Evening star., 1943-08-05
Too Great Optimism
Seen ProIoneing War
By Mai. George Fielding Eliot.

| to throw cold water on the rising TIDE
of popular optimism which has its origin
in the recent successes in the Mediter-
ranean, the advance in the Pacific
| Slight though it Isl and the heavy
bombings of Germany. To this optimism,
the Russian advance on Orel and the
fall of Mussolini have added very greatly.
But it is necessary to remember that
the war is not yet won against either
Germany or Japan. The German army is
still intact, though reduced in fighting
efficiency and numbers. The LuftwafIe
is no longer able to meet all its commit
ments, but that is not to say that 1t
could not meet the lesser commitment
of the defense of a smaller area, an area
comprising the vital centers and bases
of German power and considerable out
lying buffer and base territory.
The German submarine effort has
been reduced, but our naval authorities
warn us that even this snake is not yet
dead. AS for the japanese, no serious
attack has yet been made of the centers
of their strength; we are still in the
process of reducing conquered outposts
and striking at their merchant shipping.
Their air power is dwindling, probably
also their naval power, but we are still
fighting them at Munda, Kiska and in
Burma, thousands of miles from the
main islands of Japan. There is a long
and bloody road ahead of us to Toxic
This is not the sort of talk people
want to- hear. We like to be told that
victory is Just around the corner. We
resent attempts to break up our beautiful
illusions. We welcome any one who
comes along with scheme for winning
the war quickly and inexpensively by,
say, Tuesday of next week
OF course these illusory ideas are bad
for the war effort; they tend to produce
complacency and relaxation, lust at a
time when one of our enemies-Germany
lis being very hard hit and when COM
mon sense should tell us to hit even
harder, before the Germans can have a
chance to recover. OF all times the
present is no time to relax, because we
do have a chance to shorten the war
perhaps considerably. by increasing our
Efforts to the utmost of which we are
capable. But it will not help us, 1t will
harm us If we spend too much time max
ing bad guesses about when the Ger
mans are going to collapse.
AS an example Of all this, and the
sort of thinking which accompanies it,
we might take the Navy press conference
OF July 20. On that occasion Vice Ad-
miral Horne, the vice chief of naval op-
erations, said soberly that the Navy was
preparing for a war in the Pacific which
might last till l949. Now Vice Admiral
Horne is charged with the responsibility
for building up the strength OF the Navy
to meet any responsibility which may
be laid upon it.
He has charge of the whole shore
establishment, the whole building pro-
gram, the whole training program. He
provides the ships, the planes and the
men for. the execution OF the strategy
which Admiral King, the commander in
chief OF the fleet, must carry out OBJ
vlously, Admiral Horne Is the last man
who should permit himself to indulge in
wishful thinking.
II he were not planning at least six
years ahead, the country would. indeed.
have cause for alarn-considering the
length of time 1t takes to carry out
naval building plans, even after they
have been decided on, and the vast COM
pleX1ty OF detailed work which they in
volve, reaching clear back to the raw
material sources of the Nation. Yet inn
medlately there arose storm of criti-
clsm and comment. One might have
supposed that the admiral wanted the
war to last till 1949 and was wickedlv
consplrlng to see to it that it didn't end
sooner; or that he had some inside
knowledge of how long it was going to
last, and that the magic date had been
wrenched from him by clever cross ey.
animation.
Actually, OF course. neither Admiral
Horne nor his Navy colleagues know how
long the war is going to last they Just
Know that they muslin order to carry
OUT tnelr sworn duty-prepare for the
worst that can happen while hoping for
the best and trying their hardest to
bring the best to pass.
The harder they try, the shorter the
war will he; the more ships and planes
ana trained men are available to he
throWn into battle at crucial moments
the more likely it will be that decisive
results will be achieved 1t is quite true
mat II the war ends much earlier than
tne plans call for, money and material
may be wasted; but it is also true that
II our plans underestimate the length
OF the war and fail to provide enough
nghtlng power, the price of that error
Will nave to be paid. Not only in money
and material, but in lives
Indeed, such an underestimate is one
OF the surest ways of actually prolone-
ing the war If, when the war is over
we are able to say to those who directed
our strategy: We'll. you fellows certain
~ dld that job much quicker than Won
expected, You had us worried for .
while, that reproach will be easv to bear
Far less easy to bear would be the ius.
.nleo Feproach: You drag out the war
Tor years and cost your country thou
SANDS OF lives because you thought the
enemy was push-over He turned ont
so mucn tougher than you guessed"
(Copyright. l943, New York Tribune 1,.,
Wartime Prison Labor