Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-16
Race for Rostov

kdce tor kOStOV
The complex campaign in South
Russia revolves basically about Ros-
toy, the big perfectly at the mouth
of the Don River Rostov is the hub
Of Axis communications both by rail
and by water from the Black Sea
up the intermediate Sea of Azov 1t
is likewise the bottleneck through
which troops and supplies from the
| Axis deep rear in the Ukraine re-
! enforce their armies in the eau
| CaSuS. The fall Of ROStov would
thus Shatter the entire Axis system
Of defense in South Russia. There
fore, it is obvious that the German
high command will do its utmost to
hold Rostov. while the Russian high
command will bend every effort to
take it.
This is the strategic objective be-
hind the complicated maneuverS of
at least half dozen Russian
columns, striking converging blows
| from the upper Don below Voronezh
to the Caucasus. The most imme-
date threat to Rostov is in the center
OF the 600-mile battle front, where
three parallel Russian columns are
working their way down the Don
valley and two railway lines. One
Of these columns has reached a
point only SO miles from Rostov,
with the others not far behind.
However, those last so miles should
prove emphatically the hardest The
German high command is countering
the Russian drive by the system
known as elastic defense Its first
decision was to hang on to its po-
sitionS in and around Stalingrad,
allowing upwards of 100000 troops
to be isolated there. That big gar
riSon, presumably we'll supplied and
re-enforcible to certain extent by
air. serves as a block on Russian
communications. So long as the
Germans at Stalingrad hold out, the
Russian offensive on RoStov cannot
use the captured railway segments,
all OF which pass through Stain
grad. On the other hand, the
Germans defending Rostov are
served by the excellent railway net
work which exists in the Ukraine,
narrows to the Rostov bottleneck,
and again spreads out through the
western Caucasus which is under
their control
The same system of elastic de-
Tense is seen in the Axis retirement
from the central Caucasus. Once
the Axis drive on the Grozhny oil
fields had failed, there was no reason
for trying to maintain this exposed
salient through the winter. There
fore, in sharp contrast to the holding
strategy at Stalingrad, the German
high command executed rapid re-
treat up the railway and highroad
which runs across the Caucasus re-
gion parallel with the mountain
chain. That retreat has been con-
Quoted skillfully and with minor
losses for over 100 miles. 1t has
now reached point where the Ger
mans can be supplied by inter-
mediate railway lines which cover
the relatively fertile region of the
western Caucasus known as the
Kuban. Already German resistance
is stiffening there, though it Is too
soon to say whether they intend to
stand there or retreat another 100
miles or so. This they could do be-
fore their hold on the Maikop oil
fields and their communications
with the Crimea via the strait of
Kerch would be endangered.
Obviously, the campaign in South
Russia is as yet far from it's strategic
climax. The Russian offensive has
been going on for more than two
months. 1t has inflicted great losses
on the Axis and has gained much
territory. But its supply problems
are growing. while those of the Ger
mans are diminishing This is re-
iiNSON" al Viz SAo"Ci ldte VI NuSSldu
progress in every sector except the
Caucasus, where the Axis has been
putting up only rearguard resist
ance. The supreme test will come
when the Russians run up against
the cloSe-knit system of Axis de-
lenses around RoStov itself. Until
then, no objective analysis can be
more than speculative in character.