The Wilmington morning star., 1940-08-25
Advantage With British


Major George Fielding Eliot, who has
high batting average as a war commentato
saws the honors to date in the Battle of Bri
ain "certainly rest with the Royal Air Force.
In a copyrighted article, originating in tE
New York Herald Tribune and distributed +
if to other American newspapers, Major Elit
analyzes the results of what he declares tn
first phase of the present battle.
The lull in the fighting, which he believe
NAV be renewed at any moment, is BEN
utilized by the Germans in digesting the LEI
sons of their first large-scale air operations
These he summarizes under six heads, thus:
/. The British cannot prevent the Ger
mans from reaching and attacking points
on the coast, but attempts to penetrate
further inland by any considerable force
of aircraft result in proportionately in
creasing losses.
2. Even in attacks on coastal points.
daylight raids by large formations OF
bombers, escorted by fighters, may be
expected to suffer losses averaging Is per
cent. Further penetration will cause these
losses to rise to 20 per cent or even Is
per cent.
g. High-flying, level bombing attacks
do not do any great amount OF damage.
Low-flying attacks of any sort must reck-
on with anti-aircraft fire and balloon bar
RACES at important points which tend
sharply to reduce their effectiveness.
a. Small formations can penetrate to
inland points almost at will when flying
high, and do not suffer severely on the
average, but they do not do much dam
age, nor can they have that continuity of
effort essential to decisive results in air
bombing.
5. The defenses of London in particu-
lar are extremely formidable and can
not be penetrated save at heavy sacrifice.
6. Meanwhile, night after night without
respite, British bombers continue t h e i r
raids over Germany, suffering little loss,
doing considerable damage. There is no
sign whatever of the German attacks in
any way overcoming or even reducing
the efficiency of the Royal Air Force in
either defensive or offensive opera
tions
OF the comparative losses by British an
German air forces and the probable losses i
uture warplane engagements, he thinks tn
dds decidedly with the British. He finds tha
he German losses on the average four time
reater than Britains and continues:
On this basis, or anything like it, the
German fighter force will tend to diminish
proportionately to the British, twice as
fast in material and four times as fast
in personnel in proportion to the numbers
employed Since the German numerical
superiority in fighter planes in operating
units is now only about four to three,
large scale operations at this rate cannot
long be continued without bringing the
Germans to a position of numerical in
feriority unless their production rate in
machines and trained pilots is so much
higher than that of Britain plus the En-
pire plus what the United States can do
now and in the future to enable them to
make up these losses. The actual pro-
duction rate being but little greater than
the British total in machines, and prob
ably no more than equal in pilots, the
conclusion is obvious-the one great ad-
vantage the Germans have is in their
large Immediately available reserves of
machines, and they must win while that
reserve lasts.
He says that if the Germans decide to al
ack with larger forces they will be riskin
roportionately larger losses with no assur
nee of proportionately larger results. I'm
eed, these latter would have to be muc
arger in proportion, to justify the risk. AM
is not apparent that with all his reserves
litter is prepared to take the risk.
1t would not be safe to assume that Hitle
5 finished with his major air attack But j
must be apparent if Major Eliot's reasoning
S sound, which it appears to be, that Hitle
must develop new strategy and new powe
0 bring Britain to her knees.
e. NKz