Evening star., 1942-02-10
CIimux at Singapore

ton, the "all-out" Japanese assault
on Singapore has begun. Intense
artillery barrageS from Japanese
batteries on the Malay Peninsula
and massed aerial bombings by Japa-
nese planes heralded a large-scale
landing by troops on the beleaguered
island. The operation was carried
out early Monday morning in the
dark hours before the rising of a
waning moon. The scene Of the
landing was the northwestern corner
of Singapore Island, thinly settled
region of mangrove swamps and
rubber plantations. Here, the pro-
tecting moat of Johore Strait is at
its narrowest, averaging only half
mile wide. simultaneously, the jap
anese occupied Ubin Island at the
eastern entrance to Johore Strait,
though separated from Singapore
Island by deep channel three miles
wide.
With the situation changing al
most from hour to hour and obScured
by conflicting British and Japanese
communiques, the best way to Wis
ualize and interpret the desperate
conflict is to understand the basic
aspects Of this strategic problem.
Singapore Island is nearly thirty
miles long and about fifteen broad.
That is approximately five times the
size of the District Of Colum-
bia. And this large island is sep
arated from the mainland by the
winding Johore Strait, some thirty
miles in length and in several parts
no wider than the Potomac at Me-
mortal Bridge. The northern shore
Of the island along the strait is gen.
orally low and marshy. In the in
terror the land rises to low hills.
Here are located the reservoirs which
supply drinking water to Singapore
City, situated at the southern tip of
the Island. The city has nearly
100000 inhabitants, mostly Asiatics,
and has been further crowded with
refugees from Malaga. At its maxi
mum, there may have been nearly
100000 people on the island, though
large evacuation of women and
children to the nearby Dutch island
OF Sumatra and elsewhere is under
stood to be taking place.
The strength of the imperial gar
rison defending this vital bastion OF
empire Is military secret, though 1t
is supposed from British unoff1cial
estimates to number about 10000,
while the Japanese put it as low as
10000. Even 10000 are none too
many for the task OF repelling at
tacks by foe several times as nu-
merous and with almost complete
command Of the air. But, whatever
the true figure, the troops are known
to be Of high quality, including crack
Australians, famous British and
Scottish regiments, and good Indian
oCOdSAlAlCllVO. 4lICOC lllCll lldNC DCCik
hardened and seasoned by two
months Of fierce fighting in the Ma
layan jungles. japanese tactics
should have no surprises for them.
Their immediate problem is the
annihilation of the large Japanese
bridgehead established on the north
west corner of the island. Doubtless
other landing attempts will be made;
so reserves must be held back for
such emergencies. All in all, the
prospect is not bright. Singapore
Island is vastly more difficult to hold
than Bataan Peninsula, because the
terrain is more open, more extensive,
and assailable at many points. If
the Japanese are willing to pay the
price, Singapore probably can be
taken in the not distant future. Yet,
like Bataan, 1t already has become
an episode in the vaster strategic
picture of a war theater extending
from India to Australia. Singapore'S
fall would be no more disastrous than
Japanese success in Burma or in
Java. Those, too, are key points on
which the larger outcome Of the
Japanese grand offensive depends.