Evening star., 1939-05-10
Litvinoff's Removal
Laid 10 Britain's
Demurrer on Pact
StoIin Deemed Guarantee
Of Soviet Territory by
Allies Necessary
By PERTINAX,

confirmed now on all hands that
Maxim Litvinoff was dismissed as
Soviet foreign commissar because
the British government refused to
comply with his request that an
Anglo-French-Ru pact of mu-
tual assistance should be concluded
and form the central piece of the
new system of security that is being
set up.
But why was that tripartite pact
invested with such great Importance
in the judgment of Soviet diplo-
macy?
The answer is twofold. First,
Stain considered that Britain and
France. as long as they withdrew
from the pact, practically refused to
extend to Russia the treatment of
a great power and strove to push
her back to position of inferiority.
Second, Stain has long come to the
conclusion that Russia could not
safely enforce the guarantee that
the western powers pressed her to
grant the states between the Baltic
and the Black Sea unless, through
the means of tripartite pact, those
western powers pledged themselves
to maintain in all circumstances
her territorial integrity.
Guarantee Held Superfluous.
British Prime Minister Chamber
lain argued and Foreign Secretary
Halifax tried to demonstrate to the
Russian Ambassador that such an
Anglo-French guarantee of Russia S
territory was really superfluous since
Poland and Rumania, which are in
terposed between the great Slav
and the great German empires,
would themselves be fully guaran-
teed by the London and Paris cab
inets.
But the retort of the Russian
Ambassador was that such a mode
Of protection hardly deserved to be
described as adequate, as it could
not be excluded from all possibili-
ties that the Polish and Rumanian
Armies should be defeated and the
Russian frontiers exposed to Ger
man invasion. We're Warlike events
to take that turn. the Moscow gov
ernment would then, under the Brit
ish proposals, be deprived of any
legal title to claim Anglo-French as
slstance on its own account, and it
would not feel sure about the peace
terms to be arranged by the British
and French ministers afterward.
The Russian request, in that re-
spect, has been found natural IN
Paris, and Premier Daladier, VINO
has practically superseded Foreign
Minister Bonnet in the direction OF
the Quai d'Orsay, has done his ut
most to convince Mr.. Chamberlain.
first, that the British counter-pro-
posals of May ought not to be sent
to Moscow, and, afterWard, that it
was urgent to change them in order
to comply with the Russian wishes
about the capital point of the Anglo
French guarantee to Russia.
Reason for Hesitation.
But why did Mr.. Chamberlain
hesitate so many days? The only
possible explanation is that once
more he has labored under the de-
fusion that, while the Anglo French
alliance had not been expanded so as
to include the Soviet, some chance
was left for him to detach from the
totalitarian axis Japan, Nationalist
Spain, Portugal and perhaps even
Italy. But it has been represented
to the British Premier that the very
uncertain prospect of winning back
to the Anglo-French security system
any one of the above states would
be bought at too dangerous a price
If, as a result, Soviet Russia were
to be finally estranged from the
Western democracies, as no hope of
creating an Eastern battlefront could
indeed be entertained.
Once Germany might expect that
she would not have to fight as seri-
ously and as lastingly in the East
as we'll as in the West if the worst
came to the worst, she would not
fail to become bolder and more
provocative, since she would regard
military victory as being within her
grasp.
Deprived of Russia's support.
France and Britain would hardly
avoid having to surrender another
time as they had to surrender last
September. Then they would run
a great risk of being drawn into a
four or five power conference of the
Munich pattern.
Heeds Remonstrances.
1t is reported from London that
Mr.. Chamberlain is at last paying
greater heed to the remonstrances
of foreign Office officials, backed by
the French Ambassador. If the op-
timism which runs fairly high were
to be contradicted by subsequent
developments and an Anglo French
Russian agreement did not material
lie when Lord Halifax, M. Bonnet
and Russia's vice commissar for
foreign affairs, Vladimir Potemkin,
meet in Geneva next week, every
thing would happen then as though
Russia intended to remain neutral
In the eventual conflict and staked
everything upon the promise of
non-a aggression that Germany would
find 1t worth while to give her.
But, as a matter of fact, Russia's
neutrality would not be maintained
many weeks, because, according to
usual practice, Hitler would redeem
the promise of on-aggression only
so far as Stain should accept to
repay it from time to time with
fresh advantages and, to start with,
send raw materials and supplies
that the Reich would require in
ever-growing volume to be able to
fight in the West. Thus, little by
little, Russia's neutrality would be
bound to degenerate into active COM
plicity with Pan-Germanism.
Polish Foreign Minister Beck's for
eign policy would become the Krem-
Inns policy shortly afterward. Col.
Beck had to give it up. But Ger
many would have more than re-
couped herself for the loss of Po-
land to her alliance.