Evening star., 1942-03-21
Russia Next for japan?
Tokio's Military Strategy and Army Politics
Nay Inspire Attack on 'Bockdoor' Enemy

China. In such q case, the high
command of the Kwangtung army
is quite capable Of launching an at
tack on the Russians regardless Of
whether Toxic likes it or not.
So far we have been considering
this possibility solely from the
point Of view of Jspan's immediate
interests and military necessities in
East Asia. From the wider point of
view Of Axis world strategy. a jap
anese attack on Russia would seem
to have much to commend 1t. II
synchronized with a German often
sive against Russia's European
front. 1t would present the Russian
high command with serious difficult
ties. Unless the Russians were pre-
pared to give up their Far Eastern
provinces without serious resistance,
Siberia would cease to be a source
of supply and reinforcement for the
German campaign. Indeed, a war
in the Far East probably would
begin to absorb men and supplies
which would be badly needed in Eu-
rope. All of the disputes, disloce-
tions and dissensions which normal
ly attend a two-front war would
arise to plague the Russian staff.
1t seems reasonable to suppose that
German influence both at TOXIC and
at the headquarters Of the Kwang-
tung army may be working in favor
of a Japanese attack on Russia this
spring.
1t should not be supposed that
such a Japanese move would not
be attended with serious risks. The
Red banner armies Of the Far East
have been reduced by transfers to
Europe, but they are still formidable,
highly trained, high-spirited forces.
They are probably better equipped
than any other troops the japanese
have faced in this war. They have
large armored formations and an
air force trained in ground-air CO.
operation. Wherever Far Eastern
troops have been used against the
Germans, they have acquitted them
selves with notable excellence, as
in the battle of Smolensk and the
recapture of Roetov. 1t should be
added that in two unofficial small
wars" they have soundly beaten the
Japanese.
Red Subs Efficient.
Also. there are 30 to 100 Russian
submarines in the Far East and
Russian submarines have already
drawn praise for their efficiency
from British and United States
naval officers. The threat to Japan s
food and coal supplies from Man
churia and North China would be
a real one, as would be the threat
of long-range Russian bombers TO
Japan's crowded cities and centers
of industry.
However, from now on Japan can
take no course, not even that OF
sitting still, which is without serious
risks. Her position is not unlike
that of Germany in the spring OF
ls4l. when the decision was taken
to eliminate the Russian menace
before the air threat from Britain
could become really serious, leaving
the Middle East for later considera-
ton. Substitute Australia" for
Britain" and India" for the
Middle East" and you have curl
ously similar strategic situation
now confronting Japan.
The Japanese have gambled
boldly. and for enormous stakes. II
they lose, they lose everything
hence it is quite logical to assume
that they may continue as boldly
as they have begun. They may we'll
consider that to push on to great
and more distant efforts in India
or Australia would be foolhardy
while the threat of Russian attack
hangs over them in the north.
If the Russian high command be-
lieves a Japanese attack inevitable,
Moscow may decide to operate on
the principle, thrice armed is he
who gets his blow in first" The
Russians may well consider that an
early start will enable them to do
greater damage to Japan's vital CEN
ters-even a days additional use
of their well-located bases might
make considerable difference. 1t
appears unlikely. however, that the
Russians will initiate such a con-
flict unless they are absolutely Ger
tain the Japanese are about to at
tack or until operations elsewhere
have gravely weakened Japan's
fighting power.
(copyrisht. 1942. by New York
Tribune, Inc)