Evening star., 1943-06-28
Hard Blows Urged
To Ruin Enemies
Major Eliot Discusses
Allied Advantages
In Initiutive
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
One of the great advantages of pos
sessing the initiative in war is the ability
to choose the time, place and circum-
stances Of combat. When one side has
grown strong enough to deprive the other
of freedom of action, the strong side can
make its advantage cumulative by Fore
ing fight on its weakening opponent
under conditions favorable to itself thus
producing disproportionate loss and cons
pelling disproportionate expenditure Of
effort. The battle of Tunisia was an ex-
cellent example Of this principle.
We, the Allied powers used our stra-
tegic mobility, our command of the sea,
to open new theater of operations in
Northwest Africa. The enemy had to
come and fight us there. If he failed to
do so, then he had to submit to the
early and complete destruction of Mar
shal Rommels Afrika Korps, the OPEN
ing of the Mediterranean last winter in
stead of this spring, and the enormous
loss of prestige.
He had to fight under crushing dis
advantages. He could 60 to Africa only
by air against powerful opposition) and
by what ships he could contrive to slip
through our blockade, which were not
many. Our sea lanes to Africa were
wide open, save for the attrition of
U-boats. The enemy was not able to
build up in Africa sufficient fighting
strength by the means which were at
his disposal to match the fighting
strength we could put there by the much
ampler means at our disposal.
The result was inevitable We had
seized the initiative, and we used it to
force the enemy to come and fight us on
battle-ground of our own choosing. and
at time Of our own choosing. 1t is al
most automatic not only that the enemy
should, under the conditions, be de-
feated, but also that he should suffer
far heavier losses than we, because he
had to put forth so much more effort in
proportion to the actual amount of fight
ing power he was able to bring to the
decisive combat area.
We can and will bring this principle
into further practice. Let us take Sicily
as an example. Suppose we now begin
an invasion of that island. The Ger
mans can withdraw and leave the de-
tense OF Sicily to the Italians If they
do that 1t Is not improbable that the de-
tense Will collapse after a more or less
considerable show of resistance. The
loss Of Sardinia might follow, and the
loss OF Corsica. Peninsular Italy would
be hopeleSsly in thran to our air power
and our amphibious power.
From Corsica, the south coast of
France would be menaced with invasion.
The Italian garrisons in the Balkans
might throw down their arms. The Ger
mans would then have to make up their
minds whether to make a stout defense
OF Northern Italy, or to admit our air
bases to the Plain of Lombardy, threat
ening all the hitherto comparatively safe
industrial establishments of South Ger
many, Austria and Bohemia. Each ad-
vance OF ours would present a new prob
lem, new danger.
So let us suppose the Germans decide
to take forward part in the defense of
Sicily. In that case, they will have to
put strong air forces and at least five or
six divisions Of their best troops into the
island. They can delay us, cause us
severe losses, but in the end our sea and
air power will isolate the Axis troops in
Sicily, and they will very likely perish
there. Another German army will be
destroyed, like the one at Stalingrad and
the one in Tunisia
Once more we shall have compelled
the Germans to come and fight us on a
battlefield OF our choosing, and once
more the Germans will have purchased
time at the cost of net reduction in
their defensive strength when the final
and decisive battle of Germany comes
to be joined.
Take the problem of Spain. From the
German point of view, an invasion of
Spain Is strategically very attractive. If
German air and submarine bases could
be established on the Strait of Gibraltar
cur use OF the Mediterranean-one of
the principal gains of our victory in
Africa-might be sharply reduced, if not
altogether nullifled for the time being.
But the moment the Germans cross the
Pyrenees, the Spanish government must
take its stand. 1t must call in our forces
to defend it, or it must admit the Ger
mans and thus become our enemy.
In either case our course is perfectly
clear-we take steps to occupy Spanish
Morocco, we expand the bridgehead cov-
ering Gibraltar till it commands most OF
the southmost tip of Spain, and we oc-
cupy the Balearic Islands. The Ger
mans are then committed to campaign
in Southern Spain, against a distant
stronghold to which their lines of COM
munications are long and difficult, while
our lines Of communication are seaborne
and of great capacity.
The more force the Germans employ
In such an enterprise, the more they
weaken themselves on other fronts. The
greater the proportion of their reserves
they use in Spain, the greater their loss OF
freedom of action on the Russian front
and against an Allied invasion of Europe
at some other place
Or let us suppose that we now attempt
an invasion of Northern Norway-but
why continue with such details which
repeat themselves? You can figure them
out for yourself. We have the initiative
we have the sea power, we have the air
power, we have troops sufficient to back
up our amphibious enterprises or to meet
anything the enemy may do.