Evening star., 1928-03-11
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.

~ ERLIN.-If In London and Paris
- the question Of the liquidation
Of the Dawes plan eXcites gen.
- eral discussion, In Berlin il Is
easily the most important of
all problems. For this the reason is
simple-on the ultimate solution Of the
problem Of reparations rests the pros
pect Of the liberation Of German soil
from armies Of occupation and German
finance and economic life from the
mortgage OF the Dawes plan.
When 8. Parker Gilbert in his last
annual report recommended the fix
alton Of final sum for reparations, he
gave new impetus to the reparations
discussion. When he sharply criticized
the course of certain municipalities in
the matter OF foreign loans. he empha-
sized to the Germans the fact OF alien
control Of their own affairs.
When DR.. StreSemann and M. BRAND
in their respective parliaments quar-
relied politely over the question of the
termination OF the allied occupation of
the Rhineland every one in Germany
and France appreciated the fact that
the real question was one Of money.
What can Germany pay France to OBJ
tain evacuation before January. 1885.
the date fixed in the treaty Of Versailles?
Problem Is Urgent.
In the weeks during which I have
been in Berlin have talked with rep
resentatives OF finance, business politics
and the press. and for all the problem
Of reparations Is immediate and urgent,
the one remaining major problem left
over from the war Within limits the
conclusions Of all are the same.
The common statement would be
something like this: 1T Is time to have
a general cleanup week to rid our
selves Of the last debris Of the war and
get back to ordinary conditions. We
shall not have normal conditions in
Germany while there remain armies Of
occupation. commissions Of financial oc-
cupation like the Dawes agents. indefi-
mite reparations obligation or any repa-
rations contracts between countries"
The program OF liquidation would be:
First, to fix the sum total which Ger
many must pay 10 fulfil her commit
ments under the treaty OF Versailles.
Second to transform this obligation
from an affair between governments to
a matter OF ordinary finance by COM
mercializing the debt. Third. having
done this. to transfer the sum due to
the several allied debtors and in re-
turn obtain the winding UP OF the
watch on the Rhine and on Luisen-
! strasse. where the Dawes agents sit,
In practice. this would mean that
Germany would agree that she was
| able and ready 70 pay capital sum OF
reparationS To this amount the Ger
| man government would issue bonds.
partly based upon German railway and
industrial plants. partly In the form Of
ordinary treasury bonds, all guaran-
teed by the credit Of the Reich itself
| As Germany has practically no ma
tional debt and the railways are gov
eminent property. capable OF earning
regular profits. the value Of the under
! lying security Is obvious,
| To commercialize the debt. however
! 1t would be necessary to sell these
bonds abroad. for Germany lacks cap
! itai TO take them up herself. In prac-
| tice. q large portion OF these bonds
would have TO be marketed in the
United States. So far this Is only an
extension OF the idea first concretely
expressed in the Thoiry conversations
between BRAND and Stresemann two
years ago.
Obviously certain problems arise at
once. First OF all. would the United
States Government consent TO the sale
Of the securities on the American
market2 As We never made any objec-
ton TO the Thoiry scheme and rs the
securities would be OF undoub.ed value
there Is no real prospect OF trouble
here. Therefore this part Of Americas
relation TO the liquidation Is hardly
cause for doubt.
Question Of Amount
There are more serious problems
First OF all. there Is the great question
as 10 how much Germany can and
will pay. Under the Dawes plan Ger
many is bound 10 pay an increasing