Evening star., 1942-12-15
Rood to TripoIi

SSS w AssHVsI
Marshal Rommel's half-expected
stand at Ell Agheila has turned out
to be merely a holding rearguard
action. Unlike his tenacious resist
ance at Ell Alamein, Rommel made
no serious attempt to resist the full
weight of General Montgomery and
his British Eighth Army. Within "a
hours of the British assault on the
well-fortified Axis positions in a
40-mile bottleneck between the sea
and extensive salt marshes, the de-
tenders were in full retreat west
ward, hotly pursued by both British
ground forces and strafng airplanes.
Although details are still lacking,
it is unlikely that so willy a tactician
as Rommel would expose his whole
remaining army to so gruelling an
ordeal as the prolonged marathon it
went through across Western Egypt
and Tripolitania. Everything indi-
Gates that the holding forces at Ell
Agheila were cleverly camouflaged
screen, designed merely to delay the
British until they had brought up
their main forces and perfected their
communications The chances are
that the main body OF the Afrika
korps is far to the westward, prob
ably in and about Tripoli and
possibly clear across the border in
Southern Tunisia. Between Ell
Agheila and the 400 miles that inter-
vene thence to Tripoli, the main
Axis base, there Is no position of
comparable natural strength, and
even Tripoli is not believed to be
heavily fortified from the landward
side. But just across the Tripolitan
border in Tunisia stretches the
famous Mareth position, known as
the Little Maginot Line.
This heavily fortified belt. stretch
ing from the coastal village of
Mareth deep into the desert, takes
advantage of a maze of marshes,
salt lakes, and sand dunes. 1t was
constructed long ago by the French
as barrier against an Italian attack
from Tripolitania. Although it's
exact status is unknown, the chances
are much against its still being in
French hands, with all the rest of
Southern Tunis under Axis armed
occupation, and it is equally unlikely
that the French garrisons were able
to dismantle their forts and pill
boxes.
The Mareth lines weak aspect Is
that its successful defense presup-
poses control of the Tunisian terri
tory In its rear. That control IS
menaced by Allied columns pushing
eastward across the Algerian border.
Thus far, the Axis has clinched its
hold only on a narrow band of land
along the east coast. Unless that
strip can be held and extended
inland, the Axis may not try to
make more than another holding
stand at the Mareth Line while the
Afrika Korps retreats further up the
coast to the strategic triangle of
Tunis-Bizerta at Tunisia's extreme
northeastern tip opposite Sicily.
This is the key point in the whole
strategic situation. AS long as the
Axis can hold on there, the Allies
cannot reopen the sea lane through
the Mediterranean from Gibraltar
to Alexandria. Neither can they
launch an invasion OF Sicily or the
Italian peninsula while so formid-
able a stronghold on the North Afri-
can coast is still In Axis hands.
Axis concentration on the Tunis-
Bizerta triangle becomes more
evident by the way they have thrown
all possible strength thither, ap-
parently sending little or nothing to
bolster Rommel's resistance at Ell
Agheila. A consolidation OF all Axis
strength in Tunisia would present
formidable obstacle to even the COM
bined Allied armies, since Rommel
is presumed to have $4,000 men in
Tripolitania while the Axis forces
recently sent into Tunisia from
Sicily may amount to 10000.
Whether this ultimate Axis concen-
tration, in turn, is merely another
holding operation in basic pattern
of defensive strategy remains to be
seen.