Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1926-04-28

not act without the advice and consent
OF the council. In other words, 1t is
the universal rule that where the gov
ernor and council. anywhere in the con-
stitution or statutes are required to
act together. they. act in their sepa-
rate capacities.
1t is another well known rule of
construction that word or words
used in one part of an official or con-
tractual instrument, mean the same
when used in any other part of the
| same instrument unless the context
is such that they must necessarily be
differentiated.
The following citation may be per-
tinent to this case as 1t relates to an
| officer, IL c J, Page 706. 1.-THE infer
ence Is that the trainers of the Con-
stltution have used the same title to
designate the same officer In every
part Of the instrument" In other
places 1t is said, "a word having a
meaning established by judicial con-
struction being used in new construc-
| ton must be taken to be used In that
established sense" 1t further says,
In addition to considering the inde-
pendent and popular meaning Of
words in an act we may look to other
sections of the same instrument for
1 N~NS HSHSS III "aiEh llC WOId is ubtu,
as an aid to determine whether it has
been used in it's popular sense in the
particular provision under considera-
ton."
Under these rules of construction
one of which is very pertinent to the
present case, it seems to me that only
one reasonable construction can be
placed upon the words Governor"
and Governor and Council" Espe-
| clally when these words are found in
exact form in several parts of the
| same sentence, Yet the logic of the
| opinion gives these words one mean
ing in one part of the sentence and
an absolutely different meaning in
another part of the sentence. The
| opinion says that the removal may be
made by the Governor without any
action of the Council at all, although
the words Governor and Council"
are used. 1t also says in the same
sentence the words, Governor with
| the consent of the Council may ap-
point" But IL the words Governor
and Council" according to the rule
above stated, mean the same in the
same sentence, then the logic Of the
opinion is this: That If, after the APP
pointment is made by the Governor,
the Council should stand three to
three, the Governor could then vote
with the three, unite the tie and
| thereby. by his own advice and con-
sent, obtain the consent and advice
of the Council and complete his APP
pointment. This, 1 admit Is absurd.
but it is exactly what the opinion
says the Governor had right to do
in voting to convict the sheriff.
But note the words Governor and
Council who are to consent in an
appointment are used not only in the
same paragraph but in the same
sentence in which they are used to
enable the Governor and Council to
convict. / can conceive of no logical
or legal reason for giving the words
one meaning in one clause and not
giving them the same meaning in an
other clause of the same sentence.
For is there anything in the context
which requires any such differentia-
ton? If the words in the first clause
are given the meaning that the con-
struction and universal practice have
given them for 100 years, then there
would be no clash between the mean
ing of the words in the trial and ap-
pointing clauses, and no absurdity OF
making the words say one thing in
one clause and an entirely opposite
thing in another clause of the same
sentence.
And the opinion says the amend
Iment is sui generus, AS construed,
this is undoubtedly so, but why should
the legislature and the people be
lcharged with making a constitution
sui generis when perfectly plain
and reasonable construction is at
hand that would make it comport
with normal and rational UNDER
standing?
1t seems to me, inasmuch as per-
fectly reasonable and coherent con-
struction can be given to this amend
ment as I suggested in my last arti-
Gle, that it is a forced construction,
and in conflict with every well settled
rule or Interpretation, to hold that the
electorate must have had full knowl-
edge of the meaning of the amend
ments as construed by the opinion.
Now I wish to review the opinion
with reference to the right of the
people to consider what I will term
the submission clause, which reads
as follows: Shall the Constitution
be amended, as proposed by res
olution of the Legislature, granting
to the Governor, by consent and adj
vice of the council, the power to re-
move sheriffs who do not faithfully
and efficiently perform their duties
imposed upon them by law, and
appoint another sheriff in his place
for the remainder of the term for
which such removed sheriff was
| eIected?"
Upon this point, the opinion says,
1.-THE doubt, if any can exist, Is
raised only by the question submit
ted to the voters; but that Is no
part of the amendment. If the for
| mula, or question, framed for this
purpose differs from a proposed
amendment in any respect, 1t cannot
| be claimed the amendment, IL adopt
3D. has been added to or curtailed
to accord with the question submit
ted" and cities a Georgia case and
a Washington case to confirm this
construction of the question.
| I presume there is not first year
man in the law school who would
not readily understand that the sub
mission part of the resolve submit
ting the amendment to the people
was no part of the amendment itself.
But that is not the question involved
in this case at all. The question is
whether the plain language of the
| submission defining how the Gov
| ernor and the Council should act
| could be considered by the people
1 in enabling them to determine the
meaning of the words Governor and
Council as used in the amendment.
1 assert with confidence that the
| clause may be construed in deter
mining what the people thought they
were voting upon and whether they
were deceived. Cudiee Us. Phelps.
| the Washington case, 1856 PAC, page
365, cited by the opinion distinctly
| holds as follows, 1.-THE proposed
| constitutional oDdn,anf for tho