Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-03-18
v-Donets Sector
Offers Opportunities
Maj. Eliot Believes Russions
Have Chance for Profit
Against Germans in South
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

BY MAJ. george Ffetdlng EHOt,
The war of movement in Russia is
temporarily slowing down under the
influence of the spring thaws and the
strain of extended communica tons lines
on both sides.
In the south, the Germans have re-
| taken Kharkov, at heavy cost. If they
can hold it, they will have achieved a
| considerable measure of security for their
! Donets salient, but to make their tenure
| of Kharkov secure, they must expand
their holdings to the east and north of
the city. The prime military value of
knarkoV is as railway center. and to
exploit this advantage the Germans
must gain considerable degree of free
dom of action in the immediate vicinity
OF the city. So far they have not been
able to accomplish this and there are
some indications that the Russians are
now ready for serious counter action
in this area, presumably after having
completed the restoration of railway lines
demolished by the Germans in their
earlier retreats.
Farther to the north the German
garrison at Orel still holds out in it's
dangerous pocket. 1t still blocks Russian
use OF the main Moscow Kursk- Kharkov
railroad. If the Germans can make
themselves reasonably secure in Khar-
kov, it will hardly be worth their while
to hold the exposed position of Orel for
railroad blocking purposes alone, but
Orel would still be extremely valuable
to the Germans if they are thinking of
retaking Kursk as well as Kharkov and
thus restoring their old winter line of
last year. For such a purpose they
would, of course, have to put in addi-
tional troops and that is something that
the German high command cannot be
anxious to do. But there can be no
question that the recapture OF Kursk
and perhaps Belgored would greatly
strengthen the German hold on
Kharkov.
Still farther north, the Russian often
slVe rolls slowly through the forest to-
ward Smolensk. The German line in
this area is becoming more and more
lensk- Acknowledgements front and should
this line be preached at or near Smo-
lensk, the effect would be particularly
disturbing to all German positions to
the south and southeast The least the
Germans can afford to settle for in this
area, therefore, is sterilization on the
| line indicated
rr;u.
thrust toward Staraya Russia is likewise
moving slowly forward. Here the Ger
man stake is definite and clear for il
Staraya Russia is taken the long expected
German retirement on the left flank of
the Gulf of Finland must almost GER
talnly follow, with possible disaster to
the troops on the extreme left of the
German line if careful preparations to
cover the withdrawal have not been
made in advance
On the whole of this Northern and
Central front, however, it must be kept
IN mind that the Germans enjoy shorter
and better lines of communication than
they 90 IN the south. Consequently, their
resistance will be stiff and the Russian
than in the Don and Caucasian regions
where the Russian blows fell with such
telling effect upon an over-extended
enemy
AS to the future course of events on
the Russian front, the Germans are
limited in what they can do by their
shortage OF reserves. Their battle in the
south may best be described as battle
OF Heterogeneous. Their purpose was
hrst to save their Donets army from
encirclement and second to establish a
stabilized front with Kharkov as its
bastion; which would enable them to
Withdraw troops from this area to re-
establish that central strategic reserve
which is necessary for the all-around
oefenSe OF the fortress of Europe. Such
further enterprises as they may under
take in Russia seem likely to be directed
toward strengthening their defensive
position and to be of temporary and
local character, at least for the i'm
mediate future.
The Russians on the other hand still
nave sufncient reserves in hand to enable
W ~c'ioiiioc WEATHER To
pursue the objective of an army on the
of1ensive-the destruction of the armed
forces opposed to it in whole or in part.
In the north and center they can make
territorial gains which will be advanta-
geous to them but, save on the extreme
left, there seems comparatively little
opportunity for cutting of and destroy
ing any considerable German force.
The best opportunity of doing that is
still in the south, and lies in a renewal
OF Russian offensive toward the
Dneiper which almost succeeded last
month. There are indications that Rus
sian reserves are again flowing south
ward. 1t may be that a period of freez-
ing weather will permit an immediate
Russian counter drive or it NAV be that
the Russians will have to content them
selves with local operations until the
beginning of summer. But certainly
kharkov and the Donets salient must
remain in the minds of the Russian high
command as affording them one of the
most attractive opportunities open to
them for battle of destruction.
(Copyright, 1913, New York Tribune, Inc,