davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25

of soldiers by the military police.
for intoxication, were 3S. and ar
rests of sailors by the navy shore
patrol, for intoXicatlon, were four.
BY comparison the arrests of
civilians for drunkenness on that
night were 80. Thorough inquiry
disclosed there is no evidence Of
excessive drinking by any officer
of either service on that night.
The evidence shows that as re-
spects the use of intoxicating
liquor and intoxication, the condi-
tons amongst the men OF the army
and Of the navy on the night of
December s compare closely with
similar conditions for the several
preceding months.
On Saturday. Dec. 6. 1941. the
usual percentage of enlisted
strength entitled to passes or lib
erty- took advantage of such privi-
lege to spend the afternoon or
evening in the city of Honolulu.
Application of this ratio TO
total numbers of all the services
then on the island of Oahu and in
Pearl Harbor, amounting 10 about
$4,000 men. indicates that no less
than 1000 soldiers. sailors and
marines visited Honolulu that
afternoon and evening
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
Far Reconnaissance
AFTER Dec. z Only

Under the joint coastal frontier
defense plan. when the plan be-
came effective the navy was 10
conduct distant air reconnaissance,
radiating from Oahu 10 distance
Of from seven 10 eight hundred
miles.
Prior 10 Dec. 7. 1941, no distant
"Reminiscences were conducted,
except during drills and maneu-
vers.
The fleet from time to time had
task forces operating in various
areas off the island OF Oahu, and
in connection with such operations
carrier and patrol planes con-
Quoted reconnaissance of the op-
Grating areas.
The sectors searched, however,
constituted but small arcs of the
total arc of $50 degrees. and rarely
extended to a radius of 700 miles.
Means were available for distant
reconnaissance which would have
afforded measure of security
against a surprise air attack.
General Short assumed that the
navy was conducting distant recon-
Nuisance. but after seeing the
warning messages of October and
November from the war and navy
departments he made no inquiry
with respect 10 the distant recon-
naissance, if any, being conducted
BY the navy.
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
General Ordered
Alert on NOU. q

! Neither informed the other spe-
officially OF the action he was TAX
ING. and neither inquired OF the
other whether or not any action
had been taken, nor did they con-
suit as 10 the appropriateness of
the actions taken by them re-
spectNely.
After receipt Of the messages
of November II the following ac-
ton was taken:
The commanding general, Iia-
waiIan department. ordered alert
No. (see next succeeding para
graph into effect on November
27. and II was maintained in effect
until December Z
At the same time he ordered
that the aircraft warning system
operate daily from 4 a. +. to 7
Il. m.
The commandment Of the 1ith
Naval District. in his capacity as
base defense officer. called a con-
ference Of all the destroyer COM
manders of the inShore patrol. ad-
vised them that something might
happen, and that they should be
on the alert.
The commander in chief OF the
fleet made certain dispositions Of
units OF the fleet for the purpose
of Strengthening his outposts 10
the south and west of the Ha-
waiian Islands, and also issued
an order that any Japanese SUBJ
marines found in the operating
areas around the Island of Oahu
should be attacked. This order
went beyond the authority given
them by the navy department.
In the Hawaiian departments
standing operating procedure COW
erlng the defense Of the Hawaiian
coastal frontier. three states of
readiness were prescribed, known
as alert No. !, alert No. 2, and
alert No. 3. Alert No. l vas thus
defined
This alert II defense
against acts OF sabotage and up
risings within the islands, with
no threat from without"
Alert No . was thus defined:
This alert Is applicable TO q
condition more serious than
alert No. !. Security against
attacks from hostile subsurface,
surface, and air craft, In addi-
ton TO defense against acts OF
sabotage and uprisings, Is pro-,
yided."
Alert No 3 was thus defined:
This alert requires occupa-
ton OF all field positions by all
units, prepared for maximum de-
Tense Of Oahu and the army
installations on outlying is
lands"
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
awaiian Commanders Ignored Warnings, Board Reveals

