Evening star., 1943-06-27
Bombers Seen Getting
Their Decisive Test
By o,cen Z. Scott.

WlgnOuC The very large loSSeS Oh AMERICAN
and British troops that earlier had been
anticipated. This prospect grows from
two things, one the wastage Of German
| power in Russia, the other the growing
success Of strategic bombing.
It appears that a decision has been
reached to give q thorough trial to the
American conception OF the use Of air
power before an attempt is made to
smash head on into Northern Europe for
q land invasion. In that decision, IL
In. fact it has been made, lies the con-
viction OF air force officials that losses
of American troops In this part Of the
| war can be held to a minimum.
This country's air strategists are very
| confident that decisive results can be
obtained in modern war through the
proper use of the airplane. Their con-
ception of what is the proper use of air
| power, as an independent instrument
of war, differs from that of the air forces
Of any other nation.
American air officers place their con-
fidence in the big bomber, used in day
light In highly y-trained combat team,
capable of fighting its way to target
and able to use aimed fire to place its
bombs on the vital sources Of enemy
power. The air strategists of the United
States start from the premise that there
are relatively few key targets in a
highly industrialized nation. Those tar
gets may be electric power houses, water
works, oil refineries, locomotive round
houses, airplane factories. A relatively
few bombs, if they hit the vital spots in
those targets, can cause the enemy's
power to begin to wither. The Americans
believe that fire must be aimed at the
heart or brain or nervous system of the
enemy's industry.
This conception differs from that OF
other nations in the war.
The, Germans tried to knock out Eng
land merely by dumping bombs in large
numbers on what they regarded as a
vital area. The emphasis was upon terror
and property destruction. In cities like
Coventry property destruction was i'm
mense, yet the factories continued to
work. The British have expanded upon
the German concept. They send over
bigger bombers, more bombers. carrying
bigger bombs. These are night raids in
which the emphasis is upon creating
terror and upon destroying property.
American strategists do not belittle
this type of bombing. They doubt, how
ever, whether 1t can be decisive. Their
own methods are entirely different.
The men who have developed this
countrys bombing methods start from
the premise that two or three bombs. OF
proper size actually hitting vital target
are of more effect than thousands OF
bombs dropped around the edges of a
target. They believe that SO highly
trained bomber crews, vino can aim their
bombs with precision and can obtain TWO
or three actual hits, are Of more value
than 1000 crews whose bombs miss the
exact target and hit civilians or offlce
buildings or other non-vital objectiVes.
This represents basic difference IN
conception of the proper use OF the
bomber for strategic purposes. 1t Is
conception that is getting trial In the
Mediterranean area and that is to have
thorough trial over German Europe.
Initial results are very encouraging.
At one German submarine base which
for months had been subjected to night
bombing with little apparent effect on
operations, the Americans in one raid
succeeded in knocking out vital tnstalla-
tions that crippled the base. 1t has been
the same story at other points. How
ever, the American operations until now
have been on a rather small scale over
Europe because the many demands for
four-engine bombers have prevented any
great concentration at one point. That
situation is being remedied gradually.
Italy should be the first large nation
in which the American conception of
bomber use can be given an adequate
trial. In italy, American bombers grad
ually are cutting to pieces some of the
nations transport lines, its power facil-
tiles, its harbors and docks. The result
is that, If and when American troops
land, the Italians will have difficulty
supplying the forces that they must use
to resist that landing and to check the
conquering forces. Given time. the re-
suit might even be that Italian resist
ance would collapse before actual in
vasion started.
In all of this, there Is no claim by the
air strategists that air power alone can
win war. They do not deprecate the
effectiveness Of navy in maintaining
blockade and thereby performing vital
function. They do not deny that ground
forces are the vital element In any war.
All that they claim Is that by proper use
of bombing it is possible to cripple the
war making power of an enemy and to
that extent it is possible to ease the
problem confronting the armies on the
ground.
They believe that with relatively few
air assaults, carried out over period of
relatively few months. it is possible to
destroy vital war-making industries Of
an enemy, leading to results that viii
become apparent a few months later
when supply difficulties begin to harass
the armies in the field.
1t is that belief that now is given the
test. American flyers, highly trained, viii
try to fight their way to vital targets
over Europe and will seek, by use of
precision bombing, to place enough
bombs on the vital parts of factories,
power houses, water works and other key
targets to interfere with the war max