Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-12-29
PEACE ABOVE PARITY AIM
OF PRESIDENT AT FARLEY
Policy of Reduction Seen as Apparent
Return to WilsOnian
!. Conception. 49,

V1duaI size, increases the military value
OF the ships which Britain can mobilize
for war out of her predominant nner-
chant marine, and also increases the
security of those remaining in CONNER
cial service"
The American naval experts. the body
OF ofhcial opinion, apart from certain
exceptions. thus holds to these views.
Total abolition of the battleship would
disproportionately weaken the American
fleet. PoStponement of replacement,
undertaken before 1885, would similarly
rebound to British benefit by perpetu-
ating an existing condition of decisive
superiority for the British. If either
decision should be made, 1t would fore
cast violent struggle in the United
States Senate, where the Navy view
would find adequate defense.
Faint BattIeship Hope.
Viewed effectively therefore, the hope
to achieve great things in the battle
ship direction seems faint. Total aboli-
ton is excessively unlikely; there
the British and American naval opinion
will stand together. But unless there is
actually a program of scrapping the
necessity for new construction in cruis-
ers will insure that the London confer
ence results will forecast not reduction
hardly to be realized until 1886 or
toward the end of the term of the Pres
ident who may be elected in 1882.
On the naval side and from the
American point of view, the problem of
London is complicated by certain cir
cumstances. On the one hand the Cool
idge administration adopted and the
Hoover administration at the outset ac-
cepted the policy OF parity. That policy
not only involved building a relatively
huge cruiser tonnage to catch UP with
the British, but also persevering in the
building and scrapping process for bat
tleships, fixed by the Washington treaty,
until in 1885 actual parity should be
obtained.
Between 1880 and 1885 the United
States must build 10000 tons of cruis-
erS and ITS, 900 tons of battleships, If 1t
is to obtain parity. In no other way
can the goal be realized unless the Brit
ish agree to scrap some of their new
battleships ahead of time and also to
reduce the cruiser tonnage from the fig-
ure which the British admiralty has
set as the minimum of security. And
neither the one nor the other sacrifice
can be expected of the British by any
reasonable human being.
Does the United States really want
parity? Would majority of the Amer
lean people follow President Hoover in
a policy which amounted to more or
less tacit remuneration of parity as a
detail in new gesture to Europe, a
gesture comparable with that of Mr.
Hughes at Washington, when he sank
more ships (all American. to be sure)
than went down at Jutland, in the
hope of setting in motion a new spirit
in the worlds? That is, after all, be-
coming the real question as to the Lon
don conference.
Back to wilson's Policy.
And, in q sense, what is arriving is
distinct break between the Coolidge
policy of parity and the Hoover policy
OF reduction. Coolidge saw. somewhat
tardily, that of these two things only
was was to be attained, and in his
Armistice day speech a year ago he at
last came down firmly for parity. And
the 15-cruiser bill was the measure OF
this decision, in which Congress con-
Cured.
Viewed from the outside, the Hoover
administration would seem to be NOV
ing away from the Coolidge decision.
in fact to be turning backward to a
WIsonian conception, to the notion
that the mission of the United States
in the world is moral, that this country
should be prepared to make sacrifices
and to assume responsibilities not wholly
dissimilar from those envisaged by the
covenant of the League always, of
course. outside the League). In no other
way can one explain the intervention
in Manchuria and the transformation
OF the Kellogg pact into the Hoover
doctrine.
But any real program of reduction at
London must be headed by the scrap
ping of the principle and policy of
parity. The United States must aban-
don parity in cruisers or postpone real
ization of 1t in battleships, or, finally,
give 1t up altogether by Joining in the
abolition of the battleship. That done.
we can give the world new example,
which it is at least conceivable will be
followed more readily than was Mr.
Hughes example at the Washington
conference.
And, after all, the real question is
whether in the matter of national de-
tense Mr.. Hoover is an idealist or a
realist. My own guess Is that he Is an
loeallSt and that as consequence the
emphasis in the American delegation
at London will be laid upon disarr1a-
ment and not upon parity, that the
President is betting that the American
people, a majority OF them set peace
above preparedness and see the red,Ic-
ton OF ornaments as the necessary first
step toward peace. believe that at
London Mr.. Hoover, speaking through
Mr.. Stimson, will follow the example
of Mr.. Wilson at Paris and Mr. Hughes
at Washington and set the moral above
the military in his estimate of Amer
icas mission.
In the next article here shall dis
cuss the political aspects of the London
conference, and particularly the pros
poets OF three-power and a five-power
agreement.
Copyright, 1922