Evening star., 1942-07-12
By Constantine Brown.

another few months, neglected to
strengten their defenses in the Pacific
The Dutch, who were more far-sighted
than the British and ourselves. cried for
planes, tanks and anti-aircraft artillery,
but could not get 10 per cent Of what
they needed.
American tndustry-both management
and employes-moveds slowly before Pearl
Harbor and thought mostly in terms Of
personal gain. Tho Nazi-Russian war
was mama from heaven to Washington
and London. After some hesitation about
supporting the u S. s. r. with war ma
terials-due to the belief among most
observers that Russian armed resistance
would collapse after few weeks-we be-
gan rushing war materials to the Soviet
Union.
Most of the production of our slow
moving industry was already earmarked
for Britain. The demand on the United
States was enormous; the available sup
plies negligible. At one time, in April
1941, we were not able to deliver even the
10 bombers the Yugoslavs were begging
for, bombers which President Roosevelt
had solemnly promised them.
Even after Pearl Harbor the increase
in our production was slow. There were
bottlenecks everywhere. The men at the
head OF our production were still think
ing in peacetime terms. An army was
being created with draftees. The de-
mands from abroad on our production
facilities became even greater after De-
cember 7, and they had to be satisfied
for Russia particularly because of the
danger of losing that important asso-
ciate.
Supply Gobbled Up.
Planes were being delivered in larger
numbers from factories. but not enough
to supply our allies and the growing
United States Army. Tanks were roll
ing from new factories which used to
make pleasure cars. But that produc-
ton, too. had to be divided between the
United States. Russia and Britain in
Libya and the Far East, with little avail
able for our own needs.
The Navy and private shipyards die
miracles in Fastening construction of
ships to supply both the Pacific and
| Atlantic Fleets in such numbers as to
give either Of them the initiative tc
| strike hard at the enemy. We created
a large Army almost overnight, but coulc
equip only a small fraction for actua
fighting. Draftees, who chafed before
Pearl Harbor, became enthusiastic sol.
diers on December 7. But they still
chafed because they did not have sufh'
cient ammunition to learn their jobs or
the rife and machine gun range.
Under these circumstances the higf
command had to decide whether to cut
off all supplies from our associates ane
concentrate exclusively on the United
States forces in order to form and equiv
powerful force in a very short time
or to divide our production with the
other nations fighting the Axis, keeping
the smaller percentage for our own use
and to train that force progressively.
Russia Had to Be Supplied.
1t was obvious that we could not ceas
providing the hard-pressed fighting Brit
ish and Russians with their share o
supplies. To do so would have mean
losing at least one OF Hitler's opponents
These facts translated into strategy
meant that we could do nothing bu
make feints here and there. We savet
Australia by the brilliant action OF tn
Navy and Army air forces in the battl
of the Coral Sea- We removed an i'm
mediate threat to Hawaii and the Yves
Coast by similar action at Midway.
We tested japanese morale by darin
raid against the Japanese islands ant
discovered that such raids could produce
panic which In due time might be ex
plotted. But outside these relativel
minor operations we could do little bu
follow a hit and miss strategy. hopin
that the very critical summer which Ia!