Evening star., 1943-12-06
Army Critique Hits
PiecemeaI Use Of
Armor in Tunisia
By the Associated Press.

BY the Associated Press.
The Army, in a critique of its
campaign in Tunisia, says that the
outstanding lesson learned there
come from failure to use the ar
mored division in sufficient strength
or in concentrated mass"
The one armored division that
participated in the campaign was
not employed as unit until the
last phases of the battles for Ma
teur and Bizerte. observed the
critique, adding that before that
time the armor arrived at battle
fronts ''piecemeal and was used
piecemeal throughout.
The report, however. agrees that
mass action was precluded by the
necessity of spreading the armored
division over a wide front, because
it was the only force available with
sufficient mobility and power to meet
sudden thrusts over a long and thinly
held line.
Points Out Errors.
The observations On the TuniSian
campaign are contained in a 7O-page
digest of reports and recommends
tlOnS by various commanders in the
campaign. until now circulated
through Army circles as q confiden-
tial document.
While the report praised it also
pointed out errors in the United
States first big land operation in
this war
Scouting and patroling proved to
be one of the most serious deficiencies
in the operations of American in
fantry in Tunisia," the critique said |
Patrol activity was not sufficiently
aggressive and at times failure in
effective scouting operations resulted
in patrols being ambuShed.'
Troubles with military intelligence
reports also arose both from in
accurate information and garbled
reports. In one instance sntelligence
agencies furnished informa ton that
led TO a division commander de-
Gliding that German resistance at
certain point would be light. whereas
it was discovered the enemy posi-
tions had been worked on for two
months and were carved into solid
rock in many places.
Report Was Garbled.
In another instance, an observa-
ton post reported three Italians
were descending a certain hill, In
relaying the information back the
original wording was twisted to
three "battalions' coming down the
hill
Here are some other points made
in the critlque: f
The German tendency TO launch
counterattaCkS in an immediate at 1
tempt to recover lost ground necessi-
tateS immediate preparation Of fire
TO protect neWly-gained positions. !
One division commander said his
artillery killed more Germans when
they made these counterattackS
than it did in all the PREPARATION
fire on targets and in support during
attack"
AS developed in the present war, !
the land mine and the various types |
of BOBBY traps have proved to be a
most formidable and powerful
weapon and serious obstacle in the
advance and operations of all arms.
No longer is it possible for the en-
gineerS alone to clear away mine
fields. All branches must train men
for this work.
Snipers' Role Important.
The use of highly trained snipers
assumed increasing Importance
throughout the campaign. The de-
velopment- and effective use of
snipers should be given special at |
tention"
Air attack has been generally in
effective against armored vehicles.
1t has been reported that even dive
bombing has failed TO cause much
damage to medium tanks
Positive identification of aircraft
is essential before antiaircraft fire
is opened. In the campaign
identification was unsatisfactory
and in many instances friendly
planes were fired on and hostile
planes were allowed to pass within
ropoe ,,p,nolosted