Evening star., 1939-01-01

me DTOUH.
The Tunisian garrison has been Increase
recently by additional forces from Algiers
and Morocco. But the French have been
taught since the end of the war to rely
mainly on Notifications They believe
they can hold out behind concrete forts
almost indefinitely.
In Tunisia, the French have Maginot
line which extends the whole length of
the frontier with Libya Behind those
Notifications, say competent French staff
officers, Tunisia can hold out long enough
to enable reinforcements from elsewhere
in Africa to reach them at leisure. Not
a single realistic French officer seems to
doubt that Mussolini's forces will suffer
ultimately devastating defeat and that
France, without support from Great
Britain, can handle Italy. This opinion
is shared by politicians-who enjoy hear
ing victory song after so many tales of
unpreparedness-and, more Importantly
by the rank and file of the public.
Rightly or wrongly, the average
Frenchman considers the Italian Army
of today as force which, aside from
superior equipment and commissariat,
shows no improvement over that which
fought at Caporetto. Even the general
staff by definition pessimistic, is inclined
to treat the Italians lightly. The per-
formance of Mussolini's legions in Spain
is apparently the yardstick by which the
Italians are judged. Spain is full o.
French military agents who report
unanimously that the Italian soldie;
lacks stamina: has enthusiasm only until
confronted with real difficulties Then,
he weakens, and can be easily defeated
In eight out of 10 cases the retreat of
the Italian forces in Spain has been
rout. This contempt for the italian
Army explains the lack of excitement IN
French political and military quarters
over Mussolini's claims for Tunisia ana
Djibouti.
The frowns in the foreign office how
ever, seem to belle this optimism. Mo-
that the leaders of Frances foreign
policy doubt the confidence the arm
leaders have in their forces, but the
realize that it will be impossible to local
ize a conflict between France and Italy.
There have been many stories cir
culating through European capitals tbs
relations between the two dictators sine
Munich have been less cordial than il
the past; that Mussolini is Inundated b
his role of second fiddle to Hitler; th9
since the historical scene in the pupps
Italian Parliament when representa-
tives of the nation" demanded Corsica
Tlnisia, Savoy and Nice there has beer
little encouragement from Berlin; tina
Hitler is backing Mussolini only as long
as he plays bluff poker, but will not sup
port any military adventure which might
bring Britain on the scene; that no Ger
man cabinet officer has said a word in
Mussolini's favor; that Hitler has sup
ported his Italian colleague only in the
press. And the average Frenchman takes
little stock in what German dailies
publish.
Not so the French cabinet. In private
all agree that the situation is full of
dynamite, though there has seldom been
a more split cabinet than the present
one. Some of the ministers are not even
on speaking terms with each other But
they are unanimous in one thing: That
the threat OF Mussolini must not be taken
lightly because whatever the relationship
between Der Fuehrer and II Duce may be
the two are bound to stick together
The day may come when both men will
be at drawn daggers. But for the time
being they cannot afford to split. If
Mussolini proceeds with his adventure
in Tunnisia there is no doub. in the
cabinet that Hitler will back him. And
unfortunately, add these keepers of
Frances glory, British support is less
assured for France than is German sup
port for Italy.
Chamberlain Displeases French.
Recent statements by Premier Cham
berlain have displeased the French.
They cannot afford to show their i'll
temper but they have been saddened
by the "lack of perspective and diplo-
matte wisdom of the British Premier"
When Mr.. Chamberlain declared on
December 13 in the House of Commons
in reply to question by member of
the opposition, that the Franco-British
agreement does not provide for as
sistance in the event of q conflict in
the Mediterranean, there was panic in
Paris. The French admitted that so far
as the letter of the agreement went, Mr..
Chamberlain was correct. But, since the
question in the House of Commons had
been submitted in writing "a hours before
and since these parliamentary answers
are given after full consultation with
foreign Office experts, he could have
added that the position of Great Britain
in the Mediterranean went beyond the
scope of mere treaty. The inevitable
telephone conversations followed after
that bombshell, and Mr.. Chamberlain
was induced to make the desired cor
rection at the dinner of the foreign
press correspondents in London. Bat
there is a difference. to the legaliaic
minds of the French, between what
the premier said in the Commons, which
is binding, and what he said at banquet,
which is not.
French leaders are beset by the awful
doubt: Will Mr.. Chamberlain repeat the
Berchtesgaden and the Godesberg feats
at the expense of France when he visits
Mussolini in Rome early in January?
Will he give in before a determined
threat of war from II Duce? And will
such surrender free Britain from
coming to Frances help in the event OF