Evening star., 1943-02-14
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

The submarine problem is the
most Immediately pressing and ur-
gent question demanding solution
by the military chiefs of the United
Nations.
The reason can be stated very
simply: Germany cannot be de-
feated until the full power Of the
United States can be thrown against
her, and that cannot be done until
the sealanes are cleared-or at least
it cannot be done without grievous
loss. and what is perhaps worse tfor
it leads to still further losses
grievous waste of time.
AS for the Pacific, all that we do
there depends on shipping, and
though there are no German u
boats to contend with and the jap
anese submarines have proven rela-
lively ineffective, the enormous dis
tances make disproportionately high
demands on tonnage, even for the
limited objective" operations to
which we have so far confined our
selves in that area If we are to ex-
pand our Pacific offensives in scope
and area, we shall need more ships
and yet more ships.
The enemy does not hope to win
this war with submarines. but he
does hope to make it so costly to us,
and to protract it over so great
period. that we shall sicken of the
slaughter and make terms with him.
Anti-Submarine Methods.
The best and surest way to dis
appoint him of that fast Pickering
hope is to deal adequately with the
instrument on which it depends
the submarine.
There are various methods to
be used for this purpose. Not all
of them can be discussed publicly,
but most of them are we'll enough
known in principle, air attacks on
submarine bases do not destroy the
heavily protected concrete-roofed
docks, or the submarines in them,
but do damage the repair facilities,
storage warehouse, barracks for
crews, railways and oil tanks.
Air attacks on factories and ship
yards have their due effect, but are
unlikely to be decisive by them
selves. Commando raids on bases
such as that at St. Nazaire-will
be useful Just in proportion to the
length that physical possession of
the base can be retained; it must
be held long enough for the demoli-
ton squads to do their work
thoroughly.
But the direct protection of mer-
chant shipping in transit-that is,
convoy remains the principal
means available for fighting the
submarine. For this purpose two
types of convoy escorts are needed
surface and air Air escort re-
quires bases, which must be i'm
proved, extended and protected. In
the d-Atlantic, where air escort
and patrol from shore bases is more
difficult, floating bases converted
airplane carriers are needed in
much larger numbers than are yet
available.
Trained Crews Needed.
AS for escort ships tdestroyers
and corvettes) these are not yet
available in sufficient numbers
either. Probably we have not yet
half as many in the Atlantic as
we ought to have. We are getting
more, but production is being i'm
peded by the demands on material
and facilities for other purposes
most of which cannot be trans
lated into useful action against the
enemy until the U-boat problem has
been dealt with. This situation is
now in course of correction.
What is really required are not
only escort ships OF adequate speed
armament and sea-keeping qualities
IN adequate numbers, but trained
groups of escort ships manned by
officers and men who have been
trained to work together as a fight
ing team against submarines. With
every large convoy. there should be
enough escort ships SO that. in case
of attack, certain number can
remain with the convoy, while 9TH
ers are detached to deal with enemy
submarines, to stay with them and
track them, keep them below the
surface, and eventually destroy
them.
1t is only by this type of offensive
defensive action that a convoy can
be properly protected, and it is quite
obviously not properly protected if