Evening star., 1942-02-08
US. Greeting Air Force
Equal to Its Need
By O1Den L. Scott.

airplane really can do In war. AL shack
les that prevented full-dress demon
stration Of air power are in the process
Of being removed by both Of the old
| line services.
Air forces are getting all OF the money
that can be spent They now are re-
ceiying broad uthority-particularl in
the Army-to carry out their ideas about
the offensive uses to which the airplane
can be put. Their voice is heard In the
highest conferences on strategy.
Aviators insist that no nation in this
war has yet demonstrated the real power
In the airplane. Germany gave q partial
demonstration in France and over Eng
land, but lacked the men and machines
to put on full-dress performance. The
japanese at Pearl Harbor illustrated
what few small bombers could do
against a concentrated target Nobody
has yet shown what a real air armada
can do once 1t Is organized thoroughly
and directed at particular job.
The United States is making its plans
on basis designed to fill in this lack.
In the Army, the air force is given
what amounts to an independent status.
1t. Gen. H. H. Arnold as head OF the
force, reports only to Gen. George c.
Marshall, Chief of Staff Gen. Arnold
has picked group Of officers to operate
the Air Force who are not afraid Of new
ideas or new techniques and who are
making ambitious plans for the use Of
the airplane.
In the Navy, the air force is given far
less head than in the Army but the size
of appropriations and the new emphasis
upon aircraft carriers Of many types
shows that the admirals are willing to
give the naval aviators greater oppor-
tunity to show what they can do.
In both services the emphasis now is
upon bombers of larger size and cruising
range.
The bomber is an offensive weapon
The United States has pioneered in the
development of big bombers. It's engines
are particularly well adapted to powering
ships Of large size and long range. 1t has
far more experience than other nations
with the design, building and use Of
these ships. However, until recently, the
Air Force Of the Army was held back in
large scale development of bombers be-
cause Of Army policy which had stressed
use Of the airplane as a weapon confined
largely to defense and to aid OF ground
troops.
All past restraints now are removed
The trouble, though, is that It takes time
- L,,,I ~xr ~
ducing the great numbers of bombers
that are needed to carry out the type Of
offensive operation that is required to
demonstrate the full effectiveness of the
airplane in war.
Certainly 1912 is not to see the need
for planes met in any important degree.
In this year, the productive facilities will
be organized for something approaching
mass production. Next year those facil-
tiles will be grinding out planes at rate
which should overshadow the combined
output Of Germany's Europe and Japan.
BY that time, too, the pilot training pro-
gram and the program Of ground organ
ization required to operate planes In far
corners of the world, will be far along.
After that. this country will begin to
see results from the changes that now
are being made In conceptions of strategy
in this war. The airplane really should
begin in 1943 to show what 1t can do
for our side, rather than for the side OF
our enemies.
AS of today, the Germans and jap
anese retain superiority in the air.
The japanese are able to push ahead
in the South Pacific in large part be-
cause they can command the air and
thus interfere with naval operations that
otherwise might be directed against their
supply lines. Dutch sources advise that
1000 American planes-if based in that
area-could blast the japanese out Of the
skies and represent the difference be.
tween success and failure in their ven-
ture. The trouble is that this country
now does not possess that relatively small
number of planes in reserve that could
be diverted to the fighting area. A year
from now it should have many times that
number.
The Germans are able to prevent any
very effective British attacks on German
industries and cities because they COM
mand the air over the continent. The
Germans are now concentrating their
air force for some new operation, either
against Russia in the spring or against
the British in the Middle East and in the
Mediterranean.
Neither the Germans nor the Japa-
nese, however, have shown much where
thew could be met in the air on fairly
even numerical terms.
American pilots, flying old models OF
American planes, have knocked japanese
planes out of the air almost at will over
Burma. The trouble is that there are
very few of these pilots and planes, and
reinforcements take more than two
months to reach the scene by ship. Amer
ican machines, piloted by British pilots,
have shown a definite edge over the
Germans in Africa. Russian machines,
piloted by Russians, met the Germans
on fairly even terms in the Russian CAM
paign.
AS result, the big problem is to get
large scale production of aircraft so that
the numerical advantage of the enemy
can be removed.
The emphasis in this war, to date, with
the British and Russians and Germans
has centered on fighting aircraft-on
pursuit and interceptor and light bomb
ing planes. The emphasis that the
United States is to apply will be directed
at medium and heavy bombers. Even the
| Germans with all of their Wanted de-