Evening star., 1943-04-24
What Kind of Revenqe?

Lie CIlUTu us Ol OeuldIlQS IOr revenge
and retaliation against the Japanese
which has followed the announce
ment of the murder of United States
flyers taken prisoner after the Toxic
raid is perfectly understandable. The
Americans would be a strange race
OF people if they did not feel this
impelling urge to smash back with all
possible force at an enemy who is
capable of such wanton barbarism,
but more harm than good may be
done if we expect too much too soon.
In the prosecution of a war it is
seldom, If ever, feasible to conduct
operations dictated by emotional
considerations. It is always neces-
sary to weigh the probable damage
to the enemy against the probable
loss to ourselves, and this is especially
true in the Pacific, where our forces
are under the constant handicap of
numerical inferiorities. These fac
tors undoubtedly were in the mind of
Lieutenant General Millard F. Har-
mon, commanding United States
Army air forces in the South Pacific
war area, when he stated that re-
taliatory attacks, as such, were not
being planned against the Japanese.
General Harmon's remarks were
not directed to the execution of
the American aviatorS, but were
made in response to question as
to whether retaliatory raids were
planned against the Japanese be-
cause of their heavy bombing of the
Tulagi sector earlier this month. In
the heat of public indignation fol-
lowing the Presidents disclosure that
the American flyers had been put to
death, however, his comments and
their indirect application to the
American public's desire for revenge
against the Japanese received less
attention than they deserve.
I'VE won't retaliate for that or any
other raid" the general said. I'VE
will stick to our plan of taking every
opportunity to strike the most vul-
nerable targets Japan exposes to U.S."
This is another way of saying that,
with the forces at our disposal in the
Pacific, we are not now in position
to take risks where the probable
losses outweigh the military benefits.
Suppose, for instance. that another
carrierb attack on Japan were
in contemplation Would it be worth
the probable losses that we would
incur? Last years attack has been
hailed as a notable success, and,
taking the important psychological
factors into account, this may be
correct. But from the military
standpoint it was very costly All of
the participating planes were lost in
that venture, although 10 per cent
loss is generally regarded as the abso-
Lutte maximum for profitable raid
from the military standpoint. In ad-
dition, we had to risk a valuable car
rier, and our chances of repeating
such an attack without detection of
the carrier are less favorable now
than they were year ago, for the
japanese are on guard Finally, there
is the question of the actual mill
tary damage that can be done in
an attack of this nature. The fact
is that we do not know in detail how
badly the Japanese were hurt by the
bombs dropped last April, but it
seems safe assumption that du-
plication of that attack at this time
would have to find it's justification in
psychological rather than military
considerations.
This does not mean that we may
not look forward with confidence to
the time when Japan will be bombed
again and again by our air forces.
But we ought to recognize that at
this time we lack both the land bases
and the carriers for launching the
sustained attacks which are essential
to successful bombardment. BY
keeping these restraining factors in
mind, we will not build up hopes
that can result only in disappoint-
ment.