Evening star., 1928-09-16
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

~ ESPITE the fact that many
weeks have now passed since
the first announcement was
- made of the Anglo-French
naval agreement, 1t continues
to dominate all international discus
sions Not even the dramatic and i'm
pressive ceremonies which attended the
signing of the Kellogg pact have served
to lessen the interest or diminish the
importance of what. in itself, was the
simplest and most informal of under
standings.
This enduring Importance of the
naval agreement is a significant evi-
dence of the sensitive state which
exists in every European capital and of
the survival of the suspicious which
we're not only born of the World War,
but antedated it and might we'll be ac-
cepted as the normal condition in
Europe. But some of the cotemporary
reactions, to use the American word
which arouses most British protest. are
intensely interesting, as they disclose
the operation of the national minds in
various countries.
Makes BRAND Unpopular.
At Geneva. for example, it is patert
that the double effect of the kellogg
treaty and the Anglo-French agreement
has been to minimize the importance of
the annual assembly and stir up un-
expected unpopularity for BRAND, long
the special hero of the Geneva audi
ences. Always at the League meetings
there Is suspicion, rarely unjustified, on
the part of the small nations. They are
always expecting that the great powers
VIyiIf otfnNnrt fn
them" And the naval agreement Is
precisely the sort of bargain between
great powers which diSturbs the small
At present the great issue at Geneva
is disarmament. Despite many solemn
meetings, the whole project lags. TIL,
Coolidge conference of last year. which
resulted in a deadlock between the
British and ourselves, was patent dis
couragement of all hopes of early linn
itation of naval or land armaments
Now the Anglo French agreement acts
as further obstacle, because not only
does 1t recognize the principle that
France and Britain shall be free to
build as many small submarines and
cruisers as each respectively desires
but it registers British acquiescence in
the French contention that countries
which employ conscript armies shall be
permitted to count their soldiers only
by the troops actually under arms.
This means that in the case OF
France, Poland, Italy-in fact. all the
nations which train all their youth
while behind their active army they
have millions of trained reserves-the
reserves will not count. But this In
turn leaves all the countries which are
forbidden to train their youth - Ger
many, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria
the defeated of the war-at hopeless
disadvantage in the face of their
neighbors. And it abolishes even a re-
mote hope of procuring the abandon
ment of the whole conscript system.
Britain Swings Balance.
AS long as Great Britain stood witt
Germany and the United States in sup
port of the principle that reserves ano
active forces should be counted - ara
this principle naturally had the back
ing of the smaller states, which were
the neutrals of the war-some real linn
itation of land forces seemed at least
conceivable. But now that the British
have quit and accepted the fact that
the French mean to stand by their
ideas and therefore that further discus
sion is useless, prospects of League con-
ferences and commissions to reduce
navieS and armies are manlfestly un-
promising.
AS for the Germans, the blow for
them is heavy. for they have all along
relied on British and American infiu--
ence to produce some restriction OF
French, Polish and Czechoslovak
armies. They have claimed: not without
reason, that their own disarmament,
enforced by the peace treaties, was pro-
claimed a preliminary step to general
limitation. But now. 10 years after the
peace treaties we're framed, 1t becomes
wellnigh certain that they will be left
0isarmed, while their neighborS retain
their great armies and will be able to
throw into any conflict not only their
standing armies, which greatly out
number the Germans completely, but
reserves which number millions.
Berlin has always hoped that Anglo
Saxon pressure would more or less limit
French and little entente armies. But
now that Britain has made a general
agreement with France, all hope of lin
itation in ornaments. like all promise
of early evacuation of the Rhineland,
disappears, and as a consequence Ger
man statesmen are once more playing
with the idea of the Russian orienta-
ton. Relations between Berlin and
Moscow have become notably more cor
dial. The game is obvious and 1t
brought German disaster at Genoa six
years ago, but to the German mind 1t
is the only card left to play.
See United States as Target.
Despite all the denials and affirma-
tions which come from London and
Paris, Berlin, like Rome, sees the naval
agreement not as a simple affair COW
ering cruisers and submarines, with an
included concession in the matter of
the French army. but as the revival of
the old Anglo-French entente, which
WIS the starting point for the real or
alleged "encirclement of Germany" that
counted for so much in the German
mind in the pre-war years.
Naturally. Rome and Berlin see the
agreement as aimed primarily at the
United States. For both capitals it is
no more than the repetition of the
strategy which was adopted in London
when\the Kaiser set out to create a
great Mar fleet, and thus to challenge
British sea supremacy. They are aware
OF awakening American suspicious and
quite readily translate Secretary Kel-
logg'S visit to Ireland instead of Eng
land as polite but pointed indication
Of American sentiments. But while
both countries would gladly join the
United States in a counter demOnStra-