Evening star., 1942-10-13
Lessons From StuIinorod

Military experts in all countries
are busy evaluating the meaning of
the seven-Week siege of Stalingrad.
which appears to be settling down
to positional warfare, with artillery
and aerial bombardment playing the
major role instead of close-ouarter
lighting between infantry and tanks.
Stallngrad's tenacious resistance took
the world generally by surprise. 1t is
not technically fortified city, and
throughout the siege it has been
dominated by low hills to the west
ward in German hands. The gen.
eral expectation was, therefore, that
it could not long be held against an
intensive Axis assault. That surmise
was strengthened by the Axis pre-
vious reduction of Sevastopol, one of
the strongest natural fortresses in
the world. The logical deduction
was that Stalingrad's factories and
workers apartment blocks could be
blasted to bits much more easily than
Sevastopol's forts, built on or in cliffs
of solid rock.
However, the expected has not
happened. Stalingrad, though griev-
ously wrecked, is not obliterated.
The basic explanation seems to be
that most of the city was of modern
reinforced concrete construction.
Such buildings show an extraordi-
nary power of resistance to even
large-caliber shells and aerial bombs.
There is an interesting military
precedent in Madrid's University
City during the Spanish Civil War.
That suburb of the Spanish capital,
consisting of massive concrete build
lngs, was assaulted by Francois
troops in the early days of the siege,
and the outer fringe fell into their
hands. From then on, however, at
tacks and counterattacks proved
equally futile. Though subjected to
numberless bombardments, both
sides hung onto their defenses in the
specifically SCARED strongholds, and
positional warfare subsisted with no
notable gains for either side until
Madrid surrendered to Franco in
consequence of the general break
down of the Republican cause
throughout Spain. And the present
war has striking instances of the
ability of populated areas to resist
intensive bombardments, especially
from the air. The outstanding ex-
ample is the island of Malta.
All this is leading many military
experts to discount the theory of
victory through air power alone, first
elaborated a generation ago by the
italian General Douhet, and recently
elaborated by school of military
analysts, especially here in America.
The latest anti-Douhet analysis has
just appeared in Red Star, the Soviet
Army organ, from the pen of Major
General Zhuravlev of the Russian
aviation arm. He states that Stalin-
grad has been subjected to an aerial
! bombardment thrice as intense as
that prescribed by Douhet as the
limit OF resistance for city. Zhurav-
lev concludes that victory in a war
between great powers can be won
only by coordination of all the
services. He cites German failures
at Stalingrad and in the battle over
Britain two years ago as proof that
air power alone cannot break down
the resistance of land forces. Avia-
tion, he admits, can do much to
soften up" the enemy's resistance,
"but without field troops it cannot
reach victory on any front; it can
not even create front"
General Zhuravlev's orthodox con-
clusions are known to be shared by
many leading military men in Amer
lea, Britain and Germany alike. The
amazing defense of Stalingrad thus
provokes another phase in the
eternal debate which goes on in mill
tary circles throughout the world
over the complex phases of the art
OF war. Naturally, the last word has
not been spoken-can, indeed, never
be spoken while human invention
and adaptation continue to evolve
military theory and practice.