The Key West citizen. [volume] (Key West, Fla.) 1879-current, 1943-04-27
ITALY Shed Like To
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sible with minimum of further
bloodshed and destruction.
But the time and exact manner
of her going provoke speculations
as numerous and varied as the
kinds of spaghetti which the Ital-
ian loves.
Predictions divide into two
main types: ta) that Germany
will fight and will make Italy
fight for herself. in which case
the Mediterranean struggle pre-.
sumably would be long and
hard: tb) that Germany will be
inclined to cut Italy away as a
liability and then Italy would
find some way out with nothing
more than prefunctorY fighting.
Italy's dependence upon the
Nazis for any sort of effective
fight is illustrated particularly in.
air strength and armor.
Integrsted With Lufwaffe
According to the best informa-
ton available, the Italian air force
could not currently muster more
than 1000 operational planes and
the great majority of these are
hopelessly outsped and outgunned
by Allied types. Only the Reggiane
2o0l, fighter, is regarded as good.
The Italians are believed to have
not more than hundred or two
of these in service.
In addition, the Italian air force
has been integrated so closely
with the Luftwaffe in operations
and command that it would be al
most impossible to separate the
Italian units and rework them in
to an independence fighting force,
airmen believe.
In her peak strength army of
so to 20 divisions Italy never had
more than three armored divi-
the remains of all these
are in Tunisia where it seems GER
tain that all heavy equipment ul-
will be lost even if any
personnel can be evacuated.
In the naval department, Italy
does have men and equipment to
put up an effective fight without
great German aid.
Unofficial figures set the pres
ent Italian fleet at four battle
ships. 20 cruisers including six
carrying eight-inch guns or
heavier. so destroyers and be-
tween so and one hundred SUBJ
marines.
These forces must protect a
peninsula with coastline of about
1000 miles, and face the almost
imperative necessity of
holding Sicily with its 600 mile
coast.
Nature has provided defenses
along much of the Italian and
Sicilian coasts where mountains
rise sheer and menacing almost
from the waters edge and har-
bors are narrow. clefts. But there
still are enough hard, flat beaches
and wide harbors for determined
invader to gain footholds.
From one foreign diplomatic
source with good contacts inside
the Axis, comes the report that
the Germans are using thousands
of workers to build a network of
defense positions across the italian
peninsula from the naval base of
Spezia on the Mediterranean,
through Bologna to Ravenna on
the Adriatic, about $50 miles.
This would indicate the German
high command is prepared to
abandon southern Italy quickly
under pressure.
CACdlhCIIouSdn 01QCkdQS
When it is suggested that Ger
many's bitter resistance in Tunisia
doesn't indicate any readiness to
withdraw into Hitler's European
fortress, this source argues the
Tunisian campaign is being fought
primarily to hold the Mediterranean
blockade lines as long as possible
and that when Tunisia is lost the
blockade is broken even though
Sicily remains in Axis hands.
Even those who believe the Ger
mans are prepared to fall back
to the Bologna line across Italy
think series of delaying actions
will be fought on Sicily, along
the Italian coasts and on Sar-
DINA and Corsica.
Men who know Italy from long
residence and keep in touch with
her despite wars barriers believe
that when war comes to their
homeland Italians will fight only
as long as German pressure
makes surrender more dangerous
than continued battle.
This belief is based on the
generally accepted fact that the
war never was a popular one in
Italy and that she already has
suffered heavily.
Her losses in manpower can
not be estimated with great
accuracy but the British know
they have captured 100000 of
her oldiers--includinc q hun