Evening star., 1934-11-25
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

r T is impossible not to feel a sense
of regret that President Roosevelt
continues to employ for his inter-
i national relations and, in partic-
ular, for discussions so important
as the naval negotiations at London,
a diplomatic agent whose whole career
has been dominated by ideas of utopia
and not of reality. For the blunders
Of Mr.. Norman H. Davis at London
are likely to prove very costly to this
country in no distant future.
The actual problem at London was,
on the one hand, to stand fast to the
resolution Of the administration to
consent to no change in the relative
strength of the three great navies-
the British, American and Japanese
as fixed by the ratios of the WASH
ington treaty: and, on the other, to
prevent the British from making the
United States convenient instrument
of their balance Of power policy in the
Far East.
1t was perfectly clear from the out
set that the British were as opposed
as the United States to conceding
japanese parity. 1t was, however
equally clear that all British strategy
would be directed toward making the
United States bear the brunt of jap
anese resentment for the denial of a
demand which the whole country re-
garded as just. Mr.. Davis, then, had
to avoid permitting Mr.. Macdonald
to make him The goat" of the dis
cussionS.
This he completely failed to do. On
the contrary, the British prime min
lister, by very cleverly proposing a
compromise in principle-which was
unacceptable to the japanese but on
the surface seemed to show a friendly
and yielding spirit-left Mr.. Davis
standing like CaSabianca. Actually
what the American representative was
doing was pulling British as well as
American cheStnuts out of the fire.
but it was only the American hand
that was getting scorched.
Mr.. Davis ought to have been the
more on his guard because this was
precisely the game played at Geneva
in the last stages of the Disarmament
Conference when the British proposed
concessions to the Germans which
they knew the French would not &C.
cept, and dragged Mr.. Davis along
after them. The result was that the
Washington Government suddenly
found itself up to its neck in a Euro
pean diplomatic tangle, the Germans
alleging America was sharing in the
coercion of the Reich, the French that
American financial interests. con-
cerned with their German debts, were
selling out French security. But what
real interest we had in the mess no
one could imagine.
British Peace Policy.
British policy in the Far East Is,
moreover, identical with its policy in
Europe. In both continents tine
British desire to keep out of any new
conflict. A way of escape is open if
there exists balance of power with
out them. In Europe, for example, if
France and her allies on the one
hand and Germany on the other were
Of about equal strength, in the event
OF war the principals would become
exhausted to an extent which would
leave the victor too weak to be a
menace to Britain; or, if either party
became dangerous, the British could
step in and support the other de-
ciSively.
Now If in Asia there should exist
between the japanese and the United
States a state of hostility as we'll as
a condition of balance, the result
would be the same. The British would
not have to worry about India or
Australasia because japanese energies
and resources would be completely
consumed in meeting the American
attack. AS a neutral, too, they would
obviously profit largely from the elm
ination of both belligerents from the
world markets. If, however, there
were any chance of Japanese victory,
then the British would come in on
our side for their own safety.
The fundamental blunder of French
craftsmanship in Europe has been
repeated by Mr.. Davis in the Far
Eastern matter: He has not perceived
that the basic purpose of British
diplomacy is not to be caught in any
alliance or understanding which
would ally them to either France or
Germany in Europe, or to Japan or
the United States in the Asiatic situa-
tion. Thus the French have always
started from the assumption that the
British were their natural allies and
Mr.. Davis set out with the assumption
thot prifoiy, ,oy-iro ,ioxv
a similar relationship.
Now it is true that Germany and
not France can be a menace to
Britain, that Japan and not the
United States may threaten British
interests in the Far East. But it is
equally true that France in Europe
and the United States in Asia may,
without British Intervention, dispose
of these potential dangers to British
security. And the basic principle of
British diplomacy is to let the other
fellow do the work when possible.
That was the game Lloyd George
always played with Clemenceau, Mil
lerand and BRAND after the war.
That is the game Ramsay Macdonald
Is now playing with Mr.. Norman H.
Davis, who sets out from the stand
point that since American and Brit
ish interests are identical there must
be community of action. The British
prime minister assumes that since
American and Japanese interests are
opposed, the British can let Uncle Sam
take action, while they sit pretty, dis
closing friendship for the United
States and sympathy for the Japa-
nese.
Target Of Resentment.
The result must be that the United
States by standing uncompromisingly
against Japanese parity becomes the
target for all japanese resentments
while Britain appears as a friend who
was unhappily powerless to moderate
the intransigeance of the United