Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-28
Officers Are Found
to Be Unfamiliar With
Tactical Leadership
Required in France.
ALLIES COMMENT
ON UNFIT GENERALS
High TributeP aid COlOred
Troops in Answering
False Stories in u. S.
of Their Treatment.
CHAPTER XLVIII.

| CHAPTER XLVIII.
"HE SD, 35th, AID and 77th Diyi
sions were now in training under
the recently organized Sd Corps
i Especial effort was being MADE
to hasten their preparation II
both staff and line in anticipation o.
an early call for more serious service.
I inspected these troops June 1922
1918. and my impressions were favor
able, although a number OF officers were
| found unfamiliar with the principles O
| tactical leadership. In such hastily
trained units this was hardly surprising
especially in view OF the known defects
| Of the instruction at home.
| Many were found with but slight ap'
probation of the natural defensive pos
sibilities of a given position. Some pat
TALON and even regimental commanders
had not thought to ascertain the exact
location of their front lines, and o.
course had failed to work out the De
| tails OF preparation against possible
attack. MY prediction for detailed in
struction in minor tactics, growing oul
of nv previous personal supervision OF
| training in both small and large units
led me quickly to discover deficiencies
leadership Was Problem.
On all these visits emphasized the
Importance of understanding basic prin-
ciples of both offensive and defensive
measures, stressed provision Tor mutual
support among units, and above all the
| Importance of establishing every pos
sible means of communication among
| the different elements OF command.
So much depends upon the leader Oh
an organization that the process OF Sc
lection Of the more capable and the
elimination Of the unfit were constantly
| in operation. A competent leader can
get eficient service from poor troops
while an incapable leader can democrat
lie the best troops.
Training in quiet sectors in associa-
ton with French divisions. upon Wnlch
they laid so much stress, was oIten as
appointing, as French units coming our
of the battle line, tired and worn. were
mt active and failed to set an example
OF aegressivenesS, which we were SCFlV-
ing to inculcate In our units.
or course. our own officers were I'M
toediately responsible, but they were
often handicapped by the lethargy and
laxity of the French. After consider
able experience It was the inevitable
conclusion that except for the details
NJ trench warfare, training under the
French or British was of little value.
Needed Open Training.
The adherence at home to instruction
I'm trench warfare that was advocated
by French instructors left us 10 teacn
omen warfare. This was task not
easily overcome in the brief time that
could be devoted to training after troops
began to arrive in large numbers, unoer
circumstances that demanded their early
entry into active participation IN opera
tions. 1 had continued to insist tnat
this question be given serious atten-
ton by the War Department
The following extract from caple
sent to washington June ~ seems
pertinent: ,.,,
insufficient instruction are 1uily APP
nreciated in view OF the large increase
in number of troops sent over ouiihs
mast three months, and the inequalltles
In training are fully considered mere
The plan Of separating recently oraICeu
men from divisions and giving Them
snecial training for longer perloo IMAM
the others before being put in the line
has already been adopted. II VIII, now
ever, reduce the fighting strength con-
siderably of several divisions 10 De or
dered into the line. A.. a.,
"This situation emphasizes the I'M
home of keeping divisions intact, potr
as To officers and enlisted men,, from
the time thev are organized until they
are sent to france The plan of using
divisions through which to pass large
numbers OF men for instruction Is very
detrimental to thorough training OF the
divisions. 1t need not be pointed out
that IL takes much time to consoiloate
a division into q homogeneous nghtIne
unit and build up its esprit. Almos'
without exception, division command
ers complain Of the methods tnat nave
been followed. / recommend that IN
future the training of requirements
and OF special troops OF all klnos DC
kept distinct from that OF divisions.
Changes Policy Too Late.
"Our inspections Of divisions recently
arrived show that the training Is UNI
oven and varies much in different d.
visions. It appears superficial IN many
cases and generally lacks spirit ano
aqgressiveneSs. In most OF tnese oI-
visions little attention has been given
TO training in open warfare, and IN tnls
regard younger ofhcers are eSpeCIany
deficient. The training appears 10 nave
been carried on in a perfunctory way
and without efficient supervision. Inc
general impression is that division Oh
ficers have leaned too heavily or
French instructors. whose ideas are moi
ordinarily in accordance with our own
With good intent no doubt. the Wal
Department in July by cable Statec
that the policy of keeping divisions IN
| tact WuOid be followed, although the
harm had already been done, as mosl
Of the divisions that served abroad hac
| departed by that time or were sent soor
afterward.
After visits to units that had lately
! ioined, further attention was given u
! the physical qualifications necessary II
our higher officers. The British anC
French both had commented unfavor'
ably upon the evident inactivity o.
many and even the infirmity OF few
of the officers who had been sent ovei
during the preceding months to observe
| and study conditions at the front.
It had been proved over and ovei
again by the allies that only the strong
est could stand the continuous ant
nerve tracking strain OF actual battle
Many OF the disasters that had com'
! TO the allies were due in large par
| to the lack of energy and alertness OF
! the part of older commanders, wht
often failed to exercise that eterna
personal supervision and tactical dlrec
ton necessary to success.
Recommends Age Limit.
| M. Clemenceau himself, then 76, sale
that the French had made a Seriou
error In retaining old officers In Tn
service whom they later had to retir'
In considerable numbers.
1t was a question not merely OF be
Ing able TO pass q perfunctory. medica
examination, but vigor, stamina AM
the instincts OF leadership were re
quired. Inactive officers only threw ex
ira burdens upon their STATS. We ha'