The Wilmington morning star., 1940-05-31
FLANDERS LOST

THE terrible consequences OF the belslan
1 surrender become apparent WIFI Lie en'i1-
clement and rout of British troops Ii a
ders, This loss of approximately ooo'ooo
fighting men, halted while imposing d stlll
defense against advancing Nazl hordes' is d
harder blow to the Allies even than the Ger
man offensive, and seems to have raced them
with the necessity for such retreat as they
could make or complete humiliation.
In fact, their escape is ~problematical. With
enemy soldiers, artillery and airmen pouring
an increasing rain of shells into their ranks
at and near Dunkirque, their only possible
port of embarkation, they are suffering stag
gering losses. If any large numbers win
clear it will be miraculous. The full military
import of LEoPoLD's collapse is written in I'M
mistakable horror.
II would have been infinitely better if this
young, rash, but weak ruler OF the Belglans
had gone to France with his government and
left the leadership of his armies to his mill
tary high command, instead of trying to
emulate his valiant fathers course in the last
World War. His heroic desire to be like
ALBERT is understandable. Unfortunately, he
could not take it, as his father did. But that
is past and, as events move now, almost an
cient history. He quit at a crucial moment
and the armies that came on his call are
sacrificed upon the Nazi altar.
One significant fact, however, stands out in
the record of the British forces on the CONT
nent of Europe in this war of unprecedented
slaughter. For the second time, a British EX-
peditionary Force is in retirement. The first
pulled out of Norway. Now another is trying
in desperation and almost hopelessly to pull
out of Flanders. Neither retreat, we must
believe, is to be attributed to the Englishman's
individual inability to fight. To find a cause,
or fix the blame, we must get behind the
lines, take a look backward. Backward, even,
to the ~rearming of the Rhine.
The Flanders shamble is attributable to
British blindness six years ago, and, in part,
to British failure to recognize an obvious
peril during the years HITLER was building
his war machine. 1t is true that Great Britain
has no HAIG, no KITCHENER, in the present
crisis, no outstanding military genius. But
its armies are capable, as is we'll proved by
their fighting under tremendously adverse
odds during the Flanders campaign. They are
defeated, LEoPoLD's rash decision, and German
superiority in the air and in mechanization
account for that; but only in part. British
blindness in the past is more to blame for the
defeat.
HITLER has delivered a crushing blow to the
Allies in Flanders. Can he repeat on the
Somme? That is to be proved. He faces a
different type of fighter there. General
WEYGASD, called TO command only after the
might Of the German machine had been lem
by it, has the task of settling the future
course of civilization. He has done what
could be done in so short a time to strengthen
the Somme line, and has given increasing evil
dence of competent leadership. 1t was not
until he came into the picture that the Allied
forces took up offensive warfare. 1t may
be that he has imposed such a positive threat
to German supremacy that HITLER must thrust
toward Paris in an effort to defeat him or
find himself and his armies in imminent peril
of defeat themselves.
This may account for the announcement
that the Nazis will start a southern drive be-
fore invading England. 1t is only supposition.
No one can outguess the fuehrer at this hour.
But it may explain the change in the German
strategy, if indeed that strategy has under
gone a change. Clearly, it is up to WEYGAND
to produce the long prayed-for miracle. AS
the battle stands today, it is obvious that
he is the only man the Allies can look to-,
to produce the miracle.