Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-01

| necessary schools for mechanics and
chauffeurs.
with our country by far the greatest
producer of motor vehicles in the world,
| it was surprising that we were so poorly
equipped with them.
I AdviceS at one time indicated that
| the War Department was waiting for
motor cars and trucks to be mlanufac-
tured before sending any to France. This,
of course, was quite out of the question,
and 1 suggested that the environments
at home might use horse-drawn vehicles
and their motor transportation sent
to us.
Shipping Under British.
The motor transport procurement
was then IN the hands of the Quarter
master Department at home, and it was
my opinion that the transport bureau,
not knowing the extent to which motor
vehicles were needed, thought our re-
quests excessive.
AS to shipping, it was soon ascer-
|, tanned that practically all neutral ship
ping then in sight, estimated at about
100000 tons, considered available
on time charter, was under the Nor
wegian flag. In attempting to obtain
some Of it we learned that it was con-
trolled by the Interallied Chartering
Executive, originally organized with rep
resentatives of England, France and
Italy, but the determination of its use
was exercised by the British Admiralty.
The latter dictated the chartering of
such tonnage by Withholding bunker
facilities If any charters were granted
without its specific approval. This was
done under the guise of law in Nor
way prohibiting charter without the
consent of the Norwegian Association,
which was in effect under the direction
of the Interallied Chartering Executive.
Even the French government itself was
unable to obtain vessels seriously needed,
although offering special premiums for
direct charters.
In our case, after signing q charter
for IL steamers, subject to approval
of the Norwegian Association, our APP
plication was rejected. Thus many diff
ficulties surrounded this question, both
in France and in America. knowledge
of available shipping always reached
London first, and the British were at
that time somewhat unrestrained by
any sentiment for the allies or other
considerations than those which af-
fected their immediate interests. This
attitude in regard to granting the use
of shipping to others was apparently
not much affected by their shipping
requirements, as the spirit of co-opera-
ton did not prevail in any liberal sense
among allied governments any more
than it did among their armies.
Faced Defeat With Allies.
Our estimates of the shipping for
troops and supplies as set forth in the
plan by which due proportion of COM
bat and line of communication troops
were to form each increment of six di-
visions would require by June /, for
the shipment of "a divisions, a total
of over 100000 tons. No one seemed
to know where we were to obtain the
100000 tons of shipping in addition
to the 800, 900 tons we were then sup
posed to be using.
Il appeared almost certain then that
should disaster befall the allied armies
under these conditions we would have
to go down with them.
! always felt certain, however, that
tonnage could be found for our purpose
If the necessary pressure were exerted
to force it into use. Appeals were made
continuously and persistently in an eff
fort to get action on this vital ques-
ton, but several months elapsed before
it really came.
Taken as a whole, the apparently
slow progress of our preparation In
Europe also caused considerable adj
verse comment, if not dismay, among
the allies Inquiries were made direct
ly by the military and civil officials as
to why We did not move more rapidly,
to which the reply was always, Lack
of shipping"
It might have been added also that
1t was due partly to inattention at
nome to our requests and recommends
tons and to serious ineficiency in load
ing transports. many of which were
often sent loaded to only half capacity.