Evening star., 1927-05-08
HOPE FOR NAVAL LIMIT
IS REGARDED AS SLIGHT
Observers See Little Promise of Sue.
cess at Coming Three-POwer
Conference at Geneva.
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.

tn HE recent and practically com
-cte failure -of the Geneva
Conference witch was de
Il signed to prepare the way for
a general disarmament meet
/ ing has obvious bearing upon the
| Anglo-Japanese gathering
| which is TO assemble in Geneva next
month. And it is at least worthy of
/ passing notice that in certain quar-
ters the proposal of this conference
of three is made responsible for the
! fiasco of the larger assembly.
On the surface one must recognize
/ frankly that there is little real prom
| Use of definite achievement in the
| forthcoming meeting. On the 'Ameri-
can side there is, speaking of the
| Nation generally, little clear percep-
ton of the issues at stake.
| There is no chance of any reduc-
| tion of naval ornaments at the
| Geneva meeting. 1t is possible-just
| possible-that agreement can be
reached uron the question of cruiser
tonnage But this agreement viii
rest upon the understanding that
Great Britain, Japan and the United
States will accept a certain maximum
Of cruiser strength beyond which .all
three will agree not to build. Here
is the possibility of avoiding compe-
tition for the future.
Not Expected to Agree.
On the other hand. one may start
| with the assumption that the British
and the Japanese will not agree to
any reduction # their actual cruiser
tonnage. Both are vastly stronger
than are we. Thus the method by
which eq':ality is TO be arrived at will
be simply the adoption of a rela-
| lively large program of cruiser con-
struction on the part of the United
States.
The British will not agree to re-
| duce their present cruiser tonnage
for the simple reason that all British
expert opinion agree that the present
figure represents the minimum of
safety. For a country which is de-
| pendent upon the outside world for
it's food, which lives by what it sells
abroad and by the food it buys in
return, it is matter of life and death
to keep the sea lanes open. 1t must
have a certain number OF cruisers in
the Mediterranean. others in the At
lantic, still others in the Indian Ocean
and the Pacific.
British Problem Different.
The British problem is wholly diff
| ferent from the American. We are
not concerned with insuring our eX-
istence by the importation of food,
nor is our export trade, great and
| growing as it is. a question of first
| moment. Our fleet exists to defend
our coasts and to preserve communi-
cation with certain outlying posses
| sions; to defend the Panama Canal.
Hawaii and Porto Rico: to keep open
/ hn
| All these things are important. but
none is to be compared with the de-
| tails Of the British problem.
/ We shall be met at Geneva, there
| fore, by the perfectly frank statement
on the part of the British that they
are ready to concede our right to eX-
| pand our cruiser strength up to theirs.
| That means in practice to construct
/ anywhere from 10 to 20 new cruisers
| The question of equality will be
worked out by experts and the results
will be established. Then it will be
| for Congress to provide the money
| for this relatively enormous expan-
| sion, if the country desires it.
Would Avoid Expansion.
The diff atty is that the country
| has very generally the idea that in
some way this expansion of the Amer
! lean cruiser strength can be avoided
| by the Geneva conference. There is
a rather hazy recollection of the fact
| that at the Washington conference
the United States. which had a pros
| pective superiority in battleships,
agreed to scrap down to equality with
| Britain and to SIS ratio with Japan.
Thus the American people quite gem
orally look to the Japanese and the
| British to make a corresponding ges-
ture now.
In reality. not only is there no such
possibility, but while the British are
prepared to permit us to build up to
their present strength, the Japanese
are by no means ready to accept in
cruisers the 5-3 ratio which they did
take in battleships. Thus we are
faced with the fact that at Geneva
Japan NAV come forward and demand
that the present ratio in cruisers be
maintained, which would give Japan
superiority, or that equality between
America and Japan be established,
which would mean permanent Ameri-
can inferiority in the face of Britain.
The real weakness of the American
case lies in the fact that by accident
we have arrived at the position in
which the French and Italians found
themselves at the Washington confer
ence. Both nations had. perforce,
neglected their navies during the war.
Both were far below the relative
strength of the prewar period.
How Ratio Originated.
Nevertheless, when BRAND came to
Washington both the British and the
Americans insisted that the French
should accept as a basis for limita-
tion the strength which they actually
possessed. Here was the origin of the
5-5-3-1.75-1.75 ratio as between Amer
lea, Britain. Japan, France and Italy.
1t amounted to stabilization at the
point at which France and Italy
stood When the French suggested
that they be permitted to build above
existing strength there was loud pro-
test in America and Britain.
But today we are at least as weak
in the matter Of cruisers with respect
of Britain and Japan as France was ,
before the three great naval powers
in 1921. And all that the Japanese
have to do to give the American rep
resentatives a very bad quarter of an
hour is to insist that existing strength
be made the basis for permanent limi-
tation. This would mean that Britain
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