Evening star., 1942-10-11
Changes Promote
War Efficiency
By Otpen L. Scott.

w
streamlined basis. AS result of this
shakedowA the pickering and conflicts
of authority and hesitations of the past
may now be followed by the start of
an efficient mobilization of American
strength.
An impossible situation had developed
before President Roosevelt decided to act.
The President found his highest official
aides devoting more of their energy and
ingenuity to fighting one another than
to getting on with their war jobs. He
had a Congress that was increasingly
distrustful of the men chosen to run the
war effort at home. Clashes of farmer
and labor and industrial interests be-
came so acute that they actually were
dangerous.
The War Production Board, which was
supposed to mobilize industry for war,
was torn by internal dissention and was
engaged in bitter struggle with the
armed services whose servant it was sup
posed to be. Congress was distrustful of
the White House and of the war agencies.
At the same time, the White House was
critical of Congress. Farm and labor
groups were highly distrustfhl of Leon
Henderson as price administrator, each
feeling that its interest might be sacri-
feed to the other. There was no clear
demarcation of authority between the
Army and Navy in some war theaters
and no real overall command. Presi-
dent Roosevelt, trying to handle all sit
uations personally, had found himself
harder and harder pressed At one time
1t looked as if Harry Hopkins really
were running the war.
Now all of that is in process of being
altered. One of the most basic changes
Is IN the War Production Board, which
Is engaged in mobilizing industry. That
mobilization recently had begun to lac
as the failure to tackle the problem of
ratlonlng of ray materials showed up in
an actual slowing of the rate of gain in
arms production. Mr.. Roosevelt stepped
In with orders to get this situation cor
rected. The result has been a new re-
organization of WPB in which Donald
Nelson stays at the top, but with a new
group OF key executives, headed by Fer
dlnand Eberstadt and c. E. Wilson, who
are prepared to deal firmly with the
problem OF material distribution. The
shift marks final break with business
as-usual policies.
second basic change is occurring in
the field Of economic control. In the
past, Mr.. Henderson had power to con-
trol some prices. However, he had no
control over wages and salaries and
very uncertain control over farm prices
or utility rates. His effort to place the
national interest ahead of group inter-
ests led to violent antagonism to him on
the part CT some powerful groups. He
became controversial figure, with
1armer and labor interests in Congress
apparently more concerned about what
Mr.. Henderson might do than they were
about the course of the war. To deal
with this situation, Mr. Roosevelt called
upon Justice James F.. Byrnes to be-
come economic car,
Mr.. Byrnes is an ideal man to calm the
Tears of labor and farm and industrial
groups OF the country. The farm bloc
- N~eo AAAAAA oilO oO uCGS llle ldDOr OlOC.
lie Is conservative enough in his views
to hold the confidence of business There
probably is no man in the country with
greater ability to compromise group in
terests and with a greater practical
understanding of those interests. The
result is that the economic controls that
modern war requires now can be i'm
n0SeN without tho
been evident in every past effort to i'm
pose those controls.
Then, a third basic change is occur
ring in the military conduct of the war
itself.
Mr.. Roosevelt started out to run the
war in person. lie emphasized that, as
Commander in CHIEF, he was the high
command. However. the White House
soon was swamped by the task OF run
ming the Government, plus the task of
deaIlns with Congress, plus the task OF
trying to reconcile the internal squabbles
in war agencies. At this stage, Mr.. Hop
kins, with vague authority began to
appear as the Nations chief director of
overall strategy, making decisions con-
corning how Americas meager military
and naval strength would be divided up.
1t now appears that the President is
de-egating to top military officials the
authority that they need to run this
war. This fact is Of the highest i'm
portance and is another sign that the
days Of indecision and overlapping au-
thority are passing.
AS result of the changes now made,
the United States is moving into posi-
ton where 1t can begin really to get
it, immense strength organized
The record of this organization and
mobilization to date is not impressive.
Preparation for war has been under
way for two and one-half years. Actual
warfare itself has been under way for
10 months. Even so, the volume of
armament turned out by American in
dustry is no greater than that turned
out by British industry. Yet British
industry has q capacity that is only
fraction of that of the United States.
Its steel capacity, for instance, is barely
1900 900 tons year in the war period,
against capacity of 100000 tons in
this country.
A reason for this record has been the
unwillingness of the War Production
Board and its various predecessor agen-
cies to tackle the basic problems Of in
dustrial mobilization. Emphasis was
upon ways and means of preserving the
greatest possible amount OF ordinary
business, rather than upon speedy mobil-
izaticn of the Nations resources for
production of weapons. All of that now
is CHANGING hut its effect has heen tn