Evening star., 1943-06-07
Hitler May Attempt
AII-Out Drive in East
Major Eliot Says Nozis
Must Act Against Russia
Now or Probably Never

NOW or TIOD0DIy never
By MAJ. George Fielding Eliot.
1t Is plain that the Germans must
take some sort of decisive action in
Russia soon, as their last possible chance
Of regaining in some degree their stra-
tegic freedom OF action.
There are four possible choices before
the German High Command:
l. A general withdrawal on the Russian
front to a shorter and more easily de-
Tended front, with shorter lines of COM
munication.
2. Stand fast in present positions.
3. A limited offensive to accomplish
certain definite local results perhaps
gain prestige, perhaps prepare for with
drawal elsewhere.
4. An all-out offensive intended to
destroy great part OF the Russian
offensive potential for this year.
Every purely military argument is in
favor of choice No. /.
II the Germans were now suddenly to
withdraw behind Dvna and the Dnieper.
apply the scorched earth policy as they
went, it is unlikely that the Russians
could launch real offensive against
the new front before winter.
The problems of rebuilding transporta-
ton lines, shifting troops, taking care
of refugees, establishing new depots, air.
fields and communication centers-these
would take months to solve. The Ger
mans would dislocate the Russians stra-
logically just as they dislocated Gen.
Nivele tactically by their withdrawal
campaigns in Champagne in the spring
Of 1917. II they really want freedom of
action in Western Europe for the re-
mainder OF the year, withdrawal in
Russia is the one sure way to get it.
The only military price they would
have to pay, from the point of view of
strategy now become purely defensive,
would be the closer approach of Russian
air bases to German vital centers. But
it would be some time before they would
begin to pay the price, and strategic
long-range bombing is not, in any case,
the strong point of the Red Air Force
The reasons against this move are
political and moral, not military. 1t
would be complete acknoWledg
of defeat and would be so interpreted
by every neutral nation by all the cap
tive peoples and by the Germans them
selves. Whether the Nazi state could
Withstand such q shock to its prestige
Is question which is at least debat table.
1t seems likely that some of the German
generals may have urged this move;
should it come. it might we'll mean that
the army has taken over from the Nazi
party as the real power in Germany.
The second course-Stand fast on pres
ent lineS-probably would be the worst
course the Germans could follow from
the military viewpoint. They would be
throwing away the chief advantage
which they possess over the Russians ::
their superior rail and road net, which
enables them to concentrate for an Of
fenSlVe quicker than the Russians can
They would be standing pat and waiting
would come in terrific strength when it
had been made ready. The Germans
would simply be handing the Russians
everything the latter could ask for, on
silver platter.
The third course-a limited offensive
at time when Germany's resources are
strained. 1t might serve to dislocate
Russian offensive plans 1t might gain
time, when the Germans wished to
keep in hand their main reserve force
for possible use elsewhere.
1t might serve to keep neutrals and
occupied lands uncertain and hesitant
for little longer, particularly If it
gained some big token prize, such as
Leningrad. But it could not really give
the Germans any greater freedom of
action in the long run, because it could
offensive power.
No. 4-the all-out offensive-would
be great gamble. Reports now suggest
massing of German forces in the GEN.
ter (Bryansk- sk-Orel-Kharkov) for a pos
sible great offensive striking eastward
toward the famous crossings of the
upper Don In the Voronezh region, where
the grim Russian stand last year upset
all German strategy, and then north
Ward-instead of southwark as in 1912
northWard behind Moscow to seek to
force an engagement and decisive fight
with the Russian reserves.
Such scheme would suggest that the
Germans have found out the folly of
wasting their substance in inconclusive
warfare and letting the Russians hold
back their reserves until the Germans
are worn out.
They have done that twice-in Al
and AZ.
Even admitting the soundness of That
principle, the magnitude of the plan
thus suggested is astounding. If it is
attempted it would require every ounce
OF power remaining to Hitler's Reich.
Once begun, there can be no withholding
OF planes or men, no matter what may
be happening elsewhere.
IL Hitler tries this scheme, he sets his
whole future on single cast, to win or
lose. His chances of winning are not
bright, for the Russian Army of 1943
is far better fighting force than the
Russian Army of 1941, and the German
Army has lost heavily in many respects.
But desperate men may find themselves
driven to desperate measures. If Hitler
Is now In the frame of mind and spirit
to say, What can I lose?" he NAV trv
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