Evening star., 1928-12-09
FREEDOM OF SEAS SEEN
AS REAL NAVAL ISSUE
Britten Proposal to Cut Size of Fleets
Fails to Touch Regulation of Worlds
Commerce Directly.

fleets and armies. But the real danger
in such pacihsm lies in the fact that
the effect of successful intervention
would be to expose an inadequately
armed United States to dispute which
would be grave and might in the end
lead us into war despite our naval
weakness.
There are two possible solutions for
the present Anglo American naval quar-
rel. The first is to be found in an
Anglo-American conference to discuss
and settle the question of the freedom
of the seas. If the British will agree
to the formulation of international law
in such fashion as to guarantee that
neutral commerce shall not be inter-
fered with in war, then the purpose for
which the United States fleet has been
conceived will be attained Then any
matching of British and American ton
mage would become absurd.
The second solution lies very simply
in the construction of fleet up to the
point where it becomes a greater risk
for Great Britain to interfere with our
commerce than to let us trade with her
enemy. Once we have attained that
strength, British power to regulate the
seas disappears, and then both countries
will have an equal interest in discus
sionS for the limitation of armaments
because for both there will be the same
reasons for reducing useless expense.
But as long as the main issue re-
mains matter of dispute. all confer
enceS over tonnage are useless. It is a
fact beyond challenge that the peculiar
economic and geographical circum-
stances of the British Empire and of
the British Isles impose upon Britain
the necessity for greater navy than
matter of national defense. But it is
just as clear that the vital interests OF
the United States require that the
larger navy needed by the British to
defend their legitimate rights shall not
also be employed to injure our equally
great interests and imprescriptible
rights.
Important to British.
1t is true that it is a matter of life
and death for England to be able to keep
open her sea lanes and thus to insure
the food for her great population. But
It IS just as clear that fleet sufficient
TO perform this duty could also inter-
rupt our trade and commerce with
every other European nation. If the
British are prepared to renounce the
right to use their defensive power often
slvely, to agree to the establishment of
the rights of neutrals in international
law. well and good. Then the prob
lem OF American naval strength takes
on different aspect.
But without fighting us the British
desire to keep the power and the right
to regulate our commerce in war. And
without building we are irving to at
tain parity which will prevent such
exercise of power That is the ridicu-
lous side of the whole dispute. The
question OF parity IS a red herring
| drawn across the trail. What the
United States needs, to carry out the
policy our government has adopted, is
a fleet large enough to prevent the
British from regulating our commerce
to suit their necessities In time of war.
To that end We may need more ships
OF cruisers or different-that is a purely
technical matter to be settled by the
naval experts.
All the discussion of a big navy or
small navy, of parity or equality, is
pure humbug, where it is not mere
muddled thinking. The fact is that
the United States has adopted a policy
of preventing interference with its COM
merce by belligerents, when it remains
neutral. 1t has done this for the
double reason that it desires to protect
IT'S IeSlClIldCe material interests and be-
cause it perceiveS that inability to pro-
tect these interests in 1914-15 led to
dragging us into the World War.
Woodrow Wilson perceived all this
and undertook in his Fourteen Points
to establish the freedom of the seas.
He was outmaneuvered at Paris and
sacrificed his principle to obtain his
League. Mr.. Hughes was similarly out
maneuvered at Washington, because he
permitted his attention to be directed
at the moral issue of limitation of
ornaments, rather than the political
question of policy. Geneva was a dead
lock because Gibson was unable to OBJ
tain recognition of our right to build
fleet large enough and strong enough
automatically to insure for us the free
dom of the seas. .s,..
Any new conference must be either
deadlock or a British triumph as
long as the real question at issue, that
of the freedom of the seas, is not
brought up. All British effort is con-
centrated on delaying what may be
inevitable, but at the least may be post
poned.
(Copyrjeht 1927