Evening star., 1935-12-22
BY FRANK n. SIMoNDS.

ure OF ODJecClVlIy, LIE uIuSAA
W denounced compromise OF
Laval and Hoare designed TO
end two wars-Italy against Ethiopia
and the League versus Italy-consti-
tuted q realistic appraisal OF the peril
to world peace from continued expert
mentation with sanctions. What the
premier Of France and the foreign Sec
retary of Britain perceived with equal
clarity was that the imposition of oil
sanctions would almost certainly pre-
cipitate another general war in Europe
and that their countries would have to
bear the brunt of such a struggle.
Pr Hoare-as we'll as for Baldwin,
VIII az epted the Paris compromise
the pro lem was simple If agonizingly
cruel. 70 impose oil sanctions was to
bring bout a war in which Italy would
be smashed and would thereafter in
evitably collapse to anarchy and per-
haps bolshevism. While such war
was in progress what would Japan be
doing in China? While Italy was oe-
ing smashed, what could prevent Ger
many from making its ong-prepared
offensive against Soviet Russia? Would
British interests be served by a war
with Italy and advantaged by its in
evitable repercussions?
The smaller states which hastened
10 pronounce the Anglo-French COM
promise a betrayal could view the
prospect of an Anglo French war with
Italy with complete composure. They
would be spectators and not belliger-
ents. Only Yugoslavia might become
involved and italian defeat would
contribute to Southern Slav unity and
not impoSsibly open the way to the
possession of Fiume and even of Trieste
and Gorilla. Even if the result were
merely to reduce Italy to chaos, Bel
grade would see such a result as
neither unweIcome nor Improbable
for itself.
Powers Faced Realities.
AS to the other states which pro-
tested against the Anglo-F French pro-
gram, notably Poland and the Scan
dinavian countries, they would at
most only be spectators. Obviously
they were all interested as a matter
nation punished and prevented from
drawing any profits from its adven-
ture But British and French states
nlanship had to face the problem With
clear perception-that for both it
3! rghting on land and sea
II they were to go on with sanctions.
In point of fact, of course, the
French had never favored or believed
IN the experiment. They had. been
dragged after the British, always act
ing half-heartedly and tardily. A
war with Italy, too, was bound to
precipitate domestic strife between the
Right and Left as it was also sure to
do harm to an already nearly desper-
ate economic and financial situation.
Unquestionably Laval told Hoare all
this IN the Paris conversations, just
as he made it plain that further pur-
suit Of sanctions insured war
The British situation was less evi-
dent. No one had ever been quite
clear what the Tory cabinet was after.
1T was plain that it had come to the
aid Of the League rather as a man
euver Of domestic politics than as a
matter Of conviction. Thus its real
action in respect to Italy had been
the dispatch of the home fleet to the
Mediterranean and not the advocacy
of sanctions in Geneva. Beyond all
dispute, too, stupid and violent words
and gestures on the part of Mussolini
had awakened imperial anxieties and
Italian occupation of Ethiopia in force
was unwelcome to a country for which
Egypt was vital link in imperial
communications.
Were the British Tories resolved to
destroy Mussolini and smash Fascist
italy because both had become men
ace to their own imperial security? Or
would they be satisfied with teaching
II Duce a lesson and so restricting
his African Spoils as to prevent his
control of the headwaters of the Blue
Nile and the hinterland of British
Eonaliland? For more than three
months the problem of peace centered
In these two questions and British
purpose continued to be obscure.
Situation Forced Compromise.
The Hoare-Laval agreement at last
made it plain that the Tory cabinet,
under the influence of the London
r." "City'' and not imposSibly affected by
royal concern, was willing to permit
MuSSolini to escape under such con-
ditions as to leave his position and the
prestige of the Fascist regime uncom-
promised. He was to have his victory
and his territorial gains carefully
limited, to be sure, to regions whose
passage to Italian control had no un-
pleasant implications for Paris or for
London. Having demonstrated to II
Duce how wrong had been his calcu-
1ations that Britain was easy prey
to new Roman ambitions and appe-
tites, Britain was now ready to con-
sent that Italy should have a modest
place in the sun.
This was the smallest price at which
peace could be had for, as both Paris
and London were now aware Mussolini
had not the smallest intention of wait
ang until financial, economic and oil
embargoes starved and Strangled Italy
into submission. On the contrary,
precisely as he had always insisted
that effective sanctions meant war. so
when the oil embargo was proposed
he warned both Laval and Baldwin
that he would fight, and as a result
the proposal was promptly withdrawn
for time, during which conversations
were to take place.
s. What the League supporters in Eng
land and America have always re-
fused TO admit was that Mussolini
would go to war rather than submit
20 sanctions which we're destined to
compel him to abondon his Ethiopian
enterprise and suffer q humiliation
fatal to his regime. On the contrary
their advocacy of sanctions has been
based upon the conviction that this
was q way to punish aggression with
out precipitating war What Laval
and Baldwin had to face finally was
the certainty that oil sanctions would