Evening star., 1934-04-01


in following the past few
months of agitation. A great battle
has been fought on the Austrian front,
which is obviously the most important
of all European fronts. 1t has ended
certainly not in decision; evidently
In deadlock AS a consequence of
this struggle there has been a total
change in the situation.
Briefly stated the change has con-
sisted in the substitution of Italy for
France in the first line of resistance
to German purpose.
For the past year France has stead
lily refused to consent to German
parity in ornaments, which in praC-
tice meant the rearmament of Ger
many to the French level. Italy, on
the other hand, has been prepared to
consent to German rearmament.
France. then, has borne the brunt of
the battle which has been conducted
on the Geneva platform.
But while Italy has been willing to
concede the German right to equality
in ornaments, she has been just as
patiently unwilling to consent to the
Anschluss, which would mean the
absorption of Austria into the Ger
man Reich. Since Italy has refused
all along to support France on the
armament issue, France is now draw
ing back at the moment when Italy
Is most eager and desirous of French
support on the Anschluss question.
Roles May Be Reversed.
Ten days ago the speech of the
Duce, following completion of the tri-
partlte agreement between Italy, Hun
gary and Austria, received the same
unfavorahle treatment by the French
press that his previous proposals-in-
cluding the plan for a concert Of Eu-
rope-have received. Thus recent
events have disclosed that the gap
between French and Italian policy,
which has been so wide in the post
war period, has not yet been closed
even partially.
II the present situation continues
we are likely to see an odd reversal of
roles From the end of the war France
has been the consistent and irrecon-
cilable opponent of Germany. Italy
has supported Germany against
France on armaments and France
against Germany on the question of
Austro-G German union. But now Italy
Is irrevocsbly committed to opposition
to the AnschluSs without any formal
assurance of French support.
In this situation two things are OBJ
Nously possible-namely, an agree
ment between Rome and Paris or an
agreement between Paris and Berlin.
The former understanding would bring
81 af
in opposition to all German projects in
the Danubian Basin; the latter would
amount to French agreement not to
interfere in any German attempt to
expand either down the Danube or
across the Vistula, in return for new
German acceptance of the status quo
in the west
Both Of these courses are open to
the French. Italy can no longer
choose. because she mas committed
herself to maintain the Austrian
status quo and. by inference, to sup
port revision of the peace treaties per-
tanning to Hungary. Mussolini's hope
and his objective in this rec mt ma
neuver-has patiently been 10 demolisn
French influence in the Danubian
region ana at the same time to con,-
pei French support for his own policy.
His calculation was based on the
double assumption that France was
condemned to oppose Germany in
any event and that the Little Entente,
satisfied of present French weakness.
would transfer its allegiance from
Paris to Rome.
Ended German Advance.
Neither alternative is transpiring
at the moment. On the contrary, it
Is plain that two of the states of
the Little Entente-Czechoslov
and Yugoslavia-are quietly sounding
out the possibility of exchanging
French for German. and not Italian, |
partnership. Nor is it less clear that
the French, in their turn. are consid-
ering soberly the prospect of some
understanding with Germany pur-
chased at the price of exchanging
German guaranty of their own from
tiers for an agreement to abandon
the effort to maintain the status quo
in Central Europe.
Ever since the close of the war
France has continuously set herself
against German expansion in any di-
rection. Her alliances with Poland
and Czechoslovakia have closed the
German advance across the Vlstula
and up the Elbe. Her support of
Austria has blocked the pathway
down the Danube. But during that
period Germany has found sympathy
with her program of treaty revision
in Rome in all respects save that of
Austria. In word, instead of sup
porting France against Germany,
Italy has played the game of balance
OF power between the two, always
assuming that real agreement be-
tween Berlin and Paris was impos-
sible
This assumption remained correct
as long as the French undertook to
maintain the status quo all over
Europe. But of late large sections OF
French opinion-notably the Left. |
which until recently has had power
have been advocating French un-
derstanding with Germany based
upon French abandonment of all
Central European engagements. Such |
an arrangement is now in the realm |
Of possibility, therefore. providing the
French consent to restrict their in
tereStS 10 Jnelr own 1r0nJlerS.
The present French mood is COM
prehensible. They feel it was the busi-
nessness of the British, the Americans
and the Italians, who shared In max
ing the peace treaties. to assist in de-
Tending them. But the British and |
Americans have declined such a |
task-the Americans Internationally. |
the British, save in the west of |
Europe. As for the Italians. they |
have nominally undertaken with the |
British the responsibilities # Locarno; |
otherwise they have opposed France |
steadily.
Can Settle Saare Question.
Suppose the French should now say, |
as many Frenchmen actually nave de- !
clared, I'VE are too weak, single |
handel tn SIIppOrt tho e+,t,,. 500 |