Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1942-11-30
Sees Allied Strategy
Trapping Axis Powers
MiIitory Critic Praises Plan
Developed by Roosevelt,
Churchill and StuIin
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.


of history will pronounce Franklin D.
Roosevelt to be one OF the greatest war
Presidents this Nation has ever had.
For soldier or for statesman there is no
possible peace time criterion by which
ability to lead in war may be judged; war
itself is the only worthwhile test The
test has come, and the President has
shown that he understands war, that he
has grasp of total and global strategy
not given to many men, that he knows
how to get things done, that above all he
knows how to choose bold, able and re-
sourceful commanders.
Whatever you may think of his peace
time domestic policies-and what you
think of them does not matter very
much just now--we have just had ample
proof, by tangible results that the Presi-
dent knows how to marshal and direct
the forces of this Republic in war, knows
the essential ingredients of victory. It Is
possible to find criticism of his admins
trative methods; he has not yet been
able to produce soundly and simply
organized war cabinet, though there are
signs that gradual streamlining process
is going on; his choice of civilian sub
ordinates, being inescapably colored by
political considerations, is not always as
happy as his choice of military COM
manders; but when all this has been
said, the great and essential fact re-
mains that he does understand war, that
he can conceive great plan of global
strategy, that he has the moral courage
to make great decisions and to carry
them through unflinchingly.
1t is not enough that great war
leader should know what ought to be
done. The making of strategcal plans
with ruler and divider on a map of the
world is no great task for anyone with
an elementary grasp of the subject. But
to determine upon plan which calls
for the movement of hundreds of thou
sands Of men, vast stores of supplies and
huge fleet of shipping; and having
made it, carry it through in the face Of
every risk and every threat, weighing
risk against advantage and adhering
with determination to the purpose in
mind-that is the mark of war leader.
In the last analysis, 1t is not upon the
generals or the admirals that the respon-
sibility for the great operations of this
war resist is upon the chiefs of state,
who alone can choose from among the
many plans offered to them, who alone
can weigh the pros and cons presented
to them by their military advisers and
give the great decisions which involve
not only the movement of military forces
but the employment and direction for
many months beforehand of all the re-
gether make up the grand alliance
against Germany and Japan.
The President has shown not only
that he can do this as far as America
is concerned, but also that he can work
hand in hand with the leaders of our
Allies to produce a coalition strategy
which has turned the tide and put the
United Nations definitely on the often
sive and on the beginning of the long,
hard road to victory. I would not, of
course, claim for the President the whole
conception of the vast strategical scheme
which is slowly unrolling before our eyes
on the battlefelds of all the world Mr..
Churchill had his part in it, and so did
Mr.. Stain. They worked together in
perfect understanding and confidence,
to produce this great result, while little
people stood around and shrieked sec
ond front! which was also useful in
that it served to bemuse the enemy.
But the African and Pacific portions
Of the plan were certainly the Presidents
own contributions, and his personality
and enthusiasm were enormous factors
in obtaining the mutual confidence and
sound teamwork which has been -
essential part of the whole great opera
ton.
Consider what has happened on the
vast global scale of this war. In July
the Germans launched their great attack
in South Russia, as expected-and moth
Ing seemed more certain than that the
Japanese would attack the Russian Far
Eastern provinces. But in August we
launched our attack in the Solomons,
and the japanese, acting in accordance
with their known military character, fell
into the trap-they started feeding into
the Southwest Pacific the air and naval
forces without which their Russian adj
venture could not succeed. Meanwhile
Molotov had already been to London and
Washington, and in August Churchill
went to Moscow latter full understand
ing with the President) to make final ar
rangements.
Stalingrad continued to hold, and the
Allied propaganda continued to needle
the Germans on their inability to take
the Volga city. The Germans poured
their resources into this bottomless pit
with lavish hand. The scale of the air
offensive rose, impeding and weakening
the Germans. Skillfully the word was
passed about that the Allies hoped to
win the war by air bombardment, while
the Dieppe raid suggested second front
in France or the Low Countries.
Then like bolt from the blue, Mont
gomery in Egypt fell on Rommel and
hurled him out of Egypt and back into
Cyrenaica. The second phase of this
offensive followed swiftly as Eisenhower
landed in French North Africa and
speeded eastward toward Tunisia and
Tripoli. The Germans, like the Japa-
nese, reacted as expected-they flung
their air power and their weapon of
emergency, their air transport COM
mand, into Italy and Sicily in a panic
stricken attempt to hold the central
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