Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-11-03
After Stresemann-What?

his diplomatic accords, and the example
of President Wilson, denied by his own
Senate after he had sailed without its
authorization to Versailles, made him
the more wary and the more anxious
for popular sanction.
Traced to Authority.
Stresemann developed a system of
tracing every element of his politics to
some authority. He took his belief in
strong central control within the
Reich from Bismarck" When Graf
Westarp called him a fanatic of unity"
he was flattered. for the epithet lent
him strength. He turned to the Ruhr
and found there no way but that thrust
upon him by the logic of events. Once,
however. the opportunity for construc-
tive work came, he Immediately adopted
his predecessors policy of offering to
mortgage the state railways and in
dustry to provide guarantees to replace
the Ruhr. 1T was the policy of Cuno."
He fell into an accord with the Dawes
group. His understanding with them
paved the way in international discus
sionS for his first suggestion of Locarno.
1t was his own personal success, yet he
was careful, in his exposition of policy
to the Reichstag, to relate all his work
to Muller's note of June z, 1923. pro-
posing truce OF Goo.
Stresemann'S insistence that Germany
accept the Dawes plan meant that
henceforth the allies were to act to-
gether in enforcing payment and that
Germany need no longer fear independ-
ent raids from France. Locarno, trans
ferring the debates that arose from
Versailles from terrain of arms to the
council chamber. put Germany on the
way to Geneva What Stresemann'S
achievement in introducing Germany
into the League really meant can be
understood only when one realizes that
the League for six years had been a
holy alliance of victors rather than a
meeting place of the nations.
u S. Had "CIean Hands,"
One reason why the United States
was the first of the allied nations to
win Germany's gratitude after the war
was that the Senate had refused to ac-
cept the League and thus. in these mat
tiers of putting the treaty into execu-
ton. appeared to have clean hands"
However, the enthusiastic ceremony
of reception at Geneva, followed by the
at Thoiry, brought home
to Germany as nothing else could the
success Of StreSemann's pacific efforts
to reinstate his country. His popularity
grew like Brands, who was ac-
claimed in France only when it became
known that his policy of reconciliation
was immensely beneficial to French
prestige throughout the world. For the
first time since 1870 the two nations
saw that instead of scuffling eternally
as to who was to be the under dog they
might reach agreements profitable to
both. From such a realization it was
easy to proceed to the first trade treaty
ever executed between France and
united Germany, to further modif1ca-
tons of the debt in the Young plan,
and finally the evacuation of Wiesbaden
and the Rhineland.
Stresemann's foundations for the new
Germany have been laid In six years
be brought Germany back to her old
place among the first powers.
UndOing of Hasty Steps.
In six years he undid without violence
most of the haSty and dangerous meas
lreS taken by the allies to enforce the |
Treaty of Versailles. 1t is true that
these measures were most irritating to |
Central Europe but 1t is also true, as
successfully pointed out. |
that they were irritating as well to all |
peace on the continent. His |
logic was beginning to nibble at the
treaty itself
1t is at direct revisions Of the YER
sailles treaty that his future policy was
to have been directed and it is this
precarious program that he has be-
lueathed to Muller, Curtius, Rheinba-
ben, Schubert, Hoesch and their coll
league. II the Stresemann policy is to
survive its founder, certain parts of the
treaty of VerSailleS-thoSe which are
not so just as the return of Lorraine
Or so constructive as the creation of
,he League, or so fundamental as the
recognition of a Polish nation - viii
slowly be abrogated until, like the |
ireaty of Vienna 100 years earlier, it |
will remain for the most part hollow |
md reactionary document, historical |
Realized Nations Need.
Stresemann's opposition to the treaty,
ike all his other policies, was based |
lpon economic argument. Seldom did |
lis arguments interest Germany alone.
IN planning for possible revision of |
he Eastern frontiers, for some possible |
lnion with German Austria or for some |
Instant recognition of Germany's readi-
hess to take back her inundated colonies |
felt the need for a nation |
argely devoted to industry and con-
aiming in the Rhineland the most |
iensely populated regions of Europe, |
If raw materials and foodStuffs. It was |
obvious that the electrical energy of |
he Austrian Alps, the wheat of those
lands which lie to the east of Posen