Evening star., 1927-05-08

Nevertheless, il must be clear that
when the British come forward, as
they will. with the proposal to reduce
cruiser size, while actually they would
destroy the value of American cruis-
ers. on the surface they will seem to
be proposing limitation. and the
American delegation will stand con-
victed of opposing it. This circum-
stance is a fair example of the intri.
cacies of the whole subject.
But in the last analysis even greater
difficulties gro.y out Of circumstances
which lie outside the field of the new
conference. One of the chief missions
of the British secondary naval arma-
ment is to meet the submarine. AT
Washington the British frankly de-
clared that the reduction or limita'
iton of their cruiser tonnage must
depend upon the abolition of the sub.
marir' as a naval weapon, or at the
least upon its rigid restriction.
Rely on Submarines.
France, on the other hand. and
Italy as well, rely upon the subma-
rine as their main weapon of naval
defense. Even more, it represents
their chief instrument of political in
dependence. If the submarine were
prohibited, then the French and Ital-
ians would be quite helpless in the
presence of British sea power. For
financial reasons, they cannot build
battleships or cruisers in numbers
sufficient to make head against the
British.
AS long as France and Italy main
tain submarine fleets they can, after
all. speak as great powers in the face
of Britain. The war disclosed the eX-
treme menace Cf the submarine to the
British Isles. This potential weapon
gives France a standing which would
disappear were she to be forced TO
abandon the submarine or to accept
British limit on her tonnage.
Nevertheless, all British policy since
the war has been directed at having
the submarine banned. 1t is a nat
ural and utterly reasonable British
effort. But the effect would net be to
contribute to disarmament. but obv1-
ously, by removing the single chal'
lenge to British sea supremacy, to re-
store that mastery. Thus. paradoxi-
cally, as it may seem, the British fight
against the submarine is fight not
to establish a limitation of naval
armaments, but merely to insure the
old value to her own.
Moreover, American and British
views as to the submarine are quite
opposed. Just as we need 10,00O-ton
cruisers, our naval experts believe we
need the submarine. Thus we stood
with the French at Washington and
against the British on the submarine
question. At Geneva we shall be once
more condemned TO take a position
which will, on the surface, seem
against the disarmament when the
British bring up the submarine issue.
The real danger Of the Geneva
conference is then patent. Each or
the three great naval powers has
different problem in the matter OF sea
strength. Each has a. navy con-
structed TO meet the particular prob
lem. Only the United States, with
far less serious problem, has since the
Washington conference neglected Its
Navy and permitted it's cruiser
strength to become disproportionately
low. No. we are going to Geneva
with the perfectly patent purpose to
seek to persuade Japan and Britain TO
sacrifice existing strength to permit
us to avoid EXPENSIVE construction.
Naturally, Japan and Britain Will
decline any such invitation. In the
last analysis every nation will inva-
riablv insist upon being its own judge
of what it needs in the way OF self
defense.
Neither Fleet Is Menace.
Despite all the clamor of present or
past time, neither the British nor the
Japanese fleets are real. or even
theoretical. menace TO the United
States. And the American fleet is not,
as I have said. the single barrier be-
tween our people and starvation, as
the British, Is for example. for the
English people. Again, while British
cruiser strength is naturally based
upon French and Italian cruiser and
submarine tonnageS, neither OF these
have the remotest meaning for US,
since the Mediterranean sea lanes are
for us remote and without vital i'm
portance.
1t might we'll serve a useful pur-
pose if the United States, Great Brit
ain and Japan could agree upon MAXI
ma for their cruiser strength as they
have for their battleship tonnage.
This would eliminate any possibility
of competition in the future. although
the danger is actually slight. But the
trouble is that in reaching basis OF
agreement, both Japan and Britain
are in advance committed to figures
which can only compel very great
American expansion if we are TO
keep pace.
One must appreciate. too. that
nearly every continental nation re-
sents our intervention. which has pre-
the Geneva meeting. And in
this respect the South American ma
tions belonging to the League will &C.
lively share the continental point OF
view. Our whole activity, quite un-
fairly, TO be sure, will be interpreted
as a deliberate effort to injure the
League of Nations and to reduce its
usefulness.
Beyond, this, too. lies the enduring
suspicion of European powers
as to the purposes OF the
two great Anglo-SaXon nations,
which are also the two great sea pow
ers. Always there hovers in the back
ground of European political thought
the conception Of an Anglo-Saxon
hegemony based upon fleet and
finance. While we are at the moment
far more unpopular than the British
In Europe, the traditional suspicion Of
John Bull continues little abated.
Finally, Europe will watch very
closely to see whether the Geneva
meeting may not be made the basis
of some alliance between Britain.
America and Japan to meet the Chi
nese problem. European statesmen
believe that Britain made a great mis-
-ake in dropping the japanese alli-
ance, and this view is gaining ground
n Britain itself.
Singapore Is Problem.
Then there is the problem of Singa.
bore, the British base built to cover
Australia, India and New Zealand
tgainst Japan after the Washington
and bitterly resented by
he Japanese. Will the Japanese dele
rates at Geneva seek to make this
singapore issue a matter Of discussion
md bargaining?
Within the limits of the preserva-
ion of their navy at the strength re-
n rcled as essential all. British policy