Evening star., 1925-02-05
What Price, Senator's

Are those senators who are feartul
that some day, in some manner, we
may in some way become involved
in the affairs of Europe willing to
pay the price for that complete and
utter American detachment which
they seem to think should he the
goal of our foreign policy? Is the
isolation they advocate worth the
twelve billion dollars owed this Gov
ernment by the governments of
Europe and the several other billions
owed by Europe to American citizens?
That they are not willing to pay
any such price goes without saying.
In fact, they are rather inclined to
press for payment by the nations
which were our associates in the late
war and to display somewhat Of i'm
patience because those charged with
responsibility for our foreign rela-
tions have not been a little more in
sistent as debt collectors. They ex-
hibit no great fear that pressure on
France and Italy and other delin-
quent debtors would result in embar-
RAISING involvement in European af-
fairs. But efforts to collect relatively
insignificant sums owed US by Ger
many apparently fill them with ap-
prehension.
Before the text of the Paris agree
ment was received in Washington
Secretary Hughes gave assurances
} that it made no provision for sane
tions and did not commit the United
States in any way to action in case
the contemplated payments were not
made. Subsequent publication of the
complete text bore out the Secretary's
advance Interpretation of it. But still
the fears of objecting Senators are
unallayed. They foresee a time when
operation Of the Dawes plan will fail
to be productive of the expected an
nual payments, and something will
have to be done about it. The thing
they evidently fear is use of armed
force or other coercive measures to
make Germany pay. They are COM
PEELED to admit that no such pro-
ceeding is provided for in the Paris
agreement and that the United States
would be under no legal obligation
to participate in the employment of
force, but they dread the compelling
power of a moral obligation. Upon
what do they base their contention
that such an obligation would exist?
1t is automatic that there can be no
moral obligation to do an immoral
act, and if the United States believed
use Of force against Germany was
wrong it would be as free to decline
participation as Great Britain was to
stand aloof from occupation of the
Ruhr, which the British government
believed exceeded the sanctions pro-
Vided for in the treaty Of peace. Is
it to be expected that a future Ameri-
can Government would be flabbier in
a matter of right and wrong than
was the British government in the
instance of the Ruhr?
Let it be admitted that assign
ment to us of a percentage of the
Dawes annuities gave US a direct in
rerest in the problem Of collecting
reparations from Germany. We had
that direct interest before the Paris
agreement was conceived, and would
have had it if we had refused to
sign at Paris. The nations to which
German reparations are owed are
owing us for money we leaned them
and, Great Britain alone excepted,
are predicating ability to pay us upon
receipt of payments from Germany.
Our interest thus arising is many
times greater than our interest under
the percentage assignment at Paris.
1t seems rather childish to believe
that if the larger interest would not
lead us into a wicked use of force
we would consent to be wickedly
forceful on the smaller account.