Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1940-11-10
The Campaign in Retrospect
Politics Again Demonstrated as Inexact Science

battery Of microphones to show that he
was also talking to the whole country.
Willkie and McNary were both poor
radio performers. Willkie obviously
played up to the crowd in front Of him;
McNary has had no experience in radio
campaigning.
The late Will Rogers once apologized
to a National Press Club audience that
"a gag that would panic crowd of 500
here might not go over so well with
radio audience of 100000 Roosevelt
knew his radio audiences; Willkie tried
to impress the cheering spectators.
Poll Takers Feel Blows.
Along with the pro- Willkie newspa pers,
the straw vote takers and the political
prognosticators in general felt body
blows. Regardless of post-election ex-
plantations, the evidence is impressive
that the prophets, however honest, have
not yet found the formula for accurate
prediction of how a close popular vote
will divide the 531 presidential electors.
This is not surprising. The expert
enced reporter who can weigh the vari-
Gus political factors in local situation
has far wider and more diverse material
to work on than the samples" and sur
veys" of so-called scientific" polls, yet
most of these travelling correspondents
greatly underestimate the New Deal
strength this year as it would be ex-
pressed i'll the electoral college. The
explanation Is simple-the local political
experts and politicians cannot tell for
certain how their own regions will vote.
A large division is easily discernible even
to the inexperienced, but in State like
New York, where shift of 2 per cent
in the popular vote would decide the out
come, only guesses are possible. When 8
formula is found that will accurately
determine how 100000 persons will
divide, there will be little need of costly
elections
The most accurate straw vote taken
in this country was that of Maryland In
1886 by the Baltimore Sun. Every regis
tered voter was polled by post card
ballot. The result was within half per
cent of the actual election figures. But
it was in effect a preliminary election,
and for the comparatively small State
of Maryland the cost was well over
s15o,O0O. The formula was right. but
the expense for general use would be
prohibitive.
The election also confirmed the con-
clusion of 1896 that in general President
Roosevelt is bigger vote-getter than
the lesser Democratic candidates; it also
demonstrated that an outstanding sena-
torial candidate with principles of his
own, like David I. Walsh in MaSSachu-
sets or Burton K. Wheeler in Montana,
can run on his own record, and thaG
while presidential coat-tail riders like
Harry Truman of Missouri and Joseph
Guffey of Pennsylvania can be returned
to the Senate, they get in with reduced
majorities
WilIkie Advisers Amateurish.
1t is too early to determine whether
the RooseveltNew Deal victory was only
a Willkie or Republican party organ
ization defeat. From the beginning to
the end of the campaign, Willkie was
the amateur in politics. Many of his
closest advisers we're either amateurs or
politicians inexperienced in national
affairs. His three campaign organiza-
tons lacked the professional efficiency
of the single Democratic machine left
by James A. Farley.
The various Willkie organizations
seemed to have plenty of money, al
though the managers complained about
lack of funds. Unfortunately for can
didate who had espoused the detectives
of the New Deal, there were rich indus
trialists in several States who were iden-
titled as being personally bitter against
Roosevelt and the New Deal labor pol
icies. In Pennsylvania they were Joseph
N Pew, Jay Cooke and E. T. Weir; in
Ohio, Thomas Girdler of Republic Steel
was pointed to as the true representative
of Republican sentiment; in Michigan it
was Henry Ford and in Missouri, Edgar
M. Queeny.
1t may be significant that the profess
SIGNALS of the Republican National Com
mittee kept in the background in the
Willkie fight. John Hamilton, former