Evening star., 1925-11-01
CREDIT is GIVEN BRITON
FOR ZINIMERMANN EXPOSE
Admiral Hall Barred Secret of German
Plot to Lure Mexico to Invade
U. S. Territory.

Japanese Government, but / think 1t
not unlikely that when 1t reaches them
they may make a public statement on
it in order to clear up their position
regarding the United States and prove
their good faith to their allies"
PAGE
Sent Over Four Routes.
This fateful communication was
picked up by the British government
almost as soon as 1t was sent in four
ways. 1t was bought" in the City of
Mexico. 1t was sent by wireless from
Nauen to Sayville. 1t was sent by the
BuenoS Aires, and it was transmitted
directly by cable by the American
State Department.
The British secret service had OBJ
tanned 1t from some person in the
Mexican capital. Mr.. Hepdrick says:
THE German government was so
determined to make this Mexican al.
lance that it did not depend upon a
single route for transmitting the Zim-
mermann message to Won Eckhardt. 1t
dispatched it in several other ways.
For one it used the wireless route
from Nauen, Germany, to Sayville,
Long Island.
In the early days Of the war. the
American Government prohibited the
use of this Sayville line except under
American supervision; how little this
prohibition interfered with the Ger
mans is shown by the use they made
of the Long Island station for this,
the most fateful message sent to
America during the war. AS Page dis
closes to the President, the British
had for a considerable period been
reading the most secret German mes
nj n
air was easily obtained by the British
and as easily deciphered. One of the
most curious discoveries, and one that
casts an illuminating light upon Ger
man simplicity, is the confident belief
OF the German government that Its
secret service was in fact secret. Not
once did the suspicion apparently rise
that its proceedings were almost as
well known to the British as though
they had been published in the news
papers. The ciphers and codes of
other nations might be read. but not
the German; its secret methods Of COM
munication. like anything else Ger
man, were regarded as perfection.
Berlin Hoodwinked.
Not until the war was concluded
did the Germans learn the truth: That
the British for nearly four years had
had continual access to their most con-
1idential information. This German
confidence in their intelligence meth
DDS cost them dear. Relying upon the
secrecy of their codes, they developed
an amazing telegraphic loquacity in
the course of the war. They were
constantly filling the atmosphere with
the most intimate news Of their navy,
army and their diplomatic service.
and all this information the British
fcly N,,t Nf hat
and promptly deciphering. The result
was that the British government had
as accurate information about every
thing German as the Germans them
selves. The movement of every Ger
man submarine was about as we'll
known to the British as 1t was to the
German admiralty; every time one left
a German port the British had an
accurate record of that fact; they fol
lowed It's voyage day by day, and even
plotted it on the map. Similarly, as
soon as any message involving any
department of the German govern
British promptly seized 1t and reduced
1t to understandable English"
Swedes Willing Aides
With reference to the third way
this message was intercepted, Mr..
Hendrick says:
THE fact seems to be that the Swed.
ish court was openly pro-German:
that popular opinion in Sweden SINH
larly inclined to the German side; and
by January, 1917, the Swedish foreign
office had become almost an integral
part of the German organization. In
many capitals German messages were
frequently put in Swedish cipher and
sent to Swedish ministers in other
countries and by them delivered to
their German colleagues. Herr Zim-
hermann, in his desire to make GER
tain that his Mexican telegram should
reach Washington. again fell back
upon the assistance Of his Swedish
confreres. He handed his message
to the Swedish Minister to Berlin:
this functionary sent it to Stockholm,
Sweden; from this point it was cabled
to Buenos Aires, Argentina, and from
that city cabled in turn to Washing
ton. The journey was roundabout
one, covering about 10000 miles. Yet
nothing that was sent through the air
or under the sea seemed to escape
the watchful attention of the British
naval intelligence, and this Swedish
message was captured almost, at the
same moment as that one which was
going by the main line"
lean embassy in Berlin to transmit
ington, which seems almost incred-
ible. In this connection Mr. Hendrick
says:
L. s. Methods Clumsy.
'The transaction reflects so serious
ly upon the methods of the State De-
partment that it probably never would
have seen the light had the Germans
not made 1t public themselves. In
1890 the German constituent assem-
bly, held an elaborate investigation
into the responsibility for the war.
In this the Zimmerman telegram
played It's part. Among it's published
documents is note which reveals one
route by which this document found
it's way across the Atlantic 1t says:
instructions to Minister Won Eek
hardt were to be taken by letter by
way of Washington by U-boat on the
18th of January; since the U-boat
Deutschland did not start on her out
ward trip, these instructions were at
tached on January 10Th to telegram
No. 157, and through the offices of the
American embassy in Berlin telegraph
ed to Count Bernstorff by way Of the
State Department in Washington
What this means is that the Ger
man foreign office used the American
Government as an errand boy for the
transmission of a document that con-
tained a plot against its own territorial
integrity. The coolness with which
Bernstorff sent his financial account
to the German foreign office in the
American diplomatic pouch-docu-
ments that contained the details of
his propa ganda work at Washington
has already been set forth. The use
of the American State Department in
transmitting the Zimmerman tele-
gram is another instance of similar
kind.