The Waterbury Democrat., 1942-11-11

COIl1lI 11ld JIOIl O1 C1lSoC l lAAA4OL D
 Military Urgency
 Hitler, it was evident, was cast ing aside any further consideration for the Vichy government and mak- ing his decisions from a basis of plain military urgency.
 With American troops rapidly mopping up French Africa and driv- ing full tilt toward Tunisia, with his favorite general, Marshal Erwin Rommel falling back into Libya, beaten and battered with the Allies on the verge of winning full con- trol of the western Mediterranean seaways, Hitler appeared to be striv- ing desperately to build up some protection against Allied assault on the Axis Achilles Heel-the soft underside of Europe"-France's Mediterranean coast and the eX- tended coastline of Italy.
 Whether Hitler could get away with his full military occupation of France without touching off massive uprising by French patriots was uncertain.
 But every report from France in- dicated that the situation was tin der-tense. The Vichy government was appealing to the populace to remain calm, to refrain from listen- ing to false information. But there were indications that the Vichy government already was virtu- ally adrift in a swirling sea of forces whihc were beyond its pow CT to control.
 Tunisia Important
 From the military standpoint the dispatch of Nazi forces to Tunisia seemed more immediately important than the southward push of Nazi troops within France itself.
 Tunisia is the immediate objec- tive of the American expeditionary corps as soon as Algeria and Moroc- co are cleaned up.
 Military sources believed that the Nazi vanguard in Tunisia probably has instructions to stand of the Americans until Rommel can either reorganize his broken Afrika KorpS for a new battle in Tripolitania or until the remnants of the once proud army can be evacuated.
 It was presumed that the forces in Tunisia were rushed over from Sicily where the Luftwatfe has long maintained a full air fleet and num- bers of Junkers 52 transports which have been used to ferry reinforce ments to Libya. It is also believed that the Nazis had considerable re- serves of paratroops in Sicily, train ing against the day of an ultimate attack on Malta.
 However, 1t was doubted in allied military quarters that Hitler would be able to pour enough troops into TuniSia for an extended stand due to the limitations of his available air and sea transport.
 Fate of French Fleet
 Of almost equal importance in the Nazi campaign was the fate of the French fleet.
 Three French battleships, two or three squadrons of cruisers and many destroyers, submarines and smaller craft may be at Toulon though various reports have put them at sea. Since the start of the American offensive these units have been reported to have been standing by with steam up,
 Hitler obviously hoped to seize these warships and prevent their disaffection to the allied side = al growing possibility due to the fact that Admiral Jean Francois Darlar its commander, who is being "enter tained" by Americans at Algies, may cast his lot with the allies.
 Actually, however, 1t was belieed that the French fleet will be of little value to Hitler unless he can obtain at the same time the support of the men and officers who man 1t.
 There was no immediate indica- ton of the effectiveness of the allied appeal to the French navy.
 Hitler backed his move into unoc- cupied France with the assertion that Providence had appointed him to guide the destinies of the Reich and that he and his allies were nov ing in to defend" the French fleet against American and British ag- gression.
 He lifted the armistice restrictions to allow the Vichy government to conscript Frenchmen for military duty and said the government could move back to Versailles if 1t wished.