Evening star., 1943-08-02
Italian Fleet at PoIu
An Asset of japan
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.


general contempt as far as American
| public opinion is concerned that we
may fail to recognize its Importance
as a piece on the great chessboard of
this global war
| AS long as the italian feet continues
| to exist-as long as there remain con-
| siderable number of battleships cruisers.
destroyers, torpedo boats and sub
marines in Italian ports for an attack
on United Nations shipping, just so long
must Allied warships in comparable
number be detained in the Mediterra-
mean as a counter measure.
If there were no Italian fleet. there
would be no need for Allied battleships
and cruisers in the Mediterranean at
| all, save for a few of older types to give
naval gunfire support to landing forces.
All the newer heavy ships could be
| transferred to the Far East. So could
most of the submarines. Destroyers and
escort craft would be needed in the
Mediterranean only in proportion to the
| extent to which German U-boats were
| able to operate there. The net result
forcement for the war against Japan.
This would be of especial value just
now for several reasons. First, because
as japanese air power wanes, Japan is
more and more dependent on warships
| for maintaining the safety of her far
| flung network of sea communications on
which all her military enterprises
| depend.
Second, because if full-scale attack
on Burma Is in the cards for this
autumn prerequisite to such an opera
ton is assured naval command Of the
Bay of Bengal-which can best be
attained by transferring the British
Mediterranean fleet to Colombo.
Third, because this applies to sub
marines especially, but also perhaps to
big, fast cruisers of great fuel endurance
we need more and more ships capable
of attacking japanese merchant shipping
whenever it Is to be found
The Japanese, of course, are fully
aware of the consequences to them
selves of the removal OF the Italian fleet
from the sphere of our anxieties. They
are undoubtedly exercising all the in
fluence they possess at Berlin to bring
about measures to prevent this
happening.
How far the Germans would go in
response to japanese pressure is un-
certain; probably not to the extent OF
risking any important German interest,
though it is to be remembered that the
Germans do have vital stake in keep
ing Japan in the war as full-fedged
and powerful combatant, because Japan
draws off Allied fighting power and
resources Of all sorts that could other
wise be concentrated against Germany.
But 1t is disturbing to receive reports
that the Taranto squadron of the italian
Navy (which includes the older battle
ships and about half the cruisers and
smaller crafD, has gone up the Adriatic
and taken refuge in the naval harbor
of Pola. If this report is true, it means
that good part of the italian fleet has
gone from port In which the Germans
could not hope to get at 1t, to one of
which the Germans are almost certain
to be able to retain possession for the
present
1t means that If Italy capitulates, and
the capitulating government Is not able
to deliver over Pola and Trieste (as it
probably will not be able to do), there
will still be an Axis feet of some sort in
the Mediterranean-a fleet which can in
time be manned by Germans. and will
continue to be a source of naval anxiety
| to the Allied high command
This will be good news in Toxic. for
the reasons above stated But the Ger
mans also have something to gain by
| keeping their hands on a naval force In
the Adriatc Sea. Their concern there
is to increase the risk of Allied opera
tions based on the peninsula of Italy,
and directed toward the eastern shore of
| the Adriatic-operations which would
have for their object the reinforcement
and supply of Yugoslav and Greek
patriot armies.
| Could these forces receive arms and
munitions, and the support of various
specialist units of American and British
troops-for example, engineers, COM
munications troops, small specially or
| ganized commands of infantry and
mountain artillery. light tank detach-
ments-they would become a formidable
menace not only to the German COM
munications in the Balkan peninsula, but
to the ability of the Germans to remain
| there at all.
The German air force has heavy and
increasing responsibilities on its hands
1t cannot add the control of the Adriatic
to the task it has already to perform
German naval force based on Pola,
therefore, would be of great use to the
haraSsed high command in Berlin
AS to why the italian feet went from
Taranto to Pola, if 60 1t did, one can
only surmise that the Germans are mov-
ing heaven and earth, sparing neither
threats nor promises In order to re-
trieve something from the debacle OF
| their Italian ally. secure German
hold on northern Italy may be one of
| their detectives; the Italian fleet may
we'll be another.
Gen. Eisenhower's warning to the
Italians that their breathing space is
| over doubtless reflects a realistic appre-
citation of the need for depriving the
Germans of more time in which to ac-
complish their purposes in Italy.
| Copyright, 1943, by New York Tribune Inc