The Daily Alaska empire. [volume] (Juneau, Alaska) 1926-1964, 1926-12-28
ComfesSes KilIimg Wife and EIGHT 4Eebchihd1em
STOCK MARKET At CLOSE
or PRESENT YEAR BETTER
THIN At CLOSE OF 1925

| of the severest reactions in stock ex-
| change history last March, and in
dications of slowing down in some
| major lines of business in 1927, the
general level of stock prices at the
I close of the year is well above that
! at the end of 1925. Bond prices have
risen to the highest levels since
1913. In both the bond and stock
markets, the total volume of bust
/ ness in 1926 was slightly below that
! of 1925
The major trerl Of stock prices
has been upward since the early
summer of 1924 although the big
bull" movement did not get under
way until after the Presidential elec
ton that year. A the beginning of
1926 prices were rising and continued
that way, with g few minor inter
ruptions, until late in February when
heavy liquidating movement started,
eliminating in the disastrous March
break which reduced quoted values
of listed securities several billion
dollars in the aggregate.
Charp Reaction
Alternate periods of weakness and
strength characterized the late spring
markets, with a rather definite up
ward tendency apparent again by
early summer This continued until
the early fall when another sharp
reaction TOOK place. In the closing
months of the year prices started
to climb again. the industrial aver
age touching the highest level ever
recorded in the.xiast mouth of the
year
While it is generally conceded that
the trend OF business and money
rates undoubtedly will determine the
movement of security prices in 1927
competent observers of market COZ
ditions are more qualified than usual
at this season of the year. Indicating
widespread Uncertainty Those com
mitted to the cycle theory of busi-
ness and market trends naturally
look for downward readjustment
Of values while others see nothing
in fundamental conditions that would
warrant a general recession, although /
admitting that irregularities may de-
velop in certain lines.
Sources of Uneasiness
Three principal sources of uneasi- |
ness are: -. the huge volume of !
bank funds invested in securities; |
p, the rapid growth of installment |
buying, and -. the low price of |
commodities, particularly cotton In.
ability of business and commercial
channels to absorb the huge imports
of gold within the last few years. |
necessitating the employment of
lunds derived from its sale in the !
securities markets, is believed to be |
responsible for the gigantic invest |
ment of banks in stocks and bonds. |
While methods of financing install |
ment purchases undoubtedly haze |
been improved and strengthened in
the last year or two, the extensive |
use of this method particularly in
the purchase of motor cars. radios |
and other luxuries, is regarded as |
source of danger in some quarters. |
and it is generally conceded that I
the real test of the system will not
come until the country enters a
period of general depression. The de
cline in commodity prices is feared
largely because of its adverse effect
ON purchasing power. particularly in
the agricultural regions.
Favorable factors in the situation
as the year draws to close are:
an abundance of credit at relatively
low rates; comparatively low in
ventories, resulting largely from So
called hand to mouth" buying and
quick and efficient transportation. in
creasing industrial efficiency, especi-
ally through the more general use
OF labor and time saving devices;
absence of any serious labor disputes
and generally high rate of EN-
ployment, and gradual economic re-
habilitation abroad
Steel Shares Fiuke
On the other side of the ledger
are: slowing down in steel pro-
duction and building construction,
| the low price of cotton; increasing
foreign competition; the relatively
low margin OF profit in many indus
tries, and the large volume of brok-
ers' loans.
Steel shares, as a group, failed
to make much progress although
United States Steel common sold
at the highest price ON record in
reflection OF an, unusually prosperous
peace time year, despite the lower