The Wilmington morning star., 1944-12-08
ian America Abroad

c serious dlsparit.7 be-
p't +be military power g. the
~ c Coates and lis civilia.4 rep
tsstives abroad. The 1 L. rs, Is;
ba'' have beer grow-sg in
edSi,o discipline, and in profess
n bts - competence, the foreign
si@'.. and the related agencies
s,5e effect of case OF re-
it. ~ nerhaps even of arrested,
a1 Eminent. There is a world of
G"p pce between the military
If the United States today
~ ,efore Pearl Harbor; there
e.son no comparable progress
4s civilian SIDE.
l ar is no doubt a good gen
5~eason Why we have learned
@o1duct war more readily than
'e s.re learned to conduct our
# ar relations. War is now in
tss degree kind of armed in
1. ..,iaIsm. and Americans have
disable ahle to draw quickly upon
Ds ti. attitude and their experience
ta' inducing. Transporting dlstrl-
...!no and in handling compllcat-
'l'l Eminent. and in managing
e e., Avis d;vision of labor in large scale
pn '.,rnrises But owing to our long
en' 1a+tan we have not had ready
l y hand enough experienced men
y, :. ' fbe conduct of foreign rela-
l ,?.,, Dr nor did we have the tradi-
Nv, NV. and the knoW-hoW.
hVH
VT when we have made all the
.,nIsnations, we cannot afford in
5 5DTiepntly to explain away the fact
t u"l' we could by this time be bet
+ rr prepared to form and admin
;.er foreign policy, and that we
rTst most urgently take measures
!, become better prepared. T h e
ornamental truth is, I believe,
+,+ the standard of judgment we
univ 10 our civilian agencies is
~ much softer than that which
mr military leaders have set for
remselves and for their subordi-
rateS.
The United States could never
have become the great military
mower it now is if General Mar
s5all and Admiral King had con-
.nued to use men whom they
knew to be inadequate, if they had
not replaced men quickly who
we're not equal TO their RESPONSE
bility. They too have had to deal
in hard way with old friends.
They too have had to overcome
political pressure and the vested
rights of men well intrenched in
their Jobs. But never would they
have made the United States a
great military power if they had
been as unwilling as the civilian
leaders to exercise their authority
sternly.
The need for sternness is, of
course, more Immediately evident
n the fighting services. There the
allure Of a commander has soon
10 be paid for in lives and in treas
ure. whereas in the civilian ser
vices the consequences of made
Quacy and of failure are less self
evident General Eisenhower could
not afford to make a botch of his
m litary relations with our allies;
he would have paid for it on the
oattlefields. But if by a failure of
2ur information services we make
botch of our political relations,
failing TO understand what is going
on among our allies or to make
clear to them where we stand and
what we mean, the result is likely
10 be not remedy for the trouble
tut an lnconclusive argument.
Until the Administration is will
ng to remove men who are not |
quail TO their Jobs and to replace
hem as soon as they show signs
f not being equal to their jobs,
will be fighting a first-class war
1th a third-rate diplomatic ma
line.
Without a good many resigna-
ons' good many promotions,
nd good many new appoint
tents, nothing substantial can be
'compllshed. The civilian serv-
es dealing with foreign relations
9ed rejuvenation n reinforce
ent' But they need also to be
canned from the top downward
order to make coherent and eff
crlVe the making OF policy and
administration. We have form
combined force out of the
med services but there IS no
ch combination of t h e foreign
fVlce, our economic agencies,
ID Of the o. W. I. They cannot
present the United States eff
entity abroad because back in
ashlngton there is nothing that
responds !. to the joint chiefs of
H. There is in other words no
II cabinet to which all great
'lrers are submitted and from
III rcn there is promulgated h e
lch OF the United States, as dis
ct from the policy of Mr.. Ell
i DAVIS or Mr.. Morgenthau or
ILlral Leahy or Mr.. Crowley or |