Evening star., 1942-02-22
Strategy Of Offense
Developing
BIZ ODen L. Scott.

beginning to question the British plan
for fighting the war. That plan stresses
defense. 1t calls for spreading available
forces thinly over the world in the hope
that the tide Of victory for the Germans
and japanese can be checked at some
point and then reversed.
Experience now suggests that that type
Of plan leads nowhere, except to con-
tinual defeat. The alternative Is to con-
centrate forces in an effort to- deliver
an offensive blow at some weak spot
in the defensive armor of the enemy.
This type Of plan would accept the pros
pect of defeat in outlying areas Of the
world as the temporary price to be paid
for the chance to organize a blow to be
delivered toward the heart Of the op-
ponent.
Some Of the best Of American STRAIT
egists point out that the strategic plan
followed to date permits the enemy to
retain the initiative while American and
British forces are dispersed-a few here
and a few thereto the far corners of
the world.
The result is most clearly apparent in
the case of Japan. There is nation Of
about 100000 people, with industry
capable of producing only $4,000, 900 900
of arms each year. Her steel capacity is
only about 100000 tons. She has limited
shipbuilding facilities. The United States
and Great Britain in the past have sup
piled at least rs per cent of the basic
materials that went into her armament
On the other side are America and
Britain with her dominions. These ma
tions have nearly 200 100000 people. They
now are producing arms at the rate Of
about 500,0OO,000 each month, rather
than each year Their steel capacity is
100000 0000 tons. They are producing
airplanes at the rate of about 1000 each
month, as against Japan's 1000 or less.
Their shipbuilding capacity is immense.
They have access to almost unlimited
supplies of raw materials.
Yet Japan to date is the victor. Her
victories are of the blitzkrieg variety
and are overwhelming in their signifi-
canoe.
The reason is that the American and
British forces are spread thin, except
for the British Isles themselves. We sent
a few planes to the Philippines, very
few to the Dutch East Indies, few to
the Chinese, few to Russia, a few to
each of the numerous bases around this
country, quite few to Africa and quite
a few to England. 1t was the same with
the British. And it was the same with
tanks, guns and other war equipment
and with men.
But the japanese, fast thinking, fast
acting, making CANDLES Of great i'm
portance, smashed through to victory by
concentrating their limited forces toward
a single definite objective. These forces
were tied to the airplane. Even with her
limited aircraft industry, Japan was
able to gain complete mastery of the
air over the Philippines. over Malaga
and over most of the Dutch East Indies
With this command of the air she
gained control Of the sea and drove the
British and American navies out OF
most of the Pacific.
Japan, with limited power, concen-
trated that power and is reaping i'm
mense rewards. Britain and the United
States, with much greater power, dis
persed that power and are suffering de-
feats of almost staggering consequence
The failure of American leadership to
estimate the airplane accurately con-
tributed greatly to the size and severity
of the defeat.
Hitler, like the japanese, is taking ad-
vantage of the same British American
policy to make his gains. He miscalcu-
lated in the case of Russia and has lost
time and strength as a result. but he
now obviously is preparing new thrust:
designed to make the most Of the pre-
vailing dispersal of strength on the part
Of his enemies.
What should be done under the cir.
cumstances?
A school Of military opinion that ap.
pears now to be getting a hearing is urg.
ing the need for organization and action
of American-British Empire strength Il
take the offensive at some important
point. This group of military planner:
suggests something like the following
First, decide which Is the weaker op-
ponent, Germany or Japan. Second
with that decision made, determine
which points in the world must be helc
at all costs. Third, concentrate efforts
on bulwarking those points with a
strength that will be sufficient to check
an attack. After that, or coincident with
it, get forces together to strike at the
heart of the weaker opponent. The argu.
ment is made that so long as all empha-
sis is upon defense, the other side viii
be able to call all of the shots and tt
make attacks in overwhelming force a
the point of attack.
It is obvious that Japan is the weake
of this country's major opponents. Sh'
is using up material faster than it car
be replaced. When her troops or ship
or airplanes are met on anything near al
equal footing the result is defeat fol
the Japanese On the other hand, thi
country is well able to replace its ma
terial losses. 1t can afford to TAX
chances if there Is any prospect of weak
ening the Japanese Army and air fore
or its industry.
Until this time, however, Presiden
Roosevelt as Commander in Chief of tn
Army and Navy, appears to have followed
a very cautious defensive policy.
No effort was made to aid or to evacu