Detroit evening times. (Detroit, Mich) 1921-1958, 1941-02-24
By HUGH S. JOHNSON

IN A FRIENDLY debate with
L Maj. George Fielding Eliot in
Pittsburgh Saturday on war
possibilities, two of the prin-
cipal schools of so-called thought
were seen in pretty clear profile.
On a few basic guesses there
was complete agreement; that
this country is in no danger OF
invasion in the measurable fu-
ture, that Germany will not be
successful in an invasion of
England this year and that her
chance of doing it later will
probably decline, that there is
no prospect that England will
lose her mastery of the ocean
this year.
So much seems TO be a pretty
general consensus of opinion
among fairly well informed stu
dents of the problems of the war
as they affect US.
Beyond that, there is disagree
ment. Major Eliot. who is one
of the most painstaking of our
military critics, is also one of
the leaders of those who feel
that it is B our interest to keep
the war as far away from our
shores as possible"
He quotes the authorities to
the general effect that the real
line of defense of a great sea-
power lis the coastline of its
possible enemies"
LIE, THEREFORE, believes
IL that the place for our navy
at least 10 threaten is the west
coast of Europe and Africa and
the east coast of Asia and
Malaysia.
He has advocated our getting
naval bases in Africa and the
Cape Verde and Azores Islands
and extending our naval bases in
the Pacific far to the west. The
effect of all this is a practical
naval alliance or pool of naval
strength with Great Britain.
Between the two nations, as
he correctly says, is control OF
every dominating point on all
the oceans: England itself, Gil
braltar. Suez. Alden. Singapore.
Corregidor, Capetown, the Ealk-
land Islands. Panama. Honduras.
Hawaii and all the great Amer
lean bases on both coasts.
Coupled with the superiority
of the two fleets. he thinks no
land power can at length prevail.
To all this he adds, and his
adversaries agree, that England
alone could never retake on land
the German conquests in north
ern Europe; that it could be
done, If at all. with only a new
AEF of millions. which he does
not favor, and that Russia is no
great threat on the German east
flank.
ITO MOST of that, the oppos-
L ing argument is:
". h.s INV II Nht
then to be won by Britain ."
His premises leave only the
one answer and he makes it
frankly economic Strangulation
of Germanized Europe by
British blockade and batterinG
of Germany from the air, naval
Illustration of Japan in Asia and
the Indies.
The opponents say:
Economic strangulation I'M
accompanied by military attack
never yet won a war. A combina-
ton of both did beat our Con-
federacy and whip Germany in
1918. In both cases it was a
long. slow process.
In this case. without constant
military pressure requiring of
any enemy the consumption OF
tremendous quantities of scant
supplies. it would be Interim
nable and extremely doubtful Of
result.
Furthermore. since we are
undertaking 10 finance this
worldwide military. naval and
economic strategy and to be-
come not only the arsenal but
the harder banker, guardian and
good neighbor 10 half world. 1t
would work out economic ruin.
1t is another great expert
ment noble in motive" but 1t
takes in too much territory for
even our resources.
IF WE perfect our own de-
L lenses and shorten our lines,
our naval, military and air
strength will be multiplied in
comparison with a strategy of
buttering them so thin across
the whole globe. We can become
impregnable.
Half a planet is enough for
one nation to undertake to
finance and defend. The differ
ence in cost is tens of billions.
The difference in risk of war
and disaster is unreasonable.
Aid Britain? Yes. up to two
very definite limits; that IL does
not weaken our own defense.
that it does not involve us in a
worldwide war the cause OF
which we can't control. The
Eliot argument does both.
There are two proposals. You
pays your money and you takes
your choice.
Distributed by King Features synd., Inc.