Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-12
TROOPS ARE PICKED
FOR lST u. S. ARMY
British Fail to Supply
Tanks as Promised,
but French Furnish
Five BattaliOns.

star Immediately began the develop.
| ment of plans for the concentration OF
the necessary troops for its execution.
It was certain the psychological effect
| on the enemy of our success in this hrst
! operation by the American Army as
! we'll as on the allies, our own troops
and our people at home would be OF
great importance. The attack must,
| therefore, not only succeed, but serl-
Gus hostile reaction must be made I'M
| possible.
were removed to Neufchateau between
August IL and 16. The special army
| troops assembled north of Chateau
| Thierry were moved eastward during
| the same period. Neufchateau was
central point for operations on any por-
! ton OF the front from st. Mihiel to the
Swiss frontier. As considerable Amefi-
can activity had been carried on there
| for many months, its selection would
probably keep the enemy in ignorance
of the exact sector we were to occupy.
Units for LIST Army.
The following corps and divisions
were placed at the disposal Of the list
Army for the st. Mi1iel operation, and
their condition may be summarized as
The 1st and I'd Divisions were ex-
cellent as to training, equipment ana
morale. They had attacked July ID In
the Scissors drive.
The Sd, 4th, 26th and AID Divi-
sions were of fine morale and consider
able experience, as they had fought IN
the defense about Chateau Thierry and
in the advance toward the Vesle River.
The seth and Goth Divisions were
going through their sector training on
the front between Toul and the Moselle
River, and the 5th and 35th Divisions
were taking their sector training IN the
The he ssd. 18th, soth and s2d Din-
sions had been training in rear Of the
British front, one brigade of the $50
having had front line service with the
British, and the 91st Division had never
been in the front line and had received
less than four weeks training in
France.
As to corps headquarters. the LIST
Corps was well organized and had OPP
Grated in the Aisne-Marne defensive
and offensive. Fourth and 5th Corps
Headquarters were only partially Or
ganized and had very few corps troops
Except for one brigade Of corps ar
tillery and three or four air service
souadrons, all of the American corps
and army troops to be employed were
at this time in their preliminary train
ing period In France.
Date Not Yet Fixed.
The training of the divisions for the
coming operation was directed by the
training section of General Headquar-
tiers. The equipment Of these units,
their supply and the handling Of re-
placements devolved upon the LIST
Army, as did the reception, equipment
and supply of thousands Of corps and
army troops arriving from the Service
Of Supply or directly from transports.
1t was some time before the date for
the st. Mihiel attack could be definitely
fixed, but preparations were being has
tened in the hope that the attack
might be made by September Z. Our
divisions were scattered and 1t seemed
doubtful whether SUFFICIENT rail or truck
TRANSPORTATION could be found to as
semble them in the area, together with
the corps and army troops and auxili-
aries, before the rainy season, which
usually starts about the middle Of Sep
TENDER and which, it was said, might
seriously hinder operations in that Sec
tor.
It was necessary TO assemble, in all,
$500 troops for this operation, and
this gigantic task, imposed mainly upon
the LIST Army General STAFF, which It
self was yet in the formative state,
might well have caused dismay even
under the most favorable ctrcunl-
stances.
The almost total inactivity on the ST.
Mihiel front since 1915 and the prep
aration for an operation of such mag
nitude made many initial installations
necessary. The telephone and tele-
graph lines to insure effective commit
nication throughout the area required
miles of wire. The artillery aTnmuni-
ton dumps, calculated on the basis Of
at least five days of battle, required
about 100000 rounds; Engineering
material required to build roads across
no-man's land behind the advancing
army, ran into thousands Of tons.
Movements Staged at Night.
The construction of railway spurs,
advance depots and hospital accomn1o-
dations for sick and wounded had to be
provided, and aviation fields prepared
Many other things were required, such
as the construction of light railways
for distribution beyond the railroads,
personnel and equipment pertaining to
searchligintS. the development Of water
supply installations for sound and
fash ranging for artillery, arrange
ments for traffic control and the cam
outage of positions, roads and mate
rial Each item was the subject of con-
sideration by qualified specialists, and
all had to be co-ordinated by the newly
| formed staff.
The actual movement for the con-
centration Of the more than 100000
troops, whether by rail, truck or on
foot. generally took place at night. The
| troops bivouacked during the day In
| forests or other sheltered places hid
| den from the observation of enemy.
| planes. resuming the movement at
nightfall. The rail and most of the
truck transport belonged to the French
and was handled by them. Changes
! were constantly necessary in schedules
I because of the non-arrival Of trucks as
! planned usually due TO their being used
! by the French elsewhere.
| All ranks of the staff and line Of our
/ army were filled with enthusiasm over
| the coming operation. Offlcers Of the
| rapidly expanding LIST Army Staff
worked with the greatest energy under
their new responsibilities. The French
] officers assigned to my headquarters
gave material assistance in expediting
the arrival Of French troops and in
handling the civilian population within
the zone of the armies.
These officers were deeply interested
and the spirit Of cooperation between
| French and Americans In the untiring
efforts given to preparation foretold
| the successful outcome of our FIRST
| offensive.
Training Unsatisfactory.
J During visit to the 92d Divi-
sion (colored) at this time 1t was
found that the situation as to training.
especially of colored officers, was not
entirely satisfactory This National
/ Army division had been in the service