Evening star., 1941-12-14

to the commonwealth'S defenSes. Why
bother, since they won't be our islands
after 1916? was one opinion. Defending
them will only drag us into war with
Japan, said others. They can't be sue
cessfully defended anyway, q number Of
experts eontended.
But the tide turned in the past couple
Of years, when the worldwide Fascist
intentions became obvious. During that
time the Philippines defenses have been
greatly strengthened. The common
wealth itself began in 1885 to create an
army, commissioning 1t. Gen. Douglas
Macarthur, then retired, to direct the
job.
At the wars start, this army consisted
OF about 10000 men and 10000 trained
reserves. The commonwealth also has
considerable air force and fleet Of
small, fast torpedo boats which can
destroy a much larger enemy in opera
tions close to shore.
In addition, the American land, air and
sea forces there have been greatly aug
mented. The President gave Gen. Mac
Arthur control of both the American
and native military forces when last
summer he appointed him commander
of the United States armed forces in
the Far East.
Bulwark of the Philippines
Macarthur expressed the opinion
short time ago that it would take
lone and one-half million men, 0,OOO,-
600 900, tremendous casualties and three
years time successfully to invade the
Philippines" Admiral William D. Leahy,
Ambassador to France, also has con-
tended that the islands can be Success
fully defended.
The weak points OF the Philippines
are that their 1882 islands have 10,850
miles of coast line; that they are within
striking distance OF the Japanese Fleet
and Of land-baSed bombers; and that
they lie behind the Japanese mandate
islands, from whose submarine, small
craft and airplane bases communication
lines might be severed.
The japanese started the encircle-
ment Of the Philippines when they
seized Hainan Island and the spratly
Islands in 1899 and Camranh Bay last
July.
Manila, on Luzon Island, Is the strong
hold of the commonwealth, and it Is
believed capable of withstanding long
seige and frontal attack. The ap-
proach to Manila Bay, on which Cavite,
base of the Asiatic Fleet, is situated, is
IoI hu Hod jSIo
chief of which is Corregidor- deemed i'm
pregnable. Within 8 to 60 miles are
the troops at Fort William Mckinley,
Fort Stotsenburg and Fort Wint, which
guards the entrance to Subic Bay.
Several air fields and other forts are
located on Luzon Island; and ON the
southernmost large island, Mindanao, h
Fort Petit, at Zamboanga, the Amer
lean Army post most distant from ths
United States mainland.
Few Landing Points
It has been conceded by many experts
that the japanese could effect landings
on some of the islands, but until they
had occupied Luzon they would not have
achieved much. Manila would still dom1-
nate the archipelago. Even If the Japa-
nese established themselves at Davao,
home of about two thirds of the islands
$4,000 Japanese, they would be $50 miles
by air from Manila.
On Luzon, the possible landing points
are few and highway communication
between them and Manila Is limited. II
highways are blasted, invading mecfa-
nized or armored forces would have to
cross swamps jungles and rugged noun
tains. Landing operations are made
difficult by rocky cliffs, rugged shores
and high waves on the Pacific side OF
Luzon and the other islands, and reefs
and shadows keep transports far or
shore on the west. The Filipinos also
have counted heavily on guerrilla warfare
against any invader who got foothold,
and the United States had learned
through sad experience years ago that
they can be effective guerrilla fighters.
II the Philippines can be held, they
might in time become the key to offen-
sive operations against the japanese.
Only 1000 miles from Toxic, Manila lies
much nearer to the enemy capital than
either Hawaii or Singapore. Bases on the
island provide fields from which to
launch air attacks against FormOSa,