Evening star., 1942-01-08
Crimeu the Touchstone

Crimeu the Touchstone
The measure of German reverses
can be best gauged by the Russian
campaign for the recapture of the
Crimea. This extensive peninsula is
a natural fortress. surrounded on all
sides by water with the exception of
the narrow isthmus of Perekop. The
storming Of the heavily fortified
Perekop lines and the subsequent
conquest of the entire Crimea, save
the isolated fortress Of Sevastopol,
was perhaps the proudest boast of
the German high command. Berlin
announced exuberantly that the
Crimea was both the springboard to
the Caucasus and the key to naval
mastery Of the Black Sea. It's i'm
portance could not be overestimated.
Once the Germans were we'll in
stalled, they needed only to occupy
the Crimea in suflcient force to hold
it against any Russian counterattack.
They did not have to fear the fero-
cious cold to the northward, because
the climate is relatively mild-never
cold enough to prevent the proper
functioning of their tanks and
planes. Given sufficient forces, all
they had to do was to sit tight and
besiege Sevastopol until this last
Russian foothold had fallen into
their hands.
1t is revelation of Germany's
waning strength in man power and
equipment on her Eastern front that
she has had to deplete her Crimean
garrison below the danger point.
Russian pressure on the mainland in
a sustained counter offensive over a
l,0O0-mile front has clearly been so
terrific that every available man,
tank, gun and plane has been needed
to bolster the sagging German de-
tense. Lynx-eyed Marshal Timo-
shenko evidently gauged the degree
OF his adversary's extremity and has
dealt a series of blows at the Crimea
which seem to have the Germans in
a desperate plight.
The first blow was a crossing Of
the Straits of Kerch, under cover of
the guns OF the Black Sea Fleet.
This was brilliant performance,
but the German positions on the
Crimean side of the straits were so
strong by nature that it could hardly
have succeeded unless the Germans
had been much inferior in numbers.
The skeleton nature of the German
defense in the Crimea becomes still
more obvious by subsequent Russian
landings from transports under naval
protection at two points on the
southern coast and one on the west
ern side. These respectively cut of
the Germans retreating from Kerch
and threatened the German lines
around Sevastopol with encircle-
ment. The Germans repeatedly are
In full retreat to the central plateau
OF the Crimea. But even here their
retreat to the isthmus of Perekop
Is threatened by still another Rus
sian descent on the northeastern
shore, quite near Perekop. This has
been made possible by the entry of
Russian transports and warships
into the Sea of Azov, opened to them
once more by the recapture of the
kerch Straits which separate the
Sea OF Azov from the Black Sea.
Indeed, Russian mastery of the Sea
OF Azov exposes the flank of the
Germans on the mainland, where
they are striving to hold up the main
Russian drive from recaptured Ros-
tov-on-Don.
1t is hard to underestimate the
strategic consequences which a Rus
sian reconquest OF the whole Crimea
might entail. This was the Sheet
anchor of the entire German front in
Southern Russia. Once it goes, there
Is no natural defense lines short of
the River Dnieper, and in mid
winter even wide rivers can be read
lily crossed on thick ice. Fighting in
the Crimea under the most favorable
conditions, the Germans do not
appear able to stem the Russian Of
fensive. This does not seem due to
broken morale or bad generalship,
because even the Russians admit
that the Germans continue to fight
stoutly and well. It must, there
fore, be as Hitler himself confesses.
that the Russians now outweigh the
Germans in equipment as well as in
man power. This bodies no good for
Hitler's already harassed high COM
mand.
More than twelve million tons OF