Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1944-03-27

upon close cooperation and under
standing with our Allies after the
fighting ends. The point is made
that the present absence of con-
cord and understanding IS distinctly
unpromising for the postwar inter-
national cooperation to which we
are so completely committed and
without which the world can neither
regain its feet nor there be any
insurance against another war.
First Impression Changed.
The truth is that there is a rather
appalling difference in the atmos-
phere and comment Of today and
that which followed the Moscow
and Teheran conferences After
Secretary Hull's return from the
first and the Presidents return from
the second, it was generally &C.
cepted that the most complete &C
cord on postwar problems had been
achieved, that there was practically
nothing on which the three Allies
did not see eye to eye. Certainly,
that was the impression gained from
the Presidents press conference and
other utterances after he got hack.
1t was accepted generally that en-
all major problems the three ma
lions would act together after con-
sultation and the idea was pro-
mulgated that there were no oues-
tions that needed to be cleared up.
pnNcnua1f Nf -ct& ,1
Stain as grand fellow" and the
conference results were hailed as a
"big step forward" None of this
has anything to do with military
cooperation. On that score there
is no room for complaint and no
reason for apprehension.
But, this is not true in the
political fields. First off. almost
Immediately following Teheran,
there was a recurrence of anti
British feeling in Washington over
various matters which, while not
vital in themselves, were of sufi-
Gent import to spoil the eye-to-eye
idea. About the time this friction
began to die down, the fact that we
were not consulting our Allies about
certain policies concerning which
they are entitled to be consulted,
and they were acting in certain
other matters without consulting
us, became SO apparent as to make
the complete understanding and
cooperation" theory altogether I'M
tenable.
BadOglio Example
For one example, there is the
Russian recognition, without advis-
ing us, of the Badoglio government
just at the moment when we were
considering another setup. For an
other, there was the awkward an
by Mr.. Roosevelt
tplainly embarrassing to the Brit
tsh) about the division of the Italian
fleet. There is further the position
of the Russians and British toward
the postwar Germany without
bothering to get our views.
Then there is the announcement
that the President has reached a
decision as to the part the French
Committee is to play in the gov
eminent of France after its liberia
tion-a decision about which the
British claim to be in the dark
though certainly they are entitled
to be consulted. Finally, there is
our decision to build an Arabian
oil pipeline through British-man-
dated territory without consulting
the British.
Add all this up and it bears no
resemblance to the complete I'M
derstanding" which seemed to be
the happy outcome of Moscow and
Teheran. 1t is not, praise be, af-
fectlng the conduct of the war, but
1t darkens somewhat the peace
making and postwar periods. So
clear is this that from various
quarters recently critical attacks
have been made on our foreign
policy or rather the lack of it. Mr..
Walter Lippmann asserts that our
foreign policy is mot sufficiently
alert, lucid, consistent and efficient"
There is ample evidence to support
this charge and it is hard to see
how harm can come from airing
these widely known facts. On the
contrary, good may result. But,
there Is no use, as the left wingers
are trying to do, blaming things on
Mr.. Hull.
Called Presidents Responsibility.
The responsibility lies squarely on
the President. 1t is he who makes
our foreign policy, and neither this
State Department nor a reorganized
one will change that situation so
long as he remains in the White
House. The real reason our policy
is weak, vacillating and muddy is
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