Evening star., 1943-07-03
Pacific Drive Aimed
At Jap Sea Lanes
Major Eliot Says Attack
Is Holding Procedure
To Stop Foes 'Coshing In

Is Holding Procedure
To Stop Foes 'Coshine In
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
As we wait for further news Of the
progress of our Pacific offensive, the
moment seems appropriate to examine
some OF its possible strategical conse-
quences.
In the first place, we must realize
that nothing is certain in war. An Of
fensive which goes well may be pushed
even beyond the objectives originally in
tended. Unexpectedly strong resistance
may slow down the rate of progress and
require long delays between each small
gain. The best attitude of mind for the
distant observer is one of firm confidence
in ultimate success while at the same
time realizing that amphibious war on
= thousand-mile front may move very
slowly and always contains big factor
Of chance.
In other words, If we don't get to Ra-
baul tomorrow morning, don't be dis
appointed. But If and when we do get
there, it will be substantial achieve
ment What we are doing now in the
Pacific is not an offensive operation in
tended to seek a decision over Japan.
We are much too far from the vital
centers of Japan as yet for anything like
that. We are holding" Japan. We are
hitting at Japan's most vulnerable in
terest outside of Japan proper-her sea-
borne lines Of communication. We are
going after Rabaul because once we are
there we can hold that place firmly,
with 800 miles Of water between us and
the nearest Japanese main base-Truk
Being thus secure, we can base our sub
marines and other naval craft there,
and we can strike far more deadly blows
at Japan's sea lanes than we can from
any base in which we are now secure.
1t is important to make this clear, be-
cause there has been a great deal of
criticism Of what is loosely called the
'island-to-island" strategy In the Pa
cif1c. This is sometimes interpreted as
meaning an attempt to recover Japan's
island conquests-the Netherlands In
dies, the Philippines. British Borneo and
the rest-one by one. doubt if any
such idea has ever entered the mind Of
any responsible oficer Of our high COM
mand. We are for the moment fighting
from island to island, but our objective
is to get into position where we can
cut of Japanese shipping in the waters
between Japan and the Philippines. II
we can do this, we can stop Japan's
"cashing in" on her conquests The ad-
vance toward Rabaul is part of that
strategy. The establishment of bomb
ing bases in Fukien Province, as I re-
Gently pointed out. is part of that
strategy. The more we reduce the Japa-
nese air and sea power in the process
of getting the necessary bases, the easier
that strategy will be to execute when the
bases are In our hands. Therefore, Japan
will grow weaker instead Of stronger
until her day OF reckoning arrives.
Whether or not the Japanese will re-
act by the most decisive countermove
at their disposal-a major fleet action
on which they would stake their all
remains to be seen. Certainly they must
concentrate their light naval forces and
their air power to oppose us. 1t is to
the last degree unlikely that they can
afford to leave their garrisons in the
Southwest Pacific to their fate, as they
did the luckless wretches on Attu Japa-
nese air power is by no means unlimited
in strength. A concentration in the
Southwest Pacific means Withdrawals
from other fronts or from the reserves
available for other fronts.
The Chinese have been asserting for
some days past that the japanese are
preparing to attack Russia There have
been hints that the reason the Germans
have not launched their expected Of
fenstve on the Russian front is that
they are waiting for the japanese to get
ready, in order to strike simultaneous
blows. Last year, when our offensive
against Guadalcanal and Tulagi was
launched there was every indication that
the japanese were making ready for a
Siberian thrust, and that this may have
been thwarted by the necessity for trans
feTing air power to the Solomons. A
like consideration may have been in the
minds of our high command this year,
though this is unlikely to be the sole
objective of our present operations.
However, there is little doubt that
Japan doesn't have sufficient air strength
to make stout fight in the Southwest
Pacific and to launch a major drive
against the Russian Far Eastern prov
inces at the same time. Moreover, the
greater the dependence the Japanese put
IN air power to stop Ms in the Pacific,
the less air power they will have to sup
port their armies in China, to deal with
our air threat to their shipping from
Chinese bases, to protect their military
installations in Burma and their isolated
garrison at Kiska. The qualitative in
feriority of the Japanese air force makes
these considerations even more exacting,
for they must suffer very heavy and
disproportionate losses in order to ac-
complish anything at all. The chances
would seem to be very good that if the
japanese do attack Russia while our
Pacific drive is still on they will either
be beaten in both places. or must ac-
cept defeat in one in order to gamble
for success in the other
tcopyrieht 1943, New York Tribune, Inc)