Evening star., 1943-07-10
Air Defeats Moy Leod
To jap Risk Of Fleet
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.


attention in these articles to the decline
of Japanese air power. The latest evi-
dence that Japanese air power is failing
is seen in the operations now in progress
in the Southwest Pacific. After initial
attacks which were beaten off with heavy
loss, the japanese airmen have done
very little to interfere with our occupa-
ton of Rendova and with three land
ings on New Georgia. They have been
quite unable to provide air cover for
their ships They did nothing to pre-
vent our occupation of Woodlark Island
and the Trobriands, though the latter lie
only $50 miles from the big japanese air
base at Gasmata on New Britain. They
have been unable to give any effective
protection to their main air base at
Rabaul, which has been repeatedly at
tackled by our heavy bombers, or to out
lying bases such as Kahili.
1t is beginning to look as If the Japa-
nese could no longer depend on their
air power to play its full part in their
fighting team. Should this prove to be
the case, the team as whole will be
sadly crippled. The whole scheme of
Japanese conquest is based on the pro-
tective shield of island outposts in the
Pacific Ocean, which are intended to
keep American amphibious forces at
distance, or at any rate to delay them
until japanese forces can concentrate
at any threatened point. The possession
of so many island bases has enabled the
Japanese to extend the influence of their
land-based aircraft over vast area of
the Pacific Ocean. within which we now
possess no bases and into which, there
fore, our naval forces can penetrate only
under imminent peril of destruction. 1t
was, for example, toward the shelter of
their land based aircraft that the rem
nants of the Japanese feet retired after
the battle of Midway. 1t is upon their
ability to effect swift concentrations of
aircraft over this great network of bases
that the Japanese have depended as
counterweight to the, heavy naval losses
which have reduced their fleet to an in
ferior position so far as surface fighting
strength is concerned.
The weaker they become in the air,
however, the more the Japanese will
have to depend on their warships to
guard the seaborne lines of communica-
tion of their island garrisons, and the
more likely it will be that as our pres
sure increases in the Southwest Pacific
the pressure at Toxic on the naval staff
will, likewise, increase, with the army
urging the navy to risk everything on a
fleet action.
If no such action is fought and won by
the Japanese, there would seem to be
a considerable likelihood that many
Japanese Army garrisons on outlying is
lands may be by-passed as we advance,
and left in hopeless isolation to be
mopped up later at our leisure. Most
OF these island garrisons have no reason
for existence except the protection of
local air bases.
In fact, anything like complete fail
ure of Japanese air power in the Pacific
would enable us to turn from our present
painstaking step-by-step offensive to
far more vigorous and swift-moving
campaign directed against important OBJ
jectives and undertaken with the ulti-
mate object of compelling the japanese
to fleet action fought under conditions
of our own choosing, or in the alterna-
tive, to the capture by use of bases from
which we could definitely cut, for good
and ALL the vital sea lanes between ia
pan proper and the Philippines, The
Netherlands East Indies, Burma Ma
laya, Thailand and South China 1t
is doubtful whether the japanese Navy
can, without adequate air support, offer
effective opposition to the offensive en-
terpriSes which we are now in position,
or soon will be in position, to launch.
The vast japanese area of conquest has
been linked together by combination of
sea power and air power and can only
be maintained as long as these links
remain unbroken.
Copyright, 1943, N, Y. Tribune. Inc)