The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1931-07-03
CHAPTER xxvll-continued.

CHAPTER <XVll-Continued.
I stated that but few of the allied
authorities seemed TO realize that
American participation would depend
upon the amount of shipping available
for the transportation of our troops
and that the time when they would be
needed was near ar hand. As there
had been some reference TO amalgama-
ton, | also took occasion 70 emphasize
the point that we expected as a matter
of course that the American army
would have its own front as an indie
pendent force and not be used merely
as reserve to be sent here and there.
One insuperable reason, said, why we
could not amalgamate with the Frnecn
added that we would not use our
troops in that way at all unless it be-
came absolutely necessary.
I then discussed our problems. call
ing attention to the delays at the
French ports and our shortage of rail
transportation, and touched on the
backward state of procurement of
of equipment. munitions and airplanes.
They all appeared surprised TO learn
of our difficulties, especially General
Foch, although, even as chief of the
general staff. he apparently could not
interfere in matters handled directly
by the ministry. 1t was astonishing
TO find how little comprehension any
Of them had of the enormous task
that confronted the Americans.
Foch said: None of these questions
has been referred to me-" whereupon
Petain retorted that -one should not
wait until such things are brought TO
his attention, but should look around
and find them" Petain added at once
that he would send an official TO study
our situation, and Haig later sent one
Of his officers, who offered many sug
gestiOns out of his own experience.
It was the sense of the conference
that every assistance should be given
Us in getting our troops across, and all
seemed fully to realize that no sue
cessful offensive could be undertaken
without them.
Conversations with General Robert
son continued the next day at the
Crillon hotel in Paris, with General
Bliss present. The same arguments
were repeated in favor of Incorporate
ing American units into British divis-
ions, and General Bliss expressed him.
self in favor of the Robertson plan.
was forced to declare myself then and
there. Ny stand was not quite what
Robertson had expected, and the meet
ing adjourned with the position Of all
concerned no longer in doubt.
General Bliss and l met later by ap-
pointment to talk the matter over be-
TO an understanding. After some dis
cussion he suggested that each of us
cable his views TO Washington and ask
for decision. 1t was not my policy
then or at any other time to put any
thing up to Washington that l could
possibly decide myself.
This would have been the last thing
to do in this case. especially as the
secretary had left in my hands the de-
termination as TO how our troops
should be employed. For two men in
our positions to have appealed in this
way would have indicated a clash, and
Washington had enough trouble; be-
sides, the secretary could not possibly
have been sufficiently in touch with
the undercurrent of these negotiations
to make wise decision.
So I said, well, Bliss, do you know
what would happen if we should do
that? We would both be relieved
from further duty in France, and that
is exactly what we should deserve"
We then spent some time examining
the question from all angles. until
finally be came around to my view and
said: Il think you are right, and
shall back you up in the position you
have taken"