Evening star., 1937-10-10
BRITAIN AND DICTATORS
JOCKEYINC FOR POSITION
Success of ''Throwing of Cauntlet'' to
Mussolini Held Unlikely-Removal of
Troops From Spain Seen Doubtful.

It's repercussions on the Far Eastern
situation. believes that this throw
ing of the gauntlet" at Mussolini k,-
not likely to meet with any success.
There was time. before Mussolini
had sent $1,000 men to help Franco,
when such a determined attitude on
the part of the two democratic powers
might have met with success. That
was in November, 1886. when the
Italian forces in Spain were not yet
actively engaged and their numbers
did not exceed 10000. But at that
time the French and the British pre-
ferred the elegant diplomatic solu-
tions OF making pretend" and direct
ed all their efforts to organizing and
putting into effect the London non.
Intervention committee, which proved,
in the end, to be just another futile
body.
Now. when Italy's honor" is en-
gagged in Spain, when Mussolini bare
facedly says that there are Italian
troops fighting on Francois side and
sends warm kilograms of congratulate
tons to his generals who are in COM
mand of the alleged volunteers, it
seems to our observers here that the
strong note dispatched to Rome a
week ago is somewhat useless. The
veiled threat that unless II Duce with
draws his men from Spain the French
government will throw its frontiers
open to permit war material and
soldiers to join the republican forces
ieaVes the Italian dictator unperturbed.
Number Of Volunteers Likely.
There is no doubt that French
citizens would be glad of the oppor-
tunity to fight for the Madrid gov.
eminent. But as q rule the number
OF men who are ready to risk death
for a cause Is not very large. In a
country like France, where the DEM
ocratic ideal is understood by ths
masses, ten or fifteen thousand men
might be ready to sacrifice their lives
and comforts. There is world of
dlfference between genuine volunteers.
coming by their own volition from
France. and the volunteers" or
ganized and ordered by Mussolini to
die for fascism in Spain.
For the Italian government. the
question of frances final victory is
almost as important as the submarine
campaign was for the German gov
ernment during the World War. At
that time the knowledge that the
United States would Join the allies
worried Berlin, and yet it did not
deter the imperial government from
continuing the submarine campaign.
Mussolini undoubtedly would pre-
Ter that the French and British main-
tain their present seni-neutral atti-
tude. But he is willing to take
chance at ircurring their displeasure
rather than order a single man back
to Spain.
The best that can be hoped from
II Duce is that his reply shall not be
a blunt rebuff to Great Britain anc
France; that to the veiled Franco
British threat he shall not answer
with another mystery" submarine
campaign. which would further COM
plicate the already involved Mediter-
ranean situation. 1t is difficult to
turn dictators from their set course
by threats or promises. They deal in
facts and will understand nothing but
| facts.
That the administration in Wash
ington keeps an eager eye on these
new developments In Western Europe
is comprehensive. For though Euro
pean developments are now of Sec
ondary significance 10 the United
States, their repercussions inevitably
will direct the trend Of the Far
Eastern hostilities.
fCopyright. 1877