Browning chief. [volume] (Browning, Mont.) 1941-1953, 1943-10-01
WNU Service, Union Trust Building,

Washington, D. c.
The ink is now dry on the secret
footnotes which appear in the memo
randa officially recorded after the
long and quiet conversations which
took place in the presidential study
in the White House when the Allied
strategists worked. out the end of
another chapter in the history of
World War II.
My own modest notations, scrib-
bled on the backs of envelopes, and
on scratch pads, and written in taxi
cabs, leaning against White House
elm after a press and radio con-
ference, taken down while the Pres
ident or other officials were speak
ing, make a clearer pattern.
Words and phrases take on new
meanings, rough sketches are filled
out in revealing detail.
The speculation, the criticism, the
attacks and the apologies which
swirled about the Allied policy
toward Russia, for instance, it is
plain now was built mostly on half
knowledge.
While press and public were cry
ing for tripartite meeting of the
representatives of Russia, Britain
and the United States, the arrange
ments for a whole series of meetings
were already being made. 1t was
not until almost the end of the
Roosevelt visit that we
learned, first, that the tripartite
meetings ION the foreign minister
level" had been definitely agreed
upon and, second, (Which no one
then guessed) that a commission
was to be formed of representatives
of all three powers to discuss the
situation arising out of the Allied
victories in the Mediterranean in
which Russia is so deeply concerned
but which, militarily speaking, she
has been forced to view from dis
lance. When we received that news,
we were unable to indicate its source.
The Darlan Question
Another source of bitter contro-
versy which has been allowed to
tester was cleared up at the same
time. Certain groups in England
and America from the very begin
ming violently objected to the choice
of Darlan as the man with whom
the Allies dealt in North Africa.
There have been two revelations on
that score which, had they come
earlier, might have cleared the air.
One concerns the Russian attitude
and the Russians certainly ought
to lean as far to the left as anyone.
1t now seems that the Soviet lead
ers, frankly opposed to Darlan and
all he stood for, actually accepted
the British and American policy on
the basis of an old Russian saying
that in matters of military strategy
or comparable situations-it is
sometimes necessary to deal with
the devil and his grandmother.
A word from the chief of staff re-
vealed in his annual report to the
secretary of war is interesting in
this connection. He says of the dip
lomatic preparation before the in
vasion of Africa: "Should an ap-
proach be made to single French
man who proved unsympathetic to
our purpose, we risked the slaughter
of our soldiers on the beaches of
North Africa as well as decisive
losses to our shipping . unexpect-
edly, Admiral Jean Darlan, Petain's
designated successor, and command
er-in-chief of all French forces,
was found to be in Algiers visiting
his sick son when our forces landed.
He was taken into protective custo-
dy and when it was found that
French leaders stood loyal to the
Vichy government, series of con-
ferences Immediately followed with
the purpose of calling halt to the
French resistance against General
Patton's task force in the vicinity of
Casablanca."
The Background
Then, on the morning of Novem-
Der II, the Germans invaded France
and Darlan obligingly rejected the
pseudo-independent Vichy govern
ment and assumed authority in
North Africa in the name of Marsh
al Petain and ordered the French to
cease all hostilities.
Just what pressure or argument
was used in getting Darlan to yield
to Allied wishes has never been re-
vealed or what his motives may
have been-they may indeed have
been prompted by the devil or his
grandmother-but those who knew
the inside military expediency, did