Evening star., 1942-12-20
Burma Front

Burmese front may herald important
military developments. For some
time Anglo-American and japanese
air squadrons have been trading
blows on each others land bases at
various points in this region. This
now has been supplemented by land
fighting along the coast. Allied
headquarters at New Delhi, India,
reports an advance OF British and ma
tive Indian troops some distance into
Japanese-held territory. On the
other hand, Axis radio stations an
nounce the start of Japanese inva-
sion of India, though these sensa-
tional broadcasts give no specific
details and are entirely unconfirmed
from Allied sources.
A study of the topographic map
casts doubt on the feasibility of
large-scale offensives by land, either
by the British into Burma or by the
japanese into India. The Indo-
Burmese border is one of the most
difficult imaginable for major mill
tary operations necessarily involving
much mechanical equipment. Al
though it extends some 700 miles,
this remote frontier consists of
rugged, jungle clad mountains
crossed by few rough trails. Even
where the dividing line reaches the
Bay of Bengal, the mountains re-
peatedly approach the sea, with only
narrow coastal strips between.
The British base for land OPERA
tions is Chittagong, a port town
about 100 miles from the Burmese
border, and also railhead for a spur
of the Indian railway system. The
British could thus mass a consider
able force there and keep it supplied.
Such a force could probably drive
along the coast and capture the
japanese base at Akyab, about 200
miles from Chittagong. especially
since Akyab has no good land COM
munication with the rest of Burma
and must be supplied by sea.
However. once Akyab was taken,
the real problem still would lie ahead
in the shape of the towering Arakan
Yoma Mountain range, which rises
literally from the sea in a virtually
unbroken wall that in places exceeds
10000 feet, This is the gigantic nat
ural barrier that blocks the invaders
path to Central Burma, the IRA
waddy River Valley and Rangoon.
Looking at the other side of the
picture, a japanese thrust from
Akyab at Chittagong would encoun-
ter less difficult terrain, but would
have to operate from a restricted
base against well-supplied British
forces with excellent rearward COM
munications 1t is hard to see how
the Japanese could mount a major
offensive into India along the coast
and keep it going.
Thus, land operations on the Indo-
Burmese border, even if they do
develop, should be regarded as of
limited and local significance. Their
chief effect might be psychological
rather than strategic. A British
coastal offensive would hearten the
Chinese and would perhaps take
some of the current japanese pres
sure off Yunnan Province A similar
japanese thrust at Chittasong might
quicken disaffected elements in India
to a fresh wave of unrest and sabo-
tage. But genuine threat to either
Burma or India could come only from
big expeditionary force by sea.
That would imply large concentra-
tlonS Of naval and air strength to
guard the extensive fleet of troop
transports and supply ships involved
in the undertaking And no such
concentrations have as yet been re-
ported by either side.