Evening star., 1943-10-29
Mission to China
Needs Strengthening
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

history is the need for unity OF policy
and purpose among the members of a
coalition at war. 1t is almost impossible
to achieve military unity until there has
been political agreement at least on
broad general principles, until the COM
mon object of the war is made more
definite than the mere aspiration to
defeat a common enemy, until there has
been some clear-cut understanding as to
what is to be done in specific cases and
eXigencies which may be anticipated.
1t is to be hoped that the current talks
at Moscow may lead to some such agree
ment among the three concerned as to
combined policy toward Germany-so
that a sudden German peace offer, for
example, may not catch the coalition di-
vided uncertain and hesitant, and COM
pei its members to take unilateral action
or to patch up hastily some sort of pro-
visional policy instead of having
deliberately concerted policy ready
made.
We have seen in North Africa and
again in Italy that the necessity for
political arrangements to go hand in
hand with military plans Is much more
eXi3ent when an alliance is on the
offensive than when its members are
doing no more than striving to keep
their individual throats from being cut.
An offensive military policy seeks for
victory; victory brings with it political
responsibilities OF all sorts, great and
small-responsibilities having to do with
the disposal of the vanquished foe and
with his more or less willing accomplices
and with his rescued victims. This is
why the Moscow conference is so timely,
for it comes at a moment when the
military situation is growing more and
more favorable for the alliance and
when therefore the need for political de-
clsions of increasing Importance may be
considered as imminent and the exact
hour at which such decisions may have
to be made cannot be longer thought of
as hidden deep behind the wells of an
indefinite future.
But if we may hope that Moscow NAV
take care of many of our European
troubles even at this eleventh hour. we
must still keep in mind the need for like
action with regard to Asia. There, too.
the United Nations are turning to the
offensive. In the Southwest Pacific
we are steadily If slowly gaining and
the rate OF gain soon may be rapidly
accelerated. In Southeast Asia a great
lnter-Allled command has been formed
with the avoWed purpose of bringing at
least partial relief to our Chinese allies
by the reconquest of Burma and per-
hapS of other territory now in enemy
occupation The British have made
some political preparation for this event
by the appointment of Field Marshal
Lord Wavel as Viceroy of India. but
neither the British nor the American
Government has as yet taken the def
mite steps necessary to put in order the
military and political relations of those
powers with China
1t would seem to be a minimum re-
qulrement, as far as the United States
Is concerned, that there should be at
Chungking an American Ambassador of
the first eminence, with full authority
over all other American civilian agen-
cleS represented at the Chinese capital.
and perhaps assisted by a capable officer
OF the rank of minister for handling
administrative detail and coordinate ton.
CnlneSe relations with this country are
considered of such Importance bv the
Chinese government that China has for
a long time past kept her foreign minis
ter, T. V. Soong as we'll as first
line Ambassador, resident in Washing
ton. The time certainly has come To
strengthen and consolidate American
representation at Chungking This is
said IN no dlSparagement of the qualities
and record of our present Ambassador,
Mr.. Gauss. but it is an open secret that
Mr. Gauss health has not been good, and
that for this and other reasons he has
not, through any fault of his own. been
particularly successful Ambassador to
China.
While this may not have mattered too
much in the past, and certainly would
not be proper matter for comment bv
military writer. the situation becomes
wholly different as a great Allied often
slVe looms on the horizon in Southeast
Asla-an offensive in which the most
active sort of cooperation between
Anglo-American and Chinese forces is
an essential ingredient of success.
II We have learned anything from
past experience, We must have learned
that military cooperation cannot be
effective until there is effective political
coordination. There cannot be effec-
tive political coordination when we
have at Chungking agencies repre-
sentlng the lease-lend administration
the Office of Strategic Services, the
once of War Information, the Treas
ury and perhaps others, none of which
operates through the Ambassador or is
controlled by him: and in addition, we
have Gen. Stilwell's Military command
which appears to occupy a semi-inde-
pendent position, the exact relationship
OF which tA) to Lord Louis Mountbat.
tens supreme command in Southeast
Asia, and (B) to the Chinese high COM
mand, never can be satisfactorily an.
Justed unless there Is at Chungkinp a
single political mission representing and
speaking for the United States Govern.
ment with full and undivided authority
Nothing is gained by pretending that
these dltflcultleS and complications do
not exist or by waiting until the fact
OF thelr existence is thrust upon us bv
unpleasant results which foresight MIGHT
have avoided Tho time +o ,,,,1x.