Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1940-12-01
Mai. Eliot Points to Pacific
As Theoter for u. S. Offensive
Best Use Of Timing and Most Thorough
Weighing Of Risk Held Necessary

vi IIle Otuer Qauo, the Me0lCeT-
ranean presents at the moment
more cheerful picture. No German
advance In Spain or the Balkans
can alter the fact that the italian
fleet has been pretty well broken up
and its offensive power destroyed.
This will give the British far greater
freedom of action In this area, and
imperils the communication of the
italian armies threatening their
central position in Egypt. 1t may
have repercussions In French North
Africa. the acquisition of whose har-
bors would offset loss of Gibraltar.
Probably British ships can be re-
leased from the Mediterranean in
the near future for service in the
Atlantic.
II we may assume that our offen-
sive power, residing chiefly in our
balanced and powerful fleet, cannot
for the moment be usefully employed
in the Atlantic, but that Britain is
for some time to come able to hold
her own there, we may then turn to
the Pacific where that fleet might
be most usefully and successfully
employed in reducing Japan from
her present status as the nuisance
partner of the axis.
Japan Is Vulnerable.
The success of the British assaults
upon italian naval power suggests
that an attack upon the weak men,
Der of coalition is sound strategy.
Japan Is, at the moment, peculiarly
vulnerable to attack because of her
war with China and her economic
exhaustion resulting therefrom. We
are peculiarly able to attack her by
blockade because of our assurance
Of British and Dutch bases. We
could thus free our hands, within a
reasonable period of time, of Pacific
anxieties, and lay for some years the
fears of the rise of a great and
menacing Oriental empire control
ling the whole of East Asia and the
approaches thereto, and expanding
inevitably into our Pacific zone of
security.
Indeed, under the Circumstances. we
might hope to accomplish this objec-
tive without having to fight for 1t,
once the japanese were assured that
we meant to fight if necessary. If
our hands were free in the Pacific.
the whole weight of our offensive
power might then be brought to bear
wherever else it might be useful,
and the foundations of a victorious
peace resting on Americana British
command of the oceans of the world
would be laid.
1t is plain that this question of
strategic balance, of the proper use
Of our central position, Of the de-
velopment of our offensive power
in worthwhile directions, involves
the most careful judgment, the best
use Of timing, and the most thorough
weighing of risk against advantage.
The worst course we can adopt Is to
allow ourselves to be so distracted
ny Jul iodo dS W
be paralyzed everywhere. to commit
our forces by driblets, until we lose
the power of concentrated offensive
effort We can worry about a pos
sible British debacle until Japan has
established herself impregnably in
Southeastern Asia and the Pacific
Islands, and then find ourselves I'M
able either to prevent q British
disaster or to take any action in
the Western Pacific because of lack
OF bases.
Or we can, by poor judgment. get
ourselves so involved in the Far
East as to be unable to take neces-
sary steps in some future Atlantic
situation. Timing is here all i'm
portant; timing, and the will and
ability so to act as to make the best
use Of opportunities while they con-
tinue to exist.
But the improving situation in the
Mediterranean makes the Atlantic
picture little brighter-and it is
by weighing all such factors, present
and future, while developing our own
industrial production and improv-
ing our basic security measures. that
we may be able to select the moment
for offensive operations which will
be of real and lasting effect in the
solution of our difficulties, and a
worth while contribution to the
future Of our civilization.
(copyright. 1910. by New York
q, Tribune, Inc.)