Evening star., 1943-11-26
BY E. COLSTON SHEPHERD.

BY E. COLSTON SHEPHERD.
LONDON (By Mail to NANA) -
One Of the subjects which still must
be engaging much attention In the
Luftwaffe Is that of intercepting
and destroying the heavy bombers
which are being sent by day and
night against targets in Germany.
The policy Of fighter concentra-
ton for home defense has been
applied. It has meant starving the
battlefronts of their essential UNI
brellas, and it has involved build
ing few bombers. It has led at
present to the assembly of some
thing more than 1000 fighters in
the western approaches to Ger
many.
If there had been some sign that
the bomber offensive was being
checked, the policy might have
been justified. It has been on
trial now for nearly six months,
and the Allied offensive, instead of
diminishing, has tended to grow in
violence. In the most successful
phase of its defensive strategy the
Iuftwaffe has had nothing to COM
pare with the success Of the Raj
at the opening of the Battle Of
Britain. During the 10 days after
August 8, 1910, the Germans lost
697 aircraft in exchange for 153
British.
Maxi Strength Sapped.
Losses at that rate would be
hard for the Allied air forces to
bear even in their present ex-
panded state and with their large
production behind them. In Sep
tember last, which was one of the
heaviest bombing months, the
bomber commands of the British
and American air forces operating
from this country lost some $50
aircraft. During the same period
British bombers alone brought
down 45 enemy fighters, and the
United States bombers accounted
for 180-a total of 225.
The comparison shows how much
more the air raid of today is a bat
tie than 1t was when the Luftwaffe
set out to demonstrate its frightful-
ness. The Allied bombers are capa-
BILE OF hitting back far more heavily
than any German bombers which
have ever been sent again Great
Britain. When their hitting power
can be massed, as in the formations
of the Army Air Forces, the enemy
fighters are faced with much the
same difficulty as destroyers at
tempting to oppose big ships when
they stand In to lombard a shore
target. Unless they can outrange
the big ships, they have to trust to
maneuver.
Night Raiders Hard to Find.
Against the night raiders, the
main trouble Of the enemy fighters
Is to find the bombers and make
close contact. theoretically the To-
cation Of a great raid of 500 bomb
ers cruising at speeds below $50 miles
per hour should be easy. Aids to
detection, particularly when the
raiders have to fly over 200 or 800
miles Of hostile territory, sheuld give
IN air Of certainty to the intercep-
ton. Once found, the big bomber
cannot rely on speed to escape and
has only . limited range Of evasive
maneuver. Because Of the Allied
strategy Of concentrated bombing
there should also be plenty Of quar-
Sies for the fighters to attack.
In both instances, therefore, the
main contest Is one Of destructive
power. Tactics have their place in
these battles. Subsidiary raids BY
the bombers to disperse the fighter
screen, sweeps by Allied fighters to
engage the outer defenses, disabling
attacks on German fighter air.
dromes and the overlooking Of the
defenses by concentrating the raids
within the shortest possible compass
Of time all have their effect In lin
iting losses.
Yet, in the last resort, the arms Of
the opposed forces determine the
result. Combat Is almost certain to
be Joined whether the raid Is made
by day or by night; and quality In
that hight exerts . greater ultimate
anfluence on the offensive against
Germany than the finest bomb sight
Or the most eff1cient corps Of path
finders"
LWtwans Shows Weakness,
In using rocket shells against the
bombers the Luftwane confesses one
OF its weaknesses. It has failed, with
the more accurately directed pro-
jectiles, to out-range the o5o ma
ch1neguns Of the Americans and
1t has failed also to devise a method
OF attack to match the weight of fire
of the bomber formations. In trying
to drop bombs on to these forma-
tions from above it has acknowl-
edged the need to keep its fighters
out of range Of the American ma
chineguns even though the fight
ers have the advantage of cannon
up to a calibre of 37-mm. u.46
anches). Their main problem Is how
to bring a few heavy shells to bear
IN the face Of masses Of bullets
which have great hitting power at
nearly equal range.
Improved armament is thus need
ed by the Germans If they are to
Stand a chance either ~ ,,rot arfirr