Evening star., 1925-07-19

his rear while fighting the Spanish on
his front
France, therefore. did nothing in the
way of preparation, keeping few
scattered garrisons. which in the ag-
gregate did not much exceed a thou
sand men on the whole stretch of
frontier. Thus il came about when
the Spanish abruptly decided 10 retire
TO the coast and abandon their own
efforts to conquer Abd -eI- krim. the
French suddenly sa Nv themselves fac-
ing critical situation. The Riffian
victor possessed A small regular army
trained in European style by some
renegade Europeans. He had taken
from the Spanish vast military stores,
including artillery and airplanes Back
OF the small regular army he had a
reservoir of a hundred thousand fight
ing men.
FOresaw Trouble.
Beginning last Winter. the French
stroVe frantically to prepare for 20
storm which seemed inevitable Block
houses We're established at vantage
points in the mountains just south Of
the frontier, and. covering the trails TO
the Iowlands, highways We're under
taken and narrowg gauge railway was
begun. Troops were also concentrated
and the Moroccan army was reinforced
from Algeria and the African colonies.
But the time was very short and the
Radical Socialist government in
France was opposed to all military ex-
penditure. Marshall I.yautey. COVER
nor general of Morocco. was therefore
able to accomplish very little in the
limited time allowed him.
In the middle of April the blow
fell. Beginning with little raids the
Riffian operations ra pidly sweIled to
the volume Of real campaign. To
understand this campaign one must
bear in mind the geogra phical cir
cumstances. The Riffs were coming
south out OF the Spanish zone and
across relatively high mountains
which concealed their movements
They had three possible objectives
They might aim at Wezzan which is
a fortified town just west and cover
ing the Atlantic plain; they might
drive directly At F'ez coming down
and across the valleys of the Wergha
and Lebene Rivers. two streams which
come out of the Spanish zone south
ward and then turn west into the
Sebu: they might drive for Taxa TO
the east and nearest their own terri
tory. To take WezZan was to gain the
rich plain of the Gharb and menace
wider fertile area; indeed. 10 menace
the whole plain right south TO Rahat.
They might drive for F'eZ. and to take
Fez was to win a far-shning triumph
which would have its effect not only
all over Morocco. but All through
Mohammedan North Africa to Fcvpt
Or they might content themselves
with the more modest operation to-
ward. Taxa. which, if successful. could
cut the line of communications be-
tween Algeria and Morocco. More
over. one Of the handicaps Of the
French lay in the fact that they could
not know in advance where the Riffs
would strike and did not have the
troops to guard adeuuat teIy front Of
hundred and fifty miles.
Struck at Center.
Actually. the Riffs struck All the cen.
ter and with Fez as their objective.
Sweeping down the mountain valleys
in numbers exceeding 5000. they sub
merged the thinly held line of French
blockhouses, as Ludendorff submerged
the first line Of the British in his great
offensive of March, 1918. Actually,
however, this phase suggests the Aus
trian attack on the Asiago Plateau, in
North Italy. in 1916. when the Aus
trians attempted to break through the
Italian lines on the hills and reach
the plain. Verona and Nicenza. their
objectives, too. we're about the same
distance from their starting point IS
Fez from the jumping off place of the
Riffs.
Like the &ustrians too. the Riffs
almost succeeded. They came across
the Wergha and Iebene streams and
by May they We're on the edge Of the
plain and within sight of the white
walls of Fez. less than 25 miles distant
The hour was very critical for the
French had not vet received adequate
reinforcements- Nevertheless. once
they knew where the main attack was
being made. the French concentrated
all their forces. executed counter
offensive. and drove the Riffs back
into the hills and systema ticallv re
lteved the garrisons of the block
houses. which in the main had held
out. making defense which consti
tuted brilliant page in colonial war
fare.
But. having relieved the blockhouses
the French evacuated them since It
was no longer possible to maintain
communica tions with all these little
posts. which in the aggregate consumed
so many men in garrisons Thus the
first phase was over by the middle Of
May and Add -krim had not taken
Eez. He had, however swept up a
number of border tribes for a mo-
ment been within sight OF his objec-
tive and he had inflicted losses as
we'll as suffering many casualties. and
he remained within French territory
and in possession after abandoning
blockhouses.
Blocked by Frontier.
In ordinary circumstances the mo-
ment was now come. but no offensive
could he undertaken because the Riffs
were standing on the frontier and
could retire behind II and the French
could not follow. The failure Of the
French to strike gravely compromised
their prestige with the Moroccans who
believed that fear and no frontiers
restrained the French Thus the slow
but steady desertion of the border vii
lagos followed the forced inaction OF
the French.
Presently ABIDE -Krim having re-
covered from his defeat and reorgan.
lied his forces, struck again. This
time the blow was leveled a. Taxa,
and with all the circumstances Of the
earlier effort 1t came far nearer to
success. The civil popula tion was
withdrawn and there was again a
moment when its capture seemed far
from improbable. Once more how.
ever, French concentra tons were
made in time and brusque counter
offensive for the moment crowded the
Riffs back from the vital railway and
highway. Nevertheless. this second
venture had severely tried French re-
sistance and as a consequence the
spread of unrest and even detection
among the border tribes continued and
increa sed.
Such. briefly. is the story of the
Moroccan campaign to date 1t is n
type of Indian warfare carried on In
difficult mountains. and the French
operations are at all times compro-
missed not alone by the absence of all