Evening star., 1937-04-04
BY ELMER PETERSON.

OF other correspondents and from
discussions NTH military obserDers.
BY ELMER PETERSON.
Y ONDON.-The Spanish civil
war, lengthy and destructive
though it has been, has done
~ relatively little to advance
military science as it might find ex-
preston in a major armed conflict
In Europe or elsewhere.
It has touched only lightly on a
proper conception of what Euro
pean war, or any war between highly
militarized nations, with full use of
air warfare, gas and big guns, would
be like.
This is now the opinion of trained
observers, both military and lay, both
from direct observation and from
close study of reports, now that the
war is we'll over its half-year mark.
The Spanish war has done no more.
In fact, up to the present, than to
permit the testing of certain types
of guns and equipment-and that
only on limited basis. Lessons
learned in the World War have been
re-emphasized and re-stated, but,
broadly speaking, nothing new has
been added to what generals have
learned through peacetime study and
maneuvers.
Spanish War Peculiar.
For the Spanish war has been, in
many ways, thing unto itself;
war fought under unusual conditions
and in a manner which, observers
agree, permits no adequate basis for
comparison for the future. 1t has
been guerilla and semiguerilla war
fare. 1t has been highway warfare.
There has been a primitive touch to
1t at times. There has been, of late
months especially, fully modern
note, but on a small scale. The mod
ern weapon of gas has not been used.
There has been no military strategy
which observers are willing to regard
as brilliant or extraordinary.
The most important lessons learned,
or rather emphasized, are the fol-
lowing:
l. That modern warfare, unless
victory is obtained through surprise
or overwhelming strength, still de-
pends on the human equation for
success. This is especially true when
scientific defense is placed against
scientific offense resulting in a stale
mate.
2. That modern military science
can aid defense as we'll as offense.
3. That civilian populations will
be directly involved in future wars
through air raids; but that the re-
sistance of such civilian populations,
In the way Of courage and stamina,
depends on q variety of factors, in
cluding heredity, health, pride Of
race, political ideals, intensity Of pur-
pose and conviction.
Specific Lessons Provided.
There have been specific lessons as
regards military equipment, including
the following:
l. Modern anti-aircraft guns, prop
erly handled, can provide an effec-
tive defense especially in the method
Of parallel barrage in which the guns,
electrically controlled and synchro-
nized, place a curtain of fire in front
OF advancing airplanes.
q That tanks are comparatively
useless unless used i: numbers and in
good conformance with infantry ad-
vance. Also that modern tanks need
far better armor plating.
3. That modern 37-mm. anti-tank
guns, which can kill at 200 yards are
effective.
4. That mechani8ed transport will
be . matter Of. increasing Importance
In modern warfare; that cavalry is Of
decreasing value.
S. That good craftsmanship must
not be overlooked
6. That high-speed bombers, well
armed, to the extent of being flying
fortresSes, are of increasing value;
that fighter airplanes must have
greater speed; that speed in military
airplanes does not diminish the neces-
sity Of well-trained pilots.
Other Lessons Through Negation.
Other lessons have been learned
through negation. Lack of organized
tactics characterized the Leftist forces
IN the early part of the war; was re-
sponsible for keeping them on the
defensive; that even masses Of un-
trained volunteers are no match for a
smaller but well-trained army.
On the whole, observers have found
good reason to believe, the showing
made by foreign equipment in Spain
has been disappointing and pro-
vides no blue ribbon for the coun-
tries which have provided such equip
ment.
The war during the first months, In
the character of military revolt, was
q matter of few armored cars, 15-
pound air bombs, limited amount
Of ordinary artillery, much of it i'm
properly handled. and little or no
modern anti-aircraft defense.
Mechanization on land, as it has de-
Gen. Franco, insurgent leader, ac-
quired about 80 small tanks, of Ger
man and Italian design, most of them
the two-man model and some equip
ped with a small cannon and flame
thrower. Leftists acquired a smaller
number OF Russian tanks, of larger
design. equipped with small cannon
as well as machine guns, and requir-
ing a crew of three or four men.
For both sides, 1t is now agreed,
the tanks have proved relatively in
eficient. Some OF them have been
stopped with anti-tank guns. There
are reports that the armor on some
of the insurgent tanks proved amaz-
ingly weak. Hand grenades and gas
oline, the latter thrown in bottles tied
to hand grenade, have been used by
both sides to destroy tanks.
Insurgents Have zoo Planes.
In the matter of airplanes, the in
surgents have been credited with hav-
ing about 100 German and Italian
bombers and about the same number
Of German and Italian fighters. The
Ihftists are credited with having