Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1926-12-26
REICHSTAC FIGHT SHOWS
GERMAN REPUBLIC STRONG
Vitality of Nation Demonstrated; Lo-
carno Seen as Releasing Democratic
Forces of Young Republic.

10y
Is, had there been no allied armies Of
occupation and no complete ruin of
German economic and financial sys-
TENS as a result of imitation, 1t Is hard
to believe that there would not have
been in 1928 another attempt to re-
store the monarchy, such az had
actually been made earlier in the Kapp
Putsch. AS it was. all saw this to be
hopeless. .se
Peoples Party Aided.
The situation was temporarily4saved
because while the Republican parties
had Lost their majority. the party of
big business, fsthe Peoples Party,
recognizing that the recovery Of Ger
man industry and German prosperity
could. only.be possible with allied help
and alliedFloans. whichawere, promised
leans both in be@negOtiating and
later ratification Of this settlement
The Peoples Partys was on the
whole menarchistfcsadn syn1pathy
and naturally conservative IN stem
per. 1t was hostile to a Socialist
control of domestic affairs. because
such a control was inimical to sue
cessful business administration, But
although on questions of domestic
policy it normally and naturally
worked with the nationaliSts and the
monarchists, on the other hand 1t
saw quite clearly that the time had
come when it was inevitable that
Germany must break with the policy
of passive resistance which had so
far, TO be sure. prevented the col
lection of all considerable repara-
ton, but had also ruined Germany.
Headed by the first great German
statesman of the postwar period.
Gustav Stresemann. the Peoples
Party interviewed, giving its ale
glance to the republic in the domes-
tic field, because 1t saw all real ad-
iustment of conditions with the allies
would be impossible if the monarchy
were restored and openly adopted
the policy of conference and settle
ment with the allies in the field OF
foreign policy.
Broad Policy Undertaken.
But Stresemann and his group had
no idea of mere acceptance OF the
allied views without return to Ger
many. They undertook the broad
policy of making fulf1llment OF rea-
sonable conditions the price OF OBJ
tanning the rapid freeing of Ger
many from the most onerous and in
tolerabIe of the burdens resulting
from the war, such as continued
occupation, military supervision and
above all the allied policy of treat
ing the Germans as morally IN
ferior people.
For a long time the Stresemann
policy, for It may fairly be called
that, Was an experiment which was
II. n. .ss=sl ~ Car
mans. who now believed that the
allies meant to turn victory into a
steady policy of keeping Germany
in subsection. In this time the new
combination of parties which sup
piled the cabinet was just as power
less as all predecessors in dealing
with the nationalist and military ele-
ments which continued in military
affairs to .evade all disarmament
provisions of the.streaty of peace.
Whatever may have been the actual
wish of the cabinet, 1t was powerless
In the presence of public sentiment.
But, little by little, the fact became
clear that peace was to be obtained
on conditions which left German re-
covery. possible. The evacuation of
the first zone of the Rhineland last
year gave a final refutatfon to- the
charge that the French meant to stay
on that river always and to annex the
German lands on the left bank. The
working of the Dawes plan and the
coming Of allied loans enabled Ger
man business. and finance to recover,
although the stabil zation period was
marked by great depression and suf-
fering. 7 : s 49,
Locarno Final Step.
Finally In the Locarno negotiations
German delegates were at last re-
ceived upon the basis of full equality.
Stresemann, BRAND and Chamberlain
sat down as equals to discuss the
future organization Of European peace.
The moral effect of this change is
hardly. to be calculated by any one
who does not know the German feel
ing. At Versailles the German dele
gates had been summoned as crimi-
mails to receive sentence: unheard, they
had been sentenced, and under CO.
ercion they had been forced to sign
a confession of guilt. which at one
time the German people repGdiated
and conceived made of them a; pariah
people, 4Hssss' 40 sasi>42,k -
With the making of the Isocafno
pacts. the republic at. last recovered
a measure of authority and power
within its own country. 1t began to
be associated in the popular mind
not with the period Of degradation
which contested SO unhappily with the
era of European power under the em.
pire, but with months and even years
during which recovery was taking
place-recovery at home and abroad.
The Stresemann policy had amounted
to a declaration to the German peo-
pie that Germany could be saved BY
a. policy of cooperation with the con-
fhot ha
other way, and that incident to the
salvation would come the restoration
OF Germany to the rank and position
belonging of right to a nation OF So.
600, 900 OF people, the most consider
able and powerful group, after the
Russian, which was out of the reckon.
ing, on the continent Of Europe.
4 Momentary Reaction Felt.
The delay in the admission Of Ger
many to the League of Nations last
March produced a momentary reac-
tlon, hut the events OF last September
restored the balance. Germany at
last could feel that despite the defeat
in the war and despite the sentence Of
Versailles, she had escaped alike the
national destruction and the enduring
national humiliation which had been
to the German mind threatened, There
remained the necessity to push for
ward with the Stresemann policy to
obtain evacuation of German soil by
occupying armies, which would nor
mally stay until 1926, and at the same
time to transfer military supervision
from allied hands to those Of the
Leagues: -.
Meantime, however. an inevitable
change was taking place within the
nation. The Socialists, the Democrats,
most of the Clericals, were from the
very nature Of things opposed alike to
mi1itarism and to military methods.
They had been silenced before by the
fact that to attack alb evasions were