Evening star., 1939-12-03
Britain Is Potential Commerce
Giant in Soviet Economic Plan
Nazi Germany's Wooing of Russia May Bring
Disillusonment to Both in Export
and Import Fields
By Lasar VoHn.

~ ' OstHs
sisal, II per cent of Soviet imports from
England. These are likewise deficit COM
| modities as far as Germany is concerned,
but she obviously cannot obtain them
| from the Soviet Union. Altogether this
| group constituted two-t thirds of the total
Soviet imports from England, while ma
chinery of various types constituted Is
| per cent. On the other hand, Russian
imports from Germany consist predom-
| inantly of machinery and other finished,
chiefly producers, goods.
Slackening Probable.
Now with the growing industrialization
of country and the development of
heavy industries and economic self
sufiiciency stressed by the policy of the
Soviet government, the requirements for
producers manufactured goods are likely
to slacken in time and in the case of cer-
tain types to be even abruptly discon-
tinued.
Could the Nazis supply the specialized
machinery, the railway rolling stock, the
locomotives that the Soviet Union needs?
No competent authority, as far as this
writer knows, believes the answer is in
the affirmative. Even the well-knoWn
German economic weekly Wirtschafts-
dlenst admitted in its issue of August
Is, on the eve of the war, that German
industry will presumably not have easy
shedding in the new Russian business"
This skeptical view has been stressed by
other German writer's for economic and
technical publications.
Will the Kremlin then continue its
profitable trade with the British or prefer
to supply Hitler with resources without
an immediate economic return? OF
course, if the commodities needed by
Germany differ from those usually pur-
chased by England from the Soviet
Union or if the latter produced such
large surpluses that it could easily ex-
pand exports, this dilemma would not
arise or at least not arise in so sharp a
form Trade with John Bull could be
maintained and Hitler could be helped
If political considerations so dictated q
am not suggesting that such an assist
ance could offset to any material extent
the effects of the British blockade of
Germany-in fact I am very skeptical
as to this) But most of the commodities
purchased by England, timber and vari-
GUS agricultural products, are essentially
the same as those that would have to
be supplied to Germany if her economic
entente with Russia were to materialize.
Petroleum a Bottleneck.
AS far as petroleum is concerned,
which, from the German standpoint, is
a supremely important sinew of war, the
existence of substantial surplus in the
Soviet Union in view of the growing do
mestic needs is highly problematical.
Petroleum is one of the bottlenecks of
the Soviet economic development.
1t is generally accepted by experts that
large agricultural exports now could take
place only at the expense of further
depression of the already low Russian
standard of living, which would be a
risky affair in the present international
conjuncture. Cotton is an exception, but
an exception that proves the rule. Ac-
cording to some reports, considerable
stocks of cotton (some of 1t probably
low-grade) were accumulated in the
U. S. S. R. chiefly because of the disparity
between production of the raw staple
and the limited spinning capacity of the
Russian mills. If this is true, 1t Is pos
sible in view of the well-known fact of
a chronic shortage of textile goods in
the U. S. S. R., that an exchange of
Soviet cotton for German textiles may
be arranged, patterned on similar ar
rangement entered into by the Soviet
Union early in the year with Poland,
whose Lodz textile industry incidentally
is now in Nazi hands. In this manner
Germany could acquire certain amount
of cotton beyond what would be neces-
sary to work up textile exports to the
U. S. S. R.
Finally, in speaking of agricultural
look the crucial role played by weather,
especially In the Soviet Union where so
much of the agriculture is carried on
under semi-arid conditions. During the
past two years weather was rather unkind
to the Russian farmer; but, If in 1910 1t
should reward him with bumper crops,
Stain would be able to spare more for
Hitler.
I have not mentioned the question Of
gold shipments from the U. S. S. r. to
Germany. Recent reports of such ship
ments seem to have surprised public
opinion, as evidenced by the questions in
the House of Commons. The only ele-
ment Of surprise should have been the
fact that the Kremlin saw fit to continue
the practice of settling its obligations
with Germany by sending gold rather
than the urgently needed goods. Gold
shipments to Germany merely testify to
the ephemeral character of any large
scale Russian material assistance.
If in the initial political phase of the
wooing contest in Moscow, John Bull was
worsted by Hitler, who welded greater
Establishments, the roles may be easily
reversed in the current economic phase
Gf the British maintain control of the
seas, of course) with psychological effects
that may far outweigh any possible
economic gains or losses to the con.
testants.