The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1931-04-30

losses for May, June ana July seemed
to confirm the conclusions of a month
previous that there would soon be in
sufficient allied shipping left to bring
over an American army of required
strength. and that the allies would find
it difficult to keep up their food sup
ply from overseas.
The data presented by the naval
officer proved that if this rate of de-
struction could not he reduced the war
would be lost before we could fire a
shot.
This report was certainly most pes
simistic. but it did not dispel my con-
fidence in the success of the plan that
had been tested and was about to be
inaugurated of sending ships over in
conveys under the protection of naval
vessels. Additional destroycrs re-
quested by Admiral Sims had by this
time largely increased such craft in
European waters, and as a result the
activities of submarines had been
somewhat diminished for July us com
pared with April
Need of Speed Evident.
Yet for the time being ship cGnstru..-
tion in British yards continued below
losses and our shipping board at home
nau scarcely stopped wrangllng over
materials and types. All these facts
caused everybody to realize the ex-
IRENE urgency of speed, and that in
turn gave some hope that the pros
poets might soon become brighter.
1t was my belief, even in the face
of the heavy losses, that with COM
plete cooperation under expert man.
agement and distribution, the shipping
would be ample for all purposes. This
would require, Of course, that it be
placed under some central authority,
but the governments, especially the
British, that controlled most of it,
while apparently DESTROYS Of helping,
did not seem inclined to think they
could make any concessions. They had
entered into arrangements to assist
each other with shipping for foods uffs,
but there was no such thing as pooling
of allied tonnage for general purp SEES.
However, the discouraging re- orts
on the situation did make such al i'm.
preston on the military leaders hat
they suggested the possibility of rool-
ing all available shipping and accord
ingly recommended commission to
consider the question, with especial
reference to the transportation of the
American army.
Spies Get Sailing Dates.
The success of submarine warfare
had been largely dependent upon adj
vance knowledge concerning move
ments of vessels. AS there was no
doubt that the sailing dates of much
of our shipping reached Germany
through spies, one way to reduce the
danger would be to close such sources
of information.
In the beginning the practice by our
War department of transmitting secret
information was extremely loose. The
data regarding sailing was, of course,
sent to my headquarters, but at the
same time, or often before, it was also
given to both French and British mill
tary and naval attaches and missions
in Washington. They Immediately
transmitted the information by cable
to their respective governments, with
the result that it usually became al
most common knowledge.
But there were other sources Of in
formation possessed by the enemy.
One message intercepted by the
French, sent from some wireless sta
tion in Spain to the German general
staff, announced the arrival of several
American vessels at Nantes and Of
10000 American soldiers at St. Ma
Zaire, and also gave the routes taken
by our transports.
Another, evidently intended for SUBJ
marines, reported the departure of a
convoy Of transports from New York.
These and similar facts were cabled at
once to Admiral Sims and to Wash
ington.
Leadership Big Problem.
Probably the most important factor
in building up an aggressive army is
the selection Of leaders. Without suf-
1icient leadership the finest Of troops
may suffer defeat by inferior forces
skilfIlly led.
The following was my recommended
ton to Secretary of War Baker:
INV observation Of British and
French armies and most exacting ardu-
Gus service conditions at the front
fully convince me that only officers in
full mental and physical vigor should
be sent here. Contrary course means
certain inefficiency in our service and
possible later humiliation of officers
concerned. General officers must I'M
dergo extreme effort in personal super
vision Of operations in trenches. Very
few British or French division COM
manders over forty-five or brigadiers
over forty.
1--WE have too much at stake to risk
inef1iciency through mental or physical
defects Strongly recommend condi-
tons be fully considered in making
high appointments and suggest that
no officer of whatever rank be sent
here for active service who is not
strong and robust in every particular
Officers selected for appointment gen.
eral officer of line should be those
with experience in actively command