Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-15

or four American divisions, with five or
six French divisions on their left, we're
to make this assault while the prin-
cipal blow was being struck by wholly
American force against the southern
face. The newly proposed operations
on the AiSne would prevent the partici-
patton of the six French divisions and
at least two of the American divisions.
In contending that an attack on the
western face would be necessary to give
us the maximum benefit from the effort
to be made north of Toul, proposed
that there should be at least seven
on the southern face and two in re-
serve, with one or two divisions attack
ing from the west.
Opening a map on which he had
sketched a project for this same attack,
Petain showed exactly the same dispo-
| SitionS and number of divisions which
I had planned in an independent study.
1t was his opinion and my oZ'n that
once Marshal Foch had determined the
| strategical use of an army by prescrib-
ing the direction and extent of its en-
ployment the details were solely the
province Of the ommander-in chief of
the army concerned, and that Foch had
| nothing further to do with 1t.
We considered the question Of putting
the American Army astFide the Aisne as
proposed by the marshal. A glance at
the map showed the difficulty Of work.
| ing up the Valley of the Aisne, as the
heights of the left bank dominated
those on the right, while deep ravines
and projecting ridges offered serious
obstacles.
The main objection to Foch's scheme,
however, was that the American Army
would be separated into two parts, with
French army between them. Petain
was decidedly Of my opinion that this
| should not be done, and that as the
| American Army was now in the Woevre
1t should continue to hold that sector
and expand from there.
Suggested Metz Movement.
We agreed that beginning with the
Moselle, its then eastern flank, the
American front could gradually be ex-
tended TO the west as the forces in
creased. In retaining its position in the
Woevre, it would, in fact, be possible to
extend in either or 10th directions. We
concluded that eventually the American
First Army might extend to Douaumont,
the Second to the Suippas and the Third
to Rheims, relieving the French Second
Army and then the Fourth. Petain
thought the Americans would later de-
liver the final blow along the Meuse.
Referring to Metz, expressed the
view that 1t would have a tremendous
moral and material effect on Germany
II the allies should advance in that di-
rection. Petain considered that it could
not well be undertaken until after we
had Strengthened out the line along the
Meuse. He did not agree with the
marshal, who thought all could be set
tied on the left Of the line. I referred
to dependence Of Germany on the mines
in that region, and pointed out how
jealousy guarded 1t we s by the Germans.
After some further discussion Petain
definitely proposed thLt he transfer to
the Americans the whole Of the front
from the Moselle River to the Argonne
Forest, exactly what had suggested to
Foch the day before. If We should at
tack between thc Mouse and the
Argonne, Petain thought all that could
be done before Winter would be to take
Montfaucon, and stated that we could
not contemplate The attack to the west
of the Mouse until the st. Mihiel salient
had been reduced.
My chief Of staff Gen. McAndrew,
and chief of operations, Fox Conner
were sent to confer with Weygand Sep
TENDER l and returned to Ligny-en-
Barrois with word that Marshal Foch
desired TO see Gen. Petain and me the
following day. Motoring to Petain's
headquarters with Boyd and de
Marenches, we found McAndrew and
Conner had preceded us, and after
lunch we went to Bombon. The others
present at the conferences were Marshal
Foch and his immediate staff, Gen.
Petain with Gen. Buat, his chief OF
staff, and Coils. Dufeux and Payot.
Would Accept Decision.
As result of the several converse
tons that had taken place since August
80 it seemed more than probable that
all differences would be settled. When
we met there was little Of the atmos-
phere of the meeting at my headquar-
conference Foch referred TO the note
he had handed me August &c. and to
my reply and asked my observations.
Stating my attitude on che desirability
Of carrying out vigorous offensives TO
the fullest possible extent, explained
that If 1t should be deemed necessary to
abandon the st. Mihiel project in order
to begin the larger offensive which was
understood to be west Of the Meuse, !
would abide by his decision.
Taking up the first part of my reply,
Marshal Foch said that If he under
stood me correctly wished to postpone
the st. Mihiel operation and concen-
trate entirely upon operations west OF
the Meuse. I explained that this was
not exactly correct. but that 10 begin
an operation west of the. Meuse be-
tween september is and 20A as. he had
suggested, would be impossible II We
vvnTa n conduct the Gf Nffdfei offensive