Evening star., 1943-04-09
Germans Not Likely
To Move Into Spoin
Major Eliot Also Doubts
kozi Campaign Aeoinst
Strong ond Neutral Turkey

kozi Compoisn Against
Strong ond Neutral Turkey
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
In recent articles we have been ex-
amining the political And physical
geography Of Europe in its relation to
the coming invasion of that continent.
No such examination can be complete
without considering the position of the
neutral states.
Two Of these neutrals, Spain and Tur-
key, are of particular interest from the
point Of view of military geography be-
cause they lie respectively at the SOUTH
western and southeastern extremities of
the continent and form, 50 to speak,
land bridges to and from the German
central position-the one connecting with
Africa and the other with the Middle
East. Africa and the Middle East are
bases of Allied military power, and the
land bridges joining them to the Ger
man-held positions in Europe are there
fore Of f1rst-rate military importance.
For some months we have heard
considerable flow OF rumor ascribing to
the Germans the intention of moving
through Spain toward Morocco, with q
view Of denying the Strait Of Gibraltar
to Allied shipping and menacing the
rear and communications of the Allied
forces in North Africa. The necessity
Of guarding against such a possibility Is
still retaining considerable number Of
American troops in French Morocco.
There has lately been q feeling in some
Allied quarters that this danger is pass
ing ~ the Tunisian campaign draws
toward its close; these quarters feel that
If the Germans intended such q move
they would have made 1t while they still
retained = greater freedom OF action In
Tunisia than they do now.
1t Is probable that the Russian situation
also affected German plans in this
respect. The German high command
no longer disposes of unlimited striking
power and it is quite possible that .
temptation but that the battle of dis
engagement in southern Russia has not
proceeded rapidly enough to permit the
detachment from the eastern front Of
the necessary troops for the purpose.
There are undeniable strategic advan-
tages for the Germans In an advance
to the Strait Of Gibraltar, but whether
these advantages outweigh the costs is
another question. In general 1t would
not seem that 1943 is a year In which the
Germans will wish to undertake great
extenAons OF front and Of lines of COM
munication, but will rather desire to les
sen their responsibilities and concen-
trate their forces.
The special position Of Portugal must
be kept in mind In connection with
Spain. If the Germans 60 into Spain.
they can hardly leave Portugal open to
an Allied force striking st their flank.
But If they invade Portugal as we'll as
Spain, they must pay a very heavy price
indeed-for the certain consequence
would be an Allied occupation Of the
Azores Islands, giving US q mid-Atlantic
air base that would enable us to deal
far more effectively with the German
U-boat campaign than we are able to
do at present.
Germany Is placing great reliance on
the U-boat to whittle down the flow
of American armed power toward Eu-
rope and Africa, and 1t may be expected
that in the inner chambers Of the high
command, the weight OF German naval
opinion will be heavily against any
Spanish Portuguese invasion. Unless
Germany makes the first move, there
does not appear to be any present like
lihood Of an Allied offensive through
Spain into German-occupied France.
Last year there was much apprehen-
sion OF German attack on Turkey as
part of q general Nazi move toward the
oil fields OF the Middle East. This year
such an attempt would be one which only
= desperate Germany could think of
undertaking. Turkey Is by far the
strongest, in the military sense of the
European neutrals, and for Germany at
this juncture deliberately to add Turkish
power to the forces arrayed against her
and to undertake a distant and difIicult
campaign over uncertain lines of COM
munication would seem an act of mad
ness 1t could be justified only as
a last desperate resort II the Germans
have convinced themselves that Turkey
will eventually join the Allies anyway
and that European Turkey would then
become bridgehead for the invasion Of
the Balkans. In such a case, the Ger
man high command might consider that
the risks of attempting to reduce that
bridgehead now are less than the risks
Of allowing the Allies to pick their
own time to make use of it.
The position of Sweden is becoming
more difficult because Sweden controls
the best lines of communication between
Germany and Norway. Should Norway
become an active theater of war, the
Germans would almost certainly be con-
fronted with the choice of abandoning
their Norwegian garrisons or making
demands on Sweden which the Swedes
would probably resist.
The position of the two remaining
European neutrals-Switzerlan and
Eire-is somewhat less critical, though
for different reasons. There appears no
present prospect of German aggression
against Switzerland as long as that
country controls oop,