Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-05-18
EUROPE THINKS NAVY PACT
END OF BRITISH DOMINION
Asquiescence to Three-Power Rule of
Seas at London Farley Generally
Held to Be Responsible.

deets OF Britain and the United States,
which would insure her a ratio not OF
so per cent but Of scant 80 per cent.
Europe cannot be sure America and
Britain have not abandoned COMPETE
ton for condominium. Agreement be-
tween Stimson and Macdonald seems
not unlikely to be followed by wider
pacts, agreements which enable Britain
to withdraw all her commitments in
volved in her membership of the League
and seek her security in Europe through
an alliance with the United States
This would be defensive alliance, I'M
questionably, but an alliance which
might permit the British, as well as the
Americans, not only to stay out of the
next continental war, but to evade the
responsibility OF underwriting any sys-
tenn of peace in Europe.
Restriction of Fleet.
AS result Of the treaty of London
the British fleet is to be restricted if not
reduced, but on the other hand the
American feet is to be enormously in
creased in fighting strength. The result
OF the Naval Conference Is not to be
the reduction or even the effective lin
ttation of the combined fleets of Britain
and the United States; united they will
be stronger in 1896 than in 1890. And,
what is even more significant, while
toward each other the relative strength
will remain immutable, both are free to
build as they choose in the face of the
expansion Of any non-Signatory state.
Has Britain abdicated, or has she
taken a partner? This Is the question
Europe asks. If she has abdicated that
Is an enormous fact in history, the first
step in the decline OF world empire.
But If she has taken a partner then the
Notwithstanding combination becomes
more formidable than was Britain at
any period in her brilliant history.
But If there Is no partnership then
what Is Britain to do in the face Of an
equal American feet defending the ira
ditional policy of neutrality in the next
conflict? Obviously the British will not
join in a league blockade against a
European aggressor, whether on the
Rhine, the Vistula or in the Mediter-
ranean, If such action insures a COLI
sion with American seapower defending
the rights of a neutral, upholding the
legal right to trade with the aggreSSor.
And this practically spells the end of
the whole principle Of sanctions which
is the basis Of the League system Of
maintained peace. 1t not only precludes
the making Of a Mediterranean Locarno,
but it dooms the existing Locarno of
the Rhineland. Thus in either case the
continental nations which feel them
selves exposed must see in the results
OF London not an example to be followed
in the way of limitation Of ornaments,
but the necessity to arm still further to
make good the lost guarantees which
they saw In the British fleet. All the
League powers which counted upon the
British feet as one Of the bulwarkS OF
peace are now almost inevitably to be
thrown back upon their own resources.
Blow to League Machinery.
BY increasing the hazards for the
British of any attempt to use their feet
to restrain or coerce a European ag-
gressor the treaty Of London has struck
a heavy blow to all the League machin-
cry for keeping peace. All this might
have been avoided could the United
States have been persuaded to enter q
consultative pact, to implement the
Kellogg pact to the extent of agreeing to
respect League disciplinary operations
against a proved aggressor.
But the consultative pact found no
adoption in London and little favor in
America.
In sum, If after London no adjust
ment can be discovered between Amer1-
can and League conceptions, then 1t Is
patent that little value will remain for
exposed nations in the covenant clauses
providing joint action ana tnuS sketcn-
ing mutual support. And once this con-
viction sinks home, we shall have not q
reduction but an expansion Of all
means of national defense, armies as
well as navies. AS the European states
increase their navies. Britain Is bound
to follow suit to maintain the two-power
standard and we must initiate TO pre-
serve parity.
That is why on the continent the
treaty of London seems, to use the con-
ventional American phrase, step, a
step not in the direction of disarmament
but into the dark. That is why Ameri-
can parity appears not a promise Of
peace, but, indirectly to be sure, blow
to the system Of peace already painfully
and all too slightly established: that is
why privately, not publicly, European
and even British champions Of the
League of Nations see London as
disaster, not a gain, for Geneva.
(ConvriOht 1qH0l