Evening star., 1932-08-28
REPORT ON MANCHURIA
STIRS FOREIGN OFFICES
Findings of Lytton Commission Feared
by Many Nations Because of
$.
Criticism of Japan.

progress, actually the League was the
scene of a great battle in which the
secretariat and the smaller powers
were struggling to force the great
powers to vindicate the League author
ity by adopting drastic measures. And
Paul Boncour and Sir John Simon were
just as consistently and much more sue
cessfully endeavoring to put a brake
upon League energies.
Machinery Broken Down.
Now the battle will be resumed be-
cause. although IN America the fact
has attracted little attention, in Europe
the failure of the League has had pro-
found and disastrous consequences. The
whole moral and legal machinery for
the maintenance OF peace which mas
been devised since the World War
the covenant of the League and the
kellogg pact-has been disclosed as in
effective. And, if the situation en-
dures, il Japan gets away" with what
she has undertaken, then no exposed
and armed country on the European
continent will henceforth consider its
own security save in terms of its armies
and its alliances.
From the European point of view all
hope of disarmament in any present
time and all value attaching to the
League covenant or the Kellogg pact
are now conditioned upon effective
action against Japan. But since the
great powers are resolved against any
such action, the struggle in Geneva is
bound to be sharp and important. And,
although the outcome Is certain, the
damage to the League is bound to be In
calculable.
Meantime the United States will find
itself in difficult position. 1t holds
with the great powers against the en-
ployment of force. On the other hand,
it holds with the smaller League pow
ers against any recognition, direct or in
direct, of Japanses power, which has
violated both the pact of Paris and the
covenant of the League. 1t is at once
determined not to attempt to expel the
japanese from Manchuria and not to
give legal recognition to the fact OF
their occupation.
In this situation Secretary StimSon
has had recourse to the familiar Euro
pean device, employed by Asquith at
the time of the Balkan Wars, and pro-
claimed that the United States will not
recognize territorial changes based upon
violence. And the President has adopt
ed this device as Hoover doctrine. In
point of fact, however, the Asquith
method, now described as the Hoover
doctrine, did not work when invoked.
The Balkan states kept the territory
which they presently conquered from
Turkey and have it still, while the
great powers have long ago recognized
their title
But the situation OF the United
States is going to be awkward if. un-
like Great Britain, France and Italy,
it takes a clearly anti-JapaneSe line.
as Mr.. Stimson's speech in New York
would foreshadow- and as the japanese
plainly expect. For, while this Ameri-
can course will not in the smallest
degree modify japanese purpose to
stick, it will Enthusiastically encourage
Chinese resistance Thus the effect OF
American policy will be to prolong
Manchurian anarchy impose huge mil
itary and financial burdens upon the
Japanese government and inescapably
intensity japanese resentment, already
at fever heat.
Will Extend Recognition.
Sooner or later Britain and France
mean to recognize the Japanese actor
and resign themselves 20 the perma'
nence of japanese control in Man
| churia. They realize that despite al
the solemn sentiments of the pact o.
Paris, japanese policy is identical WITT
that of France II Morocco. of Britain
in Egypt and wholly comparable Il
| that of the United States in the Ca
ribbean. For them the attempt to In
woke the machinery of the League is
beth futile and unWiSe, futile because
nothing can come of it, unwiSc because
it tends to dlscredlt the League itself
The Hoover doctrine will not be ac-
cepted in practice by the great powers
of Europe, because they realize that II
can only lead in the end either to
diminution of the prestige OF the ma
tionS protesting it or to war. Japan i
not going to retire, the attempt to gel
her out by mere gestures can infiamt
japanese public opinion to the poin
where conflict results. And, in the same
fashion. the course of Japan in openl!
fiouting American policy can lead TO al
eventual explosion of American public
opinion.
1t was perfectly plain in Geneva las
Winter that the great powers would dt
nothing to irritate the japanese, ant
would employ all their influence II
checking and suppressing League en-
deavors. 1t Is similarly clear now tina
they view the American course will
equal disfaVor, and have not the small
est intention of backing the Hoover doc
trine And, of course, the Japanes
know all this, as they did at Geneva
and will act accordingly. Thus in tn
end the situation is bound to com
down to an American effort, backed b.
the small powers of the League, t.
vindicate the pact of Paris and tn
covenant Of the League without the ali
of the British, French or Italian gov
ernmentS.
.Inescapably, therefore. the policy o
the Hoover administration is leadin
directly to a clash with Japan, in whicl
for all practical purposes the Unite
States will be isolated and its polio
viewed with disapproval and regret b
all Of the other great powers with tn
possible exception of the Soviet Unior
for which japanese action constitute
: a present and a continuing danger,
Copyright. 1922