Evening star., 1942-05-24

of wise appraisal, this tragic situation
would seem to deserve more sympa-
thetic consideration than is habitually
rendered in this country.
If such consideration Is given it be-
gins to appear that Pierre Laval Is the
type of man who should be expected to
assume leadership in the given situation.
And it also begins to appear that his
leadership is by no means necessarily
disadvantageous for the United Nations.
Laval is shifty, unscrupulous and op-
portunistic by record, and therefore pre-
sumably by nature But these very
characteristics also enable him to play
faction against faction in the manner
which has so often proved successful
diplomacy for nations deficient in physi-
cal power.
Mi. mt Placate Without Surrender.
1t is certainly possible for France at
the present time to placate the Nazis
without completely surrendering to Axis
control If that is done, the ultimate
disaster of italian annexation of Nice,
Savoy, Corsica and Tunis can thereby
be averted Meantime, temporary oc-
cupation of strategic French colonies by
the United Nations-for clear-cut mill
tary reasons-can be tolerated, particu-
larly if there is sufficient token resist
ance to assuage national pride.
To give the devil his due, this seems
close to an outline of the course which
Laval is seeking to follow. AS far as
one can judge, he aims at avoiding both
subsection to the Axis and final break
with the United Nations. For this sort
of tight-rope walking Laval is by tenn
permanent admirably adopted. And 1t
is difficult to see what alternative to
this course is at the moment open to
any French government.
After all, it should be noted that Laval
has not selected for his ministry any OF
the notorious Frenchmen who, like Doriot
or Deaf, advocate unreserved acceptance
by France of Nazi doctrines. If there
are no so-called liberals among the ex-
ecutive assistants whom Laval has Sc
lected, neither are there any extreme
Fascists. On the whole the Laval min
ondary figures, who need arouse neither
enthusiasm nor fear.
In short. it seems fair to assume that
Pierre Laval is, so far as conditions will
permit, endeavoring to pursue strictly
French policy. designed to preserve
and strengthen French influence and
thereby enable that country to be an
influential factor In the postwar world
Obviously, given the equivocal position in
which France is placed, such q policy
must be opportunist and will be difficult
to carry through successfully.
U. S. Break Would Balk 1t.
Success will be more nearly impossible
than difficult. however, II to the state OF
latent hostility between France and
Great Britain is added definite breach
of relations between France and the
United States.
Such an outcome our diplomacy is evil
IDENTIFY seeking to avert and it may be
hoped that the patient and far-sighted
attitude Of the Department Of State
toward Vichy will continue to command
popular support. The war has seen more
than one blunder caused by the pressure
of democratic groups whose emotional
reactions outrun their knowledge and
their wisdom. 1t would be close to fatal
If an irrevocable subordination Of French
policy to Axis control should be added to
other results of well-meaning errors in
judgment.
That outcome would be particularly
tragic if there is to be an attempt to
establish second front on French soil.
For if another A. E. F. goes into action
in France it is of the first Importance
that it should arrive not in the role Of
an army of occupation, but as one Of
deliverance.
1t would be much more difficult to con-
vey the latter impression to French minds
if, before the establishment Of second
front, there has been rupture Of diplo-
matte relations with Vichy. And this
difficulty would be the greater If such
rupture were based not on any convinc-
ing evidence of French hostility to the
United States but primarily on our dis
like for a French political leadership
which at the moment must inevitably
be contorted and devious