Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-02-13


majority government. In all the
negotiations, however, the Center
has steadily insisted that the Nation
alists, who are out-and-out monarch
lists, should accept both the republic
and r,ocarno.
The cabinet which was finally FORM
ed by Marx was based upon a coali-
ton of the two Bourgeois parties. the
Peoples and the Center. with the
Nationalist. But not only did the
Democrats refuse participation. but
there was division within the Center
itself. The moral effect of this COM
bination was pretty completely spoiled
at home and abroad By the efforts of
the Nationalist to get office without
taking any pledges. Thus they agreed
to accept the fact of the republic. but
denounced the Revolution from which
it was issued. And in the Same way,
while they accepted the legality of the
Locarno pactS. they refused to recog-
nize their logical implications. Finally
Count Westarp. the Nationalist lead.
err. violently assailed the statements Of
Marx as to the meaning of National
list participation.
1t is perfectly plain. therefore, that
the much wanted majority in the
Reichstag is actually a pretty flimsy
affair, and it is far from unlikely that
before this article is published there
will have been a new collapse. IF this
should occur a general election Is al.
most unacceptable. But even here the
relief might be slight, for while IL is
generally agreed that the Republican
parties, and particularly the Socialists.
would gain, they are unlikely to gain
enough to constitute a clear majority.
Majority Is Uncertain.
In reality, there is at present no
real basis for a majority government.
On the contrary, there is a majority
in favor Of the foreign policy or con-
ciliation-that is, the LocarnO pro-
gramme of Stresemann: and there is
another majority for policy OF con-
servatism in domestic legislation. All
the Nationalist and Peoples party are
for domestic conservation; only the
Socialists are progressive In the Amer
lean sense, while the Democrats are
liberal in the British sense.
The moment that the Nationalist
are willing to accept the republic in
practice, then 1t will be possible to
form a real majority ministry. But
to do this the Nationalists would have
to resign all present monarchist pur-
poses or principles. And IL they should
do this they would instantly be
threatened by a party schism. Prob
ably very few Nationalists believe
there is any present chance of upset
ting the republic, but equally few dare
to run the risk of acting on this con-
viction.
This incoherence and this revela-
ton of Nationalist intransigeance,
however lacking in real Importance,
must react beyond the French bor-
IL a,,I og
err side of the Polish frontier. Thus
it is exceedingly likely that there will
be little accomplished in the direction
of settling the evacuation issue dur
ing the present cabinet of Marx. And
both the Social Democrats and the
Democrats have already emphasized
this point repeatedly.
The Marx cabinet has made a very
bad start and it is faced by many
troublesome domestic issues, of which
the eight-hour day legislation Is only
the most important. On this issue
the Catholic Center may be split at
any moment. In fact, the main value
for 1t of the coalition lies in the fact
that there is also pending measure
to provide for religious teaching In
the school, and this has it's support.
Notifications an Issue.
Again, in agreeing to surrender con-
troll of German ornaments the French
demanded and obtained a German
promise to destroy many fortified
tions i'm East Prussia. Until these
disappear there is certain to be little
possibility of discussing evacuation.
Nor are the French now in any mood
to make further concessions save as
these represent a real exchange or
values. And it is excessively difficult
to see what Germany has to offer.
It liz true that British public
opinion supports the idea of speedy
evacuation, but even in the British
press there is a certain note or
criticism In recent weeks. Ana AT
least in the immediate future II Is
unlikely that British pressure VIII
be applied to hasten French action.
"Wait and see." is again the watch
word on both sides of the Channel.
French opinion is also influenced at
all times by Polish views, for Poland
is the most important continentai
aIIv of France. And Polo-German
relations are at present very far
from cordial. The Polish foreign
minister, NJ. ZaleslSie. has recently
felt compelled to remind the Ger
mans that there is not the smalIest
Polish sentiment In favor or a sup
preston of the corridor, and equally
unanimous opposition exists to any
proposal to substitute Lithuanian
exit to the sea for the present outlet
at Danzig.
While the arrival of Pilsudski un-
ouestionably weakened Polish pres
tige abroad at the moment he came,
the British coal strike has brought
a very great wave of prosperity To
Poland. and the economic and financial
conditions are probably better than
at any previous moment since the
new state began life. This circum-
stance also enables Poland TO Dear
the heavy burdens incident to tho
maintenance of a very considerable
and efficient army.
Polish Pressure on Paris.
For Poland Nationalist supremacy
in Germany is a deadly peril, and all
Polish influence will now be exerted
upon Paris to retain the occupation
forces in the Rhineland as the single
certain guarantee of Polish security.
For the moment, too. these voices
are likely to have a hearing. Prac-
tically all French journals and public
men are in agreement on The princi-
pIe that the limit Of French con-
cessions has been reached for the
present and further surrenders can
only come after German performance
has been clearly established and in
return for equally valuable German
Thus, in practice, the United States
continues to block the single evident
road to European reimbursement. Since
we refuse to buy German bonds, or.
more exactly, since our Government
declines to permit these bonds to be
sold ON the American market for the
benefit of France, Germany has no
means of getting rid of the French
army of occupation. Accordingly,
while Washington continues to insist
that the reparations and debt ques-
tons are utterly distinct, in fact they