Evening star., 1939-10-19
Nazis' Iron Position
Declared Inferior
To That Of 1916
Held One of Reasons
For Desiring Quick
Peace or Victory
BY FRANK SMOTHERS,


BERLIN, Oct. 10 (By radio -
Iron and oil, those two indis-
pensables of war, are two of the
greatest reasons, as seen by neutral
observers here, why Nazi Germany
so warmly desires either a quick
peace or quick victory.
For long war Germany would
require huge quantities of both. She
has large stores of munitions and
Oil. Neutral observers do not know
how large they are. Replenishing
iron and oil, like so many other sup
plies, looms as tremendous prob
lem for the Reich henceforth. if the
war becomes war of attribution.
Germanys iron position today
appears far inferior to that of 1916
In-that year, the central powers had
the German, Austrian and LuXem-
burg production of iron ore, totaling
s2D00,O00 tons. In addition, the
Reich imported 100000 tons from
Sweden.
Now, Germany is producing 49,
00p,0 900 or 100000 tons-not nearly
so high in iron content as her pro-
duction in 1916 which included that
of, Lorraine. She has hoped to in
crease production of low-grade ore
to- 26,000000 tons in the course Of
several years-but presumably can
not effect a huge increase in the
next year or two.
22,000,OOO Tons Imported.
Germany can still import iron but
nothing like what she imported be-
fore the hostilities began. In 1898
she brought in 220OO,OOO tons from
abroad. Here, in round figures, are
her principal iron-ore imports Of
last year:
Sweden, 100000
France, 5,000,000.
Luxembourg, 100000
Newfoundland, 100000.
Norway, 100000.
Spain, 100000.
Algeria. 100000.
Spanish Africa, 100000.
French Morocco, 100000.
Tunisia, 100000.
Brazil, 122 900.
Obviously, Germany has lost the
iron of France. Newfoundland, AL
geria, French Morocco and Tunisia
Most of the Spanish ore was from
the Bilbao region-on the northern
Spanish coast. Even supposing Gen.
Francisco Franco were willing to
make 1t available to Stains friend
and even supposing Premier Benito
Mussolini were willing to have it
shipped via Italy, the Anglo French
blocade presumably could prevent
It. The blocade could also prevent
iron from Spanish Morocco from
going to Germany.
Belgium is now reported to be
trying to get for herself the pro-
duction of Luxembourg, with which
she has a customs union. The
British blocade commands the
coast of Norway whence came not
only Norwegian shipments, but a
considerable portion of the imports
Of Swedish iron to the Reich.
Treacherous Course.
Continued attempts may be made
by Germany to slip iron from Nor
way past the blocade by hugging
the Norwegian coast within the
three-mile limit. That route. how
ever, is treacherous and two ore
ships are understood to have been
lost by hitting rocks while attempt
ing to follow it to Germany during
the first days of the war.
With virtually all other 1898
sources of foreign iron supply cut
off the Reich counts on considerable
Swedish iron-Which is very high
crude. 1t is difficult for neutral
experts at this writing, however, to
see how she can get the 100000
tons of ore that she secured last
year from Sweden. But even if she
could, her total domestic iron pro-
duction, plus iron imports, cannot
compare with 1916.
This. however, is not to suggest
that Germany soon is going to be
without sufficient iron to continue
the war. There are too many un-
certalnties. Her supplies of NUM-
tlonS and steel and iron are mill
tary secret. Her rate of consump-
tion of munitions henceforth is un-
known. 1t is not proved yet whether
she can materially increase her own
low grade ore production during
the war.
The valuable iron mines of Lux
emburg and Belgium must be most
attractive and tempting to the
Reich. Were Germany able to &C
complish a successful invasion and
occupation of those neighbor states
her iron position would be very
materially improved along with
other gains-and the liabilities
which such action would bring.
tCopyrieht 1889, Chicago Daily News, Inc)