The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1934-11-27
Liberal Viewpoint
.BY DIR. HARRY ELMER BARNES

by DR. HARRY ELMER BARNES
THE simultaneous announcement in the press
Il Of the Yugoslav accusations Of Hungary
Of completely in the assassination of King Alex
ander and Of the death Of the prominent French
diplomat Philippe Berthelot. brings sharply to
mind another striking similarity between the
crisis Of 1914 and the possible complications IN
Europe twenty years later.
In 1914 Austria accused Serbia Of instigat-
ing anti-Austrian plots and Of harboring the
Bosnian plotters who actually murdered the
archduke These charges since have been amply
confirmed. Austria followed up her charges
against Serbia with an ultimatum designed to
correct the abuses or else precptate punitive
war against Serbia. II vas this same NJ. Ber-
the lot who, as undersecretary OF foreign affairs
in Paris. outlined the very clever Serbian reply
to the Austrian ultimatum.
The Serbian reply to the Austrian ultima
turn only can be understood when viewed in the
light of the plans of France and Russia. If
Austria astutely planned her diplomatic APP
proach to the Serbian problem in order to make
the proposed punitive war more palatable 70
European opinion, so did France and Russia
similarly utilize the opportunity anoroed by
the Serbian answer in order better to prepare
Europe for the initiation of the European con-
fict involved in their program.
TRANCE and Russia desired to avoid above
Il all either a truculent and arrogant attitude
in Serbia or an actual declaration OF war oy
Serbia European opinion was still on the size
of Austria on account of the murder OF the
archdula. For Serbia to have made naughty
and insulting reply to the Austrian demands
would have made matters still worse. For Serbia
IN have declared war on Austria not only would
have affected European opinion very un1aVor-
ABLY but would have precipitated hostlltles pc
fore Russia could get moblllzed over her vast
area.
The first efforts of France and Russia were,
therefore directed toward securing an extension
of time for the Serbian reply, so as to give
France. and particularly Russia, more time Tor
their military preparations before Austria de-
clared war on Serbia.
We know from General Dobrorolsk that the
Russian army of officials assumed that the Eu-
ropean war was ION" when they heard of the
terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Baron Schlu-
ing has revealed the fact that Sazonov, 1.-THE
Russian foreign minister, expressed the same
opinion. In fact, on reading the Austrian ultl-
matum he specifically exclaimed: This IS the
European war"
If France and Russia were to precipitate
EUROPEAN war in the guise of protecting Siberia,
it was necessary to do everything possible to
make such intervention attractive before Euro
| pean and world opinion. Siberia must be MADE
to appear a brave and innocent little country,
which had gone to extreme limits in surrender
ing to the Austrian demands-but had not quite
acquesced.
ITO carry out this program of putting the soft
Il pedal" on Serbia, the Russian Ministerial
Council of July "a 1914, decided to advise Serbia
to avoid above everything else declaring war on
Austria and to make her response to Austria
conciliatory in tone and content alike.
France went even further. Jacques Mesn1l
has revealed to us that Berthelot got hold OF M.
Vesnitch Serbian minister in Paris, and drafted
in outline the Serbian reply to Austria. This
was wired in code to Belgrade.
This reply was formulated in very concllla-
tory language, feigned great friendliness for and
humility toward Austria, and seemed to consent
to everything of significance in the Austrian
ultimatum, while actually rejecting the only
really important items in it.
In this way Serbia as we'll as France and
Russia later was put in a good light before world
opinion, while Austria was placed in an appar-
emily discreditable position when she carried out
the secret plans of the Austrian ministers and
attacked Serbia.
In the diplomatic ruses Of the entente be-
fore the war there was no more clever bit OF
subterfuge than Berthelot's planning Of the Ser
bian response to Austria. 1t suficed completely
to deceive even the kaiser.
We may hope that similar hypocrsies,
dupcity and tragedy will not follow in the wake
of the present Yugoslav charges. The main hope
lies in the fact that the latter have been sub
mitted to the league of nations rather than in
the form of direct ultimatum to the Hungarian
oovnrYnopYt