Evening star., 1932-05-08

not so much in any deliberate purpose
OF Hitler and his associates to set a
match to Europe, but in the difficulty
he must now face in view of his cam
paign pledges and of the hysterical
state OF mind Of many of his fol-
lowers
A transitional period of inflammatory
eloquence and provocative but not fatal
gestures, such as marked the first stage
OF the Mussolini episode In Italy, Is far
more likely to follow than actual con-
f1ict. Nevertheless it is esentiaI to re-
member that the misery which explains
the Hitler triumph does continue. that
vast numbers of the German people
are actually desperate and that the
state OF mind created in Frence by the
Hitler victory renders any real aid to
Germany from the outside unthinkable.
ThuS stated at its lowest terms. the
Hitler victory means long postpone
ment OF European recovery. German
economic conditions must get worse be-
cause the general European situation
and the state of those countries In
whose markets Germany must sell will
worsen. Perfectly equipped and organ
lied to dominate world trade, German
conditions must remain hopeless while
world trade continues to sink toward
VAAC fnlAoAAAlB pOlIlt. OlALy-CLIee MIL
lions OF Germans crowded into a small
country and actually into insignificant
areas can support themselves only as
they can export their manufactures,
and on every hand this is made difficult
by mounting tariff walls.
The strain upon German finances TO
support between six and seven millions
OF unemployed has been terrific and is
cumulative. The first consequence was
the collapse of reparations payments
and the moratorium in private interna-
tlonal debts. The eventual consequences
must be the removal of all possibility
OF future payments by Germany on
account of her vast borrowings abroad.
And alike in Geneva and Paris, the
settled judgment of most of the in
formed observers encountered was
that what was ahead in Germany was
new collapse, quite as complete as
that which attended the occupation of
the Ruhr and the imitation crisis. And
there was the accompanying belief that
the crash, which had been skillfully
postponed pending the elections, would
follow fast upon them.
In considering the German situation
1t is essential to perceive that the Re-
publican group have had their chance
and failed. After 13 years the failure
Is decisive and all Republican parties
save the Center. which is primarily re-
lgious, have entered upon a swift de-
cline. Now the power Is to pass with
out too much delay to the revolutionary
and reactionary groups, represented by
the National Socialists and the old
Nationalists. But despite all outward
basic unity. In fact. the Hitler party
| IS mob, not an army, united only by
common passions, not agreed upon any
political or economic principles.
French Policy to Harden.
Coming to power now, it is almost
impossible to see how the revolutionary
reactionary group can be any more
successful than the Republican-Socia
ist, which preceded it. The facts are
the same. The economic depression
continues. The policy of France and
her allies will harden, not change.
Neither Great Britain nor the United
States can or will, in their present
circumstances, give Germany further
financial aid nor are they in posi-
tion to obtain political concessions from
France.
Thus. in the end, one comes face
to face with what is perhaps the grav-
est peril before Germany and the rest
OF Europe. War there may be. AS I
have said, it is extremely unlikely.
But behind the German Republican
and the German revolutionary is the
German Communist. The weakness
and paciflsm of Moscow today imposes
upon Communist Germans the waiting
game. But if revolutionary Germany
fails as republican Germany has
failed, then the single remaining re-
iS rod. and De
version that German Communism-and
Russians counting. Escape, if it
comes at all, must come through rel
atively early ending of the economic
depression. 1t was long step for Ger
mans to take from Stresemann to
Hitler. but it is far shorter step from
Hitler to still undiscovered red die
tator.
1t is this hesitation in the face of
obvious perils which has been one CT the
most striking details in Hitler policy
little compromise and the Nazis would
have been in the government long ago.
slight concession now and combi-
nation with the Center would give them
almost complete power. But the safer
game has been to refuse compromise
and continue the struggle for absolute
power, thus escaping all responsibility.
Hitler may play this game in Prussia
once more for a brief time. But the
time can only be brief. for the pace of
his movement is too fast even fer its
leader to restrain
But when power comes, even if it is
welded with the relative moderation of
Mussolini-that Is, in the foreign field
and conflict thus avoided, how can Hit
Ter and his mob survive failure, which
remains inevitable as long as world de-
pression remains? Moreover, it must be
remembered that the Bruening regime
has in the end imposed the last con-
ceivable burden upon the German people
to meet the situation, but even this
draconic taxation has not arrested the
slow decline of revenues and the ap-
proach Of bankruptcy. It has not even
checked the flight of German capital
from the Reich
Therefore, as practical question,
what can Hitler do to relieve the Ger
man people that Bruening has not
already attempted? And how can he
hope to survive If all his rash and bril-
liant promises end in new disappoint-
ments? The question Is all there.
Copyright by Mcclure Newspaper Syndicate J