Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-03-30
Writer, Returned From Con-
ference, Struck by "UniuSti-
fled" Contrast.
TANGIBLE BENEFITS
SEEN FROM FARLEY
Three-Power Pact Achievement
Alone Would Be Accomplishment.
Other Prospects Described.
BY FREDERIC WILLIAM VILE.

If the American delegation to the
London Naval Conference were to re-
turn to the United States today, its
members would be astonished at the
all-encircling gloom prevailing in this
country.
They would brand such pessimiSm as
unjustified and short-sighted, because
they contend it leaves wholly out OF
account the concrete, substantial and
far-reaching results already certain to
be achieved. A f1ve-power treaty may
turn out to be impossible. That Is q
distinct failure and Disappointing
from the American standpoint. But a
three-power agreement-among Great
Britain, the United States and Japan
is a foregone conclusion. That will be
q distinct success and qualification,
from the American standpoint. In the
opinion of Secretary Stimson and his
six colleagues, such an outcome Will
have made the London Conference
worthwhile 10 times over. They are
prepared to defend that thesis, if and
when it becomes necessary. Their con-
tention will be that incomplete success
is a long way from total failure.
This writer left London on March 20.
At that date the conference was wal
lowing in the mire of despair, as far
as any five-power arrangements were
concerned. Prime Minister Macdonald
had just dashed French hopes Of mill
tary guarantees. Secretary Stimson
had not yet become "open-mtnded" on
the subject Of a consultative pact. He
had, indeed, only few days before re-
vealed that his mind" was closed with
regard to any and all schemes for en-
tangling the United States in European
controversies. The expectation of the
American delegation 10 days ago was
that an Anglo American-Japanese naval
treaty was about the only prospect In
sight.
Called Important Prospect.
Col. Stimson and his associates had
no hesitation in describing 1t as q pros
pect Of the most important character.
It did not I'LL the rosy picture, they
admitted, which animated their hopes
when the conference opened. But there
was nothing in it, the American dele
CATION insisted, to plunge the folks
back home" into the depths OF discon-
tent. Our spokesman at London ask
or were asking a week and half ago
If the following list Of accomplish
nents (already recorded or about to be)
does not tell story of real achieve
ment:
/. Naval parity arrangements with
Great Britain.
2. Stoppage of new building by Japan,
and eventual fixation Of 1915 cruiser
ratio.
8. Humanization Of submarine war
fare.
4. Postponement of battleship re-
placement until 1886.
Always assuming that Three-Power,
rather than a Five-Power, treaty is all
we are going to get out Of the London
Conference, the benefits which lie hid
den in the above tabulation, are mani
testify extensive. The overshadoWing,
general fact which it discloses Is that
there viii result from an Anglo-Amerl-
can-Japanese limitation agreement an
aecreqate, actual reduction OF rounoly
500 900 tons of warships OF various
classes The United States Ind Ted, 5ns
tts navv bv 200 900 tons; the British
viii wi slash some 225,000 tons or more
7confinued on page 4, Column A.