The Wilmington morning star., 1944-01-13
Today And Tomorrow
BY WALTER LIPPMANN

haps more than any man IN washington to
show how to set up war agency and how to
conduct it without bureaucratic feuds and
without obscurity and confusion. An essential
element of his success in administering lend
lease has been that he and his small but ex-
ceptonally competent staff have always
known what they were doing and have not
only been ready to tell but have insisted upon
telling Congress what they were doing and
why they were doing it. Much will be said
by historians about the contribution OF lend
lease to the defense of the United States
and to the Allied victory. good deal should
also be said about how the manner and spirit
Of the Stettinius administration earned and
held the confidence OF Congress-
We now have besides the official reports
and the testimony before the committees a
very readable and engaging book on lend
lease by Mr.. Stettinius himself. 1t is a per-
sonal report to the nation, made at time
must be read by all who wish to discuss the
problems of lend-lease which lie ahead OF us.
Lend-lease was authorized by Congress- in
the winter of 1941. At that time Great Britain
stood alone against Germany. The fall of
Britain would have given Germany the mas
terry of the continents of Europe and Africa
and of the whole shoreline, of the sea and
air bases facing North and South America
and Of the arsenals and shipyards and air.
craft plants of all Europe. At that same
time China stood alone against JAPAN the
collapse and equalization of China would have
given Japan a vast and wellngh impregnable
base on the mainland of Asia from which to
expand her aggression in the Pacific At that
same time the United States had a one-ocean
and not very modern navy, almost no air
force, a minute army no well defended out
posts in Alaska, the Philippines, Guam or in
South America, and the United States had
for modern warfare virtually no war indus
try.
These were the conditions under which lend
lease aid to Britain and China was in literal
truth an indispensable measure Ito promote
the defense OF the United States" No one will
ever be able to say whether, without this
pledge of support from Congress, it would
have been possible for Britain and China to
hold on. But we can measure the Importance
of their holding on when we realize that only
now-three years after the adoption of lend
lease-do we have a navy, an air force, AM
army, merchant marine and war indus
try, adequate to play deciding part in the
war against our enemies. And even now,
when we are fully modified after three years
Of prodigious effort, what would be the pros
pect if our allies had been defeated, and wei
stood alone?
II there are any who still ask themselves
why could we not have let the Japanese con-
quer China and the oil and rubber lands OF
the South Pacific and Australia-and why
could we not let the Nazis conquer the Brit
ish Isles and France and the Atlantic coast
of Africa, and get control OF the Portuguese
and Spanish islnds in the Atlantic-if there
are any who still ask these questions, let
them consider what would be the position of
the United States if it stood alone between
the Japanese-German alliance in the two
oceans. How big a navy and air force and
army would we have needed in order to de-
fend Alaska, Hawaii, the great bulge Of Bra
I'll, the approaches to the Panama Canal.
and our coastal shipping?
And for how long time would we have
had to stand guard, fully modified and armed
to the teeth in order to make reasonably sure
we would not be attacked, as we were att
Pearl Harbor, and attacked in both oceans
at once? What promises could we have OBJ
tanned from Hitler and Togo that they would
not perpetrate several Pearl Harbors? And if
could have gotten promises that wei
dared to rely upon as indeed we could not
have, then could never have demobilized
| and we would have had to live as armed
camp and a threatened fortress forever on
the alert.
These the reasons why, being unarmed
and altogether unprepared for war in 1941,
we had to invent the device of lend-lease.
We could have avoided it only if in the twenty
years preceding the war had maintained
our ornaments, had fortified our strategic
outposts, and had been willing to take COM
| bined action with other nations to resist ag
gresson when it first appeared and while it
was still not tremendously formidable. Lend
lease was the means by which we saved our
selves from the worst consequences of our
mistakes. With it we reinforced the ramparts
that were manned by the British, the Chinese.
the Russians. the Fighting French, and our
other allies, and behind those ramparts we
have had three years time to gather our
| forces.
Measured by the results the cost of lend
lease has been trifle Between March II,
1941 when lend-lease became law, and Nov.
| 80, 1943, the last date for which figures are
available, the cost of lend-lease has been 1875
per cent, or less than one-seventh, of our
war expenditures. In fact, these figures do
not convey the full truth For if we had not
| had 1end-lease and if we had lost our allies,
or even if they had been so weakened that
| they could not take the offensive, the war
would certainly have been longer than 1t is
| going to be and our expenditures, great as
they are, would have had to be infinitely
greater.
| The details of the lend-lease operations and
the settlements after the ends have to
be examined in this true perspective. If they
are, the American people will never consent
to having this great enterprise, which has
served them so well in their most perilous
hour made the object OF carping criticism
| III Jorc hor