Evening star., 1941-06-12
Near East Struteqies

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French-mandated Syria should be
regarded not as an isolated episode
but as an integral part of a much
larger whole-the complex and far
flung struggle between Britain and
the Axis for the Near East. Each
antagonist has well-defined plan
of campaign. In so far as these can
be understood, every successive
move in the complicated game will
reveal the pattern of strategy to
which those moves are all related.
The basic factors in the Near
Eastern situation are that the Axis
is superior in man power and air
power, while Britain is superior in
sea power. Control of the sea enables
Britain partially to offset her in
feriority in troops and planes. Never
thelesS, with the conquest of the
Balkans, the Axis acquired the stra-
tegic offensive, and this was in
tensified by the capture of Crete.
The fact that Britain has taken the
initiative, first in Iraq and now in
Syria. does not mean that the Stra-
tegic offensive has passed to its side.
Both those operations were what
military experts call offensive de-
fensives." They were undertaken to
prevent the Axis from doing some
thing, rather than first steps in a
British strategic offensive of their
own.
Of course, the true offensive, like
the plgskin in a football game, may
at any moment change sides, accord
ing to what happens. This was
vividly shown in the Libyan campaign
last autumn. At first, the Italians
had the offensive and pushed it
across the frontier into Egypt. Then
Gen. Wavell, the British commander,
sent strong accommodating force to
probe the Italian position, with
orders to retire if it ran into intense
resistance. But the probe revealed
such amazing weakness and in
efficiency that it became a strategic
offensive which nearly chased the
Italian Armies out of North Africa.
Every plan of campaign has its
minimum and maximum objectives.
In Syria, Britain aims at the very
least to forestall Axis penetration
onto the ASiatic continent. But
Britain also hopes thereby to rally
the Arab peoples to its side through
heightened prestige, stiffen the Turks
to resistance and build a solid dam
against the Axis pressure from
Southern Europe and from Libya. II
Syria is quickly occupied, this British
aim will be greatly furthered, pro-
vided the ground gained can be held
and the entire line protected from
Axis counterthrustS.
The pattern of Axis strategy is
baSically to retain the initiative,
compel the British to divide their
limited strength in troops and
planes, and keep them on the stra-
tegic defensive at all points. For
instance, it is not yet known whether
the diversion of so many British
troops into Syria may not give the
reinforced German-Italian Army
in Libya a chance to make dash
further into Egypt, which would
threaten Alexandria, Britain's vital
naval base in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean.
Furthermore, such a move might
be part of a complex series of CO.
ordinated blows by land, sea and
air, directed not only at the British
armies but also at the British fleet.
Many small German submarines,
E-boats and other light fighting
craft repeatedly are entering those
waters to supplement the still con-
siderable Italian naval forces. The
elimination of this program would
be forced evacuation of the Med
iterranean by British sea power, with
consequences to the British armies
there similar to that which occurred