Evening star., 1943-01-03
The Russiun Offensive

The Russion Offensive
The storming of Velikie Luki by
the Russians is an event of great
Importance from every point of view.
Locally, it punches a hole in the
strongly defended belt of terrain on
the north-central sector of the east
ern front. The Russians did their
best last winter to breach this Ger
man defense zone, but never sue
ceeded in breaking any of the links
which bound it together. Now they
have done it, and done it at an espe-
cially vital spot in the German
armor.
Velikie Luki is the strategic hinge
at the big elbow where the German
front, which stretches almost due
southwark from Leningrad, bends
sharply eastward in the big Rzhev-
Vyazma salient that points like
blunt spearhead toward Moscow.
That salient not only serves as a
potential springboard for another
German attack on Moscow: it also
shields the city of Smolensk, the
strategic heart of the whole German
defense system on the central front.
The fall of Velikie Luki gives the
Russians a solid anchor for encir-
cling movements either at the rear
of the Rzhev-Vyazma salient, via
SmolenSk, or northWard to roll up
the German defenses and relieve
besieged Leningrad. Indeed, the
Russians have third choice which
they may already have started. This
is thrust directly westward toward
the Latvian border, aimed at the
railway trunk line from Poland to
Stalingrad, which the Germans use
as the main feeder for all their
armies in Northern Russia. The
capture of Velikie Luki already has
cut the secondary parallel line that
runs directly behind the German
front.
The German high command thus
is in the unenviable plight of having
to guard against at least three major
Russian blows operating on interior
lines. This will entail a heavy con-
centration of reserves from the
strategic German pool just at the
moment when urgent demands are
being made upon it to stem the tide
OF Russian victory in the south.
This, indeed, is the larger meaning
of the fail of Velikie Luki-the fact
that the Russians have the strength
to win such a triumph in the north
simultaneously with their complex
drives from the middle Don to the
Caucasus. 1t reveals a degree of
Russian striking power which most
military students did not believe
possible after the tremendous bat
tering the Russians took during the
German offensive of last summer and
early autumn. The Russians clearly
have the initiative all along the
eastern front. Nowhere do the Ger
mans seem to be able to do more
than fight Intellectual defensive
actions.
This radical shift in the strategic
balance may be due either to Rus
sia's absolute strength in manpoWer
and equipment, to Germanys rela-
tive weakness in those respects, or
to both. In any case, the Russians
seem to have found the answer to
the German hedgehog" defense
system which blocked the Red Of
fensive last winter. For if they can
shatter one link in the German
defense chain by pulverizing assault,
as the Russians have just done at
Velikie Luki, there is no logical rea-
son why they cannot repeat the
performance at other key points. A
few such blows might disrupt the
entire German defense system and
compel a general retreat westward
in the dead of winter. So colossal a
retirement at such a season could
not be effected without staggering
losses in men, materiel and supplies.
In fact, it might develop into dis
aster akin to the debacle Of Napo-
Icons Grand Army
OF course. such speculations
should NOT lead us too far afield.
But the rapid deployment Of Rus
sian offensive power, displayed con-
tinuously for nearly two months on
so many sectors, brings the posi-
bility of general military decision
clearly into view. German prospects
look dark. And the Russian winter
has hardly gotten into its full stride.
Field Marshal Rommel has COM
planned about Field Marshal Kes-
selring's failure to give his forces
sufficient protection from the British