Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-07-29
Impressions Of Badoglio
In Abyssinian Campaign.

To the Editor Of The Star:
With Mussolini gone and Victor EN-
manuel back in control of his country,
it devolves upon the King and his new
premier to decide whether to stay in the
war or to surrender as urged by the
powers whose armies are preparing to in
wade Italy proper.
No doubt the two principals carefully
will consider the feelings OF their coun-
trymen and seek for a solution of the
problem that will be in accord with the
honor and interest of all concerned.
If there is to be surrender, it must be
unconditional, which would mean that
the Allies would use for the prosecution
of the war against Germany all the re-
sources of Italy. including the fleet, all
military material, all air bases, all rail-
ways, ports, factories and whatever else
would serve their effort While the war
lasted Italy would be ruled by foreign
military government nominated by the
invaders.
The possibilities, of course, are endless,
and it is not the object of this commu-
nication to cover them all, but rather
to say something concerning that in
dividual who now probably is the prin-
cipal factor in the whole situation. The
writer was with the Italians in Eritrea
in 1885 and had an opportunity to reach
some conclusions about Marshal Bado-
Clio, who, the following year, marched
into Adds Ababa and completed the
conquest of Abyssinia. When he arrived
command, put there by Mussolini as a
Fascist upon whom he could depend AL
though Mussolini took the line that ne
was forced by the intransigeance of the
Abyssinians to declare war, the book
written by De Bono showed clearly
enough that he was there for years for
the express purpose of preparing to make
war whenever Mussolini decided it was
politically convenient. However, De Bono,
an agreeable and very active parsonage,
had neither the knowledge nor other
qualifications to do what was required.
He did not improve the Port OF Massowa
nor the railway from there into Eritrea;
and he constructed only one main maca-
damized road from Massowa to Asmara,
with an extension to a point near the
northeast border of Abyssinia Among
the consequences were that shipping at
Massowa remained unloaded for months,
while much of what was landed took long
to reach its destination
When hostilities commenced Adowa on
the west flank was occupied easily The
troops on the east flank reached Makale,
after they had been joined by certain
renegade forces. The position then was
that the army of about six divisions,
largely Blackshirts was divided between
two points some miles apart. The inter-
yening ground in the center, almost
impenetrable mountains, was not oc-
cupied at all except by a few outposts
in the foothills In the south. The only
connection between the two TANKS was
half-circle Of poor road running north
of the mountain area, In fact making
the distance between the TANKS 50 great
that II the Abyasinians attacked one
flank 1t could not be reinforced from
the other without great delay. On these
roads crowds of Italians worked to Inn
prove them, but they readily admitted
that their numbers were inadequate for.
the task, that they had almost no shelter
and the poorest food. Near the end Of
1885 1t was realized By observers that