The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1930-07-07
Hoover Asks for
Pact Ratification


to duplicate the exact tonnage and
gun calibre of the British cruiser
fleet if we desire to exercise it.
The relative improvement in the
position of the United States under
this treaty is even better than this
statement would indicate. In the
more important categories, battle
ships, aircrafe carriers, eightinch
and Six-inch cruiSers-that is, omit
ting the secondary arms of destroy
ers and submarineS-the fleet built
and actually building on January 1
of this year was 100000 tons in the
United States, 1,088,O0O tons in
Great Britain and $4,000 tons in
Japan, or upon the basis Of 100 for
the United States it was 134 for
Great Britain and seventy for japan.
Under the treaty the United
States will on Jan. /, 1887, possess
completed $4,000 tons of these
major units, Great Britain $4,000
tons and Japan $4,000 tons.
TN addition, the United States will
l. \have one 10,000-ton 8-inch cruis-
er two thirds completed. This will
give a ratio in these categories of
100 for the United States to 1929
for Great Britain and COS for
Japan.
The reason for the excess British
tonnage again is as mentioned
above. In other words, the United
States, in these categorieS, in
creases by 100000 tons, Great Bri-
tain decreases by 100000 tons, and
Japan decreases by $4,000 tons.
These readjustments of. units are to
take place during the next six years.
The treaty then comes to an end
except for such arrangements as
may be made then for its continu-
ance.
The major discussion has been
directed almost wholly to the fact
that the United States is to have
eighteen cruisers with eight-inch
guns, with an aggregate tonnage Of
10000 tons, as against Great
Britain's fifteen such ships, with a
tonnage of 146,800 tons and Japan's |
twelve such ships of a tonnage of
108,400 tons, the United States sup
plementing this tonnage with
cruisers armed with six-inch guns
up to a total of 100000 tons.
The larger gross tonnage to
Great Britain as stated being COM
2ensation for the larger gun caliber
of the American cruiser fleet. But,
as said, the United States has the
option to duplicate the British
fleet, if it so desires.
Il
CRITICISM of this arrangement
~ arises from the fact that the
general board of the United States
navy recommended that to reach
parity with Great Britain the
United States should have three
more of the 10,000-ton cruisers
(twenty-one instead of eighteen)
with eight-inch guns, and total
$4,000 or 5000 tons less total
cruiser tonnage than this treaty
provides.
Thus this treaty provides that in
stead of his 10000 tons more of
ships with eight-inch guns recon-
mended by the general board. we
will ha- $4,000 tons of ships armed
With SiX-inch guns, there being no
limitation upon the size Of cruis-
ers up to 10000 tons.
There ore, criticism revolves
around less than per cent of our
whole fleet, and even within this
3 PEI cent comes the lesser question
of whether 10000 tons of ships
armed with eight-inch guns are
better than $4,000 tons armed with
Six-inch guns.
The opinion of our high naval
authorities is divided on the rela-
tive merits of these alternatives.
Many earnestly believe that the
larger tonnage of siX-inch ships is
more advantageous and others vice
versa.
However, those who seek to make
this the outstanding feature of
criticism fail to mention that I'M
der the London treaty the obliga-
ton of the Washington arms treaty
of 1921 is so altered that Great
Britain scraps 133,900 tons of bat
tleships armed with thirteen and
one-half Inch guns, the United
States scraps 10000 tons of battle
ships armed with twelve-inch gunds
and Japan scraps 26,300 tons.
The economic burdens and the
diversion of taxes from welfare pur-
poses which would be imposed upon
ourselves and other nations by
failure of this treaty are worth con-
sideration.
Under its provisions the replace
ment OF battleships required under
the Washington arms treaty of 1921
is postponed for six years. Costs of
replacing and maintaining the three
Scrapped battleships is saved.
Likewise, we make economies in
construction and operation by the
reduction in our submarine and de-
stroyer fleets to 52,7OO and 10000
tons respectively. What the pos
sib1e saving over an otherwise in
evitable era of competitive building
would be, no one can estimate.
81 u
IF we assume that our present
L naval program, except for this
treaty, is to complete the ships
authorized hv congress and those