Evening star., 1942-11-09

where, covering practically every
hog path" in the colonies, and talk
with people In all walks Of life
and they made the most Of it. Their
work was described as Of immense
value in building friendship for
America and opposition to the Axis.
There was elaborate cooperation
between these special agents-as
we'll as our augmented consular
stats there-and Gen. Maxine
Weygand, anti-Hitler and anti
Laval French delegate general in
Africa. before he was removed from
his post a year ago at Hitlers de-
mand.
U. S. Aim Is to Free French.
The Weygand-American Coop
Grafton was said to have been espe-
cially effective in keeping German
subversive activities out of French
North Africa. Nazi attempts at
infiltration there were described as
being generally unsuccessful even
after Gen. Weygand's retirement to
obscurity.
Mr.. Hull said our policy, whole
heartedly supported by Britain and
Canada, has been directed toward
ultimately nberating France from
her German captors. People who
have been concerned about it should
now be able to see clearly Its entire
content. he added.
The most important objective, he
emphasized, has been to pave the
way and prepare the background in
the most effective manner possible
for the planning and sending of the
military expedition into the West
ern Mediterranean area, and assist
the movements supporting present
British operations farther east.
Other Purposes Listed.
Other major purposes, he said
all served by maintaining diplomatic
contact-were:
l. Opportunity for this Govern
ment to get from week to week
highly important information virtu-
ally from the inside of German
controlled territory and from North
Africa regarding Axis subversive &C
tivities and other important phases
Of the international situation.
2. Maintenance of close relations
with the French people and en-
couragement of leadership in oppo-
sition to Hitler wherever 1t exists.
3. Keeping alive the basic concepts
Af 4f
looking toward ultimate restoration
of free institutions for France as
they existed before German occu-
patton.
4. Retention OF closest personal
touch on the ground with all phases
of the French ana German situa-
ton under their armistice, with re-
sistance to German pressure for
collaboration beyond the armistice
terms, and constant effort to pre-
vent delivery of the French fleet or
bases In North Africa into German
hands.
Details Disclosed.
Actual beginning OF the long
awaited drive enabled Secretary
Hull to disclose the real purposes
for keeping up formal relations with
Vichy to the last, and permits dis
closure now of some of the details
in the background of the formula
ton and carrying out Of the policy
that has been so much criticized.
Stressed by friends of the Admin
istration is the farsightedness OF Mr.
Hull and President Roosevelt in
analyzing the problems and decid-
ing on a policy as long ago as June,
1910, which is just now eliminating
in dramatic action after many
months in which they could not
answer critics in anything but
vague generalities without prema-
turely tipping their hand.
This Governments first action
after Frances surrender to Ger
many was to exact pledges from the
French government fleeing from
Paris against giving up the French
fleet and important bases to Hitler
American hopes for the French
government to carry on resistance
to the Axis from North Africa were
dashed by the armistice and estab-
lishment Of the Vichy regime.
Then the question arose OF what
should be the United States diplo-
matte course-not toward Vichy in
any narrow, technical sense, but
governed by the sole object of pro-
noting the military situation in our
interest, although 1t then was more
than year before Pearl Harbor.
Background Of Policy.
Mr.. Hull insisted that the whole
thing must be viewed in a very
broad perspective unless America
shut its eyes to realities. The ques-
ton of what was to become Of the
Mediterranean was Of primary con-
Germ to him. Should the United
States walk off and leave the pro-
Hitler government at Vichy to work
unmolested by either our repre-
sentatives or French people we
helped to arouse, 1t was obvious
Germany would have better
chance to get the French fleet
and bases on the Mediterranean and
Atlantic Coasts of Africa. And this
would be q great disadvantage te
this country.
All this u,ao ", thn ho ck nvr,,,,s1 4