Evening star., 1942-02-15
BottIeships, if Well Protected,
Can Go Anywhere, Nozis Prove
Channel Break Demonstrates Air Power
Alone Can't Stop Unified Task Force
By MAI. GEORGE F. ELIOT.

By MAI. GEORGE F. ELIOT.
For once, we have some occasion
to be grateful to the Germans.
BY their bold, well-planned and
faultlessly-executed operation which
resulted in the escape of the battle
ships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen
from an exposed position in Brest
to the safety of German home bases,
the Germans have restored our sense
of balance as regards naval think
ing.
The average citizen is not, and
cannot be, naval technician. He
is prone to Judge by results. After
Pearl Harbor and the loss of the
Prince of Wales and Repulse, the
air-minded citizenry of our country
began the popular chant: THE day
of the battleship Is over" In this
they were encouraged by good
many editorial writer's, and melted
by the exultant chorus Of the air.
power enthusiasts.
Calmer voices pointed out that the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
was, after all, a naval operation
fundamentally, and that any weapon
could succeed if no proper defense
were made against it; and that as
to the two British ships. they had
suffered the same fate that might
attend-for example-the best in
fantry in the world without artillery
support. or any other sort of fighting
unit operating alone instead of as
part Of a properly balanced fighting
team. In fact, the complexity of
modern armament is such that the
omission of any necessary element
In any given tactical situation may
prove disastrous despite the excel
lence Of the remaining elements.
Some Lack of Coordination.
But these calmer voices went
unheard, even on the floors of
Congress where it was gratuitously
assumed that battleships were here
after a useless drug upon the naval
market.
The Germans have now taken
pains to demonstrate to the great
sea powers that the judgment of
their several admiralties has not
been at fault; that the battleship,
as part Of a properly co-ordinated
fighting team. with adequate escorts
OF fighter planes, destroyers and
mine sweepers, can proceed any
where, even in the narrow and tre-
mendously defended waters of the
English Channel.
1t Is really very thoughtful of the
Germans to do this for us: they had
just about sold us their pet theory
that the day of sea power Is over
and that air power has taken its
place. 1t would have been a sorry
day for the American and British
peoples had they become finally con-
vinced that all their imposing might
IN armored ships was useless. They
know better now.
OF course, the navigation of the
Channel by a German squadron has
been somewhat of a shock to the
British. Yet. on close examination,
1t would seem that too severe criti-
cism is unjustifed. At worst, it may
be said that there is some evidence
of lack of coordination, inevitable
as long as the British cling to the
idea that operations at sea can be
divided between two separate serv-
ices, navy and air force, instead of
being intrusted to the navy alone.
Task Force System Applied.
The Germans in this instance ap-
piled their task force system with
unusually brilliant results-obtain-
ing unity of purpose and effort by
the single command instead of try
ing to obtain it by cooperation and
agreement.
The careful planning which was
the foundation of the German sue
cess must excite our admiration.
The number of separate units which
had to bear each its exact and
proper part in the operation must
have been enormous. Fighter squad
rons, for example, because of their
high speed, short radius and enor-
nous fuel consumption, cannot re-
main long over comparatively
slow-moving naval force.
There must have been many such
squadronS scattered along the coast
of France. each of which must have
been ready to take off at just the
right moment, perform its part in
the protective sweep over the battle
ships, and return to its base when
replaced by another The same ap-
plies to the planes engaged in lay
Ing the smoke screens, and to their
coordination with destroyers and
motor boats similarly engaged.
Moreover. the Germans had to
wait for favorable weather, and
their whole complicated machinery
had to be ready to start moving not
at prearranged time, but on order,
when the weather seemed likely to
favor the enterprise for sufficient
length of time.
No Capital Ships Available.
Beginning with these advantages
"a careful plan complete in every
detail, favorable weather, and the
advantage of surprise-the Germans
had excellent chances of success,
and it is hard to criticize the British
too much for not having stopped
them. After all, British capital ships
ere no longer stationed in the bomb
swept channel; they are kept at
West Coast and North Irish bases
where they can intercept German
ships coming out north of Scotland.
They could not hope either to puf-
sue up Channel, or to get round
Scotland into the North Sea in time
to intercept the German force.
The German fighter cover broke
up the British bombing attacks, as
good fighters can almost always do;
some planes succeeded in deliver
ing their attacks with bombs and
torpedoes, but the co-ordinated
effect of repeated blows, such as
the japanese achieved against the
Prince of Wales and Repulse, could
hardly be hoped for.
There was only 1,000-foot CELL
ing which prevented the effective
use of armor-piercing bombs and
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