Evening star., 1941-07-22

there could be Maj. G. Fielding Eliot,
any other answer than a decided
no. Let us see just what the failure
by Congress to comply with the
Presidents S request would mean,
First, every organization Of the
Regular Army. scattered from Alas
ka to Puerto Rico and from New
foundland to the Panama Canal
Zone, would have to prepare for
progressive demObilization of its
drafted men. and for CORE
spending influx of raw recruits.
Just at a time when the SelecteeS
are really beginning to be useful
members of the unit. This means
the breaking up of squads. gun sec
tionS, flight creWS-the basic units
of the Army. on the efficiency of
which all higher echelOns depend
for carrying out their missions You
cannot have an efficient infantry
company if you do not begin by
having we'll trained, smoothly work.
ing squads; you cannot have an eff
cient battery of field artillery if
the men you have painStakingly
ment men and motor mechanics are
suddenly taken from YOU, to say
nothing Of your gun SectlonS-and
so it goes. Now the Army is Just
reaching the stage, in general, where
unit training-team tralning-iS re-
placing individual training TO large
extent. At this moment it is pro-
n l.
start all over again. Yet time is of
the essence, and having made so
excellent a start, why should We put
back the clock for precious months?
Essential to Army.
Second, We should have TO begin
the progressive demobillzation of the
units of the National Guard. These
comprise l8 Of the existing q in
fantry divisions, a great part of our
harbor defense troops, the bulk of
the anti-aircraft artillery. and many
units of corps Army ana G. H. G.
troops-au essential parts of the
military establishment. These Ma
tl0nal Guard units have benefited
greatly by the training they have
already had, but, like the expanded
Regular Army, they are Just passing
into the stage where real unit train
ing can begin, and it is difficult to
understand why they should now be
demObOllZed on the very threshold
of attaining a degree of efficiency
which active field service would
demand of them. Moreover, the
oF L.
would be grayely impaired by the
loss of so many necessary elements
of its structure. 1t is difficult TO
see how these National Guard units
could be replaced unless it is pro-
posed to raise additional National
Guard units to take their places
q long and trying process.
Third. We should have to face the
prospect of losing a great part OF
our Reserve Officers now on active
duty, who form perhaps three
fourths Of the total number of off,
GERS of the Army. The effect of
this need hardly be further de-
veloped. The Army would be de-
prlved of its platoon leaders. bat
talon staff officers, innumerable
pilots, observers and technical Off
GERS, again Just at a moment when
these young officers are becoming
really useful and getting an oppor-
tunity to show what they can do
In the field 1t is urged that there
ere many Reserve Officers who have
not been called to active duty who
could take their places; but this is
hardly the case, as the bulk of the
Reserve Officers who have not been
called up are either those who. for
lack of interest. have been placed
or the inactive Reserve list, or Off
GERS of ranks above that of captain
oho are no longer able to discharge