Evening star., 1943-04-18

%SSF Salu 10 De prepared
cTAJJN TO offer their former
friend and present
foe nothing less than the Baltic states
at present occupied by the Reichl a
larger slice Of Poland than was provided
for in the Molotoff -Ribbentrop agreement
of 1889 the return Of BeSsarabia and a
slice of Northern Rumania known as
Moldayia as well as the DobroudJa.
A Tempting Morsei
And finally, the most tempting morSel
any nation has ever offered the Russians
an outlet to the Mediterranean In the
form of consenting that the L. s, S r.
occupy Istanbul and the two straits con-
Meeting the Black Sea TO the Mediter-
ranean, the Bosphorus and the Darda-
nelleS.
II is improbable that Premier Stain
will be lured into accepting peace with
the Nazis even on such tempting basis
He has had sufficient experience with
Hitler and his cohorts TO know the tempo
rary character of any agreement with the
Nazi dictator. The proposals are said 10
have been submitted to the Moscow gov
ernment by the japanese Ambassador 10
Russia This fact in itself would tend 10
make the Russians more suspicious than
ever.
All the same. it Is felt in responsible
quarters that the very endeavor OF the
NaZis to detach Russia from the family
| of the United Nations demands an early
| clarification of the major policies OF the
Allies.
Russia, like Britain is determined to
emerge from the war with an empire OF
her own She wants territories which
we're considered sovereign by the United
| States at the outbreak OF the war.
Moscow has taken exception to this point
| of view.
What the high American officials have
| told Stain privately is, of course, not
| available to the public. But officially
| the views of the Soviet regarding the
Baltic States and Poland have not been
| condoned by the United States Govern
ment. Hence Moscow is in the dark as
to the future attitude of this country
in regard to her demands for the REIN
statement of the old western boundaries
| of Russia.
Have No Trust in Nazis.
The German proposals are said to be
| unacceptable to Moscow not so much be-
cause they do not offer enough but be-
cause the Soviet government does not
| trust the Nazi regime. Should these
| offers come from a more trustworthy
| German government 1t is hardly con-
! ceivable that they will be turned down
| without thorough examination.
On the other hand, there is the mill
tary situation which presents certain
difficulties, although it is far more in our
favor now than at any time since the
beginning of the war.
Should the Nazis be able to throw
enough force against Russia and roll the
Red armies back toward the Volga,
there will be an immediate outcry from
Russia for the Allies to open a second
front in Europe Stain will not waste
time to remind Mr.. Roosevelt and Mr..
Churchill of their Casablanca pledges
and the open note given by the two
leaders to Moscow would fall due on
sight.
Military operations-particularl those
of an amphibious character-cannot be
undertaken quickly. In all probability
we will be the masters of Tunisia before
the Nazis can start major operation
against Russia But that does not nee
essarily mean that we shall have at our
disposal the necessary tonnage to start
moving either across the Channel or the
Mediterranean with a reasonable chance
of success.
In Tunisia the cards were heavily
stacked against the Axis. 1t was they
who had to get their supplies from
across the land bases in Europe. In the
event of campaign from North Africa
to Southern Europe it will be up to us
to ferry troops and supplies for such an
operation.
And it won't be easy. In examining
the general situation we must bear in
mind the fact that there is possibility
that our first attempts to invade Europe
might fail. In such an event we must
reorganize our forces at their base
either Great Britain or Africa-and start
again later. Should the German oppo-
sition be strong and successful at first,
it may be that we will not be able to
renew an invasion attempt for several
months.
In the meantime, the Nazis might be
hammering the Russian armies with a
two-fold purpose-either to try to dam
age 1t beyond repair or to induce Stain
to pay more considerate attention to
their peace proposals
If we are marking time or butting our
heads against the European wall without
much success at the start of our inva-
sion, some high ranking officials fear
that Stalin-a stark realist-might give
(See BROWN, Page B-33