Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1940-11-25

cable from observers on the Greek,
If not the Italian, side. Further
sources of information, including a
talk with Greek officer now in
the United States, warrants the
conclusion that if the Greeks have
to fight only the Italians they can
very possibly hold out for many
months. Pursuing the tactics which
have been so signally successful
they can prevent Premier Musso-
lini's hosts from getting enough
elbow room to utilize his superiority
of numbers and his INFLAMMATION.
The Greeks went into action far
better prepared than was generally
known. Ever since the Italians &C.
cupation of Albania they knew they
were under the Italian threat. They
were preparing to meet it before
the war began. Not only had they
decided to fight, but they aligned
their destiny with that Of the Allies
If war came.
Their army had the advantage,
which means so much to the COM
mand in central planning, of know
ing just what its objective would be.
Before the war and after the war
began, until the battle of France,
they got arms from France and
later from Great Britain. They knew
just what aid they could expect
from England, once Mussolini
launched his attack.
Greek Bases Were Ready.
Britain could work out provi-
sional military arrangements with
an ally, instead of through diplo-
matte soundings with a little neu-
trail which was undecided whether
she would fight. Greek bases were
ready for immediate British occu-
patton.
The Greek Army, which was ex-
pected to stand on the defensive,
took the offensive.
This interested our Army, which
believes in the offensive. Eager for
any lessons out of the war valuable
to us. our officers wanted to profit
by those available in the use Of
arms and in tactics in the Albanian
mountains, very different terrain
from that Of Poland and the parts
Of France where the fighting was
heavy and decisive.
Britain and France had been able
to spare few planes and tanks for
Greece. They needed all they could
produce for their own air forces and
armies. Outnumbered in planes
10 to / and far more than that in
tanks, the Greeks would have to
depend preponderantly on gun fire
and rifle fire for defensive or often
sive striking power And so far
In the record Of this war this had
been a cruel handicap.
Different Enterprise.
But we learn that diving machine
gun fire over mountain ridges and
down into valleys to spray deployed
infantry Is an enterprise quite differ
ent from spraying infantry in close
order on a road or masses of refu-
gees, or people in panic in the
streets Of the fiat country of Flan-
ders Bombers have small targets
in soldiers crawling up a mountain
side or in the Greek villages and
small towns back Of the Greek Army
area, where the people scatter in
the fields when the siren sounds
Across our Western plains tanks
would have the same kind of spree
II not adequately opposed as in
Poland, or the rolling country be-
tween the Mouse and the sea in
France. But first they would have
to 60 through the Rockies or the
Alleghenies, and there they would
not get any farther than they have
in the Albanian mountains.
Normally in battle order they adj
vance and maneuver in the open.
On a road in line one is inefiectively
In front Of the other. A single
projectile which penetrates a tanks
armor may put it out Of action.
Witness the casualties among the
V~~~~V