Evening star., 1942-07-19
See Differences Between
Military and Civilians
By O7ren L. Scott.

| The official civilian viewpoint, as re-
| fected by Congress. by the War Pro-
| duction Board and by some persons
close to the White House is one of
| optimism and even of complacency.
| There is an easy assumption that Amer
| lean industry now is grinding out Weap-
ons, so that all is we'll Reports are
published to emphasize that American
factories are producing 4,000 airplanes,
1900 tanks and thousands of guns each
month. Everybody is reassured.
The military viewpoint, particularly
that of the Army meanwhile is peSsi-
mistic. Military men are inclined to be
alarmed by optimistic production re-
ports. They realize how very small is
the American output of munitions i'll
relation to needs. They know the size
of accumulated supplies in Germany
and Japan and know of the continuing
conquests by those nations, adding to
these supplies Their view is that the
American people are destined for some
unpleasant shocks, If they permit them
selves to become optimistic at this stage
Of the game.
However, the civilian attitude is the
one that is prevailing
The Army and Navy are being given
to understand by Donald Nelson's re-
organized War Production Board that
they cannot be ruthless in encroaching
upon civilian industry in their search
for raw materials. A point is made
that neither industry nor the general
public can be pushed too rapidly into
state of full mobilization for war. The
Army is denied its request for the power
to draft 1s and 10 year old youths.
1t is denied the right to confscate some
inventories of raw materials that it
requires. 1t finds that this countrys
limited stock of rubber and of some other
materials is being used up to satisfy
civilian whims rather than to aid in
the war effort.
Informed military men say that the
state of mobilization for war in the
United States today is about where 1t
was in Germany back in 1886 or 1887.
At that time, Hitler had sizable
army, trained and fully equipped. He
had his industry largely converted to
war effort. Production centered on
armament But he had not yet &C
cumulated large supplies of munitions
and had not yet trained an immense
number of reserves for his army. AS
large a proportion of German effort was
devoted to war preparation in that period
as is being devoted in the United States
to actual waging of war now.
This country's output of weapons each
month"; while large, is only trickle COM
pared with accumulated needs. One
reason is that these weapons must be
divided among fronts that are estab-
lisheed all over the world. Another
reason why is that there is no vast in
ventory of weapons. built up over the
years, such as Hitler and Japan possess.
Because of those facts. military off,
ciak are inclined to be alarmed by the
civilian attitude. They are perturbed by
the easy way with which labor leaders
call men of jobs over minor grievances.
They are far from impressed by the
record of performance thus far shown
in converting non-war industry in the
United States to war production. Most
of the production that now is achieved
is production from new plants conceived
and built during the regime of William
Knudsen with his original national de-
fense advisory commission and his Office
of production management. 1t will be
months before any large volume of
equipment flows from converted plants
of civilian industry because, except for
the automobile industry, conversion is
only starting, seven months after the
start of war.
Figures are available to illustrate what
is meant. The Army, Navy and air
forces have decided that an amount of
arms and a personnel to use those arms
required to fight this war will reach,
in dollar terms, $223, 5000, 100000. That
is the size of appropriations already ap-
proved and requested. 1t covers an army
of 4500,000 men and Navy large
enough to deal with Japan and Ger
many.
However, of that money, barely $35,-
900 900 900 has been translated into
actual war effort in the past two years.
That means about IS per cent realiza-
ton and IS per cent anticipation in arms.
The Army with $l26, 500 000, 900 to spend
actually has spent only SIS $3.50, 100000.
1t still has nearly $1l1.OOo, 100000 to
spend before the Americans who now
are moving to battle areas will have the
supplies and the equipment that the
military planners estimate to be needed.
That simple fact explains why 1t. Gen.
Brehon B. Somervell, head of the Army
service of supply, is not throwing his
| hat in the air over the rate of progress
made by industry in meeting Army
| needs.
The situation in the Navy is about
| the same. The estimate there is that
$56, 900 100000 worth of equipment and
subsistence for men to use hhat equip
ment is required to deal with submarines
and with other navles. In two years of
effort barely $4,000 100000 of that
amount has been turned into actual
naval war effort 1t is the same story
with merchant shipbuilding and lend
| lease operations.
This means that the real American war
program still is largely on paper. To
| translate that program from paper into
actuality Is going to take far more
| concentrated effort than the American
| people have been giving. Military off,
cials are alarmed in consequence when
| high officials make optimistic reports
about the rate of progress that is being
made. They look instead at the actual
need for weapons as contrasted with