Evening star., 1926-02-14
BY FRANK ii. SIMONDS.
Correspondence Of The Star.

| Correspondence Of The Star.
LONDON-Discussion public and
| private which has followed the de-
cision to postpone any limitation of
arms conference serves to make dou-
| bly, clear the fact that there is pro-
| found misapprehension in Washing
! ton of the actual European state or
| mind as to armaments. London, 10
/ say the least, is very clearly of the
| opinion that there is at present no
| disarmament question in Europe, no
prospect of anything material that
could be achieved by holding such
| conference.
| So far as the British themselves
are concerned. they have nothing to
| reduce. They viii not consent 10
any new reduction of cruiser or other
J strength of their navy. Their army
| is down to the level of prewar times,
proba bly, below it. Certainly the Brit
! ish would not be averse to seeing
! arms taken from some of the smaller
| nations, but they are perfectly aware
| that they have nothing themselves
/ to offer in the way of reduction and
nothing in the way Of guarantees
| to give to any other country to per
suade it TO reduce.
From the very outset of discus
sions on a conference the British have
been frankly skeptical and unim-
| pressed. They were by no means
| keen either to have a conference or
to have the United States invited
| because they did not see that any
result could be achieved. They did
insist that America should not even
be asked until it was very clear that
we wanted To come. The initiative did
not come from London. but when
| Washington showed that it wanted
TO come. Paris insisted upon our be
ing asked and London agreed.
New Standard of Measurement
But as England clearly perceived, a
disarmament conference now could
not get even within a mile of the real
question of the reduction of armed
strength. What France, for example,
wants to talk about, it appears, is the
introduction of totally new stand
ard of measurement of military
strength. What is TO be examined
is not a question of reducing armies
or navies but estimating how many
more troops an agricultural nation
should have than an industrial, what
| relative value should be assigned
machine power and military power,
how factories, which may be trans
formed for war, are to be balanced
against regiments for a country with
! lower factory strength.
All of which is only another way Of
saying that the British perceive that
an armament conference would at
! once become a new place for the
discussion of the problems of Sc
! curity, while no possible reduction OF
vital armed strength is even con-
ceivable a [ the present hour. Nor
! do the British regard disarmament
q hn ont oil 1Af fEs
of European readjustment. For the
present, for five years. perhaps for
ten, there is no danger that any army
which exists will become a menace
to world peace.
! Some day. in future relatively
! distant, Germany will be able TO raise
| effectively the question as to whether
she is TO rearm up to the level OF
France and the allies may have
at the moment or whether as an al
/ tentative France will reduce hel
strength to the German level But
| This issue cannot be raised until Ger
many escapes from the present posi-
ton of helplesness which results
from her relative disarmament anG
the presence of allied troops upon hel
soil. The economic pressure, too
may in due ecourse of time operate
in some measure to affect the Ques
of any arms conference.
Await German Entry
At the moment, the French ant
their continental associates do no
want an arms conference until Ger
many has joined the league. There arr
other pending issues, but this is th'
most important. But if and when th'
| conference does assemble its mall
T pre-occupations-ifit it is a serious con
ference-will not be disarmament, bu
security All of which means that /
will be a political conference, tha
: the real issues will be political ant
; have to do with commitments respon
sibilities far more than with the liml
> tation of military strength.
There does not exist any agreemen
. between European powers on the pro
gram or even upon the vague outlln
!, Of any arms conference, which Is an
= | other compelling reason for postpone
: meut. In London no one believes tina
; a conference could go beyond the Who'll
: Iy academic limits of declaring aga1ns
= ga ssing upon cities. the RESTRICTION 0
: the use of certain lethal weapons
q reality it is appreciated that TINS Woul'
y be an empty gesture, FOR Wneh wa
= came nations would fight in the way
. which seemed to them most likely t
: nroc,lre victory and prevent de1eal
The idea that Locarno Supplled az
. mirable preparation for a new 1or"af'
! step. that there is logical sequenc
y ;. hetween the Dawes plan, Whlcl
= brought economic adjustment; the 10
carno pacts, which brought pohtlca
:, pacification, and thlrd steps Milio
, would be a disarmament conference
u an idea that was most prevalent II
ths Tinted States at the moment
II sailed has not the smallest British
y support in any official. informed quar-
r ters.
If Won't Reduce Armies.
'l Ir any American delegation come
to Europe to attend the armamen
y conference which can be held TIN
. wear with the notion that 1t VIII nm
Eurone ready to cooperate In ma
u teriai reduction of standing armies
Il | If will stand precisely on as false
i ha sis as did Mr.. Wilson and his assc
e ciates when they came to the Parl
conference believing eternal peac
a could be insured and that all the pee
:. pies of Europe were only aWaltin
American leadership to abandon ira
n ditional rivalries and secular asplra
o tions. ~,
8 We shall find, we Americans, on tn
," contrary, that all Europe will b
- mainly interested to discover to wha
- degree American sentiment is chans
- ed: how far we are now Wiling I
), assume European international re
:, sponsibilities; what effectively, cor
e cretely, we are prepared to do. Thi
q does not mean that any one is inter
:. ested in our Army. our Navy, an
o reduction in either. In all cases, wha
& interests Europe about us is elthe
h political or financial-what promise
" Of aid we will give. what better term
n in the matter of debts, what new pro