davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1935-02-15
ADVERTISEMENT.

delphia lawyer. but the phrase -
number Of disasters" is scarcely
adequate as a description Of the
long roll of disasters, in the mos6
recent of which, the loss Of the
Akron, seventy-two lives were lost.
Zealots for the dirigible have often
given the impression that they be-
lieve the answer to disaster to b
more and bigger dirigibles. The
commission repeats this argument.
in effect, when it says:
We regard the arts Of airship
construction and operation as be-
ing still somewhat experimental.
The only hope of making further
progress is through the coDstruc-
tion and operation of airships.
This is approximately the theory
behind the construction Of the
Macon and the Akron in the United
States and the building of the R-100
and the R-1O1 in Great Britain. In
both countries it was argued that
by building bigger, stronger and
more powerful dirigibles the disas-
ters of the past could be avoided.
Each country lost one of the dirigi-
bles so built. The only result Of the
bigger-and-better theory was to
make certain that more persons
were killed when the bigger and
better airships came to grief. Last
spring Representative WEARIN cali
culated that the United States has
spent $1OO,000,000 on the develop
ment, construction and operation
of airships. What has been learned
or gained of military or CONNER
cial value that could not have been
obtained by the expenditure Of .
quarter or a half of the money
on airplanes? And why should not
private capital be left to blaze
the trail in transatlantic dirigible
service?
Evening star., 1935-02-15
Che Gs,&e Sun
THURSDAY, OCTOBER Is, 1925.
All Dirigibles Frail.

The chief engineer of the naval
aircraft factory at Philadelphia,
Commander WEYERBACHER, cannot
be accused of prejudice against
dirigible balloons. He supervised
the construction of the Shenan-
doah. He told the naval court of
inquiry the other day that the
Shenandoah was built 10 per cent.
stronger than the German Lac,
after which the American Zeppelin
was modelled.
But, said Commander WEYER-
BACHER, IAN airship caught in the
center of storm is doomed; no
rigid airship could have survived
the storm which wrecked the
Shenandoah"
The more testimony is heard the
more it becomes plain that the
Zeppelin is frail of its very nature.
AS Lieutenant Commander KEN
WORTHY Of the British Navy wrote
recently, the disaster of the Shen-
andoah was one inherent to air
ships themselves, however great
the Improvement made in them
the larger airships become the
more vulnerable they are"
With this knowledge, buttressed
as it is by the long record OF
Zeppelin tragedies, it would be
shocking for the government ot
the United States to invest more
lives and money in aircraft that
is at the mercy of the elements
as well as of the enemy.
Evening star., 1935-02-15
Tbe salge Sn,,
SATURDAY, MAY 10, 1881.
Alone in Folly.

Abandonment OF airship conStruc-
ton by the British leaves the
United States alone among the
great Powers committed to the
dirigible on a large and costly
scale. The Akron, the Nays $5,-
00O.00 airship, will be ready for
her first tests next month. Prime
Minister MACDoNALD's announce
ment in the House of Commons put
a period to the airship program en-
tered upon in 1924, which has cost
British taxpayers more than $11,-
100000 to date. 1t will cost them
between $5sO,OO0 and $6sO,OOO q
year in the next few years to fol-
low the program Of compromise
outlined by the Prime Minister
No fresh construction will be
started, but the R-1Oo. sister ship
of the lost R-101, will be main.
tanned for short flights over the
British Isles, and mooring masts
in Egypt, Canada and India will be
kept in commission.
No such limited bill appears fol
American taxpayers. The contract
price Of the Akron was S5,375, 900.
Her sister ship, the ZRS-5. If built,
will cost by contract $2,450, ,0O0
The proposed dirigible base in Cali
fornia would cost more than ST.
100000. What it will cost to keep
the Akron in commission cannot
be told, but it unquestionably will
exceed the $500,000 a year that
has been spent on the maintenance
of the Los Angeles. fc- the new
dirigible is nearly three times the
size of the Los Angeles.
The current study Of government
expenditures will reach the Navy
Department in due course. 1t
would be odd if the slight econo-
mics expected to arise from elimi-
nation of a score of obsolete Army
posts were to be more than offset
by the cost of our stubborn adher-
ence to an extravagant dirigible
program. The Akron is 1925
spilled milk, but it is not too late
to save money by abandoning the
plan to build her sister ship.
Evening star., 1935-02-15
And Now the Macon.

