Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-01-21
TROOP MOVEMENTS
NOT KEPT SECRET
Commander Warns War
Department Against
Sending Unqualified
Officers to France.
CHAPTER X.

Il n our naval OLlICGIS SSllG Wy SAN
miral Sims from London. Cal
culations based upon tonnage losses 10
May, June and July seemed to confirm
the conclusions of a month previous ina
there would soon be insufficient allieC
shipping left to bring over an American
Army of required strength. and that th'
allies would find it difficult to keep VI
their food supply from overseas.
The data presented by the naval Off
Ger proved that if this rate of destruc-
ton could not be reduced the war woulc
be lost before we could fire shot.
Confidence Was Maintained.
This report was certainly most pessi-
mistic, but it did not dispel my conf.
dence in the success of the plan thai
had been tested and was about to be in
augurated of sending ships over ir
! conveys under the protection Of nava
vessels Additional destroyers requested
by Admiral Sims had by this time large
ly increased such craft In European
waters, and as a result the activities Of
Submarines had been somewhat dimin'
ished for July as compared with April.
| Yet for the time being ship construc-
| ton in British yards continued below
losses, and our Shipping Board at home
lhad scarcely stopped wrangling over ma
terials and types. All these facts caused
everybody to realize the extreme urgency
Of speed, and that in turn gave some
hope that the prospects might soon be-
come brighter.
| It was my belief, even In the face OF
the heavy losses, that with complete CO.
operation under expert management and
distribution the shipping would be ample
for all purposes This would require, Of
course, that it be placed under some
central authority but the governments
especially the British, that controlled
most OF 1t, while apparently DESTROYS OF
helping, did not seem inclined to think
they could make any concessions. They
| had entered into arrangements TO as
sist each other with shipping for food
| stuf1s, but there was no such thing az
pooling Of allied tonnage for general
purposes.
Allied Authorities Concerned.
The allied authorities at this stage
were deeply concerned over the question
OF ocean tonnage, on which the success
! Of allied military effort really hinged
yet their doubt Of the possibility of any
/ considerable numbers Of our troops beine
ready TO operate as q distinctive Ameri-
can force at an early date no doubt
made them less active In trying to find
shipping for our purposes. In fact, one
could not help thinking that with our
consent to feed men into the various
armies, the government concerned would
md 1t possible to send over vessels tc
bring their respective allotments across
However, the diScouraging reports or
the situation did make such an impress
sion on the military leaders that. as
reported In my cable, they suggested
the possibility of pooling all available
shipping and accordingly recommended
a commission TO consider the question
with especial reference to the trans
portation Of the American Army.
In order to reach q solution, 1t was
necessary, in the first place, to ascer-
tain as nearly as possible what the re-
quirements in shipping would be and
then investigate the various sources
J from which it might be obtained In
| any such survey IL was essential that we
should be represented by men with ex-
pert knowledge to present our case be-
fore the commission.
Spies Got Sailing Dates.
The success Of submarine warfare
had been largely dependent upon ad.
vance knowledge concerning movements
Of vessels. AS there was no doubt that
the sailing dates Of much of our ship
ping reached Germany through spies
one way to reduce the danger would
be TO close such sources of informa-
ton. ~
In the beginning the practice by our
War Department of transmitting secret
| information was extremely loose The
| data regarding sailings was, of course
sent TO my headquarters, but at the
same time, or often before, it was also
given to both French and British mill
tary and naval attaches and missions
In Washington. They Immediately
transmitted the information by cable to
their respective governments, with the
result that 1t usually became almost
common knowledge.
Frequently in the early days Of troop
movements the news regarding sailings
reached us through civilian channels In
Paris. Finally, after consultation with
Admiral Sims through his representa-
tive, recommended that all informa-
ton regarding movements Of transports
be given only TO our naval authorities,
to be transmitted by their secret code.
This precaution largely, II not entirely,
checked the leakage from those sources.
Yet 1t required persistent protests be-
fore the War Department at home dis
continued its careless methods.
Enemy Obtained Information.
But there were other sources Of in
formation possessed by the enemy.
One message intercepted by the French,
sent from some wireless station In
; Spain to the German general staff, an
nounced the arrival Of several American
| vessels at Nantes and of 10000 Anert-
| can soldiers at st. Nazaire, and also
gave the routes taken by our transports.
Another, evidently intended for subma-
rineS reported the departure OF con-
voy Of transports from New York. These
and similar facts were cabled at once
| TO Admiral Sims and to Washington.
At the time of this gloomy outlook
| regarding tonnage losses the question OF
supplies appeared precarious enough for
Washington to send me for comment a
suggestion that had been received re-
garding the possibility of augmenting
the food supply for our armies through
! increased cultivation Of the soil In
France and Northern Spain by Ameri-
can farmers Armies in the past In that
/ part Of the world had often subsisted
themselves, and such possibility had
been already discussed at my head
| quarters.
But in my opinion, as cabled to the
| department, 1t would be wiser to In
| crease our military forces more rapidly
and then II necessary relieve the older
classes Of French soldiers from the front
| to enable them TO return to their farms.
Probably the most important factor in
building up an aggressive army Is the
selection Of leaders. without efdcient
leadership the finest OF troops may SUI
| fer defeat by inferior forces skillfully
lead. During my experience, covering q
considerable period Of years, many 9TH
erwise able and conscientious ufncers