Evening star., 1942-12-02
Sees Nozis Facing
Need to Shorten Front
Military Writer Says Russians
May Force Germans to Retire
To Gulf Of Riga Line
Bu Mai. Georoe FIELDING Eliot

By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.
So far there has been some occasion
| to believe that the Russian offensive in
the general Rzhev- -Velikiye Luki region
is in the nature of holding attack,
! intended to prevent the Germans from
shifting troops from North Russia south
ward to the Stalingrad area. Presuming,
as still seems likely, that the latter is
the Russian main effort this view is
consistent both with the facts as they
theory. The German high command at
taches great Importance to Rzhev and
previously has made great sacrifices to
hold that fortress. Should it give way,
| wanna to the Southward, probably also
would fall, bringing the Russians into
possession of additional communication
lines which would give them much
| greater freedom of action for further
| offensive actions in northern and central
Russia. Specifically, the Russians then
would be able to concentrate considerable
forces in the direction of Leningrad with
out much fear of a German attack on
their flanks
When we think of Rzhev, therefore,
we are really thinking in terms of Lenin-
grad and the Gulf of Finland, and per-
haps even of Riga.
The Russian thrust beyond Velikiye-
Luki gives some point and emphasis to
these considerations. 1t is an operation
which can have very little future If
Rzhev remains in German hands, for at
Rzhev the Germans are constant threat
to the communications OF a Russian
Army striking at Velikiye-Luki. But
should Rzhev fall, and Vyazma after
ward, the Russians would be able to con-
centrate toward Velikiye-Luki in much
| greater strength.
The Importance of Velikiye-Luki is
that it covers the approaches from the
| present Russian positions toward the
! great orth-South railroad. Leningrad-
| Vitebsk- -Orsha -Mogilev. This is a vital
supply route for the German armies be-
fore Leningrad and is the spine of the
| German lateral communica tions on the
/ whole north Russian front If the Rus
! SLAMS can establish themselves perma-
nently astride this line, it is not too
much to say that the Germans would
nave dlff1culty In maintaining them
selves in the vicinity of Leningrad and
might have to fall back as far as Lake
Peipus, or even to the Gulf of Riga. Such
! retirement of the German left flank
would give the Russians control of the
Gulf OF Finland and would free Lenin-
| grad from any direct threat from the
south. Moreover, 1t would threaten the
German and Finnish troops in Finland.
because the communications of these
forces with Germany would be seriously
impaired. The loss of the great supply
and air base at Orsha which also would
be threatened by the cutting of this vital
railway, likewise would be a most serious
threat to the German armies of the
north and center.
1t Is, therefore, Of considerable i'm
portance to determine whether the Rus
sian attacks at Rzhev and Velikiye-Luki
are really holding attacks, as has been
hitherto supposed, or whether they have
real power behind them and are intended
to be pushed through to decision. 1t is
quite possible that they may have been
begun as holding attacks, but that re-
ports from front-line commanders have
indicated to the Russian high command
that there is a possibility of greater gains
than they had supposed, and that re-
. 2 heinC "a
We hear by way of Stockholm of fighting
in the streets Of Rzhev, but Stockholm
has reported that before. Certainly, If
the Russians are really showing signs of
breaking through the main German de-
fenses at Rzhev, the German high COM
mand is faced with another of those
unpleasant decisions which have been
forced upon it since the United Nations
have passed to the offensive.
1t may very we'll be that German
shortage of nanpower will make
shortening of their Russian front seem
an attractive solution of their difficulty,
in which case they might consider pull
ing their left flank all the way back to
the Gulf of Riga. This would give them
much shorter and, incidentally, more
defensible line than that which they
now hold. 1t would mean the practical
abandonment of their Finnish ally and
of any plans they may have had for
attempting to interrupt the Arctic COM
munications Of Russia by overland at
tack; but they still would retain the
bases on Norway from which they can
make these communications very ex-
pensive for us to use. At any rate, the
developments of the next two or three
weeks on this part of the Russian front
should give us some indication of what
the respective intentions OF the Russian
and German high commands in this area
may be.
| Copyright 1912, New York Tribune Inc.