Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1932-08-21


~ EN- PERSHING, in his book,
My Experiences in the VIOLA
T War" animadverts severely
~ upon the work of the general
staff in the War Department
in the early stages OF the war. IL
| therefore becomes important to snow
! from the records precisely what took
place and to do justice to that particu--
| lar body CT men. I was not one OF
| them at the time, and l approach the
! subject from an unprejudiced stand
point.
The first and one of the most i'm
portant pieces of general staff work
| after Gen Pershing had been allowed
to select his own chief of staff and the
representatives of permanent staff bu-
reauS to accompany him to France was
! the preparation of orders for the expe-
| dition which had to be carefully drawn
| to indicate the objects and scope OF the
American movement of troops and to
| give Gen. Pershing the specific au-
thority he would be permitted to exer-
else while in command of the A. E. F.
Gen. PerShing realized the Importance
of this document, so he prepared an
order himself, with the assistance Of
| Hartford. his chief of staff, setting forth
/ their Joint idea what the letter Of in
! structions should contain. At the same
time the general staff prepared a letter
of instructions covering the same
ground. the actual author being Maj.
Gen. Francis j. Herman, assistant chief
! of staff.
Herman Letter Official.
The Pershing letter was signed by
Gen Bliss as acting chief of staff May
26, 1917 while the general staff letter
prepared by Herman was forwarded by
Gen Bliss to the Secretary of War. rec
ommending approval, and was signed
by Secretary Baker for the President.
also on May &c. This action by the
Secretary made the Pershing letter SO
much waste paper, SO 1t went into the
! files, and the general staff Baker let
ter governed Gen. Pershing's authority
in France throughout the war.
/ made the contents of the PerShing
letter known to the Army for the first
time in lecture before the Army War
College January IS. 1880, and the eff
feet was immediate and far-reaching.
A considerable propaganda had been
current in the press, erroneouSly as
cribiug the idea of a separate and dis
tinct American Army in France to Gen
Pershing. This letter containing his
own ideas of the scope of his authority
| therefore became of historical impor-
/ UCSduSC ~ lCNCdlCd tlldL IiIC ilCp
had not been included in his letter,
while the general staff letter had not
only originated the policy. but had
specifically directed him to carry it out.
When took over the Office of chief
of staff I called for all letters of in
struction, grants of authority, or orders
by the War Department which had
been communicated to Gen. Pershing.
with view to making such modifica-
tons as l considered necessary in view
Of changed conditions in France.
Hits Pershing Letter.
I was struck with the excellence Of
the general staff original letter of in
structions to Gen. Pershing, with which
I was in entire agreement. 1t was a
fine piece of general staff work. The
Pershing letter was a very poor piece
Of general staff work
An examination of these letters
which are printed herewith, reveals one
other fundamental difference besides
that of specifically directing the for
nation Of an independent and separate
American Army in France. That diff
ference is that the Pershing letter con-
fines the activities of the United States
forces abroad, during the war. to Co
operation with the French armies OPP
I
her allies" The general staff letter,
however, with broader vision, foreseeS
the possibility of American troops OPP
Grating in any one of the countries at
war with the imperial German govern
ment. and, of course, the United States
had troops serving with the British,
the Italians, and in Russia at the end
of the war.
!; Gen. Pershing had received authority
from the War Department to determine
the time his men were fit to enter bat
tie, and as long as he was kept in
command in France he was the only
man who could decide that point as
we held him responsible for results.
AS the tremendous drive in France be-
gan, I began to talk with the Secre-
tary of War about this whole matter.
If Pershing were to throw him men into
battle with, perhaps. short polishing
in training. he would be able to get so
many more men on the firing line In q
given length of time as to make a
} marked difference in the results OBJ
r tanned there.
: The constant clamoring by our al
lies for American troops was not based