Evening star., 1939-12-10

OVCII du-lll Illc Iu1lltdTy SclSc-t1lc
Baltic states. recaptured the old
Russian naval bases of Moon Sound
and Libau, and launched her often
sive against Finland.
Two reasons have been ascribed
for this German inaction: Inability
to interfere while her hands were
tied in the west, and prior agree
ment with Russia dividing the Baltic
(some say also the Balkans) into
Russian and German spheres of in
fluence. The latter theory seems
to have some support from later de-
velopments, notably the repeated
threats to Sweden in the controlled
German press. That Sweden is both
outraged and anxious Is quite clear;
but she has not moved, and it seems
likely that 1t is fear of Germany
which holds her in check.
Firms Making Fine Stand.
For example, the Firms are max
ing a fine stand on the Karelian
Isthmus, where they have only a
narrow front to defend, with its
f1anks resting on Lake Ladoga and
the Gulf of Finland. Reports that
the Russian feet is trying to cover
a landing of troops on the shore of
the gulf behind the Finnish right
indicate where the weak point Of
this position is. The Intervention
Of the Swedish feet would probably
make such Russian operations i'm
possible, as we'll as further Russian
attempts. save by air, on the fort
ress of Hanko.
More important still, against
Swedish opposition the Russians
could not, in all probability, main
tain their announced blockade Of
Finland, which, If made good, will
cut off Finnish supplies from the
rest of Scandinavia, and from the
world beyond, except for such air
planes as may be flown in. Since
Sweden is the chief source, or at
least the chief forwarding point Of
such supplies, the blockade may
very well bring about a clash be-
tween Russian and Swedish war
ships-in the present state of Swed-
ish public opinion-unless the Swed-
ish government is firmly resolved
not to permit the occurrence OF
such a thing-for fear of Germany,
whose navy Sweden could not hope
to oppose successfully.
The reports that have been cur
rent of the nature of the Russo
German Baltic pact" assign Fin
land and the Baltic states as Rus
sian spheres of influence" and give
Sweden and Denmark to Germany.
Add to these the rumors that Rus
sia desires concessions" in North
ern Norway, and the picture be-
comes even more sinister from the
allied viewpoint.
Norwegian Ports Important.
It is crystal clear, that Great
Britain In particular cannot permit
Germany or Russia to obtain pos
session Of Norwegian ports on the
open Atlantic. Such ports, which
could be supplied by rail with oil,
torpedoes, stores and spare parts,
and at which plants could be
erected, could become most for
midable submarine bases, as well, OF
course, as bases for surface raiders.
The Norwegian shipbuilding indus
try would afford the basis for the
! development of such works.
Most of the Norwegian harbors
are - geographically. and hydro
graphically-well adapted for de-
fense against attack from seaward.
The emplacement of the German
fleet, especially of its submarine flo
tillas, in series of Norwegian bases
would confront Great Britain with
a blockading problem all but in
soluble with the forces available and
would permit the present rather
tentative German attacks on British
sea communications to be developed
to a really menacing, if not decisive,
degree.
It is, therefore, an absolute neces-
sity to Britain that the attack on
Scandinavia should be beaten back.
It is not a question of whether 1t
must be stopped. It is only q ques-
ton, as Walter Lippmann points
out with such clarity and force in
his article yesterday, Of where 1t
must be stopped.
If it can be stopped in Finland
by pouring airplanes, supplies and
munitions, backed by volunteers,
such as the Swedish legion already
there, and the Italian aviators re-
ported to be flying for Finland in
Fridays dispatches, this will prob
ably be the best place to do the Job.
But if this is to be done the Russian
blockade must be broken, and the
only force in the Baltic available to
do this work, and capable Of doing
1t, is the Swedish Navy, which can
not hope for success unless 1t has
only the Russians, and not the Rus
slams plus the Germans, to deal with.
Any attempt by Britain to pene-
trate the Baltic with British naval
forces involves the cooperation of
both Sweden and Denmark, and
would be almost certain to bring
about German land attack on
Denmark in order to close the DAN
ish sounds. In any case, the main
ship channel from the Kattegat into
the Baltic is commanded by Ger
man heavy artillery.
Danish Defense Difficult.
To attempt to throw Allied forces
into Denmark to defend her would
be all but impossible, since the troop
convoys-so vulnerable to all sorts
of attack-must come within easy
range of German light surface
forces, submarines and aircraft.
The defense of the Scandinavian
Peninsula by similar means is some
what easier. The line of communi> =
cations from Scottish ports to
Bergen and Stavanger is farther
removed from the German bases.
It is, even so, not an easy line to
IL e.