Evening star., 1934-05-06
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

operations of the Germans nearly two
decades ago. At the time of the
World War the American people
or at least the overwhelming major
ity of them-desired to remain neu-
tral. But they also desired to pre-
serve and enjoy their rights as
neutrals. And nothing could per-
suade them that the two things
were irreconcilable.
Today the American people GER
tainly have no desire to engage in
war with Japan. On the other hand,
there is no general perception Of
the fact that the price of peace is the
voluntary remuneration of rights
which are alike morally and legally
unassailable The japanese inva-
sion of Manchuria was performance
on all fours with the German in
vasion of Belgium, since it reduced
an international contract, namely the
Kellogg pact, to the condition of a
scrap of paper. The assertion OF
supervisory rights over Chinese flnan-
cial and commercial relations was OF
the same sort as the German attempt
to restrict the use of the sea by
neutrals.
War No Restraining Action.
Both in the case of Belgium and
of submarine warfare, German lead
ers saw the situation of their country
as one of necessity and boldly af-
firmed that such necessity knew no
law. For Germany the Belgium road
to Paris was the sole means of escape
from a long and doubtful war. For
Japan control of China is the single
means of assuring a place in the sun
adequate to sustain the great and
growing population of the nation
Germany did not want to fight
Britain and Japan does not want to
fight the United States, but IN both
cases not even the possibility OF war
could restrain action.
For the United States, therefore,
the Japanese action can have but
two possible consequences. We shall
have to put up or shut up, to fight
or to accept the invasion of our
national rights which japanese policy
entails. In the matter Of war We
can decide to act alone or to arrange
an alliance with Great Britain.
And in practice only the latter course
is even conceivably possible. But if
we are too sensible to fight we can
not afford to be too proud to admit
that fact.
The trouble is that the United
States, thanks to the incalculable
amount of peace propaganda and
League publicity of the postwar
years, has come to the point where
any number Of its population be-
lieve that notes, treaties, pacts, COW
enants and conferences have a posi-
tive value in preventing war. De-
termined not to fight Japan, they
continue to believe that there is some
way to accomplish what they desire
without war and principally by words.
Words without Value.
But this can be done only when
two parties to a dispute are equally
anxious to avoid violence. When,
however, one of the contestants
is ready to fight rather than to
compromise, words are without value.
Now Japan is ready to fight rather
than to retire from Manchuria and
abandon her Chinese adventure. But
if she is going to continue her Chi
nese adventure it is patent that she
cannot afford to allow other nations
to finance or arm China. On the
contrary 1t is a matter of life and
death to prevent any such operation
because it will place a fresh stain
upon her all too slender resources.
Germany was in the same flx in
1917 when she resorted to unrestricted
submarine warfare. To break the
British will to conquer seemed in
German eyes the sole means to avert
ing national disaster. Otherwise at
that moment the war seemed lost
And in the same fashion to abolish
Chinese resistance by isolating China
from outside help is equally vital to
the success Of Japan'S Chinese oper-
aticn. And if Japan has to give up
that adventure now. the consequences
alike to the present regime and to
the future of the nation are evident.
British Disturbed.
Like ourselves the British are
gravely disturbed about the japanese
policy. They have the same trade
interests as ourselves and. in addition,
they have territorial stakes. absent
in our case. since we are getting out
of the Philippines while they mean
to stick to Hongkong. But not only
are they unwilling to fight, precisely
as are we. but they are also far
more intelligent than we in perceiv-
ing what must be done to avoid a
fight, although actually-both in the
matter of territory and trade-they
have far more at stake than we. For
Japanese economic imperialism has
hit them far harder than it has
hurt us.
Nevertheless the British do see that
their sole choice is between war and
passivity. They don't imagine that
invoking the Kellogg pact will accom-
plish anything. They know the Kel-
logg pact has become dead letter in
the East since Japan stepped out in
Manchuria. They don't think that
League Intervention can do any good,
for they appreciate the significance
of the fasco of the Geneva ultimatum
and the failure of the Lytton report.
They attach no value to the Stimson-
Hoover doctrine, which denies Man
chukuo formal recognition. What,
by contrast, does count in their minds
is the fact that sentimental thinking
on the part of the United States may
presently involve us in another war.
And the danger is real and unmis-
taxable. For while the present ad-
ministration is too sensible to want
war, it seems also too proud to aban-
con rights which can only be pre-
served by war. And all over the
country there are groups and organ
izations which are urging the admin
istration to action, either in the name
of peace or Of patriotism. The peace
people want America to act to save
the League and the whole postwar
system of collective peace, the pa
triots want national rights defended.
And yet in both cases there Is similar
desire to avoid conflict.
Japan May Collapse.
In point of fact now that Japan
has launched herself on her present
adventure there is nothing any coun-