southwark and southwestwsrd OF
Oahu. A report of an actual con-
tact with an enemy carrier. winch
later proved to be erroneous, gaso
.credence 10 numerous reports from
other sources indicating enemy
carriers might be 10 the SOUTHWARK
and SouthweStward. thus causing
futile searches in those areas:
ON December 7 naval task
force 3 was about 200 miles west
of Oahu proceeding towards Oahu.
Another was about 700 miles west
of Oahu.
A third. task force IL. was IN
the vicinity of Johnston Island:
about 700 miles southwest or
Oahu These task forces were en-.
gagged in operations connected
with Strengthening the defenses
of the outlying islands.
On the morning of Dec. z, 194l.
prior TO the attack, the following
searches of sea areas were being
made. Six patrol planes were
searching south and southeast.
wardly from Midway.
Three patrol planes were In the
air engaged in a joint exercise
with submarines south OF Oahu.
Eighteen scouting planes from
task force 8 had been dispatched
TO scout in advance of the force
which was on its way TO Oahu.
These secuted TO the southwest
ward of Oahu.
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
Obsolete TOrpedOes
Used by japanese

The major part Of the damage
to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted
from torpedoes launched from
planes. The torpedoes were OF an
obsolete type. altered TO increase
their explosive load. TO decrease
their radius, and fitted with side
vaneS 10 insure functioning in
shallow water-a weapon pecu-
liarly adapted TO an attack such
as the one delivered upon ships
in Pearl Harbor.
Many of the bombs had extra
heavy cases and appeared TO be
modified armor-piercing shell.
Dec. z, 1871, at $50 p. m. Mid
way Time G1;30 p. m Honolulu
Time), a force believed TO consist
of two cruisers and two destroyers,
approaching from the southwark,
opened fire and shelled Midway
Island for about 30 minutes. About
noon Dec. 8. 1871 $3.50 p. m. De-
cember Z, Honolulu time). some
u land planes made a strafing
and bombing attack on Wake Is
land
Some loss Of life and damage
to material resulted on each is
land. Attacks on Wake continued
until its capture on Dec %, 1871.
Immediately upon realizing that
the japanese were attacking. the
commanding general, Hawaiian de-
partment. ordered alert No. 3. The
alert was executed with reason
able promptness. At the same
time the commander in chief
placed the fleet on a full war
basis and issued a series of orders
in an effort to intercept and de-
stroy the attacking force.
Officers and enlisted men, In
defending against the attack, DEM
onstrated excellent training and
high morale. Anti-aircraft weap-
ons aboard ship, which were not
already manned, and anti-aircraft
weapons ashore. which were in DO
sition. were promptly manned.
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
One Navy Plane
Attacked BY Jap

After the attack the following
searches were made:
The three planes in the air south
of Oahu, according to their stand
ing orders, searched to the north
west of Oahu distance OF about
375 miles.
Nine planes were dispatched by
task force 8 and searched to the
south and southwest of Oahu.
Carrier planes of Task Force IL
searched in an area about 500
miles southwestward of Oahu.
About 11:27 a. m. two heavy
army bombers and four light
bombers took off TO attack a car
rier reported about Is miles Oft
BARRIERS Point.
After failure to make contact
the two heavy bombers searched
first to the southwestward and
then in areas to the northwest or
Oahu. The other four searched to
the southwestward.
At IL so a. m. six navy VS.
planes Searcned SOUTHWARK or
Oahu. Thereafter nine planes
searched the sector southwest to
northwest of Oahu.
Two utility planes searched
northward of Oahu to a distance
of 300 miles; and nine planes
which had arrived from carriers
and refueled searched some 200
miles to the northward.
No contacts were made with
enemy aircraft or carriers. except
that one navy airplane was at
tackled by Japanese airplane
some 300 miles north of Oahu.
This incident was not reported
until the next day.
Text of summary and con.
illusions on Page Two.)
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
Jap Ship MOUes
Told on Dec.
q

Dec. /. 194l. the director oil
naval intelligence issued a bulletin
which, under the caption japanese
naval situation" stated
DEVELOPMENT Of naval forces
10 the southwark has indicated
clearly that extensive prepare
tons are under way for HOSTILE
ties. At the same time troop
transports and freighters are
pouring continually down from
Japan and northern China coast
ports headed south, apparently
for French Indo- China and For
mosan ports. Present movements
to the south appear TO he car
ried out by small individual
units, but the organization of an
extensive task force, now def
nitely indicated, will probably
take sharper form In the next
few days. To date this task
force, under the command OF the
commander-in-chief second fleet,
appears to be subdivided into
two major task groups. one
gradually concentrating of the
southeast Asiatic coast. the other
i'm the mandates. Zach consti-
tute~ n strong striking force Of
heavy and light cruisers, units
OF the combined air force, de-
stroyer and submar ine squad
rons. Although one division OF
battleships also may he assigned,
the major capital ship strength
remains In home waters, as well
as the greatest portion Of the
carriers"
The naval intelligence service in
Hawaii. due TO lack of information
indicating that the bulk OF Japa-
ncSe carriers were al sea, con-
cludcd they were in home ports.
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
Navy Intelligence
Hunted CiUiI Spies
IS.

