Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-02-09
Says Russia Needs
Allies Help in Europe
Military Critic Discusses
Possible Ane|o-Amerieon
Commando Roids
BIZ Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

BIZ Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
There are certain basic propositions
which We should keep in mind as to the
immediate future of the war in Europe.
Cd The greater the Russian successes
the greater the need for Immediate
Anglo American offensive operations
elsewhere to tie up the German reserves
and thus prevent the Germans from tax
ing adequate counter action
(2) But the American and British
forces now in Europe and Africa are
insufficient in numbers for a full-scale
offensive on the continent. and will con-
tlnue to be so until the full strength OF
the United States Army can be deployed
and supplied in the European theater.
90 This will be a slow and costly
process as long as enemy submarine
activities continue on their present scale
in the Atlantic Ocean,
% British and American offensive
operations In Europe are, therefore, for
the immediate present, confined to oper-
atoms Of limited extent and objective.
60 Such operations are nevertheless
necessary and should be so oriented as to
make direct contribution both to the
purpose of diverting of the reserves from
Russia and to the lessening of enemy
submarine activities or the neutraliza-
ton Of the submarine menace by other
means
go Finally, time is of vital Importance,
because the coming of spring will bog
down the Russians in the mud and re-
duce the speed and scope of their opera
tions.
Obviously, first on the list must come
the successful completion of the African
campaign by the final election Of the
Germans from Tunisia. This will divert
German reserves by compelling the Ger
mans to increase their forces in Italy,
Sicily, Sardinia and the south OF France
and it would help our shipping problem
by opening the Mediterranean to our
conveys, which We could then protect
from string of air and naval bases all
along the north shore of the African
continent. This would shorten the sea
haul to the Middle East and the Persian
Gulf by many thousands Of miles effect
Ing great saving in tonnage
In the meanwhile, however, we should
be busy elsewhere. taking advantage of
the mobility and power of surprise which
our command of the sea gives us. There
have been suggestions that an agreement
might be made with the Turks to open
the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to
Allied shipping, giving us short route to
Russia. This would be especially attrac-
tive II the Russians could recover the
port OF Novorossisk or better still the
Crimea. But it is open to the objection,
quite aside from Turkish willingness to
cooperate, that Of the necessity for
clearing out the Axis In the Aegean
Islands IN order to gain access to the
Dardanelles from the Mediterranean.
This might well prove to be bloody and
time consuming operation, particularly
II the Turks were not prepared to join
actively in carrying it through.
A more promising idea, and one which
tulfills both Of the requirements above
mentioned. is the launching Of large
scale Commando attacks against the
German submarine bases such as that
at Lorient. Even II 1t were not possible
to hold these bases, possession might be
retained long enough to permit 4 thor
ough demolition Of all facilities, in a
manner that air bombardment does not
seem to be able to accomplish.
The Germans seem to be jittery about
landing In Norway and this would GER
tainly be very effective move If we
have suficient forces and shipping avail
able. The chief difficulty would be that
air support would have to come from
carriers or, in the extreme north. from
bases on Russian soil, until We were able
to capture some of the existing air fields
which the Germans have built in Nor
way. But success would pay heavy
dividends. Not only would the Germans
be deprived Of the use Of Norwegian
ports for their submarines In the Allan
tic, but also our supply route to Russia
would be made much safer
The Germans would find much DIM
Guilty In sending reinforcements to Nor
way without violating the neutrality Of
Sweden and such violation would un-
doubtedly be resisted by the Swedes. II
this were to happen, the Germans would
be cut of from one Of their best sources
OF iron ore. Moreover an Anglo Ameri-
can landing In Norway would seem likely
to have a greater morale value in Russia
than any conceivable operations in the
Mediterranean area.
The foregoing are examples OF some OF
the moves that may be under considera-
ton. They are, Of course, conjectures
merely; what Is certain is that we must
have action soon in the European
theater. that 1t must be timely, that 1t
must be within our available means, and
that 1t must be directed both toward
relieving the Russians and toward reduce
Ing the scale OF the enemys submarine
warfare.
Copyright, 1913 New York Tribune. Inc)
Urges Constructive Patriotism
In Place Of Stimulated Panic.
To the Editor Of The Star: