Evening star., 1942-08-12
Sees Bottle Objective
Worthy of Risk
Mi|itory Critic ExpIoins
How SoIomons Operations
Serve Strategic Purpose
BIZ Maj. GEORGE Fielding Eliot.

By Maj George Fielding Eliot
Copyright, 1a42, New York Tribune Inc.
The basic element in all military plan
ming is the weighing of risk against ad-
vantage. When the risk is very great
and the advantage small, usually the
proposed operation is not undertaken.
When great advantages are promised at
a minimum of risk, the conditions are
ideal to 60 ahead. In the great ma ajority
of cases, however, as far as major ope-
rations are concerned, the risk is consid-
cradle and the advantages of success are
likewise. 1t is very rare that great ad-
vantages in war can be obtained without
risking a good deal in order to get them,
In general, caution in planning and
boldness in execution are the keys to sue
cess in war. Napoleon advises that in
planning the commander should conjure
up every possible dificulty and danger,
but having provided for these as far as
human forethought permits, take no
counsel of fears in action
"Boldness in execution" says Sir Fred
erick Maurice, involves taking risks and
the responsible commander must be the
sole judge of when risks taken in the
execution of his plan are justifiable."
All of which bears directly upon our
consideration of the operations now in
progress in the Solomon Islands. These
operations have certainly been planned
very thoroughly. 1t is two months since,
at the Battle of Midway the Japanese
lost the offensive edge of their striking
power in the Pacific From that time on
ward United Nations offensive in this
area has been almost daily possibility,
but its actual delivery has naturally
awaited the completion Of plans and the
assembling of forces. In weighing the
time for striking the first blow, 1t has
been necessary to balance preparation
on the one hand against the need for
acting quickly on the other.
Probably no commander charged with
an offensive operation will ever feel that
his preparations are entirely complete,
or that he has enough men and material
OF all kinds to meet every possible con-
tingency. 1t is almost always the case
that by waiting a little longer he could
get more force or improve his situation
in this manner or in that. On the other
hand, however, he has to take account
first of the disposition of the enemy, who
must be surprised, If possible, and, sec
ond, of his objective in relation to the
progress of the war in other theaters.
1t may very well be that blow struck at
given time with a comparatively small
force may be of far greater effect than
the same blow struck later on with larger
forces. This may be particularly true
when the main effect is intended to be
diversionary; a diversion in favor of an
ally or Of ones own forces in another
theater must be effected in time to do
the other fellow some good, and 1t may
justify considerable risk to the diversion
ary force, or even its complete defeat.
This is not to say that the objective
OF the Solomon Islands operation is d.
versionary, or chiefly so. However. there
can be little doubt that 1t will have a di-
Versionary effect as far as japanese oper-
at1ons against the Russian Far Eastern
provinces are concerned. The Japanese
count very heavily upon their shore-based
aircraft for the defense OF their far flung
Pacific positions. Their interlocking sys-
tenn of island bases permits the swift
concentration of their air power at any
threatened point. Air power, indeed, is
| their mobile reserve for the defense Of
the Pacific area, and it can be brought
| TO bear against an attacker much more
quickly than can warships or troops In
| transports. If the defense of the Solo,
mons is of sufficient Importance to the
japanese tc justify the dispatch Of strong
air reinforcements from the home Is
lands and the Asiatic mainland, such an
act would conceivably delay their con-
templated attack upon Russia, or seri-
ously impair its effectiveness.
In fact, our offensive in the Pacific will
tend to be a check on Japanese freedom
of action, cot only against Siberia but
also in Chira and on the frontier of In
ola. The japanese air force is not large
enough to provide for large-scale opera
tions in all these theaters simultaneously,
and we have at least demonstrated to
them that they are not going to be per-
mitted to concentrate their air power
against a single objective and rest in
comfortable security everywhere else.
Whatever the fate OF our present Of
fensive, this minimum gain is at least
secure. If we succeed in effecting lodg-
ment in the Solomons, we shall-as Ad-
miral Ernest j. King, fleet commander in
chief, points out-use the newly won posi-
ton for further offensive operations.
There can be little doubt that our ulti-
mate purpose is to drive the japanese
from the whole of their positions in the
Solomon Bismarck and Admiralty Is
lands and on the mainland of New
Guinea. This is an objective which will
have ar-reaching strategic effect if we
can accomplish it and is we'll worth the
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