Evening star., 1943-12-02
ross-ChunneI Drive
MAY Be Advanced
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.


There have been two military situa-
tions. both in the Mediterranean area,
which have been puzzling some observ-
ers in recent weeks.
The first is the slow progress of the
Allied armies in Italy. Given the con-
diticns-a narrow front, bad weather
and limited forces-slow progress is all
that can be expected so far as the
forces actually opposed to each other
on the Italian peninsula are concerned,
but why have the Allies not used the
advantages of command of the sea and
air, and the fianking positions of Cor
sica and Sardinia, to effect a sort of
military end run, q. e. a landing in
force behind the German flank? Sure
ly this would seem better and less cost
ly than the ditch-by- ditch methods
now being used.
The second situation is the loss of the
Aegean Islands Of Cos, Leros and Samos.
True, the small isolated garrisons of air.
borne British troops, even with some
Italian help, could hardly be expected
to hold out against successive concen-
trations Of much stronger power which
the Germans were able to apply, in COM
plete security behind their covering
screen of positions on Crete, Scarpanti
and Rhodes. But why were these gar
risons set down inside that screen and
then left to perish? From the BEGIN
ming, as already pointed out in these
articles, an air-borne invasion of this
sort made sense only as preliminary to
an attack on Rhodes itself. The bases
established on the smaller islands
might have been very useful in such an
attack, and the capture of Rhodes
would have broken the German screen
and altered the whole Aegean situation
materially in the Allied favor.
But the attack on Rhodes never
came, or at any rate never developed
beyond the air bombardment stage.
Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, COM
mander in chief in the Middle East,
has said merely: I'VE had hard luck with
Rhodes" Does he mean that expected
Italian cooperation In handing over
that island was not forthcoming or was
thwarted by prompt German counter
action? Possibly.
But there is another possible explana-
ton which fits both the Italian and
the Aegean occurrences, and which
might we'll have given rise to Jumbo"
Wilson's regretful remark.
1t may be that during the recent con-
terence at Moscow, it had been decided
TO advance the date of the Anglo-Amer-
lean landing in Western Europe. If this
were indeed true, then the Mediter-
ranean operations might be profoundly
affected. Troops. planes, ships and land
Ing craft intended for use in the Medi-
terranean might have to be shifted to
the British Isles, or Just possibly to
Corsica and Sardinia for diversion
landing in the south OF France, which
might contribute greatly to the success
Of the main operation. The italian
campaign might have to be put on re-
duced allotments. The Aegean campaign
might have to be abandoned altogether.
even though this meant the loss of the
small forces already committed to It.
In Italy, of course, certain risk
would attach to such a procedure. The
risk would be that Of strong German
counterattack in Italy when the enemy
became aware-as he must eventually
become aware-of the shift of forces in
the Mediterranean. But this is a risk
with time limit, because when and II
great landing on the Channel coast
takes place, the Germans are not 20
ing to be able to give much more at
tention to Italy or to the Aegean
either. The success of the Western
invasion would give us the. other two
oojectives by default.
All this Is not necessarily to say that
Channel invasion is just around the
corner. We can say that If such an in
vasion has been planned, as seems all
most certain, and If the date as set orig
1nally has been advanced a month or
two or three months, then the most far
reaching alteration Of plans and of dis
position of forces must immediately
take place, and such an alteration
might well produce the results we now
see IN the Mediterranean This would
be true even II the original date were
sometime in the early summer of 1914
and 1t had been altered to early spring
Arrangements for great military op-
Grafton such as a cross-channel in.
vasion must be run back over a very
long period of time indeed. OF course
the effect would be the more drastic anc
immediate, the closer the new aats
might be to the moment when the de.
cision was taken to make the change
All Of which is offered purely as 6
speculation, and not as an opinion. 1,
Is speculation which just happens to
mt two sets of known facts.
(Copyrisht. 1943, N. Y Tribune, Incl