Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-15
Foch Is Given Ultimatum
That American Units
Must Not Be Sent to
Allied Commands.
MARSHAL FINALLY
MAKES AGREEMENT
Meuse-Argonne Front Is
at Last Assigned to
A. E. F. With It's Own
Officers in Charge.
CHAPTER LXIII.

4
- principal points of my formal
reply August 81, 1913, TO Mar
L. shall Foch, who sought at the
last minute before the st.
Mihiel offensive to put American
troops under the command of the
French, are given below:
II can no longer agree to any plan
which involves dispersion OF our units.
This is matter whose importance is
such as to demand very frank discus
sion. Briefly. American officers and
soldiers alike are, after one experience,
no longer willing to be Incorporated in
other armies. even though such incor-
poration be by larger units. The older
American divisions have encountered so
much difficulty in their service with the
French and British that it is inadvisable
to consider the return of such divisions
to French or British control. The same
is true of our corps STATS.
TT has been said that the American
Army is a fiction and that it cannot
now be actually formed because 1t lacks
artillery and services. Unfortunately
this lack of evidence. But our shortages
in this respect are due to the fact that
America brought over infantry and
machine gunnerS to the virtual exclu-
sion of the services and auxiliaries.
Reminded OF Promise.
Permit me also to recall that when
this decision was made there was
coupled with it a promise that the allies
would undertake to provide the neces-
sary services and auXiliaries, and that
YOU yourself have repeatedly guaran-
teed the formation CT a real American
Army. 1t seems to me that it is far
more appropriate at the present for the
-. r,.-s11 e. An0nP-
lean Army with the services and auxll-
aries it needs than for the allies to ex-
pect further delay in the formation OF
an American Army.
It am writing faithfully my own
ideas. which are those not only OF every
American officer and soldier, but also
OF nv Government
"since our arrival In France our
plans. not only with the consent, but
at the initiative of the French authori-
ties. have been based on the organiza-
ton Of the American Army on the front
st Mihiel-Belfort. All our depots,
hospitals. training areas, and other in
stailations are located with reference
to this front, and a change OF these
plans cannot be easily made, For IN
stance, the care Of our wounded must
be foreseen. We have already had very
grave sificulty and no little disSatiS-
faction in these of our divisions serving
under conditions which made us de-
rendent on the French for. the han.
ding and care Of our. sick and
wounded.
with references to the objective to
he considered in the st. Mihiel opera
tion. agree, Of course, with you, that
an advance to the line Thiacouft-
ViqneuIles would accomplish the prl-
mary result sought by the operation. !
think. however, that it Is advisable,
even in limiting the result sought, 70
make the attack north of Les Eparges,
at least as a secondary operation.
Enemy May Know Plan.
unfortunately both the French and
the Americans have talked, and it now
seems certain the enemy Is aware OF the
approaching attack. Neverthess, pc
lieve the attack. should be mace, ano
that decision as TO the extent to which
any success should be exploited should
be reserved. To DO this 1t seems es.
sential that / should hold available all
the divisions I am now concentrating
for the st. Mfhiel operation.
"The number Of American divisions
available Immediately after the attack
cannot, Of course, be foretold with any
certainty. However, 1t would appear
entirely impracticable to carry out the
81. Mihiel operation and TO assemble
the IL to is American divisions Tor an
attack in the direction Of Mesieres be-
tween the 18th and goth Of September.
In fact, it would be necessary to begin
at once the movements preliminary TO
the assembly of the IL or 16 divisions
contemplated by your note.
ct is improbable that any Of the
divisions actually engaged in the st.
Mlhiel operation could be Withdrawn
and gotten into position for the
Mazieres operation by September ~.
Then. too. the second line divisions
which will not become involved even IN
the limited attack can hardly exceed
six and these could not be the most
experienced divisions.
Assuming, however, that six OF the
divisions from the St Mihtel opera
ton would be available, we should still
have to find 6 to 10 divisions to make
up the II to 10 divisions your note
contemplates for employment in the
Mezieres operation, and we must seek
these divisions elsewhere.
Strategy Up to Foch.
1T seems apparent to me that is Inn
practicable to carry out even the limited
st. Mihiel operation and yet assemble IL
to is American divisions, suitable for un-
dertakine an offensive, by September is
or 90 It therefore follows that the st.
Mifaiel operation must be abandoned or
that the MeAeres operation must be
postponed If IL to 16 American divisions
are to participate in the latter opera
tiion. Moreover, IL the st. Mihiel opera
ticn Is carried out 1t Is only after It's
completion that 1t would be practicable
TO Ak a date upon which 1t would DE
possible to have available IL TO 16
American divisions At for powerful
offensive.
I'm your capacity as allied COM
YnAnder-in chief 1t is your province 10
decide as to the strategy Of operations,
and I abide by your decisions.
Finally, however, there Is one thing
that must not be done. and that Is TO
digperse the American forces among
the allied armies; the danger OF
destroying by such dispersion the fne
morale Of the American soldier Is too
great, TO say nothing Of the results to
be obtained by using the American
Army as a whole.
.If YOU decide to utilize American
forces in attacking in the direction OF
Mgzieres / accept that decision, even
though 1t complexities my supply sys-
tern and the care of sick and wounded,
bur do insist that the American Army
must be employed as a whole, either
east Of the Argonne or west Of the
Argonne, and not four or Ave divisions
here and six or seven there"
In my letter / also brought out the
possibility that the American Army
carry out the St. Mihiel attack and
Immediately thereafter attack again in
the vicinity of Belfort or Luneville, the
entire sector from st. Mihiel to the
Swiss border being eventually turned
over to us It was my idea that once
the st. Mihiel front was under our
control we should attack either to the
northeast or to the east.
August 81 Gen. Petain and consid.
arad the chance IN rpaY1oaSVaaYff- that