Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-08-03
Gibson Holds Authority.

can delegation, meanwhile, mas con-
siderable liberty of action Is to calling
off or proceeding with the plenary
session of the conference, which has
been set in principle for tomorrow.
The question now seems to be not
whether this meeting will be held or
not held but when it is held what Will
be its character and the tone Of the
speeches during it, and whether 1t
will not mark the conferences con-
clusion.
If the result of todays deliberations
and the reply of the British cabinet
warrant the hope that progress can
be made by the active resumption OF
negotiations with the japanese sug'
gestions as a basis. then the pienary
session may be a tame affair. consist
ing of a public exchange of the views
of the respective delegations.
If snags, however. are struck in the
course of today's meeting and IL the
British cabinet turns down the japd-
nese Idea" as a whole, tomorrow
session, it is felt, undoubtedly will be
the last.
1t is likely that il the latter is the
case, the japanese will seek 10 have
the conference terminate by the issu-
ance of a joint communique or by each
OF the delegations setting forth its re-
Enthusiasm Is Not Great.
Although the japanese proposal
kindled a spark. there was no great
flame of enthusiasm among the war;
Gus delegations. Even the Japanese
in presenting it said it was lust an
idea"; that they realized it was entire
ly, imperfect, and that Mr.. Gibson
should feel at liberty to modify 1t or
comment on it in any way he desired.
The naval experts were particularly
skeptical regarding its acceptabiiltE'
not so much by the United States-lt
being no secret that it was framed 10
please that country-as by Great
Britain. Indeed. w. c. Bridgeman'
first lord of the British admiralty, fat
ly declared to the japanese leader
Admiral Saito. that he could not ac-
cept the proposed compromise as a
basis of discussion. principally be-
cause the plan called for secondary
class Of 8000-ton cruisers capable or
mounting S-inch guns. But in view
of the earnestnesS with which the
Jananese idea" was presented. he
agreed to telegraph the text to Down
ing street.
Meaning Is Discussed.
Mr., Gibson. as soon as he scru-
tinized the text, forwarded it to Wash
ington, with his own views and COM
ment.
Immediately the gist of the COM
promise suggestion became known
conference circles were alive with
gossip as to just what the various
clauses meant and the various inter
pretations to which they were sus.
ceptible. Particular attention was
given to the clause stipulating that
Great Britain and Japan cease build
ing UP TO 1881 large cruisers beyond
those already authorized, and fixing
the number of 10 ,000-ton cruisers 10
be built up to 1881 at II for Great
Britain and the United States and
eight for Japan.
The plan starts out by calling for
maintenance of the status quo as re-
CARDS cruiser strength both for Great
Britain and Japan, giving the United
States a chance to catch up with these
two countries in powerfully armed and
armOred cruisers.
There is a safeguard clause giving a
signatory the privilege of denouncing
the arrangement if it considers that Sc
curity is menaced by building activity
of another signatory. Other clauses en-
phasize that the United states Is not
10 go Deyonu tne lOtdt brltlSIl CRUISER
strength by 1881. and that the sigma
tories shall exchange complete infor.
nation about cruiser construction.
With the Japanese compromise plan
forwarded to London for consideration
of the cabinet, and to Washington
for consideration of the American Of
ficials, the delegates to the confer
ence spent the afternoon in COMPETE
tion for the silver golf trophy offered
by Admiral Saito. In the evening they
attended a formal dinner given by the
japanese in honor of Crown Prince
VI of Korea.