Evening star., 1943-12-01

III ltdlJ Is primarily directed by
political and humane considerations.
1t is obvious that Allied air power.
which has shown itself able to shat
ter Hamburg, Cologne and other
great German cities, could readily
demolish Rome, Milan Turin. Genoa
and all other Italian centers. 1t
coula destroy communications. wreck
the country and paralyze its life.
mat ultimately would force the Ger
mans to withdraw, but in the proc
esS 1t would leave the peninsula in
ruin and chaos, with millions home
less and embittered.
Country to Be Liberated.
However, our apparent policy is to
llberate the country, not to destroy
1t. Demolition bombing. having
forced the expulsion of the Fascist
government and capitulation OF
Italy, completed its major task in
that theater The country is no
longer a member of the Axis, but a
friendly area occupied by enemy
lo:ecS. We have no alternative but
TO discontinue strategic lombard
ncnt aid Try to IiHerate Italy in a.
mlie-oy-mile struggle. 1t should be
recalled that even our lombard
ment Of France has been more Sc
lective and more considerate of tbs
local population than air assault.
on Germany.
We deliberately are holding our
most powerful aviation on a tight
leash. We are not employing the
most efficient form of air power
strategic air demolition. Instead
we are using aviation almost entirely
IN an auxiliary capacity. as a SUD-
poItlng element Tor the ground
forces, and that is the least effec.
tive use of Che air power potential.
In ltaiy the Germans today are in
the position OF burglar shielding
hmseIf with the BODY of child
We cannot shoot at him because va
would XIII the child in Going 50.
wherefore we have to throw avay
the advantages of firearms - stra.
teelc oonbardment - and try to
grapple with the burglar with our
pare hands-in surface struggle.
The Nazls have put the Vatican. the
Pope, Italian cultural centers and in
dustrial vitals between our air
power and themselves. forcing us to
resort to slow. tedious. mile -by-mils
occupation, using aviation only in its
tactical role
Advantage Lacking.
In that type Of aviation We do not
have any great advantage over the
Germans. Our superiority in tho
air lies in the fact that We have
created tremendous strategic force
and Germany hasn't. That long
range force, represented by our Flv-
ing FoTtresses and Liberators, vax
responsible for our victories from Ell
Alamein to Italy because its range
and great striking power enabled
us constantly 10 destroy the Ger
man lines of supply in Africa and
sicily. Until the surrender We used
that same strategic air force ruth
lessly in Italy itself.
II our tactical aviation succeeded
IN TunlSia. it was not because of su-
periority in this type of aviation: it
was primarily because our stratesic
air power made it impossible for
the Germans to reinforce and sup
ply their tactical aviation across the
Mediterranean. The fact is that
when 1t comes to auxiliary air forces,
German aviation Is still as good az
ours.
Hitler's Messerschmitt 1906 Is
match for the Spitfire and. together
with the Focke- Wulf fighters, is lust
as good and in some respects better
than the P-38 Lightning, particularly
when 1t comes to close individual
combat. Used as fighter bombers,
they are certainly better than the
Warhawks and can be matched only
by the North American Mustang
known as the ABS Invader when
used as a fighter bomber. In the
medium bomber class, the twin-en-
gine Junkers 88 and its newest YER
sion, the 1873, and the Messerschmitt
40 and 20lA are just as good as any.
thing we can put in the air.
The Germans, moreover. are past
masters in the use of auxiliary avia-
tion to support troop operations on
the ground. That has been their
long suit from the outset. In addi-
ton, they work with short lines OF
communication and can more readily
augment their air strength with
whatever is needed from the main
reservoirs at home. The two oppos-
ing aviations in Italy are engaged
IN slugging match, on a more or
less even basis, and control of the
skies thus far has not been decided.
New ingenious land mines, BOBBY
traps, weather and terrain, Of course.
have something to do with the slow
progress on the Italian front, but
these are only superficial. The crux
OF the situation is in deeper stra-
tegic reasons which made control Of
the Italian skies indecisive, and as
long as 1t remains indecisive, the
going on the surface will continue
to be tough and slow.
Distributed by McNaught Syndicate. Incl
Two japanese AdmiroIs
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