Evening star., 1925-01-25

T HE confusion and bitterness
which have been engendered
by the allied decision to remain
4 in Cologne beyond the time fix
ed by the treaty of Yer
sailles and because of the unques-
toned violations of the disarmament
provisions of the treaty of Versailles
remain one of the grave barriers to
Immediate adjustment of many out
standing European problems. 1t has
bedevilled the domestic political situ-
alton of Germany, it has temporarily
interrupted the negotiations of a
commercial treaty between France
and Germany-moreover it threatens
not the peace of Europe, in the sense
of rendering new war possible at
the moment, but by postponing some
via BILE adjustment.
Now in examining the question
thus raised 1t is necessary to ap-
preciate a once that the decision to
stay in Cologne and the reasons as
signed, while technically and Incl
dentally adequate. are at most no
more than temporary measures to
cover a disagreement between allies
over the permanent steps to be taken,
or, more accurate. a failure of the
allies and in particular the French
and British to arrive at a definite
agreement.
1t is plain that since under the
agreement by which the Dawes plan
was put through in London last sum
ner, France, while promising to
eVacuate the Ruhr within the present
year, can remain in the Ruhr until
August, any evacuation of the Co
logne bridgehead in advance of the
complete withdrawal from the Ruhr
would be out of the question. This
is trUe hncanSa tho nd
roads by which the occupying forces
in the Ruhr are maintained pass
through the Cologne bridgehead
area.
Therefore, if the British troops which
actually garrison Cologne We're with
drawn, French and Belgian troops would
have TO take their place, and not only
would there be no real evacuation, but
France would be put in complete control
OF the whole left bank of the Rhine
from Holland to Alsace. What the Brit
ish desire is evacuation, permanent
evacuation of Cologne, and the Ger
mans, despite their protests, have no
wish TO see French troops replace
British
But beneath these surface conditions
there lies an all-important fact in the
present issue. At Paris when the treaty
of peace was made, France asked for
the right permanently to garrison the
left bank of the Rhine as measure OF
protection for herself against a new
German aggression. This demand was
squarely opposed by Britain and the
United States. In the end a compromise
vas reached by which Lloyd George and
Wilson, for their respective countries,
gave France a treaty of guarantee,
while Clemenceau withdrew the French
demand for occupation.
Failure of Treaty Plans.
But the American Senate failed to
ratify the treaty of guarantee. and it
accordingly lapsed, since British ratifi-
cation was conditional upon American.
France, therefore, was put in the situa-
tion of having resigned her claim in
return for promises which were not now
to be kept. And the real issue was
bound to arise only when the moment
came under the treaty for the evacua-
ton of the first of three areas. which
under the treaty were during 15 years
after 1919 to be returned to German
control
If France today agrees to the
evacuation of the Cologne bridge
head, while she still has no guarantee
Of her security by the British-she
has long ago abandoned all hope of
any American pledge-then she will
be in the position of having sur
ItHueIeu HtI last cage VI SttuIll y
without having obtained any corre-
spending advantage. Thus, the whole
dispute at the moment covers the
larger question OF French security.
What one faces is a situa ton in
which the French practically say to
the British that they are not disposed
to assent to the evacuation of the
Rhine barrier unless they have some
British pledge of aid in time OF
danger arising from Germany. For
the apparent violation of the treaty
of Versailles involved the French
have ready and considerable justi-
fiCat tion growing out of the fact that
Germany has been guilty of viola =
tions of the disarmament sections of
the treaty Of Versailles, viola tions
which the allies of France conCede
unanimously.
Blocking Chances of Peace.
Yet it is plain that although Ger
many has violated these provisions,
Germany is, nevertheless. as nearly
disarmed as it is conceivable tina t
she ever will be and that further pro-
1onged occupation, anything like a
permanent occupation, would consti-
tute an intolerable menace to world
peace and a permanent barrier TO
any adjustment between France and
Germany. 1t is automatic that if a
state of peace cannot be reached be-
tween these two nations the Euro
pean situation will not only remain
bad but tend to become steadily
worse.
Thus it is unmistakable that in the
period of delay, which has now been
supplied by the undoubted German
violations of the treaty and the
unanimous action of the allies thereon,
France and Great Britain must find
some common basis OF agreement on
the main question of French security
and that following upon that and
Cotnciding with the completion of the
French evacuation of the Ruhr the
Cologne area must also be turned
back to the Germans.
But how is this isis to be found ?
After years of debate the British and
the French did arrive at a formula
of agreement which was considered
by BRAND and Lloyd George at Cannes
three years ago. But in the midst
of the discussions BRAND was sud
denly forced to resign, Poincare came
70 power and while he retained con-
troll the British refused to come to
any definite arrangement.
Meantime two separate efforts were
made to find a basis of agreement
through the League of Nations, that
IS to find a way for guaranteeing
French security through the league
Itself, for the British were increasing
ly hostile to any separate arrange
ment which might have the color If
not the character of an alliance
against Germany. Yet these two
separate experiments. the Cecil pact
and the protocol have not proven the
answer, for the British have already
rejected the former and show no in
clination to accept the latter The