Evening star., 1941-03-02

1 tration will fail to take prompt action
and far-reaching action, under the pow
ers which the lease-lend bill will grant
1t does mean that these powers will
probably be exercised more in the direc-
ton of helping Great Britain than of
taking openly aggressive action against
the axis powers. Difficult as it will be to
accomplish the first aim without risking
the second. the attempt will be made.
Anxiety for Britain Waning.
If the policy seems contradictory, the
blame must be placed on public opin-
ion which simultaneously urges aid to
Britain and preservation of peace for
the United States. The first of these de-
sireS was uppermost when entry of this
country into the war seemed highly i'm
probable. But the evidence indicates
that as the risk of war increases, the
anxiety for helping Britain wanes some
what.
A craftsmanship dependent upon public
opinion must therefore guard more care
fully against provocative action as it de-
velops vital assistance to the opponents
of the axis.
The situation has implications which
are worth considering. 1t indicates that
cooperation between the United States
and the British Empire will be less mil
1tary than economic and financial. And
this in turn indicates that the co-ordi-
nation which results from cooperation
will be of a permanent rather than a
temporary character.
A military alliance, as history shows
can be put into reverse almost over
night. Nations which fight side by side
can, with the utmost ease, become bitter
enemies, and vice versa. But the ties
OF economic and financial alliance are
more binding. And strengthening of
those ties with the British Empire, strong
as they are already, seems likely to be the
immediate and most important outcome
OF the lease-lend law, as it will shortly be.
If this appraisal is correct, one inescap-
able conclusion follows almost automati-
cally. Just as military cooperation
would operate to draw the non-belliger-
ent partner into the orbit of the belliger-
ent, so economic and financial co-opera-
ton will tend to place the belligerent
under the control of the partner remain
ing at peace, particularly if the peaceful
partner is as strong in this sphere as is
the United States.
Coordination In Pacific.
1t has been assumed, perhaps too cas-
lily, that the long-range effect of the bill
will be to pull the United States into
European quarrels, to involve this coun-
try in England's balance of power diplo-
macy and to make us guarantor of
whatever territorial settlement may
eventually evolve.
An alternative, at least as deserving
of consideration, is that the United
States may pull the British Empire out
of European quarrels. We may help to
save Britain from defeat, but in per-
forming this service may well stop short
of the military assistance without which
London can scarcely remain control
ling factor in European politics.
Such an outcome, involving also CO.
ordination of Anglo-American defense
policies in the Pacific, is one which
would appeal to the British Dominions.
For Australians and Canadians, like
Americans are much more interested in
the salvation of England than in the
political demarcation of Europe.
The outcome envisaged will be ana
thema to many, for it implies the con-
tinuation Of a favored German, though
not necessarily Nazi, position on the
continent But political reality does not
always conform to idealistic desire.
The effect of the IeaSe-lend bill, as
preliminary to closer Anglo American
cooperation, may prove alike less dis
turbing to the alarmists, and less encour-
aging to those who boast that America
is already in the war, than current dis
cusSion would lead one to believe. Presi-
dent Roosevelt, keeping his own council
on his plans, must soon reveal whether
he has this middle way in mind.