Evening star., 1943-04-14
Germans Must Shorten
Lines Under Pressure
Major Eliot Suggests Thot
kozis May Abandon ItoIy
And Quit South BuIkons

And Quit South BuIkons
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
In recent articles we have examined
some of the geographic and strategic
factors affecting the present military
points are as follows:
ID If Anglo-American and Russian
pressures are properly co-ordinated, Ger
many cannot hope to defend the whole
perimeter of the area which she now
occupies.
(2) The Germans failed last year to
beat Russia separately. They have failed
this year to disengage any great part OF
their army from the Russian front.
go In the great battle between the
Dnieper and the Donets they did succeed
in saving their Donets army from encir-
clement and partially but not wholly
restablishing their defensive position in
South Russia.
90 The period between the close of
this battle and the actual beginning OF
an Anglo-American invasion Of Western
or Southern Europe is the last interval
of time at the disposal of the Germans in
which to improve their situation in Rus
sia, or their defensive situation generally
in other parts of Europe. The desperate
German resistance in Tunisia has as its
main object the gaining of time for one
or both Of these purposes.
60 But Except in the unlikely event
of sudden and overwhelming German
success in Russia) the Germans will,
when actually faced with powerful
Anglo American attack on European soil,
have to give up something in order to
hold the rest. Somewhere they will have
to shorten their lines of communication
and the fronts they are trying to hold.
The German high command is we'll
schooled in the maxims Of Frederick the
Great: You cannot be strong every
where. He who tries to save everything
frequently ends by losing everything. 1t
is often necessary to sacrifice province
in order to save nation.
For reasons of prestige and because Of
the bad effect on the morale Of their own
people, the Germans are not likely to
start giving up anything until the actual
pressure is applied. When they do, they
must make we'll calculated choice.
One such choice might be withdrawal
in Russia to the lines Of the Dvina and
the Dnieper or even farther back a with
drawal which could confront the Rus
eio e;v 10 s,, oiv,Ja
though far greater in degree than those
which confronted the Allied high COM
mand on the occasion of the German
withdrawal to the Chemin-des-Dames in
the spring of 1917.
1t might we'll be several months before
the Russians would be in a position to
mount an offensive against the new Ger
man line. Nevertheless, such with
drawal would bring the enemy closer to
German territory at one Of the open ends
of the north coastal plain which 1t is
the German purpose to defend, and 1t
would also have the effect of weakening
Germanys position in the north where
she is particularly. vulnerable
A withdrawal from France and the
Low Countries seems out of the question.
This would bring Germanys enemies
right up to the German frontiers, would
bring France back into the war on the
Allied side, and would deprive Germany
of the most valuable of her U-boat bases
France will be the last major prize which
Germany will give up willingly.
withdrawal from Norway would like
vrrica ~ p ol,,o o1a
bases, would clear the Allies best route
to Russia, and would expose Germany's
northern flank to Allied attack.
BY the logic of elimination, therefore,
1t would seem most likely that the Ger
mans will choose to withdraw from Italy
and perhaps in part from the Balkans
AS long as time is to be gained by con-
tinuing the African fight, Italy is essen
tial to German strategy. Once the last
German soldier has perished on the Tu-
nisian beaches, Italy becomes a source
OF weakness rather than Of strength to
Germany. The mighty barrier OF the
Alps must be forced by any Allied army
attempting to attack Germany from
Italian beach heads.
AS LOT GITeeCe ana Lne southern parts
OF the Balkan peninsula, the most opti-
mistic of German staff officers can
hardly dream Of an offensive strategy in
the Mediterranean any more and short
OF this Greece is OF little importance to
Germany and its possession of no great
advantage to the Allies except for the
valley of the Vardar which Is the tradi-
tional route of invasion from the Aegean
Sea toward the Middle Danube.
All these considerations must now be
In the minds Of the officers of the Ger
man high command as the end of their
delaying action in Africa draws near
not, as they had hoped in July or August
but in April. These considerations must
likewise be in the minds of those who
direct Allied strategy, from which point
of view they will be discussed in forth
coming article
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