Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1929-12-22

~
London Conference is at once
more surprising and more dis
4 turbing than the total absence
of any clear notion on the
part of the general public of the issues
involved. While 1t is true that the two
slogans Of parity" and reduction"
are universally proclaimed and equally
true that the popular expectation is
comprehended in the utterly vague
word of disarmament, the limits of
possibility, expressed in tonnage terms,
are rarely appreciated.
Actually, Of course, any consideration
Of the questions to be dealt with at
London falls naturally into four divi-
sions. And these divisions may be
described as parity, reduction, limitation
and abolition. Moreover, since Presi-
dent Hoover has emphatically vetoed
any discussion of policies, such for ex-
ample of Freedom of the Seas" the
whole discussion is limited to more or
less technical naval terms.
Issue Is Narrowed by Time.
AS to the question of parity, the
eight years which have elapsed since
the Washington Conference have served
to narrow the issue down to small
compass. At Washington the United
States, which had prospective supremacy
in capital ships, surrendered this adj
| vantage without obtaining the formal
assurance of a corresponding sacrifice
on the part of the British in respect Of
cruiser tonnage, where they had actual
superiority.
As a consequence of this failure at
Washington, we have had eight years
Of agitation provoked by the fact that
successive governments In Great Britain,
| beginning with Labor, have not merely
retained but extended this advantage in
the cruiser line. During most of this
time the United States has vacillated
between two conceptions, the one to
persuade the British to reduce their
cruiser strength to ours, the other to
build our cruiser fleet up to theirs.
Until the Geneva Conference Mr.. Cool
idge held to the former view, after
| Geneva he abandoned it, and in his
| Armistice day speech last year and In
| his Endorsement of the fifteen cruiser
bill he disclosed his change IN view.
Britl>h Opinion Divided.
At the name time British opinion
has also bakh divided. At bottom the
naval law, shf.'ed by many of the Tory
leaders, notably Winston Churchill, was
| that If Great Britain refused to accept
the American claim to parity and de-
clined to reduce its own strength,
American public opinion would in the
end refuse to back Congress in the
great expenditures necessary to bring
our fleet up to British levels. This
view explained the rupture OF the
Geneva Conference.
But after the effect Of the Geneva
rupture in the United States had been
correctly appraised in England, the
Great majority Of the British public
concluded that the Churchill view was
mistaken, that America meant to have
parity, that it possessed the financial
resources adequate to achieve 1t ana
| the only question was whether the
actual arrival of parity was to be at
| tended with bitterness and recrim1na-
ton or was not to be permitted to dis
turb Anglo-American relations.
The Labor government which came
! to power last Summer received a more
| or less tacit mandate from the British
people to settle the issue of parity with
the United States and to settle 1t in
the only way possible, by the substantial
recognition of the American claims
| Moreover, since the battleship issue
had been disposed Of at Washington,
the issue really came down to cruisers
When Macdonald came to see Hoover
| the state of facts was this: The Brit
ish program envisaged 10 ships and
100000 tons. The American, 80 ships
|
the British purposed to have is WASH
ington conference cruisers, that Is,
10,00o-ton boats, our program envis-
aged g. Meantime, Mr.. Hoover had
| suggested that manifestly not alone the
| total tonnage of the fleet but the
character of the ships must be reck-
oned, and had thus brought In the
now famous "yardstick" idea.
Tentative Agreement Reached.
AS a result of the Hoover-Macdonald
! conversations a tentative agreement
was reached, the exact terms of which
have been announced by the British
prime minister in London, but so far
withheld in Washington. Great Brit
ain agreed gradually to reduce her
cruiser fleet from 70 ships to so, and
her tonnage from 100000 to 33s, 900.
At the same time she retained her pro-
gram of 10,000-ton cruisers, which
amounted to Is.
The United States, on its part, pro-
posed to raise its cruiser program from
| 100000 tons to $4,000. but to reduce
the number of its 10,000-ton cruisers
from % to 81. Thus. instead of build
ing two 1O,000-ton cruisers, the United
states undertook to build five OF the
7,O00-ton type, or more exactly to dis
| tribute the 315, 900 tons claimed by her
| in such fashion as she chose, but not
in 10,000-ton boats.
| This Hoover Macdonald agreement
was based upon the notion that while
the United States was to have only So
ships and but $4,000 tons, against so
and 339, 900 for the British, the superior
size, gunpower, ETC., of the American
fleet, resulting from her superiority in
the number Of 10,000-ton boats mount
ing 8-inch guns, insured parity.
| Go YnJrh for naritV Rllt IL will he