The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1929-08-07
BRITISH FIGHT
]. s. CRUISER
CLAIMS
BY GEORGE r. HOLMES,
rnt.rnntInnaI Newa service

INTERNATIONAL AeWb GGrNhGN
Despite the "substantlal progress"
which invariably IL reported after
each Dawes-MacD Donald naval con.
ference in London, very wide gulf
still exists between Great Britain
and the United States on the cruiser
question.
What progress has been made
toward the projected Angio-Amert.
can naval agreement has been along
lines other than cruisers. So far a.
this controversial element Of the
situation il concerned, the two gov.
ernments are about as far apart as
they ever were. This was ascer-
tained today from most authorita-
tive sources.
Almost . Deadlock
As regards capital ships. sub
marines and other classes OF fight.
ing craft there exists pretty general
accord. The British are Just 80
anxious as President Hoover to save
money on replacement OF capital
ships at some $45,OOO,000 per ship.
Both are willing to extend the life
OF present battleships and probably
decrease their size when replace
ment time comes. Both are willing
to give up submarines, provided the
other naval powers. France, Italy
and Japan, consent to Join them.
But on the cruiser question there
Is such q vast difference OF opinion
that it almost justifies the descrip-
ton OF q deadlock. At least, AM
bassador Dawes and his aides in
London have thus far been unable
to convince the llard-boiled. British
admiralty officials of the justice
and sense Of the American program
of cruiser parity.
Scrap or Build
Britain has overwhelming cruiser
preponderance. The only way Ameri.
can equality can be achieved IL for
Britain to scrap down to the Ameri-
can strength or for the United
States to build UP to the British.
The British admiralty has thus
| far, 1t Is learned, stood adamant
against any scrapping. President
Hoover. for reasons Of economy az
well as of world policy, Ii unwilling
| to build up. Construction has now
been stopped in both British and
4
American yards.
The only alternative Is to strike
upon a program which win take
into account American destroyer and
| submarine superiority for a period
Of years, leaving Britain superior in
cruisers. Thus, the negotiations in
variabIy return to the question:
How many rusty destroyers and
wartime submarines tdlinR at
American docks, equal how many
modern British cruisers. steadily in
commission"
AdmiraIs ScOrnful
There are admirals in the Ameri.
can Navy who fairly snort at the
idea OF trying to measure the rela-
tive fighting strength of Americas
rusty destroyers and Britain's mod.
ern cruisers. They say no naval
yard stick, however devised, could
possibly bring the two navies to the
| same measurement OF fighting eff
| ficiency on any such theory or equa-
ton.
The British admiralty experts at
the abortive Geneva conference
steadily insisted that a minimum of
| some 375 900 tons of fast modern
cruisers is necessary to protect the
| interests Of the far-flung British EN-
pire. That. they contend, Is the
lowest defensive limit for empire
needs. There has been no change
in this admiralty policy since the
Dawes.McDonald conferences began.
| The United States could complete
| the 15-cruiser program, now eus-
pended by President Hoover. and
| still be far short of that mark.
| Meanwhile, the negotiations con-
| tinue, with Ambassador Dawes in
frequent cable and telephone con-
| tact with Washington,