Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1940-10-01
Aid Short of War

Rome and Toxic require re-eXaml-
nation by the American people OF
such phrases as helping Britain by
methods short of war" and the ex-
tension of "all practicable aid" to the
victims of aggression. On various
occasions one or another of these ex-
pressions has been used by President
Roosevelt, Wendell Willkie and many
other prominent figures in both pub
lie and private life, but in no in
stance has there been any precise
definition of what was meant.
In broad sense, these terms have
been understood as meaning that we
would not send men across the At
lantic to participate in the European
war. They may have that meaning.
But it is also true that they may
mean anything or nothing.
What many persons in this coun-
try have failed to grasp is the fact
that the determination of what con-
stitutes methods short of war" may
not be left to U.S. 1t is possible that
Hitler, as is his habit, may take the
initiative in the matter and decide
- for us whether a particular act is or
is not short of war. And if con-
flict should be precipitated in that
fashion it would be unfortunate in
deed if the people of this country
were unprepared psychologically as
q result of thinking in terms of catch
slogans rather than realities.
Current dispatches from Rome and
Berlin lend substance to this view.
p One of the leading government-con
trolled Italian newspapers has as
serted that the furnishing of any
assistance to Britain by this country
r is IAN act of war" In Berlin, an As
ISOLATED Press correspondent has
been told by "authorized sources"
that the question whether American
help to the British will be treated as
an attack on the axis depends on
whether such help "is likely to affect
decisively the progress of the war"
In other words, we are told that Ger
many, her hopes of an easy victory
frustrated, will tolerate our assist
ance to Britain only as long as that
aid does not appear likely to prevent
an ultimate Nazi triumph.
This is a threat which we must
face realistically and with determi-
nation. 1t may be that it is nothing
more than a threat designed to
brighten us into withholding from
the British the assistance which is
steadily increasing their chances of
winning the war. But we cannot af-
ford to count on that, and continue
at our present pace in the unthink-
ing belief that it will surely be left
to us to decide whether we shall or
shall not fight. 1t is better for us
that we take this authorized spokes-
man at his word and prepare to act
accordingly We should understand
that these undisguised threats from
the European totalitarian capitals,
coupled with the announcement of
JapanS formal adherence to the axis,
are merely an extension of a policy
of intimidation which the dictators
have practiced successfully in the
past. But in this case we cannot
permit them to succeed
px, fI,ic 4i,,,o Oh o1oor
to the great majority of Americans,
from the standpoint of our own Sc
curity, that we have no intelligent
choice but to give every possible as
sistance to the British. If they
should be defeated and their fleet
lost, what lies ahead for us? The
answer is all too obvious. We would
be faced, certainly, with long con-
tinuipg threat of war in two oceans
against formidable odds. And there
Is at hast strong probability that it
would be not threat but an actual
ity-tllat we should be compelled to
fight ior our very existence in both
the Atlantic and Pacific, although
woefuily unprepared for such a con-
test.
Thtfre is no use in blinking the
facts We are preparing for war;
not beace. And the sooner we drop
the angerous fiction of rearming on
p De ace basis and get down to the
maximum wartime effort of which
we are capable the better it will be
for us.
Our first objective must be the
establishment of definite, clear-cut
policy. This policy must call for the
redoubling of our industrial efforts
to help England and to help our
selves. From our own materiel sup
plies we should furnish the British
with all the weapons that they can
use more effectively for our joint de-
tense. AS we produce new planes
we should think in terms OF sending
as many as possible, not as few as
possible. to Britain. The r. A. F. can
put them to better uses now than we
can. The major portion of our fleet
must be kept in the Pacific, based at