Evening star., 1941-12-15
Philippine Bastion

n SlllSlc WEEK VI Vic SlcdJ IdClliS
war has sufficed to reveal it's funda-
mental strategic pattern. And on it,
the Philippines emerge as Japan's
chief immediate objective. They are
not her ultimate goal. That is the
vast tropical empire of the Neither
lands Indies, with its illimitable
wealth of natural resources, especial
ly oil and rubber, so vitality desired
for Nippon's meager economy. But
the resources of the Indies cannot be
drawn upon effectively until the
Philippines are first subdued.
A glance at the map will show why
this is so. The Philippines are an
irregular archipelago of islands ex-
tending roughly north and south for
fully 900 miles. That is approXi-
mately the distance between Chicago
and Mobile Alabama-from Lake
Michigan to the Gulf of Mexico. The
aggregate size of the Philippine
archipelago is 114,0O0 square miles
as large as the combined areas of
the New England States, New York
and New Jersey. With wealth of
natural resources and a population
exceeding 100000, the Philippines
are in themselves rich prize, over
and above their strategic Importance
as stepping stones to Japans larger
imperial goals.
Japanese designs on the Philip
pines have long been recognized, and
the plan for their defense has been
an outstanding problem of our Army
and Navy stats. So long as it was a
question of an isolated war between
Japan and the United States, the
problem was a serious one. The di-
rect route from America to the Phil
ippines is blocked by the immense
parallelogram Of the japanese man
dated islands which spread east and
west over 5000 miles of ocean be-
tween Hawaii and Manila. Our iso-
lated and unfortifled link of Guam
already has fallen into japanese
hands. Thus, for the time being, aid
to the Philippines must come either
from our British and Dutch allies or
from America through roundabout
routes under Allied control. How
much of such aid will be sent is prob
lematical. Therefore, the present
ability of Philippine defense to beat
off Japanese attacks is the vital
question for the moment.
During the past few years the
Philippine Commonwealth has be-
stirred itself with a preparedness
program of it's own, with American
assistance under the skilled leader
ship of one Of our best soldiers,
Lieutenant General Douglas Mac
Arthur. This program began func-
tioning in 1885, and the new Filipino
Army is supposed to consist of some
10000 troops with the colors, plus an
even larger number of reserves. The
number of American troops in the
islands is a military secret, but it is
supposed considerably to exceed the
10000 men which were in garrison on
the average in preceding years. The
air force is known to have been
greatly expanded during recent
months, while the Asiatic fleet is a
well-balanced force, including a
strong squadron Of submarines.
Thus far, the defense has been
brilliantly conducted. The only
serious threat to Manila, a japanese
landing on the Lingayen Gulf, has
been annihilated. But landings on
Northern Luzon have been locally
successful. Those mountain -girt bits
of coast could never serve as starting
points for an overland invasion.
Their purpose is to acquire air bases
for closer bombing raids on vital
defense points Meanwhile, our air
force has heavily punished japanese
covering naval forces.
These operations are presumably
mere preliminaries of larger attacks
yet to come. The chief long-run
handicap to successful Philippine de-
fense is limited equipment and mu-
nitions. They might not suffice to
wage intensive large-scale warfare
for an indefinite period. That is
where aid from our allies or Ameri-
can aid via Allied-controlled routes
may play decisive role.