Evening star., 1939-04-30

It is true that when, in the early
years of this century, Germany
challenged England's supremacy on
the sea, Mahan considered that
Americas interests would be best
served by maintenance of England's S
naval superiority. His reason for
this, however, was that England was
not a military nation and that Ger
many was. Germany, in addition to
her growing navy, had the largest
army in the world. There was, then.
considerably more than sentiment
In Mahan's belief that the United
States had little to fear while Bri-
tannia ruled the waves, and a great
deal to fear If she ceased to do so.
His arguments were based on the
times in which they were made, and
there seems small point in reviving
them, but the isolationists, none the
less, are doing so.
The great point of Mahan's work,
indeed, would seem to have been Its
timeliness. It came at about the END
of our possible continental expan-
sion. We had reached the Pacific
and had fixed our northern and
southern boundaries. While we had
been proclaiming ourselves anti-ex-
pansionist in the international sense.
we had certainly been expanding IN
actuality much more widely than
any European nation at the time.
But our territory was at last filled
up, though our energy was just as
great. Mahan wrote In favor OF
strong sea power as the best means
of keeping national well-being high.
Had we been far from the satura-
ton point in filling up our own ter
ritory. it seems questionable, at least,
as to whether his words would have
affected our national policy so pro-
foundly. They fell upon the blaz-
ing brain of Theodore Roosevelt,
however, and fitted in perfectly with
his expansionist ambitions. A wave
of idealism and hysteria sent us into
the Spanish American War as
crusade to free Cuba from an op-
pressive overiord. That was enough.
The expansionists who held Roose-
velt's views as to the desirability OF
our continued growth changed the
war aim to include the annexation
of the Philippines-and Mahan was
their Bible.
Called "Incendiary."
He was called by his critics in
cendiary," and certainly he provided
a bright torch to be held up by those
pioneer imperialists. His books, none
the less, were written in spirit OF
exact research and when he implied
that naval policy should determine
foreign policy. instead of foreign
policy naval, he drew his statement
from the history of the worlds most
successful nations. He began his
work In spirit of scholarly research,
feeling that sea power was a tre-
mendous historical influence which
had never been analyzed or re-
corded. If, during Roosevelt's ad-
ministrations, he was called upon to
justify a policy of naval expansion,
that was more or less an accident OF
the times. Notwithstanding, his in
fuence was profound. All this the
present biography brings out.
BY the student of the present
naval question, Capt. Puleston's
book could well be read along with
that of the Sprouts, listed above.
The latter work makes repeated ref
erences to Mahan's influence and
devotes no less than three chapters
to interpreting his theories. 1t
agrees with Capt Puleston's view as
to the correctness with which Ma
han gauged the part played In his
tory by naval supremacy and gives
a close study of the manner In which
his work affected our naval policy
during his lifetime 1t sees Mahan,
Roosevelt and Lodge and a classic
triumvirate of naval expansionists-
Mahan supplying the theory Roose-
veft the executive backing and Lodge
the congressional leadership. Ac-
cordins to these authors our modern