Milford chronicle., 1941-06-13

As various authorities, including
the President, have lately observed,
an American characteristic has
been to be buoyed up into clouds
Of optimism by British victories,
and to be cast down into the depths
of despair by British defeats. This,
these authorities believe, is a mis-
take. In a great war, the tide of
victory never runs one way. The
achievements must be accompanied
by the failures. And so, 1t is ar
gued, the British-Greek Yugosla-
vian debacle in the Balkans, ,sbad as
1t is, should not be exaggerated.
The decisive battle of this war is
the Battle of England and the At
lantic-Hitler may go far else
where, but until England herself
falls, he cannot win.
Looking back now on the Balkan
campaign, its seems apparent that
the British either underestimated
the German power, or overestimat-
ed the effectiveness of their allies.
1t was felt in military circles that
Yugoslavia, with the aid of her
difficult terrain, should be able to
last many weeks-she actually fell
in 13 days. and long before the end
her armies were in swift retreat,
and were cut off from each other.
1t was felt that the mountainous
country of Greece, among the Sc
verest in the world, would slow the
German mechanized advance. Yet
the German small tanks went over
mountain passes al |
most as easily as il they were trav-
cling on roads, and the Greek ar
my found that personal valor could
not compensate for the immense
the Germans possessed |
in equipment. The same thing was
true of the Anzac troops of Cen
eral Wavell's army, which were
to Greece from Africa.
Man for man, the reporters on the
scene wrote, they were far better
tina ntheir German foes. But the
greatest of courage is frail weap-
on indeed against tank.
On top of that. it is apparently
true that, again, the Germans dem
far greater efficiency
IN staff work. There was no unified
Allied command in the Balkans,
and the respective General Staffs
mad little opportunity for consulta-
ion and cooperative planning. As
usual, the German campaign was
to the last detail, and
t went OFF according to schedule
There are critics, in England as
we'll as here, who believe and say
hat the British should never have
troops to Greece-that
lefeat was foredoomed. This criti-
:ism was answered by Mr.. Churc-
ill in his worldwide talk of April |
n. He said that one of the greatest
strengths of Britain lies in the ad-
and respect she has gained
n the United States and elsewhere,
ind that If she had let her allies
lown, after encouraging them to
light and pledging aid, much of that
'egard would have been lost. There
vas, in other words, great ques-
ion of national honor involved, in
he British governments view. And
10 the desperate gamble was taken.
What achievements we may next
ixpect of Hitler remain to be seen.
n his talk, Mr.. Churchill was not
anguine about the Immediate fu-
ure-he intimated that the Axis
nay dominate the Black and Cas-
'ian Seas, may Overrun Turkey,
nd seize or otherwise obtain the
.reat wheat and oil lands of the So
let Union. He pointed out that
seneral Wavelrs African forces,
which chased the Italians out of
,ibya, and have since suffered re-
erses from strong German detach-
nents, were smaller than most real
men, with relatively L
title mechanized equipment How
ver, Britain does have great forces
n Egypt, and the Germans should
md the going far harder there.
In the meantime, it was great
ay for Britain when President 3
Roosevelt decided to extend Ameri-
an naval and air patrols as far as n
and said that lurking
and raiders, when
potted, would be reported to mer-
hant ships. This means that Brit
in will have to patrol great deal
ess of the Atlantic, and can con-
entrate her none-too-numerous
avail forces in the areas where
ley are most vitality needed. The
)ss Of shipping, after all, is far
lore dangerous to Britain's ulti-
late hopes than is the loss of To-
al campaigns in Europe or Africa. H
or, if Hitler can isolate Britain q
rom the New World, and shut off =
ne war materials and the food she :
lust have to survive and fight, he
ill win the war II is in the At a