The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1931-07-03

also in August at the meeting in Paris.
except that the campaign under Gen
eral Allenby, then in progress in Pal
estine, should continue. 1t will be re-
called that these two informal confer
ences of commanders in chief had con-
Guided that the allies should remain on
the defensive on all fronts until the
Americans should arrive in sufficient
force to warrant the offensive.
See No End of War Until 1919.
The joint note was approved as the
decision of the council, with the under
standing, as suggested by the French.
that no white troops should be sent
from France to Palestine. 1t was decid-
eddy the opinion of NJ. Clemenceau and
of all others present who expressed
themselves that the war could not be
ended until 1919, when the American
army, it was thought, would reach its
maximum strength.
The allied forces at the moment
were superior in all active fronts, ex-
cept in the Balkans, but the Greek mo-
bilization, when completed, would add
sufficient strength to give the allies the
advantage there also. The American
strength was then negligible, but the
prospect was that we should have a
few divisions ready for service by
June, and by September possibly sew
tenteen or the equivalent of thirty
four French divisions.
The danger on the western front lay
in the continuous increase of the Ger
man forces and in their ability to con-
centrate in turn against the French
and British, and as neither had suffi-
cient reserves of their own it was
clear that unless some arrangement
could be made between them for ber-
ter coordination and support the war
might easily be lost before the Ameri-
cans should arrive.
Plan Allied Reserve.
The study of this problem by the
military representatives led to another
joint note which proposed a plan for
the organization of a general allied
reserve. 1t provided that the British,
French and Italian armies should each
set apart certain number of divisions
to constitute this reserve, which would
be called into action only in a great
emergency. The discussion of this
question became acrimonious. Haig
and Petain both pointed out that they
would be short of divisions very soon
in case of severe fighting and present
ed figures on the subject that were
very disturbing.
But the councils scheme was cut
and dried. The recommendations set
forth in the note were adopted then
and there by the council. The general
reserve was created and its control
was placed under an executive war
board to consist of Generals Foch, rep
resenting the French, chairman; Bliss,
the Americans; Cadorna, the Italians.
and a British general officer to be
named
At this meeting Mr.. Lloyd George
designated Gen. Sir Henry Wilson as
the British representative, to the very
evident disappointment of General
Robertson, who was present at the SEES
sion. The selection Of Wilson was re-
garded by the British high command
and the war Office as open disapproval
of their conduct of the war
Winter of 1918 Most Severe.
1t has been said that the winter of
1917-1S was the most severe of the
war. The cold was at times so intense
as to make the generally unheated
houses. barns and lofts used as billets
nearly uninhahitable. The gloom of
short days and long nights in the. iso-
lated and largely depopulated French
villages can hardly be described.
Then. as We have seen. there was
also shortage Of heavy winter cloth
ing. although frequent cables early In
the fall had called attention to the
probability Of deficiency. No doubt
the demands were greater than the
quartermaster department could meet.
but the relatively small number OF
troops In France going through the