Evening star., 1943-10-17

in Italy is being watched closely by
the American strategists. The opera
tions have been well planned, are being
carefully executed and the men are
fighting with the bravery which has
made military qualities of the Amer
leans respected throughout the world.
The battle for Italy is regarded as of
momentous importance not because it
could bring us into the heart of Ger
many; this probability was discounted
before fighting started. The strategic
advantage we can derive will be only
that our planes will be much closer to
targets which are now too far away
from our air bases
But the great interest lies in the
fact that If we do not succeed in break
ing down German resistance in the next
few weeks and the enemy is able to
bring an additional 20 divisions into
Italy the forthcoming invasion of Europe
across the English Channel might be-
come jeopardized.
This might change the entire aspect
OF the war. Our stfategists believe
more strongly than their British COL
leagues that the only way to end the
war quickly is to attack the Germans
in France. The Russians share that
point Of view and have given us to
understand that unless this operation
Is begun with a real force by next
spring they may have to reconsider
their entire position and make their own
terms with the Germans.
Americans Lukewarm.
Because Of the difficulties OF cam
paign in Italy the American strategists
were extremely lukewarm about the op-
erations. They believed that the Medi-
terranean should be cleared and that
all the islands used by the enemy as
submarine and air bases should be
taken.
They went so far as to approve the
Idea of Allied forces settling in Calabria
in Southern Italy which could be held
against any Nazi force with maximum
of 100000 men.
But to engage the Allied forces In
what has been frequently described as
"bottomless sack" was not to the
taste of the American general staff.
The friendly frictions with their Brit
lsh colleagues were due to this diverg-
ent point of view While the British
were counting on the moral effect the
occupation Of Italy and the overthrow
OF the Mussolini regime would have on
the rest OF Europe. the American gen.
fhirkirn IN, 4f
many men would be required to conquer
Italy and what the Allied position would
be If the battles demanded a much
larger force than Gen. Eisenhower had
at his disposal.
The long and short OF the story can
be contained in the following two SEN
tences: II Gen. Eisenhower can hold
Italy as far as Rome with his present
forces and does not have to call fol-
reinforcements. the opera ton will have
been worthwhile. II, on the other hand
he Is compelled to ask for assistance
from other theaters OF operation we
are likely to find ourselves in hole.
Start in Mayor Else.
The Russians have granted us an
extension of the due bill for an invasion
Of Europe until next May. We start then
or else
An important American force is being
gathered for that offensive. The time is
short and the number Of men and the
amount of equipment necessary for the
cross Channel battles are the largest the
Allies have been called on to put in the
field thus far
Because men and materiel must be
taken across the water we have problems
which do not exist when the same
number of troops can be transported by
land. Hence. all the men we can ship
across the Atlantic must of necessity be
employed in fighting the Germans in
Western Europe and only a relatively
small number can be used as replace
ments for Gen. Eisenhower This, in q
nutshell, is our problem.
Because of security considerations it is
not possible to indicate the strength OF
the Allied forces In Italy and North
Africa. 1t can be taken for granted
however, that overall we have more divi-
sions than the Nazis have in Northern
Italy. The last report placed the German
total at 18 divisions
If the Germans were unable to send
anything more than replacements to
Marshal Rommel We would not have to
be unduly worried. Gen. Eisenhowe.
could handle the enemy with his present
total force successfully.
But there is grave danger that the
Nazis may move important reinforce.
ments to Italy. They are said to have
, hoped that we would send our armies
from North Africa to Italy.
According to reports from reliable
underground sources, Marshal Gerd vor
Rundstedt, who commands the German