Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-04-26
Allies Seen Ready
To Launch Attack
EorIy Drive Against Axis
Believed Inevitable
By Maj. Eliot
BIZ Mai. George FIELDING Eliot,

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
In recent articles on the coming in
vasion OF Europe have pointed out the
nature of the ultimate Allied objective
the penetration of the German vital
area, the central part of the North
European coastal plain-and the limi-
| tations of geography and fighter plane
| range which constrain the Allies to seek
a decision by landing on the west coast
| of Europe, where the landing can be
supported by fighters operating from
British bases. This will be the bid for
decision. But it will not be made pre-
| maturely.
The enemy is still strong. He still dis
poses of troops of high quality, as his
recent counteroffensive in Russia and
his operations in Tunisia testify. He is,
perhaps, weakest proportionately in the
air, and the Allies now are exploiting
! that fact by stepping up the scale of
their bombing offensive, the purpose of
which is still further to weaken Ger
many and thus prepare the way for the
decisive blow.
There are other preliminary measures
| to be taken. If we are not yet proper
tionately strong enough in ground troops
to make a bid for final victory, at least
in those troops actually present in the
British Isles and Africa, we can find
theaters in which we can produce a
sufhcient measure Of superiority to win
against the force the Germans can afford
or are able to detach against us. We
are winning in Africa because, despite
the German strength in Europe, the
Germans have not been able to get
enough troops into Africa to defeat us.
We are able to establish local superiority,
to make the enemy come and fight us on
battlefield Of our choosing, and under
conditions OF our choosing, and where
even our limited strength Is superior
to his.
1t is this strategy which we must pur-
sue in further operations, until we are
ready for the final struggle, because we
cannot afford to give the enemy any
respite and because from the Anglo
American point of view, we must always
keep in mind the need of taking pressure
off our Russian allies.
So long as the Russian Army remains
the principal Allied ground force In &C
tual contact with the German main
forces, the main Allied effort is on the
Russian front, and all the Anglo-Ameri-
can operations are in the strategical
sense subordinate thereto and must be
designed to help the Russians. The
more closely such operations can be CO.
ordinated and connected with the Rus
sian operations, the more helpful they
will be to the Allied cause in general
and the more likely to be successful.
The situation toward which we must
work is one in which the Germans are
the whole Germany Army is either en-
gagged on the Russian front, or on sub
sidiary fronts opened up by the Allied
forces around the perimeter of the CONT
nent, so that the Germans have no
longer substantial reserve at the dis
posal Of their high command. That will
be the time when the main allied blow
can be delivered-the decisive invasion
of Western Europe from Great Britain,
which must almost certainly seek to
penetrate the coast somewhere between
the mouth of the Scheldt and the mouth
Of the Seine. But from all present indi-
cations, that hour has not yet struck.
Nevertheless, there is feeling of ex-
pectancy in the air, the tenseness which
knowledge the imminence Of great
events. AS the Tunisian campaign draws
to an end as spring begins to unlock
the pathways of war on the Russian
front, as the scale of the Allied bombing
offensive rises and extends farther and
farther into the heart of Germany, there
are to be noted many lesser straws
blowing in the wind which forecast a
new turn of the war. The very logic of
the situation makes it all but certain
that we shall have stirring news before
many days are passed.
The United Nations are on the Of
fensive. The Germans seem to be pre-
pairing some sort of desperate blow
against the Russians. Britain and Amer
lea. with air superiority everywhere and
with command of the sea (save for the
attrition Of the U-boat, can effect
strategical surprises anywhere they like,
just as they did in North Africa.
Under these conditions, 1t is inevitable
that British and American forces will be
used to rock the enemy of balance, to
dislocate his plans, to compel him to
weaken his forces in Russia or in the
alternative to accept consequences that
in the end will be worse for him than
even another defeat on the Russian front.
The initiative is ours, the opportunity
Is ours, the time is at hand. It remains
only to strike in place proportionate
to the strength available.
That place must be on (a) where the
enemy cannot meet us with his full
strength; 90 where Anglo American
efforts can be directly co-ordinated with
Russian efforts; Co where we can ex-
plot our air and sea superiority and
make them weigh heavily in the balance,
as against our shortage Of ground troops,
and (d) If possible, where success will
contribute directly to the weakening of
the U-boat campaign so that we may
60 on from strength to mounting
strength, from operations of limited OBJ
jective to those of unlimited objective.