Evening star., 1941-11-16
Luftwoffe Inactivity May Hint
Regrouping for New Offensive
Eliot Also Suggests Thot Losses Moy Have
Temporarily Crippled Power to Attack

| may cOme-but 1t seems very likely
that some sort of political offensive
Will precede or accompany them ::
A peace offer. perhaps, based on the
accomplishment of a new European
order and intended largely, as Ray
mond Clapper shrewdly observes, to
distract and divide opinion in the
United States: Hitler perhaps hop
| ing to delay American aid until he
Is ready for desperate all-out blow
at Britain.
But 1t is notable that German air
strength appears to be waning, and
| for every one of the offensives
mentioned, the Germans will need
powerful air forces. Whether it be
the Kerchenski Straits, the Bos-
porus and the Dardanelles, the Med
iterranean or the English Channel
the Germans must find sufficient
support from their air power to
enable them to overcome the supe-
rior naval power of their enemies
in order to ferry troops and supplies
across. Otherwise they cannot hope
/ for success. 1t therefore, behooves
us to ask, what has happened to the
Luftwaffe?
May be Regrouping Air Force.
Certainly something has happened
to it. 1t is not busy any where. 1t
is not bombing Britain. Its effort
over the Atlantic shipping lanes
has diminished to a marked degree.
1t is doing so little in Russia that
the Russians have regained the Of
fensive and the initiative in several
areas (almost impossible to accom-
plish In the presence OF a superior
air force and are themselves raid
ing Breslau, Koenigsberg, Danzie
and Thorn intermittently but about
as steady as weather allows. Dive
bombers appear active in the Cri-
mea, but here alone is there any
hint of a sufficient German all
power to enable the Stukas to oper-
ate with serious interference.
Are the Germans engaged in
major regrouping Of their all
strength for a new, great offensive
which will presently appear? Thi
is possible. it takes time to shift
the bases of great air force anc
reorient it for operations on a nev
front; but if this is the explanation
it is eloquent testimony to the fac
that the Germans are even les
than formerly able to conduct ma
jor air operations on two fronts a
once.
Have the German losses of air
craft and flying personnel in Russi;
been so severe as to effect tenn
porary Gripping Of the Luftwaffe'
sible. but should be considered Il
connection with third factor-th
production of new models of air
craft
In order to produce the powerful
air fleets with which they com
menced the war and carried it OF
for two years. the Germans froz
design to a considerable extent ant
turned out airplanes by mass pro
duction methods. This produce
large numbers of planes, but it is (
policy with which he who adopt
it must gain a decision before hi
enemy can overmatch him in guam
tity or quality. If he fails to wiz
such a decision. and his enemy con-
tinues to be able to produce con.
stantly improved models in accord
ance with the lessons of combat ex.
perience, the mass producer vii
presently find that the qualitative
superiority thus gradually estab.
lished will offset his numerical su.
periority. He will then have to re.
tool his plants and start all ovel
again, or continue to fight with in.
ferior aircraft. resulting in mount
ing losses of planes and personne