Evening star., 1939-11-23
Testing Of Foes
Weaknesses Delay
Mass Air Attacks
Guarding Of Bombers
May Be Nozi Motive
Of Move on HoIIond
BY MAJ. GEORGE F. ELIOT.

War is an uncertain business
indeed, the only certain thing about
1t is that it will produce the unex-
pected. Who would have supposed,
for example, that the long dreaded
second world war would have pro-
gressed to its 83d day without having
witnessed large-scale air operations;
without having given at last the
answers to the question of what is
going to happen when and if the
air fleets Of great powers are loosed
against each others vital centers?
Yet, so it is. Save for the over
whelming of Poland, air activity in
this war has been strictly limited,
either in objective or in the size of
the forces employed. There are as
yet few new lessons to be cleaned
regarding this new element in war
fare.
One lesson, however, is beginning
to stand out-and it is a lesson to
which the Spanish civil war likewise
bears witness: Large-scale opera
tions on the surface of the earth
whether land or water) and espe-
cially offensive operations, must be
co-ordinated with and supported by
aerial operations.
Planes Guide Subs.
The German air force was prob
ably the chief ingredient of victory
in Poland. The coordination of
German air with sea and subsea
activities in the North Sea undoubt-
edly accounts for some of the Ger
man successes in this area. Among
the chief limitations of the subma-
rine are its lack of speed and lack
OF vision. High-hying aircraft can
discover targets for U-boats and
direct the latter on courses enabling
them to intercept rather than over
haul their prey.
The bombing raids which German
aircraft have carried out against
Great Britain have been chiefly
directed at shipping. The very small
size OF the forces employed and the
total lack Of any attempt at con-
tinuity of effort mark these raids
as being purely Of an experimental
nature. How accurate is British
anti-aircraft fire? How alert is the
observer system? How long after
enemy aircraft have reached the
coast does it take for British pursuit
aircraft to appear? The answers to
these questions and many others of
like tenor were necessary before the
German high command could risk
any large proportion of its air force
in "full-out" attacks on the British
Isles.
Bombers Need Pursuit Protection.
One point seems here of interest.
1t was, in general, the experience of
the Spanish civil war that bombers
ought to have pursuit escort, either
Immediately accompanying them or
so operating as to cover them from
attack by enemy pursuit aviation.
For flights across the North Sea,
however, the distance from the pres
ent German bases to London is 800
miles, slightly less to some other
parts of Great Britain, but in any
case beyond the radius of action of
German pursuit aviation. If the
German experimental raids-several
OF which have been reported as being
driven of by r. A. F. planes-have
shown that unescorted bombers are
not likely to have much luck, we
have here a possible motive for a
L al,
would reduce to $50 miles their flying
distance to Britain and enable their
pursuit to cover a good part, at
least, of their bombing operations.
incidentally, the only German air
attack on British convoy which
has been reported was driven off by
shore-based aviation.
There has been no solution of the
battleship-airplane controversy.
German air attacks on British
warships appear to have inflicted
only minor damage, if British re-
ports are to be trusted rather than
German.
Claims Must Be Weighed.
1t may be well to remark that in
this particular connection the re-
ports Of both sides are likely to be
very carefully edited. Nothing
could be more damaging to British
morale than any suggestion that
German air power is a real treat to
British sea power. Conversely
nothing could give German morale
greater lift" Thus, careful ex-
animation of the available evidence
makes 1t appear likely that the
injuries inflicted by German raiders
on the British cruisers Edinburgh
and Southampton in the Firth of
Forth was somewhat more serious
than the British communique ad-
mitted. On the other hand. there
is definite proof that the German
claim to have destroyed the British
carrier Ark Royal is unjustified. So
it goes-and will continue to go,
while the world tries to read be-
tween the lines to get some glimmer
of the truth.
The allies, with minor exceptions,
have used their aircraft chiefly for
reconnaissance, Photographic and
pamphlet-dropping missions. Dur
ing the course of these operations
they have certainly accumulated a
great deal of valuable informa-
ton which may one day stand them
in good stead
There have been some "dog fights"
over the lines between allied and
German pursuit aviation engaged
in protecting reconnaissance mis-
sions or driving off opposing recon-
naissance. In these encounters the
allies appear in general to have come
off best.
It has been asserted that the
latest British and French pursuit
planes show superior qualities to
the German Messerschmidts. But
one definite superiority which these
encounters emphasize is the better
and longer training of the French
pilots. This is due to the stout
refusal of Gen. Vuillemin, chief of
the French air staff, to permit pilot
training to be rushed in order to
obtain numbers. Better a few real
pilots than many dubs," said he
and the reported defeat of q Ger