Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-24
FOCH FEARS WILSON
MAY GIVE TOO MUCH
A. E. F. Prepares to Wage
Vigorous Offensive in
Spite of Foes Efforts
to End HOstiIities.
CHAPTER LxXII.

mediate forwarding of an offer of peact
to our enemies :. There is now nc
longer any possible hope of forcing
peace on the enemy The situation
grows more desperate every day ano
may force the High Command TO grave
decisions {. :"
The chancellor yielded, and October
telegraphed, through the Swiss gov
eminent, to. President Wilson:
THE German government requests
the President of the United States *
take in hand the restoration of peace
acquairt all belligerent states with this
request and invite them to send pleni-
potentiaries for opening negotiations
1t accepts the program set forth by the
President in his message to Congress
january and in his later addresses
especially the speech OF September n
as basis for peace negotiations. With
view to avoiding further bloodshed
the German government requests the
immediate conclusion OF an armistice
on land and water and in the air.
"(Sdg.) MAX, Prince Won Baden,
Imperial Chancellor. >
Reply Not Satisfactory.
The Presidents reply was not salts
factory to the German government and
the exchange of notes continued during
the month. until finally the Germans
accepted the very frank statement by
the President, conveyed in a State De-
partment message october %. that 1.-THE
nations of the world do not andacannot
trust the word of those VINO have
hitherto been the masters of German
policy" and that 1.-The Government OF
The United States cannot zeal with any
but veritable representatives OF the
German people, who have been assured
of a genuine constitutional standing as
the real rulers of Germany
IF it must deal with the military
masters and the monarchial autocrats
OF Germany now, or IL 1t is likely to
to the international obligations Of the
German Empire, 1t must demand, not
peace negotiations. but surrender"
Meanwhile, with these peace negoti-
atoms in progress, and with our own
and allied offeiasiyes continuing to pro-
duce favorable results, 1t became more
and more evident the time soon must
come when we should have to consider
terms and conditions under which
hostilities might cease. The discussion
OF armistice terms in a general way by
the allies had IN. fact begun.
In q conversation 1 had with Mar
shall Foch October 10 he spoke Of the
notes exchanged between the Germans
and President Wilson. and expressed
some apprehension about how far the
President might commit the allies. He
said he hoped the President would not
become involved in long correspond
ence and allow himself to be duped by
the Germans, and added that so far
Mr.. Wilson had not consulted the al
lies.
I replied that he need have no fear
on that score, as. of course, Mr.. Wilson
would not act alone. In this discus
sion gained the impression that Foch
favored demanding the surrender OF
the German armies.
British Views Of Armistice.
At my request, Col Lloyd Griscom
cabled me the views Of Lord Miner
and Gen. Sir Henry Wilson, for the
British Briefly, Lord Miner said that
he occupied a middle position between
those demanding unconditional sur
render and those who wanted peace
Immediately on the best terms possible
He thought an armistice should be
many lay down her heavy guns and
give some naval guarantee such as the
possession Of Helgoland.
Gen. Wilson doubted whether II
would be possible TO inflict crush
ing victory before Winter, as the Brit
ism army was very tired and the French
more so, and the Americans not yet
prepared TO use their great force. but
he thought armistice conditions should
make it impossible for Germany TO re-
sumo operations.
Gen. Wilson regretted President VIII
sons suggestion of German evacuation
~ he
perfer TO fight the Germans where
they were than on their own frontiers
with a much shortened line. He SAID
the Germans should be required tC
abandon their heavy guns and retire
to the east bank Of the Rhine, and in
addition TO the surrender Of Helgo-
land should also give up some war
ships and submarines.
This British leader voiced the ex-
IRENE army viewpoint, but the more
conservative element in government cir
Giles advised against pushing Germany
too far for fear of having no gov
eminent there strong enough to make
peace. They feared widespread revolu-
lions in Germany might unsettle al
lied countries and imperil constitu-
tionsl monarchies. These hints gave
the general attitude of the British
as It was expressed later, when time
came TO dictate terms.
Urges No Let Up.
The 1st Army was a tried and sea.
soned force equal 70 the best on th'
western front at the time / turned i
Z, over TO the immediate command o.
Mai. Gen Liggett In order that tn,
Army might understand the value o
| its recent achievements and realize thu
urgency Of continued vigorous effort,
sent the following message to the new
p, Army commander October II TO b.
| transmitted as a telegram 10 corps anC
| division commanders:
Now that Germany and the centra
powers are losing. they are begging TO
an armistice. Their request is al
acknowledgment of weakness ant
| clearly means that the allies are win
ming the war. That is the best o
reasons for our pushing the war NOR
| vigorously at this moment. Germany
desire is only TO gain time to restor
order among her forces, but she mus
| be given no opportunity to recuperat
and we must strike harder than ever
Our strong blows are telling and con
| tinuous pressure by us has compelled
the enemy to meet us, enabling on
allies 70 gam on other parts OF tn
: line. There car be no conclusion 4
this war until Germany is brought u
| her knees"
The enemy's most important defen
sive position on the Romagne Height
was in our firm possession, and hi
final defeat was merely a question O
time. He had fought desperately +
hold mis- ground, but had been com
| PEELED 10 give way steadily before ou
effective blows We could have gon
forward without special preparation an
1 sa..sgr ~