Evening star., 1939-08-29
MussoIini in Position
To Wait 10 Choose
Side in Conflict
ItoIy, With Little to Goin,
Much to Lose, Might
Remain Neutral
By COL. FREDERICK PALMER.


NEW YORK, Aug. % (N.A.N.AD.-
his sea and land and air forces in
leash while Chancellor Hitler at
tacks Poland? What if he does not
enter the war at the start, if it
comes, and never enters? He has
precedent in the World War.
Allied to Austria, Italy remained
neutral and eventually joined the
allies, which she found was to her
interest, and may again.
So far, Mussolini waits, his hand
concealed. He has delayed general
mobilization in face of the closing
of the Mediterranean to British
ships. If he should keep out, the
effect would be tremendous by sea,
and, later, by land. 1t might enable
the British and French to bear with
land forces on the Eastern as well
as the Western front. They might
influence military decisions on the
Vistula and the Danube as we'll as
on the Rhine.
The best way to realize the effect
OF Mussolini's keeping out is to pose
the terse question he often asks
"What will Italy get out of this?"
in terms of what Italy can get
out of fighting on Hitler's side.
Hitler has no navy, except sub
marines, to go to his aid. Anglo
French sea power has the same ad-
vantage over the seabound boot
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over Poland when the British and
French armies cannot reach Po-
land in her support. BY sea, Mus
solini must 60 it alone as Hitler
does by land. In a war test, the
Rome Berlin axis looks like an al
lance of an elephant and whale
under the harpoon, with the ele-
phant getting all the profit.
Can't Afford Naval Battle.
The Italian Navy may approach
Frances in strength, but, except as
a desperate stroke it cannot afford
to meet the French in open naval
battle plus the ships Britain can
spare while still holding Germany
IN blockade in the North Sea. The
ol1 dulllh dlIy . oSllokl Al SAOoAAAS
the Mediterranean to British ships
disposes of the Italian plan of aerial
and submarine guerilla warefare to
knife the British lifeline to India
through the narrow waters between
the Sicilian and African coasts.
Italy is to be isolated if she makes
war. All her ships, all her trade, her
VIZ afc ovoI iy,onNrfc Nf
materials will be cut off from all
ports on all seas beyond the Mediter-
ranean. British traffic with India
will be around Africa, as 1t was In
the days before the Suez Canal was
dug. For this, Britain has prepared
with port facilities and bases in
South Africa. French Madagascar
is open to her ships on the way
to India.
All the big threat talk about dis
patch of an italian army, with
German allies, through the Brenner
Pass to Spain for an invasion OF
France from the Franco-Spanish
frontier, with Gen. Frances con-
nivance, evaporates Franco is far
from being receptive since the
Soviet German pact, if he ever was
He is asking, in turn, What does
Spain get out of this?"
Eastern Mediterranean Secure.
The Eastern Mediterranean. in
cluding French Syria, Palestine and
the British Mesopotamian oil fields,
seems as secure as the Western
Mediterranean. There is nothing to
gain and much to lose for seabound
italy against superior sea power.
The Suez closed, Italy would be cut
off from her expensively won Ethi-
opia, her army and civil population
there marooned.
The British and French might
send an expedition to stir up the
natives and arm them to rise against
their Italian masters. With their
superior resources, they would keep
closing in their siege to starve Italy
out of oil, coal, iron, all raw mate
rials, including food. When the war
wastage of planes is estimated at
25 per cent a month, Italy's produc-
ton facilities could not keep pace
with those of Britain and France
and the overseas countries whose
plants might be at their disposal.
Suppose Mussolini should gradu-
ally shift his policy, as Italy did in
the World War, until he is on the
Anglo-French side. 1t would open
the way for land action for the
British and French by sending
troops through the Mediterranean
to the Eastern front. They might
land at Salonika or even at Trieste.
This suggests a complete reverse
from the present situation.
The strength of Mussolini's posi-
ton is that he can wait to choose
sides, and when. and in what direc-
ton he will strike.