Evening star., 1943-10-21
German Strength
Believed Diminishing
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
There are some suggestions in recent
reports from Europe that we may have
to revise downward somewhat the esti-
mates that have been made of German
fighting strength, based on the number
OF available German divisions. The
division yardstick is the most convenient
and generally accurate method of stat
ing the total fighting strength of an
army, but its usefulness in making COM
parsons tends to diminish when the
divisions of one side are much weaker
than those Of the other.
In the World War, for example, the
American divisions at full strength
totaled something like $1,000 men each,
while British and French divisions never
had over $4,000, and German divisions
toward the end were falling off toward
5,000-l0,000. In all three of the last
named armies it was thought inadvisable
to reduce the number of divisions, but
a shortage of manpower compelled the
reduction in the size of each division.
From the normal complement of IL
battalions of infantry the divisions Of
these armies were reduced to nine bat
talions, and some reduction was also
made in the other arms. The size Of
component units-regiments, battalions,
companies-also tended to dwindle away,
especially in the German Army in the
last three months of the war;
After the World War the nine-bat-
talon organization was quite generally
adopted for infantry divisions for rea-
sons of fexibility. The l2-battalion
division proving unWieldy on the modern
battlefield. The infantry division came
to be almost standardized throughout
the worlds armies, and its strength was
in the neighborhood of Is, ,000-1 16 900 men,
including all its combatant and service
units. There were two major exceptions
the Japanese, who clung to the old
square" division Of IL battalions, and
the Italians who, basing their ideas on
their experience in Spain, reduced their
divisions to six battaHons.
Now there are reports coming in
which suggest that the Germans, again
faced with manpower shortage, are
reducing their divisions to six battalions
in some cases, though quite generally
retaining the full complement of artil-
lery and other supporting troops. This
reorganization is perhaps considered at
Berlin to be well adapted for defensive
war. Certainly a division with only six
infantry battalions lacks the punch and
follow through for a powerful offensive
operation against strong resistance. The
advantage of reducing the strength of
each division, instead of reducing the
number of divisions, is the retention of
tried and proven fighting teams and
their commanders and staffs: If divisions
are broken up and distributed among
other divisions there is sure to be fric-
ton and minor difficulties of all sorts
until the officers and men have become
accustomed to working and fighting
under the new conditions, and the serv-
ices of the operating and administrative
staffs of the disbanded divisions are
lost. 1t must be remembered that it
takes long time to train good division
staff, to get every member Of 1t fitted
into the right place and the whole
working smoothly together. When this
has been done it has a value as a unit
which greatly exceeds the value of the
individuals who compose 1t.
1t is therefore to be expected that as
the Germans begin to get to the bottom
Of their manpoWer barrel they will begin
to cut down the infantry strength of
their divisions and perhaps the artillery
strength as we'll We shall still hear of
300 German divisions Of all types, but it
will mean something less in fighting
strength than similar number Of
Allied divisions. Very likely the Ger
mans will keep up their old practice of
putting their best men into elite units
armored divisions, parachute divisions,
and, of course, the special selection of
highly indoctrinated youth for the Waf-
fen S. S. Experience does not appear to
have taught the Germans that this
process, while perhaps good for short
war, is ruinous in the long run, because
1t takes from the normal infantry divi..
sions the backbone of the army, the
very leaven of good men which every
unit needs in order that the men of
lesser qualities may function effectively.
The fact that prisoners left behind in
rear-guard actions are now found to be
Poles, Czechs. Alsatians and others of
doubtful allegiance to the Nazi cause
suggests that another sort of wedding
out process may be going on in the
Wehrmacht, with the ultimate notion
of retaining for the final defense of
Germany only tried and true German
fighting personnel.