Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-03-20
Enemy's Strength Held
Constantly Decreasing
Major Eliot Estimates
Allied Need for Power
In QuoIity and Quantity
BIZ Mai GPOrOe FieIdino Fl


1t may be useful to re-examine the
military manpower situation in the light
of the needs of the Army as set forth
March in the radio address of Secre-
tary of War Stimson.
AS the Secretary points out the
proper means of estimating the fighting
power Of an army is the number of fully
trained and equipped combat teams
that is to say divisions--which that
army can put in the field Mere num-
bers of men have very little meaning in
this respect.
The Secretary states that in Europe
Germany has available about 300 di-
visions; Italy, 80, and the satellite states
Finland Rumania. Hungary, Bulgaria
and Croatia about 80 more This
makes the formidable total of 400 di-
visions
An optimistic revision of these figures
which the Secretary admits to be APP
proximate, might suggest that German
losses in Russia have reduced the Ger
man divisions to $50, that the satellite
armies have been so badly broken up in
the Russian campaign that not more
than so divisions will be available from
this source, and these largely Finnish
and Bulgarian divisions, whose continued
availability for Axis purposes is doubt
full, and that Italy has had such heavy
losses in Africa that her present total
Is more like 70 than 80 divisions for
European purposes. Even so, 1t would
seem that the Axis can count on some
400 divisions for the defense of the
Fortress Of Europe.
Against these. the Russians can pro-
vide and supply on their European front
probably 225 to $50 divisions. In the
British Isles, Africa and the Near East,
the British can put from so to rs di-
visions in the field either now or within
the near future. To these may be added
another Is divisions for the new French
Army and the Polish Army. This is a
total Of 300 to $50 divisions.
Mr.. Stimson points out that present
plans call for an American Army of per-
haps 100 combat divisions. 1t is obvious
that even If the bulk of this army is sent
to the European-African theater of war.
1t will just about serve us to equality with
the Axis as far as numbers of ground
troops are concerned
In the Far East, the Secretary esti-
mates the Japanese strength at IS d.
visions. OF these I think it is fair to
say that at least Is are immobilized on
the Siberian frontier, and are offset by
at least an equal and probably superior
number Of Russian divisions. a condi-
ton Of affairs which will continue to
obtain even though Russia never be-
comes an actual belligerent against ia
pan. If our new army, some 20 to Is
divisions. eventually goes to the Far
Eastern theater, and If the British and
their dominions are able to supply an
equal number, We may well consider
that the Chinese will be able to make up
the remaining deficiency provided we
can get arms and munitions to them.
But neither we nor the British have as
yet achieved such strength in the Ash
attic theater and communications with
China have not yet been restored.
1t may, therefore, be asked, since it is
clear that we are not in the appreciate
future going to be able to attain any,
thing better than numerical equality
in ground forces with our enemies, upon
what foundation We rest our confident
expectations of victory.
The answer is that we shall obtain a
crushing superiority in three other WAYS.
Cd qualitative superiority on the ground,
CD both numerical and qualitative SUI
periority in the air, go command of the
sea-
These three factors are interdepend
ent. Qualitative superiority on the
ground implies, in Europe at any rate,
younger, tougher, fresher men and bet
ter and more numerous weapons; but it
also depends on our being able to keep
our sea lanes open and upon the ability
OF our air power to reduce the enemy's
ability to produce weapons and planes.
In the air, we may confidently look for
ward to two-to-one superiority in Eu-
rope in numbers of operating combat
squadrons; but again we must keep our
sea lanes open to send such a force
overseas and supply it while it is there,
and We must have the ability to protect
its bases with ground troops. and ac-
qulre new bases while depriving the
enemy of some of his Our command
OF the sea is complete on the surface
but 1t will not be true command until by
combined air, ground and naval opera
lions we have licked the U-boat.
When all this has been accomplished.
we shall find that air and naval SUI
periority will begin to work wonders in
offsetting Allied lack of complete SUI
perlority in ground troops. We shall
also flnd that the drain on the enemy's
strength represented by his police ne
cesslties in many parts of his conquered
territory becomes increasingly severe as
our pressure on the outer perimeter of
his defensive areas grows greater. In
other words. the United Nations possess
the elements necessary for a complete
ana decisive victory and can increase
their power, whereas neither in Europe
nor in Asia does the enemy possess any
prospect of increasing his power. but
must face situation in which he is less
and less able to take risks and more and
more compelled to conserve his strength,
shorten his fronts and his lines of COM
munlcatlon and conform to Allied in
initiatives.
Copyright, 1913, New York Tribune, Incl
Busis for Discussion