Evening star., 1942-10-07
Voronezh Sector
Held Vital Area
MiIitory Writer Sees Germans
Stopped on Left Flank
Of EmbottIed StoIinerod

Stopped on Left Flank
Of EmbottIed StoIinerod
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
Interest is centered at present on the
Stalingrad area of the Russian front, but
We ought not to forget the Importance
Of the nanks.
In these articles have, had occasion
repeatedly to point out that the Voro-
nezh sector which might be called the
left flank of the Stalingrad position, is
really the strategic key to the whole
situation in South Russia. Here it was
that the Germans made the first move
of their great offensive, attempting to
seize and control crossings of the upper
Don and the network of rail communi-
cations east of the river. Had they been
successful in this effort, they now could
grad from the northwest, an attack
which very probably would be decisive.
From another point of view, even If
the Germans had not been able to make
sufficient progress beyond the Don for
such purpose, they at least would have
rendered Marshal Timoshenko's present
counterattack northwest of Stalingrad
threatened its flank and its commune
cations
But the Russians held fast against
the initial German attacks In the
Voronezh sector; they have never yielded
their grip on the Don crossings, and at
the moment they are at least locally
on the offensive in this area.
The Importance of these facts cannot
be overestimated. Even If no great Rus
sian counteroffensive is launched against
the Germans from the upper Don dt is
always possible that this may happen),
Timoshenko at least has safeguarded his
flank and retained sufhcient degree of
freedom of action to enable him to ma
neuver. A distinguished American Of
ficer has said that the art OF war may be
summed up as holding your enemy by
the nose while you kick him in the seat
of the pants. The Germans are kicking
the Russians vigorously in the seat of
the pants, but they have failed to hold
them firmly by the nose while the kick
ing is going on. The result may very
well be disaster to the whole German
strategic concept for the 1912 campaign
in Russia.
The right flank Of the Stalingrad posi-
ton, in the North Caucasian area, also is
Of great interest, though not equal in i'm
portance to the Voronezh flank. Not
enough credit has been given to the Rus
slams for the very fine defense which
they made in the North Caucasus after
the collapse Of their positions on the
lower Don. This collapse has not yet
been explained, and We may not know
what occurred until after the war, but
certainly the Russians had to adjust
their plans hastily and to patch up a
new defensive system with most made
quate forces. They had to lose Maikop
and Novorossisk, the last q serious blow.
But they have contrived to stop the Ger
mans on the outskirts Of the Grozny oil
fields, on the slopes of the Caucasus and
in the narrow sea passage between Novo-
rossisk and Tuapsef The Germans have
nowhere reached the Caspian or the
lower Volga.
On the other hand, the Germans have
been able to protect the flank of their
line of communications leading north
eastward toward Stalingrad and to OBJ
tain the full use of the railway from
Rostov to the vicinity of the beleaguered
city. 1t is quite clear that there was a
very critical period in this north Cau-
casian campaign about three weeks ago
in which the Russians, by heroic efforts,
were barely able to stop the German
advance toward Grozny, but since then
the Russian defenses gradually have
been stiffening, probably by reason of
reinforcements from Turkestan and the
embodiment of reserve units of the
Caucasian army, and the Germans have
found that Stalingrad demands all the
reserves that they are able to throw into
the tight, and more, 50 that they have
not been able to put fresh troops into
the Caucasian sector.
Taken as a whole, and considering the
equipment initially available, the Rus
slams have every reason to be satisfied
with the results they have obtained, and
it seems even more certain than before
that the historians of this war will record
the names Of Shaposhnikov as chief Of
staff and T1moshenko as field COM
mander among the great captains who
proved their worth despite all odds and
in the face Of all adversities.
(copyrisht, 1912, New York Tribune Incl
Discusses What Would Be Lost
If the War Were Lost.
To the Editor Of The Star:
There Is much discussion these days
about whether we can lose this war, may
lose 1t or are losing it. Nobody has got
around yet to the statement that we
have lost 1t.