Evening star., 1942-01-27
Jupun's Maritime Gamble

Jopon's Maritime Gamble
The running sea fight in the
Straits Of Macassar, between the
Dutch islands Of Borneo and Celebes.
is important not merely in itself but
for It's larger implications, especially
because Of the heavy ship losses in
f1icted upon the japanese invaders.
Japan may find it more difficult to
replace the lost shipping than the
lost men, and this applies to mer-
chant vessels perhaps even more than
it does to warships. If the already
heavy drain on Japan's tonnage can
be kept up and intensified, it will
prove to be her Achilles heel-a GER
tain source of eventual failure in her
grandiose gamble for Far Eastern
and Pacific domination.
Japan, like Britain, is a maritime
nation. Her whole fabric OF empire
rests not merely on her battle fleet
but equally upon her mercantile ma
rine. The size of her naval eStab-
lishment Is closely guarded secret,
but international commercial regu-
lations have made 1t impossible to
conceal the size Of her merchant
marine and mercantile shipbuilding
facilities. Here, then, we have a
basis to work on.
Last year Japan had an ocean,
going merchant fleet of about 900
vessels aggregating some 100000
tons. That is one of the leading
merchant marines of the world, but
Japan's shipbuilding facilities are
limited, and during the four years
between 1887 and 1910, launchings
are reported to have fallen from
100000 to 375,000 tons, probably due
to priorities on steel and scrap for
intensive military and naval prepara-
tions. Three years ago Japan's Min
lister OF Communications announced
that Japan had 81 shipyards with an
annual capacity of 100000 tons.
With the Japanese leaders preparing
feveriShly for an all-out war, as we
know they then were, it is incredible
that they would not have built mer-
chant shipping to the limit then pos
sible. We may assume therefore that
today, with even heavier military and
naval calls upon materials and skilled
labor, japanese shipyards cannot
turn out the theoretical annual
maximum.
But unless they can do that, or
better, Japan's tonnage must decline
rapidly under the wastage Of war.
Even before the Macassar Strait
battle, Japan had lost forty mer-
chane ships, or an aggregate OF
200 900 tons-a six-month output of
her yards during recent years. Fur
thermore, that figure does not in
clude other ships damaged, but not
sunk. The Macassar losses should
aggregate well over 100000 tons.
That means another three months
normal replacement. Those losses
have been suffered in the first seven
weeks OF war. At that rate, Japan
would lose something like one-third
Of her entire merchant marine by the
end Of the year. Against these losses
should be set the considerable ton
mage OF British, Dutch and American
merchant vessels seized by Japan at
the outbreak Of the war. But Japan's
potential conquests will yield few
shipbui1ding facilities. except in the
unlikely event OF a conquest of the
settled portions Of Australia. So she
will have no way Of ofsetting the
vast building programs Of Britain and
America, which greatly exceed ia
pans total merchant marine In a
single years launchings.
Even If Japan should conserve the
bulk OF her war fleet, she must have
many merchant ships to send troops
and supplies to her expanding con-
quests, some Of them several thou
sand miles from Japan, and to bring
home vital raw materials seized in
the conquered lands. This applies
equally to Japan's hold on her pre-
war possessions, even nearby Korea.
Deprived or crippled in sea power,
the whole ambitious structure Of
empire would fall apart like a rope
OF sand. So every japanese ship
sunk brings nearer an eventual crisis
which cannot be averted.