Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-16

n
a reported a 100000 increase ir
cargo tonnage by the use o.
~ Dutch ships. Infantry and
machine gun personnel OF
four divisions were promised for tha'
month.
The allies were at last thoroughly
alive to the necessity of an extraordinary
effort TO provide tonnage for transport
ing our troops. After months of delay
and discussion they now realized fully
that the superiority of forces vitality
necessary to avert defeat must come
from across the Atlantic.
America had become their sole re-
lance. not only for the forces necessary
to save them from defeat, but for un-
limited financial aid as well.
Mr.. Bakers first-hand knowledge oil
the situation in France enabled him to
give a fresh impetus to the EFFORTS OF
the War Department. With Gen. Pey-
ton c. March as chief Of staff, the gen.
eral staff and the supply department
began to exert more energy. The war
Industries Board, reorganized under the
leadership Of Mr.. B. M. Baruch. had
taken definite control and direction OF
the Nations industries with the sole
aim of aiding us to win the war. In
the face of the crisis, activity at home
had at last replaced the apparent de-
liberation of our first year IN the war
Our hope for an improvement in
methods and a more competent co-ordi-
nation Of effort seemed about to be
realized.
Intense Energy Demanded.
II a similar awakening had taken
place at home in the previous Autumn
we should probably have had at least
one-half million combatants in France
for the Spring campaign, and they
would have been better trained than
those that were arriving. Moreover, we
would have been in position to answer
more effectively the allied arguments for
amalgamation. AS the larger program
contemplated the shipment of more
than twice the number of troops previ-
ously considered possible, preparations
to handle men and supplies demanded
intense energy in every part OF my COM
mand.
Construction of storage and the ex-
tension of facilities in general, under
the energetic direction of the staff de-
partments Of the S. o. s., were moving
more rapidly. So when cabled inquiry
came from the chief Of supply at wash
ington indicating that there might be
some hesitation in shipping over the
thousands of tons that he must have
known were badly needed. the only
conceivable reply was: Send over
everything you have ready as fast as
you can. The responsibility for failure
will be ours"
The aviation question began to look
more promising. According to recent
cables the shipments of airplanes from
the States were expected to begin in
May, and increased to 900 planes per
month by October. Although the man
ufacture of planes by the French had
slowed down for want of mechanics and
spruce, we had given them considerable
assistance, and there was possibility
that contracts might at least be par
TALLY fulfilled. These, with our own
planes, promised to approximate the
numbers that we shou-l need for such
Of our divisions as were likely soon to
be engaged.
Liberty" Motor Meets Demand.
During the preceding months the War
Department had made every effort TO
secure quantity production of an i'm
proved airplane motor called Liberty"
the design having been finally deter
mined and manufacture started. The
introduction of new design of our own
conception seemed the only way out Of
the bewildering confusion of this prob
lem, but it somewhat retarded our pro-
gram.
In the end this superior motor proved
to have been essential to meet an urgent
general demand, and requests from the
allies for allotments became difficult to
meet without neglecting our own re-
quirementS.
The burden upon our staff and sup
ply organizations in France became ex-
ceedingly heavy. The rapidly increas-
ing numbers of men and the precipi-
tate rush of supplies would be of no
avail unless they could be mustered in
orderly fashion for the contest.
The great crisis had found US with
fewer than $4,000 officers and men in
France March 81. Over 100000 were
supply.
There was great danger that the
enemy would be able to defeat the
French and British armies before sub
stantial aid could be brought from
America.
The war was up to America to win
or lose.
II our forces could not be actually
put into the lines in sufficient numbers
within the next few months 1t might be
too late.
Might Lose Opportunities.
No army was ever completely trained
or perfectly organized-in fact, there Is
no such thing except in theory. Gov
ernments or commanders who wait for
absolute perfection in organization and
training or who expect every detail OF
equipment and supply to be complete
before they act or, in a country like
ours. expect the thorough training of
troops are likely TO lose opportunities
and risk defeat at the hands OF a more
daring opponent.
It is necessary TO act vigorously when
the hour comes, whether everything is
in complete readiness or not. 1t Is
question of balance between opportunity
and preparation.
At Petain'S request the LIST Division
was withdrawn from the line near Toul
and sent TO Chaumont-en-Vexin, north
west of Paris, to go into an active sec
tor visited the division April l6 to
witness the divisions final maneuver in
open warfare before taking its place on
the front. Both officers and men were
in splendid condition, notwithsta nding
their long rail journey. and all were
ready for the test of actual battle.
Gen. Micheler, who commanded the
French 5th Army. TO which the lst had
been assigned, came also to witness the
maneuver and spoke highly of the con-
ditton of the troops and their efficiency.
The weather was clear, but still rather
sharp. The countryside was radiant
with its green meadows and early flow-
ers and one could not help thinking
how different would be those other
fields on which this unit was soon to be
engaged.
Regular Oficers Needed.
II.