Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-01-24

'\HE most important question that
confronted us in the prepara.
ton of our forces of citizen sol.
Il diery for efficient service wa;
training. Except for the Span
ish-American War, nearly 20 years be-
fore, actual combat experience of the
Regular Army had been limited to the
Independent action of minor commands
in the Philippines and to two expedi-
tons into Mexico, each with forces
smaller than modern American di-
vision.
The World War involved the handling
OF masses, where even a division was
relatively small unit. 1t was one thing
to call one or two million men to the
colors, and quite another thing to trans
form them into an organized, instructed
army capable of meeting and holding its
own in battle against the best-trained
force in Europe with three years actual
war experience to its credit.
Few people can realize what stupen-
douS undertaking it was to teach these
vast numbers their various duties when
such large percentage of them were
ignorant of practically everything per-
tanning to the business of the soldier In
war. First of all, officers had to be
provided and trained to command units
from the squad up. perhaps to the divi-
sion. These officers had to learn the
interior economy Of feeding, housing
and caring for their men. and how to
lead them in battle. This great task
was, of course. under the direction OF
the War Department.
Training Section Formed.
A general scheme of schools for the
A. E. F. was prepared by the Opera
lions and Training Section, but in order
that this instruction should be as COM
plete and uniform as possible and at
the same time be co-ordinated with
other activities, I decided that training
should be handled by officers who could
devote their entire time to it. An adj
ditional section of the Headquarters
General Staff was, therefore, establish
ed, called the Training Section, to func-
ton under my personal direction. AS
chief of this section Col. Paul B. Ma
lone was chosen, with Col. H. 3. Fiske
as his assistant.
In the preparation of courses Of train
ing an especial study had been made
not only of the basic principles taught
by the Allies. but also of the methods
employed to give them practical appli-
cation. The British and French were
not entirely in accord in their ideas OF
organization or of battle tactics and
sought to impress us with the superior
ity of their respective systems. Our OIL
fcers engaged in this duty were directed
to keep in view the development Of the
most efficient fighting machine as quick
" as possible, and as means TO this
end to adopt only sound doctrines OF
training and make them essentially our
own.
The British methods of teaching
trench warfare appealed to me very
strongly. They taught their men to be
aggressive and undertook TO perfect
them in hand-to-hand fighting with
bayonet, grenade and dagger. A GER
tain amount of this kind of training
was necessary to stimulate the morale
Of troops by giving them confidence
In their own personal proves.
Through the kindness Of Sir Douglas
Haig, we we're fortunate early in cur
experience to have assigned to us Lieut..
Gen. r. H. K. Butler and other officers
of the British Army, to assist in this
individual training. Later on several
French and British officers also came
to lecture at number of our schools.
Differ on war Principles.
We found difficulty, kowever, in US
ing these allied instructors in that the
French and. TO a large extent, the
British, had practically settled down
30 the conviction that developments
since 1914 had changed the principles
Of warfare. Both held that rev condi-