Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-01-25
Clemenceau Attempts to
Rush Americans Into
Action at Front, but
Fails i'm Effort.
PLAN TO SEPARATE
u. S. ARMY OPPOSED
Serious Delay Caused to
Forces Abroad by Tar
diness of Aviation Bu-
reau at Home.
CHAPTER XIV.

IT response to my request to WASH
ington for an experienced man to
take charge of rail transportation,
Il w. w. Atterbury, general manager
of the Pennsylvania Railroad, ar
rived in France and reported to me
September /, 1917.
In our first brief conversation we ran
over the problem in a general way.
Considerable headway in the organiza-
ton of our railway system had already
been made by the Engineer Corps.
Much to my surprise, Mr.. Atterbury
seemed to be very familiar with the
situation, and his personality, his force,
his grasp of the difficulties of the task
and his willingness to undertake 1t
appealed to me at once.
So, without hesitation and with a
feeling that undoubtedly the right man
had been found, I told him that he
would be appointed. A few days later,
in consultation with Col Harry Taylor,
the chief of Engineers, and Col. Wilglls,
we determined the details of readjust-
ment required.
An independent transportation de-
partment was created to operate and
maintain all broad and narrow gauge
railways and canals in American use
and to construct roads, wharveS, shops
and other buildings for railway pur-
tinued for the time being under the
Engineer Corps.
Atterbury's Aides Called.
At Atterbury's suggestion a cable was
sent requesting certain men to fill i'm
portant positions in the organization.
The list included j. A. McRae, general
manager of the Long Island Railroad,
for general manager, with G. M. Bunt-
ing as business manager, H. C. Booz
as engineer for construction and j. G.
Rogers as deputy. The last three were
then with the Pennsylvania Railroad.
The railway problem was far from easy,
and many were the obstacles to be
overcome, both in our own and in the
French services. Successful manage
ment would have been very doubtful
under a leader without Atterbury's pa
thence, ability and force of character.
My diary notes the following:
Paris, Monday, September 8, 1917.
Called on Gen. Foch, chief of staff,
yesterday, on routine of procurement,
but his office has no control. Afterward
talked with Paul Painleve, minister of
war. on the same subject. De Cham
brun, de Ferronay and my own stan
working far better liaison with French
bureaus.
Conferred with Atterbury this morn
ing. Took Col. Dawes this afternoon
to call on minister Of war, and ex-
planned purpose of our purchasing
agency. Called on the minister Of mu-
| nitions with Gen. Henley to expedite
manufacture of airplanes for our service.
Frequent conferences with heads Of
our various activities enable me to give
direction and impetus and promote
coordination"
It was foreseen that with the removal
of my headquarters to Chaumont our
supply officers would find it dif1cult to
keep in close touch with the correspond
ing French bureaus in Paris, and as
| we were to be within the zone of the
armies, cooperation with French army
headquarters would assume greater i'm
portance. Since the line of authority
| separating this zone from the rear was
not distinctly defined. it was evident
that procurement in general, especially
regarding the use of facilities, might
become complicated. In my discussion
with M. Painleve he thought that with
intelligent liaison officers there should
be no difhculty, and promised to expe-
dite our business with the bureaus.