Evening star., 1942-07-29

OF these areas are probably too
great to be risked.
In any large-scale invasion, the
losses of men, material and ship
ping will be very great. The enc
my has prepared system OF de-
Tense in depth along the whole
coast. backed up by numerous air
bases and by an improved COM
munication system.
The actual landing can prob
ably be effected almost any
where if we are willing to pay
the price for 1t, but the real test
will come when the enemy mobile
reserves have to be dealt with.
We must be able to pour in troops
and supplies through our cap
tured beachheads faster than the
enemy can bring up his forces
to drive us out. It is a task
which can only be performed
by determined men completely
equipped and skillfully COM
manded.
If a large-scale invasion Of
Western Europe be considered
impracticable, the main effort
will have to be made by bomb
ing, as discussed In yesterdays
article. In that case, however,
some advantage may be gained
from a subsidiary invasion op-
Grafton such as raid on Brit
tany for the purpose OF destroy
Ing the naval and air bases
rather than holding them, or
possibly landing in a more
distant theater such as Northern
Norway or French North Africa.
Diversion in Norway.
Northern Norway is in many
ways an attractive area for this
purpose. While a landing there
would not divert very large Ger
man forces, it would give direct
support to the Russians in their
extreme north sector and could
IN turn be supported by them.
If successful, it would deprive
the Germans of the submarine
and air bases from which they
have been attacking the Russian
conveys and thus would enable us
to supply Russia much more
steadily and efficiently. It might
open the way to getting Finland
out OF the war, and German at
tempts to counter it might en-
broil Germany with Sweden, thus
cutting off a main source of Ger
man iron ore.
The disadvantages are that the
landing places are few and
heavily defended, the terrain diff
f1cult, the long northern day is an
advantage to the defenders at
this season, and the air support
would initially have to come from
carriers.
AS to the latter, 1t Is probable
that three new British carriers
have now been completed, as well
as a considerable number OF con-
verted merchant carriers-which
could be used in this operation,
since speed would not be a con-
sideration.
French North Africa offers at
first sight a considerable tempta-
ton. It could be an all-American
theater of war, simplifying the
problems of command.
If the French forces and the
natives came over to our side we
might quickly establish ourselves
on the whole north shore of
Africa, reopening the Mediter-
ranean, threatening italy and
disposing of the Axis forces In
Libya and Egypt.
As long-range proposition this
would be very satisfactory, but
the effect on the Russian CAM
paign is the immediate considera-
ton. Certainly, Russia would be
greatly aided by the eventual
strengthening Of our position in
the Middle East and by the moral
effect on Turkey, which country
would be relieved OF any anxiety
about its back door.
The immediate effect on the
Russian campaign would, how
ever, be conditional on whether
an American invasion of Africa
would cause sufficient degree of
anxiety in Berlin to compel the
Germans to detach powerful air
forces to the Mediterranean to
oppose us. 1t is possible that
they would do So but not certain.
In any case, it should be en-
phasized that anything less than
an invasion Of France or perhaps
the Low Countries by a really
powerful force OF all arms must
remain subsidiary effort.
fConyrirht 1910 Now york Trih,,~> yn. /,