Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-03-27
STRESEMANN TRIUJMPHS
BRING HIM NEAR GOAL
Double Victory at Geneva and in Berlin
One More Evidence of Officials
Foreign Policy Successes.

securities which constitute a part OF
the Dawes plan program. But these
securities could only be sold on the
American market and although British
opposition was immediate American
veto was regarded as inevitable.
In addition. the French face a prac-
teal problem. All the Notifications
constructed by the Germans I'm Alsace-
Lorraine We're built facing the old
French frontier. Today Alsace-Lor-
raine is practically open on the Ger
man side and the French are just
completing a plan of fertilization
which will take several years to exc
cute. During that time. naturally. the
French people are unwilling to with
draw their occupying forces from Ger
man territory covering their own
frontiers.
French Opinion Alarmed.
But there is a deeper difficulty.
Beyond all debate the trend in Ger
man opinion and politics In the past
two years has been toward the re-
dictionary elements. Recent incidents
In German interior politics have
alarmed French opinion. Thus, while
there Is still a strong desire for some
real Franco-German reapproachment,
there is far less belief in the possibility
| of such an understanding in France
than there was a year and a half
ago.
Actually the difficulty is that the
French have not been able to escape
from the consequences not merely OF
the war but of the state of mind
which has existed since the Franco
PrusSian War. Fear and suspicion
OF German purpose not only survive,
as was perhaps inevitable, but have
acquired new vitality in the last year.
IN this situation Stresemann's Inn
mediate future must be patiently diff
cult lie has reconciled the National
ists 10 Locarno, Geneva and the recent
Sarre compromise as details in the
larger program Of liberating the
Rhineland. But the rise of Nationalist
influence and the expression Il has
mad within Germany have created
alarm outside, not merely In Franco
but also in Poland and even In Bel
GUM. Now he has to overcome this
apprehension abroad.
Dawes Plan Under Fire.
Nor is this problem lessened by the
Iact that concomitantly with the in
creased pressure upon him in the mat
Ter or occupation there is developing
German 1nSlStence upon revision Of
the Dawes plan. Secretary Mellon
IN MS letter to the Princeton faculty
pointed out that Germany would next
year pay her allied creditors mora
IMAM enough to enable all to meet
their American debts and in later
years sufficient to leave France a. hand.
some balance.
But the Germans have never ac-
cepted the Dawes plan as a final adj
JusCment and there has never been a
Or
menus All over Europe Ii is ayr eeSf
that Germany cannot be made to nav
the sums which would be due when
OaWeS payments reach their maxi
mum The policy Of the United States
mas postponed and still postponae a
conference for the discussion of repa-
rations and interallied debts. Nor can
one see any present probability that
american policy will change. Yet the
herman payments are annually in
creasing at a rapid rate and are reach
ing totals which within two wears viii.
TO say the least. be a very heavy bur
uen upon German Industrial and eco
nomic existence.
Nevertheless, to get the French to
consent to early evacuation Straan
mann Is condemned to offer larger.
payments. He is thus caught on the
horns OF dilemma Nor is there alv
apparent escape while the people OF
tne United states insist upon debt
payments. For now that France 10
paying America, although without
ratifying the Acknowledgement agree.
ment, she is less likely than ever to
consent to any reduction of the Dawes
schedules And she will Just as GER
talniy insist upon additional financial
considerations in return for any early
evacuation Of the Rhineland.
Aided by Chancellors.
So far Stresemann has, on the
whole, been very successful, although
not a little of the achievement has
been due to Marx and to Luther, the
present and the former chancellors.
Today Germany Is restored to Euro
pean influence. her finance is solidly
re-eStabliShed, her economic life is re-
building steadily. She has escaped
from the worst consequences of the
war.
But as Germany RECEIVERS, the pres
ence Of allied troops on German soil
becomes steadily more intolerable. and
postponement of evacuation constt.
tutes growing indictment OF Strese.
mann'S policy. Sooner or later-and
this year may be the linit--if he does
not obtain the promise Of early evacu-
GbAOAAs ITO may AA44s IL LS IdllS, ne VIII
be succeeded by Nationalist leaders,
and their very presence in control will
almost inevitably so alarm the French
that evacuation will not even be con-
ceivable.
All in all, it must be patent that
Stresemann, who has already been
named the postwar Bismarck" has
before him a problem Of utmost COM
plexity. To obtain abroad what all
Germans desire he must follow policies
which are bitterly opposed by the Ma
tionalists, whose influence is now very
great, if not supreme. in Germany.
But the stronger the Nationalists be-
come at home the less chance he has
of succeeding abroad, and, therefore,
of surviving at home. In any event,
however. in the matter of the Sarre
he has succeeded, and his triumph has
been both complete and on the whole
won with small difficulty. This is en-
couraging. but the larger problems
remain.
(Copyright. 1927