Evening star., 1925-04-19

even go further and say that
the Tigers definition would apply
with about equal exactness to the
mood of all the peoples of Europe who
were belligereMs in the World War
He said, You will find the people of
France, confused, the situation con,
fusing. We took much out of these
people during the war, we asked too
much of them, what you see now is
the result of the great things they did
then"
There after all is the key of con-
temporary Europe, of other countries
quite as much as France. That per-
haps adequately explains why France
a the moment is an absurdly disa p
pointing country to any one who
knew it in the great days of the war,
in the only loss exciting days of the
making of peace, or for that matter
even in the hours which preceded the
occupation of the Ruhr which was In
very real sense the final campaign
of the war.
year ago when l was here in
Paris the change was coming, you
could feel it. Poincare was still prime
minister, but his fate was already
written. France was on the eve of
breaking as completely with the war
with war leaders and war ideas as
Britain already had when it called in
man who had opposed the war even
when it was being fought.
Breaks With Past.
Given French tradition, French his
tory, recent as we'll as remote given
French continental position, it would
be impossible for France even to go
quite as far as Britain went when it
turned to Macdonald, but within in
eVita b1e limits Fra nca has popa RI tho
same extreme, and, in about the same
manner, it has made the same tre-
mendous break with it's recent and
ever glorious past.
AS | see it France called upon
Herriot with a sort of inarticulate de-
sire once for all to dissipate the foreign
legend that France was militaristic,
imperialistic, anything but a war
weary and war-eXhausted people,
which wanted to get back to the busi-
ness of life, who were tired of any
discussions of world power and even
of continental prestige, who wanted
TO break down a degree of moral
isolation which justly or not had come
in recent years.
The result, all things considered,
was about as perplexing as was the
labor advent in Britain 1t was
manifest that the moral position of
France in the world has improved
although there were those to say that
the gain is imaginary and the possible
losses concrete. Nevertheless. the.
achievement of Macdonald was to
treate a better atmosphere in Europe
and the triumph, the single triumph
of Herriot was that both in Britain
and in Germany there no longer
existed apprehension of French pur-
poses.
Germany Taken Seriously.
In the present situation France
wants peace, no country more. Even
in the matter of Germany there is
real change of view. 1t is not that
the Frenchman is going to drop MS
distrust, even his fear OF German
ultimate purposes, but there is grow
ing sentiment here that Germany VIII
not in any event be able to attack for
10 wears, perhaps for 20, what is more,
as newspaper comment on the latest
German election showed, there Is an
increasing tendency to take the Ger
man republic seriously.
Again, the F'renchman now knows
that he will never get any sort vi
guarantee from the United States,
and the only insurance he can ex-
meet from Great Britain will be based
uDon British estimate of British IN
terest. not of French necessity. Sun,
this wholly natural British attitude,
while it does not excite enthusiasm,
While it even leads to criticism. Is less
disturbing now because the French
man perceives that in England 1t Is
Getting to be understood that British
interest will always be engaged II
the German ever tries to attack
France and Belgium again.
France, then, is ready for some
thing like the kind of pact which is
in the making. 1t does not reject the
Stresemann proposals as 1t would
have one year ago, 1t does not by any
means reject them with violence as
il would have done two or three years
ago. On the contrary, there is an
amazingly reasonable tone in all dis
cussion. The distinction as l see 1t
is that. while the French do not be-
Heve overmuch, they not only are
nrepar red to listen, but they are listen
ing.
Rhine Evacuation Inevitable.
1t is a. safe conjecture that the main
obstacle to any adjustment, so far as
the German is concerned, the aSSump-
lion that the French do not mean to
evacuate the Rhineland at all, tnat
they mean to hold the left bank OF
the Rhine as the sole guarantee OF
security. has no basis in fact. The
French are almost unanimous in the
recognition that evacuation is In
evitable. Therefore, there is no un-
bridsable gulf between the two
Standpoints.
What the French are decided about
is that although evacuation is to take
place, other things must also march
with this: You may safely assume
that in September the Germans will
he admitted to the League of Nations
with French approval, that by that
time the evacuation of the Ruhr and
The Cologne zone will either be ac-
compIished or the matter will be in
such state that no one, German or
otherwise. will have any doubt that
il will take place promptly-in
word, that there will be no controversy
here.
Rut at the same time the French
will see to it that the matter of the
demiIitarization of the Rhineland is
adequately covered by international
agreement, that German violations of
the armament provisions of the treaty
have been repaired, and finally. and
the point is vital, that no detail in the
general agreement gives the Germans
any basis for regarding their eastern
frontiers as movable. France is going
to stand by Poland and Czechoslova-
lia she is going to continue TO regard
her alliances in the center and east OF
Europe as of enduring Importance.
The first German gestures reused
real wave of protest in France, and
did infinite harm because they seemed
30 indicate that Germany was onering
10 guarantee AIsace-Lorraine, but only
on the understanding that the Danzlg
Corridor, Upper Silesia and Austria
might be regarded as good hunting
ground. 1 do not pretend to know
show these proposals struck Herrfot
N5z nd AGE0-