Evening star., 1935-08-11

tween the two conceptions, that of
preventing war and that of keeping
out of it, was clearly disclosed. The
President evidently still believed that
the power of embargo could be en-
ployed effectively to coerce a country
resorting to war and that the fear Of
the exercise of that power would act
as a restraint. The Senate. on the
other hand. saw clearly that any uni
lateral embargo would constitute an
act of war and could result in making
us belligerent. And once it had tied
the Presidents hand in this respect,
he was destitute of influence abroad.
where the episode was counted fresh
disclosure of the control of American
policy by the Senate.
The recent appeal of the Emperor
of Ethiopia to Washington and the
two notes which issued as conSe-
quence again raised the same issue.
The reply to the Emperor seemed to
indicate clear purpose on the part
of the American Government to keep
out of the dispute altogether. Under
the pressure of the various peace
societies, however, Mr.. Hull was
moved to issue q second note, which
was accepted in Italy as criticism
of Italian policy and in Europe gen.
orally as an evidence of an American
purpose to participate in an effort
to restrain Mussolini. The result
was resentment in Rome and the
amusing suggestion from London that
Britain would back any American
effort to prevent war.
But, having been caught by a
similar British maneuver in the
Manchurian affair, Washington was
not inclined to permit itself to be
made the goat in the Ethiopian issue.
We had made an enemy of Japan use
lessly in 1881, we were now invited
to make a foe of Italy in 1885. But
by this time it was plain that, aside
from a few peace organizations, the
mass of the American people were
insistent, not upon a course of pre-
vention, which might lead to involve
ment, but upon policy Of minding
our own business, which promised
neutrality. And it became clear. when
the President had his notable con-
versation with the newspaper cor
respondents a few days later, that
he, too. had come round to the
same point Of view.
Problem Simple in Theory.
This was the point of departure Of
the latest discussion between the Sen
ate and the State Department OF
the question of how to insure Ameri-
can neutrality in advance. In theory
the problem is simple; in practice,
however, it is at least difficult to
solve by .pre-war legislation. 1t is
a question of waving rights, of avoid
ing any insistence upon those priv
ileges which belong legally to the
neutral. Technically, we have the
right to trade with belligerents, sub
ject to certain restrictions, and our
ships and citizens have the right to
travel and trade in the war zones.
Actually, however, the lives and prop
erty of the citizens of neutral coun-
tries are bound to be lost under such
circumstances.
We got into the World War because
Mr.. Wilson undertook to combine neu-
trality with the insiStence upon neu-
tral rights. If we had warned our
citizens to keep out of the war zones
and our ships to abandon the attempt
to travel in waters which had been
covered either by legal or illegal block
ade proclamations, then we should
not have become involved. American
lives and property would have been
destroyed, but the responsibility would
have rested with the individual, not
with the government.
1t goes without saying that the
Germans + no legal right to do
what they did. Their ultimate sub
marine blockade, with its specific re-
striction of the right of American
ships to use the open seas, constituted
an unwarranted invasion Of American
rights which was a justification for
our subsequent course. But had Will
son placed neutrality above all else
from the start, neither American nor
presidential prestige would have been
at stake and the German proclama-
ton which led directly to our belliger-
ency would not have had that conse-
quence.
But must be clear that to wage
neutrality is not matter of passing
laws in advance, but of taking a def
mite course when war breaks out. If
war comes in Europe it will come over
issues which do not concern us and
no belligerent will have the smallest
hostility toward us. Such a war will
not come to us and to encounter it
we shall have to go to it. Unless the
British are belligerents, the naval
issue will not become acute; even if
they are, it can affect us only If we
undertake to trade here trouble
actually exists. And not a few Ameri-
cans have, in advance, urged that the
policy of our Government should be
not to insist upon our legal rights, but.
a. most, to seek by arbitration to re-
cover damages for material loss.
L AC OlAACulty WALL VIC eAidI oAANO WoA
breaks out in Europe the President
will be under constant pressure to do
something about it. Even before it
actually 1omes, he will be pressed by
the peace societies, the pulpit and a
portion of the press to make moral
gestures. Inevitably such gestures, If
they are made, will be directed against
one of the'two parties at odds, against
the Germans, for exam. e, II the Aus
trian issue precipitates a clash. Such
interventions, too, will necessarily
arouse sentiment on one side and
give at least moral support to the
other, and we shall at once cease to
appear neutral.
Thus, If we are to preserve our neu-
t--ality, 1t is essential that from the
outset we should avoid all forms Of
interference. That involves recog-
nizing even now that there is Moth
ing this country can do to prevent
another war in Europe and that any
thing we may attempt to do will almost
inescapably tend to entangle us In the
struggle. Above all, it involves avoid
ance of moral gestures which are
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