Evening star., 1926-04-04
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.

~ ENEVA.-Where does the recent Ge
neva struggle leave the League of
r Nations? This is the question which
~ is the lips of all witnesses of the
latest phase of league histo y. That
the league has suffered very grave loss of
prestige is patent to all thoughtful observers,
by whom 1t is appreciated that, so far from be-
Ing able to assist the arrangement OF the great
European problem the league not only
unable to intervene aftirmatively, but, through
interior league politics. contributed fatally to
compromise the already tangled situation.
Thus. the first clear appreciation is that in
some fashion the machinery of the league must
be modified to obviate the grave danger that
In all future crises the rival aspirations of mem
Der nations to council seats may prevent any
effective league action. In the present emer
gency had the amazing spectacle of single
South American country, because 1t was desir
Gus Of getting permanent seat on the council
vetong compromise which European states
men, after 10 days of feveriSh EFFORT, had at last
worked out.
What Brazil did illustrate is underlying
weakness of the league. There is nothing new
in IT. Two years ago when the Italian action
at Corfu reused world protest, all eyes turned
to the league for decisive action. No action was
possible because several nations which were
represented on the council and sought TO remain
in this body accurately perceived that II tney
supported any effort to take drastic action
against Italy, they would lose the Itallan VOTE
thus their council seat.
Thus at Corfu at that time affirmative action
to resolve a very real international crisis ana
to deal with an obvious threat to world peace
was frustrated, because several nations cared
more for their seats in the council than they
did for world peace itself The mere question
of position and influence on the council bulked
larger than the duty to contribute TO the resolV-
ing of q grave crisis in European affairs
Now it must be plain that If action with re
spect of the danger of war. action TO preserve
peace can be made contingent upon such
question; If the action of member nations Is to
be controlled not by the immediate question at
issue but by selfish interests; If nations are
going to resort to the process of bargaining
their votes for support within the league, even
at the moment of full crisis, the usefulness or
the league must be gravely circumscribed.
X X X
Nor Is 1t anything short of a bowling farce
that the desire of a South American country
to have permanent seat in the league should
have been able to interpose a veto to European
settlement France, Britain, Italy Germany,
after long days and nights, having reached an
adiustment-could 1t be anything less than pre-
posterous that all this work should be wasted
because Brazil technically possessed the right
TO Veto and undertook to use 1t to OBTAIN 1or
herself permanent seat in the council?
Today the machinery of the league is such
that with 10 seats in the council, and four or
those allotted to the great powers, only six re-
main for the other nations although the league
has more than so members. To get these seats
is then the chief objective of all the smaller
countries, and having obtained them, all their
efforts are directed toward retaining them.
Therefore their votes in great crises are bound
to be cast not with an eye solely TO advancing
the cause of peace, but rather to the main
chance of keeping their seats Therefore, when
ever there is a crisis affecting world peace there
is also crisis affecting the inner politics of the
league
If YOU consider that In the recent affair the
admission of Germany and the final act with
respect of the Locarno pacts were blocked be-