Evening star., 1935-02-03
i. S. WORLD COURT VIEW
SEEN SAME AS In 1919
Senate Debate Called Battle Between
IsOlatiOnists Rather Than FIJI g hit ON
International Idealism.


for its enforcement was eliminated.
In 1885 it was only possible to muster
considerable support for adhesion to
the World Court by fresh reservations
conceived in the old spirit.
In Europe this American state of
mind, although simply explicable in
itself, is never understood. American
acceptance of the Kellogg pact was
interpreted as an evidence of the gain
OF internationalism on this side of
the Atlantic. Adhesion to the World
Court must have the same implica-
tlons. There are at Geneva, too, GER
tain Americans who are at all times
misleading their European colleagues
by insisting that a great change has
taken place in the American point
OF view, that isolation is giving way
to internationalism when, of course,
nothing of the sort is happening.
Isolation Really Impossible.
Ever since the collapse of the Wilson
program there has existed in this
country considerable body of men
and women who have perceived that
the kind of isolation the opponents
of the League advocated was out of
the question. They have realized that
it was necessary to find some common
platform on which European and
American craftsmanship could meet.
In so far as this belief has found
expression at all, it has perhaps found
it in the language by which the two
national parties in their platforms in
dorsed consultative pacts with other
countries.
But as was clearly disclosed in the
Manchurian affair, consultative pactS
have no value when any single nation
is resolved to resort to violence. Then
it becomes question of put up or
shut up The nations which have
consulted and agreed have now to
resort to sanctions or to confess i'm
potence and submit And, in the
japanese case they submitted. In that
instance, too, We were just as closely
associated with the League as if we
had belonged to it on the terms set
forth in the Senate reservations of
1919. We did all that We could or
should have done as member nation
and, as matter of fact, we did more
in the way of talking than other men,
ber nations like Britain, France and
Italy relished.
To me all the fight for and against
entrance into the League with reserva-
tions and over adhesion to the World
Court with stipulations has seemed
unreal because, on the one hand, the
dangers involved have been ridicu-
lously exaggerated and are, in fact,
imaginary But, by contrast, the
benefits to be derived appear equally
derisory. In the League and the
Court or out of both, the United States
will go on its way, which is uncom-
promisingly nationalistic. And even
if it entered both without reservations,
the result would be the same.
The tests are simple. Ask any group
OF advocates of entrance into the
League or Court if they are prepared
to leave it to League decision whether
the United States shall continue to
maintain the japanese exclusion act,
stick to its war debt policy, hold fast
to its tariff and currency laws. Un-
doubtedly nine out of ten will reply
in the negative. Inquire if they would
consent to respond to the call of the
League to employ its troops or its
tariffs to enforce sanctions against
Japan, for example, and the response
would be the same.
But these are the fields in which the
League must have authority if any
progress is to be made in the direc-
ton of organized peace in the world.
Broadly speaking, there are two con-
ceptionS of international relations in
the world today. The first is the old,
familiar nationaliStic conception. The
individual state is sovereign, its rights
are absolute. Wise policy consists in
the maintenance of those rights in full
and the provision of the military and
naval forces adequate to meet any
prospective challenge to that policy.
Over against this conception stands
the newer, the postwar conception of
collective action to organize not mere
ly world peace but world prosperity.
1t rests upon the assumption that the
consequences of the industrial era
have been such as to create a vast
measure Of interdependence between
countries. The result is that the pur-
suit of a purely nationalistic policy
whether military or economically one
may have infinite evil consequences
for others. Thus it is necessary to
create some international authority
having the right to speak and act in
the interests of the convenience and
necessity of all.
Collective Will Not Created.
In itself the League constitutes an
expression of this second conception.
1t is an effort to substitute collective
for individual action and international
for national sovereignty. So far, how
ever, while enormous progress has
been made in the direction of creating
machinery for the expression of the
collective will of nations, little has
been achieved in the creation of that
collective will itself. When it has ex-
listed, for a moment, the League has
functioned admirably, but unhappily
such moments have been transient
and League action restricted to minor
issues
If the champions of the League
principles in the United States could
persuade the American people to turn
from the national to the collective
conception of international relations,
American entrance into the League
and adhesion to the World Court
would represent something real and
significant. For it would then rep
resent an enormous change from the
mentality of 1919. But in order to
make possible adhesion to the Court
it is still necessary to prove conclu-
sively that we retain all our pre-
negatives Of sovereignty at the mo-
ment we are in theory associating
ourselves with the collective principle.
What the fight over the World
Court has disclosed is that the real
situation in the Senate and the coun-
try remains exactly what 1t was In
1919. There is still a considerable,
influential and able minority opposed
to all international association. There
is another group, possibly larger, pre-
pared to permit international associa-
tion provided none of the preroga-
tives of sovereignty are impaired. Last
of all there Is a totally insignificant