Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-03-10
BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.

Ern6UO0Al CONTROVERSIES IOuS1L VIII
ink rather than blood that the!
i should dominate public attention
for a certain time and then sud
denly disappear, not because they have
been settled, but because the public has
become bored with the subject. Ger.
tainly this is what has happened ir
the Anglo-American naval debate
which, following the final furry or
both sides of the Atlantic provoked BY
the personal statement of Sir Esme
Howard, the British Ambassador ir
Washington, has been forgotten in the
rush of Inauguration ceremonies.
There is, however, danger In this tenn
porary ignoring of an unsettled issue
since there is the evident possibility that
1t may at any moment be dragged into
the limelight again. It is, therefore
essential that the American people
should perceive the point to which re-
cent events have brought the debate
and realize what has been accomplished
and what remains still unsettled. 1t is
above all important to recognize that
the main issue remains quite as per-
tinent now as at any time.
As a consequence of the action OF
the United States Congress we now
have. built, building or authorized,
100000 tons of cruisers. This must be
set against 100000 for Britain and
205,000 for Japan. It is manifest. then,
that on the basis Of 5-5-3, the wash
ington ratio fixed for battleships, both
,JaDan and ourselves are, viS-a-v1s Great
Britain, still far below parity, our short
age amounting to 100000 tons and the
japanese to $4,000 tons. Parity as we
estimate 1t could, therefore, only be ar
rived at as we and the Japanese should
undertake to build to cover our Snort
age or Great Britain might agree TO
reduce her surplus. In any event there
could be no question OF failing 10 puma
the ships which We have authorized.
And. even assuming what Is today
totally Unlikely. that Britain were pre-
pared to accept $50 900 tons as a maxi
mum. we should still have to build
SO 600 tons, while the British strapped
an equal amount.
Actual Issue Defined.
This Is the actual issue between the
british and ourselves. At Geneva We
commended for mathematical parity, the
British for combat equality. The dis
tinction grows out Of the fact that our
naval advisers estimate our needs 10 oe
comprehended In the 10,000-ton cruiser,
since we have few but widely scattered
naval bases. British advisers, by con-
trast. see British needs to be SUCH tnat
Britain must have many smaller cruisers
for its different requirements.
At Geneva we proposed that the max
irnum tonnage should be $4,000. TINS
was our last figure and we demanded
freedom To use all of this tonnage IN
10 1DO-ton boats. But the British quite
correctly pointed out that, since they
were Obliged to build many smaller
boats. they would be unable TO build
as many lO, 000-ton boats. As con-
sequence, we should possess, IN our
larger number Of lO,O00-ton boats
mounting 8-inch guns. q combat SUI
periority. Thus We might nave 80
while the British had but rs, together
with 20 5,OO0-ton ships mounting o.
inch guns. Thus, in any fight between
the two fleets, We should have oe-
cisive advantage in guns.
To meet this difficulty the British
uroposed that there should be Two
forms of parity, that there should be
equality in the number of lo,00O-ton
cruisers and equality in the smaller
boats carrying guns Of lesser callber.
But the obvious objection to this from
our point of view lay in the TACT that
we had no use for the smaller boats.
Here was the actual breaking point at
Geneva. although it was covered by
technical details which left the gen.
eral public in angry obscurtty:
AS a result of the recent legislation
We are now assured of % 10,000-ton
boats. The British on their side, built
and building, have 81 similar ships,
several, to be sure, slightly smaller, put
all carrying, or capable OF carrying, D.
inch guns. The actual tonnage WORKS
out 23O. 900 for us and 203, 900 for them.
on their views of combat parity they
are thus ships and a little less
than 10000 tons short. AS for the
Japanese, they have, built and build.
ing, IL boats of 100000 tonnage, ana
are thus 10000 tons, or 3 ships, short
of the 5-5-3 standard in this category.
Situation Is Different.
When. however, one turns to smaller
eiasses the situation is quite different.
Thus, while we have but 10 cruisers,
mounting 6-inch guns and totanng
10000 tons, the British have about
200 900 and the japanese 100000 tons.
This disparity is not, however, quite
as great as it seems, because Wnne
all our ships are of 1000 tonnage only
tons and none of the japanese Is above
5.I7o. Again, while all Of our boats
mount 6-inch guns, only OF the
oldest japanese boats carry. guns
larger than 5iz inches.
The problem which must be posed
for the Washington conference OF 1881,
or any earlier meeting, is thus quite
clear. We have demanded mathematical
parity. To obtain that, assuming that
the British decline to reduce their pres
ent strength, We shall be confronted IN
1881 with the necessity to construct III
more 10, O00-ton cruisers. Any such pro-
gram would give us an Overwhelming
superiority In the battle line, unless the
British undertook both to meet our pro-
gram in 10000 boats and retain their
smaller craft. But if they did this, then
they would again destroy all prospect
Of parity based on tonnage.
AS long as the United States insists
upon having a tonnage in 10000 boats
equal to that of the British In al
cruisers, or as long as the British insisi
upon having as many 10000 cruisers a:
we have and as many smaller boats
as they need there is no escape from
deadlock. Moreover, while 1t Is con-
ceiyable that the British might not
attempt in fact to meet our program
in IO,000-ton boats and at the same
time maintain their schedule in thu
smaller craft, it is a moral certainty thai
no British government, Tory, Labor OF
Liberal, would ever agree to accept
treaty obligation which would in effec
place it in a position of patent inferiorit!
in combat craft.
In this situation it is clear that there
can be no solution without compromise
There is, however, one line of possible
accommodation, which, while 1t woult
not solve, might adjourn the debate. W.
have at the present moment 10 1000
ton boats, which will not become OBJ
selcte until 1894. Even if we even
tuslly replace these ships by 1o,o00-tor
bcStS the question will not becom
pertinent during the next dozen years
At the Washington Conference Of 1872
it was agreed that there should be new
meeting in 1891 and nothing Is NOR
likely than that the meeting of 1913