Evening star., 1933-06-14
The First Line of National Defense.

The First Line OF National defense.
A reduction of the neval forces of
the United States. whether " curtail-
ment in the interests of economy or
through international agreement toward
disarmament, must not go to the point
at which this country will lose its power
of defense. Whatever may be accom-
plished at Geneva in the direction of
the Iessening of the burden of arms
and of the menace to peace involved
in the maintenance of great armaments
and whatever may be sought In re-
trenchment to effect the balancing OF
the budget, there must remain suff1-
cient naval establishment to insure the
security of this country from foreign
attack and invasion.
With no purpose Of aggression, with
no policy of militancy, the United States
must be kept secure against possible
foe. The Navy is the first line of that
defense. The two great seacoasts must
be held immune from surprise assaults.
This is to be effected through the main
tenance of an active feet so composed
as to be able to resist a naval onset,
with major and auxiliary members and
with a personnel, in officers and en-
listed men, adequate to meet any emer-
gency.
The land forces of the country can
more safely be reduced than the naval,
for they can be more quickly recruited
and enlarged in case of need. A Navy
is effective only in terms of its equip
ment, which is not to be speedily pro-
vided. That equipment is effective only
through the maintenance Of skilled
force, the training Of which requires
long period.
Economies that involve the reduction
of the personnel, by retirement or dis
missal of officers and the lowering of
the reserve of trained enlisted men, are
calculated to lessen the effectiveness of
the naval establishment to the danger
point. Not only is the floating force
to be kept up to the mark of the ma
tional defense requirement, but the air
force, men and craft, the scouting
agencies, invaluable for observation and
attack in case of threat from the sea.
There is now danger of reductions,
in both ships and men available for i'm
mediate service-and any defense service
will be immediate In case Of attack
to the point at which in the event of
assault by q foreign enemy bent upon
invasion of the country the shores of
this country, with the great centers of
population which lie along the seaboard,
will be open to destructive attack, from
the effects of which the country may
only with dificulty recover.
To maintain the ratio which may be
assigned to the several powers by inter-
national agreement, whether the present
or higher or lower totals of ships of
keep in commission both capital and
auxiliary ships to the prescribed number,
but to keep them in the best Of condi-
ton, with the best of equipment and
with the most thoroughly trained officers
and crews.
The most costly economy would be
that which lowers the ratio not merely
of numbers but Of efficiency in both
ships and men. No other country has
greater need of defensive force than
this. On the Eastern and the Western
seaboards there are potential perils.
Despite the facility afforded by the
Panama Canal for the transfer of ships
from one coast to the other, the need
exists and will continue to exist of an
adequate establishment on both fianks
to safeguard the country against pos
sible assault This does not mean the
maintenance of full wartime strength
in all respects. But it does mean the
can In the shortest possible time be
expanded to wartime dimensions.
Ships and men, aircraft Of all de-
scriptions and men to man them, these
are the Nations imperative need, what
ever the demands for budget balancing
These truths are known to the Presi-
dent. He has an intimate acquaintance
with the naval establishment through
previous service in the administration
Of its affairs. He will doubtless bear in
mind throughout these trying times,
when there is the most urgent require
ment for economies, that the most
wasteful economy of all is that which
depletes the country's defenses, upon
which it must rely as long as there
Is the possibility Of attack.