Evening star., 1933-03-12

United States Is the principal market
for japanese tea, which, however, could
be replaced by that from Indian or
Chinese tea gardens. II these agricul-
tural products were cut of, the effect
would be felt almost at once by the
japanese farmers, already discontented
with conditions. and by large class
Of business people who in one way or
another are interested in the silk or
consequence be serious, but externally
lack of the foreign credits raised from
the sale of the silk or tea would make
it difficult, If not impossible, for the
cotton manufacturers to buy their sup
plies of raw cotton in this country, and
for the gasoline importers to acquire
the large quantity of American
petroleum products which are now paid
for mainly by the money coming from
the sale of raw silk. How, furthermore,
could the interest on the Japanese
dollar debt, held by our public. be paid?
Exports Of cotton goods, next to raw
silk, are the most important element
in the japanese international trade.
ton, mixed with the cheaper grades
from China and India, that the work.
men Of Osaka live. Without the
1,250 900 bales Of American cotton sent
annually from the Gulf ports to
Japanese harbors the cotton industry
of Japan would find it hard to operate.
Mill owners could, Of course, buy more
Indian cotton. but to make the cloth
which they have been accustomed to
supply it Is necessary to add GER
tain quantity Of the American grown
product. While no embargo by the
United States alone on exports Of
cotton to Japan could be effective, since
cotton could easily be sold through
houses in Bombay or Calcutta. the
difficulty of finding means Of paying
for it, II there were no funds from silk
sales, would be effective means Of
stopping the trade.
Trade. as it has developed between
the United States and Japan, is a re-
markable example of the interdepend-
ence Of nations, their mutual impor-
tance to one another. Our great i'm
ports of raw silk enable tens of
thousands of workers and millions of
capital to be employed in this country
to supply our people with an article
which they desire. The Japanese cot
ton manufacturers need our cotton to
mix with the cheaper grades they can
buy in Asia in order to support their
standard Of living and to enable their
to China, the Straits Settlements and
British India, which next to raw silk
are the great item in exports Of the
island empire.
The figures given show the impor-
tance OF the United States in Japanese
trade and the difficulty of carving
through any embargo measures against
Japan without her Effective action in
cutting of munitions of war or sup
plies necessary for war would require
American support, and, in case of a
general embargo. obviously the most
effective blow at the Japanese trade
would be through the United States.
Alternative for Japan.
If the manufacturing nations of the
world resolved to allow China free &C
cess to their munitions plants and to
forbid shipments to Japan. the Japa-
nese, by a declaration of war, could
close the way to the supply Of China.
Only by sea could heavy articles be
carried to China. The only rail route
to the country from Europe is the long
one through Siberia and Manchuria.
On the west and northwest is a difficult
mountainous region with no railways,
and rough road by Mongolia, which
could be reached only by long trip
through Siberia.
BY declaring war the Japanese navy,
with its control of the sea, could stop
all supplies coming to China from neu-
trail countries, and could even capture
them for the suppy Of its own armies.
blockade of the Chinese ports through
the belligerent right of stopping neu-
trail vessels with the contraband of
war aboard.
Should general embargo on Japan
be established, an obvious Japanese an
swer would be a blockade of all Chi
nese ports and an effective embargo of
trade with that republic. A blockade of
Chinese ports. however, means a Sc
rious interference with a considerable
foreign trade which could be i'll spared
| in these hard times, and it would mean,
furthermore, cessation of payment of
| interest on Chinese government obliga-
tions held largely in Europe and Sc
cured by revenue coming from Chinese
customs revenues, which could be cut
of by blockade.
A declaration of war will, of course,
involve serious legal difficulties both
under the covenant of the League and
under the Kellogg pact, and it is quite
possible that the Japanese government
would not consider that it was worth
while to incur further disapproval of
the nations by declaring war in order
to gain the privilege of stopping ship
ments Of munitions to China; the Brit
ish government may very likely have
had this contingency in mind
| The only serious effect of an embargo
on munitions shipments would be the
moral consequence No one can tell
what the effect would be on the Japan
ese people and their government of an
embargo directed against them, but it
Is obvious that there is a very great
difference between the declarations
which the powers have made so far
and overt action like the British en-
barge or an embargo on one combatant
alone. To produce this moral effect
the only really effective consequence OF
such an embargo, joint action of all the
great powers would be necessary. and
that action would have to be taken sin
cerely. An unwilling, half-hearted ges-
ture would be useless.
On the countries joining in the ac-
ton there must. too, be a strong moral
effect. If the governments feel
strongly that the case requires action
and unite to take action, the resultant
effect on the spirits of their peoples
would add greatly to the moral force
Of the embargo.
| WEST POINTERS CANCEL