Evening star., 1934-10-28
u. s. BELIEVED BALKED
AT NAVAL CONFERENCE
America Declared Shorn of Bargaining
. Policies and Nothing Short of War
Can Stop Japanese.
BY FRANK Fl. SIMONDS.

tween the British, the jap
anese and ourselves have
- served in recent days to call
attention once more to the
fact that the whole basis of the
agreements of the Washington Naval
Conference of 1922 has now been
swept away and if there is to be any
new agreement between the three
greater naval powers it will have to
be founded upon other premises And
the first of these premises will be
parity in principle. The Japanese
government and people have made the
question of equality one Of national
prestige and for them there can be no
going back.
In simple terms, therefore, II there
Is to be any agreement the United
States and Great Britain will have to
recognize the right of the Japanese
to equality The extent to which the
japanese will at once attempt to
transform parity in principle into
equality in fact is open to debate. Not
inlpoSsibly some temporary agreement
might be reached by which the Jap
anese would consent in practice not
to build up to that level which they
claim as their right Yet such an
agreement would probably be transi-
tory and unsatisfactory and might be
the cause of suspicious and recrimi-
nations later.
There is, of course, no more reason
why the japanese should consent to
accept a ratio than the British or
ourselves At the Washington Con-
ference Mr. Hughes and Lord Balfour
bought Japanese acceptance of the
celebrated 10-10-6 ratio by an agree
ment not to extend the Notifications
of Corregidor of Hongkong along
with those of the other Far Eastern
possessions of the two English speak
ing powers. With the japanese re-
fusal to continue the arrangement
both the British and the Americans
will recover their right to fortity as
they may choose.
U. S. Cannot Bargain Now.
But while it is certain that the
British will in due course exercise
their new freedom to fortify Hong
kong, it is open to doubt whether the
United States, in view Of the ap-
preaching withdrawal from the Phil
ippines. will follow the same course.
Conceivably we may do something at
Guam, probably We presently shall
fortify Alaska. Unquestionably. too.
the Japanese are counting upon this
fact. At Washington American policy
as to the Philippines was unsettled.
We had something to sell because we
were still in a position to stay Now
we have nothing to offer because we
are on our way out.
Having asserted the right to parity
the japanese are now bound, as the
preliminary conversations have in
dicated, to undertake to arrive at that
parity by the reduction of the British
and American fleets both quantitatively
and qualitatively. They will seek to
reduce the size of capital ships and
the armament of cruisers. They will
attempt to reduce the size Of aircraft
carriers or even to have them abol-
ished. The obvious purpose OF this
program is to eliminate those classes
of ships which could in war reach the
waters in which Japan has vital in
terest.
In the matter of battleships and
cruisers the British doubtless will sup
port the japanese because, having
Singapore as an Asiatic base at the
end of the long string of naval har-
bors which extends through Gibraltar,
Malta, Alden and Colombo, they have
no need of big battleships with large
steaming radius. In any five-power
conference France and Italy would
support the same thesis for the iden-
tical reason. But the effect of any
such limitation would be to eliminate
the United States from even theo-
setical power to act in the Far East.
Only Tonnage Limit Possible.
About all that really can be saved
out of the wreck of the Washington
Conference now is some agreement on
the limit to be placed alike upon total
tonnage and upon strength in the
various categories. The United States
and Great Britain have to make up
their minds as to whether they will
recognize the Japanese claim to parity
and proceed from that point to an
agreement to limit naval strength, or
whether they will undertake to pre-
serve the present ratio by building
program which roughly speaking
would mean constructing five ships for
every three of the Japanese.
If the choice is for the latter al
formative then Great Britain and the
United States face the prospect OF
new race in naval armaments. They
can still agree between themselves to
preserve parity. But it is far from
impossible that the British admiralty,
which has never relished the agree
ments either of the Washington or
London Conferences, will now seize
upon the Japanese policy as Justifca-
ton for letting the whole Anglo Amer
ican arrangement go by the board.
Then we shall be back where we
started dozen years ago.
The French and Italians have clev-
erly stayed out of the London conver-
sations, just as they avoided participa-
ton in the notorious Coolidge Con-
ference at Geneva, because their own
agreements have not been made and
their differences are considerable. If
the three greater powers cannot reach
an accord then there will be no gen.
eral agreement and the whole question
will have to be dropped. Accordingly
there is no reason why they should
come to grips again under present cir
cumStanceS.
Italy to Avoid Ratio.
Whatever happens Italy will not
accept any ratio with respect to
France. Nor will France now con-
sent to any lower ratio with respect
to the British than Japan, not be-
cause the British fleet constitutes
prospective opponent Of the French
but because the question of prestige
is involved. Japan has refused to be
reckoned longer go per cent naval
power vis-a-vis Britain and America.
France will refuse to be so per cent
power, Italy will decline to give any
odds to the French and behind the
scenes Germany is preparing to claim
equality in naval as well as military
ornaments.
All of this should be familiar to
the American public because both the
,Jananese and the italian claims for