Evening star., 1943-04-05
Defensive Walls Held
Futile Against Attack
Maj. Eliot Argues Thot Nozis
Confess Growing Weakness
By Reliance on Fortificutions
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

6y NQJ. george FletQ1Hg EHOL.
A nation which builds a wall on its
frontier to defend it from its enemies
is already beaten. BY that very act,
it proclaims it's decadence or its weak
ness. 1t puts its faith in stones and
mortar rather than in the stout hearts
and strong arms of its fighting men.
1t does this either because its men are
no longer willing to march beneath its
battle standards, or because it no
longer possesses enough men to form
adequate armies. In either case, the
building of walls is the inevitable herald
of disaster.
Moreover. it is false military sys-
tenn. Looking back over the pages of
history, it is astonishing how persistently
men have believed in the virtue of walls,
and yet how consistently walls have
failed to protect the men who have
built them. The Great Wall of China,
built at incredible cost in labor, lives
and treasure, was pierced almost at
will by the fierce raiders of the north.
The frontier walls built by the Romans
in various parts of Europe were of value
only in restricting the activities of ILL
armed maurauders; they were no pro-
lection to the empire when once that
empire began to grow rotten at the core.
The building of the Maginot Line at
the expense of maintaining a great field
army brought France to military ruin.
This is because the wall on the from
tier is based on a false military prin-
ciple. 1t seeks to be strong everywhere
The wall itself may be assumed to be
equally strong at every point, but as
practical matter it is only as strong
as the troops assigned to defend it.
1t tends to bring about dispositions in
which the troops are disposed on
linear system, which can be pierced
anywhere by strong enemy concen-
tration.
The wall fixes the location of the
front to be defended; the enemy, out
side, is left free to maneuver, and can
choose time, place and direction of
attack. He is certain to be able to
break through the wall Having done
SO, ne can then be dealt with only by
the timely arrival of reserves for coun-
terattack, and these reserves are un-
likely to be strong enough for the pur-
pose II too many of the available troops
have been used in manning other parts
OF the wall.
The very fact of building a wall. in
deed implies lack of sufficient strength
TO hight a war of maneuver. But the
existence of the wall, up to the moment
OF bitter dlsillusionment, tends to lull
the minds of the people into a sense
OF false security, and thus reduces the
efforts which each puts into his or her
share of the task of defending the
country.
This has always been true. In 500
BIC. the great Chinese strategist Sun
1zu wrote: If we wish fight, the enemy
can be forced to an engagement even
though he be sheltered behind a high
rampant and a deep ditch. All we need
TO 90 Is to attack some other place which
he will be compelled to relieve The
spot where we intend to fight must not
be made known, for then the enemy will
have to prepare against a possible at
tack at several different points and his
forces being thus distributed in MANY
directions, the numbers we shall have
to face at any given point will be pro-
oportionately few"
IWenty-three centuries after Sun Tzu
had rejoined his ancestors, we find the
Baron de Jomini writing: The system of
ntrenched lines is absurd. speak
OF extended lines many leagues in length
and intended to wholly close a part of
the frontiers. For instance, those of
Wlssembourg, which, covered by the Lau-
ter flowing in front, supported by the
Rhine on the right and the Vosges on
the left, seemed to fulfill all the condi-
tons OF safety; and yet they were forced
On every occasion when they were as
sailed. -.
However we'll such lines may be sup
ported by natural obstacles, their great
extent paralyzes their defenders, and
they are almost always susceptible of be-
ing turned. To bury an army in in
trenchments is manifest folly"
Today we find the Germans, driven to
bay, pouring out vast and persistent
propaganda about the tremendous
strength and extent of their fortifca-
tons. We should note not of a strong
point here and there, but of the whole
continent of Europe. We are given fig
ures of the depth to which the whole At
lantic coast from North Cape to the
Pyrenees has been fortified. We are
told that these Notifications are being
repeated along the south coast, facing
Africa. We are invited to consider the
terrible cost in lives of forcing these de-
fenses.
But the whole strength of a Germany
which in 1918 was hardly more exhausted
than the Germany of today, was insult
flclent to hold single short line of for
tlflcations in depth between Switzer-
land and the sea, line which could not
be turned but had to be pierced by frontal
assault.
Ibere are not enough men in all Ger
many to even begin to provide a gar
rlson for the proper defense in depth of
such fortified system with which the
German propagandists are now trying to
frighten us. The defense of Europe rests
on the fighting power of the German
armies in the field and the reserves
which must move up to meet us as we
break through the outer shell of forti-
flcations.
We can choose time, place and direc-