Evening star., 1925-02-01
FRANCE AND GERMANY
HEICHTEN OLD FEUDS
Ancient Antipathies, Marking Every
Move, Delay Day of Europe's
Reconstruction.

nounced that to obtain security
France must maintain safeguards on
the Rhine. 1t matters little that
he imm ediately won allegiance Of the
Nationalists and that subsequently he
won over wavering Socialistic ele-
ments displeased by such show of
nationalistic doctrine, but it does
matter In so far as ii betrays definite
trends In France against Germany.
And such trends cannot but empha-
size the hatreds that continue to
exist among great segments of the
German population.
Germany is divided into about three
equal divisions in so far as political
thought is concerned. One element
is for an eventual war of revenge
against France. An equally large
segment of the population is for peace
and retention of policies to prevent
war, while still another element, ap-
parently Indifferent to any course, al
ways is swayed by trends of tho
moment Should France pursue a
course Of peace and understanding.
undoubtedly this element should
maintain the balance of power in
Germany to the end. However, II
France becomes what the Germans
declare provocative, then the pre-
ponderent element of the population
will begin again to think of der tag"
which figured so largely in the
schemes OF the old monarchical re-
gime and which, as. every one knows.
fostered the opening OF the World War
with all its subsequent horrors.
However, there is some reason at
this time for the French to again
evidence determine tion, for 1t is not
known just how far nationalistic in
fuence will succeed in directing Ger
many toward the old order. If the
induStrialists and out-and-out nation
alists. become more open in their ac-
tivities leading to the overthrow OF
the republic and the restoration of
the old monarchical regime, then
France indeed would have sufficient
cause to worry and prepare for that
time.
Worry Thought UngTOunded.
But the world at large is inclined to
the belief that French worries over
Germany's military power at the mo
ment is exaggerated and uncalled
for, inasmuch as France mas the
preponderant military force in Eu-
rope today and could effectively and
quickly scotch any Germanic effort.
To appease the French suspicion
Chancellor Luther has offered a Sc
curity pact to France providing that
for the next 80 years the two poWers
pledge themselves to peace. This, the
Germans feel, should give the French
reason for curtailment of French
plans on the Rhine. But in this offer
Of a guarantee pact the Germans do
not stipuIate that this peace shall
prevail in the east. where Germany
and Poland still have many VeNatious
problems to iron out, particularly
those regarding territorial frontiers
occasioned be Poland's corridor to
Danzig. sepaEating, as it does, east
and west Prussia. France naturally
will consent to no plan which in
any wise would restrict Frances
movements in protection of the bevy
of little countries in eastern Europe
which, directly and indirectly, are
under the protection of the French
government. If the Germans should
offer a security pact which would
embrace ognition of the frontier
limits as fixed by the treaty of Ner-
sailles for a period of 80 years, un-
questionably such plan would re-
ceive some consideration, but how
| much would remain Conjectural by
virtue of nationalistic fire certain to
be centered against it.
The French likewise view any such
pact with suspicion, feeling that the
| treaties of peace are sufficient unto
-. their own ends. Furthermore, they
point out that Germany would be in
better position to initiate her war of
revenge after the 30-year period Of
recovery. They also quickly point out
that Germany might be well able to
again repudiate her agreements as
mere scraps of paper" France in
the meantime having lost all chance
OF regulating Germany during the
treaty period
One thing stands out predominantly
at the moment in the maze Of claims
and counter claims that are hurled
back and forth between Germany and
France, and that is the present situ-
alton gives further proof to the world
that little can be expected of either
country in settlement of European
problems until there is some effort
to subordinate strictly nationalistic
suspicion and enter into the general
problem of European adjustment with
firm determination to achieve that
adjustment.