Evening star., 1943-01-03
BurnaWatched
Significance of Allies
Drive Discussed
BY JOHN GRANER.


japanese war lords can look uneasily
at recent developments in the India
Burma region. The first ground often
sive in that area since Singapore fell
and the Allies were whipped out of
Burma has been recorded.
Communiques and dispatches do not
suggest that Gen. Wavells stab down
the west coast of Burma toward Akyab is
great push. It's significance lies in the
fact that the United Nations have taken
the initiative at all.
AS portent Of things to come, the
Akayab thrust Is important. In con-
junction with the carrier based British
air attack on Northern Sumatra and the
United States air raids from Chinese
fields on Indo-C China strongholds Of the
Japs, 1t betokens greatly augmented AL
lied forces in the Asiatic theater.
British Force Large.
The British must be sure Of sea and
air superiority in the Bay of Bengal to
send a carrier to Sumatra The big fat
tops don't move around without ample
protection. There are obviously power
full British naval forces in the Bay of
Bengal.
The United States attack on Haiphong,
IN Indo-Chlna, indicates reinforced air
strength in China. Presumably the
ground forces have likewise been heavily
increased
Word that the greatest convoy ever to
land in the East had reached India is
further evidence of Allied intention to
challenge the japanese in the region
where the Allies were decisively defeated
less than a year ago.
Most important right now is the likely
effect on China of the Burmese offensive.
The Japs are reported to have about 90
oo0 men in Burma, largely concentrated
In the northeast, close to Yunnan
Province.
Chinese authorities long since have
oeeh apprehensive that the Japs in
tended a once-and- -for-all drive from
upper Burma into the heart of China.
with Running (Yunnan and Chung
king, the capital as its major detectives,
Gen. Wavell'S move down the Burma
coast has found little opposition The
JapS must move to counter the push.
Some OF those forces massed on the Chi
nese border would be the logical troops to
lnterpose. That would ease the pressure
on China
The offensive also has the possibility
OF clearing protective ground around
Chlttagong and making that port ter
mlnal for supplies to China. 1t would
shorten the route.
The 1ndo-China and Sumatra air at
tacks serve notice on Japan that the sea
lanes for supply to Burma, Malaya and
Indo-China are no longer secure. This
Is serious threat to the Nipponese al
readily admittedly pinched for ships.
Their bombings of Calcutta indicate they
realize the danger of the threat.
Southern Area Vulnerable.
Lastly the movement south carries
closer to the vulnerable southern third
OF Burma every mile of the column ad-
vances. The deltas of .the Irrawaddy,
SalWeen and Sittang rivers offer the best
approaches for a road back" in Burma,
Allied success here would threaten the
whole japanese rear in northeast Burma.
The action in Burma. Sumatra and
1ndo-China, so far, is but the setting of
a stage for later and more important
moves by the Allies.
1t Is important. however, as evidence
that the United Nations are setting the
stage to suit themselves. The Japs, for
the first time since Pearl Harbor, have
been challenged on the ground where
they won their greatest victories.