Evening star., 1938-03-20
BY CONSTANTINE BROWN.

State Department-was forewarned
by Berlin that something will hap.
pen in Austria should Schuschnigg try to
interpret the Berchtesgaden agreement
textually and refuse to understand the
meaning and the implications of what
Hitler desires" High officials in the
State Department ventured a prediction
that something will happen within the
next "l5 days"
Members Of the German Embassy in
Washington. discussing Schuschnigss un-
expectedly defiant stand, shook their heads
and warned watch what will happen to
the Austrian chancellor in few days"
These facts are mentioned to show ti.at
In the chancellories OF the democratic
countries 1t was fully expected that Hitler
would not permit Schuschnigg and his
inspirers to thwart Germanys plans.
Whether the spectacular events OF the
night Of March IL were anticipateh 1t is
difficult to say But melodrama has be-
come associated with the Reichsfuehrer' S
actions
The empty gestures from London and
Paris could have had no influence on a
man who placed before Europe an &C.
complished fact
For Home Consumption.
London's mild protest was intended for
home consumption only Premier Cham
berlain knew for long time that the
Anschiuss would be accomplished in the
course of this spring. Hitler impaired this
nf
during the latters visit to Germany and
Baron Won Ribbentrop repeated the in
formation to Neville Henderson, Britain's
Ambassador to Berlin, only four months
ago.
Those in the know, however, do not be-
lieve that the Nazifcation of Austria will
result In the much-feared European coa-
fagration.
The reasons why such prediction can
be made with full confidence are:
l. Italy was the only power which could
effectively have prevented Hitler from
taking over Austria Inspired dispatches
from the democratic capitals indicated
that Mussolini was taken by surprise and
that he frowned at the latest coup of his
associate. Consequently the Berlin-Ron,e
axis had become-to say the least-bent
Once more the wish was father to the
Thought. 1t Is known in responsible quar-
ters that the Germa n-Austrian union was
discussed in detail at the meeting between
the two dictators at Berlin. Mussolini's
chief concern was the effect on the Ger
man population which lives in the Italian
1yrol Of German Steel Helmets marshalled
on the Brenner Pass. Except for this con-
sideration. he was quite ready to let his
associate take over Austria. The problem
was settled by the suggestion that the
German population in the Italian Tyrol
emigrate into the Reich. Hitler offered
to place at the disposal of these people
all 100 per cent Germans-land in Bavaria
and in East Prussia, where they could
settle and live in peace among their own
kin. This solution was acceptable to II
-Duce and the migratory move has already
started. Thousands of "workmen" are
leaving the Tyrol for Germany. Part of
the expense Is borne by Mussolini and
part by Hitler
IL Duce Is Assured.
II Duce also informed Hitler of Vatican
concern regarding the future of the Catho-
lie church in Austria when the latter be.
comes Nazified. He Is said to have re-
ceived assurances from the German dicta-
tor that the Reich's attitude toward the
Catholic church in Austria will depend
largely on the attitude of the church to-
ward the Nazification of the republic.
With these questions settled II Duce
turned off the warning light and switched
on the green signal go"
2 Great Britain was at least partially
informed of Hitler's intentions, but mace
no serious objections to them The reasons
why the Chamberlain administration did
not oppose this last breach of the
Versailles Treaty are well known. Great
Britain Is not yet prepared for war, nor
does she wish to fight for any country in
Central or Southeastern Europe. Though
British public opinion is incensed over
Hitler's spectacular nvason and worried
over "Mussolini's "disagreeable" attitude,
1t Is not prepared to back its dislike for
the two dictators by military action. The
government might easily turn this senti-
mental indignation into 'inflamed public
opinion" but it does not consider that This
would be in the interests of the Empire
Too, the dominions have made it plain
that they would not indorse an adven-
turous policy in Central Europe. Finally
the British fear that any serious entangle-
ment on the Continent would weaken their
already precarious position in the Far
East, and they have heard enough frc!n
Washington to realize that it would be
pretty difficult task to get the American
people to fight Britain's battle in the
Pacific. Hence, with the usual protests
and apparent indignation London must
accept the accomplished fact whether it
likes it or not.
France Caught In Crisis.
3. The European crisis caught France
in the midst Of one Of its perennial cabinet
crisis. Although the French government
know as did the others what Hitler in
tended to do-the French Ambassador at
and best informed man in the French
diplomatic service-they could not COL
laborate to avert ministerial crisis on the
eve of the German march.
But even the temporary solution of its
internal strife does not permit France to
even think Of an adventurous policy. The
Quai d'Orsay realizes full we'll that it can
count on Britain's support only If Frances
borders are actually attacked by . foreign
power. Britain would not give France