Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-16

Sc
passing through the heart of the salient
and along the eastern slope of the
heights of the Mouse.
The Woevre is seriously affected by
the wet season, which begins about the
middle of September In dry weather
the water supply is difficult, while dur
ing the rainy period the country be-
comes flooded, rendering many Of the
roads impossible.
During four years occupation the
Germans had strengthened the natural
defensive features by elaborate forth
f1cations and by dense network Of
barbed wire that covered the entire
front. There were four or i've defen-
sive positions, the first of which in
cluded the outpost system, the fourth
being the Hindenburg line, back Of
which were a series of detached works,
and in the rear the permanent FORTH
cations Of Metz and Thionville.
WithstoOd All French Attacks
The strength of the defenses had
been fully demonstrated earlier in the
war, when powerful attacks of the
French launched against various points
of the line had been defeated with
heavy losses.
The salient was practically q great
field fortress. It had, however, the
characteristic weakness Of all salientS
in that 1t could be attacked from both
flanks In converging operations, and
this was the essence of our plan. The
heaviest blow was to be from the
south, where there were no great
natural features to be overcome, while
the secondary attack was to drive in
from the west to join up with the main
attack in the heart of the salient.
The principal obstacle to success was
the exceptional strength of the hostile
position. Aside from all the elaborate
field Notifications he had constructed,
the enemy had tremendous advantage
In observation and in communications.
In addition, the wooded areas, with
their protection for machine guns quick
firing artillery and reserve units con-
stituted formidable obstacles.
In our original plans it had been my
purpose to follow the crushing of the
salient with an immediate continual
ton of the offensive to drive through
the Hindenburg line and go as much
farther as possible, depending upon
the success obtained and the opposition.
AS we have seen, however, the agree
ment reached in conference September
Q limited the operations to the reduc-
ton of the salient itself. The basic
features Of the plan were not altered,
but its detectives were limited and the
number Of troops to be employed were
reduced
A tactical surprise was essential to
success, as the strength of the position
would permit small enemy forces to
1nfltct heavy losses on attacking troops,
and therefore no time should be afford
ed the enemy to bring up reinforce
ments. The salient had been regarded
for some time as a quiet sector and was
usually occupied by seven enemy d.
visions In the front line, with two in
reserve. 1t was estimated that the
enemy could reinforce it by two di-
visions in two days, two more in three
days, and as many divisions as were
a1Nailable in four days.
From captured documents and other
sources Of information it seemed rea-
sonable to conclude that the enemy
had prepared plan for withdrawal
from the salient to the Hindenburg line
In case of heavy allied pressure There
was no doubt he was aware an Ameri-
can attack was probable.
We were again concerned over re-
ports from the French and even the
Germans that an American offensive
was expected in the direction of Metz.
pected such an attack, he would in
crease his strength on that front. Any
special measures the enemy should take
TO this end would make our task more
difficult, and as anything short of COM
plete success would undoubtedly have
been seized upon to our disadvantage
by those Of our allies who opposed
the policy Of forming an American
army no chances of a repulse in our
first battle could be taken.
These considerations prompted the
decision to use some of our most ex-
perienced divisions along with the
others. If it had been possible later I
would have liked to hold out more of
these older divisions for use. in the
larger offensive which was planned, but
they had already been committed before
1t was definitely decided we should have
the Meuse- Argonne front.
Fooled Germans on BOmbardment.
AS the plans for the battle neared
completion the duration of the pre-
liminary artillery bombardment came
up for consideration as affecting the
element Of surprise. Practically all
previous attacks by the allies had been
preceded by severe commandments, in
some instances lasting days. If we
should pursue the same method the
enemy would, Of course, be fully
warned Of the attack. decided there
fore that there should be only enough
preliminary artillery fire to disconcert
the enemy and still not leave him time
to withdraw or bring up reserves in
any number before we could attack
"A reasonable amount of firing would
give encouragement to our own troops
and would be especially advantageous
IN case rain should make the ground
difficult for the tanks. The length of
time for the preliminary bombardment
was therefore fixed at four hours, which
proved wise.
In the order of battle for the main
attack, the LIST Corps Uiggett) was
on the right, with the 82d Division
tBurnham) astride the Moselle, and
the Goth (Allen), the 5th (dcAfahon),
and the I'd Uejeune) in order from
east to west. Then came the 4th Corps
(Dickman) with the s9th Division
(WrighU, the 42d Division (Menoher)
and the 1st Division (SummeralD.
The 5th Corps (Cameron), with the
26th Division (Edwards) and part
Of the 4th Division CHines), assisted
by the French 18th Colonial Division.
was to conduct the secondary attack
against the west face. In this corps
the 26th Division alone was to make a
deep advance, directed southeast to-
ward Vigneulles. At the point of the
salient wss the French I'd Colonial
Corps, in which were the French seth
end 26th Infantry Divisions and the
I'd Disnounted Cavalry Division. This
corps was not to make a serious at