Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1944-02-23
Naval Strategy i'm the Pacific
Base Facilities Are Important in Fleet Operations,
Says Rear Admiral Stirling
By REAR ADMIRAL YATES STIRLING JR. Retired


II is, of course, DIRECT ROAD to the
Philippines, If that is intended.
We cannot ever lose sight of our DISADVANTAGE
with Japan holding islands and mainland from
Burma $500 miles to the eastward, including the
Admiralty, New Guinea, New Britain, also great
part of the coast of China.
THIS AREA IS ONE OF GREAT WEAK
NESS TO US AND STRENGTH FOR JAPAN.
1t would be greatly reassuring if it could be
known that similar United Nations fleet and air
force, as is now in the Marshals, was on its way|
through the Mediterranean, Suez and fndian|
Ocean to seize japanese holdings and co-operate|
with Gen. Macarthur and Adm. Halsey in that
most important part of the world WHERE HALF
THE POPULATION OF THE WORLD RESIDES,|
nearly five hundred million people are now
WHOLLY DOMINATED by a nation of only
ninety-seven million.
before our fleet now in the Marshalls cam
- safely advance into the Carolines for the cap
ture Of Truk, naval base must be organized for|
that fleet in the Kwajalein atoll
There must be constructed there fleet base
capable of giving sustenance to our fleet before|
we move on.
The radius of operation of fleet is about
$500 miles.
Our fleet is at almost the limit of
range from the base at Pearl Harbor.
We will have to bring from home all facilities
for the repair of our ships including docking
facilities, in fact navy yard must be provided in|
the Marshalls where the fleet can be fueled sup
piled, repaired and locked.
Docking is important, for in the tropics ships'|
bottoms foul quickly and that materially de-
creases ships speed.
1t is not conceivable that it is contemplated
sending ships back 2,400 miles fer repairs and|
docking at Pearl Harbor.
The great size of our fleet guarantees its
safety from Japanese attack.
It's size possibly might be as great as 10 bat.
tleshlps, among them our newest, % regular car
rers besides number of converted ones, COL
cruisers, $50 destroyels and large number of
antl-submarine vessels such destroyer escorts.
Our submarines available in the Pacific are|
hunting on Japan's lines of communication in the
Orient.
THIS fleet before it proceeds will have an ap-
preciable delay before it is ready to make its|
assault the Carolines, for the capture of Truk,
and even then it will have some distance to go,
LOO miles, before reaching the Philippines
If the next move is into the Carolines, it must
De assumed tndC base thefe VIII nave TO be eStl
hshed before it can continue further advance!
The seizure of the Philippines by our fleet
UW completely cut Oft Japan from communication
With its conquered territories, the East Indies,
Burma, Thailand and the southern China coast.
On arrvalin the Philippines LARGE BASE|
WILL BE NEEDED IN THAT AREA IN ORDER
TO MAINTAIN THE FLEET SECURELY ANDI
PERMIT FURTHER OPERATIONS.
Thus in order that our fleet can safely pro-
coed to the Orient by this direct route "road''|
will have to be built for this purpose.
There must be bases established for the fleet
in the Morshalls the Corolines and terminal base
in the Philippines THAT is THE ROAD.
THUS we cannot assure ourselves that our fleet
l. can strike lightning blow across the Pacific.
FLEET is DEPENDENT UPON BASES.|
THESE MUST BE ESTABLISHED.
We do not know what quantity of base facil-