Evening star., 1944-01-24

percentage of casualties in the
Dieppe raid, the price we paid
recently for Tarawa and other epi-
sodes are sufficient indications of
what a major invasion of long and
strongly fortified coast lines, wheth-
er in the Atlantic or the Pacific,
might involve.
No matter how gloomily the pic
ture is drawn, it makes more sense
than the optimistic bravado of re-
cent memory, when officials. were
predicting the defeat Of Japan by
last Christmas and airmen were
promised an appointment in Berlin
by February, 1944-not in their cock
pits, but In Unter den Linden. In
the interval we have learned that
1t is more desirable to be ready for
the worst and relieved If it doesn't
happen.
But it is important to understand
why such huge losses are foreseen,
If only because we have another
war to win-in the Pacific-after
the Germans are licked. The pre-
dictions are not just wild guesses,
but logical estimates based on the
kind of strategy that has apparently
been decided upon.
Jap Surprises Cited.
1t should be recalled that our hu-
initiating defeats in the Pacific dur
ing the first year were primarily
the result of the strategic surprise
the japanese sprang on us. In that
theater we had taken for granted
an old-style naval war. The Japa-
nese, we anticipated, would send
their navy against ours and would
be defeated quickly in an old-fash-
ioned naval battle. Instead they
unloosed a new type of warfare
against us amphibious tactics,
striking simultaneously with closely
co-ordinated land, sea and air
teams Because we were totally un-
prepared for this. we were helpless
Our present plan of offense in
the Pacific seemingly is based on
the very same strategy, tactics and
weapons with which the enemy beat
us. We are simply reversing the
island island procedure. Having
learned from the japanese the ef-
fectiveness of combined carrier and
land based aircraft operations, with
spasmodic support Of surface vessels
and invasion by barges. we are fol-
lowing the same pattern. The diff
ference is that our equipment is
better and we have more of it.
Evidently our top leadership did
not want to gamble with the fate of
the country by inaugurating new
strategy, with new tactics and new
weapons. They preferred to fight
with true and tried weapons and
methods, stalking all on numerical
superiority.
Air Strategy Stressed.
Military experience tells us that
the quickest and cheapest way toI
achieve victory is by springing intel
lectual surprises on the adversary
by striking with weapons and in a
manner for which he is entirely un-
prepared. In this day and age such
surprise can be obtained only
through strategy based on air power
as the dominant force, with every
thing else in auxiliary roles. There
are no more fundamental strategic
surprises on the surface of the earth.
Airmen, who plead for switching
our strategy to the third dimension,
have often been accused of gam
bling" with victory. But they feel
that the very opposite is the case
that the gambling is being done byI
those who rely stubbornly on al
strategy of prewar vintage, on imi-
tation and improvement of the
enemy's methods, and on sheer
volume of men and machines. Air
men reason as follows:
Should the enemy be taken by
surprise by an all-out air strategy
then victory will be swift and losses
slight. But even if the enemy isl
prepared, we could still win by
reason of the same factors on which
we are counting in the present sur
face strategy, namely superior tech
nology, greater natural resources,
more skilled personnel. The clement
Of risk Is therefore at a minimum.
Cost to Be Heavy.
Fighting along our present lines,
we are told, victory is assured be-
cause our troops will have "over-
powering superiority in every kind