Evening star., 1943-04-15
Eastern Front Interim

Eastern Front Interim
Along the greater part of the
interminable battle line in Russia,
stretching nearly $500 miles from
the Gulf Of Finland to the Black Sea,
the spring thaw has dissolved the
terrain into a quagmire of mud and
slush in which ground operations are
physically impossible. Military ac-
tivity is restricted to occasional artil-
lery duels and infrequent clashes be-
tween infantry patrols. Only in the
unfettered air is there brisk inter-
change Of raids by German and Rus
sian planes, smashing at objectives
behind the lines.
The only exceptions to this en-
forced lull are the two extreme ends
of the eastern front. Along the
Black Sea coast, warm winds have
already dried the ground and made
possible Russian attacks on the
shrunken Caucasian bridgehead.
This the Axis still holds to protect
the Kerch Strait leading into the
Sea of Azov and to serve as a buffer
against possible Russian attempts to
regain a foothold in the Crimea.
Around Leningrad, the thaw as yet
has only begun, so ground action is
still feasible, and the Germans show
some signs of trying to close the mar
row corridor that the Red Army
opened to the besieged metropolis
three months ago. But Russian re-
sistance is stiff and the time Is short
before the waxing thaw puts an end
to the attempt.
This interim period naturally slim
ulates speculation as to what will
happen when the hot, dry Russian
summer bakes the earth and makes
full-scale campaigning again pos
sible. The opposing high commands
certainly are making intensive prep
arations, but their plans are nat
urally prime secrets. Outside military
analysts have singularly little def
mite knowledge on which to base
their forecasts, because never has a
great war been fought behind so
impenetrable a veil of censorship. We
know that the Axis suffered tremen-
dous losses in men and equipment
during the great Russian offensive
of last autumn and winter which
retook Stalingrad and the Caucasus.
But we also know that the Axis
armies escaped entrapment, except
at Stalingrad, and that they turned
on the overextended Russians, who
were driven from Kharkov and other
points in the Eastern Ukraine.
In the immediate sense, therefore,
the winter campaign was indecisive.
It's net result depends on how far
each side was compelled to throw in
It's strategic reserves and how rapidly
expended equipment can be replaced.
Since no outsider can have precise
idea of those matters, it is impossible
to say which side is in better posture
to take the initiative when summer
COMES.
Furthermore, it should be remem-
bered that the eastern front is part
of a larger strategic whole which
includes North Africa, the Mediterra-
mean, and Western Europe, not to
speak of the submarine war in the
Atlantic and the Far East. Those
larger factors especially affect the
calculations of the German high
command. If Berlin believes there
will be no major Anglo-American
invasion of Western or Southern
Europe this summer, it will be much
more inclined to try another major
offensive against Russia. Conversely,
such an invasion probably would lead
the Russian high command to take
every risk in a full-scale offensive
against a necessarily weakened Axis
resistance on the eastern front.