Evening star., 1941-01-08
Time Vital in British Aid
Eliot Sees Stepping Up Of Nozi Attempt
To StrunqIe Island by Counter Blockade

point, giving a beacon to guide the
troop carriers. A landing place
would have been previously Sc
lected; it would, Of course, be bar
ricaded, but the barricade might
be removed by parachutists or fifth-
columnists. Suppose in the first
raid, 100 troop carriers were used,
each carrying 40 fully equipped
soldiers. OF these, 200 might be
engineers with all sorts of demoli-
ton equipment. Give such men
two or three hours to work, in ac-
cordance with a detailed plan care
fully evolved before hand, and they
could do more damage to, let us
say, a great airplane factory that
would be likely to result from the
seyerest air raid.
The launching Of a series of such
raids at various points throughout
England would make it difficult for
the defenders to concentrate upon
a single point and the damage re-
Sulting might well be very great.
Similar considerations apply to a
raid on a seaport, where shipping
piers, warehouses, vessels under re-
pair or construction, shipyards and
drydocks might be the objectives of
the demolition squads.
squads.
Some Might Succeed.
In many cases, of course, the
raiders would be beaten of or wiped
out; but in others they might sue
ceed, and We may be sure that their
work would be carefully >co-ordi-
mated with series of bombing at
tackS of the usual sort. Both in
Holland and in Norway We have
seen with what savage tenacity
German troops even in small num-
bers can, with full equipment of
automatic arms, hold on to we'll
chosen positions. 1t is not too much
to say that two or three thousand
picked German infantrymen would
have at least good chance at a
given point of holding off British
attacks while their engineers were
carrying out their missions.
Raids on somewhat larger scale
might succeed in obtaining a foot
hold in Ireland. There the air.
born troops might be supplemented
by artillery and mechanical units
rushed over in fast steamers by
night. OF course, some of these
steamers would be lost on the way.
OF the original reinforcing convoy
for Oslo, only out of 10 ships
arrived safely. The point is that
the Germans are perfectly willing
TO take such risks, and there is
no assurance, in stormy weather
and IN long nights Of these lati-
tudes, that some of the ships would
not get through Doubtless British
troops from Northern Ireland could
eventually drive the invaders out.
But If Irish ports and air bases
could be held for an appreciable
time and used by the German sub
marines and aircraft, the efficiency
| of the attacks by the latter against
British shipping could, for that
time, be immeaSureably enhanced
All these possibilities have been
thought out long ago, not only by
the Germans but by the British
STATS. They are recapitulated here
in an endeavor to suggest TO Ameri-
cans that We will see rising tempo
OF German activity directed against
Great Britain, that German sue
cess in the end is not impossible,
that every sort Of means (no doubt
including some that may not have
been foreseen) will be employed
that, in short, time is Of the essence
of our policy of aid to Britain and
that while we are talking of in
creased production during this year
we must also be thinking of the
immediate necessities. II Britain
is overwhelmed by summer it will
be of little use to know that we
would have been able to save her
II We could only have gotten there
in time with sufficient help. AL
ways too little and always too late"
must cease to be the epitaphs of
free nations efforts at self defense.
The Germans have been victorious
so far very largely because they
learned so well the value of time
and Of timing. We, too, must
learn that lesson, and apply it to
present and future exigencieS.
(Copyright. 1941)