Evening star., 1925-11-29
Simonds Sees Function of League
As the Agent of European Powers
Continued from First Page)

Continued from First Page)
happened since the league began, you
| will see that 1t has never been able
| to act against great power, save in
| the case of Germany disarmed. 1t has
| never been able to speak with author
| ity in the case Of any dispute between
two great powers, or when a situation
concerning one great power seems OBJ
viously to involve the elements of war
| or peace.
1t could not prevent the Ruhr, the
Russo-Polish War, the Greco-Turkish
War, the seizure of Wilma of Memel, 1t
| could not even act in the face of those
| facts. 1t wanted to act, 1t realized
| that for it's own power and prestige
| 1t should act. But it realized, too,
that it had no means for Transforming
| its will into action and that If it spoke
| it would be disclosed as impotent
| while perilous division would arise
within its membership. 1t could not
compel Poland to retire from Wilma,
Italy from F'iume, 1t could not enlist
the physical strength of the member
| nations to defend either Greece or Po-
land menaced by non-member nations.
Americans supporting the league
idea said. and Europeans echoed. that
the failure Of the league in these pri
mary affairs was due to the absence of
America. But how, had America been
| a member, could this fact have in
| fuenced the Bolshevist advance upon
Warsaw or the Turkish eruption to-
ward Thrace? Obviously our repre-
sentatives at Geneva would not have
been able to pledge our fleets or
| armies to defend either the crossings
of the Vistula or the straits Of the
Dardenelles. Least of all would our
Iayac,tiya 1opicla tive hra nnhaG op
government in Washington have ac-
cepted as final any decision of Geneva
calling for such contributions.
! Could Not Act.
r. was not our absence which
| hampered the League because those
who were present did only what We
| would have done and what they would
have done had we been present. The
| British people would not fight to pro-
tect Greece against Turkey or Poland
against Russia. 1t was in theory the
| duty of Geneva to call the member
nations to arms; it did not act be-
cause 1t knew the answer. It was
the duty of the League to tell Musso-
lini to get out of Corfu, but while
it consulted it did nothing and left
| the great powers, through a council
| of ambassadors, to resolve the dis
pute by permitting Greece to pay a
| heavy indemnity to Italy without any
international appraisal of the real
| merits Of the dispute.
| If tomorrow, in full peace, Bolo
| armies should come tumbling into
| Poland, the League could only act
| after the French, British, Italian and
| perhaps German governments had de-
| cided what action would conform to
| the domestic and national interests in
| their keeping. If all these powers, or
enough Of them. agreed that self de-
| fense necessitated defense Of Poland.
then the league could speak, but the
voice of Geneva would only represent
| the hand of Paris or OF London.
| When France went over the Rhine
| and into the Ruhr, the action. what
| ever also is to be said of it, consti-
| tuted a deadly menace to peace. A
league, actually guardian of the
| peace of Europe, was at once charged
| with intervention. 1t might in the
| end decide Germany wrong and con-
denim her to pay up her default.
| But it could not let the situation
march to conflict. Yet it did moth
| ing, could do nothing; and know Its
| impotence, because had 1t bade France
halt, the order would have been an
empty gesture and France and all
pudited the authority of the league.
Upper Silesia Affair.
When Upper Silesia became a bone
of contention between France and
Britain, not because either cared about
the principles or equities involved, but
because France desired to strengthen
her ally, Poland, and Britain to pre-.
vent the expansion Of French infiu.
! ence through the expansion OF