Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-27

sons above stated, and on account of
! the grave possibility that the enemy
will obtain supplies and men from
Russia before next year.
ITO meet the demands imposed by
| the above plan our minimum effort
should be based en- sending to France
prior to May, 1919, a total force, in
| Guiding that already here, of 66 di
visions COR better if possible), together
with the necessary corps and Army
troops. service of supply troops and
| requirements.
This plan would give an available
force of about 100000 soldiers for
the Summer campaign of 1919 and
! If this force were maintained would in
conjunction with our allies. give US
every hope of concluding the war in
| 1919"
The cable also set forth in detail the
numbers and classes of troops to be
| shipped each month from August, 1918,
until May 10, inclusive.
Didn't Mention Doubts.
The enlarged program gave rise in
Washington to the question whether We
should be able to handle the increased
tonnage of supplies Realizing that any
expression of doubt on our part would
certainly cause a slowing down at home
from which it might be impossible later
to recover and which would cause far
more embarrassment to us than the
delays that existed in the dispatch of
freight, did not at all hesitate to urge
the department to send over cargo as
rapidly as possible, giving no hint or
statement which might be used later as
a reason for not sending along every
thing they could.
To emphasize further the urgency of
beginning on the expanded plan and
to put it before the Secretary of War
directly, the following paragraphs were
included in a letter l wrote him:
Il wish to take up subject of very
great Importance. That is the burning
one of getting troops over here and
forming an army as rapidly as possible.
think it is imperative that our whole
program for the next 10 or II months
be reconstructed. The departments es-
innate of 81 900 men per month after
August is not nearly as much as We
must do.
Il canrot emphasize this point too
forcibly. We should have at least three
million men in France by next April
ready for the Spring and Summer cam
paign. To achieve this will involve the
shipment of 100000 men per month for
the eight months ending April /. This
is the smallest program we should con-
template The situation among our
allies is such that unless we can end
the war next year we are likely to be
left practically alone in the fight. If
further serious reverses come to us this
year, it is going to be very difficult even
to hold France in the war.
French British Morale Low.
1.-THE morale Of both the French and
British troops is not what it should be-
The presence of our troops has braced
them up very much, but their staying
powers are doubtful Our I'd and Sd
Divisions actually stopped the Germans.
The French were not equal to it. I
fear that I must put some Of our reg1-
ments into the weaker French divisions
temporarily, to give them courage.
After checking the German offensive
we must be prepared to strike as soon
as possible. The German divisions are
growing weaker and their man power Is
running low. The German people would
be inclined to make peace If they felt
few very heavy blows. We should be
ready to give them. On the other hand,
IL we do not hasten and the war Is al
lowed to drag along during the next
year and the year after, we shall run
very great risk that Germany will re-
cuperate by conscripting man power
from the western provinces of Russia.
The British and French governments
are alarmed about this, as you know,
and consider it real danger.
Then we must bear in mind the eff
| feet of long war upon our own peo-
pie. The idea seems prevalent at home
that the war is going to be finished
within a year and our people are
wrought up and wish to see big effort
| at once. But If we do not make our
selves strong enough on this front to
assume the offensive and push the war
to a finish. there are going to be criti-
cism and dissatisfaction at home and a
general letting down of our war spirit
Moreover, by using a large force and
ending the war we shall avoid the large
losses that have so dreadfully depleted
our allies. Let us take every advantage
of the high tide of enthusiasm and win
/ the war
| Il think that with proper representa-
! tons as to the necessity for shipping
! the British would do all they could to