Evening star., 1942-08-16
Experts Now Expect
q Longer War
By OUen L. Scott.

| expected earlier this year.
| Only a few months ago, high officials
were predicting privately that Hitler
| defeat would come some time between
! the middle and end Of 1943. They fig
ured that Japan then would be taken on
in force and defeated some time in 1914
Now the same officials are questioning
whether Germany can be defeated in
| 1943
| Two reasons are given for this changed
| estimate. The first is that Russia is not
| doing as we'll as expected. The Russians
| expected that Hitler in 1912 would
| strike, AS he did in 1941, all along a
| 2,000-mile front with the purpose of a
| quick decision. Instead, the Germans
set out for limited objectves, aimed at
| isolating Russia from her oil supplies and
| from her access to British and American
war materiels. Hitler appears not to be
IN the hurry that most of the experts
thought he was in.
The second reason for setting back the
date of Germanys defeat is that the
United States is not bringing its power
to bear as quickly as expected. Neither
production of armament nor the facili-
ties for transporting that production to
battlefronts is up to schedule. The result
is that war plans are not up to schedule.
The lag is at least six months in the
case of goals set early last year.
II seems that the major miscalcula-
ton concerns Russia. In June of last
year, before the United States was in
the war, the military experts under
estimated Russian strength. They ex-
pected that Russian armies would be
divided and conquered within a matter
Of weeks or of few months at most.
This year, when the United States was
in the war and had a major stake in
Russia's ability to hold, the same ex-
perts appear to have overestmated
Russian strength.
At the same time, there was a very
great underestimate of Japanese strength.
Added together, these two miscalcula-
tions, plus the lag in scheduled develop
ment of American strength, are respon-
sible for a revision of ideas about the
length and the costliness of this war TO
the United States.
At the same time, this country is be-
ginning to push its strength outward to
key bases. It's forces in the islands of
the Pacific that make up the American
defensive line are big enough to give
Japan pause 1t is building strength in
Alaska. 1t is starting an air force in
China and another in Africa The
American bases in the Atlantic are very
strongly held. American strength in
England is large and growing fast.
All of this means that the United
States is beginning to bring its power
into play. At no point, however, is that
power overwhelming. OF necessity it
has had to be scattered in order I'd pro-
tect supply lines and to check German
or Japanese expansion before a start
could be made on concentrating power
at any one point.
Nonetheless, the prospect is that 1912
probably will pass without any telling
blow being delivered against either Ger
many or Japan.
The reason why no telling blow will
be delivered is that the combined British
and American strength is insufficient.
The British openly admit that they lack
the big bombers with which to carry on
a sustained large-scale air attack upon
Germany. The British also hint that
they are somewhat disappointed at the
slowness with which the United States
is organizing to bring to bear a portion
of it's air strength against Germany.
To organize an invasion army of large
size is even more difficult task than to
organize an air offensive.
The result is that 1912, which the
British had set down earlier as very
decisive year in operations against Ger
many from the west, apparently is not
to be so decisive as anticipated. This
means that 1e43 may be the first year
in which British and American strength
really can be concentrated against Hitler.
Military men question whether one year
of offensive will bring decision against
a Germany that will have broken out of
blockade at several points and will
continue to have very large armies of
veterans.
This questioning suggests that the
American people will be forced to accept
the prospect of much longer war than
the optimists had anticipated. Late 1914
now Is being set down as probably the
earliest date to expect victory over
both the Germans and Japanese.
The great present uncertainty, in spite
of Russian difficulties, concerns what is
to happen on the Russian battlefront.
There are two big questions.
First is the question of whether Hitler
will reach the Volga and the Caspian Sea
and thereby cut Russia off from IS to 80
per cent Of her oil by severing her supply
line to that oil. If Russia is cut from
her oil supplies, Russian industry and
Russian armies gradually will be weak
ened and forced to something approach
ing a guerrilla basis of warfare.
Second is the question of whether Hit
Ter, If he does succeed in isolating Rus
sia, will then turn west for an attempt
to reach a decision against England or
whether he will continue to push east
ward and southwark, leaving his back
turned toward Britain and the United
States Expert opinion appears to be
that he will drive ahead in Russia, al
though he may release some of his air
strength and some of his ground divi-
sions for service in the west to harass
England and to make more difficult any
invasion attempt by the British and
Americans.
If, on the other hand, Hitler should
fail in Russia during 1912 as he did dur
ing 1941 his problems will be multiplied
1t seems, however, that his obiectives are