Evening star., 1933-06-04
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.

~ VEN In recent history, repelete
l. as it is with exaggerations and
misconceptions. it would be hard
IL to find case of greater dis
tortion than that discoverable
in recent interpretations of American
action at the Disarmament Conference.
Thus in Geneva and in the world gen.
orally the speech of Norman Davis, the
American Ambassador at large, has
been proclaimed a complete reversal of
American foreign policy, marking the
end alike Of traditional isolation and OF
accustomed neutrality.
On the strength of this assumed
revolution, too, there has been a new
crop of optimistic reports as to the
progress insured thereby in the Dis
armament Conference itself, which has
survived only by sustained oxygen
treatment for the past 16 months. And
yet the smallest regard for realities
must disclose the double truth that
in American foreign policy and there
fore no important change in the for
tunes Of the Geneva Conference.
There has been no change in Ameri-
can policy because 1t is not within the
power of the President of the United
States to transform that policy All
Mr.. Roosevelt could or can do Is to in
dicate what action he will take while
he is Chief Executive, and tnat action
must be rigidly limited to things which
are beyond the constitutional require
ments of consent by the Senate. He
can commit himself and his admins
tration no further. and thus only with
in restricted sphere.
BY virtue of the Presidents decla-
ration European nations can assume
that in case of a crisis an American
representative will go to conference
with delegates of other nations. They
can further assume that If American
representatives concur in the Judgment
of such conference that there has been
aggression and that the agressor is
clear the President will refrain from
insisting upon American neutral rights
in such fashion as to compromise dis
ciplinary or coercive action taken by
other powers.
Can't Bind Successors.
But Mr.. Roosevelt cannot bind his
successors to follow the same course.
They might adopt it as the successors
OF Monroe adopted his celebrated dec
laration. and a Roosevelt doctrine
might, like the Monroe, become estab-
hshed by time and general acceptance
as an American policy. But, on the
other hand, the next occupant of the
White House might ignore it and that
would be the end of the matter.
Now 1t must be said at the outset
that in taking the steps he has taken
the President has gone to the limit of
his power. He has done all that he
could and more than any predecessor,
because he has seen the European situ-
alton more realistically. He has recog-
nized that If the United States desires
to serve the cause of world peace it
must be prepared to accept interna-
tional responsibilities. He has seen
that nations will not disarm in the face
OF visible danger save as they obtain
outside guarantees to replace their own
guns.
But, having done all that he could.
1t must be plain that his maximum
falls very far short of the minimum
demand OF exposed nations. 1t falls
short primarily because it is obviously
a personal and not a national as
surance. When you have the weird
paradox of Norman Davis declaring in
the palace of the League of Nations
that America is prepared to change
her historic policy and James Hamil-
ton Lewis affirming in the Senate
chamber that nothins has been or will
be modified, it is plain that the
European appraisal of the American
proposal must be-
But, even if the President were able
to commit his country-as he Is not
the so-called consultative pact, with
its negative assurances in the matter
OF neutral rights, would only suffice
II 1t constituted a basis for a change
at Paris Mr.. Wilson gave France a
guarantee treaty in return for French
agreement to renounce permanent oc-
cupation of the left bank of the Rhine
from Holland to Switzerland. Britain
Joined in that treaty also.
But when the United States Senate
rejected the treaty the British also es-
capped automatically. Thereafter, since
the United States was not in the
League, the British declined to admit
that their feet should be the force
behind the Covenant because of the
obvious danger that it might come into
collision with American rights. This
British argument resulted in the failure
of the protocol and all subsequent at
tempts to clothe the League with
power.
When the London Naval Conference
was on the verge of failure because
Of the refusal of France to agree to
Italian naval parity, Mr.. Stimson for
moment played with the idea, of
consultative pact. The purpose of this
pact was to insure Britain against COL
lision with American neutral rights in
cases where American delegates to an
international conference had agreed
with all others that an aggression had
been undertaken. Thus assured, Britain
could employ its fleet. And France,
which feared Italian action in the
Mediterranean, M would thus have pro-
lection.
The project fell through because
Washington was not ready to agree
to the proposal Stimson had considered,
and its collapse insured the failure of
the Five-Power Conference because
France refused to accept Italian parity.
Thus the three-power treaty actually
made at London was conditional and
the Franco-Italian DISPUTE never ad-