Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1944-09-24

by an Allied or United Nations mill
tary commission.
Z. No outright reparations-Since
a German agricultural state with
little or no commerce would not be
able to pay them-although distri-
button of German machinery might
be considered as reparations in some
respects.
Criticisms Cited.
The principal criticisms which
have been leveled against this plan
by War and State Department PLAN
ners is that it will not work be-
cause Germany occupies key posi-
ton in European economy due to
her industrial capacity to produce
needed goods and because of the
markets she affords other Euro
pean countries.
Until Secretary Morgenthau
dropped his proposals in the hop
per and won presidential support
for them 1t had been tentatively
planned that that Germany would
be permitted to function as an in
duStrial state after surrender, but
under Allied military and economic
controls that would deny her any
opportunity to become a great war
making state.
To date the Morgenthau plan has
served chiefly as a basis for hot
arguments In the secret sessions of
War, State, Treasury and other
Government agency experts charged
with evolving practical controls for
the Reich of the future. 1t has been
instrumental also in bringing about
modlf1cations of the basic handbook
being prepared by the Government
Tor the guidance of military admin
lstrators IN postwar Germany.
Postwar Germany is. defined by
these experts as the German state
which will come into existence
sometime after the armistice. The
first period of German occupation
already is beginning with the adj
vance OF Allied armies onto German
soil. 1t was with this period in
mind that Gen. Dwight D. Eisen-
mower as Allied supreme command
er on Friday announced the direc-
tlves for control of Germany by
Allied combat commanders.
Eisenhower Would Direct,
1t now is expected here that Gen.
Eisenhower will serve as American
military chief in the Reich until
the second period of occupation sets
In after the war, but whether that
period will be one of three-wav oc-
cupatlon under three power COM
mission as originally planned or
whether it will follow the Morgen-
thau plan more closely evidently
now remains to be determined.
Mr.. Morgenthau always has been
regarded by his associates as an
advocate Of ruthless handling of
Germany after the war. His inter
est in detailed planning. however
is reported to stem from his trim
TO England and France a month and
half ago.
At that time he became convinced
that total victory in Europe probably
would be achieved relatively soon
and the need for decisions on Ger
man policy was urgent. Among ton
British officials he found three
broad theories of what ought to be
done. One school, repeatedly in
Guiding Foreign Secretary Eden.
favored ruthless handling; a second
with an eye to Germany,s future
place In possible European power
politics, favored an easy reace to
result in a reconstructed but con-
trolled German state; the third
sought some compromise between
these two extremes.
Had Regulations Changed.
In London also Secretary Nor
genthau came on the draft of a
booklet designed to instruct Allied
Military Government officers in han
ding German affairs once the Reich
is completely occupied. One nara :
graph Of this booklet prescribed q
daily food allowance for the Ger
mans with a calory value higher
Than that allowed for the friendly
peoples OF liberated countries
On returning to Washington. the
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