Evening star., 1942-12-30

nave COIIic W $&333 ~ -
about the same 1'' =" S%'S''
conclusion that David Lawrence.
Is being cabled in the press dis
patches from Australia. namely, that
Japan is fighting a delaying, rear
guard action.
Only such a plan explains why
such heavy naval and air forces
have been used up on such compare
lively minor places as Buna and
the Tulagi area of the Solomons.
The Japanese have hoped to keep
the American Fleet and our ma
rines occupied in the islands and
zones east and southeast of New
Guinea while the main Japanese
strength is concentrated in line of
airfields stretching from the Dutch
East Indies to the Gilbert and Mar
shall Islands In mid-Pacific.
The Japanese already have many
airflelds from which they can oper-
ate land-based aircraft against our
approaching naval forces. Judging
by the length of time consumed
in the Tulagi operation-nearly five
months-and in the mopping up
Of the Buna area in New Guinea
just about as long-the Japanese
are counting on just such a slow
campaign on the part of the Ameri-
can Government, which has the
principal responsibility for what is
to develop extensively and defensive
ly in the Pacific Ocean.
Kiska Feint Failed.
The Kiska operation in the vicinity
Of the Aleutians is now viewed as
having been part Of the same major
strategy of the Japanese, to i'm
mobilize American planes and ships
in part of the world far removed
from the main Japanese possessions
and conquered areas. The United
States chieftains failed to fall for
the stratagem and yet did manage
to render the Japanese occupation
Of Kiska valueless.
A press dispatch from Australia
by Jack Turcott, which was passed
by the censors there, gives what
appears to be a well-informed dis
cussion Of the Japanese strategy.
1t says:
THE most striking feature Of the
enemy's aerial plan is the fact that
he has bases within 700 miles of
every Allied outpost in the South
west Pacific, giving Jap pilots easy
bombing range.
"Tmor provides an excellent H.
lustration Of the enemy strategy.
The Japs are secure in Timor SO
long as the American Fleet is kept
tied to the Solomons, since the
United Nations could not under
take an invasion of Timor from
Australia without a powerful task
force for the crossing Of the more
than 400 miles of the Arafura and
Timor Seas.
TT is true that the Allied bomb
ers have been delivering steady
blows against the Timor airfields
but damaged runways are repair
able within few hours and planes
destroyed on the ground are re-
placeable within the same time from
neighboring bases. An invasion like
that of Guadalcanal is the only
means by which the Allies can take
an enemy base and that requires
naval strength which we do not
possess.
Weaken Distant Posts.
"And as a result the Japs, finding
It unnecessary to maintain large
aerial and naval forces around
Singapore, Java, Sumatra. Borneo,
the Moluccas and the Philippines
because the Allies lack bases from
which to attack them, are able to
concentrate warships throughout the
New Britain Bismarck area, keep
ing our Solomons naval units and
our Southwest Pacific air forces
engaged indefinitely fighting local
actions which do not materially
affect Japan's position"
The foregoing reflects an analysis
obtainable here among experts who
follow the Pacific situation closely,
and it indicates clearly that if the
United States is to keep on con-
sidering the japanese war as
secondary affair the Japanese will
use all the available time to build
up their line of air bases so as to
utilize their resources intensively
behind that line. Their shipping
can 60 unmolested in large part to
and from the conquered ports in
the Dutch East Indies and the Phil
ippines. The Japanese fieet-all of
which is in the Pacific, whereas our
fleet is necessarily occupied in large
part in the Atlantic-can protect the
sea lanes between the conquered
areas and the Japanese MAINLAND.
;, Unless more ships, more planes
and more warships are allocated to
TRANSPORTATION.