Evening star., 1942-01-25

~ %, 1912.
the dangers Of sabotage and sub
versive activities as far ~ Hawaii
was concerned, there was bulletin
issued on December ! telling Of the
deployment Of two strong Jap naval
task forces from their home bases.
Other messages Of this period, In
cluding authorizations for the de-
struction of confidential documents.
did not create in the minds Of the
responsible officers in the Hawaiian
area apprehension as to probable
imminence Of air raids" the COM
mission found.
"On the contrary they only served
to emphasize in their minds the dan
ger from sabotage and surprise sub
marine attack. The necessity for
taking . state Of war readiness
which would have been required to
avert or meet an air raid. attack
was not considered"
"All That Were Intended"
In this connection, incidentally, 1t
was noted that Gen. Short twice
outlined to the War Department the
precise steps being taken to guard
against sabotage or subversive ac-
tivities+and received no acknowl-
edgement of these reports. Conse-
quently, the ofiicer testified to the
commission, he considered there
had been "tacit agreement that the
measures taken were all that were
intended by the department"
Referring to incomplete liaison be-
tween the two commanding officers,
the commission reported that they
did not at any time confer on the
precise implications of messages re-
ceived from Washington on or sub
sequent to November n.
In fact, during Q discussion Of
another matter-the possible re-
placement Of Marine units by Army
units on Wake and Midway Islands
Admiral Kimmel repeatedly in
quired Of his war plans ofiicer, q
Capt. McMorris, about probability
Of a surprise air attack on Oahu.
According to Gen. Short" the
commission declared. capt McMor-
ris replied there was no probability
Of such an attack; and, according to
Capt. McMorris, his reply was that
the Japanese would never so attack"
In bluntly damning words, the
commission then asserted that after
November u the two responsible
officers independently took such
action as each deemed appropriate
to the existing situation. Neither
informed the other specifically Of
the action he was taking, and
neither inquired Of the other
whether or not any action had
been taken. nor did they consult As
to the appropriateness Of the actions
taken by them respectively"
In brief, what was done follows:
Gen. Shore ordered alert Mol
against acts "of sabotage and up
risings within the islands, with no
threat from without and directed
that the aircraft warning system
be operated daily from 4 am. to
Tam. The attack came at 7:55 am.
Admiral Bloch called q confer
ence Of destroyer commanders Of
the inshore patrols and directed
them to be on the alert.
Admiral Kimmel made certain
dispositions Of units of the fleet"
and ordered attack upon any Japa-
nese submarines found within GER
tain areas
Regarding the aircraft detection
system, the board then disclosed
that only mobile units were in oper-
ating status at that period, and
then only for intermittent daytime
training periods. The commits
stoned officer whose ignored dis
covery was made shortly after Z am.
on December was operating q
device at his own request Tor extra
training.
The commission found, however,
that there was sufficient partially
trained personnel available to oper-
ate the aircraft warning system
throughout ~ hours of the day
It found, too, that Admiral Kim
mel assumed that the aircraft
warning system was being fully
operated by the Army, but made
no inquiry"
Not Maintained On Sunday.
BY terms Of the joint defense
plan, the Army had responsibility
for conducting tnshore airplane
patrol. the Navy responsibility for
onshore patrol.
But despite recorded warnings,
only training patrols were being
maintained by either service, and on
weekdays only. No inshore patrol
was operating on the morning Of
December Z, the commission said,
and similar lack Of effective long
distance Naval reconnaissance was
indicated.
The actual attack, the commits
sion asserted, was made by force
composed of three or four Jap air-
craft carriers, with supporting sur
face craft and q few small subma-
rines. Radio silence was maintained
during their SNEAK" approach on
Oahu.
Although the first Jap submarine
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