Evening star., 1931-05-31
BY FRANK Fl. SIMONDS.

BY FRANK Fl. SIMONDS.
n YEW YORK.-The decision to send
N the question of the Austro Ger
~ man tariff union to the World
4 Court for an advisory opinion
has served not alone to give the
meeting of the League Council at
Geneva the outward appearance of
much-needed tranquility, but has also
| for the time being removed from the
area of controversy the most acute is
sue that Europe has known, at least
since the occupation of the Ruhr. The
further statement of M. BRAND that the
political questions would have to be set
tied by diplomatic methods before the
legal were dealt with by the juridical
machinery has also something of prom
Use in it.
Along with the promise, to be sure,
| goes certain warning. for, after all, the
main issue is political. France is re-
solved at all costs to prevent this tar
| iff union, which it sees as the first stage
1 in the ultimate incorporation OF the
Austrian republic in the German Reich.
And wnen I was in Paris a few weeks
| ago the ruling opinion both in official
and press circles was that. even if the
World Court found a juridical warrant.
| the security not only of France, but
of her most important allies. Czecho-
slovakia and Poland. was so clearly in
| volved that the association must be pre-
vented
Underneath the surface at Geneva it
is clear that the whole maneuver has
been to detach Austria from Germany.
Every one recognizes clearly that this
eventual mbina ton of the two Ger
man states is inevitable unless some
means can be found to remedy the ex-
isting economic and financial situation
Of Austria. Nor has there been lack
I ing from the start the belief that Aus
trian statesmen had in mind rather the
| forcing of this issue than a serious pur-
pose in the present moment to force
a union.
Gaining In Strength.
When I was in Vienna. in the last days
Of April, it was patent that opposition to
the project was there already gaining
strength. The banking and financial
circles were dead against the project,
because for them it spelled subordina-
tion and even absorption by the vastly
more powerful German banks. Indus
trial interests were divided, some seeing
advantage in the German market others
seeing a competition coming from Ger
man manufactures in the Austrian mar
ket which would be ruinous TO them. In
the same fashion the agrarian elements,
both in the Reich and in Austria, were
apprehensiye.
In Central Europe generally there was
a good deal Of skepticiSm as to the pos
sibility in any immediate time of work
| ing out scheme mutually acceptable to
| the banking. industrial and agrarian in
terests in both countries. Such an
agreement would. at the outset, have
to be both experimental and limited.
Roth industrial and oUraTian Sfe
would have to be protected in many
details. and the exceptions to tariff
union promised to be more considerable
than the points of agreement, at least in
the first years.
Thus there was a tendency, notably
in Budapest, to see the whole AnSchluSs
gesture as political rather than eco
nomic as an attempt on the part of the
Austrian government to call attention
forcibly, alike in Paris and Prague, to
the fact that something must be done
, and done at once to help Austria, If
what was most distasteful to France and
Czechoslovakia was to be avoided. Ger
many on her part was moved to what
amounted to a calculated indiscretion,
permitting the news of agreement to be-
come public. much to Vienna's disgust,
because of other political circumstances.
Feared Opposition.
In fact. there was the belief that DIR.
CurtluS, the German foreign minister,
had been moved by two facts, the ap-
parent agreement between France and
Italy over the naval question and the
similar approach of an economic agree
ment between Italy and Austria. AS to
the first, 1t threatened to leave Germany
| isolated when the disarmament confer
ence met, since Italy's main concern in
supporting disarmament proposals was
to bring about reduction of French
naval strength to the Italian level. AS
to the second. Germany resented the
appearance of an Italian competitor in
the Austrian market on favorable terms.
| 1t seems fairly clear that Berlin un-
derestimated the effect of its political
maneuver; above ALL it did not foresee
that the immediate consequence would
be the defeat of BRAND for the French
! presidency, the temporary weakening of
| his policy OF conciliation and his posi-
ble retirement from the French foreign
office. Nor did it rightly gauge the re-
suits OF these events upon the British
mind Least of all could it imagine
| that Henderson, the British foreign
minister, would be moved to take such a
definite stand with BRAND at Geneva.
and that even Grandi. speaking for
Italy, would join France in opposing the
project.
Germany, then. at Geneva was forced
to draw in its horns and agree to send
the question to the World Court. This,
in the premises was diplomatic defeat,
and the realization of this fact is dis
closed in German comment. Moreover
while no one can forecast the decision
of the World Court, it seems rather un-
likely that the verdict can afford much
satisfaction to the Germans. for the
effect of such decision would mani
festly be to throw Europe into a worse