Evening star., 1940-11-03
Crete's Position of Strategic Value
British Could Use Island to Block Enemy Naval Action
And Check Italian Reinforcements, Moi. Eliot Says
By MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

While it must be emphasized tllat
It still is too early to reach con-
elusive opinions, all that has hap
pened so far in the progress OF the
Italo- campaign reinforces
the opinion, expressed in my article
of Tuesday, that the Italians may
well have made a serious mistake
in bringing Greece into belligerent
status at this particular moment.
While the reported arrival OF
British forces at Salonika and Corfu
is not confirmed, it does appear that
the British have. occupied Crete
and possibly Kephalonia. The
italian drive in the northwest
meanwhile, appears to be making
little II any progress and there
are even circumstantial reports OF
a Greek counter-attack endanger-
ing the communications OF the
italian advanced elements.
Turkeys firm attitude has, for the
moment at any rate, apparently
held Bulgaria in check, though, OF
course, Bulgaria alone, and Bull
garia with German armies on her
soil. may prove entirely dlf1erent
military factors. For the moment,
We may examine the situation on
its face value-an exchange by the
Italians of a little territory on tne
Albanian frontier for a British oc-
cupation of Crete.
It is an exchange definitely and
decidelv to the disadvantage OF
italy. For a long time there has
been a school of thought in Great
Britain-to which Admiral OF the
Fleet Lord Chatfield gave express
sion in a speech this week-which
has held that Italy is the weak
partner in the axis, and that a
direct and violent assault on Italy
would produce far-reaching re-
suits. Such an assault could not be
made. of course, lacking adequately
placed bases for the purpose.
Gibraltar and Alexandria, the chief
British bases in the Mediterranean,
are both too far away. Malta mas
been neutralized to some extent by
its nearness to Sicily and by the IN
ability of the British to assign
sufficient air force to this base.
Crete Has Useful Harbors.
But Crete is another matter.
Crete is a big island, 100 miles long.
It is mountainous for the most part
but has fiat valleys and plateaus
capable of supporting several ar
dromes. It has one. first-rate har-
bor. Suda Bay, with adequate
sheltered anchorage for the whole
British Mediterranean fleet. 1t has
smaller harbors useful for nght
craft and seaplanes. 1t has war
like population of some 100000, and
o garrison of $4,000 regular Greek
troops, to which may be added
double that number, at least, OF
trained reseryists.
It's position is of great strategic
value. It dominates the whole
Aegean Sea-: A superior seapower
based in Crete can interdlct any
naval operations in that sea, can
prevent any reinforcements (save by
air. proceeding to the Italian bases
in the Dodecanese. British long
range bombers, operating from the
central valley of Crete, can strike
at Rhodes sfnd Leros 600 and $50
miles distant, respectively. II is
hard to see how these isolated bases
can continue to be useful to Italy
under these conditions. 1t is ike
wise hard to see how Germany can
establish air power in the Aegean
Islands while Britain holds Crete;
this is checkmate to German plans
for aiding, by air.. the Italian thrust
at Egypt, always provided Britain
can maintain sufficient air strength
in this region to be equal to all
eventualities.
II is likewise hard to see how
Italv. even if she succeeds IN oc-
cupying the northern half of Greece,
can hope to advance into the Pelo-
ponessus and obtain air bases from
which Crete might be neutrallzed
The difficulties of the terrain, the
need for maintaining a flow OF
communications across the narrow
Isthmus of Corinth or else by
water across the Gulf of Patras, and
the support of British air forces to
the Greek resistance would seem
obstacles that the Italians will not
be likely to overcome, at least with
out German aid.
Problem in Checking Army.
1t must be kept in mind that
the Greek problem-or rather the
Greco-British problem-is not the
defeat of the whole italian Army.
It is rather the checking of that
Part of the italian Army which can
be concentrated in, and supported
and supplied from the Italian pro-
tectorate of Albania. The lines OF
communication are roads which are
little more than mountain trails for
the most part, running through a
country which is little adapted to
mechanical warfare, and offers
small opportunities for any air.
ground blitzkrieg such as the Ger
mans used on the plains of Poland
and in the rolling hills of France.
British experience on the northwest
frontier of India, French experience
in the Riff, does not suggest that air
power can, in such terrain, have
the effect which can be obtained
from it in more open country.
But turning from destructive op-
portunities, what of Crete as base
for offensive action?
The most immediate peril to Italy
Is the threat to the seaborne lines of
communication of its army in Africa.
While Egypt has been repeatedly re-
inforced from Great Britain, India,
South Africa and Australasia, Libya
is dependent on line of commune
cations running across the Mediter-
ranean Sea which has been fire.
quently raided by the British feet
from Alexandria. Move the advance
L. a..