Evening star., 1942-04-01
Pacific War Council

In his press conference comment
on the Pacific War Council, creation
of which was announced here Mon
day, the President threw little light
on the specific role the council may
be expected to play in the prosecu-
tion of the war. However, he made
one thing .clear-that the council
will not attempt to direct supply
measures or devise military strategy.
There can be little doubt that the
council was set up primarily as a
result of the wholly proper demands
of Australia and New Zealand for a
direct voice in the shaping of the
policy governing the conduct of a war
which vitally affects their national
existence. And by the same token,
there was every reason to include
representatives of China, the Neither
lands, Canada, Great Britain and the
United States. Russia is a conspicu-
Gus absentee, although her interest
in the Pacific hardly can be conSid-
cred less than that of the United
Nations already at war with Japan.
RuSSia'S position is a peculiar one,
however, and the reasons for her
omission are obvious. If this be re-
garded as a serious defect, it is also
one which time may be expected to
correct.
1t seems clear that the establish
ment Of this council in Washington,
and the consequent subsidence of
the Pacific Council which has been
functioning in London, invests the
United States with major RESPONSE
bility for the conduct of the war in
the Pacific. This is not inappro-
pirate, since it is to the United States
that the embattled people of the
Pacific must look primarily for aid,
but it is circumstance which never
thelesS may clash with the funda-
mental facts of our relation to the
war as a whole
To greater extent than is the case
with any other member of the United
Nations, our position is a central one.
We are threatened Immediately and
directly in both oceans, and the
necessity on our part of meeting this
dual threat is the controlling factor
in our military planning. For this
reason, the setting up of the Pacific
Council in washington should not
lead to the Supposition that we are
going to concentrate our strength
primarily against the Japanese. We
cannot afford to fight Japan at the
expense of fighting Germany any
more than we can fight Germany at
the expense of fighting Japan. The
most that we can hope to do for the
time being is to pursue our. policy Of
striking at the enemy wherever and
whenever opportunity arises, while
strengthening our defenses at the
critical point or points of his attack.
Thus, while the japanese menace to
Australia is grave, we cannot over
look the gravity of the German
threat to Russia, nor the possibility
of a joint German-Italian drive in
the Middle East. If one Is of vital
Importance, so is the other. And so
long as we have not the resources in
hand to be strong at all points, we
must adhere to a policy of distribut-
ing our available strength among all
fronts in accordance with their re-
spective Importance.
The problem is to view the war
as a whole and to distribute our
strength accordingly. This is not a
decision which properly can be left
to the Pacific War Council. In the
last analysis it must be made by this
Government, after taking into ac-
count the opinions of all of our allies.