Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-27

slated to go to the reserve near
the Chateau Thierry salient when re-
lieved from Cantigny. The I'd was still
in line at Belleau Wood and the Sd
south of the Marine.
Gen. Foch had asked for five of the
divisions recently arrived that were
training with the British. OF these the
4th and 29th, while en- route to the
quiet VosgeS sector to relieve French
divisions, had been diverted to the re-
serve near the western face of the
Marine salient.
The 35th had moved to the vicinity OF
Epinal and the 77th was about to enter
the trenches in the Baccarat sector to
replace the 42d, which was to reinforce
Gouraud's army east of Rheims. The
82d had started for the Toul sector to
relieve the 26th, which in turn was
soon to relieve the I'd.
British Claim Priority.
Thus there were three American divi-
s!ons in quiet sectors and seven either
in the battle line or held in readiness
to meet any eventuality which might
result from further activity of the Ger
mans in the great wedge they had
driven toward Paris.
The British were displeaSed at the
transfer of our divisions from their
area, claiming priority to retain them
by reason of having brought them over.
When Gen. Foch inquired of the condl-
tions under which these troops were
serving with the British, my reply made
it clear that he had entire authority to
direct where they should go in the
emergency, as without it the theory OF
supreme command would fail.
The rapid succession Of German
offensives had seriously crippled the
allies, and net only materially reduced
their powers of resistance, but had de-
pressed their morale and caused the
darkest misgivings among them. They
grew more and more fearful lest the
enemy might still have untold reserves
ready to swell his forces. That the
morale of the allies was low was shown
by the conclusions of many Of their SOL
dicrs returning from the front to the
rear areas.
Reports from the British front were
no better Their troops continuously
told our men who were with them for
training that we had come too late and
that our entry into the battle would only
postpone allied defeat. This attitude
seemed so alarming that took steps to
prevent such a spirit from affecting our
Army by promptly reporting the facts to
allied authorities. The presence Of such
sentiments was another important rea-
son for opposing any form of amalga-
nation.
Size of Request Unrealized.
Far short had we fallen of the eXpec-
tations of the preceding November,
when Foch. Gen. Robertson Of the Brit
ish and 1 had joined in an urgent APP
peal for "a trained American divisions
by the following June. 1t is small
wonder that the allies were now so in
sistent in urging increased and contlnu-
Gus shipments of men, trained or I'M
trained.
So serious was the situation regarded
that it was no longer a demand for "a
divisions but for 100. 1t is probable that
the vastness of this request was not
fully realized, or else the allies had
greatly exaggerated ideas of our power
of accomplishment, surprising as 1t
actually proved to be.
A brief calculation of these demands
of the prime ministers showed that they
were asking more than 100000 combat
ant troops by the following Spring,
which, augmented by those required for
the services of supply, conservatively
calculated for a well balanced force sit
uated in a foreign country under the
circumstances that surrounded us, would
amount at least to 100000 men.
The American combatant force would
thus have equaled 200 divisions of the
allies, and their apprehension may be
imagined when we realize that this was
greater by one-fourth than the COM
bined allied armies of 1862 divisions
then on the western front.
Although no such number as this
could have been considered feasible, as
it is unlikely that 1t could have been
either transported, equipped or sup
piled, 1t was necessary, in view OF the
situation, to lay plans for bringing over
all we could. After giving the question
careful study 1t seemed TO me that 3,
900, 900 men would be the limit We could
hope to reach by the Spring Of 1919.
Asks 5000, 900 as Minimum.
This, roughly, would provide at least SO
or possibly over 10 combatant divisions,
the rest being necessary for the non
combatant services. AS we had hither-
TO made estimates based upon a total
force of 1000. 900 men, 1t was quite i'm
perative that calculations should be
made on the increased basis and that
work everywhere in the A. E. F. should
now have that end in view.
A cable / sent June 81 set forth the
reasons for fixing the program for the
future definitely at 100000 men as a
minimum, and urged upon the War De-
partment the utmost effort to meet ouI
immediate requirements for the eXpan-
sion of port facilities and railroads
detailed study of the troop shipments
and tonnage required was included
The situation as viewed at that time
can perhaps be best shown by quoting
part Of my cable:
THE present state of the war under
the continued German offensive makes
it necessary to consider at once the
largest possible military program fol
the United States. The morale of the
French government and OF the high
command is believed to be good, but II
is certain that the morale Of the lower
grades of the French Army is distinctly
poor Both the French and British
| people are extremely tired of the war
and their troops are rejecting this at
titude in their frequent inability IL
meet successfully the German attacks
1T is the American soldiers now in
France upon whom they rely. 1t is
| the moral as well as material aid
| given by the American soldier that is
! making the continuation of the war
| possible. Only the continual arrival
of American troops and their judicious
| employment can restore the morale
of our allies and give them courage.
Sees End Year Ahead.
THE above represents the views Of
the allied military leaders as told me
in person by Gen. Foch himself, and
/ believe 1t Is also the view Of the
civil leaders. We must start imme-
diately on our plans for the future and
be ready to strike this Fall In order tc
tide us over till Spring, when We
should have a big Army ready.
The war can be brought to a sue
cessful conclusion next year II we only
go at 1t now. From purely military
point Of view it is essential that we
make this effort especially for the rea-