Evening star., 1942-10-30
Jupun's Achilles Heel

Jopon's Achilles Heel
In the outstanding series of articles
appearing currently from the pen Of
Hanson w. Baldwin, military COM
mentator of the New York Times,
none is more revealing than the au-
thor's analysis of the extraordinary
success of our submarines in their
unremitting campaign against Jap
anese naval and merchant shipping.
Mr.. Baldwin has recently returned
from an extensive tour of the Pacific,
so his professional knowledge is en-
hanced by f1rst-hand information
and impressions. Naturally, his ar
ticles must have been checked by the
Navy Department before publication.
Thus, his factual statements can be
relied upon.
Most Americans will be agreeably
surprised to learn that, in less than
ten months of war our submarines
have sunk, unaided, better than
100000 tons of enemy shipping, per-
haps considerably more. They have
forced Japanese merchant shipping
into conveys and they have brought
the meaning of war to the very
entrances of Japan's harbors. And
they have done it with small loss to
themselves-only three submarines"
This record is not only extraordi-
nary in itself, but is especially sig
niflcant because our pig boats" are
hitting Japan hard in its tenderest
spot. Japan, like Britain, is an is
land realm, and its empire is held
together by the strong yet sensitive
threads Of seapower, which rests
upon it's mercantile marine just as
much as it does upon its navy. II
ever the roster of it's liners and
freighters falls below an irreducible
minimum, Japan's overseas garrison
soon would be paralyzed for lack of
supplies and reinforcements, while its
home industry would equally languish
from dearth of vital imported raw
materials. Furthermore, it should be
remembered that Japanese seapower
is less solidly based than that of
Britain and the United States, be-
cause it does not possess anything
like British or American shipbuilding
and repair facilities. Therefore,
Japanese new construction cannot
keep pace with ours, and losses are
less easily replaced. Lastly, Japan's
Axis allies can be Of no direct help
to her. on the seas, as Britain and
America supplement and pool each
others naval and mercantile ton
mage. ...-
The strength of Japan's Navy has
been so concealed behind secret con-
struction during recent years that
no reliable estimate is possible But,
owing to international insurance and
clearance regulations, the character
and tonnage of it's merchant ship
ping before the war can be estimat-
ed with a fair degree of accuracy.
The last reliable data are those of
July l, 1899. On that date, the
Japanese mercantile marine includ-
ed 1887 power driven vessels capable
of navigating the high seas, with a
gross total of 5,629,845 tons. That
was ample for the requirements of
Japan's peacetime foreign trade
and for the maintenance of it's
overseas possessions, including the
occupied districts in China. But war
with the United Nations and the
enormous extension of Japan's con-
quests should have strained the ca
pacity Of its mercantile marine, even
if there had been minimum losses.
To be sure, Japan seized a large
amount of American, British and
Dutch shipping early in the war, per-
hapS amounting to several hundred
thousand tons. That, however, has
been more than Offset by the known
losses due to Allied surface and air.
craft. Now, on top of those losses,
we learn of at least 100000 tons de-
stroyed by our submarines. Japanese
! shipyards cannot possibly be replac-
ing the major wastage continually
taking place. And no aid can come
from any outside source.
That is helpful thought during
these anxious days when the current
Japanese naval offensive menaces
our hold on the Solomons and our
lifeline to Australia. Shipping is
unquestionably Japan's Achilles heel
And our high command knows it
very WELL