Evening star., 1940-12-19

on the sea lanes Mai. G. Fieldins Eliot.
in which German surface ships will
support a new crop of submarines
and long-range aircraft. This may
we'll be accompanied by a series OF
day and night bombing raids on
industrial and communication CEN
ters IN the British Isles, perhaps on
scale surprising anything hereto
fore known.
Certainly at the moment Ger
many is not developing her whole
air effort by any means; the sug-
gestion that she is building up q
reserve for big show" is difficult
to avoid, unless she is in fact about
to switch to the Mediterranean, OF
which there is no present indica-
ton. Finally, following the other
steps, there might be a renewal OF
the invasion projects of this
autumn.
In sum total, this is a dangerous
prospect. and one not without hope
of success. Its success, however, Is
dependent on the success of each
Of its parts. The purpose of an in
tensified attack on British sea COM
munications is, of course, to prevent
American land Dominion) produc.
ton from filling in the gap between
British and German production
In the last analysis the United
States and the dominions, once
really at work. form overseas arse.
mails. out of range of bombing at
tacks, such as Germany does not
have and cannot acquire.
Must "Outmarch" Factories.
In the long run. then, those dis
tant arsenals must win the battle
of production, more especially since
they have open to them the raw
material resources of all the non.
European world. from which Ger
many is debarred. Obviously Ger
many must seek to win before
American production can become ar
effective factor in this modern war
which is fought as much, If not
more, in the factory as on the
battlefield.
Direct attack on the distant arse
mails being out of the question, save
by propaganda, sabotage and simi.
lar uncertain means, Germany's first
purpose must be to prevent the
products of those arsenals from
reaching Great Britain. Unless this
can be done, Britain cannot be de-
feated, save perhaps in the interval
still remaining before American pro-
duction reaches effective levels. The
time limit is very short-hence addi-
tional submarines, long-range air
craft, and mines; hence perhaps,
when the moment arrives. the loos-
ing on the sea lanes, regardless OF
loss. Of the whole German surface
navy. A great part of 1t was sacri-
feed for the possession Of Norway,
the rest might well be sacrificed to
defeat Britain.
Strategic Fire Missing.
There are number of answers to
be made to this campaign: More
escort vessels for convoy, more
merchant tonnage, better anti-air-
craft armament for merchant ships,
bombing attacks on German subma-
rine and air bases, more fighter air.
craft for convoy, more flying boats
for seaward patrol Some of these
things we can help to furnish, and
it is in our interest to do what we
can, within the limits imposed by
consideration of our own defensive
requirements. It is so plain, how
ever, from glance at the map, that
the possession of bases in Fire would
be the greatest boon that Britain
could now receive, that we ought to
consider this from the viewpoint of
American interests. Fire is, indeed,
the strategical key to both the west
ern and northern approaches tc