Evening star., 1925-01-11
IT. s. WANTS FRANK DEBT
STATEMENT FROM PARIS
Given That, Washington Likely Would Be
Generous in Arranging Payment,
Says Expert.
BY FRANK H. sMoNDs.

acrimonious discussion in the reSpec-
tive Congresses of France and the
United States. have brought the debt
question to a point where certain
facts are made fairly clear, while
others, perhaps equally important, re-
main as obscure as ever
To begin at the beginning, there is
general agreement between Washing
ton and Paris that there can be no
reputation of the French debt and
no cancellation. But, despite all the
recent disturbance over the matter
OF reputation, there is no foundation
for any assertion that the French
Government had contemplated any
such action. To put the case on the
lowest possible level of self interest,
the French Government, having just
made considerable borrowings in
America and doubtless expecting to
make more, would hardly choose this
moment for reputation.
Maneuver Is Charged.
No, on the contrary, one must con-
clude that the whole debate was
opened by an American interpreta-
ton of a French situation, which was
not even an accepted Interpretation
here. The fact was that the Ameri-
can Government thought the moment
fitting to try and find out what
French intentions were and seized
upon an accidental circumstance to
launch it's gesture. 1t did not believe
France was intending to repudiate,
but 1t did think it might persuade
France to say what was the French
plan.
The operation brought a prompt
denial of any such plan of repudia-
ton. 1t served also to launch a fresh
congressional declaration of American
purpose not to cancel So far so good.
AS I have said we know that the
French do not intend to repudiate,
the French know we do not intend to
cancel So much of the pathway has
been Illuminated.
In the next place the discussion
elected agreement between Wash
ington and Paris on the general prin
ciple that France could not at the
moment be expected to pay anything
and might therefore ask for a mora
torium.
Duration Not Disclosed.
In the matter of how long this
moratorium should be agreement was
not disclosed. Paris talked about 10
years. Washington obviously regard
ed this as too long, but on the other
hand did not raise any objection to
a moratorium which might extend for
years and during which the actual
payments would not begin.
The third point pretty well estab
lished was that the United States
was willing to consider giving to the
French easier terms than had been
given to the British, particularly as
1t was presently made clear that the
British We're not going to make such
concession a basis for a demand
for revision of their debt settle
ment. The country, by and large,
ana congress as result seemed
ready to concede that France might
not be able to pay much as the
British, certainly not with the same
relative promptness.
Back of these fairly precise points
there was some rather loose talk of
applying the principles of the Dawes
plan to France, talk which came from
Paris and from Washington alike
But no very definite ideas were de-
veloped along this line, and at this
point the discussion began to drift
again into the fog which has sur
rounded 1t from the very outset. To
De perfectly frank, the discussion
never did come down to the point of
when, how and how much France
would pay.
Not Clenr ON Dawes Plan,
Now the appeal to the principles of
the Dawes plan confuses the American
public regards the Dawes plan as a
settlement. To our mind a commit
lee of impartial experts went over the
assets of a bankrupt Germany and de-
cided how much Germany could paw
ana how long a delay she required to
get into paying condition. Having
settled these points they fixed the an
nual payments of Germany, and now
these payments have begun and will
continue
unfortunately the Dawes plan was
not quite so simple. It was not in
fact a settlement, but an experiment
in settlement. 1t did fix a moratorium,
1t did fix a maximum of German pay
ments mounting to something over
S600,0OO,000 annually several years
hence. But 1t did not say that Ger
many would surely be able to pay this
much and thus settle the question.
On the other hand, with obvious
! doubt as to whether Germany could
T reach the total fixed, it provided that
II German payments interfered with
German exchange they should be sus-
pended. In other words. what the
Dawes plan did was to establish the
principle that Germany should not be
asked to pay not merely more than
she could, but more than she could
without injury to herself Finally IL
did not decide how long Germany
should continue to pay the fixed sum.
Different With France,
Now when 1t comes to a question of
France the problem is complicated.
France is not a conquered nation,
bound to pay reparations for destruc-
tion resulting from a willful disturb
ance of world peace. She is not oc-
cupied by foreign armies, she is. not,
in fact, subjected to coercion nor
PnilfV nf Iub ieI, boy Iad to
infiiction of damages. On the con-
trary, she is country whose debts
were incurred resisting German ag-
gression.
In practice, then, the creditors of
France, and the American creditor in
particular, cannot appoint receivers
for France, authorized to enter the
premises, take over the banks, rail-
ways, government monopolies, super
vision of finances and all else, as was
done in the case of Germany. 1t is
possible in the case of France to in
woke the principle of the Dawes plan,
but it is out of the question to invoke
the practices. There cannot be a
Dawes committee with power to ex-
anime France save as France con-
sents.
Nevertheless, it is possible to say
with respect of France what we
have said with respect Of Germany,
namely. that no payments can be
asked of her which would disturb her
own domestic economy. France not
only cannot be asked to pay beyond
her theoretical capacity, but also she
cannot be asked to pay beyond the
point where her exchange remains
stable. France must first of all be
shown to be able to pay before she
can be asked for payment at all, and