Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-03-05
j. S. COMPROMISE
HELD FARLEY HOPE
Agreement With Japan Be-
lieved Acceptable, Re-
ported in London.
Continued From First Page.)

tSOHClIlueu FTOm F1TSI HdBe.D
If, however, we change our mind and
build all 1s, then Japan would have the
right to build two more itself, giving it
a total of IA to our l8, but laying down
its number Is only a year later than
we laid down our number 16 cruiser.
Submarine Ratio.
In destroyerS and 6-inch-gun cruisers
Japan would accept fiat so per cent
ratio, or $4,000 tons in small cruisers
to our lat 900 tons, and 10000 tons OF
destroyers to our $50 900 tons.
In submarines. Japan would keep for
the present its $4,000 tons, but by post
poning requirements would come down
by 1895 to $4,000 tons to our $4,000
tons.
The proposal can be criticized on the
ground that it will give Japan an 80 per
cent ratio in big cruisers and an SO per
cent ratio in submarines by 1895, The
answer is that in view of the fact that
we are far behind in 8-inch-gun cru1s-
ers and that many of our submarines
are reaching their age limit, Japan al
ready has much larger ratios in both
classes. BY agreeing thus to build no
more large cruisers and replace no sub
marines prior TO 1896, Japan would be
and a real reduction in submarines.
True, the United States could, If 1t
desired. far outbuild Japan, but we have
so neglected our building program ever
since the washington conference and
are so far behind the others, especially
in big cruisers, that unless we desire to
expend really extravagant sums, the
terms of our proposal to the japanese
represent about all we actually care TO
do within the next five years. -,
Thus we have now only two big
cruisers actually launched. six building
and two more laid down on which work
! has been stopped temporarily II in
| the next five years we finish these six,
| resume work on these two and build
| five more at a rate of about one a year,
making a total of IS. this, in addition
| to building lot Of new 6-inch-gun
cruisers and replacing lot Of Subma-
rines and destroyers, is about all we
wish practically to undertake.
Even so, the cost to us would run
into hundreds Of millions OF dollars.
True, we would thus be retarded in our
| aim of achieving actual parity with
Great Britain, but we attain this parity
| theoretically-that is, our right to parity
will be fully recognized and the only
reason we do not build up to Great
Britain Immediately is that as long as
no real crisis threatens the cost Of
parity is likely to appear excessive to
| Congress.
One of the chief obstacles to a sue
cesSful' conference heretofore has been
| the feeling Of the other powers that,
while we are asking them to reduce. we
ourselves, in the name Of parity with
Great Britain, are proposing an in
crease on a considerable scale and to
the last fraction Of ton.
Our new proposal to postpone parity
and agree tentatively to build only Is
| Of the 1S cruisers to which we claim
a right is a gesture which may exercise
a healthy influence on the other powers
especially II we were similarly to sug-
gest that we might delay construction
of the new capital ship to which we also
claim a right.
Attitude May Change.
Following this moral lead it seems
possible that France may be inclined
while maintaining its entire building
part of actual new construction until
after 1896. Italy in the same way
while continuing its claim to full parity
with France, may be inclined to post
pone its actual fulf1llment just as we
would be postponing actual fulfillment
OF our claim to parity with Great
Britain.
In other words, as a result of thi,
significant American move, the whole
conference may be shifted from tn,
CreacnerouS ground of considerations o.
prestlge onto the sound facts OF prac.
Ilcal building programs over shor
Term OF years, leaving matters of pres
.lge 10 be settled, II necessary, at som,
| later conference