Evening star., 1943-12-01
The Offensive in ItuIy

The attacks now in progress
against the eastern end of the Ger
man defense line across Central
Italy bear all the earmarks of
genuine offensive. Delivered by the
veterans of the British Eighth Army,
they constitute typical Montgom-
cry operation, following the general
pattern laid down by that distin-
guished general in his famous vic
tory at Ell Alamein in Egypt a year
ago. Successive thrusts delivered
at various sectors of the battle front
are preceded by intensive artillery
bombardment and are co-ordinated
with continuous air activity directed
not only against the enemy's ad-
vance positions but also against
his lines of communication far to
the rear in order to disrupt his
supply system and hinder reserve
concentrations.
However, it may be we'll to avoid
drawing too close parallel between
the campaign in North Africa and
the one now being waged in Italy.
The entire Axis position in North
Africa was dependent upon sea-
borne communications, while in
Italy the Germans have short and
ample overland supply lines. Fur
thermore, North Africa was an al
most limitless terrain devoid of
local resources, in which flanking
maneuvers were usually possible.
The Italian campaign is being
fought on the narrowest part of
the Italian peninsula, barely ninety
miles wide from the Adriatic to the
Mediterranean. Furthermore, this
strategic bottleneck Is a mass Of
tangled mountains wherein the Ger
man defenders, ensconced in pre-
pared positions, have great natural
advantages. In most places noun
tain spurs reach almost to the sea,
while the narrow coastal strips of
loWland are biSected at frequent
intervals by swift flowing rivers
swollen at this season by heavy rains
to raging torrents. That is as tough
a Typographical combination as can
well be imagined 1t is much tougher
than Tunisia because strategically
there Is virtually no end to it. In
deed, the mountains get higher and
more forbidding to the northward,
this being the region known as the
Abruzzi, perhaps the widest and
most inaccessible part of Italy. To
be sure, these highlands are pierced
by a few good roads. However, they
all meander through valleys domi-
mated by towering heights which
must be taken before the roads
themselves can be OF any use to the
attackers.
All this should temper optimistic
forecasts Of a sweeping advance
which would end in quick capture
OF Rome, some 100 miles to the
northwestward Of Montgomerys
present front. The best hope of
compelling large-scale German re-
tirements in this region is a dis
ruption of their communications by
air activity so effective that the local
defenders will run out of supplies,
lack reinforcements, and thus be
so worn down that they cannot
maintain themselves. This appears
to be more promising development
than mere outfanking operations,
which are extremely difficult be-
cause the mountains form a sort of
spine down the center OF the pen
lnsula and cross communications
are possible only at a few points.
OF course, it is always possible
that the Allies will make large-scale
landings further up either coast,
thus outfianking the whole of the
present German position and COM
pelling a swift retreat even beyond
Rome with only rear-guard opera
tions to delay the Allied advance
from the existing fighting fronts.
The Allies presumably have large
reserves outside peninsular Italy
for such landings. However, the
German high command has un-
douotedly foreseen those possibili-
ties and has seemingly disposed
considerable forces to deal with
them. Salerno has shown the diff
Guilty of establishing new footholds
by sea-borne troops. Until such
landings actually occur it may per-
haps be wisest to envisage current
operations in their present setting
and on basis of the local situation.