Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1944-12-04
THE w ORLD
IN REVIEW
BY Maj. Gen.
D. P. Barrows


early in the present year.
started their heavy offensive
into south China. their objec-
tives were sufficiently clear.
One japanese purpose was TO
overrun the Chinese province OF
Kwangsi and capture the Amer
lean air bases there, from which
our bombers were already at
lacking Japan.
This the japanese armies
have succeeded in doing.
A second objective was to
connect the railroad lines Of
China with those Of Indo-C China,
Thailand and Malaga, SO as to
have continuous land commune
cation between the north and
the south.
The approach of the Ameri-
can navy toward the coast OF
Asia, the steady loss by the
Japanese of their sea transport,
and the probability that we
would retake the Philippines
and cut their communications
through the China sea. made it
important for the Japanese to
establish land communications
all the way from Korea to
Singapore before disaster fell
upon their sailing routes.
TTIIS objective OF Japan Is
l. now close to accomplish
ment.
Their fighting forces have
gained possession Of most OF the
province of Kwangsi.
From the Sikiang, or west
river of China, there Is an old
route going southwest through
the Chinese city of Manning to
the frontier of Indo- China.
There is a French-built rail-
road from this frontier to
Hanoi-a distance Of perhaps
100 miles.
North of the frontier the
Chinese have probably taken up
Che rails of their own tracks
and carried them away. II
will not be altogether easy for
the Japanese to construct or
reconstruct these railroad con-
nections, but they can probably
do il, before we can retake the
Philippines and smother their
water transportation with Indo-
neSia.
The third objective of the
Japanese is to occupy in force
the eastern coast of China, be-
tween Shanghai and Hongkong,
annihilate the Chinese forces
that remain in these coast prov
inces, and make it more diff
cult for our Pacific battle fleet
to capture one or more OF these
ports and open up a beachhead
in China.
All of these purposes Of Japan
have been discernable for nearly
year. Their disastrous effect
upon our war against Japan
could likewise be foreseen.
WHY then, has Japan's war
w objective been neglected
and ignored, and the promise
of victory turned into defeatf
believe the underlying cause
is political.
1t lies in the difference OF
policies of our own country
and Great Britain and Russia,
and in the fact that our own
diplomacy has been incapable
of bringing British and Russian
aims into accord with our own.
American policy in the Far
East, since the first year of this
century, has been to uphold the
integrity of China and the open
door for trade.
Repeatedly, Great Britain and
Russia gave adherence to this
policy.
They pledged themselves by
treaties to support 1t.
They do not seem to be sup
porting it now, and in the face
of their opposition or indiffer-
ence, the United States IS UNI
able to give China the military
assistance that might save that
country from complete over
throw.
DOTH Great Britain and Rus
- STA have important terri
tories contiguous to China's
frontier. We have none.
The only lines of land supply
which we could use to support
the Chinese in their war against
Japan lie through Siberia and
British India.
The first line of entrance is
completely barred TO us because
of Russia'S neutral friendship
for Japan.
While the British have sane
toned our development of
Chinese supply line from CAL
cutta up the Brahmaputra VAL
ley TO Ledo and thence by
mountain road into northern
Burma, the amount of assist
ance which they have given TO
this project seems very small
compared to the strength of the
Indian army.
THIS difficulty and danger
l. cannot be met by our mill
tary men. II can only be met
by our diplomats and statesmen.
These do not seem impress
sive, either by reason Of COM
petence or experience, or from
what we may presume to be the