Carbon County news., 1944-12-14

s|S M other United N;
tions. At lea
c,l,e G,eneraIIssimo this is what migf
Chang kai-Shek
be termed the ir
ner official view here.
The motives behind the Still
well withdrawal, unexplained at
the time, thus now become more
fully evident. The whole panOply
of mystifying news from that
front thus becomes apparent.
Chang has always been suspi-
ciOus of the Chinese COmmu-
nists.
While they are fighting on his sid'
with their armies far off in thu
north, he actually has had soldiers
detached from his own war effor
on the Japanese front to watcf
them. True, the Communists have
not been much of deterrent to the
Japs. While some published esti
mates of their strength run as high
as 100000, numbers are worthless
in gauging any Chinese fighting
forces.
No one knows exactly how many
troops the Commies have, except
that these have been sufficient to
repel few Jap attacks. Many
whom they count as soldiers are ac-
tually farmers who run to action in
an emergency. Others are unframed
civilians, and the term bandit has
been applied to a few in the past.
Now by kicking from his cabinet
the strongest anti-Communist ele-
ments, Chang is falling in line with
the ideas of officialdom here for
more coherent action on that front.
However, the change can be in
terpreted as more political than mil
itary so far.
Improved Leadership.
Those who know the new war min
lister say they expect his leadership
to bring some Improvement" in
Chinese fighting, but very few peo-
pie in this country appreciate the
difficulties he is facing.
Frankly, it must now be said that
no satisfactory Chinese military ef-
fort has developed anywhere lately
The action on the Salween river
front may be an exception, but there
we trained the officers and men,
1t is time to admit also that China
is mostly in Jap hands. All of the
industry and much Of the agricul-
ture went long ago. The seacoast is
closed Most of the internal rail-
roads are controlled by the Japs.
We are today flying in from
India through the only contact
the Chinese have with the out
side world more materials of
war than were carried on the
Burma road before the Japs cut
it..
But our planes flying in a load of
gasoline for instance probably con-
sumo as much as they can carry as
1 load. The limitations upon our as
;istance are therefore evident, and
likely to continue indefinitely, al
hough we have greatly increased
'ur supplies in the last five months.
Then again we must recognize that
Ter armies are sometimes led by
What we used to call provincial
var lords" many of whom are pol
ticians not strictly supporting the
government.
The Chinese internal economic
distribution system has not inn
proved much since before the
war, when news of vast starva- {
tiOn was a world sensation al
most annually. Imitation is un-
believable, and indeed most au- G
thOrities suspect China cannot {
survive financially even if peace
comes soon. Certainly the CEN ;
trail government is none too sure ;
of itself.
But as these internal inefficien- S
es, dissensions and weaknesses are C
ative to the Chinese, so also has e
cen their cold, valorous spirit of il
.sistance against the conqueror.
lille the difficulties practically
mount now to internal demoraliza- >,
On, they are not likely to lead to :.
collapse of the fight on that front. =,
The Jap drive in China luckily is r
nited. All advices here prove rath- d
conclusively that the Jap strategy t,
directed only toward cutting cen q
al China off from Burma-if it n
n be done. But even if this mis- n
IN is accomplished, they will then a
We long lines of communications h
ming back to the coast. m
Such extensions are really invi-
tions for the special type of fight
9 the Chinese do best. Chang is 4,
t sufficiently equipped for battle :,
Iced could not protect five or sly ,
our valuable airfields which have y
W been lost. =,