Evening star., 1942-12-02
Argentine Food

Argentina be given a share in the
sale and shipment of it's agricultural
products to famine stricken popula-
tionS in areas recovered from the
Axis by United Nations forces
have diplomatic as we'll as economic
implications.
Economics has played large part
in determining the Castillo gov
ernment's "isolationist' neutrality,
which has so complicated the pro-
gram of Pan-American cooperation
and has indirectly favored the Axis
Argentina's economic life is geared
to largescale exports of its agricul-
tural StapleS-Wheat, corn and beef.
Continental Europe has, collectively,
been its chief market. The out
break of the present war first
diminished sharply and then entirely
cut off this market by the barrier of
Britain'S naval blockade The
United States could offer no real
compensation because the agricul-
lures of the two nations are sharply
competitive. 1t is enough to recall
the chronic quarrel over Argentine
beef imports into this country to
demonstrate this.
When Italy joined Germany in the
war and the Axis dominated vir-
tually the entire European continent,
Berlin and Rome lost no time in
telling Buenos Aires that, if Argen-
tina wanted to do business with the
Axis New Order" after the war, it
had better watch its step and avoid
giving offense. This was a powerful
argument for Argentine ranchers
and farmers who, until recently,
tended to believe either that the AXIS
would win a clear-cut victory or
would at least wangle a stalemate
leaving it with most of its European
gains. To be sure, many of the big
land owners, with reactionary ideas,
emotionally favored the Axis, but 1t
was the combination of practical
with theological motives which gave
the driving power behind the foreign
policy of President Castillo and his
Foreign Minister, Ruiz Guinazu.
Now that the tide has turned and
Axis prospects look dubious, Argen-
tina's official tone has changed. Yet,
while Axis sympathies are soft
pedaled, the economic dilemma re-
mains Argentine agriculture re-
mains depressed by huge surpluses
for which there is no market, present
or prospective. The tendency is,
therefor. still to sit on the fence and
play safe.
Here is where the faminerellef
program may come in handy. Our
occupation of French North Africa
involves the immediate supplying of
pressing wants for some 100000
people. Our lend-lease officials an
nounce the prompt shipment of some
IS 100000 worth of civilian goods.
largely foodStuffs, to be followed by
subsequent shipments on a large
scale. Even these shipments COM
plicate our pre-eXistlng commit
mentS to Britain, Russia and other
allies, and intensity the need for
rationing of our own people. But
North Africa will be only foretaste
Of the demands made upon us and
other United Nations members like
Canada, who might have to relieve
the necessities of something like
5OO,OOOOOO people after full victory
over the Axis powers.
1t is therefore argued by the pro-
ponents of the plan that Argentina
be taken into the picture by buying
up existing Surpluses under lend
lease and assuring a regular ratio to
Argentine staples in the relief pro-
gram for the duration. The belief is
that such economic inducements,
coming on top of diplomatic disillu-
sionment produced by Axis reverseS,
might cause the Castillo government
to scrap its pro-AXis orlentation ana
swing over to anti-AxiS Pan-Amerl-
can cooperation. Such arguments
are certainly interesting and would
seem to merit serious consideration