The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1933-07-21
M.

TINE New Deal as we call it, represents a
IL idea of recovery. This new idea is
essentially natonalistic. Up to last March, we
were sold on the thought that the only way out
OF depression lay through worldwide agree
mentS.
We had been told that we could not do much
of anything for ourselves until we actually be-
ieved it. We slowly were goink bankrupt through
inaction. At the end Of February our hopes
we're centered largely on what could or would
be done in London next June
Without belttling the London conference in
any way. President Roosevelt proceeded on the
theory that We could do lot for ourselves. The
program he formulated was and is necessarily
nationalstic. While not barring cooperation
it depended and still depends chiefly on action
at home.
Looking backward any one can see that this
'rogress was irreconcilable with many detectives
Of the London conference, but that was not at
all clear last March
Then many economists were inclined to look
aSkance at initiation, to doubt the feasibility of
great public works program and TO shy at the
thought of such rigid industrial control as now
is IN prospect. not as result OF deep convincing
study. but because their thoughts had been
guided in a different direction.
liver since 1929, our best minds had been
IL devoting themselves to the constantly
reiterated assertion that we could not hope for
better times until the whole world improved
and that our best bet was TO sit steady in the
boat until such time as international conference
could bring about this happy result
We were warned that abandonment of the
gold standard would be disastrous and that we
not only must save it for ourselves. but restore
1t to other countries. We were told that great
appropriations for public work would do little
out increase our Indebtedness raise taxes and
to an unhealthy degree of paternalism.
Summing 1t all up. We were advised to dis
card the notion that this or any other nation
could beat the business slump. or overcome en-
ployment by itself
Even after President Roosevelt had his pro-
gram well under way. we assumed that il would
not and could not work without worldwide
readJustment and that the London conference
still was essential TO recovery.
IT is probable that quite few people sensed
l. the irreconcilability Of the Roosevelt program
with the detectives Of the London conference but
the great majority did not
Only after the conference had assembled
and the delegations from various European
countries had presented their plans was 1t posi-
bic for the public 70 realize how definitely they
failed 70 fit the Roosevelt program. or how
impossible 1t would be TO square independent
action at home with acceptable cooperation
abroad. in certain fundamental respects.
The absurdity OF discussing sterilization Of
currencies while deliberately depressing the dol
lar now is apparent. and so is the absurdity OF
trying to readJust tariffs on an equitable basis
after several countries have bound themselves
by specific agreements
As between the two, it is much more impor-
tant 10 save the Roosevelt program than the
London conference. not only for ourselves. but
for the world at large.