Browning chief. [volume] (Browning, Mont.) 1941-1953, 1944-03-31
Anti Fasdsts in Italy
Lack Uniform Program
Immediate Circumstances Necessitate Allied
Cooperation With King and Badogio as
Leaders of Only Unified Group.
BY BAUKHAGE
NetUs analyst and Commentator.

Another point Churchill made
should be noted for later comment:
Should we succeed in the present
battle and enter Rome-as I trust
and believe we shall-we shall be
free to review the whole Italian po-
litical position and we shall do so
with many advantages which we do
not possess at the present time"
One more Churchill quote before
try to present the American view
point:
II should be sorry, however, to
see an unsettling change made at a
time when the battle is at its eli
max, swaying to and fro. When you
have to hold a hot coffee pot, it is
better not to break off the handle
until you are sure that you can get
another equally convenient and serv-
iceable, or at least that you will find
a dishcloth handy"
So much for the shadowy outlines
of the defense.
Let me give you now, from my
notebook, in the order in which I
took it down, the story as told to
me by one "who ought to know"
"At the Bari conference, there
were a number of parties which
seemed to agree, but they failed to
offer concrete program or one
that there was any firm guarantee
would receive unified support. In
war, we cannot guess, we must
know. There is no definitely estab-
lished leadership among the anti
FascistS.
1--WE know there is no future for
any leadership under the king and
Badoglio. But we must operate in
the present, not the future. At pres
ent, there is but one unified group,
small or large, loved or hated as it
may be, and that is the government
which surrendered to the Allies, un-
der King Victor Emmanuel.
Must Be Realists
"We have to be realists now,
and what is more, military realists.
AS Churchill said, what the Allies
need are Italians ready and able to
fight Germans. Such a group ex-
lists. Italians are fighting side by
side with Americans and British.
Although the Italian fleet has not
been called to action, it surrendered
without resistance. The Italian Off
GERS on duty are still loyal to the
symbol (the king) to which they
made their oath. We are perfectly
willing, we are anxious, that they
choose a new democratic symbol.
But until they do get new symbol
to which the majority of Italians can
adhere, we are not going to throw
away the DID,"
(Churchill's coffee pot.)
So much for what seems to be
the Allies viewpoint with my added
unofficial, but none-the-less be-
lieve, authentic, Interpretation. But
there is something more that no off,
cial would dare whisper. 1t is the
problem which the Allies know they
are going to face in every re-occu-
pied country. Italy is sample. 1t
is something unpleasant but some
thing we must face.
l understand that the Italian peo-
pie in the liberated regions have not
been inimical to the Americans. But
they are resentful. They are hum
cry. They cannot understand why
these strong young soldiers, who
have freed them, do not feed them.
The trucks go by loaded with NUM-
tons and supplies. Some food has
been distributed. Not enough. To
feed all the people would mean halt
ing military operations while the
Germans made hay in the sunshine
of our charity.
The present Italian government
has still some discipline over the
people; it is brutal, perhaps, but eff
fective. A new government which.
really expressed the peoples will
today would have to demand food,
would increase the pressure on the
Allies for supplies that they cannot
spare while they are fighting for
their lives. That is another real
istic, military reason for the policy
of the Allies.
And, unfortunately, that is some
thing that the Allies can expect to
face as more and more European
territory is liberated. The liberated
people cannot be blamed if resent
ment that they do not receive more,
wipes out the gratitude for the modi-
cum that military men can spare.
Armies cannot be idealistic.
And armies or governments at
war which support them, cannot
worry about ideologies. 1t is too