The Wilmington morning star., 1944-09-26
TODAY and TOMORROW
Problems Of A &c rman Settlement
By WALTER LIPPMAN]

be more than three. But the great
question is how are these "par-
titioned" German states to stay
partitioned? If they like indepen-
dence and cherish it, tina tbs one
thing. But if they resent the parti-
ton and long to reunite, then the
attempt of the Allies to enforce
partition becomes like the attempt
to unscramble vest e I'd US
scrambled eggs.
For this reason we must not, I
believe, waste time arguing fierce
" about whether we think
Germany should be divided up. We
must fix our attention on the neces-
sary and prior problems of ad-
ministering the military govern
ment of Germany in such way
as to promote the appearance by
democratic processes of trust
worthy Germans. Only when that
has been done can we know what
we are talking about when we con-
slider the German political settle
ment.
Nor have we yet got to the
bridge we shall have to cross ir
settling the economic position OF
Germany. We, that is to say the
Allies, cannot make the long-range
decisions until we have decided
what economic measures are
necessary to prevent the revival
of German military power. This
problem is now being discussed In
all the Allied capitals, and opinion
ranges widely between two poles
There are those who propose the
destruction of German industrial
power on the theory that only il
the Germans cannot rearm can we
make sure they will not rearm.
At the opposite pole there are
those who believe that a flourish.
ing German economy should be re-
stored, and that German rear11a.
ment should be prevented not by
economic measures but by mill.
tary force. Between these two
poles of theory there are m y
proposals which lean one way or
the other
My own view is that The more
effectively the problem is exam.
ined the greater will be the tend.
ency toward the second view -
that is to say toward regarding
the prevention Of rearmament as
calling primarily for military
measures, and only incidentally
for economic. In such a view we
would forbid the making of any
weapons and the training of any
men in military formations, and
we would destroy or remove any
installations or tools exclusive.
ly designed for war. We would
reserve the right to be the Judges
cf what is violation of this rule
and to back up this prohibition by
drastic penalties quickly applied.
But just because civilian industry
can be converted to war purposes
we would not attempt to destroy
German civilian industry.
The reason for not destroying
German civilian industry is that
it is impossible to reduce the Ge1
man people to an agricultural
level. They would die of famine
or rather long before they died O.
famine, they would become 6
sullen fostering mass of desperate
human being that no one coulI
deal with.
The whole theory of destroying
the German war potential by de
stroying German industry is a con
: fusion of cause and effect. It as
sumes that people are warlike be
cause they can make weapons
whereas in fact they maxi
weapons because they wish to b
OR have to be warlike. We had il
1871 the greatest war potential il
the world and we were just abou
as unwarlike as a big nation CA
be. The Japanese have a SINAI
war potential but they are a war
rior nation.
Therefore our target in German
= should not be her civilian indus
tires but her military system -
that is to say the finished pre-
ducts for use in battle - weapons
and officers corps, trained troop
planning stats, mobilization plan
and records, intelligence service:
That is easier than trying to sto
automobiles because they ca
transport troops or clothing fat
tories because they can make un
forms.
This does not mean or impl
that German civilian. industr
should not be controlled. Contr'
and destruction are two quite di: