Evening star., 1943-10-28
Air Power Needed
By Allies in Italy
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

dragging on very slowly for some weeks.
The progress that has been made by
the Allies on the road to Rome could
almost, on the map, be described as neg
igible. II this campaign is to be con-
sidered by itself, it might seem that
the Germans were accomplishing their
objective, in this case, of dragging out
the war and preventing us from obtain
ing any decisive result. But the Italian
operations cannot be so considered They
are part of the general European pic
ture. The question OF what results the
Allies are getting out Of the hard fight
ing in the Italian peninsula has to be
answered, not by what is happening
now, but by what is going to happen in
the immediate future, both in Italy and
elsewhere
in southern Italy, of course, the stronger
they can make their defenses in the
north, covering the plain of Lombardy
and the passes through the Alps. Time
Is always Of value to the defender who
Is operating on interior lines; he is try
ing to make little go long way, and
his system of defense is based on shift
ing his reserves to the proper locations
after he has determined what the enc
my Is going to do. The attackers aG-
vantage lies largely in the factor of sur
prise; having delivered his blow, he must
exploit the results before the defender
can take appropriate counter measures
1t might seem, on the face Of conditions
as they are now known, that we have
failed to do this in Italy and that the
Germans might even begin to be in a
position to deliver a crushing counter
stroke against our forces in the italian
peninsula.
But this would be superficial point
OF view 1t would not, to begin with
take into account one Of the main fac
tors OF Allied superiority -airpower. The
application of airpower to tactical stu-
ations requiring close air-ground Coop
Grafton requires a considerable system
OF bases, close behind the fighting lines.
1t was not until we had developed
such a system Of bases in Tunisia that
we were able to bring to bear the crush
Ing weight Of fire and steel which de-
stroyed the German army there. 1t was
lack OF airpower which made our early
operations at Salerno so difficult and
risky. In southern Italy today, we are
still not quite able to do everything with
our airpoWer which would be possible
II we had adequate bases The Foggia
base system has been a great help, will
be even more useful when it has been
further extended and improved. New
bases will come into existence in Corsica
IN due course, which will be of the great
est strategical Importance, and later of
tactical Importance as well. An immense
amount OF stores ammunition and fuel
has to be brought into the ports Of
south Italy in order that both our stra-
tegical and tactical air forces shall be-
gin to function with full efficiency and
at full strength This is one counter
measure which we can take as against
any German increase of strength on the
ground; and the German airforce cam
not under present conditions offset our
air power in Italy by any comparable
increase In its own strength
Another factor to be kent in mind ;c
the need for the Germans to find fresh
reserves for the Russian front. They
simply cannot afford to leave any great
number Of their best divisions locked
up in Italy beyond the Alps when they
are menaced with a real disaster in
South Russia. In war as in other hu-
man enterprises, first things must come
nrSt; the advantages which the Ger
mans might hope to gain from an in
crease of their army in Italy could not
be weighed against the disadvantages
which they might suffer in Russia if
the Russians manage to close one O.
more Of their great traps for want of
those same German divisions.
Indeed, it is this very situation which
may bring about, together with the slow
but steady increase in our air potential
the condition necessary for a new Al
lied move In Italy so long and so eagerly
expected. When two opposing generals
have each certain reserves of fighting
power in hand, and there exists some
thing like an equilibrium on the actual
battle front, the general who makes the
wisest and most timely use of his re-
serves will win. If either general COM
mlts his reserves too soon, or under the
wrong conditions, he may find them
swallowed up in inconclusive fighting,
and he will have nothing left with
which to restore the situation
Thus in Italy, presuming the Allies
have a considerable amphibious force
with which to strike at the flank and
rear of the Germans by sea, it might
prove mistake to put in this force
until 1t can be given adequate air cover
and until the German reserves have
either been absorbed, or are so reduced
that they cannot take strong counter
action. From the German point of
view, it is essential to hold reserve
power in North Italy as a counter
weight against just such an Allied move
for to concentrate their main force in
South Italy might be to risk it's encircle-
ment and loss.
Once again it must be emphasized
that all decisions in war are a matter
of weighing risk against advantage
There are no clear-cut situations sharply
etched in black and white, but rather a
series of decisions, no one of which is
made with full information, and no one
Of which carries with it any guarantee
of complete success. 1t is true enough
TO say that the most successful general
is the one who has made the fewest
mistakes; but it is also true that the
general who never makes mistakes is
likely to be one who never takes risks