Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-07-19
Out of the Geneva Haze.

The British and the Japanese at the
three. power naval conference in &c.
neva, it is reported, have indicated a
willingness to fix the cruiser and de-
stroyer tonnage for the United States
and Great Britain at 100000 tons. On
the surface, this seems like real prog
ress. The figures approximate the
total tonnage suggested by the Amer.
lean delegation at the opening of the
conference. and as such SHOULD be sat
1sfactory to the United States. But re.
port has it there are strings attached
to this offer or agreement on the part
OF the British and the Japanese.
"Open covenants, openly arrived at"
the demand Of the late President
Woodrow Wilson few years ago, is
desideratum at Geneva Just now. The
haze over the negotiations is still thick
enough to cause the suspicion that
there is too much "jockeying" for ad-
vantage for the good of the conference.
But out Of the haze has come word
that 100000 tons of cruiser and de.
stroyer strength does not mean 500, 900
tons, but really $4,000 tons, with
$4,000 cruiser tons in the reserve or
obsolete class. This additional ton.
mage is to be in cruisers over the pro-
posed 16-year age limit for cruisers.
AS Great Britain's cruisers all have
been completed since 1911 and are fast
and fairly modern vessels and still
useful, while the United States has
only old and slow cruisers, which are
now obsolete, built between the years
1894 and 1908, except for it's most re.
Gently constructed 7,500-ton cruisers,
this would all work to the advantage
of Great Britain.
Great Britain would be able to retire
cruisers constructed in 1915 and 1916
to the obsolete" or reserve tonnage
by 1881 and 1882 and replace them
with new vessels, while the United
States would have to wait until 1899
before it could withdraw any of its
e,590.ton cruisers.
In other words, Great Britain's
$4,000 tons Of obsolete or reserve
cruiser tonnage would be really valu.
able, while the similar tonnage allotted
the United States would be fit for the
scrap heap. aa
There are other strings to this lat.
est British offer in regard to cruisers.
1t is understood that the British would
limit the 10,000-ton cruisers to twelve
for the United States and Great Britain
each and eight for Japan, and that
other cruisers are to be restricted in
size to 5000 tons. carrying guns no
heavier than 6-inch. This is contrary
to the naval needs of the United
States, which has few naval bases.
and satisfactory to the British, who
have many naval bases.
Finally, it is suggested, the British
and Japanese accord on the cruiser
proposal has been aided by willing
ness on the part of the British to &C.
cord to the japanese equality with the
United States and Great Britain, or
something very near equality, in the
matter of submarine tonnage. This.
of course, is vio,ative Of the 5-5-3
ratio principle laid down at the Wash.
ington naval conference.
The United States has no desire to
be unreasonable. 1t has no desire to
be carping critic Of every proposal
emanating from the British. But why
is it necessary for the British, If they
are sincere in their declaration that
they seek no naval supremacy over
the United States, to add provisos
which are clearly in their own in.
terests?