Evening star., 1928-05-27

Z Y
Stresemann. foreign minister Of
the German Reich, has served
l. to concentrate attention upon
two circumstances, his achieve
ments to date and the possible con-
sequences to Europe because of his
removal either by death or enduring
bad health. 1t has become the habit
| in Germany to measure Stresemann
with Bismarck. The greatest tribute
| possible from the German people TO a
| public man.
We have become so accustomed to
| Stresemann and to his association at
/ Geneva with BRAND and Austen Cham
/ berlain that IL is almost beyond belief
! that it is not yet five years since he
, first became a decisive factor in Ger
man politics, first as chancellor and
! then foreign minister. His first task as
| chancellor was to attempt to bring an
| end to the Ruhr war. The end was
| ignominious, for Germany was COM
| PEELED to surrender Internationally.
Low Tide Was in 1928.
In the Autumn of 1923 Germany was
| at it's lowest point. A lost war, a
| wrecked currency, domestic unrest
which was threatening in the extreme
and foreign occupation, those were the
/ outstanding circumstances. AT that
moment the passions and prejudices OF
the war still survived. Germany was
| isolated morally. without friend in
| the world. The nation was on the edge
, of starvation and economic proStration
and to all outward appearance the
world was reconciled to seeing the ruin
completely.
/ A year later the Dawes plan had been
| formulated and Stresemann's first
| great task was to force it through the
Reichstag. A new election following
this success gave him a fairly secure
position and he Immediately exploited
i il by making the proposals in February,
| 1925. which led after delays to Locarno
and German entrance into the League
OF Nations. What has followed since Is
recent history.
The great value of Stresemann has
lain in the fact that he had the cour-
age and the intelligence to perceive
before any other equally influential pub
lie man-and in the face OF the recent
| failure and assassination OF Walter
! Rathenau that the single possible
escape for Germany from economic
urostration and political partition was
co-operation with the West, with the
victors OF the war That cooperation
tain permanent consequences.
Rathenau Went to Rapallo.
/ Before Stresemann came German
public men had toyed with the idea OF
| a combination with Red Russia. Rath-
euau went to Rapallo and by his treaty
| with the BolsheviStS wrecked the Genoa
conference. Not until the Ruhr occu-
patton did the extent of German weak
| ness and the reality of defeat come
home to the nation. Not even the
terms of the treaty of Versailles, appai-
ling as they were from the German
standpoint. disclosed the fact. The
majority of Germans believed they
were so unreasonable as 10 be destined
to vanish promptly.
| After the Ruhr. Stresemann per-
| ceived, not merely that Germany was
| helpless but that the single possible
manner in which she could regain her
position in the world and her national
| existence at home was 10 accept frankly
| and fully large measure Of the con-
sequences of defeat. His predecessors
had been convinced that America and
Great Britain would intervene on Ger
! man behalf and against France.
Although Great Britain and America
opposed French policies which culmi-
mated in the occupation of the Ruhr,
neither lifted a finger to prevent the
occupation. nor was there any hope
that either would resort to war 10
drive France out. The lesson was
patent and StreSemann graSped ii that
German salvation lay IN making terms
with France,
Terms with France meant French Sc
curity: security meant the final loss of
4-g.m H.
military methods of regaining provinces
lost IN the East II meant final COM
pliance with the disarmament clauses
of the treaty and the destruction of
postwar Notifications IN the east. Ul-
timately StreSemann led his people 10
make all these renunciations. When
he had completed this work the world
at last dismissed the notion that Ger
many was secretly preparing for a new
war. II accepted the fact of q peace
ful Germany,
American Capital Aids.
Thanks to Locarno. French apprehen-
sionS lost their driving power. Follow
Ing Locarno. American capital began to
flow into Germany in rapidly increasing
amounts. The Dawes plan had brought
currency Stabilization. the Locarno set
tlement brought economic and political
adjustment BY the Summer OF 1926
Germany had definitely turned the cor
ner. by early 1927 she was enjoying a
real If somewhat deceptive, domestic
/ boom
In foreign affairs the change was even
more striking. AT Geneva StreSemann
naturally took the seat OF a representa-
tive and great power He became the
associate of BRAND and Chamberlain,
Ia RnA hat rFr a. n skNEag,
and European affairs passed quickly un-
/ der the control OF this trtumvirate To-
day five years after the occupation Of
the Ruhr. Germany speaks as a great
power III Europe and her influence In
! creaseS viSibly and steadily
! There are limitations. and StreSemann
| has suffered as q consequence. Despite
/ Iocarno, despite the manifest progress
OF the republic toward permanency, de-
spite the complete and continuing dis
/ armament of Germany, the Rhineland
is stin occupied No limit has been fixed
for Dawes payments, and Germany
neither knows how much she has TO
| pay nor believes that payment at the
| present rate can long continue.
Dissatisfaction Is Great
The removal of StreSemann would be
| disastrous, because German dsSsattSfae-
| tion at present conditions II great ana
some successor might he tempted 10
revert to more traditional methods and
seek TO hasten evacuation by trying 20
revive the old system nF alliances,
] Failing SO far TO obtain the two great
ohiectiveS of German policy, evacuation
and the disarmament of her neighhorS
| Germany might be led TO abandon \
policy of cooperation with France and
| dieat britain and seek combination
with Russia on, more likely, with Italy