The Waterbury Democrat. [volume] (Waterbury, Conn.) 1917-1946, 1944-06-06

A great many interpretations
have been put upon that language.
Events proved that Molotov and
Stain interpreted 1t to mean that
there would be an Anglo-American
invasion Of Europe prior to Jan. !,
1913. Churchill arrived In Wash
ington within q fortnight Of Molo-
TOYS departure and to suggestion
for immediate invasion Of Europe
he parted an abrupt mo" 1t had
been assumed that the second
front" discussed by Mr.. Roosevelt
and Molotov had meant a second
front In western Europe. That GER
tainly, was what the Russians had
In mind.
Churchill argued that the point
Of attack should be from the south,
against what he termed "the UNDER
belly Of Europe" and he enlarged
his ideas to propose tina the major
assault on Hitler's fortress should
include an Allied movement into
the Balkans. Churchill was deter
mined on that point but he was
even more inSiStent that wherever
the blow might fall, 1t should not
in 1912 be a blow based In Great
Britain against western Europe.
And, besides, the Allied cause was
In the balance in North Africa. It
was while Churchill was at the
White House in June Of 1912 that
Tobruk fell and Rornmels Afrika
Corps began the Axis penetration
10 Egypt.
Stains rejoinder from Moscow
to word that the invasion Of Europe
would have to be delayed for time
must have been something to listen
to although 1t Is not as yet OF pub
lie record. It persuaded Mr.. Roose-
welt to order Gen. George G. Mar
shall, Chief of Staff, Adm. Ernest
J. King, Chief Of Naval Operations,
Harry J. Hopkins, Presidential con-
fidant. and Stephen T. Early. Presi-
dental secretary, to make an
emergency journey to LONDON III
July, 1892 less than a month after
Churchill left Washington.
Marshall King and the others had
orders to attempt to win Churchill
over TO q 1912 European invasion.
Mr.. John Bull stood pat. Marshall
and King had an alternative propo-
sition. It was for the invasion OF
North Africa at Oran and Casa
blanca, and at London In July, 1942,
that plan was agreed upon.
Mr.. Roosevelt already had given
Stain the best evidence OF GOOD
faith that was within his power by
sending General Dwight D. Eisen-
hover to Great Britain as Com
mander for United States Forces IN
the European Theater OF Opera
tions. Eisenhower was followed by
Lieutenant General Carl A. SpaatS
who arganized the U. s. Eighth AIT
Force, the first American striking
force against Europe based abroad.
The June, 1912, Roosevelt-C hur-
chill conference and the July Lon
don decisions were explained by
Mr.. Roosevelt this way in an effort
to mollify the angry Russians:
The coming operations which
were discussed In detail at our
Washington conferences, between
ourselves and our respective mill
tary advisers, will divert German
strength from the attack on Rus
sia."
But Stain was not satisfied.
Churchill made hurried visit 10
Moscow to explain why a European
invasion In 1912 could not be un-
dertaken In 1912. Stains reply
shortly thereafter was a blunt pub
lie demand that the United States
and Great Britain make good fully
and on time" on their invasion
pledge.
That was the way things stood
when the American invaders hit
the North African beaches in Mo-
vember, 1912. Even Stain was i'm
pressed by that smartly executed
amphibious manuever and the
hard-hitting manner In which the
American troops went to work.
Furthermore, Rommel's Nazi forces,
already backtracking from FL Ala
mein, heard the bell toll and speed
ed their retreat with the British IN
pursuit. All this brought from Sta
lin a somewhat grudging acknow-
ledgment that the North African
landing fulfilled the perquisites for
undertaking second front"
Stain Demands Front
It was soon evident, however,
that without an actual invasion OF