Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1935-06-30

ain prospective eIltIHy III CuioPV 10
Germany. and there is discoverable no
set of circumstances which could
transform France into similar foe.
Interdependence Recognized.
The real defect in British policy
arises not from desire to play the
balance of power game, which is ex-
cluded from present. possibility, but
from a reluctance to recognize articu-
lately, and therefore effectively, the
extent of British dependence upon
France for security. 1t is true that
progressively, ever since 1925, when
the Locarno pact was made. the Brit
ish have been making explicit the
truth which was implicit in that con-
tract. But the difficulty lies in the
fact that the French and their con-
tinental friends do recall wildly the
fact that when Lloyd George and
Ramsay Macdonald directed British
policy they were trying to play the
balance of power game. But with the
return of Baldwin to power in the
national cabinet, whose foreign policy
he has always directed, recognition
of the interdependence of France and
Britain has been restored and has
endured
1t is the tragedy of postwar Europe
that the effort to balance the power
first by a Liberal and then by a
Labor prime minister has been re-
sponsible for Frances resorting to a
course which has largely explained
the rise of Hitler. The performances
of Lloyd George created a state of
mind in Paris which, after his fall,
led to the occupation of the Ruhr.
MacDonald's destruction of the Lo-
carno partnership, when he came to
power in 1929, led France to adopt
both in the monetary crisis of 1881
and in the armament discussions in
1928 an uncompromisingly rigid
policy.
Whether Germany ultimately uses
her arms for fresh war of agrees
sion or not, only war Of prevention
could stop her rearming. The French
could. had they chosen, have pre-
cipitated such a war when the Reich
withdrew from the League and an
nounced the purpose to rearm in
1888. But they were unready to do
that. The next best thing was to
accept the inevitable and join the
British in their effort to set a limit
to German rearmament. But they
were unwilling to do that either.
Thus their later performances have
been contrary alike to common sense
and logic, which are never quite the
same thing.
Treat Situation Practically.
Great Britain won't fight to keep
Germany disarmed, either on land
or on sea, or, for that matter, in
the air. Having made up their minds
to this fact, the British have en-
deavored to deal practically with the
situation thus created They have
begun to overhaul their ornaments
and they have renewed their efforts
to persuade the Germans to agree to
set limits to theirs. In the matter
Of military ornaments they failed
because the French blocked the way.
In the field of naval ornaments they
have ignored the French and settled
the matter directly with Berlin.
Even the French cannot. however,
condemn the British for the terms
of the London agreement. since these
terms insure that the French fleet
will remain superior to the German.
although they now argue that they
must themselves have a larger pro-
portion than the Washington and
London treaties allotted to them.
But, save in the field of battleships,
they are not bound by these treaties
which they did not ratify, and in
the capital ship category Japanese
denunciation will terminte that agree
ment soon. Anglo-German strength
is not, however, contingencies far
as the Germans are concerned
upon the size Of the French or Italian
navies
The French would have grievance
if, after having settled upon German
strength, the British then undertook
to keep French down to any figure
incommenSurate with French ideas OF
security. But that bridge has yet to
be crossed. Actually what angers the
French Is the fact that the British
made direct agreement with the
Germans and the further circum-
stance that this agreement constitutes
tacit recognition of Germany's right
TO arm without regard to the terms
of the treaty of Versailles.
Aim to Avoid Naval Race.
How can the British logically JUS
tify their course in denouncing Ger
man military rearmament through
ing to German naval rearmament at
London, since both actions constitute
similar violations Of the treaty Of
Versailles?" So the French inquire.
But the fact is that the British can't
and won't try to do it, for they are not
interested in logic but in avoiding
naval race with the Germans. Thus
they have agreed that the Germans
shall have ships in excess Of the num-
Der allowed by the treaty and the
Germans have consented to let the
British decide how many more.
wouldn't it have been better to settle
the military problem the same way?"
the British ask, pointing out, as Hitler
himself has done. that at Geneva the
Germans offered to stop with 100000
men instead of $4,000, which Is their
present goal.
When, however, the Germans ex-
claim that Hitler, by supreme skill,
has separated London and Paris, and
the French promptly declare that this
is the truth. it is possible to sympa-
thize with the British view that at
least in stupidity there is perfect
parity between Paris and Berlin. And
the British are entitled to make the
same comment when Berlin and Rome
see British policy in the matter of
Ethiopia in the same light. When the
British encourage German military
occupation of the demilitarized zone
on the Rhine or the destruction Of
Austrian independence on the Dam
ube, hen the French or Italians, as