Evening star., 1943-10-18

tionists in both David Lawrence
the Republican and Democratic
parties.
Although somewhat similar in ap-
preach, the chief differences be-
tween the two is this: Mr. Willkie
would have Great Britain, Russia
the United States and China make
a declaration of intention" now
looking toward a world organization
in which all nations, including the
defeated, would ultimately be ad-
mltted, while Mr.. Welles, though
favoring the same four power pact
as an immediate necessity feels the
matter of world organization should
be left to series of agreements to
be made gradually during the
transition" period after the armis-
tice.
Mr. Willkie rightly insists that the
relationship between these four pow
ers and the rest of the Allied world
he last spoke, recognizes the dangers
of too much emphasis on the au-
thorlty of Great Britain, United
States, Russia and China and wisely
begins to mention the addition of
the fourth French republic He
suggests also that some of the
smaller nations might serve on the
Executive Committee of the United
Natlons-a concession to recent
criticism of the proposed four
power alliance idea
Weakness in Proposals.
Both Mr.. Willkie and Mr.. Welles
vehemently denounce alliances"
and while Mr.. Welles speaks of the
four-poWer arrangement as a TEN
porary' alliance, he warns it must
not oVerreach itself. To a large
extent Mr.. Welles hitherto has been
rejecting the Roosevelt Churchill
concept Of a temporary trusteeshlp
by the four big powers to serve
during a cooling off or transition"
period.
The real weakness of both the
Welles and the Willkie proposals
and the Roosevelt Churchill plan
to experiment and drift through
transition" period is that all seem
to ignore postwar psychology. They
forget that Woodrow Wilson really
lost his leadership and his leverage
among our Allies of the World War
when the armiStice was not yet six
months old. The psychology of re-
turning soldiers during demobiliza-
tion and job-hunting is not merely
antlWar, but it sometimes becomes
bitterly antiforeign. This disillu-
sionment is due in no small part to
wartime mistakes in the behavior of
cur Allies.
The seeds of the same thing are
being SoWn today. Prime Minister
Churchill blundered last week in
treating f1ippantly the criticisms
brought back by five American Sem
atorS from areas in the world where
the British are supposed to be CO.
operating with us Charges of this
kind breed isolationist votes and
Mr. Churchill can do more to re-
move the basis for isolationism in
America by exhaustive inquiry as
TO the facts than by assuming that
the American Senators are merely
being political,
The time to assure an enduring
peace for the years after the war
is during the war. The time to
clear up misunderstanding and to
put selfish commercial interests in
Britain and America and elsewhere
IN their proper place is during
war and not afterwards when the
reaction sets in against those who
would exploit the victory in a re-
surgent nationalism.
League Covenant Lives.
It is now When American re-
sources and American lives are be-
ing sacrificed that the President of
the United States has his maximum
power to influence our Allies in
Guiding Russia. Britain and China.
The talk about a new world organi-
zation eventually" means delib-
crate delay. The League of Nations
Covenant still lives. 1t is embodied
in the treaty structure of A ma
tlonS. 1t handles we'll the problem
of giving voice to small AS we'll as
large nations. 1t preserves the SOW
eighty of every nation. 1t is not
Superstate. 1t conforms to the
American Constitution. 1t depends
first on moral force and reason, but
It rests in the final analysis on the
concerted power and physical force
of all nations. 1t has a provision
which means an international po-
lice force. 1t is in fact a splendid
constitution for world peace To
try to write another constitution
means endless pickering while the
peace of the world waits. The Cove
nant of the League can be improved
in detail and clarified but the
framework is there already.
Now is the time for the Demo-
cratic party to keep faith with Pres
ident Wilson who signed the Cove
nant and for the Republican party
TO rectify the mistake made by War;
rem Harding who. though as a Sen
stor had twice voted for the League
with the so-called Lodge reserva-
tions, declined when elected to
the presidency to submit the League
Covenant to the Senate even with
the Lodge reservations.
Mr.. Harding misconstrued the
mandate of the people in the 1920
election as a rejection of the League
despite the fact that 81 prominent
IL.