Evening star., 1939-11-05
U. 5. Military Experts
Back Gen. GameIin's 5
Waiting War Tactics
Little Likelihood Seen
Of Successful Germon
Offensive in West
By COL. FREDERICK PALMER,

by COL. FREDERICK PALMER,
~~. Noted Military Expert
III you were In Gen. Maurice
0amelin's place, what would you
do, and then what If you were in
the place of Gen. Walther Won Brazil
chitsch?" the writer asked q little
group of American officers who are
recognized as masters of tactics.
All know the ground where the
allied armies and the German Army
face each other on the western
front, the layout Of the French and
German fortress lines, and have kept
abreast with military progress. Thus
we had a council Of experts. All
were practically agreed that they
would follow the waiting policy Of
Gen. Gamelin.
? In considering the wisdom of q
German offensive, naturally they
wanted more information about the
actual strength of the German
Army.
well, in order to have a pre-
mise, suppose Gen. Won Brauchitsch
has two to one in men, guns. planes,
arms, supplies and mechanization of
Ill kinds"
This opened the way for one of
those discussions-such as well may
now be going on in the German
staff-which has the fascination of
4 chess problem to chess players.
What of the time element?"
Would the German Army con-
tfnue to grow relatively weaker while
the allies grew stronger? Was it
soon or never for Won Brauchitsch?
Three to One Held Needed.
The question of whether modern
defensive weapons and installations
had not made both the Maginot
and the Siegfried Lines invulnerable
was bound to be raised. One of the
little council, who held fast to the
old tenet that no position is in
vulnerable, said. The Germans
should have at least three to one.'
Another held that not less than four
to one would have any promise Of
real, decisive success.
If I were in Won Brauchitsch's
place, in face of the Maginot Line,
said another, "and had two to one,
I'd meet Gamelin's tactics in kind
and leave half to hold him, and look
toward the Balkans. where there
might be easier going for blitz-
krieg"
Another. who was more given to
listening than talking, had the re-
spect of all as a student of the Of
fensives on the western front in
the World War and had his part in
planning and carrying one through,
remarked:
THE first 10000 yards may not be
the hardest, but the Germans must
make that gain in their initial thrust
or they are doomed to failure and
probably great disaster They must
be able to get far enough to force
the French to replace their field
guns"
There was general agreement with
his view, on the basis of q German
frontal attack on the 100-mile line
where most of the little action on
the western front has taken place.
dismissing for the moment a drive
through Holland.
Guns Can't Keep Up
Accepting the range Of HELD guns
as 10000 yards, all the tiers of
French guns In a hail Of shells will
burst into the advance of the Ger
man infantry step by step, tearing
their flesh and digging holes In the
earth under their feet.
Their own guns cannot keep up
with them in support. They must
make enough distance to force the
enemy to draw back his own guns
and redispose them, when not cap
tured, the while their own guns
work their way forward Otherwise,
they are unprotected from the blasts.
They have to fall back or be mur-
dered.
In Ludendorff's drive of March,
1918, In which specially trained
groups of infantry were the steel
fingers opening gaps for the follow
up OF infllterating waves, he made
more than 10000 yards on the first
day of large part of the line; he
was through the trenches, front and
support, in the open; and success
sive days enabled him to make a
breach between the British and
French armies.
But his guns and ammunition
were unable to keep up and he had
not the fresh troops for action
against the allied guns and reserves,
which were banking up to stop him.
Counteroffensive Unwise.
Against the trench system of the
World War he had no such hurdles
to take as Won Brauchitsch would