Evening star., 1943-08-25
Germon Air Defense
Seen Improving
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

Berlin's turn has come, and it seems
very likely that the great attack OF
Monday night will be only the first in
series such as devastated Hamburg 1t is
to be noted that the weather was clear,
which suggests the possibility that the
bomber command may have been wait
ing for time when the meteorologists
could with some confidence predict a
period of good weather, both for physical
and psychological effect, 1t is better to
keep up a continuous hammering for
several days, as was done at Hamburg
Berliners have been expecting just that.
and for the attacks to be broken off after
only one or two raids might give them
the idea that their own defenses are too
tough for penetration.
The defenses were tough enough, even
so. In fact, there are beginning to be
some hints that we are passing through
a critical period with regard to German
defense against air attack 1t has long
been known that the Germans are
switching their production from bombers
to fighters. BY so doing they abandon
their power to take the offensive in the
air. they admit that in the end they are
defeated nation, but they reaffirm their
intention to make their final defeat cost
us so dearly that we shall stop some
where short of achieving unconditional
surrender" and make peace on better
terms. Anything saved in the way of
power or prestige is net gain to the
present masters of Germany, whether
Nazis or Prussian militarists.
II the Germans can by concentrating
all their aircraft industry on producing
more and better armed fighters. reduce
the scale of our bombing attacks and
make their cost great deal higher than
1t is now, they will have achieved a gain
equivalent to great military victory
They will have blunted the edge of one of
our most promising weapons. On the
other hand if we can keep their fighter
production from increasing too RAPIDLY.
II by smashing their facilities and by air
combat we can overcome the edge which
the Germans hope to gain by their
switch from bombers to fighters. then
the results thus obtained should be
cumulative in nature and we should see
their curve of aircraft production decline
at an accelerating pace until they find
themselves in the sad state to which
japanese air poWer-for altogether diff
ferent reasons-already is reduced.
Judging from the evidence available
1t would appear that we are now in the
critical phase of this struggle: The phase
"hen the Germans are first beginning to
snow tangible results from their switch
IN production (Which, of course, also i'm
phes switch In their training program
Tor hying personnel-hghter pilots and
more fighter pilots, instead of bomber
crews. Let's look at the figures.
The controlling figure in examining the
costs of bombing is now very generally
assumed to be the weight in tons dropped
IN the target area for each aircraft
lost In the course of the operation
During the spring offensive. the RAF
night bombers showed steady improve
ment In this respect. This was the
period during which the Germans were
making their switch in production. and
were, meanwhile, frantically scraping the
oottom OF the barrel for every fighter
they could find. They lost North Africa
IN consequence, and they were impotent
to interfere with the Russian concentra.
lions which have cost them Orel, Bel
gorod and Kharkov)
In April, for every aircraft lost the
Raj dropped As tons of bombs Tbis
compared fayorably with the record for
tne previous year. In May and June.
the average rose to So tons and in .Julv
under unusually favorable conditions. il
bounded up to 86 tons. Records of indi-
Vldual operations showed even more
favorable results-those of the first three
great raids on Hamburg are particularly
instructive.
In the Hamburg raid of July "a, the
tonnage dropped for each aircraft lost
was 19l; July 27, it was 127: july %
IL was g. The weather has something
to do with this, but the progressive in
crease In loss is certainly due chiefly
TO the Germans concentrating their
defense elements in the vicinity.
NOW they seem to be doing rather
better. For example, in the big night
fald on Peenemunde, August IT, the
Raj lost Al aircraft, an average of l
aircraft loss for each 366 tons of bombs
dropped On the same day. the United
States Army Air Force lost 36 For
TeSSes In day raid on Regensberg.
Mondays raid On Berlin showed a fur
ther reduction to approximately 80 tons
OF bombs dropped per aircraft lost.
OF course, Peenemunde had high
concentration of defense, including
plenty of "A guns, and Regensberg rep
resents very deep penetration of enemy
territory for day bombers, as Berlin
does for night bombers. Hasty Judgment
on the basis of just a few operations
Is not profitable. But there does seem
to be very strong suggestion that the
Germans are increasing their defensive
strength against air attack and that we
are now beginning to see the results of
their switch to fighter production. The
results of the next two or three raids on
Berlin, If they come as expected, and
the results in other air operations over
Germany, should be enlightening.
tCopyrisht, 1913, New York Tribune Inc)
Keeping America American