The dirigible building program
authorized by the Congress in 1926
has been brought to an end by the
disaster to the Macon. 1t has been,
in the language of the Soviets,
fully liquidated. A little less than
two years ago the first unit in that
program. the dirigible Akron, was
destroyed in a storm over the At
lantic. carrying seventy-three men
to their deaths. The loss of the
Macon in the Pacific lacked being
an equally costly disaster in human
lives only because the ships Of the
navy happened to be close at hand.
For that providential arrangement
and the fine discipline of Com
mander WILEY and his crew the
nation can be thankful.
After all its experimentation, its
expenditures, its stubborn pursuit
of a policy abandoned by all the
great Powers of the world. the
United States is left with the de-
commissioned Los Angeles, a semi
rigid airship of the type of the
J-3. destroyed in the attempt to
find survivors of the Akron crash.
and a small metal airship. This
is a trifling remainder for all the
investment of time and man power.
for all the fancied gain In expert
ence. The ZR-2, the Roma, the
Shenandoah, the Akron, the Macon:
call the roll of these great dirigi-
bles, and the answer must be
LOST as the British would an
swer for the R-101 or the French
for the Dixmude or the Italians for
the Italia. Under varying weather
conditions. in different parts of the
world, under different commanding
officers. these dirigibles have gone
alike to destruction, testifying to
the fragility of these vast toys.
Perhaps this latest disaster will
arouse in members of Congress a
determination not to continue
longer a plainly demonstrated
folly. In its recent report the Fed
eral Aviation Commission recon-
mended that the United States
spend more millions for dirigibles,
partly for commercial services,
partly for naval training The COL
lapse of the Macon comes as a
devastating answer to those recon-
mendations.
Evening star., 1935-02-15
No More Steamboats,!

The chief argument advanced
by Secretary WILBUR before the
House Naval Committee at Wash
ington in favor of building a
S6,0oO,0o0 dirigible to replace the
Shenandoah bears within itself its
refutation.
The Secretary said the Navy
General Board regards lighter than
air craft as still in the experiment
tai stage, doubts their military
value and opposes experiments
which would curtail construction
of needed types of war craft. The
board agrees. however. said Mr..
WILBUR, that, for experimental
purposes, the Shenandoah should
be replaced.
If lighter than air craft are still
in the experimental stage-and
everybody knows they are-it is
because there seems to be no rea-
son to suppose they ever will get
into any other stage. Over and
over again, at heavy cost in money
and shocking cost in lives, they
have been proved untrustworthy,
unsafe, unmanageable in stormy
weather. Even the Navy General
Board doubts their military
value" That is a doubt most
Americans share.
What is the use, then, of spend
ing $6,o00,0O0 for a bigger Shen-
andoah which may prove no more
successful than the original Shen-
andoah was, but which might
carry more men to death than the
Shenandoah did If, like its prede-
cessor, it ran afoul Of Midwest
storm?
The House Appropriations Com
mittee has recorded public senti-
ment correctly in its tentative plan
to reduce the maintenance cost
of the Lakehurst Naval Air Sta
tion from $1,716,000 to $12S,0O0.
The Navy Department opposes
this on the ground that a sep
arate arrangement will have to be
made to take care of the Los An
geles. AS to this, the country is
sure of at least one thing: that Is
that as long as the Los Angeles
remains In storage there is less
chance of a new dirigible disaster
which may be even worse than
that which wrecked the Shenan-
doah. If the country can get that
assurance and at the same time
save more than 81, 500, 900 it should
count itself doubly lucky.
Evening star., 1935-02-15
Dirigibles: the Long Roll of
Disaster.

The loss of the Akron tragically
crowns the folly of 1926, wheel
Congress authorized the construc-
tion Of two huge dirigibles, which
were to be constructed on the
theory dear to lighter-than-air ad-
vocates that to make these toys
safer it is only necessary to build
them larger.
Before Congress authorized the
construction OF the Akron and the
Macon the world had witnessed
several major disasters to dirigi-
bles. On August "a, 1921, while
cruising over the Humber River.
the British-built R-38, constructed
for the United States and just
about to be taken over by the Navy
as the ZR-2, broke in two and was
destroyed by flames. Sixty-two
lives were lost; of these seventeen
were those of American naval
officers and men.
On February 81, 1922, at Hamp-
ton Roads, Virginia, the Roma,
Italian built for the United States,
was destroyed when broken verti-
cal controls sent the airship nose
down into a high-power electric
line. Thirty-four lives were lost
in that disaster.
On October II, 1922, the Army's
largest blimp, the CO, was de-
stroyed at San Antonio by an ex-
plosion, which, fortunately, did not
injure a single member of the
crew.
The French dirigible Dixmude.
like many another victim of disas-
ter the largest airship of the
moment, was destroyed some time
after December q, 1928 when
she was last sighted, with the
loss of her crew of fifty men.
In circumstances, if not in set
ting, the loss of the Akron was
similar to the loss of the Shenan-
doah, taken into the air on her
first flight on September 4, 1928,
and destroyed over Caldwell, Ohio,
on September 8, 1925. Fourteen
lives were lost in that disaster.
Only the skill and resourcefulness
of members of the crew who free
ballooned a portion of the ship TO
earth prevented the loss of life
from being greater.
Thus the record stood at the time
that Congress authorized construc-
ton Of two more dirigibles at a
total cost of $7,S25,00O. The dirigi-
BILE was not a novelty. Its history
antedates that Of the airplane. A
Germany at war had spent count
less sums of money and innumer-
able lives in a vain attempt TO
demonstrate the military useful
ness of the dirigible. The British
building program entered upon
after the war was marked by the
scrapping Of one dirigible after
another until the building of the
Los Angeles by Germany for the
United States and the Shenandoah
Of American build provided the
impetus for a fresh British pro-
gram which called for the expendi-
ture of nearly $11 100000 on the
R-100 and the R-101.
In 1926, then, there was no
Evening star., 1935-02-15

