Evening star., 1942-01-18
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.
Both in Berlin and Toxic the re-
lation between the military and
political factors in modern war is
very thoroughly understood. The
latest evidence of this fact Is the
nature of the efforts being made by
the Axis powers as the Pan-Amer-
ican conference at Rio De Janeiro
gets under way.
We hope to get great deal from
that conference. Particularly do
we hope to induce all the South
American nations to sever diplo-
matte and economic relations with
our enemies.
BY expelling the Axis embassies,
legations and consulates, the focal
points of Axis propaganda and sub
versive activity would be removed,
and the direct flow Of orders, in
formation and funds cut on. BY the
severance of all economic relation
ships, Axis Arms would be driven
out Of business and prevented from
engaging in activities hostile to our
cause.
In addition, Germany and Japan
would be deprived Of even such small
trickle of essential supplies as they
now manage to get from South
American sources.
South American Naval Aid.
1t is very likely that the peoples
Of South America would, on the
whole. like to 60 along with this
program. Many would go farther
and join the Central American and
Caribbean nations In q declaration
Of war.
The aid Of South American navies
in the conveying of merchant ship
ping-especially in the South At
lantic- might prove very valuable
to us.
But the political leaders, especially
Of the larger South American ma
tions-the only ones with any naval
strength to speak of-seem very
likely to be guided by just one basic
calculation: Are we sure to win this
war?
AS long as they entertain any
doubts on that subject, as long as
there seems to them the least pos
sibility Of an Axis victory, they
are going to trim the sails of their
respective ships of state accordingly.
Axis Hard at Work With Subs
| Understanding this quite well, the
Axis is hard at work to convince
them that even the Intervention Of
the United States cannot assure an
Allied victory: indeed, that the
United States cannot 50 much as
protect South America from Axis
attack, should the South Americans
be so unreasonable as to invite
attack.
1t is beyond coincidence that the
first appearance of hostile sub
marine in our Atlantic coastwise
shipping lanes was on the first day
of the Pan-American Conference
Other such attacks may be expected,
and all will certainly be played up
to the full by the Axis propaganda
agencies In South America.
This is a case where the military
value Of keeping quiet as to the
fate Of enemy U-boats ought to be
weighed against the propaganda
value of promptly announcing their
destruction, If and when such de-
struction takes place.
1t may also be anticipated that
the japanese may attempt some
spectacular move in the mid Pacific,
against Samoa or the Fijis. or per-
haps as far east as the Marquesas
or Society Islands. to alarm the
South Americans as to the safety
of their west coast.
1t is not very likely that any such
operations could have permanent
effect; but the Axis is willing to
run considerable military risks for
the sake Of political advantage. The
political advantage to be gained
from q defeat Of our policies as the
Rio conference would be great
enough to warrant a military risk
Of no mean proportion.
Steps Allies Could Take.
OF course. the converse Of this
proposition is that we, too, should
understand the direct connection be-
tween the military and political
elements in modern war One of
the reasons why We were taken by
surprise in the Pacific is the fact
that we were conducting a political
offensive against a well-armed and
desperate adversary without being
prepared to back it up by military
offensive if necessary, or even with
out fully realizing that 1t might be
replied to by sudden military action.
If now we were able to Offset what
the Axis Is doing-and exploiting
hourly by q terrific barrage Of
propaganda-we might gain sub
stantial military advantage a. well
as political advantage.
Thus, If we found it possible to
occupy some of the Atlantic's
islands, or together with the British
to take measures for the security
of French West Africa, denying that
area as a stepping stone for an
Axis push toward South America,
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