Evening star., 1944-04-26


1t was clear that the Japa
active. Naturally enough, our
be good targets, with Dutch H;
the best chance of success, eth
an invasion. Furthermore, an op-
Grafton directed against these points
would permit the enemy to retire
without too great loss or complete
annihilation in case their plans did
not work out. At the same time, we
had to consider the possibility that
they might renew actions in the
Coral Sea. 1t was a plain case OF
calculating the risk involved IN
stationing our forces. A mistake
at that point would have proved
costly.
Considering the chance that the
enemy knew little concerning the
location of those of our ships which
had not participated in the Coral
Sea engagement, but certainly was
aware that most of our available
carrier and cruiser strength was
then in southern waters, it seemed
reasonable to expect that the jap
anese would make the most of the
opportunity to strike us in the
Central and d/or Northern Pacific.
Such an attack was likely be-
cause of the prospect of success in
the immediate operation, and be-
cause If successful, the advance to
Australia and the islands in the
South Pacific could be accomplished
in due course with comparative ease,
once the enemy had cut our lines of
communications.
Recalled South Pacific Ships.
Acting on our best estimate of the
situation, our carriers and support
ing vessels were recalled from the
South Pacific. The Yorktown was
patched up temporarily and scout
ing and patrol lines were established
well to the westward of Midway
Island. Our total forces available
In the Central Pacific consisted of
the carriers Enterprise, Hornet and
Yorktown, seven heavy cruisers, one
light cruiser, IA destroyers and about
20 submarines.
These were divided into two task
forces, one under the command of
Rear Admiral (now admiraD Ray
mond A. Spruance; cruisers of this
task force were commanded by Rear
Admiral (now vice admiraD Kin
kaid and the others under the COM
mand of Rear Admiral (now vice
FAdMiraD Fletcher. Another flag
officer, Rear Admiral w. w. Smith,
was attached to the second task
force. In addition there was a Ma
rine Corps air group based on Mid
way, augmented by Army bombers
from Hawaii.
On the morning of June 8 enemy
forces were sighted several hundred
miles southwest of Midway on an
easterly course. The composition of
the force sighted was not determined
at that time, but 1t was clearly a
large attack force with supporting
vessels. Late in the afternoon this
force was bombed by squadron of
Bits under the command of 1t. Col.
Walter C. Sweeney, Army Air
Forces. While results of the attack
were not definitely determined, hits
on several ships were reported.
Battle Of Midway.
On the morning of June contact
was made with enemy aircraft
headed toward the island Of Midway
from the northwest and Immediately
thereafter two carriers and the
enemy main body were picked up
in the same vicinity. Although the
enemy aircraft were not prevented
from dropping their bombs on Mid
way, the Japanese air attack force
was, nevertheless, subjected to heavy
fire and the enemy plane losses were
large. Meanwhile, Army, Navy and
Marine Corps planes from Midway
attacked carriers, battleships and
other vessels, inflicting serious dam
age on one enemy carrier.
/ At this point, our own carriers
took a hand in the engagement.
Having been launched from po-
squadron from Midway, torpedo
squadron fro mthe Hornet (the
now famous Torpedo Eight without
the protection of fighters and with
out accompanying dive bombers, at
tackled a force of four enemy car
riers. All planes in the squadron
were shot down and only one pilot
survived, but the squadron made
several hits on the enemy carriers
About an hour later, torpedo
squadrons from the Enterprise and
Yorktown attacked the same car
riers, and also suffered heavy losses
but registered , hits on two car
riers These attacks were followed
by dive bombers from the Enter
prise which smothered two car
riers, and by more bombers from
the Yorktown which hit third
carrier, a cruiser, and a battleship
Two carriers had been set on fire
and put completely out of action
A third was damaged and was sunk
later by the submarine Nautilus.
Yorktown Abandoned.
Planes from the only Japanese
carrier remaining unchanged at
tackled the Yorktown, and although
this attack force was annihilated
it succeeded in making three bomb
hits. Shortly afterward, enemy tor
pedo planes scored two hits on the
Yorktown, and orders were given
to abandon ship. About two hours
later, planes from the Enterprise
attacked the unchanged japanese
carrier and left her mass of flames
and Immediately thereafter, when
a squadron from the Hornet ar
rived, the carrier was blazing SC
furniously that 1t was possible tc
concentrate on nearby battleshir
and a cruiser, both of which were
hit.
At this stage OF the engagement
1t was apparent that we had won
control of the air and it remained
for the aircraft from Midway to put
on the finishing touches. Army
Flying Fortresses attacked an
enemy heavy cruiser and left Ii