Evening star., 1943-09-18
Corsica Slated for
Important Role
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot

Bu Mai. George Fielding Eliot.
The results of the fighting at Salerno
illustrate once more the vital importance
of air power in amphibious operations,
and the difference between its strategic
and tactical roles in that type of war
fare.
All the time the Allied troops were
fighting for the Salerno beachheads,
Allied strategical air power was hammer
ing away at the enemy communications,
supply dumps and other installations all
over Southern and Central Italy A vast
amount of damage was done, on which
the Allies eventually will cash in, but
the chief immediate effect obtained was
from the injuries inflicted on the enemy
airfields.
For the rest, the enemy was dependent
on his forward depots, in which he had
assembled considerable quantities of sup
plies: Enough to enable him to fight
out his battle until it was decided one
way or the other. In other words, stra-
tegical air power Except as it strikes at
its enemy counterpart produces
strategic and not tactical effect.
The case of our tactical air power
at Salerno was quite different. In the
beginning, we were dependent on two
sorts of tactical air support: Carrier
based planes, and long-range two
engine fighters operating from bases in
Sicily, and probably also in Calabria.
The distance from Sicilian bases to
Salerno varies from ITS to 100 statute
miles. This distance is practicable for
the two-engine fighter, but because of
the terrific rate of fuel consumption at
the high speeds used in actual combat,
it limits the length of time during which
the fighter can remain in its operating
area.
A British source reports that many air.
craft were not able to stay on the job
at Salerno-"therefore there may be
periods when there are no Allied air
craft over the beaches and then again
there may be 10 squadrons operating at
once" The periods when there are none
are, of course, the periods of enemy
opportunity.
AS for carrier-based aircraft, their
qualities have been much improved
during the course of the war, but they
are limited in numbers in any given
situation because of the simple fact that
carriers are big expensive ships of which
there are, when all is said and done,
comparatively few in the navies even of
the greatest sea powers, while the land
affords infinite opportunity for the basing
and servicing of aircraft.
Note the remarkable change which
took place in the fortunes of the 5th
Army during the last 48 hours of the
heavy fighting. 1t was then that we
suddenly heard that the whole of the
Northwest African Air Force had been
thrown in and was engaged in continu-
Gus attack on the enemy. What had
happened was that we had gotten land
bases into service, perhaps in the area
through which the British 9th Army
was advancing; more likely-much more
likely-on the other side of Italy, in the
Bari-Altamura area, only 75-11o miles
from the battle zone around Salerno.
The airdromes in this vicinity are
therefore within single-engine fighter
range, and 1t is the single-engine fighter
which makes all the difference as long
as 1t can stay on the job a sufficient
length of time to do it's work well. The
moment the single-engine fighters came
in to support the others, the whole pic
ture changed, as far as tactical air
power was concerned.
1t comes to this: as against really
strong opposition, there is little hope of
making successful landing unless tao
tical air support can be given from
bases not more than 100 miles away.
Longer ranges, or dependence on car
er-based aircraft, will be risky in the
extreme unless the enemy's air power
Is decidedly limited by circumstances,
and cannot be quickly reinforced
Even then, the Importance of close
air support acting against enemy ground
targets must be recognized. The first
move in any landing must be to obtain
the close-support bases, and where this
has to be done at the same time that
the landing is taking place, there always
will be period of hard fighting, un-
certainty and heavy sacrifice until the
close-support bases are in operation.
That Is why the invasion of Western
Europe on large scale is limited to
the area between the mouth of the
Scheldt and the mouth of the Seine,
where close support can be given from
English airfelds. That is why, as we
consider the possibilities of landings in
Northern Italy and Southern France,
the Island of Corsica assumes a degree
of military Importance which it has not
enjoyed since it produced Napoleon
Bonaparte.
1t is quite likely to be the first metro
politan French territory to be recovered
from the hands of the modern imitators
of that conqueror.
fcopyright 1943. New York Tribune Incl
Living Expressions