Evening star., 1943-09-09
Germans Moy Leave
South Balkan Area
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.


surrender seem likely to begin with the
entry of additional Allied forces into the
peninsula of Italy. The fact the srmistice
was concluded on September and not
announced until September suggests
that the announcement was delayed
until the military dispositions for addi-
tional Allied landings in Italy could be
advanced to the point of imminence
To what extent these arrangements
may take the German troops now in
Italy by surprise remains to be seen. 1t
appears extremely likely that any Ger
man troops remaining in Southern and
perhaps in Central italy may be trapped.
Allied occupation of Sardinia and
Corsica appears likely and may take
place without serious resistance. Available
information does not indicate that there
Islands. II there are any at ALL Prob
ably there are not enough in any case
to resist an Allied landing force, plus
the Italian garrisons
Reports from Greek sources say that
the Germans have been disar,ning the
Italian Troops in the Aegean Islands. but
there Is some doubt as to whether the
Germans are in sufficient strength in
any OF these islands except Crete to offer
resistance to an Allied attack and at the
same time to keep In check both the
Italian troops and the Greek popula-
tlons. There seems little doubt that the
Germans are In considerable strength in
Crete and can make strong fight there.
The effect on the German forces In
Greece and Yugoslayia of the Italian
surrender may be very great indeed.
Ihey are suddenly confronted not only
with the need OF taking over all the
guard and police duties formerly per-
formed by the italians but also of dealing
with the situation created by the
presence of Allied forces in Southern
Italy, Immediately across the Adriatic
IL Is little wonder that the news of
itaiys surrender has been received with
such outspoken delight in Yugoslay and
Greek circles in London and Washington
Inc task OF preventing the Allies from
senolng relnforcements, arms, equipment
ana supplies to the Yugoslay and Greek
forces still holding mountain strong.
noios IN their native lands will be one.
tnat seems on the face of things far
beyond the capacity of the German
troops now present in the Balkan
peninsula.
Inc effect of the italian surrender on
Bulgaria seems likely to be blow to
any German hopes of assistance from
that quarter. This is hardly the rnoment
10 expect the Bulgarians to make sac
rnces and assume risks in the cause
OF an Axis already shattered beyond
repair. The Germans may be able IN
maintain 4 military hold on BULGARIA
for the time being but that is a yerv
olnerent thing from getting the Bull
sarians to fight for them.
Indeed, without going into details
there is some reason to anticipate that
the Germans may be compelled to eyac-
uate the whole southern portion of the
Balkan peninsula, including Greece, Bull
saria, Albania and part OF Yugoslayia.
perhaps making stand on the line of
the rivers Danube and Sava.
They will not of course, give I'D the
Fumanian oil fields without a heavy
ngnt and they may not give up any
Balkan territory until they are COM
PEELED to-but their ability to hold it
Is at least going to be materially If not
1staiiy reduced by the political reper-
cussions of the Italian armistice.
AS already remarked, however, It is
In Italy itself that we must look for the
most immediate results. The Germans
must now decide whether they can hope
10 defend any part of Italy, and II so
what part; and to hold any Italian ter
ritory they must find means for supply
ing and maintaining sufficient troops in
what has now become hostile country
and still make stand against the yery
powerful Allied forces which are max
ing their appearance in the italian
peninsula
Finally, we should not forget that the
possession of Sardinia and Corsica nlus
that OF good part of the Italian MAIN
land, If not all of it, puts the Allied
forces In position to attempt without
UNDUE delay an invasion of Southern
France, should this be considered de:
sirable as part OF Allied grand strategy
Ihls Is very hasty summing In
OF some of the military consequences
Oh ltalys unconditional surrender. A
careful and thorough examination of
these consequences can only be made
bit by bit as events unfold.
(oopyrisht, 1943 New York Tribune Inc,