Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-01-16
NEW NAVAL FARLEY HERE
is HELD HIGHLY UNLIKELY
Europe Has Nothing to Expect in Ex-
change for Further Cut, Says
Analyst of Situation.

battle between the Americans and the
British and that they would acquire
American sympathy and support by
taking the American side.
View Taken by Hughes.
All the other European countries
sent delegations here perfectly pre-
pared to- see the inevitable Anglo
French duel. Mr.. Hughes, on the con-
trary, viewed the whole affair as
merely a disarmament conference. He
paid little attention to the European
phase. The result was that before he
was aware of what was happening he
had been placed in the situation of a
British ally.
Before the conference was a month
old the French had decided that the
battle of Washington was lost; that
the British had been successful in
enlisting American support. Tsslt the
fatal consequence of this French feel
| ing was that power still remained in
| the French hands to wreck the con-
| ference If they chose. Since 1t had be-
come an Anglo-American love least.
moreover, the less permanent success
which it would have the better for
| them.
| As a consequence the French did
wreck all but the battleship agree
ment. In doing this they were salts
| fled they were making only legitt-
mate counter offensive to the British.
| They regarded Mr.. Hughes as the
dupe of Lord Balfour. They resented
| the part the Republican party had
| played in defeating the treaty, and
| they were enormously resentful of
| the loss of prestige which they had
/ suffered as n result of the cleverer
| British diplomacy.
When. however, the French had
blocked all progress beyond the ques-
| ton of battleships. then there came
| from London the gentle but pointed
| hint that the United States should
| come to an economic conference at
| Genoa. This was the real milk in
| the cocoanut. But Congress was by
| this time becoming uneasy. The
| 100000 majority against European
| entanglements of the previous cleo
| tions was still remembered. The Sen
ate was hostile to Mr.. Hughes. and
| the American Navy was now in arms
| against the sacrifices that had been
| imposed upon ii with no similar sur
/ renders on the part of the British.
Refused to Go to Genoa.
The Harding administration there
| fore refused to go to Genoa. This was
| the ruin of the whole British purpose
| at Washington. AS a result Lloyd
George had to go to Cannes a few
| weeks later and offer the French a
straight guarantee for their security.
But it was too late. BRAND had been
| so compromised by the failure Of the
| Washington conference and the
| French nation had become so thor
oughly aroused against Lloyd George
that while BRAND and George were
/ negotiating at Cannes there was a
| nOlitipaI fIohpa val in Paris
BRAND fell. and following this up
| heaval Poincare came to power. The
| Genoa conference was a fizzle.
| French and Italian support of the
| Turk led to Chanak and after Chanak
| Lloyd George was turned out Of Of
fee. Finally Poincare took the
French into the Ruhr and two years
more of anarchy and trouble followed
in Europe. In no small degree the
British economic troubles of the pres
ent hour are a consequence of this
delay in restoring peace in Europe.
When one turns to the question OF
a new Washington conference IL Is
clear that no European country can
now expect that it could lead to any
American return to Europe. There
is not even any present chance that
1t might lead to modification of our
debt policy What possible advan-
positive disadvantages?
The British have a very consider
able cruiser superiority They feel
that they need the number of cruis.
ers which they possess. They are
ready to agree to a ratio based upon
present comparative strength. But,
of course. the American Navy and
Government would not accept as per-
manent any such inferiority. The
1v-fN f-I. H.
United States should build up to the
British strength if it chooses. At
that point they would doubtless agree
to sterilization.
League of Nations Factor.
But there is no political or naval
advantage for them in a conference,
Moreover. they are associated with
the League of Nations in it's pending
discussion of the armament question.
If they should leave that conference
for an American meeting, their posi-
ton in Europe might be adversely af-
fected. For the League powers are
by no means friendly to any Ameri-
can attempt to interfere with issues
which are regarded as properly be.
longing to the Geneva Assembly.
The French are opposed to any
such conference. Their opposition
rests, first. upon their experience In
Washington six years ago. They re-
gard that as the demonstration of an
Anglo-Saxon willingness to cooperate
against them. They will not reduce
their marine strength, and they are
likely in the future to expand their
cruiser strength, since this is less ex-
pensive than battleship construction.
Moreover, the Italians are at pres
ent engaged in building up their
quiet matching of strength is going
on between the two Latin states. But
British cruiser strength is in part at
least conditioned upon Franco-Italian
naval power. Therefore, nothing
which happened at Washington could
affect their determination to keep a
SO ratio with respect Of both Italy
and France.
In. any Geneva meeting the French
are assured of the support of half
a dozen continental states. If they
were persuaded to come to Washing
ton they might find themselves alone,
unless, which is open to question, the
Italians made a common cause with
them. Nothing which happened at
Washington could benefit them, I'M
less promising them a better debt set.
Element were made the basis of their
attendance, which is impossible.
u. 5. Domestic Question.
The fact that the United States
must either accept very great In
feriority in cruisers or else embark
upon large program of naval ex-
pansion is a domestic problem which.
does not interest any European ma
ton. The fact that successful con.
ference would advantage the Coolidge
administration is a reason why every
European nation would, other things
being equal. stay away from it, In
view of the debt policy of the present