Evening star., 1940-04-21
BY MAJ. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

ELlOl.
AS the allied attack on the Ger
mans in Norway apparently grows
in power, 1t may be useful to survey
the situation from the Germae view
point--or, rather. from the several
viewpoints of the three German
armed services.
In the beginning, the German
Navy was asked to perform the fol-
lC7ing tasks: % Cover the landing
of the German trops from inter-
ference by the British home fleet;
CD provide escorts for the troop con-
voys against attack by British light
forces or single cruisers; Cd sup
port the landings of the German
Army against Norwegian coast de-
lenses; "a maintain the line of
communications across the Skag-
errak from Danish ports into Oslo
Fjord.
Obviously Cd entailed the likeli-
hood of heavy losses; 60 likewise
with the additional chance of es-
corting vessels being blockaded in
Norwegian ports and unable to re-
turn: CD was extremely dangerous
unless the Norwegian defenders
were wholly paralyzed by Trojan
horse" methods, which proved true
at Narvik, Trondheim and Bergen,
but not wholly so at Oslo and Kris
tianSand.
In other words, the German Navy
was asked to gamble much of its
surface strength to put the German
Army and air force into Norway,
and in the event sustained Grip
pllng losses. The fourth mission
it has performed only indifferently
well, against persistent allied mine
laying and submarine operations.
Several troopships have been lost,
and nothing is more likely to pro-
duce bad blood between army and
navy than the loss of troopships.
On the other hand, it is quite likely
that the navy is beginning to ask
whether its heavy losses have been
all in vain.
Most of Subs Preserved.
At the moment the German Navy
must feel that it has thrown away
its rather bright chances of be-
coming a thorn in the allied side by
the operations of fleet in being;
it has not even enough destroyers
for normal inshore convoy opera
tions, it cannot (until its new ships
are ready for sea- even be certain
OF commanding the Baltic against
the Swedes-a very serious matter.
1t still has in hand the major part
OF its submarine force, which has
been little risked in these opera
tions because it was one of the main
objectives of the whole Scandinavian
adventure to provide the U-boats
with harbors on the open Atlantic
from which to raid British Ship
ping, and if large number of u
boats were lost in attaining these
harbors the plan would have stulti-
fled itself.
The German Army was asked to
provide: Cd An occupying force for
Denmark, where no opposition was
anticipated; 90 a main army to
seize Oslo and to expand outward
from that central point of horse, rail
and road communications to over
run the country; (3) garrisons to
seize and hold the main Atlantic
ports until they could establish
liaison with the Oslo army; "a q
detached force, a sort of forlorn
hope, to seize Norvik and hold on as
long as possible, until perhaps the
issue had been decided elsewhere.
The army command must have
known that in the first waves there
could be little artillery or mecha-
nization taken along and no very
large stores of artillery ammuni-
tion. What was needed was a force
possessing a power of wide dispersal,
that is, chiefly infantry with plenty
of automatic arms, with some engi-
neers and light artillery.
Against this was set the German
plan, which called for the practical
disarming of the Norwegian Army at
blow. The army command no
doubt fully realized that eventually
this expeditionary force might have
to fight an allied landing force or
the Swedish Army, and that it could
not do so with much hope of sue
cess unless it had an adequate line
of communications and plenty of
modern weapons and equipment.
The army command must have
raised this point and the answer
came from the air staff.
A landing is impossible without
air superiority. We will protect you