Evening star., 1943-03-22
Arms Distribution Seen
As Bosic Problem
Major Eliot Discusses Rivalry
Of Commanders for Machines
And Materials Of Victory
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot,

The recent visit to washington OF Gen.
MacArthurs air commander, 1t. Gen
Kenney, and Gen. MacArthurs chief of
staff, Maj. Gen. Sutherland, is reported
to have been for the purpose of obtain
ing an additional allotment of air power
for the Southwestern Pacific area. This
may or may not be so, but probably it is
So 1t offers the occasion for comment
on the difficulties of making the basic
decisions as to the distribution of Amer
lean fighting strength.
The United States has no immediate
local front. We are power center, lying
between the two main theaters of war.
We produce fighting power, and we dis
tribute it to the various places where it
is required. We do this in two ways:
BY supplying our Allies with weapons
and material and by sending out our own
fighting units.
There is limit to our production of
power within any given period of time.
We can look forward a year or so; we
can estimate just about how much We
shall be able to produce in that year
how many planes of given types, how
many tanks, how many pieces of artil-
lery; how many machine guns, how
many cartridges. But underlying these
estimates must be the knowledge of
how much steel, how much skilled labor,
how much of thousand other COM
modities are available. We must decide
first of all what we want to produce.
Our Allies will want some of our pro-
duction-What things do they want? On
the character of the things we send them
depends in some part at least the kind
Of war they can fight. Hence, way back
at the beginning of decisions for any
long period, such as year, must come
basic decision agreed to by all on plans
of campaign for that period. If great
land effort is to be made, the emphasis
must be on guns and tanks; if the jor
effort is to be an air offensive. the en-
phaSls must be on planes. There are
other limiting factors. The Russians
are tied to ground war, must have
ground weapons as we'll as planes. De-
ductions must be made to insure enough
shipping to get the material to where it
is needed, and to provide escort for it on
the way-in other words, the line of
communications presents it's bill first.
Local defense and training must be pro-
vided for. The civilian economy at
home must be taken into account.
When all these decisions have been
reached, there is still the job of allo-
eating the available production between
our Allies and our own forces In many
cases our Allies can say either: "Our need
is the more urgent, for we are nearer
to the enemy" or, Give the tools into our
experienced hands, for your men are yet
to be trained in their use" Yet, on the
other hand, any examination of the man
power factor shows that in the end the
enemy can be beaten only by the use of
great American forces, who somehow
must acquire battle experience.
But even after the demands of lease
lend have been met, and the demands of
shipping, and the civilian economy,
there are still many decisions to be made
which are difficult and complicated.
Every one Of our commanders in every
active sector is urging upon his su-
periors the needs of his own command
and the vital Importance of his own area
or theater. No commander would be
worth his salt if he took any other atti-
tude.
Yet all these demands add greatly to
the burdens of those who must make the
decisions. Gen. Macarthur wins
smashing victory by the use of air power;
he sends his officers to Washington to
get more air power that he may win
| more victories, Who can quarrel with
him for that? Yet Washington is also
hearing from Gen. Eisenhower in North
Africa, Gen. Andrews in the British
Isles, Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific,
Gen. Chennault in China Admiral In
gersol in the North Atlantic and Gen.
Bissell in India.
1t is safe to say that all these officers
want more air power, and want it quickly
and are loading their dispatches with the
most urgent and cogent reasons as to
why they should have it right away Un-
fortunately there is not enough to go
around and so decisions have to be made
as to what demands can be met and
what must be postponed or denied. On
the wisdom, foresight and good judg-
ment with which these decisions are
made, and other decisions of like caliber
in other related fields may we'll rest the
lives OF thousands Or even millions of
men, the lengthening or shortening of
| the war, and indeed the state of this
world for the next so years.
To make any basic change in the
| allotments already determined upon is a
| Welghty matter. 1t involves not only
| the reaSSignment of units, but changes
in rail transportation, shipping, produc-
| ton and manpoWer plans readjustment
| of agreements with our Allies, perhaps
| changes in military dispositions on the
| other side of the world.
This is, of course. by no means to say
| that Gen. MacArthur's plea should be
| denied, or that it should be granted 1t
| is merely to point out the tremendous
| burden of responsibility which rests on
| the men-the President, Gen. Marshall
| and Admiral King-who must make the
| basic decisions, the care with which they
| must try to peer ahead into the future,
and the heavy weight in the scales
against any farreaching change of plan
save under the pressure of the most
urgent necessity or the most glowing
1p>ort,,rojt,y