Evening star., 1942-10-14
Discusses Significance
Of Jap Night Tactics
Military Writer Comedies
Four Cruisers Grim Price
To Pay for Landings
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot.

| It is pretty nearly an axiom OF naval
tactics that the admiral who deliberately
| engages in night action is fool-un-
less he is hopelessly inferior in strength
or unless he is charged with mission
so limited by time factors that he can
not wait for daylight.
| In a night action, the element of
! chance looms much larger than in a
day action. Obviously, an admiral con-
fident of his superiority wishes to make
full use of his advantages. He wishes
to leave nothing to chance Hence a
night action, in theory, must favor the
inferior force Like all theoretical state
| ments about warfare, however, this one
cannot be applied rigidly to all situa-
| tions.
There have been occasions In naval
| history in which the coming of night
| has enabled beaten fleet to break off
action Both at Tsushima and at Jut-
land this was the case. At Tsushima the
superior force was able to resume the
action the following day and carry it
through to complete success, at Jutland
this was not the case. In neither in
stance were there any effective night at
tacks; it was merely matter of Togo's
guessing the enemy intentions correctly
and Jellicoes failing to do so. Both
admirals were guided by determination
not to risk superior position on the
chances of night action.
Jellicoe, in his Jutland dispatch, wrote:
IT rejected at once the idea of night
action between the heavy ships as lead
ing to possible disaster, owing first, to
the presence of torpedo craft in such
large numbers, and secondly. to the i'm
possibility of distinguishing between our
own and enemy vessels. Further, the
result of a night action under modern
conditions must always be very largely
matter of pure chance. there
fore decided to steer southwark, where
should be in position to renew the
engagement at daybreak." But, in fact,
he did not find himself in such position
the enemy outguessed him; and Jelli-
coe has been much criticized for his
failure to conduct much closer pursuit
and especially for not making more
vigorous use of his destroyers during the
night
1t is quite evident that no theoretical
considerations will be permitted to limit
or restrain the offensive spirit of our
japanese naval enemy. The attack on
our screening force off Savo Island, in
the Solomons, during the dark hours of
the early morning of August 9 is a case
in point. The skillful use of flares and
searchlights by the enemy and the ex-
cellence of his night gunnery make it
clear that the Japanese have given much
thought to the development of night
tactics and the training of officers and
men therein.
This is significant When all is said
and done, the japanese Navy is inferior
In numbers to ours and this inferiority
will increase with time because of our
larger building program. The japanese
chances, therefore, rest on the policy Of
attrition, of cutting down our strength
by every possible means while awaiting
an opportunity for decisive action. This
strategy must be backed by a tactical
policy in which audacity is a principal
feature. .-r
The night action off Savo Island. how
ever, was not fought with the reduction
OF our naval strength as its primary OBJ
jective. The japanese admiral could not
have been certain of doing that. His
main purpose Was to attack our trans
ports off Guadalcanal and in this pur-
pose he failed. Ovr losses were severe
-Four heavy cruisers is a grim price to
pay for any success-but it should be
Kept In mind that our screening force
did carry out its mission in protecting
the transports, despite losses. and that
the Japanese, whose losses remain IN
known but were certainly substantial.
did not succeed in carrying out their mis-
sion.
This is what counts in war-not
What did you lose?" but Did YOU do
your Job?" The British losses at Jutland
were heavier than the German but the
German fleet went back to port and
stayed there; in the larger sense Jellicoe
did his job because he preserved British
command of the sea, which is the pur-
pose for which the British fleet was
bullt In the affair of the Merrimac
the Union losses were far heavier than
the Confederate, but the Merrimac failed
IN her mission of breaking the blockade
ana was never thereafter factor of anv
consequence in the war. Some of our
air squadrons in the Battle of Midway
Island lost all or nearly all their planes,
but they crippled the japanese naval air
power and they defeated the enemy's
purpose of attacking Midway.
So with our screening force off Savo
Island. Its losses were heavy, but it did
its job.
tcopyrisht, 1912, New York Tribune Inc)