Evening star., 1944-02-13

.Japs' Weakness
Is Apparent
Bu O1Den L. Scott.

The war in the Pacific is taking a
highly favorable turn. Japan finds
herself forced either to send her navy
out to fight or to lose an empire.
Yet, If Japan sends cut her navy, she
stands next to no chance of victory over
the now immensely powerful American
Navy. The result is that the Japanese
gradually are being maneuvered into
what, from their point Of view, Is seri-
Gus If not q desperate situation.
There is the highest confidence among
top commanders of the American Navy
that Japan's position can only grow
more and more serious.
All Of this Is not to say that the
Pacific war Is about over. 1t definitely
is not. Japan still is entrenched in
many bases that must be taken or
fanked. There is the difficult problem
OF distance to overcome before Japan
can be threatened At home. It is going
to take time to build up American bases
from which Japan can be bombed from
the air on a regular schedule.
The fact, however, is that the outer
defenses OF Japans new empire are
being pierced. wide open hole will be
knocked in her defense line when Ra-
baul is taken or neutralized. After that,
the United States Navy can range be-
hind her remaining screen Of islands in
the Caroline group, threatening the
supply line to the main Japanese base
at Truk. Japan at the same time will
find herself up against the problem of
defending the Mariana Islands that
screen the Philippines from the north
ern approach. Guam, which once was
American. is Japan's southern anchor
in this island group.
1t Is not too much to expect that be-
fore the end Of 1914, American forces
either will be back in the Philippine Is
lands or will be just one jump away
from moving back. Once the United
States Navy can operate around the
Philippines, Japan's new empire will
wither away. 1t then will be cut from
its industrial supply base.
The Japanese weakness is funda-
mental. That weakness lies in an in
ability to exploit the resources of the
new Japanese empire. This inability to
exploit conquered resources, in turn,
traces to the narrow industrial base on
which Japan's Army and Navy rest.
Japanese industry cannot turn out the
ships to transport or the equipment to
process available materials in the
quantities that modern war requires.
Because industry cannot turn out mill
tary equipment in volume, Japan can
not protect successfully the empire that
now is scattered across thousands of
miles of Pacific Ocean.
What has happened in the Gilbert
and then the Marshall Islands is likely
to be repeated in other sectors.
In those islands, the American Navy
appeared in overwhelming force and
blasted the Japanese from vital and
carefully prepared positions in very
lew days. The main japanese fleet
avoided combat and the Japanese air
force was grounded. Japan thereby
gave up key outer defenses of her new
empire without so much as riskine a
serious fight. She showed that she fears
the American Navy.
What happened was testimony to the
strategy and planning of Admiral Ernest
j. King, who heads the United States
Navy. Admiral King has insisted. ever
since taking command after Pearl Har-
Dor. that the Navy keep quiet and saw
wood. He has risked no more than
necessary while waiting for industry to
build an immense new American feet of
combat ships that then were welded into
powerful striking forces. The result is
that when the American Navy took the
offensive, two years after Pearl Harbor,
1t moved with force that overawed
the enemy
There no longer is a chance that
Japan can regain the balance OF strength
that she now is losing.
*x
The American Navy in the Pacific is
almost brand new, with the latest of
everything. Its battleships are new and
Immensely powerful. 1t has new aircraft
carriers by the dozen, many Of them of
the largest type. Its cruisers and de-
stroyers are in abundance. Its anti
aircraft equipment and radio detection
apparatus is ahead of any other in the
world. It's aircraft are in a class by
themselves
On the other hand Japans Navy is
largely pre-Pearl Harbor navy. Bat
tie experience suggests that It's radio
detection equipment is not modern. Its
aircraft and pilots have failed to come
through IN battle. It's aircraft carriers
are few and far between Then, to
complicate the japanese problem. this
navy must be scattered all over the
Western Pacific Ocean to guard supply
lines and to try to intercept threaten
ing American forces The United States
navy, In contrast, can be concentrated
IN an offensive striking force aimed at
the particular objective sought
What this suggests for Japan's future
is quite clear
In the discernible near future, japan
must send out her navy for a fight or
lace the prospect of severed lines of COM
municatien to her southern empire.
II she nights, she inevitably will lose
because none Of her losses readily can
be replaced while any American losses
can be replaced almost Immediately.
Once her supply lines are cut, Japan
will start to strangle. The Japanese
islands are not self-suficient in food
or In other essentials of life. The Ameri.
can Navy at some stage will blockade
Japan more tightly than Germany ever
could have blockaded England.
Then the raam IInitad c4a4.z ..~..