Evening star., 1942-10-09

certain sections David Lawrence.
OF our press because it said that fog
and bad weather were interfering
with operations The critics COM
mented on the "one-way fog" and
"one-way weather" intimating that
u wasn't so bad for the Japanese.
What are the, facts? The NAVY
had two major tasks on its hands at
the time. One was to protect Mid
Way at all costs and the other was
TO keep the supply lines to Australia
open. The japanese, by their at
tack on the Aleutians, hoped to
arouse American patriotism to such
point that the Navy would be COM
PEELED to divert its forces from the
south and try to recapture the
Aleutians. -,
But the United States Navy was
hot ensnared by those tactics, even
though the criticism was hard to
bear when 1t came from American
sources. The military and naval ex-
perts came to, the conclusion that
the AleutianS were OF doubtful mill
tary value and that possession OF the
three islands by the japanese could
only become important if they could
be used as base for an attack on
Dutch Harbor. Our forces there
were considered adequate from q
defensive viewpoint.
Had Planned Strengthening.
But 1t now becomes apparent that
the, Navy and Army had all along
intended to strengthen their forces
In the Alaskan area And that they
intended to do so in the autumn OF
this year. Doubtless the Japanese
suspected this was coming. and
sought to strike the first blow. But
1t is believed the Japanese strategy
was related wholly to the possibility
of japanese attack on Siberia.
The seizure of the Western Aleu-
tians is thought now to have been a
protective move, so as to enable the
Japanese to cut off, shipping des-
tined for Siberian ports. It is not
believed that the Japanese con-
templated. this autumn any offen-
sive operations that would, reach
into Alaska.
But now it has been oficially dis
closed that the American Air
Forces are bombing Kiska repeat
edly and that the Japanese have
evidently, withdrawn from the two
other islands which they originally
occupied. .,. -a,>s -.
TO lombard Kiska must unques-,
tionably take a stable number of
planes and a substantial amount of
fuel and supplies. The fact that
bombing is being carried out regu-
larly nowadays merely is the Navys
laconic way of saying that we have
now found time TO get at the Japa-
nese and blast them out of the Aleu-
tians.
The American people have not
been told the details of strategy,
and 1t is desirable that they should
not be given such details but there
were plenty of unofficial military
experts familiar with the Alaskan
tlreater offs operations who from the
outset warned against being led into
the Japanese trap.
Tho four months which have
elapsed show that the United States
Navy not only kept it's main forces
intact for the great victory at Mid
way but also supported landing op-
erations In the Solomon Islands,
whereas the Japanese were unable
to do anything to our main base at
Dutch Harbor or to prevent our use
Of other bases near the Western
Aieutians.
Other Objectives First.
The Alaskan area may become a
major theater of war some day,
and If Japan and Russia 60 to war
it will become of paramount sig
niffcance. But the United States
has needed the very time that has
elapsed so as to carry out certain
other operations in the Pacific, while
at the same time building up the
forces needed in the north Pacific
in the vicinity of the Aleutians.
The whole episode illustrates the
Importance Of relying implicitly on
tie Judgment Of our high command.
When there are not enough tools
td' do all the Jobs simultaneously
and when there Are other objectives
which require prior consideration,
the public can rest assured that
clamor for an alteration Of these
military plans will not influence de-
cisaons, because this war is not being
fought by the men at the top for the
purpose of meeting temporary criti-
cisms. Those In positions of re-
sponsibiuty In our Army. Navy,
Marine Corps and Air Forces are
putting first things first. The
Aaeutiar1 Islands will soon be re-
gained entirely, and the Japanese
adventure will have been proved
very costly and completely fruit
less. It is q lesson in the Importance
of concealed. strategy and IN the
need for greater faith in the man
in command.