dearth Of evidence to show the
folly Of building dirigibles. All
the solid evidence of disaster after
disaster was swept away by the
specious plea that nobody had yet
built dirigibles big enough and
strong enough. 1t was accordingly
proposed to build two airships
eighty-five feet longer than the
zR-2 and with cubic capacity more
than twice as great. The same
plea was made in Great Britain
and was listened to there as here.
The R-100 and the R-1O1 were to
be made bigger, stronger, more
powerful, with higher safety fac
tor than had ever been seen before.
The history of the working out
of the theory of bigness Is briefly
told. The two big British dirigibles
were completed in 1929. One of
them, the R-101, was destroyed
near Beauvais, France, on October
s, 1880, on the first leg of her
maiden voyage, with the loss of
forty-seven lives. Her sister ship.
the R-1O0, was sold for scrap
in 1881.
Construction of the Akron was
begun on November z, 1929. De-
struction of the airship followed
by only a year and half her first
flight. The theory Of bigness so
worked out here as to make our
biggest dirigible the cause Of our
biggest disaster.
Representative VINsoN, chair
man Of the House Naval Affairs
Committee, is reported as saying,
There won't be any more big air.
ships built" 1t is to be hoped that
he speaks with authority. The new
deal that began on March 4 should
include a casting out of a monu-
mental folly of the past. Seven
years ago THE SUN said:
Over and over again, at heavy
cost in money and shocking cost
in lives. they tdirigiblesl have
been proved untrustworthy, un-
safe, unmanageable in stormy
weather.
Not a word of that needs to be
changed in 1898.
Evening star., 1935-02-15

Representative WILSON'S recon-
mendation to the Federal Aviation
Commission that the Navy build
two giant dirigibles to replace the
Akron and the Los Angeles is a
pertinent illustration of the tenac-
ity of the theory that the way to
avoid the vulnerability characters
tic of dirigibles is to make them
larger. So far this policy has only
resulted in bringing about greater
disasters, in proportion to the in
crease in the size of the airships.
Though it happened four years
ago, the loss of the British dirigible
R-1O1 must still be remembered.
That was constructed in accord
ance with the theory of making dir
igibles bigger to make them safer.
1t crashed on its maiden voyage
with the loss of forty-seven lives.
The R-101 was eighty-five feet
longer than the ZR-2 and had q
cubic capacity twice as large, yet
its fate was the same.
The Akron, whose destruction
occurred only a year and a halt
ago, was designed to be bigger and
safer than the Shenandoah. The
Shenandoah broke in two in a Mid
western storm, with the loss of
fourteen lives, in 1928. Ten years
later the Akron was destroyed with
the loss of seventy-three lives in
the major catastrophe of the air.
The theory of bigness thus led
straight to the biggest disaster.
Untaught by the long roll of
dirigible disasters. Representative
VINsoN again comes forward in
support of the theory of bigness.
Memories must be short indeed If
members of Congress do not re-
member the ZR-2, the Roma, the
Shenandoah and the Akron when
they are asked to vote millions for
two new airships.
Evening star., 1935-02-15

The report of the Naval Court
of Inquiry. virtually generating
everybody of blame for the Shen-
andoah disaster, was not unex-
pected. Some criticism, indeed, Is
leveled at the reduction Of the diri-
gible's gas valves, which was char
acterized as inadvisable. Those re-
sponsible for that, however, are ex-
Evening star., 1935-02-15

