The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1925-04-20


Woodrow Wilson. The eleventh
instGllnsent Diu appear exctu-
siUsIy in The Washington Times
next Monday.
Woodrow Wilson lost the
peace because it could not
have been won; not the
peace he visioned. Humanity
was not ready for it. We
Americans like to think that
we were ready for it. In
the sense that we were not
bitten by the dogs OF old
nationalist enmities and sus-
picions, this is true. But
we had our jingoes as well
as did Europe. And our
jingoes preferred the peace
of the militarist to the peace
of the conference table. So
we joined the jingoes of Eu-
rope.
The common people of the
world were ready highly to
aspire with Wilson. But
they were not wise enough
to choose leaders of his kind.
Europe had scores of lead
ers. But Europe listened
less patiently to these gentle
leaders than they gave ear
to Wilson. When it came to
the surrender of their an
cient prejudices the peoples
of Europe responded to their
intriguing leaders, even as
Americans responded to
their irreconcilables. This
must be said always in the
defense of President Viii
SON s apparent failure in the
struggle for a peace based
upon reason rather than
upon force. His peace i'm
piled more good will in the
heart of the white race than
1000 years Of Christian
philosophy had been able to
put there.
Lacked COmrader.
Yet, when that is said in
extenuation Of President
Wilson's temporary futility,
we must not withhold the
fact that he might have at
tanned much more of his
ideal If he himself had been
able to exercise the very
good will and comradery
which the world lacked and
which in all conscience he
should have had.
In Europe he followed
grudgingly the advice of
Colonel House, and wrote a
letter inviting the Foreign
Relations Committee of the
United States Senate to dine
at the White House on his
return and hear his expo
sition of the treaty and the
covenent; chiefly the cove
nent. A majority of the
committee was Republican.
Faced Conflict.
When the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee left the White
House in June, 1919, after see
ing the Wilson treaty, the Pres
ident knew that he was facing
the conflict of his life. He
wrote Colonel House a rather
formal letter to tell him that the
meeting had turned out as the
President had feared and ex-
pected it would; perhaps even
as he secretly hoped it would;
such was his lust for battling
when it was once unleashed.
Always in the Senate from the
beginning to the end, a majority
mot always the Constitutional
two-thirds, but always a work
ing majority-existed for the
League of Nations with certain
mild reservations suggested by
those who held the middle
ground. This majority was made
up Of Wilsonian Democrats and
Republicans who believed in
the ideals of peace which the
President had expounded during
the war. But the President
made it plain in midsummer of
1919 that he would accept no
amendments or reservations to
the covenant of the League of
Nations.
Last Big Blunder.
That was the Presidents last
great blunder. On his part he
: felt bound in honor to his asso-
ciates around the conference
table at Paris to bring America
into the league without reserva-
tions. Possibly-though maybe
even that inference is unfair
he had his pride in sending back
the covenant of the League of
Nations as he and they had
agreed upon it. Whatever was
his motive, his experience should
have taught him to distrust his
combative instincts He was not
in form to go into the arena
with the hea SIS at Enhes1Is Ha