Evening star., 1943-09-10
Italian Balance Sheet


Although only two days have
elapsed since the capitulation of the
Badoglio government, it is already
possible to draw up a tentative bal
ance sheet listing the Allied gains
and offsetting difficulties which arise
from that momentous event.
The Allied invasion, which, under
the armistice terms may technically
be termed an occupation, is in it's
initial stages. Presumably it will be
pressed with vigor and will be aided
by the Italians, but the degree of
such assistance should not be over
estimated. TWo-thirds of the Italian
Army are outside the peninsula, do
ing garrison duty from France to
the Balkans, where they will doubt
less be disarmed by the Germans and
formed into labor battalions in ad-
dition to the 100000 Italian workmen
In Germany, who will certainly be
held in servitude. Not more than 20
regular Italian divisions are now in
Italy itself, some of them in the
north which is under almost COM
plete German control. Thus. even
If German actions force Badoglio
fully into the Allies arms, he can
not deliver much military strength.
It the Germans are as strongly
entrenched in Northern Italy as re-
ported, they will make a desperate
defense there, and their lines will
probably run, not along the river Po,
but farther south on the mountain
wall Of the Ligurian Alps and the
Apennines, which runs almost un-
broken diagonally across the penin-
sula from the Gulf of Genoa on the
Mediterranean to the Adriatic. This
200-mile line, pierced by only few
passes, will be formidable barrier
to overcome. Before falling back even
to that line, the Germans may be
expected to fight stiff delaying ac-
tions like the one they are putting
up against our landing at Naples,
which is in Southern Italy. 100 miles
below Rome. All this indicates the
likelihood of a hard campaign be-
fore the Germans are expelled from
Italy. Yet they should be handi-
capped by, the hostility and sabotage
of the resident population through
out the regions held by them, and
this factor may notably tighten the
Allies task.
On the purely economic side, the
Allies have assumed a new burden
of supplying the needs of the Italian
people, while the Germans have, on
balance, lost little. Italy supplied
the Reich with fresh fruits, vege-
tables, olive oil, mercury and sui
phur, but Germany had to send in
return much coal, iron, cereals and
equipment, all hauled by rail on an
overburdened transportation sys-
tenn. The overall economic balance
may thus represent an Allied debit
and a possible net German gain,
1t is when we turn to the po-
litical and psychological items on
the ledger that the Allied credits
are most notable. The political and
moral repercussions of Italy's de
fection from the erstWhile Axis are
incalculably great throughout both
the conquered and satellite countries
of Hitlers Fortress Europe" From
Norway and France to the Balkans.
rebellious or reluctant peoples will
be harder to manage and will ear
mark more German troops for the
task Also it should be remembered
that the German high command
must find garrison requirements for
the 30 or 40 Italian divisions which
cease to be soldiers and become cap
tive hostages.
In Germany itself the effect of
Italy's detection will be increasingly
felt. Militarily and economically,
Italy never weighed heavily in Ger
man calculations or esteem. But
ideologically, Mussolini and his Fas-
cist regime counted for much in
German eyes; indeed, they had set
the pattern which Hitler followed,
and gave the Nazis assurance that
these twin movements represented
the wave of the future" The ig-
nominious collapse of II Duce and
his system, repudiated so whole
heartedly by almost all Italians, must
give the Germans a sense of moral
isolation which will sap their self
confidence just at the moment when
their morale is under such multiple
strains from other causes.
Primitive natives of the Belgian