Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1940-09-09

sons who are participating actively
in a presidential campaign for the
first time in their lives are a bit
impatient and want the debate to
get going at once for they feel per-
hapS that political campaign is
like the stock market, changing
from week to week
AS a matter of fact, the various
polls being taken do measure public
opinion to large extent but they
do not measure the processes by
which public opinion is made nor
can they take into account the fac
tors of psychology which permit
campaign strategy to influence votes.
Broadly speaking, the speeches
and the controversies between can
didates on current issues do not,
unless cryStallized on some major
point, influence large groups of
voters. There has been much eX-
aggerated emphasis put also on the
quality of a radio voice or on the
attitude Of a candidate toward this
or that State organization or local
leadership.
Roosevelt Strategy Familiar.
Minor influences play their part
but they do not affect the general
underlying trends which set in like
tides in the middle of a campaign
and go on to election day gathering
strength and crystallizing for or
against candidate or a party.
To date the Roosevelt campaign
has followed definite strategy-not
new or unfamiliar It is the strategy
of what used to be called front
porch campaigns, when the nominee
sat back, made few speeches, rely
Ing on occasional statements but
primarily on the effectiveness of
organization and the momentum of
his record. This sort of thing sue
ceeded with President Wilson in
1915 when he was up for reelection
and in 1924 when Coolidge was re-
elected. 1t was effective in 1920
when Harding was the nominee. 1t
works all right whenever there are
no deep-Seated prejudiceS or popular
upheaVals of criticism to affect the
strength of the nominee who seeks
to benefit by it.
Thus in 1920 as in many other
campaigns the negative tide was
stronger than the affirmative argu-
mentS. The anti-Wilson and anti
League and anti-war sentiment in
1920 against the Democratic party
made it unnecessary for Harding
TO make an active or aggressive
campaign. Hardly anything he did
or might have done or said could
have affected the outcome of that
contest. Conversely the affirmative
tide of peace and prosperity was just
enough to outpoint Hughes in 1916.
Strong Negative Tide.
The 1910 situation reveals the
existence Of a strong negative tide
against President Roosevelt both on
account of the third term issue and
the revolutionary and Fascist tend
encies of his appointees who. while
externally denouncing Hitler, are
basically in sympathy with his
totalitarianism methods.
Aff1rmatively, the Roosevelt cam
paign has the benefit of a tide of
spending Government checks for
farmers and w. P. A. jobs for
workers. This is the momentum
which. brought an unprecedented
victory in the electoral college in
1886, but this time the low-income
groups are far more concerned
about the implications of a war after
election and the CONSUMPTION issue
than about social gains and
prosperity"
The Willkie campaign has hardly
gotten started. The nominee has
had to bear the brunt of the fighting
thus far. He has had little help
from the Republicans in Congress,
most of whom have been asleep at
the switch on the defense issue.
They have voted as they should
for defense appropriations but they
have been slow to reveal the
plumbers made in the whole national
defense program. They missed the
boat on the Russell-Overton amend
ment about Selling plants and the
New Dealers romped away with as
fantastic a piece of demagoguery as
the politicians have ever played
with.
Inside the Willkie camp there has