The daily worker. [volume] (Chicago, Ill.) 1924-1958, 1930-12-11

| statement made on October 49, 1900
Further Postponement of the
| Intervention.
| But the hopes set on 1880 too were doomed
| to disappointment, and a fresh delay, this
time of brief duration, until 1881, took place
Referring to this fresh poStponement, Ram
Yin states october 16, 1880:
by the second half of 1929 news arrived
| from abroad that it would be impossible to
1.-THE chief causes of this postponement
were: l. The increased revolutionary activity
| OF the working Masses 2. complications in
the military situation of France in conse-
quence OF strained relations with Italy; g.
| Germany'S uncertain attitude and the con-
| flicting interests of Germany and Poland;
A.. The failure of the adventure in the Far
East, which proved the difficulties of fight
against the Red Army; S. The absence of
agreements between the chief participants
| in the intervention.
The somewhat altered plan for 1881 now
began to take shape in accordance with the
changed general situation. This plan al
ready recognized the small probability of
great rlSlngS in the interior of the country
especially in the Ukraine, since the counter
revolutionary organizations, for instance. the
League for the Liberation OF Ukraine" had
peen destroyed; it also recognized the effect
OF the general improvement of economic con-
dltions in tn coming year. Therefore. the
new plan put much more serious demands
on the inside help to be rendered by the
Industrial Party, and stress was laid on di-
version m4npIIVprc
open treachery. In order to W AIKEN the So
wet Union as far as possible beforehand and
to compensate in part for the stronger eco
nomic and military position of the Union
as compared with 1880, the new plan included
the economic blockade of the Soviet Union.
The new plan increased essentially the
role played by the northern forces, which
were to deal the blow against Leningrad. for
now Finlands participation was secured: the
armament and equipment of the intervention
army and air forces. The southern groun
OF the Polish, Rumanian, and Wrangel SOL
diers was to occupy the Ukrainian territory
on the right bank of the Dnieper. and then
TO advance in as straight line as possible
on Moscow. 1t remained uncertain whether
Germany would take part in this operation
lalthough there was a possibility of mobiliz-
ing considerable numbers among the mem
oerS OF the "Stahlhelm" for instance). for
Poland was naturally afraid to let German
troops march through East Prussia Estate
ment made October 16)
This statement deserves special attention
1t describes the persistency shown bv the
governing strata of certain foreign powers
IN the organization of the military inter-
vention against the Soviet Union.
Kalinnikov states:
.. After returning from the London
world Power Conference, via Paris, to the
Soviet Union, Ranzin and Laritchev estab-
hshed connection with the Trade and In
oustriaI Committee through the agency of
Ryaputchlnsky, who maintained contact with
the French government via Loucheur. They
learned that - in view of the delays in the
armament and equipment of the intervention
army and the absence of mutual agreements
among the Baltic States in the matter of
the carrying out of the intervention. and in
view of the fact that the Soviet Union would
not take the initiative in war, as the success
iul 1ulf1lment of the Five-Year Plan would
be thereby thrown out of gear-the inter
yenton would probably have to be postponed
Tor year or year and half. The Trade
ana industrial Committee further substan-
tated the necessity of postponing the inter-
vention for year by pointing out that to
judge by the figures yielded by many years
OF statistical calculations there would 10 .