Evening star., 1943-07-02

air bombing. Too much reliance is
being placed already by the general
public on the idea that this war can
@ won cheaply and without any
large-scale ground action involving
heavy casualties.
Sooner or later it will become ap-
parent that air power cannot do the
lob alone and that victories such as
occurred in the surrender of the
email italian islands in the Mediter-
sanean are the exception rather
chan the rule.
The United States will use air
power to reduce the resistance of the
enemy and to make easier the land
tngs that must be made, but the
seizure Of Attu was and eventually
the conquest of Kiska will be the
result Of operations by land and
sea forces helped by air reconnais-
sance and attack.
No Final Punch From Air.
The American forces have ter
rife job ahead Of them in the Pa
cific. The taking OF important air
bases cannot be accomplished by air
bombing alone and. while there are
cir enthusiasts in the armed forces,
they do not 60 to the extreme OF
believing the final punch can be
delivered from the air-they expect
ground forces to move in at some
stage in the battle for territory.
1t is only fair to say that most OF
the experienced air commanders
have never claimed that the war
could be won by air power alone,
but some of them have at times
allowed their enthusiasm to lead
them to predictions Of what can be
done by air power which some of
the veterans in ground warfare do
not accept. Thus the "softening
up" of Europe for invasion is now
conceded by ground men, too. as
developing along very satisfactory
lines, but it is not admitted that
the large-scale land offensives can
be crossed of as superfluous.
Prime Minister Churchill's refer
ence in his speech to the fact that
an invasion will come before the
autumn leaves are turned" may
have been made to throw the Nazis
of the scent, but it would not be at
all surprising if no invasion die
occur before autumn.
Time Required.
For one thing, air power must
have reasonable time in which to
pound the bases and ports where
landings must be made. Also, it is
desirable to keep the enemy's forces
dispersed this summer so as to per-
init the Russians to strengthen their
positions in time for the certain
winter offensives at which the Rus
slams have proved themselves so
effective these last two winters.
One of the unfortunate effects of
the constant iteration Of the idea
that air power can win the war is
the belief of many people that the
size of our Army can either be l!c]d
down or materially reduced. thus
affecting the flow Of men into train
ing under the selective service law.
With the improvement in shipping
due to the effective campaign We
sre waging against the U-boats, the
opportunity to transport more man.
power overseas is here. The Army
would like to strengthen and REIN
force our forces overseas so that the
war can be won by decisive action
next year anyway. The military men
on our side are impatient to get
ahead with the war. ard they do
not relish too long delay while
waiting for air power to bring about
the hoped-for internal collapse in
Germany.
Quick Follow Through.
II the air war does bring a COL
lapse in Italy, 1t no doubt will mean
that invasion by large bodies OF
troops can be risked sooner in vari-
Gus parts of Southern Europe. but
the natural impulse of the ground
force man is to urge that air bonn
bardments be followed up promptly
with ground action SO that the en-
emy's opportunity to reconstruct air
bases and increase anti-aircraft
protection will be impaired. Though
the headlines tell of the constant
bombardment of German cities In
the Ruhr, it is also true that Ger
many is concentrating her air forces
and strengthening her defenses.
II the United Nations can strike
hard at several points on the Euro
pean continent at the same time,
the Allied troops may derive a
greater benefit from the air UNI
hrella that will be needed to sup
- neR xue Hnk - HR 1H A0y i