Evening star., 1942-08-22
Dieppe and the SoIomons

London's official summary on the
commando raid on Dieppe comedies
with an announcement by our Navy
Department that three of the Solo
mon Islands which were the main
objectives of the offensive launched
a fortnight ago have been definitely
captured save for minor mopping-up
details. 1t may be useful therefore
to compare these two operations,
since both have been logically con-
cluded
In many ways, nothing could be
more unlike than an attack upon
typical seashore summer resort and
descent upon jungle-clad tropic
isles, Terrain and climate are
wholly different, and imposed widely
different conditions upon the in
vaders, once they were ashore. Yet
both attacks were made by sea upon
open beaches; so the actual landing
problems have basic similarity.
The same mixture of contrast and
likeness applies to the aims which
inspired the two operations Dieppe
was never intended to be more than
a transient raid. The primary motive
was to test both the feasibility of a
landing on the Nazi-occupied French
coast and the German dispositions to
repel such attacks The landing was
successfully accomplished. Whether
the experiment would have been pro-
longed if the German defense had
proved less efficient is a matter for
speculation. The chief value of the
raid undoubtedly lies in the testing
out, under actual combat conditions.
Of both the general method and the
multitudinouS details such as types
OF landing boats, manner of debarka-
ton and protective fire from sea and
air. No mere maneuvers, however
realistic, can yield the conclusive an
swers needed before the supreme test
OF large-Scale battle is risked. The
Dieppe operation can thus be con-
sidered as an adequate laboratory
experiment. The incidental losses
can be justified by lessons learned in
anticipation of genuine invasion of
the European continent.
Up to certain point, the same ex-
perimental motive applies to the
descent on the Solomons. Here,
again, the potentialities of attack
and defense had to be tried out, since
we had no previous battle experience.
But the Solomons operation was no
mere raid. 1t was destined to be a
definite occupation of territory valu-
able to us, both for defending our
line OF communica ton with Australia
and for acquiring a bridgehead for
further offensives against the Japa-
nese main bases in the South Pacific.
The expedition to the Solomon Is
lands thus went beyond tactics and
contained strategic element which
the Dieppe raid did not.
The details and results of the Solo,
mon operation are still so shrouded in
official reticence that it is not vet
known what lessons have been
learned and what deductions should
be drawn. Apparently, the cost of
occupation was heavy, both afloat
and ashore. This signifies that the
Japanese defense was efficient, and
that further operations to the north
ward might be still more costly. Also,
we do not know what the burden of
occupation may be in face of po-
tential japanese counterattacks. Un-
til more is known along these lines,
it will be impossible to say definitely
whether this operation is limited
tactical success perhaps defensive in
character, or whether it is the first
stage of a broad offensive in imme-
dite contemplation The answer will
be disclosed only in the subsequent
course of events.