Evening star., 1934-11-25
BRITISH GET ADVANTAGE
BY MISTAKES OF DAVIS
Peace Policy Toward Japan While U. S.
Stands Uncompromisingly Against
Parity Makes This Country Target.


most regard for the rules Of poker,
and what these rules permit they
never hesitate to do. Mr.. Davis, how
ever, goes into the game INSPIRED by
the rules of a community chest drive,
and the results are disastrous.
The United States should never
have permitted itself to get into a
discussion like that in London on such
terms as to enable Great Britain to
play it of against Japan. II it were
impossible to advance to find any
common ground for action between
the two Anglo-SaXon countries then
there was no need of going at all.
But to walk into the web resolved to
play the fly in one more international
affair was absurd. Talleyrand once
said that the Frenchman and the
Briton were as natural allies as the
horse and the man. But he added
that 1t was unnecessary that France
should always be the horse
To be angry with the British, as
some Of the obviously inspired cables
from London suggest Mr.. Davis was.
when he found where he had been
landed, is quite absurd. It is not the
fault Of the British that Mr.. Davis
misunderstood the situation. British
craftsmanship would be justly criti-
cized if it was stupid enough to
shoulder risks it could avoid or bear
burdens for which other shoulders
were conveniently waiting
I have attended innumerable inter-
national conferences and I never saw
British craftsmanship vary its tactics.
Always the attempt has been to let
the other fellows do the work At the
Washington Conference the British
used French stupidity to enable them
TO escape agreeing to American parity
except in battleShips. Thus while all
the profit of Sarraut's refusal to agree
to Mr.. Hughes proposals went to the
British, all the blame fell upon the
French. That, of course, was because
Mr.. Hughes assumed from the start
that the one thing he wanted the
British also wanted, namely parity all
along the line. But in reality the
British wanted to get parity where
they did not have it and to retain the
supremacy which they already pos
sessed. They got both, and, for the
moment at least, charged the bill to
France.
In any international conference the
British delegates will at once assume
tone Of sweet reasonableness and
position of a mediator. They know
what they want from the start, they
know how much they are willing to
pay for it. But if they can get it for
nothing, so much the better. At
Washington they wanted to eliminate
our prospective supremacy in capital
ships, and if it had been necessary,
they would have paid for it in parity
all around. But, thanks to the
French-and Mr.. Hughes-they paid
nothing.
In the Far East the British want
to avoid any peril to themselves from
the rising tide of japanese ambition
and strength. In that respect their
interest is real As a matter Of fact
Japan Is 10 times as great menace
for the British as for the Americans.
But the British also want to avoid as
long as possible any suspicion in the
japanese mind that they are really
blocking the japanese game. Just
as long as Uncle Sam seems the
wicked partner. John Bull can radiate
secure benevolence.
Just why there should be an Amer
| ican-Japanese tension over the Far
East and not an Anglo-Japanese fric-
tion no one on earth can explain ex-
cept in terms of the blindness of
American craftsmanship and diplo-
macy. Even IN the economic sphere it
is British textiles and not American
automobiles which are suffering from
Japanese competition. Why there
should be talk of an American-Jap-
anese war and not of an Anglo-Jap-
anese conflict is incredible, until one
begins to reflect upon the comparative
skill of British and American diplo-
macy.
Years ago at the Washington Con-
ference remember distinguished
Dutch journalist calling my attention
to the fashion in which the control of
conference held in an American
Capital had shifted YES" said he,
"the voice is still the voice of Hughes,
but the hand is the hand of Balfour."
And at Geneva. some years later, un-
less am mistaken, it was Karl Radek,
the famous Russian correspondent,
who said: ''Ah. I see England still ex-
poets every Davis to do his duty"
But just imagine what would hap
pen if the question of British security
we're actually raised! Consider with
what speed an "escalator clause"
emerged in the London Conference of
1880. On one occasion, however-at
the 1927 Coolidge Conference at
Geneva-the British tactics were used
at their own expense. At that cele-
brated meeting Japan strove with in
finite f1nesse to display its equal SYM
pathy for both Anglo-Saxon nations
who quarrel was heaven-sent oppor-
tunity. If that quarrel could have
been prolonged the profit for the jap
anese would have been incredible since
their mastery of the Far East would
have been beyond challenge. Yet they
emerged from Geneva wearing the
halos of the peace makers, equally
praised by both the British and the
Americans for having tactfully con-
tributed to, the persistence Of a dis
pute in which Japan could be the only
gamer.
One is permitted, perhaps, to regret
that the American State Department
has been less diligent than the jap
anes foreign office in studying the
methods of British diplomacy. There
is so much to learn from 1t and, on our
part, such an obvious need to under
stand it. Fundamentally, too, it bor-
rows the art Of the Japanese jiu jitsu,
which is the art of letting the other
fellows energy prove tna cause Of his
own undoing.
(Copyright. 1934)