Evening star., 1927-03-06


Canal Zone" This treaty. which was
drawn up at Panamas request and az
a sort of substitute for the old Taft
agreements of 1904, 1905 and 1911. has
not yet been discussed in the United
States Senate, while the Panama
Congress, after a lively debate. voted
on January % to postpone its decision
and to send its plenipotentiaries back
TO Washington to see if the terms and
provisions of the document could not
be modified.
There is a world Of misunderstand
ing and lack of understanding about
what the trouble is. DR.. Ricardo j.
Alfaro, Minister of Panama here, and
chief Of the plenipotentiaries who
negotiated the treaty, has just re
turned to Washington, but he says
only that he has come to try to find
out what can be done. The Depart
ment of State is apparently receptive
but little stiff over the matter. The
treaty was signed, officials there point
out and now to revise it will require
that all the machinery of new pro-
tocol, new appointments, new discus
Sions and signatures be gone through
with.
Document Already Public.
The document itself has been given
to the public; the committee on foreign ,
relations Of the United States Senate
released it on January Is. a study of
the text--without taking into consid-
Grafton the background and the di-
Nergencies in the document from
what Panama hoped from it--gives
the impression of three major ele
ments which might bring disagree
ment. These are the provisions for.
military cooperation the methods OF
exercise of the right of eminent do
main as granted to the United States
bv Panama, and the arrangements BY
which Panama is to pay the cost OF
highways to be built in her natlonal
territory with obvious military STRAIT
egy as their chief immediate impor-
tance.
The press of the world-and OF
Panama-has been somewhat caustc
on these very matters. But deeper
ANALYSIS of PanamaS s own objections
to the treaty show that the military
phases, at least, are not the chlel
ground of complaint there. Inc III.
creased jurisdiction of the Cnlteo
States right of eminent domain u.s.
however. an important issue, not least
because 1t was largely in the hope that
the United States would recognize
more limited overeignty in this new
treaty. that the negotiations were in |
stituted by Panama. The payment py
Panama of a large share or the cost
of concrete roads she does not neeo |
or want, at least-comes still nearer |
to the real heart of Panaman obJec- |
tions to the treaty, however, Tor IL
brings in the economic phase.
From the beginning of the agitatlon
for the new Interpretation or the re.
Iations of Panama with the Un1ted
States, the public there has been urg
ing a realignment of the business
~ ".
the objection has been to the happy
go-lucky way in which the commits
sioners in the Zone sell goods (which
nav no Panaman duties ana re"
United States taxes) to everybody who
applies for them.
Another Difficulty Remains.
Another economic difficulty which
was not touched in the treaty was the
nosition of the Panama Railway
(owned by the United states Govern
ment), whose rates and varied pusl-
nesses like renting out delVeIy
wagons were a loss of revenue 10
Panama and the Panaman peopie,
without adequate advantage 10 the
.'defense of the canal
The Panamans also object TO the
provisions in the treaty for ponoeo
warehouses in the zone ana Tor Iree-
dom from port charges or canal snip
ments in Panama's own cities. Ine
economic problem is also involved III
the failure of the new treaty TO pro
vide specifically for adequate United
States Government support Tor local
insane asylums, leper colonies. etc,
where former employees Of the canal
are kept at Panaman government
expense.
In other words, a whole world of
little things, having to do with dol
lars and cents, and yet having almost
no tangible reality in an international
negotiation have acted like sand In the
cylinders of the once smooth running
United States-Panaman relations.
When the treaty as signed was re
turned to Panama, the explanation OF
the commissioners of their failure TO
arrange these matters was that the
treaty as written was "the best they
could get" The chief stumbling
block was the Department of War,
which was behind most of the stub
bornness and insistence of the De-
partment of State in its negotiations
on the treaty. The Panama Canal is
officially under the control of the Sec
retary of War, and its defense is OF
primary Importance in the entire
Caribbean and indeed in the whole
world policy of the United States. The
Department of War insisted through
out the negotiations that it must not
be crippled in any conceivable way in
its freedom Of action for the canals
defense-and the economic comfort of
the canal garrison and it's civilian
appendages was firmly insisted upon
In addition.
Panaman Grievances Ignored.
Panama has grievances, and pre-
sented them, but when the treaty was
completed and signed, most of Pana
mas poor little eggs lay broken be-
sido the basket, An old Spanish prov
erb tells the story:
eff you strike an egg with a rock,
the egg Is broken. II you strike
rock with an egg, the egg is, also,
broken" The situation as regards
the treaty could hardly be expressed
more clearly, for virtually everything
which Panama hoped for was broken
either by her insistence or, equally,
by the insistence of Washington.
The history of the negotiations
which resulted in the present treaty
is a long one, but some understanding
of them is necessary both to appre
oiate the position of Panama and to
understand that of the United States
The "organic act" so to speak, of
the Panama Canal is the treaty of
November IS, 1908. Article III of that
document gives to the United States
n grant of virtual sovereignty which
has, however, been the subject of
much discussion and reinterpretation
1t reads:
The Republic of Panama grants
TO the United States all the rights,
power and authority within the Zone
mentioned and described in Article
III of this agreement and within the
limits of all auxiliary lands and