The daily worker. [volume] (Chicago, Ill.) 1924-1958, 1930-08-20
By II. PURO.

By II. PURO.
IN connection with August First, we gained
new experiences, and lessons must be learn
ed regarding these experiences and the many
shortcomings that we still have in our efforts
to mobilize the masses.
Situation Favorable for August LIST
Demonstration.
First of all, it must be recognized that the
political situation for modifying masses was
favorable than ever before. There was
deepening of the economic crisis, growing
employment, the beginning of national wage
cutting offensive of employers, sharpening
danger against the Soviet Union, increasing
offensive against all workers revolutionary or
CARNATIONS the Fish Committee, Roots pro-
posal for federal police, the pope's attack
against the Communist Party of the U.S.A,
martial Law against Flint auto workers strike,
the arrests and terror in the mining fields,
intensified lynching campaign against the Ne
groes in the South, increasing imprisonments
of Communists all over the country. There
was growing resistance ard rising spirit of
struggle among the workers against the Of
fensive of employers and ruling class.
Our Mobilization on August LIST Not Equal TO
March 6.
Upon the basis of this favorable situation
we should have been able to mobilize the masses
for the August First demonstration in greater
numbers than ever before. What were then
the reasons that we were only able to mobil
ize about 10000 workers as compared to over
100000 on March Sixth,
Did we fail to DO the accessory preparatory
work? AS compared to March 9th and May
LIST, we think it is only correct to say that
our preparatory work was much better planned
and much more systematic than ever before,
perhaps with few exceptions.
Looking rto the reasons why we were not
able to lcobilize as great numbers of workers
as our efforts would have warranted we must
recognize that the capitalist class adopted diff
ferent tactics than on March 9th and May
list,
Capitalists Use New Tactics.
First of all capitalist newspapers tried o
kill our mobilization by maintaining comrlete
silence about August Firrt. whereas h9fore the
March Sixth and May First they gave us big
publicity. Therefore on August First. we
reached only those masses that we were able
to mobilize directly by our own means.
Second, while on August FIRST there we're
fewer attacks by the police against our DEM
oustrations. the police did everything possible
to smash our preparations, especially in and
at the shops by attacking US at shop gate
meetings and failing our speakers and organ
izers, thereby gripping our forces which we're
badly needed in the preparatory work.
Third, while there was temporary embargo
against Soviet imports to this country. he
embargo was lifted just a few days before
August First which created illusions not only
among the masses, but also partly amo"q our
own comrades regarding the lessening of prep
arations for attack against the Soviet Union
These some examples Of the changing tao
tics by the bourgeoisie and for this change of
tactic by ouf enemies, we were not prepared.
It must also be taken into consideration that,
because of the political backwardness Of the
American workers, the question of The war
danger is not yet as great factor for the
mobilization of masses as is the question Of
unemployment. Therefore the r'"~'-t' vt
as ready to demonstrate against the imper-
ialist war danger as they against uneni-