Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-01-26
BY WILLIAM HARD.

LONDON, January 25.-The Ameri-
can delegates to the Naval Conference
| here are necessarily confronted with
what we Americans call the politics
of international affairs. BY that word
in this conference we mean any nego-
tiations~or proposed treaties having to
do with non-naval matters, such al
guarantees" and security" and arbi-
tration or Cancellation or judicial set
! tlement of international disputes.
1t is apparently the preference oi
our delegations. and also apparently OF
the British delegation. to go at such
matters with the greatest caution, but
1t is also becoming clear that the maxi
mum of naval reduction will possibly
not be attainable unless such matters
are given some consideration. This is
| because of the attitude of France.
To this correspondent upon arrival
here the French attitude seemed to be
political merely, and designed only
to build up system of agreements and
counteragreements and superagree.
French power. This Interpretation now
seems to this observer to be in large
degree unwarranted.
Y + \ r
In the French delegation here there
\ is manifestly a most sincere anxiety
for the physical security" of France
and also manifeStly a most sincere
willingness to reduce the French naval
demands IL that security" by means
of international agreements of a pro-
tective sort, can be achieved.
! A precise summary Of the French
| view in this respect was pronounced
by Premier Tardieu last Thursday eve
ming at the end of his radio address to
the American audience. In the course
Of this address he spoke at FIRST Of
what might be called the absolute
needs of France from the naval stand
point. He dwelt upon the large and
distant French colonial possessions and
the long and perilous French trade
routes. He stated that France with
her colonies is an empire Of 100000
600 inhabitants and requires, as the
British Empire requires, an effective
naval security" He then, however
made the following Illuminating re.
mark: "Our naval requirements are
likely to become relative instead Of abb
Solute in proportion to the guarantees
afforded against aggression by an In
ternational agreement
1 Interpreted, that remark means thai
the naval tonnage demanded by France
will rise or fall as this conference fails
4
ceeds in doing so. The additional "se.
curity' in question could come, as II
were, in strong doses or in weak doses
The strongest dose, and the one which
| would most be desired in principle By
! the French, would be pact binding al
the countries here represented to rush
with their fleets to the defense of any
one of their number which, under the
sort of rules laid down in the covenant
4 NJ nf Iaki k.n
garded as having become the victim OF
an unprovoked attack by an lag.
gressor."
From that degree Of strength the dost
Of security" here concocted might be
diluted down to almost or exactly
nothing. The degree Of naval reduction
offered by France would be proper
toned to the degree of the dilution.
The problem, then, for the other ma
tons in this conference Is to discover
security" can be offered to France
with the result of eliciting from hel
some sort of really valuable naval re-
duction proposal.
The Italians are not averse, generally
speaking, to political negotiations anC
treaties. The japanese have the policy
usually Of going along with the con-
!
ers. The stumbling block to the French
ideas here are really the British and tbs
Americans
Great Britain In such matters seems
to be going through q mental revolution
leading 1t toward the acceptance of the
American theory which opposes inter
national promises to make war in order
to stop war. The sanctions" of the
covenant of the League of Nations
| NH al Nf fko l0ae
agree to bring physical pressure to beal
upon an aggreSSor, are increasingly un.
popular in Great Britain. It is freely
predicted here that this unpopularity
will some day become dominant II
British thought, and that some British
government in the near future viii
move toward eliminating sanctions
from the League Of Nations covenant.
X
Meanwhile it is certain that the bull
of British opinion at this time woule
like to get through with this naval con-
ference without mourning any further
treaty responsibilities except those of 8
strictly naval variety for the curtail-
ment of fighting fleets. Nevertheless, iT
order to drag q naval reduction offel
out of France, the present British gov.
eminent might well be willing to make
considerable concessions toward French
political" desires.
The problem then would become ont
of inquiring just how far the Amer.
leans would be willing to CO. 1t i.
realized that in no circumstances wculC
the Americans sign a treaty commit
ting the United States to the use Of
armed force in any future named con.
tingencies whatsoever. Therefore, thai
sore Of treaty is eliminated from thG
start.
It will also presently be realized here
that in no circumstances will the Amer.
leans sign a treaty binding the United
States beforehand, in the midst of TIT
unforeseeable emergencies Of a futur.
moment, to follow then any giveI
named course of covert action what
soever. It is the general policy of th'
United States in respect to overt actions
in the future to keep itself wholly free
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