Evening star., 1941-01-05
Two Courses Offered by Eliot
To Step Up Aid for Britain
Acquisition Of Bases in Ireland and Seizure
Of Axis Ships Recommended Immediately
By MAJ. GEORGE FIELDING
EITnT

The policy of AL possible aid to
Great Britain" appears assured of
congressional as we'll as popular
support. Polls indicate a majority
Of our citizens would now support
that policy even at the risk that
Germany might declare war on us
for it. 1t is, therefore, proper to
examine how this policy may be car
ried into effect.
The time element is all-important.
As pointed out in my last article,
nothing could be more certain than
that Germany will make every ef
fort to defeat Great Britain before
our help can become effective-that
is, before our industrial production
can rise to such levels, and its out
put begin arriving in Great Britain
In. such quantities as to alter sub
stantially the present advantage OF
Germany in this respect. We have
greater resources than Germany, but
1t takes time to translate resources
into fighting power.
II Britain is going to be beaten
before we can make our efforts felt,
obviously those efforts will have been
made in vain, insofar as the defense
of Britain is concerned. Therefore,
we have two parallel lines of mill
tary policy to consider and under
take: One, the increase of produc-
ton, while taking care also to per-
feet our own defenses-this is long
fnrro rn1iPyr ~ discover Uh9t
immediate steps we can take to help
Great Britain stave off the imminent
German attack. The success of the
first is in great measure dependent,
and consequent, upon the success of
the second, which is the subject of
consideration in this article.
Must Keep Sea Lanes Open.
Britain's immediate danger lies in
the German attack on her vital sea
communications. From the sea, she
receives not only our munitions and
supplies, but the industrial raw ma
terials from all over the world which
feed her own war industry, and from
40 per cent to so per cent of the
foodstuffs for her people, including
her fighting forces. These sea lanes
must be kept open. They are now
threatened by German submarines
and aircraft, working both sep
arately and in conjunction with
great advantages over the situation
of the last war. Large reinforce
ments of both are expected to be
brought into service shortly. De-
spite these, the conveys must be kept
moving in and out of British ports.
What can we do to help-at once?
Undertaking convoy halfway
across will be of little service. This
will apply only to the so-called
ocean escorts"-a single cruiser or
armed merchant cruiser to each
convoy. Escort through the sub
marine zone is undertaken by de-
stroyers and escort vessels gun
boats, they would be called in our
British ports, going out with an out
ward convoy and then taking over
an inward convoy at sea. If Amer
lean ships are to be used in the
North Atlantic, and conveyed by
American destroyers, the latter must
work also from bases on the other
side of the ocean and these bases
can only be in Fire, unless we are
to use British ports and become an
open and outright belligerent. To
thus use Irish ports would involve
repair establishments, oil storage
and anti-aircraft cat least) defenses
therefor, also stationed in Fire.
In a large measure, we should
have to assume responsibility for
the defense of Ireland from attack.
But this is far smaller RESPONSE
bility than those which would face
us if Britain were to be defeated;
and in solving the question of addi-
tional convoy escorts, we should also
be solving the perplexed question of
the Irish bases, so necessary in a
general sense to the protection of
British sea traffic. 1t might be as
suned than an anxious Irish people
would prefer some measure of Amer
lean protection to either continuing
at the mercy of German attack or
to calling in the British.
The question of additional de-
stroyers and escort vessels is also
here involved. Sound judgment
would seem to indicate that we
ought not, at this time, to allow
any more destroyers to pass from
under our flag. We must for the
present maintain the full offensive
power of the fleet in the Pacific,
which is, in part, dependent on
keeping with the fleet an adequate
number of destroyers; these would