Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1928-08-26
BY JOHN l.. BALnERST0N.

y ONDON.-ThiS IS an attempt L
unravel the mystery Of the an
agreement which has perturoeC
l. WASHINGTON an9 Rome. Thest
perturhationS are inStgnltican
compared with those caused III th'
foreign Office here. where the man
ner in which the whole affair has beer
handled is recognized as diplomatic
blunder Of the first magnitude, ana one
so difficult 10 rectify that the way on
IS vet earnestly but SO far unsucceSs'
SI'''v sought
On Juilv 30 Sir Austen Chamberlain
told the House of Commons that an
agreement had been reached with
France on naval disarmament, and
am about 10 communicate 1t 10 tht
other naval powers in the hope that i
ma be acceptable to them also Since
then officialdom has renamed silent
excepting 10 deny that any Secre'
clauses exist in the agreement while
there has been growing uneasineSS mere
and an increasing pressure Tor puollca
tion NJ " documents, q aoun0&n,
evidence that the United States and
Italy do not understand what has hap
pened and are for varying reasons dis
pleased and suspicious.
France and England have been al
ODDS ever since the Washington Naval
Conference over question vital 10 the
problem of sea disarmament ana one
which has deadlocked the League OF
Nations preparatory disarmament con-
ference In essentials the British con-
tention has been that navieS should be
limited by "categories," while the
French have argued that a fixed ton
mage should be allotted each navy. and
that within that tonnage each power
should be free TO build whatever ships
It chose.
cecret Pact Made by Naval Experts.
English naval Strategis1s, owing to
the proximity Of French harbors which
could be mined in-as the Germans
were-or attacked. believe that power
1ul French submarines would be Tar
more formidable than the Z boats IN
an Anglo-Frenen war and might sue
coed in strangling British commerce
and starving England out. The French
contention, in conjunction with French
naval programs indicated that France
proposed 70 concentrate a great part
of her tonnage allotted under any
agreement 10 big submarines able to
operate far enough from their bases
70 surround British waters.
Following the Geneva d1sagreements
the ConSeil Superioure dc la Defense
Committee met in London and author
lied direct conversations between the
naval stats Of the two countries.
These took place during the following
ten days and an extremely important
agreed document was drawn up. This
vas submitted to the foreign Office
during the last week in July and
Chamberlain wrote a letter to the
French Government giving his assent
10 the scheme, provided it meant what
the foreign Office conceived it to
mean. The French government as
scented to the British foreign Office
Interpretation and Chamberlain's an
norncenlent IN the Commons followed
Q day or two later.
The naval agreement recognized on
England's part the need Of France for
small submarines in the Mediterranean
70 safeguard French communications
IN Africa. vital in war time for the
transport Of French troops from Africa,
end for light cruisers with purely de-
fenEive ornaments for the same pur-
pose France in turn agrees that SUBJ
marines when of such size and arma-
nenf as 70 be offensive craft" should
be limited in number.
sent TO washington.
That, briefly, is what this famous
secret agreement contains, although il
is c0uched in technical language. II
Is designed TO serve as a basis for
general disarmament at sea. The for
elgn Office under Chamberlain's In
structloDs communicated a summary OF
tt--s1ot the document itself--to Toxic
Washington and Rome three weeks
ago.
Both America and Italy replied that
they old not understand II and asked
for the full text and more particulars
These have since been supplied, but
no reinsurance messages have come
from the other Two principal naval
powers Of the West and publication is
being held up IN fear Of an ernbittered
public controversy If the text Is issued
while the United States and italy re-
main Of their present opinion that
there exist undiyulged factors in the
situation.
The big bl1nder from the British
point Of view was Charnberlains public
announcement Al a time when IL Was
impossible 70 make public the full
facts. he was extremely Ill when hi
made the speech. His doctor was wait
ing outside, protesting that he ought
with pneumonia was announced and
his proracted absence from official
duties was made known when he was
ebie 10 leave his bed
What worries Washington. IT, may bc
inferred with confidence, Is the fact
that In the Anglo-FrGnch agreemeu,
now communicated to the State De
partn2ent there Is no mention Of thf
concessions made 70 France IN return
for her signature understand thai
1n the text drawn up by the French
and British aduirals which went Il
the foreign Office and which was sen
Or 10 Washington there Is no mention
Of any quid pro quo TOR France,
Secret Clauses Hinted
Aoarl from "indIscretiQns7 IN thu
French press, II Is obvious that France
xOtIIc never have renowned her ci1ie
weapon against England AS she has
cone ~ agreeing 70 the limitations 81
long distance Offensive" submarine
that coulG operate far out In the At
gantic unless she got something oi
great value IN exchange
II is this consideration that explain
af3e rumors that there are secret clauae
in the agreement This is untrue
ynere are none But there must exist
either Ia writing u As verbal under
standing, some promise by Engianf
~ France that is u great importance
H. mas been suggested That England II
exchange tor safety a. sea againa
French submarines has agreed tina
SgIaen land disarmament comes up gEi
viii support tne French contention
eazt trained TeacfYIEts should not couu
Whef the strength Of armies is IA
stoned This II seems, would b. ~
small price for France - accept f0
what she has given up,
T'fae conversations 0f the experts, In
e1ngenient ignorance Of the torelgl
Sfsices about them would iusVitabi
sslQgest even without other evidence Tn
F0fnoation Of al Angi0~Ffcnch naya
srtaate by which the TWO powers Il
s4eet guaranteed each otbet sgains
80. onuer E4nr1 4n atlnfHtalI