Evening star., 1940-09-17
Exchange of Destroyers
For Bases Praised.

To the Editor Of The Star:
1t is difficult to understand the protest
over what is spoken Of as the sale OF
destroyers to England, but which should
rightly be considered the purchase Of
base sites essential to American de-
fense. 1t would do us no harm for once
to focus our attention on the value re-
ceived, instead of decrying the price.
In that light, the transaction is OF such
inestimable benefit to us, that the des-
troyer question becomes one OF negu-
gible importance.
The deal had bad advertising, un-
fortunately. Had the public been given
to understand in advance the absolute
necessity for q chain Of fortified bases
in our defense requirements, there would
have been universal acclaim for a trade
which secured them for us at so small
price. Instead, an effort was made
to prepare the public mind for the trans
fer of the ships, q matter which, when
not balanced against the return, did
seem both risky and questionable. On
the face of 1t. we appeared to be not
only weakening our defense, but putting
ourselves in line for reprisals.
Whether or not we admit the British
Navy to be our FIRST line of defense"
the fact is that we have had no need to
build up Atlantic defenses, either mobile
or stationary, because the Atlantic was
dominated by friendly power. 1t is
also a fact that our Atlantic Coast and
approaches are pitifully vulnerable,
should that control pass into unfriendly
hands Since the advent of steam, an
ocean has been highway, not a barrier;
our safety demands an impregnable
bulkhead at the end Of that highway,
against which any possible attack would
spend itself and become impotent.
Such a bulkhead is possible, If we
utilize properly these new base sites;
it was not possible without them. Nor
would so overage destroyers provide US
with anything like the same measure
of protection. At best, they would
have constituted only an adjunct to de-
fense; the bases will become the very
foundation of it. England has lost up
wards of IS destroyers in II months Of
war, but to date not single coastal
fortihcation has fallen under direct
attack
We have no immediate need Of the
destroyers, and time to build others,
eto
which the old ones lacked. These were
suited to Englands present need, for
sacrifice vessels. good for short-term
service and single engagement. The
real return to England from the deal
is not paid by us at all. 1t releases es-
entail units of her own Navy, previously
occupied In defense Of her Western pos
sessions, and relieves her Of the respon-
sibility of their protection. Thus she
has rid herself of liabilities which be-
come assets to us, while we have traded
minor assets for major ones. Seldom
is q transaction so mutually advan-
tageous.
AS for any war risk in the deal, we
have small need to worry on that score.
Hitler may be furious, but there is little
he can hope to do about it, If We make
full use of the advantage. Governments
and dictators are prone to overlook
pretexts for war, when not in q position
for effective reprisals. We are not
bound to follow those destroyers: and
Hitler viii not declare war on us for
the sheer satisfaction Of showing his re-
sentiment, nor be nearly 50 eager to ven
ture across the Atlantic himself II he y
bound to fetch up against . ba.ricade Of