The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1931-05-15
General Pershinq's
Story Of the A. E. F.
NqTR Aasiasa Nf@.papsS World Bg General
rh reserve incl
Reproduction IN whole m part 'i'0''HS' John j. Pershinq

training so that we viii have the
troops contemplated your project in
Europe for active service by May OF
June.
Military activities of allies on land
should be strongly reinforced by conf
bined navies and destruction U-boat
bases accomplished if possible. High
British army officers confidentially
condemn waiting policy British admir-
atty. In view of gravity of ship
ping question recommend our govern
ment insist upon aggressive policy by
combined British and American navies.
q. Our position in this war very
strong. Allies now fully recog-
nize dependence upon our cooperation
and we need not hesitate demand both
aggressive naval policy and full share
commercial shipping. Recommend
American representative shipping con-
ference be instructed accordingly"
U. S. Advised on Powder Needs.
Meanwhile. a study by a joint
French and American commission Of
the question of production of powders
and explosives in France showed that
the greater part of the raw materials
must be imported and that, due TO the
shipping situation, France in Deem
Der would produce only about half of
the current output. 1t was apparent.
therefore, that to avoid calamity the
United States must not only furnish
powder and explosives for all of its
own forces. but must supply about
half the French requirements. and the
War department was so advised.
By this arrangement a large saving
of tonnage would be effected, as the
weight of raw materials was ten TO
twenty times that of the finished prod
duct As nitrates for the manufacture
of powder and explosives had TO be
imported from Chilli, the hazard to
shipping would be reduced by avoiding
the long haul to France. Millions Of
dollars were expended in the construc-
ton of plants at home in an attempt
to produce nitrates, but none had been
turned out before the end of the war.
Dawes Made Supply Chief.
In view of the uncertainty of obtain
ing more than a limited amount of
ocean tonnage it was natural that we
should procure abroad as large pro-
portion of supplies as possible, and our
supply department began at once to
make inquiries to meet the demands
for construction material. subsistence
stores and engineering equipment.
Many sources of general supply had
been developed by the French and we
soon found ourselves not only in COM
petition with them and the British but
our different departments also began
to bid against each other.
To my mind the solution seemed 70
be merely a matter of coordination.
Therefore, I established a purchasing
board to consist of one or more repre-
sentatives of each service making pur-
chases of any sort, including the Red
Cross and Y. NJ. c. A.
Lieut. Col. Charles G. Dawes, Sew
enteenth engineers, we'll known as
man of large business experience, was
appointed as the head of this board,
the members of which were to meet
together and make known their respec-
tive needs and then agree among them
selves as to where and by which de-
partment such purchase was TO De
made. thus mutually assisting instead
of competing with each other. Under
the arrangement cooperation with the
French was established and the agency
became increasingly effective in ham
ding our procurement activities.
Couldn't Depend on French r. RS.
The use of railways for the move
ment of troops and supplies had never
before attained any such proportions
as in the World war and there was no
service except sea transportation upon
which we placed greater dependence
for our success.
1t was apparent that we could not
depend on the French without great
risk of failure at a critical moment
and it was evident that if we expected
the maximum efficiency in this service
we must provide our own personnel as
well as additional locomotives and
cars. all to be as far as practicable
under American management
With this plan in view commendable
progress had been made toward both