Evening star., 1925-04-08
nv MAI. GEN. JOHN Ii HINES.
Chief of Stan, United States Army.

nv MAJ. GEN. JOHN Ii HINES.
Chief of stan, United States Army.
The art of war is a practical art.
It consists in handling men and
metal to the greatest possible ad-
vantage to yourself to accomplish
the end desired. We practice this
art in exercises like the joint
Hawaiian maneuvers for two rea-
sons-to train our personnel and to
test our equipment and our plans.
In the case OF the defense of Oahu
the object of the garrison forces is,
OF course, to prevent capture by. an
enemy, to hold off an enemy fleet
either Indefinitely, or--if our fleet
is still intact-until the American
Navy can threaten or drive the at
tackers away. Our maneuvers this
month will serve to indicate how
effective our garrison forces are.
HarBor well Guarded.
1t is, of course, a foregone conclu-
sion that we now have on the island
OF the supreme strategic impor-
tance of Oahu absolutely first-class
coastal battery installations. There
is little secrecy about these install
lations-at least. about their gen.
eral characteristics. Naturally, we
have large rifled guns of big caliber
at Fort kamehameha, near the en-
trance to Pearl Harbor.
Even the guide books sold to tour
lists tell of the 14-inch guns of Fort
De Russy at WaikilIi and the large
mortar batteries at Fort Ruger be-
hind Diamond Head, both for the
protection of Honolulu Harbor and
adjacent landing beaches. These
Notifications exist to insure safe
base for the feet operating in the
midpaoifio. knowing that its re-
pair docks and supply depots are
well defended against capture, the
Navy can cruise on its urgent mis-
sions with a sense of security and
a freedom from local ties. For the
purposes OF the maneuvers, it is
assumed that Pearl Harbor and
Honolulu must be safely guarded.
When the Blue Fleet approaches,
the Hawaiian Black forces must keep
the feet off. No Hobson must be per-
mitted to sink Merrimac in harbor
entrance or in a channel way across
the coral reefs, for such an act would
close the port. Both sides need the
harbor space. The defense is to, pre-
serve the naval facilities, not to de-
stroy them. The garrison should
protect the channel, not try to make
the channel protect them.
Lessons of other Wars.
Nevertheless, however strong we
make the fixed gun emplacements and
batteries on Oahu. they will not be
able to defend the islands of themselves.
An attacking feet might always find
a protected space into which to slip
within range OF vital shore install
lations, as the fleet did on the Pacific
side OF Panama during the maneuvers
of 1928. Some one or two batteries con-
ceivably might be silenced and so
open the way for the landing of an
expeditionary force. either of ma
rines from the warships or of soldiers
from accompanying transports. This
is something clearly to be contem-
plated in the coming maneuvers.
he invading enemy might attempt
to advance his land forces to the
shore in small boats over the sub
merged coral reefs. Landings in
force are always to be expected. They
Invariably are attempted as normal
part of the naval attack on defended
seaports. When Amherst took Louis
burg, when Howe took New York,
when the Americans took Santiago
and Manila, when Ian Hamilton as
sailed the Dardanelles, the principal
efforts were military efforts.
Sims Proposal Recalled.
II has been related how, some
time after America entered the World
War, Admiral Sims staff in London
submitted a plan for the capture
Of the fortified port Of Cattaro, on
the east side of the Adriatic Sea,
then being used as base for German
and Austrian submarines operating
with great efficiency in the Mediter-
ma ha nj 70 nj al q
use of our prodreadnaught, battle
ships and of suitable number Of
mine sweepers and destroyers, back
ed by $4,000 troops.
The plan was the occasion for the
assembling in London of general
officers of America, Italy. France,
Great Britain and Japan, and of the
admirals of their navies, together
with staff officers The meeting was
the first and only occasion previous
to the armistice when the military
and naval leaders of the allies as
sembled for point planning. We had
the ships, the fortif1cations were not
too strong. the port was remote from
support, and the gain in closing 1t
would have been great.
Success would have added very
greatly to the security of allied
sea transport communications in the
Mediterranean at a time when sue
cess in the war seemed to hinge
largely on keeping enough shipping
in operation. The plan was rejected
b because the generals decided that the
troops could not be spared
Role Of ARTILLERY.
Since. it 10 to be expected that the
forces which will attack the Hawaiian
Islands I'm any future war, as in our
Sxtst i~1 1l,,lA a. txt
forces, we have provided mo-
racks, almost in the center Of the
island, between the two mountain
ranges. In that division there are
infantry and 75-mm. and 155-mm.
guns with motorized transportation.
We have in addition heavy tractor
155-mm. guns, heavy mortar artillery