Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-06-12
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

II IlOnS conference. WHICH OpSIS |
the coming week, the first essen
i tial is to establish the points of
view of the several nations which
will be represented Obviously all
three nations, Japan, Great Britain
and the United States, while meeting
to consider the question of the limi-
tation Of naval ornaments, must ap-
proach the question from totally diff
ferent standpoints, because the prob
lens of each are, while equally vital,
quite dissimilar.
For Great Britain the first con-
sideration will be the question of rec.
onciling British concerns with the
primary British policy, which is to
expand and cement Anglo American
friendship. But these British con-
Germs must be carefully reckoned on
our side of the Atlantic. The British |
fleet has two very clear purposes,
neither of which relates to the Ameri-
can. The very difficulty of the dis
cussion lies in the fact that while the |
United States is concerned solely |
with establishing a basis of equality |
with Great Britain. Britain is occu
pied exclusively with French, Italian |
and Japanese navies.
British Position Explained.
Thus at the outset the British stand
on the principle that although their |
cruiser strength exceeds ours by per-
haps three to one, it is impossible for
them to reduce this tonnage, because
it represents the minimum of safety
for their great merchant marine and
their vastly extended sea lanes. in
the presence of the French, Italian
and Japanese navies. BY contrast
the British have disclosed every
willingness to agree that the United
States should increase it's cruiser
strength to the British level and that
the two countries should agree upon
total tonnage which would fix equal
ity and abolish all chance of futile
competition.
The British cannot. then, on their
own estimate, afford to reduce cruiser
strength. Their feet is designed to
cover the long sea lanes leading
French and italian war fleets are con-
centrated, and the equally exposed
lanes which represent their communi-
cations with India, Australia and New
Zealand, as well as with China.
By contrast the British are prepared
to accept and even to advocate the re-
duction not in the total of tonnage
but in the individual tonnage of cruis-
| ers. Just as the battleship was re-
duced to $4,000 tons as a standard size
at Washington and the cruiser to 49,
900, they are now in favor of bringing
cruiser tonnage to 1000 or even 5000.
But the reason for this policy must be
appreciated. Once more it is deter
mined by national interests.
Great Naval Bases Created.
Along her great sea lanes Britain
| has created a large number of naval
bases, Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus in
! the Mediterranean, Alden in the Red
| Sea, Colombo in Ceylon, Singapore at
the Straits and Hongkong in China.
Thus the steaming radius of her cruis-
ers can be fixed with relation to these
relatively close bases. And, of course,
the size of cruiser will primarily be
fixed by the steaming radius neces-
Sary.
Over against this particular British
situation, which is not dissimilar from
the japanese. since all Japanese in
terests are confined to waters not far
removed from the Japanese mainland,
must be set the American problem. In
the Pacific Hawaii is very far from
San Francisco, and beyond Hawaii the
Philippines are not only distant, but,
as consequence Of the Washington
conference treaties, we are forbidden
to fortify either Guam or any Philip
pine base. Thus our cruisers must
rely upon themselves for fuel both out
md back in case of war.
For the United States, the British
and japanese thesis of a reduction in
size of cruiser is just as inadmissable
as the American thesis of reduc-
ton In total cruiser tonnage is for
both of these countries.
Same Difference Separates.
In principle, at least. precisely the
same difference separates Britain on
the one hand and America and
Japan on the other, in the matter Of
submarines. For Britain the subma-
rine is a menace. 1t has no value
as a defensive weapon, because the
British problem is not one of attack
either upon the merchant marine or
the war fleets of any possible enemy.
To bring about the abolition of the
submarine as legitimate weapon of
naval warfare would be, therefore,
greatly to increase British naval Sc
curity without weakening in the least
the value of her war fleet.
Japan and the United States. on
the other hand, see in the submarine
a weapon which is useful in the ex-
IRENE. Both countries might have to
consider attacks by hostile fleets,
both would have to count upon the
submarine as a weapon against en-
envy merchant marine. In brief, the
naval experts of both countries agree
upon the principle that the subma-
rine Is in the face of national prob
lens quite as necessary a detail of
naval armament as the cruiser itself.
Here, then, one comes to an obvious
impasse.
Agree on Submarine Need.
Nor is it less clear that while
France and Italy seem unlikely to
take active part in the discussions,
both are equally agreed on the use
fulness and necessity of the subma-
rine in the face of their own prob
lens.
When one turns to the Japanese
problem it is peculiar. Japan has no
present idea of any offensive opera ,,
ton directed against either the
United States or Great Britain. Nor
is her fleet today organized for OPP
erations against British India, Aus |
tralia, or for that matter, the |
Philippines. Japanese interests lie in |
Asia and on the mainland of Asia. |
Her naval problem is exclusively one |
of defending and increasing her own |
security and therefore her own SUI |
premacy within the narrow waters |
which now and probably for a long |
future will occupy her attention.
At Washington japanese policy was |
clearly disclosed. At that time Japan |
consented to accept a ratio in battle |
ships of to in the face Of both |
Britain and the United States, which |
patiently reduced her offensive power |
in the battle line. But at the same |
time aS a counter condition che az |
tracted from the United States the |
promise to refrain from terrifying the |
Philippines. Guam and the Aleutian |
Islands. BY doing this she in fact |
rendered an attack upon her own |
homeland. IL not quite impossible. for |
all practical purposes out of the ques.
ton.