Evening star., 1938-12-18
Axis Claims Menace
Chamber|ain'sT
To Rome in January
Territory Demands May
Result in FuiIure
Of Peace Mission
BY J. C. STARK,

W S0SS SVuSSIVu
BY J. C. STARK,
Associated Press Foreign Correspondent.
LONDON, Dec. 17.-Boosted price
demands Of the axis powers and in
sistent clamor in Britain and France
against meeting them threaten fall
ure for Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain's projected appease-
ment trip to Rome in January.
Italy's avowal Of claims to French
Tunisia and Corsica added to Ger
many's own campaign for return of
her war-lost colonies confront the
British Premier with hard problems
in his forgetting for peace" policy.
One Of the objectives Of the Rome
trip was to try to bring Italy and
France into friendship agreement
such as the newly ratified Anglo
Italian pact. But the shouts Of "Tu-
nisia" and Corsica" in the Italian
Chamber Of Deputies after a recent
speech by Foreign Minister Count
Ciano further clouded relations be-
tween the two countries and led to
French protest.
Both British and French officials
meanwhile had to declare against
transferring any colonial territory
to Germany to quell public anxiety.
Skepticism Increased.
Mr.. Chamberlain announcement
Of his proposed trip to Rome, fol-
lowed quickly by the Italian demon
strations foreshadowing possible
formal demands on France for colo
NAL territory, increased skepticism
of the Premiers foreign policy.
Pessimism over the results of the
Munich settlement Of the CZecho-
Slovakian crisis already had cut
deeply into Mr.. Chamberlain's own
conservative policy.
Only the rigid disciplinary system
Of the Conservative whips in Parlia-
ment held together heavy ,najorities
for the government on vital foreign
and defense issues.
Despite setbacks abroad and crit
icism at home, however, Mr.. Cham
berlain held firm to his determine
ton against sitting still and waiting
for peace to come"
Another meeting with Chancellor
Hitler was believed to have been
first on Mr.. Chamberlain's agenda
for following up the personal con-
facts he established with the dicta-
tors during the Czecho-Slovak crisis.
The campaign against Jews in
Germany stirred such resentment in
England, however, that the Premier
had to put off any further gestures
to Hitler
Even before this Anglo German
relations had become strained by the
Nazi press and platform attacks, led
by Hitler himself, against leading
British critics of Mr.. Chamberlain's
foreign policy. They spared Mr..
Chamberlain but embarrassed him,
nevertheless, for they constituted
virtually a warning to him against
taking Nazi critics into his govern
ment.
Other Disquieting Events.
Other developments in Central
Europe after the four-power peace
of Munich were disquieting to many
in England.
These were:
Hitler's complete political and
economic subjugation Of the shrunk-
en- Czecho-Slovak republic; his plans
for broad high road straight
across Czecho- Slovakia to the East;
persistent reports he envisages con-
troll of a Ukrainian state carved
from Eastern Czecho- Slovakia, Po-
land and Russia; Germany's strenu-
GUS drive to include all the Balkans
in her own trade orbit and make
them dependent upon her economi-
cally.
Finding the road to early ap-
peasement with Germany blocked,
Mr.. Chamberlain turned to Premier
Mussolini Of Italy, who at Munich
had invited him to Rome.
ment Spain feared the Premier
British quarters that he might be
willing to make further concessions
to Italy. These skeptics saw little
to be gained from tn trip unless he
did.
British sympathizers with govern
ment Spain feared the premier
might agree to grant belligerent
rights to the insurgent Gen. Franco
in return for Mussolinis help in
furthering the appeasement pro-
gram with Hitler.
Strong Weapon for Franco.
Belligerent rights would give Gen.
Franco a strong weapon for starv-
ing out government Spain. Many
British conservatives share the view
of liberals that q Franco victory
would endanger further the safety
of both Britain and France.
The Tunisia and Corsica threats
from Italy strengthened French OBJ
jections to the granting of belliger-
ent rights.
While Italy became more friendly
toward Britain with the ratification
Of their Mediterranean agreement,
and Italy turned still cooler toward
France, the latter improved her re-
lations with Germany at the same
time that the Anglo rela-
tions were becoming more strained.
These contradictions were widely
suspected here to be Rome-Berlin
axis strategy to drive wedge be-
tween Britain and France.
They furnished fuel for criticism
Of Mr.. Chamberlain and increased
the task confronting him in his at
tempt to bring the four major Eu-
ropean powers into a broad ap-
peasener,t pact.