Evening star., 1931-03-14
A. E. F. Chieftain Refuses
to Fight Except With
U. S. Army Under Its
Own Flag and Officers.
FOCH is SURPRISED
BY GENERALS STAND
St. Mihiel Is Transferred
to u. S. Command, but
Marshal Makes Late
Effort to Change Plan.
CHAPTER Lxn.

"A undertaken to force the re-
4 tirement of the enemy from the
Vesle end Aisne Rivers. On its
relief from the Vesle August z the 32d
American Division CHaan) was assigned
to the 10th Army and entered the line
August %, immediately undertaking a
series of local operations, in which gains
were made in the face of very heavy
fire. Ravines end numerous caves in
the region provided ideal cover for the
defending troops.
The general attack of the Army the
following day met but slight success,
the enemy resisting desperately along
his entire front, but on the 30th, by
flank attack from the south, the
32d Division captured Juvigny, pushing
a small salient into the German lines.
Hard fighting continued August 81,
but by the end of the day the 32d had
reached the important Soissons-St.
Quentin road, where it was relieved
September 2. The 32d Division had
advanced nearly three miles, and its
success contributed greatly to the
forced withdrawal of the German line
to the Aisne River.
st. MihieI Transferred.
AS prearrangsd between Gen. Petain
Seille least of the Moselle River) to
Watronville (north of les Eparges), AZ
miles in extent. then occupied by the
entire French 9th Army and part Of
the French I'd Army. was transferred
to my command August 80.
The front included the st. Mihiel
salient, which was between these points
and embraced the permanent fortresSes
around Toul. We had three divisions
in line on the south face of the sector,
but the mass of our battle troops would
not take over the trenches until the
night before the attack
As we have seen, there had been a
great deal of discussion leading up to
the understanding regarding the st.
Mihiel offensive. August 16, prelimin-
ary instructions had been issued by me
and these had been supplemented from
time to time by verbal directions, and
now everything was moving smoothly
toward readiness for the attack. In my
conversation with Marshal Foch as late
as August Is he had suggested the ex-
tension of our front on the west of the
salient. Two French corps in the sector
had been assigned to my command and
arrangements for the transfer to the
area Of auxiliary troops and services
had been agreed upon, with no hint that
Foch was not in full accord with our
plans.
August 80, the day I assumed COM
mand of the sector, Marchal Foch, ac-
companied by Gen. Weygand, his chief
of staff, came to my residence at Lgny-
and after the usual cordial
exchange of greetings presented an en-
tirely new plan for the use Of the
American Army.
Foch Makes New Plans.
The marshal began by saying that
the German armies were in more or less
disorder from recent attacks by the
allies, and that We must not allow
them to reorganize, and that the
British would continue their attack in
the direction CT Cambria and st. Quen-
tin, and the French toward Mesnil.
Then, much to my surprise, he pro-
posed that the objectives in the St.
Mihiel operation be restricted and the
attack made on the southern face only,
and that upon its completion two ether
operations be undertaken by combined
Americans and French, number OF
our divisions going under French COM
mand. His plans, defining the opera
tions after st. Mihiel, were as follows:
(a) An attack between the MeuSe
and the Argonne executed by the 2nd
French Army, reinforced by few
American divisions -four or six), to be
prepared at once and launched as soon
as possible after that in Wcevre.
(b). A French American attack ex-
tending from the Argonne to the Soutn
road, to be prepared also without any
delay so that 1t may be launched a
few days after the preceding one. This
attack will be executed by-on the
right. an American Army acting on
each side of the Aisne-on the left, the
4th French Army extending its action
to the Souin road.
''I realize" Foch said, "that I am
presenting a number Of new IDEAS ana
that YOU will probably need time TO
think them over. but / should like your
first impressions" which old not nesl-
tate a moment to give.
Saw American Army Destroyed.
well. marshal" I replied. this is
a very sudden change. We are going
forward as already recommended 10
YOU and approved by you, and ! can
not understand why you want these
changes. Moreover, think that 10
make an attack in the salient with
limited cbjectives would cost little less
than to carry out the original idea,
which I think would put us IN mucn
better position"
,"That is true" he admitted, but the
fate of the 1918 campaign will be de-
cided in the Aisne region, and wish
to limit the woevre (St MihieD attack
so tee Americans can participate IN
the Meuse offensive, which VIII pro-
drce still greater results"
"But. Marshal Foch," I said, here
on the very day that you turn over
sector TO the American Army, almost
on the eve of an offensive, you ask me
to reduce the operation SO you can take
away several of my divisions ana as
sign some to the French Second Army
and use others to form an American
army to operate in conjunction with
the French Fourth Army, leaving me
with little to do except hold what viii
become a quiet sector after the st.
Mihiel offensive This virtually de-
stroys the American Army We have
been trying so long to FORM"
Marshal Foch suggested tnat II l
could give a satisfactory solution which
would permit the execution of the OPP
erations in view he would be glad to
carry IL out, but he did not think 1t
possible: that he had studied the ques-
tIon carefully and had sincerely looked
for some way TO avoid dividing the
American Army, but that he did not
believe it could be found.
Suggested Shifting Operations.
"one way" suggested. might be to
withdraw the Americans. from other
sectors and put them in with their
right on the Meuse and let them ex-
tend as far to the west as possible.
THAT might be considered" said
Marshal Foch. although it would be
dificult to execute the st. Mihiel OPP
Grafton and have time to shift the COM
mand to another front for an opera
ton there. But there would be no OBJ
lection TO relieving American divisions
from the Woevre (St. Mihiel) by tired
French divisions later, 50 they could be
sent to one or both Of the proposed
A ...nninasn y