Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-06-28


acceptance OF British views as to French
naval strength, notably in the matter
OF the submarine, seemed a clear proof
that We desired to rob France of her
one effective weapon against British
sea power.
At London, our insistence upon a
f1ve-power agreement conceded with a
sharp Franco-Italian naval dispute over
the question of parity. and the French
clear purpose to compel them to
bend their interests to ours. They
were not interested in the size of our
feet or that Of the British, they asked
no restrictions for either, but they
fatty refused to limit their own
strength, save as they were guaranteed
| their existing superiority in the Medi-
ter7anean.
Refuse to Cut Arms.
Moreover, in general, all American
activities in the direction of diSarma-
ment have inevitably encountered
French interests and opinion. Since
France is the most completely armed
state in Europe. all disarmament prof.
ects must envisage the reduction Of
her military strength and thus the
diminution of her security-that is at
least in French eyes. And the French
are unwilling to make any reduction
save as we are prepared to give promise
of guarantees in case reduction leads
to new peril.
When, moreover. We press for reduc-
| ton, when the Hoover administration
plainly uses all its influence to insure
q conference at Geneva. thus support
ing the British, the French see in this
action a readiness to subordinate
French security alike to American and
British theories-for the French say
this quite openly and brutally-to pro-
vide Mr.. Hoover with campaign mate
rial in the approaching presidential
election at the cost CT French safety.
German Concern Shared.
Similarly in the present case of
! Germany, while America and britain
have been looking upon the financial
situation in Germany with utmost con-
Germ, the French have been regarding
with equal interest the political de-
velopments. Thus while on the one
hand Germany has been sinking more
and more deeply in the financial
moraSs, she has been with ever-in-
creasing insistence proclaiming nation
alistic doctrines. With equal vehem-
ence, she has been demanding revision
Of the reparations figures and of her
Eastern frontiers.
These latter demands involve the ma
tional eXistince of Frances Slav allies,
Poland and Czechoslovakia and in
directly the security Of France itself.
The French view is, therefore, that
financial help to Germany should be
conditioned upon the remuneration by
Germany of political projects inimical
to the interests and fatal to the terri
torial unity of her neighbors.
Otherwise the French see quite clear
ly that, in the end, II Germany is saved
by international cooperation, she may.
once she has recovered her pre-war
strength, employ this strength to ends
which would be disastrous for France
and her allies. The French are not
opposed to the restoration Of German
finances or economic life, they are SIM
ply insiStent that the condition of this
restoration shall be the abandonment
of purposes dangerous to other nations,
beginning with France.
Hoover's Action Surprises.
When President Hoover suddenly
and dramatically interviewed on behalf
Of Germany, he swept away all the
French calculation Of imposing upon
Germany conditions in advance of be-
slowing benefits. He, in effect. took
the position that the only thing of i'm
and that it was the duty Of France,
automatically and without previous dis
cussion, not merely to assent to the
project. but to agree to waive the pay
ment of 500, 600, 900 during the ensuing
! year. And here 1t is patent that the
manner of the doing of the thing and
the thing done were equally obnoxious
to French opinion.
Patiently Mr.. Hoover believed that
time was the essential clement and
once he had acted the public sentiment
of the world would compel France to
submit But 1t is always dangerous
to reckon upon the effect of world
opinion in France. That fact was
occupation of the Ruhr. during both
naval conferences and, indeed, in all
postwar history. So far from being
coerced by the agreement Of the out
side world, the French people are apt
to be made suspicious and obstinate.
Moreover, while they can at times be
persuaded, the smallest hint of coercion,
even of the moral sort, arouseS a re-
sentiment fatal to all international
agreement.
France Holds Power.
There is, moreover, one all-essential
cOIlSlQeTdClOn III OeallnS WIN france
today. For the present, she has the
decisive vote; reparations cannot be
changed. treaty restrictions modified,
disarmament projects advanced, save as
she agrees Her attitude may be die
tated by egoistic, nationalistic or even
militaristic sentiments-that is matter
Of opinion-but her power in the prem
iSes for the present Is clear. That Is
why all the projects of naval disarma-
ment and military limitation, in fact,
all international undertakings begun
without previous negotiation and ad-
justment with France, have ended in
f1asco. And that is the fact Washing
ton seems consistently to ignore.
Always, as in the present case, after
adopting a policy Of major Importance
and announcing 1t to the world. the
American administration discovers on
the next day, not only that France is
opposed, but that French opposition
can be fatal.
(Copyrisht, 1881. by Mcclure Newspaper
Syndcate)