Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-12-22
NAVY BASE SLATE
HELD AS US. ACE
America May Ask Fortifica-
tons Program Revision to
Curb Cruiser Demands.
By FREDERIC WILLIAM VILE.

1t can be foreshadowed on sound
authority that If Japan insists on an
auxiliary craft ratio in excess OF the.
5-6-3 capital ship ratio, she will In all
probability open up at the LONDON
Naval Conference the whole question Of
bases and fortifcations in the Pacific.
The United States and Great Britain,
at the Washington Conference of 1929.
obtained Japan's acceptance of so
per cent Of battleship-ba cruiser
strength, as compared to 100 per cent
each for America and Britain, by max
ing two concessions. The frst was the
granting Of Japan's demand to retain
the "poSt-Jutland" battleship Mutsu of
$4,000 tons. which was then building.
The second concession made the Jap
anese was an agreement to maintain the
status quo In regard to naval bases in
the Pacific.
Toxic held the naval base concession
to be particularly important, as far as
the United States was concerned.
America had no strong bases In the
Pacific at that time. But the Philip
pines, Hawaii, Guam, Tutuila and the
Aleutian Islands in American posses
sion, could easily be converted into
strong bases and fueling stations. AS
such, in japanese eyes, they would be-
come potential menaces to the island
empire.
Bases Held Vital.
American naval experts at the Wash
tngton conference advised Secretary
Hughes and his fellow delegates that Il
the Japanese could be brought to accent
90 per cent capital-ship inferiority TO
the United States heet Uncle Sam
could safely renounce the right to ex-
pand the Notifications Of hts PACING
possessions.
Japan finally yielded and consented
TO accept the status-uuo non-fortifica.
tion program as q quid pro quo for
contenting herself with a 5-3 capital
ship relation to the American Navy.
Her own naval experts at Washington
made Admiral Kato, chief japanese
delegate, see that without well fortified
bases at five strategic American points
In the Pacific the United States would
not be able to use its superior Navy
with any great effectiveness in any
possible conflict with Japan. The
Japanese. in other words, realize that
minus adequate fortified bases for fuel
and repairs IN the Philippines and
Guam, especially, an attack by the
American feet is at least not an immi-
nent danger. Comprehensive plans for
strengthening and terrifying American
bases at Guam and Manila had been
made TO Congress not long before the
washington conference.
The proposal of a So American
japanese capital-ship ratio IVES not
arbitrarily decided upon by the United
States. 1t was arrived at after careful
analysis and consideration OF all the
factors involved in our Pacific defense
problem. 1t took carefully into account
tnat we could afford not to carry out
our projected fertilization program In
Guam and the Philippines II the Japa-
nese were agreeable to q 90 per cent
inferiority in big-gun ships. II Japan
comes along at London and asks for !
cruiser tnferiority Of not more than so
per cent, 1t can be put down as o GER
tainty that the fertilization problem in
the Pacific will be automatically re.
opened by the United States.
Progress Detailed in Report.
Some of the facts and figures which
persuaded the Japanese delegation &C
washington to submit to So battle-
ship ratio were set forth In the 1920
annual report of Secretary of the Navy
Josephus Daniels. He said that "the
project for the development of Guam
as naval base In accordance with the
announced policy of the Navy Depart
ment is progressing" In the same
year, 1920, two 55,000-barrel tanks for
storing fuel oil were sent out to the
naval station at Cavite In the Phillip
pine Islands. New equipment was be-
ing installed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,
and work had been begun to make this
station the strongest American outlying
naSe-the Gibraltar Of the Pacific, as
1t has been called.
Recalling the stirring history Of the
kato- Hughes duel over ratio and for
tlncation questions at Washington, the
Foreign Policy Associations Washing
ton analyst, William T. Stone, writes:
The Japanese demands placed the
american delegates in a difficult posi-
ton. The demands confronted the
Americans with the necessity of ask
ing tneir Government to curtail its
naval program in the Pacific. II they
did not do so, the success of the whole
disarmament plan was put in jeopardy.
admiral Baron Kato, the principal
Japanese delegate, stated quite frankly
that II the Pacific Fleet bases were to
be excluded from the Washington
agreement. his government would be
unable to accept the proposed reduce
ton ito 20 per cent inferiority) of its
naval forces. Secretary Hughes chose
the first alternative.
Tentative AZ. cement Reached.
"A tentative agreement was reached
on December Is, 1921, when 1t was
announced that the status quo would
be maintained with respect to fortif-
cations and naval bases in the Pacific
regions But this restriction was not
to apply to the Hawaiian Islands, Aus
tralla, the islands composing Japan
proper and to the coasts of the United
states and Canada. When 1t came to
drafting the precise terms of this
agreement however, serious difiiculty
arose.
The term Pacific regions was OBJ
jected to by Great Britain on the
ground that 1t was too vague AS an
alternative the British delegation pro-
posed that the area in which the status
quo was to be maintained be defined
by q parallelogram, bounded by the
Equator on the south, the 3Oth de-
gree of north latitude on the north,
the 10th degree of east longitude on
the west and the 180th degree OF longi-
tude on the east.
THE L.opoSal excluded all Of the
British islands south of the Equator,
as well as Singapore, but included the
5 %1 Islands, belonging TO- Japan.
accept this proposal on the ground
that the Bonin Islands form a part
OF the japanese mainland. Although
the japanese government apparently
nad no intention of charging its de-
ehSeS tnere, IL resented the suggestion
mat outside powers should attempt to
define the extent Of Japan proper The
United States, on the other hand, OBJ
lected to the japanese contention for
the reason that the BONN Islands,
which are more than 500 miles from
Toxic would, II fortified, be in q posi-
ion to dominate Guam, while cutting
he communications of the United
states with the Philippines. Press dis
patches at the time December, 1920,
tated that Just before the Washington