Evening star., 1944-03-18

pOS1t1On OF tIle AL ToAoeo'
they separate and distinct from the
United States Army, coordinate
with it and hence not under direct
orders of the Chief of Staff OF the
Army? Are the Air Forces respon-
sible only to Gen. Arnold OF the
Army Air Forces? Can the Army
or Navy issue orders to the Air
Forces or is the latter an inde-
pendent unit selecting their own
targets and operating as a strategic
air force or as a tactical air force
at will?
For many months the American
people have assumed that UNIFIED
command has been achieved IN
every local theater of operations
but it has not been known to what
extent the air units have been re-
sponsible to their own commanders
and to what extent to the overall
commander. There is a unified
command on paper, to be sure, but
is it a co-ordinated operational ac-
tivity with land, sea and air forces
actually functioning as one?
Bsaic weakness Possible.
1t is possible, of course, that all
these questions may be answered
with the categorical statement that
both unity of command and CO.
ordination have been ordered and
have been complied with so far as
practicable. The hitch may be
further down the line than the top
officers and may be due to a basic
weakness, namely that our Air
Forces have been developing psy-
chology of separateness and inde-
pendence-they have clamored and
propagandized for a separate and
Independent air force.
The result of such tendency
toward a separate status is doubt
less an inclination to function on
their own. The Navy viewpoint, on
the other hand, has been that Air
Forces must be trained by Navy
trained officers in order to be able
to recognize their own ships and
understand naval naneuvers and
tactics. The ground officers of the
Army have been less assertive
against the Air Force independence,
fearing no doubt the usual cry that,
because air warfare is modern,
ground d-trained officers are out
moded old fogeys.
There has been for many years a
rivalry between the Army and the
Navy which was pointed to as partly
responsible for the looseness of COM
mand at Pearl Harbor in Decem-
ber, 1941. Now a third, element OF
rivalry has entered the military pic
ture. The Army Air Forces want
to be separate unit and lately
have come to support the idea of
one Department of National De-
fense, with a single civilian head,
but with three separate services.
Despite the wonderful achievement
OF air power, the lessons of this
war thus far prove that too many
independent units and not enough
training of the air arm along with
the other units have occasionally
impaired our progress.
Hint Passes Censorship.
A hint of this is given in an Asso-
ciated Press dispatch on the Sicilian
episode that has just passed the
censorship.
Naval authorities criticized our
Air Forces at the time for flying
transports over ships that were
unloading at anchor. They said
the planes should have been di-
rected on a course that would have
taken them out of the range of our
guns. Surviving aviators said they
were puzzled by the order to fly
over the convoy. The Army and
Navy operated under joint COM
mand in this campaign while the
Air Forces operated separately and
some men blamed lack of co-ordi-
nation for the affair"
Navy men say also that the in
dependence of the RAF has re-
duced the efficiency of the British
navy, depriving it of important air
cover for offensive and defensive
operations. In the Pacific. on the