Evening star., 1935-02-10
ARC DE TRIOMPHE IN PARIS.
BY PERTINAX.

RE the Franco Italian agree
" ments signed in Rome by Mus
~ solini and Laval to be regarded
4 4 as an important landmark in
the postwar history of Eu-
rope? To answer that question some
distinct features of Italian policy must
be known and kept in mind.
Unlike the French and the German,
the Italian government does not fol-
low, in international affairs, clearly
drawn, continuous line of conduct. 1t
avoids allying itself, at any rate for
any great length of time, with either
the pangerman element. bent upon
achieving the hegemony Of Europe, or
France and Russia. which seeks to
maintain kind of equilibrium founded
upon the free development of national
communities. 1t stands midway, en-
deavoring to play a subtle and deft
hand between the two contending
forces.
Is some kind of inferiority complex
behind these many changes? Is 1t
because the government in Rome feels
that the interests Of national states
and, undoubtedly, Italy is a national
state-will always be catered to and,
in the end, efficiently protected by the
western powers. that it seeks for par
tial advantages, sometimes irrespec-
lively of the intrinsic merits of the
dominant issue at stake? At any rate,
Mussolini has not shown himself less
empirical in that respect than his
predecessors. Te a friend OF mine
who asked him whether he was in
favor of an understanding with
France he made the following an
swer, Agreements. yes: an agreement,
no." In the same spirit as Giolitti,
the great parliamentary wirepuller OF
the period before the war, II Duce has
been very careful to keep his freedom
of movement upon the European
chessboard unimpaired.
1918 Conference Recalled.
Rome in the Summer of 1918 was
the meeting place Of the Congress OF
Nationalities, when the states which
are now the component parts OF the
Little Entente, as well as Poland,
Lithuania, ETC., had their official birth
registered. Count Carlo Sforza, as
minister of foreign affairs in the Gio-
litti government of 1920, endeavored
to act in harmony with them all. Had
his policy been continued italian policy
| would have been stabilized.
Unfortunately, the support lent by
Clemenceau to President Wilson's dip
| lomatic offensive against the incorpor-
alton of Fiume within the great Latin
kingdom and the assertion of the old
historical claim of Venice upon Dali
malta, among other things, led the
peninsula to part company with the
other victorious peoples and, if not to
join hands with the vanquished, at
least to resume the former antagonism
toward France.
French diplomacy has lived, in the
past, upon the axiom that to secure the
good will Of Italy in any given case 1t
was only necessary to reach an under
standing with England. For some two
decades this axiom had proved fairly
sound one. But Of late years it has
been contradicted in many instances.
Italy has felt that it must build
system of its own. But with whom?
Turkey, Hungary, Austria and puppet-
like Albania were the only states that
could be enlisted on the international
market-and Turkey finally became
estranged from Italy after the four
power pact venture of 1928. The
Italian league consisted, therefore, of
Albania, Austria and Hungary-a very
unreliable lot.
Magyars Linked to Reich.
For the government of Rome to pre-
tend that, with those materials, it could
erect a barrier to hold Germanic re-
venge in check and at the same time
bring the states of the Little Entente
to the verge of dissociation-this
sounds like an absurdity. To start
with, by the rule of history and geog-
raphy, the Magyar nations fate seems
inevitably bound up with the fate of
the German Reich. On the surface it
may pose as Italy's satellite; it well
knows that sooner or later 1t will have
to fall back upon Germany, and 1t
behaves accordingly.
However, such a combination, arti-
fetal and shaky as it might be, was
effective as a means of intimidating
France. It was correctly foreseen that
whenever Germany should get back on
her feet the French ministers, con-
fronted with the prospect of new
struggle, would speedily repair to the
italian capital and sue for reconcilia-
ton at price. This was made all the
more certain by the fact that an anti
/! Gallo feeling has been sedulously nur-
tured year after year; the periodic
outbursts of it, on the other side of
the frontier, have made very unpleas-
, ant listening. M. Grandi, then Musso-
nni's foreign secretary, once was heard
to exclaim: "Our people are soft; they
are sorely in need Of backbone.
Francophobia has been encouraged by
us with the idea that it might supply
that backbone!"
OF course, had Hitlerism followed q
different course, things might have
turned out differently. A kind Of pan
Fascist coalition might have been set
up, which would have redounded to the
glory of II Duce.
Hitler Irritated Mussolini.
Last Spring Mussolini went some
distance In that direction; in Venice
he was ready to make a clean slate
, Of past Italo- German conflicts. But
Hitler's personality disturbed him:
I'm him." he said, 81 could not find
more than a phonograph that could
play two or three records"
| On the heels of this meeting came
the sanguinary scenes of June 80,
the cruel assassination, on July Is,
Of Chancellor Dollfuss Of Austria
These events turned Mussolini toward
France. He made up his mind to