The Bismarck tribune. [volume] (Bismarck, N.D.) 1916-current, 1930-03-31

japan and the u. S. at London
Chicago Tribune)

VNu1C&&O l
The disposition Of the japanese delegation ct London
to drive the best possible bargain presents IN interesting
contrast to the American diplomacy Of the new model
but it is especially deserving of attention Is indicating
that our situation In the Pacific viii not be governed by
the sentiments Of vicarious altruism which seem to have
inspired our conduct In international negotiations Slnce
the war. Japanese diplomacy, so far as we have followed
it, has not erred through modesty In demand or expert
mental altruism: II IT. mas AS. mace !. m ~ s,1;.. s1 s1vt rE,e
away, and the net results Of q consistently determined
policy have been such as to justify it to japanese state
craft and national Judgment.
If YOU are willing to face robust realities In interna-
tional relations we will realize from the japanese tactics
tiles sJ il the @ Pacific are to be protected and fulfilled we
must take our own part, as Theodore Roosevelt preached
to a less apologize and befuddied generation; Japan mas
not been stirred to imitation by our example 1T wash
ingtcn in 1921. Having found us willing to give. 1t has
t,en sensibly willing to take as much as We can be
induced to give. Its idea of dealing with US y derived.
we think, from jiujtsu, not ring -around-a-rosy. AT
Washington we gave up our right to establish paseS IN
the eastern Pacif: and to fortify the Philippines. That
not only gave Japan security against serious offensive
operations by us but guaranteed her military possession
of the Philippines and Guam whenever she CONSIDERS "
expedient to take them. We even pledged ourselves not
to establish q base in the Aleuti:nS, our own coast line.
Also we entered into q treaty for peaceful adjustment OF
Japan demanding an inrease Of relative naval force which
can have no justification In any change 10 ner defensive
position. but is obviously directed at increasing nef nsvs.
domination ove- trade routes and COMMUNICATIONS winch
are Of increasing Importance to US.
The commendable ambition to reduce military expen.
ditures and provocative armament should pc tempered
by our observation Of japanese amhittons. The polcy OF
the japanese delegation at London wears q signl1,cant
aspect. Our delegation has been reducing our program
of commerce defense, cruisers and submarines, :7hile the
japanese delegation has been demanding higher ratioe.
II we are willing to be shut out OF the expandine op-
p~ortunities of intercourse with Asia, to be cut off from
supplies essential to our industrial prosperity. to be some
thing like q futility In the Pacific save upon conditions
controlled by Japan, We viii continue to make concessions
to her masterful diplomacy.
With no malice or III feeling against the japanese, We
t nu.y conc Concessions ss nsu to her that are either ~tustifiabie Or
tolerable. We then assured her Of virtual immunity from
invasion and gave other substantial evidence o. our T..
clear that enough Is enough, that we are not indefinitely
gullible, and that we have interests and prospects IN the
the washington conference japanese demands for higher
ratios, for greater relative naval power, cannot be just
Tiled by fear OF naval aggresslon oy tne unnea 1 = IS:
eastern Pacific.
with our superior force in capital ships cancelled
through our lack Of bases, the situation there turns upon
cruiser strength, and in this category . balance cannot
be struck by comparing ships, except g We discount the
cruising r~adius-that Is, the distance from its nearest
base. Thus II Japan II to be granted . large cruiser
ratio Of 70 70 :. 100: this does s.. not ct represent rep sssa',a e d,se sfsnsts
what the actual ratio OF force would be. but 1t would oe
very much more favorable to Japan. probably approach
ing equality. In addition. It Is reported equality has been
agreed upon as to submarines and auxiliary ships. which
means In fact q substantial superiority for japan in east
be divided for defense ia the Atlantic Is veil Is thu
Pacific the balance Japan Is pressing toward win b soen
to be very heavily against w. u.,
country BY the other. We are considering our ability y
merce is already large. II b destined 70 grow WI
much larger. It includes one commodity alone which \
s sfs;si.ney e n o war; a0@ sesn c Raosps snS tie ns' aai. ,n s1s s q.
ago are markets Of great Importance TO Us. and Japan -
securely upon the nank q our communicstions w1tn
is tremendous opportunides, O. - compelled 70, aoespt
Il This IS our very serious interest IA the te9uns q naval