Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-04-19


ciate 1t with the memory Of the
i coup Of Agadir CT 1911, which
almost brought Europe to war
over Morocco, has in sense become
ancient history, 1t remains a fact
that dominates and colorS all interna-
tional relations in Europe. Indeed, this
Austro-German tariff agreement, which
to the rest of Continental Europe means
Anschluss. the union of the 6,500,000
of Austrians and $4,000 900 of Germans
in a new empire recalling the glories of
the old Holy Roman Empire, along with
| the power of the later Hohenzollern
structure, has already taken on the i'm
portance of an event marking the close
of the postwar period and for France
and her allies the beginning Of new
pre-war age.
Sees Failure Mt Geneva.
AS consequence of this diplomatic
stroke-for it still remains diplomatic,
awaiting translation into fact-one can
foreSee several things; first, a long post
ponement, If not final adjournment,
Of the policy of Locarno, of the old
Briand-Stresemann policy of Franco
German reconciliation and co-opera-
ton: second an equally prolonged post
ponement of all serious effort at dis
armament on the Continent, which
spells the failure of the forthcoming
conference in Geneva next February;
third, a further unfortunate decline in
the prestige and capacity for usefulness
Of the League of Nations; finally. after
a Winter Of anxiety and unrest Europe
enters upon Summer in which, with
no present sign OF economic recovery.
there is the certain promise of political
strain.
AS to the first OF these consequences,
the termination Of the Locarno expert
ment. one has only to see the roper
cussions Of the recent incident in
France, its effect upon all classes of
French men and women, TO perceive
that confidence in a new republican
and peaceful Germany built up labor
iously by all the negotiations from 1925
to 1880, has gone down in a heap. For
the mass of Frenchmen of all shades of
opinion the coup of Vienna diScloSes
that same Germany which existed in
all French eyes from 1870 to 1914, and
from the outbreak of the World War to
the climax of the occupation of the
Ruhr. Rightly or wrongly-and I am
trying here only to describe state of
mind-France sees in the Austrian
treaty, done, in French Judgment, in
open violation alike of the treaty of
Versailles and the agreement accom-
panying the loan to Austria, a new ex-
ample OF treating an international
covenant as a scrap Of paper.
To understand this French view-and
one must understand it to grasp French
policy, which will be based upon this
view-it is necessary to see that to the
French mind recent years have been
marked by long series of French con-
cessions, eliminating in the evacuation
- h. &xyn fN1 1NF0V
OF the treaty date. And to this final
concession the German answer appears
to be the Anschluss, the reconstruction
Of that Mitteluropa which was one of
the ayowed purposes of pam Germans
before the war and OF German leaders
In the great struggle.
AS a consequence this brusque Ger
man move has all but destroyed politi-
cally the best friend Germany has ever
had in France, namely, BRAND. 1t has
brought down in ruin his dream of q
United States Of Europe, which, having
failed to make even the smallest prog
ress of itself, has ended by serving as a
pretext for the German diplomacy.
AS to the question of disarmament, 1t
has always been clear that progress in
reduction of land forces was conditioned
upon the growth of confidence. The
basis of armament is patiently fear
fear in the sense of belief in national
insecurity. 1t is for this reason that
all continental states possessing large
armies have insisted steadily that re-
duction should be preceded by political
agreements, treaties of insurance and
guarantee. pooled into some general
league agreement like the protocol of
1924. binding all member states to act
together against any aggressor.
Alarms Slav Majority.
But the Austro- German treaty. as II
foreShadows political union of the two
states, Immediately alarms the Slav ma
jority Of Czechoslovakia, which would
thus be almost completely surrounded
by the new greater Germany while pos
sessing $4,000 of Germans within its
own frontiers. Against this danger the
treaty Of st. Gernain forbade Austrian
union with Germany. Moreover, If this
treaty is now to be town up, equal peril
results for the Poles, always threatened
by the German purpose to revise the
treaty OF Versailles by suppreSsing the
Polish Corridor. Since Hungary, too,
would be almost certain to throw her lot
in with this greater Germany seeking
restoration of her old frontier through
revision Of the treaty of Trianon. Ru-
mania and JugoslaVia would also feel
growing insecurity.
France, Poland and the three states
of the Little Entente are thus bound to
look TO their defenses against what
they conceive to be new German
menace. In this situation can one
foresee any reduction of armies in these |
countries? Or can one foreSee Italy !
between France and Jugoslavia, and |
with a common frontier |
with this new Germany, along the |
Tyrol, where German demands for ter