Evening star., 1944-03-26

forecast the military trends of the war.
Our diplomats who have been resting
on the laurels they won at the con-
clusion of the Moscow and Teheran con-
ferences are bewildered. OF course, they
suspected, like most men who have even
a smattering of knowledge on the COM
plexities of European politics, that some
day there would be frictions among the
Allies. There always have been fric-
tions among war associates after the
wars they had been fighting together
came to an end. But it was hoped that
the differences of concept about the
postwar world would not come to the
surface until the defeat of the enemy.
The Germans are fighting the war
alone. They have no associates in Eu-
rope-only satellites who are doing what
they are told so long as German divi-
sions are nearby. Germany's other big
ssociate-Japan-is thousands of miles
away from the European theater of
operations and is as much a predatory
nation as the Reich itself.
The objective of the Allies was to
create better world. The common
objective of the Axis was to get as much
as possible, territorially, out of the war.
Now their principal objective is to avoid
defeat, if possible, and to obtain peace
which would permit them to preserve
at least portion Of their gains.
Came at Bad Time.
This, of course, would be completely
out of the question if unfortunate politi-
cal dissentments had not occurred
among the principal United Nations
dissentments which no longer are con-
cealed in the secret files of the three
governments concerned. They are out
in the open. This in itself would not
have been bad omen had it not come
at the crucial point of the military cam
palgn in Europe when the military
clauses of the Teheran agreements were
by way of being transplanted into con-
crete action.
Moscow's recent political maneuvers
have created good deal of confusion
in the Washington and London govern
ments and among the people in the
United States. The war aims-and there
can be no valid reason for fighting a
war unless some definite aims are fol-
lowed by the nations which are throw
ing in everything they have-have be-
come beclouded
There is divergence between what
Is purported to be Russia's political aims
and those of the United States and Great
Britain. The U. S. S. r. has shown that
1t has realistic nationalistic intentions.
The ultimate aims of the British govern
ment. besides the maintenance of the
empire, which lends itself to number
Of interpretations, appear different from
what they were at the outset of the war
when Britain riskeo destruction to pre-
vent the establishment of one dictatorial
power over Central and Eastern Europe.
The United States, which has nothing
to do with power politics, desires justice
for ALL the small and large nations
which have suffered from the aggression
of the totalitarians, and security in the
future in the Pacific.
Told of Harmony.
The political objectives, the Ameri-
can people were told, had been fully
harmonized at the Moscow and Teheran
conferences. They were satisfied with
prima facie evidence as contained in
the various official statements and
declarations from the men who are at
the helm of the republic 1t is only
natural that they should have been
shocked when they discovered that
neither of the meetings had actually
paved the way for a cohesive collabora-
tion among the big three.
The Germans are taking full ad-
vantage of the new situations which
have arisen in the Allied camp. They
are now shifting their strategy to make
the utmost of the misunderstanding
among the Allies in the hope of reaping
q good political harvest out of them.
1t is common knowledge that the
principal point covered at Teheran was
a strategic unity among the Russian
forces on one side and the American
and British forces on the other. After
protracted discussions it was agreed
that the Allies would strike at the Ger
mans from the west while the Russians
would continue their relentless offensive
from the east.
The Nazis evolved a new strategy to
meet this new threat which the German
general staff recognized as being dan
gerous. 1t consists of an attempt merely
to parry the Allied blows in Italy and
in any other section of the Mediter-
ranean; to hold back the Russians and
take them as far as possible from their
main supply bases, and to concentrate a
large force in the west with the hope
that they would be able to make another
Dieppe of the forthcoming Allied land
ing.
Nazi Diplomats Active.
In the meantime, the Nazi diplomats
have become buster than ever in an
attempt to break the Allied diplomatic
wall in the east or west.
The difficulties encountered by our
forces in Italy have made that campaign
a most profitable undertaking. When it
was first conceived, against the better
judgment of the American strategists,
the Allied high command had high
hopes that the Germans would put up
a token defense, such as they put up
in Sicily, and withdraw to the Pc River
line, which we did not intend to tackle.
Strategically this would have been
sound. The Germans, however, offered
much sitter resistance than had been
anticipated by the political men who
mapped this military adventure.
The losses suffered in Italy, together
with the fact that substantial force