Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-07-03
PRESTIGE RULES ACTION !.
AT NAVAL ARMS FARLEY
Each Nation Will Bare Policy on Own
Estimate of Immediate Dangers
Apprehended.

right to fortify its possessions In the
Pacific. west of the Hawaiian Islands.
1t paid for the British equality by
surrendering a potential supremacy
resulting from our building program
Of the war.
1t is by no means clear that the
United States needs any such
equality. particularly in the matter Of
cruisers. 1t is patent that naval
affair than for either Japan a
Britain. But we have raised TIE
question. it has become one, not q
national security, but OF natiopab
prestige. Underlying all else In th9
whole discussion is the question OF
prestige. Our naval program Is based
not upon potential dangers, but upon
national pride.
Asked for Sacrifice.
But in that situation there ana
limits beyond which 1t Is not safe to
press our patent advantage. We may
safely disregard all the ingenious de.
vices Of the British admiralty for linn
iting equality. In this direction we
can trust our admirals, that is their
business. But the question of cruiser
tonnage is something quite different
A nation with the extent Of sea routes
and colonies to cover which concern
Great Britain, must obviously recog.
nize a minimum Of tonnage strength,
in cruisers, below which 1t is not safe
to go.
But in fact that is precisely the
point at which we are underneath
the surface seeking to force the Brit.
ish and the Japanese hands. II they
do not consent to reduce their cruiser
tonnage very largely, we shall have
to build relatively enormously. And
the administration. Congress, the
country do not want to build cruisers,
And at the back of most American
minos Is the notion that when we had
potential supremacy in battleships we
agreed to scrap and that it Is there.
fore fair to ask Britain and Japan
for similar sacrifices now.
The difference, Of course, lies In the
fact that for US the supremacy in
battleships had no value. We were
satisfied that we should be able to
the 5-5-3 ratio. But by contrast
the British do not believe that they
would be safe If they reduced their
cruiser tonnage to figures which
would save us the cost Of new con.
structions. The Japanese are Of the
same mind.
Useful Achievement.
1t follows, therefore, that while Il
Is clearly possible to arrive at a use.
full limitation Of tonnage at Geneva Il
is almost out Of the question to hope
for an agreement which will at one
time establish a limitation and save
US the expense of building q new
cruiser feet.
If the Geneva conference should
arrive at an agreement which. fixed
for the three nations the relative
strength in all branches, established
maximum for cruisers. submarines
and all other classes. such as was
fixed for battleships in the Wash-
ington Conference. that would be q
very real and useful achievement.
The question Is not one OF how
many tons of cruisers or submarines
shall be fixed as the maximum, but
that maximum shall be established,
a system created within which all
will agree to live. Once this maxi
mum is fixed. then 1t becomes q
question as to whether American
security requires that we build up
to that maximum figure in all
branches. But that Is a. national
not an international question. It con-
Germs neither the Japanese nor the
British. '
Frankness Is Absent.
The trouble is that no one can
quite afford to be frank at Geneva.
Ostensibly We are seeking for
equality. but actually we are out
to get equality for. nothing, to obtain
Vxyif he NyiN 20
900 tons of cruisers above those we
have already reluctantly consented to
begin. And when Ambassador Glib
son brings back proposal for equal
ity in all respects, but on the. basis
Of such new construction, as believe
he must il any agreement is reached,
the country will be disappointed. tho
administration displeased and there
will be the puzzling paradox of n
naval limitations conference endinI.
in our necessity to build what
to new cruiser feet.
And in that situation fear we shaN
have a new storm of denunciation Of
foreign countries in general and a,
Britain in particular. Yet the truth
is that we have not yet reached a
point internationally where there can
be arbitrary and automatic limita-
LlOIlS OI IIlIllldEy VI naval SIESuStnSs
And as have tried to make clear in
the matter of naval strength, as in
the matter of armies in Europe, each
nation will base it's policy upon it's
own estimate of its immediate dan
gers.
The basis of achievement in an in
conference is the possible
not the desirable. The maximum
possible in the present instance ia
agreement on figures which satisfy
The estimates OF each people of it's
needs, not agreement on an American
igure which gives us equality with
,ut large new construction. Once we
nave such a standard, competition IL
abolished, with the end Of competi->
ion a limit is put upon expense, there
8 the simple fact of the existing stu.
alton.
tCopyrisht. 1927