Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-02-27

European approval for the project
also arises from many causes. Yet
In the last analysis the reason must
be found in the steady refusal OF our
own Government to accept or even
to recognize the European point of
view, not merely with reference to
ornaments, but also as to the League
Of Nations itself.
In the United States there is the
conviction that the way to disarm is
to disarm-that the problem of limi-
tation Of ornaments is simple and
arithmetical. In the naval field all
that seems necessary is some chorus
expressing the idea of community in
reduction. Since neither the method
nor the result find favor in Europe.
American opinion easily concludes
that the League of Nations, which
conducts the disarmament conference.
liz a. failure and that European profes-
sions are hypocr1tical.
Such views are not only possible,
but natural, for a country comfortably
seated behind the Atlantic and the
Pacific Ocean and between Canada
and Mexico. In this happy situation
American military and naval strength
is not based upon American foreign
policy. 1t only vaguely represents
American estimates of concrete dam
gers. It Is an insurance against pos
sible conflagration, but 1t is insur'
ance based upon a rate established py
accident and haphazardly.
Different in Europe.
| In Europe, on the contrary. arma-
ments are the disclosure Of fire risks
carefully estimated and scientifically
adjusted. Limitation Of ornaments
| involves the reduction of fire risks
| first. The rate of insurance will only
fall with the diminution of the risk.
And, in fact, as the prospect of peace
in Europe increases. the size OF ar
maments diminishes automatically
and proportionately. Therefore, all
| discussion of the limitation of arma-
ments resolves itself into an examina-
ton of the political circumstances on
| which they are based.
| Underlying the rejection OF the
Presidents latest proposal was the
| conviction that the political ADJUST
nent which must precede reduction
or limitation has not been made. To
| the French 1t seemed a characteristic
American attempt to persuade Europe
| to abandon the consideration of the
| foundation and start building at the
ground floor.
President Coolidge's program thus
represented a new American effort to
bring Europe to deal with its own
complex and intricate problems as II
they were simple and separable.
Moreover. 1t was resented because 1t
came from the country which has
rigidly refused to share in the at
1 Of I10 anli fnn1
problems which must precede the mil
itary or the naval. America asked
Europe to drop the general problem
and deal only with the detail which
interested it.
In the larger sense the disarmament
conference which is now in progress
at Geneva will not reach decisions. 1t
| is not a conference called for the ex-
press purpose Of settling an issue and
Rdjourning. In one form or another
| It Is likely to continue for many years.
Nor will it's decisions be based upon
investigations and agreements reached
primarily in conference on the shores
Of Lake Geneva.
Variations i'm Program.
On the contrary the relation Of such
a conference to the European system
is rather like the march of the mer-
curry in barometer. 1t will show the
change in weather in Europe. All the
agreements which may be made will
follow automatically from political or
psychological changes which have
taken place. Each will represent a
vast system Of intricate balancings.
and st all times the political circum-
stances will be the dominating.
With the United States. naval lin
itation Is a question Of economy and
OF morals. 1t Is a method of saving
money and It is hailed as an evidence
Of readiness to contribute to the cause
Of peace. But this Is the case simply
because there Is no real sense of dan |
ger or apprehension in the American |
mind and the reduction or limitation |
does not arouse popular dread of in |
vasion.
In Europe the situation is, of course,
different. Under the shadow of the |
League, making use not Of the ma
chinery OF the League, but Of the idea
OF the League, there is growing up
habit OF compromise. The people of
Europe are becoming accustomed to
the idea that their statesmen must go
to Geneva and reach an agreement I
with those Of other nations. More and
more Geneva is becoming the political
center Of Europe.
@<S06 &OB ny LhAS IlutC, Has dC-
CURED a prestige which leaves It utter
ly unconcerned with the American at
ttude. The entrance of Germany
made 1t the center of the contemporary
European political system. 1t resents
the American attitude, quite naturally
But American prestige and power do
not affect It. Moreover. it represents
a Europe which Is today profoundly
anti-Amerfcan in all its deeper senti.
rAn 4
'ings are discoverable in Geneva also.
Concepts Of League.
The great evolution which has taken
place in Europe, so far as the League
is concerned, Is that the Geneva body
has become, not the expression of any
moral enthusiasm, but the mechanism
Of q political experiment. In America
the League has been not a practical
but an ideal conception. 1t expressed
a moral and evangelical explosion pro-
duced by the war. 1t had not deep
foundation in American necessities. be-
cause while 1t was a dream to make
the world better, for the United States
the existing world was neither intol- !
cradle nor unpleasant. Ii
In Europe, by contrast. the League
in the early years enlisted no en- ,
thusiasm and little support. 1t was I
regarded as an American idea with
little European application. The first
practical accession to the League came
with the perception by the statesmen |
Of the smaller nations that it offered |
them an opportunity which had never {
before existed to make their voices {
heard and collectively to make their
strength felt. Between 1920 and 1924 I
none of the great powers sent consid.
cradle men to Geneva and the prime ,
ministers and foreign ministers were |
never present. IL
Eaak NTH TIA a. j,