Evening star., 1938-10-16
By Joseph S. Edeerfon.


Carolina can set up and man such a net
in case of emergency.
For this reason it is of interest to review
briefly some of the story of the Fort Bragg
exercises, which will come to a close this
week with competitive firing by the three
anti-aircraft regiments having batteries in
the field there
The North Carolina warning net-or any
other anti-aircraft warning net-has two
primary purposes it was explained by Brig.
Gen. Fulton @ c. Gardner who COM
manded the joint air-ground defenses of
Fort Bragg. The first is to enable friendly
pursuit aviation to make interception with
the attacking enemy bombardment avia-
ton; after all, the chief defense against
aerial bombardment is in the air before
the bombers can reach their target, not
in shooting them down from the ground
after they get there. The second is to dis
seminate information to civilian and mill
tary activities likely to be subject to aerial
bombardment so they can protect them
selves by such means as the black-out at
night or by taking shelter, if nothing more,
during the day.
I'VE have problems in setting up warn
ing net that no other country has had to
face" Gen. Gardner said. They must be
approached in purely American fashion.
Our institutions and customs differ so
greatly from those of European countries
that We cannot work in the same way.
Voluntary Services.
ITO be effective at all warning net
must be so extensive as to prohibit the
use of military personnel. AS these exer-
cises have demonstrated, We must have
a net extending at least $50 to 200 miles
inland from the coast if We are to be
supplied with sufficient warning to do any
good. The problem must be solved by use
of civilian observers, and under our form
of government they must give their services
voluntarily"
Bombardment airplanes today travel at
such high speeds-up to 240 miles per
hour in the case of the giant four-engined
Boeing Bit flying fortresses-that pursuit
airplanes cannot overhaul them in short
race. This means that the pursuit must
operate as nterceptors, not really as pur-
suit at all, Gen. Gardner pointed out. To
function as interceptors the pursuit officers
must have the benefit of frequent and
constant observation. Under the North
Carolina plan which involved the dividing
of the State into squares measuring miles
in each direction, with an observation post
in each square, reports on the movements
of the invading bombardment airplanes
were coming into defense headquarters
every 2l2 to minutes on the movements OF
each plane or formation. Previous warm
ing net exercises had involved the setting
up of observation posts 8 miles apart on
circles so, 100 and $50 miles outside the
defense center This worked well except
that it failed to provide the element of
constant observation necessary to deter
mine whether the on-coming airplanes held
to straight course.
Under the North Carolina system, even
small changes of course were readily de-
tected and the pursuit commanders were
given constant accurate information. The
result was that, with 33 attackers in the air,
in widely separated flights and at varying
attitudes, the pursuit commander reported
that his airplanes had made no less than
81 interceptions on the first exercise-re-
garded as atremarkable record.
$50 Reports Received.
During the period of less than two hours
from the time the first enemy" reconnais-
sance airplane crossed the coastline until
the attack on Fort Bragg had been fully
developed no less than $50 reports were re-
ceivad from the observers. Despite the fact
that some of the observers we're then using
long-distance telephones for the first time,
their reports reached the defense headquar-
ters; after being relayed through key col
lection points, in from three to eight min
utes after the observations were made.
There had been considerable conjecture
as to whether an unframed civilian could
give the information which would be re-
quired for defense purposes" Gen. Gardner
said. Some people insisted that to be of
value reports must show types, numbers,
altitude and other technical facts concern
ing the attacking airplanes. These tests,
however, show that unframed observers can
give us 95 per cent of the information We
need-that is, are there many airplanes or
few and are they high or low? Given these
facts, frequently and constantly, our trained
personnel can apply the necessary deduc-
tions as to types of airplanes and the nature
Of the coming attack"