The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1933-05-22

10 Huey Long, from Hitler to the
President Of Paraguay should have
its motor impulses inhibited while
its higher centers Of reflection and
understanding are to be allowed tc
function.
The theory behind my proposal
is that if only events would not
happen for a year, We might catch
up with ourselves and begin tc
know what we are doing and what
we ought to do next
a T the end Of February, as I sec
L n it, we had reached a paralyzinp
deadlock in our affairs. The fed
eral government was impotent. Tie
executive had lost his hold upon
congress, the party leaders had lost
their hold upon the members OF
congress, pulic opinion was dis
tracted and disheartened.
There was neither direction nor
unity in public life, and the result
was a general conviction among
the people that they were at the
mercy Of blind and ruthless eco
nomic forces which no one could
understand or control.
The crisis was one which mad tC
be surmounted without delay. II
was not possible to let nature take
its course and trust, as in previous
great depresSions
1t was clear that disastrous de
moralizatiOn could be aVerted only
by series Of rapid, positive meas
ures.
These measures would have to be
taken by the federal government
and, therefore, the first necessity
was the establishment of its au-
thority.
The country had to have a gov
errfment which had the will and the
power to govern 1t had to have q
government which could formulate
measures, could get them adopted
and could apply them without the
prolonged debate and the compro-
mise of the ordinary legislative pro-
Cedure.
NHESE were the circumstances
Il as I understand them, which
account for the great decision of
the new administration. l refer to
the decision to ask congress for gen
eral powers rather than for specific
laws.
The President must have known
that no human mind could clearly
foresee every step that would have
to be taken, and, therefore, it was
beyond the power of any set of men
to propose precise laws covering al
the vast and complicated problems
that had to be dealt with To ask
for general powers was the only con-
ceiyable way to break the political
deadlock
The acid test was the economy
bill. When the people of this coun-
try saw that bill pass, they knew
there was a national government at
Washington which was stronger
than the strongest lobby and the
most powerful organized minority
There was an instantaneous revival
of confidence in the possibility of
conscious action to meet the crisis.
The economy bill is a political
landmark. To a people who had
come to feel that they we're polite
ally helpers in the face of organized
minorities, it offered sensational and
convincing proof they were not
helpless.
Having restored the national au-
thority, the question then arose as
to how that authority was to be
used. At this point public opinion
which had been almost unanimous,
became somewhat divided.
One view, which was held by
many men, was that the admins
tration should use its authority to
balance the budget, provide relief
for the unemployed and then turn
its whole attention to stabilizing the
foreign exchanges, reducing the war
debts, and breaking down tariff bar
riers' and other obstacles to inter
national trade.
This was, I believe. the view of
the outgoing Hoover administration
and there was much representative
opinion behind it.
DUT if this view was 10 be adopt
ID ed there had to be some 'asSur-
ance that the world economic con-
ference would be able, before next
winter. to reach successful agree
mentS on all these many questions
But the more closely the pros
poets were examined. the more evil
dent It became that internationa,
economic relations had gotten into
a vicious circle.
High tariffs and war debts anc
mistaken monetary policies and po-
litical unsettlement had become tbs
consequences of the disaster which
they had done so much to produce
How then. was that vicious cir
Gle to be broken? There was only
one nation powerful enough to dc
it. That nation was the United
States.
There was only one way to do il
and that was to start the process
Of recovery in the United States
and trust that the enormous weight
of America in the markets of the
world would turn prices upward and
influence other nations to take posi-
tive measures TO deal with the de-
preston in their own economy.
THIS decision to break away
i temporarily from an interna-
tional monetary system, which ir
fact had ceased to be truly inter-
national meant that the United
States intended to deal directly
with the depression within its own
frontiers.
1t was a break with the theory
which most of us, I think, hello
until relatively recent months. that
since the depression was a world