Evening star., 1943-05-26
Unity Regarded Key
To Pacific Victory
Major Eliot Sees Operations
At Attu Revealing Principle
Of Success Against Jopon
By Maj. George FIELDING Eliot.

Dy w VI. CCOTQC fICEQITg ELIOL,
The operations at Attu Island as
those in the Southwest Pacific have so
often done, emphasized the basic prin-
ciple that success in modern war must
come from combination, closely CO.
ordinated combination of air and surface
power. Where the theater of operations
is partly maritime, the command of the
sea is just as important as the ability
to defeat the enemy on land, but neither
sea nor land victory can be hoped for
without air superiority. On the other
hand, the air enthusiasts do not always
stop to reflect that the results they
achieve are rarely decisive in themselves
and that they are part of the team,
vitally necessary part, it is true, but not
the whole team by any means.
Obviously, If the Japanese at this late
date are going to make an attempt to
relieve Attu, they must do so primarily
by the use of sea power, which includes
the employment of aviation in due pro-
portion. We never were able to blast
them off Attu or Kiska by the use of
air power alone, and they are not going
to be able to chase us away by the use
of air power alone. If they come to the
waters around Attu with naval strength
sufficient to establish japanese command
OF those waters Gncluding command of
the air above them then we shall be
out OF luck, for the time being but there
Is no certainty as yet that the Japanese
are prepared to do that, though they
may yet try it. The appearance of two
motored bombers in an area so far from
any main Japanese base suggests, though
1t does not necessarily prove. the pres
ence Of an aircraft carrier in the vicinity;
and where there are aircraft carriers
there are generally other naval vessels,
for carriers are too valuable to be risked
alone so far from home.
In the Southwest Pacific, we have seen
again and again that surface control is
the finally decisive factor. The failure
of all the various Japanese efforts to re-
gain Guadalcanal was, in the last analy-
sis, failure to re-establish their COM
mand of the waters around that island.
1t is, of course, entirely true that our
land-based aircraft had great deal to
do with each OF these failures, but so
also did our surface craft, and so did the
marines and troops who were protecting
the bases from which these air and naval
craft were operating. 1t is not by one
weapon alone, but by the wisely-co-
ordinated use of all available weapons,
each in It's proper proportion and each
for its proper purpose, that the battles
Of today are to be won. 1t always has
been so; the fact that the process is more
complicated in these days of three-di
mensional warfare should not lead us
into q departure from sound principle.
Right now, the japanese seem to be
preparing some sort of offensive in New
Guinea. Their preparations there may,
of course, be defensive in purpose, may
be intended to meet a coming United
Nations blow rather than to deliver
blow, but in any case their character is
interesting.
They appear to depend very largely on
string of air bases along the north
coast Of New Guinea. leading from
Celebes and Ambo right down to Sala-
maua and Lac, with strong support from
the japanese positions on New Britain
and New Ireland, and with outposts in
the Western Solomons. The string of
bases along the New Guinea coast sup
ports the whole network of bases in these
outlying areas, both by permitting the
rapid transfer of aircraft to them, and
also by giving protection to coastal con-
voys which creep along from harbor to
harbor. The japanese are using many
their men and supplies. When one is
sunk by our patroling aircraft the net
loss is not nearly as great as when an
ooean-going steamer is sunk.
On this system of supply, also, the
Japanese armies in New Guinea and the
adjacent islands are largely dependent.
1t all suggests that the Japanese are
aware fully Of our growing naval strength
in the Pacific and are building against
the day when they may be unable to
supply their outposts directly by means
Of ocean conveys; but it suggests even
more strongly that the japanese may be
preparing to take some definite action
to prevent such state of affairs from
causing them too serious embarrassment
by improving their situation in this gen.
eral area while they have time to do it,
If they were able to build up q strong
enough land-and-air power to wrest from
us the whole of Papua, including Port
Moresby, they would be in much better
position to hold their lines of defense in
the Southwest Pacific than they are at
present.
II, on the other hand, they cannot find
a remedy for the defects in their air
strength, and if the command of the sea
gradually passes into our hands, as we'll,
with our air strength increasing. we shall
presently be able to drive them back from
all their positions in Eastern New Guinea
and the nearby islands. This would offer
so direct and immediate threat to those
sea-borne lines of communication on
which all Japanese military enterprises
depend, that the prospect must be re-
garded with the gravest anxiety at
Toxic. But it is to be noted that the
result they fear will be achieved. not
When we are able to raid Rabaul and
Salamua from the air, for we are doing
that now, but when we are able to come
there under an unbeatable air umbrella
With an unbeatable fleet, protecting q
convoy OF transports which can land
troops and take possession of those bases
and turn them to o,,r oun ,,co r,h;1o