Evening star., 1942-08-02


Can the United States avoid Short
age of food in three or four year all
out war?
No one knows. But the question rises
ominously from the swiftness and COM
pleteness with which the Nations pro-
drctive power and facilities are being
converted TO the needs of war.
Matching the energy and efficiency OF
industry in turning to the manufacture
Of war weapons, agriculture has put its
shoulder to the task OF producing as
much food as possible. Like industry, 1t
not only must supply this country and
its fighting forces, but must help meet
needs of Great Britain, Russia and other
Allies.
Agriculture must do this and more. It
Is being called on to supply industry and
the military forces with much of its best
manpower and to give up much in the
way Of productive machinery, facilities
and equipment normally flowing to it.
Even so, agriculture will provide a rec
ord quantity OF crops, livestock, dairy
and poultry products this year If present
favorable prospects continue. The indi-
Gated output would be suficient to
satisfy most requirements for the next
II months or so.
Reserves Will Be Tapped.
However-and this is signihcant-the
prospective supply will be sufncient only
because there are reserves from past
crops. This years indicated production
would not in itself prove sufncient.
From these facts springs the question Of
whether agriculture could produce SIMPLY
in a long, hard war, once the reserves
were depleted.
Analyze this years productive effort
on the farms. Secretary Of Agriculture
Wickard laid out a program setting up
production goals for most crops, live
stock, dairy and poultry products. 1t
was supposed to be a well rounded and
balanced program, cut to the pattern
of needs.
The program called for the largest out
put of food In the Nations history. 1t
contemplated an increase OF per cent
over 1941. Actually. the goals would not
have provided per cent more food, be-
cause the program placed special empha-
sis on increased production OF vegetable
oil crops-such as soybeans, peanuts and
faxseed-to 90 toward replacing import
supplies lost because of the war.
Goal Won't BE Reached.
It is clearly evident that Mr.. Wickard's
overall goal will not be achieved. Acre
ages to be harvested will fall short OF
goals for such crops as cotton, corn, flax
seed and peanuts for vegetable oils, cot
tonseed for oil, dried beans and peas, to-
bacco, oats, potatoes and sweet potatoes
Production of milk, sheep and lambs,
peaches and grapes, and canned fruits
and vegetables is running short OF goals.
Only in the case of wheat, hogs, poultry.
the minor feed crops, soybeans for vege-
table oil and rice are goals likely to be
reached.
Why is production tagging behind the
goals? Farmers have financial induce
ment to produce. Prices are the best
they have been for years. There is an
| assured market for all the farmers can
produce Weather conditions have been
| favorable. The Federal farm programs
were expanded to allow for extra pro-
duction. Farmers by nature like to pro-
duce abundantly. They have patriotic
incentive to meet the goals.
Those facts suggest the conclusion that
farmers are producing about all that they
can with the labor and other productive
| facilities at hand, and that If the goals
are not reached, it will be through nc
fault of theirs.
Less Manpower on Farms.
If this be true, then next's years out
put cannot be expected to be as large as
this years. Mr.. Wickard has said that
in all probability 1912 would be the farm
ers best year Of the war. He recognized
that agriculture's productive facilities
were likely to deteriorate progressively
with each year Of war.
If the war continues. agriculture vii