Evening star., 1942-02-01
Air Power Required
For Victory Over Jopon
BIZ ODen L. Scott.

Of the war against Japan, the American
people have been asking why the United
States Navy did not crash through With
a powerful attack upon the Japanese.
The Nation had built and paid for q
Navy to do just this job and now, with
the tight Joined, it wondered why its
fleet, even though damaged, did not sail
out TO defeat the Japanese fleet.
The simple answer is that the Navy is
in no position now to make q grand
attack Of the kind that admirals dream
about. A fleet must be anchored to .
base. It's effective operating range away
from base Is about $500 miles. Hawaii
is 5000 miles away from Japan proper,
50 that 1t Is not possible simply to barge
in against the Japanese on their home
base.
Britain had built Singapore As .
gigantic base for British use and it might
have served as an American base. But
Singapore Is no longer Of use either to
the British or American navies, unless
as haven for submarines. Furthermore,
the Japanese have built many bases OF
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Islands and are operating their fleet out
Of those bases to cut the South Pacific
in half
As result. all past ideas about what
the American Navy might do in the
Pacific have had to 60 overheard.
The battleship, with rather inglorious
record in this Second World War, is
going into partial eclipse while the air
plane Is emerging as the vital weapon.
Events themselves are forcing admirals
and generals who shape American policy
to turn to the airplane as something
more than gadget that is useful as an
aid IN guarding warships or In helping
troops on the ground. The warplane and
the submarine are coming to be recoR-
nized Is the weapons that will do most
to bring about Japan's downfall.
First emphasis today Is upon the air.
plane as vital. Air superiority in the
Pacific battle area Is recognized at this
late date as a fundamental prerequisite
Tor naval or ground operations If there
is to be any chance of success.
Two handicaps face the United States
IN its effort to gain that superiority.
one OF those handicaps is distance.
The battlefield is nearly 10000 miles
away from home. Not only that but the
short Pacific route is pretty well closed,
so that in reality the battlefield is
between $4,000 and 10000 miles away by
water route. Bombers can fiy this
route in relatively short time. Omcial
revelation Is made that bombers are
flying by way Of Africa and Arabia and
India. But ground crews, material,
bombs, and vitality needed fighter planes
must go by water. This is an extremely
slow process. 1t is no secret that the trip
requires about two months.
The second Of the handicaps Is found
IN Japans initial superiority in numbers.
Americans and British are driven out of
one position after another because they
lack airplanes on the scene of action.
1t Is going to be very difficult to regain
lost positions as result Of this lapse.
The very weakness in numbers of planes
IN the Pacific suggests that Army and
Navy officials Of both Great Britain and
the United States were caught of guard.
They persisted In Understanding the
airplane.
Once planes can be delivered even in
moderate numbers-if they can be de.
lvered before more bases are lost, the
result In the air need be in no doubt
American pilots in Bufma, flying planes
that already are antiquated, are Officially
credited with destroying 80 japanese
planes with a loss Of three planes and
three pilots Of their own. The Roberts
commission reports that the few fighter
planes that did get into the air over
Hawaii knocked out about 80 Japanese
planes In brief fight. There is the same
story wherever Japan's flyers bump up
against those from the United States.
The only trouble Is that few American
flyers are on the scene
The alternative situations are these:
If the United States and Britain fail
to get air superiority in time, Japan
will be in position to take Singapore
and then to move on to the key points
in the Dutch East Indies and in Burma.
If they get established in Java, Sumatra
and New Guinea they can threaten
Australia and with Singapore they can
strike at Burma and the Burma Road,
which Is the one remaining supply line
into China. After that the problem Of
winning the war would be most difficult
one.
II the United States and Britain sue
ceed in getting air superiority in time,
then the Japanese will face trouble.
Japan is dependent upon long sea COM
munications to supply her armies in the
South. Those communications could be
attacked directly from the air and by
surface craft and submarines operating
in cooperation with airplanes. Further
more, the Japanese land armies which
now are aided by air support would have
to fight with air superiority on the other
side. The story, in that case. would be
very different than it is today.
The result OF this situation is that
Japan Is In . desperate race with the
clock. She either must keep up her
blitzkrieg tempo or the United States,
given four or five nonths-or even less
will be ready to start to turn the tables.
Points that are being made by officials
with the very best understanding Of the
problem in the Pacific are these:
The first essential of success is air
superiority to be gained in hurry.
Then there must be recognition that
China can supply the base for eventual
air and naval operations directly against
Japan. This means that every effort