Evening star., 1937-07-07

posals and counter proposals ad
vanced and, finally if an understand
Ing is reached to embody that under
definite term =.
We must not be considered as
holding that an employer is obligated
by the act to accede without more
to the terms of a contract presented
to him by the representatives Of his
employees. The act does not so pro-
vide. and We make no such interpre-
tation Thus an employer is not
required to sign the specific agree
ment presented to him by representa-
tives Of his employees. Nor is he obli-
gated to agree to any Of their de-
mands solely for the sake of reach
ing some agreement when genuine
accord is impossible although both
sides are acting in good faith.
Duty Imposed by Act.
But the line between these privi-
legged areas and the duty imposed by
the act is distinct; the employer must
negotiate in good faith in an en-
deavor to reach an understanding,
and that understanding if eventually
achieved must be incorporated into
an agreement if the representatives
OF the employees so request.
The board went on to say that this
did not mean contracts had to be
entered into for extended periods of
time but that they could be terminated
or modified by prescribed notice and
that the duration of an agreement,
like its terms, was matter for
negotiation.
But, it is argued by employer coun-
Sci, that this ruling was made in July,
1885, whereas the Supreme Court said
in April, 1887, that employers were
not obliged to sign contracts or even
make agreements with employees.
Hence what the Supreme Court said
IN its two decisions-March %. 1887.
and April IL, le37-furnishes the kew
to the puzzle.
First, the court in its opinion of
April II said the Wagner law was to
be construed just as were certain pas
sages Of the railway labor act.
Quotation of Court.
Next, the Court on April IL quoted
IN part, but net completely, from what
1t had said two weeks before in the
railroad labor case. 1t is important
to read the quotation of the unani-
nous court on March 2o as being the
controlling paragraph. 1t reads as
follows:
THE statute does not undertake to
compel agreement between the en-
ployer and employees, but it does COM
mand those preliminary steps with
out which no agreement can be
reached. 1t at least requires the en-
ployer to meet and confer with the
authorized representative of its en-
ployes, to listen to their complaints.
to make reasonable efforts to compose
difterences-in short, to enter into a
negotiation for the settlement of Ia
Dor disputes"
The procedure then that should
have been followed by the C. I. O.,
therefore, instead Of calling q strike
and engaging in violence, was to de-
mand an election. Once collective
bargaining representatives were chosen
the employers could have submitted
proposals to assure themselves of the
responsibility of the signers. To an
nounce In advance that no contract
would be signed, thus refusing in ef-
1ect to negotiate on the question of
now an agreement on the issue of re-
sponslblllty might be attained, either
through the posting of a bond or some
other device, may some day be held
by the courts to be violation by en-
ployers Of the Wagner act lust as in
slstence on the part of the c. I. O. or
any other union in tying up a plant
engaged in interstate commerce NAV
be some day held unlawful when no
effort has been made in good faith to
IND out who the employees in a given
plant actually want to represent them
in negotiations.
Ihis is all the more serious because
under the Wagner act only the en-
ployes may demand the holding of an
election. Failure to demand it will
doubtless be coupled with the con-
splracy OF minority to coerce a ma
Jorlty and to obtain contracts from
employers under duress.
Protection to Individual.
what protection is afforded to an
individual who does not wish to ioin
a union and who wants to work when
strike has been declared by either
minority or majority OF his fellow
employees?
This question goes to the heart of
present-day labor troubles and it be-
comes almost the paramount problem
OF the day because Congress in pass.
Ing the Wagner act omitted. not ac-
cldentally but deliberately, listing as
"an unfair labor practice" any coercion
by employees against fellow employees.
There must have been q reason, 1t
will be assumed at the outset, why
Congress thought it wise to reject sug-
gestions that employees be protected
against coercion by other employees Just
as the Wagner act protects employees
against coercion by employers
~ 1llIu JIle answer one must look
back to the debate in May, 1895, which
preceded the passage of the Wagner
act, and it is important to do so be-
cause Congress took step then in
the Interpretation of its powers which
the Governors of several States and
the Mayors of the cities throughout
the Nation may do well to study.
Contention of Wagner.
Senator Wagner, author of the law,
and Senator Walsh of Massachusetts,.
chairman of the Senate Labor Com
mittee, insisted that it was the duty
CT the States to exercise their police
powers and not for the Federal Gov
ernment to act as a policeman in cases
OF improper conduct or violence as
between individuals. The theory ex-
pressed by these two Senator's and
others was that the restriction upon