Evening star., 1940-10-15


the prospect of quick German VIC
tory is diminishing, and that in a
long war Germany is very likely to
lose. These considerations might
urge Russia to grab all she can with
German support while the grabbing
is good, and to hope that If Ger
many goes down she will be able to
hang on to her own spoils.
But against this she must weigh
the fact that in so doing she will
make an enemy of Turkey and
Turkeys associates, IraQ, Iran and
Afghanistan; and that a victorious
Britain will never permit Russia to
remain on the Indian Ocean. Hence
in this is The eventual prospect of
long and bitter war fought under
considerable disadvantage and with
no certainty as to the outcome.
There can be few illusions remain
ing in the minds of the Russian
general staff as to the ability of the
Red Army to undertake distant
offensive operations, and Russia
lacks naval power.
If Russia now decides to oppose
Germany's advance into the Balkans,
she might be able to find immediate
allies in Yugoslavia, Greece and
Turkey. Yugoslavia is. however. in
a very bad strategic position, unless
Russia can hold Bulgaria in line
and that seems more than doubtful
at the moment. Greece is likewise
exposed to attack from Italian-held
Albania and is difficult for Russia
to reinforce. More than this,
Russia's own long frontier from the
Arctic to the Black Sea is open to
the irruption of the German armies
armies flushed with victory, and
so equipped commanded and trained
as to give the Russians little hope
OF opposing them 1t may, there
fore, be assumed that active opposi-
tion TO Germany in the Balkans will
not commend itself to our Kremlin
realists.
Middle Course Remains.
Between complete acoulescence
and active opposition there remains
middle course. Russia's leaders
no doubt understand that this Is
hardly the moment, from the Ger
man point of view, for Germany to
become embroiled with Russia.
However certain the Germans might
be of victory, they would have to
use up valuable time and valuable
material In achieving it. While they
were beating the Russians the ROYAL
Air Force would be vigorously ham
merlng away at their industries and
communications; and Italy, in the
Mediterranean, would be suffering
more and more the structures of
blockade, which are already causing
her leaders to call so peremptorily
for German aid.
Germany might very well beat the
Russians and lose the war in the
process. Hence, while Stain knows
that Hitler, smarting under his de-
feat in the air by Britain, could
hardly ignore an open challenge
from Moscow, Stain may also feel
reasonably certain that Hitler will
not take on new and formidable
foe unless he has to. Hence, Stain
may we'll decide that while he will
not fight to stop the new "Drang
mach Osten," he will not (for a pos
sibly illusory benefit in territory not
IN German hands to give) do any,
thing to prevent Turkey from re-
slstlng; he may even encourage and
aid Turkey to do so, in ways well
understood by the semi Oriental
diplomacy of the Soviets. He may
even go farther and egg on the
Yugoslavs and the Greeks to a re-
sistance which, while promising
little, would certainly delay and
harass the axis operations in the
Balkans.
Thus we have three possible Rus
sian lines of action.
Cd Continued aid to Germany,
which might result in Turkish COL
lapse and the development of a
threat to Egypt from the rear; in
this case almost certainly the Rus
sian share is an advance to the
Indian Ocean through Iran.
CD Resistance to Germany
Hardly likely in the circumstances
unless-as Is always possible-Hitler
now decides to make his bid for his
eventual goal, possession of the
Ukraine.
90 A middle course-No direct
action in the Balkans, but no Rus
sian pressure on Turkey and even
some undercover aid to that country.
Russian consideration of these
possibilities is, as emphasized earlier
in this article, always colored by
anxiety as to Russias situation in
the Far East. Here it is Japan who
is the threat, both to Russian ter
ritory and to Russian long-range
ambitions in China. And here it is
that the action of the United States
in the present crisis may prove de-
terminative of events far distant
from such places as Singapore and
Pearl Harbor. If the United States
persists with its firm policy in the
Far East. it may be very well that
the result of that policy will prove
so definite check on japanese am
billions as to swing Japan into a
wholly new attitude toward world
affairs.
A Japan thus held in check by
American and British seapower
would be Japan from whom Russia
would have little to fear, giving
Russia free hand in Europe. The
moral effect of such a check to
Japan would be very great upon the
new triple axis. following upon the
successful defense of the island of
Great Britain. Such an occurrence
would have to be weighed most care
fully at Moscow, might indeed prove
decisive as to Moscow's attitude to-
ward events in the Balkans and Near
East.
Face Long Fight in Turkey.
If Turkey lets German troops 20
through her territory, it is hard to
see how the Suez Canal can be sue
cessfully defended If Turkey re-
sists, it will be, almost certainly, be-
cause she Is at least relieved of anv