Montana labor news., 1939-10-12
SWEDISH IRON ORE
CAUSE WAR THREAT
Hitler Wants Control of Baltic
Seaway to Iron Mines.

SeaWay 10 iron MlneS.
The rich iron ores Of Sweden and
Norway are one of Hitler's objec-
tives in the present war. Control of
the Baltic seaway and repossession of
the port of Danzig and the strip of
Poland called the Polish Corridor
would open the necessary trade
route to the unhampered delivery
of the iron necessary to Germany's
industrial rearmament activities. In
commenting on this situation Bar
Irons Financial Weekly has the fol
lowing to say:
The Free City Of Danzig and the
Polish Corridor are not isolated
problems when examined from the
angle of the Baltic question. And
the Baltic question underneath its
perplexing political aspects, is pri-
marily a problem which can be
stated in terms Of iron ore and steel.
In 1914, Germany directed her
opening thrust against France to-
wards the Briey basin. The occu-
patton of this area assured Germany
of her principal source of iron ore.
No other single strategic success did
more to enable Germany to wage
'long" war. Four and one-half
years of pounding cracked at last
her armor of steel. 1t is not the
least striking paradox of the Great
War that a large part of the ore
which went into German guns was
French
The Treaty of Versailles deprived
Germany of her high-grade ore de-
posits in Lorraine. Since then
France built her Maginot line to
meet a German surprise attack. Be
tween Germany and the mines Of
Briey formidable Notifications pre-
vent the repetition of the German
maneuver of 1914.
Ore Output Less Than Third.
In 1888 greater Germany produced
approximately 1O,5OO,OOO tons of iron
ore. This figure includes the esti-
mated total of approximately 2,000,-
600 tons obtained by the absorption
of Austria. Germany's ore imports
for 1888 ran well ahead of those
for 1887, reaching a record peak Of
nearly 100000 tons and were more
than twice as large as Germany's
total domestic production.
Sweden and France provide near
ly three-quarters of Germany's i'm
ports of foreign iron ore. For the
period January September, 1888,
Sweden had shipped 100000 tons
and France 100000 tons of ore to
German furnaces, their joint total
contribution to German imports be-
ing estimated at over 100000 tons
for the year.
From the German point of view
the trouble with French ore resides
less in its quality and price than in
its political unreliability. Sweden's
record of steadfast neutrality gives
the Swedish ore a quality denied
to the French product. Untainted
by politics, Swedish imports COM
mand the preference of German
steel producers. Furthermore, Swed-
ish ore runs to high grades. Twenty
five per cent of Germany's output
represents poor ores requiring extra
blast furnace capacity. French ship
ments are qualitatively uneven.
Baltic shipping provides the sole
practical means of transportation
for Swedish ore imports to Germany
1t is estimated that some 5000 ship
loads are required annually to carry
Swedish ore to German ports. In
times of war, complete control Of
the Baltic is required to insure the
continuation of this trade. Only
absolute domination of the Baltic
extending to those shores which
; stand in danger Of falling into un-
neutral hands, can allay Germany's
fears that her life line to Sweden
will not be tampered with.
To rule the Baltic, Germany must
have control of more than Danzig
Gdynia, the Polish port and naval
base, 10 miles from Danzig, would
have to share the fate of Memel; the
; Latvian port of Riga and the Esto.
nian port of Tallinn would have tC
, grant exclusive anchorage to Ger.
; man naval vessels before the Baltic
: could become a truly German sea-
The Wallace Miner.