Evening star., 1942-03-05
The Bombing of Poris

The moonlight raid of the Royal
Air Force upon the industrial out
skirts Of Paris has significance far
transcending the damage done or the
toll of civilian casualties inflicted.
1t represents a direct challenge to the
whole Vichy policy of Cooperation
with the Axis, even within limits,
and implies readiness on the part
of the British government to accept
the unpleasant consequences of see
ing Vichy 60 wholly over to the Axis
side.
From the very beginning of his
leadership Marshal Petain has tried
to pursue middle of the road
policy between Britain and the Axis.
He consistently has opposed joining
the Axis and re-entering the war
against Frances former ally. But
just as consistently he has favored
economic arrangements with the
Axis, even though these we're to
Britain's disadvantage. And, until
recently, the British government has
tacitly condoned this, so long as
Vichy did not commit fagrantly un-
neutral acts in military or naval
matters. London's chief economic
concern has been to prevent food
stuffs or vital raw materials from
being imported into France and then
being diverted to Axis uses.
To be sure, the R. A. F. occasionally
has bombed industrial plants in
Northern France, but that is very
different from the present raid on
the French capital, with it's attend
ant notice by leaflet and radio that
this Is the start of an intensive air
campaign against French heavy in
dustry wherever 1t is geared to Axis
uses. This is challenge, not merely
to the Lavals and Darlans, who advo-
cate military and naval concessions
to German demands, but also to
Marshal Petain and his basic policy
of economic cooperation.
Marshal Petain is known both for
his stubbornness and for fits of what
he deems righteous Indignation. His
stubbornness hitherto has helped him
resist pressure from the Axis and its
French partisans. If his indigna-
ton now turns against Britain, the
last barrier to full-fedged junction
Of Vichy and the Axis may be re-
moved
London dispatches implicitly ad-
nit this possibility. The British
government undoubtedly knows the
risk and is prepared for it. The
Foreign ONCE says it did not inform
Washington of its plans. Our Gov
ernment has been even more COM
plaisant than London toward Vichy's
policy of limited economic co-opera-
tion with the Axis. This would indi-
cate that London is determined to
put stop to the process and did not
wish any interference in what it
deemed necessity. However, Acting
Secretary of State Welles made it
plain yesterday that this Govern
ment regards the bombings as legiti-
mate measures Of war.
What are the reasons for the
drastic decision? For some time
there have been intimations that
Britain was becoming increasingly
alarmed at the way French industry
was being harnessed to Axis uses,
and had come to think this menace
almost outranking the possible threat
of the French Fleet and colonial
bases in Axis hands or under direct
Axis control. 1t is also possible that
the British intelligence service has
obtained proof that Vichy has secret
ly surrendered to the Axis, and that
therefore further concessions or for
bearance are useless. Perhaps, even,
both of these things are true.
In any case, a sustained r. A. F.
campaign against France cannot fail
to bring the long dilemma of Frances
position to a decisive point. There
can be little doubt which way Vichy
will decide. How the French people
will react is another matter. Their
position is a tragic one at best. The
situation is so explosive that almost
anything may happen. But it is to
be assumed that London knew what
it was doing When it made the crisis
inevitable.