Evening star., 1942-10-25
Changing Our SIGHTS

The Presidents announcement
that, after all, we are not going to
strive for the production of 10000
planes and $4,000 tanks in 1912 may
mean that We set our sights too high
when these goals were first an
nounced, but by no means does it
necessarily follow that this is an
unfavorable state of affairs.
Perhaps there is some psychology
ical disadvantage in failing to
achieve a numerical goal, but mere
numbers of planes and tanks are not
decisive in war. The experience of
combat teaches many lessons. When
put to the test of battle some types
Of equipment will measure up to ex-
pectations, while others will disap-
point. Shifts in the character of
war often suggest changes in the
tools with which it has to be fought.
The poor commander fails to profit
from these lessons. The wise leader
takes them to heart and applies them
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the President proposes to do.
The precise considerations which
have prompted our shift to fewer and
better weapons are known only to our
top commanders, military and civil
ian. But in a general way they are
more or less self-evident. For ex-
ample, it is obvious that the teach
ings of the war indicate the desir-
ability of placing great emphasis on
heavy bombers. When our goal of
$4,000 planes was set last January
Americas four-engine bombers-the
Flying Fortresses and the LIBERIA
tors-were in the nature Of unknown
quantities. On paper and in trial
flights they looked good, but they
had yet to meet the test of battle. In
actual combat, however, they have
exceeded the fondest expectations.
They have demonstrated that in most
theaters they can operate without
fighter escort because they are more
than match for the enemy pur-
suits. And they have proved that
daylight precision bombing from
great attitudes is not only feasible,
but devastating. Consequently, 1t
would seem desirable to place greater
emphasis on heavy bombers-to ex-
plot this weapon to the fullest before
the enemy can perfect a defense
against it. But it is obvious that
heavy bombers require more mate
rials and more labor than smaller
aircraft. This means fewer, but
better, planes.
Generally speaking, the same thing
is true of tanks, although there has
not been much evidence of an appre-
ciable shift from smaller to larger
tanks. We are supposed to have been
building a light tank of around
twelve tons, a medium tank weighing
about twenty eight tons and large
Sixty-ton tank, although production
of the latter presumably has been
sharply reduced because of transpor-
tation problems and material short
ages. The President referred spe-
cifically to the Libyan campaign, in
which we have been substituting the
General Sherman for the General
Grant tank. Both of these are
medium tanks, although the Sher-
man probably is little heavier than
the Grant. There also may be other
explanations of an overall decline
in the projected number of tanks.
Perhaps we are making more medium
tanks at the expense OF light tanks.
Or it may be that experience in
Russia has indicated a declining ef-
fectiveness of tanks, and that we
have decided to put more emphasis
on anti-tank weapons.
But, whatever the specific reasons
for the changes which the President
has announced, the significant fact
is that the lessons of the war are not
being lost upon us. That is more