Evening star., 1942-07-01
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

There are some signs of renewed
activity in the Pacific which sug-
gest that the United Nations forces
may be getting ready to capitalize
on the naval advantages gained in
the Coral Sea and Midway battles.
Our aircraft have raided Wake,
nearest of the Japanese-held out
posts to Midway; raids on Timor
and the japanese bases around the
eastern end of New Guinea have
been rising in scale and apparently
In effectiveness; and it is officially
announced for the first time that a
completely equipped expeditionary
force of marines has arrived at an
unnamed base in the Southwest
Pacific Whatever these signs may
portend, there are certain general
considerations worth remembering.
First of all, bombing does not
take a position. A base held by the
enemy may be damaged by bombing,
so that he cannot use it at all for a
certain time (until he has effected
repairs) or, more usually, so that
he cannot use it at full capacity. He
can only be kept from using it over
a long period by continuous and
repeated bombings, kept up steadily
day after day, as the Germans have
done at Malta. But this requires the
assignment to that task, and no
other, of a very large number of
aircraft, and against well-de-
Tended position usually entails a
high scale of losses.
Willing to Pay Price.
The Germans were willing to pay
the price at Malta in order to reap
the. reward which Rommel has
gained in Africa. The greater the
distance the more aircraft must be
kept continuously in service to pro-
duce a given fire effect on the tar
get. Malta is only 60 miles from
Sicily, but it is 400 miles from Dar-
winfto Timor and rather more than
that from Port Moresby to Rabaul
But even if a sufficient concentra-
ton Of aircraft could be effected to
keep the japanese from using their
bases, this would still be only
negative result. There is no positive
gain to be expected elsewhere-as
in the Malta Egypt situation-which
would justify such an expenditure
of men and material What is
needed in this case is to drive the
Japanese out of the positions alto
gether and convert them to our own
use. am not applying this to the
particular cases of Timor and
Rabaul, but in general to all the
island bases of the Pacific.
We want to reduce the effective
radius of operations of the enemy's
air and naval forces and increase
that of our own. This is because
the enemy's most vulnerable spot is
his sea communications, at which
we are striking, on which all his
enterprises depend, and which he
has established these outlying bases
to cover.
Preliminary Operation.
For our Pacific purposes, there
fore, bombing is only a temporary
expedient, or a preliminary opera
ton The only way to take base
position such as Rabaul, or Wake,
or Tulagi, is to land troops and
take physical possession of it.
Bombing may damage it, but it is
not ours, nor is the enemy definitely
deprived of it, until John j. Dough-
boy Cor Henry H. Leatherneck) is
standing on it, rifle in hand.
Under Pacific conditions, John
must be transported to the place he
Is to take, with all his equipment, in
highly vulnerable ships. Protection
against naval attacks must be given
these ships by naval force superior