Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1942-11-04
Typewriter stroteeists' No More InfolIobIe
Than Actual Military and Naval Experts

and the advantages Of a privi-
legged intelligence service.
These last advantages are more
doubtful than they seem. For
it is apparent that high COM
mands on all sides have
made fundamental misjudgments.
They all misjudged the perform
ance, of the French army. The
only people who dared to breathe
an apprehension were journal
lists, without privileged informa-
ton, but with what is called q
Sense Of smell"-which has
nothing to do with the nose, but
is achieved by profound familiar
ity with political, social and mill
tary aspects.
The fall Of France was not
merely a military collapse but
social and political collapse.
These two factors are funda-
mental in modern war, but high
commands rarely take them into
account.
The same miracle" of the
"uninformed" who were not
experts" repeated itself in Rus
STA, whose powers of resistance
were misjudged by all high COM
Misunderstanding the German.
In the American army there was
a minority report, made by Brig.
Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, mill
tary attache in Moscow. But
Gen. Faymonville had to be sup
ported by the political instances
in our Government and not the
military.
One Foresaw Practically All.
At least one Typewriter STRAIT
egist" has forseen the entire
course of the Russian war, pre-
dieting the war itself, the form
of Russian resistance. and even
where the armies would be halt
ed. That is the military jour-
naist Max Werner.
Mr.. Werner's analysis has been
no act of clairvoyance. He has
spent the last 10 years of his life
in almost exclusive study Of the
military publications of the Ger
mans and the Russians, being
capable of reading and speaking
both languages. He is gifted with
an exceptional memory and an
acute intelligence. He has been
right. to date, in this area Of
the war. Now he has written a
book called THE Great Often
sive," warning against certain
strategies, advocating others.
Is his opinion worthless be-
cause he is not in a high COM
mand?
The President excused Pearl
Harbor on the ground that we
had "our best experts" To which
must be replied that it is always
an error, in any field, to place
too much faith in experts. The
expert is too often a person pos
sessed of intricate knowledge of
one phase of a problem and I'M
able to see the woods for the
trees.
Non-Experts Know Something.
if No one needs to be an expert"
to know that the way to conduct
a Pacific war is not to draw an
imaginary line in the middle OF
the ocean and give Gen. Douglas
Macarthur "a sphere Of influ-
ence" on one side and Admiral
Chester Nimitz a sphere on the
other. Gen.. Macarthur doesn't
think so either.
The conduct of our war, mill
tary and domestic, needs more
people with horse sense, treating
experts as technicians and adj
visers. Great wars are won by
leaders of great vision and SUI
preme Judgment In choosing be-
tween various war plans. The
business Of a. commander in
chief is to make a choice, and
stick to it. And the business OF
the typewriter strategist" is,
with due humility, and the ad-
vantage of freedom and disin-
terestedness, to try to clarity the
issues governing a choice.
(Released by The Bell Syndicate, Incl