Evening star., 1942-08-22
U. S. Strategy in So|omons
Bases There Must Be Used for Further
Attacks in Southwest Pacific, Mai. Eliot Says

gree of security to make extensive
preparations for the next step,
whatever it may be and in what
ever part of the tremendous Pacific
battle area it may come.
Just now, in the Eastern Solomons
we are still close to japanese held
bases, where enemy concentrations
may gather to attack us: at Bou-
gainville We would be little better
off because we would have more
base area ourselves, but the Japa-
nese would still be close at hand:
but when we have taken the New
Guinea posts and Raboul and the
other adjacent positions. then the
nearest Japanese base will be Truk.
in the Caroline Islands, 300 miles
away.
Various counter moves are, of
course. open to the Japanese, who
do not accept defeat easily. They
can send strong forces to fight us In
the Solomons, at Bougainville or
elsewhere.
Or they can try big naval sweep
through the Pacific directed toward
our line Of communication sus-
gestion which is given some color
ny the reported raid of our marines
on Maxim Island. in the Gilbert
group, which would be on the route
of such japanese stroke If directed
against Samoa.
Raids on Japanese held positions
in the Gilberts might be intended
to deprive the Japanese feet Of the
| support of shore-base aircraft in
that part of the Pacific, Gripping
blow in view of the heavy losses
Japan has suffered in aircraft car
riers.
At all events, it has always been
the theory of our naval strategists
that a war with Japan would sooner
or later come to a step-by- step
American advance into the island
base system of the Japanese in the
Southwest Pacific, and that this
would, at given point, compel the
japanese to bring their fleet out to
fight a decisive battle rather than
endure a further threat to their
vital sea communications.
What the given point may be
rests on the judgment of the Japa-
nese high command. If they think
/ their chances are better now than
later, they probably will seek fight
now, before we get any more air
bases; If they are rushing new ships
| to completion, and new aircraft. they
may wait for these reinforcements,
Russia Poses Problem to Foe.
A good deal also depends on the
extent to which they are committed
to an attack on Russia. Over this
issue. the fundamental point of long
disagreement between the Japanese
Army and Navy, it seems likely that
acrimonious dispute now is rife In
| lOKlO inner circles.
The navy will want aircraft for the
Southwest Pacific; the army will
perhaps wish to make sure OF the
Chinese railways and to attack Rus
sia while the golden opportunity
exists which is created by Russia S
troubles In Europe.
| The number of aircraft available
is limited. Consequently Japan must
give up something-or, as has often
happened in such cases. her high
! command may find itself compelled
to compromise and thus fall between
| two stools.
| Meanwhile 1t should be noted that
resistance of sort still continues
on the islands we have captured.
For long time observers who know
the japanese have predicted that In
war with the Western powers, when
! the turn of the tide came, it would
be necessary for our troops, even
when winning, to kill every japanese
soldier individually; that there
! would be no surrender-at least at
first-until the whole japanese ma
! ton realized it was defeated.
! Copyright. 1912, New York Tribune, Inc)