Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1940-11-24

eIIn Htlu keduy
| or Balkan Drive
| With 12O Divisions
Eliot Soys First Tosk
Is to Crush YugosIuviu;
Defense Seen Possible
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.
As the German diplomatic Often
We continues rounding up small
ates and endeavoring to improve
ermany's relations with larger
hes, the moment is perhaps OPP
brtune to examine the German
Military situation; for the diplo-
Satic offensive is almost certainly
prelude to a military offensive
some sort.
The tried and dependable Ger
an instrument of attack is the
ferman army, working in close CO.
rdination with the air force. A
erman staff officer asked to pre-
are an estimate of how this army
light best be employed would be
bmpelled to consider four Sepa-
tie possible theaters of action:
ID Invasion of Britain. This is
' ill, of course, a possibility. Bad
Father might in some cases prove
cover rather than hindrance,
Ut the great point is that the
ermans have not obtained air
periority, or anything like it; and
|ntil they do, they have no counter
Eight against British naval COM
and of the waters they must cross,
lille the British army is growing
strength and equipment. In
lsion seems, therefore, to become
IS attractive as time goes on. Its
-incipal advantage is that If sue
kssful it would bring the most de-
sive of victories; which is a two
hged sword, for if it is attempted
| I'D fails with tremendous losses,
might be the end of the Nazi
kgime. On the whole, one might
hess that the cautious in the
buncils of the German high COM
land would be deciSively against
! the more reckless would be for it,
|e moderate opinion would be likely
think the risks to overweight the
6vantages at the moment.
90 A direct attack on Russia, with
view to occupying the Ukraine and
lie Don Basin and obtaining direct
kcess to Caucasian oil This is
ways a possibility. but the season
unfavorable, and there would be
he disadvantage that such move
| ent could not be attempted sinful
(neously with the invasion of
5-itain. Hence Germany would be
knitting a war on two fronts, espe-
|ally from The air viewpoint, and
his is the enc condition her strate-
| SITS have desired to avoid.
Southeastern Push.
80 A push to the southeast, with a
| w to occupying The whole OF the
|alkan Peninsula. Reversing the
allan defeat in Greece and driving
Trough Turkey to obtain the Mosul
h fields and to attack Egypt from
he rear. The German Army prob
bly, has the power % do this, though
he disadvantages of poor roads,
tightening communications, rough
lrrain and formidable opposition
| ust be taken into account. 1t offers
bnsiderable reward for success: Oil
|lpply, the destruction of the cen
| al strategic arch" of Inc British
|npire, control of much larger re-
Surces of many kinds and a vastly
|nhanced prestige for the axis to
'fset the losses in that respect
stained by the successful air de-
|nse of Great Eritain and the
ALLAN reverses.
"a A push to the southwest,
Trough Spain, 70 deprive the British
their base at Gibraltar, and per-
hps to endeavor, with the Use OF the
Danish bridgehead in Morocco, to
kcupy French North and West
Erica.
The latter two steps may be taken
,bgether, since there are sufflclent
brces available for both purposes.
|ermany now has total, 1t is au-
'noritatively stated, of 240 divisions.
f these, it is probable that some
hat more than half are flrst-hne
visions for field service, distributed
) follows: Infantry divisions, 1903;
rmored divisions, II; motorized in
kntry divisions, 10; mountain di-
sions, 8; cavalry division, 1; total,
k2. Approximately 80 Ersatz and
andWehr divisions, composed OF
der men, are probably available
br police and garrison duties in
coupled areas, for holding fortified
ositions and the like. Of the 142
rst-line divisions, not more than
b to Is would be required for any
love into French Africa by way OF
he Gibraltar Ceuta route, since
Danish support would be available
I'D since the character Of resistance
be encountered might we'll be
ndermined from within even if
len. Weygand determined to fight.
n essential, of course, would be
he naturalization of Gibraltar so
hat the British fleet could not use
and the maintenance of an air
nd submarine force in and over
he straits of such overwhelming
brce as to be able to protect the
Transports. 1t is unlikely, however,
| nat enough shipping could be as