Evening star., 1944-12-31
Air Power Influence
Limited in Combat
Fighting in Europe Brings
Revision of Pacific Plans
By O1Den L. Scott.

Revision OF Pac1tlc Plans
By ODen L. Scott.
The latest German offensive, timed
at the moment when Allied commando
ers were looking for a German sur
| render, has served to answer one uues-
ton that had previously gone unan-
swered. That question concerned
| whether or not air power, with its
bombing, can win war singlehanded
The answer quite definitely is: 1t can
| not. The airplane is important, even
vital. Without it, and without air con-
troll, victory in modern war prob
ably is impossible. Yet the airplane, like
the battleship. or the tank, or the big
| gun, or the rifle is just one more weapon
| of war and not the whole war arsenal
| in itself.
Winston Churchill was the war leader
who asked for an experiment to deter
| mine whether the war against Germany
| could be won by bombing alone, after
Russia had whitfield down German man
| power. The experiment was given every
| possible support. In both Great Britain
| and the United States, the air forces
received the best of everything They
were given the cream of manpower,
the largest appropriations, the first call
on all productive facilities. Nothing was
spared and every demand Of air force
| leaders was met.
| The result that the air forces pro-
duced with the facilities given has
turned out to be satisfactory but not
decisive.
AS matter of fact, two disastrous
shortages showed on the United States
British side in the critical moment of
the war against Germany. One of those
shortages was in old-fashioned infantry.
Because of that shortage the American
Army today is throwing into combat 49,
| year-old boys without all of the train
ing promised to them. The second Of
those shortages is in old-fashioned ar
tillery Artillery needs were badly un-
derestimated by the air-minded COM
manders and only now are being recog-
nized for what they are
Thus, 1t turns out in practical eX-
perlence that the Importance of air
power was overestimated and the i'm
portance of old-fashioned ground forces
was underestimated
There are two uses to which the air.
plane is put. One is its use as a
strategic weapon, striking over long
distances at the industries and pop
ulated centers of the enemy. The other
Is its tactical use in cooperation with
ground troops. In both instances, the
airplane is in effect an artillery weapon.
Strategic bombing has had most en-
phasis in the United States Air Forces
and in the British Royal Air Force
After two or three years of pounding
German cities, it now is evident that the
Germans have been seriously inconven-
fenced. Production of their war facto-
ries has had to be dispersed and made
less efficient Cities have been badly
damaged. Very many civilians have
been blown up. Even so, there is no
conclusive evidence that the German
will to fight has been destroyed or that
| German industry is helpless. That is
true after more than five years of war
and after the Russian Army has bat
| tered the German Army
On this score, it apparently must bs
concluded that strategic bombing Is I'M
portant, but by itself Is not enough to
win war.
Tactical use of air power to date has
| proved even less decisive. At the most
critical period of the latest German
offensive, airplanes were grounded for
several days on account of weather. The
war itself however, did not stop on ac-
count of the weather or because of dark
ness. 1t appears, too, that air recon-
naissance did not disclose the size of
German concentrations of men and ma
terlal for their offensive
1t was at Casino, in Italy, that air.
planes were given their first tryout on a
great scale as a tactical weapon de-
signed to paralyze resistance at key
points. The Casino experiment was
disappointing and many times since
then it has been disclosed that the air
plane is no more effective, if as effective,
as ordinary artillery in paving the way
for advance.
All OF this adds up to a situation Of
much Importance for the future.
1t suggests that bombing of Japan,
although important. Is not to be decisive
and that large land operations may yet
be necessary, in addition to naval block
ade, to bring japanese defeat. Even
now, plans for the Japanese war are
being revised in the light of what has
been disclosed by the fighting in Europe.
| x*
Experience with the airplane also sug-
gests that this weapon in the future will
take its place as one of the weapons in
the armory of the Army and the Navy
rather than as assuming an independent
rank as third independent arm of the
services. There may be an independent
status for the strategic air arm, but
within the Army, not outside
The airplane, too now will have to
accept rival in the field of shorter
range bombardment. This rival Is the
rocket. in which Germans have pio-
neered and have left the United States
and Britain far behind. 1t seems that
our side was so preoccupied with the
airplane that it overlooked development
of this other weapon that could have
been of great use in bombarding the
highly important German Ruhr area.
All in all, war experience in serving
to de-emphasize the airplane and air
power and to fit this weapon into its
L. i