Evening star., 1943-11-27
Jops Seen Determined
To Hold Island Bases
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

some OF the evidence Is now coming IN
as to the Japanese air reaction to our
Gilbert Islands offensive. This is OF
great Importance, because 1t Is upon
their land-based air power (unless they
are to risk their main battle fleeD that
the Japanese must depend for the de-
cisive element in the defense of their
whole island outpost system in the
Central Pacific. AS already pointed out
in these articles, and as subsequently
underlined by what has happened at
Tarawa and Maxim, there is no posi-
bility of providing any sort of local de-
fense on one of these coral atolls that
can do more against a powerful am
phibious attack than put up a good de-
laying action. That is all, in fact, that
the local defense force is supposed to do.
Its job is just to hang on until air and
naval forces can come to relieve it. The
mobile force, the counterattack element,
is in this system of island defense as in
any other defense, the decisive element
the foundation on which all else depends.
1t is just because the japanese air power
has been so strong and because a suffi-
c1ent part of 1t has been available in
the Central Pacific to defend the island
strongholds OF Japan, that these islands
have remained so long inviolate.
Now as the japanese air power begins
to weaken in numbers as we'll as in
quality OF pilots and machines. and as
American striking power grows with the
IF ~
new planes and new troop units, it begins
to be possible to break into the island
defense system. Furthermore, it begins
to be possible to attack from more than
one direction toward Rabaul in the
south, which eventually means toward
Truk (the centerpiece on the whole
island network and into the Gilberts
and eventually the Marshalls out in the
Central Pacific. II the japanese have
not enough air power to provide an ener-
getic defense on both fronts they must
either seek a decisive naval action dn
which case they are stalking their all on
a single throw or they must give up
their island defenses. They can do that
either by withdrawal or by leaving their
garrisons to perish as the garrisons of
Tarawa and Maxim perished.
The evidence Of the Gilbert operation
suggests very strongly-though not con-
clusively-that the japanese air power
Is not strong enough for both jobs. Let's
examine that evidence in little more
detail. One of our carrier divisions re-
ports shooting down "a japanese fighters,
nine bombers and seaplanes. This
looks like the air group assigned to the
immediate defense Of the Gilberts, the
local air support for the garrison. 1t is
far too weak to be considered a decisive
counterattack force. Moreover. the exact
number Of planes is suggestive. Japanese
planes are organized in squadrons Of
nine planes each (three flights of three),
SO that obviously what the carrier divi-
sion encountered was four squadrons OF
fighters escorting a squadron of bombers.
Two fighters probably got away or
crashed unseen.
But what help came from outside?
Where was the overwhelming air power,
which, under the system of island de-
tense as originally planned, should i'm
mediately have concentrated toward
the threatened points from all over
the Central Pacific? 1t just didn't ma
terlalize. Two little efforts the Japa-
nese did make; in one case they sent
in 20 Zeros, of which they lost 16; where
these came from is uncertain In the
other case a small force of IS fighters
the Marshalls and was intercepted with
loss Of 10 planes. These were mere
drops in the bucket when it comes to
checking the operations of powerful
forces such as those with which Admiral
Nlmitz was attacking the Gilberts. The
Japanese defense system has thus at its
first trial been a complete fizzle, ap-
parently for lack Of air power
l say apparently, because we must
wait and see what happens next before
we can be really certain. The japanese
may be conserving their air strength
in order to defend the Marshalls and
Eastern Carolines. After all, they have
only been in the Gilberts (Which are
British territory since the beginning of
this war. In the Marshalls and Caro-
lines the japanese have been estab-
lished since 1919, and it must be .ex-
pected that their installations in those
islands will be of far greater value to
them than their temporary bases In the
Gilberts. The local defenses will be
stronger, too. but the principle of de-
tense necessarily will be the same. II
they cannot concentrate mobile forces
for counterattack, their garrisons will
inevitably be knocked off one by one, a
fact to which recent events in the
Aegean as we'll as in the Pacific bear
eloquent witness
And If the Japanese cannot find the
air forces to defend the Marshalls then
we may assume that their air power is
definitely on the wane. They will never
give up such valuable bases and what
they regard as actually Japanese terri
tory If they have the power to defend
them.
(Copyrsht 1943. by New York Tribune Inc)