Evening star., 1935-03-17
BY FRANK II. SIMONDS

ish White Paper, emphasized
Il as it was by Hitlers refusal
to meet Sir John Simon as
had been arranged. must evoke the
question, What on earth did the
Germans expect?" 1t must also elicit
the mournful conclusion that Hitler
himself is as little able to perceive
the realities of British policy as poor
Bethmann- Hollweg 20 years ago. And
that is the more amazing because,
whether or not it be the cleverest
diplomacy in the world, the British
is, in reality, the most consistent.
For something like three centuries
the dominating concern of British
craftsmanship has been to prevent
the development of any continental
state capable of controlling the main
land of Europe. And British interest
has primarily occupied itself with the
low countries facing its own coast,
where the issue of national security
Is at stake. Nevertheless. the British
have never failed to throw their
weight against any great power whose
disproportionate strength might tempt
it to seek hegemony.
Germany Rouses Britain.
Now the Germany of Adolf Hitler
presents the two basic factors that
rouse British opposition. Inherently
it is the most powerful continental
state, and intrinsically Hitler's policies
are aggressive and envisage domina-
ton. Not only, then, will Britain
oppose German policies Of aggres-
sion, but, in the same fashion, Lon
don will support those states whose
interests, like Britain's. are menaced
by the eventual, if not the immediate,
implications Of German policy.
AS long as Adolf Hitler plans to
take Austria by force, or to conquer
the Ukraine by war, British policy
will be arrayed against Germany and
with France. And the single means
by which Hitler could bring about
a modification of British policy would
be by consenting to change his own
purposes. For the greater Germany
which der Reichsfuehrer is seeking
to create would dominate the Con-
tinent and endanger British security.
But Hitler, like his pre-war predeces-
sors, continues to cherish the illusion
that he can pursue his present poll
cieS and at the same time avoid
British opposition.
The recent incident illustrates the
Hitlerian policy and the enduring
German idea that British statesman
ship can be rendered blind to its own
interests. In the London conversa-
tions between British and French
statesmen, Macdonald and Simon had
proposed the extension of the original
Locarno to cover the air. The French
had urged the establishment of new
Locarnos on the Danube and in the
east. These the British had approved
but declined to underwrite. All were
submitted to the Germans by the
British with polite admonition that
they accept them.
Disunion Sought.
Hitler, for his part, conceived that
if he accepted the British proposal
with enthusiasm and ignored the
French in Berlin conversations with
Sir John Simon which were presently
arranged, then the British foreign
minister, avid for personal success,
would take the German proposal back
to London and urge its acceptance.
Thereupon the French, the Italians
and the Soviet Russians would be-
come suspicious and indignant.
Franco-British understanding would
be abolished and Europe would be
resolved into political disunity,
patiently profitable for German prof.
ectS.
All of which would have been good
enough strategy were it not for the
German projects themselves which
the British oppose. For them Ger
many is prospective enemy just
as long as German policy looks
toward continental supremacy. And
since Germany is prospective enemy
France must be an inevitable ally.
To quarrel with France was, then,
to play the German game at the ex-
pense of British interests. And the
British do not play other peoples
games at their own expense.
Consequently, the foreign office pro-
CcGQed 10 ISSUE WllltC 1nROA WANNA
said bluntly that continental unrest
and British resort to vast new arma-
ment expenditures were the direct
consequence of German policy,
political and military. The inference,
of course, was that 1t was for the
German chancellor in his forthcom-
ing conference with the British for
eign minister to remove those causes
of disquiet. 1t was in the nature OF
warning and an invitation. this
famous official document. and it in
dtcated that If Hitler clung to- his
purposes Britain would stick to her
friends. On the other hand, If Hitler
was prepared to renounce his pur-
poses he might count on British aid
to right certain obvious wrongs.
But what Hitler was counting on
was to win British assent. If not sup
port, for his policies. He calculated
that II he subscribed to British air
proposals, which were directly re-
lated to British security, the British