The Waterbury Democrat., 1944-05-12

General. TIL c
question now is how we'll the inspec-
tons jobs on this effort has been
done.
In the insistence on speed, with
accomplishments counting first and
economic efficiency second, 1t is per-
haps only natural that some public
money slipped through the fingers
and down the drains.
There were congressional camp
construction Investigations aired
throughout 1941. A $515 100000 pro-
gram for building 229 camps actual
ly cost $4,000, 900, according to a
Senate report.
Then came a series Of ordnance
plant construction programs that
did not make nice reading. After in
specting the Wolf Greek Ordnance
Plant project at Milan, Tenn, the
Senate's Truman Committee re-
ported that the War Department
had failed to conduct an adequate
investigation simultaneously with
construction, and that it even re-
Trained from making a thorough
check Of matters referred to 1t. The
subsequent report by the Office Of
the Inspector General was consid-
cred by the Truman Committee to
ne an attempt to whitewash condi-
tons there.
On the other hand, one high
Army officer contends that the in
spector generals report was thor
ough investigation and its report
one Of the best ever prepared. The
report was not made public, how
ever, and was not even turned over
to Congress, as all reports of the
inspector generals department are
considered confidential and not
public documents.
NO CONFIDENCE,
SAYS TRUMAN
After the inspector general had
worked on several matters referred
to the War Department by the Tru-
man Committee, and after several
Of the officers, considered by the
Truman Committee to be incom-
petent bunglers, had been promoted
Senator Truman informed the War
Department that his committee
could have no confidence in the in
designations of the inspector gen.
eral.
That was pretty rough treatment
but then, after the ordnance plant
disclosures, there came series of
congressional investigations Of air.
craft procurement, truck procure
ment, the Canol oil pipeline and re-
finery project in Canada and Alas
ka, expenditures over and above ap-
preparations for Pentagon building
construction, air transport, leasing
and purchase of hotels for Army
use. All these congressional disclos-
ures certainly did not add to public
confidence.
In setting up the procurement
and construction division in the
Office of the Inspector General, it
was given only policy-making as
signment. 1t was not set up to make
the inspections itself, but to set a
patter nfor inspections to be made
by others. 1t inspected the inspec-
tors and inspected their reports.
The small staff of 16 officers, now
headed by Brigadier- General Leo
]. Ahearn. could not possibly in
spect all the war plants. all the
contracts.
ONLY A REFERRAL AGENCY
Even when the P. and c. division
did find something wrong it could
not make a full investigation itself.
Instead, it could only refer its find-
ings to the investigations division
Of OTIG to be run down.
In the case of civilian personnel
or private contractors being at
fault, evidence uncovered by inves-
legations of the inspector generals
department was of necessity turned
over to the FBI or to the war frauds
unit of the Department of Justice
for prosecution.
Dozens, hundreds, perhaps thou
sanus of cases involving both civil
ians and military personnel have
been turned up by the inspector
generals department and turned
over to proper authorities. Many
were small fry. But too many of the
big fish got away, and that raises
The question of whether this clois-
tered. grand jury-like procedure in
the inspector generals department
is adequate to deal with a vast
multi-billion dollar procurement
program,