Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1943-07-21
The
Var Toda,
Routes 10 Japan
Give No Cause
For O tinisn
Nv MAJ. PAUL {. RABoRG

BY MAJ. PAUL {. RABORG
International News service war analyst
THE WARMING statements
made by Secretary Of Navy
Knox and by the assistant chief
of naval operations. Wee Adm
Frederick }. Horne, should be
taken deeply 10 heart and re-
tanned there by every citizen
Of the United States.
Knox said
''There has been an awful lot
Of foolish optimistic talk about
the early ending of the war he
cause military operations have
been going along gratifyingly.
Nothing could be worse for
ultimate victory than 10 pro-
mote the idea that the war is
completely over because Of rela-
lively minor successes i'm the
early stages"
VICE ADM HORNE informed
the people OF America that the
United States was now planning
10 prosecute SlN-year war
against the japanese.
He stated we would need
twice as many naval vessels
and airplaneS in that area as
were possessed by the Japanese
war machine.
He added the price for victory
would be heavy and warned
that our losses would soar once
we hit japan'S main and vIJa1
defense positions.
Probably the secretary OF the
navy was only referring 10 the
war in the West as u applied
70 the probable time of HitlerS
final surrender The Hitherto re-
gime could collapse within a
week. but Hitler could prolong
the fight for year or for two
years. Therefore. optimism has
no place even in this most sue
cessful war zone.
However. both Knox and
Adm. Horne were without
doubt referring largely 10 the
war in the East which is not
won. and in which the United
Nations have not as yet struck
at any area which IL vitally i'm
portant 10 the life Of the Rising
Sun.
II was FOR this reason that
they both bluntly served warn
ing 10 the people of the United
States 10 prepare for a SiX-ycar
Nipponese war.
AT THIS time. there appear
TO he four invasion approaches
10 japan. Any or all of them
will require an Understandable
length of time 10 prepare for
serious all out attacks against
the home island Of Japan.
First. would be to Use Alaska
and the Aleutians as a base of
operations 10 strike westward
against Japan. There exists a
great disadvantage in the route
for airplanes because Of the
weather.
Second. is an overseas inva-
sion out of India to Burma A.
the moment this may be diff
cult because Of the naval
strength required
Once Burma is reached. pas
sage 10 China via the Burma
Road could be difficult How
eyer seizure eEtAa-e ll-&l4p--
ply in Burma would be a bless
ing 10 the United Nations.
THIRD. is an attack from
Australia westward through the
Dutch East Indies 10 the Ma
layan Peninsula Then the inva-
sion forces would be on the
continent.
Gen MacArthur's troonS now
"frofrneYhf S0lo41iofts srSN VS.
uouoteSiS engagti III fntfcoms''
mencement Of such An assault
Lastly, is the creation Of q
great overland route Of supply
out Of Irsq and Iran in The
Middle East northeaStward
through southern Russia or
northern India by way Of north
ern China 10 Chungking
A route is needed with 2 suf-
hciently great carrying capacity
10 supply Chang Kai-shek with
all the auxiliary troops. air
planes, ornaments and ammu-
milton necessary for hlm 10 re.
take the Chinese mainland
coast adjacent 20 the japanese
islands.
Such route iS probably all
most completed.