Evening star., 1939-12-24

detachments, operating, respectively
the Arctic Ocean and at Kontalahti
and KEN on the White Sea. The
nrst column was directed primarily
against Petsamo. then via salmijarvi
and Ivalo toward the port Of Kemi
on the Gulf of Bothnia; the second
was to move via Kuolajarvi and
Salla upon KemijarW, q railhead
town, and thence toward Rovaniemi,
where 1t might hope to join forces
with the first. The third drive was
to 60 via Suomussalmi toward Ulea-
borg on the Gulf Of Bothnia.
But from the 1irst, the supplies
must have been limited. Murmansk
itself has no resources, only those
which can be brought there by sea
or rail; Kontalahti and KEN are
dependent on the railway alone as
soon as ice has closed the White
Sea, which also prevents Murmansk
being supplied via Arkhangelsk.
Thus the total number of troops
which could be used in these three
drives was not large-probably not
more than six divisions all told,
with perhaps a few reserves. Each
column had to attack on q very
narrow front; there was no possi-
bility Of wide developments by a
small force dependent on a single
road q bad road In the case of the
last two columns). The deeper the
Russians advanced into Finnish
territory, the more exposed and ex-
tended became their slender line
Of communications, the more troops
they had to detach to guard it. For
ward Of their base. only a fixed
number of troops could be supplied,
whether these were in the main
push or guarding the line Of COM
munications.
Communications Left Weak.
It has been suggested that the
various columns were working on
timetable orders with instructions
to push on at all costs to reach the
Gulf Of Bothnia by fixed dates. At
any rate. the choice which each
column commander was forced to
make between guards for his COM
munications and increased force in
the advance seems to have been re-
solved In favor Of the latter, leaving
the communications fatally weak
and upon these the Films fell, first
at Suomussalmi, checking the SOUTH
ermost Russian column, now at Salla
in the center. The northernmost
column, being the closest to Muir
mansk and the ships, had the most
success, but here also the Finnish
communications were better, and
the Firms appear to have stopped
this one by direct counterattack
after the Russians had outrun their
supplies.
The result, from information now
available, appears to be little If any,
thing short Of a complete disaster to
the whole Russian northern CAM
paign. The Murmansk troops are
reported pouring back across the
frontier in full disorderly rout;
there Is an ou1tnous silence from the
other two columns after the Firms
announced themselves as astride the
Russian communications.
The Firms have great advantages,
Of course. They are operating on
interior lines, with highly trained
well equipped, exceptionally mobile
forces (mobile In the cross country
sense, considering terrain and
weather, as against the road-tied
Russian columns: they are well &C.
Quainted with the country; they are
fired with a bitter determination tt
protect their homes; and they ap.
pear to be exceptionally we'll com.
manded. which Is more than one
can say for the Russians, unless one
is to assume the assignment of an
impossible task to the army by the
political chiefs Of the Soviet gov.
ernment and insistence on its exc.
cution under conditions almost sure
to lead to disaster. British or Amer.
lean generals under these conditions
sometimes can argue or even refuse
to lead their men to destruction; the
inadvisability Of arguing with party
chieftains has, however, been pretty
well impressed on Red general.
these past few years.
But perhaps the most remarkable
feature Of this remarkable war /.
the continued activity of the Finnish
air force, which, according to nu-
merical standards and on the Polish