Evening star., 1942-01-18
Offensive War Woits
Upon Production
BIZ ODen L. Scott.

| By OUen L. Scott.
Events that affect American and
British operations all through 1912 are
likely to be discouraging. Everybody
from President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill on down the line are
emphasizing that fact.
The reason is that during this period.
except for isolated actions, the Amer
leans and British must confine them
selves to the defensive. The reason Is
that they still lack the weapons, and
will continue to lack the weapons, with
which to wage offensive warfare.
There now is hope that American in
dustry in 1912 will SO far adjust itself
to war production that the shift from
defense to offense can be made some
time in 1943. Whether or not the shift
can be made even then depends almost
entirely upon American factories. The
reason is that the British are producing
right now about all Of the war goods
that they will be able to produce and tho
total is not sufacient even for successful
defense.
Ohicials Of the Army and Navy would
like the American people to understand
this situation 80 that too much will not
be expected. The desire Is to avoid
ventures that cannot be carried through
with at least an even chance of success.
Otherwise there may be other occasions
such as the evacuations for the British
at Dunkirk, Greece and Crete, not to
mention the present defeat in Malaga,
and such as the American defeats in
Hawaii and the Philippine Islands.
1t took these defeats for American
forces to reveal how poorly prepared for
modern war were the American Army,
Navy and air force The lack Of pre-
paredness in the Army and air force was
almost wholly due to lack Of equipment.
that Of the Navy was due In important
part to an attitude of mind. The lead
ership tended to look backward, instead
Of forward, and to resist basic change.
As matters now stand the outlook Is
about as follows:
In the Navy. Not until the fleet that
now is building largely has been COM
pleted will the Navy be able to show a
preponderance Of power over Japan in
the Western Pacific. This turn is un-
likely to come before late 1943 or early
1914. If then. In the meantime the Navy
will figure largely as force for protect
Ing conveys and for raiding. This Is a
highly important function but isn't the
type of action that admirals dream
about, in which the fate Of a nation can
be decided in an afternoons engagement
between two big fleets. The Navy is
acting today, in both the Atlantic and
Pacific, more as q hard working police
force than as q mighty armada.
In the merchant marine. The first real
ship launching will come in 1912. Build
ing of merchant ships seems prosaic but
1t is fundamental to the waging of this
war Not until there are more ships
will the United States be able to move
the men and supplies and equipment to
the battle fronts in volume that can
permit offensive operations. The present
volume of shipping is inadequate for the
job to be done. It will be well along into
le43 before this bottleneck is broken.
In the Army. There Is quite . way
to go before even the rather small
present Army is adequately equipped.
Any American forces that now 60 into
action probably will be forced to operate
at . disadvantage In equipment. This
aIs,0v ~ {vn
artillery and ordnance Of all heavy types.
It viii represent the return in unduly
large Casualties for the fact that the
United States insisted, even after May,
1910. upon having automobiles and
washing machines rather than tanks
and guns. Certainly this situation will
not be remedied before 1943.
In the air force. Until recently. if not
now. the great proportion Of planes made
In American factories were sent abroad.
The Army and Navy combat forces were
forced to function with skeleton equip
ment. The Army, in particular. has
been forced to improvise with made
quate equipment for even the most es-
sential training operations. This condi-
ton will start to be remedied In 1912, If
production rises as expected. The need
for planes In Russia, in England, in
Africa, In the Far East, is immense, so
that 1t certainly will be 1943 before the
tide will turn in the air. This is due
to the fact that the United States and
Britain permitted . nation like Japan,
with next to no air industry, to gain q
head start.
All Of this is not to say that 1912 will
not see important raids on the Japa-
nese and upon Germany.
It still Is possible for the Navy to get
plane carriers within striking distance
Of Japan. It also is possible for the
Army to get big bombers into China for
forays against Japan. But raids Of this
type do not represent . sustained offen-
sive. The end of the war can come
into sight only when this country is
equipped to take up offensive operations
and to press those operations without
letup. That stage is at least IL months
away. It may be much farther away
than that.
There Is strong ground for encour-
agement over the results that will be
attained when the turn does come in
the center Of initiative.
The possibilities are revealed by the
experience Of one group of American
flyers, with few rather out-of-date
American planes. These flyers had
reached Burma just q few days before
the war broke out with Japan. The fact
that they were there was due. largely to