Evening star., 1942-01-30

that he would keep the leaders Of
both parties in Congress advised Of
critical moves in the international
situation, it is now possible to state
that no such communication was
made relative to the all-important
note OF November 26 sent by the
United States to Japan.
Senator Connolly, chairman Of the
Senate Foreign Relations Commit
tee, when asked whether he or any
other member of the committee
knew Of the firm note Of Novem-
Der 26, stated to this correspondent
that he did not know about 1t till
he read 1t in the press just after
Pearl Harbor was attacked.
There is nothing to indicate that
the Senators would have disagreed
with the policy Of firmness in deal
ing with Japan or that they would
have disapproved Of the contents of
the note, but 1t is interesting to
consider what would have been the
effect on the American people and
hence on the entire Army and Navy,
including those stationed at Hawaii
and the Philippines, If the document
had been given to the press Novem-
bef 26.
Historians May Ponder.
Assuming that the Japanese ships
were out to sea and waiting for
orders to move closer to Pearl Har-
Dor. would not the American mill
tary and naval forces have realized
that America was on the verge of
war after reading the note of No
vember 26? This is the question
which historians may be asking and
which defenders Of . policy of open
dealing with the people Of q democ-
racy through the press, as contrasted
with q hush-hush and suppression
policy. may exhibit as an example
OF tragedy that came because the
facts were withheld.
What would have been the public
reaction If 1t had been revealed
that the United States Government
had formally demanded that Japan |
withdraw from China and recognize
tho Chungkhag government? This
demand Is believed to have aggre-
vated an already tense situation and
proof Of this Is to be found in the
bitterly phrased note of the jap
anese which was handed to the
American Government on the very
day Of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
The Roberts report says the Jap
anese government planned to sever
diplomatic relations at l o'clock
Washington time and attack stimuli
taneously. The Japanese plan for
synchronizing the steps apparently
went wrong, but that Japan was
smarting under the American note
cannot be doubted from the follow
ing language Of her reply:
"The proposal in question (Amer-
ica's suggestion that Japan withdraw
from China and recognize the
Chungking government) ignores
Japan's sacrifices in the four years
Of the China affair, menaces the
empires existence and disparages
It's honor and prestige"
Could Have Alerted Command.
Anybody familiar with Far East
ern affairs must have known that
such demand as America made
on November 26 would make the
Japanese angry. 1t will be argued
that they deserved such a blunt
statement but can it be argued that
when such serious decision was
made it should have been kept
secret and not given to the United
States armed forces and the Ameri-
can people as well as the Japanese
people? The policy of suppression
played into the hands Of the mill
taristic clique in Japan and deprived
the American Army and Navy
officers Of information which would
have impressed upon them the
necessity for being on the alert dur
ing the II days that elapsed between
November 26 and December 7.
1t will be said that the note was
withheld for fear of offending
Japan. But the speeches made by
American official spokesmen which
were published in Japan during the
last week in October were not in
hibited by any such considerations
Of international etiquette or diplo-
matte restraint. The fact remains
that America drifted into war with
out the influential leaders of either
party in Congress or the American
people knowing the contents of a