Evening star., 1940-09-03

dScltS III Tile IOIIn u ulpiOfIldtiC
consular and other officials Secrecy
in respect of information gathered
by them may be highly necessary,
and the premature disclosure of it
productive of harmful results"
The Presidents power over for
eign relations while delicate,
plenary and exclusive" is not un-
limited. Some negotiations involve
commitments as to the future which
would carry an obligation to exer-
else powers vested in the Congress.
Such presidential arrangements are
customarily submitted for ratif1ca-
ton by a two-thirds vote of the
Senate before the future legislative
power of the country Is committed.
However, the acquisitions which you
are proposing to accept are with
out express or implied promises on
the part of the United States to
be performed in the future. The
consideration. which we later dis
cuss, is completed upon transfer of
the specified items. The executive
agreement obtains an opportunity
to establish naval and air bases for
the protection of our coastline, but
1t imposes no obligation upon the
Congress to appropriate money to
Improve the opportunity. 1t is not
necessary for the Senate to ratify
an opportunity that entails no OBJ
legation.
Precedents Cited.
There are precedents which might
be cited, but not all strictly peril
nent. The proposition falls far
short in magnitude of the acquisi-
ton by President Jefferson of the
Louisiana Territory from a bel
ligerent during European war, the
Congress later appropriating the
consideration and the Senate later
ratifying treaty embodying the
agreement.
I am also reminded that in 1850,
Secretary of State Daniel Webster
acquired Horse Shoe Reef, at the
entrance of Buffalo Harbor, upon
condition that the United States
"ooASt Sii6o6C w CiCtt q
and maintain a light, but would
erect no fortification thereon. This
was done without awaiting legis-
latlve authority. Subsequently the
Congress made appropriations for
the lighthouse, which was erected
in 1856. Malloy, Treaties and Con-
ventions. Vol /. p. $685.
1t is not believed, however. that
1t is necessary here to rely ex-
cluslvely upon your constitutional
power. AS pointed out hereinafter
Gin discussing the second question:
I think there is also ample statu-
tory authority to support the ac-
QUESTION of these bases, and the
precedents perhaps most nearly in
point are the numerous acquisitions
of rights in foreign countries for
sites of diplomatic and consular es-
adjustments - perhaps also the
trade agreements recently negotiated
under statutory authority and the
acquisition in 1908 of the coaling
and naval stations and rights in
Cuba under the act of March 2. 1901
C. 803. 81 Stat. 1896, 1898. In the last
mentioned case the agreement was
subsequently embodied in a treaty.
but it was only one of a number OF
undertakings, some clearly of a ma
ture to be dealt with ordinarily
by treaty, and the statute had re-
quired that by way of further as
surance the government of Cuba
will embody the foregoing provisions
in a permanent treaty with the
United States"
The transaction now proposed
represents only an exchange with
no statutory requirement for the
embodiment thereof in any treaty
and involving no promises or under
takings by the United States that
might raise the question of the
propriety of incorporation in a
treaty. I therefore advise that &C
QUESTION by executive agreement of
the rights proposed to be conveyed
to the United States by Great Britain
will not require ratification by the
Senate.
II
The right of the President to dis
pose of vessels of the Navy and un-
needed naval material finds clear
recognition in at least two enact
mentS of the Congress and a decision
of the Supreme Court-and any
who assert that the authority does
not exist must assume the burden
of establishing that both the Con-
gresS and the Supreme Court meant
something less than the clear import
of seemingly plain language.
BY section 5 of the act of March
3. 1883. C. 141, % Stat. 582, $4,000
tU. S. c., title "a, sec. 1927, the Con-
greSs placed restrictions upon the
methods to be followed by the Secre-
tary of the Navy in disposing of
naval vessels which have been found
unfit for further use and stricken
from the naval registry, but by the
last clause of the section recognized
and confirmed such right in the
President free from such limitations
1t provides:
But no vessel of the Navy shall
hereafter be sold in any other man.
ner that herein provided, or for less
than such appraised value, unless
the President of the United States
shall otherwise direct in writing"
In Levinson VS.. United States. 258
U. S. 1873, 20l, the Supreme Court
said of this statute that "the power
of the President to direct departure
from the statute is not confined to
sale for less than the appraised
value but extends to the manner of
the SALE" and that "the word unless
qualities both the requirements of
the concluding clause"
Free to Dispose of Vessels.
So far as concerns this statute,
in my opinion it leaves the Presi-
dent as commander in chief of the
Navy free to make such disposition
of naval vessels as he finds neces-
sary in the public interest, and