Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-09-07
RELIANCE. PUT ON PLANES
IN ~SAN FRANCISCO SIEGE"
Importance of War Game on Coast Based
on Vast Number of Ships Used
and Aircraft's Role.

that spotted the enemy 20 miles on the
coast.
AZ the outset weather conditions were
with the attacking force. as swarm OF
$50 Black planes swooped over the city, ;
their approach being screened by low
flying clouds. Far outnumbering the
Blues, q large part of which was on
patrol duty, the enemy force roared
over the city. doing untold theoretical
damage to the city itself and TO the
various airports scattered about the bay
district.
Lexington Attacked.
Remaining hidden temporarily In the
face of such overwhelming ODDS, the
Blue air forces swung into action at
the first opportunity, their bombers To-
eating the carrier Lexington 10 miles on
Monterey. The motive back of this ma
neuver was to unfit the carrier Tor
further use as O mother ship, II not sink
her. At the same time the move had
to be executed before the carriers
bonbers could get into action. II the
shin were crippled or sunk there would
be nothing for her brood" to DO, wnen
their fuel was exhausted, but 70 drop
out of the picture as far as effectiveness
Is concerned.
Theoretically swept from the channel,
the Black cruiser Omaha, leading
flock of destroyers, steamed into the
bay pouring broadsides into the city.
Her mission was to put out OF service
the searchlights of the anti-aircraft
batteries. Fire from the destroyers was
from one-pounders, the shore batteries
answering with their three-inch pieces.
Counter-Raid Successful.
Erao aN,ga
got under way early. The sun hardly
had cut the horizon before $50 planes
on both sides we're battling over San
Francisco. The insistent drone OF
swarm of Black warbirds was heard
long before they were seen from the
city; but the Blues had spotted them,
and pursuits and bombers Of the de-
tending force set out TO turn them
back.
This action Of the Blacks was really
counter attack, the answer to pre-
sunrise raid by the Blues who had
risen from Crissy Field and staged
capital ships of the Black fleet lying
well outside the Farralone Islands, 20
miles outside the Golden Gate. The
counter raid was successful.
What would probably have been
decisive action, as far as the air forces
were concerned, had this been real
warfare. took place early in the after
noon when the planes Of the Blue forces
were far out at sea attempting to
flush covey of Blackbirds." But
the Black planes were elsewhere, after
bigger game. Their objective was Fort
Winfield Scott, general headquarters
of the defending forces-the key posi-
ton, and one from which communica-
ton was maintained with each unit.
1t had to be dispatched.
Batteries Drive OF Attackers.
With this object in view, drove of
Black pursuit planes appeared suddenly
from a high altitude, swarmed over
Fort Scott and Crissy Field, and went
to work. But they had reckoned with
out the anti-aircraft batteries almost
directly beneath them. Forty minutes
of steady firing on the part Of the
"A-A'S' resulted not only in driving
OF the raiders, but bringing down"
substantial part of the enemy Meet.
The only aggressive action on tn
part of the capital ships was reported
when four members of the Black fleet
Tennessee Oklahoma. Maryland and
Nevada-moved up within range OF the
Blue shore batteries. This movement
occurred at the same time the enemy
air forces launched their early morning
raid over the city. It may have been
feint, under cover of which the Black
air forces got away, or it may have beer
part of their program to silence tn
shore batteries before closing In.
Reliance Placed on Aircraft
This and many other features Of ''the
siege of San Francisco" were brought
up and discussed at critique place
81
tives of the Army and Navy held
round table discussion. Then the aims
and strategy of each side, which had
been jealousy guarded during war
times" were laid bare Probable and
improbable losses of ships, planes and
shore batteries were gone over In de-
tail, the value of certain raiding ope-
rations were weighed. the positions OF
various combat forces, both offensive
and defensive, were considered-all this
solely with an eye to its usefulness In
time of actual warfare.
While the lessons learned In any
mimic warfare are not made public, for
obvious reasons, 1t is agreed that each
maneuver presents individual problems
characterized by the locality, number
and diversity of combat units involved,
and the object to be gained. In many
ways "the siege of San Francisco" was
unique, chiefly because of the vast
number of ships employed and the re-
lance placed on aircraft for both re-
connaisance and combat duty.
AS for the Army, the value Of CO.
operative effort, both offensive and de-
fensive, was shown pretty clearly to
depend upon communication, more
especially when its forces are scattered
over a wide area, and a large and In
creasingly important part of the service
is in the air.