Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-01-22
American Chief Visits
Gen. Petain and Is
Questioned Through
Frenchman's Error.
FINDS OLD FRIEND
OF DAYS IN JAPAN
FOrbids Publication of
Portrait Because of
Superstition Among
Comrades of Allies.
CHAPTER XI.
CHAPTER KI.
I'm the organization of our Armies for
the World War 1t was evident that
If any considerable numbers we're


7 N the organization of our Armies for
the World War 1t was evident that
If any considerable numbers were
i to be sent abroad an additional
force would be needed over and
above the Regular Army and the. Ma
tional Guard.
The War Department therefore es-
tablished what was called the National
Army, to be composed principally of
men who were to come into service
through the draft. Most Of the divisions
of the National Army were organized
in August and September, 1917.
AS the time approached to begin the
training of the smaller units 1t was
found that after equipping the special
troops urgently needed in France there
was little equipment left even for the
additional men required to I'LL up the
National Guard.
Unfortunately, this made 1t necessary
to delay calling out men for the units
OF the National Army. However, con-
siderable numbers were called into
service and proceeded with preliminary
instruction, but the lack of equipment
seriously delayed their progress.
The development of the machine gun
as an Infantry weapon, following the
experience OF the RuSSo-Japanese War
had been carried to a high degree of
perfection, especially in the German
Army, where its value was more fully
appreciated than among the allies.
Far Behind All Others.
In this, as in every other line Of
preparation, We were far behind all
others. The question of adopting types
OF machine guns and automatic rifles
for our Army had been discussed at
home for years and test after test had
ma 10 hNNf fk.n u,
to decision was an acrimonious dis
cusslon in and out of the press between
the Ordnance Department and certain
inventors, with the result that when we
entered the war no definite conclusion
had been reached that would warrant
the manufacture of machine guns in
quantity, and we were without the ad-
vantage Of having made a start. Not
only were we without machine guns
but our organization tables did not an
tic1pate their use in anything like the
numbers provided for by the enemy.
10 equip our earlier divisions, eS-
pecially in view of the possibility of
an emergency requiring our early entry
into the line, arrangements were made
to purchase HotchkiSs machine guns
and Chauchat automatics from the
French. But, on account of delay in
deliveries, the instruction of our troops
AZ 1AAC use ia .ltACSe weapons was QecGS-
Saf1Iy slowed down considerably Not
withstanding these handicaps, our ma
chine gun instruction reached high
degree OF efficiency, and the most
modern conception of the use of this
weapon was taught in our schools.
At this time the production of the
Vickers machine gun was proceeding
slowly. With the adoption of the
Browning. following the tests in May,
both the heavy for ground work and
the light as an automatic rifle. their
manufacture was begun, although none
became available for use in battle until
September, 1918. The Lewis machine
gun. about which there had been so
much controversy involving the Ord
nance Department and the inventor,
was not considered suitable as an auto
matte rife, but was recommended for
airplanes
Our earlier divisions were seriously
handicapped in their preparation at
home for lack Of machine guns for
training. When it is recalled that each
division at the beginning of the war
was allowed only 80 machine guns and
no automatic rifles, and that under
our war organization over $50 ma
chine guns and 1853 automatic rifles
were required, the result of delay in
providing these guns needs no further
comment.
Reviewing Infantry Division.
My diary notes the following:
Paris, Tuesday, August 81, 1911
Visited billeting areas OF 47th French
and cur lst Division with Gen. Petain
on Sunday