Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-07-14
PACT FOES HOPE
TO AVOID ACTION
Prediction of Ratification by
July FL Is Questioned and
Held Unlikely.
BY MARK SULLIVAN.

say the naval treaty will be ratified
and the session will be over by a week
from now, roughly about July 81. Some
Senators who make tentative arrange
ments based upon this expectation are
in positions of one degree or another
of leadership.
Admitting their authoritativeness, ar
observer is disposed to question SO early
date. 1t is always safe to count on
the time-consuming capacity of the
Senate. Some of those who speak Of
July 81 as the closing date are the
same who last year said the tariff bill
would be passed at various dates, all Of
which erred on the side Of optimism BY
from nine months to six months.
Three Speeches to Date.
To say the treaty viii be passed anc
the session over in a week is future
prediction. If one looks at past fact
one finds the Senate has been in session
week and has heard just three
speeches dealing with the naval treaty
All the rest of the week has beer
consumed by the collateral but wholly
distinct controversy over prerogative as
between Senate and President. That
question of prerogative is not settled
yet. In another form it may readily
consume the coming week.
The question Immediately before the
Senate is q resolution by Senator Nor
ris of Nebraska which proposes to at
tach to this international treaty with
Japan and Great Britain a curious
record of a domestic American quarrel
The resolution begins with a where
as" reciting that the President of the
United States declined to comply with
a request of the Senate for certain
diplomatic correspondence. The reSolu-
ton then concludes with a declaration
that the Senate ratifieS said treaty
with the distinct understanding that
no correspondence outside the treaty
itself shall lin any way modify, add to
or take away from the treaty."
Would Be Reservation.
This resolution it is proposed to add
to the treaty as q reservation. The
reservation would give rise to some
difficulty. though not much. Like all
reservations to all treaties, it would
have to be passed upon by the govern
ments Of the other countries. Prob
ably the Japanese and British Parlia-
mentS would get some amusement out
of 1t, though there is no reason why
they should not accept it. The ma
ter1al part OF the resolution is merely
like resolving that two and two make
four, or that this treaty consists OF
this treaty"
This curious resolution and reserva-
ton may consume considerable time
AS an incident of the quarrel over pre-
rogative between the Senate and the
President, some friends of the admin
1Stration in the Senate object to the
first part of the resolution, though not
to the second. Undoubtedly amend
mentS will be proposed, and the amend
mentS will give rise to debate. Ever
If and after this reservation is out OF
the way, there will be yet other reser-
vationS. Some will be proposed in gooc
faith and may be pertinent. Others
without doubt, will be proposed fol-
Understanding purposes.
Foes Play for Time.
The plainness of the purpose on the
part of the treaty's opponents to con.
sumo time is the latest material devel.
| opment in the fight. The opponent.
have begun to show alert and contin.
uous watchfulneSS as to whether Q
quorum is present. This means inten.
| ton by the opponents Of the treaty Il
take advantage Of the absence of q
quorum, If that occurs. A quorum L
40. The number of Senators present
from time to time in the Senate is, or
the average, only about so, or one over
quorum. There is, however, for the
present, a margin of some six or eight
Senators In Washington. There is al.
ways the possibility of enough leaving
Washington to bring about lack of 9
quorum. If that happens the treaty
opponents will take advantage of II
and end the session
In another way, the passage Of time
and the consuming of time, favors the
opponents. The day may come when
hot and weary Senate will be willing
to give in to the opponents and vote
to adjourn.
Seek to Avoid Action.
Adjournment without action is the
objective of the opponents. About this
intention there is no secret. No one
of the opponents would say he has any
hope of defeating the treaty on roll
call directly on that question at this
session. Every opponent would freely
say that their objective is to throw
the treaty over until December.
One thing the opponents could dc
any time they choose The IL of them
could absent themselves and thereby
| create lack Of quorum. Once or twice
some of them have limited this threat
They are not likely, however, to do this
unless they can get more public opinion
on their side than now exists.
No doubt the public wonders why
some forty-odd friends of the treaty
cannot outvote IL opponents and &c
ahead and ratify the treaty. One
reason is the Senate's methods Of pro-
cedure, about which Ambassador Dawes
when Vice President, used to discourse
adversely. Another reason is division
among the treaty's friends on questions
other than the treaty. On controver-
sizes about prerogative between Senate
| and President many friends Of the
treaty stand with the Senate.
1oanN