Evening star., 1943-04-24
y. S. Might Attack
Shore of Sardinia
Major Eliot Argues Thot
Sicily Also Must Be Token
When Tunisiu Has Been Won
BIZ Mai. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
The British 1st and 9th Armies are
making progress in Tunisia, and Allied
air supremacy becomes more significant
with every day that passes. OF particular
Importance is the toll being taken Of
Axis transport planes upon which the
Axis forces are increasingly dependent
| for supplies and reinforcements on the
one hand and for any hope of partial
evacuation of German personnel on the
| other. One need not in view of the
record, waste any time in thinking about
the evacuation Of Italian personnel-if
any escape the closing trap, they will
be Germans.
One interesting point about the recent
news from Tunisia is the lack of men,
ton of the American ground forces. It
might have been supposed that these
forces would now be operating more
or less in the center of the Allied line
between the right flank of the 1st Army
and the left flank of the 9th; but so
far as can be told from the commune
ques, the f1anks of the two British armies
are together or very close together and
the American troops seem to have dis
appeared.
The strategic possibilities of the sit
uation naturally give rise to the con-
lecture that advantage may be taken
of Allied air and naval superiority to
strike at the enemy's rear by the inva-
sion from the sea of Sardinia or Sicily,
and that the American troops may be
intended to form the landing force nee
essary for such an operation. Such a
move would have both short-range and
long-range possibilities.
From the short-range point of view, 1t
would greatly reduce the volume of sup
plies which can be sent by air or sea
to the German Army in Tunisia by de-
privlng the Germans of one of their two
major take-of bases for this purpose.
1t would compel the Axis forces to come
and fight us on battle-ground of our
own choosing, and would thereby divert
a great part of their strength and leave
their African troops almost wholly iso-
| lated
From the long-range point of view, the
occupation of both Sicily and Sardinia
will eventually be necessary in order to
| open the Mediterranean to the free
| passage OF Allied conveys, though it will
be possible to send such conveys through
under heavy escort as soon as Tunis and
| Blzerte are in our hands Moreover,
the occupation of Sicily and Sardinia by
our forces would make the mainland of
Italy almost indefensible and would be
| very likely to result in the evacuation
| OF that country by the Germans and a
complete withdrawal of Italy from the
war in consequence.
AS it seems unlikely that we have the
| force to attempt simultaneous descent
on both these big islands, the respective
advantages of attacking one or the other
may be briefly examined Sicily is the
| more valuable of the two to the Axis.
because its lines of communication with
the mainland are much shorter, and be-
cause freight cars may be ferried across
the Strait of Messina without unload
ing them, whereas the movement of sup
lies to and from SARDINIA must be made
either in ships or transport aircraft. The
distances from Sardinia to Bizerte and
Tunls are approximately equal to those
from Sicily.
But just because Sicily is in much
closer communication with the main
land and because the forces available
TO us for attack on either island are
strictly limited in numbers, Sardinia
might form the more promising objec-
tive for the immediate future An Allied
toothold in Southern Sardinia would be
OF immense value in cutting off the
movement Of supplies from Sicilian or
mainland ports to Africa and we could
PROBABLY produce a concentration of
effort against the southern shore OF
Sardinia which in proportion to the
opposition which could be offered would
aHord brighter prospect of success
than anything we could now concen-
trate against Sicily even with the added
advantage of the British base at Malta
1t is only about $50 miles from our
advance base at Bone to Cagliari, the
principal port of Sardinia, and we have
forward air fields along the African
shore which are nearer than that. We
could, therefore, give some degree of
fighting cover to landing force. We
could do it better from Malta for a force
landing on'the south coast of Sicily, only
go miles away, but the opposition to be
met in Sicily would undoubtedly be very
much greater. In other words, we can
isolate Sardinia now and we cannot
isolate Sicily. We could isolate Sicily
to much greater degree if we were
able to take Sardinia first.
These are some of the considerations
that come to mind as the strategical
situation in the Central Mediterranean
is examined in the light of current
events. All of the foregoing is a purely
conjectural analysis which may or NAV
not have any relation to the immediate
future, but we can say with entire con-
fldence that whether before or after
Tunisia is won. Sicily and Sardini must
eventually become the object of Allied
attack
| Copyright, 1943N. Y. Tribune Incl