Evening star., 1942-07-10
Defends Churchill
Against Criticism
Writer Argues British Leader
Knows Facts Not Known
To Distont Observers

! To the Editor Of The Star:
Will you please allow me to comment
on David Lawrence's criticism of Prime
Minister Churchill's speech in the House
OF Commons on the British defeat in
Libya?
The points on which Mr.. Lawrence
appears to blame Mr.. Churchill are not
strictly strategical, but rather tactical.
They are matters which concern the
military rather than the government.
1t IS characteristic of good organiza-
ton that when you give man a job to
do you do not interfere with his doing of
1t, nor encourage him to keep coming
back for more instructions, unless you
have reason to suppose he is making
serious mistakes If he succeeds you can
give him your appreciation: If he fails
you can fire him. The British powers
that be, having appointed their generals,
certainly would be wise to leave military
decisions to them
II Gen. Auchinleck Is given command
OF the Near East, 1t is for him to decide
what part of his duties he shall carry
out himself and what he shall delegate to
a subordinate. In urging Gen. Auchin-
leck, on behalf Of the cabinet, to take
command himself, Mr.. Churchill was
going as far as was reasonable or in
accordance with any good system.
There are no grounds for suggesting
that this is IAN instance where the fate
Of North Africa apparently was decided
In few exchanges between the Prime
Minister and the commander in the
feld." Even II it were there is nothing
surprising in defeat or victory hanging on
such trif1es. Many decisive battles have
been lost or won on small issues and
narrow margins. Waterloo is classic
instance. Any overall high command In
London" unquestionably would have re-
lied on Gen. Auchinleck's advice In the
circumstances.
The suggestion that Mr. Churchill was
responsible for the British taking up
defensive attitude In North Africa, or
that they in fact did so, will not bear
examination. There is no parallel be-
tween the Maginot Line mentality and
that which resulted in the loss of Tobruk.
1t is quite clear from Mr.. Churchills
statement that the British had all but
completed their plans for an offensive
and were too late by matter OF days to
put 1t into operation.
Singapore was not lost because the
British did not take the offensive in the
Malay Peninsula" Singapore was lost
long before as consequence of the loss
of sea power. There was no original
1~,%4~ -.
Britain has never been strong enough in
the present war to take the offensive,
except recently in Libya.
That offense is often-not always-the
best defense is commonplace, no doubt
familiar to Mr. Churchill from boyhood
He is aggressive by nature. and, more
than most men, can be relied on to take
the offensive whenever conditions justify
1t. There have been occasions in the
past where an important problem for his
colleagues has been how to dissuade him
from taking 1t.
All the circumstances of the Libyan
defeat are still not known, and when Mr.
Churchill, the man in possession Of what
ever facts are available, confesses that
the loss is a mystery to him, it i'll be-
| comes armchair critics thousands of
miles from the scene of action to offer
| full and facile explanations of the whole
| business.
There are some who attribute the
| Libyan defeat in part to the very fact
| that the British took the offensive in the
| air against Germany in the Cologne and
| other recent raids They argue with
| some cogency that If this additional air
| power had been available against Mar
shall Rommel 1t would have tipped the
scale. The clamor for what an odd
popular disregard for arithmetic calls a
second" front is certainly distracting to
those who have the conduct of the war
and may lead to a perilous diversion Of
| forces. An additional concentration
| against Marshal Rommel might carry as
| much relief to the Russians as the open
ing Of fifth Cor sixth?) front In West
| ern Europe. 1t will be noted that all the
great raids on Germany have not caused
her to bulge by one iota from her Rus
sian and Libyan plans.
The fact is that the British have shown
vigor, dash and pugnacity on sea and
land, as we'll as in the air, on every pos
sible occasion, but the time Is not yet
come for q general, sweeping and BUS
tanned offensive. That is only possible
when the British can take the initiative
| All Germany's victories so far are the
outcome Of twenty years of preparation
| organized, skillful, methodical and
scientific; nation planned for war, q
nation with a genius for war. Why, 1t Is
seven years since the people were so
drilled that they gave up butter for guns.
| Against this Britains achievement in
production of material and training Of
men, amazing though it is, is a mere
improvisation carried out in the face of
incredible difficulties In the short interval
since the collapse Of France, in which
| Britain lost the whole of her war ma
terial. Even the popular notion that
| Britain Is supreme in desert warfare Is q
delusion. Marshal Rommels Afrika corps
| has had years of training in the tech
nique of desert warfare carried out In
Germany and offlcered by men who know
every inch of Libya They are the most
expert desert warriors in existence. The
British have been recruited and trained
In the past eighteen months. 1t has been
said of them that "the nearest they had
ever been to desert conditions was when