Evening star., 1925-10-17
WHY ITALY SUPPORTS LOCARNO
BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.

The decision of Italy to adhere to
the Locarno agreement, and thus to
become one of the guarantorS of the
F'ranco-German security pact, has
been too promptly hailed on this side
of the Atlantic as having an ex-
clusively pacific, as contraSted with
political circumstance. Italy's adhesion
is, however. mainly based not upon
any profound interest of the Italians
in French security, but rather upon
the fact that signing the agreement
gives Italy a considerable position,
while failing to sign it would lead
to isolation. In the vernacular of
our national card game. the Italian
course signifies willingness to sit in
and take cards.
Italian interests are neither identi-
cal with French nor in the main
irreconcilable with German. On the
contrary a German-Italian combina-
ton would not be impossible, save
for single circumstance, namely,
Austria. The Italians must oppose
the union of Austria with Germany,
because it would at one time threaten
their own position both in the Tyrol
and at Trieste. In the Tyrol Italy
has taken a quarter of a million of
German-speaking people in order to
carry her frontier to the crests of
the Alps, while Trieste remains the
natural Adriatic port of the Danube
valley.
If Austria were Joined to Germany.
then the German advance southwark
would inevitably be resumed; Ger
many and Hungary would in the ma
ture of things be united in alliance.
Bulgaria, in turn, would adhere to
this combination and Italy would find
herself shut out of the Danube region
in which she hopes to exercise both
political and economic influence. Thus
italian policy tends rather to join
with that of Czechoslovakia in oppos-
ing the Austrian absorption, and,
since Czech policy and French are
Identical. Italy so far stands with
France.
On the other hand, Italy profound
lv resents the French influence both
at Prague and in Bucharest and Bel
grade, and seeks to destroy the pres
ent dependence of the Little Entente
,1pon Paris. Again, Italy has no
"a rthly interest in Poland and would
naturally support German claims
against Polish in the matter OF
Danzig, the Polish Corridor and up
per Silesia, since Poland is the any
of France. Not to perceive the fun,
damental hostility between Rome ano
Paris is to overlook one OF the con-
tinuing factors Of the postwar
Europe.
This hostility has its foundations
alike in a clash of national feelings
| and of national interests. The Italians
resent the French position in Europe,
| which they regard as partly, at least
held at their expense. They REGARD
themselves as an equal and as an
eventual superior Of France in mum
bers and strength. But even more
acutely the Italians resent the posi-
ton of the French in North Africa.
| where Tunis, Algeria and Morocco
seem to the Italians Roman colonies
which should have fallen to the estate
| of the italian heir to Rome.
Because France took Tunis, Italy
| Joined the Triple Alliance Tunis still
| remains a very sore point, since 1t Is
a natural field for Italian immigration
| but French laws both restrict this
immigration and aim at the transfer
nation Of the italian immigrants into
French citizens. Although Italy has
acquired Tripoli, it is no counterbal
ance economically. politically or stra
| logically to Tunis and Algeria. Ac
cordingly Italy would be very glad to
support Germany in the Polish mat
| ter in return for German support In
| the Mediterranean, but finds herself
condemned to stand with France