Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-02-20
Time of ituI
Importance
In Tunisiu
Nozis Not Counting
Cost Of Strategy,
Maj. Eliot Says
BY MAY. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

HAS hiLUNIi lioN w LOG ~ w poL
poses, Much of the early German
success in this war was based on
a clear appreciation of the impor-
lance of time. Now that the United
Nations are on the offensive, we
shall likewise seek to make time our
ally
The operations in Tunisia are
case in point, In that theater, the
Germans, using force of not more
than seven or eight divisions backed
by perhaps Is per cent of their air
power, are fighting very hard to gain
time. Their purpose is clear, and
so are the reasons for it.
First, the present Russian Often
sive in South Russia must soon be-
GIN to slow down. Bad weather,
and the approach of the spring
thaws, will check the Russian move
ments; so will the frightening OF
| their communications as the Ger
| man communications grow shorter,
and as the fighting moves from an
area with sparse road and rail net
into one with a much denser road
| and rail net. -l
The Russians are likely to dis
count this increasing disadvantage
by shifting their main effort north-
ward against the German left flank
in the region between Leningrad
and 'Vitebsk. On the whole. the
Germans seem likely to enjoy some
! thing OF a breathing space on the
Russian front, beginning in about
a month or six weeks, except pos
sibly for operations in the north
where a German withdrawal to the
DVlna has probably already been
planned and may we'll be executed
without heavy losses in men and
equipment. The Germans can make
good use of such breathing space
only If they are not, before it comes,
presented with new source of ma
jor anxiety elsewhere.
Second, it is of the greatest i'm
portance to the United Nations to
find some relief for their shipping
! troubles. One of the greatest pos
slble reliefs would be the reopenine
of the Mediterranean for the uss
OF our convoy. Consider two of our
main supply routes-that to the
Middle East, and that to the Per-
sian Gulf. 1t is just over $4,000
nautical miles from New York to
Alexandria by way of the Cape Of
Good Hope, the route we are using
at present; by way of the Med
iterranean, it is barely 5000 miles.
1t is likewise about 10000 miles
from New York to Basra by the
Cape of Good Hope, and only
little over 5000 miles by way OF
the Mediterranean.
An immense saving in tonnage
VIII result as soon as we can clear
the Strait of Sicily. which can be
made reasonably safe for convovs
II we can get the Axis forces out OF
Tunisia so that our air fields can
be located along the whole of the
Africa Coast. The sooner we can
do this, the sooner we will feel the
effects of that saving in all our
overseas enterprises.
Third, the change in the attitude
OF Turkey is of great Importance to
us, and might be of even greater
Importance if, with the Mediter-
ranean open, and with no further
military commitments in Africa, we
were able to give direct support to
Turkey on her exposed European
frontier, and particularly in the
matter of clearing the Axis garrisons
out Of Crete and the AFGHAN Islands.
The possibilities of opening a new
front in the Balkan Peninsula are
most inviting; they become more So
as we hear of incipient revolts in
Bulgaria. But the opportunity may
pass II 1t is not grasped in time. N
Similar though not Identical COM
| slderations apply to our relations
with Spain and Portugal. Tie eff
feet OF the Allied invasion of French
North Africa, followed by the Rus
sian victories, seems to have been
to convince Gen. Franco that the
Axis is going to lose the war. The
more firmly he becomes convinced
of this, the more likely he is to
extend some measure of co-opeva-
| ton to us and to deny such meas
ures OF cooperation to the Ger
mans. A complete victory in
Tunisia would seem the best way
of confirming Franco in that salu-
| tary point of view.
Finally we must remember the
forces involved-tWo British armies,
an American army, and a French
army, with vast quantities of ship
ping engaged in supplying them.
powerful air force, and the British
Mediterranean fleet plus an Ameri-
can naval contingent. t@
With Tunisia cleaned up, these
four armies would be available else-
where. Some of their air support
could likewise be used elsewhere,
though some would have to remain
to guard the conveys.
The submarines Of the British
feet could be sent to the Far East,
where they would form a most
welcome reinforcement to our own
submarines in their offensive
against japanese shipping. Most
of the merchant shipping now used
to support the North African cams
paign could be used to support
whatever new offensives might be
decided upon. Some of it could be
employed in the task of building
up the reconstructed French Army
and increasing its striking power
All this would be won with the
winning of the camDaign in