Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-07-15
Exrediting the Treaty.

The Norris reservation to the London
naval treaty, declaring that the Senate
rstifies the treaty with the understand
ing that no secret agreements have been
entered into by the signatories, in mod
flied form is to be adopted by the
friends of the treaty themselves. 1t is
perfectly obvious that if there are no
secret agreements-and President Hoo
yer and the members of the American
delegation attending the London Con-
ference have assured the country and
the Senate there are not-the Norris
reservation is non-effective and mean
ingless. Under such circumstances it
is immaterial whether the reservation
be adopted or rejected. Senator Borah
of Idaho. chairman of the Foreign Re-
latiors Committee and in charge of the
treaty IN the Senate, however, has per-
suaded the President and other sup
porters of the treaty that the adoption
of the Norris reservation, with the pre-
amble stricken out, means quicker &C
ton on the treaty itself, and, further,
that it means a number of votes for
ratification which might otherwise be
cast against the treaty.
Senator Norris, on the theory that the
reservation is just as effective without
the preamble, which recites the fact
that President Hoover has declined to
send all the confidential correspondence
relating to the treaty negotiation to the
Senate, is now prepared not to resist
the striking out of the preamble. The
preamble adds nothing to the effect of
the reservation, it is quite clear. But
it has been construed as an affront to
President Hoover and to the members
of the American delegation, two of
them Senators of the United States,
since they have all assured the Senate
that no secret agreements have been
entered into. The preamble should be
stricken out.
The Nebraska Senator is one of those
who have been counted in favor of the
treaty when the vote is taken on rati-
fication. The submission of his reserva-
ton followed the fight over the Nc
Kellar resolution calling for all the
confidential correspondence in regard
to treaty negotiation and the Presi-
dents refusal to send the papers. In
addition to Senator Norris, it developed
that other Senators who will vote for
the treaty with the reservation were
inclined to vote against it without the
reservation. The decision to accept the
reservation now made by the friends
of the treaty is construed as blow
for the opposition, which hoped to
profit by the fiat rejection of the
reservation. Furthermore, acceptance
of the Norris reservation promises to
speed final action on the treaty.
Doubtless other reservations will be
offered by opponents of the treaty, who
are seeking by every possible means to
delay or to defeat favorable action on
the naval pact. The supporters of the
treaty, however, have been encouraged
by the manner in which absent Sena-
tors are now returning to Washington
for the special session. A half dozen
who hitherto have been absent from the
session came to Washington yesterday
and more are reported to be on the way.
The hopes of the opposition to force an
adjournment of the special session of
the Senate, leaving the treaty high in
the air, through lack of a quorum, are
at low ebb. The nub of the whole
question Of ratification, however, lies in
maintaining not only quorum, but a
substantial vote for the treaty at all
times in Washington until this fight
is over.
There is no reason TO believe that
the adoption of the Norris reservation
will cause the failure of the treaty
through objection to the reservation by
the other signatories to the pact. After
all, the only effect of the reservation
is to state on the part Of the Senate
fact which has already been stated
effectively by the President and the
men who negotiated the treaty.