The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1931-07-31

oo ask tnat- an agreement De
made this evening among Lord Mil
ner, General Pershing and myself, ex-
tending to June what has been de-
cided on for May.
cannot forget the responsibilities
weighing on me. because of the fact
that the allied governments have in
trusted to me the direction of opera.
tons in France"
OF course all present knew that no
authority to dictate regarding such
matters had been conferred upon him
and his remarks only showed that the
allies were ready to 90 to almost any
length to carry their point
Clemenceau Makes Plea.
Premier Clemenceau then said he
agreed with General Foch and favored
an American army, but that the Ger
mans were at Villers- BretOnneux, and
If the lines were broken there the
enemy might quickly arrive under the
walls of Paris, and liaisOn between
the allied armies might have to be
established on the Loire, or if the lines
were pierced at Hazebrouck the enc.
my could reach the sea.
what is important for the morale
of our soldiers" he said, lis not to
tell them that the American soldiers
are arriving but to show them that
they have arrived
In my opinion the plan proposed
was entirely unsound, and l thought
that the best and quickest way to help
the allies would be to build up an
American army. Moreover, the i'm
piled presumption that the council
might dictate to us either as coun-
Gil or through the allied commander
in chief in the arbitrary manner in
Dictated set me more firmly than ever
against American units serving in al
lied armies. The days discussion
made it quite clear that both allies
intended to get commitment to the
proposed schedule as far into the fu-
ture as possible.
Saw Pershing Opposing Wilson.
A telegram sent by the British Sec
rotary of state for foreign affairs
April 8, 1918, to Lord Reading. British
ambassador at Washington, said:
1T is evident from the brief account
of the conversation that General
Pershing's views are absolutely in
consistent with the broad policy which
we believe the President has accept
ed. The main difference, of course,
is that we interpret it as meaning
that 100000 infantry and machine
guns are to be brigaded with French
and British troops in the course of
four months. General Pershing adj
mits no such obligation and does not
conceal the fact that he disapproves
of the policy.
"a second and minor difference is
that, while the British government
quite agrees as to the propriety of ul-
timately withdrawing American troops
brigaded with the French and British
so as to form an American army, they
do not think this process could or
ought to be attempted until the end
of the season for active operations
this year draws to its elise, say, in
October or November.
81 am unwilling to enibarrass the
President. who has shown such firm
grasp of the situation, with criticisms
of his officers. But the difference Of
opinion is so fundamental and touches
so nearly the issues of the whole war
that we are bound to have the matter
cleared up"
Three Meet Privately.
At M. Clemenceau's suggestion the
meeting of the council was adjourned
at this point that Foch, Lord Miner
and l might meet and examine the
question and see if some agreement
could not be reached. Whereupon we
repaired to an adjacent room and
went over the whole subject again.
NV proposal was more liberal than
the circumstances or my own views
on the subject really warranted. 1t
conceded priority for limited num-
Der of the infantry and machine-gun
units, but generally it contemplated
the shipment of artillery for divisions
anu cOTDS anu tiOVpSs
chanics and labor troops for the serv-
ice of the rear, all of which were
badly needed.
1t was the distinct understanding,
however, as already promised by
Foch, that if we would consent to
make the concession as to infantry
and machinegun units the French
would help us out with artillery when
the time came to form an American
army. But, of course, they could not
furnish men for other services, nor
for the services of supply, without
which we could not function as an
army.
Others Insist on Program.
When we met Miner, and especial
ly Foch, insisted that the war would
be lost unless their program was car
ried out. I repeated the arguments
already presented to the council and
added that / full realized the military
emergency, but did not think that the
plan to bring over unframed units to
fight under British and French CON-
mands would either relieve the situa-
ton or end the war.
ITO BE CONTINUED.)