Evening star., 1942-09-04
Thinks StoIingrod Fall
Might Spur japanese
Military Writer Discusses
Relation Between Compoiens
In Europe and Asia

| may pSihdpo ptuNe tIie Sl&ndl IOT LnS
launching of the long awaited japanese
offensive against the Far Eastern prov
! 1nces OF Russia. 1t is possible that the
| frantic fury with which the Germans
| are hurting their forces against Stalin-
grad is partly inspired by the belief that
| the fall of Stalingrad will unleash the
| Japanese attack. 1t is the belief of some
observers that the continuance of the
German offensive against Moscow early
In December, 1941, after the Germans
themselves must have realized that there
was little hope of success, was inspired by
the need for keeping up the appearance
OF threat to Moscow until the Japanese
had committed themselves at Pearl
Harbor.
AT any rate, the Japanese struck on
December 7 and the Germans abandoned
the Moscow operation on December 8.
This is not to suggest that japanese
attack in the Far East might bring about
cessation of the German attacks on
Stalingrad. for the Germans appear to
have much better chance of taking that
stronghold than they had of taking
Moscow last December; but it does seem
likely that there is connection between
German progress in the west and
japanese decisions in the east and that
the Japanese are watching their ally's
progress with mixture of caution and
anxiety
Meanwhile, the japanese are gather
ing their forces in the north and are
PROBABLY collecting supplies in Man
chukuo to make themselves temporarily
independent of sea-borne supplies from
Japan. From the japanese point of
view, 1t will be desirable to have depots
in Manchukuo and Korea sufficiently
well stocked to provide for all the needs
OF the army for the estimated period
that 1t will take to capture the fortress
OF Vladivostok and overrun the Russian
maritime province. During this period
the Russian submarines at vladivostok.
numbering close to 100, will be able to
operate with great effect against Japa-
nese shipping in the Sea OF Japan en-
route to mainland ports. Japan already
has suffered very heavy losses of mer-
chant shipping, probably about 20 per
cent OF her total merchant fleet, and it.
therefore, will be desirable from the
Japanese point of view to avoid exposing
her remaining shipping to Russian sub
marine attacks.
quick reduction Of vladivostok and
OF the maritime province as a whole is
certain to be the primary objective of
the Japanese for another reason-and
tnat is TO shorten the period during
Wnlch japanese cities will be exposed to
bombing attacks by Russian aircraft.
Inc Japanese timetable undoubtedly
calls for series of very heavy attacks
eastward into the maritime province and
the Japanese must be prepared to take
certain amount of bombing at home
while this is going on. If the attack is
actually delivered the Japanese high
command will be assuming a very heavy
risk, for miscalculation might prove dis
astrous.
So grave is this risk that some OBJ
servers believe that the whole japanese
concentration in the north is a feint and
that the real japanese intentions lie in
some other direction-either India or
possibly an attack on China from bases
In French Indo- China.
However, lack of self confidence is not
a Japanese failing and they have always
shown themselves ready to take great
risks in order to gain great advantages.
1t seems likely that they have as many
as 40 divisions assembled on or near the
Russian frontier, and the network of
strategic railways in Manchukuo and
Northern Korea with their tentacles ex-
tending outward toward the Russian
borders would enable the japanese to
deploy and supply their armies under
conditions much more favorable than
those which would confront the Rus
sians
Aside from the possibility that a pro-
tracted Russian defense in the maritime
province might subject the japanese
homeland to catastrophe bombing, the
principal Japanese risk is that the Rus
slams will strike heavily from Chita and
Manchul1 southeastward down the line
of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Such
an attack, If it made progress, would en-
danger the vital centers of the whole
railway system of Manchukuo. 1t is for
this reason that the Japanese will be
anxious to make sure that the Russians
cannot support such an operation by
switching troops from the European
front.
The bombing of Japanese cities might
be made much more effective If it were
possible for American air forces to bring
quick support to the Russians. This,
however, is not so simple as it sounds,
since the American flyers would have to
bring their own bombs, spare parts,
ground crews and maintenance establish
ments along with them. 1t is to be
doubted whether any considerable Amer
lean air force could be maintained in
Eastern Siberia by air transport alone.
word may be added on the subject
OF weather. This writer, as well as others.
has rather hastily assumed that the East
Siberian winter will be a bar to military
operations, and that therefore the jap
anese time limit for attack is growing
rapidly nearer. But an examination of
the record does not support this view;
Tor example, in the Russo-Japanese War,
the battle of the Sha-Ho was fought in
October, that of Sandepu in January, and
the great final battle of Mukden in
March. 1t should not be taken for
granted that the Japanese will hesitate
to face the rigors of winter campaign,
Copyrisht. 1912, New York Tribune, Inc.