The Waterbury Democrat., 1943-09-11

States, General Marshall reveals, the military issue immediately at stake was the security of the British fleet to dominate the Atlantic.
 Deficiencies of arms for U. s. de- lenses of the western hemisphere, the Panama Canal and Alaska were then SO great that achievements for the Philippines would have left the continental United States in great peril and this situation re- mained till mid-1941.
 Vitally important to the U. s. at this time was the defense of Brazil, which offered the nearest point of approach to this continent from the east. U. s. troops were sent to Brazil and air bases in Belem, Natal, Recife. The strategy then laid out had to take into consideration the possibility that g great tragedy might befall the United Kingdom, with constant threat of German occupation of Dakar and Morocco. AFRICAN CAMPAIGN
 DELAYED
 As these possibilities were wiped from the slate, defense requirements in the Caribbean were altered, so that today there is no justification for maintaining large air and ground installations in the Carib- bean from Trinidad to Cuba, or even in the Panama Canal Zone.
 The North African invasion, plan- ned to remove German threats against Morocco and DaEer, as well as to open the Mediterranean to shorten supply lines to the Middle East and the Far East, actually had to be delayed twice for months be- cause of lack of equipment.
 Combined American British Cana dian operations against North Africa l were first discussed in detail while Prime Minister Churchill and the British chiefs of staff were in Wash ington in January, 1922. They were again considered when Churchill came to Washington in June, at which time invasion was planned for early fall. But again the invasion had to be delayed until November in order to receive landing craft from the shipyards and train crews in their operation.
 Success of the North African cam paign hung on the greatest of hazards. The air forces, save for carrier-borne aircraft and few bonbers and transports, had to be funneled through a single restricted airfield at Gibraltar. This field, General Marshall reveals, could have been put out of action in an hour, had the Germans known of the plan.
 The North African invasion was assigned to three task forces, each with naval escort. One sailed di- rectly from the U. s. for landings at Morocco A second force of U. s. troops sailed from Britain with British navy escort for Gran. The third combined American British force sailed from Britain for Algiers. NAZI ADVANTAGE
 IN TUNISIA
 All task forces were under orders not to fire until fired upon. French forces had been instructed to dis play certain signals to indicate their non-resistance. But code signal was to be flashed to all invading troops at the first hostile act on the part of the French in any sector. The signal was, "Play Ball!" American reverses at Kasserine Pass in late February are explained in General Eisenhower's own words: "Our present tactical difficulties re- suited from my attempt to do possi- ply too much"
 The rains finally ended, the roads were improved, the railroad revital- ized and 10 pipelines laid, permit ting movement into Tunisia of more American troops for the final vic- tory on May g.