Evening star., 1939-04-09
Seizure of Albania by Italians
Nav Set Limit on Reich Drive
Duce's Occupation of Vassal State Seen Warning
to Yugoslavia, Hint to Hitler Not to Move
Too Far South in Push to East
RvH MnU;nc
Bv Cresfon B. Mullins.

With the Spanish war out OF the way
Premier Mussolini has gone in for sur
prises, but on somewhat smaller scale
than his partner-Adolf Hitler.
Few of the Reichsfuehrer's lightning
moves have burst upon the world with
less notice, yet none of them in the last
analysis was to be more surely expected
at some time-than Italys invasion of
Albania.
But more surprising than the deed
itself is that Mussolini neglected to do it
so long, for Italian control of Albania,
even to the extent of the protectorate
which is likely now to result, was a
point of Italian foreign policy long be-
fore Mussolini ever came to power.
The powers of Europe formally rec
ognized early in the World War that
Italy's strategic frontier lay in the
Albanian Alps which line the eastern
shore of the Adriatic.
What is significant about the seizure
of Albania is not that Italy finally is
cashing in on the Rome Berlin axis,
nor that she is acquiring in fee simple
the rich oil resources of King Zog's do
main, but that Italys political position
vis-a-vis Southeastern Europe, the de-
mocracies and Hitler himself is radically
changed.
Reich Backing Unimportant.
italy could have taken Albania long
ago. with or without the axis. It is i'm
material whether Germany supports her
Fascist friend in it or not, for seizing
Albania was like 20O-pound man walk
Ing off with a year-old child. Such are
the proportions.
Albania Is no economic gold mine. 1t
Is true she has oil, and goodly supply,
but its exploitation was already in the
hands of Italians. So was the rest of
Albania's industry and agriculture,
either directly or indirectly. In fact,
all of Albania's economy.
The meaning of Mussolini's move
must be sought in the political sphere,
and the possible interpretations are
manifold.
But two stand out with striking prom
inence, and are so closely related, in
fact. consistent with each other. that as
a whole they give the impression that
Mussolini has effected a master political
coup in what otherwise would have
been a minor incident in Balkan affairs.
At first sight Mussolini appears to be
engaged in a counter stop Hitler"
movement by thus threatening Yugo-
slavia with italian force if she should
move against the RomeBerlin axis as
q part of the democratic bloc. Such
has been the general Interpretation
placed on what II Duce is doing.
Duce Needs Hitler.
The grounds for such view are nu-
merous. Italys Premier needs Hitler If
he is going to get very far himself. He
needs him like life itself. If he ever
hopes to wiring what he wants from
France it will be because of the fear in
Paris that Hitler may lend Mussolini
what is now Europe's greatest military
machine. With Hitler II Duce can go
q long way; without him he stops where
he is.
Mussolini undoubtedly still harbors
hope that the Rome-Berlin axis will
bring him something more than Dear
Benito" notes from Der Fuehrer and
hope dies hard. So his best bet is still
with Hitler, unless the democracies pay
the tremendous price of buying him of.
The only danger is that the Yugoslavs,
who are tough people, may not be so
easily intimidated. Instead of avoiding
the democratic bloc to stop Hitler"
they may see the handwriting so clearly
on the wall-the prophecy of dismember-
ment-that they will flee into the arms of
Great Britain and France in self f-defense.
Such an occurrence would be major
catastrophe for Italy if it reached its
widest proportions, for behind Yugo-
slavia Rumania, Greece and Turkey, the
other members of the Balkan entente,
could more certainly and easily be
ranged.
There is no indication yet, however,
that Belgrade will take such course;
so Italys stratagem of thwarting the
stop Hitler" drive may succeed.
Duce's Motive May Be Deeper.
There is, on the other hand a much
deeper yet unexplored element which
may show the motive of Mussolini's tao
tical move. 1t is the certain effect the
seizure of Albania will have within the
Rome-Berlin axis.
Italy as territorial power east of
the Adriatic is quite different thing
from Italy in its boot with its insular
possessions in the Mediterranean. The
Slavic nations have had historic fears Of
Italy becoming Balkan power in the
midst of German and Russian influences.
Now their fears-and particularly the
fears of Yugoslavia-are realized in the
worst form.
Italy has "Drang mach Osten" of her
own, although never on the scale of Ger
manys. After the war, when the fate
of Albania was still uncertain, one of
the foremost italian historians-Prof.
Mario Toscano-epitomize Albania as
the "solid springboard for Italian ex-
pansion in the east" Albania thus may
easily be first Italian thrust toward
the Dardanelles.
A Greece whose policies are co-ordi-
mated with those of Rome might easily
offer Mussolini the opportunity to COM
mand the Turkish straits and what passes
through them. The Importance OF the
straits to Italy is patent if Italy Is to
achieve her aim of ruling the Mediter-
ranean. And she does intend to.
Germany Main Threat.
But two threats to that cOntrOl-Out-