New Britain herald. [microfilm reel] (New Britain, Conn.) 1890-1976, 1927-07-06

4 terlng INTO an agreement designed 70
avoid enormous additions to the re-
spective fleets. The sharp point to
! the American view consists Of ability
| to carry out the threat at less per
| capita cost to the American people
| than a cruiser race would cost Brit
ish taxpayers.
Gibson and his technicians, to win
possible adhesion to a compromise,
have given details of how quickly
cruisers can be constructed in the
United states-how quickly Britain
| can be outdista need in both number
and tonnage. The evidence when
given was convincing. 1t appears: if
w. c. Bridgen an, chief British dele
gate, actually holds to his contention
/ for bigger total his nation will lose
every vestige OF advantage on the
high seas, and instead of parity, will
be the second naval power.
The United States position is one
| of remarkable restraint. One reads
frequent references to a "ruinous
naval competition" but such COM
petition cannot ruin the richest ma
ton on earth. England would be on
| the track toward ruination compar-
atively early if attempts were made
to compete with the United States
in case the Geneva parley fails.
The British delegates have nearly
wrecked the conference. Now it is
| evident to even the most die hard,
case hardened gentlemen from the
British Isles that Britain must play
marbles according to rules or lose
the game if there are to be no rules.
Consider the extent of the British
plan as compared with the Ameri-
can: England's cruiser demand. be-
fore it was pared down. was given
at from 100000 to 100000 tons. The
American plan was for parity at
from 100000 to 100000 tons. Even
earlier the British desired only
limitations in the strength of indi-
vidual ships. and not in the num-
Der OF ships. She was willing to build
huge navy of small ships if she
could not build a huge assortment
of vast fighting craft.
The American view has won on
two points; that the United States
would build more small vessels or
more large ships-if that was to be
the outcome of the conference.
The Britons appear to have seen
the light. By reducing their cruiser
demands to point considered
within reason'-although still at
figure higher than anyone expect
ed such a conference to deal with
they have practically admitted that
domination at the conference is as
unlikely as dominance on the seas.
In the days before the Washing
ton Arms conference that nation
which combined resources and ag-
gressiveness or willingness to go to
the necessary outlay had the big
gest navy. The war shifted this pos
sibility on all counts to the United
States. Instead of taking advantage
of this shift President Harding CALL
ed a halt, and if this act saved the
American nation money it saved the
others, with less resources at their
command. comparatively more
money.
The outlook has not materially
changed; we can still out-build all
others, or any two combined IL nee
essary. The fact that we are willing
to avoid such folly indicates IL any
thing that We graciously have dis
carded an advantage which few If
any others would have done under
similar circumstances. It is doubtful
whether our good intentions are
fully appreciated.