Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-04
Troops Continue to Land
in France i'm Need of
Training That Should
Have Been Completed.
DEMAND REPEATED
ON PROGRAM IN u. S.
King of Belgium Forced
to Wait at Station While
General Puts on His
Uniform.

TINE progress of our preparation at
home at this time December,
1910 was far from being salts
factory. as tests of newly arrived
troops showed their instruction
was not IN to our standards in France.
1t was evident that my recommends 7slii
lions were being disregarded. Inns
faulty training al home threw an eX-
fra burden upon us of training ofhcerS
and men after their arrival.
had urged that we should follow
orr own conception of training, en-
phasizing the rifle and bayonet as the
supreme weapons of the infantry sol
der. and insisted upon training Iof
open warfare. 1t will be pertinent 10
quote my cable about this time crltl-
Ching the policy of the War Depart
ment as set forth in one OF the train
ing pamphlets sent to me:
I'm nv opinion this pamphlet Is not
in harmony with the recommendations
contained in my cablegram in regard
to the training Of divisions IN the
United States. The first paragraph OF
the War Department document an
nolInces that in all the military traln-
ing of a division, under existing con-
ditions, training for trench warfare Is
of paramount Importance
Il invite attention TO my cablegram
and repeat my recommendations con-
tanned therein that intensive training
in all phases of open warfare De &C
cepted as the principal mission OF di-
visions before embarkation, trench
warfare and the use OF special arms
being taught in connection with the
ASSUMPTION of an offensive from an
ent. unched position. 1t is urged that
future programs of training for d.
visions in the United States be prepared
accordingly"
Officers Were Scarce.
The training Of officers for the gen.
eral staff, which also necessarily had to
be undertaken in France, was well
under way at the General Staff School
at Langres, 40 miles south of Chau-
mont. under the able direction of Maj.
Gen. McAndreW. The three months
course of instruction was based upon
our staff organizatio and was con-
Quoted by our own instructors. with
two or three French and an equal num-
Der of British officers to assist as lee
turers The difficulty was the scarcity
of officers available for detail as STU
dents.
We were confronted with the task Of
building up an army of millions that
would require as many trained stan
officers as we had officers in the whole
Regular Army at the beginning of the
war To meet this urgent demand
Washington was asked to send over in
advance a small percentage of officers
from each division for instruction, but
only few ever came.
Out of this first class of about IS
officers at the General staff School,
most of them were taken from our
meager forces in France. Unfortunately
all the schools were short OF student
personnel, and it was not until the elev-
enth hour, when new divisions began to
come over under pressure late in the
Spring that any considerable number
of officers could be spared from our
forces in France for special staff in
struction.
Meanwhile, our program of training in
France had become fairly well estab-
lished under the immediate direction
and observation of the training section
Of the general staff. Most of our officers
were firm believers in the soundness OF
our doctrines, although a few continued
to defer to the opinions of French in
structors, who were generally commit
ted to the theory that only trench train
ing was necessary.
Phases Of Training.
Our schedule of instruction consisted
of three periods. The first included
pracllce IN Jne use OF the various
weapons, with tactical exercises for
units up to the division over such ter
rain as might be available. The second
embraced a months tour in the trenches
by smaller units with French regiments,
supported by their artillery. The third
concluded the course with combined
work of infantry, artillery and aviation
conducted in the training area, after
which the division went again into the
trenches under its own officers and as
a unit in a French corps.
The plan adopted Of training with a
veteran division was fairly successful,
considering the circumstances. and
would have been ideal il the model divi-
sion could have been American. The
objection was that the French were in
clined 10 be too paternsl and as a rule
they went little further than trench
fighting.
The fact that many of our own off,
GERS we're not well grounded in first
principles made instruction more diff
cult. Recent inspections had revealed
many Deficiencies on the part of our
officers and further confirmed reports
regarding the inefficacy of training at
home.
Although l had suggested the eStab-
llShment OF training branch of the
War Department under Gen. Morrison.
with Gen. Blatchford as his assistant.
two OF the best equipped officers in our
Army FOR such work, the spirit of the