Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-24

Hence, they minimize the difficulties OF
an invasion of Western Europe when the
Allied armies would have to be taken in
transports, then have to establish beach,
heads before they could contemplate a
wholesale invasion of the region which
they want to conquer. These difficulties
are obvious to the American and the
British high commands.
We Know of Cost.
We here know what 1t cost us to land
only one division at Guadalcanal where
the japanese were taken by surprise,
and we have learned how. difficult it was
to get our forces into North Africa in
the areas where the French offered only
token opposition. French aviation was
extremely weak and the French fleet at
Toulon, even if it had received orders to
proceed against us, did not have fuel
for more than an hours sailing. 1t is
admitted by all those who participated
in the North African operations that
had the French put up stubborn fight
instead of joining us we might still be
.hammering at the gates of Casablanca,
Oran and Algiers.
The British also have had their expert
ence in amphibious warfare The Diepps
expedition still is an unpleasant memory
in the minds of the British high COM
mand
Military observers-not armchair stra-
tegists who are moving imaginary troops
with the same facility as they move their
coffee cups-beleve that unless the Rus
slams are able to rout the Nazi forces to
such a point that they become utterly
demoralized, an attempt to land between
Norway and Spain would be a costly
affair and its success doubtful.
The Germans, ACCEPTING to the best
available information, have been work.
ing like beavers to build chain of FORTH
f1cations along the entire area, using
slave labor. For more than two years
they have been working day and night
to construct lines of fertilization which,
while not impregnable, if attacked from
the rear or by an army based on land.
would make the progress of an Allied
invasion force extremely doubtful.
Coastal Fortresses.
The sea boundaries of Norway. Hol-
land, Belgium and France are all fort
resses. To take them or break through
any one OF them in order to turn the
Na1 TANKS and gain access into the
Reich-which is our principal objective
is task no armies in the world have
ever attempted. We would not mind the
glory of doing it. The question which
is strong in the minds of some of our
military men is whether it is feasible,
and also what would be the world re-
percussion if we and the British fail.
Operations across the Mediterranean
are considered by far the more prac-
ticable although the time required to
reach the Reich may be much longer.
OF course, before we can undertake any
offensive against the northern shore of
the Mediterranean the situation in North
Africa must be iquidated by the con-
quest of Tunisia. Until that French
protectorate now in the hands of the
Nazis Is conquered by us, 1t will be
impossible to cross the Mediterranean.
From the very first day of our inva-
sion of North Africa, Hitler's general
staff realized the Importance of Tunisia
and has done its utmost to make that
area impregnable. The Nazi high COM
| mand Is determined to hold, regardless
OF cost, the triangle which separates the
(See BROWN, Page B-3)