Evening star., 1941-08-04

ings Institution '''"
entitled "A David Lawrence.
Short War Through American
Industrial Supremacy"
M. Marlio from 1918 to 1899 was
general manager and chairman of
the French Aluminium Co., and from
1925 to 1888 he was chairman of
the all-important international alu-
minum cartel. Because of his buSi-
ness operations he has had intimate
knowledge of industrial and en-
gineering problems in European
countries and on the academic side
has been professor of economics
In several of the leading French
institutions of learning.
Since arrival in the United States
M. Marlio has made a flrSt-hand
study of American armament pro-
duction.
His Conclusions.
His conclusions are as follows:
81. The fundamental reason for
the German victories has been the
massive and combined use of me-
caanical equipment-planes, tanks,
submarines, etc.-and the re-es-
tablishment and intenSification of
offensive tactics.
80. Thanks to the industrial po-
tentialities of the United States,
TO its methods of mass production,
to its capacity for swift plant con-
struction, this country is able to
multiply its present armament pro-
duction by three or four times in
a relatively short period.
"3. Germany is incapable of
matching such an armament effort,
In quantitative terms. This is be-
cause she has long been operating
at a peak capacity and because she
lacks both the natural resources and
the technical and mechanical means
for an immediate expansion pro-
gram of such magnitude.
q. Of equal Importance, for even
a partial matching of the American
expansion program Germany would
require one or two years more time.
Propitious Time Is Before 1914.
eve conclude, therefore, that the
propitious time for the Anglo-Amer-
lean group to win this war is in the
next two years-before the end of
1e43. During the coming II months
armament production in the United
States can be made to forge rapidly
ahead of that in Germany, thus Civ
ing the Anglo-American group the
advantage which has hitherto rested
with the Axis powers.
"The United States is thus faced
with the choice of providing the
means of winning the war in
period of short, concentrated effort
or preparing mere leiSurely for a
long war, which might perhaps eX-
tend over period of five years or
more. For short war the Ameri-
can advantages are much greater,
because Germany would not be af-
forded the opportunity to reorgan-
lie and harness the industrial and
armament potentialities of the oc-
eupied countries, including possibly
Russia"
NJ. Marlio foresees an American
program of concentration on big
battleships, great quantities of de-
stroyers, light cruisers and plane
carriers and submarines. He feels
that the construction of fast and
simple merchant ships should be
pushed to the limit. that the avia-
ton program should be tripled or
quadrupled, with emphasis on big
bombers of long range, and that
tanks of giant size be rushed to
the maximum effort of production,
along with anti-tank and anti-air-
craft guns.
Short War Cheaper.
A short war would reduce costs
In the long run and simplify many
postwar problems, in the opinion
of M. Marlio. incidentally he gives
from personal knowledge and ex-
perience an optimistic picture of the
aluminium outlook. He says that
by the fall of 1912, the Axis powers
will have an annual rate of output
of 100000 long tons as against 990-
600 long tons by the Anglo
group and he furnishes statistics
showing that even last May the
Anglo-American group was produc-
ing at the rate of $4,000 long tons
as against 100000 by the Axis pow
ers. He goes on to say, however,
that his optimistic estimate for 1912
els based on the assumption that
the necessary administrative deci-
sions with reference to the new
program will be made at the earliest
possible moment and that construc-
ton of the new plants will be pushed
at the greatest possible speed"
M. Marlio is impressed with the
swiftness of American industrial
plant building and with our ability
to mobilize resources as already
manifested. He says that based on
his travels and observations the
people of the United States do not
fully realize the extent of their in
dustrial superiority and that with
time now operating in favor of the
democracies, at least for two-year
period, there is an opportunity to
convert potentialities into actuali-
ties and bring an early end to the
war.
The pamphlet, while not saying
so in as many words, implies that
priority hardships and heavy taxes
should be borne cheerfully in the
hope that concerted effort now will
mean a short war.
fReleased by the North American