Evening star., 1925-06-28
EQUALITY IS ONLY BASIS #
FOR SECURITY TREATY
Germans Won't Accept Implication They
Are More Liable to Be Guilty
of Pact Violation. #

same situation. In other words. for
both nations the guarantee pact
would hold good only while neither
was pronounced by the League of
Nations to be guilty of unprovoked
aggression.
Certainly Germany will not now or
ever sign any pact or treaty as an
equal. She will not consent to be
put under duress which is spared to
any other country. She will not con-
sent to any stipulation which gives
even the colorado suggestion that
she is more likely to affront the peace
of the world than any other nation.
She will not consent to the ALLEGATION
to France of any right to disregard
the neutrality of the Rhineland which
is not bestowed upon her also.
With the idea that the German
proposal for a guarantee pact is no
more than a new device, new
scheme to forward ultimate German
plans of vengeance, l do not agree,
judging from my own experience. On
the contrary, my notion is that what
is in the back of the German mind is
very real desire TO be done with all
the mess of recent years and months,
to get the whole matter of occupa-
ton and sanctions and allied super
vision over with. The German wants
peace, but his idea of peace is a con.
posed to Ruhr occupations, prolonga-
tions of Cologne occupations, inter
minable allied military inspections.
Has Different View.
Naturally the German views all
| these things in a vastly different light
from the allied publics. He sees in
them the revelation of allied and
mainly French purpose to prevent
| Germany from recovering at any
| time, to keep Germany in a state of
! tutelege and helplessness indefinitely,
| balancing each step toward recovery
within Germany by some new Grip
| pling demand upon her. The whole
| origin of the German proposal for
a pact is to be found, l believe, in
the German conception that pledge
to France. underwritten by Britain,
would serve to satisfy French fears
| and thus end French interference.
1t follows, then, that the value of
the pact sinks TO nothing, for Ger
many. if 1t does not provide just this
immunity which the German seeks.
Take the pledge for your own terri
tory, set up a barrier in the Rhine
land, but barrier blocking you as
we'll as me- That is the reality of
the German proposal TO France. And
to appreciate il one must recognize
that the fear of French aggression in
NCi VI aggression IN
the immediate future. is as genuine
as that in France of eventual Ger.
man attack.
Now. the British would obviously
like to get France and Germany to-
gether on the basis of a pact which
would be so limited that il would not
go beyond British interests. They
would prefer an agreement which
| covered only the Rhine and concerned
only France and Belgium on the one
hand and Germany on the other.
They are interested neither in Po-
land nor in CZechoslovakia. and they
are concerned lest French interest in
both shall make the accommodation
| of FranceGerman differences impos-
sible and ultimately involve them in
a new war.
Alliances Disfavored.
Therefore the British have striven
pretty consistently to persuade France
| to drop her eastern allies. In this
| they have measurably failed because
while the French are prepared TO
agree that Germany shall not be
called upon to give pledges covering
all her frontiers, knowing full well
| that no German government could
live. II 1t. entered upon such a con-
tract, they are not prepared to sign
away their right to aid these coun-
| tries, If Germany does attack them
After three months of discussion, the
British and the French statesmen
have been unable to reconcile their
difference in a common policy, there
fore they have finally agreed on the
present compromise which France has
sent to Germany.
But Germany is just as certain to
| take alarm at the French proposals
as France at the German. Therefore
= <l,~ ).
comes with the attempt to reconcile
French views. Moreover, it is GER
| tain at the outset that neither coun-
try will give way on the essential
issue of security or accept any plan
unless equal protection is afforded by
it to both nations and it is equally
clear that the French proposal does
not give Germany her measure of
protection in its present form.
One must recognize, however, that
| the present proposal marks a very
distinct advance, so far as Britain and
France are concerned. We have at
| least a very definite statement of Brit
| ish willingness to undertake the re-
| sponsibility of defending French and
Belgian frontiers against Germany.
| 1t is true that the actual form of the
undertaking is carefully silent in the
matter of names. In form, Britain
undertakes to maintain the Rhine
against any infringement, whether
German or French, but the British
commitment in the matter of Belgium
was at least equally vague, vet the
French found it adequate in the hour
of trial
British Responsibility.
In fact. then. the British have de.
clared that French security is a mat.
ter of British responsibility. But they
| have avoided the sort of undertaking
Poincare pressed for and all French
men have hoped for, namely, an alli-
| ance between France and Britain,
which could only be aimed at Ger
many. Such an alliance would not
merely be contrary to British tradition.
for Britain only makes alliances in
the presence of immediate peril and
for the limited period of the existence
of that peril, but it would also De an
unmistakable challenge to Germany.
To guarantee French security Without
exciting German resentment cc ahpre-
/ henSion, this has been the Nl1ole
| British aim-and ii is realized when
the British guarantee takes the form
of an underwriting of bi-lateral
| security pact proposed by Germany
Had Britain been able to give such
| pledge four or five years ago, had
France been willing at that time to
/ take such a guarantee, the world
| would have been spared many evil
| moments in recent years. But in this
direction, as in the matter of repara-
! tions, 1t has needed time to dena-e ax-
pectations. And it is just as impor-
tant for the Germans to perceive that
Britain realize her necessity to main
| tain French frontiers as it is for
! France to recognize that the possi-
| bility of an exclusive alliance with