Evening star., 1941-04-27

IL NOulU NC q lllIoOdhV5 AZ 10 ASAS ~ 'AAS
highest quarters in Washington, to main-
tain that Great Britain is tottering un-
der the powerful blows of the axis and
is nearing its last gasp. But 1t would
be an even more serious mistake, 1t is
asserted in the same quarters, to mini
mize the immediate danger to the Brit
ish Empire after the Balkan catastrophe.
Great Britain is in a greater predica-
ment today than she has been since the
outbreak of the war. The German mill
tary machine has suffered serious losses,
but not sufficient to handicap her future
movements The 50000-odd casualties
suffered in the last few weeks have not
made real impression on her man
power. The air losses have not been
exactly estimated yet, but it is believed
they do not exceed 500 planes. The
heavy and light motorized units used in
the Balkan campaign have suffered the
heaviest punishment, but even so, the
production capacity of the factories in
the Reich and in some of the conquered
territories is such that these losses will
be replaced within the next two or three
months.
Under the circumstances it is believed
that the Germans will begin new opera
tions within a few weeks after the Bal
kan debris has been cleaned up. Mill
tary observers who are following the
German movements the best they can
are convinced that the British possess
sions in the Eastern Mediterranean are
y,
Iraq and the whole Near Eastern en-
pire where the Union Jack has been
reigning supreme might fall under the
powerful blows of the German military
machine, despite the sea supremacy
which the British will be able to main
tain in that region.
Indications of Gas Attack.
But what is still more worriSome is the
fact that Britain herself may once more
be the main target of the German Luft-
waite in war of determination. There
are strong indications that the German
high command, which heretofore has
refrained from using poison gas may
decide that this would be the short cut
to quick German victory
This survey of the situation necessi-
tates a close examination of our own
position and a denomination of our aid
to-Britain n-short-of-wa problem 1t must
be emphasized here that nobody in
Washington considers, by the remotest
implication, a change in our determina-
.tion to aid Britain. Our policy does not
rest on any sentimental considerations
or on any lofty theology. Help to Britain,
translated into plain English, means help
to ourselves. Any attempt to reverse
such policy is considered in the highest
quarters as an ultimate fatal blow to
everything for which we have stood for
generations.
Hence, the foremost question in the
leaders minds is whether, under the
present circumstances, an attempt to
help Britain by merely ferrying supplies
across the Atlantic is sufficient, in view
of the dangers which may besiege Brit
ain in the near future.
If the dangers of a Knockout attack
were as distant as they were II months
ago, the answer would be definitely yes.
We would have time to build enough
transports to carry over the quickly in
creasing production of our factories. But
1t is more than doubtful that Hitler will
confine himself to light blows in the
course of the next month. He will at
tempt to make our help to Britain in
war materiel as difficult as possible, even
II we decide to convoy the ships.
Difference of Opinion.
President Roosevelt and his close ad-
visers believe in proceeding cautiously
and awaiting developments. A number
of younger but nevertheless responsible
men believe in taking the bull by the
horns and Transforming our present non
belligerent status into actual belligerency
come what may
The whole question revolves around
the matter of whether we shall wait for
an incident" which might give us good
cause to declare war on the axis or
whether we shall take the initiative and
declare war forthwith on the Reich with
out awaiting preteXt.
Those who want to await developments
have the following arguments in favor
Of their policy: