The Wilmington morning star., 1943-09-24
MACARTHUR SET
PLAN FOR PUSH
CONTINUED From Page One)

These papers had asserted tina
Mountbatten would overshadow
and might even supercede Mac
Arthur-a development, incidental
ly which would have been as I'm
popular in Australia as in this
country. Furthermore, they tag
ged Macarthur with sponsoring
island hopping strategy.
The latter alone was enough t.
infuriate Macarthur, who has con
eistently opposed the tedious pro
cess of tightening the ring around
Japan by methodical seizure Of is
lnnd outposts, and has instead ad
vocated what he terms broad ano
massive strategic strokes. How
ever curious its terms, then, Mac.
Arthur's statement is regarded
here as an answer to Australian
newspapers-and possibly also te
similar implications in state
ment made in the Southwest Pa
cific by Senator Chandler D-Kyo
In the wake of all the clamo1
over what Macarthur might have
meant. it can be stated on high
if unquotable. authority:
ID There is at present no con-
troversy between Macarthur and
the War Department. between
Macarthur and the high command.
ca Nothing happened at Quebec
TO change MacArthur's status, the
Quebec conference combining itself
as far as the war with Japan
is conference.-the plans affecting
Mountbatten's new command and
to operations in China.
90 As far as operations in the
Southwest and South Pacific. and
the coordinated operations in the
Central Pacific, are concerned. the
broad decisions were reached at
Casablanca. Details were settled
at conference of Pacific staff
officers in Washington last spring.
Macarthur plan was adopted
virtually intact, and Macarthur is
now engaged in carrying it out.
Northern Pacific operations e
outside his realm.
Geographically, the extent of
Macarthur command was made
more clear by a London announce
ment today til It Mountbatten's
Southeast Asia theater stops at
line running south from Indo-China
through the China sea, passing be-
tween Sunatra and Java. East
ward of this line, and to Guadal-
canal island in the Solomons, the
responsibility is MacArthur's.
Eventually, some adjustment Of
responsibilities may have to be
made. but both Macarthur n d
Mountbatten must retake large
portions of conquered territory be-
fore their respective theaters can
conceivably overlap.
Both apparently aim at an even
tual break through into the China
sea, where the shipping lifeline
between Japan and the rich ter
ritories she has seized could be
cut by sea and air action.
AS MacArthur's campaign in
New Guinea and tn e Solomons
grows. however, it suggests that
a massive blow he has in mind
might be to break through the is
land defenses of the enemy by
Selling or neutralizing Rabaul on
New Britain. giving the fleet
access to the relatively open
stretches of the Pacific north Of
New Guinea.
With tn. Japanese chain of land
ing fields I oxen, and Allied bases
established along New Guinea's
north coast, an Allied fleet con-
ceivably could enter these waters
under the protecting cover Of
shore-based aircraft, and force the
enemy fleet out of Truk-which
would be threatened-for a show
down.
Assuming a japanese disaster
in that case, Macarthur would then
be free to swing his forces west
ward toward the Netherlands In
dies, or launch an operation
against the Philippines, an under
taking dear to his heart.
This, of course, is pure conjec-
ture-but it is certain the oper-
atoms in the Solomons and New
Guinea to date have been a strug-
gle to obtain Allied air bases and
to break the chain of Japanese air
bases in the enemy's protective
island ring.
In other words, they are not
m end in themselves, but merely
an essential preliminary to plac-
ing Macarthur and his forces in
position to begin more ambitious