Evening star., 1943-11-05

Disaster Faces
Nuzis in ItuIv
By Maj. George FIELDING Eliot

The capture of Isernia is the most
hopeful development in the Italian
campaign that we have had for some
weeks. 1t looks as though a complete
breakthrough of the German center
may have been effected. There is now
a distinct possibility that the German
Army in Southern Italy may have been
broken into two parts. If this is so,
then there is at least theoretical
chance that one Of these parts NAV
be rolled up and destroyed. 1 say a.
theoretical chance, because weather.
terrain, fatigue and the difficulties of
supply must always be taken into ac-
count, so that opportunities which on
the map look golden indeed cannot in
actual war always be seized upon and
fully realized.
The Germans have made two strong
stands in Southern Italy, each of them
IN front OF road giving good lateral
communication clear across the perlin-
sula. The first of these was the Termon-
| Vlnchlaturo-Capua road The second
Is the Vasto-Isernia- -Teano road, from
| which the Germans are now being
driven.
North of this road there is no good
transverse highway across Italy until
the road from Pescaro to Rome Is
reached. This means that the Germans
now must accept all of the dangers in
herent In fighting in two separated
groups, or they must fall back to the
vicinity of the Pescaro-Rome road, A
thlro possibility is that the Germans
might attempt a defense based partly
on the Pescaro road and partly on a
branch road running from Avezzano
south to Gaeta on the Mediterranean
coast This, however, would be a peril
Gus experiment, for 1t would mean that
the Germans accepted deep salient
in the center of their line at the outset
and breakthrough at or near the tip
OF the salient would almost certainly
mean the development and destruction
OF the troops holding the western half
OF the line.
Considering all this, it is obvious
that the of1cial spokesman at Allied
headquarters is not going too far when
he says that the Importance of the
capture of 1sernia can hardly be over
estimated. 1t is possible that it may
prove the turning point in the Italian
campaign for which we have been watt
ing, and that the situation may now so
develop as to permit the use OF addi-
tional forces in decisive fashion by the
Allies. BY decisive is meant decisive as
to the fate of Rome and the remainder
of the Italian peninsula generally. for
no more far-reaching decision Is to be
sought in Peninsular Italy
On the other hand we must not dis
euise from ourselves the fact that the
long delay in Southern Italy has given
the Germans an opportunity to assemble
considerable numbers of troops in the
area between the Alps and the Pc and
thus the opportunity to launch powerful
counterattacks against our forces in
Italy, probably in superior strength so
Tar as ground troops are concerned 1t
Is entirely possible that the very Difficult
ties In which the Germans flnd them
selves as the result OF the capture of
1sernla may serve to convince the Ger
man high command that the time has
come to resolve these difficulties by
throwing in powerful additional forces.
1t would indeed be almost certain that
they would do this rather than accept
the necessity for a retreat to the Pes
caro- road, were 1t not for the fact that
the situation in Russia has grown so
much worse for them and the threat of
an Anelo-American invasion in the west
has become so much more imminent,
that the German high command may
not now feel that they can commit any
more troops to so distant and eccentric
battle area as that in Southern italy,
The fact that they cannot in any case
do very much to offset the increasing
Allied air superiority is another factor
which must weigh in favor of a policy
OF withdrawal. But We must wait until
we see whether the Germans are able
successfully to detach their troops from
the consequences of the present break
through before we begin thinking in
terms OF a German withdrawal. which
1t Is just possible they may not have the
opportunity to make at all.
(copyrsht 1a43, New York Tribune Inc)