The Key West citizen. [volume] (Key West, Fla.) 1879-current, 1943-02-05
By HERBERT HOOVER
Written fer The Associated Press

Wf1tIen 1-r ne ASSSC&dISo FESS>
The first principle in organiza-
ticn Of the home front distilled
by al nations from the last war
is that civilian activities must be
directed by single-headed respon-
Sible administrators. The second
principle is that all functions and
authority in respect to a particu-
lar activity must be concentrat-
ed into TIE hands Of che admin
ist.ato We can no more ad-
mir te~ civilian activities in war
18th committees, boards or com
niecicns than we can direct 4
kattlo with committee. And we
car no more have divided auth
olitT over one function than we
car have independent generals in
&C .rnand e q battle.
Vt it was 10 months after we
started large preparedness, be-
fore munitions was given a sin
gle head; it was over two years
before Gil. food, rubber and man.
power were given single respon-
sible administrators. There are
still important executive func-
tons unGc- committee control
Ar 81 the administrators APP
rcintcG, none CT them have full
central in their field
Rec; mmends Wer Council
The third principle is that the
head administrators of such ma
jo f.cups should comprise a war
c0uac.i citing directly with tha
President. Here alone the gen.
eral ecenenic and civilian policies
Sh5ulj be determined, the con-
fiiet: and overl2ps planned CT
with the President present as the
final umpire. .. -.....-.~...-- %. ..-.
There WGs a war council or d
war cabinet in every principal
ne liz I in the last war There is
orc il every principal nation in
tx war excect in the United
States.
There are other principles as
to Cooperation with the public
and the trades, the methods OF
pIice-tixing, removal of labor,
restraints on production, alloca-
ton of supplies, etc, in which
hsd-won experience has been ig-
nored. That there is delay and
confusion and enormous bureau
cratic interference needs nc
proof. 1t lies all around the
landscape.
There are some policies that
SHOULD be determined at once by
a national war council. We have
twp bottlenecks; one is .InanpoW;
ertand the other Isl ships. In view
of these bottleneckS, certain homo
front pclicies suggest themselves
for immediate determination AnC
they need be related to globa
strategy itself.
For instance, to carry on {
war CT aggressive attritfof11 we
nefd give full emphasis to fight
ing planes. They can mostly
transport themselves. We will be
short of ships for another year
To transport American armies
overseas requires three times the
tonnage that is required to arm
and support the manpower of oul
Allies. We are endangering the
food supply to ourselves and oul
Allies by excessive drafts o.
manpower from agriculture.
Sees Confusion
1t is entirely possible that {
realistic revaluation of our man,
power, our bottlenecks and prior
lies in need would result in tenn
Eorary release of soldiers already
trained into producing food, ship:
and planes, or alternatively, ir
the import of Mexican labor fol
our farms and the lengthening O
the work week in our shops.
A realistic revaluation of oul
whole economic home front Woulc
reinforce some. conclusions as K
military strategy which / sugges
in bny next article.
We must admit that so far on
spiritual front in this war is no
as united as it was in the last war
The weakness today is not com
..I..--.--x- -. o,oo4I,,, Tl,oro -