Evening star., 1943-01-05

power to protect that shipping from
the submarine, there can, indeed, be
little question. Our strategy is based
on carrying on war in the enemy's
country rather than allowing war
to come to our own shores. To pro-
ject our military power across the
oceans, we shall need vast amounts
of shipping, and we must expect Sc
we're losses to result from the enc
my's attempts to destroy that ship
ping.
When it comes to reducing ground
weapons in favor of aircraft, we
have reminder that our resources
are limited and that we must choose
carefully the best possible ALLEGATION
Of those resources. both in labor and
material, in accordance with our
strategic plans and the type Of war
that we find 1t necessary to fight.
Certainly there is no use in piling
up the equipment for huge ground
Army unless we know what we are
going to do with that Army, unless
we have enough shipping to take it
o'Si oSoso anu supply ~ "lioil IL SetS
there, and unless we have sufficient
air power to give it the necessary
measure of air cooperation.
Danger in Idea.
It Is, however, to be hoped that
stti1tf change does not mark an off,
cial Endorsement of the view which,
has been put forward very persua-
s6aveay sdnzrecent magazine articles m
the e6ect that this war can be won,
at least as far as Germbny is con-
cerned, by making the bombing
plane our principal means OF attack
1t Is persuasively represented by the
advocates Of this idea that by con-
centrating our major effort on
bombing, making everything else
auxiliary thereto, we can bring about
the defeat Of Germany by disarm-
Ing her-that is. by the destruction
of her war industry and internal
communications.
There is not space within the lin
its of this article to discuss this the
ory in detail, but it might be well to
point out that experience with aerial
warfare so far has not shown that
1t can act with sufficient continuity
to bring about decisive results.
Moreover, il ground opera tions
are to be neglected, or left entirely
to the Russians, the Germans not
only will be able to devote a greater
part OF their own production to
fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft artil-
lery and other methods of defense
against bombing attack, but that part
OF their army not engaged In Russia
will be left with a considerable de-
gree of freedom of action either for
new offensive enterprise, or for the
task Of fortifying itself and improv-
ing the protection OF its lines of
communication.
Experience With Germans.
There is as yet not the slightest
evidence in anything that has ever
been done with air power that the
airplane alone can defeat a large.
powerful and well-equipped army
such as the Germans certainly
possess.
1t Is probable that the Axis DOW
ers have at their command on the
European continent something like
400 to 500 divisions Of all types, in
Guiding good many armored and
motorized divisions. There is no Ger
tainty as to the size of the Russian
Army, but good guess would be
that they have about 225 divisions
on their European front
II we assume that the British
Isles, plus Canada and South Africa.
can furnish 100 divisions for service
In Europe, North Africa and the
Middle East, we shall probably be
making an overestimate. Thus In
order to equal the minimum Axis
figure given above, We should need
at least IS American divisions for
Europe and Africa, and If it be
claimed that these will have suffl-
GENTLY superior armament to make
up for any numerical inferiority, the
answer is that we are already find
ing out in Tunisia that three years
of war experience counts for some
thing on the Axis side.