The daily worker. [volume] (Chicago, Ill.) 1924-1958, 1925-08-13
COOLIDGE GIVES |
ENDORSEMENT n.
war ON RIFFIAN'
War Department Make
Excuses forFrench


WASHINGTON, D. c., Aug. 1o.-f
statement issued by the office of tn
chief Of ordnance department
war, disagreeing with a news articI
claiming that the modern warfare
conducted by the French against tn
Rifflans has failed, tends to CONTRA
the fact that the imperiaIist govern
ment Of the United States has line,
up with French Imperialism in Ath
conquest of Morocco.
The war department statement de
tends the French method of attack OF
the Riffians, and makes excuses 70
the reverses sufferd by the French
ending with the intimation that a.
soon as the French begin their at
tack they will be able to make III
their losses.
Flag of Wall Street on Front.
Many quarters here attach signih
canoe to the statement of Laurent
Eynac, French undersecretary fol
aviation, speaking at a reception tc
American aviators who had enlisted ir
the French army to fight the Rifians
that "The fact that the star spangled
banner will fly over the plains of Mo
rocco and the mountains of the Riff
will surpass in importance the mum.
Der of the American volunteers"
The statement of the war depart
ment, expressing approval of the
French attack on the Riffians, who
are fighting for independence from the
oppression of French bankers, follow
in part
Excuses for French Failure.
There can be no doubt that one of
the delicate questions is that of the
crossing and recessing of international
boundaries involved in French cam
paign against Riffian tribes. Likewise
the French commander. must at all
times consider the question of the pop
u1arity of his campaign at home. How
often must he ask himself: VIII my
activities receive the moral support
of the French Government and the
French people, and will receive es-
sential support in the substantial form
of troops, arms, ammunition and sup
plies to prosecute my campaign
Compare the situation of the
French commander with that of Cen
eraI Pershing during his service as
commander of the Punitive Expe4t-l
ton in Mexico. Possibly there ;BP'
points of similarity. itp.
Consider the personnel Of the op-
posing forces, especially their train
ing. The Rifffan soldier is more highly
developed at act on his individual ini-
tiative, to live and fight in the open
by himself and with the arms, am
munition and equipment carried .on
his person or supplied from an ex-
tremely mobile supply system. The
French soldier of today cannot be very
different from the French soldier Of
the world war. He is distinctly
team man. His individuality and ini-
tiative are limited.
THE factor of morale is always i'm
portant in any form of military OF
civil endeavor. On the one hand we
have the French soldier away from
home, or colonial engaged in oper-
ations against neighbor, while the
Rifiian is at home or just across B
border, supported by the tradition :
centuries. The terrain, climate
strange to a large percentage of the
French command, while the Riffian is
on battlefield of his own choosing.
v. S. Hopes French Win.
1T is a well-known principle of war
that only an offensive campaign wins.
This does not mean that all offensive
campaigns do win. The French today
are strictly defensive in their tactics.
Whether or not the French take the
offensive will depend probably more
upon the political factor than any
other factor affecting the present sit
uation. If the offensive is taken and
the campaign goes forward, is it not
reasonable to assume that the French
command will utilize the weapons and
means best suited to bring about a
decisive action? We may expect to
see mobility used to overcome mobil-
ity and each of the modern weapons
utilized in its proper role.
above all, keep the Riffian situa-
ton in proper perspective. Consider
all factors before drawing conclusions,
and bear in mind that the army, and
especially the ordnance, OF a modern
nation of first magnitude, must be
ready to meet all possible contingeH
cies, and must not allow considera
tions peculiar to an isolated case Z
exert an undue influence on its orgaL.
ization, its ordnance Of its tactical en-
ployment."