Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1940-07-18

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home deet. Which, I think most
naval commentator would agree,
u unlikely.
There Is = focal point to this sort
Of reasoning. Its name u Gibraltar.
Upon British retention Of Gibraltar.
and ability to use 1t as base, rests
the control Of the western exit Of
the Mediterranean, indeed the ability
Of the home fleet to operate IN that
sea at all. AL the French bases are
now closed to British warcraft.
Gibraltar alone remains to them for
this part Of the world.
Gibraltar Vital Point.
Hence Gibraltar becomes q point
OF much interest to the military
planners Of Berlin and Rome. It
has already been attacked by air.
which Is interesting, ~ the nearest
italian territory tSardinia) Is about
$50 miles distant, pretty long bomb
ing range. One may suspect that
the bombers which made the re-
peated attacks on Gibraltar came
from French or Spanish territory
With Spanish help, Gibraltar could
be quite easily attacked; though 1t
could be defended for 4 long time,
bombing from nearby bases and
artillery fire from the mainland
could injure the docks and port 20
that the place could not be used -
4 naval base.
This is the considered view Of
most British military authorities.
There have been hints that pressure
Is being put on Madrid to allow the
passage through Spanish territory
Of the German troops which can now
be transported directly to the Span
ish frontier. Even without SPANS
direct participation. Gibraltar could
thus be invested and made useless.
The British feet could not, In that
case, use any ports in French or
Spanish North Africa; nor could
they. as was once planned, retire to
Portuguese ports and continue to
guard the Strait, because this would
simply expose helpless Portugal to
the terrors OF blitzkrieg.
Unless Britain is prepared to meet
this threat by beginning q new
peninsula war, by setting an army
down In Portugal-which she could
hardly do today because of the din
Guilty Of providing that army with q
sufficient air support-there would
be no alternative but to withdraw
the ships to home bases, thus per-
hitting the Italians to emerge from
the Strait Of Gibraltar and freeing
considerable numbers Of Italian light
craft for use in the blockade of
Great Britain. While British war
ships could still operate in the
vicinity Of Gibraltar they could not
do SO with anything like the eff
cheney which the possession of the
Gibraltar base affords them.
There are, therefore, cogent argu-
ments for an attempt upon Gibral-
tar before beginning the main at
tack on Great Britain: just as there
Is also an argument for establishing
. base in Ireland first. Either or
both of these enterprises would pro-
vide. If successful, the required Pc
riodical miracle of which Nazi dy-
namics stand in need: and either
would tend to draw the British into
desperate diversions Of strength
which might more than make I'D
for the additional time they would
be allowed for perfecting their home
defenses.
While I do not, II I can avoid it,
enter the realm of prophesy, it is at
least interesting to examine some
Of the considerations which are thus
confronting the German high COM
mand At this time, and to reflect
upon the possible decisions that
may be taken-decisions the real
mature Of which will be disclosed i
rs usual-only with the events
which proclaim them.
Copyright 1910, New York Tr,huos In.