Evening star., 1941-02-26
Fovors Transfer of
Destroyers to Britain
Writer Insists Thut Life Line
To England Is Worth
Any Risk or Cost
To the Editor OF The Star:

To the Editor of The Star:
In commenting on Wendell WILKES
proposal to transfer destroyers to Britain
the Secretary of the Navy said, I'VE
haven't any more destroyers to spare
than we need for a balanced fleet" 1t
may be asked, a balanced feet for what
purpose?
A balanced feet is feet including the
battleships, aircraft carriers, heavy cruis-
ers, light cruisers and destroyers neces-
sary to form main body, defensive
screen, a protective screen, scouting
line and if available, detached wing of
fast capital ships with accompanying
light forces. 1t is a fleet which, maneu-
vering on the expanse of an ocean, can
meet and engage, under tactical condi-
tions previously studied on game board
another full-fledged fleet.
What fleet is it against which we must
maintain a perfectly balanced fleet?
There is exactly one other nation in the
world today possessing full-fedged
fleet which might meet our fleet in full
scale naval battle.
But under no conceivable circum-
stances is the japanese feet now going
to steam across the Pacific and lombard
California or even Hawaii. The utmost
dreams of Japan do not go beyond domi-
nation of the Far East-unleSs Germany
should win a decisive victory
Are we then to keep a perfectly bal
anced fleet waiting to steam across the
Pacific and save the Philippine Islands?
Are we to keep the destroyers forming a
part Of that perfect theoretical balance
for use under the balanced conditions of
general fleet action? Which is more
important to our national safety, the
Philippine Islands or the British Islands?
In 1899 the Allies fought theoretical
war. The perfect balance of the Maginot
Line Of defense and the naval blockade
were supposed automatically to win that
war for them. They parceled out their
financial resources for three-year pc
riod. Then actual war came crashing
through their balanced calculations and
turned them upside down.
In 1941 we obviously are in this war:
since we are neutral only in name. We
seem also to be in it theoretically. We
are saving our perfectly balanced fleet to
fight another full-f1edged balanced feet
under the hypothetical conditions OF a
single, big, decisive naval battle on the
surface of an ocean.
The Japanese fleet is no more likely to
meet our feet in a naval battle fought
under formaliZed rules than the German
Army was to follow formal rules and at
tack the front of the Maginot Line with
infantry. This is not war fought under
formalized rules at all, 1t is primitive
struggle with the opponents using every
clever device and strategem they can
conceive.
A Germany triumphant in Europe
and Africa would be a hundred times
as great a menace to us as a Japan
triumphant in the Far East We did
not adopt universal military training
because of any possible japanese at
tack on our Pacific Coast. Moreover,
Japan cannot dominate the Far East
unless Germany wins; and Japan knows
1t. If Germany lost, Japan would
collapse under an American and British
embargo without even a shot being
fired. If Germany won, Japan could
take the whole of the Far East and we
could not lift finger TO stop it. for
We could not risk our one-ocean Navy
5000 miles from our shores.
The life line of supply to Britain is
the key to the whole decision. The
struggle to maintain that life line against
submarine StabS has as much resem-
blance to formalized naval battle as
dagger thruSts in the dark have to
Queensbury rules. This is not a con-
ventional war fought under interna-
tional law to the conclusion by treaty
OF peace with honor. 1t is a struggle
for the survival of the f1ttest. The in
f1uence of perfectly balanced" United
States fleet on the decision in this
struggle will be zero.
If there ever Is a decisive battle be-
tween two balanced fleets, it will occur
to 10 years from now. The other
fleet will be German fleet including
many ships built under duress in Brit
ish yards, which in 1941 we did not do
our utmost to maintain because We
were keeping our destroyers for another
battle-a relatively minor battle in the
Pacific that is unlikely ever even to
occur.
Germany is the axis. Italy and Japan
are minor satellites. Are we going to
keep our fleet formally ready for a
hypothetical battle with the japanese
fleet in the Pacific while British de-
Stroyers and German submarines fight
the actual war in the Atlantic? Is our
1941 strategy superior to the 1899 STRAIT
egy of the Allies?
Ten years from now it will not matter
whether the life line of supply to Brit
ain was kept open by British-built de-
stroyers or by American-built destroyers.
The only thing that will matter will
be whether it was kept open.
If British-built destroyers alone can
not keep it open while British built,
plus American built destroyers, can keep
it open, then the history of the world
for century to come depends upon
American-built destroyers. Strategically,
the opportunity appears to be worth
the risk G, B, STUDIEY.