Evening star., 1928-01-15
GREAT BRITAIN MAY SEEK
ANOTHER NAVAL PARLEY
American Building Program Held Blow
to British Security-Wants 10000.
Ton Cruisers Abolished.
BY FRANK Fl. SIMONDS.
OEDON.-Will the British gov
ernment ask for another naval

BY FRANK Fl. SIMONDS.
II OEDOE.-Wnl the British gov
ernment ask for another naval
conference during the early
IL months OF the new year? VIII
1t seek by some direct and pub.
lie gesture to bring about a fresh
discussion? Will the return of the
American Amba ssador, Mr.. Houghton,
! serve as the starting point for con-
versations carried on more or less pri.
| vately between Washington and Lon.
don? All these questions are being
asked quietly at the present moment
| in the British capital.
On the surface the British govern
ment and people have accepted the
| American naval program as fact
and have adopted the policy that
! British naval construction will he
conditioned upon British naval re-
| quirements without regard 10 Ameri-
can policy. One might then con.
| clude that henceforth the two fleets
| will be constructed with total dis
regard to each other.
Nothing is. however. less likely.
| Before the British actually give up
the attempt to prevent the construc-
, tion by the United States Of a feet
which would automatically end Brit
! ish sea supremacy. they are bound
10 make many efforts to reach an
agreement with America.
| First Of all, Of course. they have
not yet accepted the American naval
/ program as more than gigantic
bluff. Therefore ii is TO find some
diplomatic way to prevent the con-
! struction Of the ships that they will
/ turn.
Aimed at Big Cruisers.
Moreover. the actual objective OF
| British naval authorities Is TO abolish
the 10, ,000-ton cruiser. II the United
States actually constructs % or 30
! of these large ships. then the British
| blockade is a thing Of the past. This
! Is true because. were Britain at war.
say with Germany, and should she
undertake TO blockade not only Ger.
many but the neutral countries like
| Holland and Denmark. through which
| supplies might pass 10 Germany. as
| she did in the last war, the United
i States could, If ii chose. break that
/ blockade by sending merchant ships
| to Dutch or Danish ports conveyed
/ by American cruisers.
/ IL you dig deeply enough into the
admiralty mind in Britain. you will
/ find that what is held to be the main
| issue in the naval question is not
| parity. as we understand il. On the
| contrary. the Geneva conference in
British naval eyes was important
merely as il afforded an opportunity
| to get the big cruiser. II not actually
banned. so severely restricted as TO
/ numbers as TO have slight importance.
This biz cruiser. the Washington
- -
/ sumed in the British mind exactly the
! importance which the dreadnausht
{ had two decades ago. Then Admiral
/ Sir John Fisher invented the all.hig
gun ship. As a consequence all the
/ existing British tattleships we're ad
! tomaticaily rendered obsolete and the
Germans. who were Just starting their
/ naval competition. were able TO begin
! ON level with the British.
| How many times during this visit
/ TO London have naval men and pub
| lie officials said TO me. We are not
going 10 make the biunder OF the
dreadnaughf over again" But un-
| fortunately for IL the British admiral
~ did make an equally great hlunder
and much OF the present trouble re-
suits from their mistake. Having at
/ Washington been led or forced TO ac-
i
Their obvious policy was 10 avoid
building these ships and wait n favor
able opportunity TO have them abol.
ished. But instead they rushed
through a program OF construction
which last year gave them Is Of the
boats, built and building. against two
for America.
Nothing was more inevitable then
/. than that our Representatives at
Geneva should insist on equality in
! this department. OF course they did
in fact so beyond this and dema nj
the right TO use all our tonnage slict.
ment In cruisers for this type But
this demand carried with IL fatal
menace 10 the whole British naval
| situation. Moreover. /, would not
be an answer 10 our construction
were the British TO build up and
! maintain parity.
! This is true because cruisers OF
! this type are not mainly designed
/ 10 travel in fleets and to fiSht, with
the hattleships at their sides. In some
new Jutland The danger for Britain
/ lies precisely in the fact that pos
sessing ships cf this type We could
convey our merchant marine. as
have said, We could also. in the
remoter contingency of war. rrac.
iically interrup, many of the British
i Sealanes, which the British could rot
patrol and guard. even with twice
| as many Washington CRUISES as we
possessed. because Of the very ex,en,
of these lanes.
hey TO British Strategy.
/ In this circumstance lies the Key
To all British strategy at the C>oii<ise
conference and since, The admiralty
does not care brass far;hing about,
| American parity in hattieships small
| cruisers. submarines cr destrcyers
! None ot these types can he employed
n,eree on the oceans. nor are they
| likely to be used to convoy merchant
| fleets across the Atlantic,
/ Indeed. at Geneva the British 20
sition was almost exactly iaenttcat
With the position taken np at wash
/ ingtan: the single difference lay In
| the fact thar at Washington the
| British were cut to set the submarine
banned. and a, Geneva te have the
| Washington cruiser abolished,
| In both cases. could they have s,se~
ceede,i, they would have ccmeine<i an
| apparent limitation az srmaments and
| n real saving In ccsts With the sddj
, tion NJ very great measure NJ Sc
i turity ta themselves, hecausa they
wculd have had abolished the only
/ types cf waCshirS which could So,
i riouslv threaten their naval suprcm,
acv In Europe,
Looking hack AT Geneva, one will
| recall that In all directions the British
| proposed - reduce Sise, They Argued
/ for smaller cruisers, smaller hattie
Ships. sMaller>sValiherNd guns Rut
all these reductions IN tact set new