Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-01-19
BY WILLIAM HARD.
Special Radio Dispatch.

| GpeClAl RAolo OlSpbtCn.
LONDON, January 18.-The Ameri-
| can delegation enters the Naval Con-
| ference full Of confident hope. It be-
lieves a complete five-power agreement
is altogether possible. It realizes that
bad luck or bad management might
prevent such agreement 1t anticipates,
| nevertheless. that good management
will occur and that good luck may
follow.
1t sees nothing in the French or
Italian or Japanese or British an
nounced policies and positions to JUS
tify the belief that a f1ve-power agree
ment has been rendered unlikely. 1t
thinks that all the contradictions and
| conflicts so far disclosed can be har-
monized by patient negotiations.
1t Is to such negotiations, considerate
and accommodating, that the Ameri-
| can delegation intends TO give itself
The Americans enter the conference
with fewer detailed commitments and
fewer published professions and prefer
ences than any OF the other delega-
their diplomatic strength and advan-
tage in the situation.
They have delivered virtually no ulti-
matums. They have occupied no
trenches from which 1t might be neces-
sary later to retire. They have sent
up no trial balloons to discover the eff
| feet of them upon the public or upon
| their fellow diplomats in the confer
| enceS from other countries. They have
| only one unbreakable policy, and that
| policy is already accepted by all con-
| cerned. Tt is American naval parity
with Great Britain. For the rest and
| in respect of all the details of all the
treaties that may be suggested at Lon
don, the American delegation is play
| ing with an open mind and free hand
to a degree almost unprecedented on
| such an occasion.
The result Is thought certain to be
that the American delegation will be
peculiarly fltted to try to conciliate
| and reconcile the varying and oppoS-
| ing suggestions and demands already
| put forward so profusely by other dele
| cations. The Japanese inSiStence upon
| the No. z in place of No. in their
ratio, the italian idea Of parity with
France, the French idea of q treaty of
mutual guarantee of security, and the
British notion of abolition of the bat
| tleShip-all these tendencies will need
abatement and reinterpretation II a
| flVe-power agreement Is to be reached
| And 1t has already become clear that
the delegates who are best prepared to
undertake and accomplish that delicate
task are the delegates from the United
States.
They intend at the same time to
show the utmost circumspection in ap-
preaching each Of the successive differ
ences that the task involves. They are
far from proposing, for instance, to set
themselves up as the arbiterS of the
European political projects, such as
| the special peace pact which the French
desire in the region of the Mediterranean
That pact stands out at this moment
as perhaps the very first problem the
conference must face and solve. Until
the French have what they call Sc
curity, through political or consulta-
tional or armed agreement Of some sort
in the Mediterranean, they will hardly
know what they may want In the way
OF naval vessels. Nor will the Italians.
Until, however, the French and the
Italians are able to state their naval
requirements, the British will not be
able to state fully theirs. The Ameri-
cans meanwhile must await the British
specifications Of their naval needs be-
fore they can completely discuss with
the British the details Of American
British parity.
From this point of view it would now
seem likely that much Of the time OF
the conference during its early days
will be consumed mainly by the Medi-
terranean negotiations, in which the
Italians and the French and the Brit
ish will be the principals, and in which
the Americans and the japanese will
be onlookers and consultants.
Among the Americans there Is some
thought to the effect that the United
States could safely become party to
Mediterranean peace pact or Atlantic
peace pact or any other peace pact
provided 1t included no pledge in any
circumstance to preserve peace by
armed force, and provided further that
the consultations proposed by the pact
J among the signatories to 1t at times
Of threatened war would not in any
the courses Of subsequent action adopt
ed by other Signatories.
On the other hand, there Is also
among the Americans contrary view
which diSlikeS and repels the idea OF
any constitutional agreements whatso-
ever in connection with the present
naval negotiations. It would seem man.
ifest that the American delegation or
this point Is without any instruction
tying 1t to any one precise, arbitrary
attitude toward all unforeseeable pro-
posals which may arise out Of the Medi.
terranean pact discussion.
81 4
When that discussion has been ter
: minated, 1t will still devolve upon tn,
Italians and the French and the Brit
ish to arrive at some understanding
among themselves of their relativ'
naval needs. The conference, even a
that stage, will continue to be prima'
, rily q European conference. with thu
. Americans and the Japanese serving a!
benevolently minded neutral advisers.
The interest of the Americans in TIT
European details debated will be In
direct and yet also genuine and sin
cere. The Americans will want to SCI
4 the naval needs of Europe expressed
|. in the lowest possible terms in ordel