The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1944-06-19

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needs to be clarified and defined.
It is now used to cover every
thing that may happen from the
day of the armistice to the end of
the twentieth century. AS a result
there is no meeting of minds.
When one man is talking about
what needs to be done immediat-
ely, another about what might be
done at the end of one, two,
or three years, and another about
what ought to be done in the much
longer future they are not talking
about the same problems. Natural
ly they find themselves at cross
purposes.
The true postwar period is not
the whole future but that period
during which we shall be dealing
this war. We cannot in fact jump
over this transitional period and
We must not jump over it in our
thinking. 1t is the period in which
the armed forces will be demobili-
zed, industry reconverted, internal
and external war debts accouned
for, military commerce transform.
ed into civil commerce, provisional
governments replaced by perman-
ent. It is the period of the special
regime during which the enemy
states will be on probation, and
the occupied countries are red ress-
ing the balance.
Some of the phases-for exam
rle, the American demobilizatio IN
and reconversion will be shorter
than other pDases-for example,
tie probao-;cn u, Germany But
all nf them toge.Aer are he us
war TeIioI vt.,Gf will LAT, y we
laey iu1ge from historic exrerI-
ence, ap:u:.,: r~n years A..er .ae
arml:tice. Not Until this o.s,wa-
perio' has svea passed IL. we
likely 10 K:.: " Whether the wn, ID
has rcae:cd irf re or less .att.. :!
peace, such as prevailed in III
nineteenth r1ruLJ, or wheeaei .:e
postwar period las become a we
war period as it did betwee, 1881,
when Japan seized Manchurla,
in 1888, when Hitler rose to power
Our great task in all fields of en-
deavor is to manage this postwar
period so that fifteen or twenty
years hence political relations are
essentially stable and economic
conditions are workable. If we sue.
coed, we may pitch high our hopes
and look confidently upon plans
for collaboration among the free
peoples.
But we must not make the car
dinal mistake Of 1919 and think, as
Wilson did, that the special diff
ficulties of the postwar period can
be dealt with by a universal insti-
tuition, in theory permanent, but
new and untried in fact. Nor muet
we make the Hoover mistake at
Paris of dismantling the war ma
chinery before the war conditions
have been iquidated, or the Re-
publican party's mistake under
Harding of proclaiming return
to normally when the state of the
world is still abnormal.
The divisions among us arise in
considerable degree from a failure
TO make clear the distinction be-
tween the transitional measures Of
The postwar period and the state
OF things we wish to reach at the
end Of the period. Senator Taft,
for example, announced the other
day that it would be like pouring
money down a sever for the
United States to participate in the
proposed international monetary
fund which is to be discussed at
the coming Breton Woods confer
ence. The Senator believes that
currencies cannot be stabilized
without first taking all the other
steps necessary to get a country
on an exporting bacis," and to
this end he recommends direct fl.
nancial agreements with Great
Britain. Russia and other coun.
tries.
But Mr.. Taft would not have
needed to throw SO much cold un.
clean water on project which is
nelng worked on by many Of the
ablest tnen of all the nations, i.
me had understood, or if they hac