Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-21
Too Lille,
Too Late Is
Malaga Tale
British at Fault, Is Shout
Of Australians
BY PAUL MALLON

BILE" Jungle of Malaga is not hard
10 understand. Their tactics
have contributed nothing new TO
warfare. No new weapons have
been unveiled.
To get a notion OF what hap
pened there---(t Ito disturb again
world notions OF defensive secu-
rity)-it is necessary first to APP
preciate that the peninsula is not
all jungle.
Tin and rubber industries have
built fairly good roads through
much of the territory along the
coast.
They raised towns and viii
lagos, nearly all furnished with
air fields, as the airplane was a
common means of commercial
transportation. Much of the
ground is prairie-like and suit
able 10 tank warfare.
THE British defense relied on
Il the sea on one side, the
Jungle on the other and over
estimated the defensive nature
of rice fields Through which
Jap tanks rolled without much
effort.
The flank protection Of the sea
and jungle was broken down by
the elementary Jap device of cir
convention. When the British
formed a strong line, the Japs
merely moved around il or both
sides with small bodies of troops.
The jungle side was pene-
trated by especially trained Jap
troops, armed with machetes to
cut a path To the British rear.
The troops were trained with
simulated jungle conditions in
China and Indo-China for this
purpose. They carried five days
of rations. more than European
troops have heretofore been able
10 handle.
THE sea flank proved even
Il easier for them. Selling nu-
merous small fishing boats as
they progressed, they loaded, say
80 TO 100 men in each of the
20 boats and dropped perhaps
e66- soldiers down the penin-
sula at night into some bay
behind the British fortified line,
10 cut wires. threaten supplies
and create havoc.
As a result the Jap blitZ
has apparently broken some Ger
man records for speed. They
supplied themselves by sea on
the east coast, unmolested ex-
cept by submarines after the
disastrous sinking of the British
battleShips Prince of Wales and
Repulse.
Their supplies on the west
coast went down by rail from
Bangkok and Indo-China where
they had amaSSed an abundance
before starting the invasion.
THE British were outnumbered
Il four TO one. and soon saw
that valor could not overcome
their deficiency in numbers,
planes and anti-tank material
Including tanks).
The ,Rp medium and light
tanks found the bamboo parts
of the jungle easy going and
small rubber tree plantations no
barrier.
Selling the local commercial
air fields as they advanced, they
were always able to provide
dive bombers for use (like the
Nazis) against particularly well
defended machine gun or artil-
lery posts at the front.
Thus with supremacy OF num-
hers and equipment on land. sea
/ least COAST and in the air, they
could hardly lose.
4 FATAL British error was
~ their confidence that Thai
land would fight and delay the
advance until they could bring
up sufficient planes, tanks and
troops.
As the Australian officials now
are shouting, some one in London
erred.
BY the time the error was dis
covered il was too late 10 get an
appreciable number of bombers
To that faraway field.
apparently they had a fair
number of pursuits and even
used them as bombers, dumping
small bombs over the side by
hand in some instances
II was Just another case of
"too little and too late
TIVE bad news of the Truman
L committee on aircraft pro-
duction C'too few planes 10 al
low adequate flying time 10 our
own pilots } came from aircraft
manufacturers themselves.
Chairman Truman blamcS the
variety OF designs accepted by
The Var department Is trying
10 Get ihc department 10 adopt
q standard pursuit ship. a stand
ard tWp-englne bomber and
standard tour-engne bomber.