Evening star., 1925-09-29
The Deadlock Period

Aue UtaQlOcR fcrl0Q.
The deadlock sta &c in the French
war debt negotiations is said To he at
hand. This need not be as alarming
as 1t sounds. The deadlock is frequent
lN like the calm before the clearing. up
shower. In important negotiations
where both sides are firmly contend
ins for what they believe to be their
due, the deadlock period may be said
to be the usual thing. In the French
debt case the negotiators have also To
consider on the one hand the attitude
OF the French people and their Parlia-
ment. and on the other the attitude OF
the American people and the Con
gress. Each set of negotiators neces-
sarily feels that it would he idle to-
agree to settlement Of the debt
which would be unacceptable to the
people whom they represent.
The American Congress has made it
clear, through the mouths of its mem
hers, that it is opposed TO a settlement
of the French debt which varies in
any important degree from the settle
ment with Great Britain. This does
not mean Congress would insist upon
Identical language. with every I
crossed and every i dotted. as in the
British settlement. But it does mean
that the principle of the British settle
ment is dema nded.
On the other hand. the French
,toiy
to pay their debt. to settle their OBJ
fga but that their ability to
pay must be considered in any fund
ing arrangement. They seek terms
which shall be as favorable to the
French people as possible. so that the
burden shall not bear down upon them
crushingly.
In France the idea has been spread,
too. that morally the French are not
bound to pay the debt to the United
States on the ground that they have
slready paid their war debt in blood,
which does not make the task Of the
French commission any the less diff
cult.
Negotiato tors have submitted their orig.
inal proposition, seeking the most IA
vorable terms to France, and the
American commission has countered
with an expression of the full demand
of the United States. Further notes
have been exchanged seeking to eluci
date these proposals. but without ma.
terial modification Of terms.
The proposal that will be accepted
Il there be one-proba bly, will come
from the American commission. NJ.
Csillaux will then be in a position to
return to Paris and say to the French
government and the French people:
II accepted on your behalf the mini
mum terms to which the Americans
would agree" He probably realizes
that II he made an offer to the Ameri-
can commission which it was willing
to accept, and which the American
commission believed Congress would
ratify, that offer would be naccept-
he return to Paris after having such
an offer accepted by the Americans
he would subject himself to the criti-
cisn that he offered too much; that
the Americans had outma neuvered
htrn and mapped him up" The Amer
lean commission realizes. too. that If
IL offers to the French terms more
lenient than would be approved by
Congress it would come in for a drub-
kine later. So 1t. too. must so warily.
A rupture in the negotiations, with
no settlement. would be SO unfortu-
No te for both nations, and, indeed. for
international economic stability gen
orally, that even today It should be
the unexpected rather than the eI-
pscted. With proposal and counter
proposal, slight modifica tions, dead
lock and final acceptance Of the last
American offer the logical progra m
the hopes of France and America and
the world at large for agreement may
seill be confidently entertained.