Evening star., 1940-09-30
Loan Held VaIue|ess
To Chinese Unless
They Can GET Arms
u. 5. Need Not Be BIuffed
By Jopon, but Must
Keep Eye on Europe
By COL. FREDERICK PALMER.

6y COL. r fHEDEhlSh FALNER.
Americans have never had stronger
reason to think in terms OF force,
which rules the world today than
In considering what the alliance OF
Germany, Japan and Italy may
mean to us.
The sum of our present commit
ments leads to the frequent remark
that we are already practically in
the war. Further commitments,
which may have to be backed by
force, may put us as deep in the
second World War as in the first il
we forget, when we are still in the
first stage of our preparedness pro-
gram, that wishful thinking and
justif1able, righteous devotion to
good causes do not create sea, land
and air strength by magic.
Relying on combatant force as the
dictators do, which is the only way
to- deal with them. how can we
really help China? What force can
We bring to bear upon Japan and she
upon us?
A gift loan of S25,OO0O0O to China
is a warm-hearted action to en-
courage her in her stubborn fight.
But arms are her need, and the few
modern arms for a big army the
money will buy are no use to her
unless she receives them, which she
cannot when Japan has closed the
ports of entry and the roads to the
Chinese front. Does any one sug-
gest that We send Navy and Army
escort to insure their safe arrival?
Chinese Plants Small.
Distressing though it may be, 1t is
no military secret that Chang Kai-
shek's munition plants are so small,
he is so utterly dependent upon i'm
ports of weapons and ammunition,
that he must be soon reduced to
scattered guerrilla warfare. Distant
prayers for Nm, in which we all
Join, are not as much service in
actual combat as single fighting
or bombing plane or thousand
rounds of rife cartridges.
Our embargo on scrap iron to
Japan is an effectual aid to China
IN that it may mean that Japanese
soldiers can fire fewer shots at Chi
nese soldiers. In reprisal Japan
would have to cross the Pacific to
attack us on our own coast, raid
our shipping or descend upon the
Philippines. This would precipitate
war upon US, which obviously she
does not want. Her aim in the triple
alliance is the guarantee of a free
hand for the completion of her
tough Job in China and in con-
tunuing her Asiatic advance.
However. presumably she still has
some reserves Of scrap iron and she
may get little, very little, in Indo-
China. Only an overwhelming naval
force can stop her from receiving
across Finland, Russia and the land
locked Sea Of Japan any iron ore
which Chancellor Hitler may have
to spare from the Swedish iron
mines whose output he now controls.
Splitting Fleet Dangerous.
There IS talk Of our accepting a
lease of the great British naval and
air base at Singapore. What would
we do with 1t? Send portion Of our
fleet to Singapore, thus breaking
1t into two parts? This would pro-.
vide the wide-open opportunity for
an enemy which has been the dream
Of all naval commanders of all time.
Or should we further divide our
fleet by sending parts to bases In
New Zealand and Australia which
have also been mentioned? This
would be even more favorable to
mass, unified attack on US in detail
Or should We send our whole feet
to Singapore. the only available base
for it in the Far East. when that in
the Philippines is abSurdlv made
quate? Thereby. We should center
our strategy directly on the japanese
feet in protecting the Australian life
line and the shipping on the Indian
Seas. A further aim might be to
prevent the Japanese from sending
an army based on French Indo-
China through Siam for land at
tack on Singapore.
Power Lost With Distance.
miles beyond Hawaii there could be
40 doubt of the result If our feet
met the Japanese. We are superior
In fire power, in gunnery and in ma
terial But with every mile as we
approached the enemy in his own
seas. We should lose power in ratio
to distance
Immediately our feet began to
move Japan would seek to make the
Philippines untenable as any sort
of a base To reach Singapore al
our battleshipS. our cruisers. subma-
rines. destroyers and naval air force
would have to 60 5000 miles or more
according to the route chosen, and
then work their way through mar
row straits close to Japanese air and
submarine bases No British major
ships would be on hand to aid us.
and very few minor ships. We
should have to supply our feet from
the remote home bases. Destroyers
and cruisers must be spared from
the main feet to guard the long line
of communications. Our Pacific
COdSt "Ollu Ue ShpOSeU III tllc Icdl
of our feet. Yet. no doubt, We could
carry the war through to success in
time
Must Keep Eye on Europe.
But We must keep in mind our
other commitments and other impli-
cations. Of these you may have
vivid view in the unprecedented
diplomatic war situation of the for
eign embassies and legations in
Washington We still recognize the
governments of the countries which
have been replaced by those in
stalled by their conquerors. We
have protected their credits in our
banks for their own use We have
made their cause our cause. The
Dutch are confidently and prodigally
buying all material available, from
planes to powder, for the defense
OF their East Indian colonies.
The British have not to tell us, as