Evening star., 1943-07-03

them essential to the security OF the
United States.
Up to now it has been supposed
that the President saw eye to eye
with his military and naval chiefs
and that when they felt a step
should be taken in the interests of
military security, he acted promptly.
The evidence produced at the hear
ing shows that instead, the wishes
of the civilian chairman of the Fed
eral Communications Commission
apparently have prevailed and that
the Judgment of the chief of staff
of the Army and the commander-in-
chief of the United States Fleet, as
we'll as that of the Secretary of War
and the Secretary of the Navy, ap-
parently have not been persuasive.
Control Sought.
The request of the joint chiefs
of staff referred to desire to con-
troll the handling of military in
telligence as it relates to radio.
Secretaries Stimson and Knox, in
their letter dated February 8, 1943,
say:
THE Secretary of the Navy, on
September IL, 1912, requested the
Joint chiefs of staff to study the
problem of responsibility and Sc
curity of radio intelligence. The
Joint chiefs of staff have made
thorough and comprehensive study,
and their response, based on that
study. is attached hereto. They as
we'll as the responsible military COM
manders in the field. are of the be-
lief that radio intelligence, the loca-
ton of clandestlne stations, the su-
pervision of military communlca-
tions security and related actlvl-
ties must, in their very nature. be
under the sole contol of the military
forces. Inclosed is a copy OF
letter from Admiral Leahy, recon-
r.ending this action"
The letter from Admiral Leahy is
dated February l, 1943. and was
signed in behalf of the Joint chiefs
of staff of the United States Army
and Navy. The1ette states that the
FEC is constantly expanding us
activities and that this is a ''substan-
tial drain on available material ana
personnel" The statement is MADE
that the information obtained by
the FEC through its own radio
Intelligence activities is not, IN the
military sense, secure, due to IN
herent tendencies toward publicity
of FEC activities, use Of non-5ecure
methods of reporting and correla-
ton and the necessarily close rela-
tionship Of the FCC military-intel-
ligence activity with other phases OF
the agencys work
"Endangers Effectiveness.
The letter then makes this start
ling accusation
Because of the essential differ
ences between military and FEC
standards and methods, it has not
oeen possible to integrate their in
formation, with the result that the
attempted duplication by the FEC to
work that is being effectively done
ov the military has in fact endan-
gered the effectiveness and security
Of military radio intelligence.
IN view of the foregoing it is con-
.luded that the better prosecution
of the war will be served by termi-
mating all military and quasi-mili-
tary intelligence activities of the
Federal Communications Commits
sion and confning such activities
10 the Army and Navy"
No explanation has been forth
coming as to why this request from
the responsible heads of the Army
an Navy has been sidetracked. An
effort is to be made by the House
Investigating Committee to get at
the reasons. 1t will be recalled that
division of responsibility over COM
munications led to an unsatisfactory
situation at Hawaii out of which the
Japanese agents were able to trans
nit information about Pearl Harbor
before the attack came on Decem-
Der 7, 1941, which cost the lives of
nearly 5000 American soldiers and
sailors.
Explanation Needed.
Is there now drifting on the
same sort of problem-conflict of
jurisdiction?
There must be some explanation
for the long delay in failing to issue
an order requested by our joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Certainly it is a subject in which
there ought to be light shed. lest
the impression develop that Wash
ington and bureaucratic friendships
are preventing the military and navy
men from getting the necessary au-
thority from the President to con-
duct the war effectively.
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