Evening star., 1939-02-13

NJ AoA 40 wv & SW
servers know. n,v,d ,,wr.n..
h e President
has not confided his intentions to a
single soul. This very silence has
raised questions and produced in
ferences which are worth examin-
ing at this time, because to a pecu-
liar extent, the so-called ambitions
of the President with respect to a
third term are said to be coloring
his views on war and peace and
on legislative issues inside the Dem
ocratic party. People are saying
that if MIR. Roosevelt would only
renounce a third term, his foreign
policy would meet with more trust
and approval, though they forget
that Cordell Hull, Secretary of
State, has been and is making
Americas foreign policy.
Two Possible Assumptions.
There are supposedly only two as
sumptions possible--one that Mr..
Roosevelt wants a third term and
will directly or indirectly influence
his own denomination and the other
is that he does not want the nom
ination, will discourage his friends
from nominating him, and will, in
short, refuse to accept third nom
ination.
Quite generally in the political
realm, it is being assumed that Mr..
Roosevelt's silence is related to the
first of these two courses and that,
If he really did not want a third
term he would say so now and
eliminate himself from all consid-
Grafton.
But the experience which Presi-
dent Coolidge had with his own
remuneration statement rather points
to the probability that even if Mr..
Roosevelt intends to refuse a third
nomination he would be making q
serious error to say so privately or
publicly moment sooner than such
a statement really has to be made,
namely on the eve of the national
convention, in June, 1910.
Advantage to Say Nothing.
To put it another way, it is to
Mr.. Roosevelt's advantage to say
nothing for a year or more about
q third term, even if he has deter
mined in his own mind not to ac-
cept a nomination. This is because
of the situation existing through
out the Federal Government among
the Roosevelt supporters, in regard
to the legislative problems before
Congress, as well as to the cause of
liberalism in which Mr.. Roosevelt is
so deeply interested.
The best way to understand the
political dangers of an anti-third
imagine that on March of this
year Mr.. Roosevelt will use the
words of Mr. Coolidge and say, Il
do not choose to run for the pres
idency in 194O"
1t will be recalled that for while
In 1927 such statement was &C
cepted as sincere because President
Coolidge was known as a man who
took definite positions and stuck to
them. Yet, in few weeks, the first
draft Coolidge" clubs were start
ed, and Notwithstanding the ap-
pearance of other candidates in the
field, there was a draft Coolidge"
movement right up to the eve of the
Kansas City convention. in June,
1923, which nominated Herbert
Hoover.
Doesn't End Matter.
In other words, President may
renounce ambition, but that doesn't
by any means end the matter. In
the present instance, it would not
dispose of the third-term question
at all. The Roosevelt friends, both
in Office and out of Office, would in
sist on a draft Roosevelt" move
ment. This would be quickly under
way to protect persons in Office and
would gain momentum. There would
be demands from the opposition that
Mr.. Roosevelt repudiate such move
ments and say the forceful words,
Il shall not accept even if nomi-
mated"
But do even such statements close
the door in politics? The draft
Roosevelt" leaders would look upon
the statement, however worded, as
a natural expression from a man
who sincerely wants to dispose of
the matter, but they would insist
that he has really little to say about
1t, that the country and the cause
of liberalism" demanded reconsid-
Grafton by him of his decision, and
they would seek to confront him
with a third nomination just the
same.
Keeps Supporters Together.
From some points of view, the
strategy of the draft Roosevelt
group would be designed to keep
Roosevelt supporters together till
the last minute, so they could at
the proper time throw their strength
to true liberal" that is, to a man
Mr.. Roosevelt himself would favor.
Certainly, a cohesive group of pro-
Roosevelt men can have a lot to
say about the type of candidate who
shall have the next nomination of
the Democratic party. The longer
the President keeps silence, the
greater help he can be to such
groups.
From Mr.. Roosevelt's standpoint,
the fate of all the liberal measures
which he has espoused depends on
the kind of candidate nominated by
his own party in 1910, and if it
should appear that "reactionary''
Democrat is on the way toward
winning the nomination when June
1910, rolls around, the demand to
have Mr.. Roosevelt reconsider any