Evening star., 1943-08-03
Bombing Of PIoesti
Hurts Nuzi Defense
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

OF MAJOR Importance IN the progress OF
the war. It's effect should not, of course,
be overestimated; it will not deprive the
Germans Immediately and permanently
of their oil supply. But it will make
them much more cautious in the use of
such supplies as they have.
The bombers appear to have concen-
trated on the major refneries, which
offer the most inviting and useful tar
gets in the Ploesti area. Most Rumanian
Oil production is refined on the spot, and
the destruction of the refineries means
that the Germans will have to ship
Rumanian crude oil to German re-
f1neries for the present, which means
that both their rail and barge transport
system will be overloaded and German
refinery capacity overtaxed.
The net result will be a sharp cut IN
the shipments of gasoline and lubricat-
ing oil to the depots and storage facili-
ties of the fighting forces. This effect
will not necessarily be felt Immediately.
because there is considerable oil in
storage-how much, we do not know.
But in the sense of results on military
operations, there will be an immediate
effect because the German high COM
mand must take the eventual shortage
OF production into account at once, and
plans which may have been based on
the normal flow of refined petroleum
products from the Ploesti area must now
be sharply revised downward.
The Rumanian refineries were prob
ably furnishing about one-half of Ger
many's oil supply. Precise estimates are
dif1cult, because we do not know the
exact condition Of the other main source
OF supply, the output of the conversion
plants in Germany which manufacture
oil from coal.
Some Of these plants have been at
tackled by Allied bombers, but 1t is hard
to estimate the exact effect on produc-
ton. or the extent to which repairs may
have restored the damage done. A
rough estimate of one-half from Ru-
mania and one-half from domestic
sources (plus the smah output from
Galicia. etc. will not be very far out,
however.
In considering the effect on German
military operations of the smashing of
the Rumanian refineries, we might con-
clude with some confidence that the
Germans can now expend their accu.
mulated reserves on one powerful of.
1ensiye, with a strictly rationed de.
fensive In a much smaller area as the
inevitable sequel II that offensive fails
to ease their present situation. Or they
can accept the defensive now and give
up any idea of an offensive for the
present-in which latter case they would
spread out the consumption of their oil
reserves over further period, say, until
they can increase their refinery ca.
pacity, effect such repairs as may be
possible at Ploesti, and increase the
capacity OF rail and, barge transport
between Ploesti and German refining
centers.
Unfortunately for the Germans. one
OF the most important of their refining
centers was Hamburg, which has lust
received the most severe air hammertne
OF the war. and that fact is not of
course, unconnected with the Allied raid
on Ploesti.
The possibility Of a German defensive
strategy based on cutting down the ter
ritory to be defended Ats in well with
indications in current reports (uncon-
nrmed, OF course) that the Germans
may be thinking Of defending no more
OF Italy than just the Istrian Peninsula
and the old line of the Piave and the
Trentino-roughly, the Italo-Austrtan
frontier OF 1914 which proved 50 hard a
nut for the Italians to crack in the
last war. This would cover the an
proaches to the Brenner Pass and would
abandon any idea of a stand on the
line OF the River Po.
1t is good defensive position and one
whose military features are thorouehlv
well known to the Germans from past
experience. Its chief disadvantages are
that it exposes the Franco Italian from.
tier to direct Allied attack and permits
the Allies to establish air bases in the
Plain OF Lombardy from which South
Germany, Austria and Czechosloyakia
can be reached with greater ease than
Is now possible
But all the decisions which the Ger
mans must now make present disad-
Vantages; they must choose among hard
choices, for they are on the defensive
and have to a great extent lost their
freedom to select their battlefields and
the time and circumstances under which
they will fight.
The loss of the output of their Ru-
manian ref1neries has its greatest effect
IN still further restricting this freedom
Of action
There is, of course, also moral effect
to be considered. With Italy staggering
and perhaps almost out of the war, the
definite proof of the length of the Allied
arm which is afforded to the Rumanians.
Bulgarians and Hungarians by this raid
on Ploesti will certainly have profound
repercussions. One technical point may
be noted-news reports give this as
2,4O0-nile raid; that is, 1900 miles out
from the bases from which the planes
took off.
On a straight line from the nearest
Allied base, in Cyprus, it is only 725 miles
to Ploesti, but this fight would be over
Turkish territory good part of the way.
II the Turkish air is to be avoided
Egypt would be nearer-but even so, it
is only 975 miles from Alexandria on a