Evening star., 1944-10-29
Two Naval Concepts
Clash in the Pacific
Sea Power Given Secondary Role
in Japanese Strategy
BIZ John II. Cline.

6B JOHH II. CtIHc.
Only the Japanese admirals know
why important units of the Imperial
Navy were sent last week on their dis
astrous mission into the narrow waters
Of the Philippines-a seemingly reckless
gamble IN which at least IL of their w..r-
ships were sunk and Is or more damaged
by American gunf1re and carrier-based
planes. The Japanese, of course, will
tell us nothing, but the information
which is available suggests two possible
explanations.
One is that the Japanese stratepists.
deciding that the time had come to chal-
lenge the westward advance of Ameri-
can naval power, sent their fleet out to
seek battle, hoping to break the back of
the tremendously powerful fleet COM
manded by Admiral Halsey. The other
explanation, and by far the more prob
able, Is that the japanese foray was de-
signed to protect their line of communi-
cations along the China coast by STOP
ping Gen. MacArthur's invasion of the
Philippines before it could get well un-
der way.
II the Japanese had been seeking q
decisive engagement with the American
meet IL seems most unlikely that thev
would have divided their attacking force
INTO three units, thereby reducing their
overall strength and inviting the DANGER
OF being attacked and DESTROYED in de.
1ali. furthermore, such a hazardous
Undertaking would have been a sensa-
tlonal departure from a concept of naval
warfare to which Japan has adhered for
at least three and a half centuries
Earlier this month Admiral Nimitz
decided to have a little fun with war
correspondents at Pearl Harbor Sim
mohlng them to a press conference. he
solenlnly read a "communique" describ-
ing crushing victory over the Japanese
meet on Korea. The enemy, he said
mad been utterly destroyed, but before
the astonished correspondents could
dash to their typewriters. the admiral
explained that the communioue was
dated in June, 1892.
That naval disaster of $50 wears aoo
was no joking matter to the Japanese
And because it exerted an influence IN
their naval strategy which has persisted
10 this day, some of the details are
worth recalling.
In the summer of 1892 Tovotom,
Hloeyoshl, whom the japanese regard
as the founder of their navy. decided
TO invade and conquer Korea. He had
at his disposal an army of some 400 oOo
men and large feet, but the latter, in
keeping with Japanese concept hum
areas OF years old, was essentially a
transport fleet. not fighting fleet The
armada which finally set sail included
some combat vessels. But their role
was subordinate one, that of guarding
the troop ships and protecting their
line OF communications. The Japanese
hao no thought of seeking out the Ko-
rean Navy, commanded by an able adj
mlral, Y-sun, and bringing it to battle
with view to securing command or
the sea before the troop ships left
harbor.
FOR while the invasion proceeded
smoothly. The japanese landed at the
tip OF the peninsula and seized the
Korean capital. Another landing force
was sent up the west coast to outhank
the Koreans in campaign not greatly
olHerent In conception from that en-
ployed against the British on the Ma
iayan Peninsula. But the japanese had
underestimated Yi-sun His concept of
naval strategy, like our own and that
Oh the British, was to seek out the
enemy and destroy him. And In June
OF 1892 he proceeded to do Just that.
Yl-sun had at his command a hupe
naval force, including at least one
armor-plated vessel which served as
MS flagship. He speedily destroyed the
invading troopships and routed the
japanese covering force Hideyoshi, cut
OH from Japan, withdrew his army to
the Korean coast ana the entire force
should have been destroyed But the
Koreans, possibly chafing under the ex-
pense OF maintaining their superior
navy, dismissed Yi-sun and permitted
his warships to fall into disrepair. Five
years later Hideyoshi renewed the as
sault. BY that time. however. the
Koreans had enlisted Chinese s,1pport
and the Japanese admiral was beaten
again. incidentally, Yi-sun having
salvaged something from his abandoned
navy, fell upon the retreating enemy
troopships and destroyed many of them
on their way back to Japan
X 4
This Inflated venture did not persuade
the Japanese that their naval doctrine
was faulty. They still rejected the
theory that the function of a navy is to
secure command of the seas by seeking
out and defeating an enemy fleet. In
stead, they continued to place primary
reliance on their land forces, looking
to their fleet to safeguard the passage
OF troops to points of attack and to
insure line of communications there
after. This was true in the Sino-
japanese War of 1894-5, and again in
1904, when the Japanese DESTROYED the
Russian fleet. In this latter connection.
there is tendency to think of the
Japanese Navy as having taken aggres-
sive action. But that was not the case
The Russian Pacific fleet in Port
Arthur tried to get to Vladivostok an
effort which was turned back by Admiral
Togo in the Battle Of the Yellow Sea.
Togo did not attempt to destroy the
Russians. however, although he had an
opportunity to do so. He was content
to drive them back into Port Arthur,
where Japanese land batteries sent the