Evening star., 1942-01-28
British Air Marshal Calls Single Aviation
Force Vital to Successful Conduct of War
BY vIsCOUNT TRENCHARD,

ITOTCe VuOI 10 .
BY VISCOUNT TRENCHARD,
Marshal Of the Royal Air Force
copyrisht, 1912. BY the Daily telegraph.
London.
LONDON, Jan. 28-Far be 1t
from me to add to the controversy
that seems always to rage when any
matters of how to use air power
are debated. I cannot help remem-
bering what great general re-
marked to me in the last war about
these controversies:
why do you deplore the fight
over air between the services? AS
long as there Is air there will always
be an air crisis due to the extraordi-
nary speed and range of aircraft"
In recent months a great deal has
been written in the American press
and elsewhere to prove that the
British system Of an autonomous air
force Is a disastrous failure, that
each and every reverse that has be-
fallen British arms from Norway to
Crete has been due to the existence
Of the third service and that even
our successes, such as the sinking
of the Bismarck and the improve
ment in the battle of the Atlantic
and in the battle Of Britain were
for some mystical reason in spite
Of and not due to our organization.
Biased Criticism Charged.
The moral is drawn that the pres
ent system In the United States,
where there are three or four sep
arate. air : forces, should be per-
petuated in the United States and
extended to the British Empire
I do not presume to suggest to
the United States how their forces
should be organized. I do not pro-
fess to be an expert on Western
Hemisphere defense and would not
presume to offer advice on that
subject to those whose business 1t
is further, perhaps, than to ex-
press the hope that they will not
permit themselves to be deluded by
inexpert and biased criticism into
making wrong judgments on prem
ises fantastically incorrect.
The first point to remember as
background to all consideration
of the lessons of this war UP to
date is that we started the war in
shocking condition of weakness.
For years we had been spending
annually about eight times as much
on the older services as we spent
on the air force.
Air Force Deeds Minimized.
The lessons and portents of the
last war were not generally under
stood and after that war most re-
sponsible officers in the Navy and
Army minimized the accomplish
ments Of the air forces in the war
and failed to foresee what should
have been plain for all to see, the
potentialities of air power 20 years
ahead.
Fifteen years later we failed to
profit by the unmistakable warnings
we received in 1884 or even in 1898
to take our aircraft production
seriously in hand, and no one can
look back today on the air situation
in September, 1889, without shud-
der at our sheer audacity in going
to war at all with the air force and
the aircraft industry in the state
they were in at that time.
Even 20 months later, at the time
of Crete, we had still had to con-
centrate our resources on providing
for the vital needs of defense at
home and in the Atlantic to an
extent that may be measured by
the fact that at the time of Crete
we had barely so serviceable fight
ers in the Middle East command
and a few obsolescent American
fighters at Singapore.
Urged Malaga Is Air Base.
Fifteen years ago I, as chief Of
the air staff, was advocating that
Malaga should be made a great air
base and that our limited allotment
of money should be spent on bomb
ers and torpedo aircraft instead of
on the huge guns that are there
now.
The situation Is very different to-
day. But the significant fact is that
In only two major operations have
we had anything approaching the
necessary air strength, namely, the
battle of Britain and the recent
operations in Libya. And we were
only able to secure that strength
by ruthless adherence to the one
great principle Of air warfare, the
principle that in itself not only
justif1es but imperatively demands
a single autonomous air force, the
principle of concentration of the
greatest available force on the task
that is decisive at the time.
The second point to remember,
arising directly out of the first, is
that the democracies cannot do in
peace or even always in war all the
things that are strategically de-
sirable. a condition which, while it
will be a strength in the long run,
is often temporarily a terrible
strategic handicap.
Statesman Is Responsible.
In a democracy, because it Is q
democracy, the fighting man Is the
servant OF the statesman and
strategy is profoundly affected by
ipfaroo1 and S,tny,. tin,.sl y>oyitla.