Evening star., 1933-07-16
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

IN the history Of American foreign
relations it is far from impossible
that July 3, the date Of President
i RooSeVelt's sensational message to
the London Economic Conference,
may be reckoned as fixing the end of
period which began almost a genera
ton before, with the declaration that
state Of war existed with the i'm
perial German government. Between
April, 1917, and July, 1888, we have
lived in and perhaps through period
first in war and then in peace.
That, aside from the immediate pc
riod Of hostilities, our experiment in
internationalism has been equally un-
successful viewed from both the for
eign and domestic angles, can hardly
be denied today, The events of recent
days which have been marked by prac-
tically complete default on the part of
all our former associates of the con-
flict in war debts, the rejection of
President Roosevelt's disarmament pro-
posals at Geneva, thinly yelled by one
more adjournment and finally by the
trends of the London Conference itself,
offer further proof of the failure of
our experiment.
Clemenceau once said to Lloyd
George, when visiting England in 1922
for the first time after the war: In
my judgment you have been an enemy
of my country ever since the armiStice."
And I suppose it would not be an ex-
aggeration to say that for most Euro
pean statesmen and publicS. American
participation in Old World affairs
seems to have constituted calamity
ever since the same date of November
II, 1918. Nor is it less evident that
the bulk of the American people would
agree that the calamity has been two
sided.
From start to finish all these rela-
tions have been marked by basic in
comprehension. When President Will
son. after a long struggle at Paris,
finally accepted settlement which
represented a compromise between Eu-
ropean and American conceptions. the
United States Senate promptly rejected
that settlement. And the result was
to throw Europe into confusion which
has had continuing consequences ever
since.
Unfortunate for United States.
Precisely in the same fashion our
Intervention in the financial affairs of
postwar Europe has been unfortunate
all the way around. Mr.. Hughes in
vited Europe to avail itself of Amer
ican financial genius, and the result
was first the Dawes plan and then the
Young plan. Both reduced German
reparationS materially Then Mr..
Hoover by his moratorium. interrupted
payments altogether. at the same time
temporarily suspending the collection
OF war debts.
When. however. It became clear that
the rising nationahstic spirit of Ger
would tn
reparations payment, once they had
been interrupted, Europe took note of
the fact in the Lausanne agreements
and approached Washington for mltiga-
ton OF the debt settlements. But as
the Senate had disowned Mr.. Wilson's
contracts. it now repudiated the logical
consequences of Mr.. Hoover's actions.
The result. of course. was at first par
tial default in December and then al
most complete default in June. And
once more misunderstanding was ac-
comparied by bitter recrimination on
both sides of the Atlantic.
In the matter of disarmament the
story Is identical. At Paris Mr.. Wilson
obtained notifications of the French
conception of security which were en-
bodied in the thesis Of permanent occu-
patton of the left bank of the Rhine.
by giving an American guarantee con-
tanned in the trlpartite treaty. When
that fell in the Senate. France turned
to the older order of armaments and
alliances to which she has adhered ever
since.
When Mr.. Hoover took America back
to Europe to participate In the dis
armament discussion it was with the
precise determination. reinforced by
Senate resolution, not TO assume respon-
Sibilities or undertake commitments
But it was never possible to persuade
the French and their allies to reduce
their armies. particularly in the face
of the rising menace of Hitle-ism save
by enlarging American responsibilities
Mr. Stimson. with Mr. Hoover's ap-
proval. went to the length of envisaging
American consultation in crisis and the
waving of American neutral rights in
case of action which in American Off
cial eyes constituted aggression. Mr..
Roosevelt adopted and further elabo-
rated this idea, but 1t proved insufficient
to the French to lead to any modifica-
ton of their attitude at Geneva and the
Disarmament Conference at London.
Effective Cooperation Impossible.
The London Economic Conference
thus far has been the reductio ad
absurdum of the conception that CO.
operation between Europe and America
was possible on any basis acceptable to
the United States. Laying aside all
questions of details, London approached
collapse because the United States
placed its program of domestic recovery
ahead of all international cooperation
and that program itself appeared ir-
reconciable with the policies and inter-
ests Of all European countries. For