Evening star., 1940-05-20

was still reluctance on the part of
the British and French to estab-
hsh unity of command and the
Doullens conference appointed Gen.
Foch only as "co-ordinator for the
British and French armies"
On April the British and French
representatives., on the request of
Gen. Foch, agreed to his exercising
"the strategical direction of mill
tary operations" and on April IA,
1918, the British and French gov
ernments finally agreed to his ap-
pointment as commander in chief
of the allied armies in France" It
was high time.
For three and half years of
practically constant fighting on
bloody circle which extended from
the North Sea through France,
Italy, Greece, Rumania, Russia, to
the Baltic Sea, the allies had failed
to apply the first Of military prin-
ciples-unity of command land,
therefore, of effort).
1t is source of legitimate pride
for our Nation that Gen. Pershing
was the first of the allied COM
manders to give clear expression
and energetic adherence to this
principle in his direct and personal
statement to the allied commander
in chief, Marshal Foch, of March
%. 1918.
At Cantigny, on May %, 1918, the
1st Division of the American Ex-
peditionary Force, launched its first
attack against the Germans.
1t is interesting to note just here
that although we had been at war
with the central empires for more
than year, with the exception of
the rifle and bayonet, all of the ma
terrell Of these units had been OBJ
tanned from the French and British:
Artillery, airplanes, tanks, machine
guns, flame throwers, automatic
rifles, gas masks, etc, came from
our allies and continued so to come
until the armistice.
Change Under Unified Command.
From the very hour of Marshal
Foch's appointment as allied CO.
ordinator the situation changed.
Orders for further withdrawal were
discarded, and unified action, in
tensified by American intervention
and directed by a skillful command
er in chief, blocked the further ad-
vance of the Germans toward
Amiens.
The German offensive of 1918 on
the western front, beginning March
81 and ending July Is, consisted of
four heavy local attacks, three of
which made deep pockets but failed
to break the allied lines: In Picardie
in March, in Flanders in April, and
on the Aisne at the Chemin des
Danes In May. The last attack.
made in the region of Rheims on
July Is, was complete failure.
These attacks, widely separated in
time and space, seem to have been
only local efforts to pierce the allied
line with no interrelation of a gen.
eral plan for the entire front.
On the allied side, on the contrary,
with the assumption Of the supreme
command by Marshal Foch in March,
1918, we find a progressive and COM
prehensive plan carried out continue
ously, beginning with the flattening
of the pockets made by the German
offensives, for salients are very
vulnerable and their creation was
carefully avoided in the Foch ma
neuver.
Second Battle Of the Marne.
On July 18, 1918, the allied forces
began the counter offensive of the
second battle Of the Marne, which
was to extend from Vercun to the
North Sea and continue, with brief
interludes, to the armistice of No
vember IL, 1918. The strategy was
quite simple. The two wings Of the
allied forces were hinged and were
to pivot successfully on Verdun. The
northern wing, comprising four
fifths of the allied armies, extended
to the North Sea. The southern
wing, with one-flfth Of the total
force, extended from Verdun to
Switzerland. There were two phases
In the general plan:
(1) BY q series Of consecutive
local attacks the north wing was to
force the Germans back to the line Of
the Meuse River and to seize the
valley Of the Meuse at Sedan, where
that river passes between the for
ests Of the Argonne and the Ar
dennes. Though this valley passed
the only Lns Of communications