Evening star., 1942-04-26
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
FLfOT.

ELIOT.
This Is the fourth and con-
ciudino Article IN a series arftten
bp Maj Eliot on the tour main
fhedteTs Of the Cdv Here h dis
cusses the Pacific ocean and the
Far East
The basic strategic fact to be kept
in mind in the Pacific Ocean is that
Japan s an insular power
Japan is entirely dependent on
her maritime communications for.
/. Most Of the industrial raw
materials on which her war industry
depends
2. Substantial percentages Of her
foodstuffs
3 Her export trade. by which q
large part Of her population makes
It's living
4 And particularly. at present. for
the support Of all her offensive
operation in the Philippines. South
China. Malaga, the Netherlands
East Indies and beyond.
Japans position In these respects
has often been compared to that
of Great Britain. and it has long
been a recognized axiom of British
strategy that command of the sea
Is vital 10 British survival
Sea Communications Vital.
In one important respect. however
Japan's position is different from
that Of Britain Japans most for
midable enemies are far away,
Japans greatest protection is that
of distance. so that japanese STRAIT
egy is at present very largely con-
cerned with trying to prevent the
United Nations from retaining any
bases from which attacks may be
directed at Japan's vulnerable sea
communications.
This fact emphasizes the extreme
Importance OF Australia TO the
United Nations strategy in the
Pacific BY a series of surprise at
tacks pushed home with desperate
energy, Japan has succeeded in
knocking out the bases Of the United
Nations surrounding the South
China Sea. which is the connecting
link between the Pacific and the
Indian Oceans. She now holds a
line some 1000. miles long stretch
ing from the Andaman Islands in
the Bay of Bengal to the Solomons
In the Southwestern Pacific.
So far the japanese have not been
able to go beyond this line and they
are faced by growing United Ma
tions' strength in the continent of
Australia. 1t should be recognized
that the invasion Of a great conti-
mental area like Australia, or like
India or Siberia, is very different
matter from smashing up an island
base.
Modern defense, especially air de-
fense. depends largely on the fac
tor of depth, and can be carried
out much more successfully as to
a continent than within the restrict
ed space of a small island.
Must Have Steady Shipping.
The japanese are we'll aware that
everything they are doing is depend
ent on sea communications-on
steady flow Of ships back and forth
between Japan proper, the source of
all Japanese power, and the extern
sive system Of outlying positions
which Japan has seized.
The sea routes which Japan must
continue to control are open to at
tack from the Pacific, that is to say,
from the direction of the United
States and of the Hawaiian Islands,
the main American naval outpost in
the Central Pacific. Japan, how
ever, relies on the cover given to
these approaches by Japan's pos
sessions in the so-caned inundated
islands, the Marshall Caroline,
Palau and Mariana groups, together
with the Bonin Islands, captured
Guam and Wake, and the positions
which Japan has seized around the
eastern tip of New Guinea.
Taken together. all these islands
form an interlocking system Cf Gi~
and naval outpoSts and as long as
they can be used by japanese forcc5
the main japanese lines of COM
munication are reasonably secure
If, however, these islands should
begin 10 fall into the hands of
United Nations forces, the pressure
against the Japanese lines of COM
munication would successfully in
crease with the loss of each outpost
E~nr