Evening star., 1941-05-11
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.


Discussion of the vitally important
shipping situation in the Senate
does not show any great apprecia-
ton of what the basic factors of
that situation really are.
The reference figure. to which all
other figures are subordinate, is
really the minimum amount of op-
Grating tonnage which is required to
supply the British war effort, after
taking into account:
Cd The average rate of turn
around in the available ports;
(2) The minimum requirements
of the Near East forces;
80 The minimum requirements
of other parts of the empire and
its Allies for civilian and military
necessities;
a. The extent to which American
and other neutral tonnage can be
used to relieve belligerent tonnage:
t5) Such redistribution as may be
possible to reduce the length of
haul.
When this minimum figure has
been ascertained. the next inquiry
should be: Is this much tonnage
now available? If not, can 1t be
made available by any means now
open to the British Commonwealth,
its Allies, and the United States?
If it is available, is there any ex-
cess?
Presuming that small excess
now exists. as seems possible, We
then proceed to further set of
calculations: At what dates will a
given rate of weekly losses by
enemy action reduce the available
operating tonnage below the safety
point?
Must Consider Additions.
In figuring this, We must take ac-
count of probable future additions,
month by month, of British, Domin-
ion, American and other available
new construction; of the average
probable tonnage laid up for repair,
of the effect of bombing on repair
yards and the possibility of divert
ing repair work to American or
other safe" yards, of the prospects
of reducing the bombing effect,
both on repair and on n-around
time in port. by more effective
methods of defense
Then, taking as reference figure
the average weekly loses by enemy
action since January l (or such
other date as may be selected, We
can determine how long that rate
of loss can be endured without low
ering tonnage below the safety limit;
how long a 10 per cent increase
could be endured, a 20 per cent in
crease, and so on; on the other
hand, how much additional time
would be gained by proportionate
reductions if they could be effected.
BY comparing these dates with
various dates to be calculated from
anticipated production of aircraft
by both sides, and other weapons,
and by taking into account other
time factors such as those based on
German oil supply. reduction of
British production due to bombing,
food conditions in Britain and on
the Continent, and so on, we ought
to be able to get very good time
picture of the year 194l, and we
ought to be able to determine our
proper course with considerable ac-
curacy.
1t is this writer's guess that such
figures would show that unless the
United States takes drastic action
with regard to protecting North At
lantic shipments the existing mar
gin of safety will quickly disap-
pear and that at current rates of
loss the available tonnage will sink
well below the safety point before
the end of the year. This means
the consumption of food reserves in
Great Britain, gradual reduction Of
the ration, gradual weakening of
the British war effort in the air and
at sea, consequent loss of morale
due to hopelessness and in the end
the defeat of the British people
either by direct attack or by the
coming into power of govern
ment which will make peace on
Nazi terms-which will be victor's
terms.
Publication of Figures Urged.
AS to operations elsewhere it
| probably means the abandonment
of the whole Near Eastern cam
paign, weakening of the British
position in the Far East, due to
inability to supply the large garrl-
son in Malaga, the loss of positions