Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-12-18

primarily, Latin American question any more
than it is an Asiatic question. 1t is a world
question. Although the United States has eX-
ercised its powers of intervention many times
in the Caribbean, fundamentally it is more
a pan-American question than is limitation
Of American naval ornaments panAmerican
question.
The unwsdom generally of attempting to
place political questions before such gather.
ings the international conferences of the
American states was exemplifed in the last
conference, held in 1923 in Santiago, Chile.
The agenda then included the topic, "Reduc-
ton and Limitation of Military and Naval Ex-
penditures" The topic found it's way into the
agenda because of the sentiment created
throughout the world over the dealistic bust
ness of limiting naval armament and scrapping
ships, a sentiment developed by the Washing
ton conference. But when the topic came up
for discussion at Santiago the only two
tions which could talk about it an equal
footing were Argentina and Brazil Argen-
tina couldn't discuss limiting military eXpen-
ditures with Costa Rica, for instance, any more
than the United States could talk with Argen.
tina about limiting the American Navy. The
question, therefore, resolved itself into debate
between Argentina and Brazil with 20 other
republics sitting around in a circle tWirling
their thumbs and waiting for them to get
through A very nicely worded and highly
praiseworthy resolution was the sum total of
O.
military expenditures
1t is not difficult to picture therefore the
endless controversy and debate which would
result were the question of intervention per.
mltted to find its way into the discussions at
Havana. Nor would the controversy hinge
about whether Argentina could legitimately~
interfere with the affairs of Panama. or Chile
with the affairs of Salvador or Brazil with
the affairs of Venezuela. All of it would range
around the policy of the United States in the
Caribbean, and whether it is an indication Of
territorial acquisition and financial imperial.
ism or whether it is based on strategic neces-
sity, benevolence or the Monroe doctrine The
view of many familiar with this countrv's at.
titude is that Marines are in China and Ma.
rines are in Nicaragua but their presence in
either country does nots concern the Interna.
tional Conference of American States
x x x x
Critics of the American policy in the Carib-
bean are not confined to the statesmen and
publcists of Panama, or Costa Rica, or Sal
Vador, or Mexico, Argentina or Paraguay.
Some of the btterest are found in the United
states Senate and in the editorial sanctums of
leading American journals 1t is not a case
OF resentment confined to a corner of the
world where there has been Intervention. The
resentment is widespread Uncle Sam is as
roundly denounced by sober and solemn pro
fessors of political science in this country as
ne is by temperamental reVolutionists loaded
with Jamaica rum and planning a coup detat
in Central America. He Is excoriated on the
one hand for not having a policy in the Carib.
bean and on the other hand ne is raked over
the Goals for having one. He is accused by
some of receiving embarkaton orders for his
Marines from Wall Street, and on the other
he is accused of failing properly to look after
the small nations dependent upon him for their
place in the sun. He is pictured by one set
as a bungling, awkward diplomat, bamboozIed
by the skilled politicians of Europe and by
another he is rated as a dabolical schemer
who seeks to enlarge his territory by political
intrigue. But to date, and as far as can be
learned, the only suggested substitute for the
Caribbean policy of the United States has been
one OF passive indifference. And passive in
difference would be fatal
The American policy in the Caribbean has
never been fixed and undertaking. 1t has been
an elastic policy, applied in one manner in