Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-21
British, where the contacts had been

|
British, where the contacts had been
close.
AS to personal relations, it was graft
| flying always to find an attitude which
apparently regarded these discussions,
though often heated, as simply official
difference of opinion. There was at the
same time a very distinct impression in
my mind and in the minds of many
Of our officers familiar with the argu-
ments on both sides, that the allies,
while greatly in need Of assistance,
were inclined to advance the plea for
amalgamation as a means of keeping
us in a subordinate role.
Still. after these questions were
settled even temporarily there was no
| personal rancor or ill-feeling in evil
dence, although no doubt at times
each side thought the other difficult
to deal with.
Other proposals regarding the employ
ment Of American troops under allied
command were made from time to time,
all Of which I opposed vehemently.
An understanding of the allied atti-
tude, however, enabled me to main
tain the high regard in which held my
associates IN arms, especially when their
many acts of kindness and friendship
were considered.
After the decision at Abbeville every
body seemed content, and Gen. Foch.
parting with me. said: Mon General,
nous sommes toujourS d'accord." While
this remark no dougbt expressed salts
faction that an agreement had been
reached, it did not mean the allies
had at all given up their views on
how American troops should be trained
or used.
AS to training, the fact that neither
the British nor French had trained
their armies for open warfare, either
offensive or defensive, was at least in
part one cause of the tremendous sue
cess of the German drives with divisions
trained expressly for that kind of war
fare.
Opinion Of Americans.
That the French intended to impress
their conception on us is indicated
by memorandum of instructions for
the guidance Of their officers on duty
with us emanating from the French
general headquarters May l that fell
into our hands. 1t shows also that
the French still regarded the POSSIBLE
lty OF open warfare as more or less
visionary. Speaking of Americans, it
said:
1T should be borne in mind that
they have an extremely highly developed
sense OF 'Amour-propre' based on their
pride in belonging to one of the great
est nations Of the world Consequently
an air OF superiority over them should
be assiduously avoided, fact which
IN no way prevents the absolute sub
ordination required by the service for
carrying out the rules of hierarchy. T" a"
In case OF necessity French officers
should not hesitate to exercise their
authority. Americans dream of
operating in open country after having
broken through the front. This results
In too much attention being devoted
to this form OF operations"
The attitude the French assumed
toward us in the World War was in
marked contrast with the views held
by them when their troops so gen.
erously came TO America to aid lis
in the Revolution. The French COM
mander at that time received very
explicit instructions from his govern
ment on this subject, as the following
sent to Rochambeau shortly before he
sailed for America will show:
1t Is his majestys desire and he
hereby commands that. so far as
circumstances will permit, the Count de
Rochambeau shall maintain the inte-
CRAFTY OF the French troops which his
majesty has placed under his command
and that at the proper time he shall
express to Gen. Washington. COM
mander in chief of the forces of the
Congress, under whose orders the
French troops are to serve, that il is
the intention of the King that those
shall not be dispersed in any manner.
and that they shall serve at all times
as a unit and under the French gen.
erals, except in the case of a temporary
detachment which shall reioin the
main body without delay"
A Regiment for Italy.
After the sessions 1 suggested to M
Clemenceau and Mr.. Lloyd George that
sending regiment might help to slim
| ulate the Italian morale and asked their
opinion. They both thought it would
be wise thing to do just at this time.
l had opposed scattering our forces in
this way, but the appeal of Italian Of
Metals and the recommendations of
Americans who had visited italy indi-
Gated that under the circumstances an
exception could well be made for a
small force.
When / told Premier Orlando that
this might be done, with the possibility
OF increasing the number up to a di-
vision later on, he was much pleased
Meanwhile, the President had been
pressed by Italian representatives to
send them troops, and word came by
cable few days later that he thought
we might brigade some OF our troops with
the British and French divisions then
in Italy. But TO leave them independ-
ent was far preferable and the subject
was not taken up with the allies. my
i6ea being that if we should find it
necessary to send more troops to Italy
it would be best to build up division
of our own.
Another matter taken up informally
with the pripoo ministers after coy-
ference was that of pooling allied sup
plies. 1 explained its advantages and
emphasized the saving In tonnage that
would result Mr. Lloyd George and
Mr.. Orlando did not commit themselves
entirely, but accepted it in principle, as
M. Clemenceau had done, and each
agreed to designate an officer with bust