Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1944-08-23
u. 5. AIR
POWER
BY Maj. Alex P.
de Seversky

A NY given phase OF a war can
"a be reduced 10 an equation
of two main factors-quality
and quantity. Now that Allied
fortunes of war are on the as
Cendant, II is interesting 10 ex-
anime the great conflict IN
terms of those two factors.
Without being too technical,
il is obvious that a larger force
can be overcome by smaller
one only if the smaller one
makes HP IT, e4aiitS for what tt
lacks in size.
BY the same token, force
of superior quality can be de-
feated only when enough guam
tty is brought TO bear TO make
up the margin.
As military science has it:
quantity in itself is quality.
But true quality Is always pre-
Terable because il defeats the
enemy-with a smaller invest
These are aXlomS OF war
making. When the two sides IN
an action are identical as 10
both size and quality in men
and machines. then superior tao
ties or brains will decide the
I issue, unless sheer luck or acct
dent lntervenes TO upset the
balance.
NOW that German forces both
~ in the East and the West
are retreating and taking heavy
losses, it should be noted that
since he started the war. Hitler
has switched from reliance on
numbers-on sheer quantity--to
desperate efforts 10 overcome
Allied cumulative advantages
by means of stepup IN Ger
man quality.
At the outset of the war, in
September of 1899, Germany
counted on the effects of ter
rife surprise as represented by
It's new method of using land
and air forces as co-ordlnated
team. But over and above that.
its entire strategy was based
on immense preponderance of
force; IN short, on quantity.
But this faith in numbers and
mere mass acted as a BOOM
erang Just before the war. in
visit 10 Germany. l talked
with top luftwaffe commanders.
| pointed out the clear in
feriority OF their alrplaneS. espe-
Cially in the matter of fire
power. This was no news TO
German Hirmen. of course.
AT Paris aviation show,
they had seen the latest Spit
fires and Hurricanes which the
British had deliberately exhlb-
tied IN order to impress Eng
lands preparedness on the Ger
! mans.
THE Germans. however. did
l. not seem worried about their
qualitative lnferiority. When l
questioned them. they smiled
mySteriouSly. 'c.
After the war got under way.
the mystery was quickly ex-
planned. The Germans were con-
WINGED, il appeared, that their
superiority in numbers would be
great enough to overcome any
and all resistance regardless of
quality.
Their miScalcuIation showed
up in the Battle of Britain. when
the NazlS sought 10 knock out
the Raj IN order TO assume con-
+--trui Of the skies over the chan
/ mel for the planned invasion.
The quality OF British men
and machines proved 10 be so
high that II more than made up
for Germanys 3-to-1 numerical
advantage.
In the East, when Hitler at
tackled Russia. ne reckoned. on
the contrary on defeating vastly
greater numbers with smaller
but superior force, both in the
quality and quantity OF It's wea-
ponS. In the beginning his plan
worked
But al the critical point Allied
strategic bombing began 10 grind
down German industry, thus cut
into Germany'S ability to main
tain quantitative edge in the
matter of weapons.
In short order il became clear
that the Russians, despite their
heavy losses al the beginning,
had gained cumulative supe-
riority over the enemy.
II was the reduced German
productive capacity caused by
our air assaults. that prevented
Hitler from accommodating wea-
ponS necessary TO stem the Rus
sian counteroffenSive.
WHEN we started our stra-
w tegic offensive against Ger
many's industrial Setup. the
Na2iS switched to reliance on
quality in meeting tho threat.
And there Is little doubt that
German research did win an
edge in the quality of fighter
DlanpS