Evening star., 1940-10-27

|LIo 10 fCOU tftC Oty yufto W ouf
NUR need of a two-ooean fleet has
Oarisen almost overnight. Until a
few months ago there were few persons
who seriously advocated such a large
expansion of our naval forces. The
changed viewpoint is obviously conse-
quence of the worldwide and rapidly
changing political cataclysm now
upon us.
A Navy or an Army may be said to be
strong only by comparison with the
corresponding forces of actual or poten-
tial foes. In 1886, at the expiration Of
the limitation Of armaments agree
ments. we had strong Navy. 1t was
thoroughly we'll capable of dealing with
any force at all likely to jeopardize our
interests. There were then some persons
to point out that a combination OF
British and japanese navies against us
would be most embarrassing. We could
not meet the British Navy in the At
lantic and at the same time deal with
the Japanese in the Pacific. But the
probability of any such combination was
too remote to worry about and certainly
not sufficient to warrant the expense of
building a two-ocean fleet
We might as well have worried about
earths collision with another star in
the heavens. Although Britain was our
principal competitor in international
trade, she was also our best customer
and we hers. Britain looked upon us as
her best friend-the one friend who
could be counted as non-aggressive ire
spective of the kaleidoscope of interna-
tional power politics Above all Britain
was tethered to the orbit of power poll
tics in Europe and seriously embarrassed
by japanese aggression in the Orient.
Her navy could be eliminated altogether
from our considerations as possible.
opponent in combination with another
navy against us. Hence there was then
no valid reason for a two-ocea Ameri-
can Navy
Foreign Navies Build.
Following termination of the limita-
ton treaties there came a rather rapid
expansion of foreign navies-notably in
CllC SdoCS OA cdpdIl dllo ollGdlll ScIs
man rearmament also stimulated French
naval building and that in turn ac-
counted for Italian activity All in all
the rapid "piling up" as President
Roosevelt put it, of naval armament
abroad made it desirable for us to keep
pace. This We did on the basis of the
old 5-3 proportions and without any in
tention of an expansion representing a
so-called two-ocean Navy.
In 1899 the world began to be turned
upside down about us, with Germany on
the upside and long list of nations in
cluding France going down. There
seemed to be no limit to the ambitions
Of German leaders and their allies. So
long as the British navy remained strong,
however, there seemed to be little danger
of aggression against this hemisphere
or our general interests elsewhere. This
was not question of the British navy
being our first or last line Of defense,
but Of its being her own salvation.
In this period Of doubt as to the out
come of the wars in Europe and Asia, in
this era Of rampant aggression wherein
the power OF might seems to be the only
limit to conquest, we should be prepared
to take care of ourselves no matter what
might happen to Britain and her navy.
We are the principal have" nation and
the "have-nots" are hard after the
"haves." If aggressors hold two pistols
or two navies we cannot afford to be
caught with only cne in readiness.
Weakness Invites War.
OF course, We do not want to get into
the war and there are still considerable
number of people, however much they
may have dwindled recently, who main
| tain that strong armaments are provoca-
| tive and in themselves an important
| cause of war. Insofar as American his
| tory goes, the opposite of this contention
Is conclusively proved. We have gotten
into wars only when relatively weak, and
have escaped war in the face of delicate
| situations when we have been obviously
| strong. A notable example of the latter
was the French withdrawal from their
occupation of Mexico following our vir-
tual ultimatum In 1866. At that time we
had the strongest Navy in the world and
| its influence was the decisive one in en-
| forcing the Monroe Doctrine without re-
sort to war.
The opposite case OF our being drawn
into war largely in consequence of weak
ness is amply illustrated without excep-
| ton by all Of our early wars. The ex-
ample OF our entry into the World War
is of particular value to us at this time,
| since naval technology and other condi-
tions, military, social, economic and po-
htical, were modern. At first we were
confronted with the difdculty Of remain
ing neutral, Of keeping out Of war under