Evening star., 1943-07-19
japanese Seek Time
To Consolidate Gains
By MAI. George Fielding Elio1


The Japanese high command Is GER
tainly peculiar. Look at the record.
Ever since we made our first landing
on Guadalcanal last August, the Japa-
nese have been sending in task forces of
various sizes to try to interfere with the
various things we have been doing in
the South and Southwest Pacific areas.
Not one of these task forces has been
strong enough to accomplish it's mission.
All have suffered severe losses.
Add those losses together and they
amount to a Gripping of Japan's air
power, the loss of something like oneA
third of her navy, and heavy substrac-
tions from Japanese merchant shipping
and flrst-line ground forces. For these
losses, Japan has purchased little time,
possibly. That is all.
Yet the method persists. Observe the
recent operations in and around the New
Georgia group of the Central Solomons
The Japanese have tried the task force
method three separate times in the past
few days.
The first time they lost two cruisers
and seven destroyers we lost one cruiser
The second time they lost cruiser and
three-possibly flve-destroyers. We lost
destroyer and had some damage to
other vessels. The third time the Japa-
nese lost, without any compensating
damage to our Navy. cruiser, two de-
stroyers, a sub chaser and three mer-
chant vessels
How long can the japanese Navy, or
course of action?
I lay particular stress on naval losses
at this time, because it is becoming in
creasingly evident that japanese air
power is on the decline. and that the
moment is approaching when the Japa-
nese must either give up many of their
island bases in the Pacific, or must risk
a majo fleet action to re-establish their
control of the sea communications on
which those bases depend.
This must be apparent to the Japa-
nese high command in Toxic as it is to
American officers. Yet the japanese.
faced by the fact that in their naval
strength lies their only hope OF COM
pensation for their lack of air power, are
not only allowing but actually courting
the whiting away of that naval strength
In series of minor affrays from which
they cannot possibly hope to derive any
considerable benefit.
They keep right on trying, long after
there is no hope of doing anything. 1t
may be face" 1t may be that as long as
there are army garrisons surrounded
and beset, the Japanese Navy cannot
abandon them without an effort, though
the effort be hopeless.
But If that is the case, why did they
not at least put together the three task
forces which we have dealt with piece
meal and come altogether in one great
big offensive effort which could hardly
have sustained more severe losses. and
under cover of which couple of mer-
chant ships at least, might have gotten
through to New Georgia and landed sup
plies and reinforcements for the garrison
of Munda?
I don't know why. and neither does
way the Japanese do things.
OF course, the basic japanese strategy
Is easy to understand. 1t is the counter
to our own strategy by which Germany
is to be dealt with first. and Japan later.
Accepting that fact, the japanese are
playing for time. They are trying to
consolidate themselves in their area of
conquest. They are trying to build up
their prestige and authority among the
peoples Of Southeastern Asia, and they
are having some success in so doing
They are exploiting to the full the raw
material resources of those areas, and
building up stock piles in Japan, where
almost all of their heavy industry is
located. They are trying AS best they
can to make themselves secure against
the day Of reckoning. in the hope that
they can present the United Nations
with so formidable military problem
that-Germany being conquered-the
British and American people will recoil
from the sacrifices that the reduction OF
Japan would entail But they miscal-
culated the amount Of strength that we
would be able to detach to the Pacific
without injurious effect on the campaign
In Germany.
They are now confronted with the
prospect of increasing pressure against
their most vulnerable spot, their sea-
borne lines of communications. They
have suffered very heavy losses in mer-
chant shipping Their air power is so
reduced that it may soon lose all offen-
sive possibilities.
Their one remaining hope. as far as
saving their sea lanes is concerned, lies
in their fleet. In the last analysis, that
hope lies in the possibility of the Japa-
nese fleet winning a major battle fleet
action against the United States fleet.
Sooner or later it will come to that, or
else the Japanese will be helplessly cut
off from all their conquered areas to the
southwark
That is why 1t is so hard to under
stand why the japanese continue to
waste their sea power in driblets. Every
time they do 1t makes our task easier as
We push forward toward the day when
the great guns of our battleships shall
speak in the thunderous voice of f1r.l
decision and the dominion of the Pacific
Ocean shall pass into our hands.
(Copyrizht. 1a43, New York Tribune. Inc.l