Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-04-20

have been unfair to have permitted
American soldiers, trained in taking the
initiative in the open, to have been alb
sorbed in defensive requirements, under
foreign control. The crisis at Arniens
which led to Pershing's offer was an
emergency, and the offer to cooperate
in that desperate battle proved the
, adaptability of our general, though the
French premier declared him stub
born" The main difference between
stubborn" and firm is that the first
is psgheaded, and the latter is wis
dom based on intelligent reason and
Self-reliance Later, Foch's greatest
boast was that he had resisted Gle
menceau's impotence at Pershing's de-
termination to make full preparation
before American attack, while, today,
Clemenceau's greatest boast is that ne
is, and always has been, personal
friend Of Gen. Pershing.
Every war of the United States has
found the Army and Navy unframed
unprepared for battle. Then when war
was upon us. civilian authorities-Iust
as Premier Clemenceau in France-have
assumed that numbers Of men meant
an effective fighting force, trained or
u0JIdu1GQ, 81 k1lC CAdIAAOA AAoo ~ I'll
mediate and premature for going int
battle. regardless of training. Our own
Secretary of State Bryan was assured
of the idea that preparedness was un-
necessary, for "a million men would
spring to arms overnight" Yes-a
mob!
Yet Gen. Upton, a writer of authority
on military matters, declares the maxim
that in war, moral force is TO physical
aS three to one"
In every war, the American public
has reposed inOrdinate confidence In
tine superiority of American MODS TO
meet and conquer trained enemies, only
TO be amazed and Inundated by early
defeats. At the outbreak Of the War
of 1872. Gen. Hull, with force OF 500
Regulars and 1900 Volunteers, UNDER
took to invade Canada from Detroit, ana
was driven back by Gen. Proctor with
800 regulars, 400 militia and 500 IN
dams, and captured in Detroit. -,
A few days later, the Canadian mill
tia was ANONYMOUSLY dismissed as in
ccmpetent.all credit for the victory
being given to the 800 regulars-trained.
In that war, according to Huidekoper,
Such were the achievements OF the
American forces, which numbered not
less than $1,000 men, in the face OF an
enemy never estimated to exceed 1,450,
and in reality even less" Proctors
force which had subdued the Americans
under Hull was itself overcome by a
STRIPPING in command Of $50 regulars
at Fort Stephenson" although 5O,OO0
men had been called out in 1917 ana
1918 for that service. in vain.
Similar failures opened our Mexican
War. and it is painful to remind q
reader now of our first battle of Bull
Run in the Civil War, when unframed
troops fed like sheep. 1t Is within the
memory of Spanish War veterans, how
rashly Americans demanded immediate
ION to Havana" against Gen. Miles
warning that the Spaniards had II.
resistible defenses there. Gen. Per-
shing wanted no such fiascos in France
with unprepared American troops.
Here is an American book, published
last year, without Censor" by Thomas
M. johnson, correspondent of the New
York Sun. which tells the story as II
leaked out at the front-10 or II years
before this weeks French controversy
| came to light:
After 1t had been decided that Gen.
Pershings force should attack the st.
Mihiel salient IS days later Marshal
! Foch changed his plans and ordered
| that he should not make much more
| than a feint there, and then prepare
| to Join in the general advance through
the Argonne Forest toward Sedan.
But the Americans should fght
neither together nor in one place. A
small American Army Of 100000 or
| 100000 men should attack with the
| French. west of the Argonne Forest.
| Mat - f1,n ArroV,v,o tho Erov,rt1 ugra1l6
| attack, helped by 100000 to 100000
| Americans under French command. The
| rest of the 100000 then in France
| would be scattered in various sectors
of the front, under French or British
command, working on our services OF
supply, or in rear training areas. Two
French generals-Degoutte. an army
commander, and Malcor OF the artil-
lery-should be placed at Gen. Per-
shing's disposition. furnished with SUI
ficient power to assure the rapid solu-
ton Of all questions
In plain English--or rather in par
lez vous"-Gen. Pershing was to turn
over the supreme authority to French
officers of the American forces In
battle.
eff we must change our st. Mihiel
plans, and fight this new battle IN the
Meuse-Argonne.' replied the American
commander in chief, we will do 1t I'M
der American command and manage
ment, subject only to your general SUI
pervision. You can give US full control
of the country from the Argonne east
to the. Meuse, or If you want one
American Army west of the Argonne,
then the force east of 1t must not be
mixed with French troops, but must be
another American army
"'ThiS Is an emergency, crisis! the
marshal cried. This Is the best way
TO use your inexperienced troops and
leaders. If you do not agree, I shall
appeal to President Wilson.
"Thereupon the American command
er in chief stood upon figurative hind
legs and said: i don't, want to appear
difficult, but the American Govern
ment and people expect their Army to
operate as a representative part of the
American Nation, no longer as separate
bodies under various controls scattered
over the whole western front. We have
been on the point Of forming such an
Army before, and always some new
"Once again Gen. Pershing relied
upon that trlisty weapon, the orders Of
President Wilson, Secretary Baker and
Gen. Bliss. They left 1t to his judg-
ment to determine when the American
forces in Europe should be sufficiently
strong to justify their operating indie
pendently. In his Judgment. that time
had come. Nearly two million seemed
sufficiently strong
Eli bien!
1t now appears evident that neither
Marshal Foch nor Premier Clemenceau
dared appeal to President Wilson over
- la ~ L. +