Evening star., 1943-10-20

De seVersky. The informa-
ton available is rather fragmentary
the most explicit account having
come from Mr.. Churchill himself
in his Commons report on Septem-
ber 21. But there is enough to en-
able us to reconstruct the larger
pattern of the air phase.
To begin with, it is clear that
what made the operation so "dar-
ing" so full of hazards" was the
fact that the landing on the Salerno
shores was made at the very out,
side rim of our Umbrella of land
based air protection. Our land
planes could just about reach the
area, but with gasoline so depleted
that they must Immediately start
for home again. AS the Prime Min
lister summed it up:
From the Gulf of Salerno we
were at the extreme range of shore
based aircraft flying from Palermo
and other conquered Sicilian fields.
Until we gained refueling stations
and landing places our single-en-
CINE fighter Squadrons had but a
quarter hours activity over the bat
tlefleld area"
Risk Is Stressed.
In other words, we undertook a
vital surface action beyond the
range Of supporting land-based avia-
ton. This was done despite the
sad lesson in TuniSia, when Amer
lean forces suffered serious losses
and setbacks because they had ven-
tured beyond effective aerial cover.
Both engagements showed clearly
again that air control over the
entire area of a battle is indis-
pensable to victory-a principle not
yet as deeply engraved on the minds
of some ground generals as tshould
be.
But while Salerno showed up our
serious handicap by reason of in
sufficient range in fighter planes.
it also demonstrated the great bril-
lance of the Allied air chiefs. From
the available information we are
able to piece together a picture of
quick thinking and ingenious I'M
provisation that will make one of
the most exciting pages in the his
tory of this war.
The picture is not easy to convey
without diagrams. In essence 1t
amounted to this: The effective
range of the fighter-bomber planes
was nearly doubled by a unique and
successful employment of carrier
based aviation. The shore-based
aviation was used primarily to pro-
vide an impregnable air cover for
the carriers, and the carrier-based
planes were in that way released
to provide a cover for the trans
ports, warships and ground forces
at Salerno.
Seafires Used.
Seafres. an adaptation of the Spit
fire for operation from carriers, were
massed on floating bases" at an in
termediary point between Sicily and
Salerno. Without air protection out
CT Sicily they would have been quite
unable to help the landings or pro-
tect the naval units in the Gulf of
Salerno. They would then, as Mr..
Churchill put it, have been deprived
- of the support of shore based
aircraft and they would have thus
become the sole object of the enemy's
attack, thus absorbing their own air
power for their own defense instead
Of helping the troops on the
beaches"
Had it not been for land-based
aviation working out of Sicily, that
is to say, the carriers would have
been obliged to use their entire COM
plement of aircraft to keep from
being sunk themselves, leaving the
battleships and the landing contin-
gents at the mercury of the German
luftwaffe. AS it was, the floating
base" remained safely under an UNI
brella of land-based fighters, en-
abling the Seafires in turn to open
up an umbrella of air protection
over the Salerno theater.
Indirectly the improvisation un-
derlined once more the new doctrine
that navies cannot today approach
pnemy shores that are adequately
shielded by the enemy's land based
air power. Specifically it might look
as if this doctrine has been dis
proven-at Salerno, battleships die
provide artillery support to the land
ing forces under cover of carrier
borne planes. But closer analysis
shows that this could happen only
because the carriers enjoyed the sup
port Of land-based aviation. That
was the telltale condition that guar
enteed the survival of the carriers,
normally exceedingly vulnerable.
Because airpower, in addition to