Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-13
Crushing of Germany Set
by A. E. F. Commander
as Goal Before Any
Peace Movement.
ASKED INSTRUCTORS
RECALL FROM U. S.
Ruse Is Used to Mislead
Enemy Before Drive
on St. Mihiel-End of
War in 1913 Seen.
CHAPTER LXI.

Ok1Ak L@AAs
WENT to Gen. Petains head
quarters at Chantilly August "a
1918, to confer on various details
4 of the coming st. Mihiel offensive
We fixed the boundary between the
American sector and that of the French
I'd Army, which was to attack on oui
left with six divisions.
When we took up the questions OF
truck transport and additional artillery
Gen. Petain told me he had issued
orders directing all services to give us
every assistance. He also said that all
the aviation we had asked would be
brought into the sector, and more
besides.
1 was eager to begin the attack by
September 7 If possible, or the 10th
at the latest, but it appeared that a
considerable number of the necessary
heavy guns we're to come from Mangin' S
10th Army, then preparing an opera
ton. It looked as though this would
make 1t necessary to postpone the date
Of our attack until the 10th, or possibly
the 18th.
Asked Artillery Early.
returned to Bombon the following
afternoon for further conference with
Marshal Foch. asked him particularly
to expedite the arrival Of the artillery,
advising him that to save time the nee
essary reconnaissance had already been
made and the positions for the guns
chosen. I pointed cut that any delay
in the st. Mihiel operation would, Of
course, reduce the time we would have
to prepare for the later offensive else
where. The delay In getting the heavy
artillery from Mangin's army, however,
held us up until September IL, and
there was no way to avoid it.
Marshal Foch and also spoke of the
large program proposed for the United
States in 1919. I mentioned the coming
visit of Secretary of War Baker and
suggested we get together upon his ar
rival and go thoroughly into all
questions.
That Foch might visualize our prob
lem as it appeared to me and be pre-.
pared TO discuss it with the Secretary,
/ explained that our War Department
feared we should not be able to pro-
vide supplies for such q large increase
in our forces, but that had commended
there should be no hesitation, arguing
that we were not making war in bar
rem country, and although we might
have to economic more strictly there
would be no danger Of our men starving.
4
ing, as he was thoroughly committed
to the larger program. He said that
in his opinion the allies should make
every effort to win the war in 1919
that the British we're tired, the French
were worn out, and we must hasten
the arrival Of American divisions. He
said he was doing and would continue
to do all in his power to obtain the
necessary sea transportation, and ina
HIS requests had included British
American and Italian shipping
spurns Early Peace.
I suggested that he go into these
details In his conversation With our
Secretary Of War. Feeling that pos
sibly allied effort might be weakened
by peace propaganda, said positively
that I'VE must not let the people listen
to rumors that the Germans are ready
to make peace; there should be no
peace until Germany Is completely
crushed. We should emphasize this
fact. We have paciflsts who are luxe.
warm and too much inclined
to listen to any proposition to have
the war stopped"
Up to this time, whatever views OF
hopes any of us may have helo
privately, there was no hint OF re-
iinquishing plans for the supreme ei-
fort in 1918. In support OF the 100
division program, Gen. Bliss came 70
see me and suggested closer co-opera-
ton between US in advocating us
adoption. AS no definite advice mao
been received from the War Depart
ment regarding the greater plans, l
continued to urge that the SO-olVlSlon
program be completed by April, 1919
and the lO0-division goal by July, oas-
49, -, onttoy, IA accommodating the
higher number mainly on the failure
by the war Department 50 lar 70
reach the maximum figures set in any
previous program.
It was my thought also, and I so
advised the War Department by caple
August 10, that II we ourselves should
decide to make the great effort the
allies would be the more willing 70
concede additional tonnage and sup
plies. Moreover, it was certain that
il our people at home could be brought
IN realize the possible eventual de-
mands, they would be prepared for
the necessary sacrifice the effort would
entail and we should be all the more
likely to attain at least the 8O-divlslon
I consulted with Mr.. Herbert Hoover
on the question of food supply, with
Assistant Secretary of War Stettinius
on production of munitions, and with
Marshal Foch on the military require
ments, and all agreed the maximum
should be the goal Hence, with the
thought that insistence would ct least
insure the o0-division plan, 1t was
again recommended that there be nc
hesitation or delay in entering upon
the larger plan.
Urges 1OO-DivisiOn Plan.
In a letter to Secretary Baker August
II, 1918, I wrote in part:
II sincerely hope the President may
decide on the 100-division program
as a minimum and establish that as
a. air, touard which every energy