Evening star., 1944-10-22

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speed along the eastern shore But
the 9th ran into very stiff oppo-
sition in the center. Here was a
Japanese strong point, complete
with artillery and tanks at a place
the Army dubbed Hells Pocket.
Two companies attempted frontal
assaults and failed with consider
able losses. Then Army COM
manders, as they had done at the
neck of the peninsula, called for
artillery and bombers before at
tempting an attack All this took
about four days
Meanwhile the 4th Division had
pushed ahead on the east and the
I'd Division still held its much ad-
vanced positions on the left. The
4th Divisions supply problem was
difficult and it's flanks badly eX-
posed. The I'd Division had trouble
on its right, and both cursed the
Army roundly as they tried to fight
forward and to the side simultane-
ously.
At this period, the 4th Division
had by far the heaviest casualties,
although the I'd Division had taken
important losses on the beaches, in
cluding the wounding of Col. Jim
Grove of Tarawa fame.
The Army had not had to fight
its way ashore, so went into the
land battle at full strength. How
ever, it had lost number of KEY
officers, notably 1t Col Harold
Mizony of Spokane, Wash, battalion
commander in and spark plug of
the 106th Infantry.
At any rate, the corps command
called on the Army for additional
speed. The line became increasing
| ly U-shaped, with the 9th Division
at the bottom of the u" The situ-
alton could have been dangerous,
and it did put the entire operation
we'll behind the original schedule.
Aslito Airfleld, although in Amer
ican hands, could not be used to
full advantage while the japanese
center was still so close to it. Night
fighter pilots had to be guarded on
the way to their planes. Day air.
field workers had to form their own
guarding preimter at night. Pilots
turned infantrymen to defend their
tents against infiltrating Japs..
Whether all this can be blamed
on the fact the 9th Division had
not advanced on plan is a question
for military experts and extremely
doubtful; but certainly the delay
contributed. Whether the disrup-
ton OF carefully plans was
more important than the sacrifice of
lives in a mass assault is a ques-
ton for philosophers.
At any rate, Gen. Holland Smith
blamed Gen. Ralph Smith, and re-
lieved him.
For the Army general, it was
direct reversal of his record on
Maxim, and it came only few DAYS
after the Marine commander had
publicly commended his Army COL
league on the early showing of the
9th Division on Saipan.
Gen. Ralph Smith returned to
Hawaii Immediately, being sue
ceeded by Maj. Gen. Sanderford
Jarman.
Gen. Jarman relieved one reei-
mental commander Immediately
but made few other important
changes.
However, whether it was the new
command or whether it would have
come anyway, the division did be-
gin to move faster. Within hours
Hells Pocket was wiped out. With
in days the "U'' became straight
line and the two divisions on the
right gradually forged ahead as
originally planned, turning more
and more northwest until finally
the remaining Japanese were
penned in the northwest corner of
the island. Garapan fell. The
9th Division returned to the west
shore, cutting in ahead of the End
Marines for the final assaults on
Marpi Point and the desperate
japanese remnants.
When the battle was over the 9th
Division had covered more ground
than either of the marine units and
had suffered fewer losses.
Gen. Ralph Smith, in Hawaii. told
his story to his superiors. A general
investigation held him still fit for
new assignment which, although
unannounced for security purposes.
Is known to be commensurate with
his rank.
The battle for Saipan ended OH.
cially "a days after the original
assault. Whether anybody was to
blame for 1t not ending sooner is a
question for the experts. Whether
the fact it did not end sooner had
any truly important effect on the
Pacific war remains to be seen.
There is no such indication now.
(Nert Sunday Mr.. Worden will
tell Dhdt iDas behind the runner
that American troops broke and
ran before a japanese counter
attack