Evening star., 1943-11-26
Berlin as Air Portent

Berlin as Air fortent
Besides the immense material de-
struction and the blow to popular
morale inflicted by the current mass
raids on Berlin, weighty technical
factors are involved. The German
capital is about 600 miles from the
nearest British airfields. and this
has hitherto been about the limit for
heavy bombers flying by night with
out fighter escort to do their work
with maximum efficiency and with
out too great losses. This accounts
for the fact that, although Berlin had
previously been bombed nearly 80
times and a grand total of over 1000
tons of explosive and incendiary
bombs had been dumped on it, the
damage done had been intermittent
and sporadic. The sprawling German
metropolis with its belt of industrial
suburbs covers an extensive area
interspersed by many parks, lakes
and woodland. Night bombing neces-
sarily has to be of the "saturation"
rather than the precision" type.
This takes a tremendous lot Of explo-
sives to inflict generalized destruction
like that meted out last summer to
Hamburg. which was much closer to
Britain's airbases and therefore an
easier task. To this Berlin has owed
it's relative immunity from mass
raids.
The terrible visitations of the past
week, however, tend to prove that
Berlin can be Granddaughter" One of
the most interesting aspects techni-
cally was the success of the first
great raid when Berlin was COM
pletely shrouded by a cloud-belt.
This made impossible direct observa-
ton, but the difficulty was overcome
by pathfinder" planes flying well
ahead of the bombers and dropping
flares which glowed through the
cloud-blanket and thus disclosed the
target area. Indeed, those very
clouds aided the attackers, because
they in turn were screened from
observation from the ground. Anti
aircraft fire had to be shot blindly,
except for radar direction, and Ger
man night fighters were confused.
The upshot was the very moderate
loss Of 26 bombers on the first raid.
In the second mass raid, though the
weather was better, only 20 bombers
were lost, which can only mean that
the protective system had been con-
siderably disorganized. The ratio
was nearly 30 tons of bombs dropped
per plane lost-a highly satisfactory
situation as compared with last sum-
mer, when the average was only
30-40 tons per lost plane. There
seems little doubt that Berlin can be
put out OF commission by persistent
bombing without paying an exorbi-
tant price.
The question still unanswered Is
whether the effective bombing radius
can be extended to cover Eastern
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria,
Poland and other parts of Hitler's
Fortress Europe where German
heavy industry has been increasingly
shifted so as to function beyond
obliterating raids. Until this is done,
the German war machine and the
civilian population will continue to
get enough vital products to keep
going, and speedy collapse from
sheer lack Of them will not take
place.
Air warfare is the most uncertain
and least stabilized side Of the pres
ent conflict. This is natural, because,
for all its extraordinarily rapid de-
velopment, aeronautics is still in its
early stages, while new antiaircraft
devices are continually being in
vented and perfected. The wavering
balance between aerial offense and
defense parallels the traditional
balance between the projectile and
armor which has been going on since
the dawn of history. Last summer,
for instance, 1t began to look as
though the Germans had found an
effective answer to Allied air attacks.
Indeed, limitations on daylight air
raids have tacitly been acknowledged
ever since the expensive Schweinfurt
raid by our Flying Fortresses last
August. The attempt to obliterate
Berlin is at once a demonstration
and an experiment by the Allies. It
likewise puts the inventive genius Of
the Germans on it's mettle. What
the net result will be, only time and
events can disclose.