Evening star., 1942-01-26

For the report David Lawrence.
reveals that despite telegraphic
warnings issued by Washington to
the Hawaiian commanders in ample
time, there was no follow-up, no
check and double check by high off,
Gals in Washington to see if the
orders to take proper measures of
protection we're actually being COM
piled with at Hawaii
From November 26 to December
the day of the japanese attack
IL whole days elapsed. On the
former date it was known to the
President and his cabinet that a
stiff note had just been sent to
Japan by the United States Gov
ernment demanding, in effect. that
Japan should virtually surrender in
her war with China.
It was serious message to send
to flrst-class naval power and
serious decision. Unfortunately the
contents of the note were withheld
from the American people and the
press until December 7 but the
Roberts report shows that Washing
ton for some time had been sending
grave warnings and on November q
and thereafter actually advised the
commanders at Hawaii of impending
war.
And yet nobody high up in WASH
ington during those II days took the
trouble to decide whether Hawaii
should be placed under alert num-
ber one" or alert number two" or
"alert number three" or to find out
just what form of alert was being
ordered in Hawaii.
Indifference Charged.
Nobody in Washington took the
trouble to ascertain whether the
mechanical detection apparatus
which warns of approaching air
planes was being operated in Hawaii
for a few hours day or for "a
hours a day and nobody took the
trouble to check up and see whether
the Army and Navy commanders
were in joint consultation daily on
measures of adequate protection for
Hawaii against surprise attacks.
This was Washington job as it
would be in any general headquar-
ters responsible for operations in the
field where excellent communication
facilities exist, including the over
seas telephone.
Why also were the cable and radio
circuits out of Hawaii to Japan un-
watched or still unrestricted after
the critical decision of international
policy was made on November 26?
The Federal Bureau of Investiga-
ton is under the Attorney General
who reports to the President. The
Navy intelligence officer wanted the
F. B. I. to arrest the 200 japanese
spies, but the Army commander in
Hawaii intervened and prevented it.
Why did no high official in Wash
ington protest against this and by
whom were the restrictions" against
counterespionage imposed and why
didn't some one in the War or Navy
Departments in Washington insist
that the President remove such re-
strictions after November %?
Above all. why was it that even if
Admiral Kimmel and Gen. Short did
not expect a surprise attack by air,
nobody among the senior officers of
either the Army or Navy in Hawaii
argued for measures of greater pro-
lection against such a possibility?
Other Questions Raised.
Why, inasmuch as Secretary Knox
In January, 1941, and his aides in
subsequent messages had pointed
out the dangers of an air attack,
didn't the high naval officials in
Washington follow through and in
sist on measures of precaution and
protection? What, too, was the ma
ture Of the reinforcements asked for
last year by the Army and Navy
commanders in Hawaii and who in
Washington made the decisions that
deprived them of the weapons they
needed?
Who in Washington ordered or
countenanced the concentration in