Evening star., 1940-05-22
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

verse side. It is a decision which
the British, too, must face. The
Germans report that already the
British are moving down to Calais,
Boulogne, Ostend for re-embark-
ment. for return to England. Are
the British to abandon the Con-
tinent, leaving France to her fate?
1t seems hardly possible. Yet the
British Expeditionary Force now in
Belgium and France is all the really
ready army which Britain has: and
she may face invasion herself before
many days are over. Again, the
first responsibility of commander
in chief, of government, is to its
own nation. @
Command Of Straits.
I can offer no better exposition OF
the situation than an extract from
a paper submitted by Sir John
French. as chief of the imperial de-
fense shortly before the outbreak OF
the last World War: .4s
II think it will be allowed"
wrote Sir John, that, in a war be-
tween ourselves and a great CONT
mental power which is in possession
of the eastern Channel coast line
between Dunkerque and Boulogne,
submarines, assisted by aircraft,
would effectually deny the passage
of the Straits of Dover to any war
or other vessel which was not sub
mersible. In fact, the command of
the sea, in so far as this part of the
Channel is concerned. would not
depend upon the relative strength
of the opposing navies, but would
remain in dispute until one side or
the other effected practical destruc-
ton of its adversarys' aircraft and
submarines.
"The way would then lie open to
the power which had gained this
advantage to move an invading
force of any size in comparative
safety across the Straits at any
part of the coast between (say)
Ramsgate and Dungeness on the
one side and Dunkerque and Bou-
logne on the other.
THE command Of these Straits
would be a contest between sub
marines and aeroplanes -
IF the Continental powers secured
the command they would possess the
great advantage of menacing US
with Goth century edition Of the
stroke Napoleon intended to deal
against us from Boulogne in 1905.
Strong Bridgehead.
ITO put the matter briefly: hold
that the Straits Of Dover, regarded
as a military obstacle to the in
vasion Of this country, will, in the
not far distant future, altogether
lose their maritime character. and
the problem OF their successful pas
sage by an invading force will pre-
sent features somewhat resembling
those involving the attack and de-
fense Of great river lines or opera
tions on the Great Lakes in q war
between Canada and the United
States.
"The main object to be attained
in trying to secure the passage Of q
great river line is to gain possession
of the opposite bank and establish
strong bridgehead.
TN accordance with the views
enunciated in this paper, apply
the same principle to the Straits of
Dover, and hold that the only reli-
able defense against powerful
attack by hostile aircraft and sub
marines in vastly superior numbers,
is to possess strong bridgehead
on the French coast with an ef-
fective means of passing and re-
passing across the straits which
would only be secured by the pro-
jected channel tunnel"
In quoting from the above paper
in his book, 1914" Sir John adds:
"It was just about now (September
16, 1910 that I began to conceive
the idea of disengaging from the
Aisne and moving to position in
the north, for the main purpose Of
defending the channel ports" Later
on, in the same book, after this
shift had been effected, he says:
1.-The stakes for which We were
playing at the great Battle of Ypres
were nothing less than the safety,
indeed the very existence, Of the
British Empire"
Message to King.
These are solemn words and well
weighed. It is only necessary to add
that yesterday afternoon. accom-
panied by the Prime Minister, Gen.
Sir Edmund nonside, chief Of the
imperial general stan, was received
In audience b. ths King ct BuckinS-
ham Palace after dispatchas had