Evening star., 1943-05-15
Attack on Attu Part
Of New Drive on Jopon
Major Eliot Says Resources
Of Enemy Will Be Stroined
By AIeutiuns Blow
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
The landing OF American forces on
| Attu is first of all, another illustration
| of the proper use of the initiative.
The japanese forces are spread out
| over vast area of land and sea- They
| probably have no shortage of trained
troops, but they have been showing
| signs of weakness in the air and their
naval and merchant shipping has suf-
| fered heavy losses. 1t is our proper
| strategy to compel the japanese to dis
| perse their air and naval power as much
| as possible and to put as great a strain
| as we can upon their merchant ship
| ping. The more Of these elements Of
japanese power we can destroy in oper-
ations on the perimeter of their defense
area, the less we shall have to meet
when we come to decisive battle after
penetrating toward the heart of that
area. Furthermore, If we can make the
Japanese fight at two Or three places
on the perimeter, there is always a
chance that we can capitalize on an
error OF Judgment, that they will be
too weak to meet us at one of our chosen
points and times of attack and thus we
shall be able to effect an advance to
bases from which we can inflict even
greater injuries upon the enemy.
The attack upon Attu Island, coming
at the same moment that conversa-
tions between Gen. Macarthur and Ad-
mral Halsey are reported in the South
west Pacific, looks as though the Jap
anese are about to be threatened from
two widely distant points at the same
time
Attu itself is not place Of vast i'm
portance, except as stepping stone. 1t
is mountainous island with peak
| just over 5000 feet in height and the
waters around it present many naviga-
tional difficulties. One OF the chief ad-
vantages which the japanese will have
| in its defense will be the fact that dur
| ing their stay there they have been
very busy taking soundings and per-
fecting their charts so that their move
ments by sea will be less beset with
naviga tional dangers than will ours
In all distant operations of this
nature, the main point to be kept in
is the force which can be brought to
bear at the crucial point not that which
may be available at home or else
where. The projection of fighting
| power from its sources in the homeland
| to distant theaters of war Is difficult
and painful task and one which alb
| serbs a great measure of power as 1t
| goes along. both in the task of trans
| portation itself and for the defense OF
| the line of communica tions
| Our forward base at Amchitka is
much closer to Attu than the japanese
| forward base at Paramushiro-the dis
| tances are respectively about 22O and
about $50 nautical miles. However,
| Amchitka is about $50 miles from Dutch
| Harbor, our principal base in the Aleu-
| tians, which is itself about ! TOO miles
| from Seattle, the nearest large port of
the continental United States. Para
mushiro, on the other hand, is only about
| 700 miles from Ominato at the northern
| tip of the japanese main island. Thus
| the japanese are much closer to the
sources of their power than we are as
far as fighting in the Attu-Kiska area
| is concerned
| We do, however, have one advantage
| which they do not possess. From Dutch
| Harbor through the Andreanof Islands
| to Amchitka, we have an unbroken
series of island stepping stones by which
| We can bring our fighting strength
right into the immediate area of oper-
ations, once we get that strength to
| Dutch Harbor. From Paramuchiro to
| Attu the japanese have nothing but
$50 miles of open water. The Japanese
never have developed transport aviation
to any considerable extent, and their
| ability to reinforce their threatened
| garrison on Attu will depend largely on
! their inability to keep control of the
| surface of the sea between Paramushiro
and Attu. In the vicinity of Attu we
| shall be able to give much stronger air
| support to our surface vessels than the
| japanese will be able to do. an advantage
| which. in the Southwest Pacific, usually
| has proved decisive when the surface
strength was anything like even.
The reason for bypassing Kiska and
attacking Attu probably Is to be found
in consideration of this factor. If we
| had attacked Kiska first, the japanese
| might have been able to throw consid-
erable air power into the area. using
| Attu as an advance base. But with Attu
the point of attack, Kiska is caught
| between Attu and Amchitka and can
be pretty well neutralized while Attu
| is being reduced
AS to the progress of the fighting on
| Attu, according to the latest informa-
tion it is proceeding satisfactorily. We
! have had plenty of time to plan this
| operation and it is to be presumed that
we have not sent boy to do mans
| work
(Copyrisht, 1943, New York Tribune, Inc)
A II Aona%rr,, H.:.:.o