Evening star., 1943-09-06
Field Defense System
OF Nazis Revealed by
Red Army Victories
BY HENRY c. CASSIDY.


WITH THE RED ARMY ON'T THE
STEPPE FRONT. Sept. S Delayed.
An elaborate system of German
field defenses-similar to those the
Allies may encounter later in West
ern Europe-has been laid bare by
the Red Army's offensive which has
taken Kharkov, Taganrog, Belgorod,
Orel and other important points.
Generally speaking, the Nazi de-
fenses consisted of three zones to a
depth of 10 to 1872 miles, with
intermediary lines intended toabsorb
the shock of attacks.
Details Of the, intricate defense
system were explained and shown to
American and British correspondents
today in visit to this front. While
no steel or concrete Notifications
were in evidence, the defenses were
cleverly constructed and appeared to
be tough nut to crack.
Col. Ivan Vorobiev, staff represent
atlve OF Gen. Ivan Konevy's Steppe
army which took Kharkov, told the
correspondents the three zones were
divided into frontal region about
81 miles deep, a secondary zone
3H2 to 5 miles deep and rear area
extending for 2l2 to 3 miles.
How Troops Are Distributed.
The frontal regional Is subdiyid-
eo into three stretches, each a
little over mile deep, the first con-
tanning infantry battalions and NOR
tar batteries, the second regimental
reserves, light artillery and heavy
mortars, and the third divisional
reserves and heavy artillery.
The intermediary lines are used
Tor delaying action, Col. Vorobiev
said, while the Germans retreat to
the secondary and rear zones.
Fire power of all weapons In
the various defense zones, he ex-
planned, was carefully arranged to
cover all approaches to prepared
positions, which included barbed
wire, trenches and minefields.
THE German defenses were pre-
pared over period of four to five
months and present a very serious
obstacle" Col. Vorobiev added. ITO
break through 1t is necessary to act
by fire on the entire depth defense
with co-ordinated action of artil-
lery, aviation, tanks and infantry"
A significant point in the Ger
mans army organization was the
practice of discarding regimental
and company formations after one
of their divisions had been de-
feated and reassembling the unit in
groups of 60 to IS men and throw
ing them back into battle, the Rus
sian officer said.
Such a step was taken with the
German seth Infantry Division,
which was cut down during the bat
tie of Kharkov from a normal
strength of 10000 or 1000 men to
600-but still continued to operate.
Three Reasons for Failure.
Col. Vorobiev said the German
summer offensive failed for three
reasons-hrst, because it lacked all
elements of surprise; two, the at
tack on the Kursk salient was made
along narrow front, and three, the
German air force acted only against
the Russian front line without at
lacking rear areas.
On the other hand, he said, the
Russian offensive succeeded be-
cause the Red Army was able to
use reserves on a wide front to
break through with the co-opera-
ton of all arms.
Encircling maneuvers were de-
scribed as the basis of the Russian
attacks, but Col. Vorobiev said the
Red Army also used a new technique
of sending individual guns out in
great numbers to fire point blank
from open positions against their
targets.
The correspondents were shown
a typical German strong point in
a forest at Pomerky, 21a miles north
of Kharkov, where the Nazis had a
zigzag trench line feet deep and 2
feet wide with timber r-supported
dugouts, barber wire and mines. 1t
was taken by flank attack from
the east.
We also saw at Alexeievka height
dominating the countryside north
west of Kharkov where the Germans
converted canning factory on
hilltop into a fortress surrounded
by trenches and battery positions,
with mines and barbed wire in the
valley below. The position was
stormed by Red Army infantry after
artillery had blasted the heights.