Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-02-20
BY WALLACE THOMPSON.
Author of Rainbow Countries Of Central
America - etc.

literally the two best friends
Il this country ever had in Mica
ragua. or perhaps in all Latin
America. This point has been con-
siStently overlooked, both by the de-
tenders of DIR. Juan .BautiSta SacaSa
and by the self-appointed apologists
for the Department of State. Most of
the shouting and tumult that has
arisen over the support of the govern
ment of Adolfo Diaz by the United
States has in fact been predicated on
e. the assumption that President Dlaz
was put into power" by the United
States because he was a willing and
famous tool of both this Government
and of the American bankers who
have been held responsible, in some
quarters. for the present turn OF al
fairs in Nicaragua.
But the facts of the past and of the
present-up until very recent weeks,
at any rate-indicate that DIR. Sacasa
would always have been quite as good
q friend and quite as faithful fol-
lower of the leadings, hints or even OF
the directions of the Department OF
State as President Diaz could possibly
dream of being.
Then how did Washington come to
get into this certainly unpleasant po-
sition of having turned down one good
friend of having apparently fiShed up
out of the obscurity of an honorable
retirement another friend whose 10y
atty was of rather too vociferous a
cast for the needs of the crisis, ana
finally of having put some 1000 Ma
rines and Heaven knows how many
warships of various kinds and sizes on
the job of neutralizing Nicaragua so
that this latter friend might not be
overthrown by the other and very
much-former friend?
Background of Events.
If one goes back far enough, one
can usually find a fairly satisfactory
starting point, even in the compl-
Gated and eternally shifting issues OF
Central American politics. For the
present. going back to 1922 will prob
ably suffice. In that year the five
Central American countries were in
vited to a conference in Washington,
there to draw up treaties to take the
place of the somewhat Anticipated doc
umentS of 1907.
Amongst the IA treaties and con-
ventions signed on February 3, 1923,
was one tthe treaty of peace and am
ity) in which the five countries agreed
never to recognize as the head of the
government of any of the others a
man who had been the leader or even
q close relative of the leader of
revolution or coup dtat. This pro-
vision was more or less forced upon
the Central American delegates-in
the way cards are forced by con-
jurer-by the American Secretary of
State, then Charles Evans Hughes,
and the very capable second 'Ameri-
can observer" Sumner Wells, former
chief of the Latin American division
of the Department Of State and one
of the wiSeSt of the young men who
have held that important office in
recent years.
This non-recognition of revolution
airy governments had been initiated
as policy of the United States in
Latin America by President Wilson
In connection with the unfortunate
President Victoriano Huerta of Mex
leo, but the Central Americans were
dubious about the wisdom of the pro-
vision. They felt that revolution was
after all one of the ways still needed
sometimes for the expression of popu-
lar opinion in lands where the fran
chise is but lightly regarded and the
duty of maintaining the sanctity of
the ballot an obligation not always
seriously observed by the kinds of
governments that most need to be
displaced But the counsel and the
virtual promise of the United States
to aid in the enforcement of this re-
nuirement of constitutionality finally
persuaded them, and the treaty was
signed.
Action i'm Honduras.
1t was only a few months later that
the Department of State foreSaW, as
st believed, an imminent danger of
crisis of just this sort. Elections were
approaching in Honduras, and the
thprn IL, in
capable of controlling the various fac
tions, so that it looked as if the next
president Of Honduras was going to
arrive by the old revolutionary route.
AT that time, in June. 1928, the De
partment of State placed its solemn
seal of approval on that section III of
the Central American Treaty of Peace
and Amity by sending a note to the
government of Honduras and to it's
warning factions warning them that,
although not a Signatory TO the treaty,
the United States would be guided alb
solutely by its provisions in according
recognition TO any future presidents
in Central America.
The note was given to the press of
every country Of Central America,
although, interestingly enough it has
never been made public here, and even
in his message to Congress on Janu-
to mention that this warning long
since had gone broadcast over Cen
trail America.
However, Central America knew
and when Gen. Emiliano Chamorro on
October %, 1925, captured La Iona,
the fortified hill overlooking and com
manding the Nicaraguan capital,
Managua, Central America knew that
under its solemn pronouncement the
sfnfn nciS . In,
recognize him as president. To the
eternal credit of the Department of
State let it be noted than when Cha
MORO, as anticipated, forced the resig-
nation of President Carlos SolorZano
and the flight of Vice President Juan
Bautista Sacasa and placed himself
in the presidency, the Department of
State not only did not recognize him
but held to that policy consistently
and without compromise. Gen. Cha
MORO was Well and favorably known
in Washington. where he had served
as Nicaraguan minister for many
wears, and there was genuine regret
that he had chosen this road to the
presidency, but the policy was never
altered because of that.
No Recognition of Sacasa.
on the other hand, however there
was no recognition of DIR. SacaSa, the
constitutional,y elected vice president.
who had fled from Nicaragua both to
save his life and to prevent the tor
ture which he feared would be inflicted
upon his followers if he remained in
hiding in Nicaragua. Or. Sacasa
slipped over the Honduran border
and by short stages came direct to
Washington He did not at that time
go to Mexico, as some of the volun-
teer apologsts for the Department of
ctofa baua dec la rcd