The Waterbury Democrat., 1944-12-23


 first and second freedoms of the air.
 Where the United States kept its shirt, it is claimed, was in refusing to give in to British and Canadian demands that postwar commercial aviation be controlled by an Inter- national Civil Aeronautics Board which would have had the absolute regulatory power to assign routes and determine frequencies of flight, The U s. delegation view on this point was that international flying should be on an unlimited frequency basis, the number of schedules be- ing determined only by the amount of traffic there is to carry. The Bri- tish idea was restrictive and would have resulted in a lot of uneconomic flying. The U. s. idea was expansive, to prevent planes having to fly with empty seats or cargo space if pas sengers or freight are available to haul. "ESCALATION" SUPPORTED
 On this issue there arose the con- troversy over so-called ''escalator clause" which would permit inter national airlineS to increase their capacity to carry traffic as it was offered. The British were willing to permit this to apply to traffic de- veloping at the ends of line, but not to traffic developing along the route. The U. 5. delegation, keeping its shirt, refused to budge from its position that there should be eSca- lation of frequencieS as traffic de- veloped at intermediate as well as at terminal points. This became known as the fifth freedom.
 The conference was deadlocked on this point for two weeks and com- promised by the decision to let those countries which wished to do so withhold their acceptance of the fifth freedom while accepting the first two. Third and fourth free doms. tying in with the fifth, would permit unloading and loading of passengers and freight from or in the planes home nation.
 What the United States did give up was the right for other nations to fly over Alaska and Hawaii. These rights were given up in exchange for the rights to fly over Canada and the United Kingdom en route to other countries, which rights the United States did not have. The United States therefore gives up its rights in the Pacific in exchange for rights in the Atlantic. In justifi- cation of this swap it is held that: first, the bulk of the business will be over the Atlantic, so the United States stands to gain more than it loses; second, that the logical route for the British in operating to Aus tralia is by way of Europe, the Mid- de East and India - not across America and the Pacific - so the U. s. has nothing to lose by permit ting the British to use the Pacific route if they choose to do SO, and could not prevent the British from flying overland to Australia even if Hawaiian rights had been with held.
 NET GAIN FOR U. S.
 The net result of the interim and permanent conventions proposed at Chicago is that the United States can now start to do business with any country that accepts the fifth freedom document. With other na- tions, it will still be able to conduct negotiations for bilateral agree mentS which it could have done any, way, so there is no less there and considerable gain.
 Perhaps the best appraisal to put upon the achievements at Chicago is to judge them as a temporary expedient which gets us going. The results can be measured best after they have been put into effect There is protection in that the Uni ted States can cancel any single provision on six months notice or cancel it all on a years notice.