Evening star., 1944-06-06
Policy Of Expediency
Seen Working Well
Problems With Rome Capture
Must Be Met Elsewhere
By David Laurence

Dv DupFu LOUFENCG
Military success in capturing Rome Is
tempered somewhat by the fact that the
problems Of shipping and supply for the
liberated regions tend to grow and so
do the complexities of the political ques-
tions that arise
On the Nazi side, there Is but one con-
sideration-military occupation. The
wishes Of the populace whose country is
entered mean nothing to the Fascists.
But the Allied governments must begin
to re-establish liberties taken away from
the people, and this involves compli-
Gated policing job.
For many months now Britain, Russia
and the United States have been trying
to iberate the Italian people by setting
up government that would be satisfac-
tory to the Italians. But the struggle
has not been confined to Italy. In Lon
don, Washington and Moscow pressures
have been exerted in behalf of factions.
The so-called left wing has been insist
ing that the Badoglio government and
the King be eliminated The so-called
right wing has favored a maintenance
of the existing situation till the capture
Of Rome could be consummated.
Expedieney Seen as Policy.
theological differences as well as the
interests of political factions inside Italy
have served to make the situation per-
picking. But 1t is not alone in Italy that
this kind of controversy has arisen. 1t
is the same thing with respect to the
recognition of the De Gaullists in France
or the continued sympathy of the
Churchill government for the Franco
government In Spain.
Expediency is the real policy. Out
wardly one gets the impression from the
dispatches and the public statements
that Winston Churchill, who favors con-
tinuance of friendly relations with
Franco, is rightist so far as Spain is
concerned, but when it comes to friendli-
ness to De Gaulle, he is apparently q
leftist. In the case of Italy, the Rus
slams have recognized the Badogho
government, although leftists in the
United States have been bitterly opposed
to the continuance of Badoglio In power
The real answer must be that Messrs.
Churchill, Stain and Roosevelt have
some kind of an understanding that
each may take whatever position he
wishes as to Badoglio, De Gaulle and
Franco, but that as a group the Allied
governments must not allow anything
to happen that interferes with the prog
ress Of the military forces.
One might even suspect that Mr..
Churchilrs neutral position as between
the British public opinion that favors
De Gaulle and his own Difference to
President Roosevelt's wishes which are
more or less anti-De Gaulle, Is just q
convenient way Of postponing decision
on the whole business of recognition till
| after the invasion starts.
| Certainly Gen. Eisenhower doesn't
want to have his military operations
messed up by having to defer to Gen.
| De Gaulle for advice on some civilian
| problems that are really military but in
which De Gaulle might wish to partici-
pate.
Worked Well In Italy.
The policy of expediency worked well
in Italy Slowly all factions were pre-
vailed on to let matters alone till after
| the capture of Rome when, according 10
| the assurances given, change in gov
ernment would be effected and the King
would retire.
| Something of the same kind may be
in the works with respect to both France
| and Spain. Mr. Churchill said in words
| plain enough for any one to understand
that Franco was playing ball with the
| Allies. This may be unpleasant news to
| those who would like to see Franco
| deposed right away, but it is not In the
| Allied interest to have a civil war start
| just now. 1t might conceivably suit
! Germany's purposes, but not the Allies.
| Ultimately, of course, when the Allies
have achieved the unconditional sur
render Of the Nazis and all occupied
countries are completely in Allied pos
session from a military standpoint, the
time for reorganizing governments will
be at hand. The Allied governments
| may find themselves defending right
| ist government in one place and leftist
in another to prevent massacres and
| bloodshed and to assure the re-estab-
| hshment of democracy by orderly proc
esses rather than by violence
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