Evening star., 1942-12-04
Sees Logistics Key
To British Plan
Military Critic ExpIoins
Preparation Must Preeede
Attack on RommeI
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

NAASSN VII tNSItttSs
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
AS expected, Marshal Rommel appears
to be making stand at Agheila. Wheth-
er this is merely rear-guard operation
to cover the retirement of his main body
toward Tripoh or a determined defensive
stand by his whole force to put a def
mite stop to a British advance into
Tripolitania is not yet certain.
The terrain at Agheila is well adapted
for defense. The only road from
Cyrenaica into Tripolitania available for
large quantities of heavy traffic is the
coastal road. Approaching Agheila along
this road, the possibility OF maneuver by
a force advancing from Cyrenaica be-
comes limited by the sea on the right
and-about 20 miles east of Agheila-by
salt marshes on the left Inland from
the marshes Is country broken by
limestone ridges and dry water courses,
very difficult for mechanized troops but
well suited to defense by small groups
of highly trained infantry with auto
matte weapons, mortars and plenty OF
ammunition.
Still farther inland the deep ditch OF
the water course known as the Wadi Ell
Fareq runs parallel to the coast, sunk
between two rows of limestone hills.
Salt marshes occur along its course.
The Wadi el Fareq is from Is to 20 miles
distant from the coast, south and east
of Agheila, thus canalizing the British
advance and affording a constant pro-
lection to the German right flank
OF course, it also affords protection to
the British left flank, but this Is OF less
advantage to the British because 1t is
they and not the Germans who have the
greater power of maneuver and who wish
to use that power to envelop their enemy.
The Germans, short as they are OF ar
mored fighting vehicles and motor trans
port, must rely chiefly on defensive tao
tics
Probably the best means open to the
British of outflanking the German posi-
tions at Agheila lies in the use OF their
famous mobile desert columns, which are
self-contained units Of seasoned, highly
trained men with special motor equip
ment, capable of operating long distances
over the waterless desert. 1t will be
recalled that about month before Gen.
Montgomerys great victory in Egypt
these desert columns raided the oasis Of
Gialo, which lies about 100 miles SOUTH
east OF Agheila 1t is very likely that
Gialo again has fallen into British hands
and may now be an advance base for the
mobile desert troops If these could move
140 miles west from Gialo to the oasis OF
Marada, they would have a good position,
itself protected by salt marshes, from
which they could strike either directly
north toward Agheila (65 niles or
northwest toward the coastal road behind
Agheila, along which must come all Rom
mel's supplies and reinforcements from
Tripoli.
Maneuver OF this sort Is less risky
under the existing conditions because OF
the comparative lack Of tactical mobility
on the part OF the Germans.
However, 1t is clear that the Germans
have received some reinforcements both
in men and equipment including num-
Der of guns, and Gen. Montgomery
seems to be feeling his way very care
mined attack. This is, OF course, the
part Of wisdom. Little would be gained
and much might be lost by rashness in
this fluid and uncertain desert warfare.
Montgomery's victory at Alamein was
the result of months of the most careful
preparation, and he is not the man to
throw away even part Of the fruits OF
that victory because of lack Of proper
caution now.
Weak as Rommel may be, he is far
closer to his base than he was at Ala
mein, and his line of communications Is
much better protected. On the other
hand, Montgomery's communications
now run over many miles Of desert road,
and even though the port of Bengasi
may now be in use as British advance
base, supplied in part by sea, an attack
In force toward Agheila must be pre-
ceded by the establishment Of supply
and ammunition depots, repair centers
and airflelds well up toward the front, so
that when the attack is delivered the
effort may be made sufficiently continu-
ous to achieve decisive results All this
takes time, just as the Allied attack on
Tunis and Bizerte has taken time. Prob
ably nine -tenths Of the effort in modern
war Is devoted to these matters Of logis-
tics: only about tenth Is expended in
actual combat.