The Republican., 1931-09-24
CHAPTER LVlI

CHAPTER LVlI
In accordance with the understand
ing of September we were now NOV
ing rapidly toward our second great
offensive. Questions concerning the
concentration and supply of the ele-
ments of the First army in the battle
areas were being worked out by the
staff of that army. who were given
every possible assistance by the staff
at G. H. Q.
The general plan Of action of the
allied armies, as agreed upon at the
conference of commanders in chief
July "a, was, to state it simply and
briefly, that the offensive should con-
tinue, each army driving forward as
rapidly as possible. The allied and
American operations during the sum-
mer had resulted in the reduction of
the Chateau Thierry, Amiens and st.
Mihiel salients and the great offensive
was now under way. Immediately
west of the Meuse river the battle line
had remained practically unchanged
since 1917. 1t was on this front the
American army was to play its great
part.
The disposition of the Belgian, Brit
ish, French and American armies on
the wide front between the North sea
and Verdun was such that they would
naturally converge as they advanced.
So long as the enemy could hold his
ground on the east of this battle line
frontal attacks farther west might
drive him back on his successive posi-
tions, yet a decision would be long
delayed.
Yanks Face Strong Position.
His main line Of communication and
supply ran through Carignan, Sedan
and Mezieres. If that should be in
terrupted before he could withdraw
his armies from France and Belgium
the communications in the narrow ave-
nue. which lay between the Ardennes
forest and the Dutch frontier were so
limited that he would be unable ade-
quately to supply his forces or to
be accomplished. AS our objective
was the Seda.l-C -Carignan railroad. 1t
was evident that the sector assigned
to the American army was opposite
the most sensitive part Of the German
front then being attacked.
The danger confronting the enemy
made 1t imperative that he should
hold on in front of the American army
to the limit of his resources.
Germans Strongly Fortified.
The area between the Meuse river
and the Argonne forest was ideal for
defensive fighting. On the east the
heights of the Meuse commanded that
river valley and on the west the
rugged, high hills of the Argonne for
est dominated the valley Of the Aire
river. In the center the watershed
between the Aire and the Meuse rivers
commanded both valleys, with the
heights Of Montfaucon, Cunel, Ro-
mango and of the Bois de Barricourt
standing out as natural strong points.
From these heights observation points
completely covered the entire German
front.
The terrain over which the attack
was to be made formed a defile blocked
by three successive barriers, the
heights of Montfaucon, then those of
Cunel and Romange and farther back
the ridges Of the Bois de Barricourt
and of the Bois de Bourgoyne. The
Meuse river was unfordable; the Aire
river fordable only in places. In addi-
ton to the heavy forest Of the Ar
gonne there were numerous woods
with heavy underground which were
serious obstacles.
These natural defenses were strength
ened by every artificial means imagin-
able.
A dense network Of wire entangle-
ments covered every position. 1t was
small wonder the enemy had rested
four years on this front without being
moleSted.
Hindenburg Position Is Objective.
In accordance with the principal
mission, which remained the same
throughout this great offensive, the
main attack of the First army was to
be launched west of the Meuse river,
its right to be covered by the river and
by the operations of the French
Seventeenth corps on the east Of the
river, that corps being a part Of our
army.
Our left was to be supported by q
simultaneous attack by the French