Evening star., 1943-03-05
japanese Air Power
Held 'Non-Existent'
Major Eliot Argues Bottle
Of Bismarck Sea Displayed
Foes Replacement Weakness

BIZ Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
We have won a great victory in the
Southwest Pacific The complete de-
struction by the Air Force of Gen Mac
Arthurs command of the Japanese con-
voy off New Guinea seems likely to para
lyze the enemys efforts to reinforce his
garrjsons on the mainland of New
Guinea for some time to come and may
we'll result il the extinction of the last
japanese foothold on that great island.
1t may indeed prove so to have weak
ened the enemy AS to pave the way for
the ong-expected Allied offensive to-
ward Rabaul
But while we must wait for the future
to disclose the strategical results of
Gen. MacArthurs great achievement,
the operation in itself is highly signih-
cant as to its details and as to the
curious light which it throws upon the
japanese mentality.
The action began with the discovery
OF the Japanese convoy off the SOUTH
eastern tip of the island of New Britain
and 1t proceeded in a long running
ilSlio oo"Il tllIouSll bdIll)lcI oGIdlJ ullO
the Huon Gulf, on which Lac is situ-
ated. Lac was undoubtedly the point
which the japanese were trying to reach.
The total japanese force involved was
% ships-12 troop transports and 10
escortlng warships, reported in Gen.
MacArthur's communique as CRUISERS
or destroyers." 1t should be noted that
"A visibility
the swiftly moving conditions of the
fight, 1t was undoubtedly most difficult
for our Army flyers to determine wheth-
er the Japanese warships were small
cruisers or large destroyers.
The japanese appear to have been op-
Grating in two groups-one of IA ships,
the first to be discovered by our air
craft, and one Of eight ships which
joined the first group after the attack
had begun.
The point where the battle started is
only about 325 miles from Port Moresby
and the finish in Huon Gulf only about
16O miles. The intervening track of the
action followed winding course, about
270 miles in length
high command which sends a troon
convoy OF such size into waters within
such easy reach of hostile air bases well
provided with long range bombing
planes? Yet apparently the CONVOY
commander and his captains had orders
to keep on going toward Lac at all costs.
for there does not seem to have been
qtfpDnt n boo olr
any japanese ship and the smaller
group joined the larger under fire and
carried on with it-instead of trying to
get away independently All this is
either desperation or overconfidence, or
shocking ignorance of modern war
We may dismiss the latter; the Jap
anese have shown that they understand
war we'll enough. Nor is it easy to
ascribe overconfidence to the Japanese
high command. They have learned by
this time the fighting qualities of our
Air Force and the skill and courage of
our pilots. 1t may very we'll be that In
far-of Toxic an. order was issued to
the commander of the New Britain
area that he must reinforce the JAP
anese troops in New Guinea at all costs;
in this case 1t would be quite In con-
tormlty with the japanese character
to proceed with an operation of this
sort even though its chances OF get
ting through were infinitesimal.
1t is known that there Is an increas-
Ing feeling In the Japanese Army that
their navy has let the army down badly,
at Guadalcanal, Buna and elsewhere.
The navy may have determined to take
this convoy through, come what may,
or perish in the attempt.
The Japanese may, of course, have
counted too heavily upon the poor visi-
bility and upon the covering operations
OF their own air force, and it is quite
possible that our numerical superiority
In the air was surprise to them and
represents reinforcements recently and
secretly made available to Gen. Mac
Arthur.
Our really imposing qualitative su-
periority in the air can have been no
secret to the Japanese, as it has been
becoming more apparent almost daily
IN all air operations in the Southern
and Southwestern Pacific areas. When
on both counts our superiority reaches
point where we destroy or damage IS
enemy aircraft in a single action at
cost OF foE of our own, 1t is a highly
significant development.
1t has long been the opinion of this
writer that japanese air power, in the
true sense of that word, is practically
non-existent. This is because the low
rate OF replacement does not permit the
japanese aircraft industry to meet the
losses of long sustained war against
a major enemy, with the result that
both in quantity and quality the op-
Grating forces deteriorate at accumulate
ing rates
The japanese were able to get to-
gether enough aircraft and enough pi-
lots for their initial efforts but no ma
ton can be said to have air power
which is unable to sustain it's air force
IN the field AS the inevitable losses begin
to mount. That seems to be the case
with Japan
Copyright, 1a43, New York Tribune, 1nc)