Evening star., 1939-08-05
Germany Expected
To Have 100000
Modified by Aug. Z
Increasing Of Forces Is
Believed to Have
Already Begun

lilOOlAGoVlOtl Va Vic NICl lIldll
Army for the purpose of military
maneuvers is believed in competent
quarters to have begun on August 2.
The calling in of reservists will be-
come more extensive on August
and by August II about $500 900
men will be under arms. This is
the figure quoted Wednesday by
Winston Churchill.
Whether other measures of that
kind will follow and whether the
fallacious pretext of military maneu-
vers will then be dropped and the
menace to European peace become
more direct and naked. nobody dares
foretell. Anyhow. serious prob
lem is bound to arise for the French
government.
Premier Daladier will have to ex-
anime what steps must be
taken so that Germany in her war
like preparations shouldn't be al
lowed to steal march The French
Premier will have to face again the
dilemma which confronted him for
the first time one year ago. His
problem is whether to order a gen.
eral mobilization and thus make it
more difficult for Hitler to save face
while retracing his steps or to tenn
porize and, at best, call to the colors
the three youngest classes of re-
servists. If he elects this latter al
tentative, he will incur the risk of
being outdistanced by German
mobilization in such way as to be
deprived of the possibility of resist
ing the German military machine in
time
German System More Elastic
The root of the difficulty is that
the French system of mobilization
is not as elastic as the German. 1t
works more massively. There is
hardly any middle way between
mobilization of the whole army and
mobilization of the three most re-
cent classes.
Last September an experiment
was attempted more or less in ac-
cordance with the German pattern
1t is unlikely to be renewed For
the time being attention is con-
centrated mainly upon military ne
gotiaUions to begin next week in
Moscow. If they could prove sue
cessful within fairly short while,
useful deterrent might perhaps
still be created to keep Hitler and
Mussolini in order.
But it is to be expected that the
exchange of views between the gen.
eral staff of the Red army and the
representatives of the French and
British higher commands will give
rise to long range of questions by
of some interest to mention some of
them.
Aid Promise Is Purpose.
First, the chief purpose of the
French and British military dele
gates to Moscow will be to secure
a promise that Soviet Russia would
adequately support the Polish-Ru-
manian armies in emergency
through providing them with air
planes and tanks in addition to raw
materials and finished products.
The Polish government already buys
on a large scale from her Eastern
neighbor, but the Russian coritribu-
tion in airplanes and tanks to Po-
lands national defense doesn't
promise to be really important un-
less the Warsaw government land
the same applies to the Bucharest
governmenD does accept co-opera-
ton of it's troops with Russian pilots
and crews. This is so because there
is at least probability that the
Russian armies will insist their war
material is not to be regarded as
being on sale, but could only be
placed at the disposal of Western
associates as fighting units under
their own officers.
The opinion prevails here in COM
petent quarters that such Russian
suggestion, if it were put forward,
ought not to be turned down on the
ground that too close an acquain-
tance of Polish troops with detach-
ments Of the Red Army would be
fraught with political and social
dangers. The precedent of the
Spanish civil war is quoted as clear
proof that foreign pilots and foreign
crews manning tanks can be put on
the fire line easily without associat-
ing too intimately with native troops.
Polish Fears an Obstacle.
Second, it is foreseen by some that
the staff of the Red Army will pro-
pound the thesis that Russia cannot
be treated as a kind of storehouse
where Poles and Rumanians will
freely provision themselves with the
option left to them of calling to their
rescue Soviet armies if defeat on the
battlefield compelled them to do So
Therefore, it will have to be exam
ined whether Russia ought not to be
authorized from the outset to take
over some strategical positions. cho-
sen in such q manner as to tighten