The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1940-05-16
GEN ERAl
JOH N SON
Jduc.'
THE WAR AS ELECTION ISSUE
Washington, ID. C..


European and Asian power politics,
with whatever consequence that
may carry, is sure to be an issue
this year.
AS in 1916, the sentiment against
that, west of the Alleghenies, is
overwhelming. In 1917, we were at
war and, before the end of that
year, with complete and even enthu-
siastic support of the country. Yet
Immediately after the declaration of
war, there was no such sentiment
except on the Eastern seaboard.
know, because had undertaken
the organization of the selective
draft in every American commu-
nifty.
Most of the gray hairs had until
recently, I got in the first anxious
80 days of that effort.
Was the ambitious experiment 60
ing to flop? In most states, except
the East, there was only aloof and
skeptical if not sullen acceptance.
By the persuasive power of the
eloquence and idealism of Woodrow
Wilson, by some arts we used of
blatant ballyhoo and hokum national
high-pressure selling, that was
changed in few weeks to a war
psychosis which approached hyste-
ria.
Woodrow Wilson could do that be-
cause he prepared the seed bed by
months of patient and long-suffering
inf Of
lance, because we were actually in,
and not merely flirting with, a
bloody war and sickly season.
Can Franklin Roosevelt do that
which to be elected, he must do, or
sincerely change the whole course
of his foreign policy? Can he do it
when we are not engaged in war, and
when no such seed bed is ready?
He has another handicap which
Mr.. Wilson had not. This country
had then never tried a mass adj
venture in the embarrassing war
diplomacy of Europe.
We tried in 1917 and 1918 and we
know it to have been the most dis
astrous gamble this nation ever
made.
Apart from the handicap of our
dolorous experience, is the simple
military question of whether we
should scatter our strength over
vast areas of this globe, or whether,
the obvious course is to retain
our interior lines, our concentrated
strength, the advantages of our nat
ural barriers and our unquestioned
unity.
1t is reversal of every Aneri-
can traditional (if not constitutionaD
political principle and of every mill
tary and naval axiom. Coupled
with the reversal of the third term
tradition, it will certainly be
massive handicap. 1t cannot be
shushed or even minimized.
Only the persuasive skill of Mr..
Roosevelt, his literary ghosts, and
the greater pulling power of four
billion dollars, coupled with possible
Republican campaign laundering
could overcome it.
Yet, so great is the power of good
or i'll of all these elements, that I
for one, am not yet ready to say it
can't be done.
OMNIBUS WAR MOVE
How can the British abandon the
Mediterranean? That would be to
abandon France, whose lifeline and
link with her African colonies it is.
1t would be to abandon the great
Anglo-French near-eastern army,
which is rapidly being assembled
as threat to the totalitarian left
flank. That army couldn't be NUM-
toned and supplied by the long
route around Africa. 1t might pos
sibly be fed by supplies coming
through the Red sea but not sup
ported by munitions and equipment.
To abandon the Mediterranean to
Italy would also be to abandon Tur-
key and leave the mess in south
eastern Europe in Hitler's hands,
to the extent that he could divide
| up the spoils by some kind of trade
between the supposed enemies,
Mussolini and Stain. Such a pair
ing of strange bedfellows would be
stronger than the coupling of sup
| posed enemies, Hitler and Stain, to
! ravage and divide Poland.
Such results are impossible for
England and certainly for France
to contemplate. Therefore it seems
pretty clear that England is not
leaving the Mediterranean with
anything except her ordinary COM
mercial traffic usually routed
through the Suez canal. She is just
| getting her rich argosies promptly
out of an area of danger from
sudden possible clash of aerial and
maritime navies in those waters.
1t seems to me that the critical
element in this war just now is not
what happened in Norway, as what
may happen in the Mediterranean.
If that warfare opens up, the af-
fair in Norway will just be side
show and that raises my principal
conjecture Hitler has two choices
in grand strategy. He can concen-
trate on the British empire by strik-
ing at its heart in western Europe,
or, if he has the armed assistance
of Italy, he can attempt to cut it in
pieces in detail and strengthen his
own economic, if not military, posi-
ton by operation in southeastern
Europe and the Mediterranean. He
can do either, but he can't do both
at the same time.
Conquest of England, or great i'm
pairment of British seapower, is un-
likely.
If the European war points west,