Evening star., 1940-08-11
Proper Defense Plan
Demands Sacrifices
By ODen L. Scott.

The attempt by this Government to
arm itself at record breaking speed Is
not showing initial success Instead, the
American Government, like the British
and French governments before 1t, is
found to be contenting itself with a
maximum OF talk and a minimum of
decisive action
On paper, the Allies in Europe-when
there were Allies-had an overwhelming
advantage IN comparison with the Ger
mans. Their man power, including that
Of the British and French empires, was
incomparably greater. Their material
resources made Germany's seem puny by
comparison. Yet, when the time came
for action. the Germans had the men
and the machines and the Allies had
paper plans. Today, Britain, with her
back to the wall, is striving feverishly to
make up for lost time and is heavily
dependent upon the United States to
help her.
Again: On paper, the United States is
more powerful than all of Europe COM
bined.- This Nations industrial strength,
II modified and put to work, could not
be matched by any possible combination
of other nations. No other nation can
even compare with the United States in
the quality OF its tools, or the skill of
its management, or the ability Of its
workmen. But, just as in Britain and
France, persons are beginning to doubt
whether these resources can be mobilized
and put to work with the speed that the
situation today seems to demand. Speed
Is vital for aid to Britain, even II not
quite so vital in preparing the United
States for any trouble that might lie
ahead.
The degree Of speed in rearmament is
measured first Of all by orders actually
placed with American industry to pro-
duce war material. This Is the Govern
ments part. After that, the degree Of
speed in actual production is industrys
problem. The situation with regard to
orders placed with industry is this:
Adolf Hitler stirred the United States
to action on May 10 with his invasion of
Holland and Belgium. Congress quickly
accepted appropriations for billions of
dollars designed to increase the strength
OF the American Army and Navy. Presi-
dent Roosevelt promised the country
$4,000 airplanes and all emphasis was
upon speed. A National Defense Com
mission was constituted to make sure
that speed would be realized. 1t now is
three months later. The facts show that
in June and July, allowing May as a
month to get organized, the following
orders were placed:
For airplanes, scarcely sl5,000, 900, or
enough for about rs planes. For tanks,
$ll ,500,0 ,00o or enough for 627 small tanks
For rifles, $4,000 or enough for about
$4,000 modern guns. For machine guns,
81 900, or enough for about 1900
For artillery, $l65oo, 900. which is pin
money in that business. But: For naval
vessels, ss2l, 100000.
The great immediate need, both for
defense OF this country and for aid to
Britain, is for airplanes. For three
months, in highly critical period of
world affairs, orders for nearly 5000 air.
planes were held up while Government
haggled over policy. This could turn
out to be vital delay. Blame for 1t rests
both in Congress and in the executive
arm Of the Government. Congress
piqued hcause the White House had
tried to sell some speedboats to Britain
wrote into an appropriation bill a provi-
sion that imposed a drastic limit on
profit that the aircraft and shipbuAding
industries could make on defense orders.
When Secretary Morgenthau refused to
relax his Interpretation of what the
Treasury would classify as cost in de-
termining profits. the aircraft industry
showed lack OF interest in the business.
Then other issues presented them
selves. If there was to be vast arma-
ment program new plants would be re-
quired to build airplanes and armor
plate and guns. If new plant had to
be built industry had to know how that
plant could be paid for. This, in turn,
raised tax problems. And again the
Treasury refused to bulge, contending
that only Congress could give the as
surances that industry needed. But Con-
gress was interested in other things with
the result that valuable months have
gone by without action.
Experience in the United States is very
closely paralleling that in Great Britain
and in France
The American Army was neglected for
many years, until its establishment had
dwindled In size and effectiveness. Then
the White House and Congress decided