Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-02-24
BY FRANK H. sIMoNDs.


problems of peace ana war has there
been any such proposal as is embodied
in the Capper resolution. AS conse-
quence of the presentation of this reSo-
luton it is inevitable that we shall have
q new discussion of American foreign
relations, not this time turning directly
upon American membership in the
League, but on whether or not we are
willing to be an accessory of the Geneva
body.
This discussion rests upon the fact
that the refusal of the United States to
enter the League meant that, in case OF
q new European war, while all the
League powers might agree upon the
guilt of any state. and undertake
through League machinery to coeIce it.
the United States might remain neutral
insisting upon its rights to trade with
the nation undergoing coercion. In that
case the League powers would not only
have to consider the use of force against
the aggresSor, but also the possible re-
sistance of the United States to the use
OF such power, which would be tech
nically illegal.
Blockade Unavailable.
It has long been perceived at Geneva
that the use of naval power to coerce a
European aggresScr would be practically
impossible as long as the United States
was not member of the League and
not otherwise bound to accept the
Leagues decision as invalidating its
rights as neutral Thus the easiest
means of coercing an aggreSSor- namely
the use of the blockade-would be I'M
available.
To get over this gap the friends of
The League both in Europe and the
United States conceived Of two steps.
FIRST, through the Kellogg pact the
United States was to be committed to
an agreement not to make war, COM
parable to that contained in the Cow
erant of the League, and all League
powers were to join. Second, the at
tempt was to be made 80 persuade the
Omitted States to agree not to insist upon
IS neutral rights in case a nation vio-
sated the Kellogg pact.
This would amount to a situation in
which all the League powers might be
united in coercing single aggreSsor,
pronounced to have violated the Cow
enant, and the United States might be
bound to allow this coercion at the cost
Of its own neutral rights, because the
violator of the Covenant was also the
viOlator of the Kellogg pact. AS mem
berS of the League the European powers
would act directly against the offender.
As signatory to the kellogg pact, we
would consent to stand aside and let
this happen.
But there remained the difhculty that
OBVIOUSLY the United States would not
consent to let any other power or
powers pronounce for it. The Capper
proposal vests in the President of the
United States the power and duty. in
case Of any future war, to Determine
the aggreSsor and to forbid American
export of arms and war nlaterials--in
tact, all products to the nation thus
indicted.
Duty Is Made Presidents.
Here is one Of the most startling de-
NRrtures from our traditional and con-
etitutional methods conceivable. Actu-
ally power is vested In and the duty
imposed upon the President to take us
into any war that may break out. This
S the case because merely to embargo
exports in the case of one Of two bellig-
eFentS would be an unneutral act, max
ing US in fact and in law a belligerent.
The best way to appreciate the i'm
plications of the Capper resolution is
to consider what would have happened
IN August. 1914, had the Capper reso-
luton and the kellogg pact previously
been adopted The declaration of war
BIZ the imperial German government
1HF. Wilson with the duty to declare
wAo was the aggressor. Was it Ger
many. because it had declared war upon
Russia, or was 1t Russia, because 1t had
Mrst resorted to general mobilization?
At the moment Mr.. Wilson was actu-
any framing his neutrality proclama-
tion he would have been obliged to an
u0unce that American citizens we're for
Mldden to export all forms of war ma
tnEiais to one or the other set Of bellig-
erents. And, given the enormous eX-
panSion OF the contemporary conception
Of war materials, what would be in
volved would be an embargo of Aneri-
can exports to tbs naticn put under the
ban, an embargo quite the same as the
embargo and intercourse acts Of
the Jeffersonian regime.
Now, under existing circumstances
the League Of Nations would already
have declared its opinion of which ma
ton was the aggressor. The United
States would then, In theory, concur in
the Leagues decision. But in fact it is
and the people of the United States
might reject the Leagues verdict and
hold the other party in interest to have
BEEN really the aggressor. Then, OF
course, the President would be bound
20 order an embargo upon exports to
the League powers engaged in coercion
Embargo Held Absurdity.
Far more likely would be the posi-
hliity that the United States might de-
eide, as the majority did in August
1914, that not one but both sets OF
belligerents were actually responsible
But any such decision would require
that we embargo all trade with all
League states-a patent absurdity-oI
that we insist upon our neutral rights
In undertaking to coefce nation it had
pronounced an aggressor, when we
should at once come into collision with
the League.
Nor is it in the least a fantastic
thesis that public and presidential
judgment in this country might differ
from the League decision. If Germany
and Austria should decide to unite
that would be an aggression; the
League would be compelled to authorize
the employment of force to prevent
this. The interested powers, France
Czechoslovakia and Poland. would take
UP arms. But would not most Ameri-
cans regard such Austro-G German action
as no more than the exercise of the
right of self determination? Might they
not see in the attack by France anc
her associates the real aggression?
One has to look at the material al
well as the political aspects of thu
case. If one assume that Germany
was pronounced the aggressor by. thu
League and by the President, then al
our exports to Germany would in ef.
feet be embargoed The South, fol
example, would be faced by the loss o.
the enormous and vital German mar
ket for its cotton, the West. for 1t,
copper and foodstuffs. Quite clearl!
the United States Government woult
be forced at once to consider thu
need to reimburse the cotton and foot
states. since 1t would not be fair tina
&Aey alone should bear the burden q
hrfP S1ats~~1ai @rt'cr
u. S. Would Bear Cost.
Thus the situation might occur j