Coulee City dispatch. [volume] (Coulee City, Wash.) 19??-19??, 1940-01-18

We Need National DetenSe
By HUGH S. JOHNSON
WASHINGTON 1.-The experience
Of winter war ID Finland does not
Indicate IA LIKELIHOOD Of any in1rde-
diate change from the present
strange standstills war. anywhere.
Few great offensives have ever been
begun in winter and few great bat
ties fought.
In tn world is almost sure to- have
a breathing spell, but the coming
Of spring threatens terrible things.
7 Don't believe that Goering was
blufing in his New Year message.
Nobody ought to prophesy, but how
can the spring of 1910 be anything
other than now-or-never for the lit
tie handful of scoundrels at the head
of the Nazi party and government?
! In war purely of economic
4strapgulation, they, cannot possibly
win. Furthermore. their gradual
relative weakening and their con-
slant inaction makes less and less
likely any kind Of negotiated peace
that, politically, they could afford to
sign. F-e.!'
: The only thing that I can think
of that will avert a terrible ordeal
in the air no later than April is
something that could happen within
Germ any to change it's government.
That there may be a, popular up
rising against the Hitler Goering
gang am told is most unlikely. But
the life of no tyrant or even group
cof tyrants is ever secure.
Assassination is not in the books
as part of modern war methods.
But when one single warped individ-
'ual holds over the head of the whole
world so much misery, danger and
! death, who would question divine
providence if something like that
should happen to Adolf? 4admtn ia
WASHINGTON..-I frequently do
not agree with Oswald Garrison Viii
lard. I emphatically do not agree
with, many of the things said in his
latest book, 'fOur Military Chaos"
l can't support many Of his con-
illusions, but i. have long supported
his principal one-which is that we
need an impartial nop=partisan. ex-
tra-governmenta1 commission to
look into the question of national
defense.
!, In summing up his own book he
says-in the main, truly; cit has.
shown (I that we have no defense
policy whatever; (2) that all our ex-
penditures. bear no relation what
ever (?) to an established military.
program; go that we are asking the
impossible of the, army, and navy
since we do not tell what to defend
or how or where to defend it; (4)
that there can sbe no adequate de-.
Tense policy set up until there is a
decision as to what our foreign pol
icy is to be, until our detectives are
defined; (5) that the primary de-
tense problem for the United States
is as to whether we are only to de-
fend our shores or prepare. again to
fight abroad; (6) that, because of
the failure to define what we shall
TO defend, our policies, notably in
@the Pacific, vary from yearto year,
almost from hour to- hour; a(7] that
Until that is settled we are; adding to
our vast expenditures without the
slightest guarantee that those out
lays make for a saner or better de-
tense =. II; (8) that there are grave
faults in the organization of the war
and navy departments and (9) that
they fail to cooperate. with. each
other; 10D that although no less
than seven billions have been spent
for defense since the fiscal year
1934-35 the war, department admits
amazing shortage in supplies Of fun
damental Importance; (1D =. that
there is no hope Of balancing a nor
NAL budget without putting definite
limit to the increase Of army and
navy expenditures now fast approx
mating two, billions of dollars, etc.,
There is no room here to point
aouts some of the inaccuracies, over-,
emphasis and conclusions, but in a
general way, I strongly feel that
the: book does bring ample docu-
meditation and authority to estab-
fishing what he here says Improves.
L A commission inquiry is imperar
tive. If it finds that this column
and Mr.. Wizards book are wrong, it
will be splendid vindication-which
l, for one, would welcome If it
finds that we are only partly right,
the country ought toIknow it. sosq
General Marshall, chief of staff,
has just said that in spite of these
billions, our defense is not Is per
cent Elective. He charges it to the
historians and heff is right in his
reasons, but there are other culprits.
l would shudder to see, careful
compilation of comparative unit
costs-per soldier or per ton of ship
ping-as between our own and the
armies and navies of all other ma
tons. 1t would shock the country.
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