Evening star., 1943-09-24
Flaws Seen in
Marshall Transfer
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

ment of Gen. George G. Marshall as
commander in chief of all American and
| British armed forces in the European
theater of operations, there has been
very little thoughtful examination of
what the relations of such commander
would be with the governments whose
joint servant he must thus become.
At present there exist three inter-
Allied commands-those of Gen. Eisen-
hover in the Mediterranean, of Gen.
Macarthur in the Southwest Pacific,
and of Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mount
| batten in Southeast Asia.
None of these commanders in chief
has direct contact with any of the
Allied governments; they take their
general directives" from the combined
chiefs of staff, which represents the
high commands of the various British
| end American armed forces-the United
States Army and Navy, the Royal Navy
and Royal Air Force. and the British
Army.
The combined chiefs of staff is an
organization set up under the joint
authority of the President of the United
States, as constitutional commander in
chief of the armed forces thereof, and
the Prime Minister of Great Britain,
as the individual charged with respon-
sibility for the conduct of the war by
the Parliament of Great Britain.
'The combined chiefs of staff includes
also ofIicers representing the armed
forces of the several dominions of the
British Commonwealth of Nations,
though its relationship to the constitu-
tional authorities of the dominions is by
no means clear
But If Gen. Marshall were to be ap-
pointed joint Anglo-American COM
mander in chief in Europe, it would be
difficult for him to be subordinated to
the combined chiefs of staff, of which
he is at present perhaps the most in
fiuential member, and in which he
would then have to be replaced, in all
probability, by an officer who is now his
subordinate.
1t IS one thing for Gen. Eisenhower
for example-to receive his orders
from body on which the American rep
resentatives are the chief of staff of
the Army, his regularly constituted
superior, plus the chief of naval opera
tions and the commanding general of
the Army Air Forces, and on which the
British members-headed by a field
marshal who himself Is a former chief
Of the imperial general staff-are direct
representatives Of the British chiefs Of
stan In London.
1t is quite another to take one of these
oficers out Of his place, appoint him to
q command OF unprecedented RESPONSE
bility. and then put him in subordination
to his former associates and even-neces-
sarily-to former subordinate.
The question, therefore, remains, If
Gen. Marshall is appointed to this new
post to whom is he to be responsible,
and from whom will he receive his or
ders? Quite clearly, he will have to be
responsible to the highest political au-
thority in Great Britain and the United
States: but how can he be responsible
to two men. who may not always agree,
and whose possible differences Gen.
Marshall will have no means of recon-
Cling. From whom are Mr.. Roosevelt
and Mr.. Churchill to receive military
advice? From Gen. Marshall? Or from
the Combined Chiefs of Staff?
The essential omission in this proposed
setup is the omission which wrecked the
joint commands Of Joffre and of Nivelle
In the last war-the lack of any joint
political authority through which the
combined will of the Allied governments
might be exercised and combined de.
cisions made known after the recon-
ciliation of any differences of viewpoint.
1t was not until there had been created
Supreme War Council that a Joint
command was found possible and effec-
tive. Marshal Foch owes much of his
success to the fact he did not have to
deal with two or three different govern
ments or chiefs of state, but was the SER
want of the Supreme War Council, whose
members were those same chiefs of state,
1t Is not enough to say that, in effect,
we have the same thing now, in the fire.
quent meetings of Mr.. Roosevelt and Mr..
Churchill. Frequent meetings of indi-
viduals are not a permanent and func-
tioning organization. What is needed
is the beginnings of political counter
part to the work which the Combined
Chiefs of Staff does so we'll in the mill
tary field: sort of combined foreign and
political office for Britain and America,
where matters of high policy can be
threshed out, and kept continually under
study, and which can serve the Presi-
dent and the Prime Minister by affordino
the framework of which they can be-
come the principal pillars, constituting
themselves as an Anglo American war
council.
Immediately this is done, the Junction.
Ing of the new command becomes per-
fectly clear The Supreme War Council
becomes the mouthpiece of joint deci-
sion, receiving it's routine military advice
and assistance from the Combined Chiefs
OF Staff; to 1t the commander in chief
OF the combined forces reports, makes
recommendations, and from it he re-
ceives his directives.
Into such a framework it then be-
comes perfectly possible to fit other
pieces as occasion may offer, or perhaps
eventually third pillar in the person
of Premier Stain, when the time comes
for that. But without such an organ
for the combined political direction of
the war, the position of any comman-
| der-in-chief in a command Of greater