The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1944-12-14

out concentrating our full force in
either. Though we have won great
victories both in Europe and in
the Pacific, we have missed OBJ
tanning the certain and quick de-
cision which we hoped for. 1t will
always be an interesting question
what would have happened if Cen
eral Eisenhower had had the ships
and the men to make two separate
landings in northern Europe in
stead Of the one landing in Nor
Be that as it may, the basic
decision to conduct the two great
simultaneously had GER
tain other immensely important
consequences. 1t meant that there
could be no large B-itish-Ameri-
can landing in the Balkans. 1t
that the Italian campaign
could not be concluded. 1t meant
that almost no shipping was avail
able to put adequate civilian sup
plies in Italy, Greece, Belgium, or
France.
There is little doubt, I think, that
our political strategy failed to take
account of the consequences of our
strategy. In Belgium, for
example, the root Of the trouble,
as I understand it, is that h e
Pierlo government put into force
Immediately well meant policy
of currency deflation. The policy
would have worked if, as was sup
posed when it was formed in Lon.
don, it had been possible to import
into Belgium the civilian supplies
which were needed, which would
have counteracted the black mar.
kets that had developed under the
German occupation.
But for lack of shipping and OF
ports and OF railways it was not
possible to bring in the imports.
So when the Belgian government
debated the currency nevertheless,
the effect was to cause the peas
ants to hoard their produce and
in general to cause an economic
paralysis. For the time to debate
is when larders are being filled,
not when they are empty. The Bel
gian fiscal policy was orthodox
and sound but the economic sit
uation was so abnormal that an
policy was the wrong pol
icy.
In Greece we find the same es-
sential difficulty, namely the per-
sistence in a policy which might
have worked if a large Allied ar
my had gone into Greece to fight
the Germans, bringing with them
adequate supplies for the civilians.
Under these conditions the Greek
coalition government might have
held together, and the difficult
problem of fusing the forces of the
resistance with the legitimate gov
eminent might have been manag-
ed. But what happened was that
the Germans evacuated Greece,
and a mere handful of British
troops entered Greece bringing
with them a government which
had little authority of its own and
no certain means of furnishing
rapid and sufficient economic re-
lief to the people of Greece.
Under these conditions the CEN
ter of gravity in the Greek gov
eminent had to be the armed for
ces of the resistance, numbering
it is said some 10000 men. The
center of gravity could not be the
little British army and the rem
nants of the Creek army from ov-
erseas. Much of what happened in
Athens during the past ten days
is obscure, and we must not judge
hastily. But it does seem fairly
clear that the advice of the British
and the Greeks on the spot was ov-
erruled from London, ana that as
a result the British are fighting
Greeks to prop up a Greek gov
eminent which was formed in ex-
lie when the prospect was very
which tried to resign
when it got to Athens but was
not allowed to resign.
The same fundamental condi-
tons of the war dominate Italy.
Only the weakest part of Italy is
liberated and that part has been
badly devastated by the fighting
and is paralyzed by the needs of
the armies; the Allies have been
unable to find the shipping to bring
in adequate supplies for the civil
lians. The requirements Of the war
elsewhere are the reason why no
Italian policy can work satisfac-
torily. They are the reason why
the only Italian policy that can
work at all is one in which Italians
aree allowed to feel, are made to
feel, that they share the RESPONSE
bility. For since the Allies have
not the military force to drive the
Germans quickly out of the whole
Of Italy, nor the material means
to rehabilitate Italy quickly, tney
cannot afford to act as if they
wanted to take upon themselves
the whole responsibility for gov
erning Italy. They do this when
they presume to say who, among
Italians, may enter
the Italian government.
The crisis in the liberated coun-
tries is due to the fact that civilian