Evening star., 1926-06-04

judging from first Impressions on re-
turning from Europe and from the
more or less official utterances OF our
Government at the moment OF the
opening of the Geneva conference TO
consider the question of limiting arma-
ments, the American view Is still miles
apart from the European. The diner
ence may be summed up in the state
ment that in America there Is lively
hope and even expectation that some
thing definite can be accomplished al
frmatively at Geneva, while in Eu-
rope not only is there little or no
hope Of progress. but great apprehen'
sion less evil may come rather tina n
good.
Europe. speaking broadly. does not
believe that the present hour Is pro-
pitious for precipitating a discussion
Enthusiastically fraught with grave pos
sibilities The European view is that
armies will be reduced only when the
state Of mind Is such that fear and
suspicion are diminished. 1t does not
believe YOU help peace by undertaking
+! to reduce armies. but that with the de-
velopment OF an atmosphere OF peace
armies will be reduced. In word. IT
does not see armies as an evidence OF
militarism. but as a proof Of interna-
tional distrust.
There is. moreover, one obvious
da niger at the outse Germany is very
largely disarrned az a consequence Of
the peace treaty. and the increase OF
German military and naval strength
are rigidly prohibited. All this repre-
sents the effort to give security 10
Germanys neighbOrs in the peace set
tlement Since she cannot arm again.
however, nothing is more inevitable
than that Germany should seek TO
bring about the reduction OF the
armies of her neighbors. and she has
a good case in the language of the
peace treaty itself, which In imposing
disarmament upon her definitely
stated that this was To he step In
general disarmament.
Looking to the future. every one
knows that Germany will not stay dis
armed II her neishbors retain large
: armies. and that it will be impossible
to impose such a condition upon Ger
MANY. But for the moment 1t is
equally clear that insofar as Germany
can promote the reduction of the
! armies of Franco Polan and Czecho-
slovakia. she will in effect destroy the
| security these peoples obtained
| through the peace treaties. And
despite the general improvement in
! the German situation abroad-that is.
the diminution of fear among her
| neighbors-the moment is still distant
when these neighbors are ready TO
! ba ndon their own means Of defense
or see German strength increased
even relatively.
X -
Obviously the United States al Ge-
neva Ia In real danger Of finding itself
rather awkwardly aligned with Ger
many on arms questions. because Ger
| many has patent practical reasons for
, urging every reduction In the arms of
her former foes. Each reduction i'm
proves the situation Of her relatively
| inconsiderable armament. Germany.
like the United States, can stand
sQuarely for every sort OF land reduc-
ton, for Germany and the United
States are both to all practical pur-
poses disarmed on land. But while the
United States has no Interior motive,
the German purpose must be plain.
1t Is only matter Of time until
the neighbors of Germany will have
to face the practical question of choos-
ing between seeing great increase In
German military strength and a sub
stantial reduction OF their own. But
It needs few years OF peace and
reviving confidence before they are
ready to make the inescapable con-
ceesion and accept reductions for
themselves Meantime active German
campaigns for dissrmtng her recent
opponents, perhaps supported by
American public opinion and Official
action, could easily arouse European
ant
were being made catSpaws.
Again, as the British have in.
dicated already. both Britain and
France have peculiar problems. mill
with great colonial empires. Apart
from their European. army. which
is certainly cut to the bone, the
British maintain a. considerable force
in India and other contingents In
their colonies. az contrasted with
their self.governing dominions. The
army in India. alone is nearly 24O, 600,
with more than $4,000 British troops.
This IL apart from the home army
of 150, 900. France has well over 200.-
600 troops in North Africa and Syria
and troops in other colonies. notably
Indo.China.
Although the situation In Inola
has improved, it is unlikely that
there can any reduction in the
British military forces at present. As.
for France, she has trouble both In
Syria and Morocco and will have to
keep large forces there. OF the 6O0,-
900 troops carried on the French rolls
with the new legislation. One-third
are native and ~ per cent are nor
mally employed in the colonies, leav-
ing $4,000 for France and the army
of Occupation on the Rhine. But both
in the case Of Britain and France. ma
tive troops from Asia and Africa can.
in emergency, be transferred to Eu-
rope. On the other hand. Germany
and Italy, without considerable COL
onies. do not need large colonial arm
les. But since British and French CD.
lonial armies can be transferred to
Europe, Italy might naturally claim
a larger home establishment, which
would again disturb the balance, be-
cause larger home establishments
would be more promptly available on
mobilization.
France and Britain then must stand
together on the issue cf colonial
Armies. Again 1he British insist upon
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