Evening star., 1942-06-15

oceanic war it may form the only
means by which aircraft can ae-
company surface forces either for
offensive or defensive purposes.
In an attack by seaborne forces
against hostile positions on land.
carriers may be the only means of
providing fighter cover for the
troops going ashore. "
The greater the distance from
home bases and the less the capacity
Of such advance bases as may exist,
the more the aircraft carrier be-
comes an essential part of every
expeditionary force.
The Japanese have used their car
riers freely in the Pacific and the
South China Sea, and even In the
Indian Ocean. AS long as they
had no strong opposition their car
riers suffered little. Lately, how.
ever, they have suffered heavy losses
in this class.
Up to the time of the Battle of the
Coral Sea the japanese had had only
two carriers damaged and none lost.
These two damaged carriers may
have been small naval carriers or
converted merchant ships.
Apparently the japanese began
tho
several improvised carriers converted
from merchant vessels. OF the II
naval carriers, 5 were quite small
three of 10000 tons and two of 1000
tons, operating only 20 to 30 air.
craft each.
These ships were useful in pro-
tected waters, but their sea-keeping
qualities were deficient.
They were, indeed, designed more
for operations off the China coast
and in the archipelagos to the south
ward, and for the quick reinforce
ment of island outposts than for
fleet actions against formidable op.
position.
All the Larger Ships Lost.
The real strength OF the Japanese
carrier-borne aviation lay in six
much larger ships, all of which have
now been lost. These were the Kaga
and Akagi, which, like our own Sar-
atoga and Lexington, were con-
verted from capital ships to aircraft
carriers under the terms of the
Washington naval agreement of
1922, and the four new carriers, the
Shokaku, Ryokaku, zuikaku and
Takasago.
OF these. the Shokaku was prob
ably Of $4,000 tons and the other
three of 10000 tons. The aircraft
capacity of the Akagi and Kaga was
about 60 each; that of the four new
carriers has been reported as being
from 40 to As each, but this seems
too small, and study of published
reports suggests that double the fig
ure given would be a closer estis
mate. d
The Shokaku and Ryokaku were
lost in the Coral Sea, and the
Akagi. Kaga and two other carriers
which, from published descriptions
were almost certainly the Zuikaku
and Takasago, were lost at the Bat
tie Of Midway Island.
Thus, unless still other carriers
exist Of which nothing Is known,
the Japanese Navy has lost the
whole of Its ocean-going, air-strik-
ing power. The only carriers 1t has
remaining are the five small ones
whose combined aircraft operating
capacity is only about so per cent
greater than that of one of our big
carriers-plus whatever converted
merchant carriers the japanese may
have left. ~
Out of this lot at least four ships
are known to have been damaged
and some may still be in dockyard
hands.
On our side We have lost the big
carrier Lexington; one other car
rier has been slightly damaged, but
is probably back in service, and the
small British carrier Hermes was
lost IN the Indian Ocean. Alto
gether the record of the carrier
as far as survival is concerned is
not an impressive one. -.
Suggests Carrier Groups. a
1t is almost impossible to guard
completely against surprise attack
by air. The trick is to disperse ones
aircraft over a number Of bases 30
that the enemy cannot knock out
any large proportion, either Of air.
craft or Of bases, at a single blow.
This principle applies with equal
force whether the bases be on land
or ahoat.
All of this is at present, Of course,
more or less academic and theoreti,
cal. The numbers of small carriers
required do not exist in any navy,
though new carriers are almost
everywhere under construction. The
salient fact for immediate consid-
Grafton is that the Japanese havs
no ocean-going carriers left and ara
therefore seriously If not fatally
handicapped for further naval offen-
sives in the Pacific; while we, pos
sessing at least six large modern
carriers, can now take the offensive.
In other words, the offensive and
the initiative have passed to us, buf
no early miracles should be ex-
pected. -
Copyright 1e4s. New York Tribune. Me1