The Wilmington morning star., 1943-08-30

otherWlse sad tale with its happy
ending.
The Hess case, which had been
slmmering for more than a year
after Hitler's aide flew to Scot
land and was locked up with
scarcely a word by the British,
boiled over October IA. On that
day, Molotov issued a statement
OF the Soviet government regard
Ing the responsibility of the Hit
lecite invaders and their accom-
pllces for the infamies committed
oy them in the occupied countries
OF Europe In it he named Hess,
only after Hitler and Goering, as
one OF the 'ri1gleaders of the
criminal clique and said pointed
ly:
The Soviet government consid-
ers 1t imperative that any one of
the ringleaders of Fascist Ge--
many, who during the course of
the war has already fallen into
the hands of the authorities of
states fighting against Hitlerite
Germany, should be brought to
trial without delay before a spe-
cial international tribunal and
punished with the full severity of
the penal law.
On the surface, this was a SIM
pie and outspoken demand for i'm
mediate trial Of Hess. Actually,
there was much more to it than
that. The Russians did want Hess
tried and his status as guest
of the British clarified. But more
than anything, they wanted a sec
ond front, and the Hess case pro-
vided another occasion for prod
cling the British government. Next
to that, the Russians were man.
euvering for postwar positions,
and here was one in which they
felt strong.
The background of the case
went back to January 13, 1912,
when the Czech minister to Rus
sia, M. Fierlinger, and the repre-
sentative of the French National
Committee, M. Garreau, sent
note to the Soviet government on
behalf of the occupied nations Of
Europe, Czechoslovakia, France,
Poland, Yugoslavia, Norway, Bel
GUM, Greece, Holland, and Lux
embourg, giving a joint 'declara-
ton regarding punishment for
crimes committed during the
war; and asking the Soviet Un-
ion to join in with a statement
of German responsibility for such
crimes. The note was growing
yellow with age, and M. Garreau
was already back in London, when
Molotov pulled it out of its pigeon
hole at the foreign commissariat
and answered 1t.
What had happened in the
meantime to provoke the answer?
In addition to the differences over
the second front, which the Rus
slams had come to consider as an
open political issue, there had
been another exchange of notes.
Foreign Secretary Eden sent to
Soviet Ambassador Maisky in Lon
don an invitation to the Soviet
Union to join a United Nations
Commission for the investigation
of war crimes. The date of that
note was important. British au-
thorities said it was sent October
3. The Soviets claimed they re-
ceived it October g. Without wait
ing fo- Soviet reply, the British
government announced, October Z,
IN the House of Commons, through
the Lord Chancellor, Lord Simon,
the details of its plan. 1t provided
for postwar surrender and punish
ment of war criminals and early
ablishment of the commission
to record crimes and name those z
responsible.
President Roosevelt announced
simultaneously in Washington the
United States readiness to COOP
crate with Great Britain and the
other United Nations il establish.
ing the war crimes commission,
and its intention to demand enemy
surrender of criminals at the close
of the war.
The Soviet Union was left out
of the United Nations plan until
the last moment, and then CON
fronted with a fait accornpli.
Moreover, it's known desire for i'm
mediate trial of war criminals
was ignored. This point might be
argued, on the basis of British
and American desire to avoid mass
~eprisals. But no one could deny
Russia. as the country which had
suffered the most, the right to a
leading place in formation of any
plans for punishment of war GRIM
inals. That this happened was, on
the face of it, a diplomatic blum.
der The Soviets did nothing h
improve the situation by raising
the Hess case so sharply. Allied
relations were at their darkest.
In any such international issue,
the question, which was rarely
raised. but always implied, was:
What are you going to do about
it? The unspoke.l answer mlgh'
be that the Russians would aban
. don the war, leave the United Ma
tions, and make separate peaci
with Germany. No one who re-
: membered the Russian about-face
of August, 1889, the pact Ct non
AGGRESSION and friendship with
German, could deny that the Sow
lets were capable of abrupt action
!. In this case the SovieLs had nc
such intention. But the implied