Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1928-11-12

/, to the energy and initiative of the
commanders-in and their armies
to make the results obtained definite.
when you're dealing with Germans
you must expect anything"
1t will be seen that the doctrine unit
ing the policy of Clemenceau and
symbolized strategy of Marshal Foch
was supreme. Both understood that
we had to act quickly. 1t is needless
to recall that the victory in this long
war YVES due to this perfect unity be-
this axiom: Strategy is only the con-
tinuation of policy, and the COM
mander- in chief of the armies could
not accomplish good strategy unless the
political director of the war had a
good policy, each remaining firmly
fixed within the limits of his attri-
buteS. Such method, such an UNI
Outstanding not only insured the unity
OF command but also the unity of d.
rection, and it cannot be said too often
that that is what won the war.
Return to Paris.
We returned Immediately to Paris.
On the way back Clemenceau and /
went over the details of the interview
with the marshal and we agreed that,
i'll the absence Of unforeseen circum-
stances-the marshal had said: When
you're dealing with Germans YOU must
expect anything" there we're excel
lent chances that the armistice would
be concluded on the following day. No
vember 10, or the day after at the
latcS;.
II Is scarcely necessary to add that
on our arrival at the war ministry we
were besieged by visitors. most of whom
brought extravaganza reports circulate
ing III Paris. Nervousness continued.
We thought it was time to finish. This
feeling was eXcusable after four years
of war. with ell the terrible emotions
which the people of the capital had ex-
perienced At 3:45 pm. I learned the
Germans had transmitted to Marshal
Foch their observations on the clauses
of the armistice He examined them
and after telephone conversation
with Clemenceau sent them back with
a note saying he could not accept any
of the changes urged beyond a few
small matters of detail.
At the same time he sent memo
randum pointing out that the time
limit (72 hours expired on the follow
ing day, and that 1t would be most ad-
viSable for the German delegates to
insist on a reply from their govern
ment.
News About Germany.
In the evening we received some
news of the German revolution. 1t
was vague, merely that the Prince
of Babe had resigned as head of the
government and that new cabinet had
been formed The German armies
were continuing their retreat before
our troops, but slowly, orderly and Of
fering rear guard resistance. How
ever, in course of the conversations
which had in the evening with Glenn
enceau I realized perfectly that this
new situation in the interior of Ger
many was worrying him. Did the dele
gates who we're now negotiating for an
armistice represent the new govern
ment? What would happen If they
signed the protocol and the new gov
eminent refused to ratify it on the
ground that they did not have powers,
I knew Clemenceau was worried and
I understood why.
1t was late, 8 o'clock and no news
came to the foreign Office or the min
iStry of war. Clemenceau and said
goodnight with the firm belief that
the night would not pass without news
Of the situation in Germany. Clemen-
ceau, as usual, went to his home in the
Rue Franklin, I, as usual, slept in the
war Office, ready to warn him Of any
important happening
(Copyright, 1927