The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1933-06-01

80 hhAH" ~ 4AAApAAb
was that congress I;,,ar
would in a h
case have to make the decision as
to whether the United States would
or would not assist the blockade
against the "aggressor."
The foreign relations committee
of the senate now has reported the
resolution. with an amendment
which provides that the President
may lay an embargo only against
all the parties IN the conflict. He
may not single out the aggresSor
nation, lay an embargo against it,,
and continue to let arms and mu-
nitions be shipped to its opponents.
Thus the senate committee has in
effect refused to give the President
power to join in the so-called sane
tions Of peace, has refused to let
him be the judge as to whether the
United States should be neutral
For all practical purposes the
amended resolution vetoeS the offer
recently made at Geneva.
The offer to consult would remain,
but the offer to do something after
the consultation is virtually multi
fed.
ITO my mind, il seems clear that
Il to give the President the
power to judge which is the ag-
gressor nation and to join in pun
ishing it is almost indistinguishable
from giving him the power to de-
clare war.
How true this is was borne in
upon me last winter when l hap
pened to be at Geneva in the criti-
cal days of the Manchuian affair.
The sentiment of the smaller pow
ers in the league was strongly in
favor of declaring that Japan was
the aggressor and of proceeding to
act under Article XVI of the league
covenant
What prevented this action was
that Great Britain would have had
to use her navy TO apply the block
ade, and Great Britain had no APP
petite for war with Japan.
Now, if at that time the Uniteo
States had been under obligation to
identify the aggressor in that dis
pute and then to lay an embargo
against Japan, the whole response
bility in the Orient inevitably would
have been concentrated on us. The
last and the decisive word would
have been ours.
If we refused to declare Japan the
aggreSsor. the other great powers
would have said, as in fact they did
say, that they could not act under
the covenant. If, on the other hand,
we did declare Japan the aggresSor
it would have been the United
States which had in reality set the
blockade in motion, and from the
point of view we should
have become the principal enemy,
THIS practical demonstration
Il convinced me of something
which I had previously only dimly
suspected, namely, that to stand
outside the league and yet to accept
the final responsibility as to whether
the league should apply force, was
the most dangerous way possible of
to organize international
peace.
We should be creating a situation
in which responsibility would not be
as President Wilson
conceived it, among the
members of the league, but where
the whole responsibility for what the
league did or failed to do was placed
upon the United States.
The responsibility is too great
one for the United States to assume. |
AS regards the Far East, it would as
have already indicated, isolate us
as the principal enemy.
AS regards the continent of Eu-
rope, we should, if we persuaded ma
tons to diSarm because they eX-
pected our help be driven into po-
sition where any injury they suffered |
because they were inSufficiently |
armed was chargeable to us.
1t is not a sound foreign policy as
L oSG ~ " dNbCllAPb W N4N VIC opC !
,ific disarmament of any nation /
with a vague and uncertain commit /
ment as to what we might do in the /
future.
But even if the responsibility were
not too great a one for the United .
States to assume. it is certainly too |
great a one for any President alone /
% assume.
THE trouble with the American |
Il attempt for the last twelve
months to force some measure of |
and disarmament in Europe has |
been that, until the underlying po-
itical conflicts are mitigated, the
armed powers will reduce only if
hey receive equivalent guarantees.
The recent offer at Geneva has
been an attempt to provide them |
With such guarantees, and yet to
keep a free hand for the United |
States. It can not be done.
A guarantee which meant any |
hing in Europe would mean the
abandonment of complete liberty |
# action by the United States.
This dilemma can not be resolved |
" a diplomatic formula which
night mean one thing in Europe
md another in the United States.
Copyright 1881