Browning chief. [volume] (Browning, Mont.) 1941-1953, 1941-02-28
GEN ERAL
HU0oo &.
JON N SON
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This u little more than . bunch
story but Il ID . bunch based on Q
good many circumstances al facing
in the same direction-the admin
istration's willingness to compro-
mise on amendments on the lease
lend bill that do not conflict with II
and its adamantine opposition to any
amendments that do, the nature Of
the military and naval problem in
its present phase, the opinions Of
some naval officers, the apparent de-
termination Of Mr.. Roosevelt to de-
fend the British empire wherever II
is threatened.
The bunch Is that very shortly aft
er that bill IL passed. we shall zee
one Of the most startling switches Of
American and British naval equip
ment ever yet rumored or imagined.
What is most needed to keep ocean
lanes Of supply open to beleaguered
Britain and oppose the German air
and submarine blockade are destroy
ers, cruisers and other light swift
warcraft. What is most needed II
we are to challenge japanese sea
power in the west Pacific Is battle
ships.
These latter take a long time to
build and we are not too comfortably
equipped in this category as COM
pared with Japan, especially con-
sidering distance, lack of bases and
tricky defensive naval terrain of
the Japanese Archipelago.
TraHsnn wnvao ~ o,,r l;rb%nr ,roft
for just one British battleship would
not be a very thrifty thing to do.
1t would be hard to fit it into
squadron otherwise composed Of
battleships of American design, cal
iber Of guns, fire-control and SO
forth. But getting whole squadron
of British battle wagons could be
much more effective addition to our
naval strength If our purpose is to
fight the Japanese navy.
We are turning out some honeys Of
destroyers and doing it ahead of
time. The conversion and moderni-
zation Of our old destroyers is NOV
ing very rapidly in our own and Brit
ish shipyards. The British are not
experiencing the difficulty in man.
ming our light craft that we might
have in manning theirs. But even
with our difficulties, this whole idea
Of wholesale shifts is not so
screwy, assuming always that we
have decided to gamble our posi-
ton in the Atlantic on the British
manning American ships and our 60
ing to tackle Japan in the Pacific
with Americans manning British
ships.
What we are possibly facing here
is British-American pool Of the
fighting ships of both navies. In
the lease-lend bill as it now stands in
the senate, there is no financial or
other limit whatever on the Presi-
dents power to make these shifts,
even to the whole of our navy.
LABOR AND MANAGEMENT
On more than one occasion dur
ing the World war when suggestions
were made to the late great Samuel
Gompers, that labor should have a
voice in industrial management, he
always shook his head-just as he
always shook his head at suggestions
Of labor's greater participation in
partisan politics.
His reasoning was clear and may
be fairly paraphrased thus: IF la
Dor Is party in management it par
takes in one Of the great responsible
tiles Of management, namely prof.
its. 1t is the business Of labor or
carnations to see that workers get
a fair days pay for a fair days
work. In hard times capital gets
no wages. It can afford this for
long periods of time. Labor can
not. We want neither that RESPONSE
bility nor that sacrifice"
As to close political affiliation, the
argument was that parties must
compromise on vast assortment of
issues which are not the direct con-
Germ of organized labor. That con-
Germ is always to champion the cause
of workers. It must work POLITICAL
ly but it must do so in the manner
that serves it best It is not served
best by entangling its fate with any
political faith where often the de-
mand on it may be Everything for
the good of the party" when at
times that everything may be all
to the disadvantage of labor.
That always seemed to me q very
sound philosophy for . labor leader.
Il al seems now to be in the ash
can. In the defense set-up. organ
i1ed labor, ut least insofar n Il u
renneeented nv Sidney Hfl1rnan de-.