Evening star., 1934-02-11
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.

hH WuOermenU nave Deeu re-
IVI vealed on this side of the At
4 i lantic over the recent nom
aggression pact between Po-
hand and Germany The step seems
30 directly in conflict with all German
policy regarding Danzig, the Corridor
and Upper Silesia that some quarters
see in it change Of heart on the part
Of Hitler and a consequent revolution
in the European outlook.
Much of this optimism Is the result
OF an apparently impregnable Ameri-
can faith in pacts. Quite recently,
speaking before the Association for
the Cause and Cure of War, I was
asked If 1t would not be a good thing
to incorporate the Kellogg pact in the
Constitution of the United States. The
fact that Japan had signed the Kel-
1ogg pact and then invaded Manchuria
seemed to have left no doubt in the
questioner's mind as to the lasting
value Of that pact.
In examining the meaning Of the
recent convention between Germany
and Poland, therefore. We must first of
al consider it as it appeared in the
eyes of both nations. For what actual
~ counts in the matter of treaties and
pacts is not the text itself but the
meaning 1t has for the two signatories.
And the difference is often very great.
Organize for War.
Now the Germans have made nom
aggression pact with the Poles cor a
variety of reasons. In the first place,
the 10-year period for which the truce
Is to run corresponds fairly exactly
with the time the NaziS themselves
calculate they will be occupied with
the consolidation and organization of
Germany for another war. During the
larger part Of that time. at least, Ger
many will not be ready to take on a
coalition made up of France, Poland
and the Little Entente And in the
East it is worth recalling that Berlin
is today only a hundred miles from
the Polish frontier
Underneath this consideration lies
the broader purpose Of separating
France from her most important mill
tary ally. Actually Hitler is playing
the old Bismarckian game. Before at
tacking Austria in 1866 the Iron Chan
cellor first carried on series of OBJ
scure and intricate negotiations with
NdpOleOA LII ueSlSIleQ 10 Keep
neutral. He succeeded: then, when
France sought to obtain pay for her
neutrality. he published the French
claim for compensation in Luxembourg
and Belgium and thus undermined the
French position in Europe. Thereafter
he attacked France.
Hitler in his own book-which is
the Bible of the Nazis-has clearly
outlined the policy of isolating France.
which he there describes as the chief
enemy Of Germany-the enemy that
must be DESTROYED If Germany's right
tul place in the world is to be attained
Obviously If he can separate Poland
and France the first and most con-
siderable step IN his program will have
been realized.
Polish Matter Later.
On the other hand. neither Hitler
nor any of his associates has the
smallest intention of permanently re-
siging the Corridor and Upper Sile-
sia But before these things can be
accomplished Germany must be
armed and must also recover the Saar
and realize union with Austria. When
these two crucial points in the Nazi
program are realized 1t will be time to
deal with the Polish matter.
Again, If Austria is gathered into
the new Germany the Czech half of
Czechoslovakia will inescapably be
drawn into the German orbit. 1so-
lated, practically surrounded by Ger
man territory, with a German minor
ity of 3.500000, it can be subjected to
the same economic and political prop
aganda that is now destroying the
Dollfuss government in Austria.
Thus, before Germany feels she can
deal with Poland advantageously she
believes she must recover the Saar
and complete the creation of the
new and great Third Reich, which
will really amount to restoration OF
the historic Holy Roman Empire And
before she realizes that program she
may have to fight Italy and France
and perhaps Czechoslovakia, either
separately or together.
Accordingly, Germany is now ready
to put the Polish question on ice for a
decade. In doing this she will throw
dust in the eyes of the world, which
may identify this course as a really
peaceful move. She will also bring
about a division between France and
her chief military ally. Finally, now
that Poland and Soviet Russia have
come to an understanding, she will
quiet Russian apprehensions in the
East, which could have unpleasant
consequences.
In sum, then, Hitler's Polish opera
ton amounts to a skillful move to free
his hands from all Eastern complica-
tions during the decisive period of his
operations in Central Europe.
Why Is Poland willing?
But why has Poland consented to
play what must seem to be the Ger
man game? Why has she signed a
pact which has already awakened both
suspicion and recrimination in Paris?
The reasons are varied, but in the
main they rest upon the fact that
with the triumph of the Left in France
there has been a considerable drift ir
sentiment away from the Polish alli-
ance The French people have be-
come increasingly unwilling to engage
in another war to preserve the Polish
Corridor And at least until the Hit
Ter movement took on its contempt
rary menace for Austrian freedom and
for the Danubian status quo, French
policy aimed at a direct understand
ing with Germany and a gradual
abandonment of the old system of al
liances.
in March Of last year, after the first
electoral triumph of the Nazis, there
was sharp break between Paris and
Warsaw. Macdonald, it will be re-
1nd Et,t1 -
and there Mussolini skillfully trapped
him into indorsing a plan for a four
power pact. France, Germany, Britain
and Italy were to constitute them
selves the new concert of Europe and
together proceed to treaty revision.
While the French signed that pio-
posed agreement, they never ratified
1t and it is now a dead affair. But