The Waterbury Democrat. [volume] (Waterbury, Conn.) 1917-1946, 1938-10-15

court for determination, the ul-
innate issues which determine
the right of a party to the re-
lief he claims, but which neither
terminate the action nor de-
termine those issues in such a
manner as to put 1t beyond the
power of the court to alter its
decision except as 1t may reopen
the Judgment it has rendered.
Batesville v. Ball, 100 Ark. 496,
800, 140 8. w. 712. The character
of such interlcoutory rulings is
well illustrated In the case Of
a demurrer; the decision upon. 1t
may determine the basic issues
upon which a party relies for
relief, yet that decision, wheth-
er the demurrer be sustained or
overruled, Is not q final judy
ment from which an appeal may
be taken: Huntington v. McMa-
hon, 48 Conn. 174, 2o1; Costocki
v. Skaulio, 103 Conn. 1872, 13l
att. 398. Thus where the trial
court sustained the demurrer OF
a town, defendant in the action,
we held that no appeal would
lie from the decision, saying:
1.-THE court simply sustained the
towns demurrer. This alone did
not amount to final judgment
dismissing the town from the
case. 1t might furnish the foun-
dalton for such a judgment II
amendment should not be made.
The rights Of the parties as
against the town were not final
~ foreclosed by the ruling upon
the demurrer. The town was still
in court. The case against 1t
was still open. Judgment might
still be rendered against 1t upon
amended pleadings." Martin v.
Sherwood, IA Conn. 202, 203, 50
att. 564. An analogous situation
exists where the court makes q
ruling sustaining q demurrer TO
q remonstrance to O commit
tees report and refuses to ac-
cept that report. Cothron v. At
wood, So Conn. SIC, 20 atl. IS.
Recognizing the force Of these
decisions the appellants claim
that the motions now before us
were made in the proceedings
collateral to but independent OF
the prosecutions and as the rul-
ings upon them terminated those
proceedings they constitute final
judgments. Under 570i Of the
general statutes q court may,
for certain reasons, such as the
discovery of new evidence, grant
a new trial Of an action, and
while q petition for such RELIEF
is really ancillary to the orgi-
nal action, nevertheless, unless
relief Is sought by q motion
made In the course Of that &C
ton, the petition must be served
and returned as is required in
the case Of other civil process;
Cannon v. State. rs Conn. 516,
SIT, 81 all. 100; Reilly v. State,
100 Conn. PIT, 220, IT'S att. $50;
and we have held that the judy
ment upon such o petition Is to
be regarded as so far final that
an appeal may be taken from
1t. Hustled v. Mead, So Conn.
IS. SO. 10 atl. 233.
The statutes also provide that
In certain instances an applica-
ton may be made to q Judge Of
the court In which an action Is
pending for reduction In the
amount Of an attachment or Tor
its dissolution, the adverse party
being cited to appear TO answer
thereto; general statutes, 5740 ct
soq.; we have held that ruling
Of the Judge upon such an appli-
cation Is q final judgment, from
which an appeal may be taken,
stating that the proceedings were
mot only in fact and form but
also OF necessity entirely inde-
pendent OF that action and not in
cidental to It," and that when the
order was made "the matter was
at an end and the proceeding
and parties were, ave for the
possibility Of appeal, out of
court. The order could not be
regarded as in any sense an In
terlocutory one made IN the
progress of the pending suit.
That progress was not concerned
with or In any way affected by
1t. The order made final dispose
ton OF judicial or quasi judi
cial proceeding authorized by
statute and therefore was final
Judgment within the meaning Of
our statutes regulating appeals"
Sachs v. NussonbauIn. 81 Conn.,
602, 606, lO4 atl. 1893. Section
$500 Of the general statutes pro-
vides that q court may, IN an
action pending before 1t, make
ANY order. interlocutory on
final, in the nature Of certain
provocative writs, including that
Of mandamus. In Wardell Y.
Killingly, 90 Conn. 7iS. lis atl.
$50, 1t developed during the trial
that the plaintiff, who was suing
to recover for q breach Of con- 2
tract Of employment as q teach
er, did not have g requisite cer-
tificate; thereupon q continuance
Of the action was granted and
the plaintiff brought an applica-
ton In the nature Of q manda-
mus to compel the issuance Of
such q certificate TO her; and we
held that an appeal lay from the
decision for the defendant In that
proceeding, saying (P. 722); "tte
application for Inandamus takes
the place Of an independent ac-
ton; Its purpose Is the same as,
II an action for nlandamums had
been begun. In fact the applica-