Evening star., 1943-11-19
Jops Losing Strength
In Central Pacific
BY Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

BY Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
The repeated air raids on Japanese
positions in the Marshall and Gilbert
Islands are, at least, significant OF our
growing air superiority In the whole
Pacific area, II they are not the harbin-
gers Of an attack by amphibious forces
to take over some Of these Central
Pacific bases.
1t has, OF course, been obvious from
the first that the Japanese could hold
these far-fiung island bases only as long
as the Japanese air and naval powers
were dominant throughout the Central
Pacific area. The theory on which the
defense of such base system rests, is
that each base has sufncient local de-
fensive strength to enable 1t to hold out
against any probable scale of attack
until naval and air forces can be con-
centrated from other bases to relieve 1t.
When the mobile forces available for
this purpose become 80 reduced in
strength that they cannot deal with the
forces available to the assailant then q
true defensive system ceases to exist and
we have instead just group of scattered
weak detachments likely to be over
whelmed one by one with no hope OF
rescue when each is attacked.
1t Is not clear that the Japanese are
yet reduced to this state in the Central
Pacific, but they must be coming close
to it. Moreover, the Central Pacific
situation must be considered, not by IT.
self, but in relation to the operations in
the South and Southwest Pacific.
In one of Gen. MacArthur's recent
communiques, the point was made that
the Japanese moving their planes down
from Japan in short hops over the in
tervening island bases, were able to re-
n1orce their air power in Rabaul and
vicinity almost at will, and to concen-
trate their major air effort there because
they were not being seriously attacked
IN any other area These new operations
IN the Central Pacific may be, in some
part, designed to bring about a change
IN that situation, and to compel the
Japanese either to weaken their air
power on Gen. MacArthurs front, or to
lose their Central Pacific islands for lack
OF air defense.
From the Japanese point of view these
conditions will become even worse when
the coming Allied attack on Burma
really gets under way. The Japanese
obviously do not have enough air power
to go around, and they are using up
what they do have in a fashion that
seems nothing short of reckless. The
conditions under which they have had
only one really active air sector-the
South and Southwest Pacific-are COM
ing to an end. 1t Is difficult to zee
how the japanese are going to be able
to meet the new conditions without
sharply curtailing their commitments
by abandoning some OF their outlying
positions and falling back to positions
nearer their sources Of power. That
may mean the giving up OF Rabaul and
OF Bougainville, as has been suggested
by some dispatches from the Pacific.
1t may mean giving up the Marshall
and Gilbert Islands, or leaving the gar
risons there to make a last-ditch fight
and sell their lives as dearly as they
may; though there has been a notable
tendency of late for Japanese island
garrisons in isolated positions to try to
escape rather than to die fighting.
The Japanese must, Of course, realize
the consequences to themselves of such
retreats, bringing our air and naval
power ever closer to their vital sea
lanes south Of the Japanese main
islands. They must be well aware that
their losses in merchant shipping have
been so great that they can hardly
dare permit our forces to move into
more favorable positions for attacks
upon the remainder OF that shipping.
Shipping is their very life's blood,
and their position is much like that of
wounded and bleeding warrior who
must somehow gain a respite from the
persistent attacks Of a stronger foe in
order to get chance to bind up his
wounds before he has lost so much
blood that he can no longer either run
or fight. Yet they must also know
that the constant drain on their air
power, and their losses of cruisers and
destroyers are reducing their ability
to hit back with the one powerful
weapon which they still possess in the
Pacific: their main battle feet. The
more crucial their situation becomes the
greater must be the pressure upon their
high command to cease the ace-in-the-
hole policy and bring the battle fleets
out for a showdown fight.
(Copyright. 1943. New York Tribune Incl