The Waterbury Democrat., 1944-12-26

NAON NO4A4O44Os
 When you read carefully the Stenographic record of that press conference, as this writer has, 1t is easy to see that the President was only trying to give some in- teresting history Sas to how the Atlantic Charter was scrubbed on bits of paper by him and Chur- chill and radioed back and forth between ships.
 He did not mean to throw the Atlantic Charter overheard. He was trying to steer his press conference, as he so frequently does, away from the dynamite laden question of Poland by tell ing them some other human in- terest background information about the Atlantic Charter. Un- questionably he did not mean to imply that the Charter no long CT existed as an ideal toward which the USA and the world should strive.
 The incident was very Simi- lar to the press conference in which FDR denied he had writ ten a letter to Wendell WiIlIxie, then quickly admitted to Steve Early and Judge Sam ROsen- man afterward thart he had made 8 mistake.
 In this case, unfortunately, the Presidents human interest dis course on how the fact that the Atlantic Charter never existed as a formal document already has reverberated around the world with results extremely difficult to remedy.
 The inside fact is, however, that the President most of the time has fought to preserve the principles of the Atlantic Char
 ter. Sometimes, as in the case of Greece, he has not appeared
 to fight very hard. But in the
 case of Poland, for instance, R0oseveIt's record Is consistent.
 The record goes back to the spring of 1942 wheun Foreign Minister Molotoff. negotiating a treaty with England, secured Bri- tiSh consent to new Polish bor- ders, giving Russia her previou: provinces in Poland up to the Curzon Line. This meantt hat Poland would be split in half. ROOSEVELT PROTECTS POLES
 President Roosevelt, however, objected. He cabled Churchill that he could not agre to these terms. Churchill thell held up the whole matter while U. s. Ambassador Winant brought the treaty back to Washington. Fol- lowing on his heels came Foreign Minister Molotoff. He wanted two things: 8 second front in western Europe to take the heat off Stall ingrad; also an agreement on the partition fo Poland.
 MolotOff got neither. The British opposed the first and Roosevelt opposed the second.
 He explained to MOlotOff dip- maticalIy but firmly that he
 could not enter into 8 secret agreement, that there was a large number of Poles in this OrousIy to Polish partition, that country who would object viz it was unwise for the sake of
 Allied unity to arouse them, that European problems were
 not our bailliwick and finally
 that the Russian PUlan was contrary to the Atlantic Char ter.
 The Russians came back with the reminder that Poland up to the Curzon Line, together with EStonia. Latvia, Lithuania, and part of Rumania, was in Russian hands when tile Atlantic Charter was signed, so it did not affly to them. Beyonl that, Molotoff did not press the point: The Rus- sians were in a desperate mili- tary situation at theh time and he was much mCre interested in getting 8 second front.
 However, they did raise the question of Poland when Secre- tary Hull visited Moscow and they raised it again at Teheran. In fact, they never forgot the point or let us forget 1t.
 NO SECOND FRONT TILL "A
 Some critical diplomats argue that Roosevelt should have se- cured a commitment in writing from the Russians in 1942 when they were in desperate military situation and we were in 8 better bargaining position. Had he been able to promise the Russians a When we recoxnize the inevitable