Evening star., 1931-06-21
BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.

|HE very considerable animation
in official circles in washington
following the ChequerS confer
i ence and the various and some
what conflicting statements of
policy which have emerged from the
Capital serve to suggest that, at least
in administration quarters, there Is a
growing perception of the fact that a
German collapse must have American
repercuSSionS.
What, then, in the simplest terms,
would a German breakdown such as
every European dispatch now discusses
as a possibility have not merely upon
the Government of the United States
but upon the individual citizen? How
would his daily life and immediate in
tereSts be affected? Or is the indif-
ference which this individual now mani
tests toward the question, comparable
with his indifference in the days when
Europe was at war and America still
neutral, we'll founded?
In point Of fact, the individual would
be affected, directly and indirectly. To
take the simplest and most probable of
the present possibilities, II Germany
should interrupt the payment of repara-
tionS her action would be followed al
most automatically by similar ceSSa-
ton Of debt payments to us by France,
Italy, Belgium and Great Britain. A
sum estimated by former Ambassador
Houghton in round figures at 5000, ,Ooo,-
900 annually would be added to the
present billion-dollar deficit in the
Treasury and duly handed on to the
individual taxpayer in the shape Of a
bigger annual bill.
Masses Face Losses.
Such a process would, however only
kINV ~ III
senS. If Germany should break down
completely, II there were domestic dis
order, provoked either by q push from
the Nationalist Right or from the Com
munist Left, then in addition to the ces-
Sation of the payment of reparations
there would be an inevitable termina-
ton OF the payment of interest upon all
the various securities issued by Ger
many, by municipalities and industrial
establishments alike, and sold largely in
the United States.
This cessation of payments would not
AFFECT the great banking houses, which
originally issued these securities. It
would not be case Of the great Wall
Street firms whistling for their money
as the man in the street too generally
hnagines. On the contrary, those Sc
&alritieS have long ago been marketed
among the great mass of American in
vestors, chiefly among the smaller in
vestorS. Thus there would result a
very marked decline in the purchasing
power of the victims, whose holdings
certainly pass the $4,000, 900 900 mark.
The American domestic situation
would then be directly affected, the re-
covery from the present depression
would be to an unmistakable degree
postponed. Unemployment would find
less ready relief. Something like $780,
100000 would be directly withdrawn
from the total amount available for
That would be the immediate and in
evitable effect upon the home situation
Gern|sn Buying Cut.
But at the same time there would be
even greater indirect effects. Any do
meStic disturbance within Germany
would necessarily reduce German pur-
chasing power abroad. The ability to
buy fOodStuffS and raw materials, which
are the basis of our export trade with
the Reich, would be at once curtailed.
This would affect the farmer, primarily
and, in turn, still further diminish his
purchasing power.
Moreover, it is automatic in all Euro
pean discussion of the German situa-
ton that a collapse in Germany would
not be an isolated fact, but would in
Central Europe. All the countries be-
tween the Rhine and the Russian from
tier and between the Baltic and the
Mediterranean would be affected, all
would have their purchasing power
abroad reduced. Thus again American
export trade would suffer.
A German disturbance might take
one of two forms. It might result in
the creation of a dictatorship with Hit
Ter or the Crown Prince or some other
Nationalist and extremist in control; it
might, much less possibly, culminate in
2 Communist triumph. Either would
Inevitably provoke very loud echoes all
over Europe.
Tranquility Threatened.
A Nationalist dictatorship would cer-
tainly rouse France, Poland and Czecho-
slovakia to take precautionary steps, of
which the increase of their military
forces would be the first Thus the
prospect of tranquility and normalcy in
Europe would be abolished for long
time to come.
A Communist triumph, even if it were
short lived, would have an incredibly de-
structive influence all over Europe and,
indeed, all over the world. If by any
conceivable chance the Reds gained the
upper hand in Berlin, then the asSocia-
ton of Red Germany with Red Rus
sia would be assured and the danger to
all of Central Europe would be instant
and unlimited. Given the moral and
economic disintegration which Is tax
ing place in all of Central Europe, it Is
dificult to say where and when Boil
shevism could be checked. The United
States would feel the effects of any
such convulsion primarily in further