Evening star., 1934-03-18

ally is not deficiency of money, men,
training or equipment.
The deficiency is psychological, and
is based upon the total absence OF
sound military aviation policy and ma
tional defense philosophy in the
United States. After eight years Of
handling War Department appropria-
tons bills and listening to the testi-
mony of high-ranking officers of all
branches, 1 am convinced that there
have been formulated no well-rounded
modern tactics for military aviation
and that there exists no complete
concept of military flying as related to
our national defense problems.
1t is the sacred name of national
defense as applied to aviation, that
has caused this youthful art to bog
down in its own footsteps. Aviation
suffers not so much from bad men as
from excessive ballyhoo. Clear, i'm
partial observation and thought about
military and naval aviation have been
continuously Shrouded in a deep fog
OF publicity and exploitation ever since
the Wright brothers first left the
Cheated by Industry.
For example, it has been pointed
out that Eddie Rickenbacker flies
across the continent as a passenger,
making new high speed record, and
the press of the country halls him as
the pilot of the ship. The real fact
is that he does not have a pilots
license of any description. Flyers
cross the Atlantic and the public
through the press learns to regard
them as tribal deitieS with all the
virtues of saints and all the taboos
of aboriginal medicine men.
A strictly war military machine
the Army Air CorpS-is given a peace
time commercial mission to perform
and the public hoWls ''legaliZed
murder" This attitude is displayed
not because the military have been
cheated by selfish and hort-sighted
industry that has sold below standard
articles to an inept and unSuSpecting
military group, but because the mill
tary group prevented the commission
OF fraud upon itself
Behind all this ballyhoo and popu-
lariZed public attitudes there stands
our military and naval aviation with
out even the Semblance of tactics or
strategy intelligently related to ma
tiOnal defense problems. For instance,
Army aviation by regulation and order
is tied fast to the ground troops Of
the military establishment. Ground
troops march at best 2I2 miles per
hour Army aviation still remains
forced to perform missions" for these
ground troops. 1t is regarded as only
an auxiliary arm of our military ma
chine, similar to the Signal Corps.
the veterinary service or the quarter
master. 1t has never been allowed
to function Independently. to solve its
own problems or to achieve the status
its three -dimenSional nature de-
mands OF it. .
UnacknowIedged by Navy.
Likewise. naval aviation is tied fast
to the surface vessels of our sea forces.
The Navy buys practically the same
planes, operates under the same laws
and is burdened with the same psy-
chOlogy as military aviation. Thus we
see the British Navy providing its
cruisers with four fighting planes and
its battleShips with three fighting
planes. while our own Navy gives its
similar vessels only observation air.
craft. The Navy has never acknoWl-
edged its air power as cohesive
striking force. 1t gives its aviatOrS four
years of surface vessel training and
at its Naval Academy, and
then somehow expects these same men
to throw off those ShackleS and leap
full-bloWn and efficient into the aero
nautical sphere.
Up until January 81, 1884, the Army
Air Corps received no mention what
ever as an independent force from the
pundits of the War Depart
ment. Every chief Of staff in his an
nual report since the war has referred
to Army aviation as an arm OF the
service SubServient to all other arms.
Even the air act of 1926 and the great
public interest surrounding that piece
of legislation made no dent upon the
thinking of the desk soldiers and mill
tary theorists of our service schools
and training centers. Even today the
Air Corps is not represented upon the
war council" of the War Department.
The G. H. @. warplane scheme an
nounced hurriedly January 27 was the
first inkling that aviation, as Such, was
beginning to be recognized as some
thing more than message bearer and
forming glorified carrier pigeon
service for the rest of the Army.
This c. H. Q. plan threw into clear
relief the absurdity of our military
and naval aviation policies of the past.
And the tragic attempt OF the Army
to fly the airmail made these aviation
policies seem what they truly have
been-a CHASTITY joke, or, at best, gro
tesuue proof of the muddied manlpu-
lation by the American military OF the
fastest, most deadly and most ell
fective war weapon ever invented by
man.
"Fair Weather Flyers"
A general would be called stupid II
he trained his soldiers only in fair
weather, in balmy climates and dur
ing the daylight hours. Yet our mil
itary and naval aviation. as the rec
ords show, has almost generally fol-
lowed this procedure during the past
eight years. A military machine, to
be of any effectiveness at all, must be
able to take the field or take to sea
in any season, no matter how inclem-
ent the weather or how dark the
night. Surprise-perhaps the greatest
essential in Warfare-unusual or un-
occasinnS must be chosen