Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-01-13
BY HUGH SCOTT,
Former Chief of STAFF and Major General,
u S. A, Retired.

Special Dispatch to The Star.
PRINCETON, N. j., January IS On
ANAL have just read the opening
chapters of the memoirs of Gen. Per-
shing.
In them I find some structures against
the conduct of the War Department
and the general staff, of which I was
chief, prior to our actual entrance into
the war. On these structures wish to
comment, in friendly and by no
means captious or controversial spirit,
not only on my own account, but on
account also CT my comrades in the
War Department.
have admired Gen. Pershing ever
since our first meeting and recon-
mended him for command, both IN
Mexico and France, and always rejoice
that I did so. In his conduct OF the
part we took during the war in France,
he held high his AmericaniSm against
strong opposition that might have
crushed a weaker man; maintained his
uoint for an American Army and
brought back a wonderful victory Tor
our Army in the greatest war OF all
times. for which the American people
owe him an eternal gratitude and ad-
rniration, in which I share.
Advanced Cause of Peace.
The conduct of our Army under MS
direction has placed us IN the lore
front of all the nations OF the eaTtn
and has advanced greatly the cause OF
cares to embroil itself with one as pow
erful as we proved to be, and certainly
we have no wish to embroA ourselves
with others.
In his first chapter Gen. Persing says
that CONGRESS passed compromise
act but scarcely move was
made to carry it out to our actual en-
trance into war.
While I have no papers at hand tor
reference, my memory tells me that the
act Gen Pershing refers to was passed
at the previous session of Congress-at
a time when Congress had no thought
If war-and provided for a peace-time
force nv increments from time to time,
and the provision of the act had been
carried out as the proper time ar
rived.
AS for sending political army to
France. there was no disposition 10 90
war Department. All the better In
formed officers in the Regular Army,
such as Gen. Pershing himself were
fully converSant with the mistakes made
in our former wars, and was fully oe-
ternined, so far as my power should
90. that these mistakes should not pc
repeated in this war. They were not
repeated, because was thoroughly sup
ported in this by the Secretary OF war
4rfifh Il
should have been unable to accomplish
anything, for a portion of Congress
seemed bent upon making these mis-
takes again.
Statements Not Clear.
Gen. Pershing does not make himself
clear when he says, in chapter 2: II
had been apparent for months that we
were likely to be forced into the war,
and a state Of war had actually exlsteo
for several weeks, yet scarcely start
had been made to prepare for it. The
War Department seemed to be suffering
from kind of inertia, for which it was
probably not altogether responsible.
Nor does he make himself clear, in the
same chapter, in saying: Until lew
weeks before the war neither the gen.
eral staff nor the War College had re-
ceiYed any hint or direction to be ready
with recommendations, except as mol
Gated above The general staff had app
parently done little more, even after
war was declared, than to consider the
immediate question Of organizing ana
sending abroad one combat division and
$4,000 special troops"
This statement differs widely from
that the general made earlier in this
same chapter-"beginning with February
3, the War College division (of the gen
eral staff presented number OF rec
concentrations for action in the event OF
war with the central powers. One was
for the enactment Of the draft law
(upon which had been engaged myself
for four monthS) and others referred
TO the size of the Army TO be organ
lied and the necessity for the procure
ment of equipment and supplies. March
is, acting under instructions, from the
chief of staff, the War College sub
mitted more detailed scheme LOT
raising 100000 men"
To be more accurate, these studies
had been going on all Winter with many
conferences between myself and the
different heads Of the War College and
heads of bureaus. / had been engaged
in preparing the mind of the admins
tration and the country for compulsory
service Seven hundred and ninety-two
favorable editorials had been received
from newspapers in all parts OF the
country before the counting was stopped.
Laughed at 100000 Men.
I asked the committee Of Congress for
1000, 600 men in 1916. This request was
received with great hilarity. I was
asked: What do you want with 1000
600 men? The United States will never
be at war with anybody. Do you want
them to eat? You certainly cannot
have any other use for them" The
temper of Congress was such as to dis
courage further effort at that time. /
have since felt with Gen. Pershing that
1t were better so. Had my request been
granted, such gesture would have con-
WINGED Germany of our determined pur-
pose with the probability that she would
have ceased the acts that brought US
into the war with the chance OF our
continuing to stand on the side lines,
while the civilization of France and
England was being deStroyed-our turn
to come later, unprepared and alone
No doubt the ideas OF all OF US were
crude in the beginning, and by no means
the ideas we have now-even Gen.
Pershings. We all had to grow through
experience. remember Gen. PerShlng
asking if I thought it possible for him
to get a Cadillac touring car for his
personal use in France. / told him to
80 out ana Duy ~ lot nlfflSeu ana SCdH'
would now have said 100, but gave
dim 10 times az many as he asked.
1t was not possible to order the recon-
mendations Of the general staff carried
out at once for the reason that all Of
them could not be approved on account
of minor imperfections or until the
policy Of the Government was decided
upon, as to the size and character of
the contribution we were to make 10
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