The Hardin tribune-herald. [volume] (Hardin, Mont.) 1925-1973, 1941-07-17
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MEDITERRANEAN MIX-UP

In IAN N1IA-OT
Inside story on General Waven's
transfer to India, as told in diplo-
matte dispatches, is that Wavell had
been q%uarreling with Churchill and
had opposed polite al-military moves
such as the campaign in Greece and
Crete and the expedition to Solum.
More important from the Amer
lean point of view. Wavell had IA
vored the evacuation of all British
forces from the entire Mediter-
: ranean area. And U. S. military ex-
perts, agreed with HMM fact,
urged it.
So although in a sense General
Wavell is being denoted, yet in 9TH
er respects he will be in a position
to command British forces from an
area to which he had urged that
British forces retreat.
For some time General Wavell
had commended that Britain's posi-
ton in the Mediterranean was in
defensible. The British force of only
400, 900 men in the Near East faced
a combined Axis total twice as
stronghold 900 Germans and Italians
IN Libya, plus 600, 900 Nazis in
Greece. Bulgaria and Rumania.
The latter figure has been partially
diminished by transfers to Russia;
but Wavell argued that the Nazi-
Fascist armies could concentrate
attack in one place while British
troops had to spread out over a far
flung line from Libya to Syria and
Iraq. Therefore he disagreed with
Churchill on all military moves
which had a political motive.
U. S. Worried Over Atlantic.
U. S. military and naval strate-
gists sided with Wavell, were strong
for the idea of a complete British
withdrawal from the Mediterranean.
The strategy behind this was two
fold:
l. The British have lost 40 per
| cent of their original Mediterranean
fleet. The losses at Crete were
much worse than officially admitted,
and even in the Syrian campaign
naval losses were considerable.
Therefore, American naval men,
facing the probability Of having to
help the British fleet in the Atlantic,
did not want the fleet further weak
ened.
2. The United States is more in
terested in what happens on the
bulge Of Africa around Dakar (op-
posite BraziD than it is in the Medi-
terranean.
To this end, both General Wavell
and U. S. s~trategists favored the idea
the Mediterranean entirely and es-
tablishing a new line of defense
across the very center Of Africa
from Port Sudan on the Red sea to
Freetown on the Atlantic ocean.
This line of defense meant that
about $500 miles Of the hottest des-
ert in the world would be between
the Nazis and the British lines.
Over such a desert it is difficult for
tanks to operate without heating up;
also it is difficult for the average
bomber to carry a load over such
distances. So it was expected that
the Nazis would exhaust themselves
in the deep, hot deserts Of Africa.
Part Of the plan contemplated a
highway straight across equatorial
Africa from Freetown and later
from Dakar to Port Sudan.
Churchill Says No.
However, Churchill was fatty op-
posed. So were many other British
leaders. They felt that the shock
of withdrawal from the Mediterran-
can, traditional sphere Of British in
~fluence, and from Suez which had
been identified with the British en-
pire for years, would be too much
for the British public.
This debate occurred before the
Nazi attack IN Russia and before
the British march into Syria. But
after the slowness of Wavell's sue
cess in Syria, all these factors cul-
minated in his transfer to India.
There Wavell can concentrate on
defense of the most important part
of the empire-if the Nazis creep
up on the Indian border in South
Russia. Also, he will not be in the
Mediterranean. for the defense of
which he had no great enthusiasm