Evening star., 1943-11-13
German Difficulties
In ItoIy Are Many
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.


Reports that the Germans are pre-
pairing to stand "at least eight weeks"
on their present positions in italy, which
are being referred to as a German
winter line come from captured Ger
man prisoners, apparently with con-
siderable unanimity. Possibly that. Is
what the German high command would
like to have our commanders believe.
1t might be one way of gaining little
time, since our approach naturally
would be more cautious If we were sure
we were dealing with strong. well
defended German defensive zone rather
than with German Army on the rum
I think there is a good deal Of evi-
dence which suggests that the Ger
mans are pulling fast one. First of
all, their two wings are not in direct
communication with each other, nor
have they been since the fall of Isernia
and Venafro. A considerable detour
has to be made In order to shift forces
from one side to the other, which tends
to interfere with the mobile defense
which has so far been the German
mainstay-as long as they had un-
broken lateral communications behind
their front. Next, the Germans cer-
tainly must be in constant fear OF an
Allied landing behind one or the other
Of their flanks, and any real stabiliza-
ton would afford every opportunity
for such landing, unless the Germans
were prepared to back up their new
position with reserves strong enough to
cover, with a powerful mobile defense,
every possible landing point along both
impossible that the Germans can dis
pose of so great force in Italy as
would meet this requirement. That is
to say, 1t Is impossible to suppose that,
under present conditions, the German
high command could find any defensive
object in Italy worth the assignment
OF as many troops as this would take.
They need troops too badly to stave
off disaster in Russia and to build up
their dwindling strategic reserve against
the day of reckoning in the west.
The reported destruction of the port
facilities at Leghorn and Pescara sug-
gests how greatly the Germans fear
the possibility of an Allied landing and
the division of their forces by high and
almost impossible mountains would put
either wing in a very poor position to
deal with an attack on its rear. All OF
which would seem to indicate that
wherever the Germans may mean to
make stand in italy. it is not likely
to be where they are now. The dis
advantages seem too great to be &C
cepted
There are other disadvantages to the
whole German position in Italy which
are making themselves felt. and will do
so in increasing measure as our air.
power develops its full efficiency. These
disadvantages have to do with the
precarious nature of the main supply
lines of the German Army in Italy,
which run across the Alps through mar
row passes and through tunnels. The
principal one Of these supply lines, the
most direct route from Germany and
the one of greatest capacity is the
Brenner Pass line. Entering Italy, this
double track railroad follows the narrow,
close-walled valley of the Adige River
for many miles. There are a number
of bridges over afluents of the Adige.
This whole stretch, from Bolzano to
Trento, is natural target for our
long-range bombardment aviation and
the powerful attack which has just been
delivered against the railway installa-
tions at Bolzano, coupled with an equally
vigorous attack on the exit of the
Mont Cenis tunnel at Modane, suggests
the possibility that the great air base
at Foggia now may be in shape to handle
our big four-engine bombers.
The Germans carried out some demo-
lition at Foggia, probably enough to
prevent the early use of the big ships
from that base. Now they are getting
to work in Italy. and if they can operate
regularly from Foggia from now on they
can do great deal to make life miser-
able for any German soldier who de-
reinforcements on railways which cross
the Alps. 1t would be too much to say
that they can cut the rail communica-
tions OF the German Army in Italy and
keep them cut. If that could be done,
the Germans would face destruction.
But the bombers can. by persistent at
tacks, so reduce the capacity Of the
railways in terms of average daily de-
liveries, as to limit the number of
troops which the Germans can main
tain south of the Alps, and thus place
a definite limitation on the scale of
the German military effort in Italy
lCopyrisht 1a43. New York Tribune Incl