Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-01-09
IL. S. CRUISER STRENGTH
NO CONCERN TO BRITAIN
Like Japan, London Must Maintain Ger
tain Number, Regardless of Other
Navies, Says Observer.

detail in the convoy system, which
in the end defeated the German sub
marine campaign.
To persuade the British to consider
the reduction of their cruiser
strength would then be difficult, I'M
possible, IL IT were impossible at the
same time to persuade the Italians
and French to reduce their sub
marine strength-and that is abso-
lutely impossible. The prospect OF
an American cruiser fleet equal, even
superior, to the British In tonnage
would not in the smallest degree
affect British decision. for the
American fleet is not in this instance
prospective opponent and the
Italian and French are.
France May Add Cruisers.
Moreover, while both France and
Italy are at the moment still facing
financial problems which make large
naval constructions impossible. the
time is perhaps not remote when
both will be able to undertake new
cruiser programs. For France, with
her vast colonial empire and her
vital Mediterranean communications,
this is almost inevitable.
As a consequence, neither France
nor Italy is likely now to sign away
the right to a naval expansion which
both re gard as vital TO their inter-
ests. Neither has. too, any interest
in American strength. We may, IL
we choose. build not 10 but 40 cruis-
ers and Rome and Paris will re-
main undisturbed. 1t Is not the
American fleet which either Is
watching.
The brutal fact OF the situation Is
v1nfhfn0 UyhafAVAF tn
offer which would in any way in
fuence any of the European states
or Japan, for that matter-which
would either persuade or coerce them
into asserting to our views. They
are not ready to sacrifice their own
views to what seems to them no
more than an American effort TO
avoid the cost of naval expan-
sion.
Again. the very fact that we are
| a peaceful people and that. as
consequence no matter how large
our feet may become. 1t will not
| in all human probability menace any
people or threaten any of their vital
| interests, makes the size OF the
American fleet an academic question
| for all but professional naval minds.
| The situation for France. for ex-
| ample, WOulu D6 IdE uA1CACAAb ~ 4S9SAS
were to threaten an expansion OF
cruiser strength. France would then
have to build ship for ship or agree
to mutual limitation.
Europe Watched by Britain.
e. All negotiations attempted on the
| basis of the use of a. prospective pro-
gram of cruiser expansion will fail
because it Is an, empty threat. For
the British, the choice between Amer
lean equality In this branch and Brit
ish inferiority in the presence of
| continental dangers and world pertlS
to her lines Of communication can be
| foreeeen.
| OF course It is also perfectly true
that no European country would be
much interested in contributing to the
success of any American conference
at this moment, in view of American
policy with respect of the debts. All,
too, would see in the debt issue the
possible basis for trading. II in fact,
which is doubtful, they could be per-
suaded to come here at all. And, in
any event, they could bear with utter
equanimity the spectacle Of the Amer
lean taxpayer compelled to give UP
millions to create a cruiser feet which
did not in the least concern them.
In thinking of ornaments, general
ly, the American people are always
facing a theory, the European deal
ing with facts. The armament of
any European country, whether MILL
tary or naval. is based alike upon
political and technical circumstances.
1t bears a very direct relation to the
future. and the immediate and definite
future as each people sees It.
The American Army, for example,
exists. so far as 1t exists at all, as
sort of skeleton on which to build
a national army In time Of conflict.
Meantime the American Navy and
the width Of the two oceans insure
a period of time adequate to prepara-
ton, to the creation Of the national
Army. But to any specific question,
TO any dangers on the side Of Canada
or Mexico, the American military
strength has no relation.
French Army Necessities.
The French army. on the contrary.
is maintained in principle at that
minimum strength which will enable
1t at any moment to cover French
frontiers during the time which is re-
quired to mobilize the remaining
strength Of the nation. There must
be precisely that number OF divisions
which would be physically sufficient
ways and points of strategic inpor-
lance. either on the German or the
italian boundaries, or on both, II
dangers are to be feared from both.
When the question OF limitation Of
ornaments arises in the French
Chamber of Deputies. for example,
the mathematical standards have no
bearing. No matter what reductions
take place in remote nations. the
French strength must and will be
maintained at the figure which Will
moment of danger, to undertake to
bar access to the soil of France.
The British navy is in precisely the
same position. It's business Is to cover
the country during the period neces-
sary for the country TO arm. But COW
ertng the country does not merely
mean guarding 1t against invasion,
which Is the mission of the French
army. 1t also means insuring the
the guard of Britain can be under.
taken by the grand fleet, the insurance
OF communications must be the task
of the cruisers.
French military strength VIII not
be reduced because of any outside
pressure of admonition save as reduc.
ton still preserves the irreducible
minimum necessary Tor the task OF
covering French frontiers at the mo-
ment OF mobilization. The British
naval strength will not be reduced be-
low the point necessary to protect the
sea lines. And neither the French
army nor the British navy will be re-
duced with relation to American. be-
cause neither the American Army nor
the American Navy figures in those
which involve immediate
problems Of national defense.
Professional Naval Views.
It is perfectly true that professional
naval circles in Great Britain look with