The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1931-07-23

ish wanted unlimited infantry and
machine-gun units, but 1 would con-
slider nothing further than a limited
extension of the Subdivision plan.
During the conference a cable from
Lord Reading to the prime minister
was brought forth, which stated that
the President had agreed to the ANAL
gamation of Americans with the Brit
fish. 1 had nothing official at hand
later than the Presidents conditional
approval Of joint note No. 10 Of the
supreme war council as suggested by
Secretary Baker, so I promptly said
that it could not be possible that any
such concession had been made and
that the classes of our troops to be
shipped over and their disposition
must be left to me.
Agree on Troop Shipments.
AS result of these discussions we
reached an agreement which provided
for the shipment in May by British
and American tonnage of the infantry.
machine gun, engineer and signal
troops. together with the various unit
headquarters, Of six divisions for
training with the British army. It
was provided that any shipping in ex-
cess of the amount required for this
number of troops should be utilized
to transport the artillery of these d.
visions; also that such personnel as
might be required to build up corps
organizations should then follow, it
being understood that the artillery
regiments would train with the French
and join their proper divisions when
this was completed.
To meet any emergency that might
require an excess Of infantry after the
completion of this program. it was
agreed that all the American and
British shipping available for the
transportation Of troops was to be
used under such arrangement as
would insure immediate aid to the al
lies, and thereafter as far as possible
provide other units necessary to COM
plete the organization of our divisions
and corps.
It was further agreed that the COM
Blatant troops mentioned in connection
with May shipments should be fol-
lowed by such services of supply and
other contingents as we ourselves
might consider necessary, the ship
ment of large number of these troops
should be utilized at my discretion,
except that the six divisions which the
British were to transport would be
trained with them.
Washington Makes Concession.
Reaching Chaumont, l found that
cablegram dated April &c had been
received, transmitting a memorandum
dated April 10, that had been sent by
direction of the President to the Brit
ish ambassador at Washington in con-
formity with his approval of note No.
1S. In this memorandum the shipment
of 10000 infantry and machine-gun
units per month for four months was
conceded, with the understanding that
their assignment for training and use
should be left to my discretion.
It went on to say that the United
States, until the situation changed,
had no intention Of departing from
as full compliance with the recon-
mendation of the permanent military
representatives as the nature of the
case would permit.
This was the first official informa-
ton I had received that the admins
tration had agreed to send any specific
numbers Of infantry and machine gun
units to France.
Lord Readings influence.
This concession went further than
it was necessary to 60 and much fur
ther than had expected. Realizing
the complications that might arise
from commitments so far in the future
and the delay in forming an American
army that would follow, did not
agree in later discussions at the su.
preme war council with all that the
allies now felt justified in demanding.
I was opposed to the action of the
supreme war council in assuming the
power under any circumstances to dis
pose of American troops. It was not
In any sense prerogative of the su-
preme war council.
There can be little doubt that Lord
Reading received the distinct impress.
sion from President Wilson that in
fantry and machine-gun units would
be sent to France at the rate Of
10000 men per month for four
months, beginning with April. That
the President agreed to this Gin prin-
ciple" is practically certain. It need
not be further emphasized that such
concession, even though prompted
by the most generous impulse, could
only add to the difficulties Of our task
Of building up an army Of our own.
It is probable that Lord Reading,
skilled advocate that he was, did more
while ambassador at Washington to
influence the administration to grant
allied requests than any other indi-
| vidual.
CHAPTER XXxVIl
I left London April rs, 1918, and