The people's voice., 1941-07-30
By HENRY STEPHENSON
In the American Guardian

Premier Churchill's broadcast ar
, nouncing the decision to co-operat
with the Soviet Union was one o
the most mastery strokes of all hi
political acts. 1t accomplished hi
design-to forestall and swing owe
those die-hard elements in Britain an,
the United States which might de
Imand a cessation of the wrong war
now that the right one had begun
The conditioning factors underlyini
this dramatic change in British policy
were few, simple and decisive:
1. Britain's rulers had had a severe
shock They faced, even more acute
ly than after the fall of France, the
imminent possibility of a broker
back" at Suez or even the loss of theil
main base, Britain itself;
2. They were beginning to realize
I-or some sections of them were
that Britain's economic organization
was unsuited to total war, was not
comparable in immediate strength
with the nazi war machine, and was
| tagging far behind in certain import
ant respects;
8. The invasion of Soviet Russia
offered them a breathing space In
which to reorganize and receive added
help from America
A. There is an unquenchable hope
that these two giant powers will ex-
haust each other (the strategy of
1935-39), leaving Britain the arbiter
of Europe;
5. Relatively little practical help
can be given the Soviet Union at this
stage in any case.
Resumed An Old Policy
Mr.. Churchill has resumed his pol
icy of pre-war and pre-ministerial
vintage He was consistently the chief
advocate of the two-front alliance,
which he saw to be necessary to Brit
ish survival. But the extent of Brit
ish military help in the west could
have become problematical when the
question arose. (Today, immediate
help is practically impossible except
by air bombing, and Hitler seems to
be willing to endure that for the time
being)
Hitlers refusal to march east con-
vinced the Churchillians that the U. S.
S. R. was too strong to be trusted as
an ally: Finland and now this inva-
sion have persuaded them the risk
is worth taking Whether they will
have reason to change their view
again remains to be seen.
There are immediate advantages
from this cooperation from the point
of view of world progress and world
socialism There will be a cessation
of the worst forms of slander against
socialism and in particular the Soviet
Union. There will be heightening
of consciousness of the real issues in
the ranks of western labor. There
will be new and worldwide sound
ingboard for Soviet views and leader
ship on vital aspects of socialist strug
gle-above all on the colonial question
which is at the root of this war.
"SaIvaging" the Naz System
But there will be even greater long,
term disadvantages (and by "1ong-
term" 1 mean matter of months in
stead of days, so swiftly is history
moving).
AS the Soviet counter-offensive de-
veIops it's full power and begins to
envelop, isolate and destroy the nazi
forces, rapid disintegration will arise
in Washington and London, and the
tendency will appear to disrupt coop
Grafton with Moscow, return to the
sharpest antagonism, and stake all on
attempts to Salvage" as much of
nazi Imperialism as may be possible.
The divergent trends must be rec
ognized The first must be used, the
second fought, for if successful it will
give a further lease of life to western
European capitalism, and as the very
least might precipitate heavy civil
war and an anti-Soviet war inextrica-
bly, entangled across the loveliest and
richest lands of the Atlantic coast.
Here are indications of the latter
trend The Municheers and appeasers
of the pre-war period still dominate
the British cabinet and the city of
Their policy was based on
the hope of Nazi-Soviet clash-other-
wise it was nonsensical AS the
American broadcaster, Alistair Cooke,
said as late as June 21: "The promise
of Nazi-Soviet war was the first and
last hope of the appeasers during the
1930s."
Anti-Russian Bias Consistent
Anti-Soviet policy was continued |
even at the worst and most dangerous |
periods of the war-e.g., the plans |
for attacking through Scandinavia and |
the Caucasus, the careful fostering |
and keeping open of the Baltic states
question for use "at later date" and |
the favor shown to the Polish colo
nels' government" which was openly
at war with the U. S. S. r.
If the indirect evidence was correct
which seemed to show that Whitehall |
threw King Boris into Hitlers arms |
rather than see a Soviet-Bulgar alli-
,poo thic 10 cuffioiont oo,,, N, O n for, T.,