Evening star., 1943-05-31

majority of his constituents favored. II
that had not been the case no constitu-
ton would have been possible, for the
f1fty-flve delegates met in secret session
and each decided. to the best of his mind
and conscience, what was for the good
and the common welfare.
Sir Robert Inglis. representative and
delegate in the English Parliament. stat
ed classically in the great debate on the
English reform bill of 1888: This House
is not collection Of deputies as the
States-General of Holland and the As
sempEes in some other continental coun-
tries are. We are not sent here day by
day to represent the opinions of our con-
stituents Their legal rights their mu-
nicipal privileges we are bound to pro-
tect. Their general interests we are
bound to consult at all times, but not
their will, unless it shall coincide with
our own deliberate sense of right
Edmund Burke also contributes the
following along the same line: Let me
say with plainness, I who am no longer
in public character, that if by fair,
by an indulgent, by gentlemanly be-
haviour to our representatives. we do not
give confidence to their minds, and a
liberal scope to their understandings; if
we do not permit our members to act
upon very enlarged view of things, we
shall at length infallibly degrade our
national representation into a confused
and scuffling hustle of local agency"
This theory of democracy in which
delegates were to consult at all times
about the general interest but not the
will of the electorate was that of the
trainers of our Constitution Since 1900
we have been accursed with the theory
OF direct democracy. What the people
wanted the people were to have and their
representatives had only one duty, and
that was to ascertain the views of his
constituents and carry them into effect.
Such theory would be workable if the
constituents were agreed upon any course
with practical unanimity. However, in
the practical workings Of democracy
there is no such unanimity.
In the practical workings of democ-
racy. with less than half of the electorate
voting, it is impossible for a delegate
VI representative, II ne QeSlreS TO aDQl-
cate the judicial functions of his duties,
to know with any certainty what the
majority of his constituents favor A
loud and substantial minority may carry
and generally does carry an election
when majority is apathetic or unwilling
to vote. For this reason, the Senator or
Representative not only must surrender
his judgment to the supposed judgment
of the majority of his constituents and
become their phonograph, but he must
accept the judgment of minority which,
If their wishes are ignored, can drive
him out of public life. If his party has
normally 81 per cent of the electorate
registered as its partisans, 26 per cent
of the entire electorate can defeat his
denomination. Therefore, to continue in
public life, he must give even greater
consideration to the active minority than
to the passive majority. With so many
lobbies and blackmailing minorities Of
various blocks, classes and interests, it Is
amazing that there are still in public
life 50 many sef-respecting men who are
willing to subject themselves to such hu-
initiating ordeals. PAUL D. GABLE.