Evening star., 1941-12-12
President Pructiced
Secret Diplomacy
Writer Tells How Negotiations
Were Kept Secret to Permit
Jupon to 'Suve Fuce
By Bertrant Benedict.

By Bertrnm Benedict.
"Open covenants of peace, openly ar
rived at, after which there shall be no
private international understandings OF
any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed
always frankly and in the public view"
This was the first of Woodrow Wilson's
IA points Of peace, placed before
the Senate on January 8, 1918, when
peace possibilities in the first World War
were being discussed gingerly under the
surface. The American President was
quite sure that secret diplomacy was a
fertile cause Of wars, that open di-
plomacy would always make for peace
He believed that the people could be
trusted better than heads of governments.
And in the negotiations with Germany
which led to the armiStice of November
II, 1918, Wilson practiced the open
diplomacy which he had preached. Every
overture from Berlin was made public,
as was every reply from Washington.
Step by step the American President in
formed the world what Germany must
do to get peace. When Great Britain
and France raised objections to the
peace point on freedom Of the seas, and
when they also demanded that Germany
pay fully for all the civilian damage
wrought by the German armies, Wilson
told the world about those two reser-
vations.
But in the peace negotiations at Paris,
Woodrow Wilson was led to abandon
open for secret diplomacy He was
persuaded that the peoples of Great
Britain, France and Italy had become
more bitter toward Germany than were
the British. French, and Italian govern
ments. The war-embittered peoples
would demand Wilson was told, much
more severe treatment OF Germany than
he was willing to mete out and than
Lloyd George and Clemenceau were
prepared to insist upon. So the Treaty
OF Versailles was conceived in secrecy.
All this has distinct bearing on the
way in which the United States got into
war with Japan in the year Of Our Lord
l941. For although President Roosevelt
followed open diplomacy in his rela-
tions with Nazi Germany, he followed
secret diplomacy in his relations with
militaristic Japan.
Until Japan actually committed overt
acts OF war against the United States,
the people Of the United States had not
been told in specific detail just what
was creating the danger of war. There
had been even no official denunciat ton OF
japanese programs and practices COM
parable to the many official denuncia-
tions of German programs and practices,
until Secretary of State Hull finally
spoke ou4on December last. That was
only four days before Japan attacked
the American feet without warning.
Oh. OF course, We had a general idea
Of why war was threatened. We knew
in a general way that Japan had tied
up with Germany. We knew in a general
way that japanese aggression in the
Far East was weakening not only the
strategic position of the Philippines. but
also the military and naval position of
Great Britain in the Far East and even
in the Mediterranean. II the British
were weakened there, they would be
automatically weakened in the Atlantic.
and the greater danger to the British
In the Atlantic, the greater danger to
the United States from Nazi Germany.
But just what, specifically. did Japan
insist upon in the Far East? Just how
much, specifically, was Japan willing
to concede in the Far East to avoid war
with the United States? Just what.
specifically did the United States insist
upon, and just how much was the
United States prepared to concede. to
avoid Wa with Japan? Not until the
very day when Japan began the war
without warning did the American Gov
ernment make public the answers to
these questions
For all this secrecy there was a very
cogent reason. The United States be-
lieved that If we specified our demands
publicly Japan couldn't concede any of
them without seeming to surrender to
us. Conversely, if our demands were kept
secret, Japan could yield to at least some
of them while pretending to have had no
contrary aims all the time. Face-saving
Is important in the Orient.
And We wanted to avoid a showdown
with Japan If we could We were con-
vinced that We could get along salts
factorily enough In the same world with
Japan, at least for generation or 50, if
Japan would only stick to her own
knitting. We were more than willing to
yield to japanese sensibilities if that
would help to detach Japan from her
afiliation with Germany.
With Germany, on the other hand. we
had no hope of avoiding a showdown
We were convinced that the world
couldn't exist half Nazi and half demo-
cratic, and we suspected that Germany
was convinced to the same effect If that
were true, the only question was whether
the showdown with Germany should
come when it suited Hitler best or when
1t suited the United States best.
So with Germany President Roosevelt
pursued open diplomacy. Again and
again he made public his peace pleas to
Hitler until the Fuehrer committed the
objectionable act of rudeness of refusing
to reply except by an address to the
Reichstag in which he held the President
OF the United States up to scorn and
ridicule. Thereafter President Roosevelt
told the American people at almost every
opportunity just how and why Germany
was menace to the peace and security
OF the United States.
Well, we seem to have gained nothing
by making concessions to japanese sensi-
billties in our negotiations with the