Evening star., 1927-03-09
The Three.Power Proposal.

Ih6 tnree-pOWer ndSal NHhilatioi
conference, proposed by the United
States to Great Britain and Japan, is
In line with the earnest desire of this
Government to bring about reduction
of armaments and the elimination of
war. The refusal of France and Italy
to participate in a five.power naval
agreement was a disappointment.
Half a loaf, however. Is usually con-
sidered better than no loaf. There is
the chance, too, that with the United
States. Great Britain and Japan set
ting a further example in the mat
ter OF naval limitation the govern
ments of France and Italy may revise
their earlier decision that naval limita-
tion must go hand in hand with and
depend upon land and air limitation.
Suggestion of three-power confer
ence. since the five-power proposal fell
through, has been in the air, and
sentiment in favor of such a confer
/ ence apparently has crystallized in
Great Britain and Japan as well as in
the United States.
A three-power naval pact, covering
cruisers and other auxiliary craft, en-
tered into by the United States, Great
Britain and Japan, obviously would
not look to reduction in the present
strength and building programs. With
France and Italy outside the agree.
ment and at liberty to build cruisers.
submarines, etc., in any number they
desire, the likelihood of a reduction
by Great Britain is infinitesimal. The
most that could be expected would be
an agreement allowing Great Britain
It's present large cruiser strength, with
perhaps an increase therein.
In an agreement Of this character
the United States would claim the
right to as large naval force as that
Of Great Britain. unless the sentiment
of the country has changed nightly
In the years since the Washington
arms conference. In plain English,
the United States by such an agree.
ment would be committed to a great
cruiser-buiiding program. There would
be no compulsion upon this country to
enter such building program, it Is
true. But once a ratio for cruisers,
equal TO that accorded Great Britain,
has been established there will be in
sistent demands that the ratio be
lived up to. Paradoxically, the three
power naval Limitation conference
might give a big impetus to naval
construction in the United States.
1t appears quite clear from all re-
ports from Europe that Great Britain
will look with disfavor on any pro-
posal for scrapping her own cruisers
or other auxiliary craft-save SUBJ
marines, which she would like to have
entirely eliminated from modern
nayies. With France outside the con.
ference submarines would not be re-
duced. Japan's attitude, too, is against
reduction of her present naval
strength. The United States, at. Ge-
neva, will have no cruisers to scrap;
will be in no position to make the
generous offer OF the Washington con-
ference. This Government is learning
that it 10 easier to scrap its own naval
vessels than 1t is to persuade foreign
governments to scrap theirs.
The utmost that could come from a
|. three.power naval treaty would be a
limitation, not a reduction in naval
strength. But should there come from
such an agreement the copstruction
of a United States Navy which would
equal in all branches that of Great
Britain a new situation might arise
internationally: A combination of the
British and american naval powers
would be unassaiiable.