Evening star., 1943-01-31
French Deadlock

The high hopes that had been
raised by the meeting between Gen
eral Henri Giraud, high commits
sioner for French Africa, and General
Charles de Gaulle. head of the
Fighting French movement. have
proved to be somewhat premature.
This conclusion seems obvious from
an interview given by General
Giraud to representatives of the
| press. At this conference the high
commissioner stated categorically
that there is mo question for the
moment of political unity between
| him and General de Gaulle. The
best that can be expected in the way
of cooperation is one "of liaison on
military. economic and financial
matters, without any idea of politics. -
Indeed, judging by reports from
Fighting French sources, this "liai-
son" may not amount to much. At
the close of the Casablanca confer
ence it was understood that De
Gaulle was to send General Catroux
as his personal representative to
Algiers CatrouX is one of De
Gaulle's righthand men, with dis
tinguished military record that
should make him personally accept
able to so soldierly a personality as
General Giraud. Yet London dis
patches indicate that, after return
ing to London and comforting with
his political advisers, General de
Gaulle has turned cool on the idea
of sending Catroux as his liaison
officer with the North African re-
gime. Furthermore, Major de Bois-
lambert, who can be considered a
Fighting French spokesman since he
is high on De Gaulle's staff and was
present at Casablanca, has given out
a rather provocative statement to
the effect that revolution is
probable in France if former Vichy
men continue to have a part in the
North African administration. Even
General Giraud must understand
that" concludes the major. That is
not exactly pouring oil on the
troubled waters. Such an attitude
augurs Ill for effective cooperation
between the two factions.
To what can this unfortunate
deadlock be ascribed? In part,
doubtless, to the personalities of the
two leaders, obstinate, proud and
touchy individuals who take them
selves and their missions" seriously.
From the very beginning General de
Gaulle has declared fatty that he
would have nothing to do with any
one who has taken prominent part
in the Vichy regime established by
Marshal Petain after the armistice
with Germany in the summer OF
1910: That lets out virtually every
high official in the present provl-
sional government Of North Africa
with the exception of Giraud him
self, who was never soiled with the
vichy taint because he was pris-
oner in Germany at the time OF the
armistice and took no part In public
affairs after his escape from his
German prison to what was then ur-
occupied French territory. In short,
what De Gaulle demands is a clean
sweep of North African officialdom
as a prerequisite to full-f1edged
cooperation by his Fighting French.
He thus insists upon thoroughgoing
political reorganization as a prelim-
mary to joint military action. And
1t becomes clear that De Gaulle has
not yielded an inch on the matter.
Giraud, on his part, sticks with
equal tenacity to his original thesis
that politics should be subordinated
to military concentration on what
he deems the primary task of throw
ing the Axis out of Africa, He,
therefore, repeats his favorite slogan:
There is only one kind of politics for
France-fight and win the war"
Giraud and his spokesmen contend
that to attempt a reorganization of
the civil administration in North
Africa at this crucial military mo-
ment would gravely complicate the
war effort, especially If it involved
placing De Gaullists in positions Of
authority in North Africa, where
they are a small minority. And on
this point he is equally unyielding.
The deadlock thus persists. Mean
while, the field troops of Giraud and
De Gaulle are actually in contact on
the -Tripolitan border,
fighting the common Axis foe. Per-
haps comradeship in arms will by
pass the stiff logic Of their respective