Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-06
Communications Slow
Russian Drive in Don
German Grip on RoiIrood
At StoIinerod Seen Bor
To Lone-Ronee Offensive
BIZ Mai. George Fielding Eliot.


By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
In recent discussions of operations in
Russia, it has been necessary to lay
great stress on the German supply prob
lens, and these are still of vital i'm
portance. In considering them, how
ever, we should not forget that the Rus
SLAMS have supply problems of their
own, and now that the Russian armies
are on the offensive their stats must
see to it that their supply systems con-
tinue to move forward, keeping pace
with the advance of the fighting troops
whose ability to continue to advance
depends upon periodic and adequate
arrival OF rations, fuel and ammuni-
ton.
To take the middle Don offensive
first, this is now slowing down before
the increasing German resistance which
was to be expected north of Kamensk.
We should not, however, disregard the
fact that the lengthening Russian COM
munications may have had something
to do with the slowing of the Russian
advance. In all probability the prin-
cipal railhead for this operation was at
Kalach, at the end OF branch line
about so miles northeast of Boguchar
(this town of Kalach is not to be con-
fused with town Of the same name on
the bend of the Don near StalingraO.
From Kalach it has been necessary to
send supplies forward by truck columns,
and the farther the fighting front adj
vances southwark, from Kalach, the
more trucks are necessary to keep the
troops supplied. Probably the best move
the Russians can make to improve this
situation is to open the remaining
stretch of the MoscoW-Rostov railway
north of Kantemirovka, where the Ger
man stronghold Of Rossosh still blocks
full Russian use Of this line. If Ros-
sosh were in Russian hands, the Rus
slams would be able to bring supplies by
rail clear down to the outskirts of Mil
lerove. If this offensive Is to continue
southwark, therefore, a secondary oper-
alton toward Rossosh seems an early
possibility.
The Russian operations in the bend
of the Don, and also those southwest
of Stalingrad, would be immensely IA
cilitated If Stalingrad itself could be
cleared of the enemy so as to permit
through rail traffic through that city.
At present the Russians control the
Stalingrad line to point on
the outskirts of the city; they control
the Stalingrad- Donetz line from a point
just west of Stalingrad to Chernish-
kovski, and they control the Stain
grad Rostov line from a point just
south of Stalingrad to Remontnaya. But
these last two stretches of railway are.
so to speak. in the air. They will not be
of much use to the Russians until they
are connected either through Stain
grad, or possibly by the temporary con-
struction OF bypass lines-with the
Stalingrad- Moscow railway.
If this could be done. much greater
pressure could be exercised westward
from Stalingrad toward Kamensk,
though even here the line is still blocked
by the German post at Morozovka. The
Russian capture of Chernishkovsh in
dicates that they are giving some at
tention to this matter and probably
presages an attack on Morozovka within
the near future.
AS to the offensive southwest of Sta
lingrad, if it is to gain much more
ground its communications will have
to be very considerably increased in
capacity A bypass line around Stall
ingrad to connect the Stalingrad-
Moscow and Stalingrad- Rostov rail-
ways would do this, but some improve
ment would be effected If the Russians
can get hold of the crossings of the
Don at Tsimlyansk From this point
to Chernishkovski there is good road,
which has probably been improved by
the Germans, so that the Russian armies
moving toward Salsk would at least have
the advantage of two lines of supply by
truck instead of one. In this connec-
ton it is interesting to note that Rus
sian troops have moved up to positions
on the south bank of the Don opposite
Tsimlyansk, suggesting that the Russian
high command may be going to try to
seize the river crossing there.
Thus, while the Russian offensives
continue at slower pace than before,
much Of the Russian effort is now be-
ing expended for the improvement of
their communications and the CONSOLE
dation behind the advancing troops OF
rail and road net adequate to permit
the renewal of large-scale offensives in
the distant areas to which their forces
have advanced. Probably the greatest
single gain that they could make in this
connection would be the clearing OF Sta
lingrad itself for through railway traffic.