The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1931-04-24

| made them br1ef as pOSSibie--We got
down to work, as ii was urgent that
we should begin at once to lay the
foundation for the development and
employment of the American army.
To expedite handling the many ques-
tons that must arise, especially In our
relations with the French war Office,
which controlled practically all indus
trial facilities and transportation, 1t
was War Minister Paul Painleve's
idea that there should be group of
French officers placed at our disposal.
Marshal Joffre was designated as
head of this liasion group. The in
structions received by Marshal Joffre
from the minister of war were trans
mitted to me in a polite note. Natur-
ally, II was pleasing to think of being
associated with Marshal Joffre, but
thought the adoption of the plan at
this time would only add an extra
channel through which requests must
pass and that this would complicate
rather than simplify matters.
The scheme indicated that sort of
tutelage was contemplated, which also
made it Objectionable.
In my opinion, it would be more
expeditions to utilize the French Off
GERS on duty at my headquarters and
develop a workable system through
experience. l explained my views to
Nj. Painleve and readily arranged for
the officers of our supply department
tn al of
the corresponding bureaus of the
French organization. But this was
only the beginning and we soon found
that we had much to learn of the diff
cultieS of dealing with French bu-
reaus, either directly or indirectly.
There was no question that under
the great enthusiasm the afternoon of
our arrival there existed serious de-
spondency among all classes. The ter
rible strain of the previous years Of
continuous fighting, with heavy losses.
was telling against both the French
and the British. Temporary success
in different theaters of war had
brought small comforts, followed as
they had been all too frequently by
disastrous reverses.
With actual conditions in mind, one
could fully understand why the allies
had been so insistent that a contingent
Of American troops be Immediately
sent to France to bolster their morale.
While not yet prepared to do any
fighting, we could and did furnish men
for service behind the lines. We also
provided raw material and certain
manufactured supplies as rapidly as
possible and financial aid without stint.
U. S. Inaction Shows Effect.
The more serious the situation in
France, the more deplorable the loss
of time by our inactiOn at home APP
peared. 1t is true that committee
at the war college in February had
presented brief outline report on the
organization of limited force, yet no
comprehensive general plan had been
considered for the formation or en-
plOyment of such a force, much less
for larger one.
1t was finally decided we should use
the ports of Bordeaux and st. Nazaire.
lines leading to the Lorraine sector,
with collateral routes available, could
be improved to meet our needs.
Then it became necessary to deter
mine the sector where our forces. fight
ing as unit, would be most effective.
After lengthy study and consultation
with allied leaders it was logical to
conclude that from the purely military
standpoint the employment of the
American armies on the Lorraine front
would prove the most beneficial. In
conference with General Petain, who
had reached the same conclusion, the
decision was made accordingly.
1t was necessary to have a particu-
uar sector in mind to plan definitely