Evening star., 1941-10-31
Soviet Considers Its Strategy Success,
But Needs U S. Output to Offset Nozis' Edge


vidual is utterly unimportant III
comparison to it-and that the state
and the government are Synony-
nous. I emphasize that this is
complete and fundamental assump-
ton, foundation for all Soviet
thinking on all subjects. To be
against the government is to be
anti-social. as to us criminal is
anti-social. The principal effect of
this, to repeat. is that they are led
into thinking of Roosevelt as if he
were the simplest of autocrats. with
United States armies and industries
his to command at will.
Based on information from its
own agents in Germany and in
formation obtained from captives.
the Soviet government dose not |
believe collapse of the German
state is in order. 1t has heard /.
talk about an imminent collapse
from its allies-but it believes this |
is wiShful thinking. 1t thinks Ger !
man morale is high and that moth |
ing will unSeat Hitler except a de- |
cisive military defeat. For the pur-
poses of upsetting the Nazi regime |
it does not believe that this defeat |
need necessarily be administered to |
his principal armies. 1t believes |
the decisive defeat of one of Hit
ler's allies could turn the trick. |
1t looks at it this way:
Many of those who have Joined |
forces with Hitler-the Rumanians,
the HungarlanS, the Firms, etc, have |
done so as the lesser of two evils. |
1t must be demonstrated to at least |
one of them that their alliance is |
not the lesser but the far greater !
of the two evils. For this purpose
1t will not be enough simply to de-
feat an army allied to Germany in
the field; it will be necessary utterly
to annihilate the forces of some
ally, wholly to destroy its govern
ment To rub its nose in it. To
make defeat and collapse so obvious
that the news of it will spread over
the world, censorship and controlled
press or no.
hueu
This is the principle behind the
Soviet request to Britain for
diversion front"
incidentally. there is this story
which I got from foreign source,
but which I believe to be true:
When Churchill announced his alli-
anee with the Russians Immediately
after the German invasion the
| Soviet government drew up a list
of things it hoped Great Britain
might be willing and able to do
| Certain supplies were included, but
1 most of the list was of Opportu-
| mites for the creation of diversion
| fronts. Back to Stain came a long
/ document explaining in detail
and with great politeness-why
none Of the offered suggestions was
practical Stain is supposed to
have read this list in silence, turned
over the sheaf of papers. smiled
/ and said five words: No regrets
and no reproaCheS.'
The rest of the story was that
Churchill was so moved when he
got this gallant reply that he burst
into tears.
Attack on Italy.
The Soviet government thinks the
ideal diversion would be an attack
on already defeated Italy.
Soviet officials will deny this. but
I believe they are almost equally
enthusiastic about the removal of
/ japan as a factor in the AXlS-a
removal requiring the total defeat
/ of japanese armies in China. the
destruction and bottling up of the
| japanese fleet, the burning of all
the highly inflammable japanese
! cities from the air. Soviet officials
will deny this because the Soviet
government still pursues the policy
| of soft words about Japan. But,
nevertheless. it's true.
Soviet officials also believe that
even a diversion front in Norway
has advantages. would turn Sweden
from a potential enemy into an ally.
The SWedes are cooperating with
the Germans today and German
troops and supply columns use
Swedish railways freely.
Balkans on List. Too.
An invasion of the Balkans would
also be on their list.
At the bottom of the list would be
an invasion of France, the difficulty
of which they admit. because OF the
ease with which Germans would re-
inforce any new front there.
The Soviet government believes
that its armies are fighting Hitler
hard. 1t does not believe any one
has ever fought Hitler hard before
except once. 1t credits the Brit
ish Army with fighting him in the
retreat from Belgium to France and
at Dunkerque. 1t is sure no one else
has ever fought him hard anywhere
1t does not think he is so tough if
he can be matched in armament.
On British and L. S. Aid.
AS to British and American aid:
There is absolutely no question but
that the Soviet government still is
deeply suspicious of the capitalist
governments of Britain and the
United States. particularly of Brit
ain. I am emphatic about this SIM
ply because it will be emphatically
denied Nevertheless. it's true.
The British government has long
history of anti-Soviet policy. and it
is anything but forgotten. Neither
is Munich.
The succession of American jour-
nalistS who turned on the Soviets
after leaving the country, their irri-
tation and subsequent disillusion-
ment with eX-Ambassadol William
Bullitt (or vice versa)- these things,
added to a fundamental distrust.
seemed to them to have been con-
, flrmed when we denounced Soviet
aggression in Finland. You must re-
member that the Soviet government
never felt it was an aggressor in
Finland or Poland and now believes
that these invasions to capture de-
fenSive positions have been thor
, oughly justified
Tho PrScian Attitude