The Wilmington morning star., 1944-05-11

IL Call Ie1y upon Tie IcpOII VI SdCIl
OF its many agents.
In our own estimates of the en-
envy position there is, of course,
bound to be some incorrect infor-
nation mixed with correct infor-
nation. If our estimates were pub
lished the enemy would know at
once when we are discovering his
secrets, and this would sson tell
him how we were discovering them
and he would take steps to seal
up the leaks.
Nevertheless, the broad align
ment and the proportion of forces
in the various theaters of war are
not much of a secret, and the cen
sors do not, as matte of fact,
prevent writer's on military mat
tiers from talking about them. But
the lay public does not have the
general picture from its recognized
leaders. Yet many questions which
are debated and agitated by civil
ians are unintelligible without a
general picture of the disposition
of enemy forces.
In the Pacific war, for example,
it is useful to bear in mind that
the British and American forces
of Mountbatten, Stilwell, Mac
Arthur and Nimitz are in contact
with considerably less than half
the Japanese Army, that the
larger part of the Japanese Army
is facing the Chinese, the Rus
slams, or is in Japan. This may
have a profound bearing upon
how a full military decision over
Japan is to be reached. 1t is also
useful to realize that in the num-
Der of enemy troops engaged, the
campaign in Italy alone is COM
parable with the British-American
ground operations now in progress
against Japan. This gives us some
idea of what enormous forces can
be released for use against japan
when Germany is defeated.
In the European theater the
Italian campaign engages only
fraction of the German Army. A
considerably larger part of the
German Army is drawn up in
western Europe facing the inva
sion forces under General Eisen-
hover. The greatest part of the
German Army faces the Russians.
In the great battle which is i'm
pending, the western allied armies
and the Russian armies will be like
the two blades of pair of scissors.
Each blade separately could do
much damage; the Russian blade
has done immense damage, our
blade, using its air power, has
done much damage. But to cut
down the enemy decisively the two
blades together are necessary. It
is upon the fact that their action
is to be combined that all the allies
rest their hope of a decision.
Though we all know this, we do
not always appreciate it. Nor do
we always take into account, as we
must if we are not to confront our
own men with desperately diff cult
tasks, that if there were a stale
mate, rather than prompt deci-
sion, in Europe, we should almost
certainly find ourselves in long
stalemate against Japan as well.
A stalemate in Europe would
mean not only that all the Rus
sin and British forces were pinned
down in Europe but that our own
were also pinned down. Indeed,
there is reason to think that in a
European stalemate we should find
ourselves in good deal of trouble
in the Western Hemisphere. Just
how we could then deal with the
main BODY of the Japanese Army
facing the Russians, the Chinese
and in reserve at home is not a
pleasant problem to contemplate
if we imagine Russia and Britain
pinned down to an exhausting
stalemate in Europe.
The military situation is so seri-
Gus, the interdependence of all the
theaters of war and of all the AL
lies is so great that we cannot now
afford to agitate recklessly and vio-
lently subsidiary issues of trade,
lend-lease and disputed bounda-
ries. They have to be discussed
and they must be negotiated and
every conceivable effort made to
reach acceptable compromises.
But to tear passion to tatters
over them is to have lost all sense
OF proportion and of responsibility
in the presence of the mightiest
events in which Americans now
living have ever bee engaged.