The Washington times., 1932-09-13

that afternoon, there doubtless
would be more rioting and pos
Sible bloodshed. I recommended
that, should further evicting be
required that day, the Federal
troops should be called upon to
do it. Nothing was said by
the Commissioners at this con-
ference to indicate they had
reached a decision to call for
Federal aid.
Secretary Quoted
My statement above is sub
stantiated by certificate of my
personal secretary, Mr.. Aldace
Walker, quoted as follows:
"After Major GIasSfOrd had
quelIed the first riot and had
declared that the evacuation
would cease until after lunch,
I accompanied him from the
Pennsylvania Avenue area to
the District Building. On the
way up in the police car, I Sug-
gested to Major GlaSSfOrd that
he take one of two courses,
either to request that an ex-
tentiOn Of time be given in
the evacuation program, or, for
him to ask the Commissioners
to call on the Federal Govern
ment for aid. He expressed
strong opposition to calling for
Federal aid. Both Commits
SiOnerS asked Major GlaSSfOrd
if. the police had lost control
Of the situation. The Major
replied that the situation was
not out of the control of the
police. He explained fully just
what had happened, and then
maintained that the area which
was rOped off could be held if
he were not required to extend
this area. The Commissioners
then told the Major to hold
what he had. The conference
ended and Major GlassfOrd and
1 returned to the area ON Penn
SyIvan1a avenue
"AlthOugh the subject Of re
queSting Federal aid was dis
cuSSed at this conference there
was no manifestation on the
part of the Commissioners of
calling upon the President for
the use of troops"
COMMISSIONERS ARRIVE
Within half an hour. after
the conference at the District
Building, Commissioners Reich
elderfer and Crosby appeared
at the diSaffected area. I left
a group of veterans which in
cluded Commander j. w.
Waters and other veteran lead
ers to- tell the Commissioners
that all was quiet and that
plans were being formulated to
get all the veterans visiting in
this area to return to their
own camps. Nothing was said
by the Commissioners at this
time to indicate they had
reached a decision to call for
Federal aid.
1t was not until more than
an hour later that I had any
intimation that the troops had
been called out. The informa-
ton came to me first from a
newspaper reporter, and was
confirmed officially a few
minutes later by a message
from Attorney General Nit
chell. transmitted verbally by
Mr.. Nugent Dodds of his office.
I was in command at the
scene of a difficult situation
which was vitality affected by
the call for Federal troops.
I have never been informed
why the Commissioners did
not notify me instantly when
the troops were called.
Attack Story Denied
4. The report says: Finally
the mob of bonus marchers
again attacked the police with
bricks, Jumps of concrete and
iron bars. Two Of the bonus
marcherS were shot by police
who had been set upon and
were In danger of their lives.
The entire mob became hostile
and riOtOuS. It was apparent
that a pitched battle on a large
scale might start at any mo-
ment. Practically the entire
police force of the city were
called from their posts and as
Sembled at this point"
The facts are as follows: This
second attack occurred about
1:45 p. M, more than an hour
and a half after the brick
battle. 1t was a short Spon-
taneouS affair involving seven
police holding the repossessed
police officers who were iso-
lated from the main body of
area, which was in the same
block but on the other side of
three large buildings.
1t is true that there was a
certain amount of hostility but
a very large proportion Of the
unemployed veterans remained
loyal to law and order. With
out this mass of loyal men it
would not have been possible
for me to have stopped the
brick battle before it had been
in progress five minutes, or to
have stopped the second out
1arAaE in--NViicINNE EVg0 ~Weterans