Evening star., 1939-02-05


of chronology-a day-by-da state
ment of what actually took place,
and includes finally as an appendix
the reply made by the Czecho-
Slovak government on September 20
to the Anglo French plan which was
presented to President Benes on
September 10, of which latter docu-
ment Mr.. Armstrong says that 1t has
not hitherto been published, as far
as he is aware, though, certainly, 1t
Is q highly important piece In the
chain of correspondence which end
ed in partition; his implication Is
that it has been withheld from the
general public deliberately. All this,
1t will be seen, makes book of no
more than 236 pages, but If ever
there was savage indictment in
condensed form, When There Is No
Peace is that.
As Mr.. Armstrong sees it, there is
q strong likelihood that England
had decided, as early as May, 1888,
to abandon Czecho- -Slovakia in the
event of German demand for par
tition, and he goes even farther than
this In saying that the sending Of
Lord Runciman to Prague to act as
an arbitrator was polite blackmail"
and that the real Runciman mission
in CZecho-Slovakia was to begin
'little by little to whittle down the
Czech position until the govern
ment could no longer present de-
termined and unified front to any
change in the fundamental position
taken by England and France He
places the direct responsibility for
this British duplicity at Mr.. Cham
berlains door, but indicates that the
Prime Minister was no more than
rejecting the opinions of certain
members of the Conservative party
and, of course, of the famous Olive
den set"
Fascism Favored.
ut is fair to Prime Minister
Chamberlain" he says, ito note that
many of his Conservative support
ers, including, probably, members
OF his own cabinet, felt more COM
munity of interest with Fascism
than Communism and also in
stinctively preferred Germany to
France. Among British reaction
aries, liking for Germany and fear
Of Germany blended curiously. =" I"
Prime Minister Chamberlain was
subject to the insistent pressure of
this whole point of view, repeatedly
emphasized in speeches by members
of his own party, in leading articles
in the London Times and in the
busy talk of London hostesses. His
own character and background in
clined him to regard 1t sympathet-
ically. He would perhaps be
conscious of the sense of shame ap-
parently felt by many Englishmen-
the result of being told about in
justices in the Versailles treaty-at
having won the World War. An
instinct for fair play would make
him anxious to throw the underdog
q bone, even somebody else's. And
when suddenly he discovered that
1t was a top dog and not an under
dog with which he had to deal, he
would be credulous enough to hope
by successive bones to reduce its
hunger and make 1t friendly and
innocuous rather than stronger,
greedier and bolder."
And that, says Mr.. Armstrong, is
just what he did. He threw Ger
many a bone which did not belong
to him and which he had sworn to
defend, and Germany swallowed it
without batting an eye and is now
preparing to demand more. And
now the powers of Western Europe
are in a greatly weakened position
for denying her.
The reviewer, in hearing England
and France excoriated for their be-
trayal of their protege democracy,
has often wondered what they
might have done that they did not
do-beyond risking a war. Mr..
Armstrong seems to feel that the
risk would have been safe one. A
strong position by France, England
and Russia (who would have been
included in the Czecho-S -Slovakian
defense under then existing treaties)
would have made Germany back
down. he believes. And, too, he
feels that the Czecho- -Slovakian af-
fair was about the last chance for
such a German humiliation.
Czech Army Lost.
II am not competent" he says,
to draw the post-Munich strategic
picture. But obviously the dismem-
berment of the Czechoslovak State
marks great change in German
military power. The Czechs had
nearly a million men under arms
In the last days before Munich, and
another million ready to be called
up. They occupied a strong stra-
teglc position and they had a war
industry larger than Italy's. Not
merely is the Czech Army lost to
the Western Powers, along with the
mighty Notifications in which it
was encased and the great NUM-
tons factory which made it one of
the best-equipped forces in Europe.
Germany has incorporated a large
slice OF that trained army into her
own army; henceforth the great
Skoda plant will not work for
Czechoslovakia's former friends and
allies but for Germany, and in
case Of war Germany will instantly
move across the frontier, a matter
OF few miles, and occupy the plant
outright. AS for the Czech air force,
an estimate . in June, 1897 .
put the number of f1rst-line Czech
planes at 1000, plus 500 second-line
planes, with personnel of abcxt
10000 men Figures. of course, great
ly increased in the subsequent year, .
Such was the armed enemy force
of which Hitler got rid without sus-
tanning any losses in return, and of
which he was even able to add a
substantial part to his own offensive
power"
The title of Mr.. Armstrong; book
~, hn1;of that fl,ero L. x,e