Evening star., 1941-02-21


Jay 6. HAYDEN. force 1000 miles
from home would be extremely bad
strategy.
There is no doubt as to the desire
of the British government that the
United States take Singapore of IT'S
hands. This for obvious reasons.
First. every American ship 50
placed would release a British ship
for operation either in defense OF
the British Isles or in the Medi"
terranean.
Second, Australia and New Zea-
land are very nervous and public
opinion in these countries is be-
ginning to demand return of their
soldiers. now serving in Africa and
Asia. for home protection. Amert-
can assumption of the Job Of East
relieve this situation.
Good VIII Gesture. -
Third, and perhaps most import
ant of all, American occupation OF
Singapore would remove the last
vestige of doubt of American inten-
ton to fight in the event Japan at
temps to extend southwark its pres-
ent limited penetration Of Indo-
China
A substantial group in the State
Department favors at least a ges-
ture of American interest in Singa-
pore, such as sending a goodwill"
feet of few cruisers and destroy
ers TO Australia and thence 10 the
British and Dutch East Indies. The
theory advanced in support Of this
course is that it would give deflnlts
notice of American intention 10 re-
sist further Japanese southerly ag-
gression. and that nothing short Of
this is likely to hold Japan in leash.
American naval opinion on this
subject in no sense arises from fear
of Japan. From admirals to ensigns
our officers are confident of their
ability to outmaneuver and outshoot
the japanese. They are thoroughly
alive to the importance of Singa-
pore and its environs in a Far East
ern war. But they do not believe
the best way to protect Singapore
is an American occupation of it.
Even as things stand, these Amer
iCan naval experts say. Singapore is
no puShover. It's location makes II
extremely difficult of approach even
by a flrst-rate attacking fleet, and
it is powerfully manned and
equipped
Considerable Naval Strength.
Just before the outbreak Of the
European war the British feet,
based at Singapore and Hong Kong,
was given eight cruisers, one air.
craft carrier, nine destroyers, IS
submarines. and. in view Of the de-
mands elsewhere, it is improba BILE
this force has been Increased. Sup
plementing it, however, is all that
Is left of the not inconsiderable
Dutch Navy Before the war the
Dutch East Indies had a standing
army of $1,000. a navy consisting
Of two cruisers, eight destroyers
and IA submarines, and an air force
of 70 hydroplanes. To these have
been added Dutch naval and air
units driven from the Homeland
by German invasion. Australia has
six cruisers and five destroyers and
New Zealand two cruisers.
The American naval conclusion is
that while the BritiSh-Dutch forces
could not go out to meet an attack
ing japanese fleet head on. they
could put up stiff defense. possibly
doing severe damage to the Japanese
forces by submarine and air attack.
The British are known to have been
concentrating submarines at Singa-
pore and. compared with Japanese
naval aviation. the British and
Dutch East Indian air force is
formidable.
1t is approximately 1900 sailing
miles from the southern tip Of
Japan to Singapore The supply
problem of an attack over this dis
tance would be great as would the
opportunity for the British-Dutch
submarines and aiTplanes to play
hob with the japanese supply ships.
Desire for Break Doubted.
In the meantime, as the American
naval strategists conceive it, We
would be threatening if not formd-
ably attacking. the japanese main
| land. The main American Pacific
base in Hawaii is not much farther
from Japan than Japan is from
Singapore. In view of this situation,
1t is held to be inconceivable that
Japan would dare send its grand
fleet to attack Singapore.
Added to these strategic considera-
tions is the basic question of whether
Japan really is bent on provoking a
war with the United States. The
consensus of the State Departments
Far Eastern experts is that the Toxic
government. despite its vocal bellig-
erency, is doing everything in its
power to avoid break. The danger,
as these experts see it, lies in the
fact that the Japanese Army is
largely out of Tokios control and
bent on maintaining this position
of power at all costs The Japanese
naval high command, on the other
hand, always heretofore has tended
to play ball with the diplomatic and
commercial elements which now
seem to be providing the principal
opposition to war. The navy, in this