Evening star., 1934-09-30
Continued From First Page.)

peace by the collective action of the
nations of the world. And the first
question to be settled was that OF
security. II the League could not
provide security for the member ma
tons. If it could not prevent Gggres-
sion or at the least bring the aggressor
to terms promptly, it was always GER
tain that it could not endure. The
Austrian and japanese episodes alone
we're sufficient to demonstrate that
In maintaining world peace the efforts
OF the League of Nations, as now con-
stituted, must be futile.
While the League has nothing to
offer Poland in the way of security,
1t still asserts the authority to inter-
vene in the domestic affairs of that
state. Poland has therefore torn up
the contract and asserted her free
dom of action. Appeals by the various
Polish minorities may still be SUBJ
mitted to Geneva, but Poland may
refuse to respond to a summons to
discuss them and, If the League tries
to press the issue, will withdraw just
as Japan and Germany have already
done.
Sooner or later, if the League is
TO survive at all, there will have to
be some effective recognition of the
fact that it can proceed only by unani-
nous consent. If Japan in the matter
of Manchuria, Germany in that of
armaments, Poland In that of minori-
ties are resolved to follow national
rather than international interests,
then the attempt to impose interna-
tional guidance can only lead to with
drawal from the League.
Panama Incident Cited.
Americans should ask themselves
whether they would have submitted
to a European decision the action of
Theodore Roosevelt, when in his own
words he took" Panama. Would they
have bowed to European judgment in
the matter of the political rights of
the Negro in the South? Would they
agree that Britain, Japan and Ger
many should for all future time be
permitted to restrict American prepa-
rations for defense on sea or land to
standards which these powers have
fixed in advance?
The contemporary collapse of the
League is due directly to the fact
that other countries are making the
same answers to questions involving
national sovereignty which the United
States would inevitably make under
similar circumstances. Invaluable as
a place of conference, useful as an in
strument of international cooperation
where powers have a common interest
in such cooperation, the League is
nevertheless rapidly losing even the
semblance of an institution which can
do anything directly to remove the
causes of war and thus to establish a
permanent state of order.
For the nations whose interests lie
IN the preservation of the territorial
status quo in Europe, notably France
and her allies, this decline in the
authority of the League is viewed
with diSmay, because they hoped to
exploit that authority to perpetuate
a set-up they found satisfactory. Even
Italy, which only recently was urging
treaty revision because it found the
status quo in certain regions unsatis-
factory for herself, is now criticizing
Poland's demand for revision, because
that act may encourage Germany to
push revision in other regions in
which Italy's interest is with the
status quo.
Two Groups Of Powers.
One group of powers-Japan. Ger
many and Poland-has either quit
Geneva altogether, or politely but
firmly told the League to mind its own
business, because the law which the
League represents is unfavorable to
its interests. Another, composed of
France, Great Britain and-for the
present-Italy, is trying to strengthen
the Leagues authority so that its in
terests can be better served. The
latter group is we'll aware that the
League can only lend moral support
at best, and it must be equally aware
that in making Geneva an instru-
ment OF its own policies it is shatter-
ing even that moral force. But 1t
counts its own immediate interest
more important than the future of
Geneva.
Today the League has become the
instrument of the nations which are
opposed to Germany in Europe. Russia
has come to the League to cooperate
with France and Italy in smashing
German aspirations to acquire Austria
and to extend its frontiers to satisfy
ethnic considerations and economic
necessities. Under cover of the old
Wilsonian program new holy alli-
ance is taking form, designed this time
to restrain Germany and not France.
But the objective is purely political.
France, Soviet Russia and Italy are
ready to fight today rather than let
Germany take Austria. Britain is
prepared to lend her moral, but not
her military, support to this combina-
tion. On the other hand. Poland,
yesterday the ally of France, has
broken away from French leading
because France refused to make a
war of prevention when Hitler first
came to power and, instead, played
with MuSsoliniS idea Of big four
composed of Italy, Britain, France
and Germany-to administer Europe
in the interest Of these great powers
and at the expense of the small.
From that moment on Warsaw de-
cided that France was no longer to be
relied upon, that it was ready to use
Poland, but not to protect 1t, and that
the wise policy was to come to terms
with Berlin. Hitler met Pilsudski half
way, with a 10-year non-a aggression
pact, because he was not able to fight
Poland at the moment and wanted his
hands free of Vistula complications
while he was pushing his operations
In the Danubian area.
Belgrade Stunning Paris.
Belgrade has about reached the same
conclusion as Warsaw. It sees France
ready to sacrifice it to an agreement
with Rome. And for Yugoslavia the
menace is Italy and not Germany. So
Belgrade is rapidly drawing away from
Paris and becoming more intimate
with Berlin. One day it is probable
Yugoslavia, in its turn, will serve no
tice upon Geneva and Paris alike, as
Poland has done, that its own inter-
estS are not those of the League and
are parallel with-not opposed to
those of Germany.
II