Evening star., 1943-04-13
Patton Lost Chance
To Crush Afriku Korps
Major Eliot Explains How
Tunisiun Events Were Ruled
By British 9th Army Power
By Mai. George Fielding Eliot.


By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
The fall of Sousse and Kairouan def
nitely brings to close the hard-fought
campaign in Southern and Central
Tunisia. This campaign was decided by
the veteran British 9th Army, COM
manded by Gen. Sir Bernard L. Mont
gomery. The entry of this force into
the Tunisian theater of war exercised
from the very first controlling influence
on the course of events.
It's accomplishments were not, Of
course, Immediately spectacular. 1t had,
first of all, to mop up the desert out
posts, to establish a satisfactory base
for seaborne supplies at Iripol, to bring
up to its advance positions thousands
of tons Of supplies, ammunition and
engineer material-in a word, to carry
out all the long, weary tasks Of prepara-
ton which must precede an attack in
force on a fortified position During
this period Marshal Rommel enjoyed a
certain amount of freedom of action
within T>unisia and used it in vigorous
attempts to push back the American
forces threatening his flank and to Sc
cure his flank guards in positions corp-
manding the exits from the mountain
Gus zone of Central Tunisia into the
coastal plain through which ran his
lines OF supply and Of retreat.
Then the Sth Army's blow fell with
irresistible force upon the Mareth posi-
tions. Checked in his first attempt at
penetration, Gen. Montgomery showed
qualities Of battle leadership no less
distinguished than his qualities as
strategist or an organizer of supply.
Shifting the weight of his attack to his
left where f1anking column had already
penetrated deeply into the German rear
areas, he drove the Germans out of the
Mareth positions in almost exactly the
same length OF time that it had taken
him to drive them out of their lines at
Ell Alamein in Egypt. 1t is at this point
that Marshal Rommel appears to have
begun his retreat northward to effect
junction with Col. Gen. Won Arnim,
under cover OF the flank guards which
still held the Americans in check in
the Fondouk, Maknassy and Ell Guettar
areas, and strong rear guard which
made stout fight on the Wadi Akarit
position 20 miles north of Gabes.
Gen. Montgomerys operations between
Mareth and Wadi Akarit were d4stin-
guished by the furious energy which we
have come to expect OF this remarkable
soldier. In an incredibly short time, he
made his preparations for attack brought
500 guns into position, and smashed
through the German defenses in single
day Of terrific fighting. When that was
done, he was ready instantly to exploit
his success. His armored and motorized
columns poured. across the Wadi Akarit
and out into the Tunisian coastal plain.
Careful preparation had paved the way
for successful assault, and assault was
now to be followed by relentless and
magnif1cently conducted pursuit.
Sfax, Kairouan, Sousse fell in rapid
succession. Great numbers of prisoners
were captured, mostly the wretched
Italians left behind by their disdainful
masters, but including an increasingly
large number Of Germans AS this is
written, there is still doubt whether
Rommel can halt and turn to fight or
whether he is about to be driven head
long into the sea.
Thus, the training. experience and
battle-worthiness of the 9th Army and
the high military qualities OF its COM
mander have done all that could be ex.
pected Of them. The accomplishments
OF the American troops on the flank OF
Rommel's retreat have hardly measured
up to this exacting standard Had the
Americans been able to break through
into the plain and cut off Rommels re-
treat in time, the destruction of the
whole of the Afrika Korps would have
been certain.
But they were, in fact, able only to
effect diversions; at no point did the
German flank guards find themselves
forced to give ground until they were
ready to do so. There were, Of course,
good reasons for this The American
officers and men are as yet inexperienced
IN war and were pitted against an enemy
OF the highest quality. Commanders of
American combat groups had learned
caution in dealing with Rommel's vet
erans after suffering severe casualties
by running into cunningly set tactical
traps. Moreover, it may be doubted
That Gen. Patton ever had at his dis
posal any very considerable forces,
though he was probably superior in num-
bers to the German flank guards ac-
tually opposed to him.
Inc result was that a great oppor-
tunity was lost and though it would be
unfair to ascribe the blame for this to
Gen. Patton or any of his subordinate
commanders without far more accurate
knowledge of the conditions which ac-
tually confronted them, and though
we must give credit for diverting German
armor from the main battle, it is no
use disgusting the tact that the result
mas on the whole been disappointing.
However, we shall do well to remem-
Der that our young soldiers have shown
themselves possessed of the traditional
courage and fortitude which American
troops have ever displayed on the battle
held, that they are lacking only in ex-
perlence, and that the 9th Army itself
has In times gone by-when its officers
and men were likewise lacking in expert
ence-been roughly handled by better
trained opponents. The American Armv
has its lessons still to learn in the