Evening star., 1942-10-26
Suggests Ghorm!ey
May Be Just 'UnIucky'
MiIitory Writer Sees Relief
As No Reflection on Ability
Of South Pacific Commander
By Mai. GEORGE Fielding Eliot.

o1 dNuJ. oCOfyC SotNHtS CksOks
The shift In command in the crucial
South Pacific area, by which Vice Ad-
miral Halsey takes over from Vice Admi-
raj Ghormley will, OF course, be variously
interpreted and give rise to much specu-
lation. It may be assumed that, for
whatever reason, the relief of Admiral
Ghormley is considered imperative by
his superiors. These superiors are. in
inverse order of authority, Admiral
Nimitz, commander in chief of the Paci-
flc Fleet; Admiral King, commander in
chief of the United States Fleet and chief
of naval operations; the Secretary OF
the Navy and the President, whose naval
advice may come in part from his per-
sonal chief of staff, Admiral Leahy
Somewhere along this line the relief of
Admiral Ghormley has been decided
upon. The reason must have been a
compelling one, for officers in high COM
mand are not relieved in the midst Of
active operations and In the face Of
gathering enemy attack for any ordinary
cause. The risks OF such a change in
command are too obvious to require elab-
grafton.
But this is not to say that the relief
necessarily reflects on Admiral Ghorm-
leys military character or professional
ability, and it would be highly unfair to
assume so. A very likely cause is Ill
| health; the admiral's health is known
not to have been good, and it must be
remembered that recently all of the older
| officers of the Navy were, by the direct
order of Secretary Knox, subjected to q
most rigorous physical examination.
Then again, Admiral Ghormley,
through no fault of his own, may have
been unlucky. In war, ruthless and
utterly impersonal judgments must be
taken by those in high places, i'll luck
may blast an officers career quite as
completely, though not as deservedly, as
incompetence. If for any reason an
officer comes to be regarded as unlucky
by his superiors, they cannot help losing
confidence in him; it is still worse for
this opinion to be acquired by his sub
| ordinates.
Napoleon's first query used to be when
| any colonel was recommended to him
for promotion to a generals rank-"Is
he lucky?"
Then again, Admiral Ghormley may
have come to entertain views as to the
| future conduct of the operations in the
South Pacific which came to be at
variance with those of his superiors;
and this would necessitate his relief
unless his superiors were prepared to
alter their conceptions quite regardless
OF which might be in the right as proved
by subsequent and unforeseeable events,
However all this may be, and whatever
the reason for Admiral Ghormley's re-
lief. he is certainly handing over the
vitally important South Pacific command
to an aggressive. fighting officer with a
nigh reputation among all ranks of the
naval service from seaman up to admiral
as man who wants to carry the fight
| to the enemy. Admiral Halsey has
unique qualifications for the command of
an amphibious operation, involving the
coordination of ships, planes and troops.
He is naval aviator. He has had both
battleship and destroyer experience as
well as the command of a carrier divi-
sion. He is graduate Of the Army War
| College as well as the Naval War COL
lege. He thus has an unusually well
rounded experience and professional edu-
| cation.
1t may well be that flag officers who
have had good deal of aviation expert
ence have an advantage in the realm of
the Intangible over those whose life work
has been confined to surface ships In
time OF peace, the naval officer is taught
to think very largely in terms of the
safety of his ship. If ship is lost, or
even run ashore. her captain, navigator
and watch officer are automatically tried
by general courtmartial Therefore in
war, the loss of ship, especially large
ship, comes as a heavy psychological
blow to the responsible commander, and
the loss of several such ships may have g.
terribly depressing effect upon his mind.
A historical instance may serve to
emphasize this point. During the naval
attack, on the Turkish ports at the Dar-
danelles, on March 18, 1915, the Allied
fleet under the command of Vice Ad-
miral de Robeck, Royal Navy, lost three
old battleships (two British and one
French to enemy mines, and a British
battle cruiser was so badly damaged
that she had to be beached. Though
De Rebeck professed anxiety to renew
the attack, 1t was never in fact re-
newed, though it had bright prospects
OF being successful. Weather conditions,
the advice of the army, the difficulty
OF sweeping mines, and so on, were the
objections put forward; In other words,
all the possible obstacles loomed much
larger TO the admiral after the losses
OF March 18.
"One must" writes Winston Churchill
IN World Crisis, make great allowances
for the admiral and the naval point of
view he represents. To statesmen or SOL
dlers. ships in time of war possess no
sentimental value. They are engines of
war to be used, risked and If necessary
expended in the common cause and for
the general policy of the state. ss. But
10 an admiral of this standing and
upbr!nging, ships were sacred. The dis
credit and even disgrace Of casting
away ship was ingrained deeply by
years OF mental training and outlook.
The spectacle of this noble structure on
which so many loyalties centered, which
was the floating foothold of daily life,
laundering miserably beneath the waves
appeared as an event shocking and un-
natural IN its character. Admiral