Evening star., 1940-10-04
Scrap Iron Embargo
Wins Approval
Silk and Cotton Trude Ban
In Siberian Dispute Cited
As Precedent

The action of President Roosevelt in
placing total embargo on all shipments
of scrap iron to Japan is q move which
has long been overdue, but which is none
the less welcome. 1t is an encouraging
indication that the United States is at
last beginning to take a strong stand
against Japan's program Of aggressive
territorial expansion which has been q
settled policy of that country for genera
tons.
Japan's behavior in Indo- China, and
the present action toward cutting of the
war supplies which have been flowing
In steady stream from the United
States to Japan. are vivid reminders OF
a practically forgotten period when
Japan moved into Eastern Siberia at the
close Of the World War In 1918.
In Russias exhaustion due to the war,
her military collapse, and the revolution,
Japan saw another opportunity for ag-
grandizement. The Japanese not only
saw an opportunity for succeeding to
Russia's position in Manchuria and
Mongolia, but also for bringing all of
Siberia east Of Lake Baikal, under
Japanese domination. They did every
thing possible to prevent the establish
ment of any kind of stable government
in Siberia following the Russian collapse
sand Immediately began acquiring mining,
railway. shipping and fishing rights,
power plants. -four mills, etc, all over
Eastern Siberia. A host of Japanese sur
veyors swarmed into the maritime prov
inces and beyond Subsidized colonial
tion, on large scale, also took place
during this period. In whatever direc-
ton the situation developed, this eco
nomic penetration promised to be of
enormous strategic value and importance
The idea of intervention in Eastern
Siberia in 1918 originated with the jap
anese. During the last days of the
Kerensky regime they disseminated
propaganda in all the allied nations,
pointing out that japanese Intervention
in Siberia would save it from falling
into the hands of the Germans. Later
Japan made specific proposals to this
effect to the United States and the other
principal allies. British and French
opinion were inclined to accept the
Japanese plan of intervention. but only
on condition that the United States
also would assent. The United States
refused, and it was this refusal that
killed the plan for exclusive Japanese
intervention.
Japan was not interested in restoring
Siberia but was interested only in that
portion east of Lake Baikal which. once
under her control, she would be able to
hold indefinitely.
The United States did not relax her
opposition to exclusive intervention by
the Japanese but finally agreed to a plan
OF joint intervention under which the
United States and Japan were each to
send 1000 troops to Siberia This an
nouncement was made on August 3, 1913.
A few days later it was tacitly agreed
that Japan might send $4,000 troops in
stead of the original 1000 The force
dispatched by the United States totalled
7649 fighting men and officers. With no
further word Of any kind to the United
States, Japan proceeded, within the next
few weeks. to send a force of 70 500
troops to Siberia. This was more than
all the other forces of the allied inter-
vention, east and west, combined.
1t was Japan's intention to do in Si-
IBERIA at that time what she later did in
Manchuria in 1881. Every harbor and
every river in Siberia was domino ted by
the japanese. Every bridge and road
was guarded by japanese troops and
every railway station few the Japanese
flag only. Nothing moved without jap
aneSe permission.
The situation became so bad that the
commanders of the troops of the Western
nations made formal protest, and on
November 2, 1918, Secretary of State
Lansing told Viscount Ishii Ambassador
to the United States, that Japan had
gone too far. japanese action had pro-
duced serious tension President Wilson.
disappointed and displeased with Japan's
failure to observe the agreement, made
the most vigorous diplomatic protest and
authorized the strongest kind Of economic
pressure On November 18, through the
War Trade Board. an order was issued
stopping the further granting of all
licenses for the export Of cotton to Japan
and for the import of silk from that
country. Outstanding licenses were not
revoked. but would have been had this
been found necessary. Iron and steel
and their products were considered for
such action, but as the feeling seemed
to be that Japan would be able to obtain
these products elsewhere, cotton and silk
were chosen as the commodities that
would make the embargo most practically
effective.
At that time we were buying from
Japan about Is million dollars worth OF
silk and were selling that country roughly
13 million dollars worth Of cotton per
month. This trade was vital to Japan's
economy. The action taken by the
United States, together with the effect
of the collapse of Germany, brought an
immediate favorable response from the
japanese. Over $4,000 troops were re-
moved from Siberia by the end OF De-
cember, 1918 This was so gratifying to
the United States that the granting Of
licenses was shortly restored. In fact.
the response to the embargo was so i'm
mediate that the only eventual effect
on the trade statistics for cotton and
silk was the reduction of silk imports by
about third during the first three
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