The Waterbury Democrat. [volume] (Waterbury, Conn.) 1917-1946, 1944-04-19

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Still untold was the fact that,
after losing % transport planes
loaded with 400 men on August
ii, we lost a second wave of 81
planes with almost another 400
men three days later-also shot
down by Allied naval gunnerS.
But perhaps even more i'm
pOrtant is the fact that eight
months have now passed, and
with thousands of paratrOoperS
poised to begin the invasion Of
Europe, no step has been taken
to provide anything but Ordin-
airy transport planes to carry
paratrOOperS over the second
front.
The inside story of what hap
pened over Sicily and the failures
since is set forth here only with
the hope that it may still move
the high command to side with
the younger officers who have
fought losing battle to give bet
ter protection to paratroop-car-
rying transports. Here is the
story:
WHAT LED TO DISASTER
The first paratroop drop over
Sicily took place before midnight
of August $40, before the Navy
arrived, and was amazingly sue
cessful. Out of about 500 planes
participating, only two were lost.
General Eisenhower sent his con-
CALCULATIONS.
Prior to the opening of the ST.
Gillian campaign, the paratroop
operations had been under the
command of Colonel Mike Dunn, a
fighting Irishman, who had Sc
cured an agreement from the Navy
that it would not fire on any
planes goilng into Sicily for fear
of mistaken identity.
Once the Navy made this agree
ment, it Immediately brought
pressure to change it, fearing en-
envy air raids from Sicily, against
Allied shipping.
NO." said Dunn, "your boys
arc fingered. They start
shooting at the drop of the
hat and, once one starts, the
whole bunch will join in. They
can't tell who they're firing at
in the dark"
The Navy then proposed that
certain air corridor be marked out
through which U. S. planes could
fly to safety, but Dunn argued
that they might get lost, fly off
course, and be shot down.
Later, however, Brig. Gen. P. L.
Williams, then temporarily at
loose ends, was placed in COM
mand of the Sicilian air-borne in
fantry operation, and finally
yielded to Navy pressure. The
early order was changed.
SLOW TRANSPORTS HELPLESS
So when U. S. paratroop planes
came over on the night of Aug. IL,
in the Celia operation. % were
shot down. 1t is not fair to say,
as previously reported, that the
Navy shot them all. Some I'M
OOQOtCO1y WC4C OOWAACA Wy UAAV
enemy. Also, black smoke was
pouring up over Sicily as re-
suit of fires started by our bomb
ers and 1t was difficult to tell
who friend and who was foe.
However, U. S. naval gum
fire was extremely accurate, and
after about two shots to get the
range, they made mincemeat Of
the slow paratrOOp transports.
Later, on August IA, another
81 planes, bringing paratroOp-
erst to aid the British operation
at Catania, were shot down by
naval gunnerS probably
combination Of U. S. and Brit
ish ships.
Immediately, committee Of in
quiry was appointerd in North
Africa and an investigation was
conducted to ascertain the caus-
es. The findings so far have
been shrouded with a strict veil
of secrecy. However. 1t can be
revealed that there has been Wig
orous debate inside the Air Forces
regarding means Of providing bet
ter protection for paratroopers.
WALLACE TO CHINA
One significant sidelight on Vice