Evening star., 1925-12-06
Germans Behind LocarnO Treaties
Three to One, Analysis of Vote Reveals

(Contiaued from First Page.)
expand so greatly, the Italians unwill-
ing to have Germany as a nefghbor
both because of the Tyrolese question
and the ultimate threat of Trieste.
Question of Poland.
But in the first line Of German ac-
ton must be the question Of Poland.
And the first step toward regaining
lost lands there is the complete salts
faction of France. 1t Is not love Of
Poland, but fear of Germany. which
explains the presence of France mount
Ing guard on the Nistula. France
cannot be driven out. she cannot be
forced out by any means as long as
she Is there to defend herself, but Ger
man policy may contrive fo lessen
French anxiety and make ,he Polish
alliance seem liability and not an
asset. | am not seeking to forecast
that this can be done, but only that
II Will be attempted.
In 80 far as France is concerned
one car fairly forecast very far
reaching Improvement. France needs
| badly commercial treaty which will
| open the German market to her iron.
to the iron In the regained Lorraine
district. She has other fields in Ger
production. But II the French and
German coal and iron interests do ar
rive at a settlement which satisfies the
French, then considerab BILE co-opera ton
Is likely. AT the moment France can
trade in the right to 10 years occupa-
! ton of German territory. but in the
end the German position is stronger.
Developments May BE Rapid.
Negotiations so far have failed to
bring about commercial adjustment,
but with LocarnO out of the way de-
velopmentS along this line may be
rapid. If France has security assured
by Locarno and the British guaran-
tee, prosperity insured by an agree
ment between French and German
heavy interests, then France IS far
more likely to turn her attention to
the development OF her vast colonial
enterprises than to playing sterile
European politics. At least this must
be the German hope and to bring this
about the aim of German statesmen.
Herceforth for a long time | do not
believe Franco-(sernan relations viii
he matters Of international interest
or at least concern. Nor, in point of
fact do ! believe that issues like that
Of the Polish corridor and Austria II
union will dominate German foreign
politics Immediately. Much less, Of
course, will any question as between
republic and monarchy within Ger
many come to the fore.
From the point of view OF the men
and interests responsible in Germany
both for the Dawes plan and the Lo-
carno pact, it was essential first to
restore Germany to economic strength
and prosperity, and this restoration
was contingent upon getting a settle
ment for the reparations question and
obtaining the liberation of the Ruhr
and the rest Of the occupied territory.
| Both operations, which have been
substantially achieved. are only pre-.
liminaries. But the same spirit which
dictated these Is likely 10 prevent Ger.
man foreign policy from doing what
has been accomplished by rash or
foolish adventures by premature at
tempts to realize ultimate aspirations
Have Given Proof.
BY accepting both the Dawes plan
and the Locarno agreements, the lat
ter by surprisingly decisive majorities,
the Germans have supplied the best
and the most complete proof conceiv-
able of q desire TO live peacefully in
the world and avoid new conflicts To
put 1t broadly, after long delays the
reasonable men in France, in Britain
n Germany have come to the top;
have discovered the mutual reason
ableness of each other and have pro-
ceeded to exploit this reasona bleness
| in the interests of a settlement needed
by all.
We are a thousand miles away from