Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1939-04-13
By JOSEPH S. EDGERTON.

BY JOSEPH S. EDGERTON.
Ability of the American aeronau-
teal industry to produce 5000 COM
bat airplanes in two years, despite
the seriousness OF the present emer-
gency, is not SO great concern to
the country's defense leaders as is
the ability of the industry to take
over the tremendously expanded
program which would become nee
essary should the United States be-
come involved in a major war
In case of war the problem of
airplane requirements alone would
at once become greater than the
entire present program, even should
the war continue for only month
or two. This requirement for re-
placements would have to be met
before any expansion of the air
force could be undertaken.
= The losses of our Air Service dur
ing the World War amounted to so
per cent of our airplanes each
month. The extent of the losses in
event of a war between two major
air powers can only be conjectured.
Some experts have estimated them
as high as 100 per cent per month.
Winston Churchill has arrived at an
estimate of 60 to 70 per cent
month. Other British aviation
leaders have estimated that the air
plain wastage will amount to so per
cent month. This, the minimum
of the estimates, means that to
maintain a combat force of $500
hrst-line airplanes the British in
dustry would have to produce $4,000
alrplanes year.
30 Per Cent Estimate.
- The wastage factor, for our Army
Air Corps, including combat and all
other losses. has been placed at 80
per cent-a figure which in the light
of foreign estimates and our own
war experience appears to be opti-
mistic
Even on the basis of this very
conservative estimate, it is apparent
that in case of war our entire force
of combat airplanes would have to
be replaced each three months and
that during the course of war last
ing a year our factories would have
to send to the front at least four
simes the number of airplanes in
service at the start Of the war,
merely to take care of requirements.
81 1t is believed that airplane losses
will be heavier, at least in the initial
phases of war, than losses of
combat crews. Airplanes will be lost
through bombing of airdromes,
washout landings on poor wartime
airdromes, from which the crews
may escape without injury, and in
dir fighting from which crews may
escape by parachute. Nevertheless.
air defense experts hold, it will be-
come necessary in case of war to
provide for the procurement and
training of new combat crews in
approximately the same proportion
adopted for airplane construction.
20 Per Cent Requirements.
Even in peacetime the necessary
replacement Of airplanes is no small
item. 1t is estimated that approx
mately 20 per cent requirements will
be required each year merely to keep
up the strength of our air force.
This means that approximately
5000 900 a year must be spent to
Maintain the air force we will have
On CONCLUSION of the present ex-
pansion program. In addition, it is
estimated $16O,OOO,0OO a year will
be required, for the operation of
$500 airplanes, even if 1000 or $500
airplanes are held in incorporating
reserve.
The expected annual cost of
maintaining and operating only a
part of our expanded air force on
conclusion of the present program,
therefore, will total approximately
$3.50 1000, 900.
The program calls for additional
erganizational equipment to outfit
approximately 81 proposed new
squadrons. There will be a further
increase OF about $4,000, 900 in main
tenance funds and 100000 for in
structional equipment and payment
for the instruction of Air Corps pilots
in civilian aviation schools, and
considerable increase for bombs and
ammunition and ordnance storage.