Evening star., 1932-06-19


will be the anniversary Of the
Hoover moratorium. The fact
i that it will also see the Lausanne
Conference in session serves to
give additional incentive to a brief
backward glance. 1t IS clear now that
the moratorium itself failed OF its
larger purpose, which was not only to
arrest immediate German bankruptcy
but also to provide psychological i'm
pulse toward general recovery. Instead
mere and more it seems to have been
what the French Ambassador described
it to be at the time, namely "a pause
between crisis and catastrophe"
What M. Claudel obviously meant a
year ago was that events had already
gone too far to permit any reversal of
direction before certain things had
happened. And he must have had IN
mind the state of feeling prevailing
alike in his own country and in Ger
many, which he knows unusually well
for a Frenchman. 1t is clear now that
the underlying cause, of the failure OF
the Hoover moratorium was that, fol-
lowing the death of Stresemann. his
successor, Bruening, under the pressure
of the rising force of the Hitler Ma
tional Socialists, felt impelled to adopt
a new attitude in foreign relations.
Policy of Moderation.
The Stresemann policy had been one
of moderation. To obtain the evacua-
tion of German soil he had agreed to
Locarno, which was the permanent re-
and at least Temporary postponement
of all efforts to recover the Polish Cor
ridor or realize union with Germany.
Bruening, when he took over the real
guidance of foreign affairs, had before
hlm a similar unique objective, which
was to end the reparationS payments; !;
| in a word, to remove the financial bur-
den upon Germany, as StreSemann had
the political.
But from the very moment he took
over. Bruening's task was complicated
by the rapid worsening of the economic
and financial circumstances OF Ger
many, which was the first great nation
| to feel the full weight Of the world
| depression. And as material condi-
tions deteriorated, political passions be-
came more acute. AS result Bruenlng
| felt obliged to make two far-going con-
cessions to the Nationalist elements.
! He adopted as his own their demand
| for territorial revision in the east,
| and by his Austro-German Tariff
Union seemed to be preparing the
Anschluss.
Both these decisions were made long
before the Hoover moratorium, but each
in turn was responsible in measure
for the financial situation In Germany
! in the critical days of June. They also
explained why the French refused to
follow the Presidents lead in the sal
vaging of German finance. They fur
ther explained why France attached
political conditions to any financial aid
on her part to Germany. And the Ger
man state of mind quite as clearly
prohibited any political concessions.
Hoped for Political Agreement.
| When M. Laval came to Washington
last Autumn one of the major concerns
in the minds of Mr.. Hoover and Mr..
| Stimson was to indicate to the French
| premier the American hope that he
would seek a political agreement with
Germany, which would permit, long
before the moratorium year expired, a
material improvement In the political
atmosphere of Europe. The United
States Government in effect promised
to stand aside and leave it to France
to initiate discussions first with Ger