Evening star., 1943-06-06
Isles of Italy

| cloaked in such secrecy and are often
so coupled with deliberate feints in
other directions that no military
operation can be surely foretold until
it has actually begun. However, an
| impressive weight of evidence is
accumulating that Italy's outlying
| islands soon will bear the brunt of
combined attacks by air. naval and
| ground forces, British and American,
launched from their newly won bases
in North Africa 1t may be useful,
therefore, to survey those advanced
| island bastions in order to estimate
their capacity for resistance and
their utility for further operations
once they come into Allied hands.
Those island outposts are four in
number. They are Pantellerla,
Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, which,
though politically French, has been
occupied and garrisoned by Axis
forces. Together, they form rough
chain protecting the Italian penin-
sula itself from invasion. They also
provide the Axis with air, naval and
submarine bases from which to harry
Allied shipping through the Medi-
terranean at its midway bottleneck.
This gives the Allies a double incen-
tive to take control of them, even at
| considerable cost.
| Pantelleria is mere pygnly in size.
being only eight miles long by four
miles wide-much smaller than its
neighbor, British-owned Malta. But,
like Malta, Pantelleria has high
strategic Importance, lying as it does
| squarely athWart the strait between
Sicily and Tunisia. Logically, it
should be the first as we'll as the most
feasible Allied objective, and the ter
rife aerial poundings to which it has
been subjected during the past fort
night, coupled with bombardments
from Allied warships, indicate a
"softening-up" process that is usually
the forerunner of landing by sea-
borne eXpeditionary forces. How
ever, the conquest of Pantelleria, If
defended by resolute troops, will not
be easy. It's volcanic heights rise, in
most places. sheer from the sea and
are heavily fortified The garrison
is estimated at between 10000 and
$4,000 The taking of Pantelleria
should serve the Allies as valuable
test and gauge for subsequent opera
tions, not only against the other
Italian islands, but against further
Axis insular outposts in the Eastern
Mediterranean like Crete and Rhodes.
Sicily Sardinia and Corsica are
large islands. The first two are
about the size Of New Hampshire.
Corsica is less than half that size.
All are mountainous, and many of
their coast lines are forbidding, but
each has bays and harbors where
Allied landings could be effected
with proper naval bombardment and
under air umbrellas They have al
ready been heavily hit from the air,
and many Of their landing fields are
damaged or out of commission. Sar-
dinia and Corsica can be reinforced
only so long as the Italian fleet can
retain q measure of local control over
the intercoastal waters. Sicily, sepa-
rated from the Italian mainland only
by the narrow, yet deep, Strait OF
Messina has ferry service, some
what damaged by air bombardments,
supplemented by small boats. 1t
may, therefore, be considered the
most difficult of the trio to invade
and conquer.
One factor in the problem is the
attitude of the local inhabitants. It
may be assumed that the Corsicans,
strongly French in feeling, despite
their Italian speech and descent,
would welcome an Allied landing and
would assist the invaders. There is
probably a good deal of disaffection
against Fascist rule in Sicily. though
whether this would mean active aid
to Anglo o-American troops is ques-
tionable. The Sardinians are better
disposed to Mussolini's regime, which
has done much to remedy the neg
lect of the island by previous
governments.