Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-05-18
By WILLIAM HARD.

may nave done Tor tons and guns, has
most certainly established q perfect
parity in yelps and yowls for all three
countries concerned. This becomes
abundantly apparent as the naval hear
ings on Capitol Hill in Washington con-
tinue and as news keeps pouring in
simultaneously through public dis
patches and through private letters
from outraged and indignant admirals
and statesmen In London and in Toxic.
Admiral Takarabe. one Of the jap
anese delegates at London, has been
pausing and hesitating in Korea before
adventuring himself into his native
land. The distinguished Japanese pub
licist, Mr.. K. K. Kawakaml, says that
what bothers the Japanese delegates Is
that they fear that when they get back
to Japan they will be assassinated.
= A&
Admiral Takarabe Is undeniably In
f1ghtful f1x. Before he left Japan
to 90 to London he addressed q con-
siderable assemblage Of Japanese digni-
tartes and promised them that in the
London conference he would never re-
cede from the Japanese naval demands
for 10 per cent Of the American
strength in 8-inch gun cruisers and for
nat or full $4,000 tons Of submarines
for the Japanese navy irrespective of
the views Of any selfish foreign power.
He said that rather than recede from
these demands, he would resign from
the Japanese delegation and also from
his ONCE as secretary Of the navy In
the Japanese government.
He went to London; he receded from
the demands named; he accepted for
Japan go per cent Of the American
strength In 8-inch gun cruisers; he &C
cepted $4,000 tons of submarines for
Japan instead Of $4,000: he did not
resign from the Japanese delegation:
he proceeded homeward via Siberia and
arrived In Korea only to hear from
across the Korean Straits an almost
unanimous demand from Japanese
naval officers that he at least resign
from managing the navy Of the proud
country which bears as It's emblem the
rising, and not the setting, sun.
Admiral Kanji Kato, chief naval tech
meal adviser Of the Japanese naval
general staff, Is most particularly living
In wait for Admiral Takarabe This
Kato we used to know In Washington
during the Naval Arms Conference in
1921. He was subordinate member
then OF the Japanese delegation at that
conference and profoundly believed that
ly trimmed by the American republic.
He was stricken to silence temporarily
by another Kato-TomoSabur Kato-
who was the head of the Japanese del
egation in the 1921 conference. Tomo-
Saburo Kato has now gone on. Kanji
Kato survives. He survives as Japans
central technical naval authority. He
awaits Admiral Takarabe to convict him
Of treason.
The big point, there as here, L. cruis-
ers. The Japanese and the British at
London (and this is perfectly true)
a tonnage OF some seven thousand tons
per unit. The Americans insisted sue
cessfully that 6-inch-gun cruisers should
be permitted to grow to a 10,000-ton
size. Why was this? The japanese
know. A 10,00o-ton cruiser can cruise
farther than q 7,000-ton cruiser and can
arrive more readily in Japanese waters
for offensive and hostile purposes. Sew
en-thousand-ton cruisers are stay-at-
home innocent creatures. They are
what the Japanese wanted. Ten-thou-
sand-ton cruisers are far-reaching and
far-striking wild animals. They are
what the Americans with their habitual
ferocity wanted, and they are what the
Americans with their accustomed diplo-
matte subtlety and brutal skill succeeded
In getting.
It Is said that Secretary Of State
Stimson congratulates himself on being
regarded as great negotiator-il
Japan.
He bears q similar reputation in Brit
ain. This writer in London recently con-
versed much with Lord Bridgeman, who
used to be British first lord Of the ad-
miralty and who represented Britain al
the 1927 Naval Arms Conference al
Geneva. Lord Bridgeman-andp pretty
ish gentleman that this writer met In
London-thlnks that the treaty is ar
abomination. They think 50 because
of cruisers.
Britain should have 10 cruisers, at
least, they say. Let the Americans
build what they please. Why should
the foreign purposes Of any foreign
power affect the purposes of Britain?
Why should Mr.. Stimson be able to re-
strict the number Of British cruisers to
so? Why should he be allowed to over
ride all the highest British naval au-
thorities who continuously, till now
have said 40" But-according to the
most eminent personages slipping theil
port In the best British club corners
the American negotiators nowadays al
ways have their way.
\ \
See what they did to the British
negotiators In the matter Of cruiser re-
placements! (And this Ia true. too.)
The treaty says that cruisers may bt
| replaced when they are 16 years old
in case they were laid down before 1920
All the British 6-inch-gun cruisers were
laid down before 1920. Therefore, al
of the treaty, could begin to be replaced
| by 1896. The total tonnage Of British
| 6-inch-gun cruisers is 177.000. There
fore, the general rule would be that b!
1885 the British could begin cruiser re
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