Evening star., 1943-06-22
Third Year in Russia

just two years ago, at dawn of the
longest day in the Northern Hemi-
sphere, Hitler's hitherto invincible
Wehrmacht struck with all its mas
sive power at the Red Army, deployed
behind a demarkation line drawn by
the previous Russo-German agree
ment across partitioned Poland.
At the moment, military opinion
throughout the world generally pre-
dicted another triumph for the Ger
man war machine. These views were
seemingly confirmed by the early
victories won by the Wehrmacht,
even though the Russians put up ira
ditionally stubborn resistance. Pres
emily, however, the German drive
began to slow down except in the
Ukraine, where local break through
was accomplished. The climax of
the campaign came in the late au-
tumn, when the Germans, though
within sight of Moscow, failed in
their supreme effort and were COM
PEELED to retreat. The Red Army,
aided by an unusually severe and
early winter, staged a counteroffen-
sive which drove the Germans back
to a prepared line far from their
strategic goal.
On June %, 1912, the German high
command launched a second summer
campaign, this time apparently aim
ing not at general destruction of
the Red armies, but at the cutting Of
the vital Volga River artery and the
Baku oil fields which fuel Russian
agriculture as we'll as its war ma
chine. This more limited offensive
likewise ended in failure. Stalin-
grad on the Volga was reached only
to be lost, while the drive through
the Caucasus never got within hail
ing distance of Baku. The Russian
winter counterthrust inflicted terri
BILE losses and came within an ace of
bringing about a German disaster.
Also, the two-year siege of Leningrad
on the BalJlc was raised.
AS last winter waned and Soviet
military intelligence learned of
heavy massing of Axis combat units
on the eastern front, opinion in both
Russia and the world at large took
for granted that the German high
command would launch a supreme
effort this summer either to destroy
the Red Army or at least so to weaken
1t that its offensive power would be
crippled in advance of possible
Anglo-American attacks on Western
Europe. An unusually mild winter
was followed by an early spring. In
Central and Northern Russia heavy
spring rains kept the ground too
soggy for mechanical warfare at it's
maximum effectiveness, but by late
May the south was dry enough for
the start of an offensive rolling
northward with the advancing sea-
son. Moscow, London and Washing
ton alike predicted that the zero
hour was at hand.
Yet May ended and June is now
two-t thirds over, with no conclusive
proof that the anticipated German
drive is about to begin. The bulk of
the Axis ground strength, together
with at least one-half of the Luft-
waite, is known to be massed along
the eastern front. The short Russian
summer is here. The last two years
have proved that every day counts
for the Germans if their summer
campaign is not to be begged down
by the autumn rains and the terrible
winter not far behind. Yet precious
time passes, and they do not strike.
Indeed, intima tions from Axis
sources hint that there will be no
major drive against the Red Army
this year.
Such is the strategic enigma of the
eastern front. Has the German high
command renounced an all-out Of
fensive? Will it rely henceforth on
defensive strategy, pinning its hopes
on the strength of Fortress Europe"
and playing for a stalemate due to
mutual exhaustion? Has the Red
Army the resources and ability to
stage major offensive of its own, or
will it likewise wait until an Allied
invasion of Western Europe can take
place? These are some of the tan
talizing queries which intrigue an
anxious world as the Russo German
war goes into its third year.