Evening star., 1932-07-17
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.
TINE decision of the Geneva Arms
Conference to go home and re-
convene later was the only nat
i ural and logical conclusion
uhich could fnllnm the Hoover

which could follow the Hoover
proposal. The conference had. IN a
sense, to put up or shut up and,
having nothing to put up, it has shut
up The fiction that the adjournment
will be largely to give the statesmen
and experts an opportunity to confer
in quiet is just the same sort OF nc
tion that has always attended an un-
successful conference. On the success
full, meetings end; the others adjourn
to reconvene.
AS far as the great powers were
concerned they were ready to go home
last March, when it was clear to every
one that nothing could come out OF
the present session. But the Amerl-
can delegation was very insistent, and
at that time no one wanted to cross
the worlds most considerable and SEN
sitive creditor Now the moment has
come when the President of the United
States is more reconciled to adjourn
ment because continued sessions could
only emphasize the fact that his prof.
ect fer reduction BY third of world
armamentS had no chance of adoption.
It is by no means uncertain that
some of the more astute of European
statesmen were not unmindful that
in the event Mr.. Hoover were re-
elected his disarmament proposal might
furnish a basis for trading next Fall
when the more serious question of war
debts would come up. Perhaps some
more or less pleasing application Of the
Hoover ideas, enough to constitute a
moral triumph for the President, might
enlist his powerful support for some
satisfactory meeting of the awkward
situation which must arise when the
cue date for debt payments arrives in
December.
Farley Has Lived Life.
In any event this Arms Conference
has lived its life met its failure and
gone its way. No one will be deceived
as to the actual value of agreements
on chemical warfare and bacteriologi-
cal hostilities The business of the
conference was to produce some form
of agreement which insured the reduc-
ton of the great armies and the SINH
lar pairing down of the enormous eX-
penses of the present time. 1t has
accomplished neither task. All the
large problems remain just where they
were when the conference met in
February.
The failure. too. has been the direct
consequence of the fact that in the
present circumstances of Europe the
i cal problems upon the solution
Il. h all real disarmament de-
, ~ -GnGin unsolV2d. The question
E-GN-o- German military equality,
-lanao-It5.ian naval parity, are pre-
Il as "a king in solution as when
Cg2EGi end Tardieu met six months
TO ana the German demand for
eluality in defense and therefore in
sc urity stands.
No direct demand was made upon
the United States to enter into any
form OF security pact because at the
moment the European statesmen recog-
nIZed that an administration on the
eve of national election could hardly
undertake the discussion of that aspect
of disarmament. But there is small
reason to doubt that it will be raised
when the conference meets again or
outside this conference in some other
fashion. For just as long as the United
States displays an acute interest in the
size of European armies, European
states are going to be concerned with
the course the United States proposes
to take if they reduce their armamentS
and are later attacked.
Looking backward, it cannot be said
that the Arms Conference was ever a
very dramatic or interesting affair The
opening proposals of Tardieu promptly
forecast the failure that ultimately ar
rived. The progress of the war in the
Far East supplied an unfortunate back
ground for the proposal that European
nations that, felt themselves in danger
should initiate the Chinese example and
rely upon something beside their own
forces to maintain their territorial in
tegrity
In fact, the Japanese adventure in
Manchuria cast wet blanket over the
whole Geneva affair, which was never
full roiS no
save, perhaps, one or two members OF
the American delegation, ever took the
conference very seriously. Not because
they did not regard the issues involved
as in themselves serious, but because
they were we'll aware that nothing real
could be accomplished.
Speeches for Home Effect.
In a large measure the whole affair
consisted, first, of a long series of
speeches designed on the one hand to
satisfy the Left in the several countries
that their delegations were seriously
working for disarmament, and on the
other to convince the Right that they
had no intention of abandoning any
essential element in their system of
national defense. All the high-sounding
phrases when analyzed were without
specific relation to the simple problem
OF disarmament or even of the reduc-
ton of military and naval forces.
After a while all hope of making
progress in the direction of reducing
men - that is, effectives - was aban-
doned. The conference proceeded to
the second phase, which was the dis
cussion of qualitative as contrasted with
Quantitative disarmament. These i'm
pressive terms meant in simple words
that, being unable to limit or reduce
the numbers of men, the conference
tried to reduce the size of guns. OF
course the operation was somewhat
more extensive. 1t ran, in fact. to an
attempt to define what were offensive
and what defensive weapons.
The experts. who were now called In
&c. on the question long and finally
came to an approximate agreement that
offensive weapons were the Sort
rointed at you and defensive weapons
the kind you pointed. In word, as
the geographical conditions OF states
differed, the size and type OF weapons
they regarded as necessary Tor tnell
defense varied. And each set OF eX-
merits was perfectly prepared to agree
TO the definition of offensive as applied
to types not essential TO thelr OWL
conditions.
So presently qualitative disarma-
ment discussions broke down exactly
as ouantitative had broken down be-
fore. No considerable number of coun-
tries could agree on anything ex,
cept the two details of bugs" ane
"pases" They we're banned by COM
mon consent. But no nation tool
either seriously as a means of defense
On the other hand, all experts were
aware that the formal prohibition II
reace time of such weapons had II
the past proved no barrier to their en-
rlovment during actual conflict.
Through the conference at all time
ran the divisions which are the faithful
reproductions of the actual separation
in Europe today The Italians, fol
example, were ever ready to supper
American proposals when these lrri
tated the French and ever behlno th'