Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-09-11
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.
Asst week I discussed at some
length the outlook for the ses-
sion Of the assembly of the

Asst week / discussed at some
length the outlook for the ses-
sion OF the assembly of the
IL League. In later articles from
Geneva I shall hope to deal with
the various phases Of this meeting. In
the present article I shall try to set
forth the basic facts in what consti.
tutes not merely the chief problem
for this session but remains the most
important question to be faced In the
whole European situation, namely,
| that of the evacuation of the Rhine
| lard.
Under the terms of the Treaty of
| Versailles, allied occupation Of Ger
man territory was to endure for Is
years and evacuation was to take
| place In three separate movements.
| The Cologne area was 10 he left in
| 1925, the CoblenZ sector In 1880 and
| the balance in 1885. In this last year,
| too, the plebiscite in the Saar Basin
was to determine the final ALLEGATION
OF this region. temporarily erected into
a political unit at Paris by the peace
| settlement.
Treaty Still Holds.
| Technically. the Treaty of Versailles
still holds. The Cologne area has been
cleared, and the next evacuation would
not take place before 1880 had 1t not
been for the understandings which ac-
companied the Locarno affair. There
| was d very definite understanding that
| following the acceptance of this adj
| justment by the Germans and German
entrance into the League of Nations
| the question OF evacuation would be
reopened, to the end that allied troops
| might be withdrawn more speedily.
1
ton was one Of the most attractive
details of the whole Locarno pacts.
| Continued occupation constitutes a
great. and growing grievance to the
| German mind. This sense of injus-
| tice Is intensified because in all ques-
tons since raised German perform
ance has been exact and no basis for
protest has been supplied.
| 1t will be recalled that year ago
in the famous Thoiry converse tons
between BRAND and Stresemann there
was mention of a rather elaborate
program, by which Germany was to
issue bonds for her state railways, to
be sold npon the markets of the world.
| The proceeds were to be distributed
| among her creditors, in conformity
with the reparations clauses of the
| Treaty of Versailles and the program
| OF the Dawes plan.
This proposal found instant and
widespread French approval, because
| France was at that time in the midst
| of the very grave imitation crisis.
Nothing came Of the proposal, how.
| ever, because it involved f1otation of
vast security issues upon the British
and American markets. and the Brit.
ish were opposed. American approval
was therefore not sought
/ N1II
marked change in French opinion
The arrival of a new ministry in Der
lin, in which the Nationalists became
the dominant party, aroused French
lapprehensions. Meanwhile, the French
| financial crisis was passed and the
French need for money rapidly de.
| clined.
And, inevitably, the sense Of danger
| again came to be the controlling ele-
| ment in the French mind. Looking
back over all the years since the
Paris conference. one can note that
there has been this see-saw of French
| concern. At certain moments finan-
cial difficulties have dominated. At
others the problem of security has
controlled. In the periods of money
difficulties French willingness to make
concessions has been marked. In the
times Of fear for security French
opinion has hardened.
There is, however, another circum-
stance. The French, like all Euro
peans, are perfectly aware that a
| crisis in the operations Of the Dawes
plan is likely to arrive within the
next two years. So far the payments
have not been large, and Germany
has actually financed PREPARATIONS by
foreign loans.
Expansion Of Expenditures.
This process cannot continue. As
Parker Gilbert has indicated in his
last report, there has been an enor.
nous expansion in the domestic ex-
penditures Of the German govern
ment. Nor is it less disturbing that
the balance of trade against Germany
not only has been steadily great but
has steadily tended to rise. Germany
is buying abroad vastly more than
she Is selling. And she has not now,
as in pre-war days, foreign invest
mentS, while the earnings Of her ships
are much less than in 1914.
But Germany can only pay her
separations in goods and services. If
she cannot sell abroad, she cannot
pay abroad. And since she can no
longer hope to buy abroad. the prob
lem becomes grave when her repara-
tons payments mount suddenly, as
they will In the next two years from
$500, 100000 to $625, 100000. Moreover,
under the Dawes plan it is rigidly
fixed that German reparations pay
ments shall never be permitted to
disturb German exchange.
1t follows, then, that the French.