Evening star., 1940-01-18
Allies Face Risks
In Extendin ng War
To New Fronts !.
Political Foctors and
Communications Among
Weighty considerations
BY MAJ. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

-
ELIOT.
It was Napoleon who, enraged by
hesitant conduct on the part Of his
admirals, remarked that apparently
the latter were laboring under the
Misrepresentation that war can be
made without the taking Of risks:
and 1t was Nelson who defined mill
tary genius as q willingness to as
sumo the responsibility for taking
risks when necessary.
Indeed, every sound plan for a
military operation begins with what
is called an estimate Of the situa-
tion"-which is nothing more than
the weighing, as to the several
courses open to the commander, of
the respective risks against the re-
spective advantages thereof.
To the over-cautious leader, the
risks are likely to loom greater than
the advantages; with the overbold,
the risks are likely to be minimized.
But commander who never takes
risks is unlikely to attain either sue
cess or even an approach to fame.
The German military mind tends
to very careful calculation OF risks
In advance, leaving boldness almost
entirely to the realm of execution
Of plans. Nothing could have been
more precisely examined and ar
ranged, for example, than the Ger
man campaign against Poland, and
we may be sure, always provided the
military chiefs are not overborne by
their political superiors, that any
new German move will be as care
fully calculated as the Polish effort,
and as boldly and efficiently carried
out.
French Thinking imaginative.
The German officer likes to dis
count his risks in advance, out is
perfectly willing to take them once
action has begun.
French military thought is tend
Ing closer to this procedure today
than in 1914, when the views of the
Grandmaison schoo IL 'attaque,
L'attaque, toujours lattaque"-
were paramount.
However. 1t will probably never
be possible for French minds to re-
duce war plans to the mathemat-
ical basis beloved of the Germans;
there will always be more imag-
ination in French military think
ing. which is probably why French
leadership and staff work in the
last war was better than German,
and is likely to be so again.
There is. Of course, all the differ
ence in the world between the sea-
soned and capable commander who,
having weighed all the factors af-
fecting his situation, takes a risk
even q desperate riSk-as the best
solution Of his problem, the best
means Of effecting his mission: and
the heading onset born in ignor-
ance or recklessness. which wastes
the lives of men and risks perhaps
the safety Of an army or a nation
for no good end.
Gen. Robert E. Lee, at Chancel-
lorsville. knowing well the character
Of his opponent, took the risk of
driving his forces and Of making a
wide turning movement which ex-
posed him, against a more energetic
and capable foe, to almost certain
destruction in detail-it brought him
victory against Gen. Hooker; against
Gen. Sherman 1t would have brought
him ruin.
But it Is fair to say that against
Gen. Sherman, Gen. Lee would
never have thought of doing such
thing.
Question Is Where to Attack.
The Russian command against
Finland attempted a series Of wide
turning movements in the north
which resulted, as could easily be
calculated in advance, in the syste-
matte and successive destruction of
the isolated columns engaged in
these forlorn hopes.
Now, from the point of view of
allied strategy, we may perhaps be
seeing the revival of the old question
of Westerners against Easterners-
shall we concentrate all effort on
the western front, or shall we engage
in turning movements in the Balkans
or Scandinavia, as opportunity
offers?
Again it is question of weighing
risk against Advantages in the
deeper, underlying question-Shall
we take the offensive at all, or shall
we depend on the blockade and its