Evening star., 1943-04-20

MOOR Eliot Advocates Attack
On Germany From Britain
As Speedily as Possible
By Maj. George. Fielding Eliot.
From the United Nations point Of
view, the ultimate objective Of the COM
ing invasion Of Europe must be the pene-
tration by Allied troops Of the central
part OF the North European coastal
plain, where the vital centers Of Ger
many are to be found. BY this means
slone can the armed power Of Germany
be defeated and destroyed.
The problem Of attacking the Fortress
of Europe is identical in principle with
that Of the attack Of any other fortified
position which is capable Of being COM
pletely surrounded. This principle was
seen In ancient sieges, and it has not
changed today.
First, you blockade the enemy's posi-
tion so as to cut him OF from sill sources
OF outside help, and then you breach his
fortihcations and tight your way inside
and overwhelm him by superior force Of
arms.
Blockade weakens him because his
supplies are never inexhaustible, but it
rarely decides the result. Bombard-
ment is a part Of blockade. 1t prepares
the wsy for assault by reducing the
enemy's power to resist. But In the end
1t Is assault that produces the decision
a ~ sia ~&
Romans and so 1t is now.
The expulsion of the Germans from
Tunisia will deprive them Of their last
foothold outside of Europe and will COM
plete the forging Of the steel ring Of
blockade-the Romans used to call 1t
the wall Of circumvallation-aroun the
beseiged enemy. He may make further
attempts to break out. as was the pur-
pose OF his campaign in South Russia
last year, but the more he Is exposed to
attack at other parts of the perimeter of
his fortress, the less strength he can de-
vote to attempts to break out at any one
place. But how can we break in?
The map shows us that from our pres
ent positions In the British Isles, Africa,
the Middle East and Russia, there are
three methods Of gaining access to the
North European coastal plain.
One Of these methods is by using the
land bridges mentioned In q previous
article. which connect Europe with our
present positions. These land bridges are
Spain and Turkey, and as both these
powers are neutral 1t is hardly worth
while discussing an approach by either
OF these routes without making political
assumptions which may prove to be un-
Justified. An approach from the north
through the Scandinavian peninsula and
by the land bridge of Denmark involves
the neutrality of Sweden and is also
therefore hardly realistic at the mo-
ment.
The second method is the approach
through Russia. 1t probably would be
highly advantageous, from the strict
point OF view of military principle, il the
whole Of the Allied forces could be con-
centrated on the Russian front and
could smash their way into Germany
from this direction. But as a practical
matter, the exterior communications Of
Russia are so difficult that such a con-
centration is impossible. The best the
western Allies can do is to give the Rus
slams Ill practicable sid in the way OF
weapons and munitions.
The third and only remaining method
OF employing the Anglo American armies
IN Europe Is by means of landing from
the sea. Here the controlling factor Is
that at the point Of landing We must
have an overwhelming sir superiority.
We must be able to employ not only
heavy bombers to smash enemy defenses
and communications, but we must also
be able to employ fighters in vast num-
bers as protection against enemy air
craft, and we must be able to employ
dive bombers for the close support of
our troops. Therefore an essential pre-
liminary to any such landing is the pos
session OF adequate air base facilities for
these purposes within fighter and dive
bomber range Of the point OF landing.
This range cannot be greatly in excess of
100 miles.
On the map Of Europe you will see
how this restricts the possibilities open
TO us. We can land in Greece, for ex-
ample, only If we have previously reduced
Crete and some of the Aegean Islands.
We can land in Italy only If we have
previously reduced Sicily and sardina.
and perhaps Corsica. But to land in
either place would mean that in order
to get at the vitals of Germany we
would still have to penetrate the great
mountain wall which protects Germany
on the south. A landing in Norway
would be largely dependent on carrier
based aviation though some support
might be given from Russian bases.
1t boils down to this: Sooner or later.
when we are really ready to seek q de-
clsion in this war, we shall have to land
an Anglo-American Army on the vest
ern shore OF Europe at point where We
can give the landing adequate air SUD-
port from the only base available to us
Tor that purpose-the island of Great
Britain. This will be a tremendously
costly and bloody operation. But we
snail have to face it and go through, with
1t II we are going to win the war. What
ever the cost, the sooner we can accom-
push this purpose. the sooner we sre
going to bring the war to an end.
(copyrtEht. 1943, New York Tribune rr.,