Evening star., 1939-01-22
Fortificution Of Guam
Held Key to U.S.. Policy
BIZ OUen L. Scott.


crate effort, become an unassailable
fortress defensively.
Two wide oceans and friendly or weak
neighbors on this Nations borders great
ly simplify the problem of defense in a
world overrun with aggressors.
Buff the United States intends
again to try to save the rest of the
world against aggressors, the whole
problem of both the military men and
of the Congressman becomes something
else again. Here would be task that
might dwarf the World War task, in
volving fights thousands of miles from
home on two fronts-one in Europe, an
other in Asia.
There is every sign that President
Roosevelts new national defense pro-
gram is shaped almost wholly from the
point of view of hemisphere defense and
not from the point of view of large
scale operations over the seas.
At only one point as the military
experts see it, does the outline of de-
tense plans, supplemented by Navy
Board report on naval bases, depart
from strictly defensive strategy.
This departure lies in the Nays rec
ommendation for Notifications and a
base on the Island of Guam, lying near
ly 1000 miles west of Hawaii and barely
1,4O0 miles from the Japanese main
land. Guam is situated in the heart of
the Japanese -mandated Pacific islands
and is a spearhead aimed at a vital
point in her defensive position.
Two purposes could lie back of the
the Nays request for new major forti-
fed base in Asiatic waters.
One purpose can be to fortify Guam
as part of determination to defend
the Philippines in the event OF Japanese
aggression. AS the law now stands,
those islands are to sever all ties with
the United States in 1946. The assump-
ton has been that the United States
intended to get out of that venture
rather than to assume the risk of an
Immensely expensive and highly diff
cult war to defend the Philippines for
the Filipinos. Army opinion-and the
Army must defend naval bases-has
been that defense was not practical. It
may be, however, that Congress will
want to accept responsibility for at
tempting to block Japanese expansion
SouthWard and that this is very favor
able moment to fortify Guam as part of
that purpose
A second and less dangerous purpose
can be merely to make what now is
regarded as an impregnable defense in
the Pacific doubly impregnable. With
Guam fortified, any enemy heading east
IRON Asia would be forced to reduce
that fortification before proceeding to
the task of reducing the worlds strong
est tortress-Hawaii. Also, the NAVY
may feel that, in view of events in
Britain, the British base at Singapore
might not be available to this country in
the event of trouble.
Whatever the purpose, the request for
fortified base at Guam may be the
most fateful suggestion in the Presi-
dents entire defense program.
II that program is strictly defensive
IN purpose, then expert opinion is that
the people of this country can feel al
most perfectly secure against important
attack by utilizing the forces and the re-
sources that will be available. If how
ever, adventures are in mind out in the
Pacific, that is something else again.
Ihe feeling of security in defense is
possible because of the strength of the
American Navy. The Navy is regarded
To-Day as the peer of any in the world
and much stronger in fighting power
than the Navy of any probable enemy
or combination of enemies.
So long as the American NAVY is M
defeated, the United States, as the mill
tary strategists see it, has nothing to
fear other than a possible isolated
attack from the air or a possible subma-
rlne attack on American shipping. At
present there is no feet, other than the
British, which could challenge the
American feet with even the remotest
chance of success.
The greatest public concern, as re-
Hected by members of Congress, is over
the chance that an aggressor nation
might subject the United States to q
devastating air attack. This concern
leads to a demand that this country
build the most powerful air fleet in the
world.
Actually, the air defense problem at
the moment, as outlined by military ex-
perts, is not particularly difficult from
the point of view of the United States.
In the first place, the two oceans still
provide effective barriers to most air
attacks so long as potential enemies lack
bases within striking distance Planes
are not yet built that could fly across
the Atlantic, much less the Pacific, car
rying full bomb loads, if those planes
expected to return. In the next place,
no navy possesses a plane-carrying ca
pacity as large as 500 planes, and any
navy seeking to launch those planes
against this country would first have to
deal with the American Navy, possessed
Of the strongest air fleet of any.
If there is danger of an air threat to
the United States, that danger is said
by informed authorities to lie in the
fact that an enemy power might obtain
access to a base both for aircraft and