Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-25

pose, a1OSr the Capture O4 TIC
Hindenburg line, to drive through
the center of the enemy's position,
capture the Bots de Barricourt ridge,
and Immediately thereafter, by an adj
vance westward to Boult-auX-B o's, out
flank the Bots de Bourgogne and the
enemys forces facing the French 4th
Army on the AiSne.
In discussing the coming operation OF
the LIST Army with Gen. Maistre, the
representative CT Marshal Foch, who
had recently been sent to coordinate
the activities our Army and the French
4th Army, he argued that our main
blow should be aimed at the eastern
flank of the Bots de Bourgogne. In
INV opinion the execution of the origi-
nal plan, which had been fully decided
in discussion with my chief OF stan,
Gen. Drum, and advocated by him,
would clearly be productive Of greater
results. therefore issued the following
instructions to the commanding gen.
eral, LIST Army:
"The 1st Army viii prepare to launch
q general attack October % with the OBJ
ject of securing control Of Buzancy and
the heights immediately to the east OF
that place. The minimum objective
to be reached the first day is marked
by the general line: Heights south OF
Aincreville-Bois de Barricourt-Hills
north Of Sivry-ies- Buzancy-Boi DIES
Loges. Immediately after reaching the
general line above indicated you will
proceed to free the Bots de Bourgogne
from the enemy and to gain possession
of the heights surrounding Briquenay.
The operations of your left flank will
be conducted in closest liaison with the
right Of the French 4th Army. All
plans will be made for following up
any opportunities to gain possession OF
the high ground north and northeast
Of BuZancy.
Continue Present Pressure"
"While preparing for the general at
tack as above ordered, you viii con-
stantly bear in mind that the present
situation demands that there be no re-
Taxation in the pressure now exerted
On the enemy. You will therefore 50
time the local operations which are
necessary preliminaries to the general
attack as to continue the present pres
sure, and will take immediate advan-
tage of any favorable opportunity TO
advance your lines.
East of the Mouse you will for the
present confine your offensive opera
lions to the local attacks necessary to
improve your present position"
The changes Of divisions and other
adjustments necessary in preparation
for this attack were being rapidly car
ried out. Except for those units In the
Argonne which utilized German dug
outs, all Of our troops had been with
out shelter Of any sort, as none ex-
road, so RELIEF for rest and recuperation
during this period entailed movements
Of considerable distance.
During the previous weeks OF furious
fighting against obstinate resistance
the LIST Army had captured the strong
est defenses on the western front, and
was now advancing through operations
which were preparatory to effective de-
livery of the final blow.
In the face of these splendid achieve
ments rumors reached me that the
French prime minister, claiming we
were not making satisfactory headway,
was contemplating another move 70
interfere with our control of our own
troops and force their distribution more
generally among the allied armies.
Certainly, M. Clemenceau was aware of
our steady progress and of the fact
that we had attained a dominating po-
sition. The end was clearly approach
ing.
Political Gesture.
~ WAS DUblOuog JLlSLGlOiEy blAdO ally
attempt on his part to discredit our
accomplishments would be purely a po-
htical gesture designed to minimize
Americas prestige at the peace con-
ference.
The demands of incessant battle had
compelled our divisions to fight to the
limit Of their capacity. Troops were
held in line and pushed to the attack
until deemed incapable of further effort
because of casualties or exhaustion; ar
tillery once ens, ged was seldom with
drawn. Many batteries fought until
practically all the animals were casual
ties, leaving the guns to be towed out
Of line by motor trucks or by hand.
Our men as whole showed unrivaled
fortitude in this continuous fighting
during Indictment weather and under
the many disadvantages of position.
Through such experience the Army had
developed into a powerful machine and
had supreme confidence in its ability 70
carry through successfully.
October % the combat strength Of
the A. z. r. was 1864 Of which
592,300 were in tire 1st Army The
LIST Army also included approximately
100 600 French combat troops.
While the high pressure Of our dog
ged attacks was severe on our troops,
It was calamitous to the enemy. He
had been so hard pressed that once a
division was engaged in the fight it be-