The Wilmington morning star., 1944-05-05
Interpreting
The War
BY K1RKE L. SIMPSON
Associated Press War An.,..

preparations In Britain for
invasion Of the continent have :.
obviously reached an advanc
ed stage that the preliminary teint,
and false starts foretold by prim.
Minister Churchill weeks ago ~.
In order at any time. 1t does w..
necessarily follow, however w. w.
they will come in the wsstns ~'
theater itself. They would ssrra
the same purpose executed in tbo
south. 4e
Nazi reports of a quickenipg .,
Allied behind-the-line activities IN
Italy sound plausible for that rsa
son. A break of some sort in IL.
now extended lull in ground ons
rations on that front would not
be surprising.
Even if no real effort to break
through to Rome, strike in force
across the Adriatic into the Balkan
peninsula, or to threaten the south
coast of France is included in III.
overall concept of Allied STRATEGY
at this critical moment it is under.
standable that every device to keen
the Germans pinned to their south
front defenses would be employed
Whatever its tactical successes Or
failures to date, a primary stra.
tegic objective of the Anglo-Arer.
lean campaign on the Italian
''Boot' itself was to take enemv
weight off both the Russians in tn.
east and off the invasion coast in
the west.
Official Allied estimates place 81
German divisions in Italy and tn.
Balkans most of them withdrawn
from Russia. That is precisely
the figure used by Moscow com.
mentators many months ago in
urging immediate Anglo-American
second front attack. Given that
help, they contended, Russian
armies could roll up the German
front in Russia.
The Russians have more TIM
made good that prediction. 1t is
still urgently necessary that there
be no relaxation in the Allied threat
in the south, nevertheless. The sue.
cess of the coming Russian-Allied
east-west squeeze in bringing the
war in Europe to reasonably
early and victorious conclusion
probably depends as much on the
Allied operations in prospect in the
south as upon any other factor.
Italy may not be regarded as
continental invasion drawbridge.
The Pc stands like a formidable,
mountain-backed moat across the
head of the peninsula. 1t does serve
as a potential spring board for in,
vasion of southern France or of the
Balkan peninsula. And Italy based
Allied bombers are calling that to
German attention anew night and
day, as well as materially aiding
in Russian preparations to storm
the Galati gateway to the Danube
plains in Romania by battering at
Bucharest and Ploesti.
Insistent Nazi reports Of at least
Russian skirmishing in force down
, the Siret valley toward that most
, vulnerable gap in the Nazi south
eastern defense front are ignored
in Moscow, but there is no doubt
, that Russian armies in heavy
forces are preparing to strike in
: that direction.
The east front situation drew
significant comment in Washington
} from War Secretary Stimson, who
, noted that the Russians had bomb
ed Lwow four times in two weeks
and also poured explosives from
the air upon Brest LitovSk. They
: are communication keys as well
? as the probably well fortified
, prime bastions of the long line
covering the approaches to the
plains of western Poland.
In this area, Stimson said, the
Nazis cannot withdraw further
without exposing both these indust-
rial and communication centers,
adding that there had been German
efforts to strengthen their front
there and in the Tartar Pass and
above the Galati gap.
E That seems to dispose of Polish
: report some days ago that the
! Nazis were evacuating Lublin. 1t
is the primary supporting rail and
l road center substantially midway
5 between Lwow and Brest Lltovsk
and east of the Vistula. Only NaA
! intention to fall back behind the
, San-Vistula line which would put
, Warsaw in grave peril could e&
plain enemy abandonment Oh
: Lublin and Allied intelligence re-
! ports on which Mr.. Stimson passes
$ his war reviews give no lndlcatlon
of such a German purpose. lney
z anticipate the first crucial pa''es
l of the climatic campaign IN ns
east along the Lwow-Brest Ll'o'Sh
. 1i,o