Evening star., 1940-02-25
Allies Confidence
In Italy Shown by
Troop Dispositions
Maj. Eliot Says France
Has Weakened Forces
To Put Men in Syrio

To Put Men in Syria
By MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.
Last week we discussed the naval
situation In the Mediterranean
pointing out the evidences Of al
most complete British naval with
drawal, for the moment at any
rate, from that theater and OF
French naval concentration in the
eastern part thereof, despite the
approaching completion of the new
italian battleships, this seeming to
indicate little. If any, anxiety on
the part of the allies as to Italy's
future attitude. The disposition Of
land forces in this theater of pros
pective operations is not less in
teresting.
The most reliable estimates Of the
strength of the French forces in
Syria seems to place them in the
vicinity of 250.000. Included in these
are not only French troops whether
of the metropolitan" or colonial
army is not stated, but also Al
gerian, Moroccan, Tunisian, Sene-
galese, Indo-C Chinese and Malagasy
(Madagascar) units, as well as local
Syrian forces and units of the IA
nous Foreign Legion. It becomes
pertinent to inquire-where have
these troops come from?
Normally, the French Army main
tains in France certain units called
the mobile force" available for
immediate service in any part OF the
French colonial empire. These
amount to four or five divisions,
partly French. partly native. The
garrison of North Africa, brought
to war strength, would include 80
infantry regiments. tank bat
talions 61z field artillery regiments
and II cavalry regiments-say 125,-
900 men, divided between Morocco,
Algeria and Tunis In proportions of
about 2-2-1. Some increase could
be obtained by calling up the re-
servists Of the locally recruited
units.
Limit of Safety Reached.
Algeria is usually considered a part
Of France, and acts as a reserve
area for Morocco and Tunis. The
normal expectation of reinforce
ments for France from the army of
North Africa amounts to six divisions
and two cavalry divisions-say 10O,-
600 men, plus Is 900 corps and army
troops. Perhaps $4,000 of these would
be French or native reservists, max
ing a withdrawal from the peace
time garrison which would reduce
it to $4,000. This is certainly the
limit Of safety, having regard to
internal conditions, the administra-
ton of the military territories, and
the need for maintaining a watch
on possible hostile manifestations in
Spanish Morocco and a minimum
garrison for the powerful fortiflca-
tion of the Mareth Line, guarding
the Tunisian-Libyan frontier.
The total immediate contribution
at war strength, Of Madagascar to
the French expeditionary force
could not be more than 5000 men,
which would denude Madagascar
entirely Of mobile troops. It is ex-
tremely unlikely that under present
conditions in the Far East any
heavy withdrawal from the garrison
OF 1ndo-China could be considered
10000 men would probably be the
maximum. Finally, the normal gar
rison Of Syria, brought to war
strength. would not exceed dnclud-
ing the locally recruited units) 23,-
900 men.
We thus gain a pretty good idea
OF the probable composition of Gen.
Weygand's army: The mobile force
from France, say five divisions plus
corps and army troops-10O, 900; the
North African contribution, q maxi
mum Of 5000. and from Syria,
Madagascar and Indo- China. say
10000 all told. Total, 265 900 (say
IL or 13 divisions and 2 or 3 cav
airy divisions).
Italian Garrison Unreduced.
But IN order to obtain this total
the garrison of North Africa must
have been reduced to a minimum,
while there is nothing to indicate
that the Italians have reduced their
establishment in Libya from the
100000 reported there last summer.
Moreover, both as to the usual North
African reserve in Algeria and the
mobile force in France (the first
reinforcement for North Africa in
cas- eof need, these forces have evi-
IDENTIFY been called on for Syrian
contributions to something ap-
preaching the total of their ef-
festiveness.
Surely this is an additional proof
that the allies have set aside anxiety
as to Italy entering the lists against
them. No doubt, in case of need, the
Mareth Line might be expected to
hold for a time, until reinforcements
could arrive from France; but now
these reinforcements would have to
consist of metropolitan troops, un-
used to African conditions, and the
need for their presence in Africa
might arise at moment when their
withdrawal from Europe would be
embarrassing If not impossible.
Moreover. the new naval disposition
IN the Mediterranean might render
extremely difficult the reinforcement,
as against a hostile Italy, of North
Africa from France.
We do not desire to labor this
point unduly, but on purely military
grounds it certainly appears that the
allies have good reason to believe
that Italy will not presently become
their enemy; reasons so good that
upon them the allied governments
are ready to assume very consider
able military risks.
Indeed the whole question Of the
new front" in the Balkans and