Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1942-11-16
Sees Three Choices
Open to Hitler
Militoy Writer Thinks Nozis
Moy Sit Tight or Strike
Through Spoin or Turkey
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

through SPoin or turkey
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
The military position in the Central
Mediterranean looks less and less prom
Using for the Axis As 1t develops. Air at
tacks. plus local French resistance. plus
the swift advance OF Anglo American
forces from Algeria, seem likely to wipe
out the tenuous German foothold in
Tunisia very quickly. With Tunisia gone
and Cyrenaica going, Tripolitania can
never be held. That means the end of
the Axis in Africa; 1t means the reopen
ing Of the Mediterranean; it means the
smashing Of italian industry from the
air; 1t means a whole new front for
Hitler to defend.
His first reaction to this sudden threat
which seems to have taken him by
surprise-was the air-borne invasion of
Tunisia. This, as already remarked, he
can hardly hope to make good. What
then? Unless Germany is far weaker
than she appears to be, Hitler may try
to counter the new Mediterranean cam
paign in some other way.
1t will do him very little good just
to sit tight in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia
and Crete and snipe away at our con-
voys with dive bombers. Not only could
we give adequate fighter cover to all
conveys, but as soon as our system OF
air bases in Africa was fully organized
we would be able to concentrate over
whelming air strength against the islands
(Sicily, Sardinia, Crete in succession.
The invasion and reduction OF these
islands, one by one, would inevitably
follow, whereafter Italy's position would
be hopeless, the Germans might have
to retire behind the Alps and the whole
Axis position In the Balkans would be
threatened.
Possibly Hitler may now consider that
in view Of the Russian war this is the
best he can do in the Mediterranean.
II, however, he elects more active
counterpolicy he has two choices: East
and west. He can attack Turkey or he
can try to move south through Spain.
Turkey seems the less attractive choice.
1t Is not too much to say that the Russian
resistance at Stalingrad and in the North
Caucasian area, plus the destruction of
Rommels army in Egypt, have cemented
Turkeys adherence to the Allied cause to
such an extent that there can no longer
be the slightest doubt that Turkey would
light, and fight hard, against Axis attack
That means that German army invad-
Ing Turkey would have to deal not only
with tough and determined Turkish
army, but before very long would also be
faced by Montgomerys battle hardened
9th Army from Africa. The Turks alone
could certainly delay the Germans long
enough for Montgomery to finish mop
ping up Rommel and begin moving by
sea and rail around into Anatolia. More
over, the German communications would
be long and difficult, and would be seri-
ously threatened by the Yugoslavs, and
the opening Of the Turkish ports to the
Russian Black Sea fleet would add to the
German difficulties. .-,
The one great point to be made for
German winter campaign in Turkey is
that 1t offers an approach by the most
direct route to the oil fields of Trans
caucasia. Iraq and Iran, and Germany is
desperately in need Of oil.
Furthermore, an advance to the Per-
sian Gulf would cut Russias principal
winter supply route. The advantages OF
success would therefore be very great, but
the risks are appalling. Nothing less
than Germanys whole remaining reserve
Of fighting power would be needed, leav-
ing Hitler without reserves to meet
either Russian counterattacks or an in
vasion Of Western Europe.
A move into Spain offers far less in
the way OF advantages, but also far less
risk. Spain and Portugal could probably
both be overrun by German troops al
ready available in Western Europe with
out calling on the central reserves. Gil
braltar could be invested and German
planes could operate with great effect
against Allied conveys passing through
the narrow strait. Moreover the u
boats would have not only some excellent
new bases on the Atlantic. but also
would, by German control of the whole
coast line Of Spain; be able to operate
much more effectively in the Mediter-
ranean itself. We would still be able
to use the Mediterranean, but its use
would be made much more difficult and
costly to us.
About the only disadvantages to Hitler
Of the Spanish move are the strain OF a
possible guerrilla war in Spain itself, and
the fact that an invasion Of the Iberian
Peninsula would automatically make us
q present Of the Spanish and Portuguese
islands in the Atlantic Ocean, which
would be Of great value in our anti
submarine operations.
Finally, an Axis occupation of Spain
would eliminate that country as a pos
sible route for Allied invasion of Europe.
Thus, assuming for the purposes of
this discussion that the thrust at the
center (Tunisia) is a failure, Hitler has
three remaining choices on his southern
front: Cd Sit tight on the defensive and
abandon the initiative to us; ca take
the big gamble to win or lose all and at
tack Turkey; 90 try the policy Of the
limited offensive in the Iberian PENN
sula, In the hope of depriving us Of some,
at least, of the logistical advantages Of
our African successes.
(copyrisht. 1912. New York Tribune, Inc)
Gives Instance of Cooperation
With War Effort Of Government.
To the Editor OF The Star: