Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-07-13
Allied Campaign
In Sicily Succeeding
BIZ Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

BY MAJ. George Ftetdtng EttOt.
The Sicilian operation continues to
60 well.
We are now in possession Of one major
seaport, Syracuse, and one fair second
rate seaport, Licata. Between the two
we have several points where ships can
anchor close to shore, and landings can
he made. Syracuse is large natural
harbor, which can accommodate good
many ships at one time. It's controlling
depth is 20 feet, which means that very
large ships cannot enter, but the 'ordi-
nary medium sized tramp steamer can
come in. There is good wharfage, and
some cargo-handling neutrality-suspicious.
the enemy hardly will have left the
latter in workable condition. Licata is
an artificial port, with two moles and
breakwater; it's sheltered area is not
large, 1t has only single wharf, and its
controlling depth is Is feet. Still, it is
useful place. Celia, Scoglitti and Poz-
zallo are open anchorages.
Our next care, naturally, would be to
our two main forces: One in the area
Licata-Gela, one in the area Syracuse
Pozzallo. The road connecting the latter
two places appears to be wholly in our
hands, thus giving us full possession of
the extreme southeast corner of Sicily
1.-THE road curves across this corner.
Next we shall probably seek to control
the main highway from Ispica ION
the Syracuse Pozzallo road westward
through Ragusa (where fighting is re-
ported to Vittoria, Celia, Licata.
Meanwhile, the British under Mont
gomery are pushing north from SYRIA
cuse. One objective is probably Porto
Augusta, about 20 miles away by road
and Is by sea. This is the best harbor
any size. Another objective may be
Catania, the second city Of Sicily, which
is about 48 miles from Syracuse by road
But as Montgomery moves north past
Augusta, he debouches into the Great
Plain of Catania, where the terrain is
ideal for the swift maneuvering of
armored troops and also for the estab-
lishment of airfields. The valleys Of the
Caltagirone and Teripio Rivers extend
southwestward from the southwest cor
ner OF this almost square plain, toward
Celia on the south coast which lies at
the mouth OF the Celia River. The divide
between the headwaters of these rivers
is not high-at Caltagirone it is only 608
meters aboves sea level.
Therefore II our forces can push
northeast from Celia, they can link up
with other forces in the plain of Catania
somewhere in the vicinity of Caltagirone
We would then have about one-sixth Of
Sicily in our possession, with plenty Of
room on which to maneuver: We would
have supporting airfields, good seaports.
and we would be in position to cut of
the main Axis supply lines across the
Strait of Messina by air The Axis
troops in the island would have to try
very hard to drive us back to the sea,
or they would have to divide their forces
toward Messina and toward Palermo,
respectively, and make a separate de-
tense of Northeastern and of Western
Sicily, with reasonable assurance that
those in the west would never leave the
island
All this is what the map suggests as
our possible strategy on Sicily. 1t is
based on the assumption that the
enemy's defense Is stiffening, and that
we cannot hope to carry major objec-
tives in anything like blitzkrieg style.
This assumption may prove over -pessi-
mistic. Our tremendous air superiority,
and the favorable inclination of the pop
ulation, may be two factors which will
help us enormously. We may 60 ahead
much faster than now seems probable.
But. on the whole, the chances seem to
be that We shall push on to the line
Catania -Caltagirone-Gelaa and from that
line develop an offensive designed to cut
Sicily in two and separate Messina from
Palermo and the west. Of course, a new
landing in Western Sicily is by no means
ruled out, and may come at any time.
Incidentally, it is to be noted that the
enemy was apparently of the opinion
that we were going to land in the west
and perhaps make our main effort there.
This is indicated by his destruction of
the piers at Trapani a week before our
actual landings took place. and by the
weak initial resistance which we encoun-
tered in the southeast. 1t looks as if the
enemy had made the same mistake he
made in Tunisia when Col Gen. Won
Arnim was SO firmly convinced that his
chief danger was from the British 9th
Army on. the south and made all his
dispositions accordingly-only to be at
tackled from the west. Even after we
had landed on the south coast, the
Algiers radio was announcing that we
were landing at the western tip of
Sicily"-and the enemy did not find out
where our main effort was coming until
too late. Once more. therefore, the mill
tary idiots" of the Free Nations of the
world have demonstrated that the free
thinking mind is likely to develop some
pretty bright ideas in war as well as in
peace. The team of Eisenhower and
Alexander is making a very fair bid to
become as famous in this war as the
team of Foch and Weygand in the last,
or the team of Lee and jackson In the
Civil War.
(Copyricht 1Q43 New york Tribune Incl