Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-09-29
BRITISH MASSES FORCED
NAVAL ACCORD WITH u. S.
MacDOnald's Success i'm Election Laid to
Desire for Friendship Between
Two Nations.

I to lessen the value of his concessions,
either by discussing the question OF alli-
ance. which Is absurd. or of debt can
collation., which Is at the least untimely.
An agreement upon the naval question
will Of itself suf1ce to liquidate the only
dispute of any. importance We have, or
can have, with the British and restore
Anglo American relations to a satisfac-
tory basis.
One obvious danger, however. remains
to be faced. The Washington confer
ence ended in very unpleasant rum
pus because the British tried to enlist
our aid in abolishing the submarine.
But France, Italy, Japan and many
smaller nations were then and are still
convinced Of the usefulness to them OF
the underSea boat. And France is today
at least as displeased with British policy
as she was in 1922.
While it is unlikely that either Italy
or France will refuse to attend a new
Geneva, both will 60 to any new meet
ing disgruntled, suspicious and by TO
means disposed to make any conces-
Sions. France would like nothing better
| than to see the Labor government ever
thrown, since she believes it to be hos
tile. AS for Italy, she was the worst
sufferer from the Snowden tactics at
The Hague.
Wholly apart from The Hague episode.
too, France and all other Continental
powers are inStinctively, II absurdly,
fearful of what they describe as Anglo
Saxon hegemony. They have already
begun to read into the proposed naval
agreement q meaning that goes far be-
yond any narrow question of parity and
extends to that of actual partnership
financial, naval and political. In o
word, France Is even more diSgruntled
than in 1922, when her representa-
tives upset most of Mr.. Hughes pro-
gram at Washington. Italy is in still
worse temper.
Fine Diplomacy Needed.
Such being the case. it Is going to
require a good deal of real diplomacy
to engineer any .Anglo-American pro-
gram through new conference. And,
to a degree at least, any agreement be-
tween ourselves and the British must be
contingent upon an acceptance Of GER
tain ratios by both France and Italy. to
say nothing of Japan. This is the case
because British cruiser strength is nat
urally to a degree based upon the
strength Of the two Mediterranean pow
ers. Australia and New Zealand are
equally concerned about Japanese tom
mage.
II Japan agrees, Britain and the
United States can go ahead. as they
were prepared to do had the Geneva
conference succeeded, but agreement
will be subject to modification to meet
any French and Italian circumstances,
and the value Of the agreement may
thus be materially reduced. Nor can
one overlook the fact that the British
course at Geneva has aroused Cont
FOL a
reversal in the matter Of reserves.
There will in all probability be opposi-
ton In Parliament and in Congress
more serious in the latter-but it does
not seem possible that one of the most
StateSmanlike agreements Of our own
time can be wrecked by legislative re-
lection. And in my judgment it would
be an inexcusable folly If the American
Congress assumed responsibility for such
a disaster.
British Good VIII Seen.
do not see how any people could
have given a more convincing evidence
of a desire to reach q friendly and rea-
sonable agreement than the British have
now supplied, nor how any fairer solu-
ton of the vexed question of parity
could be discovered. In their desire to
put an end to lamentable controversy
the brlClSn government ana the brlClSn
people have come at least half way.
Not only the United States and Britain
but the whole world will be advantaged
by a settlement.
Naturally, as an American, I should
prefer that our estimates prevailed and
that we should have 81 rather than Is
10, 000-ton cruisers and all the tons of
additional cruisers our experts propose.
But whether the British or American
estimates are adopted. we have attained
substantial parity. The day an agree
ment is offlciaily accepted will prove
the most profitable days work for peace
since Locarno, not because there was
danger Of an Anglo-American war, but
because If Great Britain and the United
States could not agree about ornaments
1t was hopeless to expect the curtail-
ment of ornaments and the cessation
Of preparation for new wars anywhere
on this planet.
Copyright. 1921