Evening star., 1943-09-22

body without exception comedies
that Gen. Marshall is perhaps the
greatest military organizer in the
world today and should be in COM
mand of Allied military operations
In Europe, there is fear expressed
In many quarters that the move may
be demoralizing at home in the ac-
tual management by the Army of
the vast military organization in
continental America.
The fear arises out of belief that
some one may be chosen chief OF
staff who would technically be SUI
perior to Gen Marshall and be able
to give him orders and plans for the
conduct of the war.
But it is also quite possible that
Gen. Marshall may not be asked to
relinquish his statutory post of chief
of staff of the United States Army
but that legislation may be sought
permitting him to exercise opera
from whatever headquarters he may
establish in London or in territory
subsequently invaded by the Allied
armies
Pacific Sympathies.
Protests against the transfer of
Gen. Marshall arise also from a
belief that the interests of the Eu-
ropean theater of war will be the
generals preoccupation and that his
sympathetic and understanding ap-
probation of the Pacific war against
Japan will be lost. The Navy in
particular has worked closely with
Gen. Marshall, and many naval Off
GERS would feel that the absence of
the general from Washington would
weaken their efforts to get more war
production allotted to the Pacific.
But this need not happen if the
right man is selected as deputy
chief Of staff and if he is subject
to the orders of Gen. Marshall. The
global nature of the war is as read
lily understood by American high
commanders whether stationed in
London or Washington or elsewhere.
Already the problems of personnel
In high command in the Pacific seem
to have brought new difficulties, as
illustrated by the brief statement
issued by Gen. Douglas Macarthur
from his headquarters in New
Guinea declaring that isIand-by-
island strategy and a possible victory
IN 1949 is not his idea of the way to
wage war against Japan
This may be an intimation that
Gen. Macarthur is disappointed and
frustrated, that he believes he will be
left stranded in Australia or New
Guinea and that land opera tions,
after an attack by sea and air,
against the Philippines will be post
poned indefinitely or at least until
the longer campaign through Burma
and the Malay Peninsula into China
Is consummated.
Issue in IA Campaign?
The appointment of Lord Louis
Mountbatten as commander in chief
of all Allied forces in Southeast Asia
has not been interpreted heretofore
as meaning that Gen. Macarthur
would be subordinated, but perhaps
that Is the reason behind the gen.
erals blunt comment, which is most
unusual for him and for wartime.
1t may be that the general thinks
he Is being shelved just because his
name is so often mentioned as a
possible Republican nominee to run
against President Roosevelt.
There can be no doubt that the
American people will find themselves
increasingly interested in whether
We are flghting the war against
Japan with all our might or whether
we are still failing to deliver a
proper proportion of our war pro-
duction to the Pacific. 1t could
conceivably become an issue of the
1914 campaign, though such con-
tingency would be most unfortunate
History records that military strategy
was an issue in Lincolns second
presidential campaign in 1864 and
that Gen. Mcclellan, military man,
ran against the President.
Most observers would prefer that
politics be kept out of the Wnole
war, but the transfer of Gen. Mar
shall, unless persuasively presented