Evening star., 1925-10-02

mon department. officered by experts
working with the assistance of Army
and Navy officers Of experience In the
operation of the product supplied"
Opposes One Air Force.
The commander OF the Hawaiian
flight opposed either n united air force
or separate air corps. such as have
been urged by various witnesses be-
fore the board. declaring the problem
engaging the study Of the board was
one involving essentially a revision OF
present organizations. So far as avia.
ton Itself was concerned as an tnte-
rtor problem, he believed the question
might be solved satisfactorily for the
moment by proper esta ablishment of an
aviation budget. by improvement of
personnel situation. fixing by law the
retention Of officers in the line OF the
Navy on a special list and by "estab-
lishment of a strong aviation section
in operations"
For a permanent and fnal solu
tion," he added. appoint the strongest
man attainable Is secretary OF the ma
tional defense, give him a good stan
let him work out the orga nization re-
quired and. when ready, take over
both the Army and Navy.
Now, last. but most important-a
aviator has heretofore mentioned-de-
fense by the air Is no cheap thing, as
seems to be the popular opinion. /
have not the figures and / doubt II
they exist. but have q conviction that
they would not be pleasant to look
upon.
Costs Must BE Cut.
Ways and means must be found
to reduce this cost The matter OF
costs is one which it seems to me
you must face before your duties are
completed in this committee.
Some such great reorganization
as have suggested is required TO
effect a great reduction and thus per-
NIT aviation to take its proper place
in the national defense without
breaking the United States Treasury"
OF the Hawaiian flight he said he
stretch of the Imagination could at
tach any blame to the Navy Depart
ment because the fight did not work
out as planned. OF the Shenandoah
disaster he said: Il cannot see how
the Navy Department can, in any
way, be responsible for the fact that
a good airship, well manned and cap
tained, goes out on a cruise. meets
heavy weather and its lost" This
testimony was in direct contrast to
that Of Col. William Mitchell. who at
tributed the failures to "bungling."
Cites His Record
"How can the Navy Department, -
he asked. prevent q Savannah line
road, Is required to keep clear, from
running down q submarine?"
Declaring that these accidents had
no bearing on the personal efficiency
Of any officer stationed in the depart
ment. he said:
"The Navy Department is not or.
ganized on the principles of scientific
organization, as I understand them.
Briefly there must be q stronger CO.
ordinating and controlling force. There
must be a more highly developed plane
division in order that the Navy may
be developed and be ready to meet the
needs of tomorrow, as well "a OF
today. The powers of the individual
bureaus should be combined under one
chief of supply.
Comdr. Rodgers told the board that
his record showed that he was qualified
to command either ships, or aircraft,
and therefore he had little to gain
personally by advancing the interests
of either.
"Since serving in the Spanish War
and graduating from the Naval
he said. Il have served in
nearly all capacities and on board all
types of craft now found in the United
States Navy. This includes five years
aviation duty-700 hours In tho air.
not including 216 hours in Pms No. 1
at sea-"
Objects to United Air Force.
Explaining his opposition to a united
air force, he declared 1T defeats the
very chief advantage which it pur-
ports to gain. namely, the control of
airplanes."
80 far az sea- going airplAnes are
concerned" he continued, my imag.
ination does not permit me to conceive
q airnla nes operating at Hreat distances