Evening star., 1942-04-28
ImperiIed Burmo

imperiled burmo
Local successes like the current
counterattack launched by the Chit
nese at Taungyi to relieve japanese
pressure on their left flank should
not blind us to the significance OF
the general picture. which is increas-
ingly grave. With japan pouring
In reinforcements and maintaining
mastery of the air, the disparity OF
strength grows steadily in It's favor
Except for airplanes, no help can
reach the British in Burma from
India. Chinese ground forces con-
tinue to arrive from South China
over the Burma road, but these have
little equipment except small arms,
machine guns and trench mortars.
The Anglo Chinese defenders are
short on artillery and ammunition
with which to serve what guns they
still possess This exposes the de-
tenders to heavy losses at all times.
Under such handicaps, no praise
can be too high for the skill with
which the defense has been con-
Quoted From the very start of the
campaign. 1t was waged against
heavy odds. When the japanese be-
gan operations against Burma, the
British imperial garrison there did
not exceed one division of mixed
white and Indian troops, together
with about the same number of
Burmese local forces, some of whom
proved unreliable. They were not
notably reinforced from India at
that time, because all available
strength In men and equipment was
being rushed to the defense of Sin
gapore. Then it was too late, because
Japanese naval forces Immediately
appeared in the Bay of Bengal, cut
ting the water routes over which aid
from India must come The number
Of Chinese troops sent to Burma was
limited to the capacity Of the Burma
road. and probably has not exceeded
the equivalent Of three British di-
visions, Thought may now be slightly
stepped up to replace mounting
losses. The original British imperial
division, after nearly five months of
continuous fighting, must be reduced
to a vestige of its original strength.
1t Is against this grim background
that the present strategical situation
should be viewed. The japanese are
pressing a fourfold attack. Their
main columns, pressing up the par
allel valleys Of the Irrawaddy and
Sittang Rivers, have been powerfully
supplemented by another column
working westward from Thailand up
the Salween River and its tributaries,
its aim being to cut the communica-
tions of the Chinese in the Sittang
Valley. This was prevented temp
orarily by the desperate Chinese
counterattack which threw the Jap
anese out of Taungyi But another
Japanese menace is developing still
farther to the eastward, where
column is working through the
mountainous valleys of the Shan
States, aiming at the ultimate Chi
nese base at Lashio, the southern
terminus of the Burma road.
Under these circumstances, it is
hard to see how the Anglo-C Chinese
defense can do better than fight
rearguard operations in a general
retreat on Mandalay. Perhaps the
last oil fields on the upper Irrawaddy
can be held for some time, since they
are only fifty miles from Mandalay.
The coming of the monsoon rains
may help some, but not to the extent
they would have done If the japanese
had been held in Lower Burma, be-
cause Upper Burma has a much
lighter rainfall and campaigning
there is proportionately more FEAST
BILE The well-led British imperial
and Chinese troops can be expected
to continue their dogged resistance.
But they cannot work miracles.