Evening star., 1941-02-10
Homicide Law
Cha||engedin in
Appeals Case
Stotute Also Backed
As Court Hears Plea
Involving FotoIity

Constitutionality of the Districts
Negligent Homicide Vehicle Act was
challenged and defended today as
case involving its enforcement
was argued before the Court OF
Appeals.
The case came before the tribunal
on an appeal by District Attorney
Edward NJ. Curran from an order
by Police Judge Walter J. Casey,
cuashing an information charging
Rufus R Henderson with negligent
homicide
Mr.. Henderson. riding a motor
cycle was alleged to have struck
uown John Stahl at Eighteenth
street and Columbia road NV, in
f1icting fatal injuries. In dismiss
ing the charge, Judge Casey held
that the Court OF Appeals should
pass on the statute on the suflciency
of the information drawn under 1t.
interpretations Divided.
Representing the Government,
Assistant United States Attorney
Dennis Mccarthy held that the law,
which was passed in 1885. was
sufficiently definite to enable an
accused person to meet any charges
brought under this statute. In
citing numerous cases in which the
courts have upheld similar laws. he
admitted that a long list also could
be compiled on the other side. since
the courts had been divided in
their interpretations of negligent
homicide.
Mr. Mccarthy cited two Supreme
Court decisions which laid down the
rule, he said, that such law could
compel court or jury to de-
termine the degree of negligence
and did not require that it be set
forth explicitly. The law. he added,
was intended ito bridge the gap be-
tween the crime OF manslaughter
and the offense of reckless driving"
Contending that the act is un-
constitutional, Earl H. Davis. attor-
ney for the defendant, declared it
threw on the accused person the
burden Of canvassing the realm
Of negligence" to find out if he
were guilty of some degree of this
offense.
The District statute. as drawn.
Mr.. Davis argued. does not even
require that a defendant should
have been conscious of any negli-
eence in being involved in an acci-
dent forming the basis of such
charge The attorney objected
particularly to the language in the
Henderson information stating that
the defendant drove his motorcycle
"at an immoderate rate of speed"
and in careless, reckless and
negligent manner" Mr.. Davis said
this was too vague to permit the
accused to know exactly what he
was charged with.
More Specific Wording.
Associate Justice Justin Miller
asked whether this language was
not as specific as if the informa ton
had charged the defendant with
running through red light.
Mr.. Davis did not think so. He
said the rate of speed and other
circumstances should have been re-
cited exactly. To charge negligence
without explaining of just what it
consists, the attorney maintained,
would be like charging a man with
fraud or merely crime" without
designating its nature and the cir
cumstances
Mr.. Davis contended also that the
District Negligent Homicide Act had !
not been successful during the six
years it has been in effect in meet"
ing the problem of criminal re-
sponsibility in traffic deaths. He told
the court that out of los cases
brought in Police Court under this
law there had been only IS jury
verdicts of guilty. He blamed the
"vagueness' of the law for its al /
legged failure
Taken Under Amusement.
In reply to the contentious of .
the defense. Assistant District At |
torney Mccarthy argued that the /
great weight of judicial authority .
sustains the suffciency of an in
dictment or information drawn in |
the language of criminal statute. |
provided the indictment or infor-
nation apprises the defendant of |
the nature of the offense charged |
and is sufficiently definite to enable
The defendant to plead double
jeopardy in the event of a second
prosecution" He maintained that |
the present information satisfied |
both of these requirements.
The Court of Appeals took the !
case under advisement. This is the
first time the statute has been tested |,
in the higher courts. 1t provides /
for penalties up to imprisonment !
mn E1a L~tL,