Evening star., 1943-11-21


Office, the United States State Depart
ment and the French political organ
izations in North Africa.
Certainly, in the smoothness of its
operation and in the results attained,
the plan of the Sicilian campaign in
dicates that the United Nations have
arrived at degree of proficiency in
joint planning not previously reached
in any military operations of compara-
BILE magnitude by any association Of
powers at any previous time in military
history. This proficiency in joint plan
ming augurS well for future operations
in the assault on the Axis fortress in
Europe as well as in the prosecution Of
the war In any part of the globe.
Weather Factor Vital.
In planning amphibious operations
certain definite assumptions in regard
to meteorological conditions must be
made far in advance of the scheduled
day and hour of the actual assault.
In making weather assumptions for
the Sicilian campaign average condi-
tions of wind and surf for the area and
time of the year indicated that there was
an almost 100 per cent chance of encoun-
tering ideal weather conditions But
despite favorable long-range weather
forecasts and the absence of alarming
factors in the short-range forecasts, the
element of weather began to loom very
large in the picture early on July 9.
This was totally unxpected situation
which was alarming to say the least.
The sea and surf resulting from near
gale conditions simply and finally pre-
cluded all possibility of launching boats
from transports or attempting to ap-
proach the landing beaches through
the heavy surf. The orders for the as
suit could not, at this late hour, be
Cancelled. They could only be modified.
Had the perverse weather conditions
continued for few more hours it would
have been necessary to abandon all hope
of surprise and make the assault in day.
light. The weather had given us all a
bad scare, but the net result was
delay of one hour in the scheduled
landing time.
The state Of the weather up to late
afternoon undoubtedly brought with 1t
certain compensating advantages. The
Axis high command most certainly de-
the beaches of Sicily on the night Of
July 9-10 was told of German officer
who was deceived by the storm He re-
tired early after looking over the stormy
seas, sure that no invasion would be at
tempted that night. He was awakened
few hours later by the persuasive dig
of As and an American soldier telling
him to rise and shine-his dream was
over.
During the invasion of French Moroc-
co and OF Sicily I was in command of a
large combatant vessel of one of the
latest types. The duty assigned to my
ship during the five days Immediately
preceding the invasion of Sicily was
that of acting in conjunction with other
United States naval units, to interpose
beWeen various troop conveys proceed
ing eastward along the coast of North
Africa and the Italian, Sandman and
Sicllian ports from which the enemy
might launch attacks with combatant
ships. Our unit was not strong enough
to cope with an enemy force of battle
ships, cruisers and destroyers but it did
have sufficient speed and gunpower to
intercept and destroy an attack by
cruisers and destroyers or by E-boats.
Fail to See Lighted Ships.
AS we drew near the Sicilian coast on
the night of July 9, we heard the drone
of airplane engines on our starboard
beam. This, we knew, was the first wave
or Allied transport planes ferrying para
troopers to the drop points Immediately
behind the invasion beaches. Almost
Immediately we note with dismay, the
Sicilian southern beach line for length
of about two miles erupt into geysers
and Wierd patterns of tracers from anti
aircraft batteries
The passage of our transport planes
served to alert the whole area. Search
lights popped on and swept to seaward,
weaving back and forth and effectively
silhouetting hundreds of ships. 1t is
a peculiar failing of searchlights, how
ever, that they have effective light
penetration far beyond the visual range
OF observers at the lights. These search
(Continued IN Pape H2 Col,1p,p A.