davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1944-11-23
From the Quebec L'Acton catholique.

Prom the Quebec L'Acton Catholioue
Who is there that has not his after
war program? Never has the future
had similar body of coutiers, each
one more audacious than the other.
To recall here the phrase of Victor
Hugo would be outmoded romanticism!
Tomorrow will, however, be what
the family makes it, Let the factory
be transformed into luxurious labora-
tory, resplendent with neon tubes; let
the shop shine with cleaning zinc and
false porcelain; let the houses be of
glass and the motors of plastic, parents
will still be needed to educate youth
For all the progress of science and
art and even of pedagogy will never
take away the rights and the duties of
the fathers and mothers of the family.
That great truism hides, however, a
terrible problem. For all these inno-
vations, this gigantic upsetting of men
and of things, consequences of the war
and of the period of transition that
follows it, will modify the way of life
of the people and will exercise their
influence on ideas and morals. 1t is
necessary to adapt ones self to them
to an extent, and to react against ex-
cesses which will be inevitable in such
conditions.
Evening star., 1944-11-23
Letters to The Star
Spokesman for Prisoners Re.
joices in Philippine Invasion
To the Editor Of The Star:

To the Editor Of The Star:
1t is unlikely that this will accomplish
much, but in behalf of the thousands Of
kinsmen Of American prisoners OF war
in the Far East cannot refrain from
taking issue with David Lawrence, who
in his November Is signed column in
The Star argued that the invasion Of
the Philippines may delay the ending
Of the war against Japan.
In every State in the Union there are
those who have gone to bed night after
night for more than 80 months with an
ache in their hearts and solemn prayers
for nearly 5000 Americans who since
April 8 and May 6, 1912, have been
carried on the casualty roles as missing
in action"
We are told that every War Bond
purchased every speedup in war plants
means the saving of lives on the fight
ing front and shortening the war
Never have so few done so much
with 50 little" is the graphic tribute to
the heroes Of Bataan and Corregidor.
There are about $4,000 of those heroes
In Japanese prison camps-most of
them, we believe, in the Philippines.
Haven't they waited long enough?
Haven't the Japanese been given enough
opportunity to neglect, abuse and tor
ture them? Don't we owe something to
them and their parents, wives and other
kinsmen that we should repay with
interest. and as speedily as possible?
We do not want the war prolonged,
but we do want relief for our men in the
Far East
We believe that McNimsey 81 Co.
Admirals Halsey and Nimitz and Gen.
MacArthur-and the men who make up
the Philippine expedition are carrying
relief in the only manner that the Japs
can understand and in the only manner
that they cannot block.
At last our men behind the barbed
wire on Luzon, Mindanao and the other
islands that hold prison pens can look
into the sky and see ray Of hope
bombers. They can. hear in the distance
the unmistakable approach of ultimate
release from bondage, suffering and
humiliation.
For months in the early stages Of
conflict in Europe we heard the plain
tive cry, TOO little, too late" Thank
God, enough is there, we believe; and
before it is too late, we hope
Perhaps it may be that the war may
be little longer, but most of us be-
lieve that the expedition will help to
speed that day when at last the Jap
anese can be made to understand the
meaning of their own words, spoken
heretofore derisively: ZOO Zorreel"
CHARLES H. ADAMS.
Regional director Federated Organiza-
tions for Bataan Relief, St. Joseph
13, Mo.
Evening star., 1944-11-23

