Evening star., 1944-11-06

divided that
way since the Frank 4. Kent.
Roosevelt nomination. They would
have divioeo tnat way no matter
whom the Republicans had put ur
--Willkie, Bricker. Stassen or War
rem.
Any one Of these would have
occupied essentially the same posi-
tion that Gov. Dewey occupies. Any
one Of them would have made the
same sort of campaign. And the
same sort OF campaign would have
been made against them. Some will
contend that this would not have
been true about Mr.. Willkie. But il
would have been. The Willkie at
titude on postwar foreign policy was
in no essential way different from
that taken by Mr.. Dewey.
Mr.. Roosevelt could-and unques-
tionably would-have dwelt upon
the isolationists within Mr.. Will
/. kie's party as he has done in the
case OF Mr.. Dewey.
Same Arguments.
He would have made the same
arguments about Senator Hiram
johnson becoming chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs in
the event of Republican success,
and of Representative Hamilton
Fish becoming chairman of the
Rules Committee.
The Hillman Browder combina-
ton would have been on the Roose-
velt, side just the same and would
/. have been making the same kind of
assault. Mr. Willkie, it will be re-
called, only became a hero of the
radicals behind the President after
he had withdr n as candidate.
There would have been the same
arguments about Mr. WILKES lin
experience: about the danger of
changing the Commander in Chief
with the war still on; about lessen
ing the morale of our troops,
prolonging the war and discouraging
Our Allies. :.
There would have been the same
straining Of the eminent publicists
and professional intellectuals, all
lined, up against Mr.. Willkies last
time, to find a reason for lining up
against him again, Just as they
have strained to find a reason for
lining up against Mr.. Dewey. For
some OF them, Mr.. WILKES defeat
and subsequent death has made it
easier, but If those things had not
occurred they would have found
another reason.
In any case, the division would
have been, as 1t is now, between
those who want Mr.. Roosevelt and
those who don't. This being So
and not many will disagree-it is
worth while to reiterate certain basic
facts on both sides.
In the first place, it is clear that
the only thing that makes possible
a Roosevelt success Is the war. As
one acute, and informed Democrat
privately says: If it were not for
the war, it would be .. murder" In
the second place. even with the
Commander in. Chief advantage.
Mr.. Roosevelt could not possibly
win II 1t were not for the solid
South, which seethes with resent
ment toward him but is held in
line by the extraordinary power of
the party label.
Outside the South, the factors
upon which the President relies in
the pivotal and indispensable States
and without, which, despite the
South and the war, he would have
no chance, can be reduced to five
The support of not one of the five
hinges even remotely on an issue.
Their Roosevelt support is wholly
due to what they regard as their
own. interests. With all of them. 1t
: is i personal or . group reason !:
with none OF them is the reason na-
tional. .-
Formidable Combination.
First, there Is the CLOS PAC,
headed by Mr.. Hillman, through
which It is expected the bulk Of
the organized labor vote will be
delivered. sss -
Second, there are the Communists
I, who control the American Labor
party In New York, estimated to be
, worth 10000 votes in the largest
electoral State.
Third, there are the big city bosses.
These are the professionals with
whom politics is q business. Their
machines man the wards and pre-
, cincts. They have fattened on Fed
eral patronage for IL years. They
are for Mr.. Roosevelt not because
OF his policies or his charm but be-
cause he is good for their business
Fourth, there is, the Negro vote in
the great cities. which Mr.. Roosevelt
took over In 1896 and expects to hold
this time.
Fifth. there is what the Dunn Sur
vey calls the bought vote" )" by which
Is meant the Federal jobholders and
which the Survey estimates to be
worth, at least. three million votes
Obviously, this is 4 formidable
combination. Yet, it can be over
scome. To offset these Roosevelt
assets there can be listed on the
Dewey side4- ~.
q Cd The farmer vote, which. it IL
agreed, has been lost to the Presi-
.dent;
"a The fact that the Republicans
with Goyernots In rs States, now
have 4 Bought vote" of their own
and organizations that have been
greatly strengthened In the past foa,y
years;
CD The fact that the prominence
OF Mr.. Hillman and the Communists
for Mr.. Roosevelt has caused 4 Ger
tain unfavorable reaction in labor,
own ranks rs. well as outside:
% There undoubtedly has been a
certain shift Of Negro voters, which
means that the solidity with which
they formerly voted for Mr.. Roose-
velt will not be nearly SO great:
l5} There is the accumulation Of
N< a