Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-09-15


outcome. Presidents were elected and
deposed. dictators rose and were as
saSsinated, with callous regularity. Sc
cret societies, like the Carbonarios, were
maintained. During the war Sidonio
Pals who had assumed absolute power
in the name OF the army. was shot down
in spite Of the country's danger. and
during his imposing funeral bombs were
exploded throughout the city as warn
ing against future relationships. When
Gen. Carmona came into power his
first task was to break the professional
politician.
These men," he explained to me.
formed a little oligarchy within the
| body polite. They were like feudal
chieftainS. In its decision to take over
dictatorial power and restore Portugal
to its former estate the army moved pri-
marty against them.
Type Of CannIbal.
"In Africa you will find type of can
nibal known as the KaSsai Within our
ranks we call these white savages of
politics after them. 'KaSSais' Of the
Tagus instead Of the KonRo. In the
name OF liberty the 'Kassai' was able
to DO anything. He filled his own
pockets with gold. gave his supporters
rich positions in the administratt anil
ruined the country"
Today the "KaSsais." If they exist at
ALI lead q hidden life. The secret
police call them the furmigas braucns
or white ants" because, like the IA
nous termites of Angola, they never
come out into the light, but work con-
cealed until the edifice which they are
devouring crumbles and falls. Their
conquest and probable ultimate disap-
pearance has been the greatest achieve
ment Of President CarmonaS career.
+ Far more original danger than the
political parasite is the revolutionary
parasite. Portugal in 1920 resembled an
italian city state Mt the time Of the
Renaissance.
Revolution" the President once said.
had become q career like any other.
| There were certain groups in the city
who could provide at any time. for a
round sum. any number Of reSolute
scoundrelS ready to be armed and sent
out against any opponent.
Most vicious Of all. revolution had
become to such an extent an institution
that many civilians, who were SO nu-
merous that In the end one had TO in
vent q name for them and call them
the RevolucionarioS Civis-Lay Revolu-
tionaries-joined themselves to the
armed forces or pretended to
join themselves to the armed forces
whenever there was q coup
d'etat. These adventures were uu-
fortunately recognized by the first re-
public. after It had driven out Dom
Manuel II. and they received q more
than adequate compensation "of their
services" Since then, Of course. there
has always been O vsst number of
Revolucionarios Civis to assert that
they had participated in every success
full revolt and to claim their
recompense. BY refusing to recognize
them in 1925 hope that we have now
rid ourselves of them. They were a
symptom Of the political illness which
we are trying to cure"
An Intelligent Listener.
Gen. Carmona always says I'VE"
instead Of 81" He is the one dictator
in Europe who ahhors the explode alton
of his own individuality.
When one approaches him ne is al
ways an attentive, fiattering and intelli-
gent listener. yet his answers are cir
cumspect. Concise enough whsn de-
Scribing events or discussing facts, he
will at once become silent II the CONVEX
, sation approaches some present enter
prise or modern instance in which the
government Is interested.
That" is his response, should be
the affair of the minister of such-And-
such. and I must refer you to him."
| Or
"Senhor So-and.So is effecting this
reform, and you must address yourself
to him and not to me-"
This is the modesty of the eonstitu-
tional monarch and not that Of the die
tator. There Is something ironic In the
ins!stence with which President Car
mona refuses to WELD the big stick.
Obviously, the attitude is a certain de-
| tense against the all too present threat
OF assassination, vet he Is a brave man,
and q higher purpose determines his
choice Of anonymity. To obtain the
unity of the country he had first to OBJ
tain that of the army, which controlled
the country. BY invoking his cabinet,
by retiring behind any one Of the APP
pointees who collaborate with him. and
by speaking of I'VE" upon every occa-
sion, he stresses an accord.
The Portuguese Army Is not easy to
unity. There are too many high spir-
tied individualiSts champing for power
and position in q corps where unlini-
| tied opportunity is rare. There was a
| time before Gen. Carmona's rise to
power when the army was not at all
one in It's purpose.
1.-THE movement Of the 2Sth of May
was a surprise" he says reminiscentlv,
because nobody was prepared for con-
certed movement from the soldiers. Was
it really possible to unite the Army?
None Of the politicians believed that
such q move could succeed. However,
union was and Is fact"
In making his statement, President
| Carmona overlooks the dissolution Of the
military triumvirate Of which he was
one member, and the exiting Of numer-
Gus obstreperous ofhcers who later
were allowed to return. The President
prefers to maintain O strategic silence
about such matters.
1--WE have had" he nevertheless adj
mitted upon another occasion, "des
sons who, having sown the wind, had 70
reap the tempest. In the precarious
state of the nation It was necessary to
act swiftly and decisively. There were
certain persons in our path. We put
them aside"
Even, Placid Voice.
Gen. Carmonas voice Is never
raised. It flows on evenly, placidly,
serenely.
state" he continued, I'VE do not do It
vilely. In the night. Our man leaves in
blaze Of elegance. The best cabin on
the ship has been reserved for him. He
arrives at the quai to find rank Of
soldiery drawn up and presenting arms,
so that he ernbarks with the fullest
honors Of the army. Furthermore, those
individuals who do not 90 into voluri-
tary exile in France or italy or Eng
land are not sent away to q St. Helena
on certain Of the Cape Verdes, but in.
stead to our most prosperous colonies.
to Angola, to Sac Thofne or to Madeira. -
| Gen. CArmona's primary ambition
was not to exile or imprison, but TO