Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-22
BY FRANK n. sIMoNDs.

can be more striking to the
L American than the policy of the
various countries toward Red
Russia. That the latest developments
in the Soviet Union, notably in the
matter of the flve-year plan, carry a
deadly thrust to nearly all European
countries, Is conceded with equal frank
ness on all sides. That along with this
economic menace goes an eventual
military danger is similarly recognized.
Nevertheless there Is the unmistakable
fact that in the face Of these dangers
the European states are incapable Of
establishing even common economic
front.
The case of Germany Is the most in
teresting and significant. If the five
year plan succeeds, even after longer
delays and with lesser magnitude than
is now foreseen, Germany will find her
self not merely shut out Of the enc
great market which after the war
and indeed during it-GernanS calcu-
lated as offering the field for future
recovery and expansion, but German
manufacturers will find themselves con-
fronted with system Of dumping thai
may spell ruin to the vast industrial
edifice of the Reich.
Moreover, long before the industrial
program has been realized. German
agriculture, now suffering from the gen.
eraI and worldwide depression, seems
bound to suffer still greater losses. In
fact, not Germany alone, but all the
great agrarian states in central and
southern Europe, Rumania, Poland and
Hungary in particular, are already url-
der the shadow Of Russian danger
which was foreshadowed IN the recent
dumping Of Soviet wheat, and can at
tain grave proportions were Russia to
have two or three good crops and meas
urably restore her communications.
Scope Of Red Gross.
OF course it must be seen that the
economic danger, however great, is only
incidental What the new Soviet
strategy envisages is primarily the ruin
Of the economic and agrarian systems
OF her neighboring states, the impos1-
ticn of a state OF proximate ruin by
the simple methods of collective farm
ing and convict and forced labor.
Thereafter Is to follow automatically
the outbreak of domestic disorder pre-
cipitated by hunger and misery. Then
Is to come the final step, the forward
march Of the Red armies to the relief
Of the Communist revolutions in all
capitalistic states.
Today, too, in Europe one may see
situation, which at least vaguely IL
illustrates the bases Of Soviet calcutta
ton. AS q consequence of worldwide
depression Europe Is supporting IN idle
ness many more millions than she main
tanned in war Is years ago. Were Great
Britain, Germany and Italy to name
the nations worst hit, to md them
selves unable to sustain this vast burden,
which in numbers exceeds 100000
Of unemployed, the immediate cOnSe-
quences can be imagined, for at least
the larger part of this mass would be
promptly reduced to starvation.
Yet even at the present time there
Is grave question as to how long these
countries can continue to bear the
burden. Only the hope that with Spring
the tide will turn and a measure Of
prosperity return supplies the smallest
prospect of relief upon national treas
urtes and interruption Of the steady
march toward national bankruptcy. All
Europe Is literally engaged In bailing
the boat in the hope that the storm
win shortly subside.
Future Russian Moves.
But what If Soviet Russia were able
periodically to precipitate tremendous
world economic crises; to ruin the
farmers OF the world or at least of all
food exporting countries by dumping its
wheat? The same process could, as
has been shown recently, be extended
to lumber and OIL And at later date
1t might even be pushed further into
industrial fields, when the five-year
plan, expanded by ten-year plan and
perhaps by yet another ten-year plan,
at last achieves.
What confuses many observers is the
conception that this Is, after all, mere
ly an economic issue. In, reality the
moment one comes in touch with Soviet |
mentality 1t Is clear that the driving |
force is not economic, but political. |
While the western nations tumble and !
falter with Russian affairs, the Soviets |
pursue their course consistently. They |
are always at war with all capitalistic |
nations
Success for the five-year plan, for
Soviet policy, does not mean prosper
Gus Russia, living peacefully alongside |
its many neighbors. 1t means providing |
Communism. Moreover, while we in |
capitalistic nations are continuing to
talk about the suffering and misery in /
Russia, the Russian press and propa-
ganda are busy portraying to their
audience the appalling crisis in all |
capitalistic countries at the moment.
Notwithstanding the fact that Ger
many is, on the whole, the country
most hit by the economic depression,
certainly on the continent, and In the
nature Of things the nation which must
remain most vulnerable to Soviet at
tack, alike because Of its dependence
upon foreign markets and because Of
the presence Of a relatively huge Com
munist party, which counted nearly
100000 votes in the last election, it
Is precisely in Germany that Soviet
policy seems most incomprehensible.
Because the Germans believe that
powerful Soviet state will one day over
whelm Poland and enable them to re-
cover the Corridor, because they be-
lieve that close relations with this Red
Russia will enable them to escape from
what they consider French hegemony,
German policy, with increasing empha-
sis since the death of Stresemann,
seeks to make closer political relations
between Moscow and Berlin.
But If the Red armies crossed the
DnieSter and the Vistula, their march
would be directed quite as much against
the capitalistic system of Germany as
the political structure OF Rumania and
Poland. They would not come to re-
store the Corridor to Germany, but to
bring succor to the Communist major
ity Of Berlin.
The Italian situation differs from
the German IN degree. Italy has a
strong government, for the present a
weak or non-existent Communist party.
But it does suffer cruelty from the
present economic depression and basic
ally its economic structure is far less
solid than that of Germany. A new
and general European upheaval would,
therefore, bear heavily upon a country
which must import much of its food
and all Of its raw materials from abroad
and pay for them by exports.
Yet italian resentment of French
power in Europe today leads Fascism
to follow the German example and flirt
with Moscow. At the same time Ital-
ian repression Of Communism is saw