The daily worker. [volume] (Chicago, Ill.) 1924-1958, 1931-11-11

the actual situation, and did not
transmit the decisions of the lead
ing bodies to the mass of the strik-
ers. All these WEAKNESSES led to a
condition that the leading commit
tees, in formulating their policy, did
not fully know the actually existing
situation, thus resulting in many Sc
rious errors. Thus in the course of
the miners strike, the back to work
movement was already very strong,
while the strike leadership was still
slow to recognize the extent of this,
and also slow to draw the conclu-
Sions in changed tactics. This also
resulted In the policy of the or
ganized retreat being adopted not
soon enough. The organized retreat
means to reform the front of Strug-
gle concentration in certain places,
liquidation of others, modification
of demands, etc. at a time when
the enemy has made a breach in
our front, but when we still have
strength. If we wait until our forces
are disintegrated, then it is i'm
possible to make an organized re-
treat In order to gain concessions,
and keep our ranks intact. In the
Paterson strike, as well as in the
strike of the textile workers in
Rhode Island, the leading organs
were not aware of the actual situa-
ton of the strikes In many in
stances during the critical moments
because of the failure to register
all the strikers, to organize the
strike committees in the shops, and
to organize the central strike ma
chinery on q correct basis repre-
sentative of all the strikers.
Weak Application of United Front
Cb) While in the recent strikes,
the policy of the united front was
followed, in the actual application,
it was very weak. In practice it was
the small bodies that carried
through all decisions, and the unit
ed front organs had too much
merely a formal existence. In the
matter of uniting the unemployed
and employed masses through the
organization of the joint struggle
for joint demands, only in the
miners strike were real beginnings
made, and even here this was not
followed up. In practically all the
textile strikes little attempt was
made to draw the unemployed
workers into the struggle. Mistakes
were made, particularly in the
strikes in textile paterson, Wey-
bosset, etc. In iquidating the role
of the TUUL union, and substitute
ing the united front organs for the
union. While this is not the main
danger, the main danger still being
the failure to apply the policy of
the united front, we must fight
against all tendencies to hquidate
the role of our union. While always
developing the broadest possible
united front, we must from the very
beginning in preparation for the
struggle, during the strike and after
the strike, take up energetically the
recruiting into the TUUL unions,
and the building OF the unions into
mass organizations. This requires
that at all stages of the struggle
and during the strike In particular,
that the union shall be the instru-
ment for the mobilization Of the
masses, to develop and lead the
struggles. In the carrying through
of the united front policy, we must
De on guard to counterfeit all the
fake unity maneuvers of the re-
formists and always maintain the
initiative in the fight for unity. In
the Paterson strike, at a certain
stage, We lost this initiative be-
cause of the slowness and hesita-
ton in carrying through the correct
line, adopted in the struggle against
The Musteite- Gitlow maneuvers,
Co Our unions have not given
enough attention in the course of
che strikes, through their practical
work, to smash the lies spread by
all our enemies, that we are not
interested in fighting for and win