Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-01-18

for an international naval agreement
was to get the United States and Great
Britain to settle their difficulty over
cruisers.
As pointed out in yesterdays article,
this question has now been virtually
solved. Nevertheless, new and perhaps
more difficult questions loom on the
horizon, for which no solution is as
yet in sight.
AS far as battleships are concerned
the Washington Conference established
the famous ratio of .67-1 81.
This ratio meant that the British and
American battleships were to be not
only equal to each other, but supreme
over the navies of Japan, France and
Italy Under this ratio Japan can
maintain battleshipS having 60 per
cent of the tonnage of the United
States or Great Britain, while France
and Italy may maintain only one-third
of such tonnage.
Must Fix Ratios.
The forthcoming London conference
must decide whether or not these
Washington ratios shall be applied to
CIulSeTS dIlu VI WACblACA
these ratios shall be revised.
Both Japan and France have al
ready served notice that these ratios
shall be revised.
Japan declares that it will not accept
so per cent of the tonnage of the
United States in cruisers and Subrna-
rines. Apparently Japan is afraid Of
the new 10,000-ton cruisers q large
number of which have been constructed
by the United States. To repulSe any
possible attack Japan demands the right
to maintain large cruisers for
each 10 such cruisers maintained by
the United States; it also asks parity
in submarines. Despite the recent visit
of the Japanese delegation to Washing
ton, it is not known whether either
the United States or Great Britain Is
prepared to accept the japanese de-
mand. 1t will be more difficult for the
British Empire to do so than for the
United States.
In the draft agreement reached by
the United States and Great Britain
last September, it was agreed that the
British navy should contain only about
10 per cent as many large cruisers as
the American Navy. The Japanese de-
mand for 70 per cent of the American
strength. therefore, means a demand for
equality with the British Empire In
large cruisers. The British dominions,
which have experienced dimcultieS over
Japanese immigration, will probably OBJ
ject to any such proposal. Some COM
promise on this issue must be worked
out il the forthcoming London Naval
Conference is to be success.
France Falls Behind.
while France has been less explicit
in stating her demands than Japan,
it Is q foreRone conclusion that she VIII
not accept the Washington ratios. Be-
fore the World War, France had navy
which was stronger than the navy OF
Japan and of Italy. But because OF
the exieencies of the World War. naval
replacements in France fell behind, and
when the washington conference was
called In 1921, France had fallen lar
below Japan in naval strength.
The washington conference attempt
ed to make French tnferlorlty perma
nent, and it was only after the united
States had stated that France was pre-
venting the success of the conference
that M. BRAND agreed to position OF
equality with Italy at a ratio OF l.oi
in comparison to Tor Great briUanl
and the United States.
Ever since the washington confer
ence France has been attempting TO
offset this inferiority In battleshlps WIS.,
avis the Anglo-Saxon powers ana
Japan by the construction OF otheT
types of vessels. Frenchmen feel that
for reasons of prestige their nation is
entitled to a strong navy They point
to the fact that France has the second
largest colonial empire in the world ana
that France relies upon this empire 10
offset the numerical inferiority OF
France in comparison to Germany.
Generally speaking. there has been
resurgence of big navy feeling in
1000 factor with winch
the forthcoming London conference
must reckon. It is q feeling based
partly on pride, which was injured at
the Washington conference, and partly
on a conception of naval needs"
Must Protect Colonies.
In view of this feeling it is prac-
tically sure that France will refuse to
accept Italys demand for parity in
auxiliary craft. France argues that
Italy has interests only in the Mediter-
ranean. France not only has interests
in the Mediterranean, but in addition
she must protect her Atlantic coast as
well as colonies in Central Africa and
the Pacific.
Frenchmen therefore believe that
mathematical equality between the
French and Italian navies would mean
actual supremacy of Italy in the Med
iterranean. Few Frenchmen are willing
to acknowledge such supremacy, because
Italy could then threaten French conf
munication with North Africa on the
one hand and with Indo-China on the
other.
1t has been proposed that in return
for theoretical recognition OF equality
Italy should promise not to maintain
fleet in the Mediterranean larger than
the French feet there. Moreover, in
its memorandum of December 26 the
French government formally suggested,
in imitation of the four-poWer pacinc
pact signed at the Washington confer
ence of 1921, a Mediterranean guaran-
tee and non-aggression agreement. The
parties to this agreement should be
France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain,
and perhaps also Turkey and the Balkan
countries.
1t is not known whether italy will
accept any such proposal A Meddter-
ranean Locarno would mean that Italy
would have to abandon any hopes OF
altering the territorial settlement in
North Africa and the Near East. Con-
sequently the Franco-Italian problem
awaits the solution of the statesmen at
London.
Other French Aims.
France not only demands q ratio
higher than that of Italy, she demands
a ratio which will give her the right to
maintain a feet much larger than that
fixed by the Washington ratio Of 1871
to for battleships. In 1925 the French
Parliament adopted building program
called the naval statute, which calls fol
the construction of 81 large l0,000-ton
cruisers, or six more than the British
Empire proposes to maintain in the
draft agreement made with the United
States last September. This statute
likewise calls for the construction OF
100 900 tons of destroyers and $4,000
tons of large submarines Including
battleships, the total proposed tonnage