Evening star., 1943-02-27
RommeI Seen Taking
Lone Wolf Gamble
Major Eliot Warns Against
Danger in Thinking Fox
At End of His Resources
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot

Rea adefS OF these articles may recall
| that on February % I expressed some
astonishment that Field Marshal Rom
mel should have pressed his offensive
| beyond the Kasserine Pass, and pointed
| out that in the existing circumstances,
| such an operation with Rommels limited
forces must be considered reckless and
even foolhardy unless it formed part of
larger plan which might include
| diversion of Allied strength by a Nazi
drive down through Spain to the Strait
| of Gibraltar
Now Rommel has been driven back by
| the swift concentration against him of
superior British and American ground
forces and what seems to be overwhelm-
ing air power. He has lost the Kasserine
Pass. and is reported to be falling back
| on the coast. 1t would appear that he
was taking tremendous gamble, reck-
| less gamble, perhaps-but why?
| 1t may be that he committed the fatal
error of Understanding the fighting
| qualities, the courage, the resistance of
| the American soldier He has never
| fought Americans before; he may have
| believed that the advantages he pos
sessed in the way of experienced troops
would sweep the less experienced Ameri-
| cans before him. We should remember
| that the German propaganda has been
! assuring the German people for some
| time that the American Army is a sort
| OF oVergroWn awkward squad composed
| of decadent weaklings. Maybe a little
of this idea had seeped into Rommels
mind. II so, he knows better now. Ex-
| perience, especially in desert and in ar
mored warfare, counts for a great deal,
and can be gained only at bitter cost;
but Rommel may have counted too
heavily on this fact.
1t may, however, turn out when the
full story of this war comes to he writ
ten, that there was master plan per-
haps including an invasion of Spain,
which was to be set in motion on con-
tingent basis: That is, if Rommel could
| get to Tebessa and start northward to-
ward the Constantine -Tunis Railway,
| then the German armies would cross the
Pyrenees. There is something to be said
| for this as a conjecture, because the
| Germans are desperately short of re-
serves, and the high command may have
| been unwilling to undertake a Spanish
| gamble without a successful prelude in
| North Africa. Such a success, Berlin
may have felt, would bring about Span
ish compliance with German desires.
But 1t seems most likely of all that
Rommel was gambling on his own ac-
| count; that he felt his position to be a
| bad one, almost hopeless, trapped as he
was between the Allies in Northern Tu-
| nisia and Gen. Montgomerys 9Th Army
| in the south. His one mobile asset was
| his armored force. If he could use it,
| capitalizing on superior experience and
| a few superpoWerful tanks to smash our
| base at Tebessa and even to cut our
| communications with Algiers, he would
win much in the way of time and prestige.
| Failure could not much worsen a stua-
| ton That was none too good to begin
| with.
For the moment, he has failed. The
| fluid quality of desert warfare, so often
| attested in Libya, warns us not to make
| too much of his failure. We can take a
| fierce pride in the splendid showing
| made by our troops, and the high quail
| ties of battle leadership shown by our
| officers, from Maj. Gen. Fredendall
| downward; but we should not hastily
assume that Rommel is finished Much
depends on the extent of his losses, on
the price he has had to pay for his Kas-
serine adventure, and on our ability to
follow him up.
| If we can now keep pressing sharply
| on his heels. without giving him an op-
| portunity for one OF his famous offensive
| returns, while the British 9th Army
| comes smashing through from the south
we should soon have him penned up
with Won Arnim in the northeastern COR
ner of Tunisia, where he can still turn
at bay. In such a case, we would have
| retrieved most of the time his offensive
was designed to gain, and we would have
| real reason for rejoicing.
But If Rommel still retains sufficient
| freedom of action to maneuver against
both the American and British forces
| closing in upon him. if the Mareth posi-
| tions hold while longer and if we are
still too weak in the northwest to take
strong offensive attitude, there may be
further delays, and further iockeying
for position, which will consume time
the precious commodity which we dare
not waste, which means so much to us
now with every day that passes, while
Germany girds for the final defensive
struggle, while the decisive battle of the
east is being fought out in desperate
combat on the plains between the Donetz
and the Dnieper, while the spring ap-
proaches and the thaws come in Russia
and the African stalemate still denies
America and Britain the chance to use
their full power against Germany in the
west.
tCopyrisht' 1919 New York Tribune, Inc)