Evening star., 1925-10-18


bitter people. lIenccforth they Str"ve
To ev;de what they could not hope to
resist bV force
Moreover. there crew up ia the Ger
man mind the SrtI led conviction that
all endcaNor 10 perform under the
treaty Was futile: that the lnmulable
purpose of the yctorS was IL destroy
Germany: 10 take advantage uf im-
possible terms written into the treaty.
to employ coercion and achieve de-
Struction. Despair and hatred became
once more the domino nj emotions in
Germany. They found expression
presently in the passive resistance
which eliminated in the Rnhr war.
for war il was. When Germany had
lost that war she was ON the whole.
/ as close 10 ruin moral. physical. Spir-
itual-aS il is possible TO lima Gine. Io-
litically the republic had lost all pres
tige and popularity. financially the
mark had ceased to have value. So
cially the collapse was appalling.
Two very clear convictions explain
ed the developments Of these five
wears. The Germans were convinced
that their destruction WAS the single
objective Of their ConquerorS. the al
| lies and particularly France. were
satisfied that the republic was sham.
( German surrender bluff and that be
/ hind outward submission there was
hidden the Will Ia do il all again on
the first favorable opportunity.
Resistance Futile.
The Ruhr war demonstrated !" the
Germans the futility of all resistance,
/ passive or otherwise. Il proved that
! they were helpless and that their tate
was not in their own hands. but il Just
az clearly demonstrated to The allied
! world that unless something were
! done Germany would be transformed
/ into an area al anarchy. revolution
I 9 nj passion which would menace The
! whole of Europe II the German was
I convinced "f his own Impotence. the
Z allied public was at last educated AZ
/ to the limits ANA dangers Of their own
strength. No one could say whether
| red revolution OF white reaction would
/ dominate GeImany, but it Was plain
/ that only the Communists and the
/ Junker could live in existing cnndi-
tionS and that all moderateS We're
| helpless.
I As - consequence there was at last
+ "A total change in allied policy. which
/ eliminated in the London conference
and the Dawes plan. Al last. on the
! financial side. Germany received a
! program which was in itself moderate.
and she was not nnly assured of pro
I lection while She performed under it.
. but she WAS guaranteed that honest
effort would count az performance. If
in the future the requirements seemed
too severe. Al London. q wear ago.
Germany received sn economic char
ter of existence But this was not All:
I in the London discussions Dr Strese-
mann and Dr. Luther were treated
/ rot aS the suspect representatives of
I criminal nation. but a. representa-
/ tiNeS of a great power They We're
/ not ON position of equality in the
/ nature Uf the case. for what was at
I issue was what they must pay. Rut
/ they were permitted to speak. To ar
que. and their acceptance ut he terms
/ was voluntary. not dictated.
/ Moderation Gains Strength.
A. a consequence the moderateS in
Germany. who sought for peace by
/ agreement. We're again able 10 raise
their voices. 10 argue that what the
allies sought WAS not the total ruin Of
. Germany achieved by indirectiun. For
/ the first time since the signing Of the
! treaty of peace there WAS i measure
( of optimism III Germany. which WAS
/ reflected in the elections. The eco
( nomlC conditions recovered rapidly.
I the mental conditions even more rap
( idly and surprisingly.
Nevertheless there WAS soon - re-
action. due To the failure of the allies
To quit Cologne. once more the peSSi-
mists raised their voices and argued
that Germany was being swiudlcd.
/ that despite momentary pauses the
/ ruin of the nation was still ineXora hlv
/ sought by her foes. Nor could the re-
/ public recover the ground that had
! been lost over six years of misfortune
and allied severity. Hindenburg was
elected president = consequence
and reaction scored a considerable VIC
tory.
/ Yet IL must he counted permanently
to the credit of Dr.. Luther and DR..
| StreSemann that. nevertheless and de-
! spite the grave difficulties which con-
tlnued IL surge up. they steadily
! kept in mind the fundamental fact
| that the condition of German survival
Was real peace with the enemy of the
| war and that real peace was tu be
| obtained only by evidence of good
faith and pacific purpose. Both Lu-
ther and StreSemann We're satisfied
latter the X.ondon conference that the
allied purpose was not to destroy
Germany, that an understanding" MAS
| possible.
Nation nc0nyinced
Yet their problem then and now
has been To deal with a nation which
deliberately sought by the conqueror
and TO restrain those political forces
which sought To exploit national de-
Spair for political ends. And again
one is bound To say that the allied
nations have not made the task
wholly easy. on the contrary, the
failure to evacuate the Cologne zone
| was almost a fatal mistake. which has
only in part been counterbala need bv
n FROM lon Ir,I, y
will not be completely abolished until
Cologne is free<aSain
The course of Luther and StreSe-
mann. taken at the risk not alone Of
political but physical life in insisting
i upon settlement with the allies. their
proposal of the guarantee pact. their
determination to so TO conference and
their presence at Locarno seem TO me
likely to he ranked as among the
really great national and international
deeds OF the postwar period and ma V
perhaps entitle them hereafter TO be
called the true saviors of Germany.
Before Locarno, at Locarno after
Locarno, their gravest obstacle will be
the very general conviction among
their fellow countrymen that the idea
of settlement is a delusion, that the
hope of peace is vain. that the con-
querOr still remains resolved to de.
stroy Germany. Luther and Strese.
mann did not go to Locarno with free
| hands. Almost they went with a rope
about their neck, not their wrists.
Their greatest problem was to obtain
terms which they could safely carry
home. Their greatest danger was the
possibility that they might have 10 re-
iect terms which they personally re
garded as possible because of the state
of the German mind. ErZberger ac-
cepted the treaty of Versailles and he
=.
| a policy of performance and he was
murdered. One must. then. recognizs