Evening star., 1943-09-20
Real Gains Seen
In ItuIy's S Fall
Bv Mai. Georoe FIELDING Eliot.

able that the Allies would derive wide
spread advantages from having knocked
out of the war one of the major enemy
powers, one of the two chief partners
in the Rome Berlin Axis. Just what
these advantages would be has been the
subject of much speculation. Now the
dust of the Italian collapse is beginning
to settle. and We are seeing little more
clearly, though we do not see everything
as yet.
Definitely in the bag, today, we have:
% The italian fleet, removing the last
naval danger (other than from subma-
rines) in the Mediterranean. and per-
mitting strong reinforcement of Allied
naval forces in Far Eastern waters
(2) Sardinia taken over by its Italian
garrison, which advances our air and
sea power toward the north part> of
Italy's Mediterranean coast, and which
exposes Corsica-and thus eventually the
south coast of France-to direct attack.
90 A secure foothold in Southern
Italy, stretching across from Salerno on
the Tyrrhenian Sea to Bari on the
Adriatic, with good seaports in our DOS
session, and with command of the Strait
of Otrante, the entrance to the Adriatic
Sea.
There are reports of other occurrences
not definitely confirmed, not yet Ger
tain by any means, but suggestive of the
possibilities of the immediate future:
Cd The reported occupation by Allied
forces of the Aegean Islands of Cos,
Samos and Leros. 1t is quite possible
that these islands may-like Sardinia
have been taken over by their Italian
garrisons and are being held for Mar
shall Badoglio, which means, in effect, for
the Allies. While it does not seem likely
that any large Allied expedition could
have reached them-because to do so it
would be necessary to get by Rhodes
and Scarpanti, still in German hands as
far as is known-it is quite possible that
Allied parachutists, Or small sea-borne
forces, carried by destroyers or torpedo
boats, may have arrived
The situation on Rhodes itself is un-
certain; the Germans certainly hold
the main air1eld, because it has just
been bombed by our Middle East flyers,
but there are reports that Italian troops
are in arms against the Germans in the
interior of the big island.
(2) The reported occupation by Yugo-
slav Partisan troops of the ports of Split,
Semi and Susak, On the upper Dalma-
ton coast. This, If true, would seem to
open a gateway into the interior OF
YugoSlavia for the passage of Allied
arms and ammunitions sent across the
sea from Italy. However, two points are
to be kept in mind; first, that the forces
reported in Split, etc. are those of the
Partisan leader, "Tito,' not those of the
recognized Yugoslav government under
Gen. Draja Mihailovich, and until the
exact relationship between these two
Yugoslav forces is cleared up, we can
Tot be certain how to act; second, that
there is no certainty that any Patriot
forces in Yugoslavia can long maintain
hold on seaport cities against German
attack, since the very essence of the Pa
triot success has been to strike and run,
never giving the Germans chance to
superior weapons. But the very need for
German action is diversion of German
striking power from other points, and
there are clear indications that the in
creased German difficulties in Yugo-
slavia are largely due to Italian forces
joining the Patriots, and handing over
to them stores of weapons and NUM-
tions.
6 The political repercussions in Hun
gary and Bulgaria, which we see less
clearly at present, but which seem to
be taking turn in both cases unfavor-
able to the Germans. It would be use
less at this time to try to foresee in de-
tail what may happen in those coun-
tries, but the trend is plainly perceptible.
Obviously, the concrete product of all
these and other disturbances of the Axis
position set In motion by the surrender
of Italy, may be long in taking form,
and it may be some time before we
shall see the whole of what we have
gained. just as obviously, it would in
most cases be very good thing If the
Allied high command were in position
to rush with military force to these va
rious areas and take immediate adj
vantage of the confusion and uncer-
tainty, backing up those who are or may
become favorably disposed to the Allied
cause, dealing drastically with the REM
nants of pro-German elements. Impa-
tient voices will be raised here and in
Britain, crying to the four winds of lost
opportunities and accusing our high
command and the governments behind
it of everything from sympathy with
Fascist" regimes to cowardice and
sloth.
But the fact remains that we have in
the Mediterranean only SO much fighting
power, and so much shipping. We must
devote that fighting power and the
shipping, which is our means of trans
porting it, to those purposes of greatest
military advantage at the moment. We
must concentrate on these purposes, to
the exclusion of all others. To dissi-
pate our strength over large number
of objectives would be to assure failure
everywhere. And let us again remember,
as Gen. Eisenhower has recently re-
minded us, that our main objective is
not the taking of an island here and
town there, but the destruction of the
enemy's fighting forces.
(Copyright. 1943, New York Tribune, Inc)
Time for d Question
Prom tho Wippinee prass