Evening star., 1943-06-29
Allies in Fukien
Could Bomb Jap Ships
Major Eliot Commends
American Attacks
On Enemy Transports
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

ince, China, is interesting even though
the report comes from enemy sources.
Berlin pictures Toxic as in a dither for
fear these bases may herald the begin
ming of long-range bombing attacks on
the vital centers of Japan proper. Such
attacks would not be impossible from
Fukien; the distance is about 700 miles
ton an aVerage) from points in that
province to the southern island of the
main japanese group, Kiushiu, which
contains such obiectives as Nagazaki
and Sasebo.
But it seems more likely that the real
source of japanese anxiety may be the
possibility Of attacks on Japanese ship
ping in the narrow Strait of Formosa
which Fukien Province directly borders
on the west. Such attacks would seem
far more profitable, from our point of
view, than the carrying to Japan of the
comparatively small bomb loads which
our tWo-englne bombers could convey
over 700 miles.
1t should be noted that we have not as
yet heard of any four-engine bombers
operating with Maj. Gen. Claire l..
Chennault'S command in China. Very
likely it is considered uneconomical to
try to use the big ships there, as long as
their supply and maintenance is de-
pendent on the long air hop over the
Himalayas from India.
The tWo-engine medium bombers op-
Grating from Fukien would present a
much more formidable menace to Japa-
nese shipping than to any other Japa-
nese target within their reach. The
reason is not far to seek.
AS repeatedly pointed out in these ar
ticleS, all Japan's military enterprises
are dependent on her merchant ship
ping. The only dependable source Of
manpoWer which Japan has is in the
japanese islands. The only industrial
nese islands. That manpoWer, and the
products of that industry, must flow
outward from the Japanese islands by
ship, and the raw materials to feed those
industries tfOr the Japanese islands
have little IN the way of such reSourCes>
must flow inward. So also must at least
part of the food for Japan's teeming
millions of people.
The basic vulnerabilitv Of the mer-
chant vessel to attack by gunfre, mine
torpedo or air bomb is therefore a matter
of the most vital Importance to Japan.
1t Is being exploited to our disadvantage
by the submarines and aircraft in the
Atlantic ir hoi,
pans disadvantage by our aircraft and
submarines in the Pacific.
If the Germans could make their in
terupt1on Of our trans Atlantic sea lanes
absolute, American fighting strength
could not support our allies in Europe
and Africa. If We could make our inter-
ruption Of Japans radiating sea lanes
absolute, every Japanese military opera
ton in China, Burma, Thailand Malaga,
Indo-China and all the islands of the
Netherlands Indies and the South Pacific
would come to an abrupt conclusion.
A glance at any map of the Far East
will show the relative difficulties of such
interruption. Within the inclosed
waters of the Sea of Japan, only Russia
is In position to act effectively against
japanese shipping, and the Russian SUBJ
marines and destroyers at Vladivostok,
the Russian air bases in the maritime
province, are as yet neutral as far as
Japan is concerned. With the partly
lnclosed waters of the Yellow and East
China Seas, Japan's dominance is not
difficult to maintain. 1t is when Japa =
neSe shipping ventures out into the open
Pacific, or passes southwark of Formosa,
that 1t begins to come within the reach
OF our means of destroying it.
The farther it ventures into the Pa =
clhc the easier it becomes for our dis
tanly based submarines to reach it.
These submarines of ours have done a
f1rst-class job. They have hurt the
Japanese seriously. They are increas-
ing both in numbers and efficiency,
They will hurt Japan still more as time
goes on. The japanese can still supply
their armies in North China and in
Manchukuo by protected routes. But
they control no land connection between
their forces in North China and the
Yangtze Valley on the one hand and
those in South China, Burma, Thailand
and Malaga on the other. These latter
are wholly dependent on ships which
must either go outside Formosa and risk
the submarines or go inside Formosa,
hugging the Chinese coast. This latter
route has been Japan's recent depend
ence.
What happens to it If American and
chinese bombers are comfortably estab-
llshed in adequate numbers at bases in
Fuklen Province? Look at the map The
Strait Of Formosa averages about 100
miles in width. Its whole western shore
is that of Fukien Province. Bombers
operating from protected bases within
that province could cause very heavy
losses to japanese shipping in the strait.
OF course, the Japanese could take pro-
tective measures; still they would suffer
losses which they could i'll afford.
IT all this were to happen at time
when an Allied offensive in the South
west Pacific, headed for Rabaul, got
under way, the japanese would find
themselves severely strained in meeting
both threats. Our main purpose in try
ing to go to Rabaul would be to establish
the base of our submarine operations
closer to the main sea lanes on which
the Japanese depend. Thus Fukien and
Rabaul may form the closing Jaws of
vast pincers movement; closing not on
Japan, for the moment, but on Japans
means of reaching and supporting her