Evening star., 1942-09-27

risk of defaulting on some of our inter-
national commitments, this demand is
not entirely selfish. 1t derives from the
conviction that democracy and the fate
of the United States are indivisible.
The British people and their govern
ment naturally are primarily interested
in the empire. The maintenance of the
empire is their principal concern and
aim If only small proportion of Brit
aims manpower has been sent to other
fronts; If we are asked to send Britain
a good part of our relatively small num-
ber of fully trained troops, the reason is
found in the fact that we must help de-
fend the empire. Our fleet, our principal
offensive weapon which has been ready
for action from the very first day of the
war, is divided into several groups which
are doing marvellous work on the seven
seas.
Today we are confronted with a su-
preme Japanese attack in the South
western Pacific. 1t is safe to say that if
it had not been for our commitments"
the new obligations we have undertaken
to send troops to England, Central Africa.
Egypt, India, and the Near East besides
sending large fleets of transports to
Russia, we would today be conducting a
strong and successful offensive in the
Pacific, threatening the Jap lines of COM
munication instead of being on the de-
fensive in the Solomons, hoping for the
best and fearing the worst.
Shipping Main Problem.
The Allied problem at this time is not
one of manpower or even production. 1t
is one of shipping. Our yards are pro-
ducing at capacity, but the rate of sink
ings in the Atlantic is so high that it is
doubtful whether we are doing more
than replacing our losses. The tonnage
of the United Nations has shrunk and
we do not have enough to meet all situa-
tions.
If we concentrate in the Atlantic there
would be little left for the Pacific. If
we concentrate in the Pacific, as hap
pened few months ago, we would hear
bitter charges from Moscow and London
that the Government of the United
States was not keeping its solemn pledges.
Confronted with this situation, We
|. have been compelled to postpone the
Pacific offensive, which appeared so
promising for us, in order to send men
and war materials across the Atlantic.
In the Pacific, on the other hand, our
losses have been extremely small. While
no figures are available, it is q fair guess
to say that we have not lost l per cent
of the merchantmen sent to Australia
and New Zealand.
S Pacific Sea Lanes Safe.
The Pacific is vast expanse of water
and at the present time the japanese
have no airdromes from which their
planes could bother our conveys. Their
submarines cannot find our conveys over
the thousands of miles of water which
separate us from Australia The picture
will change, however, if the japanese
conquer the islands east of Australia
| and win position astride our communi-
cation lines.
| If our military and naval experts were
| lItC W tllCy "Odlb
say that in order to defeat the Axis and
efficiently help the cause of the United
! Nations we must soon adopt strategy
based strictly on the needs of the United
! States.
No one opposes the sending of assist
ance to our Allies. On the contrary
every military man in Washington
realizes the Importance of keeping those
countries supplied with what they need
/ provided the stuff can reach them. Blu
4 the policy of sending the U. S. S. r. wa
material, the bulk of which is lost er
| route or cannot reach the front aftel
it is unloaded, is gesture which W.
cannot afford any longer.
No military or naval man denies tn,
Importance to us of Great Britain which
has been properly described as our mair
fortress in the path of the Nazis. But
according to all accounts, Britain is mill
tarily and industrially strong enough Il
meet any emergency with only small
amount of assistance from us.
The United Nations are tied togethe
by the same aim-to defeat the Axis
But this aim will be difficult to accom-
plish if we spread our strength too thir