Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1941-07-08
Fighters Act
Differently
In This Era
Sort Of Harsh FataIism
Seen in Attitude
BY HUGH S. JOHNSON

brought about by [ n e
mechanization OF modern war
are two that are very little no.
ticed.
They are so intangible, reside
so clearly in matters OF the
mind--ways of thinking-that
it may be denied or questioned
that they exist.
After talking 10 a good many
officers-mostly young ones-I
am convinced that they do
exist.
The first is what seems to me,
after a life time as a soldier,
to be a sort of new, harsh,
fatalism, almost suicidal, in the
thinking of younger soldiers
and sailors.
There were always plenty OF
brave men.
Courage is the most common OF
human qualities.
The sgracef panic
stricken routs of history have
been in nearly every case due TO
faulty organization or I'M
trained and amateur leadership.
4 CONSPICUOUS example OF
"A this is first Manassas or
Bull Run. where raw Union
troops ran all the way back 10
Washington and raw Confeder-
ate troops were only little less
demoralized
| Yet il was exactly the same
kind of men who later, when
trained and shaken down, "
dished out some of the coolest
and most desperate. stubborn
courage and fighting in the his
tory of warfare at F'redericks-
burg, Gettysburg and Cold
| Harbor
| But the soldier Of my genera
ton expected TO take his
chance bravely, and yet some.
how not get killed. A common
boast was the bullet that VIII
snuff me out has not been
poured.
We heard OF troop leaders
tell about how many horses had
been shot under them or how
many bullet holes there were
in their clothing at the end OF
the scrap.
Belief that YOU bore a
charmed life" was considered
an excellent quality.
THE difference that I see to-
Il day, in talking 10 young Of
ficers,- is that they do expect tc
get Killed, have discounted tte
expectation long ago and dis
miss il with shrug and SO
what? I get mine What am
here for"
I don't know what has made
the change.
Maybe il is the about risk OF
submarine. air. tank or other
mechanical forms of fighting.
Maybe il is the tremendous
SCATTERING power Of modern ex-
plosives.
Maybe II is the habituation "a
risk of swift and shocking death
that all of us take daily and
hourly on automobile roads in
plotting tons OF steel and glass
and rubber at terrific speeds and
possible shock Of impact.
Whatever made the change, il
| is there.
1t is fine and brave and manly
but il certainly is bleak and
sinister outlook.
| Another change grows from
perhaps the same causes.
A very able. distinguished and
high ranking naval officer-an
oldster of course this time-said
TO me last week:
T doubt IL we are going TO see
many more surrenders of Grip
pied warships at sea or any more
such fleet actions as Trafalgar"
WHAT he meant was = that attn In
w such encounters OF small
units as occurred when the Bis
marck was destroyed, the cap
tain of a wounded ship is going
to fight her until she sinks.
National high commands seem
to demand that.
Officers and crews seem to ex-
pect and accept it.
The surrender Of so powerful
and costly a weapon is just too
much to concede TO an enemy as
long as she has an ounce Of pow
der 10 burn or OF steel TO fling at
her foes.
The conjecture about future
fleet action has something OF the
same basis,
1t is better 10 retain the fleet
as a threat. like boxers right
hand. TO use il or parts OF II
when il can be used with near
certainty of results. but not to
risk the whole of naval strength
in one grand gesture.
That risk TO the whole nation
is also too great.
This is perhaps the old doc
trine of the fleet in being" but
il seems TO have become more
generally accepted than ever be-