Evening star., 1940-09-15
By MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

ELIOT.
animals" wrote Frederick the
Great in his secret instructions fol
his generals, as translated by Maj
Thomas r. Phillips, u. S. A. "have
only one method of acting, but in
telligent men have ineXhaustible re-
sources. These resources are in
finite in number Their object Is
to hide your veritable design and
to catch the enemy in the trap you
have prepared for him.
Thus the contrary of what one
wishes to do is feigned. If you open
the campaign, you have your troops
march and countermarch, so that
the enemy cannot learn the locality
where you assemble. If it is a queS-
tion of capturing cities, you encamp
in a place which makes him fearful
for two or three of his cities at the
same time. If he haStens to one
flank, you throw yourself on the
other. If there are no cities to be
taken, but some defile which you
wish to seize, your ruSeS should
tend to draw the enemy away from
It, giving the appearance that you
are moving in some other direc-
ton"
Justly does Maj. Phillips entitle
the book in which the above is in
cluded, Roots of Strategy" For
here is a root-idea which has never
been far absent from German stra-
tegical conceptions from Frederick S
time onward. The latest of Ger
man military writer's, Col. Foertsch
of the general staff, says in his Art
of Modern Warfare: Surprise can
be effected by deception of the OPP
ponent, either in time or In direc-
ton. That is to say, he must be
kept in the dark as long as possible
as to when and where the decisive
attack is to be expected. A condl-
ton of surprise, and the best means
of attaining it, is by means OF
mobility and speed. This apples
particularly to the concentration OF
forces preparatory to attack
It would of course be perfectly
ridiculous to assert that Frederick
invented surprise, or that the Ger
mans are the only people who make
1t a basic principle for their fight
ing forces. But the Germans, IN
war as in other matters, are
methodical and doctrinaire race,
clinging to principles which they
have tested and found good; so
that. in considering the immediate
possibilities of their present sltua-
tion-,lpon the issue of which hang
s,lch grave eventualities for Ger
MANY as we'll as for the rest OF the
vorld-we may well assume thaI
thev will do as they have for gen.
erations been taught to do. They
will seek to achieve surprise. Read
ing Fredericks instructions. one re-
ouires little imagination to adapt
them to the precise conditions OF
the moment; and so rejecting, one
NAV well hesitate to accept tne
obvious as evidence Of the intentions
of the German high command.
Britain Not Like Norway.
Possibly the best recent instance
of the use of surprise by the Ger
mans was the attack on Norway.
This was conceived with boldneSs
that well-nigh passed into the realm
of foolhardy, save that the element
of chance had been so Thoroughly
eliminated by the most palnstaklng
planning in advance, the most
thorough preparation, coupled WIn
speed and boldness in execution.
The attacks were widely spaced, and
fell at the various points selected
almost if not exactly simultaneously.
Meanwhile resistance was paralyzed
bv internal means. The main blow
fell at the chief military and pollti-
cal center of the country.
The conditions are not the same
In England. Here there is no hope
of paralyzing the power OF the de-
tenders by means Of spies and
traitors, though of course such ele-
ments may do something In small
wavs. The chief center OF the
island Is now undergoing attack,
but has not been reduced to I'M
potence.. Certainly we may assume
that there will be not one but sew
eral attacks when and if invasion
is attempted-attacks widely spaced
in distance, possibly, but probably
made-at least as to the initial ef-
forts-closely spaced in time. In
these attacks, and those which are
to follow, surprise will be a main
If not the main element in the Ger
man calculations.
Certain possibilities may, In the
light of these general consldera-
tions. be examined in some detail
First, the possibility of prelim,
nary operations with limited oolec-
tives. The Germans may have de-
termined that a direct assault upon
a Britain as yet unweakened serl-
ously by blockade or air attack
would hold too much risk Of bloody
repulse-with possible repercuSsions
of unforeseeable dimensions.
Hence, while Britain steels her-
self for a great blow, the Germans
NAV intend to drive suddenly with
small highly selected forces, Tor
such objectives as the Orkney and
Shetland Islands, or for Ireland,
North or South, with a view to es-
tablishing bases there from whlcn
their air and submarine forces could
encircle Great Britain, check the
flow of munitions and food from
abroad, and bring still greater pres
sure to bear upon British vital CEN
ters by air attack.
Would Eliminate Much Risk.
Such moves would, If beaten back,
not have the effect in defeat upon
the German prestige that the re-
pulse of a major assault on England
would have. Invaluable experience
would be gained from them. II
successful, they would immensely
assist the main attack by providing
a means of weakening and breaking
down British powers Of resistance.
They would be in accord with Hit
lers own pet principle OF the mini
mum and maximum objective. since
nnt