Evening star., 1933-07-09

that there was a question whether the
semi-public financing with bankers
would take. precedence over reparaticns
obligations
The Departments of State and the
| Treasury saw the picture more clearly
than did the banking and business
world. The bankers were eager to make
loans; business men were eager to have
them make loans because it meant more
business; and the public, if it thought
about the matter at all, was glad to
see Germany get all the assistance pos
sible. This financing made Germany
one of cur best customers. The Ger
mans bought American goods with
American money, and everybody was
happy.
Mistake in Stressmann.
Also, as the years passed. we thought
that we were finding in Germany our
best support in our efforts to reduce
armaments, to consolidate world peace.
We lnistook Stresenann for Germany,
and therein we made grave mistake.
There were fine men in the German
government, true republicans and honest
peacemakers. But they were not Ger
many, and they represented a govern
ment which-although no one in the
United States realized the fact-Was
built on sand. They we're men who
were not sufficiently practical to safe
guard and strengthen the republic
until it might at last become truly ma
tional. They took for granted that
because it was it always would be.
They were as bad psychologists as were
the Turpitzes and the Ludendorffs of
| the war
The achievement of Stresemann at
Locarno was notable; it would have been
| permanently notable if Stresemann and
his colleagues had realized that the
sympathy Of Germany was not with
them and had had the adroitness and
the vision to stir the popular imagira-
ton. The American awakening to this
TACT was bitter disappointment.
There were comparatively few trade
disputes to disturb German American
relations, especially in the years before
! the depression began. The treaty
worked well. Germany paid its install
ments Of the costs of the Army of Occu-
patton and toward settlement of the
aware of the Mixed Claims Commits
sion. Germans were we'll received in
the Un4ted States and American tour
lists f1ocked in increasing numbers to
the Fatherland because they had good
treatment, were made to feel welcome
and we're never insulted. as sometimes
happened in France. 1t is true that
American movies" got into more and
more trouble. but this did not par
| tlcularly affect Americans in general
only the producers Of films 1t began
specifically to look as though after
fighting Germany We were coming to
think OF her as our best friend in
Europe
Then the depression changed the
| aspect of everything Germany was hH
like every other nation, and cried about
| 1t very much more than most. GERMAN
Indebtedness had grown by leaps and
bounds, and comparatively small pro-
! portion CT the money borrowed had
| been put into constructive and self
liquidating projects. The states and
! cities were as deeply involved as the
Reich itself. Americans had taken a
| good deal Of credit to themselves in
having helped solve the reparation
| question in the Dawes plan. had been
( a little shocked when this proved un-
/ workable, but had taken renewed salts
faction when the Young plan was
adopted. Now it was clear that pay
ments even under the Young plan were
! impossible
Germany's export balance had always
/ been encouraging-one of the argu-
ments in favor of lending more and
more money-but now exports were cut
to minimum. Loans to Germany
! ceased. partly because the bankeli
| had no money to loan and partly be-
cause there was sudden realization
that Germany had already borrowed
far too much for her own good or that
of her creditors. 1t should not have
been, but actually was, a shock to dis
cover that when Germany could no
! longer borrow, it no longer bought
| abroad. Americans felt that somehow
, they had been fooled
The fact remained that Germany was
fast approaching state of bankruptcy.
of complete collapse. And this fact was
of vital interest to the whole world.
since a German collapse would affect
all classes in almost every nation. The
German government was not making
! particularly strenuous efforts 10 pre-
vent the debacle; this was intensely
irritating, but did not diminish the
seriousness of the situation for other
nations. There were some in America,
seeing Germany supine, who believed
that the German government was bent
Oh treating the rest of the world exactly
as it treated its own people when it
permitted the mark to become waste
paper. But the world had more to lose
and had more power Of resistance. 1t
was in these circumstances that Presi-
dent Hoover conceived the idea of
years moratorium on intergovern-
mental debts. He believed that Ger
many could carry on if temporarily re-
lie we'd of reparations payments, he knew
that Germany otherwise would simply
have to default, which would help al
most not at all, since it would utterly
destroy German credit. He realized, too.
that in the stress Of the times there
might well be default in other inter-
governmental payments, and he did not
want to see the contracts on which in
ternational obligations rested thrown in
tC the discard
President Hoover was thinking of the
welfare of millions of human beings.
1t is idle to speculate on what might
have been the result had his proposal
been instantly accepted as made.
France delayed while the situation
everywhere deteriorated. But a thing
which would have shocked America
quite as much as the French delay, had
it been as widely known, was that
Germany even then would do nothing
to facilitate our efforts to aid her
France always wants quid pro quo.
1t is probable that if Germany had
agreed to drop the idea of the Austrian
Customs Union - made unnecessary,
even from the German point of view,
be the aid implicit in the moratorium
or even if she had agreed to postpone
OululS lllc peilOu VI tlle HUI dtOl iuui
the building of the second pocket bat
tleship," France would have withdrawn
objections.
1t is a sad lesson in German men
tality. Rightly or wrongly, the impress
sion was given, 60 ahead and save me.
There is no reason why should assist"
Germany behaved like the exhausted
swimmer who will rot obey the instruc-
tions of the life guard, but In tsie case
Of Germany there was not even the
justification of panic. Although the
American public knew comparatively
little of this at the time, it somehow
sensed the fact that Germany was not
playing the game with the United
States.
After this, sympathy for Germany