The Wilmington morning star., 1943-09-25
WRITER EXPLAINS
MACARTHUR PLAN
CONTINUED From Page One)

my at the lowest cost in men ano
materiel?
There art four available base
areas from which the Allies coulo
pivot striking forces against ia
pans far-flung empire. These are
Alaska Aleutians: Hawaii Mid
way: Australian Guinea-Solo
mons; and India-Ceylon.
The Aleutians are somewha'
more distant from the centers OF
American production and supply
than Hawaii, but Kiska and even
Dutch Harbor. are much nearer
than other bases to the heart OF
Japan proper. Aleutian based
bombers have already demonstrate
ed that they are within the range
of Japanese-held Kurile islands but
the difficulties of rough and foggy
weather there have not been over
come.
1t would be a daring commander
irdeed who would venture to lead
ar invasion fleet across $3.50 stat
ute miles of open seas from Mid
way to the main island of Japan.
Over two-thirds of the distance the
invasion fleet would not only be
dependent upon carriers for air
plane cover but would be within
range of enemy planes based on
islands.
The Australian and Indian base
areas are both distant from Japan
proper and approximately equidis-
tant from the enemys newly won
sources of vital war materials.
Both areas are approximately the
same distance from British and
American sources of supply.
India. as base for large scale
operations, has an apparent ad.
vantage over Australia in tht il
offers land bridgehead into Jap
anese-held East Asia and that il
possesses a vast reservoir OF ma
tive fighting and labor power.
India's land connection with Bur.
ma threatened to prove a weak
ness last year but now the British
have made India reasonably Sc.
cure from invasion. India still rep
resents definite weaknesses. Chief
of these is its native population Of
subject peoples among whom dis
content is prevented from p e n
eruption by stern repressive meas
ures.
Adding to this discomfort, and
weakening midas potential useful
ness as an operating base, is the
country's chronic lack of food suf-
ficient even for the native popu-
lace.
Even if these weaknesses could
be overcome-as they no doubt
focused there-the chances of sue.
would be if major attention were
cess of such an undertaking should
be weighed against basic geograph-
ical and military facts which still
are discernible through the men
tai fog generated by the very sin,
cerity and urgency of our desire
to give effective succor to long
suffering China.
All leaders seem to agree that
we must, to achieve decisive
smashing victory over the Japa
nese military machine, make the
fullest use Of China's bases, her
n Empower and above all her I'm
breakable will to fight to victory
Heroic exertions might succeed
iii pushing the Allied armies across
northern Burma to the Chinese
border. That would mean the re
opening Of the Burma road. Those
of us who worked in Burma anc
China during the bitter pre-Pear
Harbor years know that the Bur
ma road, far from being an end il
Itself, was the last and least eff
ficient supply route resorted to by
the Chinese in the hope of main
tanning minimum resistance after
the lifelines from H0nkong, Tonkir
gulf and northern Indo-Chia hae
bee successfully cut by the Japa
nese.
Allied engineers could increase
its carrying capacity many times
but it would have to carry a vol
ume that would pale it's pre-wa.
traffic into ignificance.
Lord Mountbatten is unlikely t.
disclose the method or objective
of promised operations by the Eas
Asia command.
Existing and we'll established
| bases at Ceylon, only Thousand
! miles from the tip of Sumatra ant
little further from the marrow
waist of the Malayan peninsula
however, would suggest the pos
sibility of at least strong fem
toward the northwestern end o
Sunatra and stronger thrust de
signed to cut Japanese communi
cations between Siam and Singa
pore.
Such a daring move would strik
at the heart of the enemy's mill
tary and economic hold in South
east Asia but it likely would prov
costly. Even if successful it woul'
-4.1J IT, h11;o- ,,,;fl, 49, =.