Evening star., 1939-06-18
y. ORGANIZES AGAINST ESPIONAGE OF FOREIGN POWERS
F. B. |. Named to Direct Campaign to Guard
Military and Naval Secrets Aided
by Intelligence Groups

tion more accurate and reliable
than those of the regularly consti-
! tuted authorities. While Pouches
spies saved Napoleon from scores of
plots they enabled their master to
survive two abdications and die
wealthy man several years after the
Little Corporal had been laid in his
grave.
During the World War, military
intelligence in all its phases, from
spying and sabotage to propaganda,
reached new heights of efficiency
and played decisive part in the
outcome entirely aside from its role
on the battlefield, where it was
primarily concerned with troop
movements and military offensives.
The United States had become a
mecca for spies. saboteurs and
propagandists long before our entry
in the war, and their presence was
a constant danger up to the armi-
stice.
AS the United States undertakes
huge program to bring its Army
and Navy to state of modern pre-
paredneSs. however, it faces the task
OF maintaining secrecy and counter
ing the efforts of foreign spies in
far different atmosphere than per-
vades the European scene and with
out the extraordinary powers Gus
tomary in a national emergency.
With controlled press and radio
and a totalitarian parliamentary
system Hitler was able to carry on
tremendous rearmament program
III secret over period of years. EX-
penditures and demands for person.
mel or armament projects took prece-
dence over all else. In carrying out
our new program such measures are
simply beyond the realm of con-
temptation. Without the national
ization of practically all industry.
conscription of capital, management
and labor, censorship of the press
and elimination of debate in Con-
gress, secrecy on the present Ger
man model is out of the question.
The new preparedness program must
be carried out without too much re-
stricting the every day life of the
Nation.
Price Of Secrecy.
Absolute secrecy In purely mill
tary matters is not too difficult but
may prove two-edged sword. If
plans for some revolutionary weapon
are locked up securely to keep them
from the enemy, they are kept also
from our own troops, who must learn
to handle the new weapon before it
can be used effectively. Several
such instances are on record in mod
ern history. Immediately preceding
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870
the French troops were issued a new
type of field piece, known as the
mitrailleuse, designed under the per-
sonal orders and with funds from
the private purse Of Emperor Ma
poleOn III in a. private arsenal. So
successful had been the efforts at
secrecy that not only the Prussian
Army, but the French Army knew
nothing about it, with the excep-
tion of few artillery officers. At
the outbreak of hostilities the new
weapon was taken into the field by
officers and men, less than 10 per
cent of whom had ever seen them
Sire a round of live cartridges. They
were never employed in the man
ner in which their designer intend
ed and, although they proved ef-
fective on occasions, were a disap-
pointment to the hopes of the EN-
peror.
During the World War, two mod
ern adaptations Of ancient weapons