Evening star., 1943-06-12
After PonteIIerio

The surrender of Italys strongly
fortified island outpost of Pantelleria
gives rise to a number of specula-
tlons. both strategic and political in
character.
Pantelleria was. for the Allied high
command, laboratory experiment
in intensive bombing from the air.
The experiment was a notable sue
cess. 1t confirmed what Tunisia had
already Indicated, that, given virtu-
ally complete air supremacy, limited
areas can be so saturated" by air
bombardment that prolonged defense
is impossible. Pantelleria was an
ideal test case, because it's small
extent. eight miles long by four miles
wide, could be completely overshad-
owed by the deadly Allied plane
roof" The same is undoubtedly true
of the nearby Italian island of Lam
pedusa, which is even less defensible
than Pantelleria. That will remove
the twin bottlenecks which once him
dered Allied shipping through the
Mediterranean, thus bringing a step
nearer the full restoration of that
vital sea route.
This naturally raises the question
of Italy's remaining island out
posts, Sicily and Sardinia, together
with neighboring Corsica, politically
French but under Axis military occu-
patton. Those insular bastions are
in a very different class from tiny
Pantelleria and Lampedusa. They
are all large islands, with good inter-
nal communications and natural
resources. Sicily and Sardinia each
are approximately the size of the
State of New Hampshire, Corsica
being about half their area. Obvi-
ously, none of the trio can be COM
pletely blanketed and saturated by
air bombardment However, it is
quite possible that certain coastal
areas can be so treated and may thus
furnish relatively easy beachheads
for invasion by landing forces. Fur
thermore, Sardinia and Corsica pre-
sumably could be isolated from
the Italian mainland and thereby
deprived of reinforcements by the
Allies growing naval and air superb
ority. Sicily cannot be thus cut of,
since it is sundered from Italy proper
only by the narrow Strait of MesSina.
Sicily should thus be the most diff
cult island objective for the Allies.
Another point to remember is that
those larger islands repeatedly have
a stiffening of German troops among
their garrisons, whereas Pantelleria
and Lampedusa appear to have been
held only by Italians
All such purely military considera-
tions are affected by the morale Of
both the Italian armed forces and
the general population. Just what
that is, or what it soon may be, is
hard to say. Italy is undoubtedly
war weary, disillusioned with FaS-
cism, and resentful of its German
associates Yet it cannot be taken
for granted that an actual Allied
invasion of it's home territories would
bring revolt or collapse after a mere
token resistance. Here the test will
probably be the first Allied invasion
of the large islands. The way the
Italian garrison and the local popu-
lation react to that attack should
indicate what an invasion of the
mainland would encounter.
Both the British and American
Governments have been conducting
a campaign of Psychological" war
fare to stimulate Italian popular dis
content and encourage withdrawal
from the war. President Roosevelt
furthered this campaign when he
coupled the surrender of Pantelleria
with an assurance that the Italian
people could look forward to fair
treatment by the victorious Allies
and an honorable place in the new
European order planned after Axis
tyranny had been eliminated. Such
assurances cannot fail to impress