Evening star., 1932-03-13
CONSTITUTION TRIUMPHS
In COSTA RICAN REVOLT
Crushing of Uprising Emphasizes Per-
sonal Ambitions no Longer Have
Place i'm Political Structure.

one OF personal S1gnlncance- The QueS-
ton was not who would be the next
ruler Of Costa Rica. It was a struggle
between the reign Of the constitution
and chaos; between the traditions Of
order, legality and democratic develop
ment of Costa Rica and the rule s4
force and personal ambition which had
been thought buried forever. The ques-
tion was whether bullets would take up
the role of ballots in the most politically
advanced of the Central American
states.
1t is because of this conflict of princi-
pies that the news of the failure of the
revolution was welcomed with such
widespread rejoicing in Washington and
| in the Latin American capitals. The
overwhelming way in which the Costa
Rican people reacted against the upris-
ing and rallied to the defense of the
constitutional government clearly DEM
onstrated that political movements for
purely personalistic, selfish purposes can
no longer command support in that
part Of the world,
Public Opinion Rallies.
1t was precisely this rcsolute back
ing of public opinion and the prompt
ness with which all the influential ele-
ments rallied to the support of the
constitution that made the early re-
storation of peace possible After three
days of a more or less Dfoodless siege
of the rebels in their stronghold-the
Bella Vista Barracks-and occasional
street fighting in the capital, the lead
ers of the movement surrendered to the
authorities. They did SO, however only
| after they were certain that their
efforts had failed to arouse the SYM
pathies of the civil population, indis-
nenSable to their plans
Another evidence of political progress
| and moderation may be found In the
generous way in which the rebel leaders
were treated by the government after
| their surrender. President Gonzales
Viquez not only guaranteed their free
dom and safety, but he also pledged
| the government not TO initiate legal
action against the rebels. Furthermore,
| he promised those of the insurgents
who had government jobs that they
would be kept in them and also per-
mitted civilians and foreigners impli-
Gated in the movement to leave safely
the Buena Vista Barracks.
The peace pact signed with the revo-
lutionists provides that Senor Castro
Quesada and his friends will be al
| lowed to remain in the Buena Vista
Barracks as long as they deem it con-
venient. No punishment, no jail, not
even exile for the enemies of public
order" general amnesty is already
mentioned in the pact. This generous
policy on the part of the President evi-
IDENTIFY marks a drastic departure from
the firing squad Of former days.
Political Methods Change.
Whoever remembers the excesses Of
personal hatred and revenge, the over
flow of human passions which Latin
A. ofvril to criTT fx~au -
in days gone by, will have no difficulty
in admitting that the methods OF
domestic politics have changed for the
better in the Southern nations.
President Gonzales ViqueZ, whose
| term ends on May 8, is now confronted
with the question of whether he should
order q run-of election between the
| two candidates who received the largest
number of votes on February IA, as the
constitution of Costa Rica provides, or
call for entirely new elections, as the
| opposition desires, or, finally, have Con-
| gress confirm the election Of Don Ri
| cardo JimeneZ the candidate who re-
ceived the greatest number Of votes in
the recent elections.
This latter course is probably the one
that will be followed. Don Ricardo
lacked only about 1000 votes to have
the absolute majority he needed to be
| eleCJeQ IN IISL pun. Lie III al
Consejo National" where all the votes
90 for final computation, may annul
the returns of districts where pressure
on the part of the followers of Castro
Quesada was evident, and thus give Don
Ricardo the needed legal majority to
become the elected chief executive Of
Costa Rica.
In case this is not done, and a run
of election should take place, it is, Of
, course, obvious that the majority Of
D. Ricardo Jimenez would be over
that he has lost all chance Of victory
because of the unpopularity of his revo-
lutionary movement, refuses to take
part in such a contest.
Two Certain Results.
At any rate, however this problem
of procedure may be settled, two things
appear certain as the smoke Of the ill
advised revolutionary attempt Of the de-
feated candidate fades away: One, that
the old statesman, D. Ricardo Jimenez,
twice President of the country, former
chief justice, four times a member Of
Congress and with record of almost
so years of public service, will be in
augurated next May as the Chief
executive of Costa Rica.
And second, that the people of Costa
Rica are really through with the old
fashioned provincial coup d'etat for
personal purposes, which used to be
characteristic of tropical Latin Amer
lean republics
This latter fact, together with num-
Der of other incidents in Central Amer
lean politics, to which I have referred
in previous articles, indicates, as I have
said before, that these countries are
actually nearing their political maturity
Perhaps such unfortunate occurrences
as the Castro upheaval, the Salvadorian
efforts to nullify the 1928 treaty in the
matter of recognition, or the present
Nicaraguan endeavors to play with the
Constitution in order to perpetuate the
power Of President Moncada after his
term is over, should be welcomed from
time to time
They serve to test the progress of
democratic institutions in that part of
the world and to see how far the Cen
trail American peoples have gotten from
their past experiences of meaningless,
selfish petty politics.
Ioa0N