Evening star., 1941-11-17
(Second OF a Series.)
BY RALPH INGERSOLL.

BY RALPH INGERSOLL.
Pressure on the British govern
ment to hasten its aid to Russia was
growing stronger daily when I was
in England. 1t was showing signs
of becoming a runaway national
had encouraged it in the beginning,
but now this movement Is worrying
the men who are. running Great
Britain's war, because it threatens
to interfere with their plans for
winning it.
In what follows. I am not passing
Judgment one way or the other. I
don't feel qualified. I am simply
reporting what the British cabinet
feels.
This cabinet runs the war. 1t is
headed by Winston Churchill, a man
who for 10 years was the Tory gov
ernment's most savage, intelligent
and articulate critic. Yet, 1t re-
mains a Tory Party cabinet. Cts
representative from Labor, Ernest
Bevin. is not active in formulating
policy)
In the U. S. A. We went into this
crisis with a liberal government.
headed by the most aggressive and
successful reformer this country has
had in 80 years His severest critics
were the Republicans. His first act
in the crisis was to invite some of
his critics into his cabinet-in the
interest of national unity.
In England. the dominant party is
the Conservative (Tory) Party.
When the crisis came. the party in
power invited some of it's critics into
the government, even as here. But
these critics were not paid off with
mere cabinet jobs. The most Wig
orous of them became Prime Minis
ter and took over the party which
he had criticized for 50 long. There
is no liberal opposition to this odd
coalition. There are no left-vs fright
issues in England. There is only one
issue: how to 60 about winning the
war.
fdFauOXcal S1tuaLlOn.
1t was the Tory Party. whose
leadership Churchill inherited,
that stalled for so long about fighting
this war. Churchill belabored the
party's policies so savagely that its
leaders sought for 10 years to destroy
him. And yet, when he became
Prime Minister, he kept these leaders
in his cabinet.
1t is this paradoxical situation that
makes the British cabinet so vul-
nerable to criticism. 1t affects the
judgment of many people in Eng
land. The issues tend to become con-
fused by personalities-and they
shouldn't. Yet just because you don't
like a mans politics you have no
right to presume that his Judgment
on military matters is unsound.
I having said this, here is nv
Judgment on how the British gov
ernment plans to win the war-and
what it thinks of the id-to-Russia
movement.
The British government is wor-
ried about the aid-to- Russia move
ment because 1t threatens TO force
them into an aggressive policy a year
before they believe their country is
ready.
Like the Soviet government in
Moscow, the British government in
London sees this as war not of men
but Of machines-fundamentallya a
war of production.
The British government differs
from the Soviet government in that
1t Is optimistic about the current
situation on production, whereas
the Soviet government is still pessi-
miStic.
Pre-War Production Apathy.
Members of the British govern
ment had very little interest in pro-
duction before the war. knew moth
ing about factories or how thev
worked Their education was aca-
demic rather than scientific. Engi-
neers were queer chaps, deadly dull
to talk with.
The commonest mistake now be-
ing made in America, it seems to
me. Is in thinking of the British
government as composed OF STUPID
men. The top professional British
polltlclans are not stupid Quite
While ago they caught on to the fact
that there was great gap In their
knowledge sand experiences lack
OF understanding of the tools with
which wars are now won-and thev
have worked hard since to under
stand their problem. They have
even done business with Lord Beay-
erbrook, whom they neither like nor
trust.
Whether these men really do
understand production, I would not
know. But do know that they now
think they understand 1t. And
what they think they understand is
this:
That the time 1t takes to build
the machines to win 4 modern war
Is three years.
The first year they call the blue
print year. They think it takes .
year to make sound decisions on
what to build, to complete the design