Evening star., 1941-07-27
Russo-Germon Alternatives

Russo-Germun Alternatives
For five long weeks the titanic
Russo German death grapple has
gone on with ever-mounting fury.
Through the veil of rival censorships
and cunning propaganda the outer
world sees little save a confused
welter of battling millions, with
vast destruction and huge losses.
One thing, however, is clear: The
quick military decision confidently
predicted at the start by German
spokeSmen and rather expected by
many competent students of warfare
has not materialized. The German
war machine, which at first rolled
rapidly forward, has slowed down
and, in some sectors of the long bat
tlefield, apparently has stopped.
What does this mean?
Two widely different theories are
held by military commentators One
school holds that the Germans
have failed in their basic objective,
the quick smashing of Soviet Russia.
These observers believe that the
blitzkrieg, designed primarily for rel
atively small, thickly populated
countries with good communications,
does not work we'll in Russias limit
less and almost roadless spaces.
According to this theory the Ger
mans will either wear themselves
out like Charles XII and Napoleon or
will at best win a limited victory
only after much time and at ruinouS
cost in man power and materiel. In
short, despite the airplane, motor
lied equipment and other modern
gadgets, history is destined sub
stantially to repeat itself. and Rus
sia will literally smother another
rash invader
The other school of thought be-
lieves that, though admittedly up
against Unexpectedly tough oppoSi-
ton, the German war machine is
really functioning according to
plan" That plan, following the
maXims of ClauseWitz, Moltke and
other great German StrategiStS, els,
not the occupation of territory but
the destruction of the enemys
armed forces. They point out that,
in Russia as in France, faSt-moving
rhnaIc
great toops around bodies of troops
isolated by a mechanical break
through and that those pocketed
troops are subsequently annihilated.
This is known to have happened to
the vast Russian frontier force
trapped around Byalistok early in
the campaign, and the German high
command announces that several
similar pocket battles" are now TAX
ing place which must be finished
before the general advance can be
resumed. The reason why this
process takes more time than in pre-
vious campaigns is that the Russians
fight with fanatical desperation long
after their position is militarily
hopeless. But the net result is the
same RuSsia's armies are DESTROYED
relatively near the German border
instead of being chased INTERIM
lnably across country under the Ger
man handicap of lengthening lines
OF communication. When enough
Russian troops have been destroyed
to break their power of resistance,
the key cities and regions desired by
the Germans will fall almost of
themselves.
Such are the two contrasting
theories put forward by military
critics today. Which is correct the
events of the next two months
should conclusively prove. For if the
Russian autumn and winter descend
before Germany has won a military
decision, Nazi prospects are gloomy
indeed. Hitler's gamble of stroke
at the Russian colossus can be justi-
fled only by success this season. A
stabilized eastern front with Rus
sian military power unbroken would
spell repetition of the doom which
overlook Germany in the last war
generation ago. There is no real
alternative.