Evening star., 1927-03-13

~ ECENT weeks have seen re-
crudescence of that Polish-Ger-
IN man quarrel which seems des-
\ tined to prove one of the most
solid obstacles to the realiza-
ton of the larger promises of Locarno.
Polish expulsion of four German citi-
zens has reopened the whole discus
sion of the eastern frontier of the
Reich and led to the abandonment of
negotiations for a commercial treaty
between Poland and Germany.
This turn of affairs is unqueStion-
ably due to the appearance in the new
German cabinet of Nationalist repre-
sentatives. For all German National
lists the loss of DanZig, the Polish cor
ridor and Upper Silesia constitutes an
intolerable diminution of German
power, as it physically destroys Prus-
sian unity Thus. while the breaking
off of the recent negotiations prolongs
q tariff war which has been infinitely
more expensive to Germany than to
Poland, any adjustment with Poland,
however profitable, is unthinkable for
German Nationalists.
Present Episode Interesting.
The present episode is interesting
because it discloses again the under
lying purpose of practically all of the
Geneva remaking of the eastern
frontiers. The rather general assump-
tion in the United States that Locarno
meant an end of the postwar disputes
in Europe was totally unfounded. be-
cause it failed to take account of the
actual purposes of the new German
policy.
Locarno represented the intelligent
recognition by the majority OF the
German people, and by all the po-
litical parties, save the Nationalist,
that German reconstruction was to
be attained only in cooperation with
the allied nations. A policy of passive
resistance which had endured from
the Paris Peace Conference to the
occupation of the Ruhr had demon
strated that, while Germany could
drag Europe down with her in COM
mon ruin, she could not herself escape
from the consequences of her mill.
tary defeat.
This German resistance had been
SO far successful that 1t had COM
PEELED the victors of the war to aban-
don all effort to deal with Germany
on any other basis than that of po-
litical equality. 1t had established
the fact that the treaty of Versailles
could not actually be enforced by
military strength. 1t had opened the
way to negotiated agreements which
were expressed in the Dawes plan.
Germany Remained Disarmed.
After the Dawes plan, however.
Germany still remained disarmed and
helpless. While immediate dangers
had been avoided, it could only hope
for permanent escape from peril by
a far-going adjustment with its con-
querors, and in particular with
France. The price which had to be
paid for financial assistance and po-
litical security was the remuneration
of any purpose to change the terri
torial terms of the treaty OF Versailles
by force.
Nevertheless, Locarno did not
change the German purpose to modify
the territorial decision of Versailles.
On the contrary, the German people
accepted entrance into the League as
a step toward bringing the whole
territorial question before the Geneva
body. ss
All German interest thus lies in
keeping the Polish question alive. A
commercial treaty with Poland, while
in itself profitable to German inter-
ests economically, would constitute
dangerous recognition of Poland itself.
Such treaty might be possible while
German business dominated politics,
but IL would be inconceivable when
nationalistic influences were in the
ascendancy.
Reconciliation is Romantic"
In the present situation, however,
all German policy can hope to accom-
pIish is to keep the issue alive. But
what is important to note is that while
the Polish issue remains unsettled all
such talk of F'ranco-German reconcili-
alton as accompanied the Thoiry
luncheon is romantic rather than con.
vincing. However much French policy
may change in later years, today 1t Is
founded upon the belief that the lib
erty of Europe and the security of
France are equally dependent upon
the maintenance of the territorial situ-
alton created by the Paris settlement.
If Germany were to regain Danzig,
the Corridor and upper Silesia Poland
would be economically under German
control, since all exits would be in
German hands. If. in addition, Ger.
many were to achieve the union of
Austria with the Reich. which is a
second German purpose. Czechoslo-
vakia would be similarly encircled and
controlled. In addition Germany OF
$4,000. 900 would be created and
brought in contact with the Balkan
ized area of southeastern Europe.