Evening star., 1940-03-24
f;!f5t |! Major Use
Df Air Power Seen
Under Way by Eliot
Attacks on Scope Flow
And SyIt Declared
Probable Sturt
BY MAI. GEORGE
FIELDING ELIOT.


hrticle of this series, the German
bombing attack on Scapa Flow and
the British attack on Sylt are i'm
portant, not for the results actually
accomplished. but because they diff
fered in cllaracter-especially the
.6ylt attack-from any previous oper-
Ations conducted in this theater.
The damage achieved by both Is
still matter of dispute; what is
hot dispute Is that these we're
attacks for effect, and not primarily
for experiment or reconnaissance.
Ket they may have borne also an
experimental character; indeed,
avery operation of war should teach
ITS lesson. should be weighed and
guided for improving its successors.
Particularly is this true of modern
air operations, for they belong to
D branch of war of which compara-
lively little is known.
3 The employment of air power as
4 battle agency is as yet in its in
fancy. We have only the experience
Nf the World War, in which tech
scratch and the employment of air
forces as an independent striking
arm was only beginning as the war
closed; the fragmentary experiences
OF Spain, China and Ethiopia. in
which but small forces were en-
ployed under conditions peculiar to
each locale, and finally the Polish
and Finnish wars and the compare
lively minor air operations over the
North Sea during the past fall and
winter.
AS spring opens, it is, therefore,
with grim interest that we observe
also the beginning of more serious
air attacks by both sides; and it is
not from the results of these initial
operations that our interest arises,
but rather from the fact that for
the first time in history we are see
ing what may be the opening of
major aerial warfare between really
f1rst-rate powers.
Lessons Incomplete.
Always before there has been some
qualifying factor. In China and
Ethiopia there was no effective op-
position; In Spain the forces were
small and diversely constituted and
equipped; in Poland a small air
force was utterly overwhelmed at
the outset by one far superior; in
Finland a large air force was so
poorly led and technically so de-
f1cient, and the weather in general
SO unfavorable, as to render only
incomplete lessons. Always, when
proponents of air power have been
challenged on the results obtained
in any of these wars. their answer
has been: "Ah, yes. But wait until
great air forces, fully equipped, COM
petently commanded, thoroughly
trained, really clash in Western Eu-
rope. Then we shall see."
Perhaps we are about to see.
Meanwhile, to assess the expe-
riences of the last few months may
not be Improbable.
The Polish campaign showed that
other factors being equal-great
numerical superiority of one air
force over the other at the outset
may quickly be converted into per-
manent command of the air, and
that this command in turn conveys
such advantages to its possessor in
his land operations as to amount,
in itself. almost to an assurance of
victory. Air attack on communica-
.tions-notably on railways, bridges
and road junctions-were shown to
be most effective in the absence of
serious opposition, but to require con-
siderable continuity of effort in or
der really to interrupt transit. The
practicability Of the overwhelming
attack from the air, destroying the
enemy air force and then breaking
up his mobilization and concentra-
ton on the ground, was proven prac-
ticable against weak foe. It's pos
sibilities as against a major foe
remain, for this war, in the realm
of academic consideration unless
some new belligerent is so attacked,
since those now participating have
passed through the mobilization
stage.
But the greatest air lesson of the
Polish war which is of immediate
interest in other theaters was the
use of air power in cooperation
with ground forces. In this highly
mobile campaign, air-ground CO.
separation was particularly notable
in reconnaissance, in pursuit and
in the detached operations of mech
anized forces. The all but perfect
information which, in the compara-
lively open country and good wealth.
ier, the German air force was able
ito afford its ground troops was one
'of the principal ingredients of VIC
tory.
Pursuit Value Proved.
| In pursuit the air force proved
;once again its very great value.
s1he fruits of many well-earned VIC
tories have been wholly or partly
lost through failure to pursue, which
has sometimes been due to lack of
energy on the part of command
Nrs but more often to lack of fresh
and available troops in position to
garry on the pursuit. Indeed, it has
dong been recognized that a WELL
conducted pursuit was itself amongst
sfhe most difficult operations of war
1are, and it has not often been the
case in modern times that victory
has been possible of achievement
with troops still in hand available
dor the follow-up.
i But it is now clear that air
forces afford the arm of pursuit par
excellence. This was foreshadowed
IN Palestine, Macedonia and Italy
Dust at the close of the World War,
when, in all three theaters, the most
decisive and indeed terrible re-
suits were obtained by air forces
pursuing beaten armies. Now their
fombination with fast moving
Snechanized columns on the ground
"Opens up still further the possibili-
ties of exploitation of victory. AS
aor the independent use of mech
IAnized troops on deep raids into
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