Evening star., 1942-12-24
Russiun Offensive


Nothing is more difficult than to
estimate realistically the progress
and prospects of the complex Rus
sian offensive which, beginning some
weeks ago around Stalingrad, has
now extended throughout the middle
Don valley into the Ukraine.
Even accepting at somewhere near
face value Russian claims of ground
gained and casualties inflicted, a
glance at the map makes it obvious
that there is no connected fighting
front. Throughout the vast combat
area, mostly fiat and with virtually
no natural obstacles now that the
rivers are frozen, fighting is open
and fluid except around a few for
tilted strong points, This, indeed,
characterizes the entire eastern
front. Solid trench lines like those
in France and Belgium during the
last war do not, and cannot, exist in
the illimitable spaces where Russian
and Axis armies are at death grips.
Both sides are always able to wage
a war of movement, infItrating
deeply through the gaps between the
enemy's chain of garrisoned posts
established at strategic points such
as a railway junction or highroad
crossing.
What the Russian high command
seems to have in mind is a series of
correlated thrusts deep into enemy
held territory, disrupting Axis COM
munications and isolating advanced
enemy forces so that these can be
supplied only by air. This was what
the Red armies tried to do last year
in their winter offensives, but with
only moderate success. The Ger
mans had evolved the system of So
called hedgehog defense-a chain of
strong points fortified to resist at
tackS from every quarter, amply
stocked with food and munitions,
and reinforcible by air transport on
a large scale. The classic instance
was at Staraya Russa, on the north
central front, where large German
garrison, cut off by land, resisted
successfully for months and was
never overcome.
This winter the Russians hope to
be more successful in their penetra-
ton tactics, chiefly because the Ger
mans have been compelled to divert
so much of their air strength from
the eastern front to the Mediterran-
can, North Africa, and Western
Europe. Obviously, Axis transport
planes must have heavy fighter es-
cort to avoid being destroyed en-
route. Moscow reports shooting down
great numbers Of Axis transports,
which implies that the Red air force
Is not so outclassed as 1t was last
year. Should the Germans lose COM
mand of the air on the eastern front,
their isolated garrisons would be
gravely endangered.
OF course, it is possible that the
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the strength to smash the Axis main
forces in open combat and precipl-
tate a strategic rout. Should the
present Red drive knife southwark
to Rostov, the communications OF
all the Axis forces from Stalingrad
to the Caucasus would be cut and
something like 100000 troops would
be isolated. They could not possibly
be supplied by air, and colossal
disaster would be inevitable, with
incalculable consequences on the en-
tire war situation.
However, that welcome possibility
does not yet appear imminent. The
Russians have thus far not taken
single Axis strong point, and their
infiItrationS are still at least 120
miles north of Rostov. The German
high command will certainly strain
every nerve to prevent the cutting
of their main communications, and
presumably they have large reserves
for emergencies. Until German
counter attacks have failed and key
points like the railway junction of
Millerovo are in Russian hands, it
would be we'll to suspend Judgment
as to the eventual outcome of the
current winter campaign.