Evening star., 1928-05-20
DESIRE FOR MONARCHY
ON WANE In GERMANY
Definite Adverse Sentiment Noted on
Eve of ElectiOns-DaWes Plan lmpOr-
tant Factor Against Extremists.

Labor groups.
This was based upon the general
agreement that the country had stead
jlv moved toward the left, that is, in
the direction of republican sympathies,
during the past four years; that the
Nationalists and particularly their ex-
IRENE wing. had lost all public support.
Thus it was prophesied that the famous
HITLER -Ludendorf Fascist group would
altogether disappear. And the almost
certain decline Of the Communists was
discounted and explained as a similar
drift away from the extremists IN the
Left.
There is one issue which has been
steadily gaining ground and has become
much strengthened by the result OF the
French elections. All Germany hoped,
and the republican faction believed,
that the making of the Locarno pacts
foreshadowed an early evacuation Of
the occupied Rhineland and the restora-
ton of the Sarre Basin to German
sovereignty without any plebiscite and
in advance of the date of January !,
1885, fixed by the Treaty Of Versailles
both for final evacuation on the Rhine
and for the taking Of the vote in the
Sarre.
This hope has not been realized
While the Anglo o-French- Belgian garri-
sons have been somewhat reduced, they
remain. Nor is there any present indi-
cations that they will be withdrawn
during the current year. This is, for
the Germans, great disappointment
and for the NationalSts a real boon,
since It enables them to claim that
Locarno has been deception and that
their, opposition to the pactS was
founded IN wisdom. It also weakens
Stresemann's position and at least
raises a domestic doubt as to the ulti-
mate success of his policy Of concih-
alton.
Disarmament Lags.
Nor is the result of the several meet
ings of the Preparatory Disarmament
Commission at Geneva less cause OF
German regret. No progress whatever
has been made toward disarmament
abroad, and at home Germany remains
forcibly disarmed. legally compelled 70
restrict her military forces to the mar
row limits fixed by the Treaty Of Yer
sailles and surrounded by neighbors all
of whom have large standing armies.
Finally. the Dawes plan in the present
year enters upon its maximum total
and this puts real burden upon the
German treasury. Moreover there IS IN
Germany a very natural desire TO see
the total Of reparattons payments fixed.
which means that there must be q
decision as to how long the present
maximum Of S625,0oo 900 annually is
10 be paid. No one in Germany be-
lieves the figure can be maintained for
more than year or two. So far all
the Dawes payments have been financed
out of the various loans made by Ger
| many in the United States and the total
OF the foreign debt Is going up alarm
fngly.
The present German hope Is that
during this year and next, following the
American election and the arrival OF a
new administration IN washington, the
question Of reparationS can be ironed
out. France, they perceive. is resolved
to hold TO occupation until the repara-
tons question Is settled to her SatiSfac-
ton. Occupation IS no longer for her o
question Of security in the military
sense. but only in the financial Thus
settling reparations is a preliminary 70
getting rid Of occupation.
Wanted Left to Win.
Poincare's victory in France and the
slight but real gain Of the Nationalist
groups disappointed the Germans enor-
mouSiy. for they had hoped for q
triumph of the Left. Brands illness.
too. has disturbed them. With Poincare
now master OF the French policy for an
indefinite period. they see no promise OF
prompt settlement of any one OF
the three burning issues. evacuationS,
reparatsonS and disarmament The
consequences of this disappointment viii
at the least check decisive defeat for
the NationaliStS.
No one seriously believes that StreSe-
mann's position will be compromised.
He is likely to remain foreign minister
in any coalition which comes after
election and, Of course. given the dis
perSlon into groups in the ReichStag,
Germany must have coalition cabinet
In the new ReichStag StreSemann viii
undoubtedly have to face sharper criti-
ciSrn and more inSiStent urging. II he
cannot hasten evacuation. he win ind
1t difficult to hold on.
On the eve of the election. the gen
eral expectation was that IN the new
RsichStag power would rest with q
coalition made up OF the Social Demo-
Gratis, Peoples party. Center and Demo-
Gratis. the So-called Great Coalition,
which would include all parties Of con-
sequence save the Nationalist and Com
muniStS. In such coalition the chan
cellor would be Social Democrat. prob
aniy Otto Braun. now prime minister
OF Prussia, Such q coalition, with the
assistance Of the Bavarian Peoples
party, would count not less than 500
seats in a house Of 500. thus possessing
a decisive majority.
Its unity would be prscariouS. Moth
ing is more difficult than for the Peo-
pies party, which is the party Of big
business, 10 work with the Socialists,
save IN the matter Of foreign policy
Thus the Berlin forecasts were that the
new cabinet and the Great Coalition
would be short lived.