Evening star., 1941-11-13
New Shadow for Japan
Eliot Says Arrival Of Six British Worships at
Singapore Could Check Nipponese Fleet

otherwise heavily superior and
backed by an unbreakable line of
communications and supply
AS to British naval shifts to the
Far East, these may form the sub
ject of considerable conjecture
With the completion of the King
George V. anu Prince of Wales,
Britain had l6 capital ships. Three
more were in stages of advanced
construction and all may now have
been completed, so that Britain's
total battleship strength may now
be 19 Four modern aircraft car
rierS and two older ones are known
to be in commission, and three
others may be finished by this time,
a possible total of nine At a rough
guess, it might be possible for Brit
ain to send to the Far East a force
of six battleshipS and two or three
carriers, with some cruisers and a
few deStroyers Ghe latter being very
much needed everywhere. This
would still leave three battleships
and a carrier for each end of the
Mediterranean, and from four TO
seven battleShips and from one to
four carriers for the Atlantic.
Could Cramp Japan.
A Far Eastern detachment of the
size suggested would not be able to
seek out the japanese Navy in Jap
aneSe waters and force it to battle,
but neither would the japanese
Navy dare venture into the South
China Sea to seek out and bring to
battle such a British force, in the
presence Of British and Dutch shore
based aircraft and submarines. re-
lnfOrced by American light forces
from Manila, and with the prospect
of being cut off from its base by
the American Pacific fleet.
In fact, the arrival of six British
battleshlps at Singapore would
render the japanese naval problem
in the Pacific quite hopeless. II
Japan were then subjected TO
rigorous blockade, she could keep
up her communications with the
mainland of Asia, but only in a
precarious manner and under con-
stand raids by opposing aircraft and
submarines, while her one chance
of relief from pressure that in her
present situation must quickly be-
come intolerable would be to
attempt TO bring about an action
between her main battle feet and
the American Pacific Fleet. hoping
to win and then be able to dispose
of the British afterWard. But when
a weaker feet seeks TO bring a
superior fleet to action. il must hope
to do so only under its own chosen
conditions and at its own selected
moment. For this. accurate and
thorough reconnaissance and a swift
flow OF information are required.
which in naval operation means air
craft and more aircraft However.
naval aviation is of all its depart
menls that in which the japanese
fleet is weakest as compared with
the American. and Japanese air
craft production is so small as 10 be
utterly unable to replace the losses
OF war. Hence the japanese feet
could not hope TO use opportunity
TO offset weakness indeed if it
Ventured out from its bases it could
expect only to be brought to action
under conditions considered favor
able by the American commander
IN chief, whose superior aviation
would enable him to obtain infor-
nation while denying it to the jap
aneSe, and to choose the conditions
under which he would bring about
fleet engagement
The fact is that the japanese are
caught in a trap of their own max
ing. and that neither by land nor
sea nor in the air do they have even
a glimmer of a chance of victory
if they now appeal to arms against
the preponderant forces which en-
circle them.
(Copyrght. 1871. by New York
Tribune, Inc