Evening star., 1943-05-29
Dam Warfare

Dam Warfare
The bombing of the Tirso dam
system on the island Of Sardinia,
following closely on the successful
preaching of two big dams in West
ern Germany, suggests the elabora-
ton OF one of the most promising
developments in aerial warfare.
This applies especially to Italy,
which is far more vulnerable to such
attacks than Germany.
1taly's economic life is vitally de-
pendent on its controlled water.
Both the peninsula and it's outlying
islands, Sardinia and Sicily, are
mountainous lands with a seasonal
rainfall. Furthermore, Italy has
virtually no coal nor oil. This means
that its factories and railroads must
be run largely by hydroelectric
| power while it's crops during the
long. dry summer are. in many dis
tricts, dependent on irrigation. But
| the only way to obtain a constant
supply OF both is by impoundng the
water of its lakes and streams This
| has been accomplished by the erec-
ton Of more than 5000 dams, some
Of great size, distributed all over
! Italy, from the Alps to the extreme
south and in the islands as we'll.
4 In peacetimes, Italy has supple
mented its hydroelectricity by i'm
ported coal, largely by sea. It's entry
| into the war cut off water-borne
coal and forced reliance on coal
from Germany brought by rail over
the Alpine passes. But those rail
lines are few in number, and their
limited capacity is overtaXed by
other requirements such as troops,
munitions, and variety of strategic
materials. The result has been
an acute transportation bottleneck
which has kept coal deliveries from
Germany below Italian needs. Italy
has thus become more dependent
upon hydroelectric power than ever
before.
The logical inference from this
crucial dependence is that, if Italys
hydroelectric system could be dis
rupted by the destruction of even
it's key dams, the result would be
something akin to economic pa
| ralysis. It's factories. even where un-
bombed, would go dead. trains would
not run. and the growing crops
would wither in this summers S
droughts. With it's population al
ready war-weary and half-starved
this might we'll be the proverbial
last straw that could precipitate a
chaotic break in morale and knock
| Italy out of the war.
Can those vital dams be destroyed
| from the air? That is question not
| yet decisively answered. 1t should
be recalled that the preaching of the
Moehne and Eder dams in Germany
| was accomplished, not by direct
| bomb hits on the dams themselves,
| but by dropping into the reservoirs
| mines which f1oated down on the
dams and there exploded. That was
a surprise method which caught the
Germans unprepared 1t should be
| possible to protect dams against such
mines by strong nets similar to those
stretched across the mouths of
harbors to guard against subma-
rines. Direct hits on the dams
themselves by bombs dropped from
airplanes usually forced to fly high
by adequate hack fire are difficult
feats to accomplish, and even when
such hits are scored, the decisive
preaching Of reinforced concrete
dam structures does not follow as a
matter of course. Reports on the
bombing of the Tirso system by our
planes do not indicate that ire
| parable damage was caused.
| 1t is always wise not to overesti-
mate the potentialities Of new de-
velopment in the science of warfare.
| The rational attitude to take regard
ing this novel form of aerial attack
is to regard it as one more promising
| factor in a complex offensive waged
| by many co-ordinated methods.
The eventual defeat of the Axis will
presumably be effected by skillful
and methodical combination of all
practicable means rather than by
the overweening results of any one
of them. Military history shows that
to be the way most wars are won.
It is said that Admiral Robert,