Evening star., 1943-11-14
Crimeun Prize

Reports from Moscow and Berlin
of sharp, continuous fighting at
Kerch and Perekop direct attention
to the Crimean theater of operations
and stimulate speculation as to the
precise significance of this campaign.
1t is obvious that the Germans have
a large garrison in that isolated
peninsula, presumably well-stocked
with equipment, munitions and
supplies. If this were not so, the
Russians, whose Black Sea fleet con-
trolls all sea approaches, would have
made landings at various points be-
fore this to possess as soon as possible
a prize with such far-reaching stra-
tegic possibilities. No mere rear
guard could have held so long a
region the size of Maryland with ex-
tensive seacoasts. The long, des-
perate stand by the Germans at
Melitopol, key to the Nogaisk
Steppe which covers the land ap-
proach to the Crimea, presumably
would have given the German high
command time enough to have
evacuated the Crimea If such had
been its Intention. The logical pre-
sumption is, therefore, thatethe high
command has deliberately sacrificed
considerable body of troops and
equipment for last-ditch holding
operation, in order to delay as long
as possible the larger strategic con-
sequences which will operate when
the Crimea is again fully in Russian
handS.a, s,a-t>-,- t,--- - r-~---..
Whatever it's size, ,the~fate eot the
trapped garrison seems to be Ful-'
timately sealed. Escape by sea is
virtually impossible. Even small
craft hugging the shore cannot be
used4 because the coast. Of y the
Nogaisk Steppe which lies between
the Crimea and the German base at
Odessa is now entirely in Russian
control and any such flotillas could
be caught between shore batteries
and the Black Sea fleet standing
in close. Indeed, Moscow reports
the destruction of a number of small
craft attempting to run the Red
naval blockade. Perhaps the block
ade-running effort was an attempt
to bring out wounded or nonessen-
tial personnel. It is hard to believe
that, having gone so far in holding
the Crimea, the Germans would try
mass evacuation that must end
in wholesale slaughter to no mill
tary purpose.
The strategic value of the Crimea
for Russia is obvious First OF all,
it will give the Black Sea fleet
secure base at Sevastopol, only 200
miles from the mouth of the Danube,
less than 300 miles from the main
Rumanian port of Constanza, and
some 400 miles from the ports of
Bulgaria. Germany has nothing to
oppose sea-borne Russian expedi-
tionary force to the Black Sea coast
Of the Balkans except a few small
submarines, some light naval craft
and land-based airplanes. But Ger
man air defense could be countered
by long-range Russian fighter planes
operating from Crimean fields, since
the range to the Balkan coast
averages only 300 miles. And a
large-scale Russian landing might
be followed by chaos and revolt in
Rumania or even by a spontaneous
revolution in pro-Russian Bulgaria
which would carry that country's
strong, intact army over to the side
of the United Nations. Such a
Russian landing might also be the
factor which would make Turkey
decide to abandon neutrality, at
least to the extent of opening the
Straits and allowing Allied use of
it's airbases.
The combined Importance of all
these contingencies presumably
would justify the German high COM
mand in sacrificing large force to
delay the fall of the Crimea even
by two or three months. Further
more, it is probable that a con-
siderable portion Of the Crimean
garrison consists Of Rumanian
troops and possibly other satellite
units. That has been a consistent
German procedure wherever sacri-
flee operations have been conducted.
The length of the Crimean cam
paign will demonstrate whether the
sacrifice has been worthwhile from
the German point of view