Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-11-02
u. S. MAY SOLVE
NAVAL DISPUTE
Offer Through Gibson to End
Dangerous Franco.ItaIi
Rivalry.
Continued From First Page)

Continued From First Paee)
yesterday, Premier Mussolini. Tit
French government, meanwhile, ha'
sent explicit instructions to its Ambas.
sador in Washington, Paul Claudel.
The main lines of these talks car
perhaps be summarized in the form Of
O dialogue somewhat as follows
United States-"Tell us what Is The
trouble Remember at the end Of the
London Conference 1t was understood
that you and Italy. with Great Brttains
aid, would try to agree so that by this
time the London treaty would become
q complete flve-power instrument. Nov
we learn that the negotia tons have
broken of and new shipbuilding Il
about to start"
France-"We have tried repeatedly
10 reach an agreement but the same
obstacles kept recurring. italy demands
parity with us and we absolutely re-
fuse to grant parity to Italy In any
formal naval treaty, for Italy Is &
Mediterranean power, whereas we have
O coast on three seas TO defend, to sa!
nothing of our far-fiung colonies.
Parity Blocks Agreement.
"Only the other day the Fascist
council in Rome announced that we
q
fore any other talk begins. This seem:
to render an attempt at new negotia-
tons useless
United States-"Can we possibly helT
you? Would you be willing to make
an agreement on actual figures without
regard to the abstract issue of parity?'
France-"Certainly. Our position has
not changed since the London Confer.
ence, but remember that at London al
a. AL %
actual figures proved quite useless
United States-"On what figures
would you be willing to talk?"
France-"So long as no security pac'
covering circumstances exists, we con.
sider that we need q navy roughly OF
TOO 900 tons as compared with loo, 0Ot
tons for Great Britain and ~ United
states However, in the inhrests OF
agreement we are willing to come down
to 600, 900. provided Italy has not ovei
100000. Furthermore, II security
pact can be provided, we will reduce
still more"
It was apparently in these conditions
that Mr.. Gibson went to Rome
whether he has been able to persuade
the Italians to produce actual figure'
10 still unknown.
Meanwhile the British seem to have
Informed the French that they also
desire to be consulted before the French
and Italians get down TO figures. They
seem to have intimated that they nave
q new proposal under consideration
namely, extension Of the I.ocarno guar.
antics to the North Sea and promise
to use q restraining influence on Italian
building, provided France will agree t.
accept q total tonnage only slightly su-
perior to that of italy.
This proposal seems to have not YET
been definitely formulated, but the
French are interested. They would like
more details, 1t Is said, and, above all
they would like to know whether there
making q consultative pact, for moi
much confidence is felt here at the pres
ent time in Great Britain's promises
owing to Franco-British differences re-
garding Interpretation of what the COW
enant Of the League Of Nations and the
Locarno treaty really mean.
United States ~ StabiIiser.
II, however, the United States agreed
10 consult with the others In case Of Z
crisis, this, it Is felt, would be q greater
stabilizing force in international affairs
for no European power or group woulC
desire openly TO affront the United
States.
If Ambassador Gibson in Rom.
proves unable TO persuade the Italianl
70 consider an agreement on the bash
Of present tonnages without respect Il
the principle Of parity, then the ques-
ton Of f0urrpower agreement emitting
italy win seemingly again be in thl
foreground 1t Is true that France re.
fused such an agreement at London
but the situation in Paris since hai
changed and it is believed that France
would now be willing to 60 ahead with
81 AAk a
8fitatn carr be persuaded to accept the
French ngiires. both the total and in
categories. and provided there Is m
escape clause enabling France to keer
o. margin Of 100000 tons over italy
Whatever the latter builds
The reasons for Great Britain's
failure as Franco italian mediator
are widely believed In Europe TO be the
following:
!. The intrinsic complication and
dimeulty Of the Franco-Italian problem
2. Great Britain's declining interna-
tional prestige due to its economic and
colonial difhculties and its tendency to
withdraw from continental affairs.
y. The fact that Great Britain, as the
dominant power in the Mediterranean
which forms an essential link in it,
system OF empire communications, is
UNIT TO be a mediator because 1t Is it.
sell 1nIereSLeQ.
The Italians, for example, believe that
they have Great Britain's tacit sym
pathy against France, while the French
seem convinced that one of Great
Brttatn's main ideas is to prevent any
lining like permanent Franco Italian
understanding which would destroy
Great Britain's preponderance in the
Mediterranean
Since the London Conference the
severe international tension has tended
70 harden the positions taken by both
Italy and France and hence to make
mediation more dificult.
In any case, 1t is certain that no So
luton OF any sort can be reached with
IN many weeks. The meeting of the
League OF Nations Disarmament Com
mit.ee IN Geneva next week will, 1t is
said, be purely technical. The main
naval talks win take place afterward.
tCopyriEht. ls30)