Imperial Valley press., 1944-02-06

Two military terms which the
civilian may want to get straight
ened out in his mind as a prelude
to the invasion of Europe are "tac-
tical air force" and strategic air
force" 1t is a strategic U. S. Army
air force which Is now operating
out of Great Britain in the long
range bombing of Germany, first
to destroy the enemy's fighter
plane strength and second to
smash industrial targets vital TO
the enemy's military strength on
the ground.
When the actual invasion OF
Hitler's. fortress in Europe begins,
then the tactical air force will be-
Gin to be heard from, working IN
actual battle along with the ground
forces.
How this differentiation of stra-
tegic and tactical air forces was
developed in the North African
campaign is revealed by Gen.
Henry H. Arnold's report to the
secretary of war. covering opera
tions of the past 25 months.
Many of the principles governing
the tactical and strategic uses OF
airpower in modern warfare were
learned. General Arnold reveals
from the mistakes of the Italians
In the summer of 1910 the Italians
started their Lybian operations
with a large, powerful and modern
air force which might have won
the campaign for them. The Italian
air forces were, however, under the
command of ground force officers
Local army commanders broke up
this big air force and used II IN
small units for the support OF
minor operations.
Against this big italian air force,
the British in Egypt had only
handful of obsolete aircraft. inc
British used its small force as one
mass and as a result was able 10
destroy 1100 italian planes. AS the
British air force in North Africa
was strengthened during the next
two years it gained control OF the
air and it was the tactical use OF
This force which stopped Rommel
and kept him from destroying the
British army.
From these desert campaign en-
periences were evolved many OF the
present ideas about the use OF a
tactical air forcc-ideas which Will
in all probability be put to use IN
the coming invasion. II Is mis-
leading. says General Arnold, to say
merely tactical air force PROVIDES
support to the ground troops, al
though that conception appears
firmly imbcddcd i'll the public
mind.
The German conception of this
air support for ground forces was
adequate in the blitz against
France. when there was no oppoSi-
tion. but there is marked dill
ference between that kind of war
fare and the present Allied con-
ception of having an air general
run the air war while a ground
general runs the ground War-buf
always working together Tor the
same objective.
TEAM" LEADERS NOW
IN ENGLAND
The same kind of teamwork is
of course necessary between the
stratcgical and tactical units OF an
air force in any theater of opera :
tons. General Arnold points out
Ctr1tDDlfll
Air Force under Major General
Doolittle, a Coastal Air Force under
Vice Marshal Lloyd to attack Ger
man and Italian supply lines across
the Mediterranean, and Tactical
Air Force under Air Marshal Con-
ingham.
These units were not fixed, but
entirely flexible. They borroWcc
flights and SquadronS from cacl
other for various missions as the
situation demanded. All were under
Lieutenant General Spaatz as
commander of the NorthWes'
African Air Forces. Spaatz, in turn
was Air Marshal Teder, as com.
mander of air forces in the entire
Mediterranean theater, and Tedel
of course was under the supreme
command of General Eisenhower.
AS Eisenhower, Teder, Spaatz ant
Doolittle have all been transferred
to England to command the IN
vasion of northwestern Europe, Il
is only reasonable to assume that
their same division of tactical ano
strategical employment of air forces
will be employed against Germany