Evening star., 1943-09-26
Collapse of Germany in 1918
Finds Sinilarities in This War
BY Raymond p. Brandt.

civilian powers and retained its repu-
tation, later exaggerated by Adolf Hit
Ter, for having spared Germany the
ignominy and destruction of invasion
and occupation.
BY the middle of September the Aus
trians were suing for peace and the Mac
| edonian front had collapsed, so that on
September 81, Ludendorff was forced to
request the German government to
sound out the United States concerning
peace Seven days later he pressed his
| demand, declaring that the German sit
uation was so desperate that no further
delay was possible. On October l. the
supreme command urged the immediate
dispatch of a note to President Wilson,
warning that a military catastrophe
might occur within 48 hours. The result
was the German governments note on
| October 3 asking for an armistice on tie
| basis of President Wilson'S 14-point
| speech, delivered in January, 1918.
Then started a formal interchange of
notes, but the military later reversed it's
! position and insisted that the war go on.
Ludendorf resigned on October 27 and
the Kaiser abdicated November 8 Thus
the responsibility for peace negotiations
was shifted to the shoulders of the civil
ian government.
The political and propaganda value of
the military caste's refusal to take blame
for Germany's defeat in 1918 was clearly
demonstrated by Hitlers assertions in
"Mein Kampf," that the real cause was
the breakdown of civilian morale, Begin
ming with the Berlin munitions strike in
February, 1918 During this strike Lu-
dendorH placed Berlin under martial
law, made mass arrests and sent many
! workers to the front. This drastic ac-
ton, according to German writer's broke
the strike before any military damage
was done, but the psychological effect
on the workers was bad. @
Commenting on this strike, Hitler wrote
in "Mein Kampf":
THE munitions strike had not the
ultimately desired success SO far as
starving the front of weapons was con-
cerned it broke down too early to allow
tie shortage of munitions as such to
sentence the army to doom. But how
much more terrible was the moral dam
age which had now been done"
Ready for Last Gamble.
At the time of the munitions strike
the German military command was pre-
pairing for its last almost successful
gamble in France. Prime Minister Lloyd
George had outlined the British peace
aims in January and was followed a few
days later by President Wilson with his
famous IA points. From the first of the
year the Germans and the Allied powers
played the same diplomatic game-to
break up the unity of their opponents,
just as Is years later President Roosevelt,
in his message to Congress, called on
Rumania, Hungary, Finland and Bull
garia to revolt against Nazi domination.
/ Some of the most fascinating reading
in diplomatic literature is to be found in
the reports of Americans from the vari-
Gus listening posts in the neutral coun-
tries Of Switzerland Sweden, Holland
and Denmark, between January and No
vember, 1913 These dispatches, secret,
of course, at the time, have been printed
by the State Department in red-bound
volumes, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1918, Supplement /, the
World War"
Interesting reports were received from
Hugh r. Wilson, then secretary of the
American Legation in Switzerland who
seemingly by sheer chance had the
effective aid of Prof. George D. Heron,
an American temporarily living in &C.
| neva, who the Germans, Austrians and
Bulgarians thought was an intimate
friend of President Wilson because he
had written books and articles about the
American Chief Executive. Through him
they tried to establish secret commune
cations with the White House
Prof. Heron, acting "unofficially," but
under the guidance of the State Depart
ment, had many conversations with lib
| eral Germans and Austrians and was
able to find out the peace sentiment in
| Germany and the Austro-H Hungarian en-
! pire. Other American embassies and
legations had their official and unofficial
agents supplying similar information, all
| of which was treated warily in Wash
| ington because officials believed the peace
feelers were part of plot to separate
us from the British and the French, or
to give German more time to prepare
for military action.
| AS the months went on, however, the
| proposals frfom Austria became more
specific, but Ambassador Page in London
reported that the British were convinced
that the Austrian peace offers had the
connivance of the Germans. In June
when the German offensive was at its
peak, P. A. Stovall American Minister
to Switzerland, reported that Prof. Her
ron had talked with a DR.. de Fiori
identified as former correspondent OF
Vienna Neue Freie Presse, but had subse-
quently been informed that De Fiori was
"one of Ludendorff's most intelligent
agents" SO trusted that he could pass
Continued on Page C-3, Column A.