Evening star., 1942-03-26
Yuqos|uvs q Vitu| Factor
MihoiIovich, If Reinforced, Could Upset
HitIer's PIons for Balkan Offensive

Sea, and its freedom Of action will
be increased If there are further
Russian successes In the Crimea, q
possibility which ought to be kept in
mind. The British fleet Is still able
to deal with any attempt to ap-
proach Cyprs or Syria by ship as
long as the Germans do not get q
lodgment for their air power any
father east than Rhodes.
If Turkey should become bellig-
erent, the Turkish fleet would make
an appreciable addition to the Rus
sian power in the Black Sea. This
is important because one motive for
q German attack on Turkey would
undoubtedly be to open the Darda-
nelles to the passage Of italian war
ships.
Sevastopol - Barrier.
There seems some reason to doubt
whether enough Italian ships could
be taken through, even If the straits
were more or less open, to defeat
the combined Russo Turkish naval
forces as long as the latter had
Sevastopol for q base.
In another sense, sea power Is Of
vital importance to operations in all
this area, because the reinforce
ments and supplies Of the Allied
troops in Egypt. Libya. Syria. Pales-
tine, Iran and 1raq all come by sea
through the Indian Ocean. Any
interruption of Indian Ocean sea
communications by Japanese naval
action would have . most serious
effect.
The presence Of strong British
and Russian forces as . back-stop
on Turkeys Asiatic frontiers has
undoubtedly stiffened the attitude
Of those Turks who favor . pro-
Allied policy, and 1t is Of the gravest
importance that nothing should
weaken or seem to weaken this sup
port as the moment approaches
when Turkey may be called upon
to choose her course Of action.
Yugoslavs . Factor.
There is one more factor, which
may well be of primary importance
in this theater Of war, and that Is
the fighting Yugoslav Army under
the command of Gen. Draja Mihail-
ovich. Gen. Mihailovich is said to
control about 1000 square miles of
Yugoslav territory within which he
has organized a strong and rea-
sonably well equipped army. He is
said TO be preparing plans for Of
fensive operations this spring. The
importance Of this Yugoslav resist
ance lies in the fact that the two
most valuable lines Of German COM
munication-the Orient railway and
the Danube River-pass through
Yugoslav territory and very slight
advance by the free Yugoslav forces
would cut both of them. without
the assured use Of both these routes
the Germans would have great Diff
flculty in maintaining a large-scale
offensive against Turkey. provided
the latter resisted.
It may be added that the nkeli-
hood Of Turkeys resistance would
be greatly increased If the Turks
could be certain Of strong Yugo-
slav attacks against the German
communications. 1t is, therefore, to
be hoped that some means has been
or can be found to send assistance
to Gen. Mihailovich, perhaps by
transport plane, or perhaps by sub
marine or otherwise. through some
of the small Adriatic ports with
which he maintains connections.
There is hardly a place in Europe
where q comparatively few such
weapons as automatic rifles, ma
chine guns, light mortars, pack ar
tillery and grenades could. have
greater potential effect. The ap-
proach of March ~, the anniversary
Of the Yugoslav uprising which so
upset the German plans for q Bal
kan offensive and delayed the Ger