Evening star., 1941-09-04
Nuzis Face Soviet Stu|emote
Outlook for September Not Impressive;
Spotlight Turning to Bottle Of Atlantic

: der the control of the Royal Navy
for operations. Probably of chief
Importance, there is the American
patrol as far as Iceland, which forces
the Germans to take one of two
courses: Risk an incident" with
an American patrol, or confine their
operations, as far as attacks on
North Atlantic conveys are con-
cerned, to the waters between Ice
land and the British Isles. These
waters are all within the radius of
action Of long-range shore based
fighters, and it has already been
demonstrated that conveys protected
by fighters are rarely attacked sue
cessfully by bombers, or tracked by
scouting planes reporting their posi-
ton to bombers or submarines.
1t is hardly to be expected that
the Germans will allow this state of
affairs to continue unchallenged. II
they once face up to the fact that
the war is going into 1912, they must
then realize that their principal
source of danger in that year will
be the rising tide of American arms
production.
Quick Victory Fades.
Their plan for quick victory over
Russia, followed by peace offensive,
seems to be fading out of the picture,
for no peace offensive which is not
preceded by victory in Russia
would be possible from the psyche
logical point of view. Hence it would
seem certain that the Germans, ever
forehanded as they have been, must
be giving much thought to the battle
of the Atlantic and the measures to
be taken in that theater during the
coming winter.
These measures probably include
the increased use of submarines and
of long-range scouting and bomb
ing aircraft; but the decision must
be taken as to how the menace Of
the shore-based fighter is to be
overcome. The best means would
be, If German resources were equal
to it, an attack on the chain of
island bases-Iceland, Faroes, Ork-
neys, Shetlands-which make the
fighter operations possible.
If such attacks seem unlikely to
succeed, the Germans must then
weigh the risks and advantages to
be gained from an extension of
their operations into the American
patrolled area. These considera-
tions might even lead them to the
view that their only hope lies in an
invasion OF the British Isles. desper-
ate as such a decision must now
seem. If it is the only hope Of VIC
tory, they may try it.
May Try Invasion Yet.
Intensifcations Of bombing at
tacks on British centers might be
the first sign Of such a decision. In
blllc SOiAAAcSIsOli tAiS 3O1lS ALL IA odS2i
bombing attacks may have been
intended partly for psychological ef-
feet; to prepare the way for
peace offensive, but also with the
idea of producing overconfdence
and a relaxation of precaution. that
the renewal of such attacks might
be more effective both materially
and in their effect on British
morale.
AS for invasion itself. 1t does not
seem possible that the Germans can
gain a sufficient degree of air supe-
riority to give them any chance of
success; yet they may, as soon as
the Russian campaign began to look
uncertain, have commenced q great
program of fighter construction and
fighter pilot training for one mighty
effort. II Hitler Is now desperate,
he may make this bid for quick VIC
tory.
(copyrisht, 1e4I, New York Tribune, Ine.)