Evening star., 1941-02-27
Eden in Turkey

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Secretary, has arrived at Ankara, the
Turkish capital, accompanied by an
imposing military mission headed
by General Sir John Dill, chief of
Britain's imperial general staff.
Coming direct from long conferences
with General Wavell, commander of
the victorious Near Eastern Army,
the political and military heads of
the British Empire are now cloSeted
with the Turkish leaders. Obviously,
this is a meeting of great impor-
tance, from which far-reaching de-
ciSions are bound to enSue.
Without attempting to predict the
outcome, certain basic factors are
fairly clear. In the first place, Brit
ain obviously has the initiative in the
Near East and evidently is taking
the offensive in both the military
and diplomatic sense. What the
British would like is the establish
ment of a major Balkan front
which would divert large German
forces from Western Europe and
upset the Reich's economic system,
based as this is largely on Balkan
foodstuffS and raw materials.
Hitherto Britain has been unable
to do this because she could not
guarantee even her ally, Turkey,
the necessary aid to confront a
German blitzkrieg. That has enabled
the Germans to conduct strenuous
diplomatic counteroffenSive, which
has mastered Rumania, penetrated
Bulgaria and immured Yugoslavia
in a rather benevolently pro-axis
neutrality. But, no matter how
many aggressive moves this may
involve, Germany's Balkan policy
remains fundamentally a defensive
one. There may have been a time
when German strategy looked for
ward to taking the offensive in the
Near East as part of a gigantic
pincer movement with Italy on Suez.
Italys collapse in Africa has sent
that ambitious project into the dis
card, at least for the predictable
future.
These facts doubtless account for
the reluctance of Turkey and the
Balkan states Fundamentally to take
sides. They shrewdly calculate that,
by clever diplomacy, they may keep
the Near East from becoming a
major battle-ground, and they seem
to feel that nothing they might gain
from fighting even on the winning
side would compensate them for the
terrific devastation they would
suffer. This certainly explains the
reported refusal of Greece to accept
full-f1edged British aid if it would
thereby convert the conflict from a
local struggle against the Italians
into a war with Germany as well.
What is being decided at Ankara
appears to be whether British diplo-
macy can swing Turkey into line and
thus lay the foundation for Balkan
front or whether the British offen-
Sive will shift to the Western Medi-
terranean. For Britain has that
alternative. With a minimum of
help, Greece can probably hold off
the Italians, and it is unlikely that
the Germans will deliberately open
up the Balkan theater of war unless
as preventive stroke to counter a
British offensive there, for reasons
already stated. Britain has much to
gain by finishing off the Italians in
Libya, gaining a common frontier
with the French in North Africa,
and getting into position for decisive
blows at Sicily or the Italian main
land. This will be especially true if
Italian East Africa collapses before
the impending rainy season. In
that case. the large British forces
now engaged in that operation,
added to those in Libya, would con-
stitute an army of great striking
power. Where this seasoned army
shall be used depends probably on
what is being decided at Ankara
today,