Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-04-13

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dreamed vainly until they came.
Pershing Has His Way.
Now Foch and Clemenceau could no
longer deny Pershing command Of his
own independent American fighting
! force, for which he had struggled in
cessantly. The Americans had made
possible the victory for which Glenn
enceau conferred upon Foch the ex-
Foch began to plan the great battle
that in the Fall brought the Germans
to their knees-although not quite as
Foch had planned. Haig, Pershing and
Petain had their say.
The battle that started September
26 was series of great converging at
tacks to disjoint and crush the Ger
man armies by cutting their vital rail-
roads. The newly formed American
1st Army under Pershing had the
rough, heavily fortified, strategically
vital Meuse-A rgonne region. It started
its assault well, but stopped short Of
the well-nigh incredible victory for
which some had hoped.
In the heat Of war, eager to end It
VIGOROUSLY, some French and British
leaders, especially Haig and Petain,
manders they called too inexperienced
to run q big battle. They pointed to
our road jams, which Pershing himself
stood at crossings trying to disentangle.
Partly from piQue, partly because they
sincerely believed us incompetent, Glenn
enceau and Lloyd George embarked
upon propaganda that became an in
in general and Pershing's in particular.
Traffic jam RouSes Ire.
Clemenceau visited the American
front, was stuck for time in a road
jam, and arrived at Foch's headquarters
boiling. He seldom disturbed the mar
shall at mass, which the old agnostic
said works very well with him." but
this time he exploded:
Those Americans will lose us our
chance for big victory before Winter"
he said in erect. "They are all tan
gled up with themselves. You have
tried to make Pershing see. Now let's
put 1t up to President Wilson"
The French had thought of that be-
fore when they found Pershing stub
born, sticking to the orders President
Wilson, Secretary Baker and Gen. Bliss
had given him when he sailed, to form
an American Army as soon as prac-
ticable. He was too ambitious, the
French said.
But Marshal Foch knew that the
American commander was flmrly set
now for an independent American
Army. He knew also that any other
American commander would be just as
set and would be backed by his Army
and Government. So what was the use
intriguing for Gen. Pershing's removal?
The Americans must learn some
time" said the marshal to the premier.
! They are learning now, rapidly. Every
day they will help us more and more.
We must play the game with them"
Grudgingly, Clemenceau returned to
Paris, but there he told Admiral Sims
that the Americans had lost q great
chance, because that stubborn Per-
shing insisted on trying to run q big
battle independently. American Repre-
SentativeS visiting France took the
story back to Washington. There were
whispers that Gen. March would take
Pershtng's place.
FOch Sends Letter.
Meantime, Marshal Focl1 got from
warded to Gen. Pershing in a letter
dated September 30, that was as vel
come as German air raid. The let
| ter advised that the whole Argonne
Forest front Of our battle be given to
| a French general to command. The
proposal did not mean that we should
have fewer men engaged or smaller
1OSSCS-IdIIICI 1dlScL, 4OL tLIC ulhLoA1d1
wanted us to bring to the Meuse-Ar-
gonne more American troops and put
many of them under French command.
To part Of the proposals Gen. Per-
Shing consented, but not to turning over
100, 900 or more American troops and
q good slice of an American battlefield
to French general. Gen. Pershing and
his staff considered the proposal tao
tically unsound and morally impossible:
oF% In
the Argonne Forest were inseparable,
and must be handled by the same COM
mander and staff.
what would be the moral effect If the
American Army, not the German,
should be cut in two in the midst of
its greatest battle? The Army and the
American people would be explaining
school histories today said that we had
failed in our first big battle, and the
French had to take command?
Gen. Pershing's reply was plain. And
so, on an American battlefield, there
started the 10-year feud between Foch
and Clemenceau. For Foch dropped
the idea, but Clemenceau did not.
The Tiger was bulldog, whose Jaws
did not slip. The Americans struggled
forward once more, then in mid-Octo-
Der, paused for rest and to prepare
| for another blow. On October 81
Clemenceau wrote to Foch, protesting
that he should force the Americans to
accept absorption into allied armies, or
else get new commander. Foch did
not agree.
Suggestion Made Again.
Only a few days before the war ended,
Clemenceau proposed the same thing
to Secretary of War Baker, then in
Paris. SO did Lord Miner, British war
minister, and, finally, Lloyd George.
During the very armistice deliberations
slurring reference to the Americans,
which later he withdrew. In those last
days Foch remained the Americans
friend and wrote to Pershing:
1.-The accomplishments of the Ameri-
can divisions under your orders are too
fine for me not to look forward for every
means of leaving them there"
So, although subsequent differences
caused Pershing, on his return home,
TO tell interviewers dryly: Marshal Foch
Is q very great strategist-1 think that
| covers it." the Ratchet was soon buried
and the two great soldiers remained
friends, approaching one another. Not
70 Foch and Clenenceau.
The great French soldier had af-
fronted the great French premier. Foch
had singed the Tigers whiskers by
thruSting forward firebrand idea-that
the peace treaty should place Frances
military frontier at the Rhine, that so
only could future German invasion be
prevented. Clemenceau replied:
your business is war. We will not
suffer you to interfere in these matters"
Perhaps, as some say, the old Tiger
dozed after his great exertions, prefer
ring Lloyd Georges and Wilson's nebu-
lous promises Of q protective alliance
which NEITHER coiIld make good
Perhaps. as others say, the Tiger saw