Evening star., 1939-08-06
Shock Of Treaty Denunciation
Forecasts Calm or a Hurricane
Roosevets Surprise Move May Send Tokio's
Navy Into Action to Take Over
Dutch East Indies Resources
Bv Constantine BrOwn,

ny ~ OUStNN
President Roosevelt has once more
projected the United States into the
arena of international relations with q
spectacular demonstration.
The notice served to Toxic that six
months after July 26 this year the
American Japanese treaty of COM
merce and amity-the last word Is just
one of those diplomatic misnomers-will
be abrogated has caused CONSERVATION in
Toxic and worry in Berlin and in Rome.
In the manner characteristic of Mr..
Roosevelt, the plans for the denunciation
Of the treaty were kept so confidential
that his most intimate advisers had no
inkling of what was coming. This was
necessary, it was said. in order to make
the bombshell as effective as possible.
President Roosevelt decided to play his
last card in order to postpone the evil
hour of another crisis in Europe. He
wanted to show the dictators that
America still must be taken into account
In international affairs and that the ad-
ministration still has teeth which can
bite. Basically, the abrogation was
prompted by the same motives which de-
cided Mr.. Roosevelt to make bellicose
speech before the United States Congress
when it reconvened last January and to
send the famous messages to Hitler and
Mussolini on April Is. The State De-
partment and the White House believe
firmly that, useless as the Presidents
messages may have appeared to the aver
age citizen they did postpone the Danzig
crisis which was scheduled to take place
late in April
Two Motives Behind Action,
President Roosevelts decision to break
OF commercial relations with Japan has
two-fold motive: First, the President
became tired of the manner in which the
Japanese were treating American citi-
zens and American interests in those re-
gions occupied by the japanese Army in
China. Second, he wanted to offset the
effect caused in Europe by the refusal
OF Congress to abrogate the arms en-
oargo clause OF the Neutrality Act. He
wanted to show the world, despite the
obvious isolationism of Congress. that
the executive branch still has some aces
up its sleeve which can be played in time
Of need.
The administration has known for
long time what the stoppage of the
American sources of supplies to Nippon
will mean for the prosecution of the
war in China. No less than half of the
needs OF the Japanese Army in cotton.
iron, copper and oil are provided by
the united States. These imports
amounted to something like $3.50 900 900
in 1888. In order to make it possible for
Japan to purchase these raw materials.
together with number of airplanes and
military trucks, Japan had to have the
gold or the equivalent of the yellow
metal The American exporters, like the
British, never extend credit for longer
period than 80 days and these credits
have to be secured with gold deposits
In New York.
curtailment of the Japanese exports
to the United States by extra heavy
duties, as will be possible the day the
present treaty of commerce ceases to
exist, will deprive the japanese of their
source of income in dollars. Hence they
will not be able to purchase the oil with
out which their navy will have to re-
main in its harbors, or the raw materials
needed to shoot up Chang Kai-shek's
soldiers.
While it is true that the trade with
Japan forms an important item in our
national economy, there is nothing that
Japan exports to the United States which
can be considered of vital Importance
This country can live without silk-al-
though good many industries will have
to suffer. The Japanese, on the other
hand, cannot possibly spare our raw ma
terials If they want to conclude their
war in China some day. 1t is this rea-
soning which has determined Mr.. Roose-
velt to make use of the provisions of the
1911 treaty and to denounce it at this
time.
Japan's Attitude Nom Committal.
So far Toxic has maintained re-
served attitude. The army and the navy
have not yet had time to make their
decisions. They still bank on Britain's
surrender and hope that the attitude
adopted by Washington will not influence
the British cabinet Behind the dis
cussions between the Japanese and the
English in Toxic lies more than the help
lessness Of the British alone to oppose
Japan by force. Great Britain, 1t is
pointed out by American observers, could
have exercised the same pressure on
Japan as the Washington Government
did last week.
But the City did not want Premier
Chamberlain to do it. For months there
have been discussions between represent
atives of the London banks and business
houses and the Japanese government.
These preceded the Tentsin incident by
weeks. The spokesmen of the Japanese
army and civilian government held out
the hope to the British bankers that the
Japanese government would not only
honor its own obligations toward the
British stors-approximately $780,
ooo,000-but once Japan was in complete
and unchallenged control Of China the