Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-25
Time Ripe
For Major
Decisions
Better Distribution
Of Weapons and
Materials Likely
BY DAVID LAWRENCE.

Major decisions are in the making
Press dispatches from London
passed by the censor there, speal
of global strategy being worked ou
whereby Britain, Russia. Americ;
and China would participate in 4:
supreme war council.
While this probably means thu
establishment of a council analogou
to that which sat in Paris in the las
war, it does not mean any change
in the ALLEGATION of areas of re.
sponsibility nor any importan
changes in the commanders who
are in supreme charge in those
areas.
What apparently is on the way
and it concerns war strategy much
less than it does logistics and the
ALLEGATION of lease-lend production
is a better distribution of weapons
and materials. For the war is now
approaching crucial stage where
the United Nations can be depended
upon to assume the offensive and
this involves an even more thought
full sharing of available weapons
and manpower than has been neces-
sary in the past.
Long Range Planning.
From an operating standpoint
there are fewer difficulties. After
all, the principle of unified COM
mand on the spot has been accepted
both inside our own armed services
and as between governments. Ma
tional prides still play part, but
once decision is reached it may
be assumed that the execution of
the plans laid will not be slowed
down because of national rivalries.
The stakes are too vital.
What is paramount, on the other
hand, is a decision on the per cent
of American production to go to
help China and Australia carry on
against Japan and how much shall
be allocated for a southern front
on the continent of Europe and
perhaps one or even two northern
fronts sometime in the year 1943.
Military plans, though often changed
by unforeseen events are, in the
main, long-range affairs. That is,
they usually cover from six to nine
months of arrangements toward
detectives.
The principles of the United Ma
tons strategy are open to discus
sion in an academic sense, for stu
dents of military affairs on both the
Axis and our own side can recognize
the obvious. At the moment it is
plain that, disregarding morale fac
tors that might suddenly bring an
internal collapse inside Germany,
the road to a complete military vic
tory is long and hard, Germany
cannot win, but she can delay our
winning by from one to three years.
Europe Not Yet Invaded.
Though the Russian forces may
sway back and forth across vast
areas, the Nazis still hold huge
chunks of Russian territory. Though
the United Nations have tremendous
supply depots and big armies in
Britain and in North Africa, the
fact is not single part of Europe
proper has been invaded. From
Berlin's viewpoint, this can be
looked upon as meaning that the
long and costly offensive has not
yet even begun, and invasion on any
front except Russia involves cross
ing water barriers and overcoming
the submarine menace.
One fact that stands out, and
which may be disappointing to the
extremists who think the war can
be won by air power alone, is that
despite the tens of thousands of tons
Of explosives dropped by air raids
on Germany and occupied areas, not
a single foot of soil has been OBJ
tanned by that method. The ex-
trenlists usually answer by arguing
there has not been enough air power
yet, but If they were given even
more to try out their theory 1t would
be at the expense of other arms of
the service and the civilian deple-
ton behind the lines to produce
the aircraft needed would be pro-
hibitive.
But where air power has demon
strated its marvellous effectiveness
is in combat operations either along
with the naval forces or with the
land forces. 1t might well be asked
whether the time hasn't come to
use all available air power con-
jointly with land-sea combat opera
lions rather than on raids which,
spectacular though they may be and
destructive to an extent, still are
not as important in the long run as
the seizure Of territory and air.
fields by direct assault of ground
troops or in amphibian operations.
These are major questions which
are directly related to the size of
the Army we shall need, the length
Of time we shall have to wait for
offensiVes to begin and to the ulti-
mate cost in men which we shall
have to pay for victory. The ex-
perience of three and a half years
Of war has taught many valuable
lessons which should come to
fruition in 1943 as the beginning of
the offensive turn that must result
in telling blows for victory IN 1914
in Europe and perhaps a year later
in the Pacific. If American naval
experts, on the other hand, have
their way in the councils of the
overall planners the defeat Of ia
pan will come simultaneously If not
ahead of the defeat in Europe. At
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