Evening star., 1941-06-18
British Offensives

General WavelPS attacks upon the
Axis positions on the Egyptian
Libyan border are clearly more than
Skirmish raids. At the very least,
they constitute what military men
call a reconnaissance in force" de-
signed to probe deeply into the
enemy's situation and test his
strength. 1t should be remembered
that this was just the way Wavell'S
great offensive last autumn got
started. At that time his recon-
noitering expedition had orders to
retire if it ran into strong Italian
resistance. But the result of that
probe revealed such weakness and
ineffciency that it turned into a
full-fedged offensive which chased
the Italians half way across Libya
and nearly expelled them from North
Africa.
1t is unlikely that Wavell's present
operation will find such a gratifying
situation. This time the Axis forces
are largely picked German troops
commanded by General Rommel, the
Reich's ace tank corps leader. Yet
even though no far-reaching often
sive is contemplated, a successful
local operation would yield several
important results. 1t might so
"bleed" the Axis forces of their
supplies, transported overland with
great difficulty, that counter offen-
sive would have to be long postponed.
Also, if pressed far enough, it would
establish contact with the besieged
garrison at Tobruk and thereby weld
Eastern Libya into a solid bastion
against Axis attacks on Egypt. Final
ly, it may be a test to see whether
the Axis troops can stand up as well
as the British and Indian forces in
blistering desert heat running as
high as 120 degrees Fahrenheit.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect
of the Libyan operation is that it is
launched at the very moment when
Unexpectedly stiff French resistance
in Syria presumably has compelled
the British to reinforce their COL
umns in that quarter. The general
impression has been that the British
armies in the Near East were spread
pretty thin, and that the Syrian
venture would compel General
Wavell to remain on the defensive
along the Egyptian-Libyan border.
On the other hand, he is known to
be receiving large contingents of sea-
soned troops released from service in
East Africa by the collapse of Italian
resistance there, while reliable in
formation indicates the arrival of
big shipments of tanks and other
heavy war material from America
and Britain via the Red Sea.
1t is thus possible that General
Wavell is far stronger than has been
imagined and is able to launch full
f1edged offensives in both Libya and
Syria for purely military reasons.
However, it is also possible that his
actions are determined in part by
political considerations. The press
and public opinion in Great Britain
are getting uneasy over the seeming
slowness of the Syrian campaign and
the possibility of a dangerous Axis
counterstroke at Egypt while their
forces in Syria are fully engaged. A
daring stroke at Libya yielding even
temporary advantages would do
much to restore confidence in Lon
don, and would also heighten British
prestige in the Near East.
This last would be especially useful
in Egypt, where the state of public
opinion is not satisfactory from the
British point of view. The safe
guarding of the Libyan border would
tend to restore Egyptian confidence
in British superiority, shaken by re-
cent events, and would partially
efface the bad effects of Axis bomb
ings of Alexandria. All these con-
siderations may have induced Gen.
eral Wavell to start his current
offensive, even though it involved an
element of risk.