The Waterbury Democrat., 1944-10-06
Pearl Horbor Dutu Printed
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eraI in Hawaii, that diplomatic Ae- gotlAtlons with the Japanese seemed Co he over that hostllitles on the part Of Japan were momentarily possible, and that it was desired that the United states should not commit the first overt act, Short was directed Co take certain pre- cautions but was warned not to alarm the civilian population, Speei. foally, he was instructed to report to the chief of stan on the meas ureS taken,
 on the same day the chief of naval operations, then Admiral liar. old Stark, sent Q message to Admir-. al Husband E, Kimmel, commander. in-ehief of the Pacific fleet with headquarters at Pearl Harbor, ,.'Ae Roberts report says the dispatch identified itself In substance as Q war warning and said negotiations with the Japanese to stabilize Pact- flo conditions had ended, It stated that Japan was expected to make on aggressive move within tho next few days"
 Neither the army or navy, how ever, foresaw on attack on Hawai- Ns likely, but thought one might come in tho far eastern Pacific, Such consideration of an attack on HN- wall as was given substantially ig- nored the possibility of attack by air,
 On Nov. 27, Short informed Mar shall that he had Nlerted his com mand against sabotage and that he was maintaining liaison with the Navy" the Roberts report says, and mo reply referring to this message was sent by tho War Department, !"
 But next day the adjutant gem erAl sent to Short from Washing. ton 0 message stating that the critical situation required every pre- cat ton against subversive activities and sabotage, The message continu. cd with other instructions bearing on those two factors,
 On Nov, % Short replied to that message "ortlining at length and in detail tho measures taken to prevent sabotage of military establishments Rn6 property" The Roberts report states that mo reply was sent by tho War Department to this mes. sage"
 On Nov. 20 Stark sent to Klmmel . message which, among other things, directed the latter to take no offensive action until Japan had committed on overt act and ordered certain action it the event Of hostil- itieS.
 "The foregoing messages" said the Roberts report, "did not create in the minds of the responsible of- fieoFS in Hawai- apprehension as to the probable imminenee of air raids, On the contrary they only served to emphasize in their minds the dan- ger from sabotage and surprise suh- marine attack, The necessity for taking Q state of war readiness which would have been required to avert or meet on air raid attack was not considered"
 Tho report says Kimmel and Short Independently took such ae- ton aS each deemed appropriate. Each assumed" that the other had taken certain specific steps and suggested precautions but neither checked with the other to make sure, tho report says, The facts were that these assumed" preeau. tions had not been taken,
 Short ordered alert No. on No- vember 27,
 This alert is . defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings with ia the islands with no threat from without" tho report explains,
 Alerts No, 2 and 3 include the foregoing and also the probability of immediate attack by land, sea and air, Summing up the Roberts TO. port asserts;
 "on November 27 each responsi- bio commander was warned that hostilitleS were momentarily pos. sible, The warnings indicated war, and war only"
 The Roberts Committee came to certain conclusions The secretaries of State, War and Navy were found specifically to have fulfilled" their obligations so that no blame at- taehed to them Marshall and stark collectively and individually ful- filled their obligations to the full, the report said,
 Short and Kimmei failed of ful- fiilment and neither the Army nor Navy was ready when the crisis came. But the blame Is not oil placed on those two officers, The report cites failure Of the officers in the War Department" to note that Short had not reported the measures taken by him ((presuln- ably other than anti-sabotage meaSures) The report also cites "The failure to reply to his mes- sage of November 20 outlining in full oil actions taken against sabo- tage only, and referring to nothing else" These omissions, the report states, tended to lead short to be- lieve that what he had done met with the requirements of the warn. ings and orders received by him"
 Contributory causes to the Japan- csc success cited by the report in- cluded:
 Restrictions which prevented ef- fectiVe counter espionage, ((Our counter espionage agents were for. bidden by law or regulator to tap wires or otherwise to gain access to the cables between Japanese agents in Hawai- and Japan)
 Emphasis in the warning mes- sages on the probability of aggres- sive Japanese action in the Far East and on anti-sabotage meas ures.
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