Evening star., 1938-11-27

RIGA, Latv1a.-A1ter vlSltlng vienna
Budapest, Bucharest, Berlin and War
saw, I find four main factors which
will direct the course Of events in the
coming year. 1t is truism nowadays to
say that the Munich agreement ranks
as q historical landmark Of first-class
Importance. but even yet it is doubtful
whether statesmen, business men and
other foreign observers are fully aware
of the depth and extent of the change
which Munich has brought.
The first factor is a sudden vast ex-
tension of German influence which
henceforth is being, or can be, exerted
in three ways. First, directly, by po-
cal-diplomatic, economic and, if nee
essary, military pressure. Second, indi-
rectly, through local Nazi parties in vari-
Gus countries, to whose movements and
morale there has been given immense
impetus. Thirdly, what might be called
a yet more indirect or at least more
peaceful manner of commercial and in
dustrial development, along the lines laid
down by geographical conditions and the
natural demands of trade.
AS might be expected, the increase Of
German prestige has been accompanied
by corresponding decrease Of French
and British influence in Central and
Southern Europe, which is the second
dominant factor of the present situation.
Politically speaking, the attitude and
policies of France and Britain are at the
moment almost negligible to the minds
of Balkan statesmen, whose eyes and ears
are concentrated upon Germany Eco
nomically, the British at least are by no
means idle, and their financial and COM
mercial operations may, in given circum-
stances play an important part in the
shaping Of the future.
Colonial Shift Noted.
The third factor is the effect produced
in the Balkans, traditionally Europe's
powder magazine, by the scrapping OF
the territorial clauses OF the Versailles
treaty in regard to Czechoslovakia. I'm
mediately, Hungary and Bulgaria were
ahame with patriotic enthusiasm and
hope, while the treaty profiteers," Ru-
mania and Greece, showed a correspond
ing apprehension. Poland and Yugo-
slavia had stronger nerves, but they, too,
felt the thrill of excitement, and Poland
took prompt steps to get what it could
from the grab bag while the going was
good. 1t is no exaggeration to say that
the tension in South Central Europe
was so great in the middle of October
that almost anything might have hap
pened to set them all fighting like the
tabled wolf pack. 1t is here that there
comes into play the fourth factor of
post Munich Europe; to wit the attitude
and purposes of Germany with regard to
Europe in general and to the so-called
Balkans in particular.
As matters stand today, Germany has
found itself, almost overnight, in the
unexpected and fortunate position of
controlling Europe from the North Sea
and the French frontier to the borders
of Poland and Russia. to the Black Sea
and almost to within sight of the Adri-
attic, for it is hardly to be supposed that
Trieste can long fail to be attracted to
the Austro-German orbit. AS said be-
fore, Germany's influence is paramount
throughout this vast area and the in
f1uence of it's potential adversaries or
competitors has been reduced to mini
num- A most enviable situation if Hitler
can handle it right.
Reich's Possible Disadvantages.
Consider first of all the reichs possible
disadvantages, as follows:
ca The strain of the past five years
has been terrific upon the financial and
economic resources of Germany.
Co The living standard of the Ger
man people has been considerably, If not
alarmingly. reduced.
(c) Industrial production has been so
extensively devoted to the production of
war material as gravely to diminish the
amount and quality of machines and
commodities of use and consumption,
both at home and for export.
Cd In recent years, Germany has
beaten the war drum or used the threat
of war as its chief instrument of in
ternal and external policy. The result
has been that the nerves of the German
people and of the rest of Europe are not
only overstrung and representative, but
q war-neurosis has been created every
where which will put many difficulties,
both practical and psychological, in the
way of return to more peaceful and
friendly methods.
Against these drawbacks, there are
several points in Germanys favor.
(a) The war threat has achieved its
purpose Not only does Germany no
longer need it as an instrument of policy,
but immediate German interests clearly
demand peace, If only for the simple pur-
pose of digesting and developing recent
gains and future possibilities.
90 The internal efficiency of the Hit
ler regime and the disciplined character
Of the German people, which enables
them to endure hardship without COM
plant, especially now that the policies
| of the regime have been so triumphantly
indicated, and that the prospect Of bet
ter times ahead are 50 abundantly dis
| played.
(c) The productive capacity of Ger
man industry has almost doubled In the
past i've years, particularly In the vital
items of steel and coal.
cd The raw material resources OF
Grain and other foodstuffs OIL lumber
and minerals, which Germany hitherto
lacked, can now be brought within Ger
| IL. $AN ~