Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-04-06
FRANCOITALIAN RIVALRY
HELD DOMINATING FARLEY
Cross-Demands for Security and Parity
Regarded Greatest Conference
Problem.

tense with JugoSlaVla, 1talyS rival on
the Adriatic.
italy thus found herself suddenly
encircled, size saw French loans going
to equip the Serbian Army, she saw
French submarines towed into the
Adriatic and established at the great
harbor of Cattaro, whence they could
cut the traffic Of both Venice and
Trieste in time of war. And finally
she saw French aviators training the
Slavs and furnishing them with air
planes.
These things were the inevitable con-
sequences of the Fascist utteranceS.
Today there are few Frenchmen who
believe that Mussolini is actually plan
ming to attack France. For war on the
modern scale Italy lacks everything but
men. She has no money, no coal or
iron, and she is terribly overpopulated
and dependent upon other countries for
her food. In war with France all her
shipping would be at the mercy of
French aircraft and submarines based
upon Bizerta, Ajaccio, Oran, Algiers
and Toulon.
Disturbing Situation.
With years, too, it is clear that Mus
solini has come to adopt a more mod
crate tone and to abandon his old habit
of addressing to France frequent and
thinly yelled threats. But in a sense
the Duce, like William II before him,
is the victim of his own incautious ut
terances, and his people have been
reused to an expectation Of great
achievements and to an animosity
toward France which is perhaps the
most disturbing single detail In CO.
temporary Europe.
Since it was at all times clear that
in the light of the existing state Of
mind France would never concede Ital-
ian parity, Italy never consent to any
other status, the clash at London, all
ways inevitable, instantly raised the
question of why the two countries had
been invited to the conference.
Moreover this italian circumstance
made patent at once why France would
not abate her naval program mate
rally. save as she was able to get from
Britain an insurance against an Ital-
ian aggression equal in value to that
which she had obtained at Locarno
against any new German invasion.
France was building warships to meet
an Italian menace which seemed to her
real. If the size of her prospective
fleet was tnconvenient for the British
and Americans and threatened to dis
turb the Rapidan agreement, it was
clearly for Britain and the United
States. so the French alleged, to supply
the political guarantees France desired
for her own security and thus permit
France to bring her naval estimates
down to Anglo-American wishes.
In the face of this situation, British
and American delegates sought with
equal unsuccess to persuade both the
French and the Italians. They under
took to coerce each in turn by the
threat of isolation, through the making
OF four-power pact, with one or the
other excluded. But neither France nor
Italy desired to enter four-power pact,
and both were equally resolved to main
tain their respective theses.
Appeared Unlikely.
Such was the deadlock when left
London and it eliminated few days
later when Grand recommended the
adjournment of the conference to a dis
tant date, in fact, only to reassemble
when France and Italy had adjusted
their differences, a thing which ap-
peared wholly unlikely in any calculable
time during the March days Of the
Naval Conference.
This episode, along with its repercus-
sions upon the Naval Conference, must
serve as one more striking illustration
OF the folly of any attempt to promote
reoucClon or even limitation OF arma-
mentS in advance of the preparation
of political conditions. 1t was idle to
tell France that she had the Kellogg
pact, the Locarno guarantees, the pro-
visions Of the Covenant of the League,
while France felt that not one or all
Of these would avail to protect her in
the face of an Italian attack which
seemed no longer unthinkable.
France wanted ships or allies; she was
prepared to reduce her own strength
only as she obtained the promise of the
aid Of those of other countries. AS for
Italy, her ruler and her people were
all convinced that anything short of
parity with France would relegate the
nation to second-rate position. On the
one hand national security was held at
stake, on the other national honor. How
to reconcile these irreconcilable de-
mandS with the American British pro-
grams Of naval limitation was from the
outset, and remains as write, the dom
mating problem of the conference.
But, after all, this was no more than
repetition Of the situation which be-
deviled all woodrow Wilson's efforts at
Paris. The real marvel and mystery is
that 1t was not this time foreseen and
avoided at the outset.
Copyright, 1907