Evening star., 1942-08-23
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

ELIOT.
A readers letter asks a question
which this writer has frequently
heard in various parts of the coun-
try: Why did we not from the very
beginning of the war concentrate all
our effort to hold back the Jap
anese? Is it not a mistake to con-
centrate on the stronger Of two
opponents? And have we not Suf-
fered serious impairment of our
total war effort as a result of this
strategy, notably the loss of our
rubber supply.
The best answer to this funda-
mental question of national strategy
is that the proof of that pudding
is very much in the eating, Having
adopted the policy of making our
major effort in the Atlantic. and
thereby reducing the scale of our
effort in the Pacific, we must, to
Justify that policy. accomplish some
thing worthwhile in the Atlantic
theater. To abandon the oppor-
tunities offered in the Pacific. and
then DO nothing in the Atlantic,
would be to demonstrate that we
had fallen into the fatal error Of
dispersion of force.
He who seeks to be strong every
where" Frederick the Great said,
"only succeeds in being weak every
where. 1t is sometimes necessary
to give up a province in order to
win campaign"
Must Show Gains Elsewhere.
I'VE have given up our provinces
In the Pacific; We must show
compensatory gain elsewhere. or our
policy and the strategy which flows
from it may justly be accused Of
being bankrupt.
But before we can accomplish
anything positive. in our peculiar
geographic and military situation,
the minimum demands of security
must be met We in the continent
of North America occupy a CEN
trail position as between the two
main theaters of war-that in Eu-
rope and that in East Asia We make
our power felt in those theaters by
sending it on or over the sea in
ships and cargo planes to our re-
spective advance bases, the British
Isles and Australia
Our first consideration, therefore,
had to be the security of those
bases and of the lines of COM
munication extending to them The
security of the latter included the
security of such intermediate bases
rs Iceland in the Atlantic, and E%-
waii. Samoa, Fiji and New Gale
donia in the Pacific.
In the Atlantic the British Isles
and the North Atlantic bridge of
boats" already were reasonably Sc
cure against attack In the Pacific
there was a real and pressing dan
ger lest we be cut off from all hope
of acting effectively in that theater
by the loss of Australia Our i'm
mediate effort was therefore turned
toward the security of that great
island continent and of its long and
vulnerable line of communications.
Had to Think of Offense.
Meanwhile, we had to think of
the eventual development of Of
fensive operations against Ger
many, so that the flow of aircraft
and other munitions to the British
Isles had to be kept up; we had to
think of the supply of our great
continental Allies. Russia and
China, whose security was vital to
our grand strategy and whose sup
ply had to be continued; and spe-
cial security problems arose in the
Middle East and India which could
not be neglected.
Added to this came the question
OF additional equipment and mate
rial for our own tremendous ex-
pansison of fighting power, the Of
fensive striking force of the future
upon which in due course the out
come of the war might we'll depend.
The task of allocating, as amongst
these various claims and needs, the
war production of the United States,
the fighting forces available for
overseas operations. and the ship