Evening star., 1943-10-26
The BudoqIio Interview

! he budogIIo Interview
The interview given by Marshal
Pietro Badoglio to representatives of
| leading American and British news
| papers is a peculiarly revealing one.
Giving straightforward and un-
| equivocal answers to a list of search
| ing questions, the marshal not only
clarified the present and future
attitudes and policies of the pro-
vlsional government which he heads
| but also made several illuminating
disclosures from the past. An an
alysis of the interview as a whole
affords an enlightening survey of
1taly's position and actions from
the genesis of the present war down
to this time.
Especially gratifying are the
marshal's assurances that he seeks
no perpetuation of his own author
ity or that of the regime he directs,
which he recognizes as emphati-
cally an interim one, created by war
time eXigencies and due auto
matically to terminate with the
emergency which brought it into
being. He likewise promises COM
plete collaboration with the United
Nations in the common struggle
against Germany and cites an i'm
presSive list of services already per-
formed by his government and the
armed forces loyal to it's orders.
Finally, he pledges sincere CO.
operation with all Italian political
parties, including the Communists,
in a political common front" de-
signed to eradicate the last vestiges
OF FasciSm at home and prepare the
ground for resumption of normal
political life after the war in ac-
cordance with the principles of lib
erty and popular choice of govern
mental forms and methods.
The marshal gave assurances that
1taly's postwar foreign policy would
be one of peace and nonaggression.
Il am convinced" he stated, that
the Italian policy toward France,
Yugoslavia and Greece after the
war will be policy Of cordial, open
friendship and that there will be no
longer in Italy any one who would
want to revive territorial claims
against them. Those claims were
purely Fascist conceptions"
1t is in regard to past events that
Badoglio was most revealing. He
began by stating that, in the final
diplomatic crisis of August, 1899,
Mussolini did his best to dissuade
Hitler from going to war, telling
the Fuehrer that Italy was not pre-
pared and would be nonbelligerent.
At that time the Duce seems to
have been sincere, and every one
was convinced that we would never
get into the war" But the anaz-
ing German victories of May, 1910,
presented MusSolini with tempta-
tlon that he could not resist: so,
against the unanimous advice of his
generals and diplomats, including
Count Ciano, he deliberately plunged
Italy into the war. Mussolini's
cold -blooded cynicism is strikingly
revealed by his answer to their
remonstrances when he disclosed to
them his secret pledge to Hitler to
declare war on France and Britain
by June 10th. In September" he
asserted, everything will be over.
and I need some thousands of dead
to be able to sit at the peace table
as a belligerent." Badoglio draws
from this conclusion that "responsi-
blllty for the declaration of war
rests exclusively on Mussolini." That,
incidentally, accords with Church
HIS judgment in his speech delivered
IN the autumn of 1910 that "one
man, and one man alone" was re-
Sponsible for Italy's plunge into the
maelstrom.
Equally revealing are Badoglio's
statements concerning the downfall
of the Fascist regime last summer.
He declares that it was entirely a
palace revolution within the Fascist
ranks; that the army had no hand
in it, and that popular rising was
impossible under the repressive
conditions which then prevailed.
Mussolini's overthrow was due to
the disillusionment of his own
partisans and colleagues at his cat
astrophic blunders which had led
his country to humiliation and i'm
pending ruin, He fell like rotten
pear" says Badoglio. What better
epitaph could be framed for the
political mausoleum of the Saw