Evening star., 1943-07-18
Experts Divided on Best Path
To Take War Directly to Nazis
By Constantine Byown

me DfOVn.
crossing Of the highest mountains In
Europe - the Alps - which have been
strongly fortified by the Nazis since
1898.
Our supply problem will be a very
difficult one. Not only will we need war
material and food for a considerable
Allied force, but we shall have to keep
the Italian railroads going and thus
transport to Italy at least 10000 tons of
coal every day.
Feeding Presents Problem,
Beyond that we shall have to feed a
starving italian population. Even if this
feeding will be scant one our sea
transportation will be heavily taxed by
keeping a continuous sea traffic between
the United States and the Mediterra-
mean.
The other route opened to the Allied
armies to penetrate Germany is across
the Adriatic through Yugoslavia into
austria. This operation is not easy, but is
considered by the Allied strategists as
much more feasible than the penetra-
ton OF the Reich by way of the Alps.
Once across the Adriatic-and this will
be mere routine operation if Southern
Italy Is in our hands-We can get into
friendly land and be assured of the
support of the guerrillas of Gen. Draia
Mlhailovich and Of the bulk of the civ
ilian population.
The fly in the ointment, as far as this
operation Is concerned, is political. Mos
COW has indicated to us that it would
rather have us choose another route ia
defeat the Germans than the Balkan
route. IL
The Balkans are considered by the
Soviet leaders as belonging to the kus-
sian zone of influence. The arrival of
British and American forces In that
area and the inevitable lengthy stay OF
these forces among the Yugoslavs might
Jeopardize the Russian theological hold
on section of the population of Yugo-
sla7ia and its ne1ghboring states such as
Hungary and Rumania.
1t Is in the cards that if strong AlIleu
force reaches the borders of these two
Nazi satellites they would secede from
Berlin and accept any terms offered.
And while neither the United States
nor Britain might refuse Russia at the
peace table, her claim Of Influence" in
the Balkans, the people of these co11n-
tries themselves might refuse to accent
such tutelage
Ihls might cause disturbances ana
an unpleasant situation which Moscow
dlslikes Hence, the hint from Moscow
that We keep out OF the Balkans as mucn
as possible.
French Road Lengthy.
Under the circumstances the Amer,c.r
strateglsts see but little advantage in
using Italy as the main road to Berlin.
lhey consider it detour with too manv
narrlcades to make our march on the
Nazis profitable.
Our strateglsts consider in the same
way the possibility of entering Southern
france by way of Italy even If we con-
quered those sections of italy which
would make the invasion of French
RIVIERA possible. Such an operation
might get us to Marseilles and possibly
TO Lyons, but we still would be far from
the main Nazi lines of defense.
The attack on the Nazis from across
the Channel, in spite of the strong
enemy Notifications, still is considered
by Our chief strategists as the only oper-
alton capable of yielding quick results.
1t is obvious that the American armies
Will nave to bear the brunt of the war
against the Nazis The opera tions
against Sicily, stronghold defended by
some 10000 Axis troops, have required
an Allied invasion force Of at least two
and one-half times that number.
Unless there is collapse from within
and for the time being there Is no
indication that such blessing will oc-
cur soon-we must count on an even
larger force to conquer the Germans.
The British have put many troops in
Africa. The total number of British
striking divisions available in the United
Kingdom cannot exceed the maximum of
30-that is to say, about 100000 men.
The rest of the British force Is in Africa,
the Middle East and India
If We take the number of troops en-
ployed in the conquest of Sicily as an
adequate yardstick, we shall need at least
100000 men in the first wave in West
ern Europe This number will have to be
increased by an equal number once we
have established beachheads in France
and begin to move against the main
Nazi defenses. Since the British cannot
afford to increase the number Of their
striking divisions substantially it is evil
dent that the major burden will fall on
the American forces.
Want Direct Attack.
Notwithstanding, the American gen.
erals. who cannot help keeping in mind
the major military problem of this coun-
try in the Pacific, are said to favor this
frontal operation because it would yield
quick and positive results.
They are confident that the Russians,
from the military point of view, can hold
their own. Even if the Nazis were to
start an all-out offensive on the eastern
front in the next few weeks and if they
were to obtain initial advantages, the
American strategists feel that the Rus
slams will not be defeated.
The certainty that the Allies will at
tack the Nazis in Western Europe in the
next few months-early in 1944-would
be a, tremendous incentive for the Rus
slams to fight on, despite whatever diff
cult circumstances they may meet IN
the next 10 weeks.
Under these conditions, the American
strategists are said to be convinced that
the 1914 campaign would be most fruit