Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1944-08-09
u. s. AIR
POWER
BY Maj. Alex P.
de Seversky
WE HAVE every reason to be-

uctt tildt tic Aillcu ullils
tary machine. though slow in
starting, will now roll back the
enemy at constantly acceler-
ated rate of speed.
Because of its lack of
strength in the air, Germany
cannot prevent US from accumu-
lating supplies and men-and
that means we have broken
through tha confinement OF the
beaches.
Now it is Germany which
cannot bring up adequate re-
Inducements on account of har-
assment from the skies,
whereas the Allied side can en-
large its force continuously
without serious interference.
II was the air offensive
against Germany, focused pri-
marily on Hitler's luftwaffe,
which made the invasion pos
sible.
Enemy air power was yir-
tually absent, while we were
able to provide ourselves with
an lmpregnable aerial roof.
Then we maintained a roof
over the invading forces while
we piled up the necessary sup
plies.
Finally air power gave vital
tactical support in breaking
through the German defenses on
the ground
Tl1E most important job now
L being done by air power in
northwestern France, however,
is one that has been largely
ignored in the day TO day ac-
counts. refer to the fact that
our air power is preventing an
accumulation of German forces.
Air power is destroying lines
of communication and actually
rubbing out vehicles on high
ways. II is limiting Germany 10
a fixed quantity of force, while
our own potential is strengthen
ing every day.
The strategic picture is remi-
niscent of FL Alemain. where
Rommel had TO work with what
he had on hand. since our air
power stymied his efforts 10 OBJ
tain reinforcements.
This made II possible for
Alexander TO accumulate superb
GRITTY of men and machines 10
ratio of nearly six 10 one and
made Rommels defeat q fore
gone conclusion.
In North Africa We cut the
enemy's lines of communication
across the Mediterranean In
France we are cutting them on
land. But the effect-in isolat-
ing the German fronts very
similar. In Normandy, as in
Africa, il was only a matter OF
time before we began 10 move
forward.
4 S HITLERS opponents begin
"A to converge on Germany,
its strategic position should be
better understood. Several years
ago | had occasion 10 forecast
that Germany's coming sltua-
ton. under many sided attack.
could be represented graphically
as a wheel
The hub is its industrial
might-its reservoir Of warmak-
ing capacity.
The spokes are the lines of
supply leading from the hub
10 the rim. And the rim itself is
the battlefront.
II and when enough force is
assembled 10 strike at the rim
from all directions, II would
contract under the pressure.
AS the wheel contracts, nat
urally the structure on the
ground becomes stronger; the
same quantity Of men and ma
chimes is accumulated in a
smaller area and depends on
shorter supply lines.
But from the air power view
point. the shrinkage provides
an ever more concentrated tar
get. which is therefore more
vulnerable TO overhead assault.
As Germany is forced 10 re-
duce its area of control, II thus
becomes stronger on the surface
but weaker in relation TO
bombing threats from the air.
Of COURSE. it also means
" that the Germans will have
an ever smaller territory 10 pro-
tect. and that viii make their
available defensive air power
more effective.
We may sustain more losses
in the sky in consequence. but
at the same time we will infiict
more destruction. The whole
process. in other words, will be
enormously speeded up.
Even if Germany is able 10
use its latest new weapon-the
Jet propelled fighter plane
against our bombers, il can no
longer obtain air superiority.
II lacks the force to destroy
our means TO wage war, our in
dustrial potential, and in mod
ern chronological conflicts that
is the key factor
Hitler is completely on the
defensive.
He is trying 10 shield his war
making machine while unable 10
menace ours.
In such a contest the deten-
sive is hopelessly outclassed.
This war has repeatedly DEM
onstrated that defense cannot