Evening star., 1941-03-10

ficials, but for 3
reasons of eX-
pediency t ey David Lawrence.
have refrained from expressing IL.
These opinions range from the idea
of specific legislation of prohib-
itory sort to plans for handling the
situation through executive infu-
ence and without new legislation.
No new laws are really needed
If the administration will effectively
use the present laws. Thus the
National Labor Relations Board has
the power to remove a prolific cause
Of Strikes-its own inept handling
of collective bargaining elections.
Likewise the Secretary of Labor
has the power to make public essen
tial information upon which public
opinion would readily crystalline If
available-the facts about current
strikes.
Thus the entire Nation has been
kept in the dark about the issues
involved in some Of the major
strikes. The Labor Department
knows the truth, but suppresses 1t
for fear of offending one side or
the other. Publicity in the public
interest on basic strike causes
would do much to eliminate them.
Foreign Agents Held Involved.
Another department of the Gov
ernment knows good deal about
the activities of agents of and
SympathiZers with foreign govern
ments who foment strikes, but for
one reason or another, too, is soft
pedaled. Perhaps all the agencies
of the executive branch of the
Government, including the National
Labor Relations Board. have been
waiting for cue from the Presi-
dent himself. Certainly most strikes
could be stopped in defense indus
tries If the executive powers were
properly exercised and particularly
if there wasn't such a hesitancy on
the part of national union leaders
to get rid of the Communist SYM
pathizers who here and there have
gotten control of local unions.
A program Of labor peace that
doesn't involve a bit of new leais-
Of any Of its rights or privileges
has been summarized by this CORE
sDondent after getting suggestions
from some Of the people here who
have been closest to the difficulties
arising in recent strikes in defense
industries. Here 1t is:
First. provisions for an enlarge
&c
the work Of this agency of the Gov
errmPnt being remarkably efficient
and useful, and full publicity in
cases of deadlock.
Second, an executive order that
ell persons engaged in defense work
shall be permitted by secret ballot,
conducted by Government repre-
sentatives. to say whether or not
they wish a strike to be called. SIM
ilarlv at weekly intervals there
after, when once a strike is called,
p governmental mechanism to find
out by secret ballot whether the
workers wish to return to work.
Bargaining EHctions.
Third, provision for the prompt
determination by elections among
the employees whether they wish to
be represented by one union or the
other if there is a conflict or by no
union as against a particular union
seeking to bargain for them. The
Wagner law was supposed to aC-
complish this, but the present labor
board has found technical reasons
for evading the spirit as well as
the letter of the law, which vests
in the board complete power to in
vestigate disputes and order imme-
diate elections
Various labor board decisions
have done great deal to intensity
labor disputes in America by en-
comaging union leaders to go to
extremes in their demands and
even to carry on showdown
strikes. The theory that the en-
ployer must make concessions and
that the best way for all strikes to
be settled is for the employer al
ways to yield has been widely held
in administration circles and many
labor board decisions point that
way, thus whiting down the Su-
preme Courts ruling that the labor
law does not compel the making of
contracts or permit the board to
control directly or indirectly the
terms of the negotiations.
The present labor board mis-
takenly recognizes the right of
unions to ignore the board and call
a strike without trying to have the
machinery of the law determine the
appropriate bargaining unit. Yet
the Wagner law places definite
responsibility on the labor board
10 find out whether one union or
another is entitled to sole bargain
ing rights.
It is significant that not single