The Wilmington morning star., 1944-10-20
TODAY and TOMORROW
By WALTER LIPPMANN

IT Is always a mistake to under
estimate your enerny, and it is
now evident that during the sum-
mer Allied public opinion underes-
tlms>ed the intelligence of the Nazi
military command. The swift ad-
vance Of the Soviet armies to the
gates Of Warsaw and Immediately
thereafter the unexpectedly rapid
liberation Of most Of France and
Belgium, undoubtedly created the
false expectation of an impending
collapse of all German resistance.
We now see that the Nazi leaders
are far from being fools. that in
deed they are as cunning and
shrewd as they are ruthless and
bold, and that they have had
plan and know what they are do
ing.
They know, Of course, that the
forces arrayed against them are
in the end irresistible. They knew,
we may be certain, that if they
could not hold the Red Army at
the so-called Fatherland line deep
in the Ukraine and the western
armies inside the Normandy pen
insula, they would then have 10
retreat to the Vistula and the
Rhine. Their military purpose, it
appears, was to hold as long as
possible. For their objective was
and is to gain time-a commodity
Of the greatest value to the Nazi
cause.
Their military plan for gaining
time has been to prevent the So.
viets and the western Allies from
concentrating more than a part OF
their superior forces against the
Vistula and Rhine positions. They
achieved this purpose in the east
by holding on grimly to the Baltic
states and in Hungary. This com.
PEELED the Red army either te
guard the flanks Of its long salient
into central Poland, or to straight
en- its line by pausing until t h {
Baltic region and Hungary h a {
been cleared. Adopting a defen
sive strategy intended to gain time
by sacrificing men, the German
high command has been success
full on the eastern front. For they
must count it a success not to have
had their lines pierced and east
ern Germany overrun during tn
summer Of 1914.
In the west their defensive start
egg has been based on a simila
idea, and there also it has achieved
the kind Of success the Nazis wer'
working for. The Germans hav'
held on as long as possible to tn
great ports of France and Belgium
and have used the time gained II
make them unusable for as long ;
time as possible after they had t.
be surrendered. Even now we hav
only Cherbourg, a secondary por
far distant from the fighting front
We have as yet no good port o.
the western coast that we can use
not Brest, St. Nazaire or Bordeaux
On the north the great port Of L
Havre is in very bad shape, an
the Germans still hold t h e ar
proaches to Antwerp. It is est
mated that the Germans may hav
sacrificed as many as 1000 me-
to deny us the French and Belgial
ports, But they sacrificed as man,
as 100000 men to deny us tn
French and Belgian ports. But tn
sacrifice has meant that Genera
Eisenhower has nothing like tn
full power at the Rhine and tn
Siegfired line which he would hav
if he could move all the force
available to him.
In order to carry out this plal
for sacrificing men to gain tim
before the final defeat, Hitler ant
his supporters had to impose thei
will upon the German high com
mand. They did this during tn,
July affair when they hanged som,
Of the generals in order to impress!
all the generals. It is reasonably