Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-02-16
What Rostov Means

The fall of RoStov is another link
IN the chain of evidence that the
German high command is conduct
ing a planned retirement on a vast
scale which will presumably take the
Axis armies back approximately to
the line Of the River Dnieper. There
is no other rational explanation for
the German yielding of a whole series
of heavily fortified key points with
only perfunctory resistance by rear
guard units fighting delaying actions.
The rapidity of the German retire
ment at the southern end of their
battle line is shown by the fact that
the keys to RostOv's defense to the
northward Likhaya and Voroshilov-
grad, fell simultaneously within "a
hours Of the fall of Rostov itself. The
MOSCOW communicates make no claim
to heavy casualties inflicted on the
Axis troops in either dead or prison
ers. This means that the retreat is
being conducted in orderly fashion.
NOW that Rostov. the southern an
Choir OF the German line and a COM
munlcatlons center of great impor-
lance. has been so quickly yielded
1t is natural that today's news indi-
Gates that Kharkov, the central pivot
OF the Axis defense some $50 miles to
the northward, is likewise being evac-
uated. The recent fall of Kursk, the
German baStion north of Kharkov,
also without serious resistance, indi-
Gates that the German retirement
will extend to the sectors west of
Moscow and may we'll involve a re-
tirement from the stubbornly held
Rzhev-Viazma salient. Indeed, neu-
tral advices from Sweden suggest
that the German high command in
tends to evacuate most of Northern
Russia. The upShot would be a re-
tirement on the whole Eastern front
averaging between 200 and 300 miles.
Some commentators stress the
shortening of the Axis lines which
those operations would mean. Study
Of the map, however, does not fully
bear out such an Interpretation. Any
eastern front would be extensive.
The major gains from a general re-
tirement westward at this moment
would seem to be in time rather than
In space. This has been an unusually
in
ticipate that the spring thaW will
begin in Southern Russia within the
next four weeks and will reach the
Moscow region we'll before the be-
ginning of April. Once the spring
thaw sets in. ground operations on
a large scale are begged down in
sea Of mud and slush. The only
means of transportation during that
season are the railways. But the
Germans undoubtedly have changed
all the rail lines under their control
to their medium gauge and it will
take some time for the Soviet en-
gineers to change them back to the
wide Russian gauge. Assuming that
the Axis forces can make an orderly
retirement, it is difficult to see how
the Soviet armies can push across
that wide and Systematically devas-
tated belt Of territory in strength
sufficient to assail the new Axis de-
Tense line before summer The Ger
man high command would thus have
several months to reorganize and re-
inforce their troops, either to resist
further Russian attacks or to launch
a counteroffenSive Of their own.
1t is unlikely that the German
high command has defense system
along the Dnieper equal in strength
to the one they are now abandoning.
This would imply that the summer
campaign will be essentially a war
of movement, wherein mechanical
equipment and supply lines will play
| predominant roles. The Axis will be
nearer its bases: the Red Army will
| enjoy heightened morale. Those fac
tors, plus possible political considera-
tons, will strongly affect the out
| come.