The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1944-02-16
TODAY and TOMORROW
By WALTER .LIPPMANN

After the brilliant success in the
Marshall Islands Admiral Ninitz
told the newspaper men that his
objective is to open the way to the
coast of China for ground and air
forces which could then deal final
~ with Japan. This is perhaps the
one most important idea for the
layman to understand when he
hears arguments about the strate-
gy OF the Pacific war.
There have been many contend
ing theories about how that war
should be fought. But there has
been no plan that could be con-
sldered seriously which did not call
for our establishing ourselves Sc
curely and in force upon the main
land of Asia somewhere from
southern China to eastern Siberia.
The Nimitz campaign from Ha.
wall, MacArthur's from Australia
STA, Mountbatten's from India, all
have this same objective. In so far
as one has been favored by the
high command over the others, il
has been because it seemed bet
ter way to achieve this objective.
Ii all the campaigns could be push.
ed with complete success at the
same time, Nimitz through the cen
trail Pacific, Macarthur through
the. southwest Pacific and Mount
batten coming from the west, they
would all meet eventually in China.
We shall see the larger outlines
OF the Pacific war still more clear
~ if We say that the present cam.
paigns of Nimitz, Macarthur and
Mountbatten are for the purpose Of
opening second front on the Con.
tinent of Asia. If we fix our minds
on the need to get to the Asiatic
mainland, it will give us a good
idea of the shape Of things to
come.
On the mainland of Asia there
are two great nations-the Chinese
and the Russians. The Chinese are
at war with Japan. The Russians
are not. When we have fought our
way in China, we shall be in a
large country with huge popu-
lation but with little military
equipment of its own and win a
modest number of troops trained
for modern war. We shall be faced
with a large japanese army which
is quite near its own bases Of
supply. We shall be at the ex'
IRENE end of an enormously long
line o communications in coun
try where we shall have to i'm
port and then contract the install
lations needed for modern war.
1t is evident that the action o
Russia will be critically importan
as to how long and how costly thu
war will be, and Russia's actor
may even be decisive. If Russi;
were completely and, from thu
Japanese point of view, certainl.
neutral, it is hard to see how WI
could in any reasonable time built
up a great enough force in Chin;
to deal not only with the Japa
nese army already in China bu
also with the Japanese army nov
facing the Russians. If the Rus
slams kept the japanese wonder
ing but did not intervene, our tasl
would, of course, be easier, but
would, of course, be easier, bu
it would still be formidable.
But if the Russians interviewed a
a time when we had opened up tn
way to China, then the whole situ
alton would be radically changed
There would be not only the Rus
sian forces already in Siberia but
once the Germans are defeated
there would b opened up a Ian
route from Europe to eastern Asia
The Japanese could not threate
| it seriously and the power we coul'
all bring to bear would be man,
times greater than that which W
can hope to transport across tn
Pacific alone.
Therefore, barring the unexpect
ed and the unforeseeable suddel
collapse of Japan, the promptes
and most decisive ending of tn
Pacific war depends upon 2 mai
elements: that the Nimitz-MacA1
thur Mountbatten campaign
should at least be approaching thei
climax at about the time that Gel
many is defeated and Russia is di'
engaged on its European front.
If we ask ourselves what Russi
will do, we can without mind reat
| ing or inside knowledge say this
The world war is raging in Euror
but it will be concluded in easter
Asia. The pledges given and take
at Moscow and Teheran which ca
for world organization under tt