Evening star., 1944-06-24
Pacific Battle Strategy
By Maj. George Fieldine Eliot

Piecing together the of1icial reports,
statements Of Navy oficials and William
L. Worden's excellent dispatch from the
5th Fleet, we can get some connected
idea Of the desperate Japanese attempt
to break up our attack on the Marianas
Islands.
The first air attacks on Saipan and
the neighboring islands were on June
10 and II. These attacks were probably
made by carrier-borne aircraft of Vice
Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58."
Having knocked out the Japanese air
power based In the Marianas, Admiral
Mitscher seems to have gone 800 miles
north to attack the Bonin Islands and
thus prevent immediate reinforcement
of Saipan by Japanese planes coming
down the island string from the Jap
anese mainland. He knocked out So
japanese planes In the Bonins on june
Il.
Meanwhile, on June II, bombardment
Of Saipan by our surface ships COM
menced, and on June IA our marines
and troops began landing on Saipan.
Our heavy surface units bombarded
Guam on the 18th.
The Japanese reaction seems to have
been along these lines: Being unable to
reach Saipan by way Of the Bonins,
they decided to send carrier task force
to attempt q surprise air attack on our
feet. This force was probably as
sembled at or near Formosa, though 1t
may have come from Amamioshima, in
the Riu Kiu Islands. The east coast
Of Luzon Is about 400 miles from
Saipan, Amamoishima is something over
1900 If we allow four days to make
the force ready to move and assume
the starting date of the preparations as
June IL, the day when our lombard
may have tipped the japanese OF that
we meant real business at Saipan, this
calculation would permit the Japanese
task force to set out from its base on
June 16. If it moved at an average
speed of 20 knots, then it could reach
position roughly 400 miles west of the
Saipan- -Rota-Guam line in 40 to so
hours, say two days, or the morning of
June 18.
At this point the japanese carriers
seem to have flown of their aircraft.
There was little hope Of any Of the air
craft getting back to the carriers; the
intention seems to have been for the
planes to deliver their attacks on our
ships and then to land on Guam and
Rota for refueling and for the delivery
of fresh attacks. But the Japanese
seem to have had a further purpose.
If their air attack succeeded in inflict-
ing severe damage they may well have
planned for their task force to advance
and establish itself firmly at Guam and
Rota. That Is where the tankers come
in, and it is the only hypothesis can
think of under which the presence of
the tankers with that task force makes
any sense
This leads to the supposition that the
Japanese gravely underestimated our
strength in the Marianas area, for the
battleship portion of their task force
included only four ships, and al one of
these was Of the old, almost obsolete
Kongo class, 1t is a fair presumption
that the others were also of compare
lively old types.
Hence they must have been deceived
by the reports of their people on
Saipan, who doubtless saw only parts
of our forces. In fact, 1t is quite pos
sible that the Saipan garrison thought
they were still being attacked by Task
Force So, which In fact had (as we
have SEEM gone north to the Bonins,
attacked those islands June IA, and by
June 18 appears to have rejoined Ad-