The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1933-11-13

enough to Judge. 1t is not possible
for us to render the verdicts OF his
tory.
Our part is not to render moral
judgments or to imagine we can
expound the truth in a tangled MS
tory. or to let our own minds ana
spirits be poisoned and perverted by
taking sides passionately IN the
conflicts of Europe and of Asia. Our
task is to formulate an American
no1icv. Our main concern is to de-
termine what is our duty and inter-
est in the presence of these dan
gers. The premise of our policy Is,
if seems to me, reasonably clear. 1t
has been determined by the hrm
resolution Of the American people
not to be drawn into a European or
into an Asiatic war.
"HERE have been sharp differ
ences of opinion among US IN
the past as to whether another
great war could be prevented by
our participation in the collective
organization of peace. There are
no differences of opinion on the
fundamental decision not to employ
orr armed forces in Europe or IN
Asia. No service can be rendered
to the cause of peace by dlsgulSlng
or qualifying the singleneSS OF
American purpose in this matter.
Were we in any way to fail to
make this clear we should be prac-
ticing a cruel deception which
could only aggregate the situation
abroad.
But. of course, it is evident that
in the event of war there would be
difficulties in acting upon the
American decision. The role OF the
neutral in a modern war is not an
easv one. We learned that during
the World war In fact, 1t seems
to me that we learned that in
world war neutrality for great
trading nation is eventually impos-
sible. If that is so, if in fact neu-
trality probably can not be pre-
served in a world war, what con-
clusion are we, who have deter
mined that we would wish to be
neutral, to draw as to the course
of our own policy?
The conclusion I draw is that
the fewer neutrals there are the
greater the danger of becoming in
volved. You can put this another
way and say that, since we are not
in a position to prevent all wars,
the object of our diplomacy must
be to localize the extension OF the
wars that are threatened. For
while it is difficult, it is not impos-
sible to escape ENHANCEMENT in a
local war: so if we wish to main
tain neutrality with self-respect it
is the localization of wars, given
the world as it is today, that we
must make the primary aim of our
foreign policy.
Before proceeding further, let us
fix this point clearly in our minds.
We live in world in which wars
involving great powers have to be
considered frankly as real possibili-
ties. I dislike saying this as much
as most of you must dislike hearing
it said.
DUT in matters of the highest
ID policy, affecting the security OF
America, every responsible man
must base his view not on his wishes
but on the most candid and accu-
rate estimates of the possibilities
and the probabilities in the world
as it is. That wars are possible
both in Asia and in Europe no one
viii deny. How probable they are
no one can say. In formulating an
American policy we must hope for
the best. But we must be fully
prepared for the worst.
Since war is possible, are we pre-
pared to stand up and say that we
shall throw our whole might into the
scales to prevent it? We are not.
This means then that war may
come and that we should seek to
be neutral But experience tells us
that in world war neutrality is
an almost impossible policy. There
have been two world wars since the
foundation Of the American repub-
| lie. We have been drawn into both
of them. 1t follows, does it not,
that since we decline to resort to
extreme measures to prevent wars
and since we know how impossible
it is to stay out Of a world war,
! there is but one clear course for us
and that is to devote our efforts to
combining the possible wars Of the
| future to the locality where they
begin. If we can not prevent wars
as, fifteen years ago We dreamed
we might do, then we must try to
conf1ne and limit wars, as prudent
statesmen in the past have always
tried to do.
I wish, therefore, to raise the
question: What, from the Ameri-
can point of view, is the actual, con-
crete difference between a world
war and a local war? I think the
difference is perfectly plain. A
world war, such a war as might
originate in eastern Asia or central
Europe, would be one in which the
British commonwealth Of nations
was engaged. If Britain is neutral
such a war would, from the point
of view Of our interests, be a local
war. If Britain is engaged, the
problem of neutrality would arise as
conflicts between Britain and our
selves.
If Britain is not engaged, the
problems of neutrality are the COM
mon problems of Britain and our
selves. With Britain fighting. We
can be neutral only by yielding our
rights or by challenging British sea
power: with Britain neutral, the
overwhelming weight Of the worlds
naval armament1 and Of the worlds
sea borne commerce are on the side
J Of neutral as against belligerent