Evening star., 1942-06-28

Jdpdn's threat to India Is discussed
here by an Australian statesman, for
merly Prime Minister OF NeU South
Wales, 1Dho Is n,oD Australia's repre-
sentative on the Eastern Group Sup
oily Council. After II months in In
dia, organizing supply, he recently
travelled through the Middle East and
stopped in NeU York and Washing
tom on his tDdy back to Australia.
Inexorably events are rapidly shaping
1ndia's destiny regardless Of all past
policies, constitutions, pledges or perso-
nalities. The way India stands up to the
coming japanese moral and military
onslaught, and perhaps the Nazi attack,
too, will determine for a very long time
to come her status among the people Of
the earth. Her problem is literally the
problem of survival
AS the japanese menace moves nearer,
the political position will probably recede,
to some extent at least, in importance in
Indian minds. The demand will be and
Is now for defense, immediate and ade-
quate.
In my view. there can be little question
that the Japanese attack on India may
come soon. The fall Of Burma and the
occupation by Japan of all the strong
posts on the coast Of Bengal have pre-
pared the way for this. I have heard
through the length and breadth Of India
that this cannot happen; the Japanese
lines are already stretched too far. 1t
would be against all the canons of
military science and planning, the Japs
would need an army of countless bat
talions-and so forth.
But the wise men who say these
things were among those who told us
that the Japanese could not conquer
Singapore.
Hold Dominating Position.
Let us look at the facts. The Japanese
are now consolidating their gains in
Burma and they are getting ready to
strike further west-and to strike in
spite Of the prevailing monsoons.
With battle fleet based at Singapore,
the Japanese are in a dominating posi-
ton. Even though their actual strength
in capital units may be inferior to the
combined British and American forces,
the fact that they have interior sea
lines Of communications and three or
four rear repair bases puts the Allies at
a grave disadvantage.
I believe the key industrial areas
around Calcutta, Madras and Jamshed-
pur will feel the first brunt The way
may then be open to the Japanese to
try landing in Bengal.
At the same time communications with
India are gravely imperiled. and it is
only a question of how complete
blockade Of Madras, Calcutta, Vizagapa-
tam, Colombo, Goa, Bombay and Kar-
achi that the Japanese can establish.
A third threat of still greater seri-
BUSINESS must be kept in mind. With
strong base in Singapore and a powerful
battle fleet in the Indian Ocean, the
japanese may extend amphibious war
fare to Ceylon. Were this island cap
tured We should lose our only usable
naval base in the Indian Ocean except
Bombay. Complete blockade OF Calcutta
and Madras would follow.
There is yet fourth threat to India,
less immediate but no less great, namely,
the possibility Of push into Iran by
Germany via Turkey and through the
Caucasus. The success of such a drive
depends on either the collapse of Turkey
or the weakening OF Russian resistance
and the collapse of our Mideast forces
Once the Germans get the oil resources
of Caucasus a drive on India becomes as
certain as fate.
Two Courses Possible.
There would seem to be no question
that Germany and Japan intend, If pos
sible, to link up one with the other in
1912. The possibility exists of junction
between the Germans and the japanese
forces in at least two places.
The first is through Russia and the
second through India and the Mideast
The distances may seem very great. But
what do we mean by distance? In war
fare distance means two things: First Of
all, the possibility Of moving supplies
forward and, secondly, the degree of
resistance to be encountered.