The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1931-09-04
CHAPTER L


they still had superiority of about
100000 May 81. July Is this was
changed and the allies then had the
superiority by the same number. In
other words, the Germans were rela-
lively worse off by $4,000 rifles in
July than in March.
This was accounted for almost en-
tirely by the great increase in the num-
bers of Americans The French and
British had not been able to add to
their strength but, on the contrary.
they were being reduced faster than
the Germans.
The German offensive south of
Rheims, July 1916, having been
checked, the moment was favorable
for an allied counteroffensive. The Sc
lection by the Germans of the Cham
payne sector and the eastern and
southern faces of the Marine pocket
on which to make their offensive was
fortunate for the allies. as it favored
the counterattack already planned.
We shall now see the reason for
the concentration of several American
divisions southwest Of Scissors. Some
of them were available for use in the
main counterstroke, to be delivered by
the French Tenth army under Mangin.
The American First and Second divi-
sions were hastily assembled to form
the American Third corps under Gen.
eral Billiard. But his corps staff had
not yet been fully organized and these
divisions, by his direction, under dis
cretionary authority given by me, be-
came a part of the French Twentieth
corps, commanded by General Berdou-
lat.
Form Spearhead of Attack.
This corps then was composed of
these two divisions and the French
First Moroccan division, which had
fine reputation, and was assigned to
the most important position in the at
tack on the left center of the Tenth
army. The three divisions mentioned
had the honor of being the spearhead
of the thrust against the vulnerable
flank of the salient. The line of adj
vance ran eastward over the COM
handing plateau just south Of Sois-
sons, and across the main road lead
ing from that place to Chateau
Thierry.
The First had recently been relieved
from the Cantigny sector and was en-
route to rest area. 1t was scattered
throughout the Dammartin area. just
north of Meaux, when it received or
ders July Is to move by truck to the
front. After a hurried departure the
advance troops arrived at dawn the
10th at the forest of Retz (or forest
of Villers-C otterets) and during the
night the division moved to the front
of the fores.. The night of July II it
went forward over muddy and longest
ed roads, the columns of infantry
working their way to the front, where
they arrived in the nick of time.
The Second division was at Mont
reuil-aux-Lions in reserve of the First
corps, recuperating, when the order
came on the 14th to move by truck
toward the front. Dawn July II found
the infantry and machine-gun ele-
ments arriving at the forest of Villers-
Cotterets. The night of the 18th the
movement toward the front, through
the forest, was made with extreme diff
ficulty. The narrow roads became
jammed, troops lost their direction
and there was serious doubt whether
they would be at their line of depar-
ture at the appointed hour of 4:35
a. NJ, the 18th.
Proceed Against Odds.
With most commendable energy and
initiative the officers led their CON-
mands forward during the night, wind
ing in and out through the almost in
eXtricable snarls of wheeled vehicles.
One of the battalions assigned to lead
in the attack, though on the march
most of the night, was forced to move
on the run for the last few hundred
yards, and just reached it's place as
the barrage started.
The Second division headquarters
found itself July 16 with no knowledge
of the terrain and little obtainable
from any source. Harbord and his
chief of staff, Col. Preston Brown,
started for the front and accidentally
ran into the headquarters of the
Twentieth corps. They there found
the directive for the attack, from
which they issued the divisions orders.
The country over which the TWEEN
tieth corps attacked consisted of a
succession of wooded ravines that lay
across the line Of advance, with
scarcely any roads leading toward the
front. The enemy'S main defenses
along the ridges Of the scissors pla-
teau were naturally strong, and with
the added intrenchments the enemy
evidently felt himself reasonably Sc
cure It was harvest time and the
ripening wheat that covered the roll
ing landscape gave excellent cover for
the enemy's infantry and machine
guns, but it also helped to hide our
advance.
Enemy Caught by Surprise.
Without the usual preliminary ar
tillery preparation, the assaulting bat
talions, accompanied by light tanks,
plunged forward behind the barrage.
The enemy was caught by surprise
and the First and Second divisions.
CALAMITY supported by the Moroccan
division in the center. soon overran
his forward positions and broke
through the zone of his light artillery.
Though constantly confronted by fresh
enemy troops, this corps took the lead
in the advance and its progress was
most satisfactory. BY noon it had
captured half of the great plateau in