Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-15

on the 10th, unless we could have plenty
of transportation.
In the ensuing discussion, while there
was considerable sparring, 1t was agreed
the American Army should operate as q
unit under its own commander on the
Meuse-Argonne front. In my opinion
| with which the French tacitly con-
morale or the offensive spirit to over
come the difficulties to be met in the
Meuse-Argonne sector.
Marshal Foch concluded that the date
for the operation should be postponed
so we could first carry out the limited
attack at st. Mihiel We finally reached
the definite understanding that after
st. Mihiel our First Army should pre-
pare to begin this second offensive not
later than September rs.
~ Gigantic Task.
The French Fourth Army was to adj
vance at the same time west Of the
| Argonne. The line from the Moselle tc
| the Argonne, 80 miles long, was to be
under my command and was to include
! certain French divisions to be left In
the sector. The details of boundaries
| between the French and American sec
I tors were to be settled by Gen. Petair
and myself
Our commitments now represented q
! gigantic task, involving the execution
Of the major operation against the St
Mlhiel salient and the transfer of Ger.
! tain troops employed in that battle, to.
| gether with many others, to new
front, and the initiation of the second
battle in the brief space Of two weeks.
Plans for this second concentration
contemplated the movement of some
| 100000 men and 2,700 guns, more thar
~ ~ nL = -
| ferred from the battlefield of St. Mihie
by three roads, almost entirely during
the hours Of darkness. In other words
we had undertaken to launch with
practically the same army within the
next "a days two great attacks on bat
tlefields 90 miles apart.
Each Of the allied armies already &C.
cupied its own front, and the neces-
sary installations, more complicated
than the public utility services of a
great city, were already established. We
were confronted with the problem of
taxing over a new portion of the line
and had to put in many new installa-
tons.
No Parallel In History.
The time was very short. A million
tons OF supplies ana munitions had TO
be transported TO the Meuse-Argonne
front before the attack. AS nearly all
our truck transportation was involved
at this time in connection with the
st. Mihiel operation only a limited
amount was then available for use in
preparing for the second attack.
When viewed as whole, it is believed
that history gives no parallel of such
an undertaking with so large an army.
At that moment it could not be said
that my staff in the First Army was
perfect, although it had already done
exceedingly well so far and was being
rapidly whipped into shape under the
able direction of Col. II. A. Drum, First
Army chief of staff, and by his princi-
pal assistants. The stats Of two Of the
four army corps had already gained
profitable experience, but the others
had only recently been organized It
was only my absolute faith in the en-
ergy and resourcefulness of our officers
Of both staff and line and the resolute
and aggressive courage of our soldiers
that permitted me to accept such a
prodigious undertaking
IL was relief to have a decision.
Whne certain changes were necessary
In plans already under way, the limit
ing OF the st. Mihiel operation made
the preliminaries for it somewhat
easier TO complete. In spite of this,
the additional burden on my First
Na4J SboAl Wao SO great JIhJ i AT once
assigned several officers from G.. H. @,
to assist. Immediate instructions were
issued to carry out the amended pro-
gram.
My diary has this notation:
"ngny-en-Barrois, Friday, September
8, 1918. Lord Reading called on me in
Paris Tuesday to discuss shipping. He
also presented the advantages of having
the American Army near the British.
Gen. Dtaz came to request American
divisions. Reports indicate President
urging economic and political pressure
against Germany by Scandinavian
countries"
In my discussion of shipping with
Lord Reading the increase of British