Evening star., 1941-11-14
FinIund's Choice

FinIond's Choice
The welcome announcement from
Helslnki that Finland does not con-
slider the door closed to further ne
on the question Of peace with Rus
sia directs attention to two pertinent
| questions, concerning which the
American people have been given
little information.
One of these concerns the charac-
! ter of such peace terms as the Soviets
may be prepared to offer, and the
other the extent to which Britain
and the United States are willing to
underwrite any settlement that may
be agreed upon.
In the light of Finland's bitter ex-
perienceS with Russia, it is too much
t. expect that the Firms should lay
down their arms now merely because
they have received indirect advices
that Moscow is willing to discuss
settlement. At the least, before sur
rendering the temporary advantage
that is theirs, they are entitled to
know specifically what the Russian
terms are, and, should those terms
be satisfactory, what guarantees of
their permanency will be forthcom-
ing.
If satisfactory understanding
can be reached on these points, re-
sulting in Finlands withdrawal from
| the war, most happy way out of
an exceedingly difficult situation will
have been found 1t should be rec
ogniZed, however, that Finland and
Russia may not be able to come to
terms, and that, even in event of an
agreement being reached, the Ger
mans may be able to prevent Fin
land from making a separate peace
In that not unlikely eventuality,
this Government will have to con-
slider still a third question-the prob
able military consequences Of Fin
lands continued participation in the
war.
Unfortunately, despite the high
regard in which Finland is held by
virtually all Americans, it is inpos-
Sible to treat the Russo-Finnish war
as separate and distinct from the
larger conflict. Finland and Ger
many are fighting for wholly differ
ent objectives, but it can hardly be
! denied that Finnish military sue
| cesses, while directed primarily to-
ward insurance of Flnland's security,
also tend to make possible a German
victory Thus, if Finland, as a mat
ter of self defense, finds it necessary
/ to hold the important Murmansk
railway. the Russians are not only
prevented from getting American
and British supplies which might be
! used against Finland, but are also
denied supplies which they must
have to continue the fight against
the Germans 1t is true that the
Germans, in the Leningrad sector,
also have cut the rail line. but with
| the fight for that vital city hanging
| in the balance it would be rash to
assume that the Russians could not
reopen this supply route if they were
| free to throw against the Germans
the considerable military forces now
immobilized by the Firms.
1t is under these bitter-almost
Observation-Disclosures that Finland s
| hard choice must be taken. For our
part, every effort should be made to
provide the Firms with opportunity
to make an honorable peace-a peace
which would give them British
and American guarantee of the Sc
curity they so justly demand. But
If this effort failS-if Finland for
reasons within or beyond her con-
trol-should decide finally to 60 on
with the war, this Government would
have to take stand in accordance
with the strategic factors as they
would then exist.
We may hope for the best, and it
is not for us to criticize the Firms if
their ultimate decision is to continue
in the war. They will do whatever,
in their Judgment, seems to be in
Finland'S best interests, and, by the
same token, our decision would have
to be governed by an equally realistic
appraisal of the course of action best
calculated to serve the vital inter-
eSts of the United States.
| It has been learned that two