Evening star., 1939-12-01
Far-Reaching Political
Move May Inspire
Soviet Attack
War on Finland
Might Open Woy for
Nozis in Scandinavia
Rv MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.

The long heralded Russian attack
on Finland has come, and its first
result in this country will, of course,
be a spreading and rising wave of
honest indignation and of sympathy
with small people for whom Ameri-
cans have long cherished particu-
lar regard. But in examining, as OBJ
jectively as possible under circum.
stances which do not lend them
selves to calm reflection. the pos
sible repercussions of Russia's ac-
ton on the course of the present war,
we must ask ourselves first of all,
what are the Soviet objectives?
One suggestion is that Russia Is
seeking merely to occupy those parts
of Finnish territory which were the
subject of her original demands.
These include a naval and air base
on the Hango Peninsula, at the
northwestern entrance to the Gulf
of Finland; several islands in the
gulf itself; the Arctic port of Pet
same, and a rectification OF the
frontier on the Karelian Isthmus.
In a military sense, the first two
of these objectives seem intended to
secure better Russian control over
the Gulf of Finland and the sea
approaches to Leningrad. Russian
batteries at Hango combined with
similar batteries on the Estonian
shore, where Russian troops are al
ready emplaced, could together COM
mand the whole width of the gulf.
The pushing back of the Finnish
Frontier on the Karelian Peninsula
would give the Russians a much
more favorable position for the de-
fense of Leningrad from an attack
by land.
Difficult to Defend.
To put the Russian case at its best,
there is no doubt that Leningrad and
its vicinity constitute a very con-
siderable section of the Russian in
dustrial system and that Leningrad
is certainly situated too close to the
frontier for comfort. besides being
a very difficult place to defend.
But it is necessary to add, from
whom is an attack to be expected?
Certainly not from Finland alone.
The old story used to be that Fin
land was plotting with the Germans
to serve as a bridgehead for Ger
man invasion of Russia from this dl-
rection when time was ripe. If the
Russians continue to nourish such
apprehensionS we have here an in
teresting commentary on the true
state of iet-German relations.
One cannot help wondering what the
real feelings of Germany's leaders
are as they observe Russia moving
to positions from which she can
command the supply routes for
Swedish iron ore, so necessary to
Germanys war industry.
The restrained comment of the
German press tells very little. How
ever, it may be well to recall the
story current about 10 days ago to
the effect that Germany had agreed
not to oppose (and indeed to aid,
at sea- the Russian move into Fin
land in return for Russian acqui-
escence in whatever steps Germany
sees flt to take in Sweden and Den
mark. The threat which Russian
positions at the mouth of the gulf
constitute to Germany's iron ore
supplies from Sweden would tend to
disappear If Germany were in con-
troll of the mines themselves. It is
also interesting to observe that there
are persistent reports in Oslo that
Russia has demanded three ports in
the northern part of Norway. Nor
way was supposed to be specifically
excluded from the scope OF the
rumored agreement with Germany
on the ground that Norway is not
Baltic state" If any Norwegian
ports on the Atlantic became avail
able to the German sea raiders,