Evening star., 1938-10-04
Daladier
Continued From First Page.)

We iedilleu tIldL Iile English observer
in his soul and conscience, conclude,
it was impossible to make Czechoslo
vaks and Sudeten Germans live to
gether any longer when all our effort
mad consisted in making CZechoSlo
Vakia turn toward the federalism Whicl
would have assured the integrity of it
territory?" he asked.
Declaring that it then became neces
sary to face realities" Daladier said
We found ourselves faced with tn
following alternatives:
Either to say no to Sudeten de-
mands and thereby push the Czecho
slovak government into an unyieldins
position and the German government
to aggression, thus provoking armed
conflict which would result in the rapie
destruction of Czechoslovakia, or to try
to find compromise"
If the first hypothesis were veri.
fed, who could hold that Czechoslo.
vakla's territorial integrity would have
been maintained after a terrible wal
OF coalition, even victorious war.
I'VE chose peace The French
British plan of London (for partition
Of Czechoslovakia) came from this
choice. but at the same time we sub
mitted these unhappy propositions te
Czechoslovakia We carried to her en-
gagements taken by Britain to Join us
in an international guarantee. for we
had persuaded the British government
to bring the help of its power and
prestige to maintenance of peaceful
order in the very heart of Europe"
Daladier said that when he and Bon
net left London September 19 they
had feeling" that the plan would
be received in Prague with indignant
protests" and would be agreed to by
NaA Germany.
Then the Czechoslovaks, in their
historic devotion to peace" accepted
the plan, the Premier continued.
At the same time. he said, Hitler
formulated new demands which coulc
be considered as an operation with
all the characteristics and conse.
quences of conquest except for resort
to arms"
[hhiohk IIVhCu.
Daladier then publicly acknowledged
division among French people dur.
ing the crisis.
During these anguishing days." hi
said, two great currents were mani.
fest in our country. They were founC
in every political party, in every shade
OF political thought, and they fought
for the conscience of each Frenchman
Some put their hope in negotia.
ton; others in unyielding firmness.
"As for me, chief of the government
recognized from the first minute the
infallible instinct of the French people
in both movements.
Il felt the truth was in the blend
ing Of the two currents, and not in
their contradiction.
What the French people wanted
was that the irreparable be avoided
The irreparable was German aggres-
sion. This aggression, by the terms of
our treaty with Czechoslovakia) }
would have brought forth the aid and
assistance of Frence. We would have
asked 20 uto fulfill the engagements
OF France"
AS Daladier went on, his address
was received coldly by the deputies and
packed galleries. Except for bursts of
applause when he mentioned the
names of Roosevelt and Chamberlain
there was little handclapping and
cheering such as might have been
expected from the Premier'S own ma
jority.
In his address Daladier then ar
rived at events of the crucial night
OF September 27-28."
Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain
close political adviser, had returned
from Berlin with Hitler's threat to
march into Czechoslovakia at 2 pm
the next day.
I'VE had only a few hours before
us" said the Premier. Mr.. Cham
berlain's radio speech had warned the
world of the gravity of the situation
We resolved to make a last effort"
Daladier then told how he and
Chamberlain had instructed the Brit
ish and French Ambassadors at Ber-
lin to see Hitler, and how the Earl of
Perth, British Ambassador to Rome,
had been told to make an effort with
Premier MuSSolini
Praises RooseveIt's Part.
I'm that way" Daladier declared,
I'VE were responding to the spirit of
President Roosevelt's second message
addressed to Hitler alone), which so
generously contributed to make a
peaceful solution"
Chamberlain then proposed that the
chiefs OF the four powers meet at
Munich. Daladier said, and m. Mus
solini backed up this request with
force and success"
The premier continued:
Il accepted that invitation and I
have nothing to regret. 1 would have
preferred that all interested powers
were present (Czechoslovakia and her
ally, Soviet Russia not being invited
but it was necessary to act quickly.
Delay could have been fatal.
you know the results Of the Munich
interview. 1t was more useful con-
versation than formal conference.
I'VE avoided recourse to force, and
we without doubt provoked a plebi-
scite of peace in four countries by the
spontaneous warmth of the receptions
at Berlin, Rome, London and Paris by
the peoples of the four capitals for the
chiefs of the four governments.