Evening star., 1940-05-20

decisive battles-the first battle of
the Marne. at the outset. September
clio, 1914, and the second battle of
the Marne, which began July 10,
1918, and continued along the front
until the armistice of November IL,
1918. Neither of these battles pos
sessed the characteristics of a great
decisive victory. The first. q de-
fensive fight. saved France for the
allies. and gave them a definite
strategic status; the second was
ended by an armistice which, while
imposing the will of the allies.
lacked the psychological value Of
unconditional surrender.
Between these two battles, four
years apart, occurred many local
efforts on both sides to break the
opposing front at q particular spot,
all resulting in heavy losses and
eventual failure.
First Marine Battle-Sept. CLIO, 1914.
When the World War broke in
early August of 1914 Germany i'm
mediately invaded France, apply
ing the Schlieffen plan to the cam
paign. This maneuver under the
original scheme as prepared by
Schlieffen, chief of staff from 1891
to 1905. divided the German Army
into two wings, hinged and pivot
ing on the fortified region Of Metz
Thionville. The northern wing,
comprising seven-eighths Of the
army, was to sweep on q continuous
front through Belgium around
Paris to the west ana then apply
flank and frontal pressure on the
French Army so as to roll it back
upon the Swiss frontier. The other
one-eighth of the German Army
was to hold between Metz and Swift
Zerland, prevent an invasion Of
Alsace and Lorraine and II pos
sible without heavy fighting to in
wade France between her eastern
Notifications of Toul, Epinal and
Belfort. Under the Schlieffen plan
this wing was really hardly more
than the extension of the Metz
Thionville pivot to the Swiss from
tier.
''Make the FLANK Strong"
The decisive element Of the
Schlieffen maneuver was to be the
flank attack eastward after the en-
circlement and capture Of Paris
from the west, and Schneffen's dy-
ing words in 1918 had urged creating
and maintaining strong envelop-
ing flank throughout the operation
Had Schlieffen directed his own plan
the campaign Of 1914 might well
have had an end very different from
that of the record. But the brain
and will of Schief1en were needed
for the execution Of his bold and
grandiose program and Schliehen's
successor, Moltke, did not possess
those Schleffen attributes.
When the test came in August Of
1914 not only had Moltke made an
initial reduction of the marching
wing by one-fifth of Schlieden's
plan, but during the operation he
further reduced the marching flank
by detachments to other fields.
Moreover, at a critical time in the
midst Of the torrent of events Of
mid-August, 1918, he changed the
entire maneuver by attempting to
break the French lines by a major
offensive through the valley of
Charmes toward Nancy, at the other
extremity of the front. To this at
tack. made by the sixth and seventh
armies (the force occupying the
pivotal region under the Schliefen
plan) Moltke assigned the greater
part Of his general reserve, thereby
giving to these two armies greater
strength than that of the first and
second armies, to which had been
assigned the principal elements Of
the Schheffen plan, viz, the en-
circlement Of the French left, the
capture of Paris and the flank at
tack eastward.
Schliefen's Plan Changed.
Moltke had thus changed the uni
lateral Schlieffen plan to q bilateral
maneuver consisting Of two stimuli
taneous attacks on the French
right and left flanks. separated BY
q distance Of some 200 miles-a
divided effort which failed In both
cases. The wreck Of the Schle6en
plan was complete about August %
1914, when the German high COM
mand left the army commanders
pretty much to their own initiative
In pursuing the retreat Of the
French main forces.
BY this time Moltke had pretty