Evening star., 1937-02-03

Suppose q maid servant was EN-.
ployed at monthly wage OF $50
and the use of q furnished room
in the house of her employer, and
should then 60 on a strike and
refuse to do any work. could she
still insist upon the right to use
the furnished room? A statement
Of the proposition shows its un-
reasonableness and yet 1t Is like
the instant case in principle.
THE language used in Bowman
VS.. Bradley. ISL Pa. 351 GA All.
1862, II L. r. A. 213, Is pertinent
here:
IF the possession Of the house
be regarded as an incident Of the
hiring, the incident must fall with
the principal. II 1t be regarded as
part Of the compensation stipu-
lated for, then the right to the
compensation ceased when the la
Dor was discontinued.
Bowman had the same right to
insist on the payment Of the cash
part of his wages as on that part
which provided his family place
to live. His right under the con-
tract Of hiring was like that Of
the porter to the possession Of the
porter's lodge; like that Of the
coachman to his apartments over
the stable: like that Of the teacher
to the rooms he or she may have
occupied in the school buildings;
like that of the domestic servants
to the rooms in which they lodge
in the house of their employers.
In all thi cases, and others that
might be enumerated, the occu-
pancy of the room or house is in
cidental to the employment. The
employe has no distinct right OF
possession, for his possession is that
Of the employer. and it cannot
survive the hiring to which 1t is
incidental. or under which it Is
part of the contract price for the
services performed. = When
his contract ended, his rights in
the premises were extinguished,
and it was his duty to give way
to his right to remain in the de-
fendant's service.
When the labor ceased on the
10th of July, the plaintiff ceased
to pay for his occupancy by ceas-
ing to labor without remonstrance
or objection, he must be held to
acquiesce in the defendants right
to terminate the contract for la
Dor. If that contract was right
fully terminated. then the plain.
tiff's right to the house was at an
end. and he could be lawfully put
out of possession. 1t is not
necessary that occupation of a
house, or apartments. should be a
necessary incident to the service
to be performed in order that the
right to continue in possession
should end with the service. 1t is
enough, if such occupation is con-
venient, for the purposes Of the
services. and was obtained by rea-
son Of the hiring"
To the same effect is Heffelfnger
VS.. Fulton, Is Ind. App. 80 (56
N. E. 688), and Trustees VS.. Frois-
lie, 81 MINI. 447 (35 N w. 260.
The latter case is a case of
pastor of a church and the ques-
ton of the right Of the admins
TRAITOR of the pastors estate to
keep possession of the premises
after the decease of the pastor.
Case Decided in 1914
Unqualifiedly Accepted by State.
The main case, Allen VS.. Au
Sable Electric Co. has never been
reversed in Michigan. has never
been so much as cited since its
adoption by the Supreme Court
Of the State of Michigan, and re-
mains and is the law Of the State
of Michigan today. 1t did not go
back to 1898, or to any of those
dates. It is a case of 1914. and
was decided by our court at that
time.
Now. as to the right Of injunc-
tive relief Hall vs. Nestor, %
Mich. at 141. which. in the opin-
ion of this court. provides the right
under our law to injunctive relief.
Quoting at great length from a
great many authorities. but par
ticularly from Pomeroy. in his
equity jurisprudence, at section
1857, IF treSpass to property Is
a single act. and is temporary in
its nature and effects. SO that the
legal remedy Of an action at law
for damages is adequate, equity
will not interfere" The principle
determining the jurisdiction en-
braces two classes of cases, and
may be correctly formulated as
follows:
Cd If the trespass, although a
single act. is or would be destruc-
tive, If the injury is or would be
irreparable-that is, If the injury
done or threatened is of such a
nature that. when accomplished,
the property cannot be restored to
its original condition, or cannot
be replaced by means of compensa-
ton in money-then the wrong will
be prevented or stopped by injunc-
ton.
CD If the trespass is continuous
in its nature, if repeated acts of
wrong are done or threatened, al
though each of these acts, taken by
itself, may not be destructive, and
the legal remedy may, therefore,
be adequate for each single act if
it stood alone, then, also, the entire
wrong will be prevented or stopped
by injunction on the ground of
avoiding a repetition of similar
actions. In both cases the ultimate
criterion is the inadequacy of the
legal remedy. All the cases, Eng
lish and American, have professed
to adopt the inadequacy Of legal
remedies as the test and limit of
the injunctive jurisdiction. but in
applying this criterion the modern
decisions, with some exceptions
among the American authorities.
have certainly held the injury to
be irreparable, and the legal REM
edy inadequate in many instances