Evening star., 1941-04-05
Turn About in Libyu

The British evacuation of Bengasi,
capital and chief town of Cyrenaica
or Eastern Libya, was not wholly un-
expected. For the past fortnight,
strong motorized force, chiefly Ger
man, has been feeling out the British
outpostS to the westward, where they
had stopped their victorious advance
two months ago. Nevertheless, this
setback has caused disappointment
in London, despite official explana-
tions that the retirement was "stra-
tegic" and that Bengasi had no mill
tary value.
Technically, that is doubtless true.
Yet two deductions will inevitably
suggest themselves. The first is that
Britain must have notably weakened
both their land and naval forces in
Libya in order for it to have been pos
sible for the Germans to mass me-
chanized forces there and deliver a
telling counterstroke. A mechanical
corps means not only men but even
more, machines and abundant sup
plies, especially of oil and gasoline.
To get them to Tripoli meant, first,
evading Britain's Mediterranean
blockade, and second, moving the
corps over the single highway be-
tween Tripoli and Cyrenaica, which
runs along the seashore, the hinter
land of this intermediate strip being
WaterleSS, trackless desert. Adequate
British light naval units presumably
could have harried the German
Italian expedition in vexatious fash
ion. Yet it seems to have reached
Cyrenaica practically unopposed.
The second deduction is that the
rumors long current about strong
German armored corps in Tripoli are
basically correct. Those rumors have
given the Germans $4,000 troops
there, including two mechanical di-
visions and many tanks. 1t is un-
likely that the German high COM
mand would have riSked such valu-
able forces and material unless it
had a real objective in mind Now
that they have reached Cyrenaica,
with a fairly good network of interior
roads, they might attempt to strike
swiftly across the hump" toward the
Egyptian border. The British might
thus be compelled to abandon most
of Cyreniaca if their land communi-
cations with Egypt were menaced,
though they could still be supplied
by sea through the deep-water ports
of Derna and Tobruk.
Even so, this would in no sense be
British disaster. In these desert
campaigns, territory means relatively
little. Troops and equipment are the
things that count most. Further
more, North Africa is heating up with
the spring. Two months hence, the
climate will be so terrific that white
troops in tanks would be almost
roasted alive. That, plus lengthen-
ing lines of overland communication,
should set limits to the German ad-
vance
The British have obviously been
concentrating their efforts on clean
ing up the Italians in East Africa
before the rainy season and on re-
inforcing their position in Greece in
order to retain their Balkan foothold
and encourage the Yugoslavs to re-
sist German pressure. Both ventures
are paying such good dividends that
the loss of Cyrenaica and even bor-
der raids on Egypt would presumably
be worth the price.
The Near East is a large theater
of action which must be viewed as a
strategic whole British forces, while
considerable in the aggregate, cannot
be everywhere in full force at the same
time. The British high command
seems to be keeping the entire picture
consistently in view. And nothing
as yet indicates that they have not
made wise choices