Evening star., 1941-09-26
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

ELIOT.
The proposed arming of United
States merchant vessels for defense
against submarine and air attacks
brings to mind certain memories OF
the World War, when the efficacy of
this measure was held in some
doubt
Arming of British merchantmen
on large scale was first carried
out in the spring and summer Of
1915. BY July of that year, some
$50 ships had been armed, mostly
with one 3-inch or 4.7-inch guns. BY
December, the number reached 75o
The results began to show in 1916
From January to September of
that year according to the British
official history, "Seaborne Trade0
228 British ships were attacked oy
submarines. OF these 90 carried
guns. OF the 1873 unarmed ships,
l16 were sunk. Of the 80 armed
ships, only l9 were sunk-a loss
ratio of 81 per cent for the unarmed
ships as against q per cent for
the ships with guns.
However, during this period the
submarines we're acting under GER
tain restrictions, as a result largely
of American diplomatic action. Dur
ing the last three months of 1916,
attacks without warning increased
Of the unarmed ships attacked
during this period, 68 per cent were
lost as against 80 per cent for armed
ships. This suggests greater cau-
ton all round, imposed by the fact
that the submarines had difficulty
in telling whether the ships We. e
armed or not, but it also indicates
that the guns we're not much pro-
lection against attacks without
warning.
Potency Somewhat Lost.
BY January, 1917, the official his
torian C'Naval Operations" volume
IV) records that while naval opin-
ion of all grades seems to have been
entirely in favor of arming more
and more ships with 4-inch and
6-inch guns" nevertheless, existing
statistics were sufficient to show that
this method was. in fact. rapidly
losing its efficacy" OF armed ships
which were attacked and escaped,
90 per cent owed their safety TO
their gunfire: but if, as happened
in January, 1917, submarines could
sink 20 armed merchantmen III a
month under conditions of re-
ct-io IF
StrictionS were removed and they
were free to attack without warning,
the number was sure to rise enorm-
ously, and this is, in fact, what hap
pened when the time came
On June %, 1917, Admiral Will
liam S. Sims sent from London to
the Navy Department a report on
the arming of American merchant
ships, in which he said in part ::
The measures demanded are not
defensive, but offenSive-detensive
Guns are no defense against torpedo
attack without warning. In this
area alone during the last six weeks,
30 armed ships were sunk py tor
pedoes without a submarine being
seen. The comparative immunity
of the relatively small number of
American ships is believed here to
be due to the enemy'S hopes thai
the. pacifiSt movement will succeed
If the submarine campaign is to
be defeated it must be by offensive
measures"
Handicapped Submarines. ~
In fact, the principal result of
arming merchant ships was to COM
pei the submarines to attack with
out warning. This had a certain
advantage. 1t forced the submarines
to use the torpedo, a bulky and
expensive weapon of which they
could carry only a limited supply.
They no longer dared to attack
on the surface with guns. The
period during which any submarine
could operate effectively was thus
limited by her torpedo capacity.
This is Of even greater Importance
today, when so many of the Ger
man submarines are small craft,
carrying few torpedoes. But it is
just as true now as it was in 1917
that against submerged attack
without warning, guns are no de-
fenSe
Air attack, however, is quite an
other matter. For ocean-goina
ships, defense against air attack
was of little consequence in the
last war because of the short range
of the aircraft available to the
Germans. During the whole of
that war only 8,039 tons of British,
Allied and neutral shipping was
lost by the action of aircraft To-
day, air action is estimated to ac-