Evening star., 1941-03-23
Rouschning
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Is far more unfavorable than the one
In which she found herself in 1877,
after the elimination of Russia.
Despite the RusSo-German pact,
there is today Russian front which
engages about 100000 of Germany's
fighting men and the greater part
of her armored divisions. These
could not become available elsewhere
even In the event of RuSso-German
military alliance, because the TWO
partners would not trust each other.
Likewise it is impossible to weaken
the invasion forces in the coastal re-
sions to any great extent, because
German propaganda has repeatedly
characterized them as a line OF de-
fense, and Germany knows full well
that Britain might later be in a posi-
ton to undertake a counter offensive
and occupy strategically important
points. Despite certain press reports,
Germany would be barely able to
employ forces of $4,000 men and
five armored divisions for operations
in Bulgaria and Turkey.
Finally, we have to consider
strategy reserves, and they would ap-
pear to be insufficient. They may
be reckoned as between 80 and IS
divisions, with something like double
this number of half-trained year
classes, but large-scale operations in
She near future would involve i'm
mense wastage, so these reserves
could only be used as requirements
Cor losses.
Moreover, by extension of his in
visible fronts Hitler has become in
volved in the situation which he and
his generals have striven to avoid,
i.e., one IN which a decision will be
attained by means of mass armies
rather than the operations of highly
trained shock troops. A national
army, of the type prevailing in the
10Th century, is dominated by a
minimum law"-which regulates
the potential achievements OF an
army by the performance Of its
worst rather than its best troops.
The German high command knows
well enough that II masses 60 into
action, it will become apparent that
ths German people have no more
enthusiasm for the war than the
French and italian nations have
evinced. This Is q fact which Nazi
upbringing Is powerless to alter.
Economy Seems Necessary.
In these circumstances it looks as
II the German higher command will
be forced to economic. Can it un-
dertake operations of an unlimited
scope? Must it not endeavor to
avoid the occupation of further ter
ritories, involving long and difficult
lines of communication which need
vast numbers of men to safeguard?
These are the problems which
could confront Germany if she at
tempted to occupy all Spain and
Portugal, or even only Gibraltar
and vigo (Spanish Atlantic port)-
o task far more difficult than occu-
patton of the remainder of France
or detachment Of troops to assist
italy. Can Germany carry out q
plan which lies within the frame
work OF her policy and strategy
tho overrunning Of Turkey, the
occupation of Iran and thrust
to the Persian Gulf?
All these aims, even If considered
separately, would seem to be beyond
the power of National Socialism
and contain the risk of developing
q gap on one or another too widely
extended front. May we not, there
fore, assume that German troop
movements in three different regions
have political rather than mill
tary purpose? Does not any genu-
ine future move which Hitler may
be forced to undertake against his
will, as, for instance, in the Balkans,
contain risks which were not evident
to the same extent in his enterprises
Of 1889 and 1910?
When weighing the surmiSed in
tentions of an opponent, one easily
falls into the error of imagining
him to be motivated by purely ra-
tional considerations instead of tax
ing his typical blunders into account.
The German military faults are an
exaggerated expenditure of energy
In forward thrusts and an exhaust
ing pace of forward movements,
coupled with an exaggerated i'm
portance attached to territorial
gains. Military history will reveal
in detail that, for example, the Ger
man armies in France were on the
verge of disintegration after their
great successes beyond Paris during
the first half of June, 1910. The
Allies tried to save Paris by another
battle Of the Marine. The Germans
had to cover far greater stretches
this time before they exhausted
themselves, but they reached the
exhaustion point because they made
the same mistake as in 1914.
A Fault of German Strategy.
Faith in quick successes Is one Of
the typical faults Of German STRAIT
egy. 1t leads to a strategic disper-
thrusts are carried out with the
utmost concentration of forces. Con-
sequently the successes achieved are
often illusory. Will the German
high command yield this time to the
very evident temptation to disperse
its forces in the hope of solving
some problems by sudden blows and
thus gaining opportunity to deal
with others? Will it resist the temp
tation to dissipate its strength in
vast areas?
Despite all his spectacular sue
eesses last summer, Hitler did not
achieve the strategic aim of his
campaign. The unexpected British
resistance robbed him of the fruits
LII IL