Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1930-07-13
DELAY OF TREATY ACTION
ASSURES NO INTERFERENCE
Extra Session Prevents Swapping of
Measure by Other Legislative
Activities Being Considered.

| The effect of such blockade upon
American trade-upon the farmer even
more quickly than the manufacturer
would be disastrous. All the circum-
stances of 1856 would inevitably be
reproduced. Moreover, If we accepted
the blockade, as we did substantially
That OF the allies In The World War,
then we should be in fact, an ally of
the League. But just as obviously we
should be the enemy of the nation or
nations at war in defiance of the
League mandate.
1t may easily be argued that this is
the course that we should follow; that
we are at the least in duty bound not
to feed, munition or finance such an
aggreSsor. But the trouble is that we
have adopted no such policy, and on the
whole stand firmly against it. To assist
IN disciplining Italy or Germany, to
help Europe make war to preserve
peace, is not at the present hour any
part of American intention.
But since our present policy is clearly.
as Mr.. Wilson once phrased it, Ito wage
neutrality" to maintain not alone our
aloofness from actual conflict, but to
avoid vast losses incident to an illegal
blockade, 1t becomes necessary to have
feet equal to that of the greatest of
the League powers, namely. Great Brit
ain. For 1t is manifest that Britain will
not engage in a League of Nations en-
terpriSe to preserve peace on the CONT
nent of Europe if such enlistment in
sures actual collision with an American
fleet of equal strength. The existence
of such a fleet in itself provides the
certain barrier to such British action,
and is thus the guarantee of American
neutral rights.
Admirals Entitled to Hearing.
If the Government and people of the
United States are ready to join the
League, if they are prepared to agree
in advance to waive their neutral rights
when the Council of the League shall
sion and liable to sanction, then the
whole case of the admirals falls to the
ground. We have no need Of parity
with Britain, because there is then no
conceivable cause of conflict.
But If we refuse to join the League,
II we adhere to our traditional views as
to neutral rights, then the admiralS, as
the ultimate executors of our policy, are
entitled to be heard upon the question
of the means which are required. 1t Is
not only their province, but their duty,
to inform the country in advance If in
their judgment the existing Navy or the
treaty Navy falls so far short of parity
as to be incapable of performing its
mission.
A European war is today at the very
least patent possibility. Such war
would at once compel the League to
take action, and such action would in
evitably involve us. If President
Hoover and Secretary Stimson could in
form the admirals that they would not
be called into question, that we were
prepared to remain neutral, but along
with nominal neutrality to act as the
benevolent associate of the League pow
ers, then they would have no case and
no temptation to go beyond their i'm
mediate duty.
But If we are to wage neutrality we
must have Navy adequate to the task,
so completely the equal of the British
as to preclude any British action which
might bring collision. And of course,
the same is true in both the ASiatic
issues. If we are determined to de-
fend the Philippines, the London treaty
deprives us of adequate naval resources.
The increase of the Japanese ratio au-
tomatically gives Japan strategic supe-
riority in the area in which we must
defend our island possessions. And the
same is even more the case in the mat
ter Of the open door.
Policy Real Case.
If we are prepared to retire behind
the Hawaiian Islands, If we are on the
one hand ready to resign our purpose
to defend the Philippines and on the
other to renounce our policy Of equal
opportunity commercially in China, then
the admirals' case against the London
treaty falls to the ground. But, on the
other hand, If We are not prepared to
renounce either policy, it Is clearly the
business of the admirals to tell us that
we are pursuing policies with inadequate
resources.
The real basis for the limitation or
reduction Of ornaments Is the ADJUST
ment of national policies which may
lead to collision. To reduce the size OF
navies, for example, while maintaining
in full vigor policies which may neces-
state the use of navies Is like reducing
the carrying capacity Of q new bridge
without making any prior reduction in
the size of the load it must carry.
At London the single conceivable
cause for Anglo-American dispute. neu-
trail rights, was vigorously excluded.
Collision was thus made no less likely,
but vastly more risky for the United
States. And that Is the case OF the
admiralS.
Reducing the number Of ships and
the size of guns to be employed In war
and maintaining in full vigor the poll
cies which may produce war Is not 9
step toward peace. With the making OF
these policies admirals have no proper
concern. But they are entitled to ask
for the naval means to carry out the
political policies which the Govern
ment has adopted and to testify If the
means are lacking. What the admirals
have said in substance is that the treaty
feet is not adequate to sustain the ma
tional policy. That Is the situation to
date.
(CopyriRht 1900