Evening star., 1942-05-24

mere on LHe WIuHuytIty uUoCtU W
John Fairtar & Sons, Ltd. pub
fishers OF the Sydney Morning
Herald.
BY WARWICK FAIRFAX.
written for The Star and North American
Newspaper Alliance, Ine)
SYDNEY, Australia, May 23.-The
battle of the Coral Sea and its after
math bear out entirely my previous
contention that an attempt to in
wade Australia would be made via
the Queensland coast and could best
be met by an American naval force
including aircraft carriers and sup
porting ships. The messages of cor
respondents in the last few weeks
also confirm that determined naval
action was the key which would lock
Australia to the japanese if it was
used In combination with other
forces already here. This view is
known to be held in the highest cir
cles here, American, Australian and
British.
While all Australia awards laurels
to those who planned and executed
this action, there is doubt whether
adequate opportunities were pro-
vided for full and timely co-opera-
ton by all possible air forces under
the Southwest Pacific command and
a question whether the blow might
not have been even more telling If
such resources could have been used
against the vulnerable feet of trans
ports as we'll as the japanese naval
forces.
Those who talk of respite from
the fear of invasion must remem-
ber, first, that the battle of Macassar
Straits did not prevent the conquest
of Java and, second. that the Allied
feet suffered losses as well as the
enemy-losses which though offlci-
ally termed comparatively light"
were probably not negligible-and
that the value of the respite depends
on whether the japanese or Ameri-
can navy makes the best use of the
interval of time before the next and
inevitable attempt is made.
Air Forces Doing Good Job.
Before Growing over victory, let us
ask ourselves two questions:
/. What would the powerful jap
anese force of WarShips and troops
have done if the United States Navy
had not happened to plan to have
task forces SO close to Australia at
that particular time?
2. What guarantee is there that
the next time similar drive is
made. task forces of adequate
strength will again be present at
the crucial time and place to meet
It?
The respite will, OF course. un-
doubtedly benefit the Australian
Army, whose dispositions. training
and equipment from our own re-
sources are steadily growing more
ready to meet the test. This is
apart from what United States help
is still arriving. But it is insisted
in the highest military circles that
with the huge area and limited
transport facilities Of this country,
It would require a very large army
to safeguard it from invasion If the
command of Australian waters was
teopardized and a considerably
smaller one if such waters were
reasonably we'll defended.
In cooperation with the Royal
Australian Air Force, United States
Air Forces are doing a magnificent
lob in the hard and continuous air
warfare in North Australia and the
enemy has not only been held, but
beaten back. What the public does
not know, however, is the relative
losses of both sides and how those
losses compare with the capacity OF
both sides to replace them without
exhausting local reserves. 1t must
be plain that against the flow OF air
reinforcements from America must
be set the strain Of this campaign,
which. repeat. is an drduous one
bv anv standard. The air strength
In Australia must be enough not
only to keep this up indefinitely. but
also to cooperate with naval forces
when necessary and to meet an IN
vasion perhaps at another point
altogether.
Combination of All Forces
I suggest that the experience OF
the whole war shows that comol-
nation of all three arms OF the land'
sea and air can do any job more
quickly, more efficiently and more
economically; that there is no area
of which this is more true than the
Pacific and that there Is none who
has learned this lesson better than
the Japanese.
We have here troops and planes,
but for the naval arm we are de-
pendent on cooperation with the
United States forces operating from
far distant bases 1t is for the
United States to decide whether
this cooperation can best be
achieved by continuing the present
system of task forces or whether it
might not be a gain to station part
of the American forces at base
closer to the areas where 1t is alb
solutely certain that 1t will be
needed. Such detachment prob
ably could not be as strong as some
of the task forces that have been in
the Southwest Pacific waters. but
1t could have the advantage of as
sistance from land-based aircraft
and with this it could take the edge
off any attempt at invasion while
awaiting the arrival Of the task
forces which one hopes would be
Forthcoming in any case If an in
vasion were in progress. The risk
of dividing naval forces would be
Offset by the possession of strong de-
fensive bases in Australia and the
opportunity provided for task force
to cut the communications of the
invaders after they have become
engaged.
Would Make Sure of Australia.
The alternative to this is to be
content with the present compara-
lively slender naval force perma-
t. % !, 80