Evening star., 1940-04-14
Panama Canal Dictates II. S.
Defense of Three Americas
Danger From Transoceanic Attacker Mieht
Necessitate American Gibraltars at
Pernambuco and Galapagos
By Duncan Altman,
Author Of "The All-American Front"

In any war in which 1t is attacked by
. major power the United States, with
its $500 airplanes, its second greatest
world navy and the few score thousand
trained troops and few hundred effective
fighting planes it can rake together from
allied and friendly powers In Latin
America, will have to defend the Western
Hemisphere.
In the mid-20th century's military
primers this statement is rapidly becom-
ing axiom !. Moreover, it is determine
ing axiom in our fundamental military
and foreign policies: The size and distri-
button Of our peacetime Army and Navy,
the location Of our major fighting and
supply bases, and our economic and
diplomatic wooing of the Latin American
republics.
In the pan-American movement, which
celebrates its 50th birthday anniversary
today, defense motives are a subtle but
energizing and overall background force.
Naturally, behind such a policy-coH-
trolling axiom are certain hard-boiled
rationalizations, briefly these:
l. Any overseas attacking power, or
group of powers, at war with the United
States would automatically, as strategic
objective No. l, seek to cut the American
continents naval defense lifeline at the
Panama Canal. The Canal could be
f1anked by an enemy establishing land
ing, naval and air bases anywhere from
Pernambuco, Brazil-the nearest Amer
ican deep-water harbor to Africa-to the
Yucatan peninsula in Mexico. Or it
could be subjected to frontal assaults by
an enemy established In bases in the
West Indies.
On the western side, the Canal could
be flanked by bases located anywhere be-
tween the Ecuadorean coaster the
Galapagos Islands-and Lower Califor-
mia.
Danger Defines Outposts.
Consequently, to keep the Canal safe,
: Uncle Sam must be in position to de-
fend the continental land mass and its
island outposts from Pernambuco to Ber-
muda on the Atlantic side, from the
Galapagos to the tip of the Lower Cali
fornia peninsula on the Pacific. Con-
ceivably, too. since Pernambuco, or the
Galapagos, could be seized by an enemy
based much farther South, he might
have to begin the battle for hemisphere
security as far away as the La Plata
estuary, or of the Chilean coastal plain.
2. The main territorial objectives of
an overseas attacking power would al
most certainly be in Latin America. The
needs OF the have not" states for settle
ment lands and economic explorations
could be met more easily below the Rio
Grande than in populous-in some re-
gions overpopulated-Uni States, to
say nothing of the lesser military risks
involved in southern conquests and the
greater ease with which weaker nations
could be brought under the conuueror's
discipline.
A victorious Japan, that is to say,
would be safer helping herself to Central
America or Southern Mexico or the west
coast of South America than in trying to
hold California against an embittered
and militant population in Uncle Sans
hinterland. The power, or coalition of
powers, lucky enough to whip" the
United States consequently would prob
ably content itself with a record in.
demnity and do its land-grabbing south.
This means, necessarily, that the lands
and the natural military bases below the
Rio Grande would be the chief detectives
Of an "imperialist" invader nations con-
quest operations.
Can the United States Resist?
What would be the hemisphere de-
fense" problem. then, If a major assault
on the American land mass developed?
And is the United States strong enough
to meet it?
Basically, it is a question of where to
use our strength.
Presumably, no power without a navy
and air force that outranked. or at least
equaled, ours would dream of an attack
on the western nations. No matter how
many West Indian or South American
bases such power might seize in a series
Of surprise raids, it could not hold them
against Uncle Sans preponderance.
But power whose air fleets could out
range and outbomb our air defenses for
the Caribbean and the South Atlantic.
whose navy was superior to the forces
we could spare from our own coast de-
fenses, would be another problem.
Our first military purpose would be to
prevent such an enemy from landing and
occupying territory anywhere in the
hemisphere where he could establish
himself in force.
This would mean that our Navy and
air forces would have to watch for at
tacks on the West Indies from their
Puerto Rico, Guantanamo and Virgin
Islands bases: watch the Colombian and
Venezuelan coasts and harbors from their
Panama base. This could be done with
reasonable efficiency today against any
existing European naval and air force,
considering the advantage which our
Caribbean notifications and war facili-
ties give us over fleets and air navies
which would have their nearest stations
in Africa or Europe. Unless we had to
divide our force because of q simultane-
Gus attack In the Pacific, the Panama
Canals inner line Of defenses probably
could be held.
Protecting Pernambuco.
The danger spot lies farther south.
Pernambuco is 1000 miles by airline from
FreetOWn, one of the best deen-water