Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-07-24

peril 10 friendly relations
wv between the two peoples.
there would have been
something we'll nigh comic
in the long drawn out quarrelings
and chickering's of the Geneva Naval
Conference. Despite the truth, ac-
cepted on both sides of the Atlantic,
that war between the United States
and Great Britain is utterly unthink-
able, alike for moral and material
reasons, weeks were occupied in the
bitterest kind of battle to maintain
equality or promote superiority as be-
tween the fleets of the two countries
Laying aside all question of the
relative justice of the two theses
maintained, one is bound to recognize
that the early British tactics ignored
two fundamental facts, which were in
the end likely to be controlling. The
first of these facts was that parity
between the British and American
fleets was only at American pleasure.
The second was that the American
people felt uncomfortably that in
some fashion they had paid for
equality at Washington, and it had
escaped them. They were therefore
bound to insist upon it at Geneva
and view with suspicion any real or
cNCH apparent u DIcNcHL IL
On the side of power, no one can
mistake the fact voiced by Lord Grey
of Falloden that given American
wealth, given the comparative popu-
lation of the United States and of
Great Britain and North Ireland
which would have to bear the costs of
naval expansion, finally given the
condition of the national debts, reve-
nues and prosperity of the two ma
tons, it is out of the question to
imagine that Britain could retain
parity, if the American people ever
made up their minds that for any
reason they desired the supreme navy.
u. S. Has Power.
Equality on American terms was
and is, in the nature of things, the
best the British can hope for. And
in this situation it was clearly the
counsel of craftsmanship to avoid
any course which might eXasperate
American opinion already sensitive
and suspicious and thus precipitate a
building race which could have but
one end. In the last analysis power
determines and power since the war
has belonged to us. We may not
need the naval strength we ask for,
our claims may be unreasonable and
our spirit imperialistic, all this is at
least arguable, but in the premises
irrelevant.
Nevertheless the British Admiralty,
which at all stages dominated the
British delegation at the Geneva Con-
ference, viewed the meeting not as d
discussion but as a battle in which it
was the mission of the British repre-
sentatives to retain British superior
ity, not in principle but in fact. Thus
a whole number of technical proposals
were advanced, all of which tended to
acquire or retain advantages for Bri-
tain which bore no relation to the
actual question of parity.
To prolong the life of battleships by
five years was to give the British
navy. with the Rodney and the
Nelson, st-Jutland ships, superior
ity to anything in our battle-line, five
years more of actual supremacy dur
ing a period of nominal equality in
battleships. The proposal to reduce
the caliber of armament on cruisers
from eight to six inch guns was to
give the British with their enormous
merchant fleet available for use in
war an incalculable advantage in
fact, even if in theory cruiser strength
were matched ton for ton.
Stirred British Surprise.
These proposals would have been in
admissible on the American side in
any situation, but they were precisely
calculated in the existing state of
mind of the American people to start
a protest and invite charge of I'M
fairness, which came promptly and a.
once stirred British surprise and re-
sentiment. Agreeing that there was
nothing morally reprehensible in this
British course, it is still essential to
perceive how bad it was psychologist
cally, since it angered that people
which in the last resource had the
power.
The whole cruiser controversy was
equally futile and just as bad
strategy. Broadly speaking, the Brit
ish have today around 100000 tons of
cruisers laid down or planned. Three
quarters, at least, are we'll under
10000 tons and the majority around
5000 or even less. This is due to the
fact that Britain needs many cruisers
because of her sea lanes and her
is exactly adjusted to British require
ments.
The United States, on the contrary.
has, at the moment, only $4,000 tons
of cruisers Of $500 tons and two of
10 900 nearly complete, with six or
eight more authorized but not yet ap-
for; these latter are to be
of 10000 tons. This size is for us
not only best but almost obligatory,
because, while British naval bases
are many and close together, ours are
few and widely separated. In pro-
posing equality in cruiser tonnage,
our delegates proposed that we should
build up to the level the British pos
sess and since the original proposal
Of 100000 tons involved a certain
amount of British scrapping. the COM
promise figure of 100000 was ad-
Views OF Peoples.
But It was clearly indicated that
our building would be largely con-
fined to the 1O0O0-ton type. We
should then have. perhaps. twenty-five
10 ,000-ton cruisers and ten 7.500-ton.
The British would have some thirteen
10 ,000.ton cruisers and the balance of |
their tonnage would be in smaller |
types. Both navies would thus be |
based upon the views of the respective ,
peoples as to their needs.
But patiently, if we had twenty-five !
10, 000.ton cruisers and the British only !!
half that number, we should have ac- |
ual superiority not in tonnage but in |
power in the cruiser branch of our |
1eet. Since, however, it is universally |
conceded that the fleets were not de- I
signed to fight each other, this was of |
little real Importance, so far as the |