Evening star., 1932-04-02

kC.y
1t proposes to begin by creating an
economic bloc on the Danube, followed
by better German Polish relations to
stabalize Eastern Europe and better
Franco-Italian relations to stabalize the
Mediterranean region. For all this ID
badly wants Great Britain's sympathy
and support.
But what does Great Britain wanta
Great Britain now, as for over two
centuries past, desires to hold the bal
ance OF power as between the various
continental States It's own prestige and
safety, British opinion holds, depends
on the maintenance of this doctrine.
which to the British appears to be al
most as vital as does the Monroe Doc
trine to the United States.
In practice this means that Great
Britain should carefully keep the scales
even as between France and Germany
IN Northern and Central Europe and as
between France and Italy ON the Medi-
terranean, throwing its weight rather
TO the weaker than the stronger side
ana this without question of right or
wrong, but simply as matter Of expe-
diency.
French Aims Opposed.
Thus, since the World War. British
opinion has tended steadily to sllnnort
Germany and Italy as against France,
because, from the British Viewpoint.
France, owing partly to its own new
position and partly to its alliances,
had become too strong" Georges
Clemenceau. visiting London a few
years ago, said to David Lloyd George,
Il think you have been an enemy of
my country ever since the armistice,"
To which Lloyd George, according to
Clemenceau, replied: 'Well, you know
our history"
Great Britain, accordingly, would
like to see the French system Of al
liances dissolved and would be re-
luctant to participate In any plan
which seemed to tend to perpetuate
the domination Of France and It's allies
on the Continent.
Finally. what do Germany and
Italy want?
They, along with Hungary, Austria
and Bulgaria, want the territorial dis
positions of the peace treaties revised,
naturally in their own favor and to
the detriment of France and its allies.
They are not agreed on details Of this
revision, but they are agreed in their
desire to keep the present European sys-
TEN from consolidating until after they
rearrange it to suit themselves Like
port they are courting on their side
as ardently as France Is on its side,
they are reluctant to see the status quo
consolidated. whether along the Dan
ube or anywhere else.
Grave Plight Pressing.
There is one problem, however. which
will not wait, and that is the financial
plight of Hungary and Austria. Thus
while France wants to utilize the pres
ent moment to effect first Danube sta
bilization and then Eastern European
and Mediterranean stabilizations on
the present territorial bases, the revis-
ionist countries want merely TO deal
with emergency aid to Hungary and
Austria and leave the other problems
until later. Great Britain tends to
share this latter view.
However, the only country which can
effectively aid Hungary and Austria for
the moment seems to be France, and
France threatens to withhold this aid
unless 1t Is accompanied by some sort
of permanent stability.
Great Britain, therefore, intends TO
take care not to force the French hand
into open opposition. which might re-
suit disastrously for Hungary and Aus
tria and even the others In Central
Europe, but on the contrary, to go easy.
speak soothingly to France and try TO
effect a sort of minimum compromise.
Hungary and Austria, themselves
caught between their prediction for
territorial revision and their urgent
need for money. tend to support this
British strategy.
Germany is strongly opposed to the
French plans on the Danube, as every
where else, but may prefer for the pres
ent somewhat to ven this opposition.
AS for Italy, there are signs that IL
might be willing to come to terms with
France, but only If France makes con-
siderable colonial and naval concessions
to Italy.
This, as nearly as can now be de-
scribed, seems to be the inner reality
Of the forthcoming London laegotiations.
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