Evening star., 1943-01-29
'CusubIunco's
Big Decisions
.Comouhoged
EnIoreed Council
Of United Nations
Believed in Wind
BY DAVID LAWRENCE.

BY DAVID LAWRENCE.
Maybe It's our habit OF being ac-
clstomed to play-by- play descrip-
tions Of big events. but those who
profess disappointment because
they were not told In detail about
what happened at the Casablanca
conference are just bit impatient,
II not captious.
When the commanders Of the
Army, Navy and Air Forces of
Great Britain and America sit down
together for 10 whole days 1t would
be extremely foolish to give Berlin
Rome and Toxic even the sketchiest
account Of what was decided.
II, therefore, what was announced
seemed hazy and dealt too extern
Nvely with what might truly be
called a secondary episode-the
political situation In North Africa
one can rest assured that the big
decisions were purposely camou-
fased behind the very vague word
Ing OF the ofncial pronouncements
It's past history now, but when
Prime Minister Churchill and
President Roosevelt met to formu-
late the Atlantic Charter some of
the global war which since materi-
allied were then laid down. The
sarne thing happened in December,
ls4l, when Mr.. Churchill came to
washington. Indeed, it since has
been disclosed that agreement was
reached at that conference on the
division Of areas OF combat and the
responsibilities of each country
within those areas. The war has
been fought on that basis ever
since.
Inside Strategy.
II takes months to carry out any
large e-scale plan and hence some
day the public may learn that the
Casablanca conference, which de-
manded the unconditional sur
render" OF the Axis powers, was far
more concerned with the inside
strategy that will force such an end
than with the words used to de-
scribe so abstractly the true nature
Of the war council.
When Admiral Ernest J. King
leaves his desk rs chief of naval
operations and Gen. George c. Mar
shall ahsents himself from his post
as Chief OF staf OF the United
States Army 1t is not surely for the
purpose Of discussing the aspirations
OF India or the feelings Of the De
Gaullists or the former vichy
Frenchmen toward the war.
Under our system OF government,
civilian heads must lay down the
broad policy and military chiefs then
determine how best to carry it out.
This, In turn, means that in the
making Of a feasible policy the mill
tary chieftains must be consulted.
The Casablanca conference unuues-
tionably was a lnomentous occasion
because history some day may record
that the plan laid there was the
one that brought victory. In any
event, Americans will do we'll to
wait patiently for the unfolding of
the strategy before they express
disappointment.
1t has been said by some that
Josef Stain and Generalissimo
Chang Kai-shek should have been
there. An invitation was sent them
but 1t may be assumed that even
this was more Of q concession to
courtesy than q practical necessity.
II 1t had been vital for either one
to have been there or to have sent
enissaries this would have been
done. The real measure OF what
America is doing for Russia was dis
closed earlier this week In that for
NAL report by Edward stettinius, the
lease-lend administrator.
As for China. there is q growing
recognition Of the needs of the Pa
cific war .or more materials and
weapons and 1t may be assumed that
q much larger share of our produc-
ton henceforth will 60 to that
theater OF war, for Toxic will have
70 wait for while before details
can be dispatched in the form Of
bombers or transports bound for
Japanese held territory.
Standley's Comment.
The real answer concerning the
talk Of supreme war council has
come from the casual comment of
Admiral William H. STANDBY,
American Ambassador to Russia
who said Wednesday in Moscow:
Personally, I find it difncult TO
conceive Of one general staff which
could gather and assimilste the
data and make decisions affecting
operations throughout the world.
There has been much misunder-
standing about the question Of such
q joint command. At the moment
the United Nations already have
come as closely as possible to an ap-
propriate division OF combat zones
and their respective responsibility" )"
The foregoing is virtually an off,
cial statement for 1t corresponds
with what has been said authorita-
lively in Washington heretofore.
What may really be in the wind
however. is an enlarged United Ma
tions council for diplomatic repre-
sentatives at which the dificult
problems of peace terms and post
war readjustments will be developed
But meetings for that purpose need
not be held at such places as Casa
blanca nor do they need the pres
ence Of the British and American
military commanders.
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