Evening star., 1943-06-24
German Strategy


Although an "all-out" Axis offen-
sive in Russia is still possible, its
likelihood appears to diminish with
each passing day of the short sum-
mer season during which mechan-
lied warfare on the eastern front
can be waged with maximum
efficiency. To be sure, there seem
to have been no large Withdrawals
of troops, so it may be assumed
that this front is still manned by
the 100 German and % satellite divi-
sions officially cited by Mr.. Church.
i'll some weeks ago. Nevertheless,
it can be argued that those forces
are a liberal insurance against a
Russian counteroffensive.
The most revealing factor as to
the intentions of the German high
command this summer is the dis
position of its reserve pools. Now
recent information to we'll = in
formed neutral European sources
indicates that the bulk of Germany's
strategic reserve has lately been con-
centrated in Bavaria. That is an
ideal central point for rapid Ship
ment to all parts of western, south
ern and south-central Europe, but it
would not fit into plans for
supreme effort to crack the Red
armies. In that case, we should
logically expect German reserves to
be massed from East Prussia to
Sllesia, with echelons forward
through the Baltic States and
Poland. In this connection, it should
be understood that Germany has
abundant reserves this summer, due
to the total mobilization" measures
last winter, when so many men were
combed out of business and even in
duStry that an estimated 100 new
divisions were creatable from the
manpower thus made available. This
is another reason why it is possible
for the German high command to
keep its eastern front fully manned
while building up big reserves for
other eventualitieS.
All this raises the question as to the
grand strategy, on which the Ger
man high command has determined.
Last winter Adolf Hitler publicly an
nounced that Germany planned to
go henceforth on the strategic de-
fensive, letting its enemies butt their
heads against the walls of his
European fortress, and making mere
tactical sallies where these might
prove useful. At the time, foreign
military opinion discounted this as
ruse, though minority of foreign
observers were inclined to take it
seriously. The absence of a major
Axis offensive in Russia and the
relative lack of German support in
Tunisia this spring lend weight to
this minority view that Hitler may
have been telling the truth
The view SO often maintained in
Allied countries that Hitler must
provide fresh victories to sustain
German morale overlooks important
psychological factors During the
first two years of the war Germany
won the mastery of most of Europe
by a series of victories attained at
relatively trifling cost. This domi-
nant position enables the Germans
to live and supply themselves rela-
lively well, no matter what happens
to the subject peoples. The big
losses came only after the invasion
of Russia, and even here rich prizes
were garnered. We do not know
how much will be gained from the
Ukraine and the Baltic states this
year, but it should be considerable.
Would it not be more agreeable to
harried and wounded Germany to
decide that it could stand pat on
acquired gains and let the enemy
lead with his chin?"
How much German overall strate-
gy is influenced by the prospect of
an Anglo-American full-scale inva-
sion of Western Europe this summer
is uncertain. 1t is generally agreed
that such an invasion would require
100000 troops, and doubts have
been expressed whether the shipping
bottleneck would permit such an in
vasion simultaneously with activity
in the Mediterranean, which has al
ready developed.