Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-06-19

marines with US, and our representa-
tives obligtngly yielded.
Cruisers.
The cruiser is a necessary and in
dispensable part of a navy. Great
Britain desires one kind. The United
States up to the time of the London
treaty has desired another kind. Great
Britain has many naval bases and ru-
merouS large merchant ships capable
of ready Transformation into fighting
ships. America has few naval bases
and not one-fourth the merchant ships
available to Britain for naval fighting
aaxiliaries. The Washington Confer
ence limited the maximum tonnage of
cruisers to 10000 and the size of guns
which might be mounted upon them to
inches, and authorized merchant ships
under certain circumstances to carry
6-inch guns. Great Britain in the long
course of negotiations suggested total
tonnage in cruisers of $4,000. This
was accepted. The American Navy de-
sired that, up 10 the total tonnage,
Great Britain should build such cruisers
as she wished. and the United states
should build such cruisers as we deemed
appropriate. The needs of the two ma
lions admittedly are different, and the
disparity between the two in naval
bases and merchant ships which might
be armed made this difference. Great
Britain has consistently and pertina-
ciously declined to permit The two ma
ttons to build within the limits of the
tonnage such cruisers as each thought
necessary. Finally Great Britain Sug-
gested two categories of cruisers, divid-
ing them, In substance, into those car
rying 6-inch guns and those carrying
S-inch guns. Six-inch-gun cruisers are
of little value to the United States par
ticularly in the matter of protecting
American commerce. and the position
of our country mas always been that
the first duty of the Navy is commerce
protection. The 6-inch-gun cruisers
are, generally speaking, all-sufhcient for
Great Britain. The representatives oil
our Navy N Washington at the IN
sistence of our Government, and that
an agreement of limitation might be
reached, finally reluctantly agreed 10 an
irreducible minimum of twenty-one B.
inch-gun cruisers, while asserting,
nevertheless, that we should have %.
Great Britain refused to permit lis %.
Great Britain refused TO permit us Il.
Ultimately, Great Britain offered to
permit" the United States to build ID.
Even this under the treaty was coupled
with the condition we could have only
Is during he life of the treaty and 2
thereafter OF course, an equivalent OF
6-inch-gun cruisers was offered, but
these the great preponderance OF naval
authorities hold to be OF little conSe-
uuence to the United States.
Gives Britain's Geneva Attitude.
In 1927 at Geneva the same attitude
was maintained by Great Britain.
Great Britain then insisted, as she IN
sisted at London. that the kind OF
cruisers we should have for our Navy
should be as designated by her. Our
representatives at Geneva thought We
ourselves should determine the kind OF
cruisers within the limitation we might
build. At London, Mr.. Macdonald never
varied in his demands, and we gra-
ciously yielded. The question involved
is far greater than a mere three or nve
cruisers, as the case may be. In 1886
the surplus of British and japanese
cruiser strength, counting built ana
building tonnage over and above the
-5-3 ratio. will be for Great Britain
81 900 and Japan $4,000. Again We are
restricted in the type of cruiser best
suited to our needs. And If We admit
this principle now. we are dehnltely
committed to it at the forthcoming con-
ference of 1885 and at the long series
of distant future conferences so roslly
pictured by Secretary Stlmson. Al
these there will be many American
cruisers cut to foreign pattern If we
now accept the principle Moreover, a
casual reading of the treaty would LEAD
an unsuspecting person to believe that
during the life of the treaty we were
to obtain Is cruisers, as compared with
Is for Great Britain. AS stated, we
are to have but 16 during the life OF
the treaty, and when the complicated
ramified exceptions to the treaty are
unraveled, it develops that the number
of this type of cruiser which the Brit
ish are to have is not Is at all, but
NAV be as many as 10 during the
greater part of the life of the treaty.
Thus there are at issue In reality the
question of II cruisers, American and
4 British, and a principle operating to
our disadvantage covering many future
cruisers, British, American and Japa-
nese.
Important TO England.
Accept If you will the minimizing Of
what is called the cruiser controversy,
the fact remains that the question was
of sufficient importance for Great Brit
ain, from first to last and during all
these years, to deny us what we de-
manded for our protection and was
deemed of sufficient Importance by
Great Britain at London to threaten
the collapse of the entire conference.
In justification of the violation OF
American interests in the matter OF
cruisers, it has been suggested that we
had little cruiser tonnage to bargain
with, and that a great concession. has
been granted us by Japan and Great
Britain in permitting" us to build up
to their cruiser strength. Yet an ex-
actly parallel situation existed respect
ing our destroyer and submarine ton
mage. We entered the conference with
substantial advantage in both these
categories. II it had been matter
for bargaining, We gave away our adj
vantage there without any correspond
ing return in relation to cruisers. If
the London treaty is carried out as
contemplated by its terms. the ratio