Evening star., 1943-10-05
Jap Drive in China
Aims at Air Bases
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

~S 'AoJ' ~0Scf SS tStutHS GttOL.
The Japanese offensive in East Cen
trail China appears to be an operation
in considerable strength and it is gaining
ground.
1t has been launched from an area
where the japanese are we'll established
the triangle Marking -Shanghai-Hang-
chow, just south of the lower course of
the Yangtze River. Its general direction
OF advance is southwestWard, along the
line Wuhu- -HangchoW. It's objective
probably Is to recover possession of the
general area between Hangchow and
Nanchang and re-establish japanese
control in the province of Chekiang. The
reason the Japanese are interested in
doing this is because it is at this point
that it would be most feasible to estab-
liSh United Nations air bases for
bombing offensive against Japan should
the Burma road be reopened or should
the capacity of the present air trans
port system from India to China be so
Increased as to permit the servicing of
strong forces of 1ong-range aircraft in
China.
Cheklang Is the one good location
available for such bombing bases. 1t is
nearer to Japans vital centers than anv
other region of China south of the
Yangtze River No such bases could be
established on Chinese TERRITORY north
OF the Yangtze, because the japanese
hold Hankow and Marking. through
which pass all the practicable routes Of
communication from South China to
North CHINA. Indeed, the reason that
no such bases are now in operation is
just because of communications diff
culties
But once the Burma road is open
and presumlng that its reopening is
pafalleled by the development Of the air
transport system (Which could operate
much more efficiently from Burmese
fields than from those 1t is now using
IN Eastern India, a steady flow of
oomoS, Iuel lubricants and other SUD-
pies might begin TO arrive at Chinese
rallheadS, such as kweiln and Sinhwa
FROM these points into Chekiang there
Is unbroken rail connection, save for
the Japanese-held city of Nanchang
which cuts the railway between Chang
Sha and points in Chekiang Province
about midway. This place could be bv-
passed by a short road detour or it
could be recovered by concentrated At
tack when the time came TO do so
Nanchang has for a long time been
a more or less isolated japanese out
post. 1t lies at the end of a branch rail-
way leading down from the Yanetze
River port Of Klukiang. The Japanese
line OF communications to Nanchang is
by way of the river and this branch rail-
way. The Chinese hold the through rail-
way 'Changsha Nanchang Hangchow)
except lot smal! piece east and west
OF Nanchang, and another small piece
southwest OF Hangchow. The Japanese
recovered the HangChow- -Nanchang part
OF this line last year but could not hold
II. This is the part which passes through
the province of Chekiang and would
service the airtields which would be nee
eSSary to bomb Japan.
1t would seem that what the Jauanese
are now doing in China is an attempr,
10 1oreStaIl the coming campaign in
southeast Asia by depriving the Allies
OF one OF the most useful fruits of that
venture. If the Japanese can recover
control OF Cheklang, they can prevent
the bombing Of Japan for the time be-
ing at any rate, and they can conso,i-
date their position in this area by end.
ing the strategic isolation of their con-
troll point at Nanchang.
II so doing they are using the one ele
ment OF hghtlng strength of which they
StlII possess surplus, land forces. The
ChlneSe cannot hope TO oppose them
with anything like equal numbers of
thoroughly equipped divisions, though
as lar as manpoWer goes the Chinese
nave superiority. The allies of China
cannot yet send their troops to reinforce
emma. But what can be done. at least
70 some extent, is to give the Chinese
ar relnforcements by building up as
rapidly as possible the 14th Army Air
Force under Gen. Chennault This is the
one type OF help which will be most use
tuI to the Chinese in proportion to The
capacity of the transport lines available
to send it to them.
If the japanese are compelled to put
heavy air elements into the fighting in
Cheklang, they must do so bv rohbing
other fronts. since they do not have
enough air power to go around. Even
overwhelming superiority in numbers
has not helped the japanese velv much
Oh late III the air, however. and it NAV
we'll turn out that they will be unable
to succeed in their new Chinese often
slVe because they cannot give their
troops adequate air support or that. hav-
ing advanced somewhat, they will be
unable to retain their gains. That they
are moving at all in China at time
When the demands of other fronts are
growing SO imperative is significant of
their anxiety about possible bombing of
thelr nome centerS. If they should fail
IN their present purposes the reaction
on their morale, both official and popu-
lar, might have interesting results.
(Copyrieht, 1943, New York Tribune Incl
Fieonho Hon,oe u,