Evening star., 1927-08-14
By FRANK II. SIMONDS.


ference marks the third sue.
cessive disappointment of the
/ l. United States in international
/ assemblies. At Paris, al Wash
ington, and now at Geneva, we have
| failed to see realized those results
which bulked largest in American esti-
nation of the proper conclusions of
an international meeting.
It is true in the main that Geneva
was foredoomed from the American
standpoint by the previous failure in
Washington, and Ambassador Gibson
was condemned to seek to recover by
diplomatic means the cards which had
been flung away in 1921.1922. More
over. at Geneva, and not at Paris or
Washington, an American delegation
did address itself exclusively TO the
protection or advancement OF Ameri-
can interests. Nevertheless, after
Geneva. as after Paris and Washing
ton. the American people are faced
with the fact of failure.
In this situation two courses are
now patiently open. 1t is possible, 5
in the case of Paris, 10 assail our as
sociates about the green table and to
indulge in much bitter recrimina ton
and not a little self-righteousness, re
| nforced by moral indignat tion. On
the other hand, it is just as possible
| TO find in the actual proceedings les.
sons which may we'll serve. if learned,
TO make the two affairs relatively in
expensive bits OF national education
| in international affairs.
Why Wilson Failed.
Mr.. Wilson failed at Paris because
| he had neglected at the moment when
the United States entered the war TO
81 nd 4IT1au
| agreement between the United States
and it's prospective associates as to
the terms Of peace following the vic
tory which our entrance insured. In
stead of precise and definite under
| takings witnessed on all sides, he con-
| tented himself with obtaining from
the European opponents of Germany
during the course Of hostilities wholly
casual Endorsements Of the vague for
mula of the IA points.
Once the victory was won, however
Mr.. Wilson was in no position to COM
pei the allies to accept his interpreta-
ton Of the application of this formula
TO a peace settlement. He still had
measure of power due to the allied
desire to obtain continuing American
aid and support, but this American aid
| was no longer a matter OF life or
death. In the last analysis, Clemen'
ceau. Orlando and Lloyd George were
| bound to follow the demands OF their
own people. even when these ran
counter to Mr.. Wilson's views
Thus Mr.. Wilson was in the end
brought 10 the point where he had to
reject the Treaty of Versailles, which
| was patiently inconsistent with his
principles, and thus confess failure
abroad to an unsympathetic domestic
audience, abandon all hope of any
Ieagu of nations and come back igno-
miniously or make the best of what
had been done and represent 1t to the
| American people as substantial VIC
tory.
President Wilson chose the latter
course. But the American people did
not face the Presidents difficulty.
Therefore, they rejected the treaty.
This saved the United States from
ay really serious consequences OF the
Paris failure, but it did not in any
sense modify the fact of failure.
Washington Conference.
Three years later, at the moment
when the Washington Conference was
meeting, Secretary Hughes had pre-
cisely the same advantage that PreSi-
dent Wilson had enjoyed in the Spring
of 1917. We had prospective suprem-
acy in the battle line, assured by our
naval program. then approaching COM
pletion. The British and the Japanese
were faced with the prospect of over.
whelming American superiority, while
neither had the financial resources TO
| build to the extent which would insure
parity.
| We had simply to insist that Great
Britain and Japan agree to our views
as to parity or ratio. not only with
respect of all branches of fighting
craft but of cruisers as well. first line
and second, and British and japanese
compliance was assured.
| 1t was assured because we offered
them for nothing something better
than they could otherwise obtain.
| That was the situation. We. who had
prospective superiority, offered the
| British actual equality, but on our
| terms.
And at the outset the British ac-
cepted our proposition, as they were
| bound to do. both for cruisers and
| battleships. But when the French re-
| fused to meet our views in the matter
of submarines, then the British saw a
heaven-sent means of evading the OBJ
noxious idea of parity in all branches,
and they announced that they could
not reduce their cruiser tonnage, or
limit it. unless the French accepted
their views as to submarines.
Thereupon the American Govern
ment and people went off on a bitter
attack upon France. They sought to
force the French to accept the Amerl-
can view. and held the French respon-
sible for the failure of limitation in
all directions save that of capital
ships. And that was precisely what
the British, who had carefully foment-
ed the French resistance, had hoped
for
Mr.. Hughes now faced Mr.. Wilson's
dilemma. He had not got parity, save
in the capital ships. where our supe
riority was enormous. He had OBJ
tanned this and Japanese relative
ratio by agreeing to scrap our pro-
gram and abandon fortifying the
Philippines and other outlying islands.
But we should only have parity if
the Japanese and the British accepted
battleship terms in the cruiser branch.
Claimed Success at Conference.
Since the British had refused all
cruiser limitation. Mr.. Hughes now
had either to announce the failure of
the negotiation or claim limited sue
cess. But political circumstances We're
again important. If the Washington
Conference failed, the Republicans in
1924 would be placed in the position
of the Democrats in 1920, when failure |
at Paris had made campaign ammuni- |
tion. And so far as prestige was con- |
cerned, there was no miStaking the |
fact that failure would be disastrous. |
Like Mr. Wilson before him Mr. |