Evening star., 1943-03-01
WORLD AIRlE4YS: Control Of Bases NIB Of Ri1aly...

Philippines We could reach the Middle East
by arrangements covering the Azores, or Brazil,
Liberia, French West Africa and the independ-
ent Mediterranean countries.
In worldwide struggle for commercial air
supremacy with Britain, we probably could
win. But it would be at heavy cost, financially
and politically, and perhaps eventually in terms
of military security. 1t would split wide open
the British-American concert which is the back
bone of the United Nations and on which the
preservation of peace will largely depend. Be-
sides, the British have within their own empire
mot counting the dominions with which we
might succeed in reaching separate arrange
ments-many important airfelds and strategic
locations for others.
At the same time, American money and en-
ergy are pouring into the construction of air-
ports throughout the world The exact number
built or developed since the war began is a
military secret. But since the ATC operates more
than 60 900 miles of routes and it is fair to pre-
sumo that there is airport for every 500 miles
of operation, deduce that the ATC itself
is operating at least 120 airports. These do not
include the military and naval air bases built or
developed for strategic tactical reason, or the
airfelds in the United Kingdom which Britain
is providing at British expense for use by
American bombers.
The ATC would like to see this herculean
labor and expense turned into peacetime COM
mercial asset. And so that these fields may be
used effectively, General George and his airmen
believe the United States should have the right
to establish its own radio communication and
weather observation services, and that it should
be guaranteed freedom from customs barriers
IL L e. r.
and passengers.
We want the right to fly everywhere, but we
cannot fly everywhere without the permission
of other sovereign nations. If we could persuade
other nations to agree on the internationaliza-
ton of air space and on the application of the
open-port" system to commercial aviation, we
would fly everywhere But so could every other
nation. The alternative to o4internationalization
lsaseries of agreements between nations
Enter the Governments: Whatever the
method, the basic arrangements must be negoti-
ated by governments. For reasons of security
and trade international air transport has be-
come an instrument of state policy. This was
openly recognized before the war by every inn
portant nation except the United States. ALI the
others were represented in international air
tldHSEOlt ny IuOHOpOllcS pdIlIy OI wholly OWncO
by their respective governments. The American
monopoly, Pan American did extremely we'll
despite its unofficial status.
1t does not follow that the United States can
win and hold its own in international air trans
port only by adopting OF setting up monopoly
closely tied to the government But the United
States cannot expect to win and hold its own if
competing privately owned lines are left to fight
fha,r e.
backed by their governments. Our policy may
be to allocate routes among various privately
owned lines, or even to provide competition be-
tween American-operated lines On some routes
Or we may decide that we too can protect our
international interests best through single air-
line company But whatever the mechanism
adopted, the government will have to negotiate
the basic agreements.
In January President Roosevelt established
an 1nterdepartmental Committee on Interna.
tlonal Civil Aviation to study the whole ques-
ton And, as this is written, the House is dis
ousslng the creation of separate committee to
consider the air transport question. The Senate
may be expected to follow suit.
1t is not too soon to develop practical plans
to assure the United States its proper place in
international air transport after the war. If we
o'' navy PAd>tiNdl pidllS ana pursue them
energetically, we are likely either to get less
than we should have, or to drift into cat-and-
dog fight with our victorious Allies which will
knock the props from under an enduring peace.
POSTWAR HORIZONS is prepared and yyitteu by
special NEWSWEEK Staff beaded BY Charles Huyd.
formerly of THE New York Times Washington Bu-
rean. He is Vorkine in collaboration tuitb Ernest
K. Lindiey, Chief of NEWswEEKs Washington Bu-
rean and special Adrisory Board including such
NEWSWEEK antborifies as RAYMOND Moley Ralbb
Robey, Admiral William Y. Pratt Major General
Stephen 0. FHqna and Milton Van Syek, Business
NeUs Editor.
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