Evening star., 1940-04-14


Tending him OF. It would be q case Of
distant overseas warfare for both COM
batants, with the advantages by no
means altogether on the side of the
armies and navies originating on the
American land mass.
Under the circumstances, there will be
a dangerous, If not necessarily fatal, flaw
in our hemisphere defenses as long as no
agreement exists with Brazil for the use
OF maximum air, naval and land facili-
ties in the Pernambuco region by our
armed forces in the event Of major at
tack from Europe. If such an attack
could be foreseen several years in ad-
vance, as the British have foreseen po-
tential Far Eastern crisis since the early
1930s and as Europe's present troubles
have been indicated since Hitler's re-
armament "putsch" in 1885, even more
solid preparedness measures would be
called for. AS the Singapore base now
holds the fate of the balance of power in
the Orient in its hands, the fate of the
western lands might some day depend on
whether the Pernambuco approaches
have been transformed in time into q
Gibraltar of South America.
But the establishment of one of tho
worlds ranking fortresses at this point,
presumably through cooperation be-
tween the United States and the Bra
lillian government, would have a further
advantage. From it, the massed forces
Of the United States and its South
American allies could establish an "in.
side line" for the defense of the hemi-
spheres Atlantic coasts at least as far
south as the La Plata estuary.
The problem of defending the hemi-
sphere on its Pacific side has fortunately
been simplified by geography. There is
no oriental land mass south of the eo,la-
tor from which South America could be
attacked, and Japan's nearest potential
bases in the inundated South Sea Islands
are more than 1000 miles from Panama.
This is relatively impossible distance
for effective air or naval attack against
strong defensive forces with equipment
now available.
Double Attack Might Succeed.
Hence the chief danger in the Pacific
lies in the possibility of an attack from a
Far Eastern power simultaneously with
an invading power from Europe. With
the United States fleet and air forces di-
v1ded between two oceans Japan-or a
Japanese Russian combination, II one
should prove feasible-would have a def
mite chance to seize the Galapagos
or sectors of the Mexican, Central
American or Northern South American
coastline, and thus put themselves WITH
in striking distance of Uncle Sans Pam
anna "jugular."
To be utterly safe from these con-
tingencies would call for the establish
ment of minor Gibraltar" on the
Galapagos and a series of smaller bases
along the Pacific Coasts Of Colombia ard
Ecuador.
But as absolute requirements these
defense plans await the development of
a power in Europe strong enough to
risk the venture of an overseas war
across the South Atlantic and sufficiently
gifted automatically to arrange bar
gain for the division of the Western
World with conquest-minded Japaa.
The deeper one plunges into the ques-
tion OF hemisphere defense, in fact, the
more one is impressed that the New
Worlds strongest bastions may lie less
in the air fleets and navies of the West
ern republics than in the ifs" of these
complicated equations.
If Great Britain wins the European
war, for instance, her fleet and air forces,
working from their West Indian bases,
unquestionably could launch an attack
on the Western Hemisphere on the grand
scale. But why should England, the
basis Of whose foreign policy is friendly
relations with the United States and
whose colonial problems in the empire
are already almost more than she can
solve, seek to force the United States
into the next world war coalition against
her merely to acquire more colonial prob.
lens? Or, for difficult South American
conquests, risk the almost certain loss
Of Canada?
II Germany wins, presumably by TAX
ing over the British fleet and the British
and French West Indies, she could make
herself even more dangerous than Eng
land But would not the British fleet
scuttle itself or sail to Canada rather
than surrender? And would the United
States permit totalitarian power to
take the West Indies? To say nothing
of the fact that in taking over the British
and French Empires, Germany would
inherit their colonial problems plus the
handicap Of almost total inexperience.
Could Match German Naval Race.
Again, partially victorious Germany,
without the British fleet and the West
Indies, might build her future arma-
ment for career of conquest in the
Western world. But the United States,
with greater naval strength to begin with
and the defensive position to its advan-
tage, could match her ship for ship and
gun for gun as long as the race lasted.
Or If Japan, by absorbing China and
Eastern Siberia and sei1ng the East
Indies, in some Far Eastern blitzkrieg,
established herself as military power Of
unprecedented magnitude? - But how
long would it take Japan to achieve
these miracles Of Jacks beanstalk SELF
multiplication? And what plans for the
defense Of the hemisphere's western
shoreline could the United States put into
effect while the .beanstalk process was