Evening star., 1941-10-08
Middle East Strategy

Winston Churchill's message to the
troops engaged in mass maneuvers
on the Indian Northwest Frontier
may be a revelation of momentous
events to come in the Middle East.
The Prime Minister greeted the SOL
diers about to take part in a weeks
mock campaign with the words:
During 1912, the armies of India,
with their British comrades, will be
fighting on long front from the
Caspian to the Nile"
This categorical statement from
the head of the British government
warrants certain interesting con-
lectures. If Mr.. Churchill envisages
a British Army actually fighting on
the Caspian. it means that he doubts
seriously RuSsia's ability single
handedly to hold back the German
thrust to the line Of the Volga River
and the Caucasus Mountains,
thrust that would bring the Wehr-
macht to the shores of the Caspian
Sea. 1t will be recalled that General
Wavell, commander in chief of the
British forces in India, recently
visited the Caucasus region and con-
ferred at length with the Russian
high command there. 1t should like
wise be remembered that the British
occupational forces in both Iran and
1raq are mostly from India, and
presumably come directly under Cen
eral WavellS military Jurisdiction.
That looks as though Britain was
preparing for action in the Middle
East on a major scale.
Meanwhile, in the adjacent region
of the Near East, Britain's military
strength has so increased that it is
now functionally divided into two
armies, one quartered in Egypt
and specifically destined for action
against the Italians and Germans in
Libya; the other concentrated in
Palestine and Syria, to serve either
as a connecting link, a reserve, or
for contingent service in Turkey,
should that country be drawn into
the war. Britain must figure on the
possibility that Turkey may join
either side, though she is much more
likely to come in with Britain than
with the Axis. Nevertheless, a Rus
sian collapse might cause the Turks
to yield to Axis pressure and permit
unneutral conduct, such as granting
Axis warships passage of the Straits
or allowing the use of it's territory
for bases and transit. In that case,
British troops might follow suit,
even against Turkish resistance. On
the other hand, should Turkey fight
the Axis to resist German moves,
British aid on large scale would be
needed to support the Turks in their
unequal struggle.
Britain undoubtedly has increased
her man power vastly in both the
Near and Middle East. and up to a
short time ago the evidence was that
mechanical equipment had been
strengthened proportionally. But
since aid to Russia became supremely
urgent, there is reason to believe
that much of this equipment has
been diverted to Russia or is now on
the way there. That has an i'm
portant bearing on the likelihood OF
a British offensive against Libya this
autumn. The North African desert
already has cooled off sufficiently to
make sustained campaigning pos
Sible, as is proved by the events there
during the past two years. Yet, out
side of -one or two accommodating
skirmishes, quiet still prevails
The explanation undoubtedly is
that neither side wishes to commit
itself decisively in North Africa until
the current campaign in Russia has
reached a climax, one way or the
other. The eastern front is, strate-
gically, the crux of the entire land
war Its outcome will cause rapid
and profound repercuSsions on every
theater of action, no matter how far
geographically they may be removed