The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1943-09-16
interpreting
The War
BY KIRKE L. sr1pso,,

nasno.a. I L. SIMPSON
. desperate Nazi attacks
the center of the Amer gs ass ain
Army,s bridgehead fringjr r@ III t.ta
no gulf appeared baked I lag, Saie'
ana the first Allied crisis ts'' II alsH
invasion vas. of Italy passing e'' Of IL
Allled air power, thrown INF, ,
struggle on a tremend ,n mo h.
is credited with staving G off . sl q
man oreak-through down W H. a Ger'
of Eboli, south of the - , ' 5oo plan
mountain OF that mama ''0V tot
&C could have cut the American (which fa.s
IN half in the center. WIZ VIZ l0S''
constant arrival by sea ' ~ a'
1orcements and the approa VI IT. sPla'
the Il south of British troo Ts', IL ''on
flank the Nazi positions W. w out
lnshore heights, the tide of IN I'm III.
seems ms. destined to turn decis g'','
IN Allied favor before maov 'I boe.
have gone by. Doof'
Mount Eboli itself il tbo
the situation. Official Alra nsY %
counts finnish little data -'l oa az
nature of the struggle WIKI, 1'
S shadow, although empnasizin r',u a.. Is
bitterness OF the conflict anS a ne
desperation with which Na alu ~. la'
manders hurled armored toIcs s0, ~
the beach. '''00sA Il
Press accounts passed tbron,.
censorship give a clearer n naougf
They make it clear thst p NJ,
E b" towering just north 81 r.' "a,
village Of that name on ifs ~ ,o,, @'
easern flank, must have bao s'I III
stumbling block to swift evn ns, III
| lnshore of the Allied beach N bo.a
Nazi big guns set high on itS , l'Ssa
commanded not only the bea ,cs@
IN the center, but the EboIi 1 nrl''
and the valley OF the seJe t D'po
south of 1t, tne natural iow. lnu
route Of advance insborc far ".
Allied invaders. VIZ
The press accounts teg Of ~.
rifle massing Of Allied med5m
and small bomberS over The SHINE,
OF Mount Eboli and the rosdS
north and east Of ii, supolemen,sl
by a pounding attack from Br,t,yf
and American naval guns Tia,
describe the main Na1 attach |
having been delivered between
Sele and the Galore rivers r.
south of Mount Eboli. 1t was%
ed before the confluence off,.
two streams al Persano william
was reached.
That indicates that the dlerv
American penetration is IN M
center. 1t appears aimed M
the Sele valley presumaoy d
reach the main Salerno mOto,
highway southwark, which ps::e,
over the lower slopes Of Noun.
Eboli to reach both the Toe sM
heel of the Italian boot, forki,g
at Auletta.
1t is up the west fork Of Til;
primary highway that the British
Eighth Army spearhead at Cosen
"a is pushing, but still distant
The nearest British force is re-
ported on the west coast road al
Belvedere, with nearly 70 miles
still to go by last account 10 reagt
the Salerno battle front
Even so, that British s9esat85
at Belvedere and its nsaGg /
Eighth Army push up the ~a&
shore highway from COa4a Gl4
figure in Nazi tactical -;2NalH
They cannot continue u -s@a
available forces in the Cec&
on the southern end OF tAtS%
lean Salerno bridgehead ',~ '
General Clark 5 forces. The 5~
ish would take them in flank all
rear from the south within Tx
next few days unless a Naz Faa:
against Eighth Army speaH'aG
is quickly developed.
The implication Of the GeTNs
failure to break through to l
beach in the Eboli sector is 2i
an American counter drive up A
valley of the Sele is to be eXpec7
once sufficient men and Aea4
equipment have been set asnuf
Once they reach the Salerno'AD'
ia highway southeast Of Noun
Eboli. that Nazi bastion WouIu u
outflanked and could be taken
free the Salerno bridgehead
danger and permit its eXpalS.
both eastward and northwaH
the Salerno-Naples motoT%a%
most ambitious bit Of modern T~
in Tta1y