Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1943-05-20
BY CLARK LEE

CAPTURE or Anu. cS-
pecially Il i is followed hy
Suu1iar vr--rr~Sfui rxf1r--.tttett-
agsinst ki.ka VIII greatly
lessen the throat Of a japanese
offensive against the American
mainland hur % Will not open
LIP a ropal Enad -.ar- aurlaAaSlnn-
Of Japan
u marks t--rr- rr'l,t-rrtttrr tt ctr
penetration of The northern end
OF the outpost lines that Japan
has built and Is building around
her major bases and captured
territories. IL brings US within
bombing range Of most Of this
japanese curve OF outer de-
fenSeS stretching from SInga-
pore 10 the northern Pacific
Seen In proper perspective,
however, the loss Of Attu IS a
serious but by no means fatal
blow 70 SJapanS strategy. The
longer Japan can keep US tight-
ing along her outer rim Of de-
lenses. the more time she viii
have 10 strengthen her really
vital bases and TO attain her
political and economic obJectIveS
In Asia.
A year ago Attu and KlSka
were unoccupied and we could
have taken them, II we had the
forces available, without any
opposition-FhHs- the-Japanese
may consider that they have
gained a years time in building
up their defenSes against an
American attack from the
northeast. even though they
were unable in that time 10 win
the race TO build aIrfelds IN the
AleutianS and consequently lost
Attu.
ATTU WAS the last Of all the
islands in the Pacific 10 be taken
by the japanese, which would
seem 10 indicate that they were
not overconceTned with the pos
sihility of establishment OF an
American base there. However,
since our landing. spokesman for
the Toxic war office have shown
great concern over the AmeTi-
can seizure of the northern
gateway of our greater East
Asia war.
What happens after Attu de-
ponds almost entirely on how
large a percentage of our
strength is devoted TO fighting
Japan.
Our victory in the AleutianS.
as in the SolomonS and New
Guinea and in local air actions
over China and Burma, has
shown that wherever we concen-
trate enough power we can de-
feat the japanese.
Our mighty production is be-
ginning 10 tell, and we have at
. last slugged our way into
JapanS outpost defenseS in The
North. as we did months ago IN
,"the Solomons and New Guinea.
2
THE IMMEDIATE results Of
the capture Of Attu VIII prob
ably not he great As a de-
. fensive base against further
japanese penetration Of the
AleUtians, the island should be
a valuable shock abSorbcr.
Because OF the almost pcrma-
nently unfavora flying
weather and because II lacks
any OF the facilities Of a naval
base, IFS value as a jumping Off
point for bombing raids against
Japan or for a major invasion
is less Immediately apparent
Japan's position in the Pacific
is still very strong The Jap
snese have an interior line Of
communications over which Jap
snese supply ships have 20
travel only approximately one
third az the distance 20 be COW
cred by our own transports and
supply vessels As We push our
offensives. the distances VIII
lengthen
Distance-and ur1e-are the
two most important factors
working IN Japans favor
Gwen Sift cent tlWC he Jap
snese may he able 10 move q
great portion Of their Industries
or of the narrow strip south
ward and westward @, Toxic IN
which 'hcy, are now concc0-
trated
The most critical part ~ he
AeIstic picture today d. 'rc
situation 20 China The japanese
Pc mOr'aily afraid that me
United STATES VIII orc day pour
= real stream ci srp.ar-, gs.D-
line and bombs mn CHINA and
open ar about ar offensive
against J.p-r
Consequently 'ne 1span.-e
are concentrating great Jea.
~ Their attention on China
For more than r. tcar. frr
japanese Raw, mot u..- U~afr
any severe mlItsry pressure.
They have concentrate on 90.
velopng the economic resources
Of their great new empire and
they have succeeded IN getting
chrome ironNand copper from
the Philippines on and FISH FROM
The Dutch East Indies Tin and
rubber from Malaga end rice
from al the conquered countries
More important they have
been work king lnduSirlousIy
and with cunning 20 win ne
support Of fhc conquered peoples.