Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-14
FOch's Command Is Made
Supreme Over Troops
of France, Britain and
u. S. on Western Front.
AMERICAN ARMY
GETS RECOGNITION
Pershing and Petain Near
Clash Whether Our
Soldiers Should Be
Regarded as Unit.
CHAPTER XXXIV.

! frequently ulSCuSSCQ CAlC AACoOACAi
I of a supreme allied commander,
~ and we were both ready to ac-
cept it in principle when pro-
posed. Apropos its probability, Secre-
| tary Baker March 80, 1918, cableo
President Wilson:
Il have just been shown copy OF a
message from Lloyd George to you with
regard % Gen Foch and American
| troops The situation seems to be that
Lloyd George is personally in favor OF a
supreme commander, but fears British
opinion will be the other way. because
such a commander could sacrifice the
Channel ports to the defense of Paris.
1.-THE arrangement, therefore, is that
Gen. Foch is to be supreme enough TO
coordinate. but without being called
supreme commander. Gen. PerShlng
will, of course. act under Gen. Foch, as
Petain and Haig have agreed to do.
Il venture to suggest that in replying
to that part of Lloyd Georges message
you might go further than he asks ana
say that we are willing to accept gen.
eral supreme command whenever the
| French and British are. Perhaps the
relative smallness of our present force
and our having no immediate defensive
object in France would make it unwlse
| for us to urge the point, though the
| present events would seem 10 nave
demonstrated the need.
"s Gen. Pershing's prompt and
| fine action with regard to the use OF our
| troops and facilities here in the emer-
gency has won enthusiastic commenoa-
| ton from French and British. Our lSt
Division will shortly be Withdrawn from
trenches and used in battle"
LLOYD Georges Message.
The substance of Mr.. Lloyd Georges
message to President Wilson Is con-
tanned in the copy of message, dated
March %, sent by Gen. Bliss TO the
Secretary of War and me as given be-
low: -
me by the military representative OF
Great Britain and is transmitted for the
information of the Secretary OF War
and Gen. Pershing:
Secret. From the prime minister.
"Subparagraph A.
"Please communicate to Gen. Bliss
that have cabled to President wilson
asking him to approve Of Foch exercls-
ing the same authority over the
American Army as he is exercising over
| the British and French. To send men
| over to France with the utmost possible
speed to make good losses ana 10 agree
| to ARRANGEMENTS made by Gen. Pershlng
to their being brigaded as they become
available with French and British d.
visions for the duration of the crisis.
"Subparagraph B.
/ THE prime minister thinks that be-
| fore this fighting is over every man
NAV count, and he can see no other
, way of making splendid American ma
terial available in this crisis OF the war
"(SignedD BLISS"
In response to notice from Prime
Minister Clemenceau 1 went April to
Beauyais to meet with the Supreme
| War Council. This curious old town,
| not far from the active front. has much
| of historical interest. Arriving early,
| Col. Boyd and strolled about and Wis
| tied the Cathedral and then had to wait
an hour at the Hotel de Vile before
NJ. Clemenceau and Lloyd George came
| into the conference room. Marshal
Haig. Gems. Foch. Petain, Sir Henry
Wilson. Bliss, Weygand and myself were
the others participating.
Foch Makes Address.
Brig. Gen. Spiers acted as Interpreter
and Lieut.. Col Sir Maurice Hankey,
who usually accompanied Mr.. Lloyd
| George as recorder. The meeting was
! finally called to order by M. Clemen-
ceau. who stated its purpose, saying in
| substance:
1--WE have come together to settle a
very simple question regarding the tunc-
! lions of Gen. Foch. I think we are all
/ in agreement as to the coordination of
allied action, but there is some differ
ence in the understanding of Gen.
| Foch's powers as conferred upon him at
| the Doullens Conference Of March 26
| Gen. Foch will explain his difficulties.
Gen Foch then set forth briefly his
! situation, as follows:
1.-The powers conferred by the Doullens
Conference we're limited to the co-ordi-
/ nation Of action between the allies
They were conferred while the action
! was on. The power to coordinate has
been construed to be limited to the time
the allies were in action. That was
March &c at Doullens. Now We arc at
April 3.
Now that the two opposing armies
are no longer in action, but have STOP
ped and are facing each other, there
is nothing TO coordinate. There should
be authority to prepare for action and
direct it. So we are right back where
we were. and nothing can be done until
an action starts again
Mr. Lloyd George then entered the
discussion, saying substantially:
I'VE have had more than three years
of THIS war and we have not had unity
of action during that time. During the
J last year we have had two kinds OF
strategy, one by Haig and another by
Petain. both different and nothing has
been gained. The only thing that was
accomplished was by Gen. Nivelle when
he was in supreme command.
Want Unity Of Command.
1.-The Germans have done exactly
what Gen. Nivelle tried to do. The Su-
hat at in T1okN
ruary adopted a plan for handling g
general reserve, but, through the actor
of those concerned, nothing has come
of il. It Is a nullity. What has hap
pened recently has stirred the British
people very much and must not happier
again, as the people will demand why
it has happened and somebody viii bt
called to account. They want some Sort
Of unity of command.
Gen. Foch is now empowered to CO.
ordinate the action of the allied armies
but this does not go far enough. as III
has no authority to control except b!
comforting with the respective ON
manders in chief. He wants authority
to prepare for action. ! think the reso-
luton made at Doullens should be mod
flied SO that we may have better un
Outstanding. I should like to hear wha
i Gen. Bliss and Gen. Pershing have Il
J say"
I then gave my view. which was Sc
. forth in a brief memorandum prepared
in pencil after the discussion began, a!
follows: =
"The principle of unity of commanC
is undoubtedly the correct one for tn,
allies to follow. / do not believe 1t i
. possible TO have unity of action withou
a supreme commander. We have al
ready had experience enough in tryinI
to coordinate the operations of the al
dIina n...a,i 1.titlnnIit cIInnacc trlanII