Evening star., 1940-05-20
History Of First World War Strategy Invites Feeling Of Some Optimism
By Old Soldier Who Knows the French and Their battle-ground
Lesson Of Unity
Of Commend Still
Helps Allies Now
In Their Stond
By FRANK PARKER.

ridge, then Assistant Secretary of
War, arrived in France as head of q
mission sent by our Government to
aid Americans stranded in Europe
by that war. was assigned Is an
aide to his staff. In conversation
with him in those hectic days when
the German armies were rushing on
Paris and several days before the
first battle of the Marne, I stated
my belief that the French Army
would turn back the German Army
in their first major encounter, and
I based my prediction on the facts
that the defeat of 1870 had caused
France to remedy her military
weaknesses by creating a sound svs-
tenn OF high command, general staff
and services and by organizing mill
tary effort on national basis. This
policy has progressed under the
stimulation Of the victory of 1918.
AS to the French combat troops,
there has never been any weakness
in that department. Moreover, the
French military traditions are quite
as good as those of Germany.
Situation Better Than 1914.
therefore estimate that the rela-
tive conditions of the adversaries of
today are still sufficiently similar to
those OF 1914 to warrant considera-
ton of the war of 19l4-19l8 as the
best light upon the probable devel-
opment OF the present war. Handi-
capped as she is by an apparently
precarlous gasoline and oil situation,
Germany's present advantage in air
planes and mechanical units is of no
greater value than her superiority
In heavy artillery and automatic
small arms in 1914.
The mechanical forces of Ger
many are just now beginning to
meet the French field artillery along
the Maginot line. The isolated
German salient with apex at Rethel
is, as always in such cases. yery
vulnerable.
Inc Two great armies of Europe
are now apparently beginning the
nrst decisive battle of the Second
World War. On the available data
present and past, the allied armies
are in my estimate in a better Sit
uatlon than they were on the west
ern 'front.' in late August of 1914.
Short War Was Predicted.
just before the World War, a great
economist of international fame had
esIlmated. by careful research and
calculation, that for economic rea-
sons such war could not last longer
than three to five months. When
that war ended after duration of
1our years and a half, principally
because OF shortage of manpowsr on
the losing side, he explained the in
accuracy OF his forecast as follows:
1 knew nothing about my SUBJ
Ject. All, those imponderables! Thev
upset our most sincere and thorough
calculations.
The imponderable is probably once
more the element which will decide
the present European strife. In the
llght OF the past we may expect
some unforeseen event or combina-
ton OF circumstances again to decide
the issue, and these surprises will
be the best test of the relative power
OF the opponents. Bold indeed must
be the prophet who, on the known
data of today, dares predict the out
come OF the present European war.
The Past Wars Record.
Leaving prophecy to the prophets,
let us turn to the more solid matter
OF certain records made upon this
same European battlefield by the
same adversaries quarter of a CEN
tury ago. Field fortif1cation and de-
tense in general have become
stronger, but offensive weapons have
likewise gained in power. There is
nothing as yet to indicate any con-
siderable change in the text of the
final lessons of 1918 on the western
front. Once more this front. from
the North Sea to Switzerland, seems
indicated as the field of final de-
cision. It's artificial barriers are
formidable, but the advantage of the
interior position certainly favors
Germany upon any other possible
front, under the present European
status, which is very much like that
of the spring of 1918, after the Ger
man-Russian peace of March 3 and
before our Intervention occurred on
April 6.
AS the major campaign opens,
there are certain definite factors
which give to the allies a far more
advantageous situation than that of
August. 1914. The surprise element
has long since departed, unity of
command has been solidly estab-
lished, and Germany's admittedly
superior military preparation has yet
to show as factor of greater value
than the supply systems of the world
open to the allies by their suprem-
acy of the seas and abundant water
transport.
Similarity in Strategy.
The initial German strategy seems
to be that of August, 1914, with a
probable air concentration from
Belgian and Dutch bases against
Great Britain prior to the main
attack southwark against the allied
line between the Meuse and the
North Sea.
In the forecast of this writer, the
western front of 1918 will again be
the scene of the final decision, the
infantry artillery combination, with
its auxiliaries of navy, air, mech
anization and supply, will again be
the court Of last appeal.
The imponderable hangs as heav-
lily over the duration of present
hoStilitieS as in 1914. and warns
against overconfidence in economic
statistics as known quantities in the
equation of war.
In the four years and a half Of
the World War there were only two