Evening star., 1943-05-29
Allied Naval Power
Assures HitIer's Defeat
Major Eliot Says Germans
Failure to Understand Sea )
Constitutes Their Busic Error
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By MAJ. George Fielding Eliot.
1t is related of the Grand Admiral
| Won Tirpitz that after the close of the
| First World War, he shook his head re-
| gretfully and said: The Germans have
| never understood the sea" That was
| true then and it is still true. There is
| no evidence that the German high
command has applied to its strategy
! the underlying, fundamental principle
of sea power. which may be stated as
| follows:
The object of all naval operations is
| the control of maritime communica-
| tlons, the ability to use them for ones
| own purpose, whether military or COM
mercial, and to deny them to the enemy.
| In the last war the Germans had a
| powerful high seas fleet. which they kept
| tied up in harbor most of the time,
They apparently considered the function
| of that fleet to be fulfilled by the fact
that it kept the British grand feet held
| fast to Scapa Flow and Rosyth. But.
actually, it was the grand fleet which
was performing the task for which it
was designed; the keeping open of the
sea lanes on which Britains fighting
power and very life depended. 1t did
not matter whether this purpose was
| accomplished by destroying the German
| fleet or by confining it to harbor. The
| grand feet had been built to protect
| Brltalns maritime communications. and
it did its job. The high seas fleet had
been built for the purpose of interrupt
| ing those communications, and it failed
| to do its job
In this war, the Germans began with
| the theory that air power could neu-
| trallze sea power They were confirmed
| in this view by misreading two early
lessons-those Of Norway and of Crete.
1t is quite true that land based air
| power can protect shipping from attack
by surface ships in narrow waters, par
tlcularly when based on both shores.
The LuftWaffe was able to protect Ger
man shipping en- route to Norway and
as result the Germany Army was able
TO take Norway. while the British sea
! power was unable to throw into Norway
an army adequate to resist the Germans.
| But the Germans apparently never re-
| fected upon what might have happened
II British sea power had been equipped
| with a really modern air force: thev
made the mistake of thinking of sea
| power solely in terms of ships, without
realizing that sea power is actually the
control OF maritime communications bv
any means whatever-bv ships, by
| planes, even by shore based guns where
| possible, They did not stop to ask
| themselves what would have happened
! to their first weak detachments in Nor
way If the British home fleet had pos-
sessed really modern and adequate air
| arm and 'Well-trained, completely
| equipped landing force such as our own
| fleet marine force.
| In Crete was demonstrated the ex-
| treme difficulty Of holding a detached
| island outpost, i'll fortified, too far dis
! tant from main air bases to be given
direct support and imperfectly equipped
with air bases Of its own-lacking,
therefore, the depth and dispersion
necessary for modern defense There
Is not much that surface ships can do
In such a case save to evacuate the gar
rlson, especially when the island Is
within reach of enemy shore based avia-
ton. The battle Of Crete was proclaimed
as triumph of air power over sea
| power; 1t was in fact nothing of the sort
but rather an example of a gallant
defense of an inherently hopeless posi-
ton. Malta, far better protected
though far more exposed has held out
against everything that air power could
do against it, and has been constantly
reinforced and supplied by sea.
But the Germans do not appear ever
10 nave understood how sea power con-
stantly checked them whenever they
came at last to the coast line, lust as
| 1t checked Napoleon Like NAPOLEON
| they undertook an enterprise in Africa
| with some initial success, which came
| finally to an end because they could not
| protect its maritime communications.
| Like Napoleon, they stood on the shores
OF the English Channel with an army
| which might have conquered ENGLAND
| II only 1t could have been ferried across
lew miles OF water. Like Napoleon
| they have deluded themselves with the
| IDEA that a privateering war against
| their enemy's commerce could be SUBJ
| stltuted for true command of the sea
and have found themselves leaning
upon a broken reed.
Even in their Russian operations. the
| lack OF naval command of the Black Sea
| PROBABLY has made the difference be-
tween victory and defeat. The Stalin-
| grad campaign was, above all, battle
| OF supply; uninterrupted use of the Black
Sea to supply the German armies
| through the port of Novorossisk might
we'll have turned the balance, but the
| Germans were not able to wipe out the
Russian Black Sea fleet.
And all the while, sea power was
bringing to their enemies, in the British
Isles, in Africa, and, to some extent in
Russia, the resources of all the rest of
| the world, resources to which German
| lack OF sea power denied them access
The result always has been inevitable
from the day when Hitlers armies hesi-
| tated at the Channel when a bold GAM
BILE might have won him the dominion
OF the world and he dared not take it
while the chance was his. When Ma
poleon turned away from the Channel
/ so -