Evening star., 1943-01-23
Leningrod Now Seen
AS Offensive Base
Says Advance Would Aid
Russian Navy in BoItic,
Open Way to Finland
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

The strategical implications of the
| relief Of Leningrad may prove of far
| reaching Importance. Leningrad Is, OF
| course, an important industrial center
and now that its industries can receive
raw materials and ship out their prod
ucts to other parts of Russia they will
| be of much value to the Russian war
effort.
From the strategical point of view,
however, it is to be noted that large
city like Leningrad is of great impor-
tance as a base of operations. In addi-
ton to its industries, 1t has available a
| great deal OF storage space, repair and
| maintenance facilities, railroad trackage
and shelter for troops and civilian per-
sonnel.
1t is, therefore, probable that Lenin-
grad will now become a base for Russian
offensive operations in the north directed
toward pushing back the German left
flank along the southern shore of the
Gulf of Finland.
AS soon as sufficient ground has been
gained to clear the Leningrad- -Novgorod
railway, Leningrad can also become a
base of operations to bolster Russian
ofenSives in the vicinity Of Lake linen
which are directed against two main
German strongholds Novgorod to the
north of the lake and Staraya Russa to
the south.
At both these points and also in the
immediate vicinities of Leningrad itself
the Germans have formidable defenses
and considerable concentrations of artil-
lery. However, the increased Russian
pressure which will now be possible,
added to the German lack of reserves,
indicates the possibility that the Ger
mans may be forced, as previously sug-
gested in these articles, TO retire their
left flank as far back as Lake Peipus,
their line then running generally south
ward in the direction of Pskovh-Novol-
Vitebsk If the Russians are able to
spare troops to continue pressure in this
area the Germans might even find it
necessary to withdraw clear back to the
Dvina
Should the latter prove to be the case,
1t would mean that the Germans would
have to give up control of the Gulf of
Finland, and they would have to choose
between keeping a considerable part of
their surface feet constantly stationed
in the upper Baltic or having their sea
communications with Finland severed by
the Russian Baltic fleet.
The German Navy is so reduced In
size that it could not maintain superb
ority in the Baltic and also maintain a
striking force of any size on the coast
of Norway, as it Is now doing to the
great annoyance of the British and
American Navies. One advantage or the
other the Germans would have to give
up.
In any case the reopening of the rail
communications of Leningrad will be
bad news for the German troops in
Finland and for the Firms themselves as
long as they continue to act as the allies
of Germany. 1t will enable the Russians
to resume pressure against the fortifica-
tons of the Karelian Isthmus and it
may very well turn out that the Ger
mans will not now be able to send much
help to Finland should the latter be
faced with a powerful Russian offensive
This condition will be accentuated il
the Germans lose, in whole or in part
their command of the Gulf of Finland
the greater degree of freedom of action
that the Russian Baltic fleet obtains
the more it can do to cut off German
supplies and reinforcements for Fin
land whom cpriro re,-,oi+c +ba ree,,,,,u+{o,,
of navigation in the gulf.
1t is apparent, therefore, that the
Finnish people may find themselves face
to face with difficult decisions. There
are still a considerable number of Ger
man troops in Finland, but probably
not enough to resist full-scale Russian
offensive of the character which has
proven so disastrous to German armies
In Russia. The Firms may have to
choose between a last desperate fight
against Russian invasion, a fight almost
certainly doomed to defeat, or an at
tempt to make peace with Russia which
might bring about conflict between the
Finnish Army and German troops now
stationed in that country.
1t is impossible to say, of course, to
what degree the Finnish government
still retains freedom of action. Ger
tainly, the latter course could do much
to re-establish Finland's credit and
moral standing with the eventual VIC
tors in this war and certainly Finland
could, under those circumstances, count
upon the good Offices of Washington and
London to secure reasonable terms from
the Russians
But it is not always possible for gov
ernment and a people, placed in the
tragic position in which those of Fin
land find themselves, to view such de-
cisions effectively or to choose the
course that might in the end prove to be
In their own best interests,
tCopyrght. 1913, New York Tribune, Inc)
Hvtsa