Evening star., 1940-02-18
America Keeps Its Powder Dry
For Action in This Hemisphere
Administration Is Sympathetic to Allied Cause But
Sees Preparation for Any Eventually in
Either Ocean as First Duty
By Constantine Byoyn.

division). These troops are idle, but
trained to the eyelashes.
On the French side there are 30 home
divisions and 20 colonial, all effective SOL
diers. The British had six partly-trained
divisions on the Maginot Line at the
end Of 1885, There are many more diu-
sions in formation both In the United
Kingdom and in the rest Of the empire,
but these are wholly unframed men.
There are also three Czecho-Slovak and
Polish divisions on French territory, but
their military value is considered by ex-
perts as negligible.
Italy Can't Be Discounted.
The battle front extends from the
North Sea to Switzerland and the ratio
Of forces at the present time is approx
imately three allied divisions to five Ger
man.
Furthermore, the allies have by no
means an assurance that Italy will re-
main neutral. Italy, Mussolini and other
Fascists leaders repeatedly have en-
phasized, Is not a neutral but a mon
belligerent" waiting for developments.
This compels the French to keep their
best troops (the Alpine Corps on the
Italian border and also makes it neces-
sary to maintain important and reliable
garrisons in Corsica and Tunisia.
The British believe that the blockade
Of Germany is bound to drive the Reich
into action against the French and the
British, rather than drive them into
Southeastern Europe toward the Balkans
and eventually the Dardanelles.
The British General Staff maintains
that the explanation as to why the arms
factories at Essen, Skoda, Wiener-Neu-
stadt and whatever there was In Poland
are working "a hours day, Is to give
the army of the Reich an unlimited sup
ply of arms, ammunition, airplanes and
tanks, for relatively short but deadly
campaign. The first objective of the
Germans, so the British General Staff
is reported to believe, will be the British
ports-not necessarily the naval bases.
The Germans would want to destroy the
ports il which the British, French and
neutral merchantmen can put in and
thus prevent war material from the
SAAcSA ocoeSo dAAA ONCAoC i dW 1ldoCl idl
from reaching the British army and
civilian population. Coupled with that
will be an intense attack on a given
point between Switzerland and Holland,
where the Germans, thanks to their
numerical superiority, could concentrate
their main effort.
Fifty Per Cent Chance.
The chances OF success of such a move
according to best informed sources
are SO per cent A large ratio would lie
In the moral effect-of penetrating the
Maginot Line and the destruction of
British harbors-on the neutrals and
belligerents. Whether the percent.
age is accurate is immaterial. The main
factor so far as this administration is
concerned, is the effect it might have
on an uncertain Japan and an ex-
pectant Italy.
A failure on the part of the German
military machine might and possibility
would shake the confidence of the Ger
mans in Hitler. But they are concerned.
| There might be a change of men but not
Of regime. This consideration might
AAdhC A41eiCA' 1Co4Ldlt Uub llOt tllc 1eu.
eral Staff. If the strategists of the
| Reich-it must be emphasized that this
| Is the point of view of the British army,
as represented in Washington-feel that
an attack in April or May is anywhere
near fair risk, they will attack.
American military observers are
somewhat skeptical about this theory
which has reached them recently from
many influential British quarters. They
believe that the Germans will not risk
| anything as long as they can afford
| waiting game. They also believe that
the economic organization of the Bal
kans and the rest of Southeastern Eu-
rope is preoccupying the minds of the
German General Staff. There might be
q showdown with the Rumanians and
the Turks; showdown in which allied
and totalitarian forces will clash In q
struggle more spectacular and impor-
tant than the Finnish Russian war. But
no vital forces will be engaged there and
the Germans will do their utmost to
proceed methodically with the organ
ization on totalitarian basis OF those
states which are separated geographic
ally from their political allies.