Evening star., 1943-01-21
VeIuiki Drive Seen
AS Limited Objective
Russion Forces Believed
Lacking Strength for
Push on to Khurkov
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
There appears to be some tendency in
news reports and headlines to consider
the Russian operations southwest of Vor-
onezh as being directed toward no less
an objective than the recapture of
Kharkov. The swift Russian advance to
and beyond the rail junction of Veluiki
(not to be confused with Velikie Luki
much farther north) brings the Russian
armies back to the River Oskol for the
first time since they were driven from
it last summer. and puts them within
striking distance of the much more i'm
portant rail junction of Kupyansk. These
places are on the way to Kharkov. The
Hungarian and Italian forces in this
general region appear to have collapsed,
the Russians have taken So 900 prisoners
and the advance is reported continuing.
1t is possible that the Russian high
command does possess sufficient reserves
to make it possible for them to think of
push to Kharkov; this would mean, of
course, very much more than the mere
recapture of an important industrial city.
II they are thinking of Kharkov, the
extremely hard-headed and astute off,
GERS who direct RussiaS military des-
TIMES are not thinking of city; they
are thinking of push by truly enormous
Russian forces straight down through
Kharkov to the bend of the Dnieper and
so to the Black Sea of the recovery of
the whole of the Donetz Basin, the
Crimea and the intervening region along
the shore OF the Sea of Asov and the
encirclement and destruction of all the
German forces in that area.
But until we have additional evidence
that it Is now possible for the Russian
staff to think in such terms we ought
not to place too much emphasis on dis
tant objectives which they may reach
some day. 1t will be better to examine
each phase Of this truly magnificent
offensive operation as it develops, not as
separate affair, but in its true relation
to the other parts Of the operation.
So considered, the Russian advance
southwest of Voronezh has both local and
general significance. It's local effect is
to d1slocate one end-the southern-of
the German line of lateral communica-
tions along the Oskol River and its par
alleling railway. thus imposing great
burdens on the Germans in maintaining
the supply of their troops facing the
Don west OF Voronezh itself. II this is
the correct view of the matter, we are
likely now to see another of these re-
markable Russian limited objective"
operations moving southwest from Yelets
TO strike directly at the Kursk -Voronezh
railway. probably to meet a push north
ward between the Oskol and the Don.
Once the Kursk- -Voronezh railway is cut.
the remaining German pockets of resist
ance along and near the upper Don can
be liquidated, and the Russians will have
regained full freedom of action In this
entire area
The general effect of all this on the
main Russian effort-which we must still
consider as directed upon Rostov until
we have evidence to the contrary-is the
protection OF Russian right flank against
a great German counter offensive. which
would, almost certainly, be mounted at
kharkov and on the bend Of the Dnieper,
and would strike east and southeast
along the network of rail lines spreading
out from Kharkov into the Donetz Basin.
Such an operation is seriously menaced
by the presence of a strong Russian arnv
at Veluiki and along the Oskol, especially
one which has behind it unbroken con-
troll OF its rear and of the railways of
the Oskol-Don corridor.
Thus the advance to Veluiki bears
direct relation to all the concentric
moves on Rostov, and especially to the
exploitation by the Russians of their
hridgehead at Kamensk on the south
side of the Donetz, breach which thev
will certainly attempt to widen and
extend in view OF the extreme impor-
tance discussed yesterday of the ada
cent rail junction of Likhaya.
1t is impossible to exaggerate the
Importance of railways in this campaign,
They are the sole means by which suff1-
ctent supplies and reinforcements for
large armies can be moved over long dis
tances IN Russia In the winter time,
either by the Germans or the Russians.
This Is why every move is aimed at rail
line or rail junction; this is why Rostoy
Is OF such primary Importance; this is
why places like Veluiki Likhaya, Kupy-
ansk, Millerovo are of scarcely less i'm
portance; this is why the German de-
tense tends to crystalline along or Just
In front of railway lines; this is why the
German trapped army at stalingrad
was hidden to hold out to the last gasp.
(Copyright. 1943. by New York Tribune. Incl