Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-08-04
Continued from First Page.)

3 CONTINUED from First Pageo
ut Geneva with statements from each
of the three governments as to their
respective proposals.
The various programs in brief were
Us follows:
THE United States-Extension of
fhe $50 ratio to all warships, with
definite tonnage limits for cruisers,
destroyers and submarines.
Great Britain-F'urther limitation OF
hattleships, reduction in size and arm.
ament of both capital ships and
cruisers and extension of the 5'o-S
ratio to 10,000ton cruisers. but no
mention of application to auxiliary
vessels.
Japan-A naval holiday on the basis
OF the status quo and ban on battie'
ship construction.
The British proposals urging cur
in the size of future battieshlps rom
"a 600 tons to something Tess tiail
81 600 tons. Immediately brought up
~ o,,astion of the Washington agree
. hv which battleships sizes had
been fixed.
Reopening of Treaty Opposed.
The American delegation showed
clearly that it was opposed to any
reconsideration of the matters liAe'
oft the Washington agreement ana the
conference soon shifted to study OF
the question of auxiliary ships. IN
general the British argument was III
favor of many but smaller auHiilaiS
vessels. with the smaller vessels limit
ed to siX-inch guns. 80
This tendency was untaVoraoiy re-
ceived bv the American delegates, VINO
org,,ed that small vessels were un.
suited ia American needs because OF
tho great distance to be traVerSeu 10
bases in comparison with the many
scattered British bases. Great Brit
aims rreponderance or merciiail'
liners. which could mount 6-lnch guns,
but not S.inch guns without speclai
nrenaration, also caused the Amerl-
cans to look unfavorably upon tiis
phase of the British project.
The japanese. in general, soueiit
higher ratio that to IN auXiilai!
vessels, with the right TO ouilu "n
many smaller craft, particularly smaii
submarines, as they felt necessary Tor
the protection of their trade routes:
rThey were DESTROYS of holding total
tonnages as low as practical.
Wide Divergence on Cruisers.
The cruiser problem, on which most
of the negotiations hinged, brought
divergent views from the United States
and Great Britain. The American
delegation sought to fix totai TOM
mage for the cruiser class, going from
500, 600 tons to AGO. 900 tons, but Great
Britain held that this, in view or the
United States desire for lO,O0O-ton
cruisers would give Britain too small
a tonnage for her needs in protecting
Hn py.ifi
to limit strictly large cruisers OF the
10,000-ton class, which they character
ICED as offensive" type vessels, and
concentrate on small cruisers, which
they described as essentially "defen-
sive" vessels. At the same time they
sought to limit the armament OF the
latter to 6-inch guns.
The number of cruisers which Great
Britain declared necessary for her
program was about 70, a figure that
brought the total cruiser tonnage fig
ures higher than the American delega-
ton was willing to consider, contend
ing that it represented expansion
rather than limitation in naval arma-
ments.
The American delegation held out
for greater freedom in building lO,00o-
ton cruisers, a type regarded as best
designed for American needs, but the
British contended that for Great Brit
ain to build many 10,000-ton cruisers
in order to rate in parity with the
United States in these vessels would
cut down her smaller cruisers too
greatly for safety if a low total ton
mage were fixed. fs4sp
Results i'm Deadlock.
On this problem and on the ques-
ton of keeping small cruiser arma-