Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1933-11-19
IL DUCE PLAYS DIZZY GAME
TOCAIN BALANCE OFPOWER
Backs One Nation Against Another in
Effort to Get European Affairs
Away From Geneva.
BY FRANK H. sIMoNDs.

LHe american mlnO-aiWdyS De-
wfldering play of European politics
today, no single detail is more in
terestiag than the italian and no play
or at once more skillful and more i'm
portant than Mussolini. In fact, within
certain limits, the Duce has become the
central figure and perhaps the decisive
factor in the contemporary crisis. Sc
much will, moreover, depend upon the
course pursued by the Fascist dictator
IN the next few months and perhaps
even in the next year or two that his
situation is worth looking at closely.
1t is fair to recognize at once that
Gussolini is beyond question the best
poker player in Europe, but also that
h the nature of things he is condemned
always to hold the worst hands. In
his latest phase he has, too, earned the
claim to be ranked as a statesman; a
cool. cynical realist, but also the states
man who knows his Europe best and
understands continental conditions most
perfectly. BY contrast with the Duce,
Sir John Simon belongs in the kinder
garten, Paul Boncour IN an institution
for backward children and Adolf Hitler
hi school for the juvenile blind.
Mussolini Wants Peace?
Now, controlling Italy absolutely and
having become a factor in the present
European complex which cannot be
ignored or even treated lightly, what
does Mussolini want? First of all
peace-of that there can be no doubt.
He wants peace because Italy cannot
afford a war either financially, eco
nomically or socially, and the strain of
q long war or the consequences of
swift defeat in war must overthrow
Che Fascist regime which is otherwise
secure at least for his lifetime.
But in desiring peace Mussolini is
not thinking Of freezing Europe on the
present basis for all future time. Peace
with the Duce means a period of tran
guilty during which Italy will organize
herself to participate in the next war
which Mussolini believes Is inevitable.
For he believes that nations rise and
fall, are young and strong and become
old and weak. And he also believes
that as they rise and fall, they con-
quer and In turn are conquered. He
sees Italy as young nation destined
one day to exploit the strength of her
youth IN such fashion as to obtain for
herself the things which she lacks and
without which she can never be quite
great power
All this, you perceive, is far away from
any American, British or French idea
Of peace. It is far more like a truce
than g solid state of peace, but it is the
Duce's idea and that is why he has
never had faith, patience or interest in
Geneva But in the immediate prem
ises and at least for the next 10 years,
Mussolini is for a peace Of calculation,
rather than peace of understanding.
but nevertheless peace.
The second of the Duces concerns Is
that during a period limited but fairly
long, nothing shall be done to compro-
mise the Italian situation in Europe In
such fashion as to lessen his comtry,s
chance to benefit by the ultimate next
CONFUSION. If, however, Germany
should unite with Austria, then not
only would a new state of more than
81, 000.0 900 people be established on his
frontiers. but such a state would inevi-
tably become the dominating power i'll
all the lower valley Of the Danube and
in the Balkans 1t might even seek
to acquire Trieste, which is the historic
and natural port of Central Europe on
The Adriatic.
Opposes Austro- German Pact.
AS a consequence, Mussolini must OPP
pose all German plans for Austro-
German union, and he has indicated
this by standing with the French
against the Germans at the time of the
proposed Austro-German tariff union
and recently by his conversations and
proposals to Dollfuss, the Austrian
chancellor, during the Nazi drive
against the Austrian Republic. There
Is, then, fundamental divergence be-
tween German and italian policy, for
Austro-G German union is one of the
basic ideas of Hitler, who is, himself,
by birth an Austrian.
On the other hand, as Mussolini has
sought to create an Italian bloc in
Central Europe made up first of Hun
gary and then of Bulgaria and finally
of Austria, he has found himself at
all times opposed by the French bloc
united in the Little Entente, of Czecho-
glovakia, Yugoslavja and Rumania.
This alliance is primarily directed
against Hungary and aims at preserving
the status quo Of the peace treaties, but
It also seeks to exclude both Italy and
Germany from Central European DOM
nance And, in addition, the quarrel
between the Yugoslavs and the Italians
over Dalmatia is one of the bitterest
feuds in Europe.
France-intereSted in reyenting Ger
man advance to Vienna-SupportS
CzechoSloyakia. On this issue France
and Italy are agreed. But France also
supports Yugoslayia because Italy has
steadily challenged French position in
North Africa and il this became the
cause of Franco-Italian war Yugo-
elav aid would be Invaluable to the
French But the southern Slav state
is a geographical as well as political
obstacle to the Italian program in the
Danubisn area.
Blocked by Danubian Region.
Thus MoSsolini, finding himself
blocked in the Danubian region by the
little entente, is eager to bring about
the dissolution Of that alliance and the
substitution Of another alliance con-
trolled from Rome, in which Austria
and Hungary, as allies of Italy, would
have the controlling influence.
There, then, is the double play.
Mussolini is with France against Ger
many in the matter of Austro- German
union. But he is against France in the
matter of Danubian organization be-
cause the little entente blocks his am
billions, and that is controlled from
Paris. II he simply joins In an alliance
with France against Germany, he has
to abandon all his Central European
aspirations and thus accept the role OF
an inferior, become just one Of the
allies Of the French, like Pilsudski OF
Benes.
AS a consequence he has to hazard
the dangerous game of playing with the
Germans against the French on al
issues save that Of Austria. And dis.