Evening star., 1940-12-27

AS a result OF Ma!. u. Fieio'hS Ehot'
that bit of strategical imbecillty,
the initiative in the Mediterranean
area was wrested from the axis by
the British, and 1T is now question
of how far the British can compel
the axis to conform to British
moves in that theater; of how far
it will be necessary for Germany,
in particular, to 60 in aiding Tot
tering Italy and how far such as
siStance to Italy will impair Ger
many's possession of the initia-
tive, which she still retains against
Britain in the decisive Atlantic
theater of war.
In yesterdays article, I pointed
out that it was very likely that Ger
man Intervention in the Mediter-
ranean, if it came, would come prin-
cipally in Spain-no doubt with ex-
cursions and alarums in other
theaters meanwhile in order to dis
tract attention and divide British
forces and efforts.
Where Will Germany Strike?
Indeed, the present situation is
very clear demonstration of the
fact that whatever has happened
to Italy, Germany heSself still
possesses that priceless advantage
of the initiative; every one is con-
cerned with one question: Where
will Germany strike next?
Will it be the "all-out" blow
against Britain, regardless of italian
disaster? Will it be preceded by a
Mediterranean thrust intended to
offset the British and Greek sue
cesses in that theater? The Ger
mans are skilled in the art of
maintaining such distracting un-
certainties-indeed, of manufacture
ing them. This use of the initiative
is not the least of its advantages.
and is made the more effective by
the fact that Germany is centrally
located power, able to strike outward
in any direction, and with a govern
ment in full control of all channels
of news and information. But there
is another field in which Germany
may decide to strike first of all.
In a recent article. I pointed out
that the battle of Britain, the
really crucial battle of this war. is
really three battles: Cd The battle
of production, in which the United
States is taking an active and in
creasing part; 90 the battle of
transportation. in which we seem
likely to take greater part as time
goes on, and 49, the battle OF
combat, in which we are hoping not
to be involved by reason Of our
effective contributions to the other
two. But behind all these battles,
and affecting them all, is still an
other which, for want of better
word, we may call the battle of
morale. In this battle as in the
others, the possession of the initia-
tive is of primary Importance, and
the present leaders of Germany are
extraordinarily skillful in making
use of their advantages in this field
Peace Offensive" May Surprise.
Not only do they contrive to keep
every one uncertain as to their next
military move, thus insuring them
selves at least in some measure the
benefits of surprise when the move
does come, but they are also able
to effect surprise in the political
field. The outcome of the present
German French discussions may
provide one such surprise. Another
may lurk in the sudden appearance
of the so-called peace offensive" :"
This may bear some extended ex-
animation, for it contains terrifying
possibilities.
Prior 20 Mussolinis incredible
blunder in Greece, and the swift
and effective exploitation thereof by
the British, there existed very good
reason to suppose that the end OF
this year might be marked by a
strong peace offensive" from Ber-
lin; that very generous terms might
be offered to Great Britain, terms
which, while leaving Hitler in con-
troll of Central Europe, would re-
store France Qess Alsace Lorraine)
and might even involve German
evacuation of the Low Countries
and Scandinavia. In the colonial
field, Germany might for the mo-