Evening star., 1942-01-25
Pearl Hurbor Report


port of the Pearl Harbor naval
disaster which has been submitted
to the President by Supreme Court
Justice Roberts and his associates on
the investigating commission it is
difficult to avoid a sense of bitter
Illustration.
1t is an old story of human frailty,
of the inability of men to compre-
hend that which they prefer to dis
believe. The officers named in the
report as responsible for the disaster
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short
knew that war with Japan was immi-
nent, and adequate plans for such
contingency had been made But
the plans failed to save Pearl Har-
Dor, not because the planning was
faulty, but because the officers
charged with it's execution simply
could not or would not bring them
selves to believe that the Japanese
might strike from the air. And, over
and beyond this human failure,
there Is the plain suggestion, GER
tainly valid to the superstitious, that
the hand of Fate was raised against
the United States on the morning of
December 7. Three distinct oppor-
tunities to reverse the course of the
battle presented themselves and all
we're muffed-first, when a last
minute warning from Washington
went astray; second, when an air
raid listening detail was discontinued
Just two scant minutes before the
approach Of japanese planes-then
nearly an hour away-would have
been detected, and, third, when
japanese submarine was discovered
of the harbor and sunk more than
an hour before the air raid without
resulting in the issuance of an alert
order to the defending forces.
These eleventh hour mischances,
however, do not go to the heart of
the fumbling which brought on the
disaster. The record shows clearly
that the danger of an air attack on
the fleet and the naval base was
fully anticipated in Washington
year ago, and that the Secretary of
the Navy warned at that time of the
inherent possibilities of major dis
aster" in the situation. This view
was communicated to both Admiral
Kimmel and General Short. The
Secretary of State kept the War and
Navy Departments fully informed of
the worsening character of diplo-
matte relations with Japan, and
these notifications were passed on
to the commanders at Hawaii.
On November 27, just ten days be-
fore the attack, Admiral Kimmel and
General Short were warned that hos
tilitieS on the part of Japan were
momentarily possible and were in
structed to take defensive measures
which they deemed appropriate.
Further warnings followed, but, since
available information indicated the
Japanese would attack in the Far
East, the warnings, according to the
report, "did not create in the minds
of the responsible officers in the
Hawaiian area apprehension as to
the probable imminence of air
raids" They discussed air raids, it
Is true, but, to quote again from the
report, without exception they be-
lieved that the chances of such a
raid while the Pacific Fleet was
based upon Pearl Harbor were prac-
tically nil. The attack was there
lore a complete surprise to each of
them" AS a matter of fact, the re-
port shows that the responsible Off
.s7S not only failed to expect an
air attack, but that each neglected
to maintain proper patrols while
assuming that the other was taking
the precautionary steps which were
within his province. General Short,
to cite another example, was main
tanning the air raid warning system,
for which he was responsible, only
from IN. to 7 m Admiral Kimmel
assumed that the warning system
was being fully operated, but made
no inquiry to ascertain the fact
The report suggests that there was
some culpability in the War Depart
ment for not being more aggressive
in seeing to it that greater precau-
tions were taken at Hawaii but it
is the field commanders-Gen
Short and Admiral Kimmel-who
are accused of a 'dereliction of duty
and with demonstrating "a lack of
appreciation Of the responsibilities
vested in them"
There is not a great deal more to
be said of the report. except that it
is a fortnight, impartial document,
and the members of the commission
and the President are to be con-
graduated for refraining from any
suggestion of "whitewaSh."
It may be assumed with confid-
ence that the people of the country
will take heart from what is obvi-
ously a candid and factual report.
Now, except for details as to damage,