Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-12-28
Italy AIignS in Support of
Latter, With Japan an
intermediary.
VIEWS OF ALL 5 POWERS
INDICATE BITTER FIGHT
America and England in General
Accord, While Rome Wants
Parity With French.
BY PAUL SCOTT MOWRER.

By Cable to The Star and Chicago Daily
News. Copyrtght, 1929.
PARIS, December 28.-It is now pos
sible to forecast the physiognomy Of
the London Naval ConfereE.oe to be held
in January. Il oids fair to be long
wrangle between France on the one
hap7 and Great Britain and the United
States, Supported by Italy, on the other,
with Japan strategically situated as an
Intermediary.
The siews of all five powers have now
reen stated in one form or another.
The United States and Great Britain
are already practically in agreement.
Italy merely demands parity with
France, anc. % get that or some cor
responding political compensation, it
seems, after some hesitancy, to have
cast its lot with Britain and America.
Japan's demand for a higher cruiser
ratio than the percentage granted her
at the Washington Conference and for
parity in submarine tonnage would be
sufficiently embarrassing If that country
stood a.one, bat Japan's figures are so
moderately augmented compared to
those OF Frame that Toxic can afford
to sit relatively quiet and let France
bear the brunh of the discussion.
France Holds No Secret.
The French memorandum concern
ing her position as to the approaching
London Conference states that France
Will readily dec*.re her needs at Lon
don. These neeCs are not secret, and
nave already been computed IN what
the French call their naval statute"
or building program up to 1912. Ac-
cord1ng to this program, the French
are abandoning capital ships alto
gether and will ask cruiser ratio of
8.75, or higher than Japan's, and lust
under that of the United StNtes and
England.
At the same time, a. regaruS ratios
IN both destroyers and submarines, the
French memorandum statss that
frances claims will exceed those of the
supposed Anglo-American agreement
figures.
The real problem of the conference,
therefore, appears to be the finding of
q means OF reducing French claims.
one suggestion is to make a three
power agreement, including the United
States, Britain and Japan, without
France. But in this event it seems
probable that France would go right
on with her building program, which,
in turn, would gradually either satisfy
trench claims automatically or oblige
the other three nations to build. there
by defeating the whole purpose of any
naval agreement at London.
May Agree on Delay.
Another suggestion is that in case
the three principal naval powers agree
| to delay replacement of capital ships
and ultimately reduce their size, France
| might be willing to make some corre-
spending form of reduction in her own
fleet, which consists almost entirely of
So-called auxiliarieS. This suggestion
seems to contain possibilities, for the
French have no modern capital ships
and are building none. They consider
their high claims to auXiliaries as
legitimate as an Offset to the powerful
fleets of capital ships maintained by
the three leading naval powers.
The third suggestion is that some
form of political guarantee might be
found, which by increasing the general
security would enable France to consent
to really considerable reductions.
France itself has proposed this, and 1t
Is possible that this is almost the sole
constructive possibility in the confer
ence. Taking the Locarno treaties as q
precedent, it is seen that since those
treaties have been ratified France has
of her own volition, without any outside
pressure whatever, reduced her army
by nearly one-half. A similar reduction
in the French claim for cruisers and
submarines would probably easily insure
the success of the conference.