Evening star., 1942-07-02

In the days that followed there
were distorted accounts Of feeling
| in Britain and in Commons. The
House can have no idea how its
proceedings are represented across
the ocean. Questions are asked,
comments are made by individual
members or by independents who
represent no organized group of polit-
ical power which are cabled verbatim
and often are honestly taken to be
the opinion of Parliament.
Gossip echoes from the smoking
room, talks in Fleet street are
worked up into serious articles SEEM
ing to represent that the whole basis
of British political life is shaken or
| is tottering. A flood of speculation
is let loose. Thus I read streamer
headlines like this: Commons
Demand Churchill Return to Face
Accusers', or Churchill Returns to
Supreme Political Crisis
Such an atmosphere is naturally
injurious to a British representative
engaged in negotiating great matters
of state upon which the larger issues
of the war depend.
That these rumors come from
home did not prejudice the work I
had to do was due solely to the fact
that our American press are not
fair weather friends.
They never expected this war
would be short or easy OF that its
course would not be chequered by
lamentable misfortunes. On the
contrary, will admit, the bonds of
comradeship between us were ac-
tually strengthened.
All the same I must say I do not
think any public man on such a
mission from this country ever seems
to be barracked from his home
land in his absence-unintentio
ally, can well believe-to the extent
that befell me while I was on this
visit to the United States.
And only my unshakeable con-
tldence in ties which bind me to
the mass OF the British people up
held me through those days of trial.
l naturally explained to my host
that those who were voluble in
Parliament in no way represent the
House of Commons. s.+
L notice 1t was stipulated that I
should not be allowed to refer in
any way, in the statement / am
making about Libya, to the results
OF my mission to the United States
must make it clear that accept
no letters upon me except the rules
OF order and the public interest, I
nave, however, a worthier reason
Tor not speaking about nv late
American missions further than the
public statement agreed on between
the President and myself. Here is
the reason: Our conversations were
concerned almost entirely with
nothing but the movement of ships
guns, troops, aircraft and measures
TO be taken to combat losses at sea
and replacement and more than re-
placement of sunken tonnage.
Here 1 will turn aside to meet the
complaint that the minister of de-
tense was at Washington when the
disaster of Tobruk occurred. Well
washington was the very place
"nere ne should be. It was there
where most of the future business of
the war was being transacted, moi
only IN general sense but in regard
to particular matters in passing.
Two. Nations Declared .~~
Never Closer Together"
Almost everything I arranged In
the United States with the Presi.
dent and his officers is secret and
must be kept from the enemy and ]
have therefore nothing to tell about
II except this: That the two great
English-speaking nations were neye,
closer together.
Never was there a more earnes,
oeslre between Allies to engage thu
enemy and never was there more
hearty resolve to run all risks. tt
make all sacrifices, to wage thi.
hard war with vigor and to carry il
TO a successful conclusion. Tha
assurance at least I can give tn,
House.
I hope there will be no aspersion,
cast on the United States shipbuild.
ing program. We are making con.
siderable efforts at shipbuilding our.
, selves. We could only increase oul
output at the expense Of other in.
dispensable munitions and supplies
But the United States is buildin,
now, in the present time, about fouj
, times as much gross tonnage as W,
I are building and I am assured sh,
Will range between 8 and 10 times a,
much as we are building in tn,
calendar year 1943
, Ship losses have been heavy latel,
! and the bulk has been upon tn,
eastern shores of America. Utmos
measures have been taken to curtai
those losses and do not doubt the,
Will be substantially reduced as tn,
' mass OF escort vessels now unde
construction come into service ant
, as the convoy system and othe
> methods of defense come into full
. ana effective operation. Thes
, measures combined with the grea
v Shlpbullding efforts of the Unitet
r States and the British Empir
. should result in a substantial eai,
' in tonnage at the end of 1943 owe
v and above that we now possess.
8 This we shall owe largely to tn
= prodigious eXertions of the Govern
ment and people of the Unite
States who share with us, and full
, and freely according to our respec
r tive needs and duties, in this as il
r all other parts of our war program
1 have not trespassed very mucl
q upon the United States aspect, al
o though it is most vital sphere, an
. I return to the desert and the Mile
n One of the most painful parts il
/ this battle has been that in its open
Ing stages we were defeated unde
conditions which gave good and rea
s sonable expectation of success Dur
t ing the whole of spring we had bee,
d desirous that the army of the west
7 ern desert should begin an offensiv
against the enemy. The regatherin
Il and reinforcement of our army wa
# considered to be necessary reaso
q for our delay but of course that de
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