Evening star., 1942-03-15

The Japanese completed conquest of
the Southwestern Pacific area in far bet
ter time than the worst pessimists
imagined possible. BY so doing. they
not only won enormously rich territories.
which were only specifically scorched,
but they also placed the United Nations
definitely on the defensive in that area
for a long time to come.
The fall of Singapore and the Meth
erlands Indies was painful surprise for
everybody in the Allied Nations, except
perhaps the reticent military and naval
men The public had received formal
assurances from the civilian leaders of
the United States and Great Britain that
Singapore would be held.
1t is said that both President Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Churchill had held
some doubts about the Allies ability to
hold Singapore. which was too far gone
when the japanese attacked with the
bulk of their forces. But it was sincerely
believed that the Netherlands Indies, de-
Tended by armies exceeding those of the
aggreSsor, would hold out for long time.
Lacked Sufficient Planes.
In the 10-Week interval between the
sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and the
conquest of Malaga, it was thought suffi-
cient air reinforcementS could reach the
Dutch to make the Japanese task in Java
difficult, If not impossible But for some
reasons-not yet revealed-fghter and
pursuit planes arrived only in negligible
numbers and the bombers which were
sent to Java, unable to fight without
the necessary protection of fast pursuit
planes were forced to flee from the
island to avoid useless destruction.
All this came as a great shock to the
American public, since a parsonage of
no less distinction and integrity than
Secretary of War Stimson himself as
sured an anxious public just a day be-
fore the bomberS left the Dutch island
that American planes were being rushed
at that moment to the support of the
United Nations forces defending the
last outpost of the Southwestern Pacific.
This official statement by the Secre-
tary of War, together with others of an
equally optimistic nature by Secretary
of the Navy Knox, indicates that wires
were crossed somewhere and that a dis
entangling process is badly needed.
Public opinion in Russia and Britain is
now demanding an offensive. American
public opinion is more quiet and is still
willing to leave control of military opera
tions to those who by law have the re-
sponsibility for leading us to victory.
But in military and naval quarters a
concerted offensive by the United Ma
tions is considered to be a paramount
necessity for victory. No nation has
ever won war by merely defending 1t
self; neither has any army ever won a
victory while on the defensive, unless
assistance arrived from outside, in which
case defensive strategy was transformed
into offensive.
While the principle of striking the
enemy first is fully recognized, most mill
tary experts in Washington fail to see
where, for the time being, we can strike
after We have wasted our possibilities
against Japan.
Bold Plan Given Up.
It may now be revealed that some
enterprising strategists conceived dar-
ing plan which involved a great deal of
risk and might have been crowned with
spectacular achievements, but it came to
naught.
This plan consisted in concentrating
the British and American fleets in the
Pacific and using this enormous naval
power to strike at japanese lines of COM
municatlon and the japanese Navy. 1t
involved serious risk not only for the
Anglo American combined fleet but for
the American Atlantic seaboard and for
Britain herself.
Generally speaking, the project called
for the massing of all our remaining bat
tleships, including the two newest which
are now idling in the Atlantic, and of
at least five heavy British units. This
battleship force, accompanied by the bulk
of our heavy and light cruisers. and
those maintained in the Pacific by the
other United Nations together with 10
or so American and British plane car
riers, would have been in position to
match their strength against the Japa-
nese fleet.