Evening star., 1943-06-03
Naval Outlook
For Axis Gloomy
Major Eliot Discusses
Allies Steady Growth
Of Effective Sea Power
Bu Mai. George Fielding Eliot.

With all the uproar of the Tunlslan
| fighting, and the crash Of bombs falllng
| on Germany and Italy, the steady IN
| crease of Allied naval power has passed
almost unnoticed by the public. This is
not only an actual increase, but rela-
| tive increase.
America and Britain have been build
ing and commissioning innumerable war
| ships of all sizes, from battleships to
PIT boats A new French Navy has come
| into being and is receiving further ac-
| cessions, such as the squadron at Alex
! andria. On the other hand, the italian
and japanese fleets have been suffering
severe losses, and 1t is quite possible that
| the Italian fleet may be knocked out of
the war altogether before many weeks
have passed
! AS for enemy building programs
probably the Japanese have completed
some new ships, although shortages of
| labor. raw materials and transportation
must have handicapped them to con-
| siderable extent. There seems little
| question that the Germans have sus-
| pended the construction of surface naval
| vessels larger than destroyers in favor
| Of submarines. Some new italian ships
have been finished but there again con-
struction has been painfully slow when
compared with Allied accomplishments
in that field.
The net result of ali this is a shift
In the naval balance of power in the
world. Setting aside for the moment
the German submarines, our principal
naval enemy is Japan AS the naval
| power of the United Nations increases
naval position of Japan will steadily de-
teriorate, because the tendency will be to
concentrate more and more of the in
creased Allied sea power against our
principal naval opponents.
1t Is probable even today that the
Japanese are in no position to risk a
fleet action in the Pacific, and this fact
of itself hampers them in all that they
do. Under such conditions, it is, of
course, our basic purpose to compel them
to fight, and the stronger we get the
more freedom of action our commanders
have to choose the place, time and con-
dition of the decisive combat.
1t is interesting to note that of the
possible changes in the political COM
plexion of the war, almost none could
IN any way contribute to increasing the
AXIS sea power, but rather the reverse
Ihus, II Sweden were forced into the
war on our side her strong Baltic fleet
would go far to neutrslize what has up
10 THIS time been an almost complete
German naval command of the Baltic
Should Turkey become one of the United
Nations her fleet and her bases would
cLheh our naval command of the Black
Sea
Should complete French unitv he
acheVed at Alglers, almost certainly the
french Warshlps at Martinique and
Guadeloupe would be added to the French
| fleet now operating with us. The Spanish
fleet is the only neutral naval force which
the Axis could conceivablv get hold of
and Its value to them, under existing
conditions, must be considered very
doubtful
Ih1s worldwide naval picture must be
viewed in its relation to the apparent
decline of the German submarine CAM
palgn in the Atlantic Ocean. The SUBJ
marine is being fought not by battleships
and cruisers and big naval carriers, but
by escort vessels. escort carriers and
various types of patrol aircraft
In general, the anti-submarine Weapons
OF the Atlantic are not the types most
needed for the long range naval war
tare of the Pacific, although this is not
wholly so in all instances. But cer-
talnly If the submarine war continues
to go badly for Germany, the increase
in available merchant tonnage will be
felt in the Pacific and will form a useful
supplement to our growing naval strength
in that theater.
From the naval point of view. the out
look is gloomy one for the Axis, and
particularly for Japan. all of whose en-
terprlses are so entirely dependent on
sea power. AS the pressure on japanese
sea lanes increases, so will increase the
japanese tendency to take a desperate
chance at relieving that pressure bv
fleet action. And every day that passes
increases the chance that when and if
the japanese do take that gamble. it will
be a losing one
(Copyrisht, 1943, by New York Tribune, IneJ