Evening star., 1943-06-29
CHAPTER Xxx.

sobdUeS as Cne P6ar1 1arDOr attack
eight months and two days before.
It delayed our whole schedule for
further attacks in the Solomons, took
the Initiative out of our hands and
put us in defensive position which
we were still maintaining at the end
of the first year of war.
At Savo Island we lost perma-
nently sunk the cruisers Astoria
Quincy and Vincennes, plus the
Australian cruiser Canberra. The
loss of life was never announced, but
both directly, in ships crews killed,
and indirectly, in marines who lost
their lives as a result of failure to
land their supplies, it was very large.
Our cruisers had gone into the
Tulagi gi-Guadalcanal area to cover
the marine landings and were de-
ployed across the entrance to the
harbor. The Canberra and an
American cruiser steamed back and
forth between Savo Island, at the
mouth Of the harbor area and Qua
dalcanal, while the Quincy, Astoria
and VincenneS patroled the northerr
channel between Savo and Florida
Islands. Several destroyerS were out
in front of the cruisers, but their
radio equipment failed to detect the
Japanese ships.
The enemy vessels slipped in
among our cruisers at 1:55 am,
made circle of Savo Island from
south to north, and sped out again.
AS they had done in the Java Sea
battle, the japanese used cruiser
planes to drop flares which Silhouet-
ted our ships for their gunnerS
Our crews were not at general
quarters, and the first they knew of
the presence of the japanese was
when torpedoes and shells crashed
into their ships. The Quincy and
Vincennes were blown up and sank
within few minutes, the Astoria
and Canberra were so badly damaged
that they went down the next morn
ing. The crews never had chance
to fight for their lives
X X
The news of these losses was. quite
tustiflably, withheld from the Ameri-
can public for some time, for there
was no way that the Japanese could
be absolutely certain of how amaz-
jngly successful they had been.
However, once the losses had been
announced there was no justification
for attempting to tighten the disaster
by claiming that it was a partial
victory. Three months after the
battle high officials in Washington
were still asserting that the Japs had
not achieved their objectives because
they had not continued on into the
Guadalcanal-Tulagi area and at
tackled our transports.
The truth was that the Japs ac-
compliShed their objectives without
sinking the transports, for the trans
ports never were fully unloaded.
The transports stayed in the har-
Dor all day Sunday, August 9, un-
loading supplies. All their troops
we're already ashore. But that night
all the transports upped anchor and
scattered from the SolomonS to va
rious parts of the South Pacific
Some of them were still almost
fully loaded. Only approximately
one-flfth of the supplies for the Ma
rines was put ashore, and conse-
quently the landing forces were
short of gasoline, bombs, bullets,
airplane parts, food and medicine
for many weeks. During those
weeks the Japs succeeded in land
ing reinfOrcements on Guadalcanal
and it was not until sometime later
almost too late-that our own
i,,
ashore supplies and infantry rein
forcements for our battle-weary
Marines
Despite the fact that air power
had won every victory in the Pacific
up to that time. our Marines were
put ashore at Guadalcanal without
any provision for air protection after
the afternoon of August 8, when our
carriers withdrew to the south. The
Guadalcanal airfeld, which was re-
named Henderson Field, was put
into shape for airplane operations
within three days after the Marines
landed, but it was not until August
20 that the first planes-l8 fighter
and II dive bombers ferried from
Honolulu-were put ashore.
x X X
While the American public was
being fed reports of our growing air
plane construction and accepting
those reports as accurate, the start
ling fact was that eight months
after the start of the war our Navy
in the Pacific could get only %
planes to send into Gusdalcsnal
and those arrived nearly two weeks
after the landing!
The Japs took immediate advan-
ta9e of this Situa ton. Unopposed.
they landed about 1000 troops on
the north shore of Guadalcanal on
August 18 and advanced to within
two miles OF Henderson Field before
they were wiped out by Marine ma
chine guns and tanks.
Meanwhile, our vast task force
was too far away TO give air or sea
support to the Marines, but when
the small carrier with the Marine
planes arrived from Honolulu we
moved back up TO the vicinity of
Guadalcanal and waited for the
laps to make a ajor attempt to
retake the islands we had captured.
Reconnaissance planes spotted the
Japanese coming southwark in three
strong forces on August %. With
two carriers we steamed out to meet
and fight them about $50 miles north
of Malaita Island in the southeast
ern Solomons.
At last! Our long awaited car
rier battle was just over the horizon.
X
NinetysiX planes were shot down
by our Navy pilots, the Marines over
Guadalcanal, and our anti-aircraft
fire in the battle that followed.
One small Jap carrier was dead
In the water and burning. In addi-
iion to the carrier, which was either
the Ryujo or Hosho, one Jap de-
stroyer, cruiser, and a transport
ylu
EXf3K -XI,NH6ffNU