Evening star., 1933-05-07


tions of the British and French
VI statesmen and journalists wh1
4 came to Washington for the
recent conferences was at once
more striking and more discouraging
than the estimates they supplied OF
the contemporary European situation.
British and French alike agreed without
the smallest hesitation or reservation
that this situation was bad almost be-
yond exaggeration and that the state
of mind in March, Immediately follow
ing the Hitler triumph, had been the
worst since the World War.
M. Herriot in his talk with President
Roosevelt made no concealment Of the
dangers which had resulted from the
triumph of the Nazis and he made clear
as well the perils which would attend
even the undertaking to discuss the
question of territorial revision. The
Polish Corridor-that most dangerous
of all the questions-was discussed with
utmost frankness as was also the fact
too little recognized on this side of the
Atlantic-that in this matter French
influence upon Poland was of the
slightest. Nor was there any question
that the French believed their spokes.
man had found sympathetic hearer.
In talks with French friends, found
the fact that the rise of Hitler fore
shadowed new war in Europe. The
difference of opinion came solely over
the question as to whether that war
would be. in their own words ''tomor-
row, next month or next year." In
fact. they all spoke of it with kind
of fatalistic acceptance which was not
the least disturbing circumstance of
the Washington affair.
British No Less Impressed.
The British on their side were obvi-
ously no less impressed by the extent
of the crisis in March. It was their
belief that the excursion of Macdonald
to Rome, despite the subsequent failure
of the Macdonald -Mussolini four-power
plan, had constituted a substantial con-
tribution to removing immediate threats
to peace But this belief did not ex-
tend to the conviction that any perma
nent barrier had been erected against
hostilities.
BY contrast. the French on their
side pronounced the Roman adventure
a mistake in itssf and continuing
cause of trouble. Under the surface
there was no evading the French con-
viction that events in Germany-the
excuses of Hitler and his Nazi follow
ers-had enormously improved the
French situation both in America and
in Britain. Why should we waste
money on propaganda in Anglo-Saxon
countries one distinguished French
journalist inquired, when our work is
being done for us by Hitler every day
and far better than We could do it for
ourselves?"
Another striking circumstance was
the obvious recognition on the part of
Pritoy1c E1ranrhn1pn Q1ika that the
events of the past two years have prac-
tically abolished the League of Nations
as a factor in the preservation of
world peace For both there was
common perception that the period in
which that whole conception of peace
by international understanding and COL
lective action which the League illus
trated was at an end. Only force was
henceforth to count. in their judgments.
As always in similar conferences and
conversations, there was the same
eagerness to discover some sign of
American readiness to take an effec-
tive part in the organization of peace,
accompanied by the same difference Of
opinion as to the usefulness of mere
consultative pacts. For the British,
such an American undertaking seemed
to promise something real; for the
French, it was a gesture which they
welcomed but only as gesture. 1t
was not in their minds reason for
reducing their heavy artillery or re-
stricting their other means of defense.
Atmosphere of Unreality.
1t was. however, this underlying
sense of apprehension and unrest which
gave to the whole affair certain
atmosphere of unreality. On the part
of the Americans, attention was
directed to issues such as that of
stabilization. tariff adjustments and
similar economic and financial ques-
tions. While the British were acutely.
and the French measurably, interested
in these discussions, both saw clearly
that agreement even of the most tenta-
tive sort made here would at once be
exposed to the destructive tendencies
of present Continental political condi-
tions
No one who came in close touch
with either the British or the French
who came to Washington in official or
journalistic capacities could escape the
conviction that while economic prob
lens played role. political were far
more important In theory a great
discussion was taking place here about
issues which were recognizedly born
of economic and financial consequences
OF the Great Depression. But IL was
really the question of peace which over
bore that of prosperity.
It would, then, be an obvious If
familiar mistake to imagine that the
consent of the United States to i'm
plement the Kellogg Pact by any agree
ment to consult in case of crisis or to
vest with the President the right to
waive American neutrality in case Of
aggression would prove any material
contribution to the security of the ma
tions which feel themselves in peril
or a deterrent to nations which be-
lieve that they must have treaty re-
vision before there can be assured
order.
Once more, as at most other inter-
national meetings in which the United
States has participated, there was the
same absence of any community OF
views. The Americans were thinking
only of economic and financial ques-