Evening star., 1942-05-03
Armchair Strategists Fear
Allies Lack of Concrete Plan
Amateurs Have Had Sad Satisfaction of Seeing
Dire Predictions Come True in Past
While Professionals Sneered
BY Constantine Brown.

tine Br0wn.
standing between the United States and
Japan.
Armchair" diplomatists had the sad
satisfaction of seeing their predictions
come true. They had seen correctly into
the future while the professionals were
lulled into a sense of security by wish
fully thinking that "it's inconceivable the
japanese will risk it" The glasses of
Washington of1cialdom are an even
roster hue in regard to European mat
ters
Private students of strategy and diplo-
macy regard the present military situa-
ton with the same concern they have
felt over the political situation for the
last decade They have little secret in
formation about the disposition of enemy
strength and Allied naval, air and mill
tary forces, but they see one thing
namely, that a coalition such as the
United Nations, still in the midst of war
preparations, cannot disperse it's forces
the way it is doing without courting
disaster
Some packages here and there-a few
ships in one ocean, a few planes in
another sector and few thousand men
on one front or another-is the way the
Allies have distributed their forces. Such
widespread, thin distribution of strength
may permit temporary defensive sue
cesses but it will be at a tremendous
disadvantage when confronted with the
entire might of the Axis. forces concen-
trated at one point. This already has
been amply demonstrated.
Strategy Still Lacking.
For the most part high-ranking Of
fcers of the United States forces are
good men. If political considerations
did not enter into the framing of our
strategy, they would be less worried and
less harassed.
Frankly speaking, we have still to for
mulate definite strategy for our forces.
Even after Pearl Harbor the emphasis
in the American war effort continued to
be on Europe. Hitler, we were told, was
the principal antagonist against whom
we must throw our strength; hence, we
should direct every ounce of energy
against him. Any other strategy, such
as defending-to say nothing OF taking
the initiative-in the Pacific, would only
play into the Fuehrers hands, we were
told.
When the Japanese overran the i'm
pregnable' British base at Singapore,
took the Netherlands Indies almost in
a matter of days and began to manace
Australia, those who are responsible for
our strategy received jolt and change
OF heart began to appear.
The new strategy of the United Ma
tions seemed to be based on the premise
that the japanese could be defeated
first, if concerted effort was made
against them. But that did not last
long. After few more commando raids
and a number of successful air raids
over Germany and occupied France we
heard once more the talk about an
offensive this year against the European
mainland
New Cry Is Heard.
The prospect that the Japanese would
soon turn either against Alaska, the
Panama Canal, Australia or even our
West Coast made no impression on our
strategists. Rush forces to Europe"
was the new cry after President Roose-
velt's principal adviser, Harry Hopkins,
and Gen. George C. Marshall returned
from London
The fact is that we do not have suffi-
cient troops to organize an expeditionary
force which could take any appreciable
part in an invasion attempt Nor do
we have the ships to supply whatever
force we could muster. But these de-
hciencies appear to count for little. The
bulk OF our production is being sent
across the Atlantic to help the Russians
and to prepare some move in connection
with the British in Europe.
AS consequence of the doctrine that
we will meet and defeat the enemy
wherever he may be found we have
strewn our forces in Ireland, India,
Australia, New Caledonia and various
other widely separated places which have
not yet been the subject of official COM
muniques. Our Navy is even more
thinly spread over the seven seas. AL
| though such wide distribution may not
be particularly sound, we can do nothing
else, it is ccntended. since TIE fat of