The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1931-07-02
Continued from last issue)
CHAPTER XVII

the great offensive Of the central pow
ers expected in the spring, but to use
them effectively close cooperation
among commanders would be impera-
tive. With this in mind proposed to
Premier Clemenceau that the COM
manders in chief and chiefs of staff
get together to examine the situation
and, if possible, determine general
program Of combined action.
M. Clemenceau at once approved the
suggestion. 1t was also favorably re-
ceived by General Foch, who, it will
be recalled, was chief of the French
general staff. proposed that the
meeting be held at my headquarters,
but the French selected Compiegne,
Petain's G. 81. @.
At the meeting, January "a, 1918,
Robertson, for the British, spoke first,
and suggested a general statement as
to: 1) Mutual support between allied
armies, (2) Situation as to reserves,
(3) Question of troops in Italy, (4)
Situation as to the transportation of
the American army and facilities given
It in France.
Petain Favored Defensive.
General Petain thought that for the
present the allies would be forced to
remain on the defensive because Of
lack of men. He said the French army
had ninety-seven divisions with an in
fantry strength of from 5000 to 5000
men each, some thirty-odd Of these d.
visions being in reserve and the rest
in the trenches, besides eight cavalry
divisions, two of which were dismount-
ed and six mounted.
All divisions he thought could be
kept up until April if there should be
no fighting, but later on, even without
a battle, he would have to break up
five divisions to maintain the others,
the six mounted cavalry divisions
would have to be reduced to four, and
before the end of the year the total
force would have to be reduced by
twenty divisions.
Foch Was for counteroffensive.
General Foch declared that the best
means of hating strong and persist
ent offensive was powerful counter
offensive.
1.-THE German offensive at Verdun
was stopped not by our resistance
there but by our offensive on the Som
me in 1916" said General Foch. "Such
an operation is possible only when
foreseen and prepared beforehand. In
planning the counteroffensive l think
that the entire front must be cOnsid-
cred as a whole and not the French as
one part and the British as another.
The plan must. envisage them together
preparing for offensive action on a
common battlefield with all the forces
at their disposal"
General Robertson expressed accord
with Foch, but he did not see where or
with what means such an offensive
could be executed, and stated that the
war could not be won by remaining on
the defensive.
"Give us back the troops from Sa-
lonika and we will commence often
SlNCo, SulO
1--WE were not speaking Of often
sives, but of counteroffensives," Gen
eral FOch replied.
General Robertson remarked that of
course the French and British could
reinforce each other and make cOun-
terattacks, and then asked: Gould
they do more than that?"
mot without the Americans" Cen
eral Petain answered him.
Dependent Upon U. s.
General Robertson then said: n
think our only hope lies in American
reserves" and he wanted to hear from
me.
I stated that but few Of the allied
authorities seemed to realize that
American participation would depend
upon the amount of shipping available
for the transportation Of our troops.
and that the time when they would be
needed was near at hand. AS there
had been some reference to amalgama-
the point that we expected as matter
Of course that the American army
would have its own front as an indie
pendent force and not be used merely
as a reserve to be sent here and there.
One insuperable reason, said, why we
could not amalgamate with the Frnech
was the difference in language, and ]
added that we would not use our
troops in that way at all unless it be-
came absolutely necessary.
I then discussed our problems, call
ing attention to the delays at the
French ports and our shortage Of rail
transportation, and touched on the
backward state Of procurement of
Of equipment, munitions and airplanes.
They all appeared surprised to learn
of our difficulties, especially General
Foch, although, even as chief of the
general staff, he apparently could not
interfere in matters handled directly
by the ministry. 1t was astonishing
to find how little comprehension any
Of them had of the enormous task
that confronted the Americans.
Foch said: "None of these questions
has been referred to me-" whereupon
Petain retorted that zone should not
wait until such things are brought to
his attention, but should look around