Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-07

hing complained, ana Wnlcn the
which the French could not fully ap-
preciate. In their own way they ap-
peared to be making an effort to aid
us, but Claveille undertook to keep
track of every detail of operation, even
to the allotment of each piece Of trans
portation to this or that use, and we
were left in a continuous state OF I'M
certainty.
Sufficient Cars Lost.
He would not believe that there could
be any method better than that OF the
French, which we regarded as anti
Quated. There were nearly enough dam
aged or lost cars and engines here and
there throughout France to supply our
needs If only they could be put in order,
and offered to send out experts to as
siSt in locating them.
With the object of obtaining control
over our own movements of trains, with
our own railway organization, Gen. w.
w. Atterbury. in charge of our rail
system, and had already made sew
eral visits to M. Claveille'S Office Again
seeing him January 81, 1918, I asked
that authority at ports, so far as rail
transportation and port management
were concerned, be concentrated in one
official, to which he agreed, although 1t
was not done for some time. He also
promised better cooperation in furnish
ing cars, but he had done that before.
We proposed that the French should
turn over to us a fixed number of en-
gines and cars and let us run them
ourselves, but Claveille was obdurate
and would make no such concession.
It finally became necessary to take the
matter up with NJ Clemenceau before
we got any consideration of this sugges-
ton.
with the growth of our armies and
the consequent greater need for port
and rail accommodations, our situation
threatened an early crisis not entirely
indicated in my letter to the Secretary.
The question of getting. our men over
seas as rapidly as possible was being
emphasized by both the French and
British then. The British had made
an offer to transport q number of bat
talions for service with their divisions,
as mentioned in the preceding chap
ter, and in my letter to Secretary Baker
gave my views of this offer, as fol-
lows:
PawnS Would Be Different.
although in serving with the British
we should not have difference in Ian
guage to contend with, the sticking
point of the thing is service under an
other flag. If human beings were pawns
1t would be different, but they are our
own men, and we should therefore study
carefully our national sentiment and
the attitude of our enemy and the peo-
pie toward the proposition.
Generally speaking, the Army would
be opposed to it, officers and all, but
really the question presented Is, Can
we afford not TO send over extra men
to help our allies in what may be an
emergency when the necessary extra sea
transportation is offered and we have
the spare men? AS already cabled,
there Is less difficulty in sending over
men than material and men will prob
ably be needed before the material can
be obtained and the men trained to
use it.
'If we agree to this, we must insist
upon our men being returned when
called for, or at least when we get over
the remainder OF the organizations
from which they may be taken, and,
besides, we must insist that the British
and French both do their utmost until
We can come In with q well organized
and well trained force large enough to
count. We must look forward to bear
ing q very heavy part in this conflict
before it ends, and our forces should
not be dissipated except for temporary
emergency. Moreover, 1t is unnecessary
to say, when the war ends our position
will be stronger II our Army, acting as
such, shall have played q distinct and
definite part.
"The Supreme War Council seems to
be busy at work on vigorous studies,
although its status as yet is not very
clearly defined. The opinion generally
prevails that its function is only that
Of an advisory body, although it is
credited with having q certain political
aspect. There seems little probability
OF supreme war commander being
selected, nor, as I am informed, is it
generally favored, especially by men,
berS of the council. All the allies want
concerted action, of course but for the
present, thorough understanding and
close liaisoA between the high COM
mands appear to be the only solution"
Conference Agreed Upon.
On that subject I had been dwelling
in conversations with Premier Clemen-
ceau and with Gen. Sir William Rob-
ertson, the British chief of staff de-
sired to see especially some harmoni-
/ Gus military understanding as to plans
of operation for the Spring and Sum-
| mer Of 1918. There was full accord
with my view, and a conference was
set for January ~, 1918, at Compiegne.
Field Marshal Haig. Gems. Petain, Foch,
! Robertson and myself and chiefs of
staff in the field. Gems. Lawrence and
Anthoine and Col. Boyd, were to be the
conferees.
My diary of that date notes that ar
| rangements were made for the 26th
Division TO so into quiet sector with
| the French near Scissors on Febrll-
airy S.
Among guests at my headquar-
| tiers that week were Gems. j. Franklin
Bell and Thomas II. Barry. 1t was a
| pleasure to see both Gems. Bell and
Barry and find them deeply interested
in all they had seen. Both were look
ing forward eagerly to service In France.
It was well known that Gen. Bell was,
and had been for some years. In poor
health. In fact, he spent some time
in the hospital while in France. Later
they were both found physically unfit
for service, very much to my regret, as
they would have taken high positions
in the American expeditionary forces.
Gen. Bliss returned from Washington
at that time to be our military repre-
sentative on the Supreme War Council.
Tomorrow: Gems. Pershing and Bliss
near clash on use OF our troops with
British.
Copyright. 1881, in all countries by. the
Nsh ss
Representation IN whole or y part pFshis-