Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1944-07-18
u. S. AIR
POWER
BY Maj. Alex P.
de Seversky

~ AA'Ah AAOANS tiot <ihCi van
= bombers mightier by far than
the B-29 Superbombers are in
the works" have just come
from Gen. Bennett E. Meyers.
head of the Army Air Forces
materiel command
In conference with the press
he declared that the B-29 is
the first new plane developed
since Pearl Harbor, all the
others having been designed and
tested earlier.
That, incidentally. disposes
of the claim that the PAT
Thunderbolt is a new plane,
rather than a development from
a much earlier prototype.
There is every reason to ex-
pect that the mightier lombard
ment aircraft limited at by the
general and as yet unknown to
the public will be in action de-
cisively, at least in the Pacific
theater Of operations. before
World War II becomes history.
That the Bog itself falls
short Of a decisive role Ia too
clear by this time to need
proving.
It's operations are inter-
mittent and OF purely auxiliary
nature.
THE reason for these nrni.
tauons is in the range q
the plane. That range. true
enough. is longer than In any
other military aircraft yet in
the sky. but it happens to b
still short for genuine strategic
undertakings.
II must work out of bases
which are vi either themselves
cut of from their sources on
supply. requiring slow. tedious
and very costly servicing by air
across immense distances, or too
small to house sufficient aerial
force.
The function Of the B-29 10
the relatively modest one Of
softening up Japan for our
triphibious-that is to say, land.
sea and air-strategy.
"Softening up" is a purely
tactical purpose OF combined
operations and should not be
confused with strategic action
by air power.
Strategic action would he
under way IL air power by it's
own direct and independent
action seeks 10 destroy the
enemy's means OF waging war.
In destroying the opposing
war machine. air power would
thus force the enemy nation to
sue for peace.
That cannot be attempted
with the B-29, even II such
strategy were considered desir-
able by the minds in control Of
our war plans.
TTiE B-29. by reason Of It's in
L adequate range. requires
advance bases from which 10
operate.
These bases must be con-
quered, held and supplied.
That calls for operations on
land and sea so colossal that IL
absorbs a lions share Of the
national manpower and re-
sources thereby preventing the
full exploitation OF the air
power potential.
Moreover. the surface opera
tions 10 obtain bases cannot b.
successful without support Of
aviation. thereby again siphon.
ing of air power for a secondary
or tactical purpose.
Such IL the vicious circle
formed by the physical fact Of
inadequate range OF our present
aircraft.
II is q circle that can only be
broken by the construction Of
the kind Of bigger bombers re-
ferred to by Gen. Meyers.
Those bigger aircraft will diff
fer from the Bog in the fact
that they will be able to strike
at Japan from primary bases
such as those in Alaska, Aus
tralia and India.
These bases are already safely
in our hands; they don's have TO
be fought for.
Secondly. they are vast
enough TO accommodate equip
ment Of the necessary magni.
tude.
Finally. they are beyond the
range OF hostile land and sea
forces and therefore immune to
the kind of surprise assaults
that may he expected by small
islands scattered in the Pacific.
TNiE assumption that the war
L will be won exclusively with
Liberators and Flying Fort