Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-06

troops: that is, their purpose was to
build I'D their own units instead OF aid
ing the cause by augmenting the num-
Der of complete combat divisions on
the western front.
The question that naturally arose in
my mind was that If tonnage was
available for this purpose why had it
not been offered to us some time be-
fore. or, indeed, why not at that very
moment? If it had been, we could have
brought several more divisions to France
and had them prepared to go into the
line much earlier than was eventually
possible. And it Is conceivable that
they might have been able to prevent
the disasters that came to the British
in March and to the French in May.
But. of course. the offer was made pri-
marilv in order to build up their units
with Americans. The British we're not
thinking in terms of an American
Army at ALL
However, as Gen. Robertson's pro-
posal would enable us to increase our
strength more rapidly, my preliminary
cable to washington reporting the con-
ference recommended that it be given
consideration and, in view of our ma
tional attitude regarding service with
another army, that if approved the plan
should be regarded as temporary meas
as possible the remaining troops of our
divisions thus temporarily broken up
should be brought over and the units
reassembled; that division, brigade and
regimental commanders and their
stats be sent with their Infantry for
training with the corresponding Brit
ish units, and that the Infantry be
taken from those divisions that would
not otherwise be transported until after
June.
Feared They Might Relax.
The arrangement proposed by Rob-
ertson, if adopted, was not to interfere
in any way with our program for bring
ing our troops in our own tonnage, as
already planned. My cable suggested
that we should insist that the British
government continue to provide as
many men for their armies as possible
and that it would be pertinent for our
Government to inquire just what the
British government proposed to do to
keep up it's own forces. / feared that
should we make this concession the
tendency would be for them to relax
and let the burden of keeping up their
man power fall on us, to the detriment
of preparations for building up our own
Army later on.
In a telegram to Gen. Robertson
later I set forth the report of our con-
versation which 1 had cabled the War
Department and further stated that 1t
was of the utmost Importance that the
British government should exert every
energy to keep up its own man power.
I requested full statement from him
as to British resources, including the
men then available and to become so
during the year, in order that we might
have all the facts available before
making a final decision on his PROPOSE
ton.
In reply, Gen Robertson sent me the
following data in a letter dated jan
uary IT:
1.-THE British government has given
the most anxious consideration to the
question Of the maintenance of the
armies in the field during 1918: and,
by making every effort, there will be-
come available for service at the front
449 900 men now under training, plus
100 600 to be called up, In addition
there will be called up 100000 men OF
lower category who are not fit for the
first line, plus 10000 lads of 18 years
of age, who will not be available for
service at the front till 1919. Please
keep these figures strictly secret"
Nothing further was done toward an
agreement until a week or so later,
when conversations were resumed.
Tomorrow: Pershing tells Baker
French consider themselves superior in
art of war and details differences be-
tween them and United States.
Copyright. 1881. in all countries by the
North American Newspaper Alliance; World
rights reserved. including the SCANDINAVIAN.
ited)