Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-06-07

next February. But outside Of British
Labor circles, there is not the smallest
conference Is foredoomed to failure and
can hardly escape bringing disastrous
consequences in its train. It must de-
fine and accentuate existing bitterness,
as the London Naval Conference &C
centuated Franco-Italian rivalries.
Distrusts Intensified.
The recent explosion over the pro-
jected customs union between Germany
and Austria has served to revive all the
distrusts existing both on the Rhine
and in all of the center and east of Eu-
rope, and the atmosphere all over the
Continent is less propitious for a dis
armament conference than at any mo-
ment since the armistice. The recent
happenings in the discussion over
Franco Italian naval adjustments and
the defeat of BRAND at Versailles serve
to illustrate this fact. But here, again,
1t must be seen that the issue Is politi-
cal Italy. stricken by the economic
crisis and unable to make good her
claim of parity with Fran"e, is con-
cerned, not with naval uction as
such, but with the in on OF a
limit on French building 4ntil Italy
can recover from economic depression
and resume her race for parity. France,
having the money, Is in no mood to
surrender her present advantage.
Unless all signs fail, Europe is more
likely to increase than to diminish its
ornaments in the next few years. Thus
Germany has practically served notice
that If her neighbors, and France par
ticularly, do not reduce their armies TO
- hn uyil1 dncrita froQfV
restrictions build up to theirs. And
one of the most likely consequences OF
an unsuccessful disarmament confer
ence would be a German attempt With
the Soviets' aid to achieve military
parity with France.
Now with the question Of disarma-
ment, that of debts and reparations Is
inevitably tied in, the more because
President Hoover has recently under
taken to establish the fact that the
cure for the European economic diff
culties lies not in the cancellation of
allied debts but in the reduction OF
European military establishments. At
bottom this assumes that Europe could
pay its debts to America If 1t would
only reduce It's expenditures upon
ornaments.
Only Germany Paying.
The difficulty with any such assump-
ton arises from the fact that only
one country, and that Germany, Is
actually paying the war debts, and
Germany is for all practical purposes
disarmed down to the irreducible min
imum. France, Britain and Italy are
paying their war debts to America out
Of the proceeds of German reparations,
and France is, in addition, drawing
from the same source $l25,000, 900
annually, which represents the excess
of what she gets from Germany over
what she pays to America and Britain:
If the United States were to cancel
the debts of her associates in the war,
and these associates were to abandon
German reparations, Germany would
be the sole immediate beneficiary.
Moreover, France would agree only TO
cancel that part of the German obli-
CATION equal to her debts to Britain
and America. If, moreover, Germany
should, as she seems bound to, de-
clare a moratorium in payments OF
reparations. France. Italy and Britain
would inevitably do the same IN the
matter of debt payments.
It follows clearly that an American
offer to cancel the debts in return for
an allied agreement to forego repara-
tions would not constitute any direct
benefit to the former allies, and, there
fore no basis for bargain in the mat
ter of disarmament. There would be
no reason why France should disband
a battalion or Britain scrap a cruiser.
Both would stand just where they do
now. The only nation directly benefit
ing would be Germany, which Is al
ready disarmed.
France Demands Security.
It Is also clear that II the double
process of wiping out debts and repara-
lions did promote an economic recovery
In Europe, all nations would share in
the profit, but even here dispropor-
tionately. France is not interested in
such a recovery to the same extent as
Germany or Britain, as industrial coun-
tries and trading nations. But it is
precisely France. as the most strongly
armed country in Europe and as the
head of the strongest military combina-
ton, which must be persuaded If dis
armament Is to assume any practical
shape. All. then, that the United States
and Great Britain collectively or
severally could offer France. to gain
her assent to disarmament, would be
some form of political and military
guarantee Of her security. something
the London Naval Conference to the
British obligations under the Locarno
treaty.
But 1t is plain that the United States
is no more ready now than it was al
the time of the naval conference to
accept even the relatively slight re-
sponsibilities of a consultative pact,
which would put certain obligations
upon us in case of a European crisis
In word we cannot offer France any
benefits, financial or otherwise. to dis
arm, but France is in the position to
ask us political contracts in return for
any concession on her part.
As to the degree European recovery
would be promoted by the double dis
appearance of debts and reparations
the matter is plainly debatable. But
one thing is beyond question, the psy-
chology benefit in Germany would be
incalculable. The German people are
today in a dangerous state of mind.