Evening star., 1942-01-27

dUtdSh AloAl WAtAl WlllSll VIC
had no means of coping.
But as time passed the mighty
United States, under the leadership
of President Roosevelt, for reasons
Of its own interests and safety but
also out Of chivalrous regard for the
cause OF freedom and democracy,
has drawn ever nearer to the strug-
gle and now that this blow has
fallen it does not fall on us alone.
On the contrary, 1t falls upon
United States forces and united ma
tions which unquestionably are
capable Of enduring the struggle, re-
trieving their losses and preventing
another such stroke from ever being
delivered again.
We are producing more than twice
as many and far more complicated
guns every month than in the peak
19l7-18 war period, as we'll as service
rifles.
Tank production has doubled In
the last six months.
Small-arms production is more
than twice what 1t was six months
ago.
Filled rounds of ammunition dou-
bled In the last six months.
In aircraft production there Is 4
steady increase. not only In num-
bers, but in size and quality, though
1t Is not all the increase looked for.
Transport Limits Amount
OF Aid to Be Sent TO East.
But this has nothing to do with
the preparations it was open to US
to make in Malaga, Burma and the
Far East.
The limiting factor has not been
troops and equipment, but trans
port.
From the moment this Govern
ment was formed, every scrap Of
shipping We could draw away from
our vital supply route, every U-boat
escort we could divert from the
Battle of the Atlantic has been used
to its utmost capacity to carry
troops, tanks and munitions to the
East.
AAC4C Al0o bCC1l y SCA0CACoc 4AOW.
The decision was taken, as I have
explained. to make our contribu-
tions to Russia, try to beat Rommel
and form q strong front from the
Levant to the Caspian.
It follows we could only make
partial provision in the Far East
against the hypothetical danger Of
Japanese onslaught.
Sixty thousand men were. indeed,
concentrated at Singapore but pri-
ority of aircraft, tanks. anti-air-
craft. anti-tank and munitions was
accorded the Nile Valley.
Takes Personal Responsibility
For Singapore Defenses.
For this decision in its broad
strategic aspects and also its diplo-
matte policy toward Russia I take
the fullest personal responsibility.
Why, therefore, should I be called
upon to pick our scapegoats, throw
blame upon generals and sacrifice
my loyal and trusted colleagues to
appease the clamor OF certain Sec
tions Of the British and Australian
press or take the edge of our re-
verses in the Far East?
If were capable Of rendering this
country no further service when.
therefore, I am told to jettison Duff
Cooper and to throw him to the
wolves, I can only say that I much
regret I am unable to crafty such
wishes, or words to that effect.
1t seemed irrational - to sup
pose that the japanese, having
thrown away the opportunity of at
tacking us in the autumn Of 1910,
when we were 50 much weaker and
all alone, should have at this period
come into q desperate struggle
against the combined forces of the
British Empire and the United
States.
Nevertheless nations, like individ-
uals, commit irrational acts, and
there were forces at work in Japan
violent, murderous, fanatical, ex-
plosive forces-which no one could
measure.
V0UntcO OH OHltCO StAtCS
To Enter War In Pacific.
On the other hand the probability,
since the Atlantic Conference at
which discussed these matters with
President Roosevelt. that the United
States, even if not herself attacked,
would come into the war In the
Far East and thus make the final
victory assured, allayed some OF
these anxieties and that expectation
has not been falsified by events.
This fortified our British decision
to use our limited resources on the
actual fighting front.
As time went on We have had
greater assurance that, If Japan ran
amok in the Pacific, We should not
flnd ourselves alone.
1t must also be remembered that
over the whole Pacific seas brooded
the powerful United States fleet con-
centrated at Hawaii.
It seemed very unlikely that the
japanese would attempt a distant
invasion Of the Malay Peninsula, an
assault on Singapore and an attack
on the Netherlands Indies while
leaving behind them, on flank and
rear, this great American Fleet.
When I reached the United States
further steps were taken by the
President, with my cordial assent,
to move from many directions every
thing that ships could carry and
all air power which could be flown
to suitable areas.
However, to strengthen the posi-
ton. we sent the Prince Of Wales
and Repulse to form the spearpoint
Of the considerable battle squadron
which we felt able to form in the
Indian Ocean.
Japs' Treacherous Attack
Reversed the Situation.
On December 7 the Japanese, by
q sudden and treacherous attack
delivered while their ENJOYS still
were negotiating in Washington,
crippled for the time being the
American Pacific Fleet and in a
few days inflicted a very heavy
naval loss on us by sinking the
Prince of Wales and the Repulse.
For q time, therefore, naval su-