Evening star., 1944-01-10
Smashing Of Luftwoffe Seen
Vital in Advance of Invasion


Iof the Luftwaffe-cruel losses must
be foreseen.
AS the men selected to command
the projected invasion gather in
London, their personalities are of
especial interest to airmen. 1t hap
pens that Air Marshal Sir Arthur
William Tedder and Gen. Carl
Spaatz, who will direct the aviation
phase, have been among the most
outspoken active commanders in
supporting the basic contentious of
the "air power school,"
Leaders Views Cited.
Air Marshal Tedder has said that
"air supremacy will win the war, 4"
and Gen. Spaatz has said that IF
adequate air power could be ap-
piled to the heart of nation, no
other force is necessary Never
theless, both men showed themselves
capable air commanders in cooper
ating with ground operations, acting
always on the theory that surface
actions are hopelessly handicapped
unless overhead control is first cap
tured.
Whether Gen. Eisenhower goes
all the way on this strategic concept
is not clear. There is abundant
ground for supposing, however, that
his experience in such engagements
as Kasserine Pass in Tunisia and the
landing at Salerno have convinced
him on this basic principle of the
air thesis. AS for Gen. Montgomery
he has been almost as emphatic as
the most fervid air power advocates
in asserting that the "air battle must
be won first" before surface battles
can succeed.
The names of Air Marshal Tedder,
Gen. Spaatz and Gen. Montgomery
are almost guarantee, therefore,
that the invasion will not be under
taken on a full scale until Hitler's
air power is broken-provided, of
course, that the plans are based on
military logic alone and not pre-
maturely forced by political consid-
erations.
Local Superiority Not Enough.
These leaders, profoundly versed
in the strategy Of aerial warfare,
know that in invading Fortress
Europe" local superiority in the air
is not enough. The Hitler-held con-
tinent is an unbroken land mass and
must be considered as unit. The
extreme mobility of air power means
that the Germans can concentrate
all they possess at any threatened
coastal regions almost Immediately,
so that local superiority by the
Allies would be short-lived.
How will we know when actual
control of the air has fallen to us?
How can we define that condition?
The answer is that when our
bombing force can penetrate deep
into Germany in broad daylight al
most at will, practically without
interference from the German
fighter command, we will have
achieved such control. When we
can mount offensive, day after day,
like the one we launched against
SchWeinfurt, but with loss of only a
few planes instead of sacrificing 50
bombers, then the air control will
be in our hands. OccasionA planes
would still rise to meet us. of course.
but organized air resistance would
then be broken.
Control Not Achieved.
Obviously we are still far from
such control.
The paradox of the strategic pic
ture is this: Control Of the skies is
essential to the success Of an in
vasion, but once We have such con-
troll and enjoy freedom of naviga-
ton over Germany, the invasion
loses its purely military character,
A nation which is exposed to con-
tinuous bombardment at the will
of the enemy, unable to shield itself
or to retaliate effectively, will realize
the futility Of further struggle and
its will to resistance will collapse
An invasion then becomes primarily
political measure: The occupation
of enemy territory in support Of
whatever political policies the Allied
governments may wish TO put into
effect.
Even a political occupation, no
matter how easily achieved, would
also justify the building up of such
enormous ground forces. The dan
ger lies in the temptation facing
commanders with vast accumula-
tions of men and weapons at their
disposal to put them to use as soon
as possible. However, the air power
views long held by men like Air