Evening star., 1943-10-11

equipped with 20 and % nm. cam
non. This enables them to stay out
of the range of the 50-caliber ma
chine guns carried by our bombers,
and to fire at us from a safe distance.
Such facts raise again the whole
vital question of performance factors
in our aviation, as against sheer
numbers. Precisely because ours is
a Nation devoted to mass production
there is always the temptation to
rely on quantity to the detriment
of quality-a policy which, in air
war, would prove disastrous.
President Quoted.
Recently the President, in his mes
sage to Congress, had this to say:
I'VE must remember that in any
great air attack the British and
Americans lose a fairly high proper
ton of planes and those losses must
be made up quickly, so that the
weight of bombing shall not decrease
for a day in the future. In fact, a
high rate of increase must be
maintained according to plan and
that means constant stepping up
of our production at home here"
The President has on previous oc-
casions mentioned the Importance
of military fighting attributes in air.
craft. All the same it is a pity he
did not make this explicit and en-
phatic this time. Airmen are al
ways alarmed when quantity is soft
pedaled And with good reason.
We know that air power strategy
can be discredited if we fail to keep
away out front in the matter of per-
formance leadership Whenever we
attempt to meet a challenge in the
air by outbullding the enemy, We
only increase our losses without
bringing a decision nearer. We must
also outthink the enemy, maintain
ing a tactical superiority over his
equipment.
Nazis Pay for Error.
Germany'S national thinking on
air power was distorted by its ex-
perience in the battle of Britain
That failure tended to discredit air
strategy in Nazi minds, and they
have been paving dearly for the
mistake ever since. They lost faith
in strategic bombardment as such
when the fault was with their
equipment and their tactics in its
employment
We should guard against air
power being discredited in similar
fashion in our own country, which
is exactly what may happen if our
air offensive is stymied by dispro-
portionate losses. If modern war
were only a contest in building we
could probably win hands down. But
it is also a contest in ingenuity The
research laboratory is as crucial for
the final outcome as the assembly
belt, and this is especially true in the
sphere of aeronauticS.
Gen. KnudSen, when he headed
up our production. once said that We
must defeat the enemy with the
weight Of our equipment. AS a spe-
cialist in mass output it was quite
natural that he should think in
those terms. But weight of equip
ment is only half the story. We
cannot hope to win by merely turn
ing the crank of production. The
sooner we stop thinking in terms of
abundance and begin to keep the
factors of combat superiority in the
forefront, the better.
The answer to German improve
ment in defensive fighter aircraft
is not just more bombers, but better
bombers, to close the tactical gap
that has been created by Nazi inno-
vatiOnS.
Our Flying Fortress has been i'm
proved again and again, but it is,
after all, an 8-vear-old design and
the limits of its refinement have
been reached. 1t has had it's face
lifted, so to speak, again and again,
until little more in the way of
higher performance can be squeezed
out Of it.
New bombers, about twice the size
of the Flying Fortress, have been
announced and may be in action
in the near future. But it is Ger
tainly not enough to bring out an
advanced type every six or eight
years. The change has been long
overdue and by the time the bigger
bombers are in full production they
may not be advanced enough to
close the tactical gap. We need to
think way ahead, and go in boldly
for the most effective equipment
by aeronautical progress
In the years before the war and
for some time after it started, for
ward-looking aviation people were
as matter of military
policy from thinking in terms Of
strategy. They were told that such
things were outside their compe-