Evening star., 1942-07-04
SevostopoI Falls

SSVOStOPOI IuIIS
The final fall OF Sevastopol is
like stone dropped into pond.
The local splash is projected in a
series Of ripples which spread out
wards on every side and progress
sively effect the entire eastern front.
1t is we'll to survey those effects in
their logical order.
The immediate result of Sevasto-
polls capture is to abolish the latent
threat exercised upon Axis hold over
the Crimea. Sevastopol was one of
the strongest fortresses in the world,
and Russian command of the Black
Sea made it impossible for the Axis
to blockade it by water. Last winter,
when the Russians retook Kerch, the
large garrison of Sevastopol made
simultaneous offensive and nearly
caught the Axis forces in the Crimea
between the Jaws OF pincer move
ment The Axis would never have
dared use the Crimea as a spring
board for an invasion of the Caucasus
via Kerch so long as Sevastopol
flanked their line of communications.
That danger has now been definitely
removed.
The naval aspect is perhaps even
more important. After the fall of
Odessa and Nikolaiev last autumn,
sevastopol was the only first-class
naval base still in Russian hands.
The Black Sea feet is now "or-
phaned" 1t has no place to go with
adequate dockage and repair facili-
ties. The subsidiary naval base at
Novorossiisk, on the Caucasian coast,
is both inadequate and within dive
bomber range of the Axis outpost on
the Strait of Kerch. The feet pre-
sumably will have to base itself
henceforth on Batum, at the extreme
eastern end of the Black Sea. There
it can get ample oil, but Batum is a
commercial port; not naval base.
Furthermore, it is over 500 miles east
of Sevastopol. That presumably
means that the Black Sea fleet no
longer can operate effectively in the
western half Of the Black Sea, which
in turn means that Axis transports
and supply ships may sail from the
mouth Of the Danube and Rumanian
or Bulgarian ports to South Russian
ports with reasonable safety, escort
ed by light craft and planes to keep
of raiding Russian destroyers and
submarines. This will greatly ease
Axis transportation, which hitherto
has been exclusively overland by in
sufficient Russian roads and railways.
One of the chief problems confront
ing the German high command in
it's plans for further invasion of
Southeastern Russia and the Cau-
casus has been the additional strain
which would be put on their already
overtaxed land communications. Even
though the Russian Black Sea fleet
remains in being, and even though
the Axis can use only the western
| half of the Black Sea, the supply
| problem-assuming shipping to be
available-will be greatly simplified
1t is probable that most of the
ground troops and tanks used by the
Axis in their siege of Sevastopol will
be kept in the Crimea to bolster the
forces already at Kerch, poised for a
drive across the Straits. But much
of the air strength in the Crimea will
now be available for the big battles
raging on the southern and central
sectors of the mainland eastern front
| Likewise, the train of very heavy
artillery which blasted Sevastopol's
rock and concrete forts can be taken
north for the main offensives that
are in progress.
These are the chief advantages
which the Axis has gained by the
capture of Sevastopol But against
this must be set the enormous losses
suffered and the waste Of precious
time. There can be no doubt tina,
the magnificent defense put up by
the Russian garrison for nearly {
month of uninterrupted Axis assault!
exceeded the calculations of the Axi
high command. That presumabl.
slowed down their projected often
sives all along the southern and cen
trail sectors of the eastern front
With the brief Russian summer, tim
is the most irreparable of losses. S.
the heroic defenders of Sevastopo
have not fought in vain.