The potters herald. [volume] (East Liverpool, Ohio) 1899-1982, 1942-01-01
Siqrificonce Of
Jopon's Strategy
By ADMIRAL WILLIAM v. PRATT,
u. s. y, Retired

liz IuIudIIl6Illdl SSd SlIdISSy VI
Japan differs from the concept of the
China campaign, in which military
strategy took precedence. The pres
ent strategy is based on sea power and
strong air force. The surprise at
tack on Oahu and the furious air on
slaught on the Prince of Wales and
Repulse We're a part of the original
concept, which is to weaken relatively
opposing sea power and give Japan
time in which to strengthen and con-
solidate her position in the Far East.
In many respects it resembles the
struggle now going on in the mediter-
ranean, where sea power supported by
air power still holds command.
If Japan can seize and defend key
positions from which the fleet and air
power can operate together efficiently,
the the China Sea, from Formosa
south, including the waters between
Australia and the Philippines, be-
comes another Mediterranean, with
sea and air power guarding the ap-
proaches to these many seas.
In the forefront of this picture lie
the heavily fortified island of Truk
(another Oahu, about 600 miles from
Guam) and the Marianas, with the
Palau group, also strongly entrenched,
situated between Truk and the new
Mediterranean.
The plan adapts itself to the blitz-
krieg type of offensive, which for
Japan is necessity, since her eco
nomic position is not sound and the
quicker she consolidates her position
offensive the sooner will she be able
to counter efficiently opposing sea
power, gain access to much needed
supplies, and make the war long
one requiring great effort to overcome
her.
With the foregoing background in
mind, it becomes possible to review
and assign values to some of the more
recent events in the Far East.
The capture of Hong Kong, while
it has high prestige value, has no
particular military significance. On
the contrary, the occupation of Pc
nang has. 1t brings Singapore, the
Malacca Straits, and the western
third of Sumatra within 3OO-mile
air radius. Since Singapore, the key
stone of Japan's sea plan, is the OBJ
jective of the present main offensive
this is important.
The attack in Northwest Borneo is
significant also because Brunei Bay
near Miri, an excellent fleet base le
miles by 1S miles in extent with its
back protected by jungle and high
mountains, lies across the China Sea
from Camranh Bay in Japanese-occu-
pied French Indo- China.
The attack on the Netherlands
! Anambas islands, $50 miles from
Singapore, indicates another japanese
objective. Here are to be found ex-
cellent submariBstand seaplane bases
with 10 miles of fleet anchorage.
The current attack on Dravao ir
Mindanao may develop an objective as
important as the attack on Luzon
Mndanao is populated by many
thousand Japanese. On the peninsula
due west of Davao is a bay, a fleet
base II miles deep which, with sea
and air superiority, could control the
nearby sea area.
The attack on Ternate probably was
preliminary to a landing at Dodings
Bay, a fve-mile deep base about II
miles to the east, in order to secure 6
position to further the control of the
Celebes Sea, Molucca Passage, and ad
jacent waters. The attack on North
west New Guinea may have been pre-
liminary to move on the Netherlands
air base on Amboina Island. The
flights over Batavia, Java, Macassar
Celebes, and Borneo, are preliminar!
moves, for these are key positions fol
control Of the surrounding seas ant
passages leading to them.
Tmor Island, strategically placed tt
control the passage between Australi;
and the Netherlands Indies, was in
cluded in Japans plan, but the British
and Dutch got the jump there. Th'
advance of submarines, based on tn,
inundated islands we'll to the eastward
for the purpose of reconnaissance ant
attacks on shipping, is part of th'
base plan.
The entire concept for the conques
of this vast rich area is we'll con
ceived and very audacious. To be sue
cessful it requires air and sea su
periority. It's weakness is perhaps tn
same as made the China campaign /;
failure: too big an enterprise for tn
means available. However, as long a.
Japan does have local air and sea su
periority in this area, thus possessin,
the ability to move troops PRACTICAL!
at will, the first phase of this Eastern
Pacific war should give Japan an ad
vantage.