Evening star., 1932-01-31
GARDINER SAYS u. S. MUST BOW
TO JAPANESE OR BUILD UP NAVY
League Head Says Doctrine
of "0pen Door" in Trade
Depends Upon Fleet.
Japan's Control of Islands,
Aimed at ASlatiC Empire,
Held Peril to America.
BY REX COLLIER.

! ApropOS the Sino-Japanese embroglio,
! William Howard Gardiner, president of
the Navy League called attention in an
! interview yesterday to a previously re-
! corded declaration by him, that Japan's
practices of sequeStration and mo-
nopoly" in the Far East make advisable
maintenance Of an American feet
adequate to stop tlagrant and danger
Gus inequity there"
"Of far greater Importance than the
! Manchurian or Shanghai situations per
! Sc" Mr.. Gardiner says, is the basic
issue at stake. namely, whether the
American doctrine of equality Of eco
| nomic opportunity for all and of the
/ inviolability Of territorial and govern
mental integrity will survive or be
abandoned
"AS l have pointed out on a previous
! occasion, real adherence to the OPEN
! door doctrine would end conquest for
special privilege and thus remove what
| is probably the greatest and most i'm
memorial cause of war.
But failure on our part to give eff
fective support to that doctrine inau-
gurated by us in Mozambique in 1882
would be, in my opinion, greater blow
to the SO-Called peace machinery of the
world than the abOliShment of the
League Of Nations or the scrapping of
the Kellogg pact"
Tells Of japanese Conquest Plans.
Mr.. Gardiner who attained wide
spread notice recently for his "abysmal
ignorance thrust at President Hoover
IN connection with the Navy, has long
been known as a close student of Far
Eastern affairs. He visited JaDan
| China and other ASiatic countries In
1923 and again in 1929
Mr.. GARDENERS estimate of Japan's
intentions in the Far East is summed up
in the following statement:
AS is well known within the Japa-
neSe bureaucracy two quite different
plans have been cOntending for prefer
ence. What might be called the Japa-
neSe territOrialiStS' plan is sponsored BY
the Chosu clan that predominates in
the army.
Naturally, this is reminiscent Of i'm
perial Prussian thought in its desire to
spread direct military, political and
economic control progressively over ad-
jacent parts of the continent of Asia as
extensively as possible, SO that the Jap
anese of the future may live in the
main, on their economic exploitation of
! China and of the Chinese.
Maritime Supremacy Plan.
In contrast to this territorialist
plan is what might be called the Japa-
nese maritime plan that is supported by
the naval SatZuma clan This springs
! from an appreciation of MahanS doc
! trine to the effect that the ability to
| conduct extensive communications by
! sea Of ones self and the power to deny
adequate communications by sea to
ones opponent has been a most potent
and far-reaChlng factor in the history
| OF peOpleS-and this because such con-
| troll over communications by sea gives
| preferential access to overseas lands and
| to their human and material resources
| while enabling one to minimize such
access to ones opponent in peace and
virtually to deny it to him III war.
Apart from the Aleutian Islands, the
| Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines,
Northern Borneo, few small and scat
tered American or British islands and
! the coastal islands, all the islands of
| the Pacific north of the Equator are in
the hands of the japanese.
| One effect of this is that the sub
marines or airplanes based on islands
remote from Japan proper could seri-
ouSly impede the advance of an enemy
force toward japanese home waters.
! Another is that control of the entire
/ inSular barrier to Northwestern Asia
makes it possible for the Japanese navy
to isolate that region from direct over
seas communication. Thus they can
deny commercial access to 1t from the
sea- except by naval force based near
enough to break through the barrier Ell
| fectively and to hold open the breach
created
Would Menace Z. S. Security.
80 when some talk easily of throw
| ing this or that force into China, say,
against brigandS it does not seem that
! they have given due consideration TO
| the control the japanese might eXer-
| else over such operations, because OF
their naval hold over the northern part
of the inSular barrier lying across the
! lines of communication to Northern
! China and Siberia.
The japanese see for themselves, as
the reward of astute persistence, a
| future empire that shall enfold Eastern
Asia and command the Pacific. They
parry interference from the United
drugged giant shall have returned to
! potency. But we, on the other hand,
| see that such future japanese empire
would Gebar us from Asia and could
menace cur future security
Three Courses Open to U. S.
THE evident intention of the Jap
anese empire to continue practices that
have proved so vastly profitable and
are so very promising would seem to
| confront us with the necessity of
choosing from among the following
courses:
We should be prepared to offer the
Japanese, in convincing terms, pros
pect even more profitable than their
vision of empire if they will abandon
their practices and really adhere to
our policy (tha open door, instead of
merely protesting to do So
! "Or we should be prepared-also in
convincing terms-to make their con-
/ tinuance of their practices Improbable
to them.
"Or, regardless of our own ultimate
! interests, We should abandon our half
hearted attempt by our policy to sub
stitute equality of opportunity, equity
| and peace for the immemorial pro-
| cedure of war sequestration and sub
jugation for gain.
1T does not appear possible 10 offer
the Japanese convincing prospects OF