Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1942-11-22

Following our smashing sea victory ir
the Southwest Pacific, this question has
been asked in Washington naval quar-
tiers: Will sufficient reinforcements be
received by our forces to permit them
to press their advantage before the Japa-
nese can reorganize for a new offensive
Between october 10 and Is not a high
ranking officer in Washington was op-
timistic enough to predict that our
chances of holding the Solomons were
better than 30 to 10. Sheer heroism on
the part Of the marines who were holding
q small strip on Guadalcanal and the
Army, Navy and Marine aviators turned
what appeared to be certain defeat into
victory. Later, thanks to the naval rein
forcements received by Vice Admiral
William Halsey, jr the temporary sue
cess OF holding off the japanese was
turred into brilliant victory.
VIII we rest now on our laurels or
will the necessary men and material
and Admiral Halsey needs many men
and much material-be sent to the scene
Vt action?
Pacific Fighters Returning.
Oflcers and men of all ranks are
trlckling back into Washington from the
South Pacific. Some have returned per-
nanently because their services no
longer can be used in theater of op-
eratlons where few months Of the type
OF fighting waged there is equivalent to
three years in other zones. Other men
are home on furlough to mend their
wounds and straighten out their nerves.
All of them are somewhat bewildered
at the apparent lack of understanding
on the part of the American public in
regard to the Pacific front. Regardless
OF whether he has an admirals gold
braid or the insignia of a seaman, the
stars OF a general or the stripes of
corporal, each is wondering why people
st home do not realize what the Pacific
really means to the final outcome of the
war These men listen in amazement
to the radio commentators, read the
newspapers avidly and wonder why so
little Importance is attached to that area
We have classified our enemies into
two groups: Those across the Atlantic
and those across the Pacific The Ger
mans rate No. l and the japanese are
No. 2. This classification was a psyche
logical necessity. Our supreme command
realized from the beginning that we
must fight on two fronts. From the
time the Philippines, Singapore and the
Netherlands Indies were lost it became
obvious that the principal interest of
our allies-the British and the Russians
would be directed at the European bat
tleflelds. A country like ours, isolationist
ct heart, and fed up with wars and the
quarrels of Europe, was likely to insist
on applying our principal military effort
to the Pacific where the japanese we're
emerging as flrst-class military power.
Contradiction Pointed Out.
Such tendency, while logical if we
had to fight only for our own interests,
would have been, if allowed to continue,
in contradiction with the interests of our
associates. It is true that the chief
riches of the British Empire we're sit
uated in the Indian Ocean and in the
Pacific But the threat to the very
existence of the British Empire came
from Hitler.
The Russians, who we're fighting life
or-death struggle to preserve not only
their territorial integrity but also the
political, economic and social philosophy
initiated by Lenin, appeared little con-
eerned over Pacific developments.
To allow American public opinion to
become geared t. the idea that our main
effort lay in the Pacific would have
meant for the administration to be at
loggerheads politically with the themes
of our chief associates. In addition,
European victims of Hitlerism who were
represented in Washington were adding
their voices to those of Britain and
Russia, and there is no wonder that
within short time after Allied setbacks
in the Pacific, the accent of the war
turned toward Europe.
Much has been written and argued
10 the last few weeks about the alleged
blunder of the Pacific command and the
hastily improvised operations which led
us to the conquest of the Gaudalcanal
sirfield Some day, when the truth Is
known, it will be apparent that the plan
conceived by the American high COM
mana was ehCellSIlt dllu Aeo SheSu'AoAA
faultless.
Our Losses Conceded.
But from the beginning of the CAM
paign it was pointed out here that the
capture of Henderson Airheld' and Tu-
lagi Island would serve to place us in a
difficult position unless we developed the
operations and went into New Britain
and occupied Rabaul, major base in
the hands of the Japanese.
It was evident to professional strate-
eists that unless we could dislodge the
Japanese from that stronghold, occupied
last August by only one enemy division,
the Japs would concentrate against us
and return in force to the Solomons and
the other islands astride our lines of
communication with Australia and New
Zealand.
The occupation of Guadalcanal was
not made without losses in men and
ships. To continue the operation de-
spite the losses-which were inevitable
since we could not, Of course, make the
same deal with the Japs as we made
with the French in North Africa--it was
necessary that strong reinforcements be
dispatched at once before the Japs them
selves could rush more troops from Java
the Philippines and China. We had to
be in Rabaul at least a month before the
Japs could reach the scene of action.
The spectacular success of our first
offensive action against the Japs served
..1tkt s.~A- s,,s& ST.