Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-03-09
TARIFF FIGHT HINGES
ON FLEXIBLE PROVISION
Debenture Plan Is Second of Three Main
Points Involved in Battle Between
House and Senate.

WOIhc uOW h1l0 I1dS NUIAGu GllCS x84A
(In describing the mechanism here, foA
claritys sake only the essential outlines
are given; there are many complexities
in it, In the writing Of the pending
tariff revision now soon to be concluded,
the House in its version of the bill res
tanned the flexible provision in subStanS
TALLY the form described above, though
with some changes not material to the
Issue involved in the coming contros
versy.
The Senate, however, in writing ita
version Of the BILL few into q minor
passion of indignation about the Presi-
dent having the power to make and
proclaim these individual tariff changes.
Omitting here much that the Senate
said about the way the flexible provision
had been operated under President
Senate was that it is unconstitutional
and otherwise undesirable for any Presi-
dent to have this much power.
Power was the thing that excited the
coalition in the Senate. Members Of the
coalition made many fervent orationS
about the mischiefs, the unfair dis
ordinations, even the corruptions that
are possible when a President has the
power to make q tariff change greatly
to the benefit of one industry or greatly
to the detriment Of another.
Consequently the coalition majority
in the Senate, In its version Of the tariff
bill, says that this power must be taken
away from the President and must be
given to Congress. The Senate'S version
of the flexible provision Is much the
same as the existing one described
above-except that in the Senate YER
sion the Tariff Commission must send
its recommendation, not to the Presi-
dent, but to Congress. Thereafter, Con.
greSS will exercise the discrimination
and the power that the President now
exercises; thereafter, Congress will say
whether the change in a given tariff
recommended by the Tariff Commission
shall or shall not go into effect.
That, In the main, is the distinction
between the Senate version and the
House version of the flexible provision.
The difference between the two goes to
the very heart Of q controversy, jeal.
ousy of power that Is as old as our Gov.
eminent itself. The difference Is whether
given prerogative shall be in the pos.
session Of the President or Of Congress.
This class Of questions is always com.
ing up. Always changes are going on
In that no-man'S land OF power which
lies between Congress and the President.
Always within this no-man'S land the
pendulum Of power Is oScillattng; it Is
never still. Sometimes the oscillation Il
faint and unnottced BY the public; at
other times, as at present, the oScilla-
ton Is violent and becomes the focus OF
public attention.
Prevailing Trend I'm Congress.
Whenever the majority in Congress
belongs to the same party rs the PreSi.
dent they are likely to let little accres
lions Of power pass over to the presi.
dency. Since this condition exists most
81 iaA t4Van tia i1tVaeP tRAa3A AY1FiR0
all our history has been for power TO
pass slightly away from Congress
slightly In the direction Of the Presi-
But occasionally It happens, as ut
present, that Congress or one chamber
In Congress Gin the present case the
Senate) has 9 majority antagonistic to
exists, as at present, the Senate tries
hard to take some power away from the
President. For doing so in such cases
the Senate has q double mottve-the
motive of natural pride In the prestige
Of the Senate and the motive which
lies in the fact that it Is always good
politics-or seems to be-for the opposi.
ton when it controls the Senate to at
tack the President.
vision, to make changes in the tariff,
is formidable power for any President
to possess. with the horror expressed
by coalition orators In the Senate
against leaving such power N the preSis
dency, one may, as a matter OF pr1ns
ciple, sympathize.
Hoover Equipped for Job.
Doubtless few would deny that Presi-
dent Hoover is better equipped probably
than any other man In the United
States to decide whether given tariff
on a given commodity ought to be
raised or lowered. Doubtless, most per.
sons, especially business men, would say
the country is fortunate in having as
President man with so much capacity
to know what Is best about the tariff.
Doubtless, there Is hardly a person
who would suspect that President Hoo
yer would exercise that power with an
eye to any motive other than the good
of American business. Even the coa11s
| ton orators In the Senate-Strongly I'm.
I friendly to President Hoover and also
strongly suspicious by temperament
did not charge that President Hoover
would use this power other than with
justice as he sees 1t and for the COM
mon good.
But obviously it is possible to use
such q power for political purposes.
And President Hoover is as subject to
automobile accidents or germs as any Of
the rest OF US. He Is as likely to be not
reelected In 1882 and as certain to be
not reelected in 1886, as Is the COM
mon fate of any President. Quite con.
cetvably some successor Of Mr.. Hoover,
near or distant, might make political
capital out of this power, or party cap
ital, or even personal capital-might
use 1t to, reward friends or to punish
enemies. A strongly partisan Repub-
lican President might use the power to
raise the tariff and never to lower it.
A strongly partisan Democratic Presi-
tariff and never raise 1t. * Any Presi-
dent, Republican or Democrat, might
conceivably use the power to reward
lContinIled an Fifth PAGE