Evening star., 1936-02-16
BY r. BRITTEN AUSTIN.


posals, they unwittingly wrote finis to
the first postwar epoch of diplomacy.
During that epoch, while European
statesmen and American observers"
used Geneva as a more or less con-
venient arena for public debate and
private negotiation, 1t never occurred
to either to take the League seriously.
President Wilson's creation was a
highly respectable myth, useful for
placating idealists at home and bluff
f1ng realists abroad. Certainly M.
Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare, when
they shook hands at parting, must
have felt that they had done very
good job of work.
In thus rendering to the Duce a
reasonably face-saving formula for
terminating the Ethiopian War, they
had served the vital interests of their
respective countries. Britain, dis
armed almost to the point of i'm
potence, was relieved from the night
mare of an overwhelming air attack
on Malta. Malta is the key to the
Eastern Mediterranean and, except for
Gibraltar, also vulnerable to air at
tack, has the sole overseas drydock
capable of accommodating a post
Jutland battleship until the base at
Singapore shall be completed.
France was relieved of the unpleas-
ant alternative of losing British sup
port against Germany or breaking the
new accord with Italy, which not only
added the 100000 men of the Franco
italian frontier guard to the defenses
of the Rhine, but ranged Italy as a
potential active combatant against
the ever-feared Teuton. Both states
men might reasonably have expected
to be warmly congratulated on their
neat solution of the whole trouble
some nexus of interrelated problems.
1t was really in the best tradition of
diplomacy-to avoid war if war can
be avoided. That, indeed, is what
diplomats are for.
But Agreement Aroused Storm.
They must have been considerably
surprised at the reaction of the entire
world. Not congratulations, but a
howl of almost universal execration
greeted their neat piece of work. The
League had denounced Italy as the
aggressor, and now the burglar was
to be politely rewarded with a large
= lump of swag by the policeman! Was
the League, then, demonstrated
futility? In Britain there was an
unprecedented storm, and Mr.. Baldwin
took the unprecedented step of dis
missing his foreign secretary (of whose
negotiations he must have been ap-
provingly cogniZant) without himself
resigning. A deft politician, he put
himself at the head of that embar-
rassingly unanimous and militant pro-
League sentiment.
In France, where opinion was vio-
1ently divided, NJ Laval had a close
call. Apart from the pure idealists,
less common in France than in Anglo
Saxon countries, for the last Is years
the French have regarded the League
as the best possible machine for again
mobilizing the world against Germany
in the next inevitable war. If in this
crisis the League did not and could
not function, of what use was it
against Germany? The smaller states
cheaply composing the bulk of the
League Cfew of them even pay their
subscriptions look to it to save them
from the aggression of more powerful
nations; they cried out eloquently.
Russia-by no means to be omitted in
this matter-championed the full
League policy for a double reason:
She fears both Germany and Japan,
and an effective League would give her
both Britain and France as allies; also
q war of Britain and France against
Italy (surely buying a German mill
tary alliance at the price of Austria)
would leave Soviet Russia as the happy
tertius gaudens.
Britain Is League Backbone.
These non-Anglo-SaXon reactions
were and are of a cynically practical
order. They do not affect the main
issue. the effective survival of the
League as the instrument of a new
idealsm. The overthrow of Sir Samuel
Hoare for Mr.. Eden and a full imple-
menting of League policy with France
reluctantly in tow alone really mat
tiers. Without Britain and her navy
the League falls to the ground. In
startling ourtburst of unanimous SEN
tlment, the British public have insisted
that the Leagues decisions must be
carried out to the full, at whatever cost
to purely British interests, even at the
cost of war (but, of course there won't
be WarD. 1t is triumph for idealism,
Tor mans common longing for a new
world order Of eternal peace Also, as
the major direction of British policy
is automatically taken out of the
hands of the British government for
the time at least) and confided to the
League, it is a political event of the
first order.
contrary to very common opinion.
Brltain-or rather the professional
governing group in Britain-does not
normally use the League as Machia-
velllan instrument of imperial policy
Hitherto that professional group has
given only lip service to President Will
sons idealistic creation and has often
cursed 1t in its heart. Notoriouslv.
Britain refused to use her fleet against
Japan in the Manchurian affair. and
automatically the League did not func-
j.. tion. Notoriously, last May Britain
concluded naval pact with Germany
without consulting any other member
OF the League. Again, notoriously,
Britain knew of the Italian designs
against Abyssinia year ago and made
no protest loud enough to be heard.
Why has Britain now modified the
League against Italy-summoning up
a storm OF spirits which the doughtiest
Hotspur among British diplomats GER
tainly never counted upon?
Initial Fault Is ItaIys.
The initial fault, if fault it is. lies
with Italy. Apart from natural reluc-
tance to see one of the main elements
OF European equilibrium engage its
forces IN remote adventure, Britain
could see no strategic danger-there is
none to her empire communications
in an italian conquest of Abyissinia.
!, Nor, from Abyssinia, could italy
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