Evening star., 1941-11-16


tween the conflicting powers in the
Pacific are about 10 to l, the highest
American authorities believe, but the
prevailing opinion in Washington is that
conflict with Japan is not likely to
occur in the immediate future.
Jepan's special envoy, Saburo Kurusu,
who is bearing a set of questions-not
proposals-to be submitted to the Amer
lean Government as a last effort of the
Nipponese government to reach a settle
ment in the Pacific, will be accorded all
the consideration due an emissary of
Emperor Hirohito
Kurusus questions will be answered
with utmost frankness and a genuine
desire to maintain friendship between
the two foremost powers in the Pacific.
But there is grave doubt in the minds
OF American policy-makers that they will
be able to satisfy the Nipponese govern
ment.
The present naval strength of the
United States in the Pacific is about
equal to that of the japanese. The COM
bined power of American. British and
Dutch naval forces in the Pacific is
somewhat superior to Japan's. Wash
ington and Toxic are fully aware of the
strength and potentialities of each coun-
try, but Japan, from considerations of
long-range policy, is more keenly inter-
ested in peaceful than forceful solution
of its differences with the United States.
Japan has strong nuisance possibilities
for the United States. She can be
severe headache to this country al
moment when we wish to deploy all our
forces in the battle against Hitler. The
Japanese know that as long as they are
even a silent partner of the Axis the
United States will not be able to with
draw destroyers or submarines from the
Pacific to strengthen the Atlantic fleet.
Willing to Make Concessions.
The japanese also know that for the
time being the United States can carry
on the battle of the Atlantic with the
vessels at its disposal. American losses
In that struggle can be replaced by
stepping up production of Navy yards
on the Atlantic Coast. OF course, no one
knows how severe those losses may be
in the next few months. If the number
Of German submarines operating in the
Atlantic is as large as some naval experts
believe, it is bare possibility that the
output of the Atlantic Coast yards may
not compensate for the losses. In such
q case the United States will be COM
PEELED to slow down conveying or re-
move from the Pacific a number Of
fighting ships.
This is where the japanese come into
the picture as nuisance. No American
admiral in command of forces between
land would want to weaken his fleet
while the Japanese increase theirs
In order to avoid such an unpleasant
situation and also for the sake of pre-
serving at least one peace area in the
world the administration is willing to
make some concessions to Japan. For
instance, in spite of the Stimson doctrine
by force-this Government would be
willing TO recognize the japanese puppet
state of Manchukuo. 1t might 60 even
further and recognize certain Japanese
spheres of influence along the coast of
China and would be willing, in exchange
for definite peace commitment by the
japanese governmental commitment
which, in effect, would be abandonment
OF the Axis-to recognize Japan's inter-
ests in Indo-China, provided some sort
of arrangement could be reached after
the war between the French and Jap
anese governments
Not Mere Paper Program.
Some japanese naval leaders are con-
hdent that the Japanese fleet can win
an initial victory over the American
Pacific feet if old-style battle formation
and tactics are adhered to- But what will
happen afterWard? The japanese gov
eminent knows full we'll that our Navy
yards on the West Coast can replace our
eventual losses, they also know that the
building program which calls for twice
the number Of Japanese battleships,
cruisers, submarines and destroyers is
not mere paper" program, and that it
can be translated into sea-going ships
and will be if it is necessary for Ameri-
can national defense
What will happen if the American fleet
avoids old-style battle methods-like
those Of Jutland-and confines itself to
destruction of Japans commerce and an