Evening star., 1943-07-26
Germans May Profit
From II Duce's Fall
Bu Mai. George Fielding Eliot.


effect of the sudden change in the 1tal-
ian government until there is more evl-
| dence of what the actual intentions may
be of the King, Marshal Badoglio and
those who will support them in power
have previously had occasion to point
! out that the actual military value OF
| Italian territory to Germany is doubtful,
while Italy as an ally is an economic
| burden to the Reich rather than an asset.
The chief German stake in the Italian
alliance is the Italian army of occupa-
ton in the Balkans.
| To examine this situation in more
| detail, it may be considered that the
| Germans must now write off Sicily, and
with it any hope of further interrupting
Allied sea traffic in the Central Medi-
terranean. The Germans would not like
to have Allied forces established in
peninsula Italy, because it would be
possible from there to undertake extern
sive measures for the support OF the
patriot forces in Greece and Yueoslavia.
But to prevent this is hardly worth the
risking of strong German army for the
defense of the peninsula.
The Germans would, of course, be
| best pleased by strong Italian defense
of Italian territory, which they could
support with small specialist units of
various sorts, but they are in no position
| to make large military commitments in
| Italy themselves. at least not for the
defense of anything south of the Pc
Valley.
But the open abandonment OF Italy
by Germany might produce a serious
state of affairs for German interests in
| the Balkans and the Aegean islands,
which are now becoming more and more
exposed to Allied attack. Germany can
not afford to lose the Balkan peninsula,
both for military and for economic rea-
sons, nor can Germany afford to replace
the Is to 80 Italian divisions there with
German troops.
There is also the question of the Ital-
ian air force, which of recent weeks
seems almost to be out of the picture.
The Germans need every bit Of assist
ance they can get in the air, and even
the remnants of the Italian air power,
important to them.
Then there is the italian fleet. 1t has
not been very effective fighting force,
but were it to be definitely disposed of,
the Allied naval forces in the Mediter-
ranean could be largely transferred
either to the Atlantic to fight Uboats
and raid German coastal shipping or to
ho to fol no n
whose continued resistance German
hopes are very largely staked.
Finally, there are the political dangers
involved in the abandonment by Ger
many of her major ally-dangers which
might extend to the disaffection of Bull
garia, Rumania and Hungary. But Ger
many cannot find the means to support
Italy unless Italy will do most of her
own fighting. Thus the German high
command is caught on the horns of
dilemma.
1t is quite possible that the Germans
have encouraged or even demanded the
dismissal of Mussolni and his replace
ment by Badoglio in the hope that the
Italian people and the Italian armed
forces might rally to the persons Of their
King and the old marshal and that the
armed forces might under Badoglio's
leadership prove more effective than
under the leaders OF Mussolini's choos-
ing.
This is, Of course, mere conjecture,
but it might be as we'll not to throw up
our hats and start shouting over Mus
solini's downfall until we have some
tangible proof that his successors are
not more formidable enemies of our
cause than was II Duce himself
On the other hand, this may be
purely Italian move, the purpose of
which is to save Italian territory from
further invasion or devastation. In such
a case, it would appear to afford us an
excellent opportunity for showing that
we mean exactly what we say when we
speak of unconditional surrender
Certainly, as a preliminary to even
considering any Italian peace feelers,
we should demand the immediate sur
render of all italian forces in Sicily, the
withdrawal Of Italian troops from the
Balkans, the Aegean islands, France,
Corsica and Russia; the surrender of the
Italian fleet and the occupation by our
forces of Sardinia, Corsica and the
principal ports and airfields of Southern
Italy, as we'll as those of the Aegean is
lands where the Italians are in charge
which probably includes Rhodes.
Copyright, 1e43 by New York Tribune Incl