Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1941-05-29
Hoods Loss Teaches Lesson
U.S.. Has Avoided 'Armored Cruiser DeIuson,'
And Built Slower but Heavier Fleet

The experience Of the Hood and
Bismarck is case in point.
The Bismarck, heavily hit by shells
in her action with Hood, hit again
by a feet air arm torpedo, hit by
two more torpedoes and yet again
two more, still managed to survive
a gun duel with the Prince of Wales
during which her fire was still
dangerous and accurateD and
finally alone, her STERLING gear done
for, beset on every side, had to be
finished off by still more torpedoes.
No one could expect single battle
ship to survive all that, yet no one
could doubt what would have been
the result of feet action between.
let us say, six Bismarcks and ten
Hoods, with all the proper compo-
nents of feet strength present on
either side in equal numbers. The
hybrids of the worlds navies, like
the Hood and the Graf Spec, do not
stand the test of battle. They tend,
after the fashion of hybrids, to show
up the bad qualities of their sires
rather than the good 1t is COM
forting thought for Americans that
our naval designers have adhered.
on the whole, so firmly to the basic
principles of Mahan; have asked
themselves, What is this ship
meant to do?"
Raises Interesting Question.
We may find some interest in
endeavoring to conjecture what the
Bismarck was doing so far from
her base and with no better escort
than one heavy cruiser. The Ger
mans do not take risks of this sort
without sound reason. 1t is true
that their surface navy has been
built with view rather to COM
merce raiding than to line-of-battle
fighting. but one hesitates to ac-
cept the easy theory that IS, 900
ton battleship was abroad in an
ocean containing at least 10 British
battleships for no better purpose
than raiding such conveys as she
might chance upon. The explana-
ton lies probably in the British
communique which informs us that
two British battleships, which were
moving pieces in the remarkable
series of British combinations that
brought the Bismarck to her end,
were engaged in escorting conveys.
The Germans may have had def
mite information either as to the
Hoods whereabouts or such infor-
nation as would enable them to
anticipate bringing single British
escort battleship to action. This
would justify the risk of losing the
Bismarck. If they managed to bring
off a successful single ship action,
they would have a powerful propa-
ganda weapon with which to exert
pressure on the United States, while
depressing British morale.
The speed with which their propa-
ganda machine swung into activity
as soon as the news of the Hoods
fate was known suggests that the
Germans were ready to exploit such
a success.
The tenor of Grand Admiral
Raeder's threatening remarks shows
what result they hoped to obtain.
Unfortunately for them, the loss OF
Bismarck followed so swiftly as to
cancel out any hope of impressing
American opinion and served the
further purpose Of blanketing in the
headlines the news of the severe
British naval losses of Crete. There
Is no escaping the hard fact that
Britain lost one sixteenth of her cap
ital ship strength while Germany
lost one-fourth of hers-rather bet
ter than one-fourth, since Scharn-
horst and Gneisnau are not only
damaged but are themselves of the
fatal battle cruiser design, having
less protection than Hood. We're
good fortune to permit these two
ships presumably still in Brest I'M
der daily battering by the r. A. F.
to be Cancelled out only Tirpitz
would remain. This might well per-
NIT the detachment of heavy British
units to reinforce the Mediterranean
or the Far East. A very considerable
strategical relocation of sea power
might become possible under such
conditions.
Endorses Fleet Air Arm.
It Is to be noted, however, that
there is no certainty that the Ger
mans, with their customary energy,
have not been able to take over
some of the units of the Italian
Fleet. Damage to two British bat
tleships off Crete, the loss of two