Evening star., 1938-09-29

pOSeo guarantee against unprOVOKeo
aggression.
On that point of guarantee he made
no objection, but he said he could not
enter into any guarantee unless other
powers. including Italy, we're also
guarantors.
said I had not asked them to enter
into q guarantee but that I had In
tended to ask him If he were willing
to enter into q pact Of non-aggression
with a new CzechoslovAkia. He said
he could not enter into such q COM
pact while the other minorities of
Czechoslovakia were not satisfied, but
that when they were satisfied he would
then be prepared to Join in an in
ternational guarantee.
Other Proposals Rejected.
He said he could not accept other
proposals which described to him on
grounds they were too dilatory and
offered too many opportunities for eva
sion. He insisted solution was essen
tial on account of the terrorism and
oppression with which the Sudeten
Germans were faced.
chamberlain said Hitler then
gave him an outline of the pro-
posals subsequently embodied in
the famous memorandum, except
he did not in this conversation
actually name any time limit.")
The honorable members will realize
the perplexity in which I found my
self in being faced with this totally
unexpected situation. I had been told
at Berchtesgaden that, If principles
Of self-determination were accepted,
Herr Hitler would discuss with me
ways and means of carrying it out.
He told me afterward he never for
one moment supposed should be able
to come back and say that the princi-
pie was accepted
(The Prime Minister added he
did not think Hitler deliberately
deceived him.
Hitler Provides Shock,
When I got back to Godesberg I
thought I had only to discuss quietly
with him the various proposals already
submitted. was shocked when, at
the beginning Of the conversations, he
(Hltler) said these proposals were not
acceptable and that there were other
proposals which I had not contem-
plated at ALL
felt had to consider what I had
to do. Consequently withdrew with
my mind full Of foreboding as to the
success OF my mission. have seen
speculative accounts of what hap
pened the next day which suggested
that long hours passed whilst re-
mained on one side of the Rhine and
Herr Hitler on the other because had
dimculty in obtaining assurances from
him about the removal of his troops.
I want to say at once that this is
purely imaginary. There was no such
difhculty. We had arranged to re-
sumo our conversation at 1l:30 the
next morning, but in view of the dit
hculty Of talking with q man through
an interpreter and the fact I could
not feel sure that what I had been
saying had always been understood
and appreciated by him, I thought it
would be wise to put down on paper
some comments upon these new pro-
posals Of his and let him have 1t some
time before the talks began.
Ready to Convey Proposals.
Accordingly. I wrote letter (which
Is No. 4 in the white paper) which I
sent him. I sent that soon after
breakfast and in 1t I declared my
readiness to convey the proposals to
the Czechoslovak government, but I
pointed out what thought to be grave
dimculties in the way OF their ac-
ceptance.
On receipt Of this letter the Chan
cellor intimated he would like to say
something in reply.
The reply was not received until
Wednesday afternoon and contained
no more proposals than those which
had been described to me the night
before. Accordingly. replied. asking
for q memorandum of the proposals
and copy Of the map for transmission
to Prague, and intimating my inten-
ton Of returning to England.
The memorandum and map were
handed me at my final interview with
the Chancellor. which began at 1890
that night and lasted into the small
hours Of the morning, and at which
the German foreign secretary was
present as we'll as Sir Neville Henderson
and Sir Horace Wilson.
For the first time. I found in the
memoranda new proposals and spoke
very frankly. I dwelt with all the
emphasis at my command upon the
risks which would be incurred by in.
sisting on such terms.
I declared the language and man.
ner of the document, which I de-