Evening star., 1937-04-04

1t is generally agreed, have proved
themselves faster in the air than the
German and Italian models, as have
been monoplanes as opposed to BIZ
planes. A high-speed Russian bomber
has been threat.
On the other hand, low-speed Junk
ers and faster Savoas, among the
largest bombers in Europe. have float
ed steadily over Madrid with rela-
tive impunity because Of excellent es-
cort by fighting planes and inefficient
handling of anti-aircraft guns by the
Madrid defenders.
The machine gun has been one of
the most important single factors in
the war. 1t was the machine gun.
expertly handled by Leftists for the
first time, which stopped the first at
tacks on Madrid.
Little of Importance has been
learned in the matter of artillery.
Most of the guns used have been small
field pieces, easily transported and
4 and inch guns. Some heavier
siege guns have been imported on the
insurgent side Improper handling
of guns was frequent during the first
months and even afterWard. Yet,
heavy artillery has proved one OF
Madrid's chief defenses, once the
militiamen learned how to handle
their guns.
Dearth of Good Workmanship.
There has been at all times, OBJ
servers agree. dearth of good marks
manship especially in mountain fight
ing and warfare along difficult ter
rain.
The human equation is still the
vital factor in the winning or losing
of wars.
The Spanish conflict has, if any,
thing, strengthened the emphasis on
the human element as opposed to
modern weapons of destruction and
defense.
Early months of the war. with a
small but we'll trained and profess
sional army opposing large numbers
of unframed and disorganized troops,
gave emphasis and definite advan-
tage to military science and good
weapons as demonstrated by the in
surgehts.
Recent months of the war, however,
with fighting reduced to more sta
tionary' maneuvers, and even stale
mated, has emphasized the factors of
morale, courage. generalship and
strategy. Insurgent foreign volun-
teers. now being used in increasing
numbers and more directly, were met
with the Leftist international Bri-
gade.'
Much the same has been true of
civilian populations. Air bombing
was effective in demoralizing the
population of all areas over which
the insurgents advanced to reach
Madrid. 1t demoralized government
troops as we'll. The effect of bombing
of Madrid has been different, how
ever, due to psychological factors of
pride, stubbornness and individual
courage.
There is no denial, however, that
air bombing has done extensive prop
erty damage and caused heavy casual
ties.
Foreign civilian protection experts
found that virtually nothing of use
in a future war was to be learned
from the bombing Of Madrid; except,
perhaps, that no building is invul-
nerable to a heavy bomb weighing
500 pounds Or more.
Madrid, these experts say, has not,
moreover, been bombed in the sense
ternational war. The largest fleet of
planes that ever appeared over the
Spanish capital consisted of fewer
than SO planes.
All in all there is no reason to be-
lieve, with the Spanish war as a guide,
that the human element in warfare
has been much interfered with by
modern science. If anything, 1t Is
claimed, modern weapons of war
fare have only put premium on
human endurance and ability to use
such weapons 1t has been shown
that manpower is important-it was
lack of reserves that kept Franco out
Of Madrid on his first try to storm
the city. 1t has been shown as we'll
that mere manpoWer is not sufficient;
that training counts for a great deal;
that individual courage is important;
that, given equally modern weapons,
equally courageous troops, it becomes,
now as in the past, matter of
guiding brains.
For future great wars, however,
it is agreed-wars in which highly
efficient armies will move with light
ming speed, in which enormous fleets
OF airplanes will strike quickly and
fass. and in which every effort will
be made to win quickly in order to
avoid stalemate-the Spanish war
has been very little more than an
indicator, and, because conditions
are hardly comparable, very little of
that.