Evening star., 1942-10-12
Discusses Weakness
Of Nuzis in Air
Critic Thinks Luftwuffe
Moy Be Held in Reserve
For Allied Invasion

oV 1NNJs 0COJvS CsotUItH GtsOts
There are evidences on every front OF
German weakness in the air. At Stalin-
| grad we have, Of course, seen consider
able concentrations, particularly Of dive
bombers, but 1t is noticeable that these
have obviously been made up by draining
some Of the other fronts, especially the
Mediterranean. Moreover, comparatively
small Russian air forces have been able
! to work much more effectively than
would be the case If the Germans had
a strong and well-balanced air power
close at hand; and there has been little,
| If any, interference by the German
bombers with the lines of communica-
ton Of Marshal Tmoshenko's attacking
forces.
In the Mediterranean, German air at
tacks on Malta have diminished to such
an extent that British aircraft and sub
| marines are again operating from that
base. United Nations aircraft enjoy COM
plete mastery of the air in the eastern
Mediterranean; they are able to attack
Axis supply lines, bases and even har-
bors In Greece and Sicily, almost at will.
In Western Europe little is now heard
Of German long-range bombers over the
Atlantic. What striking force is avail
able to the Luftwaffe appears to be con-
centrated In Norway for attacks on the
Russian conveys. A certain number Of
fighter squadrons are at hand but not
nearly enough to deal adequately with
the rising scale of daylight raids by our
Flying Fortresses and British aircraft
nor nearly enough night fighters to deal
with the night raids of the Raj.
One might almost be tempted to ask,
"Where is the Luftwaf1e?"
We should be indulging in wishful
| thinking of the most dangerous sort
| II we allowed ourselves to suppose that
| the German air power has been perma-
| nently impaired to such degree that Its
present rather feeble showing is the best
it will hereafter be capable of achieving.
The truth is probably that great part
of the Luftwaffe is only temporarily out
| Of action, partly for one reason and
| partly for another. Partly, that is, as a
reserve force against strategical surprise
by an Anglo American attack, and partly
|
with new types Of aircraft.
| The Germans face a very serious
strategical problem on their long and
exposed western front. If they are at
tackled in force they cannot hope-and
well they know it to hold the coast line
very long. Any system of mere linear
defense can be broken through by any
! Uyhn ic will IN %I,o
and 1t is simply impossible to provide
adequate defense in depth along the
whole coast from the Finnish border
down to the Pyrenees. The German
dependence must be on delaying action
on the coast, and a sacrifice of local
reserves to gain time thereafter while
the main reserve is being brought up
to deal with the invader.
Everything, therefore, depends on the
speed with which the main reserve can
be brought to the danger point and sent
into action. A location must be found
for it; that is, its divisions must be so
disposed that movement can be begun
toward any, threatened point the mos,
ment that the faA of. IN attack in force
is reported, and the dispositions must be
such as to permit concentrated action
by the whole available reserve force
rather than mere throwing in Of di-
visions one at a time, which is one OF
the worst of military follies.
So considered, glance at the map
OF Europe will show the German diff
Guilty. Let their main reserve be located
in Northern France-suppose the blow
falls in Denmark? Hamburg and Kiel
might be in our hands before the re-
serves could get there. Let the reserves
be located in Western Germany, and
suppose the blow falls in Norway?
Trondheim might be ours, the German
fleet homeless, and all Scandinavia in a
blaze before the situation could be dealt
with. To range farther afleld, let such
dispositions be taken as might protect
all the west, and suppose a great convoy
suddenly makes its appearance In the
Middle East-Rommel might be over
whelmed before, help could reach him.
The Germans, as they pass to the
defensive, have need OF really mobile
reserve, one which can in part neut1 alize
our advantage of mobility and surprise,
our ability to select the point of attack
at will, which advantages are conferred
upon us by our command of the sea.
Such mobile reserve, given the extent
Of territory to be guarded, can only be
an air force. The Germans must, in
the nature Of things, keep under the
hand of the high command consider
able part of the Luftwaffe, In state
and position of complete readiness for
any emergency; and they must so de-
velop their air-base system as to be able
to throw that aerial reserve toward any
sector Of the vast perimeter which they
now seek to defend.
In addition to this, we must consider
that another part of the Luftwaffe is
probably now undergoing training in the
use Of some of the new types of aircraft
which have recently, in small expert
mental numbers, made their appearance
on the various air fronts This part OF
the Luftwaf1e is probably intended
eventually, for offensive operations, very
likely against the British Isles during the
winter. The new high-level bomber
seems to constitute a very definite
threat to renewed area bombing by
night over British cities; and the posi-
bility that it may be used for gas at
tacks cannot be ruled out by any means