Evening star., 1934-12-30


by the Japanese and the con-
L sequent collapse of the con-
versations in London have pro-
vided an occasion for great deal of
excited comment but as yet of very
little considered analysis. What is
to be regretted is that the japanese
action has been viewed in this country
as an isolated phenomenon and not
as one more in a series of similar
decisions.
In point of fact, as far back as the
London Naval Conference of 1890, no
fve-power treaty could be framed be-
cause Italy refused to accept anything
but parity vis-a-vis France At the
Geneva Disarmament Conference last
year Germany declined to endure
longer the unequal situation existing
between her military forces and those
OF France. Japan is, then, only the
third of the great powers to take a
stand for parity and against ratio.
1t is not unreasonable to conclude,
therefore, that the idea of ratio, which
first found expression in the Washing
ton treaty, is a thing of the past
No great power will again consent to
accept for itself by treaty a position
of inferiority either in military or
naval forces. OF course. that does not
mean that Italy. for example, will
undertake to equal the naval strength
OF Britain, or France that of the
United States What it does mean
Is that for reasons of national pride
and prestige, great powers will not
voluntarily accept a secondary situa-
tion and, in addition. that countries
will seek equality with those states
which they regard as potential enc
mics.
U. S. Held Japans Enemy.
The fact that Japan regards the
United States as a potential enemy
cannot be blinked. And the reason
Is that the United States has delib-
erately undertaken to check the Jap
sneSe policy of expansion in Man
churia and the even more ambitious
program of control in China which
is described as japanese Monroe
Doctrine. The course which Mr..
Stimson followed during the Man
churian incident in 1892 must be
accepted as the explanation of the
present state of mind of Japan and
one of the contributory causes of
the recent japanese action in de-
nouncing the treaty of Washington.
In effect, Mr.. Stimson. with the
consent of President Hoover, of course,
set out to compel Japan to abandon
her policy of aggrandizement in Man
churia. To do that he brought the
United States into close cooperation
1. 7 s 49,
In addition, the American repre-
sentatives at Geneva and in London
endeavored to bring about a united
front between Great Britain and the
United States. That attempt was,
too, continued by the present ad-
ministration and as lately as in the
recent conversations in London
The attempt failed. In 1892
the British were appalled, by what
they conceived to be the recklessness
of the American course. They realized
from the very start that Japan would
fight rather than get out Of Man
churia. They were aware that in
4 their own economic and financial
I circumstances war would be dis
! aster. They knew that in the ex-
p listing state of tension in Europe a
war in the Far East must open the
way to German adventure on the
4 continent Finally, they recognized
! that the haste and precipitancy of
the American actions supplied them
B with an admirable chance to obtain
security in the Far East for them
selves.
|! British Played Neutral Role.
In word, they concluded that the
Stimson policy would arouse resent
r1ent which would lead the japanese
to concentrate their hostility upon
the United States and turn away
their attention from any project
which might be more Immediately
disastrous to British interests. Thus,
from the outset, the British assumed,
not the attitude of approving Ameri-
can enterprise, but the role of dis
interested power seeking to reconcile
the opposing views of the two ma
tionS. Today, as result of this
course, the japanese regard the Brit
ish as their friends and the Ameri-
cans as their enemies.
Nevertheless it is plain that had
Mr.. StimSon been successful at Ge-
/, neva, or Mr.. Davis in London, in
creating a united front of Britain and
the United States against Japan.
then the weight of the combined
naval forces of the two Anglo-Saxon
powers would have been overwhelm-
ing The old 10-10-6 ratio, repre-
senting the strengths of Britain. the
United States and Japan, would have
been transformed in actuality into
20-6 ratio-of the combined Anglo
Saxon fleets against the Japanese
Obviously, in such a situation, even
parity for the Japanese would not
restore the old ratio, since it would
then amount only to 20-10.
Against this future possibility of an
Anglo-American combination Japan
was thus led to demand parity. Mr..
|, Stimson's Manchurian policy, there
fore, without accomplishing anything
practical insured the denunciation of
the Washington treaty. 1t also dis
closed the folly of any expectation
that Great Britain would join her
fortunes to those of the United States
so long as the latter was ready to
constitute itself the unique guarantor
Of the status quo in Asia.
American Precedent Shown.
Now it is well to look at japanese
policy in the light Of American prec-
edent. More than century ago we
asserted through the Monroe doctrine
purpose to prevent European states
from attempting to set up colonial
empires in the Americas. Nominally
this was proposal to guarantee the
security and liberty of the Latin
American states and as such we have
continued to view it. Two decades
later, however, by the Mexican War
we forced one of the Latin American
states to cede its vast possessions in
California, New Mexico and Arizona.
That was far more extensive i'm
perialistic adventure than the jap
anese in Manchuria. And at later
time we engineered the Panama Rev.
olutlon, set up the Republic of Panama
ta L,