Evening star., 1942-04-24


From the beginning Of the war
the British Navy has contrived to
maintain a reasonably complete
control of the Western Mediter-
ranean from its base at Gibraltar,
though it has never been possible
to station any considerable naval
force in that area and Gibraltar
suffers from its isolated position,
lack Of resources and almost COM
plete lack of air facilities. There
has always existed possibility of
q German attack on Gibraltar
through Spain. though so far the
Germans have either not been will
ing or not been able to exert enough
pressure on Madrid to permit the
passage of German troops through
that country.
The British have been able. like
wise, to command the Eastern Med
iterranean from their bases at Alex
andria, Haifa and Cyprus. Here
they have used much larger forces
with much stronger air support and
they had the benefit of an extraordi-
nariiy able and energetic COM
mander In chief, Admiral Sid An
drew Cunningham.
British Still Hold Malta.
The Central Mediterranean has
been q sort Of no-man's land. The
British have maintained their hold
on the island of Malta despite
almost incessant air attack, and
have been able to send conveys
through the Mediterranean from
west to east whenever a sufncient
scale Of escort could be provided.
The British have been able serious
ly TO interfere with the movement OF
reinforcements and supplies from
Italy to Libya. but have never been
able wholly to stop such movements.
Whenever the Axis has found 1t
possible to build up a sufhciently
strong air concentration they have
been able to dominate the air over
most of this central region. The
italian Navy has, however, proven
a broken reed and it. is almost al
together upon the German Air
Force and the German submarines
that any measure of Axis dornina-
ton In the Central Mediterranean
depends.
In this year l942, Allied opera
tions In the Mediterranean seem
likely TO have two principal OBJ
jectives:
Cd To cut the communications of
the German Army in Africa and
to prevent any further German Ia
cursion into that continent. as for
example, into any part Of French
North Africa.
t2) To maintain their own use
OF the Mediterranean communica-
tions for the support Of the Middle
East and perhaps later on for Of
fensive operations directed against
italy or toward the aid OF the free
Yugoslav Army.
Rommel Faces Peril.
The Axis, on the other hand, will
try to keep open its line of COM
munications TO Africa and will prob
ably continue its efforts to reduce
Malta as part of this effort. 1t
may be compelled to reduce It's
strength in the Central Mediterran-
can by the demands of the Russian
front for air reinforcements, as hap
pened this winter. and in that case
the situation of Gen, Erwin Rom
mels army in Libya may become a
serious one.
A move. by way Of the Iberian
Peninsula toward French North
Africa Is always a possibility and
the question OF the French Fleet as
upsetting the naval balance in the
Mediterranean must be kept in
mind, However. there Is some rea-
son 10 believe that the French Fleet
may have more blaekmail value as
a diplomatic instrument than 1t has
hghting value, especially II Ameri-
can warships make their appear
anoe In the Western Mediterranean.
There seems good reason to doubt
whether French crews would FIRE on
the American flag.
Another possible Axis move in
the Mediterranean is the much
talked-of air-borne offensive from
Rhodes and Crete toward Cyprus
and Syria, but this seems at best
desperate gamble.
Naval Factor Is GIobaI.
To sum Up. as long as the United
Nations can hold Gibraltar. Malta
ana Alexandria, maintain air SUI
perorlty both in the East and the
West, the situation is fairly salts
factory. Under these conditions 1t
seems probable that the Germans
VIII have great difficulty in develop
Ing a strong offensive in Africa. and
that there will continue to be hope
that the Allies may be able to expel
them from that continent alto
gether.
The German effort will of course
oe-in Napoleon's phrase-to con-
ouer the sea by the land: that is.
TO push overland toward Suez and
perhaps toward Gibraltar. Allied
sea command OF the Mediterranean
wiz De nelpIuI IN preventing the
Germans from doing so.
However. the question of naval
superiority must be considered in
the globsl sense. The need for naval
reinforcements in the Indian Ocean
may tend to weaken the Eastern
Mediterranean, just as the need
Of the Atlantic might weaken the
Western Mediterranean -- or vice
veraa,
Every extension of German or
japanese raicing activities against
Allied shipping draws Allied naval
forces farther adeld. This is the
real peril IN considering the possi-
bility OF thu Axis obtaining pcsses-
sion Of additional bases such as
Dakar or Madagascar. The effect
of the Mediterranean situation on
the South Atlantic Is chiefly the fact