Evening star., 1940-10-12
THE EVENING STAR WASHINGTON, D. G, SATURDAY ocro
U. 5. Believed Ready
To Fight # Japan
Attacks East Indies
Commitments to Brituin
Held Unlikely os
Being Unnecessary
By EDGAR ANsEL MOWRER.

Being Unnecessary
BY EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER.
With the White House, the State
Department and the Navy keeping
mum. conjecture is running rife
about just how far this country has
really gone in assuring Britain of
our close cooperation in case OF
Japanese attacks upon British or
Dutch possessions in the Far East.
Richard Austen Butler, British
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs,
told the House of Commons Thurs
day that "the question of withhold
Ing war supplies from Japan and the
possibilities of American-British CO.
operation in the Pacific are being
discussed in the United States"
Obviously, Mr.. Butler must be
telling the truth-in fact, every one
here has known for weeks that such
conversations have been taking place
and that, in addition to Singapore,
the British have offered us the use
of any other of their Pacific islands
We will consent to utilize.
Commitments Not Necessary.
At the same time, it is reasonably
sure that neither the President nor
the administration of the United
States has entered into any fixed
commitments to help Britain, even
in case Of attack.
What is the truth? In the first
place. the administration has. since
this war started, given the greatest
possible assistance to the British by
the simple fact of keeping the fleet
in the Pacific Moreover, it is help
ing the British by helping China.
That the British have, rather re-
luctantly, recognized that China was
fighting for them is shown by the
decision to reopen the Burma road.
But, critics of the administration
are saying, the British would not
have reopened the Burma road with
out precise assurance from this
country that in case this led to
trouble, they would get military
support from us. I believe that such
assurance has not been given and I
submit that it is not necessary
Nations collaborate less because Of
written or verbal pledges than be-
cause they have, or think to have,
common interests.
This Governments Policy.
The British promised to reopen
the Burma road before the an
nouncement of the triple alliance.
Therefore. they did not do so be-
cause of the alliance or even because
they foresaw the alliance. They
saw, as we saw, that the Germans
the japanese and the Italians had
common interest in trying to de-
spoil the British Empire They saw
that the United States had an in
terest in helping Britain prevent
such spoila ton.
They saw, further, that the ad-
ministratio had become aware of
this interest. Therefore, they were
perfectly safe in opening the Burma
road and in counting upon help
from us if directly attacked, without
receiving any promises.
The policy of this Government as
it seems to this writer, is somewhat
as follows:
To keen out Of any and all wars
if possible.
In particular. to keep out of war
with Japan. at least until the fate
of the British feet in the Atlantic
is sure.
To make 1t very clear that this
does not mean that Japan can do
what it likes in the Far East with
out opposition from us.
If measures are taken to slow
down. handicap or prevent further
Japanese advance southwark down
the coast of Asia, to coordinate
them with similar measures being
taken by Great Britain or Canada
or Australia or the government of
the Dutch Indies.
We Are Ready to Fight.
If this means anything, it means
that there is a point at which. Ger
man threat or no German threat,
We are ready to accept Japan's
challenge and fight. In all prob
ability an attack upon the British
or Dutch possessions in the Far
East would constitute this point.
If it were otherwise, the State
Department would hardly have re-
ceived the japanese Ambassador,
Kensuke Horinouchi, who came, a
few days ago, to say that laying
the embargo on scrap iron consti-
tuted an "unfriendly act" with a
fat refusal to do anything about it.
For, in international diplomacy,
calling something an "unfriendly
act" often means that you are ready
to fight about it.
In turning a cold shoulder to Am
bassador Horinouchi, the State De-
partment accepted a risk of war,
though it probably did not believe
that the Japanese would 60 that far
In this case-to date-the State De-
partment was right. For, if people
here, without any one having said
so, are convinced that an attack by
Japan upon the British or Dutch
Far Eastern possessions will mean
war with us, the Japanese probably
know it also. Which accounts for
the new-found sweetness of their
accents