Evening star., 1943-07-12
Axis Power in Sicily
Not Yet Disclosed
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
The nrst phase Of the invasion Of
Sicily has been successfully accomplished
and with surprisingly little loss. Our
beachheads have been firmly established
and are being expanded Contact has
been made between landing parties and
our airborne troops which spearheaded
the invasion. Several airfields already
are In our hands.
The first crisis period" of landing
is the period between the beginning of
the ship-to-shore movement and the
Arm establishment Of the beachhead.
During this time, the enemy air reaction
may be severe against troops, landing
barges and ships; and the enemy counter
attacks on the ground, particularly ar
mored attack, may dislodge the landing
parties before they have had time to
dig in.
We have gotten through this period
without much trouble. In fact, on the
basis OF the rather fragmentary re-
ports now available. the Italian coastal
defense units do not appear to have put
up anything like stin resistance. For
example, one report from Algiers says
that our parachutists have everywhere
joined hands with our landing forces,
which suggest that even the hrst groups
Of parachutists were not too seriously in
terfered with by the enemy.
The coastal region of the southeastern
corner of Sicily, roughly from Licata
around the coast to the vicinity Of Syra-
cuse, seems to be in Allied hands
though these locations are not alto
gether confirmed and must not be taken
too literally.
The second "crisis period" in landing
is that between the establishment of
the 'beachheads and the first serious
enemy counterattack. In defending
against landing, the defender keeps the
bulk Of his mobile ground forces in hand.
He uses his advance elements and his air
force to inflict as much loss as he can,
and waits for the development of the
landing to see where the attacker is
going to make his main effort before
committing his own reserves He Is COM
PEELED to do this because the attacker
has the initiative, and is coming in
from the open sea.
There is no way for the defender to
tell whether any given landing party is
the spearhead Of the main effort or
simply diversion or a secondary opera
ton. OF the latter there will be in q
large landing probably several, and their
objectives generally will be to obtain
of "a AL
the use Of the attackers fighter planes
and to deprive the defenders Of it. This
seizure of airfields is an essential part
Of the first phase of the operation.
When the defender has determined
what 1t is that the attackers are trying
to do, he may then counterattack with
such forces as he can bring to bear, and
usually the quicker he does so. the better
his chance Of success. The quicker he
attacks, the less will be the forces &C.
tually ashore to oppose him.
The ideal moment for counterattack
is when the force ashore is still SO small
that 1t can be overwhelmed, but repre-
sents a substantial loss to the attacker.
This is called catching the attacker
dca idS tiIC bCdSAi ~bOutlI llllu III
detail, while that part Of his force still
in barges or on shipboard is helpless
to aid the outnumbered fraction on the
shore.
1t is the particular duty Of the air
craft supporting the attack to prevent or
delay the movement and concentration
OF the enemy counterattack elements
during this second crisis period This
is why the seizure of airfields near the
points Of landing is 50 important part
OF the first phase.
We have not yet seen a serious enemy
counterattack In Sicily. There has
not been time for that yet, but the
moment for it may be close at hand.
good deal depends on the strength and
position Of the German troops avail
able, and on whether the Italians (who
are certainly the bulk of Sicily's de-
fenses) fight stoutly and efficiently.
We should not judge the Italians by
the fact that their coastal detachments
do not seem to have put up very strong
fight. These detachments may we'll be
composed Of poorly trained and poorly
equipped militia and territorial army
| formations. The regular troops held
back at central points awaiting develop
ments. may prove to be foes Of differ
| ent sort. We can only wait and see.
AS for enemy air power, it appears
| to have been completely overwhelmed
as far as the Sicilian airfields are con-
cerned, but there has not been time for
reserve squadrons from Central Europe
to arrive at airfields in South Italy.
How much of their air reserve the
German high command will see fit to
use for the defense Of Sicily is, of course,
uncertain. This mobile reserve is not
very large. 1t is Gernany's fire depart
ment, so to speak, ready to rush to any
threatened point and hold off the enemy
until other measures can be taken. But
the Russian front may need air rein
forcements, and only air reinforcements
could do Crete and Rhodes any good,
If other Allied blows were to be struck
in the Eastern Mediterranean.
AS we await developments, we are
making the best possible use of each
moment the enemy allows us by improv-
ing our positions in Sicily. The more
time we have before his counterattack
comes, the stronger we shall be, and the
better placed.
There Is every reason to feel proud
and happy over the admirable organiza-
ton and management of this the first
inv Nf