The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1944-04-22
Interpreting
The War
BY KIRKE L. SIMPSON
Associated Press War An,I.s,

Allied experts in England nicL
ing continental targets for migb+n
fleets of outbound bombers ~.
playing their own grim cat.and
mouse nerve warfare game wiz
the Nazi high command.
They sift the focus from IN.
type of objective to another ho
tween raids, from strategic ~
tactical operations and back aga;O
in bewildering fashion presumabI,
to keep the enemy uncertain IN n
the last possible moment not onlv
as to the where, but also ax ~
the when of the actual first SEA,
borne invasion stabs at the conf.
nent.
The enemy can have no doubt
however, that the crisis in the aer,
al build up for invasion is an.
preaching. He would know it even
if Allied broadcasts beamed for
continental listeners were not tell.
ing him so day after day and
night after night. New records h
numbers of planes flown and W
the weight of bombs loosed over
selected targets have become an
almost daily and nightly occur.
renee.
The mental and physical wear
and tear of that cumulative BON.
bardment on Nazi war workers
and civilian and military person.
mel manning defensive devices and
posts to say nothing of the Ger.
man air force crews aloft and on
the ground is an unknown factor
in the European war equation
There is little or no previous ex.
perience by which to guage the
psychological effect of that night
and day alert.
Like the effect of Nazi fighter
plane attrition in air, on the
ground and in blasted plane fac.
tories and component part produc.
ton centers, the full war of-nerves
impact of the Anglo-American pre-.
invasion campaign cannot be fore.
seen. But there is no reasonable
doubt, however, that all Germany
is facing the final trial of strength
worn down by the ravages of the
home front strain, by the sting Of
bitter defeats in Africa and Russia
! and by the knowledge that all Of
| it is but foretaste of what is 10
come.
Even if the German high com.
mand feels assured that it can
with reasonable accuracy judge
the probable date and most likely
theaters of Allied invasion attacks
that does not apply to German
civilians or to the forces deployed
in the west to cope with such as
saults By way of illustration, Ma.
ri reaction in the field to any sud-
den shift of Allied air attacks from
factory targets to rail and road
hub detectives relatively close be-
hind the coastal defense front must
send invasion alarms over wide
areas. It could mean the acual
Allied onset was impending any
l where on the defense front served
by those communications.
The result would be a standby
: for all defense garrisons until it
5 was certain that the operation was
, merely another mass raid and not
the beginning of sustained air
attack in close support OF troops
r moving in on invasion beach-headS'
, Nazi defense forces in Belgium
and western France went through
that again more than once this
> week. 1t involved loss of sleep il
!. nothing else for many thousands
;. of the troops alerted, and the aft
er effects of keying-up for action
only to let down again.
The enemy has been foreWam'
ed by Prime Minister Churchill
that many feints and false alarms
will precede the actual invasion
drives to keep him off balance
That prelude phase is only now
getting started. How long it Will
last none but highest Allied staff
] personnel actually know. The night
and day blasting of Nazi rail lines
. leading to western beachheaG
), may be just another feint; but IL
was we'll calculated to rasp NaA
nerves anew to supplement me
4 physical damage wrought, and 70
| redouble the invasion jltters