Evening star., 1925-06-21

about the proposed four-power
pact between Britain, Fra
| ~ Belgium and Germany to main
| tain the status quo in the west
| OF Europe-that is. the frontiers Gre
ated by the Treaty of Versaiiles-that
| 1t would be easy to derive the i'm.
! preston that the most difficult of all
! the outsts nding problems of Europe
| had at last In some miraculous fash
/ ion got itself solved at Geneva and
In few brief exchanges between NJ.
BRAND and Mr.. Austen Chamberlain.
The truth is. however, quite differ
ent. We have already had more than
one settlement of the western Euro
pean situation and guarantee Of the
| security of France arranged at least
| TO the extent that at present has
| been agreed upon. The series begins
with the still-fam nous three power
| pact which President Wilson signed
| during the peace conference: con-
| tlnues through the draft treaty NJ.
| BRAND and Mr.. Lloyd George were
completing at Cannes when the
| former was called home to resign,
and ended tempora rily with the much
Naunted protocol accepted by Ramsay
! Macdonald in Geneva last September
and slain in the ga me place by Cham
berlain last March.
! What NJ. Briant and Mr.. Cham
berlain have actually done is to agree
on a preliminary draft of treaty
! which will be one of the most i'm
/ portant post war crea tions. If and
/ when it shall be adopted. not alone
! by France and Britain. but also by
! Germany. And Germany in this dis
i cussion has all the rights of a sover-
! eign power and can reject the whole
, affair. if il displa ces her. without thus
| in any mea asure affecting her legal
! position.
Reply to Germany.
! All that has actually happened. to
| get the case fairly stated. is that Ger
many. having-on British suggestion
/ approached Franc last Winter wit
a proposal for security pact guar.
| anteeing~F'rench German and Belgian
! frontiers from Switzerland TO Holland
NJ. BRAND and Mr.. Chamberlain have
| been In consultation over the French
reply and have reached a. basis of
agreement as to the form the French
reply shall take. All of which means
| that the Baldwin cabinetzhas agreed
upon formula for the defense of
both French and Belgian frontiers.
| along with German, which it has
! promised to present TO Parliament
with its important Endorsement. after
! France has sent 1t along to Germany.
and provided Germany will accept it.
NJ. BRAND has similarly engaged him
| self op behalf of France. But both
| governments may be rebuffed by their
parliame and there is the Germa n
to be considered in addition.
SO far as one may make coherent
detail out of thet terribly confused re
ports which have been circulated and
the official denials which have pursued
them. the proposed pact represents a
triumph for British policy within the
limits of British necessity. Great
Britain does not want another war
between France and Germany be
cause she recognizes she would be
| involved on the French side again.
Her splendid isolation" having be
| come a memory in consequence of the
| developments of modern warfare, her
| own security dema ndS something more
| than a passive observance of Euro
! pean affairs.
| Nevertheless. although geography
| has bound British security TO French,
the British have no desire and no in
| tention to undertake responsibilities
as to French security without having
some influence in shaping European
| conditions. They are not ready 70
ally themselves with France against
/ GERMANY: their concern Is TO find
! some basis for agreement between
| France and Germany and guarantee
! that.
Situation Changed.
/ A good deal of nonsense has been
{! printed recently explaining how the
| new pact renews the old situation
which existed before the war. 1t does
/ nothing of the sort. because this con-
/ dition is one of the precise things
! the British wish to avoid. British
! statesma nship does not start with any
idea of an alliance with Fra nee: it is
! not thinking of dealing with the qUes-
ton in terms OF alliance. In the
present temper of the British people
no alliance as such could be forced
! upon the ma ton. -.-.-.
! But there are certain facts which
are patent In the first place. the
! French state of mind is entirely domi-
mated by the element Of fear-fear of
later German aggression, fear of the
| survival of a German determination
to reconQuer AlSace-Lorraine- Fra nee
is perfectly satisfied to live within her
own frontiers, provided that within
those frontiers she Is safe. And. con-
versely. she Is on the middle Rhine
and will stay there until she feels
! safe.
! 90. Now the British have gone. sys-
tematically TO work to find out how
the Germans feels about Alsace and
the Germans have said quite frankly
that they are prepared to abandon
any aspira tions in this direction, that
they are willing to guarantee French
security-and Belgian is implied
| provided, in return, allied evacuation
! of German territories shall take place
within the periods fixed by the treaty
! OF Versailles. or perhaps more
promptly. And, as | have said. act
ing on British impulsion. the Ger.
mans have proposed to the French
| some sort of agreement, with Britain
as a party. which should embody the
readiness of both nations to abide by
existing frontiers and pledge their
/ faith in that respect.
! Without the British ba cking, such a
proposal would have no hearing in
France because the French would
inevitably fear that it would become
another scrap of paper" But with
the British Endorsement 1t becomes
another thing, for in effect it obligates
Britain to defend the French and
Belgian frontiers against a German
iattack Since France has no purpose
to attack Germany, similar British
undertaking with respect of German
frontiers is not a disadvantage.
Plans Of Own.
So far the line of discussion has
run smoothly enough. But it was in
evitable, both France and Germany,
while complying with British sug-
gestions, have had plans and interests
of their own. Thus France, lacking
a British guarantee all these years
since the close of the war, has sought