Evening star., 1934-12-30

she became great power, has never
undertaken to interfere with our i'm
perialism in the Americas. we have
set out to restrain hers in AiSa. And
whereas she has tacitly recognized our
Monroe doctrine always, we have re-
jected hers from the outset. 1t must
be plain, however. that there is no
more likelihood that Japan will now
voluntarily give up Manchuria than
there ever was that we would restore
California to Mexico or Panama to
Colombia Had the British under
taken to force either restitution, that
would have meant war.
War Choice Left to United States.
Today the question posed by the
whole Japanese question is very SIM
ply whether we want war or peace
with Japan. The choice. moreover,
is exclusively ours. We can only COM
pei the Japanese to abandon Man
choukuo or renounce their Far East
ern Monroe doctrine by defeating
them in conflict. In such a conflict
we should not be backed by Great
Britain, and probably not by the
| Soviet Union. The outcome of that
war would be, not only indecisive
on the naval side, but ruinous eco
nomically, because the strain would
produce disaster in Japan, and not
improbably an ultimate triumph of
Communism.
The alternative is to adopt toward
japanese policy in Asia precisely the
| course which is already being fol-
lowed by the other great powers with
! considerable territorial possessions,
namely, Britain, France and Russia
These three are ready to defend
their possessions, but none has the
| smallest intention of interfering with
japanese purpose in China. The odd
| thing is that without any territory at
stake and with only relatively in
significant amount of trade involved,
we have taken it upon ourselves
| purely on principle-to become the
single country which is actually and
openly attempting to block Japanese
policy.
AS result there is very rapidly
| developing in the United States a
japanese phobia and in Japan a de-
| fusion of persecution resulting from
American policy. The naval demands
of the japanese are being interpreted
/ on this side of the Pacific as the evil
dence of a design against American
security. The political policy of the
Unuited States is being identified ir
Japan as deliberate purpose tc
throttle japanese expansion made
necessary by population pressure and
by the poverty of the homeland in the
essential raw materials and minerals
of industry.
No Collision Of Interests.
AS matter of fact, the most
intransigent of Japanese admirals or
generals does not cherish any notion
OF japanese attack upon American
shores because, after ALL within the
limits of their own professions, they
are practical men. In the same
fashion there are not a thousand
Americans who perceive the economic
explanations of the eXpansionist
course of the japanese. Between the
vital interests of the two countries
there is no collision. In the minds
of neither people is there any de-
liberate design to do violence to the
other.
All the differences between the two
countries would disappear overnight
if the United States made it clear
that it had no purpose of interfering
in Asia, either to make that con-
tinent safe for the British or for
the Soviet Union, let alone for the
Chinese, who are incapable of de-
Tending themselves. Under such cir
cumstances the Japanese would not
resign the right to parity. but they
would be under not the smallest temp
tation to seek to attain it.
But the trouble is that the Jap
anese have been led to think of us
as the Germans have come to think
of the. French. We have refused to
! permit them to settle in our own
territories and, in addition, have
placed them under the stigma of our
immigration laws. We have attempted
to close South America to them by
the Monroe doctrine We have led
the fight at Geneva and elsewhere to
prevent their expansion in Manchuria
and we have made the issue of the
naval ratio basis for warnings which
fall little short of threats. Although
we were not even a member of the
League of Nations we went to Geneva
and tried to rally the world against
them.
Japan Held Legally Wrong.
Now there is nothing to be said
on the moral or legal side in de-
fense of Japan's policy in Manchuria
or in China. 1t is plain, barefaced i'm
perialism. Morally it is as culpable
as our course in Mexico or Panama,
the British in South Africa or Egypt,
the French in Morocco or the Italian
in Tripoli Moreover, it is the more
reprehensible because whereas all
other great powers accomplished their
imperialistic ends before the League
was formed and the Kellogg pact
framed, the japanese have followed
the old and evil course after sub
scribing to the covenant and pact.
Nevertheless, we never attempted to
lead the world in a crusade against
the British for their South African
operation, we sat still in the Tripolitan
| dlldlT, we QlQ IlOIflllR dDOuL MOIOCCO.
Right and justice were at stake in
all three cases, even If there was yet
no Kellogg pact, and we had ma
terial interests at stake in the matter
| of trade. If now the world, or only
| the great powers-Britain, France, the
Soviet Union and Italy-who are
members of the League and, save for
Italy, have vastly greater interests
than ours in Asia, were prepared to
join in an attempt to restrain Japan
in the name of international law and
morality, something might be said
for our participation in such an effort.
But all four of these great powers
are notoriously unwilling to do any
thing of the sort. They have all
turned cold shoulders alike to Mr..
Stimson and Mr.. Davis. And they
have done this Notwithstanding their
obligations to China written in the
| Covenant of the League and their
material interests resident in India,
Indo- China and Siberia. All of them,
save perhaps the Soviet Union, main
tain the friendliest relations with