Evening star., 1932-09-11

A
wv tion to general European CO.
operation-and at the mo-
ment that seems slight-it is
beyond question that 1t marked de-
cisive point in Anglo-French relations.
If it would perhaps be an exaggeration
to say that the entente of the pre-war
period has been restored it is at least
true that the relations between Mac
Donald and Hewiot recall those be-
tween BRAND and Chamberlain in the
days when Locarno was still force in
European affairs.
For this association of the statesmen
and policies Of the two countries there
are many reasons. On the personal side
Macdonald and Herriot have worked
together successfully before when Euro
pean conditions were almost as ominous
as today. They were responsible for the
making of the Dawes plan. 1t was their
joint appearance at Geneva in 1924
that was the point of departure for the
new era in the Leagues fortunes.
In point of fact, since he remains at
heart a Laborite. association with
Sationalist government or premier in
France would be hard for Macdonald.
Last Spring before the French e.ec-
ton Tardieu made every conceivable
attempt to restore the cordial relations
between London and Paris that had ex
listed from 1924 to 1929, that is through
out the period during which, in the
main, BRAND directed French foreign
policy Tardieu failed, and that failure
possibly contributed little to his sub
sequent defeat in the May elections.
France Drew to Britain.
For all France was last Winter and
Spring patiently eager to draw closely
to Britain. The reason for this desire
was obvious. The rapid expansion Of
the Hitler movement in Germany and
the growing threat of the program OF
the Nazis inevitably created appre-
hension in France. Precisely the same
influence that led Britain to the en-
tente cordiale before the war and in
face Of the German naval challenge,
now operated on the other side of the
Channel
At the same time it was quite obvi-
Gus that a profound change had taken
place in Britain. When Labor came to
power in 1929 it was with the declared
intention of abolishing the very close
intimacy between London and Paris
and substituting a policy based upon
equally close relations between London
on the one hand and Paris and Berlin
on the other " At the moment the
Tories were reproached for having dis
played too great readiness to follow
French leading.
Inevitably this course produced a
swift change in French sentiment, and
in no long time relations between Paris
nd London became exceedingly bad.
.Iha British Labor government saw
TsS7oh policy toward Germany as un-
tust and destructive. The French saw
the British support Of German projects
q menace to their own security. Politi-
cal disagreement was followed by flnan-
cial, and British and French statesmen
and financiers were presently opposing
each other all over the continent.
The result was disastrous, for Ger
many first and for Britain next, with
out proving in the smallest degree
profitable for France. The quarrel be-
tween the Bank of England and the
Bank of France in the matter OF the
Kredit Anstallt last year was one Of
the precipitating causes of the whole
German and British debacle, which cul-
minated when the British were forced
to abandon the gold standard. But
worldwide depression in due course
produced economic prostration in
France.
In fact, the past three years have
once more disclosed the truth, made
clear once before, during the long duel
between Lloyd George and Poincare,
which eliminated in the French oc-
cupation of the Ruhr. Actually all
progress toward peace and order In
Europe is conditioned upon close
glo-French cooperation. Conversely
when these two nations are at odds
their quarrels constitute disaster for
all countries. beginning with Germany
T3,yf- oh draw
for neither country is strong enough
to impose its policy upon the other.
Both Status Quo Powers.
At bottom, too, British and French
purposes have vast deal OF common
ground Both are status quo powers
in their own view. Neither desires to
annex territory now belonging to any
other nation. Both, too, are equally
eager to avert another war, which must
prove costly for both and could bring
no profit to either. Moreover, on the
Rhine the British have already under
taken to maintain the status Of the
peace treaties by the accord Of Locarnc
and thus to cover French security.
In the Mediterranean, although nc
specific agreement has been made. both
countries are equally interested IN
avoiding any disturbance of the exist
ing order Italian ambitions in the
direction Of Malta disturb The British
as much as similar designs IN the case
of Corsica arouse the French. British
concern for Egypt parallels French fol
Turis. And the British have no wish
to see the Italians replace the French
in Tunis and thus control both sides
of the Mediterranean at its narrowest
point. Sooner or later, therefore, Bit
ain is almost certain to agree to q
Mediterranean Locarno, which, while
clearing the way for French consent
to permit Italian naval parity, will de-
priVe such Italian equality of any men.
ace for France or any real value fol
Italy.
The single real barrier between
France and Britain in the postwar
years has been the British disapprova
of French policy toward Germany
And. while the French stood fast t.
their reparations policy, calculated il
the British mind to bar the way It
German recovery, actual co-operat.ol
was difficult. But at Lausanne Her
riot, in response to MacDonald's ap
peals. went IS far as reasonable British
opinion could hope and much farthe
than the English public expected. Il