Evening star., 1941-08-05
British Offensive Possibilities
Finland, Norway and French Coast All Offer
Problems; Mediterranean Area Held Best Bet

cut In the vicinity Of Petrosavodsk,
which no British expeditionary force
in the far north would be able to
prevent.
Political Barriers, Too.
The political and psychological
barriers to British attack on Fin
land are considerable, and might
have American repercussions; such
a move would be ammunition for
isolationist guns at moment when
those guns are running rather short
Of ammunition.
1t is. Of course. possible that the
real purpose of such British move
might be the recovery of substan-
tial portions of Norway, perhaps
aided by an internal movement of
some kind; in that case its effect
on the Russian campaign would be
diversionary rather than of direct
assistance. But the moral gain from
Britain. if the enterprise were to
prove successful, would be very great.
AS to British attacks on other
portions of the coast opposite the
island Of Great Britain, again con-
siderations Of shipping apply. Nor
way seems the more likely location
for such thrusts, because 1t is the
most difficult part Of the coast for
the Germans to reinforce, as well
as because there is always the pos
sibility that success might lie in
Sweden, especially If the attack
came at a time when the German
difficulties in Russia were increasing
rather than decreasing.
Raids on Coast.
As to raids on the coast for the
purpose Of creating confusion and Of
doing material damage to such OBJ
jectives as harbor works, oil storage,
railway terminals, shipping and the
like, there is this to be said: That
a skilled party Of engineer troops
provided with proper demolition
equipment and plenty of explosives
can do far more damage, If given
undisturbed possession for a few
hours of an area containing large
material objectives, than can almost
any amount of air bombardment;
especially if they have carefully re-
hearsed the operation on dummy
reproductions of the area to be
attacked.
However, there is always to be
considered the weighing of risk
against advantage; a staff consider
ing such enterprises must always
ask itself whether the damage rea-
sonably to be expected to enemy
works will offset the losses of skilled
men, weapons and equipment which
may also reasonably be expected.
A Major British Landing.
A major British landing in France,
say for the purpose of cutting of
the peninsula of Brittany and the
naval and air base at Brest, would
be Of enormous advantage were it
successful; but 1t can hardly have
been possible to prepare the plans
for such an enterprise. assemble the
shipping and troops since the Rus
sian war began to show signs of
affording the opportunity.
There is, however, a third area in
which British offensive operations
are possible, and if one were guess
ing on the basis Of existing proba-
bilities as they may now be per-
ceived through the fog of war"
one would be inclined to the view
that the Mediterranean affords the
most attractive field for a British
attack on the Axis at the present
time.
There are, indeed, not wanting
signs of activity in that region. Brit
ish submarines and aircraft are
busy; vigorous attack on the
Cretan airdromes has been followed
by raids on Sicily; Malta has just |
been heavily reinforced; the garri-