Evening star., 1943-06-17
Sardinia Open
To Allied Attack
Major Eliot Says Shore
Of South Side of Island
Could Be Taken Easily
BIZ Mai. Georoe FIELDING Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
The island of Sardinia is only slightly
smaller than Sicily in area-about 1900
square miles. 1t has, however, only
about quarter of Sicily's population
about 975,O00 against Sicily's 100000.
Sardinia has indeed a lower density OF
population than any other province of
the kingdom of Italy. Sardinian troops al
ways have been considered good fighters,
and in the last war were outstanding in
that respect. Sardinians have, in gen.
eral, great loyalty to the House of
Savoy and it is quite likely that in case
OF an Allied invasion of Sardinia, the
populace would take much greater
part in the resistance than might be the
case in Sicily.
Sardinia is roughly a rectangle with
rounded corners about 160 miles long and
about 10 miles wide. It is a mountain
Gus island but has a considerable area
of plain in the southwestern quarter,
called the Campidano. At the southern
end Of this plain stands the capital,
Cagliari, which is also the principal ma
val base and largest city.
By far the most important line of in
terror communications in Sardinia is the
north-south railway running from Gag
llari northWard through the Campidano
and across the northern mountains to
Sassari, the second city of the island.
Near Sassari branch line runs north
eastward to TerranoVa, on the northeast
coast. Main highways parallel these
railway lines. There are other roads and
branch railways (some of the latter mar
row gauge in Sardinia, but the ones de-
scribed are those of the greatest military
consequence
Sardinia lies closer to Africa than
1t does Italy. 1t is 160 n.Aes from Ter
ranova to the nearest point on the
Italian mainland; it is only 100 miles
from Sardinia to Africa at the nearest
point and l45 miles from Cag)iari to BIZ
zerte. The distance between Sardinia
and Sicily is approximately ITS miles
Under these conditions, 1t would appear
that the Allied forces would have some
advantage in an attack on Sardinia as
against air defense partly conducted
from the Italian mainland. Cagliari for
example, and the whole southwestern
quarter of Sardinia is much easier for
US to attack from Africa than it is for
the Axis to defend from Italy, insofar as
air operations are concerned.
The question of air support and de-
fense, therefore, Doils down to one point:
Can the Axis maintain in Sardinia itself
sufficient air forces to prevent our gain
ing that air superiority which is an es-
Sential preliminary to actual invasion?
The answer is to be found in the tre-
mendOuS f1eXibllity of air power. From
bases all along an arc extending from
Pantelerla, on the east to Bone on the
west we can concentrate the full weight
OF our North African air power against
Southern Sardinia. There is no posi-
blIlty that the Axis can maintain on
Sardina's few fields any air force ade-
quate to deal with such concentrated
attack from many fields. We can, If we
so desire, certainly give adequate cover
to landing in Southern Sardinia and
1t Is difficult to see how We could be
prevented from occupying the whole
of the Campidano.
The conquest of the mountain regions
might very we'll prove a more difficult
task. The farther north We go the more
we come within comfortable reach of
enemy aircraft operating from Corsica,
as we'll as from the mainland The
;,.Ea zf
are occupied by Italian troops, though
the rest of the island is controlled by it's
formidable inhabitants, who hate the
Italians with a bitter hatred. AS long
as the Italians do hold the Corsican air.
fields, however, they can make life very
miserable for us in Northern Sardinia
which is separated from Corsica by
strait only 7l2 miles wide Corsica is
only SIS miles from the nearest part of
the Italian mainland and part Of that
distance is bridged by the Island of
Elba, where Napoleon spent his first
exile. 1t should not, therefore, be too
difficult matter for Axis air forces in
Northern Italy to maintain fairly con-
tinuous operations from Corsican air.
fields and still be able to withdraw If
the pressure became too great.
Thus the problems attending an attack
on Sardinia are quite different from
those of attacking Sicily, as described in
one of my recent articles One point,
however, should be particularly noted:
The f1exibility of air power and our
command of the sea permit us to con-
centrate on these great islands one at a
time, while they can do little or nothing
to support each other. 1t is for us to
choose which we will take first, according
to our interests. The enemy has no
choice; he must defend where we choose
to attack.
Copyright 943, New York Tribune Inc)