Evening star., 1941-10-30

Just drriued in Re1U York from
London. Dr.. RauSchning 1Das tor
several years special adpiser TO
the German Foreign Office and
1Uds high in the Nasi party's in
ner councils until 1885, 1uhen he
broke iUith Hitler and left Ger
many. He is the author OF "The
Voice of Destruction" and other
books exposing the Na2iS' plans
for ,Uorld conquest. .
BY DR.. HERMANN RAUSCHNING.
NEW YORK, Oct. 3O.-Hitler
cannot make a compromise peace
with Joseph Stain because Soviet
Russia's territory is to serve as the
nucleus of the Fuehrer's plan for a
German Euro-Asiatic continental
empire.
Germany has achieved one of the
goals of its Russian war. The Of
| fensive power of the Russian Army
has been broken. Hitler has OBJ
tanned "a free rear" for other under
takings. He need no longer fear
that Russia can step out with a
dangerous blow against Germany at
the climax Of new camapign in the
west or anywhere alse.
This raises the question Of
whether achievement of this mill
tary goal might not satisfy Hitler
for the moment and indicate to him
that this Is the time for another
political f1anking movement on his
part. Instead of becoming involved
in further difficult undertakings in
the East, it would seem obvious TO
conclude an armiStice with Russia
on relatively moderate terms before
the onset of winter-thus bringing
Germany into position to concen-
trate all its strength against the
single remaining enemy, Great
! Britain.
A compromise (negotiated) peace
between Germany and Russia would
have a revolutionary effect on the
international situation. Hitler's po-
litical acts usually are executed in
surprising thrusts. Such sudden
turns confuse public opinion in the
democratic countries.
Other Objective Grounds.
These surprises provide Hitler
with the means of preventing the
consolidation of any great protec-
tive front against him. But there
are other, objective grounds. that
would appear to indicate limitation
of Germany's military and political
goals in Russia. The oil of the
| Trans Caucasus is more likely to be
reached by an understanding with
Russia than by a difficult and costly
military operation. Moreover, the
German general staff is we'll aware,
from its experience in the World
War, what destructive effect on
the morale of German troops an
an-winter campaign would have.
As a group of cody calculating
realists, they know that the pre-
requisite of every lasting success
lies in the limitation of objectives.
The general staff will advise
against fantastic objectives: it will
! attempt to persuade Hitler to liQui-
date the Russian campaign the mo-
ment the desired objective has beer
reached. This objective is, so far
as the general staff is concerned
elimination of the threat represented
by increasing military might of Rus
sia. Neither more nor less than
thati The German general STATS
communicates tell the truth. Neither
Moscow nor any other territorial
gain is the motive of German mill
tary operations.
But the German general staf
does not alone determine German
policy. Therefore, it is necessary tc
examine what other motives might
have led to the German war against
Russia. The usual answers-that
Hitler had to keep his immense wal
machine busy somewhere and, since
he could not do this in Britain, hi
had to turn to Russia, or that 1t Il
National Socialist doctrine that Boil.
shevism must be annihilated-art
too superficial to explain anything
There have also been not a few
commentators who saw in the Rus
sian war Hitler's greatest mistake
and the end of the Nazi regime.
Heart Of War Series.
Actually, the German-Russian wa
is the heart of the entire German
war series. According to the German
view, all previous operations ver'
necessary preliminaries to the con
duct of this war with the hope o
decisive success. The German-Rus'
sian war was characterized to me b!
all German groups as "the onl!
really necessary war"
Should Germany succeed in com
pletely annihilating Russia and ther
organizing the immense resource
Of the European continent, the Ger
man continental empire will be IN
vincible. Any further military cam
paign will be unnecessary. German.
then will be able to limit itself to tn
defensive, and hand the initiative
over to Great Britain. Can German.
afford to do this, and when Will sh'
be able to afford to do it?
Hitler believes that with the con
quest Of Russia he will have made
continuance of the war purposeless
He reckons with the disunity OF thu
democracies, with all peoples desir'
for peace. Victory over Russia, HI
thinks, will bring time over to hi
side as an ally. He will be the ont
who can afford to wait, not th'
Allies. He will be able to attend u
the domestic" organization OF hi
continental empire.
He will not need to fight for worlt
domination any longer. He will nee
only to build up that which he ha
wrested for himself and to protec
it against external attack. Hereto
fore he has exploited both the mill
tary and political advantages Offered
by the surprise offensive. Now h
will be able to utilize the advan
tages secured by a defensive posi-
ton. He will be able to limit nimsel
to answering air attacks by occa
sional reprisal attacks. He will b
able to continue the battle of til
Atlantic. All the rest he can wal
for. He will have no further nee