Evening star., 1940-03-10

loT m o0enslvo might seem more
promising. But, BY any modern
process Of calculation, their margin
Of superiority In numbers is not
enough to support that promise. So
Tar as can be gauged, only the in
PRODUCTION Of some radically new
weapon, or extraordinarily bad gen.
eralship on the allies side, could give
them any chance of real success.
Otherwise they would be inviting q
heavy repulse-which might have
far-reaching repercussions.
Must Only Defend Line.
Their strategic situation provides
no cause for indulging in such q
perilous gamble. They have full
filled their immediate purpose with
the conquest of Poland; to assure
the security Of their recent gains
they have merely to defend q highly
defensible frontier in the west only
200 miles wide. Their economic
situation at present scarcely seems
to prompt such q venture, and by
holding their hand they may hope
to strengthen 1t through an increas-
Ing flow Of Russian supplies.
While we must allow for the pos
s1bility of an emotional urge over
riding all reasoned calculations. the
sum effect Of these is so clear as to
form an exceptionally strong check
on emotional urges, especially as
there are such obvious outlets south
eastward or northwestward, where
military pressure has q much better
prospect Of achieving, cheaply, both
emotional qualification and further
solid assets.
There remains the question
whether the Germans will try a
limited coup on the flanks Of the
main western front for the ad-i
vancement OF their strategic posi-
ton. Neither Belgium nor Switzer-
land offers very tempting target.
Ine water lines In the one case, the
mountain ranges in the other. form
a formidable obstacle to rapid pene-
tration. while allied reinforcement
10 either If attacked would be COM.
paratively easy. An incomplete sue
cess might bring more complica-
lions than advantages to the in
vader.
Holland Vulnerable Tarset.
Holland is a more accessible and
more vulnerable target, besides being
more dimcult of reinforcement by
the allies. And II Germany should
be counting on decisive results from
an air offensive against England the
establishment Of her air bases in
Holland would be an important step
forward. On the other hand, il
such an air offensive failed to sue
coed. and succeed soon. she would
nave incurred the strategic disad-
vantage OF greatly widening the path
and increasing the scope for the
allied air forces; which would be-
come an increasing boomerang with
every stage Of the latter's growth.
She would also Immediately sim
pity the British naval blockade.
Thus. apart from the political draw
backs, II Hitler can afford to take
a long view, he may very we'll con-
tinue to stop short of invading
Holland.
As for the ultimate outlook for
achieving a decision in the war, no
clearer or weightier forecast can
be found than the conclusion drawn
from the last war by the British
Onhcial History. which is compiled
under the auspices Of the Com
mittee Of Imperial Defense:
Armies even Of the highest fight-
ing capacity cannot make up for
inadequacy of numbers by the valor
Of their troops or by the novelty and
brilliance of their tactics; In q con-
flict between foes Of the same stand
ard Of skill. determination and yalor
numbers approaching three TO- one
are required to turn the scale de-
cisively." 81.
Unless that conclusion be totallys
unsound, no stretch Of the imag-
ination can find on either side now
the potential means of victory in a
total war. BY no calculation, save
in state Of intoxication, can two
and two make twelve.
It would be wise If all the war