The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1929-12-17
JAPAN Defines
NAVY FARLEY
AIMS
(continued FrOm Psgs ~

ratio, which, they emphasize, Is
insufficient for attack" and
."only adequate for defense In
home waters"
While the Hoover-Macdonald
thesis Of naval reduction was
built on the theory Of O ratio Of
so per cent instead Of 10 per cent
for Japan, officials were inclined
to feel today that the increased
ratio demanded by Japan offers
no insurmountable barrier to the
success of the conference, pro-
vided it can be worked out in ac-
ceptable categories.
There will have to be much
conference and negotiations, how
ever, before Japan's policy can De
adjusted to the Hoover-M cdonald
thesis. In e preliminary way, this
negotiation was begun here today
when the japanese conference
delegates, visiting here en- route
to London, began a series OF talks
with the American delegates.
The international amenities and
the Misunderstanding were concluded
yesterday. Today the real work
began.
While japanese naval strength
and policy Is a vital conEidera-
ton with the United States, actu-
ally It Is probably Of more con-
Germ to Great Britain than to
this Government because Of
Britain'S wider interests in the
Orient, and tner need for pla-
eating the dominion governments
of Australia and New Zealand.
The granting of Japan's demand
for a ratio Of 20 per cent in all
categories of auxiliary naval
strength would. Of course, make
Japan the naval mistress OF the
orient. How that viii set with
Australia and New Zealand, and
with Britain herself, remains to
be Seen--and remains to be
worked out at the conference II
self. But it is more q problem
Of British concern than Ameri-
can.
Japan Wants Submarines
The former prime minister.
Reiiuro Wakatsuki, who heads
the empires delegation, made It
clear in talking with newspaper
correspondents that Japan win
not necessarily insist upon ex-
actly 10 per cent, category by
category. Or, fiji ether words, II
the ratio fell below 10 per cent
in one category such as cruisers,
it might be compensated for IN
submarines or destroyers, or vice
versa.
Great Britain can expect NO
support from Japan in the desire
to abolish submarines. Japan
considers, WakatSuli said, that
submarines represent an inavlu-
able adjunct to the naval defense
Of her empire, and she viii take
her stand alongside France and
Italy for their retention.
Similarly, Japan regards the
discussion Of abolishing the CAPT.
tai ship, that is. the ship Of more
than 10000 tons, as somewhat
premature. For the time being
at least, Japan desires to retain
her battleships, although she Is
prepared to discuss the prolonga-
ton Of their service and the post
ponement Of their replacement.
What Japan, In effect, desires
Is naval reduction on the old
French thesis Of global tonnage,
with each nation left to decide
for itself what particular cate
CORY Of naval strength, cruisers,
submarines, or destroyers, is best
fitted for its Individual defense.
Significantly enough, the Jap
anese delegates in their CONVEX
sationS In washington have
rather pointedly emphasized their
faith in the kellogg treaty, UNI
der which some fifty-odd nations
have agreed never to resort to
war, but always to settle their
international differences by pa
cific means.
'The forthcoming meeting. !"
said Premier Wakatsuki, makes
the Kellogg pact its starting point.
Under that pact, the signatory
powers are pledged to renounce
war as an instrument Of national
policy, and to settle all interna-
tional disputes only by pacific
means. TO meet under such all-
spices is In itself 3 guarantees Of
success, for policies OF disarnla-
Iment are the natural sequences
of the remuneration Of war.
Japan advocates reduction.
She advocates scaling down the
naval arm amentS of the partici-
pating powers. and she herself
stands ready to reduce her naval
strength proportionately.
"She feels entitled to retain q
minimum strength, insufficient
for attack and adequate only for
defense IN home waters.
That minimum strength" has
been placed at 20 per cent Of what
ever tonnage ultimately Is allotted
to Great Britain and the United
States.
The japanese, spokesman Smil-
ingly evaded questions as to
whether Japan would consider en-
tering q three-poWer naval pact
with Great Britain and the United
States IN the event that Franco
italian or Franco British differ
ences made it impossible for the
London conference to produce q
five-power agreement. Wakatsuh
gravely observed that he would
not envision any such failure.
In some quarters it was felt to-
day that Japan has taken her POI