Evening star., 1939-01-01
Ha!y$ Colonial Aspirations
Frances Sffened Attitude Makes Realization Difficult

the expense of France may mark the
first failure of the totalitarian powers
during the last half decade to gain new
territory by threats of force.
This belief was widely held by Ameri-
can officials this week end following the
strong resistance Rome's latest demand
has met in Paris and London. While
France may temporize and offer some
minor concessions to Italy in the hope
of a peaceful settlement of the issue,
Paris shows every indication of continued
stubborn resistance to the Fascist de-
mand for actual control of large part
of its Mediterranean empire.
In palmer words, the prevailing opinion
here is that Italy misjudged the strength
of French opposition; that its diplomatic
timing, usually correct went wrong, and
that the present crisis presently will be
circumvented without war. That does
not mean in any sense that II Duce will
abandon his hopes of adding Tunisia,
French Somaliland, Corsica and Nice to
his domain. But he probably will wait
| for a more propitious moment to force
the issue.
just why the Italian government be-
leved that France would yield to Italy's
demand for such valuable and strate-
gically important parts of its empire
without a struggle is not entirely clear
to diplomatic observers here. Presumably,
however, the Italians overestimated the
weakening effects on France of domestic
turmoil there. particularly the threat of
general strike II Duce, too, may have
let his mind dwell too much on the
weakness shown by the British and
French statesmen at Munich.
Duce's Thinking Not Thorough.
If so. observers here point out, II Duce
failed to take into consideration several
important factors:
/. At Munich Great Britain and France
had less direct stake in the controversy
than they have in the present crisis.
There they were concerned with the
domain of third country, removed from
their primary spheres of interest. But
Italian control of the Mediterranean
would threaten the very existence of the
British and French colonial empires.
@ Prime Ministers Daladier and Cham
berlain were "bluffed" at Munich by the
Italy has no comparable threat to offer.
Both the French and British air forces,
authorities here believe. are match for
the Italian. And while the possibility
that Hitler might aid his colleague in
the Rome Berlin axis can not be for
gotten, his assistance is by no means
certain so long as German interests are
not directly involved.
1t may be, too, that Mussolini, when
he allowed his puppet deputies in the
Italian chamber and the controlled 1tal-
ian press to raise the present issue, did
not expect London's prompt avowal OF
support for France. Yet in view of the
direct threat to the British lifeline"
in the Mediterranean implied by Italian
was almost inevitable.
Franco a Consideration.
The belief among officials here that
Italy does not care to force the issue
of war just now is based on several con-
siderations. In the first place, Italian
prestige is so closely bound up with
the fate of Gen. Francisco Franco in
Spain that Rome could hardly afford
to undertake a frst-rate war; which
would inevitably mean a lessening of
its support to Franco. Second, in France
| alone Italy would face an enemy with
| an army superior to its own and with a
navy approximately as strong as that
of Rome. The addition of even that part
of British naval strength which could
be placed in the Mediterranean would
| give the democratic powers preponder-
ance at sea.
Hence, it seems illogical to suppose
| that II Duce will force the issue of war
unless he can count on the active mill
tary support of his stronger partner
in the Notwithstanding Hitler.
And thus far Germany has given no
evidence that it would intervene in
| war fought purely for Italian territorial
expansion.
italian eXpansionist aims are made
clear at once by a glance at the map
of the Mediterranean basin, which Rome
once ruled and which Italians still call
"our sea-
Tunisia Is Prime Object.
Tunisia, perhaps, is strategically the
| most important of the French Mediter-
ranean possessions which Rome covets.
| Lying directly southwest of the Italian
| Island Of Sicily, the two are separated
! only by gap of water about 100 miles
wide at the narrowest point. BY estab-
| fishing strong naval and air bases at
Tunis, capital of the little territory,
Rome easily could control all trans
Mediterranean traffic and sever Britains
line Of communications to the Near East
and India as well as Frances to Syria
| and French Somaliland. The CITY of
Carthage, which controlled the Mediter-
ranean in ancient times, owed its power
to its strategic location on the Tunisian
peninsula.
For many years Tunisia was ruled by
its native beys 1t became a coveted
object of European imperialistic powers
in the late 10th century. The first
step toward its acquisition was taken in
1862, when the British, French and Ital-
ian governments, for reasons of COM
merce, established joint financial con-
troll over the little country, including
about $4,000 square miles.
French Coup Obtained Tunis.
France, with the covert support of
Britain, ousted italian influence in 1880