Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-06-19

investigation and study was met with
ill-concealed impotence that soon de-
veloped into downright denunciation.
BY many newspapers and advocates it
was deemed a sort of les majestic in
any respect to question such a Sacro-
sanct document, and the endeavor was
made to bludgeon into silence any
who had the temerity to speak other
wise than in praise or worship. A
treaty asserted to be in the holy name
of peace and good will among all men,
strangely enough, aroused in its adVo-
Gates a spirit which would brook
neither question nor opposition; and
a week ago, over this same radio, the
distinguished Secretary of State, while
indulging in platitudinous generalities
and emitting detailed explanation of
the treaty, displayed an angry intoler-
ance toward any who might not agree
with him and all who, under process
had been compelled to testify before the
Senate committees contrary to his view
1t is neither as an opponent of dis
armament nor as big Navy man that
I am against tbs London treaty. It is
as an American with the due regard of
the average American for national
security and defense, but with the
present hope that the nations of
the world will limit and reduce arma
there and living long life only there.
with eyes upon the broad Pacific and
a firm belief that the Pacific ultimate
~ will be the theater of world activity;
It is as one grown old in public service,
to whom the safeguarding of the Ma
tons future is far more important
than an immediate petty political tri
umph, that 1 take issue upon an in
strument utterly lacking in the con-
summation of its high-sounding pur-
poses, and in its terms unfair and
unjust to the United States.
Pleas Aren't Reasons.
To say that the London treaty has
the sanction of one man or another:
to plead to the Senate that two of its
members have participated in its ne
gotiations, are to state no reasons for
its ratification. Does it relieve our
people of what politicians like to call
the crushing burden of taxation? Does
it provide, in reality, naval limitation?
Does it prevent competition in naval
building in the future? Does it give
our Navy parity with that of Great
Britain? Does it preserve what we
thought we had achieved in previous
disarmament conferences? Does it
finally give to our country a sufficient
Navy to enable us to protect our sea-
borne commerce in case OF dlfhcAty,
and does it accord US adequate national
defense? If it does these things, the
treaty should be ratified. If 1t does
not do these things, then it ought not
to be ratified. And the decision far
transcends in importance our pleasure
in bending to influence and power or
our loyaltieS to personalities.
The Washington Conference-Ratios
of NavieS Then Established.
We are not without past experience
10 guide us; and the past humiliating
experience. if it has not taught lis
wisdom, should at least have taught
care and caution.
In 1922 at Washington conference
upon naval limitation was held. There
were more panegyrics delivered con-
corning it and more apostrophes to
peace because of it than have been in
dulged even in respect to the Lon
don treaty. That We were egregiously
fooled then is generally conceded now.
AS result of that conference we scrap
ped a part of our Navy, wherein We
were far superior to all others. We
destroyed actually hundreds of mil
lions of dollars of our taxpayers prop
erty;; when others did little in COMPARE
son. We did 1t with high astounding
phrases like We hear today-to limit
nayies, to prevent forever competition
in naval building and in the holy
cause of peace. And when the confer
ence had closed, with our cheers, and
some others smiles, the American del
egation, with Mr.. Hughes at its head,
wrote of the treaty they then made:
1T is obvious that this agreement
means ultimately an enormous saving
of money and the lifting of a heavy
~ fFpctV
absolutely stops the race in competition
in naval armament. At the same time
it leaves the relative security of the
great naval powers unimpaired."
Cites Washington Conference.
Time has demonstrated that the
Washington Conference did nothing CT
the sort. It neither lifted any burden
of taxation, nor did it leave the relative
security of the great naval powers I'M
impaired, and worse still, instead OF
stopping. it actually started race in
competition in naval armament. And
these unpalatable results of the Wash
ington Conference are now blithely
stated by the proponents of the London
treaty as reasons for its ratification.
Exactly the same unfortunate results
that followed the ratification of the
Washington treaty will follow IN intensi-
don treaty. And at the end of the life
of the London treaty We will find our
country in still worse position. Our
weakened situation at london, due to
the Washington Conference, is the e%-
cuse for accepting other provisions that
render us weaker still; and in 1885, If
the nations meet again, and our repre-
sentatives adopt the theory apparently
adopted by them at London again We
must yield to yet unknown and worse
conditions.
At Washington, in 1922, the ratio OF
the navies of the three great powers in
capital ships and accepted N principle
for all auxiliary craft, was Ave for
Great Britain, five for the United States
and three for Japan. We then agreed
in order that this ratio might be fixed
and as the price for it, that We would
not strengthen our bases in the far Pa
cifc. We kept faith. We hoped then
that the disadvantage of our lack OF
naval bases might be Offset by ouI
naval superiority accorded by the Sd
ratio with Japan. Our naval experts
then and now are unanimous in the
opinion that that ratio is essential fol
our safety. At London, upon the de-
nand of the japanese, this ratio wa:
destroyed, and Japan was accorded q
ratio of substantially 10 to z, insteac
of 10 to s.; but the United States sill
continues to pay the price of the s.;
ratio, and still is forbidden to utilize
TO the full the bases in the far Pacific
Notwithstanding this So ratio, Japar
demanded at London equality in sub
n