The Tacoma times. [volume] (Tacoma, Wash.) 1903-1949, 1942-11-09

Use Football Technique
In Navy Loss Reports
Sharp Controversy on
SoIomons Battle
Look Out For Key
Cabinet Changes
aHoness Abe" Had That
Problem. Too


Problem. Too
BY RAY TUCKER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS L<-
land p. Lovette resorts to = simple
football analogy to explain the
reasons for week-long delays n
announcing naval losses in the
Solomon islands fighting One Of
the Nays most brilliant young
officers. be vas brought back fre<
Pear HArbor after December tn
70 handle publicity IN Washing
ton.
when . player II hurt In the
middle Of the game he points
out s.you must bring In . suhsti-
fute. He has TO run from the
bench 10 the place where the ball
r. In play. Now suppose that the
opponents could stop him and
3xnock him out Of business before
he gave his name TO the referee
and got into the lineup. And
uuppose that they could use six
tacklers to disable this man DASH
ing across the field with small or
no interference. The result would
Be- that your side would have 70
tinish the contest with only ten
nen against eleven"
Applying that figure to sinking
Of the carrier Wasp. a. well a. TO
destruction Of the cruisers Quincy.
Astoria ana vincennes. and noting
That our naval bases Tor benches)
are far distant from the scene Of
The present struggle. Captain
.Lovette maintains that withhold
ing news for . reasonable period
Is fully justified.
Another explanation for not
flashing reports Immediately AZ
ter = disaster Il the fear II would
tip off the Japs TO our code. Any
message giving names OF ships or
places would provide the enemy
with clue 10 our cryptograph.
In fact the utmost caution has
20 be used In framing formal COM
muniques lest . comparison OF the
wording with radio dispatches
should enable them to break down
our cipher. And We have positive
knowledge that to date Tokyo has
not become wise to our inside
stuff.
Selection Of the Solomons ~ the
spot for our first and fiercest at
tack on Japan has become a quso-
zion OF bitter controversy among
official and amateur strategists.
Critics Of the choice contend that
II was forced on President Roose-
welt by naval enthusiasts and that
even Q victory there win have
scant Significance. Here Ii the
simple behind the scenes story as
20 why the move was considered
necessary:
Reconnaissance flyers ~ early
n June reported that the enemy
was establishing q main airfield
on Cuadalcanal and constructing
q deep water naval base in the
harbor Of nearby Tuiagi. A joint
meeting Of Army and Navy chiefs
decided unanimously that the Japs
must be prevented from complet-
ing these projects. Otherwise
planes and subs would endanger
our life lines to Australia and
other Islands our troops have oc-
cupied. In fact the strengthened
position of the Nipponese would
enable them TO launch IN About
assault on Australia itself. The
new toe holds, u was explained.
would be a thousand miies nearer
our territory than their present
supply and repair center at Truk.
Instructions for the campaign
Were rushed to Admiral Chester
w. Nlmitx at Pearl Harbor, Gen.
.eral Douglas A. Macarthur and 70
Vice Admiral Robert Lee Ghorm-
ley. These commanders knew that
the Jsps could assemble = strong
tr striking force In that area than
ne, but they agreed that the risks
had TO be taken. Working secretly
and with the utmost cooperation
The trio spent two months In ad-
vance preparations and hit hard
ON August 7th. So far events ap-
pear to have warranted the Of
1enxive.
President Roosevelt IL expected
20 make key changes in the cab
met within few month";. Despite
Che official amiahility which holds
dim back from discharging an
aide. he may bow TO public clamor
ind private sugEsstions that he
needs q stronger set Of advisers.
He win. however. wait q decent
period SO that the shske-up win
not appear as = reaction TO ad-
verse election results.
Members supposed TO be slated
for the pink slip again
Madame Perkins. Frank Knox.
Henry Stimson and possiblyl
Claude r. wiekand. though the
last may quit on his own initla-
tive n annoyance about the feeble