Evening star., 1942-04-09
Spring Moves Analysed
In Light of the Unexpected
Russian Attack Held LikeIiest, but Nozis'
Ready Agreement Prompts Suspicion

vasion barges. This may be nothing
more than q war Of nerves against
Turkey. A barge attack over the
275 miles which separate Crete and
Egypt or the $50 miles from Rhodes
to Cyprus looks like a suicide opera
ton on the face Of 1t. Yet, 1t is i'm
possible to tell to what extent the
eastern Mediterranean has been
weakened in naval and air power
in order to defend India and the
Indian Ocean routes against Japan.
1t is conceivable tkat the recent
Japanese attack on Ceylon and jap
anese naval demonstrations in the
Bay Of Bengal are part Of q grand
strategy intended further to weaken
the United Nations forces in the
Mediterranean.
There are some suggestions that
the German Army in Libya may
be developing an offensive, and the
gathering Of forces in Crete may
indicate an attempt to reinforce
Gen. Rommel, while the intensified
air attacks on Malta are almost
certainly designed to enable fresh
reinforcements and supplies to be
sent across to Africa. Altogether
1t Is not inconceivable that the main
axis Of the first German attack may
be directed southeasterly instead
Of due east, though this may be
only q part Of . major operation
which will include an offensive In
South Russia.
Defenses Tested During Winter.
However, there is another very
definite possibility. During the win
ter campaign the Germans have
had an opportunity to test the
strength OF their defensive posi-
tions in Russia and they may be
satisfied that these positions can
hold back any Russian attack for
some months. 1t is possible to con-
ceive OF line Of German reasoning
which would take the view that the
greatest actual peril to Germany Is
the rising tide Of American armed
power.
The Japanese method OF dealing
with q similar situation was to
seize the bases from which that
armed power could be used against
them before the factors Of time
and distance would allow its accum-
ulation in strength in the Far East.
The Germans may consider that
they have no choice but to try to
do the same. In this case, the
merest glance at q map will show
any one that the only available
bases from which American armed
power can directly menace German
interest at present are the British
Isles and North Africa.
AS to North Africa, the Germans
can move through Spain or west
ward from Libya; or, If they can
obtain the use OF the French fleet,
they might try to establish naval
command Of the western Mediter-
ranean long enough to get troops
into Algeria and Tunis and thence
into Morocco.
An all-out attack on the British
Isles would be q far more serious
proposition. 1t seems possible that
the Germans might begin such an
attack by a preliminary move in
the north-a concentration Of naval
forces and q sudden attack on Ice
land. Were this to be successful,
they would have cut OF a great
deal OF the supplies reaching the
British Isles from North America
and they would also be In q position
to interrupt the movement Of sup
plies to Russia Though the Arctic
ports Of that country. An attack
on Iceland would not be easy, but
the Germans may feel that their
position Is one which calls for
desperate measures.
Another secondary operation which
might lead up to q final assault on
Great Britain is an air-borne in
vasion f Fire. This, on the whole,
would seem to have greater chances
Of success than an attack on Ice
land. The initial resistance to be
encountered would be much less
and the distances are by no means
as great.
Fire Threat AnalyIed.
If the presence Of strong Anglo
American forces in the British Isles
be considered as having a diversion
ary effect on the German campaign
In Russia. the Germans might in
turn consider that with compare
lively small forces directed against
| Fire. they could divert 4 great mart