The midland journal. (Rising Sun, Md.) 1885-1947, 1940-09-06
GENERAL
HUGH $.
jon N SON
..y.!!...!d!|'!!!:u.'''':.,,..' !
United Features wNu s.Ms
wNu s.rvis
Washington, ID. g.
AIR BASES FOR U. s.

bulge" should have the unified
support of this country. It is a
move in the direction we must 60
which is to make our defense indie
pendent of the strength of any ma
ton but our own. The only criti-
cism Of it is the inexcusable delay
and lack Of foresight in not having
done it long ago.
But what we are giving for them
is something else again. It has not
been revealed. Neither have the de-
tails of our defensive deal with Can
ada. Canada is a nation at war.
She has gone across the sea to at
tack a European power. 1t puts us
in position of saying to Europe:
American nations can attack you
but If you counterattack them we
will fight you"
Perhaps in view of our geographic
and strategic problem, that can't
be helped. But do our Canadian
and British secret understandings
60 further? There was some inn
plication in Mr.. Churchilps recent
peroration that they do-British and
American cooperation in war
rolling along the Old Man River,
which is symbol for fateful in
evitability-the '.fiotillas of 1941,"
which sounded like promise Of
American naval Intervention.
Mr.. Roosevelt is reported to have
secuted the idea that there is any
thing in the deal for bases about
our detaching a part of our insult
ficient navy-50 destroyers-to fight
on the side of Britain. But things
that Mr.. Roosevelt scouts, like his
third term ambition, have curious
and tortuous way Of promptly COM
ing true.
No matter how it may be dis
guised or how warlike lawyers now
split hairs, the detachment Of those
destroyers is so clearly direct par
ticipation in this war that two years
ago, examining the question colby,
there is not an international lawyer
on earth who would not have re-
garded contrary view as prepos-
ferrous.
From his Chicago Quarantine"
speech to the present moment, there
has not been an act Of The Presi-
dent inconsistent with an inference
Of his willingness, if not his inten-
ton, to mix this country up in the
wars Of both Europe and Asia. On
the contrary, with increasing tempo
and intensity, every act has been
completely consistent with precisely
that aim.
Mr.. Ickes, Mr.. Wallace and others
have emphasized Mr.. Wilkes "en-
dorsement' of "our foreign policy"
Mr.. Ickes has suggested that this
is like the God-awful 1886 campaign
where there were no issues except
"The New Deal is good but ! can
deal it better" The New Deal boys,
hell-bent-for-a-war-crisis-before-No-
vember, had better look that thought
over carefully.
Some Of Mr.. Wilkes Republican
and Democratic supporters in New
York are also minded to involve us
in foreign war. But most Of this
country isn't. Especially that great
stretch Of America from the Ale
ghenies west isn't and, as I read his
utterances, Mr.. Willkie isn't.
WHAT DO WE DEFEND?
Step by step in the rapidly expand
ing policy Of Intervention every
where, our general staff has been
confronted with new and lightning
like changes in policy. There is this
difference between the Harvesting Of
Nazi foreign policy with Nazi mill
tary preparation = that Hitler
planned nothing on foreign policy
that his general staff hadn't been
told to prepare in military strength
and wasn't given time to prepare.
In our case, the whole surprising
brainstorm shift in a constantly in
creasing foreign policy Of threat and
aggression has proceeded with no
regard whatever to our military
preparation to make it good and
with no sufficient allowance OF time
and money to do so.
General Marshall's talk about an
army of 100000 to 100000 men
was wholly based on a new diplo-
matte theory that we are to police
every American country from the
North Pole to Cape Horn. That the
ory is utterly fantastic and impos-
sible. We can't afford it, couldn't
do it and have no business indulg-
ing in any such popular deceits and
ludicrous international posturing.
It is about time that this govern
ment settled down and decided ex-
actly what its foreign policy is GO
ing to be and, more precisely, as
controlling that, exactly what pol
lev it can enforce, without absurdity
and possible disaster, within the
realistic and reasonable limits Of its
present and Immediately potential
strength Of arms and men on land,
sea and in the air.
In that connection, the immediate
controlling nubbin is naval and POI
litical policy in the Pacific. AS be-
tween our necessary defensive pol
~, ~ rom aiming dominant On both