Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-04-14

IlC OCNU Oh 0CCIeDdIy dO~
dress, which was delivered yesterday in
London and broadcast In this country
over the Columbia Broadcasting System,
was made public by the State Depart
ment, as follows:
Almost three months ago the Ameri-
can delegation landed In England to
take part in the London Naval Con-
ference. In order to understand its
purpose and to appraise the results
esSary to view the background and his
tory Of which 1t is part. Naval liui-
tation has formed part Of the or.
ganized efforts Of the world to limit
international suspicious and promote
good relations. It is a new effort and
has grown gradually. At the first
Hague conference, in 1899, the subject
Of limitation Of arms was one Of the
purposes for which the conference was
luton favoring restriction as a desirable
end. At the second Hague conference,
in 1907, 1t was considered too dangerous
to put on the program. Naval COMPETE
ton was going on unchecked In those
days, as It had been in one shape or
another for centuries. This particular
naval race ended in the Great War In
competitive naval building race had be-
gun. This later one included the United
States. For the first time in our history
we found ourselves facing the trritations
and ill-will arising from naval competl-
ton. Neither the experiences Of the
war nor the exhaustion which it caused
prevented the world from resuming
naval competition, and We found our
selves entangled in 1t.
Moral Standards Changed.
Under these circumstances President
Harding called the Washington confer.
ence and Mr.. Hughes made his historic
proposals. They were historic because
they changed the moral standards Of
the world. Before those proposals were
made human experience seemed to in.
dicate that naval competition was in.
evitable. Since that day the conscience
Of the world has insisted that naval
limitation by mutual agreement shall
take the place Of competition. The
Washington conference achieved enough
to prove that what the conscience Of
the world demanded was a practical
ton of the Washington treaty not
battleship has been laid down by any
nation in the world.
But though the success Of that con-
ference was great, 1t was not complete.
Only two kinds of warships were lin
tied. Cruisers, destroyers and subn1a-
rines were not, and after the conference
adjourned competitive building began
in those types-competition which babe
fair to become dangerous. The Prepar-
atory Commission Of the League Of Ma
tons tried again and again to agree
upon methods Of limitation, but failed.
In 1927 President Coolidge called the
three-power conference at Geneva, but
that conference failed to reach an
agreement. Yet the work Of these meet
ings was not entirely lost, for each one
gave tangible evidence that the world
belieVed In the principle Of limitation
and agreement. But each failure
showed the extraordinary difficulty Of
reaching an international agreement
upon that most vital concern Of every sew
ereign state, national defense, and the
aftermath Of each failure made 1t more
was necessary to the good relations and
stability of the naval world. Interna-
tional suspicion, irritation and Ill will,
the ugly children Of naval competition,
began to show their heads again. At
the very time when the world needed
all its resources to recover, financially
and economically, from the exhaustion
Of the Great War the navies OF the
world were beginning to build up an
expensive and dangerous rivalry. It
was time to try again to halt this
process. The other naval powers Sug-
gested that Great Britain and the
United States should see If they could
get close enough together in their fig-
ureS to give assurance that the failure
Of Geneva would not be repeated.
Long negotiations took place last Sum-
mer, eliminating In the visit Of Prime
Minister Macdonald to the United
States. Then followed this naval con-
ference.
Difficulty Of Problem.
"Tae problem which faced the Amer
lean delegation here was difhcult and
complicated. Since the washington
treaty the United States has laid down
no battleships, no aircraft carriers and
no destroyers-and only three sub
marines. 1mpelled by the cruiser con-
struction of the other nations, our Con.
but only two ships Of that program
were In the water. Our Navy was III
balanced. The end Of the battleship
holiday instituted by the Washington
treaty was approaching and most Of
our other ships were becoming old and
approaching their normal time for re-
placement. The question was, should
the United States replace the bulk Of
it's Navy on Q competitive basis or upon
q basis of limitation reached by mutual
agreement with the other naval nations
Of the .worldP Would the other coun-
tries whose navieS were In better con-
dition than ours agree to such limita.
ton without taking advantage Of their
better bargaining position? It 1t to the
credit Of the faith in the principle Of