Evening star., 1941-12-07
British Still Hold Advantage in Lbyon Battle
Despite Gen. Romme|'s First Escape

British had supposed, so that the
German armored troops which were
virtually surrounded by the British
advance to Join forces with the
Tobruk garrison were able to go on
fighting longer than the British staff
had calculated would be possible.
This being the case, the peculiar
conditions of tank warfare in the
desert enabled the Germans to re-
tain their mobility and to regroup
their forces It is a mistake TO
think of the British as having estab-
lished anything like a solid line Of
posts and Notifications across the
desert from the frontier to Tobruk.
This would require infantry, backed
by guns and engineers.
1t is possible that in the area
where the heavy fighting took place,
and is taking place again. the Axis
was heavily superior in infantry. The
British would hardly have been able
to bring up enough infantry to con-
solidate and hold positions in SUM-
cient strength and on wide enough
deployment to contain the Axis ar
mored troops.
Tanks Cannot Hold Ground.
We have, then, just one more
illustration of the fact that tanks
can take, but cannot hold, and that
decisive action in war Is likely in
the last analysis to continue to de-
pend on the arrival Of John j.
Doughboy, weapons in hand, to seize
and hold grounds that may have
been won or to which the way has
been prepared by the action of other
arms.
But the basic elements for a
British success in Libya still exist;
the basic British advantage is in
the matter of supply, reinforcement
and replacement. This advantage
they still possess. Their depots in
Egypt can still replace British losses
in tanks and men more quickly
and steadily than can the Axis de-
pots in Tripolitania and Italy. The
flow of British supplies into those
deposits by sea cannot be inter-
rupted by Axis action, while the
flow of Axis supplies across the
Mediterranean is now suffering, ac-
cording to British naval estimates,
something like go per cent of losses
from British surface ships, subma-
rines and aircraft.
One is reminded Of the words of
Douglas Southall Freeman, the
biographer of Robert E. Lee, saying
Of that general that in the cam
paigns of 1864 and 1855 he gained
no success that was not purchased
with the blood of men he could not
replace. A similar but even more
immediate consideration affects the
present decisions of Gen. Rommel.
ROmmel Takes Bolder Course.
After his successful escape from
the British trap and his regroup-
ing of his forces, Gen. Rommel had
two choices: one, to retire to the
westward and take up fresh posi-
tions around Derna to defend Ben
gasi and the road to Tripoli This
would have meant the abandonment
Of the Axis garrison at Bardia and
Salum to begin with, but those gar
risons are probably lost anyway;
it would have meant in the larger
field the adoption of a purely de-
fensive strategy under conditions
tantamount to accepting final de-
feat and the loss of Cyrenaica. 1t
might, however. have gained enough
time to permit the reinforcement
of Tripoli, behind its 60O-mile desert
barrier.
The other choice was to stand
and fight where he was, to use the
fine fighting qualities of his ar
mored troops in an endeavor to
break up the British attacks when
they were renewed, to work his