Evening star., 1944-11-18

during one of the most crucial
down their aerial strength by some
900 planes.
These successes indicated the
feasibility of advancing the date for
the invasion Of the Philippines, ani
the date of October 20 was set by
Gen. Macarthur in consultation
with Admiral Nimitz and approved
by the high command.
However, a great deal of hard
tough work had to be accomplished
first. AS much damage as possible
had to be inflicted upon the enemy
over the widest available area
guarding the Philippines. Addi-
tionally, by hitting the Japanese
hard, and again and again, the en-
emy was to be confused, and kept
confused, as to the ultimate objec-
tive of our far-ranging forces.
General Offensive Starts.
On october 8, surface forces bonn
barded Marcus Island, and on the
following day a carrier task force
struck at Okinawa, in the Nansei
Shoto group, about $500 miles to
the westward. The Japanese de-
Tenders were caught off base each
time, losing 50 planes at Okinawa
and 46 ships, not counting IL prob
ably destroyed.
On October IL, while the enemy
was still trying to figure out what
had hit him to the northward, the
airplanes of one carrier group swept
over the northern part of Luzon
main island of the Philippine Com
monwealth, while the other carrier
forces were refueling. That strike
cost the japanese 10 to Is airplanes
destroyed on the ground. Enemy
opposition was inconsequential.
Three times, in as many days, the
United States forces had struck at
three different and widely sepa-
rated strongholds of the enemy. On
the fourth day, October II, feet
appeared in the enemy's own back
yard, off the island of Formosa,
from which the aerial attack
against the Philippines had been
launched by the Japanese nearly
three years before. Our objectives
were the Is to 80 first-class military
airfields on Formosa, the airplanes
besed there, and, of course, any other
military establishments on shore
and the enemy shipping in the
harbors.
Three Days Of Formosa.
Our fleet maneuvered in the vicin-
ity of Formosa for three days, Oc-
tober II, 13 and IA. Fifty five
vessels of all kinds were certainly
destroyed, and 80 were probably
sunk, while approximately 1896 air.
planes were destroyed in the air
or on the ground. On the last day,
and on October Is, Formosa was
additionally the target of United
States Army B-29s, flying from
China.
The effrontery of the attack on
Formosa from the sea provoked the
japanese into immediate counter
action. Strong units of bomber
and torpedo planes swept down
from the islands of the empire, to
be met and broken up by fighters
from our carriers. Two Japanese
planes which forced their way
through found targets in a couple
of United States medium-size ships,
which were damaged by torpedoes
but which successfully retired to the
eastward.
Now comes one of the most fan
tastic chapters of the war. The
Japanese aviators who managed to
reach home reported an amazing
victory, and Tokyo was quick to
claim-for the fifth or sixth time
that the naval strength of the
United States had been rendered
puny. But, this time the Japanese
believed their own propaganda, that
at least Is carriers had been sunk
and varying quantities OF other
warships.
Jap Task Force Flees.
A task force of the japanese Navy
was sighted leaving the empire to
give the American fleet its coup
de grace, but when the astonished
pilots of the enemy scouting force
saw the size of the healthy opposi-
tion deploying to receive them, the
Japanese expedition wheeled and
ran back to the safer waters OF the
empire. Admiral Halsey ironically
observed that his ships sunk by
Jap radio announcement had been
salvaged. and were retiring at high
speed toward the Japanese fleet"
On October IA our carrier planes
began working over the Philippine
Island of Luzon and the lesser
islands of the Archipelago to the
south and east, In order to come
into immediate support of the am
phibious forces approaching for the
invasion. Only about IS enemy
planes were bagged in. the sweeps
over approximately 100 airfields up
to the time our carriers, both the
large and fast ones and the smaller
escort ships, converged in support
OF the landings of the United States
forces on Leyte. The
strategy had succeeded and the
landings were effected by Gen. Mac
Arthur's forces in complete surprise
III.
The invasion Of the Philippines
q grand-scale use OF all
arms Of modern warfare land and
forces, surface and Sub
surface ships and, Of course, 4 tre-
mendous air coverage.
A look at the chart viii show the
n