The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1943-10-18
Interpreting
The War
By ELTON C. FAY

High commanders, especially
those who win, make their W.
plans flexible.
This is done for many reasons
production, logistics, manpowe-
new allies or OBJECTIONS, But otbar
reasons may exist behind the line,
of the enemy, beyond the imma-
date ken Of the high command.
ers, and these possibilities must
be taken into account.
1t is to be presumed that IN.
British and American leaders who
have cut the patterns for this win.
ter's warfare in western and
southern Europe bore this in mind
Generally winter is not looke6
| upon as the time for launcaiaQ
invasions or establishing beach.
heads in enemy territory (Rus
sian operations being the excep.
tom This, combined with other
factors, seems to work agains,
the likelihood of cross channel IN.
vasion of Europe, a move on Nor,
way or any full-scale effort in
snow-filled passes of the Balkans
There are, however, at least
two possibilities for an upset
surprise and swiftly changed
situation in any one or all areas
of Nazi-dominated Europe. It is
the latter which presumably would
be taken into account in making
war plans flexible.
While the Allied leaders NAY
rot intend any landings in Eur
one under winter conditions sud-
cen and broad collapse Of the Ger
man home-front, broadscale re-
volt bv Nazi-conquered people or
mass Withdrawal of German gar
risons to reinforce the eastern or
southern fronts could change their
plans.
Extensive withdrawal Of Nad
forces from Norway land under
ground reports have suggested
some units already have been
moved out) might make It worth.
while for the Allies to attempt
establishment of a base there, with
the idea of holding or until spring
makes possible its expansion into
broad reoccupation move. In
the interim, the value Of such a
base or bases would be to pro,
vide some semblance Of aviation
protection and reconnaissance for
the northern ship route to Russia
and to bring the Allies closer to
the Nazi fleet hiding in NorWe-
sian fjords and in Germanys Bal
tic ports.
Revolt and continued success by
guerrilla armies in the Balkans
could outbalance a decision not tC
attempt an invasion of that area
when snow, rain, fog and freezInE
}, winds would work against Allet
| lana ana all lOICGS.
Similarly, disqualification of IN
rest in France and the low coun
tries into organized revolt, couple
with any shlpping-out of Germa
garrisons, might beckon the al
mics in England to move ahea
of some previously fixed TIM
schedule.
A winter invasion at any Of tn
points Of the European fortress
except from the foothold alread.
established in Italy, would in
volve cross-Water operations anl
therefore make the circumstance!
more difficult than those under
which the Russians have conduct
ed winter offensives. Air cover IS
one of the prime essentials for a
successful amphibious operahQa-
and winter weather is not reliable
for aviators. Moreover, the Anglo
American allies have found, N
the invasions of Sicily and Italy,
the value of airborne troops BON
, glider and parachute, in setting
up beachheads. AS in the case OF
an air umbrella to protect tie
landing parties, winter weather
! would operate against the use OF
, airborne troops.
These considerations are in ad-
dition to the usual difficulties OF
fighting a war on land when men