Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-13

when called for" although It was pos
sible that the situation might become
$50 serious that some Of our Infantry
units will be forced to serve with Brit
ish temporarily"
MY intentions were further indicated
by saying: Americans must not lose
sight Of the purpose to build up divi-
sions and corps Of their own" and also,
1--WE must avoid the tendency to ir1cor-
porate our Infantry into British divi-
sions, where 1t will be used up and
never relieved"
NV cable recommended that the In
farltry of two divisions should be sent
by British shipping and two by our
own, but that present plans should 60
no further than this. It was my pur-
pose not to become too deeply involved
in an agreement that would make II
impossible later to form our own mde-
pendent force under our own officers.
With reference to the meeting At
Doullens, mentioned in the preceding
chapter, there was much difference OF
opinion on what course TO pursue. &C
cording to Gen. Bliss. who reported the
situation to the Secretary and me
President Poincare presided, M. Glenn
enceau, M. Loucheur, Lord Miner
Marshal Haig, Gen. Sir Henry Wilson
Gen. Foch and others being present.
COngratulates FOch.
One suggestion made prior TO the
formal meeting was that M. Clemen-
ceau be selected allied commander In
chief, with Gen. Foch his chief Of
staff, but, as we have seen, the confer
ence itself agreed that Gen. Foch, a.
the senior military member of the
council. should be charged with CO.
ordinating the action of the allieC
armies on the western front.
It was, however. the prevalent Brit
ish view that Foch was simply q
Iiaison off1cer between the two armies
with advisory and co-ordinating au-
thority only. Although inadequate to
meet all circumstances, even this con-
cession was a stride in the right d.
recticn, and his position was soon to
be more clearly defined. In fact, Presi'
dent Wilson sent Gen. Foch the 1olloW'
ing message March %:
MAY l not convey to you my sin
cere congratulations on your new au-
thority Such unity OF command Is 9
most hopeful augury Of ultimate sue.
cess. We are following with profounc
interest the bold and brilliant action
of your forces"
Of course, Mr.. Cravath's idea fol
unity of command, as mentioned II
my diary, was never seriously COhSAo
cred by any one in authority. and u
fell short of absolute unity OF com
mand, but 1t would have been more
likely to have met the situation thar
the plan adopted by the Supreme wa
Council, which was q thinly disguised
attempt on its part to control military
operations =,
have been expected, because 1t woule
almost certainly have the effect OF re-
lieving the commanders in chief o.
their responsibility and placing 1t II
the hands of an agent not empowered
to do more than consult the com
manders in chief in an endeavor TO &c
their approval before taking actlon.
was entirely a makeshift.
Il fortunately led to the selectioi
of an allied commander in cnleI
which was probably what some OF IN
far-sighted advocates thought wouie
happen.
Tomorrow-Foch made commanoel
in chief; Pershing and Peta1n neal
clash on question Of American Army.
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