Evening star., 1943-05-25
Germans May Drive
Against Leningrod
Major Eliot Sees Possible
Offensive in North Russia
To Offset Loss in Africu
Bu Mai. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot
All indications continue to be that the
Germans are about to Launch an offensive
on the Russian front, and that the pur-
pose of this offensive Is to reduce the
striking power of the Red Army so that
the Germans can gain greater freedom
of action to deal with the Anglo -Ameri-
can offensive elsewhere.
Just where the German offensive In
Russia is going to be launched is as yet
uncertain. There are signs of activity
all along the front from the Gulf Of
Finland to the Kuban.
One possibility, which will be examined
in this article, is that the Germans may
select the northern part Of the front for
what is probably their last great offensive
effort of the war.
To begin with, they are constrained by
the limited size of their forces. In 1941,
they found themselves able to keep up
series Of successive attacks along the
whole Russian fronts 1r 1912, they had
forces only for an offensive in the SOUTH
This year it is likely that their forces
will be still smaller, and in consequence
they must seek still more limited OBJ
jective.
So considered, the northern front
presents definite attractions. Since their
primary purpose is to cut off and destroy
a considerable part of the Russian Army,
the Germans might seek to achieve this
by attacking both sides of the Russian
salient between Lake linen and
Smolensk, making their major effort on
their left in the Leningrad-Novgorod
sector, so that their left flank would be
protected by the Gulf Ct Finland until it
had passed Leningrad.
Incidentally, part of this operation
would be directed toward the capture of
Leningrad itself, which would contribute
more to German prestige than any other
prize IN Russia except Moscow. After
Stallngrad and Tunisia, the Germans are
oaoly IN need of military success which
they can hold up to the world as showing
that there is life in the old dog vet.
Moreover, the capture of Leningrad
would tend to hold Finland in the war
by maintaining Germanys lines of COM
munlcation with that country. 1t would
1orestall Russian offensive using Lenin-
grad as a base, which might clear the
south shore of the Gulf of Finland and
cu1 F1nland of from Germany altogether.
Inc Germans have shown themselves ex-
traorolnarlly touchy about Finlands at
tltude, which indicates that thev are most
anxious not to have their position in
northern Europe weakened.
such result also wouldS have q tend.
ency to overawe the Swedes, who have
iateiy been showing a decidedly firmer
attitude toward all things German,
II Lenlngrad were to fall, the Germans
n'1ene oe able to develop their success
eastward and cut the railways leading
from the Arctic into Russia. or at least
nrlng these lines under heavy and con-
.n'uous air attack. Thus they might hope
that even If they were unable to cut Of
tne russian armies to any considerable
oeeree, tney could weaken the fighting
power OF Russia by severing her main line
OF communications with the 11n,tad
states and Great Britain.
1t has been a feature of most cer,,o ',
plans That they combine political and
military objectives and are based on the
tneory OF maximum and minimum gains
lhey are designed to win at least a cer-
Ialn minimum objective with the nossi-
olllty alway present Of gaining much
more.
IL would appear that an offensive
against Leningrad and the smolensk
sahent-that Is to say, an offensive in
North Russia, fulhlls ell these charac-
teristics, and that the German High Com
mand hardly could find elsewhere an
operation from which they could hope to
gain so much for so comparatively modest
an expenditure of force. They are no
longer in the position which they once
enjoyed Of being able to use practically
unlimited force against single enemy
without worrying about what is going
to happen elsewhere. They must now
budget their resources and seek for bar
gains. And while attacking the Red
Army is hardly to be described as bar
gain from any point of view, the Ger
mans being compelled by necessity to
make such an attack, may well consider
that the northern sector is the most
attractive place in which to try their
luck.
(copyrieht. 1943 New York Tribune 1nc)