Evening star., 1943-08-08
Sicily Proves Coss
for Air Power
Eg John n, Cltns.


n lsfle, va arc air forces IN this coun-
ify's experience. promises 20 insure the
full equality Of air power In future
operations OF this kind.
The War Department has been out
spoken in its commendation of the
part played by the Army Air Forces, de-
claring that air power paved the way
for the successful invasion with one
OF the most complicated and intense
undertakings in air force history"
American and British pilots. beginning
in early July, succeeded virtually In
driving the Axis planes out of the
sky over Sicily. In the four weeks
ending July 2s United States planes
few 1883 offensive sorties, dropped
l2,460 tons of bombs, destroyed 342
enemy planes with 54 "probables," and
aree believed to have sunk enemy
ships and to have damaged 10 others.
All of this with loss of but 100 Ameri-
can planes.
In the course of these operations the
Axis air bases on Sicily we're rendered
useless, the islands system of COM
munications was crippled and bombs
were dropped far up the Italian penin-
sula, measurably choking of enemy sup
plies which might otherwise have been
used by the Axis against our troops.
Certainly 1t is no exaggeration to say
that without this effective employment
of air power the invasion probably would
not have been undertaken, nor could It
have succeeded If the attempt had been
made
Problems Of Cooperation.
There were mistakes, of course, and
there are those who believe that our
air strength would have been more
effective If differently employed For
instance, Mark S. Watson, able military
commentator for the Baltimore Sun,
writes from North Africa of an incident
in which column of our troops was
attacked by our own planes, the pilots
mistaking them for an enemy force.
And Mr.. Watson also tells of the problem
confronting some naval officers when
partially identified or unidentified planes
come roaring toward their ships. Shall
they open fire on the assumption that
the planes are hostile when they may be
friendly, or shall they hold their fire and
take chance on being bombed2 This Is
difficult decision, particularly for q
commander whose vessel may have been
attacked but few minutes before by
enemy aircraft, and Mr.. Watson found
competent military men in the Sicilian
theater who cling to the belief that the
best remedy lies in training certain air
units to support particular ground or sea
units with which they have had special
lied training. In their view, when air
power is operating in support of land
or sea power, the air units must be under
the full control of the ground or naval
commanders.
Most air officers needless to say, are
in emphatic disagreement. While recog-
nizing the need for better joint training
to avoid such incidents as those men
toned, Mr.. Watson reports, they feel
very strongly that the tremendous strik-
ing power and mobility of the air forces
should not be dissipated by training air
units to operate with particular ground
or sea forces, and then tying them down
to those forces when the training Is COM
pleted The typical air officer is con-
vinced that the air force must be pre-
served as a single powerful mass" and
that any control by ground or naval
units as such, means dispersal and rel
ative weakness
In support of this belief they point
to the fact that in the Sicilian operation
the air forces appear to have had full
equality with the ground and naval
| forces, all three, of course, being under
| the command of Gen. Eisenhower
And if this arrangement has worked so
well in Sicily, they ask, why should there
be any thought Of changing 1t in fu-
ture operations?
Air Power on Equality.
Generally similar is the view put forth
| by Col. Wilfrid H. Hardy in an ar
ticle written for the Military Review on
the function of the Air Support Com
mand. Col. Hardy's article was written
before the invasion Of Sicily and his
discussion was limited to the function
Of air support of ground unit up to
the size of an army of perhaps three
corps, but the principles involved are
pretty much the same.
1t Is a mistake, Col. Hardy says, to
start with a mental picture that air
units must, from the very beginning, be
tied securely to either ground or naval
units. The idea that some air must at
all times be tied to every division is not
only false but it won't even stand the
test of ordinary logic. division is a
force which can occupy at one time only
few miles Of terrain. 1t fights on solid
ground only and its movement is ex-
tremely slow when compared to air
units. :. Aviation never has been,
and never can be. considered as an ac-
companying weapon, so you should get
away from the idea that air operations
must begin by dropping bombs right in
front Of our infantry. Always bringing
aviation within the call Of each battalion
or division commander Is not the basis
Of effective air support. The assignment
of general missions is by far the best
method Of insuring maximum support" 4"
This does not mean that air power
should function without relation to the
operations of ground or naval forces On
the contrary, they will work and plan
together, and there will be times when
air power will execute missions as di-
rected by ground or naval commanders.
The essential point, however, is that air
power, in this scheme of things, would
be on plane Of equality with ground
and sea units and not subordinate to