Evening star., 1926-06-20

serve a useful purpose, if only
! it disclosed to the American public
| the futility of attempting to deal with
what is essentially a European prob
| lem SO long as we refuse to consider
| it at all from the precise standpoint
from which Europe must and will
| view II.
The failure was totally foreseen in
Europe and in the Winter and Spring
did not find in any foreign Office
| which / visited the slightest belief
that anything could be accomplished.
| There was the general feeling that,
| had 1t not been for apparent and
rather inexplicable American eager
ness In the matter, no serious attempt
| would have been made, and there
was not q little only thinly concealed
| regret at American insistence.
In so far as Europe is concerned,
the question of limitation of arma
ments is an incidental and dependent
| proposition which can only be dealt
with when the main problem of Sc
| curity is disposed of and, by contrast,
will not be a very serious matter
when that time comes. The American
| idea that disarmament will insure
| peace, that armies are the causes of
| side of the Atlantic and is on the
i
gree of cynical amusement.
Europe Knows War Cost.
AS for the periodic outbursts of
propaganda against war and against
armaments, conducted on the lines
| of cleanup day" or swat the fly,
they leave Europe quite cold where
they do not arouse it's rather con-
| temptuous amusement. This is be.
| cause there seems to be underlying
this form of demonstration the idea
that it is necessary to educate people,
| and particularly Europeans, to the
| fact that war is costly in life and
| treasure and nothing short Of a gen.
eral disaster.
| At the present moment, viewed
| from all angles, Europe is In a lar
| better position than America to real
| ize the cost of war, suffering and the
| devastation and destruction which
follow 1t. Were the problem of pre-
| venting war as simple as the Amerl-
| can propaganda seems to imply,
| Europe in its present appalling situ-
alton would be able to muster the In
| telligence and the courage to disarm
and settle down to peace.
But of course, Europe rejects as
| childish, most American ideas with
| respect of its> problems, as rather
| droll form of oversimplification, which
| has no other importance than discov-
ering how little European issues are
| understood with US. Because, how
| ever, our financial position is what 1t
| is and no nation can afford to affront
| US, there has grown up policy OF
| public and official tolerance for
American advice and proposals, which
is counterbalanced by no little caustic
| criticism.
| Security Main Problem.
| 1t is aximatic in the minds of con-
| tinental Europeans that the main
| problem which confronts the whole
continent and all peoples is that OF
security. 1t may be that If nations are
| completely armed they will still be at
| tackled and it is even possible that in
the process of self protection COM
| petition in armament will ensue and
lead to hostilities. Nevertheless. the
| continental nations are convinced that
| the dangers incident to preparation
are relatively insignificant by con-
trast with those of defenselessness.
| AS a consequence, ever since the
| close of the last great conflict, all con-
tinental thought and effort have been
| directed at finding some form of Ses
curity which will permit the rigid
| limitation of armament. Were 1t
possible, for example. for the British
| people to feel secure with respect
both to their homeland and their vast
| empire, then in the existing situation
of British finance and industry. moth
| ing could prevent a sweeping re-
| duction of the vast navy and the
T! same is exactly true of the French
| people and their considerable army.
| Until some method of insuring Sc
| curity can be found, however, nothing
| is more certain than that the British
| will maintain a navy and the French
an army adequate to their own con-
| ception of their own dangers, and no
outside advice or exhortation will
have the smallest effect upon either
people, both of which are essentially
peaceful and have every human rea-
son for desiring uninterrupted peace.
Hopes Reused by League.
When Mr.. Wilson brought forward
! his idea of a League of Nations, both
| France and Britain seized upon it, be-
cause for both 1t held out very attrac-
! tive possibilities in the matter of Sc
curity. But what the British hoped
for was an Anglo-American combina-
| ten which by reason of its vast re-
sources, it's wealth and it's power,
could impose peace upon the world.
| What the French saw in the proposal
was an American guarantee against
any new attack upon themselves COM
| ing from Germany and, more than
that, an Anglo-American guarantee
of the status created by the peace
| treaties.
| But the United States was totally
unwilling to undertake either the
4 British or the French task, while the
British, after we departed, were quite
as willing to guarantee the status quo
| in Europe, although in the end and at
| Locarno they undertook a very limited
contract to preserve the status quo as
between France, Germany and Bel
gium, solely because in this area
peace was Of utmost Importance to
Britain and the Rhine was in reality
the real British frontier. Thus their
action was entirely in the nature Of
a fortification of their own security.
! The departure of America and the
refusal of Britain left the French
without real security and they under
| took to obtain it by forming series Of
alliances, defensive alliances, which
| should bind all the nations equally
/ interested with France in keeping
! things as they were, to defend each
other in case of attack upon any. In
the same sense, the nations which
wholly or in part issued from the old
Hapsburg monarchy formed the little
/ entente.
| Wanted Germany Admitted.
| The basis of this French system.
however, was the French army.
| Without it, there was no promise of
! safety for France, Poland, Belgium
or the counties of the little entente.
But at the same time this alliance
constituted an obvious menace to
other nations not included, and tended
| to divide Europe again into rival
systems which might in the end