Evening star., 1942-07-11
Indian Ocean Strategy

Indian Ocean Strategy
London's announcement that Brit
iSh forces had occupied the Vichy
French island Of Mayotte emphasizes
the Importance of the Indian Ocean
in the worldwide strategy of this
planetary struggle. Mayotte is one
Of group known as the ComOro Is
lands which lie athwart the Mozam-
bique Channel, the strip Of ocean
that separates Portuguese East Africa
from the great island Of Madagascar.
Part of that latter island was occu-
pied by the British two months ago,
its chief harbor and naval base,
Diego Suarez, surrendering after
stiff fight by the local garrison.
British intervention in Madagascar
was dictated by fears that the Vichy
French authorities might permit
japanese inf1ltration on the model Of
Indo-China. The present occupation
of Mayotte, some 200 miles northwest
of Madagascar, is obviously further
preventive measure against Japanese
activity in this part of the Indian
Ocean. Such measures are clearly
needed, for it has just been disclosed
that a number of United Nations
merchant ships, including one Amer
lean vessel, have been torpedoed in
these waters, presumably by japanese
submarines. Those sea raiders prob
ably have a secret base nearby, be-
cause their nearest known bases are
in the captured Dutch Indies, nearly
5000 miles away. Mayotte would be
an ideal base, because it Is the only
one of the Comoro group which has
good harbor, besides possessing
wireless station and an airplane land
ing field
Madagascar and its Comoro de-
Tendencies are not the only French
possessions in that part of the world
which owe allegiance to Vichy. About
500 miles east Of Madagascar is Re-
union, a good-sized island with an
area of nearly 1000 square miles and
population exceeding 100000. 1t
has been French colony for 800
years, formerly known as Bourbon,
but given its present name after it
was restored to France by the British,
who had captured and held it during
the Napoleonic wars. Reunion could
also serve as way station for Japa-
nese submarines and surface raiders.
1t is doubtless under close surveil-
lance by the nearby British island of
Mauritius. Each British seizure of
Vichy territory naturally increases
the tension between the home gov
ernment and London, and may rem
der the local colonial authorities
more disposed to aid Japan, at least
under cover.
Two other potential trouble spots
in the Indian Ocean under Vichy con-
troll should be noted. They are the
twin islands Of Amsterdam and st.
Paul, and the Kerguelen archipelago.
Both lie in the far south, and in
peacetime serve as whaling and fish
ing stations. Their strategic impor-
tance arises from the fact that they
lie directly on the shipping lane be-
tween the Cape of Good Hope, at the
tip of Africa, and Australia. Japa-
neSe submarines thus could lie in
wait there, much as they are now
lying in the Mozambique Channel
the far more important shipping lane
from the cape to the Red Sea, the
Persian Gulf and India.
With shipping perhaps the most
serious bottleneck of the United Ma
tons war effort, sinkings anywhere
are a grave matter. The japanese
threat in the Indian Ocean must
therefore be dealt with promptly and
drastically, even though it involves a
further strain on relations with
Vichy. There can be no temporizing
with the Indian Ocean problem.