Evening star., 1940-02-29
Security Of Waterway Not
Absolute, Says Eliot,
Despite Fortificutions
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
- ELIOT. t,s

are not generally understood by the
public at large. The canal Is hardly
likely to be attacked by a great over
seas expeditionary force. In the
Pacific it is much too far from any
base possessed by any major power
capable of landing such an attack.
In the Atlantic, the distances are
less though still prohibitive for prac-
tical purposes, and the canal Is COW
cred by our naval control over the
entrances to. the Caribbean Sea,
which, in the strategic sense, is
rapidly being converted into an
American lake. In any case the
garrison and defenses Of the canal
even now are such that to promise
success, an expedition of this sort
would have to be major effort,
involving large numbers Of troops
and ships, a strong supporting air
force and, above all, naval control
Of the ocean across which it was
launched. Lacking such control no
general staff in its senses would
think Of risking anything of the sort.
Attack in force being out of the
question, it follows that the major
premise of canal defense must be de-
tense against surprise. Here 1t may
be remarked that no attack of any
sort is likely to be made on the canal
with the object of getting possession
of it and using it. In the first place,
1t Is difficult to see what use could
be made of the canal by any foreign
power that would justify the risk in
volved. In the second place, the
canal being much closer to the seat
Of our national power than to any
other, if it were taken it could prob
ably not be held, nor its uninter-
rupted use enjoyed. In the third
place if about to be overwhelmed
our garrison would hardly be kind
enough to leave the canal in working
order to fall into enemy hands, Now
If the canal is attacked the object
will be the interruption Of traffic
through it. probably the interruption
OF American naval traffic and If the
attempt Is made it must be made by
surprise.
Initiative Up to Enemy.
Now the defense against surprise
of an inmovable object, lying well
outside the national boundaries, is
a complicated and difficult business.
First OF all, it confines the defend
ers to more or less static atti-
tude, at least until some hostile ac-
ton manifests itself. It abandons
the initiative to the enemy; the
first move is his. The best that
can be done is to provide against
every contingency that can be fore
seen, and then hope that no enemy
thinks Of something we have not
provided against. Only when the
enemy has shown his hand, or at
least played his first card, can we
take the offensive and begin our
counter action.
So far as may be foreseen the
means by which the canal may be
attacked by surprise, with a view
OF interrupting traffic through it
are: l. Sabotage or the action of
secret agents. 2. Naval lombard
ment of the locks. 3. Raiding par
ties. 4. Air attack.
Defense against sabotage and Sc
cret agents Is matter of eternal
vigilance, of guarding vital points,
Of keeping watch on suspicious char
acters, of controlling and guarding
rigidly the movements of foreign
ships through the canal. This is
being done, and done efficiently. No
such system is invulnerable, human
ingenuity and human frailty being
what they are; but the chances are
heavily against the success of any
attempt of the sort.
Defense against naval lombard
ment of the locks is provided by
long-range guns, bombing planes
and submarines. It is unlikely that
any admiral would risk his expen-
sive and irreplaceable batteships
within reach of these weapons on
the OF chance of damaging lock;
still less likely that the attempt
would succeed if made.
Attackers May Land in Panama.
Raiding parties to attack the
canal might be landed secretly on
the coast of the Republic of Pam
anna, or make their way there from
a neighboring country. But the
travelling is extremely difficult and
detection before reaching any vul-
nerable part of the canal almost
certain; especially as the raiding
party would have to be very
strong one. since it would have to
seize possession of a lock or spill
way dam against opposition, and
hold it long enough to place ex-
plosive charges to destroy it. Since
there are now three regiments of
infantry in the canal garrison, this
does not seem a promising method
of attack.
There remains air attack. To in
terrupt traffic through the canal by
bombing, both channels of one of
the locks must be destroyed, or a
spillway dam must be blasted open
to let the water out of Gatum Lake.
This is not q matter of q raiding
plane with two or three bombs. It
is . matter Of enough planes to pro-
duce sufficient concentration Of fire
to destroy massive concrete struc-
lures, which are less easily injured
by the detonation Of high explosives
against them in the open air than
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