Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-03

by q less moderate government"
with possibly most unfortunate"
epercussions. Konoye did fall and
Gen. Hideki TOTO took over.
Meanwhile, the Hull Nomura con-
versations continued in the futile
effort to find If there was any basis
for agreement. The white Paper"
lists the chief questions on which
agreement seemed impossible" as
Japanese obligations to Germany
and Italy under the Tripartite
Pact; the question OF Japanese
adherence to basic course Of peace
and evacuation of Japanese troops
from China Throughout the ne
gotiations, the United States in
sisted that any settlement involv-
ing China must provide fully for
the sovereignty and territorial in
tegrity of that country
Grew Renews Warning.
During this deadlock, there came
from Ambassador Grew in Toxic
on November a renewed warning
"of the possibility of Japan's adopt
ing measures with dramatic and
dangerous suddenness which might
make inevitable a war with the
United States" He advised against
misjudging Japanese capacity to
plunge into a suicidal struggle"
with us, or proceeding on the
theory that "bellicose utterances"
in Japan were merely saber rat
things.
Four days later Secretary Hull
told Cabinet meeting that rela-
tons with Japan were extremely
critical and there was imminent
possibility" that Japan might start
war at any time" The Cabinet
decided that the critical situation
should be emphasized in speeches
in order that 1.-THE country would, II
possible, be better prepared for such
development" This was in the
background of speech by Mr..
Welles on Armistice Day, 1871,
warning that at any moment war
may be forced upon u.s."
Last Ditch Talks.
On the same day that Saburo
Kurusu, Japan's special emissary,
joined Ambassador Nomura in the
'last-ditch" peace or war talks with
the President and Mr.. Hull-No-
vember l7-Mr. Grew cabled an
other urgent warning OF sudden
Japanese attack. He pointed out
that there was extremely effec-
tive" control over military informa-
ton in Japan, making 1t unlikely
that the Embassy would be able to
give much more substantial warn
| ing.
In the conversations here, it soon
| became clear that KuruSu has
brought no new plans or proposals
to add to the chances of a peaceful
solution of the crisis. Secretary Hull
bluntly told him and Nomura on
November 18 that I'VE could 60 SO
far but rather than go beyond
certain point 1t would be better for
us to stand and take the conse-
quences," the White Paper" said.
The Secretary emphasized that
no settlement for the Pacific area
would be taken seriously" while
Japan kept troops in China and was
'clinging" to the Axis pact.
Kurusu would not say that Japan
would abrogate the pact with Ger
many and Italy. but intimated she
might do something to "out-shine
it." He said Japan would not be
cats paw" for Germany and would
use the alliance ''for its own pur-
poses"
November 20 Proposal. u
BY November 26 it was evident to
this Government that was "illusory'
to expect any agreement with ia
pan. So as a last-chance matter
and to make the United States
position throughout the negotiations
crystal clear" for the record. a
comprehensive new proposal was
given the Japanese.
Kurusu said this document likely
would cause his government to
throw up its hands" and that 1t
could be interpreted as an end to
the negotiations.
In meetings with Army and Navy
and other high officials on Novem-
Der Is and % Secretary Hull again
emphasized the critical nature OF
relations with Japan, saying that in
his opinion the Japanese were
likely to break out at any time with
new acts of conquest by force" and
that the matter of safeguarding
| our national security was in the
hands of the Army and Navy"
Mr.. Hull advised that any plans
for our military defense include an
assumption that the Japanese might
make the element of surprise q
central point in their strategy and
also might attack at various points
simultaneously with view to
demoralizing efforts of defense"
U. s. mot Running Away"
On December 5, the Secretary told
Nomura and Kurusu that the
United States was mot looking for
trouble but that at the same time
we were not running away from any
menaces."
JapanS reply 10 the American
proposal of November 26 and a
further peace plea to the Japanese
Emperor by the President on De-
cember was delivered to Mr.. Hull
on Sunday, December 7, an hour
after the attack on Pearl Harbor had
begun.
The White Paper" concludes with
a summary of the Declaration by
United Nations, signed here Janu-
airy l, 1912, pledging cooperation in
prosecution of the war and promis-
ing no separate peace with the com.
mon enemies.