Evening star., 1939-09-10

saved Paris in 1914 and up to the last
year of the war-even after the treaty
of Brest-Litovsk in the early spring of
1918-Russia forced the Germans to keep
not far from a million men on her
Eastern front.
1t might we'll have been disastrous to
the allied cause if Russia had been COM
pletely eliminated from the conflict in
1917. BY 1918, Americans were pouring
in on our side.
One must not conceal from ourselves
the enormous difference it would have
made to our chances if at this hour the
appreciably facilitating the advance OF
her armies in Poland. were confronted
by an equally powerful fleet of Russia
and if two powerful Russian Armies were
advancing. one upon East Prussia and
the other toward Krakow.
This was the plan placed before our
military missions by Voroshiloff. The
tragic story of the rejection OF this
plan has yet to be told and the respon-
sibility for the stupidities that lost us
Russias powerful support must be justly
| affixed and sternly dealt with.
There are however, two or three con-
siderations in our favor which did not
exist in 1914. If Russia and Italy are
neutral so is the Austrian empire and
Bulgaria. Turkey is on our side and
Bulgaria is neutral Nearly million
men were employed by ourselves and
France in fighting Turkey and Bulgaria
in the Great War. The fact that Turkey,
with her reorganized army, is on the side
of Britain and France has already had
a shattering effect upon the more am
| bilious designs of Mussolini.
The dreams of Roman legions falling
upon a Soudan, Egypt, Palestine and
Tunis denuded of troops have been dis
persed by this apparition of powerful
Turkish Army marching down from
| Syria to confront and confound this
triumphant vision of easy conquest.
Turkey has already played great part
in battling the axis plan. Another IA
vorable factor is the Polish Army, now
alone holding up the great army of Ger
many.
Polish Retreat Grave.
The issue of the first campaign will
depend whether Poland will be able to
! continue the struggle until the French
Army succeeds in breaking through the
Siegfried Line Up to the present the
outlook is not too promising. The over
Whelming forces which the Germans
have thrown into Poland seem to be
! forcing the Polish Army into a discour-
aging retreat
The Germans possess an irresistible
superiority in numbers, in guns and in
the air, which are overcoming the re-
sistance put up by the Poles But there
has been no decisive German victory
at any point The Polish Army is still
intact. The best proof of that is the
comparatively insignificant number OF
prisoners claimed by the Germans. The
| French lost far more in the first few
DAYS of their retreat in September,
1914
1t ali depends on three factors. One
is the quality of Polish generalship.
The second is whether the Poles have
prepared positions where they can make
a stand The third is morale of the
Polish Army
AS to the two first of these considera-
tions, we have no reliable information.
Do the Poles possess amongst their
generals an Osman Pasha, a Lee or a
Todleben with the genius of defense?
The valiant and stubborn resistance put
up by the garrison of that little town
near Gdynia against a combined at
tack from sea and land shows what the
Poles are capable of doing when well
led.
No Sign of Panic.
AS to the third it is encouraging to
note there are no signs of panic in the
Polish Army. If the Poles succeed in
holding up the German hordes before
we'll constructed, stoutly defended en-
trenchments, the whole military posi-
ton will be changed. Then there will
be time for the most formidable factor
in our favor to be brought to bear.
What is that factor? Undoubtedly it
is the superiority of the French Army
to any other army in the field, together
with our immense reserves of man
power
I have quoted Fochs opinion of the
German Army of 1914. 1t is no dis
paragement to German courage or in
telligence to say that the Hitler army
is not comparable to the Kaisers grand
army in 1914.
The authors of the Versailles treaty
cut down the German army to 100000
and insisted it should be raised by vol
untary enlistment and not by conscrip.
ton.
I was personally responsible for the
latter condition. I had in mind the
expedient resorted to by Prussia after
Jena when Napoleon, by the treaty OF
peace, cut down the numbers of the
Prussian Army. Prussian statesmen
then circumnavigated this reduction by
resorting to the ingenious expedient OF
passing through their truncated army a
number of short-service conscripts SC
that by 1914 most of the young men had
received some training for war. Because
of conditions in the Versailles Treaty
the young men of Germany received nc
war training from 1918 to 1884.
Lacks Good Officers.
Another effect OF the Versailles re-
strictions is that Germany does not
possess the fine body of officers, espe.
cially n-commissioned officers, te
whom so much of their success in the