Evening star., 1943-11-27
The GiIberts as Pottern

Inc rapid success of our offensive
IN the Gilbert Islands is significant
not only in itself, but also as estab-
fishing pattern which can be ap-
piled successfully to all the other
Japanese islet groups in mid-Pacific.
Seemingly the only thing that could
stop this inexorable process would be
a gigantic naval action in which the
japanese battle fleet was victorious
over our main Pacific Fleet, thereby
throwing us on the defensive again
as we were after Pearl Harbor. But
that eventuality has become ex-
tremely unlikely, since our Navy has
increasedin the past two years much
faster than the japanese Navy could
possibly have done. while Japanese
naval losses in lighter craft have
been so heavy that most experts
think the balance of their fleet has
been gravely impaired, even though
their battleship strength remains
virtually intact. Anyhow. our Navy
high command hopes and prays that
the japanese Admiralty will risk
showdown fight on which the fate
of the whole japanese Empire, based
as it is on sea power, would depend.
That is just what makes it unlikely
that the japanese will take so great
a risk. But that throws them back
on the other horn of the dilemma
the steady reduction of their entire
island screen from the Marshalls to
the Bonin group within hailing dis
tance of Japan itself.
What, then, is this new pattern of
conquest? 1t consists in big "tri-
phibous' operation, to use Mr..
Churchill's happy phrase, whereby
an overwhelming combination of
Warships, planes and troop trans
ports descend on the key islands of
group and quickly wipe out the
defenders. 1t should be emphasized
that these mid-Pacific islands are
radically different from those of the
Southwestern Pacific, which are
large, volcanic, mountainous and
covered with dense jungle. There,
big garrisonS are capable of main
tanning a protracted defense. But
the Pacific islands are mere pin
polnts-coral atolls whereon neces-
sarily small garrisons with almost
no natural cover or elaborate fixed
defenses cannot individually hold out
long against superior landing forces
attacking after devastating prelim-
mary naval and air bombardment
by the enemy task force. Japan's
entire mid-Paciflc defense system
rests on ability to concentrate naval
and air power quickly at any threat
ened point. But, although the fight
was bitter and costly, the Gilberts
were overwhelmed in four days by a
combined American task force so
powerful that the Japanese Navy
dared not interfere, while japanese
air attempts ended in futile failure.
Now we are firmly installed in the
captured Gilberts and our engineers
are busily repairing the bomb
pitted airf1elds. From the main Gill
bert airbase at Tarawa it is only
about $50 miles to Jaluit, Japans
chief stronghold in the nearby Mar
shall Island group. That is within
easy range of land-based bombers
with fighter escort, to say nothing of
carrler-based planes. It is almost
certain that, the moment our forces
are solidly established in the Gilberts
the process will be repeated in the
Marshalls. And once there, the way
is open both westward to the Caro-
lines, with their big bases at Ponape
and Truk, and to the recovery of
Wake Island to the northward.
Meanwhile, it should not be for
gotten that the japanese must
maintain themselves against Mac
Arthur's insistent pressure against
Rabaul, must at least hold their lines
on the Asiatic continent from Man.
chukuo through China to Burma,
and must guard against possible air
raids on Japan or on vital commu-
nications like the reported raid on
Formosa. This limits naval and air
concentrations in mid-Pacifc. The
one thing Japan has in abundance
is trained manpower. But in the
islets of mid-Pacihc that means lit
tie, because troops cannot proftably
be crammed onto tiny atolls. The
new strategic pattern revealed in
the Gilberts is probably giving the
war lords at Toxic severe head