Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-17

Brig. Gen. Evan M johnson. then
temporarily in command and his staff
officers He praised the Soldierly quail
! ties of the men, but said they were
very much behind in their training.
This division had suffered severely
from the practice followed by the War
Department of taking men who had
| been under training for some time and
sending them elsewhere for special
purposes. a total of $4,000 men having
! been thus selected from time to time
and their places filled with recruits.
/ Therefore the Infantry and machine
gun units of the division. about 1900
men. that reported in France, were
composed largely of unframed or par
/ TALLY trained troops.
! While at Sir Douglas headquarters
| he and ! reached an understa nding as
to the training and administration Of
our troops that were to be temporarily
! with the British. In the first place,
they we're to be allocated by regiments
| to British skeleton divisions under such
a schedule as might be agreed upon.
| The training stats OF British divisions
were to be at the disposal of these
! regiments especially for instruction in
/ the use of the rife and machine gun
and the handling of gas.
Plan Of Training Units.
! After that, and with the approval
of their American division commander,
| the regiments were to be attached 10
! a British division in line. SO each Of
| the three battalions Of the regiment
! would have the opportunity to serve
with one of the three brigades in each
| British division. These battalions were
! to be commanded by their own officers
/ as a part OF the British brigade. while
! the stan OF the American regiment was
| to be attached to that of the brigade
/ In the next stage the American
! regiments. with their three battalions
united under the regimental COM
mander. we're to act as a brigade in
/ would find the four American regi
ments of each division united as such
under it's own officers, the artillery
| being British until the arrival of its
own Artillery brigade.
! In carrying out this scheme the
/ tendency at first was for British officers
! actually to assume command of our
units In training. Our officers in most
I cases permitted this TO be done until
! 1t was checked by my orders that
! American units must be commanded
| in training by the officers and non
! commissioned officers who are TO COM
mand them in battle" and that Amer
| lean troops would in all cases be COM
manded in battle only by Americans.
! The program probably expedited
/ preparation, but questions of food
transport and methods arose which
/ demonstrated that any attempt at per-
manent amalgamation would have
surely led TO friction and inefficiency.
/ Because they were needed elsewhere
none of the divisions sent to train
! with the British remained long enough
! to carry out the prescribed course, ex-
cept the 9th and 30th.
! Opposed AmaIga ma ton.
Following a suggestion by Lord
Miner, l went to London April %,
| 1918, TO consider further the shipment
/ OF American troops At our first con-
/ ference there were present Lord Miner
and Gen. Sir Henry Wilson, who had
succeeded Gen. Robertson as the chief
OF the general staff: Harbord and my
self. The main point of difference
that had developed in previous con-
ferences. as to just how far the Amer
leans should be committed to serve in
/ active operations, was again considered
i stated that the main thing was to
! get our units trained and that, while
was opposed to amalga anna ton yet il
during the period OF instruction the
units with which they we're serving
| should be attacked, or IL another great
emergency should arise. OF course cur
men would 60 in. Naturally, the Brit
ish wanted unlimited infantry and ma
chine gun units, but / would consider
nothing further than q limited extern
/ sion OF the Subdivision plan.
During the conference q cable from
Lord Reading to the prime minister was
brought forth. which stated that the
President had agreed TO the slnaIgsms-
( ton Of Americans with the british
( had nothing offlcial at hand later than
the Presidents conditional approval 10
/ Joint note No. 10 of the Supreme War
Council, as suggested by &ecretaTy
/ Baker, so ! promptly said that it could
| not be possible that any such Gonces-
sion had been made and that the ella sSes
Of our troops TO be shipped oVer and
their disposition must be left to me.
or course, we knew that the British
were pressing this point by constant ap-
! peals to the President and that they
we're insisting he should agree TO the
shipment OF 10000 infantry and ma
| chine gun units per month for four
months to the exclusion OF all other
! personnel While the British conferees
had concluded from Lord Readings
cable that their case was won, l took
I quite another view and declined to con-
sider the Information as conclusive.
Training With British Army.
! AS a result OF these discussions we
reached an agreement which provided
for the shipment in May. by British
and American tonnage. of the infantry
machine gun. engineer and signal
troops, together with the various unit
headquarters of six divisions, for train
ing with the British Army. 1t was pro-
vided that any shipping in excess of
/ the amount required for this number of
/ troops should be utilized TO transport
! the artillery OF these divisions; also that
such personnel IS might be required TO
build up corps organizations should
then follow. it being understood that
! the artillery regiments would train with
| the French and join their proper divi-
sions when this was completed.
| To meet any emergency that might
require an excess OF infantry after the
completion of this program, it was
agreed that all the American and Brit
ish shipping available for the transpor-
| tation of troops was to be used under
such arrangement as would insure i'm
mediate aid to the allies and thereafter,
AS far as possible. provide other units
necessary to complete the ,0rga nization
OF OiIr divisions and corpaXf