The Wilmington morning star., 1940-10-18
Editorial Comment
THE TURN TO THE EAST
N. Y. Herald Tribune

As the Nazi Educational mission pours
into Rumania by land, river and air, leaving
the Channel invasion ports blazing far behind
them; as eastern Europe turns again into a
vast, jittery whispering gallery where any,
thing is expected to happen at any moment.
it is easy to think once more of the moment
in the late summer of 1905 when Napoleon
abruptly abandoned his proposed invasion of
England and turned the Grand Army east
ward. Today one must enlarge the whole scale
and introduce many notifications in the pat
tern. 1t is still difficult not to be struck by
the fundamental parallelism. Napoleon
marched eastward to the glories of Ulm and
Austerlitz, but ultimately to the disaster Of
the road from Moscow. Hitler has taken Ru-
mania in a bloodless victory. But there are
still the Russians. Between Austerlitz and the
Beresina seven years elapsed in which Napo-
leon beat the Russians, allied himself with
them, warred upon them, in which minor
states like Prussia Tin a position not unlike
Turkeys today were variously neutrals or
victims. But Britain always remained; and
the end was crushing. The decision to aban-
don the invasion and attack England by going
eastward was basic to the whole Napoleonic
career, and at long last proved fatal to it.
Impelled by reasons almost identical at bot
tom, Hitler has turned likewise to attack Brit
ain in the east. But there are still the enig-
matte Russians; there is still an unbroken
British sea power, and it may be years before
the full consequences of the move become
apparent. While trying to guess the implica-
tions of the maneuvers of the moment it is
worth remembering that momentary maneu-
vers, however spectacular, may count for as
little in the long run as did Ulm or Austerlitz
or Friedland. In Rumania the Nazis have
clearly taken an important pawn; equally
clearly, they have taken no major piece by
the move, and in it's essentials the situation IS
scarcely changed. AS a means of protecting
both the Rumanian oil supply and any new
Balkan military or air bases from a possible
Russian threat, the occupation of Rumanla
was a virtually unavoidable prerequisite to
any winter campaign through the Balkans
against the British eastern Mediterranean
fleet. 1t was simply a logical next step"
giving Hitler time to consider what the sue
ceeding move will be. .
It has the disadvantage, however, that it
alarms the Kremlin as well as Greece ana
Turkey; it throws into unpleasant relief the
fundamental conflict between Red and Brown
Bolshevism, as it brings the latter to the
Black Sea and places it firmly astride Russia's
only road to her traditional goal of the straits.
Few of those on the ground seem to think that
the Kremlin's answer will be war. But if the
Kremlin has not saved it's pawn, it seems
clear. if only from the Tass agency's icy note
on the subject, that it did not voluntarily give
the pawn away. Hitler could always take HUI
mania: the only question was whether he could
do it with Russian connivance or would be
forced to do it without, which means that ne
has purchased an immediate advantage at the
cost of gravely weakening his longrun posltl-
zion,