Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-27

(
| November ]. The American
| i Army was now able for the first
time to prepare for an offensive
| with some elaboration, under reason
| ably normal conditions and more nearly
on an equal footing with the other
armies. 1t was already on the front OF
| attack, the weather had taken favor
able turn and the morale OF the troops
was lifted even higher than before.
Our STATS and troops had become
veterans. French special units of artil-
| lery pioneers, engineers, rail and seTv-
ice troops had been largely replaced by
Americans. The Army was operating
in a sector which had been under its
control for q month and more. Hither-
| to, as on September IL and 20, we had
held the front but q brief period In
stead Of being several months on the
ground, as was usually the case with
| the allies.
Preparatory to the general attack the
| front line had now been reorganized,
1 inefficient commanders had been re-
placed by active, energetic men and large
| quantities Of ammunition, supplies and
| equipment had been brought up. Our
| line occupied favorable positions from
which to start this offensive. From east
Of Landres-et-St Georges to the MeuSe
we were beyond, the Hindenburg line
defenses, and at the Cote de Chatillon
, we danked the enemy'S positions IN
and near Landres-et-St. Georges. Hav-
Bois de Bantheville, We were within
striking distance Of the Heights Of Bar
T1cOurts
Planned Position on Ridge.
We had learned from reports and
from photographs taken by our aviators
that the enemy had greatly strength
ened the most prominent points back
Of his lines, while captured documents
indicated his intention OF organizing
position along the west slopes OF the
Barricourt ridge. The eastern spurs of
this ridge commanded all the crossings
Of the Meuse and formed q connecting
link with the high grounds east of the
river about Cote Saint German.
The plans, as already indicated, con-
ternplated first a deep penetration In
the center Of the front west Of the
AAeuse with the object Of capturing Bar
| left to effect a junction with the French
4th Army near Boult-aux-Bois. The
capture Of the ridge would give us
flank position which would compel the
enemy to withdraw to the east Of the
river.
On the right the Sd Corps (Hines)
composed, from right to left, Of the
5th Division (Ely) and Goth (Allenl,
was to support the right Of the 5th
Bots de Barricourt and carrying the
| Barricourt ridge at Villers-devant-
Dun. The 5th Corps (SummeraIl) In
the center, with the seth Division
| wright and I'd Uejeune), was the
wedge to make the drive to the north,
carrying the ridge west Of Barricourt
The Ist Corps Dickman), on the
left, consisting Of the e0th Division
| (Cronkhite), 77th (AlexandeT) and 18th
| CMcRae), was TO protect the left Of the
| 9Th Corps and later TO strike toward
Boult-aux-BOis The LIST Division
| (ParkerJ and the 42d (Menoher) were
! placed IN close reserve in rear Of the
5th Corps, to be passed through the I'd
and 8Oth Divisions when needed to add
impetus to the attack.
The personnel Of our artillery had
| quickly absorbed the traditions and the
| efficiency Of this branch of the Regular
Army. The value Of close cooperation
| with the Infantry was soon recognized,
| especially where these units Of the d.
| vision were trained together The adj
vance shipments Of infantry and ma
| chine gun units prevented combined
| practice In many divisions which had
TO enter the lines supported BY strange
artillery.
Artillery OvercOmes Handicaps.
A shortage had often compelled us to
keep some artillery units IN the line
to support successive divisions. Not
withstanding such handicaps, the bat
tie efficiency developed in our artillery
was unsurpassed In any army. This
was shown especially by the striking
success in this offensive of the well
| w-ln - xxInfrH1
materially aided the infantry's initial
penetration OF the enemy's lines.
Special arrangements were made for
| the artillery to employ our limited
| quantity of persistent gas against the
eastern edge Of the Bots de BOurgogne
and other selected points. The strong
est enemy positions were to be en-
! gagged from the front by specified units,
4 while all others were to push forward
rapidly between these points.
In the two-hour violent artillery
| preparation which preceded the attack,
| all sensitive places such as known bat
teries, ammunition dumps, strongholds
and cross roads were Systematically and
effectively bombaTded.
Three batteries of naval 14-inch guns
| on railway mounts and manned by
naval personnel had been brought into
| the battle october %. These guns out
| ranged any artillery on the western
| front and were used to good advantage
| against the enemys main lines of rail-
| wav communications.
| Machine guns were Of incalculable
aid TO our Infantry. Capable Of direct
and overhead fire and readily concealed
in flank positions. the machine gun,
alone or in mass. was the primary
weapon of the defense On the offensive
| our machine guns, often carried long
! distances, were kept well forward and
! played an important role in our attacks.
In the same way. despite the difficulties
single liRht-artillery guns were adj
! vanced with the troops for use against
enemy machine gun nests.
| Demonstrated Effectiveness.
The effectiveness of the machine gun