The Bismarck tribune. [volume] (Bismarck, N.D.) 1916-current, 1935-02-04

I'd. 562, It = aaid: III ono removes
with intent to make q permanent
settlement or for an indefinite time
he changes his domicile."
In the case Of State ' Stoeltius
So N. D. 1876, 200 N. w. l0l, this court
said: while registering and voting
In . particular place Is not conclus-
i've. It Is strong circumstantial proof
Of residence" This statement Of the
law Is supported BY the great weight
Of authority.
The fact Of voting Is not conclu.
sive, but It is q strong circumstance
which indicates the intention Of the
voter to cast legal vote.
The case Kadlec v Pavik, . N. ..
276. 3 N. w. s, was an election con.
test. It was claimed that one Jaxus
was foreign born: that he came to
this country about ten years before
the election was held ana when he
was about twenty years old. There
was no evidence to show that he
had ever denationaliSed himself. He
lived In Walsh county for seven or
eight years before this election was
held. The contestant showed these
facts and then showed that the rec
ords Of Walsh county failed to show
that he had ever declared his inten-
ton to become q citizen Of this
country or received his final nat
uralization papers. From these facts
the trial court concluded that q legal
presumption arose that Jarls was
not legal voter and this court said:
1T Is a case that rests largely upon
presumptions. The alenage being
shown, 1t is presumed to continue
until evidence to the contrary Is
shown. Hauenstein v LYMAN, 100
q. s. 483, as L. Ed. 62S. But, when
it Is shown that the party has cast
q vote In this country, then this
presumption disappears, and the OPP
posite presumption prevails, because
the law will not presume that q
party has committed any unlawful
act. Quinn v Hubbard, 81 Mo. 3ll,
IL 8. w. g."
Vote Cast Legal
In that case 1t was shown that
Jarus was foreign born and the pre-
Of law that this condition
continued until the contrary was
shown was overcome by the pre-
sumption Of law that the vote cast
was q legal vote. The same pre-
applies to the vote cast
by Mr.. Noodle at the primary elec-
ton and the general election which
followed In Minneapolis: that Il. the
presumption Is that his voting in
Minneapolis was legal. An examina-
ton Of the authorities will show that
the law, as stated by Judge Spalding
(Nelson Goss. supra) for deter
mining residence Is supported by the
great weight Of authority and It Is
unnecessary to cite the au-
thoritieS at length. But see Pacific
Mutual ms. Co. Thompkins, II
G. G. A. 488: futile Wood, lis Ia.
507, So N. w. 1856; Hairston Hair
ston, a Miss. 704: 81 Am. Dec. 53l:
Pope williams. 90 Md. 50, S. Att.
543, 103 A. 8. r. $40: Gaddie v Mann.
lat Fed. 055; Chambers Prince.
IS Fed. 1T: Jones Subera. $50
Fed. 462; Corel Ry. Co. 123 Fed.
l52: Blair v Silver Peak Mines,
Do Fed. 332: Mitchell v U. s. ~ /. |
Ed. 584.
Can Vote Elsewhere
;. BY the use Of the word 'inten-
ton In the statute it IS reasonably
clear the legislature did not mean
an underlined or undefinable pur-
pose on the part Of the voter to re.
turn to his former residence at some |
unknown time during the course Of |
MS life. To entertain q doubtful. |
vague, or equivocal purpose to re-
turn does not prove the fact Of In
tention' as used in the statute, when |
reasonably construed In view Of the |
legislative object and the general
aw on the subject Of domicile. That
person may live In one voting dis
riot and do business there and at |
he same time retain q right to vote
n another district Is undoubtedly
rue: but the right depends upon q |
reasonable intention to resume his
former home and to rebuff the pre-
sumption that he had abandoned
IL KEENAN, on Residence and
Domicile, Sec. 500, quoting from
Felker Henderson, 70 N. H. 500. 100
All. 623, L. r. A. l9laE $40.
The difficulties which are met
With In connection with this question
Ire due not 50 much to any ohscuri.
" or uncertainty In the law as to
he infinite variety Of facts and CIR
;un,stances which have to be con.
'idered in its application to indi-
'idual cases. In every case Of change
II domicile there are three essen.
'ial elements which must concur, viz:
First. A definite abandonment
OF the former domicile.
Second. Actual removal to, and
physical presence In the new domi-
cile.
Third. A bona fide intention
to change and to remain In the
new domicile permanently or for
an indefinite time.
Law Of Domicile Definite
Nothing Is better settled In the
law Of domicile than that every
change must be facto ct animo-in
TACT and intent. It IL also eleuen.