Evening star., 1932-12-12
Japan's Naval Proposals.


Japan's Naval Proposals.
Japan has Just laid before the Dis
armament Conference at Geneva pro-
posal which seeks nothing more nor less
than the worlds approval of indis-
putable japanese naval supremacy In
the Western Pacific. The plan Is
couched In seductive terms of naval re-
duction for all powers and, as model
of diplomatic statecraft, does credit TO the
astuteness of its architects. But even the
altruistic lines upon which it appears
to be drawn cannot blind other coun-
tries, notably the United States and
Great Britain, to the fact that while
projecting diminution Of gross naval
tonnage for everybody, the scheme con-
templates substantial relative improve
ment in sea power for Japan alone.
Concretely what the Japanese put
forward is plan whereby the naval
ratios laid down at Washington in 1922
and confirmed, with slight modifica-
tions in Japan's favor. at London in
1880, shall be radically altered. At
present the 5-5-3 ratio prevails, as
among. respectively, the United States,
Great Britain and Japan. Toxic now
asks that 1t be amended so that the
Japanese ratio in battleships would be
8 as to II each for the Americans and
the British, while in hrst-class cruisers
Japan's quota would be as to go each
for the United States and Great
Britain. In round figures, combining
both battleship and cruiser proposals,
Japan would convert the SIS ratio
into a 10-1o-8.7 ratio. The number
of units would be on an Ills basis.
In addition, Toxic would reduce the
size Of battleships to $4,000 tons and
limit their armc ment to 14-inch guns.
It would decrease the tonnage of first
class cruisers to 5000. Japan would
allot the Americans and British each
275,000 tons In capital ships and her
self 200, 900 tons. In big-gln cruisers the
United States and Great Britain each
would have $4,000 tons and she 10000
tons. For the obvious purpose of win
ming the sympathy of those two coun-
tries for her enterprise, Japan assigns
France and italy full parity in both
battleships and cruisers, but in the con-
tinued ratio of inferiority to America,
Great Britain and Japan that the
French and Italians now occupy.
From the standpoint Of the United
States, 1t needs to be said without
equivocation that the japanese pro-
posal Is unacceptable and virtually un-
debatable. Any delegation at Geneva
that went the length Of approving it
could count with certainty on storm
of devastating opposition in both houses
Of Congress and in the country at large.
During disarmament discussions Of the
past year, Secretary Stimson dealt pub
licly with suggested upward revision Of
the 5]5-3 ratio in Japan's favor. He
pointed out that when the Washington
conference determined the margin Of
naval superiority which the Americans
and the British felt 1t imperative for
them to possess, Japanese assent to 1t
was obtained only on a pledge by the
two English-speaking powers not to
expand existing fortiications In their
Far Eastern possessions. In the case
Of the United States that self-denial
applies to Guam and the Philippines.
If there is to be any upset in Japan's
part In the 5-5-3 ratio arrangement,
there will have to be new deal about
fortifcations, which would nullify any
value attaching to such readjustment.
Japan's desire to reduce the size Of bat
tleships and first-class cruisers is no less
unpalatable to the United States. With a
great feet operating for their purposes
In what are practically exclusively home
waters-those which lap the shores Of
their own islands and the adjacent con-
tinent of Asia-the Japanese do not
need vessels Of wide cruising radius.
The United States, without naval sta
tons IN the far Pacific, except In Guam
and the Philippines, requires floating
fortresses" like 35,000-ton battleships and
10,000-ton cruisers. American naval
authorities are firm in this attitude.
Nor do they consider it to the advan-
tage of the United States to abolish
aircraft carriers and landing decks on
warships, which Japan also advocates.
Japan launches her naval program In
the spirit of seeking to emphasize the
defensive, rather than the offensive
quality of fleets. "Our principle" says
Admiral Nagano, chief naval delegate at
Geneva, "is to reduce the means OF at
tack while strengthening the means of
defense" But, as one American COM
mentator sagely says, Japan would,
should her scheme ever be adopted, "be
left safe and supreme In the East, able
to defend herself, and in position to
operate at short range against Asiatics. "