Evening star., 1940-02-11

ACt11lS Vic CAAl1AS1I SACudtAOl AI t1AC
north. Once Murmansk was in the
hands Of the expedition, 1t should be
possible to advance some distance
down the railway, with Finnish sup
port, and the destruction of all Rus
sian forces operating of the railway
toward and across the Finnish FROM
tier would be pretty nearly certain.
But this would take time, since the
distances are great and the capture
of adequate rolling stock at MUIR
mansk uncertain. 1t would not profit
Finland much, If meanwhile the
Russians broke through the Man.
nerheim line and took Viipuri.
If. therefore, when the expedition
is of Petsamo, it appears that the
situation on the Karelian Isthmus
and Immediately north of Lake
Ladoga is critical, 1t might be con-
sidered that the expeditionary troops
were more urgently needed in that
area. In such q case, the recapture
of Petsamo, aided by the fragmen-
tary Finnish forces which are ap-
parently still in that neighborhood,
would be much less risky and din
cult task than an assault upon Mur-
mansk. From Petsamo, always pro-
viding that ample motor transport
had been brought along, the expedi-
tionary force could move by the
Arctic road to Rovaniemi, and thence
by rail to South Finland.
Would Open Supply Line.
A sufficient garrison to assure the
safety Of Petsamo could be left be-
hind and thereafter there would be
open a direct supply line by which
further reinforcements and supplies
could enter Finland without bring
ing into question the neutrality of
Scandinavian states or giving Ger
many any chance Of interfering, save
by naval operations in the North Sea
This latter plan would also leave
to one side the thorny question of
direct attack on Russian territory.
There remains, however, the ques-
ton Of the final result of these alter
native operations. For immediate
purposes, the latter would mean
when all was said and done, only q
reinforcement of $4,000 men for the
Finnish defenses In the south. The
maximum force which, considering
the lines Of supply, the Russians can
employ north of the lake is probably
four of their large divisions, or To-
600 men-perhaps somewhat less
South Of the lake, on the isthmus
they cannot deploy at one time more
than five or six divisions.
Would Relieve Tired Units.
The Firms have six and q halt
mobile divisions, plus fortress troops
and militia. The addition Of two
or three divisions might enable the
Firms to give some of their tired
units some measure of relief and
rest, might for the time being re-
lieve them from the necessity OF
bleeding one front to reinforce the
other. But If the Russians kept up
their war of attrition, such a rein
forcement might purchase delay, but
could not give the assurance of VIC
tory-unless it were promptly fol-
lowed up by more troops and more
supplies.
An advance from Murmansk, il
resolutely pressed on straight down
the railway, would eventually bring
the communications and rear of the
Russian forces north of Lake Ladoga
into peril; If it reached Petrosavodsk
the Russians would be compelled
either to abandon all enterprises
north Of the lake, or make a de-
termined effort to dislodge and de-
stroy the newcomers. Certainly the
pressure on the Mannerheim Line
would be relieved for the time be-
ing, If it could hold out long enough
to enable the expeditionary force to
advance 50 far.
Political questions aside, therefore
the Murmansk advance Is the better
from the military point Of view pro-
vided-and this is a very definite
proviso-the Firms are certain to
hold their fortified lines for q suf-
f1cient length Of time. If this seems
doubtful, the quicker route must be
adopted. A further consideration
might Of course be the capture Of
German shipping in Murmansk, and
the depriving Of the Russians OF
their only ice-free Arctic port; q
possible submarine and raider base.
But since the main purpose Of such
an expedition, the only purpose that
could justify so much effort and
risk, must be the saving of Finland,
the time factor is paramount, and
Finnish necessities the criterion by
which the course Of the expedition
must be decided. It may be well to
add that one tremendous asset In
favor of such an effort IS the fact
that Gen. Sir Edmund Ironside,
chief Of the British imperial general
stan, was commander Of the North
Russian expedition Of 1o18-1o and il
thoroughly acquainted with the ter
rain, weather and general condi-
tions under which the troops would
have to operate. -
(copyrikht. 1910. b. Nsw York Herald.
Tribune. 1nc)