Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-02-16
Jap Army and Navy
Relations Strained
Over GuadaIcano|
AdmiruI's Insistence
On Savior Rule Seen
Hinged With Politics
BY GEORGE WELLER.
War Correspondent of The Star and
Chicaso Daily News.


SOMEWHERE IN NEW GUINEA
Feb. II Delayed - Slight but
nevertheless definite symptoms OF
the strained relations between the
japanese Army and Navy are max
ing themselves noticeable as a re-
suit Of the cleaning up within a
month of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's
Papuan and Vice Admiral William
F. HalSey, jr.'s Guadalcanal counter
offensives.
The Toxic radio presses firmly on
the theme that the navy went with
alacrity ito the aiG of their brothers
in arms"
The navy's very insistence on its
savior role in coming to the assist
ance of the beleaguered army forces
is considered significant.
Different Viewpoints.
Army figures like Premier Hideki
TOTO have always insisted with fire.
brand fanaticism on immediate war
with the United States. But the
japanese navy while foreseeing the
conflicts inevitability, was in favor
of lulling American fears and ac-
complishing whatever might be done
by inf1ltration. The navy, in other
words, favored getting America in
volved in Europe before striking in
Hawaii and the Philippines.
In a sense, the two japanese
forces were forced into a split by
fr,n ry11t ",
army having China and Russia
which could be fought only on land
End the Navy having the United
States which could be fought only
by sea.
What has upset matters is that the
Jap generals, answering the orders
of the army premier were push
ing their offensive at Papua and
their defense in Guadalcanal to
great lengths, but left to the navy
the job of supplying and defending
them by sea. Thus it happens that
due to interference by 1t. Gen.
George c. Kenney's aircraft in the
Southwest Pacific and by Admiral
Halsey's warships and aircraft In
the Solomons. the Jap navy has
been forced to pay dearly for COM
niitment3 which the army under
took.
1t is evident that while the
army paid at most only between two
and three divisions from their TO
o. 80, the navy's bills have been
proporticnately much higher.
Insist on Recognition.
The Jap navy is becoming more
insistent on being recognized for its
sacrifices. The Saigon radio re-
vealed yesterday morning, February
10, that Zeros which engaged Amer
lean fighters over Wau at the be-
ginning of the week with such dis
aStrous results for themselves-at
least "a were positively shot down
and not single American fighter
failed to return-were navy planes
with navy pilots.
This fact is interesting particularly
because the navy pilots are usually
between those of the Jap army.
Yet the Jap pilots training has been
apparently greatly speeded up lately
to meet losses, with corresponding
breaches in airmanship hitherto
rale in the navy.
BY comparison with our develop
ment 1t may be observed that only
three or four of some 30 American
pilots who wiped out the Zeros, had
ever brought down a plane before
That their first victims were Jap
Navy pilots is significant.
1t is also significant that the navy
is not only feeding but providing
air cover for the substantial army
garrisons at Lac and Salamaua.
Headache Over Buna.
The navy has plenty of reason to
feel headache about Buna. While
the army lost there only strawfoots
who had romped through Burma
and The Philippines, the navy lost
at least one battalion of crack
marines with equipment far superior
and Intelligence and training much
more advanced.
! Furthermore, the navy paid with
losses of several cruisers and about
dozen destroyers for attempts to
/ reinforce in Papua the armys in
effec5ual attempt at crossing the
! Owen Stanley range.
1t Is evident that the Jap Navy has
seen, too, that the Papuan and
! Guadalcanal dramas are likely To
repeat themselves more than once
all the way back TO Japan. Suppose
for example, the retaking of Java
should cost the army only two more
divisions but the navy another quar-
ter OF its fighting force. The effect
] ON : he lnat.nL,c Ia ,c... -.