Evening star., 1934-01-14


i little public attention has been
given to international affairs. No
one in the administration, however,
minimizes the importance Of this phase
Of recovery; no one doubts the necessity
Of earnest efforts to re-eStablish our
shattered trade relations with other ma
tions. In many ways the depression we
are fighting is an international phe-
nomenon, and working our way out OF
it consequently requires international
action.
Any discussion of this sort inevitably
works back to the war and even beyond
to the time when we were borrowers
from European nations and when they
sent us more goods than we sent them.
It was the war which reversed this sit
uation. We then began to lend to them
and to send them more goods than they
sent US. The difference was that we
liked our former situation, or at least
accepted 1t as something natural; and
that Europe now withdraws from &C
ceptance Of the situation, which Is un-
derstandable in countries which are
debtors, but which nevertheless makes
trade resumption difficult. Instead Of
opening her markets to our goods she
shuts them tighter and tighter putting
up tariffs, imposing quotas, impounding
We have been foolish in our turn,
too, if our position was to be made good
For we have attempted to maintain ex-
port balances along with high tariffs,
two wholly inconsistent policies. Our
loans abroad enabled foreign importers
to buy. but our refusal to accept goods
in exchange prevented exporters there
from sending us goods. This is not
exchange: 1t Is some form Of enforced
charity with Americans on the giving
end
The sentiment Of agrarian national
ism has swept the whole Western world
in most astounding fashion in postwar
years, and 1t is important to remember
that 1t Is q sentiment rather than a
calculated economic policy. 1t is per-
haps traceable to causes which are un-
certain and obscure. So it seems to me.
France, Italy and Germany have pre-
ferred to pay more than a dollar and
half q bushel for domestic wheat
rather than buy it from us at about
half that price. The same is true of
many others Of our products, some of
them industrial, but the case there is
not so severe since adjustment to de-
mand is easier. Factories can be shut
down much easier than farms.
Impasse Grows Worse.
There is little that can be done about
such situation except to hope that in
time it will disappear. Perhaps the
causes lie in the fright which was
caused by the success of Germany S
submarine campaign, perhaps in the
superior political preSsureS which are
exercised by agrarians, perhaps in a
genuine reluctance to enter on q
tenuous industrial career. However,
this may be, our goods are refused and
we refuse theirs. There is an impasse
which grows worse and worse And
many parts of our recovery program
have unquestioningly been adapted to
the situation as though it were perma-
nent.
This had to be so. In agriculture
there seemed to be no good purpose to
be served by pretending that there
still existed foreign market which was
in reality disappearing. In industry the
administration was determined to raise
| wages and shorten hours regardless OF
what other countries might do. II
seemed impossible also to persuade
program which would genuinely relieve
unemployment or would raise prices sc
that the burdens Of debt might be re-
lieved. And If the United States was
to to these things alone it seemed
necessary to be cut on from the rest oi
the world and to proceed as though
other nations did not exist. OF course
this country was in position to do that
If it had to be done. We were as nearly
Self-suf1cient as any nation could be
| in the sense that we had most of the
materials Of living within our borders
or Immediately adjacent to the south OF
us and quite outside the European
system.
If, at the London Conference, Europ,
had shown disposition to enter on
policies similar to ours-to engage II
public works, to 1aise prices and relieve
debtors-a genuine turn toward inter-
nationaliSm might have come then. Blu
there was no such disposition. And thai
was the real failure at London: the re.
sponsibility did not rest, I should say
with the United States
1t is barely possible that the confer.
ence might have succeeded in this If Il
had been held in Washington. The ex.
posure Of the statesmen to President
Roosevelt's gallantry and charm, the
understanding they might have got o.
what 1t was our Nation was fully deter.
mined to do, the sense of renewed hope
which had come to our people out of &
program Of courageous action-all thi!
i, might have induced them to accep
American leadership and to parallel the
effort being made here. But that die
not happen. Their imaginations vert
not fred and they preferred to follow
more orthodox courses.
Distrust Deepens.
The result Of the nations failure Il
agree has been evident ever since in tht
deepening of mutual distrust, in tht
increase Of restrictions on trade, in the
cutting OF Of each from the other. W.
are forced to 60 our own way alone
We had no choice, really, if we were no
to proceed In the same way that Europe
did; and even that way required isola.
ton, as anyone can see who looks care.
fully now at the European scene. It 1.
nonsense to say that because we wert
forced to follow that course for the time
being We had to become determined ma
tionalists. What it did mean was thai
Americans had accepted the principl,
of q planned national life which couls
widen into internationalism only wher
others also abandoned laissez faire ane
began to plan along with US.
No responsible statesman In thi
country has ever expressed an unwil
lingness to Cooperate with any natioY
with whom 1t was possible to cooperate
Planning can and must become inter
! national. America cannot determin,
when others will make that possible
That Is clearly up to them. But tn.
Western world cannot be put right unit
IL haDr,ens. and IL would he foolish In