Evening star., 1940-04-04
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
Eliot

!
with which the blow of an enemy
may fall. Still further is it en-
phasized, for the free peoples of the
world, by the obvious advantages
| possessed by dictator nations in the
concerting and preparation of mill
tary strokes, as against the hesita-
ton, discussion and uncertainty
which, to some extent at any rate,
seem inSeparable from the demo-
cratic process; and for the peaceably
inclined as against the aggressor, the
one hoping until the last that peace
may somehow be preserved, while
the other has resolved upon using
violence at predetermined moment.
Air Power Has Flexibility,
In the strategical aspect the value
of time is emphasized first by the
nature of the instruments of war
now available. and especially by the
| characteristics of air power. Within
its radius of action, air power pos
sesses a power of strategic concen-
tration, fexibility, which enables
| it to strike with concentrated force
at the objective most important at
the time Thus in the German cam
palgn against Poland, the German
ali force struck first at the Polish
air force, thus removing the posi-
bility of even limited reprisals: next
at Polish communications breaking
up the half-completed Polish mobil-
| ization; next at industrial centers
and targets of opportunity in the
field. 1t was first of all important
to prevent the Poles from hitting
back over Germany; there was still
time to break up their mobilization:
after that the air force could take
up the work of cooperating def
nitely with the advancing German
armies.
A change in the order of these
obJectlves, or a division of force
among them. or a failure to con-
centrate sufficient squadrons for
their accomplishment might have
seriously affected the outcome of
the campaign. For it was abso-
lutely essential that Poland should
be eliminated as a military factor
on Germany's eastern frontier be-
fore the completion of French mo-
bilization and British transit of the
Channel. Had the allies been able
to gain a state of readiness for
attack in the west while the Ger
man Army was still largely en-
gagged in Poland, disaster for Ger
many might have followed. Such
delay might have been produced
either by internal troubles in Ger
many, due. to series of Polish air
raids and consequent panic among
people accustomed to regard their
leadership as omnipotent, or by |
failure to seriously dislocate Polish |
mobilization, which would have re-
suited in much greater delay for
the German advance and perhaps
would have checked Russian en-
thusiasm for Intervention.
Needed to Prevent Intervention.
Similar considerations governed
the German attitude toward the
Russo-Finnish War. AS it became
apparent in Berlin that the allies
were really contemplating interven-
ton on large and possibly decisive
scale in the Finnish theater of oper-
atoms, it became of the first import
ance to prevent this. There was lit
tie hope of really stopping the allied
troop conveys at sea. An invasion
OF the Scandinavian peninsula, cer-
tainly at one time contemplated and
probably held in reserve as a last re-
sort If need be, was not in the best
interests of the Reich If it could be
avoided; strategically, because it
would create new battlefield and a
new drain on German resources,
economically because it would cut
of supplies of Swedish iron, timber
and other items. Diplomatic pres
sure backed by threats of military
atcion possibly prevail at Stockholm
and Oslo, but would not prevent the
allies from landing on the Arctic
coast OF Finland or Russia proper.
The best solution was a termina.
ton OF the Finnish war in a man
ner reasonably satisfactory to Mos
COW, yet preserving Finnish inde-
pendence as the price of Swedish
cooperation. But for this end the
prime necessity was a Russian mill
tary victory, lacking which Finnish
resistance would assuredly continue
as against any terms of peace Mos
COW could be induced to consider;
and If that resistance continued but
q few weeks longer the fat would be
in the fire.
In mid-January the state of al
lied preparation was such as to indi-
cate an extremely short period Of
time for decisive action on the
part Of Germany II the Baltic sit
uation was to be saved. It was on
January 16 that the French mill