Evening star., 1942-01-25

planes searched ths sector south.
west to northwest Of Oahu. Two
utility planes searched northward
of Oahu to q distance Of 300 miles;
and nine planes which had arrived
from carriers and refueled searched
some 200 miles to the northward.
No contacts were made with enemy
aircraft or carriers, except that one
Navy airplane was attacked by a
Japanese airplane some 800 miles
north Of Oahu. This incident was
not reported until next day.
Summary Of the More
Important Facts
Pearl Harbor is an important
outlying naval base, and its security
is vital to both offensive and de-
fensive operations. 1t Is the Army's
function to insure the security Of
Pearl Harbor against hostile at
tack, and the Navy's function to
support the Army indirectly by
operations at sea and directly by
making available therefor such in
strrmentalities of the Navy as are
on the vessels of the feet when in
harbor and are located or based on
shore, either temporarily or per-
manently.
Effective utilization of the mill
itary power of the Nation is es-
sential to success In war and re-
quires that the operations of the
Army and Navy be co-ordinated.
Under the then existing plans the
joint defense of the Hawaiian from
tier was to be co-ordinated by
mutual cooperation between the
commanders concerned. Plans for
the defense Of the Hawaiian coastal
frontier were prepared by the COM
manding general, Hawaiian Depart
ment, and the commandant of the
14th Naval District, the latter act
ing as q subordinate of the COM
mander In chief of the Pacific Fleet.
Adherance to such a plan prepared
In advance OF hostiities does not
suffice to relieve commanders of
their responsibility to apply and
adapt the plan to the situation as
it develops.
Where as here the defense Of an
area is the joint responsibility Of
two commanders who are to co-ordi-
nate their activities by mutual CO.
operation, the first duty Of such
commanders In the case of an emer-
gency is conference and consulta-
ton with respect to the measures
to be taken under the existing plans
and the adaptation of those plans in
whole or in part to the situation.
At about the time that Admiral
Kimmel and Gen. Short assumed
their respective commands, the War
and Navy Departments were in cor
respondence with respect to ade-
quate defense against air raids on
Oahu and the naval base. The cor
respondence between the depart
ments exhibits a deep concern re-
specting the probability of this form
Of attack. These commanders were
acquainted with this correspond
ence. Nevertheless, there has been
amongst the responsible command
ers and their subordinates, without
exception, a conviction, which pre-
sisted up to December 7, 194l, that
Japan had no intention of making
any such raid. Consequently this
form of attack was a complete sur
prise to all of the superior officers
of Army and Navy stationed in the
Hawaiian area. This conviction per-
sisted notwithstanding messages
containing warnings and orders,
brought to the attention of both
commanders over a period of weeks
prior to the attack. AS early as
October 16 the commanders were
warned Of the possibility Of an at
tack by Japan on the United States
and were directed to take precau-
tions and make preparatory DISPOSE
tions in the light of this informa-
ton. A significant warning mes
sage was communicated to both the
local commanders on November "a.
On November q each responsible
commander was warned that hos
tilities were momentarily possible.
The warnings indicated war, and
war only.
No Conferences Held
For 10 Days Before Attack.
Both Of these messages contained
orders. The commanding general
was ordered to undertake such re-
connaissance and other measures as
he deemed necessary. The COM
mander in chief of the fleet was
ordered to execute a defensive de-
ployment in preparation for carry
4lS Out Wo1 bdShS. oIllCl 0ASIllllCdllk
messages followed on succeeding
days. These emphasized the i'm
pending danger and the need for
war readiness.
In this situation, during a period
Of 10 days preceding the Japanese
attack, the responsible commanders
held no conference directed to a
discussion Of the meaning of the
warnings and orders sent them. and
failed to collaborate and to CO.
ordinate defensive measures which
should be taken pursuant to the or
ders received. Dispositions as a re-
suit of the messages we're inde-
pendently made by each comman-
der. Neither of them informed
himself of the measures and dis
positions taken by the other.
The dispositions 50 made were
inadequate to meet a surprise air
attack.
Both commanders were handi-