The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1932-03-21


the whole future of Russia firmly
is bound up. A factory, Of which
only 90 per cent is finished, is not
a factory, and in the U. S. s. r.
there are hundreds and thousands
of factories still building.
War would transform them for
long time into dead capital. All
this is too evident to need en-
phasis.
IF we admit that a military
conflict in the far east is, never
theless inevitable-and such is
the conviction of many japanese
statesmen and not of the Japan
csc only-even in that case the
Soviet government has no reason
to force the issue.
Japan has entered China in
pursuance of a grandiose enter
prise, which will have incalculable
consequences. She may have, and
will have partial military and dip
lomatic successes, but they will be
tranSitory, whereas the difficulties
will be permanent and will go on
increasing.
TIN Korea, Japan has her Ire
Il land. In China, she is trying
to create her India.
"Only entirely stupid generals
of the feudal type could contem-
plate the national movement in
China with disdain. A huge ma
ton of 450,0O0,O00, awakened to
self-consciousness, can not be
kept under by airplaneS.
Japan is going to stick up to
the knees in the fat soil of Man
churia-if not up to the waist!
And since in Japan itself the
economic development has come
into absolute contradiction with
the feudal structure of soviety,
one may enviSage an internal
crisis as quite inevitable. First the
Seiukai will give place to the
Minseito party, which later will
move to the left. Then the ReVo-
lutionary party will lift up its
France lost not a little in
financing Czarism. She is mis-
taken if she thinks that this has
assured her against losses in
financing the Mikado.
1T is quite clear-in the far east
the Soviet government has no rea-
son to be in hurry or to lose its
nerve.
so war between the U. S. S. r.
and Japan could only have de-
veloped if the conflict had been
knowingly and deliberately pro-
voked by Japan, with the consent
of stronger allies. The objective
of such war clearly would be
Infinitely greater than the Ques-
tons of the Chinese Eastern Rail-
road and Manchuria together.
ME idea of a war between the
Il Soviets and Japan, as well
as the parallel idea of war be-
tween Japan and the United
States, Immediately raises the
problem Of distances:-a land
ocean and a water-ocean as pos
sible arenas of military opera
tons.
AT the very first moment the
strategic problem disappears en-
tirely in the problem of distances.
ON this point many people
hasten to come to conclusions UNI
pleasant for the U. S. S. R. The
scarcity of population in the
Asiatic' districts of the U. S. S. r.;
the economic backwardneSs, the
shortage of railway communica-
tions-all these are regarded rs
so many factors initiating against
the Soviets.
This is true up to certain
point, but only up to certain
point.
Even limiting the problem to
the field of military technique,
one can not but see that the same
vast distances become equally the
ally of the Soviets.
Admitting the possibility of
some Japanese military successes
in an advance westward. it is
easy to foreSee that the difficulties
would increase as the square of
the distances covered by the JAP
anese troops.
The successes would be swaI-
lowed up. And Japan would have
to leave behind her Ireland and
her India.
However, the problem can not
be put so narrowly. The war
would be waged not merely by
military means. The U. S. S. r.
would not be alone. China is
alive. She desires to fight for her
existence and is capable of doing
so. Any one who should ignore
this factor will break his head
against it.
ITO transport millions of SOL
Il diers by the Siberian rail-
way and to provide them with all
that is necessary for the conduct
OF war is no ordinary problem.
However, in view OF the indus
trial possibilities of the u. S. S. r..
now enormously increased, the
means of railway transport could,
in case of need, largely be aug
mented. Naturally, this would
demand time. But war of great
distances would inevitably be a
war of long duration.
"One might perhaps elaborate a
f1ve-year war plan and re-shape
the industrial five-year plan ac-
cording to its exigencies. Evil
IDENTIFY all this would deliver a ter
rible blow to the economy and the
culture of those participating in
the war.
But I base myself on the hypo-
thesis that no other issue exists
once war is inevitable, it must be
conducted seriously, utilizing every
force and every means.
The participation of the u. S.
S. r. in the war would open be-
fore the Chinese people new per-
spectives, and arouse in it a ma
tional movement on the grand
scale. To any one who under
stands the logic of circumstances
and the psychology of popular
masses, this admits of no doubt.