Evening star., 1943-01-24
Showdown Believed
Near in Dealing With
North Africa French
cffort Closely Linked
10 VItol Decisions on
Allies le43 War Plan
BY GARNETT d. HoRNER.

70 nandlcap Allied military on
seraeions in North Africa anc
possloiy delay an American
nrlClsh drive to Ii rate Franco
s.tsel1 were believed last night tc
oe approaching a showdown
indications were that +ho e.
.,.empts to stabilize the North African
political situation are tied up witt
Ihe making of vital decisions or
United Nations war plans for 1914:
10 the extent that future opera
tlons might be affected by condi-
: tlons behind the lines on the African
sfront.
Inc impending decisions obvious
.iy must provide for detailed CO.
ssoroination of Allied land, sea and
.alf blows against the Axis through
.out the world if they are to do the
maximum possible impact.
Danger to War Strategy.
since a monkey wrench in the
smachnery on one front could upset
AIMS co-ordinated effort and DOS
ssibiy throw the entire war strategy
ION schedule, what might appear on
stne surface to be an isolated politi-
scal disturbance becomes a factor to
Fhe reckoned with in the global war
picture if it has any bearing on
military operations.
Unity-or the lack of it-among
the French groups opposing the Axis
might have direct bearing, it is
pointed out, on any plans for open
ing European second 'front.'
through continental France. in ad-
oition to its immediate effects on
behind lines problems of the
military commanders in North
Africa,
The efforts to settle the political
turmoil surrounding the African
campaign by bringing about effec-
tive collaboration between Gen
Charles de Gaulle's French National
Committee and the French African
regime Of Gen. Henri Giraud are
Understood to be directed largely to-
ward weaving Gen. de Gaulle away
from the influence of military.
politically ambitious advisers in
London.
Elements in Situation.
In the view of informed quarters
here, the situation shapes up sub
stantially as follows:
1. Gen. de Gaulle's demand for
political recognition and immediate
removal from the North and West
African governmental set-up of Of
ficials who had anything to do with
vichy in the past are not compatible
with existing military problems.
For one thing, the risk of native
riots or other unrest occurring
during the confusion of any whole
sale change OF local authority is too
great.
2. The Fighting French leaders
persistence in these demands is at
tributed, in part at least. 70 the
influence of job-hunting hangers,
on who have gained his ear in Lon
don, encouraged by some second
string British officials working for
their own ends.
3. Hopes for change in his posi-
tion to make a rapprochement with
Gen. Giraud possible appear to de-
pend on success of efforts to get
him to break away from these in
f7uences and act on the advice Of
military realists, of whom there are
said to be many in his own Fighting
French group that are opposed to
the emphasis on political considera-
tions in their leaders recent course.
Time Must Be Saved.
4. Importance of some settlement
of the behind -the-lines problems in
North Africa being reached in
creases hourly as the British 9Th
Army, under Gen. Harold AleXan-
der, approaches a junction with the
Allied forces under command OF
American 1t. Gen. Dwight D. Eisen-
hover, bringing nearer the time for
consolidation of the British -Ameri-
can forces under a supreme COM
fr7ander for climactic offensive
action.
Whatever happens, there is not
believed to be any prospect of the
United States Government making
any sweeping political concessions
To Gen. de Gaulle that would upset
the present delicate arrangements
for maintaining order behind the
lines.
This Governments firm policy IS
to deal in any particular locality on
a military basis and with no i'm
plications of future political support
If one faction or another, with who
ever can deliver the goods in help
inp TO win the war, shelving po-
ltical likes or dislikes until after
the battle. Thus We cooperate
Fundamentally, in military way
with De Gaullists wherever they
have strength In North AFRICA,
however, Gen. Giraud and the civil
administration backed by him are
those who are considered best able
to maintain ORDER.
War Only Considered.
While policy makers in Wash
,ngton look with no more favor than
Cen de Gaulle on the past actions
~ many Frenchmep exercising au-
thoritv in North Africa who were
ocsociated with the Vichy regime
+hev proceed on the conviction that
sny other considerations are rela-
tivelv unirnportant for the time oe-
tnc compared with the supreme
taek of doing everything possible
~ vin the war and shorten the
line ~ required to do it. After the
Carmans S1.s, are driven out OF Africa,
~ Nv to necessary house cleaning
ST The hope is that Gen. de Ganlie ie
- the elements in Britain ana m lilI1
a,,,trv anu il.v who have encouraged MN
co'i,is 60 his dissident stand can be I'M