Evening star., 1933-06-28

and Vienna was bleak On January
| President Wilson outlined his famous IL
points.
A fortnight later Chancellor Hertline
| told the German Reichstag that ht
| could agree upon all but those points
having to do with colonies, evacuation
from occupied territories and the
creation of free Poland.
| simultaneously, Chancellor Czernir
| told the Austro-Hungarian Parliament
/ he found in the Wilson attitude "close
| approach to the Austro- Hungarian point
| of view"
| But behind these formal expressions
| and surface manifestations there was
| developing a constant effort to discuss
peace. which on the part of Austria
| Hungary eventually took on a frantic
tone.
Vienna Willing for Peace.
| The Vienna government was willing
! even anxious, to make a separate peace,
and on one occasion was encouraged by
| an informal offer of American financial
| assistance should she break with Ger
many.
Franz Josef was dead The Emperor
| Charles had succeeded to the throne
He foresaw the approaching disintegra-
| ton of his empire His people were
war weary. Peace, constitutional con-
! cessions to his subjects, and the end
of the alliance with Germany was his
aim.
He forced Czernin, ardently Prussian,
| to adopt his conciliatory tone and
meanwhile a trusted adviser, Prof.
| Lammasch of Vienna, was seeking these
objectives in informal negotiations in
Switzerland.
Later, the Austrian government util-
lied the good Offices Of the Spanish and
Swedish sovereigns to dispatch notes
to President Wilson asking confer
ence for the discussion Of his peace
terms.
wilson's reply was that his peace
points had been made sufficiently clear
in his speeches to Congress. When
the Teutonic powers were ready to
agree with them then there could be
peace.
Meanwhile, as early as January 4,
Grant Smith. the American charge in
Denmark, told the State Department
that "a Teutonic peace offensive Is
? making itself felt on every hand" I"
Correspondence of the period is filled
with similar references.
On February 10, Vice Consul McNally,
at Zurich. Switzerland, cabled Secre-
tary Lansing
"The German offensive is being held
back by the influence of the Kaiser
who urges that the terrible slaughter
which must follow should be withheld
as he is certain that Lloyd George,
the only person now preventing peace,
soon will be deposed. The pan Germans
are exceedingly incensed and have In
formed him that the offensive will not
be withheld later than very early
March"
Again, on February %, Minister Nor
ris cabled from Stockholm that an un-
official representative of Germany had
told him that the contemplated great
offensive on the Western front was be-
ing held in allegiance to see what result
would be obtained from this speech of
Hertling's affirming that the German
government accepted in principle" a
second enunciation of peace terms in
which President Wilson had reduced
his IA points to four points of principle.
No Agreement Reached.
But no agreement could be reached.
The German offensive of the Spring of
1918 was launched, with resulting tre-
mendous casualty lists, and severe set
backs for the allied forces.
| Eventually, however, it was halted
| and the allied drive of the Summer,
which led ultimately to victory in the
| Fall, was begun.
The offer of financial aid to Austria
| in the event Of separate peace was
| surrounded by the greatest secrecy. 1t
| was put into written form only in a
| ciphered message to the legation in
| Switzerland with instructions that 1t
be decoded only by Hugh Wilson, then
| charge d daffaires and acting head of the
| mission.
Concerning the possible need of
| Austria to obtain financial aid after the
war under certain conditions I think
that it would be wise at this time to
convey secretely, unofficially and orally
to Lammasch or his agent, that, in the
| event Of Austria being deprived of Ger
man financial support through acting
contrary to the wishes of the German
government in independently arranging
a cessation of hostilities and negotia-
| tions for peace at the present time
person conveying information has strong
| impression amounting to conviction
| that government of the United States
will exert its influence to the end that
| financial assistance may be obtained in
| the United States as nearly as possible
| to the extent that Germany would have
furnished it if there had been no breach
| in their relations.
| AS to the most expedient channe
| to convey this secret and unofficial in.
| formation to Lammasch. l rely wholly
| upon your discretion though ! thinl
it would be unwise to employ Herror
(an American historian then in Swift.
| zerland who had previously taken par
| in unofficial discussions with the Aus
trians,, whose relationship with Lam
| maSch should in no way be embarrassed
| by making him the agent of deliver,
| of even the most unofficial message
Please act promptly and discreetly
In this matter and report fully"
The message was signed by Secretar.
Lansing, and dated February Is.
Reply of Wilson.
Wilson'S reply, on February q, fol
lows:
'"Lammasch has no agent in Swift
zerland and 1 hesitate to confide thi
message to any neutral. 1t was there
fore imperative to confide 1t only Il
person Of confidence. who could dc
liver the message secretly, orally ant
unoficially to Lammasch in Vienna
therefore summoned York-Steiner, al
Austrian, who often calls at the lega
ton. He is close friend ant
warm admirer of Lammasch and
disciple Of his political matters.
L asked him whether he could pro
ceed to Vienna on a confidential mis-
sion Of benefit to his country. He re
piled that he could proceed as soon a
the necessary three days of passpor
formalitieS had elapsed. / told him t
, | Nht Io vic nd ro
turn to me.
He returned on the nineteenth in
stant, having obtained permission t
visit Vienna on the ground of his dc
sire to bring his daughter back to Swift
| zerland a reason which really exist