Evening star., 1942-09-28
Says Help for Russio
Is Present Problem
MiIitory Writer Urges Need
For Greater Flow Of Supplies
To Soviet Armies This Winter
By Mai. GEORGE Fieldino Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
! The success or failure of the German
/ campaign in Russia for 1912 must be
measured by the yardstick of what Ger
/ many hoped to accomplish. This is a
| yardstick which we do not use often
enough in our thinking about this war.
For example. one frequently hears. as an
| argument for the immediate opening of
a second front in Western Europe, the
! contention that If We cannot invade
! Western Europe now we cannot do so
next year if the Russian war effort Is
meanwhile reduced and the Germans
thereby enabled to send more forces to
| the west.
Those who argue in this fashion ap-
parently do not pause to reflect that
the German purpose in beginning this
war was nothing less than the conquest
| of the world, and that it is pretty poor
showing for would-be conqueror to
have no better accomplishment to boast
of than a slightly increased ability to
defend himself on his home ground.
AS a matter of fact, Germany re-
| duced to the defensive is by that very
token defeated.
1t is necessary for us to keep this point
clearly in mind. for it's full realization
| by all of us is the best possible antidote
| to the German peace offensive Of this
winter, toward which the German mill
tary operations in Russia were expected
to provide an impressive contribution.
The Germans hoped to break the block
ade on the land side, being unable to
! break it on the sea side, and, In doing
so, to reduce the offensive power of the
Russian armies to such an extent as to
enable the Germans to say to Britain
and America: 1T is no use attacking us
in Western Europe, it will only cost you
useless casualties. Better make peace"
The Germans could not hope to get
away with anything like this unless they
could point toward a broken blockade in
the east, access to fresh supplies of oil
and sharply reduced Russian striking
| power. All of these objectives would be
accomplished if the Germans could
break through to the lower Volga and
the Caspian, occupy the whole Cauca-
sian area, and invade Iran and Irak
both from the Caucasus and through
Africa and Syria. But they have done
none OF these things. They have been
held by the Russians at Stalingrad and
in the North Caucasian area, they have
been held by the British at Ell Alamein.
The blockade Is unbroken-so far.
If the Germans are unable to do very
much better than this before winter
slows down their operations in Russia,
Alderman peace offensive could pro-
duce nothing save derision. The in
ltiative would seem certain under such
circumstances to pass to the United
Nations, and. as an editorial in yester-
days New York Herald Tribune points
out, it would then be largely up to
America and Britain, gathering their
| offenslve power, to exploit situation
created by Russian sacrifices and cour-
age. We ought not to count on Rus
sian ability to turn the tables on the
Germans and defeat them single
handed. That is our job very largely,
as we come fresh to the battle with our
resources untouched and our fighting
power rising toward its peak instead of
declining.
We must, however, give thought, and
very careful thought, to the question
OF aiding our Russian Allies, who have
laid the foundations upon which we
hope to erect our edifice of victory.
During this winter they will be able
to draw upon their accumulated reserves
OF material, and it is probable that the
industrial production of the manufac-
turing areas which still remain in their
hands will be enough for those offensives
OF limited objective which they may
be expected to undertake. But If they
are to be in a position in the spring to
exploit to the full the German weak
nesses which will surely develop in the
east as Germany is compelled to face
about and meet the shock of our onset
in the west, the Russians must have a
greater supply of the weapons of offen-
slve Warfare-airplanes, tanks, mobile
artillery-than their present resources
seem likely to be able to supply.
For this reason one of our major
responsibilities for the immediate future
is the improvement of the lines of COM
| AluiliCdtloIl DeIWeen our Russian allies
and our own centers of industry 1t is
all very well to congratulate ourselves
upon having got through a big convoy
to the Northern Russian ports but if
we are going to have to fight a major
air and naval battle and endure heavy
losses every time We want to send con-
voy to Russia, there are not going to be
enough conveys getting through to give
the Russians the sort of support they
need. 1t is all very well to find praise
for the very great improvements that
have been made in the railways, roads
and port facilities OF Iran and Irak, but
much more will have to be done before
supplies in really impressive quantities
can flow into Russia from this direction.
How best to help Russia? BY lnvad-
ing Northern Norway and securing the
best short line of communications now
available? BY breaking the Axis power
in Africa and freeing the Middle East
of direct threat? BY opening a new
front in Western Europe and so di-
verting German power? These are
crucial questions which the Allied
leaders must face and solve as they