Evening star., 1942-08-09


part of the United States Navy to dis
rupt the all-vital lines of communica-
ton between the Nipponese islands and
their conquered~lands. And as time goes
by the Japanese are getting better pre-
pared to meet an American offensive.
The situation worries some of our
ablest military and naval men. There
is vociferous minority in this country
which clings to the belief that nothing
but an immediate offensive against the
Reich can win this war for us. To that
well-organized minority military con-
siderations are of secondary importance.
The operation must be undertaken, they
is the business of professional men who
have spent their lives studying warfare.
These people believe, rightly, that If
Hitler were to collapse Japan would be-
come negligible quantity, Of which we
could dispose in no time. The fact that
Nazi defenses are exceedingly powerful
and that the shipping facilities at Our
disposal are very limited seems to make
no impression.
Peace Terms Doubted.
These groups, both in the United
States and Britain, assume that the coll
lapse of Russia would mean the COM
plete defeat of all the rest of the United
Nations. Most competent observers in
the United States argue, however, that
even If the present Nazi offensive in
Russia is successful the likelihood Of
Moscow coming to terms with the enemy
is extremely remote.
These observers believe the Russian
armies will be able to fight even if they
are pushed back into the Urals, provided
they receive sufficient war material, and
they think further that the future supply
routes for Russia will be the airways and
the Trans Siberian Railroad, and in
order to secure that line it is essential
that Japan either be defeated or so
heavily engaged in the South Pacific that
she will have to give up all idea OF in
vading and conquering Siberia.
PresidenJ Roosevelt. and his military
and naval advisers seem to realize that
the situation today demands immediate
action in the Pacific. They recognize the
soundness of such strategy. There are,
however, definite agreements between the
governments of the United Nations which
make it difficult for America to assume
control Of the grand strategy of the war.
This is particularly true with respect to
Great Britain
Unlike the Axis, the United Nations are
trying to work out their plans In demo-
cratic fashion. The Axis follows orders
from Nazi headquarters. We discuss
matters among ourselves, taking into
consideration not only the immediate
military necessities, but also the desire
OF the various governments which are
our allies.
In Britain an all-out offensive In the
Pacific is looked on with disfavor for
two definite reasons: The possibility OF q
major Nazi offensive against the islands
In the event Hitler successfully finishes
his campaign in Russia, and reluctance
to use their entire manpower in fighting
the Nazis single handed. 1t Is obvious
that if we embark our forces on a cam
paign in the South Pacific we shall be
compelled to neglect the Atlantic until
We have terminated our job against Ja-
pan.
The British government is somewhat
skeptical about the reports of colossal
losses suffered by the Germans in their
second campaign against the USSR.
They believe the Nazis are using their
mechanized and air forces much more
sparingly than last year. Hence the be-
lief that Hitler will be too exhausted to
start a campaign against Britain after
he reaches his objectives in Russia does
not seem to be shared by the military In
London.
Fear Nads Will Renew Attack.
It appears from official warnings and
from conversations between high Amer
lean and British officials that the Brit
tsh fully expect the Nazis to turn ON
Britain again, perhaps this year. Hence.
the reluctance of the British to use
some of the 1,250,0o0 fully trained men
they have in the islands for an offen-
sive in Europe without substantial
American participation. They feel that
this reserve of manpower must be main
tanned in England lest the Germans
resume the attack they were forced to
break off in 1910 because of its great
cost.
The British government is not will
ing either to sacrifice too many men
in questionable adventure across the
Channel. This is for good reason.
During the last war France was bled
almost to death, losing very large
number of her young men. When the
war ended in 1918 France was victorious.
but had become almost a second-rate
power. People did not realize this at
first, but subsequent developments lead
ing to the fall of France proved that
the loss of her manpower had killed
France as first-class power.
Britain does not want history to re.
peat itself in World War II. While the
British people would shed the last drop
OF blood to defeat the Axis, the leaders
OF Britain are looking further ahead.
Hence, their insistence that we send a
large force to the United Kingdom and
90 $3.50 in any military operations un-
dertaken on the continent Of Europe or
the Near East.
II we follow the purely military ad.
vice and nove-with the Australians-
against Japan to clear the enemy from
the Pacific zone OF operations, at least
Britain may have to hold the fort In
the Atlantic single-handed.
Until complete understanding regard
Ing the. general situation is reached and
the Russian situation is clarified there