Evening star., 1939-09-02

her for proVOk-
ing, after Is years, another era OF
bloodshed.
There are significant statements
In the European cables which per-
NIT one possible inference OF
hopeful nature to be drawn. Herr
Hitler did not declare war, put
considered his orders for air bomb
tngs and the march of troops to
be "reprisals" for Polish border incl
dents. This meant that If Britain
and France chose to regard these
"reprisals" as isolated acts, they
could still do so. 1t was Hitler S
method of trying to confine the
war to the German-Polish theater
and make it seem as if France and
Britain were actually Initiating a
general war.
The British and French govern
ments, however, have no choice.
An attack on Poland, whether 1t be
. "reprisal' or an act of retaliation,
is construed by Warsaw as an act of
aggression and now the solemn
pledges of the alliance signed last
week between Britain and Poland
necessarily come into force.
Another Path to Negotiation.
The dispatch of a stop ultl-
matum by the British and French
simultaneously was, from the stand
point of the democracies, necessi-
tated in order to justify their own
beginning of military and naval
action. Hitler could, if he liked,
use the opportunity to begin parleys
of delay, taking the position that
he is still ready to negotiate on the
basis of return of DanZlg and the
Polish Corridor, and on the l6-polnt
program.
The impression here in Wash
ington is that Hitler is still counting
on some circumstances to cause
Britain and France to limit their
operations to the naval blockade in
the Baltic and North Sea areas. The
decision Of Italy to remain "neu-
trail" in the sense of refraining
from joint military or naval action
with Hitler Is regarded here as part
of a plan determined upon long
ago in order to keep the British
feet In the Mediterranean on patrol
and yet not affording any chance
10 attack Italy.
In other words, Italian neutral
Hy" Is expected to be friendly to
Hitler and Is in no sense a turning
toward the democracies. The TACT
that the British need not give as
much concern as they had expected
to operations in the Mediterranean
may assist in making blockade OF
German ports effective in the north
and also may mean search and
seizure Of vessels entering the Med
iterranean at either Suez or Gibral-
tar.
Fleet Can Trouble Germany.
The full extent of British naval
power is scarcely realized until a
war begins. For then real block
ade is on and even shipments des-
tined to social neutral countries in
the Balkans and countries bordering
on Germany are subject to indefinite
delays. Germanys internal econ
omy will feel the full impact OF the
British fleet if Britain is provoked
into general war.
American shipping will find itself
affected by the examinations OF car
goes at sea, and for time American
commerce will suffer. The first six
months OF the 1914 war was, as 1
recall, a serious period of harass-
ment for American commerce by
the British ships, and a depression
of an economic character ensued,
but it was quickly followed by war
boom. The preparations for the war
this time have been long drawn out
and any decline in business will be
ehort-lived.
The most significant business news
of the last "a hours was the voting
hy the British Parliament of a
credit of about s2.250,O0 900. Most
of this will be spent in the Western
Hemisphere, where extensive sur
pluses of food and war materials
are readily to be found. Likewise,
American plant capacity, lying idle
since the depression began and never
used to it's fullest extent, can be
quickly swung into action in manu-
featuring war munitions. America
will profit out of the war situation
again as Is years ago.
Anything Can Be Shipped.
BY the time Congress reconvenes,
the war trade will have doomed so
greatly that any necessary changes
in the neutrality laws will be made.
For the moment, unless the Presi-
dent issues a proclamation finding
a state of war to exist among for
eign states, no embargo is legally
imposed and anything can be
shipped abroad. Though China and
Japan have been at war, no embargo
has been invoked against them.
Hitler has been careful not to
issue a formal declaration of war.
Mr.. Roosevelt may feel that, in view
of the technicalities involved, he will
put the question before Congress
when it reconvenes. If he decides
to take that view, there may be no
hurry about the calling OF a spe-
cial session. Should public opinion
disapprove this course, 1t will mani
fest itself and then a special ses-
sion can be promptly summoned.
The hope here is that somehow
general war may yet be avoided or
be held to short interval, but,
meanwhile, Americas industrial ma
Hh1na