Evening star., 1942-09-18
~ the Associated Press

Is the tert OF the statement on the
Dieppe raid OF August 10 issued
today by Defense Minister !. L.
Rdlston:
1t now is possible to give some
what fuller details of the combined
operation against the enemy forces
In the Dieppe area carried out Au-
gust 10 by forces which included q
large body of the Canadian Army
overseas.
This account is based upon the
preliminary report made by the
military force commander mai
Gen. j. H. Roberts, officer com
manding the I'd Canadian Division)
and upon examination of personal
reports made by many participants
including a large number of NCOS
and private soldiers, as we'll as in
formation from other sources.
1t is obvious that many facts con-
cernins operations of this particular
nature cannot be revealed without
af1ording the enemy information
which he is very anxious to obtain
1t is. therefore, impossible to tell
the full story of the Dieppe opera
ton at the present time; but it is
the purpose of the present state
ment to describe the operation as
fully as is possible without giving
assistance to the enemy.
Reconnaissance in Force.
Ob]ectives Of the operation:
1VNS{
agreed offensive policy. In the
preparation and development of
such a policy the acquisition of the
fullest possible information con-
cernlng the enemy's strength and
dispositions and every other element
IN the situation affecting the con-
quot OF operations against him is a
matter of the most fundamental
Importance.
Such information is available
from many sources, but it is fire.
Quently the case that facts essential
70 the successful prosecution of Of
1ensive operations can only be
gained by fighting for them.
The Dieppe operation must be
regarded in this light. 1t was, in
Iact, reconnaissance in force con-
ceived with the important object of
obtaining information and expert
ence vital to the general offensive
program.
1t was considered most important
that our forces should have an
opportunity for practical experience
In the landing on an enemy-occupied
coast OF large military force, and
In particular in the problems arising
out Of the employment in such a
force OF heavy armored fighting
vehicles.
The strategic objectiyes of the
operation now have been outlined in
very general terms. 1t also had what
may be termed tactical or local OBJ
iectives involving the destruction OF
enemy installations in the Dieppe
area and the infiiction of as much
local damage as possible upon the
enemy
1t is impossible to discuss these
objectives in detail
The task of carrying out these
operations against well-fortified
and strongly held coastline was one
which could be intrusted only to
troops of very high standard OF
training and general quality.
McNaughton o. KID Plan.
Preliminaries OF the operation:
The employment Of Canadian mil
itary forces was approved by the
GOC-IN-C 1st Canadian Army
Gt. Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton He
had satisfied himself that the objec-
tives OF the proposed operation were
vital to the agreed offensive policy
and that the means available were
likely to be adequate for the task
in hand.
The planning of the enterprise, so
FAR as the Canadian military forces
were concerned, was directed by Gen.
Roberts, the military force COM
mander. Canadian plans were con-
certed with the chief of combined
operations Vice Admiral Lord Louis
Mountbatten by 1t. Gen. H. D. G..
Crerar, general officer commanding
4 Canadian corps.
In all combined operations, there
Is force commander for each serv-
ice element involved. At Dieppe,
while the military force commander,
as already stated, was Gen. Roberts,
the naval force commander was
Capt. j. Hughes-Halletr, r. N, and
the air force, commander was Air
Marshal T. Leigh-Mallory.
The Canadian military force in
volved was composed basically of
large elements of two brigades of
the I'd Canadian Division, COM
manded by Brigadiers W. w. South
am (of Toronto), and S. Lett tof
Vancouver, and a battalion of the
LIST Canadian Army Tank Brigade
The Canadian Army troops engaged
comprised about 5000 all ranks. In
addition. detachments of all arms
and services played essential parts in
the operation.
8 All Troops Highly Trained.
Units of the I'd Canadian Division
we're chosen because, although these
troops had been in the United King
dom since 1910, they had had nc
opportunities for active employment
such as had fallen to troops of the
1st Canadian Division in France ir
June of 1910 and in the expedition
to Spitzbergen in 1941.
The 1st Canadian Army Tank
Brigade was the first Canadian
armored formation to arrive in the
United Kingdom, which it reached
In June, 1941.
All the troops chosen for the en-
terprise were In high state Of general
training, apart from additional and
special training which they received
for this operation.
In addition to the Canadian forces
the military units employed included
the Sd. 4th and Royal Marine "A
Commands Especial service brigade
troops as we'll as small detachments
OF United States Rangers and Fight
ing French troops.
The naval force participating in
cluded no vessels larger. than de-
stroyers and was composed primarily
of various types of landing Graf