Evening star., 1944-10-15
Economic Controls Alone
Held Unable to Curb Enemy
Economists Urge Military Supervision of Germany
and Japan to Guard World Against
a New War
By Charles G. Ross

be developed which would leave little
room for private enterprise. In any case.
each government would have to allocate
quotas of permitted exports to the vari-
ous domestic producers. Thus 1t would
not be possible for each individual COM
pany to use its own initiative in de-
veloping outlets to the quarantined
countries, or even to adjacent states
which might be regarded as trans
shipment centers. These and other
complications of an international eco
nomic control plan would inevitably
exert powerful influence In the di-
rection of government domination Of
business, both in the international and
domestic fields"
Favor Military Control.
All these realistic considerations lead
Drs Moulton and Marlio to their con-
clusion as to the necessity for military
force to prevent the resurgence of mill
tarism in Germany and Japan. Not
only, they point out are economic con-
troll measures two-edged in their effect,
disturbing to world stability and of
dubious dependability, but in any case
they cannot be enforced unless backed
by adequate military power. 1.-THE ex-
perience of the 1906" the writer's add,
should have engraved this fact upon
our memories
Why, then, they ask, should not eco
nomic control devices be discarded
altogether and complete reliance placed
on military measures?
Because, they answer, there are GER
tain economic measures which do have
a supplementary place in a general
control scheme. They enumerate three
such measures, applicable both to Ger
many and Japan, which would not be
very difficult to administer and which
because of their preventive character
would materially ease the problem of
military control The first of these
Is the suppression of commercial as we'll
as military aviation in Germany and
Japan. This is necessary for the OBJ
vious reasons that commercial aviation
is training ground for military pilots
and that many planes, especially those
of the transport type, can be quickly
converted to war uses. without pilots
trained in civilian life, quick prepara-
ton for war would not be easy"
There are wide differences of view,
the authors say, as to whether aviation
controls should include the prohibition
of individual private flying. Such pro-
hibition to the German people would
be source Of perpetual hostility" and
would be much more dificult to enforce
than the suppression Of regular COM
mercial lines. The writers conclude,
however, that "for complete safety" the
prohibition Of private flying of all kinds
would be necessary
Control Of Power Urged.
The effective supervision of civilian
aviation, they continue, would be
facilitated by the control of the sup
porting Observation-Disclosures and Pc
troleum. With respect both to Germany
and Japan, it is suggested that the
production of aluminium ingots and of
synthetic oil be suppressed. As far as
Germany is concerned, it is found that
military control would be effectively
aided by the permanent supervision of
electric power stations and high tension
transmission lines
This type of control" Drs. Moulton
and Marlio explain, has the great ad-
vantage of being able to affect quickly,
in case of need, the output of numerous
key war industries, such as magnesiuc,
alloy steels, nitrogen, hydrogen and syn
thetic rubber. :. 1t seems highly prob
able that generation hence the mill
tary importance of these industries will
be even greater than today"
The recommended devices it is argued,
would not in normal times appreciably
disturb economic conditions within the
controlled countries or dislocate inter-
national trade. They possess the adj
vantage, moreover, of requiring only a
small number of administrators-in the
main invisible"
The economic measures outlined
having to do with aviation, oil, alum
inum and electric power-are offered
only as measures to reinforce the mill
tary control which is deemed essential.
The authors divide the military con-
troll problem into two parts: The i'm
mediate disarming of the enemy coun-
tSee CONTROLS, Page C-11)