Evening star., 1943-08-30
Nozis Facing Crisis
In Scandinavia
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.


ming to form an interesting pattern
perhaps by chance, perhaps by design.
First to be noted is the unrest in Fin
land, where there is plenty of evidence
that the Firms would like to get out of
the war If they could get rid of the
Germans and make anything like an
acceptable peace with the Russians. The
German hold on Finland is weakening,
and may weaken still more if there are
Russian advances in the north.
Finnish affairs nave always had strong
repercussions in Sweden. But it is not
only with Finland, but also with other
northern states-Norway and Denmark
that Sweden is concerned. Sweden
has to live with these neighbors after the
war. Alone among them, Sweden has
escaped Nazi domination, though she has
been compelled to give the Nazis good
deal in return. Now Sweden feels her
self strong enough to begin refusing to
help the Germans. On August 20, for
example, all military traffic over Swedish
railways between Germany and Norway
was stopped.
A glance at the map will show what
this means. Where formerly it was pos
sible to send German military supplies to
the German troops garrisoned in Norway
by the ferries which cross the Baltic into
Sweden, and thence by rail through
Swedish territory, now these supplies
must move by sea from Danish or Ger
man to Norwegian ports.
The first route is perfectly safe from
attack, save occasional long distance air
raids. The second is perilous in the
extreme, and the more perilous the
farther north the Norwegian landfall is
made. No part is safe from air attack,
from submarine attack, and even, as
events have proven, from daring raids
by Allied surface warships. More British
submarines, in particular, are now avail
able for northern waters, since they are
no longer needed in great numbers in
the Mediterranean.
The whole of the waters OF the Skag-
gerak. lying between Denmark and Nor
way, lie within a radius of 500 miles from
British air bases in the east of Scotland
How nervous the Germans are about the
conditions which they now have to meet
in these waters is evidenced by the
repeated incidents in which German
naval vessels have attacked Swedish
merchant shipping and even a Swedish
submarine, thus involving the German
government in series of disputes of in
creasing acrimony with the Swedish
government.
But, quite obviously it will be still
better for the Germans, having lost
their Swedish routes, to use the Danish
airfields for their communications with
Norway than to be compelled to fall
back on the German North Sea ports
and German airfields. 1t is therefore
with heightened interest that we observe,
Immediately subsequent to the closing of
the Swedish routes, the outbreak of dis
orders and sabotage incidents in Den
mark, charged by the Germans as having
been instigated by foreign sources
whether parachutists or secret agents,
or both, is not clear.
There seems no reason to suppose that
the Germans cannot muster sufficient
force to keep the Danish railways, ports
and airfields open. But to do so against
the resistance of the population will
Involve further strain upon the Ger
man military power at a moment when
it is not too we'll equipped to endure any
further strain.
For the same reason, but in a far
greater degree, the Germans can hardly
contemplate with any pleasure the pos
sibility of an armed clashes with the
Swedes. The Swedish forces are now at
the peak Of their efficiency and strength,
having absorbed for four years almost
the whole output of the very consider
able Swedish armament and shipbuild-
Ing industry. Yet even this seems to be
forcing the Germans toward what NAV
prove to be a showdown in the north.
The cramping of their communications
with their Norwegian garrisons will tend
to weaken the power of the latter to
resist attack either from without or
within.
The opportunity thus afforded for a
SOASAAaCo AAiCu dtVdCk anu norwegian
patriot uprisings may become too favor
able to be resisted. The Germans can
reinforce Norway by sea and air only at
the cost of considerable attrition on the
troops and shipping in transit This is
to be added to the additional RESPONSE
bilities undertaken in clamping down the
iron heel on the Danes.
The other courses open to the Ger
mans are all unpleasant: Attack Sweden
to open the railways; abandon Norway
altogether; or in the event of Allied
attack, leave the Norwegian garrisons to
their fate, as was done in Tunisia under
conditions not altogether dissimilar.
Probably the course which the Ger
mans will follow will, in any case be one
designed to keep Sweden out of the war
II that is humanity possible. The Ger
mans cannot afford to fight the Swedes,
nor can they afford to lose Swedish iron
supplies, nor can they afford to see in
the end the establishment of air bases in
Southern Sweden less than 200 miles
from Berlin and only about 400 miles
from the great silicon industrial dis
trict, hitherto unhurt. But there can be
no doubt that an Allied attack on Nor
way or Denmark-if the means should
| become available for such an enterprise
would present the German high COM
mand with set of very hard, not to say