There were, prior 10 Dec. z.
1871. japanese spies on the island
of Oahu. Some were japanese con-
sular agents and others were per-
sons having no open relations with
the japanese foreign service. These
spies collected. and through va
rious channels transmitted. infor-
nation TO the japanese Empire
respecting the military and naval
establishments and dispositions on
the island.
In Hawaii the local army intelli-
gence service has always devoted
itself 10 matters pertaining to
army personnel and property: and
the local naval intelligence service
10 matters pertaining 10 navy per-
sonnet and property.
In addition. prior 10 the cStab-
lishment OF an office of the Fed
eral Bureau OF Investigation il,
Hawaii, naval intelligence investi-
gated enemy activities amongst
the civil population.
When the bureaus office was
established IL was agreed by the
three governmental agencies tina
the bureau should take over dno
become primarily responsible fci
investigation of matters connected
with the civil population. and tina,
the three services should cooper.
ate with each other.
Efforts were made by the bureau
to uncover espionage activities ~
Hawaii.
The United States being a
peace with japan, restrictions i'm.
posed prevented resort to certain
methods of obtaining the conten;
of messages transmitted by tele'
phone or radio telegraph over The
commercial lines operating be-
tween Oahu and Japan.
The bureau and the local intelli
gence staffs were unable, prior tc
December z. to obtain and make
available significant information
respecting Japanese plans and flee
movements in the direction Of
Hawaii.
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
Ant-TOrpedO Net
Open for 3 Hours

The ready destroyer was des.
patched 10 investigate. but no aler,
warnings were issued based upon
this report. Another small sub
marine was fired upon. depth
charged. rammed and sunk inside
the harbor between S:35 and 8:43
a. m. A third small submarine
grounded in Kaneohe Bay and was
captured. There is no evidence of
any damage by torpedoes fired by
these submarines.
. Pearl Harbor was provided with
an anti-torpedo net which would
have prevented the entrance of
torpedoes into the harbor. and
would. have revealed the entrance
of submarine.
The procedure prior TO Dec. Z.
194l. was 10 keep the net closed
during the hours of darkness, open
ing il only when necessary for a
vessel to pass through.
II was kept open during day
light hours. on the theory that,
during daylight the channel en-
trance destroyer. the net vessel,
and other vessels in the vicinity.
would detect submerged or
partially submerged submarine.
December 7 the net was opened
at ass a. m. for the entrance of
two mine sweepers. II was kept
open until $40 a. m, when il was
closed by orders.
The net was not damaged The
submarine was first sighted in the
harbor at 7:45 a. m. The time Of
its entrance is not known, but
probably il passed in about z a. m.
An estimated force of from 80
to 200 fighting. bombing and tor
pedo planes simultaneously at
tackled Pearl HORROR and all air
bases on Oahu at about 7:55 a. m.
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
; Pilots Killed
Trying to Take Off

Junior officers and enlisted men
on their own initiative procured
from storage every possible auto
matte weapon. These weapons
continued in action during and
in spite Of low level strafing and
dive bombing which have been
known to demoralize even sea-
soned troops.
At least three fighter pilots, in
total disregard of their own safety,
attempted to take off in the face
OF greatly superior forces then at
lacking their airdrome, but lost
their lives in the attempt.
A few fighter planes parked on
an outlying gunnery training
held. which was not attacked, took
the air.
This combined anti-aircraft and
fighter action resulted in the de-
struction Of approximately 80 en-
envy aircraft; and a number of
others were lost at sea because
they were unable to rejoin their
carriers.
The state of readiness pre-
scribed for army aircraft prior to
the attack required them to be
ready for flight only after four
hours notice. The type of alert
in effect required all army air.
craft TO be concentrated in order
more effectively to guard agains,
possible sabotage, instead of being
dispersed in order 10 afford
greater security against air at
tack. and greater facility in taking
the air.
This state of readiness, this con-
centration of airplanes. and the
element of surprise, all contributed
to the effectiveness of the jana
nese attack, and resulted in such
permanent or temporary disable
ment of airplanes that very few
fighter airplanes were able to
take the air during the course of
the action.
For the same reasons II was
impossible TO get airplanes into
the air in time TO trail the Japa-
nese airplanes back to their car
riers.
The aircraft warning system,
which was renamed by about
$3.50 a. m. Dec. z, 1871, failed
during the balance of that day
to furnish any reliable information
of enemy aircraft returning TO
their carriers.
Such information as ii afforded
indicated enemy forces TO the
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
Message 'NeWs'
To General Short

