Evening star., 1935-08-25
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.

II Is interesting ana illuminating W
consider from q detached point OF
view the performance of European
craftsmanship in what has become q
major crisis. To analyze the motives
Of the several countries, too, is to un-
derstand moves which are otherwise
20 inconsistent with past pretensions
as to be practically unintelligible. And
in this respect the British and French
courses are most impressive.
-Four years ago, for example, when
the Manchurian episode occurred, the
whole question Of the future OF the
League of Nations was raised. 1t was
clear then that If Japan got away
with her Asiatic adventure the prece-
dent would be fatal to Geneva's inf1u-
ence in the future. Great Britain, too,
had long been the most earnest advo-
cate of League action rather than
operations of individual nations. The
British were the champions of the
collective idea because they were
eager that the world should not re-
vert to the old condition of rival al
liances, but make use of the machin-
cry of Geneva.
But In the crisis Of 1881 the British
utterly declined to share in any at
tempt to make the collective system
effective. Mr.. Stimson carried the
United States to Geneva and made it
practical partner of the League in
the effort to insure combined action.
But the British saw their Asiatic sit
uation as such that they could not
afford to make an enemy Of Japan
Instead Of accepting the Manchurian
affair as a direct challenge to the
League and the collective idea, there
fore. they permitted it to assume the
character of dispute between the
United States and Japan, in which
they were using their good Offices.
Double Precedent Remains.
Necessarily, they later subscribed to
the Lytton report, which ultimately
condemned Japanese action. and gen.
orally, but by no means unanimous
ly. the British press criticized Japa-
nese withdrawal from the League.
Throughout the crisis the relations
between London and Toxic were not
strained as those between Washing
ton and Toxic were. But the double
precedent of Japanese triumph and
British paSsivity has remained ever
since to plague British craftsmanship.
In the Ethiopian affair the British
attitude is quite different. In 1881
there was a direct break between the
elements in England actually anxious
to back the League and genuinely
convinced Of its value and those who
thought japanese friendship more
important for British interests in the
Far East than the fortunes of the
League. Today however, both those
who consider the moral aspects of
the Italian adventure and those who
are concerned with the material in
terests Of Britain in the premises are
In agreement. And this explains the
wholly different tone of British COM
ment and display Of zeal now which
was lacking four years ago.
new general election Is coming in
Great Britain this Fall. Failure of
the present government to support the
League to the uttermost will provide
the opposition with convenient line
OF attack. But, at the same time.
those Tories who have little concern
for Geneva are fully aware that war
In Ethiopia must have very disagree
able implications for British inter-
ests. Not only does this mean that
London Is disturbed over the possible
approach of Italy to the headwaters
OF the Blue Nile, but 1t is also aware,
as Gen. Smuts indicated the other
day, that this war of Mussolini's may
produce unrest and worse among the
millions Of King Georges black sub
jects.
Wants League Strengthened.
Britain wants the hand of the
League strengthened now as the
United States sought to have it backed
IN the Manchurian affair. In 1881
the problem of the League was awk-
ward for the British because there
was collision between principle and
Interest. In 1885, however, these run
parallel. Unhappily alike for the
League and the British, though. the
situation Is otherwise for the French.
Ihus, just as London was at all times
concerned with keeping relations with
Toxic cordial. Paris recently has been
equally occupied with preserving its
new entente with Rome.
Having to choose between sacr;f7c-
ing the League and arousing Japanese
resentment, the British chose to let
Geneva down. Having to decide be-
tween the League and Italy, France
mas now followed the British example
ano let Geneva pay the price in lost
prestlge. That is not to say that the
french like the Italian preference
neither for that matter did the Brit
lsn approve OF the Japanese action
put each country in turn has faced An
identical situation in the same fash
ion. 1t Is, moreover, interesting tn
note tnat Just as Sir John Simon de-
hected Japanese resentment from
Britain to the United States, so has
Laval turned Italian wrath from
French to British shoulders.
YOU put the thing brutally but ac-
curately If you say that in 1881 Britain
feit that she needed japanese friend
snip IN her imperial business too much
70 PACK the League in any actual phys
ical interference with Japanese &C
tion. In the same way in 1895 France
needs Italy too gravely in her Euro
Pean enterprise to help Geneva hindar
italy. The objective of French poIicv
To-Day Is to soften British-Italian
acerbities as to prevent Italy's depar-
ture from Geneva. Because, as France
Is trying to convince Britain. the
League may well prove an adn,;roh,e
instrument in French, italian and
British hands to defeat a German
aggression later.
France Has to Choose.
Called upon to choose between see
Ing League prestige shaken by failure
to stop the Ethiopian war and seeing
Its ranks further thinned by the de-
parture Of Italy. France has deliber-
ately chosen the former alternative.
Paris Is patiently annoyed with Musso-
lini's course in embarking upon an
sA1S~