Evening star., 1941-11-16
By Charles G. Ross.

day the adoption Of a resolution of ap-
proval by the Senate. Wilson ordered
the seizure of Veracruz in order to pre-.
vent the delivery TO Huerta of con-
signment of war supplies scheduled to
reach Veracruz by a German ship on
the morning of the 2lst.
The armed intervention of the United
States in Russia in 19l8-l920 was an out
standing example of the use of our
armed forces without a war declaration
There were practically no hostilities in
the Vladivostok sector, but in North
Russia, around Archangel, the Allied
and American occupation was resisted
and soldiers were killed and wounded on
both sides.
Wilson Armed Ships Regardless.
In 1917, President Wilson asked Con-
gress for the right to arm merchant
ships against German submarine at
tacks. A Senate filibuster held up the
proposed grant of authority, but Wilson
nevertheless armed the ships.
All these instances, and others that
might be cited. illustrate the broad
powers of President as Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy. AS
matter Of practical fact, there is little
except public opinion to restrain him
from taking extraordinary steps in any
situation he may deem to constitute
national emergency.
But public opinion can be an effective
ai,,t
been compelled to take account of 1t at
the various stages of our progress toward
a shooting war with Germany.
If the sampling" polls mean anything
the public has approved all the major
steps along this road: The 1889 amend
ment of the Neutrality Act to permit the
shipment of arms on the cash. and-carry
plan, revision plainly in the interest Of
the Allies: the transfer of the so over
age destrovers to Great Britain in Sep
tember, 1910; the Lease-Lend Act of
March, 194l, to allow war supplies to go
to Great Britain on barter and credit:
the voting of billions to make this act
effective-and SO on. All these acts
seemingly, have been approved, yet the
public, again according to the polls, has
hestitated on the brink Of shooting war
initiating against a formal declaration
has been the fear Of the people that all
out war would mean the dispatch of an
expeditionary force to Europe, as in 1917.
Mr. Roosevelt. clearly, has had to reckon
with this fear, as also he has had to
reckon with the outspoken opposition. all
along the line, of the anti-war elements
represented by such spokesmen as Lind
bergh and Senator Wheeler.
Congress Causes Roosevelt Caution.
If any concrete development more
than another led to caution on the part
of the President, it was the narrow
squeak by which the bill to extend the
draft went through Congress. Whereas
the original 12-month draft bill was
passed by almost two-to-one margin
in both branches, the amendment to ex-
tend the draft by l8 months was
adopted by three-to-two vote in the
Senate and scraped through the House
by only one vote.
But for the complete story of why we
are shooting it out with Germany in
the Atlantic Ocean without war dec
laration, We must look not only to the
precedents and to the restraints put upon
the Executive by his own words and by
public opinion. AS already suggested. a
variety of factors have had their weight
The point need not be labored that
Uar declarat ations Under modern condi.
tions. are outmoded nor the related
point that the unscrupulous nature OF
the Hitler attack entities the enemies
of Naziism to use what means they can
find in defense. Hardly less obvious is
the relation Of Japan to the war in the
Atlantic. The war picture must be seen
as whole. Undoubtedly our course has
been influenced by the consideration
that declaration of war on Germany
might bring Japan, committed as she is
to Germany by the three-power pact,
actively into the war on the side of the
NaZis.
One of the main lines of our foreign
policy has been to prevent an involve
ment in the Pacific that would curb the
flow of supplies to Great Britain across
the Atlantic. That policy has been
shrewdly and effectively pursued. Japan,
despite pressure by Germany, has kept
out of the war, and in the meantime our
production Of ships and the other i'm
plemsots q VA hAs inersassd. We ars