Evening star., 1934-06-17


growing stronger industrially and
therefore militarily, the situation,
changes. And today the states of the
Little Entente are Joined with Russia
and France.
Can Go to MusSOlini.
Hitler can still go to Mussolini, If
he chooses. He can recognize Italian
supremacy in Vienna and partnership
with Hungary. But that would be to
surrender the dream of expansion
along the Danube and the Vistula.
And increasingly the Russian mantle,
like the French, will cover CZechoslo-
vakia. Mussolini. as the Italian press
shows, does not welcome the Franco
Russian alliance, for it establishes a .
combination Of force which he cannot
rival. Neither does London. because
it gives France an independence of
British support which the attitude Of
Barthou at Geneva recently has
pretty clearly illustrated
If you think of the European politi- /.
cal game as card game you will see !
that the hand dealt when Hitler .
came to power has been played out /.
and the cards have turned against :
the Nazis. They have forfeited
British support and American SYM
pathy by their anti-Jewish policy and
invited economic disaster as well.
They have driven Russia back into
the arms Of France again. (Hitler
has followed the unpromising example
OF William II in diSregarding the
BiSmarckian tradition in this respect
They have forced Mussolini to mount
guard in Austria and enabled him to
make friend of Hungary. And the
sum Of all Nazi successes is the non
aggression pact with Poland. which
gives the hated Corridor 10 years
more to exist unchallenged.
That and the blow he has dealt the
League by Withdrawing from Geneva
| is the harvest of a year and a half q
OF the Fuehrer in foreign policy. And
the financial difficulties continue to
mount, the gold reserves to sink to
the vanishing point, the need ~ raw
materials for domestic recovery to in
crease. But the wherewithal to buy
them is lacking. And defaulted past
debts constitute no foundation for
fresh foreign loans. At home, while
the Jews are smashed, the Roman
Catholics are not. The old army. too,
is reStive and the new legions of the
Brown Shirts are dissatisfied. So far.
then, the achievement of Hitler does
not compare too well with that of
Mussolini or of Stain.
In the welter of currents and cross
currents European observers report
that the immediate danger Of war.
which was acute from October to Feb
ruary, when the domestic disturbance
IN France broke out, has for the mo-
ment diminished. France is in no
mood for a war of prevention and
again feels time to be on her side
Mounting domestic distress in Ger
many and growing lack of ability to
finance foreign purchases essential for
rearming and for recovery encourage
the French to bide their time, to wait
and to watch and to prepare, but
meantime to leave Hitler and his fol-
lowers to wreStle with their domestic
problems.
French See Nazi Failure.
Rightly or wrongly, the French be-
lieve again that the Na1 experiment
is going to fail. Meantime they are
relying upon diplomacy rather than
guns. They are abandoning the
League like everybody else. They are
piling up their armaments along with
the rest. But they are at last begin
ming to believe that a real balance of
power can be restored on the conti-
nent even if the Anglo-Saxons will
not indorse their security. You can
see these calculations working out in
all they do at Geneva. To British
proposals the French opposition is
hardening to the point it reached Just
before the occupation of the Ruhr.
The British, too, are angry because
they perceive that French dependence
upon them is diminishing. For three
yearS-ever since the Austro-G German
tar1h union scare-the French have
been striving desperately to restore
the old Anglo-French entente. But
the British have refused all new COM
mltmentS. Their refusal, however, has
in the end sent the French elsewhere.
Inc London door being closed, they
have knocked at the Kremlin, and not
in vain.
Thus, II restoration of the pre-war
Franco-Russian alliance alarms the
Germans, it does not reassure the
British. They fear that the Germans
sooner or later, will react violently to
the attempt to put them in a strait
jacket. They see the portent of q new
war and they also perceive that If
Moscow and Paris hit it off neither
Will be too considerate of British
wishes. Their influence on the conti-
nent has sunk to the lowest point
since the occupation of the Ruhr
They might revive it by making a
bargain with Germany, but German
purposes are even less appealing to
Britain than France, while in a new
triple entente like the old France and
Russia would certainly not invariably.
bow to British demands.
The British are aware that the
League Is done for, at least for all
present time-and the League was the
corner stone Of their postwar Euro
pean policy. 1t was a means of
exerting influence without assuming
direct responsibility. 1t was, after all,
a British and American creation. But
as 1t cIumbles little each day, behind
the facade new system of alliance is
taking form, with Russia, France and
SA4S ~ASeAS &AAOC44IC Q1llUGQ. 4Ldly aQQ
Germany are deadlocked over Austria
and neither will yield. If neither does
yield, there is nothing to counter.
balance Russia and France.
Russia Wants Security.
With France Russia now puts Sc
curity first, with France she stand.
for the status quo against German
designs in the Ukraine and japanese
in Siberia. Pan-Slavism is perhaps
dead, but the little Slav powers.
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, ar,
beginning to look to the big Slav
brother again. And If France mounts
guard on the Rhine, as she does, and
Italy on the Danube, as she too does.
and Soviet Russia presently on the
Vistula, where can Hitler turn for his
place in the sun2 And Mussolini
committed to his Austrian policy, can
hardly hope to challenge France as
well as Germany. Decidedly the first.
| hand in the Hitler game has tlIry,a4