Browning chief. [volume] (Browning, Mont.) 1941-1953, 1941-03-07
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49, Ess~u nn,s.s.
Warrington, D. C.
WAR POSSIBILITIES

Washington, d. C.
WAR POSSIBILITIES
In a friendly debate with Major
George Fielding Eliot on war posi-
bilities, two of the principal schools
of so-called thought were seen in
pretty clear profile.
On few basic guesses there was
complete agreement; that this coun-
try is in no danger of invasion in
the measurable future, that Ger
many will not be successful in an in
vasion of England this year and that
her chance of doing it later will
probably decline, that there is no
prospect that England will lose her
mastery of the ocean this year.
So much seems to be pretty gen.
eral consensus of opinion among
fairly well informed students of the
problems of war as they affect US.
Beyond that, there is disagree
ment. Major Eliot, who is one of
the most painstaking of our military
critics, is also one of the leaders of
those who feel that it is to our inter-
est to keep the war as far away
from our shores as possible" He
quotes the authorities to the general
effect that the real line of defense
of a great sea-power sis the coast
line of its possible enemies"
Between the two nations, as he
correctly says, is control of every
dominating point on all the oceans;
England itself, Gibraltar, Suez,
Alden. Singapore, Corregidor, Cape
town, the Falkland islands, Pana-
ma, Honduras, Hawaii and all the
great American bases on both
coasts. Coupled with the superior
ity of the two fleets, he thinks no
land power can at length prevail.
To all this he adds, and his adver-
saries agree, that England alone
could never retake on land, the Ger
man conquests in northern Europe;
that it could be done, if at all, only
with new A.E.F. of millions, which
he does not favor, and that Russia
is no great threat on the German
east flank.
To most of that, the opposing argu-
ment is: ok, but how is the war
then to be won by Britain" His
premises leave only the one answer
and he makes it frankly-economic
strangulation of Germanized Europe
by British blockade and battering
of Germany from the air, naval
Illustration of Japan in Asia and
the Indies.
The opponents say: Economic
strangulation unaccompanied by
military attack never yet won
war. A combination of both did beat
our Confederacy and whip Germany
in 1918. In both cases it was long
slow process. In this case, without
constant military pressure requiring
of any enemy the consumption of
tremendous quantities of scant sup
plies, it would be interminable and
extremely doubtful of result. Fur
thermore, since we are undertaking
to finance this worldwide military,
naval and economic strategy and to
become not only the arsenal but the
larder, banker, guardian and good
neighbor to half world, it would
work our economic ruin. 1t is an
other great experiment noble in
motive" but it takes in too much
territory for even our resources.
IF we perfect our own defenses
and shorten our lines, our naval,
military and air strength will be
multiplied in comparison with
strategy of buttering them thin so
across the whole globe. We can be-
come impregnable. Half a planet
is enough for one nation to undertake
to finance and defend. The differ
ence in cost is tens of billions. The
difference in risk of war and dis
aster is unreasonable Aid Brit
ain? Yes, up to two very definite
limits: That it does not weaken our
own defense, that it does not involve
us in a worldwide war the cause
of which we can't control. The Eliot
argument does BOTH"
There are two proposals. "You
pays your money and you takes your
choice"