The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1931-10-22

effect were sent to our armies immedi-
ately. Our troops had been advancing
rapidly during the preceding two days,
and although every effort was made
to reach them promptly a few could
not be overtaken before the prescribed
hour.
A brief account of the conference
with the German delegates was given
to me a few days later by General
Weygand. He said the Germans came
across the line by automobile the aft
ernoon Of November 7 and boarded
special railway coach sent by the
French to meet them. During the
night this car and the marshals were
placed side by side in the forest be-
tween Compiegne and scissors.
The emissaries were ushered into
the marshal's presence, and after pro-
ducing their credentials were asked
the object Of their visit. They replied
that they had come to discuss the
terms of an armistice. The marshal
then made it clear that he himself
was not requesting an armistice and
did not care to have one.
When asked If they wished an arm
istice they replied that they did. The
marshal said that if that was the
case, here were the terms, copy of
which he handed them. The severity
Of the demands seemed to surprise
them and they appeared very much
depressed. They had no power to sign
an armistice they said, without the
consent Of the chancellor, and after
some little discussion they started an
officer to the German capital with the
terms.
They did not seem to object to turn
ing over 5000 cannon, but deplored
the condition which required them to
surrender 10000 machine guns. They
finally succeeded in having this re-
duced to $4,000 machine guns on the
ground that they might have some
left for riot duty. In speaking Of the
danger of riots, the delegates were
asked why they did not send some
Of their reserve divisions to maintain
order in the interior.
Their reply was that they had no
divisions in reserve, as every division
that they had was actually in line.
Then they complained about the short
time allowed for evacuation, stating
that the German army was in no con-
dition to move, either forward or back
ward.
What America Had Done.
Between September 20 and Novem-
Der II, twenty-five American and six
French divisions, with an approximate
fighting strength of 100000 men, on
front extending from southeast Of Yer
dun to the Argonne forest, had en-
gagged and decisively beaten forty
three different German divisions, with
an estimated fighting strength of 470,-
600. OF the twenty-five American div
isions, four had at different times dur
ing this period been in action on fronts
other than our own.
The enemy suffered an estimated
loss of over 100000 casualties in this
battle, and our First army lost about
117,00O. The total strength of the
First army, including $4,000 French
troops, reached 1881, 900 men. It cap.
tured 10000 prisoners, S74 cannon,
5000 machine guns and large guam
titles of material.
The transportation and supply of
divisions to and from our front during
this battle was "A gigantic task. There
were 26 American and seven French
divisions, besides hundreds Of thou
sands of corps and army troops,
moved in and out Of the American
zone. A total Of $4,000 men were
evacuated to the rear and more than
100000 requirements were received.
It need hardly be restated that our
entry into the war gave the allies