The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1943-09-17
interpreting
The War
BY KIRKE /. Sr,rnn

a Inc M! effort to halt or lii,
delay Allied invasion of the Jta 'Uas
mainland via tie Salerno br Gi,aa
mead appears to have failed 81
"A nasty retreat of German f..
confronting NJ 1t. Gen. Mark c1 s1Ie'
Fifth Army on the south ~ G1'tA'
1ral sectors is strongly indic. te4'
Their escape routes are slra{
threatened by the western 'leaoy
head of the British Eighth s s.
surging up the coastal road any, u
Cape Scalea. '0 from
| With his bridgehead secur.
eral Clark shifted at once t gea,
the defensive to the offensive IRON ron
terday in the dangerous cos YES
section of his line south Of Mon ,s.
EDoh; As was to be expected 'I sas
attack was aimed up tho lo! nl'
lands between the sele and caJo ,s,
rivers, suitable for tank ac sio,e
That demonstrates that he 'I ba.
been heavily reinforced mt o ,-as
with men, but with heavy t, Ua.y
and mobile guns to outmatch IA.
Nazi armor hurled against b VI.
original landing forces.
A forward lunge of few MIL.
up the sele river valley bv n.y.
Fifth Army would place if ae+r; %5s
primary road and rail ron+os
which are vitality needed bv Me- ,sS
forces in the big coastal bnr ~1,
south of the lower bridgebead nv
Choir at Agropoli. 1t would a p,,,
turn the inshore flank Of Nonns
Eboli, the key to the tactical si1,
alton on Clark's centra' front sns
free his whole c9-mile bridgebe.d
position for further advance,
north and east.
General Clark said Yesterday
that lin a matter of hours tba
presence of the British Figb4b
Army would be felt by the enemy
This indicates that its advance n,
troll might already have reached
Lagonergro, within a days march
of a possible junction with the
Fifth Army column pushing up the
Sele valley.
1t is the danger Of being trap.
ped between converting Fifth and
Eighth Army columns that con.
fronts the Nazi commander. Hav.
ing failed tt smash or disrupt the
Salerno bridgehead, h. is gravely
threatened with loss Of the whole
left wing of his force deployed
about the Salerno-Agrocoi e dge.
head unless he pulls it back east
and north in time.
In retrospect, the desperate NaZ
: attempt to halt the Fifth Army
incursion or pin it to its beach
; landings begins to look more like
l delaying action than real effort
: to throw the Anglo-American fore
t es back into the sea.
E Not more than five Nazi diW'
a sions have been identified as en-
gagged The implication is that
r they were assigned to fight de-
r laying rearguard battle while
: main Nazi defense line across the
: Italian peninsula farther north
t was being organized and manned
and while scattered Naz troops
retreating before the British in the
| south made good their escape
a Just where that potential Nazi
r first defense line may be in Italy.
aside from the fact that it ought
to lie we'll south of Rome to Sc
cure the good Italian airteIds n
the Rome area, is matter Of
' conjecture. The narroWea portion
+ of the Italian boot is Adore Naples
That must be importat 10 he
Germans in view of Their urgent
e necessity to conserve manT5a.
; Any Nazi defense front N way
south of the Pc, however, W.A
be vulnerable from the air. tl@
: bases in southern Italy and IRON
: the island of Corsica, available @
= Allied occupation at any mone9.
- there is no point in northern i''|
that would not be under cl0SS.
= range air bombardment. L ma.
also must enter into Nazi defense
y dispositions.