Evening star., 1940-05-29
BY MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

EL1OI.
1t is much too early for any one
who has been soldier to attempt
to pass judgment on the surrender
OF the Belgium Army by its COM
mander in chief, King Leopold. The
hysteria and recriminations may be
left to others while some examina-
ton Is given to the possible cause
Of the Belgium surrender.
The position Of the Belgian front
line on the night of May 27 is un-
certain. Some accounts have 1t that
the Belgians were trying to hold
the line of the River Lys from Menin
to Ghent, with the British on their
right stretching south or little east
of south in front Of Lille. This
Belgian front, If correctly stated,
would be roughly 60 to 65 miles in
length, disregarding the innumerable
windings Of the river. In the defense
of a river line 1t is generally con-
sidered that division (triangular
type, as in the Belgian Army can
defend front of 10 to IA miles. This
is at full strength, of course.
Effective Strength q Question.
The Belgians may have had as
many as 18 (infantry) divisions,
assuming that the six second line
divisions had been successfully
modified. But the Belgian Army
has been fighting hard, it's electives
must have been greatly reduced, and
so we cannot assume that the Bel
gians had an effective strength Of
much more than half the original
number-say, the equivalent of 8
to 10 divisions. This was barely
enough to defend Lys front, and to
leave reserve of two or three divi-
sions under the hand OF the COM
mander in chief.
However, readers Of these articles
will have noted during the last few
days the growing anxiety which
have been expressing about the state
Of affairs on the Belgian left. Client
Is by no means a secure bastion for
that flank. North Of Client there
is considerable open space between
the city and the Scheldt Estuary,
through which. If unopposed, the
Germans could push from Antwerp.
If the Belgians had to extend their
lines to cover this, they were being
extended too far. If not, they were
in imminent danger of development.
1t is at Ghent that the Rivers Lys
and Scheldt join: hence, if the Ger
mans gained full possession of
Ghent (both the act and the date
are uncertain), they turned not only
the Scheldt line, but also that of the
Lys. The Scheldt runs generally
south from Ghent, the Lys more to
the west of south.
Thus even If Client held and the
Belgians pivoted their right back
to the Lys as the Germans crossed
the Scheldt at Audenarde and Tour
mai, German advance to the Lys
in the vicinity of Menin would drive
forward re-entrant angle into the
allied line and a crossing of the
Lys north of Menin would threaten
to cut off the Belgian right with
the Belgian Army overextended for
any sort Of fighting except the de-
fense Of river line), while their
left may we'll have been threatened
by German envleoping movement
sweeping through or around Ghent.
Endangered If Wheeling.
One report of May 81 stated that
the Belgian left flank rested ION
the North Sea"-at what point was
not stated. But since the loss of
the Lys deprived the Belgians Of
any good natural obstacle, short OF
the User Canal, it is plain that If
the Belgians were endeavoring to
wheel back their left flank from
Client to the sea, they must still
have been in grave danger of being
outflanked by the fast-moving Ger
mans, and even had they completed
their wheel, there must have been
considerable intervals between divi-
sions and a desperate shortage Of