Evening star., 1941-06-15

South CdrOlind'S Democratic
legislator transfers to the judicial
realm. A. P. Photo.
given to the board is, as we have said,
not an unrestricted power, and the grant
is not to be read as though the words
including the reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay were no part
of the statute. None of the words of
statute are to be disregarded and it
cannot be assumed that the introduce
ton of the phrase in this one was
without purpose"
This case was unusual in that three
New Deal appointees, Justices Murphy
Black and Douglas, while concurring
with the majority on other points, held
that the court had no authority what
ever to put even minor limitations, as
the Frankfurter opinion had done, on
the boards authority to make back pay
awards. In other words. even Justice
Frankfurter's opinion did not go far
enough for them.
The Anheuser-Buscn case. formally
known as the United States " William
L. Hutcheson ct al, also occasioned three
opinions, with Justice Frankfurter
speaking for the majority, Justice
Roberts speaking for himself and the
Chief Justice, and Justice Stone. con-
curing in the result of the majority
opinion but arriving at it by different
| reasoning.
This case was started by the Govern
ments attempt to use the criminal
| penalties of the Sherman Act to check
| jurisdictional strikes. There is high
doubt whether Congress, even now,
would dare legislate specifically on this
controversial subject.
Stone Saw No Violation of Act.
b. carefully interlacing the Sherman,
| Clayton and Norris s-LaGuardia acts,
! Justice Frankfurter and three other
| justices-Justice Murphy did not parti-
| cipate in the case-determined that
| Congress had no intention of seeking to
prevent jurisdictional strikes; indeed
that by the Norris-La Guardia Anti-In-
junction Act it had actually immunized
labor unions from the penalties of the
| Sherman law.
Justice Roberts, with the support of
Chief Justice Hughes. retorted that the
majority opinion was judicial legisla-
ton carried to a length hitherto un-
known.
Justice Stone, in concurring with the
result of the majority opinion, was care
full to say that he found no occasion to
consider the Norris-LaGuar Act a
determining factor, but he observed that
the majority's application of that act
was mot free from doubt and which
some of my brethren sharply challenge" J."
In the Classic case-so-called because
one of the ntigants was Patrick B.
Classic, a Louisiana election commits
sioner, Justice Douglas, dissenting for
himself and Justices Black and Murphy,
| turned the tables on Justice Stone and
others who had complained that the
court was legislating by extending the
scope of statutory language. Justice
Stone wrote the ma jority opinion with
| the concurrence of Justices Roberts,
Reed and Frankfurter. Chief Justice
Hughes did not participate in the case.
| Primary Elections Case.
| The majority held that Congress by
two far-reaching but specific post
Civil War statutes had constitutionally
asserted jurisdiction over primary elec-
tions at which members of Congress
were selected.
The minority, while agreeing that
Congress had constitutional authority
to enact laws covering primaries, argued
that the old statutes we're so general
yet so drastic in criminal penalties
that the court should not apply them
to primaries.
Justices Stone and Douglas had like
wise taken opposite positions a few
weeks before in the Guthrie case, in
which the language of a i10-year- old
contempt statute was given differing
interpretations. In this case, however,
Justice Douglas wrote the majority
opinion; Justice Stone, with the con-
currence of the Chief Justice and Justice
Roberts, dissented, declaring that if
the court was to reverse itself, as it
had done by the majority opinion, the
responsibility of departing from the
long-accepted construction of this stat
ute should be left to the legislative
branch of the Government to which it
rightfully belongs"
The question before the justices was
whether misbehavior could be pun
ished for contempt of court when it
occurred miles away from the actual
courtroom. The statute itself limited
the punishment to "misbehavior of any
person or persons in the presence of
said court or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice"
The majority held that the limits
were geographic" and the minority,