Evening star., 1928-12-23
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.


discoverable than that revealed
in the fashion in which dis
cussion has developed on either side OF
the Atlantic as consequence OF recent
Anglo American naval differences. In
Europe this discussion has proceeded
logically and even inevitably to the
consideration of the possibility OF an
Anelo-American war. In the United
States the whole subject has been
shelved to be replaced by comment on
Mr.. Hoover's South American voyage
1t is significant, however, OF the
European discussion of possible conflict
countries that 1t has so far been
limited to those who may fairly be
described as champions alike of worN
peace and of protagonists of Anglo
American friendship. We are not now
in the presence of debate carried on
between war lords, as in the postwar
period, but rather are hearing warning
voices raised by those who view even
the remote prospect of new conflict
with frank horror.
War Held Not Impossible.
! So far there has been a general
unanimity both in the United States
and in Great Britain on the verdict
that an Anglo-American war was un-
thinkable. Now, however, one must
face the fact that in Britain and on the
continent there is growing fear lest
the unthinkable war becomes a very
real and we'll nigh inescapable menace
Europe, which has a long and unhappy
experience in reading the signs which
forecast stormy international weather
begins to interpret the new signs with
the accustomed standards.
To be sure it remains as true In
Great Britain as in the United States
that the conception of war exclusive
ly between the United States and Brit
ain: that is, a war arising from the col
lision of direct interests, a war which
would be in the nature of duel with
only the two peoples in shock-continues
to appear impossible. That the Brit
ish and American people should in colo
blood or even in hot blood go to wal
with each other, while the rest of the
world was at peace, seems at once
monstrous and unimaginable.
Nevertheless it is becoming clear In
Britain that while there is no immed-
late or even remote possibility Of such
a clash, this does not exclude the dan
ger of collision. While there is nc
chance whatever of an Anglo-Americar
1
been a danger of Franco-German war
and no possibility that such rivalries
disagreements, misunderstanding OF
grudgeS as may exist would ever be per-
mitted to lead to hoStilities, there is 8
real danger of war which lies outside al
of this familiar area.
4 What British observers feel, wha
continental commentators note, is thai
nothing has been done to abolish the
real menace to enduring Anglo-Amer.
lean peace, the menace which actually
led to war between Britain and the
United States in 1872 and might, un.
der other circumstances, have precipi.
tated another clash in the years be-
tween 1914 and 1917. While Britain
is at peace with the world, Anglo
American peace is certainly assured
but were Britain again fighting for he1
life as against Napoleon and William
II, the situation might easily be quite
different.
Measures Might Offend U. S.
So much has happened since the first
years OF the World War that the mass
OF people on this side of the Atlantic
nave easily and completely forgotten
the long series of episodes which char
acterized the first period of the great
conflict. In that time the British de-
llberately set out to employ their sea
power to Strangle their German foe
| without regard to existing internationa]
law, limiting interference with neutral
commerce. In that time the only real
restriction upon British interference
with American rights was due to clear
perception of the evil consequences
should the United States undertake tc
defend those rights, either by force or
what was more likely and quite as dan
gerous, by resort to the embargo.
Fortunately for the British, the Ger
man method of carrying on the struggle
served to paralyZe American purpose to
defend neutral rights. The invasion OF
Belgium reused resentment which en-
dured up to the moment when German
submarine warfare eliminated in the
sinking of the LuSitania. After that
active pursuit of policy which would
have amounted to supporting Germany
became impossible.
But the fact remains that were Great
Britain again to be involved in Euro
pean war, she would inevitably resort to
the same measures as in 1914. One OF
the chief weapons she would employ
would be her naval arm, and to employ
this weapon successfully would neces-
state constant interference with neu-
trail rights in general and with those oi
the United States in particular. AnC
Immediately the question of 1914 would
arise again. the question as to whether
the United States were prepared tc
maintain its neutral rights or suspend
them, as in effect we did in the last
war.
Again, the situation might easily
take on the character of the German
problem. Under pressure from the
United States the Germans did toward
the end of 1914 and as result of the
Lusitania controversy abandon the use
Of the submarine weapon, by which
they were illegally meeting British il
/! legality. They took this course because
they were at that moment satisfied that
If they continued to use the submarine
they would have to fight the United
States and that American hostility
would outweigh any possible advantage
of submarine warfare.
Germany Became Desperate.
But in 1917 the German situation
became desperate. The British blockade
had reduced Germany to the point of
starvation, the collapse of Russia was
not yet recognized and German de-
feat seemed inevitable unless British
sea power could be abolished by an at
tack upon British existence through the
submarine. In that situation the risk
of American Intervention seemed less
terrible than the certainty of German
defeat following progressive starvation.
1t is not impossible to believe that
such situation might arise in a new
war, and that Britain and not Germany
would find herself In position where
the use of her naval arm without re-
gard to neutral rights would seem the
sole means Of escaping complete disas-
ter. Such a decision, too, would OBJ
viously be conditioned on the strength
of the American fleet at the moment.
If We were as destitute of cruisers as
at the present moment. for example
that is to say If we were as weak in the
naval branch as we were In the military