Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-01-30

allow time for China to fulfil those
conditions. The reason why that
most admirable agreement was not
embodied i'm a treaty which might by
now be in effect Is that the Chinese
delegates to the conference vanished
into "thestall timber" on the occasion
of the coup at Picking in April, 1925.
Apparently Mr.. Porter is for per-
hitting Chinese tariff autonomy to
take effect at once without conditions.
+ Mr.. kellogg IL, no doubt advisedly,
non-committal In that connection. He
says: THE Government of the United
States Is ready to continue the nego-
tiations on the entire subject of the
tariff and exrraterritoriality or to take
up negotiations on behalf of the
United States alone. The only Ques-
ton Is with whom it shall negotiate.
IL China can agree upon the appoint
ment of delegates representing the au-
thorities or the people of the country,
we are prepared to negotiate such a
treaty"
/ There's the rub. With whom are
you going TO, negotiate? Champion
ship of the integrity of China is per-
haps the most firmly established. as
It is perhaps the most creditable. fea-
ture OF our foreign policy. At present
government and the. Nationalist or
WI Chang government claims to
speak for all China, Neither claim,
apparently, Is admitted by our Govern.
ment, and, indeed, neither claim is
properly admissible. What prospect,
then, Is there of negotiation consistent
with our cherished policy until one
or the other claim has been made
good?
The suggestion has been advanced
OF conference between an American
| commission and a. commission made
up equally of delegates OF the Picking
| and WI Chang governments; the
conferees to draw up a treaty as be-
| tween our Government and the gov
eminent yto-be of all China, our Gov
| eminent to pledge itself to offer the
treaty to thai government upon its
establishment; the conferees also to
draw up Identical agreements to gov.
ern the relations between our Govern
ment, and the Chinese governments,
respectively, Of north and south, to
continue effective pending the decision
of their conflict and to embody as
much by way of concession as present
conditions may allow. M% a
But the question asks itself: Can we
successfully play lone hand? Would
| negotiations between China and the
| United States alone prosper were they
conditioned as indicated in the follow
ing PARAGRAPH of Mr.. Kellogg's state
| ment?
THE United States" says Mr..
Kellogg, would expect that it be
granted most favored nation treat
ment and that there should be no
discrimination against the United
| States and it's citizens In customs
duties or taxes In favor of the citizens
Of other nations or discrimination by
grants of special privileges"
No doubt there WILDE two minds in
| Congress as TO reputation of the
/ concert of the powers respecting
| China; an association to which so.
many fragrant memories cling.
can but touch the fringe Of a vast
| subject We may expect a great de-
| bate In both Houses. .f#
The long -drawn.out negotiation be-
tween Eugene Chen, foreign minister
| of the Nationalist or. WI Chang gov
eminent, and Counselor O'Mafiey OF
| the British legation at Picking con-
ktinues The British establishments at
| Hankow reopened for business on
| Januaryf24 It is plausible interpre-
tatior that 1t was hoped this action
/ might impress MIR. Chen as mag
unanimous gesture of confidence and
conciliate him. Perhaps il had that
effect, but if so, IL was probably 81
! good deal more than offset by the
action Of the British government in
| ordering considerable military and
!! naval reinforcement to Shanghai.
/ IA division or British troops Of very
especial composition, without the
regular divisional artillery. but with
pack artillery, ar1nored cars and air
planes has been ordered to Shanghai.
1T is to be known as the Shanghai de-
Tense force and numbers about Il 600.
That was q desperate decision the
British government had to make;
whether or no, taking long view.
British interests would best be served
by sending q force adequate to the
| defense Of the Shanghai international