Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-01-05
BY FRANK H. sIMoNDs.

may VIC y 41NC~RONCI DdCIt 1OllONkllk lIlC
analogy Of the Washington treaty and
fixing the absolute and relative strength
Of the naval powers. There may be a
three-power pact, adjusting British.
japanese and American tonnage. And
there may be an Anglo-American treaty
diSposing of the issue of parity.
Manifestly f1ve-power pact would be
dersecretary of State has been repre-
sented as saying the United States
would accept nothing else. Actually
Cotton did not say or mean this. His
comment was intended to express the
hope that it would be possible to at
tain what was most desirable, and
foolish to aim at less. But if five
power pact is impossible, the United
States will sign a tripartite agreement
No one can disguise the fact that the
chances of f1ve-power pact are slight
because Of the French policy. For the
French, London is preliminary and all
decisions must be referred to Geneva.
Put badly, this means that France real
ICES that at London she will be isolated,
but in the League she is sure of the
support Of all of her European allies
and, in addition, of certain South
American states.
Furthermore, France refuses to rec
ognize the Italian claim to parity,
while the Italians decline to accept
any agreement that does not concede
them equality with France. Thus you
have the situation that the Tardieu
government in France would fall If
the prime minister accepted Italian
parity at London, while Mussolini
would suffer an incalculahle loss of
prestige If Grand, his foreign min
lister. accepted a subordinate rank in
the face of France.
All things considered, q dve-power
RTnatV NIT Af the r1IaefiAR1 Ac
for four-power pact, with France or
Italy left out, that would have little
value, for, assuming what is probable
that France would be out and italy
m-an Italian undertakings would be
conditioned upon French naval pro-
grams. Moreover. however irritated
British and American opinion might
be with French tactics, it is doubtful
If the two governments would care to
mix up In the Mediterranean mess to
the extent of indorsing the Italian
against the French thesis.
Three Will Agree.
Then what about the triparite al
Cerpative? Here one must say at once
that the difnculties as between the
three powers themselves which not neg
1gtble, are far from disturbing. The
japanese visit to Washington, the
Hoover conversations, give
equal evidence OF both desire and an
expectation Of adjustment.
That Great Britain, Japan and the
United States viii in the end agree
upon treaty which establishes Anglo
American party and fixes the Japanese
ratio In auxiliary craft at the limit of
the Washington treaty in the matter
Of capital ships seems assured. But
the difficulty with such treaty is that
it cannot be other than conditional.
A. warG
the French factor.
France has announced that she will
ask for q total tonnage Of 100000 with
the right to employ It as she chooses
as between categoTies. This represents
for France the determination to re-
capture the naval rank she held up
to the eve of the World War, when
resources on manufacturing shells, not
ships, and after the war In rebuild
ing her devastated areas instead Of her
navy.
Not only does France thus demand
9 tonnage double that which she now
possesses, but she purposes to employ
the tonnage chiefly in two categories,
Submarines and cruisers. such alloca-
ton might easily mean that she would
spend 300 900 tons in cruisers and 100,-
600 tons In submarines. But this would
be to expand her feet in precisely the
directions most menacing to the British,
and in the face Of such program,
which the Italians would claim the
right to duplicate, the British position
in Europe would be compromised.
Therefore the British in any tri-
partite treaty would be compelled to
stipulate that while they accepted par
ity on the basis Of the Washington and
Rapidan agreements, namely, $4,000
tons to 525, 900 in capital ships and
$4,000 tons to $4,000 in cruisers, the
larger figure being theirs, they would
tonnage to keep pace with the French
and at such a rate as to preserve the
existing relative strength.
Britain Could Block ALL
Thus while the French and Italian
claims and programs have no interest
for the United States and little for the
Japanese. both countries would find
their own naval program affected by
the British action in the face OF pro-
grams of vital importance to Britain.
For Great Britain cannot be expected
TO sacrifice her security in the interests
Of parity. Obviously then a three
power pact subject to immediate re-
vision, involving almost constant dis
cuSsions between the interested govern
ments to determine the preservation OF
the balance in new constructions, would
be not only unsatisfactory In itself, but
dangerous.
The danger would lie, as the noted
British naval critic, Hector Bywater,
has pointed out, in the fact that Amer
lean suspicion might easily be stirred
by the spectacle OF a steady expansion
Of the British cruiser fleet despite the
London agreement, and British resent
n1ent not less quickly moved If the
United States seemed to demand that
Britain should ignore her own security
to suit American views.
Nevertheless some form Of three
power pact is likely. And 1t is more
likely because neither Britain nor the
United States wants a two-power pact
Such a treaty would seem both in the
United States and in Europe little more
than the sign Of an actual alliance,
and on the one hand it would rouse
American opposition and on the other
lead to European counter ohenSiveS
directed at Britain. Since, however
Japan is on her side ready and reason
able, there is no real necessity to daily
with the two-power idea.
So far, however, it will be seen that
the possible agreements are chiefly
political and do not envisage the slight
est reduction in fleets. On the con-
trary they merely legaliZe by interna-
tional treaty a vast naval construction
on the part Of the three powers pos
sessing great fleets.
How then is the London conference
to give even the semblance Of a dis
armament conference? Already there
u absolute refusal on the part of the
French and Japanese to consider not
alone abolition but even reduction Of
submarine tonnage. More submarines
like more cruisers are the certain con-
comitants Of London. And the French
tnsistence upon submarines involves