Evening star., 1934-03-18
BY FRANK II. STMONDS.

pOoL-WdT SySLGul O1 Ill
. liances incident to the making
Of non-aggreSsion pact be-
tween Poland and Germany. Still
more recently a blunt statement Of
Charles de Broqueville, Belgian
premier, that Germany would arm
and no one could stop her-since
France was manifestly unready for a
preventive war-Stirred up a new SEN
sation in Paris. For the French were
thus faced with the fact that Belgium,
like Poland, had visibly escaped the
French system of alliances
Now comes the plain intimation
that Czechoslovakia is looking signifi-
cantly toward Berlin in the hope of
there aggression pact
like that already granted to Poland.
Concomitantly Benes, the present
Czech foreign minister, who may
soon be President, is reported plan
ming a visit to Rome. And this means
in simple terms that Czechoslovakia,
convinced that France is no longer
a sure reliance, is turning over the
possibility of finding a new ally
either in Germany or Italy.
What this foreshadows must be
clear. The whole system Of alliances
which France constructed after the
United States refused to take up
Woodrow Wilson's tripartite treaty
of guarantee-the system made up of
Poland, the little entente and Bel
gium-is crashing. Poland has gone,
Belgium has drawn back, Czechoslo-
vakia is hunting for a better guar
antor of her obviously precarious ex-
istence than her French ally. And
that indicates that the little entente
itself Is beginning to crumble.
Challenge Brought Home.
Explanation Of this significant phe-
nomenon must be sought in the inco-
herencies Of domestic politics in
France. For two years before the
February revolution power rested
with a coalition of Radical Socialists
and Socialists; that is, with the Left
as contrasted with the Right, with the
Liberal as opposed to the Nationalist
parties. In that period French for
eign policy weakened steadily. Broadly
speaking the French people seemed
increasingly unwilling to undertake
the burden of maintaining the status
quo in the east and center of Europe
as an assurance of their own Sc
curity.
The rise Of Hitler in Germany and
the unmistakably aggressive and ex-
pansive purposes of the Nazis brought
home to the masses in France the
fact that the whole territorial sys-
tenn of the peace treaties was under
direct challenge. Again, the German
withdrawal from the League and dec
laration of purpose to rearm brought
France face to face with the neces-
sity of either embarking upon a war
of prevention against Germany or re-
signing herself to German rearma-
ment.
In this situation the French looked
to London only to find that the Brit
ish were alike unwilling to approve
and unprepared to share in any form
Of coercion calculated either to pre-
vent German rearmament or to pro-
hibit Austro- German union. And the
Left governments in France were un-
willing to 60 it alone. They criticized
the British policy alike as blind and
amounting to desertion Of France.
But having failed to change that
policy they largely initiated it.
Thus while the BritiSh-at least In
French eyes-were abandoning the
former French ally, the French-in
the eyes of the Czechs, Poles and
Rumanians-were similarly deserting
their present allies. Feeling them
selves abandoned, the Poles gladly
seized upon the offer of Hitler for
1O-year truce and economic CO.
operation. Fearing that they will
presently be left in the 1urch, the
Czechs now seem ready to accept any
similar offer.
Sudden Shift Possible.
When the revolution occurred In
Paris in February and resulted in the
creation Of q strong national1Stlc d.
rectorate of foreign affairs, made up
Of Doumergue, Barthou, Tardieu and
Herriot (Herriot, although Of the
Left, Is nationalistic in foreign policy, /,
there was q general conviction in
many circles-a conviction which my
readers may recall 1 shared-that
France would now act to save her
alliance and halt German armament.
And of course the sole line of action
possible was a war of prevention.
1t is still conceivable that there
may be some sudden shift in Paris;
~
possibility Of preventive war this
Spring or Summer. Nevertheless the
chances Of such action not only seem
slight today, but are visibly becoming
slighter all the time. The truth Is
that the domestic political situation
in France appears to be such that
the present government does not feel
itself strong enough to act vigorously.
The undertaking now Is to meet the
obvious German danger not by direct
action, but by the vast increase OF
the military, naval and air forces Of
the republic.
Such q course, however, amounts to
a virtual confession that France Is
not going to defend the territorial
clauses of the peace treaties, save in
the west; that is, where they directly
affect her. She Is thus acquiescing
in the disintegration of the little en-
tente and giving complete justification
to the Poles for the deal they have
made with Hitler and to the CZechs
for any deal they may arrange with
Berlin or, for that matter, with Rome.
Even more, she Is bowling to the in
evitable crash of her own prestige
and power on the continent, where
she has been dominant for the past
decade and half.
In this situation the course Of
Czechoslovakia will be of capital i'm
portance. If, for example, in return
for o 10-year truce Benes associates
his country from any resistance to
the attempt Of Hitler to get control
in Ausria. then the last possible OBJ
stacle to the Anschluss-due to
France herself or to her allies-will
be removed. Then the issue will be
squarely raised between Berlin and
Rome, between Hitler and Mussolini
Moreover, while in theory Benes
might make an arrangement with
Mussolini, in practice this Is highly
unlikely, because Mussolini Is already