The people's voice. [volume] (Helena, Mont.) 1939-1969, 1943-06-04

ing 1912 was higher than in 1941 ant
only SO less than during the 1885
1889 period of surplus farm labor
But unless we convert from non-es
sential crops, about 80 per cent OF
three billion of the estimated man
hours spent in agriculture in 1943 lex
Guiding livestock) will be wasted on
cotton and tobacco.
The Farm labor freeze proposed in
the Bankhead and Fulmer bills (S.729
and HR 1929 would tie these workers
to useless crops. Worse, it would
force war industry areas to make up
the deficit in manpower for the armed
forces caused by exempting these
workers from the draft This would
obviously result in serious manpower
shortages in war industry or in a fail
ure to meet the manpower goals of
the armed services.
| Such legislation would also tie farm
ers and farm workers to below sub
sistence wages, resulting in further
loss of effective manpower through
malnutrition, sub-standard health con-
ditions, etc.
The proposed farm manpower freeze
is product of the refusal to convert
from non-essential to war crops. I'm
less corrected by planned conversion,
the condition will grow continually
worse.
Small Farmers
The nation possesses another man.
power resource that is neglected in
the small farmer" some one million
of whom are not now in war food pro-
duction. The attitude of congress,
under the drive of the farm bloc lead
ers, has so far effectively kept these
potential war farmers out of war
work, by strangling Farm Security
Administration aid and denying them
other credit and production aids.
The small farmers are particularly
able to contribute increased produc-
tion of such crops as milk, eggs, poul-
try, pork, beef and peanuts. For ex-
ample, 100000 small farmers aided by
the FSA in 1912 accounted for 80
per cent of the increase in milk, 25
per cent of the increase in beans and
10 per cent of the increase in pork,
beef, eggs, chickens and peanuts
Similar goals are expected from the
same FSA clients in 1913, as result
of aid in the past.
Farm Machinerv
Though present supplies of farm
machinery would be ample, if fully
utilized, and although we have the
greatest supply of farm machinery in
history, we are still taking steel and
other metals needed for war materials
and putting them into new farm equip
ment.
The United States average for trac-
tor use is 493 hours per year, though
in some areas this amounts to more
than 800. Despite this failure to util-
ize available farm machinery, we in
creased production of farm machinery |
by Sc per cent between 1889 and 1912. |
Present plans are to use over one |
millions tons of steel for farm machin-
cry in 1943 while steel shortages force |
cuts in ALLEGATIONS to the armed serv-
ices ranging up to 20 per cent. Steel
to make 1000 tractors is enough to
make a destroyer. Yet, we produced
over 100000 tractors last year.
Fertilizer
Supplies of fertilizer, particularly
nitrogen, and potash, would be ade-
lhate for war food production if they
we're not wasted on non-essential
crops - again principally cotton and
tobacco.
Cotton and tobacco are now con-
,uming about 25 percent of our nitro
gen and 20 per cent of our potash.
Rather than allocating these fertiliz-
ITS to essential crops, the Department
If Agriculture is planning to use ship
,ing space to import low-grade potash
rom Chile.
Phosphates, which can be produced
n large amounts by the Tennessee
Valley Authority, are not being pro-
luced at capacity despite the fact that
ull use of phosphates can increase
production by 80 per cent
Processing Facilities
Adequate processing facilities exist,
,iven sufficient raw material = ie.,
God to prepare. For example, the
industry was ready to in
rease 1912 production by % per cent
'ver 1871. The fact that the increase ;
vas only seven per cent was due to
me simple fact-lack of raw material.
The labor supply was about the same,
s were other factors. Repair and re-
'lacement parts were not a bottle
leck; only the failure to supply in {
reased food, due once more to the {