davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1942-08-15
Permits for u. s.:
Housing Valued
AtS1,895,000
Dwelling OutIoy
On Mclean Estote
To Cost $4,000, 900

While building in the Metropoli-2
tan Area has continued at fairly
low level, substantial boost was
given this week through the permits
for building by the Government.
Though it has been announced
that the Governments large dwell
ing project has gotten under way
on the Mclean estate on Wisconsin.
avenue, Is building permits issued
this week show 4 total cost OF
81, ,895, 900 for more than 1000 dor1''
mitory rooms for women as well A.
720 home units in 81 buildings. 20
Cost of the entire development.
will run close to $4,000, 900, includ-
ing the land, it was estimated. The
building permit list notes that the
Defense Housing Corp is the owner
with the George A. Fuller Co. as
builder A. Kenneth Franzheimer
was designer.
Most Of the units are three story
and basement brick and tile apart
ments of from "a to 80 groups each.-
Tabulation of the building per-
mits issued this week shows a total
valuation of more than 3l.s7o, 900,
including several large projects.
Permits of $500 value and over in
clude:
c. IL P. Telephone Co. Columbia
Exchange, 726 Thirteenth street
NV. owner Kinnear Manufacture
ing Co., Columbus, Ohio, builder:
Leon Chatelain. designer: to install
labeled steel rolling doors on AZ ex-
terror windows and 10 doors on in
terror windows; to cost $4,000.
Dallas M. Grady d1 Son, 1104 Yer
mont avenue NV, owners and
builders; G.. T. Santmyers, designer:
to erect two 2-story brick and cinder
block fats a units eacf1), 401 -40S
Thirty-fourth street Sc; to cost
$4,000.
Dallas M. Grady & Son. 1l04 ver-
mont avenue NV, owners and
builders; George T. Santmyers, de-
signer; to erect two 2-story brick
and cinder block flats a units EACH,
3301-3305 D street Sc; to cost
$4,000
Morris Miller, Columbian Build.
ing, owner and builder: George T..
Santmyers, l410 H street NV. de-
signer; to erect three l and o.
story brick and cinder block stairs
additions. rear 1900 2-04 Alaska
avenue NV: to cost $1,000
Queens Chapel, Inc, AIT Southern
Building, owners and builders;
: George r. HUNT, designer; to erect
eight 2-story brick and cinder block
residences, 1881 to 1545 K street
Sc; to cost $500.
James H. Chaconas, 821 H street
NE, owner; M. Cladny Construction
Co., 635 F street NV, builders
l.. c. Mayors, designer: to make
(Gan nEvDA RYrpy -
Evening star., 1942-08-15

sateen are concealed under ordinary
draperies when not in use, and are
drawn together over venetian blinds
and buttoned down the middle when
the blackout signal comes.
Blackout window coverings should
overlap the window frame on both
sides and at top and bottom. Miss
Fahsbender says. Some types OF
materials require weights at the
bottom or curtain rod through the
bottom hem. After room has been
prepared for blackout, home owners
must check it from the outside to
be sure there is no light leakage.
A few thumb tacks. scotch tape,
wedges. molding or baff1es may be
necessary.
Ventilating No Problem.
Ventilating a blacked-out room is
no problem in homes where year
around air conditioning is installed
Otherwise. an electric fan will help
to keep the air in circulation. A
few manufacturers are working or
portable ventilators that can be
readily installed and become part
OF the blackout ensemble.
To simplify your preparedness
program Miss Fahsbender has
summed up her experiments into
these few dos and don'ts.
Don't go of on 4 shopping spree
for blackout materials. Rummage
around, first, in storage boxes. Dis
carded draperies and portieres are
often "just the thing"
Don't buy black materials. Dark
red, deep blue and brown are quite
as effective and not nearly so de-
pressing. Just be sure the material
Is thick enough so the light wonr
penetrate. Zone very cheerful black
(See BLACKOUT, Page BID
Evening star., 1942-08-15

(See PERMITS, page B-3J
Evening star., 1942-08-15

lSee BLACKOUT, Page BID
Evening star., 1942-08-15
so Permits Issued
In Prince GEORGES

In the Metropolitan Area of
Prince Georges County so building
permits were issued last month,
Herbert Roby. building inspector
announced. Total cost Of con-
struction was $89,545. The low fig
ure was attributed to Government
limitations on construction of new
homes.
New one-family homes numbered
% and had priority ratings costing
$70,l00. Other building permits in
cluded $700 tobacco barn. IA oil
burner installations and the bal
ance of the permits were for mis-
cellaneous repairs.
Evening star., 1942-08-15

