Evening star., 1942-10-02
BY CLARK LEE,
Wide World.

maps tne DcSt way W plCIuIC WIidt
faces the American forces in the
Pacific today is to visualize an at
tack on Truk. Japan's greatest
Southwest Pacific pase.
Truk is Japan's Pearl HarbOr, the
springboard for japanese action in
the Southwest Pacific. baStion
against American counter -action on
Japan. The Japanese have closely
guarded Truk's development, but
this cluster of more than 200 islands
has lagoon 40 miles in diameter,
facilities to shelter the whole jap
anese feet. or provide base for a
huge invasion force.
Our present nearest land base to
Truk is Henderson Field, on Gaud-
alcanal, in the Solomons, distance
Of 1900 miles.
Even if we drove the Japanese
out of New Guinea, New Britain and
took Rabaul, which is 720 miles from
Truk, the distance still would be too
great for land-based fighters. Heavy
bombers, however, could participate
in the attack So much OF our air
force would have to be carrier-borne.
500 Planes Needed.
We would need probably 500
planes, and possibly double that
number. constantly In the air over
Truk during the decisive stages OF
the battle and as protection over sea
forces. That means aircraft carriers
plus escorting surface ships OF all
classes, along with countless trans
ports and supply ships.
For at least one day and perhaps
longer during our move on Truk
our armada would be under attack
bv japanese long-range. land-based
bomhers. But, If the American
forces had suff1cient fighters to pro-
tect them, that would not be a great
obstacle.
II the japanese still had enough
carriers, however, they could inter-
cept our forces far from their goal
and possibly destroy or damage
enough of our own carriers to make
us turn back. Once the enemy
carriers had gone, our offensive
forces would be able to move within
800 or 200 miles of enemy bases
without fear of attack and also
would not have to be concerned
about their fianks or rear while con-
centrating on land operations.
In addition, once the Japanese
carriers were sunk, any likelihood of
a further japanese attack against
Alaska, Hawaii, Australia or the
mainlands of the United States
would practically disappear. 1t is
impossible to conduct an over-water
offensive without air protection.
And that is why air power will be
the decisive factor in this Pacific
war, since long water gaps separate
the land bases.
Air Power Will Decide.
In the present phase of airplane
development. as it applies to the
Pacific, sirplanes mean aircraft car
riers. That is true simply because
at present planes can't fly the long
distances covered in our offensive
jumps.
This is not intended to be q dis
eussion OF the relative merits of
carrier-based or land-based planes
But 1t is Dcontrovertible that land
based planes should always be
superior in speed. range, maneu-
verability. load-carrying and fire.
power. That is because operations
from carrier require an especially
sturdy construction, which means
heavier planes at consequent
sacrifice in performance.
1t is a fact that American Navy
carrier fighters are superior in many
respects to our Army fighters. This,
however, is passing phase and
eventually our Army will supply its
pilots with a satisfactory all-round
fighter. At least the pilots hope So
Many air-minded Americans urge
i"uifect aerail attack on Japan as
an alternative to the long, slow and
undoubtedly costly campaign to re-
capture the South Pacific bases one
after the other
These sources argue that If we
started today, Japan could be
smashed in six months. They advo-
cate sending hundreds of fighters
and heavy bombers to China. the
fighters to cover Chinese Army
drives against air bases within strik-
ing distance of Japan and to defend
those bases: the bombers to attack
Japans industrial centers. nearly all
Of which are located along a single
railway line from Toxic to Shimono-
keki and Moji to Nagasaki
Proponents of this argument be-
lieve that concentrated attacks on
factories. piers. shipping and rail-
roads would so cripple japanese pro-
duction as to make end of the war
inevitable within short time.
Direct Attack Believed Best.
On the basis of my own knowledge
Of the Japanese people and OF
Japan's industrial setup. agree that
this would be the quickest and
easiest way to end the war.
The big part OF this program
would be getting the supplies to
China. Airplanes would have to be
flown from India, as would bombs
and ammunition. spare parts and
everything needed to maintain an
air force. However, with United
States air production increasing this
problem should not be insurmount-
able
Another alternative to a South
Sea drive from the Southwest Pa
cific would be direct attack against
the Japanese northern islands from
our Alaskan bases.
Our final offensive may combine
all three.
Meanwhile. our Navy and Army
both have done an outstanding Job
Of mailing down supply lines to the
Southwest Pacific and building
bases and outposts. These bases
must be supplied by ships and ships