Evening star., 1934-04-29
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

precipitated a new crisis in Europe
the implications of which are still in
part obscure, 10 days after the French
note was dispatched. On the surface
1t is clear that the French govern
ment seized upon an opportunity pro-
vided by the German budget, with its
program of armament expenditures
to endeavor to maneuver the British
out of their position of reserve. In a
word, the French note was an effort
to force the National government to
fish or cut bait; that is, to take a
German or French attitude.
Now not only is the present Ma
tional government almost inherently
incapable of taking an attitude in
foreign affairs, but no British gov
ernment ever enjoys having its hand
forced. Thus, whatever may happen
eventually as a result of the French
move, it is fairly certain that there
is going to be period of official
coldnesS between London and Paris
and no little bitterness of tone re-
vealed alike in the British and
French press.
British Policy Brought to Head.
Nevertheless, regardless of the wis
dom of the French maneuver, it does
bring to a head the whole question
OF British policy. Ever since the rise
of Hitler the British government has
endeavored to temporize 1t has rec
ognized the ultimate menace to itself
of Germany once more organized
for war and in the hands of the pas
slonate super -nationalistS, of whom
Hitler is only the most conspicuous.
But it has also regarded the peril as
relatively remote and sought some
means of satisfying the most insist
ent of German demands while SLOW
ing down the pace of German re-
armament
Such tactics are, of course. charac-
teristic of all British policy and
diplomacy. Instinctively the British
shrink from vast and carefully de-
fined programs. Their method is
quite different. They believe in pre-
serving by patches rather than saw
ing by complete transformations. To
prevent the arrival of a crisis bv
timely expedient rather than by any
systematic attack upon the basic
causes of the impending crisis is the
British style.
No Sides Taken.
Now, when it is clear that the rise
OF Hitler has precipitated an acute
situation in Franco German relations
the first thought of the British is not
TO take the French or the German
SIDE, but to exercise pressure upon
both to bring about some temporary
compromise. That is what thev have
been trying to do ever since the OPEN
ing of the Disarmament Conference
Thus. they were furious with Tardieu
when at the very start his brusoue
announcement of French policy
blocked the way to progress. They
were no less angry with Hitler when
last Fall, he took Germany out of
the League and the conference with
one defiant sweep
But II the British are eager to avoid
taxing definite stand. there is no
real doubt as to the side they will
elect If decision has to be made.
For the mass of the British people
Germany has now become the dis
turolng force in Europe They hold
the French partially responsible for
the condition, but they recognize the
TACT. general war in Europe within
a relatively brief span of years is. in
their eyes, inescapable if German pur-
pose remains unchanged and German
preparations go on apace AS a con-
sequence, they have got to find some
OASIS OF common action with France.
primarily, and with Italy and the So
Wet Union, as well For only by the
combination of such overwhelming
forse Is 1t conceivable that catas-
trophe can be postponed, let alone
prevented.
Britain Alone Capable.
Thus, under the surface events are
moving precisely toward that situa-
ton which in the past has led Britain
to intervene directly in continental af-
fairs and to take definite stand. And
only Britain can bring about any such
combination. For between France and
Italy the circumstances are such as
to prevent direct agreement Never
theleSS, there is a common basis for
such an association arising from the
fashion in which German purposes
menace all prospective members. For
France, 1t is a question of her own
security; for Italy the Austrian is
sue; for the Soviet Union. Nazi de:
signs in the Ukraine. Finally, for
Britain, the prospective rise of Ger
man air forces is an obvious concern.
Today Germany has come to occupy
the place in Europe that France did
after the Congress of Vienna. And
under the threat of new French ex-
plosion Great Britain, through Cas-
tlereagh, successfully brought about a
four-power association-Austria. Prus-
sia and Russia joining-which con-
tinued to guard Europe against
French adventure from Waterloo until
the Crimean War This coalition is
not to be confused with the Holy AL
lance: its concern was not primarily
to regulate all that occurred in Eu-
rope, but to guard against French ex-
pansion. And its value was COM
pletely demonstrated at the moment
when, following the Belgian Revolu-
ton In 1880, there was a question of
the union of France and Belgium,
which would have upset the balance
Of power on the continent.
Treated as Great Power.
On the other hand, this old four
power coalition was not anti-French
in any positive fashion and France
herself was permitted, not long after
1915, to join it and thus make it a
real concert of Europe. Nor was any
limit put upon French ornaments or
any form of restriction upon French
sovereignty. France was recognized
and treated as a great power. but she
was faced by the inescapable fact
that if she returned to imperialistic
purposes she would be confronted by
coalition which had already twice
overthrown Napoleon.
Unless some similar form of part
nership between Britain, France Italy
and Soviet Russia can be formed, it is
clear that in no long time, when Ger
many has rearmed and if the present
regime continues to rule in the Reich
Europe will have to face a new Of