Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1944-10-08
Allies Face Winter Campaign
As Nazis Stiffen Defenses
Unexpected Factors Temper Optimism Over
Prospects of Early Victory as German
Morale Fails to Break
By Constantine Bro.cn


Of staff, composed of top-ranking Amer
lean and British admirals and generals
Of the armies and the air forces, sit to-
gether several times each week They
receive reports from all the battle fronts
except the Russian-formulate strategy
and communicate their overall decisions
to Gen. Eisenhower and Gen. Sir Matt
land Wilson, who commands the Allied
forces in the Mediterranean.
But there is no common war planning
with the general staff of the Red Armies.
The Russians are working absolutely on
their own. In the past the War Depart
ment here and the British War ONCE in
London had hard time getting even
the most meager military information
from Moscow. Now things have i'm
proved to some extent. We are getting
some details concerning past operations
Of the Russian forces, but our high
ranking military men have little If any
knowledge of their future plans. 8
The same secrecy, however, As not
maintained from this side in regard to
Moscow. Our military plans are COM
municated in full to the "Stavka" (the
Russian general staff many weeks be-
fore they are put into effect in order to
facilitate the task Of the Russian war
planners. So are all the political con-
versations between President Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Churchill. Reports
are sent by special courier to Moscow,
where they are submitted to Premier
Stain and Foreign Commissar Molotov.
Began on Schedule.
Our plans and expectations from the
invasion were fully known to the Rus
SLAMS. The offensive was launched on
June 6 on the basis of the Teheran
agreement which provided that similar
large-scale offensive would be under
taken by the Red Armies against the
heart OF Germany. No one among the
| military planners bothered about who
would get to Berlin first, provided some
body got there before the end of the
year.
| We kept our part of the Teheran bar
gain 100 per cent. The combined Amer
ican-British- Canadian ground, naval
and air forces pounced on the Nazis with
armies are attacking the Siegfried Line.
The task of breaking through that line
was not as difficult as the German
| propaganda wanted us to believe Early
in September when the Allied forces
were chasing the Germans toward their
last line in the west, Gen. Eisenhower
| when asked about the job of breaking
that second German wall, said that a
fortress Is only as good as the men be-
hind it. He indicated he believed the
breaking of the Siegfried Line depended
very much on the morale of the German
soldiers who at that time showed signs
OF disintegration.
But, unfortunately, the Red Armies
did not follow up the Teheran arrange
nients, at least as they had been under.
stood by the American and British gen.
erals After lightning offensive follow
ing our landing in Normandy, the huge
Russian Army was slowed down not by
the enemy's resistance but by its diver
sion to other detectives which the Amer
lean military observers did not consider
vital fog the early termination of the
| war.
| Russian Troops Diverted.
| The Russians scored brilliant adj
vance which took them to the gates of
Warsaw. The Polish underground, fol-
lowing previous arrangement, began to
move inside Warsaw. The Russians were
in Praga, suburb of the Polish capital,
and intended to extendsa helping hand
to the liberators as they had done at
Lwow and other important fortified
cities in Poland. The Germans offered
the same stubborn resistance they had
offered the Americans and British in
Normandy. The Russian Armies, how
ever, were so large and strong that the
Germans would have suffered the same
fate, according to Allied military OBJ
servers, as in their previous fruitless op-
positions on much better fortified areas.
After August l. the Russians directed
their attention to the Balkans. Large
Red forces were sent to Romania, Bull
garia and are now prosecuting success
full war in Hungary and Yugoslavia.
American and British strategists are
not overenthusiastic about this depart
ure from what was believed to be the
soundest Russian strategy-an offensive
against the Reich itself from the nearest
Polish bases. Since August the Red
Armies have been only 135 miles from
the important German Posen- Breslau
defense line. Penetration of this line
would mean the opening of an easy
road to Berlin and, combined with the
violent American British attacks in the
west, would bring about an early coll
lapse OF the Reich.
The offensives in the Balkans and in
Central Europe keep the Russians far
away from our common objective-the
destruction of organized German re-
sistance. Even if the Russians were to
reach Budapest and Vienna within the
next few weeks, successful offensive
against Germany proper would be i'm
possible for logistic considerations.
/ Costly to Mails.
1t Is true that the Russian offensive
IN the Balkans has deprived the Reich
| OF all its satellites and must have cost
the Wehrmacht at least 40 of the so or
70 divisions it had in that area.
But, as soon as Romania folded up
/ and indications that this would hap
pen must have reached the German
general staff at least two weeks before
Romania's actual surrender-the Nazis
hastily began withdrawing their forces
from the Balkans According to avai1a-
/ bic information, at least 20 and probably
4 rs divisions from t,e Balkan areas all