The Waterbury Democrat., 1942-11-12

Africa.
 For weeks Mussollnl had dangled before the eyes of the Italian peo- pie the juicy reward of Alexandria and the Suez Canal, At one time he was SO sure Suez was going to fall that he prepared for 6 tri- umphal entry Into Cairo.
 The Italians, discouraged with the war, were buoyed up chiefly by the thought that Suez would be theirs and they would rule the great Roman Empire again.
 So news of the retreat in North Africa has been crushing. Hatred of MussOlinl Is at Q peak. Dls- gension In the army Is stronger than ever before. It seems eer- tain that # Naxi troops were not in Italy the people would have revolted long age.
 At present Hitler has seven d. visions or about 100000 men ia Italy, many of them being air- men on the islands of Sicily and Sardinia, Now he is reported to have about five more divisions en route from the Russian front to guard against the Second Front Allied invasion across the Medi- teffanean. SURROUNDING DAKAR
 Significant fact about the first U. s. landing operations was that no U. s. troops landed very near Dakar. This has long been con. sidefed the most important French base in Northwest Africa and the chief menace to the Western Hemisphere.
 However, it was also known that Dakar was the most f0r- midable fortress the French had in Africa. It had resisted the British fleet when they attempt. cd t0 take it in l040. It had also received the benefit of NaZi specialists in increasing its strength.
 Particularly it had mounted i0- inch guns on railway cars for use along the African coast. A i0- inch gun Is heavier and will shoot farther than the fourteen-ineh guns on our othre battleships.
 Therefore, it was significant that while Vichy reported U, s. troops landing at Safi north of Dakar, no troops were landed in It's im- mediate vicinity, Also, 1t had been announced some time before by the British that American troops were in Liberia, south of Dakar.
 Thus American strategy prob- ably will be to isolate this all- important French base and cap. tuFe easier and more immediate bases first. Tn other words, with AlglcFs and Tunis in AI- lied hands, the United States first could get at R0mmeFs rear, then could tackle DakaF when psychological factors had time to sink in.
 The roads to Dakar from either Libya or the north are not the easiest in the world, butt hey are passable for faechknized troops, and the pick Of U. s. armored forces are in West Africa.
 ALLIED INGENUITY
 American- British ingenuity has caused extra-special worry to Axis troops fleeing from Egypt, or- dinarily bomber planes cannot waste ammunition on small com- bat units, must fly to main ob- jectiyes, drop their expensive bomb loads and return. Scattered en- emy tanks or trucks in the des- ert are not considered important enough game.
 Because of this, American and British flyers used fighter planes for bombing operations. To do this they rigged up four or five fragmentary bombs of only 26 to 50 pounds each. And since the Italians and Germans did not have strong anti-aircraft, fighter planes swooped low in the desert, drop ping bombs on fleeing Axis units, causing tremendous confusion.
 Another dIsconcerting activity was that of U. s. armored scout cars, usually manned by the Bri- tish. Equipped with machine guns and 37-tnilimeter guns, they skirt-