Evening star., 1930-12-07


sire" was the reply, II am going to
wait for your majesty at Pampeluna
50 as to give you . proper reception" I"
Henri " began to laugh and nothing
more was said about Pampeluna.
To know how to wait Is no less nec-
esSAry for successful diplomatist.
When the wind Is not favorable you
have to luR to reach port. In the
course Of long negotiations was car
rying on with Herr Won Kinderlen-
Waechter, public opinion showed signs
Of irritation In both countries. When
urged him to settle the matter. the
secretary Of state, who concealed q
good deal of fineSse under occasionally
brusque language, remarked:
Patience May Work Wonders
"Let them say what they like. You
want Q settlement and so do I, but we
must wear out the amour propre" of
others. What was impossible yesterday
and is difficult today will be accepted
with relief tomorrow"
Unfortunately the relief alluded to
by Herr Won Kinderlen- -Waechter was
only temporary. Pacif1cation was not
peace, but, precariouS as it was, it was
none the less an advantage.
A negotiator must be discreet This
Is a strict obligation, not only for the
sake Of his own Minister but for that
| of the person with whom he Is nego-
tiating. I must admit that discretion
Is not fashionable at present. The
public loves gossip, and some news
papers make point of stimulating this
taste TO an exaggerated extent. Gov
ernments are not as free as they need
to be. They must reckon with the I'M
patience Of public opinion, but this Is
very different from open discussion.
Moreover, In all free countries Parlia.
ment is the final court of appeal, as
most treaties must be submitted to it
before being ratified. One might per-
haps say without falling into paradox
that II there is any secrecy in the nego-
tiations this secrecy ceases to exist when
paper, and that finally no diplomacy
exists which can properly be called
secret.
Resistance Is Big Item.
In policy, as in applied mechanics,
companied by the calculation Of resist
ances. Many reasons seldom avowed,
such as amour propre, private interests,
traditional prejudice and internal pas.
sion, are present In the minds Of the
negotiations and these obstacles can be
surmounted only in silence, out Of the
view OF the critical public. Bismarck,
who had some experience in these mat
ters, remarked to the Prussian LandtaR
In 1873. In the homely way he often
adopted: "If you want to buy a horse.
you do not go about telling people the
highest price you will give, and II you
want TO get rid Of your own horse you
DO not state the lowest price you will
take. Diplomacy must act with the
same elementary wisdom"
Many people imagine that as soon as
an Ambassador has presented his Gre
dentialS he can negotiate on every uues-
ton affecting his country, This is
quite a mistake. The only object af
credentials is to establish the holders
diplomatic position. When he has pre-
sented them, the Ambassador begins to
enjoy the privileges of his office. He
enters into official relations with the
government to which he is accredited.
and he can speak authoritatively as the
representative Of his sovereign, but he is
not qualified to conclude any arrange
ment on any particular point. To do
this he must have special powers. It Is
for this reason that the preamble of
every treaty contains, after the enumer-
alton Of the signatories, the statement
that the plenipotentiaries have mutu-
ally produced their plein pouvoirs and
that these have been found to be In
order.
Practice May Be Modified.
The force of circumstances, however,
sometimes prevails against strict official
practice, and can cite an example
from my own experience. was French
Ambassador in Washington in 1898,
during the war between Spain and the
United States. In response to an appli-
cation from Madrid the French govern
ment asked me If thought I could
bring about an arrangement which
would put an end to the war. After
due reflection replied In the affirm
ative. thus had the rare honor Of
being doubly an Ambassador, so to
speak. and Of representing Spain as well
as France for several months.
carried on negotiations directly with
President Mckinley and the Secretary
or State, Mr.. Day. I was fortunate
enough to have the assistance of NJ
Th1ebabut, our counselor Of embassy in
Washington. The porparlers were de-
layed only by the necessity of constantly
referring to Madrid. Mr.. Mckinley be-
longed to the Republican party. He
had been Senator for Ohio and had
been popular by advocating a protective
tariff in favor of American industries
This tariff was named after him. He
was q fervent friend Of peace, and I
learned from him that a statesman who
loves peace can nevertheless involve his
country in war.
Such negotiations are not always
easy. The Puritan spirit still prevailed
among great many Americans, espe-
cially in New England, and innumerable
people conceived modern Spain to be
what the country was in the sixteenth
century. At last we succeeded in COM
ing to an understanding. maintained
that Spain, which gave up Porto Rico
and the Philippines, should not pay a
war indemnity, but should actually re-.
ceive 100000, the whole of which
sum was hanCed to me Immediately
after the signature Of the peace treaty.
FormaIities May Be Waived.
The Madrid government approved the
arrangement and cabled that 1t was
sending me full powers to sign the
agreement. 1t was obvious that q great
many days would elapse before the docu-
ment could reach me, and It was urg-
emily necessary to avert useless. blood
shed by putting an end to hoStilitieS.
We hurried UP the peace preliminarieS,
but I had no powers except q cable
message. Mr.. Day very kindly said he
would take my word for It, and we
signed without waiting any longer. On