Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1940-10-13
Strengthening japan

nese military machine which now
looms as a serious threat to US from
across the vast reaches of the Pa
ciflc. For at least three years we
have been JapanS principal supply
source of the raw and finished in
gradients of conqueSt-the inStru-
ments of war which have enabled
an aggression-bent nation to trample
China and to lay the foundations
of that Greater East Asia in which
other nations would do business on
Japan's terms or not at all Nor have
we done this blindly, for 1t has long
been evident that clash between
Japanese imperialism and vital
American interests was in the off1ng.
Japan's aspirations in the Far
East, while they have been brought
into bold relief by her formal adher-
ence to the Rome-Berlin axis, are
not new. Toxic has made no secret
of her ambitions; we have simply
refused to believe that which was
evident on its face. And even today,
when the most WiShful thinker no
longer can conceal from himself the
outlines of war in Asia, we are pur-
suing this incredible policy of
strengthening a potential enemy. 1t
is fact that we have stopped the
sale of some vital commodities and
that the export of others has been
restricted; but it is also true that
we are still offering the Japanese all
that they can buy of many military
essentials, such as copper and crude
petroleum. Statistics normally are
dull, but they speak eloquently of
the part we have played in arning
Japan.
The military supplies which we
have made available to the Japanese
may be divided roughly into two
classes-arms, ammunition and i'm
plements of war in the first, and the
commodities essential to the produc-
ton of materiel in the second
In 1887, the year in which the
Mikado's legions invaded China
proper, we sold Japan nearly S2,000,-
900 worth of arms, ammunition and
implements of war. In 1888 this fig
ure jumped to more than 100000,
of which 81 per cent was for air.
planes, parts and motors. After ap-
plication of the moral embargo"
however, this trade fell off, dropping
under a million dollars in 1889 and
to negligible figures in 1910.
In the second category, however,
there has been a different story. OF
these raw materials of war, there are
four which are of outstanding i'm
portance-iron and steel materials,
including scrap; petroleum and its
products, copper and power-operated
metal working neutrality-suspicious.
deficiency in the last being her most
vulnerable point. And yet, despite
the Importance of these commodities,
we have been Japan's principal sup
plier, the record showing that since
the outbreak of the China war we
have sold the japanese 64,8 per cent
of their petroleum and gasoline i'm
ports, $50 per cent of their machine
tools, 1876 per cent of their iron and
steel scrap and 92.7 per cent of
their copper.
In the interim since the attack on
China, embargoes and licensing pro-
visions have made inroads on these
exports, reduced them by an esti
mated As per cent But that is not
enough. And while we hesitate to
adopt a sterner policy, Japan is
making the most of the opportunity
which remains open to her.
Exports of copper are still unre-
stricted. And in August of this year
Japan purchased copper worth more
than S6,000,000, as against only
$8,600,000 worth during the preceding
seven months. A comparison of
some of Japan's purchases during
the first seven months of 1889 with
the corresponding period in 1910 is
interesting. 1t is as follows: Raw
cotton, 407 900 bales, against 49l 900
bales; wood pulp, 1926 tons, against
52,503 tons; iron and steel rods and
bars, 36,443,000 pounds, against 49,
$4,000 pounds; wire rods, $685. 900
pounds, against 36,945,000 pounds,
and steel sheets, 100000 pounds,
against 1901 900 pounds. When it is
remembered that all of these items
are of great Importance to a nation
at war, one must conclude that the
Japanese have read the handwriting
on the wall, If we have not.
From the standpoint of self pres
ervation, ultimately if not now, it is
essential that we stop at once the
sale of any and all materials to the
japanese that can be used by them
to strengthen their military position.
II the President does not now have
authority to embargo all exports of
military Importance to the Japa-
nese, Congress should be asked to
enact the necessary legislation with