Coulee City dispatch. [volume] (Coulee City, Wash.) 19??-19??, 1937-10-28
Our Foreign
Policy

ment that is less
Our Foreign understood by the
Policy people at large
than questions or
actions relating to foreign policy. 1t
is easy to understand why this is so.
American foreign policy, like the
foreign policy of every other nation,
is closely akin to patchwork. 1t
cannot be otherwise because of the
very nature of the matters to be
dealt with officially Foreign policy,
indeed, is one thing to which Presi-
dent Roosevelt's oft-quoted state
ment about his decisions resembling
those of a football quarterback can
be most properly applied. It is a
day-to-day treatment with new de-
cisions as changes come in the in
ternational play.
This brings us to the Presidents
Chicago speech and the announce
ment by the State department of
American conclusions that Japan is
the aggressor in China. Of course,
all persons who have read anything
about the Sino-Japanese war knew
long ago that the Japs were con-
Quoting raid on China. Officials
of the government knew it also, but
there is difference and must be
difference in the methods employed
by individuals as distinct from those
employed by a nation which repre-
sents all of it's Individual citizens.
Time had to elapse, therefore, be-
fore our government or any other
could say definitely and publicly
that Japan was seeking to acquire
new territory by theft and seizure.
Many observers and many in
dividuals have indicated their sur
prise at the Presidents speech
which, by the way, was the most
distinct pronouncement of any that
he has ever made. There was like
wise surprise when the secretary Of
state, Mr.. Hull, gave the press his
statement condemning Japanese ag-
gression even though the statement
should have been anticipated after
Mr.. Roosevelt's Chicago speech and
after word had come from Geneva
that the League of Nations appeared
unanimous in the same conclusion.
The reason that say there should
have been no surprise concerning
the final position which our govern
ment has taken traces back to the
administration of President Hoover
and Henry L. Stimson, then secre-
tary of state. 1t was at that time
that a fundamental change took
place in our foreign policy but it
was not change that appeared to
be sensational at the moment. In
other words, the position which Mr..
Hoover and Mr.. Stimson took at
that time was overlooked because
there was no real crisis to attract
attention to American policy.
What that change in policy did is
plain now. 1t was the beginning of
the end of the isolationist program
which followed the bitter contro-
versy over President Wilson'S pro-
posal that the United States affiliate
with the League of Nations and adj
here to all phases of the program
embodied in the league covenant.
The reaction against Mr.. Wilson'S
plan was violent and carried us to
the other eXtreme-so much so that
for number of years we were
lone wolf among nations in fact as
well as in name.
The one thing that really repre-
sents an important change of pol
icy that Mr.. Roosevelt enunciated
at Chicago is his view of neutrality.
Without making any particular ref
erence to the neutrality statute en-
acted last winter under the sponsor
ship Of Senator Pittman of Nevada,
Mr.. Roosevelt announced without
equivocation that the United States
will do everything it can, short of
military force, to curb the japanese
course in China. That is to say,
and believe it is accurate, we will
not invoke the neutrality laws if
such course will do harm to the
Chinese. Rather, the American pol
icy for the time being at least in
wolves working hand in hand with
other nations that may be striving
to maintain International order and
morality in matters in which we
are directly concerned.
I have been asked several times
recently concerning the possibility
Keep Out of States NAV en-
FarEast War gage in actual war
in the Far East. T
think that eventuality is very far
removed.
Possibilities always exist for ma
ton to get tangled up International
ly under conditions such as obtain
throughout the world today, yet
do not believe that the United States
ever will do more in the Far East
than exert moral pressure upon the
Japs. 1t must not be overlooked,
however, that the bulk of Ameri-
can sympathy is with the Chi
nese. One cannot tell how far that
may lead us as nation. Nor is it
possible to forecast the weight of
this sympathy in an economic way.
mean by that, no one can fore
J tell what such a thing as boycott