Evening star., 1942-03-11

The tert OF Admiral Thomas c.
Hdrts statement on the ndpal cam
pdton In the Far East follo,0s
The area over which the Japa-
nese campaign, begun on December
7, has extended forms a triangle
which Is over 1000 miles on the
side and the distances involved are
very great. There are many islands
within the area, some of them very
large, many mere dots. The Jape-
nese were very we'll acquainted with
this area due to the activities of
their fisheries and their other COM
mercial interests over many years.
The campaign was one of am
phibious war, this most difficult and
least known variety of warfare. In
this instance, aircraft took very
forward part. The enemy has been
able to employ land based planes
throughout all his advances. In
most instances, the planes which
have played so vital part in the
enemy's success were of the Japa-
nese Naval Air Service-mostly
land planes. The enemy was adept
in their use-as we found them to
be with other weapons as well. ia
pans long war with China he'd pro-
vided much experience in amphi-
bious warfare. She prepared her
blows long In advance, evidently
with thoroughness, and the sur
prise element gave her forces a
tremendous advantage.
The Allied naval forces in ASiatic
waters were not large. A full half
of them were American, after the
early loss Of the British Repulse and
Prince of Wales. Those were the
only two capital ships on our side
and their loss was a severe one.
1t occurred at the very beginning
and included the loss OF Admiral
Phillips, r. N, we'll known to be one
of the best of the British Navy. His
venture was unlucky and there has
been criticism of his taking to the
sea with those two ships under the
conditions which obtained. 1t is
now apparent, in the light of the
final outcome of the land campaign
in Malaga, that Admiral Phillips
took the only course which could
have saved Singapore.
Stuck to Original Plans.
One salient. feature Of this cam
paign is that the Allied naval forces
generally followed the plans which
the three nations had separately de-
veloped prior to the outbreak of
the war. All three based their plans
on the basis that any opening of
the war would be made by the enemy
and that it would be a surprise at
tack made by superior naval forces
The japanese attack, Of course, was
q surprise, but 1t did not succeed
in upsetting our own naval plans.
Another feature: AS is we'll under
stood, naval forces can be effective
over any considerable period only if
they can operate from bases which
are reasonably secure. What did
eventually upset our own plans was
the loss of such bases. In the case of
the American Asiatic Fleet, this loss
came early;-not by the capture of
Manila Bay, which still holds OUT
but because the enemy obtained
control of the air within a few
days, destroyed most of the naval
base facilities by high level bomb
ing, and soon made the harbors
themselves too insecure for the
necessary servicing of ships.
Following it's approved plans, the
American Asiatic Fleet disposed it's
surface ships prior to the enemy's S
attack. Thus in this initial depioy-
ment they could not be bottled up
or caught and destroyed even by
superior forces. During the cam
paign, since we never had superior
ity in the air, the advantage of in
formation from air reconnaissance
lay with the enemy.
Consequently, the meric a n
cruisers and destroyers were never
able to effectively participate in di-
rect opposition to the enemy in
the northern part of the waters of
the Philippines. The American
cruisers and destroyers therefore
withdrew toward the southern por-
ton of the area and generally
operated In conjunction with the
Dutch and British naval detach-
ments as quickly as the necessary
arrangements therefor could be
made.
Conveyed Reinforcements.
For over two months after the
initial Japanese attack the Allied
naval forces had extensive commit
ments in guarding reinforcements
being brought into the area, particu-
larly into Malaga. Actually, in that
period the fleet guarded a total of
10 conveys which carried troops and
war materials into Singapore alone.
Those duties appropriated prac-
tically all the services of the British
cruisers and destroyers, much of the
Dutch, and some OF the American
ships of the same type. In conse-
quence, it was, except in the later
stages of the campaign, difficult to
maintain surface ship concentra-
tions to use in directly opposing the
enemy's advancing forces.
However, as the enemy's advance
progressed, his distances from bases
and the length of his communica-
ton lines increased. There was
consequent reduction in his power,
irrespective of the size of his forces.
1t was during those latter stages
that most of the combat involving
Allied cruisers and destroyers took
place and the damage to the enemy
was probably increased in conse-
quence.
In the end, it amounted to just
that; doing as much damage to