Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-03-13

Conferred with Andrews, Moseley and
| Bethel. Saw Walter Damrosch, who
has assisted m improving our bands.
Sent cable Tuesday supporting Lib
| erty loan. Cabled objections to plan
of starting school at home for higher
commanders with French and British
! instructors. Issued general order
commencing 1st and Sd Corps.
Went to Neufchateau to confer with
| LIST Army staff, and returned, yester-
| day. Sent de Marenches to French
G. H. Q. to see about tanks, airplanes
and gas shells. Washington complains
not receiving prompt report of casual
ties.
Arrived at Ligny-en-Barrois this
morning Visited headquarters LIST
Corps Giggett), and 4th Corps Dick
mani. Preparations for attack going
we'll"
The question of training came up
again, through a cable saying that an
advanced course OF military instruction
for higher commanders would be con-
Quoted at home by selected French and
British officers. Our experience in
France and our observation of the re-
suits of training at home under the
French and British officers did not
point to the success of this higher
course.
Objects 10 Foreign Instructors.
We had already abandoned foreign
instructors in France. / cabled my
objections, suggesting the ACCESSIBILITY
Of placing such instruction under COM
petent American officers. My cable
stated that too much tutelage by allied
omcerS tended to rob our officers Of a
sense of responsibility and initiative.
1t was well known that many of the
allied officers sent TO the States were
not professional soldiers, but men whose
knowledge was limited to personal ex-
| perience in subordinate grads in trench
warfare. Moreover, the French doc
trtne, as well as the British, was based
| upon the cautious advance of infantry
| with prescribed objectiYss where all
| obstacles had been destroyed and re-
sistance broken by artillery.
The French infantryman, as has been
already stated, did not rely upon his
rife and made little use of its great
power. The infantry Of both the FRENCH
! and British were poor administers, asg Ia
result of extended service in the
| trenches. Our mission REQUIRED an
aggressive offensive based on self-reliant
| infantry.
Our organization was radically differ
ent from that of any Of the allied
armies, and we could not become imita-
tors Of methods which applied especially
to armies in which initiative was more
OF. less depressed by infinite attention
| to detail in directiveS prepared for
their guidance. 1t was my belief, as
cabled the War Department, that the
highest efficiency could only be attained
| by adherence to our own doctrines,
based upon thorough appreciation of
the American temperament, qualiflca-
tons and deficiencies.
Recommends Recall.
I recommended the withdrawal of all
! instruction in the United States from
| the hands of allied instructors. This
| commentator was promptly approved
by the chief of stan, who entirely
agreed with my views.
In preparation for the coming often
sives the advance headquarters of the
LIST Army was moved from Neuf-
CHATEAU, August 20, and established at
| Ligny Barrels, small town 25
miles southwest of ST. Mihiel 1t was
from Lgny that all LIST Army activi-
ties were directed during the st. Mihiel
operation.
When we arrived the French general
who was being relieved; and his chief
| of staff, all dressed up in their red
| trousers and blue coats, came formally
| TO turn oY:r the command. The chief
| OI SLdlI LWO NOluLilEo, CdCAA
consisting Of about $50 pages. These
they presented. to me with considerable
ceremony One was the plan Offensive"
and the other the Plan Defensive" for
the st. Mihiel salient. My orders had
been already prepared, the one for the
| attack comprising six pages and the one
| for the defense eight pages.
This incident Is cited merely to show
the difference between planning for
trench warfare, to which the French
were welded, as compared with open
warfare, which we expected to conduct.
| At Ligny-en-Barrois we were in close
touch with the front. The LIST Corps
headquarters Oiggett) was established
at Saizerais, northeast Of Toul, and the
4th (Dickman) at Toul, as both
corps were TO be engaged on the south
| side Of the salient. During my visit
on the 29th I went over the plans Of
| each corps and examined the progress
/ 1t was making In the assembly of
troops.
Misleading the Germans.
The considerable circulation of
| troops in the ST. Mihiel area naturally
attracted the attention of the people
and of the officers and soldiers. AL
though cautioned against such discus
sion, the probability of an American at
tack on the salient was discussed here