- w - -
Official investigation of the loss
of the dirigible Macon ought to
be facilitated by survival Of
eighty-one of the eighty-three per-
sons on board the airship when
her stern crumpled and she fell
to the surface of the Pacific. Yet
it is possible that the whole
eighty-one will be able to give no
clearer explanation of the cause
of the disaster than was con-
tanned in Commander WILEY's
immediate report, in which he
says that "a casualty occurred in
stern" after which one gas cell
was lost, the stern crumpled, an
other gas cell was lost and the ship
landed stern first. The observa-
tions of the lighthouse keeper at
Point Sur, who watched the Ma
con almost up to the moment she
fell, indicate that there was a
rain squall just before the ship
fell, but they also indicate that
the velocity Of the wind on the
surface was no more than three
miles an hour and that there was
not a heavy sea. Naval vessels
picked up the survivors without
difficulty. further evidence that
there was little wind or sea-
The Shenandoah was destroyed
by a corn-belt thunderstorm and
her great bulk was torn into three
pieces. The Akron was crushed
by a storm on the Atlantic. The
French dirigible Dixmude was lost
in a Mediterranean storm. The
British dirigible R-101 was driven
to French earth by a fierce RAIN
storm and there destroyed. There
were storm conditions prior to the
Macon's destruction, but appar-
emily not at the moment Of the
accident. The variety Of the cir
cumstances which accompanied
these dirigible disasters suggests
strongly that it is not merely one
type of bad weather that is dan
gerous to dirigibles. No; the plain
evidence is that they are fair
weather creatures, ever in danger
when they attempt to run through
bad weather Of any description.
The loss Of the Macon closes
the chapter begun in 1925, when
Congress authorized the construc-
ton of the Akron and the Macon
at a cost of $7,s25,Oo0. The con-
struction Of the dirigible base at
Sunnyvale, California, added more
millions to the cost Of the pro-
gram, undertaken in spite Of the
plain warning given by the loss
of the ZR-2, the Roma and the
Shenandoah, and by the abandon
ment Of the dirigible by all ether
great Powers.
The Akron was destroyed on
April 4, 1888, with the loss Of
seventy-three lives, less than q
year after it had been pronounced
by the House Naval Affairs Com
mittee to be flawless. Before her
destruction the Akron suffered
three minor accidents in 1882.
The Macon survived her sister
ship less than two years. But for
The immediate presence Of naval
vessels the death list would have
been as large as the Akron's.
The end of this disastrous chap
.er should not be accepted as an
excuse by Congress to listen to
another plea to build bigger, more
costly dirigibles on the theory that
mere size means safety. That
.heory has been well examined
md has been found wanting.
The President has plainly indi-
:ated that he will not ask Congress
or funds to build more dirigibles.
.et Congress accept the facts a.
honestly.
Evening star., 1935-02-15
The Zeppelin Complex.

It is useless to try to convince
men who have the Zeppelin COM
plex. Last week Captain ANTON
HEINEN argued to the naval board
investigating the collapse of the
Shenandoah that the Shenandoah
was all right but that the dirigible
was improperly handled. Yester-
day Rear Admiral MoFFETT told
the aircraft committee that the
government ought to build an
other Zeppelin with three times
the gas capacity of the Shenan-
doah.
The history of Zeppelins has
shown that they are weak by
nature. To float in the air they
must be huge in proportion to
their weight. The bigger they are
Evening star., 1935-02-15
ADVERTISEMENT.

