Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1933-11-19

because while her population is equal
to the French, her poverty makes it
impossible for her to keep up either an
army or a navy equal to ne French.
Nations Remain in Line.
If France and Germany had equal
armies and France and Italy equal
| armies and navies, then MuSsolini
would hold the balance of power be-
tween both. He could throw his weight
to France in the discussion of Austro-
German union, but to Germany in
other questions of treaty revision like
that of the Polish Corridor. If, in adj
dition, Britain were brought into a
four-sided arrangement, then British
aid would also be assured against any
present project of Austro German union.
But, on the other hand, British support
might easily be had for the Italian pro-
poSal to make concessions to Germany
in the matter Of arms or even of east
ern frontiers.
The British are willing to go along
with the four-power pact idea, because
they see Mussolini assuming the re-
Sponsibility for preventing the Austro-
German union and generally for hold
ing Germany back from dangerous adj
ventures. For Mussolini can play the
friend to Hitler in a variety of ques-
tions, of which ornaments is the most
important. They see, too, that for
Mussolini the obvious desire to play a
great role must engage his authority
and they do not care how much prestige
he earns thereby. Nor do they care
| fig whether the Italian or French sys-
tenn of alliances prevails in the DAN
ubian area.
The British, then, are willing to 60
along with Mussolini In the center Of
Europe, just as they are condemned to
go along with France in the west, by
reason Of the obligations incurred by
the Locarno treaty. Let France mount
guard on the Rhine and Italy on the
Danube, that is the British idea, and
let nothing be omitted to prevent a new
war, because In a new war England
British interest and policy would die
tate that Germany be Modified by con-
cesslons made by Poland.
That is the old idea of the concert
of Europe as Bismarck worked it out at
the Congress of Berlin. War between
great powers Is to be avoided by agree
ments between these great powers
themselves, which reconcile their rival
claims at the expense of smaller ma
tons. In the old case it was at the
expense of Balkan states. Now the
little entente Is to be sacrificed to
Italian ambitions, the Poles to German.
But France, Italy and Germany are
thus to avoid collisions and Britain
escape new continental involvement.
But the French are now the doni-
mating power in Europe by reason of
their alliances with Poland and the
little entente and because of the mill
tary force resident In their own and
their allies armies. And, of course,
this advantage would end if Germany
rearmed. In four-power pact, too,
France would lose her primacy, be but
one Of several equals, certain to be iso-
lated on many questions, and OF losing
her leadership altogether. Therefore
she will not play in such game and
her allies at all times exercise pressure
at Paris against any such deal for OBJ
vious reasons
Mussoiini Plays Field.
Now you see Mussolini, playing be-
tween all of these camps, with France
against Germany on the Anschluss
with Germany against France in the
arms issue. with Britain and against
France in the matter of a four-power
agreement. He is with Austria and
Hungary against the little entente
and with Austria against Germany in
the present Austro- German crisis. He
Is always balancing, changing sides,
proposing compromises, but his aim Is
to get European affairs away from &C.
neva, where Italy is relatively isolated
and into the hands Of q combination
Of great powers, where he can have the
decisive role.
His fatal weakness lies, however, In
the fact that Hitler and his followers
are without diplomatic skill, political
experience or international sense.
When they quarrel with the British,
outrage English public opinion and
world opinion by prosecuting their
Jews, when they rush head down into
the Austrian question, MusSolini has no
choice but to stand aside and leave
them to the consequences of their folly,
save in the Austrian issue, and there
he must act against them.
The French, moreover, who have no
MuSsolini but are far from fools, can
calculate that the domestic madness of
the Nazis will line British public opin-
ion solidly with France against Ger
many, while Hitler's Austrian adventure
will force MuSsolini, willy nilly, to be
against Germany and therefore COM
PEELED to play with France.
1t is, then, a dizzy game, this Italian
play, calling for a cool mind and a
firm hand. In no case must the Duce
become committed to any country-that
Is, to France, or England or Germany
ompletely-hecause then he loses his
freedom Of action and power of bal
ance. In no case, too, must he permit
! his own public sentiment to get away
from him and make an issue of pres
tige either with France or Germany.
| And, If the Germans continue to make
themselves the nuisance of Europe, he
cannot risk British diSapproval by be-
| coming identified with them
If Hitler were Bismarck, Mussolini
and he could do business together, upset
the French influence in Eastern and
Central Europe and together run the
continent without arousing any British
protest. The one trouble, of course,
would be which would come first, the
Duce or the Fuehrer. But Hitler is
only Bismarck Of bedlam. He has
the same and even greater ambitions
| than the old iron chancellor for his
country, but his only idea of achieving
his ends is by shaking his fists in the
face Of every other nation and keeping
Europe in an uproar by his perform
anceS.
Hitler Disregards Signals.
BE good and together we can even-
tually be as bad as we please with
| profit and impunity," that Is the advice
| of the Italian dictator to the German.
But keep up this internal uproar and
no one, not even Italy, can stand with