Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1944-01-02
Allies, Poised to Strike, Guard
Against First Blow by Nazis
Turkey and Spain Closely Watched in Case Hitler
Should Seek Diversion to Cripple
Cross.Channe1 Invasion
By Constantine Br0vn.

, off operation. It's only value would be
to worry the British and compel them to
rush first class troops from England. Its
purpose could be only diversion to
delay the offensive across the channel
This is considered feasible when it
| is estimated that the Turkish Army still
| Is unprepared and that the rs divisions
the Bulgarians and the Germans might
| place in the field would seriously upset
the calculations of the British general
staff
While few American military men be-
lieve in this possibility, the British high
command is not wiling to discount it.
The Allied forces in that area are a
Heterogeneous conglomeration including
Poles, Indians, French and other troops
besides the British. They are better
equipped than they were year ago, but
they cannot be described as first class.
A diversion through Spain would be
more serious and it's possibility not being
excluded by the American general staff,
Spain is neutral. Franco has told us
that he intends to remain so. In the
past we and the British have handled
him with gloves and there is no present
indication that he would encourage a
German invasion of Spain.
Could Strike Quickly.
But rapid concentration of German
reserves in France with lightning move
across the Pyrenees would not meet with
much Spanish resistance 1t is true that
communications in Spain are poor and
the lack of food would compel the Ger
mans to assume the same burden as we
have assumed in Italy. But the objec-
tive of the Germans can be more harm
full to the Allied strategy than our OPP
erations in italy have been to them
If the Germans were to move into
Spain their only goal would be to cut
off the lines of communication which
forces in the Mediterranean. A strong
Spanish force is in Spanish Morocco.
For the time being the relations be-
tween the Allies and the Spaniards
there in that area are cordial. But
should France be compelled to join the
Nazis to save his position even tempo
rarily the Spanish force in Morocco
could give us severe headache.
The Germans might be temtped to
move in that direction. They realize
that If our communications in Africa
and Italy were threatened we might be
compelled to cancel our plans for the
cross Channel operations and fight in
Spain. The war thus would be pro-
longed considerably.
The Nazis know that their only hope
for a negotiated peace hes in rift
among the major Allies. They believe
that delay in our offensive plans
would give them the best opportunity to-
: deal with the United Nations separately
They. realize that while the political
discussions at Terheran nay have been \
very important so far as the postwar
world is concerned, the major and most
important topic discussed there was the .
correlation of the Allied defeat
Want Simultaneous Blow.
The Russians have insisted, and Bril-
tain and the United States have agreed,
to strike at the Nazis from the west and
Tile east simultaneously. II Dy DOlQ
stroke the Germans can force us to
change our strategy and compel us to
fight in another area than the one
agreed on, the Russians might be in
duced to listen to Germany's offers.
The Germans are poor offensive
psychologists" That is to say, they are
stupid when victory appears within their
IL, nj
They know what we all know here, that
there still are some fundamental prob
lens between Britain and Russia which
have not been discussed at the various
meetings between the Russians and the
British during the last two years.
1t is possible that the Germans know
(See ALLIES, Page C-3)