Evening star., 1941-06-23
Member of the Associated Press.
Why Russo-Germun War?

Why kusso-0ermon war!
Why has Hitler deliberately added
TO the ranks of his foes the vast bulk
of Soviet Russia, covering one-sixth
of the entire land surface OF the
globe and inhabited by nearly 20O,-
600 900 people? That Germany is the
aggressor is obvious. Berlin'S at
tempts to shift the odium on Mos
cows shoulders are as transparently
false as was Moscow's attempt to
brand little Finland as the asSailant,
a year and half ago. Whatever may
be RusSia's weaknesses, the German
task will be no light one. There must
be pressing reasons for its being
undertaken.
Two outstanding reasons at once
suggest themselves. Hitler was
driven to attack Russia by mixture
of worry and confidence. Worry over
his inability to conquer Britain, the
economic shortcomings of his Euro
pean domain, and the growing weight
of American intervention. Confidence
In his ability to smash Russian re-
sistance and thereby gain the re-
sources needed to sustain long war
against the English-speaking powers.
Only thus can be explained the
taking of gamble which, if lost,
would speedily doom him and his
country to disaster.
It is not yet known what Stains
attitude was in the negotiations
which undoubtedly preceded the war
that has now begun. Everything in
dicates that Stain feared war with
Germany, and it may be assumed
that he was willing to make conSid-
cradle concessions in order to avert
1t. They were not enough. Why?
Were German demands such that
yielding would have spelled Stains
overthrow at home? Did Hitler
suspect a trick? Or had the Ger
mans become convinced that the
Soviet regime was too inefficient to
deliver the goods, even though acting
In good faith? In either of the two
latter hypothesis, Germany would
have marched, no matter what prom
ises Stain might have been ready to
make or what agreements he may
have offered to sign.
Most American military commen-
tators think that Russia will not be
able long to withstand the impact OF
the German war machine. The Rus
sian Army has two great weaknesses.
It Is under -officered, thanks largely
to Stains wholesale purges of some
years ago, and it is overmechanlzed,
in the sense that it has neither the
technical personnel nor the indus
trial plant required to stand wars
prodigious strain and WaStage OF
machines. At this season of the year,
most of Russia is ideal terrain for
mechanical warfare. Russian SOL
diers are probably as brave as ever,
and their numbers are prodigiouS, but
the outstanding lesson of this war is
that mere man power is OF little
value. German difficulties preSum-
ably will begin after the Russian
armies have been driven into the
limitless interior. Then, the prob
lens of holding extended lines
against Russian counterattackS, Or
ranizing the conquered regions, and
getting the produce to Germany
will be pressing ones.
This Russo German conflict, of
3. course, upsets the whole previous
war equation. Already, Winston
Churchill has promised Soviet Russia
. all the aid which Britain and its en-
pire can afford. That means prac-
= tical Anglo-Russian alliance against
Germany and Italy. 1t likewise
transforms the diplomatic setup in
the Far East. Japan is even now
debating what course she shall pur-
sue. And here in America, new de-
cisions of policy will have to be taken
BY suddenly attacking Russia, in
z defiance of non aggression treaty
and other diplomatic engagements
Nazi Germany has once more demon
strated the WorthleSSneSS OF its
agreements, which become proverbial
scraps of paper the instant they
cease to favor its Self-interest. This
, Is the last, but by no means the least
OF the lessons to be drawn from what
= Churchill calls the wars fourth
turning point.