Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1940-12-01
By MAJ. GEO. FIELDING ELIOT.

The essence of strategy may be
defined as the development Of con-
centrated offensive power from q
secure base against q selected and
vital objective. Applied to the
broad field Of American national
strategy, and in the terms Of the
present emergency, this demands
careful examination Of existing con-
ditions. Assuming for the pur-
pose of discussion that We are going
to act decisiyely, whas can we do?
The primary consideration is Sc
curity. The base of action on
national scale is, of course, the con-
tinental United States, with it's
industrial, material and human re-
sources; the well-springs of national
power. This great base must be
secure from attack before offensive
operations can be considered. We
have two maritime frontiers, In the
Atlantic and In the Pacific. Both
are protected by an outer ring of
outpost positions, from which mobile
air and naval forces may operate
to cover all practical routes of ap-
proach. In the Pacific we have the
additional protection of distance.
In the Atlantic we must take into
account the possibility OF enemy
forces reaching South America by
way of Africa, an operation which
we are not now well placed to in
terrupt.
The vita. link in our naval COM
munications is the Panama Canal,
which affords us freedom of move
ment between our two frontiers and
denies such freedom of movement
to an enemy. Any threat to the
canal is threat to our security.
Offensive Action.
Keeping these basic thoughts in
mind, we may next consider the
possible development of offensive
action. Our Army is not at present
In condition to supply large ex-
peditionary forces, though it could
undertake operations of limited
extent and objective such as the
occupation of an advanced base
position where the opposition to be
encountered would not be the full
force of great foreign power.
1t is capable of protecting our
present advanced positions from
any scale of attack to be reasonably
anticipated. with the possible ex-
ception of the Philippines; and
there the garrison is at least sum-
cient to insure that the main posi-
tons in the island of Luzon will
not fall to mere raid, but would
require a major hostile effort for
their reduction, involving the ex-
penditure of considerable time and
the assumption Of major risks. The
Navy thus is given freedom Of
action for offensive operations
within the radius made possible by
the location of existing defended
areas.
Political conditions at present
greatly extend the radius Of action
of the Navy in the Pacific, since it
40 AiOW doodi GU tA1dt Willie ttlC ~ Co
ent state of affairs continues, the
Navy would, in case of Japanese
aggression in the region of the
South China Sea, be able to use
British, Dutch and Australian bases
in that area; notably the great
and well-equipped British base at
Singapore. Similarly 1t may be as
sumed that in addition to the bases
acquired by lease from Great Brit
ain in the Atlantic, such positions
as Freetown, Sierra Leone, would
be available for our feet.
The Navy, at present, constitutes
our sole available means of offensive
action on a large scale: the Army's
ability to conduct such operations
would be limited to support Of the
Navy in the securing and defense
of bases, or the bringing of limited
assistance to one of our American
neighbors who might be in danger.
Question Of Objective.
We must next ask ourselves what
our objective might be. Assuming
that our purpose in undertaking
any military action would be the
support of Great Britain in her
struggle with the axis powers, how
could we accomplish this object
with the forces we now have avail
able?
There are three theaters Of pos
sible operations: Cd the North At
lantic; CD the Mediterranean; CD
the Far East. The most serious
threat now faced by Great Britain
is the threat to her sea-borne COM