Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1942-11-04
Opposes Jewish Army
In Palestine Now
MiIitory Critic Says Cause
Of Allies Would Be Hurt
By Difficulties of Such q Step
BIZ Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
Agitation for the creation of Jewish
army in Palestine continues, and the
subject requires examination on its
merits. 1t is impossible not to sympa-
thize with the very natural desire of
"stateless" Jews to be permitted to
serve in arms against their cruel OPP
pressors and thus to contribute to the
restoration of world in which men
shall be free to worship according to the
The nations which are fighting for
that very end must, however, necessarily
examine every proposal of military
character strictly and impartially on the
basis of it's military value on the prose-
cution of the war This is not to say
that moral values must go unregarded,
but they must be weighed in the balance
with material considerations.
Briefly, what is proposed in regard to
the Jewish army is this: That separate
force be formed of stateless and Pales-
tinian Jews now resident in Palestine,
to operate as unit of the United Ma
tons forces under their own colorS.
There are said to be at present about
10000 such Jews of military age and
qualifications in Palestine, and 1t is
asserted that this number may be in
creased to as much as 100000 by incor-
porating stateless Jews now in other
territories under United Nations control.
1t seems doubtful whether the pro-
ponents of this plan have any very clear
idea of the magnitude of the task which
they thus would set for, the military
and economic staffs Of the United
Nations. First comes the question of
training. For, this officers must be pro-
vided. and it is to he presumed that most
of the officers will be sought from among
the Jewish recruits. This means the
establishment in Palestine of a large
officer-training program at time when
it is difficult enough 10 find adequate
instructors for the Office training pro-
grams of the British and American
armies. In the meantime, the men not
selected as officer candidates must be
organized into appropriate units, receive
arms. uniforms and equipment and be
started on a program of basic training
Eventually We must enyisage their Or
ganlzation into divisions and corps, COM
plete with hand weapons of all sorts.
machine guns, mortars, artillery of all
types, tanks, armored cars motor trans
port, and all the vast mass of material
which a modern army requires. Even
supposlng the material to be available
in Palestine now, when it is not, a
Jewish army of this size could not
possibly be prepared fo, the field in less
than a year to 10 months 1t is, there
fore. beside the point to urge that the
formation Of such force could have
any immediate effect on the fortunes of
war in the Middle East
Then the question of command would
arise. Who is to command this new
army? BY whom is the commander to
be chosen. and to what political author
lty will he be responsible? There exists
no political body representing the United
Nations as whole, and if there did, it
still would be difficult to fix the proper
chain OF responsibility for an officer COM
handing a force composed largely of
stateless individuals. If it be urged that
the commander can be responsible to the
Zionist organization, it must be pointed
out that such an arrangement would
have extremely unfortunate repercussions
on the Arab population of Palestine. in
particular, and on the Moslem world in
general. If any such program is to be
carried through, it must be done on
basis which makes it abundantly clear
that the Jewish army cannot be ulti-
mately employed as an instrument to
further Zionist political ambitions in
Palestine
But there is one practical considera-
ZION which seems to this writer to rule
out any immediate possibility of the
creation of such Jewish army, all
other arguments aside. and that is the
question of making the best use of avail
able merchant tonnage. We are now
engaged in a great offensive in Egypt
designed to eliminate the Axis foothold
IN Africa. We are operating there under
conditions which are difficult enough at
best, over a sea-borne line of communica-
tons 10000 miles in length. Every ton
OF available shipping that we can use
over this distance must be employed to
send supplies and munitions to the
United Nations forces fighting under the
command of Gen. Sir Harold Alexander,
or to send reinforcements to them in the
form of British or American troops al
ready armed, trained, officered and
equipped. To divert single ton for the
purpose of building up an army which
could not possibly take the field for a
year, and probably not for a much longer
period, would be an advantage gratui-
tously offered to the enemy.
The British government, which still
holds the mandate for Palestine, has
announced the formation of a Pales-
tinian regiment to be composed of
Jewish battalions and Arab battalions,
and the ranks of certain units of the
British Army have been open to state
less and Palestinian Jews. These are
opportunities for service which can be
al orded these Jews without disruption
OF existing organizations or misuse of
shipping and equipment. It is the con-
sidered judgment of this writer that any
attempt to form and equip Jewish
army in Palestine at this stage of the
war would be detriment rather than
an aid to the cause which the proponents