Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1934-05-13
III. s. ARMS FARLEY POLICY
H. IS HELD AID TO PEACE
End of Norman H. Davis Negotiations
in Europe Seen Salutary to Ameri'
can Relations Abroad.

pudiated the new convention as We
rejected the old covenant of Paris.
For the American people, in their
present mood, are not prepared TO
underwrite European peace and order
with their own blood and treasure.
Neither are the European peoples pre-
| pared to lay down their own means Of
self-defense to satisfy the demands Of
an American administration in the
matter of disarmament unless they
obtain such an underwriting The two
states of mind are set, rigid, uncom-
promising. No European or Amer
lean Government which failed to
recognize this fact could hope to OBJ
tain the support Of its public.
Defense Promised.
The idea that the United States has
a European mission is, in itself, pre-
posterous. 1t presupposes an eleva-
ton in morality and an altitude in
intelligence which do not exist. When
Mr.. Wilson, for example, told the
Rumanians in the Peace Conference
that if they would consent to allow
international supervision of the treat
ment OF their mlnorities. the United
States in time of need. would send it.
fleet and Army to defend Rumanian
frontiers, he obviously believed what
he said, but the truth is that no ma
! ton is prepared to make any such
sacrifice.
The British will make a Locarno
agreement covering the regions of the
Rhine which are a matter of i'm
mediate concern for them. The Ital-
lans will guarantee the independence
OF Austria, because that is essential
to their own security. France will
back the status quo on the Vistula to
insure the aid of the Polish army il
she is attacked on the Rhine. We
in the United States have BY the
Monroe Doctrine closed the Americas
to European imperialism. But no ma
ton or people is ready to risk its own
peace to preserve the status QUO in
regions where it has no direct in
tereStS.
Nor is any nation or people, which
Is actually heavily armed because it
Is faced by the undisguised purpose
OF another country to take portions Of
its territory, ever likely to abandon
It's defenSeS until its neighborS re-
nounce their purposes or its friends
| consent to share in the burdens of
defense. Peoples today do not think
that way and governments, as a con-
sequence. do not act that way. But
the whole WilSonian experiment was
based upon the assumption that every
people was ready to be its brothers
keeper.
| Arms Seem Excessive
What Mr.. Davis urges that we
should do would be not only possible
but prudent, if only We had Canada
and not Germany as a neighbor."
one eminent French statesman said
| to me at Geneva. But Mr.. Davis
/ cannot convince US that if we
Scrapped some Of our heavy artillery
the consequence would be that Hitler
would become a Bennett. And we
cannot persuade him that the size of
your ornaments is due to the char
acter of your neighbors. Indeed, in
the light OF the character of your
neighbors, the state of your arma-
ments seems to US excessive"
1t was clear at the very outset Of
the Disarmament Conference that
! France would consent to reduce her
ornaments only as Britain and the
United States agreed to guarantee her
security. 1t was equally clear that
/ in the state of mind of both the
British and the American pubIics
| guarantees were not to be had. Nor
was it less evident that Germany
would be satisfied only with arma-
ment parity with France. and France
was bound to oppose this, supported
/ by all her allies save as they were
insured against evil consequences.
Those were the basic facts of the
Disarmament Conference. They never
changed. You could go away from
Geneva for weeks or months and
come back and find things just where
they were when you left. Statesmen
disappeared, ministries fell, govern
ments were overturned. but neverthe-
less in the conference hall the words
security, parity and reduction con-
tinued to be thrown back and forth
increasingly. Time and again the OPP
timistic Mr.. Davis. through the press,
would inform home folks that Amer
lea had saved" the conference, that
a settlement was "in sight," that
France had changed her whole point
Of view and that England was COM
ing round.
But. in fact. the spectacle of the
conference was always that of
treadmill on which weary statesmen
did their turn. In fact. in the end it
came to have the appearance of a
six-day bicycle race. with the audi
ence as bored as the performers. All
over the world the peoples recognized
that nothing could come Of it, al
though they could only explain the
failure by criticizing one people or
another But they were momentarily
deceived into the belief that some
thing was being done. only to wake
up to the fact that after infinite
progress every one was just where he
started.
Reality Injected.
When Washington announced that
American activity at Geneva was now
suspended until Europe adjusted its
political difficulties, it interjected a
note of reality into American policy.
Once the United States Senate re-
jected the treaty of Versailles and
the public opinion Of the country
| SuppOIIcu IIldL dCIlUIl our IOl6 dS
missionary in Europe came to an
end. We couldn't offer to defend peo-
pie who diSarmed to suit our views,
thus We couldn't persuade them to
disarm. But if We tried, then we ex-
posed ourselves to new demands for
| guarantees.
We did get the creditor nations to
permit Germany to suspend repara-
tons payments by giving them q
moratorium in debt payments to US.
But when Germany refused to resume
payment so did they. We had our
way, but we paid for it. We can have
our way about disarmament by pay
ing for 1t similarly. After Wilson's
failure with the treaty. however, the
European motto has been pay as
you enter" Mr. Davis attempted to
get things back to a basis of mutual
trust. He failed because on both
sides Of the Atlantic there was equal
| diStr1lSt founded lIrOn enllallv cood