Evening star., 1936-09-26
SPLIT IN FRANCE
STRESSED BY WAR
But Underlying Factors Are
Essentially Different,
Observer Says.

International repercussions OF the
Spanish cipil uar, especially as
they bear on the outlook for peace
or Ddr in Europe, are examined
mere tn the second of three dis
patches BY famous Uriter and
foreign correspondent Dho has Just
reached Paris after travelling SEP
erdl iDeeks In Spain and recording
his impressions OF under-surtace
conditions there.
BY WALTER DURANTY,
~ Radio to The Star.
PARIS, September 26.-The Span
lsh civil war is an advantage for Hit
Ter, but it puts France in a corre-
spondingly difficult position.
Superfcially at least, the French
government is not greatly different
from SPANS. Each Is the product Of
leftish coalition-which is some
what incoherent-againsta a center and
right minority. This minority made
the same accusations against the Blum
government as the die-hard conserva-
tives made against the labor govern
ments some years ago in England and
as the Liberty Leaguers made more
recently against the Roosevelt admin
istration in America-that it, willy or
nilly, is leading the country toward
bolshevism, anarchy and class war.
Hitler thundered forth the same ac-
eusation at Nurnberg and events in
Spain give him-as they give the
French right" critics of the Blum
government-some measure of justifl-
cation.
Essential Difference Cited.
In point Of fact, however, there is
an essential difference between the
situations in France and Spain. In
the latter country what the Marxists
call revolutionary conditions did ex-
tst-that Is to say, the vast mass of
discontented workers and peasants was
driven by an intolerable position to
fight against the special privilege of
the minority.
That is true of Spain, but it is not
true Of France, whose workers, for the
most part, want no more than raised
wages to meet the higher cost of living
and whose numerically powerful farm
ers chiefly want to reduce the profits
Of the middlemen, which make such a
wide gap between the producer and
consumer.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the
Spanish civil war has greatly increased
French anxiety, which comes from two
causes-first, belief approaching GER
tainty that Germany, sooner or later,
will make bid to revise by violence,
meaning war, the territorial status quo
established by the treaty of Versailles,
and, second, Frances own internal
dissensions, which the Spanish events
have accentuated and embittered.
Charges Of Press.
On the one hand, there is the gov.
ernment-a loose bloc of left parties,
Radicals, Socialists, Communists,
which already seems disintegrating-
pledged to social reform which is being
opposed by the privileged class and the
upper bourgeoisie. On the other hand,
there is the wave OF strikes, with its
ominious factor that the strikers have
begun to occupy factories. This en-
ables the right" press, with its pow
srful financial big business and cleri-
cal support, to declare more or less
overtly that the popular front govern
ment is tool in the hands of the Ia
Dor unions and is leading the country
toward bolshevism.
That, Of course, is Hitler's thesis,
and the fact that a politically and
economically important section of
French opinion Is eChoing it shows
how profound is the dissension caused
in French ranks by Spanish events.
On the one side, there is the ex-
treme left. with its war cry Of planes
and munitions for the Spanish gov
eminent" On the other side, the
French right is attacking both the
Spanish government and the govern
ment Of Premier Blum in terms that
might almost be dictated by Hitler
himself.
Realize Germans Enemy.
Thus, to the superficial view, France
presents q desperate and hopeless
spectacle-a country divided against
itself and covering beneath the great
shadows Of internal strife and Ger
man onslaught. But the superficial
view fails to take into account three
essential factors of the French situa-
tion-f1rst, that no revolutionary con-
ditions exist in France; second, that
the French people have more cold
logic and common sense than any
other people in Europe, and, third,
that every Frenchman, from the red
dest Of the Reds to the Royalists,
knows that Germany is the enemy,
and, In the final instance, will united
against the German danger as in 1914.
These factors do much to counter.
act Germanys advantages, which
consists. firstly, in unity-or the ap-
pearance of unity-against Frances
internal divisions, and, secondly, in
the fact that France, as one Of
Europe's "haves," has more to lose
by war than Germany, which is
Europe's greatest "have-not."
Franco Soviet Pact.
There remains, however. the vexed
question Of the Franco-Soviet pact.
which, it must not be forgotten, was
initiated by the Barthou representa-
tives Of the French right" and the
same Echo de Par1s-comite des forges
general staff elements which now
are letting themselves be stampeded
By developments Of the Spanish civil
war into q social revolution and by
the strikes in France toward accep-
tAnce Of Hitler's theory that democ-
Sacy leads to bolshevism and that the
Ffanco-Soviet pact is not only q
mortal danger to France, but an al
lance with the forces of anti-Christ.
In short, this section Of French
opinion is being buffaloed by its own
fears and political enmities into play
ing Hitler's game by forgetting that
0ermany's real object is revenge for
1918 and by believing the German
thesis of a crusade against the Red