Evening star., 1939-09-27
BY BLAIR MOODY.

4Ile JOU VI lIle Oil1teu OtdGeS Aiuly
Is to meet and smash any invading
military force which seeks to estab-
lsh base of operations in this
hemisphere. 1t is not now equipped
to do that job.
1t has, compared to modern armies
of great powers, a mere handful of
men. Even these men have not suf-
ficient modern equipment. We are
short of nearly every type Of vital
materiel without which an army |
Is helpless in time of war and which |
must be on hand when war breaks |
out-guns, tanks, anti-aircraft, ar
tillery, gas masks, even modern |
rifles. We have not a single full di-
vision ready to take the field
In the old international picture, |
such situation would not have |
been so alarming. 1t never was. |
The United States has never gone
into war prepared-and we're still |
getting along pretty we'll
Then why change the policy now?
What does the United States need |
an arm for, anyhow, unless some
one plans to take it abroad to fight? |
. Does not the plain temper of the
people indicate that any political
administration that did that would
not remain long in power? Who's |
coming over here to get us?
Times Change in Warfare.
To that last question, the General
Staff OF the Army does not know
the answer. But it does know that |
times have changed, and that no
one can foresee the future political
and military lineup of world
powers.
1t knows that no one can sue
cessfully invade the United States
by long distance"-that is, without
first establishing bases on this side
OF the ocean-but that, if some
power does establish such bases, the
implements of modern warfare
would put this country within easy
reach.
That is why the Armys plans to-
DAY are based on the necessity of
Kicking out any interloper, not only
from our own shores, but from Plser-
10 Rico, or Nova Scotia, or the Ba-
hamas or Venezuela or Brazil. If
hostile bases were established with
IN couple of thousand miles of our
Dig cities, and if we could not de-
stroy them, a situation would de-
velop which has been generally
thought mpossible"-invasion of
the United States.
This is an immensely rich Ma
don," says Brig. Gen. George v.
Strong, Chief of the War Plans Di-
vision OF the Army's General Staff,
.out all OF its wealth, all of its in
oustrlal capacity, all of its intelli-
gent man-power, would be helpless
before the inexorable demands of
time in manufacture and training,
Inc period has passed when ineffec-
lively armed or insufficiently trained
men can succeed in war"
Tiny Force Available.
We nave on paper today a mobile
Army OF 71,000 men. To be GER
tain OF effective initial action against
an invader of the hemisphere, Armv
plans call for a minimum of 1913 OO0
But in actuality, there would be
available for free action to move
against an enemy wherever he ap-
peared, assuming we placed in such
overseas possessions as Hawaii. Alas
ka. and Puerto Rico garrisons SUM-
clent to defend them, a force of onlv
$4,000! N Why
After the World War, our leading
military minds, led by General John
.. Pershing, analyzed the peacetime
oeIense needs OF the country, The
group decided 100000 men were
needed, incorporated it into the "a
nous Pershing report, which was
Ater substantially made law by
Act Of 1920.
But the Army never reached the
zoO,OOO peacetime minimum" II
stood at 1000 until Congress- re-.
Gently added $4,000 to man the air
corps and increase defenses of tho
Panama Canal, and President
Roosevelt added 1900 more under
an emergency order to "fiu In
ehinks." "
But this does not mean q mobile
iorce OF over 100000. For we have
1900 men posted overseas, 30 600
interior troops, and others in the
coast Guard, Air Corps and other
assignments.
Instead of the "irreducible mini
mum" OF nine mobile Infantry Di-
visions, the Army now has four d.
visions and three brigades. Before
appropriations by Congress at the