Evening star., 1943-06-13

but shorter than it once seemed, and
perhaps the anniversary of the Battle of
Midway is as good time as any to take
stock of progress in the Pacific.
For an estimate of how far we've
come" said a high-ranking naval staff
officer the other day, recall what things
were like one year ago at this time"
He was thinking of Jap preparations,
last May, to seize Midway and the Aleu-
tlans. There was the gravest danger, one
year ago. that Japan might achieve this
double objective, and then push on to
Hawaii, and even to the Alaskan main
land.
Today, Honolulu and Alaska seem
nearly as remote from the war zones as
the United States itself.
Toehold on Kiska.
The Japs did get toehold on Kiska,
but it begins to appear that their own
toes are going to be twisted in that thea
ter. We are in Attu. Tokio's statesmen,
as quoted by the Berlin radio, are break
ing the news to their people that "set-
backs" not only in the Aleutians but
"at home" are to be expected
What do they mean, "setbacks at
home? I think they are thinking of
their Bering Sea fishing grounds off
kamchatka. Twenty or 30 per cent of
the Jap fish diet comes from that re-
glon. ShreWd naval observers believe
that it was mainly to protect those vital
resources that the Japs waged such
bitter fight to remain on Kiska
No doubt Toxic thinks also of the new
menace to Paramushiro and the north
ern Kuriles, now brought within easy
bombing range of any airfield we COM
plete on Attu. Unless the japanese are
not fools, they do not dismiss the posi-
blllty that under cover of the same
clouds and fog which shielded our ad-
vances to Adak, Amchitka and Attu
(and. made easy their own initial seiz-
ure OF Kiska) we may one day land
forces in the Kuriles themselves. This
would put us on Jap home soil, in
bombing range of some of the biggest
Jap cities.
Not the Only Worries.
Nor is this all that worries the gen.
tlemen in Toxic. What of the South
Pacific? One year ago the Solomons
campaign had not even been completely
Planned. Australia was in imminent
Jeopardy. So were the island groups to
the north and east, with New Hebrides
first on the Jap list and then New
Caledonia, Samoa and Fijis and others.
Had 1t been able to seize these groups.
Japan would have secured it's new-won
empire from attacks via the south and
southwest. On our side we would have
oeen lett Vulnerable to a degree which
lew realized. The whole South Pacific.
right up to the South American coast
and the Panama Canal, would have
been open to big-scale Japanese raids.
But no one In this area now regards
seriously the prospect of successful Jan
oHenslVes against our well-organized sys-
tenn OF South Pacific island bases,
instead, attention is occupied by the
PROBABILITY OF early thrusts of some mag
nltude against the Japs themselves, in
their Northern Solomons positions: in
NE" Britain, Tlmor, or in two or three
Such areas at once. The now thoroughly
unlned team OF Admiral William F.. Hal
sey, Jr., and Gen. Douglas Macarthur
and their subordinates are thinking and
planning in terms of offensive warfare.
No one can look at the map without
guessing that the ultimate objective of
such planning is the Jap base at Rabaul.
capture OF Rabaul would indeed be a
prize plum. It's indispensability to jap
offensive thrusts against our own ad-
Vanced positions in New Guinea and the
Solomons has often been remarked. Ra
baul is the enemy's principal supply base
Tor his New Guinea and Solomons forces.
IL is likewise his main advanced air base.
What hasn't so frequently been en-
phaslzed is that Rabaul is also the kew
to the whole japanese defensive position
the main defensive position, in the
Caroline, Marshall and Gilbert Islands.
Japans Pearl Harbor of the South
Pacific" Truk itself, is but 700 miles
north OF Rabaul. Bombers based on Ra-
baul would find Truk within practicable
striking range. 1t is likely that by the
time we got Rabaul we would also be
able to base there enough bomber
strength to visit upon Truk daily, or
nightly, bombing raids of sufficient mag
nitude to make it untenable for large
warships
Thus its present character and value
as the principal Jap naval base in the
South Pacific would be destroyed
We nightnt-short Of prohibitive
prlces-be able to seize and hold it our
selves. But we could deny effectively it's
use to the Japs. Heavy surface units
now in the habit Of basing on Truk would
be driven-for comparable shelter and
facilities-far to the north and west
But from these, areas their protective
influence over Northwestern New Guinea
and the easternmost Indies would be
weakened gravely.
Would Open Road Back.
The heart of Japan's new Indies en-
pire would be laid open.
Gen. Macarthur, aided and abetted
by ships and planes of the United States
fleet, would be launched, at last, on the
road back to Manila.
AS if this were not enough for the
men of Toxic to worry about, there is
Brig. Gen. Claire l.. Chennault's growing
air power in China, menacing Japans
soft belly" from the west. There are Sir
Archibald p. Wavell's people in the
fringes of Burma, readying for eventual
commencement of drive to reopen over
land supply routes to Generalissimo
Chang Kai-shek.
And there is all the while the expand
ing American submarine fleet nihhlinc