The Wilmington morning star., 1940-07-06
Interpreting The War
Continued From Page One)

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and over which her armies of &C.
cupation are thinly spread.
Berlin's recognition of that is dis
closed in the steady flow of dis
patches recording Nazi efforts at
Cancellation and appeasement in
German-occupied France, in the
low countries and in Norway. It
is the dominant undertone of Ber-
lin press %insistence that England
must and will be crushed without
delay to insure stability of the
new order which Hitler proposes for
Europe.
It follows logically, therefore
that Britain need have small i'm
mediate concern over the Petain
government reaction to her stroke
to eliminate the French navy as
a potential factor of mortal dam
ger for her. London must be much
more concerned with the reaction
of French and world public opinion.
Mass opinion in conquered
France is muzzled. 1t can be guess
ed. But the reaction is clearly
favorable to Britain in the West
ern hemisphere, and in still neu-
trail fragments of Europe. 1t sets
down British elimination of the
French navy as essential and as
at least an important negative vic
tory in the grim struggle.
A taste of victory is particular
lv sweet in British mouths at this
critical junction, although achieved
at the somber price of British she'd
ding of French blood for the first
time in nearly a century. It tends
to hearten national fighting spirit
as well as to bolster world belief
that Britain can and will fight to
the bitter end.
There may well be other roper
cussions, too, from this demonstra-
ton of British sea power still inn
posing its massive strength be-
tween the Axis allies and complete
victory IN Europe.
l. Significant
It may prove significant that ru-
mors of new Russian demands on
Rumania synchronized with the
British action against the French
fleet.
Despite insistence of the Moscow
press that Russia's %incursions into
southeastern Europe are aimed at
France-British "Warmongers'', not
at Germany, Britain must be the
beneficiary and Germany the vic
tim of internal disorders or war in
the Balkans.
Nazi concentrations for attack on
England are affected to the extent
that Germany must man her east
ern and southeastern frontiers
watchfully against Russia's uncer-
tain purposes and motives.
German air power is the wea-
pom on which Berlin must rely
primarily in the West. Without
an overwhelming Nazi air superb
GRITTY to fear, Britain still could
laugh behind the steel walls of her
ships of war at Germany's threats
of invasion. She could still have
confidence in her ability to pre-
vent a blockade by Nazi under-sea
craft alone.
Yet at the moment when Hitler's
generals are mapping their final
drive against Britain, they r con-
fronted with t h e necessity
of scattering their Wanted air pow
er. They must hold some substan-
tia1 part of it in the East in readi-
ness for whatever may happen
there.
That may account for the rela-
lively small air force which has
engaged in the persistent bomb
ing attack on England. It may ac-
count, also, for the fact that 'Bri-
ish bombers have apparently
found it as easy to reach objec-
tives in distant Germany as their
Nazi rivals have found it to blast
at now nearby England.
There is an obvious essential
difference in the type of planes up
on which the cross-chanrel foes
count most for victory. Germany
must have bombers for her at.
tack, and reserve her d~og-fghters
to protect her own essential air
and submarine bases. England
needs fighters to intercept raid
ing Nazi bombers, and can spare
her bombers for counter ra1ding.
Fighters can be produced fair
ly quickly and call for less man
power in action than bombers. That
like her fleet, is an asset for Bri-
tain