(See HOUSING, Page B-3)
Evening star., 1942-08-15

(See FILA, Page B-3.D
Evening star., 1942-08-15

(See HOME CLINIC, Page B-2)
Evening star., 1942-01-25

forts and certain of the coast fortifi-
cations on the Island Of Oahu.
The minutes of each meeting of
the commission are Of record. The
statements Of witnesses received in
the meetings previous to that of
December % have been recorded in
summaries. All testimony received
at the meeting Of December % and
the subsequent meetings was steno-
graphically reported and transcribed
The oral evidence received amounts
to 1887 typewriter pages. and the
records and documents examined
exceed 5000 printed pages in num-
Der.
Appended hereto is a map of the
Island Of Oahu showing the loca-
ton of the principal naval and
military establishments.
All the testimony and evidence
received have been considered, and
as the result Of its deliberations the
commission submits the following
Evening star., 1942-01-25
Y !

The means available to the Army,
for the fulfillment OF its mission,
consist of coast defense and anti
aircraft artillery, mobile ground
forces, the Hawaiian Air Force and
an aircraft warning service. The
supporting elements of the Navy
consist of local naval defense forces
comprising light surface craft and
shore biased aircraft not assigned
to the fleet. The feet as such was
not charged with the defense Of
Pearl Harbor, except that certain
aircraft attached to the feet, when
present, and the anti-aircraft
weapons Of such units of the feet
as were in port, were available.
It was recognized that, prior to
furnishing the full war strength
garrison, insufficient forces were
available to maintain all the de-
fenses on a war footing for ex-
tended period Of time. The re-
sponsible commanders made numer-
Gus recommendations to the War
and Navy Departments for addi-
Evening star., 1942-01-25
| '

Plans and preparations against
the contingency of war are the
joint responsibility of the military
and naval authorities, and within
the limits of funds and authorize
tions provided by the Congress were
being ceaselessly carried out.
Under these plans the general
function Of the Army is to conduct
military operations in direct defense
Of United States territory. The gen.
eral function of the Navy is to con-
duct naval operations to gain and
maintain control of vital sea areas,
thereby contributing to the defense
Of the coastal frontiers.
Specific plans for the protection Of
the Hawaiian area against every
contingency had been prepared.
These included joint Army and
Navy war plans and War Depart
ment and Navy Department plans
subsidiary thereto which establish
the Hawaiian coastal frontier, as
sign tasks and forces to both Army
and Navy for its joint defense, and
prescribe that the system of CO.
Evening star., 1942-01-25
XIII

The responsibilities Of the Army
included the installation and opera
ton of an aircraft warning system
for the detection of water-borne
and air-borne craft at a distance
from the coast. Throughout the
late spring and summer of 1941 the
Army was engaged in the install
lation of permanent facilities for
this purpose on the Hawaiian Is
lands. Permanent installations had
not. on December 7, 1941, been COM
pleted. BY November 27, 194l,
certain mobile equipment had been
installed at temporary locations,
and was being operated intermit-
tently throughout the day for the
purpose of training personnel in
its operation. On November 27,
1941, in connection with the order
for alert No. /, the commanding
general, Hawaiian Department, Or
dered that this system be operated
each day during the period from
400 am. until TOO am. 1t was
intended that in the future the
Navy should have officer personnel
in the information center, but up
to December such officers had not
been designated. In accordance
with the order in effect, the system
closed at TOO am. Sunday, De-
cember Z. A commissioned off,
Ger who had been receiving training
requested that he be allowed to re-
main at one Of the stations, and
was granted leave to do so. At
about 7:02 am. he discovered what
he thought was a large flight Of
planes slightly east Of north Of Oa-
hu, at a distance of about 130 miles.
He reported this fact at 7:20 am.
to q lieutenant of the Army who
was at the central information CEN
ter, having been detailed there to
familiarize himself with the opera
ton of the system. This inexperi-
enced lieutenant, having informa-
ton that certain United States
planes might be in the vicinity at
the time, assumed that the planes
in question were friendly planes,
and took no action with respect to
them. The recording of the obser.
vation made indicated that these
(see REPORT, Page AID
Evening star., 1942-01-25
ordination between the responsible
Army and Navy commanders shall
be by mutual cooperation.

