Evening star., 1943-08-14
Quebec Meeting Hints
At Highest Decision
By Maj. Georoe FIELDING Eliot.

Cnleny Win dntl-JapdneSe strategy, IL
is not hard to imagine what the new
circumstances are which have made A
revision of that strategy necessary. The
key to the situation is still in Europe,
and the unexpectedly swift progress be-
ing made there, in three directions:
in the Allied air offensive in the west
But this works two ways. 1t might
suggest that more forces could be spared
for the Pacific, permitting increased ef-
fort against Japan. or it might suggest
piling everything IN on Germany, in the
hope Of knocking that country out
quickly even at the cost of downward
revision in the plans now in hand for
the Far East.
The reopening of the Mediterranean
to Allied shipping will certainly allow
much greater volume in useful tonnage
to arrive in India and Ceylon. To this
must be added the release of certain
number of warships from the Medi-
terranean--just how many, will depend
on what is known to the Allied high
command of the exact state of the Ital-
ian fleet.
If that feet is now considered def
nitely out of the picture, the sum total
of naval reinforcements available for
the Far East might be such as to in
crease greatly the possibilities of offen-
sive operations there. Other accretions
may have come from the completion for
sea duty of new American and British
men of war, and the refitting of French
ships.
There Is also to be considered the
waning of Japan's air power, and the
losses inflicted on the Japanese feet in
recent months. If Japans air strength
is as much weakened as it seems to be,
very much bolder tactics than those for
merly used might be justified in striking
deep into the heart of the japanese is
land base network in the Pacific.
If her naval losses have so far ex-
ceeded her replacements as one may
guess, then the resultant challenge to
the Japanese fleet would be glove
which we could ardently hope the Japa-
nese might pick up.
Or it may be that the time has come
for blow at the Japanese along the
shorter line to the northward, through
the Aleutian Islands-which; inciden-
tally, might we'll be the reason for the
rather ostentatious Russian non -partici-
patton in the conference, and would be
an equally good reason why the Cana
dians should be in it.
The land and air communications of
Alaska run through Canadian territory
and the sea communications along the
Canadian coast. In any North Pacific
offensive, the Canadians are deeply in
volved
But it is also possible that the favor
able turn which the whole military Sit
uation in Europe has taken may now be
the occasion for examining available re-
sources with the idea of seeing whether
the interests of all the Allies would not
in the end be better served by concen-
trating still more of those resources
against Germany.
If Germany is really weakening more
than appears on the surface, if the
sources of information open to the Allied
high command suggest that by extra
effort Germany may be defeated at
considerably earlier date than was an
ticipated at the time of the last Roose-
velt- Churchill conference, then it might
be worth while to make that extra effort.
1t would be a question of weighing
very carefully the results which may be
expected. AS for the effect on the
Pacific war, 1t might mean not doing
certain things which it is now planned
to do; and before making any such deci-
sion, it would be needful to balance the
temporary benefit which Japan might
get from such change against the pos
sibility of being able to come with full
concentration OF effort against Japan at
an earlier date than might otherwise
be possible.
1t is. of course, impossible for any one
to say what course this new conference
will take, or what will be the subjects
chiefly to be discussed The various pos
sibilities of the situation lie open to
analysis, and analysis warns us against
jumping at conclusions.
AL war planning Is based on the
weighing of risk against advantage; it
can rarely be definite beyond a certain
point, because human beings cannot
see into the future, cannot gauge exactly
what their opponents will do, cannot
even be sure that their own forces can
accomplish the tasks set them, nor guess
exactly the time it will take to perform
those tasks Hence from time to time
plans must be revised, to meet chang
ing conditions which could not be FORE
seen.
What the Roosevelt Churchill meet
ing surely means is that the time has
come for such a revision on the plane
of the highest decision-a change beyond
the authority of commanders in chief in
the field That much we can be sure
Of. For the rest, we can only hope that
the Quebec plans prove as successful as
those of CaSablanca and Washington.
On the record we have good reason for
confidence.
(Copyright, 1943, New York Tribune. Incl