Evening star., 1942-08-21
Sees Roid on Dieppe
Valuable Experience
Militory Writer Finds Test
Of Landing Equipment
Involved in Attack
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

By Maj George Fielding Eliot.
One of the most important purposes
to be served by an operation such as
the raid on Dieppe is to test the special
equipment required. Since 1t became ap-
parent that, both in the Atlantic and in
the Pacific, large-scale landing opera
tions against opposition would be
prominent feature of United Nations
tactics, a great deal of thought has been
given to the design of equipment for such
landings and the training of troops in
its use. In this field the United States
had considerable advantage because
OF the fact that the United States
Marine Corps. has for many years made
special study of landings and landing
equipment. However, much of the ma
terial provided was of new design, in
both the British and the American
forces, and while .maneuvers are very
helpful, there is no test like the test
of active service.
The handling of landing barges under
various conditions of sea and weather,
both troop carriers and those designed
for carrying tanks and artillery, is a
subject in which few armies have any
wide experience--the japanese being a
notable exception. Indeed. the success
of the japanese in most of their landing
operations in this war has in large part
been due to long study and long practice
IN the tactics and technique of landings.
Means OF disembarking troops and equip
ment from ships of all types, as we'll as
barges, also must be studied,
Only at first hand can a proper knowl-
edge be acquired of the obstacles Used nv
the enemy both to prevent approach by
sea and to prevent the movement of
troops after they have landed. Knowl-
edge OF these obstacles is necessary in
order to provide the proper means of
dealing with them and to make sure that
landing parties have the necessary allot-
menf OF tools and explosives Practice
IN removal or naturalization of enemv-
type mines also is essential and. In gen.
eral, troops require both instruction and
practlce in the use of captured enemv
weapons and materials
The problems of air-ground co-opera-
ton, so vital to the success of anv land.
Ing, can never be adequately studied ex-
cept from the book of experience. ANY
commander in chief who is considering q
landing must begin by asking himself:
can my air force protect nv ships.
parges and landing parties from destruc
tlon by enemy aviation until I have es-
taohshed firm bridgehead?" Unless he
can be reasonably certain of an aff1rma-
1--WE answer to this question, a landing
IN force can hardly be considered at all
Inc same question Is present In the mind
OF every officer and man of the initial
attacking force. Therefore, when. in a.
raid such as that of Dieppe, it is demon
strated that the fighter umbrella really
works. not only is this useful military
information but also it is a tremendous
morale builder for the troops and tends
TO increase mutual confidence between
ground and air forces.
Ihe use as part of landing oners- -
ron OF parachutists and air-borne in
:antry can be worked out very nicely on
paper, but 1t takes q test of operations
IN the face of the enemy to find out inst
now effectively these arms can be en-
ployed and under what conditions thew
are most efficient
Inc effect of naval bombardment
against various types of enemy defenses
can, OF course, be tested to some extent
otherWlse than as part of a landing
operation, but naval gunfire is an essen
tlal part OF the teamwork necessary
IN landings, both against shore obiec-
tlves ana for anti-aircraft purposes.
It may be that as a result of experi-
ments such as that at Dieppe some
form OF support by high-angle weapons
may be worked out. The fiat trajectory
OF most ships guns is a handicap in
nr1ng against Notifications. In the last
war the British Navy built a number Of
monitors for close support of landing
| operations, and In this war we NAV see
some new type of ship developed de-
signed to carry howitzers in order to
deliver hlgh-angle fire against the shore
target. OF special importance is prac-
lice In the quick establishment of OBJ
servation stations on shore to direct the
fire of the ships.
Probably the most important problem
OF all is that of communication. which
In the modern sense means not onlv
communications between headquarters OF
large units but communications with and
between every plane and tank and ar
mored car and landing barge and every
small patrol Of infantry throughout the
whole zone of action. 1t is of vital i'm
portance that communications eo,in-
ment. on which the success or failure at
great enterprise may well depend
should be given the most thorough test
under active service conditions before
dependence Is placed in it under condi-
tlons OF greater responsibility. great
zeal OF our communications equipment
is new-indeed, improvements are be;no
made in it almost daily.
IL Is imperative that commanders
should be able to exercise ADEQUATE con.
troll over their troops and that units on.
gagged IN combat should be.a to keer
IN touch with one another and to renort
swiftly the changing conditions and op.
NStf