Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-08


of cooperation and concerted action.
Cablegrans are Of course inconclusive
and uncertain, and constantly find
that even letters fail to carry Just the
spirit in which they are dictated.
when I write you,. Of course know
that our personal relations and knowl-
edge Of each other are too cordial and
entire to allow any sort Of misunder-
standing, but I haven't the same ac-
quaintance with the British and French
cabinet officers, and with them the
presumptionS do not obtain which are
always implied in our correspondence.
confess / am somewhat moved to this
idea of the necessity for my going by
my desire to GO; 1t is a tremendous in
SEPARATION to see our forces and to look
at the work which you and they have
done.
Cordially yours,
"(Signed) NEWTON D. BAKER.
Secretary Of War"
In reply, by return messenger wrote
Secretary Baker In part as follows:
II realize that very large under
taking has been proposed in the 30 to
100 division program, and that to carry
it out is going to require very great
sacrifices on our part. But, as you say,
the war has gone on long enough and
should be brought to close as early
as 1t Is possible for us TO do 1t.
Must Act Early.
"The main reason for an extreme ef-
fort on our part next year Is the stirlu-
lating effect that our immediate entry
into the war in a large way will have
upon our allies. II We should not DEM
onstrate our wish thus to bring the
war to a speedy end our allies might
not hold on over another year, and we
shall need every ounce of fight they
have left in them to win, not that we
have not the men and the resources at
war alone, even on French soil, We
would soon come to the limit Of our
ability to bring them over and supply
them.
June 23d, when M. Clemenceau was
at my headquarters, had an oppor-
tunity to speak about the use of our
troops. I told him they were being
wasted and that instead of the allies
being always on the defensive, an
American Army should be formed at
once to strike an offensive blow and
much impressed at such boldness, as
he had heard only of our men going
into French divisions as platoons or at
most as regiments. Soon after that
Petain was called TO Paris, and. I have
heard, was told my views. Anyway,
Petain soon began to take another view.
You know he has always opposed the
formation of American units under
their own commanders. Now both he
and Foch favor 1t.
Our troops have done well for new
troops. and the part they have taken
has encouraged our allies especially the
| 20 tn hnln q
counter offensive This offensive, be-
tween Scissors and Chateau-Thierry,
was planned some time ago, To be I'M
dertaken especially in the event of the
Germans attempting to push their line
south of the Marne or to the east be-
tween the Marine and Rheims.
Our Army Superior.
ct have had to insist very strongly.
in the face of determined opposition,
to get out troops out Of leading strings.
You know the French and British have
always advanced the idea that we
men had three or four months with
them. We have found, however, that
only a short time was necessary to
learn all they know as 1t is confined
to trench warfare almost entirely, and
have insisted on open warfare train
ing To get this training, 1t has been
necessary TO unite our men under our
own commanders, which Is now being
done rapidly.
"Our oficers and men are far and
away superior to any now in Europe.
| High officers Of the allies have often
| dropped derogatory remarks about our
poorly trained staff and high COM
! manders, which our men have stood
as long as they can. Even Mr.. Tardieu
said some of these things TO me a few
days ago. I replied. in rather forcible
| language, that we had now been pat
ronized as long as we would stand for
| II, and I wished to hear no more OF
| that sort of nonsense. Orders have
now been given by the French that all
Of our troops in sectors with the French
would be placed under our own officers,
| and that American division command
! ers would be given command OF their
| own sectors. This has come about since
nv insistence forced the French TO
agree to the formation OF an American
| field army -
Il entirely agree with what you say
regarding Gen, Bliss as diplomatic
| intermediary However, very little OF
my time has been taken up with that
sort of thing, except as 1t concerned
questions of troop shipments and their
/ tNa
know, I have the highest regard for
Gen. Bliss and our relations have been
| the most pleasant. think he is ad-
mirably fitted to represent the President
in many OF these perplexing diplomatic
questions that come up. He has excel
lent Judgment, and is very highly re-
garded by the allied official world.
Against Coordinate Authority.
ION the subject of Gen. Goethsls,
have about covered it in my cablegram
of today. thank you very much for
referring this matter to me. Mr.. Sec
rotary. our organization here Is working
well. 1t is founded upon sound princi-
pies May not emphasize again the
principle of unity of command and re-
sponsibility. 1t has always been my
understanding that you believed that
full power should be given to the man
on the spot and responsible for results