Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-05-11
Mediterranean MASTERY

Mediterranean Mastery
Where the victorious Allies may
plan to strike the mainland of Fort
ress Europe" is naturally as yet I'M
disclosed. But it is practical GER
tainty that the large Allied land, air
and naval forces freed for other
services by the collapse of Axis re-
sistance in Tunisia will be employed
in reducing at least some of the Axis
island outposts in the Mediterranean.
This has to be done, not only to pave
the way for a direct attack on the
Axis soft underside but also to clear
the Middle Sea of Axis interference
and establish a practicable route for
merchant conveys all the way from
Gibraltar to the Middle and Far East
via the Suez Canal. This natural
short line will save millions of tons
of shipping now employed in the
immensely long voyage around Africa
via the Cape of Good Hope. Such an
objective is worth attainment.
Sicily and Sardinia are the targets
most discussed. Both are large is
lands, mountainous and presumably
strongly held, in part by picked Ger
man troops. The conquest of either
probably will be stiff job, needing a
large expeditionary force. But before
those offensives can be prepared, two
minor tasks could we'll be under
taken. These are the little islands
of Pantelleria and Lampedusa. Small
though they are, those two rocky dots
are dangerous hazards in the narrow
waters between Sicily and Tunisia.
They are, indeed, Axis counterparts
of Malta, which has so splendidly
proved it's value to the Allied cause.
Pantelleria lies squarely across the
narrowest part OF the Sicilian Straits.
About half the size of Malta, it
bristles with gun emplacements, has
small harbor used as submarine
base and contains an airfeld re-
portedly connected by tunnel with an
underground hangar that is bomb
proof. Malta's example shows that
Pantelleria can prove hard nut to
crack if held by resolute defenders.
Yet Malta was never exposed to an
attack by an expeditionary force Of
troops, whereas Allied control of the
sea in this area permits such an
attack at any time. The reduction
of Lampedusa, 100 miles southeast
Of Pantelleria and midway between
Malta and Tunisia, should be
simpler matter, because Lampedusa
is much smaller and repeatedly less
heavily fortified Both these is
lands have recently been intensively
bombed by air, which may be the
preliminary softening up Of their
resistance to Allied assaults soon to
come.
The logic of the situation thus
points to the preliminary reduction
of Lampedusa and Pantelleria, fol-
lowed by invasions of Sicily and
Sardinia. Another natural objective
in this general area is Corsica, polit-
ically part of France but occupied
some months ago by Axis forces. An
Allied landing in Corsica would Ger
tainly be welcomed by the native
population, and once in Allied hands
it would be pistol pointed squarely
at both Northern Italy and the
French Riviera, which lie literally
within sight of Corsica's mountain
Gus northern tip.
Such is the strategic picture in
the Western Mediterranean. Eastern
Mediterranean strategy centers about
the island of Crete, which the Axis
has converted into an enormously
strong base. This central bastion is
flanked on the west by the rugged
Peloponnesus Peninsula of Southern
Greece and on the east by the Italian
archipelago of the Dodecanese, lying
close to Turkish Asia Minor. In view
of transportation difficulties, it would
seem that the breaking of the Axis
hold on the Cretan bastion and it's
supports must await a clearing of
the Western Mediterranean along
tactical lines already surveyed. Yet
high commands do not always map
their strategy according to geograph-
ical logic; so the actual course of
events may contain startling sur
prises. The one thing sure is that
the Allies now hold the initiative
in the Mediterranean and can be
counted on to press their advantage
at the earliest possible moment.
A Local Matter