Evening star., 1943-10-16
Allies May Trop
Germans in ItuIy
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

1t Is difficult to believe that the Ital-
ian operations can long continue in
their present form. The Allied armies
now are advancing on both sides of the
Apennines, the 9th Army on the right,
the 5th on the left, in what amounts to
a continuous line across the peninsula
from sea to sea.
Before this Allied advance the Ger
mans are slowly retiring, fighting those
skillful rearguard actions which they
do so we'll This is, of all possible ar
rangements under the circumstances,
the one most advantageous to the Ger
mans. If they can do this all the way
up the peninsula, they will have gained
great deal of valuable time at the
expenditure of a minimum of force and
will have given up only Italian peninsula
territory which became untenable any
way with the fall of Sicily, Sardinia and
Corsica.
Looking at the red and blue pins
stuck in large-scale map, ones mind
turns irresistibly to the long stretch Of
communications down that narrow pen
insula-the rail and road lines by which
the German armies are supplied and
reinforced, and by which they must
withdraw to join their comrades behind
the northern mountains.
These lines are exposed to attack from
both sides, attack from the sea and air,
attack based on the f1anking islands or
on south Italian bases. The Germans
have had to put more troops into South
Italy to play their rearguard game.
Seven German divisions are reported on
the 5th Army front alone, and it does
not seem likely that there can be less
than three on the 9th Army front,
though the 9th Army is at present prob
ably weaker than the 5th. It hardly
seems possible that the Germans can
be in a position to defend those two
long coast lines against new amphibious
descent. And then comes once more
the question that has been asked ever
since Salerno-where is the 7th Army9
Certainly the Germans are taking
great risks in Italy. They know that.
1t is hard to escape the conclusion that
they began to take those risks with the
heavy assault on the 5th Army at
Salerno, in the hope Of gaining smash
the first Anglo American invasion OF
the European continent.
That would have been a priceless gain
for the Germans. They could have used
it in their political offensive to great
effect. The reaction in America and
Britain would have been profound. So
also in Russia and throughout the Bal
.kans, to say nothing of Germany itself.
The captive peoples would have been
cruelty cast down, the satellites of Ger
many correspondingly encouraged. Vic
tory at Salerno would have been worth
almost any risk the German high COM
mand might have cared to take. But
hard fighting and good leadership de-
MED the Germans that victory. There
after, their stake in South Italy has
diminished
1t perhaps has been difficult for them
to disengage their forces. Gen. Clark
has clung to them like a burr; Gen.
Montgomery has pressed forward with
all his customary vigor, an ever -hovering
threat to their flank and rear.
Allied airmen and Italian saboteurs
have damaged their communications.
And the prestige value of Rome has to
be taken into account. But, weighing
all the factors as we'll as they can be
weighed from this distance, the map still
tells the story of an isolated force of
perhaps 10 divisions, with 300 miles of
narrow peninsula behind it: with Corsica
leaning in toward the shore line like a
leveled cannon, with air and sea in
Allied control and with Yugoslav guer-
on the German reserves in the north.
Those are the conditions. What the
plans of the Allied high command may
be, only time will reveal to us. Possibly
it is felt in those quarters that there is
nothing in Italy worth further expendi-
ture Of force than that now present
there. Yet there are 10 German divi-
sions, most of them armored divisions
perhaps 20 or 25 per cent of all the
German armored force, and the pick
of the lot at that.
War moves slowly. especially amphibi-
Gus war, in its planning and preparatory
stages. There is an infinitude of detail
to be dealt with and the most madden
ing delays to be encountered. Yet there
is the map, and there are the German
troops the opportunity is not being over
looked, of that we may be sure. The
tendency to believe that the Italian op-
erations will soon undergo a drastic
change in character is all but irresistible.
Unless-and this is point upon which
great events may hang-unless it has
been decided that yet greater oppor-
tunity offers itself elsewhere, to which
every available man and weapon must
now be devoted.
tCopyrisht. 1943. by New York Tribune. Incl
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