Evening star., 1943-05-30
Jopon's New Empire
Won't Lost
By ODen L. Scott.


plot Japans basic weakness.
That basic weakness of the new jap
anese empire lies in its sprawling char
acter. The empire stretches across
thousands of islands that extend from
near to the arctic circle to below the
equator. The supply lines of that en-
pire are vulnerable to submarine attack,
to surface vessel attack and to air at
tack. At the same time, it is next to i'm
possible for Japan to be strong at all of
the points at which she must be strong
If she is to ward of attacks.
series of offensives against the Jap
anese does not require a slowing of the
offensive against Germany. 1t never has
been the view of American military and
naval commanders that the war on Ger
many must be held back in order to per-
NIT more action against Japan.
What this countrys military men have
Insisted upon, however, is offensive op-
erations in both wars at the earliest
possible moment. They have felt that
with cooperation from the British, with
their fleet in the Indian Ocean and their
forces in India, very good results could
be achieved without waiting for the Ger
mans to be defeated.
The complaint has been that the
British were doing next to nothing, on
the sea, or in the air, or on land, to
harass the Japanese flank on the Bay of
Bengal and thereby force Japan to divert
forces to that distant area so that Amer
leans could have an easier time with Of
fensives elsewhere. AS war theaters are
divided up, the British run things west
of Singapore and the Americans east of
Singapore. Americans complained that
the British showed very little enthusiasm
of kind that would force Japan to dis
perse its strength even further.
This complaint extended to the fact
that British naval forces in the Indian
Ocean were based and used in a way
that enabled the Japanese to feel secure
In their new conquests in the area that
the British dominated. This feeling of
security, in turn, enabled Japan to con-
centrate her naval and air power at key
points confronting the Americans, max
ing more difficult the start of offensives
on our part.
1t is probable that these and other
complaints on the part of American mill
tary men gradually will be removed as
result of decisions now taken.
The big new point is that the French
fleet, which had been a worry to the
British in the Mediterranean, now is
either destroyed or immobilized Also,
the Italian Navy which has been a
threat, even though its performance has
been nothing to get excited about, is ex-
pected soon to be out of action. These
developments will relieve the British
Navy of some of its worries and will per-
NIT realignment of naval forces.
A British force of battleships, aircraft
carriers and cruisers, plus submarines,
operating in the Bay of Bengal and
based on Ceylon, can spell trouble of the
most serious sort for the japanese. To
avoid a naval threat to her supply line to
Burma, and to avoid even threat to her
new hold on Singapore, Japan then
would be forced to divert naval and air
forces from other points in her far
flung empire.
ouG IL Odpdll O1VCl Ca OIL chg Cll AloAA AASA
other bases, in order to bolster her de-
fenses against a British threat to her
southernmost flank, then the American
Navy with its own offensive plans, can
have an easier time of it. BY co-ordinat-
ing their operations against Japan the
British and Americans can obtain results
that are not possible on the basis Of the
Ji.,iJo hot hov r,rouoi1pS
1t Is true that many American military
leaders have been impatient with the
British methods and attitudes as they
relate to the war in the Pacific.
The British have inclined to slow mo-
ton. More than a year after the loss of
their Far Eastern possessions, the most
that they could do was to stage a rather
feeble raid into Burma which appears
to have ended disastrously in another
defeat and retirement. Instead of build
ing new bases and strengthening old
bases for air and naval action against
the Japanese in the Bay of Bengal the
British went ahead building mass army
of Indians that lacks arms and training.
1t is a mystery to American military men
where an army OF 100000 Indian troops
can ever fight.
Instead, the job in the Pacific is one
for highly trained task forces and for
equally well-trained amphibious expedi-
tions. 1t is one, too, of raids that will
wear down the none-too-great Japanese
strength.
American commanders have felt that
too much attention may have been de-
voted to building up supplies at points in
the world where they would not soon be
used, while neglecting the concentration
of supplies that would be needed for
offensive operations in the Pacific. The
whole problem, basically, has been one of
dividing up merchant ships and in this
division the British were given guaran-
tees that resulted in some sighting OF
the American needs in the war on Japan.
1t is presumed that many of the irrita-
tions now have been removed and that
war developments are such that a CO.
ordinated operation in the Pacific can be
set up before many months. Japan's days
OF relative security in her new empire
seems to be very definitely numbered.
Indictment