Douglas daily dispatch., 1927-08-19
VORKMENS COMPENSATION Law
CONSTRUED and EXPLAINED BY
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION

lured the foreman. The injury clear
ly occurred in the course of the en-
ployment, but did it arise out OF
the employmentg The court held
that it did.
In another case workman was
embittered against his fellow work.
man because of real or fancied at
tention paid by the latter to the
formers wife. They quarreled over
the matter while at work and one
OF them was injured The court held
the injtry did not arise out Of the
employment. Tt can be readily per-
Ceivcd that the assault upon the
foreman arose out Of the foreman'S
duties, and flowed from the same as
q rational consequence of his CRITICS.
ing subordinate. But this can not
be said about the other case. There
is no reason why industry should
bear the cost of repairing injuries
resulting from a fight over personal
matters which two employees may
choose to stage upon their employers
premises rather than elsewhere.
Then again, if a hostile aircraft
should fly over the city, dropping
bombs unfortunately and injuring
alike those employed and those not
employed, could it be held that the
injuries to those employed arose out
of their employment. Clearly under
such circumstances it can not, as
their injuries would be due to a risk
of life in general. On the other
hand, if a particular rlunition factory
had frequently been made a target
for enemy aircraft bombs, and on
the occasion of the injury was again
being bombardeds and If it were
further shown that the building was
SO constructed or SO lighted as to
attract the notice of the enemy afr-
craft, could it not under such cir
cuinstances be held that an injury
to q workman by reason of such
bombardnent would arise out of such
employment. 1t would seem that IL
could. In other words, in the latter
case, the risk would be peculiar to
the employees work and not merely
common to the neighborhood.
An insect flew through an open
window into room and injured the
eye Of an employe. 1t was held III
that case by the court that the in.
jury did not arise out of the employ
ment. On the other hand, if one
were working in an apiary and should
happen to be stung by the bees, the
risk of such injury would be peculiar
to the work and the injury would
arise out of the employment.
Ii a tornado should strike city
and knock down several buildings,
i.liuring alike persons employed and
unemployed, there would be no reason
why compensation should be paid to
the employees injured when their en-
ployment in no wise contributed Go
their injuries.
There are many towns in Arizona
where lightning strikes frequently. AS
pointed out in the decision OF our
supreme court, if the lightning should
strike in the midst of a crowd IL
the street, injuring a clerk on an
errand for his employer ard also
injuring another not employed, thera
is no reason why the burden OF one
of the injuries should be thrown upon
industry while the unemployed per-
son should be compelled to bear his
burden alone. The risk of injury III
each case would be a common risk.
So also, an injury to a sheep aerder
Oh an open desert would not arise
out of his employment. On the other
hand, if one we're employed upon a
stecplc or elevated scaffold under such
circumstances that the work involved
materially greater exposure to the
risk of being struck by lightning than
in the case of the average inhabitant
compensation could properly be
awarded. Or where, due to a defect
in g fuse or III the wiring, lightning
was carried into power house, or
into mine, injuring an employe
therein.
Industry is not responsible for acts
of God and the courts of the various
states have placed a construction
upon the compensation laws which
frees industry from the burden of
compensation for acts of Goa, whether
it be lightning, earthquake, tornado
or what not, unless the particular
is peculiarly exposed to the
act of God, and the nature of his
work offers an invitation to injury
from such cause substantially greater
than that to which the average per-
son in the vicinity is exposed.
Our supreme court has placed arl
Interpretation on the language in our
statute which permits the granting
of compensation in cases of injury
by lightning where the employment
increases the risk. Of injury there
from above that of the general public
in the vicinity.