Evening star., 1937-10-31
MEDIATION is KEYNOTE
OF F9.POWER CONFERENCE
U. S. Enters Farley for Far East Peace
With Powerful Weapon in Threat
to Invoke Neutrality Act.


Neutrality Act would not only have
deprived the United States Of one
weapon over the heads of the embat-
tied nations, but would have robbed
this Government of a means of CO.
operation with possible future embar-
goes imposed by the nine-power sigma
torres.
AS it stands, the United States has
a means of applying pressure to China
and Japan by threatening to invoke
the act if either displays unreasonable
intransigence and in the event concil-
iatory efforts fail has something to
offer in the way of cooperation with
Europe if an initiative is taken by
some government other than the
United States.
This could be carried out by the
League enforcing an arms embargo
against Japan while the United States
imposed one against both Japan and
China. China could continue to obtain
her arms from European countries
while Japan would be deprived of
American arms sources. More positive
cooperation would be possible through
the discriminatory use of the "cash
and carry" clause of the Neutrality
Act.
On the whole, consultation is not to
be lightly regarded as a means of
meeting threats to world peace. States
men have not ceased deploring the alb
sence of the machinery for consulta-
ton in 1914. Experience has been that
consultation leads either toward a def
mite alleviation of crises or to show
down of forces which takes the place
of armed combat. Threats of force in
a conference room may often make
unnecessary use of force on the battle
field.
The integral relationship of the
Chinese and Spanish crises is already
being demonstrated. Coming as the
conference does Immediately after the
diplomatic convulsions at London over
withdrawal Of Italian volunteers from
Spain, it cannot be expected that the
Brussels negotiations, where will be
represented most of those who took
part in the London debates, will be
entirely disconnected from the furies
which ragged over the Italian and
Russian demands
One fact stands out as a result of
the London negotiations which is of
Importance for the Brussels sessions,
namely, that Great Britain and
France have been forced nearer the
Rome-Berlin axis than at any time
since the Spanish Civil War began.
The adamant attitude of Russia in
refusing to concede belligerent rights
to Gen. Francisco Franco until the last
foreign volunteer has left Spain did
more to solidify this embryonic Four
Power Entente-which is the goal
of Reichsfuehrer Hitler and Premier
Mussolini-than any other one factor.
May Consolidate Gains.
There may we'll be efforts by Great
Britain and France on the one hand
and Italy on the other to preserve the
gains thus made, the former because
of the fear that antagonizing Italy on
the Far Eastern question may incite
her to resumption of aid for Gen.
Franco: the latter because of the fear
of destroying the progress thus far
made in crystalizing the Four-Power
Entente.
Thus, the negotiations in regard to
Spain at the moment appear to have
provided the basis for an understand
ing upon some moderate plan.
Key to the probable lineup Of
powers at Brussels is provided by the
non-intervention struggle at London.
Italy has counted there not only on
the active support of Germany, but
on the less manifest, but effective.
backing of Portugal. The latter can
certainly act as sounding board for
ItalyS protection of the interests of
Japan if disposition develops to
shift from the field of conciliation to
the field Of action.
Russia, although deserving a place
at the council table because of her
deep-seated interest in the final settle
ment in the Far East. appears disposed
to be disrupting influence, just as
she was at London.
Preparation Vital.
The success of the conference may
nlnge upon whether adequate prepar-
atory negotiations took place to pro-
vide the basis for an ultimate agree
ment. The lack OF sufficient prelim-
mary agreement has torpedoed more
than one international consultation.
One of the greatest misfortunes of
postwar diplomacy has been the i'm
perfect development of conference
technique, and the attempt to iron
out questions involving face" in
open negotiation.
During the week or more between
the speech Of President Roosevelt at
Chicago and the calling of the Brus-
sells conference, there was intense
diplomatic activity not only in Wash
ington, but in the capitals of the other
signers of the Nine-Power Treaty.
How far those discussions went toward
providing the basis for ultimate agree
ment will not be known until the con-
ference convenes, but the agenda, at
least, had not been completed when
the American delegation arrived at
Brussels.
The assurances of Mr.. Roosevelt
and Norman Davis that the United
States goes into the conference with
no commitments and its hands free is
interpreted as meaning only that
there has been no agreement upon
anything more concrete than an at
tempt to mediate, which was pro-
claimed as the purpose of the Brussels
meeting not only by Mr.. Roosevelt,
but by British Foreign Secretary An
thony Eden as well.