Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-07-03
BY FRANK HI. SIMONDS.


~ ceeds, the almost inevitable
| "A tendency to regard it as a
4 4 game if not a battle and to
fall into the habit Of discuss
| ing the whole affair as a struggle, not
| for limitation but for advantage, DEM
onstrates anew the grave dangers
which always attend any international
conference.
Moreover, as at Paris in 1919 and
| in Washington in 1921. the conditions
as between the American representa-
tives and their foreign associates are
strikingly different. We, who are re-
sponsible for the conference, who
are urging limitation, are the single
| one of the powers represented for
| whom naval power is not an imme.
date question of life or death. Fifty
millions of Britons in the British Isles,
rs millions Of Japanese in the equally
| narrow islands of the Japanese home
| land, would be conquered and at the
mercy of the victor the moment that,
| in war, control of the sea was lost
and blockade established.
Britain Loses Prestige.
Historically, too, the Geneva con.
| ference, as an extension of the Wash.
| lngton meeting, marks one of the
most extraordinary incidents in mod.
ern times. For three centuries the
British fleet has dominated the seas.
1t has broken the naval power OF Hol-
land, Spain, France and Germany. 1t
has even as late as 1914 seen In the
rise of any other nation to the rank
of first class sea power, an immedl'
ate challenge to be met alike by the
creation of system of alliances and
in the end by war.
Yet at Washington, and now at
Geneva, the British have accepted the
principle of equality for the American
| fleet. And in the mere acceptance OF
| the principle an almost incalculable
measure of prestige is lost to Britain.
Again, what the British fleet had con-
quered by centuries Of repeated con-
| fiict, they are called upon to lay down
without a struggle. There is the real
bitterness of the situation.
Americas Star Rises.
The World War did more than i'm
pose upon Great Britain great lmme
date losses in life and treasure, enor'
NOUS costs in trade and industry. II
took from the British Empire the posi-
ton of financial and industrial su.
premacy which had been its for a full
century at least. And the tremendous
change took place without the posi-
bility of British opposition. While
Britain fought for its life, while it in
Cured a debt for 10000, 000. 900, the
American rival with small cost, hard
ly with an effort, took financial su.
premacy, and thereupon claimed naval
and therefore political equality.
The Washington conference in limit
ing capital ships in size and number
did not establish equality between
fleets in fact, but 1t did in principle.
In seeking to extend the limitation to
the secondary classes the United
States is now actually undertaking to
complete the operation of depriving
Great Britain of even the semblance
of naval supremacy. If we have our
way, the result of the two conferences
will be to end British naval domina-
ton which has lasted for three CEN
turtles.
Factor OF Wealth.
Moreover, we are not in reality do
ing this thing by moral suasion. AL.
ways at the back Of the stage there
is the immutable fact that, il we
choose, we have the wealth to build a
fleet which will be in all respects SUI
preme. Given the condition of both
the British and Japanese finances.
there is for them the obvious impos-
sibility of matching ton with ton. We
have a net national debt Of less than
SIS, 900, 900 900: we had surplus last
year of upward of half billion.
Britain has a national debt Of 40 bill
lions and a considerable deficit for the
latest financial year.
But we are not now resting upon
the demand for equality. We are also
insisting upon equality upon our own
terms Today the British have three
to one in cruiser tonnage, and the
Japanese two to one. We propose, in
substance, that. to avoid the costs OF
arriving at equality by construction,
the two naval powers whose existence
depends upon their fleets shall reduce
their tonnage to levels which will be
commensurate with ours. We save
money, they sacrifice tonnage or, II
they decline, we outbuild them both.
as we can, thanks to our wealth and
their relative poverty.
Sum Of Proposal.
In reality, therefore, the American
proposal applied to Great Britain I'M
dertakes to set limit to British ton
mage without regard to British neces-
stiles and in conformity with our con-
Venience. That is the sum and sub
stance of our proposal.
When one comes to look at the
British proposals it is clear at once
that the chief purpose is twofold, to
keep so much of the temporary su-
periority as remains, to avoid all re-
auctions which may compromise Brit
ish safety in British eyes. The first
line Of British strategy is more or less
the natural product of the admiralty
mind. Lengthen the life of capital
ships and the advantage resulting
from the possession Of two or three
post-Jutland ships will endure for a
few more years. Reduce the size of
cruisers and the British advantage in
naval bases will restore something of
British supremacy, in fact, although
not in tonnage. Reduce the caliber of
guns on cruisers. and merchant ships
will acquire new value as auxiliaries