The responsibility for the joint
defense Of the Hawaiian coastal
frontier rested upon the command
ing general, Hawaiian Department,
and the commandant 18th Naval
District, the latter acting as q
subordinate of the commander in
chief of the Pacific Fleet. The COM
mander in chief of the Fleet, In
addition, was assigned the task of
protecting the territory within the
Hawaiian naval coastal frontier by
destroying hostile expeditions and
by supporting land and air forces
in denying the enemy the use of
land positions within that frontier,
and the further task of covering the
operations of the Hawaiian coastal
frontier forces. The commanding
general, Hawaiian Department,
could properly deal respecting de-
fense measures and dispositions with
either the commander in chief Of
the Pacific Fleet or the comman-
dant of the 14th Naval District.
The commander in chief Of the
Pacific Fleet from February /, 1941.
to December IT, 1941, was Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel. The comman-
dant, 14th Naval District from April
u, 1910, to date is Rear Admiral
Claude c. Bloch. The commanding
general, Hawaiian Department, from
February 7, 194l, to December II,
1941, was 1t. Gen. Walter c. Short
A local joint defense plan entitled
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier,
was prepared by Gen. Short and Rear
Admiral Bloch, the latter acting
under the direction Of Admiral
Kimmel. Each commander adopted
q standing operating procedure, OF
standing orders, to carry out his
obligation under the joint agree
ment. This joint coastal frontier de-
fense plan was intended to become
operative upon order of the War and
Navy Departments or as agreed
upon by the local commanders In
the case OF an emergency, threat
of hostile action, or the occurrence
of war.
Evening star., 1942-01-25
II !

1t has been well known that the
policy Of the United States as to
affairs in the Pacific was in con-
f1ict with the policies of other gov
ernments. 1t was realized by the
State, War and Navy Departments
Of the United States that unless
these policies were reconciled, wal
in the Pacific was inevitable.
Evening star., 1942-01-25

tional forces, equipment and funds
which they deemed necessary to in
sure the defense Of the Hawaiian
coastal frontier under any event.
uanty. The national situation per-
mitted only . partial filling Of these
requirements. However, presup-
posing timely dispositions by the
Army and Navy commands In
Hawaii, the forces available to them
were adequate to frustrate a sur
prise air attack or greatly to miti-
gate It's effectiveness.
VII
In q letter Of January "a, 194l,
the Secretary Of the Navy advised
the Secretary Of the War that the
increased gravity of the Japanese
situation had prompted q restudy
Of the problem Of the security Of
the Pacific fleet while In Pearl Har-
Dor. The writer stated: IF war
eventuates with Japan, 1t is be-
lieved easily possible that hostilities
would be initiated by . surprise
attack upon the fleet or the naval
base at Pearl Harbor." The writer
stated that the inherent possibil-
tiles Of a major disaster" warranted
further speedy action to increase
the joint readiness of the Army
and Navy to Withstand a raid Of the
character mentioned" ."
The letter proceeded: "The dan
gers envisaged in their order of i'm
portance and probability are con-
sidered to be: Q) air bombing
attack. ca air torpedo plane attack.
90 sabotage, a. submarine attack,
60 mining, 90 bombardment by
gun fire" It stated the defenses
against all but the first two were
then satisfactory, described the
probable character Of an air attack
and urged consideration by the
Army of dispositions to discover and
meet such attack and provision of
additional equipment therefor. 1t
concluded with recommendations
for the revision of joint defense
plans with special emphasis on the
coordination of Army and Navy
operations against surprise aircraft
raids. It also urged the conduct of
joint exercises to train the forces to
meet such raids.
Kimmel and Short
Got Copies Of Letters.
The Secretary of War replied
February 7, 1s4l, giving the present
and prospective status Of the
Hawaiian Department in respect of
airplanes and anti-aircraft artillery,
and stating with respect to the
other proposals of the Secretary Of
the Navy that a copy Of the letter
was being forwarded to the Com
manding General, Hawaiian De-
partment. with direction to him to
cooperate with the local naval au-
thorities in making the suggested
measures effective.
Admiral Kimmel and Gen. Short
received copies Of these letters
at about the time they assumed the
commands which they held Decem-
Der 7, 1941. Rear Admiral Bloch
also received copies.
The joint coastal frontier defense
plan and plans subsidiary thereo
envisaged the possibility Of an air
attack and estimated that, II made,
it would most likely occur at dawn.
An agreement the Hawaiian Air
Evening star., 1942-01-25
Responsible Officers
Feared No Air Attack.

