Evening star., 1934-10-28

even II we had chung to our prospec-
tive strength, the British eventually
would have built up to 1t and the
Japanese would have strained every
nerve to do the same.
The real importance Of the Wash
ington Conference, however, lay not
in the Anglo but the Amer
ican-Japanese aspects Of the discus
sion To get the British to consent
to parity we threw away a prospec-
tive supremacy. To persuade the
Japanese to accept a ratio. We sur
rendered all power to act in the Far
East. We assumed In the British case
that this sacrifice would mean parity
in all categories but we discovered
that 1t was restricted to battleships
and it took another decade to estab-
lish our right in all fields. We sim
ilarly assumed that our agreement
with the Japanese, by virtue of the
four-power and nine-power treaties,
would insure the territorial integrity
Of China and tho permanence Of the
Open Door, but the Japanese course
in Manchuria shattered that illusion.
Soviets to Avoid War.
Today the Japanese have, as a re-
suit of our course and that Of the
British, come to occupy an impregna-
BILE position in the Far East. On the
strength of that position they have
asserted a Monroe Doctrine which, in
effect. declares their right to stand
between China and the rest Of the
world and to supervise foreign rela-
tions with China in so far as these
concern Japanese security and hege-
mony. They have taken Manchuria
and they can, when they choose, 20
further with no other possible oppo-
nent save Soviet Russia. The Soviets,
in their turn, will make every possible
concession short of the surrender of
territory to avoid a war-which they
do not want for obvious reasons.
AS for the British, their situation is
far from unsatisfactory. They can, II
they choose, renew the old Anglo
japanese alliance at the price of
recognizing Manchoukuo and accept
ing japanese supremacy north Of the
sphere covered by Singapore. Or they
can stand aside and play the old bal
ance-of-power game between the
United States and Japan. And In such
case the worse the relations between
Japan and America the more advan-
tageous the British position, because
the Japanese, with American hostility
on their hands, will be less likely to
quarrel with Britain. Either an Ameri-
can-Japanese or Russo-Japanese war
would leave Britain perfectly serene
because such wars would inevitably
weaken Japan financially and eco
nomically.
The unfortunate circumstance in
the American situation lies In the fact
that we have never had a realistic
policy in the Far East and have not
now. At Washington we surrendered
the means for exerting influence in
the Western Pacific, but we did not
at the same time resign the purpose
to act there. And that, after all, is
the way nations get into wars. BY re-
fusing to recognize Manchoukuo and
proclaiming the Stimson doctrine we
aroused Japanese resentment and en-
couraged Chinese resistance. but we
accomplished nothing positive. We
made it little more difficult for the
Japanese to accomplish their ends,
out we didn't make it impossible and
they have gone ahead just the same.
Peace Declared Feasible,
II we actually intended to act ef-
fectively in the Far East our only
course would have to be to make an
alliance with the Soviets and under
take vast increase in our naval and
military forces. We could then NUM-
ton Russian armies so far as was nee
essary and send small expeditionary
army via Leningrad and the Trans
siberian to the Far East. At the same
time our naval forces, while they could
not blockade Japan at close range.
could interfere with Japanese COM
merce all over the world and abolish
1t in the Eastern Pacific.
Short of that the only practical
tnlng must be to accept what we can
not prevent save by war. If we will
not tight the Japanese to preserve the
integrity OF Chinese territory and de-
lend the open door, then we ought to
make peace with the japanese on the
terms which are feasible. We are not
rivals OF Japan for Chinese trade be-
cause what we sell the Chinese the
Japanese do not produce. The jana
nese are, In addition, exceedingly good
customers OF ours. Like the Chinese
tney need our raw materials and. as
1or ourselves, we are not competing
WIN. Japanese textile exports which.
Tor example, play havoc with the Brit
iSh.
Unhappily, there is in Washington
ana elsewhere in the country a no.
tlon that we can exert a moral in
huence in the Far East without re-
sorting to force, that in some fashion
difficult to describe we can, without
the use OF ships or armies, coerce
the Japanese. We are thus supposed
to be able to impose respect for
treaties and for the rights of other
nations. In fact, we can do nothing
OF the sort. If our so-called moral
influence were really effective, the
Japanese would declare war upon us
because they regard their Asiatic policy
as a matter Of life and death.
The best thing that can possibly
happen now is that the whole naval
conference program shall collapse of
its own weight. We shall not agree
to Japanese parity; they will not
consent to a ratio. They will de-
nounce the Washington and London
treaties, and we shall recover our right
to fortify our Far Eastern bases. II
we undertake to do that, however,
war will result because the Japanese
are resolved not to permit any power
to establish position from which
1t can interfere with their purposes.
On the other hand, If we refrain
from fortifying Corregidor or Guam,
1t Is probable that at present q three
power agreement as to the size of
equal fleets can be reached. And it
is possible that for the moment the
Japanese will consent to retard their
building to parity by private agree
ment.
All American policy in respect to
the Far East, however, must start
from the recognition that the Japa-
nese mean 10 dominate the Far East
ern waters beyond the range Of Singa-
pore as we intend to control those