Evening star., 1943-06-05
Revolt in Arqentinu

NeVOIt IN Argentina
Although the military revolt in
Argentina has come as a surprise, it
is a not Illogical elimination to an
increasingly unbearable political sit
uation. The policies of the Castillo
administration, both foreign and do
mestic, had offended majority of
the Argentine people from the start.
It's stubborn isolationist neutrality
compromised Argentina's national
interests with the world at large and
threatened to forfeit it's leading po-
sition among the Latin American re-
publics. At home, its suppression Of
free speech and repression of normal
political activity verged more and
more on dictatorship. The rising
tide Of popular discomfort was bound
to precipitate climax, either parlia-
mentary or revolutionary in char
acter.
Unfortunately, a quick change Of
government by constitutional meth
DDS was not feasible. President Ra-
mon S. Castillo, who had risen from
the vice presidency to the chief ex-
ecutive by the political accident of
the illness and death of former
President Roberto Ortiz, was the
leader of a we'll organized and pow
erful minority group composed chief
ly Of the great landowners and kin
dred ultra a-conservative elements.
This group dominated the coalition
party known as the Concordancia,
whose voting strength was mainly
in the provinces but which also in
cluded big business and finance. The
opposition was divided between two
parties. the Radicals and the Social
lists. Their supporters are mostly in
Buenos Aires. Argentina's metropo-
lis and capital, which, with it's sur
rounding urban metropolitan zone,
contains nearly one half of the total
population. In the legislative branch
OF government, known as the con-
gress, the senate or upper house was
dominated by the Conservatives,
while the lower chamber was run
by coalition of Radical and Social
ist deputies. The chamber was the
political rallying point for the op-
position, but its activities were
thWarted by President Castillo's dras-
tic use of his extraordinary powers,
especially by his proclamation of a
state of emergency, under which he
functioned almost as a dictator.
Argentine public opinion had been
looking forward to the presidential
elections next September as the best
chance for legal change. But the
inability of the Radicals and Social
lists to put up strong coalition ticket,
and the apparent intention of the
administration to use its authority
unduly to influence the elections,
made it not unlikely that President
Castillo would be succeeded by his
henchman, Senor Costas, leader of
the senate, who would presumably
carry on present policies virtually
unchanged. These dubious political
prospects inevita bly, suggested to the
opposition the need for prompt re-
lief by extralegal action.
The key to the dilemma was.
naturally, the army. So long as it
solidly supported the government,
revolutionary attempt was imprac-
ticable. However, the army is not
unresponsive to the trend Of public
opinion, and the policies of the Cas-
tlllO government were alternating
some of its own supporters. Big bust
ness and finance, tied up as they are
with foreign interests, British even
more than North American, deplored
the way Argentina's economic pros
poets were being injured and its eco
nomic future jeopardized. Exclusion
from the United Nations Food Con-
ference, just concluded, was an espe-
cially ominous pOrtent. The upshot
seems to have been movement
quietly prepared in the army under
the guidance of General Pedro Ra-
mirez Minister of War in Castillo's
own cabinet. This strongly indi-
Gates the disaffection which must
have been spreading even within ad-
ministration circles. The almost
bloodless success of the coup struck
by the main body of troops in the
metropolitan area indicates that
President Castillo and his inner cir
Gle had been politically isolated and
undermined.