Evening star., 1941-01-24
Full Necessary Aid

The assertion that we can give
"full aid' to England by methods
: short of war" has been repeated Sc
? often and accepted as a practical
: program by so many people in this
country that a confusion of deflni-
: ton is threatening to obscure the
basic realities of our foreign policy.
In any consideration of this matter
. It is essential to have a clear under
) standing of what is meant by full
aid" or "all-out assistance" to Eng
land. If these terms have any real
meaning, they necessarily must imply
: a degree of assistance which will pre-
vent the defeat of the British and
the passage of naval control of the
Atlantic to the totalitarian powers.
That is the objective which our own
self interest requires US to strive for,
= and a policy which contemplated aid
in kinds and quantities insufficient
to achieve that objective would be
unworthy of consideration, for not
only would we thereby fail to enable
Britain to continue the fight, but we
would weaken ourselves in the
process.
If this Interpretation of full aid'
to England is valid, and The Star
believes it is the only tenable one
under the circumstances in which
we find ourselves, the qualification,
by methods short of war" becomes
singularly inappropriate. Full nee
essary aid'-that is, all aid neces-
sary to prevent a Hitlerian victory,
more clearly states our national pol
icy-and that policy cannot be more
narrowly restricted. With our Gov
ernment, of course, resides the final
decision of what aid is necessary.
In the first place, the term laid
short of war" itself is not susceptible
of any precise definition. Except for
an actual attack by our armed forces
on Germany or Italy, almost any,
thing that we do to aid England
might or might not be an act of
war. Hitler, for instance, might
have elected to treat the recent
transfer of fifty destroyers as war
like act, but it did not suit his pur-
poses to do so. The fact still remains,
however, that the decision as to what
are and what are not methods short
of war ultimately rests with him, not
with us, and in making that deter
mination he will be guided solely by
what he considers his own selfish
interests-just as we should be in
making our decision as to how much
assistance we are going to give the
British.
With the great majority of Ameri-
cans-including many of those who
oppose the administration on this or
that detail-solidly behind the pro-
gram of aiding England, it may be
assumed that this is our settled policy
and that 1t will not be abandoned if
it is at all possible for us to see it
through. And it is an equally safe
assumption that this majority con-
templates continued and effective
aid; that public opinion in this coun-
try would strongly oppose any cur
tailment of assistance to the British
merely because such aid was reaching
effective proportions and was there
fore becoming offensive to Hitler.
The vital interests of the United
States, both now and for many years
to come, make it necessary, as the
President has said, for us to become
the great arsenal of the embattled
democracies. And it follows as a
necessary corollary that the weapons
. produced in this arsenal must reach
. those for whom they are being made.
Otherwise, 1t is useless to talk of
giving "full aid" to England, for
weapons which never reach the field
q. Of battle are of no assistance what
soever. In these circumstances it
seems plain that we should cease
deceiving and giving false comfort
to ourselves by such qualifications
as laid short of war" There is no
definable line, the crossing of which
means war and the avoidance of
which means peace. The search for
such a line, however, confuses and
muddles our whole effort. We waste
precious time in looking for some
. thing that does not exist. We will
reach our full effort when we cour-
: ageously face the fact that it does
: not exist, that there is no guaranty
of peace in this troubled world to-
day, and devote our energies whole
heartedly to the single objective
"all necessary aid" to Britain and
: those who stand with her.