Evening star., 1942-01-22
Counteruttucks Vital
Saving Of Singapore Moy Depend on Action
By SEQ and Lond, Eliot Points Out

time. Tobruk has already demon
strated what British, Australian and
Indian troops can do In that way.
especially in fortress which can be
supplied from the sea, as Singapore
can be.
Attack Necessary.
But mere static defense, even II
temporarily and locally successful,
cannot be permanently 50. Tobruk,
In the end, was saved when the Axis
armies were swept out of Cyrenaica
by an attack by superior land and air
forces. Singapore will be saved
when the Japanese forces are swept
out Of Malaga, and that seems
hardly possible by any advance from
Singapore itself. Rather, the even
tual relief Of the base is q matter Of
attack directed against the far-flung
Japanese lines Of Communication,
both those by land down the Malay
Peninsula from Thailand and Indo-
China, and by those by sea to ports
on the east coast Of the peninsula.
The land communications are the
least important of the two. They
can be attacked only from Burma,
and some Japanese uneasiness as to
the possibility Of such attack Is
shown by Japanese thrusts into
Burma, which have given them pos
session Of the airports at Victoria
Point, Bakpytn and Tavoy in South
ern Burma. None Of these places
has any communication with Burma
proper by road or rail. More serious
is the indication Of . Japanese ad-
vance on Moulmein, an important
town which Is connected by road
and by rail with Rangoon. Should
the Japanese gain ground in this
sector. the suggestion would be very
strong that the British forces in
Burma are far weaker than has
been generally supposed. On the
other hand, should . British attack
develop, from Moulmein or farther
north, 1t might be Of great strategic
Importance, for 1t would tend to
lessen the Japanese pressure on
Singapore and the farther 1t went,
the more 1t would tend to become
an assault on the Japanese bases
and rear organizations in the Malay
Peninsula itself. It must, however,
be admitted that the japanese oc-
cupation Of Tavoy is particularly
discouraging to such hopes.
Achilles Heel for Japs.
The maritime communications Of
the Japanese forces In the South
China Sea really form the Achilles
heel OF the whole Japanese effort
against Singapore. That effort would
have collapsed to = certainty If the
Japanese air force had not been able
to sink the Prince Of Wales and Rs
pulse. which were sent to Singapore
1ol tne very purpose OF making ex-
tensive Japanese landings impossible
unless the japanese were willing to
risk their main battle feet 5000
miles from q home base. The pres
ence Of other Allied battleships In
the South China Sea would have the
same effect, but the problem Of CIV
ing them fighter protection against
bombing attacks must be faced. This
means tying them to the radius
Of action Of shore-based fighters, or
else using aircraft carriers, or else
doing what the Germans are trying
to do at Malta to protect their
convoys-smothering tho japanese
bombardment bases under heavy
and continuous bombing attacks of
our own.
It is certain that risks must be
taken II the Japanese are to be
checked. Probably enterprises will
have to be undertaken with less
force than would seem desirable,