Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-15

De made on our part, and
VI when units were sorely needed
a for immediate active service, it
was found, much to my sur
prise, that although the divisions then
coming to France had been under
training for six months or even more,
| they still contained a large percentage
of unframed men.
This condition was mainly the result
of very grevious lack of appreciation
by the War Department of the urgency
of continuous and thorough training Of
complete units.
AS already pointed out, the general
stah, when called upon to provide men
for special services, had relied upon
taking them from combat divisions In
stead Of anticipating such requirements
and segregating these specialists from
the start and training them as such.
This was most vicious application in
time OF war Of o very Objectionable
practice that had grown up in our Army
in time Of peace. It appears that during
the preparation Of our armies in the
World War no other plan was followed,
and the practice was carried to such an
extent that divisions with, say, 5000
men. which should have been held in
tact and each one perfected as an or
ganized team, were constantly called
upon to send large groups Of their
trained soldiers to other duties.
Had to Start All Over.
The numbers taken from time to time
aggregated from $4,000 to 10000 men
for each division. AS the War Depart
ment failed to establish replacement
system according to my recommended
ton, green men were substituted, and
as q result training had to be started
all Ovor AGAIN with aaFh ef1ah V,a61irfiOSN
Although the "a National Guard and
National Army divisions that eventual.
ly came to France were, with two exc
ceptions, organized in August and Sep
TENDER, 1917, they did not receive train
ing as complete units from that time
on. They were filled gradually, weeks
and even months usually elapsing be-
fore they reached full strength, and,
as we have seen, the personnel was not
permanent, but was constantly being
shifted.
Therefore, when the time came for
service abroad, very large proportion
of the msn in these divisions had lit
tie or no experience, and the training
Of the unit as a whole had been seri-
ously delayed Moreover, training
methods at home had not improved, as
preparation for trench warfare still pre-
dominated. All this was discouraging
to their officers. very disastrous to
morale, and worst Of all 1t threw upon
the A. E. F. an extra burden of training
and resulted In our having q number
Of divisions only partially trained when
the time came to use them.
The indications were that incoming
units would soon have TO be put in the
front lines, with no time to carry out
complete course of training in France
for units composed largely of recruits.
I, therefore, sent q vigorous protest on
the subject Of taking men out Of the
units In training, and emphasized again
the necessity Of open warfare exercises
for all organizations including the di-
vision. The urgency of target practice
and musketry training of platoons and
companies was especially stressed, and
over without four months Of intensive
training.
Recruits to Face Veterans.
This condition Of things signalized
the failure on the part of the general
staff at home to realize that their most
important function was to supervise
the organization and training of COM
plete divisions for combat and provide
them with equipment and supplies.
Their obligations to the armies in the
ACi0 HCIC IlOb 1ullIllcO ny IlcIcly ScIlU-
ing units carelessly prepared and with
an undue proportion of green officers
and men to fight against trained veter-
ans.
Only 900, 900 men had Joined the COL
ors In France UP to April !, and Of the
latest group stable proportion had
been in training only few days. To
provide the men and give them as
much time TO train Is possible, I laid
before Secretary of War Baker the
urgency Of making q further call for
all that we should be likely to need by
Fall and Of putting them In training at
once
Mr. Baker seemed willing to do 90,
but pointed out that this would prob
ably cause Q shortage Of labor for
planting and harvesting the crops. I
thought this demand ought TO be met In
some other way and that the military
needs, under the circumstances, were Of
first importance.
My diary notes the following:
Paris. Sunday. April 7. 1918. Went
TO Chaumont on Friday, accompanied
by Col. Boyd and Lieut.. Adamson, my
secretary. Mr.. Baker remained in
Paris
Yesterday saw part Of the LIST Di-
vision at Toul entraining for the
Somme. Found Gen. Billiard Ill In
hospital. Visited 26th Division In quiet
sector, but anxious for active employ
ment. Saw I'd in line south of Verdun,
equally keen. At Soully called on Maj
Gen. Hirschauer, commanding French
I'd Army, who spoke In high praise of
our soldiers.