Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1935-06-16
BY FRANK III. SIMONDs.


cess of the conference in Rome
to deal with the Danubian question
and for the permanence of peace in
Europe. The rise of a NaZi party in
Czechoslovakia threatens to destroy
the last semblance of democracy in
Central Europe, while the emergence
of q strong German party In C2echo-
slovakia constitutes menace to that
State itself.
On the subject of domestic politics
the triumph of the German NaZiS
has posed problem which the Czechs
may attempt to solve by the employ
ment of Fascist methods because
their own differences over economic
issues and the polyglot nature Of their
state make any solution by demo-
cratic methods difficult, if not impos-
sible. Certainly Masaryk and Benes,
the President and foreign minister of
Czechoslovakia, will resist such re-
course to Fascism as long as possible,
for both are confirmed democrats.
But Masaryk Is old and his disap-
pearance might entail that of Benes
as we'll.
Czechoslovakia is, after all, eth
nically at least, Switzerland which
has failed to fuse In this state, which
has an area little greater than that
of New York and population Of
15,000,000 there are many races and
no majority. Power rests in the hands
of 100000 CzechS politically allied
with something less than 100000
Slovaks. Against this block stand
100000 Germans, 100000 Hun
garians, 100000 Ruthenians and
100000 Poles. Inevitably, the Ger
mans look to Berlin, the Hungarians
to Budapest, the Ruthenians to Kiev
and the Poles to Warsaw. In addition
the CZechS are divided into various
groups ranging from Communists to
Fascists. For half a decade Masaryk
has been trying to bring about po-
litical adjustment between these races,
such as has been achieved between
the German, French and Italian fac
tons of the Swiss population.
Attempt Has Failed.
That attempt has now definitely
failed, as the rise of the Nazi party
has disclosed, and the German minor
ity is again looking to Berlin as it
did at the close of the World War.
AS for the Hungarians, they have
always remained intranSigeant. while
in the case of the Ruthenians al
though politically little articulate as
yet, their ethnic aspirations look
toward the Soviet Union or at least
to the Ukraine. Naturally, the small
Polish minority, in it's turn, looks to
Warsaw. And recent events have
served to emphasize the centrifugal
pull of ethnic circumstances. To save
themselves, therefore, the Czechs may
feel driven to Fascism.
The double menace of German and
Hungarian influences is, however, far
more serious. To bring the 3,500.000
Sudetan Germans into the Reich has
always been one of the detectives of
the pan-Germans, like the similar
aim of acquiring the 6,500,00O Aus
TRAN Germans. Hungary, on her
side, has never ceased to insist upon
the restoration of Slovakia with its
considerable Magyar minority. Be-
fore the World War the Germans of
what then constituted the Austrian
half of the dual monarchy denied the
Czechs any real political influence
and maintained their control by a
tacit alliance with the 5O00,0 900 Poles |
Of Galicia. The Slovaks of Slovakia
also enjoyed little or no political in
Huence under Hungarian rule.
The disappearance of the Hapsburg |
empire was effected by the decision |
of the Czechs led by Masaryk and
Benes to seek independence rather
than political equality in the old
state. In this decision the Czechs
were backed by Wilson on the ground
of self-determination, by Clemenceau
because he saw the proposed Slav
state as bulwark against German
expansion southwark, and by the
British because of q vague liberal
sympathy with the small Slav people,
which had enlisted powerful cham
pions in the English press.
France Made Land Her Base.
After the peace treaties were made
Czechoslovakia became the political
base of France in Central Europe and
the dominating factor in the Little
Entente. France and Czechoslovakia
found common ground in their fear
Of Germany. The Czechs, the Serbs
and the Rumanians discovered a
similar ground for partnership in
their dread of Hungarian ambitions.
AInAgs 1dSUDAdNld dAu EIdL1CC
entity Joined hands to meet prospec-
tive Italian menace. AS Poland was
also an ally of the French, sharing |
their apprehension Of Germany,
there was thus established system
Of alliances under the direction of
France, designed to maintain the
status quo of the Paris settlement
against German attack on the Dan
.tam ND ho EJho and incl
Hungarian aggression In the Car |
pathians.
For time Germany and Italy pur-
sued common policy in the Danubian |
Basin. and Italy in addition made an
entente with Hungary and presently |
became the champion Of the Dollfuss
cabinet in Austria. In 1881, however,
the effort of Austria and Germany
to effect a customs union drove Mus
solini to stand with France in vetoing
that project. Three years later the
putsch in Vienna in July, 1884, forced
MuSsolini at last to abandon all hope
Of coming to terms with Hitler. And
that adjustment was disclosed in the
acccrds Of Rome between France and
Italy last January.
The Little Entente, however, looked
askance ct this Franco-Italian recon-
Citation. IL was unwelcome to the
Czechs because Mussolini had In the
past given at least tacit support to
German ambitions in Silesia and b.
henria and to Hungarian purposes In
Slcvakia. Yugoslavia was even less |
satisfied because Italy had long been |
a dangerous neighbor and had seized
Fiume by force against the protest of |
the Western nations. Nor was Italy |
more popular in Rumania. With the |
shift in italian policy from German
to French partnership, therefore. the
Little Entente began to crumble and
the crumbling still continues.
Process liz Twofold.
In fact. the process OF disintegra-
xEr.Al.ir. Tia Hl,xaa |