Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1926-06-27


rect consequence.
The protocol represented league
creation, it has been accepted by the
representatives of most. if not all. of
the nations belonging to the league.
and it had been made by the league
in session. Now the British proposed
as a substitute what ultimately
rtpened into the Locarbo Dacts. But
first of all the British idea led to
a conference outside Of the league
altogether. 1t was not the league.
but group Of powers, one of which.
namely, Germany, was not member
of the league at all, which met at
Locarno and made a series of agree
ments based upon their own per
sonal and national interests and with
small regard for anything else.
In this private. but of course not
secret arrangement. the Locarno
powers included the proviso that
Germany should be admitted to the
league and agreed that she should
have a seat on the council, the gov
erning body.
This, these powers had no right
to promise. By doing it they simply
made the league the servant of their
private agreement. just as they made
their agreement on the assumption
that the league would obediently
swallow it. 1t was for the league
to decide whether Germany should
be admitted or not. 1t was for the
league to fix the conditions, if there
were to be conditions. But actually
the assembly of the league was
merely summoned in March to regis
ter the decisions of the great powers,
which had met at Locarno along
with certain smaller powers.
ATArnnyvaY M IL
Great Britain agree that Germany
should come into the league and
have a permanent seat on the coun-
Gil as a great power, but France
and Britain also more or less agreed
that other seats should be dis
tributed to Spain, Poland. Belgium
and Brazil. Italy was interested In
SPANS case, so was Britain. France
was interested in Poland's claim
Belgium had q measure of support
from both France and Britain. But
the league was not consulted. II
was expected simply to register the
decisions of the great powers.
Germany Imposes Conditions.
Then Germany, on her side. al
though not yet a member, proceeded
to serve notice that she would not
come in at all if the number of
permanent seats was TO be increased.
At last France, Italy and Britain
were member nations who could
promise to support a candidate Tor
a permanent seat, but Germany was
not even a member and yet she was
laying down conditions.
At this point the first signs OF re-
volt on the part of the league came
with the notice served by Sweden
that she would veto all but German
claims. Sweden was then on wholly
sound ground. because she only prom
ised what she could perform and her
action was within her own rights.
What it amounted to was a declara-
ton that she would not stand for the
wholesale distribution of permanent
seats to suit the interests OF the great
powers and without regard TO the
league or the member nations.
Spain and Brazil then took up the
question. Each had long been can
didate for a permanent seat and each
had very good claims and rather
impressive array of promises OF sup
port. If Germany were not to have
permanent seat because 1t suited
French and British wishes, why
should Spain and Brazil be denied
seats? And if Poland, simply to
please France, were to have a seat,
then there was a new reason why they
should be rewarded also. Moreover
each as temporary member or the
council. had the right of veto. which
Brazil in due course of time exercised.
The Swedish veto could be dealt
with because Sweden proved in prac-
tice to be reasonable. While opposing
any increase in the number of seats.
she Welded to the adroit suggestion
that Poland might be brought in to
fill a vacancy which could be created:
But again the whole conception of
the league was prostituted to politics.
In substance, France prevailed upon
her ally, CZechoslovakia, to offer to re-
sign in favor of her other ally,
Poland, thus sacrificing a subservient
small power to her own interests
ArOuses Violent Protests.
But the maneuver of France
aroused two violent protests, one from
sincere leaguers. who saw the league
being turned into a chess board for
the great powers, the other from Ru-
mania and JugoSlavia. members or the
little entente and thus the real heirs
to the Czechoslovak seat. which in
practice had been assigned to one OF
these states habitually. And as it was
Rumania's next turn. the Rumanian
protest was loudest. In the end even
this rather inglorious device proved
useless, for Brazil stuck to her guns
and Germany was not admitted.
Now it must be clear from this
rapid review of the essential facts
that the crisis is due to something
more than the selfish ambition OF
Brazil or the unwarranted ambition of
Spain. 1t was caused, not by Brazil
ian or Spanish action, but by the
great powers, and in fact by France
and Britain, who went outside OF the
league altogether and made a bargain
with Germany for German admission
into the league, without any warrant
from the league.
IOearno itself was very significant
and Important step in European pacifi-
cation, provided it could be or can be
translated into fact. But the fashion
in which it was made discloses in
stantly the real attitude of the great
powers concerned toward the league.
Manifestly, they considered it as not
qualified to aid in the making of this
important pact and as being no more
than a mere registering board, which
would follow their decisions unques-
tioningly. And if 1t would obey orders
and admit Germany to the council and
to a permanent seat thereon, why not
make it at the same time admit Poland
to please France, Spain to please
Italy and Brazil to please itself? Ger
man admission, it being understood,
was to please Britain, primarily.
! But the league and the small pow
ers have long been sick of the at
titude of the great powers. just as
the neutral states have resented the
airs of authority of the victor great
nowers And the revolt which has
been long on the way broke with the
Swedish threat, which every one knew
would be made good. No one was
opposed to the admission of Germany
but many nations were angry that
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