Evening star., 1925-03-15


zollern and Wittelsbach, that is Prus-
sian and Bavarian, and there is the
other question as to what HohenZol-
lern should be chosen. Not the for
mer kaiser, that is out of the ques-
ton. Only less certainly it cannot
be the crown prince. Perhaps the
crown princes son, but there you
have confusion enough to make res
toration a bit difficult even in the
abstract.
Bavaria, every one says, is a mon
archy today in all but name. The
Crown Prince Rupprecht is regarded
as a sovereign, perhaps incognito, but
you have general agreement that he
is too wise to make an attempt to
seize the throne by force and you
have also the significant agreement
that such an attempt would mean
bloodshed, universal strikes, economic
disturbances which would abolish the
progress, real, but still restricted
which has been made. Above all, il
would abolish confidence
Republic shows Vitality.
In a word. the republic is here. il
can't be abolished now. The most
nearly nationalistic ministry the re-
public has yet had is just as much
captive of the form of government
as the first republican cabinet. Ma
tionalist policy may seek to destroy
the republic Ly sabotage, to discredit
it by piling up confusion. by estab-
fishing the idea that under the re-
public nothing can be accomplished,
that its continuation means humilia-
ton abroad and chaos at home-and
that, one must note, is the game of
the Communists, too.
Now when you consider that most
experienced and informed observers
agree that short of the deluge the
republic has from five to ten years
more to live, it is plain that much
may happen. You may have wholly
different situation abroad, the Rhine
land may all be evacuated with the
Ruhr, agreements may be made with
the old enemies, security treaties as
to the Rhineland, commercial treaties
with France and other nations. In
a word. in spite of all that the ex-
treme Nationalists may attempt, the
republic may live, even become as
sociated in the public mind with a
degree of comfort at home and of
dignity abroad.
There you have the real chance of
the republic as / see it here, the fact
that for a number of years it has
got to live. That was exactly what
saved the French republic between
1871 and 1875, when the ma jority of
the National Assembly was mon
archist and imperialist. The Hohen-
zollerns have already been gone more
than six years. Suppose that another
decade passes without a restoration,
will it be as easy then to restore?
Evacuation Prime Issue.
l feel certain that the republic can
not live, cannot have any real chance
of survival if it is unable to bring
about the evacuation of all of occu-
pied Germany. 1 think it is highly
probable that if this evacuation be
postponed too long the evil effects
of such delay may prove ineradicable.
1t could not survive, moreover, if the
German governments of it's period
should undertake any new contract to
accept as permanent the eastern
boundary as laid down by the Paris
treaty.
1t might in the end survive if the
present Summer saw the termination
of the present debate over the
Cologne zone, the evacuation of the
Ruhr and the Cologne bridgehead, the
general agreement as to the certainty
of the evacuation Of all the other
zones, including the Saar, under the
sailles. 1t might survive if England
and France and Belgium, together
with Germany, signed treaties guar
ante eing the present frontiers which
these three continental nations have
in common.
l suppose that the real key Of the
situat ton lies in the fact that there
exist at this moment in Europe two
distrusts-that of France
for Germany and that of Germany foI
France The mass of the French peo-
pie believe that the Germans are
planning and plotting a new war OF
destruction and aggression; the mass
of the German people believe that
French policy is entirely summed uI
in the purpose to prevent German re-
covery, to take advantage of every
technical excuse for prolonging the
occupation of the Rhire and in the
end to hold permanently the Rhine
frontiers.
Must Bridge Differences.
Unless some bridge be found over
these two streams of distrust the
impossible. The French will not
evacuate, and the Germans will turn
from any republican form of gov.
ernment to the most extreme reaction
the moment they have the slightest
sense of strength or perhaps at the
moment when they are seized with
despair. Leave out militarists, poll.
ticians, agitators of every sort, and
you still have, L think, a great and
decisive number of people on either
side of the Franco-German frontier
who are almost immovably convinced
of the bad faith of the other country
Now, this works quite obviously ir
Germany. Everything the allies have
done, notably the occupation of the
Ruhr, has served to give confirma.
tion to this conviction. L do not now
try to argue about the wisdom oil
folly of the Ruhr occupation, mucf
less it's legality or ,illegality. Bu
the effect in Germany was perhap:
as bad as 1t was good-that is, il i
brought the Dawes plan it alst
strengthened enormously the hands o
those who insisted that France nevel
meant to let up until she had de
stroyed Germany and that all at
tempt at fulfillment was supreme
folly
The Dawes plan brought change
The pessimists were for the momen
silenced. But then the new Cologn,
dispute interposed. The old cry was
heard again: What use to concede
to agree, to promise, to undertake t.
perform? A new excuse will be found
for attacking u.s." Mind, 1 am mo-
trying to argue that such assertion.
are right or wrong; l am only trying
to report the effect of such action.
upon millions of German minds, filled
crammed with distrust of French
purpose, saturated with skepticism O.
British and American politics. Ant
in the same way 1 am trying to poin
out the admirable handle such epi
sodes give to the extreme National
lists, who are to sabotage the repubIi,
now and restore the empire one day.
Drift Against Republic.
Enthusiastically weaker than it was
gather the republic is still too
strong to upset by force. A new