Evening star., 1932-02-14

stinctively that the Manchu1ian prov
inces had never constituted anything
but a more or less loose parcel Of the
Chinese Empire.
The psychological error of Mr.. Yo-
shizawa and Of his protectors and
friends reminds me Of an analogous
case which I was fortunate enough to
witness as a young man. The case was
at the root Of four years of European
war; that is why recall it.
Points TO Austria's Case.
Another diplomat. even as Mr.. Yo-
shizawa, was required to leave his en-
bassy in the capital Of a great Euro
pean power and called to the direction
of the foreign affairs of his country;
over the leadership Of Austro- Hun
garian foreign politics on leaving the
Petersburg embassy Aehrenthal left
Russia deeply convinced that, despite
its grandiose appearance, the Russian
Empire showed but an empty front,
and that he, Aehrenthal, was free to
dare anything-just as Mr.. Yoshizawa
may have felt toward diplomatic
Europe. A few months later came the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
to the Austrian monarchy. 1t was a
success. and it seemed as If Vienna had
come back to the days when Count
Kalnoky shared with Bismarck the
hegemony over Europe.
But. as an inevitable counter stroke
to this rash move by Austria, there
came. three years later, the Italo-
Turkish war. followed by the two Bal
kan wars-the whole thing being SIM
ply the consequences of AehrenthalS
move. and, alas. the unconscious re-
hearsal of the terrible four years OF
years of the World War, we saw Serbia.
little and despised, which ten years
earlier had silently suffered the insult
Of -Hungarys annexation Of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. come out CT
the struggle aggrandized and free.
whereas the powerful Austrian mon
archy had fallen to pieces.
1t is manifest that there is not the
slightest question here of comparing
Japan and Austria. Austria had
good administration and a powerful
army, but behind the military and ad-
ministrative screen lived 5O,OOO,0O
men utterly divided by the hatredS of
10 different nationalities, all of them
bent under the yoke of the artificial
supremacy Of few million Germans
and Magyars. Japan. on the contrary,
Is one of the m"st admirably united
nations in the W. world. as much
from national stanur 1t as from the
standpoint of historical formation.
See Mistaken Ideas.
The analogy I wanted to bring out
lies in the two diplomatic methods
both OF them stamped by the tre-
mendous mistake, for which. in the
long run. one always pays the price:
Too great contempt for a week neigh
Dor; too firm conviction that the dis
tant neighbors will forever stand bv
passively.
1 have already told in an article
which appeared in The Sunday Star
that the present aggressive policy of
Japan toward China is essentially the
policy of the militaristic and reaction
airy clans at the moment in power: and
that many and important elements of
industrial Japan ere not at all sure that
such a policy is likely to serve the es-
sential economic interest of the ever in
creaslng japanese people.
The present japanese policy Is q
policy with two ends in view: one Of
prestige abroad. to please the military
tendencies of the clans in whose hands
are the imperial army and navy; and
another one, not SO loudly admitted.
which tries, by means of the old trick
Of patriotic adventures. to stem the tide
of the democratic revendicationS which
in Japan are beginning to question even
the authority of the Emperor and which
smile at the old legends of his divine
origin
Most of the japanese and Of the
Chinese who have been killed in Man
churia and who perhaps will be killed
in the valley of the Yangtse did not
suspect and will not suspect that one Of
the hidden reasons of their sacrifice
was the necessity of keeping up the
privileges of a few old aristocratic clans
in Japan.
I began this article by saying how
dangerous 1t is to try to foretell about
events in China. But this much may
safely be advanced: that Japan or, to
be more precise, the militaristic ele-
ments IN Japan, may succeed in Secur-
ing immediate results in China: that
they may succeed in deceiving the
masses in Japan as to the bearing Of
these results, but that every success and
any success in China and against China
means no more than the pressure of q
finger on an India rubber ball AS soon
IS the finger is removed so soon does
the ball dispel all traces of the pres
sure it endured so easily. Japan's
policy in China will be a policy fecund
of benefcent results only when the
japanese leaders understand this simple
truth: 1t does not pay in the long run
f0 h,llIv China