Evening star., 1944-12-10
Leose-Lend Theory
Changing in Practice
Writer Sees Great Credits to
Allies Postwar Probability
BIZ Oanen L. Scott

By ODen L. Scott.
| The prospect now lis that lease-lend
aid given by the United States In large
part to the British Empire and Russia
| will total $50, ,000, 900 900 before the pres
| ent wars end That will represent a
volume Of aid about 10 times the size
| Of the loans OF the last war This will
be in addition to about $3.50 ,O00, 600 900
to be spent directly on the American
war effort.
Lease-lend is to undergo a change In
basic theory after the German war ends.
Originally this form of aid was designed
to supplement the effort Of nations
| fighting Germany and Japan after those
| nations had strained all of their own
| resources to the limit. Lease-lend as
sumed as its first condition that the
1 nation receiving aid should be devoting
| every energy to war.
Now, however, this same machinery
is to be used to help other nations shift
back to peace basis. 1t now Is agreed
that after the German war ends, the
1 United States will continue to supply
aid to the United Kingdom and to some
other nations of the British Empire.
This aid in the form of food and OF
direct munitions of war will be given
in order to permit the British to start
shifting their industry from a war to
a peace basis in step with the indus
try Of the United States
Without lease-lend help in this period
1 foip attl l.
to devote its energies almost wholly to
war or woulds be unable to participate
on large scale in the war against
Japan The British already are wor-
ried by the prospect that American in
dustry will gain head start in recon-
verting to peace and will capture export
markets that British industry needs.
Lease-lend will tend to equalize this sit
uation by enabling Britain to reduce its
war production and its war spending
after the German war ends and to re-
turn to peacetime activity in step with
this country
The same altered theory of lease
lend later can be applied to Russia, if
josef Stain decides to join up In the
war against Japan. If he does join up
then this country will be able to supply
Russia with war equipment while Rus
sian industry starts to shift back to
peeacetime production. The net effect
OF all of this will be to delay some
what the reconversion of American in
dustry from war to peace basis. It
also will be to add somewhat to the
dollar cost Of the war for this country
while reducing those costs somewhat
for other nations. These dollar costs.
however, will be expected to be made
up many times over in the saving of
lives that will result from large-scale
British and Russian help in the Japa-
nese war
change in the theory of lease-lend
is being justified. too, on the ground
that 1t will permit Great Britain to
re-establish herself on a stable basis
much earlier than otherwise would be
the case. The British now are so fully
converted to war and have made such
sacrifices of assets during the war that
they would have great difficulty recon-
verting without aid from this country.
All of this leads up to the question
Of eventual payment for lease-lend aid.
This question apparently is to be
answered by the working of a rather
simple formula. This formula is likely
to call for the United States to write
OF, without any consideration of repay
. ment, all munitions of war that have
been used up and all food trucks and
other items that have been consumed
or destroyed during war. On this basis.
probably rs per cent of a $50 900 900 900
lease-lend contribution can be written
of the books
There is another category of aid how
ever, that is to have permanent value
10 lia- nations receiving it, Britain,
for instance, - received machine tools
of great value. She ::-s received ma
chinery of many kinds and nIeS... ID
great stores of oil. Russia has received
whole industrial plants. She has re-
ceived very great numbers of trucks
and many other types of equipment.
The value of this type of lease-lend
goods may reach $4,000 900 900 before
the war ends. The prevailing idea is
that some modest payment might be
made in return for American goods
that will have peacetime value.
When accounts finally are settled on a
s5o'0oo.o 1000 lease-lend operation this
country may get commitment to pay
$4,000, 900 900 or So, 900 ,000, 900 over long
period Of years. There is some slight
doubt, however, about that because of
t.>e difficulties of exchange that are
like. to prevail in the postwar period.
As .|ssult, it will not be surprising If
the en,Fre lease-lend effort will be
| charged - as a war cost for the United
States, un.ess the Government should
decide to exercise its right under the
lease-lend C, ntracts to take back some
of the goods dipped. Title to all lease
lend equipment and other goods still is
in the hands OF his country so that 1t
is in position. If It wants, - take back
what is not paid for or usec up. Sur
pluses in this country will be so large
that this right probably vii not be
exercised.
At the same time, plans now are
being laid for very large foreie.. loans
to be made by the United States after
war ends. These plans call for loans
of from $4,000, 900 ,OO0 to $4,000 000. 900
a year, If Congress likes the idea. Lease
lend is running at about $4,000 900 900
". wx~sn