Evening star., 1940-01-14
Po|ifico-Economic
Stress in War Too
Great, Says Eliot
kon-MiIitory Elements
Held Dangerous for
Military Honor
BY MAI. GEORGE ELIO1

ny MAJ. oLOn1E r. LL1o1.
Sometimes one wonders whether
the Importance in this modern world
of the economic and political fac
tors in war is not being overempha-
sized at the expense, indeed, to the
serious detriment, of the military
factors
War is, of course, political act,
the extension, as ClausewitZ says, of
state policy by forcible means. Ma
tions 60 to war for a political, or
perhaps a politico-economic, objec-
tive, whether 1t be to gain the pos
sessions of others or to defend pos
sessions of ones own. The military
objectives are but means to the
larger end, the military forces are
but the instruments of the national
purpose. Yet where armies and
navies have traditions of their own,
and are, indeed, little worlds apart,
instead Of being completely merged
in the life of the nation, in the
great all-embracing conception of
the totalitarian state, it may well
be that they are thereby better
adapted to the purposes of war.
The fine clear-cut conceptions Of
military duty and military honor
tend to become blurred 1t would
seem, by too complete integration
with military elements. The
profession Of arms, with all its
faults, has also its virtues and its
standards, and these have made no
inconsiderable contributions to the
victories of all the military powers
Of the earth.
Example of Lost Honor.
We have just had particularly
shocking example of the effect of
destroying the conceptions of mill
tary honor. 1t is reported from
the Karelian Isthmus front that the
Russians have set up loud-speakers
in front Of their positions, facing
the Finnish lines, into which they
have so completely failed to break
their way, and through these loud
speakers have demanded Finnish
surrender within 48 hours-"other-
wise the Germans will come"
The surrender they were not men
enough to enforce, Russian Army
now demands by threatening the
intervention of foreign army. The
old imperial Russian service was
pretty bad in many ways and Of
ficers were on the whole not the
best in Europe; but there were
plenty of them who, rather than
permit such dishonor as this to fall
upon their commands, would have
gone alone, sword in hand, into the
Finnish machine gun fire if no one
else would have followed them.
This, then, is what comes of put
ting political commissars alongside
of military commanders; this is the
fruit of the systematic destruction
Of every leader who shows initia-
tive and courage and self reliance
this unmanly threatening at safe
distance of men whom one dare not
meet on the field of battle. No won-
der the Russian attacks have failed; !;
no wonder their columns have crum-
pied in the North before the Finnish
counter attacks. Grim old Suvarov
must be turning in his grave, and the
shades Of Skobelen and Nikolai Nj
kolaievitch blushing with shame; not
by such means did Russian Armies
storm the redoubts of Plevna or scale
the icy slopes of the fortresses of
ErZerum
Work Of Politicians.
Av@N4rAv1f1N, x1yhn
ordered this disgraceful piece of
business-they must have been poll
ticians, they could not have been
soldiers, however degenerate-were
convinced of the superior efficacy of
propaganda as a weapon, of the
spoken word as a missile. 1t is a
conception perhaps natural to those
who have lost touch with the basic
ideas of war, of the relations of the
armed forces to the state, whose doc
trines merge every individual, every
resource, every thought into one
great totalitarian whole, inspired by
one idea, subservient to one will.
Such integration may have military
advantages when (aS In the Ma
poleonic empire) the central idea
and the central will are soldierly; it
may present military dangers when
they are not.
Indeed, there is very good reason
to guess that the initiation of the
attack on Finland arose from a po-
litical error in estimating the sit
uation; the error being that the po-
litical chiefs of the Kremlin' were
convinced that the Firms would yield
to the first demonstration of force.
They did not, and the Russian armed
forces were thereupon saddled for
reasons of political prestige) with a
task for which they had made little
If any preparation and were unable
to execute.
A similar political misconception
Is apparent in the German idea that
after Poland was destroyed peace
could be made in the west on the
basis Of the fait accompli; only in
Germany the army has succeeded in
retaining some measure of individ-
uality, OF retaining also the services
Of capable chiefs with ideas and
characters of their own, and there
fore still retains the chance of re-
deeming the political error.
Even, however, in non-totalitarian
states there appears to be danger in
allowing overemphasis on political
and economic measures of war-mak-
ing. These are important-they are
tremendously important. But where
they overshadow the military con-
ceptions they hold the seeds of peril
1t cannot have been comfortable
hearing for British officers and SOL
diers to be told by secretary OF
state for war that British troops
have always excelled in their abil-
ity to "outsit" an enemy. Regiments
whose colors bear upon them the
battle honors of Badajcz and Wit
toria Of Quebec and the relief of
Lucknow may we'll have found such
views difficult to understand.
Effect on Morale Important.
Translating this into the larger