Evening star., 1936-05-19
Congress- Po,cer to Enact
Control Provisions Is Denied
Price Fixing Is Disposed of "Before
Coming to Question of Constitu.
tionaIity," Says Court Decision.

lntO ei1cCG. 1ltcIStdtc COilulchCC WOO
the direct object Of attack; and the
restraint of such commerce was the
necessary consequence of the acts" "ss
Another group Of cases, Of which
Swift and Co. VS.. United States, is an
example, rest upon the circumstance
that the acts in question constituted
direct interferences with the "fiow"
of commerce among the States. In
the Swift case live stock was con-
signed and delivered to stockyards-
not as a place Of final destination,
but, as the court said in Stafford VS..
Wallace, 258 u. S. 495, Sic, "A
throat through which the current
flows" The sales which ensued merely
changed the private interest in the
subject of a current without inter-
fering with its continuity. It was
nowhere suggested in these cases that
the interstate commerce cover ex-
tended to the growth or production Of
the things which, after production,
entered the flow. If the court had
held that the raising of cattle, which
were involved in the Swift case, in
Guiding the wages paid to and work.
ing conditions of the herders and
others employed in the business, could
be regulated by Congress. that de-
cision and decisions holding similarly
would be in point; for it is that sit
uation. and not the one with which
the court actually dealt, which here
concerns us.
Railway Case Quoted
To Sustain Court View.
The distinction suggested is illus
trated by the decision in Arkadelphia
Co. VS. st. Louis S. w. Ry. Co. Co. That
case dealt with orders of State COM
mission fixing railroad rates. One of
the questions considered was whether
certain shipments of rough material
from the forest to mills in the same
State for manufacture, followed by
the forwarding of the finished prod
uct to points outside the State, was a
continuous movement in interstate
commerce. 1t appeared that when the
rough material reached the mills it
was manufactured into various ar
ticles which were stacked or placed
in kilns to dry, the processes occupy
ing several months. Markets for the
manufactured articles were almost en-
tirely in other States or in foreign
countries. About 95 per cent of the
finished articles was made for out
bound shipment. When the rough
material was shipped to the mills it
aI hyy 11e 1,at III
percentage of the finished articles
would be sold and shipped outside
the State, and all of them knew and
intended that this 95 per cent of the
finished product would be sold and
shipped. This court held that the
State order did not interfere with
interstate commerce, and that the
Swift case was not in point; as it.
is not in point here.
The restricted field covered by the
swift and kindred cases is illustrated
by the Schecter case. There the COM
modify in question, although shipped
from another State, had come to rest
in the State of its destination, and
as the court pointed out, was. no
longer in a current or flow of inter-
state commerce. The swift doctrine
was rejected as inapposite. In the
Schecfter case the flow had ceased.
Here it had not begun. The differ
ence is not one of substances. The
applicable principle Is the same.
Labor Troubles Local
Issues Outside U. S. Control.
Much stress is put upon the evils
which come from the struggle between
employers and employees over the
matter of wages, working conditions,
the right of collective bargaining,
etc, and the resulting strikes, curtail-
ment and irregularity of production
and effect on prices: and 1t is in
sisted that interstate commerce Is
greatly affected thereby. But, in ad-
dition to what has just been said,
the conclusive answer is that the evils
are all local evils over which the
Federal Government has no legisla-
tive control The relation of employer
and employe is a local relation. At
common law, it is one Of the domestic
relations. The wages are paid for
the doing of local work. Working
conditions are obviously local condi-
tions. The employees are not engaged
in or about commerce, but exclusively
in producing a commodity.
The Governments contentious in
defense of the labor provisions are
really disposed of adversely by our
decision in the Schechter case The
only perceptible difference between
that case and this is that in the
Schechter case, the Federal power
was asserted with respect to commod-
tiles which had come to rest after
their interstate transportation; while
here, the case deals with commodities
at rest before interstate commerce
has begun. That difference is with
out significance.
Compulsion Aims Clear;
Maximum Hours Considered.
Sixth. That the act, whatever it
may be in form, in fact is compulsory
clearly appears. We have already dis
cussed section 8, which imposes the
excise tax as a penalty to compel
acceptance" of the code. Section IA
provides that the United States shall
purchase no bituminous coal product
at any mine where the producer has
not complied with the provisions of the
code; and that each contract made by
the United States shall contain a pro-
vision that the contractor will buy no
bituminous coal to use on, or in the
carrying out of. such contract unless
the producer be a member of the code,
as certified by the Coal Commission.
In the light Of these provisions we
come to consideration of subdivision
60 of Part III of Section 4, dealing
with labor relations"
That subdivision delegates the
power to fix maximum hours of labor
to part of the producers and the
miners-namely, "The producers of
more than two-thirds Of the annuel
national tonnage production for the
preceding calendar year" and more