Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1941-05-28
Naval VS.. Air Power

NQNOl VS.. AIT rover
The struggle between the British
Navy and the German Luftwaffe in
the waters around Crete and the de-
struction by air and sea units of the
mighty new German battleship Bis
marck are providing students of the
future roles of air and sea weapons
p with food for a great deal of sober
thinking.
These actions are in the nature of
laboratory tests, both in confined
waters and on the vast reaches of
the high seas, of the airplane against
the surface vessel. Their results may
affect vitality future tactics of both
air and sea forces.
But for the excellent performance
of American-buil reconnaissance
and patrol airplaneS in Norwegian
and Greenland waters, under highly
adverse weather conditions, and the
subsequent effective work of carrier
borne British torpedo planes, it is
possible that the Bismarck might
have gone Scot-free to become one
of the deadliest scourges of the Brit
ish convoy lifeline the war has pro-
duced
The Nazis have claimed the de-
= struction of twenty-five British naval
vessels in the Cretan campaign, in
Guiding eleven of twelve cruisers en-
gagged. The British have admitted
q the loss of two cruisers and four de-
stroyers. Time alone can account
for the discrepant claims insofar as
the public is concerned.
That the British must have eX-
pected serious naval losses and were
willing to take the gamble of ex-
posing the Mediterranean fleet to
German air strength under most ad-
verse conditions for the surface YES
sells has been evident from the tenor
of British official comment since the
start of the Cretan campaign. $1,000
The waters around Crete are par
ticularly dangerous for naval vessels.
They are full of reefs and islands and
movements of ships are sharply re-
stricted Ships cannot resort to zig
tagging or other maneuvers to evade
commandment In such waters, they
undoubtedly had to be held to re-
duced speeds. Under such condi-
tons, they became ideal targets for
bomberS, especially since the Ger
mans benefited from undisputed
command of the air and the presence
of air power in great strength.
In this case, again, the advantage
of distance lay with the Germans.
Their air bases in Greece, Pelopon-
nesus and the Dodecanese Islands
placed even short-range planes
within effective operating distances
of Cretan waters. The British, on
the other hand, were forced to use
aircraft based in Egypt, which is be-
yond the range of the Hurricanes,
Spitfres and other types of aircraft
most urgently needed to meet the
Nazi air menace.
The lesson, if an attempt should
be made to draw one on the basis OF
the as yet incomplete and incon-
elusive evidence available, is that it
is unwise and unsafe to expose naval
vessels to Shore-based aviation at
tacks. That the British did so was a
recognition of the vital Importance
of the Cretan campaign and its re-
suits on the future of the Mediter-
ranean and the Near East. The les
sons of Crete are a confederation of
the lessons of the Norwegian cam
paign, in which sea forces first were
exposed on an important scale to
land-based aviation.
1t would be most unWise to assume
from the outcome of the Cretan bat
tie or the Bismarck incident that
sea power has been doomed by avia-
ton. At most, it may be concluded
that the lines of demarcation be-
tween the spheres of naval and air
forces are being more sharply drawn
and that the sphere of naval forces
lies beyond the effective range OF
shore-based aviation. The range of
the deadly bombers is increasing
rapidly, however, and it is with this
hard fact that the champions of sea
power must reckon now and in the
years to come.