Evening star., 1934-05-27
BY REAR ADMIRAL YATES
STIRLING. JR.. U. S. N.

VIE CdpdIcSc representatives al
the Washington Conference on
Limitation Of Armaments in
L 1921 were so much concerned
over the possible expansion of
the British naval base at Hongkong
and the United States naval base at
Manila that before agreeing to the
@5-3 ratios at that conference they
caused to be written into the treaty
the virtual abandonment of those
fortified naval positions. Japanese
naval authorities at that time saw
clearly that superior fleets of those
nations, securely based in the Orient,
would exercise a strong veto power to
prevent the carrying out Of japanese
political intentions toward China
which might not harmonic with the
political interest of those sea powers
Great Britain, while agreeing to re-
tire from Hongkong, insisted upon a
new naval position for her feet at
Singapore. An effective British fleet
based there will be in the focus of
Oriental trade routes and will be q
distinct encouragement to any hostile
attempt by Japan upon India, the
Dutch East Indies, Borneo, Australia
and New Zealand. It seems assured
now. as ever, that the British policy
is unwilling, even with a feet much
smaller In numbers than formerly, to
give up Britain's boasted control of
the seas in all parts Of the world.
Britain Favors Cruisers.
Great Britain visions that her con-
troll Of the seven seas lies primarily
in her cruiser strength. With cruis-
ers in numbers and with correctly To-
Gated bases for them along essential
trade routes, British trade can be
given adequate security. When We
consider that $500 900 900 worth Of
British property, ships and cargoes
are afloat daily in the China seas,
Australian and Indian waters. it is
only natural that Great Britain will
desire to maintain the safety of this
essential wealth.
The United States, abandoning the
Manila base, was obliged to be con-
tent with her nearest naval base in
the Hawaiian Islands, 1000 m i e S
from Oriental waters. Our loss in CIV
ing up q naval base in Philippine
waters was in decreased mobility Of
our naval ships in the Orient and in
decline Of national prestige in the
Far East. Our floating trade out
there is negligible compared with that
OF the British Empire. At Hawaii
the United States feet menaces Japan
far less than Great Britain's feet
does at Singapore.
Limitation Reduces warships.
Limitation Of naval armaments has
considerably reduced the number OF
warxhips In each class available to
each of the great sea powers. This
shortage makes 1t increasingly difficult
for Great Britain, while retaining
naval power in other areas, to send an
adequate fleet to base at Singapore
for the protection of its empire COM
mitments. In war between Great
Britain and Japan the British navy
would wish to have nearly the entire
existing feet In Oriental waters. Vic
tory might not be bought with less.
Limitation Of ornaments works a
hardship to sea powers like Great
Britain, and In lesser degree to the
United States, due to the far-fiung OBJ
legations of those empires, by decreas-
ing the number of warships available
to each. Insufficient numbers of war
ships can be held outside of a possible
Oriental war zone to retain naval
power elsewhere.
Japan profits in comparison, because
her empire Is more compact and re-
quires fewer ships for defense, while
none are required to be held outside
the war zone. This geographical con-
solidation of the Japanese Empire also
makes it inevitable that any war in
which that nation may be engaged will
be fought almost certainly near her
home bases.
Until only short time ago Japan
believed her security lay in building
up her fleet to treaty ratios and ex-
Guiding rival sea powers from naval
bases close enough to threaten her
lines OF communication and her in
dustrial centers. Japan's attention has
been directed more especially toward
Great Britain and the United States.
with war fleets numerically superior
to her own.
A naval base has been likened to a
gun and a fleet to the projectile fired
from the gun. The feet finds at the
base secure anchorage, supplies. re-
pairs, fuel and recreation for the per-
sonnel. The fleet when fired" by
the base can operate only a certain
distance in time and space; then it
must return for fuel and supplies and
II 1t has been in contact with enemy
ships, for repairs to injuries suffered
In action. The distance a fleet can
operate from its base depends upon
the steaming radius Of the individual
snlps and upon the speeds used by
the several ships of the fleet. Twenty
live hundred miles seems a conserva-
tive estimate of the distance a feet
may go under normal conditions.
Singapore is 1900 miles, while Ha-
wa1i Is 3,400 miles from Japan. Both
are, therefore, outside the base
range"
Importance of Bases.
In the past it has been difficult to
make our countrymen realize the
great importance Of outlying bases to
fleet. Home bases receive support
and are supplied almost too pienti-
fully. The home bases furnish mobil-
lty to warshipS, but only to q definite
distance from our shores. As q gun.
the home base fires" the feet in any
direction to seaward. If the arc of
the circle representing half the fleets
steaming radius does not include an
outlying base, the feet must return
after it has reached the arc of the
circle. If there is a base, in the di-
rection Of the fleets advance, within
the arc, where supplies, fuel, refit
and security can be obtained, then the
outlying base becomes a new gun and
can project the feet further on its
mission. In not supplying outlying
bases for our fleet, we might be said
to have furnished a projectile, the
fleet, without the essential gun to
fire" It.
A British fleet at Singapore or a
United States feet at Hawaii must,
therefore, be considered on the de-
fensive and not in anyway q menace
to Japan, for both bases are outside