Evening star., 1940-05-03
Britain ImperiIed
Il Nazis Control
Norway, Is View
SyS
Allied Leaders Fail
To Grosp Importance
Of Time Element in War
By MAI. GEORGE F. ELIOT.

BY MAI. GEORGE F. ELIOT.
The allied campaign in Central
Norway has come to an end with
the evacuation of Andalsnes, the
port Of entry. What the losses have
been, in men and material, how
many troops have been left behind
In isolated centers of resistance, we
do not yet know. p
Basically, the campaign failed be-
cause of the factor which we have
repeatedly pointed out was its chief
weakness-lack of ability to counter
the German air force. The German
task was to seize control Of the CEN
trail valleys of Norway and through
them to open up communications
between Trondheim and Oslo, before
the allies could so establish them
selves in these valleys as to check
the German advance and deliver an
attack in force on the isolated gar
rison Of Trondheim. In this task,
time was the factor Of first impor-
tance.
The Germans were delayed by the
naval operations in the Skagerrak in
assembling troops and equipment at
Oslo. This they overcame in part by
the use of air transport; in part by
occasional runnings of the Skager-
rak, which were only partly success
full, but added to the sum total of
their forces in Norway. At the other
end OF the line they sought to gain
time by vigorous employment of
their air power in attacking allied
troopships, landing places, marching
columns and troop trains and the
roads and railways through the mar
row valleys, by which-and only by
which-the allies could move. These
efforts appear to have been highly
successful. They prevented the al
lies from sending anything save
small, lightly armed detachments
into the interior, and, though these
detachments succeeded in occupying
the vital rail and road functions of
Dombas and Storen, they were un-
able to hold the former against a
strong German attack coming up
the Gudbrandsdal, nor to prevent
the latter being cut off by the op-
erations of German motor units.
Swept Allies Before Them.
The German advance by the Gud-
brandsdal appears to have been
their main attack; it was preceded
by aircraft, cooperating closely with
the ground troops, and it literally
swept the allied Norwegian covering
force before it. Meanwhile the par
allel advance of small motorized
(perhaps partly mechanized) column
through the Osterdal threatened
Storen was driven back, and then
branched out by mountain roads to
fall upon the Dombas-Storen rail-
way at two points. Ulsberg and
Hjerkinn. 1t Is possible that the
garrison of Dombas was weakened
to protect these threatened points,
though there is no certainty of this.
At any rate, the German plan was
fully successful; contact was made
with German troops striking south
from Trondheim, and the allied
forces remaining at Dombas retired
rapidly-evidently by rail or motor
to Andalsnes and re-embarked.
That the poor port facilities at
Andalsnes, the lack of transport,
and the continued German air at
tacks prevented the sending into
Norway of guns, tanks and other
heavy equipment needed by a mod
ern army is plainly evident. SIM
liar considerations would attend the
attempt to land the equipment to set
up series Of large air bases. But
certainly, in the time available, it
should have been possible to employ
improvised landing fields for a Ger
tain number of fighter planes, which,
coupled with unremitting bombing
attacks on the German air bases,
might have abated the nuisance of
the German air force to con-
siderable extent.
Would Have Been Risky.
Admittedly this would have been
risky, and attended with consider
able loss, but unless risks were to be
discounted in advance, the invasion
OF Central Norway should never
have been undertaken at all. 1t does
not require second sight to foresee
that the German air power was the
chief weapon to fear, that time was
all-important and that the one hope
OF getting set to strike a heavy blow
at Trondheim without having every
thing ruined by continuous German
air attacks was to be able to counter
these attacks by the use of fighter
aircraft and by attacking the Ger
man air bases.
It may therefore be pertinent to
inquire whether there was hesitation
in high quarters about sending air.
craft, particularly fighter aircraft, to
Norway because of fear of dimin-
ishing the air defense of Great Brit
ain. If this was the case, one
wonders whether the air defense of
Great Britain will not find itself in
.gEeater difficulties with the Germans
securely established on the Nor
wegian coast than any it might have
encountered due to losses of such
aircraft as might have been sent to
Norway.
Fast-Moving War.
1t is abundantly clear, in any case.
that the Germans have fully grapsed
the tremendous Importance of the
time element in modern war; and
1t is at least an open question
whether those responsible for the
destiny of the allied countries have
as yet realized that war today moves
far more rapidly than it did even in
19l4-1918-or if they have, whether
they possess the qualities requisite
for the quick decisions and swift
action demanded of them in coun-
tering the moves of such dynamic
opponent as Nazi Germany. This
is not to say that the armed serv-
ices Of the allied powers do not
have such men-but one wonders
whether they are in the places of
decision.
A direct attack by naval forces, air
forces and landing parties directed
l. IL