Evening star., 1943-11-30
Jap Outposts Needed
By American Forces
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.


The importance Of the American re-
capture of the Gilbert Islands and of
the apparent impotence OF the Japanese
air power to interfere with this opera
tion must be considered in the light Of
our immediate strategic objective in the
Pacific theater OF operations.
That objective, very clearly, is to cut
the sea communications of Japan south
of the Japanese main islands and in so
doing to reopen our own sea communi-
cations.
The Pacific war may be considered as
divided into three periods. The first
was the period of the Japanese offen-
sive. This came to an end with the
battle Of Midway. There the edge OF
the Japanese sword was blunted by the
destruction of great part Of his naval
air force, and thereafter the enemy was
not capable OF anything save counter
offensives Of limited objective and du-
ration.
The second period is now in progress.
1t is the period during which the
United Nations pass to the limited Of
fensive themselves and are engaged in
containing the Japanese and in moving
slowly forward toward positions from
which the decisive operations against
Japan's vital centers may be COM
menced. This phase of the war is
greatly concerned with attacks against
Japanese sea communications and with
attritions against Japanese naval and
air forces and merchant shipping.
The third and decisive phase OF the
war will commence when positions have
been gained from which decisive at
tacks may be launched against Japan,
probably when additional forces are
available from the European theater of
operations and when the reopening of
the sea communications with China
enables that country to be reconstructed
and rearmed.
Now, II you will look at map of the
Far East you will see that the irregular
quadrilateral Shanghai, Hong Kong,
Formosa and Luzon-is an objective of
tremendous strategic Importance. Once
this quadrilateral is controlled by our
naval and air forces, the Japanese cam
not transport the iron, oil. tin and rub
Der Of the Netherlands Indies and
Malaga to feed Japanese industries, nor
can they send reinforcements and sup
plies to their garrisons in these areas
or in South China itself What Is per-
haps even more important, we shall be
able to send our merchant conveys into
Canton and Hong Kong. providing good
seaports and good rail communications
with the interior of China.
This is the only really effective way
by which we can bring help to China
and establish our air power in mainland
bases from which the destruction of the
industrial centers of Japan can be som-
menced. For example, a single big
tanker can discharge more gasoline
at Hong Kong than can be hauled over
the Burma road into China in a month.
Does all this seem a far cry from the
Gilbert Islands? Perhaps it does. Yet
it is precisely because Of the existence
Of these Japanese outpost positions in
the Central Pacific that our naval forces
Japanese communications before this
in order to advance toward the Philip
pines and Formosa. We must clear
the japanese air and naval power out
Of these covering islands, the Gilberts,
Marshalls. Carolines and Marianas. We
must take those islands over to be
used for our own forces. AS long as
We were strong enough TO attack only
from one direction, from the Solomons
and New Guinea toward Rabaul and
Truk, the japanese could concentrate
their defense too. Now We are attack
ing from two directions and it is not at
all certain that the Japanese are strong
enough to resist us effectively in both
sectors. If that proves to be the case
indeed, then our offensives will proceed
at an accelerated rate from island DO
sition to island position until the way
lies clear before us for a great effort
to re-establisn our power in the Philip
pines with a chain of island bases
behind to facilitate that effort.
All of which bears on the continual
suggestions from our naval spokesman
that the japanese may risk their main
battle fleet in last great attempt to
stop us If their land-based air power
can no longer back up their defensive
shield Of island bases. Then at some
point in the process Of the reduction
Of those bases they must put in their
last reserve. their feet, or lose the war
by default.
(Copyrisht 1nA2 N " rr,hun. yr.N