Evening star., 1943-09-10


datly installments, Chief of Staf
George c. MarshalPs report to
the Secretary OF War on the pc
Tiod July 1, 194I-June 80, I943,
Just made public. t.It is a record"
Gen. Marshall ,Drites, Sot What
,Dds done and ,0hy it Wds done
and is submitted DhiIe America is
at a,dr to permit d better under
standtnD OF the great ofensiue
operations no,0 in progress.
The Japanese attack on Pear
Harbor on December Z, l941, galvan.
lied the entire military organization
of our Nation into the immediate
tasks OF protecting the Unitee
States. Alaska and the Panama
Canal Zone against surprise attack
and sabotage. 1t also precipitatee
the movement of additional mer
and materiel to guard our extended
naval and air lines of communica.
tions from the United States to &C.
tive and prospective theaters of op.
erations. and to replace losses ir
Z
formulated in preparation for pos.
sible state of war were put into
effect according to the demands o.
the actual situation.
Since the japanese attacks on the
Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had uncov.
cred the entire West Coast of North
america, the reinforcement of gar.
risons along the West Coast, Pana.
ma. Hawaii and in Alaska was giver
first priority. The movement of All
Forces and antiaircraft units was
iniated Immediately by flight ano
fast freight specials. The move.
ment Of an Army corps of two in.
fantry divisions and corps troops tc
the West Coast started on December
IA, 1871, and was completed few
days lateE BY December II the
critical areas on both the Pacific
and Atlantic coasts had been pro-
vided with . reasonable degree OF
protection against air and sea at
tack. additional antiaircraft units
were sent by sea and air reinforce
ments were flown to the Panama
Canal. 4
Emergency Troop Movement.
In the first five weeks of the war
these deployments in conjunction
with the forces en- route to Hawaii,
Alaska, and other bases involved a
rail movement of approximately
600, ,000s troops with their vehicular
transportation, guns and equipment
The railroads of the Nation handled
this sudden and tremendous volume
Of trafic In personnel and materiel
In an extremely efficient manner,
thanks In part to the previous elab-
crate organization in depth of coas-
tai ports of emharkation with their
intermediate storage depots and
regulating stations extending as far
inland as Phoenix, Ariz.; Ogden,
Utah, and Harrisburg, Pa. CThe rail
tonnage concentrated on the Brook
lyn Army Base in the fall of 1941
exceeded that of 1918 on the port of
New York;
A first necessity was to make good
the damage in Hawaii and to
strengthen its defenses and those at
Midway, to establish q succession OF
island bases to guard the Pacific
lines Of communication with Aus
tralia and New Zealand and to per-
NIT the transport of bonbers and
transport planes and the servicing of
naval aircraft and shipping.
Ships in the Pacific Coast harbors
were Immediately requisitioned, re-
loaded and sent westward with COM
bat and service personnel, aircraft
equipment and other materiel. Two
fast conveys were organized, loaded
|and left San Francisco for Hawaii
lduring the first 10 days of the war.
IA convoy en- route to the Philippines
was diverted to Australia.
Troops were sent to relieve the
marines and British forces in Ice
land and, at the same time, the
first echelon of troops was sent over
seas to Northern Ireland to assist
in the protection of the British
Isles and to pave the way for future
American activities in Europe.
Air Bases in South America.
The outposts of the Panama Canal
defenses were rapidly extended by
the establishment of air bases in
South and Central America and by
the provision of small coast artil-
lery detachments with 155-mm. guns
to defend the critical points along
the South American coast as far as
Chile.
To meet the situation in the
United States the areas contiguous
to the East and West Coasts were
organized into the Eastern ano
Western Defense Commands, respec-
lively, and placed under the COM
mand of 1t. Gen. Hugh A. Drum
and 1t. Gen. John L. De Witt. In
tegrated into this command setuI
was the operational control of in.
terceptor aircraft assigned to pro.
tect our coastlines. In addition
Gen. De Witt retained control ovel
the Alaskan Defense Command anc
Gen. Drum over the United State!
troops in Newfoundland and Ber.
muda.
Work on the Alaska military high
way was accelerated, and the roat
was open to traffic on october 29
1912, despite the difficulties o
weather and terrain.
Strategy and Control.
On December %, l94l, Winston
Churchill, Prime Minister of Grea
Britain, accompanied by the Brit
ish chiefs of staff, arrived in Wash
ington to confer with the Presiden
and the American chiefs of staff
Out OF the series of discussion
which then followed resulted al
agreement not only regarding tn
immediate strategy for our com
bined conduct Of the war but ais
for the organization Of metho
for the strategical command an
control of British and American
military resources.
Probably no other Allied action, i
the field or otherwise, has exerte
as powerful an effect on the condue
of this war as the prompt establish
ment of a prescribed procedure fo
achieving unity of effort throug