Evening star., 1943-01-12
Jups' Air Weaknesses
Described by Observer
OId-Type PIunes and
HoIf-Troined Pilots
Reported in Action

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
One of the most significant points to
be noted about the recent air battle of
New Guinea is the growing qualitative
superiority of the American and Aus
tralian air forces. Not only do the Al
lied planes and pilots seem superior to
the japanese, but We are now able to
put in an increased number of planes,
of an increased number of types-the
right planes for the right tasks, in all
the various and varied categories re-
quired by aerial combat.
This gives our air forces a versatility
and f1exibility which the Japanese seem
unable to match. They are still slug
ging away with the same old types with
which they began the war, while we
are providing a constant flow of new
and improved types in accordance with
the lessons of actual experience.
The reason probably is that the Japa-
ncse production of aircraft is so low
in comparison with their losses that
they do not dare to stop production in
any plant in order to re-tool and re-
equip for the production Of new types
of planes.
They began this war on the theory
that they could win 1t quickly, by means
of assembled reserves of planes land
of everything else) which would give
them temporary and local superiority.
They have failed to win, in the sense
that they have failed to deprive their
enemies of the power to attack them,
and now they are feeling the pinch as
our strength increases.
AS we approach equality In numbers,
our growing qualitative superiority tends
to have a cumulative effect upon the
enemy. That is, he cannot any longer
take the air save in great force-as he
has done to cover his convoy into Lac
and he must face ruinous losses in
order to carry through any enterprise
requiring extensive aerial cover: which,
IN modern war, means just about any
important operation of any kind,
whether by land or sea. He runs the
risk OF being shot out of the air when-
ever he comes within our reach, as
indeed he seems to have been in the
instance-without causing us anything
like compensating loss. Thus he is
driven more and more to the expedient
of rushing hastily-built planes and half
trained pilots into action, with losses
growing ever greater in proportion to
our own.
This process will go on not only in
New Guinea. but everywhere in the
Pacific: 1t will go on in Burma, as the
strength of Allied air power in India
Increases: 1t will 60 on in China, as
we are able to get more planes and
men to General Chennault.
And meanwhile the Japanese high
command must somehow find planes
enough for their Siberian front, or risk
a sudden blow from Russia which they
Will lack the means to resist: they
must find planes enough to escort their
shipping. on which all their enterprises
depend, or give up one of their most
potent weapons against our submarines
they must find planes enough for home
defense, or risk carrier raids against
their vast inf1ammable cities, where
their planes are produced and they
must find planes enough for training
new pilots, or their air force will dry
up and wither away for lack of new
personnel.
In other words, the japanese high
command Is learning by the hard route
OF bitter experience, that air power does
not consist just Of a certain number of
planes, pilots and ground crews as
sembled in units and organized for COM
bat; 1t consists also of the national
ability to provide a constant flow of
requirements as to planes and fuel and
bombers as we'll as to pilots, gunners and
mechanics, and also sufficient reserve
capacity to continually make the neces-
sary improvements and changes of type
demanded by the existing situation in
the areas of active operations.
NO type OF warfare is so implacable in
Its demands for perfection as air war
fare; in no type Of warfare is improyisa- =
ton less possible, nor the penalty for any
defect IN the system-whether human
or material-so certain, so swift. m
severe and so quickly cumulative In tts
effects.
1t seems probable that the only hope
which the Japanese now have of re-
storing in any measure their deteriorat-
ing air situation is the completion Of
new factories at home equipped to turn
out new planes in larger quantities.
Many Japanese aircraft factories are, as
a matter Of fact, only assembly plants
where parts manufactured in smaller
plants or even by home labor are as
sembled into finished planes.
The infinite difficulties in switching
such a system as that to the production
of new types need hardly be commented
on in detail. Whether the japanese can
find the material and labor to build new
production plants is at least doubtful.
though we should not assume it will be
impossible. Meanwhile, they continue to
labor under the cumulative troubles of
which the operation OIL New Guinea I,
but one Of several Indicate which we
have recently been able to see.
(Copyrisht, 1943, New York Tribune. Incl