Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-07-29
Italy and France

General Charles de Gaulle, delivered
in Algiers Tuesday evening, raises
another aspect of the Italian situa-
ton which, though hitherto unap-
preciated in America, is of potential
Importance from several angles.
The co-chairman of the French
Committee of National Liberation
made an imprisoned plea, not only
for French inclusion in the final
peace settlement but also for partic-
ipation in preceding arrangements
between Italy and the Allies. 1T
is clear" said the general, that the
change of power in Rome may raise
the question of a settlement of &C
counts in the near future. Now it is
obvious that, in spite of the terrible
plight of our country, such a settle
ment could be neither valid nor
lasting without France"
General de Gaulle went on to de-
clare that the war between Italy and
France, begun when Mussolini en-
tered the general conflict on Ger
many's side and attacked France on
the eve of her capitulation, was
never ended, nor even interrupted"
This, OF course, is the De Gaullist
thesis, which does not acknowledge
the validity of the armistice entered
into with the Axis by the Petain
regime, which De Gaulle maintains
is utterly illegal. However, even il
Vichy did have the authority to
interrupt" the war by its armistice,
De Gaulle is correct in stating that
1t never ended; because, under an
armistice as distinguished from a
peace treaty, the parties concerned
remain technically beliigerents. Fur
thermore, Italy broke the armistice
terms by its occupation OF portions
OF Vichy territory, including the is
land OF Corsica, at the same time
that the Germans took over the
rest OF the metropolitan "Unoccupied
Zone" after the Allied landing in
French North Africa last December.
Italian aggression against France
was continued by the Axis forcible
joint occupation of the French
protectorate of Tunis. There can
be no question that France has "ac-
counts" to settle with Italy for the
latter's part in the terrible mis-
fortunes which the French, at home
and across the Mediterranean, have
undergone.
De Gaulle used these undeniable
facts as an implied argument for
immediate recognition by the Allies
OF the Committee of National Liber-
alton, which has been strongly
pressed from the very beginning by
both its component elements. In his
pronouncement last Tuesday, the
general did not categorically make
that demand, but the implication Is
obvious. The committee, he said is
fully aware of its duties and rights"
regarding the Italian crisis. And
he went on to assert that those
rights are derived from the eager
confidence of the immense majority
OF Frenchmen and from its own
character as the organism respon-
sible for the sacred interests of the
nation"
No one can fail to comprehend and
sympathise with the aspirations
voiced by De Gaulle. Yet it should
be clearly understood that this is
an attempt to inject political fac
tors into situation which, as yet,
is essentially military and strategic
in character. Still other political
pressures are developing from
various quarters ranging from
Italian exiles to groups in America
and Britain who aim at getting the
Allied governments to commit them
selves to political solutions in Italy
before the Italian people themselves
have had a chance to express their
wishes for the future of their coun-
try. Such efforts tend to complicate
or even detract from the basic war
aim of the Allies, which is the
defeat of the arch-enemy, Germany,
in the shortest possible time and
with a minimum of Allied losses.