Evening star., 1943-11-20
Russians May Take
Many Nozi Prisoners
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

The fall of Rechitsa and Korosten
emphasizes the shift of the axis of the
Russian main effort to the northwest,
a tendency which has already been
noted in these articles. 1t seems very
likely that at Rechitsa-and perhaps
as q result of Rechitsa in the Gomel
area-the Russians may for the first
time gather In considerable bag OF
German prisoners. There seems every
reason to anticipate the early capture
of Gomel, which virtually is encircled
by Russian forces.
These Russian successes are only par
TALLY Offset by the stiffening German
resistance west and southwest of Zhito-
mir and in the area of Fastov. The
Germans appear determined to prevent
the Russians gaining more ground In
these directions which menace the rail
communicate of the German armies
still between the Dnieper and the
Dniester. But 1t is probable that the
loss Of Rechitsa and Korosten, perhaps
OF Gomel, was the price which the Ger
mans had to pay in order to get the
reserves to stop the Russian threat to
these vital communications.
We must, however, realize that what
the Russians have so far done beyond
the Dnieper is only, so to speak, the
work of preparation which they may or
may not be able to develop into decisive
accomplishment. They have driven
two great salients across the Dnieper.
one from Kremenchug toward Krivoi
Rog, the other from Kiev, tanning out
to Rechitsa, Korosten, Zhitomir and
Fastov The farther they drive the apex
of either salient the more they must
broaden the base in order to maintain
a secure and well-consolidated position
They have not been able to broaden
the base of the Kremenchug salient
and have been held up, at its apex,
short OF decisive accomplishment at
Krivoi Rog.
They have, however, been able to
broaden the base of the Kiev salient
and their reward seems likely to be a
considerable one in the Gomel area.
That reward may become even greater
II they can do as we'll to the south and
southwest as they have to the north
west.
The crucial sector is probably that
between Kiev and Kremenchug. If the
Russians can advance anywhere along
that line they can connect their two
salients and push the Germans back
from the rail points of Smelly and
znamenka They will then be in a
position to go ahead toward the
Dniester, outf1anking the line OF the
River Bug on the north and perhaps
cutting the two remaining rail links to
the Dnieper- -Dniester region.
But much depends on the timing. At
the risk of seeming tiresomely repeti-
tious, it must be pointed out once more
that the Russian object is the destruc-
ton OF the Wehrmacht and not so much
the recovery of territory. To cut the
Dnieper-Dniester rail lines after all the
German troops have been evacuated
from that region, save perhaps for a
well-dug-in garrison in the Crimea,
would be Russian success that would
look we'll on the map, but it would not
be great military victory. In the sense
OF military progress, the shortening of
the war, there is all the difference in
the world between the recovery of 10000
square miles of evacuated Russian ter
ritory and the capture of that much
territory with 100000 Germans trapped
and surrounded within it.
The Russians still have chance Of
gaining their consistently pursued OBJ
Jective OF cutting off, and DESTROYING the
southern wing of the German forces,
They will undoubtedly keep on trying
until they succeed, or until the Ger
mans find it possible to stabilize their
southern front for the time being IF
the Russians succeed, they will have
dealt the Wehrmacht its deadliest blow
OF the war. If they fail, it seems likely
that the next move in the great Rus
sian offensive will be in the north be-
tween Leningrad and Vitebsk. where al
ready the ground must be freezing in
the sWampy region around Lake linen.
To such northern offensive, as re-
marked in previous article, the pres
sure on the line Vitebsk-Orsl1a-M Mogilev
which will result from the fall of Gomel
and Rechitsa will make a material con-
tribution. A German withdrawal from
that line would almost of itself neces-
state the pulling back of their whole
northern flank to Lake Peipus, If not
to the Dvlna. This would not in itself
be inconsistent with the German basic
purpose of gaining shorter fronts and
shorter lines of communication in the
east. The German danger lies in the
fact that their increasing shortage of
reserves makes it increasingly likely.
with every withdrawal, that Russian
energy and power may turn the with
draWal into rout, and the rout into
dlsaster-as seems to have happened, or
to be about to happen to some extent,
at Gomel
Copyright. 1a4a, New York Tribune. Incl
TIL AI-