Evening star., 1943-08-11
Nuzis Face Disaster in
Donets, Khorkov Areas
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

1t looks very much as If the Russian
flag soon would be flying over Kharkov
again. The railway lines northwest and
west of the city have been cut by the
Russian encircling moves it is probable
that only the two lines which enter from
the south, one connecting via Poltava
with Kiev, and the other via Pavlograd
with Dniepropetrovsk are still available
to the Germans, either for reinforcement
or withdrawal of the garrison. And
these are threatened by a new Russian
advance southeast of the city.
From the military point of view it is
not Kharkov as a great steel center and
a great city that is of chief interest; 1t
is Kharkov as the bastion of the whole
Donets area, that line of the Donets
River where the Germans held fast
against the Russian winter offensive,
and which they still hold in long curv-
ing salient down to the shores of the Sea
of Azov About this area, both the Rus
sian and the German communicates
maintain a silence that Is becoming al
most painful.
Let us turn our minds back to the
conditions which prevailed at the time
the great Russian winter offensive burst
like thunderbolt on the Germans and
their luckleSs satellites at Stalingrad and
along the middle Don last November.
At that time, as pointed out in these
articles, it was instantly apparent that
the Germans were threatened with
great disaster.
Not only was the Stalingrad siege
army SO threatened but If Stalingrad
were relieved, the communicate tions Of the
German army of the Caucasus would be
In imminent peril from Russian armies
advancing southwestward on both sides
of the Don. That was the moment for
the Germans to make swift estimate
and swift decision. If they could not
hold Stalingrad, then they must begin,
without an hours delay, to withdraw
from the Caucasus.
But it was a decision which could not
be made on his own initiative, by the
general in command of the southern
army group, nor IS the German high
chief of the general staff. 1t was one of
those decisions of the highest order
which had to be made by the Fuehrer
himself. And the Fuehrer could not
bring himself to order the giving up of
territory which he fondly believed was
to give him springboard to seize that
Baku oil which he so desperately needed.
uo OF toI CD Lx,{n
Of his generals. And he waited too long.
In the end he had to do. under Russian
pressure, what he should have done of
his own accord weeks before. He had
to see his Caucasian armies driven back.
losing vast quantities Of material and
great numbers of prisoners. He was
able to save only those parts Of his Cau-
casian forces which squeezed through
the narrowing corridor at Rostov before
the Russians cut 1t, or crowded into the
Kuban bridgehead to maintain a pre-
carious and costly defense.
Now In the Donets area, the Germans
are faced with an exactly similar situa-
ton, and again the decision is one of the
highest order. II the German high COM
mand thinks Kharkov cannot be held, by
its present garrison, they ought to do one
Of two things: They must dndeed they
already should have $done SO, order a
general withdrawal from the whole
Donets area. or they must Immediately
prepare to counterattack in great force
to relieve or recover Kharkov and Bel
gorod ss well.
1t is Just possible that the Germans are
planning to draw the Russian forces into
great battle of maneuver, such as that
which ragged in the area between the
Dnieper and the Donets last February,
and resulted in the German recapture of
kharkov and Belgorod and the general
stabilization of the South Russian front
for several months.
But II so. the Germans are stalking
everything on being able to bring such
an operation to a victorious conclusion
within strict limits not only of time (as
against what the Western Allies may be
doing in the meanWhile) but also of
force (since they dare not risk too much
OF their precious strategic reserves.
The risks Involved in such a procedure
drawal, and if that withdrawal is not
going on at this moment, it has. like the
withdrawal from the Caucasus last VIM
ter, been delayed too long; and possibly
for the same reason-dissension between
the military and political leadership OF
Germany.
For the decision-either to put in the
general reserve. or to give up the whole
OF the territory in that bend of the
Donets-is one that cannot be made
except by the highest authority or by
military aut hority which has decided to
defy or overule its political superiors.
The silence of the communicates means
little. If the Germans were. in fact,
withdrawing! they would keep that fact
secret as long as they could: both for
military and home-front morale reasons,
they certainly would be in no hurry to
put 1t in communique
AS for the Russians, when they have
good news to tell they have a habit of
holding it back until they have the whole
story, and then giving it to the world
In one impressive load.
1t is impossible, therefore. to say Just
what is happening or is about to happen.
We can only set forth the elements OF
the situation, point out the probabl
consequences, and wait to see which
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