Evening star., 1942-11-10

it is believed the Nation will still
be. faced with the necessity of re-
cruiting and training 100000 new
workers in addition to the normal
entrance Of young people in the
labor force. The great majority of
these new workers of necessity will
be women. All women without small
children or other urgent household
responsibilities will be needed and
should prepare to enter employ
ment.
The situation is worse than these
figures suggest because of the fact
that labor requirements are highly
concentrated in comparatively few
war production centers. At the
present time, several industrial
centers are faced with a general
shortage of labor and many addi-
tional areas expect general
shortage to develop before next
summer. In a few areas, labor
shortages are so acute that work
essential to the support of the
armed forces remains undone. Labor
shortages are also highly concen-
trated by occupation. Critical
shortages now exist in numerous
occupations, including most of the
skilled and semi-skilled jobs in
shipbuilding, aircraft and ordnance
plants.
The problem can be met only by
prompt and vigorous action along
several related lines. Losses of man
power from essential industries
through needless migration and
turnover must be stopped. Trans
ference of labor from less essential
to more essential activities must be
accelerated Additional labor sup
plies must be mobilized, trained and
placed in employment. All workers
must be fully employed at work re-
quiring their highest skills.
The complications incidental to
problem of such magnitude are STU
pendous. They can be overcome
only by higher degree of initiative,
cooperation and unselflsh service
than the Nation has ever known.
Conclusions and Recommendations.
After careful study of the situa-
ton, the committee respectfully
submits the following specific con-
clusions and recommendations for
immediate considerations:
l. The manpower problem is an
integral part of the process OF mob
ilizing the entire Nation for war
and must be considered in close
conjunction with military and pro-
duction planning. Decisions con-
cerning the ultimate size and rate
of growth of the armed forces must
precede the formulation of detailed
manpower policies. Conservation OF
the manpower resources requires
that the available supply be ap-
portioned between the military and
essential civilian activities. The
number, as well as the rate at which
men are to be withdrawn from ci-
villain activities for the armed
forces must be determined in the
light of the overall demands upon
the Nations supply of manpower.
Therefore, in the belief that first
things must come first, the commit
tee recommends that the authority
and responsibility for the appor-
tionment of manpower, as between
the armed services and essential
civilian activities, in short, the
of the overall program,
be centralized in the chiefs of staff
of the Army and the Navy, the
Administrator, the
chairman Of the War Production
Board and the chairman of the War.
Commission.
In addition. it Is suggested that
be given to closer in
tegration of the manpower and pro-
duction programs.
2. Responsibility for administra-
ton of the manpower program has
been placed in the War Manpower
Commission. In order to carry out
the program and satisfactorily dis
charge this responsibility, the War
Commission must pos
sess centralized authority sufficient
to insure compliance with its estab-
lished policies and operating pro-
grams. In this connection the COM
mittee believes critical weaknesses
exist at present.
(a) AS the rate of induction
is stepped up and employment
increases, the supply of skilled
and semi-skilied men must be
most carefully distributed be-
tween the armed forces and in
dustry in such manner that each
individual may be placed where
he can be of maximum use to the
war effort. The committee be-
lieves this will require a greater
degree of integration with re-
spect to deferment and replace
ment policies than is possible
if the Selective Service System
operates independently of the
yETor NHo,~0ruer