Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1942-11-29
Long War Seen
Collapse of Germany
Appears Unlikely

DJ u ODSIOUuHe .0fOWn.
American forces have destroyed a great
deal Of Japan's naval strength In the
South Pacific, but not enough to make
us rest easily, and we may expect the
enemy to return for an attack within
the next few weeks.
Whether the Japs will resume opera
tons In the same area or move to
another is conjectural; their forces are
being reorganized and 1t Is too early to
predict where the next blow will fall.
No doubt. however, the Japs will pick
some point between Australia and the
chain Of islands south Of New Britain.
In North Africa the separate forces
under command Of 1t. Gen. Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Gen. Bernard L. Mont
gomery are progressing according to plan
and it is expected that they will make
juncture in a short time The Allies
then would have complete control over
the North African coast, an important
advantage over the Axis
Our total losses in the landing opera
lions in French North Africa were "ex-
ceedlngly light" the War Department
reported last Monday, placing the num- =,
Der dead, injured or missing at 1910.
Gen. Montgomery suffered severe losses
at the beginning of the campaign against
Marshal Erwin RommeIs Afrika Korps.
We face a formidable foe and unless
the human equation plays the Berlin
high command false as in the last war,
and the Germans decide to call it quits,
our road will be hard and difficult. The
fight is Just beginning.
The principal difficulty will be our
lines of communication. The Allied
forces have to be supplied with enormous
quantities of war material and fuel and
food from the United States, and our
conveys must stand up under repeated
attacks by Axis submarines and planes
while they are crossing the Atlantic and
after they proceed into the Mediter-
ranean.
The Germans have entered winter
| quarters in Russia and until next sum-
mer will be able to devote their entire
attention to the Allies According to
available information, the morale of the
German people-despite failure to win
all OF Russia this year and the setbacks
in Africa-has come nowhere near the
breaking point. Therefore, we must
inquire on defeating the Nazis by force
of arms, leaving out entirely the matter
| of morale
Those who frame Americas policies
| still are divided into two groups-the
realists, who are not Influenced bv anv
theology, and the idealogists, who want
to hight the war on what might be called
an emotional basis.
In the first group are the military men
with less than a handful of civilians to
back them up. They maintain that if we
are to overWhelm the Germans-Who
control the whole of Europe as far as the
Volga R1ver-we must plan on throwing
| millions OF men into the battle. To de-
1eat Hitler, Europe must be invaded, and
lying between our North African posts
and the European continent are a great
stretch of the Mediterranean Sea and
! strong Notifications which must be over
come. Unless there is collapse of enemy
morale an invasion of Europe would be
the most gigantic and difficult operation
ever undertaken by any army, the mill
tary experts agree. To attain success we
and our Allies must consider throwing
the full might of the United Nations
across the Mediterranean or through
| Turkey into the Balkans.
| This would be exceedingly risky If at
the same time our West Coast and Aus
| tralla were menaced by the japanese. II
| the Japanese are not pushed back suf-
f1ciently to make their offensive efforts
useless. We may be confronted with a
| situation whereby We would have to slow
down operations across the Atlantic to
meet japanese onslaught in the Pa
clfic. We definitely are not in position
| to leave the Pacific unguarded, naval and
| military strategists declare We must re-
| conquer some of the islands from the
| Japs and hold them with an adequate
air and submarine force before we can
regard the Pacific front as a secondary
theater of operations to be dealt with
only after Hitler has been defeated
Our experts believe we can handle the
Japs this winter if necessary support is
| given to our forces. An important con-
| centration Of naval. air and army units
is required, they say, but our position
would be made secure and the operation
need not be nearly as protracted as the
one across the Atlantic. Give our men
| everything they need, these same experts
say, and before the end of spring we Will
| be astride the Jap lines of communica-
ton close to the shores of Asia
Many high liberal quarters, however,
| regard these purely military considera-
lions as dangerously Fascist"
So anxious are they to set to work on
| their blueprints for the postwar world
| that they have little patience with the
! admirals and generals who at present are
| interested only in going about the busi-
| ness of winning the war with as small
cost in lives and material as possible.
| Our military leaders fully realize the toll
| in lives we Shall have to pay and they
/ sincerely desire to keep the losses down.
risking as few setbacks as possible.
1t was because of the insistence of the
military chieftains that we did not en-
bark on costly expedition against
Western Europe last September. They
were prodded and accused Of all kinds
OF concealed motives when they Stub
bornly insisted that neither the British
nor ourselves were in position to relieve
the pressure on the Russian front BY
breaking our heads against the walls of
| Western Europe. Their stubbornness
prevailed in the end when they suggested
| North Africa az a con1nroyy,ise for a rorN