Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-03-10
II. S.-BRTTISH NAVY ISSUE
IS HELD WORLD MENACE
Agreement by Washington to London
Terms Until 1881 Suggested
by Observer.

1 o-AuCu guns up W TIC AAiiAC VI .o'UVO
tons and for the period lasting until the
conference of 1941. There would re-
main the problem of bridging the gap
between the total British tonnage of
400, 900 and the American of 100000
This could be covered in one of two
ways; either the British might agree to
reduction of their present tonnage or
the United States might build up to it.
If the British agreed to accept a
maximum tonnage of $4,000, that
! would impose upon us the necessity OF
constructing five 10,000-ton cruisers in
10 years before 1941: If they insisted
upon maintaining their present total OF
100000 tons, we should have to build
| 10 boats in the same period But, OBJ
viously, neither would be an excessive
strain upon our resources. It Is even
conceivable that for these years our
Government might agree upon di-
vision which would allow 100000 ton
mage to be used in boats Of 1000 tons
or less and 6-inch guns. leaving $50, 900
or 100000 tons for the 10,0o0-ton boats,
as the case might be, dependent upon
the British claim for total tonnage.
But one thing is perfectly clear. The
British are not going to agree to any
compact which will formally condemn
their fleet to decisive inferiority in the
combat class. They may have to sub
NIT to such state of fact, since OBJ
viouSly we can, If We choose, outbuild
them, but they will not sign a contract
accepting the principle, because, de-
spite present handicapS, not a few
Britons are confident that the balance
of wealth and power between the two
countries will be readjusted in the next
half century Moreover, confess do
not see how any American, viewing the
situation with the least objectivity,
could expect such a concession.
II the British government should pro-
pose to President Hoover that there
should be an agreement upon a total
cruiser figure of 350,000-or 10000
that of this total 10000 tons should be
allotted to smaller cruisers carrying g.
inch guns and the balance to 10,000-ton
standard cruisers and that this state of
facts should endure until new confer
ence met in 1941, no vital interest of
the United States, no principle advo-
Gated at Geneva, would be compromised
We should still have to build seven new
cruisers between 1881 and 194l, but we
shall have to build them in any event
If We are to hold to our policy Of parity.
Would Obtain Bargain.
As for the British, they would obtain
what is to my mind the best possible
bargain now available ] am satisfied,
as a result of following the recent de-
bates in Congress, that the determine
ton to have parity Is today irresistible
Moreover, as our foreign commerce Is
almost certain to grow under the Hoo
yer administration, the demand for
adequate protection will keep pace. If
no other way is found to attain parity,
am convinced that Congress, after
failure of the Washington Conference
OF 1891 to solve this problem, viii 60
straight ahead with naval construction
until it attains the end sought.
? On the other hand, since we have
the 10 smaller cruisers and they win
not become obsolete before 1884, we
are in position to give present heed
to the British arguments. to give tenn
porary satisfaction to their needs for
smaller cruisers and still preserve
parity in total tonnage and equality in
the combat line. Moreover, o dozen
In both countries will have materially
cooled of. We shall have had at least
a decade Of actual equality, and on
both sides of the Atlantic 1t will be
possible to review the whole dispute
effectively.
But unless some such adjustment is
found fairly promptly, it is difficult to
escape the conviction that we shall be
cursed with long period Of Anglo
American pickering and, what Is per-
haps even more disastrous, the whole
progress of world appeasement and adj
justment will be arrested, for no one
can exaggerate the evil effects for Eu-
rope of an Anglo-American dispute over
limitation of ornaments.
At Odds With Authorities.
Moreover, although in this I find my
self squarely at odds with some of our
naval authorities, cannot for the life
of me see any practical advantage of
pressing the abstract principle of parity
now, parity expressed in terms of TO-
OOO-ton cruisers, when we have the
smaller boats and are bound to keep
them In service for at least IL years
more.
It seems to me that the British con-
tention that our idea Of parity based
on tonnage would impose upon them
inferiority in the combat class Is unan-
swerable. In the end, If this dispute is
to be settled amicably, there will have
to be some form Of compromise, which
gives to the British an advantage in
tonnage, expressed In smaller craft, and
allows us a proportionate advantage in
combat craft, but naturally not OF any
such overwhelming character as our
present thesis would imply.
believed in the 15-cruiser bill be-
cause on no other terms was 1t possible
for us to have Navy in any measure
equal to the British. I still believe in
equality as between the two fleets, but
the time has come when fair-minded
Americans must perceive that parity. as
we reckon it, is not equality and that
adjustment must depend upon mutual
compromises And a temporary COM
promise, such as have outlined, would
give a breathing spell Of a dozen years
not only to consider the question OF
naval strength, but also to discuss the