Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-06-29

States and months spent in closest
observation. has real significance and
United States and in Europe, has writ
ah0r Of Ga tas booEs s aTs
Is the second OF series Of two. The
first appeared here yesterday.
BY ELIAS TOBENKIN.
MOSCOW By MaiD. The extent
to which unemployment elsewhere con-
tributed to the rapid progress of the
first two years of the Five-Year Plan, by
releasing to the Soviet Union on COM
paratively inexpensive terms some OF
the greatest engineering and construc-
tive experts of both Europe and the
United States, will no doubt form a
theme for the historian of the future
to speculate on.
AS the first tangible return on its
investment the Soviet government ex-
poets a marked increase in production
by four or five of its basic industries.
BY the end of the Five-Year Plan coal
production in Russia is expected to
have risen from a pre-war level Of U.s.
100000 tons year to 100.000,000 tons.
The output of cast iron averaged $780,
900 tons year under the old regime;
the five-year plan is expected to raise 1t
to 100000. Russia's pre-war cotton
production averaged 100000 tons a
year; it is expected to be raised to
650,000 Russia's oil production was
100000 tons in 1911. This, it is
forecast, will be increased to 100000
tons in 1888.
Soviet industrial leaders confidently
assert that by the end of another two
years Russian factories. built under
the Ffve-Year Plan. will make available
for Russian agriculture 100000 trac-
tors of 80 and 40 horsepower.
Peasants Leave Farms.
No perspective of the Five-Year Plan
is complete II it does not take into
account a parallel movement for the
industrialiZation and collectiviZation of
agriculture. which Stain is carrying on
in the face of even greater opposition
than manifested to his industrial pro-
gram.
Ten and a half million peasant
households in the Soviet Union have,
since the start of the Five-Year Plan,
ceased to exist as individual farm en-
titles. Their implements and live stock
have been communiZcd. Each peasant
has become part Of collective house.
hold-"kolkhoZ" is the Russian abbre-
Walton for (which works under in
structions from the government as to
how much grain and other commodi-
ties it must produce and what pro-
portion of these is to be be the govern
ment'S share.
The collectizivation policy of Stain
is one of advance and retreat-advance
two steps. retreat one. AS originally
announced. only 18 per cent of Russia's
peaSantry was TO have been commu-
nized by the end of the Five-Year Plan.
The collectivization was to come about
voluntarily. The peasant was to be
convinced by observation and expert
ence that working the land in a COM
mune is more profitable than working
singly There was to be no coercion.
Kulaks Hard Hit.
Actually impresSment rather than
argument soon became the chief driv-
ing force in the collectiviZation cam
paign. The better fixed peasants,
known as kulaks, who resisted such
forced collectivization, saw their prop
erty confiscated and themselves and
their families deported by scores of
thousands to the frontier provinces
there TO start life anew on less de-
sirable and sometimes totally unfit land
Close to 00,000000 rubles' worth of
property has in this manner been taken
from the richer peasantry and turned
over to the budding Communist farms
for general use.
In January and February. 1880, SAN
culinary peasant uprisings broke out in
various parts of the Soviet Union
Stain. in his now famous statement.
Dizziness from Success" blamed the
and overzealousness of certain officials
and directed that the collectiviZation
processes be slowed down.
Huge Group Planned.
However. in the Winter and especial
~ in the Spring of the current year
the former collectiviZation tempos not
only were resumed, but greatly intensi-
fed. The avowed policy of the Krem-
lin today (unless events force change
before this is published) is to have all
or nearly all of Russia's 100000 in
dividual peasant households united in
huge Communist farms by the end of
1888.
While the former tempos have been
resumed, new methods are being en-
ployed today to get the peasant to sign
as member of a collecSiviZation farm
and to part with his horse and plow
Peasants are not being shot or exiled
for refusing to go into 'kolkhoz"-
they are merely being boycotted. The
government owns the banks and con-
trolls the sale of machinery and the
distribution of seed for planting. The
official orders are to supply the COM
muniZed farms with these things in
the first instance. The peasant who
stands out for his individual acres finds
himself minus credit. minus ability to
buy machinery. He is an outlaw, or
almost so.
Official explanation Of the resump-
ton of the forced collectivization
marches which in the past have nearly
brought ruin upon the Soviet scheme
Is that Russia has at last entered upon
the golden period OF socialism indus
triallly. and that agricultural develop
ment must keep pace with industry
The peasants must adopt on the land
the methods and tempos employed BY
their brothers in the factories
Actually, the feverish collectivization
tempos are dictated by the Soviet's
ever-expanding building program.
Depend on Soil.
The products of the soil have today
become almost the sole means Of
financing the five-year plan. The role
OF the cities and their populations as
source of revenue is dwindling month
by month. The government feeds,
houses and amuSes its workmen at a
loss. The theaters, chains of Coop
erative stores, housing trusts, must
continually be subsidized bv the gov
eminent or cease to function. That
part OF national economy which in
other countries is grouped under the
head OF trade and commerce and brings
the government substantial revenue
In Russia is run almost universally at
loss, despite the profitable showing
by an occasional sector in this branch