Evening star., 1941-02-16
Japanese Won't Risk Fighting
u. S. Pacific Fleet, Eliot Says
But America Should Make Its Position
In Orient Clear to All, He Warns
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT,

BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.
Once more we find our attention
centered on events in Europe, and
once more it may be pertinent TO
remark that while we look eastward
across the Atlantic, the mere fact
of our turning our backs temporarily
on the Pacific does not abolish that
ocean or its problems. They are
still there. We still have a mari
time frontier in that ocean. just as
we have in the Atlantic; and there
are still forces of aggression operat-
ing in that area which are largely
restrained for the moment only by
the potential weight of our opposi-
ton.
From every point of view, Ameri-
can or British or Anglo American,
those forces ought to be restrained.
The President has pointed out, and
wisely. that we could take an active
part in restraining Japanese ex-
pansioniSt tendencies in the Far
East. particularly in the region of
the South China Sea, without di-
miniShing our aid to Britain. Indeed,
if We became seriously involved with
Japan in the Far East, it is quite
likely that the net result would be
beneficial from the direct aid-to-
Britain viewpoint because of the
speed-up in production which would
necessarily result from wider ma
tional realization of the seriousness
of the situation, brought about by
the incidence of hostilities in the
Far East.
Our contribution to a collective
OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES effort
for protecting the Philippines. the
Netherland Indies and Malaya from
japanese aggression would very
largely be in the naval sphere, in
Guiding naval aviation The troops
and land-based aviation would be
furnished by the British and Dutch,
indeed are already present in cen-
siderable force; and India is a far
handler source of troop replace
ments than the United States.
Vital to General WaveH.
From the point of view of aid to
Britain we must consider very
seriously also the relationship of
Singapore, which is the Japanese
objective, to the British war effort
as whole While Singapore re-
mains in British hands. it COM
mandS the most important maritime
crossroads of the Far East. A fleet.
whether American or British. based
on Singapore, protects not only
Malaga itself, but the Netherlands
Indies, Australia, New Zealand and
India from japanese aggression.
1t prevents japanese incursions
into the Indian Ocean. In fine. it
assures the safety of a vast supply
area from which the British war
effort now draws raw materials and
manpower. and which is the princi-
pal support of the British campaign
in the Mediterranean. This should
be clearly understood: It is India.
Australia, New Zealand. South
Africa. Malaga, and the connecting
network of maritime communication
lines in the Indian Ocean upon
which General Wavell and his as
sociates are dependent for their
supplies and reinforcements-not
the British Isles.
The fall of Singapore and the ap-
pearanCe of Japanese raiding cruis-
erS in the Indian Ocean would bring
about the almost immediate collapse
of the whole British Mediterranean
effort. This is the quickest and
surest way at the disposal of the
Axis for relieving their disasters in
that area-or would be, if it were
certain that Japan could take Singa-
pore and would be willing to risk
her armed forces for that purpose.
Toxic Fears q. S. Fleet.
Of course, Japan would be very
willing to take reasonable chances
for such a prize; not so much for
the purpose of saving Italy, as for
driving British influence out of East
Asia and opening the road to India
and Australia. But the reasonable
chances which the most reckless of
Japanese militariStS must weigh in
clude the possibility of having to
fight the United States Fleet. This
is a chance which few Japanese
would be willing to take. especially
as long as British and Dutch bases
are open for the use of our ships
and naval aircraft.
The japanese position in the
South China Sea-in Hainan and
ndo-China-is really very weak
one, if the possible arrival of a
superior naval force in the area,
plus immediate United States
Dutch-British defense co-ordina-
ton, are predicated. There is no
physical connection by road or rail
between the main japanese armies
in China and their forces in South
China and Indo-China. The lines
of communication of the latter are
wholly maritime. and are flanked,
on opposite sides of a 600-mile
channel, by the British base at
Hong Hong and the American base
at Manila. The latter contains at
least 18 submarines, and two squad
rons of patrol aircraft.
Would Be Reckless Move.
The communications of any
and would certainly find itself cut off
through Thailand against Singa-
pore would thus be Immediately i'm
perilled, unless Hong Hong and
Manila were first reduced; and if
the latter course were chosen, time
would be given for the movement
of the United States Pacific fleet
from Pearl Harbor to Singapore
or Manila or Port Darwin. A
Japanese move by sea against