Evening star., 1941-04-24
Balkan Balance Sheet

bulkun Balance Sheet
Although the British expeditionary
force is still putting up a stiff rear
guard action, the surrender of the
main Greek Army to the westward
and the flight of the Greek King
and his government to the island of
Crete make the military outcome of
the Battle of Greece a foregone con-
cluSion.. The Balkan campaign is
practically over, and the balance
sheet of profit and loss can be struck
with reasonable accuracy.
The Germans undoubtedly have
won reSounding military victory.
The prestige of their army stands at
its highest point, and this will pre-
sumably be used by German dipIo-
macy to good advantage, especially
in the Near East. Against these
strategic and psychological gains
must be offset heavy losses of men
and Of war materials, some of which
may be difficult to replace. Con-
CduIlOU
be expected to yield food or raw
materials in quantities equaling
what Germany already was obtain
ing under the trade agreements
existing before the campaign began.
Economically their occupation by
German armies is likely to show a
deficit.
From the British standpoint, the
campaign should be judged in two
widely different ways. Militarily, it
was always fairly risky gamble.
But the gamble was taken for several
reasons. There was, first, the pos
sibility of gaining a real foothold in
Southeastern Europe. And, falling
that, there remained the prospect of
tying up the Germans in the Balkans
and thereby making more difficult
any assault on the British Isles 1t
was also necessary to support the
heroic Greeks by more than token"
army if British prestige through
out the Near East was not to
suffer bad blow Britain did not
gamble everything, because the
eXpedltionary force sent to Greece
does not seem to have exceeded
10000. Yet the dispatch even of this
force dangerously depleted the gar
rison of conquered Italian Lihya. and
the troops sent to Greece were sea-
Soned firSt-line troops whose loss
could i'll be spared Nevertheless, the
military venture was not too risky so
long as the Yugoslav Army was intact
and the Libyan front appeared to
be secure.
The entire military situation
changed almost simultaneously by
two events. neither of which could
reasonably have been foreSeen. Few
| military experts anywhere expected
either the Yugoslav collapse or the
amazing strength Of the German
armored sweep across North Africa.
The time element on which the Brit
lsh general staff undoubtedly based
It's calculations was thus doubly upset.
The real choice had to be made
after the German break through
across the Bulgarian mountains to
the vital Vardar Valley within three
days after the start of the campaign.
From a strictly military point of
view, the best thing for the British
to have done was to start pulling out
OF Greece, and had they acted
promptly the evacuation probably
could have been accomplished with
negligible losses But to have left
the Greeks in the lurch without a
fight might have damaged British
prestige even more than would have
been the case if British troops had
never been sent. The Near Eastern
peoples are peculiarly susceptible to
charges of cowardice and bad faith,
which German propaganda would
certainly have used with devastating
effect if the British Army in Greece
had turned tail and run without even
meeting the oncoming Germans in
genuine combat.
SO the British stood their ground.
And, from all accounts, the splendid
showing they made and the grue-
some losses they inflicted upon Ger
many's crack troops will go far to
nullify German gains in prestige
from victories won with overwhelm-
ing superiority in numbers and
equipment. If the North African
front can be held and the axis drive
stopped or even reversed, the net
military result may not be too seri-
Gus, while the prestige deficit should
be even smaller. Nevertheless, on
both counts, the British are today
in the red. Of that, there can be
no doubt.