Evening star., 1936-02-02
OIL EMBARGO SHELVED
AS AMERICA HESITATES
British Government Is Veering to
French View That Italy's Power Is
Necessary in Europe.

| isfactory terms might prove balm
for Mussolini's pride.
Moreover, Mussolinis Ethiopian
campaign has been messed up. despite
the reports of spectacular victories Of
Italian troops Field Marshal Badoglio
has not advanced further than his
unfortunate predecessor. Gen. Bara-
teri had reached in 1896. The real
truth. unknown in Italy as yet. Is that
the italian Army in Ethiopia is on the
defensive.
Lack of political foresight. weakness
of the military leadership, politics
mixing with strategy and tactics.
jealousies between Fascist troops and
regular soldiers, economic sanctions,
difficult terrain and climatic condi-
tions, all have contributed to delay
the realization of Mussolini's grandioSe
plans.
Followed Conservative Plan.
When Gen. de Bono, retired army
man put in command of the Italian
forces in East Africa because he was
prominent Fascist. began his cam
paign, his chief worry was not to re-
peat the mistakes which caused the
Italian Army to meet with disaster at
Adowa in 1896. Hence, he followed
strictly conservative plan of action
known by strategists as a logistical
war plan. This meant that the Italian
high command did not worry about
the enemy in front of the troops, but
took into consideration the question
of supplies, political circumstances
and transport No commander of an
army group dared move before he got
the signal "go" from the quartermas-
ter general, the chief of engineers and
the political agents.
This method of warfare was i'm
portant, but De Bono pushed it to
such an extreme that the Italians
were crawling instead of advancing.
In the south Gen. GraNani, regu-
lar army man, had $4,000 men based
on the inadequate port of Mogadit-
chou. The line of communication be-
tween that port and his headquarters
extends to something like $50 miles.
GraZiani did marvels with his small
SOA Hos A/CoPACC OCAl AlO0o 0xAIuAtAVoy AAN
pushed his men onward and gave the
impression that he was close to Harrar.
city as important as Adds Ababa.
In fact, he was never anywhere near
it, and under the most favorable cir
cumstances he could not have occupied
it with the inadequate forces placed
at his disposal.
BadogIio Faced Critical Situation.
When Marshal Badoglio replaced De
Bono, he found a difficult situation.
His troops were entrenched. The
aggressor, the invading army, was on
the defensive, although 1t had never
met any important body of enemy
troops. Trained officers had frequently
to bow before the amateurish ideas
Of the Fascist commanders. The army
had not reached even the Amba Alagi
Pass, leading to Adds Ababa. where
the Italians had arrived in 1896 and
were driven back to be defeated at
Adowa, and the season was already
| far advanced. The troops he had with
him, both Fascists and regulars, were
not really first class. Mussolini had
kept the best in Europe.
The new Italian commander in
chief decided to resume the offensive.
He sent the necessary reinforcements
to GRAHAM, but it was too late to
accomplish anything effective
Badoglio threw number of bat
talions outside the entrenched line to
give the impression of another often
sive and ordered the air squadrons to
resume relentless air bombardment.
Badoglio cannot get to Adds Ababa
this year, and Mussolini knows it now.
He has subordinated military strategy
to political considerations and this has
been fatal. The Italian Army must
henceforth remain on the defensive
until next October, unless II Duce is
forced before then 20 nquidate the
campaign entirely by the -bellig-
erent members of the League-whose
course will be determined by the action
of the American Congress
The idea of ali embargo on raw ma
terials-principally oil, because italy
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