Evening star., 1935-08-11


been disclosed in Washington
~ by the renewal of discussion
of the question of American neu-
trality. 1t has been plain from the
start that the Italian adventure in
Africa could have very far-reaching
consequences in Europe. Thus de-
feat for Italy or a protraction of the
campaign of conquest might so Grip
pie the Fascist state that it would be
unable to oppose German purpose in
Austria. Or, at the very least, the
conviction on the part of Hitler and
his advisers that Italy was out of the
running might tempt them to fresh
effort to accomplish what they failed
to achieve by the putsch in Vienna
q year ago.
In all human probability such an
attempt would precipitate another gen.
eral war in Europe. France, the ma
tions of the Little Entente and the
Soviet Union all see their own security
at stake in the question of Austrian in
dependence. They would therefore be
bound to take up arms. What Great
Britain would do under such circum-
stances is patiently open to question,
but the British themselves have little
hope of keeping out of the mess. 1t is,
then, quiet clear that both the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the
American Government are face to face
with the problem of policy which this
prospect presents.
Ever since the days of Woodrow
Wilson, too, there has been a profound
divergence between the views of Presi-
dents and Congresses. The former
have turned their attention to the
efforts to prevent war, the latter have
concentrated their interest upon keep
ing the United States out of war.
The historic battle over this issue was
that fought between Wilson and the
Senate over the League of Nations.
Decisive as was the victory of the
Senate, however, the divergence en-
dured and from time to time new
attempts have been made by various
Secretaries of State to find common
ground for action with the rest of the
world to prevent war.
Kellogg Pact Harmless.
The first of these attempts, that dis
closed in the so-called Kellogg pact,
was nominally harmless, since it car
ried no specific responsibility for the
enforcement of the pledge embodied in
this treaty. All countries formally re-
nounced war as an instrument of
policy, but none agreed to act against
another, if it broke this pledge The
Senate, moreover, specifically elm
mated from the contract any duty of
enforcement. On the surface it was
. promise and nothing more Never
theless, when Japan began her Man
churian operations the country was
suddenly brought face to face with
the fact that the Kellogg pact did
have implications which had not been
foreseen.
Thus Mr.. Kellogg's successor, Mr..
Stimson, at once seized upon the pact
as the basis for American cooperation
with the League in very clear attempt
to restrain Japan. In realty the Kel-
loeg pact had thus served as a bridge
between Washington and Geneva and
the American people one day woke up
to the fact that they had become in
Volved in collective attempt to inter-
fere with Japanese policy. More than
that, they presently discovered that
their government was leading the fight
against the Japanese and that, as a
result, the relations between Toxic
and Washington were becoming strain
ed and talk of a possible war was
general.
What was even more illuminating
was the discovery that the League
powers were in no mood to support
the American Government in it's at
tempt to prevent war, once that at
tempt was disclosed as bound to fail
unless moral pressure was reinforced
oy military and naval action. Great
Britain was perfectly ready to let the
United States make war Single-handed
with Japan to defeat the policy Japan
was pursuing, but it was not willing
to join us in exerting pressure. On
the contrary, it at once fell back upon
It's traditional balance of power tech
nique and skillfully avoided sharing
In the resentments which Mr.. Stim-
sons actions had awakened in Japan.
Heritage of Hostility.
Our effort to prevent war in Asia
and to restrain japanese imperialism
In Manchuria thus not merely failed
but left us faced by a continuing
heritage of Japanese suspicion and
hostility. One effect of these emotions
was the subsequent denunciation of
the London naval treaties by the
Japanese. Since Mr.. Stimson had at
tempted to create a common front
between America and England and
against Japan, the Japanese now de-
manded naval parity with both as an
insurance against any later Anglo
American combination The japanese
withdrawal from the League and de-
nunciation of the naval treaties were
then the only lasting consequences
of the Hoover-Stimson attempt to
give effect to the Kellogg pact.
A new stage in this question of
neutrality developed when, at the
Geneva Disarmament Conference,
Norman H. Davis, speaking for Mr..
Roosevelt, proposed that the United
armament of the armed states of
Europe by promise not to insist upon
its neutral rights in case some country
should be guilty of aggression and the
League powers should set out to pre-
vent such an aggression. In word,
under such circumstances we should
waive any right to trade with the
guilty nation and to that extent be-
come partners in the effort to prevent
war, or at least to punish the ag-
gressor.
Nothing came of this proposal be-
cause the armed powers of Europe,
remembering their experience with
wilson's pledges which were later
Yepudiated by the Senate, saw in the
Roosevelt offer only presidential
gesture which at best would have i'm
portance only during Mr.. Roosevelt's
stay in the White House. Conf1rma-
tion of the conviction that the Senate
L. B. a.