Evening star., 1944-09-10
Byrnes Report on Reconversion Plans
War Mobilization Director Informs President 50 Per Cent
Cutbuck Is Possible When Germany FoIs

- w uSu 0St utsOtly OutS
is more likely to occur where the
curtailment is in Government-owned
plants engaged entirely In war pro-
duction and having no plans for
civilian production.
MINES Committee.
In order to meet this situation
have appointed q committee con-
sisting of representatives of the
War Production Board, the War
Manpower Commission, the Defense
Plant Corp. and the Surplus War
Property Administration. They are
at work interviewing the contract
ors. Their objective is to ascertain
whether or not the contractor will
exercise his option to buy or lease
the plants. II he Is not interested,
then the committee. having de-
termined to what uses the plant can
be put, will inquire whether local
capital or some corporation or in
dividual can be interested in pur-
chasing or leasing the plant-of
course, subject to the policies pre-
scribed by law.
The primary purpose is to help
the manpower situation. The pres
ence Of representative Of the Man.
power Commission on this commit
tee will enable that agency to
know what progress is being made
IN arranging for the operation Of
these plants. If such operation does
not seem probable, the Manpower
Commission, in advance, can make
plans to secure jobs for the workers
when their employment is termi-
mated.
1t is obvious that any restric-
tions upon the sale or leasing of
these plants that will delay their
conversion to civilian production
will cause unemployment. In the
Government-owned plants there are
several million war workers. If they
are not employed until other plants
can be built or other machinery in
stalled they will be out of work for
long period. The plant equipment
OF these Government-owned plants
must be put to work promptly If
jobs are to be provided.
Manpower Controls.
1t Is apparent that with the de-
feat OF Germany the necessity for
existing manpower controls will
largely cease. Hence these controls
will be abandoned to facilitate the
transfer of manpower from the cur
tailed war programs to civilian pro-
duction. The services available
through the War Manpower Com
mission and the United States EN-
ployment Service will continue. The
production urgency and manpower
priorities committees also will con-
tlnue to function as at present, al
though their functions will become
advisory.
However, a loss of manpower in
war production below the needs to
meet the schedules established for
the war against Japan would neces-
state prompt restoration OF con-
trolls. 1t is anticipated that the
voluntary establishment of ceilings
will correct such conditions locally
If the need arises.
Defense Against Idleness,
Unemployment compensation is
our first line of defense against un-
In view of the failure
OF the Congress to provide for more
liberal benefit payments by the un-
compensation systems
OF the States through supplemental
appropriations by the Federal Gov
ernment, there will be some States
IN which the payments will be very
inadequate, particularly in view of
the increase in the cost of living
since such payments were estab-
lished by those States.
The weekly benefits were estab-
l1shed several years prior to the
war. If they were adequate then,
they are inadequate now. The State
systems have, during the war, as a
result OF increased contributions and
reduced expenditures, accumulated
reserves of s5,5O0,OOO, 900. That is
fortunate. But the objective of the
system is to provide a defense
against unemployment, and not
merely to accumulate money. The
States should act now to hberalize
the benefits and make the State
systems serve their true purpose.
1 still hope the Congress will re-
consider its action in rejecting the
plan suggested by me that the max
lmum weekly benefit should not be
less than stated percentage of the
workers previous wages or $50
whichever is the lower; should be
paid for as long as rs weeks and the
coverage be extended to include
workers where the number of en-
ployes is less than eight.
Return to 40-Hour Week.
1t is evident to me that If on
We day we are to reduce war pro-
ductlon 40 per cent, 1t is necessary
that the Government plan now to
spread the work.
Only the necessities of war pro-
duction and the shortage Of work.
ers caused the Government to in
crease the work week to 48 hours.
When We day comes we should re-
turn to the 40-hour week. This will
give jobs to those who are left with
out employment The workers want
Jobs and not unemployment COM
pensation.
On February 9, 1943, I recon-
mended that the President issue an
order authorizing the increased en-
ployment to 48 hours. AS the reason
for the order will not exist after
We day, hope an order will be
issued returning to the 40-hour
week provided by law, except to take
care Of production necessary to the
war effort and some specially tight
labor areas.
This will help solve a problem
which is already giving concern.
Many employees have been leaving