Evening star., 1943-05-22

Major Eliot Stresses
importance Of Red Army
In Winning Over Axis
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
Decisions in war must be based not on
hopes or fears, on prejudices or per-
sonalities, but on facts.
The United States Is not fighting this
war alone. We are fighting As 4 member
of \ great coalition.
No coalition can hope to succeed in war
unless its members are willing to subordi-
nate selfish national interests for the
common victory. The victory Of one
must mean the victory OF all; the defeat
OF one may well mean the defeat Of all.
Victory In war is finally to be obtained
only on the surface Of the land. The
| combined effort Of sea power air power
and land power will be necessary to at
tain victory, but victory becomes COM
plete only when the enemy land forces
have been defeated, when his bases and
vital centers have been occupied, and
control Of his territory.
This Is because man Is not 4 marine
animal, nor yet flying animal He lives
and has his being on the surface Of the
land. From thence he draws his susie
nance, and there are located all his ma jor
possessions and vital interests. On the
surface of the land will all his great de-
cisions of peace and war be taken.
There is nothing in the experience OF
this war to suggest that air power alone,
or sea power alone. is capable OF produc-
ing decisive victory under modern con-
ditions any more than in the past.
Very we'll, then-let US face the facts.
BY far the largest and most powerful
land force on our side-the United Ma
tons side, is the Red Army. That army
is irretrievably committed to war against
Germany. 1t cannot be shifted else
where.
British land power and American land
power are only just coming into the pic
ture as instruments of offensive warfare.
Distance and geography prevent their
immediate use against japan.
Moreover, the principle Of concentra-
ton demands that they be added to the
Russian land power. in order to bring
about the decisive defeat Of the German
land power The fact that the British
and American power can be moved. while
the Russian cannot, should not be per-
mitted to tempt us into unwise disper-
sion of our total strength.
Then what about air power? Land
power cannot win without air power.
Hence our land power being committed
to the European theater by reason Of the
immobility of the greater fraction Of 1t
(the Red Army the bulk of our air
power is likewise, committed to that
theater, for our land power cannot win
without 1t.
The case is 4 little different with sea
power. Those elements OF sea power
which are necessary to maintain the
communica tions Of our land and air
forces in Europe and Africa still must
remain on that assignment: but tespe-
7 eially in heavy ships) the bulk Of the
United Nations sea power. is not requited
for this purpose and eatt be employed
usefully in the Pacific and Indian Oceans
against Japan,r our. strongest naval
enemy. Naturally Certain amount Of
! air power and land power will likewise,
be required there.
| These are the fundamental considera-
tions which dictate the strategy OF seek
ing decision against Germany before
we seek a decision against Japan. They
cannot be argued away: they are In
escapable in the facts of the case.
There is. however, one ma jor political
consideration which. likewise, cannot be
argued away, and that is the vital neces-
sity OF sustaining our Chinese allies.
Whatever is necessary to do this, must
be done. 1t will represent a detachment
from our European striking power, but
it is a necessary detachment in the COM
mon interest, for the interest OF the
coalition as a whole is involved in seeing
to it that none Of its ma jor pillars is
stricken down.
The increase in our total armaments,
the reopening OF the Mediterranean, the
crushing German defeat in Africa, the
weakening of Italy-are all factors which
tend to increase our margin Of strength.
Our major problem now Is not to decide
whether we shall strike first at Germany
or first at Japan. for the logic OF fact
commits us to choose Germany. Our
problem is, rather, to make such wise
and careful ALLEGATION Of our means A.
shall enable us to sustain China and
keep Japan in check, without jeopardiz-
ing the prospects OF an early victory over
Germany.
The worst error we possibly could make
would be so to divide our forces as to
weaken our blows against Germany while
fighting an indecisive and lengthy war
against Japan. The prolongation Of the
war is the one great hope Of both our
enemies. Their separate and successive
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