Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1926-08-01
EUROPEAN DEBACLE SEEN
UNLESS U. S. INTERVIEWS
Financial Crisis Over Debts Compared
With Dark Days of 1917 When America
Turned Tide to Victory.

and Europe has the new loans, then
the real crisis will arrive and we
shall have lost our last weapon or
coercion. Thereafter, / think, we
shall be exceedingly lucky If we are
able to collect the commercial loans;
as for the war loans, they will be-
come as obsoleteNas Fenian bonds or
Confederate currency.
Our policy of debt collection Is
Just as bankrupt as the French
policy of reparations. We cannot
collect and we have to face the fact.
Meantime, because our people have
not been educated to the fact, our
Government does not dare to act on
the basis Of fact and we are treated
to the spectacle of steadily rising
and fusing European anger, which
already expresses itself in a variety
of relatively ridiculous reprisals,
such as political denunciation, press
criticism and occasional acts OF
violence against American tourists.
And this is only the beginning.
The nation which really has US at
its mercy is the British, because 1t
is saying it is immune from any
American criticism. but 1t Is in the
perfect position to rally the continent
against us. We are making the
British pay through the nose; they
are paying, but they are also giving
the whole continent the lead In what
is becoming continent-wids cam
paign against the United States.
Poincare Last Resources.
Turning now abruptly 10 the
French situation, one is bound to
recognize at once that a Poincare
ministry is the last resource OF
France. If anything is 70 be saved
from the ruins II must be saved now
and without further shllly-shallying.
For the present situation a. measure
of responsibility must be charged
against the new premier. He was
prime minister of France for a con-
siderable time-from the fall OF the
BRAND ministry over the Cannes pro-
posals to the election of May, 1924.
In that time the ex-president was
guilty of two fatal blunders. 1t Is
possible still to debate the occupation
of the Ruhr as a necessary step; it
is impossible now or ever to deny
that when the Germans did sur
render in September, 1923, Poincare
was not ready to take advantage OF
the situation. He could not make
peace and the situation dragged, to
the very great cost Of France. More
over, he was at least compromised by
his failure to stamp upon the first
moves in the lamentable Rhineland
separation intrigue.
But the real criticism of Poincare
rests on the fact that for more than
two years, while he had power and
a solid bloc behind him in the
Chamber, he did nothing to meet the
financial problems, and the crisis of
1924, the first real crisis in the franc,
came upon him Unexpectedly. He did
act then courageously and energeti-
cally, but 1t was too late; the country
was not alive to the situation and
unwilling to carry the burdens i'm
posed.
Once Before Met Crisis.
Poincare is honest, obstinate, dull,
with a routine mind. no imagination
and a very narrow and parochial
view of foreign affairs. But he is
safe, sane, logical and, IL timid a.
the outset, obstinate when the de-
cision has been made. He has no
personal following and no real popu-
larity. But once before he was
called to liquidate frightful mess In
which the name of Caillaux was
prominent. 1t was with a ministry OF
AL the talents that he came to
power after Agadir in 1911 and pres
emily passed on to the presidency.
But the French problem now has
gone beyond personalities and it is
not even limited to France. If the
financial situation cannot be remedied
without a. debacle like that in Ger
many some very grave CONFUSION in
France is far from unlikely. The
Germans, beaten in the war and
broken by the Ruhr defeat, crushed
mentally and morally. submitted to
the ruin following the collapse of the
mark with complete passivity. The
middle class was practically annihi-
lated. the masses suffered misery not
yet fully appreciated abroad.
In recent visits to France / have
been told over and over again that
the French people would never submit
passiveIy to q similar strain, that the
bourgeoisie would never go to ex.
tinction with the sheeplike fesigna.
ton of the German. Without attempt.
Ing any forecast, then, one must
appreciate at once that a French col.
lapse might easily bring new con.
vulsion, which, would in no sense be
limited to France.
Effect on U. s. Of Collapse.
''If we go down we shall not go
down aloner' How often has this been
said to me by Frenchmen, and how
frequently 1t has been the burden Of
bitter articles in the French pressl
Moreover, up to the moment Poin-
care was called. France had been GO
Ing down with ever-increasing "a
pidity. A real collapse in France
might, then, prove the final act In
the world catastrophe. the twelfth
anniversary of which is just at hand.
II such catastrophe did arrive, we
should certainly lose all that we have
put into Europe in the past dozen
years, and in addition most Of the
markets on that continent, which are
the chief elements In our foreign
trade.
That is why we are certain now to
be faced with the inevitable inquiry
as to what we are going to do to
assist In the prevention of a new and,
perhaps, general collapse. France can.
not be saved now without some Anneri-
can assistance. Great Britain has
every reason to wish to avert q
French collapse, and is alive to its
repercuSsions upon herself, but she Is
far too grayely compromised at home
to he able to act alone. On the other
hand, 1t is exceedingly doubtful II
Poincare can save the situation, II It
involves acceptance Of the Mellon
Berenger debt settlement Certainly
the majority of his supporters and the
majority OF the present Chamber have
been up to the present hour against
that arrangement.
We are likely to be brought soon
face to face with the issue: Shall we
stoically insist. that France take the
debt settlement oath before we per-
NIT any financial aid to come to her
from this side of the Atlantic. even
IL her government is unable to per-
suade the country to accept such
bargain? To take this line might
easily lead to the complete disaster
which Is now at least in SIGHT. But