Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-05-12
Maj Drive in Russia
Expected Shortly
Major Eliot Says Germans
May Risk New Offensive
In East to Offset Losses
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

Logically, it would seem that those
| charged with the direction of German
| strategy must be seeking now by every
| means to gain greater degree of free
| dom of action in order to deal with the
| coming Allied invasion of Europe where
| ever and whenever it may occur. They
| must be prepared to meet invasion in
| force in single area, or they must be
| prepared to meet attacks at two or more
| points, perhaps widely distant. The only
| means by which this can be done sue
| cessfully is to establish strong mobile
| reserves, with good communications,
| which can be rapidly moved from central
| locations to any threatened part of the
| perimeter.
The principal impeachment to such
preparatory measures is unquestionably
| the tremendous pressure on the Russian
front AS long as two thirds of the
German army and half of the Luftwaffe
| is tied up in Russia, as long as the Rus
slams are in position at any moment
| to launch a devastating offensive which
might require even a greater portion Of
dom of action of the German high COM
| mand against possible Allied invasion
| of Western Europe, is sadly compromised.
| While these conditions continue, the
| high command never can feel sure that
| the reserves it may have earmarked to
| deal with Anglo-French invasion threats
! may not, when the crucial moment
arrives, be likewise required on the Rus
| sian front.
Their immediate problem, therefore, is
| to reduce their commitments on that
| front. There are two methods by which
| this can be done-to shorten the front
| and to shorten the lines of communica-
| ton leading to the front by a general
| withdrawal, or to reduce the Russian
| offensive power by battle Of destruction
aimed at wiping out one or more of the
Russian armies.
From the strictly military viewpoint,
| the withdrawal would seem the better
| advised of these two eXpedients. 1t would
| be certain to produce the desired effect,
| whereas the other is gamble. 1t would
| have the disadvantage of bringing Rus
| sian air bases closer to German targets,
| but strategical bombing is not the strong
| point of the Red air force, and the
| Russians would be busy for quite a while
in consolidating the territory thus aban-
| doned, improving its communications and
| getting set for a new offensive. The
Germans would, by this means, gain
considerable period of respite on their
eastern front and would be able to
detach from it considerable forces to add
to their strategic reserves for operations
in the west.
But it is probable that the psychology
ical effect of such withdrawal coming
closely after the tremendous defeat in
Tunisia, may seem to the German high
command to outweigh its military advan-
tages. 1t might bring Turkey into the
war on the Allied side; it might even
result in the loss of great part of the
Balkans; it would certainly mean the
| loss of Finland and a general resurgence
| of hope and, therefore, of guerrilla and
| underground activity throughout oc-
cupied Europe. 1t would be accepted
everywhere as an admission of final
| defeat
1t, therefore, seems likely that the
warnings which are coming from Russia
| of renewed German activity on the east
| ern front may we'll be true, and that the
| German high command probably has
| decided to take the risk Of attempting
| new offensive on the Russian front before
| the western Allies can launch an inva-
If in no IF
| such German offensive in Russia must
| be to create a situation in which German
| anxieties and commitments as to Russia
| may be lessened substantially. Hence, it
| must seek not only territorial gains, but
| chiefly the development and destruction
| of strong Russian fighting forces. 1t is
| therefore most likely to be launched in
areas where salient now held by the
| Russians can be bitten off. One such
| salient exists in the Smolensk area,
| which can be attacked from two sides
| from the direction of Staraya Russo and
| from some point along the line Smolensk-
| Bryansk-Orel.
A second Russian-held salient exists in
| the Kursk area, which can be attacked
| from the direction of Orel on the north,
and from Belgorod on the south. An
even deeper penetration might be ef-
| fected by renewal of the German
| attacks along the Upper Donets in the
| region of Izyum.
There are signs that the Germans
| mean to take this desperate chance
| because it is, of all the courses available
to them, the one which, on the whole,
| presents the best hope of prolonging the
| war, which is now the German object.
| But our Russian allies will meet the
| German stroke in good heart, for this
| time they may place their confidence not
only in their own strength, but in the
| certainty that they will not fight alone.
Copyright 1913. New York Tribune Inc)
What Strikes Accomplish