Evening star., 1935-05-28

restrictions that are imposed, the dis
cretion Of the President In approving
or prescribing codes, and thus enact
ing laws for the Government Of trade
and industry throughout the coun-
try, Is virtually unfettered. We think
that the code making authority thus
conferred Is an unconstitutional dele
cation Of legislative power.
Second, the question Of the appli-
cation Of the provisions of the live
poultry code to intrastate transactions.
Although the validity of the codes
(apart from the question of delega-
tion) rests upon the commerce clause
OF the Constitution, section 8 (a) is
not In terms limited to interstate and
foreign commerce. From the gen.
erality Of its terms, and from the ar
gument OF the Government at the bar,
1t would appear that section (a)
was designed to authorize codes with
out that limitation. But under sec
ton Cd penalties are confined to
violations OF q code provision 'in any
transaction in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce" This aspect
Of the case presents the question
whether the particular provisions of
the live poultry code, which the de-
fendents were convicted OF violating,
and for having conspired to violate.
were within the regulating power Of
Congress.
Flow Of Poultry in
Interstate Commerce Ceased.
These provisions relate to the hours
and wages of those employed by de-
PENDANTS In their slaughter houses in
Brooklyn and to the sales there made
to retail dealers and butchers.
% Were these transactions "in"
interstate commerce? Much Is made
Of the fact that almost all the poultry
coming TO New York Is sent there from
other States. But the code pro-
visions. as here applied, do not con-
Germ the transportation OF the poultry
from other States to New York, or
the transaction Of the commission
men or others to whom 1t Is con-
signed, or the sales made by such
consignees to defendants. When de-
PENDANTS had made their purchases,
whether at the West Washington
Market in New York City or at the rail-
road terminals serving the city, or
elsewhere, the poultry was trucked to
their slaughter houses in Brooklyn for
local disposition. The interstate
transactions in relation to that
poultry then ended. Defendants held
the poultry at their slaughter house
markets for slaughter and local sale
to retail dealers and butchers who in
turn sold directly to consumers
Neither the slaughtering nor the sales
by defendants were transactions in
interstate commerce. Brown VS..
Houston. ia U. S. 622, 632, 633; Pub
lie Utilities Commission VS.. Landon,
249 U. s. 236. PAS; Industrial Associa-
ton vs.. United States. 268 U. S. 81,
78. 70: Atlantic Coast Line VS.. Stand
ard Oil Co. 275 U. S. 257, 267.
The undisputed facts thus afford
no warrant for the argument that
the poultry handled by defendants at
their slaughter house markets. was in
a current" or flow" of interstate
commerce and was thus subject to
congressional relation. The mere fact
that there may be q constant fiow
Of commodities into a State does not
mean that the flow continues after
the property has arrived and has be-
come commingled with the mass of
property within the State and is there
held solely for local disposition and
use. So far as the poultry here in
question is concerned, the flow in in
terState commerce had ceased. The
poultry had come to q permanent rest
within the State. It was not held,
used, or sold by defendants in relation
to any further transactions in inter-
state commerce and was not destined
for transportation to other States.
Hence, decisions which deal with a
stream of interstate commerce-where
goods come to rest within q State
temporarily and are later to go for
ward in interstate commerce-and
with the regulations OF transactions
involved in that practical continuity
Of movement. are not applicable here.
See Swift & Co. vs.. United States, 1876
U. S. 375, 387, 38S; Lenke VS.. Farmers
Grain Co.. 258 U. S. 50. 55: Stafford
VS.. Wallace. 258 U. S. 4e5. 5ls; Chica-
60 Board of Trade VS.. Olsen. 262 u.
S. l. IS; Tags. Bros a. Moorhead VS..
United States. 28o U. S. 42o. 43e.
Intrastate Regulation
In Certain Cases Upheld.
(N Did the defendants transactions
directly affect interstate commerce
so as to be subject to Federal reg
ulation? The power of Congress ex-
tends not only to the regulation of
transactions which are part of inter-
state commerce. but to the protection
of that commerce from injury. It
matters not that the injury may be
due to the conduct of those engaged
in intrastate operations. Thus, Con-
gress may protect the safety of those
employed in interstate transportation
no matter what may be the source
OF the dangers which treaten it."
Southern Railway Co. vs. United
Second Employers Liability Cases. 223
U. S. l, 81, that it is the effect upon
interstate commerce." not 1.-The source
Of the injury" which is "the criterion
Of congressional power" We have
held that, in dealing with common
carriers engaged in both interstate
and intraState commerce, the domin-
ant authority Of Congress necessarily
embraces the right to control their
intrastate operations in all matters
having such close and substantial
relation to interstate traffic that the
control is essential or appropriate to
secure the freedom of that traffic from
interference or unjust discrimination
and to promote the efficiency of the
interstate service. The Shreveport
Case. 234, U. s. 342. 35l, 352; Wiscon-
sin Railroad Commission vs.. Chicago.
Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 257
U. S. 563 588. And combinations and
conSpiracies to restrain interstate
commerce, or to monopolize any part
OF 1t. are none the less within the
reach of the antitrust act because
the conspirators seek to attain their
end by means of instrastate activities.
Coronado Coal Co. VS.. United Mine
Workers. 268 U. S. 2S5. $40: Bedford
Co. VS.. Stonecutters' Association, 274
U. S. 81, 46.
We recently had occasion, in Local