Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1936-02-23

$40 600 900 apiece OF the threat 10
them from the attack of air bombers,
costing $4,000 apiece, was so real.
The lords of the admiralty promptly
produced counter arguments which
had the effect of restoring shattered
nerves upset by the visions of Musso-
linis bomberS humbling British sea
power.
The next move in this game Of
bluff was the threat that the Italian
armies in Northern Abyssinia would
either retreat to their own borders Of
Eritrea or act on the defensive, so
that sufficient forces would be re-
leased to march westward to the
Sudan - which, unlike Egypt, Is
full British protectorate-and there
cut off the waters of the Nile from the
teeming agricultural population of
the ancient land Of the Pharaohs. But
there are no roads from Eritrea to
Sudan: the country is difficult, and
the native Sudanese troops under
British officers, unlike the AbySsinians,
are plentifully supplied with modern
weapons.
Another move in the game was the
parading of the so-called Sea-sleds.
The Italian Navy has recently spe-
cialized in a very fast skimming
motor boat carrying torpedoes. Passed
on Sicilian harbors, these venomous
little craft would skim about the sur
face of the sea whenever it was calm,
running to within sight Of Malta and
back. and pirouetting round any
British man of war they could find.
Laymen were much impressed.
Sleds Fair weather Craft.
But the sea-sled is a device which
was tried in the World War. 1t was
used by the British on active service.
The Italians had their one naval sue
cess after the Austrian collapse and
revolution, when three of them en-,
tered the Austrian naval port of Pola
and sank man of war. These YES
sells are fair-weather craft. Even
under the best conditions, they would
be tackled with the greatest of ease
by the British destroyers.
Another rumor, started deliberately
in various quarters and repeated with
bated breath in political circles In
Britain, was to the effect that the
Italians were contemplating a coun-
ter-attack on Gibraltar. The. story
went that for this purpose they would
make surprise descent on the Span
iSh Balearic Islands and use these as
an advance base.
Quite apart from Spanish reactions,
this was too much for the French
when the story was repeated in Paris;
and 1t was then that serious CONVERSE
tons began between the French and
British naval stats. The British de-
manded, not for the first time, assur-
ances of French naval help in the
event of an italian attack on the
League powers generally and Britain
in particular.
M. Laval, still clinging to his mill
tary ideal of a strong Italian army,
ready to help France in case of a
rupture with Germany, fought gal
liant rear-guard action. French naval
bases were not suitable, he said; the
advance cruiser harbor of Bizerta was
not deep enough. Toulon was too
congested. The French cabinet could
not mobilize the fleet without mobiliz-
ing the army, and this the French
nation would not tolerate. And there
were other similar arguments. But in
the end two powerful French squad
rons have not only been mobilized,
but sent from Brest, in the Atlantic,
to the western entrance to the Med
iterranean.
1t may be convenient here to scotch
| another old wives tale which was
circulated in the European capitals.
F., 1t was to the effect that the British
warships in the Mediterranean were
short of ammunition. The truth is
that every warship at all times carries
her outfit of ammunition. Her maya
zines are always full. There was this
foundation for the rumor: There were
no reserves of ammunition for the
largest guns, the 16-inch armament
of the Rodney and the Nelson, avail
able at Alexandria, but they have
been sent since.
Apart from the Anglo-French ma
val and military stan conversations,