Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1934-05-13
BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.

Tort TO revive the OeaQ Arms Con-
ference. In thus eliminating Mr.. Nor
man H. Davis from the field of our
foreign negotiations Mr.. Roosevelt has
abolished great danger to American
peace. For back of all Mr.. Davis
activities has lain the almost passion
ate purpose in some way or other tc
get the United States back into
European affairs and also into the
now declining League of Nations.
No one will criticize the sincerity Of
Mr.. Davis convictions or the nobility
of his motives, but the fact remains
that had he his way-indeed. il
European statemen had accepted the
proposals he made in the name OF
President Roosevelt-the United States
would now be in the very thick OF
the political mess in Europe. Fol
what Mr.. Davis proposed was that
European nations. accepting the Presi-
dents promise to manipulate Amer
lean neutrality to the benefit of any
victim of future aggression, SHOULD
reduce their ornaments.
Had any nation accepted that prop
osition-and it was directed u
France, in particular-the United
States would have been morally bounc
to support that nation in the next
war and the President legally COM
mitted to sacrifice our neutrality tc
that country's necessity. But while
acceptance Of that proposal woulc
have involved us in the European
maelstrom, it would not have contrib
uted in the smallest degree to re-
moving the causes and dangers of wal
itself.
Fear Seen Obstacle.
Over and over again Mr.. Davis
told the American people that the OBJ
stacle to disarmament was fear, ano
left them with the impression thai
some gesture on our part would quiet
that fear in the minds of European
peoples But what he did not say
what perhaps he never was prepared
to admit even to himself-was thai
the fears of European peoples were
well founded. so well founded. in fact
that they meant to retain their owr
arms unless We promised TO replace
them with our own.
Actually the Davis episode in its
final stage has significance because il
marks the final rejection by a Demo
cratic administration of the Wilson
doctrine in all its phases. Even before
he became President, Mr.. Roosevelt
told the public that the League OF
Nations had been so altered by
European influences as to have nc
resemblance to the design OF the
founder and no appeal for his fellow
countrymen. Thus membership in
the League was officially excluded
from the detectives of policy of the
incoming Chief Executive.
Nevertheless. largely through the
influence of Mr.. Davis doubtless, Mr.
Roosevelt still dung to some small
vestige of the Wilson doctrine regard
ing the Disarmament Conference. In
his mind there still seemed to be
the conviction that the United States
could do something about insuring the
peace of Europe. Just what was, how
ever, not in the least clear. For as ar
astute politician the President, knew
that neither Congress nor the people
of the United States we're prepared tt
accept European responsibilities. anc
as a Nationalist at heart he doubtless
had no desire to do it himself.
Moral Mission.
Mr.. Davis. on the other hand, was
an unreconstructed Wilsonian - and
remains so. For him the United
States had a moral misSion-the Dis
armament Conference was another
crusade. like the original expedition
to Paris for the Peace Conference
Our moral strength was to be applied
to reconcile the quarreling peoples OF
Europe. to reconcile them to the eX-
tent of signing a paper, no matter
how unimportant in fact. Something
signed was something settled, from
the Davis standpoint. And to en-
courage the others, we were to sign
something. too.
7 But as a prime minister OF enc OF
the great European countries said to
me at the outset Of the Disarmament
Conference: Mr. Wilson deceived him.
self first and Europe afterward II
the matter of American participation
in European Affairs, but it will be oul
fault if Mr.. Davis succeeds in de-
ceiving either himself or u.s." Thus
when in the name of the President
Mr.. Davis pledged that Mr.. Roose'
welt would handle our neutrality Il
the advantage of that Nation. Europe
remained unimpressed, although pub
lie opinion in America protested.
The great calamity of the Wilson
affair-and it was a double calamity
was that it created in Europe for the
moment a conception of the United
States which was totally inexact anc
an impression of Europe in America
which was without foundations. Eu-
rope saw in the Wilsonian phrases the
revelation of complete change II
American policy which was tradi'
tional and a present readiness to en-
bark our resources in men, money
and material upon great adventure
of peace to be carried out upon Eu-
ropean soil. When. after the peace
of Paris was made. the United States
Senate rejected the treaty Of Yer
sailles, Europe was disillusioned, en-
FILTERED, scornful.
Europe Disappoints.
BY contrast. the Wilsonian phrase
established for the moment in the
eyes of the American public the con-
ception of a Europe composed OF
peace-loving majorities. who by
American effort had been freed from
their unrepresentative and war-pro-
noting rulers and we're now ready for
peace at any price. But when the
Peace Conference revealed these peo-
piles driving their representatives tc
every form of nationalistic excess in
the. way of reparations and annex
atoms. the American people in Their
turn felt that Wilson had been de-
ceived and they had been deluded
The result was disastrous.
Today the mass of the European
people feel that the United States
went back on its promises and pre-
tensions, that it was responsible for
some of the worst things in the peace
settlement and that once it had i'm
posed these things upon the European
world it ran away from all RESPONSE
bility. In the same fashion the ma
jority of the American people are
satisfied that from first to last Europe
was only interested in getting our men