Evening star., 1937-12-28

on one man tne
power Of life and death over their sons
and many people likewise do not relish
the idea of a system OF government
which gives the power Of life and death
TO one man over the agricultural. the
Industrial or the credit system of the
Nation.
But as population has grown and as
the States have either neglected to or
found themselves unable to control
various business operations that cross
State lines, the trend toward centrali-
Eation of more power in the Federal
Government has in turn developed
into . practice Of delegating legislative
powers to commissions and bureaus
under the control of the Executive.
In England and France large
amount Of centralization Of authority
In the national government has been
permitted, but the people maintain
check on the possible arbitrariness or
mistakes Of the National Government
by means Of the recall system.
Would Halt Arbitrary Action.
The overthrow of parliamentary
governments whenever the national
will differs from the action Of the
parliament or the presiding ministry
has been criticized as bringing
certain amount of instability as against
the American system of fairly rigid
tenure of Office for the Chief Executive
Yet 4 plan that would enable the
people to register their wishes instantly
would be just as effective in preventing
q plaunge by the Executive into war
as 1t would be a means of halting
arbitrary action by an Executive who
possesses vast powers over the eco
nomic life of the Nation.
The cure for possible mistakes Of
the Executive is not to be found In
one device aimed merely at restraining
executive action on foreign policy
the one subject on which there is apt
to be closer approximation of una
nimity than on any other because par
tisanship usually disappears in time of
international crisis-but in some plan
that would be continuously operative
In restricting the executive agencies
from going beyond the wishes of the
people.
The referendum plan has been chal- !
lenged as futile by some who say that |
by the time the referendum is taken |
on the concrete issue Of participation |
In the war, the Executive and his asso- |
ciates can have committed the Nation |
to a war policy because OF incidents |
occurring long before the actual par
ticipation in war comes up for de- |
cision.
Continuous Restraint"
To put it another way, if there are
large groups of citizens who feel that
democracy can best be preserved by
putting into operation a continuous
restraint upon the Executive, then |
some plan which provides for the re-
call Of Presidents whenever two-thirds
Of both houses of Congress shall will
1t would seem to be a logical answer.
But here again there IS no check on
Congress except in the case Of the
and In the case of Senators every six
years. If it were possible to institute
the recall of either Senators or Rep
resentatives in special elections when
ever one-third or some other desirable
percentage of the citizens should petit
ton for recall, then the advantages |
sought by the war referendum might |
be achieved as we'll as the opportunity |
to check an Executive on questions Of |
domestic policy which can be Of more |
vital consequence sometime, than ex- |
ternal policy.
There are, to be sure, viewpoints |
here, even among the administration |
oficials, which object to anything like |
the recall or the referendum principle. |
Their dissent goes to the question Of !
control of the electorate by propagan-
da, and especially through the use of |
radio facilities.
Looking back to 1917 when Con- |
gress-and not the President-actu-
ally had to decide the passage of a |
resolution formally recognizing that |
Germany had instituted a state of |
war against the United States, the |
vote was more than two-tnirds Of |
both houses. Certainly the recall |
plan would not have altered the cir
cumstances then unless, of course, the |
theory is held that members Of Con-
gress had no alternative but to &C.
cept the situation presented to them
In the Presidents war message.
II 1t be true that members of Con-