Evening star., 1934-01-07
T. s. in DANGER OF BEING
DRAWN INTO WORLD WAR
Must "Wage'' or ''Suffer" Neutrality,
Unless Steps Are Taken to
Formulate Policy.

with Britain must solve the question.
The British, 1t is assumed, will not dare
to repeat their course of the Worla war
period, because our fleet Will tie 700
strong to permit that. But this means,
in effect, that we shall be ready to as
sist in the defeat of Britain, because we
desire to take every possible profit OF
new war from all contestants. 1t would
mean backing Germany against Britain,
because. with access to our markets,
Germany might defeat Britain.
Here is the vicious circle which opens
before as We cannot be neutral ana
insist upon our neutral rights" with
out being a factor, and perhaps deci-
sive factor, in any European war in
which Britain is involved. Is there any
escape from il? Mr.. Warren returns an
affirmative answer, but bases it upon an
American recognition that IN practice
no such thing as neutral rights" exist
When war comes he would have us enter
into negotiations with the belligerents
to extract as large a concession to our
maritime interests as possible and for
the rest avoid an insistence upon our al
leqed rights, which must lead to ultl-
matums following notes, as the expert
ence of 1914-17 demonstrated.
That is the policy which I have de
scribed as suffering neutrality" It
would quite obviously avoid collision
with British sea power, but 1t would just
as patiently invite resentment, and even
reprisal. from the land powers at war
with Britain. An alternative. theoret-
ically if perhaps not practically, would
be an embargo of all American trade
with any belligerent. But that would
involve domestic losses of unmistakable
proportions.
Does Not See Clear Answer.
Over against the Warren suggestion
one must set that of Mr.. Walter Lipp-
mann, who boldly proposes that we
should now enter into negotiations with
Great Britain to determine British and
American policy in advance. In justice
to Mr.. Lippmann, I should say that his
attitude is rather one of proposing that
we explore the possibilities of this course
than of asserting its certain value. He
sees the dilemma clearly, but he admits
| very frankly that he does not see any
clear answer.
The Lippmann thesis is interesting.
because it rests upon two 1neScapable
assumptions-frs that a European
war Is now possibility; second. that
the United States has always been In
volved in European conflicts when Brit
I
wise. Unless something is done in ad-
vance-some agreement reached with
the British-will not this occur again?
That is Mr. Lippman'S point.
The difficulty here is obvious. Would
either the United States or Great Brit
ain mortgage itself in advance? Before
the World War the British had tenta-
lively gone very far in the direction of
the freedom of the seas" In the So
called declaration of London. which had
been accepted by a British government,
but not ratified Had 1t been ratified, 1t
would have changed the whole charac-
ter of contraband, assured the Germans
the right to import and the neutrals to
export to the belligerents all sorts of
foodstuffS and raw materials, and, IT.
the later Judgment of British admiralty
experts, this would have cost the allies
the war
Now I cannot conceive of any British
government ever making the same mis-
take again. The British are not un-
justly satisfied that victory in 1918 was
due far more to naval than military
causes, due primarily to the blockade.
They are satisfied that in the World
War, as in the Napoleonic struggle and
in the Civil War sea power decided the
issue. And they believe that this would
prove the case again as before. They
may be right or wrong in this assump-
ton for the future, but upon it British
policy is bound to be based.
Would Meet Polite Evasion.
If, therefore, the American Govern
ment approached the British today to
ask for some agreement in advance as to
how the British would employ their sea
power next time feel sure they would
be met by polite evasion. In effect the
British would say that it was impossi-
BILE to tell in advance how sea power
could and would be used and that this
very uncertainty was an al-sufflcient
reason for not making any agreement
which might prove embarrassing later.
If, moreover, our Government pressed
the point, British resentment woudd be
| instant and public opinion in the British
Isles and the Empire would see In such
an American action an attempt to ex-
ploit the parity in naval forces estab-
lished at the London Conference TO
(Conttnued on Third Page.)