Evening star., 1943-03-21
Hunch Strategy
Hitler's Ideas Have Cost
Germany Her Chance
Bv Constantine Br0zcn.

d
ability and on the cooperation received
from the home 'front.' The civilian au-
thority was showed into the background.
Men like David Lloyd George and
Georges Clemenceau had great power at
home and frequently suggested to the
army or the navy high command GER
tain operations-which were generally
flops, such as the Dardanelles and Salon.
ika expeditions-but on the whole they
could not direct strategy
The job was left in the hands of pro-
fessionals. The political men had only
the power to select the best available
professional for the job. And after
many mistakes had been made, the
Allies chose Marshal Foch who did
not do a bad job.
The armchair strategists were men
with perfunctory knowledge of military
matters but frequently possessed with
a strong intuition. They expounded
their views in writing or by making
speeches in Parliament or at cabinet
meetings. Sometimes their views were
taken into consideration by the pro-
fessionals, but that did not occur often.
The most that was said in their
favor was that when a certain operation
failed, they shouted Il told you So" and
enjoyed a brief moment of prestige.
New Breed of Strategists.
The present global war has developed
another breed of strategist which may
best be described as "hunch strategists"
These men would be put in the arm
chair class were it not for the fact that
they find themselves at the head of
nations and holding tremendous power.
The best type of this brand is Adolf
Hitler, who in the last war succeeded
after four years of intense fighting to
rise to the rank of corporal in the
Imperial German Army. He never went
higher because his commanding officers
did not think he had enough military
ability to command a squad on his own.
The dictator of Germany took over
the overall Nazi military operations as
soon as the war started. Plans for the
invasion of Poland and of Western
Europe had been prepared by the pro-
lCooiOlldlS lUllS DclOIc tlle uellIST uu-
leashed the Second World War.
The campaigns between September,
1899, and June, 194l, were performed
with clocklike precision. All the glory
for these remarkable military operations
went to the Fuehrer, whom his propa-
ganda machine described as a second
Caesar or Napoleon. Hitler's gang back
in Germany was saying that the Fuehrer
could, in fact, teach few things to the
former Emperor OF France.
So long as the conquest Of Western
Europe went without hitch everything
was all right. But from the moment
the British were too slow minded to
accept defeat and the invasion of Britain
did not succeed, Hitler began to follow
his lunches. In the past his political
lunches had proved correct.
A Bitter Pill.
The failure of the Nazis to cross the
Channel was bitter pill for the Fuehrer
The German armies had run roughshod
over most of continental Europe. But
in doing so Hitler acquired some power
full enemies. His failure to reach Lon
don was severe blow to his prestige,
and in the meantime his diplomacy had
not worked particularly we'll All the
peace trial balloons he had sent to
MISUNDERSTANDING some say, Herr Hess
were punctured by the British. He
antagonized the powerful Catholic world
and the people of the United States
ne n
Nazi victory and indications in the
summer of 194l were that sooner or
later America would be at war with
the Reich. And Hitler began playing
lunches. He decided to attack Russia
against the advice of his generals This,
at least, is the view of most competent
professional military observers in Amer
lea and England.
The Fuehrer'S reasoning was based on
his hunch that the rest of the world
was more bitterly opposed to COM
munism than it was to the Nazi menace.
The Vatican and Catholics through
out the world were incensed at the
intolerance Of the Nazi regime; true,
but Hitler thought they opposed the
more strongly.
The people of the United States were
equally as outspoken against the rising
power of the Reich But they too he
reasoned, were more concerned with
the Communist danger, particularly
since Russia had become Germanys
ally in 1889 and had shown that it was
determined to swallow up such small
independent states as the Baltic ma
tions, Poland and Finland.
Generals Were Opposed.
According to reliable sources Hitler
ordered his generals to start prepara-
tions for an offensive against Russia
in March of l94l.
The generals who did not like this
strategic hunch" of the Fuehrer pointed
out that the risks of attacking Russia
were great unless the resistance of the
Red armies could be crushed before the
Russian winter set in.
In other words, they believed an attack
on Russia might be a good idea--they
were not looking toward face-saving
victories for the Fuehrer, but we're
worried about strong Russia on their
hanks-provided Russia could be de-
feated in a few months
There was difference of opinion
among members of the German high
command. Some leaders like Won Rund-
Stedt, Won Brauchitsch and particularly
ReichmarShal Goering were definitely
opposed to fighting Russia while Britain
sill .llNed :" Others such Non PncLr