Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-09-07

ourteouS and decent TO one
mother.
good administration, and his standing
as a statesman grew SO rapidly that in
1929 he was elected constitutional Presi-
dent by a large popular majority. In
ternal conditions are better In Ecuador,
the finances Of the country have been
Strengthened out, the administration
brought to high moral standard, edu-
ational and social reforms encouraged
and the national credit tremendously
strengthened abroad. Political compli-
have not arisen, nor has the "militar-
istic menace" endangered the normal
and legal existence of the republic.
In Chile the process was rather diff
ferent, but the results the same. After
a series of domestic quarrels, during
which several political leaders tried TO
take personal advantage Of chaotic
conditions, the leaders.cp of a strong
man was felt necessary TO avoid politi-
appeared in the person Of a colonel in
the army, Carlos Ibanez, who, also with
the cooperation of the armed forces,
took control of the situation and extri-
Gated the nation from vicious political
strife. AS in Ecuador, the army saved
the country from anarchy and from
economic bankruptcy, although in this
case behind the army there was an off,
Ger of extraordinary ability and ambi-
ton. Col. Ibanez was elected President
of Chile, and since that moment Gillian
conditions began to change. The ma
terial progress of the country can only
be judged by the great improvement in
its financial status, political unrest has
been entirely banished, the outstanding
international problem of Chile has been
solved in an unexpectedly favorable way
for the Chil4ans, and, in q word, the
Southern republic Is much better of"
with Ibanez than she was before. Al
though this time the intervention Of
the army did not have democratic
outcome, 1t saved Chile from civil strug-
gle and gave the country the best gov
eminent 1t has had in long while.
With these two instances Of such re-
cent occurrence, 1t does not seem fair
to condemn so hastily the army inter-
ventions in Peru and Bolivia, or to aSso-
ciate them with the beginning of domes-
tic anarchy in that part OF the world.
Other Factors Involved.
If, instead OF considering each partic-
ular case by itself, we wish TO generalize
and explain as q whole this widespread
domestic reStleSSneSS in Latin America,
which has resulted in military coups
d'etat in Bolivia and Peru and menace
ing diSquiet in Cuba, Argentina and
Brazil, We must take into account three
fundamental elements, one political, one
psychological, and one economic.
The political factor may be character
lied as the awakening of feeling in
Ia ck 49, I'll
gimeS, the reaction of public sentiment
against the strong man" policy which
had grown so rapidly In the Southern
continent since European leaders set
the example In the Old World. The
success OF MusSolini in Italy, and the
apparently successful imitation of 1t by
Primo de Rivera in Spain, awoke the
ambitions Of several Latin American
executives who, believing themselves to
be the chosen of Providence, decided,
whether or not sincerely, to help their
countries by staying indefinitely in
power At first public opinion seemed
to favor this dictatorial trend, which
was giving splendid results In two Eu-
ropean nations OF Latin origin. Later
on, however the Latin Americans were
enabled to see that Fascist methods are
an exclusively Italian phenomenon, and
that there were reasons to doubt the real
success OF the Primo dictatorship in
Mother Spain. The consequences of
such change Of opinion, intensified by
the mistakes and abuses on the part of
the "iron-handed" regimes in Latin
America, can be observed in this gen.
eral reaction against dictatorial forms
OF government, which is now producing
its results.
Politically speaking, this can be de-
scr1bed as the denunciation of dicta-
torial power by Latin America. Per-
haps, as her first step toward true dem
ocratic maturity.
There Is also psychological element
In the situation. just as with individ-
ualS, the masses are extremely suscep-
tible to intellectual contagious influence
The power of suggestion Is master of
crowds. The propagation of political
ideas in the mind of the masses Is ex-
traordinarily contagious. Just as a sui
eide Is never an isolated case in a COM
munity, but Is always followed by two or
three, or more, suicides which scientists
are agreed in attributing to pSycholo-
gtcal influence, so 1t happens that any
political trend in Latin American
country Is almost invariably followed by
similar phenomena In the neighbor-
ing nations, which have, moreover, their
origin. traditions and political back
ground in common.
And last, but not least, the economic
factor has played this time o most i'm
portant part. 1t gave a concrete form
to the political ideal and really deter
mined the time of action. 1t had pre-
cipitated events. Until economic crises
appeared on the. horizon revolutionary
ideas did not 60 beyond mere intellec-
tual aspirations in Bolivia, Peru, Cuba,
etc. But when the tin crisis seriously
affected the financial situation OF Bo-
livia, q country almost entirely depend
ent on its tin exports, the political prob
lem reached it's point of saturation and
made q change Of administration in1mi-
nent. In like manner. real revolution
airy unrest was not seriously felt In Peru
until the government finances began to
fall seriously since the early days of
this year. In Cuba the governments
position is now being greatly embar-
raised by the sugar crisis and all men,
aces of rebellion are intimately con-
nected with this critical economic fac
tor. In Argentina and Brazil the re-
Gently reported internal discomfort Ii