Evening star., 1943-05-31
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.


Fire and movement are the twin
rulers of the battlefield in modern
times as well as in the days of Han
nibal. In their proper coordination
and application to ever-variant sit
uation lies all the art of the
tactician.
Before aviation came into its own,
1t used to be said that the attacker
must gain fire superiority over the
defender as an essential preliminary
to launching assault. The attacking
of this superior fire.
That is still true, but the begin
ming must be made by gaining
superiority in the fire delivered from
the air. Air superiority is now the
essential preliminary to surface at
tack. The fight to gain air superb
ority is not only an aerial fight. 1t
may also be struggle for air bases
in which all elements of the fighting
forces may take part.
Take the japanese on Luzon: The
first need of the japanese was for
bases within fighter range of their
chosen landing point on tie Gulf
of Lingayan. They tried one land
ing before they had such bases. and
were beaten off with heavy loss Not
until they had seized and improved
fighter bases in Northern Luzon
could they get on with their main
job. They we're then able to gain
fire superiority from the air, as the
essential preliminary to successful
surface attack.
This fire superiority from the air
was a necessary element in the sue
cess of the German blitzkrieg cam
paign against France. The German
fighters protected the dive bombers,
which in turn smashed the French
batteries which otherwise might
have dealt sharply with the German
armored spearheads. In this case
there was no struggle for bases, for
the Germans had plenty, but they
were stopped cold when they came
within reach of an enemy well
equipped with fighters and with
bases-the fighter command of the
Royal Air Force. 1t was German
inability to gain fire superiority
from the air that saved the British
Army at Dunkerque and subsequent
ly saved Britain from invasion.
In Tunisia, We saw the same prin-
ciples working under a new set of
conditions. At first, the Allies had
insufficient and inadequate fighter
bases. They were stopped at the
very gates of Tunis, pushed back,
held. A long struggle followed, dur
ing which the main task of the
Allies was to keep the German land
forces in check while they built up
a system of air bases within range
of their objectives.
When the 9th Army drove Mar
shal Rommel back into Southern
Tunisia, the area available to the
Axis for airfelds began to narrow
while the Allies were rapidly gaining
in the number and location of their
bases. From then on, the Axis situ-
alton began to deteriorate. When
they were confined to the northern
corner of Tunisia, the Allies air su-
perlority was complete.
Superiority of fire from the air
paved the way for gaining superb
ority of fire on the ground, and that
in turn was preparatory to the sue
cessful and decisive assault of the
infantry and armored troops.
So it will be with the invasion of
Europe. We are now in the pre-
paratory stage. We have excellent
air bases in Great Britain and in
North Africa, but these are not
enough. We have excellent air bases
in Russia, but they are as yet too
far from the vital centers of Ger
many. We must gain other bases
and yet others. We must come closer
to those vital centers. Wherever
we decide to land troops on a de-
Tended shore, We must have fighter
bases close at hand to provide fire
superiority from the air.
The tremendous bomber raids con-
tinue, softening up the Germans,
weakening their power to fight. In
the Mediterranean, Allied planes
batter at Sicllian and Sardinian
harbors, airfields, railways, ferry
termini and at the outpost of Pan
telleria. These attacks seem likely
to be the preliminary to invasion
Of these islands, and when gained.
the islands themselves are of chief
value as providing bases for fur