Evening star., 1942-10-26

on the Repub-
ucan ticket. David Lawrence.
This type of thing, vicious in its
effects. inside and outside the armed
services, has been ignored so far
as public denial is concerned and
1t is most regrettable that reports
Of that kind do gain such headWay
that something has to be said about
them.
First Of all, if Gen. Macarthur
and more units of the United States
Army are not participating in the
Solomon Islands operation any more
extensively than has already been
announced, the responsibility lies
with Gen. Marshall, chief of staff
OF the United States Army. 1t is
his duty as a member of our tri-
umvirate high command, consisting
of himself, Admiral King and Ad-
miral Leahy, to speak, up for the
Army and insist on it's participation
II he thinks it wise.
But anybody who knows the SIM
plest facts of military and naval
strategy knows that the job of TAX
Ing the Solomons and making them
secure Is a naval task and that
once the Navy and the marines
have achieved that job reinforce
ments or replacement forces from
the Army can substitute for the
marines, who are then able to pro-
ceed to occupy other islands and
bases. But protection for the trans
ports carrying the new forces some
1900 miles overseas is also a job for
our Navy, of limited size in the
Pacific.
Seas Not Yet in Our Control.
The reason why Gen. MacArthur's
forces have not been landed in
greater numbers is that the seas In
and around the Solomons are not
yet In our control and that's the
Navy's problem just now. So far
rs reports of a divided authority
or command are concerned, these
are based on misunderstanding,
too. For Admiral Nimitz at Hawaii
commands the entire Pacific area,
insofar as the waters of that ocean
are concerned, outside of Australia,
He commands activities in the sea
lanes approaching Australia and
any and all islands in the Pacific.
Since the main job at the moment
Is naval it is fitting that a high
naval officer should be in command
81 Army air and sea forces. The jap
anese Navy has been in command of
every si4ele operation relating to
the East Indies and Java and in
Guiding the attacks on Australia by
aircraft from land bases in New
Guinea.
Gen. Macarthur reports directly
to Gen. Marshall and if the latter
sitting In daily conference with
Admiral King and Admiral Leahy
sees a chance for the Army to come
In and supplement the Nays opera
tions this will be done, Gen. Mac
Arthur isn't being shelved at all but
the time has not come for him tC
assume command of military opera
tions because the Navy has not yet
acquired any big bases or the ap-
proaches to any new land areas fol
him to command.
Recent Nimitz Action.
Now the chief difficulty Of the mo.
ment and one to which severe
criticism has properly been directed
Is the Nays tactics in and aroune
the Solomons. Admiral Ninitz a
Hawaii had delegated this to Vic'
Admiral Ghormley, who made hi
headquarters in New Zealand Ad
miral Nimitz flew to the Solomon
recently and made an investigation
and the announcement last Satur
day afternoon of the removal o
both Admiral Ghormley and hi
task force commander, Admiral Pye
is the sequel.
No official explanation has beel
given as to the reasons for tn
removal of these two admirals bu
Hanson Baldwin, military expert o
the New York Times. who has jus
returned from the Solomons an,
presumably was there about tn
same time as Admiral Nimitz, wrot
significant dispatch which wa
printed the morning before tn
change in the naval command in tn
South Pacific was made public. H
wrote in part:
"The bad chapters of our Solomon
operations followed hard upon tn
heels of the initial landing TIL
Astoria, Quincy, Vincennes ant
Canderra we're sunk in night &C
ton with japanese cruisers two day
after the initial landings were made
Our ships were surprised like sittin
ducks; none of them had a chanc
to get of more than a few ineffec
tive salvoS. They were surprises
despite the fact that report sen
by one of our planes of the approach