Evening star., 1944-04-24

(c) The offensive defensive
following our seizure OF the ini
had to use a large part of our fl
(d) The offensive, which begal
when our advance bases were m
longer seriously threatened and W
became able to attack the enemy a
places of our own choosing.
The Defensive.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor
the Japanese withdrew from th'
Central Pacific and for the time be-
ing, except for the capture OF th'
islands of Guam and Wake, confined
their major attacks to the Philip
pine Islands and Netherlands EaS
Indies. Our own operations were o.
necessity limited to that line OF en-
envy advance. Guam was easily
taken. Our forces on Wake, aftel
gallant resistance which took 8
large toll of enemy attacking forces
far superior in strength, were over
come at the end of December.
Except for the forces in the
Philippine Islands under Gen. Mac
Arthur, our strength in the Western
Pacific area consisted chiefly OF the
Asiatic Fleet, few aviation units
and the garrisons of marines at
Guam and Wake already referred
to. The small Asiatic Fleet COM
manded by Admiral Thomas c. Hart
included the heavy cruiser Houston
the light cruiser Marblehead, Is
over-age destroyers, some 20 SUBJ
marines, two squadrons of Catalinas
comprising Patrol Wing 10, and a
few gunboats and auMiliaries which
could not be counted on for combat
With this force (plus the light
cruiser Boise, which happened to be
in Asiatic waters when the war
warning was received we undertook
to delay the enemy's advance until
such time as we could muster suf-
ficient strength to put up any real
resistance. In so far as completely
stopping the advance was con-
cerned, the campaign was fore
doomed but it nevertheless con-
tributed materially to the ultimate
check of the Japanese advance, and
the energy and gallantry of the Of
ficers and men participating con-
stitute a remarkable chapter in the
history OF naval warfare.
Ships Dispatched.
During the latter part of Novem-
Der, when the Japanese advances
along the coast of Indo- China indi-
Gated the approach of crisis, Ad-
mtral Hart had sent the Marblehead
and eight destroyers to Borneo
Likewise, the Houston, Boise and
the destroyer tender Black Hawk
had been dispatched to operate in
southern waters. On the evening of
December 8, therefore, after the
japanese had bombed our airf1elds
and destroyed many of Gen. Mac
Arthur's planes, our submarines and
motor torpedo boats, which were
still in Philippine waters, were left
with the task of impeding the en-
emy's advance.
On December 10, the navy yard at
Cavite, which had long been recog-
nized as insecure, was practically
wiped out by an air attack which
also damaged the submarine Sealion
and the destroyer Peary, the Seahon
being destroyed by our own forces
to prevent its capture. On the same
day the Japanese effected landings
on the islands and thereafter all
attempts to bring In effective guam
titles Of supplies by sea proved un-
successful. 1t should be noted, how
ever, that on December 10, there
were some 200,0 900 tons of Allied
shipping in Manila Bay, most of il
good and some of it with valuable
cargoes. ALI but one of these ships
got clear, to the southwark, under
what amounted to cover by our sur.
face forces, and escaped via the
Sulu Sea and Makassar Strait. Thi.
was an important save"
The holding of the Army's posi-.
tions on Bataan and Corregidol
became only a question of time ant
Rear Admiral F. w. Rockwell, whit
was in command of the local nava
defense forces, moved with them Il
Corregidor on December 26.
Plans Worked Out.
Admiral Hart set up his headquar
ters in the Netherlands East Indies
Shortly thereafter Gen. Sir Archi
bald p. Wavell of the British Arm,
arrived and assumed supreme com
mand in that theater, whereupoi
Admiral Hart became the command
er of the Allied naval forces. Unit
Admiral Hart's arrival in Java, Rea
Admiral (now vice admiraD Viii
liam A. Glassford commanded thu
surface ships in southern waters
assisted by Rear Admiral william
r. Purnell and other members o
the feet staff. Up to this poin
dnsofar as the Asiatic Fleet wa
concerneO the campaign was con
Quoted in accordance with plan
worked out in the Navy Department
PA Aoi w Vic outbl Cdh Vi llUSGlllJlCS.
The method adopted by the Japa
nese in making their advance
through the Philippine Islands an,
the Netherlands East Indies wa
built around their air power. Afte
building up their strength at
given base they would overcome tn
consistently inferior Allied air op
position at the next point of attacl
and then send along heavil,
screened amphibious forces to max
landings. AS rule the distance
were too short to permit attack b.
our naval forces while the enem
was en- route.
AS soon as the enemy were IL
control OF a new area they woul,
repair the airfields and gather force
for the next attack. These tactic
were well adapted to the geograph