Evening star., 1942-11-06

Of common understanding not only
among employees but also among op-
Grating officials as to what consti-
tutes proper flag protection" the re-
port stated. Some of the officials
and employees thought the flag pro-
lection provided for No. 18 in this
case was sufficient, but others
thought it was not adequate. The
conditions disclosed by this investi-
cation are similar to conditions and
practices disclosed by previous in
vestigations Of this railroad"
In its detailed discussion of the
conditions Immediately before the
crash, the commission had this say:
"As No. 20 was approaching signal
E38-34 the controller was open,
the engineer was maintaining a
lookout ahead through the front
window and the speed was about 66
miles per hour. Dense fog re-
stricted visibility considerably.
Engineers Story Recalled.
"The engineer made various some
what conflicting statements but
finally said that he failed to see
signal E38-34 until the control COM
partment of the engine was opposite
the signal mast and then he OBJ
served from the side window the
back OF the semaphone arm, which
was displaying approach at that in
slant. Because this type of signal
drops rapidly as a train passes it,
he assumed it had displayed clear
for his train and was in the process
of dropping to horizontal position.
"After the engine passed the fuse
he made a service brakepipe reduc-
ton and. attempted to observe the
indication displayed by signal
E36-14. Because of dense fog and of
smoke from the engine of Extra 1852
West (the westbound freight train)
he was unable to observe the
signal until his engine was a short
distance west of it, where he OBJ
served that the signal displayed stop
and proceed, and then placed the
brake valve in emergency position.
simultaneously, he observed the rear
of No. 18, but the distance was not
sufficient for stopping his train >"
Train Records Checked.
In checking back on the records
of B. g. o. trains, the ICC reported
that speed-recorder tapes for 100
eastbound passenger trains operated
between Point of Rocks miles
west of Dickerson-and Washington
during 10 days before the wreck
revealed that "35 trains exceeded
the maximum authorized speed Of
30 miles per hour through the inter-
locking at Point of Rocks from to
20 miles per hour: 55 trains exceeded
the maximum authorized speed Of
10 miles per hour between Point Of
Rocks ON Tower (Washington) from
4 to II miles per hour, and all trains
exceeded the maximum authorized
speed of Is miles per hour between
ON Tower and Washington Ter
minal Station from 10 to 13 miles
per hour
I'm the territory involved in this
accident" the report continued, ION
8 of the 10 days Immediately preced-
ing the day of the accident No. 20
received approach indications, which
required the speed to be reduced to
not exceeding 80 miles per hour, bu.
in no case was the speed reduced be-
low SO miles per hour and it ranged
as high as go miles per hour"
If the f1agman had not been re-
called when No. Is was ready to
proceed, this train could have de-
parted not less than az minutes
before the arrival of No. 20 and the
accident could have been averted
the report continued. Since the
flagman was killed in the accident,
it could not be determined why he
failed to proceed westward far
enough to provide adequate protec-
ton, 1t added,