Evening star., 1943-05-13
Allied Africa Victory
Poses Threat to Japan
Maj. Eliot Believes
Opening Of Mediterranean
Affects Far East Situation
Bu Mai. Georqe Fieldinu Eliot.

WIN PreSlQe1U Roosevelt IN washington,
they have one vitality important change
in the strategical situation of the United
Nations which must be foremost in their
thoughts-the effect on all our grand
strategy of the reopening of the Med
iterranean. The collapse of Axis resist
ance in Tunisia makes it possible for
fighter escorts and coastal patrols to
protect conveys throughout the whole
length of the Mediterranean; this does
not mean that they can get through
without danger or without fighting, and
certainly it does not mean that they can
get through as securely as they could
if Sicily, Sardinia and Crete we're in
our hands. But they can get through,
which means that for the same ton
mage now employed on the long pull
around the Cape of Good Hope we can
double the rate of cargo delivered to the
Middle East the Persian Gulf and India
This may go far to explain the reason
for the presence in Mr.. Churchill's COM
pany of Field Marshal Sir Archibald P.
WaVell, the British commander in chief
in India, and of the air and naval COM
manders for that area.
The strategic problems of the Far
East, as whole, are primarily naval
and shipping problems. They form part
Of the global problems with which we
must deal in endeavoring to make
power generated in North America and
the British Isles effective in such dis
tant parts of the world as India, the
Southwest Pacific, North Africa and the
Middle East. The shipping factor being
constant, there is always the primary
question of its ALLEGATION. The reopen
ing of the Mediterranean is, in effect
a gift of many thousands of tons of
shlpplng, that Is to say many thou
sands of tons Of additional cargo, arriv-
ing month by month at every port from
Alexandria to Bombay. Translated into
terms OF fighting power, this means that
IN all the areas served by all these ports
from now on we can make much greater
efforts and accomplish much greater
results
1t may very we'll be that one of the
results to be sought is the reopening of
communication with our Chinese Allies
by the recovery of Burma That is the
only way in which this can be done sat-
lsfactorlly, and it is certainly the best
way now open to us for launching an
air offensive against the vital centers of
Japan.
The recovery of Burma is not to be
accomplished by an invasion over the
extremely difficult land frontier which
divides Burma from India. It can be
accomplished only by fully establishing
Allied sea and air command over the
Bay of Bengal, and by effecting a land
ing on the coast of lower Burma. In
order to do this, there must be United
Nations naval forces present in the Bav
of Bengal adequate, with their air SUD-
port, to defeat any naval force which
the japanese can send into those waters
The only naval force now available to
us for this purpose is the British Med
lterranean Fleet.
Most of its heavy ships could be re-
leased from their present duties and
sent to East Indian waters if the italian
fleet could be disposed of. The Italian
fleet has suffered severe losses in the
course of the Tunisian operations, but
IL still remains fleet in being. If the
Allied forces now proceed to the reduc-
ton OF Sicily and Sardinia, no doubt
the Italian Navy will suffer still further
IN the resultant fighting, and if Sicily
ana Sardinia fall into Allied hands, our
air forces will exercise such dominance
over the Italian naval bases that it is
unlikely that any considerable portion
OF the italian fleet can continue to exist
We're this to happen, the only ma ior
anxiety other than anti-submarine ac-
tlVlt1es which would be left the British
Navy IN the Atlantic or the Mediterra-
mean would be the German concentra-
tion off the Norwegian coast, and
considerable margin of naval force
would be left over for operations in the
Far East.
1t is further to be noted that the
rainy season in Burma, which makes
campaigning and, indeed, all movement
IN the interior of the country extremely
difficult, lasts from May to mid-Octo-
per- II operations on a large scale are
TO begin there at the end of this wears
rainy season, it is not too early to begin
planning them now, and the destruction
of the Italian fleet and the securing of
our Mediterranean communications are
two preliminary steps which are essential
and which are now made possible by
the victory in Tunisia.
In Africa, subsidiary theater of war
has been eliminated with all it's drain
on our resources; our lines of communi-
cation have been shortened; more and
more as these processes continue, we
are able to concentrate our forces
against the vital centers of our chief
enemies. We are about to make the
Germans realize the difficulties and
dangers of war on two fronts; the
same achievements which make this Dos
sIble, likewise make it possible for us
to present Japan with these same diff
culties and dangers. It is doubtful
whether japanese strategists have ever
given any great thought to Tunisia, but
what has just happened in Tunisia may
be felt, in its results, in TOXIC This is
truly global war.
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