Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-08

attacks, and then asked: could they
do more than that?"
Not without the Americans" Gen.
| Petain answered him.
Gen. Robertson then said: at think
| our only hope lies in American reserves"
and he wanted to hear from me.
stated that but few of the allied
authorities seemed to realize that Ameri-
can participation would depend upon
the amount of shipping available for
the transportation of our troops, and
needed was near at hand. AS there
had been some reference to amalgama-
ton, also took occasion to emphasize
the point that we expected as a matter
Of course that the American Army
would have Its own front as an tnde-
pendent force and not be used merely
as a reserve to be sent here and there.
One inSuperable reason, said, why We
could not amalgamate with the French
was the difference in language, and I
added that we would not use our troops
In that way at all unless 1t became abb
solutely necessary.
then discussed our problems, call
ing attention to the delays at the French
ports and our shortage of rail transpor-
alton, and touched on the backward
state of procurement of equipment, mu-
nitions and airplanes. They all ap-
peared surprised to learn of our diff
culties, especially Gen. Foch, although,
even as chief Of the general staff, he
apparently could not interfere in mat
tiers handled directly by the ministry.
It was astonishing to find how little
comprehension any Of them had Of the
enormous task that confronted the
Americans.
Foch said: None Of these questions
has been referred to me-" Whereupon
Petain retorted that lone should not
wait until such things are brought to
his attention, but should look around
and find them" Petain added at once
that he would send an oficial to study
of his officers, who offered many sug-
geStions out Of his own experience.
Might Lead 10 Disaster.
It was the sense of the conference
| that every assistance should be given
US in getting our troops across, and all
seemed fully to realize that no success
full offensive could be undertaken with
out them.
The declarations of the French and
British commanders in chief that the
reserves of each were available for the
use of the other could mean much or
the conception of the situation that
might confront each Of them and also
upon the relations that might exist be-
tween them at the time. In the light
of their previous experience, 1t should
have been apparent that the difhcultieS
of securing the necessary close CO.
operation between allied armies might
lead to disaster.
While the meeting was perhaps worth
1 Ill aS.11v to- Sraf ~
and the conclusion that the allies must
remain on the defensive, yet no def
mite understanding was reached as to
real unity Of action, and the conference
had little more effect than the one held
In the preceding August.
Conversations with Gen. Robertson
continued the next day at the Crillon
Hotel, in Paris, with Gen. Bliss present.
The same arguments were repeated in
favor Of Incorporating American units
into British divisions. My immediate
interest lay mainly in getting additional
tonnage for the transportation of our
men to form our own army, and 1t was
not my intention at any time to agree
to amalgamation with either Of the al
lies. So far we were not committed to
any plan of amalgamation, but Gen.
Bliss, who came into the conference
under instructions from the Secretary
of War, was much impressed with the
British point Of view and almost out OF
be- clear sky frankly expressed himself In
favor Of the Robertson plan.
OF course, American troops behind
the British Army, even temporarily
would be an encouragement to Its
morale, and If the emergency should
arise they could actually be put into
the fighting line, but to agree to the
use of American battalionS to build uI
British divisions in any permanent
sense could not be thought Of. Wher
Gen. Bliss spoke In favor OF 1t was
forced to declare myself then and there
MY stand was not quite what Robert
SON had expected, and the meeting
adjourned with the position of all con.
cerned no longer In doubt.
Refused to Send Gable.
Gen. Bliss and I met later by ap.
pointment to talk the matter over be-
tween ourselves and, If possible, come to
an understanding. After some discus
sion he suggested that each Of us CABLE
his views to Washington and ask for {
decision 1t was not my policy theT
or at any other time to put anything
up to washington that could possibl!
decide myself.
This would have been the last thini
to do In this case, especially as tn
Secretary had left In my hands tn
determination as to how our troop
should be employed. For two men y
cur positions TO have appealed In thi
lWav would bare indicated o flash. 81