Evening star., 1939-11-05
Eliot
Continued From First Page)

ocean to Great Britain and France
It is further estimated that Amer
lean deliveries of aircraft, provided
transportation is available, can with
out any large increase in plant,
reach total of about, 1000 a month
within the near future. How will
these figures, If correct, affect the
present air situation in Europe?
At the beginning of this war the
air strength of Germany was ap-
proximately 10000 to-12.0 900 first line
planes of which about half were in
operating squadrons and the others
in reserve. The combined British
and French air strength was from
$500 to 10000 planes. with a some
what higher proportion in first line
squadrons. The immediate addition
to the allied strength of $50 high
quality American planes would
therefore, make a considerable pro-
portionate reduction in the present
German numerical superiority.
The Potential Production.
Again, at the beginning of the war.
German production of aircraft wa.
estimated at a potential figure of
1000 to 1900 per month. British
production was from 600 to 300 per
month and French production about
250. 1t was further estimated that
the allies might in time overtake
and even considerably exceed the
German rate, because there would
be open to them sources of raw ma
terials which would be closed to the
Germans, but that for immediate
purposes the Germans could prob
ably maintain their lead. The ad-
dltlon to the allied resources, there
lore, OF an American production of
1000 planes per month might we'll
provide decisive victory and de-
feat in the initial operations, so i'm
portant in air warfare, provided that
this rate of production can be at
tanned promptly and that delivery of
the planes can be assured.
AS to the first, it Is by no means
certain that the various difficulties
in speeding up production can be
promptly overcome and 1t must be
kept in mind that our airplane in
dustry has already on hand very
large orders for our own defense
forces which carry time and penalty
qualities. The possibilities of sabo-
tage must not be forgotten. The
second question, that of transpor-
tation, presents some extremely in
teresting aspects.
Transportation by sea under the
cash-and-carry principle involves
the sending by the allied govern
ments of sufficient shipping to carry
the war material which we sell to
them from American ports to its
destination. No doubt the shipping
will be made available in view Of
the importance to the allies Of
American air reinforcement.
May Be Deutschland's Duty.
But it is equally important to the
Germans to prevent the arrival Of
American airplanes in any quantity
to reinforce Germany's enemies. It
may, therefore, be expected that the
German Navy, with its submarines
and surface raiders, supported by
The German Air Force, will bend every
energy toward checking the flow Of
these air reinforcements across the
Atlantic.
It may we'll be that it was this
particular mission which the Ger
mans had in mind when they sent
out the pocket battleship Deutsch-
land into the North Atlantic; for a
vessel Of her formidable qualities
she has 50 far accomplished very
little, as far as we are informed and
it may be that she is being reserved
for what the Germans may well con-
slider the bigger game Of airplane
shipments. The Germans are be-
ieved to possess a certain number
Of long range planes especially de-
signed for attack on merchant ship |
ping and these, too, may be en-
ployed against airplane cargoes.
Both from the material and the
psychological point Of view it is we'll |
worth Germany's while to make |
every effort to stop the traffic, and,
especially from the later viewpoint,
to score some early and spectacular
success against - atrplans-csrryins |