Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-06-29

occasions the old Tiger positively warns
up in admiration Of Foch, mon bon
Foch, who combined genius and humor
and could nudge one in such a funny
way at Just the right moment. sYet
most people think Clemenceau has
treated the great soldier unfairly.
Situation Under Review.
do not share in that opinion.
Clemenceau may have been wrong In
attaching too much importance TO con-
versations which Foch would never have
countersigned. He might have saved
himself q good deal of Irritation by re-
Numbering that the editor of the
Memorial was pre-eminently q jour-
nalist: He might have sacrificed the
JOY OF writing a final volume in a vein
which had been more familiar to him
when he spoke than when he wrote.
But people are not fair when they call
him unjust. His psychology may be-
and no doubt Is, faulty, but his accu-
racy is unimpeachable.
1t is a fact that the beginning OF
Foch's career dates from 1908. when
Clemenceau. prime minister for the FIRST
time, placed the comparatively obscure
colonel in command of the Ecole de
Guerre. Foch showed a proper spirit
The DEGREES against the religious or
ders had recently been issued. Foch's
Jesuit brother had had to exile him
self to Spain. and radical newspapers
might allude to the fact Foch said So
D the Jesuit brother" Clemen-
ceau replied. II want you"
II Is also a fact that 1t was to Gle
menceau, then chairman of the army
commission in the Senate, that Fcch
sent one Of his aides in 1915 with his
own bust as present and some mill
tary disclosures tending to prove that
Foch. as he well might, knew his pos
sloilitles as generalissimo. It was
also to the same Clemencesu that he
came In 1916 when, after the failure
of the offensive on the Somme, he was
sent to Senlis to help in the prepara-
ton OF the Saloniki campaign-that Is
to say, when he was purely and simply
canned" 1t was also the old Jacobin
who got him the unity of command at
the famous Doullens conference, and
1t was the same Clemenceau who In
May, 1918. saved him from the anger
of the Chamber after the still unex-
planned capture Of the Chemin des
Danes.
Clemenceau's Estimate Of Foch.
There can be no doubt that it was
Clemenceau. and none other, who d.
vined and, Il rarious emergencies, went
| OAl bCllCNllIk III EUCH \ RSIlluS. FOCH
being conscious of his unique gift, may
have thought that Clemenceau was Just
fairly wise man among fools. but
Clemenceau wanted more than a mini
mum Of gratitude. Grandeur ct
Miseres" quotes the letter written by
the generalissimo when Clemenceau
appointed him first marshal Of France.
1t is not very warm letter.
Not pleasant reading either, are the
accounts given by Clemenceau-in a
| spirit of retaliation, und0ubtedly-of
how Foch let him down in the matter
Of the British attack on Constantinople
| October, 1919 and sided with Lloyd
George; how Foch had to apologize
after the Nudant telegram incident:
how he was set right by King Albert
OF Belgium on an important incident
of the User battle; how, finally, he be"
trayed Clemenceau in two interviews
given, one to the Daily Mail and the
other to the New York Tribune. Pain
full, painful. But as all this is now in
| print, 1t also has to be taken into ac-
count-which many people prefer not
doing.
Clemenceau was too much Of a pow
erful egotist to be a subtle psycholo-
| gist. He admires Foch. but does not
understand him: he had only to be a
quarter of an hour with the generals
Simo to be conscious Of the rare, beau
tifully childlike charm which emanated
along with genius from every word he
said Foch. like most soldiers, had
more ruse than prudence, and within
certain limits would say anything in
the honest belief that 1t did not mat
ter. Bring him the accurate report on
paper Of what he had just said and
he would refuse to sign 1t. only admit
| ting that 1t came somewhat near his
/ meaning. Talk and action with him
were separated by q gulf. 1t is absurd
to saddle on such a man the RESPONSE
bility of what newspaper men represent
him as having said.
Noted Generals Soldier Traits.
Another trait of the soldier is visible
| in Foch. However civilians may resent
| it. soldiers regard civilians as instances.
| The civilian does not know the soldiers
craft, he does not even know his Ian
guage. He makes mistakes the mo-
ment he interfereS. He may no doubt
be useful in democracies given up to
politicians, and as such he cannot be
ignored, must be flattered by presents
of buSts, but he remains a danger all
the time and has to be handled as an
irresponsible person in possession of an
arm or torch.
Analyze Fochs attitude with regard
to the Chemin des Danes annoyance
and contrast 1t with the civilians view
on the same subject. To Foch the Incl
dent was mere nothing in the superb
development Of the campaign. To Glenn
enceau 1t remained a black note of in
terrogation. Or remember the attitude
of naval experts sitting in Judgment on
a brother officer after a disaster at sea.
The facts are there, but the great fact
is the environing presence of an ocean
OF landlubber ignorance. Foch, like all
soldiers economical with civilians Had
Clemenceau realized it. there would be
over "Grandeurs ct Miseres" beautiful
light which We miss.
It would be useless to say more than
word about what Clemenceau had in
mind when he used "Miseres tune Vic
TORE" rs the second part of his title
Foch's view OF the treaty was: I'VE
should have occupied the Rhine, as the
Dutch once occupied Belgium: instead
OF soldiers we have the Geneva Assem-
bly, and the Locarno scrap Of paper"
Outcome Of Farley Analysed.
Clemenceau's view OF the same is: Il
/ wanted peace and not a mere treaty;
objected TO an occupation which, in
the long run, would have resulted IN
furious revenge. Instead of that sue-
gested protective pact which Mr. VII
son and Mr. Lloyd George promised me.
What happened? Americans would not
ratify and the British skunk out of tho
agreement. I have been vilely taken in.
and what people have made OF nv
treaty does not bear the least resem-
blance to what wanted 1t to BE-. OF
course, Geneva is only talk and Locarno
Is only paper, and there surely viii be
another war, but let those who have
nutchered my work bear the respon-
sibility."
Foch would no doubt reply: at was
your job to foresee that the American
senate would not ratify and act in con-