Evening star., 1943-08-06
German Withdrawal
In Russia Suggested
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

oorod.
The fall of Orel comes coincidentally
with news of Russian offensive opera
tions-on what scale is yet to be de-
termined-in two other sectors of the
long Russo German front. One is in
the Belgorod area. the other far to the
southeast on the Mus River north of
Taganrog.
These events seem likely to be closely
connected with each other. They sug-
gest very strongly Russian offensive
plan of very wide scope and thorough
planning.
From the moment the Germans OPEN
ed their offensive between Orel and Bel
gorod. it was plain-as repeatedly point
ed out in these articles-that the German
operation was one of limited objective.
1t was intended to obtain, If possible,
the recapture of Kursk in order to
relieve Russian pressure on Orel and
upset future Russian plans for an
offensive in the direction of Belgorod-
Kharkov. with eventual resumption OF
the push to the Dnieper, which the
ular success last winter
1t was likewise plain that, if the
Germans failed to retake Kursk, the
Russians would react against Orel, as
has happened.
The fall of Orel now brings the whole
German line from Velikie Luki through
Bryansk to Kharkov into danger. Bry-
tc ia11
Germans cannot afford to lose it
unless they are preparing-as they
may be-a general withdrawal on the
Russian front. Assuming that they are
not ready for such a withdrawal yet,
they must concentrate forces for the
defense Of Bryansk.
The Russians, on the other hand while
keeping up pressure against Bryansk,
may turn naturally to Belgorod as their
next major objective. The threat to
Bryansk acts as diversion; the Rus
slams appear to be in amply sufficient
strength for both purposes.
But the old conditions prevail, the
old attractions of the drive southwest
ward to the Dnieper are still there.
Look at the map. The Germans have
failed to retake Kursk, without which
neither Orel to the north, nor Belgorod
to the south can be secure. Now Orel
has fallen, Bryansk is exposed. But
Belgorod is even more exposed. Orel no
longer threatens the flank of a Russian
offensive toward Belgorod
II Belgorod falls, Kharkov in its turn
y-if1 j%r
bare to Russian thrust from the
northeast. And beyond Kharkov lie the
vital crossings OF the Dnieper, those
rail and road crossings at Dnieper-
Petrovsk and Saporozhe on which all
the German armies in the bend Of the
Donets and on the Mus River are
dependent.
With such a Russian advance, we
return to the old critical situation of
last winter, when the Germans saved
their Donets armies only by throwing in.
at the very last moment, a great part
OF their strategical reserves, including
10 armored divisions. These were the
troops which, if they had been allowed
TO rest, recruit and train in peace during
the winter, might have made the differ
ence between defeat and victory in the
German push for Kursk.
1t is these considerations which make
the prompt appearance of a Russian
offensive toward Belgorod, at the yerv
moment of the fall Of Orel-coupled
with what seems to be holding attack
down on the Mius-appear so signifi-
cant. The attention Of the Russian high
command Is irresistibly drawn to that
deep southern salient along the Donets,
and to the memories of their near sue
cess there only a few months ago.
They must, of course, remember what
baked them of that success-a German
counterattack in great force. But where
Will the Germans find the reserves to
do that again? If they withdraw troops
from any other part of the Russian
front, it is probable that the Russians
Will be prepared to take full ADVANTAGE
OF the opportunity thus created. There
are even suggestions of Russian pressure
clear up in the >Leningrad area. If the
Germans are compelled again to employ
what the Russians call the high COM
mand reserves" which appear now to
include some of their best hand picked
divisions, the freedom of action of the
German leaders to meet any other emery
ency may this time be fatally compro-
missed.
1t may be compromised in even greater
degree than their freedom OF action in
the Mediterranean front, and later at
Kursk, was compromised by the necessity
OF using SO much Of their main reserves
last winter to stop the Russian thrust
toward the bend of the Dnieper.
At moment when Axis resistance on
Sicily is collapsing, when Italy itself may
be unable to continue the war, when An
Allied invasion of the Balkans is possible,
when great Allied forces stand ready in
the British Isles, and when a new Rus
sian offensive on some other part of the
front is an eVer-present possibility, the
Germans must desire to husband their
reserves, watch and wait.
1t is precisely because the Russians
may find the means of denying the Ger
mans this privilege that the new Rus
sian moves at Belgorod and on the Mus
River seem to promise so much if they
develop along the suggested lines.
And 1t is because the problems thus
presented to the German high command
seem so difficult of solution under exist
ing conditions, that ones mind keeps
revertlng to the possibility that the Ger
mans may cut the Gordian knot of their