The Ypsilanti daily press. (Ypsilanti, Mich.) 1928-1962, 1944-11-20
SideIiqhts on The News

, event. In the Pacific. whereas the
Japanese were active and alert in
/ our territory.
Young officers were reluctant TO
report on anything unless speci-
foally ordered TO do so by their
superiors. As a consequence the. e
was much hocus pocus mystery
and gumshoe work. but little expert
gathering of the facts which Wash
irgton should AaIe had at hand.
A top Navy intelligence officer
wrote in the summer OF 1871 that
the Pacific feet Is at one OF the
strongest bases in the world
Pearl Harbor-practically on a war
footing and under a war regime.
There will be no American Port
Arthur"
Were our naval authorities mis-
led by the over-conhdence OF GER
tain members OF the intelligence
stan? Did this overcon1dence lead
to the statement published on
Sunday, Dec. 7, 1871, that the U.
S. Navy was ready? And was 1t
responsible for the belief that our
fleet could wipe out the japanese
navy in a few weeks?
We were surprised at the at
tack. The Japs were astonished -
that their intelligence had been so
excellent, their propaganda SO eff
fective.
n March 1871, a report which ]
have studied, warned high naval
authorities as follows:
I'VE spend millions on ships but
Congress failed to appropriate for
an off-shore patrol system which
could cover the tremendous coast
line of sparsely inhabited bays and
harbors suitable for use by an at
tracking force. For years Japanese
government ships and crews were
sneaking in and out our territorial
waters"
An intelligence officer replied
"our Navy is wise to these people
and when the time comes will take
them in hand"
Yet three days before Pearl Har-
Dor, the Navy Department was
warned in a lengthy report by a
naval reserve officer that I'm event
Of a declaration OF war with Japan
naval intelligence is not ade-
quately prepared"
West Coast naval districts were
urready to inspect and inventory
gear and equipment of Japanese
fishing vessels. Dual ownership
and dummy control of vessels was
not satisfactorily established. The
FBI could trace ownership OF Japa-
nese ships yet the Navy could not
handle the assignment In time OF
peace-it had to wait until attack
ed to index its files. Highly placed
Navy officers, in writing, said the
Coast Guard had the job OF peace
time patrols!
Colonel Knox on March II, 1912
observed in a private communica'
ton that the Nays intelligence
department gave him a great deal
of concern. The difficulty he found
was "a fundamental one.
THE training OF naval officer
is not such as TO fit him for efficient
and effective intelligence work.
They do the best they can but the
best is by no means sufficient he
| noted.
The Navy secretary hoped that
career men could spend their
whole lives In intelligence Knox
pressed a proposal to Congress for
S1.50O,O00 with which 10 secure goo
trained investigators and civilians.
Congress twice refused to make
this appropriation.
Finally, will the Pearl Harbor In
vestigators reveal the powerful in
fluence exerted by Japanese gov
er1ment representatives and the
lobbyists OF Japanese business int
erests from coast 10 coast to sup
press investigation OF Japanee ac-
tivities in Alaskan waters and of
] Southern California?