Evening star., 1942-06-17
Jops' Move
.OnAIeutiuns
.Anolyzed
Moy Be Part Of Force
Retiring From
Dutch Hurbor
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.


have been persistent. The Japanese
undoubtedly have some purpose in
sending men and ships to these
islands, the outermost Of the Aleu-
tian chain, though it is not yet clear
what that purpose may be.
There seems little reason to sup
pose that the purpose is an often
sive toward Alaska or the larger
islands Of the Aleutian group. The
Japanese capacity for the amphibi-
GUS offensive in the North Paciflo
was pretty well wiped out at Mid.
! way.
They have learned, as We have,
that air support is an absolute es-
sential for any such proceeding and
air support is the one thing the
Japanese cannot now give to any
serious attack in such distant waters.
Their large carriers are gone, their
smaller carriers, what few they have
remaining, would inevitably be over,
whelmed by our shore based aircraft
were they to come within our radius
Of action.
Islands Not Well Adapted.
AS for building up chain of land
bases, such as they did in the Meth
erlands Indies, the outer islands OF
the Aleutian chain do not lend
themselves to the construction OF
runways and are not well adapted
for the operation of seaplanes More
over. the weather appears to be un-
I promising.
There is, therefore, good reason
to accept, within the limits of a
projected offensive against ourselves,
the published statements that the
temporary presence of the Japanese
at Attu and in the Rat Islands is Of
little strategical importance. Yet
they are there, and so far in this
war they have done nothing with
out reason.
One answer might be that the
japanese forces reported in the is
lands may be merely a part of the
force which thrust at Dutch Harbor.
a part of the preliminary moves
leading to that attack, and that they
have been trapped in their exposed
positions by bad weather, which has
prevented their withdrawal.
Simplest Explanation.
This is the simplest explanation.
and may well be the correct one. II
the Dutch Harbor attack was meant
as a serious attempt to effect lodg-
ment, its repulse would naturally be
/ followed by retirement of the ad-
vanced posts; If. as is far more
likely, 1t was a mere diversion and
reconnaissance. forming part of the
larger picture of the Midway attack,
then the future fate of the advanced
posts in the Aleutians would be de-
pendent on the outcome of the main
operation: and that having failed,
these posts would likewise be with
drawn In either case bad weather
may have been the determining
factor
There is also the possibility.
though it is remote. that the Jap
anese decided to maintain these
positions as long as possible for
propaganda purposes, to offset the
heavy defeat at Midway. This Is
borne out by the tremendous play
which the Axis radio has been Civ
ing the Japanese landings in the
Aleutian Islands" 1t Is, however,
worthy of note that the German
radio has been the most assidiuous
in this regard, which suggests that.
however small the significance which
Toxic may attach to these landings,
the Germans are badly in need of a
few more japanese victories to bol-
ster up their own morale and to
maintain their psychological posi-
ton vis-a-vis the rest of the world,
and are desperately anxious to find
some counter-word as against our
reports of the victory of Midway.
May Be Move on Russia.
Then there is q third possibility.
For some weeks, there has been a
growing conviction in the minds OF
careful observers that the Japanese
are going to be compelled to attack
the Russian Far Eastern provinces
this summer.
The greater the threat to Japa-
nese sea communications. the great
er the compulsion to improve their
hand communications with their
southern conquests in South China.
Malaga, Burma and Indo- China. For
the strengthening of these positions
and communications, the elimlna-
ton of the Russian threat is a
necessity; or to take the longer
view. the Japanese have gambled on
a German victory in Europe. lacking
which they can never be secure In
possession of their loot. and they
must now, whether they like 1t or
not. do their best to bring such .
victory about.
Considering the matter thus. they
would have q definite reason for
desiring to occupy at least a tempo
rary position in the outer Aleutians.
This would serve as listening post.
an observation station from which
they could get some warning in
case we were to move to the aid
Of the Russians in the northern
Pacific. AS long as they could
maintain 1t, such q post would be
Of great value to q Japan embroiled
with Russia.
copyright, 1942, New York Tribune. Inc.
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