Evening star., 1940-03-10
Failure Of Efforts
For Finnish Peace
Would Aid Allies
Maj. Eliot Sees Success
In Interest of Finland,
Reich, Soviet, Sweden
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

7, Reich, Soviet, Sweden
!. BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.
Almost every diplomatic move In
Europe these days has III military
implications or motives. Those Of
the present Russo Finnish armistice
negotiations are not difficult to an
alyze. Four nations are primarily
concerned-Russia, Finland, Ger
many, Sweden-with the Allies GER
tainly scarcely less interested.
Finland. having called up her last
or almost her last reserves, faced
with the prospect of further relent-
less pounding on the weakening
right fland of the Mannerheim Line,
with the spring thaws still weeks
away and with the fall Of Viipuri
imminent. might wen grasp at the
chance of reasonable peace If
one could be had on terms which
would not compromise her national
independence. This is not to say
that Finland is beaten; but her mill
tary future certainly depends, if the
war proceeds, on the measure of the
help she gets from outside. Her
own resources are very near exhaus-
ton, especially in the matter of
manpower. It may be the prospect
Of outside help. or the lack of 1t,
which will determine Finland's final
decision in the matter of an armis-
tice.
Sweden's position becomes more
difhcult with every day the Russo
Finnish war proceeds. Her people
and her government cannot regard
with other than the gravest anxiety
and the deepest sympathy the over
running Of Finland by Russia.
Sweden has no desire for Russia as
q neighbor either along her north
eastern frontier or along the op-
posite shore of the Gulf of Bothnia
and in the Aland Islands. The
popular pressure for giving aid to
the Firms has already resulted In
considerable UNOFFICIAL" action of
this sort, and there is evident, de-
spite the strict censorship, an in
creasing pressure for active Swedish
participation in the war on Finlands S
side. Were Finland and Russia the
only factors to be cos:dered, there
Is little doubt that this participation
would have long since taken place.
and very likely considering the
qualities of the Swedish fleet and
land forces) have been decisive of
the result.
Other Pressures on Sweden.
But there are other and external
pressures which the Swedes must
take gravely into account. On the
one hand, the allies are increasing
their insistence on sending through
Swedish territory not only supplies,
but troops to Finland's assistance.
On the other hand, Germany
much closer to Sweden and a much
more Immediately formidable fac
tor in Swedish calculations-is
threatening dire results if Sweden
permits the allies to do any such
thing, Is, indeed, demanding that
Sweden stop helping the Firms her
self.
CIhe Associated Press reported
from London last night that
Sweden had put up to the Brit
ish government the alternatives
Of sending a large-scale force to
aid Finland or sending none at
all, and that If the allies attempt
ed to dispatch a moderate-sized
army across Swedish territory 1t
would be resisted by every effort
short of war;
Obviously, from the Swedish
viewpoint, the best possible solu-
tion would be a termination of the
war. which would enable her to
resume her neutral status, remove
the fear of becoming an allied Ger
man battlefield, and relax the strain
OF aiding Finland-provided always
that the war could be ended on
such terms as would leave Finland
q strong and independent state and
would exclude Russia from such
threatening positions as Hanko.
Terms which would in effect de-
stroy Finnish independence would
be direct menace to Sweden, and
would certainly not be acceptable
to the Swedish people.
From the German viewpoint, also,
termination of the war on reason
able terms Is the most satisfactory
solution for the moment. First, it
deprives the allies of any further
excuse for seeking to interfere in
the affairs of Northern Europe, an
interference which threatens to ex-
tend allied military power into areas
where it would be a deadly menace
to Germany. The specter of the
allies In the Baltic is one which
haunted German strategists In the
last war, and is far nearer realiza-
ton today than ever in 19l4-1S,
despite the fancil plans of "Jacky"
Fisher. Next, from the economic
angle, the assured supply OF Swed-
ish iron ore is necessary to Ger
man industry, and is far more cer-
tain while Sweden remains neutral
than 1t would be were Sweden a
belligerent on either side.
Russia May Turn Enemy.
Too considerable a Russian ad-
vance toward the Gulf of Both1ia
cannot be satisfactory TO Germany
in the long view. The Russians at
Hanko today may mean the Rus
SLAMS in the Aland Islands tomor-
row, and these points directly COM
mand the water route which, as
the Ice clears, becomes the prin-
cipal means of conveying to Ger
man ports the Swedish iron from
the north-a route increasing In
Importance as the allies show signs
Of interfering with the shore
hugging iron steamers coming down
the Norwegian coast from Narvik
While Russia may be Germany's
friend today, Russia may not al
ways remain 50.
Also, while Russia is compelled
to put forward q major military
ehor: to overcome Finland, she is