Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-29

NARIS.-Snce last wrote mere
- there has occurred one Of those
dramatic transformations in Eu-
4 ropean politics which since the
war have arrived at precisely the
moments when affairs seemed to be
drifting to q wholly hopeless impasSe.
And while it Is perhaps too soon 10
attach unlimited Importance to the
Anglo -French-Italian naval agreement,
it is at least plain that it may prove
as beneficial as the Locarno agreements,
which, without definitely settling any
thing, gave Europe a truce of several
years and breathing spell of incalcu
able value following the disastrous crisis
precipitated by the occupation Of the
Ruhr.
In the consideration Of this naval
agreement it is plain that it has two
phases. 1t is on the one hand the cul-
mination Of Fascist foreign policy, pur-
sued with a central purpose more or
less infiexible and emphasized by a
| series OF actions and gestures which
have again and again troubled the sur
face of European affairs and seemed to
pi esage grave crises. If not actual con-
flict. In the present article l shall dis
cusS this more or less historical aspect,
and in the next the outlook for the
| future.
Behind all the various actions of
FasciSm and its chosen leader, Muse
| lini, there has always, been the fixed
purpose to obtain for Italy the prestige
and the perquisites of a first-class
poWer-things which most Italians have
| thought were denied to their country
from the moment of its uniflcation
| right down to the present hour. In
| point of fact, the arrival of FasciSm to
power was in no small measure the
consequence of the feeling that Italy
had been robbed of her just rewards by
the peace treaties, whereas the great
prizes had fallen to France, Britain and
the succession powers.
When, however MuSsolini, following
the march on Rome, came to power he
| found his country on the one hand
shaken by domestic differences and on
| the other isolated and impotent abroad.
Europe was controlled by France and
| Britain when they were agreed. When,
as in the matter of the Ruhr occupa-
ton. they disagreed, France, with her
military allies. Poland and the Little
Entente, remained master.
Italy More or Less Isolated.
The first considerable venture of Fas-
ciSt foreign policy, the occupation OF
| Corfu, while precipitating a European
crisis, ended unhappily for the Italians.
Thereafter. with brief delay, the arrival
of a close entente between France,
Britain and Germany, emphasized by
the personal cooperation of BRAND,
Chamberlain and Stresemann in the
Locarno policy, left italy at one side.
European policy was henceforth for sew
! eTal years dictated by France. Ger
many and Britain, while Italy remained
more or less isolated and almost COM
pletely without influence.
In this period a multitude Of incl
dents combined to accentuate Franco
| italian bitterness, which had arisen at
the peace conference out Of the convic-
| ton of the Italians that Clemenceau
had sacrificed his italian ally to his
Anglo-Saxon partners. In addition the
| Italians saw in the French system of
alliances not only q barrier to their own
influence in Central Europe but COM
bination of military forces which men
aced them upon their eastern and
western Alpine frontiers. Furthermore,
| the FaScists saw in the asylum given by
France to the enemies of the Mussolini
regime q deliberate threat to the in
ternal security Of Fascism.
Basically, then, Italy sought to break
the French circle, to destroy the So
called French hegemony in Europe, to
re-establish italian position as a great
| power. The obvious line of action was
to establish some sort of Italian-Ger
T0An COnDlnaLlOn. But WI1lle SLreSe-
mann lived his determination to make
permanent entente with France
blocked the way. All that could be
accomplished was some sort of vague
anti-French combination, with Albania,
Hungary and Bulgaria as possible part
nerS OF Italy.
But it was not until Stresemann died,
not until the British Labor party came
to Office, resolved to break the union
between France and Britain, and finally
not until the rise of the National So
! cialistS in Germany that Mussolini
found any real opportunity. During
the past two years, however, the diSin-
| tegration in Europe has gone forward
with such great rapidity that Fascism
at last came into its own.
For the past year there has been de-
veloping the discussion of a new anti
French constellation, with Italy, Ger
many and Russia as the major partners.
The line Rome Berlin Moscow has
found daily exploitation. Europe has
seemed on the point of a new division
into groups. And all of this movement
eliminated last Summer when Mussolini
publicly proclaimed Italian advocacy of
the principle of territorial revision in