Evening star., 1933-12-10
us. TRADE WITH RUSSIA
is VIEWED AS UNCERTAIN
No Appreciable Gain to This Country Is
Expected Unless Long g-Time Credits
Are Granted to Soviet.

| ditions permit Certainly there Ii M
domestic Russian influence to impede ol
interfere with them).
The motives governing these decisions
are varied and sometimes devious
Considerations of profit (under thu
Communist economy Of course, play nj
part whatever, and human predilectionl
have almost as little influence. With
the Soviets, international commerce 1!
not only q social service; it Is potent
tool, indeed, at times mighty weapon
1t is an instrument which can be. and
often Is, manipulated in the service oi
international tactics" as well as fol
firmly ground economic ends.
Human Demands Sacrificed.
In the history Of foreign trade under
the Communist commissars there have
been instances of utter ruthlessness
Human demands have been coldly sac
rificed to broad considerations Of the
Soviet Unions world position" and
financial exigencies. ! have In mind
particularly the time (not so very long
ago) when Soviet Russia was exporting
large quantities Of grain, as well q
eggs, butter, sugar and similar food
stuffs, while at the very same time
great numbers of wretched peasants
and gaunt city workers were precari-
ously lowering on the border Of starva-
ton and were clamoring piteously for a
recent ration. Russia shipped those
foodstuffs abroad in order to establish
credits for the purchase of equipment
needed in the five-year plan.
To safeguard or enhance its foreign
trade position, the Soviet government
in the past has not hesitated to in
tensify its harsh requisitions of grain
from a reluctant peasantry. And since,
under the Soviet set-up, the govern
ment does not labor under the ortii-
nary compulsion Of considering the
actual costs of production, it is In q
position to sell abroad at any price
necessary to overcome competition, The
short, crude name for the extreme form
OF that practice is dumping"
Now, the power to allocate Soviet
orders for goods from abroad can be
utilized for all manner Of jockeyine
and juggling. It can be used to blast
or to bless-to spur or to spank. Such
orders can be generously given as evi-
dence OF Communist favor, or they can
oe withheld as condign punishment
or as an inducement to q desired
change In policy by q foreign country.
Zone wonders whether the Russian de-
sire for American recognition had any
thing to do with the precipitous falling
on in Soviet purchases Of our goods. }
An Illuminating example of the gen.
eral situation is to be found in the case
OF Russian German trade relations dur
ing recent months-and this particular
Illustration promises to become rapidly
more impressive.
Seeks to Be Self Sufficient.
The Soviet determination to achieve
Tor Russia the maximum measure of
economic -sufficiency is a second
factor with a vital bearing on the pros
pect for increases in, the purchase of
American goods. AS most people are
well aware, Russia is resolutely work.
ing to free itself from dependence on
foreign products, of whatever origin
TO build up sturdy and self-contained
productive organism. To achieve that
end, the nation has lashed itself to
veritable fury of industrialization.
Russia's aim is not to increase its pur-
chases OF foreign goods; the purpose is
TO cut them down. And that statement
applies to machinery and other capital
goods as well as to consumer COM
modities'' -
The extent to which that grim re-
solve will ultimately be realized and
thus affect us-and Germany and Eng
land and the other supplying coun-
tries-depends on the degree of success
that the Soviet program of industrial
lzatlon can attain. Just what Is the
outlook In that respect? No categorical
answer can be returned at this moment.
There are favorable factors and there
are inauspicious ones. The commits
sars have the power to enforce a
planned economy. They have aroused,
In many classes, burning ardor, a
spirit Of emulation, a fierce allegiance
to the plan. But the underlying ma
tlonaI temperament Is q formidable
drawback to such industrialization.
The background Of long training, in
dustrial tradition and natural mechanic
cal instinct Is absent
Recognizing the superiority Of Ameri-
can products, the Russians may con-
slider it expedient TO buy certain guam
titles OF our machinery, chemicals and
similar wares in the dogged attempt to
achieve the Industrial "acceleration"
which they so fervently desire. But
every oh1cial pronomcement, every
principle OF Soviet theory. shows that
in the long run they purpose to rely on
their own domestically produced equip
ment for such measure of manufactur-
ing progress as their inherent imita-
tions will permit them to achieve.
Can Take Meat Surplus.
When we visualize prospective in
creases in American sales to Russia, we
are inclined to think very largely in
terms Of industrial equipment. But it
is unwise to concentrate too much on
machinery. In agricultural products,
the potentialities appear significant.
The experts in the United States De-
partment of Agriculture tell me that
the Soviet Union is capable of taking
our entire American surplus Of pork and
beef products-which would surely be
an enormous relief to our raisers of live
stock. But here is an important point:
Such purchases would be entirely out
side of the rigid plan" under which
the Soviets are operating; the plan
makes no provision for buying such
products abroad and therefore In this
the Russians would require six
years in which to pay for our beef, ham,
lard, etc.
The Union needs, too, our surplus OF
so ,000, ,000, 900 pounds of butter. Rus
sia, to be sure, exports a certain guam
tity of butter, but it goes to markets
where we do not sell. so we would es-
cape the danger of shipping butter on
long-term credits and having it turn up
later to compete with us in our own
foreign markets. With its actual pres
ent capacity the Russia textile indus
try can use 1000 600 bales of American
cotton a year; in the matter Of possible
re-eXpOrtS from Russia we have the