Evening star., 1944-04-24

(b) The defensive offensive, d
though our operations were chi
character, we were able never
certain offensive measures.
(c) The offensive defensive,
following our seizure of the ini
had to use a large part of our fo
Cd The offensive. which begar
when our advance bases were nc
longer seriously threatened and we
became able to attack the enemy at
places of our own choosing.
The Defensive.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor,
the Japanese withdrew from the
Central Pacific and for the time be-
ing, except for the capture OF the
islands of Guam and Wake, confined
their major attacks to the Philip
pine Islands and Netherlands East
Indies. Our own operations were Of
necessity limited to that line of en-
emy advance. Guam was easily
taken. Our forces on Wake, after
gallant resistance which took a
large toll of enemy attacking forces,
far superior in strength, were over
come at the end of December.
Except for the forces in the
Philippine Islands under Gen. Mac
Arthur, our strength in the Western
Pacific area consisted chiefly of the
Asiatic Fleet, few aviation units,
and the garrisons of marines at
Guam and Wake already referred
to. The small Asiatic Fleet COM
manded by Admiral Thomas c. Hart
included the heavy cruiser Houston,
the light cruiser Marblehead, 13
over-age destroyers, some 20 SUBJ
marines, two squadrons of Catalinas
comprising Patrol Wing 10, and a
few gunboats and auxiliaries which
could not be counted on for combat.
With this force plus the light
cruiser Boise. which happened to be
in Asiatic waters when the war
warning was received) we undertook
to delay the enemy's advance until
such time as we could muster suf-
fieient strength to put up any real
resistance. In so far as completely
stopping the advance was con-
cerned, the campaign was FORE
doomed but 1t nevertheless con-
tributed materially to the ultimate
check of the japanese advance, and
the energy and gallantry of the Of
ficers and men participating con-
stitute a remarkable chapter in the
history OF naval warfare.
Ships Dispatched.
During the latter part of Novem-
Der, when the Japanese advances
along the coast of Indo- China indi-
Gated the approach of a crisis, Ad-
mtral Hart had sent the Marblehead
and eight destroyers to Borneo.
Likewise, the Houston, Boise and
the destroyer tender Black Hawk
had been dispatched to operate in
southern waters. On the evening of
December 8, therefore, after the
Japanese had bombed our airfields
and destroyed many of Gen. Mac
Arthuris planes, our submarines and
motor torpedo boats, which were
still in Philippine waters, were left
with the task of impeding the en-
emy's advance.
On December 10, the navy yard at|
Cavite, which had long been recog-
nized as insecure, was practically
wiped out by an air attack which
also damaged the submarine Sealion
and the destroyer Peary, the Sealion
being destroyed by our own forces
to prevent its capture. On the same
day the japanese effected landings
on the islands and thereafter all
attempts to bring in effective guam
titles Of supplies by sea proved un-
successful. It should be noted, how
ever, that on December 10, there
were some 100000 tons of Allied
shipping In Manila Bay, most of it
good and some of it with valuable
cargoes. All but one of these ships
got clear, to the southwark, under
what amounted to cover by our sur
face forces, and escaped via the
Sulu Sea and Makassar Strait. This
was an important save"
The holding of the Army's posi-
tons on Bataan and Corregidor
became only question of time and
Rear Admiral r. w. Rockwell, who
was in command of the local naval
defense forces, moved with them to
Corregidor on December 26.
Plans Worked Out.
Admiral Hart set up his headquar-
ters in the Netherlands East Indies.
Shortly thereafter Gen. Sir Archi-
bald p. Wavell of the British Army
arrived and assumed supreme COM
mand in that theater, whereupon
Admiral Hart became the command
er of the Allied naval forces. Until
Admiral Hart's arrival in Java, Rear
Admiral NOW vice admiraD Will
liam A. Glassford commanded the
surface ships in southern waters,
assisted by Rear Admiral William
r. Purnell and other members of
the fleet staff. Up to this point
Gnsofar as the Asiatic Fleet was
concerned the campaign was con-
Quoted in accordance with plans
worked out in the Navy Department
prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
The method adopted by the Japa-
nese in making their advances
through the Philippine Islands and
the Netherlands East Indies was
built around their air power. After
building up their strength at a
given base they would overcome the
consistently inferior Allied air op-
position at the next point of attack
and then send along heavily
screened amphibious forces to make
landings. AS a rule the distances
were too short to permit attack by
our naval forces while the enemy
was en- route.
AS soon as the enemy were in
control OF a new area they would