The Waterbury Democrat. [volume] (Waterbury, Conn.) 1917-1946, 1944-01-24

W pIlC
U. s. civilian trucking industry, too.
Only 5000 new trucks have been
manufactured for civilian use since
early 1912. A million new trucks
had been made in 1941, but of these.
only 10000 trucks of all types were
left in dealers hands as a stockpile
to be rationed to essential civilian
users. Less than 1900 of these trucks
remain on hand, and they will all
be gone by Arpil l. Commercial
truck operators therefore look long
ingly at the tremendous Army pro-
duction and put on all the pressure
they can to get some of those trucks
diverted to civilian transport. A
large part of the pressure consists
in making it appear that the Army
can't possibly use this many trucks,
and that the civilian truckers need
them worse for the admittedly in
creased loads of war production
freight they are hauling.
COMMITTEE FINDINGS
The way the Truman committee
presented the figures was like this:
For the year 1913, the War De-
partment requested the production
of 671, lot trucks for its own use
and that of the British and Russian
forces. The present estimates are
that GOT, $40 we're delivered. For 1914,
for the same uses, the War Depart
ment requested 742,433."
Actually, the Army requested 764,-
355, but it was allocated only the
42,433. But the 6O761O and the
742, 433 add up to 1850, 043-not a
million and half-and you begin
from there.
To the Army, this number of
trucks contracted for in the two
year program makes sense and is
not excessive. People just don't
appreciate how dependent we are on
trucks says Maj. -Gen. L. D. Clay
of the Army Service Forces, in
charge of procurement.
1t is considered impossible to re-
veal all the figures on the military
truck requirements program, but
enough can be given to quiet some
fears and justify some Of the larger
numbers
The first item to knock off is
shipments to Soviet Russia, the
United Kingdom and other Lend
Lease aid and Navy. This will ac-
count for nearly 40 per cent of the
total, or approximately 534 900
trucks. This 40 per cent will be d.
vided approximately % per cent to
Soviet Russia, IT per cent to the U
K. and elsewhere.
Knock this $4,000 off the 1885,
600 and it leaves total of $4,000
vehicles in the two-year production
program. This includes everything
from passenger cars up to Acton
tank transports, but not including
half tracks or other combat vehi-
Giles.
5000 JEEPS
1t includes jeeps. The total jeep
production in the two-year program
is 1888 600, of which 10000 will go
to the Soviet and the British, leav-
ing 2l4,000 for the U. S. Subtract
this 214,000 from the $4,000 total
and you get an actual truck produc-
ton figure of 100000, which sounds
a good bit more reasonable.
AS of Jan. 1, 1914, the Army es-
Inmates it had a fleet of $4,000 We
hicles of all types, passenger cars
and up. Perhaps 10000 of them
were pre-Pearl Harbor models. Army
estimates the life of q truck in the
United States at five years. In COM
bat areas overseas, the average is
two years which, considering battle
attrition, is a liberal estimate. At
Salerno, 36 per cent of the artillery
carriages were knocked out. Truck
casualties were comparable, in some
classes as high as so per cent. That's
where most Of the requirements are
required.
What the civilian truck program
amounts to for 1914 is the manu-
facture of some 10000 vehicles, ac-
cording to latest schedules. OF the
10000, some 10000 will be for the
non military government agencies
leaving only 10000 for civilian ra-
tioning and the larger part of these
will not be available until the lat
ter half of 1914. On them will de-
pend the problem of replacing trucks
which actually break down in 1914.
Civilian trucks now in operation are
estimated at 100000, of which l.
GOO, 900 are on farms.
AS for curtailing military truck
requirements, there doesn't seem to
be chance, unless the war ends
suddenly.