Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-21

~ MBuSe AIBOIlIlS Ol1SIlSlNS
wv completed, was surprised
to receive a proposal by
Marshal Foch, brought to
my headquarters october l by Gen.
Weygand, to insert the French I'd Army
between the American 1st and the
French 4th Armies.
1t was suggested that the I'd Army
should take over these divisions from
the left of our 1st Army that were
in and near the Argonne Forest, leav-
ing the rest of the army under my
command
Foch's idea seemed to be that this
would accelerate the advance. The
proposal was similar to the one pre-
sented by Foch en- August 80, which
was rejected so positively that
thought the matter settled once for all.
CIemenceau's Hand Seen.
Just what prompted the idea was
never able to learn, but surmised that
Clemenceau had suggested or directed
some such action. Clemenceau could
tary situations or of operations, and
he probably measured success by the
number of kilometerS gained in a
given time, regardless of the terrain
or the stubbornness with which it was
defended.
He assumed, however, to judge in
such matters as though he were quite
competent to do so. He apparently
had a notion that his position as
French prime minister and head OF the
Supreme War Council gave him au-
thority over Foch. But the allied COM
mander was chosen by the govern
ments concerned and was responsible
to them jointly. He realized, no doubt,
that his position was entirely de-
pendent upon the unanimous support
of the governments which had chosen
him. That is to say, if any one Of
them, including his own, had objected
to him as allied commander in chief
his tenure would have been at an end.
The proposition Weygand submitted
was not sound because the different
features Of that front were interdepend-
ent and the advantages they afforded
the defense could best be overcome by
a force under one control. Another OBJ
lection was that there was only one
road leading to the part of our front
which was proposed for the French I'd
Army and an attempt to use 1t for
the supply of two different armies
would have resulted in many compli-
cations. Moreover, the marshal, as
usual, overlooked the fact that our men
seriously objected to service in the
French Army and would not serve in 1t
with the same enthusiasm as in their
own.
/ pointed out these objections to Wey-
gand and told him that the change
would, in my opinion, retard instead Of
increase allied speed. He left with the
view that I was right, and my formal
reply disappearing the plan, sent by
letter, seemed to settle the matter.
Cunclio. Eau Fahipd
My diary at this point records:
"Souilly, Thursday, October 8. 1918.
Claudel came yesterday to receive in
structions about proposed attack. Gen.
Claudel commanded the French 18th
Corps at Verdun, which formed a part
of the American 1st Army. Sent let
ter to Secretary Baker.
Minor engagements have occurred
since September %. Captured posi-
tons being consolidated.
This afternoon saw corps command
ers about the attack tomorrow. Roads
rapidly improving and conditions better.
Serious situation as to motor trans
port again cabled to Washington.
Shortage in tonnage reducing supplies
to danger point. The French have
agreed to import locomotives and turn
over cars made for them in the United
complete rail requirements"
We were woefully deficient in motor
transportation now that We had under
taken large operations, although the
shipment of motor vehicles had been
repeatedly urged upon the War Depart
ment. Once more we were almost
wholly dependent upon the French for
land transport to move our troops and
handle about half Of our ammunition
r. fsrV,r MA 40 n
almost to strip the S. o. S. of trucks,
and this seriously interfered with work
at the base ports, with construction
projects at other points and with sup
| ply of troops in general.
The shortage of ambulances to move
! the SICK and wounded was critical, and
we were compelled TO borrow IS Amer
] lean ambulance sections from Italy.
But we had reached the point where
We were no longer able to borrow.
Given Little Encouragement.
This condition was not easy to recon-
Gle with the suggestion from Washing
| ton short time before that motor
transportation be largely substituted
! for horses.
All these facts were pointed out
| plainly TO the War Department, but we
received little or no encouragement. Ac-
cording to the departments detailed
program Of shipments, the best we
could expect In the near future was
only about one-fifth OF our require
ments. The promise to ship us 10000
motor vehicles in october was only
partially fulfilled
| In locomotives and cars the situation
continued much the same and came to
/ such a pass that the French said they
| could do no more. They offered TO i'm
port for us as many locomotives as
| could be produced in excess Of our
monthly program, the -fulfillment
of which had left us short, and to turn
over sufficient cars manufactured on