Evening star., 1943-08-04
The Meaning of OreI


The great Russian attack on Orel
should be considered with reference
to the German attack on Kursk
which Immediately preceded it.
Both are operations of essentially
the same sort. Orel and Kursk are
corresponding salients in the central
section Of the long eastern front.
Although for convenience we use the
words "Orel" and "Kursk," we should
not think of those places by them
selves but rather as the strategic
nuclei OF entire areas elaboratelv
fortified throughout. Thus, whether
the Russians have or have not. ac-
tually penetrated into the town of
Orel is relatively unimportant, since
Orel lies near the outer extremity of
the salient to which it gives it's name.
The Russians have not succeeded in
cutting the base of the salient: so
the German defenders have ample
opportunities of withdrawal to sue
cessive fortified lines behind their
Orel bulge. Even if they should
evacuate the entire salient, a belt
OF rough hill country, naturally de-
fensible, bars the Russian advance
on the next German fortified area
around Bryansk. So the German
REIMBURSEMENT Of Orel would not
mean Russian break through.
Nevertheless, the taking of Orel
would be an important Russian gain.
The chief strategic advantage would
be the freeing of the main north
south railway in Central Russia from
Moscow via Tula, Orel and Kursk as
lar south as the German road blocks
at Belgorod and Kharkov. This
would greatly facilitate the move
ment of Red troops and supplies. 1t
should be remembered that the
absence of good roads in most parts
OF Russia invests its railways with a
peculiarly vital role in problems of
communication.
Russian success at Orel likewise
would contrast so favorably with
the German failure before Kursk as
logically to imply that the Red Army
has the edge in striking power even
IN summer-an advantage which
should be accentuated during the
coming winter. Germany's complex
troubles throughout its European
Fortress" aggravated by the fall of
Fascist Italy, presumably removes
the likelihood of even local German
attacks on the eastern front. thus
throwing both the strategic and tao
tlcal Initiative into Russian hands.
Henceforth the Russians probably
can strike at any point they choose
without fear of an effective German
counterthrust elsewhere on the long
front.
However, this does not imply that
the Russians can launch a general
offensive like those mounted bv the
Germans in the past two years. AL
though the Russians seem to be
stronger than the Germans. this Sill
perlorlty is relative. Both sides have
suffered tremendously, and Russia
mas grave internal problems, espe-
clally the food supply. Furthermore.
the character Of the war itself has
changed. The eastern front has
oeen SO fortified and stabilized that
IL becomes more and more like the
western front" through France and
Belgium in World War One. The
eastern front is not yet static, but it
Is no longer fluid. The war of ma
neuver is still prominent, vet ma
neuVer becomes limited in scope.
lhlS Is strlkingly shown by the bat
Ties OF Orel and kursk. Both are
prolonged slugging matches between
enormous forces concentrated on
relatively small backgrounds and
alike suffering tremendous losses,
The Red attack on Orel has now
gone on continuously for nearly
three weeks without reaching a de-
clsion. A recent German Army
spokesman was perhaps correct
when he termed it the greatest bat
tie OF attrition Of the war" No
break In German morale or equip
ment has yet become evident. There
fore, unless developments elsewhere
force the German high command to
weaken the eastern front, piece
meal gains at high cost may be the
best that can be anticipated from
Russian exploitation of the initia-
tive they have acquired.