Evening star., 1943-08-23
Jops Soon May Face
War on Two Fronts
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

freedom of action in the North Pacific.
We now can take the offensive there, II
we so desire and II We possess adequate
means, without anxiety to our line of
communications.
Seven hundred miles Of open water
separate our advance bases from those
of the japanese. Our air power is in
the ascendant. The japanese base at
Paramushiru is far more exposed to at
tack, under these conditions, than Dutch
Harbor was even when the Japanese
held Kiska and Attu. A move by us
toward Paramushiru, moreover, is one
which the Japanese must counter. They
cannot afford to let us penetrate the
Kuriles, for the Kuriles are but a ma
rine and aerial highway to the main
islands of Japan.
Provided we have strength enough,
and probably We have, we can now make
the Japanese suffer all the perils and
uncertainties of two-front war in the
Pacific. They must somehow ward off
our attack from the north, while still
finding means to protect themselves
against the rising tide of our offensive
In the south.
The distances are, however, very great,
and we already have seen how distance
lays paralyzing hand on military op-
erations. 1t takes long time to de-
velop great fighting power at the far
ther end of a long line of communica-
tions. Operations conducted at such q
distance tend to produce spasmodc
bursts Of energy, each followed by long
periods OF consolidation and prepara-
ton for q new attack. We must not.
therefore, expect to see push straight
on from Kiska to Toxic
What may happen now in the North
Pacific will depend on how we'll prepared
our forces are to exploit the retaking OF
Kiska. If preparations are well ad-
vanced, We may see some further move
very soon; If not, 1t may be weeks or
even months before we shall be glad
dened by such news.
But the japanese will be feeling q new
strain all that time. They will be COM
PEELED to divert to their northern de-
lenses steady stream of men, ships
alrplanes and material of war which
will cease TO be available for use either
N the South Pacific, China or Burma
This Is the first fruit Of the recovery of
Kiska.
Another immediate result may we'll
be IN the increased efficiency of our sub
marine operations in the Pacific. For
these operations, Kiska offers an ad-
mirable advance base As long as the
japanese held Kiska, they not only de-
MED its use to us, but their aircraft,
operating from Kiska, imperilled the
security Of other Aleutian bases.
For the efficient operation of subma-
rines, base of considerable dimensions.
complexity and cost is required. Sub
marine tenders can, at need, afford
temporary base facilities, but the sub
marine tender itself is a large, costly
vessel, and there are none too many of
them available.
1t is not economical warfare to locate
submarine bases within easy range of
enemy bombers, unless they can be pro-
Vided with so extraordinary a scale of
defense, both active and passive, ss the
Germans possess at Lorient or Saint
Nazaire. Now the Aleutian Islands as
whole become much more comfortably
situated in this respect.
The net gain Is considerable. If vou
will look at map of the North Pacific
Ocean you will be able to see where the
natural hunting grounds Of our sub
marines must be located-that is. where
the Japanese shipping must be found in
greatest congestion. There are three
areas OF special interest: Cd the triangle
Yokohama -Bonin Islands Amami Oshi.
ma, through which must pass all ocean,
going shipping plying between eastern
Japanese ports and the vast island net
work OF Japan's bases to the southward:
% the quadrilateral Fusan-Shanghai-
Amami Oshima- Formosa, through which
must pass shipping plying between any
Japanese port and the ports of South
China, or seeking to slip along the Chi
nese coast through the Strait of For
mosa; go the triangle Formosa- -Luzon-
Hong Kong, which may be called tho
focal area through which the main
southern sea lanes converge into the
Formosa Strait.
AS to the last two of these hunting
grounds. Kiska has no great advantage
over Midway, the western OUTPOST of
Pearl Harbor; but as to the first, it has
an advantage Of about 300 nautical miles
over Midway, which, translated into
cruising time, gives submarines fuelling
at Kiska on their outward voyage about
40 hours longer on their hunting sta
tions than if they fuelled at Midway.
Furthermore, on the voyage Midway
Yokohama, most of the time on passage
is just wasted, whereas on the voyage
Kiska- Y okohama, the submarine both
going and returning passes through
waters where the japanese fishing feet
Is to be found-and fish Is one of ia
pans staples of diet Indeed, the effect
Of the reoccupation of Kiska on the
Japanese fisheries may prove one of its
most valuable results.
Finally, the increase in the capacity
OF base facilities, made possible by add
ing Aleutian bases to those already
available in the Central and South Pa
cific, will give much greater fiexibility
and efficiency to our submarine opera
tions at time when our submarine
strength in the Pacific is increasing and
also at a time when the Japanese can
Ill afford to suffer an increase of ship
ping losses.
(Copyright, 1919 by New York Tribune Incl