Evening star., 1943-05-21
Attu-und Beyond

Attu-und Beyond
Current Navy communicates make
1t plain that the attack on Attu has
been successful. Begun only ten days
ago, it caught the enemy by surprise,
and despite bad weather which has
deprived our troops Of full-scale air
support, our ground forces, aided by
the guns of our warships offshore,
have crowded the Japanese onto the
eastern tip of the island, where they
seemingly face annihilation In the
near future.
1t Is extremely unlikely that the
Toxic high command will try to
relieve its hard pressed garrison.
Nothing short of large Japanese
fleet would suffice, and such an expe-
dition would be exposed to joint
attacks by our Navy and land-based
planes operating from the chain of
airf1elds we have constructed at vari-
Gus points in the Aleutians. The
battles of Midway and the Bismarck
Sea have been bitter lessons which
Toxic has doubtless taken to heart.
Our high command would probably
welcome japanese counter-move to
save Attu. That is a good reason for
assuming that it will not be made.
The success of our attack on Attu
presumably indicates similar oper-
alton against Kiska. That island,
lying 180 miles east of Attu, is the
main Japanese base in the Outer
Aleutians, owing to it's relatively good
harbor. With its stronger garrison,
1t will doubtless be a harder nut to
crack, but the terrain is no tougher
and the military problem is basically
the same. There is plenty of time for
the job, because the short sub-Arctic
summer, during which landings are
feasible, has only just begun, and
spells of favorable weather can be
counted on through August. 1t Is
therefore logical to assume that, be-
fore the close of the summer season,
Japan's last Aleutian foothold will be
in our hands
From this vantage point, we may
prof1tably survey the entire Aleutian
episode. 1t was almost year ago
that a strong japanese expeditionary
force suddenly descended upon Attu
and Kiska, occupying them without
resistance, since they were unfortifed
and almost uninhabited. Japan
thereby acquired the outermost links
in our Aleutian island d-chain, thus
blocking possible American thrusts
at her similar island-chain of the
Kuriles with its base on Paramu-
shiru, just off Russian Kamchatka
peninsula and only 765 miles from
Attu. That was the defensive aspect
OF the Japanese success. It likewise
had offensive possibilities. There is
good reason to believe that Japan,
then at the height of her striking
power, meditated a general attack on
Alaska. This larger aim was foiled
by our great naval and air victory of
Midway, which occurred just at that
crucial time.
For while the japanese seemed
to be content with a defensive policy
on their Aleutian footholds. But
presently they revealed new aggres-
sive plans by commencing to build
airf1elds on both islands, which re-
peated bombings by our air arm
might hinder but could not prevent.
Those airfields, when completed,
would be a serious threat to our
installations throughout Alaska and
to our sea communications in the
North Pacific as well. A situation
was created similar to that on Quad
alcanal in the Solomons which pre-
cipated our attack there last August.
During the winter months our Navy
and Army methodically prepared for
the present campaign by construct
Ing a chain of bases out along the
Aleutians, eliminating in the fortify-
ing OF Amchitka Island, only So miles
from Kiska. The actual campaign
was launched as soon as it was cli-
matically possible. And the efficiency
with which it is being conducted
proves how well our preparations
were made.
What our high command plans to
do in the North Pacific after the
complete reconquest of the Outer
Aleutians is unpredictable. It is un-
doubtedly integrated with a larger
strategic scheme embracing the en-
tire Pacific area. And that, in turn,
involves the still larger strategy Of a
global war whose evolution can be
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