Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1944-08-19
U. S. AIR
POWER
BY Maj. Alex P.
de Seversky


be knocked out of the war and
forced 10 surrender without
invasion. He held out the Dos
sibility that the far eastern
enemy may be driven TO sur
render before the assault in
vasion stage is reached.
The press rightly played up
his assertion as a significant
departure from recent claims of
naval strategists. For three
years now they had in lis I g d
that the war in the Pacific
could not be ended until
triphibious task forces, includ-
ing men with bayonets. stormed
the beaches of the japanese
home islands.
In effect, Adm. Nimitz has
conceded what airmen like the
late Gen. Billy Mitchell have
argued long ago. He has thus
provided the proof that under
the pressure of events the logic
of the air power age Is being
recognized, slowly but surely.
THE cr,lx of the furious dis
pute between surface and
air minded military thinkers
has been this very issue of
whether Japan or any nation
can be defeated without actual
invasion.
We have maintained that once
nation is knocked out OF the
war, whether we decide TO
occupy or not 10 occupy is a
purely political decision
OF course, Adm. Nimitz sticks
10 his guns of naval tradition
when he foresees that the
knockout will be scored by sea
blockade and air and sea bonn
bardment" TO quote the OK
preston used in dispatches from
Pearl Harbor.
TO-DAY there is no longer any
i such thing as sea blockade.
Germany tried to blockade the
British Isles with her subma-
rines and nearly succeeded-as
long as we depended on escort
vessels and other surface means
TO fight the menace. But when
the Job was turned over 10 AIR
power, the submarine threat
was quickly eliminated.
At our OWN end. the Allied
blockade of Germany today is IN
effect an air blockade. If Allied
naval strength were no greater
than Germanys, could Hitler
conceivably open up sea routes
Would any of his surface YES
sells venture into seas beneath
skies where Allied aviation
reigns supreme? The blockade
of Germany is maintained by
ring of air power, in the British
Isles, Africa. Iceland, the
Azores.
Adm. Nimitz. while concedlng
the basic principle that Japan
can be defeated without inva-
sion. adheres TO an outllved sur
face assumption that the air
plane is simply auxiliary fire
power. of the navy. That as
sumption is implicit in his ref
erence 10 air and sea lombard
ment" as though 1t were a COM
bined fire power of the fleet.
IN REALITY, of course. air
l. power is a strategic force IN
its own right. AS the matter
stands, air power has begun its
blockade of Japan--a more et-
fective blockade than was ever
possible with surface forces. l
refer to the fact that our long
range bombers are not only
striking at Japanese war indus
tries but are cutting japanese
exterior and interior lines of
communication.
The admiral is dealing with
incommensurates when he puts
into one combined category air
action from distances of 1900
miles and more, and sea bonn
bardment from distances OF 20
and 80 miles.
If and when we reach the
stage where we can apply sea
bombardment' against Japan,
it Will mean that japanese air
opposition has been eliminated.
Otherwise we shall be unable TO
venture into japanese home
waters.
As long as the enemy possesses
formidable defensive air power
any reliance on sea lombard
ment" is pure self-delusion.
There can be neither sea
bombardment nor sea blockade
for the simple reason that naval
forces cannot operate in waters
shielded by hostile air power.
JAPANESE air power must
u first be neutralized, but once
that is accomplished, Japan Will
lie hopelessly exposed TO de-
struction by tridimenslonal
blockade from the air. Bomb
bardment of a narrow strip of
coastline by naval units at that
point wouid he ineonsequential.
Whether the admirals have
grasped the fact or not. effec-
tive blockade in this day and
age can be applied only by air
power, because it not only
sewers exterior lines of COM
municatlon but wrecks interior
lines. at the same time that 1t
destroys the enemy's means of