Evening star., 1943-04-03
Three Paths Lead Into
Heart Of Germany
Major Eliot Says Centers Of
Nuzi Power Cun Be Hit From
England, Russia and Africu
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
The invasion of Europe is coming
When we do not know, and where we do
not know, but that it is coming, we are
we'll assured. German soil is going to
feel the tread of hostile feet. Whether
between rows of crumbling ruins or not,
the parade of the Allied armies down the
Unter Den Linden will inevitably take
place.
In thinking about the possibilities OF
the immediate future, we should keep
In mind that there are two general types
OF invading operations which may come
to pass. There is the operation of limited
objective, that is one directed toward the
accomplishment of particular local
mission, such as the destruction of an
enemy submarine base, or the establish
ment of an Allied air base in a favorable
location, Or as preparatory for an OPERA
ton of larger scope to follow In the
upper brackets so to speak, of this classi-
hcatlon are operations intended to eject
the enemy from considerable area such
as Norway, or Sicily, and of course to
transfer that area to Allied military pos
session and use.
All these operations of limited obiec-
tive, whatever their timing and locatio
have the further effect of dividing the
enemy's forces and attention, for he can
never be quite certain that any one of
them may not be the spearhead for still
greater effort. The more points we can
occupy around the perimeter of his Euro
pean fortress, the greater his anxieties
ana the more reluctant he will be to
undertake any considerable enterprise of
his own because of the need of keeping
reserves in hand to deal with our attacks
or with attacks which he may conceive
us to have yet in contemplation
The other type of offensive is the all
out, scale offensive intended to
BRING about decision-the bid for final
victory. Whether we shall see such an
offensive this year depends on many
factors 1t depends on how soon We can
clean up the Tunisian campaign and
reopen the Mediterranean. 1t depends
on the success which we have in over
coming the U-hoat. 1t depends on the
progress Of our Shipbuilding program. II
depends on the extent to which our
bombing campaign succeeds in reducing
the enemy's power of resistance, It
depends on the further progress of our
Russian allies. 1t depends to some extent
on internal conditions within occupied
territory
There are, however, certain general
considerations to be kept in mind. The
vital centers of Germany lie very largely
in the central portion of the North
European coastal plain This plain
begins at the Pyrenees. swings right
around across the north of Europe until
1t loses itself in the vast distances of the
Russian steppes. The German portion
OF it is easy of access from the west, that
is from France and the Low Countries
and from the east, that is from Russia
and Poland. On the south. however the
German portion of this plain is walled
OH by the huge mountain barrier of the
Alps and the Carpathians. the most i'm
portant single terrain feature of the
European continent.
We are already in position on the
eastern end of the approaches to this
plain, to penetrate it from Russia
through Poland. We do not hold similar
positions in the west, and to gain such
positions IN France or the Low Countries
VIII require the landing of large numbers
OF troops on a heavily defended coast.
We have, in the island of Great Britain.
a base admirably located for this pur-
pose, but we must remember the tremen-
dous difficulty of effecting a landing of
large numbers of troops against opposi-
ton and in the presence of hostile air
forces.
We must also consider the possibility
OF penetrating the German portion of
the coastal plain from the south, that is
by forcing the mountain barriers either
from Spain, or from Italy. or from the
Balkan peninsula. In any Of these cases
we would have to effect landing (except
IN case either Spain or Turkey should
become belllgerent on our side. These
landings would have their bases in Africa
and would be effected at points where
we might be able to enjoy a more favor
able air situation because we would be
farther away from the centers of German
power and would be able to effect con-
siderable diversions by air attacks on
other fronts. However, once the landings
were made our troops would still be a
long way from the vital centers of Ger
many, which would be their ultimate
ohJectlves, and to reach these detectives
they would have to pass through noun
famous areas with sparse and difficult
communications
These are some of the general consid-
erations which We should have in our
thoughts as We reflect on the coming
invasion of Europe. In subsequent arti-
cles I shall hope to examine certain of
these general considerations in greater
detail
Copyrieht 1a43. N Y Tribune. Jnc)
Sweden Takes Initiotive