Evening star., 1941-09-24
Mock War Lesson

NiSSN vi ECSSOu
In his appraisal of the showing
good and bad-made by the Second
and Third Armies during the first
phase of the Louisiana maneuvers,
Lieutenant General L. G. McNair,
whose function as chief of the Army
General Headquarters Staff is to
dissect and analyze, found much that
should be encouraging to the Ameri-
can people.
In his opinion, assuming adequate
equipment, the Army of today is bet
ter prepared for actual combat than
were our troops during the first World
War. The principal deficiency
brought to light by the maneuvers, in
his judgment, is deficiency in small
unit training due to tisfactory
leadership This, however, is a de-
f1ciency which should respond favor
ably to the process of wedding out
unfit officers, which is now under
way, and to the additional training
which the Army is scheduled to re-
ceive.
General McNair described the first
phase of the maneuver as epoch
making" in the matter of air support
OF ground troops. Although the crit
ical Importance of this complex
phase of military operations has been
conclusively demonstrated abroad, it
is something which is relatively new
in the American service. In view of
this latter consideration, the fact
that air and ground troops were able
to coordinate their efforts reason
ably wei during this maneuver may
be regarded as an augury of future
In which they will function even
better-without any of the supposed
antipathy Of the ground forces for
air units, which does not seem to
exist now in any substantial sense.
In this connection, however, it is
significant that General McNair
found 1t necessary to point out that
ground troops, especially when in
column formation, failed to manifest
a proper appreciation of the serious
ness OF air attacks. This Is a lesson
which, If not learned in peacetime,
will prove costly In lives in time Of
war.
Important also in General McNair's
critique was his observation that the
success obtained in anti-tank de-
fense was an "outstanding feature"
of the maneuver. The American
conception of mobile, separate anti
tank units Is an innovation peculiar
to our Army, and while it is undoubt-
edly true that the Louisiana terrain
seriously hampered the movements
of tanks, it is no less evident that
General McNair was guilty of under
statement when, in commenting on
the work of the anti-tank units, he
said that this type of defense gives
promise of marked success"
In one important respect-that of
counterattack-the showing made
during the maneuver was disap-
pointing.
Under modern war conditions, the
counterattack has come to be rec
ognized as a vital part of defense.
Indeed, it may be doubted whether
any defense against strong foe can
be successfully maintained without
powerful counterblows, delivered
when the attack is beginning to lose
momentum.
Thus, despite the Third Army's
paper victory, it's showing was un-
satisfactory to the extent that sue
cessful counterattacks were few and
far between In this connection,
however, it should be recognized that
the Third Army's infantry units,
equipped with only light arms, had
little incentive to attack the opposing
armored units. If counterattacks
against tanks are desirable-and un-
doubtedly they are-it would seem
essential to consider the develop
ment of anti-tank units to a point
where they could be used extensively
with infantry instead of holding
them for defensive purposes to stop
tanks after they have broken through
the front lines.