Evening star., 1939-10-17

restrictions upon American vessels
Is the injury to our national defense.
The Mercantile Marine Act Of 1895,
under which we are building up our
merchant fleet, was based on its
auxiliary service to the United States
Navy. A fleet must have fuel; it
must, therefore, have tankers, with
competent speed. A fleet must have
feeding and housing also. It must
have vessels for disqualification, for
shelter of personnel of small vessels,
such as submarine. aircraft and. de-
stroyers. 1t must have access to
basic materials and to supplies.
Without a merchant marine, a navy
could not serve.
Therefore, it is to be hoped that
that the restrictive embargoes on
American shipping may be reason
ably relaxed by amendment of the
pending blu.
Seen Aid to Defense.
But dealing with the proposed
legislation as it stands tonight, I IA
vor its adoption for the following
reasons:
It would promote our national de-
fense.
1t would make more remote our
getting into war.
It would increase the probability
Of victory Of the allies.
1t would tend to shorten the war.
It would keep the battlefront far
away from America.
1t would help to keep the ocean the
protection for us that 1t has been
while our vis-a-vis navy was under
the British flag.
The United States has been on the
defensive throughout the Seventy
sixth Congress. While the Military
Affairs Committees of the House and
Senate developed a military, naval
and aerial plan for national defense,
the committees of both houses hav-
ing Jurisdiction Of our foreign rela-
tions were at work trying to pro-
mote such governmental action as
would keep us at peace and at the
same time protect our free institu-
tions and our territory from ag-
gression. The evidence showed, at
the beginning Of the session, an en-
vironment of danger, wars proceed
ing, all the great treaty powers Of
the world armed and getting ready
for mobilization, even the Western
Hemisphere penetrated covertly, and
In peaceful disguise, by the dynamic
foreign policy of National Socialism,
having the implications of an effort
to set up world empire. Within
striking distance of the Panama
Canal, namely, in Colombia, an air
ways system, OF which the crews
were at least 95 per cent German; q
system Of airlines being established
around Latin America with adequate
bases and stations with stocks of
convertible parts adaptable to mill
tary planes as well as commercial
planes, so that If Germany wanted
to fly military versions Of the Folke-
Wulf planes to Latin America, they
would there have all ready adequate
supplies for military use. The parts
of the commercial ships all ready in
Latin America are interchangeable
with parts for bombers and for
other military planes. If Germany
should wish to send large number
Of bombing planes through Latin
America to our southern boundaries
she would have the facilities to do so,
she would have the fuel supplies in
large reserves. she would have the
parts, she would have the replace
ments and the personnel, If they
were needed.
Aircraft Expectation.
Such picture clearly given to the
Committee on Military Affairs could
not be ignored with prudence. It
appeared from the evidence that
Germany was sending able tech
n1cians to Latin America who had
recently been trained In special
courses in n>the economic theories and
the political PHILOSOPHERS Of their
own country, in technique, In diplo-
macy and in the language Of the
country where they were going.
Moreover, the trend Of exporta-
ton of aircraft was significant.
Whereas our Latin American exports
of aeronautical products in 1898 in
creased 1877 per cent over 1887, Latin
American sales of totalitarian air
craft gained about 300 per cent in
those two years. This tremendous
gain in totalitarian exports Of aero
nautical products in Latin America
was consistent with the foreign pol
icy of Germany recently associated
with claims of pressure of popula-
ton, the so-called natural right to