Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-18

ticularly to visit Thiaucourt, but it
seemed to me still too dangerous, and
/ said: I'VE cannot take the chance
of losing prime minister.
Moreover the roads were filled with
traffic moving in both directions, SO
much to M. Clemenceau's disappoint-
ment l gave instructions that he should
not be allowed to go.
At luncheon that day with the Presi-
dent and Madame Poincare on their
train at Sampigny, just south of st.
Mihiel, they also expressed themselves
as being much pleased at our success
especially SO because the town was now
no longer under the enemyS guns.
After lunch we visited the site of
their residence, only to find that 1t had
been demolished by German artillery.
1t had been a beautiful though modest
house, and its location especially well
chosen to give one fine view of the
MeuSe Valley.
'C'est la Guerre."
1t was a sad occasion for them as
they looked over the ruins, but they
accepted it in the usual courageous
French way by saying simply: "C'est
la guerre," as did thousands of others
in Northern France, many of whose
homes had been destroyed, leaving
scarcely a trace.
AS we Strolled about two American
artillerymen, whose brigade happened
to be billeted in the village, came for
ward, and when I told them who the
visitors were they seemed to regard
my remarks as an introduction, and
both walked up and warmly shook
hands with the President and Madame
Poincare and then quietly went about
with us.
1t was just another illustration of
our democracy, and the President and
his wife were very gracious, though
much amused by the cordial and rather
unconventional manner of their guests.
l returned to army headquarters.
leaving the President and Madame
Poincare to be escorted by Col. Boyd,
who was compelled by the Presidents
inSistence TO take them to Thiaucourt.
M. Clemenceau, who dinsd with me
that evening, was much annoyed when
he learned about it, as I had denied
him the opportunity to go that far
to the front.
Marshal Fcch and went to st
Mlhiel few days later, accompanied by
Gen. Weygand and my aide, Col. Boyd
and as we walked around we found the
people generally going about their bust
The destruction of buildings was not SO
great as might have been expected, and
the work of reconstruction had already
begun.
FOch Enthusiastic.
Marshal Foch was very deyout and
wanted especially to visit the cathedral.
When we entered, he knelt reverently.
and, following his example, ali Of us did
likewise, remaining some minutes at our
devotions. Weygand told me that it
was Foch'S custom to visit the church
whenever he had an opportunity.
We went from there to Hattonchatel,
where We. had a fine view overlooking
the st. Mihiel battlefield, and as we
stood on this prominent point Foch
spoke with enthusiasm regarding the
battle. Having spent a very pleasant
half day, We returned to my quarters at
Ligny-e -Barrois for luncheon.
In accordance with the understand
ing of September 2. we were now mov-
ing rapidly toward our second great
offensive. Questions concerning the
concentration and supply Of the ele-
ments of the lst Army in the battle
areas were being worked out by the
staff of that army, who were given
every possible assistance by the staff at
O. H. @.
In my dual capacity as commander
in chief and commander of the lst
Army I was able promptly to place
disposition of the 1st Army. With
the headquarters general staff and the
services of supply both in excellent
working order, the business of the A E.
F., once general directions were given,
was well conducted and I was free to
devote my time to the operations.
Great Offensive Due.
The general plan Of action of the
allied armies, as agreed upon at the
conference of commanders in chief July
"a, was, to state it simply and briefly,
that the offensive should continue, each
army driving forward as rapidly as pos
sible. The allied and American opera
tons during the Summer had resulted
in the reduction Of the Chateau Thierry
AmienS and st. Mihiel SalientS. and the
great offensive was now under way. I'M
mediately west CT the Meuse River the
battle line had remained practically I'M
changed since 1917. 1t was on this
front the American Army was to play
its great part. In accordance with
Marshal Foch's idea, offensiyes we're to
be launched by the allies as follows:
(a) A British-French attack on the
general line st. Quentin Cambria, ad-
vancing between the Disc and the
Scarpe Rivers.
OBJ A French-American attack on
the general line Rheims-Verdun, ad-
vancing between the Suippes and the
Mouse Rivers.
(c) A combined allied attack east OF
Ypres.
Cd Between the attacks mentioned
above. liaison was to be maintained
by intervening armies.
These operations were to consist Of
attacks as nearly simultaneous as pos
sible all along the western front. II
successful they would force the enemy
either to disperse his reserves and
weaken his defense generally, or con-
centrate his reserve power at what APP
peared to be the vital points, to the
Jeopardy of the remainder of his line
The disposition of the Belgian
British, French and American armies
on the wide front between the NORTH
Sea and Verdun was such that they
would naturally converge as they ad.
vanced. So long as the enemy coulc
hold his ground on the east of this
battle line frontal attacks farther ives
might drive him back on his successive
positions, yet decision would be Ions
delayed.
Most Sensitive Sector.
His main line of communication anC
supply ran through Carignan, Sedan
and Mezieres. If that should be in.
terrupted before he could withdraw hi
armies from France and Belgium, thu
communications in the narrow avenue
between the Ardennes forest and the
Dutch frontier were so limited that
he would be unable adequately to sup
ply his forces or to evacuate then
before his ruin would be accomplished
AS our objective was the Sedan
carisnan railroad. it was gidsnt tina