Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-06-05
BRITISH-SOVIET RUPTURE
INTERESTS ALL WORLD
Some Regard 1t as One of Most Mo.
mentOus Events Since Close
OF Great War.

ment was breaking out In China. II
| could be canaliZed and concentrated
against Britain. Russian aid In
money and otherwise could be sent
| Chinese passion could be reused
against Great Britain. Beyond much
doubt, the Russians realized that
! China was not permanent field for
! Bolshevism; that they were being used
| against the British by the Chinese
hut they were just as clearly using
| the Chinese against the British. II
they were themselves presently ex.
| peeled, they would have contributed to
| preparing that uprising in British
! India which is the final goal of Soviet
| anti British policy.
Makes War on Britain.
| Thus actually from 1920 onward
| Russia has made war upon Britain.
| But until the Autumn of 1924, follow
! ing the fall of the Macdonald cabinet,
| British public opinion was still uncer-
tain and the Labor party and por.
| ton of the Liberals were firmly con-
| WINGED that peace could be made with
Russia. Again, the strikes of 1926, in
| rousing passions, prolonged the divi-
sion of opinion. Even when the strike
was finally beaten, the class bitter
ness remained at fever heat.
The long series of Chinese and other
injuries has at last reused the British
cabinet to action, but one is bound to
perceive that the action is of little
real practical importance. This revo-
cation of British recognition under the
circumstances is no longer of great
Importance to the Russians. 1t will
cost them little materially; morally
their successes in China are far more
xX-ill he oh 10 81
strike back at once by trade boycottS
which will to a degree at least hurt
British trade
Finds War Impossible.
Under any normal circumstances
Britain would have met the Russian
attack by a declaration of war. But
it is impossible for the British to
make war upon Russia. Military op-
erations are out of the question for
geographical. financial and political
reasons. Naval operations could not
have any large results. War, by it..
SELF, might serve to consolidate Rus
sian factions and open the way to a
very great Russian operation in Asia
and toward India. And public opinion
IN Britain would certainly not support
another long and expensive war,
Inc situation would be different if
Britain could be assured of the sup
port of Continental allies. If France,
the Baltic states, Poland and Rumania
would join, then the continent might
be reused against Russia under the
SoViets as it was against France under
Napoleon. But none of the continental
states are in shape for such war. nor
VIII public opinion in any of them
support such an undertaking.
Within Russia tho Cox-;o+C loo,,1
the past years very clearly and sue
cessfully created the conviction that
the Western powers led by Britain
have been planning an attack All
russians believe it, The Russian
press is filled with the details of il.
And little by little national sentiment.
as contrasted with the restricted
Soviet opinion, has been aroused.
Reasons Are Overlooked.
In discussing British policy with re.
spect to Russia, American opinion far
too easily condemns what was actually
done and pays too little attention to
the reasons. British recognition of
Russia was probably mistake; GER
talnly 1t was without profit, but the
primary explanation lies not in anv
effort 20 get trade, although this ele-
ment was present, but in the domestic
political condition OF Britain. Russian
recognition became an issue in do.
mestic politics and the triumph of the
Labor and Liberal opposition in 1928
made this recognition inevitable.
In looking at the present situation
1t is essential to perceive that the
British action plays directly into Ger.
man hands. This is true not merely
from the economic point of view but
from the political. Certainly Germany
stands to gain by the certain economic
reprisals Russia will employ against
Britain. But even more obvious is
the fact that Germany will be able to
play role as between Russia and
Britain. In a united Europe, in a
Europe united against Germany, the
Germans would be helpless. But to in
sure German support against Russia,
Britain and her associates must OBJ
viously be prepared to pay Germany a
price.
Nationalist Never Waiver.
German Nationalist have never
wavered in the conviction that the true
policy for Germany was to rely upon
Russian recovery and alliance and to
look forward to ultimate reconquest of
lost provinces in the east following
Russian recovery. Today Poland,
hemmed in between hostile Germany
and an equally hostile Russia, is in
new danger. If France should join
Britain against Russia, Poland, as the
ally of France, would be instantly
exposed. But if France declines to
follow Britain she may see British
sympathies cool and she may have to
face the possibility of an Anglo-Italian
alliance, dangerous for the Mediter-
ranean interests.
Thus the Anglo Russian quarrel is
of immense significance in Europe
today because it patiently opens the
way to new groupings of great
powers.
In sum. the British have ended
nothing by their breaking off of re.
lations with Russia. The war con-
tinues; on the Russian side it will
doubtless be accentuated. The issue
between Labor and the Tories in
Britain is intensified. Yet in the
premises there remained nothing else
for Britain to do. Now, however the
conflict has been recognized, the issue
becomes European as well as Asiatic
and new and momentous develop.
ments must be expected.
Copyright. 1927
Dickens Law Desk