Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-05-05
HOOVER ARMS CUT PLEA
CALLED MASTER STROKE
Viewed as Giving Sound Basis for Real
Armament Reduction-Next Step
Up to England.
BY FRANK n. SIMONDs >

BY FRANK Fl. SIMONDSss/
n TOT since Woodrow Wilson. by
notes composed on his type
VI writer in the White House,
4 drove william II discredited
exile into Holland. has there
been so successful diplomatic opera =
ton as that conducted by President
Hoover in the matter of naval arnla-
ments Viewed purely and simply as
a diplomatic gesture, it met instantly
and completely all the accusations lev
eled at us by Europe and based upon
an alleged purpose to seize naval SUI
premacy. And concomitantly. 1t APP
peapled instantly to every political
group and every unorganized mass of
Europeans who are seeking peace
through disarmament.
-7o1itically. too, the moment was
CHOSEN with keenest appreciation. The
Tory government. which has been doml-
mated by the admiralty and is too. weak
to venture upon any policy of real parity.
Is very shortly to go before the people
of Britain for a general election. Its
handling of the American naval ques-
ton has been violently denounced by
both opposition parties and even by one
faction of its own membership. Thus
Mr.. Gibsons challenge put the Baldwin
government in position where 1t must
fish or cut bait.
When one turns from the diplomatic
and political to the practical aspects of
the Hoover proposal, it is necessary to
perceive at once that. while it does
clearly open a new door to settlement,
provided there is an equal desire for
settlement on both sides of the Atlantic.
it just as clearly provides a practically
ineXhaustible supply of opportunities to
prevent agreement by employing tech
nical arguments.
Put quite simply the Hoover PROPOSE
ton Is double: In the first place, it
enviSageS not limitation of ornaments
but actual reduction. Mere limitation
would amount to an agreement to accept
a maximum total of tonnage which
might or might not be in existence.
And, in the second place. Hoover's
proposition meets squarely the diff
cultles which wrecked the Geneva con-
ference by a common-se proposal of
compromise. At Geneva in 1927 we SAID
that we would build only l0.000-ton
cruisers, since they alone would satisfy
our requirements. We proposed, there
fore. solution of the problem of
equality by the allotment to each nation
OF liked tonnage of cruisers The two
countries could build the sort and size
boats they desired. within the standard
!0.0O0-ton limit fixed at Washington.
ana we suggested totals ranging from
100000 to $4,000 as the maximum.
British Need Many Boats.
=, The. British. on their side, declared
that they needed many boats. because
of their problem of comn1unica tons
put that they also required as many
lO,O0O-ton boats as We should have. be-
cause otherwise we should have a fight
ing advantage If all of our boats were
10000 tonners and most of theirs much
smaller. II, for example. the limit were
fixed at 100000 tons and we had 30
10,oee-ton boats armed with S-inch
guns while the British had 20 10, 600
ton boats and 20 5000 tonners. the lat
Ter unable to carry guns about 6-inch
caliber our fighting supremacy, If the
Meets met, would be undeniable.
In the debate which followed the
British proposed that we should agree
with them to fix upon a certain num-
Der of 10,00O-ton boats, armed with
S-inch guns. that we should agree
that all other boats should carry only
6-i1ch guns, but they were prepared
to agree that the size of the balance of
our quota should be as we might decide.
We rejected this proposal because our
experts argued that this would give the
British an enormous actual superiority
In tonnage, since for war they had
hany merchant steamers available and
equipped to carry 6-inch guns, which
could be employed in cruiser warfare.
Why Geneva Broke Down.
The real breakdown of the Geneva
conference was thus due primarily to
the fact that the two countries, because
of their peculiar problems. required diff
ferent kinds of navies, and no balance
could be struck between the two re-
quirements.
Now the Hoover proposition amounts
to the suggestion that some system of
adjustment be struck between the two
national standards. It is clear, for ex-
ample, that If we have 80 l0,000-ton
boats, while the British have only 20,
together with 20 5,000-ton boats, we
shall have an advantage On the other
hand, there might be some rough and
ready method of measuring the thing
by which the British could have, say,
Is or 30 of the smaller boats, and thus
have an offset to ours
Technically the problem turns on the
question Of the purpose of the feet.