Evening star., 1939-03-19
Famous Aces
Lack Quality
Under Rules
Experience in War
Contributes to
Standards
Bv Ben II. PenrSe.


II Eddie Rickenbacker and Frank
Luke, the Armys ranking aces dur
ing the World War, were to seek
admission to the ranks of the Air
Corps today, as they did in 1917, the
chances would be strongly in favor
Of both of them being turned down.
Somewhere along the tortuous off,
cial channels. an officer glancing
over the application of Ricken-
backer, Edward Vernon, would mark
under the heading "education," the
notation. 1.-TWO years high school
insufficient" Thumbing through the
record Of Luke, Frank, jr.. the officer
with the blue pencil would find in
the flight surgeons report, under
stability (emotionaD," the remark,
Unsatisfactory"
Educational requirements were
not stringent in 1917 and flight
surgeons non-existent. When the
armistice was signed. Maj Ricken-
hacker was in command of the
Oath Pursuit Squadron with 81
credit. 1t. Luke had brought down
4 enemy planes and IA balloons,
earning the unofficial title of Bal
loon Buster" and second place in
the Air Service list of victories when
he was killed after crashing behind
the German lines. Yet with these
outstanding examples before them,
flight surgeons entrusted with sift-
ing the f1t from the unfit would
unhesitatingly mark "disapproved"
across any similar applications from
the thousands of young college men
clamoring for chance to become
Army flyers today. In carrying out
a program as vast as that before it
today and planning for an en-
ergency which might exceed World
War proportions, the law of per-
centages must govern.
World War Service.
During the World War. Congress
appropriated $1,730,0OO for the
.Air Service in the effort to fulfill
the request Of the French Air
Service for a flying corps of 4,500
planes on the Western Front during
the 1918 campaign. That meant
building not only 4,500 planes, but
10000 more'for reserves and replace
ments of the latest combat types,
andsroughly two engines for every
plane. By June. 1918, our aircraft
industry was to be turning out 1000
planes and 1000 engines a month.
In the eight-year history of our
aviation industry, from 1909 to the
entry. of America in the World War,
exactly 142 airplanes had been de-
livered to the Army.
With optimism and enthusiasm
= we accepted the French offer to
make the Allies supreme in the air,
but 1t is needless to say we did not
fill it. When the Armistice was
signed, not IL, but 18 months after
our eager acceptance, we had TAO
planes at the front.
This fleet of 4,500 planes would
require 5000 pilots and $4,000
mechanics to keep them in the air.
On April S, 1917, our air force con-
sisted of IS officers and 1,120 enlisted
men of all grades, mechanics In
cluded, but nevertheless we made
the attempt. Within year, we had
1880 officers and $4,000 enlisted
men in the air service BY Novem-
ber, 1918, however, we had only 757
pilots and 481 observers, some OF
the latter with balloon units, at
the front. Not a bright picture!
Expansion Program.
Today the Army is embarked on a.
vast expansion program. Thou
sands of planes. thousands OF pilots
to fly them, all by the end OF the
fiscal year 1899. Yet the War De-
partment Building is empty at 4:3O
in the afternoon and at night the
windows are dark. A program that
% years ago scattered routine and
precedent to the four winds is being
taken in stride. Out of the meager
appropriations allowed during the
lean years following the World War,
the Army has been building pro-
gram to withstand the stress of a
sudden emergency.
The Army learned from sad ex-
perience during the World War that
building an air force is a delicately
balanced problem of providing not
only planes, but the personnel to
fly them. Both phases of this
problem have innumerable ramif1-
cations, but the key to efficiency is
coordination. When the planes are
ready, there must be pilots TO fly
them. Failure in the functioning
of one phase, the experience of the
World War has taught, will throw
the other out of balance and result
in failure of the entire program.
Far back in the labyrinthian cor
ridors of the War Department
Munitions Building lies the nerve
center of the first phase, the office
OF 1t. Col. c. L. Beaven, Medical
Corps, chief flight surgeon of the
Air Corps. The personnel division
will bring the applications of thou
sands of eager young Americans to
his desk. The training division will
teach them how to fly. His job Is
TO separate the chaff from the wheat
of good military flying prospects,
to eliminate before they reach the
training division, where precious
time. money and equipment are
=, involved, those whose chances of
becoming combat pilots are below
average.
Test for Equilibrium.
Prior to the United States entry
Into the World War, medical ex-
aminers were inclined to accept
candidates for flying duty providing
they had no demonstrable physical
defects. The War Department