Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1935-09-08
BY FRANK II. sIMoNDs.

1 legislation by Congress just
before 1t adjourned has
- marked a fresh stage in g
disaHsS4sea which has been going on
ever since the close Of the World War.
That legislation itself, however. was
frankly compromise and the debate
Is bound to be reopened when Con-
gress comes back. Meantime public
opinion still remains profoundly con-
fused on the whole subject. The
Overwhelming majority of the Ameri-
can people is manifestly determined
to keep out of any European struggle
but very little aware of the complex
titles which surround the question.
The recent action represented an
effort to deal with two problems at
once. Italian purpose and the roper
cussionS this purpose had awakened
in many nations in Great
Britain-put the American people on
notice of the imminence of another
war. 1t was plain, too that while
Italy was planning a colonial adven-
ture indistinguishable from those of
Great Britain and France in the pre-
war era, there was general fear that
the flames might spread to Europe
Before Congress reconvened, there
fore, there was danger that the United
States might become involved in an
other European war.
Mindful of the fashion in which
ne had become involved in the World
War. public opinion-and Congress in
response to that opinion-demanded
legislation which would block the
pathways Of involvement. That was
the major purpose of the various pro-
visions of the Pittman law. But, in
addition. there was hardly less ap-
prehension that the Administration
and, in particular, the State Depart
ment, might involve the country in
the various foreign efforts to prevent
the impending conflict to such an
extent that we should automatically
become belligerents in the war that
followed
japanese Situation Recalled.
Popular apprehension, too, was pat
emily we'll founded. No one had for
gotten that the Hoover administra-
ton had almost involved us in a war
with Japan in its effort first to prevent
and thereafter to defeat japanese ag-
erosion in Manchuria. Rushing to
the aid of the League, Mr.. Stimson
had produced situation in which the
League powers cleverly stood aside
and left America to face the resent
r1ent Of Japan. The result of our in
Prevention was therefore not to pro-
,tect China, preserve treaties or help
the League, but only to become the
sole target of natural japanese wrath.
Popular anxiety was further ex-
cited by the knowledge of what Nor
man H. Davis had been promising in
the name Of President Roosevelt at
the disarmament conference At
Geneva the Ambassador at-large had
proposed that the more heavily armed
nations should consent to material
reduction in the naval and military
establishments. In return, he indi-
Gated, the Roosevelt administration
stood ready to employ American neu-
trality in such fashion as TO aid
those States which, acting through
the League, undertook sanctions
against an aggressor.
, It was plain a few weeks ago that
, In the United States the great mass
Of professional peacemakers, friends
Of the League and believers in the
. Kellogg pact alike, we're eager to
have the United States do something
to prevent the Ethiopian War. They
believed that there was some peace
! full way of preventing war and, like
their British opposite numbers, saw
o solution through the resort to non
military sanctions. Accordingly the
administration was under great pres
sure to do something and Congress
was well aware that Mr.. Hull himself
inclined to the belief that some sort
OF action was possible and desirable.
The public and the majority in
Congress saw, however, that if Britain
set out to apply sanctions, to close
the Suez Canal and to declare an
embargo. and we associated ourselves
with such an undertaking, when it
had led to war between Britain and
Italy we should not be in a position
to draw back and wash our hands of
the whole matter. It was all very well
TO resort to sanctions provided these
at once were non military and did not
provoke fight. But 1t was clear in
the immediate instance that thew
must bring on a battle because Italy
was resolved to go forward, come
what might.
Way Still Open to NEEDLE.
Now in point of fact the action of
Congress did not securely bar the
door against any such involvement.
On the contrary 1t was directed at
regulating and restricting executive
action after war had begun and in the
effort to accomplish this purpose i'm
posed restraints of very doubtful wis
dom. In principle, therefore, the way
Is still open for the administration to
NEEDLE in foreign controversies. In
practice, however, the action of Con-
Sgress, the expressions of public opin-
zion which preceded and precipitated
these actions, all have served to reveal
1.-THE temper of the country and to sup
sply warning which no wise politician
lean ignore.
! Unless all signs fail, we are not at
present to be involved in the Anglo
italian dispute over Ethiopia. Even
II the President should now make some
gesture it would have little value as q
RESTRAINT upon Italy because the action
of Congress has clearly informed Mus
ssolini that, whatever the United States
says, it will not resort to war in order
ito coerce the Italian government. And
nothing but war could stop Mussolini.
Nor are the British likely to run the
risk Of having to face italy single
shanded-the chance we took when we
confronted Japan over the Manchurian
episode.
! All that has happened, therefore,
seems to me to illustrate how much
more effective than any legislation is
the expression of opinion by Congress.