Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1925-10-25

Continued from First Page)
power is established. And the pres
ent importance Of financial power is
not less clearly perceived.
1t follows. then, that Locarno not
only represents the greatest British
diplomatic triumph of recent times,
but that it puts in British hands the
leading strings of Europe. Moreover,
we know quite we'll that one of the
first detectives OF British policy will
be disarmament. To get Europe to
disarm down to the German and Brit
ish standards instead OF seeing Ger
many gradually rearm up to the
French level, that is the British pur
pose. For the moment the way is
still blocked by Russia. 1t is useless
and even undesirable from the British
point of view to persuade Poland and
Rumania to reduce their armies while
the Russian stands unchanged. But
Germany will not permanently con-
sent to a weaker army than Poland
or Hungary than Rumania.
Work for Smaller Armies.
British policy must. then, still
achieve one of two things-an adjust
| ment between Germany and Poland or
a reconciliation between Russia and
the western nations. Bringing Ger
| many into the league is a long step
toward isolating Russia. AS a conse-
quence it is conceivable that Russia
may come to Geneva of her own ac-
cord in a future not too distant. But
in any event the British will never
abandon their fight for great reduc
tons in armies. 1t is the cardinal
point in their doctrine, and it is the
vulnerable point in their position.
n ha no SjS IF inf &c
! tary power. Britain is hopelessly
| handicapped, for her people will not
stand the burden Of CONSUMPTION in
peace.
But in the effort to promote dis
armament Britain has now the as
| sured support of Germany. The
treaty of Versailles disarmed Germany
and undertakes to keep her dis
armed, but If Germany can bring
about the equal disarmament of
France her situation morally and
physically is totally changed.
| Unless all signs fail, we are now
| to see the temporary eclipse Of French
| influence. France has got security
and a promise of Preparations. but to
obtain these assurances she has
abandoned her hold upon European
| leadership. The protected power does
not challenge the protecting power.
| moreover, rance Is on the 6QB6 Oh
| financial and consequent political
| troubles, the end of which it is diff
cult to perceive. In the end some
| form of bankruptcy or reputation
| seems unacceptable.
To sum up. among the political con-
| sequences Of Locarno that Of first i'm
portance is the inevitable destruction
of French supremacy in Europe.
| Britain regains paramount influence,
France sinks back to the situation OF
a great power temporarily, at least,
| weakened by terrible domestic diff
| culties.
Effect Upon Geneva League.
| Finally, British paramount influence
| in Europe Is bound to be expressed in
renewed efforts to procure disarma-
| ment. Arbitration and security were
! continental conditions to pacification;
, disarmament is the British condition,
and through Geneva and the league
Britain Is likely now to pursue her
| own end, not impossibly. to the great
enhancement of her prestige and inf1u-
ence inside the league. Meantime, in
rejecting the protocol, thus at least
temporarily destroying it, Britain has
unquestionably weakened the league,
the more because for the protocol she
has substituted a peace system Of her
own devising.
Copyright. 1880