The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1931-09-17

the enemy resisting desperately along
his entire front, but on the Both, by
a flank attack from the south, the
Thirty-second division captured Ju-
vigny. pushing a small salient into the
German lines.
Hard fighting continued August 81,
but by the end Of the day the Thirty
second had reached the important
Soissons-St. Quentin road, where it
was relieved September 2. The Thirty
second division had advanced nearly
three miles and its success contrib
uted greatly to the forced withdrawal
of the German line to the Aisne river.
Pershing Takes Over Sector.
AS prearranged between General
Petain and myself. the sector from
Port-sur-Seille least of the Moselle
river) to Watronville (north of Les
Esparges), forty-two miles in extent,
then occupied by the entire French
'f%hth army and part of the French
Second army, was transferred to my
command on August 80.
The front included the st. Mihiel
salient, which was between these
points, and embraced the permanent
fortresses around Toul. We had three
divisions in line on the south face Of
the sector, but the mass Of our battle
troops would not take over the
trenches until the night before the
attack.
Foch Springs Surprise.
August 80, the day 1 assumed COM
mand of the sector, Marshal Foch,
accompanied by General Weygand, his
chief of staff, came to my residence
at Ligny-en-Barrois and after the
usual cordial exchange of greetings
presented an entirely new plan for
the use of the American army.
The marshal began by saying that
the German armies were in more or
less disorder from recent attacks by
the allies and that we must not allow
them to reorganize, and that the Brit
ish would continue their attack in
the direction of Cambria and st. Quen-
tin and the French toward Mesnil.
Then, much to my surprise, he pro-
posed that the detectives in the st.
Mihiel operation be restricted and the
attack made on the southern face
only, and that upon its completion two
other operations be undertaken by
combined American and French,
number Of our divisions going under
French command
Pershing Insists on U. S. Army.
1 repeated what I had often said,
that the American government and
people expected the army to act as a
unit and not be dispersed in this way.
I pointed out that each time we were
about to complete the organization of
our army, some proposition like this
was presented to prevent it.
The discussion was somewhat heat
ed and much Of it was carried on so
rapidly that it could not be trans
lated. He continued to reiterate his
demands for the adoption of his plan,
but I had learned that 1t was neces-
sary to be very firm in dealing with
him, and finally said, in effect:
marshal Foch, you have no au-
thority as allied commander in chief
to call upon me to yield up my COM
mand of the American army to have
it scattered among the allied forces,
where it will not be an American
army at ALL
He was apparently surprised at my
resentment of his attempt to confine
American effort to subordinate roles.
and said, II must insist upon the ar
rangement," to which I replied, as we
both rose:
You may insist all you please, but
, decline absolutely to agree to your
plan. While our army will fight
wherever you may decide, it will not
fight except as an Independent Amer
lean army"
He said he was disposed to do what
he could toward forming an American
army. He then picked up his maps
and papers and left, very pale and ap-
parently exhausted, saying at the door
as he handed me the memorandum Of
his proposal that he thought that
after careful study I should arrive at
the same conclusion he had.
Agreement Is Reached.
My chief Of staff, General Mean
drew, and chief of operations, Fox
! Conner, were sent to confer with Wey-
! gand September and returned to
Ligny-en-Barrois with word that Mar
shall Foch desired to see General Pc
tain and me the following day. Mo-
toring to Petain's headquarters with
| Boyd and De Marcenches, we found
McAndrew and Conner had preceded
us and after lunch we went to Bonn
bon.
Opening the conference Foch re-
ferred to the note he had handed me
August 30 and to my reply and asked
my observations. Stating my attitude
on the desirability of carrying out
vigorous offensives to the fullest pos
sible extent, 1 explained that If it
should be deemed necessary to aban-
don the St. Mihiel project in order to
begin the larger offensive, which was
understood to be west of the Mouse,
I would abide by his decision.
In the ensuing discussion, while
there was considerable sparring, it
| raS q orood tho American army chOr1 n