Evening star., 1941-09-18
Budyenny's Strategy Vital
Ability to Counterottoek Seen Endangered if
He Attempted to Hold Nozis at the Dnieper

the crossings to special outpost ele-
ments and local troops, he may be
able to launch successful counter
attacks against the German COL
umns. He has a long front to hold
and probably none too many troops
to hold it. He certainly sustained
severe losses in the western Ukraine,
and had to give up many troops to
hold the central front. The curve
of the Dnieper offers opportunity
to the Germans to split Budyenny's
forces into two parts: one attempt
ing to hold back the German thrust
in northeasterly direction from
Kremenchug on Poltava and Khar-
kov. the other trying to hold back an
eastward thrust from the lower
Dnieper against the Crimean COM
munications and perhaps eventually
the Don basin.
1t is in such situation, however,
that the strategical flexibility Of air
forces makes them of immense
value to the defense. The defense,
from well established bases, can
hurl the whole of its air power on
the enemy threat which is most
dangerous at the moment. The
same squadrons can one day assail
one enemy force and on the follow
ing day be launched against another
enemy force hundreds of miles
distant. Much, therefore, depends
on the amount of reserve air power
which the Russians now have in
hand. If large scale air opera
tions Of this nature do not develop,
including concentrated attacks on
the German bridgeheads and bridges.
we may assume that the Russian
air force Is at last weakening, flnd-
ing difficulties in replacing machines
and flying personnel, and perhaps
difficulties in maintenance and fuel
supply.
The same may prove true Of Rus
sian armored forces, and the
criterion will be the strength and
success of the Russian counter
attacks which should now be in
progress.
Sea Lines Vital.
AS to the Crimea itself. IT may be
doubted whether the one single
track railway line connecting the
naval port of Sevastopol with the
main Russian system Is Of vital
Importance as far as supply goes
to the defense of the great nava.
base. Probably by far the greater
part of Sevastopol's supplies come
by sea, and the Russian Black Sea
feet is still the master of the mari
time communications of that body
of water. 1t may be that the Ger
mans are planning a descent on
Sevastopol by air-borne troops, per-
haps accompanied by air attacks
with torpedo planes, as at Taranto,
or with -bombers, or BOTH on
the Russian feet within the port
itself. These operations would, in
the thorough German fashion, be
co-ordinated with land operations
coming by way of the Isthmus Of
Perekop.
But for the immediate future. the
eyes of most military observers will
be upon the German bridges across
the Dnieper, and the very consider
able possibilities opened to a Wig
orous Russian counteroffensive in
this area. If it does not develop,
there will be ground for believing
that the Russian defense is growing
weak, and further German successes,
even an advance to the Don, may
prove possible before the season
grows too unfavorable.
The main German problem, bar
ring heavy Russian counterstrokes,
will be one of supply as their lines
of communication lengthen, and for
the solution of this problem they
will probably need the use of sea-
borne transport. This would give .
clue to their present interest in the
Russian nava base, in the ports and
shipping of the Black Sea in gen.
eral. 1t is quite possible that the
Black Sea may again become a
theater of major war, as it has so
often in the past.
(Copyright, 194l, New York Tribune, Inc)