Evening star., 1935-10-13

resort to military sanctions by the
League. What they did not reckon
with was the fact that the British
might see the Ethiopian enterprise as
dangerous to their own imperial inter-
ests and transform dispute between
italy and the League into a direct IS
sue between themselves and II Duce.
When this thing did actually occur the
effect upon Mussolini was immediate
and impressive. To be sure he did not
abandon mis- African enterprise, but
he did multiply those protestations of
respect for British interests in which
he had hitherto economical.
Two Episodes Transpiring.
When the dust has cleared the world
will see very clearly that we have had
two quite different episodes in recent
weeks: The struggle between Italy and
the League and the battle between
Britain and Italy. In the former the
Italians have won because no great
power was disposed to make war upon
italy to prevent italy from making war
upon Ethiopia. In the latter dispute,
while specifically italy has stuck to
her program, under cover she has been
compelled to make some pretty hu-
initiating concessions to the British,
the most humiliating Of which was
the tacit admission that British naval
supremacy in the Mediterranean still
endured.
The British, for their part, have had
an unpleasant awakening and a Sc
we're shock. They underestimated Mus
solini almost as much as II Duce exag-
gerated his own strength. Nevertheless
it Is impossible to withhold admiration
from subsequent British performance
under such adverse circumstances. The
disclosure of British weakness in the
Middle Sea has enabled the Baldwin
government to provide the admiralty
with a newer and bigger navy, no
longer hanpered by the restrictions Of
the London and Washington treaties.
In the forthcoming general election,
too, the Tories will face a divided op-
position because Labor has split over
the question of the resort to force to
coerce Italy. Last of all, Baldwin can
count on much of the support Of the
peace societies who recently rallied up
ward Of II 900, 900 voters to their cause,
which Is that Of the League, for at
Geneva Britain has been the Cove
nant's sole uncompromising champion.
What then is missing from the pic
ture? Obviously any relief for the
Ethiopians. They are going to be left
to fare as best they can under the
Italian attack. If Mussolini wins,
then Ethiopia will be partitioned aud
the British will, under some polite fic-
ton, manage to get control of the re-
gion about Lake Tsana, the source of
the Blue Nile. Mussolini, for his part,
will take the rest, and presently some
sort OF bargain will be made between
Great Britain, France and Italy-re-
placing the accord of 1906-covering
North African questions generally.
That was what happened after the
Fashoda affair and again after the
Moroccan incidents.
France to Aid Italy.
OF course Italy may lose, but mill
tary defeat Is unlikely and when the
dust of the present row has cleared
away Rome is fairly sure to receive
financial help from Paris. Actually
the present affair is likely to have two
victims and one villain. Ethiopia is
almost certain to lose its independ-
ence, Geneva is bound to be stripped
Of what little prestige the Manchu-
rian incident left it. The United States
Is going to be held responsible for the
failure of the Leagues economic sane
lions to operate effectively, both by
the publics of fofeign countries gen.
orally and by the domestic cham
pions of Geneva as we'll.
Whether the British government
ever believed it could halt Mussolini
without war will doubtless remain a
mystery. Unquestionably a consider
able portion of the British public
did, while the die-hards were not un-
willing to restort to war if necessary
to put an end to Italian trespassing
on British spheres Of interest. And
1t Is evident that no inconSiderable
fraction of the American public did
believe that there was a magic in
world opinion and a potency in eco
nomic sanctions calculated to frighten
II Duce. From start to finish they
failed to realize that what troubled
Mussolini was not the prospect of
League boycott. but Of q British
blockade.
At last, however, after many
excursions and alarms the discussion
has come down to the question Of
token" sanctions. Americans who re-
call the once familiar device Of "tok-
en-" payments as applied to war debts
may, perhaps, be forgiven a certain
amount of skepticism, remembering
as they must that the token" in that
instance constituted the immediate
preface to default. Like the token
payments, too, the token sanctions are
likely to constitute sacrifice OF the
while attempting to pre-
serve the semblance. Whether they
will prove more successful this time
than before is open to doubt.