Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-03

found scant immediate prospect for
just peace.
Following entrance Of Italy into
the war on June 10. 1910, despite
Mr. Roosevelt's appeals, and the COL
lapse Of France, this Government
intensified its efforts-that were
successful-to prevent French pos
sessions in this hemisphere going
to the Axis and to keep the French
fleet out Of German hands.
Japan Watched.
Meanwhile, however, attention to
the threat from Japan was not re-
Taxed. Especially during the 1885,
40 period, the white Paper" recalls,
various measures which might be
used to induce Japan to renounce"
its program OF conquest were "un-
der active consideration"
Among the moves considered
during the 1905 was the applica-
ton Of economic pressure through
embargoes on shipments of vari-
GUS goods to Japan. But it was the
opinion of responsible officials, ;"
including military and naval au-
thorities. that such action would in
volve serious risk" Of retaliation
likely to involve us in war.
The President and his advisers
are described as realizing before
actuel outbreak of war in 1889 that
Axis preparations for war in both
the Atlantic and Pacific were vir-
tually complete while this country
and minded nations were far
behind parity with offsetting prep
arations"
They were in agreement" that
the prevailing public opinion here
and our comparative military I'M
preparedness" were such as to "ren-
der it inadvisable to risk, by resort
to drastic economic measures against
Japan, involvement in war =.
This Government had to consider
that If the United States became
involved in war there might easily
arise the problem Of defense in both
oceans-and to meet that problem
this country was not adequately
prepared"
Danger Grows.
During the summer OF 1898, how
ever, this Government did make
effective moral embargo" on ship
ment of airplanes to Japan, and in
1899 we abrogated the 1911 COM
mercial treaty with Japan to pave
the way legally for further embargo
action which finally came in the
summer of 1941.
BY this time 1t was no longer
a question of avoiding the risk of
war. which already had become
acute, but Of preventing a complete
undermining" Of our security.
Secretary Hull had bluntly told
the Japanese Ambassador in 1899
that the future of United States
japanese relations was largely in
the hands Of Japan" He explained
our permanent policy was one of
friendliness and dealing toward
all nations, but that:
I'VE drew the line between, on
the one hand, honest, law-abiding,
peaceful countries and peoples, with
out reference to their form of gov
eminent. and on the other, those
who were Haunting law and order
and threatening military conquest
without limit as to time or extent"
Arm to the Teeth Talk.
In another talk with the Japanese
Ambassador on May 16, 194O-at the
time German armies were smashing
through Belgium and the Neither
lands-Mr. Hull said 1t appeared no
country was safe from aggression
and that the only thing to do was
to arm to the teeth" and be ready
for any threats.
On June 26, 1910, Mr.. Hull pointed
out to the British Ambassador and
Australian Minister that we were
exerting economic pressure on ia
pan and keeping our fleet in the
Pacific-that everything possible
was being done short Of q serious
risk Of actual military hostilities to
keep the Japanese situation stabil-
lied"
After passage Of the Lease Lend
Act cleared the way for substantial
aid to Britain in the European war
and our own preparedness program
was in full swing, Mr.. Hull in
structed our diplomatic missions in
several neutral countries to impress
on the Government and people
there "the absolute determination"
Of the United States to "see this
thing through" He hoped this
would encourage countries still out
side the Axis circle to resist total
itartan propaganda. ....,.....-
Meanwhile. the Government heard