The Waterbury Democrat., 1938-05-28


 Cause of the probe is the fact that between January s and March 30 of this year a total of 31 of the Navy's finest flyers crashed to death at sea, while seven long-range patrol bombers, costing around $200,000 apiece, crashed with them. The loss, measured in material alone, was around $1,400,000.
 The tragedies all occurred dur ing the war games near the San Diego and Hawaii bases. No trace whatsoever has been found of four of the great twin -engined bombers, despite search by hun- dreds of planes and ships, nor of the men who vanished with them.
 Just as mysterious as disap- pearance of the bombers has been the hearing behind the walls of the Board of Inquiry. Sworn to secrecy, the board has now finished it's work, and it's final report is being che :ked in Washington. Some announce ment will be made of it's find ings, but much of the report will remain a carefully guarded naval secret.
 From naval pilots who flew some of the big planes, however, the chief reasons for the unpre- cedented air disasters of last winter have been ascertained.
 Private testimony of the pilots indicates that the time still may be long way off before air. planes can play any vital part in naval warfare-despite the hun- dreds of bombers the Navy now is building.
 Scouting Air Fleet
 Most important factor leading to the naval aviation disasters was the new strategy of using air. planes in place of scouting ships. Instead of using destroyers to To- cate the "enemy" fleet, airplanes flew far out to sea, attempted to locate the enemy, reported it's To- cation by radio, laser reported wal Olllp Su1llAC ICoulLo.
 They simply could not do the trick.
 Although this was the basic cause of the air tragedies, the following also were contributory causes:
 l. Planes were ordered into the
 air in weather when 1t was al-
 most certain that some of them
 could not come back. 2. Pilots were so exhausted phys
 ically and mentally from long
 hours in the air that they
 should not have been permitted
 to go on duty.
 CTS are older men who would
 have trouble getting a kite aloft
 in a gale.
 The last is one of the chief com- plaints of the younger pilots, who claim that high-ranking naval aviation officers were trained in the small, slow planes of years gone by and know little of the problems of flying the fast 18-ton bombers of today-especially in grueling formation flights at night or through storms.
 A check of naval aviation com- manders also shows that many of them were trained aboard war; ships, transferring to naval avi- ton largely because or extra pay. Naval aviation pays time and a half, the extra money being for the risk. In order to qualify for this risk money an aviator must spend four hours monthly in the air; but many of the olders off, cers merely go aloft with younger officers. The senior officers may never touch the controls, but by logging pilotage time can collect their extra money.
 Air Fatigue
 Fatigue, the dread of the mod ern airman, also was an impor- tant accident factor, according to the pilots participating in the re- cent war games. The log books show that many of the crews flew more than 50 hours in four days. One crew had been 20 hours in the air searching for lost bomb- CT, then was ordered into the air again for a 9-hour flight, with only six hours sleep in between. One officer, since dead, flew Al hours out of A.
 The Navy counts time off from the moment a crew steps out of the plane until its members re- port for duty the next morning possibly ten hours. Actually it is impossible to rest up from long flight in that time. Physical ad- justments are slow, internal or gans fail to function normally for many hours.
 After a day or two of contin- uous flight, flyers are near men, tai as we'll as physical exhaus- tion. They become fearful of