New Britain herald., 1930-04-23
THE HISTORIC NAVAL
CONFERENCE

With 8 minimum of ceremony, due to the fact that the London Naval Pact produced only limited results" the five powers have signed the epochal document and the dele gates have sailed for home. Thus ends conference which in it's ,tackling of intricate international armament problems accepted three -fifths of l loaf as better than none, and furthermore induced the entire live nations to sign the pact affecting for the most part only three of the i've nations involved.
 As applying to Britain. Japan and the United States, the efficacy of this pact can scarcely be doubted. It is when one contemplates it's dove tailing with the possible actions of France and Italy that a modicum of doubt arises. Should France, in order to maintain its fleets against those of Italy and in conformity with its idea of security" build more ships than England cares to see sprouting across the Channel and in the Mediterranean, the effect will be to increase the total of England and then the United States and Japan. In theory this possibility perhaps looks more important than it will be- come in practice. Everyone knows fully that both France and Italy are not financially able to upset the bal ance of the powers with large and extensive naval fleets; yet, should they incline to do so, it would not be the first time in history when folly governed the policies of na- tions.
 Considering the difficulties that faced the conference from the be- ginning to its finish, the e-power treaty unquestionably was an achievement that may well be point ed to with a feeling that the cause of International understanding among the most powerful nations has been accelerated.
 The conference, opening on Janu- ary Fl amid an aroma of idealism and an avalanche of hope, soon tool; a turn that indicated difficulties ahead. Instead of wing with one another in an effort to reduce naval craft, the powers set forth their naval needs.' The British and Americans chief among the idealists set down their needs at 1900, 900 tons each. The only hopeful sign was that Britain accepted parity with tn 3 Americans practically for the ask ing.
 Of the discussion regarding "cate- goric limitations of "global ton mage" and the remainder of the names given the naval clessmen we need not pause to analyze further. It has been done time and again, often. we have thought with little benefit to the reader, who inevitably received the impression that most of this chatter was smokescreen to conceal an underlying desire to possess as many ships as public opinion would allow, and possibly more.
 Striking. however was the alacrity with which Britain and the United States acceded to the Japanese re- quest for larger ratio over that granted Nippon at the Washing ton conference. There was a time in the history of relations between the United States and Japan when any such request would have aroused d considerable jingo spirit in the United States. The request at Lon- don, however, met with no such response in America ct this time. IL see ms to have been definitely under stood that an increased ratio for Japan is TO menace to anyone iu particular. Yet it is undeniable that the Japanese become relatively