Evening star., 1925-08-30


brief history Of the orga nization. In
the nature of things this meeting will
be dominated by two closely related
issues, the admission of Germany to
the league and the relation of the pro.
posed security pact to the league
itself.
AS to the admission of Germany,
the real problem remains whether
Germany will consent TO come in un-
less certain special concessions are al
lowed her. For Germany the league
itself has obvious attractions and
quite as patent disadvantages. Look
ing to the. latter first, the league is
unmistakably the product of the
Paris conference which made the
treaty of Versailles. the formal ex-
preston of Germany's defeat, and it
has SO far been dominated by those
nations which were conspicuous as
Germany's foes in the war itself. The
connection between the treaty of Yer
sailles and the league, then. is too
unmistakable not to arouse German
dislike.
Again and specifically. 1t was
through the agency of the league that
the Upper Silesian settlement was
made in form totally unsatisfactory
to Germany. This decision, which di-
vided the industrial region of this part
VI cIlnd1y anu gave lnS DelIeT part
to Poland, remains one of the greatest
of the postwar grievances of the Ger
| man people. In addition, the league
failed TO make any protest when the
French and Belgians occupied the
Ruhr, which to the German mind
stamped it with a pro-ally and preju
diced character.
Outside Has Disadvantages.
On the other hand the Germans are
quite manifestly at disadvantage in
remaining outside the league when
all Europe belongs and the Geneva
! meetings deal with variety of ques
! tions closely affecting the Reich. The
| mere absence of Germany tends to
! continue her position as an inferior
| and defeated nation. Within the
/ league, too. as DR.. Stresemann. the
| German foreign minister, pointed out
| to me last March. Germany would be
! able TO work more effectively for GER
tain desira BILE ends than without.
The question of German minorities
| in Poland, Czechoslovakia and even in
| Ruma mia. a burning question as the
recent Polish eXpulsions showed
could be approached much more ef'
! fectively through the league-indeed
it is difficult to see any other place
in which Germany could raise these
! there is the fact that a marked isola
ton must be felt in Berlin when all
the rest of the European world goes tc
Geneva and the solidarity of member
nations naturally grows,
Germany, too, cherishes certain
manifest hopes. the most consider
able of which are the remaking of the
Polish frontier, the union of Austria
with the Reich and some more salts
factory adjustment of the question o1
the large German minority within the
frontiers of CZechoSlovakia. 1t is the
hope of Germany to reopen all OF
these questions ultimately, but save
for the resort to force, that is to war
which would certainly array the public
is no chance of raising them outside
the league, while there is at least &
legal basis for raising them under the
language of the covenant itself.
Linked With Russia.
But Germany would be willing tc
enter the league only on conditions
| because. while the advantages are
plain, the disadva ntages are also
obvious. She made at Rapallo in 1922
a treaty with Russia the full extent
OF which remains unknown. but the
! bearing of which upon the league
matter is disclosed by German diplo
matte fencing now. Since Russia is
outside the league and likely to re
main outside for a long period, it Is tC
be conjectured that the Russo o-Germar
understanding covered the possibility
of German entrance into the league
| and doubtless pledged Germany not
| to enter the league on such terms as
| to compel her to assist actively OF
| even passively in the event of a Rus
sian conflict with any league member
Poland for example. In return, Ger
many probably was assured the rever
sion of the Polish corridor in case OF
a Russian victory.
All German diplomacy in this ques
| ton turns on the double play of escap
ing the disadvantages incident to non.
| membership while retaining the ad.
! vantages, real and prospective of the
| Russian alliance. Therefore she de.
mands that since she is herself dis.
armed under the treaty, she shall be
freed from the obligation to share ir
the defense of any member nation and
her territory shall be forbidden to the
troops of any league nation seeking
! to aid an attacked member. In plair
| English, this means that Germany de.
mands that IL she joins the league
! France will not be able to send troops
| across Germany to aid Poland against
! Russia.
| But not only is Poland bound to op.
pose such concessions. but she has
| allies in CZechoslova kia, which fears
Germany, and in Rumania, which
fears Russia, while Fra nee is the
powerful ally of all three with strong
reasons for not desiring to see Ger.
many aggrandized at the expense OF
Poland. Thus German application to
| enter the league on special terms has
been so far steadily rejected despite
the fact that the British would like to
see the Germans in on any terms, be-
l1evlng that, once they are in, this
fact will have a powerful influence.
Entrance Seems Certain.
That Germany will enter the
league seems to me fairly certain,
neuvering to be done within the Ger.
man Reich itself before the thing is
carried through. That she will get
the terms she seeks is totally un-
! likely because of the position OF
France, which holds the necessary
veto. Nevertheless in practice it is
excessively unlikely that, given the
German state Of mind, French troops
could be moved to the support of Po-
land; convenient strike of the rail.
way men. who are government EN-.
ployes, could prevent this.
| Turning to the broader issue of
the relation of the proposed security
pact to the league, one comes up
against many of the same factors
Last year at Geneva the league for
mulated the famous protocol, which
was in reality a universal security
pact. an agreement which, had 1t been
adopted by all member nations, would
have bound each to go to the defense
of any one attacked. 1t embodied
the doctrine of universal RESPONSE
bility and placed a moral obligation
upon all member nations to defend
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