Evening star., 1939-12-03
By MAI. GEORGE FIELDING
ELIOT.


not long endure privation. There Is
perhaps a further thought that the
very dynamics of the Nazi regime
itself or perhaps considerations OF
military necessity, will impel the
Germans to waste their substance IN
great offensives of their own, which.
being repulsed with severe losses,
will lead the way to allied counter
attacks under favorable auspices.
This belief in the essential value
of the defensive as the proper
strategy for Great Britain has oc-
cupied the foreground of British
military thought for years, and been
the subject of heated discussion,
pro and con, in British service jour-
nails as we'll as in the secular press.
The high priest Of the cult OF the
defensive is undoubtedly the distin-
guished British military writer,
Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, whose
views are known to have great
weight with the Secretary Of State
for War, Mr.. Leslie Hore-Belisha.
The publication of Capt. Harris book,
THE Defense of Britain" on the
very eve of the outbreak Of the pres
ent var is believed to have been fol-
lowed by the submission OF memo
randum by Capt. Hart containing
further exposition of his views which
has notably influenced it is reported,
the policy of the war cabinet.
Defeat of Nazis Only Goal.
The military objectives sought by
government at war must, OF course,
be in consonance with the political
objectives of the war itself. 1t has
been repeatedly stated by British
leaders that the British political
objective in this war is the destruc-
ton of Nazi-ism The Prime Minis
ter in mis- recent radio address reaf-
firmed this objective and pointed out
that the British government did not
desire the defeat of the German
people, nor even of the German
armed forces, but only the defeat OF
the present Nazi leadership Of Ger
many.
In view of the tendencies and
anXieties known to exist IN the
minds of many persons influential IN
British political and financial cir
cles, it is impossible to escape from
the idea that the Prime Minister'S
statement has reference to a hope
that peace can be reconstructed in
Western Europe on the basis Of the
old four-power theory of collabora-
ton among Great Britain, France,
Germany and Italy, with the object
not only of stabilizing the political
and military situation in the west
and, incidentally, of restoring finan-
cial and commercial markets for
British enterprise-but also Of form
ing a common front against the ad-
vance of Communism. How far
Russian attack on Finland will tend
to accentuate these tendencies and
anxieties, In Berlin as well as IN
London, is therefore an interesting
subject for present speculation.
But in the meanwhile the war pro-
ceeds, and there is no immediate in
dication that the Russian moves in
the Baltic have caused disquiet
among the present rulers OF Ger
many. There appears to be no doubt
in their minds that they desire very
ardently the defeat of the armed
forces of Great Britain; and If they
have not as yet undertaken attacks
against these forces by land, the
same cannot be said of their pro-
ceedings at sea.
Conceptions of 1914 Adhered To.
The defensive attitude of the Brit
ish government. has been trans
lated, apparently, into the directive
given to its commanders by sea as
well as by land. Indeed, it is quite
clear that the British sea forces are
beginning this war under very much
the same basic conceptions as the
last. It will be recalled that British
naval doctrine was set forth in Lord
Je1licoe's famous letter of October
30, 1914. which received the ap-
proval of the admiralty. This indi-
Gated the commander in chiefs in
tention to avoid a fleet action ex-
cept in the northern part of the
North Sea, close to British and dis
tant from German bases; and to
avoid closing in upon the German
fleet in battle for fear of damage to
British capital ships by mines and
torpedoes.
This tactical idea grew directly
from the strategical theory that the
British required only to contain the
German fleet within circumscribed
area in order to command the sea
routes of the world, and that, there
fore, it was idle to take risks with
the force upon which the whole
allied command Of sea communica-
tions rested. But it took into ac-
count the conditioning factor, not
heretofore present in British naval
considerations, of the existence of
weapons which could destroy or seri-
ously injure ships of the line, other
than the weapons possessed by op-
posing ships of the line.
In fact, close blockade of enemy
ports. such as had been practiced
during the Napoleonic wars. was
becoming increasingly difficult, if
not impossible. The last example
of such a blockade was that of the
American fleet at Santiago in 1898.
Six years later, in the Russo-Jap-
anese War, the japanese sustained
severe losses from mines in attempt
Ing a close blockade of Port Arthur,
and were compelled to withdraw
their main forces to the Elliott Is
lands so miles away. The develop
ment of mine, torpedo and sub
marine warfare within the ensuing
10 years forced an increase in this
distance in the World War to the
500 miles intervening between
Scapa Flow and Wilhelmshaven.
Indeed, at one period early in the
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