The Waterbury Democrat., 1938-05-28

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 I sori. It is "an artificial being, invis- ible, intangible and existing in con- temptation of law"
 Dartmouth College vs. Woodward Wheat. 518, 636.
 Cooke, Corporations 9th Ed Sec. 1
 Clearly the State falls within that definition of a corporation. It is an artificial person. It is a legal enti- ty There are two things about the statute in question which indicate clearly that the phrase public cor poration therein was used in the sense of including the State. The first is that the title of the statute is "Embezzlement by public officer" Certainly every state officer is a public officer and it was clearly the intent of the legislature to strike at embezzlement by all public officers. If the title of the statute means anything it means that She statute is intended to cover embezzlement by all public officers and that can be effectuated only by construing public corporations" as used in the body of the act so as to include the State.
 In the second place, the statute refers to public, municipal and private corporations" What sort of corporation could have been in the minds of the legislature as com- ing within the designation of public other than the State, All of the public corporations which exist other than the state are municipal cor porations. If the legislature had not intended to include the State 1t could have omitted the word "pub- lie" altogether. The fact that it used the word municipal" as we'll as public as modifying the word corpo- ration indicates clearly that in using the phrase public corporation the legislature intended to use it in the sense of including the State.
 It is argued by the accused that because Section 3132 Gen. St., Rev. 1880 provides penalty for the viola ton of "any provision of Part III of this chapter" and Section 3115 which requires a Town Clerk to re- init license fees collected to the treasurer of the State, is included in said Part TIT, no penalty may be imposed on this accused other than that provided in Section 3132. Such position is not tenable. In essence the contention is that, because a man is guilty of one offense he can- Nf fense involved in the same transac- tion even though he is guilty of the latter offense also. It might as well be argued that where a man has committed an aggravated assault he may be prosecuted only for sim pie assault. In the present case, it is true that the accused is guilty of violation of one of the provisions of Part III of Chapter 186 of the General Statutes but 1t is also true that he was the agent of the State and that the funds which he mis- appropriated were the funds of the State. Because these additional ele- ments were involved in the transac- tion he has also committed the crime of embezzlement and may be prose- cuted for that.
 As to the second count the agreed statement of facts is to the effect that the accused appropriated to his own use hunting and other license fees collected by him during the month of January 1887 in the amount of $399O0. The contention of the State is that that constitutes a violation of Section 6372 Gen St. Rev. 1880. That section imposes a penalty on "any officer or agent of any public community who shall, with intent to prejudice 1t, appro- priate it's property to the use of any person"
 It is obviously the intent of the statute to cover situations where a public community has been de- frauded by it's agent but where the crime of embezzlement has not been committed because the element of possession or control of the funds or property of the community by the agent is absent from the offense. That is 1t creates crime which hes some of the elements of embezzle- ment by an agent of a public com- munity but not all.
 It is concluded, however, that the State comes within the term public community" as that is used in the statute and as stated above that the accused was an agent of the State. There can be no doubt that the &C., cused with intent to prejudice it (the state) appropriated its property to the use of any person." The case therefore comes within the terms of this particular statute and the mere fact that there were additional facts involved in the transaction which would have made the accused guilty of the greater crime of en- bezzlement under Section TIT c Cum. Supp. 1885 does not preclude his being prosecuted under Section 6372.
 The finding of the court Is that the accused is guilty on both counts. INGLIS, J.