Evening star., 1941-01-26
By A ndre MOriSe.


FrenchmanD. This was done even be-
tween the movements of symphonies
played in Munich or Berlin
1t means getting poor French prison.
ers of war to come to the microphoHe
i'll Stuttgart to tell their families in
France that the Germans were treating
them well, that they loved the French
and hated the British. and that it was
too bad 10 prolong such an absurd war.
1t means using every possible despic-
able method to undermine the nerves,
the morale and the hopes of a country
at war-it means to rot" the enemy.
Believe me. this is a lesson
There is the lesson about the fifth
column. The authentic and complete
story will be written some day A few
chapters We already know, but we still
have a great deal to learn. To US, from
the morning Of the invasion of Holland.
it was stunning, tragic, sickening revel-
alton. I know that the subject lends
itself to sensational detective story"
writing. Nevertheless. the facts are here,
ard they are more amazing than any
wild dime novel ever published.
The simple and undeniable fact is
that. for years, in Holland, Belgium
and France, and I speak only of what
I know, Germany had achieved a sys-
tematic invasion, completed war ma
chine, minutely organized to the smallest
detail, and that when the signal was
given that machine Was set in motion
The Fifth Column.
Entire regiments of Germans living in
Holland as peaceful tradesmen, tailors,
walters. owners of delicatessen stores,
boarding houses or beer parlors, who
suddenly appeared at assigned places in
uniforms with complete equipment, crews
to blow up bridges. set factories aflre,
destroy railroad connections. dynamite
canal locks. In Belgium, men to signal
bombarding airplanes. guide invading
columns, paralyZe communications. in
France, men to send fake telephone COM
munications to upset troop movements
or start hordes of refugees on the roads,
hopelessly jamming military operations,
agents to prepare billets and supplies
or to spread panic.
In Paris, remarkab BILE personalities who
presented themselves as Intellectual
exiles, writer's or artists, and succeeded
in making themselves members of the
most exclusive sets, able journalists who
for more than four years worked as ele-
vator boys in the offices of Paris-Soir, to
hand the whole organization over to the
Germans the day of their arrival. In
Vichy itself, former hotel porter who
came back as a captain to install the
Germans in the best hotels and knew
everything about the bathrooms and the
wine lists-and so on ad infinitum
The fifth column is not legend, but
deadly reality-and this is lesson.
There is the lesson of organized
sabotage.
1t can be summed up in few SEN
tences: After the monstrous (although
logicaD pact which united anti-Com-
munist Nazi-ism and anti-Nazi Com
munism, Germany used some of the
French communists as tools to hinder,
slow up or paralyze war industry in
France. The money came from Ger
many, to be paid through Soviet agencies
in Paris. Agents worked on the spot
causing a sort of invisible, steady, un-
accountable sabotage. the consequences
of which are incalculable. Here an over
loaded boiler would explode there a
machine tool would be creased with oil
mixed with an abrasive, now carload
of bolts and nuts destined to Bordeaux
would go to Toulouse, then parts for a
certain type of plane would go to a fac
tory making planes of another type.
Lack of Information.
There is the lesson about intelligence
service, a sad lesson which can be told
in nine words: We thought we knew and
we did not know. Oh yes, we had secret
service and spies and confidential infor-
nation galore; honest men working hard,
using methods they believed to be good.
Where the weakness lay, I cannot tell
because 1 do not know. But the fact
remains: We had insufficient informa-
ton, and the Germans were terribly well
informed Planes and tanks and motor
lied units were being built by Germany
in numbers infinitely greater than we
thought; we did not know, with full &C
curacy. We had in Paris that awful
feeling that nothing was done, said or
even thought that was not, in some
mysterious way, instantly received by the
German service of information.
There is the lesson about preparedness.
This is simple enough: We thought we
were ready, and we were not. We hon.
estly believed that we had "tfle best army
tn the W." and to help US entertain