Evening star., 1943-10-09
And Now Corsica

The breaking of the last German
resistance on Corsica is bound to
have important consequences, both
military and political. Corsica is
the northernmost of the island out
posts which screened the Italian
peninsula and correspondingly pro-
1ected Axis naval and air power into
the Western Mediterranean. This
island screen is now entirely in Allied
hands; so the strategic situation is
deciSively reversed. With full naval
and air control over the Western
Mediterranean, the whole western
side OF peninsular Italy is now ex-
posed to attacks from the air and
from the sea. From the northern
tip Of Corsica it is less than 60 miles
to the coast Of Tuscany and barely
100 miles from Genoa, the port me-
tropolis Of Northern Italy, with it's
splendid harbor and excellent dock
age facilities. Both Northern and
Central Italy are thus brought with
IN easy range for Allied fighter
planes, which could be used either as
escorts for bombing raids or as UNI
brella coverage for the landing Of
an Allied expeditionary force similar
to that at Salerno. Henceforth the
Germans must divert troops and
equipment to parry possible Allied
"leapfrog" tactics at almost any
point between Genoa and Rome.
OF course, 1t should be remembered
that Corsica is not Italian but French
territory. The island was occupied
by mixed Italian and German forces
after the breakdown OF the Petain
regime late last year. Most of the
occupying troops were Italian, with
a core of German technical and air
units. With the collapse of Musso-
lini's Fascist regime last summer,
the Italian troops in Corsica became
obviously unreliable; so the German
high command rushed in reinforce
ments, to which were soon added the
German contingent on Sardinia.
This gave the local German COM
mander strength enough to master
the diSaffected Italian soldiers and
hold in check the growing activities
OF Corsican patriots who were form
ing guerrilla bands in the noun
famous interior.
However, the German situation had
become clearly untenable The sur
render OF the Italian fleet auto
matically opened the way for Allied
sea power to dominate the waterborne
communications between Corsica and
the mainland, while the establish
ment Of Allied air bases in nearby
Sardinia threatened German aerial
connections with Corsica as well.
Further reinforcement OF the Ger
man garrison on Corsica, even If
feasible, would have been merely
throwing good money after bad
The mission of that garrison had
been reduced to fighting a delaying
action against Allied attacks which
were inevitable. Those attacks
quickly came, the expeditionary
forces including large contingent
OF the reorganized French Army in
North Africa.
Here, political factors enter the
strategic picture. The liberation of
Corsica in large part by French
forces is potent stimulant to French
patriotic action everywhere Al
though the first effect was to pre-
cipitate fresh quarrel between
Generals de Gaulle and Giraud, this
flare-up of personalities has been
overshadoWed by the increased pres
tige of the Committee for French
Liberation at Algiers and the grow
ing unrest in German dominated
France itself. These psychological
factors have as yet had few tangible
consequences, but the leaven is work.
ing beneath the surface and should
show itself whenever the time is ripe
for Allied landings on French soil.
probably spearheaded by ardent and
well-equipped French troops. The
political effects of the Corsican VIC
tory should thus grow greater in the
course of future events.