Evening star., 1943-03-01
Submarines Called
Obstacle to Offensive
Maj. Eliot Says Atlantic
Must Be Freed Of U-Bouts
For Front in Western Europe
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot

!
| Western Europe makes that plain
| Lorient, Brest, Cherbourg, Wilhelms-
| haven.
The ocean lanes must be cleared for
| the coming offensive in Europe.
! AS Admiral Lord Jellicoe wrote during
| the great submarine crisis of 1917, mill
| tary history is full of warnings as to the
disastrous results of attempting large
| scale operations with insecure lines of
communication. If America is to bring
| her full power to bear across the seas.
| the U-boat menace must be reduced and
| kept in hand. 1t never can be entirely
| eliminated, but it can be kept within
! bearable limits.
To do this, however, requires a vast
| and co-ordinated effort of which bomb
| ing attacks on U-boat bases. shpyards
| and engine plants, such as that at Co.
| logne. are but a single phase
| The U-boat must be attacked at it's
| sources of manufacture, at it's operating
! bases, on its Journeys to and from its
cruising grounds and on the high seas in
| the course of its nefarious activities
The first is almost altogether matter
| of bombing from the air, at least for the
| present. Attacks on operating bases
| may be from the air or by Commando
! raids, or under exceptional circum-
| stances by bombardment from the sea
by surface warships. There must always
be kept in mind the possibility of large
scale amphibious attacks on base posi-
tlons, made possible by our control of
the surface of the sea, which enables us
to effect strategical surprise just as we
did in North Africa.
Attacks on the U-boat in its journeys
outward and inward can be made in
various ways. The mine is here valu-
able weapon. The principal restriction
on its use in the last war was the vast
amount Of material needed for a really
effective mining campaign, so that it
was not possible, for example to Law the
great North Sea mine barrage until the
United States came into the war and
American industry became available.
In this war, of course, the mining
problem is immensely complicated by
the German possession of Norwegian and
French bases on the open Atlantic. II
extensive mine fields can be laid where
the U-boat must pass, not only will many
casualties result more U-boats we're de-
stroyed by mines in the last war than
by any other single Weapon), but the
enemy will have to expend great re-
sources in men and ships for sweeping
purposes
In war of attrition, this Is vitally
important. Air and surface patrol of
areas through which U-boats must pass
are also likely to produce good results.
The alrplane is especially valuable, be-
cause OF its wide range of vision and
because when hostile aircraft are in
sight, the U-boat has to remain below
the surface and thus is forced to use its
precious battery capacity.
Our principal dependence. however.
must continue to be on the extension and
perfection of our convoy system 1t was
the convoy system which beat the U-boat
in the last war and it will be the CONVOY
system which will beat it in this war.
Convoy today is more difficult. because
OF improvements in the submarine and
because of the need for providing air
protection
The characteristics of aircraft do not
lend themselves to close convoyinp of
sloW-moving merchant vessels Long
range patrol aircraft are very useful,
but we must also have fighter aircraft
operating from small carriers and we
are long way from having enough
carriers for every convoy to have one.
The greatest immediate need is, how
ever adequate surface escorts and prop
erly trained officers and men to man
them In the last war, conveys av-
eraged 20 to "a merchant ships. From
SIX to eight destroyers, with perhaps a
couple of smaller patrol vessels added,
were considered a proper escort for such
convoy. If we could convoy on this
scale today, with sufficient air production
ADDED, the U-boat would be beaten.
whenever, as in the North African ex-
pedltlon, we have been able to give full
protection, we have suffered little loss.
we 90 not now have the resources to give
THIS full protection to all our convoys,
out the lessons of experience make 1t
certain that when we can do So our
O-boat worries will be vastly reduced.
IL IS Tor this reason that the building
OF faster cargo vessels, or cargo vessels
with more space devoted to underwater
protection, does not seem so necessary
as the building of more escort vessels
The labor and material and shipyard
space available is limited 1t would
seem more likely to produce the desired
result II we continue to produce standard
types of cargo ships which are now COM
ing out at so satisfactory rate, but re-
duce their number somewhat in order to
build more escorts.
The more speed put into cargo ship
the less likely she is to be overtaken bv
U-boat. But she cannot sail in CONVOY
or her speed is wasted, and high speed
makes tremendous demands on cargo
carrying capacity in favor of engines
boilers and fuel supply. For the protec-
ton OF our ocean shipping, escorts and
more escorts, planes and more planes
carriers and more carriers is the the
tfleo and true answer. The pity is that
we have to suffer for some time to come
before we can make that answer COM
pletely and finally.
'Copyrisht 1943, by New York Tribune, Incl