Evening star., 1933-10-15
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.
7 T is interesting as well as significant
to note that in advance of the re-
assembling of the Disarmament
i Conference at Geneva reports alike
from Tokio and London indicate
movements are on foot to undo in the
meeting of the naval powers in 1886
substantially all that was accomplished
in the assemblies of 1921 at Washing
ton and Of 1880 in London. And.
broadly speaking these achievements
cover about all that has been accom-
or reduction Of ornaments in the post
war world.
OF course. in practice. neither Of the
earlier conferences achieved anything
in the way Of actual disarmament save
as the United States agreed to return
for a c0ltractual right to parity in capi-
tai ships with Britain to scrap a con-
siderable number of ships actually un-
der construction. which, had they been
completed would have assured Ameri-
can superiority in the battle line. In
the same fashion the United States paid
for Japanese acceptance of a 5-3 ratio
in capital ships by remuneration of the
right to fortify further either the
Philippines, Guam or the Aleutlan
Islands.
But in practice, the Washington Con-
ference precipitated race in cruisers,
which were unrestricted in numbers
and in that particular type of craft
which, ironically enough, took the name
OF the WASHINGTON Conference. In that
race the United States Jagged behind
because the Coolidge administration
long remained under the impression
that it would be possible to persuade
Britain and Japan to reduce down to
American standards and the United
States would thus escape the cost and
discredit Of building up-a dlscredlt
which would be domestic and among
pacifist circles.
Illusion Was Punctured.
At the Coolidge conference In
Geneva in 1928 this illusion was
promptly punctured. Britain there de-
manded not 55 cruisers. which she
actually possessed as her permanent
total, but more than 10. After Geneva;
American policy began to turn toward
construction, but Mr.. Hoover. like Mr..
Coolidge, still chung to the hope that
parity could be achieved by passlvlty
When. however. Macdonald came to
washington and the famous interview
at the Rapidan took place. Mr.. Hoover
was brought to the realization tnat
Britain wsuld not reduce below her
existing total and that parity IN cruisers
was attainable only by American build
ing. ,,;,,, to,-
lowed a program of parity in all cate
pories between Britain and the Unlteo
States was adopted-a program closeiy
following lines tentatively sketcneo at
the Rapidan. So, far from bringing
about any reduction in tonnage or costs,
the London agreement imposed upon
the American people an expenditure IN
the next few years OF not less than a
billion dollars in new constructions. Ine
old fight between the British and
American naval experts - the former
seeking to reduce the size OF cruisers,
the latter the number - ended In a
compromise equally unsatisfactory TO
both. The United States retained the
right to employ its tonnage IN 10000
ton craft, but the British eXacted con-
cession that above the number OF ID
such cruisers should be furnished with
six instead of eight inch guns.
During the course of this London con-
ference the Japanese successfully main
tanned the right to a larger ratio in
cruisers than in capital ships. while the
French and Italians, quarreling over
the issue of parity as between them
selves, refused to agree to the figures
set for them by American and British
conferees and thus retained the right to
unlimited tonnage outside the battle
line.
British Not Reconciled.
That the British admiralty was never
reconciled to the American right to put
all its tonnage in 10,000-ton craft was
subsequently disclosed impressively when
the British government recently, through
Norman H. Davis, requested the Amer
ican Government to refrain from eX-
ercising its privilege to construct q
number of 10,000-ton cruisers equipped
with six-inch guns until after the meet
ing Of 1886, with which all the limita-
tions and agreements will expire auto
matically If not further extended.
The rejection Of the British request
by the Roosevelt administration evoked
on the other side of the Atlantic clear
evidence that in 1886 the British will
return to their old arguments against
any fixed limit to the number of cruis-
ers. Meantime, Japanese events indi-
cate plainly that in the next conference
Japan will assert her right not to 5-3
ratio, but to parity in all categories.
Since the United States is wholly un-
likely to agree to either proposal,
violent end to all the present systems of
limitation by agreement can easily be
foreseen.
One may. too, say with exactitude
that the British admiralty never really
accepted the idea of physical parity for
the United States The advent of Labor
to power in 1929 forced it to modify the
stand it had taken and
imposed upon the Baldwin cabinet dur
ing the Coolidge conference. But even
though the agreements of London estab-
lished theoretical parity between the