Evening star., 1935-09-20
Anglo-Italian War?

With staggering swiftnesS danger OF
war has shifted from its original cause
the Italo- Ethiopian confiict-to an
Anglo-Italian crisis. That the perlls OF
worldwide conflagration are thus en-
hanced is obvious. Even with applica-
ton of League sanctions, in case Italy
were to be branded an aggreSSor, CAM
paign in Ethiopia might concelvably be
localized" within the bounds OF that
colonial" affair which MuSSolini pro-
fesses to regard it. But with Great
Britain and Italy at war, the situation
automatically assumes ramiflcations OF
illimitable International dimensions.
Every scrap of news coming out OF nerve
racked Europe reflects something akin
to a spirit of resignation in the face of
the inevitable. 1t is 1914 all over again.
The Italians are being Systematically
drilled in the belief that Britain aims
deliberately at their humiliation. Their
irritation over League plans for settle
ment of the African quarrel has given
way to rabid indignation over British
action in massing naval forces in the
Mediterranean, especially in the vicinity
of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. Rome
considers these notifications deliberately
provocative and leaves no doubt that
they will be met by counter measures,
notably in the region of Malta, which is
susceptible to submarine attack, and
mine-laying operations capable OF
harassing even the strongest British
feet.
The imagination shrinks from con-
templating the complications to which
Anglo-Italian hostilities might lead.
Britains determination to retain Su-
premacy in the Mediterranean may be
taken for granted. She will shrink from
no recourse to preserve the Empires
life line" to the East. No less at stake
is the British position in Africa, with
Egypt and the Sudan menaced by an
expanding Italian colonial domain
British naval strength is estimated to be
at least two and half times that of
would seem suicidal for Mussolini to risk
combat in the Mediterranean. He relies
upon his formidable submarine and air.
craft forces as an offset against British
superiority in battleships and battle
cruisers. The Italians are well equipped
with bases both in the middle sea and
In the Adriatic.
The preponderance of actual British
power, nevertheless, is so overwhelming
that the conclusion is inescapable that
Mussolini must be thinking in terms of
allies. He may fancy, too, that if it
comes to a question of sanctions, the
French may not be minded to give the
British complete cooperation. 1t has
to be remembered that Britain has in
sisted throughout upon collective" re-
sistance to Italy's pretensions. She has
clearly intimated her unwillingness to
oppose them single-handedly.
In the event of Anglo-Italian war,
what would be the role of Germany?
Has II Duce private understanding
with Hitler, with Austria as its base?
Is he holding such a contingency as a
club with which to ward off British
extremes and French support of them?
How long would Yugoslavia refrain
from attacking an Italy locked in a
death grapple with Britain? How soon,
then, would the Little Entente powers
march? Would Soviet Russias legions
be held in leash? Matters are has
tening with deadly rapidity to a point
at which early answers to these ques-
tions should be possible. The world
awaits them in gravest anxiety, appalled,
by the thought that in this enlightened
hour the idea of another great war can
be seriously harbored by civilized nations.