Askov American., 1942-12-03
Needs Political
Decision
(By E. Dixwell Chase in World
over PreSs).


over Press).
II the landing of American troops
in French North Africa came as a
surprise to Frenchmen in that area,
it was a surprise to which many of
them had been looking forward for
several month. A correspondent in
Rabat, Morocco, in a letter brought
over to the United States just be-
fore the opening of the North Afri-
can front, recountS how many
Frenchmen considered the Atlantic
and Mediterranean shores of Nor
occo and Algeria the most likely
places for the opening of the eX-
pected new action, and followed radio
broadcasts from Britain and Amer
ica eagerly.
The peculiar division of French
opinion which has led to so many
contradictory accus ions being
thrown at France are explained by
this correspondent as the more or less
customary social cleavages greatly
magnified by the pressure of Frances
distress. Maxine Weygand is cited
as an example of the type of Vichy
official who advocated surrender in
order to stave off revolution from
the Left, but who, after the armistice,
worked against the Nazis in every
field which did not threaten to pre-
cipitate revolution. Weygand, this
correspondent writes, was a patriot,
filled with secret hatred of the Nazis,
but turned ''collaborator" through
fear of French and Arab revolu-
ton. The Germans demanded his
return from North Africa because
he had built up there an anti-Nazi
general staff; because he had al
lowed his soldiers to know that he was
awaiting an appropriate moment for
taking revenge; because he had hid
den stores Of arms and munitions;
because he had sabotaged the work
of the German and Italian armistice
commissions; because he had placed
under police supervision, had arrested
and had even shot Frenchmen, Arabs,
foreigners and even Germans and
Italians, who had had suspicious
dealings with these commissions. Yet
when the Germans demanded it, he
resigned. He resigned because he
was afraid of an Arab uprising with
which Nazi propaganda had con-
stantly threatened him in the event
of too serious opposition
Weygand's case was typical of the
state of mind of part of the French
ruling class" Although secretly
proud of their sons who demonstrated
in the schools against the German
occupation, still these men feared re-
sistance to the Germans because they
knew that it was bound to touch off
an internal social struggle in France
which they dreaded above all.
The other part of the Vichy lead
ership was frankly pro-Nazi. There
were the adventures like Laval who
had nothing to lose and thought they
had everything to gain from backing
the Nazis; who recognized that the
war itself was a worldwide civil
war and knew on which side their
interests lay. These men were not
as typical of the "upper-crust"
French opinion as were the Wey-
gands, but they were a well-known
international phenomenon which had
bobbed up in Italy, in Germany, in
Spain-wherever Fascism was on the
march.
AS for the French workers, they
felt, almost to man, that they had
been sold out by the bourgeoisie.
OF radical turn of mind anyway,
they soon recovered from the initial
shock of defeat. They held back
from organized resistance because
they did not know whether Britain
would or could give them real and
effective aid, and they were not dis
posed to allow themselves to be mas
sacred uselessly. With the entry of
Russia into the war the picture
changed. Among the French Com
munists were to be found the more
skillful and daring organizers, and
sabotage and street demonstrations
spread rapidly with the improve
ment of the machinery of organized
opposition. Yet up to the American
invasion, open insurrection involving
nationwide strikes was still not pos
sible for three reasons: A million
and a half Frenchmen were still
prisoners of war in Germany; tens
of thousands of militant revolution
aries were still in French prisons, and
the opposition missed their ability
and daring; the lack of assurance of
prompt and effective aid from the
outside led to doubts as to whether