Evening star., 1934-03-25
By FRANK II. SIMONDS.

- creasing emphasis that the
world IS on the brink of
new race in armaments. At what
precise moment this competition was
assured 1t is a little hard to say.
British, American and Japanese COM
mentators are all equally certain that
the cause must be sought outside
their own respective bailiwicks. And
while their competition is obviously
to be In ships, Britain and France are
openly looking to their air forces with
a similar eye to rapid and consider
able expansion.
Does this approaching or, prehaps
more exactly, already proceeding
competition in armaments foreshadow
war? That question is heard on all
sides at the moment. And in the
United States, at least, the answer Is
usually in the Affirmative.
Those who take the trouble to look
back to the still recent past recall
that competition in armaments, be-
tween France and Germany on land.
between Britain and Germany on the
water. was one of the striking features
of the pre-war period. Actually.
however, this competition began and
developed in close relation to certain
political events. And the starting
point was the landing Of the Kaiser
at Tangier in 1905. This, in itself,
constituted a clear warning that Ger
many was prepared to fight rather
than permit French pacific penetra-
ton of the shereefian empire.
France. however. was not ready to
fight, for her military forces were dis
organized. Accordingly she bowed to
the inevitable. But Immediately there
after she began to set her house in
order and the French army was ready
in 1914.
Arms Not War Cause.
In 1908 Austria, with German
backing. challenged Russia in the
same fashion by the annexation Of
Bosnia. Once more the choice was
between war and submission and
Russia yielded. But thenceforth she
intensified her military preparations.
Finally. in 1911. Germany challenged
Great Britain and France by sending
ship to Agadir. But this time
Great Britain stood firm: Lloyd
George in famous speech met threat
by warning. And, after Agadir. 1t
was Germany who began to multiply
armaments.
Yet it is not quite exact to ascribe
to competition in armaments the
cause Of the World War, for that
competition itself followed disclosure
that the policies and purposes OF
France and her allies, on the one
hand, and of Germany and her as
sociates. on the other. were basically
irreconcilable. After 1911 both coali-
tions we're prepared to face war
rather than yield to coercion.
In a word, nations did not sud-
denly start arming and thus pro-
duce tension and finally conflict. On
the contrary, collisions Of policy set
in motion competition IN armaments.
That, too, is the situation today.
I have read recently with much in
terest and general agreement an artl-
Gle by Walter Lippmann in which he
points out that all our American ex-
periments in disarmament in the
postwar years have amounted to
putting the cart before the horse.
And he means that We have confined
our attention to attempts at bringing
about armament reduction in ad-
vance of achieving any modification
In the policies of nations, ignoring
the fact that each armament CAM
paign has been directly based, first,
upon what the nation in question in
tended to do and, second, upon the
opposition it expected to encounter
on its way.
France Had Two Courses.
Since 1920. and progressively as
she has recognized the unlikelihood
of obtaining British or American sup
port in her undertaking, France has
organized her military forces on the
basis of maintaining the territorial
decisions OF the peace treaties against
Germany, and her naval forces on
the basis of a similar defense OF the
status quo in the Mediterranean
against Italy. Her military advisers
have fixed the number OF divisions
and ships required for these two
tasks, her military preparations nave
conformed to these commentators,
and in the matter Of land forces she
has. of course. included the armies
of her allies in her calculations.
When, last october, Germany with
drew from the League and announced
her purpose to rearm the French
had to do one of two things-attack
Germany at once to prevent her re-
arming or increase her own forces
10 maintain her superiority. In a
word she had to disarm Germany oy
force or further arm herself, because
the undisguised purpose Of German
policy was a treaty revision which the
French viewed as threatening their
own security. However, it was not
German armaments but the use which
German policy indicated would De
made OF these armaments that forced
this dilemma upon France.
All along, too. what Norman n.
Davis and other American representa-
tiyes abroad have actually had to do,
If they wanted to bring about reduc-
ton of the armaments of the armed
powers, was, on the one hand, to
persuade the Germans to renounce
their purpose to use arms for treaty
revision or, on the other, to persuade
the people of the United States to
defend France against attack. Both
things being obviously out OF the
question, our representatives contin-
ued to ask the armed powers to re-
duce and run all the incidental risks.
But this was childish, for no In
formed American could with sincerity
afirm that German revision policies
did not menace the unity and security
OF her neishbors. Mr.. Davis, for ex-
ample, has again and again asserted
that the cause Of armaments was
fear. What he has not told his
fellow-countrymen, however, is that
the fear was itself well founded; that
If they wished to aid in disarmament
they would have to assist in remov-
ing the causes, not the results, Of
fear. Mr.. Davis, on the contrary,
has left the impression that the fears
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