Evening star., 1938-01-30
BY JOHN C. HENRY.

VIZ DOOM.
By JOHN C. HENRY.
Nur Of strange welter Of agree
ments and disagreements given
~ voice by leaders Of Government,
industry and labor, the Senate Unem-
ployment Committee hopes soon to present
to the Nation its most comprehensive
analysis Of why the country went into
q record breaking economic tailspin last
fall and what should be done to cure
the present attack and others like it.
Currently, committee members and
their technical staff are studying three
weeks Of public testimony and mass Of
other data accumulated ever period Of
several months. -
Most intriguing was the cross-section
OF opinion gathered during the open
hearings as witnesses blamed the sudden
collapse Of business on everybody from
President Roosevelt to J. P. Morgan. and
on everything from too much buying to
too little buying. Some thought the drop
in the stock market forced the recession,
others thought the recession forced the
drop in the stock market Some blamed
payment of the soldiers bonus. Some
we're optimistic, others were pessimistic.
Not a few of those of highest standing in
their respective fields confessed themselves
baf11ed by the entire situation.
Knudsen Frankly Puzzled.
One of those most frank in confessing
his inability to understand why the record
business activity of the first part Of 1887
should have reversed itself 50 sharply was
William Knudsen, president of General
Motors Corp. His sales officials, he testi-
fed, reported only the sudden appearance
of psychology of fear on the part Of
potential customers, causing them to
hesitate to spend money for new auto
mobiles.
But his only defense when asked If
General Motors was not contributing to
that fear by discharging 10000 men at
one time was that business already had
gone bad and that anyway he couldn't
build cars on psychological basis.
In spite of the committees obvious i'm
patience dt this type of testimony, none
were able to muster any very formidable
ACOuIldi W lIlC COAOAJ oAAAAPAC ShP1dAidSAoAA
of Mr. Knudsen, which might be para
phrased as follows:
II make automobiles, as many as think
people will buy. When people stop buying.
I stop making When I do not need to
make more automobiles, have no jobs
for workmen."
Similar Philosophy Presented.
Variously phrased, numerous other en-
ployers of labor presented a similar phi
losophy, one which is difficult to answer
from the economy Of the individual en-
ployer, but which very frankly contem.
plates doing little along the lines of
assuring working men and women OF jobs.
The answer, in which spokesmen OF
Government, labor and industry agreed.
was relief financed principally by the Fed
eral Government. From that basic agree
ment, however, there was wide scattering
Of opinion.
Many industrialists, committed first to
the somewhat contradictory objectives of
reduced taxes and balanced budget, very
obviously leaned toward direct relief rather
than work programs, although some were
reluctant to state their position clearly
in support Of dole. John D. Biggers.
director Of the national unemployment
census and an industrialbt in his own
right, was one Of those who admitted
favoring direct relief rather than work
relief. Attempting to call the former
something other than . dole, he exhibited
what is apparently confusion in his own
mind by classifying unemployment COM
pensation in the dole category. Since
unemployment compensation benefits bear
direct relationship to previous employ
n1ent and to premiums paid by employers
and in some cases by employees. with no
requirement Of need, it Is somewhat far
removed from a dole.
In view of rather widespread shaking of
heads at the magnitude of the public
works programs initiated in the early years
OF the Roosevelt administration, 1t was
noticeable how unanimous was the testi-
mony Of all witnesses. many Of whom
showed themselves to be implacsble foes
Of the New Deal In favor Of this parttcu.
hr federsl policy In times oe depression.
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