The Waterbury Democrat., 1943-08-16

ing each:
 l. Russia. As everyone knows, Russia has been asking the United States and Britain repeatedly for a second front in France. Each time we have sidestepped. In June 1942, when Foreign 1inister Molotoff came to Washington we told him the United States had only just come into the war and wasn't ready. Moltoff sympa- thized. He had pointed out that Britain had a large army in Eng land. We had to reply that the United States could not dictate what Britain did with her troops.
 Several times since then Rus sia has asked us for a second front in France. We have given different excuses: that we were setting up front in North Af- rica, that we were beginning oper- ations in Sicily, that a second front acros sthe Channel would cause terrific casuaolties. To the latter Russia has replied:
 Of course it would cost casualties, but what do you think
 we have been doing, attending
 a tea party? This is war, we
 have lost more than four mill lion men,"
 So last week, as the tide of vic- tory began to turn decisively in favor of the Allies, Stalin gently reminded us through "Pravda," his controlled newspaper, that we had not yet started a second front, that Churchill and Roose- welt had both violated their Casa blanca promises for second front, and implied that since we hadn't done much fighting, Russia intend- ed to write the terms of peace. This is one big phase of the problem Roosevelt and Churchill face in Canada.
 CASABLANCA DECISION
 2. The second phase of this personal diagnosis is my opinion of what happened at Casablanca. There all sides agreed in prin- ciple on second frotn in France, but when it came down to practice tn moot poitn arose as to what proportion of British troops, what proportion of American troops should make up the invasion army.
 Churchill has always opposed a mass sacrifice of British man. power, has pointed to the cream of the British youth lost in the last war. Has diplimatically suggested that American man. power, with population of 130,- 100000 was much greater than Britain's 30,O00,000. Heavy Bri- tish losses, he has reasoned, would set England back a whole gen. eration. Therefore, Churchill at Casablanca undoubtedly wanted the invasion army to be about 70 per cent American troops, 30 per cent British. subject to shipping U. s. troops to England in large enough quantities. Roosevelt probably agreed. However, the submarine situation all last win ter was not as favorable as today so obviously it was impossible to ship all the troops we wanted to England.
 SECOND FRONT-WHERE?
 3. The third chapter came dur ing the May-June conference between Roosevelt and Churchill. By this time we had all of North Africa and had to decide whether to push ahead with second front in the Mediterranean or a second front in France. If in France, 1t would be necessary for the Allies to use a larger proportion of Bri- tish troops than American. Be- cause we had not been able to ship enough to England, probably the ratio, instead of being 70 per- cent American and 30 per cent British, would have been nearer 30 per cent American and 70 per cent British.
 Another vital factor also en- tered the June picture. Until then, the Allies had not had suf- ficient bomber strength in England to really punish enemy industry. We were just beginning to go to town. So. after prolonged debates, the Churchill thesis finally was adopted-striking at the "soft un- der-belly of the Axis" through the Mediterranean islands and wait ing for an invasion through France until W we could really blast Germany from the air and (2) build up U. s. troop reserves in England.
 U. s. war chiefs have never been too enthusiastic about the "soft under-belly" approach. They think