Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-07-24
BRITISHERS OVERLOOKED
BASIC FACTS AT GENEVA
Parity of Fleets at u. S. Pleasure and
American Loss of Equality at
Washington UnnOticed.

while the British have but 100000 to
fix tonnage limit of 100000 was not
limitation but expansion, II amounted
In terms to an American construction
of 100000 tons of cruisers as the sim
gle method of obtaining equality. And
just as patiently it was not economy.
And in the mind of the American
President economy was one OF the
main benefits sought at the confer
ence. Having opposed the congress
sional agitation for q naval increase
which at most would not have carried
our total to 100000 on the ground OF
economy, the President could hardly
afford to present treaty which i'm.
posed the obligation of building AGO.
900 tons beyond present strength.
One may say with perfect justice
that the British presented n proposal
which envisaged economies in their
opening offer. But all the economies
were at American expense. The life
Of battleships was to be prolonged,
continuing British superiority, the
size of cruisers was TO be reduced,
suiting British necessities; the arma-
ment on cruisers was to be scaled
down, complying with British condi-
tions. In this way large sums might
have been saved but there would have
remained nothing but paper parity.
1t is just as plain that the equality
offered by the United States-that is,
an equality of tonnage-did not con.
stitute an equality in fact, since we
should have 10000-ton cruisers and
the British mainly 5.OOO.ton boats.
They were confronted with the choice
between scrappinS their smaller boats
and building a new fleet of 10000-ton
boats or accepting inferiority in the
cruiser line. But our 0.000-ton boats.
although described by the British as
offensive types. were not aimed at
Britain, but conformed to obvious
American requirements.
Made DOubly Unwise.
Moreover. the. British position was
made dOublY unWiSe by the fact that
| in Geneva Japan stood with America.
and even more strongly than the
United States, for restricted total ton.
| mage in cruisers. This Japanese posi-.
| ton was based on the double fact that
the Japanese did not need additional
tonnage and did not care to spend the
money involved in expanding their
| fleet to proposed limits, whether the
British 100000 or the Anglo-American
compromise figure of 100000.
Again, while American public opin.
ion solidly supported our delegation in
its effort to arrive at a low limitation
and was generally aroused by the high
figures proposed by the British, there
was actual division in Britain. both
due to the position taken by the Labor
opposition and due to the recognition
by not a few statesmen and pressmen
that II race were actually precipi-
tated, the British must lose, IL the
United States were prepared to force
the pace.
What was rather 1aughable about
the British phase was the panied sur.
prise which American comment ex.
cited and the assertion that this re-
suited from Misrepresentation of the
British case. Any one who recalls the
degree to which the British officially
and unofficially stimulated American
criticism of the French attitude at the
washington conference and the bene-
fits derived from the press campaign
then directed against the French dele
cation for taking a position on sub.
marine tonnage wholly analogous to
that held by the British in the matter
or cruisers at Geneva, must see the
exquisite irony of the later circum.
stances.
British Sea Psychology.
Americans are rarely able to grasp
what OIiC Illdy CdlI the sea
psychology of the British nation. For
England believes seriously and asserts
always with utmost solemnity that
the British Navy it not a military but
moral force, that it's right to the
supreme fleet is too obvious to per-
nit of any misrepresentation. Three
centuries of naval supremacy and
many wars against prospective rivals
have established a tradition which
is the deepest single circumstance in
British policy.
This tradition explains British
policy at Geneva. Any other judg-
ment was held impossible and when
an emphatic dissent came from the
United States, this was explained as
due to misrepresentation. On the
other side all this British case seemed
in a majority of American minds to
be one more evidence of supreme
British diplomatic skill, the disclosure
of cunning and disingenuousness.
In realty, at Geneva the British
admiralty found itself for the first
time squarely in the presence of a
nation which meant to have actual
equality on the high seas and was in
a position TO dictate the terms Of
equality, because it had the absolute
power to obtain not equality but
supremacy, if it chose. And all the
British proposals were framed with
out regard to this basic fact.
Calculated to Anger.
Precisely the same state of mind
that permitted a British cabinet TO
utter the Balfour note explains the
original British proposals at Geneva.
Both had the same fundamental lack
or appreciation of the state of mind
OF the people it was designed to con-
vince. Both were equally calculated
to anger the audience it was essential
to persuade and in both cases ulti.
mate power rested with those whose
indignation was profoundly stirred.
The Balfour note abolished all
chance of cancellation of the British
war debt to the United States, the
original proposals of the British dele
cation at Geneva. in my judgment.
abolished all possibility of the reten-
ton of the smallest fragment of naval
II there was real cues.
ton before as to whether the Ameri-
can people would consider it necessary
to build up to parity. this doubt van.
ished in the first days of the con.
ference. For of all the friends of the
American Navy and the champions
Of naval expansion, w. G.. Brakeman
has been the most valuable ally IL
was humanity possible to imagine.
Whatever one may say of British tao
Tics at Jutland. it is hard to justify two
opinions of the British Navy in action
at Geneva.