Evening star., 1940-02-26
Wilson's Distrust of Some
Allied Statesmen Revealed
Pershings Efforts to Block Armistice
Recalled in Lonsinq's Papers

but that it was not made because
the allied nations had a lurking fear
that 1t might be declined" and the
war continued through another
costly winter.
Nothing but the complete disin-
tegration of the German army
which Immediately followed the
armistice saved us from a danger
Gus situation" Gen. Bliss COM
mented.
Gen. Pershing's controversial
statement to the Supreme War
Council had argued that the allies
should take advantage of their grow
ing strength and Germany's d.
minishing man power and low mo-
rale to continue the offensive until
we compel her to unconditional sur
render" adding that the allies
should distrust the sincerity and
motives" of German peace talk.
Frankfurter on Mission.
Long before an armistice was
talked Of. Prof. Felix Frankfurter,
now an Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court, had reported to Secre-
tary Lansing. after a special mission
In France. that there is hardly
trace In France of the larger aim
which brought the United States
into the war, namely, to have issue
from the war not only the failure of
German aggression, but the frustra-
ton, through an international part
nership, league of nations, of any
future aggression" This was filed
on August 7, 1917. Il.
Gen. Bliss commented in October,
1918, concerning efforts made BY
Great Britain and France to get the
United States to approve joint inter-
vention in Russia despite adoption
of a non-intervention policy here,
that some of them seem to think
that there cannot be such a thing
as conscientious policy in such
matters; they are inclined to al
together divorce conscience and
policy"
Gen. Bliss said numerous allied
military reverses could have been
prevented by earlier adoption of a
unified command of the armies,
because without unity leach had its
own plan and these were attempted
to be stitched together like the
pieces of q patchwork quilt" and
that Stitching is not strategy" He
referred to separate" national aims,
which created an "indisposition to
coordinate efforts to common
end" until many disasters brought
desperate pooling of resources un-
der unified control.
big Stick" Against Denmark.
In resorting to "big stick" diplo-
macy to acquire the Virgin Islands
from Denmark during the early part
of the World War, when such step
was considered necessary to prevent
the possibility Of a foreign power
establishing a naval base there.
Secretary Lansing told the Danish
Minister that this country might
have to take possession of the
islands whether or not Denmark
agreed to sell them.
In November, 1915, the Danish
Minister informed Mr.. Lansing that
his government would not consider
selling the islands except under
the pressure of necessity" and asked
him whether the United States
would feel it necessary to take pos
session of them If the sale was not
agreed upon.
II told him." Mr.. Lansing wrote
in q memorandum, that while I
had not in mind such action at the
present time, as I had hoped that
some form Of negotiations would re-
suit in the transfer of the SOW
ereignty Of the islands to this Gov
ernment, that I could conceive of
circumstances which would compel
such an act on our part"
He explained that such circum-
stances would include absorption by
great power or cession of the
islands by Denmark to another Eu-
ropean power
President Wilson wrote Mr.. Lam
sing that II am glad the Danish
Minister gave you an opportunity
to be SO frank with him and I hope
he realizes how entirely friendly to
Denmark the frankness was"
Negotiations continued, with the
price Of $25 ,000, 900 finally agreed
upon.