Evening star., 1943-11-21
Planning Invasion Involves
Tremendous Forces and Luck
BY Capt. Paul Hendren, u. s. ".

tCdpt. raul Hendfen, u. ). ~, mas
had 20 years. sea serpice ON battle
ships, cruisers and deStroyers and is
an authority on anlphibiouS 1Ddrdre.
He is graduate OF the Navy War
College and the Army Industrial
College Which concerns itself aUith
joint procurement planning for joint
action betiOeen Army and NaDy.
Capt. Hendren commanded large
co'nbdtant ship in the inuaSion of
Northwest Africa in November, 1912,
and commanded the same ship in the
inuasion OF Sicily and at Salerno,
Italy,
After the Casablanca conference in
January of this year the detailed plans
for Allied offensives in the Mediterra-
mean began to crystalline. Combatant
vessels TO support these landing opera
tions were available. Troop transports
could be made available in the required
numbers. 1t was necessary, however to
plan for. build, and transport to Medi-
terraneen bases literally thousands of
assor---] small craft. This heterogeneous
collection of invasion craft might, for
lack of a better collective name, be
called water bugs"
In news releases from United Nations
sources it has been correctly stated that
between $500 and 5000 vessels took part
IN the invasion of Sicily. Of these
thousands of vessels the great majority
were of the water-bug variety. Each of
them falls properly within the limits of
the definition of naval vessel but not
within the usually accepted layman's
mental picture of a naval vessel.
They are of assorted and sometimes
weird types. There are the familiar
and photographed invasion barges
designed to carry troops, any type of
motorized equipment as we'll as ammu-
milton, aviation gasoline, field kitchens
and myriad of other items of the
paraphernalia of war. In addition to
these, there are the infantry landing
barges, mine sweepers by the hundred;
submarine chasers, patrol craft tank
landing craft of assorted sizes and ca
pacities, support vessels, control vessels,
aircraft rescue vessels, and the much
glamorized motor torpedo boats, be-
sides some specialized craft the details
of which cannot, at this time, be re-
vealed
The scheduling of the routing and
timing for these groups of vessels posed
a problem of the first magnitude Not
only was it necessary to route them so
as to provide a minimum of interfer-
ence between individual groups, but also
to provide protection from submarines,
surface vessels including night raids by
E-boats, and from enemy aircraft. Also
1t was necessary so to route them as to
confuse the Axis intelligence services as
to ultimate destination.
Planned Far Ahead.
This routing schedule was worked out
months ahead of time and it was a
model and a masterpiece of its kind. For
week before D-day conveys were set
in motion throughout the length of the
Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Alex
andria. Each sailed on a definite day
and at specified hour and each was
required to be at definite rendezvous
at certain hours of each day. The Axis
air reconnaissance information obtained
from observing these movements must
have been startling and confusing to
degree approaching the chaotic.
BY 4:30 pm. of July 9, about IL hours
before the time scheduled for the actual
landing, all of these groups of ships
took up a direct course to their ulti-
mate destination and each group at this
time passed close enough to a definite
landmark to enable it to obtain a
geographical position and thus insure
accurate navigation for the few remain
ing hours.
1t is not possible to overemphasize the
extreme value of the detailed and metz
culous planning which had been done
by the Allied staff organizations in
preparation for the Sicilian campaign.
The final plan was truly paragon of
clarity and completeness which had
evolved from the painstaking fitting
together of the needs and capabilities
of such varied military commands and
other agencies as the British, Cana
dian, United States and French colo
nial armies; the British, United States,
Canadian, Greek, Polish and Neither
lands navies; the Allied air forces, both