The Waterbury Democrat., 1944-05-24

Ane HllSCaKeS which AMG made in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, evok- ing considerable criticism. were principally three: miscalculation of the amount of food required to feed the civilian population and the re- building of local food distribution system; uncertainty in control of the black market, food prices and the rate of exchange; misunder- standing in the United States of the problem of dealing with local officials who were holdovers from the Fascist government.
 Somehow the plans made in the Army'S military government schools at Charlottesville, Va, and Algiers did not work out as they had been conceived in the classroom. But Secretary McCloy and General Hill- dring say that the postgraduate training center for military govern ment off1cers-which General Eisen- hover has established in England has prof1ted by those mistakes. That is the best assurance that they will not be repeated. It is considered no particular disgrace that there was a certain amount of fumbling in Italy, for there was no precedent in American history for establishment of military govern ment. The lessons had to be learned the hard way.
 TT SHOULD BE ... DIFFERENT IN FRANCE
 In France the job should be easier than 1t was in Italy, according to Secretary Mccoy, first because the people of France will be welcoming the American and British forces as allies. second because General Eisenhower has already well-estab- lished haison with the French Na- tional Committee through General De Gaulle in Algiers and his deputy, General Koenig, in London.
 Since the French National Com mittee may be presumed to have the closest of connections with the French underground, the spotting of Vichy collaborationists and their elimination from the transitional government should be simpler than the elimination of Fascists from southern Italy.
 The danger in France, however, is that any domination of provis- sional government by U. S. and French officers may be resented by the De Gaullists. From the very be- ginning the French liberationists have tried to establish the position that they should be in charge of the central administrative govern ment the day the invasion begins. Further, they have argued that this central administrative government should be permitted to work through the existing governmental machinery in each area and have charge of civilian supply distribu- tion. Under any other arrangement, the French have maintained, there will be a repetition of the experi- ences in Italy.
 AMG WILL HAVE
 THE SAY
 This point of view has apparently not been adopted in full. In Wash- ington. Algiers and London, there has been collaboration with the French National Committee repre- sentativeS charged with acquisition of some supplies, but the main movement of relief food and cloth- ing will be under British and Am erican officers who will be the first military governors after invasion.
 In insisting on this course of ac- tion. General Eisenhower will be merely exercising his right as a commander-in-chief to set up his own form of government behind his battle lines. AMG will probably be in for criticism in France as it was in Italy, and on the same grounds.
 But as the only function of mili- tary government is to facilitate operations of the armed forces by maintaining order in the civil pop ulation, it is on this basis that AMG results in northern Europe should be judged.