Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-11
Clemenceau Changes His
Mind on Formation of
Independent American
Army in France.
BRITISH CONTINUE
ASKING FOR TROOPS
General Staff at Home
Again Criticized by
Commander for Poor
Cooperation Abroad.
CHAPTER LIX.
r CALLED on Prime Minister Glenn

CEhG i Eb LIN
Y CALLED on Prime Minister Glenn
enceau in Paris august Is, 1918
and told him Of my visit to British
Army headquarters. We spoke Of
the progress toward formation Of
an American Army. A record OF wna'
he said, as set down by my notes, 1oI-
lows:
IN. Clenenceau told me that when
I FIRST began insisting on using Ameri-
| can divisions in an American army
under an American command. ne
| frankly did not agree with me, but
| that he wished to say to me now that
/ was right and that everyone who was
against me on this proposition was
wrong: that he fully agreed with me
! now that the Americans should operate
separately as an American army.
Lloyd Georges Message.
We then discussed telegram he had
received from Lloyd George, endeavor-
ing to arrange for a number OF Ameri-
! can divisions to be retained with the
British This message was HANDED 70
me by NJ. Clemenceau. In part, Mr.
Lloyd George said:
Il did not ask for the transfer OF
American divisions to the British front.
The brilliant part taken by them in the
second great Marine victory has more
than justified the use made OF them.
What / asked was that a few Ameri-
can divisions at most, from among those
recently arrived In France, ana VINO couIo
not be put in the line without some
training should be sent to complete
their training behind the British lines.
MY purpose was to form a reserve
capable of being used In the critical
situation of a break on our front by
the enemy, permitting the holding with
our local reserves until the arrival OF
divisions from the general reserve OF
the allied armies on the western front.
st did not consider my demand ex-
cessive, for it must not be forgotten
that the greater part Of the American
troops were brought to France by Brit
ish Shipping and that because OF the
sacrifices made to furnish this ship
ping our people have the right to ex-
pect that more than five divisions OF
the % now in France should be put
in training behind our lines.
I'VE are informed that serious at
tack on the British front still Is prob
able now. do not wish to hamper
YOU now, but in the interest Of that
unity Of command for which I made
so great an effort, urgently ask you
to support the very modest request mace
| DIV me IEOIL OUI CUAllA4o1AACA -AAA- SAAA~~'
Italians Wanted Americans.
Not only we're the British anxious TO
get our units, but the whole question
+ az the employment of American troops
| continued to be considered among the
allies. one program the British chung
| to Contemplated the use of DunkirE
as the supply port for an American
army they hoped would be sent TO
their front for service under their con-
troll. ~
Ambassador and Mr.. Lloyd George mao
been in conference in London regarding
the DISPOSITION Of our troops, the Tor
n1er urging that every influence be
brought TO bear upon Marshal Foch ana
myself to obtain divisions for Italy
This was not the first time the British
had shown an interest I'D having our
units 20 to Italy, having previously
suggested that they be grouped with
the British forces there.
Another proposal which vas again
submitted to Marshal Foch ABOUT this
time by the other allies was that OF
placing American infantry and other
services in the reduced divisions OF all
the principal allies. British, French
and Italian, but the French had
changed their attitude and were OPP
posed to any Of these schemes, none
Of which ever came up for formal con-
sideration.
It was surprising TO find Mr. Lloyd
! George lending himself to any OF these
plans in view of his positive declara-
ton at the Abbeville Conference IN
favor OF the formation and use OF an
American army as such.
It was also difficult to reconcile the
attitude indicated in his message with
his promise on several occasions, made
Internationally, to supply all possible
shipping to carry out the large Ameri-
can program recommended by the
prime ministers and Marshal Foch.
Impression Of British
The impression left on our minds
was. first, that the British desired TO
discourage the concentration. of our
forces into one army, and, second, THAI
perhaps there was a desire tc check
the growth of too friendly relations be-
tween Americans and French.
In my diary it is noted:
"Chaumont, Thursday, August IS,
| 1918. Senator j. Hamilton Lewis had
1 luncheon with US yesterday. Party OF
| Congressman and naval officers visited
us today.
"Foch suggests single control Of sup-
|
Wrote Sir Douglas Haig, approving
request that 2Tth and 30th Divisions re-
main With British temporarily to func-
| ton under our I'd Army Corps, DR..
! Schurnan Of Cornell University, called
\ Marshal Foch sent copy OF proposed
cable to President Wilson urging the
| 100-division plan. sent back word
| TO Foch that il would probably irritate
| the President, and advised against II. =
| 1ol
in nv diary included Congressman l.
p. Psdgett, j. J. Riordan. F. g
! Hicks, S. e. Mudd, w B. oliver, w
| ]. Browning, and Paymaster ]. e.
/ Higgins, who took luncheon with us;
j A. Peters, w w. Venable, J. G.
/ Wilson, j. r. Farr, j. r. Connolly. w
L. Hensley, T. 8. Butler, T.. d: SchalL
| Capt r. H Jackson and Lieut.. M. II
! Anderson of the Navy
Representatives Interested.
Our members of Congress from home
were always welcome, and particular
care was taken to give them oppor'
tunity 10 become acquainted as far a.
practicable with our plans and the
state of our preparations. The mem
bers Of this group Of Representatives
were intensely interested, each one
especially so in what the units from
his own section OF the country were
doing.
They were shown through our or
panization at General Headquarter,
and the projects we were about to un'
dertake were explained to them. A;
representatives elected by the people
their personal and oficial interest ir
our effort and their expressed BELIEF
in our success were encouraging to me
and to the command.
In its practical application through
the Military Board of Allied Supply
our theory Of pooling certain supplies
was proving effective in solving a mum.
h.. Of shiranlu questions of greater %