Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-08-11
BY CYRIL ARTHUR PLAYER.
!pecial pIspateh 70 rhe star.

Special Dispatch to The Star.
BERLIN, August II (N.ANA).-Is
disarmament always to be set UP
against security? In sum, all the diff
culties boil down to that One group
naturally including those with few
arms, believe that fewer ornaments
will bring great security. The other
group fears that diminished defenses
mean loss of security. 1t is the latter
group. those who set disarmament
against security, who make the prob
lem difficult.
SuperllcialIy 1t looked a simple mat
ter for all the world to decide to adopt
lower schedule in ornaments. In
practice 1t has been so difficult that
many well meaning man has, like
Lord Cecil, completely reversed himself
within as brief period as three years
For example, in 1927 Lord Cecil said
+" II you limit the people who
are in the fighting line you NIT the
aggressive power of nation.
do not propose to limit them (the
trained reserves) separately from the
regular army, but as part, for that pur-
pose, of the regular army. We
are agreed that the thing that matters
from the point Of view of the agrees
sive force of the country SO far as eff
fectives are concerned, is the number
of trained reserves, and that is, there
fore, the thing you have got to limit,
and, If 1t may be 50, reduce"
Limit Reserves as Well.
But in 1880 the same man said: I'VE
have no objection at all to limiting the
number of the annual contingent, and
l am a little sorry that my colleagues CT
Germany and Japan have introduced
into that question the question of
trained reserves, which does not seem
to me to arise at all in this question.
II you limit the number of SOL
diers taken into the army you limit In
the only possible way. You limit
automatically, and as a consequence,
the trained reserves as we'll"
In 1927 Lord Cecil thought that "if
you fix your period of service at a year
you are not reducing the efficiency of
your fully trained soldier. Do not
let us feel too sanguine about the re-
suits of our action. 1 should have pre-
ferred to proceed by a more direct
method of reducing the actual number
OF fully trained soldiers ="
But in 1880 the same mind was con-
WINGED that the principle Of any pol
icy Of limitation or reduction of arma
ments, SO far as electives are concerned.
must lie in the limitation Of service =" >
IL we can obtain a universal agreement
to reduce the period of service In the
first instance to one year we shall have
made a great stride toward reduction
so far as military electives are con-
cerned.
In 1927: 90 there are proposals
for what is called indirect limita-
ton, ie., limitation by limiting the ma
terial and so making the men not so
efhcient have preference
for the idea that, If you wish to pro-
duce a result, the best thing is to do 1t
directly and not indirectly = !"
But in 1880: unless we can
arrive at some system of limiting ma
terial as well, 1 do not think we shall
have done anything toward disarma-
ment."
Another Change Of Mind.
In 1927, one Of many similar state
ments: limitation by eXpendi-
ture only would be inadequate as the
basis for a convention"
And in 1890: I believe that as
a practical business move the limiting
of expenditure Is going to be the most
effective way In which you can limit
the growth of material"
Obviously If so sound and conscientious
friend OF peace as Lord Cecil can find
his opinion undergoing such radical
changes. the problem does not show
that clear and progressive march to a
solution the world has hoped for.
Side by side with this conscientious
befuddlement has proceeded the stub
born warfare of nationalism which is
called security" Britain fought the
war. presumably, to retain her mastery
OF the seas, and at the end was obliged
to yield it to the United States. That
is true, no matter what construction is
placed on the Washington treaty. The
United States can give its primacy
reality when it chooses and England
knows IT.
Germany. in 1914. a powerful naval
factor. whose growth in that direction
was basic cause for Britains entente
with France, and therefore prime rea-
son for Britain entering the war, now
has only the rudiments of a new
feet. which must be definitely limited.