Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-12-08
BY FRANK H. sIMONDs.

TINE closer we get to the date of the
London Naval Conference, the
clearer 1t becomes that 1t is 60
i ing to take something like a
miracle to produce any consid-
cradle success. The explanation of this
fact Is to be found in the European
situation generally. and in the policy
of France in particular.
In the London conference, as in the
Washington conference eight years ago,
the decisive role will belong to the
French In 1922 1t was the refusal of
the FlenCh to accept fol- submarines
the ratio fixed for battleships which
prevented any Anglo American agree
ment in the matter of cruisers and
opened the way for the long quarrel
that followed.
Today the French have announced
not only that they will not accept the
ratio in submarines fixed for them at
Washington, much less the total aboli-
ton of submarines, but that thew will
not accept any ratio whatever; in a
word, that they reject the whole idea
Of sliding scale of naval strength
And obviously, If the Tardieu Cabinet
holds to this view, the success of the
London conference is we'll nigh out
of the question.
1t, of course, remains possible for
the British and the Americans, or, for
that matter, the British, Americans and
Japanese, to make their own bargain
and let the Latin nations go hang
This, too, Is the present purpose of the
Washington Government, If one can
believe the secret hints going the
rounds
But the dificulty with any such pro-
gram is patent. The United States
and Great Britain can agree as to par
tty. That is to say, the British can
agree that the United States shall have
the same strength in all branches of
naval craft that they possess. They
can also agree to the application OF
some yardStick to establish equivalent
naval values. But what they cannot
agree to is any such reduction of their
own naval strength as will permit Mr.
Hoover to realize his hope for naval
limitation and an escape from the ne
cessity OF fulfilling all of the Fifteen
Cruiser Program.
Britain Accepts Parity.
Great Britain has definitely accepted
the principle Of American parity, but II
has not renounced the idea of British
supremacy in European waters. And
that supremacy is based upon a two
power standard. In practice the Brit
ish hold that their own security rests
upon the possession of naval strength
at least equal to that of France and
Italy. the only considerable naval
powers of the continent.
If France and Italy were prepared
to accept the Washington ratio, namely
10-l0-3.5-3.5 for Britain, the United
States, Italy and France respectively
then there would be no difficulty in
the pathway of an adoption of the tom
mage plan made tentatively by Mac
donald and Hoover, the program
which permits the British to have $50
ships and $4,000 tons against 28 or
81 for the United States with 2S5, OOO
or even 100000 tons. In this plan, ii
will be recalled, We are allotted either
three or six more 10.000-ton cruisers
than the British, to offset their greater
aggregate tonnage.
But the French are not prepared to
accept any such ARRANGEMENT. They
are not prepared to put any limit on
their cruiser tonnage, while the pro-
gram, which they have already adopted
lnsures them of greater tonnage than
they would have under the Washington
ratio. Since, too, the Italians insist
upon parity with the French, it is clear
that the British can only adopt the
Macdonald-Hoover ratio not alone at
mic Cuot oA AlOGGluk 10 the Unlteu states
q parity which In British eyes amounts
to superiority, but also at the cost of
abandoning the two-power standard in
Europe itself.
Obviously the British in this situa-
ton can make q bargain with the United
States by which they agree that we shall
build fleet up to their level but that
level will not be. nifty ships and SAC, 900
tons, but seventy ships and 400, 900 tons.
In such case we shall still have par
ity provided we are prepared, not alone
to complete the Fifteen Cruiser pro-
gram, which would give us sos, 900
tons, but also to undertake another
program which would call for any,
where from seven to ten further 10000
ton cruisers. But such a result of the
London Conference would of course be
a failure for the Hoover program,
which lays its emphasis upon limita-
ton.
Why French Favor League.
From the French point of view, the
London Conference is no more than a
private political deal between the United
States and Great Britain. which has no
relation to the larger question of world
disarmament. The French believe that
disarmament can only be discussed at