Evening star., 1925-06-14

tude with respect to the pend
ing German proposals for guarantee
pacts covering the Western frontiers
of Germany and her neighbors. In
the French situation and the bases of
French policy and opinion. Moreover
1t is the misunderstanding of the fun
damental bases of French opinion and
purpose which have tended and tend
to obscure the whole present Euro
pean problem in American minds.
France at the close of the World
War found herself in much the same
situation as Germany after the series
of wars eliminating in 1870. which
gave Germany her unity, her mastery
In the old German state and launched
her on her period of European great
ness, which lasted right down TO the
collapse of her military power in the
late Summer of 1918.
After 1870 the Bismarckian policy
was clear. Germany had realized her
aspirations, and her chiefest interest
was the maintenance of a status quo
created by her victory. Inevitably
she marched toward an alliance with
such other powers as had the same
desires. For herself greatest concern
was the preservation of her possession
of Alsace- Lorraine against a recovered
France, which promptly disclosed her
purpose never to accept as final the
treaty of Frankfort, which tore from
her Strasbourg and Metz.
Ally i'm South.
To the southwark Germany found a
Hapsburg monarchy which was also
facing a problem Of stability. The
rising nationalities of the Balkans,
the Serbs and the Rumanians looked
with unconcealed hope over the from
tiers of the Austrian and Hungarian
states to the millions of their fellow
Slavs and Latins, subjects of Francis
Joseph against their will, while the
CZechs, Slovaks and Poles still and in
creasingly nourished hopes of racial
liberty and, in the case Of the Poles
and CZechs, the restoration of old
freedom and greatness.
Moreover, from without Russia
more and more tended to adopt
policy of n-Slavism and thus to en-
courage the hopes of the subject
Slavs. In addition, the march of
Russian ambitions upon Constantine
pie carried with it menace to Turkey
and ultimate menace to the Haps-
burg monarchy. for once seated at
the Golden Horn, Russia was bound
to seek to move northward, liberat-
ing the Serb and the Bulgarian and
thus menacing Austrian unity.
To preserve the status quo exist
ing after the treaty or Frankfort.
then. was the first German purpose;
history, race. everything tended TO
draw Germany together with Austria.
and thus insensibly German policy
expanded to defend not merely the
status quo on the Rhine, but on the
Danube. Nor did the process end
here because presently Germany be-
came the ally of Turkey also, and
thus the defender of the status quo
existing in the southeast corner of
Europe.
Champion of Stability.
Germany thus became the champion
of things as they were in Europe, be-
cause that situation was the most
satisfactory conceivable for herself
and because any possible change
would mean a weakening of her posi-
ton. The rise Of strong Balkan states
carried a fatal menace to Austria,
and with the passing of years Aus
tria became the single sure ally of
Germany against the Franco-Russlan
combination, which, while ostenslbly
dedicated to the preservation of eX-
listing conditions. looked toward
changes which would be advan-
tageous-France on the Rhine and
Horn.
Now, at the present moment and
as a consequence of the World War,
what is the situation? The treaty
of peace liberated many races and at
the same time set France back on
the Rhine. 1t created a state of facts
as satisfactory to France as the
treaty of Frankfort created for Ger
many, and quite as naturally France
s,fo tA <Nff
Defense of that state of facts means,
in practice, association for the main
tenance of peace and existing from
tiers with Poland CZechoSloVakla,
Jugoslavia and Rumania. all of
whom are aually resolved To preserve
what exists.
France is not Immediately con-
cerned with the frontiers drawn along
the lower Vistula or the middle Dan
ube But France is concerned if Ger
many can, by crushing Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, breaking up the little entente
and annexing Austria, assemble an
overwhelming force with which to at
tack France on the Rhine. If, in
association with Poland, Rumania,
Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Bel
gium, including $4,000, 900 of people,
| which joined to her own 100000
make a combination representing 1885,
900 900 of people, France can prevent
all notifications and revisions of trea-
ties, her own security and that of her
friends is assured.
France Now Champion.
France. then, stands forth as the
! champion of the status quo in Europe,
| just as Germany did in the years fol-
| lowing 1870, because it alone promises
adequate security for herself. She
| makes common cause with the sue
| cession states. because they have. the
| same view and the same necessities as
| she has; they, too, are committed to
| the defense of the state of Europe Gre
ated by the peace conference of Paris,
] because 1t is the charter of their po-
litical liberty and geographical unity.
If one by one the smaller success.
sion states are forced to give way be-
fore German demands; if Poland has
to resign the corridor and Upper ST.
lesia, Czechslovakia the German
speaking regions within her frontiers;
ii Germany is able to obtain for Hum
gary, her old ally and still available
partner, changes in Magyar frontiers,
then by piecemeal the whole map of
Europe Is made over, and If Germany
should ultimately resolve to reopen
the question of Alsace, France would
find herself again, as in 1870, facing a
superior foe with only British sup
port assured. Such war might end
victoriously, but even victory might
be won on French territory at the
cost of new invasions and fresh devas-
| tatfons.
How different the situation IL at
each effort on the part of Germany to
change her own frontiers she were
1 confronted by a solid group of powers
numbering 125, 100000 and provided
| with powerful armies. Underlying all
else II Ia essential to nerceiya that