Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1928-11-11

purely military viewpoint. all other con-
siderations being eliminated, you would
prefer the Germans to reject or accept
the armistice as drafted?"
The marshal replied: "One only
makes war for its results. If the Ger
mans now sign an arn1istice whose gen.
eral conditions are such as we have
settled on we should have obtained
these results. This end having been
attained, no one has the right to cause
another drop of blood to be shed. The
terms agreed upon by your military
advisers are exactly the same as those
which we could and should dictate after
the success of our imminent operations.
Therefore, if the Germans accept them,
it is useless to continue the battle"
THE unanswerable logic of this reply
which was made before the whole
council, stopped all further discussions
of the utility or the advisability of a
march on Berlin at this time abruptly.
In the session of November 2 Clemen-
ceau raised the question of reparations
for the first time. AS a result, the
PREPARATION of damages" was added to
the terms stated in the draft of the
projected armistice, which was the
only change or addition of any i'm
portance made by the Supreme Council
during the four days it sat. The APP
proval of the draft of the armistice
completed all the preparations for the
meeting of the plenipotentiaries of the
opposing sides which were necessary on
the part of the allies.
On the German side these prepara-
tons were much more complicated by
the fact that the imperial government
had, even on November /, practically
ceased to function and there was as
yet nothing to take its place. Prince
Max of Baden was, it is true, still I'M
perial chancellor but he was facing
hostile Reichstag and surrounded in
the cabinet by men determined to over
throw the imperial government and
create a republic, of which they intend
ed to make themselves the heads. In
addition, a third faction was marching
in arms through the Berlin streets,
with the anliable intention of putting
in power government of the Soviet
type, with Russian cooperation.
The necessities of the situation forced
momentary truce between the chan
cellor, the Reichstag and his cabinet
opponents. The allies had accepted the
German proposal for an arrnistice and
the German government, or what still
was outwardly the government, had to
select plenipotentiaries, equip them
with the necessary credentials and send
them to meet the representatives of the
allies
No time could be lost. Hindenburg
had advised Berlin that the army was
rapidly getting completely out Of con-
troll and he could not answer for the
consequences if there was any delay in
arriving at a cessation of hostilities.
The first thing to do was to select
the plenipotentiaries. Under ordinary
circumstances this would not have been
a difficult task Habitually the army
commander is intrusted with the ne
gotiation of an armiStice, but the allies
had notified the German chancellor that
they would not accept Won Hindenburg
as the German plenipotentiary. All
the other generals of sufficient rank
were unavailable for other reasons or
were at the front, communications be-
tween which and Berlin were more or
less interrupted, except Won Groener,
who was acting minister of war and
who pleaded that the duties of his Of
flee, at such a critical moment, made
his presence at the capital imperative.
Prince Max then turned to civilians
and called on all the chiefs of the pop
ular movement in succession, Ebert,
Scheidemann, ETC., but each Of these
found some weighty reason why some
one else should be selected.
In reality all had triple motive for
declining the task. All were leaders
of the Republican movement and as it
was then easy to see that in few days
the phantom of empire still existing
would crurnble completely. both for the
sake of their general cause and for
their own personal fortunes at that
moment, they wished to be on the spot
Swhen the climax occurred. = Further