Evening star., 1943-08-05
Balkan Complexities

|
Nowhere has the collapse Of the
Fascist regime in Italy entailed more
important consequences than in the
Balkans, for it was there that a
large portion of the Italian Army
was stationed, as garrison troops or
! as labor battalionS. Whether Italy
does, or does not Immediately
capitulate to the Allies, her soldiers
| in the Balkans, estimated at some
twenty divisions, cannot be relied
| upon henceforth by the German
high command, which will be COM
PEELED to make up the deficiency by
second-string German reserves sup
plemented by troops of its satel-
liteS - Bulgaria, Hungary and Ru-
mania. This entails a period of
reorganization which could con-
ceivably be used by the Allies for a
major invasion of the Balkans at
one or several points.
The success of such a venture
would depend upon political as we'll
as upon strictly military factors. 1t
is therefore wise to understand the
political aspect of the Balkans in
any attempt to evaluate invasion
prospects. Yet correct understand
ing is not easy, because Balkan
politics are exceedingly complex
Nevertheless, few basic generaliza-
tions will be helpful in such survey.
The Balkan peninsula is inhabited
by a number of peoples differing
widely from one another in blood,
language, culture and religion, this
last factor playing much greater
role in politics than it does elsewhere
in Europe. The Turkish conquest
five centuries ago stunted their ma
tional lives, keeping them primitive
and backward. Emancipation from
Turkey during the past century in
tensified their historic nationalisms,
giving rise to rival claims and feuds
which made it impossible for them
to cooperate sincerely for common
ends. These rivalries were made use
of by the European great powers for
their selfish ends, and that, in turn,
intensified Balkan antagonisms. The
German conquest of the Balkans
two years ago was due largely to
clever appeals to nationalistic ap-
petites and hatreds. Thereby Bull
garia and Rumania were brought
voluntarily into line, while the re-
cent and fragile unity of Yugoslavia
was broken by defections among the
Croats, the Bosnian Mohammedans
and the Bulgar-feeling element in
Macedonia. The atrocities COM
mitted by these pro-Axis dissidents
mark them down for exemplary
vengeance by their compatriots,
while the seventies of the Bulgarian
occupation forces in Macedonia and
Greece logically entail further penal
ties upon that country for having
once more taken the German side in
a European war. Despite pro-Russian
sentiment and war WEAKNESS, Bull
garia, which has as yet suffered
hardly at all, will probably stick to
its bargain from which it has al
ready richly profted in territorial
gains, until a German collapse be-
comes self-evident. Broadly speak
ing, the same is true of Hungary and
Rumania, though in those countries
fear of Soviet Russia plays part in
their continued adhesion to the Ger
man cause.
The Balkans, therefore, should not
be visualized as seething with almost
universal anti-German hatred and
ready to rise generally at the sight
of Allied invading armies. Only in
Greece would the population be
solidly and enthusiastically in favor
Of the invaders. Elsewhere, factional
and nationalistic feuds would prob
ably be stirred to fresh fury and
would tend to cancel each other out.
This implies that a successful
Balkan invasion would require large
Allied armies in order to tip the scales
and so discourage the pro-German
elements that they would accept de-
feat with its unpleasant con-
sequences to themselves. An Allied
conquest of the Balkans would, of
course, be greatly facilitated by the
aid of Turkey with it's large, fresh
and well-equipped forces. Turkey,
however, still seems to prefer
policy of neutrality. Its present
rulers covet no Balkan territory and
appear content to conserve their
strength for postwar eventualities.