Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-01-23

II attention of the allies. Apropos
the approaching interallied confer
ence on shipping, cabled Washington
August %, 1917, in part, as follows:
"a" The British, and especially
the French, have reached absolute limit
Of manpower and any augmentation
their military force cannot be expected.
Imperative hasten our organization and
training, 50 that we will have the troops
contemplated your project in Europe
for active service by May or June.
Military activities of allies on land
should be strongly reinforced by COM
bined navies and destruction U-boat
bases accomplished if possible. High
British Army officers conf1dentially con-
denim waiting policy British admi-
rally. In view of gravity of
shipping question recommend our Gov
eminent insist upon aggressive policy
By combined British and American
Navies.
"s Our position in this war very
strong. Allies now full recog-
Ilize dependence upon our cooperation
and we need not hesitate demand both
aggressive naval policy and full share
commercial shipping. Recommend Amer
lean representative shipping conference
be instructed accordingly"
Numbers of officers of all armies felt
very strongly that to check the losses
by submarine the two navieS should
take some risk and attempt to destroy
the bases from which these boats oper-
ated. It Is not known whether any steps
were ever taken to convey this sugges-
ton to the combined navies.
Meanwhile, study by joint French
and American commission of the ques-
ton of production of powders and ex-
plosiveS in France showed that the
greater part OF the raw materials must
be imported and that, due to the ship
ping situation, France, in December,
would produce only about half of the
current output. 1t was apparent, there
fore. that to avoid calamity the United
States must not only furnish powder
and explosives for all of its own forces,
but must supply about half the French
requirements, and the War Department
was so advised.
Should Look to Future.
BY this arrangement a large saving
Of tonnage would be effected, as the
weight Of raw materials was 70 to 20
times that Of the finished product. As
nitrates for the manufacture of powder
and explosives had to be imported from
Chile, the hazard to shipping would be
reduced by avoiding the long haul to
France. Millions of dollars were ex-
pended in the construction Of plants at
home In an attempt to produce nftrates.
but none had been turned out before
the end of the war. In view of these
costly experiments, it would seem wise
during peace 20. make some provision
Our efforts to arrange for the pro-
eurenent in France of munitions, aVia-
ton, various classes Of equipment and
supply and the use Of facilities brought
our officers in close contact with bu-
reaus of the Government. In the be-
ginning we were largely dependent upon
them to make up DEFICIENCIES in many
things necessary TO complete our prep
arations.
The failure Of the French to realize
the necessity of hearty cooperation be-
came evident very early in our relations
with them
The higher authorities apparently I'M
derstood, and promises Of assistance
were readily given, but when we got
down to actual details We encountered
d1fnculties. This criticism especially
applied to the granting Of docking IA
cilities, the allotment Of rail transpor-
tation and the assignment of forests
for lumber procurement.
One confusing thing was that the d.
vision Of authority between bureaus and
departments was not clearly defined.
Even after three years of war there re-
manned considerable question between
the zone OF operations and the service
of the rear as TO the control of NUM-
tons and transportation. The COM
nander in chief assumed TO have the
final voice in the allotment of artillery,
aviation and railroad rolling stock, but
his authority behind the zone of the
armies was not conceded by the bureaus
Of the war office and was especially
contested as to rail transportation In
f1a mas mt lIxy, 4
with authority beyond the material in
the possession Of the army, but his in
fiuence as head Of the armies was such
that his approval was usually necessary
to insure definite action.
Dealing with French Difficult.
In our dealings with French bureaus
we had to overcome many obstacles.
The subordinate one might happen to
encounter at the start was usually i'm
pressed with his Importance and would
undertake to make a decision, which
would lead one TO think the matter
practically settled, only to find that this
ofncial had little, II any, authority and
that his action was not approved by
the senior next above him. Then one
would learn, after the loss of much
time, that this was not the proper
ONCE after all. At last reaching the re-
sponSible bureau, one was likely to be
told that the thing couldn't be done
no reason being apparent except that
IL never had been done.
So, frequently throughout the war, ii
was necessary for me to make a per-
sonal appeal to the minister concerned
that orders be given for supplies or
services already promised and which
therefore, We had every reason to ex-
pect should be furnished. Although our
own departments at home are consid-
cred rather adept in the use Of red
tape, yet, TO use an apt though inele-
giant comparison. the art of tying things
up in off1cial routine is in swaddling
clothes In America as compared tC
France.
After Q few contacts with the French
SYSTEM one marveled that they had
managed to get along 30 well in sup
plying their armies during three years
Of war. The French are very 1ntelli-
gent, especially the educated class, anc
they have q highly organized govern
niert, but from the practical viewpoint
they often become deeply involved ir
pon-essential details and lose sight .oi
the main objective.
always likened the average French
bureau official to certain narrow typt
of cuartermaster in our Army who usec
70 regard all quartermaster property
under his charge a. his own and wher
he finally issued 1t always made th'
recipient feel that he was being espe
ciAllys favored
HoweTer. such z-dlfaCuitles were MOI
confined TO dealings with The FEanch
7 while a. entirely disadyantagecuA -