Evening star., 1942-06-09
By BLAIR BOLLES.

guns, planes and other arms on the
Russian battlefields than her fac
tories have been able to produce
during the last year, the Brookings
Institution reported today in PAM
phlet issued under its aegis and
written by Fritz Sternberg, German
refugee economist.
The Nazis' factory problem has
been made worse. DR.. Sternberg
added, by the fact so many troops
are needed constantly on the Rus
sian front that arms production is
Is to 80 per cent below what it was
during the first two war years.
The shortage of German man
power is developing into a crucial
bottleneck," DR.. Sternberg wrote.
Armament production is the crucial
point in modern mechanical war
fare"
The economists findings match
reports which now are reaching the
American and British governments
at time when Allied production, as
testified by British Production Min
lister Oliver Lyttelton after a trip to
Detroit, is steadily mounting both
over previous output and above the
level Of losses.
Halifax Gives Outlook.
In a cautious manner, Lord Hall
fax, British Ambassador, spoke yes
terday on the production outlook for
us and for our enemies:
The aircraft industry of Ger
many is incapable of further great,
expansion. We believe that ours
has achieved at least parity with
that of Germany. The Germans
have good cause to know what the
Russians are producing. You here
are producing something like all
the aircraft that Japan can turn
out In a year, and you will go on
from strength to strength.
These facts will not be pub
lished in enemy countries, but their
peoples are we'll aware of what it
means to be up against the full
weight of American production.
And I have no doubt that, day and
night, this specter haunts the en-
emy's general staffs."
DR.. Sternberg finds that the "de-
clining quality and supply of man
power" available to the Germans
for work in the arms factories and
its accompanying maleffect on Ger
man production may play a vital
role in determining the outcome
of the war" But he, too, is cau-
tious:
1T does not mean that in 1912
Germany Is necessarily a less pow
erful adversary than in 1941.
Nazis Seen at Peak.
But 1t suggests that she is now
reaching - perhaps has already
reached-a peak which it will be
virtually impossible to maintain for
long period AS Germany pos
sessed reserves of war materials
there is valid reason for expecting
her military peak to coincide with
the peak of armament production
This caution is necessary, lest too
optimistic an Interpretation be
placed on our findings"
The commencement of the war
with Russia, which has turned out
to be a long campaign instead of a
blitzkrieg, brought an end to the
smoothly working German scheme
for using large numbers of men
briefly at the front and for long
terms in the factories, DR.. Sternberg
says.
This was the German manpower
scheme before the war with Russia:
I'm appraising Germany's ability
to produce ornaments no factor is
more important than the planned
fluctuations in the size of the army
This phenomenon is typical of Ger
man strategy during the first two
years of the war.
War Duty Not Continuous.
War action was by no means con-
tinuous. Presence at the fronts of
armies running into many millions
was not required. True, for the Is
combat days of the Polish campaign
and the periods Immediately before
and after this effort, an army of
several millions, plus all of its supply
services, was put into the field.
I'm the winter of 1939-40, however,
there was relative quiet on all fronts.
With a clear picture of Germany's
industrial production and labor force
before them, the German military
and economic general stats fur
loughed large numbers of soldiers,
especially skilled workers.
These men worked in war pro-
duction, where they were far more
valuable to the military effort than
If they had remained in the army.
At the same time new age groups
received military training and the
older ones were given supplementary
training.
"ror the offensive arainst France