The daily worker. [volume] (Chicago, Ill.) 1924-1958, 1931-08-03
Resolution Of Politburo, &C. C.P.U.S,Av
July 20, 1881.

l.
/. The miners strike has now reached the
most difficult stage since its beginning In the
very heart Of the strike western PENN about
so per cent of the strikers are at work At the
same time the spread OF the strike To other
mines has sharply slowed down. However, the
strike has not been broken and there can be OBJ
served though on a smaller scale than hereto
fo1c, the development of the strike movement
within the back-to-Work movement itself. In
the Ohio ond northern West Virginia section
the strike is in a stronger position, but this
area comprises less than IS per cent of the total
number on strike at the highest peak Fur
Their in the Western Pennsylvania region the
miners now on strike are i'll mines that are
totally struck or at least rs per cent, so that
there exists solid block Of miners on strike in
mines where the strike is effective. The miners
who went back to work. on the whole do not
maintain hostile attitude to the strike and to
the National Miners Union, On the contrary,
many Of them wish to remain members of the
National Miners Union and are preparing to
rejoin the struggle.
O. The objective difficulties in the strike can
not be considered as the cause for this situa-
ton. The task of the Party is to examine what
are the reasons for our failure to overcome
these objective difficulties starvation, terror,
United Mine Workers of America, Pinchot dem
agogy, etc.. Such an analysis discloses the fol-
lowing main weaknesses in the conduct of the
strike:
(a) The Party as whole, and in the mining
fields in particular, was unprepared for the
strike Thus the largest strike struggle ever
conducted under the leadership of the Party
disclosed the weaknesses of the Party and its
lack of orientation on the immediate prepara-
tions for mass work, its weak base in the mines
and factories and the consequences Of such I'M
preparedness. The absence of functioning mine
nuclei was an important factor in our inability
TO overcome the objective difficulties The
Party is not mobile enough and there was not
q quick enough response to the strike develop
ments. The Party's lack of experience in mass
work led to many errors particularly in the
methods of work Of the Party itself and in the
strike committees and the National Miners
Union. The Party as a whole did not respond
sufficiently in the mobilization for the support
Of the strike. This finds its expression particu-
larly in the slow collection of relief. The Pol
bureau shares the responsibility in this for not
sharply raising this question in time and eff
feet a change in the attitude of the District
and local Party organizations.
(b) The weaknesses in the organization Of
re strike is one of the prime factors in pro-
cling the present situation First there was
.> ig delay in properly organizing the union and
strike machinery This led to the inability to
properly organize the various phases of strike
activity, including mass defense and the local
collection of relief. Secondly, even after the
strike machinery was organized except for the
Rank and File Central Strike Committee which
met regularly the other strike organs, particu-
To-
the top leadership Of the strike the striking
miners themselves were not drawn in sufficiently
to the day to day work The relations Of the
top leadership and the mass of the miners and
their strike committees was very loose so that
the top leadership did no know at all times the
actual state of affairs. To a certain extent
bureaucracy crept into the work of the leading
strike organs. Trade union democracy was not
sufficiently developed and much OF the leader
ship by the miners themselves was only formal
The failure to build the Party fractions in the
Central Strike Committee and the Section
Strike Committees contributed very much to
the entire weakness in the organization of the
strike. All these conditions led to the situation
that while the back-to-Work movement was al
ready strong, this situation was not realized by
the leading strike and union organs. The lat
ter themselves Gid not function regularly but
dissolved in the strike machinery.
Co While the weakness in the relief cam
paign on a national scale can not be separated
from the general Party unpreparedness for the
struggles there are additional weaknesses that
led to the slow tempo of the relief collections
First there existed and we're not sufficiently
combatted, wrong tendencies such as disbelief
in our ability to collect mass relief in the period
of crisis ian underastimation of the radicaliza-
ton of the Masses belief that all strikes in the
present period are short strikes, therefore the
uninportance of mass relief, etc. Secondly, the
failure to enter the campaign with an already