Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-03

reports that some elements in Japan
would welcome negotiations looking
toward a settlement of the issues
in the Pacific. Admiral KichiSa-
buro Nomura was sent here as Japa-
nese Ambassador, and in the spring
of l941 he and Secretary Hull began
the series of Exploratory CONVEX
sations" that continued intermit-
tently until Pearl Harbor was at
tackled.
Chung to Faint Hope
The President and Secretary Hull
well realized" the white Paper"
says, ''the probability that Japan
already had gone so far in policy
of conquest that it would be i'm
possible to persuade her to stop"
Nevertheless, even a faint hope"
that a peaceful settlement might
be worked out for the Far Eastern
area impelled them to agree to the
exploratory conversations
American efforts were directed
toward persuading the Japanese
that their real opportunity lay in
collaborating with Britain and the
United States against Hitler. Japan
insisted on maintaining troops in
China MISUNDERSTANDING to
which the United States consistently
made clear it would not agree-and
refused to abrogate her alliance with
Germany or commit herself "unre-
servedly to a general policy of
peace"
Thus it soon became clear that
there was practically no chance of
any agreement being reached.
However, the conversations served
to gain time for our own military
preparations and to keep open the
door to the remote possibility of a
change of policy by Japan This
Government broke off the talks after
the Japanese move into French
Indo-China in July, 1941; froze jap
anese assets in this country and
cut off most trade with Japan
Mr.. Roosevelt told Ambassador
Nomura that this Government could
only assume that the occupation of
Indo-China was being undertaken
by Japan for the purpose Of fur
Their offense." The President sug-
gested that japanese policies were
due to German pressure and warned
that If Germany should win in
Europe she then would turn her
attention to the Far East. adding
that 'it was entirely possible that
after some years the navies of ia
pan and the United States would be
cooperating against Hitler as a
common enemy"
Atlantic Charter.
The Presidents virtual ultimatum
to Japan against further aggression
followed his conference at sea earl
Ter in August with Prime Minister
Churchill when they proclaimed the
Atlantic Charter and agreed to take
parallel action in warning Japan
against new moves of aggression"
The Atlantic Charter was dated
August IA, 1941, and the Presidents
warning that further measures of
conquest by Japan would compel
the United States ITO take imme-
diately any and all steps which it
may deem necessary" was handed to
Ambassador Nomura in a formal
document August II.
Another agreement between Mr..
Roosevelt and Mr.. Churchill was for
continuance Of the conversations
with the japanese here in order to
give Japan reasonable and just
alternative" to war-and to gain
time for Allied preparations.
Meanwhile, on August 8, Ambas-
sador Nomura had suggested a meet
ing between the President and the
japanese premier, Prince Konoye.
Mr.. Roosevelt and Mr.. Hull insisted
that an agreement in principle at
least would have to be reached to
assure she success of such a meeting
before it could. be arranged.
Throughout September the Japa-
nese continued to urge the Roose-
velt-Konoye meeting, but did not
provide the "clear-cut manifesto
ton" Of intention to follow policies
of peace that this Government con-
sidered prerequisite.
Fall of Konoye Regime.
In one conversation, Ambassador
Nomura said his government was
very anxious that the meeting be
held at the earliest possible mo-
ment in view of the efforts of
third country" and fifth column
lists in Japan" to disturb Japanese
American relations. On September
20, he told Secretary Hull that if
the meeting did not take place ut
might be difficult for the Konoye
regime to stay in Office, and that
II T. fell Il WAS likely to be followed