The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1943-11-08
Interpreting
The War
BY ELTON c. FAY

'SotueQ
by the Allies in the strategic HON,
bling of Germany will pay djvi.
dends when Japan's turn come,
| One of the first conclusion,
drawn is that to reduce the wa,
making potential of a nation III,
bombing must be sustained. Inter
walls must not be allowed in which
damaged targets can be repair.
ed and rebuilt.
| Another conclusion: fighter e.,
corts keep bomber loss figure,
from soaring to the dangerous mar
centage where sustained bonnhin,
becomes impossible.
| The air war over Europe b.,
emphasized this latter point WITH
in recent months. Bomber losse,
in the big raids on the Ploesti nil
fields and on the Schweinfur+ i,
dustrial plants were high. Thew
were beyond the range Of figh1
ers. But huge flights of beavr
bombers raided northern and west
ern German targets last weaL
and the losses were slight. in Soma
instances about one per rent
Fighters equipped with disposabs
auxiliary gasoline tanks accompa
MED them and drove off many
Nazi fighter plane which Other.
wise would have bored in tbrougb
the bombers' defensive fire
| When the European phase If tbo
war is ended, tremendous strjkinr
lpoWer can be marshalled for an
about blow at Japan. But evon
then the land bases from which
heavy bombing Of Japan NAV bo
launched will be hundreds or fv
Ell thousands of miles from sucb
Iprime target areas in the Japaa
csc mainland as Kobe and Tokyo
They cannot be, unless starHno
Advances are made in the interim
much nearer than China, the Apg.
tians, the Kurile islands or in tbe
maritime provinces of Russia If
Russia should agree to that
| The geography of the chain NJ
islands that compose Japan proD.
er make them useful in two wave
in dealing with a bombing attack
They serve as an aircraft warn.
ing network and provide far.
flung system of fighter plane air.
fields. Bases in the Kurile islands,
at the northern end of the Japan.
csc chain, and on Russia's Kam-
chatka peninsula, Immediately
north of the Kurile group, are
mentioned often as the most de.
sirable points from which to bomb
the heart of Japan. Among the ad-
vantages would be the closer To-
cation to the target and the fact
that the air bases or staging bas-
es could be supplied directly BY
sea and air from American and
Alaskan sources.
The approach to the target from
the north, however, would be over
the japanese island chain of dc.
tector and fighter stations. To a
lesser degree, the same situation
would prevail on the approaches
from the west and south.
An escort of extended-range
fighters, even if impossible over
the whole route to the target
would mean that more of the
bombers would reach the objective
and fewer fall prey to the Zeros
swarming up from airfields aA
along the route. An airfield grant,
ed by Russia on Kamchatka
seized by invasion from Japan al
Paramushiru, in the northern Ku-
rifles, would make possible a
, fighter escort over almost half the
route.
Doolittle's raid on Tokyo was
launched from the sea. It had
both the advantage of complete
surprise and approach to the tar
get without crossing aircraft warn
ing networks.
Flying Firtresses, LiberatOrs and
the forthcoming super-bombers Of
the Bog type cannot be sent up
from aircraft carriers. They must
take off from known positions on
land and fly, with such minor de-
! viations as are possible, a gener
. ally expectable course to the tar
get. And, therefore, they must
reckon with attacking fighters
If the sustained and heavy
bombing that the Allies have
found necessary in Germany is 10
be used on Japan, the big-la2d
planes must do it. But they will
need the support of the fighters
and the backing of the Navy and
the groundfighters to seize and
hold the fields from which they
take off.
-V-
n-.7 n