Evening star., 1942-07-02

minds. The military miSfortuheS OF
the last fortnight in Cirenaica and
in Egypt completely transform the
situation: not only in this area, but
throughout the Mediterranean. We
have lost upward of $4,000 men, and
by far the larger number OF them
are prisoners, and in spite Of great
deal of organized demolition, large
quantities of stores have fallen into
the enemy's hands.
Rommel has advanced nearly 400
miles through the desert and is now
approaching the fertile valley of the
Nile. The evil effect of these events
in Turkey, Spain and Free French
Africa has yet to be measured. We
are in the presence of a recession of
our hopes and prospects in the East
as great as any since the fall of
France.
If there is any one who wishes to
prophesy disasters to the full and
they can paint the picture in darker
colors they are free to do so.
A painful feature of the fall of
Tobruk was its suddenness, with its
garrison of $4,000 men in a single
day. 1t was utterly unexpected not
only by the public, but by the war
cabinet and even by the general
staffs.
1t was also unexpected by Gen.
Auchinleck and the high command
of the Middle East. On the night
before its capture we received a tele-
gram from Gen. Auchinleck that
the garrison was adequate and the
defenses in good order and that
80 days supplies were available for
the troops.
1t was hoped they could hold the
very strong frontier positions which
had been built by the Germans and
made by ourselves from Halfaya
Pass. Gen. Auchinleck expected to
maintain this position until powerful
reinforcements would arrive to
enable him to launch a counter
offensive. The question whether
Tobruk should have been held or
not was disputable; it was one of
those questions which is easier to
decide after the event. Only those
on the spot had full knowledge of
approaching reinforcements which
the enemy had available.
The decision to hold Tobruk and
the disposition made for the purpose
was taken by Gen. Auchinleck, but I
should like to say we in the war
cabinet and our professional ad-
visers thoroughly agreed with Gen.
Auchinleck beforehand and al
though in tactical matters the COM
mander in chief in any war theater
is supreme and his decision is final,
we consider that if he was wrong,
we were wrong, too, and I am very
ready, on behalf of his majestYs
government, to take my full share
of the responsibility.
Tells of War Conversations
With President Roosevelt.
The honorable member for Kidder-
minister (Wardlaw Milne) asks
where the order for the capitulation
OF Tobruk came from. Did it come
from the battlefield or from Cairo
or from London, or from Washing
ton?
What strange world of thought he
must live in if he imagines I sent
from Washington the order for the
capitulation Of Tobruk. The decision
was taken to the best of my
knowledge by the commander of the
fortress and certainly it was most
unexpected to the higher command
in the Middle East.
When I left this country for the
United States on the night of June
II. the feeling which I had and
which was fully shared by the chief
Of the imperial general staff, was
that the struggle in the western
desert had entered upon wearing
down phase or long battle of ex-
haustion similar to that which took
place in the autumn and although
l was disappointed that we had moi
been able to make counter stroke
, after the enemy's first onslaught
: had been, l will not say repulsed
but rebuffed, and largely broken
: that was situation with which WE
. had no reason to be discontented.
, Our resources were much larger
than those of the enemy and 81
were our approaching reinforce.
: ments. This desert warfare proceed
among much confusion and inter
ruption of communications and i
= was only gradually that very griev.
: Gus and disproportionate losse
!, which our armor sustained in th'
' fighting around and south o
, Knightsbridge became apparent.
;, Here I will make a short digres
. sion on to somewhat less seriou
plane. Complaint has been mad
r that the newspapers have been full
y of information of very rosy char
= acter.
Some members referred to that il
the debate and that the government
4 have declared themselves less full
informed than the newspapers
r Surely this is very natural while
n battle of this kind is going on. Their
: has never been in this war battl
e where so much liberty has beel
q given to war correspondents. The
have been allowed to roam all owe
= the battlefield: to take their chanc
: of being killed and send home yer
4 full messages, almost whenever the
It can reach telegraph Office This /
: what the press has always asked TO
j." and this is what they got.
O These war correspondents movin
e about amid the troops and sharin
Ir their perils have also shared thei
e hopes and been inspired by thei
Is buoyant spirit.
They have sympathized with tn
fighting men whose deeds they hav
been recording and no doubt ar
being extremely anxious not t
write anything which would sprea
encouragement or add to their bur
- den. =
l. Certainly I do not want general
S. in close battle-and these desel
= battles are close; prolonged an
often peculiarly indeterminate-
C do not want them to burden them
v selves by writing full stories abol
10 10 matters on which, in the nature {
AZ. io things, the home government hay