Evening star., 1940-10-05
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT

ELlOl.
In Thursdays article, I examined
the possibilities of Japanese attack
on the Dutch East Indies, some
times pointed to as certain con-
sequence Of any strong policy ol
ours in the Far East-particularly
an extension of our embargo to in
clude oil and other raw materials
I ventured to point out the impos.
sibility of Japan attempting any.
thing of the sort without first dis.
posing the advanced bases of Hong
Kong, Manila and Amboina-pro.
vided, of course, that the United
States and the British had made
up their minds to put an end to the
Japanese menace by firm, united
action to protect the Netherlands
Indies and to blockade Japan until
her leaders came to their senses.
United action is the key to the
whole question. When acting to-
gether-our ships and British bases
and Dutch troops-the problem is
comparatively simple. Alone, none
CT the three can do very much The
British are occupied elsewhere, the
Dutch are too weak, we are to far
away. 1t Is the combination that
Japan needs fear, not any of the
three singly. 1t Is the combination
that would bring Japan to reason
The very delay imposed in attempt
ing to reduce the advance bases
mentioned would enable our fleet
to arrive in the theater of opera
tions in overwhelming strength and
with every advantage of position
and timing.
But a great deal would depend on
the base at Singapore, which is the
one Far Eastern base suitable for
the repair and maintenance OF
capital ships. We are sometimes
presented with the bogey of Japa-
nese reaction in a slightly different
form from the Dutch East Indies
version. We are told that Sing
apore will be in Japanese hands
before our feet can get there.
!, Distances Vast.
Those who tell us such things
are. of course, not thinking of the
Japanese as Japanese, but as Ger
mans. They are thinking of Nor
way and the fort of Eben- -Emael
they are thinking of dive-bombine
Stukas and of the distances OF
Europe. They have not stopped to
reflect on the actual means avail
able to Japan with which to carry
out any such tremendous effort as
an assault upon Singapore, or the
vast Asiatic distances to be covered
We may begin considering a great
mixed expedition by sea to attempt
landing in Malaga and an assault
on Singapore by the army under
protection of the fleet. Formosa
necessarily would be the assembly
point. 1t is 1900 miles from For
mosa to Singapore, or matter OF
weeks steaming for fleet OF
transports at 10 to u knots. This
fleet would have to pass between
Hong Kong and Manila, only 64C
miles apart and both containing
submarines and long range naval
flying boats. Approaching Sing
apore, it would come within the
radius of action of aircraft baseo
there while still two and one-hali
to three days steaming time away
BY this time it would be under
heavy attack from Dutch and
Australian aircraft and Dutch SUD-
marines operating from Borneo.
In order to avoid concerted attack
by British, American and Dutch
cruisers and destroyers, it would
have to be escorted by armored
ships, meaning that Japan would
have to risk the whole of her
armored feet Git would be fatal to
divide it, in the South China Sea,
1900 miles from the nearest Japa-
nese-defended harbor and 2,40O miles
from the nearest Japanese drydock