The Daily Alaska empire., 1928-05-12
Not the Fault of the Admirals.
(New York Herald Tribune.) )

recent statement of Vscount Cecil puts out of misery the lingering contention that the Geneva naval conference failed because too much recognition was given there to the views of hard boiled admirals" People who would like to see fve-power naval armament limitation maintained on a basis other than that of Washington treaty parity are fond of saying: Keep the admirals out of limitation conferences and reasonaple solutions can always be found"
 Viscount Cecil one of the British dele gates to the Geneva Conference. MT Bridge man. the First Lord of the Admiralty, was an- other They were accompanied by formidable staff of naval advisers. Mr. Gibson, American Ambassador to Belgium had Admiral Jones as an associate It has been a popular but erroneous impression in Great Britain that the naval nego- tiators proved ntractable and that the conference fell through because sufficient diplomatic ana political preparation had not been made for it. The facts are quite the reverse as Lord Cecil shows
 In letter to The London Times, under date of March 16 last. he corrected certain misappre- hensons cropping out in debate in the House of Commons. He recalled that differences arose at Geneva over cruiser unit tonnage and caliber of guns These issues largely technical and in the Viscount's opinion, could and should have been adjusted by compromise He says:
 I disagreed with the Americans, but
 thought the difference far too small
 to justify breakdown of the nego-
 tatons In any case, I thought com
 promise should be attempted and on
 this point MT. Bridgeman and were
 absolutely in accord.
 The British delegation controlled by naval lopinion, made three different cruiser limitation proposals. The first to let the life of any agreement run only till 1881. since before that time the United States could not catch up to Great Britain in 10,000-ton cruisers, built or building The second to reduce the future maximum gun caliber from eight inches to The last was that the question of the caliber of the guns for seeond-class cruisers might be left unsettled-it could not become actual for the United States for some years-on the under standing that if the United States definitely de- cided to build cruisers carrying eight-inch guns, other than the 10,000-onners, they should give us notice, and further conference should be held, if desired'
 Viscount Cecil says further
 I thought, and think, there was very good chance that this would have | been accepted All these suggestions of compromise rejected by the l Cabinet though both Mir Bridgeman | and I supported them. In the final | telegram from the Cabinet | specifically directed to ''ofer no com | promise on the eight-inch gun ques- l tion. Before sending this telegram the | Cabinet had been warned that without l a compromise the eight-inch guns | the conference would fall
 | Naval advice and insistence, therefore did not create the Geneva deadlock. It was created | by politicians in London not connected with or | speaking for the Admiralty. It is understood that MT. Winston Churchill, Chancellor of the Exehequer, influenced the decision more than any one else. The idea that naval officers obstructed an agreement at Geneva is thus completely ex- poded. British refusal to live up to cruiser Limitation commitments made at the Washington conference was the work of statesmen, not of military men. Critics of the hard boiled admir- als" owe them humble apology.