cused on the grounds it was due to
an error of judgment, which lid not
involve negligence or culpabiity.
The report then makes this state
ment:
The disaster is part Of the price
which must inevitably be paid in
the development Of any new and
hazardous art.
It is one thing to be willing to
pay a high price for a purpose that
is worth accomplishing, but when a
country is asked to pay with the
lives of able and useful men for a
thing of such doubtful value as the
dirigible it is an altogether differ
ent matter. The dirigible is still un-
developed as a practical instrument
either for war or for peace, and
conceivably more lives will have to
be sacrificed If it is to be improved.
Is the country willing to pay that
price? THE SUN believes it is not.
1t believes that enough experiments
have already been paid for in pre-
cious blood to prove the dirigible
nothing but an expensive plaything.
A machine so unwieldy and cum
bersome as to be at the mercy of
every gale is not to be depended on
for the ordinary requirements of
day by day commercial traffic. How
much less is it to be depended on in
time of war? Unless some under
standing could be reached whereby
an enemy would agree to suspend
all operations during times OF
storm, when dirigibles would be in
capable of attacking, its military
usefulness must remain practically
negligible.
Even if such an absurd agree
ment could be made and kept, the
dirigible would be handicapped. Fu-
tile in bad weather, it would be a
shining mark in fair weather for
every anti-aircraft gun and every
hostile airplane. 1t can keep the
air in war only as airplanes cooper
ating with it can maintain control
of the air, and since the airplanes
themselves can perform most of
the services intended for the dirigi-
BILE more quickly, more surely and
more safely than balloons can, its
scope is limited rather than in
creased by its natural auxiliaries.
The Shenandoah was not worth
the price represented by those
brave men who perished on her last
journey. Nor does the report of the
Naval Court disclose any evidence
that lessons to be learned from that
disaster can be considered as COM
pensation for them.
Technically the Shenandoah epi-
sode is closed. There may be those
who will not be pleased with the
findings. Whether the report rep
resents the soundest possible judg-
ment, in view of all the evidence,
really matters very little. But there
is one thing which does matter and
that is the question of how soon the
country is going to quit squander-
ing lives in the hopeless task OF
trying to make a useful thing out
of a mechanism so repeatedly
shown to lack the fundamentals of
usefulness.
Evening star., 1935-02-15
ADVERTISEMENT.
The editorial articles repro

The editorial articles repro
duced on this page are a few
of the many which The Sun,
New York, has printed in the
last ten years in opposition to
the purchase by the United
States of dirigibles as instru-
ments of defense.
Evening star., 1935-02-15
Che ge Sun
Disastrous Theory.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER IA. 1884
Evening star., 1935-02-15
Tbe Esag~ Sun

THURSDAY. OCTOBER 8, 1925.
Evening star., 1935-02-15
Tbe Esg Sum
Folly's Own Disaster.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY IA, 1885.
Evening star., 1935-02-15
Tbe E& Sur,

THURSDAY, JANUARY IA, 1926.
Evening star., 1935-02-15
Tbe aake Sun
The Folly of Dirigibles.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 10. 1925.
Evening star., 1935-02-15
CHE Ea&e Sur,

WEDNESDAY. APRIL 5, 1888.
Evening star., 1935-02-15
Che salg Sm,,
Not Worth the Price.

MONDAY, JANUARY 4, 1925.
Henderson daily dispatch., 1935-07-26
SPREAD OR SQUEEZE?

ONE OF THE first things noted by
a careful player is squeeze possibili-
ties. The earlier in the game such
possibilities are noted the brighter
are declarers chances to make that
coup. The following hand which l
played at the Engineers club showed
squeeze probabilities from the first
lead. with game certain in case West
held the missing X Of clubs. With
out Vests double and the squeeze
thought strongly in mind I would
have taken a heart finesse at the
twelfth trick and gone down two
tricks,
Henderson daily dispatch., 1935-07-26
Contract Bridge

be fulfilled. | led the q OF clubs
and lost to East's T.. Back came the
J of diamonds, which l knew better
than to cover with the .. Holding
the third defensive trick East led the
10 OF diamonds and was allowed to
hold that also. When the of dia-
monds was led the O. K and Ace fell
together, as expected. All remaining
tricks had to be won to fulfill the
game contract.
The Z Of hearts was led from
dummy East played low. The 4
won. West played the 1. The OF
clubs took the eighth trick and dunn
mys 10 of clubs won the next trick.
West let go his 2 of spades. His
original hand could be counted for
the 5-3-3-2 distribution. The tenth
trick was won with dummy's Ace Of
clubs. East discarded his last dia-
mond. 1 let go the of hearts.
West discarded next to his last
spade He was commencing to feel
the pressure Of being squeezed. Tbs
holdings about the table were as
shown below.
Henderson daily dispatch., 1935-07-26

Bidding went: South, 1-No
Trump; West, 2-Spades; North,
9-Clubs; South. S-No Trumps, which
West doubled.
Of course the opening lead was
the K of spades. East played the Z.
Then West led the bottom of his
sequence, the 10. When East played
the 8 it was evident that he held
no more. My Ace took the trick.
Vests double showed at least two
possible cards Of re-entry. He was
too cautious a player to 1sble on
single hope of entry. Fl tMght hold
both missing KS an Inc v OF
hearts. If West held t. missing X
nj cl,1hs the contract Id certainly
Henderson daily dispatch., 1935-07-26

When the last club was led I let
go my last spade. East let go nis
lowest heart and so did West. He
had to keep his lone spade. DUNE
my's last heart was led. East COW
cred with the 10. 1t was deceptive.
He might hold the Q and West might
have the lone 8, but played the Ace
and caught Vests. @, leaving the y
good for the ninth trick for game