Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1942-11-01
American Problem in Solomons
Traced Back to Global Strategy
japanese Triumph in Pacific Area Would Over.
shadow Gains Made by Allies in North Africa
And Block Opening of Real Second Front
By Constantine Br0wn.

of communication would be, constantly
menaced by Japanese planes and subma-
rines.
The position of India likewise would
be endangered because, once these oper-
atoms are successful, the Japanese could
turn their full power against India.
Chinas position would be more grave
since all hope of opening up adequate
communications with the war material
producing Western world would be sur
rendered
Even the Russians would feel the con-
sequences of such United States defeat.
The decision to attempt to recapture the
Solomons and possibly add the New
Hebridies and New Zealand has caused
the japanese to postpone all thoughts
OF an immediate attack on Siberia.
So it is that most qualified observers in
Washington regard the Solomons battle
as being of the utmost Importance and
they would compare the loss of islands
in the Southwest Pacific with the tragic
loss OF Singapore and the Netherlands
Indies. The Southwest Pacific would of
course, be closed to us and the last KEY
which still is in our pocket might be in
the pocket of the japanese.
Atmosphere of Uncertainty.
While it Is too early to say that we
have won or lost that key no one knows
yet what mistakes the enemy might make
and what our actual strength is in the
area-there is an atmosphere of UNI
certainty in responsible Washington
quarters. No major operational blunders
have yet been committed in the Solomons
lighting. Even the tragic loss of the Three
cruisers-the Quincy, the Vincennes and
the Astoria, the aircraft carrier Wasp
and loss or damage to other units-is not
the chief factor contributing to the
gloom. The reason we are in such pre-
carlous position in the South Pacific to-
day must be traced back to our global
strategy. We have dispersed our forces
over the Seven Seas in much the same
manner that rice is strewn over newly
welded couples.
The commitments of a political mill
tary nature which had been undertaken
so fundamentally earlier in the war are
still hanging around our necks and
make our movements difficult and
clumsy. Although the military chief
talns in Washington have much more
freedom of action than a few months
ago, this freedom still is restricted by
commitments. The military can move
within the framework of those commit
ments. That is to say, the general idea
is defense in the Pacific and offense
in the Atlantic. This strategy is predi-
Gated, of course, on the theory that
Germans are our No. enemies while
the Japanese rank No. 2.
But even this theory OF placing the
Germans at the top of our list of en-
emies could be acceptable if we had the
means of remaining on solid defensive
line in the Pacific. Also, it would have
been acceptable had the japanese con-
fined their operations to the Far East,
but, unfortunately, the Japs are not al
lowing us to remain on the defensive.
They are pushing their lines danger
ously close to our home waters, strategi-
cally if not geographically. They plan
to settle astride our lines of communica-
ton with Australia and New Zealand.
To comply with the strategy of throw
ing the bulk of our war effort against
the Nazis it would have been necessary
for us first to assume the offensive in
the Pacific. 1t. would have been neces-