Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-03-13
Critics Forget
Old Generals
Can Win, Too
Macarthur, Won MoItke
Cited as Proof
BY HUGH S. JOHNSON

tions is the tendency to gen.
eralize. In war. there are too
many imponderables for that.
On all appearances, the South
should not have been able to
hold out against the North for a
year. The world knows what
happened. There were times,
for instance the day before the
Monitor appeared at Hampton
Roads, when it seemed to be
anybody's fight.
Just now, there are several
widely accepted dogmas. One
is that, to be victorious, generals
must be young. All other things
being equal, youth is leading
consideration and some great
commanders have been very
young. But .others have not.
IN PROOF of their youth
L theory, these punditS cite
Stonewall Jackson in the Con-
federacy. and forget all about
Lee and Joe Johnston, who were
better generals for supreme COM
mand.
They dwell on Napoleon, who
had gone stale and sluggish at
middle life before Waterloo, and
forget Foch and the elder Won
Moltke, the victors of greater
wars.
They don't remember Mac
Arthur who is 81, but warn the
President to recall that he, too,
is of that age.
They rarely mention Ghengis
Khan who was probably the
worlds greatest military genius
and continued victorious into old
age. Alexander the Great is their
classic example. but they don't
often say that he was SO handi-
capped by the follies of the
young that he made an ass of
himself in most of the known
world and died, crooked TO the
gills, before he had consolidated
his conquests.
4 LMOST as many examples
"A could be given on one side
as the other. That doeSn't neces-
Sarlly answer the argument
that. in war, the vigor and
valor and Imagination Of youth
have proved 10 be great assets.
But it IS caution that youth
alone is not enough.
That caution is particularly
appropriate at the beginning Of
war when few officers, either
young or aging. have had a
chance to prove what they have
on the ball, except the file Of
annual efficiency reports gen
orally made out by older men
and frequently based on the
youngsters orthodoxy and devo-
ton TO tradition.
The braSh young Bolsheviks,
as they are called-the inno-
Enthusiastically get Indifferent
or adverse reports in the piping
times Of peace. 1t is best 10 wait
TO see if a young man is also
a good man before we go off
half-cocked.
I ARGELY due 10 the clamor
IL Of columnists, we are getting
new generals young enough 10
reduce the average age of high
command 10 AZ. Many of these
appointments are excellent, but,
in some of them, the candidate
outstanding qualities are his
lack of important war experience
and his ability TO say yes, sir,
and very well, sir" with con-
viction.
Another dogma is that forti-
fications are soul deadeners for
soldiers and that the Maginot
Line felled France The pun
dts in this case forget that the
Maginot Line was like a wing
dam with its left flank in the
air" and improperly guarded
and that the victorious Germans
had a Siegfried Line.
They forget that Malaga and
Singapore fell quickly because
their approaches were not for
titled and that Macarthur S
great feats are possible because
of the fertilization of Corregi-
dor and his almost imprcgnabie
mountain defenses in Bataan.
NONE of this is either utterly
~ 10 condemn or fully TO en-
dorse these sweeping theories
1t is only TO remark that the
public is widely taking them for
granted. and that in war you
can't take anything for granted.
The qualities of a great ZEN
eral are the sum of all his char
acteristics sand not just one OF
them.
Whether a fortified defensive
or an active moving offensive is
the best strategy at particular
time depends on all the circum-
stances at the time and not just
on some theory Of continuous at
tack.
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