The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1944-10-09

| the invasion OF Europe, or the IL
nal reduction of Japan, require
very much longer. The making of
all great plans involves commit
ments, extending far into the fu-
ture, which are not merely mill
tary in the narrow sense but are
also diplomatic and economic.
Thus, for example, the agree
ments which Secretary Hull made
at Moscow a year ago were a
pledge to perpetuate the wartime
alliance by Transforming it into the
general organization which is be-
ing worked out now at Dumbarton
Oaks; this political agreement
was the necessary foundation to
the military agreements, made
subsequently at Teheran, of which
the results-so far only as regarda
Europe are now visible. It is
evident that if between the Tehe-
ran conference of 1943 and the
great European campaign of 1914,
there had been any break in poll
cy, or any period of uncertainty
about its execution, the consequent
ces would have been very serious
indeed.
Mr.. Dewey's action in sending
Mr.. John Foster Dulles to the
State Department, and Secretary
Hulrs response, are a recognition
that in the crisis of war way
must be found to keep high policy
unbroken. Mr.. Dewey's action
must be interpreted, I think, as
meaning more than a willingness
to collaborate on the specific mat
ter of the Dumbarton Oaks
charter. 1t was intended, we must
assume, as symbol to the coun-
try and the world that the great
lines of our foreign policy will not
be changed, and this view was on
the whole confirmed by Mr.. Dew
ey's Louisville address.
Secretary Hulps response, and
more than that the restraint which
it is said he has imposed upon
Democrats who wish to malign
Mr.. Dulles, is recognition that
while the President and he can
form a foreign policy, and can ne
gotiate treaties and agreements,
all their work will be in vain anG
will not become the settled foreign
policy of the United States unless
the Republican party, or at least
the main body of them, really ra-
tify it. When we say ratify, it is
more than question of the two
thirds vote in the Senate The
Monroe Doctrine, for example,
vas stated by a Democratic Pres
il mt and was never formally rati-
fled by any one votee of Congress.
But it became the foreign policy
of the United States by almost uni
versal consent in both parties.
That is the kind Of consent, rather
than one damned through by a
narrow margin in a count of noses,
that we must have to make truly
workable and effective our policy
during and after the war.
The more difficult problem aris-
es from the fact that the election
comes in the midst of a war that
is by no means concluded. It3eiS
how during the period from Elets
ton Day until after inauguration
responsible decisions can be tax
en- about the conduct of the war If
the office has been
defeated and the President-elect
and his new Cabinet do not yet
have responsibility. This is not
new problem in American poll
tics. 1t is the OLD problem, known
as the interregnum, which our
Constitution creates. 1t is acute in
time of. crisis. 1t arose in 1864,
and again in 1916 and 1910 when,
though we were not at war, we
were on the verge of war. It is a
very real problem, and nothing
could more surely indicate an I'M
fitness to carry on the war than
disposition to deny that the prob
lem exists. .t..
The problem is soluble, should
Mr.. Dewey be elected, only if he
turns at once to Mr.. Roosevelt,
and to the seasoned administrators
who are in charge of the war, and
then offers and demands a kind Of
collaboration which transcends all
party lines. The situation is such
that the men who are now charged
with responsibility and that means
many more than the President,
~