Evening star., 1944-09-11
The Byrnes Report

The report which War Mobiliza-
ton Director Byrnes has submitted
to the President presumably repre-
sents the administration program
for resumption OF the peacetime
production that will become pos
sible when the war with Germany
ends. It seems adequate in some
respects, deficient in others.
The hard core of the first phase
OF the reconversion problem will be
to find useful jobs for the 5000 900
or more workers who are expected
to be released from war plants when
Germany is beaten. It is essential
that they be re-employed quickly in
productive jobs in private industry.
And this must be done without dis
rupting the war work that will con-
tinue necessary until the final de-
feat OF Japan.
To further this objective, Mr..
Byrnes recommends that the Presi-
dent restore the 40-hour week in all
but war plants. This has a dual
purpose-first, to spread the work
among the men who will be unem-
ployed, and, second, to preserve
overtime premium pay as an incen-
tive to keep needed workers in war
plants. Undoubtedly the workers
going over to a 40-hour week will
press for increases in basic pay
rates to offset in whole or in part
the loss of overtime compensation.
Mr.. Byrnes indicated, however, that
he was opposed to this; that for the
time being he felt wage controls
should be firmly maintained. Unless
this is done, prices, Of course, will
have to be boosted.
To ease the problems which will
confront employers abandoning war
work, Mr.. Byrnes calls for the quick
removal of wartime inventories and
other facilities that will not be re-
quired in civilian production. This
will have to be done if the process
of reconverting is to be quick
one, and similar efforts should be
directed to the disposal of Govern
ment-owned plants that will be-
come surplus, for unless these be-
come available for use there will not
be enough plant space to accommo-
date the increased civilian working
force when the war ends.
With respect to taxes, Mr.. Byrnes
proposes only an announcement
that the excess profits tax will be
removed when Japan is beaten and
a suggestion that manufacturers be
allowed to depreciate new machin-
cry substantially during the years
it is being purchased. These are all
right as far as they go, but they do
not go nearly far enough. II private
industry is going to provide jobs for
all who want to work when the war
ends, much more comprehensive
overhauling of the tax structure will
be imperatively necessary.
Mr.. Byrnes also said that new
price schedules for civilian goods
to be produced under his program
will be announced in the near fu-
tire. This, too, will be essential,
and the prices should be fixed with
care, for it is obvious that no manu-
facturer Is going into new produc-
ton unless he knows the prices he
will be permitted to charge and
unless they are fixed at a level at
which he can make a profit.
Most of the other points in Mr..
Byrnes' program have been an
nounced previously. Some of them
involve marked alteration of official
positions taken within recent
months-the plan to lift manpower
controls, for instance-but all of
them probably are desirable.
In considering the wisdom of
publishing his report at this time,
Mr.. Byrnes was faced with the dan
ger that it might divert attention
from the big war job which remains
to be done. Balanced against this,
however, was the certainty that war
workers and war producers would
become increasingly apprehensive
without evidence that the Govern
ment was making tangible prepara-
tions for reconversion. incidentally,
this was also becoming something
of a political issue, and Mr.. Byrnes
decided to lay his cards on the
table, trusting to the common
sense and sound Judgment of the
people to keep the necessary war
work going. In all the circum-
stances, this decision probably was
a wise one.