The Waterbury Democrat., 1944-03-09

gatlng the war effort. Two hundred and twenty five of the bureau-designed lighters were actually placed. Fortunately, construction was stopped on 1000 of them before it was too late. But the mistakes cost the taxpayers ST. GOO, 900 and a full years delay in getting started on construction of tank lighters and small landing craft of sound deSign-essential in Pacific island-hopping and in the forthco1n- ing invasion of Europe.
 1 The Truman committee investi- gated this situation in the summer of 1942, and on August 5 filed a re- , port with Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. Next day, the secre- tary asked that the report be with held in the public interest. He later asked Chairman David I. Walsh of the senate naval Affairs commit tee to make a separate investigation but when that invitation was de- clined, Knox asked Prof. H. s. Seward of Yale to make the investi- gation.
 NAVY DEFENDED
 Professor Seward reported in November, partially whitewashing the Navy but recommending reor- ganization of the Bureau of Ships in which there were "rifts and chasms between factions" and "peacetime slow-going procedure" The Truman report, now released because the committee considers there is mo possibility that its con- tents would be useful to the enemy" takes sharp issue with Stewards find ing that boat-builder Andrew J. Higgins of New Orleans was ignored In the original tank lighter program only ''due to inadvertence"
 In the spring of 1941, the Navy had two tank lighter models to choose from, and though the Forces Afloat expressed preference for the Higgins design, when the Bureau of Ships on Aug. IS, 1941, adver- tised for bids for the construction of 131 47-foot lighters, they speci- fled the bureau design developed in 1889. Higgins protested had to un- derbid competitors to get a contract for the first 10 and test the first one in April 1942 to show that 1t was unsatisfactory, even in calm water. The contract was only then modified for construction of the remaining nine of the original or der as 50-foot Higgins models.
 Tn the meantime, the Navy had designed another 50-foot model of Its own, ordered 25 from a Massa- chusetts yard without pilot model or tests. On April 4, 1942, there was a White House conference at which the Bureau of Ships was irl- structed to provide 500 50-foot light CTS by Sept. 1. To make sure of getting the 600, the bureau ordered l1O0-all of its own design! Orders were placed April 9.
 HIGGINS MODEL SEAWORTHY On May g, 10 and 12, 1942, first of the Navy's 50-footers was tested at Philadelphia. It maneuvered for ward all right, but was unsatisfac- tory in reverse. Finally, on May 25, 1942. this pilot model and Higgins model were tested at Norfolk, each bearing a 30-ton tank in an IS to 23-mile wind. Says a report, "Tne ! bureau tank lighter shipped so much water that it was forced to turn back for fear of laundering. The Higgins lighter successfully reached Fort Story and disgorged the 30-ton tank on the beach," Although Rear Admiral c. A. Jones said there had been no dan ger of capsizing and Comdr. R. B, Daggett, chief of the Contract De- sign Section in the Bureau of Ships, would not admit that the bureau lighter failed, next day all yards building the HOO lighter were ad- vised that 1t was necessary to change construction from the bureau to the Higgins-type lighter.
 'The failure of the bureau to initi ate rough water tests of its lighter for a period of over three years may be explained" says the Truman committee report, "by any of three reasons: First. negligence: second, an ingrained doubt as to the prob I able success of such tests; or third. belief that it's own design could not be susceptible to unseaworthi- maze