The Western news. [volume] (Libby, Mont.) 1933-current, 1943-07-01
American
Submarines
BY Frank Gerpasi
(WNU Feature-Through special arrangement
with Golfers Weekly

Dozens of American submarine
commanders have made records in
the Pacific. Their roster grows ev-
cry day. There are proportionately
more Navy Crosses in the subma-
rine service than in any other
branch of the navy, and for this
there are many reasons.
The submarine is an American
weapon, invented and now perfected
by Americans. Our men understand
what the submarine can do. and
they employ it as what it is-an Of
fensive weapon of irresistible hitting
power.
Most important of all, however, is
that fact that German U-men are
ordered or sent into action in
ships lacking even elementary COM
forts and unequipped with any safe
ty devices.
Our men go" They love the
submarines, and spend as much
time telling you how safe they
are-"safest ships afioat"--as
fiicrs will say In describing the
good qualities OF our planes.
Submariners and fiiers are the
most wcapon-proud men I've
met in this war.
There is evidence of the subma-
riners' contention concerning the
safety of our submarines. Since the
war began, the navy has reported
the loss of only six undersea boats,
including the Argonaut.
Submariners Quiet About Exploits.
Concerning their exploits, how
ever, submariners are invariably
mum, and no matter how we'll you
might be prepared to contend with a
submariner economy of words. his
reticence will still surprise you.
A quiet Very Well' is the accus-
toned acknowledgment of all orders,
disasters, communications and mis-
sions aboard ship. A torpedoman
might come to the control room with
news that the aft and the forward
torpedo room is flooded and he
would probably obtain from the skip
per nothing more than a Very
we'll. -
This reticence, however, as adj
mirable as the submariners' cour-
age and ingenuity and calm efficien-
cy, has contributed to the neglect
which was the lot of the service
until war came. Hidebound naval
traditionalists with limited magma
ton couldn't see the submarine as
anything more than an adjunct of
the battleships and cruisers. To
the horse-and-buggy naval strate-
gists of yesterday, the submarine
represented merely scouting and
observation auxiliary weapon which
might, with luck, sometime surprise
and sink an enemy ship.
Our Sub Force December I, I94I.
And on December Z, 194l, we had,
for major sea power, a third
string submarine force. Theoreti-
cally we had lib submarines, with
Is building and % more scheduled
to be constructed. Actually, how
ever, there were substantially less
than 100 submarines in service.
Thirty-five subs were Of the S-type
which were found to be unsatisfac-
tory and had been withdrawn for re-
fitting.
Out of the total of submarines
available for duty, roughly only one
third could be spared for action
against the Japanese.
With our declaration of war on
Japan, the picture changed rapidly,
although not fast enough to suit our
submariners. In May, 1912, an addi-
tional appropriation was made by
congress for the construction of 200,-
900 tons of submarines which are
now coming off the ways in yards
on both coasts at a rate surprising
to the 1ayman but still unsatisfac-
tory to submarine commanders.
u. 5. Subs Sink 81 Jap Ships.
Even the punishable figures APP
pear to support their point of view
Up to August of last year, American
submarines had sunk or damaged
81 of the 2l9 Japanese ships sunk by
all weapons This represented 3 or r
per cent of the total. Our subma-
rines accounted for n per cent Of
all enemy warships sunk, and for
so per cent of all noncombatant ship
ping sent to the bottom.
The submariners' record i'm
proved as more boats entered
service. The navy department
has credited our submarines
with having sunk approximately
$50 Japanese vessels of all cate
gOries.
Written down beside the total num-
Der of United Nations ships sunk by
German U-boats, the admitted 1870
sunk or crippled by our own subs in
the Pacific might not seem so star
thing. But every Jap ship sent to
the bottom represents proportion
ately higher loss than. the equiva-
lent in American or British tonnage.
The reason is simple The Japs
send supplies to their overseas
troops only when absolutely neces-
sary. The Jap soldiers fight on less
food, medicines and other nonmiii-
tary supplies than their American or