Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-11-10

III o 1CeptlOn MAI NC oe'ersA''
needs to be corrected When a So
called military expert writes that
the new arrangements specifically
boost air power to an equal status
with land and sea power" surely the
public is in bad way.
The fact is that our country's
aviation does not possess a status
equal to that of sea or land power.
Nothing that is done within the
Army setup to give its aviation or
any other subordinate part more
scope can affect the overall picture
There will be no equal status until
we have an air department like the
War and Navy Departments, with
an independent cabinet member and
unhampered authority to develop
strategic ideas and equipment in its
own domain.
Reasons Offered.
Here are few of the reasons why
the latest reorganization of the air.
ground relationship in the Army
does not give us true air power:
l. Our air potential is still split
into various parts, among the Army,
Navy, Marine Corps. Coast Guard
and Civil Aeronautics Authority,
each under different control. OBJ
vlously the Army regulations are
limited to that one part of our air
! power. The mischief of the situa-
ton is evidenced by the fact that
the Navy is today duplicating land
base air power and competing with
the Army for equipment, bases and
operations.
?. The new manual of the Army
represents necessary improvement
IN the employment of its air power
in tactical cooperation with its
land forces, giving its aerial arm full
| leeWay IN working out its end of the
combined effort. The question of
overall national strategy-of the
main plan Of War-Which is what is
involved in the struggle for sep
arate air department, does not en-
ter at all
3. Our top airmen. including one
with four stars on his shoulders, are
Istlll subordinate to the highest Army
leadership and must work and plan
strictly within the bounds set by the
Army and within budgetary assign
mentS by the Army.
a. Unlike sea power and land DOW
er, whose spokesman can go directly
not only to the Commander in Chief
but to the people through Congress
Gef n tlonjy. II
tlons Of war making, air power must
go through Army and Navy supe-
riors. The air leaders must contin-
ually educate surface minded STRAIT
eglsts and must sell the air power
viewpoint to Army and Navy su-
perlors. They have no right or
means to insist on adoption of their
ideas for conducting the war in
preference to Army and Navy ideas.
Changes Demanded.
These points should suffice to
show that independent air power
cannot be achieved by new rules
within the existing military struc-
ture. 1t calls for fundamental re-
vision of the military setup that
can De achleVed only by congress
Slonal action establishing an air de-
partment absolutely on a par with
War and Navy.
At bottom the great debate over
air power comes down to a problem
of how best to use the limited
amounts of American resources in
men and materials to win the war.
Expansion in one direction always
means retrenchment in some other
direction. The ALLEGATION of re-
sources in turn is governed by stra-
teglc concepts. The Army and Navy
can fight for their concepts through
cabinet official and an autono-
nous department. Air power, d.
vided between two departments and
subordinate in each of them, can
not do so.
1t Is absurd to assume that any,
thing fundamental has been altered