Evening star., 1943-11-26
Counteruttuck in Russiu

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Counterottuck in Russiu
Interest in the eastern front nat
urally centers on the German re-
action which began a week ago in
the region of Zhitomir. For the first
time since their short-lived June
assault on the Kursk salient broke
down. the Germans have staged a
large scale counterattack, aimed at
the southern side Of the huge wedge
which the Red Army has thrust
westward from regained Kiev toward
the old Polish border. The Russian
salient is too wide to be as
yet endangered by German
pincer movement aimed at Its base.
Nevertheless, the Russians were
compelled to abandon the important
rail junction of Zhitomir at the very
start, and the Wehrmacht is now
hallway back to Kiev. Should the
Germans keep going, Russian re-
tirement behind the middle Dnieper
might become imperative.
The question naturally arises
whether this German operation is a
local counterattack or whether 1t
portends a genuine counteroffensive
in the larger strategic sense. That
latter alternative still appears un-
likely. The German high command
had to halt the Russian offensive in
this middle sector OF the eastern
front unless it was resigned to the
sundering Of effective coordination
between its northern and southern
army groups. German strategy chose
a telling moment, when the advent
of winter further handicapped
the Russian supply lines, already
stretched tensely by five months Of
continuous advance over wide belt
Of devastated country. Indeed, the
marvel has been that the Red high
command has been able to maintain
its offensive with no perceptible
pauses for consolidation. The out
come OF the German counterattack
probably depends on two factors.
The first of these is whether or not
the Russians have overextended
themselves. The second is whether
the Germans are conducting this
operation with strategic reserves or
whether they have had to use local
reserves from adjacent sectors Of
the eastern front. II the latter
hypothesis should prove true, tho
Red high command will doubtless
soon learn about 1t and can
be expected to make damaging
counterthrusts at the spots thereby
weakened. However, there is as yet
nothing to show that the Germans
have stripped nearby segments OF
their lines. Russian probes far to
the eastward at the bend Of the
Dnieper seem to be meeting resist
ance just as stin as that which, for
weeks, has held them up before the
communications center Of Krivoi
Rog. So long as that key point
holds, the German position In the
Southern Ukraine is not seriously
endangered.
A survey Of the general strategic
picture yields no reason why the
Germans should be short Of men or
equipment on the eastern front Our
own Army spokesmen have recently
warned us that the German Army
was numerically about as strong as
1t ever was, though the average
offensive value Of German combat
units has probably declined. Ger
tainly the German war machine
functions we'll in Italy and has Just
shown its power by ejecting the
British from the Aegean Islands.
Lastly, there is no evidence that the
German garrisons in Western Europe
have been stripped below the danger
point. The logical deduction is that
the German war machine Is still
powerful enough to react energeti-
cally wherever its position is gravely
CIludIlScIcQ.
However, this does not mean that
Germany can hope to mount vast
strategic offensives looking toward
the military destruction of its main
enemies. This is especially true of
Russia, where the mere occupation
Of huge territories means little 30
long as the Red armies remain in
being. Germany is definitely on the
strategic defensive, fighting in hopes
of an eventual military stalemate
and a resultant compromise peace.
Hence, even though the Wehrmacht
should gain a real local victory and
retake Kiev-and the latest Russian
communique suggests that the Nazi
counterattack has been stopped in
this sector-the general situation
would remain basically unaltered.
Ambassador K. Nomura as late as
June Is, 1941, wrote to an American