The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1931-06-19

to tragic death. He had fought Lee
and Stonewan Jackson, Jeb Stuart
and the gallant Pelham'-great and
remembered soldiers-but it was the
naked Sioux warriors of the plains
who sent him to deathless fame. The
gods of battle have their own in
scrutable way of making heroes"
If Custer needed the aid of others
besides the gods of battle to help
make him hero, he found them in
the persons of the government Off
Gals who had forgotten Fetterman
and his 81 men. For in the last anal
ysis, responsibility for what took
to them. Custer himself, during con-
versation with General Darlington
early in 1876, in regard to the pro-
posed campaign against the hostile
Sioux and Cheyennes, remarked that
1T will take another Phil Kearney
massacre to bring congress up to gen.
erous support of the army" Although,
from his experience on the plains, he
knew full well of the task that lay
ahead Of the army, he little realized
how true his prophecy was nor that
he was to make the same sacrifice
that Fetterman had made.
The general plan Of the campaign
was to have three army columns con-
verge from different directions upon
the section in Wyoming and Montana
hoI toly
after their refusal to stay on the res
ervations set aside by the government
for them. One under General Gibbon
was to come eastward from western
Montana; another under General
Crook was to advance northward from
southern Nebraska; and the third un-
der General Terry was to proceed
westward from Fort Abraham Lincoln
in what is now North Dakota. The
principal trouble with this plan was
that it didn't work. 1t didn't work be-
cause the combined three forces were
not large enough for the task ahead
Of them, even though the government
had thought it might be large
enough, especially since the Indians,
instead Of waiting for the three
armies to concentrate upon them,
made use of some Napoleonic STRAIT
egg, unconsciously, perhaps, and by
operating ION interior lines" attacked
two Of the columns in severalty and
defeated them in detail. Then, too, 1t
didn't work because in reality one de-
partment of the government was allied
with the Indians, instead Of with the
army. For it was the inefficiency-
to be extremely eharitable-of the In
dian department which permitted the
Indians to go into the field much bet
ter armed than the soldiers Of Crook
and Gibbon and Terry, and which al
lowed those three to start upon their
expeditions grossly Understanding
the strength of the hostiles.
From the beginning the results o.
the campaign were unsatisfactory.
Gen. ]. ]. Reynolds Of Crooks COM
mand attacked the village of the
Sioux chief, Crazy Horse, on March
II and fought sharp engagement
in which all the honors rested with
the latter. Three months later on
June IT, Crazy Horse fought Crooks
force to standstill at the battle of
the Rosebud and halted his forward
progress indefinitely. A short time
before this Terry and Gibbon success
fully joined forces on the Powder
river and on June IL Major Reno of
Clusters Seventh cavalry, which
formed the principal part Of Terry's
command, went on a scout which took
them within 40 miles of where Crook
was having his fierce battle with
Crazy Horse. Terry and Gibbon were
surprised at not finding any Indians.
They did not realize that the hostiles
were busy elsewhere fighting the bat
tie which paved the way for their VIC
tory on the Little Big Horn.
Then on June - Custer was sent
to scout a trail that Reno had discov-
cred and this led him to the banks Of
the Little Pig Horn and his Waterloo.