Evening star., 1938-12-02
By WILLIAM II. sTONEMAN,

By WILLIAM II. STONEMAN,
chiesso Daily News Foreign Correspondent
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS for Brit
AIMS retreat ut Munich are talking
sense when they say that the Brit
ish Army was not in shape for .
war with . first-class power.
Certainly the French Army was
the most formidable In Europe, and
the Czech Army, though overrated
by some enthusiasts, was well
equipped with weapons, fairly well
mechanical and in possession Of ter
rifle Notifications. But the British
Army-which was not expected to
play very big role anyway-was
not anywhere near ready.
This, it must be emphasized i'm
mediately, does not mean that the
combined armes of the potential
allies were not capable of meeting
the German Army. If they had
fought in September France and
Britain would have had the Coop
Grafton OF 40 Czech diyisions-about
100000 men-and some Russian
troops. They would probably have
been well advised, from 4 purely
military point Of view, to accept a
general war before those forces
were lost to them.
Army's Role Must Be Minor.
The point is that Britain's Army
could have played only a minor role
in such q war for some time. At
the time of crisis Britain's home
forces were supposed to include the
regular army. consisting of in
fantry divisions, cavalry division
and l mobile division, and IL divi-
sions of the territorial army-which
corresponds to the American Ma
tional Guard. Thus they had NOM
inal total of 20 divisions.
In normal circumstances several
of these divisions should be re-
tanned for home defense, and the
majority should be sent out as an
expeditionary force to give material
and moral support to the western or
left wing of the French Army. As
things stood at the end of Septem-
ber, 1898, the British could not have
sent any sizable force to France
without completely denuding this
country of its minimum defense re-
quirements.
OF the five regular infantry di-
visions which were designed for an
initial expeditionary force>oot more
than two or two and a half could
have been mustered at crisis time
The rest had been depleted for
service in Palestine. The IL terri
torial divisions were not even ready
to fight a defensive war in England
itself. All the forces were short of
machine guns, mortars, cannon and
tanks. The territorial divisions had
little except their rifles.
Territorial Army Not Strong.
The explanation is that the ter
eitorial army, which should furnish
the basis for great expeditionary
force, was allowed to disintegrate
almost completely between the end
Of the war in 1918 and 1896, when
the new f1ve-year national defense
program was announced. During
the first two and q half years of
that program not much modern ma
terial was produced and all that be-
came available was given immedi-
ately to the regulars.
The territorials have not been
mechanized or modernized. The
new program for their reorganiza-
ton and expansion, which was an
nounced by the war ministry i'm
mediately after the crisis, was not
expected to be announced until next
year. In any case the necessary
equipment will not be ready until
then. =.
Despite much high h-pressure re-
cruiting propaganda, the territorial
units, at the time of the crisis, had
only about 80 per cent of their
peacetime establishment, which, in
turn, is only one-half Of their war
time strength. The lack of modern
equipment further meant that the
troops had little knowledge of mod
ern weapons and modern warfare.
Two Schools Of Thought.
It is still a question whether
Britain would send an expedition
ary force to the continent in any
case. One prominent school of
thought, led by Capt. Liddel Hart
and supported by the present war
minister, Hore-Belisha, believes ic
war of limited liability" in
which Britain would conf1ne her
participation to the use of her fleet
and air force. The range and pow
er of modern aircraft, these people
feel, would make the transportation
and supply of q British field force
In France impossible.
Others argue with equal zest that
there is no such thing as q war of
limited liability and that Britain
must be prepared to give men as
well as machines. If German troops
were to smash their way into
France, they argue, it would be
necessary for Britain to send troops
to help save Paris and the channel
ports. In any event, they argue,
Britain must be prepared for such
an eventuality.
In the event of a general war on
the continent, 1t is probable that
Britain would want to send several
mobile divisions to France and that
she would do 50 If such units were