Evening star., 1935-01-13
BALANCE OF POWER BANS
FRANCO.ITALIAN ENTENTE
Rome Still Frets Under Continued
Prestige of France-Mussolini-Laval
Farley Moves Toward Peace.

ing his resolution to retain parity in
power and prestige with France in
European affairs. In the face Of a
mounting German danger and con-
fronted by the fact that on the Aus
trian question Hitler was as uncom-
promising as he was himself, the Duce
has been forced to turn to France.
Nevertheless he has at all times in
sisted upon the right to fix the terms.
And those terms, in effect, have been
the abandonment of the Little Entente
by France.
The French. by contrast, have not
been ready and apparently are not yet
ready to drop their allies, Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia and Rumania, to sat-
1Sfy Italy. On the question of the
maintenance Of the independence of
Austria, they see eye for eye with the
Italians. In the matter of Germany,
they recognize the necessity of a COM
mon front between the two Latin
countries, the one menaced at the
Rhine and the other at the Alps by
eventual German purposes. Neverthe-
less. Paris also perceives clearly that
If French support is withdrawn from
the Little Entente, French influence
will be replaced either by Italian or
German-and French ascendency in
the councils of Europe will come to
an end
All their intricate negotiations
which have been going on during the
past year have centered in this Gen.
tral European issue. Italy has offered
France her own alliance to replace
that OF the nations of the Little En-
tente. France has riposted by asking
Italy to join herself and the Little En-
tente IN creating a common front
against the Germans. Mussolini, how
ever, has perceived clearly enough
that In the combination which the
French urge, the Italian role would be
subordinate to the French and hardly
more impressive than that Of Czecho-
slovakia.
Quarrel Sought.
Meanwhile, the nations of the Little
Entente, perceiving that France was
apparently playing with the idea Of
substituting an Italian alliance for
her present partnership with them,
precipitated the December crisis in
Geneva. Nominally this resulted from
the alleged harboring of the assassins
of King Alexander on Hungarian ter
ritory; actually it was designed to
start a quarrel between France and
Italy and arrest their pending negoti-
ations. While this offensive of the Lit
tie Entente failed to achieve its i'm.
mediate objective, its later conse-
quences seem to have been consider
able and in part responsible for the
rather meager proportions Of the
Franco-Italian agreements.
1t Is at least possible to conjecture
that France has played with the idea
OF substituting an Italian agreement
for its present system of alliances with
the nations of the Little Entente.
French newspapers disclose the fact
that under the surface a sharp con-
dict has been going on and it is certain
that there are considerable elements
IN the country which would rejoice to
see France abandon her attempts to
maintain the status quo in Austria
and throughout the Danubian region
and conf1ne her attention to her own
frontiers.
Apparently, however, Laval, after
some hesitation. reverted to the IA
miliar French course, threw his in
f1uence in favor of maintaining the old
relations with the Little Entente and
asked OF MuSSolini that he abandon his
championship of Hungarian claims for
,, treaty revision, which could only be
honored at the expense of all three of
the countries of the Little Entente. The
result was temporary deadlock and
the spread of reports that Franco
Italian conversations had broken
down. Following these reports came
the sudden decision of Laval to 60 to
Rome and agree to the compromise
there formally announced.
Thus, although the actual agree
ments have brought France and italy
nearer together themselves, they have
left unsettled the larger question of the
Danubian region. So far as is now
revealed, Italy has not consented to
drop her championship of Hungary
and the Magyar claims for territorial
revision, nor has France modified her
support of her Little Entente allies
and their opposition to all projects of
revision. That issue remains to be
settled, and while 1t continues un-
settled the prospect of political recon-
Citation and of economic recovery
In the Danubian area is unappealing.
Hitler Holds Hope.
For Germany, Franco Italian agree
ment, particularly in the matter of
Austrian independence, constitutes an
obvious disaster. France, Italy, the
Soviet Union and Great Britain with
Czechoslovakia now stand squarely to-
gether in their opposition to what has
become the chief ambition Of Hitler,
pamely, the control of his native Aus
tria. Nevertheless, so long as the issue
between Hungary and the Little En-
tente remains unsettled, Germany will
have a basis for diplomatic activity.
And, of course, the chief maneuver of
Berlin will be to detach Belgrade from
Paris and revive the quarrels between
Italy and Yugoslavia. After the Saar
question is disposed of, a revival of
German activity in Central Europe
may be expected.
1t is far from unlikely that such an
operation will drive the French and
Italians even more closely together
and compel both to seek an adjust
ment between their respective allies,
the Little Entente and Hungary. Mean
while 1t is an enormous gain for the
cause Of peace to have even a detente
between France and Italy. Four years
ago, when I was at Mention on the
Italian frontier, the atmosphere was
one Of impending war. Troops were
everywhere; military roads were being
built all over the mountains. The
French Mediterranean fleet daily pa
trolled the coast. During the previous
Summer reports of coming Italian
raids designed to seize Nice by q coup
de main had produced panics In the
countryside.
The coming Of Hitler changed all
that. Obviously it has not yet sufficed
to insure complete agreement in larger
questions Of policy. The Danubian
problem still awaits solution. And
the disproportionate influence of