Evening star., 1942-06-24

ferred TO DaDy II
along" the Japa- 81 -
nese for three David Lawrence.
months.
This is the sensational disclosure
made by Ernest Lindley and For
rest Davis in an article in the cur
rent issue of the Ladies Home Jour-
nal which is prefaced by the maga-
zines editors with the statement
that these two writer's have been
given access to something hitherto
denied the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the members of
Congress generally, namely access
to the files in the White House, the
State Department and other Gov
ernment agencies" concerning the
events that led up to our entry into
the present World War.
The isolationists have all along
claimed that secret diplomacy and
secret conversations were determin-
ing Americas commitments and
would lead to American participa-
ton in the war. The strongly
worded note which was sent by the
United States Government to Japan
on November 26, 194l, and which
has often been referred to as an
ultima tum because it served notice
that Japan must in effect withdraw
from China, was met by Japan on
December 7, 1941, with an attack
at Pearl Harbor.
Indicated War Expected.
The events that preceded and
which indicated that America ex-
pected war are told by Messrs. Lind
ley and Davis in what must consti-
tute the most striking piece of pre-
war history yet published. 1t reads
in part as follows:
THE transatlantic exchange OF
views (on December Z, l94D re-
minded the President Of difference
over Far Eastern policy that devel-
oped between him and the Prime
Minister when they met in New
foundland blight for the Atlantic
conference august, 194D. Churchill
wished to meet the issue head on.
He asked the President-as the Brit
ish, Australians and Dutch repeat
edly had besought this Government
before-to join in an ultimative dec
laration to Japan.
For some time the other Pacific
powers had sought to establish
deadline in the Far East, serving
notice on the Nipponese Empire that
thus far, and no further, might they
goa deadline political as well as
geographical, setting bounds to
pressure on other states as we'll as
to the enlargement of Japanese
forces in Indo- China. While such a
move entailed the risk OF war,
Churchill. mistrusting further pro-
crastination, believed 1t might bring
the japanese to book.
President 'Temporized.'
"Unlike the Prime Minister, Mr..
Roosevelt lacked the constitutional
capacity to make commitment in
volving the possibility Of automatic
hostilities. Only Congress can de-
clare war. There were, moreover,
other considerations. Mr.. Roosevelt
believed in August, on evidence IN
the hands of the State Department,
that war in the Pacific was matter
of weeks or months. Yet he knew
the country's unreadiness. The
President, therefore, temporized.
Wouldn't we be better of In
three months?' he asked.
Churchill agreed, still doubling,
however, that such respite would
be forthcoming without concerted
action now.
leave that to me- said the
President. I think I can baby them
along for three months
"A hitherto unpublished aspect
OF the Atlantic conference, the Incl
dent should dispose Of an 1mpllca-
tion sometimes heard: That the
United States projected an unwill-
Ing Britain into the Far Eastern war.
"On December 7 Mr.. Roosevelt
reflected that he had babied the
Japanese along for almost four
months, not three. He had nat
urally been aware that the japanese
concurrently we're babying along the
Western powers. Their motives
were, however, far from innocent.
The japanese, readying us for the
kill, needed time to mature their
treachery. In the light Of their
Atlantic conversations, neither
Roosevelt nor Churchill was sur
prised on December 7, although both
were taken aback by the foulness
of the blow. On their timetables,
war in that quarter was overdue"
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