Evening star., 1943-02-04
The End at StoIinqrod

The End at StoIingrod
1t is all over at Stalingrad. The
last islets of Axis resistance have run
up the white flag, and the surviving
defenders, ragged, hungry, dirty, and
half-frozen, are on their way to
prison camps. One of the greatest
battles of all history has ended in a
complete Russian victory and COM
plete Axis disaster.
1t was on August Is of last year,
more than five months ago, that the
Axis armies, then in the full tide Of
their great offensive, opened fire on
Stalingrad. At that time, few foreign
military observers believed that the
city could be saved. Stalingrad was
not technically a fortress. It was an
Industrial center, strung rather mar
rowly along the river Volga and
strategically dominated by low hills
that had fallen into Axis hands.
"Open Cities" as the military phrase
has it, have rarely been defended in
modern warfare. The chief instance
was the prolonged siege of Madrid
during the Spanish civil war, but
that was struggle between imper-
fectly equipped armies; so, to the
technician, it was not a good prece-
dent.
However, Madrid did give one hint
that the Russians possibly took to
heart. This was the amazing contest
In the suburb known as University
City, a group OF structures built en-
tirely Of REINFORCED concrete. Those
buildings proved to be first-class
fortresses which, despite prolonged
artillery and aerial bombardments,
were never taken. But Stalingrad,
thoroughly reconstructed out Of the
former Tsarytsin as it was called
before the revolution, was mostly
built in that modern way, and the
Russians proved what q combination
Of concrete and human fortitude can
do. Stalingrad became ''meat
grinder" worse than Verdun In the
last war. Losses on both sides were
huge, but the tremendous strain on
the long Axis line Of communication
was the more severe. Meanwhile, the
Russians were able to build up q
growing surplus Of reserve power for
q counteroffensive launched at the
psychological moment when the Axis
momentum had spent itself.
The Axis high command had taken
q grave gamble early In the summer
when they failed to take Voronezh,
the hinge OF the entire strategic
situation in southern Russia. It has
been well established that there was
a sharp division Of opinion at Axis
headquarters, several German gen
erals insisting that Voronezh must be
taken and the hinge secured before
onensives against Stalingrad and the
Caucasus could be pushed. Whether
or not by Hitler's personal insistence
for reasons OF prestige, certain 1t is
that the risk was taken. The failure
to capture stalingrad In its entirety
exposed the Axis armies to eventual
danger. Yet enough OF the city fell
into Axis hands to block both the
Volga River traffic and the network
Of railway lines which passed
through Stalingrad. Accordingly,
when the Russian counterof7ensive
began and revealed its latent
strength, the German high command
was faced with q hard choice
either to renounce those important
advantages by quick retreat from
stalingrad or to leave a large garri-
son there in order to block the Rus
sian communications and possibly
to hold out until spring by the
method Of hedgehog defense"
Unquestionably the stubborn Axis
defense OF their Stalingrad positions
over a period OF several weeks has
handicapped the Russian advance,
especially toward Rostov, and has
probably enabled much OF the Axis
army in the Caucasus to escape the
Russian net. Yet the sacrifice at
Stalingrad has been heavy, and the
Axis garrison probably has been over
come far sooner than the Axis high
command anticipated. The Russians
have now reopened their communica-
tions, and their besieging divisions
are free to join their comrades to
the westward. The supreme ordeal
for the Axis defense in south Russia
is at hand.
New Zeulund Comment
c%o - l. Wy 4.