Evening star., 1943-06-08
PunteI|eriu as Test Case

PonteIIerio as Test Case
For the past fortnight 1taly's island
outpost of Pantelleria has been sub
jected to an accelerating crescendo
OF attack Aerial bombings have be-
come continuous "round the clock"
supplemented by periodic lombard
ments from heavy Allied naval units
offshore. 1t seems virtually certain
that this constitutes "softening up"
process preliminary to Allied troop
landings and the taking of the island
by assault. However, it is interesting
to speculate how much of those pre-
liminary air and naval operations are
motivated by local tactical consider
ations and how much as a sort of
laboratory experiment, the results OF
which can be applied to subsequent
operations of a similar character.
Islands have certainly played big
role in the present war, and many
useful lessons have already been
learned from a long list including
Crete, Hong Kong. Corregidor, Java,
Guadalcanal and Attu. The closest
parallel to Pantelleria, tactically as
we'll as geographically, is Malta, that
British island less than $50 miles dis
tant, which successfully withstood
terrific aerial poundings lasting more
than year. Malta went far to prove
that well-defended island cannot
be knocked out from the air alone.
What saved Malta was the fact that
the Axis was never able to risk send
ing an expeditionary force In the
teeth of even partial British naval
control of the Mediterranean. BY
contrast, Pantelleria is now entirely
cut OF from Axis aid. Allied domi-
nance of the surrounding sea and air
Is alike absolute. The way is thus
clear for an expeditionary landing
whenever the Allied high command
deems the time ripe.
Assuming that the defenders are
ready to put up last-ditch resist
ance, Pantelleria appears to be a
hard nut to crack. Only eight miles
long by four miles wide, the island
Is tumble Of volcanic crags culmi-
mating In a peak nearly 5000 feet
high, while much of the coastline is
a cliff rising vertically from the sea.
It's one small harbor. at the north
west corner of the island, seems to
have been so effectively wrecked by
air and naval bombardments as to
be OF little use to any one Heavily
fortified during the past decade, Pan
telleria literally bristles with artillery
ranging up to 15-inch guns. Its very
smallness makes possible its effec-
tive defense throughout by garri-
son estimated at between 10000 and
$4,000, reported to be well-balanced
fortress troops. The one weakness
thus far disclosed is a relative lack
of anti-aircraft batteries, probably
due to Italy's general shortage of
those weapons on all fronts.
Notwithstanding Pantelleria's S for
midable defenses, they could pre-
sumably be quickly overcome if the
Allies are willing to pay the maxi
mum price. But such sacrifices are
no longer required, because the is
land has ceased to be the air and
submarine base which formerly har-
ried Allied conveys sailing through
the strait between Sicily and Tunisia
wherein Pantelleria lies as a natural
stopper. The Allied high command
can thus take its time and systemati-
cally work out technique whereby
the island can be reduced with the
least possible expenditure of men,
ships and planes. It is thus possible
that the actual assault may be con-
siderably delayed while experimental
air and naval operations are further
elaborated and perfected. In that
event, the test case of Pantelleria
may be cited as q classic in military
textbooks long after the present war
has ended. This operation thus has
a technical interest apart from its
practical Importance in current and
subsequent phases OF the war now
going on.