Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-07-31

Washington regarding the
NV evident breakdown OF the
Geneva conference contin-
ues to be policy of watch
ful waiting until the outcome is def
nitely established, there is. no doubt,
of the feeling on the part Of those who
have been advocating a naval building
program that the United States is
passing through the final stage of dis
illusionment which had its inception
after the Washington conference.
Frow now on it is felt here that naval
building will come in for and continue
to hold a prominent position in the
spotlight of national affairs. beginning
with the next session of Congress.
Regardless of whether the confer
Ance ends successfully or whether the
failure already forecast materializes
or whether an adjournment may be
adopted as an eXpedient to resort to
secret diplomacy in an effort to ac-
complish what open conferences evil
IDENTIFY have failed to accomplish, it
Is emphasized by those interested in
bringing the American Navy up TO
standard that naval building
program can be delayed no longer.
Realizing that the American Navy has
fallen woefully behind the naval forces
arms conference. the administration
policy has been to delay the adoption
or building program until the out
come at Geneva. This did not mean
that ii the United States was success
ful in putting through its own pro-
gram at Geneva there would be no
more building. 1t meant, on the other
hand, that the extent of this building
program would be determined at
Geneva. II there is failure at
Geneva, as all indications point to
now, there will be no reason to longer
delay, it is pointed out. The question
then will be strength of the American
Navy in auxiliary craft. and whether
the United States will seek parity
with other nations or choose the size
of its Navy Independent of other ma
tons.
British Propose Huge Program.
The final British proposals, if &C.
cepted by the United States, and if
the United States chose to achieve
the parity therein outlined, would re-
quire an estimated expenditure of
$4O0,00O,000 in cruisers alone by this
country. Under the same proposals,
Instead OF scrapping any of her exist.
ing auxiliary armament in which she
10 far superior, even Great Britain
would build additional vessels. This
policy is in marked contrast, 1t is
pointed out, to the altruistic attitude
OF the United States in connection
with the Washington arms confer
Ance, when the United States, superior
IN batfieships, strapped some 500 900
tons OF f1ne vessels built or building
in order to cut down her armament
to meet the parity agreed upon with
Great Britain
The question TO confront Congress
In connection with the Navy's needs
10 whether to catch up with the other
nations which have been busiIy at
work in auxiliary naval vessel con-
structlon since the Washington con.
ference. or to decide upon a naval
strength in auxiliary craft regardless
of the ships of other navies. and
maugurate a program designed to
meet that strength.
Since the Washington conference
the United States Government, with
the nope that limitation in auxiliary
craft would be extended comparable
to the limitation in battleships agreed
upon then, has done little building.
Great Britain. France. italy and
Japan, however, have been steadily
at work. Each has had its own pro
gram.
Status OF u. q. in Cruisers,
The status today of the American
Navy IN cruisers, the type of vessel
that proved tina stumbling block AT
Geneva, is as follows: Two cruisers
OF the I0,000.ton type are now build.
ing, and ak more OF this TYNE hava
peen appropriated for. Ten cruisers