The Waterbury Democrat., 1943-06-16

instant case, that the traffic author
shall have the power to prohibit,
limit or regulate the parking of
vehicles, that the traffic authority
shall be the board of police COM
missioners and that such authority
shall have power to make rules and
regulations necessary to make effec-
tive the provisions "of this chapter"
The plaintiffs claim is that the
power to prohibit, limit or regulate
the parking Of vehicles does not in
clude the authority to install park
ing meters and to charge such a fee
as we have discussed. There can be
no serious denial that parking
meters are means of regulating
parking The power to regu-
late justifies the charge of a fee
and the imposition of a penalty;
and the city's receipts of money are
increased County Court V. Ro-
can, supra, 1888. In a case in which
the facts are quite similar to those
OF the instant one, it was held that,
since there can be no doubt of the
right to regulate parking, the city
should have a wide latitude in Sc
lecting the means to be adopted,
and may provide meters to measure
the time of parking as we'll as it
may measure such time by other
means, and may charge such a fee
as is reasonably necessary to defray
the expense connected with their
operation. Owens v. Owens, sunra.
To the same effect are Elk parte
Harrison and Elk parte Duncan, su-
pra. We decide that under the stat
utes we have cited the board of DO
lice commissioners, as the traffic
authority, had power to install the
meter system.
THE plaintiff claims that the
making of the contract for the leas-
ing of the meters was not in COM
pliance with various provisions of
the charter of the city; thus he
says that it was executed in behalf
OF the city by the mayor at the re-
quest of the board of police COM
nlissioners but that he had no au-
thority to bind the city in this way,
that there was no order for 1.-THE
purchase" of the meters by the
director of purchases, that no ap-
preparation for the expense entailed
had been made when the contract
was expected and that the contract
required an expenditure of more
than $1,000 and therefore competi-
tive bids were necessary. 81 Spec.
Laws 500, sol, S 5 76, 83, 85; 90 Spec.
Laws 651, 653, 81 %. 30. In his
complaint the plaintiff alleged that
he was a taxpayer in the city as
we'll as a property owner, and in
his prayers for relief he asked, in
addition to an injunction requiring
the defendant to remove the meters
in the streets adjacent to his prop
erty, one restraining the defendant
from installing or maintaining
other meters on the streets in front
of his property land in other streets
and sidewalks in the CITY, But the
gravamen of the complaint was that
he had been injured in his rights
as a property owner, and the court
in its judgment granted him relief
in that capacity. 1t may be that,
while the board of police commits
Sions. But it does not follow that
system of parking meters in the city,
it could not impose on the city any
financial obligation except in &C
cordance with the charter provi-
sions. But it does not follow tshat
the plaintiff as a property owner
has the right to compel the city to
remove the meters in front of his
property. The police commissioners
had authority to install the meters,
and, if in procuring them the pro-
visions of the city charter were not
complied with, this does not entitle
the plaintiff as the owner of the
property in front of which some of
them were Installed to compel their
removal
The complaint does not allege
that the plaintiff has suffered any
injury as a taxpayer; in fact one of
his principal claims is that the city
will receive an income from the use
of the meters greatly in excess of
the cost of installing and maintain
ing them; and he has made the city
the sole defendant. Neither his
pleadings nor his proof furnished
a basis for according him relief as
a taxpayer.
There is error, the judgment is
set aside and the trial court is di-
rected to render judgment for the