The Waterbury Democrat., 1942-11-17

were compelled to keep hands of
 Tunisia until now. They have no army there comparable to the AL
 lied forces now attacking Tunisia and on which months of prepara-
 tions have been spent.
 It seems likely that the remnants of Rommel's army, which, accord ing to incomplete reports received here, has been moving westward at top speed, will either abandon bibya altogethre or attempt to defend only the western half of Libya - Tripo- litania = where they would be aided by the great natural barrier of the
 Sirte deesrt, 300-mile stretch of
 hot sand more arid than any other
 section of North Africa, being devoid
 of even the smallest oasis. On the other hand, if the Nazi forces with draw from Libya entirely they could take up positions along the Mareth line, the powerful system of fortifi- cations which the French buitl to protect Tunisia from possible att tacks by the Italians in Libya.
 It is all important to the axis to hold Bizerte and its Hinterland of Tunisia. With Sicily and Bizerte in axis hands the Mediterranean is cut in two. Here at its waistline the Mediterranean is so narrow that reasonably fast boats can cross from Sicily to Africa in four hours and axis bombers in either Sicily or Bizerte can take of and attack al- lied naval forces or conveys within less than half an hour after they are spotted. That is one reason why the axis is so eager to control Tunisia. If the axis can withstand the allied assault, it could-after the battle is over-send fresh troops across this canal-like section of th- Mediterranean for an attempted re- conquest of Libya.
 Once in possession of the allies, however, Bizerte would seem to be the most logical spring board for a second front in Europe. From its well-protected waters, allied troops and airplanes would be in a posi- ton to strike effectively not only at Sardinia and Sicily but even at the mainland of Italy itself.
 Geographically, Sicily and Sar- dinia offer the easiest targets, but during our five months internment in Italy we learned that the Ger mans had moved into those islands and fortified them with formidable coastal defenses. There is every reason to believe that the Germans today have from five to 10 divisions in Sicily alone. Points on the Ital- ian mainland which are farther away might be more vulnerable, therefore, to attack. Certainly when we came out of Italy on the diplo- matic train last summer there was little sign of fortifieation that we could see along the northern coast of Italy. The Germans, preoccupied with fighting in Russia and busy strengthening their positions in France. have not had time in all probability to plug this gap.
 The question of what the French fleet at Toulon does is of paramount The German fleet can- not get into the Mediterranean, blocked by Gibraltar. The axis. is depending on the Ital- ian navy to attack the United Na- tions supply line to Algeria. The Italian fleet, in the main. is not composed of heavy craft built for service in the Atlantic. but its of lighter weight primarily for service in the Mediterranean. The French ships on the other hand include many which are designed for Atlan- tic cruising and they are heavier in structure than the Italian. This is why disposition of the French fleet is of such great importance.
 A blow at northern Italy, between La Spezia and Mentone, for exam pie, would undoubtedly catch the axis unprepared at the present mo- ment and If successful would mean cutting of Italy from Germany. From there. allied forces would have to choose between storming the heights of Brenner Pass or striking north of the Adri- attic through Jugoslavia and Central Europe to Berlin.
 Tn the event of a second front opening in Italy, we are convinced that the softest spot will prove to be northern Italy. Such an opera ton would require tremendous naval undertaking-much greater than an attack on nearby Sicily and Rsrdinia--hssA s,aA~ # ni-@~tA t' ''-