Evening star., 1934-07-08
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.

A NUM- CIle CIldTCLeTlSIlCS Ol Lie
" present era which are bound
II to puzzle the historian of the
4 \ future none is likely to con-
stitute so complete a conun-
drum as the international confer
ence. Among these conferences, those
devoted to armaments are certain to
take first rank. How odd those
people WERE" the analySiSt of another
age will remark Whenever their
statesmen found that they could not
reach an agreement privately they
summoned a world conference in
order that the nature and extent OF
their disagreement should be broad
cast to all mankind"
The first faint preliminary rum
blings Of the Naval Conference OF
next year supply a magnificent ex-
ample of contemporary methods. AS
to the question of naval armaments
themselves, there are only a few es-
Sential facts, and these will survive
any conference. In the first place,
the United States and Great Britain
are agreed on parity, since Americas
right to that was recognized BY
Ramsay Macdonald when he talked
with Herbert Hoover at the Rapidan.
In the second place, the British
right to a two-power standard was
similarly conceded by the United
States at the same time.
In simple terms. that means We
now have the right to build as
many ships as the British and that
they have the right to build as many
as the sum of the two most consider
able navies in Europe, which are
today the French and the Italian.
Finally, We and the British are agreed
that we shall never allow the Jap
enese to pass the 1916 ratio estab-
lished at Washington and substan-
TALLY maintained at London. OBJ
Viously neither the United States nor
Great Britain can undertake to set
a limit to japanese building. but both
can, and, if necessary, will outbullo
the Japanese
Difference in Size.
What else remains to be discussed?
The British want to lower the size
of battleships and cruisers: we want
to keep them where they are. The
British, with their many responsible
ties, want numerous cruisers; we, with
greater distances between bases, re-
ouire larger ships. But that is not
an issue which can be settled better
at a conference than in ordinary talks
between governments. Before the
Rapidan conference the British ad-
miralty provided Macdonald with a
statement of its necessities. He
showed it to Hoover and they struck
a preliminary bargain which was not
materially modified at London. There
was a little shutting between eight
inch guns and six, that was all.
No conference is going to compose
the Franco-Italian situation because
the French attitude toward the Italian
is ours toward the Japanese. The
French can outbuild the Italians, and
because of the situation in the Medl-
terranean, they are resolved not tc
permit Italian parity. They have
about the same actual superiority
over the Italians that we have ovel
the japanese and they mean to keep it.
Since the French and Italians can't
agree. there's an end to that matter
For it would be no easier to persuade
the French at London to agree tc
Italian naval parity than it has beer
at Geneva to get them to concedt
German military equality.
What is going to happen, conference
or no conference. is that the British
are going to maintain navy on the
one hand equal to the sum OF the
Italian and French and, on the other
satisfying the 1916 ratio with the
Japanese. AS for the French anc
italians, neither cares fig how many
ships the British, Americans or Jap
anese possess, for they have no quar-
rels with these three nations ane
no chance of keeping up with theh
fleets.
Why shouldn't London and the
United States quite frankly discuss
the matter by ordinary diplomatic
channels? What that means IS tina,
the British will tell us the size OF
the feet they need. We shall tel
them the fashion in which we NEAR
to employ equal tonnage. We shall
both tell the Japanese that these
are our provisional figures, but If they
intend to build beyond the 1915 ratio
we shall make the necessary add
tions. There is no need for secrecy
for that is what we are going TO DO
and the japanese know it as well al
we do.
Parity Chief Concern.
suupose. on the other hand, the
conference comes off. We shall SOL
emnly present our program designed
to promote reduction of the British
fleet, because our sole concern |!
parity and the cheaper it comes the
better. The British will respond witt
theirs and then the debate will oper
Just as it did in Geneva in 1927 anc
in London in 1880. The end OF the
debate will be that we shall decide
the size of ships and the British th'
total tonnage Of navieS. Meantime
the japanese will demand parity. anc
we and the British will oppose it anc
then the fireworks will begin.
simultaneously new effort will bt
made to persuade the French to re-
duce their totals, just as was done al
London, and the French will reply
by asking the British and ourselves tc
guarantee their security in the Med.
lterranean as they did at London
We shall refuse the French viii
decline to reduce their totals; Franco
italian relations will be embitterec
once again. In the end we shall agree
10 another escalator clause as we die
Mt London, empowering the British
despite any figures agreed to at the
conference, to build further if French
and Italian totals go beyond the two
power standard.
During all these proposals ano
counter proposals, charges and coun'
ter-charges, public opinion in every
country will be aroused. We shall be
angry at the British for the size oi
their figures they will be indignant
at us for trying to reduce their mar
gin of safety. We and the British
will both be angry at the French fol
wrecking another conference by theil
security claims. Anglo-Japanese anc
Japanese-American relations will bt
further strained. And they will be
even more COMPROMISED if the Man.