Evening star., 1943-05-18
Europe May Yield
To Tunisiun Strategy
Major Eliot Says Allies
Should Pin Down and Destroy
Nozi Forces Systematically

Should Pin Down and Destroy
Nozi Forces Systematically
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
There is a fundamental lesson to be
learned from the Tunisian campaign
which will go far to explain the prob
lens and difficulties which beset the
German high command as they await
the coming Allied invasion of Europe
The enemy held a semi-circular front
In Northeastern Tunisia, stretching from
sea to sea- This front could be attacked
in five different sectors, and a successful
attack In any one of these sectors would
have brought about the complete defeat
of the whole Axis force or, at least,
greatly contributed to that end. These
were the sectors Of Bizerte, Mateur,
Medjez ell Bah, Pont du Fahs and
Enfidaville.
The theory OF defensive warfare Is
to hold the line in just sufficient force
to stop or delay the enemy and keep
the bulk of the troops in hand as a
reserve to counterattack when the
enemy has developed his attack The
best time for counterattack is, Of course,
when the attacking force has lost its
momentum and outrun the support of
it's artillery. Counterattacks may some
times be launched against an enemy
force which is preparing to attack in
order to offset the enemy's dispositions
orN lyooy, hi IA haI I,,,& ,Snv
attacks of this nature are generally en-
trusted to local reserves and do not
involve the general reserve, which is
kept in hand until the enemys inten-
tions have been made thoroughly clear.
The victory in Tunisia was brought
about by the maintenance OF constant
pressure against the whole front,
series Of attacks which gradually alb
sorbed all Of the reserves available to
the Axis commander. The erroneous
impression that the main Allied effort
would be made by the British 9Th Army
was fostered carefully in Gen. Won
Arnim's mind, which caused him to
make an incorrect disposition of his
forces at the outset, and from this
initial error he was never able to recover
When the British 1st Army struck its
heavy blow in the Medjez ell Bah sector,
1t took the last remaining German re-
serves to stop it. When the American
I'd Corps struck in the Mateur sector,
there was nothing left for the German
commander with which to counter
attack and the Americans broke
through. This was Immediately fol-
lowed up by renewal of the British
attack in the center and, as a result,
two great gaps were torn in the German
line through which the Allied armor
poured to break up and destroy the
entire Axis army. The only way to
stop them was by counterattack and, as
all the reserves already had been alb
sorbed into the front line, the German
commander was helpless.
Exactly the same principles apply to
the attack of the so-called fortress of
Europe. Just as In Tunisia, the German
forces are limited in number. They are,
of course, much larger forces than Won
Arnim had in Africa, but, nevertheless,
there Is a limit to their strength. A
great part Of them now are tied up on
the Russian front-probably about two
thirds OF the total German ground
forces. OF the remainder slightly more
than half is scattered around the peri
meter of Western and Southern Europe.
and the rest-say 50 to so divisions
form the strategic reserve. This stra-
tegic reserve must be ready to meet
emergencies either on the Russian front
attack may develop.
Unfortunately for the German high
command, that attack may come any
where from Petsamo all the way around
the European coastline to the Aegean
Sea. They cannot know In advance
where 1t Is coming. Won Arnim was in
the same position in Tunisia because
Allied air superiority deprived him Of
the information to be gained from aerial
reconnaissance. The shift of the
American I'd Corps from Southern to
Northern Tunisia took him by surprise,
and SO did the shift of two divisions Of
the British 9th Army to the sector of
the British 1st Army
The German high command is like
wise unable to gain accurate information
as to the concentration OF Anglo-Amer-
ican forces, both because Of our general
air superiority and because of our COM
mand of the sea. They must be ready
to meet attack wherever it may come.
And If the policy OF constant pressure.
which worked 50 well in Tunisia. is
applied to Europe, it inevitably will
absorb the German reserves or compel
the Germans, in the alternative, to give
up territory or suffer local defeats, the
cumulative effect of which, both in the
moral and material spheres, will mount
rapidly. The Germans undoubtedly are
going to try their old tactics of trying
to beat us to the punch by desperate
offensive IN Russia in the hope of knock
Ing out part of the Russian forces and
thus gaining few more troops for their
strategic reserve. But it is questionable
whether they now have the power to
do this successfully.
Certainly they will not be able to do
1t without having to pay heavily for it
elsewhere. They cannot hold the long
lines, to the defense Of which they are
committed, against the heavy forces
now gathering to attack them. Consid-
cred from the point of view of sound
military principle, the German clamor
about their Atlantic wall is absurd, We
have only to attack and 60 on attacking,
CT of