The Waterbury Democrat., 1943-03-03

and Cuba itself, to recommend
armed intervention by the Navy and
Marine Corps to restore order,
Welles firmly recommended against
any such step. Not only did the
United States refuse to intervene,
even after an American had been
killed In Havana, but 1t eventually
abrogated the "Platt Amendment"
which specifically gave 1t the right
TO do so.
Hull and Welles, working with
Latin American statesmen at the
conferences at Montevideo u933),
Buenos Aires 1880, Lima 1889,
Panama 1880, Havana (l940), Rio
de Janeiro u942), evolved and do.
veloped the doctrine Of CONT
mental solidarity" Although II has
not proved 100 per cent effective In
this war, It has proven more sue.
cessful than anybody foresaw 10
years ago.
AS evidence of Its desire for closer
commercial ties with the other
American Republics, the United
States entered into reciprocal trade
treaties with IS OF them. Stabiliza-
ton agreements and export-import
bank credits In varying amounts
were negotiated with most Of them.
The United States around 1885.
SO was swept by o wave Of anti-war
sentiment, and Of propaganda
against the "munition makers" Dis
armament still was In vogue, al
thouh Hitler secretly had started
rearming Germany. A Senatorial
investigating committee headed by
Gerald p. Nye, Republican. Of North
Dakota, with much publicity In.
vestigated the Morgans, Du Points
and others who helped finance and
arm the Allies In the 19l4.l8 war.
The committees activities did much
to create the feeling that II arma.
ment profits were reduced the dam
ger Of war would be lessened
Strlved for Peace
The Administration also was
hopeful of arousing sufficient world
wide sentiment to avert danger Of
war. Right after his electoral VIC
tory over Governor Alfred M. Lam
don, Republican, of Kansas, in the
November, 1885, elections. Roose-
welt played prominent part In the
Conference for the Maintenance
and Consolidation of Peace. called
by the late President Augustin p.
Justo of Argentina.
Largely through the influence Of
Secretary Hull. the then Argentine
Foreign Minister Saavedra LamaS
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
He had been instrumental In ar
ranging a peace treaty between Ar
gentina and Brazil, to which many
other nations later adhered.
Soon the horizon In Europe and
Africa gave advance indications Of
the great war that was to come.
Italy's aggression In Ethiopia was
followed by military uprising In
Spanish cities and Spanish Mo-
rocco, which eventually triumphed
with the military aid of Italy and
Germany. In both cases the United
States foreign policy paralleled that
of the British Foreign once, which
was inclined to maintain hand
of. Japan by then had completed
consolidation Of Manchuria and its
military was busy in North China.
That Mr.. Roosevelt clearly saw
The war clouds was evident when in
his famous Chicago speech In 1897
he referred to the necessity o. put
ting the aggressors In quarantine.
Internally, however, this address
had the effect of strengthening the
'isolationists," as 1t simply in
creased their determination to avoid
involvement In the approaching
conflict. This sentiment was re-
Elected by the then United States
Ambassador to England, Joseph p.
Kennedy. who made 1t plain that
the people Of this country were
largely disillusioned with their par
tlcipatiOn In the World War OF 1914.
10 and would be Inclined to stay
on the sidellnes II new war de"
veloped.
Delay N Aiming
The United States did little 70
strengthen It's military forces dess
pite the tenss situation prevailing
abroad. The Army, In proportion
10 the population OF the country.
was one OF the smallest IN the
world, II numbered only i7e.i0l In
1887, and In 1899 II had risen only
10 igT, $3.50. Lessons OF the German
seizure of Austria and the Munich
crisis WeIe lost so far as preparing
the United States armed forces was
concerned. Real expansion OF the
Army did not get started until after
the fall OF France 10 May-June'
1910.
Only when Britain itself was Q
victim Of the "blltz' and threatened
with German Invasion did the
United states people really begin
10 wake No 70 International dam
gers "Isolatl0nlst" forces still were
strong ard ED 10 Britain was Tor Q
long time confined 10 measures
abort Of war" Eventually this was
expanded with adoption Of the
end.leasc" system and With Unit
cd States naval participation ~
conveys 10 reduce the toll submas
rlnes were taking on war goods.
OCCUPATION Of Iceland, the Destroy
Ars.f0r bases deal were complement
tAry measures. This activity IN the
Atlantic resulted IN o slight de-
crease OF United States naval
strength In the Pacific. Sin ultane-