The Waterbury Democrat., 1938-05-28
Precedent Created
 In Schiller Trial
(Continued from Page D

(Continued son. It is legal entity" The com- plete finding is as follows:
 STATE OF CONNECTICUT VS
 LOUIS SCHILLER
 SUPERIOR COURT, NEW HAVEN
 COUNTY, May 27, 1888.
 Memorandum of Decision
 This is an information in two counts. The first count charges the accused with embezzlement under Cum. Supp. 1885, Sec. 1717c. The second count charges violation of Sec. 6372 General Statutes, Revision 1880.
 As regards the first count the facts stipulated are that in the month of April 1887 as town clerk of the Town of Naugatuck, the &C., cused collected certain fees on the issuance of hunting and angling licenses to the amount of $l,4l2.00 which fees he converted to his own use. Sections 3l10, 3111, 3ll2 and 3l15 of the General Statutes, Re- vision 1880 proved that such fees shall be collected by the Town Clerk in the town in which the li- censes are issued and at the end of each month remitted by him to the State Treasurer to be used by the State of the propagation of game and fish.
 Section 1717 Cum. Supp. 1885 provides in part as follows: "Em- bezzlement by public officer of fiduciary: Any officer, agent or em- ploye of any public, municipal or private corporation - who shall wrongfully appropriate and convert to his own use or to the use of any other person any money, funds, or property belonging to, held intrust by or under the control of such cor poration-shan be punished.
 There are two questions raised by the accused with reference to the first count. They are first as to whether the accused was the agent of the state and second as to whether the State is public corporation within the meaning of the statute.
 On the first of these questions the contention of the accused is that as Town Clerk he was the agent of the Town rather than the agent of the State. There can be no doubt that as Town Clerk he was an officer of the Town.
 State vs. Griswold, B Conn. 95.
 That, however, did not prevent his being the agent of the State. An agent is one who acts for and on behalf of another at the others re- quest. In collecting the license fee in question the accused clearly was acting on behalf of the State. It was the States business upon which he was engaged. The fees which he collected became the property of the State and were to be remitted to the State. After the money was received 1t was to be used for one of the pur- poses of the state. The town of Naugatuck had no claim on the fees and in collecting the fees the &C., cused was not engaged in any bus mess for the Town. The gist of the matter is that in this regard Gas it does in many other situations) the State has designated the official of town to act as the agent of the State. InaSmuch as the accused in issuing hunting and angling licenses and collecting the fees thereon was engaged on the States business, it is concluded that he was an agent for the state.
 State vs. Clerkin; 58 Conn. 98
 As regards the second contention of the accused, namely, that the State is not a public corporation as the term is used in the statute, it is of course, to be borne in mind that this being penal statute it must be construed strictly in favor of the accused and that what we are con- cerned with is not what the legisla- ture intended to say but rather as to what is the meaning of what it has said.
 State vs. Perker, 112 Conn. 39
 In construing this particular stat ute cases construing similar statutes III otllcl oCdttS dIc IlOC pdTUlCulaTly helpful. For instance State vs. Taylor ' SD. 533, GA N. E. 548 and State vs. Bancroft g Kansas 2nd Ed. 130 cited by the accused, although they hold that the State is not a pLSlic cor poration as that term is used in the embezzlement statutes of South Dakota and Kansas respectively, are of no assistance here because in each of those states there were other statutes defining public corporations as subdivisions of the State. In the same way the case of State vs. Sid- dowy (Utah) 21l Pac. 97O is of no great assistance. It holds, it is true, that the conversion of state funds by state official is not a violation of the general embezzlement statute which refers to public corporations but 1t puts the decision on the ground that there was another stat. ute specifically relating to the em- bezzlement of state funds.
 A corporation is an artificial per-