Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-28
Believes CusubIoncu
'Scotched' Peace Drive
Military Commentator Sees
Symbol of Enemies Doom
In Unconditional Surrender
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj, George Fielding Eliot
The Official report of the conference
at Casablanca seems likely to be of a
preliminary nature only. 1t is probable
that there were other decisions and
accomplishments which will be revealed
later.
Of course. the military decisions, inso-
far as they affect strategical plans for
the immediate future, will not be made
known until the operations arising from
them actually begin That is only COM
mon sense. But in the political field and
in that Of military policy and high
command, great deal of work must
have been done which the peoples of
the United Nations will learn about later
For example, even though the difficult
political situation in French North Africa
may not have been fully resolved. there
were two questions in this field which
must have received careful attention
The one was the organization and equip
ment of the French Army in North and
West Africa and the other is the agree
ment on the command of the Allied
mander in chief Gen. Alexander enter
the territory Of another commander in
chief Gen. Eisenhower
That creates a delicate situation which
can be dealt with only by agreement
between the highest political authorities
Of the countries involved Unless one
keeps in mind continually this relation
OF political to military authority, it is
impossible to realize the difficulty of Civ
ing proper direction to a war Of coalition
1t is easy to understand the disap-
pointment Of some commentators over
the fact that no announcement was
forthcoming of the formation of an
lnter-Allied supreme war council for the
United Nations AS a whole. No one has
hoped more earnestly for such a devel-
opment than this writer, but it was
clearly impossible that the conference of
Casablanca could produce such a result
in the absence Of the chiefs of state of
two of the four major Allies-China and
the Soviet Union.
1t is not, however, necessary to seek
complicated or sinister reasons for their
absence. In both cases there is a per-
fectly simple explanation. AS to Cen
eralissimo Chang Kai-shek, he is facing,
at home, what must be described as an
extremely difficult political situation
one in which he is under great pressure
from the Communists, whom he pro-
foundly d1struSts, while at the same time
he has to find means for carrying on war
"a
sketchy aid from his Allies. Had he gone
to Casablanca and returned without i'm
mediate and tangible benefits for China
his position at home might have become
impossible-and of such benefits he could
not be certain.
AS for Mr.. Stain, he is the handspring
OF great offensive operation against the
German armies which is just now ap-
preaching its crisis. The Russian armies
are closing in upon Rostov, they have
freed their main lines of communication
but the German resistance Is growing
and it is evident that the critical moment
Of the great struggle is approaching
Stain is, first of all, Russian and a
nationalist, and from his point of view
no worse moment could have been
selected to ask him to absent himself
for matter of two weeks from his post
Of command.
But all this Is not to say, by any means,
that the Casablanca conference was not
worth while. It's demand for the uncon-
ditional surrender of the Axis powers as
the indispensable element of peace would
alone have justified all the risk and all
the effort undertaken by the President
and the Prime Minister.
The enemy knows now that his peace
offensive has been scotched in advance.
feats by victories in the political and
psychological fields. Indeed in this sense
the conference was a victory in those
fields for the United Nations 1t is one
more sign of our growing offensive
power; one more banner of hope for the
eyes of our friends; one more symbol of
impending doom in the eyes Of our
enemies.
For it Is the privilege of those who
possess the initiative in war to travel to
far places and there to concert plans for
the destruction of their foes. It is a
privilege which our enemies in times
gone by have often exercised to our dis
may. It seems long while since the
world awaited in indecisive terror the
results Of conferences in the Bremen
Pass. Now the conferees of the Bremen
are looking at the reverse side of the
shield. 1t is they who await. 1t is we
who act.
(Copyrsht 1913, New York Tribune Inc)