Evening star., 1932-08-28

Mexican border, where the revelations
in the Zimmerman case involving a
promise to Mexico of the States OF
| Texas, Arizona and New Mexico as
Mexico'S reward if 1t joined in war
| against the United States, made an
! alert border patrol imperative.
| Shipping Cavalry across the Atlantic
meant tearing out the insides of trans
/ ports and equipping them with stalls;
! it meant bulky shipping of hay, straw,
oats, grain, all at the expense OF the
| fighting men in France and their sup
plies. August 7. 1918, Gen. PerShing
cabled me a program of troop ship
ments he proposed for August and
| September, which included eight corps
Cavalry regiments.
Turned Pershing Request Down.
This request at the very peak Of our
drive to get infantrymen and Field
raging the entire length of the West
ern front, was peculiarly disquieting
| because he, obviously, could not use
them in the fighting. In fact, I knew
| that Great Britain and France had
each had for long time, in rear OF
the lines, large bodies of Cavalry in
reserve simply eating their heads of
and serving no useful purpose. 1 re-
! piled to Gen. Pershing. pointing out
why his request could not be met at
that time.
In consideration Of Gen Pershing's
! inSistence on being furnished Cavalry
for use on the Western front under the
adverse conditions I have cited, 1t
must be remembered that he was a
Cavalry captain before he became a
general officer and, naturally, would
! have a prediction for that arm.
Gen. PershingS custom was to ap-
point board of officers to consider and
determine for him the details concern
| ing any foreign implement of war he
was told was necessary for the a. Z. r.
! These boards were often living exem-
| plification of the old Army saying that
"a board is long, narrow and wooden!
Gen. Pershing himself knew nothing
about airplanes, so he approved and for-
warded the report of board Wnlcn
from time to time did not suggest few
changes in a standard type OF plane,
previously recommended by it and him,
for adoption and manufacture in the
United States, but literally hundreds
and hundreds of changes, including
complete changes in the plane itself in
favor Of some other model.
! ClteS NOtOr Dtldys
The wretched manufacturer at home
would have to discard all his work and
begin again on something else, only to
| find later that PerShing and company
had changed their collective mind again
in favor of the first recommendation.
And the country and Congress we're
blaming the War Department for all
| these delays.
Even the Liberty motor was DELAYED
and interfered with by Pershing. We
had just reached production of the g.
cylinder Liberty in July, 1917, when he
asked for a 12-cylinder, motor instead,
for the construction of which the manu-
facturers had to create and set up new
machines, only to find Pershing the fol-
| lowing May asking for the 8-cylinder
again. Every one in the world was beg
ging for Liberty motors, including our
own Navy Department, which wanted
1000 of them And never did we let
any one know why the delay!
We never knew from day to day where
we stood on airplaneS. AS soon as we got
going on one construction of a type
Gen. PerShing had stated was necessary,
cable would come from him saying he
did not want that type and asking for
something else. This would involve a
redeSign of the plan, changes in fac
tories and delay ali along the line.
Then, when his second type was ap-
preaching production, he would cable
that he did not want 1t. but wanted
the first type, and all our work had
been wasted. He did not seem to have
the faintest conception of the effect on
production Of all this vacillation.
Ryan Stopped Changes.
Change after change in the details of
planes were cabled by him until manu-
facturers simply threw up their hands,
and one of the greatest contributions
of John D. Ryan to the success of the
program of production was his taking
of the bull by the horns and telling the
manufacturers there would be no more
changes authorized. After that, for the
first time, the manufacturers knew
where they stood and could go ahead in
safety.
One Of the first and most important
pieces of general staff work undertaken
by Gen. Pershing in France was the
determination of the proper organiza-
ton for the larger American military
units Gen. Pershing and his assistants
prepared an organization Tor an Amerl-
can division as the basic military unit.
The experience of the war had prac-
tically crystallized the strength of a di-
vision OF troops. A French division, a
British division and German division
had each been fixed at approximately
10000 men as the maximum number
of combatant troops which could be
effectively handled by one general and
his staff. And Marshal Joffre, on his
visit to Washington after We entered the
war, recommended 10000 as the COM
batant strength of the American di-
vision.
Gen. Pershing and his own general
staff. however, fixed as the organization
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