Evening star., 1935-12-08
BY FRANK H. sIMONDs.


II trality policy of the Roosevelt
administration which is certain to
find expression just as soon as Con-
gress conveneS. At that time the
President will unquestionably ask for
d modification of the existing law,
which expires on February 90, to per-
nit the Executive to exercise diScre-
tionary powers in dealing with the
problem. The Secretary of State, on
his part, will seek legislation enabling
the Government to fix quotas IN
various essential raw materials. Both
will be confronted by strong oppoSi-
ton and the present chances OF
bestowal of discretionary power are
exceedingly slim.
Meantime practical politicians on
the Democratic side are becoming in
creasingly disturbed by the fact that
all over the United States Italian
Americans are quietly but not less
effectively organizing to take sanctions
of their own upon the present admin
istration at the forthcoming presi-
dental election. This detail is i'm
portant for not only are there several
millions of Italian voters but these
are mainly located in pivotal States.
Exactly the same reSentmentS Wnlcn
German-Americans felt against the
Democratic party after the United
States became an open belligerent are
today discoverable among Italians OF
all shades of political sympathy and
every class of society. Since in recent
years the bulk of this vote has been
Democratic, the implications Of the
impending shift are plain.
Looking to the criticisms which
have been directed against the ad-
ninistration's course it is plain that
the incident of the oil embargo has
served to crystalline and fortify these
views. After two months of crisis 1t
had become patent that, while in the
end the hunger blockade" OF the
economic embargo could Starve and
freeze the Italian people into condi-
ton which would lead to domestic
upheaval and the overthrow OF Musso-
lni and the Fascist regime, both in
and out of Britain there developed
apprehension over protracted tension
and certainty of an eventual collapse
of Italy into the hands of Communists.
Quicker Means Needed.
British policy, still inspired by the
determination to break Italy'S purpose
to establish a colonial domain on the
flank of the British roads to India ana
from the Cape to Cairo, was therefore
forced to seek a quicker means OF
coercing Italians into surrender ana
that way lay through cutting OF Oil
s,1pplies, The success Of such ven-
ture, however, manifestly depended
upon persuading the United States TO
come along with Britain ana tnuS
make possible the tightening OF the
moose about the Italian neck.
Actually Tory craftsmanship had
three cbjectives in mind. The first
was the obvious desire to enlist Amer
ican aid in the strangulation OF 1taly's
military machine by an oil embargo.
Not less important from the British
point of view, was the need to impress
the Italians with the idea that the
United States was just as hostile as
England to the Italian cause and thus
TO create burning resentment against
Americans in Italy. In this way Rome
would be reused to some angry but
costly threat against Washington.
which would awaken irritation and
further compromise ItalyS cause in
American eyes.
Finally, the British were anxious
that Italian resentment should be so
spread out that in the period following
the present crisis the Italians would
not single out British trade as a unique
target for reprisals. If Italian anger
could be stirred up against the United
States to pitch at which there would
be no tariff discrimination between the
two countries, then the costs to Eng
land of her campaign against italian
expansion would be greatly reduced.
Now see how this threefold purpose
was realized. In London and in
Geneva, and at British inspiration, talk
of an oil embargo was suddenly let
loose. Thereupon Washington, salts
fed that an embargo was going to be
imposed rushed suddenly into the
open and began its coercive measures
directed at stopping American sales
of oil to Italy. Once the British saw
that the United States had gone too
far to retreat, then it consented, upon |
the urging of NJ. Laval, to postpone |
the League embargo. The United
States was thus left out on a limb, |
and, as the British calculated, i'll
considered words in Rome created
Jnmistakable irritation in Washington.
Threats of reprisals by Italy, too added
fuel to the fire. In the eyes of Italy
the United States has become, not
merely an enemy like Great Britain,
but foe replacing Britain in the front
rank In the matter Of the oil embargo,
which insured italian ruin.
British Sought to Embroil U. s.
Thus overnight the United States
became as completely embroiled with
italy as II II had actually been q mem
Der Of the League of Nations. And
that, of course, has been the primary
purpose of the British ever since the
Anglo-Italian crisis began When the
perilous nature of the situation into
which they had adventured blindly
was tardily perceived by the State
Department, it attempted to effect
strategic retirement by asserting that
Is was concerned not in instituting an
embargo, but in keeping American
sales down to normal proportions.
That end was in itself beyond criticism,
because 1t Is the essence of real neu-
trality, but had it been announced in
advance it would have been fatal to
the whole British project.
What the State Department has
steadily ignored during the present
crisis has been the effect and not the
technical justification of its perform
ances. From start to finish it has left
the world with the impression that the
design Of the United States Govern
ment WhS to overlook no opportunity