Evening star., 1939-06-04
BY LUIS ARAQUISTAIN.

At least 80 per cent of the Spanish
Republicans can vouch for this fact,
which was tolerated because of the
cunning argument Creally form Of
blackmaiD that, unless the policy
favored by Russia were adopted in
Spain, Russia would cease selling
war material to the republic, as
actually was done whenever Russia
wished the dismissal Of members Of
the government or military or civil
officials in the bad graces politically
of the Soviets.
This personal testimony has
started to appear and will continue
to appear in the press and in books,
and the world will be amazed at the
truth of what happened in Repub-
lican Spain. I suppose that some
day the same thing will be done with
regard to the happenings in Fascist
Spain, and then the amazement of
the world, which has been so in
completely informed hitherto, will
be doubled.
Proof Still Scanty.
On the other hand, documentary
proofs of this policy Of interference
by foreign state in Spain are still
extremely scarce, and we shall have
to wait for internal political changes
and the pacifying action of historical
time to permit the opening of the
archives and a search for the truth.
more or less deprived of diplomatic
instruments and the condolences of
special agents.
BY good chance I have come into
possession of two documents which
clearly prove Soviet interference in
Spanish affairs and which may be
unique in their class. because their
authors are distinguished by extreme
caution in their dealings and rela-
tions with other countries. These
documents are two letters signed by
Stain, Molotoff (Premier and
Voroshiloff (war commissar) and
sent by those gentlemen to the then
president of the Spanish cabinet,
Largo Caballero. But their signifi-
canoe and transcendency would not
be correctly understood without an
explanation of the antecedents
giving rise to these letters and the
intimate sense of their wording.
The first letter. dated Moscow. De-
cember 2l, 1896, was brought to
Spain by the Soviet Ambassador,
Marcel Rosenberg, on his return
from journey he made to Russia,
no doubt to inform his government
of the political and military situa-
ton IN Spain. The relations be-
| tween the two countries were even
then extremely strained, precisely
because of the interference, discov-
cred more and more each day, by
the Russian civil and military agents
| in the affairs of the Spanish gov
eminent, especially where its head,
Largo Caballero, was concerned, in
the conduct of the war and, to an
even more marked extent, in the
control Of the army.
Distasteful to Largo CabalIero.
Largo Caballero did not disguise
his dlstaste for this importuning
and on one occasion he was obliged
to break of violently an interview
with Rosenberg and virtually to dis
miss him from his Office for his i'm
pertinent inSistence on the dismis-
sal Of Gen. ASensio.
Rosenberg went to Moscow short
ly before this scene, evidently to
give an account of the tenseness of
this situation. The spontaneous let
ter from Stain, Molotoff and Voro-
shlloH was the reply to the infor-
nation brought by Rosenberg, and
the blunt question whether the Am
basSador was or was not to con-
tlnue TO be persona grata to the
Spanish government proves that
Rosenberg. or one of the numerous
Soviet agents in Spain, had given
the Russian rulers full details of
the Spaniards' discomfort. 1t is
probable that Rosenberg described
Largo Caballero as a man who, by
his personality and character, would
never lend himself as a docile tool
OF Russian policy. The former So
Wet general, Krivitsky, relates in the
Saturday Evening Post april 13,
1882 that as early as December,
1885, the Soviet authorities had
agreed to dispense with Largo Ca
ballero as head of the government.
II this is true, there is every induce
ment to believe this decision was
reached as a consequence Of Rosen-
berg's visit to Moscow in that month,
The Russian rulers assert in their
letter that the Soviet forces in Spain
had been sent in compliance with
the repeated requests of the Span
lards sent through Rosenberg. They
do not state who made these re-
quests. 1t was not Largo Cabailero.
Shortly after his government had
been formed in September, 1896. the
Russian Ambassador presented to
1t serving Soviet general, stating
that he was the Military Attache of
the Embassy and offering his pro-
fessional services.
Upset Army.
| Later on fresh 'auxiliari ries" spranp
up spontaneously, without being
asked for. and introduced them
selves motu propio into the mill
tary staff and army corps, where
they gave orders at will, thus caus-
ing much disorganization and dis
content among the Spanish forces,
not only because they were foreign
ers, but also because Of their mani
fest and immense incompetence.
The authors of the letter state
| that the categorical orders received
by the Soviet soldiers that had gone
to Spain were to act simply as ad-
visers to the Spanish forces and
nothing more. It is doubtful, to
say the least, whether such orders
existed, because in view of the iron
discipline of the Russian soldiers
they would have obeyed implicitly
instead Of behaving, as they did, in
constant and open insubordiation