Evening star., 1942-06-21
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT,

LL1Ok.
AS President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill meet again on
American soil to confer on the con-
duct of the war, it is natural that
talk Of the so-called second front"
in Western Europe should be revived
in the headlines of our press.
Actually, this is a dangerous de-
velopment. There has been alto
gether too much agitation for this
second front, which most people in
terpret as a landing of a large
Anglo-American expeditionary force
on the European continent. In a
democracy, whenever the popular
mind fixes on some particular mill
tary operation, especially one to
which it can attach a simple and
easily remembered name like sec
ond 'front.'" dangerous series Of
pressures are set up which may even
limit the freedom of action of the
Government and the high command.
The central fact of the strategical
situation in Europe this year is that
the main effort for the United Ma
tions in the European theater of
war must be made by the Russian
armies They are present on the
continent in far greater strength
and with far more equipment than
the Western powers can hope to put
there. In the air. we and the Brit
lsh may accomplish & great deal,
but on land we are p6hstrained, as
in all our efforts, 6y the eternal
factor of shipping.
Main Effort Up to Russians.
1t is a well-recosnized principle of
the military art that when by
choice or the pressure Of circum-
stance you have determined on your
main effort, then all secondary ef-
forts in that theater must be made
contributory to the main effort
either directly or indirectly. Other
wise these secondary efforts become
unwarrantable and dangerous scat
terings of strengthen violation of
the principles of concentration and
economy of force.
However, as Is almost always the
case in war. the problem is not as
simple as its basic terms might
indicate The Russians are to make
the main effort, but their efforts
can hardly be great offensive
within the immediate future 1t
must be for some time to come, at
any rate, a defensive effort, an
effort directed toward keeping their
armies in being, holding on to as
much territory as possible, protect
ing as much of their industrial and
natural resources as possible-in
a word, of containing the German
armies and preventing any German
offensive from going too far.
The Russian difficulties are diff
culties of supply. They already
have lost much of their industry
and their lines of communication
with the outside world are of low
capacity.
The Western powers, in making
their secondary efforts, whose main
object to keep the Russians going,
find themselves operating along
two main lines of endeavor-to
maintain and increase the flow of
supplies to Russia, and to divert
German fighting strength from
Russia by attacking Germany in
other areas. and thus to compel the
Germans to come and fight on
grounds Of our choosing rather
than their own.
Close Cooperation Required.
Obviously, operations Of this sort
require the closest sort of co-opera-
ton between Washington and Lon
don, on the one hand, and Moscow
on the other. The closer that CO.
operation can be made, the greater
can be the effect of given ex-
penditure of force on either side
of Germany. 1t is not too much
to say that without such co-ordi-
nation we shall lose at least one
third of the value of our efforts.
Now there is no use Disgusting the
fact that Russia has proven a very
difficult and suspicious ally. The
Russian government and the Rus
sian high command have shown a