Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-07-13
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.


session insures that there would
= be another chance for the pub
lie to consider the merits OF the
London accomplishment with no such
complicating details as tariff and pen
sion legislation. Moreover, it is un-
mistakable that so far the treaty has
excited only languid interest, and rati-
nation rather than with any real en-
thusiaSm.
It is patent, however, that the only
real criticiSm-that coming from the
naval authorities of all ranks-has on
the whole failed to enlist public sup
port. On the whole, the opposition of
the naval men has been the single
real contribution to the forwarding of
the treaty.
Yet there is an obvious paradox in
all this. We are living under an ad-
miniStration which more than any
other places value upon experts and
commissions. From prohibition to
panics, the inevitable resort has been to
the so-called best minds" to the spe-
cialists and the experts. That is pre-
cisely what makes the official attitude
toward the naval experts rather i'm
preSSive. For with exceptions which
are too inconsiderable to make any real
differences, the admirals, the captains
and the COMMUNICATIVE best minds in
the Navy-are in accord in opposing
the treaty.
Agree on Defense Here.
The great difficulty with the case of
the admiralS against the treaty lies in
the fact that it is presented to the
civilian mind, which is not in the least
trained to consider technical or strate-
gic aspects and has an instructive dis
trust OF the uniform and of the soldier
or sailor. Nevertheless, there is one
phase Of the protest of the sailor men
which deserves an attention it has not
yet had.
All the naval experts who have testi-
fed have agreed that the so-called
treaty Navy is adequate to defend the
shores of the American continent, to
maintain control of the Caribbean; in
a word, to conduct a passive defensive
within the vital areas of the United
States. They are at one in testifying
that neither the British fleet in the
Atlantic nor the Japanese in the Pacific
can constitute menace to our home
territory.
To the unframed civilian mind this
seems not only much, but enough. Why
should the United States desire to send
a fleet to invade British areas in Eu-
rope or Japanese in Asia? The diff
Guilty with the situation lies in the fact
that there is complete failure on the
part of the layman to perceive the
fact which is uppermost in the expert
mind, namely, that the fleet of the
United States which is adequate to
defend home shores is not equal to the
task of maintaining the actual policies
Of the Nation.
Affected by Policy.
For it is a truism that the size Of the
f1eet of any nation must be based
upon the character of its policies. The
first step in the reduction or even the
limitation of armed strength must be
the modification of national policies, to
carry out which is the sole purpose of
the Army and Navy. The real case of
the admirals against the treaty is that
1t reduces the means to carry out poll
cies which may produce collision with
out in the smallest degree cutting down
the policies.
Broadly speaking, the United States
has three policies which could carry it
into collision, one with Britain and two
with Japan. These policies may be de-
scribed as neutrality in European con-
Philippines, and the maintenance OF the
open door in the Far East. AS long as
our Government and people adhere to
these policies, they are bound to main
tain the military and naval forces ade-
quate to support them.
AS to the policy of neutrality, the
situation is simple. The great powers
and the small of Europe, bound by the
covenant of the League of Nations,
have adopted a policy of enforced
peace. They have bound themselves to
common action against any country
which resorts to war in defiance of the
rules and regulations of the League.
In theory they would be bound to use
economic, financial, military and naval
resources against the aggressor.
And in the calculations of all the
League states the first and most i'm
portant weapon is naval, and is pri-
marily the British feet. If Germany
should one day seek to recover the
Polish Corridor by force in violation of
existing treaties, II Italy should apply
Mussolini's recent and familiar words
to any one of many questions, the
League powers would be bound to unite
in common action and the first step
would be the employment of the British
feet for purposes of blockade, along
with economic and financial pressure.
Anti-U. S. Blockade Disaster.
But the United States is not mem
Der of the League; it is not considered
either with German or italian aspira-
tionS. It would have no part in the
discussions and consultations which
preceded the application of force. On
the other hand, it would Immediately
be affected by any blockade which In
the nature of things would go beyond
any existing warrant in international
law, as was the case during the World
War.