Evening star., 1928-10-21
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

lantic. And this circumstance supplied |
the major fact of the Washington Naval |
Conference of 1922.
Every one will recall that after the |
question of battleShips had been settled |
a great controversy broke out on sub
marines. The British delegation came |
to America resolved to persuade the !
United States to join Britain in pro- |
hibition of the submarine as a weapon. |
This purpose was the natural outcome |
of a war in which the Germans had
very nearly starved Britain into defeat |
by their use of the undersea craft.
In washington, however, the British |
were confronted by the report OF our
own naval experts, who alleged that the
submarine was an essential element IN
our own defense and should not be
abolished This was the position taken
by Mr. Hughes in his opening address.
MIR. Balfour, by contrast, pressed the
British view and in fact appealed over
the heads of the American Government
to the American people. He was enor-
mously aided in this campaign by the
brilliant group of English Journalists
who accompanied the British mission
and circulated their articles through
the American press.
The French, on the other hand,
backed by various smaller nations, toOK
the American view and held out for the
submarine. French resistance belng
immutable, American policy-wh1ch wa
vered a little under British attack, was
less important. Finally the whole dis
pute was carried from the private con-
ference to the public and the French
were castigated all over the United
States for refusing to accept l1mlta-
tion of submarine strength which con-
formed to the ratio they had accepted
in battleships.
Since the French refused to yield, the
British presently declared that no llml-
tation in cruisers was possible, because
the cruiser was the natural weapon OF
defense against the submarine. Tnus,
while we surrendered our prospective
supremacy in battleships, the British
retained their actual superiority IN
cruisers and no limitation was set Tor
this craft. This was of course the point
of departure of negotiations which ter
minated in the unsuccessful Coolldge
Conference in Geneva. These negotla-
tions had for their purpose to bring
about parity between American ana
British cruiser fleets by the fixation OF
limit such as was already agreed upon
in the case of the battleships.
Interest Revives.
All of this otherwise musty ancient
history becomes of immense contem-
porarv interest when the present An
glo-French naval agreement is examln-
ed. By this agreement the British con-
sent among other things to the aban-
donment of any attempt not merely TO
abolish. but even to limit the tonnage
of small submarines. But small SUD-
marines are patiently the sort OF craft
the French could use most advantage
eously against British merchant mar
irle given the relation OF the Frencn
coast to the British lines OF sea COM |
munication.
Thus the British have gone over COM |
pletely to the French view. They have |
accepted the French position which |
they assailed in the Washington confer
ence. They have publicly repudiated |
all the long and ingenious arguments |
Mr.. Balfour made at washington tend !
ing to show first that the submarine |
itself was an inhuman weapon, and |
second that British existence would be |
endangered if the use of this weapon
continued. On the contrary, they nave |
agreed to the unlimited use OF the |
weapon by that nation which could use |
1t most effectively
Why have the British thus changed |
front and, to accept their own estl- |
mate, put their own security in the |
hands of their French neighbors? There |
can be but one explanation. The Brl-
tish admiralty, which largely controls |
the present British cabinet, have con- |
vinced it that the real menace to |
Great Britain, the actual enemy to pre- |
pare against, is not France, but the |
United States. There is no other con- |
ceivable explanation for such a per-
formance in SomerSaulting.
The thing goes much deeper, how |
ever What the British have done is |
to undertake by diplomatic arrange |
ment to bring about a complete accord |
between British and French policies, |
not on naval matters. but on the |
whole range of foreign questions affect |
ing both. They have, in effect, con-
cluded to accept French views with |
respect of Germany-which means to |
continue the occupation of the Rhine
land until Germany meets French |
terms-to swallow French views to land |
ornaments, views which have hither- |
to been stoutly opposed by all British |
representatives in the League of Ma
tionS. They have-a minor detail but |
showing how the wind blows-permit- |
ted their troops to join with the |
French in maneuvers on German soil |
and their aviators to indulge in SINH |
lar operations with the French in the |
SOuGIl VI FTdIlCe, WIleIc 1Cdlldl SuS-
capabilities are most sensitive.
Now all this must recall to the mind |
of any one who remembers the last |
decade of the nineteenth century and |
the first of the present the fashion in |
which the British. after coming very |
nearly to war with the French over |
Fashoda, proceeded to liquidate all the |
colonial disputes and arrange that en-
tente cordiale with their hereditary /
enemy which was the starting point |
of the World War in the minds of
not few observers. |
German Challenge Responsible.
All this really tremendous change
In front was due to the German naval
challenge. The British cleared their
decks of all minor disputes and ad-
dressed themselves to the business of
organizing a combination in Europe
which could make face to a great
power, whose naval policy constituted
in British view a direct challenge to
British supremacy and a real menace
to British security
But this is what they are doing
again. We and not Germany consti-
tute, to the comprehension of the Brit
ish admiralty, the cotemporary danger.
The old strategy is just as good for
them now as then and they are us
ing IL. Less JLldl seven years aICeI |
they were fighting the French on all
the points which were contested in the
American Capital. And the French are
accepting all the British views in the
matter of the British dispute with the
United States over naval parity.
Now no one SuppoSeS that history
is going to repeat itself inexorably
and that we shall presently find our
selves as the Germans did in 1914 up
against a great combination of power
and compelled to choose between sac
rif1ce of prestige and conflict against
great odds. All the conditions are
different, neither the British nor the
Asnnnrinnrn H. rkr. 49,