Evening star., 1935-12-15
BY FRANK H. SIMONDs.


~ which, by implication at
feast, condemned Japanese advance
in North China, and the uncom-
promising stand of the American
delegation to the London Naval Con-
ference foreshadowS new period of
American-JapaneSe tension. The first
of these details constitutes, too,
clear proof that the State Depart
ment is still inspired by the StimSon
doctrine and that Secretary Hull, like
his predecessor, is unable to accept
Japanese control of China as final.
Actually, those who have talked with
tn Secretary of State in the recent
weeks, when the Anglo-Italian crisis
has been so acute, have found him
viewing the Ethiopian affair as i'm
portant largely, if not mainly, because
of its implications for the Far East.
Success for Italy in Africa would in
his eyes certainly serve as an en-
couragement for Japan in Asia, just
as Japan's triumph over the League
in the Manchurian incident encour-
aged Mussolini in his Ethiopian ad-
venture
But the danger which is implicit
in such statements as Secretary Hull
has lately made is that they suggest
the United States can and will do
anything to arrest Japanese advance.
Now the simple truth is that this
advance can be stopped in just one
way and that is by force. An al
lance between Great Britain, the
Soviet Union and the United States
could, by military pressure in Siberia,
by an economic and naval blockade
cutting off Japan'S trade with the
world, do the trick. From Hawaii
and Singapore the British and Ameri-
can fleets could interrupt all japanese
trade with the Americas, Western
Asia, Africa, Europe and Australasia.
Meantime Soviet armies could man
the Siberian frontier.
Japan Would Fight.
OF course, any such operation would
mean war, precisely as effective eco
nonic sanctions against Italy have
always been sure to provoke conflict.
To strangle Japan might be possible
in the long run, because Japan, like
Italy and Germany, is excessively
poor in the raw materials and min
erals essential to industry. Like Italy,
however, Japan would not submit to
coercion tamely. And just as GER
tainly. if Great Britain and the Soviet
Union turned to Asia, Germany would
seize her opportunity in Europe.
To halt Japanese advance. there
fore. a coalition war would be nee
essary and the launching Of such
conflict in Asia would almost invari-
ably prove to be the signal for an
other struggle in Europe. AS to the
purely American detail, the people OF
this country have steadily to ask
themselves whether their interests In
China and the Far East are worth a
war. Sooner or later it may be that
Japan will overextend herself and as
a result her imperial venture may col
lapse. But nothing warrants the as
sumption today that there are do
mestic forces working within Japan
to put a brake upon national policy.
On the contrary, at the first sign Of
foreign interference the whole nation
will unquestionably unite to offer a
solid front to alien pressure.
Talk about the Sanctity of treaties
and desire for peace, in fact all the
familiar language of the American
State Department, is without bearing
upon the japanese crisis as it has been
upon the Italian and will be upon the
German. These three nations are
ciy ri fn or uraU
out of the economic territorial restric-
tions laid upon them by their present
national circumstances. All are equally
unconcerned with anything except the
amount Of force which can be en-
ployed against them.
Britain Points Moral.
In 1881 the Japanese correctly con-
cluded that the political and financial
chaos in Europe would insure them
free hand for their Asiatic enterprise.
Accordingly, they moved into Man
churia and successfully defied the
League countries and the United
States, well knowing that neither COL
lectively nor severally would these
fight. In 1885 Mussolini, seeing France
and Great Britain similarly alarmed
by German signs and portents, under
took his Ethiopian adventure, with
consequences which are still incalcu-
liable.
1t is plain, however, that II Duce
did underestimate the British reaction
to his operation. In point of fact the
British, having made naval bargain
with the Germans and upon investi-
cation having also convinced them
selves that German rearmament would
not reach a point which would con-
stitute a real menace for themselves
Tor another year or two, seized upon
1taly's transgreSSion as an opportunity
at one time to defend their own i'm
perial interests in Egypt and to point
moral to Berlin and Toxic.
This unforeseen British rejoinder
to his African operation has cost Mus
solini many anxious moments. But
1t has not brought him to modify his
original purpose, and now the japanese
advance into North China has put the
British on the spot. To continue to
exert economic pressure upon Italy.
always with the knowledge that sue
cessful sanctions mean war, will re-
quire constant concentration of
British naval and military forces in
the Mediterranean and in home
waters. And that means that, unless
the United States takes over the job
of defending the status quo in West
ern Asia by force and in cooperation
with the Soviet Union, Japan can per-
siSt in her approach to the Yangstze
Valley without fear of hindrance.
No Half Way.
In such a situation I do not be-
lieve for a moment that any consid-
erable number of Americans are even
remotely willing to fight Japan. There
is, however, very large number who,
despite all that has happened so far
in the Ethiopian affair, still believe
that great power, resolved upon for
eign adventure, can be halted by other