The daily worker. [volume] (Chicago, Ill.) 1924-1958, 1929-03-13
SomeEXperiences Of the Armed
By Fred Ellis

Paris workers, provided for in plan
o." certainly explains the efforts
of the French bourgeoisie to create
a thoroughly reliable army with
the help of Paul Boncour and Coz.
An army composed of patriotic, de-
classed and utterly unconscious
(coloredD elements is to defend
France against the internal enc
N.Y."
The cases of determination which
took place this January between
the French soldiers and the miners
in Grand Combe show that the
French bourgeoisie needs very much
reliable army. The government
was compelled to substitute the con-
scripted forces, who proved them
selves unreliable, by colored troops.
The efforts of the bourgeoisie to
create mercenary cadres on whom
it can rely, not only in the case of
proletarian Instructions, but also
in the labor struggles, as blind tools
against the working population, are
an international phenomenon. This
phenomenon can be very dangerous
to the proletariat if it shows itself
incapable of enlightening the pro-
fessional soldiers, including the col
ored troops, by suitable methods,
and of shaking their confidence in
the bourgeoisie.
The highest tactical principle of
the counter-revolutionary side con-
sists in not letting their forces be
defeated singly, but to concentrate
them, to form regular fronts against
the insurgents, to liquidate one by
one the various hotbeds of rebellion.
Having restored order" in one rebel
center, it will be possible to proceed
against another with concentrated
forces.
This tactic is, no doubt, the most
favorable to the bourgeoisie; it is
bound to lead to the suppression OF
the instruction if the insurgents
do not succeed in preventing the
concentration of the counter-revolu-
tionary forces, in disorganizing them
already before their concentration,
in neutralizing them or drawing
them to the side of the revolution,
in disuniting and defeating the al
ready concentrated troops.
But this presupposes maximum
activity on the part of the insur-
gents, from the beginning. They
are lost if they do not assume
relentless offensive. "The defensive
is the death of every armed upris-
ing" Mark.
Use of Provincial Garrisons.
1t is said in plan ~" that armed
forces are to be drawn from the
provincial garrisons to suppress an
instruction in Paris. Certainly, if
the instruction feared by the bour-
geoisie is to become repetition OF
the Paris Commune in the sense
that it will be limited to the capt.
tai, that it will be impossible to
extend the instruction to the pro-
vinces, the instruction in Paris will
be failure if the counter-revolu-
ton were really successful in en-
ploying also the provincial garrisons
! for the suppression of the insurrec-
! ton.
! But if the instruction takes place
simultaneously in various parts of
the country and if the insurgents,
first and foremost in the provinces.
succeed in getting the best of the
armed forces of the counter-revolu-
ticn in their own regions and then
l.. .mediately make an energetic at
tack on other counter-revolutionary
troops, the issue of the struggle
will be different.
Such a simultaneous insurrection
everywhere, when there will be no
"Vendees" where the counter-revo-
lutionary forces can be concentrated
undisturbed, can certainly only be
visualized under the leadership of
revolutionary Party, well estab-
lished among the masses not only
in industrial districts but also in the
countryside and among the rank and
file of the army, and only if this
Party has acquired the art of con-
trolling the instruction.
This is the most important lesson
of the armed class struggles Of the
I s.onE 1loan4Ia ~. 49,