Evening star., 1943-05-03
Artillery Plays Lead
In Tunisio Campaign
Maj. Eliot Says Tonks No
Longer Are Undisputed
Masters of Battlefield
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

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Masters of Battlefield
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
In dispatches from Tunisia we read
OF tactics which are strangely remi-
niscent of the western front in the
World War; We read of heavy fires of
preparation by medium artillery, Of In
fantry going forward under the cover OF
barrage fires, of counterattacks launched
when the attacking infantry has out
run. the immediate protection of its
supporting batteries. All Of which only
goes to show that war in its essentials
does not change very much, that FIRE
and movement still win battles, and that
when new weapons and new methods
seem to have been "revolutionized" tao
tics, the pendulum swings quickly back
as new defense techniques are developed.
The tank is omnipresent but the tank
is no longer the undisputed master of
the battlefield. The all-conquering
blitzkrieg does not work against an
enemy adequately armed, trained and
prepared. The gun is always superior to
the tank, provided the gun can be in
the right place at the right time
In the Polish and French blitzkriegs,
the dive bomber had the task of taking
the opposing artillery out of the picture.
But the dive bomber is hopelessly vul-
nerable to the fighter. 1t can be de-
pended on to perform q major battle
assignment only when the side which
is using 1t possesses complete air SUI
periority.
We come back, therefore, to the normal
teamwork conception Of tactics-the
combination of fire and movement, by
mutually supporting weapons and meth
ods. The battlefield has moved into
three dimensions In every combat,
from skirmish of patrols to the battle
Of decision between great armies, the
air factor is present and must be taken
into account. But the principles which
control the conduct of war have not
changed and will not change.
The art of war Is still to be described
as the development of offensive power
from secure base against 4 well-chosen
objective. Concentration, offensive ac-
ton and security are still the guiding
lights which subalterns as well as gen.
erals must learn to follow.
Notable among the developments Of
today's tactics is the increased impor-
tance OF artillery. In the German Army
which had learned to put undue reliance
on the dive bomber, the artillery arm
has been partially neglected. Much of
the success obtained by the Russians
has been due to their superiority in this
arm.
The Germans are now trying to catch
up but there are some indications that
they have been outdistanced in the
race and will not be able to retrieve
their initial error. AS far as the small
force they have in Tunisia is concerned,
there seems to be no lack of guns, but
there is considerable doubt whether
they can do as well for their larger
forces on the continent Of Europe, when
the real test comes.
Reports by the British 1st and 9th
Armies, and our own I'd Corps front
line stress heavily the excellence and
the worth of the artillery This sug-
ScStS IIidI SOlIIc VI GIlC Ou.ldSIlO1eu
minds which have been at work on the
task Of organizing and arming the
forces of the democracies may not have
been SO weighted down by the dead
hand of the past as might be supposed
from reading some of the frantic out
pourings of critics who supposed that
the Germans, with their blitzkrieg, had
i,fr
Evidently modern artillery, with ade-
quate air cover and handled by officers
imbued with the offensive spirit, is go
ing to play a most important part in the
battles of the immediate future. 1t will
be more mobile than the guns Of old, it
will sometimes even lead the way (as 1t
did at the crossing of the Don last Mo-
gineers, who laid the bridges; it will,
on occasion, take the offensive by itself
(as with tank destroyer commands; 1t
will almost be relatively farther forward
than it ever was in the World War. But
the guns will be there and they will be
essential ingredients of victory.
So essential is it that they should
ticeable tendency to give guns directly
to infantry and armored units, in addi-
ton to the artillery assigned to the di-
visions and corps to which these units
belong. The cannon company of an
infantry regiment, for example, now in
cludes 75-mm. and 150-mm. howitzers,
which in former days were strictly ar
tillery weapons. These are in addition
to the anti-tank guns, and to the in
fantry mortars Of 60-mm. and 8l-mm.
caliber, which give the closest support
to infantry in combat, and which are
proving Of such great value in the
broken terrain of Tunisia.
In the formation of combat teams,
the most usual arrangement is for an
infantry regiment SO armed to be sup
ported by a battalion of four batteries
of field artillery, armed with 105-mm.
and 155-mm. howitzers. Behind this
are the medium batteries of the corps
artillery and the vast and varied collec-
: ton of guns of all types and calibers
which form the army artillery.
The gun is coming into its own again;
the caissons are rolling along.
But when all is said and done, no one
weapon wins wars. 1t is the team that
counts.
(coprisht, 1913, by New York Tribune 1ne)