The people's voice. [volume] (Helena, Mont.) 1939-1969, 1941-12-10
From Creenland's Icy Mountains"
November 20, 1914

November ~, 1871
UNCENSORED learns on complete
ly reliable authority that U. 5. army
officers have left for Africa where
they will survey sites for the en-
campment of q. S. troops. These OF
ficers received their assignment be
fore William C. Bullitt was appointed
special Presidential representative
to the Near East. Both missions
seem to support the widespread Wash
ington report that a token AEF
(Army regulars only will be sent to
Africa next spring.
EAST MEETS WEST
At the end of last week Messrs.
Roosevelt, Hull, Kurusu and Admiral
Nomura still were not telling the pub
lie exactly what they had been talk
ing about during the preceding fort
night. The two Japanese ENJOYS con-
tinued to be bland and smiling In
their observance of diplomatic pune
tilio. Mr.. Hull said nothing about
bandits" Mr. Roosevelt's train
CuuSSGu Oll lOI w al Ill OPl 1852 0eA'
Tokyo editors rumbled as loudly as
their colleagues in New York The
only thing that everybody was sure
of was that U.S.-Japanese converse
lions had broken down-at least tenn
porarily However, nothing SO big as
the content of the conversations with
the Japanese could remain an abso-
lutte secret in Washington. Moreover,
the issues were too obvious for sec
recy. By the end Of the week 1t was
possible to piece together what Roose-
welt and Hull had been demanding
and what stand the Japanese had
been taking.
Six Points
APPARENTLY Cordell Hull came to the
conversations prepared to be hard
boiled and unyielding. He is reported
to have laid down six points which
the Japanese would have to accept
before the real negotiations could
commence: the Japanese would have
to % get out of Indo-China, (2) get
out of Thailand, 60 get out of China
including the northern provinces, (4)
maintain neutrality in the Nazi-Soviet
war, (5) leave the Axis, (6) guarantee
free passage of munitions into Vladi-
vostok. On acceptance of these terms
by Japan the U. S. would ~ defrost
Japanese credits, (2) lift the CONNER
cial blockade, (3) guarantee markets
for Japanese industry in the q. S., in
Latin America and in British posses
sions In the Far East, az help finance
the eventual shift in Japan from a
war economy to peace economy.
elaborate studies are reported to
have been made in the state depart
ment regarding the last point.)
The six points do not differ sub
stantially from the program discussed |
in less publicized conversations two |
months before Kurusu emplaned for
Washington. What U. 8. and Japa-
nese statesmen talk about is decreed |
by the logic Of U. S. and Japanese
foreign policies. Both Japan and the
u. S. will have to make concessions to |
reach any sort of an agreement; and
each country will require face-sav-
ing device to screen the fact that it
has backed down. On the basis of
Hulls six points Japan would do all
the backing down. Not even the
broad economic concessions could obs
cure the humiliation that would be
Japan's were she to withdraw from
all of China The only thing about
the six points that Senator Pepper or
Henry Luce could call "appeasement"
is the failure to mention Manchukus.
President Roosevelt's refusal to con-
slider recognition of Manchukuo was
to be one Of the stumbling blocks in
earlier conversations. This time