Evening star., 1941-02-23

| dIleSt dlGdCh VII OlllSdEOICy vi CNCIl
American reinforcement of the British,
defense there would probably involve
the United States in immediate fighting.
But this danger is itself causing the
japanese to move with more caution in
the attempted extension of their new
order"
So enactment of the lease-lend bill will
not of itself bring this country closer to
actual hoStilitieS. Careful diplomacy,
and careful utilization of the enormous
powers granted, may yet avert that out
come. What must be anticipated how
ever, is much closer cooperation with
the British commonwealth of nations.
That cooperation will be with the
dominonS and crown colonies, as well
as with Great Britain alone. And its
economic and financial aspects will be
just as important, perhaps in the long
run much more important, than any
military coordination.
Churchill's Prediction.
The collaboration will take many forms,
but all of them will tend to strengthen
Winston Churchill's prediction, made six
months ago, that "the British Empire
and the United States will have to be
somewhat mixed up together in some of
their affairs" Today those words seem
understatement.
In the extension of the assistance to
Great Britain envisaged by the lease
lend bill. various governmental controls,
in shipping and other fields, will have to
be rapidly established.
Some of these, as in the case of the
New Zealand wool now stored in this
country, are already in operation. Others
will be developed as it becomes public
policy to take measures which hereto
fore have been considered almost sur
reptitiously A definite possibility now
is a new department of economic de-
fense, to align production policies more
closely with those of Great Britain, to
coordinate shipping facilities and to
provide instrumentalities of permanent
postwar cooperation.
A somewhat similar alignment of Brit
ish and American policy took place in
1918. But there are several reasons
for thinking that the coordination will
be of more enduring character this time.
During the other war the machinery
of cooperation such as the Allied Mari
time Transport Council, involved France
and Italy as we'll as Great Britain and
the United States. 1t was, therefore,
more cumbersome and more subject to
divergent national ambitions than will
ho ho Wi ho
Anglo American controls now to be ex-
pected.
Joint Policy Needed.
In the second place, there is this time
much more social necessity for planning
permanent international controls than
was the case in the last war. After the
1918 armistice Great Britain and the
United States followed wholly independ-
ent economic and financial policies. 1t
is widely believed that in the future
the currencies and the tariff policies Of
the two governments will have to be
linked and remain linked
In the third place, public opinion in
this country. thoroughly alarmed by the
threat to Britain, is now clearly receptive
to some form of permanent association
with the British Empire, while an ener-
getic minority goes so far as to urge
outright political union.
Finally, as already noted, the Presi-
dent will soon have unchallenged power
to establish forms of association which
may at the moment seem emergency,
but will, in all probability, prove to be
permanent in character. The present
method of getting the power first and
working out the plan afterwards is likely
to prove far more effective than
Woodrow Wilson'S procedure of planning
first and asking retroactive Endorsement.
1t Is an anomalous picture-this deep
ening association of a belligerent and a
non-belligerent power. Whether it will
result in the long run in the United
States pulling the British Empire out of
the war, or in the British Empire pulling
the United States in, none can at the
moment predict with any certainty.