Evening star., 1935-04-14

essarily between the Rhine and the |
Moselle. would run straight up against
the system of fixed Notifications and |
the now concentrated corps of French |
covering troops. In addition to new
Notifications it would quickly en-
counter the old line of Verdun- -Toul- |
Epinal- -Belfort and also would have
to cross several considerable rivers. |
Finally, for long distance, at least, |
the narrowness of the front available
would prevent any general deployment |
Of the Germans superior numbers. |
In fact. save for surprise attack Of |
small mechanical force, 1t would |
seem that the natural and prepared |
obstacles to German advance would |
make the direct approach impossible. |
Belgium Road Best.
To go through Belgium, on the |
other hand, would be to insure British |
| Intervention and the more successful |
| the advance the more serious would |
be British resistance. The Germans |
do not want to fight the World War |
all over again. Unquestionably the
Belgian road is still the best way to
Paris. True, the Belgians have now
constructed system of Notifications |
| from the Dutch to the French from |
tiers, although by no means as elab-
crate as the French. But it Is fair
to assume that these might be over
run, and so far the French have not
finished the extension of their from
tier defenSes from Lorraine to Flanders
| In the 1914 invasion of Belgium.
German possession OF Metz and
Thionville was vital to the Schlieffen
plan, that is. to the movement
through Belgium, and now both for
treSSeS are within French frontiers. To
get the necessary room for deployment,
| therefore, the Germans would have
to come through Holland as we'll as
Belgium. In fact, even in making the
Schlieffen plan that was long con-
sidered. And it is easy to imagine
British feelings II the next war began
with the invasion of Holland as we'll
as Belgium. Again, If the attack is
delayed for one or two years more,
French Notifications are likely to be-
come far more formidable.
In reality. it seems very doubtful
that Germany will begin a war with
her main hopes centered in the west
and her chief calculation the speedy
overthrow of France. If the Ger
mans do that then they may be Ger
tain that not only will the British,
French. Dutch and Belgians inn
mediately unite against them, but In
addition Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
Union will also move. But If they
| attack the Poles or the Czechs, or
undertake to ''liberate" the Austrians,
then certainly Belgium and Holland
will not enter the conflict, Britain will
probably remain aloof, and even If
France does draw her sword she can
be restrained west of the Rhine with
out too great effort.
Poland Big Factor.
Certainly, If Germany should move
against Poland for example, the
domestic pressure upon the French
government to stand aside, reinforced
by influence from London and Brus-
sells, would be enormous. And the
course the Poles have taken in re-
cent months has not increased the
French enthusiasm to fight to de-
fend the Polish Corridor or to prevent
German recovery of Upper Silesia. It
is just as likely, too, that Mussolini |
would stand aside and watch while |
Hitler got himself involved with the
Poles at the Vistula, struggle bound
to be followed by a battle with the |
Soviets beyond the Niemen.
Hitler has two major objectiveS, to |
recover the territories lost to Poland |
in the east and make Poland itself |
the springboard for an attack upon |
Russia, in addition, he means to en-
brace Austria and the Bohemian half |
of Czechoslovakia within German
frontiers. Neither of these objectives
would be largely served if Hitler got |
into a war with France and Great |
Britain. But will France and Italy |
fight to preserve the Corridor? Would |
a Labor government in England go to |
war to prevent Austro- German union, |
or would it solemnly warn France
that if she intervened she could not |
expect Britain to fulfill the Locarno |
contract?
Despite all the show of armaments |
and of marching and counter-march- |
ing divisions and corps, I do not much |
believe that Europe will see war this |
year and am satisfied that if it does, |
that war will be precipitated by acci- |
dent and not by design. The Austrian |
situation may become too hot to hold, |
the quarrel over DanZig may lead to |
the breakdown Of the present Polish
German truce, Central and Eastern |
Europe are just full of open powder |
magazines and the sparks are flying |
high and wide, but the German high |
command Is not ready and the French |
no longer can persuade its govern
ment to launch war Of prevention. |
Sudden Raids Checked.
The fact that troops are being |
moved up to frontiers and kept ready |
Tor immediate hostilities, while it
patiently opens the way for border
incidents, also reduces the chances
of successful sudden raids. Unques-
tionably, from now on we shall hear
much about troop movements and
there may be a sharp and possibly |
fatal incident if Germany moves
troops into the demilitarized zone in
the Rhineland. But if Germany can
hold out economically, I do not be-
lieve she will act militarily during the |
present year and perhaps not dur
ing the next.
Henceforth, however, the troops are
there, countries are taking the last
steps which precede battle, steps that
they did not take in 1914 until the
actual crisis had arrived. Now, in
what is nominally described as a time
OF peace, governments are acting as
If crisis were already here. And, of
course, that means that we are not
to be confronted by chronic state |
OF fear and distrust in Europe. When |
war comes. therefore, there will not |
be a month Of pause and a week of
frantic negotiations. This time the |
soldiers will probably shoot even be- |
fore the diplomats can get to talking |
at all. Very likely, too, just as there |
will be an absence of drawn out con- |
versations there will be lack of long
established formalities. For as Topsy
was never born, but just "growed" 50
the next war bids fair never to be