Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-01-13
EUROPE LOOKS ON PACT
AS AID TO STATUS QUO
Hopes Kellogg Treaty Enforcement Will
Obligate U. S. to Accept League
Decisions.

uTdWdl IEOH1 Europe HAS SeeIileu likcty
to endure at least for considerable
period of years. Thus for Europe the
Kellogg treaty holds out the immediate
promise of opening a way to the reali-
cation of the European hope. Obviously
it would be a simple matter to argue
that the nation which violated the
covenant of the League of Nations had
also violated the Kellogg pact, nor
would it be less simple to reason that
the United States would agree, at the
very least, not to interfere with
European undertaking to punish the
nation guilty of violating both con-
tracts.
All this is but one phase of the de-
velopment of the United States as
world power Before 1914 Europe had
10 reason to pay attention to the
United States. save as it recognized
American policy in the matter of South
America, and, to a lesser extent in
Asia. AS far as Europe itself was con-
cerned, the great powers went on with
their alliances, their ententes and their
quarrelS Just as If the United States
did not exist.
Since the war, however, it has been
impossible to ignore the nation that in
wealth was plainly the first power on
the planet Our influence, too, was
of our Navy and by the proclamation
on our part to equal British sea power
Quite simply, the European problem
has been to find some way of insuring
themselves against any American in
reference. We have become too power
full to ignore, but in the face of this
fact Europe has been steadily seeking
to find q means to neutralize our power
The League offered just such means,
for once we were in the League we
could always be outvoted in the Council
and the decision of the Council would
remain binding upon us. AS Europe
was sure always to preserve a majority
in the Council, as the allies of the war
were sure for long time to hold a
majority of that majority. had we joined
the League We should have been de-
prived of all real Importance. Our
fleet and our wealth would then have
been one of the resources of the League
powers in enforcing its decisions and of
the allied powers of the war in pre-
serving the status quo.
Once we rejected the League. the
problem became acute. Some way must
be found to keep us from interfering
with the League operations. To con-
siderable extent such way might have
been found if We had joined the World
Court. But when We refused to join
the World Court, as we had declined
to join the League, the difficulty per-
sisted
Everything turns upon the inter-
probation We are prepared to give the
Kellogg treaty. Is it to serve as
bridge to get over the gap left in the
European system when we rejected the
League and the court? Having ratified
this treaty, which bears the name of the
American Secretary of State, shall we
consent to regard as an aggressor and
q criminal any nation which the Coun-
Gil of the League declares has violated
the covenant of the League and which
all the interested nations will unite in
affirming has similarly violated the KEEL
logg pact?
If we build our fleet to parity with
British, If We refuse to bind ourselves to
refrain from using the fleet to protect
our rights under international law,
whenever the League declares that
nation has Sinned and proclaims a sort
OF holy war against it, then it is quite
clear that the machinery of the League
for preserving peace has very little real
value, because it can only be invoked
at the risk of bringing the United States
into the quarrel on the side against the
League powers and Great Britain into
naval quarrel with us.
Would Expose Us to Risks.
For us to give any such pledge would
mean giving promise to permit the
nations belonging to the League to de-
eide our action for us. It would make
us one of the most important agencies
for the maintenance of the status quo
in Europe. Finally, it would expose us
to the risks of great commercial and
financial losses incident to blockades.
And all this might happen in cases in
which the majority of the American
people felt they we're not concerned or
even that the weight of moral justifica-
ton was on the part of the nations
proclaimed to be the criminal
Today the Council of the League of
Nations is the instrument by which
Great Britain and France, together with
the allies of these powers, dominate
Europe. Whenever British and French
policies can be combined the Council is
the place where this Anglo French con-
troll is expressed. Thus. in any crisis,
were France and Britain to agree, it
would not be difficult for them to con-
troll a majority of the Council and to
decide in accordance with Anglo-French
interests what to do. And since we are
absent from the League, France and
Britain could, were We bound to re-
SpecL the League decision, shape our
course to suit their ends.
It is perfectly true that there Is
nothing in the text of the Kellogg
treaty which opens the way to any such
realization of European hopes as has
been sketched. On the other hand. 1t
is just as patent that Europe sees in
the pact the promise of a change in
American point of view toward the
League. 1t hopes that once We have
adopted the pact we shall perceive the
need of enforcing it. and that that per-
ception will bring us to associate our
selves with League police operations.
Copyright, 1927