Evening star., 1932-05-22
ANOTHER CHAPTER CLOSES
in DISARMAMENT EFFORT
Even Most Optimistic Proponents Dis
miss Idea of Practical Achieve
ment at Geneva.

set out TO save Germany and the rest
OF the world from the consequences of
an impending German collapse. He
proposed TO waive an American cole
lection Of 100000 on account Of
allied debts in return for a renuncia-
ton by the allied creditors of Germany
on account Of reparations of above
$400, 100000. But he took no account
OF the special legal rights or the politi-
cal and material interests of France.
The result was q long deadlock, a
partial defeat of the purpose Of the
President by the destruction of the
psychological effects of the moratorium,
and the beginning Of a new period Of
Franco-American recrimination, which
continues on both sides Of the Atlantic
to the present moment.
When Mr.. Gibson, the other day, sud-
denly proposed an American program
for the disarmament conference, he
flung himself and his Government into
square collision with French policy and
the French program. The result was
the virtual collapse of the Geneva con-
ference, for 1t precipitated a deadlock
which cannot now be broken. And the
consequences Of this clash spilled over
into the field of other negotiations and
contributed nightly to reducing Mr..
Stimson's Geneva harvest to an extern
sion Of knowledge through contact.
French People Blame United States.
All Americans know how they feel
about this never-ending clash of French
and American conceptions and policies.
But not one In a hundred thousand
knows how the French feel about the
same question. Yet the mass of the
French people are satisfied that either
by deliberate purpose or because of
1nexplicable blindness the United States
Is and has been ever since the war
engaged in campaign to deprive
France and her allies of the fruits of
victory, rob them of their means of
defending themselves against a new
attack Finally, France thinks that the
United States, while insisting upon
French payment Of the debt to America,
Is steadily endeavoring to abolish Ger
man payments on account of repara-
ttons, thus leaving France to pay the
American debt and the reconstruction
costs In the devastated areas out Of
her own pocket.
One section of French public opinion
d1strusts our motives, the other our
mentality, but all diStrust us. There
fore, what conceivable possibility exists
for American delegates to persuade the
French to adopt their views Of disarm-
ament or the American Government to
enlist french approval for any Of its
Limitation or reduction programs? Even
If there were no distrust and suspicion
the tasb would be impossible But un-
dertaken under existing circumstances
1t merely arouSeS resentment and pro-
vokes recrimtnations
The United States cannot disarm
France by argument, by political COM
bination in conference with the oppo-
nents Of France, or by force, financial
or otherwise. Such means are, on the
whole, rather In French hands than In
our own. But without far-reaching
reduction Of the armies of France and
her allies nothing real can be done In
the way Of cutting the costs and dan
gers Of armaments at present-day levels.
Can Block Attempts.
On the other hand, we can block and
have blocked all French attempts to
obtain a guarantee Of the status quo in
the world. Of their own security and
that Of their allies by international con-
tract. We blocked it first when the Sen
ate rejected the treaty of Versailles and
refused to ratify the treaty of guar
antee. We blocked it again by refus-
ing at all times to implement the Kel-
logg pact by physical commitment. We
blocked 1t at London when we declined
to go even to the length of a consulta-
tive pact. Finally in the still pending
Geneva conference we have never dis
guised our. rejection of any program of
international force to maintain peace,
which was the Tardieu formula.
Part OF the world agrees with us,
part with France. The nations stand
ing with us are more numerous than
those standing with France. But of
those, Germany, Italy and Russia-So
far as Russia inclines in our direction
ARE influenced not by moral, but by
political reasons, not by the desire to
sec arms limited. but by the wish to
acquire parity with France and her
allies. But such support of our pro-
gram only hardens the opposition Of
France and her allies
The result Is deadlock. The dead
lock has endured for a dozen years.
Both the French and ourselves have
hardened in our positions and intensi-
fed in our resentments The Geneva
conference has merely supplied a fresh
version for an old story. But why does
1t require new conferences to prove
what the old have established, as long
as both peoples remain uncompro-
missing?
(Copyright, 1927