Evening star., 1941-07-29

The Germans appear still to re-
tain the initiative, though there
are hints that the Russians NAV
be passing to the general offensive
in the Smolensk sector. Can the
Germans find troops. airplanes, ma
terial for a fresh and mighty effort
to smash through at whatever point
they have determined to be the
weakest? Or can the Russians ac-
tuallv succeed in taking the counter
offensive in such strength as TO
regain lost territory and lnf1lct a
serious reverse on the German
armies? We do not know; we cam
not CLEAN enough information from
the conflicting reports and cross
claims to tell.
It does. however, seem certain
that, because of their highly colored
claims in the early stages Of the
war, because of the failure so far to
gain any worthwhile success either
In the destruction of important
parts of the Red Army or the cap
ture of any vital Russian center,
the Germans must now make very
great effort to achieve something
that can be held up to the German
people in the guise of victory.
Morale Depends on Victory.
German morale has been nurtured
on victory; the German people will
find the past five weeks difficult to
understand and in the foreign field
L. af tho ylClt nf the
German economic mission to Turkey
and the increasingly obvious anX-
ietv at Toxic are sufficient lndlca-
tions of what may result If brighter
tidines from the Russian front cam
not soon be sent out from Berlin.
The present question is what can
the Germans now do?
It seems quite possible that they
NAV seek a token victory OF some
sort. such as would be represented
nv the capture of Leningrad. 1t
might be possible for them to rem
force the Finnish front by sea, as
well as to aid their friends IN
Fstonia-and recent Russian claims
of naval engagements in the Baltic
suggest that some sort OF marltlme
activity is in progress.
Rv this means the Germans might
create a sufficient concentration IN
the North to drive home their twin
thrusts at Leningrad and take the
city. despite the difficulties OF the
marshy terrain.
This would be a diversion OF
strength. 1t would be strategicaly
iustifable for the German objective
is properly the destruction Of the
Russian armies, not the capture
of cities. But the German need for
something spectacular to offset the
increasingly large question marx
which underlies the worlds headlines
NAV affect German strategical
reasoning. The political necessities
of total war are not less important
than the military.
Hurried Action May Be Forced.
Ieningrad. of course. may not be
the choice. Kiev-toWard which city
the Germans have made some pro-
greSs-may be considered the easier
prev. Moscow seems out of the
question for the time being. as
does Odessa. Further progress by
the Russian counter-offensive in the
SmolenSk area might indeed change
the whole aspect of the situation
and compel a large scale German
retirement.
But we do not seem yet to have
reached that point. The interesting
consideration is that political neces-
sity may now compel the Germans to
do something which in the strictly
military sense would be unWise; OF
compel them to act hurriedly, under
the spur of time when deliberatior
would be better strategy. Offensives
so undertaken resemble in many
WAYS the desperate effort of q