The Waterbury Democrat., 1935-10-08

chief war base, and g miles inside the Italian frontier north of Adj grat, which the Italians captured on their way to Aduwa.
 These rumors were received with every reserve because such trust would have taken the Philippians along the left flank of the great Italian army operating southward from Asmara.
 The communique which an- nounced the daring drive into Eritrea said also that Italian native soldiers the crack Askaris who formed the central column of the three that took Aduwa were de- serting in mass to the Philippians.
 It was asserted specifically that 50 Askaris arrived at Makale, be- hind Aduwa, and 200 on the Agame front in the northeast. The men who arrived at Mekale, 1t was said, had with them five machine guns, 12 mule loads of ammunition and cannon whose nature and amount was not specified.
 It was asserted further that Ital- fans attacking the Dolo district down where Ethiopia, Italian Soma Hand and British Kenya Colony meet, had been forced to withdraw across the border.
 No Details of Drive
 T8here were no details of the daying drive into the northern stronghold of the Italians. Off cials were reluctant to discuss the operation, possible because they had acclaimed, as their chief strategy, no operations of the size or import ance indicated by the terse com munique.
 They had planned for a series of drives by guerrilla bands, number ing not more than a few hundred, to infiltrate through the rear and finaks of the Italians into Eritrea. There had been no indication of an official plan for an operation by a force numbered in thousands.
 Behind the Eritrean frontier, in the hills of the plateau awaiting the next move of the Italian invaders, is a big Ethiopian force numbering into the hundreds of thousands.
 There had been persistent reports that somewhere up on the north- western front men of Ras Seyyoum's army operating in semi-guerrilla fashion had dashed across into Eritrea.
 The announcement that Ras Sey- youm's warriors had crossed the frontier to challenge the Eagles of the Fascist Legion was calculated to be of great moral stimulus to the Ethiopian army.
 Yet the very success of the daring operation was a cause of anxiety to Emperor Halle SelasSic and his advisers here.
 No Zeal Resistance.
 The Meagre reports indicated that there was no real Italian resistance. This despite the fact that 1t is known Italian forces are placed at intervals all along the northern frontier to the frontier of the An glo-Egyptian Sudan on the west, and that Italian bombing planes have been active at Ethiopian points all along the frontier.
 Hence there was some fear that the lack of Italian resistcncc was a matter of strategy and that Ras Seyyoum's men might be permitted to penetrate Eritrea and then to be attacked by q forsc which would seek to cut them off and annihilate them.
 But the attackers were operating with some advantage in that to them the country is familiar and that their very existence i8 one that makes up the ideal soldier. They can move with almost incredible agility through the broken country, they can carry rationS for days, they can 8ubBist with little water they can take advantage of bits of cover which would be of no use to most trained soldiers, and they can disappear like WraithS into the hilly fastncsscs when they like, to return and snipe and raid in dark ness.
 The announced desertion of Brit -------<------