Evening star., 1941-10-19
Russian Struteoy

Ever since the start OF the Russo
German war last June, foreign mill
tary commentators, especially in
Britain and America, have question:
ed the decision of the Soviet high
command to resist the Germans
tooth and nail, giving no ground ex-
cept for local tactical reasons.
The classic Russian strategy was
that of withdrawal in face of a ma
jor invasion, Turing the enemy into
Russia's vast open spaces" weak
ening his effective fighting force by
the necessity of occupying territory
and guarding communication lines,
and finally falling upon him when
he was worn down past the danger
point. That was the winning plan
OF the Russian commanders against
Napoleon. That likewise was the
strategy of Peter the Great. Unable
to face the splendid Swedish war
machine headed by Charles XII,
Peter let his antagonist follow the
lure Of Ukranian revolt. Then,
when the Russian winter had done
its work, he crushed the reduced
Swedish Army at Poltava.
When the present war broke out,
the Russian high command sur
prised foreign critics by standing up
to the invaders and slugging it out,
even on the newly acquired political
frontiers in Bessarabia, Poland and
the Baltic States. The Russians
thereby lost heavily in first-line
troops and equipment through Ger
man encircling movements. How
ever, criticism tended to die away
when the Soviet Union revealed a
mechanical equipment vastly greater
than any foreign military men, in
cluding the Germans, had believed
possible. Only in the past few weeks
has criticism revived, when the huge
WaStage of Russian manpoWer and
materiel seems to be threatening the
SovietS with exhaustion. In modern
mechanical warfare, armies once
thoroughly involved with the enemy
cannot easily be eXtricated. The fall
Of Moscow, the vital hub of the en-
tire railway system of European
Russian, would sever feasible COM
municationS between Soviet Army
groups and render their piece meal
destruction likely. Why did not the
Russian high command earlier at
tempt to withdraw the armies, sub
stantially intact, to the line of the
middle Volga River or even to the
Urals?
1t is interesting to note that
Berlin military commentators are
now coming to the intellectual de-
| fense of their Russian antagonists.
Articles in German technical Jour-
nails point out the vast difference be-
tween the primitive, agricultural
Russia of former days and the
highly industrialized Soviet Union.
These articles assert that the Soviet
high command had to defend the
war industries in the western and
central zones of the union at almost
any cost. The strategy of retire
ment having become outmoded, a
plan of resolute resistance was the
proper one.
Where the plan was faulty, assert
these German commentators, was
not the idea itself but It's execution.
Modern mechanized warfare re-
quires the'highest degree of strategic
mastery, staff work, supply and gen.
eral coordination. The Russian
| commanders, many of them German
educated, understood the Wehr-
macht's recipe for victory" but
could not carry it out properly. BY
the lavish use of men and materiel,
regardless of losses, the Russian high
command made splendid showing
and inflicted admittedly high losses
on the invaders, but they are now
paying the penalty of their tactical
mistakes.
| Such is 1e German thesis The