Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1935-06-30
CLEAVAGE OF BRITISH
AND FRENCH NOT BASIC
Both Nations Are United in Peace
Desire-France Holds Germany
Immutably Bent on War.
BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.
naval treaty recently signed
between Great Britain and

Germany has many aspects,
- some of which sare political
and purely European and others
which, since they are naval, have
importance for both the United States
and Japan as maritime powers. On
the political side this treaty illus
trates the fundamental difference be-
tween British and French policy in
dealing with Germany. The British
will not admit that National Socialist
Germany in itself constitutes an i'm
mutable threat of war. The French.
on the contrary, cannot see relations
with Germany conducted upon any
other basis
It Is true that the British do not
ignore the neutrality-suspicious. even
the bability-that Hitler may lead
his country to conflict. On the con-
trary. as far back as last Summer
Stanley Baldwin gave Berlin fair
warning of British policy when he
announced that the Rhine and not
the Chalk Cliffs of Dover was Eng
lands frontier. And since then he
has given further significant warning
by adopting an air program which
insures British equality with the
Reich. British support of French and
Italian purpose to prevent the forcible
annexation of Austria by Germany
has also been made clear on more
than one occasion.
So far, then. British policy parallels
French. If Germany undertakes to
disturb the territorial and military
status quo in the west the British
will stand with the French even to
the extent of making war if neceS-
sary. If Germany attempts to
destroy the political status of Austria.
British influence will be exerted
against such an enterprise, although
British readiness to fight is by no
means assured. Furthermore, the
British have bestowed their blessing
upon Franco-Soviet efforts to estab-
lish an Eastern Locarno and Franco
Italian to create similar agreement
in the Danubian region.
Backed German Argument.
On the other hand, during the dis
armament conference the British
steadily advocated recognition of
German right to equality in military
means of defense. They did that be-
cause they correctly Judged that Ger
many was bound in the end to rearm
in any case and that refusal to permit
such rearmament, which was an
essential right of sovereignty. would
in the end fail to achieve its objective
and incidentally awaken German
rr-nH Ia
even more dangerous character upon
the armament itself. In this view
they were, of course, entirely correct.
Germany is rearming and has left
the League of Nations, retiring into
an isolation which if uncomfortable
for herself is not without menace for
her neighbors.
No the French say that the end
OF all German maneuvers both in the
matter of military and naval arma-
ments and, in fact, in the diplomatic
field, is another war designed to es-
tabliSh German hegemony on the con-
tinent. They say that German STRAIT
egy consists in endeavoring to sepa-
rate France and Great Britain and
that, as consequence, when Britain
agrees to German proposals to rearm
she is actually playing the German
game and encouraging Germany to
later aggression by disclosing break
in the Anglo-French front. In the
naval armament question, too, Rome
seems to have followed Paris. although
It is not impossible that British action
in the matter of Ethiopia has played
part in shaping Italian decision. For
1t insult not be forgotten that Italy
and Great Britain were agreed on
ment Conference.
London replies to Paris in the naval
matter that Germany is going to arm
and from the point of view of British
interests voluntary agreement on
the part of Berlin to set modest
limit to such rearming is all to the
GOOD AS to the break between French
and British policies, that break, in so
far as it has occurred, has been due
to the French demand that Britain
shape her policy to conform to French
estimates of German design. That,
from the British point of view, is I'M
reasonable, and if the French do not
like it then they must still put up
with it.
France Held Pacific.
1t is possible to exaggerate this
cleavage in thought and action. Thus
If the Germans should imagine that
Great Britain is setting out to sub
stitute a German for a French part
nership they will come to grief. For
the basis of the Anglo French part
nership. so far as it exists, is the per-
fectly clear perception in London that
the policy of France is purely pacific.
And no such conviction exists in re-
spect to Germany. France, so every
sane Englishman recognizes, is out for
peace at all times and Fundamentally.
Since British policy in this respect CO.
incides with French there is no basic
disagreement. If the same situation
we're to be created between London
and Berlin it would first be necessary
for Hitler to renounce all of the ia
NOUS detectives of his foreign policy.
But Britain will not follow French
policy, pacific as it is. when British
Judgment Is IHdG VIC PoiiIJ Az P
ing mistaken ways and is destined
not to prevent but to precipitate war.
Again and again in the postwar pc
riod the truth of both of these state
ments has been demonstrated. When
crises have arisen which were due to
the adoption of methods of violence
by the Germans, Great Britain has
stood by France. When French policy
has seemed by its rigidity and un-
compromising character to be calcu-
lated to drive the Germans to ex-
plosive action, London has pretty
ostentatiously disassociated itself with
French diplomatic activity.
1t Is frequently said that this course
is q disclosure of the British habit
Of employing the balance OF power
technique, but I think this interpre-
tation is mistaken. AS far as balance