Evening star., 1933-08-20

vast interests in Cuba as responsible,
through their loans, for Machado's self
maintenance In power. For economical
ly Cuba has shared the worldwide
disaster, a disaster aggravated by
peculation of the Machado government.
Hence Machado had to sacrifice all else
to the payment Of the forces that kept
him in Office. Education has been
abandoned. school teachers have been
unpaid Oonger than in Chicago. des-
titution has been on the increase, but
loans to Machado enabled him to keep
his troops loyal up to the last.
The Hoover-Stimson policy of "hands
off" was doubtless conceived in the
best of faith and intentions 1t was
the Mckinley Interpretation of
mo intermeddling" The Cubans were
to work out their own destiny But
meanwhile Cuba was progressively be-
coming a shambles, and the opposition
caustically pointed to the paradox Of
the economic support of Machado,
which, the affirmed. alone kept him in
Office against the will Of the Cubans.
Reprisals Are Begun.
In 1882 the long-suffering Cubans
began a policy Of reprisals. The A B
c. secret organization of Cuban
youth. sprang up. Its first victim was
the head of the Cuban secret police
But this organization was far more
than counter terrorist. Led by the
flower of the Cuban intellectual aris-
tocracy. it was determined not merely
that Machado must go, as the indis-
pensable preliminary to reconstruc-
tion but that the political and eco
nomic abuses of which Machado was,
after all, only the supreme manifesto
tion. must be removed
Its program-too long to be detailed
here's superb analysis of Cuba's s
internal shortcomings, a charter for a
renascent republic and a clarion call
for new deal" This group. the
B c. did not desire United States
Intervention. believing that, left alone,
1t could solve Cuba'S problems. Other
opposition groups, however much de-
plorlng the United States right to in
tervene under the Platt amendment.
felt that the cost of such a civil war
would be disastrous. These other
groups hoped for and welcomed the
kind OF change which they believed the
Franklin Roosevelt administration por-
tended. And the A B C was per-
suaded to accept the mediation of Am
baSSador WelleS in the civilized hope
that the restoration of Cuban liberties
could be achieved by other means than
mere bloodshed.
Mr.. Welles arrived in Cuba toward
the end Of April. He obviously had a
dennlte plan, conferences proceeded
rapidly. and before long he had secured
the cooperation Of the opposition
groups, and apparently the cooperation
OF Machado: Killings ceased The most
notorious of the thugs sailed-appro-
priately enough-for Germany.
The prescriptions against politica,
foes were lifted. The jails were opened
The exiles began to return. The press
showed the loosening of the iron clamps
OF censorship. The stage seemed set
Tor happy, evolutionary solution
With the voluntary" departure of Ma
chado into that Partisan exile beloved
OF Latin American dictators.
Mediation Too Slow.
But there was a hitch. Mr.. W7elles
mad apparently reckoned without his
host. Machado was not vet ready to
go. And with the apprehension that
this sine qua non of their desires was
not certain of achievement, the emo
tlonS OF the Cubans, pent up for years,
painfully suppressed during the weeks
OF mediation, famed out in strikes. in
the paralysis of the nations industry.
simultaneously Machado's porra, the
armed gang" reappeared The pace
OF the proceedings presided over by Mr..
Welles had proved too slow for the
cuban people, too rapid for the die
tator.
In the face of this perilous tension,
Machado publicly threatened the re-
sumption OF martial law, at which crit
lcaI moment the graveSt responsibility
TOR what might happen was incurred
Dy the United States. For the United
States had assumed the role of media
tor. and because Of this, and indeed
virtually at its invitation, exiles and
opposition leaders generally had trust
1ngly returned to the Cuban arena. At
that moment Of threatened resumption
OF violence, therefore, given the as
sumed new responsibility of the United
states, based on its underlying COM
mitment through the Plat amendment,
Machado should have been given his
waking papers. But the moment was
allowed to pass without such preventa-
tive action: And, the next day, Ma
chado's police, opening fire with ma
chine guns on a crowd demonstrating
Tor Joy at the rumor of his impending
abdication, killed a score-including
nationals Of other countries. Diplo-
macy had received q grievous setback
an eventuality, incidentally, which many
A B G leaders feared, having no faith
whatever in Machado's assumed rea-
sonableness.
Massacre fastened Doom.
That massacre hastened the political
doom of Machado-a high price for a
certain occurrence which should have
come earlier.
But the problems of Cuba's recon-
struction still lie ahead, difficult and
complex, yet which could not be seri-
ously tackled while he remained. And
As