San Antonio light. [volume] (San Antonio, Tex.) 1911-1993, 1925-12-20


ed a modern plane carrier. although
actually she had only six planes
which she used to good advantage and
capabilities and purpose, considering
Numbers and capabilities and the
/ Langley's own characteristics. The
Atlantic air squadron had % sea
planes. The seaplanes were useful
working for base ION shore). An
attempt should be made TO operate
sesplanes from a carrier. II was
demonstrated that modern fleet
must have its aircraft fighters, at
least, if nothing further can be de-
vlcped.
PLANES USELESS.
-No other ships than the Langley
sent up any planes. The catapults
do not seem to be working well, and
fighters cannot be expected in peace
time operations to sacrifice themselves
20 readily as the theory of scouting
has led some TO suppose.
The actual distances that land
planes should go from succor is ten
miles at present, else they may sink
before help arrives after a forced
landing in the water.
Until il has been demonstrated
that planes will operate at sea from
the battleships and cruisers where they
are now carried, it would seem prema-
ture to alter or rearrange any other
types of combatant ships for their
accommodation.
The air souadrons. Pacific fleet,
did not take part in the problems,
except potentially. the planes being
boxed mp for transportation. v. f.
squadron was absent at North
Island. v. F. squadron 2, composed of
obsolete planes. was present. v. o.
squadrons 1 and 2 carried no ord
nance equipment. because they were
equipped with radio. These planes are
obsolete and much worn in service.
V. i. squadron l did not carry ma
chine guns nor radio equipment.
BOMBS LACKING.
NO torpedoes nor bombs were
available. 1t is doubtful If those
planes could have lifted torpedo off
Colon. They are not fitted for bomb
ing.
These planes cannot land or take off
in moderate sea, and are hence inef-
fective.
"Under the upkeep conditions OBJ.
tanning, probably not over half the
planes in the problem could be oper-
ated at any one time.
Generally speaking, the command
er-in-chief recommends concentration
of attention and available funds on
the very few types Of planes useful to
the fleet and their equipment.
~The quantity and effectiveness Of
the air force actually available to the
fleet did not appear favorable from
a material point of view.
CARRIER USEFUL.
The Langley was useful, in spite Of
her small number of planes and her
crudeness. Her slow speed made il
necessary in problem 4 to place her
in the convoy instead of in the van
with the scouting fleet, where she GER
tainly belonged, upon approach to the
base which was to be seized.
Her use was limited, because
planes cannot get on or off either end
and because she had to head into the
wind, thus losing position and enhauc-
ing Der liability 70 attack. SPEED
A n ID GOOD HANDWRITING
QUALITIES ARE ESSENTIAL. Ar
resting gear, deck lighting and other
material requirements 10 permit night
flying should be developed.
The construction Of new carriers
should be expedited" In this report
the commander-in-chief of the fleet
paints a picture of a helpless fleet.
II admits that the fleet speed was re-
duced to z IL knots, and even then
its auxiliaries did not keep up, but
were apparently scattered over the
Caribbean Sea.
1t is admitted by the commander-in-
chief that the submarines were obso-
lete, could not keep pace with the
fleet and would be practically useless
in offensive operations.
lt was demonstrated and admitted
that the air force with the fleet was