Evening star., 1942-10-19
Sees Nuzi Retreat
From StoIingrod
Military Writer Believes
Germans Must FuII Back
Unless They Win City Now

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
The history of sieges conducted at
the ends of long lines of communication
is not without its grains of comfort for
the gallant defenders of Stalingrad.
Barring those cases In which fortified
places have been reduced in early stages
OF the operations, usually by the appli-
cation OF overwhelming numerical SUI
periority, supply and communications
have in the end been decisive in most
cases.
The siege of Sevastopol during the
Crimean War Q854-1856) is a case in
point, for it was actually possible for
the British and French to send supplies
and reinforcements by sea from their
home ports to the Crimea in shorter
time than the Russians could send
them from Moscow by the bad roads
which then were almost the only in
ternal communications of Russia. Here
the attackers were successful in the
end. The successful defense of Gibraltar
during the long siege of 1779-1783 was
largely due to the fact that the British
sea communications were superior to
the French and Spanish land COM
munications; the British fleet threw
major supplies into the fortress no less
than three times, besides innumerable
smaller ventures. Port Arthur was
taken by the Japanese in the war of
1904-1905 because 1t was possible for
them to cut off the fortress from all
outside communications, and the Rus
sian Baltic fleet did not arrive in time
to upset these conditions, even had it
been strong enough to do 50. But the
great siege OF Verdun in the last war
ended in failure because the Germans
could not stop the French traffic on the
famous road from Bar-le-Duc and in
thls war Tobruk was successfully de-
1ended Tor seven months because no
Axis effort could completely cut the
communications Of that fortress.
At stalingrad the Germans are making
a really tremendous effort at the end
OF a very long and arduous line of COM
mun1cations, while they have not been
able to isolate the city The Russian
line OF communications is much shorter
than the German and the communica-
tions Of the Russian relieving forces are
even better than those with the gar
rison Under these conditions it is not
surprising that the German attacks,
having failed to carry the city in the
first phases of the operations, are now
intermittent, with considerable breathing
spaces between each effort, the renewal
OF the attacks coming each time that
1t becomes possible to build up fresh
assault echelon Of troops and weapons
and to renew the supplies in the advance
depots.
Each such attack seems to gain a.
little ground, for tremendous price, but
none has been decisive, and the spirit
of the Russian defenders remains un-
broken. 1t must be pointed out that the
Russian counterattack northwest Of the
city seems to have begged down, but for
this also the Germans are paying a price
in the diversion Of important elements
OF German troops. They have discov-
cred that they cannot leave the defense
Of their vital left flank to the Italians.
possible that each German attack may
prove to be the last. In other words,
after each failure to gain decision the
German high command must review the
situation, asking itself with increasing
seriousness whether 1t is worth while to
continue. The damage to German pres
tige from withdrawal to the line OF
tho ny, ypp111I ha ~, 81
consideration which cannot be ignored; ;
on the other hand, unless the military
are reasonably confident that by keeping
up their attacks they can win in the
end, they must represent to their po-
litical superiors that eventual failure
will be the more damaging in the moral
sense the longer the attacks are con-
tinued
From the strictly military point Of
view, Stalingrad Is of great Importance
as possible winter quarters. No matter
how ruined its condition, it will afford
more shelter than the open steppe. If
the Germans are to remain on the Volga
this winter, they must have Stalingrad.
Otherwise, as previously remarked, a re-
tirement to the Don and probably to the
Manych farther south is about the best
they can hope for.
1t will be some time yet before winter
will begin to check the German attacks
on Stalingrad itself; but If it is now a
question of establishing a winter line,
the Germans must allow some time for
digging in and providing shelter. They
must have already made up their minds
as to what they are going to do; if they
have not their condition will be border
ing on the disastrous should they con-
tinue the attacks on Stalingrad too long
and still fail to take the place in the end.
Should the Stalingrad operations end
In failure, 1t may be expected that the
Germans may try-as they did on one or
two occasions last year-a prestige" at
tack on some other sector of the Russian
front. Leningrad would seem a likely
location for such an operation, and there
are some reports of shift OF German
forces and siege materials in that direc-
ton. The present time of year, when ice
impedes the Russian supply traffic on
Lake Ladoga, but is not yet strong
enough to bear traffic itself, is favorable
for German attack on Leningrad from
the supply viewpoint. But the season is
growing very short for large-scale opera
tions in that part of Russia.
(Copyright 1912, the New York Tribune)
Objects to Concession
To Italian Enemy Aliens.