Evening star., 1941-02-09

1t is not fear of the enemy, but faith
in their own cause which has carried
the American people successfully through
every war in which they have so far
engaged. In the leadership of today the
emphasis unfortunately seems to be more
on fear than on faith.
The absence of the appeal to idealism
is the more difficult to understand be-
cause idealism could so readily be en-
listed in behalf of the all-out aid for
Britain which the bill envisages.
Support for British Ideals.
Most of the support for the bill is not
based on any belief that the British
stand is preserving the United States
from invasion 1t comes from pro-
found conviction that ideals defended
in the way the English are defending
them must have value deserving Amer
ican support. Many Americans, wholly
regardless of whether or not ST. Louis
is in jeopardy, would, therefore, like to
share in the defense of those English
shrineS which are also a common
heritage of the American people.
If there were more official emphasis
on the lons-range value of permanent,
purposeful Anglo-American cooperation
there would be less hesitation in many
minds about the lease-lend bill There
would be more certainty, and the
strength which goes with certainty, if
the President would assure the country
hot he of iy,tor
cooperation in mind in asking for the
enormous powers which the bill would
delegate. That would be more to the
point than his press conference wise
crack about authorization to stand on
his head in the middle of Pennsylvania
avenue.
The lease-lend bill will be enacted,
according to present portents, in spite
of rather than because of executive lead
erShip. The measure is likely to arouse
rather than placate opposition precisely
because only negative purpose has as
yet been vouchsafed by its sponsors. 1t
is hoped that the final vote will somehow
eXemplify national unity. But it is very
difficult to secure, or expect, unity when
there is no clear-cut program around
which it can crystalline.
British Won't State War Aims.
One great obstacle to the enunciation
of such program is perhaps beyond the
power of the administration to remove.
That is the refusal of the British gov
eminent to state, or even to intimate, its
war aims AS long as these remain wholly
underlined it will be difficult for the
administration to urge, and more diff
cult for the American people to accept,
a long-range program of Anglo-Amer-
ican cooperation
There are, of course, few Americans
who would be willing to fight, or let
younger Americans fight. for any British
war aims, no matter what. To this small
group 1t is, paradoXically, almost trea-
sonable to suggest that Britain should
state a definite policy before expecting
definite American support. The explana-
ton of that paradox is simple. Those
who feel this way are not Americans, but
English in the emotional reactions which
in a crisis do more than formal allegi-
ance to determine loyalty.
This group, however, is as much a
minority, though far more influential,
than their German counterparts at the
other end of the scale. The great
majority of Americans, the ones who will
swing the balance, are pro-English, but
not SO at any price. 1t is this great ma
jority which wants more information
before the destiny of this country is
voluntarily linked to that of England.
Lord Halifax, according to report, will
shortly state the British war aims, with
degree of precision yet to be decided.
1t is further said that the statement is
likely to be delayed until final action on
the lease lend bill has been taken.
That is unfortunate, for between the
opposition to this bill, the absence of any
American policy looking towards post
war reconstruction, and the uncertainty
as to Great Britain's war objectives, there
is a triangular connection.
BY the same token, all three difficulties
could be simultaneously removed.