Evening star., 1941-11-02
BY MAJ. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT,

In his article yesterday my dis
tinguished colleague, Walter Lipp-
mann. comments on Charles A.
Lindbergh's Thursday night speech
at Madison Square Garden, observ-
ing with incisive accuracy that the
success of Hitler's famous "one-bv-
one strategy depends for its success
OF German expansion of Mr.. Lind
bergh'S advice to do nothing unless
attacked, never take the offensive.
abandon all initiative to Germany.
await always German moves at Ger
many's selected time. place and con-
ditions. The "one-by-one strategy,
as Mr.. Lippmann points out. can be
beaten only by concerted action pre-
venting full German concentration
against a single foe at a time.
The moment is perhaps opportune
to examine further certain of Mr..
Lindbergh's military theories, lest
they receive wider acceptance than
Mr.. Lindbergh's experience and apti-
tude in military affairs really war
rants.
I'm the same. speech, Mr.. Lind
bereln lays considerable stress on
the 'ffnpossibility of invading Europe.
while asserting that "a mechanical
army Of at least 100000 Ameri-
cans would have to be transported
to that continent and landed there
on In order to defeat Germany. He
further insists that air power has
proved more than match for sea
power, because the British Navy was
unable to support British troops in
Norway, Greece and Flanders.
The Workings Of Sea Power.
Examining all that Mr.. Lindbergh
has uttered on what he calls the
military situation. this writer is un-
able to find any evidence that he
understands the workings of sea
power at all. Like so many others.
he seems to suppose that it is the
prime purpose of navies to lombard
enemy coast lines and attack enemy
seaportS. Of the axiom that the ul-
innate purpose of all naval opera
tions is the control of wartime COM
munlcatlOnS. the denying of them
to the enemy and the conserving of
them for ones own use. whether
military or commercial, he appears
never to have heard. One would
hazard a guess that he has never
read single volume by Admiral
Alfred T. Mahan.
Mr. TirIhorUh onraorr
that a situation in which Germany
| cannot invade Britain and Britain
cannot invade Germany would re-
suit in stalemate, quite ignoring the
fact that this would leave Britain
| land America) in control of the
sea, that the sea powers thus could
| continue to deprive Germany of
many necessary commodities while
Germany could deprive them of
nothing, and that Germanys ad-
vantage, which rests entirely on the
six years of undisturbed preparation
| for war which she has been allowed,
will thus steadily be whitfield away
while her opponents can pile up
! against her the offensive power de-
rived from the mobilization of all
! the resources of the non European
world
| In other words. Mr.. Lindbergh ig-
/ nores the effect on the military sit
uation of the most important factor
| in war time He does not see that if
| Germany is to win she must be
| quick, before the enormously su-
perior resources of her opponents
can be translated into fighting
power.
Germany's Opportunity.
Mr.. Lindbergh does not see that
his advice would grant Germany the
opportunity to win while she still
has measurable fighting advan-
tage and that only if the American
people take his advice and withhold
the output of their full strength
now can Germany hope for victory.
How ardently the German high COM
mand must have hoped. in 1888 and
1889, that the policies advocated by
Mr.. Lindbergh would be accepted at
London and Paris; how ardently
must they hope today that they like
wise will be accepted at Washing
ton.
AS to the invasion of Europe by
a hypothetical A. E. F. of 10000, 600
men, Mr.. Lindbergh's theory ignores
the effect of the passage of time, the
strangulation of blockade, and the
losses of the Russian campaign on
German fighting power He seems
to think that offensive operations
would necessarily be met by q Ger
man Wehrmacht in the fighting
trim of June, 1910.
He does not seem to know that
Germany is today cutting deeply
into her oil reserves, that Germany
WHERE TO DINE.