The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1933-06-14


Lippmann state of political
paralysis in WASH
ington which prevented the govern
ment from taking positive measure
of any kind
1t was possible aeither to work out
a controllesA defiation toward a new
equilibrium nor controlled imitation.
Under these circumstances the
one hope of relief lay in trying to
persuade the other nations to return
to the gold standard as promptly as
possible with view at least to
stabilizing gold prices and stopping
further deflation.
The American policy in the closing
months of the Hoover administra-
ton, therefore, turned chiefly on
pressing Great Britain to stabilize
the pound on gold.
DUT for various reasons the Brit
10 ish government would not COM
init itself. 1t was moved in part,
no doubt, by a quite proper con-
viction that there should be a
settlement Of the war debts before
sterilization. But there is no
evidence which is publicly known
that Great Britain would have re-
turned quickly to the gold standard
even If the debts were settled.
The impression may be mistaken,
but none the less it exists in this
country, that the British people we're
extremely reluctant to surrender the
freedom of action which goes with
the management of their currency.
In any event, when the conference
was ORGANIZED the position was one in
which the United States and France
were seeking to bring Britain back
to currency stabilized on gold
In the interim, the United States,
after going through a crisis which
was outwardly different from but
inWardly very similar to the British
experience, went off the gold stand
ard and undertook the management
of its own currency.
Almost instantly the previous po-
sition was reversed: The British
began to preach our former doctrine
of stability and We adopted the for
mer British doctrine of being rather
suspicious of the gold standard and
reluctant to surrender the freedom
under which we had obtained such
enormous relief.
IF We compare somewhat more
Il closely the present position of the
two governments, we must note, l
think, very important difference.
The Roosevelt administration is
set to undertake very powerful
measures. 1t is prepared, if neces-
sary, to revalue the dollar in case
gold itself does not become re-
valued 1t is prepared to expand
credit in large volume.
1t is prepared to promote great
public works to force some of this
credit into use. 1t is prepared to
refinance much private indebted
ness. 1t is prepared by various con-
trolls to stop price-cutting and wage
cutting.
In short, the Roosevelt admins
tration has the authority and I'M
questionably will employ it, to at
tempt to bring American prices,
debts, fixed charges, and wages into
workable equilibrium.
The position of the Macdonald
conservative government present a
striking contrast. So far as one
can see. it has no comparable pro-
gram Of action, and to all appear
ance it has not the will or the
unity of purpose to adopt COM
parable program.
This. 1 suspect, is the root of the
difficulty in working out Immediate
ly effective cooperation between the
two governments.
The Roosevelt administration is
prepared to use the power and the
credit of the United States in posi-
tive action. The Macdonald gov
eminent appears to be inhibited by
the natural conservatism of its COM
ponentS elements.
1T is the absence of any really
Il convincing domestic program OF
reconstruction in Great Britain, anC
also, of course, in France, which
must make Americans hesitate al
this time to bind the dollar closely
or rigidly to the pound, the francs
and to gold.
A tentative and temporary anC
very flexible Sterilization within
ample limits, may be desirable; but
the essential fact is that unit
Britain and France give some rea
proof that they mean to take posi-
tive measures to raise prices, relieve
debtors and enhance PURCHASING
power. we cannot afford to be bounc
by their hesitation and their mac
ton.
They are entitled to pursue any
domestic policy they wish, but il
their domestic policies do not move
in the direction in which we are
set to move, they must not expect
the United States to stand and wait
with them.
International cooperation is ar
admirable ideal, but it should be 6
cooperation in powerful. concur.
rent, and concerted measures, anc
not merely a cooperation which
produces a negative and impotent
stability.
(Copyrieht 1881