The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1931-05-15


err was necessary. French publications
and manuals were generally In accord
with this theory.
Ii the French doctrine had prevailed
our instruction would have been limit
ed to a brief period of training for
trench fighting. A new army brought
up entirely on such principles would
have been seriously handicapped with
out the protection of the trenches II
would probably have lacked the ag-
my's lines and the knowledge of how
to carry on thereafter.
1t was evident that the victory could
not be won by the costly process of at
triton, but that we should have To
drive the enemy out into the open and
engage him in war of movement In
structiOn in open warfare was based
upon individual and group initiative.
resourcefuIness and tactical Judgment.
which were of equal advantage in
trench warfare.
Therefore, we took decided issu.
with the allies, and. without neglect
ing thorough preparations for trench
warfare. undertook to train mainly for
open warfare. with the object from the
start of vigorously forcing the
offensive
Rifle Practice Urged.
Intimately connected with the ques-
ton of training for open warfare was
the matter of rife practice. The earli-
est of my cablegrams on this subject
was in August, in which it was urged
that thorough instruction in rifle prac-
tice should be carried on at home be-
cause of the difficulty of giving it in
France:
STUDY here shows value and desir-
ability of retaining our existing small
arms target practice course. In view
of great difficulty in securing range in
France due TO density of the popula-
ton and cultivation, recommend as
fast as practicable the complete course
be given in the United States before
troops embark Special emphasis
should be placed on rapid fire."
My view was that the rifle and bay
onet still remained the essential
weapons of infantry. and my cable
stressing the fact that the basic prin-
ciples of warfare had not changed.
were sent in an endeavor to influence
the courses of training at home. Un-
fortunately. however, no fixed policy of
instruction in the various arms, under
a single authority, ever was carried
out there.
Insensible TO advice, the inclination
was to accept the views of French spe-
cialists and limit training to the mar
row field Of trench warfare. Therefore.
in large measure, the fundamentals so
thoroughly taught at West Point for
century were more or less neglected.
The responsibility for the failure of
the War department to take positive
action on my recommendations in such
matters must fall upon the military
head of the department. which was the
general staff
There were other causes. as we shall
regularity in training to such an ex-
tent that we often were compelled dur
ing the last stages of the war to send
men into battle with little knowledge
of warfare and often with no rife
practice at all.
Military Police Provided.
The maintenance of good order
among our troops under the peculiar
conditions of service in France was
most important. and for this purpose
a force, under the control of provost
marshal general, corresponded to the
police department in a well-organized
city, except that its Jurisdiction in
Guided only those in the military serv-
ice. The British. whose situation was
similar to our own, gave us helpful
information regarding their system,
which. with a slight modification, was
adopted for our armies.
In our previous wars, the provost
guard. so called. usually consisted of
troops of the line detailed for the pur-
pose. but without any special training
for such duty.
Col. Hanson Ely was selected TO
organize the police corps and made a
good beginning in laying the founda-
ton, but, at his own request, he was
shortly relieved and sent to regimental
duty. His successor, Col W. 81. AL
laire, became provost marshal general
until the following July. when he was
relieved by Col. ]. c. Groome.
Brig. Gen. 81. 81. Bandholtz, on ac-
count of his special fitness for such
work from his experience as chief of
constabulary in the Philippine islands,
became the permanent head of the
corps in September, 1918.
Due credit must be given to each of
these officers but particularly to Band
holtz, for the smart appearance and
the high efficiency of this force.
The military police were indispens-
able in directing and handling traffic
during combat activities. in preventing
struggling and In maintaining order
among scattered groups of our armies
both before and after the armistiee.
The organization November 1, 1918.
numbered 463 officers and 1892 men.
spread over the whole of France.
tTo BE CONTINUED
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