Evening star., 1940-03-10

anime the hard facts of the problem.
The urge for reckless action, for
actions sake, would seem to come
rather from impatient civilians or
retired generals who are out Of touch
with the facts Of the situation.
Strategic Factors Ignored.
Shortly before the war 1t was
reckoned thst the French should be
able to mobilize up to 70 divisions
in addition to the fortress troops in
the Maginot Line. As for the Ger
mans, it was estimated they might
be able to place in the field some
thing over 100 divisions. The Poles
had an army Of 80 divisions, and in
theory should have been able to
double 1t on mobilization, but there
was serious doubt whether they had
the equipment to do so.
From this 1t might seem that the
opposing forces were so evenly bal
anced as to check the temptation to
aggression. If any hopes were built
on such purely numerical reckon
ing. they ignored strategic factors
which must obviously turn the bal
ance. While the French In the west
were faced with the Siegfried Line,
the Germans were offered in the
east a most inviting target-the i'm
mensely long and strategically en-
circled Polish frontier, unfortiaed,
and defended by an army which was
not only ill-equipped, but did not
really believe in the defensive. For
the Poles showed a fundamental un-
realism in the way they consoled
themselves for a lack of modern
weapons by a gallant disdain for
such material means. On that front
the Germans had every prospect of
being able to enjoy an overwhelming
superiority in aircraft, tanks and
guns.
The sum Of evidence from neutral
sources suggest that when the war
came the French considerably exceed
ed the estimate of their mobilizable
strength, although at the price Of
dislocating their industrial life; but
that the Poles did not attain more
than half their theoretical expan-
sion. It would seem from reports
that the Germans were able to con-
centrate about 10 divisions and the
bulk of their mechanical equipment
to pulverize the Poles, and that they
considered some 20 divisions were
sufficient to hold of the French in
the West. If that be correct, it is
not surprising, for. the deep defense
system of the Siegfried Line might
reasonably be counted on to in
crease, beyond a 3-to-1 ratio, the
scale of force which the French
would require in order to attack
effectively.
Germans Hold Advantage.
With the arrival in the west Of
the bulk of the German Army, re-
leased by the swift ending of the
Polish campaign. the large, If not
large enough, temporary superiority
Of the French disappeared-the bal
ance turning to the Germans ad-
vantage.
Moreover, according to neutral re-
ports, the Germans have created q
very considerable number of new
divisions and some estimates sug-
gest the total may be found to have
increased about so per cent. II
50, their strength relatively to the
allies may be larger this spring
than 1t was last autumn. after the
close of the Polish campaign.
Even If these estimates should
prove excessive, tasis obvious that
Gen. Gamelin can hardly be ex-
pected to achieve now, by An of1en-
sive. what he judged that it was un-
wise to attempt when the Polisl,
Army was In being and the forces
defending the Siegfried Line-itselt
now made deeper-were far smaller
No military information is needed to
arrive at such q conclusion, but only
sense of proportion.
For the Germans, the prospect