The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1934-07-26

trees. This Is an enormously dlfflC
Mr.. Roosevelt, for example
hardly had started on his voyage
when there appeared the threat of
a general strike all along the Pa
cific coast. Appeals went out to
him beseeching him to turn the
Houston off her course, make a
dramatic landing at San Francisco,
and by the spectacular might of
his presence impose a peace.
1t is easy to imagine the argu-
ments for such gesture. 1t could
have been said that his whole re-
covery program would be leopard
lied if the strike became embit-
tered, prolonged and extended;
that a failure of the recovery
would mean his own political de-
feat.
1t also could have been said by
another school of advisers that
since the strike was doomed to
fail, a sensational intervention
would give him lots of glory.
To resist the hysterical appeals
for help required composure
founded on confidence in the
working of American institutions;
and, in his own disposition, it
needed a freedom from the Mes
Sianic delusion to which public
men are so susceptible. To resist
the temptation to exploit the sit
uation for an easy victory required
not only a freedom from vulgar
ambition, but sure sense of what
will really in the long run enable
him to govern successfully.
LIE chose not to let the excite
IL ment of local crisis assume
the proportions of a national
emergency. The Houston proceed
ed on her course.
This capacity to see correctly a
complex situation and to make
simple and decisive judgments is
the test of craftsmanship. 1t can
not be acquired from statistical
indicators: it can not be planned;
it can not be reduced TO a for
mula and applied by rule of
thumb. 1t is a subtle combination
of intuition and experience, of in
sight to the essential and a recol-
lection of how men have behaved.
1t was in the month preceding
his Inauguration that the PreSi-
dent was called upon to display
such wisdom. The nation was
moving through generalization to
panic. 1t was then that Franklin
Roosevelt reached the conclusion
which made the first months of
his administration such a brilliant
success. 1t was not a conclusion
about devices and schemes and
particular policies.
A man without political wisdom
might easily have lost himself in
a Jungle of proposals for doing
this or that particular thing
about this or that bank, this or
that aspect of credit and currency
and gold.
The President had the insight TO
see that the crisis was -fundamen-
tally political in the sense that
the people had become confused
and frightened, because the gov
eminent and their institutions
were paralyzed and impotent.
Seeing this, he took the decision
10 ask congress for a concentra-
ton of power in the executive.
That was what broke the panic,
opened the banks, and restored
the morale of the nation. 1t was
not done with the devices of the
emergency banking act; other de-
vices might have been better. 1t
was done by restoring the gov
eminent as point around which
the nation could rally; by making
a government strong enough TO
Danish fear and allow private
courage 10 revive.
n
TT has become increasingly evil
Il dent for some time that events
are shaping UP where there is