Evening star., 1940-06-30
BY MAI. GEORGE
FIELDING ELIOT,

The basic struggle IN the Bal
kans,' once remarked Milan Stoya-
dinovich, lis the struggle between
the Teuton and the Slav.'
OF course, it is not as simple as
that. The situation is immensely
complicated by the presence and
pressure of peoples who are neither
Teuton nor Slav-Rumanians, Mag
vars, Turks. Greeks, Italians. Yet
when all is said and done, the
Balkans are necessary economic
and strategic unit for the dreamers
of Mitteleuropa, and the Russian,
whether he obeys Tsar or Soviet, can
never rest easily with Germany
standing at the mouth of the
Danube nor can he forget that the
Balkans are his path to- the fulfill
ment of a dream older than Nit
teleuropa-the possession of the
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.
For centuries the lesser peoples
OF the Balkan Peninsula have been
pawns-unhappy pawns, for the
most parton the international
chess board. They remain so today
Protectorate Move Seen.
There will be many explanations
offered of Russia's motives in choos-
ing this moment for an advance into
Rumania Probably the truth will
not be known until much later,
but on the face of what evidence
is available, it certainly appears that
this is only the opening gambit in
plan for reviving, under Soviet
leadership, the ancient preroga-
tives of Russia as the protector
of the Slavs of the Balkans. Rus
sian diplomacy has been active in
the two Slav. capitals-Sofia and
Belgrade. Russia demands not only
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina,
but also the ports at the mouths of
the Danube, control of which area
would enable Russia to join hands
with Bulgaria, were the latter, with
the Russian support, to obtain the
return of the Dobrudja.
A Russian Bulgarian pact, under
such circumstances, would in turn
bring Russian power to the frontier
of Yugoslavia. Thus a Slav mill
tary barrier would be constructed,
stretching right across the Balkan
Peninsula from the Adriatic to the
Black Sea.
Many Factors to Be Weighed.
1t may be objected that this, too,
is an ver-simplification and prob
ably it is. There are many other fac
tors to be considered. Turkey would
naturally be anxious at any en-
placement of Russian power so close
to the Dardanelles as the Bulgarian
frontier. Greece would recall Bull
garian ambitions for the return of
the window of the Aegean "-Ka-
valla. Hungary, longing for the re-
turn of her lost province of Tran
sylvania, cannot be expected to see
revisionist claims against Rumania
accomplished by Russia and Bull
garia without striving for her own
cut of the pie. Hungary might be
backed by Germany and /or Italy,
just as Russia backs Bulgaria In
deed, it is possible that the Berlin
claim that the Russian advance
into Rumania is part of a Russo
Axis agreement may be true, though
it looks like Nazi face-saving, the
making the best of a situation about
which nothing can be done for the
moment. Italy wants the Dalma-
tian coast and so cannot be happy
over anything which strengthens
Yugoslavia.
Yet in trying to analyze situation
so confusing, one inevitably returns
to the fundamentals-to the really
great powers whose interests are in
volved, Germany and Russia. The
whole policy of Russia in this war
so far has not been to help Ger
many, but to advance Russian in
terests and fortify Russian military
security. This has been done in the
north, on the Baltic shore, in Po-
land; there remains the Balkan
front.
Nazi Victory Would Be Blow.
The defeat of France came so swift
ly as to take the world-no doubt in
cluding the Kremlin - utterly by
surprise. There is no reason to sup
pose the military advisers of the
Russian government to be any more
gifted with prescience in this mat
ter than those of other governments.
A long and wearing struggle between
the Western capitalistic states, Of
fering perhaps in the end opportuni-
ties for Communistic revolution,
would suit the Kremlin very well.
An Allied victory, while having un-
pleasant possibilities, would not
necessarily be fatal. But a quick
German victory would be the last