Evening star., 1936-03-15

pared to the army of the imperial era,
but that 1t now possessed advantages
which the latter had always lacked
honesty in the high command. zeal
and a sufficient number Of weapons.
The other side Of the question is
that modern Russia hoists the flag OF
world revolution. and that its example
may be contagious. BY pledging our
military support to her, and by ac-
cepting her promise Of assistance,
shall we. in the long run, lose or gain?
The pros and the cons Of the contro-
and they are Of direct concern not
only to France, but, perhaps, to every
country.
First-It is hard to forget that the
Soviet government, behind the frail
screen of the Komintern, in practice
claims the right to control the attitude
Of the revolutionary parties in every
land-that, for instance, French dele
gates to the Third International, on
their return from Moscow, were able
to boast Of decisions reached with the
active participation of Stain in order
to rout the national government OF
the day.
Komintern Left Alive.
What would Stain say II the Presi-
dent Of the French Republic or the
French premier were to sit by the side
Of White Russians in an international
assembly and express views about
what they had better do to harass the
Bolshevik regime? When diplomatic
relations were resumed with revolu-
tionary Russia, and when she was ad-
mitted to the League in September.
1884, she ought to have been told that,
as condition of the powers new at
titude toward her, the Komintern
must cease its activities. But as early
as 1922, at the time it initiated its CO.
operation with Russia, the German
government had deliberately left aside
that point, we'll knowing that it would
not be conceded. When bidding for
Russia's friendship France afterward
had to follow suit.
Now it is much too late to raise the
question. As a consequence, cooper
alton with Russia has to be taken
as 1t is offered-that Is without any
abandonment Of the Komintern-or
it is to be rejected altogether.
The true solution would be for a
government willing to enlist Russian
support to make short work of the
Communist parties at home-a process
to which the revolutionary leaders in
Moscow do not object; indeed, their
closest ally, Mustapha Kemal Pasha,
Turkeys dictator, set an example to
that effect shortly after he had ap-
pended his signature to the convention
Of 1925. But it is obvious that par
liamentary governments do not fare
as well as autocracies in that respect.
Reds Don't Bother Friends.
Second-As a matter of fact, the
Soviets do not appear to interfere
very seriously in the internal policies
Of the countries to which they are
linked by political bond. At least
such is the opinion entertained by the
French general staff and by the high
er police authorities. Communist
propaganda has disappeared In the
French Army. Three cases of in
citement to disobedience were record
ed In 1885, as against $50 in 1884. In
the charges brought against Moscow
by M. Pierre Laval and his journalistic
associates electoral considerations
loom very large indeed. 1t Is always
easy to blame on Russia every deed
and word of the French Communists.
The Soviets have a genuine fear Of
Hitlerian Germany, and on the dip
lomatic plane their anti German con-
duct for the last three years, has
always been most uneQuivocal. The
danger to our social structure does not
lie in collusion Of the Bolsheviks
with national malcontents and schem-
ers of all kinds, but in the fact that
the Russian revolution has solved a
good many of its problems and that
a social organization Of some stability
has issued from it. This, despite a long
trail of misery and bloodshed, may
appeal to the reforming spirit every
where-especially to those who have
not ascertained on the spot the price
that had to be paid for it. But the
adverse influence Of the Russian revo-
luton will have to be felt all the same,
and probably to a greater degree II
hostility instead Of friendship Is being
shown to the Soviet.
German Peril Held Greatest.
Third.-What Is the foremost dan
ger, the German or the Russian?
Such is the crucial query. personally
believe. and, as body. French diplo-
mats believe that the German peril
ranks first-that, at any rate, it will
come to q crisis earlier than the other.
Hence the idea of using the ill-feelng
which Adolf Hitler has brought about
between Russia and Germany to
drive a wedge between them. Were
Hitler to disappear tomorrow (and
many reports that cannot be checked
point to his bad health), the generals
of the Reichswehr would certainly
strive to bring Russia back into their
system, creating q common front
against Western Europe. Therefore,
to waste time would be to incur serious
risks.
Some political writer's, It Is true.
assert that the dilemma, Germany or
Russia, is not a real one-that Ger
many cannot expand except in an
eastern direction, and that she will
ultimately meet Napoleon's fate there.
II the Hitlerian leaders were to re-
peat Napoleon's error and to force q
decision upon the Soviets by pushing
deeper and deeper into the Russian
Asiatic Plain, this might be true. But
the German conqueror would occupy
sectors one by one, and organize
them little by little. In that way an
eastern empire would be carved out
and the full weight Of 1t would surely
be thrown against the West sooner or
later-probably sooner. And this would
be an eastern empire Of a compact
nature, because, meanwhile, all the
Danubian countries, noting Frances
submissive policy, would hastily have
turned toward the German master
and sousht to sell themselves for some