Evening star., 1925-03-22
PEACE RATED GERMANS
CHIEF HOPE AT PRESENT
War of Revenge" Unlikely for Years, il
Ever, Provided Territory Is Evac-
uated, Says Observer.

swift and easy triumphs of 1855 and
1870, but with the long agony of
1914-1s24, which penetrated to the
very tiniest detail in the life of every
individual German and took from him
most of all that life had had of COM
fort, of pleasure, of eed,
of tho vtry smallest necessities OF
life.
Long Period of Misery.
For the German, the declarations
of war in the first week of August,
1914, mark the beginning of a period
Of nightmare which had hardly ended
10 years later. That is what war
meant and means to the German
people-to all of them, save perhaps
a handful of old officers and old off,
cials, who lost all and cannot regain
anything save through some new con-
vulsion. War meant to the German
people in 1914 the short and glorious
sweep to Paris, a second 1870, with
conquered provinces. high indemni-
ties and all that accumulation of
glory. 1t means now 10 indescrib-
able years of privation, of misery.
ending in the utter prostration Of
their country, the loss Of provinces,
the loss of the individual bank ac-
count, along with the obligation to
At least, If and when he goes TO
war again, every German will think
Of what is coming, with only the
vivid memory OF the recent past, he
can have no illusions and he will
have none. That is why 1t Is prac-
tically impossible to conceive of Ger
many rushing to war in the active
lifetime of the men and women who
know the recent struggle. One must
look to the new generation to expect
war, If at all. One must look to the
time when the immediate truths of
the last war have pa ed from the
range Of experience to that of le-
sends. For what il is worth. then, ]
give my first conviction, which is
that the mass of the German people
have been adequately educated in the
meaning of war.
Now, then, on the basis of this
state of public mind. what can and
will the government seek in foreign
affairs? What is the direction of
German policy? The people and the
man impotence. The Frenchman
talks of the eventual German menace
when Germany recovers; tho German
tells you quite simply that to risk
war now would be to commit suicide,
because French, Polish and Czech
armies would overrun his territory
from all directions almost over night.
Might Grow Desperate.
Nevertheless, the German might.
under certain circumstances, fight. in
despair now. in hope ultimately, un-
less certain present convictions
should be abolished. II the allied
armies stay on the Rhine, If the
French feeling of insecurity leads to
the practical scrappins of the provi-
sions OF the Treaty of Versailles, with
respect to the evacuation of the
three zones, beginning with Cologne,
then the chances of peace in Europe
are exactly nil. The German-mil-
lions of him, all of him-I think, is
convinced that it is the real purpose
OF France to prevent German recov-
cry stay on the Rhine, dominate q
helpless Germany.
BY contrast, if the present govern
ment is able in negotiation with the
British and the French to reach a
settlement by which the Cologne area
- evacuated this Summer, simultane-
ously with the Ruhr, as was agreed
at London; il the fact is made clear
by this evacuation that at the ap-
pointed dates the other areas will be
evacuated, then the most potent
weapon in. the hands of those who
would restore the old regime, repeat
the old policy, plan and deliver war
of revenge, would vanish.
Every German with whom l have
talked has said, in substance that all
hope of peace in the world is contin-
gent upon the restora ton to Germany
in the West of what the Treaty of
Versailles left here. All have said
and ] Go not mean to attempt to as
hA "a hat
Germany would not make war to re-
cover Alsace-Lorraine, but that all
hope OF restoration OF living condi-
tions between their own country and
their neighbors must be based upon
the performance of the treaty in
such respects as it held out assur-
ances to Germany.
Basis of Amin osfty.
Today the hatred of France is the
dominating emotion with Germans
One must not disguise it. Germans
would, ! think, despite all that they
have suffered from war, respond to a
call to arms against France But the
basis Of the hatred is the conviction
that France means to stay on the
Rhine, to create a vast Alsace- -Lor-
raine in the area that Paris treaties
assigned to Germany, that Britain is
too weak or too selfish to restrain
France, and that America will not
lift a finger.
Tomorrow, II the evacuation were
assured and begun, am bound to saw
that 1t seems to me the basis of
hatred, the sense OF present griey-
ance, would disappear. This cause of
war would disappear. because, in my
judgment, while most Germans would
fight to recover the Rhineland and
u
the risks of a new catastrophe simply
for the moral or immoral satisfac-
ton OF paying Off French score At
least, you have the French parallel
after 1870, and merely to recover AL
sace-Lorraine no sensible Frenchman
advocated a war of revenge The
sufferings of the terrible year" were
too deeply burned into the minds of
the French people.
Every German with whom 1 have
talked has quite freely conceded the
need of finding some way to give
France sense of security in return
for French evacuation of German
territory. There is an almost curious
readiness to give any kind of German
assurance, to assent to any Franco
British German compact which would
establish as inviolable the frontiers
Of the west as laid down at Paris
But, incomprehensibly to the German,
the Frenchman Is not satisfied with
this pledge. He wants some other
assurance. He will not trust. And
this dissatisfaction easily translates
itself in Germany into hidden desire
to stay on the Rhine-to hold Ger
many down.
Middle Course Advised.
If you are Francophile, you can
believe that France must be protected
against an inevitable German attack:
If you are Germanophile, you can just
as easily believe that the peace Of the
world is threatened because a wick ed