Evening star., 1943-08-08
Jupun's Defect Soon to
Follow Germonys
By OtUen L. Scott.


ton depends largely on when the United
! States and Great Britain can shift
| bombers and battleships from the war
in Europe to the battle front in the Pa
cifc.
| At present operations against Japan
are regarded by the air forces, in par
ticular, as an illustration of how not to
fight a war. Those movements are CEN
| tered on blasting isolated japanese forces
| from their jungle or Arctic outpoSts at
the far reaches of their new empire.
| There is almost no effort to strike at the
heart of japanese power at home
through use of air power, or to cut the
communications with her new empire.
Todays Slowmotion war in the Pa
cif1c is necessary for the period in which
| this country is gathering strength for
real blows to come. This slow-motion
war may rather suddenly shift into a
| much faster moving one when our Army
Air Forces are able to build their strength
in the South Pacific up to a formidable
| size. The time may not be so far distant
when the American Army under Gen.
Macarthur, equipped with sufficient ship
|
| units, may race with the American Navy
to reconquer areas lost in the early days
| of the war.
When that time comes months and
| years will not be spent trying to root
| japanese garrisons out of their Jungle
strongholds. The drive will be directed
instead at really important sources of
japanese power. 1t will be pressed by
air and by sea, and almost certainly will
| yield immense dividends, as contrasted
with the extremely limited ones that
come from jungle fights on the periphery
OF Japans territory.
Why Japan Is near to very serious
trouble can be seen from experience.
Gradual American Gains.
| At the time of Pearl Harbor, the Japa-
nese achieved temporary supremacy OF
| seapower in the Western Pacific In 20
months since Pearl Harbor, however, the
| United States has so far added to It's
naval strength that Japan by comparison
has small and inefficient navy. Ameri-
| can shipyards now are turning out a
| Navy larger in tonnage than the Japa-
nese one every six months. Further
more, the British before many months
| will be able to shift important naval
| strength to the Pacific and Bay of Ben
| gal area. 1t Is not improbable that a
| year from now our side will have a naval
| force that is from five to seven times
| greater than Japan's.
This sea power and its accompanying
| air strength can be used to smash
through to conquest of bases from
| which this countrys fast-growing air
power can be utilized. 1t is no secret
| that bombers twice the size of Flying
Fortresses, and with longer range, soon
| will be coming into use. Neither Is it a
secret that If Flying Fortresses can knock
out the best opposition Germany can
offer, the bigger and improved models
| should have little difficulty with Japan's
| far less impressive air force.
Once Japan herself can come under
| sustained air attack the Pacific war will
be not far from won. That is owing to
the fact that Japanese industry is highly
concentrated in a small area, and Is the
smallest war industry Of any nation
which claims to be an important power.
The japanese are unable at this time to
replace the relatively small losses OF
merchant shipping, aircraft and naval
vessels that they are suffering in the
slow-motion Pacific war. When the real
| fight starts they may be denuded of
power in fairly short order
| Approach From East
There is widespread opinion that to
win over Japan the United States and
Great Britain must reconquer Burma,
| open the Burma road and then transport
supplies with which to arm and train
| Chinese army. This force then would re-
conquer territory from which air at
tacks could be directed against Japan
Either that or, according to this view, 1t
would be necessary to obtain bases from
Russia.
1t is improbable If either Of these
courses will be followed The Burma
road approach would take forever. Any
move that Russia makes In dealing with
| Japan would be on her own and not IN
volve operation of American forces from
Russian territory.
Instead this country in all of its plan
| ming for war with Japan over the years
has contemplated a direct approach via
| Alaska and via islands of the mid
Pacific. There is no reason to expect that
this strategy will be scrapped when the
time comes to put it to use. Then, in the
| present war there is another approach
| from the south. The island stepping
stones that Japan herself used to move
southwark to Singapore and the Dutch
East Indies now are equally available
| for move northWard from Australia
| and eastward from India.
When the moves in the Pacific come
| they can be in overwhelming force.
| Furthermore, when they do come the
| Japanese fleet and its air force will
either have to come out and fight Or give
up by default If they take the first
! course any japanese losses will be large
| ly irreparable, while those that this
| country and Britain may suffer should
readily be replaced by the vast store of
war materials and of weapons now ac-
cumulating.
AS a result it seems quite improbable
that the war in the Pacific will last until
| 1949 as Frank Knox, Secretary Of the
| Navy, suggested The more considered
| view of officials whose judgment ought
| to be good is that Japan should be de-
! feated within a year after Germany's
downfall. There may be some japanese
forces left in the jungles to be rooted
| out later, but Japan as a major enemy