Evening star., 1940-10-27

Prot. Laski, an internationally
knoUn authority on political science,
has frequently been a spokesman for
the British Labor party. He has been
for ndny years on the faculty OF the
University OF London and has lee
tured at many American universities.
LONDON, Oct 26 (By Wireless to
NANAD-The character of the dicta-
tors policy for the second winter of the
war now seems to be defining itself with
some precision.
The center of the axis attack is evi-
IDENTITY to be the Mediterranean. Ger
many is to push through the Balkans to
the Black Sea, and Italy is to seek,
through Egypt, to break the British mold
on the Middle East. 1t is reckoned that
the threat of a dual attack by Germany
and Japan will be sufficient to keep the
Soviet Union neutral and, suspect, they
are calculating that if this policy is
successful, the United States, interven-
ton or no intervention, will not be able
to assist in time.
An actual attempt at invasion of Great
Britain is now unlikely before spring.
tack is designed to damage our morale
and inf1ict decisive blows on our war
production.
Clearly. the first part of the program
depends wholly upon the attitude of
the Soviet Union The only two things
we know about Russia with any asSur-
ance are its anxiety to keep out OF the
war and retention of its suspicious of
Great Britain. 1t cannot, indeed, be to
the advantage or even the safety of the
Soviet Union to see the Fascists bring
Greece and Bulgaria under their heel
and be able to influence Turkey at
their discretion. Still less is their ad-
vantage obvious in Fascist domination
Of the Middle East.
Price Must Be Paid.
From this I infer that it is time for
Britain to make a definite effort to re-
move the grounds for Soviet suspicious
Of its Intentions If that means recog-
milton of the incorporation of the Baltic
republics and of Sovietized Poland, it is,
I suggest, a necessary price to pay as one
means of defeating the dictators Balkan
advance. With all that has been ugly In
Soviet diplomacy since the spring OF
1899, it remains true that wise policy
on the part of Britain can still make
the Kremelin understand that there is
nothing of essential interest that Is
likely to be jeopardized by democratic
victory and everything to fear from
victory of the dictators.
odJ ~
derstanding and the sooner the Churchill
government makes up its mind to pay
that price. the better To threaten con-
summation of the dictators' Mediterra-
mean policy by engaging Soviet lnf1u-
ence against it is in fact to win the war.
For it is now clear that the threats OF
Japan against America have failed and
1t is at least probable that their failure
has minimized Soviet fears Of japanese
attack. The economic weapons the
United States and Great Britain can
employ against her would put Japan In
q rapidly desperate position if she en-
gagged in a second major war.
The democracies and the Soviet Union
between them hold the trump cards in
complicated game of power politics that
is afoot But they have to be willing to
play them and they have to make it plain
what they are playing them for.
At present, think, the Soviet outlook
Is dominated by three considerations:
Fear of a German victory, fear that
Anglo-American supremacy may be
threat to her security, and anxiety, born
of past suspicious and bad treatment,
that her status as a great power should
be amply recognized. Her fear of a Ger
man victory is wise.
Russia's Anxiety.
The fear of Anglo American victory
and her anxiety for a proper status ought
not to be difficult to meet if there is the
will to meet it. But there must be that
will and it cannot come too soon to be
effective On its coming depends not
only the attitude of Bulgaria and Greece;
it is decisive also for the possibilities OF
Turkish policy in the next few months.
For despite her good will and sincerity.
1t is obvious that Turkey cannot afford
to pursue a course which the Soviet
Union does not pretty fully indorse.
1 see no sign that the air attack on
Britain is succeeding in its purposes. 1t
is ugly and no doubt cruel. Six thousand
deaths in a month mean, on any show
ing, intense suffering. and the material
damage leaves ugly gaps, especially in
London and the Merseyside. Their scale
raises serious problems of administration,
which do not grow easier with the ap-