Evening star., 1942-04-25
Jap Attacks on Bali,
koepang and Dill
part OF Same Move
Purpose Wos TO Cut Off
U. S. Fighter pIones and
Lure Allied Worships
last OF a series
By GEORGE WELLER,


By GEORGE WELLER,
TotsiTn Correspondent Of The Star an
chicaso DSfiy Te~s
SOMEWHERE IN AUSTRALIA
April 25.--Japanx s simultaneous at.
tack on Ball oversfnadowed at th'
time the attack against Koepanf
Dutch Tifnorl and Dill fPortuRueSs
Tmorl but both were part Of
single movement, which had two
purposes
The first purpose was TO cut of
American fighter planes. which tho
Japanese knew were being dowT
along the stepping stone chain oi
islands OF the Tndoneeian barrier
to Java. The plan was 10 break
the chain OF American supplies
simultaneously at two vital sirhelds
at Denpassar in Bali. the last STOP
before American flghter bases neal
Soerabaja and Malang In Eastern
Java and also at the airdrome In
Penfoh, miles outside Koepang,
which was the first landing after
Australia.
The second Japanese purpose in
the two-headed attack on T1mor
was the hope Of luring American,
Dutch and British warships into
the Timor Sea, both from the Java
Sea and the waters around Darwin,
Australia. 1t was hoped in this
way to get Vice Admiral C. K. l..
Helfrich's united fleets away from
the Java coasts and thus clear the
way for the massing of invasion
transports In Macsssar Straits and
around Palembang. Thus the Japs
exploited the superiority of their
naval forces in planning the main
invasion of Java, due the week
afterwsrd
Carriers R0amed Freely.
As far as their own forces were
concerned, destroyers and cruisers
were kept between Celebes, Borneo
and the Indonesian Island barrier.
Aircraft carriers, however, were sent
southwark Of Java where. roaming
freely in the Indian Ocean, they
were able to attack the Pecos. the
Langley and other Allied warships
coming from Australia.
Thus, the Japanese. while inter-
rupting the inlet service of Arneri-
can fighters from Australia both
by land and by sea, were enabled
TO take their own carrier-borne
fighters and bonbers far enough
from the Indonesian scene during
the preliminary stage of the conflict
to insure their fullest use a week
later when the investment of Java
actually began, and also the most
destructive campaign against Allied
shipping fleeing Tjilatjap, Soera-
baja and Batavia.
Actually, weather and tricky navi-
cation conditions made the Ameri-
can problem of sending fighters to
Java via Timor anything but easy.
No fighter pilot has a metal mike
to take over the job of plotting
and afford him the needed rest dur
ing long oyerwater hops, as do the
flying fortresses. Continually sub
Ject to great strain, he Is obliged,
nevertheless, 10 work out tricky
problems of navigation over COM
plicated islands.
Fortress Used as BeIIweather.
Had the United States foreseen
politically the importance of the
Southwest Pacific bases, her fighter
pilots would have been trained long
ahead for the assumption of mill
tary obligation In these waters.
Sometimes fortress was sent part
of the way from Australia as bell
weather for the tiny wasplike P-40s
and A-24 dive-bombers.
But an example of the difficulties
occurred when five fighters, sup
posed to land at Koepang-neu-
trality laws prevented military air