The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1944-10-02
Other Side Of The Picture

Yesterday we quoted Office of War Informa-
ton deductions, from its survey Of the situa-
ton in the Pacific war theater, tending to
show that this conflict would be prolonged
two years after the fall OF Germany.
Today we present the other side OF the pic
ture, showing strategic advantages gained by
the Allies since they were able to assume
thy offensive. +
Whether these advantages are sufficient to
justify 4 belief that its conclusion concerning
Japan's power Of endurance is more than
offset, the OWL does not attempt to say. But
it has been at as great pains to report them
as it was to show Japans strength to 60 on
fighting after its European Axis partner has
been overthrown This summary is more
cheering than yesterdays.
1t shows:
l. Huge Allied war production. The United
States alone produces 5000 combat planes a
month, while estimates place Japan's pro-
duction at only $500 planes a month.
2. United States supremacy in aircraft car
riers Pacific commanders assert that Japan
has lost the power for a strategic offensive
beyond the range OF its land-based planes,
that many Of its lighter, screening units Of
the fleet have been sunk. There is still the
possibility however, these authorities believe
that Japan might make sporadic raids on the
West Coast.
3. Japan's merchant shipping disappearing
Never adequate to meet the demands Of 4
conquered area stretching 10000 miles north
and south and 5000 miles east and west, it
has been steadily reduced by naval, air and
submarine action. Construction falls behind
losses with at least three ships lost for every
two built
4. Superfortresses threaten Japan's indus.
try. Though B-2s raids have only been pos
definitely advance the war against Japan.
S. Island-skipping technique. Such maneu-
verins has neutralized about so major bases
on the fringes Of Japan's outer zone Of de-
tense. Guam, Saipan and Tinian victories
bring Allied forces within striking distance of
the inner defense zone Of Japan itself
6. Blockade Of Japanese islands. With but
one more giant stride westward that would
include the conquest OF the Philippines, Allied
forces would be in position through Navy
and land-based planes to cut Japan's north
south supply route arteries.
7. Burma possibilities. A successful issue
Of the battle Of supply routes there will open
the Ledo-Burma road from India to China.
g. Tactical ability Of Japanese generals in
question. While such ability has not yet been
proved since there has been no modern full
dress warfare on land as there has been in
Europe and no battles involving more than
few tanks Gen. Douglas Macarthur has
said that though the military quality OF the
rank and file remains Of the highest their
officers corps deteriorates as you 70 up the
scale. 1t is fundamentally based upon the
caste and feudal system and doesn't repre-.
sent strict professional merit The Allies
have military leaders of proved ability in
global warfare and in full-scale battles.
3. Poor japanese naval record. At sea the
Japanese have been outfought and out-rna.
neuvered. In the air they have lost about five
planes to our one.
10. Japan's industrial weakness. Japan has
failed to capitalize its post-Pearl Harbor con-
quests. Its measure OF war production con.
tlnues to be based on prewar industrial plant
| rather than acquired raw material resources
V-