Evening star., 1938-03-24
Presidential Power.

The Presidents removal of DR.. Arthur
E. Morgan from the Tennessee Valley
Authority has focused attention once
again on the important question of where
the dividing line shall be drawn between
the power of the legislative and eXecu-
tive branches of the Government to dis
miss public officials. If the mutual in
dependence of both branches is to be
preserved there should be a judicial de-
clsion settling with all possible certainty
the question raised by the Morgan case.
In the first place, it should be conceded
that the President has some legal sup
port for his asserted power to remove
DR.. Morgan. He claims to derive his
authority in part from a section of the
Constitution charging the President with
the duty of seeing that the laws are
faithfully executed. 1t seems quite
obvious, however, that the constitutional
provision confers no authority on the
President to take unlawful action to
secure faithful execution of the laws. In
other words, the President must have
authority in law for his official acts, and
If that specific authority is lacking it
cannot be drawn from general phrase
of the Constitution.
Mr.. Roosevelt is on firmer ground,
however, when he points to the so-called
Myers case in support of the legality of
the removal. In that case the Supreme
Court said the President has absolute
authority to remove a postmaster, an
executive officer restricted to executive
functions and charged with no duty at
all related to the legislative or the Judi
cial power If DR.. Morgan can be placed
in that category, if he had no judicial
or legislative functions, the President
clearly was within his power in remov-
ing him, but it seems rather obvious that
the deposed chairman cannot be so
classified.
Another Supreme Court decision bear
ing on the question concerned the re-
moval by Mr.. Roosevelt of William E,
Humphrey, member of the Federal Trade
Commission, the justices holding unan-
imously that the President had exceeded
his authority. The act creating the
Trade Commission specified certain
things for which the President could
remove member. The President did
not contend Mr.. Humphrey had COM
mitted any of the prescribed acts. The
justices then decided that Mr.. Hum
phrey's duties were legislative and
judicial in character not executive.
therefore, they said, the President could
not remove him, the doctrine of the
Myers case not being applicable.
From the foregoing it would appear
that the decision in the Morgan case,
assuming it reaches the courts, will be
governed by the nature of his duties.
The act specifically authorizes the Presi-
dent to remove T. v. A. director only
upon finding that he appointed sub
ordlnates upon basis of their political
qualifications. Since DR.. Morgan was
not accused of that offense, it follows
that the President had power to remove
him only if his duties were executive in
character-if he functioned as an arm
or an eye' of the President.
To ascertain DR.. Morgans status one
must look to the intent of Congress as
expressed in the act. The language of
the statute makes it clear that he had
no judicial functions, but, unfortunately,
1t is ambiguous as to whether his duties
were OF executive or legislative nature.
Apparently Dr. Morgan's activities as
head OF the T. V. A. were both legisla-
tive and executive in character, and the
legality of his removal must turn on
whether he functioned primarily as an
executive or legislative agent
Perhaps the Supreme Court, should it
pass on the case, can lay down some
guiding principle to cover similar con-
troversies in the future. But If it does
not do so, and it probably will not, Con-
gress can guard against another Morgan
case by drafting its legislation in Ian
guage that will make 1t clear hereafter
whether a Federal employe occupies a
legislative, a judicial or an executive
status.