Evening star., 1942-11-25
Expects Jap Attack
On Australia
Military Writer Anticipates
Drive Against Port Darwin
As Diversion Tuctie
BY Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

As Diversion Tuctie
BY Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
1t is sometimes useful to examine the
military situation from the enemy's point
Of view, and this is particularly the case
at present in the Pacific theater Of war.
The Japanese theory Of war is offensive,
as we have already learned to our cost.
Our naval victory in the Solomon Islands
has, however, made 1t very dimcult for
the Japanese to take the offensive in
that particular area without q great deal
Of reorganization and preparation. It is
not inconceivable that they may make
another attempt to recover possession of
Guadalcanal. but the factors of time and
distance seem to be against them.
On the basis Of normal calculation, It
would seem far more probable that they
must give up their garrison on Guadalca-
nal for lost and that they must likewise
be prepared for the loss of the remainder
Of the Solomon Islands.
The advantages which We have gained
seem to preclude the possibility Of the
Japanese appearing in the Solomons in
SUFFICIENT force and In time to prevent us
from cashing in on our victory to this
extent.
The Japanese situation In Papua also
appears desperate. with their holdings
reduced to a single heavily beset beach,
head at Buna.
minded high command unquestionably
would be inclined to cut its losses in the
whole Solomons-New Guinea area and
would now be making preparations to
retire not only from the Solomons and
New Guinea but also from Rabaul, in
New Britain Island. thus putting some
100 miles Of water between the advance
ing Allied forces and the next nearest
Japanese bases (those in the Caroline
Islands,.
1t Is not, however. by any means Ger
tain that the Japanese high command
will think in these terms. They are
much more likely to cast about In their
minds for something they can do in the
way Of offensive operations to upset our
plans They can hardly consider dis
tant offensive, such as blow In force
at our Pacific communications, because
Of their heavy naval losses. They must
do something which they can support
with air power plus limited naval force,
and preferably In an area where their
air superiority can be so established that
we will hesitate to risk the heavy naval
units which gave US victory in the
Solomons.
So considering, we begin to see the
reason why Gen. MacArthur's bombers
have been hammertng away 50 steadily
at the island Of Timor. Timor lies north
of Australia and west Of New Guinea.
1t is only about 325 miles from Port
Darwin, the most important port on the
north coast of Australia and the only
one with any satisfactory communica-
tions with the main centers Of population
and industry.
The Japanese may very well be PLAN
ming diversionary attack on Port
Darwin from Tmor, hoping thus to ease
the pressure, particularly the air pres
sure, on their positions farther to the
eastward, and to make 1t impossible for
us to assemble q striking force to attack
Rabaul. They might thus hope to gain
time to build up new offensive Of their
own to restore the Solomons- New Guinea
situation, which they could hardly hope
to do at all If they lose Rabaul now.
The Japanese will hardly hope to be
able to conduct a major invasion Of
Australia from Port Darwin because 1t
will be too hard for them to supply q
large invading army At any distance
from the coast; but there can be no
doubt that an attack on Darwin would
compel Gen. Macarthur to take very
strong measures for its repulse, and the
forces at his command are not 50 great
that he could mount an attack on Rabaul
at the same time that he was repelling
an attack at Darwin.
Timor has the advantage of well pro-
tected lines Of communication-much
better protected than those Of Rabaul-
and by way Of Formosa, the Philippines,
the Palau Islands and Amboina the jap
anese can build up considerable air con-
SoAtA dUOAo AL Vic kcI1cIAl area uOI III Oh
Darwin, where they also have occupied
other small islands which should give
them further bases for the operation of
aircraft.
One unknown factor in these calcula-
tions Is the extent Of the damage which
our constant air attacks have done to
the Japanese installations on Timor.
The fact that the Japanese have been
able to use Rabaul extensively despite
all that our bombers could do leads to
the supposition that they can use Timor
just as effectively If they make up their
minds to do 30. At any rate, Port Dar-
win and. indeed. the whole northwest
and west coasts Of Australia are worth
watching As possible scenes Of Japanese
diversionary oiensives within the next
few weeks
(Copyright, 1942, New York Tribune Incl