Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1944-05-14
By Richard l.. Stokes

IcdlisLu oi dAdHS III tiie rdCiliC, VICE
Admiral Frederick j. Horne, vice chief
of naval operations, ushered his visitor
into an adjoining room and presented
him to an officer who rose from desk
with shy and gentle smile. His dark
brown hair was fiecked with gray The
eyes were blue, the features were rudy
and the medium figure was athletic. On
and about his left shoulder were looped
the gold cords of triple aiguillette.
MY aide" the admiral announced,
"Comdr. Clarence w. McClusky, jr. The
man who won the Battle of Midway"
Comdr. McClusky protested that lots
of men helped win the Battle of Mid
way, and that any credit involving him.
self was due to members of his air group.
But the admiral persisted
He already has the Navy Cross
Distinguished Flying Cross and Purple
Heart. I've recommended him to Ad-
miral Nimitz for the Navy Distinguished
Service Medal"
From questions and answers that
followed there emerged story, never
before printed, Of one crucial chapter
in the combat which ragged for three
days and nights over thousands Of
square miles of sea and air, and which
set a definite period to the mammoth
offensive unleashed by Japan six months
earlier at Pearl Harbor.
A Li8htenin9 Decision
The episode proved to have centered
about a lightning decision which Nc
Clusky was called upon to make, en-
tirely on his own, at 11:20 o'clock on
the morning of June 4, 1912. At that
instant he was 10000 feet aloft in the
sky some ITS miles northwest Of Mid
way, in command of SO Douglas Daunt-
less dive bombers from the carrier En-
terprise.
In top naval opinion his judgment
represented the critical turn in the en-
gagement. Based on such diverse fac
tors as wind velocity, gasoline supply
and probable Japanese psychology, it
resulted Immediately in Gripping the
two largest of four aircraft carriers
which formed the mailed fist Of the
enemy striking force, and led eventually
to the destruction of all four, besides
other warships and auxiliaries. Three
days earlier, on June |, 1t. Comdr. Nc
Clusky, as his rank then was, had cele-
brated his 10th birthday
The Japanese defeat month before
in the Coral Sea taught the enemy that
approaches to Australia were strongly
defended and that further thrusts in
this direction could be made only at
the price of head-on collision with
American sea power, which it is Japa-
nese strategy to avoid. Reconnaissance
planes and submarine scouts reported
general withdrawal Of enemy naval
ships from the Southwest Pacific The
American high command suspected that
another stroke was preparing, but it
remained uncertain whether the target
would be Alaska, Midway and Hawaii,
the Panama Canal or even the Pacific
Coast Of the United States. All of these
areas were strengthened with long
range, shore CHASED aircraft.
Heading West .es,
The carrier Lexington was sunk in
the Coral Sea and the Yorktown was
slightly damaged The Enterprise and
Hornet, steaming up with reinforce
ments, appeared too late for the battle.
and were ordered to return at emer-
gency speed to Pearl Harbor. They ar
rived on May az, and the Yorktown fol-
lowed two days later. The carriers
were instructed to refuel, reprovision
and make airplane requirements for
immediate service. On May 28 they put
out to sea, heading into the west.
On June / Rear Admiral NOW Ad-
miraD Raymond A. Spruance held
conference of officers aboard his flag
ship. They learned for the first time
of strategic theory which had been
evolved by Admiral Nimitz and his staff.
1t was based partly on intelligence from
submarines that japanese naval strength
had been building up in home waters,
and at the bases of Truk in the Caro-
lines and Saipan in the Mariana Is
lands. Mostly 1t was inspired guess
work, which happily turned out to be
correct.
The conjecture on which the Ameri-
cans were acting, explained Admiral
Spruance, was that the Japs were about
to make an attack in force, with the
design of occupying Midway and then
pushing on to Hawaii. If successful,
the campaign would cut of the Amer
lean fleet from its principal outpost in
the Pacific and recoup the death-strohe
which Admiral Yamamoto failed to de-
liver after Pearl Harbors defenses were
paralyzed.
Carrier Ambush
Because the Americans had no more
than IS surface ships with which to
oppose the enemy, Admiral Spruance
continued, it had been decided to post
an ambush of carriers on what would
presumably be his left flank. Their par
ticular task would be the destruction of
the Jap carrier force. 1t was hoped
that the enemy carriers. when close
enough, would launch their bombers
and fighters in an assault on Midway's
land installations. During their abb
sence, the plan was, American carrier
borne planes would dart in and polish
off the Nipponese f1attops.
The Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown
were instructed to take positions north
east of Midway and reached their sta
tons on June 2. AS happened later in
n,