Evening star., 1943-07-11

war materials on a large SCALE mainly
with an eye on future American attacks
The Japs have achieved all their polit-
ical and strategic objectives, with the
| possible exception of China They can
afford to remain on the defensive, par
| ticularly when they know that in order
to smash Hitler and his satellites the
American forces will have to take pretty
| severe losses
In Europe we have not yet started our
| offensive. There has been much talk
about invasion" But we are now in
the middle of July and our preliminary
objectives-the conquest of Sicily and
Sardinia-have only begun.
There is much wishful thinking in con-
nection with the invasion of Europe.
Realistic military observers maintain
that the Job ahead still is very difficult
and nothing but miracle could bring
about the collapse of the Nazis this year.
| There is some doubt that it will be ac-
compliShed even in 1914.
The invasion of the principal islands
in the mid-Mediterranean had to be
somewhat delayed. Commanding officers
do not keep newspaper timetables 1t
appears probable that the attack against
Corsica and Sardinia, which the Nazis
thought was scheduled for July 3, had
to be delayed.
There seems to have been change of
heart in the Nazi high command.
More Troops on Islands.
After the fall of Tunisia the Germans
began to withdraw forces from Sicily and
from Southern Italy. In the last five
weeks reliable reports indicated to the
Allied high command that not only have
Nazi forces been taken back to Italy, but
also that the Nazi forces in Sicily had
been increased by number greater than
were there last winter. Sardinia, which
originally had been reported to be held
by Italian troops alone, now has some
10000 NaZis to bolster the power of re-
sistance of the Fascists.
It is not quite clear whether there
are 10000 or 100000 men in Sicily and
whether the garrison of Sardinia
amounts to three or four divisions. But it
is certain that in the interval between
the Axis defeat in Tunisia and the end of
June large Nazi ana Italian forces have
been transferred from the mainland to
the two island fortresses.
The Allies cannot afford to suffer
major setback. Gen. Eisenhower held
back the order to attack until he was
positive that the objectives he has in
srnind will be attained The fact that We
jare now meeting much more stubborn
air resistance, when only three weeks
ago we appeared to have to deal with
only small Nazi- italian air force. indi-
Gates that the Germans have taken air
reinforcements to airfeldS in Italy
proper and are. operating defensively
from there. -" ~ss=
While the American commander in
North Africa is certain of victory when
he deems that the moment for an at
tack has come, he is by no means sure of
what sacrifices will be required to con-
quer the two principal mid -Mediter-
ranean islands.
And that is of utmost importance. The
conquest OF Sicily and Sardinia can have
as an immediate effect a further in
crease of the safety margin of our con-
voys to the Middle East. But from the
purely strategic point of view the ques-
tion of where do we go from here"
looms very large in the council Of our
military policy trainers.
Doubt Italians VIII Quit
The talk that the Italians are ready
to fold up as soon as they see an Allied
force appear on the shores of their home
land is good publicity or propaganda but
it is heavily discounted in military
quarters
| We have had no indication whatever
that the Italian Army will refuse to
fight for the land of it's ancestors. The
surrender of the Pantelleria garrison was
due principally to the fact that the only
available WaterWorks on the island had
been destroyed by Allied planes and the
/ garrison and the population had been
without water for three or four days
Military plans cannot be based on
wishful thinking and hopes that some
! miracle will happen. They have to take
into consideration the worst possible
| conditions and not the best.
The Allied forces in Africa are not
sufficiently large to permit an invasion
! of Italy should the Italian Armies offer
a strong resistance. To the average man
a figure such as 100000 or 100000 men
sounds large. But the fact is overlooked
| generally that in modern warfare the
number of services, such as supply, re-
| pair and others of the mechanical fight
| ing forces, reduce an army nominally
OF say 10000 men to less than 100000
actual fighting troops.
1t is impossible to apprise the losses
we shall have to suffer in operations
leading to the conquest of Sicily and
Sardinia. No estimate is possible until
the actual operations have been con-
cluded, But the guess is that the struggle
to wrest these two islanGs from the Axis
Will be heavy and the cost higher than
! in Tunisia.
Under these circumstances the question
tSee WAR, Page C-3D