Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-01-03

| refusal to make any preparation what
| SoeVer for action" Were he alive now,
| Mahan, one may guess. would be nap
pier than he was at the close OF his
illuStrious life.
Harbors and rivers-the more numer-
Gus, the larger and the deeper the bet
ter-were other geographical factors OF
naval power as Mahan saw it. In such
harbors shipping found home; down
such rivers the agricultural and indus
trial products of nation moved to the
sea. Our harborS on the Atlantic. both
in number and in depth, are satisfac-
tory, but on the Pacific they are less SO.
In each case, however, mountain
ranges cut of the harbors from river
communication with the heart of the
continent. There is an outlet by way
OF the st. Lawrence, but it is frozen in
Winter; and the great vision OF water
ways and roads eventually to connect
the Mississippi Valley with the Gulf Of
Mexico awaits realization.
HinterIand Important.
Sea power as Mahan described 1t,
rested not only on harborS and rivers,
but on what lay back of them. their
comprehensive hinterland, If "hinter-
land" may be widened to include, IN
addition to territory, the people and
the institutions OF the country conSid-
cred.
The more extensive and richly en-
dowed the land; the more numerous,
gifted, energetic and daring the people;
the purer, ADLER and more representa-
tive the government, the larger would
be the nations showing on the sea
and the larger its prestige and place In
the world.
Trading instincts, as Mahan taught,
are at the bottom Of sea power. II
nation trades, 1t must have something
to trade with. II 1t has something to
trade with, 1t must have fellow traders
Fellow traders in sufficient number
and producing goods of sufficient diver
Sity can be found only overSeas-why
the Cretans, the Greeks, the Morse, the
Venetians, the Duluth, the English, the
early Americans became active far
reaching men of the sea.
Northern Nations Led.
With the Iberians 1t was different.
They sought silver and gold, which re-
CURED few ships. For their silver and
gold, the Dutch and the English sup
piled them with wares tranSportable
only in many vessels, and SO the north
ernerS Supplanted the Southerners in
command Of the sea.
France and Italy. as every one has
AC@hCu tAAOuBn IcCcLJ Naval discus
SionS have comparatively small nayies.
The reason for this is manifest in
Mahan's writings. The French and the
Italians did not comprehend Or were
pSychologically unable to seize the DO
liticO-economic advantages OF great and
permanent overseas activities and con-
Sequently developed only land strength,
always indeciSive among the supreme
forces OF politics and economies in the
world.
rs great sea power possible to the
AmerlcanS?" Mahan asked himself,
ana ms answer was affirmative. We
have the harbors and the rivers, the
land, the climate, the natural resources.
the people and the government neceS-
Sary for indefinite expansion at sea.
production, trade, shipping, protection
in the form of fighting craft-all on
an adequate scale, in Mahans view,
were easily latent in the physical, moral
and mental estate of the American
people.
Sea power will not long delay its
appearance" said Mahan in his antici-
patton with reference to America.
Alter much uncertainty and many
lapses since that prophecy was uttered,
sea power Is fact under the American
nag. 1t was q fact only q little more
than q generation before Mahan wrote
when England went vigorously to sea
but the continent yimperiously, and
American enterprise flowed toward the
Pacifc. American sea power again
looked up during the Civil War. and
again, afterward, 1t declined, only to
receive an immense and seemingly last
ing impetus in the World War. Today
we go to London to work out naval
parity with Great Britain, long the mis-
tresS Of the seas.
Copyright. 1902
BLOCKADE, the chief weapon of naval
power, Is discussed in the third special
article, appearing tomorrow