Evening star., 1943-11-29

A. P. De sev.r,ky. tary meaning Of
the attack on the Axis capital.
The Allies have made it clear In
many statements that the purpose
of the air offensive against Germany
is not merely vengeance or indis-
criminate killing Of civilians. It II
the application of air power strategy,
aiming IN the first place to cripple
the country's ability to make war by
knocking out its air power and de-
molishing its industrial setup and
communications for warmaking.
Berlin has Its share of industry, Of
course, but the kind Of satration
bombing being delivered to the heart
OF the city is pretty clearly not in
line with the above strategic purpose.
The center Of Berlin has no more
strategic significance than, let us
say. the center of New York. An
enemy air assault on industrial De-
troit or on Pittsburgh, let us say,
would be far more disastrous to our
war effort than blows against the
heart of Manhattan or Washington.
Military Goals.
Neither is the Berlin offensive 4
morale undertaking, in the ordinary
conception of the idea A country's
will to resist is not easily broken by
killing people and wrecking houses,
as the London experience demon
strated.
What then are the military goals
in the present all-out attacks On
the German capital?
The main purpose, the writer be.
ieves, is this: II Hitler has accumu-
lated some strategic air power for
a counteroffensive, the present bonn.
bardment OF Berlin is to force him
to use it, not as and when he plans,
but at a less favorable time. The
Nazis have continually threatened
large-scale reprisals. On the third
successive day of the bombardment
Of Berlin, Goering told mine work.
ers in Essen: Give us only q few
more days. When Germany decides
to wage the same type of aerial war
fare as Britain, things will be easier.
Every Enghshman fears the hour Of
retribution. We know the hour u
coming
The bombardment Of Berlin NAV
serve to call their blufI. Under the
terrific pounding, it Is hoped, the
indignant German people will raise
ciamor for an immediate counter
offensive. The Nazis have only two
alternatives: Either to start a pre-.
mature air assault on Britain-up-
setting whatever timetable they may
have mapped out-or to admit by
inaction that they do not possess
the necessary means. Such a SEEM
ing admission would precipitate a
genuine German crackup in morale,
May Force Hitler Action.
IT Germany has been saving up
strategic bombing force, the most
propitious time for its use would be
after major land invasion Ia
launched by the Allies. Anelo.
American fighter forces would then
be divided-part to shield the inva-
sion. and part to protect the British
Isles. A German counterattack in
force against England before the
invasion starts. however, would have
to face the whole strength of our
fighter command and would have
very little chance to succeed.
Offensives, whether on land on
sea or in the air, undertaken pre-
maturely under political pressures
or for political reasons are always
RISKY If not fatal. 1t Is that kind Of
air offensive that the Berlin raid.
may force Hitler to undertake-if
ne does possess a sufficient reserys
OF strategic bombardment aircraft.
We would welcome q premature
German air offensive, because vs
could meet 1t with our full defensive
air force, just as the Germans
would have welcomed a premature
iano invasion when the demand for
so-called second front" was tn.
sistent from certain political quar-.
ters.
'Dstributed BY McNausht Syndicate. Inc,