Evening star., 1943-11-18

Young, chief OF - L
the Navy Bureau David Lawrence.
OF Supplies, had stated that more
than ever was going to the Pacific
and that we were getting ready for
real offensive.
The two viewpoints are really not
IN conflict at all. The answer to
what Is happening depends on the
SPECIFIC zone or combination of
zones, which is being considered.
Early in the war, Gen, Macarthur
was given a certain area around
Australia and New Zealand in which
he has held supreme command
This means that he has Army, Navy
and Air Forces under him. But the
naval force under him was not in
cluded in the percentage given out
from Gen. MacArthur's spokesman
at his headquarters. It was care
fully pointed out that the 10 per
cent figure related solely to the
Macarthur military establishment
apart from the naval forces under
his command.
Exact Percentage Is Secret.
Now the exact proportion OF
Americas war effort in the Pacific
Ocean is a military secret, but it is
generally believed that If Army and
Navy and Air Forces in all parts of
the Pacific were Jumped together
the total percentage would be nearer
20 per cent than 10 and possibly
might be as much as Is per cent.
1t must be noted. however, that
Gen. Macarthur does not command |
the United States naval forces east
OF a line that passes somewhere
near Guadalcanal. Everything east
of that line in the South Pacific is |
under Admiral Halsey, who, in turn,
reports to Admiral Nimitz at Hawaii.
There are several task forces in
the Pacific, and it is a military Sc
cret how many such task forces are
operating north or south of the
Equator. This flexibility of COM
mand is absolutely necessary in sea
operations, and it is only when naval
forces approach close to New Guinea
or come within the Macarthur zone
that they are under his orders.
Nevertheless splendid working ar
rangement exists between Admiral
Ealsey and Gen. Macarthur. They
must cooperate in order to employ
either land-based or carrier-based
planes for bombing operations and
in order to permit surface ships and
submarines to attack enemy ship
ping in the zone Immediately under
the Macarthur command.
There is no doubt that Admiral
Young, who was quoted in dispatches
from London, was thinking of the
overall supply problem in the Pacific
and the amount of supplies and
weapons going to fight the Japanese.
When he spoke of enough being
sent for real offensive he did not
mean by Gen. Macarthur alone but
by the Navy in the Pacific operating
with the air power and land power
under Macarthur.
Sea Lanes Must Be Cleared.
1t has been limited by naval
spokesmen for several weeks that a
major offensive was being mounted
against the Japanese. But aside
from the movement of troops and
air power toward Rabaul from New
Guinea or westward toward some
of the airfelds and bases of the
japanese in the Netherlands East
Indies no offensive OF a major nature
would seem to be possible by Gen.
Macarthur until the United States
Navy clears the sea lanes.
Some day it is hoped that the
Navy will clear the seas direct to the
Philippines and to the coast of
China. When that time comes the
Macarthur command will be called
on to mount an offensive reaching
to the Philippines. Whether this
can be done before Germany COL
lapses or whether, even If Germany
does collapse, the time needed to
fight series of major naval and
air battles will be such as to prevent
a landing in the Philippines for
another year or so depends wholly
on the progress made by the Often
sive which we have just begun in
the South Pacific and which will
presently be begun in mid-Pacific,
judging from the recent raids on the
islands closer and closer to Japan.
Unquestionably more supplies are
needed in the Pacific and in due
time they will be furnished, but it is
fact we have sent enough and
plan to send enough more to keep
the japanese on the defensive for
many months to come-and Ger
tainly until we can mobilize all
Allied air and sea power for the
final blow when the war in Europe
has been won.
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