Evening star., 1943-09-15


daily installments, Chief OF Stat
George C. Marshalrs report to
the Secretary OF War on the pc
riod July 1, 1941-June 30, 1943,
Just made public. 1T is rec
ord" Gen. Marshall iUrites, "ot
,r1,at Das done and Dhy it tDas
done. and is submitted While
America is at iUar to permit a
better understanding OF the great
ifensiue operations not1 in prog
sess.
Despite the negotiations which
had been carried on with a few
French officials the amount of re-
eistance which the landing forces
would encounter remained prob
iematical. Gen. Eisenhower broad
east a proclamation of our friendly
intentions toward French North
Africa and instructed the French
forces to display certain signals to
indicate their nonresistance. How
ever, each task force proceeded on
the assumption that determined re-
sistance must be expected. They
were under orders not to fire until
fired upon. A code signal Play Bali
was to be broadcast to the entire
force at the first hostile act on the
part of the French in any sector
as a warning to initiate vigorous
offensive action.
At the moment the landings in
Algeria began, at l o'clock on the
morning of November 8, President
Roosevelt assured the French people
by short wave radio that the Allies
sought no territory and asked for
French cooperation. The Spanish
government was also informed at
this time that the occupation was
in no way directed against Spanish
Morocco or other Spanish possess
sions in Africa
The landings were carried out in
accordance with plans ard with a
boldness and efficiency which Sc
cured the initial objectives, the
major airflelds and ports in North
Africa, within period of 4s hours.
Diplomatic Negotiations.
These military operations were
staged against background of dip
tomato negotiations through which
speedy cessation of French resist
ance was sought Both Gen. Charles
de Gaulle, leader of the Fighting
French, and Gen. Henri Giraud,
who had escaped from Germany to
France and then from France to
Gibraltar. broadcast pleas for French
cooperation when our operations
started.
Gen. Eisenhower had announced
that Gen Giraud would be RESPONSE
BILE for civil and military affairs in
North Africa. but the French mill
tary officials on the ground were
found to be loyal to Marshal Pc
tain's government. President Roose-
velt's note to the French Chief of
State had assured Marshal Petain
Of our desire for a liberated France,
but the Vichy answer was disap-
pointing. Our Ambassador was
handed his passports on November
D. and orders were dispatched from
Vichy to French African units to re-
sist our forces, which by then had
already accomplished their missions
except on the Casablanca front.
Unexpectedly Admiral Jean Dar-
Ian, Petain's designated successor
and commander in chief of all
French forces, was found to be in
Algiers visiting sick son when our
forces landed He was taken into
protective custody, and when it was
found that the French leaders
stood loyal to the Vichy government
. series of conferences Immediately
followed, with the purpose of calling
a halt to the French resistance
against Gen. Patton's task force in
the vicinity of Casablanca. When,
on the morning of November II the
Germans invaded unoccupied France
Darlan rejected the pseudo-inde-
pendent Vichy government, assumed
authority in North Africa in the
name of Marshal Petain and pro-
mulgated an order to all French
commanders in North Africa to
cease hostilities. This order reached
Casablanca a few minutes before
the assault on that city was to be
launched on the early morning of
November H.
Admiral Darlan Heads Government.
The North African government
was reoriented and brought into
close collaboration with the United
Nations under provisional govern
ment headed by Admiral Darlan,
with Gen. Giraud as commander in
chief of the French ground and air
units. Subsequently French West
Africa under Gov. Gen Pierre Bois-
son announced its adherence to the
Darlan regime, bringing to the AL
lied cause additional naval power
and trained ground units and max
ing Immediately possible short air
route from the United States to the
North African battle fronts. Cor
dial relations were quickly estab-
hshed with the Sultan of Morocco.
Later it was possible to convince
Gen. Orgaz. high commissioner of
Spanish Morocco, that the American
forces contemplated no action
against Spanish territory.
Upon the cessation of hostilities
Gen. Eisenhower's forces were faced
with numerous and pressing prob
lens Harbors had to be cleared of
sunken ships, wharfs and docks re-
paired, neglected and slender lines
of rail communication had to be de-
veloped to carry heavy traffic, anti
submarine patrols organized to pro-
tect our sea routes in the Mediter-
Yanean, the civil population had to
be provided for and its economy
started on the road to reconstruc-
ton, French troops in North Africa
had to be equipped, our forces had
to be disposed to prevent success
full Axis thrust through Spain, and
finally, and most important of all
our forces had to close with the
enemy in Tunisia to effect his de-
struction in North Africa.
Race for Tunisia.
The rapid extension of the Of
fensive eastward was facilitated by
the expeditions landing at Alpiers