Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-08-21


NV with undated energy the
consequences and the re-
sponsibilities for the failure
Of the Geneva Conference in Continen-
tai Europe, as contrasted with Britain
and the United States there has been
widespread and increasing apprecia.
ton of the skill and the success with
which the Japanese played what was
confessedly a difficult, and, within linn
its. dangerous role.
Specifically at least, the Japanese
situation at Geneva was that of the
| French at Washington. In both cases
the possibility of an Anglo-American
conflict were latent, and in the recent
affair the collision actually arrived.
In 1921, when BRAND and his asso-
ciates embarked for the Washington
Conference, they came satisfied that
France would hold the decisive posi-
ton, and that. in fact, France, by sup
porting the United States in the dis
pute which seemed inevitable would
harvest rich rewards in American
friendship.
AS it turned out. not only was there
no Anglo-American clash but Britain
and the United States united in fixiig
the responsibility for failure-so far
as failure was then acknowledged
upon French shoulders. BRAND was
the casualty of Washington, and
France suffered severely as a conse-
quence. French pride and French
prestige were both affected. and the
arrival of Poincare cabinet was
made inevitable.
Resisted Temptation.
At Geneva it was possible to fore
see much more clearly and accurately
hat A AxN,1 -t,,o,x all e,{z
likely. Japanese craftsmanship might
then have seized upon the role which
the French essayed to play at Wash.
ington. Giving their complete sup.
port either to Britain or to the United
States, they might have insured the
moral, if not the material, success Of
the cause championed.
With supreme skill, however, the
Japanese resisted the obvious tempta-
ton to play a role which might have
enhanced their prestige. but could not
fail to have been dangerous. Instead.
Japanese diplomacy first considered
world public opinion, A circumstance
little reckoned with either by London
or Washington.
AS consequence, Japan made IT.
self the champion not of the British
or American thesis but of the prin-
ciple of limitation. 1t identified it's
policy with each proposal, no matter
what its source, which seemed to
promise restriction, and. further, ui-
dertook the role of mediator between
conflicting views.
AS consequence, Japan energies
from the conference having earned
quite fairly the praise of the whole
world for its championship of the
principle which in theory explained
the conference. Europe, which de-
nounces both British and American
navalisn. praises Japanese loyalty to
the cause of limitation. Yet at the
same time the Japanese delegates so
conducted themselves during the sharp
debates that both the British and the
Americans are conscious of Japanese
support at critical moments, and
neither has any resentment of any
Japanese action. Both in Britain and
the United States, japan has the
credit for having honestly and ear
nestly worked for the success of the
Geneva meeting, and in both coun.
tries not merely has japanese diplom-
acy earned praise but Japanese pur-
pose and the spirit have excited ap-
prevail and even enlisted admiration.
Japan Had Grievances.
Yet at bottom one must recognize
that Japan came to the conference
with very real grievances against both
her colleagues. The American immi.
grafton policy has inflicted a deep and
enduring wound to Japanese sensibil-
tiles and legitimate pride, while the
manner in which the British scrapped
the Anglo-Japanese alliance and rushed
to the construction Of the Singapore
base is quite as ranking.
| Japanese craftsmanship. however.
with supreme wisdom, elected to avoid
foolish and expensive reprisal. 1t
could afford to wait. In so far as
America is concerned, the Washing
ton Conference deprived the United
States of all power to make war upon
Japan On the japanese side of the Pa
cific. 1t made the Philippines and
Guam hostages to Japan. Both can
be taken at will. Moreover, the ratio
of naval strength assigned to Japan
then gives her defensively an impreg-
nable position.
For the rest, so far Is the United
! States is concerned. economic deVel-
Opments have abolished old political
| conceptions. To an amazing extent
Japan has become a factory devoted
| to the production of goods for the
American market. The silk produc.
ton has developed into the foundation
of cotemporary Japanese prosperity.
Financially and industrially Amer
lean penetration has gone very far
However badly the japanese may feel
| over the immigration matter, it does
not supply basis for sacrificing COM
mercial relations which are vital
The Japanese attitude toward
Britain is far Jess simple. Quite nat
urally the Japanese would prefer ri
VaIry rather than common action he.
| tween the United States and Britain,
for in such combination alone there
could be a real challenge to Japanese
security. Again, Britain Is valuable
as cOunterweight to Soviet Russia.
And Russia remains the eventual
menace to Japanese supremacy in
Asia during all the period that pre-
cedes the rise of any united and eff |
fectively nationalstic China.
Nevertheless. Japanese policy has |
become markedly Asiatic. The Chi |
nese events have been interpreted as
having a real relation to principles |
rashly promulgated by Europe and |
America during the World War. In |
all the many crises which have at |
tended the Chinese disturbance the |
Japanese have steadily avoided any
action which might put them in the |
position of supporting European inn |
perialism against Asiatic nationalism. |
Works With United States.
Significantly enough, too. IN most |
instances Japan and the United States |
have worked together. The old order, |
under which the United States and |
Britain were frequently led TO seek to |
restrain Japanese imperialism di- !,
rected against China, has been re-
placed by a. new order. in which Amer.
lean and japanese efforts are COM
bined TO restrain Britain. On the |