Evening star., 1942-02-17
The Morale Problem

The Morale Problem
Now that Singapore has fallen,
casting across the whole picture of
the war a black shadow which must
be obvious to the most unobservant
citizen, it is to be hoped that the
leaders of the Anglo-Saxon peoples
will stop trying to sugar r-coat the
fact that the struggle as whole is
going very badly for the Allied ma
tions.
Winston Churchill by and large
has not INDUCED in false optimism.
But many of his subordinates have.
Long before war started in the Far
East. British authorities gave out
rosy-hued reports of the reinforce
ments being sent to Singapore.
Glowing stories were released of ship
after ship that was docking there,
loaded with men and military equip
ment. Nor was the public given any
thing approaching an accurate pic
ture of the military situation after
the fighting had started. When
Cecil Brown, radio correspondent,
attempted to broadcast some of the
facts he was barred from the air.
Even as late as February the
actual situation was being grossly
n1isrepresented. On that date Lieu
tenant General A. E. Percival, COM
mander of the British forces at
Singapore. declared without the
slightest qualification: 1--WE will hold
Singapore. There is no question
about it." A week later he was ac-
cepting a japanese demand for un-
conditional surrender.
1t is hardly to be supposed that
an officer of General Percival's expe-
rience could have so utterly niscal-
culated the military prospects as to
have really believed on February 7
that Singapore certainly would be
held. 1t is much more probable. and
many incidents in the Malayan cam
paign tend to confirm the belief, that
his statement was issued on the
assumption that it would be good
for the morale of the native popula-
ton and probably also for that OF
the English-speaking peoples.
Yet when such categorical state
ment Is followed so quickly by un-
conditional surrender, the effect on
morale surely must be quite the con-
trary. Would 1t not be better to issue
only factual statements. or to remain
silent, rather than to raise false
hopes which are so soon to be dashed
in total defeat? And Singapore,
after all, is but one battle in long
war. What may be expected OF the
morale Of the people If, at the very
outset Of the struggle, they discover
that they cannot put faith in the
statements of their commanders?
That is the sort of thing that leads
to disbelief Of any official statement,
whether it be true or false, and
which lends substance to the wild
est rumors simply because the people
will not believe denials OF them, even
when the denials are true.
The British have not been the only
ones to fall into this error. There
has been nothing in this country
comparable to the Singapore Incl
dent, but it is fact that the Ameri-
can people have not been given any
picture OF the war which properly
relates the good to the bad. There
Is too much emphasis on minor sue
cesses. too much of tendency to
play down the significant reverses
It is good for the people to know of
individual acts Of heroism on the
part of American soldiers, but morale
is not really being bolstered when
these incidents-relatively unimpor-
tant in the broad sweep of the war
are given so much prominence in
official communiques that the public
tends to lose sight of the fact that
the conflict on the whole is going
very badly for us. At some point the
hour of awakening will come and
then there will be disillusionment,
accompanied by justified resentment.
The major purpose Of the Govern
ment at this time should not be to
soft pedal bad news. The people of
this country, as we'll as the British,
are strong enough to face the truth.
And their response to appeals for
an all-out war effort will be greater
when the true facts of our position
are laid before them. without any
attempt to disguise their real signifi-