Evening star., 1941-04-10
Balkan Adversely
Weapons, Planning and BoIdness Give Nozis
AVictoy; Allies Still Have Few Cards to PIoy

Albanian attack, perhaps to the un-
due weakening of other sectors.
The Germans seem to have been
using comparatively small forces,
and to have been operating on very
tenuous communications.
In this country they could not
hope to supplement their supplies of
gasoline, for example, from local
captures as they did to some extent
in France and the Low Countries.
They were dependent on the dumps
already assembled in Bulgaria, and
these seem to have sufficed, though
stouter resistance by the Yugo-
slavs would have made the German
position rather precarious. with
their communications under heavy
attack by the Royal Air Force.
Apparently the Yugoslavs. who
have never faced armored attack,
simply did not know how to deal
with it; they were brave enough,
but they lacked the experience that
the Greeks had gained at the ex-
pense of less formidable foe, and
used so we'll against the Germans.
The Missing Piece in the Puzzle.
The missing piece in the Balkan
puzzle is for the moment the Brit
ish expeditionary force No one
knows just where it is, or how
strong 1t is, or what the plans OF
Its commander may be- The hasty
German thrust westward toward
Albania would certainly be vul-
nerable to a British counter attack
moving north and a Yugoslav
counter-attack moving south. But
these counter-attacks, to be sue
cessful, would have to be co-ordi-
mated: indeed, they would have to
be part of a preconceived plan,
and there is no immediate evidence
that anything in the way OF military
plans has been preconcerted with
the Yugoslavs.
II the British simply stand fast
on the so-called Odessa line, south
west of Salonika, joining with what
remains Of the Greek Army for
the defense of Greece, the question
is. what becomes of the Yugoslavs?
Do they find themselves isolated,
condemned to the conduct of mere
guerilla warfare in their mountains
as long as they can hold out? 1t
is difficult to say. A double counter
attack against the long thin Ger
man thrust along the Somme Valley
seemed feasible last spring, but
it failed to come off.
British Objective.
1t would be better not to in
dulge in wishful thinking as to this
Balkan campaign. while admitting
that is not yet decided and that the
British and their allies still have
certain cards to play
AS previously pointed out, the
whole object OF the British sending
an expeditionary force to Greece
at all was in the hope Of creating
some sort of stabilized front in the
Balkans which would occupy great
deal of German attention. especially
a good part Of the German air
force, for a considerable period Of
time and thus relieve the strain
on Great Britain-still the decisive
area of this war
Merely to present the Germans
with cheap and easy victory would
be disastrous.
Could Turn on Turkey.
Unless some means can be found
for stabilizing or partly retrieving
the present situation, the Germans
will in great measure have regained
their freedom of action: IL they do
that. If they can presently turn away
from the Balkans to concentrate on
Britain, they will have won another
success of outstanding strategic i'm
portance
Or they can. IL they choose to
do so, turn in full force on Turkey.
and drive for the Dardanelles and
then for Suez: or they can, as one
school of thought holds possible,
resume their eastward march north
of the Black Sea, striking for the
Ukraine, the Don and the Caucasus.
In order to exercise any restrain
ing and diyersionary influence on
their plans, there must be a stabi-
lized Balkan front with sufncient
depth for air operations-s real
British foothold, in the modern