Evening star., 1926-06-06

sudski episode there 10 patiently an
international side, which must sooner
or later command attention. For Po-
land Pilsudski Is q complete disaster.
What the Polish nation needs is a
great administrator, a super-financial
expert with the courage and the au-
thority to bring order out of a chaos
which Is the inevitable consequence of
youth, inexperience and misfortune.
What 1t has got In Pilsudski is some
thing between Garibaldi and Napo-
loon III. with the weak qualities of
both
Ptisudski comes because the men of
reasonable ideas and ordinary common
| sense have been unable to fight
against i'll luck at home and abroad.
Two years ago Poland by q desperate
effort stabilized her currency and bal
anced her budget. At the same time
| she placed her political fortunes in the
hands OF w. Grabski. a quiet. taciturn,
well balanced man with no strong po-
litical affiliations and with something
like genius for administration.
Sterilization always brings hard
times and unemployment. with an in
creased cost of living. On top Of
that Poland had two crop failures.
which were disastrous, as the country
Is primarily agricultural and depends
upon the export Of foodstuffs for
much Of Its income. But 1t had to
buy food abroad. Hard on the two
crop failures came a tariff war with
Germany, an inevitable consequence
Of territorial disputes. The tariff war
was terrifcally expensive for Ger
many, but 1t was fatal for Poland be-
! cause 1T deprived the great Silesian
coal mines of their German market.
Together with these domestic mis-
/ fortunes came the two foreign disas-
ters Of Locarno and Geneva. with the
recent RussoGerman treaty as
third. Locarno did give the Poles a
certain measure of protection as Ger
many agreed not to remake her east
ern frontier by force. but it clearly
established German purpose to abolish
| the Danzig Corridor and 1t set up a
distinction between Eastern and
| Western frontiers as created at Yer
| sailles. Germany accepted the loss of
| Alsace-Lorraine as final. but she not
only established a way to reopen the
Eastern question diplomatically, she
clearly had British support for her
| purpose.
| Geneva was second disaster, be.
| cause not only did Poland there fail to
| get a permanent seat on the council
| Of the league, but It was made fairly
clear that she was unlikely to obtain
1t later. Her representatives suffered
a very great loss Of prestige and the
home front was shaken. Even at
| Geneva whispers of an upheaval in
| Warsaw we're heard as Polish failure
| became manifest. Finally the recent
! Russo-German treaty not alone
brought together in clear association
| the two nations which look upon Po-
land with great hostility and have un-
disguised purposes TO regain lands as
signed to Poland at Paris and Riga.
but it disclosed anew the failure of
Polish craftsmanship. which had been
unable to get Western guarantees or
any more solid insurance against Rus
sia than a Rumanian alliance.
OF course Pilsudski can do nothing
to improve the situation financially,
politically or automatically. He is
| the idol of the private soldiers, appar-
emily. but he is far from being a great
general or oven a reasonable states
man. His famous rush into Russia a
few years ago took him as far as Kiev
but brought the Soviet army to the
gates OF Warsaw, where the invaders
were checked by. French generalship
and the fighting ability of Sikorski
and Haller. Polish generals. who are
not with Pilsudski today.
Position Is Different.
Pilsudski has no gift for admins
tration. no European sense. The
sober sense Of the country Is against
him. His position from the start must
be compromise because foreign oapi-
tai win obviously have nothing to do
with him or with Poland under his
control. But Poland must have for
eisn capital to develop and in her
present straits she must have out
side aid.
Only the enemies Of Poland will re-
joice at the present disaster. which
may in the end lead directly to a new
partition. and'in any event must post
pone the actual reunification of the
country indefinitely. Poland had a
certain number Of years of grace while
Germany and Russia were both for
different reasons incapable Of attack
ing her again. For Germany this
period IL bound to end with the COM
pletion Of the period Of occupation by
allied armies-that is. nine years
hence. But a little Of Pilsudski and
Poland will lose her chance.
There is. however. a far more i'm
portant and international aspect to
the present Polish episode. France
has made of Poland a close ally. Her
policy has been based upon the AS
sumption that in case of a new Ger
man attack Poland would be able to
play the role which Russia played in
1914, and that as Russian invasion
Of East Prussia drew off army corps
from the West before the Battle of
tho Marne and just made the French
victory possible, 50 Polish invasion
might play the same part.
British Hold Aloof.
But Poland has been a liability as
we'll AZ an asset. for the British have
not only steadily refused to under
take any responsibility for Poland.
but have consistently indicated that
they regard Poland as unduly exten-
sive and were willing to placate Ger
many by the retrocession of Polish
lands both in the Danzig Corridor and
in Upper Silesia. Nevertheless, Poland
has had a strong army and France
has maintained her Polish policy.
It has become steadily clearer, how
ever. that as long as France backed
created at Versailles q real reoonoilia-
ton or appeaseanent between France
and German could not be had The
Germans were prepared to resign
Alsace-Lorraine, partly because they
saw that q new war with France
would almost certainly mean a new
war with Britain also. partly because
they were pretty thoroughly disillu-
stoned as to the loyalty Of the Reichs-
land population itself In the same
sense the Germans were willing, as
the IIocarno pact showed, to guaran
tee French security.
But there is not an adult German
ready to accept the loss of Danzig and
the Corridor as permanent or willing
to resign the German claim to Upper
Silesia. While for two years Franco.
German relations have inprYvsd In.