Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-05-03
|ROOSEVELTS CHANGES REST
WITH INNER PARTY CIRCLE
Rank and File Of Democrats Will Follow
Preferences of Few Proven Leaders.
Tammany Probe Is Feared.

health has apparently been no imped1-.
ment to his being a perfectly conpe-
tent Governor Of New York, they reply
that the presidency is a tougher, mora
wearing lob. They say, not with mail
ity but merely as the expression Of
querying doubt. that they would feel
uneasy about putting upon Roosevelt
the heavy business of leading a three
month grueling countrywide compatgn
for the presidency.
Past Sacrifices Aid.
II Is true that in 1928 RooSevelt's
health was supposed to be such a. to
governor and imprudent to take UP thu
duties of that ONCE. When Smith. be-
ing then the Democratic candidate for
the presidency and wishing to have
every help in carrying New York State:
when Smith asked Roosevelt to 60 on
the ticket as candidate for governor,
persons close to Roosevelt demurred on
the kround that the campaign might
seriously retard Roosevelt's recovery of
mis- health. Roosevelt. however. upon
intimate urging from Smith, calamity
took the chance.
That act, by the way-thst Difference
to Smiths wish under circumstances
that made difference a sacrifice-that
act is today Roosevelt'S greatest single
political asset 1t Is the first law of
Smiths human nature and Of his polit-
ical technique to live UP to his obi
cations. And Il is largely In Smiths
power now TO say whether Roosevelt
shall or shall not be the presidential
nominee. Smith is by far the most i'm
portant one of the leaders who have
the decision in their hands. Unless
Smith is for Roosevelt unreservedly for
him, Fundamentally. and convincingly
for him-not merely for" him, but
fur" him, as they say in Illinois with
subtle diStinction-unleSS Roosevelt
has Smiths support in that sense and
to that degree. Roosevelt hasn't O.
Chinaman's chance without Smiths
complete and public blessing, Roose-
welt cannot get the nomination, and II
he should get the nomination he would
have no chance for the election.
Prosperity Is Issue.
Some Democratic leaders, considering
with conscientious earneStneSs whom Il
is best to nominate, feel there are bet=
ter men than RooSevelt-better in the
sense OF being more adapted to the sit
uation. They think the decisive issue
In the coming campaign will be pros
perity. They think sincerely that the
country's greatest need Is the restora-
"
believe that the one Democrat best
equipped to guide the country into q
new channel Of prosperity Is Owen D.
Young. They think that the next era
of prosperity for America must be ac-
companied by, perhaps based upon.
closer intimacy in trade and finance
with Europe. and the rest of the world
For functioning In terms Of 1nterna-
tional trade, they think Young has
superb experience and endowments. For
that sort Of thing, for the part that
government has directly to do with do
mestic business and international COM
merce, they feel that Roosevelt has no
particular ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS, Young
has conspicuous and proved endow-
ments.
Again. the next Democratic presiden-
tial nomination Is 1nextricably knotted
into the matter Of Chairman Raskob's
plank committing the Democratic party
to the wet position. To get that plank
adopted Mr.. Raskob and the leaders
associated with him need only to have
majority Of the delegates-and it is
fairly certain they viii have the ajor-
ity. The drys can hardly have ma
jority in resistance.
But to nominate q wet presidential
candidate Cor any kind Of presidential
candidate) 1t is necessary to have not
merely majority Of the delegates but
two-t thirds And it is doubtful II Mr..
Raskob and his associates will have the
necessary two-thirds. The dryS can
readily command the one-third Of the
delegates that can veto a presidential
nomination. Certainly the drys can
command an effective third If they have
good leadership, If they have q candi-
date of their own and II they achieve
solidarity and maintain 1t to the end.
Anything Can Happen.
In this situation-the wet leaders with
a ma jority. but not with two-thirdS-lie
the possibilities of countless complexi-
ties. To express the situation the.
other way round, the drys will not have
the majority necessary to resist wet
plank, but will have the one-third that
is capable of resisting a wet nominee.
Under such circumstances many things
can happen. eccentric outcomeS perhaps.
The fight on the wet plank will come
first and presumably will be won by
the vets. Thereafter, what will be the
state of the mind of the drys? Will
they say. In effect: THE vets have
beaten us and had their way on the
plank. Now we will stay here until
doomsday before we let them have their
way on the candidate" Or will the
drys say. in effect: I'VE have lost on the
plank and we might as we'll let the tail
60 with the deg. The vets can non1i-
nate any one they feel like, so far as We
care"
AS to the vets there are similarly con-
trasting possibilities about their state of
mind after they win the fight on plat
form. No human being Is wise enough
to divine what will be the net mass
psychology Of those LOO delegates, all
stirred up emotionally. after the night
on the wet plank. The whole picture is
much too complex to be explored In
advance.
AS to Roosevelt's relation TO It. one
can only say that the situation within
the convention will be full of quick
sands, charged with explosive mines;
situation in which the avoidance of
fatal miSstep calls for extraordinary
political talent-or incredible luck.
To turn back to the situation rs of
today one can at least record as clear
present fact that the national Demo-
cratic leaders are sufficiently disturbed
by various perils associated with Roose-
welt to cause them to hold themselves
in reserve and to keep other possibilities
as "aces up their sleeves" until the very
day and hour Of the national convention,
that will name the presidential candi-
date.
Edelweiss Protected
Rv Swiss ReoTIIatiOu