Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1942-02-05
Russia Holds Key to Spring
Eliot Sees German Striking Power Sharply
Reduced If Soviet Presses Winter ADVANTAGE

Of filing losses in existing units and
police duties in occupied territories
make heavy demands on man power,
while q great proportion Of the
German war industry must be busy
making requirements rather than
accommodating fresh reserves OF
weapons. We will not be far afield
If we estimate that as Of April 1, the
German high command may have in
hand so to 80 divisions and 1000 to
5000 first-line aircraft for offensive
operations, either to pass from the
defensive to the offensive in Russia
or to undertake a new offensive else
where. But even this modest esti-
mate is subject to one factor OF
variance, and that Is the extent to
which the exigencies Of the Russian
winter fighting may draw upon these
German reserves.
Situations Similar.
In this regard the German s.tua-
ton In Russia Is very similar to that
Of the Allies in the Far East. In both
cases the initiative Is with the
enemy and the defense must plan
to make the best use of its strength
so that no vital advantage be lost
while 1t is gathering its power to
take the offensive.
Thus we are now fighting hard to
hold Singapore, Manila Bay and
Java. II We should lose these 1t
would be far more difncult and costly
for us to pass to the offensive at a
later date. This was precisely the
German view when Marshal limo
shenko's advance threatened the
Crimea. Reinforcements had to be
put in to prevent what might have
proven irreparable disaster. The
present stif1ening German resistance
in the Leningrad and Kharkov areas
indicates . similar German reaction
to Russian advances In those sectors.
The farther back the Germans must
60 and the more strategic lines Of
communication and communicating
centers they lose the harder it will
be for them to regain the lost ground
in the spring and the more losses
they must expect before they get
back to the position at which they
started their retirement.
There is. therefore, q tendency
for the Germans to use up in drib-
lets. here and there, in the manner
Of q man patching q leaking dam,
those reserves which they are de-
pending on for their spring Often
sive. 1t Is all very well to say that
the high command should be firm
in refusal to reduce these reserves
beyond certain minimum, but 1t
is difficult indeed for the high COM
mand to continue to refuse the
urgent demands of army command
ers for help here and help there,
especially when the army COM
manders can not only point out that
vital strategic positions will other
wise be lost, but also that the
morale Of their troops is suffering
at being compelled to yield ground
for which those troops have paid In
blood and agony.
Russians May Decide.
The German striking power In
the spring may very well depend,
therefore, on the extent to which
the Russians can keep their coun-
teronensive going during the win
ter, capitalizing upon their superior
mobility over snow-covered terrain,
and their superior adaptability to
winter conditions, in which they
have such long experience.
One more point IS worth men,
tioning, and that is the probability
that the Germans have pulled all
Of their panzer divisions out of
Russia and are rebuilding them,
probably reducing them somewhat
in numbers as well as in the indi-
vidual establishment OF each divi-
sion. When spring comes, 1t Is quite
possible that the initial striking
power Of the Germans in armored
troops may be little less than 1t was