Evening star., 1944-04-16
US. Looks to France to Save
DemocracyinP PostwarEurope
Explains Reluctance to Back Any Form
Of Government Until Liberated People
Have Chance to Express Their Will
By Constantine Br0,On.

the reSurrected trencn Army IN AFRICA
needed an able commander.
Gen. de Gaulle informed us he was
not interested in such a command.
He was the spirit of French resistance
and said he was known in France. He
could not jeopardize his important
political role to accept subordinate
position under an American or French
general. Whereupon, it was suggested
that he had better stay where he was.
Gen. Giraud, who had co-operated
with the Allies in formulating plans
for the invasion, was regarded by the
American and British general staffs
as the ablest French general. He was
known to have no personal political
ambitions and was designated as the
successor to Admiral Darlan. At the
Casablanca conference in January, 1943,
President Roosevelt yielded to the re-
quests of Prime Minister Churchill
and brought about meeting between
Gen. Giraud and Gen. de Gaulle with
the view to finding some way to bring
the political general to Algiers. After
protracted negotiations Gen. Giraud
allowed Gen. de Gaulle to come to
Algiers. Thereafter the shrewd de
Gaulle dominated Gen. Giraud.
Giraud Dislikes Politics.
Within short time after the estab-
lishment of the Committee for National
Defense-an idea of Gen. de Gaulle
who was anxious to give the Algiers
organization the status of a govern
ment-things began to 60 badly for Gen.
Giraud and his American supporters.
Gen. Giraud did not like the long
political conferences and the intrigues
of trained politicians who had spent
their life in France on political sab
botage and when 1t was suggested that
he take over the unrestricted conduct
OF military operations and the organ
ization of new army with which he
was going to fight his way into Cont
mental France on the side of the Allies,
he quickly accepted.
Gen. Eisenhower also had his hands
full with complicated and difficult
military situation. Gen. Eisenhower is
not politically minded officer, either,
and he erred frequently by not execut-
ing to the letter the instructions he got
from Washington in regard to Gen de
Gaulle. There have been many dra-
matte situations at Algiers. The Amer
ican Government realized early in the
game that Gen. de Gaulle wished to
enter France as ruler. Neither Presi-
Hant Pnncnua1f IN,
Hull wanted this to happen because
in their eyes it would constitute a
betrayal Of our open and private
pledges to France.
When Gen. de Gaulle desired to bring
about certain conditions by overlooking
his own promises, Gen. Eisenhower was
instructed to use utmost firmness. At
one time when Gen. de Gaulle insisted
on removing the governor general Of
Senegal, Pierre Boisson, the situation
became so dramatic that 1t looked as II
the Free French leader would be 'invit-
ed" to take the first plane out of
Algiers.
De Gaulle Wins Point.
Gen. Eisenhower, following the advice
OF his civilian American and British
advisers, was uncertain about the reper-
cussions of such an act and preferred to
patch up the misunderstanding" with
Gen. de Gaulle. But after every tenn
porary setback Gen. de Gaulle man.
aged to win his point by waiting short
while and pressing his wishes later. In
his anxiety to obtain political control
OF North Africa he had overlooked the
Importance military glamour would play
in the liberation of France.
From our point of view, Gen. Giraud
Is safe man to support because he will
retire after receiving whatever military
honors we might bestow on him. On the
other hand, Gen. de Gaulle, whose acts
have shown him to be potential die
tator, is not regarded as the ideal man
to help France once more carry the
torch of democracy in Europe.
That is why Washington is 50 reluc-
tant to give full recognition to Gen. de
Gaulle and why 1t insists that the
American general who will lead the
Allies into France shall remain in charge
of all affairs until the French people
can express themselves freely.