Evening star., 1942-03-29
By MAI. GEORGE
FIELDING ELIOT.

FIELDING ELlO1.
It seems likely that 1912 will be
the critical year Of this war.
It Is the last year in which the
Axis can hope for decisive gains.
Unless Germany can knock out the
Russian armies In 1912, she will find
herself in 1943 faced with full-scale
war In the West. the dreaded war
on two fronts Germany will not
have the resources to meet this
double strain.
Unless the positions captured by
Japan in 1912 can be consolidated,
the Dutch oil exploited and the
Chinese and Russian Far Eastern
armies knocked out, Japan will be
faced by such overwhelming strength
in 1943-if she lasts that long
as to make her situation hopeless.
1t may be going too far to say
that the United Nations can win
this war in 1912, but certainly they
can make sure Of winning it. The
Axis countries will make q ire
mendous effort. They know it is
their last chance. There Is no use
Understanding the power and the
fury behind the blows which they
will deliver, In the East and in the
West.
Clearly, our major purposes in
this year must be essentially de-
fensive. We must prevent the enc
my from doing certain things. Bar
ring internal collapses. on which
1t would be foolish to count. it does
not seem likely that Germany can
be decisively defeated this year. 1t
Is not certain that Japan can be
decisively defeated this year But
AL this does not mean that we
should leave the initiative to the
Axis-quite the contrary.
Offensive Action Urged.
IN all that we do, and in all that
We plan to do. we should seek to
cultivate the offensive spirit. The
Axis still possess a general superb
ority Of armament in the actual
theaters OF operation. This is a
superiority which will diminish as
the year goes on and will have dis
appeared by 1943.
This condition does not, however,
prevent the United Nations from
taking offensive action in areas
where they can obtain a local su-
periority SUFFICIENT for the purpose
and especially where they can use
their command of the sea to effect
surprise.
The more such secondary often
sives can be made effective, the
more the Axis will be compelled to
dissipate its resources in guarding
its far-flung positions and lines Of
communication, and the less will be
It's concentrated striking power for
Its main offensive against Russia and
China.
Our major purpose, indeed. is to
keep our Russian and Chinese allies
In the field until we can come to
their aid with really powerful Of
fensives Of our own. One Of the best
ways Of doing this is to make the
enemy come and fight in distant
areas and under circumstances not
of his own choosing German SOL
diers and planes tied up in Western
Europe are not attacking the Rus
slams: Japanese soldiers vainly bat
tering at the defenses of Bataan are
not seeking decision over China !;
Japanese cruisers and planes striv-
ing to defend vital bases and COM
munications in the Pacific are not
raiding our vital bases and COM
munications in the Indian Ocean.
These are the basic considerations
which affect the war of 1912.
Crucial Decisions Faced.
It is obvious that in this year we
shall need to make the best use OF
our limited striking power and our
even more limited shipping, by
which We convey that striking power
to the area where 1t may be use
fully employed.
1t Is equally obvious that many
Of the crucial decisions will have
to be made by the President of the
United States in allocating Ameri-
can power and resources to the sew
eral theaters OF operation. and par
ticularly as between the Pacific and
the European theaters.
There Is no escaping the fact that
the major burden OF the conduct OF
this war now rests on the American
people and their war leader. the
President.
This crucial year Of 1o42 will be
one In which very strong repre-
sentations will Be made to the Pres
ident By the various interests in
volved. each seeking to obtain
American aid In . particular the
ater or enterprise.
The struggle between the so-called