Evening star., 1943-02-06
Sees Donetz Line
Under Soviet Pressure
Military Writer Believes
Germans Must Shorten
Communications Soon
By Maj Georoe Fieldino Eliot

BIZ Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
It has been evident for some time
| that the Germans have chosen to make
| their main defensive stand on the line
! of the Donetz River, where the ground
| on the south bank is generally higher
| than that on the north bank and affords
| the Germans excellent positions covering
| all the available crossings.
Nowhere, save at Kamensk, where the
Russians have small bridgehead. has
! this river been successfully crossed. But
it is evident that pressure against the
Donetz line is increasing. The Russians
have now reached the upper course of the
river at Krasni-Liman. Here they have
cut the second of the three railways di-
rectly connecting Kharkov with the
Donetz industrial region and Rostov (the
first, by way of Kupyansk, they had al
ready cut in several places, and if they
can cross the Donetz at Krasni-Liman,
very short advance to Slavyansk will
cut the third of these main lines.
Should this happen, communications
between the German forces at Rostov
and behind the Donetz and the German
armies in central Russia will be seriously
impaired A long detour by way of
Pavlograd will then be imposed upon
the Germans and any further develop
ment of the Russian offensive in this
sector would threaten the whole Donetz-
Rostov army with encirclement and de-
struction.
1t is interesting to note that from this
central and pivotal area of Krasni-Liman
and Slavyansk, there are three possible
directions of advance open to the Rus
slams. If they can effect crossing of
the Donetz in force, they can swing east
ward against the left flank of the Ger
man Army defending the Donetz; or
they can drive southwark to the shore
Of the Sea of Azov; or-most ambitious
plan Of all-they can strike straight
westward for the vital crossings of the
Dnieper at Dnieper -Petrovsk and Zapo-
rozhe.
If they were able to effect successful
advance this far-and they are only
about $50 miles from Dnieper-P -Petrovsk
at this moment-they would cut off not
only the Donetz-Rostov army but the
whole Crimea from any direct rail con-
nection with the rest of the German
forces in Russia, or in Germany itself for
that matter. If this were to be success
fully accomplished, it would be the great
est strategical coup of the war.
Once again the possibilities latent in
the Russian situation must be imposing
the most painful decisions upon the
German high command. Only few
days ago they had to face the decision
whether to withdraw from the Caucasus.
and they took it too late; too late, at
any rate, to avoid the entrapment of
considerable number of men and the
loss of vast amounts of material Then
they were taken by surprise in the
Voronezh sector and lost another sizable
piece of the German Army.
Now they must decide whether to
continue to try to hold on along the
Donetz and at Rostov or to pull, back
behind their old winter line at Stalino
and Taganrog with the ever-present
question Of whether they can even hold
that line.
So far the Donetz line has not given
way-but the continual outflanking
threat Of the Russians must by this
time put Berlin on notice that they are
faced by opponents who understand
thoroughly the art of offensive as well
as that of defensive warfare. and that
to attempt to hold positions too far
forward can only result in further dis
aster and further losses.
Indeed, much of the German difficulty
Is occasioned by the enormous length
Of their lines OF communication I have
repeatedly pointed out in these articles
that modern war consists Of three types
Of effort-production transportation and
combat.
The German high command must be
asking themselves very seriously whether
the time has not come when Germany,
In order not to reduce her war produc-
ton or her fighting power, must not
now make drastic reductions in the
amount of effort and the number OF
men employed in transportation.
In other words, she must shorten the
long. weary, land-borne lines of COM
munication to the Russian front. 1t is
for this reason that it is now possible
to think in terms of the Dvina on the
north and the Dnieper on the south as
lines behind which the German Army
may be compelled to retire, not only by
Russian pressure, but also by Germany's
necessity to conserve her strength for
that defensive war which has now been
forced upon her.
(CopyriEht 1043, by New York Tribune Incl