Evening star., 1933-07-09
BY SIR ARTHUR SALTER.

Member British Economic Advisory Council
LONDON.-A recess after earlier
discussions during which ministers
from reasonably near countries can
return to them. while experts elaborate
detailed proposals for later acceptance,
is sometimes a convenient procedure
in an assemblage such as the London
Economic Conference. 1t was in fact
contemplated as a possible method
before this conference began.
But the present partial adjournment
must be recognized not so much as a
stage in orderly progress toward sue
cess, but a definite setback. The con-
ference has been partially suspended
not because sufficient progress toward
agreement has been reached in discus
sions by the principal delegates to give
a basis for experts to WORK out detalted
proposals. but because except on a lew
subsidiary questions no progress was
made or seems Immediately possible.
We need to consider calmly but can
didly the causes of this situation the
immediate prospects of resumed effort
and the probable consequences.
A conference of more than so gov
ernments is necessarily cumbrous In
strument of negotiation, though 1t Is
the only one for the kind OF world
problems which now need solution.
Several conditions are essential TO
success. There must be not only
material and expert preparation, but
diplomatic preparation as well. The
main lines Of possible solutions must
be visible before such a conference
begins. Public opinion and pohtlcal
for>es behind the different delegates
must be such as to make agreement
practicable.
Postponement Impossible.
Some Of these conditions we're salts
fed for the London Conference. Ex-
pert and diplomatic conversation at
WASHINGTON and Geneva had prepared
the way: the gravity of the world STU
alton had given the necessary impetus
to action At the beginning OF April,
in the opinion of the best observers,
the changes were favorable for success,
though the odds were not great. me
sudden fall of the dollar from golo,
however. introduced new, compllcat-
ing factor Of the utmost Importance.
On all technical grounds those who
have had the most experience IN great
conferences would probably have pre-
ferred by the end of April that this
ccnference should be postponed at least
six months But the expectations OF
the world had by then become so cen
tered upon it that politically such
decision was scarcely possible. AND
the obstacles to success. If greater, Sthl
were not insuperable if the conference
could start with reasonably clear
view of the extent to which the new
American policy was to be carried, and
If temporary arrangements coulo De
made to allay immediate disturbances.
The abortive attempts to bring about
these conditions have been described
Upon their failure most Of the delegates
decided that uncertainties regarding de-
velopments in America which the con-
ference itself could not influence, and
the psychological atmosphere that re-
suited not only in the conference but
in all the principal countries concerned,
made immediate progress with the
more important countries lmposslDle:
1t must be admitted that the actual
form of President Roosevelt's message
July 3 contributed to this situation.
What. then, is likely to be the course
Of coming developments? NegotlatlonS
on the stabilization of currency pc
tween different groups of countries
may continue, and central bankers will
meet to discuss at least the emergency
situation of the moment. On the eco
nomic side secondary work in regard
to the regulation of wheat and sugar
production and export, etc, will GER
tainly continue
On the financial side discussions of
existing Indebtedness will proceed. New
impetus is given this question because
the prospect of the general collapse OF
the conference would certainly in
crease greatly the risks of wholesale
default or reputation. But the future
of the conference depends upon whether
1t proves practicable to resume effective
discussions on two principal questions
On which all others are largely de-
pendent. monetary policy and tariff
policy.
Regarding the first Of these it should