Evening star., 1925-04-12

He has made an alliance with Ru-
mania and Jugoslavia, which Is the
little entente; with France, which is
the basis OF Czech security and
French influence in the middle of Eu-
rope; he has an understanding with
Austria which has possibilities of far
greater development, and the chances
of closer Polish-CZech relations are
generally recognized. All these agree
ments are directed at making the
existing frontiers permanent, and all
are strictly defensive.
Now all of this policy of Benes was
expressed in the protocol, which did
in general what had been done be-
fore in part by separate arrange
ments. In throwing over the proto-
col the British have been forced to
fall back upon the other Benes
method, which was the separate pact.
But Benes and the Czechs all per-
ceive clearly that the British diff
Guilty lies in the fact that in the
effort to escape giving a general
guarantee to all European frontiers
the British have been driven back to
a situation where they are compelled
to give very complete guarantees to
Belgium and France or accomplish
nothing.
France stands in this position: She
has definite alliances with Belgium,
Poland and Czechoslovakia; her
agreements with the two Slav states
insure her tho support against Ger
man aggression of two standing
armies amounting to half million
on peace footing and capable OF eS-
pansion to more than two millions in
case of hostilities. The German pro-
posal, which had British approval,
would ask her to drop her arrange
ments with these two states In re-
turn for German promises and some
form of British guarantee. But since
the French will not accept German
promises at face value, the problem
would be one of weighing the values
Of two guarantees, that found in the
two allied armies and that found in
the British offer of aid. But could
any British government today make
an offer of guarantee which would
outweigh the Polish and Czech mill
tary conventions?
At the least, you do not find this
impr ession in the middle of Europe.
On Business Beat.
The Czechs are a serious business
people with no delusions of grandeur
and no interest in militarism. They
have a good army because they have
at least one dangerous neighbor and
no. end of disturbing prospects. But
they have-and Benes embodies 1t-a
real European point of view; they
have-and Benes expresses it at
every international gathering at
which he is present-the clear per-
ception that Europe is not only
complicated affair, but that also Eu-
ropean frontiers are not to be simply
and definitely separated. as, for ex-
ample. into eastern and western
boundaries.
Now the fundamental reason why
the Czechs were not excited about
the German proposal for a western
guarantee pact was that they per-
ceived from the outset that the thing
was impossible and would lead no
where. Benes, unless l have been
grossly misinformed, presently told
Mr. Chamberlain, who represented
England, that the idea of separating
eastern from western boundaries
would mean war, not peace, and that
1t would only be possible to make a
western pact If the western pact
contained certain definite conditions
with respect of the east, that is, of
Poland and Czechoslovakia-
Then Benes told Herriot again.
unless l have been gravely deceived.
that Czechoslovakia, so far from op-
posing, would welcome a British
II
would also be d guarantee of Czecho-
slovakia, in effect, asking only that
the western pact include some Ger
man agreement to make an eastern
agreement, which would include
promises to arbitrate differences with
Poland and Czechoslovakia on the
basis OF existing frontiers.
Blocked British Play.
Roughly speaking, then, when the
British had torpedoed the protocol
at Geneva, Mr. Benes went to Paris
and torpedoed the whole British con-
ception of a western pact without
eastern commitments, reached solid
agreement with France, and then
hurried back to Prague, en- route for
Warsaw. to reach a general settle
ment with the Poles. which would
enable both Slav states to oppose
united front to any new maneuver.
Czech Position Strong.
You have, then, a clear notion of
the Importance of Czechoslovakia in
the whole operation and the part that
Benes has played and will play. The
Germans are ready to give France q
guarantee, which will cover the west
They are, I personally believe, pre-
pared to accept the decision of the
war with respect of Alsace-Lorraine,
settle all future disputes in the west
by arbitration-and on this basis to
enter the League OF Nations.
The British, on their side having
torpedoed the protocol, are keenly
aware of the fact that they must give
France some guarantee or the French
will not quit the Ruhr, which Is the
acknowledged desideratum of both
British and German diplomacy. And
the British have been assured OF the
German readiness to come into such
a bargain, making perhaps g. nVe-
power pact OF the western nations.
Britain, France, Belgium, Germany
and Italy, all agreeing to respect and
defend the status quo. Thus the
British guarantee would not involve
any tremendous British response
bilities
But the Germans are not equal
ly willing to accept their eastern
frontier. They have insisted that the
Danzig corriedor must be suppressed
and Danzig restored to them, to-
gether with Upper Silesia. This
would mean a multilation of Poland,
and Poland is an ally of France.
British policy has, then, aimed at
getting France to cut loose from
the eastern ally in return for the
western guarantee. This has been
the whole play of the diplomatic
game for several months.
Failure seems Sure.
Now that the British effort has
failed, the situation resolves itself
into struggle between the two
standpoints. The British will try to
persuade the French, but they are
now almost certain to fail The
French will insist that in giving
France q guarantee, the Germans
safesuard the eastern allies of France
Poland and CzechosloVakia. If Ger