Evening star., 1933-06-11

than $40, 900 900 IN 1900. But the peak
year was 1893.
Then began a decline which continued
until the war It was a rapid decline,
but it caused no trouble. Farmers ad-
justed themselves to the change In de-
mand and prospered while they were do
ing so. AS their foreign customers turned
to Canada, Argentina, Russia, India,
Australia and New Zealand for grain,
meat and fibers, farmers lessened their
export surpluses and cultivated the do
mestic market, which was expanding.
This period of declining exports was the
golden era of American agriculture. Agri-
cultural prices rose more than the prices
of other goods, and farm land values
trebled. During the period Of 1909 to
1914 all groups of our economic life were
in approximate balance.
The change of the relationship of
American agriculture to its world market
caused no difficulty because it was logical,
natural and not sudden or unexpected.
But the war changed everything. 1t re-
quired farmers to switch back to huge
production for export. Answering the
call of price and also of patriotism, they
sent more beef, pork and cereals to Eu-
rope than they had done at the height
of our agricultural export trade in the
90s BY 1918 our farm exports had risen
to As per cent above the pre-war level.
AS contribution to the winning Of the
war, this course was justified. But the
greatly expanded production persisted
long after the initial impulse for 1t had
vanished.
There was another serious economic
drawback. Our farm export trade dur
ing and after the war, unlike that Of the
nineteenth century, rested on American
rather than on European buying power.
It was financed here instead Of there.
This country exported not merely the
goods, but the money to pay for them,
at first by Government loans and after
ward by private loans. In short. the
export movement lacked natural trade
foundation. It was not really trade, be-
cause there was no exchange. We were
merely taking money out Of our own
pockets to pay for our own goods. We
then put our money back In the other
pocket and thought we had been paid.
In reality we had given the goods away.
For when the loans ceased, export de-
mand dropped.
However, the surpluses which this Gov
ernment had called into existence did
not disappear. For time we sold them
for very little. As late as 1926-T we
continued to export farm commodities In
a volume nearly SO per cent greater than
before the war, at prices which were
not remunerative to farmers, even
though they seem high as compared with
those which followed in 1880.
A FTER the slump OF, 1929 Europe could
not afford to accept our surpluses,
even at the desperately low prices we
were then willing to take, and It inter-
posed embargoes, quotas and other
obstacles. Europe definitely turned TO
a program of self-suf1iciency. The game
was up. Our farmers had fallen into
pit dug for them by the country. 1t is
only fair that the country should help
to get them out.
It seems to me to be perfectly clear
that many of these damaging postwar
changes could have been avoided. At
least, they could have been weakened in
their unfavorable effect on American
agriculture. For example, when we be-
came creditor Nation we might have
elected to permit our debtors to pay
US in goods. We did not choose to do
this. European nations acted only as
debtor nations could under the circum-
stances. They set out to grow their own
wheat and their own live stock We