Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1937-05-16
BY CASTOR NERVAL.

n UBLIC discussion about the
- merits of the neutrality bill
just passed by Congress has
4 centered mainly on its effec-
tiveness to keep the United States out
Of war. Disregarding technical ques-
tions. and even the fact that real
neutrality is the thing least assured
by the new law. its critics have been
concerned almost exclusively with the
extent to which it may or may not
prevent the United States from be-
coming involved in armed conflicts
abroad.
1t is only natural that it should
be So There is no problem more i'm
portant to the immediate future of
this country than the preservation of
external peace. Once that discussion
has been exhausted, hoWever-and it
will be, quite soon-there are other
aspects of the neutrality bill which
are also deserving of some considera-
ton.
In previous article we dealt with
probable consequences the bill may
have on the relations of certain Latin
American countries rich in raw ma
terials with the Fascist powers of
Europe, most In need of such raw
materials and most belligerent in
their foreign policies, and therefore.
most eager to protect themselves from
the embargoes and restrictions de-
creed by the United States against
warning nations. But even the re-
latlonS of the Latin American re-
publlcS with the United States may
be affected by other provisions of the
neutrality policy which is now the
law of the land
Embargo Provisions.
Those provisions of the new law
which authorize the President to place
an embargo on the expectation of
arms, munitions and elements of war
to any country in which civil war is
IN progress, might conceivably have
far-reaching implications in the years
to come. They create weapon which.
In the hands Of an administration less
liberal and less respectful of Latin
American sovereignty than the Roose-
Velt-Hull administration, would leave
certain Latin American regimes at
the mercy of Washington.
Perhaps the lesson Of the Wilson
non-recognition policy should be re-
called. When President Wilson an
nounced his theory that no Latin
American government should be recog-
niSed which had not been formed
along constitutional lines, no one sus-
pected him of desire to use that
power for political purposes, to suit
his own choice in each particular
emergency. or that advised by political
or financial interests of the United
States.
The Wilson theory implied Gin
sistence on orderly. constitutional
democratic government" 1t tended
to discourage revolutions and coups
d'etat. On the assumption-an as
sumption which shows very little
knowledge of the real causes of Latin
American revolts-that revolutions
and assassinations in order to obtain
control of government are instituted
almost wholly for the purpose of
loot 1t attempted to discontinue
them, by warning the Latin Americans
that violent means would not bring
the desired results
Belief of Wilson.
Wilson believed that Latin Ameri-
can revolutions were, without excep-
ton, only the result of personal ambi-
ton and desire of looting He did
not stop to think that in Latin
America, as elsewhere, oppressed ma
jorities might have no other means
but force to rid themselves of tyran-
nical, personalist regimes. He did
not stop to think that in Latin
America, more than anywhere else
revolution is the only safeguard against
permanent despotism and exploitation;
the only recourse to recover freedom,
for seldom, an aDtocrotic r,,1er loo VOC