The Waterbury Democrat., 1939-03-16
BY GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT Formerly Major, United States
 Army.


 Army.
 New York, March 16.-The frac- tious German eagle, content since last October to feast on its Czecho- slovakian spells has again struck in it's march of conquest.
 That is the fear which has held all of the non-Fascist world tense, and recent developments in central Europe plus military estimate of the situation indicated that when the land-hungry bird took off, 1t would soar toward the east.
 German support for autonomy agitation in the eastern Czecho- slovakian provinces of Slovakia and Carpatho- Ukraine means that Herr Hitler may be planning to strike next in hs projected "Drang Mach Osten" into the promised land" of the Ukraine.
 It is not possible, of course, to say with any certainty what such man as Adolf Hitler will do next. But it is possible, from the purely military viewpoint, to make what in staff parlance is called "an estimate of the situa- tion."
 The plan, to be exact scheme based on supporting the claims of the Ukranian minority in Po- land to autonomy" or perhaps complete independence, with "anschluss" with the sub-Carpa- thian Ukraine. This (now under complete German controD would be the propaganda and perhaps military center for the move. Note that this is the time-honored method already twice successful, in Austria and Czechoslovakia.
 Probable opponent: Poland, de- finitely inferior both in military and economic sense to the Reich.
 Possible opponents: Soviet Rus- sia - but Japan is moving troops into Manchukuo, like good axis partner, and the Kremlin will think twice before risking war on two separate fronts 800 miles apart.
 Rumania - but Rumania is well off to the flank and can't in- tervene very effectively; moreover the Rumanian-Polish communica- tions are very bad.
 Probable allies: the .Ukranian minority in Poland, or at lest the actively organized Ukranian Mili- tary Union, supplied and led by Germany; also, Czechoslovakia, to whom, it is stated, Germany has promised the return of Tes- chen Silesia in return for support aganst Poland. (Did Germany encourage Poland to take this req las fall in provision of the present situation?)
 Chances of achieving the objec- tive without war: excellent. The Poles, like the Czechs at Munich, will hardly dare fight alone. The Russans may very well bide their time. AS for Britain, whatever Chamberlain might do if France or French possessions were attacked, it is hardly possible to imagine the apostle of appeasement moving Bri- tish troops and ships to the aid of Poland; and without Britain, France will not take the risk.
 Risk to be considered: Russia coming to the aid of Poland im- mediately with full force. But if so, a graceful withdrawal can always be achieved, as the move will be initiated, by the Ukrainian "legionnaires" in Poland.
 Advantages to be expecetd from success (without war, or with a war confined to Germany and Po- land): setting up of Ukrainian state allied to and controlled by Germany, as a spearhead for a further advance (military and po- liticaD upon the Soviet Ukraine; probably the reclamation of the Polish corridor and Upper Silesia for Germany; reduction of Poland to a military nonentity like Czecho- slovakia, wholly dependent on Ger many; great improvement in the German position against Russa erecting barrier of German-con trolled buffer states between the two; consequent freedom of action for Germany in the West, whence she can then turn to bring pres sure on France and Britain for the satisfaction of Italy's Mediterranean claims if she sees fit; finally, con- trol of regions which can do much to relieve the food, timber and mineral shortages now troubling the Reich.
 The obvious anxiety in Warsaw, the outbursts of anti-German dem- onstrations here, the frantic -L