Evening star., 1944-04-28
StreomIining the Military

WV
The nature of modern battle con-
stitutes in itself a most persuasive
argument in favor of the broad plan
to merge the War and Navy Depart
ments into single governmental
unit. Everywhere at present. in
every major offensive undertaking,
our land, sea and air forces must
operate as a closely integrated team
directed by unified overall COM
mand. If they did otherwise, func-
tioning separately and not together,
our victories would probably be few
and far between, for if experience
has taught us nothing else in these
bloody times, it has taught us that
no one branch of our armed serv-
ices can be sufficient unto itself but
that all are interdependent.
And what holds true in respect
to the co-ordinated organization of
our forces for combat-such as in
the case of our amphibious opera
tions in the Pacific-seems by logic
to hold equally true for the admin
istration of the Army and Navy at
the highest level of authority, in
peace no less than in war. Indeed,
since Pearl Harbor, we have moved
far toward this kind of admins
trative unification, and have in ef-
feet largely achieved it, through
the mechanism of the joint chiefs
of staff headed by General Marshall
and Admiral King underathe civilian
leadership of Secretaries AStimson
and Knox-a mechanism linked to
the President through Admiral
Ie&hy who is attached:.directly to
Mr. Roosevelt as a sort Of chief Of
chiefs of staff.
This setup, as events have DEM
onstrated, has been of great service
in promoting the efficiency of our
armed forces by reducing duplica-
tion of effort, cutting down waste
motion and pulling together many
loose threads in such fields as plan
ming and supply. But aSs General
McNarney, deputy chief OF staff
and one of the Army's most brilliant
organizing minds. has just told the
House Committee on Postwar Mill
tary Policy, the structure, despite
its obvious value, will fall apart
automatically with the end of the
war and the expiration of the Presi-
dents emergency powers unless
Congress takes steps in the mean
time to give it permanence on the
basis of enabling legislation.
With Secretary Stimson, General
McNarney has therefore called
upon Congress to act "as soon as
possible" so that the integration
and streamlining of our military
strength may become a formal
legislative fact within six months
after the war" Though some ad-
vocate that the change be put into
effect even before the end of hos
tllit1es, neither he nor Mr.. Stimson
appears to favor such a course, feel
lng-With good reason-that a fun
damental midWar departmental re-
organization of this sort could lead
to serious confusion at a time when
great battles still remain to be
fought. AS explained by General
McNarney, the plan, to become
operative not until after the shoot
ing stops, would be to consolidate
the War and Navy Departments into
a single organization headed by a
secretary of the armed forces, "
with three undersecretaries-o for
the Army, one for the Navy and one
| for the Air.
This plan, in its broad aspects, is
believed to have the approval of all
the military and civilian leaders
charged with the main responsible
tiles of prosecuting the war. 1t
gives rise to several controversial
questions, of course, and it may tenc
to excite anxious speculation over
the relative future influence of the
different branches of service anc
over their ability to continue whole.
some competition in the proposed
new organization. But such matter.
are of secondary significance. Tht
all-important thing, in Genera
McNarney's words, is to do no more
at first than to establish the funda.
mental consolidation, for I'VE mus
avoid the error of trying to prescrib.
exact specifications to cover multi
tudinouS details that can be WORKED
out only in an evolutionary manner
This makes sense. The whole basi'
plan makes sense. What is happen
ing on all the battle fronts of tn
world leaves little room for doub
that something like it is not onl,
essential but virtually inevitable.