Evening star., 1940-10-27

VuOy Utt SUHty H W uCLtoH uPOH otS
the critical circumstances Of a general
conflict in Europe. 1t was most anxious
work for our diplomats, who were faced
with dilemma after dilemma of the most
serious import. And in the end they
could not keep us out of war principally
because we had an inadequate naval
force as an influence with which to back
up their diplomacy.
1t is true that we then had a good
sized Navy Although it was substan-
TALLY smaller than the German Navy the
latter was smothered in its home ports
by the all but overwhelming British Navy
except for submarines. This is an i'm
portant exception from many viewpoints
most particularly with regard to Amer
lean neutrality. In common with other
navies our Navy had no wartime expert
ence in combating submarines. and the
RAPID development of that form of war
fare. together with the secrecy respecting
counter-measures which were being de-
veloped by the Allies, found us very
poorly prepared to deal with U-boats.
Our weakness in this regard was we'll
known to the German high command.
1t had vital influence upon their de-
cisions to ignore American protests and
hence upon our being drawn into the
war.
Subs Begin Operations.
This is clear from the evidences that
have come to light from German sources
since the war. AS early as November,
1914, the German chancellor vetoed
proposal to embark on submarine war
fare against shipping. His reasons are
Illuminating According to Admiral
Scheer: The question was not whether
it should be done. but when it could be
done without running our position. Such
a measure would react detrimentally
upon the attitude of neutrals and our
imports; it could only be employed with
out dangerous consequences when our
military position on the continent was so
secure that there could be no doubt as
to the ultimate outcome there, and the
danger that the neutrals would join our
opponents might be regarded as out of
the question. At the moment these con-
ditions do not exist Clearly, at this
stage, it was regard for neutral strength
that alone assured neutrals of peace, to-
gether with respect for their rights.
BY February of 1915 the Germans felt
strong enough to begin ruthless subma-
rining. We protested vigorously on hui
manitarian grounds and threatened to
declare war. In May the Lusitania was
sunk and in August the Arabic, with the
loss of American passengers in both
cases. At that time Germany had rela-
lively few submarines available She
was uncertain as to what counter-meas-
ures might be developed against them,
and she was much concerned over the
economic effect of losing imports from
the United States that the British
blockade had not then virtually cut of.
Consequently, the decision was reached
on that occasion to respect American
protests and to cease the submarine cam
paign.
U-Boat Ruthlessness.
In March, 1916, the German high COM
mand decided to renew the illegal sub
marining. Their reasons included the
opinion of the chief of naval staff that
''the general military situation is good
- no serious danger is to be appre-
hended from America so long as our
U-boats and fleet remain afloat =
break with America certainly affords us
the tactical advantage of ruthless U-boat
warfare against England, but only under
conditions that will prolong the war, and
will certainly bring neither relief nor
ameloration to the economic situation"
The fateful renewal of submarine war
fare that brought us into the war was
determined upon by the Kaiser at
special meeting at general headquarters
on January 8, 1917. Gen. Ludendor6
outlines its proceedings in his War
Memoirs" There was no longer danger
to be feared from neutral Holland. Den
mark, Switzerland. Sweden or Norway
because the victorious German army in
Rumania would soon be back on the
home 'front.' That America would de-
clare war was practically certain. She
would arm herself but could not sub
stantially increase her output of NUM-
tions, which were already being supplied
to the Allies. In the first year she could
put a maximum of five or six divisions
of troops in France A shortage of ship
ping in consequence of the submarine
campaign would prevent transporting
greater force together with Its supplies.
These were the erroneous assumptions
upon which the decision to renew the
final submarine campaign was taken.
It is apparent that if the German high
command had believed that the United
States Navy. in cooperation with the
Allied navies. was strong enough In anti
submarine forces to nullify and defeat