Evening star., 1942-02-17
Sumutru and Burmo

The immediate pattern of japanese
strategy after their capture of Singa-
pore is already revealed. The next
objective is undoubtedly the great
Dutch island of Sumatra, stretching
diagonally across the Equator for
1,100 miles Sumatra parallels the
Malay Peninsula for the northern
half of its length, the inclosed waters
being known as the Strait of Malacca.
This is the chief trade route be-
tween the Indian Ocean and the
China Sea. With the fall of Singa-
pore, it has passed into Japanese
hands. But Sumatra stretches fur
ther southwark until it almost
touches the western end of the island
of Java, vital stronghold of Dutch
colonial empire. The streak of sea
between the two islands, known as
the Sunda Passage, is less than
twenty-five miles wide-about the
width of the Strait of Dover.
Even before Singapore had for
mally surrendered, the japanese had
begun their attack on Sumatra by a
large-scale descent of paratroops.
That attack was made on the OIL
bearing district of Palembang, the
richest oil fields in the whole Far
East. The Dutch were on the alert,
and the sky-borne invaders were
wiped out. But only day later,
big japanese fleet of transports ap-
peared off the coast and, despite
some losses due to Dutch and Ameri-
can aircraft. masses of soldiers were
quickly landed and pressed inland.
The Dutch barely had time to de-
stroy the wells and refineries before
they were forced to yield ruined
Palembang to the invaders. 1t Is
generally conceded that Sumatra
cannot be held and must soon be
overrun. The vast island, with its
area of about 10000 square miles, is
nearly four times the size of Java,
though with only 100000 inhabi-
tants-less than fifth of Java's
teeming population. Nevertheless, its
great natural wealth is considerably
developed and there is a good system
of roads which will facilitate the
Japanese occupation. The Dutch
admittedly have concentrated the
bulk Of their forces for a last-ditch
fight in Java; so Sumatra presum-
ably contains only light garrisons
which can do little more than con-
duct delaying or harassing actions.
The japanese are presumed to have
had more than 100000 troops en-
gagged in the Singapore campaign.
Virtually all of these now are free
for action elsewhere. 1t is unlikely
that large proportion of them will
be shifted to Sumatra unless most
of the army is destined for an
immediate assault on Java. This
makes 1t possible that many of them
will be shifted northward to heighten
japanese pressure on Burma, which
Is already severe.
The situation in Burma is critical.
The japanese are across the Salween
River line both at Mataban, near the
rivers mouth, and at a point up
stream some fifty miles to the north
ward. The japanese troops are re-
ported to be filtering through the
jungle country much as they did in
Malaga, and the British imperial
forces seem to be too small to hold
them at all points. Except along the
coast, the terrain is hilly to noun
famous. and two more rivers lie
across the japanese line of advance
before they emerge into the wide
Burmese plain, up which runs the
main railway and highroad from the
port of Rangoon to the capital,
Mandalay. However. the japanese
have less than one hundred miles to
go before they reach that vital line
which feeds the Burma road into
China. Also, another japanese
column threatens the Salween line
far to the northward. 1t is here that
Chinese troops are presumed to be
taking up the defense.
The Burmese situation obviously
is grave. Only large reinforce
ments from both India and China
seemingly can arrest japanese at
tacks which will be pressed fiercely,
in accordance with the daringly
offensive strategy that the japanese
high command has displayed.