Evening star., 1934-01-21
Trouble Ahead in Far East?

C1Culaf DOCK Will PROBABLY make IL SeL,
| and that Is all there Is to 1t.
A far more fundamental disagree
r1ent, because 1t was q disagreement In
principle, came recently over the in
| vasion of Manchuria. An attempt to
explain the japanese point Of view must
not be taken as conformation of recent
japanese actions in China, but simply
as showing the divergence in principle
between the two nations.
Americans love their country, but are
quite willing to criticize 1t. The Japa-
nese love their country, but brook no
criticism. Patriotism is the essence Of
their blood, is the air they breathe
All loyalties center in the fatherland
and in the imperial family. Therefore,
anything done in the name or for the
sake Of the Emperor, who represents the
country, Is altogether right in the eyes
of the mass of the people. AS a theory
this is wholly laudable. 1t makes for
virility, for self-sacrifice, for devotion
to a great cause. In practice it may
destroy the critical faculty, in that it
cials for a reasoned support Of the best
interests Of the nation.
To Americans it seemed that this was
what happened in the case of Man
churia. Americans were not opposed to
the national aspirations OF Japan for
expansion OF its influence, but they were
eager for the preservation of the various
postwar treaties; they did not like to
see one friend profit by the weakness
of another. Essentially 1t was q conf1lct
of ideals.
The Manchurian trouble is too recent
to enable US to evaluate the different
steps in American policy. That mis-
takes were undoubtedly made is only
natural and human. but there also can
be no doubt that the main stream OF
American policy was correct. The De-
partment Of State was not unconscious
of the tribulations of the japanese IN
Manchuria. Of the long series OF un-
provoked attacks on Japanese rights. IT
did not ignore the truth that Man
churia, because of its proximity and the
fact that it must always be an 1ndls-
pensible source of supply of Japan,
stood in a very special relationship to
the island empire But 1t did most ear
nestly believe that this relationship
could better be advanced through peace
full measures. 1t deplored the doml-
nance of the military in Japan, doml-
nance that meant virtual breakdown
of civil government, so far as the max
ing of policy was concerned, tnat lg-
nored any treaty obligations which, IN
the eyes of the army, were contrary 10
the immediate interests OF the empire
The situation was difficult Tor the De-
partment of State The League OF Ma
tions had taken Jurisdiction of the dis
pute at the beginning, but wanted the
United States to cooperate. The
United States was clearly involved
through the terms Of the nine-p power
treaty guaranteeing the political and
administrative integrity OF CHINA anu
through the terms Of the Kellogg pact
renouncing war as national policy
and promising to seek peaceful settle
ment of disputes. Cooperation was
difficult because America was oeter-
mined to take no measures which mlgnt
lead toward war. no measures winch
might make the Japanese feel that II
was influencing the nations in the
League to institute a drastic policy
America as a potential enemy looms
large in Japanese eyes and. in the tenn
per Of the military, as illustrated by
the senseless Shanghai fehting. the ap-
pearance Of hostility might have led to
dire results.
AS one looks back over the kaleido-
scopic events of the last two years 1t IS
yerv easy to criticize the separate steps
taken, but it is not easy to criticize ad-
versely the main line OF American
policy. 1t would undoubtedly have been
wiser to insist at the very beginning
that China and Japan institute direct
conversations. But that is to look back
ward.
At the time the world was all too
ready to listen to the protestatlons OF
China that in such conversations 1t
would have no chance. 1t is clear now
that China would have retained a
shadowy sovereignty over Manchuria. 1t
certainly was not clear then that with
out such conversations China stood to
lose everything.
But nobody appreciated the deter
mination of the japanese military lead
ers nobody realized the impotence OF
the japanese government in the face
of the military. What the American
Government wanted-its only purpose
in everything it did, alone or IN con-
junction with the League-was to pre-
serve the postwar treaties which
seemed the only indication of progress
toward a stable world. Therefore, and
for that reason only America protested
against the successive Japanese move
ments when they we're clearly in con-
travention of the treatieS-movements
In many cases, which the japanese
government had solemnly promised
would not be made
The press of the United States was
far more bitter than was the Depart
ment of State. but the press was deal
ing in facts of the moment. was not
looking ahead The President always
counseled patience. He knew that an
other World War was stupid and
immoral way to settle a local war.
What the future may bring, or
whether the puppet state Of Manchukuo
will remain. no man can say. The
United States was the first to announce
that it would not recognize the fruits
of aggression. and 1t referred. primarily.
of course, to the Japanese invasion OF
Manchuria.
1t is very much to the credit Of the
japanese government and suggests that
a calmer spirit is abroad in the land
that there was little or no excitement
when the United States recognized the
Russian Soviet government. The Rus
sian government had published docu-
ments of a sensational character alleged
to have been sent by the Japanese
representatives in Manchukuo to his
government in Toxic. Nobody outside
Of Moscow knew the reason for this