Evening star., 1942-12-27
fFtth OF a Series.)
By LELAND STOWE.
Special Correspondent of The Star and
Chicago Daily News

BY LELAND STOWE,
Special Correspondent of The Star and
Chicago Daily News.
The fact that Allied divisions and
bombers are still besieging the ap-
proaches to Tunis, almost two
months after American forces took
over Algiers (only 400 miles away
| clearly shows that we have some
valuable lessons to learn from the
North African campaign This is
another way of admittin: that orr
| North African operation. even
though brilliantly launched, has not
been anything like 80 per cent
success to date.
We may as we'll admit this fact
plainly because we may be able to
avoid good deal of future trouble
if we clearly understand and de-
termine to profit by the shortcom-
| ings and mistakes of our military
debut across the Atlantic. North
Africa has shown that the Amer
leans and British, cooperating, can
| organize and organize extremely
well. 1t has not shown that We yet
| possess or have mastered several
other essential qualities of the blitz-
krieg.
Darlan Deal Brings Surprise.
Since I was in Moscow when our
star-spangled balloon shot up over
Morocco and Algeria, and was trav-
cling through Iran and the Middle
East as our occupation developed,
had immediate contact with the
reaction of Russians and of Iran
lans and other neutrals to our
North African operation. Every
where they were impressed by the
speed of the initial American land
lngs. But almost everywhere. as
the Allied thrust against Bizerte
and Tunis seemed to lag and falter
there was natural tendency to be
less impressed.
| In the minds of Iranians, for in
stance, there was genuine surprise
that the Americans had appar-
emily made deal with Admiral
Jean Darlan. To them. and un-
doubtedly to the great majority of
people in every occupied European
country, this seemed a confession
OF American military weakness.
Communication and supply OBJ
stacles have certainly been very
great in North Africa Nevertheless
the average neutral observer ir
/ Teheran, Bagdad or Cairo. is puz-
zled by the fact that Tunis anC
Blzerte were not occupied by the
Allies within the first two or three
weeks at the most. These outside
observers do not understand why
several thousand Allied paratroops
were not landed near these cities
before the Germans had recovered
from their surprise and begun tc
move IN transport planes. 1t seems
| to them that the Americans ano
British must have had a great pre-
ponderance Of bombers and trans
port planes at that stage, but that
we shrank from taking the kind OF
risks that the Nazis took in Norway
When our North African opera
ton is compared with the Germans
| Norwegian occupation, it is true
that the contrasts appear rather
striking. Trondheim is nearly as fal
from Oslo as Tunis is from Algiers
yet the Nazis garrisoned Trondhein
by air (over wild and difficult coun-
try in an amazingly short time
Trondheim was also the KEY to al
OF Central and Northern Norway
just as Bizerte and Tunis are the
keys to control of the Mediterra
mean. Should we have gambled al
the way, as the Germans did, anc
have landed air-borne troops ir
Tunisia at the same time we were
landing others In Algiers and Oran
Evidently. that will be one for the
military historians to debate about
Lest Americans should be over
complacent about our very important
achievement in occupying NORTH
Africa, there are several points
which can be extremely instructive
for future l,ference.
First. the Allies did not make q
real blitzkrieg in Morocco and Al
gerie-there were no enemy force!
OF serious proportions to be met
anywhere on the North African
coast. even in Tunisia. Therefore
our armed forces still have to prove
themselves against territory and po-
sitions where the enemy is already
entrenched. Aside from that. it NAV
be argued that we still do not DOS
sess sufficient facts about the mill
tary problems and operations which
have since characterized the slowly
unfolding attack on Tunis-and that
is true. But it still does not explain
why We did not go for Tunis as the
Germans went for Trondheim-al
out, from the very start.
Decries Neglect of Radio.
1t seems to me that it is even OF
greater significance, however. thai
our American forces certainly dis.
played a considerable lack of politi.
cal and propaganda control aptitude
when we first occupied Algeria. Nc
German army in the world woulc
ever occupy city like Algiers with.
out seizing that city's radio station
in the very first hours-and using il
Immediately. Several weeks aftel
Allied occupation it is astounding to
read in American newspapers thai
prepared Office of War Information
broadcasts in French had not beer
made to France all this time simply
because Admiral Darlan or some
other local person raised objection,
to American propaganda beine
broadcast to the French people.
Such a thing as this can only be
described as incredible. Did oul
American forces occupy Algeria
or did they not? 1t would be abso.
lutte folly for Americans to think W.
can defeat Hitlerism in Europe b,
the use of military weapons alone
Nazi spokesmen and Quisling wer,
on the air in Oslo within two hour!