Imperial Valley press., 1940-09-04
Destroyer Trade
Makes Invasion of
Britain Unlikely
BY ]. w. T. MASON
United Press War Expert

Acquisition by Great Britain of
30 American destroyers increases
British command of the channel
so decisively that it should give
preponderant weight to the opinion
of those German generals who
have been advising Hitler against
an invasion. The destroyers too will
strengthen security of the British
convoy system. Augmented British
sea power in the Mediterranean
will further jeopardize reinforce
ments of men and supplies for an
Italian campaign in North Africa.
Hitler and Mussolini now will
have to revise their former strategy
based on depletion of the British
destroyer fleet. Once the American
ships get into action, Hitler can
hold no serious hope for even mo-
derate success for his starvation
blockade. Losses of British mer-
chant shipping henceforth should
be reduced considerably while pass
ing through the submarine zone.
A United Press correspondent
who had been eight days with a
convoy of 80 merchantmen report
ed Tuesday that the escort con-
sisted of only one destroyer and
smaller auxiliary craft. The con-
voyed ships stretched out for Is
miles, which would require three
destroyers to guarantee security.
These now will be available and
the intensity of the strain on a
single destroyer crew will be dimin-
ished, thus adding to efficient
guardianship.
An attempted invasion of the
British Isles must be planned on
the assumption of no serious at
tack upon transports while cross
ing the channel Large warships
operating in the narrow channel
waters, run serious danger because
of lack of adequate maneuver
space.
Speedy destroyers able to twist
and turn at will are the natural
challengers of an invading fleet.
A flotilla of American ships rein
forcing the British destroyers and
armed speed boats might we'll scat
ter and drive back German trans
ports in midchannel engagements,
making a landing in force impos-
sible.
In the Mediterranean the prob
lem of a major Italian expedition
from Libya directed against Egypt
and Suez, largely concerns con-
tinuous contact with the home
bases. A lengthy campaigns would
require replenishment of troops,
munitions, and food from Italy.
American destroyers could hamper
the Italians to point where Mus
solini might have to choose be-
tween remaining on the defensive
in Libya or sending forth his bat
tie fleet to risk all in an engage
ment with the first great line
British warships that repeatedly
have challenged him to come out
and fight for Mediterranean DOM
ination.
The effect of the American des-
troyer transfer on the morale of
Germans and Italians must be con-
sidered in estimating the value of
the reinforcement. Hitler and
Mussolini have repeatedly inform
ed their people that no effective
American aid to Britain could ar
rive before the war ended. This
promise has now been nullified,
for it is impossible to deny effec-
tiveness of the sudden strengthen
ing of the British fleet by the ad-
dition of nearly twice the number
of destroyers thus far lost in the
war.
Furthermore, the Italians and
Germans inevitably will be uneasy
and confused through not know
ing whether further unanticipated
aid to Britain from the western
hemisphere will be Forthcoming II
necessary. Depressing reactions OF
this kind are natural and certain.
They may have an eventual bearing
ON outcome of the war.