Evening star., 1941-02-02
BY JOHN CUDAHY.

Ul-NdI tl1LllilnAdSl SU1llplaaicd OAt-
terly about Ireland. He said the
Irish. by refusing TO permit the
British to use the Irish ports against
German submarines, were conduct
ing themselves in a mean and con-
temptible way.
I asked him, assuming a. conflict
between the German and British
fleets, 100 miles or so from our
shores, could the British properly
petition for naval bases in New
York, Boston and Newport News?
He wasn't so sure about that. He
conceded that acceded occupation
of these shelters would be a war
like act on the part of the United
States and he did not favor war
That is, for his own country.
The analogy is true one. Ex-
cept that the war is at the front
gate of ireland, while 5000 miles of
the Atlantic separate us. The
question OF transferring the Irish
harbors to British naval forces is an
Irish question, concerned primarily
with Irish national self-interest.
There is as much relevancy for
everything short -of-war shouters to
dictate to the Irish their course OF
action as for the Irish to determine
what we should do if the British
sought refuge for their battleships
on our shores.
Needs cooperative Ireland.
Cobb (Queenstown) Berehaven
In Bantry Bay, and Lough Swilly
have always been of great strategic
importance in the defense of the
British Isles. for they command the
southwest approach to England and
the northwest to Scotland through
the North Channel 1t was only
a few miles from Cobb that the
LuSitania was sunk, and along these
two sea routes, only few miles from
the Irish Coast. German submarines
have inflicted and are now inflicting
their greatest toll The British Ad-
miralty has always insisted that a
cooperative ireland was absolute
" essential to the British scheme
of defense and mere glance at
the map will show this to be true.
Yet in the summer of 1888 the
British flag was lowered and the
British garrisons took their per-
manent leave of their inhospitable
hosts.
Winston Churchill savagely as
sailed the Anglo-IriSh agreement
which ceded these ports to Ireland.
He pointed out the serious, ir-
reparable impairment of British
security. In an unanswerable way
he showed how British flotillas,
denied the use of Irish anchorage.
would have to operate over range
so much greater that its effect
would mean a far larger number of
vessels and far greater consump-
ton of fuel 1t would be necessary
he said, if Cobb and Berehaven were
given up, for the British craft to
move from Pembroke in Wales, a
radius of 400 miles out and back,
for anti-submarine operations. And
with Lough Swilly in Donegal lost
to the British Navy, he demonstrated
how a new base would have to be
established at Lamlash, on Arran
Island in Scotland. with radius of
200 miles, out and home.
Guard Food Lanes.
1t is easy to understand Mr..
Churchill'S CONSERVATION at what
he called the throwing away of
''our rights wholesale" For beyond
the strategic necessity of these ports,
they guard the sea lanes over which
food supplies are brought to the
British Isles. Berehayen is the
most westerly port which can be
used in any system of transatlantic
convoy. Cobb, shielded by Spike
Island, with a dockyard of Haul
bovline, in perhaps the most ideal
naval base for the protection of the
absolutely vital trade lines of Great
Britain from the North and South
Atlantic and Lough Swilly is per-
feet sortie to protect all vessels
passing the north coast of Ireland.
1t was not far from Lough Swilly,
near TORY Rocks, that the Athena
was sunk on September 8, 1889, the
opening gun of the war.
Why were these precious ports
turned back to the Irish? The an
swer is the appeasement program OF
Neville Chamberlain. with his gen.
tIeman's agreement with Italv, then
Godesberg, Berchtesgaden and the
rJenouernent of Munich,
The persistent British Prime Min
lister would not forsake his visions
despite the lurid war clouds which
hung so heavy over all Europe two
years ago. And a formidable factor
minatory to the realization Of that
vision was Ireland and the age-long
differences between that island and
England.
Satisfied at Ports Return.
There was a deep-seated satisfac-
ton at the return of the ports, for
1t was felt that the presence OF the
British garrisons was an invasion OF
Irish sovereignty and this was deep
" resented. Surely there could
never have been any permanent
reconciliation between the two
islands while British soldiers re-
manned on Irish soil.
But with the outbreak of war the
truth of Mr.. Churchill's prophecy
that the loss of the ports would be
of grave consequence in a life-and-
death struggle of the British En-
nire became dramatically manifest
If the Irish ports have such stra-
tegic and military value, why have
not the Germans taken them by
force? The answer is that the
military difficulties are too great
They far outweigh the possible MIL
itary advantages. -.
In my opinion, the Irish woulo
oppose British seizure OF their ports
tust as bitterly as they would oppose
German occupation, and the gains
to Britain would not be conlmen-
surate with the losses.
It is difficult for Americans to be-
lieve this, but during my stay ir
Ireland, De Valera was sometimes
accused of having sold out to the
British. The hostile critics who
took this view of the Irish leader
are not an insignificant recalcitrant
minority. They represent large
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