Evening star., 1935-02-10
WORLD COURT DEFEATED
BY AMERICAN MASSES
Sentiment for Nationalism Demon
strated and Proof Given reign
Policy Not Made in White House.

OF MS country III Ine UldILeT OI HeuS
trality. Fortunately the French,
taught by their experience in the case
Of Mr.. Wilson, rejected the project OF
Mr.. Roosevelt. But had the offer
been accepted, 1t is Self-evident that
in moment Of crisis the Senate and
not the President would have dictated
policy.
Ever since the Paris Conference 16
years ago, however, there have been in
terested officials or groups of private
citizens converted to international con-
ceptions who have been misleading
Europeans as to the real nature Of
American opinion in respect to foreign
affairs. They have been building up the
IDEAS they did in the case of the
Court-that public opinion has UNDER
gone a change and thus Europeans
have presently walked up to the extent
Of their misapprehenSionS and found
themselves confronted by the con-
sequences Of such misapprehensions.
| The truth is that for many years,
ever since the onset of the great de-
preston, public opinion in the United
States has been growing more and
more isolationist. The mass Of the
people believe that the depression from
which they have suffered incalculably
has been due directly to the failure OF
Wilson to keep his country out Of the
World War. They have been further
reused by the popular Interpretation OF
| the Reputation of the war debts by the
European allies. Last of all they have
been alarmed by the rise Of jap
anese imperialism and German Ma
| tional Socialism and the complete
breakdown of the League itself, no
| tabIy in the Manchurian affair.
! The visible rise of a new peril OF
war in Europe has had almost unimag-
Unable influence upon American pub
lie opinion. The resolution TO keep out
of such war is passionate in its in
| tensity The World Court proposal
was beaten because its opponents were
able instantaneouSly to mobilize the
emotions of the millions. But when
the friends of the proposal had mo-
bilized the bar associations, the For
eign Policy Association, League Of Ma
tions organizations and the various
pacifist societies, they were done. Pop
ular support they had none.
Striking Example.
A simple example will serve to stress
I the point. When the President by a
/ single message smashed the London
Economic Conference with the de-
clared purpose to protect his domes-
tic recovery program the country was
| swept by a sudden, spontaneous and
| surprisingly violent outburst of ap-
plause. That applause was popular,
| not professional, the action was de-
| plored by most of the same people and
| organizations which later supported
the World Court, but politically it was
one Of the most popular strokes he has
| yet made. BY contrast, when he advo-
Gated the Court, the response was just
as prompt, but as Overwhelmingly un-
favorable.
1t is not impossible that if the
| World Court project had been more
| Skillfully handled it could have been
rushed through the Senate before the
public was aware of what had hap
pened. But it is evident that was the
single chance of success that existed.
| Popular opposition was always there
waiting to be aroused. The thing that
! took every one by surprise was the
SwiftneSS with which it was modified.
Equally unexpected, too, was the vio-
lence of that opinion.
| Now We are told in Washington
and believe the statement to be true
that most of the diplomats were de-
ceived by the double circumstance Of
official and press support of the Court
project. Generally speaking, the
| Court project was approved by the
leading newspapers of the East. 1t
| was plain that the administration was
in favor Cf it and the machinery Of
the dominant party was functioning
to put it over. In the same way, in
Geneva, London and Paris, all the
League propagandists were at work.
1t looked so sure and promised so well.
But that was the way the League pro-
posals looked to Europe up to the
moment when Woodrow Wilson broke
down physically.
If now European craftsmanship
would, in the light Of all the lessons
of the past. frankly face the fact that
whatever the executive branch of the
American Government may undertake
in international affairs, the power OF
veto will continue to rest with the
Senate and be exercised whenever
executive activities seem to involve in
ternational responsibilities, then they
would spare themselves future disillu-
sionments and difficulties.
Foreign Procedure.
When the British foreign office or
the French quai d'orsay formulates
foreign policy it is actually giving
effect to the ideas of the legislative
branch, which is also the executive in
fact. The foreign Office will undoubt-
| edly exercise an enormous influence
upon the prime minister or foreign
secretary ordinarily, but only indirect-
| ly. Once the prime minister and the
| foreign secretary are in agreement
with the permanent staff of the Brit
iSh foreign Office, for example, the
thing is done, for the former controls
the majority in the House of Conn
mons. The subsequent vote is, there.
fore. purely formal.
With us, of course, what the Presi.
dent and Secretary of State do with
the aid of the State Department in
the matter of the formulation of
policy is, except in routine matters,
purely preliminary. 1t carries no
seal of authority-on the contrary,
it is generally viewed as of small
Importance. The foreign policy Of
the United States Is not made in the
White House, but at the Capitol. It
is not made by the President, but
by the Senate, and, in. so far as it
Is policy at all, it is a policy Of
pure negation.
Aside from the World Court project
the Roosevelt administration has been
purely nationaliStic in its spirit. Eco.
nomically, the New Deal is essen
TALLY iSolationiSt. The expansion Of
the Navy to treaty strength and the
growing concern for the Army are
characteristic expressions of its senti-
mentS. Those who are close to the
President represent him as being
cured of all desire to mingle in
European affairs as a consequence
Of his experiences in the Disarma-