Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-07-14
TREATY WILL MAKE
TRADE SAFER, SAYS
MINORITY LEADER
(continued From First PAGE,


would prove merely temporary. and
would stimulate animosity and fear.
"On the other hand, program for
limitation and reduction worked out in
conference are usually promotive of ma
tional security and good will. They
allay fear and tend to the suppression
of international rivalry, out Of which
frequently spring misunderstanding and
hatred.
1.-The treaty accomplishes substantial
reduction in capital ships by accelerat-
ing the scrapping by Great Britain of
five, by the United States of three, and
by Japan Of one Of these very costly
vessels.
by means of this scrapping process
the tonnages in capital ships will be
reduced:
For the United States, $4,000 tons.
For Great Britain, 1873 300 tons.
For Japan, 26,330 tons.
at, is apparent that. Great Britain
scraps approximately twice as much as
this country scraps, and her ships to be
Scrapped are newer and better than
those to be strapped by the United
States.
VIII Approximate Equality.
1.-THE result win be that the tonnases
of the two countries In the capital ship
category will be approximately equal
when this scrapping program has been
carried out. ...
Japanese submarines will be greatly
reduced, and the use of these outlaws
of the seas will be restricted by the
treaty so that their effectiveness when
attacking will be comparable to that
Of surface craft.
Admittedly, in case of war, there will
arise the temptation for some belligerent
to disregard its obligation respecting
the restriction on submarines. Never
theleSS every nation will hesitate to
invite the contempt and resentment
of other civilized powers by resorting
to ruthless submarine warfare in VIOLA
ton of its obligation to refrain from
such inhuman policy.
1T is indisputable that the treaty
gives the Navy of the United States 9
better relative: position with respect tc
the navies of Great Britain and Japan
conference. This Improvement in status
applies to every class Of combat ships
save, perhaps, destroyerS.
When the London Conference as
sembled Japan had two times and Great
Britain four times our tonnage in COM
pleted cruisers.
1.-The navy Of Japan was superior to
that of the United States In SUBJ
marines under age: rec. ..- ,.',
- u. S. DestrOyers Old. - =
"Our Navy possessed an enormous
tonnage IN destroyers, but they were all
nj ND hnd korl
during the war.
Assuming that the promotion Of in
ternational good will is universally re-
garded as desirable, the treaty should
command friendly consideration, be-
cause it tends to allay the fears and
rivalries, which prior to its negotiation
threatened to involve the three countries
IN intense competition respecting COM
merce and sea power.
| THE refusal of advice and consent by
the Senate to ratification would threaten
| serious consequences.
There are in Great Britain renowned
statesmen, including the. Honorable
| Winston Churchill who declares thai
the treaty is not one of parity between
the government which he serves anc
our own, but that it definitely impose,
naval inferiority on Great Britain.
Representatives of the Japanese ad.
LII any dic carrying OH a OeJermlneC
resistance to the treaty, asserting tina
| 1T depriveS Japan of the power Of SELF
defense in'home or nearby waters.
Fruits Of Failure Pictured.
IF the Senate refuses its advice ant
consent the treaty will fail and an era
| Of insecurity. dread and fear will follow
! making probable the initiation of nava
! programs in excess of anything eve,
| conceived since the beginning of history
There may be some who would vel
| come such an era, but their attitude
cannot be accepted as reflective of pub
| lie sentiment in the United States.
| 1T has been claimed that the treaty
plan for the United States Navy in.
| wolves an abandonment of the power Il
| defend our commerce in case of inter
ference by either Great Britain OF
! Japan.
: In contemplation of the relative i'm.
| p ovement in the strength Of our Navy
1t is difficult to give credence to such g
| contention.
Does any one anticipate that withir
the life Of the treaty test of strength
! will arise?
do not the figures make clear beyond
| dispute that from position Of infert'
|