Evening star., 1942-03-11

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anomalous sit David Lawrence.
uation existing whereby both Ad-
miral King, as commander in chief
of the fleet. and Admiral Stark. as
chief of naval operations. exercised
duel functions. The President now
has rcmedied this by giving Admiral
King both tasks and ordering Ad
miral Stark TO duty abroad.
There is no question but that this
is a marked Improvement and that
the change will mean a smoother
operation of the Navy Department.
The plan. incidentally, follows eX-
actly the lines of the proposal made
by Admiral TauSsig to the Senate
Naval Affairs Committee in April,
1910. The admiral is one of the
most brilliant taCtiCianS and stu
dents of Navy organization IN the
country but he remains on the re-
tired list, even though every flag
officer who retired before he did
has been called to active duty. Ad-
miral TausSigs friends believe he
Is the victim of his outSpoken crit
icism of the traditional system and
that he is being punished for his
testimony in April, 1910, when he
predicted war with Japan unless
certain steps of a preventive nature
were taken.
Recited View of Flaw.
Admiral TauSSig wrote an article
printed in the Proceedings of the
Senate Naval Affairs Committee
in which he said in part:
The reorganization of the Navy
Department has been a subject for
discussion ever since the World
War demonstrated that the depart
ment, as it then existed, was not
adequately or properly organized
to administer efficiently the enor-
nous, complex and intricate af-
fairs of the Navy. This lack of
proper organization at the begin
ming of the period when We became
a belligerent resulted in much con-
fusion, lost motion and other de-
ficiencieS. Because Of this the cost
in both lives and materiel would
have proved extremely costly had
it not been for the fact that we
were operating behind safety
screen set up by our Allies and the
wide expanse Of the Atlantic Ocean
Admiral Taussig then reviewed all /
the efforts to get new system and
pointed out that while naval regu-
lations provide for coordination OF
bureaus by the chief of naval oper-
ations, nowhere in either law, regu-
lation or general order, is there any
authority for the Chief of Naval
Operations to exercise command or
give orders to the bureau chiefs"
Each head of bureau is by law
responsible to the Secretary of the
Navy. and while he works informally
with the chief of naval operations
the legal status does not require it
and there is likely to be vagueneSs
of responsibility where dependence
is placed on informal liaison even
with the most earnest determlna-
ton to attain efficiency.
Perhaps the principal obstacle,
however, is not the relationship of
these bureau chiefs to each other
but the part that is played by civil
ian officials 1t is clear that Con-
greSs could very well set up civilians
to take charge of bureaus dealing
with procurement and supply, ad-
ministration of docks and shipyard
facilities and even manufacture of
weapons of war, but the country
has the right to expect that naval
officers of the highest rank will be
solely responsible for strategy and
operations.
Question Of Responsibility.
President Roosevelt knows a great
deal about perhaps more
than any other layman. But men
high in the Navy feel that no lay
man can possibly make the deci-
sions during war that must be made
by the fighting officers themselves.
The President, moreover, has GER
tain understandings of an interna-
tional nature with Prime Minister
Churchill which may or may not
become factors in our own naval
strategy. There must be some way
that the President. as the constitu-
tional commander in chief, can
function effectively by retaining his
broad control of policy and yet not
interfere in strategy, which is the