Evening star., 1925-03-01
by FRANK ii. SIMONDs.

brlllSh ministry is likely to pursue.
Now L should like briefly to examine
Europe from the British point of
view. How does London look out
upon the European prospects and
problems at the present hour? What
do the British government, press and
public expect to happen in the next
few months?
Again, at the outset, 1 should like
to repeat that in looking out upon
Europe still troubled and brewing
problems which are still far from
settled. one is conscious of great
calm here. All the hysteria more or
less unreasoning apprehension, irrita-
tion and anger have passed away
j. L. Garvin, the greatest of British
foreign experts, described this az the
evidence that his fellow countrymen
had recovered their sense of humor.
AT least, allowing for an Americans
traditional doubt as to British humor,
there is no mistaking the recovery
of the state of balance
See No Great Crisis
Speaking broadly, the British view
OF Europe is that there is no great
crisis imminent, no frightfully dan
gerous development in the immediate
r. foreground. You may see the thing
pretty exactly if you note that in
the British mind Europe is entering
u,
alone from the war period, but from
that period of transition which
roughly speaking, extended from the
armistice to the close of last year
OF course, it is quite impossible to
set dates for such a change, but one
might say that the period of trans
latlon from war to peace came to
close with the past year. and a
period which might fairly be de-
scrlbed as one of peace began
The long series of crises, boil
eheVlsm, reparatfons, Ruhr, Anglo
French disputations, Turkish chal-
lenge following Greek defeat, crises
which seemed to threaten to throw
Europe into new anarchy and post
pone indefinitely all real recovery,
from the British angle, tended to
close with the London conference
which adopted the Dawes report, the
Berlin action in accepting that report
and the Geneva meeting, which, de-
spite the British excessive and ex-
treme resolutions, marked one more
step toward European reconstruction.
Little Faith I'm Dawes Plan.
That the Dawes report will prove
final solution is not much believed
here. What seems to the Americans
perhaps a solution, a settlement of
the reparations difficulties, appears
to informed Englishmen rather as a
useful, exceedingly useful, bridge to
get from an intolerabIe situation to
one in which reasonable adjustment
might be possible. l do not find any
one who believes that the decisions
of the Dawes plan will all endure, or
that substantial modification viii not
be inevitable, but all agree that it
has already proven an invaluable
contribution to any later agreement.
AS to the protocol of the league,
as 1 have pointed out in a previous
article, the British public is unlikely
to accept it in any such form as it
was adopted in Geneva, and is bound
to force its government to seek many
and sweeping notifications atthe next
meeting of the asse embly of the league
in Geneva next September. Meantime
action is in allegiance, while discus
sion is very general and public de-
bate going on everywhere.
Turning now to specific circum-
stances, the outstanding fact is the
Improvement of Anglo-French rela-
tions. A year ago, three years ago,
the British public displayed excessive
irritation and unlimited distrust of
French policy and French purpose.
France seemed menace to peace,
determined to stay on the Rhine, re-
solved to use the reparations claims
to prevent the recovery of Germany.
British, speaking generally, feel that
the spirit of France is pacific and
that the single obstacle to a final
removal of any French veto of con-
solidated peace in Europe is the
legitimate concern of the French
people for security.
British See Differently.
Wherefore the whole matter of Sc
curity for France and Belgium as
sumes a different aspect in British
eyes. There is a great and growing
recognition of the fact that new
French demands for security are
reaching an irreducible minimum. The
moment is at hand when the problem
must be opened and explored. Again,
l say, there is nothing more striking
in London than the absence of dis
trust and irritation with France. AS
Ramsay Macdonald would say, the
atmosphere in which to negotiate has
arrived, and, to be just, he is largely
: responsible for ii.
London, then, sees the probability
of some British decision and commit
ment, which will take the form, not of
Il specific alliance against Germany,
but rather of an agreement to support
the territorial situation now existing
in the west, which means the defense
of French and Belgian frontiers, pro-
vided France will in turn agree to the
evacuation, at least within the time
fixed by the treaty of Versailles, of
all the Rhine area, with the Sarre
included.
Such an agreement would not neces-
sarily be offensive to Germany, for it
would insure the evacuation of Ger
man territory, abolish all the basis
for the apprehension that more or
less forced reasons would be employed
TO maintain the watch on the Rhine.
And the cardinal principle in the
British view is the evacution of all of
Germany: Beyond this narrower
agreement lies the broader possibility
of an Anglo French German agree
ment to maintain existing frontiers
Z in the west of Europe.
Believes Germany VIII Agree.
The British believe that the Alsace-
Lorraine retrocession to France must
and will be accepted by the Germans,
provided they are assured of the re-
turn of all the occupied territory in
the west and convinced that modi-
fication of this territorial status can
only be the result of victorious war
in which they would again have 20
fight Britain as well as France. They
believe that France will be willing to
exchange the wholly illusory iusur-
ance of an occupation of the Rhine
with it's inevitable war-breeding con-
sequences, if they get a firm guasan-
tee of their own security within their
own frontiers.
There is the underlying British
hypothesis, the basis of British con-
ception and probably of policy, and
it envisages a deliberate undertaking
to divide Europe into two distinct
sets of problems, two questions, the
IA n