Evening star., 1939-10-19

Writing OF measures TAKEN LOT ue-
fense of Scapa Flow at the outset
of the last war, the latter officer
says in his book The Grand Fleet:
ut was not felt in the fleet, however,
that these measures gave much
security whatever against submarine
attack. Nothing but obstructlons OF
some kind could give that security.
The matter was frequently discussed.
Although many brains had been at
work, no satisfactory anti-submarlne
obstruction had been devised.
Elsewhere he observed: "The ques-
ton of providing gun defenses Tor
this base (Scapa Flow which the
admiralty had decided a year or TWO
before the war was to be the main
feet base, had been discussed on
more than one occasion after exanl-
nation by committee OF officers on
the spot; but since finance governs
defense, and the admiralty from year
to year had insufficient money for
even more urgent needs, no action
had been taken"
DISTINCTIONS Later Provided.
While anti-submarine distractions
were later on provided for the var
ious channels leading into Scapa
Flow under the urgent pressure OF
war" and while it is clear that there
are some such distractions there
now, to judge from the reports OF
the Royal Oak sinking, it is also
clear that these defenses are in
adequate for their purpose. Indeed,
it is difficult to escape the con-
clusion that the discussion and pro-
crastination of which Admiral Jelll-
coe speaks with such obvious re-
straint has continued during a pc
riod OF Is years, during all of which
time it was quite clear that the Brit
ish Navy would require Scapa Flow
as base in case of renewal OF the
struggle with Germany.
The attacks by German aircraft on
British warships lying off the base
at Rosyth, in which damage has ad-
mittedly been done to the large
cruisers Edinburgh and Southamp-
ton and to the destroyer leader
Mohawk, and the subsequent raids
on Scapa Flow itself, resulting in
damage to the old battleship Iron
Duke (once demilitarized for train
ing purposes, but perhaps since re-
stored to her former fighting trim,
as the japanese are reported to have
restored the Hiei, demilitarized un-
der the same treaty arrangements), ,
demonstrate how closely the Ger
mans are co-ordinating their naval
and air activities. It is co-ordina-
tion which the British would do we'll
to initiate without delay. Indeed,
unless the admiralty soon becomes
more willing to admit that the ex-
cellent staff of the royal air force
has ideas which are worthy of con-
sideration by the heirs of Nelson,
the results may pass from the omi-
nous to the disasterous.
Established Doctrine Worshiped.
The intrenched conservatism of
ofncial doctrine at the admiralty
has, Of course, its admirable fea-
lures. but is little adaptable to revo-
lutionary changes and prone to
overconfidence in established meth
ods. The admiralty appears, on the
record so far, to have completely
failed to realize the changed condi-
tions of sea warfare in narrow
waters such as those of the North
Sea within easy operating radius of
enemy shore-based aircraft nd of
enemy submarines of highly i'm
proved qualities over those of 1914.
The presence of large naval units
in such waters without adequate
protection, and especially without
the protection of counter offensive
operations against the bases from
which the danger proceeds-indeed,
under conditions which so far have
almost cOmpletelV abandoned the