Evening star., 1934-06-03
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.

S%@ANSAo1NA1AAA6 SCtNCCll IllC
and japanese nations, has provided a
new opportunity for restatement of
the present situation. That this situ-
alton is serious cannot be denied,
for it is unmistakable that war is
one OF the possible outcomes Of the
current misunderstanding.
That such war is likely, not to say
inevitable, does, however, seem i'm
probable, provided only-as Mr.. Saito
has said, like so many of his fellow
countrymen before him-the United
States is prepared to recognize that
within certain limits Japanese policy
is fixed. In such circumstances, of
course, the real question is: To
what extent does Japanese policy con-
fiict with American interests and
rights, for it is manifest that II the
collision is over vital rights and i'm
portant interests, the situation is
hopeless.
But what does Japan actually de-
sire? Two things. In the first place
the right to protect herself against
any attack directed against her either
in Manchuria or notwithstanding
from Chinese quarters and assisted or
inspired by material contributions or
moral support originating in the
United States. And, in the second
place, she desires practical if not
formal recognition of her purpose to
maintain the conditions which she has
created in Manchuria.
Now in regard to the first of these
Tononaca daSireS it iS fair IN that
there has been a great deal Of mis-
understanding on this side Of the
Pacific. 1t has been far too easily
assumed that at the back of the Japa-
nese mind is design to control and
organize the whole of what is called
China proper-that is. the country
south of the Great Wall In point
of fact, however, not only is there
little to support any such idea. but
also most sensible japanese them
selves agree that this task is far too
tremendous and complicated for their
country to undertake.
Protectorate Safeguarded.
What the japanese do propose is to
see to it that European countries and
the United States do not, either by
direct delivery of arms or by loans
which can be converted into arms,
enable the Chinese to undertake mill
tary attacks upon the japanese pro-
tectorate of Manchuria. In this re-
spect their policy might be compared
to resolution on the part OF the
United States not to permit European
nations to finance or equip Colombian
attacks upon the Republic Of Panama.
which is. of course, an American
Manchukuo
Now 1t has generally been assumed
in the United States that this Japa-
nese purpose goes to the length OF con-
templating political hegemony and
economic monopoly. This the Japa-
nese have always denied. and so far
there is nothing to suggest bad taltn.
They do not want to administer China.
They are not seeking exclusive ex-
ploitation. Their policy is one OF Sc
curity. pure and simple. 1t is form
of preventive, not aggressive activity.
Does this policy conflict with any
vital interest of the United States? 1t
is hard to see that it does. We are
interested in what is called an open
door" policy, which, in effect, means
a policy that insures that all nations
shall have equal access to the Chinese
market The japanese do not ques-
ton this right or interfere with that
interest save in one respect. They do
insist that we shall not lend money or
furnish arms. where such loans or
armaments are manifestly to be en-
ployed against themselves.
To that extent the japanese GER
tainly do challenge what Is an un-
questioned right and, in the matter of
loans and military supplies. material
interest. But does the United States
regard that right and interest as SUI
ficiently important to be ready to go
to war with Japan to defend it? For
to assert such a right and to under
take to uphold it will mean war
there can be no mistaking that point.
The japanese are in deadly earnest in
their Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine. "
thus defined. If we mean to challenge
them on this issue war Is inescapable
Manchuria Second Point.
The second point Of dispute is Man.
churia. There the japanese have done
what the French did in Morocco, the
Italians in Tripoli and We ourselves
in Panama. The reasons for the Man
churian adventure are too little ap-
| preciated in the United States, where
the conflict between the japanese
pledges set forth in the nine-power
treaty and the adventure of 1881 are
still fresh in mind Thus although in
1922, at the Washington Conference,
the japanese government contracted
to respect the integrity of Chinese
territory, nine years later Japan laid
violent hands upon a great Chinese
province and there established a pup
pet government under its own control.
1t is fair to point out, however, that
between 1922 and 1881 there had been
a profound change in the Far Eastern
situation. In the earlier year the So
Wet Union was In a state of chaos
and too weak to constitute any men,
ace to Japan. But by 1881 the Soviet
Union had become formidable state:
its government had consolidated its
1OACASA dAia oOAACctAS o4saoS4OA 4eS9
military forces had become both con-
siderable and effective, it had become
automatically active in China and was
consolidating its situation in Eastern
Siberia.
Recognition Of this change was un-
doubtedly one of the major factors in
determining japanese action in Man
churia. 1t was also responsible, to a
degree at least, for the otherwise
mysterious and inexplicable Japanese
maneuvering at the London Naval
Conference in 1890. In the japanese
mind there was at least vague reali-
zation that new situation had arisen
in the Far East and treaties and cove
nants made before had become out of
date. To insist that Japan should now
conform to their letter or even to
their spirit seemed In japanese eyes
(n1ore clearly to be sure after than
during the London Conference) unjust
and unreasonable in the light of the
changed circumstances.
The japanese went into Manchuria,
then, primarily because they had be-
come apprehensive of the ultimate de-
signs Of tie Soviet Union, now rapidly
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