The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1931-07-02

also in August at the meeting in Paris,
except that the campaign under Gen.
eral Allenby, then in progress in Pal
estine, should continue. 1t will be re-
called that these two informal confer
ences of commanders in chief had con-
cluded that the allies should remain on
the defensive on all fronts until the
Americans should arrive in sufficient
force to warrant the offensive.
See No End of War Until 1919.
The joint note was approved as the
decision Of the council, with the under
standing, as suggested by the French,
that no white troops should be sent
from France to Palestine. 1t was decid-
eddy the opinion Of NJ. Clemenceau and
of all others present who expressed
themselves that the war could not be
ended until 1919, when the American
army, it was thought, would reach its
maximum strength.
The allied forces at the moment
were superior in all active fronts, ex-
cept in the Balkans, but the Greek mo-
bilization, when completed, would add
sufficient strength to give the allies the
advantage there also. The American
strength was then negligible, but the
prospect was that we should have
few divisions ready for service by
June, and by September possibly sew
tenteen or the equivalent Of thirty.
four French divisions.
The danger on the western front lay
in the continuous increase of the Ger
man forces and in their ability to con-
centrate In turn against the French
and British, and as neither had suffi.
cient reserves Of their own 1t was
clear that unless some arrangement
could be made between them for bet
ter coordination and support the war
might easily be lost before the Ameri-
cans should arrive.
Plan Allied Reserve.
The study of this problem by the
military representatives led to another
joint note which proposed plan for
the organization of general allied
reserve. 1t provided that the British,
French and Italian armies should each
set apart a certain number of divisions
to constitute this reserve, which would
be called into action only in a great
emergency. The discussion Of this
question became acrimonious. Haig
and Petain both pointed out that they
would be short of divisions very soon
in case of severe fighting and present
ed figures on the subject that were
very disturbing.
But the councils scheme was cut
and dried. The recommendations set
forth in the note were adopted then
and there by the council. The general
reserve was created and its control
was placed under an executive war
board to consist of Generals Foch, rep
resenting the French, chairman; Bliss,
the Americans; Cadorna, the Italians,
and a British general officer to be
named.
At this meeting Mr.. Lloyd George
designated Gen. Sir Henry Wilson as
the British representative, to the very
evident disappointment Of General
Robertson, who was present at the ses-
sion. The selection of Wilson was re-
garded by the British high command
and the war office as open disapproval
of their conduct of the war.
Winter Of 1918 Most Severe.
hne fhok hn int ne
1918 was the most severe of the
war; The cold was at times so intense
as to make the generally unheated
houses, barns and lofts used as billets
nearly uninhabitable. The gloom of
short days and long nights in the iso-
lated and largely depopulated French
villages can hardly be described.
Then, as we have seen, there was
also shortage Of heavy winter cloth
ing, although frequent cables early in
the fall had called attention to the
probability of deficiency. No doubt
the demands were greater than the
quartermaster department could meet,
but the relatively small number of
troops in France going through the
winter under actual war conditions
should have been given first consider
alton.
Much Of the clothing that we re-
ceived for our troops looked to be
shoddy, and, being light and thin, Of
course offered insufficient protection.
The deficiencies were met in part by
purchases from the British, although
our men did not take kindly to the
idea Of wearing the uniform of anoth-
or nation, and 1t was with consider.
able protest and chagrin that they did
so until our own could be supplied.
To the credit Of our officers and men
be It said that they generally ignored
adverse conditions, and, barring some
irritation at French methods and occa-
sionally at our own, they kept at their
tasks with commendable determina-
ton. Looking back over the different
phases of the war regard that win
ter, with its difficulties, anxieties and
apprehension for the future, as the
most trying period Of them all.
CHAPTER xxx
At the ports in France the amount Of
freight discharged in January, 1918,
WAS more oncoura pinp hein9 ahout