Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1935-07-07

fend France from naval attack either
by Germany or Italy. then the French
will probably agree to recognize the
italian claim to parity and accept
the ratio this would impose in re-
spect to Germany. OF course. the
British pledge would take the form
of the Locarno pacts and guarantee
the status quo against any aggressor,
thus insuring Italy against France
and France against Italy. That was
what was proposed at London and
fell through because the British would
agree to Mediterranean Locarno
only if the United States promised to
come to consultation in event of
crisis.
Compromise Urged.
Dwight Morrow urged that COM
promise. Stimson played with the idea
but Washington exploded when this
ENHANCEMENT was reported to be under
consideration. So presently it was
dropped and with its demise expired
all hope of five-power treaty
Doubtless the British will try to get
us into the same sort of an agree
ment in any future naval conference.
But. as a practical matter, it is hard
to see why We should accept the re-
sponsibilitles involved If there was
no reason why We should be mixed UP
with the original Locarno on the
Rhine it Is difficult to see why we
should permit ourselves to be involved
in the Mediterranean agreement. AS
for the British, if they want Franco
Italian agreement. then they must pay
for it and the price is not excessive,
for they do not wish Germany to be
superior to France in the Channel nor
Italy in the Middle Sea.
If the United States will only stand
firmly to the principle of parity with
Great Britain and leave it to the
British to determine the modalities
Of such parity in the European field
making their political bargains as they
choose, our situation will be simple.
But If We undertake to barge into the
European situation and try to tell
Britain or any one else how strong its
fleet should be, then we shall be in
vited to accept responsibilities for the
security of the nations whose means
of defense We are seeking to limit.
When Europe makes its bargain. then
We can reduce or expand our feet as
the British totals dictate.
Reservations Certain.
What the British will try to "sell"
us again. as before. is the idea that the
peace of the world and the whole
cause of disarmament depend upon
our assuming certain responsibilities.
If We present a program. as We have
no business to do. they will support it
with reservations. to be sure-and
the prestige of the administration will
be engaged to achieve victories for
its plan One day the American people
will discover that they are mixed up
with all sorts of European issues and
then, again, it will be the mission of
the Senate to protect American Sc
curity at the price of repudiating an
other President.
Mr. Hoover could never get the hang
of armament conferences because he
believed passionately that it was pos
sible to persuade other countries to
limit and even to reduce their arma-
ments without making any reciprocal
concessions. For reasons of domestic
politics and. of course because of his
personal enthusiasm for arms limi-
tations. he was always proposing to
England and France plans both for
naval and military limitations. Time
and again these proposals were met by
similar demands for American guar
antees. Always in these meetings the
American delegates were trying to be
missionaries and the Europeans were
engaged in Yankee trading.
Now the United States has estab-
lished its claim to parity. If the
British find that European conditions
dictate an increase in their strength,
we have the right to equal any expan-
sion. But If we undertake to do
what Mr.. Stinson tried to accomplish
at London and Mr.. Davis at Geneva.
mainly to get some other country to
reduce It's strength so that we can
have cheap parity with the British
or moral triumph for an admins
tration. then we shall land Just where
We did at both the other conferences.
when we were confronted by demands
that We undertake political response
bilities ourselves.
Japan Causes Crux.
There remains the japanese CUES
ton. Japan is done with ratios and
the British, unlike ourselves, recog-
nize that fact. On the other hand
the British are just as unwilling as
are we that Japan should possess a
feet automatically equal and there
fore tactically superior to either
Anglo-SaXon fleet in the Far East.
AS practical matter the British do
not believe that the Japanese will
undertake to build such a fleet because
the costs would be prohibitive. But
unless the British and American
Governments recognize japanese mas
terry in China. it is plain the Japa-
nese will make every sacrifice to main
tain tactical superiority.
In other words, as long as the
United States shows the smallest sign
of challenging Japanese policy toward
China. so long no form of agreement
short of parity will be possible. On
the other hand. if we agree to close
our eyes to japanese action in the
Far East. then while Japan will not
formally accept ratio of inferiority,
she might agree to restrict her build
ing program. Her prestige would thus
remain unimpaired, but as a practical
matter the Washington ratio might
be substantially preserved. Until we
are ready to talk China, however, the
Japanese will not speak limitation.
For the japanese fleet is designed to
cover the Japanese offensive on the
Asiatic mainland from any attack in
the rear by either Great Britain or
the United States.
Just as wise American policy die
tates that We should keep out of the
European mess. so it also dictates that