Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-07-10

I day Senator Bordh called pdrtlcu.
lar attention to European events
of the past few weeks. These, in
his view, indicated that Europe
was today in much the same state
of mind as Is years ago, on the eve
of the World War. The break be-
tween Britain and Russia, the assas-
sination of the Russian Minister in
Warsaw. the Albanian crisis, the
| Poincare deliverance at Luneville, all
seemed to the mind of the Idaho Sem
ator clear proof that Europe was
unchanged and Locarno mockery.
which he rather sharply characterized
as organized hypocrisy.
| 1t is clear, beyond debate, that the
present year has been far less prom
| ising than the last. so far as Euro
pean conditions are concerned. The
regular and steady progress which
marked the whole period from the
| conference which made the Dawes
plan in London in 1924 to the AS
senlbly Of the League of Nations
which saw the admission Of Germany
| last September has been manifestly
| interrupted. But is it quite accurate
to find in this circumstance parallel
| for 1914 and to interpret current
events as forecasting a new general
catastrophe?
Borah's Views Discussed.
On the whole. 1t is hard to escape
| the conclusion that Borah's pessInism
| grows from the outstanding circunl-
stance of his European studies, his
| firm refusal to investigate at first
| hand the conditions, in the several
European countries whose action must
be decisive in any new crisis. as they
were just Is years ago. For, grant
as one must that on the surface there
| is much in Europe to recall the evil
| days which preceded the World War,
it remains true that beneath the sur
| face the conditions are utterly
| dissimllar.
In the Europe which exists, as in
the old Europe, there are certain per-
| manent difficulties out Of which 1t is
| always possible that war may arise.
| Soviet Russia constitutes a challenge
to the whole European order west Of
| the Russian frontiers precisely as it
is challenge to the European posi-.
ton in Asia. Bolshevism is con-
| sciously carrying on war upon the
| west; it has simply chosen for the
| time being to make it's attack in Asia
and not in Europe.
| But as Bolshevism evolves 1t plainly
| tends to follow the old nationalist
pathways. The fact that both in
| Poland and in Rumania there are do
mestic political crises, inevitable in
states which were affected so pro-
foundry by the World War. places
certain cards in Soviet hands. Boil.
| shevism is intriguing at Berlin
against Poland; it is equally active
against Rumania in all parts of South.
eastern Europe.
| Dangers Apparent.
| The mere fact Of this constant and
active effort keeps in the foreground
the dangers which these border states
must always have to face. The threat
| affects their policies; it affects the
state of mind of the peoples; it COM
| municates itself to the minds of the
peoples Of other countries which are
directly or indirectly concerned.
When Britain breaks off relations with
Russia, Poland is bound to feel anx-
ious. but Russia is just as certain
to suspect Polish response to British
urgings.
A break between Britain and Rus
STA puts Germany in a new and adj
vantageous political situation. Both
the British and the Russians have
support, but Germany has concomi-
family the opportunity to seek profit,
to put a price upon her favors. But
the price to Britain is patiently sup
port of German demands for the
evacuation of the Rhineland and
that brings France in.
Thus, at bottom, most of the real
trouble in Europe today arises from
the fact that there is no organiza-
ton, no settled basis. And just as
long as the greatest single state in
Europe, measured by area and popu-
lation, continues not alone to stand
outside the circle of peaceful states,
but to pursue ends which look to
the destruction of the whole political
and economic system of the others,
stability must be lacking all over
the continent.
Waits Upon Russia.
In the larger sense, the reorganiZa-
ton of Europe, that readjustment
about which we have all been talking
for all the years since the treaty of
Versailles was signed, waits upon Rus
STA and the change by evolution or
revolution of Russian policy. In the
matter of disarmament, little can be
accomplished on land while Russia
with a powerful army remains con-
slant threat to Poland. Rumania and
the Baltic states. While the Ger
man Nationalist believe in the
eventual resurgence of an agrees
sive Russia, they are sure to oppose
the extension of Locarno or even the
realization of the plans already
adopted.
In exactly the same fashion Italy
has put herself outside the European
circle. Like Russia, she pursues ends
which are hardly less frankly danger
Gus If not so deliberately threatening
to European peace. The underlying
principle of Fascimo Is almost fanatic
nationalism, but none of the larger
ends Of italian nationalism can be
realized without conflict. 1t is true
that Mussolini means to avoid war.
if only because the internal condition
of Italy. financially. economically and
politically, could not stand the strain,
yet to preach struggle and to practice
peace is a dangerous paradox.
Menace Well Known.
In Russia, too, as in Italy the men,
ace of any real war, of a struggle
with Poland and Rumania. for exam
pie, is not overlooked by the Soviet
rulers. That the Soviet army could