Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-16

the front, Ligny- -Barrols.
Arrangements were then complete foi
the st. Mihiel offensive, and finaII
conference was held the afternoon Of
| the 18th with corps commanders ano
| their chiefs of staff.
NV diary of September 10 notes:
Germans seem to suspect an attack
| by Americans" An extract from the
German paper, Taeglische RundSchau
| follows:
General Won Sieber foresees an
early blow from American forces. Even
| though the German official communl-
que says All is well and our front
holds good, and though French ano
British attacks have failed and tnelr
fronts have not been enlarged lately,
| there is another danger against which
| we must guard: a danger coming from
| the south, on the Aisne-Vesle.
I'VE must reckon with Americas
strength and numbers we have learned
| to know and understand. We shall see
| soon in what form they intend to par
| ticipate in Foch's offensive, or whether
| they will undertake an independent
| action on a great scale. AS Americans
pay strict attention to clocklike work.
| ing of their machine, we must expect
| them to take their time while making
| minute studies and preparations foI
their attack"
Concentration Under Way
The actual concentration Of troops
and material to form our First Army
had been begun in the st. Mihiel re-
gion in early August. The greater part
| of the American troops involved had
| previously been serving at other points
along the western front. AS railway
ana motor transport became available
units were brought from the British
front, from the French armies about
| Chateau Thierry and from the Vos-
ges. They were held In billeting areas
back Of the battle lines, where they
received requirements, were re-equip-
ped and continued their training.
Movements of certain auxiliary units
, and the French artillery could not be
carried out until after September q
as much of the transportation which
came from the French was in use far
ther west. Because of the scarcity OF
roads and the necessity for the cross
| ing Of columns, complete march tables
| for this assembly had to be prepared
by LIST Army Headquarters. The con-
| centration was conducted with EN-
cheney and celebrity, and the organiza-
| ton of the LIST Army was completed
| in these areas back of the front lines
| The next problem was the movement
| forward to the battle line. Beginning al
| the end Of August all combatant units
were quietly moved up near theil
proper places in line. The aviation
force, consisting Of nearly l.40O planes
i under Gen. Mitchell, was the strong
est assembled during the war up tc
| that time. 1t included the British In
dependent Bombing Squadrons under
| Gen. Trenchard, which Marshal Haig
had generously sent, and which were
particularly useful for attacking i'm
portant rail centers in rear Of the
| enemy's line. It also included a French
air division Of 900 planes which Gen
| Petain had placed at our disposal
This force gave us q superiority over
| the enemy in the air which was main
| tanned throughout the offensive.
A number of heavy and light tanks
had been promised by the French and
| British for this attack, but few days
| before the battle it was found that few
| light tanks and no heavy ones would
| be available In tanks we had only 267,
| all Of French manufacture, although
154 were manned by American troops.
French Under Americans.
In addition to the American divisions
assembled for the battle, four French
divisions, three Of which were then
serving under the French I'd Colonial
Corps around the tip Of the salient,
were assigned to our army for the oper-
alton.
The total strength of the 1st Army
when ready for battle was about $4,000
American and 10000 French troops.
The engineers were on hand with
personnel and material to begin the
| reconstruction of roads and light rail-
| WAYS in the wake Of our advance. The
signal troops were there to extend
| communications. Arrangements for
medical aid we're ready, many tnstalla-
/ lions having been taken over from the
! French, who assisted us materially in
this work. The task was greater be-
cause of the size and shape OF the
salient. which made 1t necessary for
us to organize two systems OF supply
One of these was to serve troops oper-
ating against the southern face and
| the other TO serve those attacking from
| the west
The large number of preliminary ar
rangements were completed expeditions
ly and efficiently, and the lst Army
| was ready to undertake its first inde-
pendent operation. Except for some
| delay in the arrival of part Of the
French heavy artillery, the attack could
| have been made as early as Septem-
| Der 10.
The st. Mihiel salient lay between
| the Mouse and the Moselle rivers, and
was roughly outlined by the triangle
| Pont-a-Mousson, st. Mihiel, Verdun
On the western side Of this area the
wooded heights of the Mouse extenc
along the east bank of the river. East
| of these heights lies the broad plain OF
| the Woevre, with its large forest areas
and numerous lakes and swamps. High
wooded bluffs follow both banks of the
Moselle, and the deep ravines and heavy
| forests on the western bank offer diff
| ficult terrain for offensive operations
Between the Moselle and Mouse rivers
the only stream Of any Importance i!
| the Rupt de Mad, which flows north
east through Thiaucourt and emptie'
into the MoSelle.
Mouse Heights Advantage.
The principal forests in the plain o.
the Woevre are the Bots lie Pretre, the
Bo.s de Mort Mare and the Bots de Wig
neulles. From the heights of Loupmont
| and MontSec a1S from the steep east
/ ern bluff OF the Cctes de Meuse prac'
ticaliy every porC4on of the plain Is visl-
BIZ.
The possession by our army of the
eastern edge of the heights of the
Meuse northwest of Les Eparges was 6
distinct advantage 10 US. But farther
1 south the enemy held large sections Of
these heights, which gave him not onl!
| important observation stations but alsC
means for concealing masses of artil.
lery that could fire either against oul
lines 10 the south on the Woeyre plair
or TO the west into the Valley Of thu
Meuse This situation made 1t espe'
cially advisable for us. in order to pre-.
vent the concentration Of this artiller!
FIRE in one direction, to attack the wes
face of the salient in conjunction witt
81 norairnaf fhn crrnfIn fnn