Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-03-27

SQeSemann at Geneva and in
! Berlin. in the matter of the
! Il Sarre, constitutes one more
! evidence of the skill with
which the astute German Foreign
| Secretary is moving toward the goal
| which he laid down for German for
| eign policy three years ago. Nor has
| there been any more striking example
| of the fashion in which this policy
| has been employed than in the pres
| ent instance.
| The Sarre question has been one
| of the most troublesome of all the
/ inheritance of the Paris Peace Con
| ference. AT the outset France claimed
| the Sarre region on two grounds. In
| the first place, most, but not quite
! all. of the territory had been French
I before the Revolution and was only
| taken after Waterloo by the Second
| Treaty of Paris. In the second place,
1 the destruction of the French coal
| mines by the Germans was made the
basis for French arguments in favor
! OF the annexation of the Sarre coal
| basin.
President Wilson opposed this
| French claim bitterly and success.
| fully and in the end, while France
| received title to the coal mines out.
! right, the sovereignty OF the Sarre
was vested temporarily in the League
/ Of Nations and the ultimate posses
| sion was left to the decision of a
| plebiscite to take place in 1895. Thus
| for a period of Is years a small state
| with some 700, 900 inhabitants and
less than 1000 square miles was
I established.
! Under French Control.
| Inevitably, however, this region
| passed under French control. II
| joined the French frontier. through
it passed one of the main trunk lines
| connecting France with the occupied
| Rhineland. Relatively large French
/ garrisons were established in Saar-
| brucken. When the German mark
| collapsed French currency replaced
/ German and for the first few years
! after the Paris Peace Conference the
| Sarre seemed likely to pass to French
| control.
| But from the outset there was
| friction between the French and the
| inhabitants of the region. Innumer.
| able protests were carried to Geneva
| The League was without any power
/ to compel France to conform to Its
views and it wisely avoided a clash
which could only have shaken its
| prestige.
| Presently, however, the French
themselves discovered that there was
not the smallest chance of winning
the allegiance of the German popula,
ton. On the contrary, it became
daily clearer that when the plebiscite
was held the German majority would
be overwhelming. AS a consequence
French policy at last arrived at rec
ognition of the fact that in 1885 the
Sarre would become German and that
in reality, there was no difference be
tween the situation here and in the
Rhineland.
Real Quarrel Passes.
Today the Sarre has ceased to be q
cause of real quarrel between France
and Germany because both nations
recognize that it is bound to return to
German rule. Thus the only ques
ton which remains is that of the date
of evacuation. And here, as in the
Rhineland, the Germans are hopeful
Of fastening the time of French re,
tirement. But. since the railway
lines which supply French troops on
the Rhine pass through the Sarre
the French are bound to insist that
| these lines be guarded against inter
ference.
The compromise which has been
reached at Geneva gives the Ger.
mans very large satisfaction by re.
ducing the number of the force of oc.
cupation from 5000 to 500 and pro.
viding that it shall be Allied and not
exclusively French. Such a reduc.
ton obviously leaves nothing but a
small police force to patrol and pro
tect the railway lines.
The German Nationalists, however
were dissatisfied with the compro-
mise reached at Geneva because they
commended that legally no forces of
Occupation could be maintained. They
lcriticised Stresemann because, while
obtaining large part of the reality,
he had compromised the principle.
This was the basis Of the great ex-
plosion in the Nationalist newspapers
Immediately after the agreement. But
Hindenburg himself, breaking with
his habit, attended the meeting of the
German cabinet to indorse the Strese.
mann decision, thus silencing the Ma
tionalists.
Aims at Occupation.
In justifying his course, Stresemann
once more disclosed his main OBJ
jective. All his policy is directed at
shortening the time of Allied occupa-
ton of the Rhineland.
The problem of evacuation now
constitutes the largest single postwar
problem in Europe and has an Amer
lean angle. The German view is sim
pie. All Germans claim that since
| Germany has subscribed to Locarno
and entered the League of Nations
and since France has both a German
| and British guarantee of her eastern
| frontier, further occupation is not
only unnecessary. but does violence
to the spirit of Locarno.
| The French view, on the other
| hand, is less simple. All Frenchmen
! agree on the principle that since
France has the legal right to stay,
| with the other allies. until 1885,
earlier evacuation would constitute a
! concession which must be paid for.
This was the basis of the Thoiry con-
versation and there payment was
envisaged through the sale of several
billions of German railway and other