Evening star., 1929-12-15
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

rs the United States prepared to join
Great Britain in political partner
ship which shall have as its pri-
i mary purpose the forcible mainte-
nance of the peace of the world?
This is the question which overShadows
all others for Europe, and. indeed, for
the whole world II respect of the forth
coming London conference.
It is perfectly true that there have
come from London and Washington
alike official denials of any secret un-
derstanding born of the conferences Of
President Hoover and Mr.. Macdonald
beside the Rapidan, ancient boundary
of strife between the armies of the Blue
and Gray. 1t is true, similarly. that
French and Italian newspaper comment
Solen1nly repeats the burden of this
denial.
Nevertheless, it is equally true that
Mr.. Macdonald'S sensational and un-
precedented excursion to American
shores has awakened not only curiosity
but suspicion all over the European
Continent. From the close of the World
War to the present hour Europe has,
turn and turn about, speculated upon
the possibilities of alliance or rivalry
between the two English-speaking coun-
tries. The Washington conference
seemed to forecast partnership; the
Geneva conference appeared the pre-
lude to collision. Today the pendulum
has swung back, and Europe is once
more considering the prospects of COM
bination
In this situation two things appear
clear. The first is that the United
States has no intention of entering upon
any formal alliance with the British.
The second is that. while the British
perceive the impossibility of formal
alliance, they have not in the least
renounced the idea of cooperation so
close and so effective that formal and
official contract would be unnecessary.
The British perceive, for example,
that what we desire at the London con-
ference is not obtainable save as we are
prepared to adopt one of two courses
We may join the League of Nations,
adding our resources to those Of the
member powers to impose peace and to
punish any aggreSsor. That would
amount to guarantee of all powers
against any disturbance of the situa-
ton which exists. France would then
cease to have any real apprehension as
to German aggression. Germany quite
as completely would be freed Of the
nightmare of French interference.
If We Side with British.
BY contrast we may throw orr LOT in
with the British. We may agree to
stand with them in any future crisis
not only to permit them to use their
fleet in accordance with their needs in
case of war and without regard to our
neutral rights, but also to join them
II we promise this, then we are in a
position to ask the British to agree to
a reduction of their naval program be-
low their traditional tWo-pcwer stand
ard. They will no longer have to keep
their fleet equal to that of France and
Italy combined. because they will be
assured of the support of our fleet in
any time of crisis
What we cainnot successfully under
take to do is to persuade the French
and the Italians on the one hand, and
the British on the other. to reduce their
naval progrsmS beyond their own con-
ceptions of national security, while we
are not prepared to insure them against
the consequences of such weakening.
The question of parity would not
enter into the discussion were 1t not
that to this demand the United States
has added that of reduction. Great
Brltan has assented to equality be-
tween the British and American fleets,
and this parity could be arrived at
simply by the carrying out of the
american naval program. But when
1t comes to the matter of reduction
the problem gets difficult.
All Working at Odds.
It get difficult because the basis OF
British sea policy in Europe is the pos
session of strength equal to the two
nearest powers, which today are France
and Italy. And in the matter of cruis-
ers. which are the defensive arm alike
against submarine and cruiser attack
upon commerce, Britain is resolved to
be at least the double of France. France
on the other hand, is resolved to have
strength equal.to that of Italy in the
Mediterranean and Germany under the
Treaty of Versailles.
When, then, France fixes her program
for cruisers at above 100000 tons anC
Italy announces that she means tC
duplicate it, the Hoover Macdonald
agreement, which fixes $780, 900 tons fol
the British cruiser allotment and some
thing between 285, 900 and 305, 900 fol
the American, falls to the ground. Nci
$4,000 but 100000 tons become the
minimum of British requirement CC
maintain the two-power standard. Anc
for us parity is attainable not merely bN
completing the 15-cruiSer program, but
by expanding to a 20 or rs cruiser
limit.
In this crisis the British must say tc
us: This price of parity by reduction
kao {VH dAalinO with fhe