Evening star., 1935-01-13
BY FRANK H. SIMONDs.

tne carrier expectations, IL Is not
i less evident that they constituted
a new milestone in the progress
Of French and Italian relations and,
as such. promise for peace. The
Franco-Italian rapprachement consti-
tutes the second Of the major conse-
quences Of Hitler's triumph. The
first, Of course, was the renewal by
Red Russia Of the association Of the
Romanov regime with the French
Republic.
The actual causes of the quarrels
between France and Italy in the post
war period differ from the familiar
Continental disputes in that they
were of themselves Of no great i'm
portance. Italy has continued to
claim from France territorial COM
pensation to balance French colonial
gains in the peace treaties on the
basis of wartime agreements. She
has demanded recognition of the ma
tional rights Of Italians living in the
French protectorate of Tunisia. She
has asked for concessions which would
enable her to make use Of the French
railway leading from Jibuti to Abys-
sinia. Finally, she has insisted upon
her right to naval parity with France.
AS to territorial concessions, 1t
seems evident that the French are
ready to grant the Tibesti region in
the heart Of the Sahara, but not to
yield to the Italian request for an
extension of their Libyan boundaries
to the shores of Lake Chad. which
would interpose barrier between
torial Africa. The question of the
Tunisian Italians seems to have been
adjusted-about a hundred thousand
of these live in the French protec-
torate, nearly half in the City Of
Tunis. Under the law, the children
Of these Italians automatically be-
come French citizens and already by
this means of naturalization French
numbers have outdistanced Italian.
AS to the Abyssinian Railway, ad-
justment there also seems to have
brought no great difficulties.
Ratio Problem Minimized.
On the other hand, the collapse
Of the Washington treaty incident
to the Japanese course has removed
the question Of naval PARTIES from
the calendar. Ratics fixed In treaties
are, 1t Would seem, a thing of the
past, not only in the case of Britain,
Japan and the United States, but also
in that of Italy and France. The
simple truth Is that there are not
going to be any more ratios fixed
by treaties. And, since with Italy
the question was one of prestige
rather than of actuality, it disap-
pears from the agenda.
Up to q point, then, the recent
Franco Italian conversations recall
the diplomatic exchanges in 1904
which put an end to the long and
acute quarrelS between France and
Great Britain alike in Asia and in
Africa. And they have the same gen.
eral cause. Conscious of the growing
menace Of German naval power, the
British, 80 years ago. after many at
tempts to come to agreement with
Germany, at last reluctantly turned
to France and by preliminary compro-
misses prepared the way for the en-
tente cordiale. Italy, after similar at
temptS to reach an accord with Ger
many, has, with equal lack of enthusi-
asm, been constrained to follow the
British example.
Nevertheless, 1t is apparent, ever
after the recent Rome conversations,
that while very important preliminary
work has been done, much still re-
mains to be accomplished before
Franco-Italian relations can take or
the character that the Anglo French
speedily acquired after 1904. Between
France and Italy there still survive
two sets of questions, both Of which
were without counterpart between
Britain and France.
It is manifest that Fascist Italy has
set out to be an equal of France in
European affairs. When Mussolini
came to power in 1922 Italy's interna-
tional position was lamentable. AT
the Peace Conference her claims had
been treated gallantly by Clemenceau
and contemptuously by Wilson and
Lloyd George. She had been regarded
as the poor relation by her recent al
lies, and far more attention was paid
to the claims of the Poles, the Czechs
and the Yugoslavs than to those OF
the Italians.
France in Ascendancy.
As a consequence, in postwar Eu-
rope the Duce found France supreme
Her army was incomparably the
strongest. Her system of alliances
which included Poland and the three
countries Of the Little Entente
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Ru-
mania-insured her diplomatic as
cendancy at Geneva and in all other
continental conclaves. BY her aln-
ance with Yugoslavia, France en-
circled Italy as she encompassed Ger
many through her partnership with
Poland. And in international gather
ings, thanks to French backing, the
statesmen and claims of Poland and
the nations of the Little Entente OBJ
tanned far greater recognition than
the italian.
For dozen years Mussolini has en-
deavored to break this French domina-
ton. And during most of this period
his chief objective has been to bring
about an agreement with the Ger
mans. To that end, he has backed
the German claims for parity in
armaments and for revision of the ter
ritorial clauses of the treaty of Ver-
sailles. In doing this he has sought
to establish a balance of power be-
tween France and Germany and thus
to acquire for his own country the de-
Gliding role. In the same fashion, by
championing the Hungarian claims
for q revision Of the treaty Of Tria-
non he has striven to weaken the
Little Entente.
Even after Hitler came to power
Mussolini still persisted In his at
tempts to promote agreements between
Rome and Berlin which might coun-
terbalance the influence Of Paris, and
1t was to that end that he received
the German dictator in Venice in
June. Always, however, the price Of
cooperation between Italy and Ger
many exacted by the Duce was the in
dependence Of Austria, which Is an
essential detail in italian security.
When, therefore, the Austrian allies
Of Hitler precipitated the July putsch
in Vienna, and murdered Dollfuss, the
friend and ally Of Mussolini, the fu-