Evening star., 1925-12-06
GERMANS UPHELDTOCARNO
THREE ONE, VOTE SHOWS
Analysis of Reichstag Action Gives Clear
Proof That Nation Is Sincere
in Promises.

even in the opposition there was by
no means a solid vote against any ad-
justment, but rather difference OF
view as to terms. II follows quite
logically that the vote may be accept
ed as an amazingly reassurins dis
closure of real German sentiment.
Nor can one overlook the moment
in the German Reichstag debate when
StreSemann said to the acComDani-
ment of cheers: I'VE have confidence
i'll France" Beyond any debate this
marks the high water stage of Euro
pean REIMBURSEMENT since the war.
And il was, in a way, an answer to
the direct appeal OF Painleve, the
French premier. addressed to the Ger
man public in an Interview in the Ger
man press.
1t Is, then, quite futile to interpret
the German action as eithe orga nlZed
deception or passing clever diSsimu-
lation. Now that Locarno has been
accepted there iS not the smallest
chance that it will be called into ques-
ton in any time which can interest
those now Interested in international
affairs. The great mass OF the Ger
man people, AL but one of the great
political parties. have accepted Io-
carno as program OF peace with
France and with Great Britain ana 1t
recognition of that part OF the de-
''-hSN'
western frontiers of Germany.
Sterilization of Parties.
What. then, will be German policy
hereafter? In the first place, one
must note that there Is little likeli-
hood that there will be any large
change in political strengths within
the Reichstag in any present time. 1
was much interested in the statement
made to me recently by young Prince
Bismarck, himself a Nationalist and
likely to lead his party presently. that
along with the stabiliZation of the cur
rency in Germany there had come
sterilization of party strength, and
that even now elections would hardly
make any very sweeping changes. The
Sa me parties. then. the same Compara-
tive strength and the same leaders will
probably continue to hold the stage.
Entering the league. then. Germany
will seek certain things. First among
these will be doubtless some effort to
promote the general question of dis
armament. From the German point
of view, at least, Germany is totally
disarmed, and it constitutes an obvi-
ouSy weak point for a diSarrned Ger
many to continue surrounded by
strongly armed nations. Therefore
once the German delegate sits in the
council of the league his best efforts
are likely to be turned toward for
warding Il general conference which
shall very greatly reduce European
armament.
Will Try to Settle Saar.
A second and quite as obvious Ger
man endeavor will be to bring an
end to the occupation of any German
territory and, incidentally, to clear up
the question of the Saar, which in
theory will settle its fate by d plebi-
scite 10 years hence. But In fact
every on knows that the decision will
be in favor of Germany, and there is
a general recognition of the likeli-
hood that some earlier settlement can
be arranged. Meantime the Germans
will work through the league, which
controls the Saar, for notifications
of the French regime.
The Nationalists in Germany are
certain to press the parties responsi-
BILE for Locarno, seeking to prove that
mistakes We're made in not getting
larger concessions. The LocarnistS
are likely at one time to lay emphasis
upon the things actually achieved and
make appeals to the allied govern
ments not to weaken the situation in
Germany by refusing concessions.
Both sides will shout Il told you So"
the Locarnists when they obtain any
the allies refuse anything.
Yet 1 do not mean to suggest that
Locarno will be open to question. that
it will remain something to be re-
opened, as the Dawes plan certainly
is. On the contrary, 1t is likely more
and more to pass to the number of
things which are settled, if not for
ever, for many years to come. AS to
German minorities, first the minorities
re a M nc n nrjo toly
from Germany and later in regions
which We're not German. the Germans
are likely to make increasing repre-
sentations before the league.
Two Dominant Issues.
But in the background of all Ger |
man minds there are two issues which !
will more and more dominate all else. |
One Is the matter of the Polish corri- !
dor and Upper Silesia, the other is the |
of the union of Austria with |
the Reich. Could both of these uues-
tions be settled in Germany's favor
she would at a single bound have re
covered all she lost of Importance In .
the war. OF, more exactly, recovered
what was most vital of what was lost
and in addition acquired new territory
tar in excess in value and Importance !
of what she surrendered.
In the Locarno agreements Ger
many has pledged herself not to seek
by arms to change her frontiers
either in the east or the west. But |
she relies upon Article XIX of the
covenant to enable her to open in the !
league the matter of her eastern |
frontiers. She feels certain, moreover,
that so far as the Polish corridor and
Upper Silesia are concerned she will
have the support of the British, per-
haps even Of the Italians. And In this |
matter all German parties are united |
II there is division in opinion over
AlSa there are many
Germans who are prepared, if a COM
plete settlement with France is posi-
BILE, to accept this loss-there is not a
single German ready to accept the
eastern frontiers as more than transi
tory.
Union With Austria.
But while the matter of eastern
frontiers Is one of national sentiment,
constituting in reality the Alsace-
Lorraine for Germany made by the
last war, the question Of the union of
Austria Is one of future greatness
To get Danzig, the corridor and Upper
Silesia would give Germany most of
what she had in 1914 and restore her
national integrity. but to acquire
Austria would not alone give her
large territories and considerable
it would take her down
the Danube and give her mastery in
central Europe.
To acquire both would make her
master of the outlets of Poland and OF
would bring her into
touch with Hungary, an inevitable
ally; would restore her to something
like her position of power and in
fiuence of 1914. But before she can
acquire either she must at the very
least find some method of separating
the Poles and the French, for France
even under the Locarno agreements