Evening star., 1932-03-27
Continued From ThiEd Page.)

audacity is the third way the cable was
sent. 1t was presented in code to the
American Ambassador in Berlin, who
telegraphed it to Copenhagen, thence
it went to London. thence to the State
Department in Washington and there
was delivered by the State Department
to Count Won Bernstorff. AS one author
ity has stated, 1t was by this means
that the German foreign Office used
the American Government as an errand
boy for the transmission of document
that contained plot against its own
territorial integrity"
President Wilson, in his anxiety to
promote peace between the belligerentS,
had allowed the German government
war to use the diplomatic facilities of
the United States Government in trans
mitting messages to Bernstorf. The
authority quoted above says further
that at this time President Wilson
was practically his own Secretary of
State, and these German messages were
sent on his explicit orders. There are
reasons to believe that the State De-
partment itself disapproved the whole
transaction"
Our embassy at Berlin apparently
transmitted the message on the as
sumption that it pertained to the
peace efforts" which were SO close to
the heart of Mr. Wilson. In some re-
Spects this cablegram was step to-
ward peace. but, ironically enough, a
peace by victory for Germany by means
Of unrestricted submarine warfare and
proposed alliance between Germany,
Mexico and Japan against the United
States.
British on Alert.
While experience may have justified
the German governments counting on
the safety of this communication be-
cause of the Innocence" of the Ameri-
can Government, they certainly made
a fatal mistake in overlooking the fact
that practically all such messages went
via England, where they were inter-
cepted by the efficient British intelli-
gence service, and, Furthermore, in as
suming that the British authorities did
not have means for deciphering such
codes when the messages were inter-
cepted.
The main problem in the German
mind seemed to be to get the message
to the German Ambassador In Wash
ington. Apparently they had no fears
as to its transmittal from Washington
to Mexico. AS a matter of fact, when
Bernstorf received the message he sent
it openly from a cable Office in Wash
ington to Mexico. When the British
government had deciphered the cable
gram and brought 1t to the attention of
Mr.. Page, our Ambassador to London,
Mr. Page suggested TO our Government
that it probably could obtain a copy OF
the text relayed by EernStorff from the
hi d., hi
ington authorities found this to be so.
and thus obtained copy, which was
deciphered with the help of the British
authorities.
For a large part of the American
public who apparently feel that, unlike
other nations we should rightfully be
free from fear of foreign aggression,
this comparatively recent episode should
give food for thought.
Another CabIegram.
This cablegram was followed by an
other one of February 5, 1917, from
Zimmerman to the German minister
in Mexico which reads as follows:
Telegram No. II.
I'm connection with telegram No. I
Strictly confidential
ITO be personally deciphered.
BERLIN, February S, 1917
provided that there is no risk of the
secret being betrayed to the United
States, will your Excellency take up the
alliance question even now with the
President. At the same time the def
mite conclusion Of the alliance depends
upon the outbreak of the war between
Germany and the United States. The
President might even now throw out
feelers to Japan.
"If the President were to reject our
PROPOSE through fear of later American
vengeance, you are empowered to offer
a defensive alliance after peace is con-
cluded, provided that Mexico succeeds
in including Japan in the alliance.
Wire confirmation of receipt.
"ZINIMERMANN."
Subsequent intercepted messages in
dicated that Germany made several fur
ther attempts to carry out the plan and
was arranging for the shipment of arms
and munitions to Mexico. The German
dispatches indicated that President Car
rama of Mexico was by no means un-
friendly to the proposition of the
alliance.
If the plan had succeeded, 1t would
have meant not only that the United
States would have been deprived of a
very large expanse of valuable territory
but that the alliance was Of such a
permanent character that the United
States might be faced for an indefinite
period on its southern border by Ger