Evening star., 1944-08-01
Commander Slogan
Seen Politically Weak

Commando Slogan
Seen Politically Weak
Dewey Only Has to Point Back
to Pearl Harbor, Says Writer
By DaOid Laurence
Although there are many Democrats
who feel that their strongest point in
the campaign win be the "Comman-
der In Chief" argument. It IL question:
able what the eject Of such Q debate
viii b II Coy. Dewey decides TO take
up the challenge.
The weakness from the Democratic
point Of view Il that the President has
already indicated that his responsibility
for the status Of the armed forces goes
back before Pearl Harbor. Thus, In his
letter 10 Chairman Hannegan Of the
Democrats National Committee on July
10 last, Mr.. Roosevelt wrote:
BY next spring I shall have been
President and Commander In Chief Of
the armed forces for IL ysars--three
times elected by the people Of this
country under the American constitu-
tional system"
It seems odd that Mr.. Roosevelt would
employ the term commander In chief to
refer to the period before Americas
entry into the war on December Z, 1871,
and even before September, 1899, when
this war began. It Is evident that Mr..
Roosevelt u willing to stand on his
record - Commander In Chief during
the nearly II years that he has been in
the presidency.
Matter Of Preparedness.
If this II the case, 1t opens I'D many
matters. including the preparedness of
the United States with respect to the
Army, Navy and the Air Forces. There
Is, for instance, the question of forti-
flying Guam. Recently Senator Walsh,
chairman Of the Naval Affairs Commit
tee Of the United States Senate, Issued
. public document giving the history of
that particular controversy, and he
points out that ut no time cid the Navy
Department actually recommend the
fertilization Of Guam. Therefore, the
fertilization item was never voted on
by either house Of Congress.
What was voted upon was q Small
appropriation Of $50oo,o 900 for harbor
dredging and this item was stricken
out by vote Of 205 to 16s on the floor
OF the House. When the matter was
up before the Senate, there was q belief
that the Navy really wanted to fortify
Guam, but apparently nobody In the
executive branch Of the Government was
willing to say 50 flatly.
Admiral Leahy, who was chief of
naval operations at the time, was asked
ut the hearings in 1889 what 1t would
cost to fortify Guam. He replied, "As
= rough estimate. something In the
neighborhood Of s200, ,000, 900. Such
proposition is not in the mind of the
Navy Department ut the present time,
The only improvements contemplated
are $5.000,0 900 for harbor improvements. {"
The Walsh document also gives q brief
history OF naval legislation from 1922
to 1874 and points out the policy of
the Government during those years in
respect to building up the Navy to its
present strength. 1t Is apparent that
the real wishes Of the Navy Department
were not met. or that the various naval
ofncers who testified were not permitted
to ask for what they wanted.
Admiral Stark, who was chief Of naval
operations In 1910. was asked q direct
question by the Senate Naval Affairs
Committee as to whether he favored a
two-ocean Navy, and he said there was
no need for 1t. Thus, as late rs 1910.
Mr.. Roosevelt did not direct the chiefs
Of the armed forces to ask for Navy
capable Of lighting two-ocean war.
Duty Of the President.
A large part Of the responsibility for
failing to build up the Navy can, of
course, be placed squarely upon the
Congress Of both the Republicans and
the Democrats, but under the Consti-
tuition 1t is the duty Of the President
to recommend legislation to Congress,
There is no record that Mr.. Roosevelt,
either in his capacity as President or
Is Commander In Chief, made recon-
mendations to build up the Army, the
Navy or the Air Forces to war strength
1910.
There Is also another aspect of the
Commander in Chief argument which
relates to strategy rather than prepar-
edness. The question Of Mr.. Roosevelt's 5
responsibility Is Commander in Chief
might be debated on the basis Of why
80 many battleships were assembled at
Pearl Harbor instead Of being dispersed
and why, Notwithstanding the recon-
mendations Of naval chiefs, the fleet was
not distributed in . manner better cal
culated to defend the Philippines.
These questions Of strategy are DIM
cult to air during the war because the
administration can clamp down q CEN
sorship rule and prevent the publication
OF details. But enough members of
Congress know the facts to participate
In the debate should the subject be de-
veloped further in the campaign.
Neproduetion Rishts Rsssrvsd.)
Temper Of the British
Prom the Montreal Star.
There is 4 dour satisfs ekion Sor xhs