Evening star., 1927-11-06
ske Anayzes Future Naval Defense Requirements in Pac

our Navy ahead of hers as soon as the
ships were finished.
This situation not being at all salts
factory to either Great Britain or ner
allv, Japan, they had brought about
not only the calling of conference
for limitation of armament. but the
main points of the decision whlcn was
to be reached. These main points
were an agreement by us not 10 IN
crease the inadequate defenses OF the
Philippine Islands or their inadequate
facilities as a naval base. and at the
same time to decrease our Isavhl force
to a 5-to-3 ratio relative to Japan and
to parity with Great Britain.
It must be understood that this 5-to-
3 ratio and our simultaneous reduc-
ton to parity with Great Britain
brought about the situation desired by
them-that is, that Japan can take
the islands whenever she wishes TO do
so. while our ability to take them back
is made highly problematical.
THE ships of the so-called 1915
program" constituted the finest
and constructive scientific genius in
the history of mankind, and they were
designed for use in recapturing the
Philippines, il at any time these
islands were captured. At the time
the conference met they were nearly
| completed, and at the same time the
Army was cooperating with the Navy
in an endeavor to make the islands
| absolutely safe from capture. Our
| four American delegates sank or
scrapped most of those outstanding
products of American genius on which
millions of dollars had been spent and
| (which was far worse) sacrificed the
safety of the Philippines and all reas-
onab BILE hopes for peace!
| The decision of the limitation of
armament conference in 1922 has
been described as the greatest naval
victory in British history. Strictly
speaking. it was a diplomatic victory
1 of the first magnitude. The master
| mind behind it was that of Mr.. Bal
| four. His easy victims were an Amer
ican Secretary of State, an American
| ex-Secretary of State, two American
Senators and 110,0O0.O0O American
people.
The conference did more to discredit
Diplomacy as safe and honest method
of settling difficulties among nations
than all our other ventures in that
deceitful art added together. When
one reads the accounts of the confer.
ence proceedings. and reflects on its
results, he can hardly fail to be re.
minded of the genial bunco expert and
the guileless countrymen whom he
befools.
After the conference Great Britain
and Japan proceeded energetically to
build up their navies in directions in
which further building was not forbid
den. AT the same time they went
ahead in building up their merchant
marines. Germany did also. The Unit.
, ed States pursued a reverse course.
She did not even keep the Navy up
to the standard which the treaty per-
, mitted, and therefore dropped behind
| Britain. As to our merchant marine,
, one can hardly think about it's dis
gracefully neglected and decadent
state without losing his proper self
! control.
: This being the situation In 1925.
movements were made to have another
, limitation conference. 1t met in Ge.
: neva in June. 1927. The United States
, delegates tried to persuade the British
delegates to consent to certain pro-
posals. by consenting to which Britain
; would have relinquished much of the
, advantage that she had secured over
} us by the previous conferences! OF
/ course, they did not consent.
No Navy officer with whom talked
, thought for moment that they would.
: Our only feeling was one Of bewilder-
ment that the United States should
have made any proposals so absurd.
Great Britain is a prosperous and pow.
erful nation. But she secured her pros.
perity and power by the cooperation
OF hard work, hard fighting and hard
dfplomatizing: and 1t would have been
5 a reversing of all her previous con.
duct to yield to the proposals that
were made