The people's voice., 1940-07-17

Zdt1On. france naQ i've mecnan1Z6d
divisions under the Gamelin system
intsead Of the 10 mechanized divisions
called for by General de Gaulle, ad-
vocate of he German system. Clearly,
| the Popular Front had no responsible
lity for this.
Airpanes
The lack of airplanes is another
matter. Explaining it involves an ex-
tensive examination Of the so-calIed
naturalization of French defense in
dustries. The Popular Front govern
ment nationalized it's defense indus
tries in July-August 1885, This legis-
lation was passed, not so much for
"socialistic" reasons, as for moral and
technical reasons. Scandals in the
privatemanufacture and trade in arms
before, during and after the World
war made SO deep an impression on
the minds Of the French people that
popular feeling demanded nationaliza-
tion. But technical reasons were also
involved. Daladier himself, then Min
lister OF War, in his speech in the
ChamDer urging passage of the bill,
dealt at length with its advantages
from the standpoint of industrial pre-
paredness (Journal Officiel, July II.
1885. Henri Bouche, editor of
principal trade Jour-
nal of the aviation industry, wrote in
July 1886: "The private system has
drained almost the entire aeronautical
industry of its substance; it has
forced it to be dependent on banks
to whom has thereby been conferred
the authority, in respect to matters of
defense, which ought to remain in the
hands of the government" The bill
was passed in the Chamber by large
majority, 4S4 to IS. Many conserva-
tives voted in favor of this bill, which
American critics call "socialistic."
The law had two parts. One COM
pletely nationalized with payment to
owners) II factories or parts of fac
tories which made guns, ammunition,
tanks, etc. The other section semi
nationalized the aviation industry.
This semi-nationalization was accom-
plished by having the government take
majority participations of stock in GER
tain reorganized air-frame companies.
At the same time, not only number
of air-frame and necessary companies
but also the two big airplane motor
companies-H -Hispano-Suiza and Gnome
ct Rhone-were left in private hands.
The semi-nationalized air-frame COM
panies which were to build and equip
new plants. This was intended to
transfer some of the aviation industry
from the Paris region where it had
and to spread it in units in different
parts of the country-for obvious mill
tary reasons. An effort was also
made to induce the two private motor
to decentralize their plants.
The nationalizatiOns went into effect
in the first three months of 1877
Now it is important to emphasize
that all the criticism in France against
naturalization has been centered on
the airplane industry. In examining
French newspapers and publications
before, during and after the war, one
finds no criticism of the nationalized
producing tanks, guns, am
munition, etc. Therefore one may
we'll assume that these categories of
production rendered satisfaction.
The Record
What, then, are the reasons for the
rom an inferiority in airplanes? The
ruth is that France delayed national
zation too long. Take the record of
he private airplane industry after the
advent of Hitler. In 1884, Air Minis
er General Denain obtained passage
If bill to buy 1000 airplanes from
private industry. This order was not
completed and delivered until three
'ears later-when the planes were al
eady absolete. In other words, pri-
rate industry was able to produce not
more than about 80 planes a month
in spite of the urgings of
General Denain, private industry did
lot decentralize or tool up for mass
By comparison, the semi-national-
zed industry did not do badly. Re-
,inning in 1887 to tool up and de-
entralize, it was able to turn out
bout 80 planes a month-in spite of
II the delays involved in building and
quiping. Revelation of this figure
aused scandal among the unin-
who did not realize as do
americans today, that it takes time
efore large-scale production can be
chieved. But after the outcry, more
honey was poured into equipment,
nd the production rate during the
inter of 1938-39 rose from 80 to 94
~ the summer of 1889 it had reached
SO month, and by the spring of
$40 it was unofficially estimated at
90 a month.
This is, of course, only fraction
Germany's rate of production (esti-
lated at 2,000-2,500 a month"; and far
Glow Britain's monthly production in
1arch, 1910 5000. But France is
mall industrial country, in plant and
lbor resources, compared with Ger
lany and Britain. 1t could never,
ithout warping the structure of it's
ldustry and finance, rival these ma
ons in plane production. L'Aeronau-
que said (May, 1889 that the ratio
atween the normal powers Of German
nd French manufacturing was about
" to 1.
+"Note sur la Naturalization des
abrications de Guerre," leaflet issued
Y the office of the Controleur-Gen-