Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-11-16

that would satisfy the British views.
Moreover, an actual war between Italy
and France would be an instant and
grave menace to all British lines of
communication passing through the
Mediterranean.
Again, Britain has no interest in
seeing the status quo modified. Italian
ton Of Malta, which for the Fascists
has become a new Irredenta. Also Ital-
ian ambition to take Tunis from France
awakens British opposition, for italian
possession Of Tunis would establish Italy
on both sides of the narrow sea lane
separating Sicily from Tunis.
But the situation has resemblance
to that involved in the Locarno agree
ment. BY this agreement Britain un-
dertook to defend the existing frontiers
from Holland to Switzerland, but re-
dividing Germany from Poland and
from CzechoGlovakia. And in the Medi-
terranean case she is equally unwilling
to assume responsibility for the Adri-
attic, where Italy and Jugoslavia are N
shock.
Labor Ties Its Hands.
What really counts, though, is that
Labor tied its hands in advance Of
coming into power by attacking the
Tory foreign policy and Austen Cham
berlain In particular-and Chamber
lain's title to fame results from his
Locarno service. It is, then, next to
impossibl for Labor now to go into q
new Locarno and not stultify Itself.
Moreover, Labor Is instinctively hostile
to France and naturally opposed to
Fascism, and to agree to defend one Of
these countries against the other would
y. IL 4
file of the Labor party.
What Labor has hoped all along has
been that 1t could persuade President
Hoover to agree to q consultative pact.
Then it could 60 ahead and enter its
Mediterranean Locarno, assured that in
q crisis the United States would at least
sit at the table with all concerned and
probably support the British arguments,
which would all be for peace.
1T Londo Stimson was told quite
frankly that the price Of q successful
five-power conference was American ac-
ceptance Of q consultative pact. And
it will be recalled that the American
Secretary of State first rejected and
then accepted the principle, only to
discover Washington was squarely
against it.
Not impossibly Macdonald still be-
lieves that the United States in general,
and the President in particular, faced
with the Franco-Italian facts, will re-
consider. a consultative pact. Certainly
he recognizes that there will be little
chance for American criticism OF q
British appeal to the escalator clause
If the United States, like Britain, has
tried to bring about a Franco-1talian
adjustment.
Tories VIII Agree to LOcarno.
In the end, in my Judgment, when
Tory cabinet does come in Britain will
agree to q Mediterranean Locarno
When this happens all real French
opposition to italian parity will vanish.
for with France the issue is one of
security. And with Italy the tempta-
ton to push the parity claim from the
theoretical to the practical plane will
vanish, because she will be confronted
by q status quo guaranteed by Britain.
The weakness Of Gibson's position as
q negotiator lay in the fact that he
had nothing to offer, either in Rome or
Paris, which would tempt either France
or italy to waive its national thesis.
Obviously, both France and Italy are
interested in keeping American friend
ship Italy has immediate financial
reasons for not wishing to irritate
washington. But both Tardieu and
Mussolini could accede to President
Hooyer's desires only If they could show
profit to their fellow countrymen-
profit commensurate with the surrender
involved.
Great Britain and the United States
are equally interested in successful
disarmament conference, as they were
interested In a successful naval con-
ference. For Italy and France, on the
contrary, neither the London nor the
Geneva affair was half as important as
the maintenance Of their national
claims. In q word, while Britain and
the United States were seeking hmita-
ton and reduction Of ornaments at
London Italy was after parity and
France out for security. and as far as
one can see the situation has not
changed.
Morrow Not DeIuded.
Dwight Morrow used to say at Lon
don that the only real difficulty lay In
the fact that everybody was right and
the rights of each nation were just as
imprescriptible as those Of another.
And from the start he was the one
American delegate who never deluded
himself with the notion that it would
be possible to talk the other fellow out
of his rights. In Europe you have got
to talk politics before you talk disarm-
ament, or, for that matter, anything
else: and the American policy OF isola-
ton precludes us from talking politics
on q business basis. That was Slim
sons handicap at London, Gibson's at
Paris and Rome, and, as far as one
can see, is likely to tie the hands Of
any American diplomat In Europe for
any future time.
(Copyrisht. 1s3o)