Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-09-15

conference was O more vital matter
for France, Germany and italy than It
was for England. To Germany 1t was
indeed vital, for success meant both
the evacuation Of the Rhine and the
substitution of the freedom and the
lower annuities of the Young plan for
the controls and higher annuities laid
down in the Dawes scheme. To France.
success was also necessary, for whereas
the whole of the Dawes annuities
could be Suspended in the event Of an
economic crisis, Frances share OF the
Young annuitieS were largely uncon-
ditional, and had to be paid by Ger
many In any event. To put the matter
clearly, spot cash can be raised by
France on the security of the uncon-
ditional pact of the Young annuities,
whereas no one would lend a nickel on
the Dawes annuities. To italy success
was desirable, because the Young plan
gave her q bigger share OF the spoils.
Attitude Of England.
England, on the other hand, was in
many ways content to carry on with
the Dawes scheme, though she was
naturally anxious to get her troops out
Of the Rhine and to reach a general
settlement of kind that would stimu-
late trade. But provided the at
mosphere remained fairly calm, she
was in no hurry to replace the Dawes
scheme by the Young plan II the
change-over meant that once more, as
in the past, England had to pay the
part of benevolent uncle to Europe.
And the trouble was that this was
lust what the Young plan meant. AL
lowing for the fact that the Young plan
gave England an early but small bird
in the hand, it deprived her in later
years, of large bird in the bush, and
in general tied her down rtgidly to the
terms of the Balfour note, under which
England agreed to ask no more from ON
her debtors than she had to pay to her
creditors. It is true that from this
standpoint, England had no complaint.
but it is one thing to use the Balfour
note as an argument for giving England
more. and quite another to deprive her
of what she was already going to get
according to her percentage snare OF
reparations under the Spa agreement
OF just after the war.
There were two other objections Eng
land had to the Young plan. The nrst
was thata quite rightly, the Young an
nuities are divided into two parts, con-
ditional and unconditional, the atCer
of which can be held up in event OF an
economic crisis in Germany. This is
a very proper arrangement, but I'M
fortunately the experts went on to give
the major portion of the conditional
annuities to France, and to leave Eng
land with the unconditional part. To
this Mr. Snowden naturally objected, on
the ground that security should be
shared as we'll as the cash. The fnal
objection had to do with vexed ques-
tions of reparations in kind. and kind"
in fact, largely meaning coal" Ulti--
mately, of course, all reparations and
other international payments are made
in goods, but this economic fact does
not necessarily mean that reparations
to France and italy shall partly be paid
in German COAL at time when the
British coal exporters badly need fresh
markets. Here again Mr.. Snowden was
on strong ground.
Opinion With Snowden.
Mr.. Snowden was thus in position
where he could sit tight and let the
other players at The Hague do the
thinking. He had British public opinion
behind him, and he judged that he had
less to lose by breakdown than had
the others. So he refused to see Brit
aims share of reparations whitfield down;
he claimed a fair share of security
as well as cash, and he asked for
quid pro quo for the British coal trade