Evening star., 1942-07-28
Dancer on the Don


The peril to Marshal Timoshenko's S
southern army group grows hourly
more acute. The situation should be
considered from the strategic rather
than the geographical aspect. Too
much emphasis is being laid upon
cities like Rostov and Stalingrad.
Important as these may be as CEN
ters OF industry. their ultimate fate
is linked with the fate Of the Red
armies in the field. And those armies
are gravely endangered
In the relatively short space of a
month, the gigantic German Often
sive originally launched from Kursk
and Kharkov has overrun virtually
the whole of the Don big bend" re-
gion, from Voronezh in the rivers
upper reaches to its mouth on the
Sea of Azov. At it's easternmost point.
the Don bends to within fifty miles
OF the Volga, mightiest OF Russian
rivers, whereon stands Stalingrad.
But, what is even more important
strategically, possession of this big
bend area gives the Axis armies
commanded by General Won Book a
huge, protected salient from
which to drive east, south, or north
at many points, operating on in
terror lines.
That basic fact heavily handicaps
Marshal Timoshenko in his problem
of defense. It is presumed that he
has concentrated a large portion OF
his troops to protect Stalingrad. But
it is not necessary for Won Book to
drive due eastward. at this capital
prize. Crossings of the Don to north
or south would do almost as we'll,
since such crossings would first men
ace the one railway line still in Rus
sian hands from the Caucasus, and
then the River Volga. The Germans
need only to cut the railroad and
reach the river at one point, and
Stalingrad is practically isolated.
Rail traffic will cease and through
river traffic becomes impracticable.
A similar situation has developed
around Rostov. Not only is the city
itself in German hands, but Axis
forces are storming across the Don
further to the eastward and have
apparently established at least one
firm bridgehead at Tsimlyansk, about
100 miles upstream. Once that
bridgehead is consolidated, armored
columns could cross the steppes of
the North Caucasus to cut the rail-
way, and take in the rear the Russian
Army guarding the Caucasian side
of the Kerch Straits. 1t should not
be forgotten that the Germans are
perched vigilantly on the Crimean
side of that narrow waterway which
connects the Sea of Azov with the
Black Sea. They can be expected to
launch an attack of their own across
the strait when the time appears
right. If those Axis offensives should
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armies might have to split into sew
eral sections to protect the Caucasus
and the roads to Baku and Astra-
khan. Again the Germans would
occupy the central position, operat-
ing on interior lines and driving the
Russians farther and farther apart.
Viewed in terms of grand strategy,
this is the alarming prospect before
Timoshenko unless he succeeds in
holding the line Of the, Don. It Is
his last strategic line of defense.
There is no other natural obstacle
short of the Volga to the eastward or
the Caucasus Mountains in the south.
The one favorable aspect of this
otherwise dark picture is that Timo-
shenko seems thus far to have kept
his armies intact and avoided mass
encirclements by the Germans. Also,
Russian morale remains good. There
fore the Russians have as yet suf-
fered no disaster. But their strategic
plight grows more and more serious.
Some radical shift in the current
trend OF the campaign seems neces-
sary to change the general situation.
And of this there is as yet no sign.