Evening star., 1941-08-24

1t was a Stockhom newspaper which
most graphically summed up the general
reaction to the Churchill Roosevelt de-
claration by comparing 1t to an iceberg,
which floats with only one-eighth of its
substance visible above the surface
The invisible part, concluded the anony-
nous Swedish editor, is in both cases
the more important.
So the Declaration of the Atlantic" is
not to be judged merely by what it says,
but also in connection with the back
ground and circumstances of its enunci-
alton And thus analyzed it may be
regarded in part as an Anglo-American
peace feeler, the more clearly so because
of President Roosevelt's subsequent de-
nial that the historic meeting has
brought the United States any closer to
active participation in the war.
The primary reason for viewing the
declaration in this light is the anticipa-
ton that Hitler will open another, and
tempting, peace offensive as soon as
military dominance over the Soviet
Union.
German control OF substantial part
of Russias vast resources, plus wide
spread reluctance to confront a third
winter of hostilities, would give much
influence to any seductive overtures
emanating from Berlin. The Churchill
Roosevelt statement of war aims was
admirably calculated to offset this po-
tential Nazi advantage and to place
German diplomacy in an inferior nego-
tiating position in advance.
The importance of the diplomatic
aspect of the statement has been amply
attested by the rapid deterioration of
Russias military position since the ac-
cord was made public on the morning
of August a.
On that very day Berlin officially an
nounced occupation of the vital IRON
mining region of Krivoi Rog and the
intervening period has seen further
serious attrition of the industrial
strength of the Soviet Union. Presum-
ably this outcome was expected as
result of information gathered by Harry
Hopkins in Moscow. There is strong
circumstantial evidence to indicate that
his report on this visit governed the
timing of the dramatic meeting in the
North Atlantic.
Differ From Wilson Program.
AS a peace program, however, the
Churchill Roosevelt statements IS less isn-
pressleeS Sthan>As,a peace fee1sFss~ Net
withstsnding the parallels dyaHns@bs-
tween it and the famous IA points laid
down by President Wilson in the last
war, the differences and not the similari-
ties are most arresting
In the first place. the IA points COM
posed definite though sketchy pro-
gram of postwar settlement. AS an
nounced by Mr.. Wilson to joint ses-
sion of Congress on January 8, 1918
they called for no punitive action against
the German government of that day.
1t is true that they foreshadowed the
acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine by France
and perhaps the loss of certain Ger
man territory to an independent Po-
land. But they were nevertheless out
lined as the basis of negotiated peace
which, if followed up, might well have
averted the present war.
For instance, point 4, dealing with
disarmament, avoided any intimation OF
dictation in this fundamental attribute
of sovereignty and merely called for:
Adequate guarantees, given and taken,
that national armaments will be reduced
to the lowest point consistent with
domestic safety" .
In sharp contrast, the eight points
of the Churchill Roosevelt declaration
assume dictated rather than negoti-
ated settlement The sixth point here
speaks of the hope" of a universally
beneficial peace after the final de-
struction of the Nazi tyranny" The
eighth point, on disarmament, asserts
that the unilateral disarmament of ag-
gressive nations-presumably Germany,
Italy and Japan-"is essential"
President Wilson, in his fourteenth
point, envisaged the League of Nations
as the organization which should achieve
reciprocal disarmament by mutual
agreement. But the Churchill Roosevelt
statement anticipates no revived aSso-