Evening star., 1925-06-28
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.

TINE recent publication Of the
text OF the French reply to
the German note Of last Feb
L ruary suggesting a guarantee
| pact, together with the Brit
ish publication Of the BRAND Cham
berlain correspondence, serves to put
| the world in possession OF the main
| facts on which, 1t is safe to guess, will
be based a very long and intricate ne
gotiation. For 1t is essential to per-
| ceive at once that while Britain and
| France are fairly in agreement, the
| difference between France and Ger
| many is very wide
At bottom this difference is based
upon one circumstance. Germany de-
sires guarantee arrangement which
| Will close the Rhineland to all mill
| tary operations, whether originating
in the East or in the West, that is. on
| French or German soil. Therefore,
Germany has proposed the absolute
naturalization of the Rhineland, the
creation Of a no-mans land. in the mil
| itary sense, to cross which would be
for either country a violation of the
pledged word and would automatically
bring the British guarantor into the
ensuing war against the aggressor.
France Has Other Views.
France. on the other hand, ap-
proaches the problem with other
views. The French desire a barrier
against all German attack whatso-
ever. but under the Treaty of Yer
| sailles, France is permitted to take
certain sanctions If Germany violates
| the treaty. In addition-and this
point is on the whole more import
ant-France is the ally of both Po-
land and CZechoslovakia, pledged to
aid them II they are attacked by Ger
| many, but France could not aid them
effectively If she were bound by the
guaranty pact not to enter the Rhine
land.
Therefore France. in her note. holds
out for the freedom of action assured
her under the Treaty of Versailles,
she asks for a pact whish shall not
! abrogate the right and the duty of
| member nations in accordance with
| the covenant Of the League Of Nations
| to support other member nations II
they are victims of unprovoked at
| tack. What France wants, then, is
to find some method by which she
| shall have her hands free to support
Poland and Czechoslovakia, provided
! these countries are wantonly attacked
by Germany.
| But Germany, while proffering ar
bitration treaties with Poland and
! CZechoslovakia, refuses to make
| guarantee pacts with them, which
| naturally arouses their apprehension.
| and at the same time proposes to
| France precisely the form OF guaran-
tee pact which would leave France
! without recourse. if in the future Ger
many should treat Poland or Czecho-
slovakia as she treated Belgium in
1914. Moreover, one has to recognize
| that the fact OF German aggression in
1914, despite the celebrated scrap of
paper" materially lessons the value
OF any new guarantee given by her.
Germans Fear French.
Yet it would be a mistake in my
judgment to dismiss the German pro
posal as no more than a deliberate
scheme to obtain a free hand to deal
| with eastern neighbors. The truth is
that there is just as firm a conviction
in the German mind than France
means to stay on the Rhine and to use
the leverage of the Treaty of Yer
sailles for repeated occupations, as
there is in the French mind that Ger
many will ultimately assail France
again.
One may dismiss either the German
or the French state of mind as un-
reasonable or denounce it as evil, pre-
cisely as one chooses or as ones SYM
pathies happen to lie. But no one
can spend a week in Berlin without
discovering that the German state of
| Iliflu cAlStS, SAlStS ScilcidIS,
what Is perhaps most important, eX-
lists among those who are On the whole
the ablest and the most influential
champions of peace and settlement
with all the allies. AS the moderate
men of France are still under the
shadow of the fear of Germany, so
are the reasonable Germans under a
similar apprehension with respect to
France.
t. xryifh n4rtn hot
no German government would or could
assent to treaty of guarantee which
did no more than protect France
against a German attack across the
Rhine. A treaty which Germany
would accept must In the very nature
of things carry with it protection for
Germany against precisely the things
Germany fears, namely, repeated in
vocations of the sanctions clauses of
the treat of Versailles to justify new
French occupations. For If France re-
members the invasions of 1892, 1914,
1915, 1870 and 1914, Germany recalls
not alone the incursions of Louis XIV
and Napoleon, but also even more
vividly the still recent invasion of the
Ruhr.
Seek Immunity.
The most reasonable Germans with
whom 1 talked while in Berlin re-
Gently, while welcoming the idea of a
pact. frankly indicated that for them
1.-THE appeal lay in the fact that it would
give them immunity from further
French occupations. They believed,
many of them, that France was GER
tain at intervals to seize upon any
pretext available, to justify new oc-
cupation What they advocated was
not a door, which was swung closed
from one direction, but could open free
ly from the other If France desired
security-and they recognized this de-
sire-they wished for, immunity.
But lust as clearly France cannot
and will not agree to treaty which
deprives her of the right to go to the
aid Of her eastern allies, II only such
agreement would mean a reputation
of solemn obligations, a reputation
which no nation could consent to
without grave loss of prestige and
even Of honor If Germany attacks
bound to aid the victims of the at
tack, and she is certain to reserve
the right to do this by the single
avenue of approach possible-namely,
by the Rhineland.
| You have then a deadlock at the
very outset, yet the deadlock is not
absolutely hopeless, provided Ger
many joins the League of Nations.
/ For, as a member of the league, not
only does Germany take new un-
dertaking not to assail her neighbors,
but she accepts the right of her
neighbors to counter-attack If she
does assail a member nation.
In Like Positions.
Is Germany willing to join the lea
que and agree that, despite the guar