Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1942-11-29

ring march of events from the Solomons
to North Africa.
American experience in this respect
Is not unique With the increasing COM
plexity of modern warfare the question
of unity over far-flung operations has
plagued most of the major powers. In
total war it has even larger inplica-
lions that concern the entire productive
machine and the very structure of civil
ian life
What about experience elsewhere?
Does it ofIer any guide for US? The
following is an attempt to appraise this
question Of command in the light Of for
eien experience and foreign criticism of
the American approach.
For the present purpose, of course,
foreign means for the most part Brit
ish. While there have been serious con-
flicts within the German military over
control, Hitler has invariably resolved
such differences in the fashion of a die
tator. Similarly in Soviet Russia there
Is absolute power over the lives of all,
from the highest general to the humblest
civilian.
What is clear after even the most
cursory examination of the issue of unity
Of command is that no system Of and by
Itself can bring unity. Essentially it
must come out of the practical working
relationships which exist when there is a
tradition of collaboration. It is here
that the British would seem to have the
edge over us.
Tradition in British Forces.
For number Of years working COL
liberation has been C-veloped by British
chiefs of staff. This was carried over
from peacetime to wartime and today.
If one accepts the word of the British
military men who constantly pass
through washington, there is no problem
of unity in the direction of the British
armed forces.
The British method is sometimes re-
ferred to by our own high-ranking mill
tary men with a shade of contempt as
command by committee" What Amer
lean military chiefs have done is to i'm
pose an arbitrary system of command
with an Army or Navy officer in COM
plete control IN fixed areas in the three
major theatorS into which the world is
divided This was explained in some
detail hy Admiral Ernest j. King. COM
mander ii chief Of the fleet and chief
Of naval operations, in a recent inter
view with the st. Louis ost-Dispatch.
Admiral King in that interview said
fl1cvo n
command areas.
Foreign military observers, while they
are extremely cautious in expressing
their views, would disagree. They be-
heVe that failure Of Army and Navy
officers to work together has been
factor in instance after instance Begin
ming with Pearl Harbor. One such OBJ
server a representative not of Britain
but of one of the other United Nations
went so far as to express the belief that
the War and Navy Departments should
be combined and the degree of authority
between Army and Navy carefully as
signed within the joint War Depart
ment.
Between the American Army and NAVY
Is long tradition of separation; a tradi-
ton Of rivalry, it might almost be said.
The competition extended to matters
large and small. The two services COM
peted for appropriations from Congress.
In Congress itself there are committees
on military-that is to say Army-affairs
and committees on naval affairs. The
Army-Navy football game, focus of fierce
feeling each fall between the two
separate schools, Annapolis and West
Point, symbolized the rivalry The Army
War College and the Navy War College
had relatively little common contact
even though they exchanged instructors
and few students.
The points at which the two met in
peacetime were few and far between.
The Army's chief of staff and the Navv's
chief of naval operations competed for
the favor OF the commander in chief in
the White House who was almost the
only focus through which the interests
of the two could be merged Their
maneuVers, up until the outbreak of the
European war, were with rare exceptions
held separately.
Imperial Defense College.
In contrast the British developed after
World War I the Imperial Defense Col
lege. This was combined school Tor
army, navy, air and civilians. In the I'M
perial Defense College military problems
were assigned to groups made up of
seven army officers, seven naval officers,
seven air officers, seven representatives
from the Foreign Office and seven civil
ians from other government depart
ments.
Thus 35 men representing every phase
Of modern war would sit down around
table to solve theoretical problem.
They would be told to work out every
step, military, political and economic, In
the event that it should become neces-
sary, say, for British forces to move into
Northern France held by a hostile power.
Each group would concentrate on its
speciality and the result was we'll
rounded solution.
Nest important of all, these men
leaders in their respective fields
learned to work together. The Imperial
Defense College, started in 1927, grew
out of staff discussions on the lessons of
World War I. The need for such a COL
lege, which would foster greater collabo-
ration, was clearly recognized.
A great ma iority Of the men new COM
handing in the vital theaters of the war
were either students or instructors in
the Imperial Defense College. Many--air,
navy and army-Went to school together
and worked on common problems. The