Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-08

n RECEIVED letter from Secretary
OF War Baker in July stating 1t had
been proposed that Gen. Goethals
be sent over to take charge OF the
Service of Supply, with the idea
that he would have coordinate author
ity with me and be in control OF sup
plies from the source at home, thence
across the Atlantic and up to the zone
of the armies, being directly under
orders from Washington.
The theory was that this arrange
ment would enable me to devote my
time exclusively to military operations
The Secretary wished to know what 1
thought OF the suggestion.
much appreciated the Secretary's
desire to relieve me of every burden
that might interfere with the direction
of operations, but there appeared to be
an exaggerated view concerning the
personal attention required In handling
these details Of administration.
Against Divided Authority.
AS q principle of military organiza-
ton, the suggestion did not meet with
my approval. The command had been
organized carefully with just this situa-
ton in view, and the supply system was
fulfilling its functions as an essential
part of the organic military structure
as far as the conditions of delayed ma
terial and Of limited and inexperienced
personnel would permit.
] was in control through the General
staff, which In turn was handling d.
rectly multitude Of questions imme-
distely vital TO military success. The
system, to be successful, could have
no divided authority or responsibility.
The man who directed the armies
wps the one 10 control their supply,
through military commander respon-
sible to him alone. This military
principle. under the peculiar circum-
could not be violated without inviting
failure. 1t was applied in the British
armies and as far as possible In the
French.
In each Of the allied armies the
general in charge of the services of
supply and the lines Of communication
Of their forces was subordinate TO the
commander in chief. In our case it
only remained to invest the command
ing general of the supply system with
all necessary authority TO enable him
to take the initiative under my general
direction.
one example borrowed from my ex-
perience will illustrate the soundness
of the principle. During the battle Of
the Melse-Argonne our situation at the
front was such that the s. o. s. had
70 DC lpcIduy bIlPpcu VI CVety SFdh~
able man and all means OF transpofta-
ton, animals, trucks railroad rolling
stock, that could possibly be spared.
Hits at Plans Proponents.
Assistance was given cheerful, but 1t
was done In compliance with my orders.
One can imagine the possibilities Of
failure If 1t had been necessary to re-
quest these things from an official OF
ay,Ir .04 .
to the department at Washington
The officer or group of officers who
proposed such a scheme to the Secre-
tary could not have had the success of
the high command in France very deep
" aE heart, or else were ignorant of the
basic principles Of organization
A reply to the Secretary wa. cabled
at once. urged him not to PERMIT any
violation Of the foregoing PRINCIPLES and
asked him TO await my letter, which
he advised he would do. IN, real
answer. however, was the assignment of
Gen. Harbord to command the Services
OF supply. Nothing further was done
| by the Secretary OF War with refer
! ence 10 sending Goethals.
| The letter from the Secretary con-
! tanning his reference to the command
o, the supply system is given mere in
part:
Il have the feeling that this war has
gone on long enough and If airy exer-
| ton on our part or any sacrifice can
/ speed its successful termination even
/ by single day. we should mag 1t. We
are therefore now having studios made
/ 10 show the things necessary - be done
| for three possible programs, one in
volving so, one 80. and the other 100
| divisions by the first of July, 1919.
! "As soon as these programs ata worked
cut we will, in consultation With the
/ War Industries Board, determine how
| far manufacturing facilities already in
existence or possible TO be created can
supply the necessary material and the
assistance We shall have TO have in the
way OF heavy artillery and trsnsporta-
ton from the British and French It
will then be possible 10 take Up with
those governments frank exE .bition OF
the possibilities and to arrange Tor con-
certed action among US which will lead
To the increase in DIR effort which you
and Gen. Foch recommend
I'm the meantime have asked the
British government to continue The troor
ships which they have had in FUR serv-