Evening star., 1942-02-22

the fall Of Singapore, the underlying
determinant Of victory or defeat re-
mains precisely what 1t was before that
disaster. The issue still depends pri-
marily on the factor Of merchant ship
ping. That is why the relatively unpub-
licized work OF the Maritime Commission
Is Of such key importance for the crucial
period ahead.
Ever since the British were forced to
evacuate the continent of Europe their
military leaders have frankly said that
large American expeditionary force
would be essential to win the war. That
requirement has not been Offset by the
stubborn and relatively effective Russian
resistance. It has not been met by the
dispatch Of token contingents of United
States troops to Iceland. Northern Ire
land and the Far East. Nor will the pre-
requisite Of victory be established until
the shipping necessary to transport and
maintain a large A. E. F. is available.
From the experience Of the First World
War, 1t has been closely estimated that
3!4 tons of shipping in continuous oper-
alton are necessary to supply each SOL
dier in active service at 5000 miles dis
tance from the United States. The prob
lem can thus be reduced to arithmetical
terms. To maintain an A. E. F. of 2,000,-
900 men in Europe Or North Africa would
by itself absorb the services of q fleet of
close to 100000 tons.
Problem Is Enormous.
If such feet cannot be produced and
maintained, the huge American Army
now in formation will be of merely de-
fensive value, confined to the CONT
mental United States or adjacent coun-
tries. It should certainly be able to
protect the New World from successful
invasion. Just as certainly this Army
will not be able to engage in the Of
fensive operations without which no
.realist expects the Axis to be defeated
To construct and man the ships neces-
sary to win the war is the heavy re-
sponsibil1ty which has been placed
squarely on the shoulders of the Mari
time Commission. That very efficient
New Deal agency fortunately got under
way in good time, having been estab-
| 11bllCu Uy tliC pQClCildllk NAL ACt VI
1896. But the magnitude Of the problem
1t is called on to solve Is nevertheless
enormous, as may be realized by q quo
tation from the commissions current
report to Congress:
~On September /, 1899 (when the war
started In Europe), the United States
| merchant fleet Of cargo vessels Of 1000
operated on the Great Lakes, consisted
of s39 ships with a gross tonnage Of
| 5,281 ,872 gross tons"
In other words, If this country at the
| outbreak of war had taken every ocean
going ship in order first to transport and
then supply an Army overseas, the maxi
mum force which the entire feet could
have maintained in Europe would have
been approximately 100000 men Obvi-
ously since essential raw material i'm
ports must be maintained, only a frac-
ton of available shipping can at any
time be diverted to the direct servicipg
Of an expeditionary force.
Accelerated Program.
On September l, 1899, the building pro-
gram Of the Maritime Commission, al
ready well started. anticipated the con-
struction Of so new ships q year over q
l0-year period. With the development
of the emergency that program has been
| rapidly accelerated.
Nearly two years ago it was doubled,
to provide for the building of 100 ships
a year. Then a special mass-production
program of 200 highly standardized cargo
ships, known as the Liberty ships" was
imposed on the doubled schedule. After
passage of the lease-lend law arrange
ments were made to build 227 modified
Liberty ships for Great Britain in Amer
ican yards. Finally, even before this
| country got into the war, orders for SAL
more cargo vessels were superimposed
on the tremendous previous expansion.
In its present form the program calls
for the construction of 5000 900 tons of
merchant ships this year and 10000, 900
tons more in 1943, total of approx