Detroit evening times., 1943-08-30

THE conquest of the island of Sicily marks
a very definite stage in the development
of this war. Perhaps not at once but even
tually, we will know the history of these 3S
DAYS of continuous movement and fighting,
and the full record will teach a great deal,
not previously known, about modern battle
and its tactics.
The strategy of this victory seems to be
quite clear now. The art of battle, the tactics
employed, are not yet clearly disclosed but
nonetheless it may be justifiable TO attempt
some observations.
First, the amphibious movement from
Africa whereby the Allied armies were sue
cessfully landed on the southeastern coast OF
Sicily, was a triumph of planning, audacity
and surprise.
Apparently, the enemy had been led to
expect that the landings would occur at the
western end of the island around Marsala
and Trapan the nearest points to the main
embarkaton port of Algiers. His expectations
had been fostered by successful feints. AS a
consequence, the points where actual landing
occurred, were not ready for resistance
as might have been expected.
I ANDING on both sides of Cape Correnti
of each army The landing was somewhat
unique because no established harbors we're
available nor were at first used.
Yet, such was the utility of the landing
barges and of the mechanical facilities, that
not only soldiers but heavy guns, transport
and equipment were moved quickly ashore,
without the assistance of improved ports, their
piers and cranes.
In former discussions of amphibious war
fare and Of landings on hostile coasts, the be-
lief has been that improved harbors were
necessary and that 1t would take many days
to get ashore the full equipment Of a division
in guns, munitions and heavy supplies, tanks
and trucks.
But on Sicily, two anxious days, probably
the most critical days of the campaign, suf
feed to land the Allies in such strength that
they gained beachheads, developed far enough
into the interior so that-the beach landing
positions were secured from devastating fire
of long distance enemy artillery.
IN THE Manchuran war with Russia in
1904 the japanese landed four armies sue
cessively on the Bay of Korea. The first was
the landing of Gen. Kuroki's first army at
Chemulpo 1t was a bold undertaking. care
fH4lyexeeuted, and IL wen wide praise.
In fact, these japanese amphibious land
ings have stood until this present war as
models of such undertakings
But it took the first Japanese army from
February II to the 22d to land one division,
the Twelfth, and not until March % were the
three divisions Of this army put ashore, and
not until the end of April had it's columns
reached, by marching, the Manchurian boun-
dary on the Yalu River
The other expeditionary landings were
likewise successful and they were considered
fine examples of organization and prepara-
ton But in point Of time they expended
weeks and months, as contrasted with the
swift operations Of the Allied armies on Sicily
The Japanese army landings have little
further military instruction for us, when COM
pared with the methods used in this war
They are still interesting examples of military
history, but today are wholly obsolete.
II was upon the British landing at Gal
lipoli in 1915, with all its mistakes and dis
NToc+ brool Doo.lop.