The Washington times., 1926-03-15

officers, have practically vanished
from the service.
Only About 10 Per Cent Aviation
The few that remain have ben
put through the Army giuund
schools, where about 90 per cent
Army and 10 per cent aviation Is
taught. In the Navy. when air Of
ficers are examined FOR promotion,
the Questions consist Of Naval SUBJ
jects, hardly 10 per cent pertaining
to aeronautics. Even IL their
courses contained more aeronautical
instructions, 1t would be impossible
to give air men the real theory.
What an air force must have IN.
stilled into It is the policy Of meet
ing and keeping hostile forces.
whether land, water or air forces,
away from the touch Of q hostile
foot or the shadow 81 an enemy
plane.
So, we see two significant factors
in the decline Of our Air Eervice-
not only are the mammoth sums APP
propriated for its use swallowed up
In the NAV OF the Army ard Navy
system, but the men put into aVia-
ton are constantly deteriOrating IN
the conception of its use and in
their ability to vision wl1at will be
done with it in the future. They
are tied to the infantry on the
ground and the battlesilip on the
water, both of which have reccded
in relative importance tremendo lousy.
Coast Defense Mostly Obsolete
IT we were to assign d compare
tive value to air power, land power
and sea power. as assets to the
state in case OF war, 1t would not
be an1iss to count air power at so
per cent, the army as 30 per cent
and the navy as 20 per cent.
Forces Of retrogression, and al.
tempts to protect and continue an
cient customs, theories, and inter-
ests, seem more rife in the Ameri-
can Army and Navy than in the
services OF any other country,
The coast artillery, another branch
of the Armyss defensive system, is
distributed with its heavy guns
among some 90 stations along our
coasts. In the ten years preceding
1920, coast defense Of all kinds in
the United States cost about $2,-
00O, 000, 900. The greater proportion
OF its equipment Is obsolete and the
position of its stations of small
military value. 1t would be SEN
sible procedure for the United
States to sell most of these and take
the money and convert II to other
uses.
The Navy maintains about 20
navy yards, representing an invest
Ement OF something like 81, 500, O00, 900.
The upkeep and depreciation OF
these yards runs into tremendous
figures. Al great many are en-
tirely useless, being too small to
accommodate modern vessels.
Thus 1t may be seen that In spite
OF paying into our national insir-
ance company about one.third of the
total national income, we are con-
fronted with the dismaying pros
pect OF its bankrupt condition. as
far as concerns its ability to de-
fend us, and with the further
| knowledge that every day 1t is
getting worse In its theory Of how
we should be protected. In apprais-
ing the value OF our national In
surance company, therefore, we find
| that Il can pay 80 cents on the dol
lar for the Army, 90 cents on the
dollar for the Navy, but nothing
for the Air Force. Hence, It Is
!: only worth about so cents on the
dollar, and cannot protect us In
case 1t is called upon.
Copyright. 1925. by the Bell
Syndicate, Incl
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