Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1941-06-08

Hope OF accomplishing this ought
not, however, to blind us to the
sinister record of similar synthetic
hopes in the past, and decisions
ought to be taken only after the
most thorough review of all avail
able information as to actual con-
ditions.
Must Not Delay Decisions.
But those decisions ought not to
be delayed in execution by artfully
created illusions of the sort that
have contributed so much to the
present desperate state of Britain
and of France itself. This is not
to say that Gen. Weygand is DELHI
erately lending himself to the crea-
ton of such an illusion. but if faith
Is to be placed In him as an OPP
ponent of German expansion in
Africa and Syria, there should be
ample assurances that he is not only
willing to deliver the goods, but will
be able to do so not only now but
when the Germans in their own
good time decide to call his hand.
AS an example of German time
saving tactics what is now going on
in the Near East is a frst-claSs
example. This goes back to the
checking of the German-Italian ad-
vance at the Egyptian frontier.
Once stopped the Germans discov-
cred that distance, lack of adequate
base facilities and the activities of
the British feet and the R. A. F.
prevented their reinforcement and
supply of their army with anything
more than the trickle of support
necessary to maintain their ground.
To assemble, under existing con-
ditions, the reserve of material
needed for resumption Of the Of
fensive was more than they could
contrive; they could not even take
Tobruk because of this lack of
means. Meanwhile Gen. Waven was
receiving successive waves of REIN
forcement and even after the retire.
ment from Greece it was clear that
IN a comparatively short time Gen.
Wavell would be able to launch a
counter offensive with every pros
pect of success.
Only Clear German Defeat.
So far, the Germans have sus-
tanned only one clear-cut major de-
feat that of the great air battle Of
Britain last fall-and in this case.
so inept was the British propaganda
and so Well-managed the German,
that the facts were successfully con-
cealed from the world until too late
TO have much moral effect. 1t would,
however, be impossible to conceal or
minimize a defeat in Libya, nor
could much be saved from the
wreckage of such a debacle because
of the impossibility of Withdrawing
by sea and the terrible difficulties
Of a retreat across the 600 miles of
desert between BengaSi and Tripoli
Hence there commenced series
of diversions: The inspired revolt
in Iraq, with but trif1ing chances of
success, filled in the time until the
assault on Crete could be mounted:
this in turn diverted British naval
forces so that some reinforcement.
but probably not enough, could be
pushed across TO Gen. Rommel;
Crete, when won. enabled an in
crease. not a large increase but one
of some value. TO be made in the
scale of the long distance air at
tacks on Alexandria and deprived
the British Navy of a valuable base
for interrupting Gen Rommel's sea-
borne communications. Now we
have the Syrian affair, with the
usual infiltration methods. ap-
parently doomed to certain defeat
if the British strike in force. yet
providing a further diversion, gain
ing still more time as the South
Africans arrive in Egypt and as the
arrival of two Indian divisions from
Ethiopia may be momentarily ex-
pected.