Evening star., 1943-11-23
Jap Strength in Pacific
Now Being Tested
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot

~ MAJ. george FtetQtng EHOt.
The signs have been pointing for
some weeks now toward 4 real am
phibious offensive in the Central Pa
cific; some of those signs have been
noted in these articles. Now the first
blows of that offensive have been
struck by American landings on Maxim
and Tarawa atolls in the Gilbert archi-
pelago. That there will be others seems
certain; possibly in the very near fu-
ture, If we can furnish the covering
forces
What we are seeing now is q test
OF Japanese air and naval strength.
A single isolated garrison on one OF
these small islands can do no more
than hold out for little time, and
cause us such loss as 1t can infiict.
No Pacific atoll can contain garri-
son which, alone and unaided, can
hope to hold out against the terrific
concentration of fire and shock power
which is at the disposal of a modern
amphibious striking force such as that
at the disposal OF Admiral Nimitz
They can make q stand. They can kill
a good many Of the invading troops.
They might even, rs did our own gall
liant marines on Wake Island, drive
of one or two attacks. But in the
end, unless aid can reach them, they
are done for.
1t might be asked why defend such
places at all If the defense cannot be
made good? The theory is that each
base In such a system as the Japanese
have in the Central Pacific is sup
ported by every other base, so that over
the whole system, air and naval forces
can be swiftly concentrated at any
threatened point. The local garrisons
are only supposed to be able to hold
out for a calculated time, until the
mobile elements can concentrate to
relieve them So what is now i'm
portant in this Gilbert Island operation
is not so much the resistance of the
garrisons of Tarawa and Maxim, for
unless supported.
What Is really important is the test
Of the ability of the japanese to hold
the Central Pacific at all, and that
test will be decided by whether they
can now strike back at our task forces
with air power or perhaps with air and
naval power combined.
If-as many observers believe-their
air power is spread so thinly and has
suffered such heavy losses in the re-
cent operations In the South and South
west Pacific, that it cannot meet this
new responsibility in the Central Pa
ciflc in addition to its present burdens,
then the loss Of all the outlying Japa-
nese island positions-the Gilberts, the
Marshalls, the Eastern Carolines, Nauru
and Wake-is just = question of time,
and OF mopping up garrisons which will
doubtless fight with fanatic courage
but will fight without hope of making
good their stand.
1t cannot yet be determined whether
the Japanese have thrown additional
troops and supplies into these island
outposts in the hope of at least pro-
longing the fight, and making 1t cost
us as dearly as possible. II they are
now thinking in terms of forlorn
hopes, this would be a natural move
They have plenty of troops; it is the
one category of lighting power in which
they are still superior in the Pacific
theater OF operations as a whole. They
might well, being what they are, con-
slider that a few more battalions and
batteries were we'll lost to gain a little
more time, but in the end If their air
power (by which, of course, I mean their
land-based air power, is unequal to this
task of defending the Central Pacific,
the japanese must choose between the
loss Of these positions and the throw
ing in of their naval power, their battle
fleet, to restore the situation.
One tactical point is we'll worth
noting, and that is the fact that our
naval commanders are now prepared
to use carriers without hesitation in
reach of japanese land-based aircraft,
In the big Armistice Day attack on
Rabaul we had almost the first in
stance in this war in which carriers
beat of1-and handsomely beat off-an
attack by land-based planes. Nothing
could more strikingly demonstrate the
inability of the Japanese to produce
new models of aircraft in accordance
with the technical and tactical lessons
of experience. Obviously, from the
losses inflicted on them, their land
based Zero fighters are now sharply
inferior to our carrier-base Corsairs
and Grummans. The same lesson ap-
pears to be taught by the results We
are obtaining in the Central Pacific.
We can look forward to even greater
accomplishments as our carrief-sup-
ported task forces get into their stride.
tcopyrisht. 1913, by New York Tribune, Inc)
The Lost Forts