Evening star., 1943-05-14
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
Eliot


Iome of the effects which the re-
opening of the Mediterranean might
be expected to have on the Far
Eastern strategy of the United
Nations, particularly as to possible
future offensive from India directed
toward the recovery of Burma and
the reopening of communications
with our Chinese Allies. I made
the point that conquest of Sicily and
Sardinia by Allied forces would not
only increase the security of Mediter-
ranean conveys, but would also
afford the opportunity for the
destruction of the Italian naval
bases, thus taking the Italian feet
out of the world picture, and per-
hitting the transfer of the British
Mediterranean fleet to the Far East.
The same effect would naturally
be produced by any series of circum-
stances which resulted in Italy being
knocked out of the war or getting
out of the war. Another point to be
kept in mind is the fact that the
considerable number of British sub
marines operating in the Mediter-
ranean are no longer needed there
for purposes of stopping the move
ment of Axis supplies to Africa, and
many of these may now become
available for operations against the
Japanese seq lanes in the Far East.
Far-Reaching Effects.
However, the reopening of the
Mediterranean will have other far
reorLi,1o efeotc ,,no,, AI1ioI ctro top,,
Sir Archibald Wavell and his asso-
ciates in the Indian high command
may not be in Washington solely for
the purpose of discussing what may
happen in Burma next October.
India occupies a central portion in
South Asia; 1t is a great subconti-
nent with one face turned toward
China and the Far East while the
other is turned toward Iran and
the Middle East; it formed the base
for the Mesopotamian campaign in
the last war and. in part, for the
Palestine campaign.
The reopening of the Mediter-
ranean Immensely strengthens the
Allied position in the Middle East
and will permit much more to be
3 Done in that part Of the world than
has hitherto been possible. 1t will,
for example, enable the oil resources
OF lraq and Iran to be more rapidly
and efficiently distributed. 1t will
enable supplies for Russia to be de-
nVered to Persian Gulf ports at
far less expenditure of tonnage than
Is required at present, but the great
difficulty about this is the lack of
capacity of the land communications
from the Persian Gulf through Iran
and 1raq to Russia.
However, we should not forget
the Dardanelles. In the last war
campaign of considerable dimen-
slons was fought during the year
1915 for the specific purpose of re-
opening the Dardanelles as a SUD-
ply route to Russia. The Allies
then dominated the Mediterranean
but Turkey was hostile: the cam
palgn was failure, though it came
near to success. Now Turkey is
obtensibly neutral but is certainly
very friendly neutral. This does
not, however, mean that Turkey is
In a position at the present time
to open the Dardanelles to our ship .
ping, because the result of such
action might very we'll be an at
tack on European Turkey by Ger
man and Bulgarian forces.
Risks Weighed by Turkey.
OF couEsc, if the Dardanelles could
be opened and kept open the ad-
FantageS would be very great. and
even greater if the Russians succeed
In recovering the port of Novoros-
ksk, as now seems likely. A direct
t1oW of Allied shipping from British
and American ports into Novoros-
slsk would constitute a supply route
to Russia Of far greater capacity
than any now at Our disposal. In
weighing the risks of making such
a route availablc i L, the Turks
must, Of course, ask themselves
whether the Germans are in a posi-
ton to undertake extensive opera
tlons in Eastern Thrace, ard vheth-
er the Bulgarians would now be
willing to give the Germans whole |
hearted support in an attack on
Turkey. There is some doubt on
ootn points. If Italy were knocked
put Of the war, so that Italian troops
would no longer be available for gar
rlson duty in the Balkan Peninsula, |
the Germans might find it very diff
hcult to maintain their positions
there, and this would certainly lessen
the enthusiasm Of the Bulgarians for
.he German alliance. Likewise, the
German ability to act decisively in |
;he Balkans would be much dimin-
IShed If they had to fight in some
,ther part of Western or Southern |
Europe at the same time.
1t should, of course, be added that |
the Use of the Dardanelles by Allied