Evening star., 1927-10-16
BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.

| - ENEVA. Last year all Europe,
however much divided on all
other questions, was able to
~ reach agreement on the
American affair. Uncle Sam"
was "Uncle Shylock" and European
recovery was blocked by American
debt policy.
Today nothing is more interesting
than the fact that the Continent is in
substantial agreement that RESPONSE.
| bility for the continued failure of all
efforts to make the League of Nations
| the basis of European unity and the
means Of arriving at disarmament is
| exclusively British. John Bull, and
not Uncle Sam, is the chief target
| Nor is Johns position helped by the
| fact that, concomitantly, he is in
dicted in the United States because of
the failure of the naval conference.
If one is to understand the British
| policy, which is today the most inn
| portant single element in the European
/ problem, it is essential to perceive at
the outTet that it is dictated by cir
cumstances which are at first geo.
graphical. France, Germany, all the
| continental nations are essentially
European. For them, all other mat
ters are, by contrast, minor.
! Position OF Britain.
The United States. on the other
hand, is completely out of Europe.
! The British Empire is half way be.
tween-the British Isles are in Europe,
the great dominions are just as COM
pletely outside of Europe as the
United States.
1t is impossible for any British gov
ernment to ignore what happens in
| E.urnno hot
Germany would inevitably involve
Britain. and British security depends
upon the Rhine and not upon the
Channel frontiers. This is fact as
old as British history, and the World
| War demonstrated that it has been
not modified but rather emphasized by
the development of modern weapons
Of war.
But If no British government can
ignore the European front, it can lust
as little ignore the fact that the great
dominions take wholly American po-
sition and insist that they shall not be
involved In European entanglements,
| ana that their resources in men and
money shall not be mortgaged to de-
| fend European frontiers or preserve
peace on the Continent.
| Always, then, any British govern
ment finds itself caught between two
fires. This difficulty is, too, accentu-
ated by the development of European
conceptions of the methods by which
peace is to be insured and disarma-
ment produced. On the Continent
there is the general belief that the
sole method of insuring peace is to
make the League of Nations a guar
antor of peace and to provide it with
the power to deal with any aggressor.
All the League efforts in this direc-
ton, eliminating in the Protocol of
1924, which remains the lasting ex.
preston of the continental point of
view, are based upon the three princi.
pies of arbitration, security and dis.
armament. Arbitration is to be COM
pulsory, security is to be established
by the pledge of all members to join
in common action against any coun.
try which resorts to war. The double
assurance of arbitration and guaran-
teed security is to make disarmament
possible.
Opposes Compulsory Arbitration.
But because of the character of the
British commonwealth, the British
government is opposed to any compul-
sorry arbitration, which might conceiv-
ably permit the League to intervene
between dominions and the mother
country. While because of the domin-
ions refusal to undertake European
guarantees, the British government
must oppose the protocol. But these
two vetoes abolish all security from
the continental point of view and thus
close the door to any real disarma-
| ment.
Sir Austen Chamberlain, with more
honesty than cleverness. told the
whole truth at Geneva the other day
when he said there were two leagues
in the world, the British common
wealth and the League of Nations,
and for him, as for his country, the
older and smaller league" came first.
But the effect of this declaration was
to arouse all continental peoples to
protest and to resentment.
| 1t remains true, however, that the
British are in the League, but not of it.
While for all continental states the
League has become the major consid-
Grafton, it remains for the British a
minor And while all continental peo-
| pies are pressing for action by the
| League. British activity at Geneva
more and more tends to aim at pre-
venting the League from doing pre-
cisely those things which continental
| people demand.
This British activity necessarily
I1hSS OilC 1IitCs <i5 LILC udI d1LOI VI
German and French security, the Brit
ish government exercises an enormous
influence upon any French or German
government. France, anxious for its
security; Germany, eager for the
evacuation of the Rhineland, cannot
afford to offend Britain. Thus the
British government is always able to
exercise a restraining influence in
Paris or Berlin. Neither France nor
Germany dares to put itself at the
head of continental opinion at Geneva
and become the champion of the small
states.
But this British policy inevitably
tends TO replace League action by
great power action, and British effort
is employed in preserving peace, not
through the League directly, but by
means of concert of great powers.
making their bargains outside the
League and then using the League s
an instrument to register these More
and more. as consequence, the League