Evening star., 1940-05-05
Woriness of Risks Seen Cause
Of Allied Reverse in Norway
Nozi objectives Attained, Maj. Eliot Says,
Because Actions Were Late and inadequate

edge the Allied, staffs did not pre-
pare fully detailed plans to deal
with this eventuality.
But the preparation of plans Is
one thing; the securing from war
cabinets of the forces to implement
these plans is quite another. The
plans were undoubtedly ready; the
forces were not, especially the air
forces. So much is made clear by
the lamentable course of events.
What mean to say is not that the
royal air force was unprepared to
deal with any eventuality, but that
sufficient proportion of squadrons
was not allocated to the Norwegian
campaign, and that preparations for
establishing bases for them in Nor
way either had not been made or
were not permitted to be carried
into effect.
The excuse has been put forward
by some British commentators that
initially forces were rushed into
Norway-just anything available
in order to encourage the Nor
wegians to resist. But If this is so,
and the appearance of allied forces
certainly did have that effect, what
are we to think of a British gov
ernment which thus encourages a
small people to resist the ruthless
might Of Nazi Germany, and then
at the first breath of danger aban-
dons them to face the enemy's ven-
geance alone?
It has also been suggested that
the purpose was to encourage the
Swedes to intervene, but if that
were the case, the very first essen
tial was to open up a secure route
by which allied aid might reach
Sweden-and this was neither ac-
complished at Trondheim, nor has
yet been accomplished at Narvik
Moreover, the precipitate allied
withdrawal from the Trondheim
area has produced a very bad psy-
Geological effect in Sweden, an
effect which even the opening of
the Narvik gateway may not do
very much to Offset.
Psychological Effect Uncertain.
What the psychological effect will
be on other nations which are asked
to put their trust in allied guaran-
tees of aid it is perhaps too early
to ascertain, though allied prestige
can hardly gain from the Norwegian
failure. Rumanians, Greeks, Yugo-
slavs, even Turks may we'll ask
themselves whether allied guaran-
tees are worth having if even Nor
way, on the very doorstep of Brit
ish sea power, cannot be protected.
But it Is not British sea power
which has failed; it is the willing
ness of those in high places to take
the risks which are inescapable in
war. the cult of the defensive, the
mistaken idea that war can be
made safely and comfortably, by
economic and political means, with
minimum of bloodshed and such
unpleasantness.
1t should now be plain to all who
have the wits to learn from bitter
experience that. the dynamism of
National Socialist Germany and
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Germany has forged cannot sue
cessfully be opposed save by meth
ods as swift, as ruthless and as
we'll co-ordinated as those which
Germany has so far victoriously
employed. The leaders who control
the destinies of the Third Reich
have not yet met their match
Their equals exist in the allied
countries; but unless and until these
come into the places of high deci-
sion We shall continue to receive
bad news from Europe. Meanwhile
from their new bases on the Nor
wegian coast we may expect to
learn of fresh German forays on
British shipping Both in this field
and in that of prestige the price of
the Norwegian defeat will be a
heavy one.
Copyright. 1910, by New York Tribune,
Inc)