Evening star., 1940-05-18
'Adxonce or Die


For the second time In twenty-six
years a French Army, fighting a
desperate battle in defense Of the
homeland, has been ordered by its
commander-in-chief to advance If
it can or, failing that, to stand and
die rather than retreat again.
AS in 1914, the invading German
forces appear to be routing the de-
tenders. The Little Maginot Line
has been preached at Sedan and a
deep pocket driven into French ter
ritory and, farther north, Brussels
and Louvain apparently have fallen
to superior German forces. In 1914
the military situation looked almost
equally as hopeless for the French
but they made a magnificent stand
at the first battle Of the Marne and
stopped the Kaiser's forces. VIII
they, with their British allies, be
able to repeat that feat in 1940?
The answer, of course, cannot be
given with any certainty, but it is
obvious that there is no basis now
for optimism.
This time the Germans appear to
have two tremendous advantages
over the defending armies. First,
they have undeniable superiority in
the air, and, second, 1t seems that
their armored forces are better than
anything the defenders have been
able to put against them.
The Germans in 1914 were stopped
through combination of their own
blunders and some well-planned
maneuvers on the part of the allies
which enabled them to rectify earlier
mistakes. The German campaign in
1914 was based on the Schlieffen
plan calling for a wide sweeping
movement into France through Bel
gium. The German left was held
stationary to serve as a pivot while
the right, supposed to have been
kept strong at all costs, was to out
flank the French left and surround
the defending troops.
At the outset everything went well
for the Germans. The first army,
under Kluck, worked to the west
of the Franco-British forces, which
retreated hastily to escape being
flanked. If the Schlieffen plan had
been strictly followed, Kluck, when
he arrived north of Paris, would have
swept behind the city, widening his
f1anking movement against the re-
treating allied troops. But instead
he passed in front of Paris, to it's
east. And, in addition, the German
high command had not obeyed the
aging Schlieffen's supposed admoni-
ton to keep the right strong"
The French, meanwhile, had been
attacking on their own right, but
when they realized their acute
danger they abandoned that often
sive and General Joffre hurriedly
dispatched troops to the west where
they were formed into the French
Sixth Army and stationed on the
left wing of the weakening British.
This Sixth Army, under General
Manoury, was driven by Kluck to
the protection of the Paris forts.
But when Kluck swept east of Paris
instead of going to the west, Gen.
eral Manoury, reinforced from the
Paris garrison, attacked the German
west wing and the Tanker was out
fanked. Kluck turned back to meet
this threat, causing a gap of some
thirty miles between the German
First Army and the Second, under
Buelow. Into this gap marched the
British Army and the French Fifth
Army. Kluck, who had been weak
ened by the sending of troop detach-
ments to Belgium, fell back again
and Buelow, fearing the significance
of this maneuver, also retreated. The
invaders communications had be-
come dangerously extended and in
the confusion the German general
staff ordered what many military
students believe was an unnecessary
general retreat.
AS result, the Germans were
stopped and Paris was saved. But
there is no real parallel between
conditions now and those prevailing
In 1914, The next few days should
tell the story.