The Washington times., 1934-05-07

person who was q lunattc,
under the age Of consent, or i'm
potent, and those which are void
able because procured by sugges-
ton of an such obstacle to the
validity of the marriage. The
only objection urged is that by
marrying in Florida the plaintiff
violated section 966. But the pre-
ceding sections do not refer to
section 966; and they contain no
reference to remarriage Of di.
vorced persons. Their only refer.
ence is to paragraph third Of sec.
ton 1888 which declares void:
"The marriage Of any persons
either Of whom has been
previously married and whose
previous marriage has not
been terminated by death or q
decree Of divorce"
Since the plaintiff had been
legally divorced from Daye in the
District while the parties were
domiciled there, and the decree
became effective under s983a un.
conditionally and irrevocably, she
was thereafter an unmarried
woman: and if she had cohabited
with Daniel in the District after
the Florida marriage she would
not have been guilty Of poly
gamy. Commonwealth v. Lane,
113 Mass. 458, 400, 462.
Moreover, it does not appear
that the plaintiff and Daniel did
retain their domicileS in the Dis
trict after her divorce, or that
after the Florida marriage they
ever lived in the District as man
and wife. The trustees argue that
it must be assumed on the plead
ingS that plaintiffs residence in
Florida and the marriage there
were not in good faith. But the
bill alleged the good faith of the
residence and marriage in Flor
ida: and the answer contains no
specific denial Of that allegation.
Nor does it contain any averment
that the residence in Florida and
marriage there were with the in
tent of evading the prohibition
against remarriag.. The Court
of Appeals did not pass upon the
issue sought 20 be raised. 1t ex-
pressly disclaimed whether the
Florida marriage was valid or
what the effect of the Virginia
decree was. And the question
whether the marriage in Florida
should be deemed void within the
District because the parties went
to Florida to evade the prohibi-
ton of 1866 was not presented by
the petition for a writ Of GER
tiorari.
Third. The Court of Appeals
stated that "the single question
for determination here is, whether
or not plaintiff is entitled to
her dover interest,"; and it held
that the bill should be dismissed,
regardless of whether the marri-
age was valid under the law of
Florida. The requisites of dover
are a valid marriage. Compare
De Vaughan VS.. Hutchinson, 165
U. S. 556,570. But if the mar
riage was valid under the laws
of Florida, the plaintiff was, un-
der established doctrines of the
conflict of laws, Daniels widow.
AS such she was entitled, as an
incident Of the marriage, to
dover in the property within the
District. For, while a statute of
the District provides for forfei-
ture of dover in case of the
wife's adultery during marriage
ID. C. Code Sect. 80, Title 14);
none denies dover to a widow
because she had been guilty of
adultery prior to her marriage
with her late husband.
Section 966 is not extra-terri-
torial in its operation. 1t does
not purport to prohibit remar-
riage outside the District; and
no other statute denies dover
to a widow because by remarry-
ing elsewhere she had disre-
garded the prohibition contained
in section 966. 1t does not make
remarriage a crime, or in terms
impose any penalty, even if con-
tracted within the District; and
obviously it could not make
criminal remarriage elsewhere.
Nor does it in terms declare the
remarriage void. Apparently. it
is the law of the District that a
remarriage elsewhere in disre-
gard Of the prohibition of Sec
tion 966, even where both parties
remained domiciled in the Dis
trict, is not void alb initio, but, at
most, voidable; and that voidable
marriage cannot be annulled
after the death of either spouse.
(Sammons VS.. Sammons 46
WL.R. 80, Al; Tyler VS.. Andrews,
40 App. D. c. 100. 104; Sim
mons VS.. Simmons, 81 App. D. C.
216, 218-219; 19 F. (2d) 800, 692-
8; Abramson VS.. Abramson, so
App. D. c. 119, 121. 1872; Com
pare Dimpfel VS.. Wilson, lot
Md. 329; Bonham VS.. Badgley, z
III. 622).
No case has been found in
which, independently of statutory
direction, a widow has been de.
MED dover on the grounds that
remarriage, legal by the law
Of the place where celebrated, had
been entered into in violation of
some prohibition imposed by the
law of the State in which the
divorce was granted and the prop
erty was situated. Compare Put
nam VS.. Putnam, 8 Pick. 433:
DickS0n- VS DickSoY1'S E4oirS