The Wilmington morning star., 1940-05-06
Editorial Comments
From Other AnqIes
A LOST
New York Herald Tribune

The German got there first. That is the bit
ter kernel of Mr.. Chamberlain's confession yes
terday before the House of Under
the circumstances it is no doubt best to cut
the losses, get out and try something else.
Whatever the reason or extenuation, the Brit
ish have managed to repeat the first great err
ror of their Dardanelles campaign-they arrlv-
ed too late and in too little force. 1t argues
Something for their generalship if they are now
avoiding the second great error (and it was an
error committed again and again on other
World war battlefeldsl of trying to hang on
after the game is up, wasting reinforcements
by dribbling them along in quantities always
Just too small to reverse the decision. The Ger
mans have succeeded in wrecking the original
plan, based on the recapture of Trondhelm in
a pincers movement. Then better abandon it.
What remains? A good deal. The Allies have
succeeded in holding the Germans to only a
partial victory. Tie vital ore port of Narvik-
one of the most important single prizes OF the
whole operation-has apparently been saved,
and a bridgehead Of a sort apparently made
good at Namsos. This latter leaves certain pos
sibilities still open-such as that, suggested IN
this paper yesterday by Major Eliot, of forcing
Trondheim ford by naval attack-and means
that at worst the Germans hold over their con-
quest will be an uneasy one, on which they will
still have to exhaust energies that might be
more useful to them elsewhere. 1t is not easy
to see them consolidating important air or SUBJ
marine bases in the country under the circum-
stances, and except as an air or submarine
base, southern Norway is more a liability than
an asset.
But the wider r-epercussionS of the failure?
Mr.. Chamberlain reveals the Anglo French
naval concentration in the eastern Mediteran-
mean and hints at a possible direct German as
sault on the western front. This may be no
more than an attempt to divert domestic opin-
ion from the fiasco in Norway; it may be a COW
err concealing some new combination about to
be tried in that area; it may, of course, mean
that the British really believe that their failure
will trip the trigger, that Mussolini is about to
come in with an attack on Yugoslavia or Greece
and that Hitler, thinking he has now reduced
Allied prestige to its lowest, will launch a SUI
premeb bid for quick victory. If so, one can only
hope that this time the Chamberlain govern
ment will in fact be fully ready, if the Cham
berlain government survives.
For even if there are no such larger and ca
taStrophic repercusslonS, even after all allow
ances are made for the actual position in Nor
way, the fact remains that the Norwegian cam
paign does represent another failure. The Brit
ish were outrnaneuvered and got there too late,
just as Mr.. Chamberlain has been consistently
outmaneuvered and has arrived too late on so
many other occasions. That he can now sur
vive would seem impossible. Yet the old dilern-
ma arises, complicated by a new one. Who is
to replace him, and now, under war conditions,
can a democracy assess the real responsible
ity? Churchill is now tarred with the Norwe-
gian brush along with his chief, unless he can
prove that he was overruled. But how. in the
midst of a critical campaign, can the wheels
be taken apart to find where the sand NAV
really be-whether in poor intelligence work
bad staff arrangements, political interference
from above, incompetence or tinidity in the