Evening star., 1940-03-14
Russo-Finnish Pact
Deals Another Blow
To Allied Prestige
Hits at French and British
Attempts to Inspire
Confidence Of NeutroIs
BY PERTINAX.

| ny 4 EN- = AANAAs
PARIS. March II N.AN.A0.-
The Russo-F Finnish peace treaty has
put an end to the critical and pain
full deliberation Of the Finnish cab
met ministers which opened March
l, whens the French representative
in Helsinki made it known to them
that a Franco British expeditionary
force would be sent to Finland's 3
rescue, Notwithstanding all the OBJ
jections Sweden and Norway might
raise, as soon as their official request
for assistance had been wired to
Paris and London.
On March l, indications were
given to Foreign Minister Tanner
by the French representative about
the effective strength of that ex-
peditionary force, and these were in
keeping with the figures that Pre-
mier Daladier gave the French
Chamber Of Deputies Tuesday.
Last week a more energetic French
minister, Vaux st. Cyr, was sent to
Helsinki and it became known in
both the western capitals that the
step taken March / had spread
alarm in Stockholm, Berlin and
Moscow, which began to make
frantic efforts to deter Premier
Risto Ryti and his colleagues from
appealing to the western powers.
Premiers Daladier and Chamberlain
then decided to enlarge the original
offer. The Helsinki cabinet was
acquainted at once with that de-
velopment. Hence the expression
used by the British Premier, that
France and England would inter-
vene with all the resources at their
disposal, If Finland so requested.
Uncertain of Purposes.
Why did the Finnish ministers
prefer to come to terms with Soviet
Russia in the face of doubts that
they surely entertained about the
permanence of Russia's pledges?
The answer is not only that they
had to put up with Swedish exhorta-
ton and German threats, but that
in addition Stain and his advisers
were shrewd enough to lessen their
conditions Of peace. The Firms did
not feel certain that the western
powers would not be inclined to
pay greater heed to cutting of from
Germany the iron ore deposits in
Northern Sweden, and warding of
the German-Russian inland ad-
vance toward the Norwegian coast
line, than to throwing on the Russo
Finnish front as many troops and
as much war materiel as possible.
The Finnish ministers would have
had to submit to the general purpose
and strategy of the Franco British
alliance and they did not relish the
prospect that their own considera- D.
tlons might be made to depend upon
the superior requirements of the war
to be waged on Germany. They
were not prepared to think In terms
OF collective security. The future
Will prove whether their calculations
were right or wrong.
Firm Stand Called For.
On the German side, there is a
tendency to speculate wildly upon
the psychological repercussions of
Finland's surrender in France, Eng
land and the United States. Indi-
cations are not lacking that, unless
Sumner Welles takes firm stand
when he again meets Mussolini, an
attempt will be made to entansle
the Washington Government In q
peace offensive. Therefore, it is of
capital interest to ascertain accur-
ately the kind OF damage inflicted
by the Russo Finnish treaty upon
the Western powers and the cause
for which they stand.
The independence of another small
nation goes under. It would be USE
less to deny that, on that account,
blow is being struck at confidence
IN the Franco-British endeavor to
inspire the neutral powers whenever
they remind them that. the fate of
national and civic freedom is bound
up throughout Europe with their
own fate.
But it must be emphasized, on the
other hand, that the material loss
entailed by Finland's subjection to
Soviet Russia does not amount to
much. From 1903 until 1918, Fin
land was only Russia s vassal and it
cannot be overlooked that geograph-
lcal and historical influences hardly
allowed the existence of a different
state of affairs. When Marshal
Bernadotte "a marshal OF France
who became King of Sweden as
Charles XIV in 1879 was chosen
crown prince of Sweden, he strongly
refused to act on the idea that Fin
land lost a few years before by
Sweden, could be won back, and he
shaped his foreign policy accord
ingly.
Possibility Of Material Loss.
Material loss would truly begin for
France and Britain once they drew
from the Russian-Finnish treaty the
consequences that henceforward
they would no longer be in position
to interfere win Germany's iron ore
supply in Northern Sweden and
would have to protect the land as
we'll as sea approaches to the Nor
wegian coast.
A fortnight ago the British cabinet
resolved to postpone action regard
ing control of Norway's territorial
waters, to be welded as a conse-
quence of the Altmark incident, be-
cause it was afraid that this would
clash with the scheme Of assistance
to Finland and make it stin more
difficult to be enforced. Let us hope
that the whole problem will be re-
considered in the light Of today's
| circumstances.