Evening star., 1942-10-29

The test of victory is not the
number OF ships lost but the effect
of our whole counteroffensive in
the Southwest Pacific. 1t is true
that our forces have been compelled
to take the defensive as the Japa-
nese have counterattacked. But
that counterattack was expected and
the dangers in it have been fully
realized from the start.
In fact, Japan could not allow
the United States to take the Solo,
mons without herself risking enor-
nous forces to dislodge us. Defeat
for the Japanese meant terrible
loss of prestige at home. But de-
feat for the American Navy is but
one OF a number of setbacks which
are part of the long uphill struggle
against forces superior in number
and possessing an advantage in in
terror lines of communication short
in length and quickly supplied from
nearby bases.
Knew Attempt Coming.
Our high command knew that
Japan had to turn out a big force
to endeavor to retake the Solomons.
Inferior as yet in numbers, our fleet
could not risk major battle In the
areas near to Japan's bases. Our
tactics have been to draw the jap
anese fleet divisions toward the
south where, with the aid Of land
based planes, we could attempt
attrition, picking OH the Japanese
naval units and planes.
Japan cannot replace lost ships
as last as we can. Japan cannot
continue to supply her big armies in
China and protect her transports
against our growing number of sub
marines if she has to expend a good
deal of her fleet In Southwest Pa
ciflc actions.
Japan cannot attack Siberia If
she is absorbed in naval combat
with the United States. Josef
Stain already knows this and it
means he need not keep such a big
Siberian army intact and send enor-
nous amounts of supplies over the
Trans-Siberian Railroad that e.. he
really needs on the European front.
The overall strategy Of the United
States is succeeding. We are, to
be sure, paying high price. Of
fensives come high. Those who
have been clamoring for a second
front on the coast Of France have
a taste today of what it means to
take the offensive and suffer heavy
losses. This is no time to say our
high command should not have at
tempted counteroffensive unless
better prepared. We had to 90
forward or suffer an attack on our
big supply lines to Australia.
Breaks Bad for Us.
Many of the breaks have gone
against us. Some of these cannot
be disclosed. In Australia they
must realize, for instance, that we
are sorry they did not have a big
ger fleet to help us in the Solomons
and we on our part are regretful
that everything has not been CO.
ordinated as 1t might have been
as between ourselves and some OF
our allies.
The American people will take
the good with the bad, the bitter
with the sweet. Our naval officers
are doing tremendous job against
odds not OF their own creation. The
Japanese transport their fuel and
supplies few hundred miles. We
must bring our octane gas and our
oil for surface ships 1000 miles to
the battle area.
The Navy isn't complaining about
the fate that has forced 1t to fight
a two-ocean war with a one-ocean
Navy. The Navy has lost some val
liable ships. Postmortems, some day
when all the facts are available, will
tell the whole story, but defeat
against an enemy superior in num-
bers and with advantages of air
and sea bases is not something to
blame on our own command.
1t is something to be swallowed
grimly, knowing our men have done
the best they can with the weapons
available and knowing. too, that de-
feat can only tighten the resolution
of our forces to persevere as more
ships and more men and more sup
plies come up for the struggle that
can never end till the whole Japa-
nese Navy has been annihilated.
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