Evening star., 1935-10-06
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.


a a ent possibility, 1t is not with
out profit to look back for moment
and consider how things came to reach
such a pass. Most interesting of all,
moreover, is the light recent events
have thrown upon the League of Ma
tions, which was the postwar panacea
for preventing war.
Now it is plain that in the pre-war
era one of two things would have hap
pened. Either the British would have
stood aside and permitted Italy to take
Ethiopia as England has taken Egypt
and assented to French occupation of
Tunis, or she would have intervened
to prevent the enterprise as she vetoed
the French attempt to occupy the
Egyptian Sudan and as Germany at
tempted to block French conquest of
Morocco. But no other country would
have been concerned, because none has
any material interest which would be
effected by the Italian undertaking.
Thanks to the existence of the
League, however, the British have been
able to carry a matter of imperial inns
portance for themselves to Geneva and
to involve the rest of the world, the
United States excepted, in a dispute in
which it has no interest and from
which 1t has a lively desire to keep
away. Thanks to the British course.
moreover, the whole confessedly fragile
framework of contemporary Europe
has been shaken to its foundation, and
the beginning of the continental war,
which most informed observers now re-
gard as inevitable. visibly hastened.
Profit in Study.
Now the people of the United States
need to examine very closely the evil
dence spread before them in the mat
ter of the present Anglo-Italian row,
because, thus studied, it furnishes an
admirable safeguard against eventual
involvement in the general war which
Is at hand. On the surface one sees at
Geneva a number of countries, appar-
emily all with equal earnestness, en-
gagged in an attempt to arrest piece
Of undisguised aggression, indistin-
euishable from British and French
performance in the pre-war era.
The truth is, however, that among
the so-called great powers of the
world only the British are profoundly
stirred. The United States, Germany
and Japan have kept out of the mess
altogether. The French are concerned
only because they have recently re-
stored friendly relations with Italy.
AS a consequence not only have they
exercised danger of attack upon the
east, but they have also been able
to move their Alpine garrisons to the
Rhine. In addition, France and Italy
are now prepared to act together if
Germany should take the offensive
either In Alsace-Lorraine or in Austria.
The extent of the relief incident to
this arrangement can be appreciated
only by those who know how tense
the situation in Province has been in
recent years.
For peace and friendship with Italy
the French would count it small
price to give their blessing to the
Ethiopian enterprise. In fact, their
only objection has been that Italy
might become so involved in Africa
that she would be unable to do
enough against Germany in Europe
Nevertheless, Laval did indicate his
lack Of opposition to the Italian plans
when he met Mussolini in Rome last
Winter and laid the foundations for
the Franco Italian reconciliation. You
may rest assured, therefore, that if
the French had been left to them
selves they never would have meddled
with the present italian undertaking
and If the League had not existed
they could not have been dragged
into a purely Anglo-Italian dispute.
But in the'next war with Germany
the French are at least as interested
In the support of the British fleet
a. of the Italian Army. And they
know that British support can only
be had through the League and on
the basis of the League principles. In
. word, the British might join the
French if both their own interests
and their obligations to the League
would be served thereby, but If France
should fail to support League princi-
piles now, Great Britain would find
in this action a welcome pretext for
avoiding later performances, particu-
larly If they promised to be costly and
profitless.
In their hearts the French are dis
turbed over the Italian program be-
cause it may weaken Italy in Europe,
and they are furious at the British for
forcing them to choose between Italy
and Great Britain when they desire to
stand equally well with both. Natur-
ally, the French see British perform
ance as merely an extension of i'm
perial policy by the employment of
the League machinery to that end.
And, like the Italians, they regard
British action as dictated solely by
selfish motives.
In point Of fact it is only the small
Or European states which have any
real affection for the League, because
they recognize it as means for en-
listing great countries in the defense
Of their own security, whereas, natur-
aNy enough. they will not be called
upon to pay any of the costs of CO.
ercing a country like Italy which may
be guilty of aggression. During the
Manchurian affair nothing in all the
tragi-comedy of the Geneva organiza-
tion was more amusing than the pos
itively blood thirsty fashion in which
landlocked European states pressed
for naval sanctions against the jap
anese.
Small Nations in Quandary.
The smaller countries want the
League saved and strengthened be-
cause it may prove a guarantor OF
their independence and territorial in
tegrity. They are ready to urge and
vote for sanctions against any vio-
lator Of the pact of Paris or the COW
enant of the League, because some one
else will have to impose these and bear
the brunt of whatever reprisals are
thus provoked. But some OF the
smaller countries are allies of France,
and thus find their situation difficult,
because the French ares totally un-
willing to see any but the mildest
sanctions employed against Italy.