Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1935-06-16
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN VOTE
ROME FARLEY THREAT
Country, Switzerland Which Has
Failed to Fuse, Looks to Other
Capitals Than Its Own.

in Rumania and Yugoslavia 1t was the
growing conviction that Germany was
bound in the end to dominate Central
Europe and that it was therefore the
policy of wisdom to come to terms
calculation presently led Poland to
make non-aggression pact with Ger
many Hungary, too, disclosed un-
mistakable signs Of turning from Rome
to Berlin.
The Nazi putsch in Vienna last
July failed because Mussolini mobil-
lied instantly and Hitler's military
advisers informed him that the Ger
man Army was in no condition to
fight Italy in the Alps, France on the
Rhine and Czechoslovakia on the
Upper Elbe. But, had Italian troops
actually entered Austria, they might
have come into collision with Yugo-
slav forces as well as German. Later,
too, after the assassination of King
Alexander, the Serbs precipitated an
awkward crisis in the League by their
attack upon Italy's Hungarian ally.
And the purpose of this attack was
to embroil France and Italy, bound
as these nations were, respectively, to
Yugoslavia and Hungary.
For the moment the collapse Of the
Nazi putsch in Vienna halted Ger
man activity in Austria. But in no
long time it was resumed, and still
continues. What the agents Of Hit
Ter now sought to accomplish was to
undermine the Schuschnigg- Star
hemberg cabinet. Their task was
made the simpler because Dollfuss,
under the direction of MuSsolini, had
destroyed the Social Democratic party
in Vienna by a violent and bloody re-
preston. Actually the present Aus
trian government does not rest upon
any popular support, but constitutes
a dictatorship pure and simple, sus-
tanned financially by France and mil
itarily by Italy.
Anschluss Held Inevitable.
What would happen If foreign in
fluence were withdrawn no one can
tell. Before Hitler came, the demand
for union with Germany had been
constant. Both Catholic and Jewish
influences are today, nominally. at
least, opposed to the Anschluss. But
it is not less evident that the reduc-
ton of the once great Austrian state
to the status of an Italian protecto-
rate is humiliation to Austrian
pride. Nor is there any mistaking
the general conviction that sooner or
later Austria will be united with Ger
many.
Meantime, German influence is at
work rallying its NaZi allies in Austria
ard in Czechoslovakia, with results
which were disclosed in the recent
election IN the latter state. To I'M
dermine me existing regimes and pre-
pare the way for later interven-
tion-that Is Hitler's present strategy.
And his success in Czechoslovakia is
paralleled by real, if less sensational,
progress in Austria. In both cases
the fruit is ripening and will be ready
to pick wher the right moment comes.
That moment cannot arrive until
Germany is rearmed unless Italy be-
comes involved in an unsuccessful
African adventure or the French
financial crisis produces political
repercussions. But it is safe calcu-
lation that when it does arrive only
Czechosloyakia, among the states of
the Little Entente, will be prepared to
fight, and she will be surrounded by
Germany. Austria, Hungary and Pol
and. all hostile and all interested in
rescuing minorities and provinces now
under Czech rule.
If Italy were not able and ready to
occupy Austria then it Is self-evident
that there would be nothing the
French could do to save Czechoslo-
vakia, even II they should invade the
Rhineland. For that state would in
evitably be crushed before French
troops could hack road across South
ern Germany to Prague. Such being
the case, 1t is highly improbable that
the French would move at all. And
British influence would doubtless be
exerted to the limit to restrain an ap-
prehenSive ally. Even were Italy and
France to act together, 1t is by no
means certain that Czechoslovakia
could be saved and not unlikely that
would 60 over to Germany
and attack the Italians on the flank.
Reich Has Bargaining Power.
Actually, Germany is in a position
o buy Hungarian support by the offer
If Slovakia and Yugoslavfa. by that
Of Fiume, and perhaps of Triesta as
well. Austrian sympathy can be
by the promise of the
liberation of the German minority in
,he Upper Adige. BY contrast what
have Germany's enemies to offer?
To Hungary nothing, to Yugoslavia
no more, to Austria financial aid at
the cost of real liberty. Only the
Czecns can find profit in alliance with
France and Italy, and the extent of
that profit Is a matter of doubt in
view of the isolated situation of the
small Slav state.
1t was the realization Of the Euro
pean implications of an italian war
in Africa far more than any concern
for the League of Nations or its prin-
ciples which led the British and the
French to oppose Italian purposes in
Geneva. Today, moreover, the British,
posed to the union of the Germans
of the former Hapsburg and Hohen-
zollern empires, since they see their
own security might thus be COM
promised. But the British are not
ready to go to war to prevent this
anschluss and it is by no means GER
tain the French would march with
out them, as it is at least possible
that they and their Italian allies would
be defeated If they attempted such
an adventure. Nominally, of course,
they could count on the backing of
the Soviet Union, but practically such
support could count for little.
Unless Germany cracks from within
as o consequence Of economic strain,
it is then hard to see any way In
which she can permanently be pre-
vented from including Austria and
the Bohemian, Moravian and Silesian
provinces Of Czechoslovakia within
her frontiers. Not impossibly political