Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-07-19
PEACE. EFFORTS INVOLVE.
u. In EUROPEAN STRIFE
Hoover Purpose of Pressing Disarma'
ment Finds Nations Eager for Modi-
fication of Reparation Terms.

ular opinion would compel 1t to meet
the American proposal for a reduction
Of the French army by the demand for
| precisely the same sort of guarantee
Clemenceau obtained from Wilson under
similar circumstances and the United
States Senate rejected And the French
people would be unable to understand
how an American President could ask
| 1t to reduce its ornaments precisely as
| long as the American Government was
unprepared to undertake that such re-
duction should not be accompanied by
any diminution in national security.
The Polish people would similarly ask
American assurances. both on the side
of Russia and Germany, the Czech
both in respect of Austria and Hungary
The idea of diminution of burdens
upon the taxpayers incident to q reduc-
ton of armies would be welcome in
every country, but no people would con-
slider the possibility of temporary relief
from a current expenditure which, If
onerous, was still tolerable at the risk
of new war and subsequent mutila-
ton of national frontiers. And Mr.
Hoover would be unable to convince the
French, Polish or Czech peoples of the
absence Of any such danger precisely as
long as he was unable to persuade the
German and Austrian peoples to aban
don their present purposes.
Moreover. there has been no moment
less suspicious for any disarmament
conference than the present since the
time OF the Ruhr occupation, because
the adoption by the Bruening cabinet
last Autumn of the revision demands Of
the Nationalist and the later sweep of
the extreme Nationalist. followed this
Spring by the proposal for tariff union
between Austria and Germany, has
aroused apprehension, and even fear in
all the countries Immediately affected.
This state of mind was clearly disclosed
in the lack of French enthusiasm over
the debt moratorium.
Peril Of MuSsolini.
On the naval side American interven-
ton has also very clear consequences to
the French mind. France sees in the
present and frequently proclaimed pur-
poses OF MuSSolini a peril to its Colo
NAL empire, and in particular to its
Mediterranean situation. AS a conSe-
quence 1t refuses to agree to parity with
Italy. AS Italy is far poorer than
France, she cannot permanently keep
pace with France II French construction
is considerable. BY contrast each re-
duction of the French tonnage lessons
the odds. 1t was this circumstance
which led the French at London to ask
some form Of Mediterranean Locarno,
involving a consultative pact on our
part as the condition of joining in q
five-power pact.
In the case of the debt negotiations
the American people had clear evidence
Of the extent to which political consid-
erations interfere with financial and
economic. Moreover, it is unmistakable
that while the French have in the end
assented to the Hoover debt program,
they remain skeptical of German pur-
poses and fearful less financial relief
may encourage German military prepa-
ratlons and American interest in Ger
many strengthen German resistance to
the peace treaties. The result is bound
to be even more sustained resistance to
any disarmament program than in the
past.
After nearly a decade and a half Of
persistent effort Europe has finally i'm
posed upon America recognition Of the
connection between war debts and Ger
man reparations and the interest of the
United States in European prosperity.
This success spells to all European
minds the eventual extinction Of both
debt and reparation payments That
issue is already considered as good as
closed by Europe. where no one expects
10 see resurrection OF the Young plan.
Notifications Are Expected.
But along with the money question
Europe has always chung to the peace
question, and continued to believe that
sooner or later, as We must modify our
debt stand, we would also have to aban-
don our policy Of isolation. Now, moth
ing is more logical and therefore more
likely than that the French should ask
us, having abandoned our debt policy to
save Germany, to change our isolation
policy to secure France. That would
mean, In fact, entrance into the League
Of Nations, and by acceptance of the
covenant OF the League automatically
putting our moral and physical power
behind the preservation of the status
quo.
But precisely as Europe chung to
separations as long as we stuck to debts
the armed powers will stick to their
guns while We adhere to the traditional
policy of no foreign commitments. No
American commitments, no European
disarmament. That is the net of It, as
Mark Sullivan would say.
Copyright, 1917