Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-23

ing the American effort and the
quality Of our training, must have been
surprised and doubtless rather discon-
certed by meeting strong resistance by
Americans on different portions OF this
a. i've battle front. especially when our
troops advanced at once to meet the
attack in open combat.
This defeat of the French furnished
the second striking confirmation OF the
wisdom of training troops for open
warfare. While the Germans had been
practicing for war of movement and
concentrating their most aggressive per-
sonnet into shock divisions, preparatory
to the Spring campaign, the training
of the allies had been still limited gen.
orally to trench warfare. AS our units
were being trained for open warfare,
this alone would have been sufficient
reason why we could not allow them
to be broken up and scattered among
the allies.
Recruits Sent Abroad.
American divisions were arriving be-
hind the British lines in increasing
numbers without the artillery and other
auxiliary componentS, but many OF the
infantry units were not up to strength
and much of the personnel only par
tally trained. The late arrivals, like
the earlier ones, complained Of the vict-
GUS practice of the general staff at home
Of frequently withdrawing large numbers
of trained men and replacing them
with recruits.
It was, therefore, of the utmost i'm
portance to push their instruction, now
fortunately beyond the possibility OF
such interruption.
Returning from the British front May
3d. I stopped at Sarcus to see Gen.
! Foch, and dined with him and his staff
It would be difficult to imagine a more
depressed group. They sat through the
meal scarcely speaking word as they
contemplated what was probably the
most serious situation OF the war. As
we still had troops that were not yet
actively occupied. suggested personally
to Foch when we were alone after din
ner that an early counter-attack be
made against the new salient, Offering
him the use of these disengaged troops.
Nest confldentially, he said, that was
what he had in mind.
Speaking of the I'd and Sd Divisions,
which had already been ordered to sup
port the French, I told him that he
could count on my doing everything
possible in this emergency, and that /
was ready to exert the utmost effort to
help meet this crisis with all our forces
then at hand, which he said Of course
he had never doubted.
In further conversation he seemed
more than ever of the opinion that only
infantry and machine gun units should
be brought over from the States, and
still apparently could not see the advan-
tage of having complete American COM
bat units or the urgency Of men to re-
lieve the extraordinary strain on our
supply system.
Replies TO Tardieu.
After the success of our troops we
were in no mood to listen to self-ap-
pointed critics. M Andre Tardieu called
me upon my return TO Paris the next
day and undertook to point out that our
staff was inefficient and offered
criticisms of our organization. AS this
was something he could not possibly
know about, replied that he had got an
entirely erroneous impression and that
our staff was second to none in either
ability or efficiency.
advised him that we had quite
enough Of this sort of thing from the
French, either military or civilian, and