Evening star., 1940-01-07

only organization and kindred
matters, but the employment of the
British Army in time of war, its
distribution in time Of peace, and
the basic strategy of the empire.
It was Capt. Hart's settled convic-
ton that in a new war with Ger
many in which Britain might be
allied with France, British field
force should not be sent to the con-
tinent, and that defensive policy
was the best assurance Of victory.
Opposed Sending Troops.
So long and close an association
was not likely to be broken up by
the coming Of war: indeed. it was
an open secret In London in Sep
tember that, as in previous crises.
Capt. Hart had submitted to the
war Office a long memorandum
setting forth his views as to the
proper conduct Of the war, and re-
emphasizing his opposition to the
dispatch of British troops dn any
numbers, at least to France. Under
these circumstances, 1t must have
been impossible for Ironside and his
associates to escape the conclusion
that Mr.. Hore-Beisha's voice in
council might well give expression
to the military views of Capt. Hart
rather than to those of the official
and responsible military chiefs Of
the war Office. Such a situation
could, of course, be viewed by such
a man as Ironside as nothing short
Of intolerable.
1t could hardly have been more
acceptable to Lord Gort, despite
the fact that he owed his advance
ment to Mr.. Hore-Belisha's choice.
1t is inevitable that friction, ris-
ing in such a time to the degree
Of real danger to the state, should
have resulted, and the Prime Min
ister's decision does him immeas-
urable credit, for Mr.. Chamberlain
is by nature anti-militarist, with an
inherent dislike of the military and
Of the use of force which is SYM
bolized by the uniform. That he
was, nevertheless, able to set aside
personal and political considerations
for those of purely military nature
when the good of the nation re-
quired it, is not the least Of the
accomplishments for which future
British historians will acclaim Ne
Vile Chamberlain.
1t may very well be that the
change at the war Office will turn
out to be the first step in the rise
Of Ironside to a position of even
greater prominence and usefulness
than that which he will now hold
in collaboration with a more SYM
pathetic war minister. Indeed, in
considering the striking personality
Of the man, his great appeal to the
British public as the embodiment of
every soldierly quality, his very
name, so reminiscent of the splen-
dors of the past and the origins
Of the modern British Army, one
can only wonder why it is that
these advantages have not been
more capably exploited by the gov
ernment.
Ironside May Become Symbol.
Such a symbol Of national effort
as. was Lord Kitchener in the last
war, 1ronside could easily become
in this one-a rallying point for the
effort Of the whole empire. What
ever Lord Kitchener's abilities as
secretary for war may have been,
no one today doubts that it was as
such a symbol that he rendered his
greatest services. Whatever Iron-
sides abilities may be-and they
are considerable, indeed-it is as
such a symbol that he could do more
for Britain than the intrinsic serv-
ices of any individual could amount
to.
But, quite aside from this view of
the matter, if he were eventually to
follow in Kitchener's footsteps and
come to the cabinet as secretary for
war, he would be a capable balance
for the presence there of Admiral
of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, a former
first sea lord, now minister for CO.
ordination of defense, there can be
little doubt that the actual physical
presence of two responsible ministers
Of such broad military and naval ex-
perience would be of the utmost
value to the cabinet in the trying
days that lie ahead. 49,
tcopyrisht, 1910. ~ y. !, Tribune. 1ne.)