Evening star., 1944-08-20
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mentary and that he has had very
limited experience in western di-
plomacy of the conference type. He
is known to his colleagues as hard
working young diplomat of the post
revolutionary school who apparently
enjoys the thorough confidence of
Moscow, but whose background is
hardly international.
Expected to Present Plan.
This is not said in derogation of
Mr.. Gromyko, but rather to en-
phasize the point that he probably
is to serve as the Kremlin's mes
senger rather than a plenipotentiary
with wide powers to negotiate. 1t is
considered likely that he will present
clear-cut plea worked out in Mos
COW and then serve as an intermedi-
ary through which the reaction of
America and Britain can be trans
mitted to Stain. Observers here be-
lieve that II Russian policy at the
conference was to be flexible and
discursive, man widely versed in
western diplomacy-Maxim Litvins
of or Ivan Maisky, former Ambas-
sador to London-would have been
sent here.
The nearest approach to an Of
f1cial Russian statement of ideas on
postwar security is found in the
widely quoted article by IN. Malin-
in," which appeared recently in the
Leningrad writer's magazine. Zvezda
1t should be understood that any
article printed on foreign policy in a
Soviet publication of this type is far
more significant of official think
ing than. say, an essay in Harper S
or the Atlantic would be of State
Department policy.
Soviet writer's are paid directly or
indirectly by the state, and al
though they enjoy freedom as to
the manner and style of their pres
entation, their central thesis on any
matter OF major policy almost in
variably reflects the thinking of
whatever government agency may
be concerned.
IN. Malinin,' pen name which
may we'll conceal the personality of
some high Soviet official, recently
set out a group Of principles which
he considered should guide the or
ganization of postwar security. The
nub of his argument was that any
postwar peace league in which Rus
sia could place trust must center its
directive organ" in the great DOW
ers, which would be prepared to in
tervene promptly with military force
TO check threatened aggression.
Fears Debating Society.
The plan advocated by IN. Ma
linin" provided for an assembly of
small nations. but they would be
limited to a consultative role. Here
may be seen clearly Russia's fear
that the new postwar organization
might become a debating society"
like the late League of Nations, In
which the long wrangles and con-
f1icting views of some 6O-odd nations
served as brake on prompt and
effective action
The article also expressed the view
that security must be bulwarked by
a series Of treaties among the ma jor
powers in the council which would
pledge them to concrete action and
regulate their spheres of RESPONSE
bility,
I'm these treaties" the Soviet
writer said, there must be defined
as precisely as possible the role of
each power In extinguishing this or
that center Of aggression. This role.
OF course, will not be the same for
each power in each case and will de-
pend on a number of political, geo.
graphical and strategic conditions.
but at the same time their mutual
aid to one another in any action for
safeguarding the peace must be as
sured in one degree or another"
The last sentence is particularly
significant.
Trends Toward Nationalism.
1t can be assumed from the very
nature of political geographical
and strategic conditions" that Soviet
Russia would expect to exercise pri-
mary responsibility. with the ap-
proval of the council, for putting
down aggression in Eastern Europe,
In the Near East (possibly with
British co-operation) and in those
areas of the Far East which border
on Russian territory.
The war has wrought manv
changes in Russia. 1t may be hoped
that the lease-lend assistance Of
fered so generously by the United
States and Great Britain have re-
moved all doubt in Soviet minds that
the Western powers desire it's de-
struction.
All these factors should work
toward trust of and cooperation
with her war Allies.
At the same time it may be tax
en- for granted that Russia will sup
port only a postwar security organ
ization which Moscow is convinced
will offer an adequate insurance
policy against such surprise attacks
as that made upon the USSR by
Germany in June, 1941.