Evening star., 1943-05-16
EIGHT PAGES.

the Afrika Korps and at least equal in
fighting enthusiasm and stamina to their
British and French comrades in arms.
The combined American, British and
French high command showed itself as
q smoothly working machine. There
were no bitches or personal jealousies
as sometimes occur when generals of
three nations are given the responsibility
OF planning and working out a campaign.
However, Tunisia was a curtain-raiser
The main show is yet to come. The
question Where do we go from here?"
Is frequently heard in Washington Not
that the Allied high command has no
plans; it has quite a few. The question
revolves around which of these plans
Is to be put into effect
Will we adopt the point of view of our
British associates and take the longer
and safer way through the Mediter-
ranean, the Near East, Bulgaria and Ru-
mania, or will we adopt the hard way
frontal attack against the European
fortress from across the English Chan
mel
The former view is popular with the
British government. 1t has many ad-
vantages and some disadvantages, par
ticularly for the United States, which
has to think seriously about the
Paciflc, our own second front The
frontal attack also has it's good and bad
points. Our British allies in particular
are loath to have their manpower too
badly damaged.
Both strategies are under close
scrutiny and before the month is over
the question of the Allies next move
will be answered.
Favor War of Attrition.
The preponderant idea of the British
general staff is war of attrition against
the Reich. The British are right, from
their own point of view, when they say
that time is in our favor. They are
equally correct when they maintain that
frontal attack against Europe between
Narvick and the Pyrenees would be a
CHASTITY expensive affair
Hence, they have maintained since last
year, when they tested the Nazi fortifca-
tlons In the Dieppe raid, that slow
moving operation against Germany
through the back door was the best
answer to our~strategy.
The islands in the Mediterranean now
IN the hands of the Axis can be reduced
without severe loss of manpower. Naval
and air supremacy, which made our lob
In Tunisia so much easier, can plav an
even more important role in the war
in the Mediterranean
The Central Mediterranean is guarded
by three strongholds. Sardinia. PAN
telleria and Sicily. The Allied air arm
already is pounding heavily on these
outposts of the "Festung Europe" The
islands are held by italian garrisons with
q sprinkling of Nazis. A thorough soft
ening OF these strongholds bv the Air
Force coupled with an intensive block
ade would soften the islands sufficiently
to make their occupation a relatively
easy matter. In this every one is agreed.
Then Crete and the Dodecanese
Islands must come under the fire of the
Allied "softening apparatus from bases
IN and near Egypt. And once the Medi-
terranean has been cleared regardless
OF whether Italy is out of the war or not.
the road to the Germans backdoor will
be open.
1t is pointed out in this respect that
the Allied forces in Syria, Palestine and
lraq have been considerably strength
ened while the lease-lend shipments to
1urkey-which still are relatively SLOW
already have increased the fighting
ability of the Turkish army.
Progress May Be Slower.
When the Mediterranean is an omen
Sea again In the hands of the United
Nations large consignments OF war ma
terial and supplies OF all kinds will be
shipped into Asia Minor with mini
mum OF risk. The Allies then can enter
the Balkans either through European
Turkey or through Greece and Yugo-
slavia at their pleasure.
The Notifications now being built bv
the Nazls IN that area will, of course
De hlndrance to facile conquest of
the Balkans, but they present nowhere
near as difficult task as the conquest
OF France or the Lowlands or Norway.
There Is no question that this strategic
tneofy OF our British Allies is safe and
the losses suffered by the invading
armies will be much smaller than If a
frontal attack is made But the time
element Is overlooked. Even If things
went on schedule as in Tunisia, it is not
conceivable that we will be able to clear
the Mediterranean before the end of
1s43.
AND this Is an optimistic point of view.
FROM now on all Allied operations must
be amphibious and even if the Germans.
40 not put up much more of fight than
tney did IN Tunisia, they will require a
good deal Of time,
germany has suffered severe setback
IN Africa, but no military man In Wash
hgton describes the defeat as a decisive
one. Germany still has at least 300 first.
ilne divisions and q production capacitv
OF between $500 and 1900 planes a
month. Continuous und-the-clock
oomoardments of the Reich and Nad-
occupied territories might reduce the
Nasi production by 20 per cent, but this
u not enough to shave the Nazis to the
verge OF military collapse, competent
observers say.
the Russians have fought with I'M
believable heroism and ability since June
1s41. The most important Soviet indus
trial centers are now in enemy hands
1t Is true that a secondary industry is
organized behind the Volga and that
shipments OF war material from the
United States and Great Britain are
rapidly filling the gaps caused by last