Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-29
BRITISH SMALLcSHIP PLAN
CALLED BLOW TO PARITY
Big Increase of Naval Power Over L. S.
Feared From Strength in Bases
and Merchant Marine.

ing the IS 900 tons size Is not clear.
1t is impossible to escape the obser-
Vation that any drastic reduction in
the size of ships would amount to an
exploitation Of the great inherent Brit
ish strength in naval bases and mer-
chant marine and would result in a
big increase in the total naval power
of Great Britain in relation to that OF
other countries, especially the United
States.
Merchant Ships a Factor.
Armed merchant ships have always
done valuable nan-of-war duty during
hostilities. There is no limit TO their
increase in size, and many of them are
now capable of mounting more six-inch
guns than could be put on a 6,500-ton
cruiser. While merchant ships are
necessarily handicapped in many re.
spects when 1t comes to fighting a regl-
lar vessel, the smaller the latter be-
comes the less will be the handicap. II
should be obvious that If the regular
cruiser is small enough the advantage
may well rest with a large merchant
liner, or a group of them.
The influence of naval bases upon
naval power is not difficult to under
stand. Bases are in reality an euuiya-
lent of ships because they multiply the
percentage of ships which can be main
tained in their vicinity. Consider, fol
example, the case of the protection oil
commerce near that great focus of ship
ping at the Straits of Gibraltar. Ter
American cruisers based at their nearest
home port (Boston) would have great
difficulty in maintaining a single cruiser
constantly on station, because most OF
their fuel would be exhausted on the
round trip journey and each ship colIlo
remain of Gibraltar only about ! day
in 10.
Power Of Squadron Multiplied,
Were it possible for these 10 cruiser,
to base on Gibraltar itself, as 10 Brit
ish cruisers could do, they could readily
maintain seven of their number or
| station constantly. Thus the power oil
the squadron would be multiplied BY
seven merely through mere advan-
tageously placed base OF operations
Clearly bases are an important equiv
alent of ships.
Bases are especially important fol
small ships because their cruising radius
Is necessarily short. In the foregoing
illustration 1t would make little differ
ence to the 10 cruisers based on Gibral-
tar whether they were big or small, anc
their cruising radius long or short. In
either case they could maintain 20 OF
80 per cent Of their total number or
| station constantly. But for 10 cruiser,
based on Boston reduction in size anc
cruising radius would make a vast diff
| ference.
Even a comparatively small reduc-
| ton in these elements could easily re.
suit in cutting in half their effective.
ness on station, because none of the
reduction could be applied to the Ions
| journey back and forth between base
and trade protecting station, and al
Of 1t would have to be taken from the
time devoted to useful work.
The tremendous advantage which the
| British Navy possesses in its superla.
| tive system OF worldwide bases al.
ready makes it substantially superior
10 ours on a parity TO total tonnage o.
lShipS. Chair bases uniiltipiN the naR