The Waterbury Democrat., 1941-12-26

Cnurcnlll III Cnelr Il1SVOGlC
 One, a hard and fast Anglo American alliance by which each country would agree to operate it's army and navy in complete cooperation with the others.
 Two, the defense of Singapore. Tn this connection there is one group of U. s. military advisers who want to concentrate on the protection of the Philippines. However, 1t is understood that they have not been able to sell this strategy to the commander -in-chief.
 Three, bases in Africa. This il- cludes what the two countries will do to head off a Hitler reach for Dakar, with its vital naval base just opposite the bulge of Brazil.
 Also under discussion have been the manner of using spanish and Portuguese island bases off the coast of Africa, plus other col- onles along the African Gold Coast, which already have been semi-developed as airplane and submarine bases by the United States and Great Britain.
 THE PACIFIC FLEET
 It Is no secret that when Win ston Churchill came to Wash- ington, the prospects facing the Allies in the Pacific arena looked none too bright.
 Pearl Harbor in the long run
 may have done more good than
 military harm by uniting the American people and electrlfy- ing them into action. But for
 the moment, It's consequences
 have obviously handicapped our naval power.
 Here is the situation as 1t looked to our military and naval experts during the Churchill Roosevelt meeting = and as 1t undoubtedly looked to the Jap- anese, now fully aware Of our Pearl Harbor losses.
 list, the powerful striking force of the U. s. fleet originally was intended to keep the Japanese worried about protecting their own main islands, thus keeping their fleet from straying too far south to Manila and Singapore.
 2nd, part of our fleet was de- pended upon to hover near enough to the Philippines to prevent large concentrations of Japanese troop ships.
 3rd, 1t was expected that an- other part of our fleet could bol- ster the British around Singapore. But always 1t was the basic pol- icy of U. s. strategy that q big naval force based on Hawaii would keep the Japanese so worried about their main islands that they could not send too big a fleet to Singapore.
 U. S. ON DEFENSIVE
 Now, however. with the Strik- ing power of the fleet reduced, 1t has been impossible to prevent the Japanese from rolling up 30 troopships in one armade off the coast of Luzon. Nor has 1t been possible to go to the rescue of the little band of Marines that have 50 heroically defended Wake and Midway Islands.
 However, the Allied strategy very wisely decided upon, has been to concentrate on fundamentals, not get sidetracked on less import ant though periodically appealing military ohjectives. For instance, 1t would bring cheers from the entire nation if the Marines at Wake and Midway could be res- cued; or if more ships could be spared to battle Japanese troop ships off Luzon.
 That, however, would detract from the defense of Singapore, which Is the main Japanese mlIi- tary objective. And the fall of Singapore might mean prO- longing the war several years.
 That is why the American pub- lie may have to be patient over possible set-backs in other areas of the Pacific. It will be difficult Cor us t0 take the offensive for