Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-24
Allied Strategy Seen Based
on Quick Seizure of Tunisia
Full Control of Mediterranean Needed to Establish
Naval and Air Bases for Offensive
in Southern Europe
By Constantine Breton.

Tunisia today bids to become the key
to the strategy of the Allies in Europe.
AT the time this is written momentous
discussions are taking place among the
Allied commanders regarding 1943 mill
tary activities.
Whatever decisions may be taken will
not be known generally until our forces
begin to strike at the enemy. But it is
fair to assume that Allied strategy this
year will deal principally with the Ger
mans and their European associates. AS
in the past holding" tactic will be
adopted in regard to the japanese, whom
we consider less dangerous and more
reducihle than the Germans.
The Russian victories are of major i'm
portance, though the Soviets' claim of
vast enemy casualties is discounted A
few months ago military experts in
Washington and London expected the
Russians to prevent the Nazis from
reaching rich oil sources of the Caucasus.
Strategy Reconsidered.
Now the Red armies are pushing the
enemy back on the central and Caucasus
fronts. This unexpected and admirable
success calls for reconsideration of our
strategy.
President Roosevelt and Prime Min
lister Churchill, who have the final word
on military operations, are said to be-
lieve that major offensive in Europe
must be attempted this year. President
Roosevelt's speech to Congress the first
week of the new year left no doubt as to
our intentions.
The Russians insist the Allies open an
offensive in Europe. They point out
that last summer an offensive might
have been considered useless because at
that time the Soviet armies were re-
treating. Now, however, they are ed
vancing and drive by the Allies would
bring squeeze play" against the Axis.
Some qualified experts in Washington
still believe that the difficulties of a cam
paign in Europe are so great that the
fight against Hitler will be longer than
many people believe Meantime, the Jap
anese may put themselves in an impreg-
nable position. Losses in European
campaign might be such that our part
ners would wish to negotiate peace with
Toxic. A peace of this kind might give
security to our Allies. but for us would
mean the maintenance of burdensome
military establishment for many years.
Majority Decides.
The voice of these experts cannot be
heard, however Political as we'll as
military considerations, together with
the well-known democratic principle
that the decisions of the majority are
final, makes it impossible for us to adopt
a strategy which the minority feels is
best fitted for the interests of the United
States. "
There are two areas inwhich an attack
on the Germans could be launched-the
seacoast of Western Europe cat some
point from Norway to the Spanish bor-
DER and the northern shores of the
Mediterranean Sea.
The former might bring us closer to
the heart of the Reich and enable us
to threaten the very borders of Germany
itself
1t appears that the Russian military
experts believe that our move should be
taken in Western Europe. The Russians,
with population of 1900O0,O00, have
never worried about losses They be-
lieve that a total war requires total sac
rifices. Moreover, they do not have to
embark on amphibious operations