The Washington times., 1935-04-12
SPLIT
ON FOREIGN
POLICIES

NSO""uG0 SbO"t u&S 81
Chamberlain's statement until
news came from London that it
had been published.
First reaction of a spokesman
for the British delegation here
was:
Nobody can make q state
ment in London for the British
foreign office because the Brit
ish foreign office is for the
moment in StreSa."
This is literally true because
not only Simon but Sir Robert
Van Sittart, permanent under
secretary, and most OF the impor'
tant department chiefs of the
foreign office are constituting the
most formidable delegation ever
sent out of Britain.
Restrained indignation was
obvious in the British camp. 1t
was as though suddenly the gen.
eral staff Of an army while visit
ing the front-line trenches should
have received high-power shell
in the midst Of their own can
mons in the rear.
To understand what this all
means in terms Of British
domestic politics and the much
more important terms Of the
present international situation, it
is necessary to remember that
Neville chamberlain has often
been spoken Of as possible
prime minister, as successor to
Macdonald.
MacDonald's position at Stresa
has been difficult enough, but
Chamberlain's statement, 1t Is
considered here, has now multi
piled his difficulties.
Because of his act Chamberlain
has suddenly revealed to the
world what was hitherto a British
family secret, that the British
government itself is not unani-
NOUS on foreign policy and its
ministers do not hold identical
views on how to handle Germany.
Two points are especially EN-.
phaSized in Chamberlain'S state
ment as giving most offenSe not
only to the French, who are now
tearing their hair in bewilderment
and shouting "PerfidiouS Albion"
but also to the British in whose
hands professional responsibility
for foreign policies lies.
These points, as Chamberlain
is reported to have expressed
them, were:
First, that Britain feels it de-
Sirable to get further informa-
ton from Germany regarding
her ultimate aims.
Second, that although Britain
has been urged to make a SIM
pie declaration that she won't
tolerate aggression on the con-
tinent, Britain will not make
any such declaration because it
would have been equivalent to q
commitment.
Treachery Seen
Finally, at the very moment
when Macdonald was telling the
French and the italians at Stresa
that every reasonable effort had
been made to persuade Germany
to come back into the family of
peaceful nations and if Germany
refused then Britain would do
something effective to help Sc
cure European peace-at this
very moment Chamberlain was
telling British journalists Britain
would under no circumstances
enter into any new commitment
on the continent except Western
air pact.
Thus Britain's extraordinary
cleavage of sentiment was radi-
cally illustrated.
The French feel Chamberlain'S
statement means British treach-
cry, because if Britain won't even
declare she is against aggression,
what is even Locarno worth?
Furthermore, to the French it
sounds like bitter irony to say it
is desirable to get further in
formation regarding Germany's
aims inasmuch as France feels
the German aims are already
menacingly clear.
Prestige Suffers
From the point of view of the
British delegates, Chamberlain's
statement is regarded as a serious
blow to the British position,
which, it is now disclosed to
friends and enemies, has been so
heavily undermined by internal
disSension that the prestige of
Macdonald and Simon is bound
to suffer.
On the other hand, from the
point of view of Germany, Cham
berlain's statement is the most
pleasant news yet developed from
the conference, which on the
whole has provided agreeable
reading for Berlin.
In the meantime, while Britain
became less and less understand
able to its Latin colleagues, the
French and Italians drew closer
together.