Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-07-05
Freedom of the Seas.

Sooner or later in current Anglo
American discussions over naval limita-
ton Washington and London are going
to bump up against the question COM
monty known as "the freedom of the
seas" There is already a considerable
school of thought in both countries
which favors coming to grips with it
before ""yardstick" and other purely
technical problems are tackled. The
supporting theory is that until the
United States and Great Britain come
to an agreement regarding neutral and
belligerent rights in war time no naval
limitation treaty-whether 1t rests on
parity" or not-will or can carry any
guarantee Of peace.
The Midsummer issue of Foreign AZ
fairs contains q stimulating article by
Charles Cheney Hyde, former solicitor
Of the State Department, on the cardi-
nal Anglo-American naval issue. II is
entitled IAN American Substitute for
British Blockades." Mr.. Hyde proceeds
on the theory that there would be little
American sentiment in favor of permit
ting the British navy to play ducks and
brakes with neutral American shipping
as 1t did in 1914, 1918 and 19l6-in
case Britain should again be belliger-
ent or merely carrying out pacific
blockade" under her League of Nations
obligation, against some breaker Of the
Geneva covenant.
Mr.. Hyde pertinently points out that
in the Kellogg pact the United States
holds pledges" from q great number of
nations not to resort to war. He con-
siders 1t well within the range of pos
sibilities, therefore, that this country
might have just as much reason to in
woke punitive measures against a multi
lateral treaty violator as League mem
bers might have to enforce sanctions
against a country which Haunted the
covenant.
He says:
The matter Of British blockade
is in point. The United States might
address Great Britain somewhat as
follows:
I'VE do not agree with you as to
the rights of blockader. Under ar
ticle Is Of the covenant Of the
League you enjoy large discretion as
to, choice Of means to use against q ,
declared aggressor. Do not resort to
blockade, whether you remain tech
nically at peace or whether you 60
naval force to assert what you
deem to be your right as
blockader against American ship
ping. We, in turn, will agree
that If q country breaks its covenant
under our multilateral treaty and
goes to war in contempt Of its pledge
to us, we shall endeavor to prevent
all commercial. intercourse through
the American merchant marine, and
all such intercourse between Amer
lean territory and that of the treaty.
breaker. But this must be done by
American authority and not by
British feet"
Mr.. Hyde says, almost unanswerably,
that the United States can only escape
the grave issue involved in the diver
gent blockade views of Britain and
America by ourselves undertaking to
provide an effective substitute for the
measures which we oppose" He cites
three American diplomatic precedents
for finding a way where there is a will
the Canadian-American boundary con-
vention Of 1909, the Anglo-American
ship-liquor treaty Of 1924 and the
Japanese-American "gentlemen's agree
ment" on immigration in 1908. I'm all
these cases." Mr.. Hyde points out, each
country promised not to assert what it
believed to be its rights, because Of the
sacrifice which the other was willing to
yield"
Specifically, this seasoned student of
international relations thinks an adj
dendum to the treaty of Paris (the
Kellogg pact) will be necessary fully to
safeguard Americas rights-"an assur-
ance on the part of countries accepting
the treaty that q contracting party,
such as the United States, may in GER
tain ways proceed to penalii treaty
breaker without becoming its enemy"
1t is Mr.. Hyde's considered Judgment
that with such a bulwark we can take
the next step and confidently enter into
negotiations with Great Britain respect
ing blockades and the Limitation Of naval
ornaments"
An--A--------