Evening star., 1939-04-09

| IT Germany were to accomplish either
or both purposes she would be practically
beyond blockade in case Of war. BY the
seizure of Austria she came almost with
in striking distance of Trieste, at the
head of the Adriatic, and in fact obtain
ed certain shipping privileges there. But
much more effective would be possession
of part of the Dalmatian coast, which
belongs to Yugoslavia. Germany would
| be Mediterranean as well as Baltic
| and North Sea power
So-called mosaic" states like Yugo-
slavia have a centrifugal force which
tends to tear them apart-as was shown
in the case of Czecho-S -Slovakia. But If
that force existed between friendly
Czechs and Slovaks, how much greater
must it be in the case of Yugoslavia,
where the Croats are in constant clamor
against the ruling Serbs?
The Croat issue is ready-made for
| Hitlers Intervention. Here is people OF
several millions almost completely domi-
mated by their cousins, whose regal
dynasty holds sway over three national
groups-Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
Separatist sentiment already exists
among the Croats, although repudiated
by DR.. Vladko Machek, the Croat leader.
There are also about half million Ger
mans in this northwestern extremity OF
Yugoslavia who could easily be turned
into another Sudetenland.
Hitler does not need to press for Trieste
as an outlet on the Adriatic when he has
much more ready route through Yugo-
Slavia
Picture Facing Mussolini.
This is the picture that stares Musso-
lini in the face:
An expanding Germany driving toward
the Dardanelles and an outlet into the
Mediterranean with all its implications
for italian dominance in the landlocked
sea-
Germany has driven to within few
hundred miles of the tip Of the Adratic
by the seizure of Austria; she has de-
stroyed Czecho- -Slovakia, replacing 1t
with her own protectorates reaching
out toward Rumania, with which she has
commercial treaty giving her virtual
economic monopoly as well as assur-
ance of a commercial outlet in the
Black Sea; she has Hungary spellbound
and is bidding desperately for Yugo-
Gernanys success would mean death to
Italian influence in Southeastern Eu-
rope. Italy would shrink into insignif-
canoe before such a colossal politico-
economic combination.
At this stage of the game Mussolinis
occupation of Albania is a clearly spoken
warning that Italy has yet to be reckoned
with in that part of Europe, warning
not only to the little powers themselves,
but to Germany as well. It means that
Italy is pressing Germanys eastward
expansion to keep north of Yugoslavia
and Greece, it means that Italy Is set
ting boundary line south of which Ger
many will meet Italian resistance.
1t would be presumptuous to assume
that Mussolini has deserted the axis or
is now in open opposition to Germany's
aims. There is no reason to believe
that is true-yet. But there is plenty of
reason to believe that Mussolini may be
dissatisfied with the course events have
followed in Central Europe, and is killing
two birds with one stone now rather than
have one of the birds escape later.
Duce's Response Weak.
II Duce did not respond like a good
axis member when Hitler took Bohemia
and Moravia. It was some days after
the event before the Fascist Grand Coun-
Gil sent message of congratulatton, and
Mussolini himself has not yet given his
personal blessing to the new German
empire.
In his one big speech since that time
he referred to the events in Central
Europe, but not as victory for the axis
in which he shared credit, but as the
consummation of fate. He spoke of the
premature and somewhat dishonorable"
end of Czecho- -Slovakia, and paid obei-
sance to the axis only as a meeting
ground of two revolutions. That was its
strength and condition of existence"
he said.
But no congratulations, no praise of
the united power of the axis, no threats
of what the axis will do in the future.
Also no hint of what was to come last
week in Albania, in contradiction to the
usual propaganda technique. In fact,
Italys march into Albania was not the
axis marching, but Italy herself seeking
to ward off democratic Establishments on
Yugoslavia because Hitler may still be
useful, perhaps seeking to turn the
Reichs eastward drive toward the north,
and establishing herself in position to
, protect the Dardanelles from control by
any Mediterranean inclined Northern
power.
At the same time she fulfilled the
promises made to her by Great Britain
and France in the secret treaty of Lon
don which lured Italy into the war
against the central powers.
That treaty had specified that one of
the conditions for Italian entrance into
the war was partitioning of Albania,
the northern and southern districts 60
ing to Montenegro, Serbia and Greece,
while the central portion was to be an
autonomous neutralized state, virtual
Italian protectorate, with Rome con-
trolling its foreign relations. The pur-
pose of thus destroying the little republic
was to guarantee Italy against strong
hostile power on the Adriatic.
August 2, 1920, italy concluded a
treaty with Albania assuring its inde-
| pendence and the following December