Evening star., 1925-10-04

tween the lines. too. many analysts
have read the view OF the commission
as being that Turkey had the better
claim. based upon racial and historical
grounds.
In reality, then, what the commits
| sion said was that the land in dispute
in whole. or as to the more valuable
half at least, ought to go to Turkey
unless Great Britain would undertake
| responsibility for the whole of the
Arab state with Mosul thrown in.
| Patiently, the prospects for orderly
progress in the valleys of the TiSris
and Euphfates under British control.
even indirect, are greater than under
! Turkish, and the league commission
might conceivably undertake to per-
suade the British to stay by offering
Mosul as a prize.
Nevertheless. 1t is not alone hard to
see any real justice in the decision,
but also simple to perceive how totally
unfair this decision seemed to the
| Turks. They had never recognized
Mosul as separated from Turkish do
minions: they had agreed to arbitrate
! the question with 1rak, but the arbi
tration commission had now in effect
offered to give Mosul to Britain If the
| British would take it. Thereupon the
| Turk began to talk war, and rumors
Of the concentration of Turkish troops
|
/ charged that the Turks were sending
raidinS parties across the line which
had been esta blished pending the de-
| ciSion of the commission. Unhappy
Christian minorities on either SIDE OF
the line were alleged to have been tho
victims of the agsressions. The Turk
on his side denied the charges.
League Situation Unpleasant.
AS for the league. its situation was
also unpleasant. Once more. as in the
| case of it's decisions with respect Of
| Upper Silesia and of Wilma. to say
nothing Of the Sarre, of Danzig, of
Memel and of Eastern Galicia. one Of
the parties in interest had fatty de-
| clined to accept the decision and
showed every sign of resorting to war
to prevent the decision from standing.
Moreover, the situation was further
complicated by the fact that there was
| unmistakable opposition in Britain to
| the assumption Of responsibility for
| quarter of century for one or the
| most infiammable areas in all Asia.
| To bridge the gap and avoid an imme
diate clash the league resorted to the
device of appointing a commission to
| investigate the charges of raids and
| masSacres in the Mosul area: but this
solution neither satisfied nor deceived
anybody. What was worse, it settled
nothing.
The truth is that the whole ques-
ton is one in which the league could
| hardly hope to achieve much, II any
thing. Britain is in Mesopotamia be-
| cause of it's relation to her strategical
| routes to India and because also of
| its proximity to the oil fields of south
| ern Persia. which she controls She
has established there an Arab state
and is thus. on the surface, working
in conformity with the principle of
self determination. But the simple
fact is that the mass of the Arabs are
eager to get rid of foreign rule. the
more odious since it is Christian. for
the vast ma jority of the inhabitants of
the area whether Arabs or kurds, are
Mohammedan.
The protocol of 1923. by which
Britain agreed to get the Irak into
the League of Nations and to have
it's frontiers fixed and thereafter recoG-
nize it as a sovereign state. with the
limitation that the King should ac-
cept British high commissioner and
take his advice in matters of foreign
policy and where British interests
were affected. looked to the ending of
Britain's mandatory responsibilities in
1928. Not only has the dispute over
Mosul interrupted this program. but
the leagues commission has delib-
erately set about to keep Britain in
this stormy area for a quarter of
century.
British Not Ready for War.
Despite the obvious dangers. the
British are in no position to face a
war with Turkey. They have only
small Garrisons, chiefly composed Of
air squadrons. which have been called
upon for various operations in past
ish army would mean the employ
ment of very considerable forces.
which could hardly be drawn from
India in view of the present Indian
state Of mind and in view. too. of the
Mohammedan question. They could,
of course, use their fleet against
Turkish ports. Constantinople could
hardly be defended. but the Turkish
government is no longer at Con-
stantinople and neither blockade nor
bombardment would much affect the
Turks, while their present capital.
Angora, is beyond reach of British
invasion.
Beyond the immediate dangers in
cident to an invasion of Mosul by
regular Turkish troops there is the
possibility that there might be
general uprising against the British
in Irak and the French in Syria. At
on a very difficult and costly struggle
with the Druses on the edge of Pales-
tine, and the French hold upon all
of Syria is exceedingly precari-
Gus. Lord Balfour, who visited Da-
mascus after his trip to Jerusalem.
had a very unpleasant demonstration
of the state of mind of the Inhabitants
of the French mandate, following
only less unpleasant experiences in
Palestine itself.
Turkeys victories over Greece and
her successful defiance Of Europe at
Lausanne have not alone raised Turk
| ish pride and passion to a danger
point but they have given Turkey
very profound influence all over this
corner of Asia and among all the
| Mohammedan populations. There has
been a corresponding diminution of
| British prestige, while France has
! suffered both because of her Syrian
| difficulties and because of the Moroc-
| can war, which has been presented
in the East as a religious struggle in
| which the Christian has been worsted.
| In the same fashion recent events in
Egypt have been employed to infiame
passions against the British.
War Would Be Popular.
If the Turks should decide to re-
| ject the Geneva decision and take up
! arms it is hard to see how the League
of Nations could exercise any in.
| fluence. There is no public opinion In
| Turkey which might be affected by
any moral fiat and war for the re-
| conquest Of the whole of the lost
Asiatic areas, Syria, Palestine and the
Irak, would doubtless be popular. In
| such a war, too. Turkey might hope
| for direct aid from the Bolshevists,