Evening star., 1941-07-24

the new japanese cabinet suggests
a policy of moderation, particularly
because of the substitution OF Ad-
miral Toyada for Mr.. Matsuoka IN
the Foreign Office, but the COM
position of Japanese cabinets has
not been a reliable index to Japa-
nese foreign, and especially MILL
tary, policy.
Very likely the bulk Of japanese
Army opinion would favor the
taking up of a position in readiness
in Manchukuo to await a favorable
opportunity of seizing the Russian
maritime province and perhaps
other parts of Eastern Siberia. 1t
has been in this direction that the
army has long wished to expand,
feeling that japanese control OF
China could never be secure while
the Russian armies remained on the
Amur and the Ussuri and that the
Russian air force and submarines
at Vladivostok remained constant
menace to Japan's metropolitan
territory.
Only by making the Sea of Japan
wholly a Japanese lake, this line
of argument insists, and by push
| ing back the Russian frontier to
point where Russian forces can no
longer be a direct menace to Japa-
nese vital interests can Japan be
safe in turning her attention to
the consolidation and exploitation
of her continental sphere of inter-
est. Therefore, the embodiment Of
Russia in a major war in Europe
must be regarded by the Japanese
Army with great satisfaction-tem-
pered only by the fact that not yet
has that European embodiment
brought about a substantial reduc-
ton of Russian fighting strength in
the Far East.
Offensive Held Unlikely.
The Russian policy has been to
make the Far Eastern armies as
autonomous as possible; they are
strong, well equipped and well
trained and Japan can equal them
in strength in the northern theater
of possible war only by stripping
Japan itself of troops by abandon
ing any idea of fighting in the
south and by giving up many ad-
vanced positions now held in China.
In other words, by literally scraping
the bottom of the military barrel.
Even then the Japanese cannot
come near equaling the Russians in
armored fighting vehicles, and
though numerical air equality is
possible it is probably counterbal-
anced by qualitative superiority
on the Russian side.
The battle of Britain has demon
Strated what qualitative superiority
in the air can do. Finally, an attack
by Japan on the Russian maritime
province would have as its first re-
suit the launching of Russian air at
tacks on Japan proper, which might
cause much international disorder
and even panic. though the range
seems prohibitive to extensive ma
terial results; probably worse, it
would loose from so to 10 Russian
submarines against Japanese ship
ping within the Sea of Japan itself,
while cutting sharply into the ac-
tivities of the Japanese fishing fleet.
The effect on the food supply of
Japan, where rice rationing is now
being enforced for the first time in
japanese history, might hardly be
short of disastrous.
For all these reasons it seems a
fair guess that the Japanese are
unlikely to take the offensive in the
north against the Russians unless
they have reason to believe that the
Russian internal structure in the
Far East would collapse under the
stresses of war or unless conditions
bringing about such a collapse re-
suit from what happens in Europe
But We do not know very much
about the internal state of affairs
in the Soviet Far East.
Uncertain About U. S.
AS to thrust in the south. this
would come more nearly into line
with the ideas of the japanese
Navy, which has always tended to
deplore too much continental ex-
pansion for Japan but has rather
felt that an insular empire should
seek expansion into other islands
and find security in mastering every
base from which attack could be di-