Evening star., 1943-09-20
Cleanup on New Guinea


destruction of their garrisons, orig
inally estimated at 10000, is an
achievement notable not only for it's
effects on the local military situa-
ton, but even more as a demonstra-
tion of the offensive technique per-
fected by the Allied high command.
1t is not too much to say that this
brilliant exploit can be repeated
against other enemy strongholds in
the South Pacific area under for
mula with almost mathematical GER
tainty, given the requisite strength
in manpower, equipment and sup
plies.
This formula is no brilliant impro-
visation. 1t has been evolved slowly
and painfully by General Douglas
Macarthur and his American-Aus-
tralian staff colleagues. The first
stages were worked out by the costly
process of trial and error against a
foe that had experimental for many
years in the art of jungle warfare
and employed troops specially
trained and hardened for this pc
culiar and difficult type of warfare.
When Macarthur took up his task in
the spring of 1912 he was heavily
handicapped not only by lack of men
and equipment but also because he
possessed a mere handful of Jungle
wise Australians, his American
troops being unframed and unsea-
soned for such campaigning. The
first half-year was a heart breaking
defensive struggle against superior
enemy forces, then in the full flush
OF their aggressive power.
The new technique was put to its
primary test in our attack on Qua
dalcanal in early August. 1912. The
experiment was long and costly. But
it was ultimately successful, and the
fanatical obstinacy Of the Japanese
high command wore down it's
strength in ships and planes even
more than in ground troops. Mean
while, the rapid flow of military,
naval and air reinforcements from
the United States redressed the stra-
teglc balance to at least parity in
the South Pacific, and made possible
sustained offensive throughout
that region.
The unsolved factors in the stra-
tegic equation were cost and time.
The conquest of Guadalcanal and
the reduction of the japanese foot
holds in Southern New Guinea or
Papua had been so slow and prodigal
in casualties that the process of
"island-hopping' threatened to drag
out almost indefinitely. The tech
nique obviously had to be perfected
and its tempo stepped up. This has
been achieved by an amazingly effec-
tive coordination of every branch of
the armed services. Answers have
been found to the japanese defense
system of multiple log g-and-concrete
"bunkers" hidden in the jungle and
other tricky devices. This quickened
tempo has been simultaneously
shown by the Allied offensives on
New Georgia Island in the Solomons
and on New Guinea. Compare the
time and cost of reducing New Geor-
gia with Guadalcanal. Still more
striking is the comparison between
the reduction of the Buna-Gona area
in Papua with that of Salamaua-Lae,
just completed. The decisive often
sive against those twin japanese
strongholds started only a fortnight
ago. 1t involved a very skillful CO.
ordination between troops sent over
land, disembarked from barges and
dropped from air transports in the
Markham Valley, while ceaseless pre-
cision bombing from airplanes sys-
tematically blasted the japanese
ground defenses in a way artillery
had not been able to accomplish.
Thus, operations which formerly
consumed months have been COM
pressed into a matter of short weeks,
or even days.
The reduction of Japan's New
Guinea strongholds controlling the
strait between that island and New
Britain, combined with our steady
climb up the island-ladder of the
Solomons, bring in sight the next
major objective, the conquest of Ra-
baul the main japanese base in the
entire region. And beyond that, still
other objectives become strategic
possibilities.