Evening star., 1939-12-01

Constitution can be interpreted by
the Supreme Court to mean that
nearly every business or industry
is engaged in interstate commerce
when it comes to applying the
Wagner labor relations law but
labor unions can escape prosecution
under antitrust laws on the ground
that their sit down" strikes do not
restrain interstate commerce.
The decision of three judges of
the Circuit Court of Appeals at
Philadelphia, all appointed under
the Roosevelt administration, was
unanimous in saying that sit
down" strike did not restrain inter-
state commerce This opinion was
rendered in spite of the fact that
the judges of the same court who
resigned or retired recently had
ruled that the same 'sit-down"
strike was conspiracy to interrupt
commerce and restrain the shipment
of materials by the Apex company
and a violation of the Federal laws
governing restraint of trade.
1t is interesting to note that the
original decision in Philadelphia
which said that the "sit-down" strikes
restrained commerce was rendered on
the ground that the Supreme Court
of the United States in upholding
the Wagner Act had defined broadly
the commerce clause of the Consti-
tuition. 1t is interesting also to
record that when the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld the
Wagner Act it did so by referring to
a famous piece of litigation known
as the second Coronado case, in
which the power of Congress to
punish those who interfered with
shipments out of coal mine was
upheld.
Decision Analyzed.
In other words, the Supreme Court
Of the United States ssys Congress
can compel collective bargaining
because absence of this means
strikes and interruptions to COM
nerce and points to previously up
held power of Congress to punish
for interference with commerce
growing out of labor disputes. Po-
tential strikes evidently affect" in
terstate commerce, but "sit-down'
strikes do not restrain it.
Thus, the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals In Philadelphia insists that
the Wagner Act is one thing and
the antitrust laws quite another
and that it isn't restraint of in
terstate commerce at all for q labor
union to force a shutdown and pre-
vent the shipment of materials in
interstate commerce by seizing the
plant itself-something far worse
than that which was done in the
second Coronado case. when the
workers prevented freight cars from
moving out of mine with load Of
coal
1t may be that the Circuit Court
of Appeals judges in their latest
decision are really constituting the
law correctly and that the Supreme
Court of the United States was
wrong in upholding the Wagner
law. Certainly the Philadelphia
court makes use of precedents in
force before the Supreme Court up
held the Wagner Act, thus making
1t possible for the New Deal to win
on either set of precedents, depend
ing on what the judges feel should
be the ruling.
Confusing to Citizens.
This state of affairs-two sets of
precedents ignored or complied with
at will-cannot but confuse the citi-
zen in attempts to understand his
rights. The Circuit Court of Appeals
may have thought it was performing
a sufficient service by denouncing
in words the "sit-doWn" strike and
suggesting that damage suits be
transferred to the State courts, but
the failure to recognize that the
Federal Government has power
through its interstate commerce laws
to punish Shutdown" strikes affect
ing interstate shipments is devas-
tating blow to the whole theory OF