Evening star., 1942-11-08

ooutn Pacific we nave blocked the Jap
anese from scoring one of the most i'm
portant victories of the war.
1t was close call, however, and the
Japanese themselves did not know that
victory was within their reach during
the period of October 1926.
Errors in the battle of the Solomons
by the American high command are now
being fully examined so that there will
be no such dangerous repetition. In the
meanwhile, reinforcements are being
rushed across the Pacific where we must
expect more-and powerful-Japanese
attempts to deprive us of our direct line
of communication between the West
Coast and Australia and New Zealand.
Whether operations on other fronts,
which are believed contemplated by
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill, will prevent us from taking a
major offensive role in the South Pacific
is military secret known by only a few
men. Should the Allied chieftains decide
that the time is ripe for an offensive
somewhere across the Atlantic this year,
It Is doubtful whether we could do little
else In the Pacific but remain on the de-
fensive, hoping the while that we will be
able to ward of future japanese blows.
The interference of the civilians in
Washington with plans OF the military
leaders has been reduced to a minimum
in the last few weeks. The Army, Navy
and air commanders are now given free
hand as far as planning future cam
paigns is concerned. This free hand,
however, is limited to the framework of
the grand strategy determined more by
political than military considerations.
And the grand strategy provides for Of
fensive action across the Atlantic until
such time as Hitler is beaten.
U. S. Air Supremacy Important.
In the meanwhile, we must keep our
selves on the defensive in the Pacific.
Had the Solomons and the rest of the
archipelagoes to the south been lost to
the japanese, the chances of maintain
ing a defensive would have been slim
indeed. This the American and Austral-
ian high commands realized. The men
who stopped the Japs on Guadalcanal
knew little about strategic consider
ations-they fought battle of kill or be
killed, and they managed to kill sufficient
numbers of japanese to ease the threat
On the high seas, despite our heavy
losses, our air superiority, and the fact
that the American aviation was based
on islands not more than 600 miles
away, permitted us to damage the enc
my's feet sufficiently to compel it to
withdraw to Truk and lick its wounds.
An American air superiority OF ratio
of three to one was really the basic
cause Of the Jap defeat.
With the reinforcements now being
sent to the assistance of our own men
and those of Australia and New Zea-
land, particularly the latter, we have
reasonable chance to check future jap
anese attacks in that area. Whether the
reinforcements are arriving in quantities
sufficient to permit Gen. Douglas Mac
Arthur and Vice Admiral William Hal
sey to do more than remain on the de-
fensive will,be known shortly.
At the same time these reinforcements
are rushed to the Southwest Pacific,
preparations are being completed by the
United Nations to tackle the Axis forces
across the Atlantic. The British, sup
ported by the American Air Force, are
proceeding cautiously in Egypt.
French in Morocco Hesitant.
There is no criticism in Washington of
the past caution of Gen. Harold Alex
ander, who is in supreme command in the
rox,v,f{on warfare &c q
ticklish problem and any ill-conceived or
hasty operation would have given Ger
man Marshal Erwin Rommel the chance
he had been waiting for. The Allies
gained an initial advantage, at least, be-
cause the offensive was started with
strong air and land force. Consequently
the Axis was forced to keep strong
army in the area to avoid any unpleas-
mt surprise. The present serious setback
will have tragic consequences for Mar
shal Rommel and his cohorts.
Once again the French are an i'm
portant factor in the plans of both
Sides II the Axis forces in Egypt are
to suffer disastrous reverses, it Is con-
ceivable that the French in Morocco un-
der the command of the somewhat hesi-
tant Gen. August Nogues may decide
to cast their lot with the Americans and
British. If, on the other hand, the Axis
Yields ground without suffering a oom-
plete defeat-such as Marshal Rodolfo
Graziani suffered-the French might be
moro hesitant to join the Allies and, in
this event, might resist with everything
at their disposal if an Allied force ap-
pears before Dakar, Casablanca or Oran.
The reports broadcast by the Berlin
radio and the inspection tour of Admiral
Jean Darlan in Morocco appear to point
TO an imminent Allied offensive against
North Africa, which, while geographically
In another continent, belongs strategical-
" to the European zone of operations.
To describe the German broadcasts and
the Darlan trip as sheer propaganda
would be foolish. There is no propaganda
value In an assertion that the Allies
plan an invasion Of North Africa.
The Frenchmen in Europe would not
care much about this information as
propaganda. They are chiefly interested
in food and q means of continuing to
live.
An attack against the French African
empire-particularly If the United States
takes a leading role-would not help the
Nazi cause among the rank and file of
the French people. Ninety three per
cent of the supplies reaching France
from Morocco and Algeria end up in
Germany and italy, and since the French