Evening star., 1925-10-18
New Meade Memorial Is Notable Botanic Garden Featu

talions toward this new encounter
| If jackson, lost at charlottesville.
had been Lees long arm, Stuart, with
his swift cavalry, was Lees eyes.
learning tile very things about the
enemy that laid the enemy low.
Stuart was given permission to recon
noiter the country, and through mis-
| direction, lost connection with Lee,
a situation that was to prove costly
before the battle was fought out.
| AS the two armies moved forward
! into Pennsylvania, each cropping for
the other. the final place OF collision
was determined not by any precon-
ceived plan but by conditions over
which the generals had no control. BY
June % Maj. Gen. Buford was guard
ing the northern approaches to the
! town of Gettysburg. On the 30th 2
brigade under Pettigrew of Hills
Corps was coming toward the town
from the north for the purpose of lay
ing a contribution of shoes on the
| town. OverestimatinG Buford's forces,
he withdrew, resolved to attack on the
following day.
On the night of the 30th. Meade had
his men stationed a little south of
Gettysburg, while Lees men lay just
| a little to the north. neither army
determined upon a field of battle, for
neither commander knew the details
of the terrain in and about the town.
The field was eventually determined
/ by the circumstances that led UP To-
the battle
When Lee had learned of the pn-
sition of the Army of the Potomar
at Frederick City, he began to recall
his advanced divisions and to concen.
trate them. their closer grouping caus-
ing reflex concentration by Meade.
After Charlottesville, Lee had com
pletely reorga nized his army, dividing
II into three corps each corps being
made up of three divisions, and each
corps capable of acting as a complete
army or in cooperation with the
others. Longstreet, EweH, and Hill
commanded these corps.
ION the morning of July l, Gen. Bu.
~ ford, with two small brigades pre-
pared to hold the enemy in check
should he attempt to enter Gettysburg.
resisting stubbornly until Reynolds
could come up with his corps. AS the
latter approa ched the town he heard
| the guns of Buford's cavalry. When
he arrived he threw his forces into the
conflict with vigor, only to be shot and
killed in the very beginning of the
struggle. His loss was irreparable TO
Meade, whose eyes and ears and brain
he was in places where Meade was
absent. Before his death he had dis
information that the enemy was ad-
vancing in strong force and would
probably occupy the heights beyond
Gettysburg before Reynolds could.
That message crystallized the move
ments of Meade, who made every effort
TO reach the town and TO occupy it,
although even then unaware of the
strategic positions il afforded.
Hancock, sent to replace Reynolds,
found the troops in confusion. He re-
organized the men and established
them on Cemetery Hill, directly south
of the town. About midnight of that
day Meade himself rode into the
scene of the battle of the morrow. the
cemetery grounds facing Seminary
- Ridge. The first day of the battle had
been a decided success for the Con
federates.
On the afternoon of the I'd of
: July, both sides had al their forces
in the field. Lees numbering about
10000 and Meade's about $4,000. The
armies lay about a mile apart, the
Confederate troops occupying con-
cave line along Seminary Ridge direct
ly opposite the Federal forces whose
convex lines were formed on Gene
terry Hill and Round Top. The Con-
federates bent their lines TO cut
through Gettysburg and they thus en-.
dangered Meade's right
! Meade desired TO tight on the de-
fenSlre. LongStreet urged Lee to
swing around Meade's left and get he
: tween him and Washington, in order
to compel him to assume the offensive.
In the absence of Stuart, with his
valuable information, Lee dared not
; take such risk and he replied: THE
enemy is there and l am going to at
tack him."
Lee ordered LonEstreet to move to
l his right and envelop the Union left.
: ordering Johnston
attack the enemys right when he
heard Longstreet'S guns on the left.
Longstreet delayed until late in the
afternoon, giving as an excuse that
his forces were insufficient. His de-
lay cost Lee the battle.
While Meade strengthened his lines
! and awaited the onslaught of the
. ConfederateS, he learned that his
whole left flank was unprotected, Bu-
fords cavalry being withdrawn and
none taking its place. 1t was too late
f to correct that mistake when it was
discovered.
, Moreover, Gen Sickles was found
! to have occupied the wrong position,
! his lines being too far in advance of
the others from. whom his position
: separated him. The enemy had al
: ready begun a bombardment, and
: Sickles had to stand his ground in
that exposed outpost. Terrific fight
: ing followed, both armies losing
heavily.
:, When night quieted the tumult,
. Meade called a council of his corps
, commanders and it was decided to re-
main where they were and fight it
out in spite of the days loss of 10000
, men. Meade claimed the victory, but
= his council of war made that claim
somewhat tenuous.
!, If Lee had fault, it was his too
great patience with the laggard move
,, ments of Longstreet "a great fighter
n when once in action). Lee lost his
S wonted calm while waiting for Long
r streets action but he still waited. In
d the meantime. the arrival of the 9th
Y Corps on the Federal side made 1t i'm
d possible for Lee to drive the Union
e forces before him.
l. Lee said to friend after the war:
/ Had ] had Stonewall Jackson at
e Gettysburg. ] should have won that
e battle" Sir Frederick Maurice is OF
the same opinion.
,inN the morning of the Sd OF July,
!, ~ Lee told Longstreet that he was
going TO attack the enemy's center
n teven as Meade had predicted that
/, he WOULD. Great God"' said Long
+ street. Look. Gen. Lee, at the in
= surmountable difficulties between our
. line and that of the Yankees-the
steep hills, the tiers of artillery, the
:. fences the heavy skirmish line
o The enemy is there, Gen. Long
e street. and am going to strike him.
said Lee in his quiet, determined voice,
Il reports Rhodes.
r Again Longstreet was in charge of