Evening star., 1943-02-13
Allied Offensive

HfIlSU SIlGnSlNG
Winston Churchill rarely holds out
false hopes. Therefore we may take
at approximately face value his as
surance to the House of Commons
that the extended conferences at
CaSablanca had evolved a master
plan for a detailed Allied offensive
pattern during the balance Of the
present year This pattern obviously
far transcendS the current operations
in North Africa, which are merely
the preliminaries to action against
Axis is-dominated Edfope.
The European continent, from
Norway to Sicily and from the Pyre-
nees to the Ukraine, today form gi-
gantic Axis fortress. The Red armies
are battering deStructively at its
eastern border, but Anglo American
blows must be delivered at other
SegmentS if the structure is to col
lapse rapidly. Since such blows are
clearly contemplated within rela-
lively near future, survey of Allied
alternatives is legitimate speculation.
Axis circles are frankly worried at
the prospect. Adolf Hitler'S special
mouthpieCe, the Voelkischer Beo-
bachter, admits that an Allied at
tack on continental Europe appears
very possible" and goes SO far as to
predict that the main drive will come
in western France, where Germany
maintains important submarine
bases" A successful Allied invasion
Of France certainly would be a body
blow to the Axis, not only by destroy
ing the most dangerous U-boat nests
on its Atlantic coasts but also by
opening up an avenue of attack on
Germany itself. 1t could also be
launched directly from Britain with
short supply lines. Yet such an IN
vasion would encounter an easy Axis
concentration behind tremendous
fortificationS, and, once embarked
upon, would require an almost limit
less volume of manpoWer, equipment
and supplies. This maximum COM
mitmcnt may be avoided by Allied
strategy so long as the U-boat men
ace renders uncertain full deliveries
of reinforcements and materiel.
Once the Axis is expelled from Tu-
nisia an invasion Of demoralized
Italy looks easy on the map. But
Italy is merely a junior partner of
Germany, from which it is separated
by rugged mountains, An Allied
conquest of Italy therefore might be
a. dead-end road rather than the
springboard for a fatal thrust at the
Axis heart.
An Allied invasion Of the Balkans
offers larger strategic possibilities,
especially in conjunction with con-
tinued Russian offensives. Axis dis
asters on the eastern front are
throwing the Balkans into increasing
ferment. Unlike Italy, the Balkan
peninsula affords direct avenues to
the heart of Central Europe, par
ticularly the Danube valley. Such
an Allied invasion would become
feasible as soon as control of the
Mediterranean has been attained.
The disadvantage of the operation is
chiefly long supply lines by sea as
opposed to much shorter Axis land
concentrations. 1t would also have
to be conducted on very large scale.
One remaining alternative should
be considered. This is an Allied at
tack upon Northern Norway. Such
an operation would have the advan-
tage of being limited in scope. North
ern Norway has virtually no land
communication with the rest Of the
country. Once the German garriSonS
there had been overcome and local
air and sea control maintained by
the Allies, a German reconquest
would be extremely difficult The
safeguarding Of the supply lines to
the Russian Arctic ports of Muir
manSk and Archangel would be a
full recompenSe for losses incurred.
With the current strain upon Allied
shipping, a limited commitment in
Europe may be the most Of which the
Allies are now capable.
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