Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-02-11
PERPLEX|TIES SEEN
IN NAVAL DESIRES
None of Powers Believed to
Have CIear-cut Opinion of
What It Wants.
BY PAUL SCOTT MoWRER.

By Wireless to The Star and Chicago Daily
News. Copyright, 1880.
LONDON, England, February H.
Secretary of State Stimson yesterday
morning pledged all the American dele
gates and advisers, for perhaps the
twentieth time, to profound secrecy.
They must not tell anything to news
paper men. In particular, nobody must
say a word regarding the British ale
CATION that the Americans had omitted
from their published memorandum one
astonishing proposal contained in the
same memorandum when handed to the
British-namely, that the United States
should build new capital ship as
compensation" for the Rodney and
Nelson Of the British fleet.
Late yesterday certain American dele
gates broke their silence and admitted
thai the British allegation was true.
We demand the right to build this ship,
~ seems, but we do not really expect to
build 1t. This curious incident, coming
after several others, leads to the newt
able question:
Does the American delegation in Lon
don really know what it wants?
Problems Referred TO Hoover.
This question is not raised ironically
or with intent to hamper the negotia-
tions, but in dead earneStneSs. The
delegation is being commanded in strict
discipline by Mr.. StimSon, who In turn
apparently is referring virtually every
thing back to President Hoover for de-
cision, sometimes by coded cablegram,
sometimes by transoceanic telephone. )
This feature has so struck the imag-
nations Of the other delegations that
they are already referring Smilingly to
Mr.. StimSons telephone diplomacy. ~
In London the delegation must argue
the knotty points of naval limitation
with the British, japanese, French and
Italians. In Washington President
Hoover must apparently argue similarly
with that element in the Senate which,
while doing lip service to the theory of
parity and the limitation of ornaments,
really believes that the United States
ought to build the worlds biggest navy
and have as many ships as possible.
This simultaneous pressure on the
Washington political front and the
London diplomatic front seems to have
caused a certain amount of wavering,
and the wavering, in turn. seems to
have led to reinforcement Of the Hoo
Ver-StimSon policy of secrecy, in order
to conceal the possibility that we are
not really sure OF our own mind.
A Third Uncertainty.
To these political and diplomatic I'M
certainties must be added third, which
Is even more striking. It is this: Naval
experts of all countries, even the
United States, are no longer sure what
types of ship they want. AirplaneS,
submarines and other services have
shaken the faith Of some of the ex-
pertS in battle fleets, in which others
still believe.
Thus. some want one kind Of ships
and others another. The political del
egates, finding that the admirals dis
agree, do not quite know what to ask
for and, as far as the United States is
concerned, they intend, therefore, to ask
for everything, so that everybody within
the delegation will be satisfied
How does all this work out in prac-
tice?
Even since the failure of the 1927
Geneva Naval Conference the general
board has been telling the American
public that we need a large number
Of eight-inch-gun cruisers and that
this is the main point Of the present
conference. But Mr.. Stimson and
President Hoover seem to consider that
the main point Of the present confer
ence is to save large sums Of money
oy OCldyluB Tic ICpIdCCLilc4lb VI CASAit
or more capital ships, the value Of
which is subject to dispute among the
experts.
The American delegates before leav-
ing Washington thought up plan for
q five-year treaty based on building
programs and requirements instead Of
ratios, and persuaded the British and
the japanese to the idea. Although
every one is now familiar with this
plan, it still is being reserved as a
deep secret to be brought forth only
at the last moment-unleSs we change
our minds.
Apparently Impressed by Protests.
In the Hoover Macdonald CONVERSE
tons it was agreed that modernization
of five battleshipS by the United States
would be sufficient compensation for
the alleged superiority Of the Rodney
and the Nelson. But when it became
known that the British would scrap
four Hawkins type cruisers. enabling
us to agree to basis of 18 to IS in
stead Of %. as our big Navy people
SpECIAV HnTICF9