The daily worker. [volume] (Chicago, Ill.) 1924-1958, 1929-01-04

%14lC1iSo 10 IHlSitSHSu ny bHS StO-
graphical position Of the eastern
coast of Brazil, which affords a pos
sibility for the establishment of
transatlantic air routes between
Europe and South America.
U. S. Gains Control.
Before the war, all forms of COM
munication in South America were
dominated by European capital
Telegraphs and cables were con-
trolled by British and French inter
ests. The press was dominated by
the Havas Agency of France, and
most of the ocean trade routes were
in European hands. So deficient
were the ocean communications be-
tween South and North America
that Argentinians, for example, de-
string to travel from Buenos Aires
to New York, found it faster and
cheaper to take a British vessel to
q European port and thence recross
the Atlantic to the United States,
rather than to wait for the infre-
quent and unsatisfactory service of
American lines.
Since the war, the United States
has been striving to overcome this
situation, to enlarge its control over
South American communications.
Thus the American telegraph and
cable monopoly is rapidly securing
control of cables to South America
and of the telegraph and telephone
lines of the South American coun-
tries. The American news agencies,
Associated Press and United Press,
have largely supplanted Havas as
the suppiier of news to the South
American press. American shipping
interests are extending and strength
ening their South American lines.
At the same time the American gov
eminent has exerted every effort, by
diplomatic pressure and other
means, to prevent the penetration of
European commercial aviation into
South America-for example, by
establishing the Panama Canal zone
as prohibited area over which for
eign planes cannot pass, thus pre-
venting the development of air-lines
between North and South America
by that route, except under Amer
lean control.
In its effort to keep the European
interests out of the air in Latin
America the United States has not
been entirely successful. Several
European firms have secured con-
cessions to establish air routes in
Mexico. Central America and South
America. The most serious threat
against the effort of American cap
ital TO monopolize communication
with South America arises from the
geographical position of the east
coast of Brazil, which juts far out
into the Atlantic Ocean, approach
ing closer to the continent of Africa
than to any part of the United
States.
This geographical location of the
coast of Brazil remains an open in
vitation to Europe to violate the
Monroe Doctrine. Already a French
company has awaited itself of this
geographical circumstance to estab-
lish fast mail route from Paris to
Ruenos Aires by the combined use
of airplanes and swift dispatch
boats over a route running from
Paris to Dakar in French Senegal
in Africa and thence across the
South Atlantic to Pernambuco, the
most easterly point of Brazil.
Brazil is Point.
1t has just been announced that
a German firm intends to use the
same route to establish a regular
service of passenger and mail planes
between Germany and Argentina.
According to the New York Evening
Post (Dec. 26) the Deutsche Luft
Hansa Airlines will operate twelve
passenger planes in service flying
from Germany to Spain, to the
Azores, thence to the Island of Fer
nando de Noronha off the coast of
Brazil, to Rio de Janeiro and Ruenos
Aires. 1t is announced that expert
mental flights over this route will
be made in 1929, and that regular
service-which may be the first
commercial transatlantic air SER
vice for passengers-will be estab-
lished in 1880.
The dangers of the proximity of
the east coast of Brazil to Europe
were frankly admitted in a recent
statement by Julius Klein, director
of the United States Bureau of For
eign and Domestic Commerce in
Washington. Coincident with Hoov-
er's visit to Brazil, Klein, the Off
cial propaganda for American
commerce, published a statement in
dicatirg the extent of Brazilian ma
tural resources and their Importance
~ tmnrir"1 capital. Since 1913 the
United States has increased its