Evening star., 1933-06-04
ROOSEVELT LACKS POWER
TO CHANGE POLICY OF u. S.
President Cannot Bind His Successors
and Faces Limitation in Need for
Approval of Senate.

tive at all would have to provide the
platform for a new British guarantee TO
employ its fleet in case OF breach OF
peace on the continent. France and her
allies, fortified by the knowledge that II
Germany were guilty of aggression they
would have the support of the British
fleet, could reduce their ornaments. In
the same fashion France could concede
the Italian naval parity. Thus the jam
in the Disarmament Conference might
be broken.
But it was obvious from the start that
the British, far less ready today than
in 1881 to agree to accept new COM
mitments, would find in the limited
pledge of the Roosevelt administration
no basis for assuming obligations
which might fall due only after Roose-
welt himself had left the White House
and new President with another con-
ception had come in his place. We'll
come as was the news that America
would come to consultation, enthusiasm
could not be expected to extend to as
suming eternally a duty which in
limited period might again involve
clash with the United States.
Situation Not Modified.
Thus while the isolationists within
and without the Senate were lamenting
the break with American tradition,
those actually on the spot at Geneva
were promptly made aware that Mr..
Roosevelt's gesture-like that of Mr..
Hoover year ago-had not materially
modified the situation. For that situ-
alton had its origin in the unmistakable
fact that a group of unarmed powers
were resolved to modify the frontiers OF
another group of armed powers. In that
situation the armed would only give
up their guns in return for guarantees
and the Roosevelt proposal brought no
new guarantee against invasion.
The actual effect of the Presidents
proposal was to put the British in
difficult situation and France and her
allies in hole. For the British, after
the American action, were manifestly
to the French, which they were unwil-
ling to make As for the French, they
found themselves likely to be charged
by the Germans and Italians with re-
sponsibility for the failure of an
American proposal The result, of
course, was days of obscure maneuver-
ing precisely like that which followed
the famous Hoover proposal of year
ago.
But Americans must see that what
even face-saving formula might be
CfCALQd1lJ dOORtCQ, tl4E EICOloClL O44El
could not promote effective disarma-
ment because it did not in the least
modify the political facts which are
the true explanation of the present
state of European ornaments. It did
not modify the danger to France and
her allies of the purposes Of nations
which demand treaty revision because
it did not involve any remuneration OF
these purposes
Slight as it does today seem In Euro
pean eyes, the Presidents proposal, had it
been made by Hoover at London three
years ago, might have brought about
a five-power naval treaty. 1t might
even have saved the Disarmament Con-
ference last Summer before the rise of
Hitler and the explosion of NaZi pas
sion. But like so many other actions
in the postwar period it is now effec-
lively outdated by events.
Two things actually killed the Dis
armament Conference, the Japanese
action in Manchuria and the triumph of
Hitler. The former disclosed the League
of Nations as helpless to prevent or ar
rest aggression, the latter revealed Ger
many dominated by men and mood
which brought instant and deadly chal-
lenge to the whole system of European
order established by the peace treaties.
Practically, Mr.. Roosevelt could only
promote disarmament in Europe as he
promised with the assent of the Senate
that the United States would Join it's
resources to those of the attacked ma
tion in case of aggression. On that
basis British participation would also be
assured And in that case aggression it
self would become exceedingly unlikely,
giving the overwhelming accumulation
of force behind the law. On that basis,
then, France and her allies might con-
sent to reduce their military establish
ments.
Europe Faces New War.
But this was precisely what the Presi-
dent could not do. As a consequence
salvaging of the Arms Conference was
beyond his power. What Europe faced
and faces is the obvious and identified
peril of new war. What the President
proposed did not touch the factors
which were responsible for this condi-
tion, the basic political conditions. In
making his proposal he showed a bet
ter appreciation OF European circum-
stances than any President since Will
son. No one can deny that his sensa-
ticnal intervention by appeal to the
world produced an enormous temporary
abatement of the immediate crisis. It
Is fair to believe that with greater pow-
er he might have taken broader action.
But while by his Intervention he could
resolve an immediate crisis, the Presi-
dent could not modify the basic facts.
He could not change French insistence
upon security or German demand for
revision. By emphasizing the extent of
German isolation he imposed a swift
change from the tone of Papen on a
Saturday to that of Hitler on the fol-
lowing Wednesday. But European arma-
ments still remained based upon the
statements of Papen, just as American
policy continued in European eyes to
remain anchored upon the speech of
Lewis rather than released by the words
Of Davis. In the European mind the
President had led his country to water,
but he apparently was unable to make
It drink