Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1941-12-13
Inquiry Urged
For BIunders
In Far East
johnson Insists Morale
Would Be Bolstered
BY HUGH s. JOHNSON

TIE ar anu the coiiiihehld-
= tors olumns are being
taken up either with explana-
tons of why some cryptic words
of theirs did not foresee the
Japanese assault on Pearl Har-
Dor and Northern Luzon, or why
clearer words did not.
AS far as my observations
went, words of neither variety
went far in either direction. This
is not hard TO understand. The
northern tip of Luzon, while
closest to japanese possessions.
is not the military stronghold OF
the Philippines.
1t is true that the Cagyan
Valley is a beautiful agricultural
area and that, for those who like
Manila tobacco. il raises what is
the equivalent of the best Havana
to the taste of the western world.
But this is not a war over
superfine wrappers and filters
for cigars. The real citadel Of
those islands is Manila Bay with
its Gibraltar of Corregidor and
its strong thanking works of
Cavite and Olongapo.
To take these works would be
harder than a seige. They could
not be captured without great
losses.
TURNING to Pearl Harbor. il
l. is probably the strongest
naval and air base in the Pacific.
If the attack there had been
with any intention of subduing
II by force, it is incredible that
a large naval and air fleet should
not have been sent.
The operation was successful
In its destructiveness, but ii
appears to have done little per-
manently 10 weaken our central
base in the Pacific.
Putting these two considera-
tions together it seems certain
that, in addition TO the harm
intended to vessels afloat, the
objects were two:
1-Destruction OF ships and
L planes.
"a diversion of our Atlantic
- feet plus perhaps the
British Pacific feet to cover
some greater naval effort and
objective, as for example, the
ambitious attack on Malaga.
Whether such was the pur-
pose or not, ii was the effect,
as the disastrous naval action of
Malaga clearly showed.
THESE post-mortems do little
l. good in appraising the
strategy in the Pacific but they
add a good deal of weight. I
think. TO the analysis made here
a day or two ago which argued
that there were two blunders
made by our own command.
The lesser. probably charge
able TO some officer in relat-
lively subordinate position, was
the fact that our airplanes were
pinned to the ground, their anti
aircraft guns not ready for
action either on the ships or on
the shore and some, at least. OF
the vessels not steamed up and
ready for action.
The greater error was clearly
attributab e TO some high
element of command, and was
the more disastrous.
TT MAY be true, as this column
L itself urged. that there are
not enough facts yet upon which
10 base a judgment, but why is
il true that there arc not
enough facts on which 10 base
an inquiry?
But il is far from true that
commanders responsible for ca
tastrophes should not be held for
the cause.
Reports OF these inspections
should. of course, be withheld
until they are of no service TO
the enemy, but they certainly
should not be withheld one mo-
ment beyond the point at which
they would be Of service TO our
own troops.
MILITARY lessons are only
I'1 written in blood and only
taught by trial and error. Com
manders who lose bait G s
through recklessness or igno-
rance cannot be maintained in
command if the confidence of
the troops is TO be retained.
II is almost a military axiom
that rewards should be be-
slowed inStantaneously.
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