The daily monitor. (Mount Clemens, Mich.) 1940-1942, 1941-04-29
LAsT.MikUTE STRATEGY

coptured Soloniko hos roised doubts as
to the effectiveness Of British did to
Greece and Yueoslovio. The British
Prime Minister probably does not share
these doubts, but he could hordly have
stoted them better than he did in his
war report to the House Of Commons
Wednesday: II am sure there is no
less likely way Of winning the war than
to odhere pedontieoIIy to the n,oxm Of
sofety first"
The apparently purely defensive toe
tics so for employed by the British
forces seem to be occosioned, however,
less by outmoded faith in defensive
warfare than by the same considcro-
tions to which we referred yesterday
when we pointed out the disadvantage
of hastily constructed oIIionces. As
the Iost-minute stand OF YuoosIovio
left too little time for coordination be-
tween it's army and that OF Greece, so
likewise, it found the British and
Greeks already agreed upon pIons OF
cotton which did not count on Yugo-
sIov resistance to the Axis. Their lines
therefore followed those oIreody estob-
Iished by the Greeks in Albania, and
the mountainous terrain from there
across the Greek peninsula.
Whether loss of SoIoniko was con-
ceded is q question. That port in Ger
man hands becomes probably air
base and possible submarine bose.
But with only the prospect Of Greek
and British forces to meet Nozi
thrust aided by Bulgarian, Hungarian,
and possibly YueosIov possivity, it is
more than likely the Allies felt they
should build their defenses where these
would be strongest.
For some weeks the British had been
ferryine equipment and men to vorous
Greek ports. They could make no such
preparations in YueosIovio. Why? Be-
cause YuoosIov resistance to the Axis
did not aim at bringing Britain into
YueosIovio as on ally, but only ct
preserving absolute Yueoslov neutral
ity as between the Nozis and the Brit
ish. This policy did not permit aid
from Britoin until Nozi troops we're
already on the march.
Those who feel disappointed thot the
British did not rush into Yu9oslovio to
meet the oncoming~ Gernons should
realize thot thot oction would have
entoiIed risks similar to those that
trapped the Greek Macedonian forces
when the YugosIovs withdrew from
south Serbia and exposed the Greek
flank Moreover, immediate rescue Of
Yueoslovio is not necessarily the aim
Of the Allies in the Balkans The Yueo-
slows took their stand with full knowl-
edge Of what they we're up o9oinst.
1t is what ultimately happens to the
Nozis that determines the fote Of such
small countries as Greece and Yueo-
sIovio What ultimately happens to the
Nozis depends on the obiIity Of the
British, with American aid, to break
the Nozi grip over oil Europe Part Of
thot task is to divert Nozi attention
away from the keystone of democratic
resistonce-the British Isles; to couse
them to use up mon-power and moter-
eI in warfare like this being corred
on in the BoIkons; to disrupt supply
centers such as Yueoslovio. Bulgaria.
Hungary and Rumonio.
The immediate problem of the Brit
ish and their olIies now is to montoin
on octive second front on which they
can keep the Germans fighting while, if
possible, preventing them from rescu-
ing the ItoIions in Albania. The speed
Of the German thrust has thrown dis
quoting doubts on the Allies ability to
do this. But the Turkish and Russian
positions remain to be tested, and mill
tory experts feel that the Allies still