Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-01-03
BY EDWARD PRICE BELL.

BY EDWARD PRICE BELL.
Special Correspondence.
Sea power had wide bearings in
Admiral Mahan's mind. 1t embraced
every form of national influence abroad
moral, cultural, political, economic.
II a nation were morally useful, or had
cal impression, or extended It's trade
overseas. it did so through some in
strumentality of transmarine communi-
cation-warships, merchantmen, liners,
aircraft. cables, the radio, and it was
exercising sea power.
In fine, to Mahan, sea power was
the vehicle par excellent of historical
power--the final arbiter Of national
deStinies.
But the fundamental and coarser
elements of sea power-the things
which constitute fighting strength
afioat--were the matters to which the
philosophical admiral gave almost ex-
elusive heed. He thought of geography.
He thought of natural resources and
climate. He thought Of extent of terri
tory. population, human qualities, gov
eminent All these, in his analysis
were major concomitantS OF any force
which nation could make effective
overseas.
What did he say of geography?
Geography Vital Factor.
He said it profoundly affected q
nations outlook relative to sea power.
If the nation were surrounded by water
Gas are England and Japan, it in
Stinctively associated floating defense
with the preservation Of its national
life. If it were cheek by jowl with
land neighborS (aS are Germany,
France, the Netherlands), its more i'm
mediate defensive preoccupation was
military.
Approximately equal in other re-
spectS, no two nations differently sit
uated geographically-the one with
land and the other with water frontiers
ever could be equal at sea. The ma
ton with land neighbors would be pre-
dominantly military, the watergirt ma
ton predominantly naval. And the
naval nation, because of its position of
command between the land nation and
the productive capacity of the world,
would be the more powerful.
Geographical contiguity meant much
to naval nations. England and Japan
were situated most favOrably in this re-
Spect, the one having Europe, the other
Asia, at It's doors. This cOntiguity en-
abled England to bring its naval power
readily to bear upon the coasts and the
trade of Europe. and the same Is true
of Japan as regards the mainland OF
Asia.
u. 3. Position Peculiar.
America, as will be shown later, Is
without this naval advantage of geo.
graphical nearnesS to the bases Of pos
sible enemies. and hence has a sea prob
lem of peculiar interest and difficulty.
Our country, to digress moment is
not in Mahan's category of land powers
with strong adjacent states on one or
more sides of them. America is a con-
tinental island, icy seas to the north,
the west, the Caribbean and Panama
to the south. Vast expanses OF salt
water roll all around us.
Know 1t or not (many Of us are be-
ginning to know it,, our outer and
greater defenseS are at sea. We have
Mexico to the south and Canada to the
north, but neither is military menace.
We are naval power, and our inter-
estB debar us from demanding less than
unquestionable adequacy OF naval
strength.
DEPRESSING a little farther, Admiral
Mahan did not live to see his own
countrymen generally informed and
sympathetic with reference to his naval
conceptions. He left us mainly land
bound in our thinking.
Ignored Naval Preparation.
n-aggreSsive satisfied with both
our moral and our material patrimony,
eager to practice and promote peace, we
opposed battleships as wicked" (Roose-
velt's world and (again to quote Roose-
velt) combined buster in speech with