Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-14
Nozis Facing Problem
On Use of Reserves
Red Armies Convereinq
On Rostov From Five
Separate Directions
By Maj. George FIELDING Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
One great problem which the Ger
mans must solve in Russia involves the
| economical but timely and efficient use
of their reserves.
Every commander of mobile troops in
the field tries at the beginning of an
action to hold out reserve. A platoon
leader may keep a squad or two in
hand. company commander a platoon,
and so on all the way up the line to
the commander of group of armies,
who may have reserve available
amounting to score of divisions or
even more, some of them withdrawn
from the front line for reorganization
and rest others Immediately ready for
action. Then there will be general re-
serve, under the direction of the high
command or general headquarters, and
the use of this reserve may determine
the outcome of a campaign or even of
the war.
Only by holding out reserve can
commander, Of whatever grade, con-
tinue to influence the course of battle
once it has commenced. Once he has
committed any part of his forces, he
can only hope that he has trained them
well and that he has put them in at the
right time and place. The outcome of
the action is in the hands of the sub
ordinate leaders Of small combat groups
squads, sections and platoons.
But the commander, while he has a
reserve in hand, can help his fighting
troops by using good judgment in put
ting that reserve in at the right time to
give the final push for victory, or by
using it, If he must, to cover with
draWal. He must be judicious and time
ly in this action, which is probably the
must not put his reserve in too soon, or
withhold it too long. All this applies in
principle to commanders of all grades
In the Russian campaign, the first
Russian blow fell on the German 9th
Army before Stalingrad. The army
commander undoubtedly used all his
own reserves, and seems to have called
on the army on his left, on the Middle
Don, for help; for this army all but COL
lapsed when the next well-directed Rus
sian blow hit it, and 1t reeled back all
the way to a point between Millerovo
and Kamensk, where its resistance be-
gan to stiffen, and where it is now hold
ing
The stiffening resistance was prob
ably due to its being reinforced, and the
reinforcements most likely came from
the reserve elements of the southern
group of armies, which included at the
beginning a total Of four armies-one on
the Middle Don, just referred to; one at
Stalingrad, now entrapped; one in the
deep Caucasus, now in full retreat and
one on the Lower Don, elements of which
are fighting astride the Don and the
Stalingrad- Rostov railway to hold back
the Russian advance southwest of Stalin-
grad.
1t has been estimated that the Ger
mans had in this southern group of
armies grand total of perhaps lis
divisions of all types (90-95 German di-
visions. and 1925 Italian, Hungarian
and Rumanian divisions. OF these, %
are now trapped in the Stalingrad area:
1895 more have been severely handled
during the various Russian drives, and
many of them will be out of action for
some time, or exist only as scattered
remnants. We may. therefore, assume
that the remaining force of the original
southern army group amounts to total
of about 60 divisions, plus such OF the
smashed divisions as may have been
hastily reconstructed. Supposing-and it
is liberal supposition-that half of
them are prepared to go into action
again, the outside limit in line and in
reserve, would be, say. rs divisions of
all types.
But such number is probably quite
inadequate to deal with the powerful
Russian armies now converging from
five separate directions upon the center
and key city of Rostov. In supporting
| all his operations, the army group COM
mander may very well have used up all
or almost all his own reserves. and he
will be frantically calling on Berlin for
| help from the great general reserve. How
will this call be answered?
The Germans have already had to
find troops for the occupation of Vichy
France. for reinforcing garrisons in
Sicily and Sardinia, as we'll as Italy it.
| self. and for their operations in North
| Africa. The remaining strength of the
| general reserve is probably not more
than so divisions, though it may be as
great as 60. 1t can be reinforced by
calling for troops from Western Eu-
rope; but in that case the threat of an
Allied landing must be taken into &C
count. It. can be reinforced from North
Russia, but the fall of Velikie Luki. the
peril to Rzhev and the reported Rus
sian advances toward Smolensk are
ample warning of the fact that the Rus
slams are prepared to take instant ad-
vantage of any such move.
If the whole of the general reserve is
thrown in on the Southern Russian
front, the German Army is fixed; it has
lost its power of maneuver, and the high
command its power to influence the
conduct of the war, which it can re-
gain only by drastic shortening of its
lines of commandments u.s. with
drawal to positions much closer to its
centers of supply.
Thus the problems presented to the
German general staff are not easy ones
and yet they are problems which must
be solved and solved quickly for with
every yard of Russian advance disaster
| loons closer and tho Russians are show