Evening star., 1935-10-13

~ ERLIN.-There is good reason
- to suppose that German re-
armament is less formidable
- and less developed than is
generally believed To no small de-
gree it has been a bluff which owes
its success, at least temporarily. to
the fact that it was not only bluff,
but bogey.
BY this I mean it was to the in
terest of other great powers, notably
Great Britain, to stress and exaggerate
German rearmament beyond its mer-
its. AS it happened, this desire of
Britain to play up" German rearm-
ament conceded with French fears of
Germany.
France knows that Germany seeks
revenge for the defeat of 1918 and
knows, too, that Hitler's success is
based primarily upon his appeal to
German national pride and to the
German sense of humiliation. That
appeal is the solid foundation upon
which Hitler built an otherwise some
what f1imsy structure. He said in
substance to the German people: I'VE
have been browbeaten and down.
trodden long enough; unless we stand
up for our own rights and develop our
own forces of resistance, we must re-
sign ourselves to a position of sub
servience which is unworthy of our
nation and its great tradition. Our
first step must be the military re-
generation of the German people,"
Whereupon Hitler tore up the mill
tary clauses of the Versailles treaty
and announced the formation of the
greatest army in Europe outside Of
Russia This announcement was greet
ed with loud outcry from every French
newspaper and public spokesman. The
French we're profoundly alarmed to
see that the German giant, who had
already successfully broken the golden
chains of the reparation clauses of the
peace treaty. was now breaking its
military shackles as Gulliver broke the
threads of Lilliput. Meanwhile, Brit
ain, for different but no less valid
reasons, echoed French alarm and
trumpeted abroad the news of Ger
man rearmament in the most en-
phatic manner.
Balance of Power Theory.
The British reason for doing this
was simple and practical Britain was
not seriously afraid of Germany: in
fact, it rather welcomed Germany
stronger than before to counter
balance the paramount strength of
France. But the balance of power"
theory which the British foreign Office
has followed successfully for centuries
is one Of the cardinal factors in Euro
pean politics, and in the years 1880
the European seesaw was too uneven
that is to say, the predominance of
France and her associates was too
great for Britain to stand successfully
in the middle and raise or depress
this side or that as British policy re-
quired.
A stronger Germany, therefore, was
useful to Britain in that 1t made the
seesaw more level. That, however,
was secondary consideration. The
important point to the British was
that the conservative government
wished to renew, reinforce and in
crease its aerial, naval and military
establishments. For two excellent
reasons. The first reason was eco
nomic; after is years of dole" and
similar palliatives for hard times,
Britain had found the only satisfac-
tory cure for unemployment was en-
ployment. Britain's basic industries
are coal, metallurgy, shipping and tex
tiles. For textiles there was little
hope, but big rearmament program
would give much-needed stimulus to.
the other three.
On the other hand, the conservative
government knew that the British
people were not only pacifist in senti-
ment but severely opposed to addi-
tional military expenditure, with its
inevitable increase of taxation. It
was therefore necessary to scare the
British public into acceptance of the
arms expenditure. For this purpose
German rearmament was the most
useful of instruments, and TIN British
presg was flooded with taleasef Ger.