Evening star., 1943-10-17
Battle for Italy Holds Key
To Invasion Across Channel
BY Constantine Broom,

forces In western Europe, stated last
November when we entered North Africa
that If the Allies decided to fight in italy
he would no longer be worried about the
invasion of Western Europe.
The sour ., which reported these words
of the Nazi general Is worthy Of con-
fidence and many Allied leaders are led
to believe that the German general stan
will leave no stone unturned to send to
Marshal Rommel all the men and war
material he needs to make the battle for
Italy so costly that we will be compelled
to send important reinforcements from
this country to Gen. Eisenhower.
In the light of what is happening on
the Russian front 1t is believed that the
Nazis may be able to detach an additional
20 divisions possibly more-to check
our advance in Italy and possibly push
us back.
1t is improbable that important battles
will be fought in Russia in the near
future. Weather conditions, the distance
from the main base Of supply of the
Russian armies-some $50 miles-and
certain amount of weariness after many
months of continuous advance make
major battles on the Dnieper line
extremely unlikely. The American gen.
eral staff is fully aware of the problem
the Russians have in supplying 100000
men with food and ammunition to con-
tinue large-scale operations.
Should the Nazis take advantage Of
this situation and dispatch the 20 more
divisions to Italy our situation would
become dangerous indeed.
Twenty Divisions Destroyed.
1t Is believed in competent quarters
that the Germans will be able to detach
100000 men from the Russian front. The
Allies estimated that their original force
in that area was 224 divisions. Some 20
have been destroyed.
The present Nad line is much shorter
than the line of last July. One hundred
and fifty divisions are considered more
than sufficient as defensive force. The
needed reserves are included In this
number. Fifty divisions thus are left for
fighting in other sectors.
The Berlin high command knows that
weather conditions will make large
scale operations in the Balkans impos-
sible. 1t is not concerned at this time
with an invasion OF Western Europe or
Scandinavia, where the present forces
are more than sufficient to meet any
Allied threat.
They know that our campaign in italy
is no longer feint to cover other opera
tions. The Germans realize that We
have staked our reputation on beating
them there. The offensive may have
been against the better judgment Of the
American military men, but that no
longer matters.
So. 1t appears probable that whatever
Russian front will be rushed to Italy to
enable Marshal Rommel to ward OF the
Allied blows and, If possible. drive us
back with losses
Once embarked on the Italian CAM
paign. it is impossible for us to leave it.
We must push on with every ounce Of
strength at our disposal. If Gen. Eisen-
hover is faced with a numerically supe-
rior enemy he may in the end need re-
Inducements from outside his present
command.
Would Have Assistance.
The implications of such situation
are regarded as grave. Should Gen.
Eisenhower become hard pressed in
few weeks or months, he cannot be re-
fused assistance.
And the troops we may have to rush
to him to equalize the enemy's strength
will have to be taken from those units
earmarked for the invasion of Western
Europe.
A shift of 10, 20 or more divisions from
our invasion bases to Italy would make
our future operations in Western Eu-
rope difficult, If not impossible and the
Russians are not in the mood to give US
any time extension.
They accepted the explanations offered
them after the last meeting at Quebec
as to why a cross-Channel invasion was
not feasible this year. They had some
misgivings about the advisability of an
operation in Italy and for this reason
showed little more than polite approval
of our Mediterranean campaign.
The Russians moved to the Dnieper
line and so far have left unanswered the
Nazi peace approaches. But they have
served notice that they fully expect an
offensive in the west next spring and no
explanation or alibis will be accepted.
The Germans, realizing this, are ex-
| pected to continue the fight in Italy with
| vigor and bitterness. They may even
strip other fronts which are not likely to
be active" during the winter in order to
give Marshal Rommel the opportunity to
shove us back and compel us to shift our
forces to Italy.
To the German general staff the battle
in Italy is far more important than the
battle for Stalingrad. On the success or
failure OF the battle depends the future
Of the Reich; whether it will be COM