Evening star., 1941-12-21
Organization Of
japanese Army
BIZ Frederic J. HdSkin.


suffer defeat, it probably would be
greater blow to the morale of the people
than If their country were taken by an
| enemy. This is because the army in
Japan is rooted in the hearts Of the peo-
| pie and from their faith it draws political
| power.
In the United States the Army Is
thought of as a separate fighting force
from that Of the Navy, and to an extent
it is, as are other units of the country's
defense strength. Japan has its military
divisions, but when the word army Is
used it means all of her fighting forces.
1t is the fighting services which have
written Japanese history in the past 10
years. Manchukuo was the creation Of
the Japanese army and the navy willed
the abrogation of the Washington treaty.
The public encouraged by the press. &C.
claimed each of these actions 1t is not
supposed that some IS, ,0O000 people were
of one accord, but it is undeniable that
not one of them opened his mouth in
opposition.
The fighting forces in Japan are en-
trenched in the nations constitution in
manner not peculiar to any other
country. The legal weapons granted by
the constitution enable the army and
navy to terminate the existence or pre-
vent the formation Of any internal gov.
ernment of which they may disapprove.
This power has been used on two occa-
sions during Japans cabinet government.
This legal authority imbedded in
JapanS constitution relating to the army
and navy is simple. An imperial regu-
! lation provides that only lieutenant
general or a vice admiral can serve as
minister of war or marine. Thus, an
administration cannot be formed with
out the consent of the higher naval and
military authorities and can be broken
up by resignation of the war and navy
ministers if that consent is withdrawn.
| These weapons have also been used TO
Illustrate the will of political groups.
When the policy of the government is
not in accord with that OF the army
and navy, a compromise must be found
! or the cabinet will fall The Secretary
of War and the Secretary OF the Navy
in the United States automatically re-
| linuuish Office when the administration
under which they are serving is voted
out OF Office But this is not the case
in Japan, or at least not always 50, for
the minister of war and the minister OF
the navy can, and do, serve IN cabinets
irrespective of the politics Of the admin
istration Thus, it can be said that
Japan's fighting forces have strangle-
hold on all administrations. The war
minister is looked upon as the arrny's
agent in the cabinet, and a like thought
is attached to the presence there Of the
minister of the nary. So there is
greater control over the cabinet by
Japan's fighting forces than is the con-
troll over these by the cabinet.
Japan's constitution was written by
enlightened bureaucrats who purposely
intended to divorce the military force
from political influences. They. how
ever, did give the elected house power
to control finances and furnish 1t with
q means Of restraint on the army and
navy However, this provision has come
to test on several occasions and the OUT
come has made the provision meaning
less. About the only function the cabinet
has relating to Japan's fighting forces Is
to decide between issuing bonds or IN
machine.
theoretically at least, the supreme
command is in the hands of the emperor.
Politically and constitutionally, however,
the japanese army is deeply entrenched
and is in an impregnable position when
ever circumstances, opportunities or
waves Of sentiment impel it to carry out
a policy In reality 1t has the power to
make any government Of the country
obey.
The reason for all this might be said
to be twofold. In old Japan only the
samurai, or hereditary warrior caste, had
the right to defend and govern. But
later when conscription created class
less army, the so-called common Japa-
nese were 50 fond Of the opportunity OF
serving their country In military effort
that 1t was like giving them new free
dom In the meantime, the military
spirit In the hereditary class did not die
out.
The law which makes every man
between 20 and 49, when physically fit,
irrespective Oh SOCIAL Ccllu4llOIlS, udUiC
for military service, is the foundation OF
the armys organization. In the early
days of the new army French and Ger
man military instructors were obtained.
and German thoroughness left a deep
impress on the new military regime. Its
exalted idea of its place in the state bears
a Prussian resemblance.
Every japanese officer, whether in the
army, navy or air force, takes personal
interest in every man serving under him.
Discipline is not only instilled, but there
is built up confidence in the japanese
army which is carried into civilian life.
If, for example, in rural district some
improvement project is needed the
farmers will consult the colonel of the
nearest regiment. They go to him
because, having served in the army they
trust him and they do not trust local
political officials They know, too, that
when the army approves proposition
it is almost assured that it will come to
pass
Training of the soldiers morale is an
important part Of military education. 1t
begins the day the conscript enters the
barracks Conscripts, relatives and
friends are addressed by company COM
manders as first step. Conscripts are
told what an honor 1t is to have been
selected. Forming regiment is color