Evening star., 1941-10-30
Nozis Out to Take SevustopoI
Loss of Black SEQ Port Would Curb Red Fleet
Which Guards Seq Access to Rostov

and limiting rather strongly at in
creasing Russian confidence as to
the security of Moscow itself.
Marshal Budyenny, cavalryman
by experience and training and the
idol of the Russian horse regiments,
is reported organizing a great re-
serve army composed largely of the
25 cavalry divisions which Russia
possesses, few of which have yet been
employed in this war. A Russian
cavalry division is about 5000 strong,
all told. 1t includes three cavalry
brigades Of two regiments each, a
regiment of horse artillery, group
Of engineers, an armored car unit,
and the necessary services. The cav
airy regiments are trained and
armed for dismounted fire action
with rifles, light and heavy machine
guns, mortars and small cannon.
They are, in effect, mounted infan-
try. Under conditions which re-
strict the freedom of movement of
German tanks and motor-b borne in
fantry, Marshal Budyenny's 25 cav
airy divisions may find many op-
portunities of usefulness.
Face Cavalry Hazard.
Their theater of operations may
well be the northern Caucasian area,
north of the formidable Caucasus
Mountains. which contains the sec
ondary but valuable oil fields OF
Maikop and Grozni. 1t is hard to
see how the Germans could push
forward quickly into this area, in
severe weather, over poor roads deep
in mud and snow, with 200 900 we'll
armed cavalry hanging on their
TANKS and rear-cavalry including
many regiments OF Don, Kuban and
Terek horsemen who know the
countryside perfectly and whose
mounts. like themselves, are accus-
toned to hardship, cold and ex-
posure. Under such conditions even
the admirably organized German
supply system might break down
especially as 1t would have avail
able only the volume of supplies
which could be brought from Ger
many all the way across Southern
Russia by dirt roads or by the few
available rairoads-and these with
limited rolling stock and constantly
threatened by sabotage and guerrilla
raids.
Similar considerations apply tc
any German move northeast towarc
Stalingrad and the Volga, with .
view to cutting of the Caucasian
area from the Russian armies o.
the north and center. Here again
with the coming of winter and witt
Marshal Budyenny's cavalry, tn,
transport difficulties approach tn,
insuperable.
Crimea Push strategical.
1t is for these reasons that tn,
reported German attempt TO fore,
4 way into the Crimea Peninsula 4
Of such strategical interest. tt
purpose s. of course, to deprive tn,
Russians Of their great naval arse
nal at Sevastopol and thus to i'm
pair the efficiency and reduce tn,
radius Of action OF the Russian
Black Sea feet. This feet, opefa..
ing from Sevastopol, denies to th'
Germans any access by sea K
Rostov df and when they take ina
porD or to any other port the,
may acquire-such. for example q,
Novorossisk. Could they use sea
transport thus far, they could con-
centrate their motor and horse.
drawn trains east Of the Don, es.
tablish and maintain huge advsnc,
depots at the ports, and find theil
troubles greatly lessened.
1t Is true that the loss of Sevas.
topol would not eryail the destruc.
ton Of the Russian fleet. 1t coulc
operate from Batum, where ampl,
fuel is available. But it would no.
have adequate repair facilities fol
its larger ships in case of torpedo
or air-bomb damage, and the Ger
mans might hope. with strong ali
forces established In the Crimea