The midland journal. (Rising Sun, Md.) 1885-1947, 1944-12-15

cS S;eneranssim mo-. that is what might
A' 'A be termed the in
ner official view here.
The motives behind the Still
well withdrawal, unexplained at
the time, thus now become more
fully evident. The whole panopIy
of mystifying news from that
front thus becomes apparent.
Chang has always been suspi-
ci0us of the Chinese COmmu-
nists.
While they are fighting on his side
with their armies far off in the
north, he actually has had soldiers
detached from his own war effort
on the Japanese front to watch
them. True, the Communists have
not been much Of deterrent to the
Japs. While some published esti-
mates of their strength run as high
as 100000, numbers are worthless
In gauging any Chinese fighting
forces.
No one knows exactly how many
troops the Commies have, except
tiioI t1lCoC nave OSSA SulllClGIiL "
repel a few Jap attacks. Many
whom they count as soldiers are ac-
tually farmers who run to action in
an emergency. Others are unframed
civilians, and the term bandit has
been applied to few in the past.
Now by kicking from his cabinet
the strongest anti-Communist ele-
ments, Chang is falling in line with
the ideas of officialdom here for
more coherent action on that front.
However, the change can be in
terpreted as more political than mil
itary so far.
Improved Leadership.
Those who know the new war min
lister say they expect his leadership
to bring some Improvement" in
Chinese fighting, but very few peo-
pie in this country appreciate the
difficulties he is facing.
I Frankly, it must now be said that
no satisfactory Chinese military eff
fort has developed anywhere lately.
The action on the Salween river
front may be an exception, but there
we trained the officers and men.
It is time to admit also that China
is mostly in Jap hands. All of the
industry and much of the agricul-
ture went long ago. The seacoast is
closed. Most of the internal rail-
roads are controlled by the Japs.
We are today flying in from
India through the only contact
the Chinese have with the out
side world more materials of
war than were carried on the
Burma road before the Japs cut
it.
But our planes flying in load Of
gasoline for instance probably con-
sumo as much as they can carry as
load. The limitations upon our as
sistance are therefore evident, and
likely to continue indefinitely, al
though we have greatly increased
our supplies in the last five months.
Then again we must recognize that
her armies are sometimes led by
what we used to call provincial
war lords" many of whom are pol
iticians not strictly supporting the
Chungking government.
The Chinese internal economic
distribution system has not inn.
proved much since before the
war, when news Of vast starva-
ton was world sensation al
most annually. Imitation is un-
believable, and indeed most au-
th0rities suspect China cannot
survive financially even If peace
comes soon. Certainly the CEN
trail government is none too sure
of itself.
But as these internal inefficien-
cies, dissensions and weaknesses are
native to the Chinese, so also has
been their cold, valorous spirit of
| resistance against the conqueror.
/ While the difficulties practically
amount now to internal demoraliza-
! ton, they are not likely to lead to
a collapse of the fight on that front.
The Jap drive in China luckily is
limited. All advices here prove rath-
er conclusively that the Jap strategy
is directed only toward cutting CEN
trail China off from Burma-if it
can be done. But even If this mis-
sion is accomplished, they will then
have long lines of communications
running back to the coast.
Such extensions are really invi-
tations for the special type Of fight
ing the Chinese do best. Chang is
not sufficiently equipped for battle,
indeed could not protect five or six
Of our valuable airfelds which have
now been lost. ~