Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-10
SHIPPING OVERSEAS
STILL HAPHAZARD
Newspaper Reports That
America Had Large
Air Force at Front
Labeled as False.
CHAPTER xxx.


during the preceding seven
months. The rate Of discharge was
accelerated to some extent by the pet
ter distribution of our transports py
the Navy. More construction materlaI
was being delivered where 1t was neeo-
ed for port works and the future was
aomewhat clarified in this respect by the
arrival of additional logging machinery.
During the month there was also an
increase in troop shipments, incluolns
some elements of the 32d (Haan,s) Dl-
vision, with 10000 men for the Service
of Supply: BY the end OF January ap-
proxinately 100 900 combat troops, 54,-
600 Engineer troops ana $1,000 others
for the Service of Supply were IN
France. Although promising, this was
only the merest start, as we were SJlll
far behind our schedule.
It must be added, however, that the
increase In the arrivals of men and ma
terials remained haphazard ana not at
all in the proportions needed.
It continued apparent that my rec
concentrations were not accepted IN an
altogether unhesitating spirit OF help
fulness and that the serious need 1or
executive leadership back home had not
been met.
StafH Departments Blamed.
In the absence Of any preparation for
war beforehand the principle could
hardly be questioned that the COM
rnarder at the front should decide upon
his requirements, and not the depart
nents in Washington. The employment
of our Armies in Europe had been fully
covered by general instructions ana
there were no problems of strategy, or
questions concerning operations that
developed upon the staff at washington.
These were matters for the commander
In chief Of the A. z. F. to determine.
It remained, then, for the War De-
partment simply and without cavil TO
support our efforts TO the fullest extent
by promptly forwarding men and sup
niles as requested. The Secretary of
war was completely IN accord with this
conception, but it was evident that the
stan departments had not graspeo 1t,
or else the Discrimination and confu-
sion were such that it could not be
carried out.
In the successful command Of an
army such as ours eventually became II
was necessary to bring the supervision
Of all elements Of the administrative
and technical departments under the
control Of the headquarters general
STAN. None Of the departments entered
upon their duties with any experience
an war, nor had they In any real sense
been trained even Theoretically TO solve
the problems that urgently demanded
solution. During times Of peace each
department had grown relatively tnoe-
pendent Of the others and its chief had \
directed the affairs of his department |
with little control, except Of q very |
general character.
With reference to the general stan,
the same thing may be said as to ex-
perience in war or real preparation for
It. In fact, so faulty had been the
training Of the general staff as mem
bers Of great directive group that
both the individuals and the group
lacked initiative and purpose for want
Of clear conception Of their task.
It was TO overcome this inertia that
I vested In the general staff well defined
powers to give such objection, by my
authority, as might become necessary
to coordinate the different parts of
the organization.
Nor did this assumption Of directive
control reduce or affect the efficiency
Of the administrative or technical de-
partment chiefs or their assistants, be-
cause they, too, under supervision, were
given independent roles. encouraged
and moderated at the same time by one
requirement-success. Such was the
broad conception Of the organization
FOch and Weygand Call
My diary notes the following:
"Chaumont, Monday, February 10,
1918. Gen. Foch and Mai Gen. Wey-
gand visited headquarters Thursday,
had luncheon with us and examined
the general staff organization. Capt.
Todd. director Of naval construction,
came to confer regarding wireless sta
ton at Bordeaux.
"Col. Stimson, former Secretary Of
War, now an efficient colonel Of ar
tillery, called and asked to be left with
troops.
"cable says Maj. Gen. Biddle re-
placed by Maj. Gen. March as chief Of
stan at Washington and ordered to
England.
left Friday, spent Saturday and
Sunday visiting LIST Division in Ansau-
vile sector; inspected infantry in front
line trenches and the artillery. Called
on Gen. Debeney, French LIST Army
aviation park, Bellies,
Maj. Arthur Page commanding
Camouflage work exceptionally well
done. Passed through Miracourt to see
Gen. de Castelnau, whol speaks highly
Of our troops"
As Gen. Foch, then chief of the
French general staff. had shown some
Compiegne in January I told of the
delays and dif1culties we were having
at the ports and in the operation OF ,
railways, ! invited him to make visit
to my headquarters, hoping to put him i
in touch with our activities.
We had already reached a state of
development that confirmed the sound
ness OF our organization and could
forecast Its ability to meet all require |
ments / went with him to the various ]
sections OF the general staff and. while
he expressed no opinion about What
he saw, his aide and spokesman, Gen.
Weygand, q staff officer of experience, |
was very complimentary.
Foch Cold to Our Problems.
Foch never seemed interested when i
] talked with him of our problems and ]
doubt whether he ever thought. knew
or cared much about organization or
questions Of transportation and supply.
He was essentially a student and a !
teacher OF history and strategy.
The very extensive and intricate or
ganization necessary 10 handle a mod
ern army engaged in war beyond the
seas was not easy 20 grasp. Indeed,
the details were not entirely under
stood in our Army itself, except by a
limited number Of officers charged with s
the functions Of direction and co-ordi-
nation.
There continued to be, considerable
cause to ind fault with the attitude !
and methods of French bureau Of
flcials. They had been repeatedly urged
70 turn over certain docks and facili-
ties for our exclusive use, and, while
some concessions had been made, they
were always made grudgingly and
piecemeal, and We were never certain
Of more than temporary occupancy.
UndeFs the circumstances ] did not
hesitate 20 call Prime Minister Clenaen-