Evening star., 1940-12-26
Nozi's Threat to Spain
Naturalization of Gibraltar as British Base
Would Undermine Mediterranean Position

Salamanca; CD the chief naval
port on the Atlantic, Ferrol; 90 the
chief naval port on the Mediter-
ranean, Cartagena, with the ports
of Valencia and Barcelona to be
taken en- route.
Must Assemble Supplies.
They will have to assemble large
depots of supplies in occupied
France, near the frontier, since
there is no food in Spain; their
troops will be entirely dependent on
road and rail communications
Their main force will probably drive
straight for Madrid and the central
area; one column-possibly couple
of motorized divisions-may strike
along the north coast for Ferrol,
which can become German sub
marine base on the Atlantic; an
other column will move on BARGE
Iona, and then south along the
coast through Valencia toward Car
tagena.
Local German elements in all
these places will no doubt attempt
to gain possession of dockyards,
naval vessels, railway stations, tele-
graph and telephone communica-
tionS, radio stations, airports and
the like. Air-borne troops will be
used to quickly support these local
efforts. The Mediterranean and
Atlantic ports are of great impor-
tance because it is by sea that any
British attempt to support possible
Spanish resistance would come. The
assembling of strong striking
force along the Valladolid- -Sala-
manca Railway is likewise impor-
tant, for 1t is from this position that
Portugal can be most easily over
awed and frightened out of any idea
of helping Britain or becoming a
British bridehead in the Iberian
Peninsula Indeed, German thrust
down the Tagus Valley to Lisbon is
by no means out of the realm of
possibility.
Gibraltar Is Final Objective.
From Madrid, it is quite likely
that an armored force might go
racing down to Seville and Cadiz,
to prepare the way for additional
troops coming eventually to besiege
Gibraltar. Here is the final objec-
tive of the German move into Spain,
if it comes; the only real iustif1ca-
ton, from the military viewpoint,
for such an attempt.
If Gibraltar can be neutralized as
British naval base, and British
control of the Straits so impaired as
to permit the free passage of Ger
man and Italian submarines, Brit
aims position in the Western Med
| iterranean has been gravely under
mined, and direct German pressure
on the French in North Africa be-
comes possible. Considering the
forces and the positions available,
it will be extremely difficult for the
British to set on foot any adequate
countermeasures. They may hold
Gibraltar. but they cannot preserve
| its usefulness as naval base If
the shores of Algeciras Bay are
available for German artillery. With
$4,000 first line, thoroughly equipped
troops they might be able to hold
enough of the hinterland to pro-
tect the base, at least for a very
long time-considering the German
difficulties of transport, and the
possibilities of rousing guerrilla war
fare in Spain itself. but how to get
$4,000 troops to the spot, and to
organize strong defensive position
covering the Gibraltar Peninsula
in time. is problem which might
we'll daunt the boldest British STRAIT
egist. The Germans are, in point
of time, closer to Gibraltar at
Hendaye than the British are either
at Malta or in Great Britain. Por-