Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-01

I did not think It possible, from our
experience. that we could accomplish
50 much, and he gave the opinion that
even a force Of 80 divisions, total OF
about 100000 men, would probably
oyertax our facilities OF transportation
and supply. It Is a question whether
either M. Clemenceau or Gen. Foch
really thought a program calling for
100 divisions, or even 30, could be
carried out within reasonable time.
In any event the 80-diyisi0n plan would
serve Serve as 5,r! goal toward which enorS
Moreover, it was clearly evident that
II the war should be prolonged any
length Of time the burden would fall
more and more upon US. Hence there
was no question but that we should
make o supreme effort to increase our
man power ON the western front SUI
ficiently to give the allies superiority
under any probable contingency.
was willing to ask for the greater
numbers, feeling, however, that the
War Department would do wonders If
1t could carry out even the 66-diyision
plan. NJ. Clemenceau gave assurance
that every possible effort to meet our
deficiencies, including munitions and
aviation, would be made by the French
Government.
Germany was believed TO have 1884,
600 combatant troops on the western
front at the time, while the combined
forces OF the allies, exclusive of Ameri-
cans, In France amounted to 2,90o, 900,
OF whom Great Britain had 1928, 900
men and France 100000. The Ger
mans were supposed still to be bringing
troops from the Russian front, but ac-
cording TO allied information would not
be able to provide more than $4,000
requirements from their own popula-
ton.
Requirements Cause Arguments.
The British contended that In pro-
vtding 10000 requirements for June
they had reached their limit, and said
they would not be able to provide any
more until October. The French said
their units at the front were short
5000 men. with a reservoir of only
10000 to draw on until the class of 1919
| should become available in September.
This matter Of providing replace
mentS for the allied armies was not at
all clear, and many different statements
! were made about 1t from time to time.
! whenever 1t came up the British and
! French locked horns, and the discus
sion often became very pointed, each
apparently doubling whether the other
was doing. everything possible TO keep
The French said, unoficially, that the
British were holding an excessive num-
Der Of men in England and ireland for
home defense, but the British denied
this vigorously.
OF course, it was common knowledge
that the draft had never been enforced
in Ireland, and 1t was something of a
bombshell thrown into the British
camp when, at one Of the sessions OF
hn ,utI n
discussion of the subject, M. Clemen-
ceau asked Mr.. Lloyd George why he
didn't draft the Irish. Not to be forced
into an explanation, Mr.. Lloyd George
replied, after some hesitation and To
the amusement Of all present, mfr
Prime Minister, you evidently do not
know the Irish"
This was the situation when the con-
ference met at my quarters. The whole
subject was thoroughly discussed, and
considering the then shortage Of man.
power claimed by the French and the
British, to say nothing Of the possible
increase OF the German armies from
Russian sources, the main question wal
to get over as many Americans as pos.
sible. 1t was finally agreed that VIZ
should propose an 80-division program
TO be completed by April, 1919, and ado
to 1t the larger program of 100 divi-
sions, to be completed by July, 1919.
CabIed War Department.
The conclusions were conveyed to the
War Department in the following cable
ITO win the victory in 1919 it Il
necessary 70 have numerical superb
ority, which can only be obtained bs
our having In France in April so Amer.
lean divisions and in July 100 divi.
sions. At Versailles June the three
prime ministers to obtain this result
requested President Wilson to draft
100000 men per month This draft
should be made up as follows:
"F,irst-For the creation of six new
divisions per month, with the GORE.
spending troops for corps, army and
service of the rear. 100000 per month
} beginning July /, 1918.
J "Second-For requirements, which
we determine according TO the expert.
! ence of the French Army at 40 per CEN
! per year OF the total strength, figure
which viii vary from month to month
but which for the whole period consid.
cred would bring the nnont1niy dgure Q