This brings up an issue even more
important than increases in wages
the need for some steps which will hold
up wages in the period after the Gov
ernment shuts down on big war con-
tracts. 1t Is to this that both organ
lied labor and thoughtful members Of
Congress and the administration should
give intelligent thought. 1t will be nee
essary not only to keep up employment,
but to sustain wages at proper levels,
once the law of supply and demand
begins to work If the country is to
come out of the war situation in a
healthy condition labor must be we'll
employed and we'll paid Anything else
will spell disaster.
The Pepper concurrent resolution,
which the Florida senator hopes to pass
through Congress, is not binding as
law. 1t merely undertakes to advise the
War Labor Board that it will have the
moral support of both houses of Con-
gress if it raises "substandard" wages to
IS cents an hour. 1t is, nevertheless. an
invitation to the board to establish a
minimum wage in industry of IS cents an
hour. If adopted, it would be so con-
strued. The present minimum wage
and hours of work act fixes DO cents
an hour as the minimum wage OBJ
jective. The board in the past, under
war conditions, has advanced this
minimum wage in some substandard
wage cases to so cents.
y
II the War Labor Board, under this
invitation from Congress, should rule
that wages under IS cents an hour are
substandard, the board will be driving a
deep wedge in the Little Steel formula.
Not only will it affect many workers,
giving them advances in wages beyond
the formula, but it will be followed by
demands for increases in wage levels
for more skilled workers. on the ground
that If the minimum wage is 65 cents
an hour for the unskilled, then they
are entitled to sharp advances. The
upshot of the adoption of the proposed
65-cent minimum wage might be a
general advance all along the line 1t
is true that the increased cost of living
has hit some of the lower paid workers
hard, The sensible plan seems to be,
however, to let the War Labor Board
act, as it has in the past. to give relief
where it is particularly needed
Evening star., 1944-11-23
Wants Really Big Stadium

To the Editor Of The Star:
have followed with a great deal of
interest your efforts to promote the
construction of satisfactory stadium
for Washington.
I have lived in majority of the
larger cities throughout the United
States, and think can appreciate the
demand and the definite benefits that
will be provided to the city as whole
and for each resident as an individual.
I know that one small voice will have
little bearing, but I know that your
paper will have tremendous bearing,
and would not be discouraged by some
Congressman who says there is too much
fuss about it-because 1t takes lot of
fuss to stir some of these fellows up.
My experience in various cities has
been that when they enter into projects
like this, there always is some one who
wants to hold them down and before
they are finished they have been out
grown. Therefore, I think you would
be within your rights to stand for a
large stadium. A seating capacity of
100000 would do, but we really should
have one that would accommodate 1885,
600 or more. The additional cost would
be very small item if proportioneu to
the whole when the job finally is
athletic fields? JOHN EISENHARD.
Fairfax, Va.
Evening star., 1944-11-23
The Political Mill
By Gould Lincoln

A battle to break through the Little
Steel" formula and bring about wage
increases Is in full swing. The attack
Is being made both directly and indi-
rectly, through fat demands by or
ganized labor that the President act
since the matter has been dumped in
mis- lap by the War Labor Board-and
through a proposal by Senator Pepper
of Florida which seeks to bring the
minimum wage to IS cents an hour
The issue is of supreme importance,
since 1t affects the whole effort of the
administration to prevent runaway la
Dor costs and to keep down prices to
prevent wild imitation. Organized la
Dor sought before the election to have
the Little Steel formula discarded. The
formula limits basic wage increases to
Is per cent above the January, 194l
level. When the administration failed
to act in advance of the election, it was
predicted the break would be made
after the election. Labor, claiming
much credit for the result of the presi-
dental election, is losing no time in
making further demands for change
in the wage formula
So far the administration has stuck
to its guns. The release of a report
made by five-man special War Labor
Committee. declaring that the cost of
living had increased between 20 and 30
per cent since January, 194l, instead of
435 per cent as asserted by organized
labor leaders, strengthens the position
Of the administration. 1t shows the
increased cost Of living within touching
distance Of the increased average wages.
The effect of the report on public
opinion may be important And public
opinion may have much to DO, in the
end, with any decision of the Little
Steel formula.
A high official of the administration
discussing the wage issue off the rec
ord. insisted that the Government must
keep control over both wages and prices
for some time. 1t was understandable,
he said, that labor should seek wage
increases under present wide employ
ment conditions; that labor understood
wage increases would not be won so
easily once Army orders for goods and
munitions were drasticauy curtailed.
The problem then, he added, for the
average worker would be to hold job,
or to find one.
Evening star., 1944-11-23
This Changing World
By Constantine Brorn

