The Wilmington morning star., 1944-06-15

While the general shape OF the
German war has been fixed and
clear since the Moscow and Tehe-
ran conferences, the same cannot
be said of the japanese war. Great
political developments of the ut
most military importance must
take place before the plan of the
Japanese defeat is settled.
We must bear in mind that
though Japan is an island empire
with a navy, her war making
power is primarily the army. Alex
ander Kiralfy, a leading authority
on the subject, tells US that 'the
Japanese Navy has been a floating
wing of powerful army occupied
with offensive operations.
The campaigns of Nimitz, Mac
Arthur, and Mountbatten On the
perimeter of the new Japanese
conquects, are engaging what is
probably not more than two-fifths
of the Japanese Army, and that
includes divisions in the Neither
lands Indies, Malaga, Indo China,
and the Philippines which are not
yet in the fighting. The main bulk
Of the japanese Army is in Man
churia, China proper, and in the
Japanese islands. 1t is forceat
least equal in numbers, though no
doubt inferior in equipment, to all
Hitler's armies in western Europe
We cannot count upon the defeat
of Japan until this army has been
defeated.
To defeat it we must find the
means of organizing a superior ar
my on the mainland of Asia. We
can bomb Japan from China and
from the Pacific islands that we
intend to take, and we can block
ade Japan from the oceanic side.
But we cannot assume that very
strong army can be defeated by
sea and air power alone.
Victory in Burma, and the open
ing of land route and safer
air passage into China, will cup
port our air power in China. But
it will not enable us to equip a
Chinese RAINY or to bring in Brit
ish and American armies capable
of fighting the main Japanese ar.
mics over primitive communica-
tons across the vast distances OF
China. las Admiral Nimitz has
told us, he and General MacAr-
thur have to neutralize or capture
the Philippines and all the Pacific
Islands in order to reach the China
coast; then they have to occupy
large Chinese ports before we have
a base of operations for the deci-
sive campaign. The Japanese op-
erations inside China today have
for their object, so it would seem
to forestan us, to prevent the
Chungking armies from joining us
when we reach the coast and to
make our landings very difficult.
1t is evident at once how formi.
able an undertaking it is, to say
the least, to fight fifty or sixty
japanese divisions in Asia with
troops and equipment that have tc
be shipped from our Pacific coast,
from Australia and from India. II
is no less evident that in the de.
cisive phases of the Japanese wal
the role of the two great land pow.
ers already in eastern Asia-name.
ly, China and the Soviet Union
must become of mounting inpor.
lance.
Because we have landed ir
western Europe it is now possible
to begin to talk bit about thu
subject.
In talking about it the Chinese
question has to come first. China
is blockaded from the outer worlc
by Japan. But within China there
is a second blockade enforced by
General Chang Kai-Shek's armies
against III Chinese Communist
armies. If we add up the Chung
king troops and the Red troops
and the Red guerrillas who, as a
result of this deplorable situation
are not fighting Japan, they may
be as much as a million of the
best fighting men of China.
Moreover, they are in an area
which lies between any part Of
180.-Legal