Evening star., 1941-04-03
Balkan Sands Run Low

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the axis are so critical that war
seems to be almost inevitable. Yugo-
slav mobilization is practically COM
plete and its borders are now guarded
by an unbroken ring of steel. The
Semi-military government of General
Simovich has the internal situation
well in hand and repeatedly has
reached a workable arrangement
with the CroatS and Slovenes. While
there is still uneaSineSS in those
exposed northern provinces, they
would presumably rally around the
throne and the national govern
ment in case of a German attack.
The only diSloyal elements are a
small minority of Croat Separatists
whose leaders are in exile, and the
Magyar and German minoritieS,
aggregating about 100000 and
found chiefly in the triangular belt
of territory north of the Danube
and abutting on Hungary and
Rumania.
The mobilized YugoSlav Army Is
supposed to number 100000. Fully
half are Serbs splendid fighting ma
terial and in a mood to battle as
gloriouSly as their warlike ancestors.
Mechanized equipment is admittedly
scanty and the air force is weak, but
the Greeks have shown what can be
done in rough, mountainous country
against mechanical handicapS prob
ably more serious than those the
Yugoslavs are likely to face. Fur
thermore, strong Anglo-Greek forces
and much war material are maSSed
on Yugoslavias southern border,
ready to be rushed up the Vardar
Valley at a moments notice. The
presence of Anthony Eden and Sir
John Dill at Athens are sufficient
evidence that Britain is prepared to
help the YugoSlavs in big way. The
smashing of the Italian Navy has
simplified the British transport
problem to the Balkans, while the
impending collapse of Italian East
Africa ahead of the rainy season
should liberate large forces of sea-
soned British troops in the near
future for use in the Balkan area.
Should war come, it will evidently
have to be fought on the axis side
almost wholly by the Germans.
Italian morale is so low that joint
Greek -YugoSlav offensive would
probably doom the Italian armies in
Albania to swift disaster, while little
could be expected of an Italian
offensive launched from Trieste over
the mountains into Slovenia. Like
wise, Germany's lesser allies would
be far from trustworthy. On paper,
the Reich could count on 1000, 900
Rumanians, 800 900 Magyars and
perhaps 100000 Bulgarians. But the
Rumanians are poor fighters at best,
and the example of Italy shows that
soldiers cannot be made to fight
| when their hearts are not in their
work. Certainly, Rumania has moth
| ing to gain from entering this
| struggle Hungary and Bulgaria do
have old scores against YugoSlavia,
and both have coveted territories to
gain from the downfall of that state.
| Yet in neither country does there
! seem to be genuine enthusiasm for a
war waged as German satellites and
chiefly for German profit.
Germany is thus confronted with
| prospects of major war entered
into under very dubious diplomatic
and military conditions. This is un-
doubtedly the reason why the Reich
has negotiated so long. Such fore
bearance is probably due to the need
of reinforcing its armies and dis
posing them for attack. There is
little reason to believe that Germany
still hopes to effect a settlement with
out recourse to arms. The recall OF
most of it's legation staff and of other
nationals indicates that Hitler has
decided to abandon the field of
diplomacy.
The Balkan sands are running low,
and the present situation is GER
tainly untenable. Unless a diplo-
matte turn for the better occurs
very soon, war will be the only
alternative.