Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-01-09
BY FRANK Fl. SIMONDS.

= PEECHES by the President. dis
cussions in Congress and in
the press, have once more
- raised the question of naval
ornaments and there ha 8
even been the hint of new Wash
ington conference to. deal with the
departments of naval armament,
which were left untouched at the
earlier conference. But all this dis
tcussion raises problems the extent Of
which has hardly been perceived.
1t is, for example, open to question
whether any European state would
consent to come to the American capt.
tai to a disarmament conference at
the present time. This is particularly
true of the French, but it is only less
true of the British and the Italians,
for certain aspects of any such con-
ference would be intensely unwel-
come to each of these three peoples.
The British, for example, would
look with very great hostility upon
any proposal to revise downward their
strength in cruisers, which would in
evitably be the crux of the whole
matter from the American point OF
view. This would be because, for the
British, their present cruiser strength
represents a minimum commensurate
with the tasks for which their Navy
is maintained.
Problem Has Many Aspects.
Nothing is more misleading and In.
exact in all discussions of proposals
to limit ornaments than the notion
that it is possible to deal with the
issue merely on mathematical basis.
Both on sea and on land. national ar
bo
terpretations Of the problems which
are peculiar to each people and differ
as between nations.
There is, for example, nothing even
remotely comparable between the pur-
pose of the British cruiser fleet and the
American. nearly fifty millions of PEG
ple crowded in one narrow island ana
dependent for all save a few weeks
supply of food in each year upon I'M
ports must necessarily have other and
larger resources in it's hands than a
country like the United States, Wnlcn
exports food. With the American PEG
nile to keep open sea lanes, in this oil
rection. Is to preserve access TO mar
kets. but it is very far from being
question of life or death.
Again. while the United States mas
outlying possessions, the Philippines
Porto Rico and Hawaii, and while II
is vitality concerned in keeping the
Panama Canal open, 1t has nothing 70
compare with that far-hung Brltlsh
system of colonies and associated 90
minions. In peace Britain draws
frim these much of her 1000 supply
In war she obtained from them hun
dreds of thousands of troops who
fought in Europe.
Britain Needs More Cruisers.
But in case of war the United
States not only would not draw fooC
from abroad, but would receive ne
military achievements from its tnsu
lar possessions. Nor can they be com
pared in size or importance with the
British. Therefore the question OF
how many cruisers the British require
for their own defense, as they see the
necessities of defense, is fundamental
" different from the American prob
lem.
Not even IL the United States should
| undertake to establish program of
intensive building to overtake the
British lead would there be any rea-
son for British consent to modify their
cruiser strength. This is true because
the expansion Of American strength to
the point Of equality with existing
British tonnage would have no men
ace, while reduction of British to pres
ent American limits would invite very
considerable risks.
The relation Of the British and
American navies is, fortunately. al
WAYS one of theory and never one of
fact. The peoples of both countries are
equally aware of the fact that these
navies will never meet in battle and
that the strength of either country
on the sea carries with 1t no threat
to the other.
The suggestion that the Washing
ton conference of 1921 supplies a
precedent Is inexact because the con-
ditions are totally different. In 1921
America had, potentially, an enormous
superiority in battleships. But It had
no desire to bear the nancial bur-
dens incident to. completion Of the
building program. There was no
reason in policy and no warrant in
national interests.
Effect of Conference Here.
But all the Washington conference
accomplished in the direction of the
limitation of naval ornaments, prac-
tically, was that. faced with a pro-
spective superiority in capital ships
which they could not rival, Britain
and Japan accepted a permanent sit
uation which was in fact about to be-
come a reality. Britain agreed upon
equality. because superiority was be-
yond her reach, and Japan on a ratio
for the same reason.
But at the time 1t was the United
States who had something and gave
1t up, because 1t did not care enough
for it to pay the costs. What we had
no nnxy
based upon a battle fleet. Today the
British - and the Japanese - have
something Of which they not only are
willing to bear the financial burdens,
but which they find an essential cir
cumstance in national defense-narne-
ly, larger cruiser strength than the
United States.
The fact that we can build an
equal, or even superior, cruiser fleet
does not in the least influence the
British or the Japanese to listen to
any American suggestion that they
limit their cruiser strength, that in
fact they reduce 1t. We may build
IF we choose, neither cares, but we
have nothing to offer to persuade
them to reduce, because our strength
is not a menace to them.
AS for France and Italy, they could
not, at the moment of the Washing
ton conference, even think of any ex-
pansion of their existing tonnage in
capital ships by reason of their finan-
cial difficulties. On the other hand,
both did then and do still see GER
tain alienation of their enforced in
feriority resulting from the appear
ance Of the submarine arm.
Role Of Submarines.
Both Latin states can build subma- |
rines: these craft are to a degree an |
answer to battleship strength. They |
do constitute an immediate and dan |
gerous weapon against the British, |
for example. Thus there is not the |
refnotest chance that either france |