Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-12-22
EUROPE THINKS AMERICA
WANTS NAVAL EXPANSION
Difference of Opinion in U. S. and Abroad
Is Held to Show Parity and Reduc.
tons Are Incompatible.

Hoover's advisers were obliged to face
the fact that 1t could not be had BY
reduction. So far from reducing her
program Of 100000 tons, the United
States was obliged to expand it by
$4,000 tons, as she was obliged to in
crease the number Of her boats from
80 to SO, assuming she put her excess
tonnage in 7,000-ton boats. This con-
dition resulted from the fact that the
British placed the minimum figure of
security at $4,000 tons. Thus In point
OF fact II lty Is foreshadowed by a
double process, the gradual lowering Of
the British tonnage from 100000 to
$4,000 and the equally gradual expan-
sion OF the American from the 100000
OF the Is program cruisers to $4,000,
the end to be attained In 1895.
On balance this does represent q re-
duction in world tonnage Of 10000 tons.
the difference between the British re-
auction and the American expansion.
But on the other hand-and the point
Is important in view of its political i'm
plicatiorls at home and abroad-it does
mean further expansion of American
armament. The United States is going
to conference ostensibly called to pro-
mote reduction of ornaments, commit
own. And manifestly this point win be
seized upon by the Japanese, the French
and the Italians.
Tacit Condition Holds.
Moreover, even in the case of the
Macdonald-H Hoover agreement, there is
more or less tacit condition. While
the British have fixed their own needs
at 339, 900 tons, that estimate Is based
upon the existing and proposed strength
OF the other three naval powers-France,
Italy and Japan. But II one or more
OF these powers shall appear at London
demanding an increased cruiser tom
mage, the British will be compelled
automatically to increase their figure in
the interests of security and then the
United States will have to do likewise
In the name of parity.
Manifestly, then, the real issue at
London is not reduction but Limitation.
Whatever happens the United States
Will nave to build more cruisers and
expand tonnage beyond the limits of
the Coolidge programs. But limitation
depends upon the arrival Of an agree
ment between the British on the one
hand and the French and Italians on
the other as to some ratio of strength.
II, as now seems likely, the Latin
powers refuse to accept any ratio, the
British can agree with the United
States that they will maintain a naval
strength equal to the French and
italian combined and recognize the
right OF the United States to equal that
strength. But then that means an
ever variable parity, with the Ameri-
can program always contingent upon
the British and the British upon the
French and the Italian?
Dangers Are Unmistakable.
Given the difficulties of the British
situation, which are real, the dangers
OF misunderstanding are unmiStakable.
AS far as the British government and
public are concerned the issue OF parity
has been settled by the general accept
ance of the American claim. Even If
the American definition Of parity seems
lnexact, the British are not going to
night about it, even automatically.
They have washed the United States
out as prospective foe.
But British public opinion has not
reached the stage where 1t is prepared
to accept reduction of British strength
VlS-a-viS France and Italy, which seems
to endanger British security, merely to
satisfy the American demand for both
parity and reduction. But on the
other hand America can make no case
for limitation with the Latin powers,
since she has not only outdistanced all
the world in her recent building pro-
gram, expressed in the fifteen cruiser
bill. but is also contemplating further
expansion to reach the Hoover-Mac-
donald figures of parity.
There remains the question Of aboli-
ton, which applies exclusively to SUBJ
marines. but since Japan and France
have formally declared their purpose to
retain these boats, it is a foregone con-
cluSion that nothing of real importance
will be done in this direction.
In sim then there iS a very real
contradiction between the American
and European views Of American policy.
On this side of the Atlantic 1t Is be-
heved that the United States Is going
to Europe to support the principle OF
reduction, of effective disarmament.
But in Europe America appears as the
nation which, in its fifteen cruiser bill,
has undertaken the most grandiose Of
armament programs OF recent years,
and in the Hoover Macdonald CONVEX
sations even adopted an additional
expansion.
This paradox between American
principles and American policy arises,
Of course, from the fact that parity and
reduction are incompatible. To attain
parity the United States last year
adopted a construction program Of
10000 tons. The Hoover-Macdonald
conversations almost inevitably commit
us to an additional 10000 tons.
How can the United States urge re-
duction upon France. italy or even
Japan in the face Of such an expansion
on her own part?
Within the area 'of the possible, what
then is to be expected? Parity pre-
cludes reduction in cruiser tonnage.
French and Japanese policies exclude
submarine diminution. There remains
the field of battleships and this after
all promises to be the central issue.
Copyright, 1922