Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-12-08
FRENCH SEEK NAVY FARLEY
FAILURE TO AID LEAGUE
Collapse Would Be Triumph for Con.
tentiOn Arms Is Matter for
League to Handle.

Geneva, and have already made clear
that anything agreed upon at London
must be regarded as tentative until
Geneva has passed upon It..
France desires that disarmament
shall be regulated at Geneva because
at Geneva the French are sure of the
support of many European and South
American states. AS things now stand,
the French control Of the League, II not
absolute, is nevertheless real
failure of the London Conference
will be victory for France, however
it comes about. It will be triumph for
the French thesis that disarmament is
League OF Nations matter. But It will
not less be a relief for that very con-
siderable fraction of the British pub
lie which as yet are not reconciled TO
the idea Of resigning naval supremacy,
but are prepared to do it as q conces-
sion to necessity. Beyond any question
a failure would be disappointment
for Macdonald, but failure. which
might leave him mistaken politically,
since 1t would abolish any peril coming
from the attacks of the navy groups.
Japan Makes New Demands.
There is. however, an extra Euro
pean aspect. Already the Japanese
have demanded that they shall have not
10-10-6 ratio with the Anglo-Saxon
countries as in battleships, but a 1910
Z strength. Moreover, in this added
strength they insist that there shall be
included the right to base upon our
are asking that they shall have not
sixty but seventy per cent of our
strength In 10,000-ton cruisers, and that
means that they will have fifteen boats
against our twenty-one. But that is
the British number. Thus in first
line and extensively effective cruisers.
the Japanese are asking for equality
with the British which would amount
to superiority in Asiatic waters. But
oncile such a demand with the British
imperial needs or with the views of
Australia and New Zealand?
AS far as the British and Americans
are concerned, success at London would
be easy. Such differences as persist
between London and washington are
insignificant and could be ironed out,
since public sentiment in both coun-
tries is equally awake to the advantage
Of agreement But the British can only
agree to limit their naval strength,
or even to reduce 1t, as the Hoover
Macdonald program requires, provided
the other naval powers agree to pro-
portionate limitations. But Japan,
France and Italy all insist not upon
limitation but upon expansion of their
tonnage.
What Can StimsOn Offer?
Mr. Stimson, them is put in the po-
sition of approaching NJ Tardieu and
appealing to him to accept for France
naval ratio in cruisers which will
insure for Britain an enduring suprem-
acy In Europe on a two-poWer basis.
He has also TO ask the French premier
to agree to Franco italian parity as q
second detail. But what on earth can
Mr.. Stimson offer France in return?
If the American delegation would
agree that in case of the decision OF
the League of Nations that any power
had been guilty of aggression, the
United States would use its feet to
blockade the guilty nation, or, at the
very least, would agree not to use its
feet to permit its nationals to trade
with the guilty state, France might be
brought to waive her present purpose.
But, Of course, neither Mr.. Stimson
nor Mr.. Hoover himself can commit
the United States to any such thing.
The basis of all French foreign policy
is paramount influence in q League OF
Nations which is itself the dominant
factor in international relations. Amer
lean refusal to enter the League has
created very definite nti-American
sentiment at Geneva and q manifest
rivalry between the League and all
American programs for settling ques-
tions outside of the League. Mr. Hoo
ver's Armistice doy speech about food
ships rallied all the League champions
all over the world against him. It was
a deadly blow at the whole peace ma
chinery of the League.
The French game Is, then, to go to
London to defend the League against
the American attack, to make 1t impos-
sible for any decision to be reached
outside of Geneva in order TO demon
strate that all questions of peace and
armament must be decided at Geneva.
If London fails. no matter what tine
circumstances, the French position in
Europe will be far better than 1t could
be in case of success and the situation
of the Tardieu cabinet in France viii
also be improved as 1t could not be
otherwise.
And 1t is because of the facts which
I have undertaken to set down above
that every member of a European EN-
bassy or legation at Washington with
whom have talked agrees In fore
casting failure at London.
Copyright. 1927