Evening star., 1937-03-07
BY WICKHAM STEED.

tory at Kings Coltege, Lo"doH'
BY WICKHAM STEED.
r ONDON (By Wireless) While 1t
would be too much to say that
the new Italian armament pro-
IL gram was received with indif-
ference in England, there is no sign OF
it having ruff1ed the composure OF any
responsible persons in British political
naval or military quarters.
It is felt that Premier Mussolini was
obliged to say something to reassure
his followers after the shock that the
British rearmament plans recently
gave them. It is thought natural.
therefore, that he should shake his fist
at England and the world in general.
The British rearmament plans are
elastic enough to meet any marked
change in the international situation.
If the contingency of war against Italy
were contemplated by the British gov
eminent, the Italian pronouncements
might have caused a flutter. AS no
such contingency is contemplated, II
is a matter of comparative indifference
whether the Italian dictator chooses
to increase rather than decrease the
heavy burdens of his own people.
Germany Has Card to Play.
Nor are the references in the Italian
communique to progressive realistic
efficiency" of an Italo- German under
standing taken less calmly. The one
thing Mussolini cannot desire Is to see
Germany take possession OF Austria or
come within striking distance OF the
Italian frontier or revive anti-1talian
agitation among the Germans Of the
Southern Tyrol. Continued existence
Of a relatively independent Austria
seems a fundamental Of Italian inter-
est. This may be why Mussolini dis.
courages all schemes for an early res
toration of the Hapsburg dynasty in
Austria. He knows that any serious
attempt to carry out such schemes
would act upon Chancellor Hitler as
a red rag upon bull.
Between Italian and German advo-
Gates of close Italo- German co-opera-
ton, or, as it sometimes is called, a
"Berlin-Rome axis" grandiose projects
for division of Northern and Southern
Europe into spheres of German and
Italian pred@inance often have been
discussed. According to these projects,
Italy would have exclusive domination
of the Mediterranean and eventually
Northern Africa, with certain conces-
sions to Germany in Morocco, while
Germany would have exclusive domi-
nation Of the Baltic Sea, including
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the
!. Russian border states Of Poland and
the Ukraine.
Difficulties Even In Theory.
. Yet. unless am misinformed, diff
ficulty has been found in agreeing
even theoretically upon the future OF
Southeastern Europe, including Ru-
mania. In this region, German and
Italian ambitions intersect and col
lide with each other. This does not
mean that Germany and Italy will
not work together on practical issues
affecting the immediate interests OF
their several totalitarian systems.
The similarity of these interests
prompted the Intervention in Spain
Both Italy and Germany understood
that, If a Fascist nationalist regime
could be established in Spain, France
would be exposed to eventual pressure
on three frontiers and England would
be placed at a disadvantage both as
q supporter of France in continental
Europe and as a Mediterranean power
Hopes Entertained in Rome and
Berlin last Summer, when swift sue
cess of q Spanish Fascist rising was
expected, were deferred by the pre-
mature outbreak of the anti-red move
ment and the stout resistance OF the
Spanish government forces. Then
another element crept into the situa-
ton. Neither Hitler nor Mussolini
could afford to see the Spanish people
set a bad example of successful re-
sistance to Fascist coup. The effect
upon the Italian and German peoples
would have been deplorable. Large
proportions of the inhabitants Of Italy
and Germany who groan under the
Fascist and NaN despotism might
have felt those despotisms not in
vulnerable and been inclined to revolt
in their turn. So Hitler and Mussolini
felt constrained to back Gen, Frances
adventure far more heavily than
originally had been intended.
Vision Depends on Outcome.
In these circumstances, the British
and French policies of non-interven-
ton in Spain may have been far
sighted If Gen. Frances triumph il
delayed or If the various Spanish fac
tions presently combine against foreign
intrusion in Spanish affairs. Should
Franco succeed with German and
Italian help, the British and French
policy may appear short-sighted.
Anyway. the Spanish fighting ha.
revealed certain insuficiencies in Ger.
man armaments that have troubled
both Hitler and the German Reich
wehr. Among German military lead
ers, the feeling has gained grount
that, before risking . European war
| coni$derable portions Of the new Ger