Evening star., 1933-10-08
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

nave DeeQ prOlOuLQly StlTIeQ ny re-
ports published in the American
i press of a new project Of German
invasion of France. Moreover, there
has been a peculiar irony in the fact
that while the League of Nations was
meeting for its fourteenth assembly at
Geneva, these reports have specifically
indicated that the pathway of this new
invasion would pass through Geneva
itself and, descending the valley OF the
Rhone, have for its immediate Objec-
tive not Paris but the great industrial
city Of Lyon at the point of junction OF
the Rhone and the Saone.
The project itself is not new. Before
the World War, the German general
staff seriously weighed the relative ad-
| vantages Of the Belgian and ::ie Swiss
roads before it finally decided for the
| Schlieffen plan and the violation OF
Belgian neutrality which was the first
| step in the campaign Of 1914. During
| Of German invasion through SwitZ-
| erland and during his period of exile
| from command following the battle OF
the Somme and the fall of Joffre, Mar
shall Foch was sent to the Jura to pre-
pare plans for repulsing such an attack
The reasoning back of the present
| real or alleged German purpose is OBJ
vious. On the Franco-German frontier
| from Basel to Luxembourg, the French
have constructed new system Of for
| tifications of the most formidable char
| acter. These are backed by the old
| line of German defenses about Metz
and Thionville and at the entrance OF
| the valley of the Bruche, reinforced by
the wall of the Vosges Mountains and
| finally supported by the old line Of
| French Notifications centering about
Belfort, Epinal, Toul and Verdun, which
was never effectively preached during
the World War.
Pivot Changes Hands.
Since the Belgians have never ade-
quately restored either the forts OF
Liege or Namur and the northern
| frontier of France is similarly destitute
of defenses, the route employed by the
armies of Kluck and Bulow remain:
available But Metz and Thionville
which were the pivot of the German
operation of 1914 are now in French
hands. German Notifications on tht
| Rhine have been demolished and {
British guarantee embodied in the &C.
cords of Locarno covers the Belgian
and French frontiers alike. Finally
successful German invasion of France
! through Belgium would again, as II
1914. raise the question Of Calais ane
Boulogne by bringing German force
within striking distance of the strait!
Of Dover.
On the other hand, t. go by Switzer
land would not automatically lnsur'
British participation in the new conf1lc
as an ally of France by reason Of an,
existing engagements save the Leagu
Covenant 1t would not awaken al
immediate British apprehension sucl
as would inevitably arise from the ap
proach of German military power t
the narrow Channel dividing Britain
from the Continent. Nor would
necessitate the preliminary reduction o
any elaborate system of defense sucl
as covers Alsace and Lorraine. Again
it may be fairly questioned whether th
Swiss could or would offer serious re
sistance to an invading army equipped
i with tanks supported by a huge al
force and in general provided with ma
chinery too expensive for the Swiss t
possess in adequate quantities.
Defects Evident.
Superficially appealing as this prof
ect may appear, however. it at once
| discloses grave defects These defect
are evident from the physical characte
of the country to be traversed and from
the distance to be covered. Once tn
German armies had reached tn
Franco Belgian frontier. little more thai
hundred miles separated them fror
the French capital. At the Frencl
boundry of the Canton of Geneva, o.
the contrary, the distance from Pari
is at least four times as great while tn
distance from the German frontier b
the Swiss road would be upwards O
700 miles against 200 by the Belgial
route Moreover, from the moment
crossed the Swiss boundry, until 1t ha
arrived at Bellegarde in France, scor
of miles south of Geneva, an invadin
army would necessarily march alon
the base Of the Jura Mountains offerin
an open flank and a vulnerable line @
communications to the French.
Behind this will of the Jura, with
shorter line of communications and
greater number of railroads and high
ways, the French could easily concen
trate superior forces, vastly create
supplies of munitions and batteries O
artillery while once across the Frencl
frontier the invading armies woul
have to negotiate the difficult passe
by which the road, the railway and tn
river penetrate south-passes which il
places nave Ulle CIldTdCteT Oh IuOuQCdu
gorges. Lyon itself is also a first clas
fortified city, capable of sustained re
sistance.
Quick Blow Necessary.
In reality such German campaig1
could only have any real chance O
success if the blow were too sudden t.
permit counter preparation or if it wer
combined with an Italian attack alon
the Alps from Savoy to Provence. Blu
once the Swiss frontier were passe
secrecy would no longer be possibl,
And there is nothing now to sugges
that Mussolini and his Fascist follower.
whatever their feelings toward France
have any desire to face a victoriou
Germany single-handed with the issue
of the Southern Tyrol and Trieste agai
brought to the fore.
Even were it conceivable that tn
German invasion might arrive befor
Lyon or actually capture the city, com
munication between Paris and Mar
Seilles would not be interrupted, sine
other lines would remain undisturbee
Thus the flow of reinforcements fror
French North Africa to Northern Franc
would not be affected materially. More