Evening star., 1933-02-26

alton Of the Chemberlatn policy.
What Is going to happen now d per.
fectly clear. Mr.. Macdonald, II he can
escape from the restraints Of his Tory
associates, win come ever and talk with
Mr.. Roosevelt. The discussion win whirl
about all the great issues OF the hour
debts cufrencies, tariffs, etc. There
will be consideration Of the extent to
which A-Elo- American cooperation can
be asS0fed at q world economic confer
ence, and not only aspects Of dis
armament but also matters Of Far
Eastern troubles may come UP.
Obviously. Macdonald cannot remain
here long, and quite as clearly so vast
an sgenda cannot and viii not promote
definitive decisions. Therefore June IS,
the date Of the next debt payment, VIII
disclose everything still In the air. And
tration will find 1t excessively difncult
to refuse to grant another moratorium
pending the meeting Of the World
Economic Conference. what win hap
pen In that conference and before the
December due date Is entirely prob
lematical.
Necessary to Temporise.
But one thing Is certain. Whatever
happens, the British are not going to
pay any more beyond the limits Of the
dime In the dollar lump sum settlement.
All that has happened Is that they have
discovered American public sentiment
has net yet come to the point where
what the British would cali q realistic
settlement Is possible. Thus II n neces-
Sary to temporize, but to temporiSe
without making further payments.
In considering recent British action.
too, 1t Is necessary to reckcn with do
mestic American politics. II the British
had gone through with their original
proposal not to pay in December the
situation Ct the Roosevelt administra-
would have been without responsibility
for the whole debt situation. Under .
Republican administration al the debt
ors would have defaulted. Theirs have
been the task to save something from
the ruin. ~
But when the British paid In Decem-
Der they carried the whole trouble over
and laid 1t In the lap Of the incoming
President. They did this believing (
new administration would have Q new
policy. But the new, like the old. ad-
ministration was faced by . congress
sional and public opinion bitterly hostile
not alone to large reductions hut also
to any reductions without compensa-
tons What Chamberlain was asking
actually was that Mr.. Roosevelt at the
very outset Of his administration should
adopt British thesis Ia the face Of Q
Nationwide agitation against any such
course.
One cannot repress . certain measure
Of admiration TOR the .calmness with
which the incoming Chief Executive
faced this unwelconle 0E1aia But, on
the other hand, It y n6t difdcult to
imagine what he told Sir Ronald Lind
say ct Warm Springs and what the
British Ambassador told his government
In Downing street. And this message
resulted In the complete change IN the
form, but, Of course, not the purpose, Of
British activity.
Chamberlatn's pronouncements were
Q realistic statement Of Brttish purpose.
but Rocsevelt's statements to Lindsay
were no lees realistic appraisal Of
American political circumstance. Once
the British perceived that any attempt
to force settlement Immediately could
only result IN alternating an incoming
administration, they desisted. In fact.
they did more. They undertook to give
Mr.. Roosevelt the appearance Of victory
by agreeing to talk about everything In
stead OF keeping to debts. 81.
Public Opinions IrreconcilabIe.
On the other hand, 1t would be futile
to ignore the fact that It would be Just
as impossible for Macdonald, in the
face Of British opinion, to consent to
further payments as for Mr.. Roosevelt,
In the face Of his own national public,
to consent to cancellation. Nor would
1t be easier for Macdonald to agree to
tariff concessions Of any Importance
than for Roosevelt to accept q lump
sum settlement, based upon the sale Of
Today British and American public
opinions are irreconcilable In the matter
Of debts and the adjustment thereof.
Any discussion must, therefore. lead
eventually to deadlock, II the object Of
such conversation Is immediate settle
ment. Neither country, however, desires
a deadlock with all the resultant bitter
ness and disturbance. Hence the obvi-
Gus purpose now to back away from
the idea of conference to settle debts
and to move on to the idea Of informal
conversations to consider all aspects Of
the world problem. Surprised tn the
midst Of such friendly conversations by
the arrival Of a new due date, Roose-
-
suspension of payments and have .
very fair chance Of getting It.
The situation that now exists be-
tween the United States and Great
Britain Is one of the most familiar Of
all postwar phenomena. Here are
two countries whose public opinions are
crystalized upon irreconcilable purposes
and whose Congress and Parliament as
q consequence are bound to play the
nationalistic end Of the game. It would
be suicidal for Mr.. Roosevelt to agree
to the only proposals the. British viii
now or ever make. It would be fatal
to Macdonald and his associates to
consent to the smallest payment Mr..
Roosevelt could accept, either in cash
or concessions.
In this situation one of two things
must happen. Either Macdonald and
Roosevelt must work together to create
the impression OF discussions, which are
making progress, or attack each other
and thus enlist behind themselves ex-
cited national feelings. They have
obviously chosen the former method.
Neither man now hopes to bring about
debt settlement In any present time.
But they may be able to insure the
can relationship first condition Of any
world recovery-and that Is what both
are obviously striving to attain.
In one respect. at least. the course Of
Mr.. Roosevelt so far must awaken ap-
proval He has avoided the mistake Of
Mr.. Hoover, both in the matter Of the
moratorium In 1891 and OF the dis
armament proposal last Summer. He
has not placed the Representatives of
other countries In the face of an ulti-
matum, delivered without warning and
unacceptable. either In form or sub
stance. Great Britain has not been
invited to sign on the dotted line, as
Britain and France In the arms matter.
The result Is that we have 90 far
escaped q fatal deadlock.
Patiently the President- ELECT q not
yet out Of the woods. His escape from
the difficulties created by the debt coll
lectQrS at home and the debt cor,cel.