Evening star., 1942-02-13
Without Singapore

WItnout SIn9oPore
BY now, every intelligent person
realizes how disastrous the loss Of
Singapore is bound to be upon the
immediate military situation in the
Far East, from Burma to Northern
Australia. But the repercussions Of
this disaster are much wider in scope.
They extend literally from the west
ern coasts of the Americas to the
eastern shores of Africa. And they
embrace the broadest problems Of
naval strategy.
From the naval aspect, Singapore
was the key to the naval position Of
the United Nations in the Far East.
The Singapore naval base, built by
the British over many years at an
expense of s4o0, 1000 900, was one Of
the finest in the world. 1t was
evacuated because 1t could be
defended by land only from the
Malay Peninsula. Once that was in
Japanese hands, its elaborate IA
cilities and splendid roadstead were
useless. Thereby. the only Far East
ern base capable of repairing and
docking capital ships was lost. The
nearest bases with similar facilities
are Sydney, Australia, and Trim
comalee in the island of Ceylon, OF
the southern tip of India.
That Is the measure Of the prob
lem which confronts the United Ma
tions. That problem Is, In the last
analysis, to secure the sea routes to
the Far East from both America and
Britain, so that eventually enough
naval and military power may be
applied to win back what the Japa-
nese have captured and then to
crush them in their island homeland.
Nothing less will suffice.
Within the past few days cheering
news has come from newspaper cor
respondents that line Of COM
munications has been established
from the Hawaiian Islands to New
Zealand and the eastern coast Of
Australia, where the chief cities and
population of the Commonwealth
are located. That Is q roundabout
route to the present battlefronts Of
the Far East, but it is the nearest
one which large conveys Of troop and
supply ships could take to avoid
attacks from the japanese mandated
islands which might serve to block
the direct route to the Orient unless
neutralized by attacks such as that
made by our Navy on the Marshall
and Gilbert Island bases. Japanese
attacks and occupation of points in
New Guinea and adjacent islands
already have made perilous the route
to Port Darwin, in Northern Aus
tralia. The east coast Of the Com
monwealth, with its great ports Of
Sydney and Melbourne, is the only
dependable base for long-range
operations.
From the British side, the main
line of communications runs clear
around Africa to India. At the tip
of the dark continent are the port
city Of Capetown and the nearby
naval base at Simonstown. These are
major bases. Midway between South
Africa and India lie minor naval
bases on the British islands OF
Seychelles and Mauritius. Thence to
the first-class base at Trincomalee,
Ceylon, with a medium base at Bonn
bay, on the east coast Of India, which
is the nearest strategic point to
Burma, already under japanese pres
sure. The problem here is compli-
Gated by the fact that Singapore's
fall and the impending capture OF
Sumatra may soon loose the Japa-
nese Navy into the Indian Ocean,
where there are no clusters Of islands
to screen British communications
like those which aid us In our South
Pacific communications with Aus
tralia.