The commander-in- chief Of the
fleet communicated the purport of
this message 10 the general COM
handing the Hawaiian department
OF the army.
At the time OF our hearing Cen
eral Short had no independent rec
objection of the last mentioned
message. although he felt that it
must have been shown TO him.
Nov. q. 1871, the commanding
general. Hawaiian department, in
response 10 the direction of the
chief Of staff that he report meas
ures taken, informed the chief of
Z that he had alerted his COM
nd against sabotage and that
ha was maintaining llaiSon with
the navy.
No reply referring 10 this mes
sage was sent by the war depart
ment: but General Short testified
that he considered the adjutant
generals message referred 10 in
the next succeeding paragraph a
reply.
Nov. %. 1871, the commanding
general, Hawaiian department. re-
ccived from the adjutant general
of the army message stating that
the critical situation required
every precaution 10 be taken at
once against subversive activities.
within the scope of the army's re-
SponSibility: that all necessary
measures be taken 10 protect mill
tary establishments. property
and equipment against sabotage,
against propaganda affecting army
personnel, and against all esplo-
mage.
The message disclaimed ordering
any illegal measures, and warned
that protective measures should
be confined to those essential 10
security. so as 10 avoid unneces-
Sary publicity and alarm.
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25

sideration the possibility OF send
ing army airplanes TO Wake and
Midway and withdrawing marine
planes then on those islands; OF
relieving marines stationed there
by the substitution of units of the
army. General Short. Admiral
Kimmel. and Rear Admiral Bloch
had been in conference concerning
this proposal.
At the time OF the receipt OF the
messages of November u by Ad-
miral Kimmel and General Short,
respectively, this proposal was a
subject of discussion. General
Short held discussions with Ad-
miral kimmel on November II,
December !, 2 and 3. concerning
this matter i'm an effort TO COM
pose certain differences of view.
At one of these conferences Ad-
miral Kimmel inquired of his war
plans officer, Captain McMorris,
who was present, concerning the
probability of surprise air attack
on Oahu.
According 10 General Short,
Captain McMorris replied there
was no probability Of such an at
tack: and. according 10 Captain
McMorris. his reply was that the
Japanese would never so attack.
According 10 the testimony. Ad-
miral Kimmel and General Short
did not discuss means or measures
for Hawaiian defense to be adopted
in the light OF The messages.
On and after Nov. u, l94l. the
commanding general, Hawaiian
and the commander
in chief OF the Pacific fleet. indie
took such action as each
deemed appropriate TO the exist
ing situation.
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
Lieutenant Thought
Planes We're Ours

He reported this fact At 7.2O
"a. IN. 10 a lieutenant Of the army
who was at the central informa-
ton center, having been detailed
there TO familiarize himself with
the operation OF the system.
This inexperienced lieutenant
having information that certain
United States planes might be in
the vicinity at the time. assumed
that the planes in question were
friendly planes. and took no action
with respect TO them. The record
ing of the observation made indi-
Gated that-these sirplaRes were
towards the island and
then lost.
On Nov. u. 1871. there was
sufficient partially trained person
mel available TO operate the air.
craft warning system throughout
"a hours of the day, as installed
in its temporary locations. An arc
of nearly $50 degrees around Oaho
could have been covered.
Admiral kimmel. on and prior
10 lee. 4, 1871. assumed tndt Ine
aircraft warning system was being
fully operated by the army. but
made no inquiry after reading any
of the messages of October and
November from the war and navy
departments as to what the fact
was with respect 10 its operation.
Il.
The Joint coastal frontier de-
Tense plan provided that. when it
became effective. the army should
conduct an inshore airplane patrol,
covering the circumference OF the
island of Oahu TO a distance of
about 20 miles.
Prior 10 Dec. z. 1871, no inshore
patrol was conducted. except dur
ing drills and maneuvers.
Pilots were being trained on
week days. and the training in
volved flying around the confines
of Oahu from about 8 o'clock in
the morning throughout the day
On Sunday morning no inshore
airplane patrol was conducted.
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
" drning System
Wasn't Installed

