Evening star., 1943-06-20
Allied Victory in North Africa
Revised Air Warfare CONCEPTS
Value Of Giving Complete Autonomy
To Once Subsidiary Force Was Shown

This Is the first OF series OF
three articles by Vincent Sheean,
,DeH-knotDn author and Uar cor
respondent t0ho 1lo,D is heuten-
ant colonel in the Northwest
african Air Force, United States
Army. He recently returned from
North Africa, ,Dhere he landed
Nth the first American troops.
BY 1T. COL. VINCENT SHEEAN.
The surrender of Pantelleria and
Lampedusa to attack almost wholly
from the air emphasizes a fact
which has been apparent through
the whole African campaign. That
fact Is that the Army Air Forces
played role of primary Importance
and that our African victory also
was an air victory. -
This is not to undervalue the
amazing march of the British 9Th
Army, or the successful transposi-
ton of French and American troops
which took place in the last phase
Of the campaign. These were bril-
liantly executed and brought the
whole business to most satisfac-
tory conclusion. But if the North
west African Air Corce had not
been able, in conjunction with the
British Navy, to cut off all sup
plies from the German and italian
Armies and to smash the Italian
merchant marine, the task of our
ground forces would have been far
more difficult and protracted.
The operation consisted in first
obtaining control of the air and in
surrounding Axis-occupied Tunisia
with aircraft and submarines from
the middle Of April onward so that
nothing could penetrate. The op-
Grafton demanded careful planning
and execution; it demanded skill
and daring on the part of the men
in the air, and most Of all it de-
manded concentration Of numbers.
Assumed Full Autonomy.
AS the African campaign prog
ressed on to its triumph, the North
west African Air Force (organized
February I'D assumed full auton-
omy, divorced, like the Raj, from
ground control, and its generals de-
veloped the capacity to plan and
execute strategical moves on the
largest scale. No longer was this
air force regarded as a mere ad-
junct to ground operations; no
longer was it in the stage of dare
devil-at-the- Cleveland air races; no
longer was it treated as a mere sub
stitute for artillery or as an aid to
observation; it had come of age.
1t. Col. Philip G. Cochran, one of
the most remarkable fighter leaders
IN the whole Air Force, has lust
returned to America after activity
which took him to all parts of the
African theater and gave him an
unrivalled acquaintance with this
force. He supports these statements,
the ideas are as much his as mine,
they are the ideas of practically
everybody in the Northwest African
Air Force. Col. Cochran says:
THE ground forces learned
through the early experiences of the
Iunisian campaign that to employ
aircraft as substitute for ground
action or ground equipment was a
misuse OF aviation. The concept of
strateg1cal attack by fighters and
bombers seems to have been dificult
for ground officers to understand.
they always wanted to use aircraft
to tight that which was directly in
front OF them. This is natural and
inevitable, and it took a good deal
OF experience to overcome it. When
the Air Force came of age it was
perhaps a little hard on the family.
there was a rather sad leave-takine.
Now the family seems ready to
admit that the boy is a good bow
after all, and they'll take him back
again on his own terms"
Organization Was Difficult.
The 18th Air Force came into
Africa from various directions and
IN various ways. Some of its
nghter aircraft were catapulted from
carriers, others flew down from
England, still others arrived from
the heart Of Africa and others came
IN crates and had to be assembled
at Moroccan and Algerian depots.
Inc mass of material necessary
Tor the functioning of an air force
had to be transported over the
shark-infested ocean and then
across 1900 to $500 miles of land,
IN a country which had but one
main railroad and one main hieh-
way. Fields had to be found and
prepared. The job of the engineers
OF the Service Command, of the
ground workers in general. was
immense.
Some people in America have re-
marked that this air force was slow
IN getting started; they overlook.
perhaps-as Col. Cochran says-that
we did not have the New York Gen.
tral and the Pennsylvania Railroad
TO do our job for us. But in spite
OF all these difficulties we did have
a functioning air force at the front
from the last part of November
onWards. 1t did not compare in
numbers with the present mighty
force, but it was fully engaged
against the Germans throughout
the winter, met their attacks and
returned them with interest.
The story of Col. Cochran's guer-
rilla air war in Southern Tunisia
during the winter has been told
over and over; it will merit retelling
80 long as we are interested in the
quality of our youth, their courage.
endurance and ingenuity, their 10y
atty to one another and to our way
OF life.
Col. Cochran led parts of a fighter
group down to the most forward field
early in December. There, on a
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