Evening star., 1937-07-06

of the failure of the lawmakers to
take into account certain contin-
gencies that arise whenever privileges
are given to one group and not to
another
These three questions are:
First, is an employer obliged to enter
into written contract with his en-
ployes with respect to working condi-
tions and can such an understanding
be oral and yet binding?
Protection of Individuals.
Second, what protection is afforded
to an individual who does not wish to
join a union and who wants to work
when a strike has been declared by
either a minority or majority of his
fellow employees?
Third, how can working men be
protected in their free access to jobs
when the Federal law now permits an
employer and majority of his en-
ployes to make a voluntary agree
ment which closes out all who do not
belong to the union prescribed by the
majority?
To answer these questions, it is
natural to examine the existing law,
the Wagner act, and the rulings of the
National Labor Relations Board,
which interprets that law, and finally
the decisions of the Supreme Court
Of the United States, which interprets
whether the various provisions of the
law and the rulings of the National
Labor Relations Board are in con-
formity with constitutional rights as
expounded in previous decisions.
Questions Still Undecided.
Offhand, it will be said that. of
course, the Wagner act is now the
law Of the land because the Supreme
Court Of the United States has up
held it. But this is superficial
statement. What the Supreme Court
has upheld is one aspect of the Wag-
ner law, that which relates to collec-
tive bargaining, and it has not yet
passed upon all the controversial ques-
tions that have arisen or may arise in
specific lawsuits growing out of the
everyday operation of the law.
Already employer representatives
and employe spokesmen are assuming
the decisions just rendered by the
Supreme Court support their respec-
tive positions.
Thus some employer spokesmen are
counseling corporation executives to
be guided only by this paragraph
from the opinion of Chief Justice
Hughes in the Jones & Laughlin case
on April IL, 1887, commonly referred
to as the principal case in which the
Wagner acts constitutionality was
upheld:
The act does not compel agree
ments between employers and en-
ployes. 1t does not compel any
agreement whatever. 1t does not
prevent the employer from refusing
to make collective contract, and
hiring individuals on whatever terms
the employer may by unilateral action
determine"
On the surface this seems to be a
complete answer to whether the inde-
pendent steel companies were right
Or wrong In their recent refusal to
sign written contract or make anv.
other kind with the C. I. o. Careful
reading Of the other parts of the
opinion and the relationship of the
foregoing paragraph to other state
ments made leads to the conclusion
that the issue is not as simple as it
looks nor is it disposed of by the fat
statement that he law docs not
compel agreements"
As matter of fact, language ouite
similar to that which the Supreme
Court used can be found in the
Senate debate before the Wagner bill
was passed, in the report filed by
the Senate Committee on Labor, and
IN orlefs filed by the Department of
'ustlce Itself in an important case
But just as many OF the EMPLOYERS
were surprised when they found that
tne Supreme Court had upheld the
wagner act, so they may be due for
surprise when they find the highest
tribunal in the land some day pointing
out that the issue presented in the
quoted paragraph is not on all fours
at all with the situation in which
the independent steel companies find
themselves today.
Inland Steel Case.
As matter of fact, the Inland Steel
Co. has at the moment before the
National Labor Relations Board
case which when appealed to the
courts will determine the precise issue
that his been raised.
The employer position is to take
literally the language quoted from the
Supreme Courts decision in the
Jones & Laughlin case.
The employe or labor position is
based on rulings by the National
Labor Relations Board, as well as on
another decision Of the Supreme Court
rendered just two weeks before, and,
incidentally, by unanimous vote.
The reasoning adopted by the labor
board Is important to examine be-
cause 1t undoubtedly will be the basis
OF the argument when the Inland
Steel case does reach the Supreme
Court.
The labor board starts with the
premise that the Wagner law COM
mands collective bargaining and that
this means compulsion to negotiate.
The obligation of employers to nego-
tiate or treat with employees, it con-
tends, cannot be evaded by a pre-
text or circumvented by some trumped
up reason which has the guise Of le-
gality. Since the Wagner act lists
as an unfair labor practice" the "re-
fusal" of an employer to bargain COL
lectively with his employees, the board
has ruled that a refusal to bargain
"in good faith" is a refusal to bar
gain at all.
Tomorrow I shall attempt to de-
scribe the basis Of an employees right
to protection, as against improper In
fluence from any source when thu
question Of unionization arises.