The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1937-05-01


nressipe uictory ouer the loyGliStS
to QueH O possible serious detection
from the tnSurgent rGnES.J
By H. R. KNICKERBOCKER
(world copyright, 1887, by International
News Service, reproduction in whole
or In part strictly prohibited)
LONDON. May / Q.NS0.-1n-
surgent GeneralisSimo Francisco
Frances foreign allies are begin
ming to show signs Of WEAKNESS IN
his support.
And on May Day-today-just
six months since the generalisslmo
of the white forces committed the
major error of the Spanish civil
war, his armies in the north are
frantically pushing against Bilbao
in order first of all to convince
Italy and Germany they have not
picked a loser.
Loss of the Espana, Frances
only battleShip, sunk with miracu-
lous celebrity by red war planes, has
come at a most inopportune time,
following hard upon world revul-
sion against the bombing, burning
and partial determination Of Guer-
MICA by German air raiders.
Neutral observers draw a con-
trast between the use of war planes
against an undefended civilian
population and their use for the
legitimate military purpose Of sink
ing an enemy ship.
Victory Questionable
More important, however, is the
impression growing among friends
as well as enemies of Franco that
his victory, seemingly certain six
months ago, has become question
able.
Capture of Bilbao and occupa-
ton of the Basque province might
check the unfavorable tide of SEN
timent and at the same time give
Franco the industrial resources OF
the BaSques and twenty or thirty
thousand white troops for opera
tionS against Madrid.
Some such victory is urgently
necessary, for the first sign Of
serious detection from the ranks
Of Frances allies comes from a re-
port that General O'Duffy is pull
ing out of Spain 1000 Irish volun-
teers who formed themselves into
a Irish brigade of the Spanish
legion last November and De-
cember.
No More Germans Sent
Second is the fact the Germans
have not sent more than the orig
inal 10000 specialized troops
which arrived in December and
January.
Third is the passivity Of the
italians since their defeat on the
Guadalajara front, and continued
uncertainty over what Premier
Mussolini intends to do.
Today's situation in Spain can
be understood only by going back
to the original fatal mistake made
by Franco when, in the first week
Of November, he failed to march
straight into Madrid, as he could
have done when his troops
reached the city.
All the world since then has
been asking the question:
"Why didn't Franco take
Madrid?"
Answer Is Clear Now
The answer is clear today.
Franco had then no more than
half the number of soldiers the
enemy had. Until Madrid was
reached, his communicates were
accurate when they reported only
a few score dead on his side and
hundreds of red casualties.
He had about 10000 highly
trained Moors and Legicnnaires
against $1,000 or 10000 unframed
red militia. He was compelled to
reserve his strength, and knew
how, while the reds did not know
how to fight, but died or ran.
Reaching Madrid, Franco was
misinformed regar. !. ing the
strength of the red positions. AS
44C 41O" AAGOWoS wv @4dOCS GAeSO1 ~
was then as good as taken. It had
lost the will to fight. It's morale
was broken, and for the first three
days after Franco reached Getafe
and occupied the Casa De Campo,
the capital was merely waiting for
the roll of his tanks through the
streets.
Iron Defense Holds
When Franco did decide to at.
tack, the Moors and legionnaires
went up against an iron defense
that to this day has not broken.
Whatever maneuverS may go on
in Europe between Premier Mus
solini and Chancellor Hitler, the
fact is the Germans in Spain de-
spiSe the Italians and detest the
SpaniardS. The italians hate the
Germans and loathe the SPAN
iardS, the Spaniards abhor both
Italians and Germans, and every
body is sick of the war.
Only MuSSolini has a deep stake
in the conflict, and upon his fu-
ture actions may depend its out
come.
Never e dull moment in Artists
3hriIIivs na,.I .4..4t'. 49, u ~