Evening star., 1939-09-26

against the richest grab" IN the
world, which happens to be us, the
admiral did not discuss.
While Congress has authorized
naval building to point 20 per cent
greater than the former treaty
strength" and while 80 fighting
ships are now being built, recent
world developments have Jared into
inside Washington an entirely Diff
ferent approach to the question Of
what is and is not safe.
It is often said that the naval
defense of the United States is de-
pendent on the Panama Canal In
one sense that is true. in another
1t Is not.
Perils in Splitting Fleet.
The canal does reduce the time of
fleet travel from our Pacific to At
lantic Coast from at least eight
weeks to three. It is the "life-
line" which, If cut, would leave one
coast or the other to be defended
almost entirely by airplanes, be-
cause to split the fleet between two
oceans might pave the way to de-
struction of both halves of it by an
immensely superior force in each
ocean.
1t is also true that if a hostile
power should run tramp steam
ship loaded with dynamite into one
of the Panama locks and blow it
up, We could be badly crippled. A
meticulously careful defense against
any such scheme has already been
installed.
But the point about the adequacy
of the Navy today goes beyond even
the safety of the Panama Canal.
The fact is. canal or no canal, we
have a one-horse outfit to do what
may be a two-horse job.
American naval strategy Is chang
ing today, or would like to change if
we had the ships, because until now
we have been depending on the
British Navy, not actually to defend
us, but to neutralize naval power
in the Atlantic.
Cost of 11-Year Lull.
This automatic assumption that
England's sea power was paramount
has freed our fleet for operation in
the Pacific. 1t permitted COM
placent Congress to put in effect
what amounted to an l1-year ship
building moratorium. which, based
on comparative strength of modern.
under-age ships, left our Navy by
1888 not in first place, but in third.
1t enabled us to count with Ger
tainty that we would defend our
western boundary"-which runs
through our one really strong off
shore naval base at Pearl Harbor,
in HaWaii-by smashing any Pacific
enemy's feet. But if we had to hove
half of our fleet into the Atlantic,
the comparative power in the Pacific
would be reversed. That is why the
basic calculation of all naval STRAIT
egy is never to split the fleet.
Where does the present building
program leave us in actual fighting
strength vis-a-vis our actual naval
problem?
Well, we have 546 ships, but of
those only 348 are commissioned
naval vessels and, while some can
hurl broadside of 10000 pounds of
steel, others can deliver only 49,
pound shell. OF the 348, only 236 are
fighting ships and of these all but
131 are "over age"-the estimated
useful life of such vessels, which, of
course, varies in years with different
classes.
Replacement Obstacles.
There are Is battleships on our
fighting line, of which one is over
26 years, the normal age, two will
become over age next year and four
more in 1912. Our newest battleships
are Is years old, the next two 18 and
the rest older. We have not single
battleship designed after the World
War. Now building we have eight
battleships, but at the present rate
of construction not one of these will
be ready for service before 1912.
AS one responsible naval officer
put it. war now would catch us
with an obsolescent and obsolete
battle line, with no requirements in
sight for two years" And If we
must fight. we'll have to fight with
what we have on the day war breaks
out. In the World War we put in a
hurry order for 275 destroyers, which
can be built with comparative rapid
ity. But only II got into war serv-
ice.
Where does this leave us in COM
parison with other powers?
We have the same number of bat
tleships as Britain, IS, though hers
are younger" and in some cases