The Waterbury Democrat., 1934-08-30

to be said to have abused the dis cretion reposed in them. The stip ulation of facts does not show tha of the liquor commission acted so arbitrarily or unreason ably in revoking the appellant (Castonguay's license as to hay, the discretion reposed il them; so that if their decision wa, not illegal, it cannot be disturbed by this court"
 The Decision
 Judge Peasley's decision follows
 This case, with the facts stipulated and the claims of law and arguments in writing has by consent of the parties ben referred to me by Judge McEvOy, for decision.
 Tho question presented for decision Is whether the acts of the appellant, which but for restraining order issued a. gainst the appellccs and oth- CTS in the case of Shore vS. Cross ct al are conceded would have been violations of the liquor law. were or were not such violations of the liquor law as to authorize the de. fendants to revoke the license of the appellants.
 From the decision of the Constitutional Court annOunc- cd by Judge Thomas, vacatlng the restraining order it Is Ob- viOus that had Shore sought an order to show cause why such a restraining order should not issue instead of seeking and obtaining the restraining order without giving the ap. pelleeS an opportunity to con- test it's issuance, no pOrtunity to contest its issuance, no such order would have been isued. It was issued and the appel lant having joined in the Shore vs Cross ct al case as patry plaintiff came under the pro- tcction which he now claims was permanent and which the appellccs claim was but tenn porary. The order vacating the restraint upon the appellecs contained suggestion that there be no prosecutions or reprisals against those who during the pcndcncy of the restraining order had violated the liquor law. Upon an appli- cation for bench warrants a. gainst n number of those who, like the appellant, had violated the law, the Superior Court adopted this suggestion and refused to prosecute.
 Present Question Cited.
 These appellecs, constituting the Liquor Control. colnmls. sion. did not adopt the sugges- tiOn to take no action and after Q hearing revoked the license of the appellant. The question is not now whether there should or should not be any action taken against the appellant, but whether the action of these appcllees in revOl1ing the appellants Ii. ccnse should stand.
 The appcllces constitute a commission which is an ad. lnlnistrativc tribunal. They, as
 
 with the function of deter. mining whether any particu- lar license should be revoked under tho provisions of the liquor law. As such, their decision rcvOking any parti- cular license, Is conclusive in the absence of proof that they acted illegally or so arbitrarily or unreasOnably as to be said to have abused the discretion rcpOsed in them. Blake vs Board of Appcls, 117 Conn. 527. 532; Iazarcvich vs StOc. kel. IF Conn. 26O, 282. The stipulation of facts does not show that the appcllecs acted so arbitrarily os unrcasOnabIy in revOking the appellants H. as to have abused the discrc- tion rcpOscd In them: so that if their decision was not H. legal 1t cannot be disturbed by this court. The cases cited by the appellant do not seem tO me. in view of the fact that the regulation of the liquor traffic Is wholly within the powers of the Connecticut General Assembly, to so justi- fy the violation of the liquor law during the period the re- straining order was in effect as to prevent the appclIces , from making such violation, . sufficient cause. within their discretion to revoke his h- ccnsc.
 The appeal is therefore dis