The Waterbury Democrat., 1942-03-13
JAPS' TACTICS SEEN AS PERIL
 TO OAHU BASE
EDITORS NOTE: The fol- lowing dispatch is written by Q former United Press bureau manager in Honolulu, now as- signed to the foreign depart ment in New York.
 United Press Associations.
BY WENDEL BURCH !,


 Japanese flanking. and infiltration tactics applied against Singapore, Java, and Burma may offer dis tinst threat to the United States sole remaining major mid-Pacific base the island of Oahu.
 Pearl Harbor, SchoAeld Bar racks, Hickam and Wheeler fields, Kaneohe Bay, and six forts are located on Oahu, as well as the city of Honolulu.
 None of the remaining islands in the Hawaiian group-Hawaii, Maui, Kahoolawe, Lanai, Molokai, Kauai and Niihau = is fortified On Hawaii, Maui, Molokai and Kauai there are small army and navy fields and installations. These islands with Oahu, are strung out in bok-shape over distance of approximately 300 miles, with Kauai 90 miles northwest of Oahu and Hawaii 200 miles southeast.
 Jap Bases 2,00O Miles
 A strong fleet of Japanese trans ports, carriers and warships, sup ported by submarines, would en- counter only perfunctory resist ance from land if an attack were made on any of the major islands, except Oahu. It would, however, have to run gauntlet of Ameri- can warships, submarines, and army and navy bomhers. In theory at least, American patrol craft would discover any invading fleet long before 1t approached the islands.
 The closest Japanes bases are over 1000 miles from any of the Hawaiian Islands at present. These bases are in the Marshall, Gilbert, Caroline and Marianas Islands. Unless the fastest transports and auxiliarieS were used 1t would take an invasion fleet week to reach Hawaii, and Americans patrols would have a chance of spotting them in this time.
 This particularly is true in view of U. s. operations from Johnston, Palmyra, Christmas, and Canton Islands, as well as Samoa. An- nouncement of U. s. cooperation with Free French forces in New Caledonia gives us another aerial outpost for patrol purposes at Noumea, former Pan American Airways Clipper base.
 At the same time patrolling this area Is comparable to patrolling a desert stretching from Los Angeles to Denver and Seattle to San Diego, or from New York to Chi cago and Boston to Miami. Lit- erally hundreds of palnes would be required.
 Furthermore. in a weeks travel an enemy convoy would travel at least half the time at night, and arrive at it's destination at dawn as the American expedition to the MarShalls and Gilberts did. Storms, squalls, and haze might offer inc valuable cover to scattered convoy units during daylight hours. Fly ing weather in this region may be as bard as that anywhere: a navy patrol plane during the Amelia Earhart search in July, 1887, was forced to turn back when 1t efl- countered icing conditions far south of Hawaii.
 lilo, only major port on the island of Hawai-, and Kahului on Maui offer only limited facilities for an invading fleet, and lie open to air attack by U. s. planes. Lihue and Nawiliwili on Kauai are not likely to attract major enemy attention.
 There are thosuands of Japa- nese on all of these islands, how ever, with at least 10000 in or near the city of lilo alone.
 Any attack on these islands might actually be Q diversion, inc tended to attract the U. s. battle fleet to these waters while a Japan ese force, protected by units of the main Japanese battle fleet, hurled itself against Alaska. If Japanese bases have been gained in Alaska all U. g. supply routes to Hawaii are endangered and the position of the naval and army garrisons on Hawaii becomes pre- cariolis.
 There Is every indication that the United States and it's allies are preparing to hold c powerful communications line through Hawaii, Samoa. Fiji, and New Caledonia to New Zealand, Australia, and the Dutch Indies. All of these points llnquesticnably, are garrisoned, and viii serve as tfIe Jumping off" points for eventual offensiveB sweeping through the screen of of Japanese tnandated islands bases and cap- tiired points.
 The strategy that has served the Japanese so well thus far, how- ever, may Do applied 10 the anchor of that whole line -- Oailti--wlth the results eventually determining the whole course of the war in the