Evening star., 1941-07-27
Indo-Chinu Move Seen Failing
To Improve Jopon's Position
Problem of Communications Not Easy
For Toxic to Solve, Mai. Eliot Says

the naval base at Cavite-and even
then the island fortress of Corregi-
dor would present a problem, though
the mere retention of Corregidor
would not enable the American sub
marines and patrol aircraft to go
on operating. However, by that time
no doubt other refueling bases would
have to be established at other
points in the vast Philippine Archi-
pelago.
Line of Communications.
The real point is that in order to
develop any powerful offensive ac-
ton from their bases in Indo-China.
the Japanese must first of all secure
the line of commpnications from
the industrial centers and supply
depotS of Japan itself to those bases.
This line is insecure while Hong
Kong and Manila are in hostile
hands and while there are forces
based on those two points which can
attack japanese shipping. The only
way the japanese can overcome
these difficulties is to attack and
reduce both Hong Kong and Manila.
No doubt this could be done in time,
but it probably could not be done
before the United States Pacific
Fleet could arrive from Hawaii
However that might turn out
and there are many problems to be
considered in moving the fleet west
ward-the offensive operations of
the Japanese forces in Indo-China
would meanwhile be confined to
those made possible by the supplies
and ammunitions assembled at the
Indo-Chinese bases, and the size of
the forces themselves, together with
their equipment in the matter of
airplanes and shipping An index to
the actual intentions of the Japanese
therefore can be obtained by taking
note of the character of the military
and naval base establishments and
garrisons which they proceed to set
up in Indo- China.
If all this disturbance has been
merely a japanese trial balloon. to
try out the international wind cur
rents and perhaps serve as a distrac-
ton while making the real move
elsewhere. then we may expect to see
more nominal forces of occupation.
with supplies enough for normal
times, established at Samranh Bay
and at Cap st. Jacques.
Thailand May Be Target.
If large forces of troops, with re-
serves of ammunition. motor trans
port, gasoline and strong air sup
port are sent, it may be that the
japanese contemplate operations
against Thailand, for which, from
Saigon, fairly good road communi-
cations exist. If great extensions of
dockage facilities also are under
taken and supplies of marine fuel
oil collected, then a maritime expe-
dition with the Indo-C Chinese ports
as a base may be in the japanese
mind.
This might be directed against
Thailand, but more probably would
be either against British Malaga.
BRUSH Borneo, or some point IN the
Netherlands Indies. In case of an
attack on Thailand, the Japanese
might hope that Britain and the
United States would not interfere;
but such hopes can hardly be main
tained in view of what has happened
at the first hint of japanese move
into Southern Indo-China. In the
other cases Japan could hardly
doubt that she would face a major
war.
Therefore, everything would de-
pend. as far as her expeditionary
forces are concerned. on the amount
of supplies previously collected in
Indo-China, and the speed with
which Hong Kong and Manila could
be reduced, while the Japanese fleet