Evening star., 1932-10-16


Position of Germany.
Germany thus finds herself NJ the
moment with a whole people resolved
TO regain lost provinces and realize the
plan of union with Austria but with 4
powerful Polish army guarding the
eastern marshes and strong Czech
army barring the road to Vienna. At
| the same { ne It has to recognize the
fact that tn great French army stands
ready to move to the Rhine in case of
German action in the east or south.
| Thus the Russian episode is bould
| to intensity German demand for the
removal of the limitations placed upon
German military force by the peace
/ treaties. But. on the other hand, she
is now likely to encounter Soviet as
we'll as French, Polish and Little En-
tente opposition to any program OF re-
policy she has lost valuable ally in
the Arms Conference. In fact she is
| isolated save in so far as Italy may
stand with. her. But Italy. although
hostile to France has no desire to be-
come embrolled with Britain, and on
the question of German re-armament
| Britain stands with the French.
| All of which means that Germany is
at the present moment more completely
isolated than at any time since the oc-
cupation of the Ruhr That isolation is
also not only discoverable in the field of
politics, but of peoples. Thus the rise OF
the Junkers and militarsts to power in
the Reich has dissipated the sympathy
| of the Labor and Liberal British for
Germany without modifying the traol-
tionai distrust Of the Tories. In the
same fashion the. Radical Left now in
power in France. although sincerely
seeking reconciliation with Germany.
! finds its task made well nigh impossible
because it has to deal with German re-
actionaries
Russia, Italy Britain, even the Lett
in France would like to come to some
accord with Germany. But the SovietS
are faced by the fact that the Papen-
Schleicher crowd are the prosecuting
foes of their own Communist allies in
Germany. Italy has to reckon with the
detail that these same nationalists mean
to bring about Austro- German union,
which is menace to Italy. The British
see in German demand for equality in
! armament the threat of a new navy as
well as new army. AS for the French
Left. it has so far found all its endeavors
blocked by the word and deed Of the
German Nationalists now in power and
the Nazis seeking power.
French diplomacy in the past two years
has exploited German events with inf
mite skill. Actually the play has been
between France and Germany each seek
ing to isolate the other At Lausanne,
tha close association of Herriot and Mac
Donald was the outstanding circum-
i stance. In the matter of German equal
ity the recent note of London to Berlin
was a striking evidence of the persist
ence of this association. Now the Rus
sian affair hos daetrnvnd ctil1 onpthSr
German hope of support. Nor has Ber-
lin at any moment obtained that sup
port from Washington which it hoped
for.
Hope Against Isolation.
I'VE thought we could isolate France
and here We are alone again" has been
the burden of innumerable German press
comments in recent weeks. Both the
Republicans and the NaZis charge the
! present unfortunate state of German
! foreign relations to the ineptitude of the
! ton. A few weeks ago. before they fell,
the Republicans were charging the
| trouble to Hitler and his Nazis.
But, in fact. the situation goes much
/ deeper. The German demand for equal
ity in armamentS with France, that is
for the right to possess equal means of
| defense. is in itself beyond criticism.
The idea that Germany should continue
| to be restricted by a treaty dictated
after defeat is preposterous just as the
notion that such a treaty can be en-
| forced is absurd. But the difficulty is
that Germany not only asks parity In
armamentS but also demands revision
OF the peace treaties in their territorial
aspects. Such revision can only be az.
complished by force and the natiot4
whose present territories GermSry
claims naturally seek to use the peste
treaties to prevent the re-armament of
Germany as long as possible.
The fatal weakness of German porcy
lies in the fact that it is always .he
foot ball of domestic politics. Go~.n-
ments have to agitate for treatr re-
vision and the right to rearn. az the
same moment. AS a consequence:
Although recognition, of Gerrtsny's
right to parity in security would not
be difficult to obtain with the consent
OF the interested nations if there were
no issue OF treaty revision, it becom IS
impossible after Schleicher and Hitler
have indicated what Germany means
to do with the weapons she demands.
The Russian episode is the latest in
the long series of diplomatic disasters
which have overtaken GerInal. foreign
policy in recent years Tor the first
10 years after the close of tie war
German opinion was sharply divided
over the wisdom of the So-called e asst
ern orientation," which meant i'll SIM
pie terms an alliance between Red
Russia and Germany against the rest
of Europe. Stresemann renounced such
an exclusive policy. but until very re-
cent times German statesmen attempt
ed to keep both irons in the fire and
use the Russian card in Paris and Lon
DIM Qnd thu WnStprn rari in Mncp0ur
Reliance of Germany.
America, Britain, Russia-these have
been in turn Germanys reliance in re-
cent times. But the Hoover mola-
torium failed to break the French
financial mastery of the situation. The
recent note Of the British foreign Office
port in the matter of armaments.
Finally, the Russian agreement with
Poland bolts another door. Italy re-
mains, but Mussolini has Lo desire to
share German isolation. Meantime
German absence from the Arms Con-
ference and threat to quit the League
altogether awakens the resentment of
the small states of the Continent, for
whom the League is vital matter.
!. The present isolation of Germany is
however. bad thing not only for the
rSeicA. pu1 toi Iuiopc oo "eA. Eoi =,
cannot fail to intensity resentment and
encourage a policy of desperation
Nothing decisive can happen in the
way of European economic reconstruc-
ton until Germany emerges from hCI
present psychological condition. This
!. fact is equally clear in Paris. london
and Washington. In all three Aapitals
there is evident willingness to MAKE
concessions, but while Germany cor,
tinues to demand the physics-- -.
possible as the sole condition ~ u
operation she is condemned to 60 Win.
cut that possible which in otftHr dav.
and by more skillful ways Stresemaiir
won.
Meantime, as she has nothing rt
J offer those who might under other cir.
cumstances be her allies. Germany L
condemned to see Red Russia chang,
| i. l. L.