Evening star., 1925-10-18

IA shness. was plaything in the hand:
of Lee at Fredericksburg, and Hooker
proved utterly incompetent at Chancel
1orsville, his army suffering tremen
dous losses under his chaotic direction
of loyal men.
More than once during the three
days terrific fighting at Chancellors.
vile Hooker was in such a nervous
state that he was untitled for com.
ma nd.
Stonewall Jackson, that consum-
mate master of the fianking move
ment, swung around Hooker's Army
and, finding the famous 18th Corps
unsupported by cavalry, doubled 1t
up, the men fleeing as in a panic.
Gaps in the lines gave the enemy the
opening it needed, for only part of
the Army was fighting, and that with
out a supreme head. The enemy's ar
tillery, on the final day of the battle,
perfectly commanded the position and
poured an entilading fire into the
Union forces.
Hooker was appealed to again and
again for reinforcements and ammuni
ton, yet neither was sent forward
Meade and Reynolds begged Hooker
for permission to throw their fresh
troops against the enemy, but they
were kept on the defensive. When
the order for retreat came, those
generals withdrew 10000 eager troops
who had no part in the struggle. Ii
is needless to say that the retreat
was as disorganized and as undirected
as the battle had been.
WHEN Lincoln heard of the loss OF
w Charlottesville and the with
withdrawal of the Army to the north
side of the Rappahannock, he cried
out: MY God. My God. What will
the country say. What will the coun
try say And yet Hooker was not
Lee up the Shenandoah, keeping his
army between Lee and Washington
| for the seat of the government must
! be covered at all odds
AT Frederick City, Md, he asked
Halleck for the 10000 inactive
| troops that had left Harpers Ferry
| to get out of the path of Lee. His
request was refused and he straight
way handed in his resignation, which
was as quickly accepted.
On the morning of June IS, 1868
| General George Gordon Meade was
appointed commander of tine Army
the change being made actually or
| the eve of a great battle. Reynolds
the command. but each had refused
| it, fearing the stultifying militar,
supervision from Washington, anc
| each had recommended Meade for th'
position. L was a supremely hazard
Gus expedient, this shifting of com
manders at so crucial time. Th'
event. however, was to justify the
choice.
The ever-anXious Lincoln felt some
doubt concerning Hooker's ability, al
though he had been partial to tha
| comma nder, for he said on June 26
I'VE cannot help beating them if we
! have the man. How much depends il
military matters on one master mind
! Hooker may commit the same faul
! as Mcclellan and lose his chance. w,
shall soon see. but it appears to mt
that he can't help but win
| Lincolns choice of Meade was for
tunate, for Meade was liked by tht
officers and the men, who had come
to trust his judgment and to admire
| his military courage. His new pos
was most difficult, for from Hooker
| he received no plan of campaign
This must be evolved, and mucl
knowledge gained concerning tn,
/ Army. Halleck eased the situation b.
assuring Meade that Washington
would not interfere with his plans
| a promise made good by Stuart
cavalry cutting all Geographic com
munication with the Union Arm,
and Washington, and Meade wa
given the 10000 men desired by Hook
| er. Thus do the moods of men var.
! the fortunes of war.
Lee was confident of victory, for h,
had successfully measured swords to-
often with the enemy to doubt hi
| strength Too. he iustly IInderra q,
the ability of the Union comma nd
ers.. His men were flushed with vic
! tory and they went like singing bat