Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-01-16

the demand in many directions for an
other conference such as took place In
Washington six years ago. Not a few
Americans of prominence have made
public statements urging that any
building program. which might have
the appearance of new competition in
naval ornaments. be postponed against
such an event
But is such conference possible or
even feasible? There are very grave
reasons to doubt it. These reasons.
too, lie very deeply in the European
consciousness. 1t may fairly be
doubted, for example, if any pressure
which the United States Government
could bring in Paris, or even in
Rome, would have the smallest influ-
ence upon either capital at the present
hour. Nor is there any real reason
for expecting more from London.
The truth is that the reasons for
the European attendance upon the
Washington conference and the new
view of its results held on the other side
of the Atlantic have been little weighed
In the United States. Europe did not
come readily and willingly to the 1921
meeting because 1t was primarily in.
terested in the immediate question at
issue. 1t came for a very much more
considerable purpose.
Wanted L. S. Assistance.
That purpose was to persuade the
United States to return to Europe. In
1921 there was still no general accept.
ance in Europe of the idea that the
decision of the American people, as
disclosed by the rejection of the
treaties by the Senate and the later
results of the presidential election,
was more than a passing circum-
stance having its explanation in do
nestle political matters.
The British were obviously eager to
reach any agreement which would
obviate the ultimate supremacy of the
American battle fleet. But the fleet
was not menace to them. They
were, too, well aware of the growing
protest in Congress and in the coun-
try against the enormous expense
incident to completing the naval
program made during the excitement
of the war period.
In the same fashion. the British
were equally eager to get rid of the
Japanese alliance, which had served
its turn and was no longer needed
since the destruction of the Germa n
fleet had relieved them of the menace
In the North Sea and of necessity to
concentrate all their battle heet in
the north. This eagerness was due
In its turn to the protest which the
Domln1ons, notably Australia and
New zealand, were making against
such combination.
But the British were as usual sat.
isfied that time was working for them
and the limitations which reached
London in the early Summer that the
Harding administration would like a
conference enlisted attention and won
approval for the very much more
impressive reason that Lloyd George
and most of his countrymen believed
that there was a chance to bring
America back to Europe.
Big Preparations Made.
1t was to this end that the MANY
distinguished British journalists all
set out on their famous journey to
discover America. 1t was for this
purpose that Lord Balfour, as the
ablest and most skillful of British
statesmen diplomats, was, much
against his will, conscripted for this
arduous task. 1t was to this end that.
from the British side. the whole con.
ference was conducted.
To appreciate this point it is es-
sentIal to recognize what was the
situation at the moment in E,urope
Inc British and French had come 10
an open quarrel over repara tions.
The French, angry at the loss of their
security, consequence of the Ameri-
can rejection of the treaty, feeling
that the Germans had begun a cam
pa1gn to escape from the conse-
quences OF defeat, were beginning to
use force to coerce the recent enemy.
All British interest now, however,
was concentrated In Fastening a, re-
turn to normal conditions in Europe
This interest rested upon the solid
basis that only by such restoration
could Britain exist. The war had in.
hlcted terrible losses upon all British
economic and commercial life. There
was vast and growing unemployment.
and the single remedy was the res.
toration of the purchasing power Of
the world
If the French proceeded to use
force against Germany, then IL was
quite plain that chaos would continue
In Europe. There was nothing, how.
ever, which the British could do to
prevent the French. They had de-
modified their army. France was
supreme on the continent and she
was supported by all the succession
states. Poland, Czechoslovakia. Ru-
mania and Jugoslavia were all de-
pendent upon the French army for
existence. Belgium was in the sam me
case. Italy was negligible at that
moment.
Need of American Aid.
Unless the United States could be
persuaded to return to Europe, the
6o1y T. A.
FRANCE a guarantee of security. But
this guarantee was both unpopular in
Britain and in the dominions. The
people of the British Isles were now
race to face with the appalling conse-
quences OF the war, and were resolved
not TO be dragged into another CONT
mental mess. The dominions, after
their enormous sacrifices during the
war, We're equally opposed to any new
dangers.
Moreover, it must be recognized that
from the armistice onward all British
policy had centered about co-opera-
ton With America and in Euorpe. 1t
had been the unanimous view in Lon
don that II America were in Europe,
American and British interests would
be Identical and cooperation would be
inevitable. American aid to solve the
separations problem was only one of
many departments In which we were
needed.
In reality the defeat and disarma-
ment of Germany had put France in
position in Europe she had not occu.
pied since the time of Napoleon. I'm
less American aid were Forthcoming.
French supremacy In Europe could
not be challenged. Ultimately French
financial weakness might, as it did,
- - d. 4.
time Europe might be wrecked and
British prosperity postponed indeh-
nitely.
The French on their side were per-
fectly aware of the fact that the
Washington conference was to be a |
trial of strength between themselves
and the British, The Anglo French |