Evening star., 1943-08-15
Soviet Army Keeps the
Coissons Rolling
By John H. Cline.

and secret weapons.
Most of the so-called new weapons
really have been improved old weapons
put to better tactical uses The effec-
tiveness of the bomber, for instance, has
been enormously increased. But, except
for better tactical employment, bombers
have done nothing in this war that
could not have been foreseen when the
First World War ended. There are those
In the air forces who believe that through
proper use of heavy bombers Germany
can be brought to her knees without a
land invasion Of the continent But If
strated, and experience on Sicily tends to
support those who say that bombers
alone cannot do the JOB; that the war
In Europe will be won when a landing Is
made and the infantry fights It's way into
the Reich. 1t may be suggested that
conditions In Sicily are not comparable
to those that would prevail In an all-out
air attack on the mainland. and this is
true. But the fact remains that 1t is too
early In the game to conclude that
bombing will be enough and that we can
win the war without coming to grips on
land with the German Army.
Reds Stick to Artillery.
Similarly, there we're those who be-
lieved that the German experiment in
co-ordinating tank and dive bomber at
tacks had sounded the death knell OF the
artillery. The dive bombers were to take
the place OF the big guns and the tanks
would mop up what was left. But 1t has
not worked out that way, and one Of the
reasons for the Nazi debacle In Russia
traces back to the fact that the Red
Army, skeptical Of the new doctrine, over
looked no opportunity to strengthen and
improve its artillery.
This faith in what many said was an
outmoded military arm has begun to
produce results. some of which are dis.
cussed in an article written by Major v.
Smlrnov, Of the Soviet Army, and pub
lished in the Military Review of the
Command and General Staff School,
Fort Leavenworth.
Recognizing that tanks, compared
with other kinds of troop units, have
striking power, Major Smirnov says that
1t was not without reason that some
military specialists put all their conf
dence IN tank troops relegating the
artillery to secondary position. But. as
he sees 1t, experience In the fighting in
Russia. in which tanks have been ex-
tensively employed by both armies, has
shown that the presence of large num-
bers of tanks tends to increase rathe.
than reduce the Eole of artillery.
Tank Defenses Improved.
After the Allied armies in Western
Europe had been crushed by the German
psnzer divisions the experts began de-
vising new methods Of stopping these
armored engines OF destruction with
the result that modern defense Is pri-
marily q matter of tank defense. As
matters stand today, according to the
Russian commentator, "an abundance of
varied means of combating the armored
arm distributed along the front and in
depth, and we'll concealed, enables the
defense to Withstand massed tank at
tacks." Tank crews, handicapped by
limited visibility and the difficulties Of
aiming fire from fast-moving vehicle
that Is pitching in and out Of shell holes
and over hills, cannot locate and knock
out all of these defenses. Unless the
tanks are to be destroyed or turned back,
they must have the close support of
artillery. The Russians. In addition to
building up their defenses against Ger
hou -
necessary artillery support for their own
armored vehicles, and measure Of their
success is to be found in the defeats now
being inflicted on the German army.
1t is not possible in this space to dis
cuss in detail the tactics set out by Mai.
SmlrnoV But, in brief, the Russians pro-
ceed on the theory that tanks require the
constant and co-ordinated support of the
artillery throughout an attack First,
the artillery may be called upon to knock
out such enemy defense installations as
can be located and to protect the Rus
sian tanks while they are assembling for
an attack. Then it will be expected to
secure the passage of the tanks up 10 the
point Of attack and to parry counterat-
tackS by the enemy. When the tanks
reach the forward edge of the enemy de-
fenses it will be up to the artillery to dis
locate the opposing antitank installa-
tionS. This may call for volume rather
than accuracy of fire in the brief period
while the tanks are breaking through,
the idea being TO provide the tanks with
the protection that lies in a maximum
diversion of enemy attention at the criti-
cal period of the attack.
The Russians also stress the impor-
tance of sending artillery right along
with the tanks. Where possible, this ar
tillery will follow two or three hundred
yards to the rear, employing It's own
means Of locomotion. This makes pos
sible better protection of the flanks Of
the attacking force against ahtitank de-
fenses which have been misseil but there
have been instances in Thiclt the Soviet
tanks have towed their own sccompany-
ing artillery by means of cEhles. The
artillery gunners, armed witE automatic
rifles, took up positions on the tanks.
where they also placed a par! Of their
ammunition.
This procedure. Maj Smirnov says, Is
unusual but 1t is In line with the Rus
sian concept that tank attacks will not
succeed unless given uninterrupted sup
port by the artillery from the moment
they move to the positions Of departure
for the attack up to the time the break
through is completed. And, Judging from
results, this should provide food for