Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-24

provide all the equipment and land
transportation they would need. In
accordance with my program, / was
willing to agree to the shipment Of fully
trained infantry not needed for the in
struction of new drafts, but felt that
this point should be left to the judg-
ment of the Secretary Of War.
Mr. Lloyd George then concluded that
as o consequence July would be blank,
and In q rather detected tone he said
the allies were In a sense in the hands
Of the United States. He spoke of the
generous and chivalrous attitude of
President Wilson. and said all they
could do was to acquaint him with their
needs and call upon him to come to
their aid, more particularly TO the aid
Of France at the period Of the most
terrible extremity that she had yet en-
countered.
Mr.. Lloyd George proposed that we
should even bring over men that were
partially instructed as he thought they
would learn faster In the atmosphere
Of war I said we could not strip the
country Of every man with any sort Of
training, as we should then be back
where we had started in 1917. and 1
argued that all men sent over should
have at least three months training If
at all possible. Whereupon NJ Clemen-
ceau asked what would become Of the
war in the interval.
British Problem Similar.
I remarked that the discussion had
become complicated, but that it was my
hope the greatest possible number of
troops, including artillery and auxiliary
combat troops and those needed for rail-
ways and ports, should be transported.
I tried TO make our needs understood.
and appealed to Gems. Foch and Wey-
gand, who, as soldiers, said, could not
fail to recognize the difficulties we had
to surmount. not only in training our
citizen army but in building up COM
plete system of supply in foreign
country. / we'll knew. however, that
neither Of them, in their extreme desire
for American requirements, had taken
these questions into serious considera-
ton, nor had they considered the de-
ficiences in our organization caused by
concessions Of the last few months.
The British problems being similar
TO ours. though less difncult, the views
Of Mr.. Thompson were more TO the
point. He had plainly said it was i'm
possible to assure the proper handling
of an army without adequate rail and
port facilities Lord Miner agreed. and
said he thought he fully understood my
problems.
M. Clemenceau reverted TO the short
age of available men in the United
States, saying he had thought our re-
sources inexhaustible, and wanted to
know when the shipments would be re-
sumed AS he had evidently not fol-
lowed the discussion. he was informed
that shipments in general would, OF
course. be continued to the full capacity
Of tonnage, and that the men we had
called out in May would be available in
August. He agreed with Mr.. Lloyd
George that President Wilson ought to
be advised Of the allies situation.
Mr.. Lloyd George read proposed
message to the President that 10000
Infantry and machine-gun units with
out regard to training be sent in both
June and July out of possible 100000
in each month, leaving transportation
for a total of $50 900 of the categories
desired by me. Gen. Foch proposed
that the message be sent and Lord
Miner appealed for an agreement, but
could not agree to bringing troops
with only one months training.
Didat Want Recruits.
I called attention to the fact that
we were being importuned, on one hand,
TO send over nothing but requirements
for allied divisions TO the utter neglect
Of our own military forces, and, on the
other, we were being pressed to furnish
thousands Of men for their technical
Moreover, it had already been DEM
onstrated by the experience of our
units that the allies were not prepared
to supply our men with either equip
ment or accustomed food. I insisted
that auxiliary and service troops be
sent TO build up our own organization
in preference to the shipment of unin-
structed troops, who could not fight
when they arrived, and suggested that
the July program might be postponed
until August. Clemenceau remarked
that the German would not postpone
his attacks to which I replied that we
could not rely on unframed men in
battle.
It was here that Mr.. Lloyd George
read . proposition which set forth the
critical situation requiring the concern
tration Of reserves in front Of Paris,
and the urgent necessity Of finding
other troops to replace the French divi-
SionS taken from the British front. He
drew attention particularly TO the
opinion expressed by Gen. Foch that
the allies would be defeated unless the
number Of British divisions could be
maintained. He then proposed as
solution that the British commander in
chief should determine when the Amer
lean troops with his armies had ac-
quired sufncient training to be placed
in the line.
This meant that such troops would
become requirements, and it was impos-
sible for me to make such a concession.
I rather vigorously stated that this
was a prerogative and q responsibility
would not relinquish under any cir
cumstances. ! said this was not the
councils business, but that every con-
sideration would be given by me to any
urgent request from Gen. Foch for our
troops, trained or unframed.
Lloyd George Sarcastic.
Reading from notes, and appealing
TO me, Gen. Foch then proposed that
States for total Of 100 combat divi-
300 900 q month. said that, in my
opinion, we would send as many men
as possible, and that our people would
not fail TO raise an army Of the neces-
sary size.
NJ Clemenceau asked how many di-
visions It would be possible for the
British TO maintain in France, to which
Mr.. Lloyd George replied with some
sarcasm that 1t would be best to post
pone the question until the return of
the French expert whom M. Clemen-
ceau had promised to send to England
Then Gen. Foch took the cue and
went on to say that we found ourselves
with $50 allied divisions opposed to 204
German, that II the number could not
I a - = 80 IA. 4