Evening star., 1941-06-22
Says Tradition Rules
United Stutes Army
BIZ OUen L. Scott.

ming to be nodded into form in maneu-
vers now starting 1t still is without ade-
quate weapons. Much Of its organiza-
tion is on the outmoded lines of World
War days.
Even so, an Army that one year age
was no more than a paper force, today
is a real Army with field training and
some experience in co-ordinated opera
ton. AS soon as priorities permit, the
troops can be provided with modern
fighting equipment in large volume
Right now, ships and airplanes have
first call on machines and material
with tanks and artillery and other Army
equipment far down the priority line.
There is genuine enthusiasm over the
| quality and performance of the person
mel in the new Army. However, there is
beginning to be some serious question
ing of the overhead management and
| planning for this Army. Many informed
| persons, largely in the Army itself, are
asking whether the United States ism t
| just copying the new German machinery
| and methods, rather than adapting this
countrys Army and its organization and
equipment to the special tasks that may
be assigned to it.
Some of the more progressive officers
of the Army say it is always possible to
tell whether an army really is getting
some place if new and younger blood
is being pushed into the top ranks
Measured by this standard, the new
American Army appears to be making
little progress.
An investigation of recent appoint
ments to top Army ranks discloses that
age and seniority continue to be the
determining factor in selections.
For example, on May % there were
appointments of eight new major gen.
erals. OF these, two were 81 years of age,
three were 60, one was 81 and two others
were SIS and SO, respectively. This same
age pattern has been rather consistent
this year. There have been twenty-six
new major generals. Of that number
were 60 years of age or older, Is were
between 55 and 60 and were between
so and SIS. Nobody under so broke into
this top group of Army officers.
The story is similar among brigadier
generals. Sixty brigadiers have been ap-
pointed in the same period OF this
number 2 were under So while AZ were
between so and SIS and Is were between
SIS and so. One was above so.
1t is important to know the ages of
the general officers of the Army because
these men do the thinking and plan
ming and deciding for the whole service.
In Hitler's army, it is said the average
age of general officers is AS. England,
after each of her defeats, has tended to
give prominence to younger officers and
to retire the older officers from positions
of major responsibility. 1t seems to be
true in every period of real crisis that
the younger men, with naturally more
adaptable attitudes and thinking, come
to the top.
This is not a reflection on the older
men. 1t merely is recording the fact
that younger leadership naturally is
more ready to accept new methods and
new weapons and to learn new ways.
Older men are not so ready to accept
change that upsets lifetime Of habit
and experience.
There certainly is nothing in the rec
ord to suggest that the United States is
learning from the experience either of
Germany or England or from it's own
experience in earlier wars The fact is
that the last group of men to be ad-
vanced to major generalships was the
oldest selected in recent months.
Somewhat the same sort of story is
told in the selections for colonelships-
the rank just below that Of general
officer.
In picking colonies, those who run the
Army can make selections without fol-
lowing the rigid system of seniority that
determines advancement in lower ranks
This means that younger men of proved
ability and resourcefulness could be
advanced and given greater responsible
ity if the Army so decided. 1t seems,
however that colonies for the new Army
are being selected almost wholly on the
basis of their length of service.
This means that il one officer is a
genius in understanding of and adapta-
ton to new methods of warfare and yet
had one day less of service than another
| man who was rather slow in his under
standing the genius will continue to be
| a major and the slower officer will be-
| but seniority continues to be the princi-
pal guide.
All of this adds up to the fact that the
uncertainty concerning the new Amer
lean Army is an uncertainty concerning
the resourcefulness of its leadership.
But the men who developed the
smoothly and so effectively were very
young men, with almost no old ideas
The years when they were not fighting
were years devoted to developing use of
new methods. Nothing that was new
was left untried.
BY contrast, the American Army
| firmly turned its back on almost every
| thing new during the pre-1939 years, be-
cause new things cost money and Con-
gress wouldn't always give the money
for maintaining the old as well as de-
veloping the new. This meant that there
| had to be a choice between the old and
! the new, and the Army-operatlng
strictly on seniority principle-took the
| old.
The sad part is that no nation can
determine, except in the actual test OF