Evening star., 1942-01-27

1t is related, were David Lawrence.
accustomed for many months to
getting messages from Washington
telling of the delicate relations with
Japan but there was always the
caution expressed to them that the
Navy must take no steps to offend
Japan or to produce an overt act.
This it is argued was one reason
why all the naval officers at Hawaii
almost without exception did not
expect any form Of attack. If
Washington didn't see fit to pro-
claim a mobilization, the officers
naturally believed the situation
could not be as serious as repre-
sented.
The fleet was scattered on Decom-
Der 8. Some ships were on the
West Coast in what might be termed
recreational journeys and some were
engaged in normal exercises.
Two Sides to Story.
1t IS not the business of the COM
ilander in chief of the Pacific Fleet
to mobilize. These are orders which
Washington is expected to send out.
1t may be that the court-martial
proceedings for Admiral Kimmel
will be welcomed by the latter be-
cause it will furnish an opportunity
for all these points to be thoroughly
explored. That there are two sides
to the story Is generally conceded
among naval men, many of whom
are pointing out that it was the
business Of the Army to protect
against air attack and that the
concentration Of the fleet in Pearl
Harbor was a policy determined
upon in high quarters in Washing
ton and not by Admiral Kimmel.
There are. incidentally, many
comments heard to the effect that
Admiral Richardson should not
have been removed from his COM
mand and Admiral Kimmel substi-
tuted and that when the vacancy
was created the right man to have
succeeded him was Admiral Snyder.
Navy men on active duty cannot
discuss these questions and yet in
naval circles there are all sorts Of
reports to the effect that President
Roosevelt himself had a hand in
selecting these high officers at
Hawaii and in resolving the conflicts
of views as to whether the battle
ships of the fleet should be concen-
trated in Pearl Harbor.
If a court-martial is held or con-
gressional inquiry to follow through
on the Roberts report, it must log
ically take up the errors of omission
and commission by everybody who
had anything to do with naval
policy. 1t would appear that such a
court martial or inquiry during the
war period would be difficult to con-
duct without taking active officers
away from their duties. Postpone
ment Of the whole inquiry to some
more favorable opportunity may be
the best way provided steps are
taken promptly to correct the errors
that are known to have been made.
General Staff Plan Urged.
One Of the things Congress can
do at once Is to provide the Navy
with general staff. Under the
present organization the eight
bureau chiefs report to the Secretary
OF the Navy. Also the so-called
general board" is only advisory and
not an operating body.
But while an operating staff for
the Navy to help Admiral Stark is
essential so is an operating chief for
Gen. Marshall in the Army. If
record of what both Gen. Marshall
and Admiral Stark have had to do
In the last few months were COM
piled it would be found that they do
not have time to administer their
respective departments, perform the
many functions of contact with
Congress and domestic phases of
their work such as the mobilization
and equipping of a draft Army or
expanding Navy and still give
thought to overseas operations day
by day and hour by hour.
The lessons of the Roberts report
are numerous. If they are taken to
heart, the country will benefit. but
with Army, Navy and Air Forces
still operating independently under
q vague formula Of mutual CO.
operation" there must be further
risks in store for our troops and
sailors.