Evening star., 1943-04-16
Balkan Moves

One of the most intriguing aspects
of the European scene is the intense
diplomatic activity among the men,
berS of the Axis. The recent meeting
between the leading heads, Hitler
and Mussolini, has been quickly
followed by conferences between the
Fuehrer and his junior partners.
First King Boris of Bulgaria and then
Marshal Antonescu of Rumania have
been at Hitler's headquarters, while
Premier Kallay of Hungary is ex-
pected there after having made
trip to Rome for talk with the Duce.
All these meetings between the off,
cial bigwigs are accompanied by con-
ferences of diplomats, soldiers and
economic experts. The whole forms
pattern of undoubted significance.
Just what the meaning is, however,
cannot easily be estimated, because
all this activity is cloaked in the
strictest reticence. The best proof of
its uncertainty is the wide variance
between press dispatches from vari-
Gus neutral listening posts. Core
spondents stationed at Berne, Stock
holm, Lisbon and Ankara do their
best to pierce the veil shrouding
Fortress Europe" They sift every
bit of evidence and strain the turbid
flood of rumors. Yet the net result
is so varied and often so contra
dictory that the picture remains a
blurred one. Under these circum-
stances, it may be wise to base our
deductions upon few factors which
are fairly certain.
It is self-evident that Germany is
the power station which motivates
the whole European end Of the Axis,
and that it strives to energize it's
partners primarily for it's own bene-
fit. Yet it would be a mistake to
think that all Hitler and the Ger
man high command need do is to lay
down the law and have their orders
obeyed. The smaller members of the
Axis are not mere inanimate puppets
dancing automatically as the strings
are pulled from Berlin. They have
national wills, desires, and aims of
their own. Sometimes these conflict
violently among themselves, as best
seen between Hungary and Rumania.
Indeed, it is often by clever use of
those intestine rivalries that Ger
man diplomacy gets its own way
without having to shake the mailed
fist. Also, there are common fears Of
what defeat would mean to each and
all Of them, which bid them hang
together lest they ultimately hang
separately. Lastly, it should be re-
membered that dependence upon an
outside Great Power is no novelty to
the small nations of Central and
Eastern Europe. That has been
their traditional situation, and they
see nothing essentially humiliating
about it. Experience has given Bal
kan diplomats an instructive cyni-
cism which discounts ideologies. Like
shrewd Bazaar traders, they rely less
on abstract principles than on the
clever manipulation of current fac
tors to drive the best possible bar
gain.
Inter-Axis relations can perhaps
best be visualized as a continuous
process OF haggling. The Balkan
satellites have made deals with Ger
many by which they have each got
something, but at heavy price.
Bulgaria apparently has Jared best.
She has actually got nearly all she
wanted at the expense of Greece and
Yugoslavia, and she is paying her
Axis dues largely by holding down
unrest in those territories with her
troops. Hungary has come off next
best, with slice of Yugoslav territory
and half of Pennsylvania, though
that entails tension with Rumania
which requires Hungary to keep
much OF her army mobiliZed in the
regained province. Rumania has
made bad bargain and is deeply
dissatisfied. Slovakia goes along be-
cause its separate existence depends
on the survival of the Axis. In every
case Germany holds the whip hand,
but dares not drive too hard and
knows that its Balkan satellites
would drop away if its own defeat
should become imminent and obvi-
Gus. In Balkan eyes, that stage has
not yet arrived. So the Axis cement
still holds. 1t will dissolve only by
the powerful acid of Allied victories
on the battlefield and in the air.
Diplomacy and prOpaganda nreS,ln-