Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1925-05-17
GERMAN CAPITAL-LABOR
STRUGGLE NOW AT HAND
Distrust Abroad Follows Election of Hin
denburg, and Politicians May Seek
to Capitalize on 1t.

purpose and policy falls 10 the ground.
/ Last year. then. Stresemann. the
abest German politician. Unanswered
to bring about ministry which should
include the Nationalists. who had
hitherto refused to participate. ex-
ciude the Socialists. but bring in rep
| resentatives of the other two repuh-
lican parties. namely the Democrats
and the Center. Such a government
would naturally be conservative on
economic issues. since II would be con-
trolled by Nationalists and leaders Of
the Peoples party. but on the issue of
republic or monarchy it was TO he
neutral. at least SO far as any decisive
action should be concerned
| In effect. the Stresemann-Luther
cabinet was formed with this pro
gram: In foreign politics the Gee
man government was TO seek to re-
store the German situation by Gre
ating an atmosphere of confidence; IL.
was essential to give evidence of an
! intention to fulfil under the Dawes
! plan and also to meet the French
feeling of apprehension by some proof
of German Willingness to insure
| French integrity and security within
| the frontiers laid down by the treaty
| of Versailles.
| Meantime on the domestic side the
| position of big business was 10
made secure by the allia nce between
the Nationalists and the Peoples
party. supported by the ca pitalistict
! elements in the Democratic and Cen!
ter parties. The purpose NJ the
| Luther Stresemann cabinet was to
| hold back extreme Nationalistic ac-
| tivfty. ma king concessions when neCes-'
sary. 10 prevent any raising of the
| dynastic question. adjourning for 10
years at least-until foreign occupa-
. 49,. L. Iz1~S
d., the form of government.
| That is the key to all which hap
pened in Germany prior to the Hin
| denburg election. That explains the
various moves made by Stresemann to
| satisfy Fra nee: it explains the pro-
posed peace pacts, the remuneration of
| any future claim upon Alsace-Lor-
| raine. the prompt and complete com
| pliance with the reparations provi-
sions Of the Dawes plan. And up to
| the moment of Ebert's death, despite
| the protests of the more extreme wing
of the Nationalistic camp, the policy
| prevailed and was bearing fruit in
| the way of increased foreign conf
| dence, even in France,
| When Ebert died an election was
forced at the worst conceivable moment
for the ther-Stresemann combina-
ton, for while it had made all its con-
cessions abroad, 1t had so far brought
back no results. The evacuation of
the Cologne Zone, fixed by the Treaty
of Versailles for early January, had
been interrupted by the report of the
Allied Commission that Germany had
evaded the disarma ment provisions of
the treaty. Nothing definite had come
of the proposals to France.
Nevertheless. in the first election the
results were satisfactory. No candi-
date was elected. but the sum of the
vote cast for the republican candi-
dates was in excess of that cast for
the nominee of the Nationalist. So
far the returns were entirely satisfac-
tory TO the outside world and made a
real impression in Fra nee. where the
reality of republican sentiment had
been generally questioned. 1t was the
common belief in Europe at the mo-
ment ! sailed home :hat Marx would
be elected and that the Luther-Strese-
mann policy would bear fruits by
early summer.
Won Hindenburg Chosen.
But at this point the Nationalist
suddenly took the game into their own
hands, cast off Jarres. who was
doomed TO defeat, and chose linden
burg, believing, as events proved cor
rectly. that the immense personal pop
ularty of the old marshal would just
turn the trick for them and win the
election. This left the People party
in a difficult situation. Obviously
neither Luther nor StreSemann was
blind TO the fact that if Hindenburg
were. elected the foreign complications
would be bad: that much of their la
| boriously engineered foreign negotia-
ton would be compromised.
On the other hand, to break with the
| Nationalists would mean TO insure,
not alone republican success. hut sue
cess in such form as to give labor ma
terial advantage in the struggle with
capital. And 1t would mean, too,
quite obvious disintegration within the
Peoples party. So. between two Oh
| vious evils and without enthusiast
the Peoples party decided for linden
burg and supported him with pretty
clear unanimity. In word, forced
! to the decision. big business decided
on the line which seemed most advan-
tageous to itself, but. so far as Luther
and Stresemann were concerned, at
least with an equally clear realization
of the difficulties the Nationalist ma
neuver had insured.
! Now that Hindenburg has been
elected, we face the new situatio In
reality it is not new, but the same
situation which in a lesser degree
prevailed before. Can the Luther
Stresemann cabinet endure? Can 1t
/. again establish its fundamental pol
Continued on Fourteenth Page)