December /. 1941, the director of
Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin
which, under the caption japanese
Naval Situation" stated:
"Deployment of naval forces to
the southwark has indicated
clearly that extensive prepara-
tions are under way for hostili-
ties. At the same time troop
transports and freighters are
pouring continually down from
Japan and Northern China coast
ports headed south, apparently
for French China and For
mosan ports. Present movements
to the south appear to be car
ried out by small individual units,
but the organization of an ex-
tensive task force, now definitely
indicated, will probably take
sharper form in the next few
days. To date, this task force,
under the command of the COM
mander in chief I'd Fleet, appears
to be subdivided into two major
task groups, one gradually con-
centrating of the Southeast
Asiatic coast, the other in the
mandates. Each constitutes a
strong striking force of heavy and
light cruisers, units of the COM
bined air force, destroyer and
submarine squadrons. Although
one division of battleships also
may be assigned, the major cap
1tal ship strength remains in
home waters, as well as the great
est portion of the carriers"
The naval intelligence service In
Hawaii, due to lack of information
indicating that the bulk of japanese
carriers were at sea, concluded they
were in home ports.
Evening star., 1942-01-25

SSA 4o' AoH4, IIlc COIIlIIldQQlQP
general, Hawaiian Department, and
the commander in chief of the
Fleet, were advised by the War and
Navy Departments of the changes
in the Japanese cabinet, of the
probability of hostilities between
Japan and Russia, and Of the posi-
bility OF an attack by Japan on
Great Britain and the United States.
Both commanders were warned to
take precautions and to make pre-
paratory dispositions which would
not disclose their strategic inten-
tions or constitute provocation as
against Japan. Admiral Kimmel
made certain dispositions of units
OF the Fleet, and placed additional
security measures In effect in the
operating areas outside Pearl Har-
Dor. At that time various task
forces of the Navy were engaged in
training operations and maneuvers
which were deemed highly impor-
tant to the training of the Fleet
personnel, and the Army was also
conducting intensive training, par
ticularly Of its air arm. The re-
sponsible commanders testified that
to undertake increased defense
measures respecting Pearl Harbor
and the Hawaiian area would nee
essitate curtailment of training, If
not its virtual suspension, and they
thought the situation was not such
as to require this.
November "A, 1871, the chief of
naval operations sent . message
to Admiral Kimmel in which he
stated that In the opinion of the
Navy Department a surprise aggres-
sive movement in any direction by
the Japanese, including an attack
on the Philippines or Guam, was
q possibility: that the doubt as to
favorable outcome Of pending nego-
tiations, the statements Of the jap
anese government, and the move
ments Of its army and naval forces,
supported this opinion. The COM
munication enjoined secrecy to pre-
vent complication Of the tense ex-
isting situation. The message ad-
vised that the chief Of staff Of the
Army requested that the local senior
Army officers be advised that he
concurred In the despatch. This
message was seen by both the COM
mander in chief of the Fleet and
the commanding general Of the
Hawaiian Department.
Responsible Commanders
Knew Of Negotiations.
The responsible commanders In
Hawaii knew that negotiations had
been continued through October
and November, and were awaiting
further developments. November
n, 1o41, the chief of stan of the
Army informed the commanding
general. Hawaiian Department, that
the negc1t tations With japan seemed
Evening star., 1942-01-25
XII

The commanding general, Ha-
waiian Department, the commander
in chief of the Fleet, and the COM
mandant 18th Naval District, their
senior subordinateS, and their prin-
cipal staff officers, considered the
possibility Of air raids. Without ex-
ception they believed that the
chances Of such a raid while the
Pacific Fleet was based upon Pearl
Harbor were practically nil. The
attack of Sunday, December Z, 194l,
was, therefore, a complete surprise
to each Of them.
While Gen. Short and Admiral
Kimmel conferred frequently with
respect to joint Army-Navy plans
and procedures, they did not. on or
subsequent to November 81, 194I,
hold any conference specifically
directed to the meaning Of the
messages received from the War and
Navy Departments or concerning
action required to be taken pur-
suant to those messages.
For some time prior to November
~, 194l, the War Department and
the Navy Department had under
Evening star., 1942-01-25

At about noon E. s. T. (6:30 am.
Honolulu time) December Z, an ad-
ditional warning message indicating
an almost immediate break in re-
lations between the United States
and Japan, was dispatched by the
chief of staff after conference with
the chief of naval operations, for
the information of responsible Army
and Navy commanders. Every effort
was made to have the message reach
Hawaii in the briefeSt possible time,
but due to conditions beyond the
control of anyone concerned the
delivery Of this urgent message was
delayed until after the attack.
Evening star., 1942-01-25
Findings Of Fact

