Evening star., 1940-05-05
BY MAI. GEORGE F. ELIOT.

Horatio Nelson in the cabin Of the
Vanguard in the fall Of 1893. must
be left to chance. Our only con-
sideration Is, is the honor and bene-
At to our country worth the risk?
If so, in Gods name let us get to
work"
He was proposing an assault by
the feet upon Leghorn; and having
just given convincing proofs at the
battle of the Nile of what he could
accomplish by well-calculated TAX
ing Of risks, his views prevailed and
brought complete success.
THE two questions in case of
risk which is under consideration
are: Does the end justify the risk?
And has every practical precaution
been taken to insure success?" OBJ
serves our Admiral Mahan.
It appears to be failure to appI
this principle, an unwillingness to
take risks even in the face of the
gravest consequences, which has
brought to an inglorious end the
allied counter offensive in Norway
From the beginning it was plain
IAAC NAOA lAAulA Pu1 DOSC Wdo W
seize and consolidate hold upon
Southern and Central Norway with
a view to using the Atlantic ports
of that country as bases for sub
marine and air attacks against the
British Isles and British shipping
Swift and even desperate measures
were demanded. rather than to per-
NIT this objective to be attained.
1t has been attained because such
measures as were taken were neither
in time nor in sufficient force.
Trondhejm-Attack Allied Reply.
The allied reply to the German
move took, as predicted in these
articles, the form of an attack upon
Trondheim The securing of this
port, and of the whole of the Trond-
helm Fjord, as an allied base of
operations on the Norwegian coast
was of the first importance. It
would have given the allies control
of a modern port through which
they could have poured their forces
into the country; it would have
commanded the northern end Of the
vital central valley, the chief routes
of interior communications in the
country: it would have imperiled
the German hold on Oslo, and if
accompanied by vigorous and un-
remitting efforts in the Skagerrak,
would have compelled the Germans
to the unpleasant choice of with
drawing and acknowledging defeat,
or of attempting to force their way
through Sweden, thus adding the
excellent Swedish forces to the sum
total of their enemies; it would.
meanwhile, have opened direct
route into Sweden, by means of
which that country could have re-
ceived allied aid.
The preliminary steps taken-the
landing of advance forces at Namsos
and Andalsnes, the rush inland to
seize the key points of Steinkjer in
the north, of Dombas and Storen in
the south, the throwing out of a
covering force to delay the German
advance up the Gudbrandsdal, were
all well conceived; they were accom-
panied by vigorous air and naval
assaults on the German bases. So
far, so good.
But these excellent measures, OBJ
vtously the first steps toward the
seizing of Trondheim by a coupe de
main, were not swiftly and resolutely
followed up. 1t must have been clear
from the very beginning that the
Germans must, at first, depend on
their air force to hamper and delay
the allies, until a sufficient German
land force could be collected at Oslo
to advance northwaId and sweep
the valleys clear, making contact
with the isolated Trondheim gar
rison. The very next measures,
therefore, should have been to coun-
ter this German air effort by keep
ing up without cessation the bomb
ing attacks on the German air bases,
by establishing strong anti-aircraft
defense for the ports of entry and
for Dombas at the very least, and by
getting allied fighter squadrons into
the country in sufficient numbers to
give, pause to the German bombers.
Under cover of these precautions,
allied reinforcements should have
been rushed in, and Trondheim
taken at whatever cost.
Great Risks Involved.
There were, of course, very great
risks involved in this procedure. It
is difficult to land anti-aircraft guns,
fire control equipment and the great
quantities of ammunition required,
at such posts as'Namsos and Andals-
mes. 1t is difficult to move them in
land with the limited transport
available. Support of carriers is
limited in degree and in effective
ness and the carriers themselves
may sustain injury or loss.
1t is difficult and dangerous to
establish improvised bases in so
broken a terrain as that of Nor
way under the attack of hostile
aviation. Many ships, many planes,
many men might have been lost in
attempting to do these things.
But they had to be done if Trond-
helm were to be taken, and it was
assuredly known in advance to the
Allied staffs that this was so. We
can hardly escape the conclusion
that plans had been made for just
this procedure, and that at some
point during the execution of these
plans someone in high places re-
fused the necessary air force-pos-
sibly because of fear of diminish
ing the air defense of the British
Isles.
At the risk of wearying the read
ers, it is needful to repeat that in
this operation, as in all modern
warfare, time was the factor of
controlling importance-a fact well
understood by the Germans, appar-
emily poorly grasped by the Allies.
The Norwegian campaign, indeed,
bears on the face of it evidence of
hesitation, timidity, division of coun-
sci, changes of mind in the midst
OF operations. It is not charged
that these factnrS uora Of u,orl>