Evening star., 1941-08-10
Army Needs Soldiers
as Well as Machines
Bu O1Uen L. Scott.

DldC6 III II lOl lIlC
man. After what happened in France
| slightly more than one year ago many
| experts and many members OF Congress
| concluded that the soldier who fought
on foot was a relic of the past.
| Now they are not so sure. The famed
German tank-plane team had its trou-
bles all over Russia. Earlier, it had not
| done all that was expected of it in North
| Africa Then, as the real story of what
| happened in France begins to unfold,
| some further doubt is cast on the idea
| that the tank with plane support is the
answer to every problem of warfare.
1t should be said that the Chief of
| Staff of the United States Army, Gen.
George C. Marshall, always has had
healthy respect for mechanization and
motorization as basic developments un-
derlying the building of a new Army.
But Gen. Marshall hasn't gone along
with those who concluded that the ex-
perience in France removed the need
for infantrymen who could march and
fight on foot or for weapons and vehi-
cles that are drawn by horses or for ar
tillery of classic mold.
Now the Infantry Journal, publica-
ton that is semi-official comes forward
with the first story of the experience
of a German panzer division in France
From that experience the Infantry
Journal draws some morals that un-
doubtedly are getting attention from
those who are shaping this country's
Army.
The story, which is told in detail in
the August issue of the infantry maga-
zine, concerns the 1st Panzer Division
and the 1st and I'd Tank Brigades in
that division. The period covered is
from May 10 to May II, 1910, as this
division led the assault that fianked
the Maginot Line and then drove deep
into Belgium. There were river cross
ings against weak resistance There
were some battles with French tanks,
which the Germans pulled away from
whenever they could. AS rule, the
French withdrew their forces with the
approach Of the German panzer outfits.
But, on May IA the Germans came
AP NeoAA'oS tiiN ~ l4AiC anu DuIIlDtu
into two divisions of Moroccan troops
who wanted to fight. These troops were
lodged behind rail line and possessed
artillery. The German tanks were
stopped cold. On the next day, the
Stuka bombers came to support the
tanks for an all-out push to break this
resistance. Here was the famous tank
plane team at work. But again there
was no luck.
AS the Infantry Journal describes it:
Losses were many. especially among the
heavy tanks, which always seemed to
draw heaviest fire But the tanks fought
steadily and fiercely back. and there
were actions of heroism on the part of
more than one tank crew The officer
leaders of several crews left their tanks
and tried to overcome especially trou-
bleSome obstacles and guns by hand-to-
hand fighting. In this desperate en-
counter, too, the higher commanders
were found where fighting was heaviest
The regimental commander was put
out Of action when his command tank.
travelling far to the front, received a
direct hit. The brigade commander was
put out of action and severely wounded
when his tank, moving even farther to
the front, also took direct hit
Only with difficulty did the Germans
withdraw from this engagement to pull
far to the rear out of range of the
French.
The sequel is. however, that on this
occasion as on many other occasions in
the battle of France, the French COM
mand ordered its troops to Withdraw
during the night, leaving the field to
the beaten panzer division. Said the
Infantry Journal:
The repeated repulse of the all-out
tank attack on the Dyle positions west
Of Baudeset shows clearly the reasons
for the general German tactical prLnci-
pie of using panzer divisions only
against weak resistance and over fav-
orable terrain. There is no indication
that, left to their own devices the tanks
would ever have succeeded in crossing
that railroad cut
The infantrymen say that it's the easy
part, the 25-mile-a-day thrust against
weak opposition, that the public remem-
bers when thinking about tank attacks,
but then they draw this moral, when
commenting on the tough but less spec
tacular part:
1t is such scenes of blitZkrieg' war
that every citizen should remember as
well as every soldier and student of war.
Such scenes as those hard reDeated nm
successful attacks by the panzer di-
vision on the French Dyle line. In those
| attacks, when the tanks couldn't gain
another foot, even with Stuka and ar
tillery support, the 'blitz, the lightning,
was arrested but the 'krieg,' the war.
was now there in the highest degree"
The point is made that machines are
necessary and vital in war; but SO are
men. After what Germany did in France
with no more than 100000 men in a
| relatively few tanks, the idea grew that
! the war of the future would be war of
| relatively few men and a great number
| of machines A more detailed under
standing of what happened in France
leads the military experts to conclude
any lessons drawn from that part of the
war may be unsatisfactory lessons The
| reason is that resistance often was
broken off before real fighting had oc-
| Cured and when resistance was success
| full retreat was ordered nonetheless
German experience in Russia, too.
suggests that the tank-plane team isn't
an unbeatable combination when the