Evening star., 1943-10-05
Crimeun Prize

Peninsula, the last remnant of the
German bridgehead in the Caucasus,
involves directly German retention
OF the Crimea. Once in full possess
sion OF Taman, the Russians will
stand on the eastern shore of the
kerchlnSkl Strait, the narrow salt
water river, in places only two miles
wide, running out of the Sea Of Azov
into the Black Sea. The western
shore OF that strait is the CORE
spending tip Of the Crimean Pc
ninsula, which the Germans invaded
in the autumn Of l94l and have held
ever since.
The Crimea, about the size of
Maryland and shaped roughly like a
diamond, is a strategic Jewel of the
hrSt water. 1t is connected with the
Russian mainland by the narrow
lSthmus of Perekop, though the main
railroad line crosses a chain of islets
and sand pits further to the east
ward which forms a virtual second
land bridge to the peninsula. This
alternative entry is already remotely
threatened by the Russian advance
along the northern shore of the Sea
OF Azov, though the Germans are
putting up a stubborn defense to
protect this rail line, and the Red
troops are still some so miles east
OF the cauSeWay and over 100 miles
from Perekop. Still there are no
natural obstacles in the Russian
path to both objectives, taking of
which would either isolate the Ger
man garrison OF the Crimea or COM
pei evacuation. Now, the presence
OF other Russian forces on the
Kerchinski Strait will constrain the
Germans to risk more troops In the
Crlmea II 1t is to be held against
this new threat. 1t should be re-
called that, during the hard winter
Of 1912, the KerchinSki Strait froze
solid and the Russians crossed it at
several points, making fierce attacks
which were repelled with difficulty.
Their object then was to relieve the
beSleged garrison of Sevastopol, the
great fortress and naval base which
did not fall until the following June.
Those Russian winter raids across
the KerchinSki Strait were coupled
with surprise landings on the south
coast Of the Crimea under cover of
RuSSia's Black Sea fleet, which was
then based on the nearby Caucasian
harbOr of NovorosSiiSk. When that
naval base fell to the Germans in
the summer of 1912, the Russian fleet
had to retire to Batum, 800 miles to
the SouthWard, at the remoteSt cor
ner Of the Black Sea. But now that
NovOrOSSliSk is again in Russian
hands, the fleet can operate effec-
lively once more for attacks upon the
Crimea, thus raising a third source
of danger to the German occupation.
All this means that the Germans
will have to hold the Crimea in great
strength if they mean to hold it at
all. The risks are obvious but the
benefits of continued occupation are
worth taking considerable chances.
Should the Russians regain the
Crimea, including the harbor of
Sevastopol, their fleet will again
dominate the whole of the Black
could void ho actp Of
Rumania and Bulgaria, Or even land
expeditionary forces there, with in
calculable possibilities in those coun-
tries, so riddled with unrest and
hatred of the German yoke.
With so much at stake, the German
high command can be counted on to
hold the Crimea so long as it intends
to hold the line of the Dnieper in
Southern and Central Russia An
evacuation of the Crimea would be
an infallible sign that the present
stand on the Dnieper is merely a
temporary holding action designed
to cover a general retreat out of Rus
sia to the Polish and Rumanian
borderS
What happens in the Crimea is
thus Of far more than local signifi-
canoe. German strategy in Russia,
Black Sea mastery, and the balance
in the Eastern Balkans, are alike in
volved. The Crimean situation should
therefore be watched intently. 1t
will be the portent of many things
to come.