Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1944-05-14
Philippines
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Woodward Sees Drive
Af1er Recent Victories
nv REAR ADMIRAL CLARK n.
WOODWARD
ceryrTht. is4l. BY I'M New s'r'lc'
W. SryrNCTON Nav a ms

cer,nHht. 1884 BY lnt'l NsuI service
WASHINGTON. May Is QNS)
The recent whirlwind campaign
in New Guinea. which resulted IN
the seizure of Hollandia, IS the
most important offensive opera
ton 10 date in the southwest Pa
eifc. This, together with the cap
ture Of Uielang. ueStornmoSt atOll
OF the Marshall group, IS Of great
strategic significance.
II denotes the beginning of a
new phase OF the Pacific war. 10
recspture the Philippines ss =
Stepping-Stone for a further Allied
advance toward China or Japan.
UIelsng. some 800 miles north
east of Hollandia. is the deepest
penetration into Japsn'S mid
Pacific defenseS. while Hollandla
is the fsrthest advance TO the
westward in the southwest Pa
eiae. These positions form the
northern and southern prongS Of
a giant plncerS destined 10 close
on tOe nllpplneS'
JAP IMPOTENCE SHOWN
The ability OF American forces
10 land SO easily al three points
along $50 miles Of the New
Guinea coast demonstrates Japans
impotence in the southwest Pa
cific as long as she refuses 10 use
her sea power against supporting
American naval task forces.
Hollsndia - former air outpost
Tuarding 5000 miles OF conquests
In the Dutch Indies-was the most
vital spot OF the enemy's New
Guinea defense system.
With the northwestern end OF
New Guinea eventually IN Allied
hands this largest island in the
world virtually would be converted
into a land bridge leading directly
10 the southern Philippines and to
the Dutch Indies.
Even now - from Hollandia'S
three captured air fields-the Al
lies are able TO carry on an aerial
offensive against Palau and Hal
rnahera, while the Philippines are
within reach of our presently COM
bined central Pacific task forces.
SPECULATION ON TACTICS
There is much speculation as 10
whether the current stepped-up
operations will eventuate in a
combined drive on the Philippines.
as the first objective, or divided
into two separate offensives with
MacArthur's forces using New
Guinea as a taking-off point for
the Philippines while Nimitz' Pa
cific feet strikes straight for
Forrnosa. or perhaps Hainan or
Canton. by-passing the Philip
pines.
Macarthur has made no secret
OF his intention of returning 10
those islands as rapidly as posi-
BILE, In which case the present
New Guinea campaign promises
the development of large enough
base from which TO mount his
reinvasion operations. On the
other hand. NimitZ' strategy, as
publicly announced. is TO cut
across the Pacific 10 establish a
port on the China coast.
The direct cooperation between
the central and southwest Pacific
forces has been made possible by
the decisive victories during the
past six months. In consequence.
the entire Pacific theater is now
unified both tactically and stra-
tegically.
JAPs GET THE JITTERS
The evcr-expanding Allied
pressure area" compels the
Tokyo war lords to dispense even
more thinly their already reduced
naval and air strength. and the
multiplicity of menaced positions
keeps them in a continuous state
Of filters, guessing as 10 when and
where the next major blow will
fall.
II Is obvious that Japan no
longer is able 10 exert any great
air effort al long distances from
her centers OF power, nor is her
naval force powerful enough 10
meet American task forces now
operating in the Pacific.
Meanwhile, Allied airrnen have
continued 10 hammer at enemy
bases 10 the westward in northern
New Guinea their most distant
target being the LEHMAN airdrome
AZ Ssrong. on the western tip Of
the island 760 miles distant)---
and on the island Of Amboina, di-
rectly north of Darwin, Australia.
tNets; The opinions expressed and the
assertions MADE hertm are my Own ana
are not n be construct - official ()f
rejecting n any way The views ~ me