by the border
disputes in eastern Europe but by
the effectiveness and the manner
Of Russian intervention in Asia.
That is where the great issues
LEON the Continent and in east
e-n Ashland the Russian action
and reaction to them, our action
and reaction to them, will make
good or will ruin the high promises
of the Moscow conference. If the
global war were divided into two
wars, and each OF us won only
one of them, we should not get
world settlement. It is only by
winning both wars as true and eff
fective allies that the foundations
can be laid for realizing the Mos
cow agreements.