Evening star., 1942-11-11
Sees TripoIi Goal
Of Action in Tunisiu
MiIitory Critic Discusses
American Operations Against
Importont Axis Base
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Mai. George Fielding Eliot.
The plan of operations in French
North Africa is becoming little clearer
as the reports come in. 1t appears to be
plan combining political and military
elements. The first military moves had
as their objectives the seizure of the
principal seaports of Morocco and AL
geria and of the principal airfields near
the coast. The seaports were necessary
to facilitate the Decentralization of large
forces with their heavy equipment which
cannot be put ashore on an open beach
except under conditions of great diff
Guilty and risk. Possession of the ports
was also necessary to forestall any at
tempt on the part of the Vichy French
or the Axis to reinforce the North AZ
rican garrison.
Possession of the airfields was essen
tial to enable our air force to get into
operation at the earliest possible mo-
ment to obtain information Of what the
French troops were doing and If neces-
sary, to prevent hostile concentrations
by attacks on rail centers.
These initial stages appear practically
completed. Algiers itself is in our hands,
and after some resistance our forces have
taken Oran and are closing on Casa
blanca. This accounts for the three chief
seaports, all Of which have important
airf1elds near them which we have also
taken. Both Oran and Casablanca are
naval bases of some consequence. The
resistance encountered appears to have
been chiefly from the French naval
forces, though it is not as yet certain
to what extent, if any, the army has
participated in the fighting.
1t should be remembered that a great
many of the French troops in North
Africa are either natives of the region
or Senegalese from West Africa, and
many of these would doubtless fire on
any one they were ordered to fight But
there is distinct and growing impress
sion that the purely French elements of
the army are either coming over to our
side or making only half-hearted show
Of resistance before surrendering. The
are manned by naval personnel and
these appear to have put up fight.
However, from all appearances, resist
ance will not last long and is not causing
our forces any serious casualties
The political phases of our offensive
have been admirably co-ordinated with
the military. The Presidents notes to the
Spanish and Portuguese governments
appear to have been reassuring both at
Madrid and Lisbon. 1t is of Importance
that Spain should remain quiet, as other
wise Spanish Morocco might afford a
bridgehead for an attack upon our forces
in French Morocco and the Balearic
Islands for raids against the Algerian
coast.
Another political move is to be noted
in the Presidents messages to the Bey
of Tunis and the French resident gen.
eral in that country, which is apparently
intended to prepare the way for the
passage of American troops through
Tunisia. There is some reason to sup
pose that Admiral Jean Pierre Esteva,
the resident general, is less well disposed
toward policy of collaboration with
Germany than some other French naval
officers.
In this connection the present position
of Admiral Jean Darlan is extremely
interesting, and there seems at least
possibility that he may have come to the
conclusion-for reasons suggested in my
article of October 24-thaG the interests
of France and his own personal fortunes
would be best served by collaborating
with the United States from now on
instead of with Germany. What effect
such decision may have on the future
movements of the French fleet remains
to be seen; at any rate. so far the main
fleet at Toulon has net made any move
to interfere with our operations, so far
as is known.
The arrival of American forces in
French North Africa is, of course, directly
connected with the Egyptian-Libyan
campaign. The remnants of Field
Marshal Erwin Rommel's forces are now
fleeing into Libya with the British in
pened, and in both cases the Axis found
it possible to send in supplies and re-
Inducements through the port of Tripoli,
so that resistance stiffened at points near
the border between Cyrenaica and
Tripolitania and eventually the Axis
forces were able to stage q comeback
when conditions become more favorable.
But Tripoli is only some 200 miles from
the Tunisian border and American forces,
once established In Tunisia, perhaps
along the Notifications of the Mareth
line originally constructed by the French
to protect Tunisia from italian invasion,
might launch from the west an attack
on Tripoli which it would be almost
impossible for the Axis forces to resist
effectively.
1t is for this reason that the political
moves affecting Tunisia are of such in
terest, and this interest is heightened by
the Vichy report that American armored
and motorized forces are already moving
toward Bou Saada, 12O miles southeast
of Algiers. From Bou Saada it is an
other 125 miles to the8reat desert center
of Bislra, where contact might easily be
made with Fighting French columns
coming up across the Sahara. It is an
other 375 miles from Biskra to Gafsa in
Southern Tunisia, road center which
is within striking distance of all the
main points of the Mareth line. For
motor elements these distances are not
great, and, If the report of a move on
Bou Saada is correct, 1t may indicate