The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1931-08-21

my reply made 1t clear that he had
entire authority to direct where they
should go in the emergency, as with
out it the theory of supreme COM
mand would fail.
The rapid succession of German
offensives had seriously crippled the
allies. and not only materially reduced
their powers of resistance but had de-
pressed their morale and caused the
darkest misgivings among them. They
grew more and more fearful lest the
enemy might still have untold reserves
ready to swell his forces. That the
morale of the allies was low was
shown by the conclusions of many of
their soldiers returning from the front
to the rest areas.
Reports from the British front were
no better. Their troops continuously
told our men who were with them
for training that we had come too late
and that our entry into the battle
would only postpone allied defeat.
This attitude seemed so alarming that
l took steps to prevent such a spirit
from affecting our army by promptly
reporting the facts to allied authori-
ties. The presen, of such sentiments
was another important reason for op-
posing any form of amalgamation.
Vastness Of Request Unrealized.
Far short had we fallen of the ex-
pectations of the preceding November.
when Foch, General Robertson of the
British, and l had joined in an urgent
appeal for twenty-four trained Ameri-
can divisions by the following June.
1t is small wonder that the allies
were now so insistent in urging in
creased and continuous shipments of
men, trained or unframed.
So serious was the situation re-
garded that it was no longer demand
for twenty-four divisions but for one
hundred. 1t is probable that the vast
ness of this request was not fully
realized, or else the allies had greatly
exaggerated ideas of our power of &C.
complishment, surprising as it actu-
ally proved to be.
A brief calculation of these demands
of the prime ministers showed that
they were asking more than 2,5O0.0OO
combatant troops by the following
spring, which, augmented by those re-
quired for the services of supply, con-
servatively calculated for well-bal-
anced force situated in 3 foreign coun-
try under the circumstances that sur
rounded US, would amount at least to
100000 men.
The american combatant force
would Thus have equaled 200 divisions
Of the allies, and their apprehension
may be imagined when we realize that
this was greater by onefourth than
the combined allied armies of 1852 d.
visions then on the western front.
Saw 100000 as Limit.
Although no such number as this
could have been considered feasible,
as it is unlikely that 1t could have
been either transported. equipped or
supplied, it was necessary, in view of
the situation, to lay plans for bringing
over all we could. After giving the
question. careful study. it seemed to
me that 100000 men would be the
limit we could hope to reach by the
spring of 1919.
This, roughly, would provide at least
sixty-six or possibly over seventy COM
blatant divisions. the rest being neces-
sary for the noncombatant service. AS
we had hitherto made estimates based
upon a total force of 2,OOO,000 men, it
was quite imperative that calculations
should be made on the increased basis
and that work everywhere in the A.
E. f. should now have that end in
view.
A cable sent June q set forth the
reasons for fixing the program for