Evening star., 1940-12-16
Nv RoRIs NIKOLAYEVSKY.

By BORIS NIKOLAYEVsKY.
The downfall of Pierre Laval and
reorganization of the Vichy govern
ment has once more brought to the
fore the name of Gen. Maxine Wey-
pand commander of French forces
IN North Africa. Again the ques-
ton is being asked: What WILL Wey-
gand do? a;,,o
washington reports of a possible
-<isit to be paid to Gen. Weygand by
Robert D. Murphy, newly appointed
counselor of the American Embassy
at Vichy, make the riddle OF the
French commanders future conduct
in the face of growing pro-Brltlsh
sentiment among the French people
even more intriguing.
Without venturing predictions, IL
NAV be said that while 1t would De
diffcult, psychologically, for Gen.
Wevgand to make common cause
with Gen. Charles de Gaulle, COM
mander of the free France forces,
such a development is not excluded
however remote it may seem at TINS
moment.
Gen. Weygand's action would oe-
pend on developments IN Vlcly'
The assumption is warranted that
should the Petain government enter
on a collaboration with Germany
Involving surrendering to Hitler any
portion of sovereignty over France S
colonial empire, Gen. Weygand
might reconsider his present attl-
tude of absolute loyalty to Vlchy.
Compelled To Leave Post.
Gen. Weygands presence In North
Africa is due to the fact that ne
resisted what he considered excess
sive demands by the Germans on
the Vichy government and was
). compelled, in consequence, TO leave
his post as Minister of War on in
sistence from Berlin. We may dis
regard, therefore, published reports
that Gen. Weygand has been re-
ouested by Marshal Petain to return
to France and that he refused.
Under present circumstances there
is no room for him in France. His
greatest usefulness can be eXer-
cised in his present post, pending
DEVELOPMENTS. However, 1t should
be remembered that his personal
relations with Marshal Petain are
very close and that his loyalty to
the present French chief of state is
very strong
AS commander in chief of the Al
lied armies in the critical weeks OF
last summer, Gen. Weygand did all
that was humanly possible to save
the French Army and to continue
the war. He urged conclusion of
the armistice only when it had be-
come apparent that there was no
longer any possibility of carrying
on the struggle on the soil of Metro
politan France.
A brilliant military technician of
the old school, he stood head and
shoulders above other French mill
tary leaders, but because, unlike Gen.
de Gaulle, he had failed to under
stand the needs of modern warfare
and of the political character OF to-
talitarian war, he supported the idea
Of the armistice when it appeared to
him that any further resistance was
hopeless.
Bitter Enemy of Germany.
An extreme nationalist and bitter
enemy of Germany, he has never,
however, considered any suggestion
Of yielding even an inch Of the
French colonial possessions.
Gen. Weygand, while Minister Of
War in the Petain government,
sought to carry out Loyalty and eff
ciently the provisions of the armi-
stice. It was his authority alone
that was responsible for the adher-
ence of the French forces in North
Africa and Syria to the Vichy gov
ernment when these forces were hes
itating to accept the armistice.
But while trying to execute Loyalty
the conditions of the armistice, Gen
Weygand did not regard it as COM
plete capitulation to the conqueror
From the very beginning of his ca
reer as member of the Vichy gov
ernment, he joined the faction which
showed resistance to the undue pre-
tensions of Germany, particularly in
the matter of debating the compo-
sitlon of the Vichy government dur
ing the period between July II and
September 6.
The fact is, of course, that any