Evening star., 1943-02-25
(Fourth Of a SerieS.)
Bv DEWITT MACKENZIE.

| When / left India after studying
/ the political crisis I submitted vo-
! luminous notes to British censorship
so l might be free to take them
out of the country. Among them
was the following:
There are many people who be-
lieve that either Britain and the
warning parties will settle their diff
ferences now or the dispute will be
settled ultimately in the old-fash-
ioned way-by revolution. Gandh1
has admitted the possibility Of civil
strife"
Now, of course, the fact that the
censor passed this note doesn't nee
eSSarily mean that he agreed there
was danger Of rebellion, but only
that he accorded me extreme free
dom of speech. Certainly there
would be no challenge to the state
ment that many foresee revolt as
the alternative to quick settlement.
ApropoS of the necessity for speed
in avoiding the dangers involved in
this quarrel are three cardinal
points:
l. This bloody controversy has
ceased to be a family affair and
has become a menace to the cause
of the United Kingdom. That is so
because India is strategically eS-
Sential to the Allies both in prose-
cution of the war and in world re-
construction after the conflict.
&c ~,
age in India which is expected to
reach its peak about April, and
many observers fear food riots.
Should agitators exploit this and be
able to merge it with the political
imbroglio, the resulting situation
might be grave, indeed.
3. Mahatma Gandhi's hunger
strike. which may cost his life and
thereby make him a sanity martyr
in the eyes of countless worshipful
followers, has vastly increased the
dangers of the situation.
With these points before us the
conclusion would seem to be un-
escapable that an immediate set
tlement is demanded in the in
terests, not only of England and
India, but of the United Nations.
Obviously our own United States
is vitality concerned.
Alternatives Appear Grim.
Any alternatives to agreement
look pretty grim. The best one
could hope for would be a long
drawn-out stalemate. The great
military base and arsenal from
which the Allies must strike at
Japan through Burma would be
only partly effective because of dis
sension. And India would be lost
as one of the guardians of United
Nations interests in the Orient after
the war.
But even if all hands subscribe to
this view, which side is to make
the first move?
When the Cripps negotiations COL
lapsed last summer the British and
the Indian negotiators squared off
and glowered at each other like
stubborn mules. Nobody would
bulge an inch. And there they
However, the consensus as I found
it, not only among impartial OBJ
servers but in both warning camps,
is that the first move is up to the
gov0nment since it has the chief
nationalist leaders under lock and
key and is sitting on the lid.
True. the authorities charge that
Gandhi and supporters were re-
sponsible for the death and de-
struction which followed the break
down, but the little Mahatma and
his followers emphatically disclaim
any hand in the disturbances.
Naturally, it's for the British
government to decide whether it
can afford to reopen the case. How
ever, my investigations convinced
me that should it do so there would
be an eager response from the In
dian leaders.
There has been a great change of
atmosphere since last summer.
Many observers believe that the
stiff attitude of the Indian leaders
then may have been inspired by
belief that the Allies, and conse-
quently Britain, were losing the war.
Be that as may, these leaders now
know that an Allied victory is GER
tain.
On the other side, it must be
recorded that Britain's triumph in
Libya has made her feel very cer-
tain Of her position. Whether this
also has made her less inclined to
Gicker with the Nationalists remains
to be seen.
And now l come to an extraor-
dinary phase of my research. I
found a widespread belief among
Indian leaders, government sup
porters and impartial observers that
the way to achieve a settlement was