Evening star., 1941-03-24

oAN Z N1RA a. -
Let us revert to our two concep-
tiOns evolved from the previous war:
"Verdun" and the elimination of
the Russian front" Today the Yer
dun conception represents an at
tack on the British Isles with all
possible means This is an opera
ton with which We still have to
reckon. But the other conception
/ is by no means TO be construed as
an attack on Soviet Russia.
In the last war it was the Rus
sian Steamroller' and its apparently
/ ineXhauStible resources which in
duced the German general staff to
rid themselves of this menace before
/ taCkling the main military objective
in the west. Today there is no such
menace and no immediate conneC-
| ton between Russia and the mill
| tary aims against Britain, even
| though Russia ties UP strong Ger
man forces in Eastern Europe. But
/ in another sense the German gen.
eral staff sees itself compelled to
initiate preparatory operations, just
! as in 1915.
| Isolation of Britain.
The second conception may there
fore be said to be represented by
auxiliary operations which would
render a later invasion of Britain
an absolute knockout, unless the
enemy was already so war weary
that he gave in before the final
blow. The value of these opera
/ tlonS would be that ID they would
not involve the same risk as the
"Verdun' scheme and (2I it would
, be possible to break them off at
any given moment and carry on
/ the war by diplomatic means.
Moreover. German propaganda
/ gave us clear indications on this
| point several weeks ago. and it is
fairly certain that this time it said
what it meant. If Britain was to
be attacked, it stated, then the as
sault would be delivered by a series
OF operations similar TO those di-
rected against the Maginot Line.
There would be no question of
frontal attack The task would be
carried out by means of a turning
movement, as in the case of the
French defenses.
Does this mean there would be no
attack on the most strongly fortified
localities on the channel front, but
that an onslaught would be directed
against weaker points and with new
weapons such as GASP
We may be sure that something
on larger and more comprehensive
scale is implied. turning move
ment against Britain and the Brit
lSh Empire must be carried out on
larger scale than one which can
be estimated by purely European
standards. Thus the German prop
agandist did not mean operations
planned to turn the defenSeS of the
Island, but a scheme to maneuver
the defenders out of their lines of
defenSeS-the destruction of the life
lines which make the British En-
plre a political, military and eco
nomlc unit. 1t implies the isolation
of Britain from her sources of
power, the deprivation of all help
from America. 1t is far too COM
prehenSive scheme to be carried
out by means of the submarine war
fare Germany has hitherto waged
in the North Atlantic.
AttritiOn Comes First.
An invasion of the British Isles
would ct1Ffnn 70
victory. The war could be carried on
by the intact British Empire, with
the United States as a nucleus of
power supplies. The Germans must
therefore first induce a state of
general attrition. in which it would
be possible for them to deliver the
decisive blow.
In this war the elimination of
the Russian front" therefore implies
an attack on the lifelines of the en-
pire and actions calculated to dissi-
pate the strength of the British
forces by a series of campaigns in
widely separated parts of the en-
pire. 1t also implies the weakening
of American assistance by a diver
sion of resources to zones vital for
the United States. Britain cannot
be beaten until Americas help is
eliminated. Consequently the United
States gives the German general
staff today the same cause for un-
easiness that Russia did in the last
war.
In fact we can already see on
the horizon the outlines of vast
operations calculated to divert and
dissipate the British war effort. the
war is about to enter universal
phase.
In such a scheme Hitler would
have the benefit of operating on
inner lines over a considerable part
of the theater of war, while his ally,
,Japan, would be equally well placed
in another sphere of action. Mean
while a large part of Britain's man
power would be tied up in the Brit
ish Isles. Britain would also be
exposed to the danger OF dlssipatlng
her forces. especially as regards her
sea and air arm. She would be faced
with the alternative of either weak
ening her main defenses or en-
deavoring to meet assaults with in
sufficient defense power in other
important parts of the empire.
Nazis May Take Initiative.
The belligerent who can secure
the initiative at this phase Of the
war and maintain it over a long
period is in a position to derive
great advantages from surprise at
tacks at all points and maneuver
his opponent into immobility and
dissipation of forces. In no phase
of the war does the initiative count
for so much as in the present one.
It is highly probable that this new