Evening star., 1940-06-07
'onted-A Military Policy for American Security
Permanent
Suggested to Direct IT. mpohed Forces in Warfare

BY MAJ. GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT.

cies and protection to our vital
interests.
Lesson In Air Power.
A single example will make
this clear. We are now learning
from the war in Europe certain
most valuable lessons as to the
employment of air power in war.
This is a subject on which COM
paratively little is known. When
the World War closed air power
was In its infancy. The lessons
OF Ethiopia, Spain and China
have been useful, but insufficient
in scale to be conclusive. We
are now seeing great air forces
at grips for the first time, and
we must apply these lessons to
our own military policy, taking
into account our own peculiar
needs and national strategy. Yet
we have no existing, permanent
means Of making a continuing
and comprehensive study Of this
subject. The Army can report
on its own views, but there will
inevitably be divergencies of
opinion as between the general
staff and the Air Corps; the
Navy can report on its particular
problems relating to air power,
but this is only part of the pic
ture. What we must know is
just what part air power is going
to play in the whole broad setup
of our defenses, what it can do,
what it cannot do. What we re-
quire is not an argument, but a
sober, informed and intelligent
appraisal. What happens now is
that the President in determin-
ing executive policy, or congress
slonal committees in making ap-
propriations, must weigh half a
dozen different recommendation
and assertions themselves, and
take decisions which may be
vital to the safety of the coun-
try without the benefit of the
sort of Well-weighed professional
study and advice which they
should have at their disposal.
There should be an agency for
making such studies and pro-
viding such advice. The quicker
we set up such an agency the
safer we are going to be and the
more effectively we are going to
employ our money and our re-
sources to make us still more
safe.
Surely it is clear as crystal that
while losing no time in making a
start toward the creation of in
struments of war, we should also
lose no time in determining upon
military policy which shall walk
hand in hand with all other ele-
ments of state policy, in close
and mutual support Such CO.
ordination is the secret of the
German successes; it is also the
secret of our own national Sc
curity in the midst of troubled
world.
Never Had True Military Policy.
We have never had true mill
tary policy. In all our history,
we have hastily and wastefully
built up improvised defense forces
after we started to fight, have
somehow won through without
disaster, and then have immedi-
ately allowed these forces to fall
into decay until we are confront
ed with a fresh emergency. We
can no longer do this with safety.
Improvised forces, whether land,
sea or air, are worse than useless
in modern war. Modern fight
ing forces require too many ma
chimes and too much training in
their use to make improvisations
of any value The time required
not only to build the machines.
but to gear up industry to build
them, the time required not only
to train men to use them, but to
train leaders to coordinate their
massed employment on the bat
tlefield, will not be afforded us
in future conflicts. We must
stand or fall on what we have
when the war starts. both in ma
chimes of war and trained men.
Without the men, the machine
are useless; without the ma