Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1940-10-29
Invaded Greece

On this first day Of the new war
In the Balkans, comment on the
opening clashes would be premature.
1t Is likewise too soon to speak def
nitely Of the scope of hostilities until
we know the attitudes Of Turkey and
of Greece's Balkan neighbors.
Certain facts, however, are already
clear. Italy dealt a typical axis
stroke-sudden, unprovoked and pre-
meditated, because the ridiculous
three-hour ultimatum delivered to
the Greek government In the wee
morning hours was merely a gesture
void of meaning. Italy had already
determined to strike, and also knew
that Greece would resist. That is
perfectly plain.
Why did Italy thus deliberately
precipitate an armed conflict with
its small Balkan neighbor? Musso-
lini must have known that Greece
would promptly throw herself into
the arms Of her British guarantor
and that all the many Greek islands
in both the Aegean and Ionian Seas
would become British naval bases.
These many new bases strengthen
Britain's hold over the Eastern Medi-
terranean and further isolate Italys
advance posts in the Dodecanese Is
lands off Southwestern Asia Minor.
Even the military occupation of the
entire Greek mainland by Italian
armies cannot notably change that
situation so long as the British fleet
is supreme.
These hard facts were, Of course,
known to Mussolini and must have
been discounted by him in advance.
Obviously, he must have reckoned
on a net gain by an occupation of
the Greek mainland His potential
advantages may be from the strate-
gical and the psychological angles.
So far as the struggle against
Britain is concerned, Italy would
seem to gain little in occupying the
Greek mainland beyond the acquire
ment Of European air and naval
bases somewhat nearer Egypt, Brit
aims citadel in the Near East. But
Italy is actually not so close to Egypt
from Greece as it already is on it's
Libyan border. So far as Britain is
concerned, therefore, the strategic
aspect does not look impressive.
Much more important seems to be
the psychological aspect. Italy's in
vasion Of Greece is a clear-cut chal-
lenge to Britain to show her military
strength in the Near East. Some
time ago the British government
stated in Parliament that eventuali-
ties in the Eastern Mediterranean
had been foreseen and prepared for.
Effective aid, military as we'll as ma
val, to its Greek ally would now seem
to be on the cards. If Greece is &C.
cupied by Italy after short struggle,
Yugoslavia will be hopelessly bottled
up and, like Sweden, will be forced
to resign itself to a benevolent axis
neutrality. Bulgaria will presum-
ably be confirmed in its pro-axis
leanings, and will be much more in
clined openly to join the axis If Italy
can offer as gift the strip of Greek
territory which bars Bulgaria from
its access to the Aegean Sea.
The attitude of Turkey may like
wise largely depend upon British
activities. Turkey can as yet hardly
risk the sending of large forces to
aid Greece along that narrow Aegean
littoral which, in places, is less than
twenty miles from the Bulgarian
border Nothing in recent Russian
policy indicates that Stain is minded
to risk crisis with the axis powers.
Psychologically, therefore, the war
in Greece is of the highest inpor-
lance. The challenge is clear. The
outcome will be determined by the
respective fighting abilities Of Brit
ain and Italy, which, for the first
time, have clear field to measure
up tc each other.