Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-03

sion without artillery. Bulgaria can be
defeated and Germany attacked through
AuStro-Hungary, where Jugoslavs
would aid allies. American division
should arrive with as little delay as
possible for action before snowfall
"All Greeks, SerbianS and Slavs in
the American Army should come to
Balkan front to encourage Greeks and
Serbians and to discourage BulgarianS.
Declaration of war by the United States
against Bulgaria would greatly increase
encouragement in latter country, which
now considers United States her friend
on final peace congress. All British
troops are now leaving Struma section,
having been replaced by three Greek
divisions. One of every four British
infantry battalions is now leaving Bal
kanS for another front"
July 10 l went to Bombon, Gen.
Fcch'S headquarters, to discuss the en-
ployment of American troops. This visit
to Bombon, like all my calls on Foch,
was by appointment. The discussion
regarding their immediate use of the
troops turned on the question of relieV-
ing those still with the British.
Asked for Sector.
I told Gen. Foch that it had been
my intention, when circumstances would
permit, to withdraw our divisions to the
American zone for the organization of
our own Army, and I suggested that he
should have this done at once before
they became engaged, when the transfer
might leave the British in an embar-
RAISING position.
My idea was that our divisions could
be assembled for service temporarily
were needed most, perhaps confronting
the Chateau Thierry salient, where we
already had the Sd (Dickmanl and the
18th (Edwards) in line, the latter hav-
ing recently relieved the I'd (Bundy).
I'VE should look further than this
and decide upon a permanent sector
without delay added. Attention was
called to my tentative understanding
with Gen. Petain that the American
sector should include the st. Mihiel
salient, and to the fact that we had
done a great amount of work behind
that front, such as the construction of
railway sidings, yards, depotS, airdromes
and regulating station, which was
nearing completion.
I went on to say that with American
units scattered all along the western
front, assigned to no particular zone for
future operations we were postponing
the day when an American Army would
be able to render its greatest help to the
allied cause.
stressed the point that we were
frittering away our resources for lack
of a plan and were not able to utilize
the full capacity Of our facilities.
Wanted st. MihieI Salient.
Instead of thinking of the future, even
the immediate future, we were merely
temporiZing. If we were to do our part
to the best advantage we should have
q definite place on the front which
could be served by our own lines of COM
munication.
again pointed out that the British
were compelled to remain in the north,
and that the French were covering
Paris and the area west of Verdun. and
that 1t seemed logical that we should
hold to our original idea as to the To-
cation of an American sector. Also that
from strategical point Of view the
new line resulting from the reduction of
the st. Mihiel salient would afford a
most favorable base for a later offensive
toward the vital part of Germany and
deprive her of some of her resources in
iron and coal. / therefore strongly
recommended this operation as the first
American offensive.
In reply Gen. Foch said he was glad
our views on the situation were so
nearly alike.
To-day, when there are a million
Americans in France" he added, 1T am