Unless some unexpected development
occurs within the next few weeks, Presi-
dent Roosevelt Is not likely to consent
to meeting with Prime Minister
Churchill and Premier Stain until after
his Inauguration on January 20.
Nothing definite has yet been decided
AS Mr.. Roosevelt emphasized at his
news conference Tuesday-but in politi-
cal quarters close to the White House
1t is reported that the President Is in
sisting that at their next conference the
leaders of the Big Three United Nations
should reach a definite agreement on
plans for postwar Europe. He is said to
feel that sufficient tentative" accord
has been found and that the next meet
ing should settle certain political ques-
tions once and for all.
In addition, Mr.. Roosevelt is described
as feeling that 1t would be a waste of
time for him to make so long trip to
meet Premier Stain without knowing
how the present offensive on the western
front Is going.
Until now the six Allied armies which
are pounding the Germans along the
400-nile western front have progressed
according to schedule. All along the
line the gains have been in the nature
Of a "warmup" to the real offensive
which is yet to come. No real attack,
as forecast for SO long by the German
broadcasters, has yet taken place in the
Aachen sector, although the American
lst and 9th Armies, and just recently
the British I'd Army, have been moving
ahead in the last week in an offensive
which dispatches have made no attempt
to minimize.
Although much credit is due the
French 1st Army on the southern end of
the long Allied front-in an around the
Belfort Pass-the Germans have been
offering only a perfunctory resistance.
The Nazis are fighting delaying opera
tions in the center of the front, where
Evening star., 1944-11-23
German Defense Moves
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot

In analyzing any great military opera
ton, 1t is always difficult to hold the
balance evenly as to the various parts
of the operation, and to weigh them
one against the other in correct proper
ton. 1t is difficult for the American
observer on this side of the water to
do this now with regard to the great
offensive which is storming against the
whole western defense front of Ger
many, but if we make mistake it will
not matter in the least, we can correct
it next day.
1t is the difficulty imposed on the
German high command which really
matters; if Field Marshal Won Rundstedt
makes a mistake, it is likely to be his
last mistake. AS for Gen. Eisenhower,
he is the man who knows the answers
because he knows what he is trying to
do, and where he intends to seek a
decision
Yesterday it was pointed out in this
column that the Germans had been
compelled to accept a serious setback
in the south in order to maintain their
position in the north, where defeat
might be Immediately decisive as far
as the fate of the German armies in the
west is concerned.
1t is this time factor which Won
Rundstedt must keep chiefly in mind at
the moment. If he is overwhelmed in
the north, it is hard to see how he
can hope to get back across the Rhine
for new stand: he might have had
chance of getting away If he had
started few days ago. now he is
heavily engaged, he is committing at
least part of his mobile reserves. and he
must stand and fight it out where
he is.
Defeat in the south does not entail
such Immediately disastrous conse-
quences because of the difficulties of
the terrain. 1t will be serious indeed for
the German cause If the Rhine is
preached between Strasbourg and the
Swiss frontier, of course, but it will not
be disastrous right away. But If the
Rhine we're to be crossed in force any
where between, let us say, Arnhem and
Immediately hopeless.
Sometimes we become so involved in
these geographical definitions OF victory
that we tend to forget the real purpose
of all offensive battles: The destruction
of the opposing enemy forces, the
taking of ground, the crossing Of river
lines, the forcing of mountain passes,
the clearing out of forests are all part
Of this ultimate purpose. Thus if the
French sweep north along the Rhine,
they are trying not just to move rapidly
but to destroy the German 10Th Army.
The same thing is true in the north.
It is the two German armies which are
opposing the Allied forces on the
Cologne plain which are the objectives
of our attack, not Cologne itself, or
Dusseldorf, or the great river. If those
armies are destroyed as organized
fighting units, If they are dispersed and
dissolved as the German armies In
northern France were dispersed and dis
Evening star., 1944-11-23

