Evening star., 1943-10-06
Allies Seen Facing
Risks in North Italy
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

moli and the development of the 5th
Army's advance from Benevento begin
to point up the dangers of the German
position in South italy, we may begin
Rome, for it seems less and less possible
that the Germans can hold positions in
or south of that city for any length Of
time-though, Of course, we can have
no assurance as to the scale of destruc-
ton which they may carry out while
they still hold it.
However our thoughts turn very natu-
rally to what may follow. Assuming, as
now seems likely, that we are faced with
nothing more than a German delaying
action in South and Central Italy, We
must assume also that the Germans are
prepared to make a tough fight for
Northern Italy. The German idea of
tough fight is not static defense. Their
theory of defense is an active one in
cluding always the maintenance of a local
threat to their opponents. This they
have proved again and again.
AS we look forward to a German de-
fense of Northern Italy based on this
principle, we must realize that risky as
the German position may now be, we will
face increasing risks ourselves the
farther north we go in the peninsula
The Germans would like nothing better,
both from the military and the morale
points of view, than to inflict on Anglo
~ Il
crushing defeat That is proved by the
very long risks they took in the hope OF
doing exactly that at SalernO They
could not quite bring it off and they are
not Immediately in position to try
again because they must first extricate
themselves from the difficulties into
which their assumption OF this initial
risk has gotten them. But they will try
again as soon as the opportunity offers.
The German position in Northern Italy
has it's good and bad points. It's greatest
weakness is its defective lines of COM
municatlon. which cross the mountain
ranges behind it, and are therefore few
in number being limited by the avail
able passes. limited in capacity, and
FullltId " iIItCil dkJtloil DN an hObnCh.
The closer our airbaSes in the peninsula
come to the controlling passes the more
this vulnerability increases. II may be
said that while this situation does not
prevent the Germans from maintaining
an army in Northern Italy supplied
from Germany, it does limit the size Of
the army which can be so maintained for
any length of time.
The question that the Allied high COM
mand must consider, therefore. is whether
they are now prepared to put into Italy
and eventually to deploy against the
German defense Of Northern Italy, an
army Of sufficient size to overcome the
largest German army which can be
maintained by the available tranS-Alpne
communiCat tionS. The Germans can prob
ably, for time defend Northern Italy
with something in the neghborhood of
20 divisions. They could not hope. with
such force, to do much more than hold
successive positions, retiring gradually to
short line covering the old ItaIo-Aus-
trian frontier or therea bouts If they
could in addition put across the Alps
another 10 divisions they might build
up an offensive defensive army in North
ern Italy which might be capable of
infilctlng upon an Allied attacking force
serious reverse, given the right con-
ditions
IhlS means that (aSSuming the Ger
man strength in Italy at present to ap-
proXimate the 20 divisions mentioned.
which Is roughly the case the Allied
nigh command. II a serious assault on
Northern Italy is contemplated, must be
making preparations now to put into
Italy anywhere from 20 to 80 divisions
and to maintain them there until the
Germans are driven back to their short
line Of defense east of Venice Behind
this force must be q constant flow Of
reinforcements and requirements and
there must be troops available TO occupy
the passes on the French side as these
are cleared TO prevent any German out
f1anking operations through the valley of
the Po. Altogether, as many as 40 divi-
sions might be required for the conquest
Of Northern Italy. 1t is question which
only those with a full knowledge of the
existing situation and plans can decide
as to whether so tremendous an effort
in this area is justified by the results to
be anticipated The diversion of 20 or
so German divisions from other fronts
is something but 1t will not make the
difference between victory and defeat in
Russia
In fact the Germans now appear to
have secured a breathing space along
the Dneiper and may be able to stabilize
this front for a time in whole or in part
The strategic advantage to be gained
from the seizure Of Northern italian air.
fields would be something, but would it
be a sufficient advantage over the air.
fields of Central Italy to justify the tying
down in the Mediterranean theater of
war OF so great part of the Anglo
American striking power?
In any Allied advance up the Italian
peninsula, the risks are all against the
Germans up to certain point once the
we are now going through. But as the
retiring Germans reach their natural
defense lines in the north the balance
of risk shifts. The question is. basically,
whether it is better to go on past the
point Of strategic equilibrium in Italy or
whether the Germans can be safely con-
tanned in the north while the focus of
Allied attention shifts elsewhere Prob
ably the real decision lies with the
Germans. If they can put enough troops
int Mort ha1 O n IN 10