Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1931-02-14

American
who the commanders in chief may be
Each commander in chief is interested
in his own army and cannot get the
other commanders point of view nor
grasp the problem as whole. 1 am in
favor of a supreme commander and
believe that the success of the allied
cause depends upon it.
Agrees With Pershing.
st think the necessary action should
be taken by this council at once. 1 am
in favor of comforting the supreme COM
mand upon Gen. Foch."
When l had finished Mr.. Lloyd George
came over to where I sat, took me by
the hand and said:
II agree fully with Gen. Pershing
This is well put"
Mr.. Lloyd George asked for the views
of Marshal Haig, who said:
I'VE have had practically complete
unity of action. / have always CO.
operated with the French, whom I re-
gard as in control of the strategical
questions of the war. was placed di-
rectly under the command of Gen.
Nivelle, and Gen. Petain and I have
always worked well together I agree
with Gen. PerShing's general idea that
there should be unity of command, but
think we have had it."
The views expressed by Gen. Petain
were practically the same as Marshal
Haig'S, although think they both re-
allied the necessity of some definite CO.
ordinating control.
AS a result, after some further in
| formal discussion, draft of the resolu-
ton was submitted which omitted ref
erence TO the American Army. Where
upon l called attention to the over
sight, saying:
Il think this resolution should in
clude the American Army. The arrange
ment is to be in force, as I understand
| Army will soon be ready to function as
such and should be included as an
entity. like the British and French ar
miles,
There is no American Army yet as
SUCH" Gen. Petain interjected, "as its
units are either in training or are ANAL
gamated with the British and French"
General Pershing Objects.
There may not be an American Army
in force functioning now I replied
but there soon will be, and want this
resolution to apply to it when it becomes
fact. The American Government is
represented here at this conference and
in the war, and any action as to the
| supreme command that includes the
British and French armies should also
include the American Army"
The foregoing account of the confer
| ence may not be an exact record of the
| language used, but is given as my aid
! took it down.
The following resolution was then
read and adopted:
Gen. Foch is charged by the British
French and American governments with
| the coordination of the action OF the
allied armies on the western front; to
! this end there Is conferred on him all
the powers necessary for its effective
realization. To the same end, the Brit
ish, French and American governments
conflde in Gen. Foch the strategic direc-
! ton of military operations.
The commanders in chief of the
British, French and American Armies
! Will exercise to the fullest extent the
| tactical direction of their armies Each
4 commander in chief will have. the right
! to appeal to his government, If in his
| opinion his army is placed in danger by
the instructions received from Gen
Foch."
| Selection Was Difficult.
! The idea Of an allied commander in
chief had been suggested and discussed
many times unofhcially, but for various
reasons, political and otherwise, it hac
/ never been definitely adopted by the
Supreme War Council. With the dis
trust that existed among the allies, II
was not easy to bring about the de-
| cision in favor of a supreme com.
mander, and it was made possible only
by the extreme emergency of the situa-
ton.
1t was natural that the position Of
supreme commander should fall either
to French or a British officer. Ar
American could hardly have been con.
sldered, for the one reason, if for nc
other, that we then occupied no front
of our own and our force was still rela.
lively small. While the two allies SHOULD
have realized the necessity for closer
cooperation, yet the sentiment in the
armies and among non-combatantS OF
each against selecting any one from tn,
army Of the other was difficult to over.
come
The British held that the Channe
ports must be defended at all costs anc
feared that this might not be fully ap.
preciated by a French allied com.
mander. The French were compelled
to protect their capital and were un-
certain OF the attitude in that regarc
that British supreme commander
might take. These obligations were. OF
course, important, and each was con-
sidered vital by the governments con-
cerned.
The common objective of their com.
bined forces, however, was the German
Army, though this fact was apparently
often obscured by the individual poin
OF view of each of the allies. Previous
tc this crisis they did not seem to reallzr
fully that the success of their common
cause demanded complete unity o
action, both on the offensive and de
fenSive, and that without it they coulC
not win.
National Pride Big Factor.
Human nature is the same whether
1t be regarded as affecting the actions
OF individuals or of nations. The sub.
ordination of national undertaking Of
any kind to the authority of another
nation can hardly be thought of except
under the most pressing necessity.
In this case national pride entered
to an unusual degree. Although We
were face to face with the greatest
crisis of the war. none of the govern
ments concerned was willing to place
its army absolutely under control Of
one of the others. This was shown In
the Beauvais resolution by the limita.
tons, placed upon the authority of tho
allied commander in chief. He coulc
coordinate the action of the armie:
and determine the strategy. but each
commander in chief was alone respon.
sible for the proper tactical direction o