Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-25
Finds Urgent Need
For Supreme Council
Military Critic Argues
For Political Coordination
And Single High Command
BIZ Mai. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
1t is most earnestly to be hoped that
the rumors emanating from London and
Washington forecasting the early estab-
nshment of supreme war council for
the United Nations may prove to be
true.
The need for a central direction for
the war effort of the great alliance has
been long acknowledged by many leaders
of many of the United Nations. If it
now comes to pass, 1t may we'll be that
it is the earliest moment at which agree
ment could be reached as to its constitu-
ton and powers. But it is more likely
that the pressure of difficulties has COM
PEELED the seeking of solution salts
factory not only for the present troubles,
but for dealing with future crises of the
same nature.
In the last World War, the formation
of a supreme council was the immediate
result of military difficulties. 1t came in
November, 1917, after every other means
of securing inter-Allied cooperation had
proven dismal failure.
Words then written by Field Marshal
Sir Henry Wilson. in q memorandum to
Prime Minister Lloyd George, might al
most have been written yesterday of this
war: 1--WE have tried many expedients,
but always with most disappointing,
sometimes even with disastrous results.
We have had frequent meetings of
ministers, constant conversations between
chiefs of staff, deliberations of COM
manders in chief, mass meetings of all
these high officials in various capitals. :. :.
And all these endeavors have failed to
attain any real concerted co-ordinated
effort in diplomacy, in strategy, in fight
Ing or in the production of war material"
Sir Henry was then thinking prin-
cipally of military troubles. Russia had
been knocked out of the war Italy had
suffered the crushing disaster of Capo-
retto. The best blood OF Britain was
being poured out in the mud of Pas
schendaele without appreciable result,
save to hold fast the German armies
while France recovered from the effect
of the widespread mutinies OF the sum-
mer of IT.
1t was a black hour for the Allies,
and the formation of the supreme war
council, composed of the prime ministers
of Britain, France and Italy, with one
other minister from each country, was
the result. Military advisers we're ap-
pointed by each country, and also by the
United States little later on. 1t was
under the auspices of this superior pol
itical direction of the war that it was
later found possible to appoint an inter-
allied commander in chief, Marshal
Foch, at the final moment of military
crisis-and the result was salvation and
victory.
1t is not too much to say, that without
first having attained political co-ordina-
ton 1t would never have been possible
for Marshal Foch to obtain the military
results which he in fact achieved. No
commander and no general staff can
serve two or three or more political
masters. s... ..s.-O
But our troubles today are more poll
tical than military just as military
difficulty brought about unity of direc-
ton for the last war, so political diff
Guilty may bring about unity of direc-
ton In this one. The United Nations
have shown that they are capable of
planning and carrying through a great
joint military effort with their present
machinery of cooperation but they
have not shown that they can solve the
political difficulties whose complexities
are now besetting their military leaders
in North Africa, and which are likewise
looming up from many other directions.
One needs only to mention the with
drawal of the Chinese military mission,
the question of the immediate future of
Finland. the confused and critical situa-
ton of Yugoslavia and the uncertain
status of Spain and Spanish Morocco
as handful of examples; there are
many others.
Moreover, the splendidly co-ordinated
offensive which has been embossed on the
Germans does not necessarily mean that
the machinery exists for carrying 1t
through, for exploiting success, for deal
ing with every future military contin-
gency that may arise. 1t Is, for example,
quite clear that the anti-submarine cam
paign is badly In need of more closely
unified command and more effective
study and CONTROL and success in this
Is fundamental to all our hopes beyond
the seas.
In the long run, the conference and
consultation method will not bring
results in war. There must, somewhere,
be a central organ of political control
and direction for the war. The physical
presence of the chiefs of state of the
various major United Nations may not,
will not, always be possible but the
absent ones can be represented by ca
pable and trusted deputies.
One enormous advantage will be the
possibilities for the exchange, study and
correlation of information at a single
center; this alone would probably justify
demand for the creation of supreme
war council. 1t has been objected by
some military men that you cannot run
| war by committee, that military de-
| cisions cannot be taken by "a show of
| hands" OF course not, but you cannot
| run war better by long range radio
and wire conversations between presi-
dents and prime ministers and chiefs
of staff either; to bring them together,
and to provide them with unified po-
| litical military and economic StafTs is