Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-05
French and British Press
for AmaIgamation of
American Troops With
Their Armies.
CLEMENCEAU GOES
DIRECTLY TO BAKER
End of Year Finds Only
10000 Men in France
When Ten Divisions
Should Have Arrived.
CHAPTER XIV.

OAAOuANA 1AdNO AA AANOAs
CHAPTER XIV.
~ ETURNING to my headquarters
at Chaumcnt December 81,
N 1917, I was not surprised to
/ receive the following cable
from Secretary of War Baker,
in view of the numerous suggestions
that had come to me regarding various
plans for training cur troops with the
French and British:
Both English and French are press
ing upon the President their desires
to have your forces amalgamated with
theirs by regiments and companies,
and both express the belief In 1mpend-
ing heavy drive by Germans somewhere
along the lines of the western Iront.
We do not desire loss Of identity OF our
forces but regard that as secondary to
the meeting Of any critical situation by
the most helpful use possible OF the
troops at your command. The diftculty
of course is to determine where the
drive or drives of the enemy will take
place: and in advance of some knowl-
edge on that question any redtstrlpu-
ton of your forces would be dimcult.
THE President, however, desires you
to have full authority to use the forces
at your command as you deem wise IN
consulta ton with the French and Brit
ish commanders in chief. 1t is sug-
gested for your consideration that pos
sibly places might be selected for your
forces nearer the junction of the Brit
ish and French lines, which would en-
able you to throw strength In which,
ever direction seemed most necessary.
This suggestion is not, however,
pressed beyond whatever merit 1t has
in YOUR Judgment. the Presidents sole
purpose being 10 acquaint you with the
representations made here and to au-
thorize you to act with entire freedom
to accomplish the main purposes IN
mind. II is hoped that complete unity
and coordination Of action can be Sc
cured in this matter by any confer
ences you may have with French and
British commanders and line OF action
that may be agreed upon"
Wanted Immediate Assignment.
During my visit with Gen. Petain at
his HEADQUARTERS O few days before this
we had taken up anew the question OF
training for our divisions then in
France and also for those yet TO come
On account Of the inminence OF pow
erful offensive BY the Germans on the
pared TO utilize all possible resources.
including the Americans, a statement TO
which I readily agreed as a matter o.
course.
Instead of following the plan then In
operation as TO training progressively,
beginning with the smaller units, ne
wanted to take O quicker method and
have each Of the four infantry regl-
ments Of each Of our divisions. together
with the proper proportion OF the artil-
lery. engineers and other troops as
aligned TO q French division at once.
After two or three months OF service
these troops would be reassembled
under their own divisional ofncers and
take their places in line. 1t was not
simply for instruction In quiet sectors
that these units were TO be used. but for
whatever service that might fall to the
lot Of the French divisions to which
they were assigned.
This, of course, virtually meant the
building up of French divisions ny
American regiments and carried With
it the probability that we should not
be able to get them back without act
ually reducing the French divisions TO
a point where they would be much
crippled for further line service.
Again, the training Of our higher
officers and their STATS was entirely
ignored under this plan.
I spoke Of that as an objection and
also mentioned the difference in Ian
guage as being an insuperable barrier TO
any idea Of active service under an as
signment that might become permA-
nent. I further stated that in my
opinion the adoption Of such plan
might lead practically TO the abandon
ment Of the idea Of ever having an
American army as such.
Rejects Petains Plan.
course became necessary, that we
should analgamate with the British,
who were also making overtures for the
use Of our troops. The French did not
then offer any objection to our sending
troops TO the British and 1t looked as
though there was an understanding be-
tween them, especially in view OF Sec
rotary Bakers cable.
In my formal reply TO q communica-
ton from Petain embracing his pro-
posal, declined to permit our regi-
ments to be assigned as he had sug-
eested. but said that I should be glad
to attach them to French divisions
solely for training for a period Of one
month in quiet sector provided that
opportunity should also be given our
officers TO learn how to handle larger
units by actually exercising their proper
functions.
In the meantime. the following cable
was received from washington which
showed the determination of the French
70 carry their point:
THE French Ambassador called on
the Secretary of War today and read
him q dispatch from M. Clemenceau
TO the effect that Gen. Pershing and
Gen. Petain had conferred as 70 the
wisdom of seasoning American troops
by attaching their regimental units to
French divisions before committing
Part Of the line 10 an American division
made IN OF troops not (sic) accustomed
10 actual front conditions.
"M. Clemenceau's cablegram stated
that Gen. Pershiug had reported him
self and On Petaln in substantial
agreement after conference on the sub
Iect. but Gen. Petain conveyed to M.
Clemenc'au the opposite opinion APP
parently some misunderstanding has
arisen which the Secretary of War will
be glad TO have Gen. Pershing endeavor
to clear UP by placing himself in com.
munication with M. Clemenceau and
reporting the result Of the interview.
1.-THE French urge action as outlined
above as being safer for American
troops than 1t would be to give them at
once an independent place in the line.
and urge very strongly that the Secre-
tary of War here accept their view and
commend It 70 you. This the Secretary
Of Wer Is not willing to do. Desiring TO
leave tbs matter wholly within your
discretion after full consideration If the
important elcp'ents Of the matter.
The Frcnch Ambassador has beer,
told that the S cretary of War would
lay the matter before you and would
communicate to him your conclusions
when they are arrived at
Pershing's Reply 10 Baker.
The following extract from my cable
Of January conveys the main points Of
my reply: a