Evening star., 1943-07-09

there has been Y
feeling of EN- David Lawrence.
oa1raSsment here among our officials
concerning losses. reported but this
is due to unavoidable circumstances.
When flyers engage in bombing
missions or in fights at high alti-
tudes. it Is often impossible to be
certain whether an enemy ship has
been sunk or damaged seriously or
damaged lightly The aviators
themselves report faithfully what
they think they have seen.
When they get back to their base,
the officers there cannot offer any
evidence in refutation Of claims ex-
cept once in a while when a report
comes from some other airman who
participated in the same engage
ment. Too often, however, these
reports, even when pieced together
leave the officials uncertain as to
what happened.
Given in Good Faith.
1t has been evident for some time
that the Japanese Navy could not
have as much reserve strength as it
seems to muster from time to time.
II our Navy has truly inflicted all
the losses claimed. But Navy men
will be the first to say that the
losses cannot be absolutely verified
and that the information given out
Ia disseminated in good faith as the
best available at the time.
The japanese, of course, did not
know exactly what happened at
Pearl Harbor and they do not know
to this day the exact extent of the
damage or when the ships could be
repaired and ready for action.
Least of all could it have been known
At the time of the attack. because
the enemy had no facilities for
examining the damage done.
Unquestionably the japanese have
been able to repair some of the ships
we have reported as damaged Also
the most serious factor in trying to
appraise losses is the introduction of
night warfare among surface ships.
New methods of fighting at night
have been devised and it is not pos
sible under certain circumstances to
be sure that direct hits have been
scored.
Certain Discount Necessary.
One important point which the
military critic of the London news
paper raises is chat published losses
must be taken with a certain dis
count due 10 unavoidable error. 1t
would be wrong to assume that the
figures are purposely exaggerated by
any official source here or abroad.
At times Ehs enemy has put out
what appeared 10 the American pub
lie TO be fantastic claims and it is
often wondered why the Toxic Navy
would do this since they knew the
correct figures would come out sub
Sequently. One reason, of course, is
that this is favorite way of fishing
for information as TO the exact
damage done. 1t is q means really
of measuring Americas reserve
strength in the Pacific.
Tt is, TO be sure, of the utmost
Importance TO the Japanese to know
what has happened Immediately
after each naval engagement be-
cause this is related to the possible
dispersal OF the remaining American
and japanese forces in the theater
of war affected.
Compromise Policy.
The American Navy, if it could
follow its real desires, probably
wouldn't give out any information
about losses for some time after
each engagement. That policy was
pursued for long while in 1912 but,
due TO criticism from some segments
of the American press, the policy
was changed. Now no claims of
enemy losses are issued unless our
own losses are also published 1t is
a poor compromise from the Navy
standpoint because it gives the
enemy knowledge of what losses
were inflicted. But in wartime the
demands of public opinion some
times upset the best laid plans for
deceiving the enemy.
One thing can be stated rather
positively-the men who run our
Navy discount the tales of the flyers
about the ships they have sunk.
They don't argue about it with them
for fear the old cry about disparging
air power may be raised. But when
the war is over, the exact number of
ships lost through air power will be
determinable, and the power of sur
face ships will compare favorably in
the results.