Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-28
Strategic Bulunce

The most difficult problem Of Ameri-
can grand strategy is the proper APP
portlonment Of our striking power
between the two ends of the Berlin
Rome-TOkiO Axis. 1t is essentially
an American rather than a United
Nations problem. because we are both
The arsenal and the manpoWer reser-
vOir of the Allied cause. Further
more, we are at war with the entire
Axis, whereas two of our main part
nerS and some CT the junior members
Of the United Nations are not. Rus
STA is neutral toward Japan, while
China is not warning against Ger
many and Italy.
Despite the fact that Japan struck
the first blow against us at Pearl
HarbOr, our Government has con-
SiStently concentrated its main eff
forts against the European end of the
Axis. And the Anglo-American con-
ference just concluded at Casablanca
makes it abundantly clear that this
policy will be continued Indeed. the
trend Of events makes this virtually
inevitable. Our growing commit
ment in North Africa, the victorious
Russian offensive, and the increasing
menace Of the U-boat all combine to
make Hitler First" the enduring
slogan.
This is well understood by our
Allies in the Far East and the Pa
cific, but they accept our Govern
ments decision reluctantly and with
none too good grace. Time after
time, the spokesman of China and
Australia have warned us that our
choice may force us ultimately to pay
an eXorbitant price. The most recent
Of these warnings was voiced by
Prime Minister John Curtin of the
Australian Commonwealth. Speaking
at the observances of Australia Day,
he asserted that the Southwestern
Pacific is too crucial a war theater
to be left to force Of "caretakers."
A mere holding war" on or part
until Germany was subdued at some
unspecified future would, as Aus
tralianS see it, enable Japan so to
develop and exploit her conquests
that she might become impregnable
to attack Or even engender fresh
aggressive power sufficient to con-
quer Australia, in which case what
of the long American coastline from
Alaska to Cape Horn?" Urging that
much greater forces be despatched
to the Pacific, Mr.. Curtin concluded:
TOO much is no good when it is too
late . . We paid cheerfully the
price for our seal of nationhood as a
free people in a free cause, and will
continue paying it. But it is also
a charter of our right to share in the
common pool of Allied resources"
China is saying little, just now, but
its attitude is we'll known, as is like
wise its increasingly desperate situa-
ton Despite the reassuring state
ment issued after the Casablanca
Conference that all possible aid
will be rendered China, Chungking
knows perfectly we'll that she can
expect little more than she now is
receiving. at least for some time.
That. makes the position of Chang
Kai-shek a difficult one with his
own people, especially If current
rumors of an attractive japanese
peace offer to China are correct.
Global war involves necessarily a
series of choices, because our re-
sources, while great, are not UNI
limited. Yet our Far Eastern and
Pacific Allies have legitimate right
to their points of view, which to
them are paramount. Their atti-
tudes and objections must be taken
into consideration, and the possible
consequences evaluated The very
fact that this is a global war makes
it all the more necessary always to
view it as balanced whole.