Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1941-06-13

for campaigning, he ventures the
opinion that Hitler's choice OF
\ the Middle East as the theater
\ for large-scale operations indi-
Gates "the initiative -. is slip
ping from him"
Lieutenant General Brown
rigg was adjutant general Of the
British eXpeditionary force dur
ing 1939-40, is veteran OF Brit
| aims Middle East campaigns in
the last World War, and former
commandment of Britain's West
Point" the Royal Military Col
lege at Sandhurst.
BY LIEUT.. GEN. SIR DOUGLAS
BROWNRIGG, II. &. b., ID. =. D.
LONDON. June 13.-The Ger
mans, by the occupation of Crete
reduced the distance of bombing
targets in Egypt by 100 miles and
the Mediterranean has been mar
rowed for our fleet.
The Germans obtained a better
position To stage an attack on
Cyprus and thus close an encir-
cling ring around Turkey from the
European side.
They also gained the prestige
which accompanies victory.
Let all this be admitted. but let
the other side of the account be
studied, too.
AXIS AGGRESSION RETARDED
The battle of Crete was a local
and logical sequel TO the battle of
Greece. 1t was continuation of
the same retreat.
The battle Of Greece resulted
from honoring the undertaking on
the part of two allies, Greece and
Yugo SlaVia. and considerably
slowed down Axis aggression in
the Balkans.
Our war cabinet was quite
aware that the chances of success
in Greece were against us.
Mr.. Eden made this perfectly
clear in Commons weeks ago. We
can assume that the war cabinet
was equally alive TO the proba-
bility that the luftWaffe would
have an overwhelming superiority
over Crete and that the success
there was at best very profile
NAUTICAL.
Yet in both these cases they
took the risk.
Why? Because the war cabinet
and their service advisers view the
war as a whole and don't confine
their attention to what is perhaps
from the public viewpoint the
most spectacular part of a shift
ing scene.
CUMULATIVE EFFECT
Viewing the war as whole 1t
must have been apparent TO them
that delay of the ehemy'S plans
in Greece and Crete would give
Empire forces time to carry out
important moves in other parts of
the world.
They also had 10 consider the
effect of their actions on public
opinion in America. Turkey, Spain
and the Arab world. The three
weeks delay in the German plans
in Greece added to fortnight's
delay in Crete have had cumu-
lative effect.
In that month much has hap
pened.
American opinion has hardened
Romel (NaZi commander in North
Africa has been compelled to halt
in unpleasant surroundings in a
desert Summer. The Iraq revolt
has collapsed and the liquidation
of the Italian East African empire
has released valuable troops fol-
action in Egypt, and for advance
over the Palestine border into
Syria.
These are very real advantages
Our present advance into Syria
will help TO limit and curtail the
advantages gained by Hitler II
Crete.
WAIT FOR EXACT SCORE
We are given 10 understand
that the battles OF OreeCe ant
Crete have caused immense losse:
in Germany and these cannot b.
measured solely in terms OF mum
berS.
Valuable specialists have beer
. sacrificed and the destruction o
\ quantities of aerial equipment ma!
have a Gripping effect.
But we. too, have suffered, ant
4 the loss of three cruisers and fou
s destroyers cannot be lig h [ i.
\ brushed aside. Let us therefor
assume no advantage in the mat
ter of this exchange until tn
losses OF both sides can be NOR
exactly computed.
In my view the battle OF Greco
; and Crete should be looked on a
Il hankguard actions in the create
\ battle for the Suez Canal and 10
A the oil fields of Iraq and Iran.
This gallant flankguard ha
i gained time for the main body Il
4 stations of the Middle East TO g
into action for a big encounter.