Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-06-29
ACTS OF CLEMENCEAU
AND FOCH REAL GAUGE
Confidence i'm Each Other Shown Manv
Times, Despite Their
Heated Words.
Continued From First Pase.)

1
what the governments view q the
peace terms would be.
The generalissiIno, In consequence,
suggested the possibility Of the perma-
nent presence ct his headquarters Of
an official from the French foreign
ONCE who might act as liaison between
him and the government. week later
! Clemenceau and M. Pichon, Minister
OF Foreign Affairs, replied Clemenceau
did not mince matters. The general
issimo was only the military adviser Ct
the government and his advice need not
| always be acted upon. In consequence.
Marshal Foch was to be informed Of
the political developments only in so far
as they depended upon military action
So the Change suggested by Foch did
not become effective, and the armistice
was purely military affair
AS for the peace negotiations, they on
the contrary, were purely civilian.
Foch, in spite of repeated efforts, could
only get admission to the conference
on April Is and May 6, 1919. The Me
mortal" narrates this failure In the
tone OF one who knows he has done his
duty, but disguised sniff every now
and then throws 2 light on the mar
ShaPs innermost feelings. VisibIy the
long delays between November, 1918,
and May, 1919, we're harder to bear
than M. Recouly is willing TO admit,
for on April II, 1919, the marshal posi-
lively refused to follow Clemenceau in
an important matter and the Tiger
deeply resented the disobedience
Clemenceau wanted the generalissimo
TO advise Gen. Nudant by telegram that
he was to take proper measures to
receive the German delegates and
escort them to Paris, where they were
to be given information regarding the
main lines Of the treaty Foch realized
that his oft-repeated wish had been
disregarded and the treaty must be
virtually complete without his having
been consulted about it. NThe diSap-
pointment was too hard to bear, and
Foch refused to send the telegram.
Send 1t yourself" he said. Besides"
he added, there are things in it which
do not understand, and I have never
signed anything that was not imme-
diately ineligible"
FOch Faces Supulations.
A week later the generalissirno Vas
at last allowed to state his views about
the future safety of France AS it was to
be safeguarded in the treaty, but Gle
menceau stipulated that Foch would not
be admitted to any debate and that
all he was expected to do would be
to have his say and Immediately retire
The Memorial" makes 1t clear that
M. Poincare did not favor this restric-
ton, as in his heart he entirely sided
with the generalissimo. AS for the
latter's view, it was perfectly simple.
do not suppose that l can be the only
person to whom Senator Lodge con-
f1ded his idea of the treaty-"pure and
simple annexation of the left bank Of
the Rhine" Foch retranslated this into
| military language: There is only one
possible precaution against the danger
of another German invasion, and 1t Is
occupation Of the Rhine"
There was no discussion of this
formula which the marshal read out to
a perfectly silent circle. Only President
Poincare asked a question: do you
think" he said, that protective pact
signed by the United States and by
Great Britain would not be as much
protection as the military occupation
you Suggest?" NO" the marshal said.
And he proceeded to recount that it
had taken Great Britain two years and
the United States more than three
years to give any worthwhile assist
ance TO French defense.
The final impression left by the Me
mortal" is that Wilson and Lloyd
! George, not Clemenceau, led the con-
! ference, and that Clemenceau, at heart
/ still an old Jacobin," acted partly from
some unsurpassed remnants Of anti
militarism.
"ContemptuOus Science" Fruitless.
The aforesaid Jacobin was 81 when
| this Memorial" was published. Since
| his retirement he had said little. But
Fcch was an opponent who could not
be disposed Of by mere contemptuous
! silence. Clemenceau retired to his place
! in Vendee. ran race with death and
won, finishing "Grandeurs ct MiSereS
tune Victoire" several weeks before the
final attack.
| "GrandeurS ct MisereS Tune Victoire"
is not an old mans book. No remi-
niscing, only arguing: no pleading, only
fighting. Frequently the writer apos-
| trophies as If he we're still on the
rostrun OF the chamber. There Is no
invective because Clemenceau always
believes in his argu nts, but many a
sentence is charged to exploding with
when you read the Memorial" because
of M Revouly, a journalist, and not
Foch, the terSest and most condensed
of writers, composed 1t; but you cannot
skip line Of "GrandeurS ct MiSereS.
| If it really possessed the serenity which
Clemenceau honestly thought he dis
| played in every chapter, 1t would be
one of the great books. AS it is. his
torianS will never consult 1t without
feeling the contagion Of its passion.
Precisely as the Memorial" devoteS
most of its space to Clemenceau and To
the Versailles treaty, "GrandeurS ct
MiSeres" is first an analysis of the rela-
lions between the author and the gen.
eraliSsimo, while its second part deals
with what Clemenceau regarded as the
sabotage of the treaty.
Eocb dfs1ike6 CIaVnapcaou moro tho ~