Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-02-10
Mop-Up on GuuduIcunuI

Mop-Up on GuudoIcunuI
Three weeks after the humiliation
of the japanese expeditionary force
in Papua, the welcome news has come
that Guadalcanal likewise is cleared
of the enemy. Toxic itself admits
the fact. though ascribing it to VOL
untary evacuation of the remnants
OF its troops on the island. This may
be the correct version. There is rea-
son to believe that the recent deploy-
ment of Japanese air and naval
strength in the vicinity Of Guadal-
canal was a screening operation to
cover the escape of the land troops
rather than an attempt to reinforce
them, as previously had been as
sumed.
At any rate, the entire area of
Guadalcanal, about as large as Long
Island, is free of japanese with the
possible exception of stray groups of
stragglers who can offer no organized
opposition. Our forces therefore can
develop the island into consolidated
base for offensive moves northward
along the island chain of the Solo,
mon archipelago that extends almost
to Rabaul, the main Japanese base
In the entire area. Guadalcanal and
Papua thus constitute the starting
points for -pronged offensive on
Rabaul.
Already beginning has been made
from Papua by Australian and Amer
lean ground troops filtering up the
coastal beaches and jungles toward
the japanese positions in Northern
New Guinea at Salamaua and Lac
The advance through the Solomons
may be more difficult, since the
Japanese seem to have fortified sew
eral of the islands. But all japanese
posts continually are being pounded
by air attacks and thus softened for
subsequent assaults by expeditionary
forces.
The final cleanup at Guadalcanal
took place almost six months to the
day from the first surprise landing
by our marines early in August. That
initial foothold was precarious and
was held with difficulty. Our local
control of the air and surrounding
waters was far from complete, so the
Japanese were able to reinforce their
garrison on the island. Time after
time the enemy made determined
efforts to drive us out. Total Japa-
nese losses for the six-month period
of struggle in the Southern Solomons
are estimated to be 10000 to $4,000
soldiers and sailors, nearly LOO
planes and nearly 100 warships,
transports and supply craft. That is
a big bill to pay for an unsuccessful
undertaking. 1t is, however, partly
Offset by considerable losses suffered
on our side, and also by the time
given the Japanese high command to
fortify the rest of the archipelago
How effective those preparations
have been can be determined only
when attempts to reduce them are
made by us.
Japan's deliberate evacuation Of
Guadalcanal is the best proof that
we hold the initiative in the Solo
mons, just as its defensive attitude in
New Guinea implies the same thing
there. The proverbial tenacity of
the japanese in defending positions
to the uttermost would seem to indi-
cate that their high command did
not mediate more than a holding
strategy in the South Pacific, at least
for the immediate future. What this
may imply for the overall picture is
problematical For many months,
Japan has launched no major Often
sive anywhere, though her armies
are virtually intact. Perhaps heavy
losses in shipping and planes are the
deterrents to large-scale offensive
military operations. Possibly Japan
has reached the limits of its planned
detectives and will devote itself
henceforth to consolidating it's gains.
Whatever the explanation, certain it
Is that japanese striking power Is
today nowhere in evidence More
than that cannot be said profitably
| at this time.