Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-07-29
Germans in Sicily
Fo Political Effect
II Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

|
FSts available here about the Italian
sitution are few and far between at this
writing. There are plenty of rumors, but
not iany facts. There are, for example,
repots that the Germans have refused a
requSt by Marshal Badoglo for the
withdrawal of German troops in Italy.
Their are reports that Italian troops are
movig northward There are reports
that he Germans intend to establish a
defese line along the River Pc.
Bu there is one fact which is reliably
repoted and may be significant-that
the Germans actually are reinforcing,
at tbs late date, their troops in Sicily.
Thy are doing this by moving some
of tn German troops in Southern Italy
into Sicily by air, which Is about the
only means open to them-though small
craftnight still get across the Strait of
Messaa at night. Both means are ex-
| pensie in the extreme, as evidenced by
the atvities of our patrol vessels in the
Messia Strait and the fact that our
flghtes shot down 81 loaded troop-car-
riers N Monday.
Ont fraction of the German SOL
diers Who set out on this perilous jour-
ney an be expected to reach Sicilian
soil, 3lere those who come by air must
land n hastily landing strips
in Mountainous terrain, under highly
unfaWable conditions
Yetsome are getting through. Ele-
mentsl of the 10th Motorized Division,
formely in Southern Italy, are max
ing thir appearance in the front line
stiffenng Italian forces, helping to
hold lack the Americans and Cana
dams on the Allied left and center as
the Ahsd wing sweeps round to encircle
the min position around Mount Etna
The Allied advance has in consequence
been lowed down.
1t ispermissible to ask why the Ger
mans Ire doing this. 1t is so desperate
AND ostly move that normally one
wouldexpect 1t to be undertaken only
II 1t WIRE stop-gap, an attempt to hold
the LIE until much stronger reinforce
ments .ould arrive. Therefore, one would
expecttt to be accompanied by reports
southwrd through Italy, and strong
Germ4 air forces making their appear
ance II cover the crossing of these REIN
forcennts into Sicily.
But here are no such reports as yet:
and If reinforcements in far greater
strength than a few air-borne detach-
ments nd few struggling boatloads do
not co4e soon, the arrival of these
small esments can only delay an inevi-
table en-. From the German viewpoint,
1t wouN seem that a better use for the
Germa15roops in South Italy could have
been fond than thus wasting them in
cause aready lost
But here are two suppositions, either
| OF with would make a considerable
differene First, if the Germans think
Italy iulf already lost, If they find
the peqle of Italy already turning
against Them, they may have reason
to think they could not extricate their
rather shall forces in Southern Italy.
In ths case, these troops would be
so to spAk-"expendable," and it might
be bette to try to get some of them
into Sich where they could do us some
damage. rather than losing them In
trying todght their way out of Italy.
Perhap more likely is the SUPPOSE
ton thatthe Germans, though unable
to send 4rong reinforcements to Italy,
are determined to hold Northern Italy at
least, AM are anxious to stiffen the
will to rdst of the italian government
and peopA, In such case they might
be willingFo make very great sacrifices
for the sab of moral effect, which would
explain TER present procedures In
Sicily. #E
This fitsin we'll with the report of
proposednefense line on the Pc. Part
of the Genan purpose may be to gain
time in Silly in order to prepare such
a defensive position. The Germans may
also feel tened of generally strong"
attitude il rider to impress the Italian
commandGs in the Balkans, and the
wavering ,atellite governments in
Hungary, limania and Bulgaria.
Certainly 1t would appear that the
arrival Of tese German attachments in
Sicily rep1sents a sudden change in
German DECISIONS, following Immediately
on the conference between Hitler and
Mussolini yAich preceded the fall from
power of til latter. Up to that time,
| there had been no hint of any Ger
man reinfrcements for Sicily. The
risks weretoo great and the military
results to e expected were too small
In the milary sense, too, the timing
was all wr2g-one does not throw in
reinforcemeFs when the battle is already
lost.
The time ! reinforce Sicily was when
our landingAwere first made and the
Strait of M$ina was not yet so thor
oughly blochded as it is now So this
was militayI decision based on a poll
tical premiS is no escape from
that concluDn. The political premise
may be Gilman realization that Italy
is lost to TIL Axis or it may be an at
tempt to sffen Italian and satellite
| allegiance I'd the Axis at the price of
sacrificing slfew thousand more Ger
man soldier on the bloody altar of
Nazi expediscy.
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