Evening star., 1938-09-29
restored in those districts by Septem-
hAp
Continued From Page A-18.)

restored in those districts by septem-
Der II.
Last Resort Utilized.
On the other hand the Czechoslo-
vakian government might have felt
compelled to mobilize at once and so
risk provoking German invasion. In
any event, German invasion might
be expected to bring into operation
the French obligation to come to
the assistance of Czechoslovakia and
50 lead to European war In which
this country might we'll have been
involved in support of France.
In these circumstances, decided
the time had come to put into opera
tion a plan which I had had in mind
for a considerable period as last
resort.
One of the, principal difficulties in
dealing with q totalitarian government
is the lack of any means of estab-
fishing contact with the personalities
in whose hands lie the final decision.
I, therefore, resolved to go to Ger
many myself and interview Herr Hit
Ter and find out in personal con-
versation whether there was any hope
yet of saving peace.
Knew Risks He Ran.
knew very well that in taking
such an unprecedented course I was
laying myself open to criticism on the
ground that was detracting from the
dignity of the British prime minister
and to disappointment, even to re-
sentiment, if failed to bring back a
satisfactory agreement.
I felt that in such a crisis, where
the issues at stake were 50 vital for a
million human beings, considerations
Of that kind could not be allowed to
prevail. Herr Hitler responded to my
suggestion with cordiality and on Sep
tember IS made my first flight to
Munich, and from there travelled by
train to Herr Hitler's mountain home
at Berchtesgaden.
I confess I was astonished at the
warmth of approval with which this
adventure was everywhere received, but
the relief which it brought for the mo-
ment was indication Of the gravity with
which the situation had been viewed.
He Receives Jolt, However.
At this first conversation, which
lasted three hours and at which only
an interpreter was present besides
Herr Hitler and myself. very soon
became aware the situation was much
more acute and much more urgent
than had realized.
In courteous but perfectly definite
terms, Herr Hitler made it plain he
had made up his mind the Sudeten
Germans must have the right of self
determination and of returning. If
they wished, to the Reich. If they
could not achieve this by their own
efforts. he said, he would assist them
to do so and he declared categorically
that, rather than wait, he would be
prepared to risk world war.
At one point, he complained Of
British threats against Germany, to
which I replied he must distinguish
between a threat and a warning and
that he might have just cause for COM
plant if I allowed him to think that
AL llo SA4SulllSGdllSCo WoQlu I41lS NOulle
try go to war with Germany when in
fact, there were conditions in which
such a contingency might arise.
Hitler Wanted Assurance.
So strongly did get the impression
that the Chancellor was contemplate
ing an immediate invasion of Czecho-
slovakia that asked him why he had
allowed me to travel all that way
since I evidently was wasting my time
He said If I could give him there
and then the assurance the British
government accepted the principle of
self-determination, he was quite ready
to discuss ways and means of carrying
it out.
If, on the contrary, told him such
q principle could not be considered by
the British government, then he agreed
1t was no use to continue our con-
versations.
was, Of course, in no position to
give there and then such assurance,
but undertook to return at once to
consult my colleagues If he would re-
frain from active hostilities until I
had had time to obtain their reply.
Promised If Hand Not Forced.
That assurance he gave, provided, he
said, nothing happened in Czecho-
slovakla of such nature as to force
his hand, and that assurance has re-
malned binding ever since.
have no doubt now. looking back.
that my visit alone prevented an in
vasion for which everything had been
prepared, and it was clear to me that,
with German troops in the positions
they then occupied, nothing anybody
could do would prevent an invasion
unless the right of self determination
was granted, and that quickly, to the
Sudeten Germans.
And that was the sole hope of a
peaceful solution.
I came back to London the next
Gay. That evening the cabinet met
and 1t was attended also by Lord
Runclman. who, at my request, had
Travelled from Prague. Lord Runci-
man informed us that although in his
view responsibility for the final breach
IN the negotiations at Prague rested
upon the Sudeten extremists, never
theless in view of recent DEVELOPMENTS
on the frontier, the districts between
Czechoslovakia and Germany where
sudeten population was in the ma
1orlty should be given the full right |
OF self-determination at once.
Cession Considered Inevitable.
He considered the cession of the
territories to be inevitable and thought
1t should be done promptly. Measures
for peaceful transfer could be arranged
between the two governments. The
Germans and Czechs, however. would
still have to live side by side in many
other parts of Czechoslovakia. In those
areas, Lord Runciman thought the
basis ought to be sought for local au-
tonomy on the lines of the fourth plan |
published by the Czechoslovak govern
ment July 10.
He considered that the dignity and |
security of Czechoslovakia could be |