Evening star., 1944-03-05

The political hens which have Matched
strategic chicks have come home to
roost. The italian campaign is begged
down and for the time being we are on
the defensive along the entire front.
On the surface this does not mean
much The Allies should have sufficient
strength to break the deadlock and push
the Nazis back beyond Rome. But the
unfortunate element in the picture is
that the Italian stalemate has occurred
just before the invasion of Western Eu-
rope. This latter operation must be on
tremendous scale in which the bulk
of our land, sea and air forces are en-
gagged.
Originally only a minor group Of
armies had been earmarked for diver
sional attacks on other sectors Of the
huge front extending probably from
Norway to the Eastern Mediterranean.
French, Polish and imperial divisions
under the command of British and
American generals were slated to keep
Nazi divisions from being rushed from
Southern Europe to the principal in
vasion front
The fact that we are stymied in Italy
may change the picture. And should the
Nazis bring further reinforcements to
the Southern Italian front it is possible
that we may have to strengthen our
tired troops with divisions intended for
other more important operations.
Campaign Political.
The campaign in italy had political
rather than strategic background and
it is assumed that it was based on some
sort Of political intelligence which indi-
Gated that the Nazis would not fight
more than a token battle for Rome.
When it was first suggested after the
conquest of Sicily, most American strate-
gists were opposed to it. Their view was
that even if we took Rome we would not
gain particular military advantage. The
fact that we would have air bases in the
plains north OF the Eternal City was of
slight importance. The main thing was
not to diffuse our forces further but
keep them concentrated for one single
military objective-the invasion of
France, the core of the Nazi resistance.
Unless the Nazis decided to set up
their principal defense line along the Po
River, Americas principal military
thinkers believed Italy would be bot
tomless sac into which We would have
to pour large force. According to the
best available information, this point
was emphasized before the two principal
Allied strategy trainers, President Roose-
welt and Prime Minister Churchill. 1t
was obvious to every well-trained mill
tary observer that once We were en-
barked into a major military adventure
Id Italy and the Nazis decided to fight
us there, the then available forces would
not be suficient to defeat the enemy and
many mare troops would be required.
Advantage With Nazis.
The Nazis had the advantage Of being
able to rush reinforcements from any
section of Europe within a few days, SO
long as they were not fighting in the
west. Our reinforcements, once the orig
inal invasion force was expended, had
to be transported by sea from North
farther away.
Transport of troops and war material
by sea is one of the most complicated
problems of the war An average pas
senger ship would cover the distance be-
tween New York and Southampton in
peacetime in less than a week. A convoy
requires several weeks for the same trip
The gathering of forces in harbor even
when the operation is not hampered by
air attacks is a complicated business
Those who opposed the Italian campaign
pointed out that if reinforcements had
to be brought in from distant points the
offensive might be more trouble than
1t was worth.
Despite all this, which was an effect
on the Allies other strategic plans, the
invasion of Italy was decided on.
The pessimistic forecasts unfortu-
nately proved correct Intelligence re.