Evening star., 1935-03-10

1t practically never happened.
After that famous discussion on a
log at the Rapidan Camp we talked
over the possibilities of trouble that
might ensue, not because either Mr..
Hoover or Mr.. Macdonald would have
Intentionally said anything to bind
his government. but because each man
might so easily misunderstood some
quite innocent remark of the other.
Out of such inevitable misunderstand-
ings serious consequences sometimes
arise Everybody was relieved when 1t
became known that the talk, although
earnest and ranging over every pos
sible topic. had been general and not
q discussion of specific subjects.
What is not always remembered in
this country is that the words OF a
chief of state are always looked on as
being somehow oracular, as having
profound significance-especia If
they are uttered by the chief of some
other state. Much of the sacred char
acter of the words of a King has car
ried across to the word of his success
sor President. In the old days Kings
undoubtedly discussed affairs of state
with each other, but when they spoke
with men of lesser rank they did not
discuss-they pronounced Judgment.
Their spoken word was considered as
binding on the nation.
Talks Not Binding.
For this very reason it became
necessary to have foreign Offices. For
eign Ministers and Ambassadors could
really discuss matters and threSh out
the points of possible controversy;
what they said did not bind their gov-
ernmentS until the result of their dis
cussions had been reduced to writing,
had been signed and passed on by the
chief of state-in very modern times
by the Parliament as we'll. Danger
of any serious misunderstanding was
thus minimi1ed because inferior Off
GERS could admit mistakes and could
sound out various methods of reaching
conclusions in way that was impos-
sible for their chiefs.
Soon after his Inauguration I was
talking one day at the White House
with Mr.. Coolidge. In his comments
and those who knew Calvin Coolidge
knew that when he wanted to talk no
one could be more fluent-he con-
fused the identity of two men about
whom We were talking and, in conse-
quence, said something very sharp of
one Of them-something which was
entirely untrue Before had chance
to point out the mistake he corrected
himself, and then remarked, 81 have
got to learn that hard lesson that
every word the President of the United
States says weighs a tom
Perhaps that was one of the expla-
nations of Mr. Coolidge's famous 81
lenceS. There is no doubt that his
reticence prevented many a mistake,
and there is no doubt that he realized
how much more potentially dangerous
ill-considered remarks would be when
made to foreigners.
Nations Head Must Take Care.
The head of a nation has to be
more and more and more careful as
TO what he says as his country grows
In importance and power. Whereas
John Adams or Thomas jefferson
could send for foreign minister to
talk over affairs of state, it would
have caused a sensation abroad if
Coolidge or Hoover had done the same
thing. Even at the beginning of our
history it was realized that for the
President to carry on his own nego-
tiations was little undignified, def
nitely inappropriate and might be
definitely dangerous This method is
exactly on a par with having legal
issues passed on first of all by the
Supreme Court: There is no possibil-
ity Of appeal.
George Washington realized these
things and created the office of Sec
retary OF State. From that time on
the successive Presidents have seen
less and less Of the diplomatic corps
or Of high officials of foreign govern
ments visiting in Washington, except,
Of course, in a purely social way.
There have been one or two excep-
tions. Theodore Roosevelt is the most
notable. He was a law unto himself,
had his strong personal likes and dis
likes, rode and tramped with Ambas-
sadors just as he did with fellow
Americans, and said just about what
he pleased to those with whom he
was on very friendly terms.
Swept Away by Friendship.
They understood him, however,
happened to be men of common sense |
and were swept away by the Presi- |
dents genius for friendship Their |
strictly official dealings with the
American Government were through |
the Secretary Of State, and they re-
peated to him what Roosevelt had
told them, just as the President tried |
10 remember to do himself.
Furthermore, the two men whom
Roosevelt placed in the Department |
of State-John Hay and Elihu Root
were extraordinarily competent and |
experienced men who cleaned much |
from situations which less able men |
would have found demoralizing.
1t Is fair to say that, certainly |
since the Civil War, the excellent |
custom has become established that
all official dealings with foreign gov
ernmentS are to be carried on through
the Department of State. The main
purpose of this is to avoid misunder-
standings. Its subsidiary purposes are
to throw international negotiations,
so far as possible, into the hands of
experts; to make it certain that ade-
Quate records shall be kept of all i'm
portant conversations; to concentrate
the conduct OF 10relgn relatlonS IN one
organization, thus minimizing the
danger of contradictions, which are
otherwise unavoidable.
The objection might be raised that
Woodrow Wilson, for example, was
far more capable Of understanding
foreign affairs than was William Jen-
nings Bryan, with his solicitude for
the Swiss navy: but true as this
may be in the individual case, it is
not true in the long run; and even
in the individual case it is probable
that Wilson was not as capable as
was the whole Department of State
with its experts, with its men of real
learning and real wisdom, like John
Bassett Moore and Frank Lyon Polk.
In destroying this custom the pres
sent administration has seriously
weakened the Department OF State
1nI Lo~ 10 1a~od oi1r synnd relations