Evening star., 1925-08-16

luluEe greatness turning on ner sue.
cess or failure in organizing her great
north and west African colonies.
Yet the heritage of the past is such
that 1t is unlikely that the Franco.
German alliance can be realized. A
detente Is well nigh inevitable, but an
entente is for a generation practically
unthinkable. Moreover, for France, as
for England. the German alliance
would have no real raison detres for
France, like Britain, wants peace in
Europe, and perceives more clearly
than the British that any disturbance
OF the status quo, any effort at terri.
torial change, would mean not alone
war but probably general conflict. On
the whole, there are fewer obstacles to
ultimate peace between France and
| Germany than between Germany and
| either Italy or Britain, but there is no.
real temptation on the French side to
! partnership.
! Germany, then, cannot hope to make
! a Western combination without sacri-
| ffcing her real interests and objectives
| to an arrangement which would thus,
| ipso facto, become profitless. On the.
! other hand, she has every need for
present peace with the West, and, in
deed, for permanent peace. provided
no Western nation undertakes TO
thwart her true interests-that is, un-
| less France mounts guard on the
lower Nistula, Italy on the middle
Danube. or Britain employs naval su-
premacy TO block German commercial
activity.
Russia Offers Much.
The Russian alliance by contrast
| offers much at once. If and when
| Russia recovers, the Russian market
will be the obvious field for German
exploitation, while there WIN be no
rivalry between the two peoples, one
of which is industrial, the other agris
cultural. On the political side both
! have obvious rea sons for seeking the
curtailment, if not the suppression, Of
| Poland, while the German advance to
| Vienna would not disturb Russian
statesmen IL they were in turn assured
of German assent to their resumption
of the traditional march to CONSTANT
nople. In word, the essential inter-
ests and objectives of the two great
peoples are often identical and always
reconcilable.
Now, if you brush aside all the
clever dialectics of DR.. Stresemann
over German objections to an uncondi-
| tional entrance into the League of Ma
| tions, 1t seems to me that it must be
clear that what he is seeking to pre-
serve is an unmortgaged future in so
| far as Russia is concerned. He is
soil for the transfer of troops to Po-
land to meet Soviet invasion He is
| insisting that Germany shall not un-
dertake the vague but actual obliga-
/ tion of the covenant to assist any
member nation attacked in defiance of
the League of Nations. He is saying,
while not saying it. 'SWe will join the
lea que, provided only-such action does
not in any direction affect our present
and future Russian relations"
Escape from Inferiority.
All of which means that he is de-
Tending that more or less mysterious
Treaty of Rapallo, which the unfortu-
nate Rathenau made at Genoa
treaty which was, more than all else,
eloquent of the fashion in which the
Germans read their future. l do not
believe Stresemann is afraid that Ger
many may be eventually the battle
ground between the West and Russia
His ingenious arguments around this
and other points seem rather to cover
the main consideration, namely, that,
looking to a future, perhaps still dis
tant, Russia offers the best possibility
of alliance and association for Ger
many.
| 1 hasten to add that do not mean
to. suggest the Russian alliance is
detail or part of grandiose scheme
/ TO wage war of revenge or to
achieve German hegemony in Europe.
On the contrary. it is the single obvi-
Gus. route to an escape from the state
of relative -inferiority which the war
| imposed upon Germany. If it is the
single avenue of approach to a release
from the territorial servitudes of the
Treaty of Versailles, not in the West
but IN the East, it is in reality more
than that; for, apart from all terri
torial questions, 1t spells independence
| for Germany politically, and indepen-
dence not otherwise obtainable, since
in one way or another all of her re-
cent foes remain obstacles in her path
way
Furthermore. it is almost self-evi-
dent that the real drive of British
policy at least in seeking to bring
Germany into the league is the appre-
citation of the fact and the danger of
a Russo-German combination. Such a
combination would have economic
menace for the British, and 1t would
have political consequences all over
Asia and in the Near East. To tie
Germany into the Western .constelIa-
tion would perhaps exercise these dan
gers or at least moderate them, and
this argument is written in all British
action and is discoverable, in many
British comments.
| heiped Dy Dawes Plan.
All German policy today eenters in
escaping from the immediate restraints
of the war. The Dawes plan has given
her comparative economic freedom be-
cause while she complies with it's
terms she is protected FROM all inter
| ference. The proposed pact would
give her the same measure Of political
| freedom, because inevitably it would
abolish all such restraints as occupa-
ton and supervision. But, with all
of these things accomplished, Germany
would not obtain real independence,
because she would be a single great
power set in a Europe made up of
great and little powers whose vital
interests were divergent from and
even conflicting with hers. Moreover,
she could not hope single.handed to
accomplish anything important, for,
although at last Independent, she
would be practically isolated.
! True, a Russian alliance now, in the
present state of Russia, would be more
of a handicap than an advantage, and
would consolidate the rest of Europe
against Germany. But, assuming that
presently Russia will emerge from her
eclipse, the situation would entirely
change. Therefore, the objective of
| German policy must be to avoid Rus
| sian complications and escape any en-
| broilment with Russia incident to as
sociation with Western powers In the
League of Nations which might make
ultimate alliance Impossible. And since
| in Russian eyes the League of Ma
tions, dominated by anti-Soviet ma
tions, has a markedly nti-Russian
character, Germany must give definite
| demonstration of the fact that shA