Evening star., 1941-08-17
MESSAGE to Stain

Message to Stulln
The Joint message which Presi-
dent Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill sent to Joseph Stain is
important not only for what it says,
but also for what it may imply. 1t
urgently suggests a three-power
conference to be held in Moscow as
soon as possible, and, since Stain
already has accepted in principle,
the meeting doubtless will take place
in the near future.
AS the joint note itself says, the
most pressing problem is the alloca-
ton and delivery of supplies to Rus
sia. Thus far neither London nor
Washington has a clear idea of just
what Russia needs most. Further
more, those needs are continually
changing with the rapidly shifting
fortunes of war. If, for example,
both the Ukraine and Leningrad
should fall into German hands, the
chief industrial centers of European
Russia would be lost to the SovietS,
which would thenceforth have to
rely chiefly on the new industrial
centers built up under the Stain
regime along the UralS and in ST.
IBERIA. So Secretive have the Rus
slams been about their industry that
foreigners have Scant knowledge of
how far those centerS could go
toward maintaining vast armies,
especially with the mechanical
equipment which is vital necessity
against the German war machine.
It Is a safe guess that RuSSia'S re-
quirements for tanks, planes and
machine tools from abroad soon will
swell to vast proportions.
But those are precisely the things
-Thich Britain also most urgently
leeds, to say nothing of China and
he Netherlands Indies. Everything
,vhich America now produces for its
democratic associates and for its
own expanding Army already is fully
allocated, with exasperating bottle
necks handicapping the volume of
output now desired. A careful
checkup in Moscow by American and
British experts would reveal what
best can be spared with the maxi
mum all-round efficiency in the
prosecution of a common task.
Equally important would be first
hand study by American and British
transportation experts of the best
way to deliver the goods allocated to
the Soviet Union. Normally, Euro
pean Russias chief outlets are the
Baltic and Black Seas. But the
Baltic is closed tight by the Axis,
and the current drive into the
Ukraine already menaces the main
Black Sea ports, even if deliveries
could get past the AXis-dominated
Aegean Sea just south of the straits
which divide the Black Sea from
the Mediterranean.
The only remaining sea frontage
for European Russia is in the Arctic,
especially the port of MurmanSk,
kept relatively free from ice by
marginal current from the Gulf
Stream. At best, this means haz-
ardouS voyage past German -occu-
pied Norway and a long haul over
a minor railway from Murmansk to
Leningrad. And there is no GER
tainty that this route will be avail
able much longer, since German
Finnish drives menace it at several
points.
With European ingress thus barred
or precariouS, the one large-scale
possibility is Vladivostok, Russia S
chief port on the Pacific Ocean.
That, in turn, involves a tremen-
dously long haul over the trans
Siberian railway. Indeed, it is prob
able that much of the goods sent to
Vladivostok could best be allocated
to the needs of the local Russian
armies, thereby releasing materiel
produced in Russia for the European
front. Yet this obvious fact raises
the likelihood of grave complications
with Japan, which already is clam
oring loudly against such action.
That may we'll have been one of the
complications envisaged by Roosevelt
and Churchill when they pointed out
to Stain the possibility of further
fighting fronts"