Evening star., 1943-09-14

II \
Note-The Star is printing, in
daily installments, Chief OF Stat
George c. Marshalrs report to the
Secretary OF War on the period
July /, I941-June 30, 1943, just
made public. at is record"
Gen. Marshall ,Drites, "ot ,Dhat
wds done and Why it toas done,
and is submitted iDhile America
is at wcr to permit better
understanding OF the great
offensive operations noso in
progress"
In January, 1912, when the Prime
Minister and his chiefs of staff were
In Washington. operations in North.
west Africa, in Morocco and Algiers
were discussed in detail. Our linn
tied means at the time made 1t i'm.
practicable to mount such ar
expedition. There were further
discussions at the time of the Prime
Minister'S visit to Washington the
following June and the final deci-
sion was taken in July to launch
an expedition into Northwest Africa
in conjunction with the prepara-
tions for the advance westward of
the British 9th Army then reor-
ganizing on the Ell Alamein line.
The opening of the Mediterranean
would facilitate Allied global opera
tions, and the removal of the con-
slant threat of German activities
in Western Morocco and at Dakar
would add immeasurably to the Sc
curity of the Allied position while
gathering strength to administer
the final Furnishing blows. Further
more, if our occupation of North
Africa could be carried out without
fatally embittering the French
troops and authorities in that re-
gion it would provide a setting for
the reconstruction of the French
Army in preparation for its return
in force to the homeland. The
psychological effect of the conquest
of North Africa would be tremen-
dous.
The adopted plans provided that
task forces from both the United
Kingdom and the United States
should strike simultaneously at AL
giers, Oran and Casablanca. 1t was
urgently desired to make initial
landings to the east of Algiers at
Bone, Philippeville and possibly
Tunts, but the lack of shipping and
of landing boats and aircraft car
riers at the time made this proce-
dure impracticable. It was desired
to carry out the operations early in
sthe fall, but it was necessary to de-
lay until November in order to re-
ceive a large number of craft from
the shipyards and provide and train
the crews for the operation of these
vessels. Some of the larger vessels
did not become available until a
week before the conveys sailed.
The success of the operation de-
pended on the efficient handling of a
mass of details as well as on the
training and fighting qualities of the
troops, and above all, upon the
secrecy with which this vast under
taking had to be prepared.
Gen. Eisenhower, who was
designated to command the Allied
forces involved, organized a COM
bined staff in London and directed
the planning. Three task forces
were formed; one entirely American
sailed directly from the United
States and carried out the landings
along the west coast of Morocco,
another of American troops, escorted
by the British Navy, sailed from
Great Britain and landed in the
vicinity of Oran; the third, COM
Dined British-American ground
force, escorted by the British Navy,
sailed from the British Isles and
landed at Algiers. There were naval
covering forces, both British and
American. The combined air forces.
other than carrier borne and a few
transports and heavy bombers, had
to be funneled through the single
restricted field at Gibraltar, which
could have been put out Of action
choice but to accept this hazard.
The Problem of French Resistance.
The problem of how to avoid
fighting with the French forces in
Africa was difficult of approach. In
the first place, and most important
of all. the hazard to the secrecy
with which the operation must be
prepared and launched presented an
extremely delicate balance in the
choice of methods to be followed.
Should an approach be made to a
single Frenchman who proved un-
sympathetic to our purpose we
risked the slaughter of soldiers on
the beaches of North Africa as we'll
as decisive losses in shipping. The
psychological impact from such a
defeat, at that particular moment
In the war, would have been little
short of catastrophe in its possible
consequences.
To certain degree, however, this
risk had to be accepted. Even SO,
the discussions regarding such an
expedition had to be conducted on a
more or less indefinite basis as to
timing. Not until four days before
the conveys would deploy off the
beaches at Algiers, Oran and Casa
blanca were the few Frenchmen we
had contacted informed of the actual
date for the operation. This, of
course, made it extremely difficult
In cases impossible, for these French
ofhcials to take all the steps neces-
ssry to facilitate our landings. The
consequences of disclosure of our
purpose to the enemy, however, in
volved too great peril to justify
earlier notification.
i The singular relationship exist
Ing between the Vichy government
and Berlin, and with the French
provinces in North Africa. together
with the differences of religion ano
race and the deep-rooted hatreds ol
the Heterogeneous populations of All.
giers and Morocco, imposed a polit.
ical problem of maximum complex
ity on Gen. Eisenhower. At the
moment his energies and direction
had to be concentrated on the sue
cessful penetration of an 8O0-mile
coastline and a vast hinterland by
4 force of htt ln7 mn yv,op To f,,r