Evening star., 1941-10-18
Invasion Lesson

Invasion Lesson
Lord Gort's official account of the
Inflated British expedition to Flan-
ders, which ended in the miracle Of
Dunkerque," contains much food for
thought by those, in Britain and
elsewhere, who have been clamoring
for an immediate invasion of the
continent by allied forces. The story
cleaned from the British COM
mander's report to the War Office is
one of woefully unprepared, poorly
equipped and badly co-ordinated
allied armies pitted against an ex-
pertly trained, fast-moving, hard
hitting mechanical military machine
! that was quick to sense and to exploit
every weakness of its adversaries.
The Gort report gives some tragic
details regarding the inadequacy of
materiel which handicapped British
operations. Against ten German
armored divisions, at least five of
which were directed toward British
rearward positions, the B. E. F. was
able to muster only seven divisional
cavalry regiments equipped with light
reconnaissance tanks, a regiment
of obsolete armored cars and two
battalions of infantry tanks, all but
tWenty-three of which were armed
with only one machine gun apiece.
In short, the British had just twenty
three tanks of a type capable OF
matching weight and armament with
the predominant German types.
There were no armor- piercing shells
available and there was a shortage
of almost every nature of ammuni-
ton"
The deficiency in air power was
even more appalling. The air arm
consisted of about l28 fighter planes
on May 10, 1910. when the Germans
crashed over the Netherlands and
Belgian frontiers. Three days later
there were only fifty British planes
left to oppose the powerful Nazi
Luftwaffe. BY May 81 the B. E. F.
had lost all of its airf1elds and sub
sequent aerial operations were con-
Quoted from home bases across the
/ Channel. Meanwhile, the closely
correlated German air and ground
forces were blasting their way re-
| lentleSSly through the Sedan sector
and onward to the coast, trapping
the B. E. F. and remnants of the
French First Army in a pocket at
Dunkerque.
In concise and restrained military
language, General Gort revealed
the striking contrast between the
smoothly functioning central leader
ship of the German blitzkrieg and
the confused and disorganized allied
command. Not until the Germans
were on the march did the BelgianS
give the British and French full ac-
cess to their defense plans. The
British were gravelv miSinformed as
to Belgian tank defenseS. Lord Gort
was under orders, of the French high
command, but he told of occasions
when he was completely in the dark
as to the developing plans. One of
Gort's orders to the British First
Armored Division was countermand-
ed by local orders" of undetermined
source. The British commander
| learned indirectly of the Belgian
surrender only an hour in advance.
There were other evidences of con-
flicting authority, fateful indecision
and laundering.
! OF course, this is all water over
the dam. But, as Lord Gort pointed
out in his report, the lesson of Flan-
ders must not be forgotten. 1t was a
lesson that teaches the vital impor-
tance Of careful preparation, of ade-
quate equipment, of efficient, inte-
grated command. And beyond these
factors, he said, is the element of
speed-"the speed with which the
enemy exploited his penetration of
the French 'front.'" the ability to
make time his servant rather than
his master" 1t is a safe assumption
that the British will take all of these
essential factors into consideration
before they risk second major land
expedition across the Channel.