Evening star., 1942-04-12
The Russian Front.


When General George c. Marshall
and Harry Hopkins arrived in Lon
don several days ago the White
House announced that the trip was
a perfectly normal wartime mis-
sion" This is a description which
seems to imply that the trip is Of
only routine importance, but recent
reports emanating from London and
the Philadelphia speech Of Russian
Ambassador Litvinoff hardly tend to
support that Interpretation.
The London reports are to the
effect that General Marshall Is con-
ferring with British officials on the
prospect Of relieving pressure on the
Russian front by striking the Ger
mans at some other point. Mr..
Litvinoff, speaking with more ur-
gency than on earlier occasions,
called bluntly for substantially
equal sacrifices" and warned that
1t was not enough to blockade Europe
and bomb Germany. To win the
war, he said, Britain and Russia
must engage in definite united ef-
forts now" and they must be sup
ported in this by "some supple
mentary aid" from the United States.
These reports and the Russian Am
bassador's speech may not add up
to a reasonable conclusion that an
Allied offensive is in the making.
But at the least they must be re-
garded as straws which reveal the
direction in which the wind Is
blowing.
The great battle on Europe's
eastern front already has moved
into its preliminary stages. During
the next few months it will swell to
a crescendo Of unparalleled fury,
and it is no exaggeration to say that
the position of the contending
armies in October may well deter
mine the final outcome Of the war.
So far as this struggle is concerned,
If the Russians are to be helped
they must be helped now. The as
sistance that we may be able to give
in 1943 will not influence in the
slightest degree the decisive battle
that must be fought this year. That
is something we cannot afford to
forget.
British objections to the opening
of a second front are plausible and
we'll known. It requires eight tons
of shipping to transport and main
tain one soldier, and ships are dis
tressingly scarce. Nor is there an
abundance of fighting men and COM
bat equipment. The men and the
machines of war are spread across
most Of the world and there seems
not to be enough anywhere. But we
may not expect the enemy to wait
until we have built up our strength
to its maximum. 1t is the consensus
that Hitler, If he is to win at all,
must win this year, and that means
that he must smash the Russian
Army.
It is against this background that
the risks confronting us must be
appraised. Which is the more dan
gerous: to risk the collapse Of the
Russians while we are gathering
strength, or to throw into battle the
forces we have now and risk their
defeat in the hope Of stopping Hitler
this year?
Obviously, this is question which
calls for the best professional judg-
ment. Laymen cannot know the
answer, but they can hope that the
professionals, in taking their de-
cision, will break away from any
narrow concept of defensive war,
which has been so costly in the past,
and balance the risks of offensive
action against the risks of sitting
tight. There is an old saying that
no commander is ever fully ready to
march against the enemy, and there
is much truth in it. But, relatively
speaking, we are stronger now than
we will be next year If Russia is
beaten in 1912.