Evening star., 1932-08-28
RUSSIA WATCHING
AMERICAN POLITICS
SOvietS Hope for Recognition
if Roosevelt Should De-
feat Hoover.
BY WILLIAM H. sToNEMAN.

BY cable 10 Ihe star.
MOSCOW. August 27-Faced for the
first time since the revolution by what
appears to BE- real possibility of recog-
milton by the United States the Soviets
are following reports of the American
presidential campaign with the deepest
interest.
If Gov. Franklin D. Roosevelt of New
York wins. it is generally felt here that
either outright diplomatic recognition
or at least some real betterment in the
relations OF the two countries will be
direct result Reelection of President
Hoover. on the other hand. would not
promise much in that direction, it is
thought. Gov Roosevelt, while unwill-
ing to pronounce himself openly at least
has shown interest in the question, 1t Is
said ..,,.-
The coolnesS approaching hostility
displayed toward the Soviet delegates
at the Disarmament Conference in Ge-
neva by Ambassador Hugh S. Gibson,
American delegate, did not appear to
srbstantiate reports that President Hoo
yer was retiring from his attitude OF
firm opposition to the opening OF dip
lonatic relations In other words, Gov.
Roosevelt gives cause for hope. II notn-
ing more: President Hoover does not.
While the Soviets naturally cannot
and will not assume the position OF
humble supplicants. they do not try IN
anv wav to conceal their firm hope that
recognition NAV come in the near fG-
ture. Full recognition, they seem u
feel, is the sine qua non of any renewal
of commercial relations on major scale.
Their need for American machinery
and other products is great. they are
quick to admit but while they Woulo
prefer to do business with the united
States. they intimate that they can al
wavs 90 elsewhere to do their shopping
as they have to a large extent DUR
ing the past year-if the American
Government continues to treat them as
outcasts.
It has become increasingly evident In
the last year or two that credits such
as the Soviet needs in order to make
its purchases cannot be arranged with
out the moral support Of governments
in the various countries from which
purchases are made.
Just what might be expected to fol-
low recognition in the way OF credit
organization is a matter of conjecture,
but it undoubtedly would have to take
one of two forms: Either an export
credit corporation which would guar
antee credits to the Soviet made by
private firms. or, what would be simpler
and probably less satisfactory, the
granting of a large loan to the Soviet
government to finance its purchases In
the United States.
In most European countries which
sell to the SovietS on a large scale,
government financed export credit in
Stitutions guarantee between so and 80
per cent of the credits extended to the
Soviets by private interests, allowing
the ready discount of all bills by those
firms If it were question of loan,
the figure would probably have to ap-
proach S500,000,000 in order to have
any lasting effect.
Far Eastern Problem.
While the temporary settlement Of
the chronic squabble between the So
viets and the japanese over the fishing
grounds in the Pacific has rather .amel-
iorated the relations between the two
governments, the Far Eastern problem
is still a cause for major concern in
Moscow Here, perhaps, the Soviets
have the best argument of all in behalf
of working arrangement between the
United States and themselves. The jap
anese have convinced the world that
that the dicta of Geneva cannot hinder
their aggressive plans in Manchuria.
Working separately, Soviet Russia
and the United States, which have to
a large extent parallel interests in the
Far East. have been unable to restrain
the japanese. Were the American and
Soviet Governments to show the world
that they were no longr at odds, 1t is
felt here, the Japanese would be forced
to refrain from aggression in Manchu-
ria and the ever-present danger of
major coniagration in the Far East
would be dispelled.
IN stressing the futility of the present
situation, the Communists point again
to the hostility Of Gibson at Geneva and
to the fact that it in no way was di-
minished by the stanch support given
by Maxim M. Litvinov, Soviet foreign
commiSsar, to President HooverS dis
armament plan.
Little or nothing is being said or may
be said regarding the greatest point of
difference which has stood in the way
of American recognition of the Soviet
government since the revolution, namely,
the activities of the Third Interna-
tionale. The Soviet government has
always maintained and still maintains
that it has no official connection with
the "Comintern" and thus 1t Is quite
impossible at this time for it to &C.
knowledge its power to squelch the ac-
tivities of that organization in the
United States.
Will Demand Guaranty.
Before granting official recognition,
on the other hand, the United States Is
almost sure to demand some guaranty
that revolutionary activities in the
United States will not secure financial
support from Moscow.
This stumbling block may have been
overcome to some extent by change
IN conditions since the revolution.
Soviet Russia unquestionably is so occu-
pied in building up Socialism" back
home that emphasis on world revo-
luton is not as great as before. This
does not mean that the Communist
Internationale is less arduous, but for
practical purposes it means that Com
munist activities in the United States
might be slackened rather than In
creased following recognition.
1t is highly significant that Commun-
ist activities in the United States dur
ing the worst period of the crisis have
been limited largely to sporadic out
bursts such as those made in the veter-
ans march on Washington and the
fight at the Ford plant That the
Third Internationale is soft-pedallng IN
the United States at present may De
taken to mean that the friendship OF
the American people to the Soviet gov
ornment is the prime consideration OF
the Communist party.
(Copyright. 1922