Evening star., 1941-10-07
Huge Nuzi Invasion Fleet Was Smashed
By 500 Bomber Raids, British Report
BY the Associated Press.

Dv OOO DOmO6
BY the Associated Press.
LONDON, Oct. 7.-Achievements
of Britain's bomber command in
two years of war were eXtolled by
the government today in a 130-page
booklet which said the aerial Of
fensive against Germany would con-
tinue with ever-growing intensity
fierce, relentless and deadly.
Already the Germans are showing
nervousness and apprehension"
under the increasing weight of
British bombings and the day may
come when they will regret the con-
sequences of a war waged without
mercy, respite or limit" the publi-
cation declared.
The booklet, issued under the
title of Bomber Command" also
shed new light on the smashing of
preparations for reported German
attempt to invade Britain last fall
for which the Nazis were said
to have assembled 5000 self-pro-
PEELED barges and 100000 tons of
shipping space in continental ports
between Cherbourg and Amsterdam.
From July. 1910, until May. 194l,
more than 500 attacks were made
on this invasion fleet, the booklet
asserted.
How many barges or small ships
doctrnynd hnuT
were killed or wounded in these
long series of attacks are not of i'm
mediate or crucial importance, 1t
added But one fact stands out
above all the rest-last autumn no
invasion took place
Further Attacks Promised.
Attacks on potential German in
vasion bases will go on as long as
any threat of sea-borne invasion
remains" the publication declared.
Before being called on to smash
the German invasion threat, the
booklet said, the bomber command
lost 40 per cent of its first line
strength in the tremendous battles
of France and Flanders and the
French had but 40 planes useful for
daylight bombing in the early days
of the war.
Tragic differences" arose between
the French and British on the air
tactics to be adopted, and on the
night Italy declared war the British
Cancelled a raid on Milan Ito avoid
an open clash" with the French, who
rushed army lorries onto an air.
drome to prevent the bomberS from
taking off.
The booklet, sequel TO The Battle
of Britain" which recently eXtollec
the fighter command, intimates that
the strategy adopted by Maurice
Gustave Gamelin, French general
issimo who commanded both the
British and French land forces, was
partly responsible for Britain's
heavy losses.
From the first, it is charged. Gen.
Gamelin refused to let the British
bomb German troop concentrations
on German soil, for fear of infiicting
casualties among civilians.
Limited Objectives.
This decision at once limited pos
sible objectives to enemy columns on
the march" the booklet says. 1T
was pointed out to Gen. Gamelin
that such targets were quite insult
able for our heavy bombers. since
they had been designed for an en-
tirely different purpose. Gamelin
remained unconvinced.
Accordingly, it was not until the
afternoon of May 10, when German
troops were moving in force through
Luxembourg, that the British ad-
vanced striking force made its first
attack on German columns.
The British lost IS out of a total
of 81 bombers in one engagement
alone, the account says
On May 10 the British advanced
striking force based in France had
125 Serviceable bombers and lost rs
OF them in five days.
The Germans also lost heavily, the
British said, especially in the "op-
Grafton dybamo," the code name
given to the evacuation operations
at Dunkerque. BY June, it was esti-
mated, the Germans had lost 2.847
aircraft, including 400 troop car
rierS.
Reports Panic in Raid.
In the first British attack on
Turin, the booklet says, "overwhelm-
ing panic was caused and even
anti-aircraft gun crews crowded into
the poorly constructed civilian
shelters
A number of their officers subse-
quently we're shot for cowardice, the
account continues. but the same
symptoms of panic were immediate
ly apparent" when Southern Italy
was bombed later.
Disclosing that uses of an r. A
F. bombing force were decided on
in conferences with the French as
early as the spring of 1899 when
Hitler completed his seizure OF
-Slovakia, the booklet adds
The French general staff made
it clear at the outset their main
preoccupation was invasion of their
country. They viewed with greatest
miSgiving any plan by which bomb
erS were to be used for attacks or