Evening star., 1934-02-11
Our New Naval Program
Continued From First Page.)

NContlnueu from rlrSC FdEc.)
They were also deep in Siberia. Bit
terneSs between the japanese and the
Americans was keen. At the same
time the Americans regarded the An
glo-Japanese alliances which had
been in force since 1902 as inimicable
to the best interests of the United
States.
Harding's Conference.
The situation had become so tense
by the beginning of 1921 that one OF
the first acts of President Warren G.
Harding was to call a conference to
discuss questions of naval limitation
and the problems of the Pacific. This
conference met In Washington in No.
vember, 1921, and adjourned in the
Spring of 1922. At the conference a
series of treaties were signed which,
while not linked together by any legal
documents, were rgardd as constituting
the fruits of the conference as whole.
These treaties embodied a series of
compromises. In naval matters a
ratio between the American, British
and japanese fleets was established,
applying at the time only to capital
ships and aircraft carriers. BY agree
ing to this ratio America abandoned
her policy of building the strongest
Navy in the world and accepted parity
with the British. 1t was agreed that
Japan's navy should have tonnage
equivalent to about 80 per cent of
that of the British and American
navies. The experts were Of the opin-
ion that as Japan had no extended
empire to defend, this ratio gave her
preponderance in the waters of the
Western Pacific and Eastern Asia.
At the same time the Americans
agreed not to fortify the Philippines
or Guam and the British agreed not
to strengthen the Notifications at
Hongkong. The Japanese likewise
agreed not to build any Notifications
on any of the islands which they had
taken from Germany and which they
held under a mandate from the
League of Nations.
A treaty was also signed by these
nations and six other participants of
the conference pledging the territorial
integrity of China. Subsidiary agree
ments were made for the withdrawal
OF Japan from Shantung and Siberia.
Tension Eased.
The conference materially eased the
tension in the Pacific area and eStab-
lished for the first time in the history
of the world the principle that arma-
ment was a subject of international
negotiation and not merely a matter
to be determined by national fear.
BY establishing the principle of limi-
tation, certain maXimums were set
which it was hoped would establish
precedents for ultimately reducing
total tonnage at a fixed ratio
In the political field this series of
treaties eased the tension because, at
the same time that they served as
check on japanese eXpansionist ten
denotes in China and on the Asiatic
mainland, they also made it virtually
impossible for the United States or
Great Britain ever to engage in war
with Japan with any prospect of sue
cess. The American position in the
Philippines was left so weakened from
q naval point of view that the islands
must be regarded as virtually defense
less. The reason for this is that Ja-
pan by dominating the lines of COM
munications between America and the
Philippines make it impossible for the
American Navy to engage in naval
action in Philippine waters and be
adequately supported.
What has happened in the years
since the Washington Conference? In
1924 the American Congress included
in a measure for the 'tation of
European immigration clause ex-
Guiding Japanese. This was unfortu-
nately placed before the public with a
series of unjustifiably bitter attacks
on Japan coming even from Senators
who, like the late Mr. Henry Cabot
Lodge, should have realized that they
were being unnecessarily offensive to
the japanese.
Criticism in America.
The resulting bitterness on the part
of the japanese toward America was
made even more intense when, at the
time of the occupation of Manchuria
by Japan in the Autumn of 1881, the
American people were outspoken in
their condemnation of Japan's aggres-
sive policy. This condemnation be-
came even louder when the Japanese
attempted to occupy Shanghai. 1t has
died down during the last few months,
but it has left feeling Of distrust
Of the Japanese in the minds of many
Americans.
In the meantime Americas naval
policy was dominated by Well-mean-
ing but misguided form of idealism
actively supported by pacif1sts and by
organizations representing various
churches in the country. The pres
sure was against building up to the
treaty limits on the theory that. if we
built, other nations would feel obliged
to build so as to keep up to US The
doctrine was preached that we should
set an example in the limitation of
ornaments by voluntarily foregoing
our right TO build up to the treaty
strength.
President Coolidge realized, how
ever, as early as 1925 that the other
nations were not following our ex-
ample. and he endeavored by direct
negotiations to induce them to refrain
from building When this failed he
called conference which was held
in Geneva In 1927, having as its pur-
pose to extend the ratios laid down at
the Washington Conference for capi-
tai ships in other categories Of YES
sells. namely, cruisers, destroyers and
submarines.
Conference Failed. :.
The conference failed, owing, pri-
inarily. to the fact that the American
delegation sought to induce the Brit
ish to scrap ships that were built or
building In return for paper ships to
be scrapped by the United States. The
British admiralty, seeing its advan-
tage over the United States, over
played it's hand and forced President
Coolidge, in the Autumn of 1927, to
make a public statement calling at
tention in sharp terms to the lack of
candor and fair play on the part Of
certain British naval representatives
who had participated in the Geneva
conference At the same time he
made it clear that we had no alter
native but to resume our building pro-
gram.
When President Hoover took office