Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-01-20
LOSS OF MEN FAILS
TO RETARD ENGLISH
Unpreparedness Brought
Home TO u. S. Leader
Again by His Visit 10
Flying Corps Field.
CHAPTER IN.

| At dinner the subject of cOnVerSat on
rcturally turned on tn military situa-
ton Of the allied armies, our own ir
! particular. They were keen to know
! about our Army, its organization and
size. and the prospects of our putting
troops in the fed. AS our active par
ti"irat on DEPENDED on many factors
such as training equipment and ship
ping my replies. of course. were in
definite and no doubt disappointing.
In turn we asked many questions
and it was especially interesting to hear
the Importance of artillery emphasized
| by its chief, Maj Gen. Birch. who
SPOKE of the difficulties they had expe-
rienced in supplying themselves with
guns that matched the enemys.
Referring to their lack of artillery in
| the beginning, Gen. Birch said there
was reason to believe that they had
/ finally alta ned a superiority over the
Germans A glance at the chart, seen
| later at the office of the chief of artil-
| lerv showed that the British had then
| 37l2 field guns end howitzers and 2.256
guns of other calibers which gave them
sufficient number of guns of all
calibers to average one to every Is
yards of their more than 80 miles of
| front These figures we're transmitted
! to the War Department to support nv
recent cable urging the expedition of
gun construction at home.
Told of Nivelle's Attack.
Sir Douglas told me some of the de-
tails of Nivelle's unsuccessful attack in
the Spring, how it was known far and
wide beforehand, and spoke particu-
larry of the consequent serious disaffec-
ton among the French troops. AL
fhOftoh ha had nlanod him Golf Yndar
Nivelle's command for these operations,
he had, he said. little confidence in the
outcome from the start. He also COM
mented on the failure of the French
| to cooperate fully on various occasions
His remarks entirely confirmed the be-
lief that I had long since held that
real team work between the two armies
was almost totally absent.
During my visit Gen. Sir William
(; Robertson. British chief of staff. hap
+, pened to be there, and we had a de.
| tailed discussion of the question of mar
| power Their casualties in the ARA.
| offensive during April and May hac
amounted to nearly 100000 officers ano
men, and they were preparing at that
| moment for another attack soon to be
made on Paschendale Ridge. This was
| the beginning of operations that lasted
until late in the Autumn, with
casualties which increased the total fol
the year to about 100000 officers and
men. The British high command, how
ever, claimed that they had inflicted
heavy losses on the enemy. 1t must be
admitted that the serious aspect of the
| general situation did not noticeably
dampen the aggressive spirit of the
| British Army nor weaken the purpose
of the war Office to continue.
! There was considerable criticism by
| certain officials of their government
/ regarding the excessive cost in mar
| power of these offensives, which. II
was alleged, could not materially affect
/ the final outcome. The superiority OF
| the allies during the first half of 1917
would no doubt have produced greater
results If there had been unity in tht
conduct of operations, but the allies die
not appear to realize that without II
| there could be little prospect Of gaining
more than a temporary local advantage
Disagreed With British.
The theory Of winning by attritior
| with isolated attacks on limited fronts
which was evidently the idea of the
British general staff, did not appeal t
me in principle, especially because they
could not afford the losses in view Of
| the shortage of men which they, them
! selves. said existed.
Scarcely anything more strikingly
! impressed upon me our unprepardnes:
! than what I saw during few hours
spent with Gen. Trenchard at thu
British flying field. where we witnessed
| flyers doing every imaginable stunt. anC
| saw planes of all classes, bombing
pursuit and observation, motors o.
different types and the thoroughly
equipped repair shops.
The outstanding thing, however
which it was gratifying to note later or
in our own aviation personnel, was the
| incompatible spirit and alertness of the
young officers and the enlisted person.
mel Every man seemed to be disap-
| pointed when flight of planes departed
Tor the trent without him.
Trenchafd was an expert flyer anc
probably the most progressive officer
of aviation in any army. Few people
then thought that the development OF
aviation could ever reach his conception
of its possibilities. He was very strong
advocate of bombing, and the British
were doing a lot of it at that time.
year later Gen. Trenchard brought
the British Independent Bombing Corp;
to our front. where it served under
my command for the st. Mihiel opera
ton.
This visit TO British headquarter
| was most instructive, as every oppor'
tunity was given us to study intimately
the details OF their wartime organiZa
| ton. After similar studies of the French
syetem we selected from each those
features best suited to perfect a vel
balanced staff for our own army.
Cordial Relations Established.
The cordial relations and good under
standing established between Sir Doug
las Haig and myself and between the
J corresponding members of our staff!
and with a number of the leading British
officers with whom we were later to hav
official dealings proved very advanta
geous. In London, long after the Ar.
: mistice, Sir Douglas, in an after-dinnel
speech. referred to this visit. which
happened during a period of depression
and said that our timely appearance
at his headquarters had aroused In then
strong feeling Of hopefulness for tn
future.
My diary at this time notes tn
following:
"Par.s, Thursday, July 20. 1917. Har
breakfast yesterday at the Crillon will
! Mr.. Lloyd George. He is alert ant
. energetic and has clear conception
! of allied problems. Took lunch will
!. Mr.. Balfour, who thinks We have rea
son to feel easier regarding submarines
REPRESENTATIVES of the various allies me