Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-11-03
PACT IS HELD VITAL
ON MEDITERRANEAN
Italy, France, Britain and
Spain Seen as Treaty Par
ties Preceding Conference.
BY PAUL SCOTT MowRER.

News. Copyright, 1929.
PARIS, November "A Mediter-
ranean peace pact for France, Italy
Great Britain and possibly Spain is
now being discussed in connection with
the private negotiations preceding the
London naval conference next January.
This pact would perform among the
powers functions similar to the four
power Pacific pact, the Locarno pact
and the Kellogg pact. Indeed, it is
intimated that unless the Mediterranean
agreement is reached the London con-
ference may result in failure, for it is
widely believed that no technical naval
arrangements are possible except on
solid political base.
Thus. the washington conference was
successful only after dissolution OF the
Anglo-Japanese alliance ana tne con-
cluSion of the four-power PACING pact,
Franco German differences were llqul-
dated only after Locarno and the kel-
logr pact had to be promulgated before
Great Britain and the United states,
which disagreed at Geneva, could reach
their recent compromise. :.
Britain vitality Interested.
The main differences forming OBJ
stacles to the Mediterranean agreement
lie between France and Italy, but
Great Britain is also vitality interested.
Britain's naval armament depends 10
some extent on the French and ItaIlan
armament. IT, therefore, italy, ana
France are unable to agree with Britain
she will doubtless be obliged to make
reservations in connection with ner ne"
1Hn
It is well to emphasize this point
for American readers, because for the
first time 1t appears that the naval
agreement in which Americans are IN
terested may be jeopardized by STU
alton In waters where America is
scarcely interested at all, The tendency
of the Washington agreements, as since
compromise, is to make the United
States NAVY supreme in American
waters. the japanese Navy supreme IN
Far Eastern waters and the British
Navy supreme in European waters.
But is the British navy supreme even
In Europe? In the Far East there Is
only one great power. In the Americas
there is only one, but in Europe there
are several. Japan is protected from
naval attack by the vast expanses OF the
Pacific, which only capital ships can
hone to cross for offensive purposes.
The United States is similarly protected
by the Pacific on one side and the At
lantic on the other.
Waters Are Narrow.
But in European waters the English
Channel, the, North Sea, the Baltic ana
the Mediterranean are narrow. Britain
NAV be- protected by present agreements
from attack by far-on powers ike the
United States and Japan, but what
about its immediate neighbors? II 1t
were only a question of capital SHIPS
the question would be less urgent, foc
Britain's superiority in capital ships Is
indubitable. She has Meet larger than
France. italy and Germany put to-
gether But in the World war capital
ships showed themselves or small utility
in these narrow seas. WllaE counts here
are small craft, particularly submarines
and airplaIles.
THE only way in, which Britain can
rossibiy keep naval superiority in Eu-
rope is by abolishing submarines ana
strictly limiting aircraft, or else by some
form of political agreement tending by
indirect means to attain the same end.
In the North Sea and the baitlc
Germany is still too weak to diSqulet
Britain The. channel between France
and Britain Is so narrow as to make 1t
dificult to conceive of any scheme OF
defense for Britain except direct, Wig
orous counter attack.
Position Of England.
The Mediterranean Is different. The
Mediterranean is considered by British
experts as vital to the empire. 1t is to
control the, Mediterranean that the
British policy in these regions has been
direct for so many years to holding
Gibraltar, the Suez Canal and to de-
veloping a big naval base at Malta. AS
far as capital ships are concerned 1t is
neither France nor Italy which IS
supreme in the Mediterranean, but
marines, airplanes? Not only are
France and Italy engaged in sort Of
building competition with one another
in these so-called auxiliaries. but al
ready either appears strong enough 10
cut Britain'S communications and
bomb or torpedo all the British ship
ping from these waters.
Britain has reluctantly agreed 10
abandon Far Eastern and American
naval control, but this Is all the more
reason why she must make serious
effort to keep control Of the Mediter-
ranean. Britain's interest is therefore,
first, that italy and France should
agree between themselves. and then
that both should agree with Britain
and indirectly this Is also the interest
of the United States and Japan, so lar
as these last two powers care about the
general limitation of navies.
The first thing to be done, then is to
help France and italy agree. Britain
seems to have done all she could In
this respect a few weeks ago when she
suggested that italy open negotiations
with France. Aristide BRAND accepted
the Italian overtures enthusiastically
70 M
not only toward a Franco-1talian naval
agreement, but toward some more gen.
eral peace pact. The fall Of the BRAND
government has interrupted negotia-
tions. but they will be begun on prac-
tically the same lines by any new
French government. Even with the
greatest good will on both sides, the
accord will admittedly be dincult.
Political Irritation.
First there is the general political ir-
ritation. Italy feels that France stands
in the way of its development. France
wants Italy for friend, but without
giving up anything to buy this friend
ship After two years of stormy nego-
tiations, the two countries were on the
verge of concluding, with Sir Austen
Chamberlain's help, a treaty of friend
ship Just year ago, but Mussolini SUD
denly broke everything of and no prog
ress has been made since.
Specifically the main outstanding
questions between France and Italy are
the status of the Italians in Tunis, the
extension of the Italian colonial from
tiers at Frances expense in Africa anc
the perennial Italian complaint thai
France harbors anti-Fascist Italian po
Iitical refugees, who spend their TIM
plotting for the lives Of the Fascis
leaders.
None, of these questions is insoluble
but all are difficult. In the naval ques