The Wilmington morning star., 1944-03-24
The Japanese Fleet

i ne Japanese lccC
1t was not so long ago, no more than two
years in fact, that Admiral Yamamoto boast
ed that the Japanese fleet would carry him
to Washington to dictate peace terms to the
the third or perhaps for the moment the
second strongest naval force in the world.
has reduced Japan's naval strength so eff
fectvely that its fleet will not offer battle.
The sharpest search OF Pacific waters and
harbors by American fiers fails to reveal
its hiding place.
Where is the Japanese fleet?
Captain Frederick L. Oliver, u S. Navy
retired believes it is in its home waters
awaiting chance to fight in its own front
yard This is plausible inasmuch as Admiral
Nirtz's task force that has been capturing
Japanese island defenses at an unprecedented
pace has failed to find it. Captain Oliver
sizes up the situation with great clarity in
an article written before the task force had
extended its conquests to the Marshalls and
the Admiralties in neither of which it en-
countered any stable naval resistance. He
writes:
In all probability the Japanese fleet is
harbored in home waters, although S m e
units may be in Camranh Bay in French
Indo. China and some may be at Singapore
conceivably as intended insurance against an
amphibious thrust against Malaga by Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten.
Early in the war, the Japanese Navy pos.
sessed sufficient strength, supported by hold
ing the initiative, to attain temporary sue
cesses. Then came series OF reverses-
Guadalcanal Coral Sea, Midway, the rest Of
the Solomons, the Aleutian repulse, New Brit
ain, Tarawa, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and the
defeats in New Guinea.
THE Japanese plan met its first setback
when its air arm proved vulnerable to at
tack. After Japan's initial stock of hand
picked pilots had been expended without COM
pe.ent reliefs being made available, the ratio
OF plane losses became fantastic.
at soon became apparent that in the mat
ter of surface ships Japan had good reason
to avoid contact except under exceptionally
favorable conditions as it's ships were at a
disadvantage in technical equipment and lack
ed the supreme zest for victory that always
has characterized the United States Navy.
These two weaknesses have been exploited
constantly to the continued disadvantage of
the Japanese with the result that they now
have insufficient air power to man their island
bases and utilize the mutua1defense feature,
and their fleet has become unbalanced
through very heavy losses in the cruiser and
destroyer categories.
Another decisive factor contributing to ia
pans predicament is its lack of merchant
shipping. United States submarines have add
ed appreciably to the toll of shipping taken
by surface craft and air forces, with the
result that an estimated one-third of Japan's
merchant marine has been destroyed"
1t would be perilous to assume that even
if the Japanese fleet has retired to Japan's
home waters it no longer constitutes major
hazard. American strategy, so far as the
public is informed calls for attack from
Chinese soil. LAS long as the japanese fleet
exists" writes Captain Oliver, Allied use of
Chinese ports cannot be depended on The
Japanese are aware Of this, he adds, and
we may well believe are not disposed to ex-
pose their fleet to destruction in open battle.
1t is Japan's last line of defense Until our
Navy has found 1t, fought it, and eliminated
it, the conquest Of Japan is not to be an
ticipated.
-V--