Evening star., 1935-09-29
BY FRANK n. SIMONDS.

i
significant than the fashion
In which the quarrel suddenly became
q direct issue between Great Britain
and Italy. Nominally all the mem
bers Of the League of Nations were
equally concerned with preventing an
action which violated the Covenant.
Actually, only Great Britain was tax
ing any steps to make League opposi-
ton effective On the one hand
Geneva was celebrating on the ques-
ton of what sanctions-probably eco
n0mic-the League would take if Italy
precipitated q war In East Africa.
On the other Great Britain was
hurrying ships and troops to the
Mediterranean as If an Anglo Italian
war was imminent.
Why were the British so worked
up? For two quite obvious reasons,
one domestic and the other foreign.
AS to the former, the present National
government will 60 before the people
not later than next Spring and, as
consequence Of the still recent plebi-
scite in which 1000, 900 Britons voted
for the League, 1t finds itself obliged
to take a course which will not lose it
the support of these millions. As to
the latter, the eventual if not the i'm
mediate implications for British i'm
perial interests Of an italian conquest
Of Ethiopia have begun to impress
sections Of public opinions not noted
for their respect for Geneva.
Made Issue Personal.
Pushed on alike by the pacifists and
by the imperialists the British gov
ernment has step by step made the
Ethiopian issue personal. 1t was
plain from the start that no other
considerable country would. Japan,
Germany and the United States were
not in the League and were resolved
to keep out Of the African mess.
France was desperately anxious to do
nothing to offend Italy and wholly
ready to dismiss the affair as a purely
colonial enterprise. AS for the Soviet
Union, it could do nothing but pro-
nounce noble sentiments and had no
desire to do more.
Had the British behaved in the
Ethiopian affair as they did in the
Manchurian, Italy would have been
able to 60 ahead Just as Japan did.
Then the British pacifists were
against war at all costs and the
British imperialists were equally op-
posed to any break with Japan which
might compromise British interests in
the Far East. You had the idealists
and the imperialists equally united In
desire to prevent war. Now. for
different reasons but with equal de-
termination, these two camps are pre-
pared to support war.
Period Of Jingoism.
Beyond all doubt, moreover, the
British people are going through one
Of their not unfamiliar periods of
| jingoism. 1t began with the Kings
! jubilee, when empire spirit was
whipped up to a degree unprece-
dented in the postwar era. And the
enterprise Of Mussolini provided a
fresh occasion for further stimula-
ton. Back of this, however, lies a
more serious detail. In the Italian
adventure in Africa the British i'm
perialists detect an operation which
may easily inspire German imitation
Already Berlin has put London on
notice that it means to get back its
colonies, taken from it by the treaty
of Versailles.
Were MuSsolini, by force, to win
for his country a colonial estat,
which at least looks impressive on the
map, pressure upon Hitler to push
the colonial issue would become ir.
resistible. Most Of the German colo.
nial possessions and all of the best
of them went to the British. The
imperialistic camp has not the small
est intention of making any restitu-
ton. And taking strong line with
Mussolini seems to it a sure way oi
avoiding further trouble. Also there
Is very general resentment of the
fashion in which II Duce has pro.
ceeded without regard to British sen.
sibilities.
Staked All on League.
As for the pacif1sts, they have
staked everything on the League anC
they have become so completely in.
volved in the support of Geneva thai
they are now quite ready to go to wal
to prevent war, which is, in itself, tn,
most preposterous of all paradoxes
War between Italy and Ethiopia, the,
| nroSantIu tn n !,
prevented. But by war between
Britain and Italy they calculated thai
the League might in some fashion bt
restored to life and influence. They
were ready, therefore to precipitate I
major war because they could moi
| prevent q minor conflict!
That such a war would be accepted
by the majority Of mankind as merely
a conflict to defend the material ant
strategic interests of the British EN-.
pire, none of the British pacifists wa.
able to believe. Yet it soon became
evident that to the French, the So
viets and the peoples Of the smaller
continental countries, this enormous
British activity, so different from the
passivity in the Manchurian affair
did necessarily appear to have it
origin in imperialistic and not ideal.
istic sentiments.
In Accord With Precedent.
Looking backward in history it Is
plain that the present British per-
formance Is wholly in accord with
precedent. When the Russians by
the treaty of San Stefano undertook
to control Turkey and thus defeat
British resolution to control and close
the Bosporus, the British sent feet
| to anchor in the Sea Of Marmora
When Marchand marched across
Africa and threatened to cut the
Cape-to-Cairo line Of British imperial
expansion, Kitchener was dispatched
| to Fashoda with force adequate to
overwhelm the French expedition
Now, the italian program in East
Africa has come to have in British
eyes something Of the same menace
that attached to the earlier Russian
and French enterprises. This time,