Evening star., 1943-08-07
Red Summer Drive


The larger significance of the Rus
sian victories at Orel and Belgorod
Is we'll expressed by Joseph Stain
himself. In his triumphant order OF
the day to his troops, the Soviet
generalissimo says: THE legend of
the Germans that Soviet troops are
allegedly unable to wage successful
offensive in the summertime has
been dispelled."
That is the literal truth The mill
tary operations of the past month
have been a progressive revelation of
the Red Army's tremendous strength
and unprecedented striking power.
1t was on July that the Germans
launched pincer movement from
Orel and Belgorod to nip off the Rus
slams Kursk salient which lay be-
tween. In a single week that Ger
man drive was smothered with
enormous losses. Then the Red
Army started its counterdrive, which
has revealed sustained momentum
much greater than that of their
opponents.
Most of the news released from
Moscow and Berlin alike concerned
the fighting around Orel; so the
logical supposition was that, however
intense and bloody, this was limited
operation, tactical rather than stra-
tegic In character. The fall of Orel
alone would not Immediately have
endangered the main German de-
fense line, because it was a salient
backed by the big German strong
point OF Bryansk some eighty miles
to the westward. The abandonment
of that exposed and costly salient
would straighten and shorten the
German line. While Bryansk stood,
there would be no danger of Rus
sian break-through on this part of
the eastern front.
Very different is the significance
Of the capture of Belgorod, 1855 miles
to the southwark, which was stormed
by the Red armies on the same day
that Orel fell to their arms. This
unheralded Soviet triumph took the
world by surprise. But the meaning
was clear. Two simultaneous &C
complishments OF such magnitude
showed that Russia's summer cam
paign was real strategic offensive
with major aims in view. Further
more, Belgorod is itself an outpost
Of Kharkov, only forty miles to the
southwark. And Kharkov Is the key
point in the whole southern section
Of the eastern front. It's temporary
capture by the Russians last winter
imperilled the entire German posi-
ton in the Eastern Ukraine. BY a
desperate German counterattack
which caught the Russians overex-
tended, Kharkov was recovered. But
its renewed fall would revive the
same peril. Further Russian tri-
umphs in this highly strategic area
logically would force the Germans
to abandon everything east Of the
river Dnieper. including the Crimea
and their tenaciously held bridge
head in the Caucasus. That would
indeed be a German disaster sur
passing Stalingrad.
Meanwhile, the capture of Orel
gives the Russians uninterrupted
use of the main north-south railway
line which runs from Moscow
through Orel. Kursk and Belgorod,
and thence through Kharkov clear to
the Crimea. This trunk line will
greatly facilitate the movement of
troops, equipment and supplies for
operations either against Kharkov
or Bryansk. 1t should be remem-
bered that in Russia railways play
major role in communications prob
lens, owing to the absence of good
roads. We may therefore expect
heightened Russian pressure all the
way from Bryansk to Kharkov as
soon as the Orel link has been re-
paired and put In running order.
This mounting Russian offensive
must be a terrific headache to the
German high command, faced as 1t Is
with new problems through the col
lapse of Italy and the necessity OF
bolstering it's Balkan garrisons. The
Allied capture of Catania in Sicily
and the likelihood of a second Tu-
nisia there further emphasizes the
fact that Germany is reduced every
where to the defensive and that the
overall initiative has passed to its
encircling foes.