Evening star., 1933-04-09
REMUNERATION BY FRANCE
OF HER ALLIES UNLIKELY
Poles and Czechs Would Lose Entity
in Event of 'sBig Four Peace
Club


Reich to unite; who viewed the gradual
expansion of German economic mastery
in Central Europe without alarm, who
not only regarded Franco-German con-
Citation and cooperation as necessary
and possible, but were also prepared to
pay a price for such an achievement
even if that price called for territorial
revision.
In France, then, there was discover
able a gradual developing conviction
that the task of maintaining the terri
torial system of Paris at the cost of
undying German and Italian hostility
was both beyond national resources and
contrary to national interest. More
over. that belief still exists and finds
influential champions among the lead
ers of the Left now dominating the
Chamber To imagine that any or all
of the French alliances are based upon
sentiment is, therefore, to fall into an
error not frequently made either in
Warsaw or Prague.
Much less is it on account of any
dream of continental hegemony, be-
cause of any miitaristic spirit or by
reason of any considerations of national
prestige that France still visibly hesi-
tates to abandon those allies who are
such constant sources Of cost and dan
i
policy is now and has always been
since the close of the war dictated by
consideration of the unanswerable
question: What would become of the
security of European France and the
integrity of Colonial France once the
nation was compelled to face in 1sola-
ton the two imperialistic nationalisms
Of Germany and Italy?
Warsaw and Prague Warnings.
From Warsaw and Prague, too, come
warnings once voiced to me by Polish
Prime Minister, who said: Our French
allies would always do well to recall
the interesting sequence Of Sadowa and
Sedan" For, two generations ago,
France did stand aside and permit
Prussia to crush Austria. But that
victorious army which considerably
refrained from entering Vienna. five
years later passed under the Arc de
Triomphe in Paris. As for that Aus
tria which France suffered to be beaten
in 1866, after 1871 it promptly allied
itself with the new German Empire
and became co-guarantor Of a Ger
man Alsace-Lorraine. Might not his
tory repeat itself?
Nor is the other parallel Of history
less striking. For by one Of the most
IL
France in 1888 faces the problems Of
Germany in 1914. Then, because
German statesmen saw the security of
their country locked up with the
preservation of Austria. Bethmann-
Hollweg felt himself compelled to fol-
low Berchthold into the Serbian ad-
venture. Today France IS confronted
by the problem of what she must do If,
now that the existence Of Poland and
Yugoslavia are both in peril, she has
to deal with the question Germany
was condemned to answer 10 years
ago.
From Berlin, Rome, and even from
London, come repeated assertions that
it would require but a gesture from
Paris to persuade the Poles to make
the necessary sacrifices in the Corridor,
to reconcile the Czechs to the union
of Austria with the Reich, to COM
pei the Serbs to modify their intran-
sigeance in the face of Italian menace.
All of these declarations are, however,
demonstrably untrue. On the contrary.
it is the realization that Poland and
Yugoslavia will resist all projects for
revision by arms, If necessary, and that
If abandoned they will be destroyed,
which renders the French problem SO
difficult.
When however, every consideration
Is paid to present French self-search-
ing and disquiet in the face Of OBJ
yious dangers, it is practically impos-
sible to believe that in the light OF
contemporary German spirit and per-
Torrance France will consent to make
any formal, or even effective, renuncia-
ton of her present policy or agree to
sacrifice her existing allies. That she
would not unwillingly urge them to
make territorial concessions were there
any chance that they would heed her
advice is beyond question. But since
she knows the answer to all such re-
quests she will hardly invite the other
risks such a course would involve.
Thus, as there is not the smallest
chance that the Germans will in any
respect modify their present revision
ary program and there is even less
possibility that Poland or the Little
Entente will agree voluntarily to the
necessary sacrifices Of their own unity
and security, it Is plain that the causes
of the still recent war panic" OF early
March endure. Consequently we are
in truth back not only in the atmos-
phere but in the circumstances Of 1914.
War now as then has certainly not
become inevitable but it is henceforth
always possible and may arrive with
all the unexpectedness of the great
conflict itself.
Indubitably, Europe continues to
move toward war
Copyright. 1889