Evening star., 1943-07-02
South Pacific Offensive

South Pacific Offensive
Every fresh bulletin from the War
and Navy Departments here in
Washington and from General Doug
las MacArthur's headquarters in
Australia confirms the impression
that far-reaching operations in the
South Pacific are under way. The
original Navy communique announc-
ing>a landing by American forces on
Rendova Island in the Central Solo,
mons at dawn on Wednesday, Solo
mons time, was quickly followed by
bulletin from MacArthur's head
quarters that landings had been
effected on islands off the southeast
tip of New Guinea and at Nassau
Bay we'll up the New Guinea coast
and near the Japanese stronghold of
Salamaua. Since those first an
nouncements, we have been informed
that all these operations are being
conducted in the closest co-ordina-
ton and under MacArthurs supreme
command
From all this, distinct strategic
pattern logically emerges. 1t appears
to be far-fung pincers drive whose
ultimate objective is the main Japa-
nese base at Rabaul on the northern
tip of New Britain Island, which is
the key to the entire Japanese posi-
ton in the South Pacific. What we
do not yet know is whether current
operations are the beginning of
sustained drive for that major objec-
tive or whether they are preliminary
operations for local goals which must
be consolidated after attainment be-
fore the eventual drive on Rabaul
can be undertaken. This will become
clearer as we learn the tenacity of
japanese resistance and their ability
to counterattack. Perhaps our high
command does not itself know, and is
waiting to test the enemy's strength
before fully committing itself.
In any event, we may be sure that
no such combined operations, cover
ing a spread of over 500 miles, would
have been started unless our high
command was assured that our CO.
ordinated land, sea and air forces
were adequate to attain their i'm
mediate objectives and hold them
against any coanteroffehsive the
japanese could develop. For some
time, series of official and semi
official statements has made it plain
that all branches of our armed forces
in the South Pacific were being
rapidly built up to point where
large-scale offensive operations in
that area would soon become possible.
Toxic has confirmed this, notably by
Premier Tojos recent statements be-
fore the japanese Diet, wherein he
warned that desperate battles in the
South Pacific impended The pro-
longed lull in ground fighting which
followed our mopping up on Guadal-
canal and on Southeastern New
Guinea. nearly six months ago, was
obviously due to end. The gathering
storm was evident to both sides.
There was thus no surprise like that
when we launched our sudden blow
at Guadalcanal last August, though
the Japanese evidently did not know
just where they were going to be hit.
Now that our initial blows have
fallen, the enemy will have chance
to show the nature and scope of his
counterpreparations.
There is good reason to believe that
we have learned great deal about
landing operations during the past
year. A series of practical lessons
such as Guadalcanal, Dieppe and
North Africa should have led to the
perfecting of equipment, methods
and coordination of services. For in
stance, we are already told that the
landing on Nassau Bay near Sala-
naua was preceded by intensive
aerial bombing and the use of an
effective air umbrella. The entire
trend of the war envisages the in
creased feasibility of landing opera
tionS and the establishment of
beachheads even in the presence of
strong enemy resistance. 1t is not
yet so clear how far the problem of
enlarging those footholds inland in
depth has been solved. Perhaps the
current offensive in the South Pacific
will provide the answer.
6h;noeo EIonuanre