Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1941-08-22
ppeasemenf
Poor Way to
Army Morale
johnson Assails Plans
Used by u. S.
BY HUGH s. JOHNSON

written about by some as though
you could weigh il like a pound
OF sugar. OF course. il is no
such thing. 1t is an intangible.
like the love of sweethearts
or religious devotion. Nobody
knows what makes it.
Probably the principal Gle
ments are three-confidence OF
soldiers, first in the ability and
second in the justice of their
officers, and third, and just as
indispensable, a SIMILAR con-
fidence OF officers in their SOL
dierS.
Without attempting anything
like a complete survey, two out
standing examples of morale az
it's apogee are the devotion OF
Stonewall Jackson's foot
cavalry" TO "Old Jack and the
idolatry for the little corporal
of Napoleon's guard. Bonaparte's
prime maxim was that, IN war,
the moral is 10 the physical
element as three TO one.
There are other examples too
confused in the fog of distant
history and religious or other
fanatacism TO appraise. no"
could a handful of gaunt Arabs.
lightly armed. poorly equipped,
come bowling out OF Asia Minor
TO threaten every kingdom IN
western Europe and 10 suodue
most of them?
How could an obscure Tartar
chieftain. with a few savage
tribes. like Ghengis Khan, sub
iucate much of the world within
the span of single life?
TT Is now said on high author
i ity that the way 10 get mo-
rale into our new army IS 10
scare hell out Of our soldiers
and their families about the
threat 10 America and. at the
same time. TO relax the rlgors
of consumption and make brig
adler general out of an I'M
trained civilian. so that he can
act as morale officer.
Horsefeathers, odd Jack
and Napoleon had no morale
officer and neither did Mo-
hamet and Ghengis Khan. They
didn't arouse enthusiasm by
making the service easy. but by
making it hard. And. 50 far
as Napoleon and Jackson were
concerned, with a few excep-
tions by Jackson. tho soldiers
knew that they could abSo-
lutely rely on the truth and JUS
tice. however bitter, of what
their commanders did
One initial mistake. in soften
inc up our army was I'm not
making it abundantly clear 70
them. that if the national inter
est should be imperiled. they
were in for the duration Of that
peril as all the pertinent laws
clearly stated.
So what do we do now 90 cor
rect that error? We say We
are going to let some but not al
of them go after Ia To Is
months total service. We arc
going to do that on some kind oi
priority" basis that is bound &c
favor some and prejudice others
We are going TO do that with
our fingers crossed.
All of them are going back Il
a reserve, subject 10 be recalled
AT any moment. Furthermore
there is really no definite prom
Use that any Of therp can e
home at all. None can if thing,
get worse.
| IT Is true that the national in
i terest is no more imperlleC
now than IL was a year ago. Blu
il was sufficiently imperiled ther
TO justify every step that wa
taken for defense. II still is
The peril may not be any more
definite and specific. 1t IS posi-
bly, less well-defined, but this il
enough that in the presence o
a world filled with vast armed
armored. motorized, mcdaniel
modern troops. we have no sucf
adequate force.
We have done little 10 &c
them, because through blunder
in production and transfers o
modern equipment abroad. w
have not been able to trair
many of the men we now pro
pose to release-with strinJ
tied TO them. ITO increase" mo
rale through n sort Of domesti,
Softness and-I will not sa!
thickness" but appeasement
is a doubtful expedient.
These released men can't plar
their civilian lives with conf
dence. They will be CONSTANT!
on call. They have not yet beer
treated frankly and, on an
nounced plans. their release ma!
be more a matter of favor thar
of military Justice. This ma!
\ be the royal road TO morale
but. if so. it is not on any for
4 mula yet revealed in history Il
build confidence by franknes
and Justice.
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