Evening star., 1943-10-14
ItoIy as Co-BeIIigerent

The Badoglio governments decla-
ration of war against Germany is
the logical elimination of a politico-
military evolution which began last
summer with the collapse of the
Fascist regime and Italy's effectual
withdrawal from the Axis. 1t was
inevitable that Italy could not get
out of the world conflict and resume
the neutral status which Mussolini
abandoned when he Joined Ger
many in a common campaign of
aggression three years ago. That
was undoubtedly the wish of most
Italians after Mussolinis fall, and
Marshal Badoglio publicly worked
for it. But we now know that he
himself realized the futility of such
a hope and strove, from the begin
ming of his secret negotiations with
the Allies, to join them actively
against the former Axis partner. He
knew that the Allies would not
relinquish Italy as a base of
operations against Germany, and
that Germany would not voluntarily
permit such a development. There
fore it was a foregone conclusion
that Italy would become a battle
ground and that it would be cruelty
devastated in the process of ejecting
the Germans by force. Since this
misfortune was inevitable, Italy's
national interest would best be
served by aiding the Allies, both to
shorten the fighting and to gain
some consideration from the Allies
in return for Italian services.
AS a matter of fact, a state of war
has existed between Germany and
the Badoglio government ever since
the latter turned over the Italian
fleet to the Allies and ordered all
land and air forces subject to it's
authority to aid the Allies in every
way. This assistance has been espe-
cially effective in Sardinia and
Corsica, where the Italian garrisons
turned against the local German
contingents and hastened their ejec-
ton.
The Allies chief difficulty in max
Ing effective use of the Badoglio
government was the fact that, at the
start, it was almost as repugnant to
important sections of Italian public
opinion as was the defunct Fascist
regime. Liberal and radical circles.
especially, feared that Marshal
Badoglio was planning to rivet a
reactionary tyranny on the Italian
people, thereby frustrating the
desire for return to freedom and
government. Allied diplomacy
thus had two fold task: to reaSsure
the popular opposition and to avoid
long-range commitments with the
King, Badoglio and their supporters.
Until all elements opposed to the
Germans had been brought together
In a genuine wartime coalition,
Allied recognition of Badoglio and
formal war declaration by Badoglio
would have been equally unwise.
The fact that both those things
have now happened is proof that
the problem has been satisfactorily
solved America, Britain and Rus
sia have accepted the Badoglo gov
ernment as a 'co-belligerent," which
means an associate in the common
struggle against Germany. But they
make it clear that this exceptional
status implies nothing for the post
war period, when the Italian people
are assured full liberty to choose
their own form Of government Like
wise, Badoglio's declaration of war
against Germany is unilateral with
no claim to special Allied considera-
ton for Italy in recompense for this
action.
The diplomatic record has thus
been kept clear, and the way seems
open for harmonious prosecution Of
the common task against the arch
enemy.