The Wilmington morning star., 1944-03-25
Interpreting
TheWa ar
BY KIRKE L. SIMPSON
Associated Press War Ana,v.,

New Delhi advices tell of contao.
between British empire troops and
japanese patrols in the Imphsl 20.
gion in India but give no intim,
ton that any substantial ensro,,
force has yet been brought TO ~
ton west of the Burma-Assam ~
der. Nor is there any mention =.
the presence in that theater y.
The national Indian army" pr0
mier Toto conjured up for Jana
nese home front consumption ~
support his statement that a nm,
scale invasion of India wa. !.
progress. Ill
That may not be conclusive owl
dence that the Nipponese incursion
from the Upper Chindwin region
into India is in reality the roinor
affair it seems. British censorshin
in linda is notably tight. About IN.
only element in the news permit
ted to reach the outside as TO tba
surprise Japanese jab from west
ern Burma that justified big bead
lines was the fact that the censors
did pass stories based on Official
statements describing it as INA.
ljor" enemy operation.
To that now is added the state
ment from Allied headquarters in
New Delhi that troops available in
the Assam zone are superior fl
Japanese forces involved. That ths
defenders rallying to throw the enc.
my back into Burma have every
advantage Of quick communicative
and supply as we'll as air prepon.
derance, any good map Of India
discloses.
General Sewwell, official British
military commentator. estimate,
there are perhaps six Japanese di.
visions all told widely scattered in
Burma. exclusive OF troops defend.
ing Akyab in the Arakan sector
which are not. he added in
position to assist the main Jana.
nese army engaged in the north"
II that is correct it is obvious that
the India invasion" is the small.
time military affair Allied spokes-
men in New Delhi seem to regard
it and justify General Auchinlech's
belief that it is far from represent.
ling a real threat" to Allied com.
munications.
| Quite aside from the relatively
small forces enemy employed, the
very serious supply problems in
volved for the Japs and the highly
flexible communications available
to British empire defense forces,
the approach of the wet monsoon
season in Burma and India vetoes
a major military operation by eth.
err side.
The Monsoon rains are not due
in Upper Burma for some time.
They are very close at hand in
the coastal region to the south.
Their run off in the Burma valleys
through which all rail and road
connections with the enemy Chind-
win Assam operations pass, cou-
pied with Allied air attacks on vul-
nerable points along the way,
should make things difficult for the
foe even without attempting often
sive operations on any scale at so
remote and inaccessible point
In any event, operations in Bur-
ma at this stage are merely Skin
mishing for position on the flank
of the main battle theater en-.
visaged in Allied creation of the
southern Asia command under Ad.
miral Lord Mountbatten to carry
the war against the Nipponese from
the southwest. The selection OF
Britain's leading Commando cap
tain for that job made it quite
clear that amphibious attacks
across the Bay of Bengal to break
into the southern end of the China
Sea ultimately via the Straits OF
Malacca are in prospect.
That is not apt to come in big
way, however, until the wet mon
soon blows out.