Evening star., 1941-04-24

ONcl llicS AAloNSA'4 'SAANSN -
the major issues of speeding up pro-
duction and entry into the war.
That the British expedition IN
Greece would fail was known TO
military experts both here and IN
Britain. but in the face OF this the
British government felt 1t necessary
to aid Greece and Yugoslavia. Un-
doubtedly President Roosevelt knew
the risks involved. He told his press
conference Tuesday that the puonc
must not allow itself to be raised
to heights of undue optimism over
the winning of a British naval battle
in one part of the Mediterranean or
to drop to the depths of undue
nessimism because of what now IS
happening in another part OF the
same area
whether Mr.. Roosevelt has real
ked that the news will be un-
favorable for little while now and
prefers to wait till more propltlous
moment before announcing his next
move is a matter of conjecture. 1t
could well be that the President
wants to see public opinion crystal
lized as a consequence OF serious
British reverse and then determine
American policy.
But even granting this premise. 1t
does not explain the Waverlng ana
the dilatory procedures, the failure
to delegate authority and the toler-
ance of experimentation and eX-
cessive spending in non-detense
fields or the gentle policy with one
group of labor leaders and the tend
encv to "crack down" on employers
If they don't yield to wage demands
L. S. Effort May Be Too Late
There is certainly an overall situ-
alton which while not yet acute can
become so. The same unrest which
causes citizens of the British En-
pire to become critical, as in Aus
tralia and even in Britain, when
things go wrong is manifestlng itself
here. Partisan politics has nothing
to do with it. Those who are aware
Of the importance of preserving the
British democracy are not thinking
about partisanship at all but Of ef-
fective defense. And just now many
officials are beginning to feel that
the most effective defense for the
United States is an active offense.
It is surprising how many people
in officialdom seriously believe Amer
lea had better enter the war now
lest the label "too late" be affixed
to American policy as 1t has been
to that of all the neutral states OF
Europe which hesitated and then
were picked off one at time.
There is comment often, too, as to
what the whole course OF events
might have been if all the Balkan
states had acted together against
the Nazis when the war broke out,
or if America had taken a positive
position earlier in the present war.
Today, as nobody knows what the
future holds in store, there can DE
only two hypothetical considerations.
Will America be able to maintain
her democracy if Britain loses her
fleet? Will America be compelled
to enter the war a year hence any
way. and if so would 1t not be
better to enter now?
These questions are discussed
constantly in official Washington.
The opponents of intervention un-
ouestionably have a much more
powerful veto influence than they
are generally believed to have. The
Gallup poll, to be sure, says that
American opinion is II per cent
in favor of conveys if necessary to
save Britain. But who is to say
whether conveys now are essential
to a British victory? Will the Presi-
dent say it? Only some word from
an authoritative source can influence
public opinion on that point.
Safety First Philosophy.
For one reason or another the
President has not felt it desirable
to influence the thinking of the
country on the subject of outright
participation in the war. Some OF
his advisers think he should and
that what confrontS America to-
day is not policy problem so much
as a military judgment. If 1t is
arguable that the Nazis might con-
ceivably be able to attack the United
States by way of base at Dakar
or bv bases among the Cape Verde
Islands and South America, especial
lv with the British feet in their pos
session. then the question from a
military standpoint is whether the
United States should wait for such
q contingency or should interject its
forces in the path of possible ag-
gressor. Nobody can guarantee alb
solutely that an invasion by the
Nazis possessing the British fleet is
impossible All one can argue with
some degree of substance is that it
may be improbable or remote. But
the safety-first philosophy of the
military mind usually prevails. De-
fense tactics are based on remote
possibilities, because public opinion
does not condone lack of preparation
for any contingency.
The critics outside the admins
tration do not have the responsible
fly for policy today. They would
not be blamed If America found her
self under the domination of
European power for the first time
since 1776. The present admins
tration would be alarmed and par
ticularly the President who, having
been elected for a third term be-
cause of an unprecedented inter-
national situation, was expected to
lead the Nation even into war If he
felt that America was about to be
attacked or might run the risk of
attack if Britain we're not ef1ec-
tiSely aided.
The next move is TO decide
whether the United States should
convoy her own merchant shipping
to the Red Sea and to the African
coast, if not to ports of Britain it
self. The defeat of the British In
the Balkans has started a counter
move for more action to help Brit
ain. And that just now centers in
H. ~ t,A