Evening star., 1942-04-26

Gen. MaCAILluT has more Ilclu~
sive authority than any of these
other commanders. Admirals Nj
mitz, Layton and Helfrich command
no land forces. Gen. Wavell and
Gen. Chang command no sea forces.
Gen. Macarthur has under his stra-
tegic direction the naval force of
Vice Admiral Herbert Leary, be-
cause his offensive task requires
the seizure of land masses separated
from each other by water He is
confronted by what Is called an
'amphibious" operation. His mill
tary plan needs naval support, and
that is where Admiral Leary comes
in. But four -fifths of his strength
is land and air rather than sea.
Gen. Macarthur, 1t is hoped. will
do in reverse, going north, what the
Japanese did coming south, and the
Japanese, it is pointed out by the
authorities, operated under one su-
preme commander in their stepping
stone advance down to the Indies.
1t is known now that there was
confusion for a few weeks In Gen.
MacArthur's own camp as to- the
extent of his authority. Should the
general make plans for naval ope-
rations in the New Zealand area?
so far as Gen. Macarthur himself
was concerned. this was not at once
made clear, although it is evident
here that the governments of the
United States, Great Britain and
the Netherlands thought almost
from the very beginning that Gen.
MacArthur's territory should in
clude only Australia, the Indies, the
Philippines and the seas between
those islands.
The New Zealanders and Austral-
ians looked on New Zealand as a
potential last ditch base for the
United States in the Southwest Pa
ciflc. They saw the possibility,
However improbable, OF the time
when New Zealand would have TO
fulfill the function that is now
Australfa's, of a seat for organic
ing an offensive northward and for
keeping from Japan the control of
everything In the South Seas. New
Zealand would assume such role
only if Australia were lost.
The United States and Great
Britain, however, looked on New
Zealand as a strong link in the
communications and supply line
between North America and Au-
stralia The protection of this sup
ply line is purely naval matter,
as well outside the direct range of
Gen. MacArthur's contemplated
operations as the protection of the
supply line to England is outside
the direct range of Gen. George c.
Marshall, our Army chief of staff.
Prime Minister Peter Fraser of
New Zealand, made clear through
his representatives here that he re-
garded his country as having
military. rather than a purely naval
place in the Pacific war. The
United Nations high command-the
combined chiefs of staff committee
here-regarded the defense of New
Zealand, apart from its position in
the supply line, as matter of naval
operations, in view of its great dis
tance from any land base in con-
troll OF the Japanese.
The New Zealand point of view
was further strengthened by the fact
that New Zealand and Australia
have co-operated closely since the
wars beginning in 1899 in planning
their war action. The proposal to
put Australia in one sphere and New
Zealand in another tended to re-
duce this close cooperation. How
ever, 1t has been decided that New
Zealand is in naval area.
The strategy of the japanese In
their southwark advance serves to
illustrate the boundary between the
type of task set for Gen. Macarthur