Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-07-24
u. S. READY TO QUIT
GENEVA IF BRITISH
INSIST ON DEMANDS
Delegation Prepared to Fight
for American Proposals
on Naval Limitation.
ADMINISTRATION BACKS
UNYlELDING ATTITUDE
Increase in Cruiser Tonnage Only
Concession Possible, View of
Officials Here.
BY G. GOULD LINCOLN.


Satisfied that the American pro-
posals for further naval limitation are
fair, the administration and the
American delegation at the Geneva
conference are prepared to go to the
mat for them.
Equally satisfied that the British
proposals for naval limitation are
calculated to give the British SUI
premacy on the sea, the Americans
are prepared to quit the conference
unless the British modify their de-
mands.
For five weeks the American dele.
CATION, backed by the administration,
has endeavored to show to the
british delegation at Geneva and TO
the British government in London
that the United States will not yield
on the matter of naval equality.
Bound up in the matter OF naval
equality are types of cruisers required
by the United States because of its
lack of naval bases, types that permit
a greater cruising radius, and naval
bases themselves, not to mention the
merchant marine capable Of CONVEX
sion for war purposes in time Of
emergency.
Willing to Increase Tonnage.
The Americans are willing TO agree
60 an increase in the matter of
cruiser tonnage. and thus meet the
British half way in that matter.
They are unwilling, on the other
hand, to agree to limitations in size
and armament of cruisers beyond
those set at the Washington confer
ence in 1922. To accept the British
proposals in this regard at once hands
over to the British the naval
superiority which they say they do
not seek.
The British cabinet is to meet
again tomorrow with the two princi-
lpal British delegates to the naval con-
ference, it is reported here. Much
hangs in the balance. If the British
delegates return to Geneva ready to
stand by the proposals so Tar adj
iVanced by them, the probabilities are
the conference will break up quickly.
There are indications that if the
conference fails, the British effort will
be to lay the blame on the United
States. American authorities, how
ever, believe that this cannot success
fully be accomplished. They point
out that the American proposals for
Limitation of auxiliary craft, includ-
ling cruisers, destroyers and sub.
marines, embodied the principles laid
down at the Washington conference
and which were then declared to be
satisfactory both to the British and TO
the Japanese. If these American pro-
posals were adopted they would in
sure definite limitation, economy and
the avoidance of competitive naval
building programs in auxiliary craft.
British Oppose U. S. Proposals.
The American delegation proposed
that the United States and Britain
should be allowed each from 100000 to
800 900 tons of cruiser.tonnage. This
did not meet with the approval OF the
British. They placed their cruiser re-
Quirements as high as $4,000 tons.
The American delegation also pro-
posed that each country lay down the
type of cruiser suited to its needs, so
long as the vessels did not exceed
10000 tons each or carry guns greater
than S-inch caliber, limitations i'm
posed by the Washington naval limi-
tation treaty.
The British have objected to this
latter proposal, too, insisting that the
size of the cruisers be restricted
largely to the type that best meets
their own needs and that be armed
with guns no greater than 6-inch
fcaliber. If the 6-inch guns were
adopted as the standard for cruisers, it
would make available, as auxiliary
fcruisers in time of war, the fast ves-
lsels of their merchant service. in which
they vastly outnumber the United
States.
The American delegation has sought
matter Of cruiser tonnage, indicating
they would be willing to agree to
100000 tons for the British and for
the United States. Beyond this they
thave been unwilling to go at a confer.
Ience, which was called for limitation
of naval ornaments and not for ex-
Ipansion.
Insist on Superiority.
The United States, at the Washing
ton conference, made great sacrifices
in capital ships built and building in
order that competition in the con-
struction of that type Of Warship
should be halted. Definite limitation
in relative naval strengths was estab-
lished on the 5-5-3 ratio for the
United States, Great Britain and
Japan, respectively. The British,
however, at Geneva, so far have
SHOWN no W AuI tlCI a
similar plan for auxiliary naval craft.
The British today have superiority
in cruisers, in merchant marine and
in naval bases. They have insisted
upon proposals that not only would
make certain a continuance of this
superiority, but would even widen the
bexisting difference between themselves
and others.
The proposals OF the British, when
examined. raise the question against
iwhom the British must prepare a fleet
kof cruisers approaching their strength
Kan this class of vessel prior TO the
World War. The British have DIS
Eclaimed the thought of any possible
ldifference ever arising between Britain
land the United States. Yet the British
Eare insisting upon a type OF cruiser
Ethat is unsuited to American needs,
kbut is advantageous to their own. The
lsBritish have so far been unwilling TO
! grant freedom of action in respect 70
! the size and armament of cruisers TO
the United States under the terms OF
the treaty negotiated at washington
I,There also has been the suggestion
THAT the British were willing to grant
10 Japan an equality in submarines
with herself and the United States.
What becomes of the 5--5-3 ratio OF
naval strength under such a PROPOSE
ton?
Al The position and responsibilities OF
N