Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1944-08-21
BEHIND
THE NEWS
BY Paul
Matton

OH'
Mdfton
WASHINGTON Aug. p -
w Travelling Mr.. Roosevelt
and his war pubhciSt. Elmer
Davis, came back from the
Pacific front with promising but
indefinite and almost alarming
reports about the time neceS-
Sary 10 crush Japan.
common notion IS that
sit will only take a lew
months" after Germany is being
correspondingly altered here
at least by official authorities.
The new notion is that another
newly-mounted campaign next
spring will be required and the
end may not come until a
year from now. SO they say
now.
This deepening attitude is due
TO new conception OF the
military situation.
NEXT logical steps for US in
~ the Pacific are the Philip
pines. FormoSa and the southern
string of islands of the Jap
mainland tFR},-tiIt,ss-H- i4laRds,-sRd
even Kyu u, SouthernmoSt
large Jap island contiguous to
the homeland group.
No secret can be made OF
Gen. MacArthur's intention to
move promptly upon the Philip
pines. He promised 1t. The
President, after calling him TO
Honolulu, confirmed the promise.
We cannot 90 anywhere IN
the Pacific without air coverage.
Dangers of landing and sus-
tanning troops subject 10 Jap
air attack are too great to be
considered.
From this basic consideration
has grown the strategy of push
ing our land bases for air power
steadily forward. This progress
has reached the Guam-Salpan
frontier, which Mr.. Davis prom
ises will lead now TO the next
steps ("not long we're his
words, but every good demo-
cratic pelitice- here hopes Mac
Arthur will be back in the Phil
-fpptres before eleetfeH-aay
The bulk of the Jap armies
are strewn over the thousands
of miles of Asia from Manchu-
kuo 10 Burma tno longer IN
India. from which they now
have been chased.
Conceivably, we could eStab-
liSh beachheads on the South
China coast and open a sea route
TO Chungking. Our people may
be reluctant 10 do this without
air bases on FormoSa and in
p the Philippines ia cover that
operation.
DUT what is needed 10 ami
ID hllate Jap fighting power IN
China. is not necessarily our
armies. but weapons and food
for the limitleSS number OF
Chinese who want 10 do the job.
The source of Jap military
power. however, is not In their
farhung armies but in the group
of large islands known as the
Jap mainland. II Japan proper
could be conquered, the armies
IN China and elsewhere must
fan for lack OF supplies, weap-
ons. even food. as the whole
Jap distribution system would
be destroyed.
As We have 100 aircraft car
ricrS Plus the overwhelming Pa
cific seapower We know we con-
troll. plus whatever Will be re-
leased from Europe as Germany
falls. why not create an armada
sufficiently powerful to blast
straight into Tokyo, carrying
our air Coverage with us? 1t
would save lot Of chasing
around and heavy fighting for
preliminary positions.
Jap airpower is still little
better than the German, but
not much. They have produce
ton while Nazl factories prac-
tically have been eXtlnguiShed
by our air bombardment. Also,
a considerable army remains on
home Jap soil.
THE air force would have 10
i be met and defeated first,
then rTe -taud force, but the
task is not beyond assured,
daring planning. incidentally,
we have an admiral in charge
of Pacific operations, the only
front at which the navy con-
trolls.
If we could do il al Saipan,
we can do It in the Jap center
al home or on a China beach
head In case We head straight
in. the war should not require
another year.
As for the land fighting in
China and Burma. we are only