The Waterbury Democrat., 1944-06-29

Dutch New Guinea offers back ground. Return to the United States of Rear Adml. Daniel E. Barbey commander of the forces on this expedition, now makes possible a detailed explanation of how an operation of this sort is planned and executed.
 The original conception of big operation stems from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. In the Hollandia operation, requiring forces from both the Southwestern Pacific under General MacArthur and the Central Pacific under Ad- miral Nimitz, the detailed planning was done by the staffs of those two commands, meeting in Brisbane, Australia.
 FLEXIBILTTY OF FORCES
 IMPORTANT
 First determination Is on the size of the force required-arny, navy support and air protection. When 1t became apparent that there were not sufficient naval and air forces in the Southwestern Pacific for the Hollandia operation, Admiral Ni- mitz was called on and, coming to Brisbane, he made up the deficienc- les, supplying all types of ships and planes from the forces under his own command.
 This flexibility in making up the force to be used against Hollandia is emphaszed by Admiral Barbey as an example of economizing on equipment, as it would be too eX- pensive to keep in every theater all the equipment the area might re- quire.
 Setting the date for the operation became a juggle in transferring the forces and equipment to their points of departure, but at this time Ad- miral Barbey was named Attack Force commander and all the ele- ments, including even Australian cruisers and clements from the Royal Australian Air Force were placed under him. Up to this point, the planning had been cooperation DGLWecT UtlS SGTNlCSS, FIJI CNCSdVASAA' 1t was unity of command
 No Marines were used in this operation. Ground troops came from Lieut.. Gen. Walter Kreuger's Sixth Army. and were placed under the direct command of Lieut. Gen. R. L. Eichelberger. The number of troops moved wes the largest ever assigned to one operation in the Southwest Pacific. Throughout the troop move nent, Admiral Barbev and General Elchelberger had their headquarters on the same ship, their seconds in command moving on smother ship 50 that possible loss of one would not interfere with direction of oper- ations. So flexible was the entire command, in fact, that two days after the landing, when the beach, head had heen established, 1t was ] General Eichelberger who took over command and the expedition from then on became his.
 COMBINED BOMBING
 Provisions for air coverage of the convoy and the landing were no less elastic. Prior to the actual invasion, there was bombing of strong points of the objective by long-range bom- bers from Lieut.. Gen. George c. Kenney's Allied Air Forces. On the actual convoy, there were success sivelv R. A. A. F.. then U. S. Army Air Force. then Navy Central Pa cific Air Force protection. One took on where the other left off, moving on various ships with the convoy, each responsible for command and protection in its own area. No other planes were allowed in these areas during passage of the convoy.
 Command of the aircraft support ing the actual landing was even more tricky than that. These were all Navy aircraft and they were un- der the command of an "Air Con- trol Group of five officers from Admiral Nimitz's staff, who moved with the convoy on Admiral Bar bey's flagship. The five officers of this Air Control Group consisted of two naval aviation officers, one marine flying officer and one Army Air Force officer. The senior was Army Col. William o. Eareckson. Colonel Eareckson. incidentally, is an old hand at this business, having been in command of similar Air Control Groups at both the Aleu- tlans and at Tarawa. But here is perfect example of co-operation-an Army Air Force colonel commando ing only Navy planes and flyers to aid the landing of Army ground forces being commanded by an ad- | miral.