Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-09-03

This 10 the laird of eight articl
;Hnot0n Butler tells tire djueFtSNg St0'
sbv the UNtted StGfes Marines ne too
'cdn HVes iH the co1Rt.yS raging efOsl
BY SAEDLEY DARLINGTON
BUTLER,
Major General. o. q. N. Q.
6cdnvri1ht. iaae. ~ Nerth American News
paper Anianee0
After looking over the situation m
Shanghai for several days went aboard
the U. s. s. Pittsburgh for q conference
with the chief OF the
American forces IN CHINA. Rear A9mM .s
G. s, williams. After o general discus
sion, he said:
III we are going 10 have . row We
had better have enough troops TO take
care of the situation"
So we radioed and suggested sending
another regiment OF Marines, ana
recommended that the remainder OF the
mobile forces OF our corps ne assemnseo
In San Diego, ready LOT tmmeolate
movement across the Pacific Ocean.
At that time President Coolidge, per-
sonally, was handling the situation In
China, as far as the United States was
concerned, and he called the Secretary
of the Navy and told him that he had
a request for more men, bat that instead
of stopping some Of them ct San Diego
they all had better 90 out where the
are was. we recommended their stop
ping at San Diego because 1t would cost
80 much to take them to China
When the Secretary OF the Navy IN
formed the President that there was no
appropriation available for the move
ment Of such large force for such
great distance the President told him
to hire a ship"
China is q long way OF: they may
need these men and some American may
be in danger there. You, get ship
somewhere and send the Marines out
there" That was the gist Of MIR. Cool
idge'S instructions.
So there came TO China more than
5000 officers and men Of the Marine
Corps to show that our citizenship was
worth while.
All the vast equipment We had in
China--and our forces were the best
equipped there Of all the troops
came from 0uanticO. Va, across the
+ continent In Al special trains ct ex-
press rates, and then BY boat. naval
transports and privately owned pas.
We never received any instructions
from our state Department while We
were there Sometimes We thought they
had no policy. It seemed that II what
We did came out all right what We
had done became the policy; II It didn't
turn out well Il became responsibility.
Avoiding EntangianAAnts.
We had to Judge BY the addresses
and remarks the President and our
statesmen made and We gathered that
It was not desirable that we make any
combinations or entAngleMents with
other foreign nations In China. We
had read Of the League Of Nations, but
b. H.
League Of Nations In China as far IS
we were concerned. =
President Coolidge sent Us the finest
troops and the best equipment there
were. All these men and this splendid
equipment were not sent to make war,
but they represented an ideal-to pro-
tect American lives without leaving
wounds behind to be bound up.
AS o result Of our experiences in
China I have concluded that by q
proper presentation Of force and .
friendly spirit this can be done in any
situation, and that sometimes we, are
not 90 expert as we might be In han
ding delicate situations in foreign lands
to which 1t becomes necessary to send
The problem was presented to us Of
doing this job Of protecting the lives
Of the thousands Of Americans In China
without hurting any one. II had been
a Junior oficer would have been
anxious for o scrap. 10 is easy enough
to start o night An you have to dc
Is to get some one to shoot at you.
Then. after the fight. you can always
say the frst shot was fired BY some
one else and your senior o1ncer goes
over and explains and StfaightenB things
out. But this time I was the senior
and had to put on the brakes to keep
our men out Of trouble.
Our task-and it became our policy
the protection Of American lives, APP
pears, on the face Of 1t, easy Of accom-
plishment, and thus IL calculated to
Allay any possible nervousness on the
part Of the average eitagen at home
landed on and occupy the territory OF
q friendly nation.
The position Of these armed forces,
however, 10 an extremely dimcylt one.
especially when it 81 realised that,
jointly with tho necessity OF furnishing
security Of our nationals ID the equally
important duty az encouraging 9rendiy
relations with the nationals Of tAe land
we have invaded. .- !.
PlayAmH o Leme Hand.
Unless every man Of such O protect
ing good WIN" force plays the game
exactly right his nationals living In the
middle Of q bitter ciyN war can be
protected only by the use OF the bayonet,
and trade balances are very infre-
quently, II ever, permanently increased
by force.
Further, our national policy o; play |
ing q lone hand In these matters has
been so constantly and iDsistently set
forth by our statesmen and Endorsed
by our people ct large that We all real
ICED aloofneas must be maintained.
The defense problem presented In
China, therefore, was delicate, and was |
further complicated By the presence of. |
thousands Of troops a. other nations, |
charged ostensibly with the same mis- |
sion as we were, but sometimes with I
far different prompting motives and cer- |
tainly with different methods Of pro- i
ce6ure.
Unity of front on the part Of these |
defense. forces was very desirable, not |;
to- say imperative, in preserving peace |
full conditions within the area Occu- |
pied by them and their nationals. But i
Interior motives prompted the adoption
OF measures on the part of ut least
one nations armed representatives !;
wiiich were distinctly diStasteful and |;
vrejudicial to the interests Of another, |
thereby adding another angle to . sit- }
udtion already, more than complicated. |
This many-phaSed problem was really |
an international one, and We. even IN |
our isolated position, realized that we |
probably might be forced to take ads |
vantage Of moves made by the others, |
although we declined to. join them In /,