Evening star., 1941-12-21
Victory Needs Action,
Not Useless Talk
By OUen L. Scott.

decline IN the volume OF CalK coming OUT
of Washington and for some increase in
the amount Of action. There is real
ground for encouragement in this trend,
if only it can be maintained.
Just before Japan delivered her sur
prise blow at the American Navy, the
output of words here had reached
new high There were speeches telling
how the Navy had become 50 strong
that it was ready for instant action.
There were other statements about how
this country would produce 1000 big
bombers q month, without telling that
the time for this output would be late
l943 or 1914.
High officials were going around the
country making people feel secure and
happy by telling them that production
of this or that weapon had risen by 400
or 1000 or some other per cent, but not
telling them that this output increase
came from some fantastically low base.
If, for instance, four anti-aircraft guns
had been produced in November and
sixteen in December the increase would
be 400 per cent, but still the number
would be unimpressive.
It was the same story all up and down
the line. In fact, the urge on the part of
officials to make speeches on every sub
ject and at the slightest provocation, be-
came so great that it actually tnterfered
with work. Key men In the defense
program were spending days on trains
Il;
ments when they might have been trying
to solve few of the many problems that
inundated their Offices. The suggestion
was made that If some of these men
wrote their own speeches they wouldn't
have time to do anything else, and If
they didn't. then the thought was
dropped that maybe the ghost writers
could become ghost speakers as well.
This whole situation is far from unim-
portant. The reason why is that both
in Great Britain and the United States
there has been tendency to mistake
promise for performance.
People are soothed with stories of i'm
mense production of this or that weapon
and of great preparation for this or that
enterprise. Then the battle starts and
invariably 1t is discovered that the
enemy has the edge in weapons and
preparation. There is defeat or near de-
feat, and the whole process starts over
again.
The time for speeches and talk Will
come when, on some occasion, the coun-
try has a greater concentration Of su-
perior planes and guns and tanks and
ships at the spot where the enemy is
encountered. When that happens, and
the other side is the one that is defeated,
the victory probably will speak for itself.
Until it happens, official energies prob
ably best can be spent trying to make it
happen.
1t is true that the United States, po-
tentially, is the most powerful military
and naval and air power on earth. But
potential power is not actual power un-
less it Is mobilized. The British and
French, potentially, were far more pow
erful than Germany. They possessed the
raw materials and the man power that
could have assured superiority. Yet the
British and French talked so much about
their resources and did so little to mo-
bilize those resources for war purposes
that their armies were q pushover for
Hitler.
The danger is that the United States
will develop the same sort Of over-confl-
dence. officials talk so glibly about the
battleShips and aircraft and tanks and
armies that they are going to have any
where from two to five years from now
that the country readily may think that
they are talking about what will be the
situation tomorrow or next year. The
hard fact is that the United States has
made only the barest beginning in the
task OF organizing its industry and its
man power for the difficult task Of war.
Take the matter Of merchant shipping.
There Is an immense amount Of talk
about a bridge Of ships across the Attain
tic and Pacific. Yet the real fact is that
this country's shipbuilding program Is
only now starting to turn out siZable
volume of ships and 1t will be two years,
according to present plans, before there
will be shipping space enough to trans
port and supply large army operating
overseas. That is figuring without losses.
If submarines and aircraft cut into the
available ships the task will be delayed
even further.
Or take aircraft The aviation indus
try in this country has performed mir
acle in production. Even so, due to the
head start Of Germany, it is going to be
many months before this country and
and start to gain possible superiority.
AS matter of fact. 1t has only been in
| the last few months that this Govern
| men made up its mind concerning the
type Of aircraft upon which to specialize.
The problem isn't simply one Of grinding
out airplanes but Of producing the exact
| type of aircraft that will be most useful
in gaining a particular objective in a
particular kind Of fight.
Then there's the Navy. 1t is true that
the Navy is far along with its program
of expansion. But it also is true that
the Navy permitted Japan to get the
| lump on it in production of aircraft car
riers which are turning out to be highly
important in sea warfare. The Navy
was badly hurt at Pearl Harbor and it
now faces the task of development along
lines that will assure 1t dominance IN
the air over the sea as well as on the
surface Of the sea. That end can't be
achieved by talk about the power In the
punch that the present fleet could de-
liver in an old-fashioned type Of sea