Evening star., 1942-06-10
Entered as second class matter post ofnce,
Washington, D. c.
Member of the Associated Press.
Calculated Risk

>Oi$OIOlSO NISN
In discussing the heartening
victory won by the American forces
In the battle of Midway, Admiral
Ernest J. King used the expression
calculated risk" The meaning of
this term in the sense in which he
employed it should be fully under
stood by those who already are
asserting, as a result of the Midway
battle, that the United States is in
a position to take the offensive in
the Pacific.
Pending publication of more COM
plete information as to the extent
of the enemys losses and our own
casualties, any opinion as to our
present ability to take aggressive
action in the broader sense against
Japan must be largely guesswork.
The strong probability is, however,
that, except for hit-and-run tactics,
we are not yet in position to carry
the war to our Pacific enemy, and
will not be for some time to come.
AS Admiral King pointed out, our
Navy has a tremendous task in the
Pacific. Primarily it must hold
Hawaii. But it must also protect
thousands of miles of communica-
tions. perform vital convoy duties,
be prepared to fight at such widely
separated points as the Coral Sea
and Midway Island and, in addition
to all of this, it must keep something
back in reserve. Obviously, with the
forces presently at our disposal, we
cannot maintain the strength we
would like to have at all threatened
points. AS Winston Churchill re-
Gently put it, to attempt to spread
limited resources too thinly can re-
suit only in being weak everywhere
and strong at no point. II such a
policy were adopted, it would be
relatively easy for the enemy to
select his point of attack, concen-
trate sufficient forces there, and
score smashing victory. The only
reasonable alternative is to adopt
as we have done-a policy of taking
calculated risks.
Thus, there were certain indica-
tions that the Japanese were pre-
pairing a major blow at Midway.
They might have struck elsewhere,
of course, and we could not ignore
those possibilities, but once due
preparation had been made to deal
with alternative contingencies, the
Navy took the calculated risk OF
concentrating its major effort on
smashing the anticipated assault on
Midway. AS events have shown the
gamble was a good one and the
taking of that calculated risk has
been abundantly justified.
We cannot assume, however, that
we always will be so successful IN
outguessing the enemy. The time
may come when we will be out
guessed, when the japanese will be
the ones to profit from taking cal
culated risk. And this possibility, so
far as offensive operations in the
Pacific are concerned, is under
scored by the part that land-based
planes played in the Midway battle.
From the information so far made
available, it appears that the dam
age to the japanese invasion fleet
was inflicted by American sub
marines and land-baSed planes. II
surface units played any significant
part in the battle, that fact is yet to
be disclosed.
If we attempt to move westward
into the Pacific, however, the ad-
vantage of land based aviation
which we enjoyed at Midway will
accrue to the enemy. AS our naval
units move nearer Japan's island
outposts it will be our carriers, our
battleships and our cruisers that Will
be exposed to attack from enemy
planes which enjoy the great ad-
vantage or a lana DdSe lIOIH wlliCli
to take of and to which they can
return for refueling and reloading.
To mention these obstacles in the
path of an early United States often
sive is not to imply that they are
insurmountable. In time we will
have the resources to take greater
CANDLES. But for the present 1T
would seem better to take only the
calculated risks that are justified
by our current capacity to absorb
losses, leaving it to the japanese
admirals to take the long chances
that are dictated by the fact that
time is working against them and
for us.