Evening star., 1944-12-17
Forecast of Early War End ,
Upset by Drive in Balkans
Hating of Red Offensive Before Warsaw Declared
To Have Brought Stifened Resistance
On Western Front by Nazis
By Constantine Brown

tine Br0Wn u
forces from France and Belgium as
soon rs it was discovered that the
Atlantic Wall could not Withstand the
firepower of the Allies. He, together
with other German military command.
ers such as Field Marshal Heinz Gud-
erian, we're convinced that Germany
could not fight on two fronts and
keep her extended lines of communi-
cations. The withdrawal from France
was not made quickly enough to save
| the Reich from disaster The Russian
| offensive on the Vistula sector could
| have made it very difficult for the
Germans to provide the troops fight
ing in front of and behind the Sieg-
; friend Line with the necessary replace
| ments and war material.
But for reasons which have never
been explained, the Russian offensive
stopped abruptly within few miles Of
Warsaw, Instead, a number of divi-
sions estimated at between so and
80 were transferred to strengthen the
armies on the southeastern front and
the Russians proceeded to occupy the
to the north where they succeeded in
crushing the Finnish resistance and
defeated the Germans holding the
Baltic states
The Nazi high command must have
given sigh of relief when it discovered
that the Russians had changed theil
military objective and instead Of rushs
ing into the Reich in an attempt ia
get to Berlin they concentrated on
the Balkans, Hungary and Austria.
Freed 65o,o00 for Frent.
The loss of these territories which
had been considered important earlier
in the war, enabled the Germans to
| pull out number of divisions and
what possibly is more important, it
enabled them to reduce their lines Of
communication. This liberated at least
| 65o,000 men who had been engaged
in guarding these lines 1t is true
that these men are not first-class Sold
iers; some of them are wounded who
have returned to partial duties; others
were too old to be put into the fight
ing line when Germany was on the
offensive on all fronts
| But in view of the losses the German
Army has suffered in the last 18 months,
these 65C000 men can be employed be-
hind fixed Notifications after short
period of training.
All reports received in Washington
from inside Germany indicated the
German high command was desperately
hoping that something would happen
to give them breathing spell to or
ganize new defense forces These forces
were to be taken by scraping the bot
tom OF the manpower barrel in the
Reich. The IS divisions the Germans
were able to form from these second-
line troops was an unhoped for gift
from the Allies.
In the meantime, the Moscow govern.
ment decided it would not be to Rus
sia's advantage to have the Allies de-
| stroy the industrial installations east of
the Oder River, where in the last few
years Germany had organized impor-
tant factories for the production of war
material. Moscow established bomb
ing area for Germany and decided that
Allied planes could not penetrate that
1
Reich. The Allied air attacks in West
ern and Central GermAny have crippled
the German war industry.
Nazis Rebuild Aviation.
At this time large part of the Ger
man equipment comes from Silesia,
Pomerania and other sections in the
east 1t is there also that the Germans
are believed to be manufacturing parts
for their V-bombs. The Russian point
of view was that she desired to remove
these factories intact into Soviet ter
ritory after Germany's defeat.
According to reports from London
quoting neutral sources, German plane
production is estimated at 1,500 planes
month despite the continuous bonn
bardment of her western industrial
areas.
Gen. Marshall and Gen. Eisenhower
were confident all through the early
stages of the invasion of France that
when our forces reached the Siegfried
area the Germans would be heavily en-
gagged in the eastern front.
When it became evident that their
hope was at least temporarily frustrated,
Gen. Marshall decided that the Allies
in the west must attempt to break
through the Siegfried Line before the
end of the year. To adopt delaying
strategy for the rest of the winter would
have meant giving Germany every adj
vantage A cessation of large-scale OPP
Grafton for three or four months would
have enabled the German high COM
mand to organize at least another 100
divisions into real fighting units.
Still Time to Act.
Thus, the offensive against the main
German line of Notifications in the west
was started. The Allied high command
was fully aware that it would be very
costly and the brunt of the cost would
fall on the American troops who are
fighting in much larger numbers than
the rest of the Western Allies. 1t was
conceded by some military observers that
this frontal attack on Germany s<strong-
est line of Notifications had all the ele-
ments of gamble. But it had to be
attempted.
The daring offensive conceived by Gen.
Marshall and executed by Gen. Eisen-
hover and his generals in the field could
already have delivered the final blow
against the enemy had our Allies in
the east, the Russians, decided that
the time had come to move their steam-
! c%