solved, then the way into the heart of
Germany is open.
A nation is defeated in war when 1t
no longer has men with which to de-
fend itself or when the men it has no
longer have the will to stand and fight
The breaking of the German will to
fight is not yet accomplished, and does
not seem likely to be accomplished as
long as there are enough desperate
fanatics to make the rest of the Ger
mans toe the line. This being so, the
one way to defeat Germany is to kill
or capture enough Germans so that it
is physically impossible to keep up an
organized defense
This is what Gen. Eisenhower is try
ing to do. This is why it is gratifying
to see the signs that Field Marshal Won
Rundstedt intends presumably because
he no longer has any other choice to
fight for a decision west of the Rhine
In that situation, if he is defeated, the
destruction of his armies is more than
likely.
The main efforts OF both Eisenhower
in attack and Rundstedt in defense
appear to be in the north. That is
because Eisenhower desires to win
quickly, and because Rundstedt is fight
ing for time to train more troops, turn
out more equipment, build more de-
fenses Rundstedt has so far resisted
the temptation-which must have been
very great-to send any reinforcements
south. He has held his mobile reserves,
so painfully collected, in the north.
These are estimated at eight or nine
armored divisions, with about so tanks
each. Front reports suggest that many
of the tanks are brand new, indicating
that they come direct from factory to
battle, and that once they are knocked
out there Is nothing much In the way
of replacements behind them. Approx
mately 100 of these tanks were thrown
against the American 9Th Army, and
have been defeated in four-day battle
in which tank losses were about equal
but not really so, because ours can be
instantly replaced. This battle may
clear the way for an Allied advance to
overrun the Roer River front and the
centers Of Duren and Julich.
Here we are again resorting to geo.
graphical terms: But the point to be
made is, that If the Roer is overrun,
if the two road centers come into our
possession, we shall then be able to pour
out in great force on the Cologne plain,
and with our superior mobility and tao
tical resourcefulness, w should be able
to inflict vast injuries upon the German
Army, composed as 1t is of a large
proportion Of poorly trained and rela-
lively immobile troops.
If at that point We have two or three
days Of good weather, we might well be
able to kill or capture enough Germans
SO that the rest would be unable to
organize further effective resistance on
this front.
That is what will count: The number
Of Germans that we can put permA-
nently out Of action. When we have
carried this process far enough, the vic
tory will be ours.
tcopysasht. 1o4A.l
Evening star., 1944-11-23
A Splendid Response

The Community War Fund cam
paign this year has come to close
in the same spirit of cheerful con-
f1dence which marked it's beginning.
A friendly enthusiasm among the
campaign workers seemed to COM
municate itself to the whole COM
munity of the Washington Metro
politan Area. making for an
atmosphere of good neighborliness
that seems to have been reflected
In the results.
The results are splendid. For the
first time since the war needs were
superimposed on and combined with
the Community Chest appeal, the
goal has been reached-not merely
reached, but exceeded-and this goal
was the largest ever set for any
comparable undertaking in Wash
ington. The Importance of meeting
this money goal cannot be overesti-
mated, for failure in that respect
leaves a black mark apt to affect
future efforts. Washington can
never afford to be found wanting.
In larger sense, the results indi-
cate that we are coming nearer all
the time to still another goal, meas
ured in terms of community appre-
citation and understanding of the
objectives of social welfare. Those
closest to the campaign this year re-
mark on the fine public response in
its conception of the purposes of the
appeal. The annual Community
Chest campaigns are necessary to
raise money. but they accomplish
the vitality necessary object of Gre
ating new interest in the Chest
agencies and the work they perform.
The greater and more sustained this
interest is, the better it is for the
Chest agencies. and the more ef-
dcient their work will become.
There were several noteworthy de-
velopments in connection with this
years campaign, which tend to en-
phasize the fine spirit of city-wide CO.
operation. The great volume of
publicity was without cost to the
campaign. furnished as it was as
public service or paid for by public
spirited citizens. There was no
charge against the campaign fund
for any of the campaign luncheons
the workers buying their own food
and supplying volunteer service.
There were fewer meetings, which
left more time for the work of So
licitation, and that went on with a
determination and persistence large
iy responsible for the outcome.
Too much cannot be said in COM
mendation of the volunteers and for
the fine leadership given them by
Coleman Jennings. In congratulat-
ing them, the community congratu-
lates itself.
Evening star., 1944-11-23

