Evening star., 1943-08-04

II z III U u IL \, baVlu Lawrence.
would be asking how long it's going
to be before the authorities in
Washington and London begin to
realize that we have. a ma ior war on
with a major enemy power in the
Pacific.
The great need in the Pacific is
for more air power. Even as little
as one months production of heavy
bombers would make all the differ
= ence in the world in the progress of
the war there.
1t seems strange, also, that pilots
from New Zealand and Australia
who ought to be used to defend the
South Pacific, are being sent all the
way to Great Britain while Ameri-
can pilots have to be sent all the
way to Australia and the South
Pacific.
When Vice Admiral Horne recent
" said he thought the war against
Japan might not end before l949. he
may have been using an extreme
illustration of how the war can be
prolonged, but it is nevertheless true
that many naval men think of the
war In the Pacific as likely to last
many years. because the Pacific war
has not been given primary atten-
ton by the United Nations.
Small Fraction i'm Pacific.
The basic pressure for more help
for the Pacific came originally from
Australia and New Zealand, Now
that both these countries are safe
from attack, there is less pressure
from them for increased forces. But
the United States, on the other
hand, has practically the whole job
to do in the Pacific and the United
States Navy is bearing the brunt of
the struggle together with an heroic
little air force of the Army.
The public has been given the i'm
preston that the war in the Pacific
has been stepped up considerably
and that more supplies have been
sent there. While this Is true, the
public doesn't know how little went
out to the Pacific in the first place.
The increase is important, but the
real percentage of our war effort allo-
Gated to the Pacific Is a small frac-
ton of the total. If it were only 30
per cent, many observers who are
familiar with the Pacific operations
would be overjoyed
The japanese know how little we
have sent to the Pacific, so they
are slowly building UP their COM
munication lines and bases and
making it steadily more difficult for
America to win important bases.
The actual number of lives to be
spent to get bases for airplanes
will be considerably greater a year
hence than it would be today.
Could Have Been Avoided.
Thus, if proper amount OF men
and supplies and airpower had been
allocated to the North Pacific early
enough, our forces would never have
had to encounter the losses We suf-
fered at Attu or the losses we are
going to suffer In trying to take
Kiska back.
The customary answer has been
that there isn't enough or hasn't
been enough to go around. The real
answer is that the President and
the Prime Minister have decided
how much shall be allocated and.
despite public professions of interest
in the Pacific, thele has never been
enough attention given to the
Pacific war.
The responsibility for the diver
sion of virtually all our airpower
to Europe however, is to no small
extent that of the air forces of both
Britain and America. which have
Influenced the President and Mr..
Churchill to use ali airpower against
Europe and to give the Pacific only
what is essential, in effect, to pre-
vent an appearance of retreat and
to give the impression of progress.
Ships for England.
The rate of advance is slow.
indeed, and will continue to be slow
until the President and the Prime
Minister become sufficiently inter
ested in the Pacific war to give it
more attention. Mr.. Churchill
already is interested in getting the
loan of $50 to 200 ships for the
British postwar merchant marine
and, while nothing has been said
about the title TO these ships, the
probabilities are that they will be
permanent part of the British
merchant marine.
Mr.. Churchill seems to be alert
already to care for postwar interests
OF Britain, which IL commendable
thing from the viewpoint of his
countrymen.
II more thought could be given to
winning the whole global war. in
Guiding the one going on in the
PACING, many American fathers and
mothers might have a chance to see
kneir sons alive some day, for II
Seems certain that the slow, drag
glng war in the Pacific eventually
VIII be more costly in casualties than
II a concentrates campaign were
undertaken in l94S.
Reproduction Rights Reserved)