Evening star., 1925-02-15
REPORT EXPECTED
TO SUSTAIN SHIPS
Likely to Point to Example of
Great Britain With Uni
fled Air Service.
BY FREDERIC WILLIAM VILE.

BY FREDERIC WILLIAM VILE.
Aviation matters will be brought to
a head within a few hours by the
report of the special Navy board
which will be issued at the White
House For four months the board,
at President Coolidge's instigation.
has been going thoroughly into every
phase of the long-raging controversy
over the relative value of submarines,
surface warships and aircraft. The
board. organized by Secretary Wilbur
has heard scores of witnesses. Gen.
Mitchell, the assistant chief of the
Army Air Service, was one of them
A voluminous mass of testimony was
taken and compiled. 1t has been in
President Coolidge's hands since Feb
ruary 1, in the shape of a carefully
prepared digest. 1t is this digest
which presently will be made public
It's presentation is designed to con-
tribute timely knowledge to the dis
cussion which latterly has attained
nation wide dimensions because Of
Gen. Mitchelfs spectacular charges.
Example of Britain.
In Washington service quarters the
prediction is freely ventured that the
special Navy board will torpedo
Mitchell's contention that American
aviation cannot be properly devel-
oped except by a unified air service,
and that the airplane has rendered
the warship obsolete. The Army air
chieftain's supporters probably will
retort that no other sort of attitude
could sensibly be expected from the
Navy. But naval officers hostility to
a unlhed air service. they claim, is
not based on prejudice, but on the
one experience on which the world is
able to frame practical judgment,
namely the experience of Great Brit
AIN. The British maintain an "air
ministry" such as Gen. Mitchell ad-
Vocates for the United States, with
supervision over both military and
naval aviation. The bulk of opinion,
not only in the United States Navy,
but in the British navy, is that the
british experiment, now nearly seven
years old, has not been a success
Active agitation for the final sever
ancc of the fleet air arm from the
royal air force" is unabated. 1t is
expected in London that when a suf-
hcent naval personnel has been built
up to take over naval aviation, COM
plete separation, except in certain
elements of supply, will take place
manned by the Navy being directed
by another department of the British
is necessarily pointed to
as an argument for restoring the air
independence of the fleet.
Awarded Gold Medal.
The Royal United Service Institu-
tion a t London awarded it's annual
gold medal prize to an essay oppos-
ing unified air service. The win
ming thesis concluded:
THE pith of the whole matter may
be summed up in a few words In
war there are, and always have been,
TWO objectfves-1, the enemys towns;
2, the enemy's ships. Towns nor
,nally can only be attacked by land
forces: ships by sea forces. Hence,
the division throughout all history
of the armed forces of nations into
navies and armies.
The air provides a third way of
approach to the two original objec-
ttves, but does not provide third OBJ
iective-
Lacking a third objective, no raison
d'etre for a third arm exists.
THE elevation of the air force to
the status of a third arm is therefore
lnsound, ana persistence in so fun |
1amental an error in time of peace
ean only lead to disaster in time of |
war"
Separate in France.
France maintains separate army
and navy air forces, as the United |
States does, and she is regarded to-
DAY as the supreme air power in |
Europe. Italy has adopted a united |
air force, but not yet established a /
for aviation. Opinion as to |
the success of the united scheme in |
Italy differs.
Japan has organized its growing !
aviation service on lines very similar
TO those in the United States In De-
cember, 1920, Japan formed an air |
board to consider the whole problem |
Of a future air organization. There |
was a group that favored patterning
after the British unified system, but |
the scheme finally adopted was the |
separation OF army and navy air /
forces. The Japanese decided that |
aviation at sea, in particular, is a |
very special business, involving such |
highly technical naval knowledge |
hat it must be adm Mustered ex-
,lusively by trained sea officers. This |
s the view that inspires American |
aaval opposition to a unified service.
stand of Coolidge.
President Coolidge hitherto has not |
encouraged the Mitchell idea of unit
nS military and naval aviation under |
me distinct head. AS to the general |
Utility of aviation, especially for the |
Navy, it is economy considera tions |
hat govern Mr.. Coolidge almost ex-
'iusively. He is hostile to the un-
necessary expenditure of a single dol |
ar on old-type war craft, like surface
fesSels or even of submarines, if it |
AN be demonstrated to him that air
raft, vastly less costly than surface |
can supply as effective, or
more effective, defense.
If the Special Navy Board, whose |
'eport the country is about to inspect, |
effects the views known to prevail |
n our naval high command, it will |
ell the President that what America |
leeds at sea is neither an all-surface
,raft Navy, nor an all-submarine |
Navy, nor an all-aircraft Navy 1t
certainly will bomb the Mitchell the
,ry that the airplane has rendered |
he Navy virtually useless. 1t is al !
likely to report that the
,apital ship (battleship and battle |
remains the backbone of |
iea power" but that, under modern
that backbone needs to be |
by commensurate fleets of |
airplanes, and particu-
arly aircraft carriers. The Special |
Navy Board, in other words, is con-
identity expected to advocate a three
,lane fleet" of submarine, surface and |
Iir units, but one acting always under
Navy orders and Navy officers.
Copyright. 1921
A.