The Waterbury Democrat., 1942-07-31

France. For day or two they had this information exclusively, because no one else could confirm 1t. Moscow was silent. Then the British and American lis- tening services picked 1t up and put out cautious bulletins on the story, carefully attributing 1t to the source. That should have been sufficient warning to take 1t easy, but it was- mt. U. s. radio announcers broad- cast it as 8 flat statement of fact, without mention of source. The re- sulting impression was that the Russians didn't need help from any, one, even in the dead of winter.
 The United States at that time had not extended Lend-Lease Aid to the Soviet. It was being discussed, and the whole question of aid to Russia was in the balance. Editorial remarks in newspapers, the words of the radio commentators, even the debate in Congress at the time all showed, according to the analysts, that the necessity for aid to Soviet Russia was neither great nor urgent. In other words, by this planted story, the United States was lulleo into false confidence in the super iority of Russian arms.
 PLAYED FOR
 A SUCKER
 Actually, the Russian armies had not stirred. They were frozen in just as tightly as the Germans and the oply action was in the air. This country was played for 8 sucker, and swallowed the bait, from hook to reel.
 This example may illustrate the essence of propaganda warfare, but 1t must not be taken as a pat tern. Once a trick is learned, the assumption IS that it's no longer a trick. The technique must be changed to provide surprise and unexpectedness. Use of the short wave radio to spread propaganda may have worn so thin that 1t may now be ineffective. Other devices have to be used, and that is where the Germans are at their best. WAlCll OAAC NdAo WMALCO VO ONdBC u recent propaganda blitz in Turkey, for instance, their key diplomatic representatives simply did some direct whispering in important ears and started a wave of rumors that caused all kinds of turmoil.
 The importance of propaganda warfare can, however, be over- ay,o,obo ci1od Tyo hacovon raoIl1y oF fective, propaganda warfare must be extended into psychological warfare, which is war plus the psychological factor. The first con- dition that must exist for the waging of psychological warfare is direct contact between the two op- posing armies. One reason more has not been heard about U. s. psychological warfare is that U. s. forces have not been in constant combat with the Germans or the Japs. So again, examples must be taken from German practice.
 TERROR
 TACTICS TRIED
 The ver-destruction of Rotter- dam. just to spread terror among the Dutch, Belgians and French, Is case in point. There is warfare, plus the psychological factor.
 German psychological warfare. can go haywire, too. Starving the conquered people, attempting to terrorize them into submission, have backflred and built up re- sistance to NaA domination. Blitz bombings of British served to strengthen British resistance.
 But for an example of how psychological warfare should not be waged, a recent announcement from U. s. headquarters in London offers fair case. When the first U. S.. Army Air Force units took part in a raid on Germany not long ago. 1t was made the occasion for a com- munique of importance. Only few planes took part, but this signifled the beginning of active U. s. parti- cipation. The catch was that about third of the U. 8. planes were shot down and did the German radio have field day with that.