Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1942-11-17
SoIomons Victory

JapanS second major effort to
knock our forces out of their posi-
tions in the Solomon Islands has been
rolled back in what has every appear
ance OF being smashing victory for
American naval and air units.
AS related by the Navy, the Japa-
nese lost one battleship, three heavy
cruisers, two light cruisers, five de-
stroyers, eight transports and from
10000 to 10000 men. In addition,
one enemy battleship, six destroyers
and four cargo transports were DAM
aged in the action. Our losses, &C
cording to the Nays commun1que,
consisted Of only two light cruisers
and six destroyers sunk-astonish
ingly small as compared to the dam
age done the enemy. Since the COM
munique made no mention of damage
to other American ships, although it
must be assumed that there was dam
age, the complete picture of the fight
cannot yet be filled in. But it seems
clear enough that the Japanese have
been badly, if not decisively, beaten.
If this be the correct Interpretation
the battle should have far-reaching
consequences in the South Pacific.
Although the japanese had been
massing their striking forces for some
time, it is a fair assumption that
they timed their initial attack on
November IS to take full advantage
of our supposed preoccupation with
the campaign in North Africa. AS
events have shown, however, this
latter effort was not made at the
price OF undermining our own
strength in the Solomons, and, judg-
ing from the text of the Nays COM
munique and the confident assertions
of Admiral Nimitz, we expect not only
to hold our present positions in the
Guadalcanal theater, but also to en-
large them. If we have the strength
to do this, even in event the Japanese
renew their attack, it means that our
communications with Australia are
secure and that we will be able to
hold the bases essential to future
offensive operations against Japan.
On. the basis Of the information
so far made available, there are two
aspects of the battle which deserve
particular attention. For the first
time in this war, both sides sent
battleships into action. Curiously,
the Japanese used two of the Kongo
class, old ships of about $4,000 tons
Perhaps this indicates that they are
short of heavy cruisers, and that they
now have to risk their battleships in
a type of operation in which they
have heretofore relied on cruisers.
But, whatever the explanation, their
choice of ships was bad one, for it
seems evident that they ran into a
force Of stronger American battle
invasion fleet. Had we not had bat
tleships on the scene the result might
have been different, but they were
there-and that should afford some
loou IoI GilouSHt oH Vic pdII VI CIloSe
who contend that the big capital ship
has outlived its usefulness.
The other significant circumstance
is the fact that the Japanese fleet
was sent into battle without carrier
escort, while our own carriers are
reported to have played an effective
role. Why the Japanese would take
such gamble as this is matter for
speculation, but it is a fair assump-
ton that they had no carriers to
send, or that they were afraid to risk
the few that may remain in their
possession. If that be the case, it
holds great promise for the future.