Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-01-29

a new system based on few hours OF
heavy bombardment, principally with
gas shells, followed by a violent assault
on the forward positions by picked bat
talions supported by an unusually
heavy concentration Of machine guns
and other portable weapons. The de-
Tense once broken, fresh troops held
close in the rear poured through the
lines of the leading troops and, IN
creasing the momentum Of the attack,
rapidly carried the fight beyond the
intrenched positions. This plan had
already been tested in the battle Of
Riga, where a complete rupture Of
opposing fortified lines was accom-
plished and the fighting successfully
carried on in the open.
The demonstration at Riga by Gen.
Won Hutier'S army was convincing
proof Of the soundness of the plan and
Isof the correctness of the doctrine OF
training for open warefare that we were
so persistently following in France, and
so continuously trying to impress upon
the War Department at home. 1t sim
ply proved that nothing in the Great
War had changed this age-old pr1n-
ciple of the art Of war. Thenceforth
this method was to characterize Ger
man attacks, and the capture OF Riga
was the precursor of Capcretto and the
series of strokes by the central powers
| later on, which were more or less uni
formly successful.
Forced Into Open.
The most delicate phase Of the sys-
tenn was the secret concentration close
To the front of the large force neces-
sary. This was usually accomplished
by a series of night marches, the
troops being concealed by day in VII
lagos and woods Under German con-
troll and reinforced by seven picked
German divisions, the Austrian forces,
| following out this plan, completely sur
prised the Italian army on q 30-kllo-
meter frCnt near Carporetto OCTOBER
| "a, during a heavy fog, and succeeded
in breaking entirely through their lines
on the first morning, rapidly forcing
the Italians into the open. The adj
vance crossed the Isonzo River, anc
German troops we're over the frontier
by the 25th.
| second army, which stood the brunt OF
the attack, has been attributed TO well
organized propaganda on the part OF
| the AustrianS, who were said 10 nave
fraternized with the Italians on the
| theory that they were brothers, ana
that If they declined to fignt each
other the war would end. But the IN
herent weakness of the Italian position
was not overlooked by the Germans
| II appears, entirely from italian
! sources, that there was an actual gap
| in the italian lines between their
second and third armies at Toiman'
where the Austrian outposts held a
commanding position on the hlgh
| ground in the interval.
The italian reserves were nisul-
ficient, few defensive positions hao peen
1 tFA
| the Isonzo we're inadequate ana the
sIInply depots, which we're in front OF
the Tagliamento, were too far forward.
At anv rate. the third army was LETT
| in a critically exposed position from
which it barely escaped by a rapid re-
| retreat.
Before the operation ended November
10 the enemy had advanced some sixty
odd miles and was confronting Gen.
Cadorna's men on the Piave. More
than 100000 prisoners, 5000 pieces OF
artillery and immense quantities OF
supplies were captured by the enemy.
All the Italian gains in the war were
wiped out during the first SO hours
of this battle. Seemingly in an instant
the cause Of the allies had been dealt
a master blow and five British and
six French divisions we're rushed to
Italy to save the situation. This VIC
tory tremendously strengthened the
! hands of the German government.
One CLEAN of light was revealed
| in this dilemma and that was that
| the magnitude Of the disaster and
its immediate affect on all the allies
| forced a realization of the necessity
Of understanding and cooperation. They
soon after made a really determined
effort to secure unity of command
through the Rapallo agreement, though
| later disaster still more serious was
necessary before this ideal could be
finally accomplished, all of which will
be discussed later on.
Started New Docks.
Toward the end of October, accom-
panied by Gems. Richard N. Batch
| ford and Mason M. Patrick, and Coils.
Charles r. Krauthof and Dovid S.
Stanley, I visited Bordeaux, one of the
ports chosen for the use of American
troops. AS facilities were only sufficient
| to accommodate a limited amount of
additional medium draft shipping, we
had started the construction of new
docks at BaSSens, IL miles below, where
deep water would permit vessels to
come alongside. Although considerable
quantities of material had been sent
over, this new construction was delayed
principally because of the lack of pill
| ing WHICH DUe engineers IldQ pldIlIleu
to have brought from the Pacific Coast
An incident happened in connection
with the shipments of piling from
home that would have been amusing
n it had not been 50 serious.
- One ship that reached Bordeaux was
supposed to be loaded with especially
long piling, but upon inspection the
engineers found it much shorter than
prescribed. Upon inquiry, 1t was learned
that to get the piles in between bulk
heads the supercargo had sawed the
ends off. While speaking of forest
products, another example of inef-
ffciencv that occurred a little later
nioht be mentioned.
One of the vessels from home was
loaded by the Quartermasters Depart
ment with shavings for the cold
storage plant instead of steel billets
for the manufacture of guns when tons
nf sawdust and shavings could have
been obtained from logging districts In
France.
Continuing the inspection, we went
on SUNDAY to Cornau, about 40 miles
from Bordeaux, thinking it might pos
sbly be available for our use later on.
It was tfen occupied by brigade Of
dissffectod Russians who, like most of
their fellows, had defied their officers
and refused to participate further In
the war. After being withdrawn from
the line they had given the French so
much trouble. even to committing