Evening star., 1925-09-20
BY FRANK II. SIMONDS

Il which have there been dis
closed serve as a. natural and
! logical basis for some review of the
point to which the league has come in
the Six years OF its existence 1t is
| clear, too, that the league has. in a
sense. reached a crisis, If not a turn
ing point. in it's development. as the
| sharp difference between British and
continental European opinion clearly
| discloses.
And at the outset Of any discus
sion it must be recognized that so
| lar, at least, the development of the
! league has not been in any large de-
gree along lines which We're foreseen
| when 1T was created. At the start the
conception was Of a super-state, which
sneuld preserve peace by the control
| or the military resources. as we'll as
| the economic, OF the member states.
Peace was to be insured by force-the
nation which broke the peace was to
| be dealt with by an international
police precisely as the lawbreaker of
the individual nation Is dealt with.
| Broken Down by L. S.
| This original conception broke
down Immediately when the United
States refused to enter the league be-
| cause such entrance imposed upon 1t
responsibilities with respect of the
| frontiers OF other countries. We as
members Of the league would have
J been morally and legally bound to
! join with all other member nations in
defending the frontiers of Rumania
| against Russian aggression. Of Poland
| against either Soviet or German in
vasion. And in the temper of our
/ cpuntrymen then and thereafter it
I was impossible to make such CON
! tract in their name.
! This original conception. however
remained instinct in the league until
| it found its definite expression in the
protocol of September. which went far
beyond the covenant in the matter of
| obligation. All member nations be-
| came by virtue of that document
guarantors Of the safety, security and
integrity OF all other member nations.
and the British people were told that
| their navy had become the interna-
uonal marine police force of the
| league. But the British people were
| in no mood to undertake the defense
Of remote frontiers, and in quite the
| same fashion that the United States
had rejected the covenant, the British
government rejected the protecol. in
dicating clearly that 1t was opposed
both to the general commitments Of
the protocol and TO the accompanying
obligation to submit all questions to
arbitration.
Britain Offered Substitute
The protocol was thus either finally
destroyed. or al the least tempora rily
illuminated. Then the British on their
side brought forward at once a substi-
itute proposal which was no more than
the offer to assume responsibility for
THAT European frontier which intimate
ily concerned themselves. namely, the
western frontier of Germany, while
specifically declining to assume any re-
sponsibility for any other frontier. At
1.-The same time they earnestly sought to
persuade the French to renounce all
Interest In other frontiers in return for
the double assurance of their own
double since France was to have
iGerman pledge to respect them and
British promise to support France in
case of German violation of the given
word, althou gh in theory the British
were also prepared to support Ger
many against any French aggression.
thus avoiding the appearance of max
ing any alliance with France against
Germany
This British substitute. although it
carried with it the condition that Ger
many should enter the league. which
twas naturally welcomed at Geneva,
was promptly recognized to do vio-
lence both to the original conception
and to all the development of the
League of Nations. Beyond all else.
ialthough the proposed security pact
Twas to be registered with the league
and tied into the league machinery. 1t
j actually went outside the league alto
gether And so far from contributing
Ito general security, it was felt, Darticu-
larly in Warsaw and Prague, that the
chief consequence of the pact would
be to compromise Polish and Czech eX-
istence and to insure ultimate German
aggression, although in terms it bound
Germany not to act against either
Slav state by force.
l. Depends on France.
| Obviously, the success or failure of
1.-THE British substitute must depend
upon France. France has not alone
been the most outSpoken and consist
lent advocate of the protocol principle,
as contrasted with the regional pact
but France also was and is the ally Of
both Poland and Czechoslovakia, bound
Ito come to the aid of either. If 1t should
be attacked. France, therefore could
mot in honor consent to accept a guar
antee of her own security which in
volved the abandonment OF her allies.
eyen more q virtual surrender of them
Ito Germany.
This moral obligation. however real.
| might perhaps De dNOlucu NS1S hot
the material interest Identical. But
If France stood aside and permitted
Poland or Czechoslavakia to be
crushed either by Germany alone or
by Germany and Russia, then an ag-
grandized Germany might in her turn
pay as little regard to the security
pact as she had in 1914 to the guaran-
tee. of Belgian neutrality. True,
Britain would be bound to. support
p>lr DIT
given the inevitable state of British
military strength, Germany might con-
vince herself again. as in 1914. that
she could triumph before the British
could get going.
Memory Is Barrier.
Moreover, one must remember that
the French have long memories and
recall that the fatal blunder of Ma
crush Austria in 1866 was the sure
prelude to 1870. when France, In turn.
was isolated and crushed. Moral and
material reasons, therefore, have
steadily prevented France from follow
ing the British completely and accept
ing the proposed security pact as an
exclusive affair. wiping out respon-
sibilities elsewhere in Europe.
The French thesis falls in naturally
! with the views of most of the con-
tinental nations. Poland. Czechoslo
i vakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania. the Bal
/ tic states. Belgium and many other
small countries regard with just sus-
picion the substitution of special for
a general pact.
For all of them there are very real
dangers, dangers in every case grow
4 ing out of the refusal of neighbors to
accept the existing political frontiers
of Europe.
/ For all of these smaller nations the