Evening star., 1943-12-06
Jap Marine Expansion
Miqht Follow Defeat
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

draw an analogy between the condi-
tions of the 18th century and those of
today, yet there are times when the
lessons of history may be applied with
little regard to the details of life at
varying periods. An instance in point
is comparison between the CONT
mental policy of the Japanese Empire
on the mainland of Asia and the policy
of the Plantagenet kings of England
during the period of the Hundred Years
War, when the objective of those mon
archs was to make good their rather
shadowy title to the Crown of France,
just as the Japanese policy of today is
to make good Japanese dominance over
China.
In both cases an insular power, whose
natural tendencies were toward the sea
and maritime expansion, has under
taken to use its command of the seas
to land its armies on the adjacent con-
tinent and there undertake the con-
quest of a great land area, with con-
stantly expanding frontiers. The Japa-
nese have indeed gone farther; they
have sought both continental and mari
time expansion at the same time.
The history of the British people will
inform us that it was only when the
ruinous French policy was finally
abandoned, and when Britain ceased to
drain away her resources in conti-
mental wars and turned to that realm
of maritime and colonial expansion
which geography had designed for her,
that Britain began to be truly great.
The world influence OF Britain dates,
not from the empty and transitory vic
tories of Edward III and Henry v, but
from the overseas adventures Of Drake
and Frobisher and Hawkins in the
reign of Elizabeth, who was the first
among British monarchs to abandon all
pretentions to continental power. The
close Of the 18th century found Eng
land third-rate power, almost without
influence in the councils of Europe and
barely beginning to recover from the
devastating effects of civil war The
end Of the 10th century found British
ships trading and fighting in far dis
tant seas, British prestige higher than it
had ever been, and the foundations of
British sea power firmly secured by the
defeat Of the greatest sea armament
which the first European power Of the
day-Spain-could assemble. From that
time onward, British progress toward
the world-girdling empire OF today was
steady and almost unbroken.
Today We are seeing the japanese
suffering from the results OF overstrain
and misdirection of their military re-
sources, just as Britain was suffering at
the close of the 18th century. They
have bitten off more than they can
chew, more indeed than the resources
of any single state could be expected to
masticate successfully. They have not
only committed themselves, being in
sular, to the folly of continental ex-
pansion, they have gone farther and
tried to do what no nation has sue
cessfully achieved since the fall of the
Roman Empire: They have tried to be
powerful and indeed dominant by sea
and by land at one and the same time.
This is something which history warns
us cannot be done, not unless the ma
ton which attempts it is so strong that
it can overcome all opposition and be-
come master of the world within a
comparatively short time The strain,
both external and intepal, is too great
to be borne for long.
Therefore, the japanese in this war
are inevitably doomed to defeat Their
very scheme of conquest contains with
in itself the seeds of its own destruc-
ton. But afterward?
The conference at Cairo has told us
what comes Immediately afterward.
Japan is to suffer the fate which Brit
ain suffered in the 18th century
She is to be thrown back into her
original islands, deprived of all her dis
tant conquests, confined to her home
territory. She becomes, therefore, once
more an insular and maritime state;
she ceases to be continental state. But
this means that Japan returns to her
normal conditions OF power and life. 1t
means that she is relieved OF an intol-
cradle burden Of continental dominion.
1t means that the Japanese will turn,
If they are not prevented from doing
so, to the same course which the British
followed to greatness from the acces-
sion of Elizabeth onward to this day
when the sun never sets upon the Brit
ish flag. 1t means that japanese en-
course from which they should never
from the point of view of true Japa-
nese INTEREST," have been diverted: The
course of maritime, commercial, and
inevitably in the end, colonial expansion.
There is warning in all this which
we of the United Nations cannot afford
to disregard. Some greater degree of
restraint must, for the present, be placed
on the japanese people-a people who
will be thirsting for revenge and seeth-
ing with injured pride-than the mere
deprivation OF areas of conquest which
for the most part must be in the long
run source of weakness to them and
not OF strength. They must, of course,
be driven out of the territory of other
peoples; but they must likewise be pre-
vented from capitalizing on the new
situation by entering upon a career of
maritime expansion. y The decisions
taken at Cairo are good as far as they
go; but it would be dangerous indeed
II we allow ourselves to imagine that
they will be enough in themselves to
abate the menace of Japan.
Copyright, 1943. New York Tribune, Inc)
pnt+orn Ronh;no