Evening star., 1925-09-21


action. Their duties and functions
do not conflict or overlap. except
along the coast line. A system for
co-ordinating the operations of the
Army and Navy along our seacoast
has been evolved after long expert
ence. This system, though not ideal,
serves to avoid. as far possible,
duplication of responsibilities, as well
as to overcome the inherent lack Of
unity of command" in this restricted
area.
However, while the operations Of
the Army and Navy overlap only
along a single line. and in the areas
Immediately adjacent thereto. the field
OF operations of the air force. pro-
posed in this bill. will overlap every
where the sphere of action Of one or
the other-either the Army or the
Navy
IF, then, there has been some diff
ficulty in the past in co-ordinating
the actinos of the Army and the
Navy along our coasts. imagine what
difficulties would exist in the future
with an independent air force con-
tinually operating in the zones OF
action Of either the Army or the
Navy; while all three Independent
agencies-Army, Navy and air force
would have to be co-ordinated along
the coast. Such a condition Of af-
fairs could end only in disaster in
time OF war, and should not be toler-
ated in time Of peace.
Recognizes Aviation's Importance.
Ion the other hand, do not think
from the above remarks that the War
Department does not recognize the
value of aviation as a combatant
"a in
tense. The experiences of the World
War demonstrated conclusively the
combat value Of aviation. Such de-
velopfnents In aviation as have been
made since the World War have not
been necessary to establish this con-
clusion. While certain developments
have increased efficiency in operation,
they have in no way introduced any
mission not already recognized by our
World War experiences. With this,
In mind the War Department realizes
the necessity for aviation as a COM
blatant branch of the Army, and
therefore cannot acquiesce In any
proposal which contemplates making
the Army Air Service anything other
than permanent and integral part
OF the Army, the same as in the Field
Artillery. Infantry, Coast Artillery
and other combatant arms.
II IS fundamental principle of
military organization that arms which
are habitually to function together in
battle must, so far as practicable,
train and live together. absorbing the
same tactical doctrines, and learning
each others powers and limitations
1t Is only In this way that team-play
ana cooperation, SO essential to sue
cess In the complications of modern
warfare, can be developed.
Aside from the inherent value of
each OF the various arms in combat,
their relative Importance in war will
always depend upon the situation. and
1t Is only through the medium of a
supreme commander that they can
each be utilized most effectively in
order TO meet the varying situation.
Summarizing the above remarks, I
consider as the fundamental defects
Of II. r. 1o147: Z
First. the proposed organization
creates a trinity Of command for our
defense forces, with divided control in
every possible theater OF operations,
instead OF that unity of command"
which is the foundation of success in
warfare
"'Second. 1t proposes an air service
for the Army which is not a perma-
nent and integral part of the Army,
thus violating the second great prin-
ciple OF military orga anizations that
arms which are habitually to function
together in battle must form perma-
nent parts of the same organization.
II have endeavored to outline brief
ly the broad policies of the War De-
partment along the lines indicated by
your questions. Detailed information
and a discussion of the subjects from
their own point of view will be pre-
sented by the chief Of staff. Maj. Gen.
]. L. Hines; the assistant chief of
staff, for operations and training.
Brig. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, and the
chief OF Air Service. Maj. Gen. Mason
NJ. Patrick. While they will discuss
the War Department policies. 1t is
probable that on some of the cues