Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-02-02
Sea Power Main Defense of Both Japan
And Great Britain in Peace and War

II has been mentioned how Japan
anu the United States are each fortu-
naIe IN being able to conflne their
t IavaI problems to consideration of only
w W. oIner powers. But because Of the
meuaterranean segment Of her axis of
einpre Britain cannot so limit her con-
faEa a.Clons, for she must, in addition.
Inc mediterranean Sea.
France and Italy Factors.
ms has a vital bearing upon her
aatat policies and upon the problems
WHEN she faces in the limitation of
Laval armament, as will be more APP
PalsnI within a short while at London.
titahS axis, this particular link of
ner cnaln, that the United States and
Japan VIII ind at London that they are
LIE tile paradoXical size of their fleets
1aIgey determined by the fleets of
france and Italy, although they have
no olrect interest whatever in the sea
forces OF the Mediterranean powers.
essential as is this axis and admirable
as are the steps which Britain has
eahen 70 insure its integrity, it Is still
so.,Sa mat the chain might snap at
effectiveness of the whole. To provide
against such a contingency, Britain
mas created secondary chain of naval
paseS OF considerably greater length,
put one, on the other hand. which is
NOT exposed to the perils of the Medi-
This chain runs from England to
LlnraItar, Sierra Leone, st. Helena,
southwest Africa, the Cape, Durham and
HAI =
singapore. Furthermore, Britain's base
at Hongkong enables her to reach north
IN ASA; those at Halifax, Bermuda and
Jamaica 10 reach the Western Atlantic
ana the Caribbean and that at the
FslKlanoS TO reach the South Atlantic
ana the Pacific by way Of Cape Horn.
Protected From Europe.
Geographically, then, we find that the
British Isles have been given an in
Sularity which means a close contact
with but protection from Europe. pro-
vided that Britain controls the Channel
and the North Sea. We find that the
nature of the axis of the British Empire
makes the Mediterranean the geo
graphical and strategical center Of
gravity of that empire.
We find that this axis would be most
susceptible to pressure from the nations
Of the Mediterranean and least suscep-
t1ble (and this is one Of the strengths
OF the empire) to pressure from the
United States and Japan-the second
and third strongest naval powers of the
world. And, finally, we observe that the
geographical remoteneSS of the integral
parts OF the empire has been overcome
by an admirable system of naval bases
located upon the strategic corners and
the important ser lanes of the world.
But the, tendons of Great Britain,
whether to the continent or the empire
Of the world. are saltwater tendons-
which ordains that, aside from the air,
Britain be a sea power as long as the
empire or even the British Isles exist.
Empire Depends on Trade.
When Napoleon said that the English
were a nation of shopkeepers he ex-
pressed the continuous economic basis
Of the British Empire, for trade is the
life blood of that body. This basis of
the empire Is reflected in the two i'm
perial conference slogans, Ships, col
onies and commerce" and Men, money
and markets"
The seafaring instinct Of her people
stood Britain in good stead when the
industrial revolution converted her into
the workshop of the world. But this
revolution accentuated the dependence
further weakened her scanty agricul-
tursl basis and forced her to look to
the sea for her imports Of practically
all foodstuffs, as well as for the new
materials required by her industries.
She became the ocean carrier for the
world and independent of any foreign
country in the bringing of her food and
raw materials and the carrying away of
her manufactured products as long as
her navy supported her mercantile
marine.
Invested in All Countries
With cheap COAL an abundance OF
labor, superior industrial DEVELOPMENT,
extensive foreign markets and vast
quantities of shipping, Britain became
wealthy and she invested her surplus in
all countries Of the world, thus binding
herself still more closely to her only
medium Of communication with the
world, the sea.
More recently another factor has in
PRODUCED itself into the complex eco
nomic life of the British Empire
namely the struggle for the control and
exploitation of the backward" regions
OF the world in the interest of insuring
continuous supplies Of certain raw ma
terials of increasing Importance
In this struggle which contains the
germs Of serious conflict, Britain has
so far been pre-eminently successfully.
But this, like her shipping and her
trade, is to Great Britain an overseas
venture requiring not only mercantile
sea power for its prosecution, but naval
sea power for its protection. Such facts
as these form the basis OF British eco
nomic interest In the sea.
Policies Reflect Trade Needs.
As in the case of Japan the political
policies Of the British Empire are, to a
great extent, merely reflections OF COM
mercial and economic exigencies, which
in turn have been largely dictated by
natures ALLEGATIONS.
The support and security of British
trade is the motivating power in British
foreign policy The support and Sc