Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-03-26
kursk and OreI
Hold Nuzi Advance
Ma ior Eliot Believes
Germon Drive Is Halted
At Leost Until After 1hows
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

At Leost Until After Thows
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
For the moment, at any rate, the Ger
man counteroffensive in South Russia
appears to be stalled with the Russians
holding fast all along the Donets. There
are some indications that the German
efforts are diminishing, though this may
be only a pause in preparation for fresh
attacks. 1t seems slightly more likely,
however, that the Russians have sue
ceeded in stabilzing the front and that
their efforts. plus the effects OF weather
and the more extended German commu-
nications. may have now brought us to
the end of definite phase Of the South
Russian campaign.
II this is the case it may very well be
that the Germans will not be able to try
to retake Kursk at least not until after
the effect Of the spring thaWs is at an
end. Should the Germans give up the
idea OF the recapture of KurSk, an early
German withdrawal from Orel would be
among the possibilities.
The Germans have paid heavy price
to hold Orel by doing so they contrib
uted to their success at Kharkov. But
Orel is in a deep pocket, with the Rus
slams on three sides Of the town. To hold
1t. and to keep open the Orel- Bryansk
railway on which the garrison depends
has been severe strain on German
resources. This strain might continue to
be justified IL the Germans intend to
launch A new offensive to retake Kursk
and thus relieve the pressure on Orel
from the south. Orel would then cease
to be in semi-deta ched position but
would resume its place as one OF the
bastions of the old German line Bryansk-
Orel-Kursk- Kharkov.
AS long as the Germans continue to
nght hard for Orel it will suggest
strongly a German intention TO try to
retake Kursk either now. or Immediately
after the thawS have ended. On the
other hand German withdrawal from
Orel would suggest the abandonment OF
any plans involving Kursk.
All of this has direct bearing on the
plans of both sides for laree-scale often
sives later in the year. II the Germans
are thinking of making another try for
Rostov and the oil of the Caucasus. they
will need a good solid front to act as
springboard for their offensive. But this
possibility seems more remote than that
Of great Russian offensive in this gen.
eral area. 1t may be doubted whether
the Germans can hope to strike as hard
a blow as they did last year. whereas the
Russians proba bly, have considerable
reserves yet in hand As previously
remarked in these articles. the Germans
have greatly improved their defensive
strength in South Russia by re-taking
Kharkov and their recap ture Of Belgorod
makes their tenure of Kharkov more
secure. But while the Russians hold
Kursk they can still launch attacks
against Belgorod and Kharkov from the
north as we'll as from the east.
In this connection the situation around
the rail junction of Sunni. west OF Kulsk,
may be OF considerable Importance. 1t
hold sunni. The Germans were driving
in that direction even before the recap
ture of Kharkov. but they have not
claimed the recapture OF Sunni and the
place has not been mentioned in the
Russian communicates. Sunni has rather
round bout rail connection with Kursk
and it is proba BILE that the Russians will
find dficulty in maintaining themselves
there unless they can advance westward
to Belopole. and thus consolidate their
positions by gaining another and more
direct rail line.
1t seems quite likely either that the
Russians may have to retire from this
whole Sunni salient Tor may have already
retired from it, or else that they will
make early efforts to consolidate it and
prepare 1t as a jumping off place for
new offensive tperhaps in the late
spring. designed to force the Germans
out of Belgorod and Kharkov once more.
Should that happen the Germans
would be right back face to face with
from the whole Donets area or facing the
risk Of having all their troops in that
area cut Off
The crux of the matter is that Bel9orod
and Kharkov are of use to the Germans
only as shields to the flank OF their
Donets salient. These fortresses them
selves are no more than delaying posi-
tons as long as the Russians have supe-
riority in striking force and as long as
the two fortresses do not form part of
solidly connected defensive system. While
Kursk is in Russian hands. while Orel
is partially developed, while Russian
troops remain in the sunni area. the sit
uation continues fluid and the Germans
have not achieved that strategcal secu-
rity which they seek-a security which
will enable them at will to go on the
strict defensive in South Russia and
disengsge troops from that front for
other purposes.
(Copyright, a43, N Y. Tribune, Inc)
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