Evening star., 1944-03-02

Importance in the long run than
the raids on Truk or the Marianas
important though these attacks
are, of course, in the forcing of the
japanese fleet back to home waters
For immediate purposes the con-
quest of the Solomons Islands, in
cluding Bougainville, under Ad-
miral Halsey, and the relentless
advance of our armed forces in New
Guinea under Gen. Macarthur may
have some far-reaching effects on
Japanese strategy. The japanese
may have to make up their minds
whether they will send fleet to
defend the bases on the western
end of New Guinea or whether they
will fight merely a delaying action.
Air Supremacy Is Key.
Our air supremacy in the South
Pacific, both from the decks of car
riers and by land-based planes, has
prevented the Japanese from send
ing surface vessels of any size to
reinforce their garrisons and most
of the latter are being left to starve.
Our surface patrols have done eff
fective work in sinking barges and
cargo ships.
A glance at the map will show that
from the Admiralty islands, we can
fly land-based bombers over a wide
arc-northward toward Truk and
eastward toward positions on New
Britain and New Ireland still held
by the Japs. We can fly land-based
planes, too,. toward Madang and
Wewak and the bases along the
northern coast of New Guinea Pres
emily we will open up supply line
which will be virtually an inland
waterway between Hawaii and the
north coast of New Guinea and
eventually the Philippines. Our
transports carrying troops and sup
plies will be able to travel in ever
increasing numbers toward the
Philippines where we must some
day concentrate The present line
of approach would seem to be head
ing toward the Southernmost islands
of the Philippines.
Coincidentally, the mid-Pacific
operations of our Navy will be head
ing some day for the northernmost
group of the Philippines. All this
takes months and months of prep
aration and organization. MacAr-
thurs idea all along has been to
approach the Philippines from the
south, but the counsel of naval
strategists, who were better versed
in the problems of naval warfare in
the Pacific than the general, pre-
vailed. 1t was deemed wiser to make
sure of the Solomons and safeguard
the supply line to the Solomons
and then strike straight across the
ndd-Pacific to the Gilberts and the
Marshalls in a bold attempt to rem
der valueless the Japanese holdings
in the Truk and the Carolina Is
lands as we'll as in Guam and the
Mariana Islands.
Viewpoints Merge.
Whatever impatience there may
have been at MacArthur's headquar-
ters last year, there is no doubt now
that the Navy viewpoint and that
of Gen. Macarthur has merged at
last. The seizure of the Admiralty
islands is like effecting a junction
between the two strategies or rather
the two approaches. The chiefs OF
staffs have all along been united in
their vieW-the Army and the Navy
and the Air Force-as to just how
the Pacific war should be fought
and there is no doubt that if Gen
Macarthur had been in Washington
all along and been a member o1
the chief of stats he would have
concurred. Indeed, after the main
lines of strategy were fully devel-
oped, Gen. Marshall went to the
south Pacific and filed in Gen
Macarthur on the details of what
has since been consummated. II
is splendid example of unity OF
plan and command.
Thus while Gen. Macarthur per-
sonally witnessed the seizure of the
Admiralty Islands and the COM
munique was issued in his name
it wac after all naval operation
a sequel to the Navy's carefully de-
veloped strategy of the last two
years. There will be many more