Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-09-11
|ANC0AIlS SIOkY
of the
Army and the War
CHAPTER Nv.
Battle for the Philippines-MacArthu
Ordered to Australia-Fall of
Corregidor-Bombing of Toxic.

Note: The Star is printing, in
daily installments, Chief OF Staff
George c. Marshalls report to
the Secretary OF War on the pc
Rod July /, 1941-June 80, 1913,
Just made public. 1T is a record"
Gen. Marshall 1Drites, "of ,Dhdt
tDds done and iDlly it ,cas done
and is submitted While America is
at ,Dar to permit better UNDER
standing OF the great offensive
operations notD in progress
The left wing of the southwark
advance of the Japanese was con-
centrated on the reduction of the
Philippines. Our strength in the
Islands at that time consisted of
$4,000 United States troops, 10000
Philippine Scouts and approximate
" 100000 men of the newly mob
ilized and but partially trained and
equipped Philippine Army. Includ-
ed in these forces were some 5000
Army Air Forces personnel equipped
with some $50 aircraft, of which IS
were Flying Fortresses and lot were
P-40 fighters.
The enemy led off with systematic
bombing of airields and key points
in Luzon. which resulted in the de-
struction of a large number of our
planes due to limited dispersal
fields and lack of sufficient radar
warning equipment, antiaircraft
guns and other materiel
On December 10 and %, japanese
landings were made in Northwestern
LUTON. Outnumbered and incom-
pletely equipped, lacking air support
and utilizing troops but recently
modified and organized for the
first time into regimental groups,
Gen. Macarthur was left no alterna-
tive but that of delaying action.
His action was further complicated
by another Japanese landing, in
force, on the eastern coast of Luzon
withdrawal to Bataan.
Under great difficulties an orderly
withdrawal was effected into the
Bataan Peninsula for a final de-
fensive stand, protected and sup
ported by the fortress of Corregidor.
The remaining bombing planes were
sent to Mindanao Qater to Aus
tralia) with the mission of secur-
ing bases from which to support
the operations on Bataan. The en-
envy rapidly concentrated his forces
ashore and launched heavy attacks
against the Bataan garrison, which
heroically contested every foot of
ground.
BY the end of January, Japanese
troops had seized the important oil
center of Tarakan on the northeast
coast of Borneo, captured Rabaul
and Kavieng in the Bismarck Archi-
pelago and Kieta on Bougainville
Island in the Solomons, were rapidly
approaching Singapore (Which fell
February Is, 1912, from the north,
and controlled the sea and air routes
to the Philippines. They stood
along 4000-mile frontier of the
Dutch East Indies and the Melane-
sian Barrier with their forces in po-
sition to threaten the remaining
Dutch possessions, Australia and the
islands to its north and east.
Running the Blockade.
The difficulties of the supply sit
uation on Bataan, under the Japa-
nese blockade, were greatly aggra-
waited by the fact that thousands of
civilians accompanied the Army into
Bataan Peninsula. The number of
people to be supplied forced reduc-
ton OF the entire command to half
rations. Efforts were Immediately
initiated to organize blockade run
ming from the Netherlands East In
dies and Australia and to carry
medicines, special fuses, and other
critical munitions by submarine.
The blockade running, financed
from the funds placed at the dis
posal of the Chief of Staff by Con-
gress, involved many difficulties;
for example, it was found that the
small ship owners and crew mem
bers approached in Java, Timor, and
New Guinea would not accept checks
on our Federal funds deposited in
Melbourne, but demanded cash.
Therefore the actual money had to
be flown across Africa and India by
plane for delivery in Java. A COM
plete report of these perilous oper-
atoms has never been received. OF
seven ships dispatched from Aus
tralia only three arrived at Cebu.
Unable to Reach Corregidor.
Attempts to transShip these sup
plies from Cebu to Corregidor failed
because OF the rigid enemy blockade.
AT least Is Of these blockade runners.
totaling 10000 tons, were sunk or
captured by the enemy while at
tempting to get supplies through to
Bataan. Several average destroyers
were also fitted out as blockade
runners but none of these succeeded
In reaching the Philippines prior to
the fall of Corregidor. Deliveries of
supplies and the evacuation of GER
tain personnel by submarine con-
tinued at intervals throughout the
siege.
The difficulty of penetrating the
japanese blockade and getting sup
plies to Corregidor and Bataan
caused the military situation to de-
teriorate. The half rations issued
Since January IL, 1912, had been
further reduced by the end of March,
and horses and mules were being
slaughtered for food.
In view of the. enemy's capabili-
ties throughout the Pacific and our
untenable position in the Philip
pines, the major efforts of the United
States were directed toward a rapid
concentration of defense forces
along our route to Australia, the
creation of an effective striking
force on that continent and the dis
patch of material aid to the forces of
our Allies in the East Indies. Ac-
cordingly, Hawaii was strengthened,
additional islands along the South
Pacific air ferry route were gar
risoned and a large force was pro-