Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1940-09-15

pected to be felt before 1910 is over. This
challenge will be preceded, according to
the most responsible quarters here, by
an attempt on Germanys part to induce
us to come to an agreement for the sta
bilization of world peace along totan-
tartan lines. Whether We accept the
invitation to discuss such an agreement
is immaterial. The repercussions OF a
German victory would be felt so strongly
IN South America that the entire frame.
work of the pan-American understand
ing could be expected to crumble like a
castle of sand.
This Is not an emotional reaction of
men in the administration conversant
with affairs in the South II is based
on their analysis of the situation in the
key republics of the Southern Henri
sphe.e. One alternative with which We
shall be confronted according to this
type of thinking, in such an eventuality
would be to accept an agreement with
the totalitarian states, cease the rearm-
ament program and bow to the economic
dictates of Berlin. Even the most prac-
ticany inclined officials and Congress
men in Washington admit that such
solution, while saving the United States
from armed intervention in South Amer
lea, would be unthinkable.
On the other hand, if the Churchill
government were compelled to give up
the capital and the British Isles and
decides to come with the feet to Canada
to continue the struggle against the to-
talitarian regimes from the Western
Hemisphere, this could not be done with
out the fullest assistance from the
United States. The challenge from the
totalltarlan states to Latin America
would be felt even more quickly. But
armed Intervention of the forces of the
English-speaking nations in favor of
the existing Latin American govern
mentS might strengthen these govern
ments and make the progress Of the
totalitarians in the countries south of
the Rio Grande slower.
Prospect of War.
But that would mean unouestionablv a
war on our hands-and in all likelihood
a bitter war lasting for years. If we were
given sufficient time we could easily de-
velop our national defense forces so as
to meet the totalitarians on an equal
footing. The military advantage they
may have over us and the experience of
warfare they have acquired during these
- months u,Oi,1I off /,
tances which separate the Old World
and the Western Hemisphere. But we
have reason to believe that even at this
moment preparations are being made on
the west coast of Africa, facing the
South American bulge, for an eventual
invasion of this continent. We know
that at Dakar the Germans are building
a large aviation field. We also know that
vast supplies of oil and gas are being
stored there and expect that the Azores
and the Canary Islands will be taken
over by the Germans when the British
yield.
Our military preparations are pro-
crossing as rapidly as is possible in a
democratic country. We are still de-
fcient in many things, but these needs
are steadily being filled. This does not
mean that we can be prepared for any
eventuality before the end of 1941. But,
of the two evils which confront us in the
event of a British defeat, the second
eventuality would be preferable to the
administration. The presence of the
British fleet in the Atlantic would give
us free hand in the Pacific and would
have tremendous moral effect on the
governments of most Latin American
republics. And the possibility of direct
action from Europe might be delayed by
the fact that string of British warships
of all types would be guarding the At
lantic while we are preparing to force
the Nazis to their knees.