Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1933-07-23
T. s. AND EUROPE SPLIT
ON POLITICS AND FINANCE
Adjustment of Policies Declared Impos
sible to Achieve When Policies Them
selves Are Irreconciliable.

steadily ever since the close OF the
war. The deadlock in the Disarma-
ment Conference has similarly awak-
ened distrust and public opinion has
consolidated against any form OF poll
tical commitment involving the coun-
try in future European conflict.
In the closing days Of the Coolidge
administration and throughout the
Hoover regime there was a steady II
insensible drift toward international
cooperation in Government circles.
The Coolidge pact was the first clear
sign. American official representation
at Geneva and the gradual elaboration
of the Stimson doctrine were later eX-
pressions of international goodwill
Cooperation with the League OF Ma
lions had reached an unexpected de-
gree of completeness during the crisis
over the japanese action in Manchurla.
Even in the first days OF the Roose-
welt administration the action OF the
new President in respect Of the Dis
armament Conference. his retention OF
Norman H. Davis. the agent OF Mr..
Hoover at Geneva, his reaffirmatlon
of the Stimson doctrine in even more
definite terms, his message to the Worlo
ir the face of the Hitler menace-all
these circumstances seemed TO lore
shadow further extension OF interna-
tional cooperation.
Cooperation Blocked.
Inevitably, however, when Mr.. Roose-
welt decided to quit the gold standard
economic consequences of this decision
put an end to all present prospect OF
cooperation abroad in financial or
economic fields. simultaneously col
lective default of "a per cent on the
part of the war debtors. which was
absolute for 8 of IA debtor nations. and
the parallel disclosure that private IN
yestments in Germany were facing a
similar enforced and Improbable llqul-
dation for Americans, awakened popular
resentment.
Thus contemporary hints from the
National Capital that Uncle Sam Is
| "going native" under the inspiration OF
the Roosevelt administration have I'M
mistakably been greeted with Nation
wide approval and equally widespread
annlause' A huge number in the ma
tional population, for whom Will
Rogers speaks consciously and exactly,
have never been able to escape the con-
viction that in some mysterious fashion
the willy and wicked foreigner has
steadily been taking advantage OF an
honest but inexperienced Uncle Sam.
What is perhaps less well perceived by
Rogers or his following is that all peo-
pies have the identical conception OF
the role of their own governments IN
the world and in international con-
ferenceS.
It is. moreover, self-evident that II
any country in the world is capable Of
working out successfully policy of
economic as well as political isolation,
it is the United States. Aside from
rubber tin, coffee and manganese We
have practically everything nation
can require to prosper in peace or de-
fend itself in war What it imposed is
only a problem Of readjustment which,
however great, is by no means insoluble.
What really counts is whether the coun-
try will patiently endure the strain Of
readjustment which can prove for the
time being severe.
President Roosevelt's July Sd mes
sage, which was somewhat ironically
described as new Declaration Of In
dependence at the London Conference,
thus seems far from unlikely to mark
a significant change in American for
eign policy. After the war and by the
rejection of the peace treaties, an &C
ton which kept us out of the League,
the United States sought to escape
political association with Europe. But
economically and financially, concern
for trade and investment dragged us
back. Hoover was thus following the
wake of Wilson but on a materialistic,
rather than an idealistic, platform.
The drastic reduction of trade Incl
dent to the great depression and the
concomitant liquidation of the war
debts by default and the suspension of
payment on German obligations by
mo-atoria have served to weaken the
economic and financial arguments for
world cooperation pretty completely.
We have lost much of our trade and
seem destined to lose much of our
money lent abroad. Thus the incen-
tive for political intervention in Euro
pean affairs largely disappears.
Again, since the world at London de-
clined definitively to share Mr.. RooSe-
velt'S great experiment until there was
clearer evidence that it would succeed,
the Nation was even more completely
thrown back upon itself. If the expert
ment succeeds we shall emerge from it
largely self-contained. If it is pro-
tracted long, before 1t succeeds finally,
We shall be progressively isolated by
reason Of the defensive measures taken
by other countries against American
goods and services. AS to what might
happen if it failed no one can say
Then, conceivably new reaction from
nationalism to internationalism might
take place
But for the moment We are frankly
done with Europe. politically and eco
nomically. Our participation in the
Disarmament Conference is hardly
likely to be significant, if that gathering
ever again gets down to serious dis
cussion. The younger Roosevelt has, in
an amusing and measurably accidental
fashion, drifted into the situation of
ct. R." himself The New Nation
alism" of the postwar era has made
way for the old of the pre-war period.
And, for certain time at least, it
seems plain that the present policy will
prove popular.
tCopyright. 1899