Evening star., 1931-03-14

said that later, having made studies
and general preparations for the at
tack, / could go and take command
when the army was formed.
Referring again to the st. Mihiel OPP
Grafton, I argued that there would be
less risk if we should attack on both
sic-S of the salient. Marshal Foch
seel. I'd to think there was danger of
our occoming too deeply involved in
that rector, although in conference in
July he had stated that clearing the
salient would bring us within reach of
the Briey Basin and permit action on
a larger scale between the Meuse and
the Moselle.
However, he now clung to the idea
that the objective should be the line
Regnieville- -Thiaucourt Vigneulles, and
that the attack should be made only on
the southern face. But did not think
it wise, at this eleventh hour, to make
changes in our solution of the prob
lem. / was willing to accept the limited
objectiveS, but I held out in favor of
the secondary attack from the west.
Objected TO Gen. Degoutte.
Supporting his plans further, Marshal
Foch suggested that for the operation
in the Aisne he could put both Gen.
Degoutte, who was thoroughly familiar
with that region, and Gen. Malcor, who
was also acquainted with the country
and was chief of artillery of the Fourth
army, at my disposal to assist, with the
aid of an American staff. in preparing
the AiSre operation while ! was en-
gagged in the Woevre.
This was only>a roundabout way Of
attempting to assign Gen. Degoutte to
command our troops. Many officers
who had served under him on the Vesle
felt that he had unnecessarily sacrificed
American troops, so for both reasons
disapproved of the suggestion.
The marshal then re-Stated his pro-
posal and suggested that if the two
American contingents, one being the
group assigned to the French Second
Army and the other the proposed Amer
lean Army on opposite sides of the
Argonne, would eventually join hands,
he could see only advantage in this.
The further we proceeded the more
apparent it became to me that the re-
suit of any of these proposals would be
to Illustrate or at least seriously delay
forming a distinctive American Army.
In this event 1t was certain that de-
spite the contribution of our splendid
units, whatever success might be at
tanned would be counted as the achieve
IIlCuL VI Lie EICAlC1l anu
ticipation would be entirely secondary.
/ asked why these Americans which
Marshal Foch proposed should go to the
Aisne, where they would replace French
divisions, should not go to replace
French divisions in the French Second
Army, then between the MetSe River
and the Argonne Forest.
Insisted on Our Army.
-
Americans take over the whole sector
then occupied by the French Second
Army west of the Meuse. thus making
the French troops relieved available to
reinforce the French Fourth Army.
repeated what I had often said,
that the American Government and
people expected the Army to act as
unit and not be dispersed tn this way.
pointed out that each time we were
about TO complete the organization of
our Army, some proposition like this
was presented to prevent it.
DO you wish TO go to battle?" Mar
shall Foch broke in.
Most aSsuredly," I replied, "but as
an American Army and in no other
way"
He argued that there would not be
time, whereupon I said: IF you will
assign me a sector will take it at
once"
Where would it beP" he asked
wherever you say
remind him tnat the French had
insisted on our shipping to France only
infantry and macnme gun units, and
had MADE the distinct promise that
they would supply us with artillery and
other auxiliary troops when needed. /
pointed out tnat he himself had made
repeated and urgent requests for these
limited shipments, and had promised
that we would be furnished whatever
necessary to complete our organization
until our own auxiliary troops should
arrive. I then demanded that he fulfill
these promises.
Americans, Not French.
Marshal Foch adhered to his PROPOSE
ton, saying, however, that he was dis
posed TO consider any suggestion that
would keep the American Army to-
gether. My reply was that I was quite
ready TO send divisions west of the
Argonne Forest as an American Army,
but not to serve in the French Second
Army. Foch then asserted that this
would not Fave the French Armies
enough troops with which to attack,
ignoring my argument that the question
was as broad as it was long, and that
ne could transfer French as easily as he
could American divisions.
After making two tentative sugges-
tions, first, that we should operate east
OF the Meuse River, and second, west
OF the Argonne Forest, both of which
he rejected, proposed fatty that the
front Of the American Army be extend
ed to include the sector between the
Meuse and the Argonne. Foch ad--
mitted that this had been his original
idea, but he still pleaded lack of time.
The discussion was somewhat hsated
and much of it was carried on so
rapidly that it could not be translated.
He continued to reiterate his demands
for the adoption Of his plan. but had
learned that 1t was necessary to be
very firm in dealing with him, and !
finally said, in effect:
Marshal Foch. you have no authority
as allied commander-in-chief to call
upon me to yield my command of the
American Army 10 have it scattered
among the allied forces, where 1t will
not be an American Army at ALL"
He was apparently surprised at my
resentment of his attempt to conflne
American effort to subordinate roles
rangement." to which replied, as we
both rose:
You may insist all you please, but
I decline absolutely to agree to your
plan. While our Army will fight wher-
ever you may decide, 1t will not fight
except as an independent American
Army"
pointed out TO him that had de-
pended upon him to assist in carrying
out the organization OF our Army, that
my Governments from the President