Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-01-13

States be a partnership be-
tween the League of Ma
tons and our own country to police
the world? This is the aspect of the
concomitant debate over the naval bill
and the Kellogg treaty which is at
oddly enough, least on this side of the
Atlantic.
In a sense the question is old. Ever
since We refused TO join the League of
Nations Europe has been troubled over
the possible consequences of a collision
between American and League policies.
It has, too, been increasingly disturbed
as We have seemed likely to insist upon
naval equality with Great Britain. For
the British fleet plays an enormous
role in the League scheme.
The present situation is both strange
and not without its element of danger.
BY virtue of articles 10 and 16 of the
League of Nations covenant, the men,
Der nations are bound to undertake
certain more or less ill-defined opera
tons against any nation guilty of an
aggression against a member nation,
once the fact of aggression has been
established by the act of the Council
This means that if Germany were to
undertake new invasion of Belgium
to take an illustration quite unlikely in
actual fact-Belgium would appeal to
the League, the League would declare
Germany an aggressor and then it
would be the duty of all the member
nations to get together to plan COM
mon action against Germany.
Blockade One of Main Details.
Such common action would beyond
any doubt include as one of its main
details the blockade of Germany. Not
less important, possibly, would be the
decision of the member nations to place
Germany under an embargo so far as
money, food and raw materials were
concerned. Since Germany's military
force would not be adequate to repeat
the great invasions of 1914 in France,
the League powers might agree to limit
their military operations to occupying
the Rhine barrier and rely upon the
blockade and embargo for the rest.
Obviously the immediate problem
would then be the action of the United
States. If our Government declined to
accept the decision Of the League, If it
refused to regard Germany as an outlaw
nation, if it should see in the German
action not an aggression but step of
actual national self-defense, then it
both to trade with Germany and to lend
Germany money, in SO far as such ac-
ton was not subject to interference
under the laws of war.
We should then at once come into
conflict with the British feet, which
would act with the League. If our feet
were equal to the British the naval as
well as the legal aspects of the ques-
ton would at once be serious. The rea-
son Great Britain has so far hesitated
to give any real pledge of using her
f1nnf IN Inc o1ln ft1SirlpCS hGpoHSn of
the immediate chance of collision with
the United States.
What the League and the pro-
Leaguers of the United States have been
working at ever since we rejected the
treaty of Versailles, is to find some way
to abolish any possibility Of American
interference with League police opera
tions They want to establish legal
situation which will assure that when
the League declares any nation to be an
aggreSSor and liable to punishment, the
United States will accept that decision
as binding upon it, at least to the ex-
tent of waving its rights as neutral.
Would ObIigate Acceptance.
On the surface this does not seem an
unreasonable endeavor. But it is clear
both that the decision of the League
may easily be such that the United
States could fairly question its moral
basis and that. If in advance we agreed
to let the League decide the matter for
US, We should always be bound to accept
the League decision both in cases where
It might seem to us morally sound, and
in others when it would appear mere
political affair.
TIE league is not only the instrument
for preventing future wars, but it is also
the machine for enforcing the decisions
of the last conflict. If, for example,
Germany and Austria were to vote to
unite, and seek to give effect to this
vote, that would constitute just as grave
an aggression under the League consti-
tuition as a new German invasion of
Belgium.
Thus, while almost all Americans
would agree that the Germans and
Austrians were merely exercising the
t inalienable right of self determination
in voting to unite, the League. on the
application Of the French, the Poles or
the CZechs, would be bound to declare
that Germany had been guilty of an
aggression and that she was liable to
all the police pursuits prepared by the
Council. And the chief among these
sanctions would certainly be the block
ade and the embargo.
So if We had promised in advance to
respect League blockade, if we had
committed ourselves in advance to per-
NIT the League to decide for us, we
should become no more than an ac-
cessory to the League of Nations, not
merely in its task of preserving peace,
but also in maintaining the status quo
in Europe.
That we should do this has been the
hope of Europe ever since our with
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