The responsibilities Of the army
included the installation and OPP
Grafton of an aircraft warning
system for the detection Of water
borne and air-borne craft al dis
tance from the coast.
Throughout the late spring and
summer OF 1871 the army was en-
gagged in the installation of per.
manent facilities for this purpose
on the Hawaiian Islands
Permanent installations had not
on Dec. Z. 1871. been completed.
BY Nov. y. 1871. certain mobile
equipment had been installed al
temporary locations. and was be-
ing operate internationally
throughout the day for the pur-
pose of training personnel in its
operation.
On Nov. 27. 1871, in connection
with the order for alert No. !.
the commanding general, Hawaiian
ordered that this sys-
tenn be operated each day during
the period from q until Z a. m.
II was intended that in the near
future the navy should have Of
ficer personnel in the information
center, but up TO December 7 such
Officers had not been designated.
In accordance with the order in
effect. the system closed at z a. m.
Sunday, December Z. A non
commissioned officer who had
been receiving training requested
that he be allowed TO remain at
one o. the stations. and was
granted leave 10 do so. At about
7;02 a. m. he discovered what he
thought was large flight OF
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
Measures Against
Sabotage Outlined

The message stated that identi-
cal communications were being
sent 10 all air stations, and on No
vember % the chief Of the army
air forces sent such an identical
message TO the commanding gen.
eral. Hawaiian air force.
Nov. 20. 194l. the commanding
general. Hawaiian department, re-
piled 10 the last mentioned mes
sage. outlining at length and in
detail the measures taken 10 pre-
nSt sabotage Of military estab-
)nents and property and essen
M industrial and public utility
installations.
No reply was sent by the war
department 10 this message. Cen
eral Short testified that he con-
Sidered this series of message a
tacit agreement that the meas
ures taken were all that were in
tended by the department.
Nov. %. 1911. the chief Of naval
operations sent a message TO the
commander in chief of the fleet
which was in substance a quota
ton of the chief of STATS dispatch
of November u 10 the command
ing general, Hawaiian department;
and in addition directed the ad-
dreSSec TO take no offensive action
until Japan had committed an
overt act. and ordered certain
action IN case hostilitieS should
occur.
Nov. 30. 1871. the chief OF naval
operations sent dispatch to the
commander in chief Of the ASiatic
fleet, and also forwarded the mos.
sage to the commander in chief 0f
the Pacific feet for his inforr'A-
Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1942-01-25
Army Posts, Ships
Fully Manned Dec. Z

In normal times more enlisted
men OF both services are absent
from duty by permission on Sat.
urday nights than on other
nights: and on Saturday nights
more officers are customary alb
sent than on weekday nights.
On the morning of Sunday. De.
cember Z. army posts and naval
vessels and stations were ade-
quately manned. for the readiness
and alert then in effect, by men
fit for duty.
The attack on the morning OF
December 7. 1941, was a COM
bined air raid and submarine at
tack on the island of Oahu, a
bombardment Of Midway. and a
continuous air attack and bonn
bardment on Wake Island.
Available information indicates
that the force attacking Oahu
consisted OF either three or four
Japanese carriers. with support
ing surface craft and a few small
submarines. and that this force
had maintained radio silence dur
ing its approach. which. except
for the submarines. was from the
of Oahu.
In the attack on Oahu sus-
picious object was sighted in the
prohibited area off Pearl Harbor
at $50 a. m, by the u. S. S.
Antares.
Between 6:33 and 6:45 this OBJ
ject, which was small submarine.
was attacked and sunk by the con-
certed action of a naval patrol
plane and the L. S. S. Ward. A
report of this action by the Ward
reached the naval base watch Of
ficer at 7:12 a. m, who notified his
chief of staff.