Evening star., 1944-02-17

Dut II is g. matter OF considerable
speculation as to just why the Nazis
were permitted to move six or seven
divisions down below Rome toward
the beachhead occupied by Allied
forces when, theoretically at least,
our air power was supposed to be
strong enough to harass communi-
cation lines, paralyze traffic, destroy
locomotives and arlnored vehicles.
Weather Partly to Blame.
Maybe the weather had something
to do with it but it would certainly
seem as if the much-hoped-f tao
tical use of the air force-the syn
Chronization of air with ground
troops-Was not working out as we'll
as had been anticipated. The same
thing happened at Salerno, but it
was argued then that the Allies
didn't have any airfields in shape
for immediate use. Several months
have elapsed since the Allies have
occupied airflelds in Italy, and GER
tainly by this time the use of tacti-
cal air forces might be expected to
materialize at least in sufficient
power to prevent seven divisions
from moving in on our troops in the
beachhead area.
There may be ample explanation
for these failures. but certainly to
date no explanation has been made
of the flasco at Bari a few weeks
ago when our ships were bombed In
harbor and were without air pro-
lection. 1t has since been declared
that most of the damage was done
by explosion of an ammunition ship,
but the fact remains that air pro-
lection was not there.
All this is not in any sense to be
regarded as disparagement of air
power because in the Gilberts and
Marshalls and in New Guinea and
in New Britain the coordination of
tactical air forces with ground
troops and artillery and with naval
aircraft and naval bombardments
by surface ships has been splendidly
executed by Gen. Macarthur and
Admiral Halsey and their COM
manders.
The United States today has many
boys alive after the Marshall Islands
attack who might not be alive if
it were not for the heavy guns of
our battleships and cruisers, which
literally decimated the japanese
troops on the atolls. For sustained
bombardment the naval vessel Is
proving invaluable. 1t does not have
to return to base to be refueled
every few hours. It can stand or
shore and throw tons upon tons Of
shells into land ports, wiping out
field guns and destroying enemy
positions.
1t can do this all day and all
particularly at night
when airplanes cannot see targets,
whereas naval vessels use radar. The
naval bombardments which have
been going on in the mid Pacific
and South Pacific and Southwest
Pacific are vindication Of the
school Of thought which has refused
to be stampeded by the extravagant
claims of the air power enthusiasts.
Air power is wonderful weapon
and without 1t this war could not be
won, but the assumption that air
forces can choose their own targets
or their own areas of operation at
will and that they can, for instance,
pursue their strategic bombing of
faraway targets while tactical air
force is needed to sweep out the
enemy's field artillery and com
munication lines in front of q
marching army is a questionable
one.
Air power of the tactical kind
played a decisive part in our opera
tions in Libya and Tunisia. The
whole world applauded the tactical
air forces there, because the enemy