Evening star., 1943-09-19
War Breuk Seen Before
Mid-1944
By ODen L. Scott.

to be rather generally accepted by those
who should know most about it. The
first is that the break in this war, when
it comes, will develop inside Germany
and not at the battle fronts. The Sec
ond is that this break should come by
or before mid-1944.
Any way that they turn now, the Ger
mans find their outlook hopeless. At
sea, their submarines never again can
hope to gain ascendancy. In the air, the
margin of American British supremacy
is growing. On land, the initiative has
been lost, never to be regained, with the
result that German armies cannot hope
to be large enough or strong enough to
protect every front.
The result is that, in Germany as in
Italy, there will come q time when the
groups who really control the nation will
decide that more Is to be saved by sur
render than by continued war that is
blasting their property sky high. That
decision never will be made by Hitler.
1t will be made by the men who made
Hitler. The decision can come, as it
came in the last war. when German
dIIlicS Stlll are StTOnR.
Right now however, the position of the
German armies themselves is rather
dangerous.
In Russia, the Germans must supply
millions of men at the end OF a long
line of supply. Once American long
range bombers are based on the heel Of
Italy, those supply lines will be under
attack. Once British-American land
forces are in the Balkans the whole Ger
man position in Russia will be threat
ened. This fact more than any offensive
drive on the part of the Russians, prob
ably accounts for the rather precipitate
German withdrawal from advanced posi-
tions in South Russia.
Hitler Busy Man.
In Italy, the Germans again find that
they must support forces at the end of
extremely difficult lines Of supply. Yet to
withdraw and not to support those sup
ply lines opens the very heart OF Ger
many to attack.
In Norway the same situation exists.
It is coming to be somewhat the same
story in France. German forces In
Northern France must be supported
along lines OF supply that are under
constant and growing air attack. Yet to
draw back those forces would open on
avenue into France and would provide
air bases to Britain and the United States
from which fighter protection could be
provided bombers striking deep into Ger
many in daylight. To complicate mat
ters there now is the strong prospect Of
an invasion via Southern France which
calls for new diversions Of German
strength.
All OF this adds up to the fact that
Adolf Hitler fast Is becoming as busy as
any one-armed paperhanger with the
itch. He scarcely can know which way
to turn or what to do to untangle him.
self.
President Roosevelt and Prime Min
lister Churchill are fully responsible Tor
the brilliant strokes Of strategy that have
placed the Germans in their present
position. Mr.. Roosevelt and Mr. Church.
Ill had only lukewarm support from mill
tary commanders when they laid out the
strategy that prevailed. Military men
at that time preferred the more tradi-
tional frontal assault from England as a
base. The President and Prime Minister,
however, insisted on air assaults from
Britain to soften Germany prior to
frontal assault while a vast flank attack
was under way via the Mediterranean.
The net results now speak for them
selves.
For one thing, as a result of the STRAIT
egy that prevailed, it is probable that
diversion of German troops from Russia
is being forced that Is fully as great as
that which would have been forced by
second front in France. The reason is
that the entire Balkan structure on
which the German lines to Russia rest
Is directly threatened. It is entirely
probable that less about second front
will be heard in Russia hereafter.
Frontal Assault Risky.
For another thing the Roosevelt
Churchill strategy avoided any possibil-
ity Of major defeat. A head-on smash
into France at any time during 1943,
prior to the diversions now forced on
Germany, might have ended in disaster.
1t would have meant on effort to crack
the most heavily fortified area in the
world before that area had been softened
properly or before its home support had
been weakened. A defeat in an initial
landing attempt, in turn, might have
given rise to demands in England and
this country for negotiated peace.
For third thing, the strategy adopted
probably will result in casualties far
smaller in number than any other STRAIT
egy that could have been adopted. The
British and Americans are enabled to
take full advantage of their two great
sources Of strength-sea power and air
power. To have plunged into France
from England would have thrown main
dependence on land power, which has
been the least strong point in the British
American armor.
AS it has turned out, the Germans were
surprised by the moves Of the past II
months. They have seen the structure Of
their power crumble far faster than any
one had imagined possible.
Now the length of the war against
Germany Isl dependent almost solely on
the amount of punishment the real rulers
Of that nation are willing to take before
they decide that enough is enough. They
may hold out long enough to try to extri-
| cate their armies from Russia and to