Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-10-06
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will almost certainly be an effort on
his part to undo what he has been
forced to surrender at the time. Count
Sforza has formulated this principle
worth quoting here.
Noisy Success Dangerous.
"I will even state this as a funda-
Genital law of diplomacy: The diplo-
mat must, of course, succeed in a
negotiation, but he must try to succeed
without too much eclat. A too noisy
success is frequently dangerous in dip
lomatic life. 1t is possible in this way
to wound former adversary even more
than by concessions eXtorted from him.
It is this discretion in success that Will
create a lasting position for an
ambassador"
The strategy of diplomacy consists In
getting ones opponent to adopt ones
case and make it his own, so that when
the negotiations are over he will carry
on the policies which he has accepted
instead of going home to thwart them
In sullen resentment. This reminder OF
the value of self-effacement in negotia-
American diplomacy. Count Sforza
adds to it three other major principles
for the diplomatic career-avoid excess
Sive zeal which the other party may
fail to understand; be sincere and hon.
est, for there are no true settlements
where there is not mutual confidence.
and, above all, have the courage to re-
Sist the waves of passion of either aris-
tocratic courts or demagogic dictator
ships. Writing of these things recently,
Count SforZa has declared his belief
that in the new era Of public diplomacy
there will be more and not less need
for practicing these tried virtues of the
old regime.
After the war was over Count Sforza
was appointed High Commissioner Of
ConStantinople, and there at once d.
vined the Importance Of the movement
led by Renal PaSha and placed Italian
policy on a sound basis with reference
to insurgent Turkey. He was the first
italian statesman to conceive Of Balkan
politics in any other terms than those
Of local feud and foreign intrigue The
last traces Of the old Califate that had
so long oppressed the people of the
Near East were being obliterated by the
secular spirit of Nationalist Turkey and
there was surely hope of equal achieve
ment In the liberated peoples them
selves.
Saw Capabilities Of Dalmatia.
The realization of Jugoslav unity,
therefore, he held, should mean to Italy
increased prosperity in the growth Of
law and order throughout all the wide
spread Jugoslav domain. tine Kingdom
OF the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was
not rival to be considered in hostile
terms by Italy, but a neighbor whose
friendship was to be won and main
tanned. The problem of the Adriatic
ceased to be in his eyes what it had
been In the mind of most Italian states
men since the day when the sea empire
OF Venice passed away and Turkish
oppression brought ruin to the Dalma-
tian coast. In most italian eyes the
only culture that existed in Dalmatia
lay In these ruined traces of Venetian
history. Count Sforza, on the contrary.
knew that beyond the devastated hills
lay rich hinterlands and a sturdy stock
capable OF playing its part in the Eu-
rope of tomorrow.
1t was this conviction which led him
As foreign minister to concentrate upon
the settlement of the Serbo-Italisn dis
pute, and largely on his own initiative
ne secured that settlement in the treaty
OF Rapallo, which is perhaps the most
outstanding triumph of his career.
AN Italian historian has described In
. narrative. hitherto unpublished. the
maj negotiations which led to the
Late at night on November @ 1920
Count Sforza and the Jugoslav Minis
ters, Vesn1c and Trumbic, met in the
salon OF a villa on the Riviera. not far
from Rapallo, to settle, at last. two
years after the end of the European
war. the division of territory of that
part OF the Hapsburg monarchy which
lay along the shores of the Adriatic.
Gains Treaty Of RapalIo.
Count Sforza refused to place the
negotiation on the basis of ordinary
diplomatic bargaining. 1t was to be an
honest Cancellation of the national as
plrat1ons Of two peoples which should
nnally result in an entente between
them. He offered therefore to meet the
claim OF the Jugoslavs with a single
sweeping concession Of all Dalmatia Eek
cepting zara), but on the north stood
frm for the natural frontier of the
eastern Alps. This the Jugoslav mini
sterS were not prepared to grant. Count
Sforza's final ultimatum was an appeal
that they should face the unpopularities
OF the Settlement-for any settlement
would be unpopular-with a courage
equal to his own, for he was prepared to
carry through the policy of peace in the
Adriatic at the cost even of his own
exile or death: then turning on his
AACNA 41C blupILJ lCAL C1ICII do LlIUukkl
the rupture had actually come. Next
morning the Jugoslav delegation ac-
cepted the italian program and two
days later the Treaty of Rapallo was
signed"
The author of this narrative goes on
to point out that In this episode Count
SforZa's character stands revealed.
Orthodox diplomacy was thrown aside
Dramatic and decisive speech violated
all the conventions, but 1t spoke to the
conscience Of responsible statesmen as
man to man.
It was not merely by the Treaty of
Rapallo that Count Sforza laid the
lines of a sound italian polic.' in the
Adriatic. He evacuated Albania while
guarding the island of Sassano to watch
over Valona. It is small wonder that
he should attack the adventurous policy
Of Mussolini In Albania and the pin
prick policy with reference to Jugo-
Blavia. SforZa saw clearly that the SUI
preme need of italy in Balkan politics
was q consistent and generous attitude
toward any movement of pacificatlon.
even II 1t envisaged the creation of a
single Balkan state: he saw that order
and prosperity in the Near East were
more to Italy's advantage than an
nrchy, and that the best way to dimin-
lsh the exuberance of Serbian nation.
e,iAaa vsas n increaes the wealth Of