Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1942-11-29
General and Admiral
Deserve Gratitude
By OUen L. Scott.

together are operating the military end
of this war for the United States. They
are Gen. George c. Marshall for the
Army and Admiral Ernest j. King for
the Navy.
These men, in reality are the Nations
supreme war commanders They func-
ton with little or no interference, or
even advice, from the President. Mr..
Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill determine
the broad overall strategy and deter
mine the broad theaters of operation for
British and American forces, Within
that strategy and in the determined
theaters of operation Gen. Marshall and
Admiral King direct the action. They
report to the President through Admiral
William D. Leahy, who is Mr. Roosevelts
personal chief of staff.
In that top organization the United
States has closely knit war high COM
mand. 1t probably is a more unified
command than that of any other nation.
Furthermore. there is agreement here,
where agreement on anything is very
unusual, that the American people are
direct the Army and the Navy Gen.
Marshall has directed the building OF an
| American Army from nothing to one OF
the worlds three most powerful striking
forces all in less than two years Ad-
miral King, who took over command af-
ter the defeat at Pearl Harbor, has
transformed the Navy in the face of the
greatest difficulties. The result is that
the United States fast is becoming the
| worlds greatest military, air and naval
power.
This country's high command has its
feet firmly on the ground. It essentially
Is conservative in Its approach to mill
tary problems. Yet it is open minded in
It's acceptance Of new methods and new
ideas. The men picked by President
Roosevelt to direct the American war
effort possess not an ounce of political
ambition. They are interested solely in
the professional task that they perform
and they have chosen operating COM
| manders in the field who likewise are
without political fare.
The record of what has been and Is
| being done tells the story of how well
| the American high command is func-
| tloning.
1t was only relatively few months ago
| that the United States Army was
| mere skeleton. 1t lacked weapons 1t
| lacked men and officers. 1t had been
| denied more than few aircraft. Be-
| hind 1t was no modern war industry
| such as every present-day army must
possess if it is to function successfully.
| Yet today the American Army has
| completed the greatest and most sue
| cessful amphibious operations in all
history. In numbers, the Army is smaller
| than the armies of Germany or of Rus
| STA. In fre-power, however. the divi-
sions that it does have are far superior
| to any in the world Its mobility is much
! greater than that of any other army.
Its air force soon will be the most pow
| erful as we'll as the largest. One-third
| of the nanpower in the new American
| Army will be in the air force.
At the same time, American weapons
| are proving out in combat. This coun-
| trys specialty-the big bomber-is likely
| to prove decisive weapon in the war.
| New American fighter planes are stand
| ing up to the best OF any other nation.
| The new American medium tanks possess
| greater fire-power, greater range OF fire.
greater speed, more protection than any
/ tanks in the world. This countrys new
war weapons which are just now begin
| ming to appear in quantity are in class
| by themselves.
All this shows careful direction and
| sound judgment at the top in the Army
It really constitutes an amazing record,
| when it is realized that Hitler required
| seven years to get his army ready for
war. Russia required nearly 20 years and
| England has been striving since 1896 to
| arm herself.
The record of the American Navy IN
| recent months is equally as impressive.
| The Navy, unlike the Army, always
| was kept in state of war readiness.
However, the Navy was caught off guard
| at Pearl Harbor and suffered a setback.
| Then it found itself unprepared to deal
| with submarines in the Atlantic because
| of two things. One was the failure OF
| the British Air Force to strike during
| early war days at German submarine
| bases and construction yards. A second
was the need for fighting tWo-ocean
war with a ore-ocean navy. There
simply were not ships enough to do the
various jobs that had to be done.
| At the same time, the Navy has faced
another severe handicap. This handi-
cap stems from the fact that decisions
of high strategy called for a concentra-
ton of force in the Atlantic against Hit
| Ter. leaving the Navy to do the best it
| could with inferior forces against the
| japanese in the Pacific. These strategy
decisions were influenced by demands OF
| the British, the Russians and the other
European nations which saw in Hitler
| the No. enemy.
The Navy has not questioned these
decisions of high strategy. The decisions,
| however, imposed upon Admiral King a
problem of balancing forces and OF di-
viding forces that would tax the genius
of a superman. Recent defeat of pow
erful Japanese feet by an American
force of much smaller size shows how
well the division of forces was worked
out. It also shows that an excellent
| choice has been made of commanders
for service at sea.
Results of recent naval action appear
to confirm the judgment of Admiral
King in other regards.
That action demonstrated conclusively