Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-08-04
What Naval Parity Means

eminent, and would probably have ex-
ceeded 1t in gun power because OF Its
additional five 10,000-ton cruisers.
This Ia why. Chairman Fred Britten,
chairman of the House committee On
naval affairs, in q significant statement
published in the magazine Of the New
York Herald Tribune Of February 81,
1929, declared that the completion Of
the Is American cruisers authorized in
1929 will, unless Great Britain or
Japan expand their naval programs,
place the United States on a basis
somewhere near equality with any other
naval force 1t might be called upon to
meet"
Naval Treaty Suggested.
In view of this substantial equality
the simplest method of arriving at a
naval agreement would be for both the
British and American governments to
make O treaty allowing each country
TO carry out its existing programs. Such
q treaty should clearly define these pro-
grams and should prohibit any addi-
tional construction. Under such treaty
the United States would be superior
destroyers and submarines, but the
British Empire would be superior to the
United States In small cruisers and in
total cruiser tonnage.
If such arr agreement is concluded
both the British and American govern
ments will have to modify the positions
taken at the Geneva conference of 1927.
At this conference the British Empire
insisted not only upon maintaining
feet of 10 cruisers of all kinds. but also
upon limiting the number of treaty
cruisers TO IL each for the United States
and the British Empire, Under this
proposal the United States would have
been obliged to construct many more
small cruisers than 1t desired.
The United States. on the other hand,
insisted at Geneva in measuring naval
not also In terms Of gun-power. 1t de-
ciined to admit at that conference that
an eight-inch-gun cruiser was worth
two smaller cruisers. and 1t did not
suggest the system Of fuctuating tom
nages. under which power wishing to
concentrate upon cruisers might deduct
destroyer tonnage for this purpose.
Already there are evidences that both
governments have receded from the
positions maintained at Geneva. Even
the Baldwin government quietly reduced
is objective from 20 to so cruisers.
Apparently the Macdonald government
Is willing to accord the United States
superiority in large cruisers In return
for British superiority in small cruisers.
Thus In his address to the House of
Commons on July "a. Mr.. Macdonald
he had agreed that without in any
way departing from the conditions of
Htrity. a measure of elasticity can be
allowed so as to meet the requirements
OF the two nations"
In his speech last April before the
League Preparatory Commission. AM
bassador Hugh Gibson set forth the
concessions which the United States
was willing to make. It was willing,
he declared. IL consider gun power and
age as well as tonnage In arriving at q
was also willing to accept French pro-
posal whereby within o certain percen-
tage limit one government could utilize
| q portion OF its destroyer tonnage for
cruiser construction. Such is the
"yardstick" formula.
Serapping Of Ships Doubled.
10 should be emphasized that any
agreement based on the status quo, a.
outlined above, assumes that the United
States win construct the Is treaty
cruisers authorized In the 1929 law. It
may be true that the present admins
tration does not wish to construct these
cruisers IL It can obtain an agreement
for naval parity with Great Britain
sible basis for parity agreement which
would relieve the United States of the
construction OF these IS cruisers Is q
reduction by Great Britain of It's present
cruiser strength.
In other words, a parity agreement
could be obtained II the British govern
rnent agreed to scrap Is Of its 1S
treaty cruisers. built and building: or
IN place Of such cruisers. It might scrap.
(, say. 80 OF its small cruisers. The
| scrapping Of these small cruisers would
| leave the British navy with 10 large
cruisers, In comparison to eight for the
| United States.
Any such proposal would .undoubt-
eddy be rejected by the United States
simply because. In the absence of nu-
merous naval bases and merchant ships
| capable Of being mounted with six-inch
| guns, we feel that we need more large
cruisers than the British Empire. In
order to avoid building at least the
| majority Of the IS cruisers authorized
| In 1922 the United States must ask
| the British government to scrap an
equal number Of its large cruisers.
Represent Great Expenditure.
Can the United States In fairness
EXPECT the British government to make
such O sacrifice? Under such pro-
pcsal the United States would merely
| promise not to construct its Is cruisers
In the future and thus save to the
American people more than 500 600,
600. But under such O proposal the
British government would have tc
scrap 10 large cruisers, which have only
recently been completed, and five others
/ which viii soon be completed
The British government has already
expended more than e34 ,O0e, 900 upon
these last I'VE vessels. and more than
| twice as much upon the other 10. Any
proposal under which the British would
1 scrap is new ships and the United
1 states scrap none would seem 20 the
British public O cne.sided proposition
4 Il would undoubtedly be rejected ron
, financial and strategic reasons.