Evening star., 1941-06-10
Text Of Chu Speech to Commons Defending Strategy Cet

could be settled in a few hours by
reference to here apparently the
Prime Minister meant reference
to the cabineD.
These commanders in chief have
settled 1t among themselves, al
though we share to the full respon-
Sibility.
Must Consider Situation
Elsewhere in Middle East.
1t must not be forgotten that,
apart from the effort in Greece,
which was so very costly in aircraft,
the situation in Palestine and Iraq
as we'll as Syria has to be considered
The winding up in Ethiopia also
makes very heavy demand upon
aircraft and the situation in the
western desert has also to be con-
sidered before any rational judg-
ment could be formed on the dispo-
sition of our aircraft and failure to
supply an adequate air force over
Crete. 1t would be necessary, as in
the case of anti-aircraft guns, to
know what were our resources and
situation in these other theaters.
1t Is no use trying to judge these
matters without full knowledge and
full knowledge cannot be made
public outside the narrowest circle
compatible with execution of opera
tions. In March we decided to go
to the aid of Greece in accordance
with our treaty obligations. This
exposed us to defeat by overwhelm-
ing numbers in Greece unless Yugo-
slavia played her part or unless the
Greek Army could be extricated to
hold narrower line if Greece was
overrun. 1t seemed probable Crete
would be the next object of attack.
The enemy, with a vast superb
ority of air power, was able to drive
our aircraft from the air fields of
Greece and, adding to these his
enormously superior anti aircraft
batteries, he was able to make these
air fields rapidly available for his
own use.
Moreover, as the season was ad-
vancing, many more air fields be-
came available to him as the
weather improved and dried them
up.
It was borne in upon us that II
an attack on Crete was made 1t
would be primarily an air borne at
tack for which the vastly superior
air force would be available
The question was whether we
should try to defend Crete or yield
1t without fight.
No one who bears responsibility
for this defense of Crete was igno-
rant of the fact conditions provided
only the most meager air support
for troops in the island or for the
feet operating around it.
1t was not a fact that dawned
upon military and other authorities
after this decision had been taken.
1t was the foundation of the
choice.
The choice was whether Crete
should be defended without effective
air support or whether Germans
should be permitted to occupy it
without opposition.
1t has been said you should never
fight without superior or at least
ample air support. 1t is not a ques-
ton between what is good and
what is bad. The choice is between
two very terrible alternatives
(cheers), must you yield an i'm
portant key position one after
another?
There are others who have said,
and l have seen it in papers also,
that you should defend no place you
cannot be sure you can hold. Well
then, can one ever be sure?
If this principle of giving up with
out a fight any place you cannot
be sure of holding were adopted
would not the enemy be able to
make an unlimited number of valu-
able conquests without any fight
ing at all?
And where would you make the
stand and engage with resolution?
What would happen if you allowed
the enemy to overrun without cost
to himself the most valuable and
strategic points?
Suppose we had never gone to
Greece. And suppose we had never
defended Crete. Where would the
Germans be now?
Suppose We had simply resigned
territory and strategic points to
them without a fight, might they
not at this early stage in the cam
paign of l94l already be masters of
Syria and Iraq and preparing them
selves for an advance into Persia?
Germans Have Gained
Many Victories Easily.
Germans in this war have gained
many victories very easily They
have overrun countries and beaten
down strong powers with very little
resistance being offered them.
1t is not only the question of time
that is gained by f1ghting-even at
a disadvantage-for important
points, but there is also the vitally
important principle of stubborn re-
Sistance to the will of the enemy.
The House will see there are some
arguments at least which deserve to
be considered before you can adopt