Evening star., 1943-12-03
She||ine Foreshodows
New Britain Lundino
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
In many cases, naval bombardment
has been the immediate preliminary to
amphibious attack on Japanese posi-
tions. This is because, As the final
act in the softening-up process pre-
paratory to landing, 1t Is desirable to
obtain the effect of the concentrated
fire of naval batteries. The difference
between naval bombardment and aerial
bombardment lies in the degree Of con-
expected to obtain against . particular
target. The bombing plane, having
dropped It's bombs, must 60 back to its
base for another load before 1t can
continue its attack. The naval vessel
can 60 on firing as long as 1t can remain
within range of its target, Its fire effect
being otherwise limited only by the
capacity OF its magazines.
Moreover, the naval vessel can stand
STILL or at least cruise at very slow
speed (enemy defensive ability permit
ting, so that, II the location Of its
targets are known and plotted, and II
there is good direct or aerial observa- =
ton OF its fire, 1t can lay a very heavy
concentration on any particular target
The risks of using expensive and
heavily manned warships within reach
Of enemy hore-based aircraft and gun
batteries are, however, considerable. In
general they can be so used only when
full surprise can be attained, or under
cover of darkness or smoke, or when
fully covered by supporting naval sun-
fire and air forces, or-as seems to be
the case in the Southwest Pacific at the
moment-when complete air superiority
has been obtained by the attacking side
and the fire of the ships themselves is
adequate to deal with the shore bat
teres.
Even SO, the risks are such that In
general they are to be undertaken only
to obtain considerable compensating
advantage such an advantage as the
nnal preparation for a landing by the
destruction OF enemy defense tnstalla-
tlons which have escaped the preceding
air attacks. When air attacks rise in
intensity, and then are followed i'm.
mediately by naval bombardment the
suggestion Is very strong that 4 landing
Is contemplated
inls appears to be the state of Affairs
NJ oasmata, on New Britain Island And
at Madang, on the north coast of
new Guinea, west of the Huon Gulf
region. Both places, but Gasmata par
ticularly, have been under heavy air
attack. The last bombing attack on
Gasmata Is reported to have been the
heaviest ever delivered in the southve,t
Facinc area. Now both of these plscex
nave been subjected to naval bonbard.
ment. 1t Is therefore possible. though
not yet certain, that Gen. Macarthur
believes the time has come for landing
on New Britain Island, heart of the jan
anese defense system in the Southwest
racine, and that he proposes to defend
the nank of this operation by a stimuli.
taneous blow at Madang.
Madang Is indeed threatened from,
three directions. American and Aux-
'railan forces are now in position to
ADVANCE along the north shore of New
Guinea westward from the Finschsfen
area, others are established inland from
Madang in the Ramu River valley and
an amphibious operation from the ~.
might under these conditions prov.
decisive as far as Madang is concerned
JUST as occurred at Salamaua and Lac.
The situation of Gasmata Is some.
what different. We have 1T present no
1oothold on New Britain itself An
attack on Gasmata would be our first
attempt to obtain one. But 1t should
not be supposed that the japanese
could rush large numbers of troons
Gown from Rabaul to defend Gasmata.
the land communications Of New Britain
are almost nonexistent. Nor would
American troops landed at Gasmata
be able to commence an advance on
Haoaui. The value OF Gasmata to
Gen. Macarthur lies really in the fact
tnat 1t would give us good air base
much closer to Rabaul than any other
we now possess and that it would
deprive the Japanese of 4 base from
which they have been able to harau
ana observe our operations. The value
OF Madang would be that its CAPTURE
would interrupt the westward COM
municatlon OF Rabaul along the coast
OF New Guinea and would thus increase
the japanese need to depend on send
Ing conveys south from Truk, as they
recently had to do with resultant severe
losses in naval and merchant shipping
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