Evening star., 1940-04-26
BY MAJ. GEORGE F. ELIOT.

I think it may be well to keep in
mind that up to the present the land
| fighting in Norway between German
and allied forces has been of what
may be called a preliminary ma
ture-in general, a race by advance
guards and detached motorized ele-
ments to seize important key posi-
tions for larger forces which may be
expected to come after them.
Owing to the rugged Norwegian
terrain and the resultant dearth of
communications, these key points, If
they command important rail or
road routes, are likely to be of pro-
portionately greater value than in
less difflcult country.
The allied objective for this phase
OF the campaign is the port of
Trondheim. This they need because
it is a well-equipped sea base
through which they can pour large
army with all its heavy equipment
into Norway. A road system and
two railways connect Trondheim
with the Norwegian capital, and
there is also road and rail connec-
ton into Sweden.
Must Be Attacked by Land.
But Trondheim is held by the
Germans, and its sea approaches
are narrow, difficult and commanded
by the fort OF Agdenes. Hence the
place must be attacked by landing
forces at nearby points and ad-
vancing overland, which the noun
famous nature of the country makes
difficult. The British chose two such
points for landing. both at the
termini OF branch railways-Namsos,
to the north Of Trondheim; Aanda-
lsnes, to the south.
Reports have been circulating that
the British force landing at Namsos
has sustained a major disaster at
Steinkjer. northeast of Trondheim.
This conclusion seems unjustified,
and it may be well to point out what
has probably happened.
Steinkjer is an important key
point in the defense of Trondheim
against attack from the north. Here
the railway from Namsos, and both
highways from that point, cross
bridges over the upper reach of
Trondheim Fjord. The rail dis
tance from Namsos to Steinkjer is
about 80 miles, the line following
a circuitous route via Grong. One
road parallels the railway, another
cuts straight across the uplands. BY
this latter road the distance be-
tween the two points is only SO
miles.
The Orthodox Procedure.
Namsos is a small port without
docks, cranes or other modern
cargo-handling equipment. In land
ing troops at such a place it is i'm
perative first Of all to send ashore
lightly equipped infantry to estab-
lish what is called a beach head"
to clear away any enemy parties
in the vicinity and to take up de-
fensive positions protecting the
landing place from attack. When
this has been done larger forces
may be sent ashore.
The problem of advancing from
Namsos toward Trondheim had to
be considered in terms of the avail
able motor equipment, which would
consist of what was brought along
and could be landed under the pre-
vailing conditions, and what was
available ashore from Norwegian
sources probably not very much);
and in terms of the available rolling
stock on the Namsos- -Trondheim
railway Some of this was, of course,
captured by the Germans along with
Trondheim, so that again not much
could have been ready at Namsos
for allied use. The German air at
tacks directed against the port and
ships undoubtedly delayed and COM
plicated the arrangements of the
allied commander.
But one point was undoubtedly
clear in his mind from the first, and
that was that any advance toward
Trondheim must 60 through Steink-
jer. His decision was, apparently, to
send two lightly equipped battalions
over the muddy, slush-clogged road
to occupy a bridge head south of
Steinkjer and endeavor to hold this
key communications point until they
could be supported.
A Sound Plan.
This decision was perfectly sound,
indeed commendable. The possess
sion of Steinkjer was a necessary
preliminary to an advance on Trond-
helm. 1t Is not known whether field