Evening star., 1937-02-13
BY FRANK H. HEDGES.

TOXIC, Fepruary Is (N.A.N.A.''-
The national government formed by
Gen. Senjura Hayashi and the policies
it espouses, represent a temporary
victory for the political parties and
the cause of liberalism in Japan, inas-
much as the parties have not suffered
the complete annihilation which they
previously faced at the hands Of army
extremists.
It is probable now that the issue
between the extremist and moderate
elements within army circles will be
forced to a showdown. If the mod
crates, of whom Premier Hayashi is
himself a leader, win out, the tale OF
what Japan's army does and thinks
from now on will be very different
from the radical policy of the last
five years. If, however, the extremists,
as represented by the younger element,
are driven too far, it is quite likely
that there will be repetition of the
military insurrection of February
26-29, 1886, on an even larger scale.
Army circles are divided into three
general schools of thought-the ex-
tremists. who are the fiery younger
element; the moderates and a third
group that is neutral. The extremists
have been in control ever since Sep
tember 10, 1881, when the Mukden in
cident took place, but, with Gen.
Hayashi as premier, his group Is al
most certain to wrest control of the
military organization from them.
Whether this can be done without
bloodshed is uncertain.
Moderates Wiser Men.
The moderates in the army are the
wiser, more level-headed high officers
who are at the head of military af-
fairs and supposedly formulate and
enforce all military policy. These
older men, who are to be found in the
war office, on the general staff. in the
Supreme War Council and in COM
mand of army divisions. have appar-
emily lost control of their subordinates.
When Gen. Kazumari Ugaki tried
to form a government, following the
resignation of the Hirota cabinet. these
high military officials insisted they
could not cooperate in regime headed
by Gen Ugaki because 1t would i'm
pede military discipline" and be 'detri-
mental to the unity Of the army"
These explanatory statements, vague
as they were in wording. could mean
but one thing: If the army consented
to Gen. Ugaki's assuming the premier
ship it feared that there would be
rebellion at the worst, direct action
in the form of assassination at the
best, on the part of some of its younger
fanatical officers.
No lieutenant general, general or
marshal on the active hst-from whose
small ranks the war minister must be
drawn-had the courage to risk pre-
cipitatirg another military revolt by
agreeing to serve as Gen. Ugaki's min
lister Of war. Here was to be found
the true explanation of the army's op-
position to the former governor gen.
eral Of Korea, five times minister of
war himself, in his attempt to form a
ministry.
This situation had been brought
ocoAs Ny VIC WAAo 1SSoAAlC Abo
victims-the higher officers of the
japanese Army. For some years they
have preached to their subordinates
a fanatical program of supernational-
ism. in which parliamentary politics.
political parties and all other forms
of democracy were damned They
have told these younger men that
military rule directly under the En-
peror was the only salvation fer the
nation. They have castigated the
capitalists and capitalism and have
urged the redistribution of wealth.
Revolt of Year Ago.
The younger officers. none too
we'll informed on economic, political
or world conditions, heard and be-
lieved without questioning this ex-
treme doctrine. The military revolt