Evening star., 1926-04-18
GENEVA FIASCO HAS COST
FRANCE HER LEADERSHIP
Backing Poland Lost Support of Little
Entente, While Italy Is Becoming
Cuarantor for Central Europe.

arrangement a guarantee OIL tIle dlu
of powerful army, for Poland kar
that. But as apprehension diminishes
and it is Enthusiastically decreasing
Poland can become not an ally againes
an inevitable war but an ally whos4
own difficulties alone menace France
German understandings. In that case
the French course may not be hard
to guess.
The latest Geneva conference at
least seemed to indicate. then, that re
lations between France and Germany
would improve. that in reality there
would he an increasing closeness of
understanding between the three great
western states, Britain. Germany and
France, with Belgium naturally In
cluded. But they quite as clearly IN
dicated that first of all French inf1u-
ence in Europe had declined and might
continue to decline, while French sup
port of Poland was called into ques-
ton and Polish safety and security
were, to say the least, compromised.
There remains the question of Italy.
At the moment and as a result OF the
row over the Upper Adige. German
Italian relations are enormously EN-
bittered. Italy has suddenly seized
the center of the stage and become
the single unmistakable guarantor OF
the existing frontiers in the middle Of
Europe. She has gathered to herself
Rumania and Jugoslavia. two of the
three states making up the little en-
tente and, whatever the predictions
of Benes, CzeChoslovakia must follow
into the Italian constellation, for the
largest of all Czech concerns Is 10
prevent the union of Austria with
Germany.
Real Italian Policy Questioned.
But is the separation between Ger
many and Italy as complete as ap-
pears, or more exactly will 1t continue
| to be as absolute? No question was
asked as frequently at Geneva. In
point of fact, nothing was more sharp
| ly discussed than the question as 10
| what the real Italian policy and pur-
| pose was. 1t was perceived that Mus
solini had with great cleverness taken
| advantage of a situation created by
mistakes made in Germany and
Austria to carry off not a little pres
tige. to acquire for his country po-
sition of importance in European
affairs rarely occupied before.
1t was and is quite clear, also, that
| for the future so far as one can look
| into il. the union Of Austria with Ger
many must have many obvious perils
for Italy. But. on the other hand. as
| Mussolini we'll knows. this union is
not a present issue. The Germans at
least recognize that ii is out of the
question now.
1t is probably no exaggeration 10
say that the Germans are quite well
satisfied to have Italy replace France
as the guarantor of the existing terri
torial situation in the center Of Europe
because they believe that sooner or
later it will he possible for Italy and
Germany to do business together
again. as they did for many years
before the war when they were allies.
At bottom one might conclude that
the Germans argue that Austria is
matter which only a distant future
can decide. but that If while prohibit
ing the Austrian union Mussolini de-
stroys the combination which might
similarly prohibit the amendment of
the Polish situation to suit German
ideas, Germans can afford to take his
rather impolite words philosophically.
German Position Changed.
One must perceive, too. that a
rather subtle change is taking place in
the position of Germany itself. With
all its various amusing and tragic de-
tails, the Geneva conference did dis
close the fact that Germany was ap
pearing in an international gathering
again as a great power. Quite wise
ly she attempted no great undertak
ing. She said little and tried to do
less. but there was a very real sense
that force and q great force which
had been absent from European con-
Sidera tions for all the years since the
armiStiCe was back in something of
her old situation. You had the sense
that never again would the conse-
quences of the. war exclude Germany
from the influence of a great power
in any European council
When all is said and done, the thing
that stands out most clearly is that
the postwar combinations are gen
orally broken or breaking.
European nations are, II 1 may use
the phrase, considering taking new
partners for the new dance" Hasty
combinations. made in the postwar
period. are collapsing. Moreover
the solid reality of the restored Ger
many is becoming a fact which can
no longer he overlooked. Policies built
upon the assumption that the old
Germany would reappear. holding to
the old ideas and following the old
detectives. are now being subjected TO
very close scrutiny. as is German pol
! icy itself.
Geneva, then. was a victory for
Germany. a defeat for France and
not impossibly a real disaster for Po-
land. But it's effect may easily be
very great improvement in Franco
German relations, following the aban-
donment by France of her pro-Polish
policy. What remains profoundly un.
certain is the ultimate relation of Italy
! to the whole European problem. and
at the same time the fate of the Ital-
ian combination which Mussolini has
reared in the middle of Europe to the
complete demolition of the earlier
French structure and the practical ex-
clusion of French influence from the
center and southeast of Europe.
Copyright. 1920