Evening star., 1943-09-30

foreign interests have tried to re-
move the general from the Wash
ington operation are all bound to
be embarrassing both to America S
number one soldier and to the
President.
AS matter of fact, the transfer
of Gen Marshall to command all
Allied forces except the Russians
IN Europe would be a tribute to his
ability and the British join in that
tribute. If 1t is a demotion for a
soldier to be given chance to
command in the fleld-the biggest
army the Allies have ever put in
the field and If it is greater honor
to sit at desk back home, then
those who take that view just do
not give due credit to the instinct
of the military man.
AS for the politics in the selection
Of a chief of staff in the event
that Gen. Marshall does not dele
gate this to his deputy, Gen. Nc
Narney, the answer is also not diff
cult to ascertain. Gen. Marshall is
too much Interested in the success
OF the war effort to allow any man
to be chosen to take his place who
Is not capable of running the home
front staff organization. For Gen.
Marshall would be dependent on
such an organization and his whole
field operation would be directly re-
lated to what was the efficiency or
inefnciency of the staff left behind.
Marshall Scorns Politics.
Gen. Marshall, like his colleague,
Admiral King, isn't interested in
political maneuvers and would be
the first to frown upon any such
considerations. President Roosevelt
has too much respect for his mill
tary advisers to ask them to con-
slider political factors in the man
hgement Of the war. If he had been
30 inclined he had ample oppor-
tunity long before this. Thus, last
autumn when the invasion of North
Africa was being planned, Mr..
Roosevelt might have sought to
schedule the operati week sooner
1T might have affected the con-
gressional elections because at the
time the country was in a rather
discontented mood about the prog
ress Of the war. Had the President
been playing politics with the war
operations, he certainly would not
have put the full force of the ad-
ulilistration behind the drafting of
fathers at this time. He might have
been tempted to defer 1t and take
D chance, but when his military
advisers say it's necessary, MIR.
Roosevelt takes their word for it.
The President has some ideas on
military and naval strategy and
doesn't hesitate to express them to
his military chiefs, but basically the
conduct Of this war is the result of
the planning of the Combined Chiefs
Of Staff, whose technical informa-
ton about logistics and training OF
troops and all collateral problems
of supply and military action is
such that no layman could possibly
take the responsibility for decision
without such technical advice.
1t has been assumed that Prime
Minister Churchill and the Presi-
dent are running the strategy OF
this war. Possibly this impression
has been created by their public
addresses which reveal many pre-
viously .undisclosed facts about tn.
conduct Of the war, but when the
Prime Minister takes a course Of
action and lays it before the Presi-
dent he has had already the rec
concentrations of his own military
men. The Prime Minister coulc
overrule them-possibly he does II
on some occasions-but there is not
the slightest foundation for the
belief that Mr.. Roosevelt overrule.
his Gwn military advisers. He MAY
accept the view of the British mill.
tary commanders as expressed t.
him by Mr.. Churchill, but wher
such view is presented it is usual,
the well-documented view of the
British land, sea and air chieftains
The British are known to have beer
very thorough and businesslike ir
presenting their ideas to the Chur.
chilli Roosevelt conferences.
One good reason for not tellins