The Wilmington morning star., 1944-04-08
Interpreting
The War
BY KIRKE L. SIMPSON
Associated Press War Analvs.

'aSSVSA"scu AAeSS war ANALYST
British censorship appears SLOW,
ficantly indulgent toward 1enor+.
from American correspondents -
that country paying up the i'm
minence of Anglo A m cries
second-front invasion assaults =,
the European continent.
II has passed accounts Stain,
that ID Day has been set 10 tba
hour, stories about the brigade ..
news, radio ane picture men from,
this side OF the Atlantic to wjtnes.
and report invasion PROCEEDINGS
even the rather startling remark,
of 1t. General Omar N. Bradler
American ground force commands
in Britain, playing down the prob
able invasion casualty cost.
A possible explanation is hope5
for effect of all this on Nazi nerves
That certainly has had sometbng
to do with Allied publicity polcS
in connection with invasion
preparations in Britain. There ba,
been a discerniable official effor.
throughout the long period of pre
paration to make it clear to everv
body, including the Germans, fiat
this is to be the greatest military
show" in History, to borrow Brad
ley's term for it. when it comes
That is an understandable tech.
nique. 1t could have benefits in
Nazi occupied countries across tbe
Channel into which the invaders ara
destined to crash. Allied radio,
beam broadcasts of much of il for
clandestine listeners from NORWAY
to France.
Bradley was making a fighting
speech to his officers.
When. the time comes you will
be surprised by the naval gunfre
and air power we have" he said
The general characterized re.
ports of possible 80 per cent casu.
alties as 'tommyrot" and noted
there was only an average loss in
Tunisia of three or four men 10
1000" What seems to Dissent 10
the tone of many official utter.
ances in tits country forebodng
very heavy losses If Allied staffers
have any official estimate of the
probabilities, they keep it to them.
selves. 1t would necessarily be
based on actual rather than con.
jectural invasion plans and might
be revealing to the foe.
At this distance, however, the
assumption that the day and hour
for any or all OF the contemplated
invasion moves has been or could
he set long in advance seems
dubious. Too much depends upon
the highly unpredictable weather
in the North Sea and English Chan.
mel.
In any case, that decision must
be up to the top commander of the
invading forces, General Eisen.
bower. Higher authority in the
United States and in Britain could
set period within which prepare.
tions for thu. launching of the ope.
rations were TO be completed and
the actual movement begin Il
would seem essential, however
that the commarder-in-chief in the
field and his staff be left to pick
the actual day and hour for any
invasion enterprise in the light Of
the most recert and dependable
weather outlook data available 10
them on the ground.
Some substained period of good
flying weather for a final concen'
tration of pombardment against Sc
lected invasion beachheads would
be highly desirable. 1t is reason
able guess that the weather fore
casting element of his forces has
been prime concern with Essen
hover since he took over,
And it is moro than possible that
nobody as of today knows the
actual dav or hour of the first
rush because il probably will be
set at the last moment with re-
lation to the weather outlook
W