Evening star., 1942-01-26

n teS, without
Jay Hayden. exception, con-
vlctlon, which persisted up to De-
cember 7, 1941. that Japan had no
intention of making any such (air)
raid. Consequently this form of at
tack was complete surprise to all
of the superior officers of the Army
and Navy stationed in the Hawaii
area"
The glaring fact, disclosed with
graphic clarity in this report and
confirmed by innumerable happen
| ings of the last seven weeks, is that
the personnel of both the Army
and Navy were completely con-
temptuous of japanese air power.
The British were equally so, as in
dlcated by the paucity Of planes at
Singapore and the loss of the battle
ships Prince of Wales and Repulse,
within less than an hours fight
from Singapore, without a single
airplane coming to their aid.
The failure of the Navy and Army
commanders in Hawaii to envisags
japanese air attack is the mors
marked because their civilian su-
periors, Secretary OF the Navy Knox
and Secretary of War Stimson. as
early as January "a. l94l. warned
in remarkable detail against lust
what happened. Secretary Knox
wrote Admiral Kimmel, commander
OF the Pacific fleet on that date,
that IF war eventuates with japan.
it is believed easily possible that
hostllities would be initiated by a
surprise attack upon the feet or
the naval base at Pearl Harbor"
Among dangers envlsaged in their
order of importance and probability"
this letter placed first and second
air bombing attack" and air
torpedo plane attack and declared
that defenses against all but these
two were then satisfactory.
Defense Steps Ordered
1t directed dispositions to dis
cover and meet such attack and
provision of additional equipment
therefor" and concluded with recon-
mendations for the revision of Joint
defense plans with special emphasis
on the coordination of Army and
Navy operations against surprise
| aircraft raids"
Secretary StimSon. acknowledge
ing receipt of copy of the Knox
| letter on February 7, stated that
it had been forwarded TO the Army
commander in Hawaii with instruc-
! tions to Cooperate with the local
Naval authorities in making the
suggested measures effective"
But Admiral Kimmel and Gen.
Short continued to scof at the idea
of japanese air attack on Hawaii,
even in the week preceding Decem-
Der 7. Relating that these COM
manders met during that week TO
discuss replacement of Marine air
lSldllOS
with Army airmen, the Roberts
report says:
Admiral Kimmel inquired Of his
war plans officer. Capt McMorris,
| who was present, concerning the
probability of surprise attack on
Oahu (the island where Pearl
Harbor is located. According TO
Gen. Short, Capt. McMorris replied
there was no probability of such an
attack and, according to Capt. Nc
Morris, his reply was that the
Japanese would never so attack.
Admiral Kimmel and Gen.
Short did not discuss means or
measures for Hawaiian defense In
light of the messages"
To the contrary the report de-
clares that Gen. Short. instead of
dispensing his air force to defensive
positions, deliberately concentrated
them ito guard against possible
sabotage" Even so the planes were
not manned, since the prevailing
orders required them to be in readi-
ness only after four hours notice.
| The report revealingly says:
AT least three fighter pilots, in
total disregard of their own safety,
attempted to take off in the face
of greatly superior forces then at
tacking their airdrome, but lost their
lives in the attempt. A few fighter
planes parked on an outlying gun
merry training field, which was not
attacked, took the air"
Main Forces Missed Action.
Plainly the main air forces, either
Army or Navy. never got into action
at all. Destruction and demoraliza-
ton of the force on the ground was
so great that only a scattered few
naval planes, engaged in exercises
at sea, were able to go in pursuit
of the Japanese, following the at
tack.
The conclusion is ineScspable that
the japanese not only knew the
American unpreparedness for air
defense in every detail and the
mental unpreparedness of Amer
lean commanders. but deliberately
banked on these conditions.
The japanese did the whole lob
with $50 to 200 fighting, bombing
and torpedo planes dhere were sew
eral times more American planes IN
and around HswaiD launched from
three or four japanese carriers.
The japanese plainly had been
getting ready for just this thing for
a long, long time and the whole
scheme functioned like clockwork.
released By North American Newspaper
Alliance, Inc)