Evening star., 1935-10-13
UNCLE SAM FACING ROLE
VILLAIN In SANCTIONS
League Policy, Headed for Failure, Will
Shift Blame for Failure to Halt
Italian Invasion in Africa.
By FRANK H. SIMONDS.

By FRANK H. SIMONDS.
OMETIME very soon-perhaps
even before this article Is
printed-the United States will
- receive a polite but ofncial invi-
tation from Geneva to throw in It's lot
with the League members In their
economic sanctions to arrest Italian
aggression in Africa. For 1t is mani
fest that the employment of such
sanctions now constitutes the next
step and 1t is equally evident that
these cannot be employed successfully
If the United States, Germany and
Japan, which are not In the League,
refuse to share in imposing them.
The reason for that is simple. If
Great Britain, France and the Soviet
Union should cut of all their own
trade with Italy any one Of the nom
League powers could step in and re-
place them. And naturally the United
States could do this most effectively
because 1t possesses most of the raw
materials which Italy lacks and must
have not merely to fight. but simply
to exist. Accordingly, without Ameri-
can assistance there can be no effec-
tive economic sanctions.
But is it probable that the Roose-
welt administration will undertake to
embargo its exports to Italy of coal,
iron, steel, cotton. copper and dozen
other raw materials and minerals in
order to help the League powers punish
q country with which 1t has no direct
quarrel2 Certainly there Is going to
be enormous pressure put upon it to
do this by the various peace societies
and League champions. If, moreover,
it refuses, then the British govern
ment will report to the British people
that the responsibility for the failure
Of Geneva to restrain Italian aggres-
sion must rest with the United States.
U. S. Trade Real Key.
So far the American people have
given very little real thought to the
actual problem Of sanctions. They
have thought Of the matter in terms
Of the closing Of the Suez Canal or
Of a blockade of Italy by the British.
And they have seen Mussolini promptly
bowling to this coercion because they
have been aware of the dependence Of
Italy upon the outside world for raw
materials and foodstuffs. They have,
therefore, ignored the fact that the
key Of the sanctions problem was in
their own hands and that if they re-
fused to abandon their own trade with
Italy the League machinery and
method could not work.
It was to get around this obstacle
that the British and French per-
suaded Norman H. Davis to agree that
II the armed nations consented to a
substantial reduction in their military
establishments the Roosevelt admin
istration would balance that conces-
sion by one Of its own. We would,
Mr.. Davis promised, do nothing to
interfere with League blockades i'm
posed against nations guilty of agrees
sion. Nothing came of this proposed
deal because no disarmament arrived.
It was, moreover, to head of any such
bargain in the future that Congress
rushed through its neutrality legisla-
ton last Summer.
What Is important to note now,
however, Is that the failure of eco
nomic sanctions to have any effect
upon the Italians is going to demon
strate that there is in fact no peace
full means to prevent war. When
the Japanese marched into Man.
churia the League, reinforced by the
United States, had recourse to moral
pressure. World opinion was mobil-
lied against the japanese and voiced
from Geneva. But all this had no
effect: The Japanese continued to
advance in Manchuria and merely re-
tired from Geneva.
Much Time Sure to Elapse.
In the Ethiopian affair, recourse is
going to be had to the second form
of coercion. Moral force having
failed, economic pressure is to be
tried. But every one in official life
knows in advance that it will come to
nothing because two and probably
three Of the great powers, already
out OF the League, will not participate
In them. Weeks and even months will
doubtless be consumed in trying to
find q formula for the applications of
these economic sanctions and the
Ethiopian campaign may well be over
before agreement is reached.
1t Is worth recalling that it took q
year and o half to produce the report
OF the Lytton Commission which, when
1t was framed, was utterly without
effect. Just the same thing is bound
TO come now-barring the unlikely
event Of an actual Anglo Italian con-
nict. You will have reports from
Africa describing Italian military per-
1ormances neatly balanced by descrip-
lions OF the debates going on at
Geneva and between London, Paris
and Moscow as to ways and means of
employing peaceful coercion in time
OF war. But, as have said before,
IN the end all Europe will agree that
america Is to blame for the failure
OF the economic weapon.
In order to employ economic sane
lions effectively against Italy it would
be necessary not merely to blockade
Italian ports, but to interrupt Italian
trade with her neighbors as well. AS
long as Germany remained free to buy
what she chose abroad, so long she
could act as the purchasing agent for
Italy and transport her purchases by
land to ner own frontier. Thence
they would pass over Austrian railways
to Italy and, since the Austrian gov
eminent Is wholly under italian con-
troll, 1t would certainly offer no resist
ance to this operation.
War Seen With Mani Blockade.
Germany, then, would also have to
be blockaded and subjected to coer-
cion by the League powers restraining
her from interfering with League dis
cipline. Blockading Germany and
Italy would, moreover, surely precipi-
tate q new general war on the conti-
nent, for neither country would tamely
submit to this form Of attack Thus,
In the attempt to stop an Italian ag-
l.