Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-08-15

bors and since the death Of Lenin. and
the downfall of Trotsky and his follow
ers the Soviet government applied ITSELF
to the transformation of Russia into 4
flrst-class military power Il
All the intelligence services OF the
powers in the West refused to believe
that the slow-moving Russians would be
able to stand up against the well trained
and inspired" Nazi legions.
Events have proved how easy it Is for
men sitting behind desks and pouring
over reports from doubtful sources to 70
wrong. The German, French, British
and American intelligence services never
realized how water-tight Russia had be-
come as far as military and Industrial
information is concerned They accepted
fake information as truthful and their
calculations went wrong
To the allies this developed as a pleas
ant surprise from the day Russia joined
their cause after the German attack
in June, 1941, but to the Germans 1t
meant their plans were all shot to pieces.
Instead of adopting strategy Of at
triton which his generals are reported
to have suggested Hitler became Stub
born and continued operations on q
large scale In Egypt, for instance, where
victory was actually within the reach
of the forces commanded by Field Mar
shall Erwin Rommel
Hitler's entire military genius" was
In Jeopardy. A change of tactics would
make him lose face with his own people
and would give the generals too much
prestige with the German people.
Russian Losses Heavy.
He believed that change of strategy
eventually would play against the Maxi
cause, and to him that was more I'M
portant than Germany itself. The Rue
slams could not be cracked. Hundreds
Of thousands of Germans persisted on
the Russian plains.
But at the same time the Germans In
vasion caused the Russians to lose many
more men than they were willing to
sacrifice and ruined the Soviet's most
productive industrial areas.
For long time the German generals
have proclaimed their belief in a col
laboration with the Soviets since it was
obvious to them that the Anglo-Saxon
powers, in their desire to prevent a re-
currence of war, would no longer be
satisfied with skinny peace as was
concluded in 1919
The most powerful Nazi military force
was gathered on the Russian front this
year. No fewer than $500, 900 men, pro-
vided with the most modern weapons
and an aviation amounting to 1000
planes, were concentrated on a 1000
mile front.
Unless the opinion of the American
military men Is wrong the Mad generals
no longer Intend to- deliver a anal blow
to the Russians. The Nazi operations
early in July have been regarded here
as a defensive offensive to prevent a
Soviet attempt to break through the
German lines.
Since this did not succeed, II appears
obvious to military observers that the
Nazis have been preparing a withdrawal
OF their forces toward the shorter
Dnieper line even though it meant q
death blow to Hitler's prestige.
OF the 352 Nazi divisions about 225
have been engaged in Russia.
BY shortening the front and thus los
ing in rearguard actions about Is divi-
sions, the Germans still will have 337
divisions powerful defensive force
which can defend the German fortress
for long time.
Would Protect Oil Field.
The collapse of the Fascist regime In
Italy is said to have caused only limited
concern in German military quarters.
From the strictly strategic point OF view.
1t means that the German forces can
establish themselves on the Pc River
front with an extension toward Yueo-
slav1a in order to prevent Hungary from
abandoning the ship and to protect the
Rumanian oil fields
1t seems unlikely that the Nazis will
make much of an effort to defend
Greece
So much for the military situation
which has been created by Hitler's
"hunch strategy"
Politically the situation is obscure.
In many highly responsible quarters
there is unconcealed concern over what
the Russian policy would be in the event
Nazi-ism disappears from the Reich and
is replaced by what may be described as
q military democracy"
All efforts of the American and the
British governments to fathom the mind
of Premier Stain have been fruitless.
The Russian leader is polite toward the
unofficial Ambassadors which are dis
patched to him. but so far he has Stub
bornly refused to get together with Mr..
Roosetelt and Mr.. Churchill and dis
cuss the common problems of the United
Nations.
Stain accepts the lease-lend goods as
A natural contribution of the western
mocraCieS-inveStmen on their part
for their security-and as the least they
could do as reward for the enormous
sacrifices Russia has made.
The Soviet Premier considers that
manpower Is far more important than
goods and whenever he becomes more
loquacious he points out that the Allies
so far have been on a military maneuver
and have not yet tasted actual warfare.
1t would be exceeding the bounds of
discretion to say that he is strongly
suspicious of the motives of the western
powers, He Endorsed the Atlantic Char
ter because as far as his own country
was concerned IL uaS irnnoa teriaI
whether he accepted 1t or not
Pacific Situation Satisfies.
He knew the Allies would not nnaka