Evening star., 1926-02-07

~ Y OTHING seems more patent
now than that the United
VI States Is at last, after q long
L period of suspicion and dis
trust Of Europe, showing
markedly striking interest not alone
In European questions. but in Ameri
can cooperation with Europe. Not
since the Washington conference. and
possibly not since the Paris peace
conference itself, has there been sny
such readiness to consider American
relations with Europe on the basis
of cooperation.
Not merely has It boon demonstrat-
ed that large majority Of the Senate
Is in favor Of American adherence
to the World Court, but the sending
of an American delegation to the pre-
limtnary arms conference In Geneva
in February has not even aroused the
familiar protests from those who re-
main extreme isolationists. Broadly
speaking, 1t seems fair to say that
there IS at the moment a general
readiness to make new experiment
in the matter OF cooperating with
Europe; to make the arms conference
which is to come, not the preliminary
but the real conference, something Of
n test, Of an object lesson TO prove
that such cooperation is possible, or
impossible, as the case may be.
Offers Difficult Problem.
Since, If only to a limited degree
and to consider a single problem. we
are going back to Europe, the i'm
portance of the conference i:sef in
influencing our later course and Shap-
Ing our future policy toward Euro
pean questions and conference must
be obviously great. On the other
hand, the mere fact that the prob
a nf liyf1{ of In,
the main European is going TO make
IL excessively difficult for US TO con
tribute anything of value to results
without becoming more or less dan
gerously involved IN political and
purely European political adjustments.
The late President Wilson went to
Paris convinced that the mak.rg OF
q just and permanent peace would
be relatively simple, because what
ever difficulties might be raised by the
European politicians, whom he dis
trusted, he had only to appeal over
the heads of the politicians TO the
various publicS to get a response
which would make his views personal
and confouhd and destroy the Euro
| pean politicians who undertook to OBJ
struct.
Nothing was more familiar 10 the
Americans who like myself We're at the
Paris conference than the assertion
coming from Mr.. Wilson's closest
friends that he had but to appeal to
the French public. for example. to
bring about the downfall of Clemen-
ceau. 1t was with this idea firmly fixed
in his mind that Mr.. Wilson ultimate.
ly did appeal to the Italian people on
the Fiume issue. asking them to sup
port his views against those of Sonino
and Orlando. The result is. of course
known now Sonino and Orlando quit
Paris, the italian people rallied to
their views, not to those of Mr.. vii
son, with a passion which was bewil-
dering to those who shared Mr.. VII
sons expectation. And in due course
Of time Fiume passed to Italy.
Will Encounter Conflicts.
Now, when our delegation goes 70
/ any new arms conference, nothing is
more inevitable than that 1t will en-
counter, not the mere diversities OF
opinion which represent differences
: in personal views without regard tc
+ nationality. but the conflicts between
interests which are based upon fun
damental considerations. This is the
. more inevitable since for ourselves the
: discussion of the limitation Of arma
, ments is almost, il not absolutely, aca
demic. No political question Is in
, volved.
! Take the case OF Germany. Ger
! many must in the nature OF things
come TO Geneva with a very definite
. purpose to undertake TO impose upor
r her conquerors the same drastic cut
lin ar1namentS which was imposed
, upon her by the treaty Of Versailles
. She cannot legally increase her ar
mics, but quite patiently she can eS
, cape the disadvantages under Whlcf
| she labors, as the single great power
a actually disarmed in the midst OF
states which by contrast rematr
easurably armed. The full conse
ouences Of defeat will be escaped II
she can disarm her neighbors, and
particularly France and Poland.
! Nothing would be more easy, then
= than for Germany to enlist the sup
port of an American delegation whicl
8 is aiming at contributing to consid
erable reduction of armies, but this
: support would in reality be the sup
g tport not of a principle of disarmament
: but actually of a German policy tC
: escape from the most disagreeable ant
3, perhaps the most intolerable of all the
I restrictions placed upon her by de
f feat.
l Dispute Over Submarine.
: Again, nothing would be simpler
: than for our delegation to become in
t tween the French and the British over
Q the submarine. France, Italy and 6
4 number Of the smaller countries are
t l1bound to refuse to consider the ban
lining Of the submarine as a weapor
of war. That Is because they regard
it, given the state Of their treasures
and of their resources, as the single
weapon for naval defense which Is
available. The British, on the con
J trary, are just as sure to press for the
banning Of this weapon, because 1t Is
] the single threat to their naval su
Ipremacy and security in Europe.
Mr.. Hughes, during the Washing
I ton conference, like Mr.. Wilson al
Paris, with the best intentions in the
= world found himself suddenly become
!, the victim Of European quarrel be
tween France and Britain which hac
}. been going on for two years. Believ
= ing that the question of naval limra
!, ltion was an absolute question, not IL
= the main q political issue, he suddenly
saw his conference transformed intt
!. something like a bear garden, In whicf
the disputes between the French an6
}. British threatened to wreck every
8 thing.
t And in the end he failed, as did Mr.
Y Wilson in the Fiume matter, because
s public sentiment in France supported
= BRAND and the stand the French rep
= resentatives had taken in the matter
! Of the submarine. Because We seemed
!. to support the British position
against the French, the resentment
of France was so universal that II
ment would ratify the limited agree
:, ments made at Washington, and
q French resentment has survived sc
) completely that 1t is wholly doubtful