Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-02-22

CONTINUED From First Page.)
doubtful if the French, even at the best.
would consent to reduce under 10000
tons.
In these circumstances the question
OF three-power, instead Of a FIVE
power, treaty has been revived in Lon
don and is being carefully examined.
II Is much less simple than first ap-
pears. It presupposes, first, that Japan
VIII be willing to compromise, now that
the japanese elections are over, on the
demands it has hitherto inflexibly
maintained.
1t presupposes, second, that Great
Britain can afford to ignore the French
ngures during the next five years to
the extent of entering into a treaty at
q level low enough to interest the
United States.
Believe Japan Would Compromise.
1t Is believed, but is far from being
certain, that Japan will compromise. It
also is believed that Great Britain can
enter into treaty with us on the
basis of the Rapidan figures as since
adjusted in London, because, even if it
wished to, it can scarcely afford within
the next flVe years to enter a building
competition with France. But this,
again, is far from being certain.
British opinion, even If there were no
real intention Of building, might feel
obliged to insert in the treaty figures
calculated to give Great Britain navy
at least twice the size of Frances in all
categories, which would, of course throw
the Rapidan agreement, all out of gear
and force the United States and japan,
in turn, to hypothetical figures to which
the United States Senate might strongly
object.
As voaarS ~ a5d;tgo,,o1 ,,ros.,,,.o 49,
France, Italy might also be invited to
join in the treaty without France, but
as Italy'S whole policy is based on parity
with France this would apparently
merely serve to swell the tonnages still
more, so that four-power treaty is un-
likely.
But even supposing that a three
power treaty could be concluded, would
1t be satisfactory?
From the point of view Of Japan and
the United States, yes. From that of
Great Britain, scarcely. Such treaty,
excluding France, would undoubtedly
mark the beginning of long series Of
newspaper and diplomatic polemics be-
tween Great Britain and France each
accusing the other of all sorts of ugly
things.
Great Britains strength would lie in
its association with the United States
and Japan and its ability to enlist the
sympathy OF Italy and Germany, thus
practically 1solating France. Frances
strength would repoSe wholly in its good
financial situation, its previous liquida-
ton Of many complicated postbellum
problems and its strong sense of right
eous indignation.
Doubtless in the long run the quarrel
would be patched up to the satisfaction
of both parties. But meanwhile the
conference would have left the world in
a worse condition than it had found it.
1t is almost rule Of European poll
tics that as long as France and Great
Britain work together the continent re-
mains orderly and peaceful, but as
soon as France and Great Britain fall
out all the nations dissatisfied with
their present political order begin to
speculate on this Franco-B British differ
ence by renewed agitations. A Franco
British quarrel, as a result of the Lon
don conference, would presumably
strengthen the German Nationalist.
Russian Communists and Italian Chau-
vinists, to say nothing Of the various
Balkan factions.
The outlook, thus filled with uncer-
tainties and disturbance, would be bad
for business, bad for international
finance and bad for peace. Probably
nothing serious would actually happen.
hut danger would probably be in
e=s=sed
For ali these reasons the suggestion
Is made that in case there is no Franco
British agreement at London there
should be a three-power agreement in
serted in a five-power treaty, France
and Italy simply filling in any figures
they like and the whole problem being
thus left over for adjustment by direct
negotiations in the near future, failing
which the entire situation could be re-
considered Sternly at the next big naval
conference In 1885, a