Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-06-12
NEW LIMITATION FARLEY
BRINGS HARD PROBLEMS
U. S. Trying to Eliminate Politics
British Insist on Need of Cruisers
Submarines Present Problem.

bases, as she did eliminate Manila and
Guam at Washington. Nor is it less
clear that the same policy would urge
her to seek to abolish the American
naval base at Hawaii.
1t has been suggested that the Japa-
nese will also bring UP the question Of
the fertilization of Panama and even
raise the immigration issue. Both
seem to me unlikely. Obviously, il
Panama were unfortified and thus
open to any attack, it could be
blocked, and this would make 1T I'M.
possible for the Atlantic feet to join
the Pacific in case of hostilities. But
no one even in Japan dreams that the
United States would agree to any such
proposition, just as, in fact, it is I'M
likely that we would consent to. scrap
the Notifications of Hawaii or even to
promise not to extend them as we .
thought necessary.
Questions Are Technical.
Beyond this lies the very wide field
which is occupied by questions highly
technical in character. Limitations OF
the practices Of war may be fixed.
But. important as these are, they can
have little meaning for the mass OF
the American people who are looking
to Geneva to see if the conference will
end in British and Japanese agree
ment to reduce their cruiser tonnage
and thus abolish the necessity for the
American Government to undertake a
really colossal program of cruiser
building, if equality is to be attained.
After the Geneva conference the
American people will be face to face
with the fact that they must decide
whether in their view of national de.
Tense it is necessary to keep our
cruiser strength equal to that Of
Britain and superior to that of Japan.
If this standard be adopted, then the
new Congress will have to consent to
the building of 10 and perhaps even Is
new cruisers, presumably Of 10000
tons.
American Problem Differs.
On the other hand, it is just as
essential to perceive that since the
American naval problem is totally diff.
ferent from the British, equality in
cruiser strength Is not an essential.
1t is not a question of matching
cruiser against cruiser, as in the case
of battleships, for the business Of
cruisers is not to fight cruisers, but
to protect merchant marine and keep
open sea lanes. And obviously in both
| respects our situation is far different
| from that of Britain. We are bound
to insist upon the right to equality IL
| only for sentimental reasons, but the
| practical value is another matter.
| In the negotiations which take
| place one thing is fairly certain. While
between both Britain and the United
States and Japan and ourselves rela.
tons are cordial. there is between
Britain and Japan a latent sense of
bitterness which may have an infiu-
1 The To-
the fashion on which the British
scrapped the Anglo-Japanese alliance
| at the Washington conference. The
| japanese feel that the British used
them during the war and then dropped
them for America after the conflict.
Japanese Are Satisfied.
Oddly enough, the Japanese are far
from dissatisfied that the Anglo
Japanese alliance was scrapped. 1t
would have been great burden to
them had they been bound to support
British action in China in recent
months and Britain might easily have
been moved to adopt far more active
and drastic policy had Japan been
committed to cooperation. But the
amour propre of Japan was hurt and
the British action in rushing to the
creation of the Singapore naval base
seemed in their light an injury added
to an insult.
American suspicion that Japan and
Britain may act together at Geneva
is therefore without much warrant.
Nor is there more basis for any idea
that the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
dropped at Washington, can be recre-
ated at Geneva. On the contrary,
Japan shares the general Asiatic desire
to see Britain driven out.
What Japan will fear at Geneva IL
anything which might bring about an
Anglo-Saxon combination based upon
Asiatic interests and insuring cooper
alton of naval forces in the Pacific.
This is the single real menace TO
eventual Japanese supremacy in tha
Pacific. that is, so far as the Pacific
concerns Japan. Thus within limits
1t is fair to forecast that Baron Saito
and his associates will seek at all times
to cooperate with the United States
rather than Great Britain.
Would Avoid Combination.
On the other hand, is just as i'm.
portant for the British to avoid any
real or even apparent combination be.
tween the United States and Japan.
In recent months American and jap
anese policies in the Far East and in
StiIIId nave we anu LUO
Japanese have opposed British action.
Our opposition and refusal to partici-
pate have paralyzed any British ac-
ton. Few Americans appreciate how
bitterly this circumstance has been
resented in London or how dangerous
ii has been to British prestige in
Shanghai and Picking.
In the same way the Soviet prob
lem must lie in the background OF
the conference. Britain is to all prac.
tical purposes at war with Russia
and the conflict is taking place main
ly in Asia. To enlist American and
japanese assistance would be of
patent value. In these circumsta noes
perhaps may be found the explana-
ton Of the repeated suggestions
coming from London that the United
States should send not alone dipIo-
mats, soldiers and sailors. but public
men of outstanding political impor-
lance. Only if such statesmen were
present could political questions be
touched upon.
Would Keep Out Politics.
Washington has obviously deter
mined to keep political questions out
by restricting its representation TO.
men concerned only with the mat
ter of naval limitation. But it is i'm
portant to recall that both in Paris
and at Washington the American
conception did not prevail and Presi-
dent Wilson and Secretary Hughes
ultimately saw many OF their hopes
frustrated by the chaos caused by po-
litical quarrels between participants. o.
Geneva may well develop the same
sort of conflicts. 1t can hardly be
said to begin under very promising
conditions. for the three great powers
directly concerned have quite differ
ent views, based upon divergent ma
tional interests. France and Italy,
too, while not participating, must at
all times be reckoned with. Nor can
one fail to perceive that despite our
outward circumstances the League OF
Nations itself is likely to view the