Evening star., 1928-11-15

Occasion OF the signing Of the dImiSt,Gtt'
Is efRec'fqMk fRe qnk fsstt bets1eeS cismenceaa and
Foch, he pGs one OF the three msn gs,!cs sO4o 70
ne fn fsrToSsSG EMrope Gen. Morddcq is best knopn
as turiter on military Suo?ecLS' t9c-
"G1aTi Dnrino T%f ths World war he commanded
Sn Tf0hmens hs oas cGlled 1ugpuS 6y H.
clemenceau qae1sceGi TO- to the ministry Of tDar
gragS his tSrss ssr'rs es st dnd hd obtaned sir
cifGtions II Novem6er' o,aoTa 1gd7 ne Sl pSs fSs
Se6seals Seqseal Vg of the french army as the chief
Fl hen ms t6T eqHHe' to veGps ear he did not quit tie
/ side of Clemencedu.
"Was the Armistice Signed Too Soon!
ANY one .who saw victors and van
quished alike weep for JOY at the new
that the armistice had been slgnet
would not have been prepared 1or In
sudden turn which caused many TO IN
uuire that day after the armls.lce
Haven't we acted ton hastily? Wh!
shouldn't we carry on the war LOT al
other year?"
But that was the idea which paSsee
through the minds of many mllltaT,
leaders during the first calm WHlcl
followed the hysteria OF November -.
Naturally, if we had continued tn'
war a few weeks longer, we Shoulo nave
been able to carry it into Germany an.
even to Berlin. Our bomoaroinen
souadrons especially were then IN
nosition to Law desolate such nerve cen
ters as the Ruhr, principal source o.
Germany's wealth and military resist
ance and Frankfort-on-the-M MAIN, I'M
citv of bankers, symbolizing that wealth.
But was it practical?
This was war of allies against com.
mon enemy, and nobody on the allleo
side could have foreseen the tragic DAYS
of November 8, 9 and 10 in Germany
BEFORE giving my own ideas on THIS
subject and before ending my discussion
of such a grave question, I am going
to give the opinions OF men well p!aceo
tn have an Opinion-Clemencea Focn
and Joffre, Col. House and the otdclal
interpreter, MantouX.
In examining the question let us see
first what Col. House, the man OF gooo
sense. straightforward and sure. adml-
rablv acquainted with the analrS OF
Europe, had to say. He had followed
| closely every phase OF the war. In a
letter, addressed July g.. 1871, 10 M
Mantoux. who was the interpreter DUR
ing the peace conference, COL HOUSE
| wrote:
Col. Houses Opinion.
"It has often been said that the arm
istice was signed too soon, and that we
should have continued the war for an
other 60 dayS to crush Germany COM
pletely. 1t is easy to criticize events
when they have passed into history.
But when we were at Versailles In
| the decisive days of the Autumn OF
1918. trying our best to win all the trults
of victory without sacrificing more lives,
| it would have been d1thcult 10 say
where our duty toward the cause enoeo
and where our duty toward our brave
soldiers began" :,
At Senlin on November 10, 1918, IN
course of the conversation between
Clemenceau and Foch, to which re-
ferred in my second article, Clemen-
ceau asked Foch if, as military man,
he "saw any mistake, political or stra-
tegic. in granting an armiStice TO Ger
: MANY" The marshal replied without
moments hesitation:
Foch's Decision.
at see nothing but advantages. To
continue the struggle would be TOO greaI
a risk. It would probably mean 5O,OOO
to 100. 600 more French lives sacrificed,
without counting what our allies would
lose. for very problematic results.
should never forgive myself. There has
been. alas! a torrent Of bloodshed.
That's enough"
Clemenceau interjected: Marshal,
that's exactly my opinion.
/ want to point out that this scene
occurred on November 10, when, as l
have already remarked, we knew only
vaguely what was happening in Ger
many from the viewpoint OF nterna-
tional politics.
opinion several times during the ses-
sionS of the peace conference ana at
the receptions at the apartment OF Col.
House in the old mansion OF the Rue
de PUniversite. On october 29, 1919,
replying to a question OF Lloyd George
and Col. House, Foch said: -,
1.-THE conditions on which the MILL
tary counselors agreed were preclSely
those we should and would impose on
the Germans If we had carried on our
November offensive operations farther.
If the Germans were willing to accept,
Il was useless to continue the battle.
(This speech is recalled by M. Taroieu
in his careful study entitled La PalX
Moreover, on July 20, 1920, the news
paper Excelsior and some American
newspapers published letter from M.
Mantoux, who, as interpreter, was pres,
ent at every conference among the allied
leaders on the subject of the armistice.
This letter, addressed to Col. House,
supports the colonelS views. 1t says:
MantOux Letter.
"There were naturally discussions Of
the details of the armiStice terms. But
the allied governments, the military
chiefs and the statesmen seemed abSo-
| lutely in agreement on one fact, namely,
| that an armiStice was desirable, pro-
vided that the Germans would accept
the conditions proposed, which amount
ed to complete surrender. Neither tne
military men nor the statesmen knew
| then what we learned afterward about
| the internal situation of Germany and
| the condition of the German army.
| our losses. very high after four years
of war. were particularly heavy in the
weeks of open warfare which marked
the last phase of the war. Without
discussing purely military considera-
| tions. the statesmen knew that the
peoples of allied countries, who had
made enormous sacrifices for a just
cause, would never forgive their chiefs
| if they suspected them OF prolonging
the war beyond the limits of necessity" "
Marshal Joffre, in the course of a
| VISlC i pdlu I1llIl OSIONCA Az 4o4O3 tb0OAV
a trip he intended to make to London,
volunteered an analogous opinion.
"You see, the Germans are beaten,
he said. That's understood, but they
are still a great people. If We want
them to bow to fate and prevent them
| thinking of another war of revenge, we
must demand the necessary and moth
ing more. We must not seek to hunili-
ate them. That would not be worthy
of the victors. Therefore, when they
ask for an armistice let it be given to
them without making excessive de-
mandS."
These were noble sentiments, and
cid not forget them during the momen-