Evening star., 1941-12-15
Russiu's S Position


Since the beginning Of war in
Europe more than two years ago this
Governments policies with respect to
the conflict have been shaped in &C
cordance with what were deemed to
be the best interests Of the United
States 1t was to serve these inter
ests that the arms embargo was re-
pealed, that nifty destroyers were
traded to Britain for bases on this
side Of the Atlantic, that the various
lease-lend programs were put into
effect. The dominant consideration
underlying all of these moves was not
a pro-British sentiment, as so often
has been charged, but rather the
recognition that Hitler and the things
that he represented were inimical to
us, and that it was to our selfish ad-
vantage to bring about his defeat. II
possible, on the far side of the At
lantic rather than wait until such
time as we might have to fight him
in the Western Hemisphere.
A proper appreciation of these re-
cent facts Of American history should
make it easier for the people of the
United States to understand the at
titude of the Russian government
toward the fighting in the Far East,
war which certainly is but a phase
of the whole conflict. In many quar-
tiers here it is being urged that Rus
sia should attack Japan from Siberia,
or, at the least, that she should open
her air bases there to American
bombing squadrons. But Russia,
through her Ambassador to Wash
ington, Maxim Litvinoff, has indi-
Gated that neither of these things
will be done at this time.
Russia, like the United States, al
ways has sought to avoid war on two
fronts. Our policy of placating
Japan, which remained in effect vir-
tually up to the time of the attack
on Pearl Harbor, was designed to pre-
vent warm the Pacific while we were
giving our undivided attention to
supporting the struggle against Hit
ler. Russia, heavily engaged with the
Nazis, also has sought to avoid an
open clash with Japan, and 1t is not
surprising that she continues to re-
frain from initiating a fight on her
Siberian front.
This, it may be assumed, is policy
dictated primarily by a regard for
Russia's own interests, by the desire
to avoid anything that might divert
Russian energies from the all-im-
portant job of holding and, If possible,
smashing the German Army on the
European front. Happily, this is a
strategy which is not only best for
Russia, but which is also most ad-
vantageous from the British and
American viewpoint. We have al
ways regarded Hitler, with Germany's
great industrial power behind him,
as the principal enemy. Nothing has
occurred which requires revision
of that judgment. If the Nazis are
smashed, or rendered miitarily in
effective, Japan and Italy need give
no one serious concern. They are
the satellites which might be crushed
without causing the downfall of Hit
Ter, but If he is brought to his knees
they cease to exist as serious mill
tary threat.
For these reasons, the American
people should not pass hasty judg-
ment on Russia's refusal to make war
upon Japan. 1t is possible, of course,
that subsequent developments may
compel drastic revision of this esti-
mate OF the situation, but until such
necessity materializes there is no rea-
son to suppose that Russia will not
be making her full contribution to
the common effort by continuing to
engage the major German strength.
Our policy should not be to demand
more, but to give her every possible
assistance in the remarkable stand
that she is making.