Evening star., 1943-08-17
Political StoH Urged
To Meet Emergencies
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

The situation which has developed in
Italy is clear warning of how much
more closely political and military con-
siderations are linked in offensive than
in defensive war.
Offensive war, if successfully prose-
cuted, brings about political changes,
either through the acquisition Of terri
tory or the fall of opposing governments,
or the collapse of the enemy's will to
fight-which must be foreseen and pre-
pared for If full advantage is to be
derived from them.
On the political side of war, as on the
military side, an advantage not taken
in time is frequently an advantage lost
1t is plain that there is clearly de-
fined Anglo-American military policy,
controlled through the combined chiefs
of staff under the higher direction of
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill.
1t is likewise clear from a study OF
events rather than from any of1cial
statement to that effect, that this mill
tary policy is well co-ordinated with that
of the Russian high command.
The continued coordination of the
blows that are struck on both sides of
Axis-held Europe Is not the product of
happy coincidence. This military policy
is secure against surprise, insofar as such
security can be achieved by carefully
working out all Of the possibilities and
providing for measures to deal with
them; and even better security against
surprise Is, of course, that we are on the
offensive.
We hold the initiative, we are striking
rather than receiving blows, and the
enemy has neither time nor resources to
do anything but try to ward of those
blows as best he can and to prepare
against other blows yet to fall, at times
and places, and in force yet unknown to
him.
But there are indications that we have
not yet wrested the initiative from the
enemy in the political field. The sudden
collapse Of Mussolini took us by surprise
and we were by no means prepared to
take full advantage Of the opportunities
which were opening to us by the pro-
found effect which the fall of II Duce
had not only in Italy itself but In the
Balkan Peninsula.
We have permitted the Badoglio gov
ernment to gain time for the Germans
in preparing the defense of Northern
Italy and we are in danger of losing
touch with our chances of bringing over
to the Allied side those very considerable
elements amongst the italian population
whose sympathies, like those of the
Sicilians, are definitely anti German and
anti-Fascist.
This seems to have occurred yery
largely because we have concerted with
our Allies no such combined strategy of
offensive political action as we have done
IN the field of military. strategy. There
exists no political agency comparable to
the combined chiefs of staff and no COM
parable understanding with the Russians
to that which so clearly exists between
our military authorities and the Russian
high command.
Until we do have thoroughgoing
offensive program in which military and
political factors are jointly considered
and co-ordinated, we are constantly open
to surprise In the political field. We
shall see more lost opportunities in
future, and perhaps of worse effect, for
the political problems facing us will
tend to grow in Importance, Just as the
political problems of Italy already exceed
in Importance those of French North
Africa.
1t may be we'll to remember that in
the last war two attempts at setting up
joint command for the British and
French forces on the Western Front
one under Joffre and one under Nivelle-
failed because of the fact there was no
joint political agency to which the inter-
Allied commander in chief could be
responsible
In both cases, the joint command
broke down because Of the inability of
the commander in chief to serve two
masters, the British and French govern
ments, whose policies were not fully CO.
ordinated.
When Marshal Foch became Joint
commander in chief in the spring of
1918, he found already in existence the
Inter-Allied Supreme War Council, which
had been formed in November of the
previous year. This body, composed of
responsible political leaders Of the Allied
powers, with military advisers, was able
to coordinate the political and military
strategy of the war on the highest level
of policy, so that Fochs tenure of the
joint command was a conspicuous
success.
The time Is obviously at hand when
the United Nations must create a def
mite organization to serve the same pur-
poses as those which the Supreme War
Council served for the Allied powers as
they turned to the offensive and to VIC
tory in the last World War.
tCopyright 1943, by New York Tribune, Incl
OVERRIDING 1t
From the Dodpe City C;lohe