Evening star., 1943-08-21
Limited Invusions
Miqht Bother Germans
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.


The air is full of rumors flowing south
ward from Quebec. We hear that an
invasion of Western Europe is being
planned there, and that the plans have
even gone so far as the selection Of
a commander in chief for the operation.
If this is true, it means a sharp ac-
celeration OF the plans made at the last
Roosevelt Churchill conference, and the
reason for such an acceleration must
lie in changed conditions which were
not foreseeable at that time. 1t seems
unlikely that the fall of Mussolini alone
could account for so drastic an alteration
of plans.
The other and greater change which
has taken place in the whole picture
of the war is the crushing defeat of the
German summer offensive in Russia,
followed by the passing over of the Red
Army to the offensive on broad scale.
which has given the Russians Orel and
Belgorod, brought Bryansk and Kharkov
into imminent danger of recapture, and
now seems to be threatening the whole
southern portion of the German front
in Russia.
This change, plus the apparent Ger
man decision to defend Northern Italy,
imposes severe additional strain on Ger
manys fighting resources.
1t would seem, therefore, that if Anglo
American power is now to be used to
invade Western Europe, this decision
must be based on the increased oppor-
tunities for shortening the war opened
up by these new conditions. The strength
of the Anglo-American forces available
may also have increased due to the re-
markable success OF our anti-submarine
measures.
On the whole, possibilities which may
have seemed remote only few months
ago now loom much larger, and may,
indeed, be considered for the immediate
future instead of being thought of as
distant ,objectives only to be attained
after the accomplishment Of much pre-
liminary "softening up" and jockeying
for position.
The objective Of an invasion Of West
ern Europe now could only be diver.
sion of German ground forces from the
Russian front in order to permit the
Russians to carry their own offensive
be understood as meaning that landing
III Western Europe might compel the
Germans to withdraw divisions actually
engaged in fighting the Russians. Prob
ably this would not be so, at least at
first.
But the diversionary effect might well
be adequate for all practical Russian
purposes. If the Allied landing immo-
bilized the so-called high command re-
serves" amounting to some 40 or 50
divisions. These are centrally held for
use in either direction and If there were
powerful Allied invasion In the west,
the Germans would be very unlikely to
throw these reserves against the Rus
slams, whatever might be happening on
the Russian front.
II the Russians were reasonably GER
tain that these reserves were in fact
immobilized, they could proceed with
much more confidence to throw in their
own reserves as opportunity may appear,
and thus perhaps convert local success
into decisive victory.
It has been repeatedly pointed out in
these articles that no major invasion of
Western Europe based on Great Britain
can be given adequate fighter cover from
British bases except along that portion
Of the coast between the mouth of the
Scheldt and the mouth OF the Seine.
It is possible, however, that the re-
quired diversionary effect might be OBJ
tanned by an operation of less dimensions
mans would find 1t difficult to concen-
trate their air power and where the
length OF their land communications
would provide an obstacle to the rapid
movement of reserves of ground troops.
In order to obtain the required effect, it
would, of course, be necessary that the
potential threat of such a thrust be
SUFFICIENT so that the Germans could not
ignore 1t and would have to begin max
ing immediate preparations to deal
with it.
Norway might afford an opportunity
for such limited offensive; so might
Brittany. In the first place, the initial
fighter support would have to be carrier
borne; in the second place, long-range
land-based fighters might be used.
There is also the possibility OF switching
the Mediterranean forces, by far the
most formidable amphibious power in
the European theater, to strike at the
south Of France. A combination of this
move and an invasion Of Brittany, or
the French Atlantic coast, mirht. indeed.
provide the German high command
with very severe headache.
(Copyright, 1888, N. Y. Tribune, Inc)
The Reeord <nanke