Evening star., 1925-02-08


making of the treaties of peace. 1t
is the problem of peace or war, not
immediate but eventual war, which
depends almost entirely upon the So
luton of the present duel between
France and Germany, solution in the
sense of the finding of some compro-
mise which Will permit both great
people to abandon policies and con-
ceptions which must lead directly to
new collision.
If you should ask the average
American when German defeat took
place he would almost certainly re-
ply that il was a certain date or
dates in the months of August, Sep
tember and October. 1918. He would
be moved to add. probably, that the
evidence of this defeat was disclosed
In the surrender of Germany as indi-
Gated by the terms of the final armi-
| stice. In a word, the answer would
be that Germany was defeated in the
war and by military force.
.Lost" in Paris.
If by contrast, you were to ask
the German when the war was lost
he would, with equal certainty, reply
that it was lost, not on the field of
battle, but at the peace conference OF
Paris. He would say that the real
German defeat lay not in the loss of
terms which compelled Germany to
surrender provinces, military re-
sources, the right to any arms, or
freedom to fortify her frontiers. and
the ability to act in Europe which,
were he free, would offer him the
chance to realize all of his fondest
wartime aspirations.
Then, this same German. beyond
much doubt, would give expression to
a qualified denunciation of France and
perhaps to heavy threats for fu-
ture reckoning. In d word, the Ger
man would pass very lightly over the
military events of the last phase of
the war, he would show little real re-
sentiment over the part played by
American or British troops, or for
that matter French troops. in bring
ing about the situation which led to
the armistice-and he would do this
without any real absence of frank
ness-but on the contrary his wrath.
his passion would begin at the mo-
ment when he discussed not merely or
mainly the peace terms. but the en-
forcement of those terms.
French Mastery Hated.
German hatred of France at the
present moment rests not upon any
passing bitterness, growing out of
the occupation of the Rhine or even
of the Ruhr. although these are in a
sense Symbolical of the real thing.
The cause of his passion is to be
found in the fact that while all the
allies in common council fixed the
terms of the treaty of peace, all the
others went home and left France to
enforce them and that, if France
abandoned the task. most of the por-
tions of the treaty which really count
would be wiped out over night.
Z The reason that Polish flags fly in
Posen, in Pomerania, in Upper Silesia,
that German flags do not fly in
Prague and Vienna, that Germany has
not re-occupied Danzig, that Ger
many has not become, in fact the
dominating force in all the middle of
Europe, is not that certain decisions
were taken in Paris, but because for
six years, French armies have backed
these decisions and French policy has
insisted upon the maintenance of the
decisions.
Germany Could Conquer.
If tomorrow a revolution should
break out in France necessitating the
recall of French troops from the
Rhine, the whole edifice of Central
Europe, as created at Paris. would go
down in a heap, because, while both
the Poles and the Czechs would fight
desperately to defend themselves and
make head against Germany, thus
freed from any French menace.
Moreover, it is automatic that in
such situation neither Great Britain,
the United States nor even Italy
would lift a finger. German aggres-
sion would doubtless be roundly de-
nounced in London, Washington and
even in Rome, but from new war
to block German aggression all three
nf,-in n r. .l,,
1t is not merely that for the Ger
man, French power is standing in the
way of his recovery of the lands he
regards as lost provinces in the east,
this is only one count: in addition it
is French power which prevents him
from reclaiming the Germans who
constitute the minority in Czechoslo-
vakia, in anneXing the Germans of
Austria. But for France he could
carry out a new partition of Poland
with Soviet Russia, he could bind to
his side-tne Hungarians by the res
toration of lands lost to Slav and
Rumanian. In Il word that whole
grandiose structure of Mitteleuropa,
which for d moment was realized dur
ing the war, could be briefly restored
in a far more viable state and Ger
man influence might shortly be es-
tablished supreme in Salonica and
Constantinople itself.
Sole Barrier Exists.
In the Europe which existed before
the World War Germany was beyond
debate the strongest single power, but
there were France, Russia and Italy
TO be reckoned with, and Britain in
the background. Even her Austrian
ally was a fact. But Russia has dis
appeared, Austria has ceased to exist
Italy is sunk in her own domestic
problems, Britain is far from any
wish, perhaps from any power to in
tcrvene in European affairs with
force. There remains only France.
herself supported by a group of
smaller powers, all of which lie in the
German pathway and are, save for
France, inevitable victims of German
might.
German hatred of France today,
then, is based not upon the facts of
the last war, but upon the present
and Immediate circumstance that 1t
is the French veto which alone pre-
vents Germany from turning the
actual results of the World War into
a supreme victory. Europe, middle
Europe, would be at her feet if only
for the briefest time French support
could be withdrawn. If France could
be driven back to her own frontiers
all the structure of central Europe
would collapse as certainly if not as
suddenly as the Napoleonic structure
after Leipzig.
Parallel Is Cited.
IT, on the contrary, French power
remains for a period of time, if
French armies stay on the Rhine,
then 1t is beyond debate that slowly
but surely the new states may con-
solidate their positions. may become