Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1935-07-14
BY MAI. GEN. SIR CHARLES
GWYNN, X. C. B., c. M. G., ID. S. o.

BY MAI. GEN. SIR CHARLES
GWYNN, X. C. B., c. M. G., ID. S. o.
Copyright 1885. by the North American
Newspaper Alliance, 1nc)
By Radio to The Star.
r ONDON, July 13-After the Bat
tie of Adowa had established
Menelek's position as Negus
- Negusti (King of Kings), he set
to work to extend the borders Of his
empire by conquest. AS Great Brit
ain then was engaged in the reoccu-
ing her East African protectorate, 1t
became OF urgent importance to ar
rive at a frontier agreement in what,
at the time, was practically unex-
plored country.
1t fell to my lot to ascertain the lin
its of Abyssinia's effective occupa-
ton, and survey and suggest from
tier line in some detail, approximating
to vague line which the British Min
lister to Adds Ababa had negotiated
with Menelek. OFF and on. over the
first 10 years of the century, / was
engaged in the work, and, as Menelek
was unable to produce or unwilling to
pay for a qualified commissioner, I
had to represent the interests OF both
countries in laying down working
frontier.
In the course of my duties, I twice
spent several months in the capital,
and came in contact there with Meme
lex, and with many other Abyssinians
in travelling through the Southern and
Western parts Of the country. My ex-
perience, though somewhat ancient
history. gives me an understanding of
Abyssinian matters and mentality.
Live on Plateau.
It is not easy to define what truly
constitutes either the Abyssinian
people or territory. For practical pur-
poses, we may say that the Abyssinian
people are the inhabitants of the
Abyssinian Plateau, the northern end
of which is included in the Italian
colony of Eritrea. Abyssinia is divided
into a number of subkingdonlS and
provinces owing a certain allegiance
to the Negus Negusti, but the
Abyssinians say they will not acknovl-
! edge any Negus Negusti who has not
won his position in battle. Menelek.
to an exceptional degree. fulfilled this
! qualification. and he established a de-
gree of unity not previously reached.
1t was not until the early eighties
Of the last century that threat 70
Abyssinian independence developed.
! Under the partition of Africa among
the European powers which then was
agreed upon, Abyssinia fell within the
sphere 'of influence allotted to Italy.
while France and Britain acquired
certain coastal areas from which Egypt
withdrew.
At about the same time, the Mahdi's
conquest of the Sudan constituted a
more immediate danger 1t led to the
death of King John of Abyssinia in
battle and facilitated the occupation
of Eritrea by Italy and her establish
ment on the plateau. When, however
Italy sought to extend her area OF
occupation southwark and assert her
claim to Suzerainty over the foreign
relations of Abyssinia, resistance de-
veloped, not little assisted by supplies
Of arms obtained from France, who
was far from friendly to Italy at the
time and dreamed of establishing a
French zone connecting West Africa
with her Djibuti colony on the Gulf
Of Alden.
Disaster of Adowa Follows.
AS result We know that Italy ex-
perienced crushing disaster at
Adowa, a disaster which was followed
by certain successes as reinforcements
arrived, but which could not be al
together retrieved because popular
opinion in Italy became virtually op-
posed to the sacrifice of her conscript
soldiers in colonial war. Italy with
drew to the agreed frontier and
Abyssinia was left with somewhat ex-
aggerated opinion of her own strength
and with marked xenophobia.
Adowa, however, is an unreliable
basis on which to form conclusions
1t resulted from tactical blunders
which dispersed a small Italian army
and exposed it to defeat in detail by
greatly superior numbers. Even more
was it due to jealousy of the italian
commander who attempted to brine
off a victory before being superseded
by senior. If the situation had no
been rushed. the greater part of tbs
Abyssinian force would have diSap-
peared in search of food.
Since the date Of the battle AbyS-
Sinian armament has improved, but
to nothing like the extent Of that Of
Italy, and Italy has gained much ex-
perience of war. WHAT numbers anC
what ornaments AbySsinia could
produce if clash again occurred can
not be estimated accurately. Nor is il
really important, as the number either
side can bring into battle is deter
mined by commissariat questions.
100000 Actual Fighters.
There are perhaps million poten-
tial fighting men in the country. anc
there are a great many rifles, though
mostly of an obsolete pattern. These
numbers, however, only indicate the
sources from which armies could bt
formed. Owing to the fact thai
Abyssinian armies, fer the most part
, subsist on the country with no organ.
lied supply service, it ic unlikely thai
as many as 100000 men could actu-
ally be employed i'll any one theatel
, of operations
Normally the fighting forces Of
Abyssinia are of three categorieS
: First, a force Of a few thousand
|, armed and trained On European lines
which forms the Eniperor's bodyguarc
and insures internal security. Second
the Emperor's army of men trained or
native principles, perhaps some $4,000
generally distributed tc outlying dis
, tricts Third, somewhat similar forces
maintained in varying numbers by
provincial sub-kinas or governors
The whole is strongly reminiscent Of
the feudal system, and, of the modern
weapons possessed by Abyssinia. some
. are wasted by being distributed as the
, perquisites of feudel chiefs instead Of
to well-trained tactical units