Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1926-01-03
ARMS CUT NOT PROBLEM
OF PEACE, BUT ECONOMY
Present Period of No Fear Is Best Time
to Work for Ultimate Security Of
Europe, Simonds Thinks.


their forces upon a state of relative
security. AS a consequence, Poland
at the end of next year Will have an
army larger than the French Eu-
ropean force and Rumania a force
at least equally large, although Poland
has q. population of but 5000 900,
against 100000 for France, while
Runania has but 10000 900.
Larger Nations Worried.
Unless, however, Poland, Rumania
and Czechoslovakia can be persuaded
to reduce their armies, Russia, Ger
many and Hungary are bound to look
upon the situation with some appre-
hension. Germany is bound to refuse
to continue in q state Of relative dis
armament, with but 100000 troops al.
lowed her by treaty, while Poland not
only counts 100000 under arms but
is able to train her whole population
by universal service system, willis
Germany Is restricted to the yoIun.
tary
The Importance Of this factor may
be appreciated when il Is perceived
that, In theory, nation with the vol
untary system can mobilize for war
only the standing army which she has,
While nation which has the conscrip-
ton system can bring up all its man
PO"Cl at ilIODlllZd tlO1- Illus germany
has 100000 troops under arms now
In case Of war hereafter, when the
veterans OF the last war have become
TOO old TO serve, she would have but
100000. But Poland would not alone
mobilize the 800, 900 which constitute
her army. but 1,000,0 900 more trained
troops, belonging to the more recent
classes of conscripts.
Our own Government has, then. Der.
cetved with clarity that the discussion
Of disarmament in Europe will not be
a simple arrangement Of the method
or laying down arms. 1t will, by con
traSt, be IA complicated and balanced
arrangement, If any comes. And the
question Of whether there will be any
arrangement depends upon the extent
to which political and other adjust,
ments can be made between European
states. No one, of course, is going To
disarm absolutely. What can be hoped
for at most is some adjustment Of the
armies of all the considerable states
which will permit Of very considera.
BILE net diminution of the total Of mel
under arms in Europe.
Adjustment Not Easy.
But such an adjustment ia not easy.
II 1t We're made upon the basis OF
population the Russian Army would
at once outnumber the French and
German combined. Moreover. the
Polish and Rumanian forces, by con
trast with the German and Russian.
would become insignificant If It were
made by the agreement of the first.
class powers to accept a common limit
there would still be the reluctance OF
the relatively less considerable powers
TO accept condition of hopeless In
feriority.
Again, any standard accepted by
great powers would involve the in
crease of the German strength beyond
the limits imposed by the treaty of
| Versailles, which restrict Germany to
force no more than that now main
tanned by Belgium. To arrive at 4
/ system Of limitation and reduction or
armies IL is essential first to find =
standard Of measurement which shall
| bear relation not alone 10 the size
! of nations, but also to their respective
| dangers
The protocol undertook to bridge ali
| these difficulties by boldly committing
all nations to the defense of any mem.
Der attacked. Thus the strength of
all armies was available for the pro.
| lection Of each member nation. Bur
the protocol has been rejected through
British influence, and the single sub
stltute Is a system of regional agree
LiciilS. buI lNeT6 Is 4 new obstacle
If Poland and Rumania make a re
gional agreement for common defense
! against Russia. then Russia Will be
| bound at the least to maintain an
army large enough to deal with both
Rumanian and Polish armies. Then
Hungary might be tempted to make
| an agreement with Russia, which
would instantly alarm Rumania and
call for a new increase in Rumaniap
| strength.
Guarantees Demanded.
The tendency of all continental nae
tons, with the exception of Germany.
which is dtsarmed, together with her
allies of the war, will be to meet all
arguments for the limitation of arma-
/ mentS with demands for guara rtees
| OF their security in case of attack
| after reduction Britain and America,
! which are bound in the nature Of
Things to be the protagonists of re-
| duction, are thus likely to be faced
steadily with demands for guarantees.
And 1t is their possibility which Ameri-
can instructions have wisely foreseen
Despite all expectation to the con-
| trary, little real progress is likely to
| be made in the actual reduction of
armed strength at any early confer
ence. Every nation in Europe at the
present time is maintaining it's army
without aggressive intent. This Is true
both because no nation has the re.
| sources, financial or economic, for q
new war and because the peoples
of all countries are at present In
| an utterly peaceful state of mind.
Fear, and not aggressive purposes
alone, explains armies.
1t follows, then, that all countries
| are eager to reduce their armies be-
cause they constitute burdens which
are well nigh intolerable. The proof
| of this lies in the course of France
| and Belgium, which have reduced
their armies and are still reducing
them, precisely as they are obtaining
| security by other means. But no
nation will reduce its army unless it
| feels that it will run no risk by such
reduction. And as long as a confer.
| ence can offer no guarantee and no
| insurance it can present no effec-
| tive argument for reduction. There
| is the main obstacle. On the other
| hand. what q conference of all can.
| not do, separate conferences, like
Locarno, between several nations, can
bring about and probably will.
Naval Difficulties.
On the side Of naval limitation the
| difficulties are quite as plain. Battle.
| ship strength Is now regulated by the
! Washington agreements. But as to
! cruisers the agreement covers sizS
| but not numbers An agreement as
| to numbers on the basis of the Wash
ington ratios Is not easy, however,
| because the needs of nations vary.
Britain, with her enormous commercial
! feet, her extended empire and her
| vital sea lanes, requires far more
! cruisers than a compact, self-contained
mass like the United States, which
cannot be blockaded in the sense of