Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1925-10-25

viously, despite warranted optimism
as a result of the making of the agree
ment, we shall not have a new
heaven or a new earth and interna-
tional rivalries and disagreements
are bound to continue The great task
of reconciliation remains to he per
formed and it is matter of years
not months. and Of habit, not more
signed treaties.
On the other hand there has been
less comment upon the political con
sequences of the ARA ngement, not
WlthSta ndlne the enormous extent of
these consequences. a new Europe
or an old Europe entering upon 4
different set of combinations of com
binations which puzzle. weary and irIi-
tate the American observers now
assured. The alliances. combinations
associations Of the World War have
definitely ended. inevitably European
nations Will now take partners for 1t
dance.
There are, moreover. three conse-
quences of the Locarno agreement
which must have present and con
tlnuins Importance. In the first place
this agreement puts a definite term
to the French supremacy In Europe.
In the second place. this termination
could not have been achieved without
French consent. Finally, the fact Of
this French consent opens the way TO
many important things.
Rise of French Army.
French supremacy in Europe was
based upon French military superior
ity. This superiority was the direct
result of the war. In 1914 there were
five great armies in Europe, the Ger
man, Russian, Austrian. Italian and
French. OF these the French was
numerically the third. although not
much inferior to the German. while the
Russian was first in numbers and the
German in efficiency, training and
equipment.
As a consequence of the war Ger
many was disarmed, Russia pa ssed
into the bolshevist stage and its army
ceased to deserve consideration as an
effective force. Austria disappeared.
while Italy, because of domestic po-
litical conditions and poverty of ma
tional resources, could not in any de
gree be considered a counterweight to
France. once we had retired from
Europe and Britain had denrubiliZed.
the French army was the dominating
fact In the European situation. On
the military side France was more
completely supreme than even in the
days of Napoleon.
Since France possessed this power.
the future of Europe for a period Of
time depended upon the use France
might make of her Irresistible strength.
At Paris when peace was made the
French did not rely heavily upon the
military circumstance. Clemenceau
was vastly more interested in getting
for his country a British guaranty, to-
Sether with an American, than in eS-
tablishing it on the middle Rhine
Despite all the criticism which has
been directed at the old tiger" he
never was an imperialiSt and he never
barrier.
Effect of L. S. Policy.
At Paris and in the Versailles
treaty France resigned those military
adva nta ges which she held and could.
for the time being at least, continue
to hold. in return for an Anglo-Ameri-
can guaranty of security against a
new German attack. 1t was only
when both engagements lapsed by
reason of the attitude of the America II
Senate that French feeling began to
change.
1t was the long quarrel between
Lloyd George and the successive
French premierS which brought about
the SIdUudl uptlSlOn bI the f1PnCn
nation to rely upon its military
strength as its only means of self
protection. As security by guaranty
steadily became less likely. as Ger
many with growing success and I'M
miStakable British appreciation evaded
reparationS, the French fell back upon
their army as their bulwark and the
occupation of the Rhine barrier as the
insurance that their army would be
able to work to the greatest advan-
tage.
French opinion crystallized in these
convictions: I'VE shall not let Ger
many recover her physical strength
while there is any chance of her en-
ploying this strength against an iSo-
lated France. We shall. not permit
Germany to recover her economical
financial strength while France is still
deprived of German reparations and
while her own financial burdens, as
contrasted with German, make her
vulnerable to German attack"
Agreement With Poland.
Lacking a British or an American
guaranty, moreover, the French
looked elsewhere. Three nations-Po-
land, Czechoslovakia and Belgium
were, like France, neighbors of Ger
many and had reason to fear German
aggression quite as much as did
France. Each of these nations was
in itself incapable of resisting German
attack, for each the French army
would be a guaranty of security and
for the French army each of these
countries would in its own military
forces bring precious reinforcement tC
France. Thus we had the series OF
military treaties uniting France with
Belgium, Poland and CZechoslovakia
When ex-President Poincare came
to power as direct consequence OF
Ang To- French quarrelS, French hegem
ony was solid fact. He demon
strated this first by destroying Lloyd
Georges Genoa conference with the
aid of his continental allies and then
by marching into the Ruhr accom-
panied by Belgium. After futile re-
sistance Germany was obliged to sur
render and lay at Poincare's feet
while Britain, although bitterly OPP
posing the whole Ruhr affair, had
been unable to prevent it or end it.
French Not Militaristic.
Now. had the French people been
actually militaristtc, as was charged
there was no limit to what they might
have done, always, of course, recog-
nizing that in due course of time
Europe would have united against
them But the French people were
not militaristic; they did not care
for the supremacy in Europe which
was again in their hands. They
wanted peace. They had only con-
scented to the use of military strength
in desperation. When the Ruhr bat
tie was over and Poincare failed to
make peace, then France threw him
over and turned to the Left-to Her
riot.
Meantime in Britain the fundamen-
tai truth had been perceived that
France could not be coerced into
adopting policies which had British
appreciation. The break between