Evening star., 1942-06-04
Air Marshal Harris
Sold Mass Bombinq
Idea While in u. !.
Hopes Eventually TO Put
PIone Over kozi Target
Every Three Seconds
BY JAY G. HAYDEN.

16THldIly are I'LL UIley are repre-
sented to be, and that even bigger
raids are in the making, Is based
in great degree on intimate ac-
quaintance with Air Marshal Arthur
TraverS Harris, the man who is
running this show.
Marshal Harris until last Feb
ruary, when he was called home to
take over the bomber command, was
chief of Britt ms air mission to the
United States. Possessed of a pc
culiarly salty conversational style,
he missed no opportunity either in
official conferences or social gath
eringS to press one supreme idea.
This was that sporadic and scat
tered air bombing is no good and
that the only effective way is to con-
centrate enough planes and have
enough bombs on selected objectives
to demolish them.
Further, Marshal Harris believed
passionately that, given plenty of big
bombers and the opportunity to use
them in this fashion, he could bring
Germany to its knees and end the
war. That he succeeded in selling
this theory to his superiors is shown
in the fact that he was chosen for
the supreme bomber command.
Bad Weather Ended.
Marshal Harris took over on Feb
ruary 25. On the night of March 8,
a long spell of bad weather over
Western Europe finally ended. That
night the RAF dealt it's crushing
blow to Germany's Paris factories,
pulverizing the big Renault plant
among others. There have followed
in an ever-rising scale the raids
on Augsburg, Rostock, Mannheim.
Kiel and Lubbock, eliminating in
two 1,0OO-plane raids on Cologne
and Essen in a space of 72 hours
The argument of Marshal Harris,
stated here over and over again,
was substantially as follows:
Experience of Great Britain and
all other warning nations has proved
that hit-and-run raids by bombers.
acting individually or in small
groups, cost much more in losses of
equipment and personnel than they
are worth either in material damage
inflicted or adverse effect on enemy
morale. This is so primarily be-
cause planes, flying at night and
high enough to avoid anti-aircraft
fire, seldom are able to hit particu-
lar targets, such as a factory, ships
In harbor or railroad functions.
Concentrate on Area.
Therefore, the only effective way
Is to concentrate on a larger vital
area-the whole industrial section
of a city like Cologne or Essen for
example-and sow it so thickly with
bombs of the heaviest possible type
as to wreck everything above
ground And after the smoke clears
away so as to enable reconnaissance
flyers to see what has been missed,
go back and hit the area a second
or even a third time if necessary
to complete its destruction.
AS against this idea it was con-
tended, first, that If the Germans
got wind of an intended 1,000-plane
raid they could so concentrate their
fighter opposition as to completely
wreck the attacking force. Sec
ondly. it was argued, that so many
air fields are required for the
simultaneous takeoff of thousand
or more big bombers that it would
be impossible to coordinate their
attack.
American air experts say Marshal
Harris has answered both of these
criticisms. In attacking Essen. he
challenged the greatest concentra-
ton of anti aircraft protection Ger
many has anywhere. The reason
Nazi communiques have failed to
mention Essen as a point OF attack,
it is conjectured, is that an ad-
mission that large numbers OF
British planes had succeeded in
getting over that city, without heavy
losses, would be equivalent to tell
ing the German people that nothing
In the Reich can be safeguarded.
Every Inrce SECONDS.
AS for synchronization of attack(
the approximately 1000 planes came
over Cologne at 6-second intervals,
within a total period of 80 minutes.
British experts say that in future
raids it is hoped to double the num-
ber of planes in an attacking period
of 120 minutes. thus putting bomb
er on the target every three to four
seconds.
Marshal Harris explanation of
the virtually complete stoppage of
British air attack on Germany dur
ing 194l was that nearly all of their
bomber crews, trained in night fly
ing, were used up in attempts to
counter the German air blitz OF
1910. While Britain was under
going this savage attack, he said,
neither men nor planes could be
spared for night training. Hence
1t was necessary to use all of last
year in preparation-building more
bombers, training pilots and provid-
ing the ground facilities required to
service the present vast air armada.
Had to Train Crews.
incidentally, this long period OF
British preparation explains why
American planes are not yet par
ticipating in the attack on Ger
many. In the months before Pearl
Harbor there was virtually no
training of American bomber crews
because these can only be trained
in bombers and all of American out
put in this line was being shipped
abroad as fast as it was produced.
Such effectively manned bombers
as the United States had, mostly
were sent to Hawaii, Panama and
points westward to fight the Japs.
Thus it was necessary to start vir-
tually from scratch, in manufacture
of planes, training of crews and
preparation of additional British
air fields to accommodate an Ameri-
can bombing force designed to at
tack Germany.
Just what has been done with
this regard since December 7 is
closely guarded secret, but there is
no doubt that assembly of an Ameri-
non h,.y,ohinu forca n1apned fo