Evening star., 1944-12-24
By Leland Sfo,ce

PARASITIC size and general outlines
of future Germany were decided in their
essential points in Moscow by Ger
many's two largest immediate neigh
bors, the Soviet Union and France.
Here are certain important aspects of
the Franco Russian negotiations as
summarized to me by one who was in
Moscow while De Gaulle was there.
When Stain discussed Germany's fu-
ture boundaries with De Gaulle, in effect
he did this: He held out a platter
whereon lay Hitler's Reich in the posi-
ton of roasted turkey. Stains atti-
tude amounted to his saying, Help
yourselves, gentlemen"
That meant the Soviets did not mind
how much the French carved off Ger
many But, according to my informant,
De Gaulle refused to be tempted by the
white meat of Germany which the in
tensively industrialized Ruhr represents.
De Gaulle knew perfectly we'll that for
France to take the Ruhr with Russia's
blessing would mean France would be
utterly reliant upon Soviet support in
all matters concerning Germany for a
long time in the future.
De Gaulle was thinking of two
things-the independence of French
policy and settlement with Germany
which has the greatest chances of en-
during. So De Gaulle did not try to
gobble up the white meat of the Ruhr
Basin. Apparently the French govern
ment would prefer that the Ruhr be
placed under international control-at
any rate that Britain share the re-
sponsibility for policing Western Ger
many after the war.
Declined to Be Subordinate.
In this fashion, Moscow learned that
De Gaulle was unwilling to make his
future policies chiefly subordinate to
the Soviets. Being realistic above all,
Stain accepted second best-recogni-
ton of an independent French policy
which nevertheless agreed upon making
Germany incapable of waging war
throughout the next generation.
But this is the most significant fact
of all. The Soviet Union and France
are united on general program to de-
prive Germany of the ability to wage
war for 25 years or more. In French
eyes this is common sense. After ALL
the Germans have fought on French
soil as aggressors three times in so years,
on Russian soil twice within 26 years.
If London and Washington have been
slow to expose their plans for postwar
Germany, at least their concern is sec
ondary compared to that of the French
and the Russians. Now any Anglo
American proposals will have to be re-
finements falling within the framework
of the Franco-Russian understanding.
This was decided at Moscow quite as
much as was the text of the Franco
Soviet treaty of mutual assistance.
What Stain did was to recognize the
fact that no problem affecting conti-
mental Europe as whole can be solved
without French participation as major
power. This is precisely what Washing
ton has failed to recognize officially for
the past two years. AS result, the de-
termining votes regarding any postwar
German settlement have been appro-
priated by the Soviet Union and France
which is logical enough, since these
two powers are most Immediately eX-
posed to German aggression.
But De Gaulle himself returned from
Moscow with mis- personal prestige def
nitely enhanced. 1t seems plain that
De Gaulle made strong impression on
Stain According to one report which
seems reliable, the Soviets did their ut
most TO persuade De Gaulle to recognize
the Lublin Committee as the legal gov
eminent of Poland. 1t is said that De
Gaulle refused even to the point of risk
ing the loss of his treaty with Russia.
He insisted that the Polish people must
first be given a chance to choose what
kind of government they wanted
1t is very rare thing for Stain to
meet a chief of state who is as stubborn
as he is But in the end it was the
Soviets who had to cede-not De Gaulle