Imperial Valley press., 1944-02-21
by
Peter
Edison
nv rFTER EPSON


@One of the more perpieNlnS ques-
tons raised by the senate Truman
committees report on transporta-
ton was what the army was 60
Inc TO do with the more than a
million and a half trucks on hand
and an order for l944 This as
the report said pointedly, "consti-
tutes a tremendous number OF
trucks"
ut looks like q tremendous num-
Ser to the United States civilian
trucking industry, too. Only 3,OSJ
ney trucks have been manufac-
iured fer civilian use since early
1912. A million new trucks had been
urade in le4l, but of these. only
lg9, 900 trucks of ali types were left
ia dealers hands as a stockplle to
be rationed to essential civilian
users. Less than 2.300 Of these
trucks remain on hand, and they
will all be gone by April l. Com
mercial truck operators therefore
look longingly at the tremendous
army production and put on all tne
pressure they can to get some OF
nese trucks diverted TO civilian
Transport. A large part OF the
pressure consists in making Il ap-
pear that the army can't possibly
use this many trucks, and that the
civilian truckers need them worse
FOR the admittedly increased loads
Cf war production freight they are
hauling.
COMMITTEES FINDINGS
1. The way the Truman committee
ysresented the figures was like this:
For the year 1943. the war de-
partment requested the production
Of 67l.l07 trucks for its own use
and that of the British and Russian
forces. The present estimates are
that 607.6l0 were delivered. For
1874, for the same uses, the war
department has requested 742,433.
! Actually. the army requested
g64.355 but it was allocated only
The 742.433. But the 607,6l0 and
the 742,433 add up TO l,35o0o0-not
a million and a half-and you be-
gin from there.
5 To the army this number of
trucks contracted for in the two
year program makes sense and IS
not excessive. People just don't
Appreciate how dependent We are
On trucks" says Maj.-Gen. L. D
Clay of the army service foroces
in charge of procurement.
1t is considered impossible 10
reveal all the figures on the mill
tary truck requirements program,
but enough can be given TO quiet
some fears and justify some Of the
larger numbers.
The first item to knock off is
shipments to Soviet Russia, the
United Kingdom and other lend
lease aid and navy This will
account for nearly 40 per cent Of
The total, or approximately $4,000
trucks. This 20 per cent will be di-
rif3ed approximately % per cent
to Soviet Russia, II per cent TO the
United Kingdom and elsewhere.
= Knock this $4,000 off the $780,
U00 and it leaves a total Of $4,000
vehicles in the two-year production
program. This includes everything
from passenger cars upsto 40-ton
tank transports, but not including
half-tracks or other combat We
hicles.
@It includes jeeps. The total jeep
PRODUCTION in the two-year pro-
ram is $4,000, Of which l69 900
viii go to the Soviet and the Brit
81, leaving 21i,000 for the United
States. Subtract this 2l4,000 from
the $4,000 total and you get an
4ttual truck production figure of
@2 900. which sounds a good bit
more reasonable.
sAs of Jan. l. 1914, the army esti-
mates it had a fleet of 850,000 We
6cles of all types. passenger cars
and up. Perhaps 10000 of them
Were pre-Pearl Harbor models.
Gmy estimates the life of a truck
IN the United States at five years.
m combat areas overseas, the av-
efage is two years which. consider
ing battle attrition, is liberal es-
Innate.