Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-04-26


simultaneously with more drastic
pressure against Germany?
These are basic questions which
touch the psychological and morale
side of the war but they are directly
related to basic decisions that must
be made now. Primarily the answers
to these questions involve a differ
ent approach as between Britains
and the Americans leaders-an ap-
proach based not so much on what
might be termed self-interest as on
fundamental differences between the
British and American concepts of
global strategy.
Time for Public Appraisal.
President Roosevelt represents the
American Government when such
far-reaching decisions are made and
Prime Minister Churchill repre-
sents the British Government. Both
these men reflect, when they can,
the military viewpoints of their re-
spective stats. What is causing
dismay in congressional quarters in
Washington is seeming willingness
of the President to bow to Mr..
Churchill on global strategy and to
reject the viewpoint of the United
States chiefs OF stats In favor
Of the British approach.
Here is case where censorship
keeps the American people in the
dark, because the enemy presumably
would like to know the details. Yet
It isn't necessary to disclose the
commitments made by President
Roosevelt-the letters and docu-
ments he has given to the British
Government in the form OF guar
antees. 1t is necessary only that
these secret agreements and COM
mitments be revealed In confidence
to appropriate congressional COM
nittees so that the President may be
advised whether the American peo-
pie, when they are permitted to
know the truth, would really con-
cur in his Judgment.
He is entitled to that appraisal
now, because now is the time when
the die is being cast! Later on,
when the documents in question
become more pieces of academic
history, it will be too late.
Long-War Theory.
The whole difference revolves
around the ALLEGATION and use of
our shipping. The British seem to
have first call on our new ships to
carry cargoes for the maintenance
of the British civilian economy and
such infantry divisions and artillery
forces as remain stagnant in Eng
land, But, meanwhile, the United
States Army apparently must sub
ordinate its demands for the use of
our own ships and witness doubtless
the loading of diminishing number
of vessels with less and less POSSIBLE
ity of an invasion of continental
Europe in 1943. This can only mean
that the British point of view about
strangling Hitler with long, slow
war is dominent at the moment.
But If that kind of policy be &C
cepted-and there may be sound
reasons for it-why cannot the Brit
ish civilian tighten his belt a bit
while more shipping is diverted for
our own use in the war against
Japan? Also, why can't the British
help us out now by more agrees
sive campaign in Burma and espe-
cially by the more active use of the
British Navy and Air Force in the
Bay of Bengal so that the Burma
road can be opened up?
If this could be done, we could
transport octane gas and repair
parts for fighter planes and open
up air bases in China from which
to send heavy bombers to demolish
Japanese factories and shipyards.
Ou Navy SoIl OdpdIl 1IOIIl
the sea alone. 1t must have air
support from Chinese bases.
Slow Versus Quick Strategy.
There never was a time when the
United States Army and Navy COM
mands and advisers have had so
much Of harmony of purpose and
unity of thought on the proper STRAIT
egg that should be used to win this
war-and to win it quickly. Indeed,
1t would not be surprising if our
military men do not become dis
heartened by the overgenerous way
we allocate ships to the British.
Mr.. Churchill and British Foreign