Evening star., 1942-06-08
e. the Associated Press.

Following is the tert OF state
ment read to press conference
yesterday by Admiral Ernest J.
King. chief OF naval operations
and fleet commander in chief:
Gentlemen:
You have all read Admiral Nj
mitz's communiques and you know
that the operations beyond Midway
are still in progress. However. I
feel tcat the informa ton at hand
at this time permits me to give you
little bit of background that led
up to these operations.
In the first place. after Gen. Doo-
Titles raid on Japan. Gen. Mar
shall and l both felt, knowing the
Japanese psychology, that some re-
prisal in kind was inevitable in order
that they might save face" Sec
retary Stimson knowing the Jap
anese has also emphasized this point.
The Coral Sea action, which was
another decisive setback to the Jap
anese, was an additional reason to
be on guard. The details Of the
Coral Sea action have not as yet
been made public, but you will
shortly be In possession of all the
essential facts. After the Coral Sea
action, we lost touch with the heavy
japanese forces engaged. They dis
appeared beyond the radius of our
immediate means Of reconnaissance.
But as you know and as the jap
anese know, we have considerable
numbers of submarines sprinkled
about the Western Pacific, and they
were able to give us a good deal of
at least negative information.
Best Chance Of Action.
1t was apparent shortly after the
Coral Sea acticn that the Japs
would have to 60 somewhere and do
something. Looking at the map,
almost anybody could see that
among our various important out
posts, Dutch Harbor and Midway Of
fered them the best chance of an
action either in the nature of
raid or an invasion with some hope
of success, or of a nature that in
case of a reverse would allow them
to retire without too great loss or
complete annihilation. At the same
time, we were fully aware that they
might renew the actions in the
Coral Sea-even though they had
recently been "stung' there
So to this extent we were prepared
for the assault upon Midway and
recognized that Alaska might also
be attacked.
You know in general way of
the line of communications we have
to protect to Australia. But you
probably do not realize the large
forces that it takes to protect line
of that length. All of these several
factors had to be evaluated. De-
cision to act had to be taken on the
basis of Calculated risk"
Midway has been greatly strength
ened since the Pearl Harbor action.
AS the Japs now know. the radius
of our effective air scouting from
that island extends to a distance of
at least 500 miles. What they do
not know and what 1 don't propose
to tell you is the actual limit of that
aerial reconnaissance radius.
Nothing to Apologize for.
Certainly if we had known exactly
when and where and in what force
the enemy intended to strike, we
might perhaps have afforded some
diversions from our other vital areas
of protection. But as the results
will prove, 1 believe, we shall have
nothing to apologize for in the pres
ent action. I cannot 60 into the
details of our own forces that were
engaged or ready to be engaged.
The Japanese probably do not ex-
actly know them but they have cause
to know plenty.
You will all probably have ques-
tions to ask, but 1 hope that what
I have said will indicate to you the
limits within which I can answer
your questions.
AS to the release of military in
formation in general, wish to read
to you certain paragraphs from a
letter which I have recently written:
Il am fully aware of the desires
of the news reel companies and
other purveyors of information to
acquaint the public in detail with
news of action with the enemy at
the earliest practicable date.
It am also fully aware that all
too often, even inadvertently, the
purveyors of information to the
public are not prone to exercise
any discrimination in regard to
giving aid and comfort to the
enemy. In this respect. feel very
strongly that military considera-
tions outweigh the satisfying of a
very natural and proper curiosity.
"I assume that Won and yOlIr col.