Evening star., 1943-07-02
New Allied Attack
May Draw Jap Fleet
Major Eliot Discusses
Geographic Aspects
Of South Pocific Bottle
RI Mini Georoe Fieldino Eliot.


It begins to look as If the two-pronged
Pacific offensive directed at Rabaul, Of
which we have heard SO hopefully during
the past few months, Is getting under
way.
The eastern prong Of this offensive
now includes landing on New Georgia
Island as well as on Rendova, and if
these points can be made secure we shall
be only about $50 miles from the main
japanese position in the Western Solo,
mons, which Is Bougainville Island and
its adjacent islets-notably Shorthand.
| West of the Solomons, we are moving
up to long line of advance positions
which may be noted in order from east
to west.
First comes Woodlark Island (called
Murua on some maps, which is only
| about $50 miles southwest OF Shorthand,
and from which any point on Bougain-
| vile easily can be attacked from the air.
A hundred miles farther west, we have
occupied the Trobriand Islands, of which
Kiriwina is the most important. This
island lies only about $50 miles south Of
Gasmata, large Japanese base on the
island of New Britain, on which Rabaul
is situated.
Both Woodlark and Kiriwina are COM
paratively low-lying islands on which 1t
should be possible to construct airfields
with considerably less difficulty than In
the mountainous Solomons.
Still farther west our forces have
landed at Nassau Bay, on the New
Guinea coast only IL miles from the
Japanese base at Salamaua, and 80 miles
from Lac.
These are the preliminary moves in a
huge combined operation involving land,
air and naval forces on a front almost
1000 miles long from Guadalcanal to
Lac Our primary objective is probably
Bougainville, now menaced from two
directions: our ultimate objective Is
almost certainly Rabaul. If we get
Bougainville, we shall be only $50 miles
from Rabaul on the east and it would
then seem likely that we should seek to
effect a landing on the south coast Of
New Britain and SO close In on Rabaul
from the southwest.
The Japanese are certainly not going to
take all this lying down. They have
already tried one considerable air attack
against our forces in the Rendova area.
! which has cost them IS out Of ITO planes
engaged. We lost II planes and a good
sized transport which was injured by the
| japanese aircraft and finished of by a
submarine. We may be sure that this is
only a preliminary blow-the first hasty
reaction of the enemy to our attack. He
will try much harder than this to stop
us before he is driven out of Bougainville
and Rabaul.
The enemy has two general lines Of
approach to this area. One is his direct
sea lane from Japan. which approaches
Rabaul from Truk. the principal Japa-
nese naval base in this part of the
Pacific. Truk lies about 300 miles north
of Rabaul, with only the open Pacific
in between. To reinforce Rabaul and
Rabaul's outposts by this means requires
command of this 300 miles of open water
The other means Of approach is by
IllC SSl leS VI IOStSt WIllCll tllC clltUly lldS
established along the north shore Of
Dutch New Guinea Aircraft can be
moved along this 12O0-mile stretch by
easy hops from field to field, and small
coasting vessels in considerable numbers
can come down this way, hugging the
shore under the protection of the land
based aircraft. Until we possess bases
in New Britain itself, it will be difficult
for us to interrupt this line of supply,
and the japanese probably can continue
to send air reinforcement and some
supplies along it. However, if we take
Lac and Salamaua, the japanese will be
pushed back toward Madang and will be
deprived of bases from which they might
otherwise operate against the flank of
an attack on New Britain from our
present positions in New Guinea.
AS to the sea route from Truk, it is
this which must be the main japanese
dependence because of it's far greater
capacity as far as men and heavy stores
are concerned. We must likewise, depend
on our command of the sea for decisive
action against either Bougainville or
Rabaul. In the end, therefore, the issue
of the struggle which has now COM
menced will be decided by our ability to
take and hold the control of maritime
communications in this entire area or
to put it the other way. by the ability of
the japanese to prevent us from doing
so. The question uppermost in the minds
of the japanese high command must,
therefore, be at what point it becomes
worthwhile for them to risk their main
battle feet in an attempt to restore their
| naval dominance of the waters lying be-
| tween our bases, on the one hand, and
Bougainville and New Britain on the
| other.
Should they risk their fleet to save
| Bougainville? If they do, they bring that
| fleet very close to our advance bases and
| within easy reach of our shore based
| aircraft. But if they let Bougainville go,
| Rabaul is gravely. if not fatally, COM
promised. And if they let Rabaul 60
without risking the fleet. then Truk has
lost it's outer guardians and is itself ex-
| posed to direct attack.
Sooner or later the Japanese must
| throw their main stake on the board to
| win or lose. 1t is decision which is
| being forced on them and it is one which
the diminishing quality of their air
| power renders ever more desperate than