Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1941-08-14
German
Generals
In Control
Hitler Seen Following
Their Advice
BY HUGH s. JOHNSON

THE substance and accuracy
of the following column can't
be guaranteed. Most of il seems
reasonable and in accord with
such facts as are known. al
though l can hardly credit some
Of it. The only thing ! can say
with confidence is that il is a
fair consensus of our active pro-
fessional military experts in
Washington.
Much of il they don't know
and have TO guess. But they
have more 10 guess on than we
newspaper kibitzers.
In the first place they have
military map specialists and
mountains of statistical infor-
nation with an organized Sys-
tenn for sitting and drawing
conclusions.
In addition. quite recently,
some unquestionable informa-
ton has been coming through
from brother officers abroad in
our own or other services. Piec-
ing it all together, the result, for
whatever il is worth, is some
thing like this.
The recent rumor that Goer-
ing is in the doghouse is entirely
unfounded, as is the explanation
that he and the generals. Won
keitel and the rest, opposed the
great Russian adventure or that
the latter has bogged down.
THE truth. according 70 these
Il reports. is that if anybody is
in the doghouse, it is Hitler him.
self.
The small but powerful group
Of Nazi politicians wanted TO
posture and gesture around in
the West.
The professional soldiers in
sisted that Germany could not
risk further westward action
leaving the powerful Russian
army on It's flank and rear.
They also argued that l94l
was the last chance 10 attend
10 II. Every strategic consider
alton required the destruction or
practical paralysis of that great
force before making another
move.
The professional view was
adopted. Hitler is combining HIM
self to political affairs and has
little 10 do with the campaign.
The soldiers are IN the saddle.
That certainly sounds reason
able.
The next important assertion
Is that while what was called
plan "A three 10 six-week de-
clslve campaign 49, has be N
slowed up, plan A was merely "A
tentative gamble, not greatly re-
lied upon by the general staff
1T IT worked by some spectacu-
lar break-through such as that
IN France through the forest of
AddedmenneS. so much the bet
ter, but the possibility of its not
working was never forgotten
and plan and schedule b were
not 10 be lnterfered with If plan
"A swift Stabbing blitz- didn I
perform a miracle.
DIAN and schedule r were q
systematic chewing into Red
mlncemeat Of the whole Russian
army corps by corps and group
by group. This required much
more time. You can't kill 1000. =
OOO men IN a day-even in a
slaughter pen.
The Russians are experts AZ
Observation-Disclosures OF roads
and bridges. Plan B required
the bringing up and supply of
masses OF German heavy in
fantry. This in turn depended
upon the speed and efficiency of
the great German specialized
bodybuilding corps.
In the meantime, by grand
scale encircling movements. such
as that now going on around
Odessa, and dozens of smaller
pincer attacks, all the way from
the White 10 the Baltic seas.
Plan B is one Of wholesale
slaughter and destruction, the
like OF which the world has
never dreamed.
Plan b is said 10 be ahead Of
schedule, and il is beginning 10
be clearer that the communicates
Of the German high command
are more accurate and timely
than those Of Russia.
WITH all this and with less
w circumstances Of verify and
more conjecture is question OF
lettering control Of the highly
powerful political minoritieS--
the Nazi party in Germany, the
Communists in Russia-and OF
the ascendancy of military COM
manders.
The German plan for Russia
is said not TO be, as il was In
Poland. reorganization Of 2
whole people and country fol
complete digestion.
Rather IL is first 10 liquidate
the Communist party and Their
1 10 seize certain mining, agricul-
tural. petroleum and industrial
areas and let the havoc of de-
feat, destruction and disorgani-