Evening star., 1925-10-04
BY FREDERIC WILLIAM VILE.

| ~ NE great power emerSeS trl-
umphant from the ineffective
Franco.AmeriCan debt nego-
" tiations at Washington. That
power is public opinion. In
the last analysis, it was that which
! prevented what President Coolidge
calls the meeting of minds" which
would have brought an agreement.
! Both the American and the French
| commissions were eager for settle
ment. Both were prepared to. and
| did. make far-reachinS concessions to
| that end. But both finally baked
! when they reached a point at which
| they feared the respective public opin-
| ions Of their countries would withhold
! approval. The Washington debt con-
| ference has proved that the world.
! after all. has been made safe for
democracy" The day of arbitrary de
| cisions by presidents and premiers Of
| issues affecting the fortunes of ma
! tions is gone.
The fate Of NJ Calliaux is, Of course.
| more directly at stake in connection
with the debt negotiations than Is the
! fate of the Coolidge administration.
| French governments and ministers
can be thrown out of office without no.
| tice whenever a majority of the
| Cha mber Of Deputies is dissatisfied
| with any given ministerial action. No
| matter how substa antial ma jority a
French cabinet commands in Parlia-
ment. the latter always faces the pos
sibility of repudiation and enforced
| retirement.
| Opposition Is Bitter.
| The Painleve government now In
power at Paris, and Of which NJ.
Caillaux was the authorized spokes-
man in Washington. IS sustained by
a majority made up Of the so-called
Bloc of the Left" consisting largely
of the Moderate and Radical Social
lists, of which NJ. Calliaux and former
Premiers BRAND and Herriot are lead
ers. The minority consists of the
| National Bloc" whose leaders in
clude powerful personalities like for.
mer Premiers Poincare and Millerand
| This group Is bitterly opposed to
Caillaux and everything he stands
| for. 1t thirsts for a chance to un-
! horse him. 1t would make ruthless
| capital for that purpose out Of any
settlement he might have made with
the United States that could be rep
resented to the French people as un-
fair or burdensome.
ger that CaillauX had before him
every minute of his hectic stay In
| Washington. He made few bones
a bout It. either in his official discus
| sions with the American negotiators
or on private occasions. Caillaux laid
particular stress on the political ex-
| igencfes he had to face-that is,
| French public opinion as represented
by Parliament-when he insisted
upon having written into any fund
| ing agreement the security" clause
which would permit France to cea .e
payments whenever she might be
| hard pressed. Contrary to popula
understanding in Washington. the
! American commissioners did not OBJ
tect to the inclusion of such a clause
1t was considered so obvious and
manifest thing that France would
simply stop payments whenever she
was unable to make them that the
Americans saw no reason why there
| shouldn't be formal agreement on
that score. 1t was not the security
proposition that caused the negotia :
| tions to collapse.
Consequences Clear.
Although the American commission
is bipartisan (fve Republicans and
three Democrats). the Presidents ap-
proval Is provided for by law in the
case of any funding agreement the
commission makes. 1t is, therefore
essentially an administra ton arm
That aspect is emphasized by the fact
that three members of the commits
| sion-Messrs. Mellon, Kellogg and
| Hoover-are cabinet officers. In ad-
dition. administra ton leaders in both
Senate and House - respectively
Messrs. Smoot and Burton-are on
the commission. Thus, 1t came about