Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1928-08-26
NAVAL CURBS ON ITALY
ANCLO.FRENCH PACT AIM
America Not Believed to Be Enemy.
Admiral's Views May En-
barrass Baldwin.


on land. for they may have to act to-
getheT at sea.
circumstances may well arise thai
will oblige them to conjugate their et'
forts for the defense of their riches
that have cost them SO much, ne
saws. 'On that day when it comes the
combined strength of France and Eng
land will hardly be enough to MAN.
tain order in the world
There is no use beating about TIT
bush The impression made on the con
tinent and perhaps III washington .,
this agreement. which is signed by tht
French minister OF marine ana DIV tll'
admiralty staff here and has received
inc assent of the foreign offices, is thai
England has given France free hane
on the continent in return Tor cessation
Of French naval building against Eng
land and possibly an understanding
that the two nayieS will act together /!
necessary.
Who Is the Enemy"
Summing up all evidence available
and some of it cannot be publlSnec
without violation of confidence. 1t Is
clear that within the past month an
Anglo French naval entente has come
into existence, roughly similar to that
between the same powers before the war
/ Then it was directed against Germany.
There are now only three other naval
powers the United States, Japan and
| italy. Whatever form this entente has
/ taken. it is certain that there is more
/ in 1t than in the summaries of purely
/ technical agreement conveyed TO other
! governments Is il directed against
italy? It may be found that in future
/ certain cooperation between the
/ British and French navies in the Medi-
! terranean will reveal itself.
! So far as the United States is con-
/ cerned. and certain French comments
have limited that this new entente
would take into account other naval
| forces everywhere, it is certain that the
/ British government as represented by
/ the cabinet and the foreign office is not
afraid of the United States. is not seek
| ing protection against America and that
| Chamberlain repeated statements that
| in British government calculations pos
Sible hostility with the United States is
never considered, represents the truth.
/ But the British government is not con-
! fined to the cabinet and the foreign
Office. especially now when, under Bald
/ Hifl, who is remarkable for letting things
/ slide and whose principal cabinet minis
! ters are at odds. the links between the
great departments are loose. The ad-
/ nliraIty is most independent of all the
| departments.
Viewpoint of Navy.
| There exists in the navy a school Of
| thought, non-poiitical and probably in
| capable Of reasonable thinking about
! political relations between nations,
which regards the United States as the
potential enemy, solely because the
United States has the next largest feet.
For instance, Vice Admiral Sir Herbert
Richmond is probably the most power
full factor in laying contingent plans
for future wars. He Is commandment of
the Imperial Defense College, where war
tactics and strategy against hypothetical
! enemies are studied and was assistant
| director of operations at the admiralty
during the war. Admiral Richmond, in
paper on the naval situation, recently
limited that If and when Britain found
herself unable 10 outbuild any other
power the next step should be to seek
allies.
$50 Ratio May Be Upset.
Once the naval disarmament question
with France was handed over by states.
men to the experts" the admiralty
school Of thought got its chance. What
/ is more probable than that some
admirals were delighted at the chance
OF killing two birds with one stone
destroying the menace of the big French
submarines and at the same time upset.
ting the 5-5-3 ration of the Washington
conference by making the ratio fol
American and for England anc
France combined?
In putting that suggestion forward
ii Is difficult to make plausible abroad
the further probability that the adj.
miralty has gone further than ths
foreign Office either knows or in.
tended With a weak foreign secre.
tary, man who at the moment wher
these decisions we're taken was ex
tremely III and who by a historic in.
discretion gave the whole show away
it might easily happen that Sir Auster
Chamberlain's general understanding
with BRAND. in itself perhaps not oper
To objection, has been used by the
naval experts of both sides 10 come Il
arrangements partly written, partly i'm
piled or verbal. which statesmen her.
did not understand until it was tot
late.
II that is the explanation 1t would
surprise no one conyersant with tn,
wrangle and lack Of cooperation II
the present British government. Thu
Old teamwork and concentration o.
power in the hands Of Asquith, Gre,
and Haidane, which characterized tn
Liberal government before the war
has gone, the dictatorship Of Lloyt
George which followed has gone, and
with q cabinet divided by tariff issu
into warning camps and foreign sec
rotary whose policy has seemed 10 MAX
England an appange Of France, the so
( h 49, ~ eli Il IL
above u.s. think, probably correct.
May Have Exceeded Authority.
II certain admirals here are anxiou
10 form working combine Of the tW,
+ strongest fleets IN Europe and objec
10 the size Of the American feet, VIVA
Is the object Of France IN the agree
nIcnt that has been made? Partly, per
haps, the assurance Of English supper
on the continent Certainly not the
! rcmotest intention Of ever combinin;
with The British feet against tn
United States.
| The principal French motive is prob
ably ~ be- found hi the Mediterranean
An AnRlo-FTench naval entente IN tn
Mediterranean Is practical politics am
the repealed rumorB Of Italian inten
tons to seek more territory there SHOW
clearly enough what France has 10 gain
by British support.
What Britain gets Out of the arrange
ment III an assurance that more sub
marines will not De built against he
in the Channel And undoubtedly, ex
cept III the minds Of a handful q
British admirais who think of nation
Ia terms Of ships and guns only, Their
has been no thought Of America II
; this whole affair,
But those few admirals may hag
had more influence IN the discussion
! last month than has been guessed an
' nave been actIated by motives unaV0H
. I'd 70 their political chiefs and whicI
! / those chiefs would never entertain,
/ fC0pyright, 1929