Evening star., 1930-06-28


indicator, and the waves or smoke or
some other external indication by which
he can check his own travel.
Some of the difficulties Stannage and
Saul met and the speed and accuracy
| which they had to attain can be imag-
ined when one considers all the factors
of their problem. Remember, our plane
was changing its position at the rate
of 90 or 100 miles an hour. The ships
from which We were obtaining our
| bearings were moving along at 10 to Is
knots, or faster or slower, on their par
ticular courses. Thus there was no op-
portunity to repeat and go over bear
| ing and correct. Those boys in the
back room" had to be right the first
time and all the time. So just as fast
as they obtained one position they went
after another, completing at least three
operations and computations on each
| finding.
When bearings began to come in
slowly Stannage would call his shore
| stations on the short wave and ask
them again to notify ships that might
be in our vicinity to listen for our long
wave.
1 don't know that I have made this
radio navigation clear to the layman.
The theory is simple enough, but it
| takes some doing. 1t takes especially
the complete cooperation of other sta
tions, and We certainly had that. They
helped us most enthusiastically, those
operators on shore and shipboard who
kept up their unending watch over our
passage.
1 would like to mention them all here
| by name, operators and ship captains,
owners of the shore stations and the
| - ka,,k R1,-k k,lvy 7
can't. Perhaps they or their friends
will see these words and receive my
thanks through them. I will mention
my friends, MesSrS. Henitz and Jack
Kaufman, and their radio chain, which
aided us all the way across.
| AS I look back over the two flights,
the Pacific and the Atlantic, I am in
clined to believe that the old Atlantic is
| the more uncomfortable for flying, even
If the distance from land to land is
shorter. We had the same radio facili-
ties over the Pacific, but fewer ships
In compensation for that we had more
stars and fewer overcast SKIES so that
We could take celestial observations.
Deviation Still Mystery.
It is not yet clear to me how we came
TO deviate so far from our course as we
approached Newfoundland. 1t may be
that the rapid magnetic variation had
| something to do with It, Then, too, it
may be that we were tired and were not
holding the Southern Cross up to her
work as we did earlier in the flight.
It certainly was rather awkward for
three or four hours. There We were,
| flying hundred miles an hour minute
after minute, and going nowhere, ap-
| parently. 1t was all blind flying, and
this condition, If a pilot keeps it up
long enough isn't conducive to accu-
rate plotting.
1t is possible that we were circling
Our compasSes certainly seemed to tell
us so. They were going all around the
place, our master compass and all The
instruments were fine, and they worked
all right for us as we came down the
coast to New York, but there seems to
be some condition up there of New
foundland that affects the compasses.
Col. FitZmaurice tells me that Koehl
and himself found the same difficulties
in about the same position, 800 or 400
miles off Newfoundland.
Then Stannage got his radio bearings
again and We discovered that we still
had 200 miles or so togo before reach
ing land, when we thought we were
right over it.
1t is merely q guess on my part, but
I believe that it is possible that the
Frenchmen, Nungesser and Coli; Capt. |
AAhAGAASAAAC OlLlC1S kOb dlIltOSb 10 ,
Newfoundland and then, coming up
against those magnetic variations when |
they were tired, flew in circles and |
went down or wandered off up into |
the wilds of Labrador. There was no
radio to straighten them out and set |
them on their way again.
Dutch Pilots Expert.
1t might be of some interest to say
how our crew came to be gathered. |
When the flight was first projected |
and even after had committed myself |
to 1t, had not picked a single one |
OF the crew. 1 knew of the thorough |
way in which the Dutch pilots are |
trained especially to f1y blind. Those
Air Line ships are trained for weeks
to. ny in an absolutely blind cockpit, |
guiding their ship by instruments alone |
l took up the matter in Holland, |
where the Fokker Co. was doing every |
thing possible to help me get ready, |
and my only stipulation was that the |
man should know his flying and that |
ms family was able to get along If |
something happened. made this |
stipulation in the case of each member |
OF the crew. -Four men were finally |
selected and Van Dyk was chosen from |
the four. 1t certainly was a happy |
choice. Van knows blind flying better |
than most.
In England, I was casting about for
a radio operator and one day Stannage |
walked into my club. 1 knew his ability |
OF old. He was the radio man aboard |
the rescue plane that came after us
when we were lost in Australia. His re-
sourcefulnesS, courage, knowledge and |
speed made him the man for the job
Well, we chatted while, and finally
he said, You don't happen to be look
ing for a radio operator to fly the At
lantic, do you?"
signed him on then and there
Then all l needed was a navigator.
We were in Ireland then, making the
last preparations. The Irish did every
thing possible to further our plans. and
suggested that if one could be found
who had the ability and wanted to go,
l would like an Irish navigator. I was
promptly informed that Ireland could
furnish me any number of good navi-
gators, and that is how we got Pat Saul
They way in which each one of
them carried out his assignments Is
proof OF how fortunate the selections
were.
There are several other points in
connection with the flight and the
whole flight around from Oakland that
/ would like to say something about,
particularly to the future of air trans
port over water. These 1 will take up
in my next article.
Squadron Leader Kingford- Smiths
next and final article will be published
In tomorrow's issue.
tCopyright, 1880, throughout the world By
the Nav York Tfnaea ca All rfRf1fe rasarved