Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-02-09


nary session, the Naval Confer
ence has definitely and success
- fully passed from its second tc
its third phase. The first was
more or less ceremonious: the seconc
might be termed exploratory: the thirc
Is nanifeStly business. We are now al
London where the Paris Peace Confer.
ence was when Wilson, Lloyd George
Orlando and Clemenceau. the big four
retired behind closed doors to settle
the major issues of peace.
In larger sense these main issues
have not yet been openly touched upon
When one speaks of the opening phases
as successful, what is meant is that the
first meetings passed off without ths
disclosure of any fixed and challenging
attitude on the part of any delegation
which from the beginning raised doubts
as to the possibility of ultimate agree
ment. The difficulties of actually
agreeing remain, but between the dele
gates they are physical rather than
psychological. All the statesmen here
present would much prefer success tc
failure in the conference. An6 that IS
q real gain.
Certain possibilities which have
awakened American apprehension are
also quite definitively abolished It is
certain that the United States will sign
no political treaty of guaranty, and it
is almost as certain that there will be
no attempt to indulge in any such
treaties, whether like the four power
pacific treaty of Washington or the
much-discussed Mediterranean-Locafn
pact.
Limits Are Held Modest.
In a general way. we know now the
limits which the conference has set
for its undertakings. These limits are
manifestly modest. Practically what
Stimson and his associates are working
for, IN company with their colleagues,
is some system of limitation of building
programs for the naval powers for the
next five or six years. When all the
states have announced their naval
needs, then the problem will be regu-
lated in such fashion as to establish
rough sort Of equilibrium and abolish
any chance of competition during this
time.
The success of this process can only
come through surrounding five distinct
obstacles which must be borne in mind
at all times because they constitute the
main problems of the conference. The
most unpleasant If not the most con-
siderable Of these obstacles is the
italian demand for parity with France.
1t is a psychological, not a naval de-
power, since Italy will not build I'D to
the French level. But French prestige
is equally involved, and if it is true that
Slgnor Grandi cannot go back to Rome
without having attained parity. Tardieu
would return to Paris only to fall if he
yielded. To find formula which would
satisfy Italian and French views will
then take some doing.
Next in order Is the question of the
French naval program. The French
have adopted the principle that, short
OF treaties of guarantee, the nations
must fix their own limits as to defense,
and they have adopted program which
would involve construction sufficiently
considerable to disturb the British esti-
mate of British needs, which is the
basis OF the Macdonald agree
ment. Although there is no question
OF guarantees, it is not impossible that
this obstacle may be surmounted If
France consents to slow down her an
nual building program little for the
next five years, always without aban-
ooning the right ultimately to fulfill 1t.
japanese Claim Causes Trouble.
The Japanese claim to a 20 per cent
ratio in large cruisers, based upon the
American number, which will be Is or
Il, j. the third cause for trouble, be-
cause it would give Japan on the one
hand numerical parity with the British,
and on the other strategical superiority.
Australia and New zealond, even Cam
ada, might be expected to object. Like
this Italian claim, too, this japanese
demand involves the question of ma
tional prestige and domestic political
consideration. Americans have mani
testify underestimate the obstinacy of
Japan on this point. But if it is as vet
an unsolved riddle, it does not today
seem insoluble. nor are the japanese
ready to break the conference rather
than agree to compromise