Evening star., 1938-10-04
By the Associated Press.


him, it was an extremely painful and
bitter moment for me because all
could offer Mr.. Chamberlain was my
resignation.
Before taking such step as I have
taken on this question, an interna-
tional policy minister must ask him.
self many questions.
Not the least important of these Is:
"Can my resignation at the present
time do any material harm to His
Majesty's government? Can 1t weaken
our position or suggest to our critics
that there is not a united front in
Great Britain?"
Had I had any doubt in regard to
that facet of the problem it would
have been set at rest by the way in
which my resignation was accepted,
not with reluctance, but really with
relief.
I have always believed one Of the
most important principles in the con-
duct of foreign policy should be make
your policy plain to other countries,
let them know where you stand and
what in certain circumstances you
are prepared to do.
Shock Of Treachery.
1t had come to Czechoslovakia as
a shock of treachery and perfidy that
with other enemies facing them, Great
Britain had turned against them.
have always thought in any other
international crisis our first duty was
make it plain exactly where we stood
and what we would do.
I believe the great defect in our
foreign policy in recent months and
rercent weeks has been that we have
failed to do so.
In the last four weeks We have
been drifting nearer and nearer to
war with Germany, and it was only
at the last moment and then IN most
uncertain tones that we have said
we were going to fight.
We knew that information to the
opposite effect was being poured into
the head of the German government.
There Was One Remedy.
All our sources of information. dip
lomatic and from other more or
secret and less reliable sources, have
pointed with extraordinary unanimity
to one conclusion and have suggested
there was one remedy.
All our information pointed to the
fact that Germany was preparing for
war at the end of September.
All recommendations agreed that
there was only one way war could
be prevented and that was for Great
Britain to make firm stand and
state she would be in that war and
on the other side.
I had represented after the rape
of Austria that Britain should make
declaration Of foreign policy, and
was later met with the objection that
the people of this country were not
prepared to fight for Czechoslovakia.
That was perfectly true. tried to
represent another aspect OF the situ-
ation-that it was not for CzechO-
slovakia we should have to fight. 1t
was not for Czechoslovakia We should
have been fighting If we had gone to
war last week. sEi
It was not for Serbia or Belgium
we fought in 1914 though it suited
some people to say SO, but We were
fighting then. as we should have been
fighting last week, in order that one
great power should not be allowed. siR
disregard of treaty Obligations and the
laws of nations and against all NOR
ality, to dominate By brutal force the
continent of Europe. Opposition
cheers. :
Cites War on Napoleon.
For that principle we fought against
Napoleon. We fought for it against
Louis the Fourteenth Of France and
Philip the Second of Spain. For that
principle we must ever be prepared
to fight, for on the day we are not pre-
pared to fight for it we shall have
forfeited our empire, our liberty and
our independence.
Prime Minister in, the House OF Com
mons in March and the chancellor OF
the exchequer at Lanark mean noth-
ing to the mentality of Herr Hitler
and Signor Mussolini. had hoped
it might be possible to make a state
ment to Herr Hitler before he made
his speech at Nurnberg. On all sides
we were being urged to do so. We were
always told on no account must we
irritate Herr Hitler.
It seems to me Herr Hitler never
makes speech except under the in
fluence of considerable irritation, and
the addition of one more irritant would
not make a great difference.
Then came the last appeal of the
Prime Minister on Wednesday morn
ing. For the first time he was pre-
pared to yield In some measure to the
representations of Great Britain, but
1 would remind the House that the
message for the Prime Minister was
not the first news he had received that
morning.
Had Urged Mobilization.
At dawn he had learned OF the
mobilization British fleet. had
been urging mobilization for many
days. I thought it was the kind Of
language which would be easier for
Herr Hitler to understand. I sug-
gested it should accompany the
mission of Sir Horace Wilson and I
remember the Prime Minister said he
thought it would be the one thing
that would ruin that and I said I
thought it was the one thing that
would lead to success.
Throughout these days he has be-
lieved in addressing Herr Hitler
through the language of sweet reason
ableness. 1 have believed he was more
open to the language of the mailed
fist.
At Berchtesgaden the Prime Min
lister was face-to-face with the per-
sonality of Hitler and knew perfectly
well, being good judge of men, that
it would be waste of time to put
forward alternative suggestion SO he
returned with those proposals wrapped
in a cloak called self-determination.