New Britain herald., 1925-09-30

ter over with Nj. Briand If he
 desired it.
 Tnitialled) F.. q.
 Foreign Office.
 February 22, 1916.
 At present there was no use to he made of it," Grey writes, and al- though he held 1t as 6 personal con tidcnce, he left 1t in way to be re- vealed to his associates in the for eign office should it become neces- sary while he was away for month. shortly thereafter however, the As quith coalition government resigned and Grey left the foreign office but placed his successors in possession of the document.
 My impression now is," he writes that for reasons which I did not know at the time the memorandum was already out of date. What these reasons were can only infer from what has since been disclosed in Germany"
 Grey does not refer further to what "waa since disclosed in Ger manY.' but fl is probable that he had in mind the fact that later. De- cember IS, 1916. President Wilson addressed an identical note 10 all tho belligerents asking them 10 state more specifically than they had heretofore, the terms on which they were prepared to make peace. The War president disclosed this step 10 congress on January 70, 1917, in his celebrated peace without victory" address. which in effect embraced in principal all the fundamental pro- posals which had been outlined in the memorandum which Earl Grey records as containing the substance of his conversation with House.
 AS the world knows, nothing came of the presidents proposal for peace conference at that time. and whether he vas then considering throwing the United States into the war Is not disclosed by any of the |1te presidents shorthand notes, memorandum with the alteration of only one word." He does not dis close what the one word was, but confdants of the late president who have read Greys work believe it undoubt edly was he word "prob- ably" making the document read. the l'nited States probably would ."nter the war against Germany" in thc event that peace proposals fall led.
 Much support for this supposition lis to he fonnd In rorolections of confidential conversations with the Hate president hy those very few men with whom he intimately discussed the war and revealed the drift of his mind. As late as the winter of 1918 -- in fact while he was on his way to the peace conference.-the disclosed to one of his corhdants that for many months before the United States entered the war. hn was not sure that tho dragti '1'cation of th" British naval !' would not so shape public m Amer tea so as 10 make i Gjf,icult to 7loi1 an open ruptur~ with the al lies and Great Britain in particular.
 For long time" President Will son told this confidant. "I was un- ahe to make up my mind whom we might have 10 fight, after all It vas difficult 10 determine which the American public regarded as worst British navalism or Prussian mill iarism My decision finally turned on this point, to wit; seized ships and cargos could be paid for In money. leaving everybody satisfied. But the American lives which the Prussian government was sacrificing in its submarine campaign never could ha paid for or restored. and in making choice of two evils l had to come 10 the conclusion that Prussian militarism was the worse"
 From that, the war president turned to the frantic efforts the AL