Evening star., 1934-09-02
BY FRANK ii. SIMONDS.

ing implications Of the recent
~ agreements between the Italian
duce and the Austrian chan
cellor. Actually they represent little
short Of o revolution, for now Italy
replaces France as guarantor Of the
status quo in the new cockpit of
Europe-the Danubian area. Instead
of the familiar quarrel between Ger
many and France the world is now
to witness a duel between dictators-
between Hitler and Mussolini.
For the historically minded, recall
ing how less than a century ago
Austrian garrisons in Milan, Verona
and Venice barred the way to Italian
liberty and unity, the spectacle Of an
Italian dictator guaranteeing Austrian
independence must be appealing. For
those who recall the relative situa-
tions of italy and Austria only two
decades ago, the contrast must prove
equally striking. Today Austria has
become an Italian protectorate almost
as completely as Tripol.
The new situation of Italy has its
rewards and its penalties. On the
positive side it gives both the nation
and its master position in Europe
which Is unprecedented. Since both
Vienna and Budapest are responsive
to, Italian wishes, although in differ
ent degrees, Italian influence is DOM
inant alike In Austria and in Hungary.
AS against a German thrust south
ward Italy Is sure of the support of
| the present regimes in both countries.
A certain measure of economic ad-
vantage must also flow from this
political alliance.
Success Is Tentative.
Nevertheless, 1t is evident that Italy
can successfully mount guard against
German possession of Austria only so
long as the Reich remains partially
disarmed and wholly disabled by a
domestic economic and political crisis.
For neither in population nor in re-
sources is Italy match for Germany
when the latter Is fully armed and
wholly united. Thus the Duce is
likely to look with less approval than
before on German rearmament, and,
since the only pending question of
territorial change is the Austro-G Ger
man Union, with equal disfavor upon
treaty revision for the benefit Of the
Reich.
The repercussions Of Italian policy
In Belgrade, too, clearly foreShadow
a shift in Yugoslav policy. So far
the Serbs have relied upon the French
and their own allies Of the Little En-
tente for protection against Italy. But
it is clear that today Rome and
Paris-in the face of common feal
Of Germany-have been movine
toward each other. Belgrade is there
fore beginning to look to Berlin anc
the Little Entente is visibly cracking
| For the Scribe, Austro- German
union has no direct peril. There 4
no German minority In the Yugoslay
state. The German market could be
a valuable outlet for Southern SlaI
foodstuffs and raw materials. Ger.
many would be an even better situated
ally than France in the face of italian
danger and the two countries could
combine policies to mutual advantage
Thus when Rome was moving Its
troops toward the frontier after the
murder of Dollfuss, Yugoslavia was
following suit, and, had Mussolini
sought to hold the Tyrol, the troops
OF King Alexander would certainly
have seized Carinthia.
AS between Italy and Germany Il
Is fair to guess that Rumania woulC
also come down on the German sids
but chiefly for economic reasons. Fol
the Rumanians, Italy does not con.
stitute large market, whereas Ger.
many has in the past and could again
AND once more there is no conflict Of
major interest. Since Hungary has al.
lied herself with Italy and Italy anC
Germany are at odds, it is to BerIir
and not Rome that the Rumanian'
VIII naturally turn. If they separatt
from France.
OF course, II the Serbs and Ru.
manians turn to Berlin, there is ar
end Of the Little Entente and also OF
French influence In the Danubian re.
gion and French hegemony in Europe
Poland has already abandoned hel
old friendship with France and al.
though the Franco-Polish alliance
still stands, it has lost most of It's
value since Warsaw and Berlin signed
a 10-year non-aggression pact. Czech
oslovakia today seems isolated, but as
between the Italians and the Germans
Prague would probably prefer the lat.
ter, If any reasonable terms were IL
be had.
II Prague and Berlin could reach
an agreement such as Warsaw and
Berlin recently made, mutually guar
anteeing the status quo for 10 years
then Germany would have free hand
to deal with the Austrian question
and be sure at least of a Serb ally
against Italy. On the other side, Italy
would have Austria and Hungary as
allies. But 1t must be remembered
that an Italian control cannot be
popular for long among the Aus
trians, and also that Hungary is un-
likely to stick by Italy once it becomes
clear that Italy cannot recover for
her her lost territories held by the
Czech, the Rumanian and the Serb.
Quiet for the Moment.
For the moment nothing is likely
to happen. Mussolini is ready and
able to prevent Austro- German un-
ion. Today he is sure of French mill
tary and British moral support against
Germany. Economically, financially
and politically, Germany is in no sit
uation to challenge Italy in the face
Of the strength that the Duce con-
trolls. Rather she must proceed to
undermine the Italian situation and
her two lines of attack are Prague
and Belgrade.
If the Little Entente actually turns
to Berlin, there will be not a few
Frenchmen who will rejoice, because
in Paris there has been a growing
anxiety about the costs and risks of
the French attempt to uphold the
status quo In all of Central Europe.
Already responsibility for the status
quo in the Polish Corridor has been
removed and now Mussolini has taken
over the Austrian responsibility. If
trouble comes now on the Danube it
will be Italy who will have to turn to
France and not vice versa, as it has
been until recently.
On the other hand, relations be-
| tween Paris and London are likely to
become closer as French commitments
| IN the contar and cast of E,1rrArna Al