Evening star., 1941-07-13

lIlllS IIlSOIiulk tIlc dh-uIlHOi tAHt
Atlantic outposts of defense. These
commands. however, are a mixture
Of regulars and selectees. No doubt
there are some National Guard
units among them, as there are in
Hawaii The important thing is
the fact that the service periods
Of many of these men will soon
terminate and under present con-
ditions they would have to be re-
placed with others. There would be
q constant stunning about OF forces
coming and going
The situation in the Pacific, which
some quarters say is far more seri-
ous than is generally supposed, may
De cited as an example, officials said.
Couldn't Use Guard Units.
The Philippines and Hawaii, our
strongest Pacific bases. are within
the territorial limits Of the United
States and are not affected by the
geographical limitations imposed on
he use of the one-year men. But
should an incident necessitate the
use of air forces in the Dutch East
Indies. without the declaration of a
national emergency by Congress,
no use could be made OF the Ma
5ional Guard squadron recently sent
to Hawaii Or for that matter. Of
any guardsmen or Selectees who
may happen to be in the Philip
pines.
But it is from the viewpoint pri-
marily of training in general and
the training of task forces" in par
ticular, that the removal of legal
restrictions is most urgently desired
by Army authorities. These restric-
tions. it was declared. only serve to
''hamstring' the building up of the
most effective forces.
At the beginning of the 1910 fs-
cal year the Regular Army was IN
process Of expanding from 174.000 to
100000 enlisted men In order to pro-
vide for the increased strength au-
thorized for the Air Corps and for
the augmentation OF the Panama
garrison.
Trained by Regulars.
Gradually these forces were in
creased until authorization was
given for total enlisted strength
for the Regular Army and National
Guard. including selectees. Of 1,4tS.-
900 by the end OF the fiscal year
194l.
There was suddenly imposed on
the Regular Army a burden to as
sumo the responsibility OF training
the new men as In World War
days.
The I'd Division at Fort Sam Hous-
ton, Tex, or the 4th Division at
Fort Benning, Ga, may be cited as
examples.
1t was necessary to build up the
divisions to full strength, and to do
that it was equally necessary to fill
up the ranks with selectees as they
arrived. But before that. the War
Department was compelled to take
from its regular divisions large seq
ments Of trained enlisted men and
non-coms to build up the nucleus of
new divisions being created. Around
this nucleus the training Of new
men would be perfected. Then, in
turn, large portion OF the seasoned
men in the division again would be
taken out to form another nucleus
in some other division.
The training OF selectees has now
been greatly advanced by the
method employed at replacement
centers, where the men are given
three months of intensive training
to mt them into permanent COM
mands without disrupting the or
dinary training Of the division.
Must Rebuild Again.
BY now the great bulk of the
selectees and the National Guards
men have become hardened by
months of steady training and
have gained the essential funda-
mentals that make up good SOL
diers. What the War Department
breads is the possibility, in the face
OF grave national emergency,
that most of these 278,000 guards
men and 597 900 selectees might be
withdrawn by reason of the termi-
nation OF their one year OF service.
The situation smacks somewhat
of the plight of many commands
under the Union Army during the
Civil War, when short-time volun-
teers simply packed up and went
home-in some cases on the eve OF
battle.
Without an extension of the years
period Of service the general staff
would be forced to sit and watch
large proportion of its now rea-
sonably well-trained Army melt
away before their eyes.
Then would begin again the tor
tuous effort to build up . new force
from scratch.