Evening star., 1939-10-01
Interests Of Allies
Might Not Benefit
By Long Warfare
Further Appeosement
Might Create Lasting
Balance Of Power
By COL. FREDERICK PALMER.

OOIUNSS VI IVWSI
By COL. FREDERICK PALMER.
There are certain signs which may
be taken to suggest, as we enter its
nth week, that this may not be a
long war. I know an international
statesman of rich experience and
distinguished service during and
since the World War who thinks
that, If European statesmen were big
enough, we might have an early
peace which might endure for a
considerable period.
Clearly, the way is being pre-
pared for Hitler to make his antici-
pated peace move.
Nations at war cease fighting
when one side has imposed its will
by force upon the other, or, in COM
mon agreement, they conclude their
interests are not served by further
fighting. Since that is the real is
sue, let us analyze in military terms
the situation as 1t has developed
during the past week from Moscow
to the western front and in the Ger
man submarine and air campaign
against British naval power.
At first glance, one clause stands
out in military significance in the
Russo German agreement. The two
governments will call upon "a be-
friending nation" to aid in ending
the war between Germany and the
Anglo-French allies. In case they
fail, then it will have been estab-
lished that Britain and France are
responsible for the continuation of
the war, land in case of continual
ton of the war the governments of
Germany and Soviet Russia will
consult each other regarding the
necessary measures
Carries Definite Threat.
This carries the threat of joint
military action against the Anglo
French by the Russo-German allies.
Back of it are further loudly her
aided threats that Russia will ad-
vance farther than Estonia in the
Baltic and Germany against Scan
dinavia, Holland and Belgium. This
they may be able to do on the
Baltic side of Scandinavia and by
land against Holland and Belgium.
The combined armies of Russia
and the Reich represent an over
shadowing and irresistible power
over the little Baltic and Balkan
countries. Any land action by Brit
ain and France against the Russo
German occupation of Poland is
utterly hopeless. Russia can give
military aid to Germany on the
western front only by sending her
troops across Germany or flying her
air forces to German air fields in
the Rhine valley. Thus Russia
would expend force which might
otherwise be held on guard against
her powerful new close neighbor on
their new frontier or against Japan.
Stalin's realistic friendship is
practically: You are in a tough
spot. You need me more than I
need you. So far but no farther in
mutual interest. There you inter-
fere with my interest"
French Wait for Attack.
Evidently the French Army ceased
any serious offensive action after
1t was apparent Poland was lost.
General Gamelin waits for the en-
emy to show his hand He holds
the mass of French planes in their
hangers against that day. If the
Germans attack on the Franco-Ger-
man front, he will depend upon a
counterattack after the offensive
is crippled and laundering in its
blood against the defenses of the
Maginot Line.
He must be prepared not only to
hold the extension of the Maginot
along the Franco-Belgian frontier,
but for mobile action against an
invasion of Belgium. Tactical ne
cessity would seem to require that
the British Army should be on the
Belgian flank ready to protect the
channel ports, which would pro-
vide more advantages than avail
ability as submarine nests for the
Germans. The loss of Zeebrugge
again would be bad enough, but a
grave danger would be the loss of
Dunkirk.
In view of the still unpredictable
attitude of Mussolini, who presum-
ably represents the "befriending ma
tion" mentioned in the Russo-Ger-
man agreement, the French must
not neglect their Italian frontier.
The size of the British Army in
France must be limited by the over
seas demands: For the protection of
Gibraltar, providing for the defense
OF the Suez in case Turkey should
turn unfriendly, garrisoning India,
Singapore and Hongkong in the
immense stretch of the empires re-
sponsibilities. British policy must
remain largely defensive until Mus
solini, at least, has shown his hand
British Doing Well at Sea.
From all that we learn it seems
that Britain is making good head
way against the submarine menace
The German air attacks on British
naval ships have been with relatively
small numbers of planes on appar-
emily preliminary experimental
missions. AS for the conflicting
communicates as to results, eithe,
there are some blind aviators OF
there has been some tall lying
However, a commander of a ship
knows whether 1t is hit, and the
pilot OF a bomber, going three OF
more miles a minute at an altitude
of 10000 feet or more, may make
. wrong guess with the wish faith.
ering the thought.
We shall know more about ali
power against naval power wher
heavier attacks are made. Ever
granted that the British lose some
major fighting ships, the British
Navy would still have immense
superiority over the German. O
course, the italian Navy nigh
make some trouble in the Mediter.
raneanff MuSsolini should take thu