Evening star., 1943-05-21
Bottle for Attu
Preface to Offensives
Mojor Eliot Says Jops
Nay Be Planning
Something Big

BY Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
On the basis of present information,
our forces appear to be getting the upper
| hand on Attu Island, and so far there
| is no suggestion of Japanese attempt
to relieve their hard-pressed garrison.
This Is so unlike the usual japanese re-
action to even limited offensives, that
we must suppose either Cd the diff
culties of attempting relief are alto
| gether too great even for the Japanese
high command, or CD that they are
| going to react with an offensive of their
own in some other area.
The difficulties are. indeed consider
able. The relief Of Attu could be at
| tempted only by re-establishing Japanese
control of the waters surrounding Attu.
1t could not be done by air. because the
nearest japanese base is at Paramushiru,
$50 nautical miles distant. For the Jap
anese to send naval forces to Attu would
mean bringing those forces within reach
| of our land-based aviation on Amchitka,
220 miles away, with results almost Ger
tainly similar to those experienced by the
Japanese in trying the same sort of en-
terprise in the Solomons There is,
| however. this difference: the weather
| might give cover to the approaching
Japanese force to far greater extent
than the clear nights and bright days
of the South Pacific. But weather is a
| treacherous ally, as the Japanese found
| out in the Bismarck Sea; and there Is,
moreover, every reason to suppose that
| we have surface naval forces present in
the vicinity of Attu, which could deal
with any likely japanese relieving fleet.
1t may, Of course, be argued that the
| Japanese are willing to give up Attu and
Kiska Che loss of the former will almost
surely entail the loss of the latter be-
cause these positions are OF value to
them only as listening posts and weather
| stations, and particularly as sentinels
! against possible United States move
| into Eastern Siberia; and now that the
| japanese seem to be cultivating better
| relations with the Soviet Union, perhaps
| their listening posts in the Aleutians.
Actually, however, no one knows what
| the actual Japanese attitude toward Rus
| sia may be. America should be the last
| place in the world where it should be
| supposed that fair and friendly gestures
| from Toxic should be taken at face value.
| There are, undoubtedly, powerful influ
| ences in Japan, particularly in army
| circles, which are still urging that
golden opportunity is being lost of driv-
! ing the Russians away from the shores
| of the Sea of Japan; that the time to
| do so is now or never. since the oppor-
| tunity will not recur. The Germans
| must, likewise, frantically be urging the
| japanese to attack the Russians just as
| their own last forlorn hope gets under
way on the Russian front. From their
| point of view, nothing could be more
| timely. Hence we ought not too hastily
| accept the idea that the Japanese are
| through with Attu and Kiska, and are
not willing to make sacrifices to hold
| them.
r What is very much more likely is that
| they have not the force for one of two
reasons: Either they are too anxious
about what we may be planning else
| where, say in the South or Southwestern
| Pacific, or they are planning something
| big themselves, as their leaders have
repeatedly and publicly stated of late.
and they are not going to be diverted
| from that purpose in order to save face
| at Attu. Very likely both these theses
| are correct, the one being the counter
| part of the other
In that case our operation at Attu
itself may be diversion. as may the
| bombardment of Wake, a diversion both
as to something coming in the way of a
| United Nations offensive in the South
and Southwest Pacific Gas foreshadowed
by the Macarthur -Halsey conference)
and as to whatever offensive the Jap
anese may have in mind.
The Japanese may, indeed, be pre-
pairing to attack Russia, but on the evil
dence available the most likely enter
| prise for them would seem to be land
attack, with strong air support, on the
| island of New Guinea for the purpose
of recovering Buna and taking Milne
conditions neither side can be secure in
this area. We never can feel safe as
long as the japanese hold New Britain
and New Ireland and can build up their
air strength by their chain of bases from
Celebes through Amboina and all along
the north coast of New Guinea down to
Salamaua and Bougainville. The Jap
anese never can feel safe as long as we
hold both Guadalcanal and Buna and
can develop from two directions the
striking power which we can build up
in the continent of Australia. Sooner
or later the Japanese must thrust us
out of New Guinea and the Solomons
altogether, so that we shall be thrown
back on the north coast of Australia and
the New Hebrides; or we must put them
out of New Britain, New Ireland and all
Eastern New Guinea, so that we shall
have the protection of the 800 miles of
open water which lies between Rabaul and
the Japanese base at Truk. The present
state of uneasy sparring between ad-
vance base: separated only by 100 miles