The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1931-06-04
Continued from last issue)
CHAPTER XIX

the italian defeat at Caporetto as be-
ing a most serious disaster, and point
ed out that sending British and French
divisions to Italy had materially weak
ened the lines in France. Mr.. Lloyd
George also spoke at some length on
the lack of concerted action among the
allied armies.
/ agreed with him and added that
in my opinion there never had been
real cooperation on the western front
between the British and French, that
when one was attacking the other was
usually standing still, and that the
Germans were thus left free to concen-
trate their reserves against the threat
ened point.
We were facing grave crisis next
year, If not sooner, said Mr. Lloyd
George, and no one knew how it was
to be met. The enemy might attack
each one separately, with the. same
results as in the case of Italy. He
then asked what thought of Great
ing supreme war council.
Having in mind councils called to
decide upon military operations in the
field, told him that the advice of war
councils was not usually of any great
value and that the proposition did not
appeal to me. l said that authority
should be vested somewhere to co-ordi-
nate the operations on the western
front, and suggested the possibility Of
having a supreme commander.
Lloyd George Favors Council.
Mr.. Lloyd George replied, in effect,
that it was unlikely that the allies
would agree upon any one, as the
French would object to any but a
Frenchman and the British might not
like that He thought the council
would be useful for the purpose pri-
marily Of bringing the heads of the
allied governments together at inter-
walls to determine general policies.
admitted that such an organiza-
tion might serve to unite the allies in
common purpose, but that the conduct
of operations by the combined armies
should be under military direction.
got the distinct impression that while
he was seeking to secure greater unity
Of action, he also sought some means
Of controlling the activities Of the
British army. During previous months
that army had been engaged in almost
continuous offensive operations, prac-
1cally single-handed, with very heavy
losses and few compensating advan-
tages.
Mr.. Lloyd George went on to say that
there was to be meeting of the prime
ministers at Rapallo, Italy, and that
he hoped they might reach some agree
ment that would result in a council
such as he had in mind. He thought
that the United States ought to be rep.
resented at this meeting and suggest
ed that l should attend. AS the pur-
pose of council seemed to be more
for political coordination than for
purely military control, ], told him that
it seemed best for me not to partici-
pate without some animation from my
government to do so.
In the afternoon, at NJ. Painleve's
request, 1 called on him, and he also
told me of the proposal to form a su-
preme war council and wanted me to
go to the conference in Italy. l gave
him the same reply that l had given
Mr.. Lloyd George.
Shortly thereafter the Rapallo meet :
ing was held, resulting in an agree.
mont m mi INT af
the governments participating, Great
Britain, France and Italy.
Approved by Wilson.
The creation of the council did not
meet with universal approval, the
commanders Of the British and French
armies and high officials in civil
circles being opposed to 1t. Military
commanders were afraid 1t would re-
suit in undue interference with the
conduct Of operations and in derision
it was often referred to as the soviet.
The action Of the three govern
ments at Rapallo was approved by
President Wilson November II and
that fact appeared in the press day
or 80 later.
The Presidents action strengthened
the hands of those who favored the
council and probably became the inf1u-
ence that saved 1t.
The fact is that IL the French and
British army commanders, in friend
ly spirit Of cooperation, had made a
joint study Of the military problem of
the western front as a whole and then
had seriously undertaken to pull to-
gether, as though under one control,
the supreme war council would never
have been born.
The supreme war council made
favorable start and gave the impress
sion that wise and conservative ex-
J ercise of its really unlimited powers
would characterize its actions. 1t re-
Trained from interfering directly with
military commanders and operations
and confined itself largely to questions
Of policy, such as the coordination of
allied resources and the conservation
and distribution Of allied strength.
However, as time went on, the su-
preme war council assumed greater
and greater authority over military
questions.
Conflict With Wilson Ideals.
As to the political situation, the un-