Evening star., 1940-03-17
by MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

Oy MAJ. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.
One Of the inevitable long-range
consequences of the international
terrorism-the war of nerves-which
has long been an outstanding fea-
ture Of German policy and lately has
been initiated by Russia. is the draw
ing together of smaller nations for
mutual protection. OF this tendency
the Oslo conferences and the Balkan
Entente were early manifestations;
the direction Of the progress being
made under the inexorable pressure
Of events is indicated by the pro-
posAls now in hand for the nfe-and-
death defensive military alliance
among the three northern states Of
Norway, Sweden and Finland.
There are two areas In which such
capitalization was to be expected,
two areas exposed to attack both
from Germany and from Russia, in
which, under easily imaginable cir
cumstances, either of these powers
might seek to expand their influence.
In which Germany in particular is
deeply interested for economic rea-
sons: Scandinavia and the Balkans.
It is, of course, necessary to add that
the allies, seeking to tighten their
blockade against Germany, to i'm
pair Russias usefulness to that
country and perhaps-again under
easily imaginable circumstances-to
open up new fighting front and
thus deprive Germany of her present
almost impregnable defensive situa-
ton, are absolutely interested in
both these regions. Neither region is
dominated by single powerful state,
but rather occupied by number of
small states of more or less divergent
political and economic interests,
varying in resources, in armed
strength and in the degree of ex-
posure to immediate attack.
Scandinavians Want Peace.
In both cases the access of Ger
many and Russia to the region is
by more direct and shorter routes
than was that of the allies, which
latter, In both cases, is primarily by
oea.
But at this point similarity ceases.
In Scandinavia dncluding Finland
In this term for purposes Of conven-
ience) there was group of four
states of very similar political insti-
tutions and Of pacific tendencies,
desirous above all things of not
being drawn into war, Of not becom-
ing battlefields, with highly edu-
Gated and politically articulate pop
ulations and a considerable degree
of industrial development. Here the
slow progress from common under
standing" to the grim, hard and fast
defensive alliance backed by steel
was due rather to reluctance to
being drawn into wars of the greater
powers than to mutual jealousies
and lack of confidence.
After all, Sweden and Norway
have not been at war for century
and 4 quarter. During most of this
time they have ardently supported
various plans for international
peace. The best thought of their
leaders has been along the line of
peaceful rather than martial prog
ress. They have progressively re-
duced their budget expenditures for
armament (as also has Denmark
in favor of social, educational and
commercial advancement.
Finland, alone of this group
possessing a long frontier with an
uncertain neighbor, has been COM
PEELED to maintain her armed forces
at the usual continental level re-
garding strength and period of serv-
ice. What was needed in order to
produce military cooperation among
these nations, an agreement to fight
In the common defense, was the i'm
perative demand of necessity-the
realization Of the certainty, as old
Ben Franklin might have put it, OF
hanging separately If they failed to
hang together.
Democracy Shows Decision.
That they were slow to act upon
the approach of danger is due not
only to an understandable reluctance
to being drawn into war, but also to
the inevitable hesitations, delays
and debates which under such cir
cumstances are inseparable from the
democratic process and which are
among the drawbacks which free
peoples must accept and as far as
possible provide against in their in
ternational policies. Not one of us
who lives in freedom could exchange
that freedom for totalitarian eff
cheney in such matters, but it is well
to recognize the limitations in the
matter of quick decision which free
institutions imposed upon us, for by
recognizing them the need for the
obvious precautionary measures be-
comes clearer. These precautionary
measures the Swiss and Norwegian
are now taking in increasing their
armament. standardizing their mu-
nitions. drawing together with Fin
land n what seems likely to become
Arm alliance. Had similar
measures been taken at the very
outset of this war. or even earlier
it is quite possible that Finland
would never have been attacked, and
that the position of the northern
states both as to German and allied
pressure would have been greatly
strengthened. /
As it is, decision comes too late
to save Finland from defeat, though
not perhaps too late to save her
from destruction; for q Kremlir
; contemplating further extension o1
its area of conquest (on the mode,
Of Germany in Czecho-Slovakia) }