Evening star., 1943-08-17

SliOuiQ lCAlCSll Oul lIlCllOI ACo.
We should recall that not so many
months ago people were disputine
the need of all-out conversion anc
the stoppage of the production Of
passenger cars, electric refrigerators
and radios. just as today they are
disputing the need of drastic limi-
tations on the use of gasoline.
1t is not so very long ago that
people were debating the need OF
building so many new steel, alu-
minum and magnesium plants just
as today they are debating the need
Of more men for our armed forces
1t is only few months ago that
many people, some in high position
told us we were losing the war and
that our whole production program
was in confusion.
Production Program
Felled One Dictator.
Yet out of this period of mobiliz-
ing for total war, We have achieved
a war production program which has
caused one strutting dictator to fall
almost before the real fighting be-
gan. Out of this period of travail
we have built and equipped a wal
machine which has brought faear to
the heart of every tyrant, and hope
to the breast of every lover of liberty
When we first started mobilizine
for war, we had, generally speaking
as much as we required for our home
needs. But with production reach
ing unprecedented goals and with
millions of our men being drawn
into the armed forces, we no longer
have goods and services for civilian
use in sufficient quantities to salts
fy the normal demands of our people
We do not now have poverty
amid plenty as we did in 1882, but
we do have a scarcity of goods
amid a surplus of spending money.
If we did not feel the hardships
of war on the home front, it would be
certain sign that we had not yet
mobilized ourselves for total war
Shortages of goods are in very
real sense evidence. not of blum
dering but of all-out mobilization for
war.
1t inconveniences us when we
cannot use our automobiles for
pleasure and for greater mileage.
But, after all. there are greater sac
rifices. Today our casualties number
9O.454.
We complain of the number OF
physicians who were permitted to
enter the armed services because OF
the inconvenience thereby caused
by the civilian population. But there
Is comfort in the knowledge that in
the last war. of our wounded, II
per cent died, while in this war, OF
our wounded, only 81 per cent have
died.
At the peak of the last World War
little more than a quarter of our
national output went for war pur-
poses. Now a full half of our ma
tional output is being taken to fight
the war.
During the last war our allies were
able to furnish half of the supplies
required for every soldier we sen,
abroad, and that half which oul
allies furnished included over 9(
per cent Of the artillery and the
heavy ammunition used by our men
In this war, we have borne the full
| burden of equipping our own men
American industry has. furnished q
vast quantity of equipment pur-
chased outright by our allies. u
In addition we have furnished
them materiel which totals In dollar
volume the anlount needed for 10,-
000, 900 troops. besides huge quanti-
ties Of aircraft.
Fifth Of Plane Output
Sent by Lease-Lend.
Thus, we have sent by lease lend
IS per cent of our tanks, IS per of
our locomotives, 10 per cent of our
railroad cars, q per cent OF our
combat cars and carriers and almost
one-fifth of our unprecedented air
plane production.
But I do not wish to convey the
idea that because we have done so
much we cannot and should not do
more.
What then can we, or should we,
do about the shortages which are
producing increasing strains in our
civilian economy? <*
We certainly are not going to take
from our fighting men or from the
fighting men Of our allies the things
which they must have. AS to the
shortages of goods which are not
essential, we must simply make up
our minds that we want none of
them for the duration. AS to the
shortages of necessities, we must
do what we can to increase the sup
ply without hurting the war effort.
We must see that the available sup
ply Is equitably distributed in ac-
cordance with need and not in ac-
cordance with the size of our pocket
books.
The programming of our all-out
mobilization for war was not a SIM
pie task. We had to prepare, on the
basis of estimates, war production
programs large enough to give us
superiority in fighting strength
16oAAAct ohl AAiOWl we
could not know all the fields in
which we would have 20 operate
The programs were so vast and COM
plicated that no one. businessman
or professor, civilian official or mill
tary offlcer, Democrat or Republican,
could look into the future and tell
exactly how these programs, when
they swung into full production
would fit into the changing require
ments of our war plans.
Programs Now at Point
Justifying Critical Review.
The programs have now developed
to the point where they can be SUBJ
jected to really critical screening
to determine whether, in the light
Of known war conditions, some OF
them may not be reduced and 9TH
ers extended to the advantage of our
overall war plans, including neces-
sary civilian supply.
At the request of the once OF
War Mobilization the principal pro-
curement agencies have set up with
in their own agencies committees