Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-05-04
BY FRANK II. SIMONDs.

become the central point In all
~ discussion Of the naval treaty
Of London and will play con-
siderable part in the debates in the
United States Senate. special value
attaches to the origin of this provision.
In April of last year, it will be re-
called, Ambassador Gibson, speaking at
an arms conference meeting at Geneva,
boldly asserted that the policy Of the
United States was not mere limitation,
but out-and-out reduction. This speech
was taken, quite correctly, as indicating
q desire on the part Of the newly in
augurated President to reopen the
Anglo-American naval issue which had
Pi sa9. VIC O'"0A 60 ~ -
The change OF administration in
Washington was followed by an even
more spectacular change In London
when q Labor government headed by
Macdonald replaced the Tory cabinet
of Baldwin. But whatever the outcome
Of the general election in Britain had
been there would have been a response
to the Gibson gesture. and had Baldwin
and not Macdonald triumphed the Con-
servative prime minister would likewise
have come to America.
Macdonald's Course.
Once Macdonald was in power jhe
began parallel conversations. On the
One hand he discussed with Ambas-
sador Dawes American views, on the
other he considered with the British
admiralty the necessities OF British
security. Out OF these latter discussions
emerged the figures which were later
to 60 under the name Of Rapidan agree
ment Asked for a statement Of the
minimum requirement for national
defense the British admiralty fixed
upon 80 ships and $4,000 tons in
cruisers, the single branch In which
there had been Anglo-American dis
agreement.
But what was never set forth to the
American public was the double fact
that the admiralty figures were at
once fixed and conditional. They were
fixed in the sense that Macdonald was
informed in advance Of his Washington
excursion that the admiralty would
refuse to sanction any lowering Of this
estimate; he was also notified that this
estimate could only be maintained II
It proved consistent with the preserva-
2Son of the two-power standard Of
Strength exclusive Of the United States.
Conditions Of Figures.
What Macdonald then had to tell
the President at the Rapidan was that
30 ships and $4,000 tons were the
lowest level Britain could accept in
cruisers and that this level was to be
fixed only If France and Italy, to say
nothing Of Japan, agreed to figures and
vantage In Europe and also aroused no
apprehension among the don1inions.
It Is clear now that the significance
OF neither OF these Macdonald state
ments was appreciated fully in WASH
1ngton. In official circles there was the
conviction that the British figures were
only an opening bid and would be re-
duced. And there was equally firm be-
lief that even in the unlikely event that
France and Italy failed to bow to
American wishes Britain would set
Anglo-American friendship above her
own security and stick by the Rapidan
estimate
But no sooner had the conference in
Lo4-1cn opened than It become obvious
that France-and Italy as o conse-
quence-was not prepared to modify
her naval program. save as she was
compensated by new political guaran-
tees. And the result was that the an
nouncement Of French figures was
promptly followed by the frank state
ment OF the spokesman Of the British
foreign office that either French fig
ures must come down or British would
have to rise, irrespective Of the Rapidan
Agreement.
United States Worked Desperately.
In this situation our delegates set to
work desperately to achieve one Of two
things-to persuade the French to re-
duce their figures or to persuade the
British to agree to stand by the Rapidan
figures, no matter what the French did.
Inevitably both endeavors ended in
failure.
Since France would not come down
and Britain would not stand still in
the race OF French expansion. what was
70 be done? The British admiralty pro-
posed that In the treaty there should
ct once be added 5000 tons to the
Rapidan figures. $4,000 tons being al
lotted to destroyers and IS 900 to crlIis-
ers Such increase would balance the
announced program Of the French, and
the French were quite willing to agree
to stay within their program, unless
Italian building went to totally unlikely
limits.
But the American delegates were
equarely opposed to any such course,
because 1t at once would destroy the
Illusion OF the Rapidan and abolish all
chance to claim reduction or lin1ita-
ton as achievements at London. Thus
the problem was to find q means by
which British freedom to build in the
face Of the French program would not
be impaired, and at the same time for
that period during which the treaty
was being debated in the Senate the
Rapidan figures would seem to stand
intact.
The Clause Was . Way Out.
Hence the "escalator" clause, which
permits any signatory to raise the limit
OF building in any category, provided it
Is alarmed by the progress Of the con-
struction Of any non-signatory power.
This means in simple terms that when
the French program reaches the point
where 1t exceeds the two-power stand
ard level Of Britain, Britain may at
once resume building, simply notifying
Toxic and Washington Of her decision.
In such case the United States and
Japan can initiate the British. They
can build more destroyers If Britain
ouiios destroyers, more cruisers II
Britain elects cruisers. but the Signi-
1icant point is that the character Of
american and japanese building will
De determined by British necessities
All Britain has to do Is to decide that
French, Italian or, for that matter,
Slamese building Is menace and start
construction to any extent she may
determine.
There was grave apprehension at
London among the American delegates
about the ultimate effect Of the "esca-
lator" clause upon the fate of the
treaty. All clearly perceived that with
such provision 1t was not possible to
claim for the treaty any character Of
binding agreement limiting construc-
ton for six years. Thus modified, the
treaty was at best gentleman's agree
ment, terminable in its vital circum-
stance merely on notice. Therefore, in
the last days Of the conference Mr..
Stimson was directed from Washington
to ask the British to renounce the