Evening star., 1942-06-10

Writer With Field Experience
Sees Moximum Effort Needed
To Win Victory in Orient
BY Stanley Washburn.
Throughout the United States the
principal subject of debate seems to be
whether We will win the war in 1o42.
1943 or 1914.
My thought Is that we would be far
better employed pondering the posi-
bility that We may not win the war at
all, though once this country is morally
prepared we cannot lose. Wishful hoping
and failure to adapt ourselves to the
necessity Of prolonged sacrifices. huge
casualty lists. and the calling up Of at
least ten million men are the only
menaces which America need fear.
was first associated with the Japanese
when, in the Russo-Japanese war,
operated the dispatch boat Fawan for
the Chicago Daily News. plowed the
Yellow Sea In the wake or near vicinity
Of both fleets for some strenuous months
and afterward was attached to Nogis
Sd Imperial Army before Port Arthur.
Thus had daily occasion to study the
people now arrayed in battle against US;
and confidently assert that the Jap
represents as tough an opposition As any
first-class power could wish to 90 against.
Let us see why. And. doing 50, let US
eliminate racial hatred and prejudice,
natural as such feelings may be today,
because such factors destroy rational and
lucid judgment.
To begin with, the Japanese are strong
because they are homogeneous and speak
the same language. In the second place,
they participate in no sectarian squabbles.
Shintoism and Buddhism do not conflict.
As matter of fact. Jap can subscribe
to both beliefs at the same time But
perhaps beyond Christian concept. the
Jap is convinced Of immortality. To
characterize him as pagan is to tumble
intellectually. His Emperor Is divine.
But the divine spirit ranks the Emperor
In any case. the Jap Is not . pagan.
Webster defines such . one as being "an
irreligious person." He certainly had no
Jap in mind.
1t is pertinent here to trace the de-
velopment Of Japan and to point out that
in 1894 when the japanese fought China
it was with no expectation of Asiatic.
much less world. conquest. 1t was. in
stead. . defensive campaign to protect
the very life Of the islands. The Sino-
japanese War of 1894-5 was fought to
prevent the Chinese from establishing
themselves in Korea, the occupation Of
which was q vital menace to the Mikados
empire. Similarly, the Russo-JApanese
War was started rs q defensive war to
keep the Russians out Of Korea and
Manchuria and to remove them from
Port Arthur, the occupation of which by
the Russians as q naval base would have
been fatal to the life OF the japanese.
The Japanese were strong in that war be-
cause As today, the world wholly under
estimated their morale, efficiency and
their willingness to die. It was clear
then that though they had profound
confidence in themselves and in their
<rmies, there was some doubt In their
minds as to whether or not there was
a subtle superiority in the white race
which they could not meet.
AS the campaigns progressed, begin
ming with the attacks on Port Arthur,
the battle of the Yalu, Motienling Pass,
Liauyang. the Shaho and finally the Rus
sian debacle at Mukden, the legend of
white superiority over the Asiatic races
gradually evaporated and there was
planted the seed Of conquest.
The greatest weakness of Japan has
been its lack of raw materials and the
cramped living space for its rapidly
growing population. Hence the plan for
the occupation Of Manchuria in 1881.
From that time on Japanese ambitions
grew from defense to ofiense. the con-
quest of Asia and. finally, to joint effort
with Hitler for the domination of the
world. If any one doubted what their
plans were, 1t should only have been
necessary to have read the Tanaka me
morial." confidentially prepared by the
then Premier Of Japan for the Emperor.
Il knew the premier in 1905 when he
was captain in the Imperial Guards Di-
vision and confidential aide to Field
Marshall Oyama) In this. memorial"
he outlined in the most meticulous way
the program he envisaged in Manchuria
and Northern China.
In reading the Tanaka memorial"
one cannot help but compare it with
Hitlers "Mein Kampf." Both the Ger
mans and Japanese did exactly what
they said they were going to do and the
world is surprised when these promises
both in the East and West actually are
carried out.
The next factor to be considered is the
manpower of Japan. The census Of
1895, which is the latest available. shows
that the total population Of Japan then
was approximately %, 600 900 and As their
increase Of population for many years
has averaged approximately 100000 an
nually, it Is safe to place their present
population at 105, 900 900, % per cent Of
which live in Japan proper. In q total
war, such As that in which We now are
involved, a well-organized nation, such as
Japan, can place 10 per cent of its total
population in the field. think 1t no ex-
aggeration to suggest that Japan can arm
at least 100000 troops. Clearly, our
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