Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-10-19
u. S. REPLACING BRITAIN
AS STABILIZER OF WORLD
Empire Appears Unable to Hold Lead
in Political Affairs, Due to
Weakened Position.

| with a weaker continental group against
a stronger, whatever the moral issues in
volved. At the present moment 1t con-
siders France and its allies too strong
and tends to support Germany on the
| one hand and Italy on the other, against
France, not, however, openly.
But in Asia Soviet Russia Is Great
Britain's declared adversary, and Great
| Britain tends therefore to support the
Baltic states, Poland and Rumania, who
are at the same time RuSSia'S neighbors
! and Frances allies.
1t is true that Great Britain proba-
bly, prefers that Russia should be pre-
occupied rather with Eastern Europe
than with Asia, but the fact remains
that the task of the British foreign
Office just now is tremendously compli-
Gated. 1t is said to be mainly the bal
ance of power idea, which leads Great
Britain to oppose profoundly and tena-
ciously the French idea of unified
Europe.
Another fundamental British foreign
policy is close cooperation with the
United States. This is necessary, first,
| to protect Great Britain against the
centrifugal tendencies of the dominions,
and second, to safeguard Great Britain's
rear in case of European complications.
More and more, therefore, do Brit
1sh statesmen appear TO regret Great
Britain's continental entanglements
| under the covenant of the League of
Nations and the Locarno treaties. The
Kellogg pact. 1t is commonly said in
London. Supersedes these.
In case OF European war, Great
Britain, it Is declared, will remain
neutral as long as the United States
does and If 1t intervenes at all it will
do so preferably only at the end to
nrlVent ahfIcac w ho Hdrf0rc oaA -
redress the balance.
U. S. Approaches Veto Power.
All this is widely interpreted as be-
ing almost equivalent to giving the
United States a power of veto over
British foreign policy and leads the
Cont1nentalS once more TO what now,
with them, appears to be the main con-
deration-namely, the temper and
trend in international affairs of the
! United States.
It is interesting to inquire how the
various powers regard these supposed
British policies. Russia, Of course, re-
mains Great Britain's avowed enemy,
especially in Asia. Germany and italy
both desire British support and have
obtained 1t to some extent, but both
seem to feel somewhat uncertain about
the future and are perhaps not unduly
disturbed at the idea that Great Britain
may be slowly declining.
France seems so convinced that In
the long run French and British in
terests will coincide with the interests
of peace and stability that, despite the
opposition to France of the present
British government, France Is dismayed
at the idea that Great Britain's star
is waning. 1t would prefer a strong,
united British Empire with big navy.
As for the United States, its leaders
IN matters Of foreign policy seem to be
First, that Great Britain viii prove
able to keep Europe In order so that
America viii not have to bother with
1t, and, second, in case of q new
European war, that Great Britain viii
be able to keep out, so that America
will be spared the risk of neutrality
complications with Great Britain.
Opinion on Continent Divided.
In this connection It may be said
that common opinion on the Continent
| Is divided on the question whether or not
Great Britain, or, for that matter, even
the United States, could remain neutral
In q new war. There are indications
that British statesmen recently have
begun to realize that all Is not going
so well on the Continent, as, with SO
| many oLner grave preoccupaClonS, they
would have liked to bslieve.
On the whole, however, British ex-
perts do not think there is going to be
| a new war within the next few years
This comedies with analyses recently
made and with the opinion just ex-
pressed by Edouard Benes, Czech
foreign minister.
Europe, said DR.. Benes-meaning
perhaps, chiefly Germany and Italy
which are the leading revisionist coun-
tries-has neither the social nor the
financial strength necessary for a new
war at the present time. It is his belief
that, while 1t may take another 20
years for Europe to readjust itself "a
| the new situation, this adjustment viii
| gradually come about.
As for disarmament, he believes that
much progress has already been made
and that in the near future ornaments
will be first stabilized and then grad
ually reduced.
(Copyright. le30.)