The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1931-07-31
CHAPTER xxxvlI-co,tinued

IDENTIFY depend upon the degree of In
struction of the units. In the crisis
that actually confronts the allied
armies il is electives that we lack.
The method of employing these units
is a question to be handled in due
course and according to their eff
cheney.
Pershing-I would like to have the
conditions under which these units
are to be employed determined now,
and to fix the time during which the
regiments and brigades will be used
separately.
Foch-Make your proposition on
that subject.
then explained the details of the
system that was being followed where
our divisions were in training with
the French and the plan agreed upon
with the British. / added that it was
fully understood that If an emergency
should arise while our troops were in
training they would 60 into battle as
part of the divisions with which they
were serving.
PerShlng RefuSeS TO consent.
General Foch then said:
II do not doubt the excellence of
the method, but in the crisis through
which we are passing | return to the
decision of the supreme war council,
and / ask you to transport during
May, June and July only infantry and
machine gun units. Will you consent?'
Pershing-No, l do not consent.
propose for one month TO ship moth
ing but infantry and machine-gun
units. and after that the other arms
and service of the rear troops to cor
respond.
Foch-If you adopt the plan / pro-
pose you would have by July 81, 30O,-
600 more American infantry.
Pershing-You said just now that
you would furnish the artillery, and
even artillerymen, which would be
joined with our infantry to complete
our divisions. Then why not consent
to transport our artillery personnel
along with our infantry?
Foch-I repeat that it is the in
fantry of which we have the greatest
need at this time. l would like to
have General Bliss tell us the consid-
erations which led to the decision
taken by the supreme war council at
Versailles.
Bliss-The collective note recon-
mended to the United States to send
only infantry until the supreme war
council should give instructions to the
contrary. The government of the
United States, in conformity with this
note and with the recommendation of
Secretary Baker, consented to this
plan. AS far as the employment of
the units on the front is concerned,
the question should be decided by
General Pershing according to agree
ment with the commander in chief to
whose army they may be attached.
Foch Fears Disaster.
Pershing-I have been discussing
this question of training our units for
the last eight months, first with Gen.
eral Petain and then with Marshal
: Haig. The method agreed upon leads
naturally to the formation of consti-
tuted American divisions.
General Foch said he wished to see
American divisions constituted and
an American army formed as large
as possible, but the policy he was
then advocating would have made it
impossible to form an American army
without serious delay, if ever. Con-
tinuing, he said:
D "But do not forget that we are in
the midst of hard battle. If we do
not take steps to prevent the disas-
ter which is threatened at present the
American army may arrive in France
to find the British pushed into the
sea and the French driven back be-
hind the Loire, while it tries in vain
10 organize on lost battle fields over
the graves of allied soldiers"
He was assured that it was fully
understood that if an emergency
should arise while our troops were in
training with the British or French
they would go into the battle and do
their part. | then gave him the num-
bers to be shipped during May and
told him that it had been agreed be-
tween the British and ourselves to
consider the question for June later
i informed him that the British ship
ping authorities now thought it would
be possible within the next three
months to transport to France 100000
men.
rpfnpQnRn OF
tack at Seicheprey on the Twenty
sixth division the night of April 2O-21,
mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter, that point was the focus of a
German raid covering a three-kilo-
meter front extending west from the
Bots de Remieres. 1t came during a
heavy fog and was a complete sur
prise to our troops, who were consid-
erably outnumbered. Seicheprey was
taken by the enemy, but cooperation
was re-established throughout the d.
vision and the original front was re-
captured on the following day.
In this affair we lost one officer.
so enlisted men, killed; IL officers, 176
enlisted men, wounded; 80 officers. 211
enlisted men, gassed, and five officers.
49, enlisted men, missing and pris-
oners.
The losses of the enemy in killed
and wounded were reported as even
greater.
CHAPTER XXxVIIl
The question of the shipment of
american troops, and particularly
their allotment to the allied armies,
had assumed very great Importance