Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-08

OF the central powers expected
il the Spring, bit to use them Ell
ie-tively close cooperation among COM
manoeis would b. imperative. With
this in mind l proposed to Prime Min
lister Clsmenceau that the commanders
in-chief and chiefs of stats should get
together to examine the situation and
If possible determine q general program
Of combined action.
M. Clemenceau at once approved the
suggestion. 1t was also favorably re-
ceived by Gen. Foch who, 1t will be re-
called, was chief of the French general
staff. proposed that the meeting be
held at my headquarters, but the
French selected Compiegne, Petain's G..
H. Q.
At the meeting, January "a, 1918,
Gen. Robertson, for the British, spoke
first, and suggested general state
ment as to: "a Mutual support b.
tween allied armies, 90 situation as 70
reserves, CD question of troops in Italy
~ sftust ton as to the transportation
" the American Army and facilities
given it in France.
Gen. Petain thought that for the
present the allies would be forced to
remain on the defensive because of lack
of men, He said the French Army had
81 divisions with an infantry strength
Of from 5000 to 5000 men each, some
30-odd of these divisions being in re-
serve and the rest in the trenches. be-
sides 8 cavalry divisions, of which
were dismounted and mounted.
Prepared for Defense.
All divisions, he thought, could be
kept up until April if there should be
no fighting, but later on, even without
battle, he would have to break up five
divisions to maintain the others. the six
mounted cavalry divisions would have
to be reduced to four, and before the
end Of the year the total force would
have to be reduced by 20 divisions.
Assuming that the allies must remain
on the defensive, he was prepared, he
said, to retire to successive lines. He
explained that they had organized Of
fenSive operations on four army fronts
to be utilized according to circum-
stances, with force Of about is di-
visions in each one, and that they
would be ready to transport available
reserves by rail either to relieve tired
troops or assist in the defense of any
threatened front. The French reserves
would be at the disposition Of Sir Doug
las Haig, and he expected q similar ar
rangement to be made by the British
The reserves, he said, were so located
that they could be started in any d.
rection within IL hours.
Sir Douglas said the British had
adopted the same policy as the French,
one-third of their divisions being In re-
serve and the rest In line; that he had
three lines Of resistance and that he
had prepared three different localities
for offensive actions of about five d.
visions each. one in the direction Of
Gonnelieu, the second toward Lens and
the third in the vicinity of Cheluvelt-
Becelaere
Gen. Foch declared that the best
means Of hating strong and persistent
offensive was a powerful counter-of-
fensive, and he thought that we should
draw some lessons from the experience
CT 1916. At that time, he said, an Of
fenS1ve had been prepared by the al
lies on the Somme, which was delayed
by the unexpected German attack on
Verdun.
THE German offensive at Verdun was
stopped not by our resistance there,
but by our offensive on the Somme in
1915" said Gen. Foch. Such an opera
ton is possible only when foreseen and
prepared beforehand. In planning for
the counter-onensive think that the
entire front must be considered as q
WAlOAC 0IA0 IlOt JklC 90 OklC
and the British as another. The plan
must envisage them together preparing
for offensive action on q common bat
tlefleld with all the forces at their dis
posal."
Petain and FOch Differ.
Gen. Petain said the situation was
different from that at the battle of YER
dun, and that "the Germans attacked
at only one point, with only las divis-
ions at their disposal Now they will
have ITO, 100 or possibly 400 divisions,
and they can attack at three points at
once or successfully, and at each point
the attack can be more violent than at
Verdun"
when they attack at one point"
Gen. Petain asked, should we then
launch a counter attack" Answering
his own question. he said: I'VE can not
prepare such q counter-attac because
we shall not know where the enemy Is
going to strike and we must be ready
with some reserves to meet it. We must
be very prudent"
Foch remarked one could not fix the
moment of attack beforehand and that
the counter offensive launched on the
Somme to which he had referred had
it could not have taken place. He did
not favor these small counter attacks,
but thought we should look forward to
a grand offensive action with all posi-
BILE force, French, British and American.
Gen. Petain agreed in principle, but
stated that the suppression of 20 d.
visions would leave them without avail
able troops for an offensive.
Gen. Robertson declared that It was
not certain that the enemy would at
tack In so many places at once and
that It did not seem possible to do more
than prepare to support the army that
might be attacked and be ready TO coun-
ter-attack.
Anyway" he said, zone cannot win
the war by remaining on the defen-
sive," and he then inquired of Foch
how and where one ought to prepare for
this counter offensive.
Gen. Foch said he had not been
charged with studying q combined
counter offensive and could not tell
where the principle would be applicable,
but it would be necessary for US to pre-
pare for q great offensive together. Gen
Robertson expressed accord with Foch,
but he did not see where or with what
means such an offensive could be ex-
ecuted, and again stated that the war
could not be won by remaining on the
defensive.
Insisted on Own Trent.
"oive US back the troops from Sa-
lonil1i and we will commence ofIen-
sives," said Gen. Haig.
I'VE were not speaking Of offensives
but of counter-offensives," Gen. Focf
replied.
Gen. Robertson remarked that o.
course the French and British could 70
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