Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-02-06

ing is impossible.
Today the British are evidently pre-
pared to resign many of those ad-
vantages which they have acquired by
force and through long years. They
are now prepared to surrender most, II
not all, of those invasions of the SOW
ereignty of China which are the tech
nical If by no means all the basic
causes of Chinese revolution against
the West
But what is very hard to discover
now is whether surrender now will be
of much avail Moreover, While they
are prepared to abandon political and
commercial privileges, the British are
naturally not prepared to surrender
property. The destruction or seizure
of the vast establishments in Shanghai
and the smaller interests in other por-
lions of the Chinese empire would be
for Britain an economic disaster Oh
the first magnitude.
Yet it is not merely to regain po-
litical and tariff rights that the
Chinese are now fighting. The British
government in the Russo-Polish war
undertook to restore peace by propos-
ing great territorial concessions to
the bolshevists. But these offers,
made, to be sure, at the expense or
Poland awakened no response in
Moscow. because Moscow was playing
for much larger stakes, for the whole
or nothing, for a general European
rising of the proletariat.
Lack of Coherent Nation.
In the larger view, of course. there
is no China in the sense that there is
a France, a Britain, a Germany or
the United States. China remains
vast incOherent mass. There is not
one government, there is not one
ruler. Nevertheless, there is the
hatred of the foreigner which is com
mon to all classes and is driving
force amidst all the incoherent revo-
lutionary groups which are today in
the field.
To compare the present Chinese up
rising with the ordinary revolution
within western countries, in highly
organized national entities, to liken it
to the American Revolution. the
French Revolution or the still recent
German Revolution is absurd. China
is, in fact. in the western sense, amor
phous, unorganized, incapable now of
organization in the European sense.
Even the small group of intelli-
gentsia is actually exercising very
little influence upon the course of
events. The fundamental hatred of
the foreigner is far more responsible
for the gravity of the situations than
the desire for liberty in the western
sense of any conception of such prin-
ciples as that of self-determinatfon.
And the prospect of loot is an meal
culable incentive.
But the question is squarely raised
for the British and measureably for
all other European countries which
hold Chinese concessions, whether it
is possible longer to permit things to
drift. There are Britons, who know
the East, who still cling to the old
fashioned notion that prestige is still
a possible basis for power and the use
of, force in adequate amount could
restore the situation.
Obviously no permanent advan-
tage will accrue to the British if by
the. dispatch of military forces they
simply save and guard their prop
critics at Shanghai. If a state of
siege and an extension of the boycott
are adopted, on the other side, Brit
ish trade is ruined, British finance
is paralyzed, even the property be-
comes in itself worthless. The single
hope must lie in the possibility that
after the property has been saved
some modus vivendi can be arranged,
some basis of peaceful living on the
foundation of political surrenders.
Powers Lose Solidarity.
Hitherto Europe has appeared
before China as a solid force. The
soldiers and warships of all Euro
pean countries have united to give
the impression of combination of
Irresistible strength. But Germany
has disappeared from the East,
France has sufficient pre- occupations
in Syria, Italian interests are rela-
lively inconsiderable and Belgium
lacks the resources for a Chinese
war.
If the United States declines to be
drawn into the conflict the British
are, it would seem, destined to stand
alone. But such isolation would in
itself be a source of incalculable
weakness, just as it would at once
place a very large burden upon Brit
ish finances, for real war, even
limited in its field, would be patiently
expensive and could hardly bring any
profit.
But IL the United States is drawn
into the struggle then the British
position would at once be strength
ened and consolidated. Moreover,
even IL evacuation were in the end
inevita BILE, Anglo American associa-
ton would at least destroy the very
real danger that the United States,
by pursuing a separate policy, might
retain an advantageous position and
might eventually inherit, with Chinese
consent, not little of British trade
and commerce in the East.
The present Chinese affair is great
British disaster 1t has already in
hicted great losses, it can hardly fail
to inflict even greater expenses. 1t
may easily compromise British pres.
tige in other parts of Asia and have
repercussions in India which will
prove ultimately unfortunate. But
one of the most unlucky consequences
might easily be the destruction of the
whole British position in the Far East
and the eventual arrival of the United
States as a successor, not to the po-
| litical but to the commercial position
Britain has SO long occupied.
On the whole our reputation in
China is very good. We have been in
no large degree a party to the Excess
sive exploitation of the Chinese people
and we have refrained from taking
| any Chinese territory. AS foreigners
we are undoubtedly sharers in the
| general hostility. Against us Russia
| is bound to work almost as energeti
cally as against Britain. Neverthe
| less, up to the present moment our
situation Is materially different from
that Of any European country.
Europe Watching u. S.
And. as a consequence, all Europe
is watching us carefully and Britain
most closely. If we withdraw our ma
| tionals, refrain from any forcible ac-
tion then our course will be put down
! to the seinsn desire to p3'e-ee- oar
future and to play lone hand in the
East If, on the other hand, we should
ne led or brought to share in any mill
tary operation, even TO defend oul
nationals. European policy would be
modified