Evening star., 1943-07-09
Allies Believed Ready
For Kill in SoIomons
By Maj. George Fielding EliQt.

There are three points to be made with
regard to the amphibious operations in
and around the New Georgia group Of the,
Central Solomons. First, we possess def
mite air and naval superiority in this
area. This Is indicated not only by the
successful landings we have accomplished
and by our scores against Japanese air.
craft and surface vessels, but also by the
fact that the Japanese constantly are
resorting to night operations, which is
the recourse of the weaker side.
This is because air superiority does not
count for SO much at night, and as far
as surface naval operations are con-
cerned, night action is heavily weighted
by the factor of chance. which the
weaker side seeks and the stronger side
desires to avoid.
Second, the object of the Japanese
naval incursion of the Kula Gulf was
probably to land reinforcements and
supplies on New Georgia in order to pro-
long the resistance of their garrison at
Munda
Despite the defeat OF their naval task
force, this object may have been partly
accomplished. This is suggested by our
bombing of Enogai Inlet on the eastern
shore of the gulf. We would not waste
bombs in an area where there were no
Japanese and it is at least possible that
what our bombers were doing was seeking
to destroy troops and supplies which the
Japanese had succeeded in putting
ashore.
The japanese purpose in so doing
would be to gain time, or at any rate to
make our conquest of Munda cost lis as
heavily as possible. This Is consistent
with japanese policy in all these amphib-
ious operations. Wherever they can do
so, they try to reinforce even hopelessly
isolated garrison, and they never quit
trying as long as there is the slightest
possibility of success. This policy has
cost them very heavily in the past and
apparently has done so again.
The third point to be noted is that
despite the probability the Japanese did
get certain number of men and supplies
ashore at Enogai. We are now in posi-
tion to exploit our air and naval supe-
riority by further landings on New
Georgia, which seem likely to give us
land superiority on that island, and may
make the japanese tenure of Munda a
short one.
1t should be remembered, however,
that New Georgia is mountainous and
heavily wooded island, with thick jungle
Incredibly thick jungle as compared to
anything to which most of us are accus-
tomed-growing right down to the edge
of the beach and even out into the water
in some areas Even with superior num-
bers it will take us a certain length of
time to close in on Munda. which we are
now able to do from two directions-east
and northwest.
Perhaps the best evidence of our sue
cess in the naval action on the morning
of July is the fact that we now have
landed at Rice Harbor on the eastern
shore of Kula Gulf which certainly
indicates that we have command of the
adjacent waters.
From here we can advance overland
to Munda, which lies about Is miles
away. We have effected another landing
east Of Munda, apparently inside or just
at the eastern entrance of the inclosed
body of water known as the Roviana
Lagoon. Munda is near the western end
of this lagoon, where the approaches are
commanded by our artillery on Rendova
Island.
AS to the actual score in the Battle Of
the Kula Gulf, there appears as yet to
be some uncertainty. Reading the COM
muniQues carefully, it is to be noted that
many of the japanese ships are reported
as having been sunk or set af1re" A
ship set afire in a night action is not
necessarily lost; for example very spec
tacular fires can occur aboard destroyer
or light cruiser from ammunition
stacked on deck in the vicinity OF the
gun positions. while the ship herself
sustains no crippling damage to hull or
machinery
Moreover, in a night action 1t Is ex-
tremely difficult to tell the difference
between a light cruiser and one of the
big destroyers now in use both in the
japanese and American Navies.
We know that we have had a success
which may amount to considerable VIC
tory, and which evidently has left us in
possession of the disputed waters, from
which the enemy has, at least for the
moment, retired. We do not know what
the exact score is as far as losses at sea
are concerned; there is every reason to
believe that the enemys losses have been
heavier than ours, but we must await
further and more detailed advices before
we can be sure of the exact type and
number of the ships of the Imperial jap
anese Navy which, in this action, have
gone to join the many others already
rusting in the ooze at the bottom of the
Pacific Ocean
(Copyrsht 1943, New York Tribune Incl