Evening star., 1941-03-26

not quite so SIM ~
pie as that. Hit
Ter and the men DR.. RauschninE.
behind him have shown themselves
capable of great blunders. But they
also have demonstrated that they
give very careful consideration to
their individual actions. The Ger
man high command is certainly pre-
pared to take very great risks, but
it will not look for them if they
can be avoided.
In warfare it is general practice
to shun definite alternatives and
seek ways out of difficult situa-
ton. Would it. therefore, not be
the immediate aim of the German
high command to endeavor to gain
a longer time limit that Is months
and so avoid being placed in a situa-
ton in which everything had to be
staked on a single card? Let it be
granted that former German high
commands did not shrink from such
risks, but we also must note that
they took them only when they had
no alternatives. At present Hitler
still has other ways out of the
dilemma.
Value Of Oil Supplies.
1t is easy to overlook the psyche
logical effect of the experiences of
the last years of the World War
on the men intrusted with Ger
many'S military leadership. For ex-
ample, the Oil reserves available for
German military aircraft amounted
to only fortnights supply when the
last great offensive in the west broke
down in 1918.
The failure of an invasion of Brit
ain certainly would be a heavy blow
for Germany, but it would by no
means imply the catastrophe that
many people presume. Yet it would
bring inevitable disaster if it ex-
hausted the Oil supplies to such an
extent that there was none left for
the armies still intact to use in
campaign directed toward the acqui-
sition of further supplies.
Would it not, therefore, be only
logical to make certain of ample
supplies of oil and adequate trans
port facilities for the precious liquid
fuel before embarking on such
risky enterprise as this invasion
would be?
Hitler needs oil. OF that there is
no doubt. He cannot draw ADEQUATE
supplies from his synthetic oil plants
and the Rumapian oil wells, espe-
cially as the latter could be destroyed
with comparative ease His need of
other raw materials likewise forces
him to seek a way out of the
blockade, and there is a way out
which, if taken in time, will render
him independent of the adverse
time limit.
Hitler can gain oil supplies in the
mosul area. A drive in this direction
would constitute a heavy blow to
the lines of communication of the
British Empire. After the French
collapse Hitler reckoned this among
his attainable objectives. He realized
that a pincers offensive undertaken
in conjunction with Italy, striking
via Suez from the south and via
the Dardanelles from the north,
might open the way for his troops
to march into Iran and Mosul and
as far as the Persian Gulf, while
other forces reached Alden via Syria.
Made Extremely Difficult.
But Marshal Graziani's defeat in
Africa has made this enterprise eX-
tremely difficult. Moreover, a march
through Turkey offers few prospects
of success, for German troops would
have to force their way through
formidable mountain country Even
If the risk of being outflanked by
hostile forces in the south were
eliminated, he still would find him.
self forced to undertake a series of
arduous frontal attacks, in which
he could make little use of the air.
craft and tanks, which are the
strongest factors of the German
Army. Furthermore, Asia Minor
cannot supply another essential
ucCCSOlUy
Practical experience has shown
there is little prospect of making up
the necessary quantities of corn and
oil by means of commercial agree
ments with the Soviet Union, even
If Russia were seriously disposed to
buy off war by scrupulous obser-
vation of such engagements. The
Soviet Union needs its oil for its
own use. We might, therefore, see
arepetition a of the situation in 1917
18, when Ludendorf occupied Rus
sian territories in order to make sure
of acquiring the corn and oil he re-
quired.
If Hitler should decide that an al
lance with Russia was less import
ant than the acquisition of corn and
of, if he should consider himself
able to dispense with Russian mill
tary assistance, or if Russia should
reject a proposal for a military al
lance, an offensive against the So
Wet Union would bring him certain
military and political advantages in
addition to the corn and oil he
needs. For this reason a diversion
of German policy to Knockout blow
against Russia was deemed to be
within the bounds of possibility as
far back as last summer, and even
considered a probable move. But
there are other considerations in
favor of this attack on Russia which,
as readers will remember, was de-
picted Is years ago in Hitler's "Mein
Kampf" as the decisive operation for
German world supremacy after the
defeat of France.
Would Want Adequate Fleet.
The serious thinkers in German
general staff circles always have OPP
posed the idea that the Luftwaffe
can become a maid of all work"
which would replace the naval arm.
Previous experience has justified
their doubts on this point. The Ger
man general staff would be unlikely
to recommend an invasion of Brit
ain without an adequate feet, and
q perusal Of German military liter