Evening star., 1943-03-15
Vyozmu and Khurkoy

Vyozmo and Khurkov
The contrast between the military
situations on the central and south
ern sectors of the eastern front is
a striking one. The same day wit
messed the Russian capture of Wy
anna and German penetration into
Kharkov as part of major counter
offensive movement throughout the
DonetS Basin. This extraordinary
difference naturally raises the ques-
ton whether the contrasting situa-
tionS can be explained by local tao
tical factors or whether basic
strategic considerations are involved
The fall of Vyazma is part of a sys-
tematic German retirement from the
great salient based on Smolensk
which thrust eastward to within 1870
miles Of Moscow. This gigantic
spearhead, $50 miles long and aver
aging nearly 100 miles wide. con-
stituted a standing threat to the
Soviet capital. The Germans began
retiring from this heavily fortified
area a fortnight ago. Berlin an
nounced the movement and has re-
ported each stage ahead of Moscow.
Although the Red forces have pressed
hard on the heels of the retreating
Germans, they do not seem to have
made more than normal captures of
men or usable equipment in the
sharp rearguard fighting that has
been going on.
A German retirement to a new
line in front Of Smolensk would
mean a notable shortening of the
central front. But, in view Of their
simultaneous offensive in the Donets
region, it seems unlikely that the
German high command would have
abandoned the Vyazma salient solely
to economic on manpoWer. The
deeper reason has been widely inter-
preted as meaning a remuneration Of
German plans for an eventual drive
on Moscow as part of a supreme at
tempt to knock Russia out of the
war. This would logically imply that
Germany would henceforth go on
the general defensive in the east.
That comfortable hypothesis is
now brought in question by the Ger
man offensive along the Donets. be-
gun about week ago, which has al
ready penetrated in places more than
100 miles and has reached Kharkov,
the Pittsburgh" of the Ukraine and
a communications center of major
Importance. Using fresh reserves
estimated at over 100000 and consist
ing largely of picked shock troops,
the German drive is based on COM
municationS far superior to those Of
the Russians, who seem to have
outrun their supply lines during their
continuous westward sweep of the
past three months. So great is
the momentum of this drive that it
may 60 considerably further. Al
ready, some military students are
specializing that this may be the
beginning of another major Axis
offensive to regain the ground lost
this winter and again menace the
Volga and the Caspian.
However, it appears possible to in
terpret the German advance in the
Donets Basin in a less ambitious
fashion. For local tactical reasons
the German high command was
bound to take sharp measures to
avert the danger to its whole position
in South Russia involved in the Rus
sian capture Of Kharkov. Unless the
Russians could be stopped, the vital
crossings Of the Dnieper River at
Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe
were menaced, with attendant dis
aSter unless most of the Ukraine and
perhaps the Crimea were promptly
evacuated. Aside from strategic
considerations, the Ukraine is Ger
many's most promising reinforce
ment to its economic system, while
retention of the Crimea is needed to
retain even partial control of the
Black Sea and cover the Balkans.
These factors alone could account
for strenuous efforts to retake Khar-
kov, especially since the imminence
Of the full spring thaW would give
the Germans a couple of months to
exploit their gains and stabilize the
South Russian front. 1t remains to
be seen whether Germany aims
merely at this limited objective or
has wider plans in view