Evening star., 1942-11-09

nies to encourage French resistance
to Axis demands and collect all
the information they could.
Mr.. Hull showed how he visual
lied the situation In conference
with Army and Navy chiefs he
called in his ONCE October II, 1910.
He pointed out that although this
country was not then at war. we
should not overlook the probabili-
ties staring us in the face.
He suggested specifically that Hit
Ter held the whiphand over his out
law associates, including Japan. and
might call for all-out offensives
everywhere at any time. Britain
then was nearer exhaustion than
most people realized. Hitler might
carry on the devastating bombings
Of England, press forward in Egypt
and strike elsewhere, for control of
the Mediterranean, leaving nothing
undone to utilize French ships and
bases. And he might prevail on
Japan to 60 ahead then with her
plans for aggression In the Pacific.
Saw Wars Nearness.
Convinced that the Mediterra-
mean, as In past ages, might become
an area Of decisive conflict before
the war was over. Mr.. Hull devoted
his efforts to framing our whole
diplomatic policy with the single
objective of making the best possible
contribution to victory in the war he
saw closing in on us.
In November, 1910, when criticism
was arising against friendly" rela-
tions with Vichy, Mr.. Hull told the
newly arrived French Ambassador
CASTOR Henry-Haye in the strong
est possible language that he did
not trust any pro-Hitlerites and
would do the best he could to
antagonize the pro-Hitler elements
at Vichy.
There developed relationship
with Vichy, then, somewhat similar
to what we had with Germany for
a couple of years before Pearl Har-
Dor ended 1t. There was no friend
ship in the Washington-B Berlin re-
lations, but having representatives
on the ground there enabled Secre-
tary Hull to receive absolutely re-
liable information in January, 1941,
that Hitler would invade Russia
in May or June OF that year.
1t may be recalled that the Sec
retary severely castigated Germany
and Japan in hearings on the lease
lend bill during that January, but
had no harsh words for Russia
then generally considered a virtual
ally OF Hitler because of the Russo
German non-aggression pact. He
knew Russia was going to be on
our side.
Carried Out Objectives.
This incident illustrated the value
OF sometimes maintaining diploma
tic relations with an unfriendly
government Mr.. Hull felt. and
served to strengthen his determina-
ton to keep open the avenues for
information out of France and her
territories as long as possible.
Whether, as a Government, we
kept on speaking terms with Laval
was utterly immaterial-an abstract
question-to the Secretary, aside
from the mechanics provided by
the relationship to further his real
objectives, which meant doom for
the pro-Hitlerites at Vichy and
liberation for real Frenchmen.
Following his discussions with
Army and Navy officials in the fall
of 1910. Mr.. Hull proceeded to
carry forward those objectives in
every feasible way This included
every kind Of resistance to every
kind of movement that might help
Germany, especially in the western
Mediterranean area by getting
ships and bases from France. It
also included the economic culti-
vation of the people OF French
North Africa with limited Ship
ments of food and other supplies in
exchange for materials we needed
from there, as well as some relief
shipments Of food and medicines
to Unoccupied France itself.
These demonstrations Of friend
ship for the French people, to-
gether with constant ofIicial as
surances of our good will and hopes
for the liberation of France, were
credited with encouraging such a
widespread anti-Axis sentiment as
to make 1t difficult for Laval and
other pro-Hit1erites at Vichv to
deliver any important military ia
vors to Hitler.
The. fact that German demands
were not realized before the United
Nations were prepared to forestall
any Axis military drive in French
Africa, together with the expecta-
ton of cooperation from the
French people in our own military
efforts, convinces Secretary Hull
and his associates that their Vichy
policy served its purpose we'll, i