Evening star., 1942-11-11
Strategic Tunis

SAsoNSSIS WHO
President Roosevelt's diplomatic
communication to Sidi Moncef Pasha,
the Bey or native ruler of Tunis,
raises both strategic and political
factors highly important in the whole
North African situation. The White
House letter requests permission for
American forces to pass through
Iulis in order to attack the nearby
Italian stronghold of Tripoli, the
Axis ultimate and hitherto inacces-
sible base in Libya. Yet, to most
Americans, the existence of such
parsonage perhaps came as a sur
prise. However, Tunis, unlike Al
geria, is not technically French ter
ritory. 1t is "protectorate," where
a native dynasty more than two CEN
turies old still sits on the throne,
with a facade of pomp and prestige,
though real authority rests with the
French minister resident" backed
by a strong army of occupation. The
situation is similar to that in Mo-
rocco, but has lasted far longer.
France invaded Tunis in 1881. This
bold stroke was made largely to
forestall Italian designs upon the
country. Lying only about 100 miles
from Sicily, Tunis had long attracted
Italian immigrants and enterprise.
The young kindgdom of Italy, then
only 10 years old, was too weak to do
more than protest. However, it's
helpless anger drove it into an alli-
ance with Germany and Austria
Hungary, which lasted down to the
World War and sowed the seeds of
an antagonism between Italy and
France which has never been dis
sipated. Even today, nearly onehalf
of the 100000 European residents in
Tunis are Italians, the other half
being French. The native popula-
ton is about 2,3OO,OOo-over eleven
times as numerous.
Tunis is a long, narrow country,
wedged in between Algeria on the
west and the Mediterranean on the
east, the big bulge of Northwest AZ
RIGA here coming to blunt end. The
best part of the country is in the
north-a region of wooded hills, fer
tile valleys and rich coastal plains.
Here is the capital, large port city
of the same name. The strategic
key to the country is Bizerte, the
finest naval base on the entire Medi-
terranean.
Tunis is separated from Algeria by
a belt of hill and plateau. The chief
line of entry is by the Medjerda
River, up which runs a railway and
military highroad. Thence, easy val
leys lead to Tunis, the capital. It is
this line which our troops undoubted-
ly must follow. Reports from Vichy
that we intend to bypass" Tunis
are patiently absurd. The southern
half of the country is desert, inter-
spersed with salt lakes. The ap-
proach to Tripoli must lie along the
seacoast.
Tunis is sizable country with an
area of $4,000 square miles, about as
large as New York State. Owing to
its relatively narrow width, it's length
is nearly 500 miles from north to
south. Most of this length must be
traversed by our troops in a cam
paign against the Axis, and Tripoli
lies over 100 miles beyond the Tu-
nisian border, likewise across desert
country. Thus, even if the Vichy
French troops offer little effective
opposition, the operation should in
volve transport difficulties. Further
more, it is not impossible that Italian
or German forces may enter Tunis,
by land from Tripoli, or by sea or air
from Italy with the connivance of
the local French authorities.
1t is therefore to be hoped that
the occupation of coastal Algeria will
be rapidly completed as a necessary
prerequisite to the penetration of
Tunis and it's utilization as a base
of operations for the campaign
against Tripoli, which is our strategic
objective. The task will thus be seen
as one which may prove more diff
cult and time consuming than is
popularly supposed.