The Indianapolis times., 1928-02-23
The S-4 Report
selves to be

IF ANYTHING were needed to show that not all the
criticisms of our naval establishment have been amss
the curious findings of the naval court OF inquiry
charged with probing the S-4 disaster would pro-
vide it.
A great deal seems to have been the matter. That
the lost submarine was blameworthy that the coasV
guard destroyer Paulding which sank it was negn-
gent: that Rear Admiral Brumby in charge OF rescue
and salvage operations, was incompetent and that
some of the elementary principles OF navigation were
violated resulting in collision-au indicated In
the report.
But the report is not altogether convincing. No
sooner had it made its appearance than it
sailed by high naval and civil officials on the ground
that it's conclusions were not supported always by
the evidence submitted So the whole case has been
shnted back to the court for further light upon some
of its phases.
In spots the findings appear inconsistent and con-
Trajectory For instance the court paid high tribute
to the rescue and salvage efforts Nothing that could
have been done was left undone, the report said.
Yet it recommends that Rear Admiral Brumby
be detached from his command because he failed
to contribute that superior intelligent guidance, force
and sound judgment expected from an officer OF his
length of service, experience and position.
We submit that if the first is true, the second is
a bit unfair. If Rear Admiral Brunnby found himself
bers Of the crew entonbed alive in the S-4. it was
because the naval hierarchy put him there. If he
knew nothing about such work. and his assistants did,
he is to be congratulated for having had the good
sense to stand aside and let them carry
Transfer him. by all means, but if public rebuke
is deserved in his connection it should go to those
responsible for his appointment to that particular
post. To rebuke Brumby, under the circumstances,
looks like making him the goat for bureaucracys pet
mistake of putting square pegs in round holes
The criticism that a tender displaying a warning
flag should have been stationed the where
the S-4 was undergoing trials was dismissed by say
ing this "was neither desirable nor necessary" be-
cause submarine efficiency is such that warning
flags have been cast into the discard
The laynans to this would seem to be
that the practice had been cast into the discard
bit too soon since that simple precauton would have
saved both the S-4 and her crew.
That Lieutenant Commander Jones of the S-4
personally jointly responsible for the collision is
held by the chief of the Navy Bureau of Navigation
as not proved and exception has been taken to this
finding.
Secretary Mellon, to whose department the Pauld-
ing belongs has filed similar objections to the blame
the court attached to Lieutenant Commander Bayis
the Pauldng's skipper because, Mellon said, the de-
stroyer was not only being properly navgated, but
the Navy had not taken the pains to let Bayis know
a submarine undergoing trials in the vicinity.
The report, however, contains constructive
recommendation at least-that "a technical board be
appointed to study the subject of and salvage
fittings, safety devices and equipment and recommend
such changes in, notifications of, submarines,
tenders and rescue vessels as may be deemed desir-
able" This should help
But, all in ALL the report is likely to prove unsat
sfactory In fact, the indications that the storm
originally raised by the death of the foryone officers
and men of the S-4 far from being Gained may.
ri4e to new pitch =