The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1935-09-28

States were involved upon one side
of the quarrel the nations in
fuence toward creating a stable
world system would be largely at
an end.
President Wilson would now do
what the editors were shrieking
for; he would send a stiff note to
Berlin and leave the problem of
what might happen in the event
of its rejection to the future. 1t
is in just that way that every war
has been made inevitable"
1t is an element of President
Wilson'S greatness that he realized
instinctively the profound futility
and irrelevance of force: it is an
element of his weakness that he
sought to find its substitute in the
treacherous boys of morality"
rather than in the -firmer ground
of practical psychology and
craftsmanship.
A FTER that, it was all over.
n The Cabinet was summoned
on Tuesday morning, and the
President began by reading them
Houses cable. The comment was
favorable and the President passed
on to outline the note in which
he proposed to follow this advice.
They were all eager for the
strong hand-eXcept the Secretary
of State. He insisted upon point
ing out the moose in which they
were placing themselves; he urged
strenuously that something be
done to prevent the nation being
plunged automatically into war in
case the Germans should not
yield.
The President was at first in
clined to accede; later on he re-
jected the idea. There was no
way of softening the note without
encouraging the Germans to re-
sist. The Cabinet approved, and
Mr.. Bryan, doubtful but uncertain
Of himself, signed. The die was
cast; the first Lusitania note was
dispatched on May Is, 1915.
What we demanded was total
surrender under the threat of war.
Yet the really extraordinary as
pect of the matter is that no one,
throughout the whole time that
the note was being prepared,
seems even to have thought of
analyzing the chances of getting
surrender.
No one called upon Mr. Gerard
for an estimate of the real mill
tary, psychological and political
forces which they had to deal
with. No one tried to calculate
the real Importance of the sub
marine to Germany. When they
agreed upon their vigorous note to
Berlin neither the President nor
his Cabinet can have had any
adequate idea as to whether they
we're in fact preparing a diplo-
matte victory or plunging the
people of the United States into
the bloodiest war that history had
known.
The first Lusitania note was re-
ceived, except in the German
language press, with an all but
universal enthusiasm.
7 ONDON. like Col House, not
IL unnaturally assumed that the
United States was now practically
one of the Allies. 1t was to learn
with something of a shock that
Washington did not share this
opinion.
To its establishment, Mr. Wilson
had barely exploded his bomb
shell in the Wilhelmstrasse before
he began exploding lesser ones in
Downing Street.
Mr.. Page, to his rebellious dis
gust, was ordered to press the
trade controversy, and on May Is
the President even tried to revive
the submarine blockade COM
promise.
1t came to nothing. but the ne
gotiations we're enlivened by the
subsequently famous episode of
the Durnba telegram, in which
Mr. Bryan apparently stands con-
victed of having at least intimated
to the Austrian ambassador that
the United States did not wish to
go TO war over the Lusitania. For
this black treason the Secretary
of State has often been reproved.
Monday-Another installment Of
the Road to War"
(Copyright Mcclure Neyspaper Syndicst tel