Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-07
GERMANY ISOLATED
BY NAVAL ACCORD
Italy Seen Aligning Self With
Nations Opposed to Revi-
sion of Treaty.
CONTINUED From First Page.)

Continued From First Page)
to bring Germany's military power tc
something like equality with that OF
the other big states.
Germany's secondary aims are annex
alton of Austria, which has again be-
come actual owing to the visit of For
eign Minister Julius Curtius to Vienna
and reacquiSition of lost Upper Silesia.
The Germans believe that the best
way to achieve their aims lies in a
close understanding with France. They
know that the majority of the French
desire this understanding. But the
Germans demand, first, treaty revision
and then an understanding.
The French say, first, moral disarma-
ment, meaning REIMBURSEMENT of Ger
many's illusionist plan, and then q
close understanding
Both Standing Pat.
Today neither side is willing to &C
cept the others viewpoint. The gen.
eral naval agreement seems to be q
point lost for Germany. But the Ger
mans will not lose heart, since funda-
mentally they believe that no lasting
settlement without them is possible.
Should the French definitely prove
0SeNA w SAC1h SAoAhlo III ACoOO1 Va
equality, the Germans believe that they
have another card in a Soviet Union
alliance. This card has laid for years
face down, with none to say whether ii
was an ace or a deuce.
But with the apparent slow but sure
development of the Soviets along the
lines OF their flve-year plan, the Ger
mans believe that the betting odds on
the face-doWn card are growing in
their favor. Some believe that Russian
development will even force them to
take a vital decision before they would
ideally care to do so.
The argument runs thus:
AS the Soviets grow industrially
stronger, Western European hostility,
particularly that Of France, will grow
accordingly. The day will come when
this hostility must take violent form.
Then Germany will direct her last
appeal to the French-"Will you accept
our friendship on our terms?"
If the French then refuse, Germany
win be compelled to seek solution OF
her problems, which means treaty revi-
sion, with the help-even the armed
help-of the Soviets.
This, again, involves Poland-a fact
which explains why the warmest Ger
man adherents of friendship with the
Soviet Union are officers Of the Reichs-
wehr.
Dislike Forced Hand.
Germans would not care thus to have
their hand forced, since, except for re-
duction of Young plan payments. none
of their demands is urgent. They would
prefer to give the French more time
to think the matter over" meanwhile
trying to obtain local, temporary adj
vantages by an opportunist policy OF
seeking friends on individual issues
wherever they can be found.
In fact. Nationalist newspapers clamor
so loudly that Germany must not yield
her revisioniSt claims in exchange for
financial concessions that it would seem
to show the presence of some Germans
who are prepared to do just this.
But the official policy to date up
holds the fundamental German claims
for revision as a cardinal policy no con-
ceivable cabinet could sacrifice.
The fundamental problem may prove
to be one of nerves-namely, whether
the Germans, faced with the necessity
Of actually fighting beside the bolshe-
viks against the civilized world, would
not change their minds before the
French. faced by Italian hostility and
q rapidly growing Soviet Union, de-
cided to purchase German alliance by
treaty revision.
Copyright, 1879
RRTTTSu WARNEn on NAVY