Evening star., 1943-11-07
Japanese Fleet
Dodges Battle
By John II. Cline.


During the black weeks after Pearl
Harbor, when the full extent of the
damage done by the Japanese raiders
was not known to the public, many
Americans were asking: Where is the
fleet? AS the Japs swept on from one
conquest to another, and as the defenders
on Bataan were ground down to bitter
defeat, the people at home could not
understand why the United States Navy
did not seek out the enemy and give
battle. They did not know that the Navy
was repairing its grievous wounds.
After nearly two years of war the
picture has changed. Our Navy is willing
and anxious to give battle, and 1t is the
Japanese who are avoiding decisive
action. More and more people are asking
themselves the question: Where is the
japanese fleet? That is question which
may not be answered any time in the
near future
American naval tradition, like that OF
the British, calls for method of opera
tion which is alien to Japanese naval
thinking. In time of war the fundamental
objective Of our naval leaders is to secure
command of the seas over which military
operations must be conducted If the
enemy is a naval power risks will be
assumed in an effort to seek out and
destroy his naval forces. Broadly speak
ing, the theory is that the Nays func-
tion is to secure communications by
destroying the enemy or driving him
from the seas, and to blockade his ports.
But that has not been the Japanese way.
The october issue of Foreign Affairs
presents an interesting discussion by
Alexander Kiralfy of the reasons why
Japan's fleet avoids action. Because this
question will assume mounting i'm
portance as the American and Allied
forces increase their pressure on the big
japanese base at Rabaul, some of Mr..
Kiralfy's points are summarized here.
Japan began this war, as she has
fought other wars, on the assumption
that victory could be won with land
forces. The main function of their navy
has been to protect communications and
they have not believed in risking ships
Tor other purposes. In part, this think
Ing grows out Of the fact that until
recently Japan has not had overseas
possessions or bases to support long
range naval actions. But in still greater
part 1t is the product of an experience
and tradition that 60 back for more
than $500 years.
The Japanese first went to their pres
ent homeland in "troopships." They
used them to land frontal attacking
force and then to outf1ank the defending
aborlgines by making additional land
ings along the coasts of the island
chain-the same technique, in fact, that
was used in the early stages of this war,
AT that time the Japanese thought of
a vessel as means of transporting
troops, not as an instrument of attack
In itself. 1t was not until several CEN
turles later, when the first attack on
Korea was made, that they evolved the
theory of using ships in protective"
squadrons. But they still had much
to learn.
In the 18th century Kublai Khan.
attempting to invade Japan, seized the
Tsushima Islands and landed many
troops on Kyushu. During the fighting
on the beaches the japanese navy"
small ships and few in number, at
tempted to break up the landings and
was defeated by the Mongols heavier
and better-fought vessels The greater
speed Of the japanese ships paid some
dividends, but it was a violent tvphoon
that finally destroyed the attacking
armada
In 1892 Toyotomi Hideyosho, consid-
cred by the japanese as the founder
OF their navy in the latter-day sense,
undertook to reconquer Korea, from
which the Japs had been ousted. He
pullt fleet OF transports, loaded 300. 900
men aboard them and set out with
cruising squadrons protecting his COM
munlcations. After initial successes.
however, the Korean admiral, Yi-sun.
appeared on the scene with a hu.e
f1eet including at least one armor plated
oreadnaught The Japanese were routed
their cruising squadrons scattered and
many OF the troopships sunk. Through
intrigue they retained a foohold in
Korea. but they had paid heavy price
Tor falling to secure command OF the
sea. Their evident conclusion from the
experience, however, was only that their
troopships should have been given better
protection.
When what might be called the mod
ern naval era, the period of steam and
iron ships, emerged, the Japanese NAVY.
while clinging to its old doctrines. began
to manifest greater concern with
potentially hostile naval forces and to
emphasize speed and rapidity of fire in
Its own naval vessels. Tactically. its
OBJECTIVE was to be capable of so in
1uring hostile naval force that it would
stay away from Japan's "troopshin"
waters. But it did not adopt the notion
that it should go out and destroy the
enemy force.
Ihls thinking was evident in the Sino-
japanese War and again in the war
with Russia in 1904. The Russian feet
was destroyed in that war, but it is
difficult to say that this was done bv
design OF the Japanese Navy. The Rus
sian battle fleet at Port Arthur was
shot to pieces while in harbor with land
based siege guns after the capture Of
203-Metre Hill. When the Cars Baltic
fleet finally arrived in eastern waters
Admiral TOTO did not 60 out to meet it..
If this fleet had turned back after the