Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1926-12-26
BY FRANK Fl. SIMONDS.

taken place in the German
Reichstag over the question of
Il secret. ornaments is at once
the most interesting and the
most promising sign of the vitality
of the republican sentiment in the
Reich since the declaration of the re-
public itself. 1t is Interesting, too, as
it follows a similar demonstration in
several of the great newspapers which
are republican in sympathy -,
The profoundest error made BY the
victorious allies in the Paris con
ference, expressed in the treaty of
Versailles and in an effort to enforce
their victory beyond. the. limits of
German popular endurance, was to
weaken the German democracy. In
point Of fact allied policy from the
armistices to the London agreement
over the Dawes PLAN and even to the
Locarno conferences; aln1ost resulted
in the destruction OF the republic
itself ,+5'
In 1918 the situation with respect
to Germany was very much the same
as that which had existed after the
fall of Napoleon century before.
The victors of: the later century bad
exactly the same reason for desiring
the permanence of the German he
public as those of hundred years
before had recognized with respect
of the Bourbon monarchy, which they
had restored.
Republic Offered Sole Hope.
And whatever may be said of the
strength of the republican sentiment
| in Germany in the first months Oh
1919, however weak it was and now
nIIaGf100
about the sincerity of the whole
fra nsaction by which the kings and
princes had been permitted to de
part. it was not less true that the
republic offered the one solid hope Oh
| the ultimate arrival of a democratic
Germany.
Yet this fact was little perceived
nv those who made peace at Parls
and the treaty of Versailles ltseii
became a. sort of body of death &c
which the German Republic was IA
| talIv attached. The men VINO heauee
| the republican parties In Germany
were from the outset caught oet"eei
a national sentiment which denlailoe.
a policy of evasion OF what was re
| garded as an unjust treaty ana tnt
force of the allied victorS seeking u
compel performance: ,,e
| Al the outset the first elections gave
the three republican parties-tne %
| cialists. the Democrats and the Cleri
| cals-a clear majority In the
Reichstag, and that majority coil
tinued down to the elections WhIIi
followed the occupation OF the run run
in 1923. But although these repupll
can parties sought at nome, " ,oo,i
soIidate the new regime and ABROAD
| fo make peace on any possible OASIS
the quarrel between the French anc
British prevented any readjustment.
Republic Grew Weaker.
AS a result the republic grew
waalxer at home; the leaders VINO al
vocated fulfillment, Erzberger ant
pathenau. were ASA Ssinated as mel
who were betraying- their Country
The German. people as a mass became
more and more convinced that tne
p1rpose of the allies was TO Destroy
Germany; that her economic recovery
was not to be permitted; tnat tne
occupation of the Rhineland Wouiu
endure permanently, and tnat lne
strategic frontier, which had been the
dream Of all the peoples and rulers
of the regions west of the Rhine since
The occupation Of the Ruhr brought
the final proof to- the German mlno
of this allied purpose and the eiec
tion following that event at last .de'
nrived the three democratic parties,
the Weimar bloc, of a majority inthe
Reichstag, which they have never
since recovered. But during all their
period of actual control they Were
never able to act against the military
elements because the sentiment OF
the country was opposed to any act
which would involve furtner weaken
ing of German power in the race o.
the foreign purpose to destroy the
country.
Actually all allied policy had played
into the hands Of the monarchist ane
nationalist elements which had beer
back of the old regime and In the
same sense allied policy had steadlly
weakened the Republican parties
whose control of German affairs gave
the single reassuripg promise for the
future. The occupation of the Rum
acted as a final disaster for these
Republican elements. 80
Dawes Plan Laid Foundation.
When the Dawes plan at last laid
the foundations for a possible ADJUST
ment-and to the German mind the
Dawes plan was acceptable. not merely
or mainly because 1t substituted pos
sible for impossible reparations terms,
but because in the making of 1t Ger
man representatives had been per
mitted to discuss on a basis of equality
with allied ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
sentiment and prospects in Germany
had sunk to a very low estate.
During all these years the republic
had been the symbol for the German
people of misery. defeat and intoler-
able foreign oppression: 1t represent
ed the government which had not
merely surrendered to the enemy at
the close of the war. but In the
treaty of Versailles had signed the
guilt clause" which in the German
minds amounted to~a confession that
tho German people were guilty
peoples. which they did not and do not
admit.
Had it been physically possible, that