Evening star., 1942-08-26
AnoIyzes Objectives
Of Jap Counterottock
Militory Writer Says Foce
Has Been Lost by Enemy
In Solomons Defeat
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
In my article Of last Saturday I
pointed out that students of Pacific
strategy had long held the opinion that,
In war between the United States and
Japan, we would sooner or later have to
the islands covering the approaches to
Japan proper, and that such an advance
would present SO serious threat to
Japans vital interests and communica-
tions that it would compel the Japanese
to bring out their main fleet for decisive
combat. 1t is quite possible, though not
yet certain, that this is what is now
taking place in the Solomon Islands
area.
Obviously, it is for the Japanese to
choose the time at which they will seek
decisive naval engagement, since their
fleet cannot as yet be directly attacked
by us unless they see fit to bring it
within our reach. Their choice of time
may be influenced by several considera-
tions.
Not the least important among their
reasons for seeking quick decision may
we'll be the ever-present question of
face" Our successful attack on the
Solomon Islands is the first occasion on
which japanese forces have been driven
from positions they had previously taken
except, of course, in China. It un-
doubtedly has had q great effect on
other Oriental peoples, among whom
Japanese propaganda has been busily
representing the Japanese as invincibly
superior to all Westerners. The Jap
anese may, therefore, feel that an i'm
mediate recovery of the lost islands is
essential to them for this reason.
Japanese necessities in other theaters
| of operation also may call for a quick
| reversal of the situation in the Solomons.
| It the Japanese are contemplating an at
tack either on Russia or on India, they
| will need to concentrate the greater part
| OF their air force for the purpose, and in
| either case will require strong naval CO.
| operation. The japanese high command
may feel that our lodgment in the Solo,
mons, obviously only the first step in an
offensive directed against New Guinea
| and New Britain, must be eliminated be-
| fore they can have free hand for
major effort elsewhere. Otherwise they
might gain on the continent of Asia only
to find their sea communications, on
| which all their continental enterprises
depend, fatally endangered.
From the tactical point OF view the
japanese may wish to strike now before
We can acquire more footholds and thus
| gain wider distribution and greater base
| capacity for our land-based aircraft, and
before We can consolidate our other de-
fensive measures in the islands. Futher-
more, the Japanese may have reason to
believe that the relative naval situation
in the immediate vicinity is more in their
favor now than it is likely to be later
on. Such a view would OF course, be
based on their knowledge Of the location
and strength of the respective fleets, the
dates when new ships or other reinforce
n,ents might be expected to arrive, the
condition of damaged ships and so forth
| If the japanese have decided to risk
the whole or major part of their fleet
in an attempt to recover lost ground in
the Solomon Islands, their decision has
VI
the strategic, tactical and psychological
factors above mentioned.
So far the evidence Is not conclusive
that they have done so. Two carriers are
/ mentioned In the Navy Departments IS
communique as having been damaged,
one being described as small" carrier.
Possibly the larger one was a converted
merchant carrier or new ship recently
completed. The smaller was the Ryuzyu
one OF the two little carriers which are
the only officially listed Japanese carriers
remaining afloat, the other being the
Hosho. But in any case the Japanese
carrier strength has been so cut down
that the japanese may well have risked
the whole OF the remnant in desperate
gamble to recover the Solomons One
japanese battleship is mentioned as hay
ing been damaged, but the class Is not
stated. In the operations of Luzon, and
again at Midway, the Japanese have
shown no hesitation in taking very seri-
GUS risks with the four old battleships OF
the Kongo class, the loss Of the whole OF
which, while serious, would not be fatal
blow to the Japanese battle force
At present, therefore. we know only
that the Japanese have made strong
effort to recapture their positions in the
Eastern Solomons; we are not yet certain
whether they are backing this effort ur
with their main feet and with deter.
mination to push 1t through to decision
regardless OF cost, or whether it is 9
limited liability" operation OF lesser di.
mensons.
tCopyright, 1912, New York Tribune, Inc)