Evening star., 1940-06-11
THE EVENING WASHINGTON c., TUESDAY, JUNE H.
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
EIYnT

Intentions: First, that Italy meant
to continue taking no risks, but
using her nuisance value to Ger
many to keep Allied forces tied up,
second, that Italy meant to come in
only when assured of a complete
German victory, and third, that
Italy intended to intervene at a
when her entrance would
give, in the judgment Of her leaders,
that final thrust which would make
German victory certain. The last
opinion has been proven correct.
Italy has entered the war at a
when the diminished
armies of France, locked in death
struggle with superior German
forces, have not yet been broken or
routed, and when the real strength
of Great Britain has scarcely been
touched at all.
This action reveals the conviction
Of Italy's leaders that in a compara-
lively short time French resistance
can be overcome, and that Italy can
then gain all her aspirations In the
Mediterranean, without danger of a
long war, which, because of her lack
of raw materials, she must inevitably
lose.
What could have given such an
assurance to Mussolini and his ad-
visers?
Must Also See End for Britain.
One can imagine his belief that
France cannot resist much longer.
He may be mistaken, but the weight
OF evidence, so to speak, is with him
But he must also believe and believe
very firmly, that with France beaten
Britain, too, cannot long endure
While the British feet commands
both ends of the Mediterranean
Italy is still locked up. her vital sea
lanes interrupted her small reserves
rapidly diminishing under the de-
mands Of war, her industries facing
quick starvation. Her time limit is
drastically shorter than Germany's,
now that the die is cast
One must refuse to believe that
the well-informed Mussolini enter
tains any belief that his navy can
defeat that of Great Britain in a
pitched battle, or that British ships
will be offered up as sacrifices to
his aircraft and submarines in the
narrow waters of the Mediter-
ranean's center. Britain holds the
gates, and he must break out. He
has said he will not move on Egypt,
or the Balkans. Does he, then, mean
to move to- the west?
When the German armies estab-
lished themselves on the Strait OF
Dover. they slammed and locked the
seagate that leads to the eastern
ports of the island of Great Britain
their establishment ir Norway locked
the approaches to that coast from
the north. Thus, as previously re-
marked in these articles, the whole
OF Britain's overseas supply of food
$50 to IS per cent? and the whole
of her overseas raw material imports
as well as all communication with
France and all exports, must move
through the western ports. This in
itself produces a concentration o1
traffic which is favorable to the
operation of German submarines
and German submarines have beer
ominously held in reserve for months
as though awaiting a moment for q
sort of sea blitzkrieg.
Spain = Key.
But the arrival Of Italy in the list.
opens up new set Of possibilities
Despite all the talk of an invasion oi
Britain, Britain is most easily to bs
reduced by starvation. If her ses
communications can be interrupted
If to German submarines can bt
added those Of Italy based so as tt
command the Atlantic sea lanes, ane
supported in some measure by air
craft, the starvation of Britain nigh
be accomplished But Gibraltar bar
the way-only partially-and Glib
raltar can be threatened from
Spanish soil, while Spanish ports OF
the Atlantic afford the bases which
Italian submarines would require t.
attack shipping moving via the cap'
route. or indeed any shipping enter
ing the western approaches to tn
British Isles.
1t Is probable that the German
now have from 100 to $50 submarines
the Italians having approximate,
120. German aircraft along tn
Channel coast could give great aid t.
these submarines, and could help il
closing the ports they could reach
Continuous air attacks against tn
ports themselves could also be ex
pected. Thus, with Italian help ant
with the use of Spanish bases, tn
resistance of Britain might b.
brought to an end through blockade
before Italy was compelled to di
minish her own war effort from tn
same cause
Lacking the assurance of SpaniSl
bases, locked In by British contro
of the Straits of Gibraltar, it is har'
to see what Italy could expect t.
accomplish in this direction, withil
her brief time limit.
Thus the conclusion Is almost ir
resistible that the Italians are GER
tain that they will have the use o
such bases, either with Spain as al
open belligerent or with Spanisl
connivance, and that they will b.
able to use Spanish soil, on one sid
or the other of the Strait, for al
attack upon Gibraltar of sufncien
force at least to make that bas
unusable by the British fleet. Malta
Of course, can hardly be held or usec
Imperils Toulon.
OF the French naval bases in tn
Western Mediterranean, Toulon !
very close to the Italian frontier,
imperiled by any Italian advance.
we'll within the reach of Italian air
craft. Bizerta, in Tunis, is alway
a peril to Italian naval operation!
but it can be reached easily b
aircraft from Sicily, and I think W
must anticipate fifth column enter
prises in Tunis, which has q larg
Italian population. The new Frencl
base at Mers ell Kebir, near Orar
seems to be the most serious DANCE
| to an italian move to the WESTWARD