Evening star., 1944-06-15
De GuuIIe and the War

US 0QuItS QHO tne WQI
Although he has made it clear
before this that he can be unbend-
ingly non-c n-co-operative when he
wishes to uphold what he regards
as his prerogatives, it comes as
something of a shock to learn that
General Charles de Gaulle. on the
eve of the invasion of Normandy,
saw fit to upset at least one phase
of our Allied plans by suddenly
resembling the orders of several
hundred French officers to land
with the first waves of our British,
Canadian and American troops.
The report-which seems to be
one of the highest reliability-goes
on to say that General Eisenhower's
headquarters has indicated that as
a result of this action cooperation
between the population and our
Allied armies has been impaired in
the area which we have occupied
up to now. This may readily be
believed, for it takes little imagina-
ton to visualize in how many ways
several hundred French officers
could help in establishing an eff
cient working relationship between
our forces and the residents Of
Normandy
General De Gaulle's action seems
all the more capricious and shock
ing because the presence of such
French contingent was planned
upon long in advance of the actual
landings. with the full agreement
Of his representative in London.
Moreover, since these officers were
presumably subject to General
Eisenhower's supreme command,
General De Gaulle's last-minute
countermanding order raises the
question OF military propriety, if not
something more serious than that.
It may be that as the leader of
the French Committee of National
Liberation, General De Gaulle has
good reason to resent the fact that
Britain and the United States have
so far refused to recognize his or
ganization as the provisional gov
ernment OF France, as Poland. Bel
gium, Czechoslovakia and Luxem-
bourg have just done. But the
British, Canadian and American
peoples, whose sons now are fight
ing and dying in Normandy, can
hardly be expected to sympathize
with him If. in a spirit of pique or
in an effort to exert pressure on
London and Washington to advance
his own political position, he resorts
to acts prejudicial to the well-being
of our armed forces. His order to
the French officers can be inter-
preted as such an act. So, too, can
his attitude toward the currency
arrangements made for our troops;
and taken all together, these and
other moves of his add up to some
thing that is not likely to sit very
well either in this country, in Can
ada or In Britain.
An argument can be made for
recognizing the De Gaullist regime,
particularly because some such
authority must be established sooner
or later to relieve our military
command of the burden of detailed
civil administration At the same
time, however, it must be assumed
that our responsible British and
American leadership is sparing no
effort to solve the problem as
promptly and as satisfactorily as
possible, which may require fol-
lowing a course more circumspect
and somewhat slower than that de-
manded by the De Gaullists.
The winning of the war, in any
case, is still the prime considera-
ton. All political arrangements,
except as they serve that end, are
subordinate. To the extent that it
impedes or embarrasses our Allied
effort, General de Gaulle's apparent
all-or- nothing attitude is therefore
insupportable, serving neither him.
self, France nor the United Nations
as whole.