Evening star., 1928-09-16
NAVAL ACCORD SHOWS
EUROPE'S SENSITIVE STATE
Dominance of Anglo-French Proposal
in International Spotlight Undimin-
ished by Anti-War Pact.
Italian press has viewed tic Kellogg

Italian press has viewed tic Kellogg
pact.
Moreover. IL is unmistakable that
Paris feels the strength of its new posi-
tion. Solemn denials of the extreme IN
terpretations placed upon the new un-
derstanding are made with the tongue
In the cheek. Any agreement is in it
self tremendous gain. France and
Britain have made an agreement. have
come together again, are cooperating
in the most vital of all matters, that
which concerns ornaments.
French diplomacy has scored shining,
If more or less inSubStantial, success in
the matter of the Kellogg BRAND pact,
for the very signing, which took place
in Paris. was a tacit recognition OF
French supremacy on the continent.
France and England and the United
State thus appear in close association.
The pact itself carries not the smallest
embarrassment to French military
strength. while the concomitant naval
agreement witnesses the British accept
ance of French military predominance.
And the United States in the matter Of
the pact seems strangely quiescent,
while BRAND and Chamberlain load it
| with reservations which leave their hands
| free in all conceivable emergencies.
Thus, when the League Assembly
| meets again, with Stresemann absent
and Chamberlain abroad, with BRAND
notably less master of his own domestic
| situation than before and the Germans
| still recalling the fact that when StreSe-
mann called upon his friend BRAND in
Paris he was advised to see Poincare,
| it is unmistakable that the Geneva af-
fair loses Importance for the moment.
In the year which has passed since the
last meeting there have been only two
real events and both have occurred with.
out League assistance.
| Furthermore, from Geneva comes the
pleasant report that in his talk with
Mueller BRAND repeated the advice Of
Poincare to StreSemann and urged Ber-
lin to undertake at Washington ne
gotiationS which might provide it with
the money to buy off allied occupation.
Certainly the British were not ignorant
OF the advice to be given. Is it too much
to conclude that they tacitly agreed
with the French that the Germans
should be deputed to approach Washing
ton and discuss the possible reduction
of debts as a detail in the liquidation
OF the Dawes plan?
Debts Form Dilemma.
So far the vast German American
population of the United States, polit-
ically important, has supported policy
OF making the allied debtors pay. But
what will be their attitude when the
German government approaches the
American and informs it that the single
obstacle to the evacuation Of German
soil and the fixation of German repara-
t1onS at reasonable figure is the
American policy in the matter of the
debts? Will not this at least bring
home to the American people that in
the matter of debts and reparations
there is only one process done in two
motions-the Germans pay the allies
and the allies pay us? In fact, done
in three times. because We lend the
money which the Germans pay to the
allies. and they pay to us.
The naval agreement shows France
and Great Britain working together, at
least in the matter of armaments. Con-
| cOm1tantly, all British pressure upon
France to evacuate the Rhineland has
ceased. In Paris, Stresemann accom-
plished nothing directly; at most he
was told price or perhaps a price
and a possible means of obtaining the
funds. British and French efforts at
Washington to modify American debt
policy have failed and the circumstances
OF the failure offer no promise Of sue
| cess Tor repetition. But France and
Britain are agreed about debts as they
are about ships and soldiers. They have
always been agreed that the United
States should cancel, or at least greatly
reduce its claims. Now that we have
stake of billions in Germany, as a
result of our commercial loans and
private investments in municipal stocks,
will not our investors see their holdings
compromised by reparation claims,
which constitute the first lien?
All this is far cry from a relative
ly small number of gentlemen and off,
GERS sitting down at table and agree
ing about the impossibility of limiting
the kinds of ships they desire and the
logical and inevitable necessity to limit
the kinds the United States desires and
they do not But in international dis
cusSions, particularly in Europe, one
thing leads to another and once people
put their feet under a table they sdiS-
cover all sorts of common interests.
Thus, it is at least specifically credible
that, in the midst of the conversations
and agreements which have set Europe
by the ears, the French and the British
also agree that it might be worth
while to let the Germans. who we're SO
eager to get their bill fixed and their
| territory evacuated. try the thing off
with Washington and. incidentally, edu-
cate the German american voter to the
consequences for the old Fatherland Of
American debt policy.