Evening star., 1940-04-28

both ValleyS-the GudbrandSdal anc
ing up their main force based on
Oslo with their as yet isolated gar
rison in Trondheim.
If the allies can take Trondheim,
the whole Norwegian situation un-
dergoes decided alteration in their
favor. Having said that, it remains
to be determined what their chances
are of accomplishing this end.
North of Trondheim, the allied
advance guard has failed to hold
the important bridgehead of Steink-
ier. Reinforcements have been
landed at Namsos, it is reported, but
the condition of the roads and the
uncertain amount of rolling stock
available on the branch line rail-
way make the time of arrival of
these reinforcements at Steinkjer
doubtful. There is another possi-
bility, an overland attack against
the rear of the coast fortress of Ag-
denes, at the mouth of Trondheirn
Fjord. If such an attack could be
made good, allied naval forces might
penetrate the ford and threaten
Trondheim directly. But here
again the bad roads are a delaying
factor, as is the fact that Namsos
has few facilities for the landing
Of guns and heavy equipment.
Situation Critical in South.
South of Trondheim the situation
is more critical.
Here the allies landed at the port
of Andalsnes, no better equipped
than Namsos. It is likely that more
rolling stock and motor transport
can be made available to them at
Andalsnes, which communicates di-
rectly with the rail and road net of
Central Norway, than at isolated
Namsos. The allies have pushed
forward to Dombas, junction of the
Andalsnes branch line with the main
railway from Oslo to Trondheim,
which passes through the Gud-
brandsal. From Dombas, covering
force has been pushed southwark to
delay the advance of the German
main forces up the valley from Oslo
Another force has gone north to
Storen, only 80 miles from Trond-
helm, where the narrow-gauge rail-
way through the Osterdal comes in.
Meanwhile, the German Army in
Oslo has rushed motorized force
up the Osterdal with the hope of
reaching Storen and cutting off the
allies move. This force was repulsed
by the allies, who got to Storen first.
1t is now reported as resuming its
advance after receiving reinforce
ments.
What is now clear is that we are
seeing the preliminary operations of
advance guards and independent
motorized forces racing to seize key
points for the use of larger forces
which may come afterwards. The
allies hope to develop attacks on
Trondhcim both from the north and
from the south. The Germans hope
to forestall them by rushing small
but highly armed forces to key posi-
tions, heading the allies back until
the Germans can be reinforced. and
greatly aided by the superior Ger
man air force. The allies are said to
be using aircraft carriers anchored
in the fjords as temporary bases for
their own fighting planes, in an en-
deavor to Offset the German air
superiority until allied land bases
can be established from which con-
siderable numbers of allied planes
can be employed.
Dombas Key For Germans.
The allies must hold Dombas, the
vital railway junction, until they
can assemble a sufficient force at
Storen to deliver an attack on Trond-
helm from the south, or until their
northern force has taken the city.
If the Germans can take Dombas
before the allies are in Trondheim,
the chances of the campaign will
veer sharply in their favor. The
capture of Storen by the Germans
would be less, but still important,
accomplishment for them.
The question of air superiority is
probably controlling. This is the
chief German dependence. With
out it they would have little chance
to save Trondheim. With it, they
have very good hope Of doing so.
Much, therefore, hinges on the
ability of the allies to acquire and
equip air bases on Norwegian soil
within a very brief period of time.
While the issue of the lighting in
Norway thus remains in balance, a
new element is introduced by the
statement Of Herr Won Ribbentrop,
the German Foreign Minister, to
the effect that the German assault
on Norway was only in anticipation
of an allied plan to do the same
thing, with Norwegian connivance.
This supports the statement pre-
viously made in these articles that if
either Germany or Britain had good
reason to believe that the other
was about to move into the Scandi-
navian Peninsula, an attempt at
anticipation was certain
But the significant element about
Herr Won Ribbentrop's statement
was his careful assurance that
Sweden had scrupulously main
tanned its neutrality. 1t is possible
not probable, but possible-that
this foreshadows stronger German
pressure on Sweden to allow the
passage of German troops through
Swedish territory, perhaps under
threat of bombing the whole
country, perhaps accompanied by
promises that Scandinavia shall not
be made the seat of German attacks
on Britain once the allies have been
driven out. If Sweden should yield
to this combination of menace and
assurance and open the Swedish
railways to the passage of German
troops, not only could the Oslo army
receive the reinforcements which
allied naval operations in the
Skagerrak have so far denied or
impedeS, but also the Trondheim
situation could quickly be resolved
in Germany's favor by means of
troops moving via Oestersund and
Cfor1jon