Evening star., 1941-03-27

operations Of the Allies failed to
stem the disaster caused by the
initial blow.
Consequently, we should not be
permitted to accustom ourselves
gradually to increasing terrors, as
was the case last year, but would
have to face the sudden concen-
trated employment of all resources
the enemy can bring to bear on us.
Possibly there might be an initial
phase during which he would en-
deavor to win better bases from
which to launch his attack. Men,
tion has been made of his efforts
to draw an inner circle around the
British Isles. The outer one con-
sists OF the Channel coastal re-
gions. Belgium. Holland, France,
Norway and the Atlantic Ocean;
the inner one would be bounded by
Iceland, the Orkneys and perhaps
Ireland. We may also envisage
further preparatory action in the
creation of yet third and inmost
circle comprising parts of the Brit
ish Isles which he could contrive
to occupy.
Frequent Hitler Blunder.
But it is possible that Hitler
would dispense with all preliminary
action and launch his decisive Of
fensive in the form OF a massed
assault, with the intention of Sc
curing foothold at some point
u-I,i icI, f,,,- -
be developed.
1t would be out of place to discuss
the possibilities of success for such
an enterprise, but perhaps we might
do well to recall blunder Hitler
has repeatedly committed. On the
eve of the execution of a plan which
has been thoroughly worked out, he
has frequently thrown it over and
improvised new one on the spur
Of the moment, thus creating con-
fusion and impairing his chances
of success. The prototype of this
sination OF DollfuSS austrian Chan
cellor) in 1884. Likewise it is con-
ceiyable that impatlence and a
feeling of inner uncertainty might
cause Hitler and his generals to
make premature attack with their
main forces on the main front.
The deduction to be drawn from
these reflections is that the danger
OF an invasion is a permanent one.
1t is the deep. menacing note which
persists amid all the variations of
the minor operations in this truly
world war.
We shall find another weak point
in the fact that Hitler no longer
has the freedom of choice which
was his In 1889 and 1910. when he
executed his prearrenged plans
without obstruction by any counter
actions on the part OF his opponents.
He must change his plans continu-
ally. In all probability his attempts
to divert his opponents forces may
result in the dispersal of his own.
His forces are strained to the ut
most. but he will put a further
heavy strain on them.
Navy His Biggest Weakness.
Hitler's greatest weakness, how
ever. is his lack of navy equal to
the British one. Neither the Italian
nor the japanese Navy could make
up for this deficiency. It is highly
improbable that he will get posses
sion of the French Fleet. Conse-
quently, he faces the danger of los
ing the initiative in the course of
an invasion, even if his forces
should suffer no decisive reverse.
But in any case Hitlers plan of
campaign for this year cannot dis
play the clear, unbroken line which
characterized his military opera
tions IN l940
Let us recapitulate the action
possibilities open to Hitler:
Cd Diversion and immobilization
of enemy forces in various theaters
of war in different parts of the
world. Cutting of communication
lanes of the British Empire and oc-
cupation of important key points
(2) A peace offensive which would
enable him to disintegrate the
enemy's morale by means of effec-
tive slogans.
(3) An attack on Russia and the
establishment of continental area
in which Nazi-ism would be prac-
tlcally unassailable
"a Invasion of Britain.
OF these four, only the second and