Evening star., 1935-03-10

w oV tAAC ACcAoCAiU 1C~
quest; or how much it was genuine
desire to settle certain questions In
advance to assure a successful con-
ference-it is futile to speculate upon
this.
If, in the conference, the United
States planned to take the leadership.
there is justification even in the first
explanation of the invitation: but the
almost utter lack of preparation would
suggest that the second explanation,
however compelling the desire to make
the conference successful may have
been at first, was forgotten.
At any rate Macdonald came. and
Herriot, and Ishii-to mention only
three of them. They saw the Presi-
dent alone and with others, appar-
emily did not attempt to reach any
conclusions. had more or less agree
able time and spent a great deal of
money. The later conference was, as
we all know, dismal failure.
Let us look, then. at the unfor-
tunate results of these visits, so far as
good international understanding IS
concerned. The good that should
have issued from them, leaving out
positive results on the work Of the
conference, was that those who came
would get to know and appreciate
American problems and that thus
future relations would be simpler end
more cordial. What actually hap
pened?
Planned Sterilization.
Macdonald returned to England
seemingly convinced that the prin-
cipal result America hoped from the
economic conference was an agree
ment on measures to bring about
some kind of international stabiliza-
ton of currency Macdonald knew
that the British government vas not
ready to stabilize. but was sure that
to do this was better than to lose
American cooperation. Plans were
worked out to that end.
But in the meantime, back in the
United States. N. r. A. and A. A A.
had changed the picture and it looked
as though stabiliZation would affect
the far more important domestic pro-
gram adversely. In consequence there
went from the Presidel.t a very sharp
cable refusing to consider any
stabilization plan whatever. That
killed the conference.
Herriot came to Washington almost
hopeless of securing any useful re-
suits. because America had just gone
off the gold standard. But he was de-
lighted with his talks with the Presi-
dent, after all. What he thought he
learned was that in the matter of
German rearmament America was
entirely on the side of France and
rearmament. Because he believed
the President had said this and said
it with great vigor. Herriot ignored
the fact that this was exactly the
kind of European political question IN
which America had always refused to
become involved.
When Viscount Ishii was talking
with the President they discussed
japanese policy in the Orient but, so
far as any one knew, without COM
mitment on either side. A few mortth5
later the Department Of State be-
leved it to be necessary to send a
sharp note to Japan about its action
in Manchoukuo. Immediately Viscount
Ishii issued statement that the note
was unfair because in Washington the
President had told him that he recog-
nized the special position of Japan
in the Far East. The President re-
fnrfnd thof 6a HoI I'D
Litvinoff Met Roosevelt.
Or, to take more recent example,
not connected with the economic cor
ference. When Litvinoff came to
Washington to negotiate the recog-
milton of the Soviet Government. he,
like the others. had several private
talks with the President. although
most of the detailed negotiation was
carried on with the Department of
State. When he left. with recognition
in his pocket, it was understood that
definite arrangements would speedily
be made to boom American export
trade with Russia-the reason people
had favored ecognition-and for the
settlement of American claims against
the Soviet.
A short time ago the Secretary OF
State was compelled to admit that
the negotiations had failed, that there
would be no revival of trade except in
the ordinary course of business, and
that there would be no payments on
the American claims. Immediately
Litvinoff issued a statement that the
failure was due to the fact that the
American Government would not
make good on the Presidents promise
OF a substantial loan to the Soviet.
Macdonald, Herriot, Ishii, Litvinoff
Britain, France, Japan, So
Wet Russia-believe that the Presi-
dent Of the United States made prom
ises which he did not keep and thus
the good faith Of the Nation is i'm
This proves how infinitely
wise was the old rule that negotiations
with foreign nations must be concen-
trated in the Department of State,
that the President must keep out of
them until the time came for him to
approve or disapprove the conclusion
except. of course, in so far as he
might discuss progress with his own
Secretary of State.
No subordinate officer binds the
Government unless he signs a written
statement. Neither does the President,
legally-but in the minds Of foreign
ers there is no doubt that the spoken
word Of the President is considered as
binding as the written word of any
inferior officer.
Absolves President.
do not for a moment assert that
the President made to LitNnof and
Ishii and Herriot the statements they
attribute to him-at least in the sense
in which they took them. In fact,
1 believe the contrary. But just as i'm
portant as what we Americans believe
is what the foreigners believe. It does
not increase our respect for them to
believe that their spokesmen are not
telling the truth, any more than it
increases their respect for us to believe
that the President deceived their dele
gates.
Any one of us can work out a form
OF words the President might have
used, quite unconsciously, which could
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