Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1943-01-19
RommeI Believed
Abandoning TripoIi
Reports Continue
Of Troop Movements
On Rouds to West
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.


Gen. Montgomerys famous 9th Army
has started again. and this time appears
to be heading straight for Tripon. Its
| right flank is moving along the so-called
coastal road" which between the Wadi
! Fem Fem and Misurata really skirts the
| inshore side of the great salt marshes
| rather than following the shore itself;
but the British main effort appears to
| be on their left flank, which is well
| inland and has reached point only 80
miles from Tripon. The British appear
| to be moving north and northwest on a
broad front Of about 10 miles, covered
| by powerful air force.
At first glance, Gen. Montgomery's
left flank would appear to be lin the
air" and dangerously exposed to a coun-
| terattack by one of Marshal Rommels
| famous desert sweeps. But this is, in all
| probability, very far from being true.
| Gen. Montgomery is not a reckless COM
| mander. He is rather one who makes
ready each operation with the utmost
| care, and accepts no risks which he can
| properly avoid. He has undoubtedly
satisfied himself that he is taking no
undue chances in his present advance.
He relies, almost certainly, on recon-
naissance to inform him of the enemy's
strength and location.
JJara I,;c oir ,11o,,, oroo+
part. We'do not always stop to think
of the reconnaissance function of the
airplane, because its combat functions
are so much more dramatic and exciting:
but, in fact, every military operation
depends for success very largely on the
! accuracy and timeliness of the informa-
ton at the disposal of the commander,
especially information of the enemy.
The commander who possesses air
superiority has an enormous advantage
in this respect. He can use frequent and
| numerous small patrols, whereas the
| commander who Is inferior in the air
| must send strong formation and fight,
| suffering losses he can i'll afford, for
| every attempt to go over enemy Positions.
He can carry out detailed Photographic
reconnaissance when necessary, a thing
which Is almost impossible for the in
| ferior air force because of the length of
| time the planes must remain in partic-
ular locality. Fighter superiority is what
| counts in these matterS-the ability to
| keep your own air clear of enemy scouts,
and to protect your own scouts and pho
tographers while they are over enemy
| territory.
| In desert warfare, too, negative infor-
nation from aircraft is of far greater
usefulness than in warfare over wooded
| or thickly inhabited terrain In Europe
| and many parts of North Africa, a report
| from an air patrol that such and such
! g. route had been flown without any
signs of enemy troops being seen would
| be Of comparatively small value; for it
| would be easy for the enemy to take
| cover in woods, villages, farm buildings,
| or even growing crops and thus avoid
being seen by the aerial observer. There
| fore, it is usually considered that mega
| tive reports from aircraft must be sup
| plemented by the reports of ground
| reconnaissance elements, armored cars,
| cavalry and even infantry patrols. In
the desert, however, where cover is scarce
| and camoufage more difficult, negative
information from aircraft Is Of greater
importance and this tends to increase
very greatly the value of the air arm for
reconnaissance purposes.
Gen. Montgomery is, however I'M
| doubtedly superior to the Germans in
| ground reconnaissance units as we'll, and
he may have established contact with the
French coming up through the Fezzan
and with the native tribes most of which
hate the italians, as well as with our
own forces in Southern and Central
Tunisia. He, therefore, knows what
| Rommel is doing, and he knows when
he can push boldly forward and when
| he must use caution. All of which, plus
| the continued reports of troop move
ments on the roads west Of Tripoli, sug-
! gests that Rommel is not intending to
! make any stand in Libya at all, and is
| abandoning Tripoli to consolidate a
| stronghold in Tunisia for a last-ditch
attempt to maintain an Axis foothold
on the African shore
1t seems entirely possible that Rom
mel may make a stand, at least for the
| time being on the famous Mareth Line,
which lies some little distance inside the
| Tunisian frontier and was originally
| built by the French to protect Tunisia
| from invasion by an italian army coming
| from Tripoli. This line is strong both
| by reason Of the rugged terrain and of
| the Notifications built by the French
engineers However, 1t was constructed
to serve an army supposedly in full pos
session Of both Tunisia and Algeria. It's
rear is covered by salt lakes and marshes,
| but 1t is vulnerable to attack from the
rear through the gap, at Gabes, between
the salt lakes and the sea by forces COM
! ing from Algeria by way Of Gafsa. 1t
| would be no easy task to defend the
| Mareth Line from frontal attack by the
| 9th Army and at the same time to stand
| off an Allied force descending on Gabes
| from the westward Hence the Mareth
Line seems best suited to serve the Ger
mans as a delaying position to cover
| consolidation farther north.
(Copyright, 1943. by New York Tribune, Inc)
, Name of Outstanding Personality
Proposed for Peace Commission.
| To the Editor of The Star: