Evening star., 1942-03-05
Ships Needed to Save Java
Maj. Eliot Sees japanese Sea Losses as Only Bright
Spot in Picture Of Bottle for Dutch Island

| have much more favorable terrain
conditions for establishing airdromes
than the British had.
The number of Dutch and Allied
troops in Java was much exaggerated
in the first reports, which spoke Of
anywhere from 100000 to 25oo00
men. Actually, the figures reported
by Dutch sources in London-50 900
Dutch and native troops and few
thousand" Americans, Australians
and British-are far closer to the
truth. Such force, with waning
air support and with the backbone
OF its naval strength broken, cannot
hold Java indefinitely. 1t may be
able to fall back to a mountain
stronghold and there put up long,
hard fight, as Macarthur is doing in
Bataan. Dutch courage and Dutch
leadership have so far shown them
selves quite equal to their respon-
sibilities and are likely to continue to
do so.
But, as previously pointed out in
these articles. unless the right type
and the right amount of reinforce
ments can reach Java very quickly,
We had better prepare ourselves for
bad news-for the loss Of the capital,
and of the great naval base at
Soerabaja, for heavy casualties, pos
sibly for a collapse of all resistance.
The ability of the Dutch to hold
even part of Java may turn-if Japa-
nese reinforcements are successfully
landed-on Dutch ability to 60 on
holding and covering the approaches
to the port Of Tjelitjap, on the
southern coast of the island, the
only South Java port which has
adequate protection from the heavy
Indian Ocean swells. Through this
port help can come to Java without
running the gantlet Of the Japa-
nese air and naval forces in the
Java Sea. OF course, could a pow
erful Allied force now appear in the
Java Sea the whole picture would
change. This may happen, but
there is no hint Of it at present.
Decimating Japs' Strength.
The one bright spot in this gloomy
situation is the extent Of the Japa-
nese losses. particularly in ships.
The Japanese Navy and merchant
marine are not of inexhaustible size.
Every Japanese cruiser, for example,
which goes down in the Java Sea
is cruiser which will not be raid
ing our communications in the In
dian Ocean nor defending Japan's
Pacific bases and lines Of communi-
cations against our carrier raids. It
seems probable that at the moment
Japan has not more than 16 or II
cruisers left At for service, while
We have SO Including the new ones
Of the Atlanta class and excluding
those of the Asiatic Fleet. This
gives us a distinct advantage in all
raidlng. covering and screening op-
erations, Of which the cruiser is the
backbone. II that advantage can
now be exploited-and that it may
be, the announcement of a task
force operating west of the Gilbert
Islands is heartening indication
something may yet be done TO par
italy restore the Pacific situation
by the only means which will ever
serve our purposes there-ofIensive
action.
The vast difference which the re-
tention even of q foothold on Java
would make to the strategical pic
ture Of the war as a whole gives
rise to the hope that even now, at
the 18th hour and seth minute,
something may yet be accomplished
by boldness and determination.
tCopyright. 1912. New York Tribune. Inc.)