About 7:55 am. Honolulu time
Q:25 pm. E. S. T) on Sunday, De-
cember Z. 1941, Japanese forces at
tackled Army and Navy installations
and ships Of the Pacific Fleet in
Oahu, Territory OF Hawaii.
Although the United States and
Japan were at peace on that morn
ing, Japan planned to announce to
the Secretary of State of the United
States at 1 pm. Of that day, E. s. T.
0:30 am. Honolulu time) the sever
ance of diplomatic relations and
simultaneously to attack the Island
Of Oahu and Pearl Harbor. The mill
tary preparations for this breach of
international faith and honor were
put in train and the forces for its
consummation had been dispatched
weeks prior to any intimation of the
planned severance of relations.
The Territory Of Hawaii comprises
the group Of islands known as "The
Hawaiian Islands" This group con-
sists of the larger islands-Hawaii,
Maui, Molokai, Oahu and Kauai.
and number of smaller islands.
They extend from Hawaii in the
south some three hundred miles in q
northwesterly direction, including
Kauai in the north. For purposes of
certain developments and protection.
the Islands of Midway, Wake, john
ston, Palmyra, Christmas and Can
ton, had been placed under the
responsible naval and military heads
IN the Hawaiian area.
The Importance OF the Territory
of Hawaii from a national defense
standpoint is the fact that Pearl
Harbor, the main outlying naval
base in the Pacific, is located in the
Island OF Oahu, one of the Hawaiian
group. For this reason all measures
for the protection and defense of
the Territory have centered in and
around Oahu, the other islands being
garrisoned by minor forces only. A
main outlying naval base. such as
Pearl Harbor, Is intended for the
use OF the fleet for taking on fuel
and supplies, for recreation and rest
of the fleet personnel, and for the
repair and refitting of ships.
Evening star., 1942-01-25
Text Of Commissions Report Pearl Harbor Debace

this series Of messages tacit agree
ment that the measures taken were
all that were intended by the de-
partment.
November %, 1941, the chief Of
naval operations sent q message to
the commander in chief of the feet,
which was In substance quotation
Of the chief OF stairs dispatch of
November IT to the commanding
general. Hawaiian Department; and
in addition directed the addressee to
take no offensive action until Japan
had committed an overt act, and
ordered certain action in case hos
tilities should occur.
Kra Isthmus Threat
Known on November 30.
November 30, 1941, the chief Of
naval operations sent q dispatch to
the commander In chief Of the
Asiatic Fleet, and also forwarded
the message to the commander In
chief Of the Pacific Fleet for his in
formation, in which it was stated
the indications were that Japan was
about to launch an attack on the
Kra Isthmus, directing the COM
mander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet
to do certain scouting, but to avoid
the appearance of attacking. nAd-
miral Kimmel testified that he had
viewed this message as indicating
that the Navy Department was not
expecting q Japanese attack on
Hawaii.
The Navy Department sent three
messages to the commander in chief
Of the Pacific Fleet; the first Of
December 3, 1941, stated that 1t was
believed certain japanese consulates
were destroying their codes and
burning secret documents; the sec
ond OF December 4, 1941, instructed
the addressee to destroy confidential
documents and means of conflden-
tial communication, retaining only
such as were necessary, the latter
to be destroyed in event Of emer-
gency this was sent to the COM
mander in chief of the Pacific Fleet
for information only, and the third
of December 6, 1941, directing that
in view Of the tense situation the
naval commands on the outlying
Pacific islands might be authorized
to destroy confidential papers then
or later, under conditions of greater
emergency, and that those essen
tial to continued operations should
be retained until the last moment.
Responsible Officers
Feared No Air Attack.
The foregoing messages did not
create in the minds of the respon-
sible officers in the Hawaiian area
apprehension as to probable immi-
nence Of air raids. On the contrary
they only served to emphasize in
their minds the danger from sabo-
tage and surprise submarine attack.
The necessity for taking a state of
war readiness. which would have
been required to avert or meet an
AFRAID attack, was not considered.
December /. 194l, the director of
Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin
which. under the caption Japanese
Naval Situation" stated:
"Deployment of naval forces to
the southwark has indicated
clearly that extensive prepara-
tions are under way for hostili-
ties. At the same time troop
transports and freighters are