Evening star., 1933-12-24
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

THE evident breakdown Of the
direct Franco-German CONVEX
Sations over the matter of arma-
Il ments, while inevitable, has an
obvious value as these conSti-
tuted just one more step in the long
chain of events moving toward a crisis
Within a relatively brief period now
the whole attempt either to reduce or
limit ornaments must be brought to
q close. TIE last hope of any real
compromise is over. The armed ma
tions will not reduce their ornaments,
the disarmed will not stay dispropor-
tionately disarmed.
In such situation the first question
which arises is as to what the armed
nations will do now that Germany is
deliberately and unmistakably proceed
ing to rearm. 1t lies within their
right to summon Germany before the
League, cite her violations Of the
treaty and, thereafter. if League inter-
Tention proves useless, to proceed
against Germany with their own forces
Nominally this would be legal measure
to bring the Germans back under the
law. Actually it would be a war of
prevention.
But SO far as one can now see the
french people have no stomach for such
an operation. In fact, one may fairly
conclude that a preventive war is beyond
the resources of democracy. Only a
dictatorship could employ it as a
weapon. But if the French will not
resort to force to prevent German re-
armament, then that rearmament may
be accepted as bound to be achieved
within the shortest possible time. And
that, in turn, means within five years at
the outside.
Present Cabinet Must Wait.
German demand for 100000 troops,
together with all of the weapons other
nations possess, including naval and
aerial, has, too, plainly taken the Brit
ish by surprise At least. the British
Although actually all real doubt in
Downing Street about German purpose
disappeared long ago. But British
public opinion is far behind the facts
and the government has to go through
motions until the public catches up.
Sid Edward Grey had thus to wait for
an invasion of Belgium to take Britain
into war he knew all along she could
not keep out of. The present cabinet
has had similarly to wait until German
Tearmament plans were unmiStakable.
If, however, Germany means to re-
ARMAND her purpose is clear-then
ID 4lG1ll Will nave " SLd1lu Will FRANCE
in conference and at Geneva. Then
the responsibility for the situation can
be Saddled upon the Germans. In the
last analysis, too, the British govern
mont must stand by the League of Ma
tions because in England that organi-
cation still commands a measure of sup
port in influential sections of public
opinion. So far, too, they have also
had TO keep going through motions of
1rrrfV to hYfr, n aYNvy
together and proffering plans for COM
promise.
Actually, however, the British govern
ment and the larger part of British
public opinion are about at the point
of dropping all effort at compromise
and coming out in the open. When they
do. this will mean simply that a new
Anglo-French entente will again begin
to take form. And British diplomacy
will do its utmost to bring Italy into
line with such an arrangement. If
Success crowns such an endeavor the
immediate danger of war will be abol-
ished for even the Germans are not yet
ready to invite hostilities from three
great powers sure to be backed by sew
eral lesser nations.
But Italy will join such combination
with great reluctance because in it her
role would be subordinate. What Mus
solini has been striving for was four
power combination with Italy acting
as the honest broker between France
and Germany and Britain standing by,
giving moral support to the Duce. And
that might have been possible if Hitler
had not left the Disarmament Confer
ence brusquely and then launched his
campaign for German rearmament
without regard to British sensibilities.
French Estimates Seem Exact
Today the British are in a state of
undisguised anger at both the Germans
and the French. but primarily at the
Germans for driving them back into
association with the French. They
don't want to be associated with any
one and the French least Of all. They
believe that the triumph of Hitler In
Germany was the consequence of post
war French policy. Also they are angry
because on the surface the French eSt1-
mates of Germany seem to have been
exact and those of the British erroneous.
The trouble there is that if war is
to be prevented in the next year or
two the only way out is close aSso-
citation of the British and the French.
If the Germans believe they have di-
vided these two countries as they know
France and Italy are divided. the temp
alton to try by force to achieve their
territorial oblectlVeS may become IRE
sistible once rearmament has reached
a certain point But for the British
such association, not ineXactly, seems
a guarantee that they will be caught
In the next war as they were in the
last
One thing is certain, the British will
not make a deal with the French as
long as they can avoid it. The nearer
London and Paris get together the
more acute the danger will be. But the
German demand for submarines and
bombing planes, along with their in
sistence upon an army of 800, 900, with
out regard for the storm troops of the
Hitlerites and their similar demand
for the return of those of their colonies
which the British took, are all details
which concern the British closely. Such
a program is quite different from a
purpose to recover the Polish Corridor