Evening star., 1943-10-08
Knockout Blow Seen
As Channel Operation
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

with the Germans fighting delaying
action to cover their real defense line
in the north, and as the scale of Ger
man defense against Allied air attack
obviously rises, 1t is perhaps an appropri-
ate moment to look at the war in Europe
as a whole.
We have been fed altogether too many
exaggerated headlines. Take the Russian
operations as an example. 1t was per-
fectly clear from the very beginning of
the German push for Kursk, that this
year in Russia the Germans must either
re-establish their old defense line or re-
tire to the Dnleper. This writer has
pointed out that fact so often as to risk
being tiresomely repetitious. Others have
done likewise. Yet the impression given
by the headlines and by some commen-
tators more anxious to be sensational
than sound, has been one of overwhelm-
ing Russian victory, steam-roller ad-
vance which would not be checked short
of Berlin
The Russians had one great oppor-
tunity for a decisive victory when Khar-
kov fell; could they then have broken
through to Poltava and the Dnieper
they might have trapped a huge section
OF the Werhmacht in the Donetz basin
Desperate German counterattacks saved
the day, as they did in the same area
last February. A somewhat similar Rus
sian opportunity came with the fall of
SmolenSk and Roslavl, but again the
Germans covered their retreat success
fully. Now the Russian attention shifts
for the moment to the north, the fall
OF Newell suggests that new German
withdrawal may be forced, perhaps a
plvotlng back of the German line to Lake
Peipus or to the Dvina; but this, again,
has been long expected
There seems good ground for the opin-
ion that the Russians are now strong
enough to push the Germans back per-
haps farther back than at present, but
that they are not strong enough to de-
liver the knockout blow to Germany this
year. and probably will not be strong
enough to do that until they have re-
built their communications in the dev-
astated area and until the German
forces on the Russian front have been
weakened by the necessity of substantial
Withdrawals to other fronts.
The italian front does not promise to
afford such diversion. At most, it may
absorb 80 German divisions. More can
hardly be supplied, even in Northern
italy. The present German force in Italy
is nearer 20 than 30 divisions. though the
proportion of armored divisions is high.
An Allied attack in the Balkans might
provide an additional diversion; the
mere threat of 1t, plus the italian de-
fection, has already done so to some ex-
tent. But the Balkan peninsula is we'll
adapted for a delaying action, and even
the approaches to the necessary landing
points in the Salonika area are not vet
conquered, nor is Turkish neutrality as
yet changed to belligerencv.
1t does not appear probable that the
knockout blow can be struck either from
Italy or the Balkans through the noun
tain wall that protects Germany on
the south. AS has been said before in
these articles, to knock Germany out
an assailant must reach the vital GEN.
tiers of the Reich in the North Euro
pean coastal plain.
Then there are the air attacks which
are doing so much to reduce German
fighting potential as whole. They are
going to increase in scale, but they are
also going to increase in cost, as the
German defenses grow stronger. pub
lie frantic with Wishful anxiety to find
cheap and quick means of winning
the war turns naturally to the air
weapon, forgetting the eternal and in
eXorable swing of the pendulum between
attack and defense. But the facts seem
to be that while the air attacks are
hurting Germany, Germany still fights
on, and there does not seem Con the
record any fair prospect that Germany
will be knocked out by the air blows.
The conclusion seems inevitable that
the knockout blow to Germany must be
delivered, when the time is ripe, by
those United Nations forces which are,
AS yet, unengaged in the European
theater-the ground forces and tactical
air forces in the British Isles. The
selection of the moment for such an
attack to begin is the principal respon-
sibility now resting on the Anglo
American high command; the selection
of the place is restricted by geographical
considerations to the coast of Western
Europe between the mouths of the
Scheldt and the Seine, by reason Of
the radius Of action of fighter aviation
essential to give the necessary air cover.
This applies, of course, to full-scale
operations intended to produce a deci-
sive result; it does not bar our prelim-
mary operations of limited objective,
such as landing in Brittany or Nor
way or the south of France
But to those who are impatient for
the decisive stroke to be delivered, it
may be well to point out that nothing
could be worse than to have the blow
delivered prematurely, and to have it
result in a bloody repulse. We have
only to reflect on the bad effect pro-
duced by the small-scale raid at Dieppe
to understand what might happen if
big landing were thrown back into the
sea. The time must be we'll chosen and
those whose responsibility it is to choose
that time have shown, by what they
have already done, that they are quail
fed to choose well and truly.
(Copyrght, 1913, by New York Tribune, Inc)