Evening star., 1932-04-24
FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
TO REMAIN UNCHANGED
Forthcoming Elections Expected to Be
Close, But Little Effect on External
Affairs Is Anticipated.

This is what Tardieu has tried many
times to achieve in the past four years
and 1t has a close resemblance 10 the
many cabinets Of national safety
which fill the history OF the third
French Republic.
Foreign Policy to Stand.
But in any such combination Tardieu
and Laval would be far more potent
figures than Herriot and Patnleve, as
Stunning all four did cooperate, which
that would mean that in foreign affairs
there would be no real modification
of the present policy And this would
be the case even If Herriot and Pain
leve with the Socialists had g narrow
majority and remained in power for
months or years. Nothing really could
bring about even a slight modification
Of basic French foreign policy except a
landslide to the Left which incidentally
gave the Socialists a numerically
stronger position in the combination.
And such landslides are almost un-
precedented in French history, nor Is
any such novelty forecast by any ex-
perts at the present moment.
One must begin, therefore, by dis
missing the idea that the overthrow
Of the present majority would por-
tend any considerable modification OF
French policy. In the matter OF dis
armament Herriot has accepted the
same thesis as Tardieu that security
comes first, while Boncour has pro-
claimed that the League must first be
armed before France can disarm. And
that is the identical thesis Of Tardieu
at Geneva where Boncour has been his
colleague What is very hard to make
clear to American and British publicS
is that in the matter of disarmament
there are not in France two opinions
and two policies, those Of the Right
and Left, the NationalistS and Liberals,
but one policy, which is French, shared
by all save the Socialists. In France
1t Is only the Socialists who sympathize
with the disarn ament ideas Of President
Hoover or Prime Minister Macdonald.
Whatever group wins the election and
whether Tardieu or Herriot Is at the
foreign Office, French policy in the
matter of security will undergo precious
little modification. In the matter of
Germany, the situation is not much
different. Just year ago no one was
more outspoken than Herriot in de-
nouncing the AuStro- German Tariff
Union. The German attitude 81
Geneva has won little approval even in
the French Left, while the combina-
ton of Berlin and Rome at London, in
the Danubian affair. aroused hostility,
for the Left is profoundly nti-Fascist,
as, Of course, are the Socialists
Majority Feels Alike.
Broadly speaking, what may be
changed by the election is not the basic
policy Of France, but the manner in
which it is applied. Herriot, Painleve
and Boncour would do weakly what
Tsrdieu or Laval would do firmly
Herriot might go TO Berlin, but he
would certainly try to restore the old
spirit and form Of Locarno. But unless
he were very successful in bringing
about profound change in present
German temper and a modification Of
German purposes, the result at home
would be just nil. One group in France
would speak more kindly to the Ger
ter of reparations, disarmament and
frontiers the majority Of Frenchmen
feel alike.
Thus when all the hubbub of cleo
tioneering Is over the France which
emerges will have as little modified its
purposes in foreign policy as the
America which emerges from our No
vember trial will have made over its
Judgment In the matter of debts and
foreign commitments. Tardieu will be
there, Laval will be there, business,
finance will still be strongly represented
In any event. The arrival Of Socialist
Radical cabinet will certainly produce
repercussions in the markets. as the
threat Of Bryan victory did in the
old days at home
The most popular thing Tardieu has
done has been his effort to restore
close and friendly relations between
France and Britain. He or his success
task. Now and for a long time to come
any direct understanding between Ger
many and France is out of the ques-
tion no matter what group rules in
Paris. Associated with Britain, France
will make certain concessions but not
otherwise. Whether time remains to
work thus effectively is open to ques-
tion.
Attitude of All Similar.
II you look back over all the French
cabinets from Clemenceau to the pres
ent Tardieu government-and heaven
knows they have been numerous
enough-you will see that although
they bore many labels and were headed
by many different statesmen they either
pursued the same general line in for
eign affairs or were eventually thrown
out because the country took alarm
BRAND stayed in the foreign Office for
seven years, and no man had in his
prime freer hand, but his sun set the
moment 1t was felt that he had en-
dangered French security by indulging
In dreams about Geneva notions
AS Is in the United States. foreign
policy in France is not primarily mat
ter of party politics. No prime minister
would dare to advise his fellow coun-
trymen to reduce their armaments or
resign their championship of the status
quo IN the face Of a Germany in its
present Hitlerian mood. 1t Is not a
change in French policy but In Ger
man temper which must come before
anything really happens in the way Of
European reconciliation and recon-
struction. On this point the French
mind Is closed. BRAND made progress
temporarily because he described new
Germany, that of Stresemann. But
that chapter ended abruptly with the
rise of the NaZis and no election will
change French purpose while Hitler
ism continues on the march.
(Copyright, 1922