Evening star., 1936-07-31
goods against discrimination In ootln-
tries which flnd o lucrative market In
America.

goods against discrimination In coun-
tries which flnd o lucrative market in
America.
Take Russia, for instance. The So
Wet Union has long been Q supplier Of
about so per cent Of the manganese ore
imported by the American steel indus
try, and Soviet leaders are anxious to
keep this market. However, there
could be no application Of the most
favored-nation clause by Russia be-
cause the government Is the sole I'm
porter and exporter, and there Is no
free marketing Of foreign goods within
the union.
The Soviets buy In the world market
as their interests dictate, and do not
attempt to quota their purchases
equally among all countries competing
for the market. How they determine
where they will buy and how much is
known only to themselves. The prob
lem, then, is how q country which is
seeking to guard Its own trade interests
can assure itself against discrimina
ton.
Although the Soviet Union would
have protested loudly II discrimination
had been hinted at two years ago, as
soon as the United States reduced by
so per cent the tariff on manganese ore
in the Brazilian agreement, the Soviets
were ready to pledge the purchase Of
$50, ,000, 900 worth Of American goods
within years time In return for the
promise that they would be accorded
INSTRUMENTATION treatment. This
was In contrast with their average prlr-
chase Of about $4,000, 900 during the
three preceding years. Russia actually
bought 1900, 900 worth Of American
goods between July, 1895, and July,
1885, and has only recently renewed
the arrangement for another year.
U. 8. Becomes Third Party.
Through the operation of the most
favored-nation clause In reciprocal
agreements the United States has re-
ceived the benefits Of duty concessions
between other countries. Several with
which trade pacts were concluded later
reduced some duties further In recipro-
cal agreements with other governments,
and these lower duties were then ex-
tended Internationally to the United
States.
Danger Of misplaced profit Is the
chief drawback to the complete sue
cess Of the Hull program, but there
have been other miscarriages as well In
the operation of the agreements. Chief
among these Is the failure Of tariff re-
ductions In some instances to stimulate
American exports at all. There have
been cases Of large, and disconcerting.
In the value Of American ship
ments.
Most prominent among commodi-
ties suffering such declines have been
sausage castings. silk wearing apparel,
automobile parts and gasoline to Can
ada; truck and bus tire castings to
Sweden and fresh fruits to Brazil. On
each Of these items we were given
duty concessions.
To carry unfavorable comparisons
still further, 1t might be shown that
in the case Of at least four agree
ments- Cuban. Sweden, Brazilian and
Belgian-tarih reductions intensified
the now Of foreign goods into the
United States more than they have the
fiow Of American goods into other
countries.
Figures in Point.
Specific figures for increases in low
cred groups are as follows:
Cuba during 1885 took from the
United States 100000 more goods
than in 1884, but sent $28,000.0 900
more, including sugar, which accounts
for about 100000 Of the increase.
II this item is deducted, however, the
rest of the Cuban export increase
shrinks to about 100000.
Whereas Brazil took about $s00,0
more goods during the first four
months Of 1896, she sent UP $1,s52,-
600 more.
Sweden, during the first five months
Of her agreement, bought 100000
more, but sold $530.000 more.
Belgium added $4,6oo.00o to the
value Of its sales to the United States
during the first quarter Of the year,
but bought s4.10o.o0o more.
In weighing increased import fig
ures against export gains 1t must be
remembered that they include not only
articles In competition with American
goods. but numerous raw or partly
manufactured materials necessary for
American industry.