Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-12-04
Germans May Decide
To Give Up Rome
BIZ Mai. George Fieldino Eliot.

In considering the operations in italy,
we must keep in mind that for the
present, at any rate, the German forces
opposing Gen. Montgomery's 9th Army
on the Adriatic side of the peninsula
are separated by high mountain bar
riers from the Germans opposing Gen.
Clark's 5th Army on the western side
Of the peninsula. The only roads which
permit the shifting of troops back and
forth from one side to the other make
considerable detours northWard Here
tofore, in most of their defensive posi-
tons, the Germans have enjoyed good
lateral communications Immediately be-
hind their main line of defense. This is
not the case at present. The next such
transverse road to the northward is
that which runs from Pescara to Rome
This matter of late rail communica-
tons Is of special Importance, because
the German theory of defense has been
that Of an active defense, one which
saves manpower by making the utmost
use of mobility. This particularly has
been the case in Italy, where the Ger
man high command has shown greatest
reluctance to put in reinforcements and
has sought rather to use few troops
Of the highest quality and with the
best mechanical and motorized equip
ment. Naturally, the demands of the
Russian front and the growing Allied
threat in the west are factors which
initiate strongly against the involve
ment Of any large number of German
troops in a secondary theater of opera
tons, such as Italy.
So far the mobile defense has served
the Germans very well, but it is sys-
tenn which has its risks, and one of
these risks comes when circumstances
such as enemy pressure, bad weather
and poor communications tend to stabi-
lie the defensive front for any consid-
cradle period of time. To break away
from such stabilized position generally
requires strong reserves to cover the
withdrawal and to counterattack The
longer the sterilization continues, the
greater becomes the accumulated pres
sure of the attacking force and when the
front does give way. II there are in
suff1clent reserves to cover the retrograde
movement, very serious results may fol-
low. In other words, the highly mobile
defense with comparatively few effec-
tives is good system only as long as it
stays mobile; if it boys down for any
length Of time, its weakness in numbers
becomes an increasing peril to it. This
is what appears to have happened on
the front of the British 9th Army, where
the Germans are now apparently in full
retreat, abandoning great quantities of
equipment for the first time in the
Italian campaign, and also for the first
time losing prisoners in appreciate
numbers.
One Of the chief reasons for the diff
culties in which the Germans now find
themselves Is the fact that they cannot
readily and quickly shift troops from
one OF their fronts to the other in order
to meet temporary emergencies. Each
OF their two wings is more or less on it's
own. If an attempt is made to transfer
troops over the long detours which are
the only way of reaching one front from
the otner, the troops SO transferred are
out of action for a greater time than is
safe in the face of strong and enterpris-
ing enemies. This has not been so be-
fore, fact of which there are several
examples in the previous history of this
campaign.
Another anxiety, this time in the field
OF supply rather than that of tactics,
now must be considered by the German
command in Italy. This arises from
the fact that the British are within easy
striking distance of the important rail-
way junction of Sulmona. If Gen.
Montgomery gets into Sulmona. the
Germans will have lost the last connect
Ing link between their east coast and
west coast longitudinal railways for
distance of almost 100 miles. This will
impede greatly their freedom of action.
because it means that once trains car
rylng relnforcements and supplies have
moved south of the general region of
Florence-Ancona, they cannot be shifted
from one flank to the other to meet
sudden changes in the military situa-
ton. The effect of Allied air attacks
against the railways will be proportion
ately increased, since the capacity of
one set of lines cannot be used to offset
temporary delays on the other.
Altogether, it seems likely that the
defense of Central Italy is going to pre-
sent more difficult problems for the
Germans than those which faced them
little farther south, and it may we'll
be that the military risks of making a
further attempt to keep the Allies out
OF Rome will, in the minds of the Ger
man high command, outweigh the DO
lltical advantages of holding the Ital-
ian capital. On this point we should
have enlightenment very shortly, as the
nature of the German dispositions to
meet the new Allied advances certainly
will make it clear whether the Germans
are still thinking in terms of fighting
another major battle south of Rome.
(Copyrisht, 1943, New York Tribune. Incl
Strategic DESIGN