Evening star., 1943-11-23
Mid-Pucific Offensive

Mid-Pocific Offensive
The simultaneous dawn landings
of American marines and troops on
Maxim and Tarawa last Saturday
make it clear that big offensive in
the Central Pacific Is under way.
This had already been indicated by
the continuous bombing raids of the
previous week. which were obviously
intended to soften up enemy posi-
tions in order to facilitate landing
operations. The scale of the Of
fensive is revealed by the official
communique, which says that the
landings were made in conjunction
with the greatest feet ever assem-
bled in the Pacific and under the
umbrella of tremendous concentra-
ton Of planes which not only blasted
the immediate objectives but also
attacked the nearest supporting
Japanese bases at Nauru and in the
Marshall Islands, thereby hindering
japanese air support of their be-
leaguered garrisons on Maxim and
Tarawa.
Those objectives of our present
offensive are the most important Of
the Gilbert Islands, a group Of coral
atolls straddling the Equator. 1t
should be remembered that neither
the Gilberts nor the phosphate is
land of Nauru, some 500 miles to the
westward, were in the Japanese
mandate. They are British pos
sessions seized almost without oppo-
sition in the vast japanese sweep
athwart the Pacific after Pearl Har-
Dor. Not until our offensive is car
ried to the Marshalls will prewar
Japanese territory be invaded.
This mid-Pacific campaign is
radically different in character
from that which is being waged in
New Guinea and the Solomons. The
vast expanse of the South Pacific
Is broken. here and there by pin
points of land, sometimes solitary
though more often in clusters form
ing archipelagos. Most of these is
lands are coral reefs built up during
untold ages from the SUBMITS of
submerged mountain peaks to the
surface of the ocean. These curious
formations usually take the form Of
rough circle, with intervening
openings by which the sea enters an
inclosed lagoon. often of consider
able depth. Tide and wind driven
sand, rotting coral and seeds
dropped by migratory birds have
combined to produce soil and vege-
tation on these low islands, never
more than few feet above sea level.
Cooled by the trade winds and with
no jungle growth. the darkness and
fevers of the Solomons are unknown.
Small as they are, prolonged cam
paigning is not needed. A fierce
life-and-death struggle like tina. of
our marines on Wake Island early
In the war will determine either a
repulse of the landing or the wiping
out of the garrison, necessarily linn
tied in numbers. The great size Of
our fleet indicates that our attacks
must succeed, even though losses arc
heavy. And, for the same reason it
Is logical to suppose that this often
sive can 60 on from one island
stronghold to another, each cap
tured atoll becoming a base for both
land and sea planes.
The one thing that can prevent
this thrust into Japan's island ram
part Is a counteroffensive on an
equally big scale. But this means
that the japanese high command
must risk much, If not most. Of its
battle fleet, hitherto carefully hoard
ed against some supreme emergency.
Indeed, this Is precisely what our
own high command hopes will hap
pen. Perhaps 1t may even be the
basic reason for this offensive. out
ranking In Importance as an objec-
tive the taking of island bases. The
whole structure Of Japan's empire,
both prewar and postwar, depends
on sea power. If the Japanese
battle fleet could be destroyed or
vitality weakened. all japanese pos
sessions outside the homeland itself
would fall apart like a rope of sand.
Our present offensive in mid-Paciflc
thus presents the japanese admirals
with thorny dilemma-either to
permit cumulative preaching of their
defense system or risk naval engage
ments which could lay Japan itself
open to invasion.