Evening star., 1943-01-29
Views CusubIuncu
As Step Toward IdeoI
Military Writer 'Supposes'
Roosevelt and Churchill
Achieved Closer Cooperation
BIZ Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

BIZ Maj George Fielding Eliot.
Let's do little supposing about the
| Casablanca conference and its relation
! to two vitally important questions: Cd
! A supreme war council of all the United
Nations, under the leadership OF the
! United States, Great Britain Russia
and China; (2) The Strengthening out
of the tangled political situation of the
French Empire
Let's begin by supposing that some
| progress is really being made, and that
those chiefly concerned are neither
dumb, nor incompetent, nor hopelessly
| reactionary. Let's even suppose that
they can read history and draw lessons
| from it the same as we can.
Let's suppose that the President and
| the Prime Minister were and are anxi-
! Gus to lay the foundations for sys-
| tenn of better inter-Allied cooperation.
Let's suppose they really wanted
Stain and Chang Kai-shek to meet with
fectly clear and understandable reasons,
neither of those leaders could make
the long trip to Africa at this time; and
| let's suppose further that it was felt
! that representation by deputy would
not produce any conclusive results.
Let's suppose that, nevertheless, the
state of affairs in North Africa, both
ND nf Of
view, and the necessity for taking mill
tary decisions as to TIE next moves in
the Allied offensive, were both so ur-
gent that the conference could not be
postponed to date more convenient
for the Russian and Chinese leaders.
Looking at the matter from this point
OF view, ordinary common sense tells
us that there was only one thing to do
the President and the Prime Minister
met in Africa, the military consulta-
tions were held under their immediate
supervision, military plans for the i'm
mediate future were aid, and there can
be no doubt that the crucial question
OF the inter-Allied high command in
the Tunisian theater Of war was de-
cided.
So far so good. Is there any reason
to suppose that nothing else was ac-
complished? Let's suppose that Gen.
Charles de Gaulle and Gen. Henri Gi-
raud couldn't get together Immediately
on thoroughly co-ordinated program
Of political and military unity for all
Axis.
OF nn
prides himself on never giving way on
matter of principle, refuses to CO.
operate with Gen. Giraud, unless Gen.
Giraud kicks out all the Vichy boys, or
ex-Vichy boys, Let's suppose Gen. Gil
raud for his part says he can't kick out
all the Vichy boys because the vast ma
Jority OF the French population OF
North Africa is pro-vichy or at any
rate pro-Petain-as seems to be the
case, judging from the reports of the
more sober and informed correspond,
ents In that area.
Let's suppose the President and the
Prime Minister !dqpt like this very well,
as they probably don't. What are they
going to do about 1t? Certainly. they
can tell 1t. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower
to take over. But are they prepared TO
assume the responsibility for governing
something like half the African conti-
nent without the aid, indeed. against the
opposition, of almost all the available
administrative and military officials who
are now engaged in carrying on that
government?
More particularly, are they prepared
to assume such responsibilities while
engaged in fighting desperate CAM
paign against the Germans in Tunisia?
Obviously not-and so there is only one
! other possible course and that is to give
Gen. Giraud and Gen. de Gaulle more
time to work out their differences and
| meanwhile to get on with the business
of kicking the Germans out of Africa as
the best possible means Of convincing the
lukewarm folks among the French that
we're really going to win this war
Nothing will bring them around to our
side quicker.
To get back TO the Supreme War
Council let's suppose that the President
and the Prime Minister, being sensible
people and experienced politicians. and
| understanding the reasons why Stain
and Chang Kai-shek can't leave their
home grounds just at present, are will
Ing to, do the next best thing when they
can't achieve the ideal.
SO let's suppose they sent the two
absent leaders a full report Of all that
has been done and all that has been
concerted at Casablanca-by the way,
do you suppose that that was the content
OF the note which our Ambassador
handed Mr.. Stain yesterday?-and per-
haps they added an invitation for a get
together at some future and more con-
venient time. Wouldn't you say that this
was long step forward toward closer
inter-Allied co-operation 1t isn't a
supreme war council yet of course but
somehow it seems to me that it brings
lis quite bit closer to the attainment
Of that ideal, and these things simply
cannot be done quickly and easily
Let's suppose that we are not so far
| from the attainment of that ideal and
from closer cooperation with our Rus
! sian and Chinese allies, as one might
| think from reading some Of the pub
| lished comment on the results of Casa
blanca as far as these have yet been
made known.
| 1 think 1t is a supposition which will
| prove to be justified by events.
| Nsw Ynrk Trihupe