Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-18

the sector assigned to the American
army was opposite the most sensitive
part of the German front then being
attacked.
The danger confronting the enemy
made it imperative that he should hold
on in front of the American Army to
the limit Of his resources. From the
enemy's point of view this was the
vital portion of his defensive line, be-
cause here 1t was closer to his main
artery Of supply (Carignan-Sedan-
Mezieres) than at any other point.
He could afford to retire his armies
gradually from all fronts except the
MeuSe- Argonne, where he must hold
until the last.
The strategical value of success
against this portion of the German
line had been apparent from the be-
ginning. but at no time after the first
battle Of the Marine had the allies
been able to contemplate an offensive
there except perhaps as a remote pos
sibility should fortune in some I'M
foressen way turn in their favor.
The operation against this important
sector of the enemy's line was to con-
sist of an attack by the American lst
Army between the Meuse River and the
Argonne Forest, supported by the
French 4th Army to the west OF the
Argonne. Our thrust east of the forest
by threatening the left flank OF the
enemy's position in front of the French
4th Army on the Aisne River would
force his withdrawal, and the combined
or successive advances of both armies
would throw the enemy back on the
line Stenay-Le Chesne-Attigny, and
eventually on Mezieres.
LIST Army Was Threat.
Once the Argonne should be captured,
these two armies would continue their
Joint attacks in the general direction OF
Mezieres and Sedan, with the object of
severing the enemy's line Of rail COM
munications between Carignan and
Sedan.
At this moment the American LIST
Army. holding the sector from the Mo-
selle River to Watronville, southeast of
Verdun and flushed with success, stood
as a menace against the German lines
that protected Metz and the Briey iron
region The second offensive, about to
take place, required the extension OF
our lines to the north of Verdun, and
from there to the western edge of the
Argonne Forest. giving us total front
Of "a miles (from the North Sea to the
MoSelle).
The area between the Meuse River
and the Argonne Forest was ideal for
defensive fighting. On the east the
heights of the Meuse commanded that
river valley and on the west the rug
ged, high hills of the Argonne Forest
dominated the Valley of the Aire
River. In the center the watershed
between the Aire and the Meuse Riy-
ers commanded both valleys, with the
heights of Montfaucon, Cunel, Romagne
and of the Bots de Barricourt standing
out as natural strong points. From these
heights observation points completely
covered the entire German front.
The terrain over which the attack
was to be made formed a defile blocked
by three successive barrierS-the heights
of Montfaucon, then those of Cunel and
Romagne, and farther back the ridges
Of the Bots de Barricourt and Of the
Bots de Bourgogne. The Meuse River
was unfordable; the Aire River ford
able only in places. In addition to the
heavy Forest Of the Argonre there were
numerous woods with heavy under
growth which were serious obstacles.
Strongly Defended.
These natural defenses were strength
ened by every artificial means tmagin-
able, such as fortified strong points, dug
outs, successive lines OF trenches and an
unlimited number of concrete machine
gun emplacementS. With the advantage
OF commanding positions the enemy
was peculiarly we'll located to pour
oblique and flanking artillery fire on
any aSsailant attempting to advance
within range between the Meuse and
the Argonne.
A dense network Of wire entangle-
mentS covered every position. 1t was
small wonder the enemy had rested
four years on this front without being
molested. He felt secure in the knowl-
edge that even with few divisions to
hold these positions his east and west
lines of rail communication in rear
would be well protected against the
probability of interference.
Having completed one major opera
ton successfully and being now en-
gagged in preparing for second, our
lack of personnel for certain services
and our deficiencies in material became
still more apparent. Every possible
emphasis was put in our cables to
Washington on the urgency of supplying
the items we needed most. In addition
our requirements for 1919 must be fore
seen and provided for
Explaining our situation to the War
Department one of my cables stated
that las q consequence, before deciding
upon any plan of operations must
| have assurance of not only sufficient
| fighting troops for the execution OF the
plan but also sufficient labor and S. o. S.
| troops to permit of necessary construc-
ton that must be completed in ad-
| vance"
As to the training and shipment of
| later divisions, it was pointed out that
| they should be called into service in
ample time to provide eflcient units, it
being important that divisions should
| be organized far enough ahead so that
the flow of fully trained divisions may
keep every available troop transport
busy from now on until the program is
completed"
Three Months Insufficient.
Among our troops recently arrived
there was a serious lack of training in
the use of the rife. 1t seemed mex
cusable to send over men who were
deficient in this very elementary step
| in preparation, even though there may
not have been time to train them
otherwise.
/ The idea apparently prevailed at
| home that three months instruction.
was sufficient, but it was never con-
ceded by me that this was anything
| like adequate.
Even though the shipment Of troops
was much more rapid than was ever
expected. making 1t often necessary to