Evening star., 1941-07-03

German general staff that they did
not possess the means for further
exploiting their position in the East
ern Mediterranean. The capture of
Crete had cost too heavily in planes
and in the picked and highly trained
air-borne troops to warrant repeti-
ton under circumstances less favor
able to success. The Iraq affair had
shown that the German political
position in the Arab world was not a
dependable asset.
In order to assure the closing OF
the Dardanelles to British warships
during the struggle with Russia, it
had been necessary to conclude a
on-aggression pact with Turkey
which. coupled with the withdrawal
of German troops from Bulgaria,
left Turkey pretty we'll freed from
immediate German pressure.
The impossibility of reinforcing
the army of Africa up to the scale
necessary for an offensive against
Egypt had been pretty we'll demon
strated: even when the Crete affair
drew off the British surface ships.
the submarines and the r. A. F.
were still on the job. And there
were no more Cretes to serve as fur
ther diversions.
Britain's Strategical Arch.
Unless British seapower could be
driven out of the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, there seemed no chance Of
getting oil supplied by this route,
nor any chance of breaking down
the so-called strategical arch of the
British Empire by the advance Of
German armies.
This strategical arch may require
some explanation. 1t is not only the
Suez Canal and the Red Sea, as a
line of communication with the Far
East; the alternate Cape route car
ries most Of the British shipping on
this run.
The importance of the Middle
East in this war is rather concerned
with the maintenance of the block
ade of Germany within the conti-
nent of Europe. with holding fast
the steel ring" with cutting of
Germany from supplies of oil, rub
ber, tin and other products.
And it is concerned with keeping
German armies out of the valley
of the Nile, the one historic route
from the Mediterranean through the
Sahara into Central Africa; and
with the defense of all the far-f1ung
British possessions around the In
dan Ocean, including India itself
Objective of Attack on Russia.
The Middle East position is in
deed the third sea gate of Europe
the other two being Gibraltar and
the British Isles-the retention OF
which by Britain is essential to con-
troll of Europe's sea communications
depriving Germany of the use OF
the sea and retaining that use fol
British military and commercial
purposes.
This third sea gate further serves
the purpose of dividing Germany
and Italy from their Axis partner
Japan, the only one of the trio
which possesses any considerable ses
power other than submarines.
Direct assault upon this sea gat,
having failed, the Germans are nov
constrained to try indirect assault
by way of Russia. Indeed, there Il
much reason to believe that tht
army has always wanted to use thi
method, and that the direct ap'
proach was tried only on the promis,
of Goering that his air force coulc
make good the African and intra.
insular lines of communication
which it proved quite unable to do
There were doubtless other con-
siderations of wider scope entering
into the decision to attack Russia
but we are here concerned only with
the attempt to break down the Brit
ish grip on the Middle East and to
obtain access to adequate supplies
of oil-both very important German