Evening star., 1944-10-15

future aggression by Germany and
Japan; only through military force can
complete protection be assured.
Such is the conclusion of compre-
hensive study published by the Brook
tngs Institution under the title 1.-THE
Control of Germany and Japan" The
authors are DR.. Harold G. Moulton,
president of the institution, and DR..
Louis Marlio, a distinguished French
economist, engineer and industrialist
who has been on it's staff since 1941.
The work represents, DR.. Moulton says,
an unusual type of collaboration, one
in which "a Frenchman and an Ameri-
can have pooled the results of many
years of previous study and experience
in very different environments in a
joint effort to find a simple and prac-
ticable approach to the problem of
making sure that neither the aggressor
OF Europe nor the aggressor of the
Orient shall in the future threaten the
peace of the world"
The authors first examine the
various types sof economic control de-
vices which have been suggested as
ways of preventing Germany and
Japan from re-establishing their mill
tary power. They conclude that while
some of these devices have merit, and
might usefully be fitted into a system
of military force, the difficulties in
volved in preventing rearmament by
economic measures, whether directed at
raw material imports or at key indus
tries, are so great as to preclude effec-
tive control.
Eight Definite Conclusions.
From their analysis, Drs. Moulton and
Marlio draw these specific conclusions:
l. Territorial readjustments would not
suffice. The authors here take cog
nizance of two proposals: One that
Germany be broken up into a large
number of small nations, the other that
an independent Rhineland state be
created for the purpose of depriving
Germany of its richest industrial region.
Either of these measures they contend,
would have such profound economic
repercussions, both upon Europe and
self defeating" AS for Japan, the con-
clusion is that "the amputation of
colonies and occupied areas is a first
requirement" in any control system,
but that Japan proper must also be
controlled lest the nearby areas again
be seized in new war of conquest.
2. Economic plans designed to destroy
the industrialism on which war power
rests are impracticable. This is found
to be true for two reasons: Cd To re-
duce any highly developed industrial
country to an agricultural status would
leave a vast population incapable Of
self f-support and (2) would contract
international trade at a time when an
expanding world economy is of para
mount Importance for all nations.
Two-edged Sword.
8. Direct and general economic super
vision would be q two-edged sword.
Such a system would require a per-
manent army of foreign economic con-
trollers :. =. and 1t could not fail to
be a continuous impeachment to produc-
general system of economic control, to be
genuinely effective, would have to be so
comprehensive in scope and so disrup-
tive economically that it would under
mine world economic prosperity and
thus work against enduring peace"
4. An indirect and partial control
system, involving merely the ALLEGATION
of strategic materials, would be inad-
equate. Under such an arrangement,
systematic smuggling would be carried
on; control of the products at the ex-
porting end would be difficult because
of their various sources and the con-
fiicting economic interests involved;
substitution in many cases would be
possible; under changing technology,
it would be impossible to determine the
true normal peacetime requirements of
Germany and Japan, and hence stock
piles might be gradually built up. The
authors feel that If any such partial
control system should be set up, it would
soon be regarded as necessary to expand
the system into direct supervision of the
whole international economy.
5. Direct controls over selected key
industries offer greater possibilities, but
even these would not insure safety. The
most promising industry controls
would be over aviation and the alumni
mum and oil industries, and, in the case
of Germany over the distribution Of
electric power for industrial uses. Even
with these controls, however, 1t might
still be possible, through new tech
biological developments, secret stock
piling and the placing of orders in
friendly countries, for a strong aggres-
sive nation to beat its way back to
military power.
Other General Factors.
In addition to these concrete Difficult
ties, the authors find certain general
factors which bear upon the efficacy
of economic control measures:
6. The nations which assume respon-
sibility for preventing re-armament by
economic means often have divergent
interests. In time of general business
depression, trade arrangements might
be made with quarantined country
regardless of international commit
ments. "The history of the past rs
years affords little ground for believing
that under the stresses and strains of
great economic dislocations the neces-
sary export controls could be main
tanned"
:. The controlling nations in time
grow weary Of enforcement respon-
sibilities. After war, the authors point
out, there is always a strong determine
ton to set up preventive measures, but