Evening star., 1925-06-07
BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.

BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.
T \ the present European situa ton
the rule of no nation is at once
more important and more absorb
i ing than the British and, il is fair
to add, none is more perplexingly
difficult. Despite the fact that it was
Germany and not Britain which
opened the discussion of the security
and guarantee pacts, there is no mis-
apprehension in Europe as to the
credit for origina ting the scheme. 1t
Is Berlin which speaks. but it is Brit
ish policy which is disclosed in the
spoken work and it is in London
rather than in Paris or, for that mat
ter. Berlin. that applause is most gem
eral
What then. lies back OF the pres
ent British advocacy of security pacts
and particularly Of a security pact be
tween France and Germany? The
single fact that the British perceive
that in case of another war between
France and Germany. not only would
Britain have to participate. but she
would have to participate on the
French side. In other words. British
statesma nship starts with the once
IA amiliar axiom that the Low Coun-
tries, TO which are now added the
channel coast of France. are the
strategic frontiers Of Britain itself
Thus after considerable postwar
wandering the British have come
suuarely back TO the tradition of Brit
ish 6oreign policy. But they have
come back with difficulty and not with
regret. When the war was over the
British conceived the plan of making
'Anglo-American cooperation. which
had existed during the struggle. not
httf he haC Ci nf 8
foreign policy of Britain and the guar
antee Of the peace of the world. Using
the League of Nations as the device
by which this cooperation could
be made effective. the British hoped 10
create a machine which in British
American hands would insure peace,
because with these peoples would be
lodged adequate power 10 prevent
war.
Dragged Into War.
Many Ensllshmen believed and be
iieve that Britain was dragged into
the last great struggle by reason Of
commitments and agreements with
France and with Russia. Most Eng
lishmen hoped that the close OF the
war would see their nation freed from
all necessities such as had constrained
il to make the triple entente in the
'
association with the United States
Britain would be secure and in com
pany with the United States she could
speak in the League of Nations IN
tones which would brook Of no denia !.
This plan shipwrecked when we re
tired from the situation and declined
TO Join the League. But for a period
of wears the British refused to believe
that our retirement was final. They
hoped they believed. that with the
passing of the immediate domestic po-
litical conflict raised over the league
and centering about Mr.. Wilson we
would come to Geneva and that the
wise course was to await our arrival
smoothing the way for our coming
and avoiding definite actions within
the league which might prevent this,
1t was not until Ramsay Macdonald
came to power that the hope Of Amer
lean partnership waned. but then II
was clear to British statesmen that II
was no longer possible to wait; some
thing had to be done in Europe; the
Ruhr occupation, the German imitation
chaos. the general situation demanded
action. II was then that Macdonald
went to Geneva and with Herriot
ioined in the framing of the protocol
Moreover in that Geneva session for
the first time there was disclosed the
intention to go ahead without America
and polite notice was served that Eu-
ropean nations would not discuss dis
armament outside the league and with
the United States.
Protocol Rejected.
But Ramsay Macdonald fell and
Britain rejected the protocol for va
rious causes, in the main anal gous
American rejection Of the covenant,
The people of the dominions most EN-
phatica1lv refused TO see themselves
committed to maintain status quo
all over Europe. Australia was not
concerned with; the frontiers of Poland
nor Canada with those of Rumania
And the British people themselves
upon nature consideration. were ap
palled by the extent to which the pro
tocol would commit them
So the protocol disappeared, done tc
death by Chamberlain in Geneva last
March Nevertheless mere rejection
of the protocol did not and could not
constitute policy. If you read the
speeches. the comments, the opinions
of British statesmen expressed in the
past year or two, you will be struck
by the fact that all agree in conced
ing that the old policy of isolation ID
impossible. When guns mounted or
the cliffs near Calais can lombard
London, when DunllirlI and Boulognf
might be used as submarine bases and
the whole Belgian and French coasts
as the starting point for air raids, II
is plain that Britain can neither risk
war with France nor permit any
strong nation, having conquered
| France. to establish itself at these
points.
The frontiers of France and Bel
GUM then the geographical from
tiers, have become the strategic from
tiers of Britain. But it follows ther
that Britain is not merely interested
in the maintenance of these frontiers
that is. i'm French security; she Is also
interested in French policy. For, nc
, matter whether French policy be
pacific or provocative. British secu
rity will be equally menaced if France
gets into war with Germany. Nc
matter whether Germany or France
is the aggressor in the first instance
Britain cannot permit a victoriou:
Germany to reach the channel. And
Germany cannot defeat France in wal
without becoming master of the
channel ports, Just as she cannot sue.
cessfully invade France, save through
Belgium.
British !AwkwardIy Placed.
Thus the British are rather awk
wardly placed. They are. after all, in
da of becoming victims of French
I policy, if that policy should be ag
gressive; in sense they are com
mitted to support France, right OIL
wrong Thus patiently it becomes q
matter of the first Importance for the