Evening star., 1943-08-20
After Sicily, What?

inevitably provokes the query: What
next? The battle-hardened armies
on the island and elsewhere in the
Mediterranean area are certainly not
going to sit down and twiddle their
thumbs, and the same presumably
applies to the even larger Allied
armies in Britain and Northern Ire
land. Somewhere, somehow, these
formidable forces are going to be
used before the leaves fall,' to use
the Churchillian phrase.
The tantalizing prospect invites
speculation, yet the plans of the
Allied high command are well-kept
military secrets. No apparent hint
should be taken at face value, since
there is an excellent chance that it
may have been deliberately put out
to deceive the enemy. Take the cur
rent United Nations radio broadcast
from Algiers, telling the Nazi- domi-
mated peoples of Continental Europe
to make ready for the call to action.
That message specifically mentioned
metropolitan France, but it could
apply almost equally we'll to any sub
ject land from Norway to Crete. This
is all part of the war of nerves which
our leaders are waging against Ger
maryland waging to good effect,
judged by the jitters it is obviously
causing our opponents.
In all this invasion talk, three
factors should be borne in mind.
They are: Cd pure strategy; 90 poll
tics; CD "happenstance" or the un-
controlled trend of events. Let us
consider them in turn.
General stats plan future OPERA
tions primarily in purely military
terms. Strategic factors are weighed
dispassionately and certain technical
equations result. But the soldiers
and sailors do not have the last word.
That is spoken by the heads of gov
ernments after balancing strategic
plans against the reports of diplo-
mats, economists and the secret
services charged with evaluating
enemy psychology. OF course, the
staff technicians must pronounce an
operation military feasible before 1t
is actually undertaken. Yet the deci-
sion may be so Influenced by other
factors that it would not be the
staff's first choice
Take the question of invading
Italy, for example. Militarily, such
an invasion is by no means ideal.
from purely strategic point OF view.
Even after it is done, the Allied
armies engaged would still be up
against most formidable barriers be-
fore either France, Germany or the
Balkans could be successfully in
vaded. The use of Italian bases for
air raids against Central Europe is
only a partial offset to those handi-
caps. Yet, should Italy explode into
violent revolution, this would produce
a sort of political vacuum which
might drag In our armies almost de-
spite themselves, while the psyche
logical effects of a quick conquest of
Italy might disrupt the satellite
states OF Central Europe and the
Balkans and thus simplify the mill
tary problem.
Again, take the question of an in
vasion of Western Europe. Logisti-
cally 1t is forbidding, because of the
enormous amount of shipping in
volved. But if the Russian drive
should disorganize the Axis eastern
front and the submarine menace be
further minimized, such an opera
ton might become feasible even in
the face of great initial losses.
There is, of course, no way for the
layman, unacquainted with the
highly confidential data on all these
phases, to form proper judgments
as to what is the wisest course to
pursue. We must necessarily trust
to the intelligence and insight of our
generals and our statesmen to decide
correctly, holding them responsible