Montana labor news., 1936-03-19
CONTROL BY SPECIAL
INTERESTS
BY w. J. PRIEST

In a one-House legislature there
would be no such thing as a conference
committee. There would be no such
thing as legislation in the dark, or leg
~islation without a public record. OPP
ponents of the one-House legislature
| claim that a two-House legislature
makes it more difficult for special in
~terests and monopolies to control legis-
lation than would be the case with a
one-House legislature. Experience
shows exactly the reverse to be true.
It must be observed that special inter
est, monopilies and combinations do not
as a rule propose legislation. They are
interested in the prevention of legisla-
ton which in any way restricts or mod
flies their powers, and they employ
shrewd and often corrupt lobbyists to
defeat any legislation to which they OBJ
ject.
To prevent legislation it is not nee
essary to control both the House and
the Senate. All that is necessary is to
prevent action by either house, or,
which is much easier, if the bill is in
conference and it usually is II to
control the conference committee.
Lobbyists are experts in such pro-
cedure. Where there is no public re-
cord and no way to tell just what hap
pens, they are able to handle the con-
ference committee so as to prevent &C
ton. Let US see how this a be done.
A conference committee of six, let
US assume, has been appointed on some
bill. Three of the members are ap-
pointed by the Speaker of the House,
and three by the presiding officer OF
the Senate. In order to get any agree
ment out of a conference committee,
the House and the Senate conferees
must agree to the same, identical pro-
visions. The three members from the
House control the House vote in the
conference committee. The three mem
bers from the Senate control the Sen
ate vote.
Ali that is necessary to prevent ac-
ton is to be able to control two OF the
conferees or two of the House con-
ferees. Either will prevent an agree
ment, or result in the laying down OF
conditions which will necessitate an
agreement along lines desired by the
two Directing members of the confer
ence committee. These two members
can insist on putting into the con-
ference bill those provisions which are
satisfactory to them, and can bring
about the rejection of other provisions
which are not satisfactory to them.
Thus, either we have no conference re-
port. in which case the bill is dead, or
we have a conference report with a
modified bill which is agreeable to the
monopoly opposing the original bill.
But this is not the only place where
special interests can prevent legisla-
ton. ii at the beginning OF the ses-
sion, they are able to control the cleo
ton of the Speaker, it is possible to
influence and sometimes actually con-
troll the appointment of all conference
committees. 1t is a well-recognized
fact that at the beginning Of almost
every legislature there is a contest over
the election of the Speaker Of the
House. The public as a rule does not
know all the ms and outs of the con-
troversy and does not often understand
what, if any, agreements have been
made in secret that have brought about
the election Of sonnet particular in
dividual as Speaker of the House.
We see, therefore, that special in
~terests desiring to control legislation in
a two-body house have several oppor-
~tunities to accomplish their purpose
first, by control of the House; second
BY control of the Senate third, by con-
troll Of two members Of the conference
committee representing the House
fourth, by control of two members OF
the conference committee; represent
ing the Senate; fifth, by control Of the
Speaker; and sixth, by control OF the
presiding officer of the Senate.