Evening star., 1928-10-07
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

at limitation of ornaments, but 1t has
also poisoned the international at
mosphere. Indeed 1t is difficult to md
any recent parallel for the contempo-
rary tactleSsneSs of a British govern
ment which interjects the first public
notice of this highly controversial
agreement into the official statement
of acceptance of the Kellogg pact. 1t
is indeed on all fours with the author
ization of Anglo-French military ma
neuvers in the Rhineland at the mo-
ment when the question of evacuation
is most acute and of similar combined
aviation experiments in the Mediter-
ranean, where 1talys susceptibilitles are
most easily aroused.
In fact, it is not longer to be ques-
toned that the naval accord was an
attempt at over-cleverness on the part
| of essentially stupid men. All the dis
| chalmers in the world are not going
| to shake the natural and the warranted
conviction that the agreement itself was
| a deliberate effort to turn the flank of
/ the Government of the United States
and leave it isolated in any continual
ton of the debate of last year at the
Coolidge conference. Nor will the con-
viction be less general that to achieve
this end the British have finally sur
|
which is the center of all discussions
of the limitation of land armaments.
Against United States.
| The effect of what the British gov
ernment has done is now clear. At
the price of accepting the French
thesis in the matter of land arrna-
ments. it has purchased French agree
ment to the British contention which
| led to the breakdown of the Geneva
conference of 1927. France henceforth
will stand with Great Britain against
the United States in any international
debate of naval ornaments and Britain
with France in any similar discussion
of land ornaments.
But the circumstance which must be-
wilder any American is the failure of
the British to perceive the contempo-
| rary limitations of their old policy
of constructing diplomatic coalitions
| against their immediate rivals. It Is
| beyond question that the first result of
the Anglo-French naval accord will be
to fortify the already considerable ele-
ments in Congress which desire to see
parity between the British and Ameri-
can fleets established on the basis of
the American conceptions. And it is
| Just as patent that all this maneuver-
| ing, conceded with the spectacular sign
ing OF the Kellogg pact will have un-
pleasant echoes when the United States
Senate comes to discuss that treaty.
\ 1t Is probably true. as the British
frequently charge, that American opin-
ion is unduly suspicious of British pur-
pose, but nothing has happened in
recent years to stimulate this feeling of
suspicion half as much as the unlucky
Anglo-French agreement. And at the
same moment it has shaken German
| faith in the sincerity of the Locarno
| policy and stimulated Fascist resentment
| at what 1t conceives to be a French
| policy of encircling the restraining
| Italy.
New Entente Seen.
For, after all, it is impossible for
| France and Britain to reach an agree
| ment of the character announced, an
| agreement which constitutes a British
acceptance Of the major French thesis
in the matter of military power and
at the same time to conduct joint
military maneuverS alike in German
| territory and on the margin of the
Mediterranean. which is the center of
Italian political interest. without giving
the impression that back of these Incl
dents lies the face of a new entente
cordiale as potent as the old.
On our side of the Atlantic this
British policy must arouse certain very
definite resentmentS. but it Is essential
to perceive it for what 1t is Above all
it is necessary to see that it is not yet
the expression and will of the whole
British people, but only one more evil
dence of the domination within the
present Tory cabinet of naval influences.
De he nf 10 Cf
what is deemed to be the American
naval challenge by all of the methods
which were employed in the case of
the German feet In the years between
1900 and 1914. This navy group are
essentially 'last ditchers" and for them
British naval supremacy is the very
foundation of British imperial existence.
So far, however, 1t would be mistake
to assume that the mass of the British
people are In any sense behind this
combination. On the contrary, there is
great and general bewilderment at the
whole Anglo American naval embroglio.
There is, too, just as widespread won
derment over the apparent demand of
the United States for naval strength
which seems in British eyes to be with
out warrant.
Want Peace With U. S.
But the mass of the nation do not |
want quarrel with the United States, |
alike for practical reasons and for less |
material considerations Far more gen.
orally and completely than their ad- |
miralty lords. civil and sea, they per-
ceive the disparity in resources between |
the two countries and the inevitable |
outcome of any competition, once Amer |
lean purpose were fully engaged.
Nor Is it less plain that very con-
siderable fraction Of British public |
opinion is totally opposed to any recon-
struction of the old Anglo-French en-
tente with its obvious anti-German |
parent anti-American intent in naval !
matters. For patiently any such revival |
chains Great Britain utterly and irre-
vocably to the French continental poll
cies and to the French determination |
to maintain the status quo at all costs
The question of pride, too enters into
the affair. Actually the result of any
restoration of the old entent would be
to make Britain the "me-too" of France
on the continent. Automatically Eng
land would be compelled to indorSe the |
French policy in the matter of evacua-
tions, which has seemingly already
happened and to be towed in the wake
of France through all the dangerous
intricacies of French policy, alike on
the Vistula and the Danube. All of |
which is a pretty stiff price to pay for
the dangerous privilege of confronting
the United States in the next naval
conference with a solid array Of ma
tions, beginning with Britain and
France and trailing off through the
little entente. Poland, Belgium to bring
up at last with Portugal.
Moreover, reading between the lines
of current British newspaper comment,
1t Is patent that all shades of opinion
are aghast at the extent of the gaffe of |
Downing Street 1t is all very well for
the foreign ofice to maintain that If
the United States rejects the Anglo
French agreement it will fall through,
but every one perceives that, whether IL