Evening star., 1943-05-30
Hitler Cannot Avoid
Abject Surrender,
'Dr. Rosinski Asserts
Native German Calls
War Lords Incapable
Of Exhoustine Allies
BY the Associated Press,

aimed at exhausting the Allies be-
fore they can achieve a decisive vic
tory, was put forward yesterday as
Germany's only hope to avoid un-
conditional surrender-but with the
belief expressed that the German
high command psychologically is in
capable of such a war
Writing in the authoritative and
semi official Infantry Journal. DR..
Herbert Rosinski, native of Germany
and former civilian expert on the
German naval staff, advanced both
suggestions in an analysis of Ger
man strategy since the beginning Of
the war.
Many informed persons here share
his prediction that Hitler and his
generals, instead of trying to salvage
as much as possible from the wreck
age of their ambitions by adopting
a careful war Of attrition. will risk
everything in one last and huge
offensive.
An accumulation of evidence that
Germany was massing for new as
saults in Russia was mentioned a
week ago by Secretary of War Slim
son. though since then there have
been suggestions in some quarters
that the new Allied threats to West
ern Europe which appeared suddenly
after the smashing victory in Tunisia
may have altered German plans for
a summer campaign in the East.
Drive Planned Months Ago.
Admitting that it is still too early
to assert with any assurance that
the expected German drive against
the Reds has been delayed. informed
persons say there can be no doubt it
was planned months ago in the be-
lief that the Nazi forces could hold
out in North Africa at least until
late summer possibly Indefinitely.
thus obstructing anv major assault
on the continent by the Allies, This
great miscalculation was attributed
largely to underestimation by the
Axis Of Allied air strength in North
Africa, probably because bad weather
kept much of the air force grounded
for many weeks.
While discussing a possibility that
a major German offensive has been
delayed, observers still expect it to
take place. with Russia as the most
likely objective. DR.. Rosinski notes
that for so years the German Army
repeatedly and unanimously has re-
jected the idea of a war of eXhaus-
ton, a war which does not have the
objective of an ultimate victorious
counteroffensive."
Further, he says. even the war Of
intended to lead to re-
of the offensive-despite
the Importance attached to it by
Clausewitz. fountainhead of Ger
man military thinking-has found
so little favor in the German Army
that the few who advocated it have
been forced to hedge their position
with explanations that they meant
by it decisive form of warfare, and
in no sense a defensive, pure and
simple"
More Likely to Tumble.
"Therefore, he says, should the
inexorable exigencies of the stra-
tegic situation force the German
military leaders in the end to adopt
a course which they have emphatic
ally, unhesitatingly and unanimous
ly rejected, their conduct is likely
to be less sure, less whole hearted
than it would be in the great often
sive operations upon which not only
their whole training, but their whole
thoughts have been concentrated for
three generations.
For that very reason is there not
a strong likelihood that, whatever
the objective consideration of their
strategic position may seem to de-
mand not only the reckless and des-
perate Fuehrer himself but the sob
crest of his advisers, may prefer to
test fate once more in a last mad
fling, rather than to resign them
selves to course that may stave
off the collapse, but cannot hold out
hope of ultimate salvation?'
In his analysis of the war to date,
DR.. Rosinski asserts that with the
failure of Field Marshal Erwin Rom
mel's attack last summer before El
Alamein the original German war
plan which aimed at the isolation
and defeat of its opponents one
after the other finally and irrevoc-
ably broke down
In fact. he writes, Hitler's great
failure throughout the war has been
his missing of opportunities to ex-
plot the Balkans early in the strug-
gle and drive through to a conquest
of the Middle East, instead of vast
ing his energies first against Britain.
then-With an undefeated Britain at
his back-against Russia.
Hitler Policy Confounded.
The outbreak and political align
ments of the war both ran counter
to the basic conceptions which had
governed Hitler's policy until few
months before, says DR.. Rosinski.
The attack on Russia was the core
of all his scheming, and the German
general staff sent up four pre-
requisites for its success: Economic
control of the Danube Basin, free
passage through Poland, active CO.
operation by Japan and-finally and
most important-benevolent British
neutrality.
The speed of the Polish campaign,
he suggests, resulted not only from
application of the blitzkrieg tactics,
but was intended to establish "fait
accompli' before Russian interven-
tion could become effective, and to
create a readiness to compromise
among leaders of the western ma
tions.
Instead. he found himself at war