Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1925-04-06

lands afford the best and the most
suitably located operating base for
our own Navy in the Pacific.
The seamen on our ships must be
able to cruise in distant waters with
that confidence that comes from hav-
ing near at hand well defended har-
bors, where fleets may anchor and
make repairs and take on fuel and
stores and organize new undertake
fngs. In the Navy, say the admirals,
it is not just the ship that counts, it
is the ship well equipped and well
supported within the area of opera
ton.
Our fleet sailing out of San Fran
cisco will require an advanced base
for operations in the Pacific, a forth
fed and defended base, which will
actually strengthen the fleet operat-
ing from it Such Notifications, the
Navy men say, add strength to the
Navy-actual strength in fighting
ships" for they shorten the voyages
back to port for refitting and re-
fueling and 1engthen the number of
days the ships can remain on the
frontier line of naval operations
Hence if Oahu, one of the Hawaiian
Islands, is in enemy hands, it must be
captured.
Problems of Defenders.
However, there is another side to
the strategy of the maneuvers, the
side of the defenders. For the pur-
poses of the maneuvers we have
| called them the enemy" and assigned
to them the color Black. Yet they
Will be charged in the maneuvers
with the same duty with which they
are charged as American fighting
men stationed on their ,nid-Pacific
territorial outpost of the United
States. They will be ordered to de-
fend Oahu against the Blue at
tack and to protect the available
naval bases thereon. Their situation
will be the same as if they were being
attacked by a hostile fleet instead of
by the United States fleet only tenn
porarlly ordered to seize the islands.
They will be protecting harbors,
repair shops and supply depots of
value in naval operations. They will
be denying these facilities to the
Blues. At the Dardanelles the at
lacking Anzacs were supplied and re-
inforced from the excellent protected
roadstead of Moudros. But in Hawaii
there is no convenient harbor to servo
as point of support for a protracted
campaign by an expeditionary force.
III It's attack be repulsed, the Blue
fleet will have no base from which to
operate. 1t will have to depart in the
CouTSe oI Time TO RENT and re-fuel
and re-provision. Therefore the
Blacks will have accomplished their
mission If they can hold out only long
enough to force a withdrawal. In the
same way the Turkish forces at the
Dardanelles held out against the
initial Franco-British attack long
enough to compel the French and the
British men-of-war to sail away for
more ammunition and supplies.
1t is true that they sank some of
the allied ships, but not enough to be
decisive. The real decision on that
occasion depended upon the pertinac-
ity of the Turkish garrison, which
held out long enough to make the
supply question a vital one.
If the Hawaiian Black garrison can
hold out sufficiently long, it may
force the Blue fleet to withdraw.
Indeed, the period of active operations
for the maneuvers has purposely been
limited to about five days on the as
sumptie.a '.sse II decisive local vic
tory is not IN sight by that time the