Evening star., 1928-05-27

| lSlflAn Is In the interior ana IlOt WlIIliLA
the range of gunboats. makes 1t neces-
sary for Japan not only to maintain q
sufficient body of troops at Tsinan itself,
but to keep open the railway communi-
cation with the port Of Tsingtao. The
larger force necesSitated by the differ
ent character of the operation and pre-
vious Japanese exploits in Shantung
tend to invest the present expedition
with more significance than 1t would
otherwise have-probably with more
significance than 1t actually has.
Despite the record OF Japan In Shan
tung between 1915 and the Washington
conference, it should not be forgotten
that Baron Tanaka himself sent Japa-
ncse troops to Tsinan on another occa-
sion when danger threatened and
promptly withdrew them when the
danger passed The more recent prece-
dent Is in favor of withdrawal and the
avoidance Of any unnecessary disputes
with the Chinese. And Baron Tanaka
has formally stated his intention to
withdraw the troops again the moment
the necessity for their presence shall
| have passed.
If this promise is fulfilled there will
be little to distinguish in principle be-
tween the action of the Japanese in
| Shantung and the action Of the British
and the Americans in bombarding Nam
king.
Checks on Japanese.
There is a very effective check upon
any tendency upon the part of the
japanese to become aggressive on Chi
nese territory.
Economically Japan has two primary
! interests in China-interests so enor-
nous that either may be described as
| vital to Japan. Japan derives from
! Manchuria a large percentage of the
raw materials and foodstuffs which sus-
tain her national life The japanese
social structure would be seriously
shaken and japanese industry sorcly
put to it If this source of supply should
! fail It was the appreciation of this
! fact which led to the earlier efforts to
dominate Manchuria by military power.
1t was not long, however before the
shortsightedness of this course was
brought home to Japan. Foodstuffs and
raw materials are, of course, necessary.
but both have to be paid for by the
export of manufactured goods. And the
| crucial portion of Japans export market
is in China. 1t was Of little service 10
secure the sources OF raw materials in
Manchuria II. by doing so, the Chinese
were so antagonized that they would
not purchase the products of Japanese
mills and factories.
China soon found means of convinc-
| ing the Japanese that her good will was
a controlling factor in the situation. BY
means of the boycott--as an economic
weapon in the use of which the Chinese
are unusually adept--they cut deep into
the figures Of Japanese exports until
the industrialists of Toxic and Osaka
became the most militant advocates of
conciliatory policy toward China.
The political pressure which they were
able to exert overcame the momentum
of the Japanese military machine and
probably had as much or more to do
with the abandonment Of Japanese
military adventures on the Asian con-
tinent as the Washington Conference
or anything else.
Problems 10 Be Faced.
Thus, any Japanese government
whether 1t ee headed by Baron Tanaka
or the mildest OF Japanese tea drink
ers--muSt deal with events as they
present themselves in China in the
face of perpetual dilemma. Every de-
cision must square itself with two prin-
ciples which are more than likely to be
found in opposition. First, Japan cam
not allow anything to happen In Man
churia which will cut of her supply of
province Second. Japan cannot permit
anything to happen in China which
will cut of the markets of that country
as an outlet for her manufactured
products.
Almost every issue. large or small.
which a Japanese cabinet must decide
In regard TO China Is tossed on the
horns Of this dilemma. An attempt to
preserve the economic security OF the
Japanese controlled railway system in
Menchuria Immediately awakens suspi-
cion and resentment among the Ma
tionalists and renews the threat Of a
boycott against Japanese goods IN the
great markets OF China, Even an ef-
fort to protect Japanese lives and prop
erty against the excesses OF ili-organized
Chinese armies Is at once construed as
aggression against China. and again the
boycott is hung threateningly above The
Japanese head.
Yet on this latter issue no Japanese
cabinet can afford long to hesitate. The
Japanese are quite rs determined 10
protect their fellow citizens abroad from
injury as are the people OF the United
States or any other country. No jap
anese cabinet--least OF ell one which Is
in unstable equilibrium at beSt.-could
hope TO stand In the face OF reports of
the killing of any appreciable number
OF Japanese in China.
No Other Course Open.
SO It is not to be wondered at that
Baron Tanaka and his colleagues de-
cided TO risk implement on the second
horn of the ubiquitous dilemma and
sent troops into Shantung to protect the
Japanese nationals at Tsinan No other
course was possible. They could not
order the Japanese settlers 10 eVacuate.
They would not have obeyed such an
order Petty traders whose whole stake
in life Is comprised In n small shop, viii
not leave 1t and face certain ruin, even
when danger threatens their very lives,
There was but one thing left for Japan
10 do send troops to Shantung--and
send enough troops SO that they them
selves would not be engilfed in the ebb
and flow OF the contending Chinese
armies
II is hardly to be believed however,
that because the Tanaka ministry felt
itself forced TO send the Japanese army
10 Tsinan that II would deliberately ac-
cept the increased dangers and difficult
ties which would follow any attempt To
renew the old aggressive policy In China.
It is more than probable that the dis
nstrous lesson Of the military adventures
| which followed the World War has been
thoroughly learned. Japan VIII not
| likely Incur a second time the resent
ment OF all China and the eondemna-
ton of the rest OF the world
Until Japan shows some disposition to
90 beyond the necessities OF protect
| ing the lives OF her Nationals and, Incl
dentally, the safety Of her own troops,
IL would be premature 10 conclude that
we are witnessing a revival OF Japanese
| imperialism, Until Japan attempts 10
secure some unrelated privilege, some
undue compensation. hold ON Chinese
| territory or some other prerequisite from
China i'm return for the withdrawal Of
her troops we shall he keeping closer 10
The record II we consider the expedition
into ahanune clumsy and awkward
and reerattahle as such expeditions al