Evening star., 1943-06-08
Allied Invasion
Problem in 7iminq
Major Eliot Sees Need
To Coordinate Any Move
With Russiun Action

To Coordinate Any Move
With Russiun Action
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
In yesterdays article, I pointed out the
four possible courses of action which are
open to the Germans on the Russian
front this year-O withdraw to shorter
front with shorter lines of communica-
tion; ca stand fast in present positions
and await Russian attack; 90 limited
offensive, probably on the northern sector
directed toward Leningrad; a. an an-out
offensive, probably on the central sector
directed behind Moscow.
What happens on the Russian front
has very direct and immediate bear
ing on what may happen elsewhere in
Europe. 1t has bearing on Anglo
American plans for invasion and on
German plans to meet that invasion.
AS long. as the Germans are not sure
where the invasion is coming or in what
force, they will be torn between the
desire to gain some success on the Rus
which they may hope to be able to dis
engage some of the forces now tied up
there) and a hesitancy to become too
deeply involved in Russia at all because
they do not know how hard they are
going to be hit elsewhere.
Out Of such uncertainties have, in past
wars as In this one, arisen some very
costly strategical errors Commanders
and stats in this frame of mind may
strike too soon, before they have made
adequate preparations, and be soundly
beaten, or they may wait too long and
lose the opportunity of striking at ALL
being forced to conform to the enemy's
action and therefore to the enemy's will
From the point Of view of the Ameri-
can and British combined chiefs of staff,
the ideal plan might seem to be to wait
until the Germans are tangled thor
oughly with the Russians and the major
part of the German reserves drawn to the
eastern front. But II this were to bring
about Russian defeat, it would not do
the cause of the United Nations as a
whole much good, so that as a practical
matter the British and Americans can't
wait too long either.
Anglo-American strategy in Europe
this year takes as its major premise the
fact that the Russians are making our
main effort in Europe and that all else
that we do must conform to the principle
that in any given theater all subsidiary
efforts must be based on and auxiliary to
the main effort.
The Germans would like to know the
Anglo-American intentions, so that they
can gauge how far they dare go in
Russia; the British and Americans would
like to see how far the Germans commit
themselves in Russia in order to choose
the time, place, character and strength
OF the attack or attacks which British
and American forces will make-always
remembering that the purpose of these
attacks is to help the Russians.
AS for the Russians, they are certainly
not going to stand around and wait for
the German attack to be launched if
they can see good chance of upsetting
1t by an offensive of their own; and If
a Russian offensive is coming, it is of the
most vital Importance that 1t should be
carefully timed and planned In co-ordi-
nation with the Anglo-American opera
tions.
For example, If the Germans are mass
ing troops for an offensive on the central
part Of the Russian front, and the Rus
slams launch a terrific drive In South
Russia, the Germans must either dis
locate their central offensive by shifting
its reserves southwark or they must let
Its flank, or they must draw troops from
their central reserve to stop the Russians
But II the Russian drive Is co-ordinated
with, let us say, an Allied offensive in
the Balkans, with the italian garrisons
and the Bulgarians calling for help and
threatening to get out of the war if they
don't get it, the Germans might find
some difficulty in employing their central
reserve in two places at once.
This is rather crude example and
perhaps somewhat overdraWn, but it
tends to illustrated the point to be made
which is, that every reserve division
and every reserve air squadron which the
Germans now possess is a division and
a squadron which they cannot replace
and which must be boarded as a miser
boards his gold until the moment when
1t Is absolutely necessary to use it. Our
whole strategy this year is to present the
German high command with more urgent
necessities than the Germans have the
resources to meet. If we can accomplish
that, something, somewhere must ulti-
mately give way.
(Copyrisht, 1913 New York Tribune, 1nc)
Going Nation
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