Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-04-21

British trade. especially In respect of
coal deliveries. The allies offer to for
! give arrears upon the account of costs
of their armies of occupation and to
make no further demands on such &C.
counts.
! On April II the German representa-
tives on the committee responded with
German offer. They offered (our
information is unoff1cial. but probably
! correcD 81 annuitieS of 1856, 900 900
marks each. That corresponds TO a
total, present value, Of about 26.5O0.-
100000 marks (about 24,000, 900 900
| corresponding to the total of the allied
debts to the United States. about
1000, 000, 900 for service of the Dawes
plan loan, and about l 400, 00O, 900 for
occupation COSTS. Not one cent, you
| see, for war damages.
Apparently, moreover, the German
offer was conditioned upon certain very
| great concessions, including continuance
of the transfer protection provided
under the Dawes plan, and implying
| (under ingeniously yelled language
| return to Germany of the Polish cor
| rider, Upper Silesia, the Saar Basin,
and some If not all of the lost colonies
But more precise information on this
head is to be desired. The present
indication, of course, is of breakdown Of
the conference.
CHINA.-Evacuation Of Japanese
troops from Shantung Province was
about to begin. But the Marking gov
eminent, having Ton account of the
direct control q. e., under command of
| Chang Kai-Shek) Immediately available
to take over policing Of the area being
evacuated by the Japanese chat which
feeds the Tsingtao-Esinan Railroad,
and contains considerable Japanese
J civilian population), implored the
| Japanese government to delay evacua-
| ton pending such availability. The
! japanese government first demurred,
and then consented. (The recently
concluded Sino-Japanese treaty calls
| for completion Of evacuation by May
| 49,
You see, it emphatically behooves that
| full protection by Chinese troops be
provided for the Japanese residents on
departure of the Japanese garrison,
and. If Chang hasn't troops available,
Marking cannot very well refuse to allow
Feng Yu-Hsiang to move troops into
the evacuated area, troops which he
| has ''all set" for the purpose. And II
Marking should refuse such permission
Feng would probably move his men in
anyway, with a plausible defense for
such action. And then there might be
the devil to pay.
Probably of all developments, in pos
sibility, the least to Markings taste
would be establishment. of Feng in
! Snantung Province. Observe that Feng
would then command belt (the prov
inces of Shantung, Honan, Shensi and
Kansu completely severing Northern
from Southern China, touching the sea
on the east, and on the west affording
contact by motor caravan across the
Mongolias with Soviet Russia. No, no:
that wouldn't do at all. But can 1t be
prevented?
Another report has it that Marking
requested Marshal Chang Hsuehliang,
supertuchun of Manchuria, to send
| troops to Shantung, but that he CURLY
refused. How Marking must hate and
fear Feng TO contemplate such ex-
pedients.
According to the latest reports. troops
| OF both Feng and Chang are moving
!. toward the area still garrisoned by
Japan, and another civil war threatens.