Evening star., 1925-11-22
By FRANK III. SIMONDS.

By FRANK III. SIMONDS.
ERHAPS the most concrete and
- definite consequence of the
events at Locarno yet disclosed
has been the official announce
ment at Paris that French op-
position to the evacuation of the
Cologne zone has been finally with
drawn. This withdrawal, delayed
| since early January, will now begin
| by December 1, and thus will be in
time to have no little repercussion IN
the German Reichstag, where Locarno
, pacts are to be voted upon and Ma
| tionalist opposition remains formid-
able.
OF course the French decision is
not only logical, but reveals one of
| the more or less tacit agreements
made at Locarno. Outside of the
| written documents. which have been
| duly reprinted all over the world,
there were a number of secret or at
least unofficial 'gentlemen's agree
ments." The allies, to use the famil-
lar term which after Locarno tends
to become obsolete, were in the posi-
ton In which they could give away
| much by favor. while they could not
give anything away by written con-
| tract.
| BRAND had an opposition in France
| position of Stresemann and Luther in
| Germany. That opposition insisted
| that Germany must enter the League
| Internationally, that she must comply
with disarmament requirements with
| out regard to guarantee pact settle
/ ments. The German Nationalists
quite as loudly proclaimed that Ger
many would not enter the League
| until her conditions were met, and
| that she would not accept League or
| pacts until Cologne was evacuated
For Home Consumption.
| Here was all the material out of
| which deadlocks are made. But the
! men who met at Locarno We're reason
| able people. resolved to agree. There
| fore what was possible to put in writ
| ing they wrote; what could not be
written, but had to be done, they ex-
| pressed in Brands assurances to
| Luther, StreSemann'S promises to
| Chamberlain. 1t was all one with the
odd situation OF few months ago.
| when Stresemann was quite reason
! ably negotiating at d distance with
| BRAND, but at the same time holding
! his NationalistS in leash by speeches
| which were provocative rather than
conciliatory. But each speech was
f! followed by a haSty call upon BRAND
!
/ who came to explain that Stresemann
meant what he wrote. not what he
! had to say because of exigencies of
what the Germans call inner poll
tics"
The key of the existing situation in
Europe is all here. The men who
are running the machines, the gov
ernments in France, Britain and Ger
many, not only have an equal desire
| to arrive at a settlement, but recog-
niZe that the good faith and desire of
all are equal. The element of conf
dence has been restored so far as the
foreign offices and foreign ministers
! of the countries are concerned, and
the strength OF this confidence is such
that there is even tacit recognition
that the principals may have to make
faces at each other from time TO time
to satisfy domestic stupidity.
But the agreement to evacuate the
Cologne zone has an obvious and tre-
mendouS Importance in the present
! European situation. Technically it
means no more than that the allies
have now consented to withdraw from
the first of the occupied zones, the
zones occupied under the provisions
of the Treaty of Versailles, because
they regard Germany as having com
piled sufficiently with the diSarma-
ment provisions of the treaty
Treaty Breaches Charged.
Last January the allies stayed when
evacuation was expected, because
they claimed that Germany was disre-
garding the treaty, and IN due course
of time served upon the German gov
ernment statement of German dere-
hctions. In many ways this action
was a disaster. Doubtless there had
been derelictions-even the Germans
would hardly deny this-but the es,
sential fact was that the agreement
lat London upon the Dawes plan in
the preceding Autumn had not alone
eliminated many obstacles to ADJUST
ment, to general adjustment, but 1t
had created q state of mind which
was altogether favorable to further
adjustment.
( The delay in the Cologne evacuation
poisoned an atmosphere which had
been clearing, it played into the hands
of the NationaliSts and it gravely
compromised the general situation.
, The election Of Hindenburg was one
later consequence. Many Germans,
by no means the most unreasonable,
who had seen in London the promise
of peace, saw in the Cologne episode
the denial Of their hopes, and more
than one said to me last Winter in
| Berlin, with obvious sincerity and
plain passion, I'VE are being swim
died"
| Nevertheless the Cologne episode
while it hampered Luther and Strese
mann, did miss upsetting the apple
cart. The election of Hindenburg
proved to be flash in the pan, SC
far as nationalist dangers were con
cerned. Germany went to Locarno
and from Locarno emerged an agree
ment which continues to inspire opti
mism all over the world.
Yet once Locarno was agreed upon
It became the obvious interest OF
, Chamberlain and BRAND to make easy
: the road of Stresemann and Luther iT
obtaining ratification of the agree
ments. And the single simple contri
, button was the promise to evacuate
Cologne and the translation of the
. election into action. For Germany the
chief present value of the Locarno
pact, the outstanding recommends
ton, is obviously that it's German &C
. ceptance would obtain the evacuation
, of the Cologne zone, as the German
acceptance Of the Dawes plan pro
.. duced the evacuation of the Ruhr.
Junkers Hastened Action.
Luther and Stresemann, on their
part, could view with something less
than complete anger the maneuvers
J of the Nationalists at home SO lons
: as the allies had not kept their pledge
, about Cologne. This very protest OF
, the junkers strengthened their hand
with the allies and contributed te
lhastening allied action. Luther and
Stresemann could wait until they had
obtained Cologne before they began
to fight for Locarno. The National
lists on their side may make claims
: to having obtained Cologne by their