Evening star., 1935-02-24
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.

London, 1t Is possible TO read lntlma-
tions which must have a very great
importance for European affairs dur
ing the present year. The proposal
itself, 1t will be recalled. was COM
plicated, covering as 1t did wide
field of political and military sub
jects. Its main features were, how
ever, fairly simple.
In the first place the Germans were
invited to join the other nations which
had subscribed to the original Locarno
pacts of 1925-namely, Britain,
France, Italy and Belgium-in a new
agreement by which an attack by air
upon any of the four nations upon the
other three would automatically call
for common action against the ag-
gressor. In practice this was every
where recognized as meaning that II
Germany attacked either France or
Britain by air. the two countries would
at once cooperate, while Italy would
act as her interests determined at the
moment, despite her acceptance OF
the obligation, since distance would
initiate against her action If air oper-
ations were limited to the Rhine area.
Second Provision.
Secondly, Germany was to return to
the League and to the Disarmament
Conference and on that basis the re-
strictions placed upon her right to
rearm by the treaty of Versailles were
to be removed. In their place there
was to be set up general agreement
of all the powers to limit their arm
ements. Germany was thus to acquire
the right to parity which she has long
claimed, the British we're to acquire
that limitation of ornaments which
they have steadily worked Tor ana,
finally, the League was to be restored
as the center of Anglo-French-Ger-
man diplomacy.
In the third place. Germany was in
vited to Join in the establishment Of at
least two new Locarnos. those of the
East and of the South, one relating to
the regions beyond the Vistula and
the other to the basin Of the Danube.
In effect, the eastern pact was to bind
the Germans to respect the status quo
as far as Russia and the Baltic states
were concerned, and the Danubian to
renounce all purpose to interfere with
the independence Of Austria or the
territorial integrity Of Czechoslovakia.
In both the Danubian and Vistulan
Locarnos, too, the signers were to bind
themselves to act together against any
aggressor as did the signatories of the
original Locarno applying to the West.
Position in Berlin.
Now In the German response it Is
plain that Berlin is prepared to enter
conversations only on the basis OF the
recognition of the German right to
parity in armaments with France.
That, in itself, was always to be ex-
pected because it was upon this issue
that Hitler left the League. Beyond
that it is clear that the Germans are
ready to subscribe to the extension Of
the original Locarno to apply to the
air and not irrevocably opposed to the
return to Geneva.
On the other hand, it is equally
obvious that they are unwilling to
consent either to an eastern or
Danubian Locarno Their decision
grows out of the fact that they have
already made 10-year non-aggres-
sion pact with the Poles and entered
into economic and political relations
with Poland The Poles, moreover,
are opposed to the eastern Locarno,
partly because having non-aggres-
sion pact with the Soviet Union as
well as with Germany they regard 1t
as unnecessary, and partly because
the relations between Paris and War
saw are no longer intimate and it is
France which is pressing for the
Eastern LocarnO
In the same fashion the Germans
make it quite obvious that they are
unwilling to foreclose the future in
respect to Austria, and it is this fact
which explains the emergence from
Berlin Of the suggestion that before
any Danubian Locarno is made there
should be plebiscite to determine
the will Of the Austrian people in the
matter Of union with the Reich. En-
boldened by the results Of the Saar
plebiscite, therefore, the Germans are
willing now to have similar test
made in Austria.
Caters to British.
Collectively these details disclose
the Germans ready to give any pos
sible guarantee in the matter of the
status quo in the West, where France
and Britain are directly concerned
From the outset of his political career
Hitler has always sought some form
of understanding with the British.
The events of the past two years have
gradually forced upon him the reali-
zation of the fact that it is impossible
20 separate France and Great Britain
when any question of changing the
status quo in the Rhine area is in
volved.
All Hitler's strategy, therefore, must
, be directed toward getting France out
OF Central Europe. He knows that the
British will not under any circum-
stances consent to give military
guarantees Of Austrian independence
He Is we'll aware that while the Brit
ish would undoubtedly move promptly
to French support in case Of a Ger
man attack upon France or Belgium
by land or air not British division
would move If German troops entered
Austria. And he is just as certain
that q German attack upon the Soviet
Union would similarly fail to bring
British armed Intervention.
On the other hand, the Reichs-
fuehrer realizes that British policy
and British public opinion are at the
moment unfavorable to Germany be-
cause of the events in Berlin and
Vienna last Summer, and that If he
Is to escape diplomatic isolation he
has to avoid rebufflng the present
proposals which. although Anglo
French in origin, have come from
London. Thus. on the point most
important to the British, the air Lo-
carno, he shows himself least uncom-
promising. In the same fashion he
does not slam the door against re-
turn to Geneva which is again pro-
posal dear to the British mind.
Nevertheless, Hitler is not going to
abandon his major purpose-to bring
about the union of Austria with Ger
many and similar union Of the Ger
man minorities Of CzechoSlovakia
\ with the Reich. His conception Of his
destiny Is that he has q divine mis-
t. - ra1,rffo fta German Heorle