Evening star., 1926-02-07
DISARMAMENT i. S. IDEAL;
BARGAIN BAG FOR EUROPE
Totally Different Attitudes on Each
Side of Water Complicates :
Situation Badly.

arInameDt-nlay Iedu ~ iliIo =
sort of complication. With US the
question of limitation of armamentS is
one of limiting ornaments; with Eu-
rope it is a political issue. perhaps
one may say il more exactly II one
indicates that the several European
nations by reason Of varying inter
ests and conditions are constantly op-
posed TO each other in all fields, ana
that an arms conference is bound To
be one more place where the COLLISION
of interests makes itself felt.
The continental states, which keep
considerable armies because they re-
gard them as necessary TO their Sc
curity, are in the nature of things
bound TO meet any British argument
for limitation Of armies by coun
ter-offensive in the direction Of naval
limitation. But the British, while
having profound reasons for desiring
the reduction of continental armies,
have similar reasons for refusing 20
reduce their fleets Germany, being
unable to increase her army, has
every reason for advocating the limit
of reduction of armies and Of naVies
for the same reason. But her reason
is political just as the British reason
with respect to continental armies Is
political.
VIII Be Market Place.
Every European conference is for
European nations a bargain counter
d market place. Each nation buys
and sells. This was true at Paris IN
1919; 1t has been true ever since
More thar that, it Is q place where
nations undertake TO sell dear and
buy cheap. To do this all have re
sort to the invocation of any moral
principle which may seem useful 10
their cause. Therefore the relatively
small results which are attained al
conferences represent the fruits of in
finite bargaining and no end of bluff
ing and naneuvering.
AT Paris in the peace conference
at Washington during the arms con
ference, the constant effort OF the
British and of the French was to en-
list American support for the pc
Cuiarly national ends each country
sought 70 attain. The French came
here convinced that they would bs
able TO support Us against the Brit,
ish. The British, on the whole, We're
able very successfully to throw US
against the French. But the British
success was one OF the main ca uses of
the fall of BRAND and the arrival OF
Poincare. who took his revenge for the
Washington failure of France by max
Ing the British conference at Genoa
an even more abysmal failure.
France in Syria.
In the Paris conference the British
/ did not want the French to obtain the
mandate for Syria. because thev had
promised Syria to their Arab allies
and hoped to construct a Brittsh-con-
troiled Arab state over all Of the area
between the Mediterranean and Per
! STA. Therefore the whole effort Of
! British diplomacy was 10 throw us
into the breach and make US oppose
! the French mandate as contrary to
Mr.. Wilson's Il points 1t was nor
| because the British believed in the
| peculiar sacredness OF the IA points
| but because Britain didn't wanr
France In Syria, just as France ana
Britain both drew US into the quarrel
with Italy, because neither wanted
Italy at Ffume. But the French in
the case OF Syria and the Italians il
the case OF ffume bitterly resented
our interference and saw in It uerel,
the success OF British diplomacy.
An arms conference at which ali
Europe IS represented will be only
incidentally a meeting to consider the
limitation or armaments. 1t will be O.
| new meeting Of all the diverse and
! conflicting national elements. We
/ snail be again in the vortex of tradi-
tional and inevitable collisions Of ma
| tlonal interests and of vital policies
| Every state there represented viii
naturally seek the powerful adyar,.
tage OF our support and will endeaynr
TO get II by adopting that part of any
| american program which does nor
run counter TO national interests
Fight Against Submarine.
Thus. for example, the British al,
sure to endeaVor TO persuade US 10
Join them in an effort TO outlaw tn.
submarine. This means that they viii
seek TO enlist our support nominally
for an abstract principle, but actually
tor a political end, namely, to abolish
that weapon which, in case of a new
war, might be as DANGEROUS TO the
| British security as it was in the last
90 not mean to suggest that there
| IS something diabolically wicked in
the British course. Nothing of the
! sort. 1t might we'll be a question OF
| lie or death for them again as II Ger.
| tainly was in 1917. Therefore any pa
tflotlc Brlton Is bound as a matter oF
mere duty to take this line.
! In exactly the same way ever,
! German will hope and work TO thu.
end that American influence shall h.
directed against all conscript armies
and TO bring about a situation IL,
which Germany shall once more stand
on equality with her conquerors OF
the World War. She will argus for
disarmament In the broadest sense
because she IS disarmed, and could
only be armed again when French
| and Polish armies We're reduced t.
levels corresponding with hers. But
such reduction would actually re
suit in enhancing, not reducing, Ger
man ornaments.
| France, Poland, CzechoSlovakia, all
the armed nations with very real res
! sons for maintaining their arma-
ments at the levels fixed by their
own estimates Of their dangers, will
| obviously meet American arguments
for the limitation of armaments by-
! the demand for American guarantees
in case the reduction Is followed by
attack. What is more, they will Ger
tainly join the American delegates
in any campaign TO bring down the
British naval strength in the field Of
cruisers, for example.
In Confusing Position.
Our delegates, then, are bound t.
be in the rather confusing position
Iiof finding themselves supported on
certain items in any disarmament
program by one or more nations
! Willie oPpoSel Oll olilel itSilS ny lHS
same nations. Mr.. Wilson had just
that experience when he found thar
turn and turn about he faced either
the enthusiastic acceptance or the
passionate rejection of some of his
fourteen points. He was further en-
barra ssed by the totally different in
depreciation given to several of the
fourteen points by the respective
nationalities.
| One is accustomed to read in many
American journals that "the way to
| disarm is to disarm." This wholly
| simple formula is going to make the