Evening star., 1935-03-02
The Legislative Deadlock.

The Legislative Deadlock.
The Constitution of the United
States contains in its first article this
provision: "All legislative powers
herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States" The
Constitution also makes the President
Q powerful factor in legislation by i'm
posing upon him the duty to recon-
mend such measures as he shall
fudge necessary and expedient' and
giving the veto power to prevent any
measure to which he objects from be-
coming a law, unless his objections
are overruled by a two-thirds vote OF
both houses of Congress.
But the duty to recommend pre-
cedes consideration by Congress and
the power to veto follows in theory
congressional consideration and action,
leaving to Congress the unimpaired
power Of affirmative, effective legis-
lation.
Thus while there is no specific limi-
tation upon the Presidents power to
recommend in such detail as he
pleases measures for consideration by
Congress and no prohibition of in
tervention by him during congress
sional consideration of his proposals,
with the veto club held over Congress,
1t is clearly not contemplated by or
within the spirit of the Constitution
that a President shall actively and
personally intervene in congressional
consideration and push important and
highly complicated measures of con-
tested constitutionality recommended
by him with threat of veto if his legis-
lative wishes are not without material
change complied with.
The present temporary deadlock on
Capitol Hill marks the clash Of op-
posing opinions concerning the degree
to which the President can with pro-
priety 60 in fighting vigorously for his
proposals in Congress itself as well
rs by recommendation before congress
sional consideration and by veto
sfterward
The present Congress has recently
and rather Unexpectedly baked at
acceptance without change of the
Presidents legislative proposals. 1t
has objected to swallowing, without
mastication at least, the legislation
sent 1t by the Executive. If this
comes as surprise to the Executive,
it is, perhaps, the fault Of Congress.
During the first two sessions of the
National Legislature after President
Roosevelt took Office Congress took
its legislative doses as prescribed by
the White House. There was little
trouble about that. The New Deal
moved along almost without hitch.
Trouble with Congress has been
brewing for some time, however.
When the administration work-re-
lief bill, with its huge appropriation of
$4.ss0, 5000 and many new powers
for the President, was laid before
Congress that body began to turn.
There was difficulty in the House. but
the ironclad rules, plus determined
leadership, finally put the bill through
that body in form acceptable to the
President. The real test came when
the bill reached the Senate. And the
test is continuing.
The contest between the legislators
and the President over the McCarran
amendment fundamentally is con-
test over the powers of legislation.
Boiled down, 1t means a demonstration
as to whether the details of legisla-
ton are to be determined by the
Chief Executive, or by the Con-
gress. 1t is not historically a new
struggle, although it is new, except in
a few isolated instances, to the pres
ent administration. The best solution
Of the difficulties of legislation is found
when the Executive consults with and
obtains the cooperation of the Con-
gress in legislative details. It does not
necessarily follow if he undertakes
10 do the whole job.
This deadlock will doubtless be
loosened by some form of compromise.
The real continuing, vital issue is that
which is developing, with an increas-
ing volume of popular discomfort as
the multitude of small taxpayers
realize that they or their descendants
or successors must contribute to re-
pay in increased taxes the billions of
money borrowed for expenditure on