Evening star., 1933-08-20
BY GASTON NERVAL.

ME new zeal HAS suCCcSoi uily
met its first major test in inter-
American relations. When, only
i q few days ago, the front page
of metropolitan newspapers was
almost monopolized by the description
| of the horrible conditions prevailing
throughout Cuba, and rumors of armed
| Intervention by the United States were
| the dominant note in political and
diplomatic circles in Washington, stu
dents of inter-American relations felt
great concern for the ultimate fate OF
| the so-called new Latin American
policy" of the State Department.
This policy began, partially, under
the Hoover -Stimson administration. but
was more precisely and more avowedly
confirmed when President Roosevelt, to-
gether with his new deal" at home,
promised upon his Inauguration to
observe in international affairs "the
policy of the good neighbor." Soon
afterward, on Pan-American day, the
new policy toward the sister republics
received added strength. The President
reaffirmed his ideals Of equality, fair
ness and friendly cooperation.
Non-Intervention Features.
But the main feature of this new
Latin American policy, its foundation,
its basis element-undoubted the
reason for its SuccesS-was, and still is,
contained in one word: Non-interven-
ton. The Hoover South American
good will tour, the Stimson Nicaraguan
policy, the reversion to the Jeffersonlan
| theory Of recognition of revolutionary
governments the disavowal of mistaken
conceptions of the Monroe Doctrine,
| the withdrawal of Marines from
| Nicaragua, the abandonment of the old
| policy of forcible collection of public
| debts, the refusal to NEEDLE with the
internal complications prevailing re-
Gently in some of the Southern
| countries-all these things had been
done chiefly to impress upon the Latin
Americans the fact that the United
States had definitely divorced itsel1
from armed Intervention below the
Rio Grande.
The announcement Of the policy OF
| the good neighbor by President Roose-
| for the sovereignty Of the neighborine
republics had treasured the Latin
| Americans that the new administration
would not only follow that policy Of
on-intervention. but would endeavor tc
improve it and perfect it. This convic-
tion became more entrenched when
immediat tely following the failure of the
London Economic Conference. the Presi.
dent and his closest advisers showed
themselves eager to work out some sort
of a continental trade alliance anc
promised elaborate plans for the forth.
coming Pan-American Conference al
Montevideo
i Errors Had to Be Explained.
i Those familiar with Latin American
conditions and with Latin American
psychology knew that no scheme for ar
economic rapprochement with th'
United States would be possible unleS
the political misunderstanding causee
by the errors of past administration
were first explained away. And among
these, armed intervention had left th'
bitterest memory. Their alarm was
then, more than justified, when th'
newspapers and the public in genera
began to talk of the imminence of {
new Intervention in Cuba.
With less reason, and with far les
popular support, other administration
had ordered Marines to land on Latil
American shores and take the situa
tion well in hand"
y Some editors expressed the opinion
that the Machado government. beinl
, one of the dictatorial type which Latll
| AulcIiCd lldQ IcPuOldtcQ III 81 lIldIl
of the Southern republics in the pas
, three years, they, perhaps. would vel
come the Intervention of United State
forces to help Machado out The trutl
of the matter is that the masses o
people in Latin America had taken n,
; detailed interest in the Cuban domestic
developments. They were familiar will
/, the kind Of government which Machadt
! , represented in the island republic ant
they knew that when the Cuban peo
pie were really ready to overthrow him
nothing would prevent them from doinI
so. But think of the effect that dra
matte and spectacular landing O
;. United States Marines on Cuban soil
over the protest Of the Cuban Presiden
at the alleged violation of Cuba's SOW
ereignty. would have had throughou
Latin America!
Roosevelt's Master Stroke.
As matter of fact, this came dan
gerously near to being the case. An,
Machado realized it. When he wa
first confronted with the demand O
. the opposition leaders that he resign
the Cuban chief executive denouncet
Ambassador Welles, the mediator, and
later, when the threat of American
Intervention became acute, he dra
matically called ON the Cuban peopl
to rise in arms to defend Cuban in
dependence" and announced that h
, would seek the support Of all Lath
, American governments against "an in
trusion upon the sovereignty of tn
Cuban nation."
But not in vain President Roosevelt
has been called q master in the ar
of politics. After his handling of tn
; Cuban crisis, the title may be prop
; erly extended to include internationa
politics. When nearly everybody ex
pected a resounding statement call
ing the CubanS to order, Somethin,
/ along the lines of the Coolidge theor,
of unlimited protection abroad, or al
executive proclamation directing blue
jackets" to Cuban shores, the PreSi
; dent issued from the Summer Whit
J House, after conference with the Gu
} ban Ambassador, brief statement t.
the effect the problems of starvation
and of depression were of such imme
diate importance, that every politica
, problem should be met in the mos
patriotic spirit in order to improv
conditions at the earliest possible mo
ment."
Nothing in that presidential pro
nouncement could be taken as re
flecting upon the sovereignty of Cuba
OF course, between the lines, any on
who knew the situation could read al
appeal to President Machado to con
slider only patriotic" consideration
and step aside If the peace of tn
country demanded it. Just as in tn
presidential Endorsement of Arnbassa
dor Welles' activities in Havana any on
could see that President Roosevelt wa
not tn sympathy with the prolongatiol