Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-09-14

1t is possible to travel light and move fast,
in small bands, when every farm every ranch
is a potential source of shelter and military aid
as they were to SANDING. When the reverse is
true, as it was to the Marines, large commits
saries and large camps have to be transported,
independent and cumbersome systems of liaison
and hospital treatment have TO be maintained.
The u. S. Marines, rightfully distrustful of
the civil population, made matters worse
through their strict methods. Again and again
they harassed the peasants, hoping TO get
bandit" or two.
At the present writing, with trouble begin
ming family to stir again in Nicaragua reports
are being published that President Moncada
has ordered all the inhabitants of the affected
districts TO concentrate at certain points with
the announcement that everybody found OUT
side Of those points after a given date would
be regarded with suspicion. The order, to me-
demonstrates the insecurity that Moncada feels
in his position.
The same move was made by the Marines
several occasions during the last SANDING
trouble. In general it may be regarded as a
military necessity, used by Kitchener in South
Africa, by the French in the Abd-el-Krim cam
paign and by the Spanish in Cuba in the days
before 49,
PUT it has also highly undesirable effect
from a military point of view
hunted man is apt to feel the uncertainty
of his position and even become an active enc
my. In Nicaragua it alienated friends, made
enemies out of neutrals and increased enor-
mously Sandinos popularity through the SIM
pie example of contrast with his methods
I talk here not as a crusader or a propa-
gandist against the United States. Few men
know better than what brutaities are Incl
dent to any war-and those of the Americans
were more than equaled in time of battle, by
the reprisals of the Sandnstas
When 1 arrived in Matagalpa, Nicaragua, in
1927, after a hazardous three months trip
across the swampy jungles of the Mosquito
Coast and Central Nicaragua, warned the Ma
rines TO try to reach agreement with San
dino rather than embark on a that had
no end in sight and that would make the
United States more hated than ever in all of
Latin America. They treated me with the ut
most courtesy and friendliness, but even if they
had wanted to heed my advice they had their
orders and no choice in the matter.
Sandino's methods of waging warfare are
Interesting to study In his country he can
skirmish indefinitely against almost any num-
Der of men,
But his methods, while eminenty suited to
his purpose, have their darker side. They allow
for no quarter to prisoners or wounded Often
he is hard enough put to feed his own men,
and prison camp in his rear, or a hospital for
Americans when his wounded often die
for lack of proper medical care would be a
SANDING has also to reckon with the abso-
lutely essential good will of the civil popula-
ton. Every soldier knows that the non-com-
batants, the people behind the lines are always
far more fierce and intolerant in their hatred
of the enemy than the fighters themselves. The
civil population is perfectly willing to support
SANDING and his men--is willing to support
many times their number-especially when gold
"Indios" pay the way.
CANDINO is not ahiicted with blood-Iust But
he cannot jeopardize his standing with
those on whose help he must depend. and, even
If he could he could not spare the men to
guard prisoners and enemy wounded against
fanatical -combatants
The rebels hemmed-in position, his difficult
ties in getting ammunition, etc. produced that
terrible hand-to-hand fighting with machetes
that Central America is famous for. Often, no
doubt, the Marines found their rifles and their
machine guns useless in jungle skirmishes.
again and again the machetes did their terrible