The Waterbury Democrat., 1937-10-11

Sultation.
 If you know what transpired in these talks you can be sure that when Roosevelt threw out his quarantine" idea he was not word-juggling. He really meant business. .....
 HERE TT WHAT HAD HAP TENED BEFORE HE MADE THE SPEECH:
 Shortly after Congress ad- journed, the President called in his chief Navy strategists and asked their advice regarding W the ability of the Navy to protect American shipping in the Far East; (2) the strength of the Navy in case of serious eventuali- ties; (S) the strategy recom- mended by the Navy to block Japanese imperialism.
 In reply, the adlnirals un- folded 8 plan for an economic blockade of Japan. It did not call for war against Japan, though admittedly 1t might lead to war. It provided for action by the leading powers of Europe possibly through the League of Nations or the signat0ries to the Nine- Power Treaty. Particu. larIy 1t called for the cOOpera- ton of the British and American Navies.
 The chief differences between the admirals' plan and the eco- homie sanctions hitherto tried by the league were twofold:
 1. The League neved had the
 cooperation of the British or
 French fleets in embargoing
 shipments to Italy during the
 Ethiopian crisis.
 2. Italy, being on the Euro
 pean mainland, had adjacent
 neighbors such as Austria. and
 Hungary which openly Stated
 they would not adhere to the
 boycott. Japan, being series of
 islands, can be blockaded.
 Moreover, it can be blockaded by placing fleets at two strategic bases-Singapore and the Panama Canal. Virtually al shipments to Japan-except those from war torn China-must pass via those two fortified bases. Therefore 1t was proposed that the British and American fleets cooperate at these two bases.
 Roosevelt Caution
 Secretary of State Hull, who was in on these conversations, approved the general idea-pro- vided, of course, that other na- tions, particularly Great Britain, took equal initiative.
 President Roosevelt was a little mo. ) skeptical. He felt that the American public was not prepared for such step.
 Naval strategiStS reported that it would take about three months of blockading Japan to force abandonment of her war against China. But should Japan win the war and estab- fish herself on the Chinese mainland, they said she would become invincible.
 The President, who was virtu- ally brought up on naval strategy Cat IA he was found reading Admiral Mahan, most profound of all naval strategists) agreed with this. But still he did not think the American people were ready for anything so drastic. British Hands Tied
 Meanwhile the British were being consulted. At first they argued that the United States should do all the policing in the Pacific. They said they could spare no ships from the Mediter- ranean and Baltic.
 Later they considered sending two destroyer squadrons, two heavy cruisers and one or two battleships to Singapore. Just about this time, however, sub- marine piracy" broke out in the Mediterranean and all further talk of fleet shifts to Singapore was dropped like a hot potato.
 Since then the British have in- formed the State Department they could not move one single ship out of the Mediterranean. Among other things, they point out that six of their fifteen bat tleships are in drydock, leaving only nine in commission.
 Bad Japanese Psychology
 Most of this took place before the war in China really got hot. Since then the Japanese have been bombing Chinese civilians on a wholesale basis, fiouting U. s. notes of protest.
 Secretary Hull, talking to one of his advisers about American public opinion, said: "You can al- ways count upon the Japanese to do the wrong thing"
 He was right. Japanese inept. ness has caused Q decided change in U. s. public opinion. However,