Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-04-21

me. Lloyd George was staggered. But
a.vote had been taken. We broke up
without any decision having been
reached. A few days later the drama
took place! The British had given way
before the German attack. Their line
was broken"
Retreat Not Considered.
On March % Haig himself telephoned
to ask for Some one to take charge
of the war;
The oath was Sunday. Foch told
M. Louchuer, Minister of Munitions,
who, being uneasy, had wished to dis
cuss the situation with him:
1T is serious, very serious, but 1t is
in no sense desperate. You under
stand, refuse to speak of a possible
retreat. There can be no question of
retreat. The time has come when We
must make both armies realize this to
the fullest extent. Haig and Petain
have offered magnificent resistance.
LlC olbudtlOll Cdll tlhCLEo W q QUu-
BILE door. Each of the generals Is be-
hind his half of the door without
knowing who should push first in
order to close the door,. / quite UNDER
stand their hesitation; the one who
pushes first risks having his right or
left wing turned 3 If they had to
be stopped, what would I do in their
place? You know my method; stick
wafer here, another there, a third
by it's side the Germans will
hardly advance any further. A fourth
wafer, and they will have stopped al
together.
on Clemenceau with letter in which
he had set out his opinion: Nothing
is ready"
The President replied: "You are de-
serting me-"
mo, no, M. lie President, am not
deserving you, but we must have
supreme command, otherwise We shall
be on the verge of disaster"
1.-The commanders-in-chi are in
agreement. I myself have frequently
ensured liaison between them. I am
personally in agreement with them"
said Clemenceau.
"YeS, as long as you are with them.
When you leave them, they each go to
work in their own way, very conscf-
entiously. but there is no liaison be-
tween them. There cannot be, as mat
tiers stand at peresent. and the Ger
mans are taking advantage OF the
fact :"
Clemenceau Proposed as Chief.
On the following day, as Foch was
on the point of starting for Abbeville
to meet the English, Clemenceau tele-
phoned him: There is a war council
at Compiegne."
What about Abbeville?" asked Foch.
Send Weygand there" was the re-
ply.
Foch went on to comment: "It was
then, while I was accompanying Wey-
gand to the Care du Nord, that I met
M Javery, the director of railway COM
munications, who said to me: IF you
do not save Amiens, everything is lost
Well. we are going to try to- At Com
piegne, the meeting took place in a
villa on the outskirts Of the town, be-
cause the latter was being bombarded.
Things were going badly Haig was
not there and we could not arrive at
any agreement. We should have had
to go to Dury. But We could not in
flict our difficulties on M. Clemenceau
in the middle of the night We there
fore agreed to meet again on the fol-
lowing day. and returned to Paris"
The marshal continues his story of
his appointment to the supreme COM
mand in these words: IT was at my
home in the Avenue De SAKE, when
Weygand called to tell me what he had
heard from Field Marshal Haig and
Wilson. The latter had gone back to
Versailles, but he called on me the
same evening to tell me: "This is the
proposal: NJ Clemenceau will be in SUI
preme command, with Gen. Foch as his
chief of staff"
Foch Opposed Proposal.
The marshal's reply was quick and
decisive: THAT will not work-M. Gle
meceau knows nothing of leading
armies or directing battles! Who then
will take charge of affairs? There will
be decisions to make-who will make
them? Clemenceau will say: I agree
with Haig and Petain.' But it is not a
matter of agreeing with them. He must
command. Who will assume the re-
sponsibility. No. it will not work." And
the marshal concludes with the phrase,
I'VE were all of the same opinion"
During this discussion Foch did not
content himself by criticizing a solu-
ton which seemed to be q bad one.
Logical with himself, he contemplated
the only possible method in this way:
"At the time of the battle of Ypres
Gen. Joffre had given me the task of
trying to bring about better union be-
tween the English and French troops.
If today I were placed in similar po-
sition should need greater degree of
authority. conferred on me by the al
lied governments themselves"
Commandant Bugnet continues his
narrative:
There was no time for hesitation.
The moment for a decision had arrived
and 1t could no longer be deferred. The
position was serious, more serious than
it had ever been, almost desperate. BY
the morrow, perhaps, all might have
been irremediably lost. In this ex-
treme, was there still remedy? One
only. Necessary? Absolutely. Ef1ca-
cious? It was to. be hoped So. Certain?
How could one say as things were? It
must be. tried. Certain people were
still opposed to it, but to no purpose.
Every one must assume his own re-
sponSibilities
"TIne night passes. They meet again
on the following day at Doullens. The
position is examined"
Marshal Focil's position is clear:
There Is not a foot of ground to
lose. It is necessary to cling to what
we hold. Recember October 1914 :.
The enemy has struck just where the
two halves of the door meet. He has
pushed them back on Haig and Petain.
New strength is necessary to force them
together again -. Above all, do not
give the troops line on which to fall
back, otherwise they will tend to re-
tire too .precipitately."
The English representatives Cord
Miner and Gen Haig) arrive. The dis
cussion becomes general. The defense
of Amiens Is mentioned. It Is described
I'VE must win in front Of Amiens. We
must win where we now stand. As we
could not hold them on the Somme.
We must no longer fall back an inch"
1t is then proposed to give Gen. Foch
the command in the AmiknS sector.