Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-07

7 ATTENDED a conference Of COM
manders in chief at Gen, Foch's
headquarters Wednesday, July "a
Il to discuss plans for offensive oper-
atoms.
Present were Gems. Foch, Petain
Weygand and Buat, Field Marshal HAS
and Gen. Lawrence and Gen. Conner
chief of operations, Boyd and Hughes
and myself.
There was pronounced good feeling
and confidence. Gen. Foch gave q
resume of the general situation. He
proposed no definite plan, but sub
mitted his remarks as the basis of dis
cusSion.
The main point was that the fifth
German offensive of the year had been
checked and the allied counter often
sive, beginning July 10, had trans
formed it into defeat, 1t was the gen.
should be taken of this fact and that
the allies should continue their attacks
with as much vigor as possible.
Reached Equal Strength.
Gen. Foch said with satisfaction that
we had now reached an equality in the
numbers of combatantS and an actual
superiority in reserves. As the enemy
would soon be required to relieve con-
4
from the active 'front.' the allies would
rapidly gain further superiority through
the constantly increasing number OF
| All information went to show that
| the enemy had two armies, so to speak
/ Foch continued, one an exhausted hold
| ing army and the other a shock army
already weakened, maneuvering behind
| this frail front. UnqueStionably we mac
material advantage in aviation and
tanks, and to smaller degree In artll-
lery, and this would be augmented by
the arrival and armament of American
artillery personnel.
AS to the reserve strength behind the
allies, it would soon be powerful, indeed,
If the rate of 100000 per month at
which the Americans were pouring IN
could be maintained. One could sense
an approaching crisis on the enemy
| side. possibly not so very remote, pc
cause Of the difhculty he was having IN
keeping up the effective strength OF MS
units.
Beyond these advantages OF ma
teriai force in our favor there also was
| the moral ascendancy we had gained
| bv orr recent victories and his failures.
| Foch felt, as we all did, that the allies
i now held the initiative and that from
| this time on they should abandon the
i defensive attitude that had been SO
4 lono imposed upon them and continue
| the offensive without cessation.
Points ont offensives.
He mentioned series Of operations
on the different fronts which should
aim at results of immediate importance
| to subsequent progress. These prehnl-
| inary actions would be Of limited ex-
| tent and would be executed as rapidly
as possible with the number OF troops
available to the allies.
He then pointed out the following
offensiyes which 1t was evident Wouio
be indispensable to later operations;
| The release of the railroad Paris
Ayricourt in the Marine region by the
| French; the Paris-Amiens Railroad by
a concerted action of the British ana
| French: the Paris-Avriconrt Raliroao
| in the region of Commercy py tne re-
| duction of the St. Mihiel salient by the
| American Army, which, by reducing
| the front. would bring us within reach
of the Briey region and permit action
| on q larger scale between the Mouse
and Moselle.
Further offensives were foreseen.
having in view the release OF the
mining sections to the north by oen-
nitely driving the enemy from the
region of Dunkirk and Calais.
with the armies working together
operations could be continued az sucn
brief intervals as to prevent the enemy
| from using his reserves to advantage
| and without giving him time to build
| I'M depleted units. No one could tell
| then Just how far these efforts might
| take us but possibly, If successful, they
would pave the way for something
more important in the late summer
or Autumn, which, in turn, would sun
further increase our advantages.
Haig Agrees TO Plans.
No one suggested that the plans OF
the moment or those to follow might
be carried so far as TO terminate the
war in 1918. Concerning the part each
should play Foch asked expressions OF
opinion of the respective commanders
| in chief as to how these or any other
operations we might propose Should
1 be conducted.
Marshal Haig gave his views and
plans. which agreed with the general
outline suggested, as did Gen. Petaln,
! who wanted further to consider the
possibilities. As far as these prelim-
| mary operations applied to the Amer
| leans, they were simply restatement
of the plans we had been leading up
to ever since our entry into the war:
| j, therefore, dQSASc0 CbdI AINoAAo Va
| organization and supply were receiv-
| ing every consideration in the prepa-
ration of the American Army TO do its
part.
/ In this connection / took up again
the question of obtaining artillery, and
the understanding that we should have
the co-opWation of the French in this
respect was confirmed The progress by
| the United States in the manufacture Of
guns was discussed and the hope ex-
pressed that 1t might reach point
which would enable the French TO turn
their attention to making shells. This
brought out the critical situation re-
garding steel / mad been urg ng haste
IL our home production of artillery anc
remarked that we mad all learned from
experience that programs for manufac-
ture of munitions had rarely been fully
met.
Gen. Foch suggested the importance
Of tanks, but we were without tanks
and there was little prospect that thu
plant Of joint production by thr British
and ourselves, previously agreed upon
would provide them In any quantity fol
use In the immediate future
/ Fixed Basis for Future.
The proposal that we should develop
our own tanks at home had come 3.
nauglnt Marshal Haig reported tina
the British had three brigades with 70l
or 800 tanks in all, but Gen. PetaiI
said the French were short. Finally