Evening star., 1943-08-24
Allied Victory Shows
Jups' Air Inferiority
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

BY Md1. george FIetuT1g EIOt.
The remarkable victory of the Ameri-
can Australian air forces at Wewak high
lights the continued lack of success of
the Japanese in their endeavors to build
up their air power in the Southwest
Pacific More than 300 Japanese planes
were destroyed, mostly on the ground,
with Insignificant Allied losses. Results
such as these are not obtained when
there is even an approach to qualitative
balance between the two forces engaged.
Admiral Ramsey recently has called
attention to the unexpected quantity Of
Japanese aircraft being fed into this
area. japanese production has been esti-
mated at from $50 to 400 planes of COM
bat types per month"; it may, in fact,
be somewhat greater, or the Japanese
may be making a special effort to scrape
up planes from all possible sources to
reinforce New Guinea and the Solomons.
In any case, the destruction at Wewak
comes painfully close to being month s
production, and the japanese cannot
afford many such disasters without los
ing their ability to operate in the air
at all.
The japanese policy in the matter of
air reinforcements seems to be running
on the same reckless course as their
policy in trying to send in naval and
land reinforcements: The emphasis is
always on doing something now, any
thing as long as they are pushing on
toward the enemy, regardless of cau-
tion or even reasonable prudence. That
may, from the japanese point of view, be
magnificent. 1t is certainly not modern
war.
In this matter of Wewak, there was
need for the most careful planning.
WeWak is one of a chain of air bases
along the north coast of New Guinea
by means of which the Japanese have
been able to move some air reinforce
ments up to the Salamaua- New Britain
front, and also to give some fighter pro-
lection to large conveys carrying stores
and men along the coast. This chain
of air bases is under constant observa-
ton by Allied patrols.
If it were intended suddenly to move
in a considerable air concentration for
a big operation the very first precau-
ton that should have suggested itself
to the japanese air command would
seem to be to prevent congestion at the
farther end of the line, within reach of
our numerous medium bombers. Since
the capacity of each airfield is limited,
such move would really seem to require
auxiliary fields, so that the necessary
dispersion might be achieved.
In this manner, for example, the Ger
mans have succeeded in building up
their fighter strength in Italy during the
past few days-because they have plenty
of fields available and because they are
careful not to permit congestion at any
one point, thus offering a target of over
whelming temptation to our strategical
air force.
Not so the japanese. They can't
wait. Something-maybe it is Bushido
pushes them on. Action now, and
never mind the consequences. The re-
suit they might almost have antici-
pated is foregone conclusion: They
start feeding aircraft along this line of
bases, the Wewak fields become jam
med, and our bombers swoop down like
hawks on sitting hens.
No doubt, the japanese didn't intend
to leave all those aircraft at Wewak:
no doubt they were on their way to do
something big with them Very likely
they paused at Wewak only to refuel,
or to await orders, or to await better
visibility in their target area, whatever
that may have been. No matter. They
waited too long
Five minutes Is too long to have that
number of aircraft piled upon two or
three little fields within a single base
area, when within reach of an enemy
whom experience has shown to be
Vgilant. enterprising and we'll heeled.
1t may very we'll be that this expert
ence will convince the Japanese that
there is no hope, by any such means, of
restoring their air situation in the
Southwest Pacific, or even of preventing
its further deterioration. On the ground,
their troops still fight desperately for
every inch they hold; give up only with
their lives. But even such devotion does
not make up for the lack of modern
weapons and equipment; especially, it
does not make UP for lack of air support.
The more the japanese come to real
lie that they cannot improve their pres
ent condition of air inferiority and that
the bravery of their ground troops can
do no more than buy little time against
inevitable disaster, the more they must
ask themselves whether they are pre-
pared to lose all their New Guinea and
New Britain positions and see us come
up to Rabaul. face to face with their
great center at Truk.
Now they must ask themselves that
question in the light OF a growing threat
in the North Pacific. Suppose Para
mush1ru gives way? Are they prepared
to defend both Truk and the northern
Island of Japan proper at one and the
same time-and Burma in addition?
And Ichang and HankoW?
There comes point at which the
japanese must seek to deal decisivelv
with one of these threats, at least and
SO relieve the strain. The japanese air
force cannot do the trick in the South
west Pacific. At what point will the