Evening star., 1941-10-28
Russia at War-Rv.sss;sn"' ssn''t 4'%y. %"
Report on

, German troops. Yet the battlelelds
on which they fought were lost.
And with the loss of the battlefield
went all the damaged equipment
on both sides. Thus whatever
German and Russian tanks failed in
their missions for want of gas fell
unscarred into the possession OF
the Germans. And whatever tanks
on either side were only partly
damaged fell into the Germans
hands to be available for use again
after a tread was mended, cannon
replaced, an armor plate welded.
Better OF in Air Power.
In the air the Russians have not
| Jared as badly There is evidence
| that they are outnumbered, but
three factors tend to nullify this dis
advantage:
The length of the front. The
Germans would have to have $4,000
planes continuously in the air TO
patrol it completely. Any plane
that will fly, no matter how anti
uuated, is useful to the defending
command-for it can always find
some place along the line to drop
at least one bomb where it will hurt
the Germans. 1t can escape before
the Messerschmitts can be tele-
phoned for.
Violent. mechanical warfare calls
for the use of the air arm down
low in support of troops. Most OF
the fighting in the air on the Rus
sian front has been at low alti-
tudes-a few hundred to at most
few thousand feet above ground.
The Messerschmitt is high-altitude
fighter. Its mechanical edge over
its Soviet opponent is greatly re-
duced when it fights on what
amounts to the other fellows battle
field. Aerobatics does not require
high speed, the most intricate aerial
combat you may see-the snap rolls,
the Immelman turn, etc.-are exc
cuted near stalling speed. In such
combat super-charges for the motor
and tanks for the pilot are just so
! much excess weight.
Third-and most important-that
part Of the Russian battlefield which
Is woods-covered land that part ex-
tends from the Arctic to several hum
| dred miles below Moscow makes
control of the air q less inSignifi-
cant factor. For when troops are
in a wood Ca an airplane cannot
see them and Cb) even if it finds out
where they are, it cannot do much
to them. This is the secret OF the
Russians escape from the hard
driven encirclement traps in the
early months of the war. The Ger
mans took the roads at 80 to 40 miles
an hour. and planes swept the sky
over limited areas. But the Soviet
armies were safe in the woods as
! long as they kept their nerve They
! kept their nerve and fought their
way out from wood to wood.
Never Joins in Final Issue.
Put all these things together in
an appraisal Of the battle for Rus
sia and you emerge with this con-
ception:
The Russian Army is good army
brave. we'll disciplined and still
fairly we'll armed, able to keep it
self supplied and intact provided it
is willing to give way and never
join final issue with a stronger. bet
ter equipped. better organized, much
more experienced enemy.
Russian General Staff strategy
has been based on this realistic ap-
praisel. 1t has, since its lines were
first overrun and it found itself un-
! able to stem the tide head on, oper-
| ated exclusively on q basis OF never
making a firm and final stand on
any battlefield but rather placing a
price on each town and each posi-
ton and concentrating its efforts
on exacting this price Of the Ger.
mans before retreating. Thus, ir
the original capture of Smolensk
it is understood by competent for
eign observers, the price set wa!
$50 900 casualties-and this price
was exacted.
The defense of major cities such
as Odessa. Kiev. Leningrad and
Moscow. in which armed civilian
populations are involved, is another
matter. The residents Of Leningrad
were asked. and chose, to make
tight of it. Although we who OBJ
served from the outside had giver
up Leningrad before left Moscow
Leningrad is still in Russian hand,
because of the determination with
which its citizens joined their army
in its defense-and Odessa held out