Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-01-20

The American and British cor
lister, gave a state dinner to officials
attending the conference.
To-day attended luncheon to allied
representatives given by the President
and Madame Poincare at the ElySee
| Palace
In conference this afternoon with
Petain, Cadorna, Robertson and Foch
at latters Office. Discussed military
! plans. talked about tonnage possibilities
and shortage of personnel. All pessimisr
! tic and reserved.
! Mr., James Stillman, just returned
from a tour of France, confirms reports
Of serious depression"
Declines Political Talk.
The conference of allied representa-
! tives was one of those periodical meet
| ingS held to discuss the Situa ton. both
political and military, and to decide
upon policies and programs. The French
were anxious that we should participate
and Premier Ribot had requested Wash
| ingVon to designate our Ambassador and
myself to attend. M. Jules Cambon,
MINISTER of foreign affairs, whom l had
known many years before when he
was Ambassador at Washington, asked
me 10 urge Washington that we should
| be represented. Speaking for the French
government, he felt that wes should
begin to take part in allied councils
and have a voice in directing policies
| It seemed to me, and so cabled Sec
rotary of War Baker. that for the mo-
ment we should limit ourselves to the
consideration of purely military ques-
tions and not become involved in politi-
cal matters that affected only the al
lies.
This view was approved by Secretary
Baker as being in accord with the opin-
ion of President Wilson, which had been
conveyed to the French government.
Therefore, arrangements were made for
a separate meeting of the military lead
| ers.
| During breakfast with Mr.. Lloyd
! George, as noted in my diary, he point
ed out the grave consequences of con-
tinued German success against Russia,
his conclusions being those already
reached by every one concerning the
outlook. This situation, he thought,
made it especially important that the
| Americans should assume the RESPONSE
bility of helping to decide the course to
be followed by the allies. I explained
that President Wilson felt that for the
present we should join only in the con-
sideration of the military aspects of the
general situation.
The meeting of the allied military
leaders July 26. which was my first,
brought out little that was hopeful. The
political relations of the allies were
touched upon in a general way, but
only so far as they might affect the
military situation. The most signifi-
cant recent event, of course, had been
the crisis in Russia. Kerensky had sue
ceeded in reviving the spirits of the
Russian armies in Galicia and they were
able to make considerable gains against
the Austro-Germans.
Russians Badly Beaten.
The effort had been short lived, how
| ever. The Russian armies in the end
had been badly beaten by the vigorous
attacks of their opponents and reports
| indicated that great generalization ex-
listed throughout the nation. Although
lacking complete information, the opin-
ion prevailed in the conference that
Russia was practically eliminated as a
military factor, yet one or two of the
officers expressed some lingering hope
that she might still be encouraged to
offer further resistance to the Germans
Under the circumstances, little doubt
existed that the Germans would be able
to renew activities on the western
front by Spring at the latest
With reference to American assist
ance, / gave in detail the situation as
to our man power, immediate and pros
pective, especially in the light of the
latest plans Of the department, and laid
particular emphasis on the necessity of
additional shipping. cablegram had
lust been received in response to mine of
July 6, IN which had requested that
at least million men reach France by
the following Spring.
This message, indicating that the
War Department foresaW small chance
of securing the necessary tonnage, was
read to the conference, in part, as
follows:
by using all shipping which is now
in sight for the purpose and which will
be available after the month of No
vember, the plan proposes to transport
to France by June Is. 1918, 81 divisions,
comprising about 100000 men, together
with auxiliary troops and replacement
troops, line of communication troops
and others amounting to 214,975 men,
making a total of 634,975 men,"
Although short of my recommended
lions, even this schedule could be car
ried out only by a very large increase of
tonnage. The other members of the
conference were of the opinion that If
new adjustments could be made there
might be shipping for nine or ten of our
divisions before Spring So for the
moment there did not seem 10 pc the
slightest chance of transporting mil
lion men to France by the following
June.
British Casualties Heavy.
AS to the state of their respective
armies, Robertson pointed out that the
British casualties had been heavy dur
ing the year and their Ipanpower
greatly reduced. Petain mentioned
their severe losses, and said that the
French could only slightly augment
their strength. Cadorna said the Italian
Il Army was little, If any, better of. The
depletion of Allied resources in men
caused considerable anxiety among
them in the face Of the probability of
having to meet the full force OF the
central powers in the Spring.
After canvassing the whole situation,
the conference expressed the unanimous
opinion that a defensive role should be
adopted on all secondary fronts. The
British and French representatives
hoped that the surplus troops resulting
from this course might be available TO
strengthen their armies il France, and