Evening star., 1933-11-15
CUBA RECOGNITION !.
AGAIN U. S. ISSUE.
Replacing of WelIes May Be
Necessary for Benefit of
Changed Viewpoint.
BY CONSTANTINE BROWN.


The advisability Of the United States
Government changing its attitude re-
garding the non-recognition of the Grau
San Martin administration in Cuba has
come to the fore again In discussions
following the successful stamping but Of
the Havana rebellion last week.
For the time being the State Depart
nlent officially maintains the same point
OF view that as long as there are not
sufficient proofs to satisfy the Govern
ment that the present Cuban govern
ment has the backing of its people,
there can be no recognition Of the pres
ent regime
The department is basing its judg-
ment exclusively on the opinion ex-
pressed by the American Ambassador
at Havana, Summer Wells
Outside the State Department, how
ever, there is a strong feeling that the
considerations which determine the
American Ambassador to stick to a
policy of non-recognition may be some
what biased.
Mr.. welles went to Cuba in June and
was successful in forcing the former
Cuban dictator, Gerardo Machado, out
of office.
Disappointed By Results.
After this successful operation, Mr..
Welles has met with many diplomatic
reverses. Machado's successor. Manuel
de Cespedes. was not able to hold his
own, and revolution followed revolution,
to the disappointment of the American
Ambassador
Because OF the extreme left tenden-
cies of the San Martin administration,
Mr. Welles could not see eye to eye
with this administration The result
of this mutual lack of sympathy was
that the relations between the Ameri-
can Ambassador and the present Cuban
government are extremely frigid. Mr..
Welles Is not consulted by any of the
Cuban leaders and Is reported to be in
touch with Grau San Martin and the
members of that cabinet merely
through contact man.
It Is human that under these cir
cunnstances Mr.. Welles should be op-
posed to a government which in his
opinion is not fit to rule a country.
Besides, and completely independent
of the Ambassador, there are important
interests in this country, representing
the American investors In Cuba, who
are doing their utmost to prevent rec
ognition. But since they do not cut
much ice either at the White House
nor in the State Department, these In
terests endeavor to keep the pot boiling
in Cuba. They were not unfamiliar
with last weeks uprising in Havana
and are encouraging the recalcitrant
elements in the interior to keep the rev.
olution going
The fact that the United States con-
tinues to refuse recognition to the
Grau San Martin government is an i'm
portant propaganda asset In their
hands.
Grau Strength Shown.
In less biased quarters, however the
feeling prevails that the efficient
crushing of last weeks revolution In
Havana has shown the strength of
San Martin and his followers. Further
| more, 1t Is admitted In the State De-
partment, that the present admins
tration has the situation in Havana
itself well in hand There is trouble in
the interior, but Havana Is quiet and
likely to remain SO.
Under these circumstances, it is said,
there is nc reason to withhold recogni-
ton from the present Cuban govern
ment. If recognition were extended, it
is said Grau San Martin would have
better chance to pacify the interior
There are two ways of forcing the
] interior into submission. One Is by
bribery, the other by military force
Both require a thing which Grau San
The Cuban treasury is empty and there
is no possibility of getting it replen-
ished.
Consequently. as long as America
withholds recognition, the forces which
take advantage of the situation will
have an easy play in the interior and
| it will take the Grau San Martin gov
ernment a long time to pacify the
| island.
The American Government is anxious
| TO see a stabilized situation in Cuba
regardless as to who is at the head of
the government. provided thai he can
actually maintain law and order in the
island.
To many official observers it appears
that the Grau San Martin administra-
ton, if given the necessary support by
q recognition, may be able to establish
a normal situation in Cuba.
Because of this belief and the views
of the American Ambassador. it is con-
sidered that Mr.. Welles has outlived his
usefulness In Havana, and that q man
with less biased feelings might be able
to hasten settlement of the Cuban tur-
mol.
Nobody doubts the ability of Mr..
Welles as a diplomat, but one has to
take into consideration the fact that
the Ambassador has lived through a
most trying period during the last few
months and his nerves are somewhat
jagged Furthermore, he is too near to
the scene OF trouble and sees the situa-
tion from too close quarter to enable
him to have clear and objective view
Of the present political situation in
Cuba.