Evening star., 1943-02-06
Prospects in Tunisiu


The present lull in Tunisia is OBJ
vlously a passing phase due chiefly
to transitory conditions such as
weather. Intensive fighting on a
large scale is Indicated in the rela-
lively near future. Both sides have
too much at stake to make it other
wise.
The Allied objective, of course, is
the expulsion of the Axis from it's
last foothold in North Africa as the
preliminary to domination of the
Mediterranean and subsequent at
tackS on AxiS-controlled Southern
Europe. BY the same token, the Axis
aim is to hold the Tunisian bridge
head across the straits of Sicily,
which prevents the realization of
those larger Allied plans. The Axis
has thus far been favored by two
outstanding factors. An exception
ally wet winter season has begged
down the Allied advance into North
ern Tunisia, while the successful re-
treat OF Rommel from Libya into
Southern Tunisia has enabled him
to join hands with the German army
under General Won Arnim which was
rushed across the Sicilian straits
simultaneously with the landings of
American and British troops in
Morocco and Algeria Those COM
bined Axis armies now stand solidly
down the entire eastern half of the
country, their united strength prob
ably totaling something like 10000
veteran troops with adequate heavy
equipment and good plane support.
Their lines of communication are
infinitely shorter than those of the
Allies, so rapid reinforcement is
possible despite losses from Allied in
reference by airplane and sub
marine. The Axis occupies the CEN
trail position, separating the British
Eighth Army in Libya from the Allied
forces pressing in from Algeria.
For the moment. the chief uncer-
tainty is in the south. Rommel's
Afrika Korps is now standing behind
the Mareth Line, a fortified belt
constructed long before the war by
the French to block possible Italian
attack from Libya. At that time this
defense in depth was supposed to be
so strong that it was known as the
little Maginot Line. However, under
the terms of the armistice by which
France submitted to the Axis in the
summer of 1910, the Mareth Line
was supposed to have been demilitar-
lied, and the best information indi-
Gates that the job was thoroughly
done. It is unlikely that the Axis
has been able to have restored those
disarmed Notifications to their for
mer efficiency in the two months
since their occupation of Tunisia. If
this be so, Rommel may be unable to
oppose a full-scale attack by the
British Eighth Army, which will
doubtless be launched as soon as the
British have repaired the wrecked
port of Tripoli and thereby short
ened their overextended land COM
munications with Egypt. Once the
Mareth Line is forced, the Axis would
have to abandon Southern Tunisia
and concentrate northward toward
the Tunis- -Bizerte triangle.
On the other hand it should be
remembered that Marshal Rommel
is a tricky opponent capable of dis
concerting surprises AS the rains
diminish and the ground dries, he
might conceivably launch an Often
sive-defensive operation of his own.
A possible line of attack would be
from Central Tunisia at the Allied
base of Tebessa, just over the AL
gerian border Tebessa is an impor-
tant rail and road junction from
which Axis strokes could be deliv-
cred at the main Allied line of ad-
vance on TuniS and Bizerte. That
advance is dependent on a single
track railway and single-line high
road stretching back nearly 400 miles
to the main Allied base at Algiers.
The Allied sectors in Central Tunisia
are held largely by French colonials
who, though brave and experienced
troops, are woefully lacking in mod
ern equipment. That is weakness
which could invite an Axis attack
The Mareth Line and the weather
are thus the present imponderables
in the Tunisian situation. On them
the next moves chiefly depend.
Horutio Alaer