Evening star., 1938-10-04
BY tde Associated Press.

LONDON, Oct. 4.-The text Of the
speech made by Prime Minister Cham
berlain in the House Of Commons yes
terday follows:
It has been my lot to- listen to more
than one speech by minister who
came to this house to explain the rea-
sons why he had felt 1t necessary to
resign his office in the government.
have never been able to listen to
such speeches without emotion.
For a man to give up. as Mr.. Dun
Cooper has just SO eloquently de-
scribed, q great position in associa-
ton with friends In pursuit OF work
IN which he takes pride and interest
for man to give up these things for
conscience's sake must lead every one
to listen to him with respect.
This afternoon I make no attempt
70 answer him or to defend myself
against the structures which he has laid
upon the policy the government has
been pursuing.
Not that have anything to with
draw or regret (cheers), but that in
the course Of this debate there will
be no doubt other criticisms which
can be answered before the debate
closes, and desire to open the dis
cussion with a speech I would have
made If Mr.. Duff Cooper had not
resigned.
Under Shadow Of War.
I do that in order that may give
the House background, as we see
1t, OF the events that have taken
place and the decisions that have
been taken.
When the House met last Wednesday
we were all under the shadow of an
imminent menace. A war more stark
and terrible than had ever taken place
before seemed to be staring us in the
face.
Before had sat down q message
had come which gave us new hope
that peace might yet be saved
Today, or q few days later, We
tointed in Joy and thankfulness that
the prayers Of millions had been an
swered.
Our anxiety has been lifted from
our hearts. On the members Of the
cabinet the strain of responsibility
has been for weeks almost overwhelm-
ing.
Some Of us, have no doubt, will
carry the marks of it for the rest
of our days.
Praises Halifax.
Necessarily, the weight fell heavier
upon some shoulders than upon
others. While all bore their parts,
would like here and now to pay
special tribute of gratitude and
praise to the man upon whom fell
the first brunt of those decisions
which had to be taken day by day
and almost hour by hour-to the
courage, the patience and the wisdom
of the foreign secretary (Vkcount
Halifax.
His lofty conception of his duty,
not only to this country, but to all
humanity, dominated us all and sus-
tanned us through the darkest hours.
Before come to describe the agree
nent which was signed at Munich in
the early hours of Friday morning I
would like to remind the House of
two things which I think it Is very
essential not to forget when these
terms are being considered.
The first is this. We did not 90
there to decide whether the predomi-
nantly German areas in the Sudeten-
land should be passed over to the
German Reich.
That had been decided already when
the Czechosloyak government accepted
the Anglo-French proposal. (Ironical
Labor cheers)
What we had to discuss was the
method, the conditions and the time
of the transfer Of the territory.
The second, point We have to re-
member is that time was one of the
essential factors. All the elements were
present on the spot for the outbreak
of q conflict which might have precipi-
tated catastrophe.
Quick Conclusions REQUIRED.
There were considerable quantities
OF arms which were by no means con-
fined to regularly organized forces and,
therefore, it was essential that We
should quickly reach a conclusion so
that this painful and difficult opera
ton OF transfer might be carried out,
beginning at the earliest moment and
concluded as soon as was consistent
with orderly procedure, in order that
We might avoid the possibility of
something which might have rendered
all our attempts at peaceful solution
useless.
The House will remember that when
I last addressed them I gave them
some account of the Godesberg memo
randun, with the terms of which they
are familiar.
They will recollect also that I ex-
pressed frankly my view that the terms
were such as were likely to shock
public opinion generally in the world
and bring prompt rejection by the
Czechoslovak government.
Those views were confirmed by the
results.
The immediate and unqualified re-
lection Of that memorandum by the
Czechoslovak government was COM
municated to us at once by them.
What I think the House will desire
to take into consideration first this
afternoon is what is the difference be-
tween these unacceptable terms and
the terms which were included in the
agreement signed at Munich be-
cause 1t is on the difference between
those two documents there will de-
pend the judgment as to whether we
We're successful in what We set out
to do.
say, first of all, that the Godesberg
memorandum, although it was cast in
the form of proposals, was in fact an
ultimatum with a time limit of six
days.
Points in Treaty.
On the other hand, the Munich
agreement reverts to the Anglo French
plan which lays down the conditions
for the abdication and the RESPONSE
bility Of the four powers and interna-
tiOnal supervision of the main nrin-