Evening star., 1943-11-22
Criticism Of Strategy
Of Allies DepIored
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

1t is somewhat alarming to note that
Representative Mas, Republican, Of
Minnesota deplores what he calls the
concealment from the public of the de-
tails of Japanese atrocities, for the rea-
son that if these details were made pub
lie the result would be, in Mr.. Mas
opinion, that an outraged public would
compel the shifting to the Pacific thea
ter of operations of a great part of the
forces and war material now being sent
to Europe.
This is surely not responsible thinking.
AS a member of the Military Affairs
Committee of the House, Mr.. Mas is
certainly aware that the decisions to
concentrate our major effort against
Germany first has already been taken,
and that the whole of the grand strategy
of the United Nations has been planned
and directed to that end.
1t is too bad that a public servant
with so excellent a record of accom-
plishment behind him as Representative
Mas should act with so little evidence
of responsible concern for his countrys
welfare and military success. 1t is not
as though he were criticizing bad judg-
ment which has already resulted in de-
feat. He is criticizing an adopted STRAIT
egy which is being pursued and imple-
mented by all the forces which the
United States can muster, and the re-
suits of which are yet to be achieved.
He is criticizing strategy which can
not now be altered as he desires with
out dislocating the whole fabric of our
military effort and that of our Allies,
and withdrawing our essential share
from joint enterprises upon which our
Allies depend and to which they are
contributing all their own efforts.
This strategy he dismisses as being
British grand strategy" 1t is time and
high time that we all stopped talking in
such terms. When, between the men,
bers of a great coalition strategic de-
cisions are to be made, of course, each
member OF the coalition comes forward
with certain plans drawn up by its mill
tary chiefs. These plans are examined:
the general pattern, yet others are re-
jected A joint plan is finally adopted,
and to that plan the members of the
coalition agree. After that, there should
be no talk of British strategy, or Ameri-
can strategy, or Russian strategy. There
should be complete loyalty to the
adopted plan, by all concerned, until 1t
has been carried into effect, and until 1t
has either been crowned with victory or
has proven incapable OF achieving VIC
tory.
1t Is hard enough for sovereign states
to work together in complete harmony
under the best Of conditions 1t Is i'm
possible for them to co so unless they
can work with mutual confidence, unless
they can generate and build up day by
day that spirit of coalition" which
French Gen. Requin has called the diff
cult but essential price of victory in
coalition warfare
The plans for attacking Germany first
and Japan afterward were based on the
hard facts OF war as they existed when
the plan was made. 1t is not easy for
the men who are working with what
must seem to them wholly inadequate
forces out in the Pacific to accept that
decision and all that 1t implies. But
they have carried on Loyalty and sue
cessfully. Their turn will come, when
Germany has been beaten and the
mighty modified power of the United
Nations comes flowing in overwhelming
force into the Pacific theater to crush
Japan. The harder we hit Germany
now, the quicker Japan's day Of reckon
ing will come. For public men to seek
to stir up public opinion against the
fulf1llment Of these well-considered and
well-advanced strategic decisions is a
disservice to the Nation, and the meas
ure of the success of such attempts is
the measure of the postponement of that
very day Of reckoning which those who
now complain appear so ardently to
desire.
Copyright, 1e43. New York Tribune, Incl