Evening star., 1943-04-10
Invasion Threat
Holds Nuzi Reserves
Moior Eliot Sees Hitler
Forced to Strike in Russio
Or Shorten Front There
By Mai. George Fieldino Eliot,

Or Shorten Front There
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
AS the African campaign draws to it's
bloody but inevitable close, the question
in every mind is what are we going to
do next?
That this should be so is of itself sig
| nliicant of the change which has come
over the whole character of the war; for
not so long ago the question in every
| mind was, what is the enemy going to
| do next?
Ihe latter Is. however. a question
Which must not be altogether forgotten.
lhe enemy has not yet wholly lost his
freedom OF action, though it is becom-
Ing more and more restricted In gen.
eral we have the initiative and we seem
! likely to use that initiative to make him
CONFORM TO our moves instead of being
compelled as We used to be to conform
10 his. The enemy is compelled to keen
IN hand strong reserves to deal with
! Whatever attacks we may launch against
MN. He cannot know the place. the
Tine, or the strength of these attacks
until they are actually launched, or at
least until the preparations for them
are so we'll advanced that they can be
no longer concealed
Under these conditions, the margin of
disable strength left to the enemv for
enterprises OF his own is sharply reduced.
lhls marginal force is the first element
10 1eel the drain of general reduction
IN the enemy's fighting power, because
ne must provide for security against our
attacks before he can allot forces to anv
contemplated offensive. If he can make
'hat offensive serve the purpose of up
settlng our plans, he might be able to
FISK some part of his security reserve
1of such purpose since that very fact
would give him a certain measure of
security. For this purpose, however he
"ould require very large forces and his
great handicap is the fact that so much
OF his fighting power is pinned down in
Russia. His hopes of being able to knock
out the Red army as an offensive force
ana dlsengage the greater part of the
Wehrmacht from the Russian grin have
not been realized.
AS long as the present conditions on
the Russian front endure, with two
thirds OF the German Army and at least
nall the Luftwaffe held fast and the nos.
slolllty OF another great Russian often
slVe ever to be kept in mind, the Ger
mans cannot find the marginal strength
necessary for any considerable offensive
elsewhere; or If they do attempt one
IL is desperate affair, gamblers throw
III "nlch failure means irretrievable
olsaster. 1t is for this reason that we
near persistent reports that the Ger
mans are going to try again in Russia
mat they are going to make one more
attempt to free themselves from the
Russian grip by launching an offensive
against Moscow before the Allies can
land in force in Western or Southern
Europe
According to this line of thought. the
desperate German fight for time in Tu-
nlsla IS intended to stave off the invasion
OF Europe by American and British
forces while the preparations for this
Moscow drive are underway. The alter
native would seem to be for the Ger
mans to reduce their commitments in
Russia by shortening both their front
and the length of their lines of COM
munlcatlon. This would mean at least
a withdrawal behind the Dvina and
the Dneiper, or even farther back tn
position covering the Vitebsk- Odessa
Railway
But it is certainly open to question
whether Germany which could not
take Moscow in the fall of 1941 in the
1ull tide OF her power and the full flush
OF victory can hope to do so in the
spring OF 1943, after the terrible losses
OF the past l8 months, with the Allied
air offensive in full swing in the West
and Allied armies crouching for their
spring all along the shores of Africa.
II 1t comes to question of reducing
commitments, it would seem far more
logical Tor Germany to give up Italy and
perhaps Greece. BY so doing GERMANY
might still contrlve to retain the pro-
lection of distance in the east by MAIN
tanning the present line in Russia and to
keep off the Anglo-American forces in
the West by retaining the German grip
on France. On the south mountains
would still stand between the Allies and
Germany's vitals. So much for logic,
but Hitler has not always been logical
and he seems still to be in control of
German war plans. 1t is impossible to
forecast what effect may be produced on
such mind as Hitler's by the mounting
tide of despair
(Copyright. 1a43 New York Tribune, Incl