Evening star., 1925-11-29

ture than that which con-
Germs the Leag que of Nations. Not a
few friends of the league have seen in
the Locarno agreements tremendous
gain for the league which will be
emphasized when Germany joins. On
the other hand, there is another school
which conceives, not unnaturally,
that while rendering clear and pre-
else the role of the league, the paCts
have In reality subtracted much from
what had been originally dreamed for
Geneva.
In reality it seems to me that the
truth lies somewhere between these
extremes. The league has been Il pos
sible instrument for the service of in
ternational relations, which has here
tofore been, in the main, unaVaia ble
because conditions made it impossible
TO turn TO 1t. 1t has been used only
in the rare cases where there was
general agreement, and in the other
cases where there was agreement
among the nations which had col
lectively the force TO impose their de-
cision.
What the league has steadily lacked
has been the authority to enforce a
decision of its own, reached at Geneva,
unless that decision had previously
been reached elsewhere. 1t could not
settle Wilma. it could not settle Memel,
it did not even venture TO interfere in
F'iume. 1t did ostensibly settle Upper
Silesia because the allies, posse essing
the power, backed the decision and
the Germans. lacking power, submit
ted without consenting.
First Handicap of League.
The first handicap of the league has
lain in the fact that 1t represented
the combination of nations which had
won a war and looked TO the league
to preserve the results advantageous
TO themselves. Peace and the per
manent possession by the victors of
the fruits of victory became synony-
nous. Nations which had lost the
war and been compelled to accept
terms which seemed to them intClera-
BILE. and even immoral, were asked 10
aba ndon all hope of revision and agree
that such hopes were themselves evil.
Thus, the league from the outset
was deprived of moral influence over
the half of Europe which had been
beaten, which had lost in war and
paid for the loss at Paris. But ii
was just as much deprived of author
ity and influence when the French
and British quarreled. If 1t took the
British view it could not enforce ii
in view of superior French strength
if 1t took the French view, as it did
in Upper Silesia, it lost prestige and
following in Britain.
1t was. and for that matter remains
automatic that the league cannot act
effectively or without grave peril to
itself in any case where the interests
of a great power are affected or where
there is a collision between the inter
ests of two such powers. At the mo-
nj nf a In nj IL
served notice upon Geneva that if il
undertook to act directly, Italy would
retire. 1t was impossible for the
league to intervene in the Egyptian
csisiS of last Winter. in the Moroccan
or Syrian affairs of the present hour
because England or France would, as
a result either f1out the league OF
ignore its behests.
GrecoBulgar Clash.
That the league may function in
I the issue of peace or war there must
he a situation such as existed in the
recent Greco Bulgarian miX-up. Their
all the great powers, allied and neu
trail, and even German. We're equally
anxious to see war averted There
was a concert of EuSope. a common
agreement, and the league spoke the
will of Europe, which was needed not
because II was the voice of Geneva
but because Geneva spoke for a E.u
rope which was resolved.
We in America have had more or
| less steadily before us the assllmp
ton that the league would itself pro
mote peace and would have within
itself the power and the prestige tc
speak In crises to make its voice
heard and its will felt. We have
fharnfNra La
the two considerable wars that have
taken place since the league wa,
| created. namely, the Greco-Turkisf
| and the Russo-Polish, the league has
been impotent. There are ever
Americans who inquire why in the
| case of Syria or Morocco it does moi
| act.
The reason is that the league can
| not act, save when there is Il rea
| agreement in advance. 1t is the in
! Strument of Il united Europe. pow
| erlesS in the presence of divisions be
| tween the great powers. 1t canno
! control policies, influence nationa
activities. circumscribe national am
| bitions. If there We're in Europe the
spirit which existed in Europe in 1871.
| the league could do nothing becaus,
! there would be no way to enforc'
| its decisions.
! Council of Anba ssadors
| Conversely, if the spirit of EUROPE
| had been in 1914 what it was for s
moment in 1923, when the counci
| of amba ssa dors of the great power
met in London under the presidenc!
| of Sir Edward Grey. and resolved tn,
| issues raised by the Balkan War
without conflict. because all tn,
great powers desired to avoid con
| f1ict. then this same council of am
| bassadors could have done all that tn,
| league can now do or ever could do
The first requirement of League
of nations, or any similar body, i
| authority. But in the nature o
things this authority can only conn
| to 1t if and when the great power
are prepared to delegate their owl
authority. If with Germany in tn
league there arises tomorrow a dis
pute, let us say, between Albania an,
Jugoslavia, and war is threatened, TIL
league can act with authority an,
effectiveness, provided only France
| Britain, Germany and Italy ar
agreed that peace is to be desire,
and that all in the interests of peac,
| will delegate the league to act a
the representative of their collectiy,
force.
But If France and Britain, for rea
! sons affecting their own interests
support Jugoslavia. and Germany ant
Italy support Albania, the leagu
can do nothing, because it has n
effective support. The division be
tween great powers is carried into it
midst and instantly paralyZes action
Perception of this fact, too, woul'
encourage rather than deter the ag
gressor in this imaginary episode.
Yet, obviously Locarno has a bear
ing because 1t is precisely this posi-
bility of agreement between grea
powers which Locarno suggests mos
powerfully AS a result Of the agree