Evening star., 1943-04-11

determined practical views.
When representatives of the Allied
fighting forces gather they, of course,
discuss strategy and map plans for fu-
ture operations. Political directives are
necessary, however, when men must
draw large-scale stategic plans.
Take, for instance, the question OF
arming the $4,000 or 10000 Poles who
have been prisoners Of the Russians
since 1889 and have now been sent to
Palestine. These men are trained SOL
diers who could add substantially to the
armies in the Near East. The question
OF supplying them with modern equip
ment to make them into an army is inn
portant from the strategic point of view.
But the political question which may
arise is whether the Soviet government
would want to have them fully armed.
| Or take the case of the French troops
in North Africa. There is no question
that we could use the $4,000 men Gen.
Henri Giraud could put into the field il
we could provide them with modern
| equipment Many long discussions were
required before war material to equip
few French divisions began to be sent
across the Atlantic. There were political
interests which preferred to see Gen,
Glrauds men only as a small adjunct
force of the Allies-mostly a police force
| behind the front.
| In both cases, it is doubtful whether
the high-ranking officers who attend the
daily conferences of the Joint chiefs OF
staff had any definite ideas concerning
the political angle of both questions.
They discussed the matter with the view
toward having as many trained and fully
equipped men as possible in both areas.
When they were confronted with an
obstinate opposition from their colleagues
sitting across the table they did not
know which way to turn
Colleagues Know Strategy.
Their colleagues representing our as
sociates in this war had definite and
clear instructions as to the political
strategy Of their governments and thev
knew that whatever they said would be
upheld by their respective governments
Our men have only confused notion OF
what our political strategy is. In fact,
they realize that it varies from day to
day and since they are so close to the
fountain Of knowledge they prefer to
leave those matters to the decisions Of
the Commanderin Chief.
Some observers close to the principal
policy trainers believe that the lack of
a precise announcement of our foreign
policy is not accidental. The theology
OF the ''uplifters' which revolves around
taking care of the world after the war
has been accepted by President Roosevelt
merely to gain time and allow things to
cool off,
We are in the midst of a heavy war
and we have just begun to fight. The
| road ahead is long and tortuous In
order to win the war in Europe we need
our Allies almost as much as they need
U.S. Any step in the wrong direction on
our part might conceivably bring about
rift between us and our associates
which would be extremely damaging to
the primary object of this war-the de.
feat of Hitler.
Although the matters are not talked
about openly in official quarters, the ad-
mlnlstration knows there will have to be
oeflnlle departures from the spirit OF
the Atlantic Charter after the European
war Is won. ANY stand on the reinstate-
ment OF certain nations to their pre-l939
frontiers might have bad effect on our
major associates
On the other hand, the philosophy Of
the "upllfters" that one of the primary
roles OF the United States after the war
Will be to provide the other nations with
everything they need cannot cause anv
dlssention with our Allies. They all
would want to get everything they can
from us for as little as possible. So the
longer we emphasize that side of our
policy, OF which lease lend has been only
forerunner the more harmonious rela-
tlons we shall have with our Allies.
The ties between Great Britain and
Russia are getting stronger every day.
NOT only do the British people consider
mat Russias fight against the Nazs has
saved them from an invasion and has
given them the necessary time to Or
game themselves for final victory, but
they also feel that America, while gen.
erous and big hearted, cannot be counted
on in the future
Fear Isolation Policy,
Ihere are two fears in Great Britain
| regarding the future policies of the
| United States. One is that we NAV again
| turn lsolationist. And this time, many OF
tnelr observers in the United States be-
| heve, 1t will be for keeps. Under the cir
cumstances, since Europe will be at war
| as long as she exists, Britain must have
another power to lean on in the future.
And that power is Russia with her 1907
oOOOOO Inhabitants and inexhaustible
natural resources. Any concessions the
Soviet government may require should
be granted, the British people feel
The other fear, less concrete. is that
after having suffered heavy losses in men.
materials and money, the United States
under the leadership of another Presi-
dent might become intensely imperalis-
tic. The word imperialistic Is not used to
mean that We may have extensive terri
torial ambitions but in the sense that We
may want to acquire as many markets az
possible.
The present impoverished world will
not remain impoverished 50 long as hui
man beings are alive and need and pro-
duce goods. And there Is a minority Of
political thinkers in Great Britain who
worry lest we may take advantage OF our
position as head Of the war effort and
grab those markets which Britain con-
siders essential to herself.
These doubts in the minds of the Brit