Evening star., 1943-04-19
Axis Air Raids on u. S.
Would Aid War Effort
Major Eliot Says Enemy
Might Strike Coast Cities
If Willing to Pay Price
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
The anniversary of Jimmy" Doolit-
ties great raid on Toxic is a good occa-
yion TO take note of the fact that among
ell the American battle leaders now
serving in Africa, the name of Maj Gen.
James H. Doolittle stands out with par
ticular brilliance.
Gen. Doolittle commands the strategic
air force which has raided enemy bases
in Sardinia, Sicily and italy, as we'll as
those in Africa itself; has taken heavy
toll of Axis shipping dncluding, for ex-
ample, a 10,000-ton cruiser sunk and
another knocked out north of Sardinia
few days ago. and in general has
proven tower of strength in the African
war. We shall hear much more of Gen.
Doolittle, as the war progresses. So will
the enemy.
The Japanese celebrated an anniver-
sary which must have been no cheerful
memory to them, by publishing an i'm
aginative picture of japanese bombers
raiding New York. Indeed, we are hear
ing great deal about air raids on our
coastal cities lately. Hitler and Mus
solini are reported to have discussed
this matter at that recent meeting in
the Bremen Pass. German propaganda
has been busy with veiled threats of
retaliation on American cities for the
damage inflicted on Germany by our
Notwithstanding Fortresses
We ought not to shrug all these threats
aside as being impossible. Technically,
there is no impossibility. It could be
done. There is no reason to suppose
that the Germans do not have long
range aircraft which could carry bombs
across the Atlantic.
They could not carry many bombs.
Their load would have to be chiefly fuel.
They could not go home again. They
would have to land and surrender after
dropping their bombs, or crash them
selves into the sea. But they could
come to New York, and they could bomb
New York, if they were willing to pay
the price.
Probably the job could be better done
by carrier-borne aircraft. Germany had
two carriers under construction at the
outset of the war. One of these, the
Graf Zeppelin, has been reported COM
pleted, and it may be that both of them
are completed now. Their reported ca
pacity is 40 aircraft each, and they are
said to carry cruisers battery of
6-inch guns, enabling them to fight
anything short of battleship with
good chance of success.
OF course, these reports are Germanys
account of the matter. The ships may
actually turn out to have a much greater
aircraft capacity, up to 100 planes apiece.
They have undergone drastic alterations
in the light of the lessons of the war.
There is no prohibitive reason why
these ships could not slip out to sea, as
other German ships have done, and get
within bombing range of New York. It
would he risky, tie chances would be all
against success, the chances of the car
riers ever getting home again would be
very small, but it could be done, again.
If the enemy were willing to pay the
price.
The same considerations apply to a
Japanese attack on our West Coast
cities from carrier-based planes. Such
attacks are always possible. The best
naval and air patrol system that could
be devised cannot provide with absolute
certainty against the ingenuity and in
itiative of determined men who are re-
solved to get through to their target,
cost that it may.
But is it worth the cost? That is the
question From the japanese point of
view, face" counts for much. From the
German point of view, the weighing of
the cost against advantage may be done
somewhat more hard-headedly.
The Germans, of course, would be de-
lighted to see japanese raid on our
West Coast, because they would count
on it to produce a dislocation of our
efforts in Europe by diverting aircraft
and materia. toward the Pacific. They
would count on a popular outcry for
more protection on the West Coast, for
greater efforts against japanese. And
paying the cost themselves.
AS for German raids on the East
Coast, on New York, for example, few
aircraft might we'll be risked if the re-
suits would be favorable enough. Even
the two German carriers might be ex-
pendahle, for they seem little likely to
serve any other useful purpose. But
would the results be favorable?
1t is not unprecedented for German
psychologists to mistake the reactions
OF Britons or Of Americans to given sets
OF circumstances. We know that a
bombing raid on our shores would only
intensity our war effort, might be the
one means of banishing the last rem
nants of lethargy and indifference, might
make the war come alive" so to speak,
in the hearts as well as the minds of
all of U.S.
But the Germans, desperate as they
must be now, might reason that such an
attack would cause panic, would cause
the detention of aircraft and defensive
weapons here, which otherwise would 20
abroad, and they might also think it
would be demonstration to the occu-
pied countries of Europe that Germany's
arm is long and terrible, can even strike
at America itself
Normally, one would suppose that a
transatlantic bombing raid, carrier
borne or otherwise, would be waste Of