Evening star., 1944-12-08
Mujor War BIunder
Loid to Selfish Groups
Writer Blames Arms Shortage on
Reconversion Pressure
By Da,id Laurence

BY David Laurence
Under q system Of invisible govern
nent 1t is difficult to locate the re-
sponsibility for blunders. Yet the
country lis witnessing today the con-
sequences of major blunder which was
aided and abetted by selfish groups In
the National Capital in urging and
pressing for reconversion to civilian
production before the Army and Navy
were ready for that reconversion.
The selfishness undoubtedly sprang
from commercial pressures only In part.
There was good deal more political
pressure in 1.-THE desire of certain
groups to get control of war plant
facilities and to acquire authority or q
voice in the disposition of war plants
and surpluses
Now that the Army and Navy are
crying out for more manpower to make
shells and ammunition and there is an
evident setback in the whole program
Of reconversion, 1t might be well to re-
examine some of the things that hap
pened last summer.
Wilson Stand Recalled.
When Charles E. Wilson, recently vice
chairman of the War Production Board,
came away from the White House on
July l3 last he declared there was no
issue between himself and Donald Nelson
with respect to reconversion except the
question of timing. Certain New Deal
groups, nevertheless, began to talk Of
the necessity for cutting war orders after
Paris was taken. In the letters of
resignation and acceptance exchanged
between the White House and Mr..
Wilson, the former War Production
executive said that he was opposed to
any interference with war production as
its necessity was stated by the Com
mander in Chief and the joint chiefs Of
staff" He also stated in his letter that
the "dissension" on the timing of re-
conversion was harmful to war produc-
ton
Many of the New Dealers assailed Mr..
Wilson on the ground that he was
opposed to the resumption of civilian
production. Mr.. Nelson, on the other
hand, was hailed as the champion Of
reconyersion, but they did not want it
put into effect until the European war
was about over. They fought against
making the plan public or even indi-
eating that it was in process until 1t
was absolutely clear that the war with
Germany was ending.
1t is significant that only few days
tLa
the first time limited program of re-
conversion because the wider application
had been definitely postponed
There is no way of telling, however,
what damage was done by the pressure
for reconversion at an inopportune time
Shortages now being felt in Europe must
be said to be responsible for prolonga-
ton of the war.
This, of course, does not explain all
the mistakes that have been made, for
part Of the blame must fall on the Army
in Understanding the need for am
munition. This is understandable be-
cause not until American troops landed
in Normandy did it become clear that
the war would have to be won with an
unprecedented amount of artillery fire
Some Of the blame must attach, too,
to those Americans who zealously in
sisted upon air power as the major
emphasis IN the present war in Europe.
There Is no doubt that air power will
deliver as important and vital blow
toward ANAL victory as any single arm
of the service, but it is also true that
failure to give enough attention from
the outset to infantry and artillery re-
quirements has made all the difference
between victory this autumn and victory
next summer.
No Use to Look Back.
1t Is, of course, of no avail now to
look back at the mistakes made in fall
ing to toresee the large shortages Of
ammunition with which our armies are
confronted now on the European front.
But it is probable that the military will
always be able to say that the pressure
for reconversion on the home front was
. menace to the war effort itself and
that manpower shifts away from war
plants came as a consequence of the
attitude taken by civilian officials who
insisted that the end of the war was In
sight and conversion to civilian pro-
duction could be readily undertaken.
Industry will probably be blamed for
much of this pressure, but any one who
has lived in Washington throughout
this war period can easily discover that
political pressure and especially the
pressure to get control of war surpluses
and civilian supply from a political
angle not only forced Charles E. Wilson
out of the War Production Board when
he had the full support of the Army
and Navy, but also resulted in slowing
up the whole psychology behind war
production.
Fortunately, j. A. Krug, who succeeded
Donald Nelson as chairman of the War
Production Board, has the whole
hearted support of the Army and Navy
and Is doing Unbalanced job.
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