Evening star., 1942-06-10
Nv MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT,


ELIOT.
It Is quite possible that the battle
Of Midway, following the battle of
the Coral Seq, has shifted the bal
ance Of naval power in the Pacific.
To begin with. the Japanese fleet
air arm appears to have been vir-
tually destroyed. Judging from the
eyewitness account of Ensign Gay,
the Japanese losses in carriers in
cluded one and probably both of the
big naval carriers Of the Kaga class,
the largest and best In the Japanese
fleet. One smaller carrier was prob
ably lost, and two others were dam
aged.
To these must be added one car
fier certainly, and another almost
certainly, lost In the battle Of the
Coral Sea. Some Of these losses
may have been converted merchant
carriers, of which the Japanese are
believed to have several, but 1t Is
now . virtual certainty that the
United States feet Is superior In
carrier-borne aircraft to the Japa-
nese and that the Japanese losses in
carriers have crippled their fleet for
offensive operations.
The operations Of task forces,
such as the Japanese have been
employing 10 freely. are based
largely on air support from car
riers, both for reconnaissance and
for the initial blows. The loss, tenn
porary or permanent, Of seven jap
anese carriers will certain restrict
japanese task-force attacks, II It
does not eliminate them altogether.
Initiative Probably Lost.
Unless the Japanese have . great
many more carriers. naval and con-
verted, than is supposed In well In
formed circles. the offensive and the
initiative in the Pacific war area
now viii pass into our hands.
What use We shall make OF these
advantages remains to be seen.
Probably our first effort in the cen
tral Pacific is being directed toward
the pursuit of the retiring Japanese
forces, and especially toward the
location and destruction Of their
crippled ships.
It is q serious matter for the Japa-
nese admiral to have so large a
number of cripples as three battle
ships. two carriers and four or more
cruisers far out at sea, 1000 miles
from any dockyard which can ef-
feet major underwater repairs.
It Is true that he can perhaps
get these cripples into Wake or into
some Of the atolls Of the Marshall
group, but there they Immediately
will become targets for American
patrol planes and carrier-based
aviation.
Temporary repairs can be effected
by repair ships In some instances,
but probably not before American
submarines can arrive to watch the
exits. There Is. therefore, an ex-
cellent chance that some. at Least.
Of the damaged Japanese ships will
never see Japan again.
Probably Hunting Japs.
So far as can be gathered from
available accounts, American bat
tleships and heavy cruisers do not
appear to have been present Oh
Midway in any considerable force.
They may, Of course, have arrived
later and may now be engaged In
pursuing the remnants Of the Japa-
nese force. which. owing to differ
ences in speed between whole and
damaged ships. may well be scat
tered over a wide expanse of ocean.
The limiting factor in the sue
cess of our pursuit is the necessity
for respecting the powers Of Japa-
nese shore biased aircraft operating
from Wake and from islands of the
Marshall group.
Later we may find that the way
has been opened for offensive opera
tions of our own to recover Wake
and to capture some of the japanese,
bases in the MarShallS.
Our superiority in carrier-based
aircraft may enable us to give
proper fighter protection to such