The Indianapolis times., 1934-03-17

Il
TN modern times the power of the
Il purse has developed far beyond
this original conception of it. Con-
gresS and other American legislative
bodies have not been content to
grant funds to the executive, to
say how much he may spend. They
have proceeded to force funds upon
the executive, to tell him what he
must spend.
Thus we have arrived at the Gu
rious position where Presidents, Gov
ernors and mayors are almost con-
tinually engaged in trying to per-
suade the representative body not
to appropriate money. In former
days the King went, hat in hand,
so to speak, to the legislature, ask
ing for funds; today the executive
in a democracy goes, hat in hand,
to the legislature, asking it not to
make him spend, not to tax the peo-
pie so much, so that he may pre-
serve the public credit.
A situation has now developed in
which constitutional liberty calls
for restraint upon the power of the
legislature to appropriate, just as
in former days it called for re-
straint upon the power of the eX-
ecutive to spend. For legislature
can squander the liberties of the
people. If it forces expenditure in
the interest Of organized minoritieS,
it affects the interests of the un-
organized minority. If it destroys
the public credit, as it has done in
many American cities, as it might
do in the nation, it jeopardizes the
jobs and the savings of the people.
TF the despotism of minorities is.
l. carried far enough to cause a
general fiancial disaster, even the
forms of free government may be
overwhelmed in a mass movement
clamoring for the efficiency of a
dictatorship.
The power of the legislature to
force expenditure upon the execu-
tive is a perverSion of representative
1t is an example of
how good principle, the power of
the purse, can be carried to point
where it becomes a bad principle. If
constitutional liberty is to be pre-
served, if representative government
is to work satisfactorily, it will be
to redefine the power of
the purse. 1t is not difficult to do
this. 1t should be the duty of the
executive to ask for funds. 1t should
be the duty of congress to grant or
to refuse them.
The executive should have no
right to spend what congress has
not appropriated. Congress should
have no right to appropriate funds
which the executive does not ask
for.
Only by the power Of purse can
the representative body keep the
executive effectively accountable to
the popular will. That is the lesson
of the long past. The lesson of the
recent past is that only by leaving
to the executive the power to ini-
tiate expenditure can the national
as a whole be effectively
protected against the pressure of
TN the equilibrium between these
Il two powers, of the executive to
ask and the legislature to grant
funds, lies the hope of constitutional
liberty.
This has been recognized for 200
years in England, where free gov
ernment has had its longest and
surest development. 1t is recog-
nized in the United States. But
unfortunately this reform, which is
of absolutely fundamental impor-
tance to the preservation Cd democ-
racy, is known by the prosaic ano
name of the executive
budget. Yet it is not an exaggera-
ton to say that in its moral and
spiritual consequences in the realm
Of liberty, the movement to limit
the power of minorities in the leg
islature is the complement of the
refusal to submit to taxation with
OUT representation.
1t is on this ground that public
opinion can best take its stand
against the immediate payment of
the veterans bonus. The practical
dangers of that particular meas
ure are considerable. It's prin-
ciple is atrocious. If one organized
can terrorize congress into
forcing an enormous expenditure
upon the President, who is charged
with the preservation of the ma
tional credit and the management
of the currency, then other organ
lied minorities can initiate the ex-
ample and follow the precedent.
That way lies chaos and the de-
struction Of liberty. That way we
must not go. That way we shall
not go if We can realize promptly
uhero II 1podc