Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1926-08-10
Clemenceau's Letter.

President Coolidge has met the open
letter of former Premier Clemenceau
OF France on the subject of the war
debt settlement with the simple state
ment that the United States will con
tinue to conduct its relations with the
French people on all questions through
their duly constituted diplomatic au
thorities. In other words. it has been
made plain that the United States will
not recognize the voice of Clemenceau
as that Of France.
The war debt settlement effected by
Ambassador Berenger and Secretary
Mellon, now pending before the
French Parliament for ratification, is
to be regarded for the present as the
final adjustment. 1t may be rejected
by the French people through their
legislative representatives. Clemen-
ceau's letter may prove to be a means
of effecting that rejection. But mean
while that letter is to be regarded as
addressed to the French government
and not to the President of the United
States. 1t cannot be needed here of.
ficially.
There can be no reopening of the
matter by the Washington Govern
ment pending action by France. Gle
menceau of course knows this He
knows that he has in effect appealed
to France and not to the United
States. If France rejects the settle
ment, or seeks it's material amend
ment, the case comes back to Wash
ington. Public sentiment in this coun-
try may be affected by the Clemen-
ceau appeal, or protest, as it may be
viewed. 1t may have been affected
already. But there is no way for 1t to
manifest as the case stands.
The conclusion is inevitable that
Clemenceau's purpose in writing his
extraordinary letter, giving it public
ity in advance of its receipt by the
President, was to affect French polit-
ical conditions. It was obviously aimed
at the Poincare program of fiscal re-
form. which has thus far proceeded
satisfactorily through its legislative
stages. 1t was designed to consolidate
sentiment in France against ratifica-
ton of the debt agreement.
Heretofore the main difficulty about
the French financial situation has
been the disposition of leaders in that
country to make political capital. Re
peated ministerial dissolutions have
been due to the inability Of successive
premiers to secure support for their
programs Of readjustment. In final
emergency the task was given to Poin-
care. supported by a national" min
istry, comprising representatives of
all parties and groups. 1t has been
successful in putting through a series
of enactments and the fiscal condi-
lions have been in consequence great
ly improved. The franc has risen in
exchange value by a substantial per-
centage. But 1t is significant that i'm
IOilOWul6 lhC PoOAASeAeAoAA Va
the Clemenceau letter the franc
dropped in value appreciably.
Reputation by France and cancel
lation by the United States of the war
debt are both probably out Of the
question. The present agreement rep
resents large concessions by both
sides. That it has less chance of rat
ification by the French Parliament
now than before the Clemenceau let
ter was published appears likely. But
there is small chance that 1t Will cause
any material change in the American
public feeling, especially in view Of
the manner in which it was put forth
and the obvious purpose Of its pres
onfofi0n