Evening star., 1942-11-18
See Navy Policies
Confirmed by Victory
Military Writer Approves Use
Of All Types Of Weapons
In Operations at Seq

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
We have won notable victory in the
South Pacific. It may not be- probably
is not, decisive victory as far as the Pacific
theater of war as whole is concerned; !;
but it seems very likely to be decisive as
affecting the immediate issue in the Solo
mons-New Guinea area, especially when
taken IN conjunction with Gen. Mac
Arthur's successes on the mainland of
New Guinea.
In the first place, it has probably
given us command of the sea in this
vicinity for some time to come. This
In itself would assure the safety of our
hold on Guadalcanal and the isolation of
the japanese troops on that island This
favorable effect has been added to by the
destruction of the japanese troop REIN
torcements, probably by far the greater
part OF the japanese troops available in
the whole South Pacific. All this means
that the Japanese, if they wish to try
a comeback, must start all over again
from the beginning, and that in the
meanwhile We shall have a considerable
degree of freedom of action not only to
build up our defenses, but to take further
offensive measures of our own
Probably one of the early results of the
conditions created by our victory at sea
will be the elimination of the japanese
forces on Guadalcanal. Up to this time
the continuous Japanese naval and air
operations and the constant trickle of
relnforcements have enabled the Japa-
nese to maintain themselves, even though
they were never able to attain the fam
tastlc numerical superiority suggested by
some imaginative commentators. For the
time being. at any rate, it seems unlikely
that the Japanese on Guadalcanal can
receive any more help: even the four
transports which were found beached on
Guadalcanal and were destroyed by gun
fire probably did not have time to land
their men and certainly were not able
to land any stores or equipment Our
own air and naval forces will be able to
devote much more of their attention to
supporting our land forces, and we can
bring IN supplies and reinforcements at
Will. On the whole, therefore, it would
seem that the japanese troops on Guadal-
canal will soon be faced with the choice
OF destruction or surrender
An advance to Santa Isabel and Bou-
gainville, in the Northwestern Solomons
may very we'll follow the clearing up
OF the situation on Guadalcanal, and, if
Macarthur drives the Japanese out of
Buna In the meanwhile, we may find
ourselves all set for grand attack on
Rabaul, which the Japanese can then
support only from Truk, more than 600
miles away.
One of the most interesting features
OF the naval action just reported is the
fact that, according to Admiral Nimitz.
battleshlps were used on both sides and
our battleships contributed to the
enemy's losses In the battle of Mid
way Island it was precisely because we
Old not have fast battleships available
to follow up our success that we we're
unable TO gain more decisive effect.
The same has been true of some of our
actions in the Solomons; but there we
mad TO keep in mind the very great risk
OF allowing our battleships to come
within reach of enemy aircraft. In the
present action, however, no japanese
carriers are reported as engaged, which
suggests the possibility that the three
enemy carriers damaged in the action
OF october 1926 may have been Japan's
last available ships of this type. The
Japanese hore-based aviation has suf-
tered heavy losses, and their bases have
been under constant bombardment both
from Guadalcanal and from New
Guinea. Under these conditions it seems
to have been possible for us to use
battleships in the pursuit and it may
be that further enemy losses will be
reported later on. {.
1he results OF this action are COM
plete confirmation of the theory of war
to which our Navy has consistently ad-
hered-that results are to be obtained
only by the skillful and co-ordinated
employment of all types of naval weap-
ons each in its proper place in the fight
ing team. When we were not able to do
this, at Midway, in the Coral Sea, and
in the earlier Solomon actions, we could
not gain decision. This time we were
able to do so by teamwork under bold
and able leadership.
But what shall we think of the Jap
anese leadership? What are we to say
of a high command which directs four
separate attacks against single objec-
tive, each attack little stronger than
it's predecessor, but not one of them
strong enough to win? This is the great
est of military crimes-the putting in
of reinforcements in driblets, the con-
slant underestimation of difficulties, the
wastage in series of weak efforts of
ships and men, which if used in one
concentrated effort might have brought
victory. This is what the Allies did at
the Dardanelles, and it was the chief
cause of their failure. This is what the
japanese have now done in the Solomon
Islands. and it seems likely to cost them
| very dearly.
tCopyrisht. 1912. New York Tribune, Inc)
Commands phiJafeJv