Evening star., 1942-07-03

may De CQdI %aefssseseS''''s ssA's@-
some changes in David Lawrence.
the overall high command of the
war itself may emerge, just as
changes occurred the last time
there was crisis in the British
Parliament.
Mr.. Churchills speech emphasizes
the difficulties of communication
and the lack Of information which
the home government seems to
have had in operating the North
African theater of war. Thus the
Prime Minister says:
"On June 13 there came a change.
We had about 300 tanks in action.
BY nightfall no more than 10 re-
manned and this happened without
any corresponding loss having been
inflicted on the enemy. I do not
know what actually happened in
fighting on that day"
Hears of Tobruks Fall.
The Prime Minister says that on
June 21st when he was in Washing
ton he was handed message say
ing Tobruk had fallen. What steps
were taken between June 18th and
June 2lst to find out the weaknesses
in the British setup are not dis
closed. But it is revealed by the
Prime Minister that he wanted
Gen. Sir Claude Auchinleck, COM
mander in chief of the Near East
forces, to take command, and the
latter persuaded him otherwise. The
speech on this point says:
Before the battle began I urged
Gen. Auchinleck to take command
himself because I was sure nothing
was going to happen in the vast
area of the Middle East in the next
month or SO comparable in i'm
portance to the fighting of this
battle in the western desert and I
thought he was the man to handle
the business. He gave me various
good reasons for not doing so and
Gen. Ritchie fought the battle. D.. 8.
! cannot pretend to form a judg-
ment upon what has happened in
this battle"
Here is an instance where the
fate of North Africa apparently was
decided in few exchanges between
the Prime Minister and the COM
mander in the field. There was no
overall high command in London
composed of officers responsible to
neither the army nor the navy, as
such, but competent to decide the
military value of what Gen. Auch-
inleck was reporting.
Entitled" to Confidence.
There was no high command
ready to say who should or should
not take the field to conduct the
battle against Field Marshal Rom
mel, who already had proved him.
self a great tactician.
Mr.. Churchill recites the history
Of the months prior to the battle
and discloses that in men and ma
terials the Allies had superiority
I'VE were therefore" he said, "en-
titled to feel confident in the result
of an offensive undertaken by us
and this would have been under
taken in the first days of June if the
enemy had not struck first"
Here is an amazing confession OF
what military men have through
out this war characterized as g
vulnerable state of mind in high
places-the defensive attitude. Thus
the French waited behind theil
Maginot line and expected to be
safe. Preparations for offensive
warfare seem not to have been fully
carried out as yet by the British or
any of the major fronts. The British
waited for the japanese offensive
in the Malay Peninsula and los
Singapore.
The Prime Minister declares tina
when the preparations for a Ger
man offensive in Libya "becam'
plainly visible it was decided, ant
think rightly, to await the attacl
on our fortified positions and thel
deliver a counterstroke in the great
est possible strength"
Strategy Proven Failure.
The history of the present wa
shows that awaiting the attack an
then communicating has not bee,
successful strategy and that de
fensive warfare can be justified onl
If ones strength is inferior. TIL
British had superiority in number
of tanks-perhaps 7 to 5-accordin
to Mr.. Churchill and superiority i