Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1928-11-11
BY JAMES T. sHoTWELL,
Authority on international Policy.

-HE first man to see clearly the
real nature of the World War
was not a soldier nor, up to that
time at least, statesman. 1t
was DR.. Walter Rathenau, the
head of the great German electrical
Trust the Allgemeine Electricians Ces-
chellschafts. known throughout Ger
MANY and the entire world as the A. E.
a.. a monster combination of engineer
ing science and BUSINESSMAN industry
devoted to the arts of peace.
When the World War came in 1914,
this man was about as far removed
from military interests as Henry Ford'
yet before week had passed he saw Inc
problem which the war had placed pc
fore the belligerent nations-the MILL
tary problem itself-more definitely ana
more accurately than any of those IN
charge of the military machinery OF the
war in any country.
Slowly the world learned the lesson
which bis intuition and imagination an
ticipated but it took years OF schoollng,
at the most tragic cost that humanity
has ever paid, for the trained soldier
to realize what the business man saw
from the first-that modern war must
undergo the same kind of revolution In
technique which separates the age OF
machinery from that of hand labor,
that it cannot be planned on the man
power basis as in the past. or the mere
strategy of marching armies and victory
in the field, but that it is henceforth an
all-embracing industry involving the
most far reaching financial and busl-
ness planning, extending backward into
the areas at peace as well as into those
which support the shock OF marching
armies. The output is destruction, but
the industry is none the less produc-
tive one, for destruction is a product as
much as creation.
Must Draw on Materials.
The industry of modern war must
therefore draw upon the raw materials
of national resources like any other in
dustry, and the efficient organization of
supply is not a mere secondary incident
any longer. as it used to be in the days
when armies lived off the land they oc-
cupied and battles we're decided by
strength of arm and the courage of the
individual fighters. The supply of high
explosives is the equivalent of whole
armies in the field; the battery that
holds back an army corps Is itself the
equivalent of the men 1t holds in check
This much is a commonplace OF
strategy, but the implications of it were
never fully seen by those who still
thought in terms of man power, even as
they learned to use the machinery OF
the industry of war. DR.. Rathenau
turned the problem the other way
around.
In his mind the power of the army
in the field was but an expression OF
the organization of all the forces of the
nation, and its strength and endurance
would depend directly upon the reserve
of power or resources which the nation
itself possessed Therefore the correct
| theory of modern war would be that
from the very first outbreak of hostili-
ties, and even before the outbreak In
the period of planning for it, the
| mobilization which it called for should
be that of all those resources that coulc
be used in any way, either directly OF
| indirectly, for the purposes OF war.
Three Major Revolutions.
There have been three major revolt
tions in the history of modern warfare
The first was the most obvious one
when bows and arrows and man-to'
man conflict were replaced by the ust
of gunpowder and other explosives. The
second change was not In armament;
but in the composition Of the armies