Evening star., 1939-07-23

the Prime Minister'S replies, the nego-
tiators are in less-agreeing least in
less agreeable-mood than when they
started This is all the more inexpli
cable because, according to the papers.
agreement was reached weeks ago on all
the most important points and the
delays are due to unimportant points of
Interpretation and application.
So much time has already elapsed
since the negotiations started that one
is apt to forget they were initiated by
us for the definite purpose of seeking
assistance in the difficulties created by
our commitments.
The talks arose out of our headlong
guarantee to Poland. Rumania and
Greece last April The Prime Minister,
without any previous consultation with
our own general staffs or with the Com
mittee of Imperial Defense, undertook
to protect these European countries
against any attack by Germany. How
he could implement his guarantee was
question he never put to any one who
knew anything about military conditions
He did not even put it to himself, and
If he had he clearly knew nothing OF the
geographical, let alone the strategic, con-
ditions.
A schoolchild's atlas would have
showed him that If the Germans
marched into Danzig or the Polish Cor
ridor, neither we nor France could throw
in a single battalion to the aid OF Poland
until we had first overcome every Ger
man fortress and marched our armies
across Germany from the Rhine practi-
cally to the Vistula.
Our navy could not have helped us.
In the Great War we could not even
effect landing at any point on the
German coast-not even on the Belgian
coast. Nor were we able to get our ships
into the Baltic.
MIR. Chamberlain's Pledge.
But these considerations were absent
from the Prime Minister'S mind. He had
to deal with a public opinion so out
ragged at the invasion and conquest of
Czecho- -Slovakia, despite positive pledges
to the contrary given by the Fuehrer to
the French and ourselves, that Mr..
Chamberlain felt that something must
be done to impress the shocked British
people He could not carry out the
definite pledge he gave so hastily at
Munich to guarantee the shrunken from
tiers of Czecho-Slovakia.
Even II he meant that Undertaking at
the time, he probably thought it would
never be called into requisition. Hitler
having fooled him, he felt he must do
something to recover his lost prestige, so
he rushed into the first rash and silly
enterprise that entered into his unin-
formed mind He guaranteed Poland,
Rumania and Greece against the huge
enemy of Germany.
It looked magnificent, but men who
had some knowledge of the problems
pointed out to him that it was not war.
I was the first to call attention to that
obvious fact in the House of Commons.
I denounced it as sheer madness to give
such pledge in the absence of military
support from Russia. Russian troops
alone could hope to reach the battlefield
In time to save the Polish Army from
being crushed by overwhelming German
superiority In men, and especially in
equipment.
Britain's Weakness.
The chief of our general staff was alb
sent in France when this harebrained
pledge was given. I have good reason to
believe that on his return he and his ad-
visers pointed out that we did not pos
sess the means to redeem it.
In despair the government decided to
approach Russia for her powerful CO.
operation. She has an army of we'll
trained men twice, if not thrice. as nu
merous as that of Germany. They have
had longer training for their men and,
what is more important, their officers,
than the Germans have been able to give
theirs. The equipment of the Russian
Army is incomparably better than it was
in 1914, when the badly equipped armies
of the Gar even then held up the superb
German legions nearly three years whilst
we were building up our great new army
to supply the gap caused by the Russian
collapse.
At last it penetrated the Prime Minis
ter's stubborn mind that a military al
lance with Russia was his only chance
of escape out of the crevasse into which
- he had, in moment of panic, jumped
So, on April 15 the British government
approached the Soviet government with
the request that they make unilateral
declaration guaranteeing the three
states, Poland, Rumania and Greece. 1t
is worth while to note the dates of the
respective replies of the two governments
In these prolonged negotiations.
Two days after receipt of the British
note the Soviet government presented
an eight-point reply, including, among
other things, triple defensive alliance
of France, Britain and Russia and a
guaranteeing of all states situated be-
tween the Baltic and the Black Sea
against the menace of aggression. After
two days consideration of the British
proposal, Russia accepted the principle
of a military alliance against the menace
Of German aggression in Central and
Southeastern Europe.
Dilatory Tactics.
For three weeks no reply was sent by
our government to this proposal. Then
reply was forwarded which was prac-
tically a reiteration of the first British
note, with only slight notifications. The
Soviet government replied within four
days of receipt of this further British
l.