Evening star., 1943-12-03

- 1s44 efficiency Above
Major De seversky. all, our men
showed magnificent courage and de-
termination-and it was that which,
in the final checkup, brought us
victory.
The taking of the Gilberts, how
ever, must also be considered in the
larger strategic picture. 1t is an
other step in the standby island
approach to the main citadel Of
enemy power. Japan itself. And the
| first thing that needs TO be noted
| is that amphiblous undertakings-a
series Of land invasions from the
sea-are the most extravagant Of
all military actions, particularly in
/ the investment of human lives.
Because the Gilberts are too small
! to permit the concentration Of
strong airpower, losses among our
naVa! forces were small Had the
areas been suitable for substantial
air strennth, the obstruction of our
ships would have been as great as
the loss Of lives among our marines.
We were able to neutralize airpower
on the Marshalls. few hundred
miles away, so that the japanese in
the Gilberts were virtually deprived
Of air support
Zig Force Utilized.
TIE main resistance was encoun-
tered on the small island Of Betio,
which is only about 2 miles long
and a thousand or so yards wide.
Against this tiny strip we brought
to bear a gigantic naval force of
batticships. cruisers. destrovers and
( transports. tens Of thousands of per-
Sonnel manning this force, and at
least l000 airplanes.
Such overwhelming power of men
and machines was needed to con-
1uer a tWo-by-four island, defended
only by 1000 japanese, at cost of
a great many American lives. And
/ even at that, we were taking a ter
riflc gamble. AS a British war COR
respondent, Henry Keys. wrote:
Rear Admiral Harry Hill. who COM
manded the operation, told me that
! had the enemy been able to sink
but one of our transports We might
we'll have suffered the most humil-
iating and CALLING defeat This
gives us hint OF what the island
oy-island strategy will be like. Hun
dreds OF islands must be oVercoms
in the ampi.ibious advance before
We are within reach of Toxic.
In attacking the Gilberts We made
contact only with the outermos,
fringe OF the japanese sphere Of
control. on the extreme end of en-
emy supply lines We must face
the fact that as we move into the
interior Of this japanese sphere,
where japanese supply lines are
shorter, resistance Will DE constantly
ncreaSeG-rOughlv in inverse pro-
portion to the distance. In other
words, when We reach halfway be-
tween the Gllbcrts and Japan itself,
We are likely to run into fortified
Islands Of much grealer defensive
power, so thai both the resistance
and our losses will be doubled.
Defenses Were Small.
Moreover, IN the case of Betio and
the other Gilberts we brought i'm
menSe force against very small
islands, incapable of containing
enough defensive power. When we
strike at bigger islands with greater
defenSeS. the cost to US will be pro-
portionately higher. Thus, as We
approach Japan. our losses will
mount and mount, until the cost
becomes prohibitive and the forward
movement must stop.
That will happen when we reach
enemy positions under the shield of
japanese land-based aviation. At
those points the naval offensive
must come to Standshill because
our tactical aviation based on car
rlers and on small land bases will bs
unable TO cope with enemy air
power based on Japan and on large
land areas like the Philippines,
Sumatra, Java, Indo-China, Malaya.
We will be stymied until we can
smash the industrial might of japan
proper, weakening it sufficiently to
, undermine its land-based air power.
The writer is convinced that those
planning the naval offensive against
Japan-in which the Gilbert battle
Is an initial step-are likely to un-
dergo the same experience as GER
tain military men who urged an
invasion of Europe from the yerv
outset. Through bitter disappoint-
mentS and heavy losses, these mill
tary men finally realized that in
vaslon could not be accomplished
until Germany itself. as the source
OF Nazl power was sufficiently sof-
! tened from the skies and Sheared OF
/ its LuftWaffe strength. British and
fAAiioi iSoi Oil po"tI 10 llOW OIl LIE
way to achieving this purpose, to
the point where invasion may be-
come practical,
The naval minds will have to 90
through the same cycle. They still
feel that with great preponderance
OF force they can put over a direct
amphibious strategy. But in the end
they will recognize that they must
anchor and wait until air power
destroys-not every island in tho
Pacific-but the enemy's war-mak-
ing machine inside Japan. Only
then, when Japan is denuded of It's
land-based air power and we attain
dominance in the skies over the
whole area of conflict, will the Navy
be able to enter japanese waters.
Those waters are forbidden to US
as long as thew are coyoraJ NV