The Waterbury Democrat., 1938-05-05

him two important and dia
 One was a 10,000-word prelimin- ary draft of message by Soli- citor General Bob Jackson, author of previous trust-busting speech es. The other was long letter from Don Richberg, once MIRA ex- ecutive, now big-shot lawyer, which proposed the same monopoly con- trols supposed to exist under NRA, namely self-government of business.
 Richberg expected to be called to the White House to help write the monopoly message, but the summons never came. Instead the President sent for Jackson and his chief, Attorney General Cum mings, showed both of them the Richberg letter.
 Jackson read it and remarked drily: "The same old stuff."
 Cummings differed. Sounds very good to me-" he said.
 "It doesn't to me-" replied the
 
 and unconvincing."
 Cummings withdrew shortly af- terward, leaving the President to work entirely with Jackson in whipping the monopoly message into final form.
 MOmentOus Decision
 This conference was even more significant than appears on the surface. It represented a long period of hemming and having between the President and his ad- visers on both sides of the road. His final decision to take the left road, therefore, is interpreted by his inner council to mean that he will follow that road without deviation in the future.
 Hitherto Roosevelt has played a policy which might be de- scribed as Balancing Prejudices." He dealt out a hand in favor of his left-wing group, then turned around and tossed few cards in the direction of his right -wingers. It was a policy of aiming a little left of cen.er'' but trying to keep both sides pacified.
 Regarding his monopoly mes- sage, Roosevelt was torn be- tween these two sides far more than anyone, except those on the inside, realized. The mes- sage was supposed to come out immediately after his return from Warm Springs, when Bob Jackson rode north on the train with him. But because of the vehement tug of war, 1t was delayed.
 On one side were the "Go Slow ers"-Secretaries Hull, Wallace, Attorney General Cummings, REC Chairman Jesse Jones and Don Richberg.
 On the other side were the "Hit-Harders"-Secretary Ickes, SEC Chairman Bill Douglas, Harry Hopkins, Bob Jackson, and Brain Trusters Henderson, Cohen and Corcoran.
 The Go-Slowers favored the Richberg plan of "self- govern ment" by the monopolies them selves. The Hit-Harders, on the other hand, claimed that the issue was clearcut and involved the vital problem of the concentra- ton of wealth.
 ArmageddOn
 After weeks of pulling in op- posite directions, two factors in- fluenced the decision:
 1. The growing insurgency of Old Guard Democrats. Their bat tie against Roosevelt on the re- organization fight convinced him that he never could get any real help from them. Naturally this strengthened the position of his liberal counselors.
 2. The LaFollette Third Party Movement. This very definite threat to take the progressives away from him convinced Roose- welt that he must be more pro- gressive than the Progressives.
 So he delivered the fighting at tack on monopolies recommended by Bob Jackson.
 Those closest to the President say that this was one of the most momentous decisions of his career, that the die is now cast for consistent swing to the left in all Roosevelt policies.
 As one of his intimate coun- selOrs remarked: "This is Ar mageddon. The President has determined that he has to shoot it out with Big Business this summer. It cannot be delayed further. He knows that either he is going to get them or they are going to get him." Spanish Protests
 Some of Secretary Hulls close friends are complaining that per- c0nol 1otforc fLox, Louo ca,t Ioiyx,