The Wilmington morning star., 1943-09-25

air attacks.
cessity of undertaking equally am
bilious overland and amphibious
campaigns to become firmly es-
tabllshed in the Hongkong area.
Now that the dark days OF threat
ened invasion are past, laymen and
officials of Australia are seeing
their country, not as defensive
battle-ground. but as a base from
hich the Allies could commence
the formidable task of rolling back
the japanese tide.
There is much to support this
conception of Australia's role. The
commemorative population is a
mere fraction of midas but Aus
tralia's 1000 900 people are almost
wholly British or of long absorbed
European stock among whom no
fifth column or dissident movement
has or is likely to make Roadway.
This population, though unable
to provide combat army large
enough to launch a major often
sive, is probably as thoroughly
modified for war effort as any
member of the British common
wealth or the United States.
Unlike India, Australia can feed
q much larger civilian and mill
tary population than she now sup
ports. Furthermore, her admitted
weakness in heavy industry and
lack of certain essential war ma
terials can be overcome by ship
cents from abroad over air and
sea routes which so far have been
subject to little worse than har-
rassment.
From a strictly military view
point it should not be forgotten
that American and Australian d.
visions already in the Southwest
Pacific form the core of recon
quest army.
The Southwest Pacific command
moreover is comprised of team
of land, air anG amphibious ex-
perts who aggregate more prac-
teal experience with our enemy
in the Pacific than probably all
other commands together o u d
muster.
Some critics have written off
the achievements in the Solomons
and New Guinea as "island he
ping Strictly speaking some of
these thrusts-all of which have
been uccessful-were island hop
ping.
But, as Prime Minister Churchill
said of a similar island hopping
venture-the invasion of Sicily
the Guadalcanal. New Georgia and
New Guinea moves were essential
preliminaries to the main assault.
Macarthur has not considered
any of his advances to date as
anything but preparatory Even
the reconquest of New Britain and
the web of bases hinged on Rabaul
would be a preliminary move de-
signed to remove the strong but
reduceable Rabaul fortress which
now prevents any deep penetra-
ton of the Japanese empire for
the east.
The strategy of Macarthur en-
visions one or series of massive
strokes, which instead of involving
the costly capture of island after
island. would carry powerful AL
lied force over and around nu-
merous islands as far as the south
ern Philippines.
Reoccupation of Mindanao might
prove costly, but probably no more
than a seaborne invasion of south
ern Burma or Malaga and possibly
far less costly than series OF
Guadalcanal campaigns.
Occupation and maintenance
Of a hold on Mindanao or another
OF the larger Philippine islands
ould require a tremendous Allied
effort
Naval raids, on larger scale
than attempted so far, against
Truk, Saipan and other of the enc
my's thanking bases would greatly
facilitate Allied development of the
southern Philippines as a b
whence not only could the enemy S
supply lines between the Indies,
Malaga and Japan be effectively
dealt with, but also strong pres
sure could be exerted against ia
pans strategically vital b Sc
around the south China sea.
Such a strategy if matched by
formidable exertions from India
and Ceylon against the west coas1
of the South Asian mainland coulo
result not only in complete lsola
, ton of Japan from its sources O.
+ raw materials, but also enable tne
Allies to gain a foothold along the
!, seaboard of China.
Such an achievement woulon
! cause the collapso Of Japan over
night, but would be the most
cisive stride in that dlrectlon ye
undertaken.
RUBBER FINANCING