Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-08-04

In view of that feeling 1t Is a natural
corollary that officials here ascrlbe
the failure of the Geneva conference
directly to this British policy.
It is equally true. however, that In
governmental political circles at least
Tho british program. unsatisfactory
as II is from an American viewpoint
is not looked upon as being threat
10 American ideals or policies. NaNal
oninion may view it from different
angle but the Presidents advisers IN
matters of international pohtlcs' as
far as known, look elsewhere Tor
their explanation of British uneaS''
ness as to her trade routes. -,
That the British spokesman VIII
seek to place the burden for fallure
on American refusal to accept the
British view as to the aggressive
character of 10,000-ton ships. armed
with S-inch guns, is to be expected, Of
fieials say. The argument in that re-
gard which is apt to follow the as
,untion of the conference may prove
troublesome to Anglo-American good
rela tons to some extent, 1t is adj
rnitted. but no official who will COM
ment appears to believe that any very
serious result will flow from this sit
uation.
For this reason it is expected in ad.
rninistration circles that President
Coolidge will work out his policy as
to a naval program without calculat-
ing American needs in terms of COM
petition with development of the Brit
ish cruiser fleet.
British Claim Offers Difficulty.
In his final address to the confer
ence restating the American position
Ambassador Gibson, head of the
American delegation, pointed out that
the invitation to the conference by
President Coolidge left no room for
doubt as to the nature of the propo-
sails the American delegation would
make Those PROPOSALS. he said had
conformed strictly to the spirit of the
invitation, and he recalled that the
japanese had indicated Willingness to
negotiate on the basis of minimum
figures suggested by the American
delegation.
From the first, however. we Ell.
countered a serious difficulty in the
claim of the British government that
it needed a considerably larger nlm.
her of cruisers than it now possesses,
Mr. Gibson said.
He added that while The British
claim had been defended on the
ground Of absolute naval needs of the
empire. the American delegation never
had been able to reconcile the en-.
ception of absolute naval needs with
the negotiation of a treaty to fix
limitations on the basis Of mutual
concession"
Further" he said, Eve nave not
yet been able to understand why, in
time Of profound peace and at the
4t-sN .l,,1
the burdens of naval expenditures.
the British government considers A
considerable program of naval eXpan'
sion as an absolute and even vital
necessity"
Smaller Craft Useless.
Calling attention to the British sug.
gestion for strict limitation of .he
larger type of cruiser armed with =
inch guns and for limiting all smaller
craft to 6-inch guns, Mr.. Gibson SAID
the smaller ships would be of relative
ly small use 10 the United States foi
lack Of cruising radius and protection
THE immediate and obvious resul
Of acquiescing in these British pro
pOSa Is" he maintain ed, would have
been that the British Empire would
have been able to build exactly what
:
hand, would be restrained from build
ing what we considered we might
need, and yet the tonnage levels in
sisted on By the British Empire would
result in a substantial increase ever
over present strength"
Ambassador Gibson also took eXcep
tion to the effort of the British dele
CATION 70 classify 10.000-ton ships
armed with S-inch guns as offensive
t~sse.s" while the 6,000-ton cruisers
with 6.inch guns were termed de
fensiye cruisers. The Washington
treaty. which established the 10000
ION cruiser and the S-inch gun, recoS
nized no such distinction, he said. no
did the United States commence con
strtlctjon of ships OF that size. Ali
Gibson emphasized the statement tina
me British EMPIRE mas already nF'
Jb.000-ton ships practically completed
six more under construction and foul
ships of $3.50 tons already IN com
mission, while the United States ha
TWO 10000 tonncrS about 10 per cen
complete and 6 others contracted Tor
He pointed out also that the &C
authorizing these American cruiser
also authorized the President TO sus
pend all or any part of the construc
lion in the event OF an internatona
limitation agreement which in hi
judgment justified that a"i,Cn.
Questions British Change.
eve cannot follow the reasoning
which attributes to 6inch gun cruis
eys a purely defensive role Ambas
sador Gibson said,
When we come down to essentials
the claim on the part Of any nation
for the right to maintain in time o
peace a cruiser strength sufficient 4
efford complete security TO its com
ynerce in case of war renders impos
sihe any effective naval limitation
by international agreement"
The Ambassador REGAL He'd that th