Evening star., 1943-07-21
Axis Communications
In Sicily Cut by Allies
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot


Two points which are we'll illustrated
by present operations in Sicily are:
Cd The vital Importance of communi-
cations in modern war, because of the
tremendous demands of modern fighting
forces for an uninterrupted flow of NUM-
tions and supplies;
90 The very great advantage, in con-
sequence, which air superiority gives to
the side which possesses it, because of its
ability to strike at the enemy's lines of
communication.
The war in Sicily is above all else a
war of communications because of the
fact that Sicily, like Tunisia. is far dis
tant from the Axis centers of production
and has little or no resources of its own.
1t must be supplied from Germany and
Northern Italy. From the very first, it
has been apparent that one of the ma jor
objectives of our strategical air force was
the cutting of Sicily's main supply route
across the Strait of Messina, by con-
stantly bombing the docks, ferry termi-
mails and railway yards and stations on
both sides of the strait. 1t seems likely
that, so far as any major movement of
supplies is concerned, this route has been
pretty definitely interrupted.
1t is of course, possible that small YES
sells may slip across the strait at night, or
with good luck may even make the dan
gerous run from an Italian mainland port
to one of the very few anchorages on the
North Slcillan coast. The only good port
on this coast is Palermo, and Palermo
too has been on our bombing list We
may assume that our warships, as well
as our aircraft are watching the northern
and western coasts of Sicily with unceas-
ing vigilance
The ports OF the south and east coasts
are all In our hands. with the exception
OF Catania, which is now closely besieged
by land and blockaded by sea.
On the whole, we may assume that the
exterior communications OF Sicily have
been cut. That means that resistance
within the island is dependent on the
stores and munitions which were already
there when our air and naval blockade
began to take effect. The further and
necessary extension OF that blockade lies
in the interruption of the internal COM
munlcations of the island so that these
munitions and the troops which use them
cannot be shifted about from point to
point as the enemy may desire. When
this has been accomplished the enemy
forces can be broken up into separate
parts, and separately destroyed.
In the beginning We were, of course,
concerned with making our own internal
communications system in Sicily secure.
We obtained the great advantage at
the very first of seizing three seaports
through which we could bring in our
troops and supplies-Licata, Syracuse
and Augusta
We now hold the whole of the road
system in the southeastern part of the
island, including the important trans
verse highway. Agricento-Canicat Call
tanlssetta-C igirone-Syracuse. We are
fighting our way into Emma, which con-
trols not only the one remaining interior
east-west highway available to the en-
emy but also the Palermo -Catania rail-
enemy lines is presented by an American
advance northward from Caltanissetta.
Before this was accomplished, however,
the enemy succeeded in concentrating
the greater part of his German troops in
the Plain of Catania and is putting up a
very fierce fight to keep us from occupy
ing the airfields on that plain and taking
the city Of Catsnia itself. 1t Is reason
able to suppose that his main supplv
depots are at Palermo and Messina. The
fall Of Emma will cut the only railway
connecting the German troops directly
with Palermo. and will greatly reduce
the capacity of his road communications
with that city. leaving him only the
difficult mountain highway through
Nicosia
The direct road to Messina skirts the
coast. squeezed in between the sea and
the frowning heights of Mount Etna and
is certainly subject to interruption by
naval bombardment 1t is probable.
therefore, that the enemy at Catania is
now dependent on the north coast high
way between Palermo and Messina, and
the roads which branch off from it
southwark toward the general region of
Mount Etna. BY this somewhat circui-
tous route, it is still possible to bring
supplies from either Messina or Palermo
to the vicinity of Catania.
Probably the most important OF the
branch roads is that which leaves the
main highway at Naso and runs south
ward to Randazzo, where it connects
with the circular road which runs
around the foot of Mount Etna and is
paralleled by little narrow gauge rail-
way, familiar to so many tourists in
days gone by. From this point it is
possible to reach Catania by way of
Adrano and Palermo. 1t is notable that
Randazzo recently has been heavily
raided by our aircraft, and the German
resistance before Catania appears to be
diminishing-doubtless in direct propor-
ton to the failure Of the communica-
tions system by which it lives.
(Copyright, 1943, New York Tribune Inc)