Evening star., 1939-08-22
War Maneuvers
Disclose Flaws
In Quick Army
Officers See Need
Of More Preparation
And Training
BY JOSEPH S. EDGERTON,
Star stan CORRESPONDENT.

Although maneuverS now in prog
ress here and those just completed
at Manassas, Va. reveal that the
United States today has unques-
tionably the best military force in
Its peacetime history, they also show
that the force is not one upon which
reliance can be placed in case of
emergency without extensive initial
preparation and training.
National Guard troops participant
Ing in these maneuvers are doing an
excellent job, in the opinion of Army
leaders. Never before in peace
times have Guard troops demon
strated so high standard of readi-
ness and technical proficiency. This
is due to some extent to the fact
that many Guard officers and non-
commissioned officers are World
War veterans with the background
and traditions of actual service.
To a greater extent, however, it
Is due to the new American defense
policy created under the National
Defense Act and subsequent amend
ments prior to and since the World
War. The act and amendments es-
tablished the Guard for the first
time as a truly efficient military
organization and gave it the means
for training its officers and men
with greater regularity and in ac-
cordance with uniform high stand
ards
Morale Higher.
The results are apparent in the
current maneuvers, which have put
into the field the first field Army to
operate in the United States under
single command since the Civil War.
The Guard troops are handling
themselves well, on the march, in
bivouac and in battle. They are
demonstrating, along with their
greater proficiency, naturally
higher morale and the esprit de
corps which are indispensable to
military success.
But although tremendous i'm
provement has been made in the
National Guard as military or
ganization and an instrument of
national defense within recent
years, much remains to be accom-
plished before the Guard could
prove of much value in the face
of sudden emergency, results of the
maneuvers show.
The present exercises are highly
realistic, in that they are being held
with an Army and National Guard
as it exists today-in exactly the
condition it would be found if con-
fronted with an overnight call to
the battlefield in defense of the
nation. Such a readiness for
emergency is the foundation of the
War Department plan for an
initial protective force which can
take the field on a moments notice
and hold of any potential enemy
until the nation is able to mobilize
Ats manpower and industrial re-
sources.
Fail to Create Army.
But the National Guard and even
the Regular Army today cannot
meet the test of such a situation,
in the opinion of observers of the
maneuvers here and in Virginia.
The Army has put into the field
what nominally is field army.
Actually, it is not an army and,
without extensive preparations, is
not capable of functioning as an
army. 1t is group of individual
units, some of them in an excellent
state of training and equipment,
but still no more constituting an
army than a pile of loose bricks
constitute a house.
The force now in the field, ac-
cording to its commander, 1t. Gen.
Hugh A. Drum, and the director
of the Virginia SHOW" Maj. Gen.
James K. Parsons, lacks necessary
army, corps and divisional troops,
headquarters staffs for the higher
commands, the necessary manpow-
er, weapons and mechanical equip
ment.
The present 1st Army, all except
the Sd Corps now in the field
in this vicinity, today has only
% per cent of the men it should
have. The 1st Army, even with
the Sd Corps, which conducted
the Manassas maneuvers of last
week, has total strength of 75,116
officers and men of the Regular
Army and National Guard. Under
tables of organization it should have
321 900. 1t lacks 81 per cent of the
required number of machine guns
and 80 per cent of the trucks re-
quired to make it a mobile, useful
force. 1t is 81 per cent short in
anti-aircraft guns and 83 per cent
deficient in 155-millimeter guns
The infantry is short by 81 per
cent of the number of automatic
rifles it should have.
Just as critical, however, from
the standpoint of defense, is the
inexperience of officers and en-
listed men in the operation of large
forces in the field. Nor are the
Guard officers and men in physical
condition to Withstand the rigors
of active field service. The expert
ence and physical endurance neces-
sary to convert the Guard into the
contemplated initial protective force
can be acquired only through long
er, more comprehensive training
than now is possible, officers in
charge OF the maneuver are con-