Evening star., 1941-06-03

David Lawrence. formal or official
sense and nobody in Washington
can say with assurance when or If
that contingency will arise. But
the address did make clear the
circumstances under which the
United States would use armed
force to resist. And it is, therefore,
the nature of the warning given
European dictators by Mr. RooSe-
welt which has become more i'm
portant than the effect of the
speech on the people of the United
States, or the definition of terms,
The American Government mas
outlined its limits of interests in
the Western Hemisphere. Any move
by the Axis forces into Dakar or into
Gibraltar may bet is not def
nitely proposed yet as a concrete
step-countered with an occupa-
ton of the Cape Verde Islands or
Dakar on the West Coast of Africa
by American and perhaps Canadian
forces.
Up to now the Axis powers have
had vague imtimations concerning
American interests in the Atlantic.
These are no longer vague. Estab-
hshmens of Axis forces or of any
forces that are hostile to America
at bases that can reach across the
Atlantic with fast-fying planes will
bring America into the war in the
sense that seizure or occupation of
those bases will follow.
Held Vital to Defense.
This conception of what is neces-
sary to defend the United States
and to "repel invasion" and ward
off attack is held by military and
naval experts to be related to
lightning warfare and sudden at
tacks Parlor strategists may differ
but the military, naval and aerial
commanders who advise the Presi-
dent have no difficulty in agreeing
that the bases across. the ocean are
vital now to the national defense
OF the United States.
Hitler and MusSolini know now
that if they venture into the At
lantic far away from their zone of
operations against Britain, the
United States will be compelled to
construe their action as aggres-
sive and it will be treated accord
ingly. If Berlin insists that there
is now no hostile intention with
respect to this hemisphere, then
the occupation of Dakar by Nazi
forces or the occupation of Portu-
guese territory would seem to be
Supertluous. Time will tell whether
Hitler Will force America into the
war, but nobody can say the warn
ing has not been given by the
President.
The fireside chat had another
oojective-to improve the national
morale at home. The proclamation
of an unlimited national emer-
gency' was not a legalistic act,
though there are some laws which
come into full force when that term
is used. 1t was a psychological
step-a move designed to eliminate,
If possible, whatever disunity there
has been with respect to defense
policy. 1t afforded a convenient
stopping place for the debate among
those who wanted to cease debating
and get behind the national pro-
gram. 1t did not exclude the op-
portunity for continued debate.
A Word to Labor.
The proclamation did another
thing. 1t furnished a background
for the Presidents efforts to cut
down the number of labor disputes.
1t put the national labor organiza-
tions on the spot and to a certain
extent put up to them the problem
of disciplining their membership on
the matter of work stoppages.
With a national emergency
proclaimed, moreover, Government
agencies and departments can OBJ
tain better cooperation than before.
Certainly the appointment Of the
Secretary of the Interior as the die
tator, so to speak, of the uses to
which petroleum can be put and
as the supervisor of the whole petro-
leum industry comes with less shock
after the proclamation was issued
than might have been the case
before.
Big appropriations about to be
requested from Congress get more
favorable attention when national
emergency has been announced than
when things are drifting listlessly
without a definition of national
policy.
Nobody who really wants to be
fair about it can say today that
the United States is not arming for
defense. or has asked for a huge
Army, Navy and air force without
defining where such forces would be
used. The answer has been given
bv the President and the strateglsts
of the Army, Navy and air force
now know what their job is. They
must deploy their forces and make
their strategy plans so as to defend
the two oceans, assuming the occu-
patton by hostile forces OF outlying
bases which hitherto have been out
side the Western Hemisphere, so fai
as longitude and latituoe are con-
cerned, but which are dehnltelS
within the zone of possible attack
because of the flying time involved
The Western HemisphereS limits
now are the number Of hours u
would take bombers, using African
or European bases, 10 nv 10 South