Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1928-09-09
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

of first-rate importance and the meet
ING between Stresemann and Poincare
might easily have marked new date
in European reconciliation, there can
be no question that what had been
hoped for, at least in Germany ana
the world outside OF France and her
allies. did not come off. Having signed
the kellogg treaty. Stresemann went
back to resume his cure and European
prospects became Enthusiastically less
promising.
Obviously what Stresemann had
hoped, what the mass of the German
people had expected, was some gesture
nm the French part in respect OF the
evacuation of the Rhineland. The ges-
ture was pretty we'll outlined as the
promise of an immediate evacuation OF
that portion of the Rhineland which.
under the treaty of Versailles, Will be
cleared of allied troops automatically
on January l, 1880.
Excavations for Sale.
Instead of the gesture. Stresemann
met from Poincare the perfectly
courteous and friendly suggestion that
France was prepared to discuss. not
merely the evacuation OF the second
zone. but also withdrawal from the
third and last area, which must be
cleared by January 1, 1885. Such a
discussion, however. the French premier
indicated, must be based upon the
principle of compensation. In WORD,
evacuation was for sale.
Nor were the terms which France
would consider less clearly indicated.
Aside from some form of League OF
Nations supervision, which would in
sure that immediate evacuation did not
| lead to prompt militarization OF the
Rhine zones. in violation of the treaty
of Versailles, France expects some
| financial advantage to be derived from
| the marketing of German bonds which
are a detail in the reparations plan.
Under the Dawes plan Germany Is
bound to sell relatively enormous
number of bonds, based upon her ral-
ways and other acknowledgement as
sets, and turn over the proceeds 10 ner
conquerors.. From THIS source rec d II mas mas
been calculated between S2,00OsOOO, 900
| and $4,000, 900 900 could be raised. This
sum would 60 to the allies, and the
French share would be little more
than half. The bonds would be sold
on the world market, the transaction
would be between the investor and the
| German government and the relation
| between allied and German govern
nlents would be terminated.
| But such an enormous transaction
depends primarily upon the condition
of the world market and upon the
willingness and capacity OF American
| investors to absorb such tremendouS
amount of foreign securities. Nor Is 1t
less manifest that the approval OF the
| American Government would be essen
tial to the Notation IN the United States
| And during the progress OF a presi-
| Dental election nothing of the sort
would be possible.
Stresemann without Resources.
| Stresemann was, then, frankly with
out any resource to meet the demands
of Poincare. He was empty handed
and unable to buy what the French
told him was for sale. What the Ger
mans had hoped for, what the very
| considerable and influential section OF
German public opinion which favors
Franco-G German reconciliation and even
an entente between the traditional en-
emies desired, was some signs, some rel
| atively inexpensive bit of generosity,
which might render less difficult their
home situation in the face of the Ma
| tionalists, who at all times maintain that
all reconciliation is impossible and that
French purpose remains hostile.
When one examines the French view.
which Poincare represents, it Is clear
that many circumstances have COM
bined to create the present state of
mind. There is, first, the kellogg treaty.
Nothing that the President or Sec
rotary of State have said or may say
will convince the French government or
the French people that the treaty is
not the first step in the series which
will bring the United States back to
Europe under conditions at least similar
to those We rejected in 1919-20.
The United States Is coming back to
Europe, thus the French reason. 1t is
going to take hand in the last stages
of reconstruction. The first and most
obvious step is to share In the necessary
liquidation of the Dawes plan, along
with which goes the final settlement
OF the debt question. We have become
enormous investors in Germany, and if
the issue of German securities to meet
separations requirements takes place
we shall expand our holdings. We are.
then, interested financially in the SOL
vency of Germany.
In that situation will not the holders
OF private securities perceive that the
value of their investments depends
largely upon the size of PREPARATIONS,
that the more Germany is bound to
pay directly to her war creditors the
less she will have to pay to the pri-
vate investor? But this raises the
question of debts. A reduction of the
sums which are now fixed by the Dawes
plan will be permitted by France only
as it is balanced by reduction of the
amounts now payable to the United
States and Great Britain on account
of allied debts.
Still Hopes for Debt Cut.
Germany asks for a revision of the
Dawes plan. Europe believes that the
payments henceforth called for by the
Dawes plan are beyond German capac-
lty. France agrees, provided that no
reduction affects her. Italy is in the
same situation, so Is Belgium. The
British still adhere to the old Balfour
plan. insisting that they must get from
Germany and their allies of the war
enough to pay the Baldwin Mellon deot
settlement contributions annually.
France. then. expects to say to the
United States. Your share in the gen.
eral clearing up of the postwar mess
must be the reduction of your claims
upon your European associates for war
debts She expects to balance this
by her assent to the reduction of rep
aratlons pari passu and by her consent |
70 the premature evacuation of the |
Rhineland, Without her consent !
neither thing is possible, but both are
essential to prosperity and order in Eu- |
rope.
Against the great international con-
ference France expects, with the Dawes |
plan and interallied debts both on the !
calendar, to hold all of her cards-and !
evacuation is one. She holds 1t against |
Germany primarily. If Germany finds |
the money herself, then the card goes !
and there is no need of using it against |
the United States and Great Britain |
But as long as Germany cannot find |
the money, France keeps the card.
There are, of course, many other rea-
SOf1g m Wt1frh France AyoH har