Evening star., 1943-09-16
CHAPTER TX.

of Axis forces. The development o
the plan Is succinctly stated in tn
following paragraph OF radio from
Gen. Eisenhower on March IL:
Our own plans contemplate a
rising scale of offensive opera
tions, and it will be the role of
the I'd Corps to draw all possible
strength (enemy) from the south
so as to help Gen. Montgomery's
9Th Army through the Mareth
Gap. Once we have the 9th Army
through that bottleneck. this
campaign is going to assume
rapidly a very definite form with
constant pressure and drive kept
up against the enemy through
out region"
Final Phase Begins.
The last phase Of the battle O
Tunisia opened on the evening O.
March 20 when the Western
Desert Air Force in rear of thu
British 9th Army Gncluding the 9tf
United States Air Force under Gen
Brereton Qaunched an air offensive
with continuous 24-hour bombing o.
the Axis positions and installation:
in the Mareth area, surprising the
intensity of any previous prepara.
tions since the capture of the E
Alamein position. The 9th Army at.
tackled and secured a bridgeheac
through the mine fields in the
north, while the New Zealand Corps
fianked the Mareth line to the
south. Co-ordinated pressure by thu
British 1st Army, the French, anc
the American I'd Corps under Gen
Patton against the Axis bridgeheae
served to divert the enemy effort
from the south. His position gradu.
ally icrulmpled and finally on April
7 patrols Of the 9th Division, ad-
vancing southeast from Gafsa, made
contact with units of the 9th Army
20 miles inland from the coast.
Sfax was captured on April 10 by
Gen. Montgomery's forces. Rommefs
columns were unable to make 8
stand at Sousse because of an Allied
break-through at Fondouk, with tht
resulting capture of Kairouan and
Pichon. He therefore fell back to q
prepared and final position through
Enfidaville.
Enemy Air Power Shattered.
The air attacks of this period pro-
vided a classic example of strategic
and tactical use of air power. Allied
air forces over a long period Of time
had studied every aspect of the
enemy air transport activity across
the Sicilian Straits. They awaited
the moment to catch a maximum
concentration of transport aircraft
on the Tunisian or Sicilian fields
and to strike when the enemy was
in greatest need of this air trans.
port service. On April 5 the oppor.
tunity developed and air attacks
OF consistent / tensity were
launched on the airdromes of Sicily
and Tunisia, resulting in the de.
struction of over $50 enemy air.
planes on the ground and SO more
shot down in the air; Axis ports
and shipping were also heavily at
tackled. In all, during q period Of IA
days, LAT transport planes and 81
vessels, large and small, were dam
aged or destroyed. The suddenness
Of this complete and violent rup-
ture of Axis communications with
their Tunisian forces undoubtedly
came as surprise, upset their plans
for delaying actions and the defense
of the Cape Bon Peninsula, and
precipitated the collapse of the Ger
man and Italian forces.
Preparation for Sicily.
The advance of the British 9th
Army up the coast pinched out the
I'd Corps which was withdrawn and
started on an extremely difficult
movement across the rear of the
British 1st Army to reappear on the
left flank of the Allied forces. Gen
Patton, who had commanded the
corps during the operation con-
cerned with the breaking of the
Mareth line, was withdrawn in Or
der to 60 ahead with the plans for
the expedition to Sicily, and Maj.
Gen. (now 1t. GEM Omar N. Brad
ley, who had been his deputy. as
sumed command.
Mateur Is Taken.
Recognizing the weakness Of the
broad river valleys within the
bridgehead, Won Arnin heavily
mined all possible avenues of mech
anized approach. BY the Goth OF
April the I'd Corps was attacking
across the mountainous terrain
north Of Medjez-el-Bab, clearing the
way for an armored thrust into the
Tine River Valley which resulted in
the fracture of the Axis position. On
May the 1st Armored Division
broke through In a powerful thrust
that carried 1t to Mateur, only 20
miles in an airline from Bizerte
The time was ripe for the final blow
Gen. Eisenhower on May S re.
ported:
Tomorrow morning we start
the big drive which we hope and
believe will see us in Tunis in a
day or so. I believe we can clear
up the Bizerte angle very quick
ly but the Bon Peninsula may
be difficult matter"
British armored units had con
centrated between Medjez-el-Bai
and Pont du Fahs in preparation
for the drive down the Medjerd,
Corridor. After two days of bite
infantry fighting this armored fore
on May Z under cover of an unpre
edented concentration of air units
struck through the gaps secured b.
the British infantry and artiller
and drove without check into tn
outskirts of Tunis. Once cracked,
the Axis defense ring collapsed. TIL
I'd Corps exploited its initial gains
advancing north into Bizerte o,
May 7 and surrounding the Axi
forces north of Garaet-Achkel an,
Lac de Bizerte. Troops of the corp
then turned east to block the threa
to the north of the Axis lines o.
the Medjerda plain.
Axis Forces Separated.
Meanwhile, British forces poure,
through their initial gap, widenin