The daily monitor leader. [volume] (Mount Clemens, Mich.) 1942-19??, 1943-10-29
. BEHIND THE SCENES
IN WASHINGTON .

field issue, without hobs. in
stead of a heavier arctic boot.
Bedding rolls were not consider
ed necessary. Everything was
planned on the basis of quick
campaign, but il didn't work out
that way.
JAPS AND WEATHER
Aside from the fanatical de-
Tense put up by the Japs, the
weather was worse than had
been expected. The intensity Of
the cold and the damp was such
that it penetrated everything.
The smooth-soled shoes slipped
on the rocks, causing falls. Some
units, which became temporarily
isolated on mountain tops, suf-
fered heavily. Efforts were
made to drop them extra clothes,
particularly extra socks, from
planes. Some of the men said
they didn't even get chance 10
change socks during the entire
campaign. They all fought and
lived on emergency rationS
alone.
Perhaps the heaviest single
cause of non-battle casualties
came from the immersion cases
men who got their feet wet
and in the intense cold, suffered
from frostbite and in extreme
cases, freezing. There were
number of amputations, particu-
larly of fingers and toes, though
War Department data do not re-
veal the exact numbers, In all,
the non-battle casualties--the
cases Of men sick or injured and
not returned 10 active duty ran
over 200. or nearly equal 10 the
number wounded in battle, 1888.
The number of u. s. killed was
342, with SO missing in action.
The Seventh division, which
took Attu, was mace up of regu-
lar Army units filled up by men
from the first drafts. The divi-
sion got its final combat training
at the Desert Training Center in
California and Arizona. The
wisdom of sending desert
trained division into the Aleu-
tians may be open TO question.
but War Department staff Of
ficers are inclined 10 minimize
this, saying that just because
a division is battle-trained by
maneuvers in the desert doesn't
mean that il has to 60 into des-
ert or jungle warfare.
SURPRISE ELEMENT
The question of why troops
that had been winter-trained in
the Rockies, or troops that had
been in Alaska, some of them for
three years without leave, were
not assigned 10 the assault on
Attu cannot be answered for rea-
sons of security and without
knowledge Of general staff plan
ming and the need for keeping
the operation as secret as pos
sible Moving of troops station
ed in Alaska might have been
learned by enemy intelligence or
reconnaissance and photographed
the punch before IL landed. AS
it was handled the assault on
Attu was completely surprise
attack.
Any attempt 10 make a scan
dial of mistakes on Attu would
probably end up nowhere. AS
a matter of fact, this information
was made available TO Truman
Committee Senators Kilgore and
Ferguson, who visited Alaska
. during the summer, and they
made no formal report on their
findings, believing the war eff
fort would not be helped by
these disclosures. Casualties
battle and non-battle--were not
excessive for this kind of opera
tion-probably about Is per
cent of the ground forces, much
less if the strength Of the naval
and air support forces is includ-
ed. The entire Jap garrison OF
we'll over 1000 was wiped out
Also. the capture Of Attu made
. il necessary for the Japs to evac-
uate Kisks, giving the Ameri-
cans two islands for the price
Of one.