Evening star., 1925-08-30
League to Tackle Greatest Issues
Ever Before Body in Coming Session

Continued from First Page)
Ike the protocol: they want an agree
ment by all nations to respect the
frontiers Of all nations. This. too. is
what the French want. But the Ger
mans will not sign such an agree
ment; they Will not renounce their
hopes OF remaking their eastern from
tiers. And the French. who are eager
to have some form of British guar
antee. are confronted with the fact
that they can only get such a guar
antee in the form Of a limited security
pact.
Were France 10 reject the whole
pact idea and remain faithful to that
OF the protocol. she would have the
support Of most OF the smaller ma
tions Of Europe, and in particular
of the considerable states Of Poland.
CzechoSlovakia, Jugoslavia and Ru-
mania. She could, too, prevent Ger
man entrance into the league, because
her veto would be sufficient But the
price she would have to pay would
be the resignation Of all chance of
any form of British guarantees, and
on the whole the French regard this
guarantee as essential to their safety.
French Think Price High.
But the French are not willing TO
pay the full price for such guarantee.
They cannot consent to permit such
an arrangement to prevent them
from carrying out their treaty oblfga-
tions to Poland. for example, in case
of a German aggression. This the
British perceive, and now the whole
problem is to find some way by which
this French action may be put upon
a legal and justitiable basis-that is.
to find a way by which French action
may be restricted to totally legitimate
circumstances.
Germany ought not to be permitted
to make her guarantee pact to France
a permission to attack Poland when
ever she felt ready. On the other
hand, France ought not to be allowed
to invade Germany without regard
to the security pact whenever she felt
satisfied that she had justification.
What is required to meet the situa-
ton Is plainly some way of de-
termininG whether German action
against Poland constitutes aggression
and is therefore cause for French
action.
Make the league through some ap-
propriate commission the judge of the
issue that might arise between France
and Germany over German action
with respect of a French ally in the
east and the way may be found for
reconciling the conflicting views. But
this instantly changes the character
Of the security pact. 1t is no longer
an isolated affair. The British, after
all, do not escape from the danger
of 3 European involvements. For
what they are after is to keep out
of any eastern trouble, whether Ger
many or Poland be the aggressor,
while If Germany is pronounced in
the wrong they will have to see
France marching into Germany, thus
insuring disturbance in the area
within which they have immediate
concern.
All Hopes Thwarted.
Thus Britain does not get her de-
sired security growing out OF the
elimination Of all chance of Franco
German collision, Germany does not
get the freedom which she desires in
the east as compensation for formal
designations in the west. And one Is
led to the conclusion that it is just
as difficult to arrive at wholly sepa-
rate pacts as it Is to achieve the
acceptance of a general pact. Those
who followed the argument of VIII
liam Rappard at Williamstowu will
remember his contentious that sepa-
rate pacts would not serve and that
the single possible solution lay in the
general pact.
As was 10 be expected. he oppo-