Evening star., 1941-11-22
Siqnificunt Offensive

Significant Offensive
In judging the significance of the
current British offensive into East
ern Libya, it is important to set the
actual military operations against an
| extensive and complex background
/ of both strategy and politics. Only
/ thus can the larger meaning of the
British offensive be properly evalu-
ated.
Considerable light has been thrown
on the question by Winston Church.
ills statement to the House Of Com
| mons. The Prime Minister stated
that the present offensive had been
long in preparation, that it had been
held up until British equipment was
fully equal to that of the Axis. and
that its objective is mot so much
the occupation of this or that local
ity, but the destruction of the armed.
and primarily the armored. force of
the enemy" In other words, Mr..
Churchill makes it plain that
this is no suddenly improviSed ma
neuver, but one carefully planned
with the aim of inflicting a knock
out blow on the Axis forces in North
Africa. The moment chosen is
climatically the most favorable for
large-scale military operations, when
the desert heat has sufficiently
abated 1t is interesting to recall
that General Wavells smashing
thrust at the Italian armies which
carried him clear across Eastern
Libya began on December 9, 194O-
approximately the same time of year.
Militarily, Britain has been piling
up a lead over the Axis in North
Africa for several months. owing to
its superior facilities for reinforcing
its armies there Nevertheless, the
precise moment for launching the
attack may we'll have been influenced
by political considerations.
The first of these is the state of
British public opinion. Ever since
the outbreak of the Russo-German
war last June, the British people have
been increasingly eXasperated by the
passive strategy of the high COM
mand. Russian appeals to open up
a second front" produced popular
mood of irritation. From the Rus
sian point of view. Libya is a less de-
sirable second front" than would
have been one in Europe, since it can
have scant immediate effect on de-
creasing German pressure-except in
the air-on the Soviet Union But in
Britain the psychological effect al
ready is excellent. The London press
is jubilant and there is general con-
fidence that major victory is in the
offing. Indeed, that is one of the
best reasons for believing that the
high command is fairly sure of over
running at least Eastern Libya; be-
cause failure in this offensive would
produce popular repercussions at
home with grave political implica-
tionS
Another political consideration
which may have haStened the
launching of the Libyan offensive is
the apparent surrender of the Vichy
regime to German pressure, SYM
bolized by the dismissal of General
Weygand as pro-consul in French
North Africa. Even though Vichy
does not utterly capitulate and enter
the war openly on the Axis side, it is
quite likely that, from now on,
its alleged neutrality will be so
increasingly benevolent toward the
Axis that German and Italian sup
plies" and even troops may make
thinly disguised use of French North
African territory. This would great
ly facilitate the defense of Libya and
would make its conquest by Britain
much more difficult. To forestall so
unfavorable development, imme-
diate and decisive action is neces-
sary. Current operations in Eastern
Libya will soon tell whether the Brit
ish high command can garner the
fruits of victory at what seems to be
favorable moment.