Evening star., 1925-03-23
The War Over the Air
Chapter K-''The United Air Service.''
By Viii IrUin.

In previous installments have
tried to set forth impartially the
danger to our cities and to machinery
of national life which might lie in one
swift, intelligently organized attack
from the air; and l have shown that
the best defense against an airplane
is another airplane. If we fall to
force aerial disarmament, we may
need some day a cohesive air fleet
built and trained TO meet this danger.
So at least. say the airmen.
Naturally and humaly, perhaps. the
old-line officers Of the Army and Navy
do not agree with this view. Air
planes are important. they say. but
not supremely important. The In
fantry with its auxiliary services on
| land, and the battleship at sea still
remain the lords of battle. If you
ask any unprofessional opinion on
this point, | will say that l lean to
the side of the airmen rather than TO
that of the old-line officers.
SIftcheIrs View Stated.
Given this danger of overwhelming
aerial attack. how shall we meet It..
asks General Mitchell and his parti
sans. except by training and drilling
our Air Service as a whole? When an
isolated country like this knows that
the enemy is advancing by land or
sea, it has at least a few days to
organize for defense. The breathing
space In event OF aerial attack might
be a matter OF hours. We should
doubtless need to throw in every air
plane we had; for an enemy air vic
tory at the beginning might not only
cause incalculable damage to civil
ian life and property, bat settle the
whole issue of the war.
In this emergency, what would
proha bly, happen? Generals and ad-
nlirals, believing s military men will
that in their own special arms of the
service lie salvation. would be likely
to hold on to their airplanes. There
would be no time to debate the ques-
tion; it would have to be done on
the instant or not at all. And even
II the sea forces and land forces con-
sented to give up their aircraft for
the emergency, you would have two
separate units which had never ma
neuvered together.
Tactics and strategy are becoming
as important in air operations as in
land or sea fighting. Even in the
face OF the enemy, there would rise
that question which hampers eff
cheney whenever units OF the Army
and Navy join operations-which arm
has precedence, which is in command?
At tn's moment. no one knows
whether the Army or Navy is re-
sponsible for our coast defense.
Three Elements Involved.
The land is one element, the sea
another. And the air is still another.
You would not expect a general of
infantry, artillery or engineers to go
aboard a battleship and command a
fleet action. But airmen. practi-
TONERS of a new technique, must take
the commands of men who never
made landing or manipulated a joy
stick. No man on the General Board
of the Navy or in high command OF
naval aviation has Qualified as a pilot.
There are more than 100 members of
the army general staff. OF these, only
two are flyers. In these circum-
stances, the air will never have its
chance.
There is, too, the matter Of appro-
priations. Our airplanes are going
to pieces with hard wear. The Euro
pean nations are on the upcurve. We
are on the down. We have the fac
tories and the mechanical talent to
build airplanes as good as the best.
But the estimates for both Army and
Navy are made, respectively. by the
general staff and general board of the
two services. 1t is they-not airmen-
who decide what proportions OF the
money should go into aviation. The
Army and Navy always ask for more
than they expect to get. Congress takes
the estimates and begins to slash them.
The battleShip commanders of the gem
eral board, the artillerymen and infan-
try OF the general staff fight like pi-
rates for thes- special arms: there is
none to fight for aviation. At least, SO
say the flying men. The Navy requested
an aviation appropriation of $50, 0,000,-
900 for 1926; 1t got s5,250,000.
Further, who are the judges on new
designs of service airplanes? To a
great extent, men who never flew!
Duplication Is Seen.
When the Navy settles on a new de-
sign for a battleship hull, the Army on
a new gun-it's right. When these
mere earth-men adopt a design for an
aeroplane or an accessory-it may be
right or II may not. Still further, the
two separate branches of the service,
whatever they themselves may say, are
duplicating effort and wasting money.
The senior services respond first that
the aviation faction eXaggerateS the
danger from the air. Secondly. the
aeroplane, while most Indispensable, is
still an auxiliary. One cannot bring the
army to grips with the enemy, Join a
general action at sea or even fight a
| battery, without aeroplanes. But flyers,
to be efficient in these circumstances,
must have an ingraIned knowledge OF
army and navy tactics.
~ spotter who didn't understand
naval operations said an admiral
| would be nearly useless in action"
Both Army and Navy announce the
same general policy for the future. Part
Of their corps of officers are to be
| trained as flyers, transferred TO the
line, and through their whole profes
sional careers educated with a view to