Evening star., 1928-06-10

not yet confide the measures their ex-
perts deem necessary for security. and
least of all those for air defense, to an
international body. When greater con-
fidence prevails an effective form OF air
control will no doubt be practicable
but then paradoxically enough, It will
be unnecessary. new era will have
dawned
In the meantime the coming OF that
dawn can be accelerated by taking full
advantage of the opportunities present.
ed by the new form OF transport. The
use OF aviation Is the best preventive of
its abuse.
Air warfare inspires such dread and
horror that the practicability OF con-
verting commercial aircraft into mill
tary machines has prejudiced many
otherwise progressive people against the
further development OF commercial
aviation. Paciflsts argue that II COM
mercial air fleets are to be merely an
insidious reinforcement OF air forces 1t
would be better TO do without them
altogether. since their existence will in
validate any genuine limitation OF air
armaments
AS a matter of fact, while a highly
developed air transport system Is the
foundation OF nations air power, the
least important feature In such a sys-
tenn. from q military point of view, Is
the number of aircraft flying on It's
routes. In the event OF another war
the requirements OF belligerent state
would far exceed the number OF air.
planes employed on the most extensive
system Again, while 1t Is also true that
passenger plane could, with certain
alterations. be made TO serve as a
bomber. time would be needed for the
readjustment, and 1t would probably be
cheaper In the end to build new ma
chine.
Question of Mobilization.
Mobilization for any future war will
be carried out In two stages; the FIRST,
immediate, will affect air forces kept
at concert pitch in time OF peace, ready
TO strike blow simultaneously with the
formal declaration of hostilities The
second stage will be concerned with In
dustry; every workshop and factory III
the belligerent states will be mobilized
for production, Obviously. during this
eecond stage. country possessing a
large and well organized aircraft indus
try would have an immense advantage
over one less we'll equipped always pro-
vtded that II had survived the first on
slaught,
Although the World War gave an i'm
mense impulse To aviation one feature
OF Its aftermath may quite conceivably
have an opposite effect. That feature Is
the dependence of the aircraft indus
tries In the principal victorious belliger-
ent states on orders for military ma
chimes. In Great Britain. France, Italy
and the United States. and probably In
Russia, the demand for these Is far
greater than It Is for commercial air
craft. and naturally the industries con-
eerned are organized SO as to supply II.
As n consequence an nnduly large
proportion of the time and money OF
designers and constructors In all these
countries is devoted 10 the production
of machines fitted with powerful en-
gines, capable OF high speed at alti-
tudes of 10000 or $4,000 feet. and handy
to maneuver II Ii. Of course, essential
that military airplanes should be de-
signed for this performance, but there
Is undoubtedly too marked tendency
In all countries with air forces To sacri-
flce the general and more scientific de-
velopment OF aviation 10 the power and
speed required In aifplanes designed for
air warfare.
This Is undesirable from every point
OF view and must, ultimately, react
toontinasd on Third ragel