Evening star., 1934-12-23
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.


which there have been a disquiet-
i ing number in the past two years,
has been as completely misinter-
preted on this side of the Atlantic as
the latest. This affair, the Yugoslav
attack upon Hungary, has been consid-
cred as constituting an immediate
peril to European peace, providing
parallel to the crisis of July, 1914, and
finally furnishing the League with a
shining vindication. In reality, how
ever. none of these interpretations was
exact.
As to the question of European
peace, in the larger sense that was
never in danger because the four
great powers Immediately concerned,
namely Italy, France, Great Britain
and Soviet Russia, were at all times
united in common determination not
to be dragged into conflict with each
other. Germany, too, her attention
concentrated upon the approach of the
plebiscite In the Saar, refrained from
any attempt to exploit a situation
which under other conditions might
have afforded her a chance for a
profitable diplomatic maneuver.
What was possible-and all that was
poSSible-waS that Yugoslav troops
might have passed the Hungarian
frontier and such an irruption might
have produced an explosion in the
Magyar state. Under such circum-
stances an occupation of Hungarian
territory by all the Little Entente
armies could have taken place. That
local disturbance was. however, pre-
vented by the admirable behavior of
the Hungarians themselves under ex-
treme provocation.
Powers Restrained Two Nations.
Meantime the great powers, acting
In close cooperation, exercised a re-
straint upon both Yugoslav violence
and Hungarian resentment. Resolved
not to be drawn in themselves and de-
termined to avert local upheaval in
the Danubian area. the four great
powers presently imposed upon the
Yugoslavs and their Rumanian and
Czech allies formula which, while
bestowing upon them the appearance
OF a diplomatic victory, in fact pro-
tected Hungary against any serious
moral or material injury.
To establish the contrast between
the situations in 1914 and in 1894 it
Is necessary to look back for a mo-
ment to the earlier year. At that mo-
ment Austria. considering her unity
irlenaced by the Serb progranl-which
aimed at detaching the southern Slav
populations of the dual monarchy
seized upon the assassination of the
archduke as pretext for an attack
upon Serbia. Such an attack risked
general war because, if Russia sup
ported Serbia, France would back
Russia and Germany would stand with
Austria. Four great powers we're thus
Immediately concerned and the secu-
rity, as well as the prestige, of Austria
was directly at stake.
In the more recent crisis no great
power was directly involved. What oc-
Cured was that Yugoslavia, backed by
the other states of the Little Entente,
undertook to exploit the murder Of
King Alexander for one clear end,
namely to break up the growing rap
prochement between France and Italy.
BY alliance France was bound to all
the nations of the Little Entente and
Italy to Hungary. The hope cherished
in Belgrade, Prague and Bucharest
was that Paris and Rome would be
led to support their allies and thus
come to quarrel. If that occurred then
the chances Of a Franco Italian un-
derstanding would be abolished.
Feared Italy on Danube.
The nations of the Little Entente
desired to break up any Franco Italian
understanding because they feared
that one of the considerations of such
an arrangement would be a consent
on the part of France to withdraw
her support from the Little Entente
and give Italy free hand in the
Danubian region. Already, at the
moment of the July putsch, when
Italy modified and disclosed her pur-
pose to defend Austrian independence,
France had given her support to Mus
solini, much to the chagrin Of the
>Yugoslavs
Italy, for her part, had steadily
backed Hungary's claims to territorial
revision, based on the fact that by
the Paris settlement of 1919 Rumania,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were
permitted to annex regions adjoining
the new frontiers of Hungary contain
ing upwards Of a million and half
of Magyars. These Magyars were
taken without right or reason simply
to bestow upon the succession states
strategic frontiers and the control OF
railways having military importance.
With Italian assistance, Hungary
has, therefore, resisted all attempts
on the part of the Little Entente
to bring about political and eco
nomic adjustment in the Danubian
area. But as long as France stood
with the Littls Entants. Italian SUP,
port of Hungary was of purely mega
tive value. It did prevent the crea-
ton Of any system OF permanent
order, but 1t did not render the Hun
garian demand for revision formida-
BILE. If, however, Italy and France
were now to come to q general agree
rnent, then the situation Of the Little
Entente would become serious.
Jockeying for Power.
The Yugoslav performance was ac-
cordingly conceived as means Of
bAlC AdAu vi FLChCl1,
demonstrating to the Hungarians the
weakness Of their position-since the
Italians would be unable to back them
effectively-and thus establishing the
authority Of the Little Entente itself
In the Danubian region. Little Entente
statesmen calculated that the French,
fearful of losing the diplomatic sup
port of their Central European allies.
would be stampeded into unreserved
support of the Yugoslavs and thus
again stand unequivocally against all
ideas of territorial revision.
Superficially, the maneuver seemed
to have succeeded. The French,
through Laval, backed Yugoslavia;
the italians, through Aloisi, sup
ported the Hungarians; but, under
the surface. the great powers col
laborated in such fashion as to de-
prive the Little Entente scheme OF
all but nominal success. Actually the
French, British and Italians were
eoually angry over the undiSguiSed