Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-02-03
BY PRIMO DE RIVERA.
FORMER Dictator of Spain.

BY PRIMO DE RIVERA.
Former Dictator of Spain.
Special Dispatch to The Star.
MADRID, February (N.A.NA).-
Wnen took power declared that the
dictatorship would last only three
lief then
My only intention was to save Spain
from anarchy, which was enveloping II
WIN gigantic strides I don't think
tne army should NEEDLE in politics
When statesmen fulfill their duties, but
in the Spain of 1923 there was rank
encouragement and the government
enjoyed no prestige. AS nobody made
any eHorts, undertook the inevitable
surgical operation,
In the f1rst moment of enthusiasm ]
thought three months would suffice to
re-establish order and solve grave
problems pending, but soon saw the
reality. To create a new Spain neither
three months nor three years would be
sufficient.
Sees Extension Necessary.
Although I pacified Morocco, and re-
stored authority to law and order in
public affairs, I was firmly convinced
dictatorship, whether military or
civil, should be extended only to do
those necessary things, although on
another occasion I stated that q CEN
fury OF miSmanagement might necessi-
tate century of strong government,
Perhaps some will blame me fCr not
having had any legislative elections.
THESE reproacheS are answered by the
fact that nobody could doubt we would
win an election by crushing majority
Immediately after my advent into
otf1ce, September, 1923, or after the
victorious end OF the Morocco cam
paign.
If did not hold any elections. it
wasn't because I was afraid of defeat,
which was impossible, but because Of
my political conception of its incom-
patibility with parliamentary democ-
racy as then existed in Spain.
Doubts Complete Unanimity.
do not, in fact, believe that a par
Eamentary system based on parties
more or less arbitrarily constituted, and
on personal groups around any leading
men, reflects the opinion or the inter-
eSts of the country or that it can in
any way prove useful. 1 saw sufficient
to know I could not reckon on a great
majority of the people--on absolute
unanimity of public opinion. This was
impossible together with the adhesion
OF the army which had raised me to
power
But if I do not believe in the eff
cheney of parliamentary system alone,
I do not believe either that one man
must govern without the assistance of
an assembly representing the vital
forces of the country--certainly not on
the basis OF parties, but on the basis
of professions.
For that purpose I instituted the
national assembly with consultive DOW
erS, which always lent loyal and efti-
Gent assistance to the government
giving it the benefit of its technical
knowledge.
Certain of Benefits.
My work during six years and the
stimulations of the dictatorial regime
have been fruitful and have no doubt
at this moment that my countrymen
will recognize it. If not at once. at
least at some later time.
The roads, schools, bridges ard i'm
provements of like character, which
we have created, will always be an
asset on the balance sheet. therefore
do not fear the verdict of history.
l recognize that in the most impor-
tant matter we have made a mistake.
/ refer to exchange. When the ex-
change pound sterling fell below %,
perfume moment and stabilizing the
currency, we were too optimistic and
we already saw the peseta at par.
Wanting legal stability, the Spanish
currency had to suffer and hence in
consequence our artificial speculation.
Not only was this due to a wish for
proht, but also owing to the fact that
various outside interests we're hit by
one of our most important provisions
INTO the details Of which I do not wish
to go at this moment.
Impression Goes Abroad.
Because of this, various phenomena
arose during last year and gave more
or less the impression abroad of an
uncertain future for this country. It
Is to these circumstances that I must
attribute the present value of the
peseta on the markets. l say markets
because it can easily be shown that the
then gold value Of the peseta was much
above the present exchange value.
recognize. however, that the i'm
mediate cause of my resignation was
the official article in the papers of
Sunday. January 26. It is my custom
to work very hard during the early
hours Of the morning. On January 26,
sent at about 3 am. an official note
to the press information bureau with
out consulting the ministers and with
out having had time to read it again.
In that note I asked the heads of
the army and navy whether I could
depend on their support. Since then /
have realized that the note was a
tactical error. The reply of the heads
Of the RAINY and navy could be only
that they. would comply with govern
ment enjoying the confidence of the
king, who, according to the constitu-
ton, appoints and dismisSes his min
listers of his free will.
I also understand how that note
could alarm the army and navy.
There was no necessity for the note
I understand this now and frankly
confess 1t.
But even if my resignation had an
immediate cause, it was really my in
tention to leave power soon-indeed,
intended to do SO some months ago.
When history Is studied we discover
how many Sanguinary revolutions have
been caused by the belief among die
tators that they are more or less i'm
mortal, or could not be replaced. For
tunately, from the very commencement,
I understood how fragile is the life of
man and I always thought there would
be some one to replace me. I truly
hoped new men would arise, not con-
nected with the articles of political
life, something to which neither could
nor would turn.
Decision IrrevOcable.
For some time past my decision to
retire at the opportune moment has
been irrevocable. On various occasions
declared publicly that ! would resign
in the Spring of this year when found
some one to take my place.
Regarding the particular personality
OF Gen. Berenguer, he inspires me with
fun confidence due to the tranquility
OF his mind his culture cl1iValry