Evening star., 1935-09-15
MATERIAL NEEDS COMPEL
ITALYTOFICHT.E ETHIOPIA
European Statesmen Call African The
arer of War Mere Byplay to
Growing Nazi Threat.
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.

the world has been brought
face to face with an acute
Il crisis precipitated by the de-
termination Of a great people to en-
ploy force to escape from material
limitations which 1t deemed inconsist-
ent not merely with national pros
perity and national pride, but with
national existence itself. Japan and
Italy have presented Manchuria and
Ethiopia, respectively, with the plain
choice between war and submission
to their purposes. And in both cases
the will of the nominal aggressor has
prevailed because it was accompanied
by q readiness to fight.
But in the Ethiopian affair all the
statesmen participating in the Geneva
debates were equally aware that the
spectacle they were witnessing owed
Its real interest to the fact that 1t
was but first act. 1t is true that
for the British a passion for peace
was directly doubled by concern for
imperial security. For them an Ital-
ian conquest of Ethiopia must con-
stitute q direct and dangerous threat
TO their position alike in Egypt and
In the Sudan.
France. the Soviet Union and the
nations Of the Little Entente were. by
contrast, little concerned with the
question Of the security Of the British
Empire. They were, in fact. as undis-
turbed by this consideration as the
British had been over the preserva-
ton Of the open door in China. when
the United States, speaking through
Henry L. Stimson, had invoked the
Kellogg pact and invited the League
Of Nations to action at the time Of
Japan's aggression in Manchuria. For
Manchuria Is far away from Europe,
and the continental problem domi-
mates all else in the minds of Euro
pean statesmen.
Foresee Hitler's Attacks.
Nevertheless, what Laval, Litvinov
and the statesmen Of the lesser states
clearly perceived was that the breach
which Mussolini was opening in the
wall Of the so-called collective system
IN Europe was bound in due course
TO serve Hitler's purposes in a later at
tack upon world peace. Oddly enough,
In reminding Laval of this patent
truth, Anthony Eden only repeated the
warning which Mr.. Stimson is re-
ported to have addressed to Sir John
Simon in the Manchurian affair.
Unconcerned with japanese per-
formances in Asia, equally undisturbed
by the immediate implications of the
italian campaign in Africa, the con-
tinental statesmen found themselves
eravely preoccupied with the problem
Of preventing these two episodes be-
coming precedents ready at German
hands when Hitler at last passed to
the offensive AS far as Asia, Africa
or America was concerned, so far the
prestige Of the League Of Nations was
without importance for European
statesmen. Were it conceivable that
Hitler would direct his operations,
when he moved, to the seizure either
OF the Portuguese Angola or of Belgian
Congo IL Is far from impossible that
Europe would give its reluctant but
relieved blessing.
But what was plain to the prime
ministers and foreign secretaries at
Geneva was that when Hitler did move
1t would be on the Rhine, the Danube
or the Vistula and not on the Nile or
the Congo. For them, moreover, the
League itself had become not a COL
lective system designed to preserve
world peace, but continental alliance
calculated to defend the status quo.
And all their labors were directed not
to protecting the Ethiopian victim Of
an impending and undisguised attack,
but to preserving the League for future
use against Germany.
Ethiopia Mere Sideshow.
In that enterprise, Of course, they
failed. After the f1ascos Of Manchuria
and Ethiopia the attempt to mobilize
against Germany even the moral
forces once conceived to be resident
In the Geneva institution would be
doomed to failure. Precisely the same
motives which the world discovered
In the British opposition to the Italian
program in Ethiopia and the American
resistance to the Japanese policy in
Msnchuria would be found again In
any French or Soviet attempt to bor-
row the voice of the League to halt
the advance of Germany upon Austria.
Now, with the struggle at Geneva
over, what is to be expected? At most
only . truce Of preparation disguised
by italian operations in Africa. What
the American audience must perceive
Is that henceforth this Ethiopian af-
fair is essentially side show. italian
defeat might hasten, italian success
may delay German action. But from
now on every decision taken, every
step made by the statesmen Of any
European country will be preceded by
side glance at the German situa-
ton.
think I have written before in this
column that after the affair of Agadir
in 1911 there descended upon Europe
q calm which was completely fatalistic
in its character. Again and again 1t
was my experience while travelling in
Europe to have explained to me why
var had now become inevitable and
the only question still unanswered
concerned the QaLe when QOSIlllLleS
would begin. This state Of mind was
the direct consequence Of the three
great crises Of Tangiers, Bosnia and
Agadir.
Manchuria, Austria and Ethiopia
have now had the same effect. What
existed In the immediate postwar era
was the conviction that war had be-
come impossible, the conviction that
peoples everywhere had become equally
satisfied that civilization in general
and their own existence in particular
would be shattered irrevocably by q
repetition of the events Of 1s14-1918.
The win to peace Of all peoples seemed
equally strong and those who doubted
the survival of this emotion were
everywhere denounced not merely as
pessimists but as themselves con-
tributors to the destruction Of faith
which was itself bulwark of peace.
English Nations Confused.