Evening star., 1932-05-15
BY MARK SULLIVAN.

constitute The clue 10 large 1rHCLlOn
Of what will happen. This Is not to say
that Smith will have the determining
hand, but that he viii have a large
hand.
Just how far will Smith go? The
answer to that Is important. To express
it mere accurately, how far will he
threaten to go? To some extent 1t has
an aspect Of the game of poker. Politics
contains much Of that momentum of
one personality against the inertia of
another, which Is the essence of pcker.
If Smith, In his opposition to Roose-
velt. says, or by his actions implies to
convincing degree, that he would not
support Roosevelt in the campaign If
the latter should be nominated, that Is
one thing. The convention, the party
leaders, Roosevelt himself, would take
serious account Of that. But II Smith
confines himself to going merely as far
as any critic or opponent of any candi-
date may often go; If Smith stops short
Of an implied threat to bolt, that is
quite another thing. II Smith opposi-
ton to Roosevelt goes no farther than,
fer example, the opposition of several
dry Democratic leaders to him in the
strains himself to position in which
he could and would support Roosevelt
In the campaign, then Roosevelt need
not be completely terrified.
More Subtle Distinction.
Beneath this is a subtler distinction
yet, having to do with Smiths attitude.
That Smith should bolt" the nominal
ton Of Roosevelt In the sense in which
that word Is used In politics Is Just
about unthinkable. Smith Is a Demo-
crat. But might he be, in this case,
the kind of Democrat David B. Hill
once was? Hill, conservative Demo-
cratic leader Of New York State, was
of course dismayed by the nomination
Of william Jennings Bryan in 1895.
Hill. after the convention, was asked
what he would do, His reply. not meant
to be cryptic, was Il am a Democrat
stilf'-to which an impish editorial
writer added, very still" 1t turned
out to be so. Hill did not bolt the
Democratic ticket-but he did not
campaign in behalf Of it.
Assuming Smiths disapproval Of
Roosevelt's nomination would go that
far, how menacing would that be to
Roosevelt in the campaign? Would
Smiths stiffness be sign to his per-
sonal followers to be likewise inert as
respects going to the polls in November?
Or would Roosevelt and his friends be
justified in assuming that Smiths
silence (if he should be silent) would
be unnoticed In the hurly-burly Of q
campaign which would promptly thrust
forward its own personalities, issues
and excitements?
All these are speculations which must
consume just now q good deal Of the
thought Of Roosevelt and Smith and
their respective supporters And the
respective conclusions of the two con-
stitute a large part Of the answer to
the question, who will be the Demo-
cratic nominee?
Smiths Convention Role.
Smith will go to the convention as q
delegate, the most powerful one dele
gate-and not as q candidate. One Is
always conscious of a restraint Of
sportsmanship in saying, as to any man
in Smiths position, that he has no
chance of getting the nomination. As
there Is much poker in politics, SO is
there some sportsmanship. For a per-
son with any reputation for Judgment
to say that candidate has no chance
Of being nominated is In itself a handi-
cap to his nomination. (The writer Of
this article suffers pain from reproaches
by Joseph I. France Of Maryland for
saying, some weeks ago, that France
would not win the Republican nomina-
ton from Mr.. Hoover.) ...
But surely ex-Gov. Smith Is in q
position where 1t does no harm to him
to say that he cannot get the nomina-
ton and Is not a serious contender for
1t. Smith himself must know this.
What he wants in that convention Is
power, not office.
That 1t Is impossible to nominate
Smith Is about as surely predestined as
anything in politics can be- If the con-
vention had the Republican rule Of
nomination by majority, Smith might
imaginably be named as the result of
the swirl OF movements within the con-
vention. But not as the situation is
In the Democratic convention it takes
only third to veto nomination, and
against Smith there Is much more than
an implacable third.
1t Is automatic in this convention
that no man strongly repugnant to
Roosevelt and Roosevelt's delegates can
be nominated. Just how many dele
gates Roosevelt will have no one can
quite say. But 1t Is certain he will have
delegates of Roosevelt's, the ones that
are really tied to him by loyalty, will
go to the convention with one emo
tion, the wish to have Roosevelt win,
The instant Roosevelt's attempt be-
comes hopeless (if it does), that mo-
ment the emotion of Rooseyelt's dele
gates will become one of preventing
the success Of the one man most re-
sponsible for Roosevelt'S defeat. Smith
is that man.
Checkmated by Roosevelt.
The Roosevelt delegates alone will
be enough to deprive Smith of any
possible chance. If not, most of the
party leaders would oppose Smith.
Some Of his own best friends would
oppose him. The Democrats have been
through the commotion and grief of
one campaign behind Smith and will
not have another. Men like Senator
Joe Robinson Of Arkansas, who went
on the ticket with Smith as his vice
presidential candidate in 1928, would
now forcefully and solemnly oppose
Smith, as an act in the interest OF the
party.
Unfortunately the rule that prevents
the nomination Of Smith will work also
to prevent the nomination of any one
conspicuously favored by Smith. This
is pity. 1t may be that Smith will
bring forward, as his choice for an
alternative to Roosevelt, the very best
possible candidate. But II Smith brings
him forward early in the convention,
or before 1t, and If the Roosevelt dele
gates think of this one man as a funda-
mental agency in stopping Roosevelt
in that event Roosevelt's delegates win
never permit the nomination of their
enemy. The resentment of the Roose-
welt delegates against Smith will extend
to any one conspicuously close to Smith.
So it comes down to this: Smiths
role in the convention must be confined
to preventing the nomination of Roose-
welt. That far he may or may not be
able to go. It is an absolute certainty
he cannot nominate himself-and 1t can
be taken for granted he does not want
to or expect to. 1t is almost q certainty