Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-04-22

ment In recent years the word "hm1ta-
ton" has come to be used chiefly in de-
scribing agreements at existing levels
or still higher levels, and Is generally
looked upon as having nothing to do
with actual reduction.
1t is useless to attempt to correct
this impression by explaining that limi-
tation may be at any level lower or
higher than those existing. AS prac-
teal matter, it would seem to be best
to accept the general public under
standing Of these terms. Let us, there
fore, take the bold course and begin by
scrapping the term Limitation" in or
der to concentrate upon general re-
duction of ornaments.
All Glasses Of Vessels.
My Government believes that there
can be no complete and effective limi-
tation Of ornaments unless all classes
of war vessels, including cruisers, de-
sLroyers and submarines, are limited. 1t
could not agree to any method which
would result in leaving any class of
combatant vessels unrestricted. In its
reply, under date of September %, 1928,
to communications from the British and
French governments concerning an I'M
derStanding reached between them as
to basis Of naval limitation, my Gov
eminent pointed out that this under
standing applied to only one type OF
cruiser and one type of submarine and
would leave totally unlimited large
class of effective fighting units. This
note also called attention to the Amer
lean position at the Geneva naval con-
fer " md the fact that proposal for
genera :, iuction was urged by the
An e-!1an delegation.
To- xxfllf <<f
may even say its eagern:ss, to go to low
levels, is based upon the fundamental
belief that naval needs are relative,
namely, that what we may require for
our defense depends chiefly upon the
size of the navies maintained by others.
Aside from the signatories of the WASH
ington treaty, there is no conceivable
combination OF naval power whcih could
threaten the safety of any of the prin-
cipal naval powers.
willing for Reduction.
What Justification can there be for
the powers which lead in the respective
classes OF naval vessels to sanction fur
Their building programs in those classes.
In the case Of the United States we
have already expressed our willingness
to agree on basis that would mean a
substantial reduction of our present de-
stroyer and submarine types. In the
case Of cruisers 1t Is only possession by
others of greatly superior strength in
this class which has lead to the adoption
Of the present building program.
My Government cannot find any jus
tification tor the building and main
tenance of large naval establishments
save on the ground that no power can
reduce except as q result of general re-
duction. Let us ask ourselves honestly
what these establishments are for. AS
regards the relation of the maritime
powers among themselves, there is no
such need. Even if the danger of war is
admitted, it could be guarded against
just as well by the maintenance of rela-
tive strength at low levels as at higher
levels.
The principal naval powers have
nothing to fear from the naval strength
of the countries nonsignatory to the
Washington treaty. There is no con-
ceivable combination of naval strength
among the nonsignatory powers which
neted give concern. AS an example. the
cruiser strength of all the nonsignatory
countries in the world does not attain
to one-half of the cruiser tonnage of
the greatest single fleet.
People Want Relief.
The people of every country are cry
ing out against burdens of taxation and
the suppression of unneces-
sary expenditure. My Government is
convinced that expenditure for dispro-
portionate naval establishments is in
defensible in that it can be avoided by
q sensible agreement among the naval
powers. And we must recognize that
the people who pay taxes are bound to
feel well-founded resentment against
any policy which commits them to
needless taxation through failure to
reach rational agreements.
My Government believes firmly in its
idea that naval needs are relative and
that radical general reduction Is posi-
bic only on the theory of relative needs.
I trust that these views may commend
themselves to other governments end
that it may be possible to agree upon
such reductions. If. however, 1t Is I'M
possible to agree on this thesis, 1t Is
obvious that there will remain only the
thesis of absolute naval needs. This
would mean that all thought Of reduc-
retains free hand in building with an
tendency toward competition.
Surely we can hardly envisage such a
sequel to our solemn undertaking to
keep the peace.
Would Cover Whole Ground.
My Government has always felt that
we need no exact balance of ships and
guns which can be based only upon
the idea of conflict-what is really
wanted is common-sense agreement,
based on the idea that we are going to
be friends and settle our problems by
peaceful means.
My Government has never believed
that an effective approach to the prob
lem Of disarmament could be made by
methods of reduction Of ornaments
alone. It feels that genuine disar-
mament viii follow only from a change
of attitude toward the use Of force In
the settlement of international disputes.
It is for that reason that venture
to make this appeal that the countries
here represented examine the whole
problem afresh in the hope that they
win find in general world conditions
and in the solemn obligation they have
taken among themselves a reinsurance
as to their security and that they VIII
find in this the confidence to enable
them to dispense with the ornaments
which hitherto have seemed so essen
tial.
A.