The Wilmington morning star. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1909-1990, 1943-09-24
MARSHALL STORY
HAS NO BASIS
Continued From Page One)

and ever SINCE we entered
coll'l. .ar the question did not be-
The a VIZ real until after the Quebec
con lrs,. after Quebec? Because our
WY Was in the Mediterranean and
areat Russian offensive had
The sht US last month to a phase
bE0 .Ea war where it was possible
o. NV necessary to make the con-
ana ;, "a strategical plans for the
tu ..o+ Of Germany and for the
'a ain campaign against J p n.
n'm a nIans we're made at Quebec.
.ns.S the strategical commitments
wv been made, it was then an
hsu ouestion whether the chief
'9s ...tf in Washington would not
o. s,s subsidiary to the generals
! 1ss in the field.
slI IN The defensive and preparatory
IN, III Of the war it was obvious
p Isst the great decisions had to be
l,.r in Washington. These deci-
lan',' dealt with the organizing and
s Swine Of the army, tn ealloca-
a is, NJ inadequate equipment, the
w. l..rrslonment of the various the
' Nv. and the global strategy of
s u. war But these questions have
a,' No main been settled, and now
u !, most likely that the great
!. will be those Of the COM
'onders who execute the plans
r ,1 have been made. When the
"".r,manders are engaged in Of
. .v, battle, will they not be tell
!s+ the chiefs of staff in Wash
! !.s and in London what they
m ns rather than be taking orders
s.,n, them? Can the fighting, as
i.;stinallished from h prepara-
.nry chase of the war be directed
bv remote control from Washing
ton?
The objection to letting General
MARSHALL command the armies he
has created is that it deprives the
president and Congress of his
oonacitv to advise them by his
ds;lv presence. This is undoubted-
" an objection. 1t arises, how
over not fire.. conspiracy but
trom the fact that no man can be
in Two places at once.
The problem is in its essentials
SIMILAR to that which Jefferson
Davis failed to solve in the case
NJ General Lee, which Lincoln did
solve when at last he found Cen
eral Grant.
Lee was the greatest soldier OF
the Confederacy. He was needed
in Richmond to show Davis how to
devise the strategy of a unified
war on the several fronts in north
ern Virginia, the Mississippi and
the Carolinas. Lee also was the
best leader of the Army of North.
ern Virginia Davis tried to solve
the problem by giving him the
command of all troops in Virginia
and the Carolinas, while leaving
him in executive command in
northern Virginia. Lee refused,
saying: II cannot operate in this
manner" and because Davis
failed to make him generalissimo
the Confederacy did not develop
unified strategy.
Lincoln, on the other hand, after
many disappointments and fail
ures with Mcclellan and others,
found in Grant a soldier to whom
he was willing to intrust the COM
mand of the Union armies on all
the fronts. Grants strategy being
settled, and his command assured,
the war was then conducted by
Grant from his military headquar-
tiers and not from Washington.
Few remember that Halleck was
chief of staff.
General Marshall has been in
Washington, as Gtneral Lee should
have been at Richmond, while the
fundamental decisions were being
made. The question is whether
now that they have been made,
MS role ought not to be that of
General Grant after 1864.
Certainly we cannot accept the
view that the role played by Wash
lngton and by Grant, by Napoleon
and by Foch, Is a demotion. We
may say also, I believe, that it
mas been bad enough to drag the