Evening star., 1943-05-14
Continued From First Page.)
the Atsuta Shrine at Nagoya,
Japan)
H-A

Size Of Garrison Not Known.
The size of the enemy's garrison
on Attu is not known, but it is be-
lieved to be smaller than the ap-
proximately 10000 troops reported
on Kiska.
There was no indication today that
any attack had been made at Kiska,
and this led to speculation that the
United States maneuver was designed
to outfank the more-strongly held
enemy base and, if possible, place Its
garrison In an almost untenable
position before attacking there.
Attu has been used as supply
point for Kiska, and presumably
American possession of Attu would
greatly reduce Kiska's usefulness to
the enemy as potential airbase and
a submarine-opera base.
Possession of the island would give
the American Aleutians command a
weather observation station west of
Kiska-a fact of supreme Importance
in the Aleutians. where weather is
most constant single problem which
airmen and seamen face. Heretofore
the advantage has been all with the
japanese because the weather moves
from west to east, and they knew
what conditions would be when
american forces could not know.
$50 Miles From Paramushiru.
Possession of Attu. provided it re-
duces the japanese garrison on
Kiska to impotence and puts Amer
lean forces in position to knock out
Kiska speedily, would afford an
American base within $50 nautical
miles of Japan's great base of Para
mushiru which is at the northern
end of the Kuriles Island extending
between Japan proper and Russia's
Kamchatka peninsula.
If the Japanese have succeeded in
carving an air base out of Attu's
mountainous landscape, American
forces undoubtedly would devote full
energies toward completing it as
speedily as possible in order to bring
ParamushirU in aerial lombard
ment.
The drive to clear the Japanese
out of the Aleutians comes II
months after the enemy moved into
the WeSternmost of those American
islands as part of their most am
bilious and most completely defeated
offensive operation.
Naval authorities now generally
agree that the offensive was broken
by American sea and air forces in
the battle of Midway in the Central
Pacific which developed simultan-
eously with the enemy attack on
American positions at and around
Dutch Harbor in the North Pacific.
The Midway victory broke the
southern arm of a japanese pincers
thrust aimed ultimately at the
North American continent and left
the northern arm endangered and
without support.
Northern Force Attacked.
The enemy's northern force, in
cluding two aircraft carriers also
came under American air attack
from Army bases about which the
japanese apparently had no prior
intel';g ;gence and the best he could
do without seriously endangering
his entire fleet of carriers, cruisers,
destroyers and transports was to
make a landing in the Western
Aleutians 800 nautical miles from
the defending bases around Dutch
Harbor.
Army and Navy airmen, flying
through the worlds worst weather
of almost constant fog and high
winds, undertook to hold the enc
my to the tip of the island chain
and were so successful that Ameri-
can naval officers began to describe
Kiska as Japanese rat trap"
Despite this aerial pounding,
which increased as American forces
moved their bases westward, the
Japs tenaciously dug themselves
into Kiska's bleak hillsides, set up
antiaircraft and harbor defenses
and, under the cover of last winters
fogs, began to build airfelds on both
Kiska and Attu, which lies l72 nau-
tical miles farther west and was
therefore less subject to frequent
bombing.
The American counter-stroke was
to move into the island of Amchitka
last January IL and set up an air.
field only 63 nautical miles from
Kiska. This lessened the weather
hazard and enabled attacking planes
to make two or more round trips
day. Raids on the japanese install
lations on Kiska reached a peak of
IS day on April 10. BY May 6 the
Aleutians command was able not
only to deliver five raids on Kiska
but also to set a one-day record for
attacks on Attu of seven raids.
Enemy's Position Weakened.
The aerial hammer blows which
had really begun in earnest March
! did much to weaken the enemys
position in the Aleutians and to
prepare the way for American re-
conquest of the islands.
The American high command, ac-
cording to the best information OBJ
tainable, was never seriously con-
Cerned about the threat to American
interests and security arising from
japanese occupation of Kiska once
1t was definitely ascertained that
Midway had been the success it
was. Defenses in the Aleutians
area unquestionably were slender
when the first japanese blows fell,
but it was believed in the highest
quarters that without full naval sup
port the enemy forces would not be
able to improve their positions by
moving eastward.
Moreover, immediate steps were
taken to strengthen American bases
stretching westward along the curv-
ing island chain. Planes, guns and
troops were poured into them as
rapidly as American production and
the grand strategy then being fol-
lowed would permit.
First japanese bombs to fall on
American possessions in the West
ern Hemisphere landed on the naval
base at Dutch Harbor and the
nearby Army base, Fort Mears, in
the Central Aleutians. about 6 am.