Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-03-23
BY FRANK n. SIMONDS.

Y ONDON.-Whatever the London
Conference may finally decide
and I am writing In advance OF
IL all decision, one thing has again
been made absolutely clear, and
that is that at the present time the
difference between the Anglo-Saxon
and the French conception of the right
method of insuring peace is too wide to
be bridged by any treaty which both
peoples can sign with equal enthusiasm
Moreover, where one uses the term
French it would be fairer, more exact
to employ the adjective European,
Tersely put, the Anglo-Saxon notion
of solving the double problem of peace
and disarmament Is to join in q uni
Versal self-denying ordinance renouncing
war and then cut down army and navy
establishments to the lowest degree
consonant with national security. And
along with this notion goes the parallel
idea that it is large armies and navies
which produce war.
French Want Alliance.
BY contrast, the French and their
continental neighbors believe Just as
sincerely that the single means Of in
curing peace is for all countries to join
in q common agreement to make war
upon any nation which deliberately pro-
volxes and precipitates a conflict. Such
q pledge having been taken in the
solemnest possible fashion, then and
then only the French think 1t is time to
proceed to a real discussion Of q reduc-
ton of armies and navies. And along
with this idea goes the parallel con-
viction that the mere reduction OF
ornaments without proper provision for
international police must prove danger
GUS to peace.
Now it,must be perceived at once that
these two views, which represent very
profound difference over basic pr1nct-
Piles, are held with equal sincerity by
peoples which to about the same extent
are DESTROYS Of enjoying peace and have
the same utter horror of war. And it
must Just as clearly be recognized that
these two views derive from two totally
different experiences. One Is after all
the natural conception Of peoples pro-
tected by seas and unfamiliar with war
upon their own soil; the other Is the
equally natural belief of peoples which
have known many and recent invaStonS.
At bottom, the major difnculty of all
international conferences which have
taken place since the war lies in this
divergence of principle and has 80 far
paralyzed the organization Of peace In
the League Of Nations. At Paris Wilson
called upon the world to renounce war
and join ina common league to insure
peace and to undertake without delay
universal progressive system Of dis
armament.
.CIemenceau Demanded Protection.
Clemenceau, by contrast, demanded
that the victors Of the war should per-
petuate an alliance which had made
victory possible and pledge their COM
bined military, naval and financial re-
sources to restrain and coerce Germany,
which he regarded as the criminal In
the recent conflict, and the prospective
criminal of the next. Thus, while VIII
son worked for the Covenant Of the
League of Nations, Clemenceau labored
United States and France, which
amounted to an Anglo-Saxon guarantee
to France against Germany.
The inevitable result of the attempt
to combine these two utterly irreconcil-
able ideas led to the rejection of the
treaty by America and the refusal to
enter the League. Britain, on the other
hand, while escaping from the tripartite
alliance by reason Of the American &C
ton, was too closely bound up with
continental affairs to ignore France and
finally. in the Locarno pact. partially
surrendered to the French view.
But inevitably the British believed
they had sacrificed their principles too
greatly, while the French felt that their
views were compromised. England, on
the other hand, resolved never to give
greater commitments, while France
steadily sought to get more precise and
all-embracing guarantees. This issue
was raised at Geneva in the protocol
and has been raised many times since,