The Waterbury Democrat. [volume] (Waterbury, Conn.) 1917-1946, 1940-08-21

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officers by the surprise and power
of his attacks, he bewildered the
generals by the daring of his strate-
gic conceptions, he troubled the en-
tire population by his radio propa-
ganda that insisted that Fronce was
being betrayed by Britain and by
the French "war-mongers." He
spread horrible rrrnors through
villages, issue fearsome reports by
wireless, and then, when the popu-
lations had congested the roads in
their flight, machine-gunned them
to heighten their panic.
Meanwhile, his agents within
France, presumably by clandestine
wireless senders, kept him informed
of what was going on and he could
thus choose the precise moment for
Italy's entrance into the war when
French disarray was at its climax. AS
a result France was not only beaten
far more thoroughly and far more
easily than Poland, but, unlike Po-
land, France cracked morally as well
and new set of leaders sought to
purchase the Germans mercy, if not
his respect, by submission to
Frances conquerorS.
Ebb In French History
Admittedly this could not have
been accomplished save during a low
ebb in French history. The French
masses were increasingly Waterfalls
tic. Capital and labor were at log
gerheads, the former remembering
the experiments of the popular front
government of 1861, the latter
reesntful of the attempted Fascist
coup d'etat in 1884 and the I'M
punished "Cagoulard" Fascist con-
spiracy later. Moreover, the Pc
culiar French form of parliamentary
government was creaking and the
bulk of the people had lost nearly
all faith in their leaders. This en-
abled Hitler (and MuSsolini as wel)
to keep up propaganda pressure,
often through the Communists, and
prevent the output in the armament
industries from ever reaching
satisfactory level.
The crucial test justified all Hit
ler's efforts: when the French SOL
diers had a chance of fighting on
equal terms they fought fairly well;
when nothing but heroism could
have made up for superior German
equipment, the French infantry, re-
peatedly deserted by their officers,
melted away.
What happened to the French Off
GERS? Simply this: for the most part
they had ceased to believe in free
dom, democracy or any of the slo-
gans which alone could galvanize the
entire country.
Hostile to Third Republic
While not exactly pro-Fascist (and
certainly not pro-German) they were
hostile to the third republic; many
had come to believe that an au-
thoritarian regime like that of Italy
and Germany was really preferable.
1t would, they thought, save the po-
sition of the privileged classes; and
really save France from the disagree
able necessity of defending itself. If
there was to be a war then let it be
against the Bolsheviks. In other
words, at least half and perhaps the
majority of influential French citi-
zens had come to believe what Hitler
wanted them to believe.
How had Hitler accomplished this?
BY patient activity. For years his
agents in France, Friedrich Sieburg,
the author, Otto Abetz, French"
con suls like Nolde, many others, had
worked" the French leaders. When
necessary they were assisted by
beautiful women ;the Baroness Won
Einem, the Princess con Hohenlohe
and others of lesser brilliance. They
Got in" with certain of those lead
ing French women who, at the mo-
ment of defeat, exercised such a
devastating influence on certain
French statesmen. They went every
where, saw everybody, came to know
everything, dipped into French poll
tics through scandalously venal
French newspapers. To the weak and
cynical they preached defeatism; to
the unsuccessful, hatred Of the Jew;
TO all the possibility Of living on good
terms with Germany, If only France
would break relations with the Boil
sheviks and money minded" Britain,
cease meddling in central and east
ern Europe and propitiate the Ital-