Evening star., 1943-08-25

remarks saws that any dlnerenceS
that arose in military matters were
related to priority or emphasis but
that there was unanimity of prin-
ciple, he. Is doubtless referring to
what has been the underlying issue
IN the British and American view
points in virtually all preceding con-
ferences where high-ranking mill
tary chieftains have been assem-
bled. namely the amount Of Ameri-
can war production which should be
sllocated to the Pacific. AS for the
principle" there has never been
anything but unanimity on the OBJ
jective-the defeat of all the Axis
powers in the shortest possible time,
The calling in of China's repre-
sentative and the noticeable refer
ence to the importance of aiding
China might or might not have
been premeditsted. Certainly the
anxiety of the conferees to make it
clear that Russia really was not a
necessary part of the meeting be-
cause 1t primarily concerned the
Pacific warm which Russia, of
course, Is not a belligerent-looks
as If convenient device had been
used to explain away the vacant
chair.
New Meeting Forecast.
1s would seem, moreover, to be
Indicated by the cautiously phrased
reference to 'tri-partite meeting"
in the indefinite future which the
offcial statement says "it may be
possible to arrange with Russia"
There is no certainty that Russia
will attend-only the vague promise
that Britain and America will issue
another invitation in the hope that
1t will be accepted.
The studied emphasis on the Far
East rather diverts attention from
the one subject that does interest
Russia, namely, when are the Allies
going to open up a battlefront in
Northern France and Belgium to
absorb the strength of sc to 100
Nszi divisions? No word or hint on
this came from the Quebec confer
ence, which rather confirms the
inference that Britain and America
have not yet decided to abandon
the. broad strategy announced by
Mr., Churchill when he was in Wash
tngton last May, namely, that air
power must be tried first and that
other measures were not excluded.
The question OF when the other
measures" in which Russia is deeply
interested will be undertaken is still
unanswered and maybe Stain will
find that 1t is not considered oppor-
tune to make the answer before the
spring of 1914.
Significant Omissions.
The Churchill Roosevelt state
ment is significant for what is omits.
Plainly, all reference to "uncondi-
tional surrender" has for the mo-
ment been deleted and the situation
In Italy particularly is not men
toned. This may be in line with a
growing impression in Washington
that Marshal Badoglio and the Ital-
ian King are not in control OF Italy,
but have been endeavoring since the
elimination of Mussolini to consoli-
date their internal strength and
especially to get rid OF Axis DOM
ination. There are some informed
observers here who think that with
In another month the King and
Badoglio will be in a position to
treat for peace.
AS for the Pacific war. 1t is no
secret that the American Navy con-
siders 1t has q long, difncult job
ahead against Japan and that 1t
wants more Of our war production
allotted there, But the British view
point has been rather definitely one
OF fear that too much might be
diverted from the war on Hitler.