Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1939-07-02
Two Strong Monetary Powers
Are Still Left to the President
Treasury's Broad Authority to Set Price of Gold
and Silver and to Buy White Metal
Left by Senate
By Herbert M. Braffer,

accumulated In this country for specu-
lative purposes during the silver cam
paign and nationalized in 1884. In the
list Of silver hoarders published by the
Government in 1884 appear not only the
names of domestic spectators but also
those of benefciaries in China, British
India, Great Britain, Mexico, Egypt,
France and elsewhere abroad.
Chasing Rainbow.
Our program, moreover conferred a
tremendous boon on the incredulous
London silver market, while our Gov
eminent took special measures to reduce
trading in New York. Foreign brokers.
trucking companies, steamship lines and
spectators have reaped rich returns.
Thousands of tons of silver have been
sold here since 1888. We have poured
out our wealth. week after week, in
exchange for the metal nobody wants.
Yet the goal of the Silver Purchase Act
has remained as remote as ever.
The Silver Purchase Act has COM
pletely failed in all its promised aims
except to line the pockets of few. 1t
was supposed to increase the monetary
use of silver abroad. 1t did the opposite
1t was intended to prevent silvers fur
ther decentralization. Instead, it en-
couraged it. 1t looked to the substitu-
ton of silver for small-denomination
money. The reverse occurred.
Due to our program, the silver stand
ard no longer exists; not even in China.
Before the inexcusable program was
undertaken the country was warned
of its fallacies. This story of failure is
nothing new.
In 1878 Congress passed a silver pur-
chase law, the Bland Act. Large de-
posits of silver had been discovered in
the West. The Mountain States then
sought restoration of bimetallism They
wanted the Treasury to buy all their
silver at high, fixed price. The Bland
Act was a compromise. For a dozen
years the Treasury bought silver. Yet,
Historians Muzzey and Krout tell us,
the act accomplished none of the re-
suits that its supporters prophesied."
Again in 1890.
Then came the Sherman silver law of
1890. More promises were made. Silver
purchases were increased. The pur-
chases were in vain. They weakened
confidence in the dollar BY 1893 Cleve-
land had to call special summer ses-
sion OF Congress to repeal the disastrous
law.
There was prolonged filibuster, and
no air conditioning. Senator John P.
Jones made a 14-day speech covering
100 pages in the Congressional Record.
But the act was repealed.
The 1896 campaign centered on BIZ
metallism. Silver was beaten. His
cross OF gold' speech failed to elect
Bryan President-but eventually it
made him Secretary of State.
During the World War the India gov
eminent needed some silver. Britain
came to us. Our Treasury held tons of
Bland Act and Sherman Act coin. Only
very small fraction of it had gone into
| circulation
We could easily spare what India
needed. So We sold about 200 900 900
ounces under the especially passed Pitt
man Act. But there was a catch. The
Treasury had to buy back that silver
from American miners at a dollar an
ounce. And nearly all the while 1t was
done, other silver was selling for less
than 10 cents an ounce.
The silver bloc is always Watchful of
| opportunities No crisis is too severe to
| prevent 1t from eking out subsidy in
exchange for its patriotic votes. The
depression of the 1905 was its next
| chance.
Propaganda of 1880.
In 1880 the silver interests argued that
there was a shortage of gold. They
annexed the support of greenbackers,
who wanted just more currency. They
solicited export interests with the appeal
that their foreign markets would expand
II by buying foreign silver we would
build up the purchasing power" of half
the world. three-quarters of the world,
indeed seven eighths of the world, whose
only money is silver" No assertion was
! too fantastic
Until the 1882 campaign the Hoover
administration resisted the demands of
the silver interests. But, as Raymond
Moley has now revealed, the New Deal
gave significant place to "bimetallism"
on its campaign agenda.
In connection with preparations for
the London Economic Conference of
1888. the Roosevelt administration gave
the silver cause prestige and momentum.
The conference refused to do anything
for silver except pass pious resolution.
But, outside the conference Senator
Pittman committed the United States
to the London silver agreement. Under
1t, seven interested countries gave nom
1nal support to Pittman's effort to pro-
vide Treasury market for silver.
Earlier in 1888 Congress had passed
the Thomas amendment, giving the
President broad powers over silver, in
GLIDING the temporary power to establish
bimetallism. Citing this power, the
President in December proclaimed the
purchase of all silver to be mined here
during 1934-37. This constituted our
ratification of the agreement Senator
Pittman had signed. The agreement
was never submitted to the Senate for
ratification.
The Presidents proclamation of De-
cember 81, 1888, went far beyond the
obligations to which Senator Pittman
had theoretically committed the United
States. The President took not merely
the % 100000 ounces per ar1n,lm pro,n