Askov American., 1942-06-11
more than the Nazi blitz of the Brit
ish Isles last year lowered Britain's
The British reported that it did not
exceed 10 per cent.

1t is not lack of numerical strength
that makes our leaders hesitate to
try invasion now. Between us, we
and Britain could doubtless muster
the needed number of soldiers.
Nor is it lack of equipment. While
1t might strain us to do so, we could
perhaps provide the guns, tanks,
planes, weapons and motorized means
OF transportation we should need.
The real problem is to maintain
ourselves after we have landed. We
should need vast, continuing flow
of munitions, supplies and new arms
and equipment to replace that which
would certainly be destroyed.
We must realize that there is a vast
difference between this problem, as
it faced us during the World war,
and as it confronts us today.
Then we had the japanese as allies
in the east, helping keep Pacific
shipping lanes open. In the Mediter-
ranean, the combined Italian, Greek
and Portuguese navies were avail
able to maintain unbroken commun-
ication lines. In the Atlantic, the
American fleet had the help of the
British, French and Belgian navies
in protecting the conveys.
Consider how vastly different the
situation is today:
We are fighting, not merely on
one front, but all over the world.
To keep a European expeditionary
force supplied would force us to
lessen our efforts on other fronts.
1t would mean reduced shipping
facilities to carry lend-lease sup
plies to Russia, if not complete aban-
donment. We might have to discon-
tinue help to China. We might even
be forced to cast Australia adrift.
Once the invasion was launched, all
else would have to become second
ary. We should need every available
bit of tonnage for ourselves.
With resistance against Japan
weakened in the east, the route
around Africa might be cut. If so,
it would be the end of Britain s
Libyan campaign and might result in
loss of Iraq, Iran and Syria. The
door would then be wide open to the
Axis powers to invade the Caucasus
from the south.
Wholly abandoned by the Western
powers, China would probably COL
lapse. japanese attack on Russia
from the east would be certain to fol-
low. 1t might mean Russia's COL
lapse as well.
It is no secret that if Russia de-
feats Hitler before Japan subdues
China, Stain will Immediately
pounce on Nippon. He realizes that
he will probably never have another
such opportunity to crush his heredi-
tary enemy. If, on the other hand,
Japan disposes of China while Stain
is still occupied with Hitler, the Jap
anese will promptly attack Russia.
Even if we and Britain concen-
trated every available ton Of mer-
chant and naval strength in the At
lantic, we might find the task of
feeding the British Isles and main
tanning a European expeditionary
force beyond us. Someone has fig
ured out that during the World war
it took IL tons of shipping to main
tain an American soldier fighting
in Europe. Consider how much tom
mage we should need, as against the
amount actually available.
Circumstances may force us to in
wade Europe even if we are not
ready. If so, it must be in such
strength as to assure a quick vic
tory. In long campaign, we might
find ourselves out on limb due to
inability to keep our forces supplied
by reason of lack of shipping.
Invasion now might end the war
in our favor. But it might also be
disastrous. Our leaders are facing
difficult problem. This, we should
have the intelligence to understand
and be restrained in our criticism.