Evening star., 1941-11-25

luSStOfto uhdtf "NS f-' I. AAS Ss''~
he quit rather than 1Drite articles
to conform 1ritll their policy.
By X. X. KAWAKAMI.
The American-Japanese conversa-
tions, resumed Immediately upon
Saburo Kurusu's arrival here, have
SO far made no appreciable progress
toward the solution of the problem
of war or peace in the Pacific. 1t is
yet too early to predict the success
or failure of the parley.
The one thing fairly certain seems
TO be that Premier Gen. Tojo's cab
met, contrary to advance lntlma-
tions, Is not intent on forcing a
showdown with the United States in
the immediate future. Certainly Mr..
Kurusu has brought with him no
plan containing anything like an
ultimatum. Nor does he seem to
have brought set of hard and fast
proposals.
More likely he has brought de-
tailed instructions for his and Am
bassador Nomura's guidance. The
scope and the bases of the current
conversations are not, apparently,
very different from those on which
informal talks were begun last
spring. Thus each side has for sew
eral months known what the other
wants, and both fully realize the ex-
tent of the gap between their re-
spective requirements. The question
is how to narrow and, If possible,
bridge the gap.
China Conflict Big Question.
From the japanese standpoint the
most important question is to ter
inmate the China conflict. This is
evident in the fact that practically
all official statements, including
Premier Gen. Tojos latest three
point program, put this question in
the forefront.
If Japan, with Americas Coop
Grafton, can adopt effective measures
to liquidate the China war in such
manner as will not seriously damage
her prestige or face, she will go
long way toward easing her Axis
alliance.
But the mere easing of Japan's
alliance with the Axis does not sat-
isfy America. America demands its
practical, if not formal, abrogation,
because as long as the alliance exists
the United States cannot be sure
what Japan may do as the fortunes
of war in Europe change in the COM
ing months and years.
America is aiding China not
merely out of sympathy for her, but
rather to keep Japan stalled in the
Chinese mire, so that she cannot
give full effect to her alliance with
the Axis. Therefore, it stands to
reason that America will not listen
to Japan's uncertain promise to
ease her Axis alliance.
Japan may say there is verbal
agreement with the Axis which
virtually absolves her of any obll-
CATION to go to war against America
in the event that America enters
the war against Germany. She may
even produce verbatim copy OF
that verbal" agreement, which was
presumably written into the pro-
ceedings of tha negotiations which
preceded her entrance into the al
lance.
This. however, will make no i'm
preston on America. So long as
japan stands committed to aid Ger
many, America will refuse to attach
anv importance to any secret sup
Elementary agreement which leaves
Japans possible action to AID Ger
MANY in the Pacific to Japanese
discretion.
This is evident from Americas his
toric attitude toward the Anglo
.Japanese alliance, which was aoro-
gated at the Washington conference
of 1922. That alliance contained
an article which explicitly absolveo
Japan of all obligations to aid Brl-
tain in the then not lnconcelVaoie
event of war between the two At
lantic powers.
Even this explicit provision did not
satisfy America. and America forced
the abrogation of the alliance much
against the will of the japanese and
most of the ruling British statesmen
, of that time. 1t is clear, then, that
America will be satisfied with moth
ing short of actual if not formal
abrogation of Japan's alliance with
the Axis.
Wants Alliance Made Harmless.
America, however, probably will
not insist on the impossible. She
must know it is impossible for Japan
at this time to declare in direct and
explicit language that she will sever
her alliance with the Axis. Wha'
America wants is presumably to pull
the teeth from the alliance and make
1t harmless.
The United States, for instance
may feel secure if Japan declares
possibly jointly with her that th'
two countries mutually respect th'
status quo of the territorial SOW
ereignty in the regions of Eastern
Asia and of the Western Pacific
This apparently innocent declara
ton would, it is argued, effectivel.
inoculate Japan's alliance with Ger
many because it would put Japal
under a definite injunction not Il
advance into Siberia or the British
and Dutch possessions in the south
Thus Japan's alliance with the Axi
would not be formally abrogateo
but it would become ineffective a
"a nuisance" or menace toWar'
America.
The mutual aspect of such
declaration serves double purpos
first, to save Japan's face, an
secondly, to allay Japan's fear tina
America might acquire new base
in the regions in question, particu
lar in Kamchatka and the Dutcl
East Indies and at Singapore.
The principle of such a declara
ton is applicable to French 1ndo
China and China, obligating Japa
to withdraw troops from those coun
tyv,,h