The Waterbury Democrat., 1944-06-10

eeNNhS wv troversial question that ha
 It is no secret that the second front has been the sorest subject of debate between the British and Russians and, at times, even be- tween U. s. and British military leaders, since the war began.
 At one time, when the Russians were hard-pressed and fighting for their lives at Stalingrad and in the winter of 1942-l943, 1t was feared by some U. s. military ob- servers that Stalin might even withdraw from the war because of bitterness over the fact that the second front was not started.
 The controversial question first arose in the early summer of l942, a few months after Pearl Harbor, when Foreign Minister Molotoff came to London, then to Wash ington, for important political military conferences. Although Poland and the Baltic States were on his list of subjects to be dis SIAooC0t ~ WkAG NSAy tOP VI VAAC list was the second front.
 At that time, the American Army was relatively small and not too we'll prepared. M0l0- toffs thesis was that we should persuade our British allies, with 2 million-man army in England, to hit Germany from the West. President Roosevelt had to say that we could not high-pressure an all!
 However, General Marshall did work out a plan for a landing across the Channel in the fall of 1922. His plan was based on the fact that the Nazis had thrown the cream of their entire into Russia and had their lines extended as far as Stalingrad, leaving France and Western Eu- rope relatively undefended.
 Marshall proposed this instead of the North Africa landing of Nov, l942. However, Churchill was not willing to take the chance and held out for his plan to strike thorugh the 'Asoft under. belly of the Axis" namely North Africa and the Mediterranean. COMPROMISE AT CASABLANCA
 The Russians were disappoint. ed; but even more so after Casa blanca. T here U. s. military and naval leaders were definitely ready to discuss the second front. But Churchill laid down the thesis that in any cross-channel opera ton, the ratio of troops would have to be about 70 per cent American to 30 per cent British.
 From the British viewpoint, he made a plausible argument for this, pointing out that Britain had lost her "seed" when she poured the cream of her man. hood into Flanders Fields in 1914. This, he said, had set Eng land back perhaps a generation, and she could not afford to lose her "seed again. She also pointed out that England's population was less than one-third that of the U. 8. A.
 However, at the rate of sub- marine sinkings at that time, 1t was impossible to ship American troops across the Atlantic in enough numbers to make up 70 per cent of an invasion Army.
 Churchill at that time want. cd to invade the Balkans. Gen. eral Marshall favored . second front In Western Europe. So, instead, they compromised on Italy which, except for Sicily and the extreme south, nobody really wanted to invade.
 Once again, the Russians were desperately disappointed, and rllmors came out of Moscow--per- haps inspired in order to influ- ence Us - that Russia might withdraw from the war.
 NO DECISION AT QUEBEC
 Highly expectant communiques were issued after each conference, so that the world got the iYn- precision that the second front was imminent. However, judging by their military movements, the Ger mans were not much concerned over these communiques and prob- ably knew that, even after the