Evening star., 1941-04-09


army for the first time, the lessons
of how the British beat the Italians
In Africa may prove instructive.
know Gen. GRAHAM and think
him a very great general. He has
been quarreling with Mussolini since
the destruction of the army of Libya.
He said pretty bluntly, if between
the lines, in his official report that
Mussolini hadn't given him the
equipment and support he asked for
in Libya. MusSolini replied in a
recent speech that he had sent mil
lions of dollars worth of equipment
to Libya. The dictator read off
long list of tanks, guns and what
nots sent down. Each is trying to
blame the other for the defeat.
Politicians and Generals.
The interplay of responsibility be-
tween politicians and generals is
one of the most serious problems
which Americans must study today.
1t is a problem which the Germans
and the British appear to have
solved but which the French and
the italians certainly did not solve.
That is the primary reason for the
defeat of France.
After Poland, Edouard Daladier
asked Gen. Maurice Gamelin If it
were not necessary to reorganize
French defense in view of the sue
cess of mechanical columns. Gen.
Gamelin replied that in his opinion
, panzer divisions could not move
from Berlin to Paris even in peace
time If the bridges were blown.
M Daladier, though unconvinced.
left it at that instead of assembling
every expert and going TO the bot
tom of the matter and reaching a
decision which meant action. Gen.
Graziani and MuSsolini proved as
Stupid as Gen Gamelin and M. Dali
adler and for exactly that reason
their country has suffered the same
fate as France.
One week before the British Of
fensive in Libya an Italian friend
who is close to Gen. GRAHAM came
UP to Rome. He brought me per-
sonal greetings from the general,
We discussed the Italian success at
Sidi Barrani and over whiskey and
soda after dinner before log fire
we talked
"Well, you know the Italian peas
ant soldier, after ALL" my friend
said. He is wonderful. He puts up
with any hardship, goes without
food for two days if necessary and
Is always cheerful. GRAHAM is
worried but the italian soldiers will
see him through. The British Army
is superlatively good. but it is too
small and Anglo-SaXons cannot
endure hardships like the Italians.
The British Army is de luxe and
their men can't go anywhere with
out Whiskey and soda, portable ice
machines, shower baths and such
gadgets.
The British haven't a chance
They can make raids but they can
never launch an offensive. WaveD's
got the tip-and-run mentality OF
Lawrence of Arabia. He has got a
little de luxe army of 25,0O0 men,
Graziani's got 10000 whites, care
fully trained in Ethiopia, where you
saw them yourself, and that many
I blacks besides. A British offensive
is quite impossible. Graziani has
built pipe lines of water through the
desert and improvised trucks with
anti-guns to turn the British COL
umns. 1t is only question of months
until we enter Alexandria and
Cairo"
And Then, q Week Later.
A week later Gen. Wavell struck
with absolute surprise, binding ra-
pidity and reckless disregard of
the conventional or outmoded rules
of warfare. He simply adopted the
technique used by the Germans in
the Lowlands and France, running
his mechanical columns clean
through the enemy and counting
for safety upon the confusion and
destruction of communications. 1t
was a brilliant operation, notably
primarily for the excellence of Brit
ish staff work
I have reason to believe after
subsequent conversations with Off
GERS in position to know that this
offensive did not come to Graziani
as surprise. He had feared it and
asked Mussolini for heavy tanks and
more air support. MusSolini had
talked with Hitler about the tanks
and Hitler agreed to provide them
but only on the condition that they
carried German crews. Mussolini
rejected this condition. AS for the
aircraft he dissipated them over the
Channel and Albania.
If Gen. GRAHAM can offer this
protest he cannot escape the re-
sponsibility on two other charges.
First, he did not refrain the italian
Army against the new British tactics.
No Italian general ever gives his
troops special training for the given
terrain and given foe. 1t is funda-
mental weakness. Secondly, he did
not cut his losses after the first
British success, fall back on a de-
fensive position and get himself set
for the next attacks. The alterna-
tive of launching attacks himself
was not offered him because the mo-
rale of the italian troops was too
low.
Responsibility Mussolinis.
That brings the ultimate RESPONSE
bility back to Mussolini. Most of the
generals knew that the Italians were
weary from Ethiopia and Spain, knew
that they loathed the Germans,
knew that Mussolini was taking
them into war they had no will