Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-02-23

1OfcemenC OF the pTOVSlOAo "a NAAS
Sevres treaty would probably have sur
feed to confirm my worst forebodings
During the whole of 1920, at every IN
terallied conference, our military ex-
perts would meet and, under the presi-
dency of Foch, declare each time that
neither Great Britain nor France nor
Italy had division to add to those they
already kept in the Near East. Then
VenizeIos would come forward and
under the fond, admiring gaze OF LLOYD
George, declare himself ready to under
take the whole job. At the Boulogne
conference (June, 1920 said: Il am.
contrary to all appearances, the only
one here who really cares for Greece.
Remember that If one may die OF hun
ger, one also may die of indigestion"
Venizelos was not at Boulogne, which
enabled Lloyd George to declare that it
was easy to "ridicule" the political and
military decisions of q statesman who
was not there to contradict.
A month afterward we met again for
the lengthy Spa Conference. M.
VeniZelos presented himself there to
urge his proposals before the Supreme
Council for the last time-and had his
way. The council was composed OF Mr..
Lloyd George, M. Millerand and myself.
M. Venizelos set forth his reasons for
being certain Of success. was the only
one who replied opposing his argument
by showing the danger that Greece
would run and finished my reply with
these very words:
Die Was Cast.
my only regret is that the attitude
Of Italy should be attributed to want of
sympathy for, or even suspicion Of,
Greece. myself feel, on the contrary,
i've, 11Nv- 1T
for her true interests. No peace is good
that is not q peace tolerable for both
sides. The Greeks, by gaining too
much, risk losing everything am
quite sure that in this hall there is at
least one person who feels the deep sin
certify of my wordS-and that person Is
M. Venizelos." looked at him and saw
that, patriot as he was, he felt for a
moment that my words might some day
prove too true. But the die was cast.
His basic error there, as before. was
mistaking the bearing of British sup
port.
Wilson-and it is, I believe, the only
case in which his personal temper got
the better of his ideas and Of his plans
decided to give Smyrna to Greece to
take his revenge on the Italians who
had refused to fall in with his views
about Fiume.
But one must acknowledge that Will
son alone could not have been respon-
sible for so great q blunder. A more
active and enthusiastic advocate was
needed for the Greek cause. This adj
vocate was found In the person of Lloyd
George
Lloyd George believed that Venizelos
would enable him to go on waging war
against the Turks with the Greek
vxrtfh
whence his praises and his presents
presents of other peoples land. The
Greek leaders mistake was to suppose
that praises and presents meant that
British support would never fail Greece.
In Greece the masses saw, clearer
than their Great Man, how dangerous
the situation was. The 1920 elections
were a resounding failure for Venizelos
| and his party; he was not reelected.
Irritated, disappointed, realizing toe
late the risk of the game in which he
had involved his country, he resigned
and left Greece, to which King Con-
stantine returned. Venizelos settled on
the French Riviera, married, Travelled
and even went to the United States
During one of his stays in Paris, when
asked his opinion on the future turn OF
events in the East. he foretold the VIC
| tory OF the Turks, the defeat of the
Greeks, the preparation of renewed
| horrors on the Christians of Asia Minor
and finally predicted the humiliation OF
the great powers by newly risen Tur-
key. A mutual friend told me- was
then Ambassador in Paris-these words
! that showed that Venizelos had, hence
forth, no illusions left as to the future
And could not help remarking that II
was the usual case of the clear sighted
Nxyt1int1 11vgfv alt
clans suddenly became endowed when
they fell.
Those Greeks who, without realizing
1t, love Venizelos even better than their
country, have a ready-made excuse for
| those disasters he brought on-they call
attention to the fact that the disasters
came when Venizelos was no longer
there. This does not do justice tc
| Greece. It would be very unfair to pre-.
tend that the Hellenic army led by Kine
| Constantine, who enjoyed q very rea
popularity among soldiers and officers
did not fight valiantly. The dream OF
a greater Greece, which had consolec
so many generations during centuries Of
slavery and misery, gave q wonderful
force of resistance to the Greeks iol
several long months. But the task
| would have been beyond any army-as
they felt at the British war ONCE when
they urged the Hellenes to fight, but
took care not to send q regiment tc
help them!
Goes TO Conference.
When the frightful military disaster
came in September, 1921, and the
Greeks were driven into the sea by the
| T'urks-after q stubborn resistance tC
which contemporary historians have not
done justice-King Constantine wa:
once more expelled and Venizelos came
back-not to government at Athens, fcI
too many enemies were in arms against
him there, but to represent Greece al
the peace conference at Lausanne.
1t was his punishment; he signed Q
treaty by which Greece lost all she hac
won since 1919.
But Greece lost much more; she lost
all the rich Hellenic colonies that fol
long centuries had kept q monopoly or
trade, navigation and industry In Asia
Minor. But all this has been wiped out
by the Turks, who-following upon the
Lausanne agreements, have cast back
upon the Greek coast q million and g
| half Asiatic Greeks, yesterday rich and
happy, today pariahs. That such ar
event, worthy to rank with the bar
barian tnvasions Of the third century
can have taken place without arousine
the horror Of the whole world is one
OF the proofs OF the mental disease and
degeneracy that the World War has left
behind.
The Turks, to defend themselves, had
one word only, Smyrna. The Greek
occupation, allowed in 1919 by Wilson
offered by LlOyd George and lightly ac-