Evening star., 1925-11-08

would be, for the people of Germany,
broadly speaking, want peace; the
people of the occupied areas want TO
end the occupation, and the business
Interests want foreign loans. On the
other hand. majority Of the Ma
tionalist party is certainly opposed to
the pacts and to the recognition as
final of the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. As
for the Socialists. having been eX-
cluded from the government, they
can very we'll refuse to participate III
the voting, putting the responsibility
for the resulting failure upon the eN-
isting Nationalist Bourgeois bloc,
which negotiated the treaties but
could not carry them through.
Treaty May Fall.
Locarno may then very easily fall
between two stools in Berlin, not be
cause the majority of the German
people are hostile or cherishing bel
ligerent purposes. but because the do
mestic political situation has become
SO complicated that the issue may not
be decided on its merits. In the
battle between the radicals and the
reactionaries, between the National
lists, backed by the Peoples party.
and the Socialists. on purely econo-
mic questions, Locarno may be lost
at least temporarily.
II the Nationalists should give il
any support-indeed, if they should
refrain from lighting it-there Is
every evidence that the party would
be split up. But if the Socialists
should supply the necessary votes TO
ratify it nothing is more certain than
that the temporary alliance with the
Bourgeois parties would instantly
break up, and the Socialists would re
ceive no solid reward for having saved
the Conservatives from the cOnSe-
quences Of the obstinacy and folly Of
their extreme wing.
1t is therefore essential for the
American audience to perceive that
the German action on the Locarnu
pact does not offer any simple and
satisfying test OF the German mental
ity at the moment on the narrow is
sue of war or peace. A temporary
defeat Will not necessarily represent
a final proof Of the recalcitrancy of
Germany; IL can not be taken as a
sufficient advertisement Of the pre-
dominance of the spirit Of revenge in
Germany.
Situation in France.
Turning now to the French situa-
ton, the Painleve cabinet, like the
Herriot cabinet before 1t, Is based
upon comRnation of the Socialists.
Radicals and Radical-Socialists. the
Cartel des Gauches Of French polit
zeal parlance. 1t is. then. the repre-
sentative of a combination of the
more radical Republican parties with
the Socialists. 1t could exist only
as long as it had the support of the
los votes Of the Socialists, but il can
have these votes only at a price which
is increasingly difficult to pay.
In general, the majority of the
French people support both the Her.
riot and Painleve efforts TO arrive al
a settlement with Germany. The fof.
eign policy, in its larger aspects, which
the present combination has pursued
a policy of reconciliation and ad-
justment-is the clear expression Of
the reaction of the French neople
against the harsh and miuatory course
of Poincare and Millerand
But by contrast the majority Of the
French nation is by no means as rad.
cal as the Cartel des Gauches. They
are long way from being socialistic
in the narrower sense. But to keep
office both IIerriot and Painleve hav"
been compelled to adopt out and-out
SocialiStiC doctrines which have pro
duced the utmost confusion and up
roar in French domestic affairs. While
American observers at a distance SOC
only the evidences of the determine
ton of the radical elements to make
peace abroad. tho frenchman sees
daily the deplorable result of the do
mestic policy, which represents fatal
concessions to the Socialists.
Same Trouble as Germany.
You say the thing quite exactly if
You say that France at the moment
wants peace abroad, that peace which
the Painleve cabinet is working for
through the LoCarno pact, but by con
traSt 1t wants a peace at home also
which the Radical-CommuniSt- Socialist
combination cannot give It. In a way.
the thing is on all fours with the
German mess. The German people
want, l think it is a safe judgment to
make, a government which is conciIia
tory abroad and conservative at
home. They want to make peace in
Europe, but the ma jority does not
want at the same time 10 adopt eX-
treme socialism in the Reich. But
the party which stands squarely for
domestic conservatism refuses abso-
lutely to adopt the policy of concilia-
ton abroad, while the strongest party
which advocates concilation abroad is
committed to socialism at home.
In France the Painleve cabinet
pretty accurately follows the will OF
the nation in its foreign policy. but in
domestic affairs its weak and yielding
policy, made under Socialist pressure,
has been for more than a year almost
insufferable. But the alternative in
France Is Poincare and the old un-
bending and unforgiving spirit toward
Germany which was expressed in the
occupation of the Ruhr. In Germany
the choice is between the Junker with
no Locarno and the Socialist with
LocarnO and an amount of Socialism
which it is almost impossible to fore
cast.
The elimination of Caillaux does not
much improve the situation of the
Painleve cabinet, for Caillaux. despite
his war record, brought the Painleye
cabinet measure of support from
the Conservatives because he stood
firmly against the capital levy. The
Conservatives were eager to see Gail
laux ruined, but they were not above
using him for the moment. What
they refused to do was to permit him
to come over to them and make a new
combination, bringin~ certain strength
from the Left; when he had been dis
credited at home, then they We're
quite reconciled to seeing him go back
to the exile from which he had tenn
porarily emerged.
Both to Continue Conservative.
Both France and Germany are fun
damentally conservative countries 80
far as economic issues are concerned,
although in both countries there is
much more effective radicalism than
in the United States. Germany prob
ably is more conservative than France
but has, nevertheless, under the en-
pire, gone a good deal further than
France in adopting many socialistic
ideas. Moreover, in estimating the
German state of mind one has IN