Evening star., 1933-02-26
CRISIS EMPHASIZES NEED
FOR MORAL DISARMAMENT
Strained World Relations Bring Appeal
to Stop Trouble Formenters and
Start Education Program.
BY JAMES r. sHoTwELL,

BY JAMES r. SHOTWELL,
srofessesss Of H!ssory. cclumSis uniysrsity;
A0'hof of n s.tionsi % e eolies sa 'nisssmeh' Ese.
A MONG all the uncertainties Of
~ the future the one which con-
"A Germs US most Is whether the
4 4 United States is going to de-
velop still further the policies Of
Isolation which have characterized so
much Of its postwar history. There
gre those who think that economic as
well as political nationalism will be the
keynote Of the coming years and that
we shall join more and more in that
fcacttonary movement which already has
established itself In many countries, to
concentrate upon our own affairs, build
up our own industries for ourselves and
buy and sell In our own markets, leav-
ing other nations to do the same.
AS President Hoover pointed out in
his Lincoln day speech, this trend to-
ward economic isolation would not sim
ply bring back the conditions of the
past. Instead, 1t would open up an un-
known and uncertain future, because
$he economic forces with which the
Nation has to measure itself have
1hanged immeasurably from pre-war
4eys. It Is quite clear that return to
economic isolation means q curtailment
bf the output of farm and factory. Ma
tions have economic frontiers as well as
political ones and the two never wholly
coincide. Failure to adjust policies to
this unacceptable fact means q lowering
Of the standard Of living Of the people
et home.
The choice which lies before the
United States has not been clearly seen,
because the alternative to isolation
seems to most people to be that kind
OF involvement In the affairs of other
nations against which this country has
both an instructive reaction and q school
ing from the days Of its founders. II
the choice Is between safety at home
and dangerous commitments abroad,
there Is no doubt which Of these two
policies the American people viii ac-
cept. Fortunately, however, this is not
the issue now and It is not likely to be
the issue in the future. Such an alter
native would leave US with reactionary
policies whichever way we decided to
take-the return to isolation or the ac-
ceptance OF the old diplomacy and the
old international anarchy. The real
question Is how to avoid both these al
ternatives by strengthening the struc-
ture Of international relations so that
foreign policies may carry on, in the
external relations Of q Nation those
policies that make for welfare at home.
There Is no more fundamental prin-
ctple OF politics than that sound for
eign relations are but the normal and
natural continuation OF domestic policy.
Public Opinion to Rule.
These issues, however, viii not be
wholly settled BY government action
In every democratic country, at least,
public opinion viii be the determining
factor. But public opinion must be d.
rected End informed, and that means
that these great issues should not be
left for the heated discussions oe partt-
san politics, but Gholld be studied with
out prejudice and explored with an open
The opportunity toI secure interna-
ttonAl action along these lines was,
strangely enough, opened up at the Dis
armament Conference In an incident
which received almost no notice In the
news accounts ct the time and which,
even yet, has failed to secure proper
attention In any but the country Of its
origin.
In September, 1881, when the differ
ent governments were sending In their
memoranda for the program Of the Dis
armament Conference, the government
of Poland proposed that the conference
undertake to deal with war fomenters
IN different countries there should
be an international agreement to sup
press those utterauces in the press and
other channels OF publicity which keep
alive the spirit Of discord or instigate
acts Of hostility.
Such measures would constitute what
kha po1fch crvarnyoonf ro11od "rnorQ1
disarmament"
The term itself was unfortunate, for
It seems to carry q suggestion Of hy-
pocrisy; at least, so 1t was interpreted
by the hard-headed delegates Of more
than one country represented at Geneva.
One can imagine with what feelings
some Of Polands neighbors, especially
the Germans, received this proposal
that the conference should begin by
measures Of moral disarmament rather
than by actually proceeding to lessen
the standing armies OF Europe. They
wanted first Of all to see some practical
evidence Of this moral movement to-
ward the international mind by les
sening of such armies as Poland itself
has been 50 busily building up In recent
years. It was little wonder, therefore,
that the Polish proposal received but
slight consideration at q time when the
conference was at grips with the practi-
cal issue Of finding q way to lessen the
existing burden of armaments.
Based on Valid Idea.
Nevertheless, this Polish proposal was
based upon a thoroughly valid idea,
and as the discussion proceeded 1t be-
came evident that 1t could be reduced
TO definite and practical terms. In its
original form, whether consciously or
not, 1t bore rather close resemblance
to o proposal which had first been made
In the original plan for the ''outlawry
Of war" which Senator Borah took over
from the scheme Of S. o. Levinson
This was to the effect that every ma
ton should indict and punish
its own international war breeders or
war instigators under powers
similar to those conferred upon our
Congress under Article !, section 3, OF
our Federal Constitution"
The actual drafting Of treaty to
include such a suppression OF war
fomenters naturally proved to be ex-
tremely difficult. How could one dis
tinguish between fomenting Of war and
the legitimate warning against real
dangers? The procedure upon whlcn
the Polish memorandum placed most
weisht was effective censorship Of the
press, radio broadcasting. moving pic
tures and other methods Of publicity.
But, although it might be argued that
such censorship would be quite in line
with the Borah-Levinson proposal nev-
ertheless the more it was brought to
the fore the more reluctant were re-
sponsible statesmen to accept any such
proposal.
Liberal minds are suspicious OF gov
eminent censorship, even when used
for good purposes, because 1t nearly
always tends to get into the hands Of
reactionaries. Liberals soon tire Of ap-
plying any form Of coercion; 1t is not
their normal way Of doing things. In
20 far as the program for moral dis
armament was mainly treaty pro-
vision for the prohibition Of irresponsi-