Evening star., 1927-08-14
GENEVA FAILURE CALLED
THIRD SETBACK FOR u. S.
Simonds Says American Delegates Threw
Away Their Best Cards at All
Parleys on Disarmament.

nifty cruisers where We had ten. More.
over. legally. there was nothing which
could possibly be urged against this
situation
Two courses were now open. We
might build the parity with the
British; in fact. of course. we could
outbuild them, both legally and be.
cause We had the money. But to do
this would destroy President
Coolidge's economy program. The
only other course was TO ask for a
new conference and try TO persuade
the British to abandon their sdvan-
tage, which meant in practice per-
suading them to abandon new con.
structions and scrap a certain amount
of relatively old tonnage. We had.
roughly speaking, 100, 900 tons OF
modern cruisers built and building.
They had above $50 600.
Parity and Economy.
But what had We to offer in ex.
change? Or what weapon Of coercion
could we employ? Patiently none.
Moreover our delegation was at all
times hamstrung by the fact that It
was advocating not one but two pTin-
ciples, 1t stood fcr parity and economy.
Parity was always obtainable with or
ference it was always possible 10 OBJ
tain agreement that the United States
should have equal tonnage in all
branches of naval craft.
But such parity involved the con-
struction of at least 800 900 tons Of
new cruisers. Such a program was
at once a mockery from the stand.
point of economy and of limitation.
Yet all our delegates could do was to
advocate the principle Of limitation
and quote the words of Mr.. Balfour
at Washington, which represented
British acceptance of parity in all
branches while we had superiority in
the fighting branch. We had. let it I've
conceded. pretty good moral argu-
ments, but we had no cards. We had
nothing to offer. We had flung away
our real resource at Westinghouse
had scrapped our capital ship tonnage.
We might threaten to build, but that
would take time, and our British as
sociates might we'll conclude that the
American people would in the end
refuse to spend the money.
F.om these three experiences or
Paris. Washington and Geneva It
seems to me a simple and inevitable
conclusion must be drawn. In inter
national negotiations it is not enoul h
To have national sentiment united and
insistent. In addition. it Is not only
essential to have power. but TO use II
while it is still valid. At Washington
we could have obtained cruiser parity
because we had battleship superiority
TO trade with. In 1917, before we en-
tered the war, we could have laid down
almost any reasonable terms as ths
price Of our cooperation, because IL
spelled victory for the allies. But wa
could not in Paris in 1919 use ths
power we had failed to employ in 1917.
nor at Geneva that which we had not
applied at Washington in 1922.
True Basis for Agreement.
Equality with Great Britain in every
branch of naval craft is always possi-
BILE for us. We have only to build to
obtain it. But equality with economy
was always impossible after Mr..
Hughes agreed to scrap battleshipS
while permitting the British to keep
their superiority in cruiser tonnag9
and even to expand il at will. Limita.
ton will be possible when we confront
the British with choice between our
superiority and equality on our terms.
1t never was and never will be posi-.
bic on any other basis.
rom an american SldfiupulHl, II
seems to me the Geneva Conference
represents a real step forward dipio-
matically by contrast with Paris and
Washington. For the first time the
practical American interests we're not
sacrificed to personal or political con-
siderations Ambassador Gibson and
Admiral Jones confined themselves TO
the business in hand The illusion OF
success did not cover the reality OF
failure. and we know after the con-
ference where we stand.
Whether as a matter OF high policy
it would not have been wiser for the
British to have shown themselves
bit more yielding is a question for de-
bate. Certainly il they are interested
in any. future revision of the debt set
tlement, they hardly hastened that
happy day by taking line which i'm.
poses vast new expenses upon the
American people for naval cOnstruc-
tion. But that was patiently for them
to decide.
Having the power in 1921.29, We
failed to employ it. Having the same
power in 1927. the British used 1t
fully and freely. They could not pre-.
vent parity in the long run-and
they did not attempt that. They
could. however. prevent limitation
limitation as Americans see 1t, and
they did. We shall pay now in the
cost of new construction because Mr..
Hughes consented TO scrap our battle
ship tonnage in 1922 without get
ting cruiser limitation. At Washing.
ton we gave away something for
nothing; at Geneva the British stand.
point was nothing for nothing.
Cost of Parity.
Geneva does not represent a failure
of American diplomacy; it only repre-
sents the liquidation of the Washing.
ton failure. At last the truth Is dis.
closed: the fact and the cost OF the
blunder are apparent. We know
where we are. Moreover. at the pre-
else moment that London perceiyes
that Washington is serious and the
American people mean to have parity
and are ready to pay the price, we
shall get limitation on rational lines.
What we shall not get. now or later.
is limitation with economy. To re-
strict, it is necessary to expand; to
get disarmament, ii is necessary 10
Increase ornaments. There is the
paradox, which happens
TO be cotemporary truth as we'll.
(CopyriSht 1877
Mining Meerschaum.