Evening star., 1943-09-28
Kiev Held Vital
To German Defense
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot

Ahe pnteAc iOi hlcN - oil, duu IL
may again prove to be battle on whose
outcome great decisions hang.
Kiev stands in precisely the relation
to the German armies down in the
great bend of the Dnieper, that Khar-
kov stood to the German armies in the
bend of the Donets a few weeks ago.
If the Russians can take Kiev and
establish themselves firmly at that point
on the west bank of the Dnieper, they
can strike southwestward at the rail
communications of the German forces
on the lower Dnieper. An advance of
only miles, to Fastov would cut the
main rail line on which those armies
depend. Moreover, the Russians in
crossing at Kiev are even less exposed
to counterattack from the northwest
than they were at Kharkov, because
their right flank is to some extent pro-
tected by the marshes which begin
north of Kiev and occupy most of the
valley of the Pripet River on both sides,
stretching north as far as Mogilev and
west across the old Polish frontier almost
to Brest-Litovsk
The line of the Dnieper from Kiev
to Dniepropetrovsk Is strong one, not
only because of the width of the river
itself, but because behind the river, on
It's right bank, there is great deal of
high ground which affords good de-
fensive positions. A break-through at
yIrN1I f11r iva af
and should it occur, and be made good,
1t is hard to see how the Germans
could hope to hold for very long any of
the territory between the Dnieper and
the Dniester. In other words, they
might have to pull back clear to the old
Russo-Rumania frontier, and they
would be very lucky if, this time, they
were able to make an orderly retreat
and avoid the disaster which has twice
so nearly overtaken them in q similar
situation on the Donets.
There Is considerable evidence that
the Germans are intending to make q
strong stand on the lower Dnieper. The
desperate defense of the bridgeheads
they still hold at Cherkashy and Krem-
enchug suggests this very strongly. Also,
the fact that the fight for the Kuban
bridgehead has been so stubbornly con-
tested (though that fight is just about
concluded with the fall of Ten1ryuk)
and the further fact that the Russians
have not yet reported the cutting of
the Crimea railway, though they were
within miles OF 1t five days ago.
hints that the Germans are still think
ing IN te:ms of holding some sort Of
line between the great bend of the
Dnieper and the shore OF the Sea Of
Azov, protecting ct least one Of their
lines into the Crimea.
incidentally, this writer has been in
error In assuming that there is only one
rail line into the Crimea. Advices re-
Gently received show that the Germans
have built 1oo-mile stretch of railway
from Kherson, near the mouth of the
Dnieper, to Armyansk, on the Isttmus
OF Perekop. where branch railway line
from the Crimea formerly had It's termi-
nus. This means that the Germans have
short line into the Crimea, and its
construction further suggests that they
do not mean to give up the Crimea with
out tough fght)
Assuming that this estimate OF Ger
man intentions is substantially correct.
it is impossible that the vital strategic
Importance Of Kiev can have escaped
them, and in that case we shall see a
very hard battle for that city as the
Russian attacks against it develop. The
Russians will undoubtedly try to force
crossings Of the Dnieper at other points.
But the marshes will restrict their ability
to maneuver from any crossing north of
kiev, while south of that city, the high
ground above referred to will afford the
Germans great advantages. A crossing
below Dniepropetrovsk would put the
Russians in much the same position as
they were in the Taganrog area of the
Donets region-pushing the Germans
back out OF the bag, of which they were
trying to tie the mouth at Kharkov.
Now 1t Is Kiev which controls the mouth
Of the bag.
On the whole, therefore, the signs at
present point to major battle for Kiev,
the terrain and by the approach of bad
weather, as well as by the shortening of
their communications and the length
enlng OF the Russian communications:
while the Russians are favored for the
most part by the momentum and spirit
OF their magnificent offensive, which
does not seem to have spent its force.
On the outcome of the battle for Kiev
certainly will rest the ability of the
Germans to continue to hold any South
Russian territory at all; and if they lose
that battle. 1t may presage the greatest
military disaster in German history, a
disaster before which the failure at
stalingrad would pale in extent, if not
in significance.
(copyrisht. 1a43. New York Tribune, Incl
Baseball Over B. B. G.