Evening star., 1941-05-18

and when it has appeared that Eng
land was doomed to defeat.
In the first instance, as In the opening
stages of the war, 1t was optin1istically
argued that an American expeditionary
force would be wholly unnecessary. In
the second instance, as right after the
collapse of France and again today, it has
been pessimistically said that American
military assistance could not hope to
effect the outcome.
Probability Of British victory and prob
ability of British defeat have seemed
almost equal obstacles to advocates Of
outright American belligerency. On the
other hand, the dogged, unf1inching, con-
tinuous resistance of the British has
steadily operated to draw us in, both
because of its heroism and because 1t is
thought that our weight would serve to
tip fairly even balance in the British
favor.
Effect on America.
If this analysis is correct, and all the
polls of public opinion seem to indicate
its validity, it would be psychological
mistake for the British to overemphasize
the significance of the Hess episode. To
draw from 1t any conclusion that the
Nazi regime is riddled with dissension and
threatened with revolt would be to in
vite relaxation of American war effort.
On the other hand to dismiss so sensa-
tional an event as fundamentally unim-
portant would be to encourage those
American pessimists of the Lindbergh
persuasion who feel that Great Britain
has already lost the war.
To take the latter line is the more In
admissible because the present British
position, when ali discounts are made. is
clearly very serious. if not desperate. The
flight of Rudolf Hess cuts across a chain
of recent events which have been almost
uniformly unfavorable to Great Britain
and which can be minimized only by
heavy overdrafts on faith. 1t Is partly
to provide contrast with prevailing gloom
that every one wants to regard Hess as
a symbol of coming Nazi collapse.
Incidentally it is curious, and an in
centive to suspicion, that Herr He's
should have fled from Germany, without
effective hindrance, on the morrow Of
that country's greatest military triumph,
and also on the eve of momentous de-
cisions of which the outcome for Ger
many is by no means clear. II 1t had
been another man than Hitler's most
fanatical and devoted lieutenant, another
moment than that of Germany's funda-
mentally inconclusive victory in the Bal
kans, doubts as to the authenticity of
the escape" could be more easily allayed.
Hess Knows Much.
There remains the possibility that the
British, whether they believe Hess or
not, will take his ostensible mission
seriously Regardless of whether his
amazing flight was made with Hitlers
knowledge, it is probable that Hess
knows as much of Germany's war OBJ
jectives as is known TO any living person
at this time Whether he talks to
Churchill as fugitive or as an un-
acknowledged envoy, he can and doubt
less will. give information as to the terms
on which Germany would be likely to
conclude and observe peace.
How Churchill will answer Hess de-
Nazi leaders sincerity. 1t further de-
pends not merely on German willing
ness to make peace but also on German
guarantees for maintaining 1t. Without
convincing evidence of reliable guaran-
tees, in oversight of which the United
States might reasonably be expected to
join, the British Prime Minister will
scarcely grab the pait which has been
so temptingly dropped in Scotland.
Either way, however, 1t is difficult to
see how Britain stands to lose as
result of this fantastic affair. If Hess
represents nobody but himself, his mis-
sion is at least sign of weakening pur-
pose among the Nazi hierarchy. If he
is actually Hitler's envoy it means that
the Germans are now the appeasers and
that the opportunity for stating terms
now rests, at least momentarily, in
London. If the cards are now played
(See MORLEY, Page C-3)