Evening star., 1928-05-27
'STRESEMANN'S ILLNESS
MAY HIT STERILIZATION
German Leader, Rising to Top in Five
Years, Has Done More for Nation
Than Any Since Bismarck.

eitner Italy or Russia. Only in such
case would it actually balance, even
slightly, the French group But any
attempt 10 arrive at an alliance with
Bolshevist Russia would inevitably an
ger the British and increase their will
ingness to stand with France and to
restore the old entente cordiale. Thus
Germany would find herself in a weak
1914.
Possibility Has Weaknesses.
On paper the Italian possibility seems
more alluring It has patent weak
nesses. First, there is profound Ger
man dislike and even contempt for the
Italian. To the German mind Italy
betrayed and abandoned Germany at
the outbreak Of the World War. That
France, Russia, even Great Britain
should have fought against him the
German understands-these three ma
tions were plainly in alliance before the
War-but Italy was the ally Of Germany
and Austria, yet when the war came
the Italians were first neutral and then
enemies
The Italian treatment of 250, 900 Ger
man-speaking Austrians in TyroleSe
territory taken by Italy in the peace
treaties has profoundly angered all Ger
mans. and remains source of recurring
controversy between Berlin and Rome,
between StreSemann and MusSolini. The
Germans have an enduring grievance In
the past and lasting cause of resent
ment In the present. Both combine with
an instructive dislike of the Italian to
block the way to any German-Italian
alliance, which, by contrast, has fire.
quently been viewed with favor in Rome.
Oddly. it is France that the majority
of Germans believe should be the nat
ural ally and partner, although there
is sharp division between those who
believe that the combination is impoSsi-
bic, although attractive, and those who
believe that it can be brought about,
chiefly through economic means at the
outset. The double fact that France
can, If she is fearful of German pur-
| poses, block German recovery In Europe
and in the world. and that France and
| Germany are, economically speaking,
| complementary, not competitive; and
| the further fact that. even after war
after many wars-French culture re-
tains its traditional popularity in Ger
many, also deserves mention.
| Doubts Russian Influence.
| Stresemann has been the steady
| champion of what might be called the
(
| bined in his mind with close association
with Great Britain and the United
| States. He has never had much pa
| tience with the italian idea, and, like
/ most informed Germans, he sees Russia
/ is going down hill economically and be-
/ coming steadily less important as q
European factor and less and less prom
| iSing as market.
At the moment when he was taken
sick Stresemann had brought Germany
| to the point where negotiations were
about to begin TO cover the question OF
| the evacuation OF the Rhinelaud and TO
| nquidate the Dawes plan.
| If Stresemann should disappear II IS
/ hard to see any man who could take
| his place. BreitScheid, one OF the lead
/ erS of the Social Democrats has long
/ been ambitious TO I'LL the ofIlce and has
/ concentrated his attention on foreign,
| questions But BreitScheid loses infiu-
| ence because he is a Socialist. and no
| one could claim for him the force or
| the strength of StreSen1ann. In gen
j eral he has supported StreSemann's
| policy and doubtless would do so IN
/ Office. but his support would be inSig-
/ nifieant outside Of his own party.
/ Kaas. on the Clerical side. is also .
! candidate, but with the same weak
| neSSeS and no greater strength than
1 BreitScheid. BernStorff Is also posi-
| bility. but he represents q weak party
| and is viSibly growing old. Germany
/ has come in a wellnigh incredible
| fashion TO regard foreign affairs and
| Stresemann as interchangeable terms.
I He has had many critics, but no serious
/ opponent and no dangerous group OF
/ political opposition since Locarno.
/ heard him make his notable answer 20
| Brands utterances in q full-dreSS per-
| formance at the ReichStag in February,
and nothing was more impressive than
| the fashion in which he held his house,
/ commanded attention and collected ap-
7 plauSe
/ Transformation Is Remarkable.
/ 1t is odd that one Of the German
+ public men whose war utteranceS were
most inflammable. who was an OUT
| spoken and arrant anneXattontSt, who
| supported all the worst olunders or
/ German policy in company with his
/ associates. should have succeeded In q
/ few brief years after the close OF the
/ conflict in establishing well founded
| reputation for reaSonableneSS, nlodera-
/ ton. good sense and moral and polttt-
/ cal SoundneSS. But in this tranSforrna-
/ ton there Is q measure Of the man.
/ Each year has seen him nearer 70
success. and his Illness has stricken him
| down at a moment when the domestic
| elections promised him power 70 con-
/ tinue unhampered and the foreign
| situation gave utmost promise Of an
| early realization Of his purpose. II Is
| an unlucky accident that StreSemannS
| Illness has conceded with Brands.
| Were either OF these men to be re-
moved the last phase Of European re-
| construction and reconciliation may
| easily be postponed for long period.
| Neither has a natural successor, and
| history has no precedent OF German
| and French foreign minister collaocTat-
| ing in complete mutual condolences and
affection.