Evening star., 1940-02-11
Expedition to Take Murmonsk
To Reinforce Firms Runored
Situation Of Defenders Grows Grover
As Russians Better Isthmus Line
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT,

0y MAJ. OEOhGE FIELDING
ELIOT.
The situation of Finland grows
graver. The expected Russian at
tacks on the Karelian Isthums and
just north of Lake Ladoga are de-
veloping, and it appears that the
Firms have been compelled by Rus
sian advances in the former sector
to reinforce it at the expense of
the latter. The Russians, as pre-
dicted, are attacking with a dis
regard of losses which indicates their
willingness to continue expending
men, which they can replace, until
the Firms are worn down. Finland's S
fate remains contingent on outside
aid, and from both London and Paris
come indications that the allies are
sending that aid. at last, in really
worthwhile amounts. But how?
And where?
The obvious way is through
Sweden. There is, however, another
way; and the long time which has
gone by since first the intention Of
the allies to aid Finland was an
nounced lends some color to the
possibility that this way may be the
one which has been selected. It is
a move through the Arctic Ocean,
directed either upon Petsamo or
3 sMurmansk.
Rumor is busy with this sugges-
ton. One report has 1t that a
French, Canadian and a Polish
division are being sent; another
that Italian volunteers are being
facilitated" by the allies in their
transit to Finland: third mentions
the figure of 10000 men. Three small
divisions, or two of normal size,
would amount to 10000 men.
Regular Force Unlikely.
It is hardly probable that regular
French or Canadian units are being
used unless the allies have made up
their minds to declare war on the
Soviet Union, but mixed forces OF
volunteers might be employed. These
would, of course, take time to Or
ganize, oncer and equip, even If the
greater part Of the men were fully
trained soldiers to begin with.
Polish divisions might be usefully
employed here; they would have
every reason to fight stoutly against
the Russians. The employment Of
Italian volunteers would tend to tie
Italy closer to the allied cause
Canadians would be well adapted to
the climate, if carefully selected
There are many possibilities.
But let us assume that 1t has been
decided to send a force of 10000
men Of some sort to the Arctic coast
of Finland or Russia. This force
would, If properly trained. COM
manded and equipped, be ample to
overcome such initial opposition as
it might meet. It would require for
its transport approximately 100000
gross tons of shipping, plus such
additional shipping as might be
needed for any special equipment
sent along in addition to that nor
mally allowed in corps and division
trains, for extra supplies, or for an
accompanying air force.
50 to 60 Ships Needed.
The diversion of this amount of
shipping for the purpose would be
a serious matter for the allies, If 1t
had to be drawn from their own
merchant services; whether Scan
dinavian ships could be made avail
able or not would depend on how
far the Scandinavian countries were
willing to stretch their already
somewhat elastic neutrality in the
Russo-Finnish affair. At least SO
or 60 ships of average size would be
required. This troop convoy would
require q strong naval escort, par
ticularly of destroyers, as . screen
against Russian submarines. An
aircraft carrier or two would be
essential, to guard against air at
tack and to provide initial air sup
port for the landing. An old bat
tleship (the Iron Duke might do)
could help, to give the support Of
her guns to the landing force, espe-
cially If the destination Of the expe-
dition be Murmansk. Minesweepers
would be indispensable, and mine
sweepers are at q premium in the
North Sea these days.
Finally, the presence In or neal
the northern part Of the North Sea
of q British fleet sumcient to assure
the convoy against German attack
until it had passed beyond the ra-
dius of action of German ships
based on Wilhelmshaven would be
necessary. All this indicates that
while by no means impossible, the
dispatch of such a force would be
a serious matter for the allies, would
require much time and very careful
planning, and would not lightly be
undertaken.
The decision as to destination
would depend very largely on condi-
tions in Finland, as well Is or
whether the die was to be cast ir
the, matter Of hostilities against Rus.
sia. An attack on Murmansk woult
by all odds be the best way Of re.