Evening star., 1943-09-21

back their answer to Gen. Eisen-
hoUer's headquarters by August 81.
In the interval another italian gem
eral arrived bringing with him as
his credentials no less 4 person than
Gen Carton de Wharf, v. c., one of
our most famous military figures
whom the Italians captured two
years ago through 4 forced landing
in the Mediterranean.
This second mission did not, how
ever, affect the course Of events. - :
Italian Envoy
Returned ON August 81.
On August 81 the italian envoy
returned. He met Gen. Eisenhower's
representative at Syracuse. The
Italian government were willing to
accept the terms Internationally.
but they did not see how they could
carry them out In the teeth OF the
heavy German forces gathered near
Rome 20 and many other points
throughout the country -
We did not doubt the sincerity of
the envoy nor his government, but
we were not able to reveal our mill
tary plans for the invasion OF Italy
'''. The real difnculty was that
the Italians we're powerless, and
until We landed In strength we
couldn't give them q date.
We therefore timed the announce
ment for the moment we deemed
would give US the best military
chance and give them the best
chance Of extracating themselves
from the German grip. This meant
an armistice should be accorded only
ut that moment or just before our
main descent ,.
We would have done more If it
had been possible to help this un-
happy government who was heset on
every side by insoluble problems and
who have acted toward us to their
best ability both with courage and
good faith.
We offered and prepared to land
i an American airborne division at
Rome at the same time the armistice
was declared In order to fight of
two German armored divisions
massed outside it to help Italians,
but, owing to the. German invest
nnent OF Rome's airfields which took
place IN the last day or two before
the announcement Of the armistice-
| Of which investment the Italian
government warned us-it was not
possible to carry out this part of
the plan I" :.
| Terms Included
Stipulation Regarding Mussolini.
Unconditional surrender, of course,
comprises, everything. But not only
was q special provision for the sur
render OF war criminals included in
the longer terms but particular .stip-
ulation was made for the surrender
Of Signor Mussolini.
1t was not, however, possible to
arrange for him to be delivered spe-
cially and separately before the
armistice ana OUR main landing took
place, for this would certainly have
disclosed the intentions of the Ital-
ian government to the enemy.
The Italian position had been
that although an internal revolution
had ia ken place in italy, they were
still the Allies Of Germany carrying
on common cause with them. This
was position very dimcult to main-
tain day after day with the pistols
OF Gestapo pointing at the napes of
so many necks.
We have every reason to believe
that Mussolini was being kept un-
der strong guard, in a secure place.
Certainly 1t was very much in the
interests Of the Badoglio government
to make sure he did not escape.
Mussolni himself was reported
to- have declared he believed he was
being delivered to the Allies, This
was certainly the intention and
would have taken place, but for
circumstances unhappily beyond our
control.
The measures which the Badoglio
government took were carefully con-
ceived and the best they could do
to hold Mussolini. but they did not
provide against so heavy a para
chute descent as the Germans made
at the particular point where he
was confined.
The stroke was one of great
daring and was conducted with q
heavy force and certainly shows
there may be possibilities of this
kind which are open in modern war.
I do not think there was any
slackness or breach OF faith on the
part OF the Badoglio government
and they had one card up their
sleeve-carabinieri guards had or
ders to shoot Mussolini If there was
any attempt At rescue-but they
failed in their duty, having regard
to the larger and considerable Ger
man forces who descended upon
them from the air who undoubtedly
would have held them responsible
for his health and safety.
Armistice Terms Were Sisned
On Night Of September 3.
So much for that. The terms were
signed at Syracuse on the night of
September 3 and from that time
forth occasional aircraft passed Sc
cretly between Rome and Allied
headquarters.
This was very difficult matter
as great numbers Of guns have to be
| silenced. Russian Soviet gov
ernment. having studied the terms,
authorized Gen. Eisenhower to sign
them in their name and he accord
ingly did, not only on behalf of the
United States and Great Britain,
but on behalf of the Soviet govern
ment and the United Nations.
have seen it said that 40 days of
precious time were lost in these ne
gotiations and that In consequence
British and American blood was
needlessly shed around Salerno.
This criticism is as ill-founded as
1t is woilnding to those who are
bereaved. The time of our main
attack upon Italy was fixed without
the slightest reference to the atti-
tude of the italian government and
the actual provisional date Of opera
ton was settled long before any
| negotiations with them had taken
place or even before the fall of
Mussolini =.
The condition and preparation of