Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1943-05-19
The World in ReUieUC:
Who Runs the War? (PartII
BY MAI GEN. DAVID PRESCOTT BARROWS
Military Authority and Former Of M unrH Of CateLn.a

years operated with tanks or he has become
an air soldier.
When such a soldier becomes a general,
that is, an officer in general command, re-
sponsible not for single branch Of the service
but for all branches of service combined into
a single army. he has 10 be cautious about his
natural preference for the particular arm in
which his early training was received.
However, experienced preference for one
arm may be an advantage to him as 1t was
to Napoleon who began as an artillerist and
remained at heart an artillerist to the end.
Napoleon developed artillery into a more
effective branch than it had been before and
made it a larger element in his armies.
In a way, the same was true of Frederick
the Great who to the end was primarily
cavalry leader, and left the training and
handling of his foot troops TO that extraordi-
nary soldier who fought battles in extreme
old age-Prince Leopole of Anhalt- Dessau,
The Old Dessauer' as the Germans call him.
The present war particularly has impressed
upon all soldiers the supreme need Of balanc-
ing, co-ordinatng as we say, not merely in
fantry, artillery, mobile units, but air troops,
also. in one operation in which each arm
plays its part, under a single, strong direction.
l have said that the principles Of strategy
do not change, and probably this is because
human nature does not change.
Men still yield to surprise; they still gain,
as they did in Caesars time. from the con-
centration of superior strength at the crucial
point of battle. Armies can still be lost by
the failure to bring all elements into action.
~ ol,;< 81;
pies of warfare
4 FEW years after the World War | dis
"a tinguished English soldier whose enthu-
siasm centers around the generalship of Robert
E. Lee. Gen. Sir Frederick Maurice, wrote
very clear-sighted book on the question
whether the last war showed any alteration
in the classical principles of strategy.
His decision, apparently, was that it did
not; that the strategy that won victory in
1914 and 1918 was the same as that which
had won victories for Alexander or for Han
nba or for julius Caesar, or for Marlborough,
or for Grant.
Strategy is the field Of war in which his
torans all so delight, and in which they may
be authoritative.
Some of the greatest historians of war
have been civilian scholars. Curious IL first
may appear to be- strategy while difficult in
practice, is simple in theory, simple in its
planning
II is the side Of campaigns which the
civilian and public generally can follow and
can even judge. 1t is the side of warfare,
and this is frequently unfortunate, in which
civil authority too often attempts TO dictate
TO the military leader; tries to tell him how
he should plan campaign; how he may sur
prise, surround and defeat the enemy
Here we enter upon one of the most try
ing problems of war, particularly in a repre-
sentative government TO what degree is
president or a prime minister 10 give orders
and directions as to campaigns, to the field
commanders or the admiras of our fleets?
The rule here is that war minister may
relieve field commander admiral in
whom he lacks confidence, but he should never
assume to direct his strategy.