Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1926-12-20

me recent spectacular advance oil
| me French franc must be reckoned
as having certain clear political con-
| sequences in addition to many econ
| omic and financial effects. And, OF
course, the first of these political con
! sequences is further to harden French
| public and political opinion against
| the Mellon Berenger debt settlement
When l was in Paris in the last
| DAYS of September it was very frankly
| said that Poincare, either deliberately
| or because of innate cautions, had
missed the moment for ratification, be-
I cause already the franc had ma
! terially improved. In word, what
was meant was that the single change
for ratification grew out of the panic
| condition of the first days of the Poirr
care regime. when the mere prospect
of a new Merriot cabinet had already
| sent the franc below cents.
At that moment the French Parlia.
ment literally abdicated in a terror
! which was not little stimulated by
| the mobs which gathered outside the
| Palais Bourbon, the building in which
! the French Chamber meets, and ex-
/ pressed their sentiments in cries
which translated meant that Herriot
should be thrown into the Seine. In
have put through the Chamber any
proposal, even the Mellon-Berenger
treaty.
But today the franc has very nearly
doubled from the low point of the
Summer. And this has been accom-
plished without any resort to Amer
lean financial aid. Therefore the
popular conception, however err
roneous, is that American support is
not necessary. And it is emphatically
true that the single weighty argu-
ment for the ratification of the debt
settlement consisted in the assertion
that the franc and thus the French
financial situation could only be saved
by American money, which was not
to be obtained save as a consequence
of debt ratification.
What was said to me in September
was that 1t would not be possible to
obtain ratification on the present
terms unless there should be a new
panic, new collapse of the franc
and a new imperative necessity for
American loans. But with the franc
at Its present level none of these
circumstances exist, and as was to be
expected, opposition to the debt settle.
ment, which never had any popular
or political support, has again become
overwhelming.
One must recognize, too, that on the
whole 1t has been an exceedingly ad.
vantageous thing for France that the
restoration of the franc has heen
achieved without mourning new for.
elgn obligations. Had it been possible
10 OBTAIN American loans easily, many
OF the necessary reforms. much of
the required economy would not have
been provided and the fundamental
situation would not have been i'm
proved.
X * X x
There remains, of course, the larger
question as to whether France can
stabilize without the support of for
elgn and particularly of American
finance. Great Britain, with her in
t1nitely greater strength, was not able
TO do 1t. Nevertheless, when he took
ONCE, Poincare was convinced that
under his leadership and through the
prestige of his name. France could
save herself. and there is plain reason
IN what has happened since to for
fify him in his CONVICTION.
Yet, despite present achievement. it
remains true that no really hopeful
attempt can be made to stabilize un-
til the question of the floating and
short-time debt is settled. As long as
there are notes to the value of billions
OF francs maturing at short intervals
and the holders are entitled to de.
mand cash. the situation IS precarious.
despite the fact that the budget has
been balanceH and that for the first