Evening star., 1941-09-25
Turks Between Two Fires
Ankoro May Decide to Open DordoneIIes
To Nozi Ships or Bow to British Pressure

British Pressure
German standard gauge. Transport
by sea would, therefore, be of the
utmost Importance to any German
advance beyond the Don. But the
Black Sea feet stands in the way.
Ankara Holds Straits.
The Germans have now in the
Black Sea only the few ships of
the Rumanian Navy; the only source
from which these can be reinforced
is the Italian fleet, and Turkey
holds the straits by which the
Sea. A few Italian cruisers, de-
stroyers and submarines, perhaps
partially manned by German crews,
might make all the difference. But
SO far as may be judged from the
utterances of the Turkish press
and radio, Turkeys answer to any
demand for the passage of italian
WarshipS, whether under the Italian
flag or by the subterfuge of sale"
TO Bulgaria, would be a decided
no" This attitude may not be
permanent; 1t may be affected by
German pressure. There can be
no doubt that the Turks are i'm
pressed by the recent German sue
cesses in the Ukraine. Should these
continue, the result might be
Turkish capitulation to German de-
mands for passage of warships
through the straits.
But British and Russian pressure
is likewise making itself felt in
Ankara. The Anglo Russian oc-
cupation of Iran, followed by hints
at joint defense plans for the
Caucasus. will be noted by Turkey
which would need support if at
tackled by Germany. The British
are now well established in Syria,
and the Iraqi revolt is a thing of
the past. Turkey is caught between
two fires and may decide either way.
Turks Lack Equipment.
The Turkish Army is much
stronger than the Bulgarian, but it
likewise is short of modern equip
ment, though there is a reasonably
good air force with perhaps 300 mod
ern planes. Turkey can mobilize %
divisions and cavalry divisions, plus
a certain number of reserve units:
these are grouped in nine army corps.
/ The total f1rst-line strength would
be about 100000 men, and reserve
troops Immediately available, plus
the well-organized and armed gen.
darmerie, would add another 100000,
making all told a force of $50, 900
men with ample reserves to keep it
in the field. The full length of the
Turkish European frontier is about
240 miles, but much shorter line
| can be obtained with both flanks
resting on the sea. The Bulgarians
would have little hope of forcing
their way into European Turkey ex-
cept with strong German aid, espe-
I cially armored troops and air power.
/ One fact of the German plan may
well be to keep the British from
launching an offensive in North
Africa. AS long as the possibility of
having to help Turkey, or defend the
/ Caucasus, is imminent, it acts as
brake on British offensive plans
directed against the Axis forces IN
Libya This may be an important
consideration, as the weather grows
cooler in the western desert: a great
British success in L;bya would be a
| disaster of the first magnitude to
the Axis, and would free large Brit
/ ish forces for use elsewhere. Indeed,
/ the very presence of the Axis Army
in Libya, while it continues, must
always be a source Of anxiety to
the British high command, which
is now apparently thinking in terms
of a great Anglo-Russian front ex-
! tending from the Caspian Sea to
the edge of the Libyan desert. A
strictly neutral Turkey is probably
the best bastion of such front; but
| that state of affairs may not long
endure, and a decision either way
/ at Ankara is bound to have far
reaching effects.
| Copyright, 1941. New York Tribune, 1nco