Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1925-02-10

rendered a decision diSmiSSlng the
two petitions for mandamus brought
Ev the Name Central Railroad COM
rany and the Portland Terminal
Company against Charles E. Quincy.
individually and as chairman of the
Public Utilities Commission, and
against Charles E. Quincy, Herbert
w. Trafton and Albert Greenlaw,
members of the Public Utili lies Com
mission. in the celebrated pulpwood
late case.
The peutioners asked the court to
issue writs of mandamuS command
ing the Public Utilities Commission
TO make certain specified and addl-
tional findings of facts in connection
with its decision in establishing Il
schedule of rates fer the transport
tation of pulpwcod and against
Chairman Quincy of the commits
sion to allow a certain bill of eX-
ceptions in the cause. A hearing
on the writs was held before Chief
Cornish last month.
Section three of Chapter 80 gives
the Public Utilities Commission tie
power to make al necessary rules
and regulations" says the decision
of Chief Justice Cornish.
Acting under that authority the
commission on Dec. j, 1924, adopted
q code of Rules of Practice and
Procedure continues the decision.
"RulC 10 reads as follows:
"All exceptions shall be filed in
the Office of the commission within
30 days from the GATE of the deci-
SION, order or other matter excepted
to-"
1.-The decision in this case was
made ~ August 4. 1924. That mark
cd the beginning of the 30-day per
led. The case had then been fully
heard and determined. If the petit
TONERS wished to carry questions of
law to the law court they had 80
Gays in which to file their exceptions.
If filed within that time it would
have been tho ,lLty of the chairman
to allow them ii th6Y were in proper
form and contained no SCandalouS
matter. But the bill was not filed
until more than three times 80 days
lad elapsed. 1t was then too late.
The chairman acted within his au-
thority in declining to allow them
at that time.
But the petitioners cl;,im in OPP
position to this contention that the
commission mad 10 power to make
and promulgate Rule 10 and that the
method of carrying the case forward
on exceptions should be prescribed
by the appellate court and not by
the tribunal appealed from. l can
not accept this view.
THE statute above quoted eX-
pressly confers upon the commits
sion the power to make all neces.
sary rules Of procedure. Moreover,
an analogous illustration may be
found in the rules adopted by our
superior courts which are statutory
and not constitutional tribunals and
which regulate the time of filing eX-
ceptlons III cases removed there
from. For half a century the su-
preme Judicial court, the appellate
court. has enforced the Jules so
adopted, if they We're reasonable.
The time allowed in this rule, 30
days, is entirely reasonable. / there
tore find that the rule is valid but
was not complied with.
But Tie petitioners further con-
tend that as long as they filed a mo-
ton for re-hearing on Sept. i. 1924,
and decision dismissing that motion
was not rendered until oct. "a,
1874, there the time for fling eX-
Ceptions was prolonged until 80 days
from Oct. "A, or until Nov. y, and
as these were pres ented on Nov. Il,
they kept within the rule.
Il cannot concur in this view. All
the rules should be so construed as
to render progress steady and rea-
Sonable.
Rule Ii. entitled "Re-Hearing"
embraces both further hearing and
're-hearing' and clearly marks the
dividing line between the two. That
line is the time of fling the decision
on the case as heard, that is, hat
the rule calls the final decision
AT any time before final decision
by the commission in any proceed
ing either party may make applica-
ton for further hearing. Such an
plication must be a verified petition
and state specifically the ground
upon which the application is based.
II such application be to reopen
the case for further evidence. the
nature and purpose of such evidence
must be briefly stated and the same
must not be merely cumulative. :"
Ihat provides for re-opening a case
before final decision thereon has
been rendered. That is plain. When
the final decision has not been rem
dered such application for further
nearing may be entertained.
But in this case final decision was
rendered on August 4. That provi-
sion as to further hearing no longer
applied. Only a re-hearing could be
requested and the rest of the rule
provides for that, viz: If the appli-
cation be for re-hearing, the petition
must specify the findings of fact and
the conclusions of law claimed to he
erroneous with a brief statement of
the grounds of error; and when any
decision. order or requirement of the
commission is sought to be reversed.
changed or modified on account of
facts and circumstances arising sub
sequent to the hearing, or of conse-
quences resulting from compliance
with such decision, order or re-
qulrement, which are claimed to
justify reconsideration of the case,
tne matters relied upon by the an
pllcant must be fully set forth"
ms is precisely the course pur-
sued by the petitioners here. Their
appilcation was based not only on
iactS considered at the first hearing
put also on facts arising subsequent
thereto. They applied for re-hear-
ing AFTER the decision Of August 4
Whlcn the very words and context
or the rule itself regard as the final
decision.'
-Otherwise there could never be
ma! decision. If a petition for a.
re-nearlng cannot be filed until after
d maj decision is rendered, and a
fnal decision cannot be rendered
until after the decision on the nett
ton for re-hearinr and tho no -
ing itself are completed, it is a le-
gal squirrel in cage. Clearly when
the original case has been heard and
decided. final decision has been
How Fat Actress