Evening star., 1934-06-03
MEDDLING in FAR EAST
SPELLS WAR WITH JAPAN
America Must Prepare if She Means to
Uphold Sanctity of Treaties Where
Interests Are Not Concerned.

sessions and those of the Soviet Union.
In doing this they manifestly repudi-
ated the pledges which they had given
in signing the covenant Of the League
Of Nations and the Kellogg pact.
Now the question arises once more:
Does the japanese program in Man
churia-its thinly disguised protecto-
rate over Manchukuo-constitu any
material injury to the United States?
Again 1t Is hard to discover that
American trade and commerce-which
are in any event inconsiderable-have
in the aggregate been adversely af-
fected to any considerable extent.
American life and property are not
menaced. On the contrary, so far as
these are concerned, there can be no
question that japanese rule has
brought security, not removed it.
In the matter of Manchuria, then,
the issue between Japan and ourselves
arises from the fact that Japanese
action in this Chinese province consti-
tuted plain and unmistakable breach
Of treaty obligation undertaken by
the japanese in company with our
selves and seven other nations. In
face of that violation we have under
taken to deny our recognition to Man
chukuo, which Is our unqueStioned
right, but our purpose in such a denial
is to employ at least moral pressure
to discipline the Japanese because Of
their moral offending
In reality, then, we are setting up
in the Far East to vindicate the sane
tity of treaties. We are taking upon
rpIa NJ mora licf- fla
This is equally disclosed in the course
of Mr.. Stimson at the time of the
original Manchurian affair and of Mr..
Hull in the still more recent japanese
Monroe Doctrine proclamation. In the
matter of Manchuria we promulgated
the so-called Stimson Doctrine, which
committed us to a policy of refusing
recognition in cases where territory
had been taken by violence and in de-
finance of treaty obligations. In the
matter of the so-called Far Eastern
Monroe Doctrine" We reiterated the
same principle.
There is, of course, something to be
said for this policy. 1t is obviously
a high-minded and inspiring sight to
see a great power unselfshly commit
ting itself to the defense of interna-
tional morality at the risk Of becoming
involved in a war. But it is equally
evident that to take such position
lofty as are the motives which inspire
its just as patiently to accept the
risks of war. For the Japanese are
just as determined to make good their
illegal performances in Manchuria as
were We in the similar case Of Panama.
Two War Risk Aspects.
AS to the actual risk of war this
must be viewed from two aspects.
There is, on the one hand, the patent
possibility of conflict arising from an
incident and, on the other. the more
serious prospect of war arising from
direct clash Of policy. As to the first,
it cannot be disguised that our course
in the Manchurian affair has aroused
intense and passionate resentment on
the part of the Japanese. That re-
sentiment is due to the fact that our
course has been dictated not by any
immediate interference with our own
material interests, but by our accept
ance of the role of defender of the
sanctity of treaties.
The consequence of our action has
been to put additional strain on Japa-
nese resources and to encourage
Chinese intransigeance. Resenting
these consequences, identifying in
them the disclosures Of deliberate
purpose to hamper and hinder Japan,
acting as her people think in defense
of their material interests and their
own national security, the Japanese
have come to look upon American
policy as inimical to themselves. In
such a situation, however correct and
careful the official attitude may be, it
is not possible for the government to
protect itself or us against some act
of violence on the part of hotheads
and super-nationalistic youths. who
are not lacking in Japan.
The second danger is, however, in
my judgment. the more serious. No
Japanese government could possibly
avert hostilities were the United States
to permit, much less encourage its ma
tionals, either by loans or by supply
ing war materials, to assist the Chinese
in new attacks upon Japan in Man
chukuo or elsewhere Gas the United
States certainly has not done hereto
fore). And of course the same thing
would be true in an even larger meas
ure we're the United States officially
to give encouragement either to China
or the Soviet Union to pursue policies
hostile to Japanese purposes and dan
gerous to Japanese security in Man.
chukuo (as. again, despite Japanese
suspicious to the contrary, we have
never done). Then we should have
war
The question that is posed by the
Japanese issue, then, is simple in the
extreme. On the one hand, apart
from the dubious advantage of sup
plying money and arms to the Chi
neSe to enable them to attack the
japanese, no material interest Of the
United States is today at stake. The
japanese are prepared to give neces-
Sary assurances In respect to the open
door in China-in fact, they have re-
peatedly done so. Those guarantees
have present value at least, for
Japanese interests are not seriously
affected thereby. On the other hand,
there is no blinking the fact that If
we are resolved to play the role of
guardian of international morals and
guarantor of the sanctities of treaties,
there is no present possibility of COM
posing our differences with Japan or
escaping the constant possibility of
war.
United States Belief Complicating.
What complicates the whole prob
lem fatally is the widespread belief in
this country that it Is possible to do
something for Righteousness safely
that we can, on the one hand, pursue
course In the Far East manifestly
disastrous for Japanese interests and.
on the other, escape all unpleasant
consequences of such action. This de-
lIsion rests upon the assumption that
Il takes two nations to make a decla-
ration of war, which is manifestly
untrue. 1t also rests upon the equally
inexact assumption that japanese poll
10y is dictated by handful of hot
heads who cannot long retain control
and that the moral pressure exerted
by our policy will end by overthrowing