The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1944-12-23
The Collapse of a Policv

The COlldpSG VI FOuCV
The influence of the United
states in shaping the European
settlement has undoubtedly had a
severe setback. But this was to
he expected, for our official pol
;cv has been to insist that no vital
anestjon be settled until some time
in the dim future-When the fight.
mo will have ceased, when the
millions of prisoners and displaced
nprsons will have returned to their
bones. when elections and plebi-
ecites can be held.
This policy has now collapsed
because it was impossible to con-
duct tle war OF to pacify Europe
hv not settling the frontiers of lib
Grated countries, the authority of
tbeir provisional governments, or
their relations with their neighbors
and to Germany. But because the
official policy was not altered, and
therefore collapsed under the i'm
nact of events, our relations with
our Allies have been strained. and
this has brought about much NOR
Al confusion here at home, and
immense encouragement to our en-
emies.
The controlling principle of our
European policy, as it was defined
early in the war by Mr.. Roosevelt,
Mr. Hull and Mr.. Welles, was to
postpone indefinitely the settle
ment OF all vital issues. Where
there was a disputed frontier, they
said that the issue must remain
omen and undecided until the in
babitants could be consulted and
had made a free choice. When
would that be? At best, and if
ever. long after the armistice. This
meant that as the Allied armies
moved into Europe, they were not
10 know whether they were liber-
ating their own territory or occu-
pving some one elses. The inhabi-
tants were not to know in whose
country they were living. This de-
vastating uncertainty put a top
premium on every kind of intrigue
and agitation within the disputed
area. and upon intervention from
the outside. against that distant
day when the Allies were going
TO sit around a green table and
dispense justice and democracy.
It is difficult to understand how
tine State Department came be be-
lieve that issues of this sort could
be put indefinitely in cold storage.
It must be because none of the
men who laid down this policy had
had diplomatic experience in the
last war. or had made a serious
study Of what happened during the
Peace Conference Of 1919 when
there had been no firm settlement
befc.e the armistice of the Italian
and the Polish frontiers.
Not only did they try to put
territorial disputes in cold storage,
they even took the position that
the provisional governments of
liberated countries should remain
unsettled until elections could be
held. But first there has to be a
government in order to hold an
election. Yet they did not wish
to deal with governments that had
not been elected. The result has
been that they find themselves
having no relations, or very cool
relations, with the provisional gov
ernments that are actually in pow
er in Europe. We must not COM
plain if our influence upon them
Is not very great: effective di-
plomacy cannot be conducted by
telling the world what you do not
approve of.
Finally, they have taen the po-
sition. or to be more accurate,
they have allowed the American
public to think it was our position.
that the European powers should
sake their whole security upon the
Dllmbarton Oaks proposals. Our
Allies were to renounce strategic
frontiers and pacts of mutual as