Evening star., 1942-09-25
Sees Nuzis Limited
In Striking Power
MiIitory Commentator Thinks
Long Transportation Lines
Hold Won Book at StuIinorod
BIZ Mai. GEORGE FIELDING Eliot.

factors of time and distance (as here
tofore explained in these articles) and
the character of the Russian block by
block defense. Indeed, about the only
factor which could not be determined
in advance was that of intestinal forti-
tude-Russian and German How long
can the Russians go on taking it, and
how long can the Germans endure the
terrific strains of dishing it outP
The Germans are fighting over 600
miles (airline) from their advance bases
at Kharkov and Taganrog, and we'll over
1000 miles from the main sources of
their power in Germany They are
maintaining in the active sectors on and
beyond the Don, both before Stalingrad
and in the Caucasus, and in their left
flank anchor sector in the Voronezh
region, force which cannot be less
than 70 to 80 divisions. or about Is corps.
This, as have previously pointed out
means that they must contrive to de-
liver to these active sectors not less than
100000 tons of rations, forage, ammuni-
ton, engineer supplies, spare parts and
other stores for every day that full-scale
hghtlng goes on, at the rate of 1000 tons
per day per corps. This does not include
replacement of men and animals (the
requirements must average close to $4,000
men per day., nor does it include paso-
line and OIL
Stop and think about this for q
moment. One hundred thousand tons of
stores per day can be translated into
various illuminating figures. An aver
age European trainload with locomotives
ana rolling stock in good condition. is
aooat o0o tons; so that 125 trainloads of
supplies must arrive at Marshal Won
BOOKS detralnlng points (railheads)
daily. From railhead these supplies must
mo1e forward by truck Some of the
total must come all the way from the
main advance bases by truck, since the
capacity Of the two rail lines available
to Won Book Is nothing like 125 trains
per day, and his locomotives, rolling
stock and right of way are none OF
them IN good condition. II we as
sumo, and 1t is a conservative assunp-
ton, that the average truck haul Is 300
miles ut Is much less in some cases and
much more in others, we must consider
this figure in the light Of the fact that on
the sort OF roads he has available. the
average days march for truck columns
Is not more than $50 to ITS miles. To
move 100000 tons Of supplies takes $1,000
trucks OF the one e-and-on half ton type
standard in the United States service,
and the Germans are hardly using any,
thlng bigger on the wretched dirt tracks
OF Southeastern Russia.
Therefore, somewhere in Won Books
communications zone, day in and day
out, not less than five echelons of 66 900
trucks each are operating-two on the
way out, two on the way back, and one
unloading or loading. These are average
figures, OF course, it is not all as simple
as that. but they will serve to give an
approximate measure of the size Of the
German supply organization. The total
Is $3.50, 900 trucks, and to keep $4,000
trucks moving an organization of about
100000 officers and men, more rather
than less, is needed. This is just for the
trucks alone, 1t does not include men for
loading and unloading, guards and dumps
and depots, administrative personnel. and
so forth, nor does it include railway
operation.
For all this effort, what does Won
Book get In the way of fighting power
at Stalingrad? He must protect his
nanks-his left on the Don, his right deep
In the North Caucasian area. But he ID
concentrating on Stalingrad, 50 let US
say he has two-thiros Of his force there,
or about IS divisions. Let us assume
that As Of these are infantry divisions,
and let us take the infantry rifle unit
as our criterion OF measurement, assum-
ing that other elements, armored troops.
supporting infantry weapons, planes and
guns will be in due proportion.
AT the best, Won Book can attack Sta
hngrad at one time with no more than
haif his forces, under the existing condi-
tions of continuous assault The others
Will be IN reserve, or temporarily out Of
the line ref1tting and reorganlzing.
twenty-five infantry divisions of three
regiments each will attack with an
average qf two each in the fighting line
and one in divisional reserve; actually.
therefore, Won Books maximum ASSAULT
Ing force is A infantry regiments. The
triangular organization persists all the
way down the line; A regiments deplov
In the fighting line 88 battalions, or l76
companies, or 352 rifle platoons Each
unit normally Though, of course, not al
Ways) puts two of its component units
IN the firing line and holds out one as
| support or reserve A German rifle MIA =
toon on active service will probably have
40 f1ghtlng men available, if the replace
ment service is working well. This means
that Stalingrad can be attacked at one
time by German force totaling about
$4,000 fighting foot soldiers with rifles
tommy-guns and grenades and a due
proportion Of the other arms.
1t is instructive to see by these figures
what time. distance and the conditions
OF modern siege warfare do to the nom
mai strength of an army. Here we
have the Germans, with an army in
South Russia of at least 1,5OO 900 men
tprobably closer to 1,7500O plus, a
supply service Of at least 900 900, plus
probably another 100000 farther back
or engaged in guarding lines of COM
munlcatlon, and in terms of hitting
Stalingrad with infantry, it comes down
to $4,000 men at any one given time
Truly 1t was a great gamble which the
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