Evening star., 1943-08-13
Air Power Held Futile
To Win War in Russiu
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

The trouble with much of our thinking
on the subject of how to win the war in
Europe is that it is out of focus. We
solemnly discuss whether Germany can
be defeated by air power alone, for ex-
ample, without ever taking into consid
Grafton the fact that Anglo American
air power would never have been able to
make as much headway as it has If the
Germans had been free to devote their
of having about two-thirds of their total
resources tied up in maintaining their
Russian front
We must keep constantly in mind that
the Russian front is the main front in
Europe, that the Russians are making
the main United Nations effort against
the Germans, and that sound military
Anglo-American air power and amphibi-
GUS power be directed toward aiding the
main effort first of all, as secondary
operations must always do if they are
worth their cost. Unless this is so, such
secondary operations are almost always
a violation of the basic principle of
economy of force.
Now, whatever air power may be able
to do in the west, it is perfectly evident
that air power is not going to win the
war in the east. In the east, the deci-
sion will be taken on the ground, by land
forces aided by air support.
The Russians have not been doing
much strategic bombing, indeed are not
equipped for 1t on large scale The
Russian high command is, of course, per-
fectly aware that Anglo-American air
power is cutting down the total German
war potential, and thus reducing the
ability of the Germans to fight the Rus
slams In any way.
They are, likewise, aware that these
operations have compelled the Germans
to concentrate the bulk of the German
fighter force in the west, which gives the
strong Russian tactical air force a great
deal more freedom of action, and re-
stricts the Germans in bombing Rus
sian positions because of lack of fighter
protection for the German bombers.
All this is very good, from the Russian
viewpoint. If the Russians were going
to continue to be on the defensive. if
they were to be no more than the anvil,
upon which the Anglo-American ham
mer was to beat the Germans to pulp
they would doubtless be quite satisfied
with the prospect of increased air attacks
rather than any other form of attack.
:. But the Russians are on the offensive
1t is ground offensive in which ground
troops will be the decisive element. 1t
is also very promising offensive, which
the Germans have got to do something
about and do quickly, or else give up
lot Of Russian territory and resources
which will be of immense value to the
Russians in the further prosecution of
the war.
The only thing the Germans can do,
as previously pointed out in these arti-
cles, is either give up territory in Russia,
execute broad and deep withdrawal, or
else put in their strategic reserve of
ground troops in large-scale counter
attack like that which saved them, in
the very nick of time, from disaster last
February.
Hence the Russian view is, and very
properly, that the greatest contribution
which their Anglo American Allies now
can make to the prosecution of the war
IN Europe, Is to tie up that German
strategic reserve. Air attacks will not do
that. Air attacks engage only the enemy's
fighter forces, and antiaircraft and air
raid precaution forces
They leave his ground forces free to
act wherever needed, except and until
they so impair his whole war potential
as to paralyze him altogether. And the
most ardent advocate of air power hardly
Will claim that such complete paralysis
can be brought about by any air attacks
we are capable OF delivering, in time to
prevent German counterattack in Rus
sia this summer.
The only way that can be done is to
compel the Germans to engage their
strategic reserve elsewhere, by Anglo
American land operations on a sufficient
scale and Of sufficient threat so that the
Germans neither will be able to check
them with local reserves, nor dare to let
them gather headway.
The Germans must be confronted not
with the present alternative of giving up
Russian territory or putting in their
strategic reserve, but with the alterna-
tive OF giving up Russian territory or
losing territory of even greater value to
them elsewhere. That is what the Rus
slams now mean by second front, and
1t Is perfectly logical thesis of war
tcopyrisht, 1943, New York Tribune, Inc)