Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-08

Gen. Pershing, part Of . distingui
ferences. Left to right: Gen. Perish
MOrdacq and Weygand and Maj. Gen.
washington had enough trouble; be-
sides, the Secretary could not possibly
have been sufficiently in touch with
the undercurrent Of these negotiations
to have made q wise decision.
So I said, well, Bliss, do you know
what would happen II we should do
thatp We would both be relieved from
further duty in France, and that Ia
exactly what we should deserve"
We then spent some time examining
| the question from all angles, until
finally he came around to my view and
said: II think you are right, and
shall back you up In the position you
have taken"
During an informal visit to Marshal
Joffre January IS I was gratifled to
hear the marshal confirm my views as
to the fallacy OF amalgamation. He
begen by remarking that with all the
conferences that were being held ]
must be quite well occupied. In due
course the conversation drifted to
military matters, and he spoke Of the
class Of 1918 recruits being now avail
able for the French, and of the class OF
1919 soon to be called, and said the
French were combing the country fol-
what he called "embusques," or
slackers, all of whom taken together he
thought would ohviate the necessity OF
reducing the French Army more than
three or four divisions, and then not
until lat9 in the year.
The view of Marshal Joffre was that
the British were not in such good
shape, and, as we knew, they were
under the necessity of reducing the
number of battalions in each division
from IL to 8. He said: The Hritish
| plan to bring over $50 battalions Of
Americans is no doubt for the purpose
Of building up their weakened divisions. "
JOffre Cites Experience.
This brought up the question OF
amalgamation, and, speaking as friend
! Of mine and also in the interests OF
the allies, Marshal Joffre said: ut
would be mistake to incorporate
American battalions in British divisions
as it would adversely affect the divi-
sionsj" and that orders might be given
by British general or his staff that
would be resented by Americans, but
the same orders would be accepted
without question If given by an Ameri-
can commander. In case Of a reverse
there would be the tendency to place
the blame on the Americans.
Furthermore, he went on to say
lin case Of an attack, your infantry
would have to be supported by British
artillery, and here again there might
be differences"
He did not believe it possible that
there could exist between them that
perfect confidence and liaison that was
absolutely necessary between the in
fantry and artillery. AS an indication
that 1t was not a policy suggested by
good practice and experience, he pointed
out that during the whole course of the
war the British had never found II
advisable to- incorporate Canadians
Australians, New ZealanderS, Indians
Portuguese or even Scotch in the same
divisions with English.
Then" he said, you must consider
the American people at home and their
interest in and their support of the
war, which would be adversely affected
by amalgamation." He added that his
views were given to me confldentially, as
an act Of friendship. Here, then, was
q distinguished French soldier who
could see these questions in their true
perspective without prejudice or bias.
Speaking Of the threatened German
offensive against the allies on the west
ern front, Marshal Joffre said there
were those who thought that the de-
lection Of Russia would enable the
Germans to bring as many as $50 d.
visions against approximately ITO al
lied divisions, but he did not agree
with them. Such talk, he said, was
causing much uneaSineSS among the
French people not under arms, and hi
felt that it was a mistake to allow such
statements to appear in the press
Some people thought that the allie,
were going to be overwhelmed, but hG
was morally certain such Q thing coulc
not happen.
Didn't Include Americans.
AS between $50 and ITO divisions
Of course, the discrepancy was great
but he thought that the allies could
hold; and, anyway, he did not believe
such discrepancy would exist. He ex'
pressed the view that the enemy woulc
have not more than 100 divisions or
the western front at the outside, and
allowing the allies 1853 instead Of nc
the difference was not enough to cause
any doubt in our ability to hold them
He said that in 1914 the Germans hac
an excess of SOC, 900 men over the al.
lied 100000 and a great preponderanct
Of artillery, yet they did not break the
line, and he thought their chances les:
favorable now.
Marshal Joffre was discussing, HI
said, the probabilities as they existed
at the moment, and although he men.
toned the prospective arrival Of two
American divisions per month, and evil
IDENTIFY had them in mind, he did moi
include them in his estimate as to rela.
tive numbers on both sides. In all this
he said, he did not want to appear a
crit1c1zing his government, but he depre.
Gated its attitude in permitting the PEG.
pie to be frightened by the stories o.
q heavy German offensive.
1t was about this time that I met
q distinguished EngliShman, who tool
occasion to discuss the same subject
saying practically just what Marsha
Joffre had said and advising strongly
against mixing nationalities. Not tina
there was q shadow Of doubt in my
mind as to the soundness Of my att
tude, yet coming IS did these indie
pendent views just at the moment o
apparently greatest pressure by neArl,
all OF of1ciN France and Great Britain
to force our hand on this question, the.
had considerable significance.
There were allied officers very closet.
in touch with my headquarters who
although very careful in our presence
secretly advised their superiors to max
every concession In order to get contro
, of American units, with the idea tina
! they would then be in position to us
, them in any manner they saw At.
J Among these there was one British
! offlcer who suggested to his superior
) that they should aid us oetentatiousl'
in building ~ = corps which q