The midland journal. (Rising Sun, Md.) 1885-1947, 1940-08-23
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THE UNPREDICTABLE

do to mix up in the European war,
we shall never send an expedition
AIRY force to Europe. On all the
military probabilities he is right, as
he usually is on such questions. But
the unerringly certain quality about
strategic planning is its unerring UNI
certainty-its utter unpredictability.
Who would have dreamed in 1918,
for example, that before Novem-.
Der, 1918, we would have more than
100000 American soldiers in
France-a larger combat force than
Great Britain ever had there? I'll
tell you some who didn't dream it
the President of the United States
and the general stats Of Germany,
France, England, Austria, Italy,
Belgium and the U. S. A.
When the first selective draft
started / wrote a memorandum, in
July, 1917, suggesting that 1t be for
1000, 900 men-not to take them be-
fore they were ready, but to classify
and warn those who would have to
60. 1t came back ink-spattered by
an angry pen-point that had pune
tured the paper and spurted indig-
nation. It was initiated NV. w."
and said, in effect, that the Ameri-
can people would never stand for a
draft of million men, that our con-
tribution was to be largely in money
and supplies, that it was absurd to
think of an offensive in any such
terms-just as General Pershing
says today.
That was perfectly understand
able. The Allies were then saying
that all they advised was token"
American force of a few divisions
to "show the flag and boost French
and British morale, that they need
ed our factories, our supplies, our
money and the available shipping to
keep business as usual much more
than they would ever need our I'M
trained levies. The enemy general
stats agreed. They did not count
on Americans in mass until we &C
tually began to send them, after the
British debacle Of March, 1918.
We in the selective draft organi-
cation never agreed. AS the system
started, it was not geared to get
100000 men a month. In Decem-
Der, 1917, I revised the entire ma
chine to examine and classify the
whole 10000, 900 pool Of man-power.
A result was that when the pres
sure came in 1918 and the Allies
: began to scream for linen in their
undershirts, it was enabled to step
up the monthly taking from some
10000 or 10000 to 100000 men a
month-without ripple. shall al
ways believe that this change did
much to win the war.
Anyway, it burned in on my mind
the fact that no man is smart enough
to foresee the course of war once
the fateful decision is made to en-
gage in it. We do lot of talking
about defensive" war and defend
ing" the Western hemisphere. No
country at war can completely de-
eide its own policy any more than
Joe Louis could decide what he had
to do against Max Schmeling in their
first fight. The enemy has some
thing to say about that. If we get
into this shindy we may have to
send men in the army to Europe,
Africa or eastern Asia. We almost
certainly will have to send men in
the navy and marines to all those
places. As has frequently been re-
marked in this space, in a knock
out fight you can't afford to 'hit
SOFT" and you can't enter any fight
with one hand tied behind your back
or one foot hobbled to a post.
Germany is fighting this war as
England always fought her wars.
to win. If we get into it, that is
the way we must fight-with every
thing we have and anywhere on the
surface of the globe where power
full blow may bring victory. Let's
make no mistake about that or be
fooled into any action on the error
that any war is picnic or that
either combatant can call his shots
without regard to what the enemy
may do.