Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-04-20
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.
FTER four months of confusion

postwar array of international
conferences, the world is at last
presented with something like the COM
pleted product of the Naval Conference;
The best way of estimating the real
achievement of the London Conference
is to weight the results against the ex-
pectations, which, particularly on this
side of the Atlantic, had their origin In
official quarters.
what were the American people in
vited by their Government to expect
from London. Briefly this: A I'VE
power treaty which should bind the
great naval powers, Britain, france,
Japan, Italy and the United States, TO
q program covering the next few years,
q program of naval construction which
should be distinguished by these things:
Reduction, limitation and parity as be-
tween the United States and Great
Britain along with the preservation OF
the Washington ratios as between Brit
ain, the United States and Japan.
Told of Peril to Peace.
All people, beginning with the Ameri-
can, were told that the size OF existing
armament and the dimensions Of pend
| ing naval construction programs consti-
tuted q peril to world peace, produced
q condition Of competitions as between
various powers and amounted to an in
tolerable burden for the peoples of all
| the countries concerned. These peo-
pies, therefore. were led to believe that
navies would be cut down, further AK
| pansion limited and the burdens OF
taxation greatly lightened.
Now, what emerged from London? A
| three-power pact, with certain five
power trimmings, which, while in all
cases calling for little or no actual ex-
pansion in tonnage, insures enormous
| increases in those branches Of naval
| craft regarded as important for con-
| temporary combat-that is, enormous
increases over the existing strength.
| AS to limitation, since only three Of
| the five powers present at the confer
ence joined in the full treaty, the other
| two are free to build as they choose,
| while the signatory powers are bound,
| as q result Of the future decisions of
| the free powers, to increase still further
their naval tonnage and combat
| strength.
| Question Of Parity.
| Finally, as to parity and ratio as
between the United States on the one
hand and Japan and Britain on the
| other, the judgment Of our naval au-
| thorities Is that we have not gained
| parity with Britain, while the language
of the treaty shows we have consented
to a relatively sweeping modification of
the Washington ratio to the advantage
of Japan.
| Taking these things UP In detail,
what of the question of reduction? AT
the beginning of the current year the
| British naval authorities estimated the
tonnage of the American feet as 1885,
600 tons. The American naval estimate
was ! ,125 900, and the difference is ex-
planned by the inclusion in the latter
figures of three 10,000-ton cruisers the
building Of which was suspended by
President Hoover pending conference
| decisions.
| In the post-conference feet the
| United States will have 1,125 900 tons,
or almost exactly the same total. But
during the next years IL viii, II IL car
rtes out the provisions Of the treaty,
spend hundreds Of millions of dollars
IN q construction and replacement pro-
| gram which viii include the building
Of $4,000 tons Of new cruisers and
$1,000 tons of fresh deStroyers. This
enormous increase win be balanced by
a small submarine reduction, a vast re-
striction In destroyer tonnage, which IS
big because Of World War circum-
stances, and the scrapping without re-
placement Of three obsolescent capital
ships.
Results Are Analysed.
Two things are to be said at once
Of this program. It Is not result Of
the London Conference, but of the
American demand for parity with Great
Britain. Just as clearly, 1t Is not the
realization Of the prospectus of reduc-
ton which was boldly sketched at the
moment when the conference assem-
bled.
In indorsing the results of the Lon
don Conference the President recently
afarmed that vast financial savings and
tonnage reductions had been achieved
II one compared the results of London
with the proposals made at the abor-
tive conference of Geneva in 1927. But
the savings were really due to the fact
that President Coolidge at that time
babe his delegates reject the Geneva
proposals and later signed the bills
passed by Congress insuring the ex-
pansion Of the American fleet, notably
the 15-cruiSer bill.
The British at Geneva had believed
the United States would not pay the
price, and had put the tonnage incred-
IDLY high. But when Congress and the
President accepted the challenge and
undertook the 15-cruiSer bill there was
q swift change in British temper This
change was revealed at the Rapidan
when Macdonald, long in advance of
the London Conference, proposed the
figures which were later adopted there
AS q result of the naval treaty, Brit
ain will almost completely, Japan
measurably, stand still, while the United
States undertakes very far-reaching
program OF new construction and re-
placement that will, without changing
the gross tonnage of the American feet,
make 1t three or four times more effec-
tive as lighting machine than before.
| But no other consequence was to be
looked for In any conference where
parity was the main desideratum. All
the confusion in the American mind has
arisen from the mistaken assertions in
oficial quarters that parity and reduc-
ton were both to be had at London.
In the matter Of nmitation-the Sec
ond objective-it Is the fact that Brit
ain, the United States and Japan have
set limits to their tonnage for the next
six years. But this limitation is only
conditional. Great Britain has in the
notorious "oScalator" or Slippery"
clause reserved the right to continue
| expansion If France continues to carry
out her naval law Of 1924. And Amer
lea and Japan are, Of course, free to
follow suit.
Manifestly then, Just as there Is to be
no reduction of the various fleets below
the existing strength, there Is to be no
assurance Of limitation for the treaty
period. Within less than two years, If
Franco holds to her present mind,
Britain will have to ask the United
States to recognize the necessity to 20
beyond the Rapidan figures, and to
maintain parity America also will have
to embark on further construction.
Gains Seen for Japan.
There remains the question of parity
ana ratio. As to Japan, the case Is
clear. At Washington the Japanese, in
return for our consent to abandon the
right to fortify further our territories
| in the philinpineS the AIe,itiau Tslands