Evening star., 1940-03-31

won by the numerically weaker side:
Sometimes through the skill of the COM
mander in playing on his opponents
nerves; sometimes through the. folly Of
q commander in shattering his troops
against strong position or leading them
into trap; sometimes because the NOM
inally weaker side possessed a superior
weapon or tactical technique which null
lifted the weight Of numbers; sometimes
because one side is definitely weaker in
morale.
National pride. everywhere, would en-.
courage the idea that the last type would
be the most common. but in historical
reality 1t has been the least frequent.
Subject to this qualification, a good case
can be made for the view that quality
counts for more than quantity on the
battlefield.
Three-to-One Margin Needed.
In the last war, we had majority Of
the great powers on our side in the first
year, unlike today, and only gained the
upper hand in the fourth year after
Americas weight was thrown into the
balance. Examination of that experience
led our official history to the conclusion
that IN war between foes of similar
callber numbers approaching to /
are required to turn the scale decisively."
1t is easy to see without an expert eve.
that there is no prospect of the required
superiority OF force on the horizon of this
War-and more than risk of doubling
Germany's strength by driving Russia
into her arms.
The absence of the odds needed for
victory in the field is also, unfortunately.
an obstacle to the chances of a moral
collapse in Germany or of a revolt
against the Nazi regime. There seems to
be general agreement among neutral OBJ
servers that neither of these possibilities
can be anticipated unless and until the
German forces have suffered a reverse
too plain for their propaganda and GEN.
sorshlp to conceal. And this view is SUD-
ported by the general experience that
successful uprisings against an author
itarlan regime have usually been the
sequel to, rather than the cause of, mill
tary failure.
Our statesmen ought, in the first
place, to concentrate on hammerinp into
the Germans minds, by every possible
means, the iron logic of the present Sit
uation-that they have no more prospect
OF winning this war than we have, so
that both peoples will be losers from its
continuance. They are much more likely
to see that plain fact if we do not OBJ
scure it by cloudy talk of ultimate vic
tory. And once their eyes are opened,
they are more likely to realize its logical
mpllcation-that, as the present occu-
piers of other peoples territory, it lies
with them to find an acceptable basis
of peace.
Dynamic Peace Plan Needed.
1t will not harm our peoples morale
to hear that decisive victory is inprob-
albeit is proverbial that they give their
best when they know the worst. and
nothing braces them like a cold shower.
The German people. being always more
carefully screened from the truth, are
more susceptible to its chilling impact.
So if spreading realization of the fu-
tlllty OF seeking victory weakens any,
bodys resistance, that effect is much
more likely to be on their side
To hasten the process, however, it is
important to produce something more
than even the strongest of negative ar
guments We need creative idea. Our
thought should be directed, without de-
lay, toward evolving a constructive and
dynamic peace plan that will have pos
Tive appeal for the mass of the people
IN the opposing country, as we'll as IN
our own. 1t should 60 further than
merely to convince them that by peace
they can avoid losing what they already
enjoy. 1t should be of a nature shat
will show them that they have mucn to
gain, individually and collectively, from
sharing in such peace. To that end,
Its design must meet not only the need
for national security, but the individuals
need for economic security.
Nothing would have more promise of
curing the German peoples inclination
to support a policy of aggression, or be
better tonic to our own people.
(Reeased BY North American Newspaper Al
lance Inc)