Evening star., 1942-12-07

and at Washing
ton and serves David Lawrence.
no useful purpose at this time be-
cause the emphasis now is not on
past but on future events, and it may
be said without fear of contradiction
that the lessons Of Pearl Harbor
have been taken to heart by the War
and Navy Departments.
The second course-to examine
realistically the effect Of the attack
on Pearl Harbor in terms OF what
has happened since to shape the
strategy OF the war itself-is the
more important for the American
people to adopt.
For only by an understanding Of
what the United States Navy has
been up against since Pearl Harbor
can true measure be made OF the
magnificent job already done and Of
the difncult and dangerous tasks
that lie ahead.
First Of all, this has not been 4
battleship war at all in its first
stages. 1t has been a war involving
primarily aircraft carriers and sub
marines and land-based planes. II
the United States Navy had been
given more aircraft carriers by Con-
gress In 1899 and 1910, the losses Of
bettleships at Pearl Harbor would
have had even much less effect than
they have had to date.
Lost Ships Obsolete Types.
But when the aircraft carriers OF
both Japan and the United States
have been materially reduced by
combat-as is the case today-the
battleship comes into Its own as re-
serve fortress. It is nova year
after Pearl Harbor-when we need
those battleships, and we have not
only repaired some of our battleships
damaged at Pearl Harbor but we
have commissioned new ones.
All of the battleships hit at Pearl
Esrbor were obsolete types. Also,
we have reduced the battleship
strength Of the Japanese navy quite
considerably. 1t should not be for
gotten. moreover, that the combined
British and American Navies still
have plentiful supply Of battle
ships. The airplanes We lost at
Pearl Harbor have been replaced
many times over.
It will, of course, be debated for
long time but 1t is certainly open
to considerable argument, whether
the loss of those battleships at
Pearl Harbor affected the strategy
of the first year of our war as
much as the layman might suppose.
Would we really have sent our
battleships to the Philippines with
out aircraft carrier protection7 1t
will be recalled that the British lost
the Prince Of Wales and the Repulse
near Singapore through effective
bombing by land-based Japanese
planes.
To hold the Philippines and the
Dutch East Indies, it was necessary
for the United Nations either to
have three times as many aircraft
carriers As we had year ago or
to possess well-fortified air bases
for land-based planes, and we were
short on both counts. No aircraft
carriers were at Hawaii when the
attack came. What we lost tempo
rarily In the use of battleships and
cruisers did not affect vitality the
kind Of war We had to fight in
areas 1000 to 10000 miles away
from our mainland.
Japs Now on Defensive.
Looked at from Japans view
point, therefore, her attack on Pearl
Harbor did not annihilate the
American Fleet or stop our building
up OF string Of air bases from
Hawaii through the Southwest Pa
cif1c to New Zealand and Australia.
1t did not stop our landing OF tens
OF thousands Of troops in that area
or the shipment of many air bomb
ers such as now are operating out
Of New Guinea and the Solomons.
Nor did 1t save the Japanese navy
from the frightful toll that has
been taken of their surface ships
not only by our intrepid cruisers,
destroyers and submarines but by
our carrier-borne as well as land
based airplanes.
Land Based Airplanes.
Japan today is on the defensive
in the Far Pacific and we are on
the offensive. The British, by their
inability to maintain strong feet
In and around Singapore and the
China Sea saw the Japanese navy
take island after island for the use
Of land-based planes. We, who had
never maintained much Of feet In
the Far East were weak there. too.
On the whole, this merely empha-.