Evening star., 1942-09-13
Tenth Month of War Finds US.
Still Lacking Uniform Strategy
Dispersed Forces of Allied Nations Fight in Every
Quarter of Globe, but Foe Selects
the Time and Place
By Constantine Browu,

We have now entered the tenth month
OF the war and are still without a STRAIT
egy. Although the United Nations are
fighting everywhere. it is the enemy who
selects the time and place
Wherever Americans have concen-
trated enough force to meet the enemy
on an equal footing they have come out
on top. 1t can be said without false
rnodesty that so far every time a full
scale American force has met the enemy
1t has been victorious
1t should be understood of course that
the American Filipino troops which de-
Tended the Philippines we're on little
fJore than peace basis and were unable
to obtain reinforcements in men and
supplies. When the defenders were ex-
hausted their resistance necessarily came
to an end. Pearl Harbor showed no de-
ficiency so far as the courage of men
and quality of war material was con-
cerned. The cause for that disaster
must be sought in other quarters.
After nine full months of war we
have an improved Navy, Air Force and
Army. None of them is large enough,
however, to fulfill the role assigned to
it by the high command. We do not have
enough ships, planes or trained troops
to fight the enemy in all parts of the
globe. Yet, from the disposition of our
forces it would appear that the high
command would like to embrace the
whole world.
A Divided Strategy
No one blamed our war leaders for
the confusion in which they found them
selves Immediately after Pearl Harbor
We were trying to apply a two-fold
strategy. One, established before De-
cember T. provided for an all-out effort
to help the fighting democracies with
everything in our power short of war"
This required our sending Britain and
Russia planes, tanks and guns as quickly
es they left our factories and as soon as
they could be taken aboard freighters. :
After the Axis forced us into the war
as an active partner of the democracies,
We had to think of our own safety and
our own ways of meeting the Axis chal-
1enge, for the accomplishment of which
we had another entirely different STRAIT
egy. 1t was obvious that under the cir
cumstances, with our industry still on a
peacetime basis we could have only an
trnprovised strategy to protect the shores
OF the United States while we applied
ourselves to building an Army and
Air Force.
The Navy was the only fighting arm
which was on full war footing Decem-
Der Z, and the Navy had suffered losses
which had to be replaced. But what was
more important, 1t was called on to as
sumo duties for which it was not fully
prepared, such as policing the seven seas.
We had naval units in the North
Pacific and the South Pacific, the Indian
Ocean and the Mediterranean, the North
Atlantic and the South Atlantic, the
Arctic Circle and the Caribbean. The
American Navy had to fight the Japs
protect conveys going to Russia, guard
American waters against submarines and
had to accomplish many other chores
which cannot be enumerated because
they are military secrets.
Striking Force Now.
Today the fully-trained portion of the
United States Army numbers we'll over
half million men. According to the
statement of Assistant Secretary John j.
McCloy, there are some 100000 men at
the various stations abroad. The train
ing centers in the United States are
working hard producing soldiers with
greater speed than in the last war. Navy
yards are working at top speed and
70 oh oF
From various official statements it ap-
pears that aviation is faring at least as
well as the Army and Navy in regard to
both the training of personnel and the
production of machines
Although we now have real striking
force, we still lack a strategy. The
reason is not that we have no military
men able enough to conceive the right
strategy for the United States and, by
reason is that military necessities are
still subordinated to commitments"
What these commitments" actuall,
are, to what extent they engage us and
where we are supposed to fight is known
to less than a handful of men. 1t i
questionable if more than three men
besides President Roosevelt. Prime Min
lister Churchill and Premier Stain. know
what they are. But they definitely in
fluence our military leaders.
Every time our strategists attempt t
plan major operations they run "
against these mysterious commitments,
which do not allow American fighting
forces to go into battle on certain fronts
with the positive assurance that they vii
receive the backing they need. Anc
rather than leave our men high and dry
the high command prefers to engage
them in secondary operations or, as il
the case of the Solomon Islands victory
after achieving q success by taking th
offensive, to return to the defensive be
cause it lacks the means to exploit
brilliant operation Immediately. 1t i
firmly believed in many military quar-
ters that If reserve warships and plane
had been available after we completed
the conquest of the Solomons, the Amer
lean forces might have been able to con
tinue their advance instead of stopping
and waiting for the next Japanese move
Commitments" Require Troops.
Our commitments" do not permi
such strategy, however. From what tn
outsider can gather these commitments
provide for assistance with American
military forces in addition to the outpu
of the American war industry. AM
4. \, Il nIrt,