The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1944-12-30

Mr.. Sumner Welles lays the po-
litical differences among The Allies
to the failure Of the administra-
ton Ito insist upon establishing
United Nations council to deal
with political problems. There was,
however, a reason why the admin
iStration could not insist upon, and
did not even desire. such a council
to deal with political problems. The
reason was that being a member
of the council the United States
government would then have had
to make up its mind definitely on
series of political issues which,
as matter of principle as well
as of expediency, it wished to post
Ipone until the war was over.
This policy of postponement-
which Mr.. WelleS himself helped
to formulate-has made it impos-
sible for the United States to take
that Leadership in establishing
the council which Mr.. Welles has
been advocating. For the council
would have had to make decisions
on the very issues which it was
our policy to leave unsettled until
after the war, namely frontiers,
the status and powers of provision
al governments in liberated coun-
tries, and military relationships
Of states within the same strategic
neighborhood. These are the is
sues which a council would have
had to decide These are the is
sues which, because they are I'M
settled or are being settled badly
by 'unilateraP action, now impair
the solidarity of h e United Ma
ton.
The United States, then, could
not insist upon political council
because it was insisting on not set
ting the questions that a council
would have had to deal with. Thus
we took our stand on the principle
that disputed territory should re-
main in dispute, unless settled by
voluntary agreement, until the war
was over. AS long as that was our
principle, a council could not have
decided such disputes. The propos-
al for a council has been mean
ingless and contradiction in
terms until we were willing to en-
ter the council and take the re-
sponsibility of judging and deciding
such vexed issues. For all that we
had to contribute to them was the
negative principle that they should
not, or at least need not, be. de-
cided now, and the vague promise
that at some indefinite date in the
dim future they could be settled
justly.
We took our stand also on the
principle that we favored only
democratically elected govern
ments in liberated countries. This
excellent principle was totally ir-
relevent to the real problem which
has presented itself in many, if not
all, Of the liberated countries. For
the real problem is how to consti-
tute a government immediately
before it is possible to hold cleo
tons - how to constitute a provi-
sional government to administer
the country, to restore free discus
sion, and then to organize cleo
tons. In our effort to take no posi-
ton on the character Of that in
term government-the government
which must be set up before a
democratic election can be held
we have simply evaded the prac
teal issue. Unless we were willing
to face and decide the practical is
sues, council could not have fac
ed and decided them.
The root of the trouble is that
our official policy has been based
on radically false conception of
war diplomacy namely that it
was possible and desirable to post
pone the settlement of political is
sures until after the war. That has
been why we could not take the
leadership in establishing United
Nations council during t h war.