Evening star., 1943-03-23
Air Weakness Seen
Hondicoppine Romme|
Mai. Eliot Believes Nozis May
Have Soved Donets Armies
At Cost of Tunisiu Forces

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
The battle is joined In Tunisia, and on
the face of present reports Rommel ap-
pears to be in difficult situation indeed.
The British 9th Army is moving up from
the south, and the American 5th Army,
with its advance elements led by 1t. Gen.
Patton, is on its way from Sened to
Maknassy. There are as yet no reports
OF Montgomery's progress, but there are
reports of really tremendous air cover
age for the combined operation. and the
Germans do not appear to be able to meet
our air attacks with anything like ade.
quate countermeasures.
In view of the fact that the Germans
are reported as using very heavy dive
bomber and fighter support for their Of
1enslVe on the Donets, 1t may be that the
Germans have been compelled to pav a
heavy price for stabilization in Russia.
They may have saved their Donets army
from its recently threatened destruction
only at the cost of leaving Rommel with
out sufficient air support to meet the
Danger which now encompasses him.
Ihls is, OF course, a familiar story to
Rommel. 1t happened to him before at
FL Alamein, when the LuftwafTe SQUAD
rons which might have helped him were
lar away engaged in the vain attempt to
storm Stalingrad
But 1t brings to mind the whole cues
ton OF German air power. No question
heard asked more often in military
circles than this-"where is the 1uft.
wane" 1t Is obvious that the Germans
90 not have enough air power to meet
their three main obligations adequately:
Russia, Tunisia and the western air front.
When 1T comes to the pinch they have
Tor several months always had to rob
Peter to pay Paul.
Are they really 80 weak in air strength
that this condition is becoming perma.
nent? Has their production Of aircraft.
their pilot training program. their fuel
supply fallen to such low levels that the
Lu1twane can never hope to regain sum-
clent strength to meet the requisitions of
even two great theaters Of action simul-
taneously? If 80, Germany may be nearer
defeat than most Of US had supposed.
But the condition may be temporary,
1t may be caused by circumstances other
than permanent and irreparable de.
cline IN production or fuel supply. The
Luftwaf1e may be engaged in re -eouiupin1
large proportion Of its squadrons with
new types Of planes; there is some evil
dence that new types are coming into
service. If large program of this sort
were under way, it might well take a good
many squadrons out of active service for
the time being, especially If 1t happened
tnat switch in production was made in
many factories at the same time, 80 that
1t was not possible to feed the new planes
into service gradually. Also, II the new
types have markedly different character
istics from their predecessors, 1t might be
that an unusually long time has had to
be given to the training of pilots and air
crews on the new models.
Again, 1t may well be that the German
high command has decided upon some
new offensive, perhaps in Spain. perhaps
against Turkey, perhaps an all-out air
assault upon Britain, or perhaps almost
anything that might win them a further
respite. 1t may have been necessary to
Withdraw number of air units from
active service in preparation and train.
ing for this new operation. Many OBJ
servers feel that Germany has the re.
sources for one more powerful blow and
That the expenditure Of ground reserves
IN Russia lends color to the possibility
that such a new German effort would be
very largely an air effort
Finally. it is to be pointed out that tn.
Germans, As they are driven more and
more to defensive strategy, that is. to
one whose military object is no longer the
destruction Of their opponents. but the
oe1enSe OF the Fortress OF Europe" must
De more and more dependent on keeping
IN nano powerful air force as 4 mobile
reserve, to be thrown swiftly into action
at any threatened point. They cannot
tell IN advance where the next blow may
lall, whether in Norway, France. italy or
the Balkans.
Iney are too good soldiers to ATTEMPT
an all-round defense, save as a DELAYING
and holding defense which must be SUD-
ported by reserves. The perimeter which
they must watch Is too great to enable
ground troops to be rushed to any part
OF 1t in time to stave of disaster. Hence
they must count on an air reserve which
by well-placed system of bases, can be
nung into the scale to delay any Allied
assault until the ground troop reserves
can be rushed to the spot. So considered
they cannot afford even under the
greatest pressure, to commit the whole Of
the Luftwaf1e to other operations but
must keep at least considerable number
OF squadrons in hand to meet the ex-
pected emergency call.
These are some of the cares and bur.
oens OF defensive strategy. It is indeed
very different situation from the earlier
days when Germany could concentrate
her whole power against her enemies
one at time, without fear of interfer-
ence from any other source.
Copyright. 1943. New York Tribune, Inc,
Decision on Eotino