The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1933-11-03
-Dietz on Science
CHANCE FORCED
OUT IN THEORY
OF DETERMINIST
Viewpoint ContraSted With
Modern Conception of
ImprobabiIity.
BY DAVID DIETZ
Scripps-Howard Science Editor

We must follow Sir Arthur Ed
dington through rather intricate
line Of reasoning if we wish to know
why he claims that determinism, for
200 years the fundamental philos-
ophy of science, is no longer valid.
We shall, however, find it worth
doing.
Sir Arthur begins by telling us
how the new philosophy of physical
science originated. I'VE observe
certain Irregularities in the course of
nature and formulate these as laws
of nature" he says. He asks us to
consider two Irregularities which &C.
cur in our experience:
(a) We never come across equi-
lateral triangles whose angles are
unequal.
(b) We never come across thir-
teen trumps in our hand at bridge.
I'm our ordinary outlook we ex-
plain these Irregularities in funda-
mentally different ways" he con-
tinues. 1--WE say that the first oc-
ours because the contrary experience
Is impossible; the second occurs be-
cause the contrary experience is too
improbable.
Theory Controls
This distinction is entirely theo-
retical; there is nothing in the OBJ
ServationS themselves to suggest
which type a particular regularity
belongs to.
The new view of science, Edding-
ton tells us, chooses to regard all
irregularities as of type (b) in our
foregoing example. Impossible" is
ruled out of the game. We have left
only too improbable
Speaking of the equality of the
angles of an equilateral triangle, he
says:
"Our measurements regularly con-
firm it to within the highest &C
curacy attainable and no doubt will
always do so; but, according to med
ern theory, that is because a failure
could only occur as the result of an
exceedingly improbable coincidence
in the behavior of the vast number
OF particles concerned in any ex-
perimental measurement"
The older view, he continues, re-
cognized two kinds of law. That
signified by type ca he calls pri-
mary law. That signifed by type
(b) he calls secondary law. And he
adds, "the recognition Of second
airy law was the thin edge, of the
wedge that ultimately cleft the de-
terministic scheme"
Either Law Strict
For practical purposes primary
and secondary law exert equally
strict control" he continues. THE
improbability referred to in secon-'
Diary law is so enormous that failure
even in an isolated case is not to be
seriously contemplated. You would
be utterly aStounded if heat flowed
from you to the fire so that you got
chilled by standing in front of it,
although such an occurrence is
judged by physical theory to be not
impossible but improbable"
The determinist, Eddington says,
can not be satisfied with a law
which says that the chances are
that standing in front Of fire will
warm you.
Ruling Luck Out
"He admits that that is the prob
able effect" Eddington continues,
but adds that somewhere at the
base of physics there are other laws
which prescribe just what the fire
will do, luck or no luck
Determinists, Eddington said,
watched the growth of secondary
laws without alarm. They were
laws which state what might hap
pen, but in the final analysis were
overridden by the primary laws
which told what must happen.
THE growth of secondary law
within the deterministic scheme
was remarkable" he says, land
gradually sections of The subject
formerly dealt with by primary laws
we're transferred to it. There came
time when in some of the most
progressive branches of physics sec
ondary law was used exclusively.
The physicist might continue to
profess allegiance to primary law,
but he ceased to utilize it.
Primary law was the gold to be
kept stored in vaults; secondary law
was the paper to be used for actual
transactions. No one minded; it was
taken for granted that the paper
was backed by gold. At last came
the crisis and physics went off the