The Waterbury Democrat., 1944-01-12

rSson gin to be heard
 from, working in actual battle along with the ground forces,
 How this differentiation of strate. gic and tactical air forces was devel. oped in the North African campaign is revealed by Gen. Henry H. Ar. holds report to the secretary of war | covering operations of the past 2s months.
 Many of the principles governing the tactical and strategic uses oi airpower in modern warfare were learned, General Arnold reveals from the mistakes of the Italians , In the summer of 1940 the Italians started their Lybian operations witl a large, powerful and modern air. force which might have won the campaign for them. The Italian ail fofces were, however. under the command of ground force officers Local army commanders broke ur 1 this big air force and used it in Smal units for the support of minor oper. i ations.
 Against this big Italian air force the British in Egypt had only c handful of obsolete aircraft. The British used its small force as one mass and as result was able to 6e- stroy HOO Italian planes. AS the British air force in North Africa waS strengthened during the next two years it gained control of the ail and it was the tactical use of this force which stopped Rommel anc kept him from destroying the Bri. tish army.
 From these desert campaign eX- periences were evolved many of the present ideas about the use of g tactical air force-ideas which will in all probability be put to use ir the coming invasion. It is mislead- ing, says General Arnold, to say merely a tactical air force provides support to the ground troops, al though that conception appears firmly imbedded in the public mind
 The German conception of this air support for ground forces was adequate in the blitz against France when there was no opposition, but there is a marked difference between that kind of warfare and the pres ent Allied conception of having ar air general run the air war while g ground general runs the ground wal but always working together fol the same objective.
 TEAM LEADERS NOW IN
 ENGLAND
 The same kind of teamwork is oi ! course necessary between the strate- gical and tactical units of an air force in any theater of operations General Arnold points out. In Africa there was a Strategical Air Force under Major General Doolittle, ( Coastal Air Force under Vice Mar shal Lloyd to attack German ano Italian supply lines across the Medi' terranean, and Tactical Air Force under Air Marshal Cunningham.
 These units were not fixed, but entirely flexible. They borrowed flights and squadrons from eacf other for various missions as the sit uation demanded. All were undel Lieutenant General Spaatz as com mander of the Northwest African Air Forces. Spaatz, in turn was un- der Air Marshal Teder, as comman- der of air forces in the entire Med iterranean theater, and Teder o. course was under the supreme com mand of General Eisenhower.
 As Eisenhower, Teder, Spaatz anc Doolittle have been transferred t( England to command the invasion of northwestern Europe, it is only reasonable to assume that theil same division of tactical and strat- egical employment Of air forces vii be employed against Germany though General Arnold's repor makes no mention of this subject. REPORT SKIPS SEPARATE
 AIR FORCE" QUESTION
 Another subject which the genera does not discuss is the subject of thC independent air command" tht separate air force" outside the Army, outside the Navy, yet absorb ing the air forces of both older arms General Arnold has never openly ad- vocated such a reorganization and his report gives no recommendation or hint that this would be desirable
 Instead, he places his emphasis on the use Of tactical and strategical air forces in closest cooperation with ground troops and the Navy for after all, it is the surface forces who must physically occupy ano hold positions to obtain victory.
 Air power has come a long way since World War l, when the air plane was used almost entirely fol observation. Today it is an offensive aggressive weapon and a carrier oi invasion troops. The full potentiali- ties of aerial warfare have not beer reached. The day may come wsler ground and sea forces may be con sidered auxiliaries to air power, but from General Arnold's report there Is no basis for belief that this day has now arrived.