Evening star., 1943-06-05
CHAPTER vi.


Later found out more about how
our Air Force was destroyed, but I
never established to my entire sat-
isfaction why it was on the ground
when the Japs came over, more than
10 hours after we had received word
Of the Pearl Harbor attack.
AS nearly as I could determine,
the situation was this:
The pursuit planes had been up
patrolling in the morning, and the
pilots had come down to eat and re-
fuel their planes all together, in
stead of a few at time.
The bombers were on the ground,
because it would have been impos-
sible for them to fly around aim
lessly while awaiting orders to bomb
objectives in Formosa or Hainan
Island.
Such orders could not be issued in
the Philippines. because we were not
yet officialy at war with Japan.
The planes were lined up in
straight rows and not dispersed, be-
cause our flyers had not had any
experience and did not understand
the necessity for dispersal. Under
ground hangers were being built but
were not yet finished
dio-detecting equipment was
inadequate.
Shortly after the Clark Field at
tack. I ran into some of the sur
vivors OF the Bit crews OF the 18th
Bombardment Squadron, who said:
That first day of the war we
went up in the morning, got our
planes running perfectly and then
came down again. The pursuits had
also been up and had come down to
refuel and to let the pilots get
lunch. For weeks we had expected
that if war came we would bomb
southern Formosa. We knew just
where and what to hit
Right after lunch we pilots were
called to the office l heard our
commander, Col Eugene Eubank
arguing over the telephone with
some one in Manila. He was insist
ing that We be allowed to take off
for Formosa, but apparently he
could not get an okay."
Anyway, Eubank hung up the
phone and turned to a map on the
wall. He was just pointing out our
objectives on Formosa when some
one came running in. The mes
senger shouted. The Japs will be
here in 20 minutes
"Wo rfn6 10 oof ont
to our planes. Two minutes later
the bombs crashed down around us.
I'VE had about II heavy bombers
left when it was all over. We flew
most of them down to the field at
Del Monte, on the island Of Min
danao
From then on we were under the
orders of Gen. Wavell. We heard
several times that Macarthur
begged for us to come up and give
his troops hand during the early
days of Bataan. but instead Wavell
sent us to attack the Japs at Borneo
and other islands once or twice.
Then we were ordered to Java and
then to Australia"
l questioned them further about
why we were surprised at Clark
Field That was one of the most
crushing blows in the whole Philip
pines campaign. 1t lost us any
chance to gain air control and with
out air control we never had
chance to win. Then it is your
IMPRESSION I asked, that some
one in Manila headquarters ordered
our planes to remain on the
ground?"
That is what we understand, :"
they said I'VE were told that we
were forbidden to bomb Formosa
because the Japs had not yet at
tackled the Philippines and perhaps
did not intend to. Inasmuch as the
Philippines were commonwealth
and not an integral part of the
United States, we had to wait to
be attacked first"
That last part didn't add up to
me because many hours before the
Clark Field bombing we knew that
the Japs had bombed Baguio and
Aparri and Davao and many other
points in the Philippines. I told
one OF the high officers of Mac
Arthurs staff what the pilots had
said
The truth is that as soon as Mac
Arthur knew Japan had attacked
Pearl Harbor he ordered our pur-
suits into the air and instructed
that our bombers be dispersed to
other fields. part of them to Del