The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1931-06-11
CONTINUED from last issue)
HIApTED WI

ter part OF September, continued DUR
ing October and the early part of No
yember, and were now assembled in
the biileting area near Neufchateau.
inspected the division November
II, 1917, and found the various or
CARNATIONS presented a very credit
able appearance. The officers seemed
alert and military and the personnel
looked strong and vigorous. Their in
the direction of Brigadier General
Traub, one of the brigade commanders.
and seemed to be well advanced.
Germans Ahead in Man Power.
The probable situation as to man
power in which the allies would find
themselves in the spring was causing
much solicitude. The Germans had
captured Riga in September. Keren-
sky's power was at an end and the
bolshevik government was established,
with Lenin and Trotzky in control.
The situation was such that Russia
had become entirely negligible as far
as assistance to the allies was con-
cerned.
An analysis of the possible strength
of the contestants showed that Ger
many would be able to spare a consid-
cradle number of divisions from the
Russian front. Careful study by my
staff, in cooperation with the allied
staffs, had led to the conclusion that
her total number in the west by spring
would be as many as 217, not counting
the possibility of the added strength
of forty-eight divisions from Austria.
The greatest number the allies could
muster, according to estimates, would
be 1859 divisions, counting two Ameri-
can. Italy could not be counted on to
do more than barely hold her own,
even with the help of the eleven allied
divisions then on that front.
Other American divisions might pos
sibly be in Europe by May if they
should arrive according to schedule,
which was doubtful, but they would be
too late to participate in the expected
early spring campaign. At the low
rate of arrival we should not have
more than half of the twenty-one d.
visions promised by the War depart
ment ready for service by June.
Outcome Depended on America.
In this war, where the battle lines
extended across entire countries, and
in which the qualities of the oppo-
nents were about equal, the strategical
aspect largely resolved itself into q
consideration of the number and loca-
ton of divisions on either side. The
situation was of. such a character that
it was a question which side could
provide the superiority Of forces nee
essary to success. In other words, the
outcome would depend upon the num-
Der of troops that America could send
over.
All eyes were on the eastern front
To allied statesmen the collapse Of
Russia meant possible grave political
consequences; to the allied command
ers it forecast the release of approx
mately 100 divisions and the increase
in the enemy's ranks in Belgium and
northern France to a preponderance
that could not be overcome. To us 1t
indicated a race between Americas
best effort to pour our fighting men
into France and Germany's best deter
mination to crush the allies before our
soldiers could arrive in sufficient num-
bers to dominate the battlefield.
Faced Defeat With Allies.
Our estimates of the shipping for
troops and supplies as set forth in the
plan by which due proportion Of
combat and line Of communication
troops were to form such increment Of
six divisions would require by June /,
for the shipment of twentyfour di.
visions, a total Of over 100000 tons.
No one seemed to know where we
were to obtain the 100000 tons Of
shipping in addition to the 100000
tons we were then supposed to be
using.
It appeared almost certain then that
should disaster befall the allied armies
that under these conditions we would
have to 60 down with them.
always felt certain, however, that
tonnage could be found for our pur-
pose If the necessary pressure were
exerted to force it into use. Appeals
were made continuously and persis-
tently in an effort to get action on this
vital question, but several months
elapsed before it really came.
Taken as a whole, the apparently
slow progress of our preparation in
Europe also caused. considerable ad.
verse comment, if not dismay, among
the allies. Inquiries were made d.
rectly by the military and civil officials
as to why we did not move more
rapidly, to which the reply was al
ways, slack of shipping"
New British Offensive.
, Immobilized by the mud of Flanders
where British attacks had continued
internationally from the end of July to
the middle of November, with rather
excessive losses, the British command
er in chief turned to more s0utherly
portion Of his line for the final often
sive of the year. Choosing the Cam
brai front on which to launch the eff
fort, careful preparations, including
the concentration Of an unusual num-
Der Of tanks, were made to insure a
break through the enemy's defenses.