Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1937-05-16
EMBARGO POWER VIEWED
DANGER TOLATIN NATIONS|
Best Guarantee Against Misuse Held
Administration by Originators of
''Cood Neighbour Policy

open the ordinary, legal channels
through which public disapproval
might express itself peacefully or con-
stitutionally. He did not realize that
people down there are not always
given a chance to register their de-
mands for new deal' at the polls.
Overlooking all that, but probably
honestly mistaken, President Wilson
decided to put an end to those back
ward outbursts of violence which were
bellttling democracy on the other side
of the Rio Grande. Knowing that
recognition by the United States was
one OF the essential requirements for
the subsistence of any revolutionary
reglme-because of the financial aid,
the political significance and the
moral influence involved-he decided
that no Latin American government
Which had been set up by uncon-
stitutional means would be recognized
by Washington.
Such was the idealistic motivation
OF the non-recognition policy, OBJ
Vlously wrong even in theory and in
Its ethical import. However, it Was
IN the practice, in the actual appli-
cation OF the policy. where this showed
Its worst features, by lending itself to
serve as an instrument of discrimina-
ton against those Latin American
regimes which. for one reason or other,
did not have the sympathies of Wash
ington
Result Called Intervention.
The result was pure and simple
intervention in the domestic concerns
OF supposedly independent foreign
states. The non-recognition policy
reserved to the President of the United
States the right to pass upon the
soundness of the governments which
Latin American peoples had chosen
for themselves. 1t gave him the final
word in the selection of such govern
ments. 1t gave President Wilson and
his successors, in his own words, the
opportunity ito teach the South
Americans to elect good men" AS
any unbiased history of those days
may show, they took advantage of
that opportunity with great frequency,
and in most instances their decision
was determined not wholly by legal
considerations.
Is 1t too venturesome to think that
the current neutrality legislation does.
potentially at least, create an equally
dangerous weapon In the discretion
II leaves the President to apply en-
bargoes and trade restrictions in
, cases Of civil war? The Wilson policy,
now in discard, served to support
certain regimes which were favorable
to United States interests and to
facilitate the overthrow of others,
which We're not so amenable, lust as
effectively, and even more so, the
embargo power now decreed by Con-
gress could be employed to deny any
Latin American government which
Washington disliked the means with
which to defend itself against an
uprising and So particularly in the
case OF those near the United States
insure its downfall A presidential
declaration that the peace of the
United States might be imperiled by
the civil war in question is all that
would be required.
VI course. that was not the in
tention of the congressman who ap-
proved the civil war provisions Of the
neutrality bill. but neither was it the
original intention Of President Wilson
that his recognition policy be
used to discriminate against foreign
regimes which happened to be out Of
favor with the powers that be at
washington. The only guarantee
against an early misuse of the embargo
powers in the neutrality bill lies in
the fact that the men entrusted with
the conduct of the foreign relations
OF the United States, for at least the
next three and half years, are the
same who devised the good neighbor"
policy and have already proven the
sincerity and consistency Of their
friendship for Latin America.
(Copyright, 1872