The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1943-10-20

known. tASSOclatcu freSS puOtU
so as to unite rather than divide
us for the establishment of last
ing peace.
We should, however, be naive il
we supposed that Messrs. Eden,
Molotov and Hull or Messrs.
Churchill, Stain and Roosevelt
can foresee, define and settle once
and for all the whole complex Of
issues over which differences can
and will arise in Europe and Asia.
To do that is beyond the wit OF
man.
It follows inexorably tn a the
principal task of the Moscow con-
ference is to reach an agreement
on ways and means of reaching
further agreements. Certain prac-
teal and Immediately urgent deci-
sions bearing upon the conduct of
the war must be taken. But it
would be a mistake to expect Or to
wish for completed blueprint of
the settlement and constitution OF
the postwar world. In fact, we
should avoid taking an overdra-
matte overanXious view of the
meeting in Moscow and cease to
ina CINE that the fate of the world
turns on how Mr.. Hull, Mr.. Molo-
tcv and Mr.. Eden get on with one
another.
The conference will have been
successful if it produces, in addi-
ton to immediate decisions on
which we act in waging war, or.
gans of consultation and combined
action. The best news we have
had is that this is precisely how
the Russians, the British and the
most clear-headeo Americans think
about the coming conference. For
ii is by working together, not by
promulgating generalities, that "a.
tons arrive at the principles on
which they can agree.
Until we establish regular and
continuing means Of exploring and
settling the problems that concern
us, we cannot really know what
these problems are and whether
we differ about them, and how
much and in what way we differ.
Therefore, "Pravda" is quite RICH,
in saying, as it did just the other
day, that 1.-The extensive economic
assistance given by tn United
States as well as Great Britain tc
the Allied countries, the unanimity
reached during the armistice talks
with Italy, the formation of the
military political command Of the
Allied states-these can serve as
examples of the developing coop
GRAFTON of the Allied countries
But, of course, this cooperation
will prosper only if in Moscow
London and Washington there i,
candid recognition of how I'm
clear and how ambiguous has beer
and is the foreign policy of thu
three powers. We may begin witt
ourselves, admitting that we ar,
In the curious position of not being
willing as yet to say whether W.
will make military commitment!
in Europe after the war, and ye
finding ourselves committed II
principles which we regard as uni
versal. Such a paradox canno
survive the test of reality.
The British policy in continental
Europe is in some degree as para
doxical as our own. And the Rus
sian policy in Europe has the car
dinal defect that-however clear i
may be to the Kremlin-the res
of the world is not convinced tina
it understands the policy.
| We in the United States do no
as yet have a policy on which W,
are agreed. It does not look as i
the British really have one either
If the Russians have one on whicl
they are agreed, they have no
made it clear to their allies. Il
the American paradox. the British
uncertainty and the Russian reti
cence-or is it the Russian para
dox and uncertainty too-suspiciol
and division, which our enemie
foster, are bred.
| This condition Of affairs canno
be cured by any of us alone bu
only by all Of us together and 81
multaneously. The lack of polio
| in each of the three states is i
great measure, though not entir
| a reflection of its own uncertaint
about the policy of the others. Fo
a coalition is like man who car
not walk very far on his right lie
| if he does not walk also on hi
'ileft leS