Evening star., 1941-11-27
The Stakes in Libyu

uS StONSS i'll IIDyU
With the British offensive in Libya
going into its tenth day, it is possible
to make a tentative analysis of both
the military situation and the politi-
cal implications Of the campaign.
For it was clear from the start that
Britain's Libyan drive had political
as well as strategic ends in view.
Indeed, it is more than probable that
politics determined the strategic OBJ
jectives, up to certain point
The British government publicized
the operation from the start as "a
big-scale offensive" as it obviously
was, since it was conducted along a
l30-mile front, from the seacoast 10
the deep-desert oasis Of Giarabub.
The main thrust was delivered from
about 40 miles inland, in the form of
several mechanical spearheads in
tended to encircle the Axis forces on
the nearly i00-mile coastal strip be-
tween Halfaya Pass and Tobruk,
which was still in British hands and
could thus serve to aid the invaders
in closing the outer net Early dis
patches from Cairo indicated that
these concerted thruStS were succeed
ing, and that large portion Of the
Axis forces in North Africa was
about to be trapped, cut in segments
and annihilated On the fourth day
of the campaign, Winston Churchill
told cheering House of Commons
that the offensive, long and carefully
prepared, aimed at the destruction
of the enemy's army. The British
public was led to believe that a
knockout blow was at hand.
But week has passed since the
Prime Minister'S statement, and the
knockout has not happened A
glance at the map shows that the
Axis army is not encircled, but is
still fighting back ferociously in what,
British communicates admit is an in
decisive action. The Axis troops
are falling back slowly, fighting a
series of rearguard actions. Berlin
and Rome claim that their troops are
taking the offensive in turn. But
even if those claims are unfounded,
there seems to be no reason why the
Axis army should not be able to re-
tire from the Tobruk area toward the
prepared positions in the mountain
Gus hump" of Libya, at Ell Gazala
and beyond.
The most immediate potential
threat to Axis communications comes
from the column Of Indian troops
which has struck across the desert
from Giarabub oasis and is now about
halfway to the Gulf of Sidra, below
the Libyan hump" That would,
indeed, cut Axis communications
with the main base at distant Tripoli.
Yet this column cannot be large or
supplied with heavy artillery in
crossing almost 400 miles of almost
trackleSS desert, Furthermore, it's
progress is spotted by Axis reconnais-
sance planes and it is being continu-
ously Strafed by bombers So this
looks like a subsidiary operation.
Reports from both sides admit ex-
tremely heavy losses. The British
must win at least partial victory if
so lavish an expenditure of lives and
machines is to be militarily justified.
Anything like failure or even local
stalemate would produce serious po-
litical consequences. British public
opinion, long clamoring for action"
would experience a bad let-down
which might endanger the present
cabinet. The Russian ally certainly
would not be cheered. Vichy "col-
| laboration" with the Axis presum-
ably would be furthered, notably in
North Africa. Turkey and the Near
Eastern peoples, who are watching
the campaign intently, would take
due note. Lastly, Axis morale would
be buoyed up, especially in Italy,
where it is badly needed
Britain thus obviously has laid
heavy stakes on its Libyan venture,
and may be expected to do every
thing possible to push it through to
at least a relatively successful issue.
The odds still seem to favor such an