Evening star., 1940-06-14
Nazis Follow One
OF Oldest Warfare
Rules in Attack
Got There Fustest
With Mostest Men,
And Hit Key Points
BY WALLACE r. DEUEL..

1hfOugh on the modern French
fortified positions here on the west
ern front, which experts have been
saying for 10 days were "impreg-
nable," is nothing more mysterious
than faithful observance of one
of the oldest rules of all warfare,
one described by the Confederate
lieutenant general. Nathan Bedford
Forrest, as TO get there fusteSt with
the mostest men. study of the opera
tlons on the spot seems to show.
The Germans have superiority in
both numbers of men and quanti-
ties of material, and they are bring
ing this superiority to bear at key
points on a colossal scale even at
the cost of heavy casualties where
necessary. They are able to con-
centrate superior power, especially
effectively, because their intelligence
service is better than those of the
Allies and because the Germans
control the air.
But neither intelligence services
nor plans are particularly new
tangled conceptions, to say nothing
of being secret weapons" and there
is no more secret or mystery about
the German successes than there is
. about pick and shovel The prin-
clpal mystery of the war so far is
the mystery of why the Allies were
SO poorly prepared for the German
attack.
Five Fatal Weaknesses
Even the muCh-Vaunted French
fortified lines are inadequate, as
events have proved. These lines
have at least five fatal weaknesses.
it seems clear from the progress
of the fighting so far.
l. In each line the French have
a relatively small number of rela
lively large bunkerS, whereas the
Germans, for their part, have rela-
lively large number of relatively
small bunkers. This had the result
that once the Germans had put one
bunker out of action they had
knocked a hole in the entire French
line big enough to pour troops
through.
2. Khe French lines lacked depth;
instead of having several lines, run
-
they had only few lines This
made the whole defense thin and
brittle and helped make a break
through even easier
3. The fire of the various bunkers
did not sufficiently overlap In the
German West Wall each bunker
can fire effectively beyond those on
all sides of it. In the French line
this was not the case For this
reason the knocking out of one
bunker left a gap in the French
fire through which the Germans
= could advance.
4. The French bunkers had too
many blind spots, that is, directions
in which the crews could not fire
at all, or at least only feebly.
The French apparently designed
their units to resist frontal attacks
adequately, but not attacks from
the flankS and rear. The bunkerS
in the real Maginot Line along
the Franco-German lapd frontier
have revolving fame throWers on
top and in general, are better de-
signed to resist attacks from all
sides, but the units on the Franco
Belgian frontier lacked these pos
sibilities of proper defense.
S. In several cases the French
had left forests and other cover
near the bunkers or had placed the
units in terrains which in other re-
spects lacked adequate fields of
observation and fire so that the
oh IN % n
fairly close without being seen in
time.
Use of Colonials an Error.
There is one other outstanding
- defect in the French defense IN
several sectors-the use of Colonial
troops. 1t seems definitely to be
the case that the black and brown
troops lack either the morale or the
training, or both, to withstand the
assault of highly mechanical armies.
Taking advantage of these weak
nesses in the French lines of defense,
the Germans have applied the
ancient technical principals of at
tacking not the point of strongest
resistance, but on the contrary, the
weakest points. In general, they
flowed through and between and
around the strong bunker positions.
like water passes rocks in the bed
OF a stream.
In the last war good many at
tacks were made against centers OF
resistance, but this was partly be-
cause these points were necessary
for observation purposes. In the
present war, the German control of
the air makes it unnecessary to at
tack centers of resistance on the
same scale
The initial German attack was
usually made up of fast tanks,
armored cars, motorcycles and
motorized heavy artillery. In most
cases, the first German wave swept
over and through and beyond the
bunkers, leaving special units behind
to reduce the bunkers themselves
later. This initial attack doubtless
caused heavy casualties, but the
German high command was pre-
pared to pay this price for the sue
cess it believed it could win in the
end.
The Germans also have developed
highly effective technique for re-
ducing bunkers. The first step is
usually to bring up anti-aircraft, or
other artillery with high muzzle
velocity and concentrate its fire on
some one single fire-opening Of the
bunker.
Accept Heavy Casualties.
To bring up these guns close
enough so they do their work prop
erly, the attacker must be able to
keep his whereabouts hidden from
the enemy or he must put the de-
I fense artillery out of action, or he
must have superiority in fire, or he
must accept heavy casualties-or
he must allow for a combination of
some, or all, of these elements in
l.; Ia, Tho L.,