The people's voice. [volume] (Helena, Mont.) 1939-1969, 1941-07-09
Choice Must Be
CONTINUED from Page one)

not created over night by voting tn
money. It has taken time and enoI
nous sacrifice in both Germany ant
Britain. 1t will take both time ant
sacrifice in the U. S. for two rea
sons: % Though U. S. productiv,
capacity today is great, the restric
lions of private monopoly economic.
have kept it from expanding to it,
potential proportions; (2) a large
part of existing capacity is directly
geared to the production of consumer
goods. To spend 40 percent of the
national income on war production
without lowering living standards is
impossible unless the national income
is raised more than the $4,000, 100000
contemplated by the government econ
omists (see above.) That in turn
would mean increasing U. S. capacity
to produce far more rapidly than can
be done in year or two. In 1910,
consumer goods industries were re-
sponsible for $4,000, 100000 out of a
national income of $4,000, 000,0 900.
Consumer goods production to war
production To reduce production of
consumer goods makes economic
sense only if there is shortage of
raw" labor.
Durable Consumers
There is no shortage of raw" labor
This is one point on which govern
ment economists at least have reach
ed agreement. The dream that arms
production would solve the unemploy
ment problem has not come true, and
it won't. Shortages of skilled labor
are a special problem but diversion
of few skilled workers from con-
sumner goods production to arms pro-
duction does not mean that new work
ers cannot be trained in a short time
to replace them. The point remains
that so much industrial capacity is
geared to personal consumption that
war production cannot be increased
by converting the industries. War
can be increased only by
curtailing consumption of the raw ma
terials which go into consumers
goods. But this principle can be APP
piled only to so-called durable con-
sumner goods automobiles, etc. and
not to non-durable consumer goods
flood, etc. which account for the
bulk of consumers goods production.
it is on the consumer
that the impact of the arms economy
Is falling.
BY and large it is the heavy indus
.ries that must turn out the bulk Of
war production In 1940 the entire |
output in this field was only S26,000- |
0,000 This total covered many sub |
divisions: durable consumer goods, |
IS, 900, 100000; producers equipment
leavy machinery, etc, $1,000, 100000; |
,lant maintenance and expansion, ST.,
1873, 100000; public construction, S4,
100000 residential and other con-
,truction, $4,000, 100000; the balance
vent for military production, net ex-
port balance, and what economists
,all met change in inventories" OBJ
yiously, only a comparatively small |
part of this heavy industry can be
to war production. Some
an be neglected.: maintenance and
eplacement of plant in consumer in
ustries, residential construction But
t is the durable consumer goods in
understanding the automobile in
ustry more than anything else-and
he producers equipment industries
oto nd mo-
which must be converted to arms
reduction Last year the total out
nut of those two fields was not much
nore than $10,000O00,000 The flexi-
ility of industrial facilities is limited
n converting industries to war pro-
uction, much machinery must stand
lie for considerable periods of time.
In view of these facts, level-headed
overnment economists are wondering
ow a 100000 100000 annual defense
rogram can be achieved for several
ears however much civilian consump-
ion is curtailed. These economists
re worrying about what may happen
D the American standard of living
l the attempt to reach such level
war production. Some think that |
complete arms economy is a greater
1reat to American democracy than /,
dolf Hitler
One thing that the arms program
as made abundantly clear is the I'M
crying maladjustment of U. S. econ
my. Washington is well agreed that
ven a s25,O0O,000, 900 defense pro-
ram for 1912 will not begin to dry {
D the labor reservoir. Various sur
eys have led to the conclusion that ,
) more than 100000 more workers
i'll be absorbed in the next twelve
onths. The national income is not
tpected to exceed $97 900, 100000 in :
y42. All this adds up to the fact
lat there are definite limits to the
rerall expansion of u. S. economy
r the next year or more. One tell
g way of stating it is this: the more
Iccessful the defense program is in y
e immediate future, the smaller will =
the increase in employment and ma :.
onal income. The reason: expan-
on in arms industries will be made
converting other industries, not by
creasing the total capacity to pro- .
Ice. =
varied Giant n
The economic reality that this fact Il
Iderscores is the failure of the U. S. b
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