Evening star., 1932-01-17
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

n Lamotte, an American woman
"A interested in the suppression OF
1 \ international narcotic traffic,
returning from 8 long stay in
Geneva, reported that the Europeans
whom she had encountered in the
Swiss city were with few exceptions
totally skeptical as to any possible
achievement in the Forthcoming Dis
armament Conference. For Europe,
Miss Lamotte declared, the new meet
ing was "just another conference"
The state of mind, which has pre-
vailed in Europe for at least year,
has its origin, of course, in the recog-
milton of the fact, which has still to
find general acceptance on our side OF
the Atlantic, that since the armistice
there have been only two kinds of in
ternational conferences-thoSe to deter
mine who won the war and those to
decide who should pay for it.
In the present instance, too while
the Geneva Conference will deal with
the problem of who won the war, the
sessions In the nearby city Of Lausanne
will be occupied with the question of
who Is to pay. And, Of course, since
the two problems are indissolubly linked,
the two conferences will be similarly
related, and since the question of money
Is more Immediately pertinent, Lau-
same will be more important than
Geneva in all European eyes.
Nominally. the Geneva Conference
will be for the purpose OF bringing about
some reduction in the military estab-
lishments and, therefore, expenditures
of the European countries. 1t has,
therefore, already been widely heralded
in this country, alike by administration
and pacifist spokesmen, as vitality i'm
portant because of the service which 1t
may and even must render both to the
cause of international peace and to
prosperity.
Europe Sees French Power Issue.
In Europe, on the other hand, it is
plainly perceived that the chief issue
at Geneva is going to be whether
France and her allies will retain their
present military predominance in Eu-
rope or can exchange this for some
| form of security agreement made by
| Britain and the United States which
| will guarantee that American and
British divisions will replace French
and Polish as physical bulwarks Of the
existing frontiers and treaty law.
| And, of course, this has been the un-
varying issue ever since the Paris
Peace Conference itself France ana
her allies have today the necessary
W lldhAIdAIl SGdbuo
quo. France, too, although suffering
from the general world depression, has
still adequate funds to assure the main
tenance of her present military estab-
| lishment and support her allies in the
maintenance Of theirs.
DR.. Woolley and her associates are
going to Geneva to persuade the
French government and the French
people that they can safely reduce their
armies, that If they reduce their armies
| they will run no risk from the Ger
mans, Italians or Hungarians, who con-
tinue to demand territorial revision as
a major detail in their respective for
! eign policies.
But If the French Poles and Czechs
should agree to reduce their armies
without obtaining any guarantee from
the United States, that in case of Ger
man or other aggreSsions, American
troops would come to their assistance,
it is plain that they would run a risk
which in their own minds has been
dominating detail in all the postwar
year history.
Now the problem Of Geneva in so far
as the United States is concerned is
simple in the extreme. 1t is purely and
simply a problem of what the United
States delegates are going to say to the
statesmen of Europe representing the
present dominant powers which will
convince them that they can safely re-
duce their armamentS in the face OF
the present state of mind in the ccun-
tries which, nominally at least, lost the
war.
The United States delegates could, in
theory, say to the French and their al
lies: Reduce your armies and Amer
lea, together with Britain, will guaran-
tee that If you are subsequently at
tackled, We will come at once and un-
hesitatingly to your assistance" That
is what the French demand, that has
been the irreducible minimum Of
French insistence ever since the close
of the World War. In point of fact
the French have been more tnsistent
upon the British assistance but the
British on their part have been resolved
not to give new guarantees in Europe
save as their responsibilities were
shared by us.
In practice, however, 1t Is clear that
the American delegates cannot bind
the United States to new foreign obli-
cations Congress would not accept
them; the Hoover administration, in the
present political season, would not per-
NIT it, Great Britain would not under
take the responsibility of the Polish
corridor or of the status quo in Central
obvious method of bringing about re-
duction or limitation of armaments Is
out Of the question.
Debt-Arm Accord Unlikely.
Nevertheless it would be possible for
the United States delegates to approach
the representatives of Germany, Italy
and Hungary and ask from them some
remuneration of their present purpose to
ask treaty revision and, in the case OF
Germany and Italy, of the resolution
to demand equality Of military or naval
strength with France. But the diff
Guilty here lies in the fact that neither
the German nor the italian govern
ment would be politically able to agree
to any such concessions.
Thus the practical situation arises
that, on the one hand, the United States
delegates cannot offer the French dl-
rect guarantees in return for arma-
ment reduction, nor can they, on the
other, offer the balancing assurance
incident to the remuneration by Ger
many and Italy of policies which ex-
plain the present strength OF the
armies of France and her allies.
Nor can the United States offer the
French and their opponents any reward
in the shape of debt reductions in re-
turn for military cuts, for Congress has
quite clearly indicated its determi-
, nation to oppose any further reduction
, of war debts, and America has signifi-
cantly absented itself from the confer
ence at Lausanne, where the financial