Evening star., 1943-08-13
The Pacific Side of 1t

In the conference soon to be held
at Quebec between President Roose-
velt and Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, the spotlight of public
interest is focused upon matters af-
fecting Europe, where momentous
developments obviously impend. The
progress of United Nations arms both
in the Mediterranean and in Russia
tends to shift the emphasis in long
range planning there from the mill
tary to the political phase, with post
war diplomacy acquiring heightened
Importance and requiring immedi-
ate attention.
What is not generally realized is
that this Stepping-up of the Euro
pean war-cycle involves a CORE
spending acceleration of the Pacific
phase of the world struggle. Be-
tween those two main phases of a
truly global conflict, a wide time
differential has existed ever since AL
lied craftsmanship resolved to con-
centrate on Europe and relegate the
war against Japan to a secondary
place. But the very fact that the
war in Europe is evolving so salts
factorily implies that the war against
Japan can now be promoted in Al
lied grand strategy to somewhat
the status which Europe held six
months ago in the thinking of the
inter-Allied high command The
layman should always remember
that general stats never bother with
the present so long as things 60 ac-
cording to schedule, but concern
themselves with a more or less dis
tant future. Sicily, for instance, was
threshed out by our top-flight strate-
gists months before the actual in
.vasion. 1t ceased to interest them
after the first landings and consoli-
dationS had proved the eventual sue
cess of that operation. 1t is we'll
nigh certain that Italy is similarly
pigeonholed by our grand strategy,
and probable that European inva-
sion plans have been theoretically
worked out in all their strategic
alternatives.
II this be true, the logical deduc-
tion is that our military and naval
master minds are concentrating on
the new aspect which military prog
ress in Europe has produced upon
the Pacific and Far Eastern thea
ters Of operations. This, of course,
does not necessarily mean that such
long-range planning will result in
immediate large-scale shifts of
troops and warShips to those thea
ters. 1t may we'll mean, however,
that the ground-plan for defeating
Japan has ceased to be academic
speculation and that the strategic
means for encompassing it's down.
fall can now be considered and
worked out in the light of altered
realities.
Assuming the correctness of this
hypothesis, Pacific and Far Eastern
strategy should rank high on the
agenda of the coming Quebec con-
ference. Military factors should be
reinforced by political considerations,
especially by China's rapidly worsen-
ing domestic crisis, which is arousing
grave concern in the Allied high COM
mand. 1t is recognized by Allied lead
ership that unless the war against
Japan is vigorously pressed in the
near future, there is a real danger
that China may cease to be mill
tarily effective and might even be
forced out of the war altogether.
Preoccupation with the Pacific and
Far East at the Quebec conference
may also account in part for Soviet
aloofness from its proceedings. Now.
as formerly, Moscow avoids carefully
any diplomatic step which might
compromise its neutral status with
Japan. For Soviet Russia, the Pa
cif1c war does not exist. This, of
course, is one of the chief handicaps
to United Nations solidarity. But
it is handicap which can be re-
moved only by Russian change of
attitude toward Japan. And of this
there is small likelihood while the
Red Army is engaged to the hilt with
Garroopu