Evening star., 1939-12-31

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MAJ. ELIOT.
Germany who regard the Russian
march down the Baltic, the attack
on Finland. the concessions made to
Russia in eastern Poland, the Rus
sian anti-Rumanian intrigues with
Bulgaria as constituting greater
potential menace to Germany than
all the allied armies and fleets. The
German navy is said to be furious
over the Baltic situation; an
estrangement between Hitler and
Goering is reported because of the
latter's anxiety to preserve Finland
as buffer state between Russia
and Scandinavia.
There is little doubt that the
strained relations with Italy have
as almost their sole cause the Russo
German pact. We cannot, therefore,
eliminate the possibility that Hitler
may decide, especially when and if
the Russians get their best troops
thoroughly begged down in Finland,
to seize the opportunity to thrust
the Russians out of Eastern Poland
and the Baltic states, perhaps to
lop off corner of the Ukraine and
establish German power on the
Black Sea.
If undisturbed by western COM
plications, the military obstacles in
the way Of doing SO do not seem
prohibitive; the move would have
Italian sympathy, might even find a
certain concurrence in some sec
tions of British and French opinion.
There is measurable chance that
even though the Germans left only
minimum defensive forces in the
west. there would be no serious
allied attack. Germany could ap-
pear as the protector of Finland,
as the champion of western civili-
such a move there might be opened
the way to peace in the west, a
peace which would leave Germany
dominant on the continent, indeed,
but which might be accompanied
by some sort of token restoration
of a Polish and a Czech state. I
do not assert that such develop
ments are imminent. do think
that some such thoughts may be
present in the minds of German
leaders, that they may conceive Of
this as possible way out of the
difficulties which beset them, a
choice of evils.
May Attack in West.
Solution (3)-Attack in the west
may be Germany's choice, though
probably not before spring. We
have already examined, in previ-
Gus article. the means open to Ger
many in such case; direct attack
on the Maginot Line. an outfianking
movement through Belgium or
Switzerland. or an assault by sea,
undersea and air methods on British
sea communications. perhaps facili-
tated by occupation of Holland.
Certainly the Germans have been
accommodating and experimenting
along the lines of the last-named
plan. Certainly it offers the great
advantages, and if successful the
quickest solution. while presenting
the smallest degree of risk.
In this connection. 1t may be said
that Germany's chief military eco
nomic shortage is one of gasoline.
She cannot hope, with the resources
now available to her and even count
ing on full control of Rumania's
output, to sustain a long campaign
against major opponent. The rate
of expenditure in the Polish cam
paign has given her planners food
for thought She has a war reserve
probably SUFFICIENT for a defensive
war of year or more, but sufficient
only for a single full-scale offensive
effort lasting three or four months.
If she makes such an effort, her lead
ers must be reasonably certain of
victory. Hence the hesitation, hence
the experiments.
Solution GA waiting game
may seem the safest course, but it
has its perils. 1t remains safe only
as long as the allies sit tight and ad-
here to the defensive policy which
has in the main characterized their
war effort so far. They are show
ing signs of more intensive activity.
Morever, such plan involves per-
mitting the consolidation of the
Balkan front, permitting allied as
sistance to bring about decisive
changes in the Baltic, perhaps fl
nal decision by Italy that Germany's
cause is doomed and her consequent
alignment with the Allies.
The internal strain resulting from
such policy can be calculated in
Berlin far better than in New York,
but certainly must be considered. If
long continued, to the point of the
exhaustion of war reserves, while
the grip of the allied blockade
tightens not only at sea but in the
Balkans and the north, waiting
game may prove as disastrous to
the existing regime in Germany as
any other. We must not forget the
individual angle; the men now in
power in Germany have set their
lives upon the cast. On the other
hand the possibility exists that a
waiting game might eventually en-
able Germany to exploit Russian
supply sources.
British Play Waiting Game.
GREAT BRITAIN.-Britain' OBJ
ject is an orderly world, a world in