Evening star., 1942-01-25

An estimated force Of from $50 to
200 fighting, bombing and torpedo
planes simultaneously attacked Pearl
Harbor and all air bases on Oahu at
about 7:55 am. All attacking planes
had withdrawn before II am. As
q result Of the attack serious loss
Of life was caused and serious dam
age was inflicted on ships in the
harbor and planes, hangers and
other facilities at Hickam Field,
Eva Field, Ford Island, Wheeler
Field, Bellows Field and Kaneohe
The major part Of the damage to
ships In Pearl Harbor resulted from
torpedoes launched from planes.
The torpedoes were Of an obsolete
type, altered to increase their ex-
plosive load. to decrease their ra-
dius and fitted with side vanes to
insure functioning In shallow water
"a weapon peculiarly adapted to
an attack such as the one delivered
upon ships in Pearl Harbor. Many
of the bombs had extra heavy cases
and appeared to be modified armor-
piercing shell.
December Z, 1941, at $50 pm.
Midway time d1:30 pm. Honolulu
tiIne) q force believed to consist of
two cruisers and two destroyers, ap-
preaching from the southwark.
opened fire and shelled Midway
Island for about 80 minutes. About
noon December 8, l94l (2:50 pm.
December 7, Honolulu time), some
twenty-seven land planes made
straffing and bombing attack on
Wake Island. Some loss Of life and
damage to material resulted in each
island. Attacks on Wake continued
until its capture on December q,
1s41 December 21, Honolulu time).
High Morale Shown
In Defending Attack.
Immediately upon realizing that
the Japanese were attacking, the
commanding general, Hawaiian De-
partment, ordered Alert No. 3. The
alert was executed with reasonable
promptness. At the same time the
commander In chief placed the feet
on . full war basis and issued a
series Of orders in an effort to inter-
cept and destroy the attacking
force.
Ofdcers and enlisted men, in de-
tending against the attack, demon
strated excellent training and high
morale. Antiaircraft weapons
aboard ship, which were not already
manned, and antiaircraft weapons
ashore. which were In position, were
promptly manned. Junior officers
and enlisted men on their own initi-
ative procured from storage every
possible automatic weapon. These
weapons continued in action during
and in spite Of low level straffing
and dive bombing which had been
known to demoralize even seasoned
troops. At least three fighter pilots,
in total disregard Of their own
safety, attempted to take of In the
face Of greatly superior forces then
attacking their airdrome, but lost
their lives In the attempt. A few
fighter planes parked on an out
lying gunnery training field, which
was not attacked, took the air. This
combined antiaircraft and fighter
action resulted in the destruction Of
approximately 80 enemy aircraft;
and a number of others were lost
at sea because they were unable to
rejoin their carriers. ,....,...-.
XIX
The state of readiness prescribed
for Army aircraft prior to the at
tack required them to be ready for
flight only after four hours notice.
The type Of alert inefiect required
all Army aircraft to be concentrated
in order more effectively to guard
against possible sabotage, instead of
being dispersed In order to afford
greater security against air attack,
and greater facility in taking the
air. This state of readiness, this
concentration Of airplanes, and the
element of surprise, all contributed
to the effectiveness of the japanese
attack. and resulted in such perma
nent or temporary disablement OF
airplanes that very few fighter air~
planes were able to take the air dur
Ing the course of the action. For
the same reasons 1t was impossible
to get airplanes into the air in time
to trail the japanese airplanes back
to their carriers.
The aircraft warning system
which was renamed by about $50
m. December Z, 1941, failed during
the balance of that day to furnish
any reliable information of enemy
aircraft returning to their carriers.
Such information as it afforded in
dicated enemy forces to the south
ward and southwestward of Oahu
A report OF an actual contact with
an enemy carrier, which later proved
to be erroneous, gave credance to
numerous reports from other sources
indicating enemy carriers might be
to the southwark and southwest
ward thus causing futile searches In
those areas.
Positions Of Naval
Forces on December Z,
On December 7 Naval Task Force
8 was about 200 miles west of Oahu
proceeding toward Oahu. Another
was about TOO miles west of Oahu
A third. Task Force II, was in the
vicinity of Johnston Island, about
700 miles southwest Of Oahu. These
task forces were engaged in opera
tions connected with STRENGTHENING
the defenses of the outlying islands.
= On the morning of December Z,
194l, prior to the attack, the fol-
lowing searches Of sea areas were