Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1927-06-23
Belittl;ng the SIS Ratio.

The British and Japanese press
like the American. strongly support:
the principle OF further naval lmi-
tation. Unlike the American press
however. 1t insists that ratios oil
naval strength are a secondary con-
sideration." 1t has become clearly
apparent that the British look
askance upon the 5-5 ratio of naval
auxiliary strength with the United
! States, as the American proposal
reads. 1t has been equally apparent
for some time that the Japanese do
not care for the 5--S ratio of naval
strength applying to them in the
same American proposal. What a
change since 1921, when, at the Wash
ington conference, leading delegates
Of both Britain and Japan. Lord Bal
four and Mr.. Hanihara. agreed that
the 5--s-3 ratio should be applied
not only to capital ships, but also to
the cruisers and other auxiliary craft
The British insist that their posi-
ton as an island kingdom, with a
far-fiung empire. makes necessary
greater cruiser strength than that of
the United States. Their lines of
communication in time of war, they
say, make greater naval strength
necessary than in the case of the
United States. In Japan there is a
sentiment against accepting inferi-
ority in naval strength to the United
States In treaty form. The effort at
Geneva on the part Of the British and
! Japanese Is to break down and get
away from the 5-5-3 ratio estab-
iished at Washington more than five
years ago.
The United States is earnestly In
favor Of further naval Limitation and
opposed to an international race in
naval construction. But this coun-
try has its own problems Of national
defense to consider. 1t has two great
ocean coasts and outlying possessions
to protect. It would be worse than
folly for the American delegation to
throw these considerations to the
wind merely to obtain an agreement
at Geneva In some quarters abroad
the impression seems to prevail that
the United States Is not serious in
its demand that the 5--5-s ratio of
naval strength be continued. or at
least not serious enough to make q
real issue Of the matter. This has
come to the attention Of the State
Department and very properly the
American authorities have promptly
emphasized the fact that the Amer
ican proposal at Geneva has the solid
backing Of the government. It repre-
SCENTS the limits to which this coun-
try will go in curtailing the national
z defense. with. OF course, such COM
promises over details as may be fair
and just to other nations.
The conference is only in the fourth
day of session, yet already many and
varied are the reports of what may
grow out of the meeting. For ex-
ample. one is that the British may
be asked to agree not to arm their
great merchant feet in time of war If
the United States agrees to reduce
the maximum size of cruisers to
1900 tons and limit the caliber of
guns to 6.inch. Another Is that
Japan win seek a three-power secu-
rity pact with America and Great
Britain, ana IL that can be accom-
plished will welcome almost any kind
of naval agreement.
In time of war nations make use
OF the weapons which fall to their
hands. This has been the history
of war. In time of war the British
naturally would make use of their
merchant feet. Any agreement to
the contrary would scarcely prevail
in time Of national emergency.
A proposal for a three power secu-
rity and peace pact. involving the
United States. Great Britain and
Japan, could scarcely go further than
the present four-power Pacific treaty
negotiated at the Washington con-
ference, which involved France as
well az the three nations mentioned
At least 1t could scarcely go further
and receive the approval Of the
United States Senate. which is
strongly opposed to international
alliances and entanglements.