Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-01-12

ready, should we by any cnance enter
the war.
What Might Have Been.
Let us suppose that instead of adher-
ing to the erroneous theory that neu-
trality forbade any move toward prep
aration we had taken the precaution in
the Spring of 1916 to organize and
equip an army of half million COM
Blatant troops, together with the requi-
site number of supply troops for such
force This could have been done
merely by increasing the Regular Army
and National Guard to war strength. 1t
would have given us the equivalent OF
40 French, German or average British
divisions ready to sail at once for
France upon the declaration of war.
With such a force to aid the allies
early in 1917, the advantage would
have been entirely on their side. Prep
aration to this extent could have been
concentration of the Regular Army and
National Guard on the Mexican border
afforded in 1916.
The actual situation at that time on
the Western Front was more favorable
for the allies than at any previous time.
The strength of the German forces
there had been greatly reduced because
of the necessity for supporting the Rus
sian front. Although reports were
hltering In regarding the beginning of
the revolution there was little to indi-
cate that Russia was not still a factor
to be reckoned with. Actually the allies
had an advantage of something over
20 per cent in numbers. French morale
was high, due to their successful defense
of Verdun, and the British armies had
reached their maximum power.
Under these conditions it is not ex-
travagant to assert that the addition
of 100000 American combat troops at
that time would have given the allies
such a preponderance of force that the
war could have been brought to a vic
torious conclusion before the end of
that year. Even without such aid, the
confidence of the allies led them to
undertake general offensive in April.
Although it ended in defeat, especially
for the French, who were under the
command of Gen. Nivelle, the failure
can be attributed to large extent to
lack of secrecy in its preparation. A
well planned campaign with the assist
ance of half million Americans would
have told quite another story.
Delay Added Year: to War.
Thus through a false notion Of neu-
trality, which had prevented practically
all previous preparation, a favorable
the war was prolonged another year and
the losses in human life tremendously
increased.
But, from another viewpoint, 1t is not
improbable that If we had been thus
prepared our rights would have been
respected and we would not have been
forced into the war. We shall see as
we proceed how great were the difficult
ties to be overcome because of our
fw.n -. ANal Il
reason long before our entry into the
war plainly indicated should have been
done.
The only training any Of our forces
received, except the ordinary routine,
during the year prior to 1917, was given
to the troops then In Mexico and to
those stationed along the border.
Wilson Favored Draft.
President Wilson recommended the
draft as the best method of raising an
Army. In discussions in Congress on
the subject, many members were in
favor of the volunteer system. Even
the Speaker Of the House, Champ Clark
OF Missouri, in a speech on the floor
opposing the draft act, compared the
conscript to the convict.
With such strong opposition 1t looked
as though the CONSUMPTION law would
fail to pass. It's opponents forgot that
during the Civil War the volunteer
system had given President Lincoln
and his commanders no end of trouble.
and that to provide manpower the
North was finally forced to adopt con-
scription. Large numbers of shirkers
were thus compelled to serve, hence
the opprobrium that chung to the word
conscript
1t was very important that a repeti-
ton of the experience in the Civil War
should be avoided. The advocates OF q
volunteer army also ignored the expert
ence in the World War of the British,
who after a year and half of effort
TO recruit their armies under that
system, had been obliged to resort to
the draft.
No "PoIiticaP' Army.
In my opinion it was so vital to our
success that while in San Antonio, con-
trary to my lifelong rule against med
ding with legislation, persuaded the
then Governor of Texas that conscrip-
ton was sound in principle, and got
him to exert his influence with the
Texas delegation in Congress in favor
of it. In writing at the time to a
subject, i said:
I'VE must avoid creating the impress
sion that we are sending a political
army to Europe-the day of political
armies is past 1t would be a whole
lot wiser for us to stay at home until
we are thoroughly prepared. Universal
service is the only principle to follow
that will lead to success in this war, and
that should be well understood We
are in this thing for keeps and it is
going to demand the utmost ex,rti m
and the best of preparation to win. We
shall have to select the flower of the
young manhood Of this country and
give them thorough training before we
start. The only way we can hope to
succeed r. by logged determination and
perseverance,. = - No half-wsy meas