The daily worker., 1930-05-19
RESOLUTION ON MAY FIRST
DEMONSTRATIONS
Ad0bted by the Central Committee c. P. u. S. A.

l ne uemOnSLIaJlOnS themselves NelS VI SdHlASu
better than ever before. Whereas on March
practically no organization prevailed in the
demonstrations, on May Day. not only the Par
ty, but other worker organizations participated
in an organized body with their own leader
ship their own banners and even their own
defense corps. In some cases Baltimore, Kan
sas City, Chattanooga and Romeo Negro work.
ers constituted a large section of the partl-
cipants 1t was only this great Improvement
in the organizational preparations of the May
Dav demonstrations which made it possible for
the Party to mobilize the working masses de-
spite the counter-preparations of the bourg-
eoisie and to force the granting of police per-
mits in humber of cities.
T. The fact that the May Day demonstra-
tons were smaller than those on March is
due primarily, not to a change in the objective
situation, nor to a decrease in the discomfort
of the masses or to a slackening in their readi-
ness to follow our leadership, as some comrades
would have it, but to the still insufficient
overcoming of the weaknesses of the Party
in the face of the increased preparations of
the bourgeoisie. While the demands put for
ward by the Party on May First were broader
and included the full revolutionary program
of the Party the principal reason for the
smaller demonstrations was our inability to
link up these demands with those which i'm
emdiately and directly affect the workers
(work or wages, unemployment insurance,
against wage cuts, the speed-up, etc., on the
one hand, and to our organizational weaknesses
on the other
These weaknesses were very greatly accentu-
ated by widespread reliance on the spontane-
Gus response of the masses, which expressed
itself in idle boasting about how much bigger
the May Day demonstrations would be than
those of March g. The work was slow in start
ing No efforts were made to follow up the
March demonstrations with efforts to or
ganize and lead the struggle of the unemployed,
day to day shop work neglected Every
where a foolish attitude of self-praise was
adopted and basic preparatory work was not
done. This substitution of idle boasting for
serious preparatory work-a tendency to be-
come dizzy from the success of the March
demonstrations was one of the chief reasons
for the failure of the Party to mobilize the
masses with the same degree of success on
May Day, despite the more conscious counter
measures of the bourgeoisie. 1t was only during
the last two weeks that the Party really began
to overcome its dizziness and to thoroughly
and energeticaly take up the work
5. While generally there was considerable
improvement in the work of the Party in the
May Day preparations, this improvement, when
one considers the great experiences gained by
the Party on March 6, was entirely insuffi-
cent. In some cases Detroit, Pittsburgh,
Cleveand) the work was decidedly unsatisfac-
tory. The conscious and widespread counter
measures of the bourgeoisie to narrow down
the mass response, on the one hand, and the re-
Spouse of we'll over 100000 workers on the
other hand, more sharply than ever before en-
phasizes the necessity of more seriously eX-
amining our weaknesses and of taking decisive
measures to overcome them in the shortest
possible time
The weaknesses of the Party were chiefly
the following:
tai insufficient efforts both theological and
oreanizational, to mobilize the Party member
ship with the result that not more than so per
cent or 60 per cent actually participated in the
preparatory work.
(b). Neglect of concentrated daily activity
at specific shops in basic industries in an eff
fort to organize May Committees and to realize
the mass political strike, with the result that
no May Day Committees were set up and no
strikes materalized directly as a result of
Party efforts.
(c). Inactive shop nuclei and in many cases
open resistance to efforts to make them carry
on preparatory work in the shops.
(d). Lack of coordination of the various
Party campaigns Instead of the T.U.U.L
recruiting drive the Daily Worker circula-
ton campaign, and the preparations for the
coming elections, ETC., being used to stimulate
the mobilization of the masses for May Day,
and May Day in turn utilized to stimulate these
campaigns the carrying through of these CAM
paigns 'were postponed until after May First,
because we were too busy"
(e). Stressing only agtatonal work (mass
distribution OF leafets), while organizatonal
work remained very weak, and the agitational
and propaganda work. while increasing guam
titatvely, did not improve qualitatively (weak-
ness in linking up immediate and general de-
mands same stereotyped leaflets for Party
and all auxiliaries, poor shop papers, etc..
(f9. Slowness in starting preparatory work,
and then feverish, unorganized, last minute
rush to try to do in the last week that which
had been neglected. with very bad effects on
the Party membership.
(g). Failure to reach out beyond those or
CARNATIONS and groups already accepting the
leadership of the Party, and especially failure
to establish committees in the shops and to
secure representation from these committees in
setting up the united front conferences. In
sufficient utilization of these conferences, and
failure to draw the mass organizations into
the preparatory work.
(h). Failure Of our trade union fractions,
both nationally and locally to draw the T.U.
U.L. the revolutionary unions or local unions
of the A.F.L. into the preparatory work or
into the demonstrations; failure to link up the
T.U.U.L recruiting drive with the May Day
preparations with the result that the T. u. L. l..