Evening star., 1927-10-16

4 L mere oratorical flourish
but was the result of a
profound conviction that the scheme
Of paying tribute to the Ban barry
States was not only wrong in prin.
eiple. but Intellectual in results.
Our forefathers early realized that
security to our merchant marine and
our coastal cities in time of peace
and protection in time of war was
an adequate justification for the eX-
penditures needed to build and main.
tain a navy. In determining the
value of the Navy of the United
States to the people of the United
States. we have to weigh the value
Of security at home and upon the
high seas. and the value of peace
10 he preserved by the Navy or re-
gained in the event of aggressive war
against us.
While it is difficult. indeed impos
sible, to measure the value of peace
and security in the exercise of our
right at home and upon the high seas,
il is worthy of notice that the Nation
did not consider forty millions of
dollars too high a price to pay to
preserve and maintain the right 10
use the hish seas for our commerce
without threat or hindrance from the
German nation or from any other
power.
This was a wartime expenditure
hut the interest upon that eNpendi-
tllre would maintain an adequate
Army and Navy. Because we were
compelled to forego peace we have
added to the burdens of maintaining
q peace establishment the burden of
paying interest upon this vast ex-
penditure and the necessity for re-
paving the principal. Without at
tempting to appraise the monetary
value of peace and security. il is
sufficient to observe that recent eX-
periences have manifested the fact
that the question of peace or war is
10 be calculated in terms of billions
rather than millions of dollars. It
is obvious that in discussing the
value of the American Navy to the
American people. the value of main
tanning and securing peace must be
considered
But there are other impbndarables in
connection with naval expenditures
which are not so well known and
which should be considered. In time
Of war the efficiency of the Navy may
he measured roughly by its ability to
deliver proiectiles on board the enemy
target-shots that do not hit do not
count. The speed with which hits are
made on the target is vital, so that in
war time, accuracy and speed of gun.
fire represent the output of the Navy.
The skill of adnirals in bringing ships
in contact under favorable conditions
and the skill of naval architects. arti-
sans and workmen are all involved in
this final result.
* X
IN time of peace. however, the output
of the Navy is educational Train
ing of officers and men in patriotism
and loyalty, as well as in the manifold
operations of the material of the feet,
is the real output of the Navy. 1t is
true that ships must be designed and
built; that guns must be manufac-
tured. powder supplied and target
practice carried on: and that the men
in the Navy must be fed and clothed.
But in this whole process. the great
objective is the training of personnel
This also means the training of the
navy yard workmen to build the ships
snd their equipment: the training nf
those whose activities are essential to
the building of the ship: the training
of the filen on board the ship for the
operation of its various Instruments;
the training of the Supply Corps in the
procurement and handling of supplies
for the Navy: the training of the Med
iCal Corps in caring for the men when
sick and instructing officers and men
how to avoid sickness; the training of
ithe members of the Construction Corps
TO design and superintend the con-
struction of ships; the training of the
Engineer Corps in the design and
construction of shore stations.
1t may be that not one of the instru-
ments devised, manufactured or util-
lied by these men will ever be used
in actual hostilities, but by reason of
their training these men will be able
TO hand down to their successors,
whom they will train. the knowledge
they have gained. Not only is this
training invaluable to the national de-
fense because it is essential to the per-
petuation of knowledge of the means
of defense. but in another aspect such
training and education are of vital CON
sequence to the people.
like to think of the Navy of the
United States as a great educational
institution. The expenditures for the
; operation and maintenance of the
Navy would be amply justified l think,
!. the only return to the Government
were the perpetuation and increase Of
the knowledge of how to construct and
operate the national defense.
Even if we eliminated guns. .the ac-
tual product of our gun factories, and
even il we eliminated the ships, the
actual product of our navy yards or
private shipbuilding yards; If We de-
stroyed every machine, engine and
boiler so produced and counted as a
complete loss the investment in such
Instruments even if we did all this.
believe that the existence of the or
ga nization which produced them, with
the intelligence and capacity TO repro
@duce them. would be ample compensa
ton for the expenditures involved in
their production and utilization.
WBEN We started building a new
Navy in 1882 the entire produc-
tion OF steel in the United States was
only ! 1874 tons a wear. The steel in
dustry had 10 be developed before we
could manufacture tho armor or make
the necessary gun forginSs for such
ships. We We're either unable to de
sign such ships as the Texas and the
Maine or the time necessary for such
design was so great that we bought
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