Evening star., 1925-05-03
BY FRANK III. SIMONDS.


Won Hindenburg as President
of the German Republic is in
Il many ways the greatest dis
aster for Germany, and. in
deed, for Europe. since the close OF the
war. If one were seeking a parallel,
not in the circumstances, but in the
consequences one might well find 1t
in the assa aSSination of Abraham Lin
coin. which postponed reconciliation
between the North and South for an
indefinite period and inflicted upon the
South, which was utterly without re-
sponsibility for the crime, the ten
terrible years of reconstruction.
The German people in choosing
Hindenburg have once more brought
confusion, not merely to their limited
number of friends in the outside
world, but also to those who in allied
countries have been seeking to bring
Germany back into peaceful relations
with other nations, and, in fact, bring
the war to a close.
Two Sets of Consequences.
Naturally the election result will
have two sets of consequences, domes-
tic and International but the interna-
tonal are vastly more important and
serious. At a moment when Germany
was at last beginning to escape from
the evil consequences of the war,
"ItH neI acceptance or the Dawes
plan, her apparent determination to
retain the republic, together with the
recent guarantee proposals of the
Luther-Stresemann cabinet, had COM
hined to enlist measure of confidence
In the allied world, Germany has
suddenly voted for the man who. to
the outside world, symbolizes the old
method and the old men who precipi-
tated the war and conducted it.
'f-slr l@
swift and sure. When l was in Paris
a pw days ago the modifica ton of
french sentiment on the matter of
Germany was impressive. The result
OF the first turn in the presidential
election had fortified the position of
those who argued that the German
ltepupIlc was real, that the men in
control honestly sought peace.
1t is true that there remained
very great number of Frenchmen Of
the type of POincare and Mnlerand
VINO argued that the German could
not change, that his true nature.
despite camouf1age, was what it had
always been. But. despite the warn
1ngs of these leaders. French sentiment
clearly favored adjustment with Ger
many, evacuation of the Rhineland:
In word, advocated the final liquida-
ton of the war.
But today. after the Hinden-
burg victory, what is there left to saw
TO Polncare, to Milerand? What pos
sIble answer can there now be made
TO their assertions vindicated by a
majority of the German electors?
Herriot, Painleve, all the Socialists
end Radicals who have been working
FOR mOqus vivendi with Germany,
are now out of court: politically they
nave been more than compromised
they have been ruined.
Shift in France Expected.
AS a consequence. French poIity is
almost certain to undergo a more or
less violent shift. All question of i'm
mediate evacuation of the Rhineland
is abolished. France. as she reads the
treaty of Versailles, is entitled to stay
on the Rhine until Germany complies
with the terms of the treaty; the
period Of occupation does not begin
until such compliance is complete
But the military control commission
has recently reported Germany to be
In fragrant violation of the arms pro-
visions of the treaty.
France, then, has d legal and a moral
justification, to her own mind, for a
prolonged occupation of the Rhine
land, Cologne zone and all. More
over her troops are in the Rhine
land, and if Britain insists on leaving
Cologne. French troops will march in
80 they marched into COblenz when
our American troops came away
For France now the single guarantee
OF security against a Germany which
has Hindenburg as president is
the Rhine barrier, the line that Mar
shal F'och has always demanded as
the single means of insuring French
provinces against new invasions and
fresh devaStations
Moreover, what France feels, Bel
GUM must feel, Poland and Czecho-
sioVdkIa must feel. The menace to
Poland and Czechoslovakia is even
greater indeed than to France and
Belgium. But for all four nations
the German decision is an authentic
warning.
What VIII Capital Do?
What does the Hindenburg cleo
ton mean to the foreign capitalists
whose loans are essential and the pri-
mary prerequisite to German restora-
ton? Either the selection of Hinden-
burg forecasts d swift move toward
the restoration of the German mon
archy. the old Potsdam gang, or it
means civil strife. growing out of
the resistance of the Republicans to
such a restoration. Either contin-
9ency, moreover, holds out no promise
the one hand, or of peace between
Germany and the outside world on
the other
Will British and American bankers
lend a reactionary Germany money
with which to prepare a new war,
with which to reorganize German re-
sources, that. as Hindenburg's sup
porterS have proclaimed openly Ger
many may reverse the decision of
1918, and, in addition, resume the con-
struction of her Mittel- Europa edi-
fee? VIII they finance a Germany
whose restoration becomes henceforth
a threat to world peace?
Within Germany it is more difficult
to fathom the results of the selection
of Hindenburg. Undoubtedly the re-
public Is henceforth compromised
and doubtless eventually doomed
What remains to be seen is whether
the Republicans will passively ac-
qulesce or actively resist; whether the
Republican parties will disintegrate,
the Democrats and Center slipping
over to reaction and the Socialists
alone supporting the republic, or
whether we shall see the same re-
sistance which defeated the Kopp
Putisch, the previous attempt at resto-
ration. But, in any event, Germany
now becomes the battle-ground of
opposing factions, and domestic dis
order. even civil strife, is conceivable.
How shall one explain this German
decision? 1t exactly contradicts all
the evidence which l could obtain in
Germany, it does violence to conclu-
slons reached by many more expe-
E!anced and distinguished visitors in
recent times. 1t represents, in my
Judgment not so much any desire on
the part of the German people for
new war or for fresh experiment
in militdriSm as a state of mind Gre