Evening star., 1941-12-09

than Germany &aA -
would have to David Lawrence.
send them from the Azores or from
African bases, and certainly If Nazi
or Vichy-owned aircraft carriers
some day duplicated the Japanese
feat, attacks on American coast
cities from the air are equally as
feasible.
Just as the French depended on
the Maginot Line and never thought
much In terms of offensive war. so
today the United States is paying
the penalty of having believed too
much in the isolationiSt doctrine Of
two oceans as a protection against
Invasion or attack.
Until less than a year ago the
designers of airplanes for the United
States we're told to think in defen-
sive terms. Only within the last
few months have the possibilities Of
offensive war, in the form of mighty
long-range bombers with large cruis-
Ing speed, or numerous aircraft car
riers capable of launching long
range bombing planes, been an in
tegral part of American defense pol
Icy. And, of course, in time of emer-
gency the United States now does
not have enough.
Failures Other Than Navy.
Congress already is giving voice
to an undercurent of criticism
against the Navy, little realizing
that our air force for offensive use
against Japan is weaker than it
should be. largely because even as
late as April, 1910. Congress re-
fused to bestir itself and vote large
appropriations for airplane making.
But there is another phase to the
criticism Of those circumstances
which today bring Americans face
to face with their first major naval
defeat in many decades of history.
1t is that somehow the civilian
branch of the administration did
not synchronize it's advices and
judgment too we'll with the naval
branch of the Government.
Inside the adminiStra ton it was
well known, for instance, that the
militarists in Japan might at any
moment commit an overt act. This
has happened before in our rela-
tions with Japan, as. for example,
when the Panay was bombed in
Chinese waters-sn act later re-
pudiated by the japanese civilian
officials in contact with our AM
bassador.
Could Have Acted Secretly.
It was known here that the mem
oranda being unchanged might pro-
long the recent negotiations and
that the militarists have felt
themselves in no sense responsible
always for keeping the foreign Office
at Toxic advised of its plans. 1t
Is a reasonable supposition that
neither Ambassador Nomura nor
Saburo Kurusu knew of the i'm
pending attack. 1t would be like
the militarists to use the diplomatic
branch of the government to cover
UP preparations for attack and to
keep that fact secret from everybody
In the whole foreign service OF
Japan.
But in Washington when the first
note was sent on November 26-a
hat rejection of the Japanese view
point-it was known that the mill.
tarists might break loose. Why
wasn't the Navy ordered to be al
posts of duty "a hours a day wher
such a critical stage was reached
In our relations with such an un-
certain government as the Japanese
has shown itself TO be?
Under the American congressional
system. there are not the opportu-
mites for interrogating the respon-
sible officials of the executive
branch of the Government as under
the parliamentary system, but new
ertheless there some day will be ,
lot of asking of questions and {
lot of explaining. For while th'
barrage of accusations concerning
the treachery Of the Japanese i
fully justified, it is also importan
to know why the American Nav.
was not on the alert and why l
had no way of determining the ap
proac1 of hostile airplanes. tn
stories of listening devices that tel
OF the approach of enemy plane
have been widely published hereto
fore, but no explanation is forth
coming as to why the detection wa
not made in the case of the Japa
nese on Sunday.
May Prove Greatest Mistake.
1t will also be interesting to lear
why the United States sent its not
of November 26 if its Navy was a
unprepared as recent events sho'
It to have been.
It Is too early to know exactl
what did happen, and later explana
tions of the attack may place tn
Navy in a different light. tn
mood of Congress, it must be re
ported, is militant today, and 1t
q safe assumption that this war wi
start out with a far more of1ensi,
spirit than did the first World Wa
Perhaps the defeat handed to tf
United States over the week en-
will eliminate the boasting ar
the overconfidence- and make 8
concerned realize that 1t is POI
policy to underestimate an enemy
strength or fighting spirit and th'
It Is wiser to prepare for the wor'
Perhaps 1t will give our Navy Il