Evening star., 1942-07-06
AIeutiun Strategy

Aleution Strategy
The fog of war, fgurative as we'll as
literal, lifted yesterday with Army
| and Navy communicates giving us a
| glimpse of what is going on in the
Aleutian Islands, distant war theater.
The Alaska Peninsula and it's con-
tinuing chain of islands jut out near
ly 1900 miles from the continental
mainland. Attu, the outermost in
habited island, and the one first
seized by the japanese last month, is
approximately 800 miles from Dutch
Harbor, our main base in the Aleu-
tians, but only about 100 miles from
Paramushiru, the japanese base in
the Kuriles, an island chain some
what similar to the Aleutians, which
stretches from the northern tip of
Japan proper to the southern tip of
Russian Kamtchatka. Kiska, the
other Inhabited Aleutian island in
japanese possession, is nearly 600
miles from Dutch Harbor. That in
tervening stretch is dotted with other
islands, mostly volcanic cones of
jagged, naked rock, lashed by heavy
seas, shrouded in almost perpetual
fog, and whipped by the fierce storms
brewed continually in the Bering Sea
to the northward.
These frightful weather conditions,
especially for aircraft, account for
the difficulty of blasting Japanese
installations on the outer Aleutian
Islands, though the Army and Navy
communiqueS relate four separate
attacks in recent weeks. This proves
that the invaders are not being let
alone to consolidate their occupa-
ton, though the reports give no hint
of an immediate attempt to drive
them out. Obviously it would be
much harder for an American ex-
peditionary force operating from
Dutch Harbor to retake the islands
in bad weather than it was for the
Japanese to take them, unopposed.
Perhaps the attempt will be deferred
until October, when the weather
normally improves.
Ever since the first news of those
japanese landings, speculation has
been rife as to their meaning and
purpose. The first surmise was that
the Japanese planned to use them as
the initial stepping stones of leap
frog campaign to Dutch Harbor and
thence to the Alaskan mainland. But
the typographical and climatic diff
culties of such an enterprise are
great, and it is quite likely that the
japanese have. other reasons which
do not include an immediate invasion
of Alaska.
In the first place, possession of
these two outer Aleutian islands en-
ables the Japanese to set up weather
stations, radio direction finder sta
tions and listening posts to spot air
and naval movements. These would
be valuable in disclosing American
attempts against the Kuriles and
Japan itself by the northern route,
or American aid to Russia via
Kamtchatka if hostilities should
break out between Japan and the
Soviet Union. The craggy surface of
the islands would seem to preclude
the japanese from installing sizable
airf1elds, but the harbor of Kiska
could accommodate seaplanes, under
handicaps of fog and storms.
In themselves, therefore, these
Japanese-held islands do not present
a formidable aggressive menace to
Alaska. Yet they are thorn in our
defensive side and a distinct him
drance to our offensive operations in
the North Pacific area. 1t is to be
assumed that the invaders will be
dislodged by our armed forces at the
first feasible opportunity.