The American issue. [volume] (Westerville, Ohio) 1912-19??, 1930-01-01

worth, not yet reported decided by the
Supreme Court involving Section 38 of
the Illinois Prohibition act, which au-
thorizes the adoption of stringent pro-
hibition ordinances that section was held
valid and the broad powers granted to
cities and villages explained This de-
cision is of great Importance in that it
approves a strong prohibition ordinance,
and can be used by the advocates Of such
ordinances when their adoption is fought
on legal grounds.
We print below the part of the Su-
preme Courts decision which bears on
the question of the constitutionality of
the law and the validity Of the Litchfeld
ordinance adopted Hereunder:
(Headings are Ours)
COMPLETE POWER GRANTED NIU-
inequalities TO PROHIBIT
LIQUOR TRAFFIC.
"The title Of the Prohibition act is, AN
act to restrict the manufacture, SALE
transportation, possession and use Of in
toXicating Liquor, aiding thereby in es-
tablishing uniformity in state and Fed
eral laws in regard thereto Section SO
of the act provides: All cities and VIII
lagos shall have full power to adopt Or
dinanceS embracing such provisions Of
this act as are applicable, and further to
prohibit the manufacture, giving away
dispensing, selling, bartering, transport
ing, delivering, furnishing, possessing
keeping, purchasing, storing, advertising
or exposing for sale, of Intoxicating liz
uor for any purpose whatsoever. No per-
nit nor other authority to manufacture
store, SELL prescribe or otherwise deal in
the beverages or liquors for which per-
nit or other authority is required by this
act, shall be issued to any person, Or
place, within the jurisdiction of any city
or village which has duly enacted an or
dinance prohibiting such act or acts and
any such permit shall become void upon
the taking effect of such an ordnance
PROVISION HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
"It is insisted by appellant that section
38 is unconstitutional for the reason that
the powers conferred by the section upon
municipalities to pass ordinances with
reference to intoxicating liquor are
broader than the title Of the act and are
in violation of section Is of article of
the Constitution, and that this is the
only section of the statute which confers
jurisdiction upon municipalities to pass
ordinances with reference to Intoxicating
liquor, and if section 38 is unconstitution-
al the ordinance is also invalid. In sup
port of this contention it is insisted that
the section gives municipalities full power
to adopt ordinances embracing such pro-
visions of the act as are applicable; that
the delegation of this power does not fol-
low the rule of law that statute must
be complete in all of its terms and pro-
visions when it leaves the legislative
branch of the government; that the word
prohibit as used in section 80 is broader
than the word restrict in the title of
the act, hence the body of the act is
broader than the title; that the title is an
act to restrict five uses of intoxicating
liquor while section 38 prohibits fourteen
uses, some of which cannot be reconciled
with and arc not synonymous of the eX-
pressions used in the title; that the last
part of the section, which provides that
any permit heretofore given shall become
vod upon the taking effect of an or
dinance prohibiting such permit is in
conflict with sections 4, 6, and 8 of the
act because it gives municipalities the
right to make void any permit issued by
the attorney general to a druggist, hos
pital or physician, and that this is dele