The Washington times., 1934-05-03
DECISIONS Of D. {. COURT OF APPEALS

of sale on record, casting, as 1t
believed, a cloud upon the title,
in the absence of a binding prom
Use, is not material.
It clearly appears, we think,
that there was an intention on
the part of the defendant club
to purchase the property in ques-
ton. Indeed, it was conceded by
defendant that the $l2 ex-
pended in repairing the roof, and
an expenditure of $25 for the
service of an architect to plan
alterations, were expenditures
made in contemplation of pur-
chase. This was followed by the
resolution of the directors deciar-
ing their intention to purchase,
and authorizing the issue Of
checks for the payment of the
purchase price, so that the in.
tention on the part of the defend
ant to purchase the property may
be regarded as concluSively estab-
lished. 1t is also true that on
February 2, the deed purDorting
to convey the property to defend
ant, was in the possession of the
title company, and that it was eX.
amined by defendants attorney.
The court below, in an able
opinion, turned the case upon the
fact that there was nothing in
the resolution of the board of di'
rectors, or in any of the communi-
cations or actions taken by the
defendant, which indicated any
knowledge on their part of the
name of the plaintiff, or with
whom it was dealing. In the
opinion, the learned justice said:
whatever plaintiff or his agent
signed went either to Kraft, the
broker, or to the title company
which became plaintiffs agent.
Nothing signed by plaintiff or his
agent ever got into possession of
defendant or its ageHt Or attor-
ney. On the other hand no writ
ing signed by any officer or mem
ber of the club, and 10 copy of
any of its resolutions Ever left
the possession Of the club. There
fore it seems to me that plaintiff
can rely only on documents signed
by proper officers of the club, or
it's agents and writings therein re-
ferred to-" After reviewing the
various documents appearing in
the record, the court reached the
conclusion that mot one of these
documents mentions the name of
the vendor, nor does it describe
him in any way.
We think, from q careful eX-
animation of this record, that the
conclusion of the court below is
correct. There is nothing in the
various documents issued by. or
brought home to the defendant,
which indicates any knowledge
on its part of the identity of the
vendor. It remains, therefore,
that this fact could only be eS'
tablished by parole evidence. It
is settled law that a contract for
the sale of land, where the mem.
orandum fails to disclose the
name of the vendor, cannot be
enforced under the statute of
frauds. Bowers v. Gluckman, 68
N. j. Law 148; Mentz v. Newwit-
ter, 1872 N. Y. 497; Moore v. Ad-
ans, 153 Ga. 709; Barkhurst v.
Nevins, 1O6 Nebr. 50; Saints v.
Cannata, AZ r. I. 1913; Irvmor
Corp. v. Rodewald, 253 N. Y. 476.
In Grafton v. Cummings, SO
U. S. 100, the Supreme Court of
the United States, considering the
sufficiency of a contract within
the staute of frauds, said:
"The distinct objection to the
instrument, as so presented, is
that the other party to the con"
tract of sale is not named in it,
and can only be supplied by pa
role testimony. The statute not
only requires that the agreement
on which the action is brought,
or some memorandum thereof,
shall be signed by the party to
be charged, but that the agree
ment or memorandum shall be in
writing. In an agreement of sale
there can be no contract without
CONTINUED on Page II, Col. l.
Second SectiOn)