Evening star., 1942-11-26
The Russian Offensive

ne NuSSlOn OITenStNe
The Russians have won a notable
victory on the Volga-Don front.
There is no doubt about that. The
one question is as to its larger impli-
cations. 1t obviously makes a vast
difference whether the Red armies
have made their sensational ad-
vances against the full strength of
German resistance or whether Mar
shall TimoShenko has cleverly caught
the Axis forces off balance in process
of retirement to some prepared
winter defense line. The first hy-
pothesis would imply clear-cut su-
periority of the Russians in both
numbers and equipment. This would
be necessary to have made a series
of breaks through on so wide front
and in so short space of time. The
second hypothesis would mean local
explorations of relative Russian su-
periority due to the weakening of
Axis lines to the status of rear
guard screens.
The balance of available evidence
appears to indicate that the latter
theory is correct. For the past three
weeks reports have been current
from many sources that German
elite divisions have been pulled back
from the eastern front, and during
that period there have been no more
major assaults on Stalingrad. This
would conform with a common
sense analysis of German grand
strategy. Once it is assumed that
Stalingrad cannot be taken before
winter, the Axis position before
Stalingrad, at the tip of a long
salient with difficult winter COM
munications becomes too dangerous.
Also, the freezing of the Volga re-
moves the necessity of blocking that
main artery of Russian communica-
tions during the winter months
The logical deduction from this
chain of reasoning would be a re-
fensible line, similar to that effected
by the Germans last winter when
their drive on Moscow had mis-
carried. The retreat naturally would
have to be conducted behind a
screen of troops, most Of which
would be second-line in order to
minimize the losses inevitable in
such an operation. The extent of
those losses would depend on sew
eral factors, notably the power of
initiative which the enemy might
assume. b.
Probably Axis difficulties have
been increased by the sudden Allied
intervention in North Africa. The
swift collapse of Vichy French re-
sistance made it imperative that an
unduly large portion of Axis air
power be diverted to that new the
ater Of operations. This meant that
the Luftwaffe could not play the
role assigned to it in screening the
retirement on the eastern front.
Sufficient air support was doubly
necessary if the screening troops
were largely second-string Germans,
plus Rumanians and other auxili-
aries of dubious quality.
The next few days should tell
whether the Axis has suffered de-
feat or a catastrophe. First-line
German reserves undoubtedly are
being rushed into the breach to stem
the Russian drive. Their chief task
for the moment will be to keep open
the road for a retirement before
Stalingrad, which seems inevitable.
Where the winter defense line of the
Axis is located cannot now be fore
cast. 1t is almost unthinkable that
such a line has not been prepared
by the German high command. If
that line can be held, we will pres
emily see a repetition OF the military
situation year ago. If not, wholly
new situation will emerge, with al
most limitless possibilities for the
shortening Of the war and an un-
expectedly quick triumph for the,
United Nations.