The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1933-10-25


formal promises Of the. Soviet cover
satisfaction of most close observers,
by the long political struggle in
Russia that has ended in the down.
fall of the world revolutioniSts and
the practical reputation Of the
Third international.
A NY one who wishes to acquaint
L \. himself with the main facts of
this internal Russian struggle can
find them clearly set forth in
Michael T. Florinsky's World Revo-
luton and the U. S. S. r." 1t ap-
pears that Communist writer's have
been arguing for at least thirty
years as to whether Socialism could
or could not be established in sin
gle country in the midst of a cap
italist world. Mr.. Florinsky shows
that this issue became acute after
the death of Lenin in 1924, and that
for some years it was fought out by
the adherentS of Stain and Trotzky.
There is a whole library of con-
troverSial literature. The thing was
debated with the utmost volubility,
with hot passion, and with tire
some pedantry. But in the end
Stain won. In 1929 Trotzky went
into exile and his adherentS lost
their influence. Since that time
the energies Of Stain have been
concentrated upon the upbuilding
of Russia and the foreign policy
of Litvinoff has become one of as
surfing peace on the frontiers and
Of expanding foreign trade.
Russia has borrowed considerable
sums Of money to finance imports.
So far as I know there never has
been question raised as to her good
faith in the fulfillment of contracts.
But even more impressive than that
is the way in which Russia has
cleaned up her relations with Po-
land and with all the other border
states from Finland to Turkey. The
treaty signed in London last July
is the clearest n-aggression treaty
that has been formulated since the
war; it is far more realistic and
definite than the Kellogg pact.
What matters is that the states
closest to Russia, and therefore
most threatened if Russia is ag-
gressive, have taken this treaty seri-
ously and rely upon it. So have
the French. These nations can not
afford to delude themselves, and if
they have confidence in the pacific
aims of the present Russian regime
we who are far away have every
reason for giving weight to their
judgment.
IN broad outline this may be as
l. sumed to be the background of
fact which has caused the admin
istration to open negotiations. The
chief objection to recognition has
been reduced, even if it is not alb
Solutely manifestly eliminated. The
positive advantages of recognition
are many. Russia is the great
power which lies between the two
danger spots of the modern world
in Eastern Asia and in Central
Europe. If Russia wants peace,
and it is plain that she does, then
it is of great advantage to the
world that she should be encour-
aged to act as a responsible world
power interested in the maintenance
of peace.
American recognition can have no
direct influence upon Russian policy;
but it undoubtedly would add some
reinforcement to those who, like
Stain and Litvinoff, are interested
in Socialism for Russia, in peace and
trade outside of Russia.
Recognition presumably would be
the prelude to policy of active
encouragement of Russo American
trade. How much trade can be
financed, do not know; but it is
clear that in theory at least Russia
is the greatest new potential mar
ket calling for the kind of goods
that our industry most urgently
needs to sell.
Russia is Transforming herself in
to an industrial state. She needs
some raw materials which we
possess, and she needs the type of
machinery we are so we'll able to
supply. The problem then would
seem to be: How to finance such
trade prudently, to determine how
much can be financed by credit and
how much of our exports can be
paid for by imports. This is OBJ
viously problem to be dealt with
by detailed negotiation after diplo-
matte relations have been resumed.
copyright. 1888. by The Tinesl