Evening star., 1925-02-08
GENEVA PROTOCOL HELD
BEST HOPE FOR PEACE
Observer Sees Conflict Inevitable With
out Offset to Conflicting Interests
of France and Germany.

impotent to test the decisions which
had followed her imperial disasters.
And the parallel is at once exact and
fatal for German hopes, for never
after the Europe made at Vienna had
consolidated did France have the
power or the opportunity to restore
the empire of Napoleon.
If at any moment before this con-
solidation takes place France can be
shaken off, forced to retire from the
Rhine: if Germany can get her hands
free. she will not have lost the World
War: she will have won it, and
all the enormous commissions and
changes in the middle of Europe will
prove but preparation for the crea-
tion of her own great empire, for the
practical absorption of much of the
old Hapsburg empire, with it's Ger
man majorities and - minorities in
Austria.
But. to take the opposite side
suppose for "A moment that France
did retire behind her own frontiers
abandon her watch on the Rhine
recall her support of the treaties
suppose, for consequence, which is
assured. Germany organized swiftly
and surely and crushed Poland and
CZechoslovakia and annexed Austria
binding the Magyars 10 her car, as
p" oulu DC is tHSTe any
thing to suggest that this new Ger
the population of France, would ulti-
mately rest until she had recovered
not merely Alsace-Lorraine, but the
areas which she marked down for
annexation while fortune still smiled
upon her arms in the World War:
Would Antwerp cease to beckon her?
Would she finally accept the British
control of the seas. or count on a
new occupation of the shores facing
submarine arm which nearly won her
last war?
Germany Grows Weaker.
But today time runs against the
German. Hundreds of thousands OF
his race brethren, the minorities OF
Posen and Bohemia. are being forced
out of Poland and Czechoslovakia;
even in Vienna German influence is
declining-that is, the influence of
the German Reich. The situation.
which is fluid, impermanent today,
may, with the passage of two dec
ades, harden fatally for him. Russia
may return as great power, re-
suming her influence in Europe. The
Europe organized at Versailles
against him, like the Europe or
ganized against France at Vienna; a
century ago, may become consoli-
dated. If this happens the chance
of the great German will be done.
Ruhr occupation, BLACK horrors, on
the Rhine" reparations-these are
merely eyewash and minor details.
The German hatred and passion to-
ward the French today rest upon the
fundamental fact that Germany lost
the last war because France under
took, after the Paris treaty of guar
anteo, those decisions which estab-
lished material loss for Germany. 1t
is French policy now which alone
prevents Germany from being great
er at this living moment than she
was before the war, and may exer-
else that veto long enough to see
the present opportunity vanish.
No Desire for Annexation.
AS for the Frenchman, he has no
desire to hold German territory, to
annex it. His ambitions for the
future in Europe do no go beyond the
limits fixed by the treaty which re-
stored her frontiers of 1870, save for
the matter of the Sarr, which was
partly his before 1915, and even here
he is ready to surrender his claims
for an assurance of continued possess
sion of the coal. His future opens
for him, not in Europe, but in Africa,
and every European drain upon his
energies and resources lessons his
ability to develop his great colonial
empire.
He holds Germany to the treaty
now lest, if he let go, Germany would
at no distant date turn and destroy
him. His hope, his sole hope, for the
future is that revised Europe will
presently become fact, that the
various states will in time become
strong enough and united enough to
guarantee the continuation of what
is and prevent Germany from recon-
quering a dominating position by the
extinction of several adjoining states.
But uniquely concerned with his
own security, the Frenchman finds no
other way to insure it than to stand
solidly in the pathway of all the
dearest hopes of Germany. 1t is not
his garrisons on the Rhine which
actually wound Germany grfevously
it is his presumptive garrisons in
Poland and Czechosrovakia; it is the
fact that his military power blocks
the road to Prague and Warsaw and
Vienna. 1t is because French power
makes it impossible for Germany to
less now to deal with the Pole and
Czech. before they have become in
fact considerable and consolidated
nations.
VIEWPOINTS Are Different.
For many Americans the present
and past bitterness between France
and Germany is explicable simply, and
by reference to relatively minor in
cidents; for Europeans, on the con-
trary, the facts are otherwise. They
appreciate that the gravity of the
situation lies, not in any minor or
superficial phase, but in the fact that
two great peoples are engaged in a
duel in which not only does the issue
for both seem one of life or death,
but so far no solution has been found
which seems to insure either of that
irreducible minimum which would
alone be acceptable.
At the moment the continent of
Europe is. in fact, divided into two
groups, a fairly well organized sys-
tenn of alliances centering about
France and including Belgium, Poland
and Czechoslovakia, the nations i'm
mediately menaced by any German
aggression, to which, too, are joined
by more or less definite ties Jugo-
sIavia and Rumania, as members OF
the little entente, these latter not
directly menaced by Germany, but
having their own needs to support
the status quo created at Paris.
Over against this group is another.
which lacks any definite form now, but
would naturally consist of states drawn
to Germany by a similar desire to upset
the European settlement of 1919 and re-
gain their lost provinces. These states
are Hungary and Bulgaria, while Rus
sia would seem at some time likely to
ioin with Germany in a partition of
Poland, as she might seek to reclaim
Bessarabia from Rumania.
Britain Stands AlOOf.
Outside both groups measurably