Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1925-10-25

Accordingly, when Ramsay Mac
Donald became the first Labor prime
minister. contrary to all expectations.
his whole policy was directed at
reconciliation with France. He saw
clearly that if France desired 10
throw Germany into anarchy and
revolution, 10 crush her temporarily,
there was no force in Europe to pre-
vent it. If. on the other hand. the
desire of France was for peace and
the inability to get safe peace the
explanation of French policy, then the
road to solution lay through Paris.
Way Paved for Dawes Plan.
! MacDonald's success paved tne way
1 for the Dawes plan. The London
! conference succeeded because France.
I offered AN alternative and assurance
! OF German reparatiOns promptly
! agreed To eVacuate the i;Uhr. What
/ Macdonald had begun baldwin bril-
/ liantlv carried ON with Austen Cham
( berlain as foreign secretary. The
! Dawes plan assured France repara-
/ lions a. compensation for allowing
( German recovery economically. The
| l-ocarnu agreement gives France a
! British. an Italian and German
! guarantee of security ia exchange for
| remuneration of that furtuitOus Sc
! curity resting upon her armed
strength and the continued helpless
ness Of Germany. in reality only to
! be preserved by French garrisons on
the middle Rhine.
But with the London agreement,
! which was the Dawes plan and the
| Locarno agreement. which is the
| security pact, the reason for the su-
| preme army disappears French Sc
| curity is no longer founded solely or
mainly upon French arms. il is also
| based upon the presumptive assur-
/ ance of Italian and British aid. This
! aid is not to be made the more Ger
/ tain by the maintenanC nee of a military
esta blishment which seems a threat
! both in Rome and London, while Ger
man disarmament can no more be
| permanently promoted save as the
| neighbors of Germany adopt a similar
| standard of armament.
| Iocarno then opens the way to real
| disarmament in Europe by removing
| the reasons which explained the arma-
| ments of the chief military power. The
American notion that to get peace YOU
must first procure disarmament has
! been demonstrated failla cious by the
/ fact that the first real chance of any
effective disarmament on land has
! only arrived with the first promise
! of Nlable state of peace on the
Continent. Arbitra ton, security. dis
| armament, this has been the formula
! the League of Nations has correctly
set for pacitication. and this order is
| going To be followed. Since the size
of any army is based upon a nations
estimate Of its danger, to reduce the
army you must reduce the fear.
Position of United States.
| An American conference to discuss
disarment could lead TO no results.
! because the United States would
| undertake no responsibilities to pro-
| tect disarmed nation which was at
| tackled. But Great Britain and Italy
| have every right to urge French re-
| duction when they are assuming the
responsibility for French safety, and
| conversely to oppose French reduction
| of armed strength if il seems I'M
/ wise in the situation Backed by
Britain and Italy. France could con
! front German attack with relative
! equanimity. for other allies would
! follow nevitably-Belgium Poland.
Czechoslovakia; but Germany has no
temptation to invite such isolation
] or France to sacrifice such security.
But France can no longer do Is
| she pleaSeS, she cannot pursue toward
| Germany policies which are unrea-
sonable. unfair or provoca tive, for by
so doing she would at one time raise
! German antagoniSm and lower British
| and Italian readiness to come to her
| aid She is the captive of her own
! security; she has what she sought
| but she has it at price She has
! sacrificed much of her independence
for degree of safety which she must
conceive to be adequate
British Prestige Higher.
Locarno really marks the return Of
a degree at least of British authority
in Europe The guaranty pact i
really her creation. She stands be
tween Germany and France, ready to
defend either against the other, and
thus in a position TO command the
consideration of both. She is. not
merely the guarantor of French Sc
curity, she is the protector of German
immunity from any new Ruhr pro
cedure. As long as the basis of in
f1uence in Europe was bayonets. Bri.
tain was relatively negligible As
long as she declined to assume res
possibilities she could not restrain
| France and she was equally unable to
protect Germany against French
| operation.
The foolish Lloyd Georgian notion
that the true British policy was to
hold France back until Germany got
on her feet and then join hands with
| Germany to restrain France failed
because there was no way of holding
the French back while Germany got
on her feet. The basis of restoring
| European bala nee of power was an
agreement with France But the es-
Sential condition of the agreement
had to be that il protected French in
terests while serving British ends.
Macdonald saw It, ana his conduct
of the foreign office during his brief
stay In Downing street will unQlIeS-
tiona bly, entitle him to stand with the
great foreign ministers Of British
history.
But there was an obvious danger
that the necessary understanding
with France might be made an eX-
elusive alliance. Any exclusive ALI
ance of Britain with France would
in the fullness of time insure a coun-
ter alliance, most. probably a Russo
German alliance. Then inescapably
would come the rivalry between two
systems of alliances, which made Eu-
ropean history from 1905 to Arma
geddon. 1t meant for the British per-
manent involvement and permanent
inability to restrain either the enemy
or the ally.
Relations With Berlin.
British influence has been supreme
in Berlin for a good while. German
foreign policy has been more and more
responsive to British urging. But this
influence was not of much use while
British influence AT Paris was small
or non-eXistent. British influence at
Paris is now quite as considerable as
at Berlin. Germany believes that she
was defeated by Britain. that the fatal
mistake which brought Britain into
the war insured her downfall. There
is not the slightest present desire III
Germany to renew the struggle with