Evening star., 1930-03-30
By WILLIAM HARD.

NNAA4ANAN@@e@ NS@S@N@~N
In the dense fog surrounding the
problem Of . So-called Consultative
pact at the London Naval Conference
two tiny specks Of light are at this
week end In washington thought to
have emerged.
/. The idea Of the adoption Of a
consultative pact" did not In any way
originate from the French delegation
or the British delegation or any other
foreign delegation at London, or, for
that matter, from the American dele
CATION, but essentially and primarily
from certain active private American
citizens, such as Prof. James T. Shot
we'll of Columbia University and Mr..
James @. Mcdonald and Mr.. Raymond
L. Buell. of the Foreign Policy ASSocia-
ton Of New York. These gentlemen
and others of q similar way of think
ing, through determined efforts not
only on this side of the Atlantic but
through associates and allies of theirs
on the other side, have been spec
tacularly able to make q Consultative
pact" the object of enormous discus
sion and have been able to tmpel the
American delegation into taking part
in the discussion, while yet, in fact, no
proposal for q Consultative pact" had
delegation by any foreign delegation
whatsoever in the conference. It is to
be doubted If any more startling sue
cess in international diplomacy has
ever been achieved by private citizens
acting on their own private initiative.
-
2. The purpose of the gentlemen In
question has been only partly the fa-
cilitating of the reduction of naval
armaments. It has been largely and
perhaps even dominantly the further
ing of American participation in the
consequences Of the system for the or
ganization and perpetuation of peace
set up by the League of Nations
covenant.
These two facts together explain why
the American administration at WASH
ington and the American delegation at
London are approaching consultative
pact with the same amount of en-
thusiaSm with which they would try
to catch q red-hot rivet with bare
hands.
The Americans, this writer learns,
II they see themselves on the verge
Of getting forced into a consultative
pact" will do their best to fill it so
and easy and rapid exits that the
amount Of consulting ever done will be
reduced to minimum.
For instance, it is proposed in re-
sponsible quarters in the American
delegation at London that the pact
should provide in so many words that
the United States, though it commits
itself to consultation, does not in any
way commit itself to the outcome of the
consultation. 1t Is further proposed
in responsible quarters in Washington
that the pact should also provide that
no consultation held under it should
ever In any way include any consulting
on the matter of the application of
sanctions" or the use of joint military
or naval force for the repression Of the
alleged "aggresSor" or alleged bandit
nation"
- &&
If these ideas were adopted, the pro-
posed Consultative pact" at London
would be immensely weaker than the
consultative pact" otherwise called
the four-power treaty, between the
United States and Japan and France
and Britain, that was adopted at the
Washington Naval Arms Limitation
Conference of 1922. The four-power
treaty does not In any way exclude a
consultation regarding the use of force
against an "aggreSSor" and 1t does not
in any way explicitly declare that the
n
wholly free from any concern regarding
participation In the outcome of 1t. 1t Is
true that the Senate added to the
four-power treaty declaration to the
effect that 1t contained mo commit
ment to armed force" There was to
be, that is, no definite obligation be-
forehand to use armed force. But there
remained, In the treaty itself, a full
opportunity to consult regarding armed
force and to agree to use it II 1t seemed
desirable. Moreover, and finally, Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge, himself delegate
to the Washington Conference. stated
on the floor of the Senate that the joint
consultation pledged In the treaty was
a prologue to an implied ultimate joint
action.
II, then, the consultative pact" at
London should expressly rule out the
idea of the discussion OF sanctions"
and should also expressly rule out the
idea of any implied ultimate participa-
ton in Joint action, 1t would be so
! much weaker than the four-power
treaty that its defenders on the floor Of
the Senate would be abundantly able to
make speeches attempting to prove
! that the new London treaty meant
really almost nothing at ALL
AC CuaC pollC' uoWeVeI' IemdIAdple
phenomenon now arises. The outright
opponents of such a Consultation"
treaty at London and the original pro-
posers and protagonistS Of such treaty
are in cordial agreement on at least one
point. Both sets Of gentlemen agree
that consultative pact" no matter
how much 1t might seem to mean Moth
ing, would really mean something ana
mean q lot.
X \ y X
At this moment no consultative
pact" could go through the Senate, be-
cause just now more than one-third OF
the members of that body think that
consultation regarding a European war
would irresistibly take the United