Evening star., 1943-10-20
Cost Of Victory
"A Price of Blood
BY Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

As Gen. Arnold pointed out to his press
conference on Monday, the losses in the
Schweinfurt raid must be weighed
against the results obtained. The same
line Of reasoning applies to any military
operation especially those in which great
risks are assumed in order to reap great
advantages. That is frequently neces-
sary In war. In fact, the planning of
every operation Of war is, in the last
analysis, based on the weighing of risk
against advantage.
There Is a tendency in this country
which has not experienced locally the
horrors OF war to overemphasize losses
and setbacks. For example. during the
crucial days at Salerno there was quite
an outcry, and this writer, for one, re-
ceived several indignant letters from
excited gentlemen who wanted to know
how such terrible risks could be justified
They were justified in the event by sue
cess, but II the attempt had failed that
would not necessarily mean that it
was mistake to try There are too
many tmponderables in war to be as
certain in criticism as all that. 1t Is
rarely possible to estimate the enemy's
strength and position with complete ac-
curacy. 1t is almost never possible to
foretell exactly what he will do, what
conference.-the he will take and with
what degree Of diligence and determina-
ton.
AS an illustration, let us look at Sa-
lerno from the German viewpoint and
let us indulge ourselves with the humor-
Gus supposition that there Is a free press
IN Germany. The Germans took very
great risks at Salerno. The chief of
those risks was to fght in Southern Italy
At all. But that risk was fully justified
by the advantages which they might
have reaped from success. Think how
important morale builder for the Ger
man people at such an hour as this it
would have been had the first Anglo
American attempt to land on the con-
tinent Of Europe been hurled back into
the sea. Think how this might have
affected the relations between America
and Britain on one side and the Rus
slams on the other Think of the sicken-
ing wave OF despair that would have
spread among the captive peoples of
the continent, and on the other hand
how the German satellite nations would
have been cemented in their allegiance
to Germany. 1t would have been worth
almost anything to the Germans to have
won at Salerno. The only wonder is
that, being prepared to risk as many
troops as they did, they did not put in
twice rs many and make sure. Probably
there were no more available-but that
Is beside the point.
They tried, they tried very hard, and
they failed. They were not strong
enough. and the people they sent against
our lads were not good enough. Now
they are fighting \ dangerous rear
guard action, retiring slowly up the
Italian Peninsula under highly favor
able strategic conditions. Can YOU
imagine what free German press would
be saying about the German high COM
mand At this point? Can you imagine
the editorials the columns, the INSIDE
Berlin chit-chat? All forgotten would
be the complete justification which sue
cess would have given to the assumption
OF the risks. All that would be remem-
bered would be failure and the price Of
failure. But perhaps that price would
be more accurately assessed. even so, be-
cause Germans have learned by their
own experience in their own cities to
appreciate the terrible costs OF war.
We IN America have not learned that
lesson and SO We are the more appalled,
by the casualty lists that come to US
from distant places like Salerno and
New Guinea and Schweinfurt.
Yet We must understand that these
lists are going to get longer rather than
shorter. The enemy is turning at bay.
He will defend himself with a despera-
ton born Of his bitter knowledge of the
consequences of defeat That defense
will not be overcome save at 4 price-a
price OF blood. From now on increas-
ingly 1t will be American blood that must
be poured out on that altar Of sacrifice
AS"ASN Al PNAo ny Jul OWN HdHOS-De-
cause We would not be the architects of
An altar Of peace under justice when we
had the opportunity to do so. We must
face these grim facts and try to under
stand such terrible lessons in military
accounting As the one which Gen,
Arnold expounded for us on Monday
that 1t may well be worth so planes and
500 American lives to put out of COM
mission great part Of the ball l-bearing
production of Germany, and thus pre-
vent or delay the construction of Ger
man mechanical weapons which If they
continued to be produced on schedule
might take far more American lives to
overcome.
And while we ponder this lesson, we
might do we'll to ask ourselves what we
can do, when the sacrifices of this war
are over and the victory is once more
ours, to make better use of that victory
than we made of the last in which we
participated. to the end that our children
and their children may not again have
to learn such lessons at such a cost.
(Copyrisht 1943. N. Y. Tribune, Incl