Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-02-02
War Tactics
Changed by
Air Power
But Military Men Revise
Procedure Constantly
BY HUGH S. JOHNSON

from lnlS wal SttIIlS W NC
that there is no leading lesson
from this war.
1t started out with much talk
about a revolution in tactics,
with all the emphasis thrown
directly opposite from the World
War | doctrine of the offensive
in mass 10 an almost complete
reliance on such "impregnable"
defenSes as the Maginot Line.
The leading military nations,
not excepting Germany. were
spending a considerable proper
ton of available military money
on the invention and develop
ment of Shellproof, bombproof,
aSsault-proof Notifications.
In addition, Germany alone
went far ahead in perfecting
highly m o b lie. mechanical.
armed and armored offensive
formations. All the principal
nations outdid themselves in ex-
Fermentation and development
of air power as an auxiliary
not as main weapon.
But the emphasis on defensive
strategy was not lightened. even
in Germany. which had her own
answer TO the Maginot Line in
her Siegfried Line.
1t is now clear that none Of
the. nations had properly APP
praised the offensive strength OF
modern air power.
MILITARY publicistS and ex-
A'A pertS during those early
months were still debating the
greatly increased value Of the
defense as a contribution 10
victory.
That is 10 say. they continued
10 debate il until the sudden
and miraculous armored Ger
man thrust through the Low
lands which isolated France
from Britain, completely out
lldIlh'h lllf Nhd6lIlbA lSlil' anu
left France helpless.
Immediately the tune changed.
The Maginot Line came 10 be
regarded as one Of the greatest
follieS of mankind
The apostles Of the defensive
were thrust like foolish proph-
cts forth
WAR, We were told had re-
w turned 10 pre-Napolconlc
days of swift and sudden move
ment and widespread Strategical
dispositions.
No more should We sec tho
wholesale slaughter 10 the point
of exhaustion of masses Of men
thrown without proteC ION
against powerful defensive posi-
tionS.
While there Is no doubt OF
great changes made by armored
and motorized troops, there j.
danger Of jumping too quick and
tao far TO final conclusions.
II was never proved that the
Maginot Line was vulnerable 10
assault.
II was a great folly. but the
folly was that II was entirely
open on the northward flank
1t merely channelod the Ger
man attack through the Low
Countries.
II was like a fence 10 enclose
cow pasture that was left
wide open on two sides.
I ATER developments promptly
IL showed that the German
swift offensive is nor the whole
Story-eSpecially by the holo-
cauSt of humanity in Russia
where once again resistance
through sheer weight Of num-
hers is shown 10 be- as success
ful as II eFeF-aWas. u tho cir
cumStanCcS are favorable
In addition. in a small way At
Wake Island and 10 much
greater and more significant OK
tent IN Bataan. the value Of tho
defensive based on powerful or
imprcgnable positions has been
again demonstrated
I AM aware that all this shows
only one thing definitely II
is that the art Of war is IN one
Of the SwifteSt periods Of fluX
and change in all its history.
The cited examples are only
part Of the problem.
The place Of air power on
both land and sea is still an I'M
plumbed depth.
Even the shocking lesson Of
Pearl liarbor did little 10 clear
that fog.
Except for a few winged on
thusiasts. nobody supposed that
such an expcditionary force as
Japan sent could do so much
damage.
About the only lesson We can
take is 10 be prepared in all
kinds of warfare and 10 neglect
none.
That we seem 10 he doing as
fast as is reasonably possible
and mostly as this proved.
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