Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1935-10-12
Possible Consequences
OF the War in Ethiopia
To the Editor of The Star:

10 the EDITOR OF The star:
Now that the Italo- Ethiopian impasse
has entered the phase of actual warfare,
1t behOoves one to commence Specu-
lating on the potential results in store
for the two parties directly involved The
question Of ultimate military defeat or
triumph on the one side or on the other
is of slight importance. Either result
will and can have but little bearing on
the final settlement of the dispute.
Italy'S grievances against Ethiopia are
of long standing and have been at, least
covertly recognized by the powers more
than once. Then this important fact
must be supplemented by Italy'S pressing
need for territorial expansion to take
care of her surplus population, on the one
hand. and the injustice done her at
Versailles in the failure of the allied
powers to give heed to this need on the
other. If all these factors be given their
due consideration at the next peace con-
ference. and this will have to be done
in order to avoid repetition of the pres
ent conflict in the future, obviously some
fair concessions will be made to Italy
even if the latter should emerge de-
point of view.
Suppose now that Italy will eventually
defeat Ethiopia and emerge triumphantly
victorious in spite of the Leagues eco
nomic sanctions, but because of failure
to apply military sanctions. In that
event England will feel constrained to
step in and play the role of peacemaker,
though probably only with a view to
guaranteeing the inviolability of the in
tegrity of her own interests without
for fhnca nf nj hpf What
will constitute a violation of that in
tegrity can be ascertained by study
of the peace formula offered by the
Councils Committee of Five to the two
warning nations shortly before the out
break of hostilities. In other words,
England, 1t may be expected, will con-
slider it desire to encroach upon her
own interests should MuSsolini then as
in the past insist on more than making
Ethiopia a protectorate of the League
of Nations. to which, OF course, she will
never yield. Wherefore MuSsolini will
find but two alternatives open to him:
Either to accept that which he so def
antly rejected in the past, or start a
second war, this time against the strong
est instead Of the weakest power IN the
world. The writer believes new circum-
stances, financial exhaustion, above all,
will force him to choose the former.
II so, Italy will In the end have achieved
no more, or at most little more, from
military victory than would fall TO her
lot from military defeat.
Thus, in the light of the above analy-
sis, it bids fair to a conclusion that the
present Ethiopian war, unless the
League of Nations decide upon military
as well as economic sanctions, in which
England will play the major part and
for which she will most likely demand
the lions share as compensation, can
result in but insignificant changes in
the territorial and political status quo
of either nation. In other words, aside
from man power and possible financial
bankruptcy, Ethiopia stands to lose little,
while Italy, facing the same loss of man
power and economic chaos stands to
gain little from the war. MuSsolini may,
therefore, yet regret some day his super
aggreSsivenesS. and at least covertly
admit that Emperor Halle SelaSsie was
the wiser statesman of the two
MORRIS I. FELDMAN.