Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1928-08-19
FEAR OF OPPOSITION BALKS
AUSTRO.CERMAN UNION
Discussion of Matter Is Rife i'm European
Capitals, But Reich Hesitates
to Take Action.

man claims on Strasbourg Italy would
even more nationally fear an immediate
return of Austro-German ambition TO
hold Trieste and thus to have an outlet
upon the Adriatic.
AS for Poland, such an increase in
German power would mean an OBVIOUS
decrease in the strength Of Poland's
1old upon her border provinces. Czecho-
slovakia. too. would see itself almost
encircled by German territory. totally
cut off from Western Europe and alike
menaced because of the German mi
norities within its frontiers and by the
probable German support of Hungarian
aspirations to reclaim Sloyakia and
Pressburg. For Italy. 1t would not
merely destroy Italian influence in the
Danube and Balkan areas. but it would
also raise the question of the Upper
Adige and Trieste.
To all other complications there IS
added religious problem. Germany is,
today, predominantly Protestant. Be-
tween Protestant and Roman Catfo-
lie there survives a certain division
surviving from the far-off reformation
and kept alive to a degree by the fact
that in the Reich there is Catho-
lie party Indeed, it was the struggle
Centre of Catholic party. which wrecked
the previous German cabinet and coali-
ton.
Since Austria is wholly Catholic it
would bring 10 the Catholics of Ger
many very considerable reinforce
ment and weaken measurably the
supremacy of the Protestant north.
Such accession to the Catholics, too.
might lead to the outbreak of new
quarrels. Thus there are patent reasons
| why the Protestants as well as the
Mot lictr nt4I
| who direct the Peoples party in Ger
| many, must view with distavor this
| proposal, which publicly they are all
| bound to advocate in the face of allied
| prohibition.
League Would Object.
| There. then, is a situation which has
| all the conceivable elements which go
TO make up the characteristic European
mess. Since the peace treaties forbid
| the union Of Austria with Germany, the
League of Nations is bound to view
any forcible attempt to bring 1t about
as menace to peace as an act OF
aggression which would permit the vari-
/ Gus concerned states to resort to arms
Were We members Of the League. We
| should naturally be bound by the same
| contract. But it is obvious what con-
| fusion and turmoil would be stirred up
In the United States were We to join in
or even assent to any attack upon Ger
many by her neighbors, provoked by
| her attempt TO do what We did in the
case of the Americans in Texas two
| generations ago. One can easily foresee
what the million of Americans of Ger
man and Austrian descent would feel
/ and say in such circumstances
| Moreover, since the AnSchluss uues-
/ tlon has been discussed concomitantlv
| with the kellogg treaty in various
European capitals the point has been
/ raised as 10 what course We might take.
in view Of the latter trgatv. in the
| event that the Anschluss issue led 10
/ trouble. Undoubtedly the League would
| be bound to invoke at least economic
and financial sanctions against Ger
| many And It has been assumed In
| Paris that as result of the kellogg
/ treaty to outlaw war We should at the
very least be obligated to respect such
bloclades and boycott as might be en-
| ployed against Germany. Indeed, the
Paris correspondent of the New York
Times has reported this to be the
French view
Americas Position.
1t is patent. however. that such q
blockade would have serious conse-
quences for us. 1t would certainly re-
strict the market for the cotton crop Of
the South materially; it would similar
~ embarraSS the Western farmer. Fin
ally 1t would precipitate lust the same
sort CT domestic row between the Ger
man and anti-German elements in our
populations as was caused by the World
War itself. All the countries interested
IN dsciphning Germany would hold us
morally bound by the Kellogg treaty. To
AGAINST Sp,ff pa ftNe~
h!ct and not only would all our Ger
man and Austrian citizens protest
against such course. but there would
surely be very considerable BODY Of
American citizens who would feel that
1t was not the business OF the United
States Government 10 aid in preventing
more than six millions Of German-Aus-
ul1ns from Self-determining themselves
INTO the Reich, II they chose, or Of aid
l1e directly or indirectly in SMASHING
Germany if she followed the example
OF the United States in Texas
II Is this accidental coincidence Of
discussions between AnSchluSs and the
kellogg treaty which supplies one more
evidence of what Europe really means
when II desires that the United States
associate itself with the other CONT
nent IN peace operations. AS il stands
today war is the only means BY which
the Germans and AuStrians can eStah-
llSh their right to unite. That il is
TIER moral right no one can deny.
That other countries oppose this right
Tor purely selfish and national reasons
Is unmistakable. But the effort 10 en-
force the Kellogg treaty against Ger
many would mean joining in an alh-
ance with European states 70 deny the
Germans exactly that privilege we af-
nrmed In our wartime propaganda was
10 be won for all peoples by our victory.
Thus. IN case war comes over An
SchltSS, the nations opposed will look
TO us for aid But the Germans Will
expect us, at the least. to observe reu-
trality. because our own urinciolsS in
the last war embodied the RIGHT OF
Self-determination All Of which is m
say the least. different from the ordi-
nary American view Of what the Ke,-
loge treaty means
tCopyright. lassp