Evening star., 1942-01-25

consideration the possibility Of
sending Army airplanes to Wake
and Midway and Withdrawing Ma
rine planes then on those islands;
of relieving Marines stationed there
by the substitution Of units of the
Army. Gen. Short. Admiral Kimmel
and Rear Admiral Block had been
in conference concerning this pro-
posal.
Air Surprise Unlikely,
Plane Officers Thought
At the time of the receipt Of the
messages of November 27 by Ad-
miral Kimmel and Gen. Short, re-
spectively, this proposal was q sub
ject of discussion. Gen. Short held
discussions with Admiral Kimmel
on November 27, December /, 2 and
8 concerning this matter in an
effort to compose certain differences
of view. At one Of these conferences
Admiral Kimmel inquired of his
war plans officer, Capt. McMorris,
who was present, concerning the
probability of a surprise air attack
on Oahu. According to Gen. Short,
Capt. McMorris replied there was no
probability of such an attack; and.
according to Capt. McMorris, his
reply was that the Japanese would
never so attack. According to the
testimony Admiral Kimmel and
Gen. Short did not discuss means
or measures for Hawaiian defense
to be adopted in the light Of the
messages.
On and after November n, l94l,
the commanding general, Hawaiian
Department, and the commander in
chief of the Pacific Fleet. independ-
emily took such action as each
deemed appropriate to the existing
situation. Neither informed the
other specifically Of the action he
was taking, and neither inquired Of
the other whether or not any action
had been taken, nor did they con-
suit as to the appropriateness Of the
actions taken by them respectively.
Action Is Taken
After Messages.
After receipt of the messages Of
November 27 the following action
was taken:
The commanding general, Ha-
waiian Department, ordered alert
No. (see next succeeding para
graph into effect on November 81,
and it was maintained in effect
until December T. At the same time
he ordered that the aircraft warm
ing system operate daily from 4 am.
to 7 am. The commandant OF the
14th naval district, in his capacity
as base defense officer, called con-
ference Of all the destroyer COM
manders of the inshore patrol, ad-
vised them that something might
happen, and that they should be on
the alert. The commander in chief
of the fleet made certain disposi-
tions of units of the feet for the
purpose of strengthening his out
posts to the south and west Of the
Hawaiian Islands. and also issued
an order that any japanese sub
marines found in the operating
areas around the Island of Oahu
should be attacked. This order went
beyond the authority given him by
the Navy Department.
Operating Procedure
For Air Alerts.
In the Hawaiian Departments
standing operating procedure gov
erning the defense of the Hawaiian
coastal frontier, three states Of
readiness were prescribed, known as
alert No. /, alert No. 2 and alert No.
8. Alert No. l was thus defined:
This alert is defense against
acts OF sabotage ana uprlSlngS
within the islands, with no threat
from without"
Alert No. 2 was thus defined:
This alert is applicable to
condition more serious than alert
No. /. Security against attacks
from hostile subsurface, surface
and aircraft, in addition to de-
fense against acts of sabotage
and uprisings, is provided"
Alert No. was thus defined:
This alert requires occupation
of all field positions by all units.
prepared for maximum defense
of Oahu and the Army installa-
tions on outlying islands"