Evening star., 1941-06-10

the rule that you have got to have
a certainty to win at any point and
that if you have not got it it is
better to clear out beforehand.
The whole history of the war
shows the fatal absurdity of such a
doctrine
Again and again it has proved
that fierce and stubborn resistance
even against heavy odds, even under
exceptional difficulties and disad-
vantages is an essential element in
victory.
- At any rate, the decision to hold
Crete and to fight was taken with
full knowledge of the fact air sup
port would be at a minimum.
I take the fullest responsibility
for that decision, but chiefs of staff
the Defense Committee and Gen
Wavell thought not only that Crete
ought to be defended, but that, in
spite of a lack of air support, we had
a good chance of winning the battle
There were no illusions about the
scale of the enemy's air-borne at
tack and it turned out the enemy
was prepared to pay an almost un-
limited price; and his resources
when concentrated on a particular
point may often be overwhelming
at that point.
Hore-Belisha referred to broad
casts given by Maj. Gen. Collins and
Air Commodore Goddard.
I take no responsibility for those
statements or for any others which
may be made. These officers are
not acquainted with the control of
affairs. members stop them broad
casting.0
I should very much like to stop
them and in some cases have re-
duced them in number.
1t is very risky thing to ask
professional officer to give a
weekly expatiation on war when he
cannot know exact facts. CCries of
Everybody thinks they speak for
the government
I am very glad to see feeling in
the House on the subject because,
on the other hand, we are often
appealed to to give more informa-
ton.
1t is not possible for the head of
the government or for chiefs of
stats to vet" these weekly state
ments beforehand, but I think the
matter must certainly be recon-
sidered.
Asked Why Air Fields
Were Not Mined.
I have been asked lots of ques-
tionS about the actual conduct of
the battle in Crete. why were Gre
tan air fields not mined beforehand
or again why they were not COM
manded by long-range guns and
why there were not more tanks al
lotted to their defense. I could give
answers to those questions, but 1 dc
not propose to discuss tactics here
His majesty's government, in their
responsibility to Parliament, choose
the best generals they can find
They set before them broad stra-
tegic operations of the campaign
They offer them the advice or coun-
Gil they can and they support them
to the best of their power in men
and munitions and as long as they
return the confidence they support
them with loyal comradeship In
failure or success.
1t is impossible to 60 into tao
tical details. Defeat is bitter-it is
no use trying to explain defeat
People do not like defeat and they
do not like explanations. however
elaborate or plausible. There is only
one answer to defeat. The only
answer to defeat is victory. If a
government in time of war gives the
impression it cannot, in the long
run. procure victory, who cares for
its explanations? 1t ought to go
that is to say, If you can find an
other that can do better. However,
it must be remembered no govern
ment can conduct war unless it
stands on a solid foundation and is
known to stand on that foundation
We hoped $4,000 to 10000 good
troops with artillery and a proper
tion of tanks, aided by Greek forces,
would be able to destroy parachute
and glider landings of the enemy
and prevent him from using air
fields or harbors while the navy
held of or destroyed the sea attack.
There was time limit, however,
and action of the navy in main
tanning the northern sea guard
without adequate air defense was
bound to be very costly.
We could only stand a certain
proportion of naval losses before
the seaguard feet had to be with
drawn.
If, in the meanwhile, the army
could succeed in biting off the head
OF this terrific apparatus of air.
borne attack before the time limit
was reached, then we would have
had to prepare all over again.
He might we'll have, for time at
least, broken it off.
I wonder what would have been
said by our critics if we had given
up Crete without firing shot.
We should have been told we had
surrendered to the enemy the COM
mand of the Eastern Mediterranean
Crete was an extremely important
salient in our line of defense. 1t
was like Fort Duamont in 1916 and
Kamel Hill in 1918.
These were taken by the Ger
mans, but the Germans lost the
war. Could you be sure the same
results would have been achieved
If the Allies had not fought for
Duamont and Kamel Hill?
These battles can only be judged
in relation to the campaign as a
whole.
Thinks IL Remarkable
So Many Escaped.
might we'll be asked why, having
begun the battle of Crete, did we
not persist in the defense? If you
could bring of 1900 safely to return
to Egypt, why not reinforce with
1000 and carry on the battle?
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