Evening star., 1937-04-13

-COpyr1ght, A. p. WTephoto.
tions.-Respondent asserts its right to
conduct its business in an orderly
manner without being subjected to ar
bitrary restraints. What we have said
points to the fallacy in the argument.
Employees have their correlative right
to organize for the purpose of secur-
ing the redress of grievances and to
promote agreements with employers
relating to rates Of pay and condi-
tions of work. Texas 81 N. o. r. Co
VS.. Railway Clerks, supra; Virginian
Railway Co. VS.. System Federation
No. 40 Restraint for the purpose OF
preventing an unjust interference with
that right cannot be considered arbi-
trary or capricious. The provision OF
section (a) that representatives, for
the purpose Of collective bargaining
of the majority of the employees in
an appropriate unit shall be the ex-
elusive representatives of all the en-
ployes in that unit, imposes upon the
respondent only the duty of confer
ring and negotiating with the author
lied representatives of its employees for
the purpose Of settling labor dispute
This provision has its analogue in sec
tion 2, ninth, Of the railway labor act
| which was under consideration in
Virginian Railway Co. VS.. System Fed
Grafton, No. 40, supra.
The decree which We afIrmed in
that case required the railway COM
pany to treat with the representative
chosen by the employees and also to
refrain from entering into collective
labor agreements with any one other
than their true representative as
ascertained in accordance with the
provisions OF the act. We said that
the obligation to treat with the true
representative was exclusive and
hence imposed the negative duty to
treat with no other. We also pointed
out that, as conceded by the Govern
ment the injunction against the COM
panys entering into any contract
concerning rules, rates Of pay and
working conditions except with a
chosen representative was designed
only to prevent collective bargaining
with any one purporting to represent
employees" other than the representa-
tive they had selected 1t was taken
ito prohibit the negotiation of labor
contracts generally applicable to en-
| ployes" in the described unit with any
other representative than the one &c
chosen, "but not as precluding such
individual contracts" as the company
might ELECT to make directly with
individual employees" We think thi,
construction also applies to section 8
(s) Of the national labor relation,
act.
Act Docs Not Compel
Any Agreement
The act does not compel agreements
between employers and employees. 1,
does not compel any agreement what
ever. 1t does not prevent the employer
from refusing to make a collective
contract and hiring individuals on
whatever terms" the employer may
| by unilateral action determine" The
act expressly provides in section 8 (a)
that any individual employe or .
group Of employees shall have the
right at any time to present griev-
ances to their employer. The theory
Of the act is that free opportunity
| for negotiation with accredited rep
resentatives Of employees is likely tc
promote industrial peace and may
bring about the adjustments and
agreements which the act in itself
does not attempt to compel. As We
said in Texas g. N 0. R. Co. VS.
Railway Clerks, supra, and repeated
in Virginian Railway Co. vs. System
\ Federation, No 40, the cases of Adair
VS. United States, 208 United States
l61, and Coppage vs. Kansas, 236
United States l, are inapplicsble to
| legislation of this character. The act
does not interfere with the normal
exercise Of the right of the employer
to select its employees or to discharge
them. The employer may not, under
cover OF that right, intimidate or
coerce its employees with respect to
their self-organization and repre-
sentation, and, on the other hand,
the board is not entitled to make its
authority pretext for interference
with the right of discharge when that
right is exercised for other reasons
than such intimidation and coercion.
The true purpose is the subject of
investigation with full opportunity to
show the facts 1t would seem that
when employers freely recognize the
right of their employees to their own
organizations and their unrestricted
right of representation there will be
much less occasion for controversy in
respect to the free and appropriate
exercise Of the right Of selection and
discharge.
The act has been criticized as one
sided in its application; that it sub
jects the employer to supervision and
restraint and leaves untouched the
abuses for which employees may be re-
sponsible. That it fails to provide .
more comprehensive plan-with better
| assurances Of fairness to both sides
and with increased chances of success
in bringing about, If not compelling,
equitable solutions Of industrial dis
putes affecting interstate commerce.
But We are dealing with the power OF
Congress, not with particular policy
| or with the extent to which policy
should 60. We have frequently said
that the legislative authority, exerted
within its proper field, need not en-
brace all the evils within it's reach.
The Constitution does not forbid
cautious advance, step by STEP" in
dealing with the evils which are ex-
hibited in activities within the range
Of legislative power. Carroll VS.. Green
wich Insurance Co., 1919 U. 8. 401, Ali;
Keokee Coke Co. W. Taylor, 234 q. 8
224, 727; Miller ". Wilson, 236 U. g.
! s7a, ss4: sprosss ". Asnford, 2se U. .