Evening star., 1935-04-21
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

n PCdSC AO1A1ClClACC dllu bllC OCCuDd-
ton of the Ruhr Europe INDUCED
1 in a long series OF conversations
between the leaders of various
allied governments and the Germans
Nothing was ever accomplished at
these meetings. which Poincare scorn-
fully described as the craftsmanship
of the cinema" and they came to a
close with the disastrous gathering at
Genoa in which the fate Of Lloyd
George was sealed by his spectacular
failure.
After the occupation Of the Ruhr,
when the truce of Locarno had
brought a breathing spell, Europe
turned to a new technique-the en-
ployment of the League machinery.
Brilliantly successful during the years
when Stresemann. BRAND and Austen
Chamberlain spoke at Geneva for
Germany, France and Britain, reSpec-
lively, this League method collapsed
with the flascos attending the Man
churian and disarmament discussions
and the Withdrawals of Japan and
Germany from the League.
The Stresa meeting constituted a
reversion to the old style. Like the
pre-Locarno meetings, too, it had no
other result than to provide the ex-
cuSe for new meeting. Nothing was
settled-nothing could be settled
because underneath a facade of good
manners there persisted solid frame
work of mutual disagreement. The
German gesture, which for a moment
filled the press of the world, was later
disclosed as empty. Things remained
after Stresa as they had been before.
No one wants war at the moment so
no country pushed its thesis to the
extreme, but, once the world had a
chance to examine the results. disil-
lusionment was general
Jusst Another SHOW"
| 1t used to be said Of Lloyd George
when he was putting on the shows"
that his idea Of a successful confer
ence was one that would look success
full long enough to insure him a
pleasant return to his own country.
! Ramsay MacDonald's idea of success
( was similar. Stresa was one more
! attempt of statesmen. fully aware they
cannot change the substance, to dis
| guise that substance by wrapping it
in the bright cellophane of diplomatic
| pretense. What it proved was that
no one can agree and no one is ready
to go to war. What its authors un-
! dertook to do was to make it appear
a step forward, but at the end every
thing was as it had been in the
beginning and the drift toward war
continues
The basic fact in the current situa-
ton is that the leadership in Europe
has passed to Great Britain. But
over against this fact must be set
the equally significant detail that the
only form of leadership the British
are able to indulge in is an almost
frantic effort to prevent any one
from going anywhere. Now the Brit
ish want to prevent war but, unlike
the French, the Italians and the So
viets. they are convinced that war
can be prevented better by refraining
from action than by acting. They
were. therefore, willing to let Ger
many go on with her technically
illegal rearmament, they were anxious
to avoid specific condemnations which
would lead to further German def
ances. they wanted to get Germany
back into the circle of great powers.
and in order to accomplish this they
were equally eager to persuade the
Germans to be less violent and the
French and Italians less exigent.
Thus for all practical purposes Sir
John Simon became the advocate of
Germany alike in the courts of Stresa
and of Geneva. But the difficulty of
his situation lay in the fact that he
can do nothing to restrain his client
and therefore nothing to reassure the
court. At Stresa came the showdown,
however, and Great Britain could
not take minority stand with diplo-
matte grace. For a certain length Of
time Britain could play this balance
of power game. because for France,
Italy and the Soviet Union the need
Of British support was obvious. Thus
If Britain actually stood aside from
ner former allies the encouragement
to Hitler would be beyond exaggera-
tion.
Britain Refuses to Act.
| iIC 4OAddLllCIlttdl UtUWccIl
British craftsmanship and continental
arises from the fact that the former
will not believe that war has become
inevitable and the latter looks upon it
as already inescapable. The result is
that while the British are trying to
prevent the outbreak of a war, their
allies of the World War are seeking
to re-eStabliSh the association of
countries which won it. And the
British could only persuade their old
partners that peace was possible II
they could offer them any interpre-
tation> of German purpose which did
not foreshadow war.
Now it is well to note that the Situ-
alton of the British bestows upon them
the leadership in Europe, but the pre-
requisite of leadership is the will and
the power to act. The present cabi-
net in England has neither. Again,
leadership presupposes the existence OF
a leader and not at any time since the
war has Britain been reduced to such
sore straits to find statesman capa-
BILE of making even a respectable
showing on the international stage.
Macdonald is just hanging on to share
in the glories of the Kings jubilee,
Simon is the weakest and most dis
trusted foreign secretary of the century
at home as well as abroad, while An
thony Eden belongs to the gardenia
school of diplomacy.
England cannot lead. then, because
she has no leaders and no objective.
But of course the result of this must
be that she will shortly lose her
primacy. France, after enjoying COM
plete European control between 1928,
when she occupied the Ruhr. and 1888.
when Germany left the League and
started rearmament, lost her place
because she failed in the latter year
to act as she had in the earlier.
Poland and the Little Entente were
ready to march with her into Germany
in October, 1888, but when France
renounced a war of prevention she
resigned the leadership of Europe.
In Mussolini Italy has leader and
the Duce himself is ready to lead
along clear and definite lines, but