The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1943-11-04
UNITED NATIONS
FACING REVISION
OF FOREIGN PLAN
Continued From Page One)

mics; when we were still divided,
as we were in 1889, in 1910 and in
1941. Britain and Russia were very
nearly destroyed and America was
very nearly left to face alone a
victorious coalition in Europe and
Asia.
The lines of policy which kept
us divided in 1889, 1910 and 1e41
were therefore profoundly wrong.
These lines of policy must be al
tered if we are to remain united
to maintain the peace which fol-
lows this war.
The American line is known as
our government could take no dip
isolation, and it has meant that
measures to defend American Sc
lomatic measures except verbal
curity until we were actually at
tackled. Our enemies could arm.
could form hostile alliances against
us, could seize strategic positions
from which to attack us, could
vanquish our natural allies d
still - under isolationism - the
United States government could
only utter words and make ges-
lures. This is the fatally false prin-
ciple of diplomacy which the Full
bright and Connally resolutions are
designed to renounce and discard.
But the British and the Russians
have also had their own brand of
isolationism, as deeply rooted as
ours in their traditions, which they
have now to renounce and to dis
card.
The British brand of isolation
ism is known by another name:
it is known as the doctrine of the
balance OF power. Il served the
British reasonably well in the 18th
and 10Th centuries. just as our
isolationism served us reasonably
well until this century.
The British doctrine of the bal
ance of power consisted in oppos-
ing the strongest military power in
Europe by supporting the h Z
military powers of Europe. This
policy did not prevent war. But
against Spain, France and Ger
many it enabled Britain to win
eventually the great wars she had
to fight.
The ultimate justification of the
policy lay in the fact that first
Spain, then France and then Ger
many, were so close to the British
Isles, that if they became
supeme on the Continent III y
could dominate and starve and de-
stroy Britain. In 1918, however,
when France was no longer a very
great power and Germany was
PROSTATE, the doctring of the bal
ance of power no longer served
British interest. There was no
very great power within striking
distance of the British Isles. New
ertheless, the doctrine continued
to shape, though confusedly, Brit
ish foreign policy. Thus in h e
'20s. Britain tended to encourage
the restoration of German power
in order to balance the apparent
and temporary military ascendan-
cy of France This was, as the
event showed, a fatal mistake aris-
ing out of the old habits of British
diplomacy.
Then when Germany's military
power revived in the '30s under
Hitler-Britain having refused to
prevent its revival-the obsolete
habit of the balance of power led
the predecessors of Mr.. Churchill
tc hope that German aggression
could be DETECTED toward the east.
that is toward Russia. This was
the inner meaning, as the Russians
saw it, Of the British appeasement
Of Hitler, and It led inexorably to
the terrible failure to reach an
agreement with Russia in the fate
full summer of 1889. The failure
tc reach an agreement with Russia
in 1889 meant that Britain had to
begin the war on the Continent
with only Poland and France as
her allies.
Britain is now, as a result not
Of her diplomacy but of Hitler S
actions, the ally of Russia. But the
continuance of this alliance. after
Hitler is finished, depends on Brit
aims part upon how clearly and
consistently she renounces the doc.
time of the balance of power. For
Russia will be the strongest con
tinental state, and if Britain has
not abandoned the doctrine of the
balance of power, she cannot re-
main the ally of Russia.
The Russian policy between the
two great wars has proved to be
nc less unsound than American iso
lationism and the British doctrine
Of the balance of power. 1t was
founded originally on the enormous
error Of promoting and counting
upon a world revolution directed
from Moscow, which automatically
made practically every state ar
enemy of Russia, and at the same
time upon strategic isolation, which
meant that in war Russia would
have many enemies and no de-
pendable allies. Later on-under
Stalin-while continuing to support
Communist parties abroad, til e
Russian government did earnestly
experiment with collective securi-
ty at Geneva. But the hostility
-.>n.n.-M >.sn..-~Ah