Gen. p.sttton's forces are striking, and
Their defense just to the north of this
sector has been none too strong.
The key to the campaign Is the north
ern anchor, above Aachen, where Berlin
commentators have said the Allies will
launch the big blow and where the
Germans are reported to have massed
the bulk of their forces
Although the weather has been quite
a handicap to the great superiority of
air power all along the front, 1t is not
to be regarded as too great a deterrent
to the ground forces. The American
troops, who comprise the majority on
the front, have no need to fear long
winter campaign-as far as the weather
is concerned-but every moments delay
IN forward movement helps the Ger
mans to grid their defense that much
better.
&. And so within the mex few weeks we
are likely to see the grand offensive
blossom forth-and until it is far
enough along to assay its possible final
result, President Roosevelt, Prime
Minister Churchill and Premier Stain
are not likely to meet.
Prime Minister Churchill is reported
to be ready for conference at any
time it can be arranged His duties,
though strenuous and important do not
at this time demand that he remain
In London when there are more
pressing matters to be discussed else
where. On the other hand, Premier
Stain himself may want to delay a
conference until after January 20, be-
cause he doubtless has made plans Tor
an early Red Army offensive and
desires to stay in Moscow, from which
point he can direct it.
Thus, though plans naturally are sub
ject to quick revision, there seems little
likelihood of a meeting until after
January 90.
Evening star., 1944-11-23
Veterinarian

He Is quiet man as though he spent
His youth Dithin whispering, secret
1pood,
Communing ,oith small creatures ond
content
With elemental Nfe WIiich he found
\ good. -A.
He did not hate the for tDho tore the
Ding
OF speckled thrush, guarding her
nest too long,
Instead he naended the hurt and tinid
thing,
Biding his time until he heard It's
song.
II he had stoorn the Hippocrntic oath
His skillful hands might Uell h1ue
brought him fame,
Yet he pursued his natural bent like
the grot1th
OF forest trees, remembering the
OF Francis OF Assist, gentle saint
Who ntinistered to erery creatures
plaint
HARRIET GRAY BLACKWELL.
Evening star., 1944-11-23
Why LeYte?

A full month of intensive fight
Ing by land, sea and air in and
around Leyte, with the issue still
far from being decided, raises the
pertinent question why the Japa-
nese high command has chosen to
make the island a major battle
ground at so high cost to their
side.
That General Macarthur should
have chosen Leyte as his initial
point of attack on the Philippines
is clear, because it is the best entry
to the middle group of islands which
lie between Luzon and Mindanao,
the main japanese strongholds in
the archipelago. The only alterna-
tive for him would have been the
twin island of Samar. which is more
rugged, has poorer communications,
and possesses less flatland for air
fields.
However, from the japanese view
point, Leyte is merely the first of
a series of islands which lie one
behind the other from east to west.
Bohol, Cebu. Negros, Panay-all four
must be successfully taken by the
American invaders before the is
land-chain between Luzon and
Mindanao can be severed and we
obtain egress to the South China
Sea. Why was no such stubborn
defense made on Samar, which
would have served our airmen al
most as we'll? The all-out effort of
the Japanese fleet was presumably
made to foil our entire invasion
project. Once that attempt failed
with crippling losses to japanese sea
power. the invasion itself could not
be eliminated, and military logic
would have seemed to dictate a pro-
longed defensive campaign by the
japanese to wear us down with
minimum losses and risks to them
selves. From this standpoint. a
series of stubborn yet limited delay
Ing actions on each of the island
series would stand a better chance
of making us pay the maximum
price.
But that has not happened. In
stead, the Japanese high command
is throwing in reinforcements to
Leyte at very high cost to them
selves in men, ships and planes. The
destruction of one convoy alone,
caught by our air patrols en- route
to Leyte. is estimated to have
drowned 5000 Japanese troops, while
japanese losses, on the island itself