Evening star., 1943-06-17
Near East Stirrinos


closing the frontier between Syria
and Turkey brings sharply into the
spotlight of public interest the region
of the Eastern Mediterranean, which
had attracted little attention since
the removal of the Axis threat to
Egypt by Rommel's rout at Ell Ala
mein last November.
This military act, capable of vari-
GUS interpretations, has given rise to
diverse speculation. Apparently it
does not Immediately involve Turkey
itself, because the Turkish Govern
ment has reaffirmed it's continued
neutrality. This is so consistent with
Ankara's cautious foreign policy that
it may be taken as forecasting Tur-
keys attitude unless the situation in
the Near East should be radically
altered.
The proximate reason given semi
officially by spokesmen of both the
British high command and the Free
French authorities who administer
Syria is that the -mile-long from
tier with Turkey was closed to pre-
vent leakage of information through
Turkey from Axis agents in Syria,
Palestine. Iraq and other regions in
the Near and Middle East under
Allied control. That explanation,
however, raises the question why
such drastic measure was taken at
this moment. And the logical answer
to that is the probability of extensive
Allied troop movements in those
areas.
The belt of Allied controlled terri
tory from Syria to Iran or Persia CON-
tainS two British armies, the Ninth
and Tenth. together with Fighting
French and American forces. Little
is known about either their DISPOSE
tions or combined strength. Last
year their strategic purpose was
chiefly to back up the British Eighth
Army in Egypt and, if necessary, to
aid the Russians in the Caucasus if
the Germans reached Baku. The
simultaneous removal Of both those
threats transformed the potential of
the Ninth and Tenth Armies from a
defensive to an offensive role. They
are known to have been strengthened
in the ensuing months, partly by
American troops. The recent open
ing of the Mediterranean to Allied
conveys not only simplifies their sup
ply problems but also renders pos
sible their use as seaborne eXpedi-
tionary forces for attacks on Axis
island outposts in the Eastern Medi-
terranean, much as the Allied Armies
in French North Africa are now
available for similar attacks on Sicily
and Sardinia.
Besides their mainland positions in
the Eastern Mediterranean, from
Egypt to Syria, the Allies have a val
liable advance base in Cyprus, a large
island lying in the blight between
Syria and Turkey. Cyprus is heavily
fortified, with excellent airflelds and
good harbor facilities. It could thus
serve as the base for combined naval,
air, and troop operations against the
Axis island strongholds. Those are
the Dodecanese group and Crete, dis
tant from Cyprus respectively 800
and trifle over 400 miles. Most of
the Dodecanese archipelago are small
islands, so even those which are for
titled might be saturated" by aerial
bombardmentS like that over Pantel-
leria Rhodes, however, would be a
more difficult problem, its area being
fifteen times that of Pantelleria and
five times that of Malta. Crete is so
large that it could not possibly be
subdued from the air alone It's
reduction would thus have to be
accomplished by big Allied expedi-
tionary force, presumably against the
fercest resistance by the strong Ger
man forces known to comprise its
garrison.
Current speculation in London by
unnamed military commentators is to
the effect that simultaneous Allied
assaults upon Axis island outposts in
both the Eastern and Western Med
iterranean may be in the offing. In
this connection, it should be noted
that the Allied domination of the
Sicilian Straits since the fall of Pan
telleria cuts the Italian Navy in
twain, thereby increasing the Allied
control of either half of the Mediter-
ranean. This would facilitate expe-
dictionary forces, east or west, singly
or in combination.
If he.