The Waterbury Democrat., 1938-09-23

A NAAaAN
 Sketch No. 1-kJust seven years ago--March 90. 1gSl--the world awoke one morning to find that Germany and Austria had nego- tiated O. atcustoHns union. It was a very tame affair, providing mere iy for the reduction of customs duties between the two countries, plus certain mutual financial sup- port.
 The Kredit Anstaldt of viena, most important bank in Southeast Europe, was in shalSy condition, and 0ernan-Austriari financiers knew that they had to act to save . collapse of their whole system.
 But news of the customs union brought immediate protests from
 the ex-.Alllcs. France and
 Cxechoslcyakia were especially loud In their denunciatiOn. So
 Germany bowed, reIinquished the customs union. 3gPf v
 Two months later, Chancellor Bruening and Foreign Minister Curtius paid a humble visit to CheQuers, spent c weekend warn- ing Prime Minister Macdonald that Germany was near the end of her financial rope.
 The British did nothing. one month later. the crash came. Banks closed through ell south- central Europe. Only the Hoover moratorium and large credits from the Bank of England and the Fed erai Reserve opened them. That was the beginning of derr1any's protest against privation, It was the beginning of Adolf Hitler's rise to power. It marked the beginning of the end for Ger rnany's moderate social-Demo- cratic government.
 Today
 Sketch No. 2 is too recent to re- quire description. The Prime minister of Great Britain, aristo- cratic representative of a proud nation, took his first airplane trip in order to plead with ail ex-cor- poral of the German army.
 He got an uItimatum from
 Che ex-cOrporal, and the Prime
 Minister of Great Britain sur-
 rendered. Czechoslovakla, which once protested SO vigorously against V mere customs union
 between Austria and Germany, now is to be disnaembered.
 Behind the change registered in those seven brief years was, of course, the greed of the one- time victor, plus three great de. cisions of postwar history-de- cisions which told Hitler that when he talked with Chamber. lain at Berchtesgaden, Chamber lain would not fight.
 Mistake In Mediterranean
 The first decision was in 1885 when Anthony Eden, Foreign Min. ister of Britain. ordered the mighty British fleet into the Medi- terranean in order to enforce League sanctions and stop the Italian war against Ethiopia.
 The British could have been successful. But to use the fleet meant 6 risk of serious war, and the Cabinet in London was not willing to take that risk. So the British fleet finally backed out of the Mediterranean and Musso. lini came home triumphant.
 The Germans--not then allied
 with Mussoiini watched,
 amazed. They decided that the
 British were afraid to fight, that
 if Italy could get away with it,
 Nazi Germany could also.
 Rhineland Evaded
 Second decision came 6 few months later when Hitler decided to test out the discovery he had made about the British. Because his test chiefly involved the French, however, he was defin. itely nervous.
 On March 2, 1886. Hitler sent his troops goose-stepping into the Rhineland. This was border ter. ritory barred to German rearma- ment by the Treaty of Versailles, and German Qualifications there meant that the great aMaeinot line virtually was nullified. It meant that if France some day should want to come to the aid of Czecho- slovakia, she could not advance far on German soil. New Ger man Notifications would be too powerful.
 Realizing the seriousness for France of this move. German troops carried double marching or ders, the second order being to retreat in case of French resist- ance.
 <. But the French Cabinet sat