Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1942-11-23
Sees Nuzis Strivino
To Save RommeI
MiIitory Critic Believes
Diversion Intended to Let
Afriko Korps Escape
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

The Axis decision in Tunisia seems to
be, as expected, the defense OF semi
circle covering the seaports of Tunis and
Bizerte. Axis forces have not been able
to establish themselves in the rest of
Tunisia because the French and native
troops and population have come over
to the Allied side and because this move
ment has been supported with commend
able energy by our motorized columns,
air forces and parachute attachments.
Any idea which the Axis high COM
mand may have cherished of using the
Tunis- Bizerte area as the site of an
African "Dunkerque" for the evacuation
Of Marshal Rommel's army appears to
have ended with the penetration OF
Allied troops to the coast at Hammamet,
south of Tunis, and the French stand
at Gabes, still farther south along the
coast. These positions can certainly be
reinforced from Algeria long before
Rommel can hope to get there across the
hundreds of desert miles now separating
his forces at Agheila from the Tunisian
frontier.
1t remains to be determined what
the purpose Of the Axis stand at Tunis-
Bizerte may be. 1t can hardly be sup
posed at Berlin that this position can be
permanently maintained. with the idea
Of sealing the Strait of Sicily against
our conveys. Its communications are far
too precarious for that, and can be
maintained at all only at the price Of
keeping up an air concentration Of over
whelming power in Sicily and Sardinia.
This may be done temporarily, but it is
not price which the Axis can afford
to pay on permanent basis: The Luft-
waite Is already spread too thin, and
reserves are lacking for possible press
ing needs elsewhere.
There Is, Of course, the possibility
that the 'runis adventure may have
been ordered in moment of semi-panic
In an endeavor to hit back at our in
vasion OF Africa by the most immedi-
ately available means, regardless of ulti-
mate result. But this is unlikely. The
Germans have not SO far undertaken any
military enterprise without a sound rea-
son.
II seems much more probable that they
are thinking in terms of Tripon. Con-
slider what the present situation would
be had no Axis move been made toward
Tun1s and Bizerte. A friendly French
regime would now be in control of those
towns, and the Allied columns would be
racing for the Tripolitanian frontier.
bent on getting to Tripoh before Rom
mel could get there, and with the chances
ten to one Of doing so. In that case
Rommel and all his men would have the
choice OF perishing in the desert or sur
rendering to Gen. Montgomery. But
with Tunis- Bizerte diverting a great
part OF the Allied strength in Tunisia for
the time being, it is possible that Rom
mel, by sacrificing yet another rear
guard at Agheila, may with a consider
able part of his Afrika Korps reach
Tripoli before we can get there in
strength.
Then if the airfields of Tunis and
Bizerte are still in Axis hands, they
may be able to give some cover to his
embarkation; and they may be able to
prevent the passage Of strong naval
forces through the Strait of Sicily to
blockade Tripoli. It is a desperate
business at BEST but 1t is a chance:
probably the Axis purpose will be to
start the famous naturalization" at
tacks against Malta as soon as Rommel
is approaching Tripoli and thus cover
his line OF retreat from the east as
Iuns-Bizerte covers it from the west.
Under these circumstances 1t is con-
ceivable that few ships CARRYING his
remnants might make their way from
Tripoli to Sicily. The distance Is only
$50 miles.
OF course, all chance Of this sort NAV
be lost by close pursuit by the British
9th Army, or by the Intervention of
desert columns coming up from Lake
Chad, or even by the taking of Tripoli
by Allied forces from Tunisia; but the
African campaign has become so des-
perate a business for the Axis In any
case that perhaps even a very long
chance seems worth the taking.
AS for the chances of the Axis holding
1unls- Bizerte for any length OF time.
that is probably dependent on their
ability to supply the garrison.
The two positions may be regarded
as one In the military sense and will
probably be defended as one. Com.
munlcation between them is by air
(35 niles, road 60 niles, sea al miles,
and rail $50 miles,, via the junction at
Mateur. The flanks of the defense NAV
rest on the sea on both sides, and the
total front to be so defended, If possess
sion OF Mateur is to be retained. is about
~ miles long. The supporting distance
by sea or air from the nearest port in
Sicily Marsala) is about 40 miles: from
the nearest port in Sardinia (CagliarD
about 16o miles. The Axis problem is.
therefore, to retain control of the sea
ana the air in this triangle Tunis-
Marsha -Cagliari, and defend a short
front OF about 70 miles on the African
mainland. 1t Is not an impossible task
1or short time, but it is one which will
demand a great expenditure of aircraft
ana heavy losses in shipping, while the
rising hostility Of the French and native
populations complexities the problem i'm
mensely.
IL remains to be determined whether
the position can be maintained umti,
Hommel has reached Tripoli-if he
ever gets there-and whether by that
Time sufficient additional aircraft have
reached Sicily to enable Malta To he
neutraiized while Rommel gets away bv
sea Predictions Il, oo... ,~..-,.