Evening star., 1933-11-12

| entered the war because OF the CeIntu
submarine policy we had staggered half
way across the threshold as result OF
private bargains between Sir Edward
Grey and Col. House, who acted in the
name of the President.
In the case of Norman H. Davis we
do not know what secret negotiations
have taken place or what private under
standings have been reached between
him and foreign statesmen. But we
have had two significant revelations.
Last Spring, at the moment when the
Disarmament Conference was in one of
its recurrent commissions, the news
papers of Europe announced that Mr..
Davis was about to make sensational
declarati forecasting a revolution in
American foreign policy. And few
days later Mr.. Davis did make an
announcement. and so far as he or the
President could produce a revolution in
foreign policy that speech did it.
Arms Bargain Offered.
For what Mr.. Davis announced was
that If France and other armed nations
would reduce their armaments to meet
MIR. Rooseyelt's standards and if they
were later attacked the United States
would refrain from insisting upon its
neutral rights when such insistence
would hinder these countries in their
fight with the Germans. Mr. Davis did
not use the names of countries, of
course, but that was the only interpre-
tation possible. And that meant We
should be the allies Of the French
against the Germans, because neutrals
not only have rights, but duties, the
first of which is to treat all belligerents
equally. But when to buy French dis
armament we promised In advance to
treat Germany unequally We were vio-
lating out own neutrality.
Nominally, this Davis doctrine was
only reStatement of the So-called
Stimson doctrine. but only nominally.
Col. StimSon merely expressed the view
that IN ratifying the kellogg pact We
had abandoned our historic policy in
the matter of neutrality. He did not
propose to sell that position; in fact, he
indicated 1t could not be sold now be-
cause 1t had been already given away.
When. moreover, at the London Naval
Conference there was question of a
consultative pact as means of getting
France to sign the five-power treaty, Col
StimSon rejected the idea precisely be-
cause he properly recognized it would
have the appearance of a bargain and
might lead to an involvement.
The peril of all such contracts,
whether public or secret, was disclosed
in the case of the Franco British naval
agreements Before the World War the
British and French admiralties, with
the consent of Sir Edward Grey, had
made an agreement by which the
French undertook to watch British COM
municationS in the Mediterranean and
the British to guard Freach coasts on
the Atlantic. But when Germany de-
clared war upon France these French
coasts were exposed and the British
foreign secretary had to tell Germany
that Britain would regard as an act of
war perfectly lawful German operation
against her enemy, France.
Britain had, therefore, actually sacri-
need her neutrality long before the
World War. Moreover. if the French
had accepted the Davis offer and re-
duced their armies, then the moment
there was a Franco-German war the
French Ambassador in Washington, like
M. Cambon in London in 1914, could
and would wait upon the American
Government and call its attention to
the fact that pursuant to an American
proposal France had reduced her
armies. was now being attacked and did
therefore request an American an
nouncement of a policy of unilateral
neutrality In the impending struggle.
But what of Germany. for whom that
would be both a moral and a material
blow? Does one forget that in the
whole submarine controversy in 1915-l7
one of the German grievances was that
we were not dealing fairly as between
the central powers and the allies by
enforcing neutral rights against the
former and waving them in the case of
the latter? But in 1851 we never
proclaimed such course as a matter
of policy.
Arms Are Means to End.
One other example: When Germany
quit the Disarmament Conference the
European press announced that COM
mon front had been established against
the Germans by the British, the French
and the Americans. Paris papers, Lon
don papers, German papers stated it
as fact and made their own varying
comments. Under the pressure of Ameri-
can public opinion Washington repudi-
ated the alleged association. But it is
evident that American participation in
arms discussions between nations which
are visibly on the verge of war can only
lead to attempts by both sides to in
volve us in their causes, and in the
recent instance there was common
agreement on their side that they had
succeeded.
Just as 1 believe that war is present
peril in Europe and will sooner or later
come, also believe that we shall be
involved in it if our present policy of
interference and involvement in Euro
pean affairs continues. 1t is useless to
/ pretend we can talk about armaments
in Europe but not about politics Arms
are only the means by which nations
carry out their policies. If we succeed
in reducing the arms of one group OF
powers. We have weakened their po-
litical situation in the face of another.
II We assist one group in keeping an
other disarmed, we are playing the
] game of the former against the latter.
The forces which are making for war
are beyond our control We cannot
bring about an agreement between Ger
many and Poland about the Corridor,
between Germany and the Little En-
tente about Austro- German union, be-
tween Germany and France about the
relative strength of armies they both
/ expect to use in no long time. But at
every stage we can become involved, as
we would have been In the matter Of
waving neutral rights. if the French
| had taken up the Davis proposals; as
we were for a moment in the matter OF
the common front-at least in European
eyes-before the President repudiated
what so far as one can judge his
Ambassador at large had done.
In sum, then, I repeat. I do believe
Europe is bound for another war and
do believe the way we are now going
we shall be involved in that war.
Copyright. 1889