Evening star., 1941-05-04
BIitzkrieg Requires Offensive
As Defense, Maj. Eliot Holds
Nozi Advantage Coined by Hesitation
Of Foes to Act With Force Cited
BY MAS. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

BY MAS. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.
Now and then in the course Of
these articles I have called atten-
ton to the increased Importance
of the time factor in modern war.
Everything moves faster in these
mechanical days, particularly air
forces. There is less time to think
things over, to weigh decisions.
That applies to the corporal with
his squad. the major general with
his division, the commander in chief
of great forces-and to the people
and government of a threatened
nation.
In no era has there been more
force behind the maxim of the old
field service regulations: Even a
defective plan boldly and resolutely
carried out is better than the hesi-
tating search for the ideal" Better
and safer; for the new teChniques
of total war are most dangerous
when the aggressor has had plenty
of time, undisturbed, to make his
plans and launch his attack. The
best defense is to upset him by some
sort of vigorous offensive action be-
| fore he is all set.
Looking back over the blitzkrieg
campaigns of this war, we can see
| how true this is.
In Poland, the Germans acted in
| rr,tt al
had had plenty of time to work
out very thoroughly. They knew
exactly what they were going to do
and how, and with what forces and
against what sort of opposition.
More, they had plenty of time to
bring up their troops to their jump
off positions, to assemble supplies
we'll forward, to make every sort
of preparations; even to rehearsals
by scaffs and by units of certain
parts of the operations. While al
this was going on, they were not
disturbed by any fear Of attack:
their opponents were indulging in
wishful thinking and futile nego-
tiations.
RehearSals for Norway.
Then Norway. Here the rehearsals
the training in embarkation and dis
embarkation, in mountain warfare
in the seizure of the Norwegian
ports, was conducted for months. ir
perfect security. No one was so rude
as to drop anything more lethal
than bundle of pamphlets on Ger
many to upset the even tenor OF th'
Oberkommandos way Likewise the
fifth column arrangements were
even better than those in POLAND
because there was so much time tt
prepare. and the Polish experience
on which to draw.
The plan worked perfectly-ane
little wonder. AS to supplies, there
we're even supplies secretly stored II
Norway itself, especially in the Mar
vik region, in anticipation of the ar
rival of the German troops. M
wonder the calculations which som,
of us made, based on former expert
ence with logistic', went awry.
Followed Immediately the applica
ton of all these methods on /;
larger scale. While the plannini
for Norway had been in progress
indeed as far back as the Polisi
War, plans had also been in hant
for the invasion of the low countrie
and France. 1t was perfectly clea
to the Germans that they need hav'
no fear of an allied offensive, eitheI
ground or aerial. They could plar
their own move to the day and hour
with no anxiety as to the upsettini
of their schemes by sudden alliet
surprise counter move.
The French sat snug behind thei
Maginot Line, the British were to-
few to attack if they had wished
and the Belgians and the Dutcl
were indulging in the customar,
wishful thinking which seems t.
include the theory that even to con
suit together in face of common
danger is "prOyOcatiOn" to b