The Waterbury Democrat. [volume] (Waterbury, Conn.) 1917-1946, 1938-10-21


Alarmed by several reports Of
public apathy toward the elections,
the inner council boys are urg-
ing the President TO 60 on the air
this month as well as on the eve
Of the balloting. A brace Of
snappy talks, they believe, would
fan up popular interest,
Lack of excitement over the
elections is worrying New Deal
strategists because they fear 1t will
play into the opposition's hands
by enabling 1t to pour In the
dough at the last minute and
score otherwise impossible VIC
tories.
Public indifference TO the cleo
lions Is attributed by politicos to
three factors: Reaction from the
tension of the recent war crisis IN
Europe, which was so terrifying
that everything else paled into in
significance; improving economic
conditions which have created q
mellower national frame of mind;
and the lack of any outstanding
issue or candidate.
Munich Aftermaths
1t is now beginning to leak out
that lot of people inside the
State Department went absolutely
haywire on the Munich conference,
thought 1t would usher in q new
millennium Of peace.
But there was one man who
didn't-CORDELL HULL.
Hull kept saying from the
start: "You can't depend on the
French and British. They're go
ing 70 sell Czechoslovalsia short.
We can't afford to get mixed
up with them"
From the beginning to the end,
Mr.. Hull did not change his tune.
Some Of his advisers, however,
differed with him considerably.
Joe Kennedy, usually sagacious
ambassador OF London, was one Of
those who got himself pretty far
out on O limb. Joe kept cabling
the State Department that the
Britishh were going to stand pat.
that they would not desert
Czechoslovakia. He even urged
the state Department 10 start
mobllizing American public
opinion In support OF Britain.
Some State Department peo.
pie looked a little askance at
Joe's cables, said TO themselves:
Looks like this Boston Irish
man Is being taken In by the
British" Other State De.
partment people heartily agreed
with Kennedy.
Later 1t appeared that Cham
berlain had seen Kennedy immedi-
ately after the Godesburg meeting
with Hitler. And Chamberlain
had told Joe that the Nazi Man
had increased his demands, and
that the British had reached the
limit, were not going to take any
more Nazi rough stuff,
Kennedy believed this, made It
the basis OF his cables to the State
Department. After Munich and
Chamberlain's surrender, Joe went
around the embassy looking blue,
and wondering whether he could
trust bosom friend Neville In the
future.
Diplomatic B0ners
ANOTHER high official who
went haywire on the Munich
agreement was sedate Sumner
Welles, under secretary OF state
After the agreement was signed,
he expressed belief that II marked
a new era Of peace. He differed
vigorously with Assistant Secre-
tary Of State George Messersmith,
who wrote O memorandum point
ing out that Munich was Just
the beginning Of Hitlers' march
into Southeast Europe.
Messersmith also criticized the
whole Munich mess for leaving out
Russia, pointing out that Russia
was the one nation powerful
enough TO balance Hitler's bel
ligerency. (Mesesrsmith once
was consul In Berlin, later min
lister to AUSTRIAN
ANOTHER who guessed wrong
was cocky Assistant Secretary OF
State Berle. Trusting Hitler, he
hailed the Munich accord with
hosannas.
Best ambassadorial reporting
during the Czech crisis was done
by ball-headed Bill Bullitt, am
bassador TO France. Builitt never
wayered from his prediction that
France would not stand up against
Hitler, would sell the Cxechs
down the river.
Pacific Shipyards
If the President puts through
a plan he Is now secretly consid-
ering, the Pacific coast win be-
NATURALIZATION.