Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1925-09-27
GERMANY RESPONSIBLE.
NOT GUILTY, in THE WAR
Made Declaration, Which Brought 1t On,
But Thought Herself Menaced by
Russian Mobilization.

great powers into something like a
close partnership against herself.
Three times. at Tangier in 1905, over
Bosnia in 1903 and at Agadir in 1911.
Germany precfpitated crises in which
war seemed unacceptable. Yet there is
r )thing to show that she sought war
or that the ends she actually strove
to attain were not defensible in the
light of similar detectives pursued by
rival nations. That Germany should
desire a part of Morocco, that she
should support Austria in the Bal
kans, that she should even dream Of
dividing sea power with Britain were
aims morally justifable If, taken in
combination, politically unwise.
German Methods Provocative.
That German methods were provo
cative will hardly be denied, even by
many Germans; indeed, the failure of
German diplomacy and even of Ger
man craftsmanship Is never denied by
Germans themselves. But in pinch,
as at Agadir time. when war would
have been an easy escape from a
hopelessly unsatisfactory situation,
the German government accepted a
compromise, which did in reality in
volve a virtual surrender little short
Of humiliating. given the tone taken
by British statesmen notably Lloyd
George in the famous GuildhaH
speech. That German policy on the
whole made for war, may we'll be the
calm Judgment Of history, but that il
sought war, that it deliberately aimed
at conflict, is hardly to be believed
now.
When the archduke was assassi-
mated at Serejevo, the German gov
eminent did a very foolish thing: 1t
gave a free hand to the Austrians.
This was a natural and human thing
to do, but 1t was excessively foolish
because Austrian purpose, well known
in Berlin, led straight to trouble with
Russia. Germany was bound to sup
port Austria, even II in the end sup
port meant war with Russia This
was a duty and involved no crime. no
rong-doing, it might even be the per-
Torrance of a moral obligation But
Germany had no business to let her
self be dragged into war. which was
what ultimately happened.
1t was very late when Berlin per-
ceived what the actual consequences
Of her blank check to Austria. but
there is nothing to show that she was
not surprised and even appalled, by
these consequences when they became
apparent and it is clear that belatedly
her craftsmanship undertook to avert
the catastrophe. That Germany want
ed war in the last days of July, 1914,
is no longer arguable, in my JudS-
ment, nor Is there much TO prove that
at any stage in the debate she con-
sidered war beyond that between Aus
tria and Serbia, with the remote pos
sfbility that Russian interference
might involve her as the ally of Aus
| tria.
Ger1nany's Ultimatum Surprises.
Nevertheless, all of a sudden. on
July 81, when Sir Edward Grey be-
gan to have hopes, when Austria her
self showed signs Of weakening. Ger
many interposed with an ultimatum
to Russia and followed II inevitably
with a shower OF declarations of war
What was the explanation? For the
world the simple and easy explanation
was that Germany had always desired
war, had only pretended to listen TO
peace proposals coming from London.
and had thrown off the mask when 1t
seemed that her desired objective was
not to be attained and that peace
might be preserved.
Such an explanation, good enough
| in the time of heated war passion,
does not. however, stand the test OF
time On the contrary, the world mas
come to concede that from the first TO
| last the German chancellor and the
| German government itself, despite
patent laundering. really aimed at
| the preservation of peace, that chan
| able to avert the conflict. II the con-
troll had remained in their hands.
What happened, however. was that
on July 20 Russia issued an order for
general mobilization, an order which
| had not been suspended despite the
direction Of the Car. Now 1t Is the
claim of the champions of Germany
that the responsibility for the war.
| the guilt, rests with Russia and not
with Germany because Of this mobili-
Zation order. This is to assume That
the issue Of a mobilization order was
| tantamount to declaration Of war,
and thus, in fact, Russia declared war,
although technically Germany did the
declaring after Russia had refused to
obey an Iltimatum calling upon her
| to cease mobilization.
INTERPRETED as War Declaration.
Now it was, in point of fact, the
case that the order for general Rus
sian mobilization was tantamount to
a declaration of war. But not for a
Russian but a German reason. Rus
| STA was wholly within her legal rights
| in mobilizing all her armed forces.
and she had through the Gar. in a
| willy Nicky" letter promised that
| the troops when modified should be
| held back, that no aggression should
! be committed. She had protested that
| the general mobilization was no more
than an answer to Austria, which mad
modified and was attacking Serbia.
What made the German declaration
of war Inevitable was the fact that
| the plan for the defense of Germany,
which the general staff had been work
| ing upon for years and which was
| now the sole reliance Of Germany in
| war, was based upon assumptions
which fell to the ground If Russia
modified before the outbreak of hos
/ tilities What actually occurred was
| that the chief of the German general
staff, Moltke, having procured copy
: of the Russian order. went to the
chancellor and said that he would not
be responsible for the defense of Ger
| many If the ultimatum were not sent
| to Russia at once. Bismarck would
| have refused to yield. Even Falken-
| hayn, then minister OF war and later
might have been delay without fatal
| consequences. But Bethmann surren-
| dered.
1 Basis of German Action.
| Thus the actual explanation of Ger
man action must be found in the cele-
| brated Schieffelin plan, on the basis
! of which German military authorities
snatched control of the situation from
| the civilian government at the mo-
| ment in which it was hopefully pro-
noting q peaceful solution. Now the
| basis of this plan. which had been
| in existence for some years, was the
assumption that France could be elimi-
\ mated as a military power before Rus
STA was able to complete her mobilfza.
| ton and intervene, provided German
| attack were launched with full speed
and coincide with mobilization orders.