Evening star., 1932-11-20
BY WILLIAM HARD.

The surface Of the international
debts question has been copiouSly COW
cred. Eminent congressional statesmen
have declared themselves firmly against
cancellation, reduction, suspension or
postponement. Many OF them have
also declared themselves firmly against
any international negotiations involv-
ing the possibility OF any cancellation,
reduction, suspension, postponement or
other deviation from payment in full
on the nail. It becomes interesting to
compare these asseverations Of infiexi-
BILE purpose with former similar as
severations and their outcomes.
The history of the debts owed by
Germany to the allies and of the debts
owed by the allies to the United States
Government Is one long accumulation
Of high demands followed by low re-
ceipts. The hauteur with which the
high demands were voiced was ulti-
mately matched by the meekness with
which the low receipts were accepted
The narrative of this process Is the
best indication Of the final destiny
toward which the process is headed.
The allies in 1921 decided with all
pertinent solemnity that Germany
should pay $4,000, 100000 Thereafter
Germany made payments against that
with default and subjected to the oc-
cupation Of the Ruhr. 1t then again
made payments under the Dawes plan
and under the Young plan. 1t this
year. at Lausanne, agreed to make
payment in bonds hereafter to be
issued The Lausanne promise is be-
yond all doubt the last promise and
the last possible performance that Ger
many will ever make under the head
Of reparations.
What is the total Of all these per-
formances, past and prospective. by
Germany in the discharge Of It's debts
to the allies2 BY the calculations OF
the allies themselves 1t is not more
than six billion dollars!
Demands: Thirty-three billion. Re-
ceipts: Six billion. Transaction con-
cluded.
The United States Government knows
very we'll the true worth OF the So
called "gentlemen's agreement" among
the allies regarding the resumption OF
reparations payments. The gentle
mems agreement" is to the effect that
reparations are not settled unless the
debts Of the allies to the United States
are also brought to 9 revision and
settlement The United States Govern
ment knows perfectly that reparations
are already SetbIcQ hlld WILL hSNSA ~
resumed In any circumstances. The
reason simply Is that Germany will not
paw one additional reichsmark unless
conquered again by arms, and there Is
no candidate in the whole world Tor
again conquering Germany in that way
The debts of the allies TO the United
States may therefore be considered in
a category of their own, They. TOO,
however, have experienced precisely tne
same gradual curtailment, precisely the
same diminuendo, which has attended
the loud music Of the collection Of rep
arations.
our first effort to organize the col
lection of the debts was in 1919. our
Treasury then made detailed pro-
posal to the allies. The basic ideas In
the proposal were two in number. the
first was that interest should be paid
at s per cent The second was that the
total of the debts should be liquidated
by 1947.
The allies had already engaged them
selves. when they contracted the debts.
to pay 5 per cent. By 1919, however.
they baked at per cent. The ne
gotiations Of that moment collapsed.
A few years later the Congress es.
tablished o World War Foreign Dept
Commission to resume the negotiations
Hv this time we ourselves had receded
from our 8 per cent ambitions. Inc
Congress did not instruct the DEBT
Commission to demand 5 per cent. IL
did instruct 1t, nevertheless, to demand
Az per cent. In fact. 1t forbade 1t 10
accept less than Az per cent: II also
FORBADE it to extend the period OF debts
liuIidation beyond 1s47.
But what then did the commission
do? And what did the Congress ratifyy
In ell the principal debt funomgs
accomplished by the commission ana
accepted by the Congress the perloo
for the complete extinguishment OF the
dettx were pushed forward from 1947
IN 1897. An additional extension OF
40 years! A protraction OF leniency
into A generation for which the great
war Will be antiquity and for which
the collection of the consequences OF
the great war will be task Tor mu-
seums rather than for treasures! Tne
yery extension OF the payments period
to 1887 was in itself a surrender-in
practical efect-of considerable num-
Der of payments; because 1t Is incon-
ceivable that debtors who already deny
the moral validity OF their obligations
will produce grandchildren who Will
And then the interest fixed on the
principal sums Of the debtsl We had
demanded per cent. and We had de-
manded ~ per cent. What did we
get7
4 $40 per cent, On the one with Bel
GUM we got ! $40 per cent. On the
one with France we got / 6-10 per
cent. on the one with Yugoslavia We
got ! per cent. On the one with Italy
we got 4-1o OF per cent. On the one
with Greece we got $40 Of per cent.
It is these reductions Of interest
which lie at the base Of all calculations
regarding the degree Of cancellation
already accomplished in the course OF
our efforts to reimburse ourselves for