The Wilmington morning star., 1942-09-29
Interpreting
The War
By KIRKE L. s tMPSON

ny MIME L.. S,MPSON
The circumstances under which
Berlin made its first claim of ~
boat successes against Americsn
troopship conveys in the Atlantja
render it especially subject 10 srs-
piciOn.
AS an offset both to the oriae
the Nazi attackers are gettina ~
fore Stalingrad and to the storr,
of Allied second front agifatom
penetrating the German radia
black-out, such claim was to ho
expected. If it proves wholly lacG,
ing in factual basis, which is non
sible, or turns out to be anotbo,,
example of extreme exaggera+Io,,
that Nazi outgiving must be sat
down as an admission that Co...
man nerves are getting jitterv
The most significant thing .bo,,A
the German claim is that if fol-
lowed so closely upon the Won Rib.
bontrop assertion in Berlin that
Germany would welcome an Az
lied attempt to invade Western
Europe. That is an admission that
the second-front talk, now amnI
fled by the Willkie and WaveT ro
marks, is reaching the ears Of tbo
German people. Won Ribbentron,s
remark was coupled with so fan
tastic a figure on Russian war
losses that both statements wora
clearly intended for German hon,o
consumption, rather than for tbe
diplomats of his immediate andi
ence.
They were offered in lieu Of Hif
ler's unfulfilled hopes of announc.
ing the capture of Stalingrad at
that second anniversary celebra.
ton of the signing of the Axis
Trl-Partite pact. Both the Jana.
nese and Italian diplomats presen4
at the gathering were fully aware
that the German campaign in Rus.
sia is definitely off schedule and
that there is bridge of sbips
from this country to the British
Isles for troop movements.
The very fact that Hitler sent
spokesman, even high rankino
one, to speak for him 10 the AVS
diplomatic love feast is significant
Hitler appears to have been in
Berlin at the time on another mis-
sion. Lacking any decisive Rms.
sian developments to report. he
preferred to leave it to Won Rib-
bentrop. It suggests that he real
lied he would see doubt and oues-
tlonlng in the eyes of his diplo.
matte audience,
Meantime, the second front dis.
cussion tends to add to the doubts
and uncertainties that may be
arising in the German peoples
mind.
Aside from the odd wording Of
part of the Willkie statement in
Moscow urging prompt ANGLO
American second.front operations
to ease pressure on Russia, both
he and General WavelI were care
full to say it should be done only
when feasible That is a purely
military question. 1t is certainly
one that neither President Roose-
welt nor Prime Minister Churchill
would attempt to decide against
the counsel of their professional
soldiers. At whom. therefore, Will
kie aimed his comment that per-
haps some" Allied military lead
ers would need public prodding7
into second front action is not
clear.
There are so many problems in
volved in determining o h the
time and the place for a major
Allied offensive in any war theater
that public "prodding' is apt to
have little effect. 1t can not be
TOO often noted, as both British
and American officials have re-
peatedly said, that once the de-
cisjon is taken, it must be car
cied through to success, whatever
the cost. Failure could only IN
crease Russia peril and prolon2
the war beyond calculation. 1t can
therefore, be argued reasonably
that both Willkie and Wavell were
primarily doing their bit on the
war-of-nerves front, front that
is growing more and more IN
portant in Germany as time pass
! eS,