Evening star., 1939-04-28
Hitler Denies Any Wake Aims in Reply to Presidents Propose

of more just treatment Of national
minorities.
/ for my part, was, at any rate,
prepared to attempt this kind of
peaceful development with patience
and, if need be, in a process lasting
some years. However, it was exactly
this peaceful solution which was
thorn in flesh of agitators in the
democracies.
They hate us Germans and would
prefer to eradicate us completely.
What do the Czechs mean to them?
They are nothing but a means to an
end. And what do they care for the
fate of a small and valiant nation,
why should they worry about the
lives OF hundreds of thousands of
brave soldiers who would have been
sacrificed for their policy?
Two Alternatives.
These Western European peace
mongers were not concerned to work
for peace but to cause bloodshed so
as, IN this way, to set nations against
one another and thus cause still
more blood to flow. For this reason
they invented the story of German
mobilization and humbugged Prague
public opinion with it. 1t was in
tended to provide an excuse for
Czech mobilization. And then, by
this means, they hoped to be able to
exert the desired military pressure on
elections in Sudeten Germany which
could no longer be avoided.
According to their view there re-
mained only two alternatives for
Germany: Either to accept this
Czech mobilization and with it a
disgraceful blow to her prestige or
settling of accounts with Czecho-
Slovakia, bloody war, and thus,
perhaps, the possibility of mobiliz-
ing the nations of Western Europe
who had no interest in these mat
tiers. thereby involving them in in
evltable bloodlust SO as to immerse
humanity in new catastrophe in
which some would have the honor
OF losing their lives and others the
pleasure of making war profits.
Decisions Of Last Fall.
You are acquainted. gentlemen,
with decisions made at the time:
l. Solution of this question and,
what is more, by October 10, 1898,
at the latest.
2. Preparations of this solution
with all means necessary to leave no
doubt that any attempt at interven-
ton would be met by the united
force of the whole nation.
1t was at this juncture that I
decreed and ordered construction of
the western Notifications. September
25, 1888, they were already in such
condition that their power of re-
sistance was 80 to 40 times as great
as that of the old Siegfried line in
the Great War. They have now
been practically completed and are
at the present moment being en-
larged by new lines outside Aachen
and Saarbrucken which 1 ordered
later. These. too, are very largely
ready for defense. In view of the
condition of these greatest fortifica-
tions ever constructed. the German
nation may feel perfectly assured
that no power in this world will ever
succeed in ever breaking through
this front.
When the first provocative at
tempt at utilizing Czech mobiliZa-
ton had failed to lead to the de-
sired result there then set in Sec
ond phase in which the tendency
of this affair. which really concerned
Central Europe alone, became all
the more obvious.
No Need for Munich.
If the cry of Never another
Munich" is raised in the world to-
day this simply confirms the fact
that peaceful solution of the
problem appeared to be the most
fatal thing that ever happened in
the eyes of those war-mongers
They are sorry no blood was shed
not their blood, of course-for these
agitators are, of course, never to be
found where shots are being fired
but only where money is being
made! No. it is the blood of name
less soldiers.
Moreover. there would have been
no necessity for the Munich con-
ference, for that conference was
| only made possible by the fact that
countries which had at first melted
those concerned to resist at all costs,
later on. when the situation pressed
for solution in one way or another,
were compelled to try and secure
for themselves more or less re-
spectacle retreat: for without Mu-
nich-that is to say. without the in
terference OF the countries of West
ern Europe-a solution of the entire
problem-if it had even grown So
acute-would very likely have been
the easiest thing in the world.
Results of Munich.
The decision of Munich led to the
following result:
l. The return of the most essential
parts of German border settlements
in Bohemia and Moravia to the
Reich.
2. The keeping open of the pos
sibility of solution of other prob
lems of that state; that is. the re-
turn or separation of existing Hun
garian and Slovak minorities.
3. There still remained the ques-
ton of guarantees. AS far as Ger
many and Italy were concerned q
guarantee of this state had, from
the first, been made dependent upon
the consent of all interested parties
bordering on Czecho-S -Slovakia, that
is to say, the guarantee was coupled
with actual solution of problems
concerning the parties mentioned
which were still unsolved.
The following problems were still