Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-08-10
BY FRANK H. sIMoNDs.

HE past week, filled as it has beer
with the anniversaries of th'
several declarations of war which
Is years ago uShered in tht
great conflict, has inevitably
produced many comparisons between
the Europe of 1914 and 1890 and giver
new impetus to the discussion OF the
prospects for peace and war in the
future.
when one undertakes to compare or
contrast contemporary Europe with that
Of half q generation ago, it is clear at
once that there is single difference
at once striking and all important. The
Europe of the pre-war days was divided
into two armed camps. Six great pow
ers, three on either side, had been In
collision for a decade and several pre-
yious crises had narrowly missed pre-
cipitating the catastrophe Of 1914.
To the great powers were attached
several of the small. Serbia depended
upon Russia, Bulgaria upon Austria,
Greece was divided with a prof. German
King and a pro-Anglo-French Prime
Minister. Rumania was nominally an
ally of the Triple Alliance while actu-
ally tending toward new association
with the Triple Entente. Turkey had
become dependent of Germany.
Examined more closely, 1t was clear
&kAdO AAO (OAAA4AlOAA OdhoC CARAnAAOA bAsS
existence of either group. Britain,
fearful of the German naval challenge,
had no quarrel with Austria, nor had
France, whose policy and purpose were
dominated by the memories of Alsace-
Lorraine. Russia had no real grew
ance with Germany, but was engaged in
Q bitter struggle with Austria for power
In the Balkans.
Challenge to France.
Yet while it was the fate of Russia's
protege. Serbia. actually to precipitate
the deluge, the German challenge to
France in Morocco at the moment Of
both the Tangier incident and the
Agadir episode almost produced the
general conflict. For 10 years, from
the Kaiser's landing at Tangier to the
archduke's assassination at Serajevo,
peace had been balanced on the edge
of knife, and the conflict between the
two armed camps daily became more
probable.
In the Europe of today it is manifest
that no such balance between powers
exists, no Triple Alliance faces q Triple
Entente. Russia temporarily has disap-
peared from the picture. Great Britain
and Germany have made peace over the
vanished German feet. France and
Germany, through Locarno, have &C
themselves. Austria has dissolved into
fragments. Only between France and
italy exists any such tension as marked
Anglo German, Franco-German and
Russo-Austrian relations before August
], 1914.
Nevertheless. If one looks beneath the
surface, It is clear that there does exist
at least one great system of alliances.
What Is even more important, one great
AividaG into frun
one Of which Is heavily armed, the
other in the main forcibly disarmed by
virtue of defeat in the last war and
the consequent terms OF the peace
treaties.
The contemporary system of alliances
Is, of course, that which centers about
France and inOudeS the states of the
Little Entente, Rumania, Jugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia, together with Poland
and Belgium. This alliance keeps on
foot standing armies numbering well
above q million. In fact, it owns all
the considerable conscript armies on
the Continent save the Italian, which
is formidable, and the Russian, which
ct the moment is not.
Backbone Of Coalition.
While the European army of France
has been cut in half since the pre-war
= days. " II SILL The I1OSI COklSlucIApic,
and constitutes the backbone of the
existing coalition, as it Is in addition
the chief nnainStay Of the system Of
frontiers created at the Paris Peace
Conference.
The issue which divides Europe today
Is patiently that of frontiers. France
and her allies stand Squarely for the
maintenance Of the status quo, because
French security and the very existence
Of several of TIE smaller states in the
coalition would be menaced by any re-
vision Of the treaties; for any revision
would necessarily increase THE area and
population of Germany at the expense
of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and in
the same fashion diminish all three Of
the little entente states to the profit
Of Hungary, and Rumania and Jugo-
alavia to the advantage of Bulgaria.
Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria, the
beaten powers of the war, steadfaStly
refuse to accept as permanent the
present frontiers, which have deprived
Germany of Danzig, the Polish Corridor
and Upper Silesia, Hungary of two
thirds Of her former area and popula-
ton, and Bulgaria of Macedonia.
Claimant for revision, too, is Lithuania,
which claims wilma. Since revision
could only come following war, and be-
cause Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria
a. today disarmed and powerless to
carry on a new struggle, the issue does
not at the moment directly threaten
tranquility, but by contrast is consti-
tutes as effective a barrier to European
consolidation as did Alsace-Lorraine
and the Trentino before 1914.
If Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria