Evening star., 1935-04-14
CONTINUED From First Pase.)

party. Mr.. Roosevelt smilingly re-
fused to catch the line that was
thrown across.
All this Is In the published record
which some of US read at the time
and most of us have forgotten. For
good or i'll it is part Of history. But
for those Of us who were In the
Government, never did impotence
seem SO complete, because never be-
fore had there been so many vital
questions demanding action.
1t is simple enough to say that on
any debt issue the United Stetes will
never be caught again in the same
way; but, made as o positive state
ment, this Is not true. Any one OF
us can imagine q situation where the
necessary to save the Nation. Nor
can 1t be said that II the expenditure
seems necessary the billions should
be given outright. Sometimes the
issue is not clearly enough drawn to
stir Congress to such action.
In the present situation think 1t
can fairly be said that two things
brought about reputation Of the war
debts, On the part Of the debtors
1t was lack Of will TO pay, induced
partly by propaganda and partly by
poverty. THE burden Of debt pay
ments. except for the transfer prob
lem. was nowhere as onerous as 1t was
made out to be.) On our own part
1t was politics. II the debts could
have been dealt with as business men
deal with private debts we should still
be collecting something.
Only our own mistakes need con-
Germ us here. The mouthings Of can
didates for ONCE who informed the
claims to the suffrage OF the voters
was that they would never, under
| any circumstances. release any one OF
our debtors from a single cent OF
their obligations was irritating The
halls of Congress echoed with SIM
liar speeches, all Of them appeals to
/ emotion, not TO common sense. The
debts were thought OF as the bonus
is today-as good vote-getters.
| I1OOfCl dohEO lOl IliC iC-
establishment of the Debt Commits
sion for the purpose of hearing such
suggestions as our debtors might
make. He pointed out to the Presi-
dent elect that the debts could not be
| discussed alone, because nothing
would then be mentioned except re-
duction: that they must be discussed
in conjunction with other economic
issues in which the world wanted
American help, since this was our
only lever. When these two requests
were refused the death knell of war
debts had been sounded.
Some nations at the time we're lit
| orally unable to pay; others we're
bound to follow their example. Mr..
Roosevelt did not realize that one
default on the part Of an important
nation was the beginning Of the end.
He had been told by one of his "un-
official" emissaries in Europe that one
great nation at least planned to re-
sumo payments Immediately after his
Inauguration as a sign Of good will
| to him.
1t is impossible to think that he
believed this absurd story, but 1t was
| certainly swallowed by some of his
encourage. He probably really be-
lieved, on the other hand. that 1t
would not be very difficult for him to
settle the matter by talking with the
leading statesmen of the debtor ma
tions after March 4. Otherwise it is
/ impossible to account for his un-
willingness to act in conjunction with
Mr.. Hoover at the one moment when
concerted action might have saved
the day.
The speeches of candidates and of
Congressman were harmful only in
that they created a bad psychology
abroad. 1t was the bitterness Of
| party politics which really did the
damage and caused the missing OF
| opportunities.
For example. some three years age
a foreigner fully qualified to speak
| asked me what the reaction hers
! would be If his government Offered
! to wipe of the debt by the immediate
payment Of q very substantial sum
in gold and an equal amount in ne
gotiable bonds. I took the suggestion
to the President, who said that w
ought to jump at the offer.
| But he made inquiries and fount
| that Congress would have none of it
that it would stand for the last
penny, even if the last penny wa.
not due for 60 years
II am afraid" the President sale
to me, that if various nations Of
fered cash to the full amount Of thu
present value of their debts, and
should transmit the offer to Con.
gresS, it would be refused"
Such was the political bitterness:
that he was probably right. And II
was just this political bitterness which
made possible the defaults which oc.
Cured
Certain aspects Of the work o1
every government must be affected
by political considerations because
political psrties have different polit.
| ical principles and ideals. This 1.