Evening star., 1940-05-07

ccadder the elEect On Norwefish,
government forces and the people
II We made no attempt to hold CEN
trail Norway" he went on.
If we refused to answer the call,
we should have justified the re-
proach that our only object In Scan
dinavia was the iron ore and that
we cared nothing for the freedom
of the small nations"
1T had been made clear to u.s.
Mr.. Chamberlain said, that unless
we were ready to assist in the only
way which the Norwegians them
selves felt to be effective-an attack
on Trondheim-the Norwegians were
not likely to have been able to con-
tinue their resistance and the whole
country would have fallen at once
into German hands,
He said opinions differed on
whether Britain should have made
direct attack on Trondheim and
since the operation was not attempt
ed 1T will never be possible to
decide the question ."
Il can say now that that idea
was constantly before u.s." Mr.
Chamberlain revealed, adding that
plans for a direct attack on Trond-
helm with forces at Namsos and
Andalsnes were prepared and care
fully considered"
For time, he said, it seemed as
If capture of Trondheim might be
effected by forces which had been
landed elsewhere" but the advance
OF the Germans was not sufficiently
held up by demolitions.
Operations of this kind were
necessarily complicated" he ex-
planned, and needed considerable
time for thorough preparation II
success was to be assured.
Answers Criticism.
Answering criticism that the al
lied expedition gathered to help
Finland should have been main
tanned to forestall German attack,
Chamberlain said this argument
is founded on a complete miscon-
ceptlon."
Whatever forces we had at our
disposal, we could not have FORE
stalled the Germans unless the
Norwegians had invited or allowed
us to come in" he declared to the
accompaniment of ringing cheers.
consequently, we were helpless
to prevent the German stroke"
Mr.. Chamberlain said that when
the Finnish campaign was given UP
1T was decided there was no need
to keep this large force in this coun-
try and, accordingly, it was dis
patched to France" whence the
troops could be transported to Nor
way as readily as from England.
The rate of dispatch of troops to
Norway was governed by the speed
with which they could be landed at
those very few and inadequate ports"
to which the British had access, Mr..
Chamberlain declared.
Ships which had been gathered to
transport an allied expeditionary
force to Finland had been dispersed,
Mr.. Chamberlain said, when it be-
came "unjustifiable" to keep them
waiting for an expedition which
might never have come Off" He
said the waiting ships were needed
elsewhere.
Powers for Churchill.
Mr. Chamberlain announced that
Mr.. Churchill will have special re-
sponsibility" for the supervision of
military operations day by day,
and answered yes to David Lloyd
Georges question whether the first
lord of the Admiralty would retain
his post.
Mr.. Churchill's appointment as
sured that when policies are de-
cided upon they will be followed up
with sprcmptness and energy" Mr..
Chamberlain said, adding that he
relied on Mr.. Churchill to "let me
know"-if the burden becomes too
heavy. ',a -
Mr.. Churchill had suggested that
it would help him. as head of
the Cabinet Military Coordination
Committee If he had close contact
with chiefs of staff.
Mr.. Chamberlain disclosed that
under Mr.. Churchill will be "a small
personal staff under Maj. Gen. Is
may" and that other changes in
the form of government or the func-
tions of individuals might be neces-
sary.'
Mr.. Chamberlain said Britain was
doing "all we can to overtake the
start Germany obtained during her
long years of preparations" The ma
ton, he added. needs "the whole
hearted cooperation of members of