Evening star., 1941-11-20
Weygond Custer Holds Peril
VitoI Role Of Africo Again Brought to Fore;
Subs Would Be Valuable in Mediterranean

one of anti British feelings like
Gen. Dentz is much more likely. 1t
remains to be seen whether disorder
and confusion will result and
whether, should this be the case,
the Free French can profit thereby
as we'll as the Axis.
The particular problem presented
by Spanish Morocco is also of some
military interest. 1t is known that
French officers in North Africa
have entertained some anXieties
with regard to the go 900 we'll armed
troops stationed in this area. Many
OF these troops, nominally belong
ing to the Spanish Foreign Legion,
are said to be Germans. There
are good many tanks and armored
cars available whereas very few, if
any. armored fighting vehicles are
in the possession of Gen. Weygands S
army.
In considering the possibility of
British or American aid arriving at
CaSablanca or some other Atlantic
port of Morocco, it has been thought
possible that a highly motorized
German-Spanish force complete
with armored spearhead might dash
into Casablanca before the over
seas reinforcements could complete
their debarkation. The exact ma
ture of the Axis relations with the
forces in Spanish Morocco is un-
known but grave suspicious are en-
tertalned in French Morocco that
this supposedly Spanish army would
take immediate steps TO support
Axis interests in French Morocco if
those interests appeared to be seri-
ously threatened either by internal
revolt or by the activities of out
side powers.
L. 5. Security Affected.
The direct and immediate inter-
ests Of the United States in this
situation lie in the fact that our
security demands the exclusion of
Axis forces from the ports and air
bases of French West Africa. A
railroad is now in course of con-
StruCtion across the Sahara Desert
which will link up Algiers and Mo-
rocco directly WITH Dakar and the
Ivory Coast. This railroad will not
be completed for several years yet,
but the fact that it is under con-
structlon at all is matter OF grave
concern TO us. The counter meas
ureS to be taken, however. lie. under
present conditions. rather in the
Mediterranean and North Africa
than by direct action in West Africa
itself.
The type of ship most needed in
the Mediterranean for the complete
cutting Of communications between
Europe and Africa is the submarine
and We have a considerable number
of older submarines no longer very
efficient for the long distances oi
the Pacific, which would be ex.
tremely valuable in the Mediter-
ranean at this juncture. The ap.
pearance Of strong f1otillas OF Amer
lean submarines in the Mediter.
ranean would probably do more thar
any other one thing we could do Il
save the situation in Africa from
taking a turn for the worse. This
move should. of course, be sup
ported by aid to the Free French
by maintaining the flow of air re.
Inducements to the British in the
Middle East by way of West African
air bases and by wise and. fore.
sighted political and economic meas
ures such as may be called for bl
any change in the status of the
French North African possessions il
Gen. Weygand is indeed no longer
! to rule those areas.
(Copyrisht, l941. New York Tribune. Inc