The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1931-09-11
CHAPTER LII

L
ers ia chief at General Foch's head
quarters Wednesday. July "a. 1918. to
discuss plans for offensive operations.
Present were Generals Foch. Petain.
Weygand and Buat; Field Marshal
Haig and General Lawrence. and Gen.
erai Conner, chief Of operations. Boyd
and Hughes and myself.
There was pronounced good feeling
and confidence. General Foch gave a
resume of the general situation. He
proposed no definite plan, but submit
ted his remarks as the basis of discus
sion.
The main point was that the fifth
German offensive of the year had been
checked and the allied counteroffen-
sive, beginning July Is, had trans
formed it into defeat 1t was the gen.
eral opinion that every advantage
should be taken of this fact and that
the allies should continue their attacks
with as much vigor as possible.
On Par With Enemy.
General Foch said with satisfaction
that we had now reached an equality
in numbers of combatants and an
actual superiority in reserves. As the
enemy would soon be required to re-
lieve a considerable number of tired
divisions from the active front, the
allies would rapidly gain further supe-
riority through the constantly increas-
ing number of Americans.
All information went to show that
the enemy had two armies. so to
speak, Foch continued, one an exhaust
ed holding army and the other a shock
army, already weakened maneuvering
behind this frail front. Unquestion-
ably we had material advantage In
aviation and tanks, and to a smaller
degree in artillery. and this would be
augmented by the arrival and arma-
ment Of American artillery personnel.
AS to the reserve strength behind
the allies, ii would soon be powerful
indeed if the rate of 100000 per month
at which the Americans were pouring
in could be maintained. One could
sense an approaching crisis on the en-
emy's side possibly not so very re-
mote because of the difficulty he was
having in keeping up the effective
strength of his units.
Allies Now Hold Initiative.
Beyond these advantages of mate
rial force in our favor there was also
the moral ascendancy we had gained
by our recent victories and his fail
ures Foch felt as we all did, that the
allies now held the initiative and that
from this time on they should aban-
don the defensive attitude that had
been so long imposed upon them and
continue the offensive without cessa-
ton.
He then pointed out the following
offensives which it was evident would
be indispensable to later operations:
The release of the railroad
Paris-Avricourt in the Marine re-
giOn by the French; the Paris
Amiens railroad by a concerted &C
ton of the British and French;
the Paris-Avricourt railroad in the
region of Commercy by the reduc-
ton of the st. Mihiel salient by
the American army, which, by re-
ducing the front, would bring US
within reach of the Briey region
and permit action on a larger
scale between the Mouse and
MOselle.
Further offensives were foreSeen,
having in view the release of the min
driving the enemy from the region of
Dunkirk and Calais.
No Idea of Ending War in 1918.
No one suggested that the plans of
the moment or those TO follow might
be carried so far as to terminate the
war in 1918. Concerning the part each
should play Foch asked expressions of
opinion of the respective commanders
in chief as to how these or any other
operations we might propose should be
conducted.
Marshal Haig gave his views and
plans, which agreed with the general
outline suggested. as did General Pc
tain, who wanted further to consider
the possibilities. AS far as these pre-
liminary operations applied to the
Americans, they were simply a restate-
ment of the plans we had been lead
ing up TO ever since our entry into
the war. l. therefore. advised that
details of organization and supply
were receiving every consideration in
the preparation of the American army
to do its part.
While at General Foch's headquar-
tiers / arranged with General Petain
for the expansion of the First corps,
then operating in the Marine sector, by
which four American divisions were
to be placed in the line with TWO in
reserve. 1t was my hope that this
would be the basis for the preliminary
formation of an American army Oh
this front. En- route TO Chaumont
stopped to call on Liggett and appr;se
him of the possibility of additional
American divisions for his corps.
Expedition to Russia.
The supreme war council was prone
10 listen to suggestions for the use of