Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-12-29
BY FRANK II. sIMoNDs.


tons of the naval conference as
they affected the cruiser. In this
IL direction certain facts are ines
capable. The double inSistence of
the American Government upon parity
and the British upon minimum ton
mage of $4,000 abolishes any chance
of reduction. The Rapidan agreement,
which fixed the American figure for
parity at $4,000 tons, as against the
British Of $4,000, foreshadowed an
American construction of $4,000 tons in
excess of the total of 300.5OO, which was
the limit set by Mr.. Coolidge In the Is
cruiser bill.
Since under the Rapidan agreement
the United States would be committed
to build 1850 tons of cruisers in the
next six years, 1t is manifest that re-
duction cannot be claimed. Since Japan
and France have similarly refused to
consider any abolition of the subma-
rine, 1t is equally manifest that nothing
is possible here. Finally, it is plain that
unless the French agree to accept low
ratio, giving Britain at least two-to-one
strength in cruisers, the 500 ,000-ton fig-
ure will have to be raised and so will
the American counterpart.
But there remains the question of
battleships, and here, 1t is conceded in
advance, the American Government
looks for results which may be a justi-
f1cation Of hopes alike for economy and
reduction. First Of all, as a maximum,
there is the notion that the battleship
may be abolished altogether. 1t has be-
come expensive beyond all conception.
Has it also become obsolete? Have the
developments of the airplane and the
submarine reached the point where the
capital ship Is only a colossal target?
Admiral Sims Is on record as asserting
that in the next war the place for our
battleships would be up the Mississippi
River, and like view is held by certain
British authorities. Gen. Mitchell has
expressed the same view even more ex-
plosively.
French Italian Situation.
1t remains true. also, that the French
and Italian governments still adhere
to their decision made after the WASH
ington Conference to build no capital
ships, decision that was based first
upon financial reasons, but also had at
least a measure of expert support. There
is then a school in Britain and in the
United States and majority among the
experts OF France and Italy-and per-
haps Japan-holding the battleship to
be obsolete.
To BattIeships.
| Nevertheless it is equally true that
the majority in both English speaking
navy circles holds to the battleship, that
anything 80 drastic as a program of
abolition would arouse an enormous
controversy and might be equally re-
jected by Parliament and the American
Congress, following the majority naval
Judgment. For the present at least it
seems certain the battleship cannot be
abolished.
But there IS an alternative proposal.
Why not lengthen the life of the battle
ship from 20 to Is years? Under the
terms of the Washington Treaty the
British and American nayieS will begin
replacement of battleships in 1881. If
the battleships are allotted a longer
span of life would it not be possible to
postpone replacement and thus save
vast sums Of money?
The answer here touches upon tech
nical details. Despite the popular i'm
States did not arrive at parity in cap
ital ships at Washington. What was
fixed upon was process of parity. To-
day the British have greater tonnage
(the disparity is 100000, more battle
ships and in the Rodney and Nelson
two decisively superior ships. But the
day will come. in 1896, when by scrap
ping and replacing there will exist
something as close to parity as is hui
manly possible. America and Britain
will then have II older battleships,
measuring for the British $3.50, 900 tons
and for the United States 375,O00 tons,
and five new boats apiece aggregating
175.000 tons in each case. This very
slight preponderance of 5000 tons in
favor of the United States will dis
appear with later requirements until
both fleets stand at Is ships and 525. 900
tons, the parity figure OF Washington.
No Replacement, No Parity.
If, however. the Conference of Lon
don undertakes to arrest replacement
at once and for five years, it automat-
ically arrests parity. Instead of attain
ing parity in capital ships in 1886, the
United States would not attain it, at
best, until 1941. II the principle of
parity were to be preserved, the post
ponement of replacement could not
begin until 1888, when the two fleets
would be substantially equal. Other
wise the American delegation would lay
itself open to the charge of having sur
rendered parity in capital ships to OBJ
tain 1t in cruisers.
But it is clear that no impressive
showing would be made If the largest
single result of the London conference
were an agreement to begin in 1885 to
postpone requirements. This fact Is the
more unmistakable because between
1891 and 1884 the British and American
programs call for the building of five
great capital ships in each case. To
announce that the two EngliSh-Speak-
ing powers were to build 10 capital
ships and the Japanese 3 before any
postponement, and therefore saying, be-
gan would not serve to Offset disap-
pointment awakened by the cruiser pro-
grams. necessarily envisaging vast con-
structions.
OF course, this means that much
greater efforts will be made to achieve
abolition of the capital ships. But one
must at once perceive that it is the
view of the American naval experts that
any such program would be dispropor-
tionately disadvantageous to the United
States To quote one of our best known