The Wilmington morning star., 1940-06-10
Editorial Comments
From Other Anqles
THE MUNICH-MEN
New York Herald Tribune)

The last of the "Munichois' have departed
from the Reynaud Cabinet, unwept, unhonor-
ed and all but unnoticed amid the desperate
pressure Of the moment. In England Mr..
Chamberlain, Sir John Simon and one or two
others of the "old gang still sit in obscure
corners of the Cabinet, but though they have
been sitting very quiet, the British press is be-
ginning to call for their elimination. However
competent they may be as administrator and
however loyal to the new spirit of determina-
ton, it would probably be better if they follow.
ed their French associates; they are tarred
with too heavy memories of irresolution, of I'M
clear purposes and of a policy of "appease-
ment" which proved disastrous. AS in the case
Of M. Daladier, their disappearance would be
taken as another symbol of the inflexible unity
with which both Allied countries have turned
their backs upon all the weaknesses and half
measures of the past and of the resolution
which has been hammered into them under the
blows of the Nazi war machine.
But in saying that it is time for the Munich.
men to go, it is important for our w democ-
racy to realize where their failure lay. Almost
certaily not at Munich. In the light of every
thing that has appeared since then, the famous
surrender in the Nazi Brown House in Septem.
Der, 1888, it seems more and more inevitable at
the moment it was made. When it came to
the roint, Mr.. Chamberlain and NJ. Daladier
simply could not fight. Even the forty Czech
divisions, the possibility of Russian aid, the
possibility of aid from southeastern Europe,
would hardly have been enough to outweigh
the relative unpreparedness of Britain and
France. 1t is quite certain now that if they
had not surrendered the European war would
have started at that moment; it is highly prob
able that if it had started then, the result would
have been far more serious for the Allies than
it's proving today.
The failure of the Munich.men was not at
Munich, but beforehand after. 1t was not in
their impulses-which were those of peace. of
order, of seeking the reasonable and moderate
solution. of eschewing the violent and the I'm.
conventional but in their practical states
manship. They misjudged the psychology Of
Hitler and the nature Of the Nazi regime. They
overrated their own power to control events
and moderated the Commissions in their own
minds. They encouraged the Czechs to resist
when they had three-quarters convinced
themselves that the CZechs would have to be
sacrificed. They tried to play poker with Mus
solini when they held no cards and were far
worse buffers than that energetic statesman.
They could never make up their minds about
Russia; and Munich was the result. But then,
when Munich had showed them their lesson
plain. they proved incapable of learning it. Mr..
Chamberlain came home convinced that Britain
must speed rearmament-but was still unable
to grasp the urgency Of the need or the scale
of the effort demanded, and in the nineteen
months between Munich and the launching of
the assault on May 10 he failed to provide wea-
pons, man power, political and industrial and
military organization in anything like the meas
ure actually required.
All this has been proved against the Munich.
men by the terrible testimony of events. But
before casting this verdict after them, let
Americans look about. Is there one of these
errors that we have not committed and are
not still committing? Major Eliot points to our
lack of a military policy. Is our slowness to
develop one any different from Mr.. Chamber
lain's failure to do the same after September,
1898? Not only in it's high places but in it's
lower ones, not only in one party but in both,
not only in Washington but in Wall Street and
around the cracker barrel, this country is
drenched, without knowing it, in the spirit of
Munich. With a far more frightful object les
son before us than Mr.. Chamberlain received,
we may yet have time to learn. But we have