Evening star., 1943-09-15


daily installments, Chief OF Stat
George C. MdrshalPs report to
the Secretary OF War on the pc
riod July /, 1941-June 30, 1943,
yNst made public. at is a rec
ord" Gen. Marshall Drites, "ot
phnt Was done and 1phy it ,oas
done, and Is submitted tDhile
America is at ,Dar to permit a
better understanding OF the great
offensive operations no,o in prog
Yess.
Despite the negotiations which
had been carried on with a few
French officials the amount Of re-
sistance which the landing forces
would encounter remained prob
lematical Gen. Eisenhower broad
cast a proclamation Of our friendly
Intentions toward French North
Africa and instructed the French
forces to display certain signals tc
indicate their nonresistance. How
ever, each task force proceeded or
the assumption that determined re-
were under orders not to fire until
fred upon. A code signal PLAY Ball
was to be broadcast to the entire
force at the first hostile act on the
part of the French in any sector
as warning to initiate vigorous
offensive action.
At the moment the landings in
Algeria began, at l o'clock on the
morning of November 8, President
Roosevelt assured the French people
bv short-wave radio that the Allies
sought no territory and asked for
French cooperation. The Spanish
government was also informed at
this time that the occupation was
tn no way directed against Spanish
Morocco or other Spanish posses
eions in Africa.
The landings were carried out in
accordance with plans and with a
boldness and efficiency which Sc
cured the initial objectives, the
major airfields and ports in North
Africa, within a period of 4S hours.
Diplomatic Negotiations.
These military operations were
staged against background of dip
1on1atic negotiations through which
speedy cessation of French resist
ance was sought. Both Gen Charles
de Gaulle, leader of the Fighting
French, and Gen. Henri Giraud,
who had escaped from Germany to
France and then from France to
Gibraltar, broadcast pleas for French
cooperation when our operations
started
Gen. Eisenhower had announced
that Gen. Giraud would be RESPONSE
Bile for civil and military affairs in
North Africa, but the French mill
tary officials on the ground were
found to be loyal to Marshal Pc
tain's government. President Roose-
velt's note to the French Chief of
State had assured Marshal Petain
Of our desire for a liberated France,
but the Vichy answer was disap-
pointing. Our Ambassador was
handed his passports on November
., and orders were dispatched from
Vichy to French African units to re-
sist our forces, which by then had
already accomplished their missions
excspt on the Casablanca front.
Unexpectedly Admiral Jean Dar-.
Ian, Petain's designated successor
and commander in chief of all
French forces, was found to be IN
Algiers visiting sick son when our
forces landed. He was taken into
protective custody, and when it was
found that the French leaders
stood loyal to the Vichy government
a series Of conferences Immediately
followed, with the purpose of calling
a halt to the French resistance
against Gen. Patton's task force in
the vicinity Of Casablanca. When.
on the morning of November IL the
Germans invaded unoccupied France
Darlan rejected the pseudo-inde-
pendent Vichy government, assumed
authority in North Africa in the
name of Marshal Petain and pro-
mulgated an order to all French
commanders in North Africa to
cease hostilities This order reached
Casablanca a few minutes before
the assault on that city was to be
launched on the early morning Of
November IL
Admiral Darlan Heads Government.
The North African government
was reoriented and brought into
close collaboration with the United
Nations under provisional govern
ment headed by Admiral Darlan,
with Gen Giraud as commander in
chief of the French ground and air
units. Subsequently French West
Africa under Gov Gen Pierre Bois-
son announced its adherence to the
Darlan regime, bringing to the AL
lied cause additional naval power
and trained ground units and max
Ing Immediately possible short air
route from the United States to the
North African battle fronts Cor
dial relations were quickly estab-
lished with the Sultan of Morocco.
Later it was possible to convince
Gen. Orgaz, high commissioner OF
Spanish Morocco, that the American
loiCcs contemplated llO dCllOli
against Spanish territory.
Upon the cessation of hostilities
Gen. Eisenhower's forces were faced
with numerous and pressing prob
lens. Harbors had to be cleared OF
sunken ships, wharfs and docks re-
paired, neglected and slender lines
of rail communication had to be de-
veloped to carry heavy traffic, anti
submarine patrols organized to pro-
teet our sea routes in the Mediter-
ranean, the civil population had tc
be provided for and its economy
started on the road to reconstruc-
ton, French troops in North Africs
had to be equipped, our forces hao
to be disposed to prevent success.
full Axis thrust through Spain, anc
finally, and most important of all
our forces had to close with tn,
enemy in Tunisia to effect his de.
struction in North Africa.
Race for Tunisia.
The rapid extension of the OF
fensiye eastward was facilitated b,
the expeditions landing at Algier