Evening star., 1925-12-13

A S was to be expected, one of the
~ first consequences OF the Lo-
| ~ carno adjustment has been a
! 4 4 renewal of the discussion of
l. prospective disarmament. The
! League of Nations, through the COM
mtttee appointed to consider the sub
Ject, has begun the organization of an
| international conference, and the prob
| ability that the United States and even
! the possibility that Russia Will be
asked to participate have been en-
| phasiZed
| Admitting, however, that the mo-
| ment is more propitious than any
since the close of the war for dis
cussions of what should be described
as limitation rather than abolition of
! armamentS, 1t remains patent that
very grave obstacles lie in the path
| way of any far-reaching adjustment
OF the question in any short time.
| Ih1s, OF course, applies more particu-
| larly TO land rather than TO naval
| ornaments, for, mea Sureably, there
has been q limitation of the latter.
AS 1t stands now, the precise situa-
! ton is this: The small nations Of
! Europe which We're neutral in the
! war, together with the large and
small nations which We're disarmed
| as a consequence of the war and
compelled by the treaties of peace to
! strong champions of the drastic limi-
! tation OF armaments, the neutral
| nations, because security for them
! lies in the elimination Of arms in the
hands of the larger neighbors, the
defeated nations because, not being
! able to rearm, they can arrive at
equality only through the reduction of
the armies Of their conquerors.
Protection Big Question.
On the other hand, the problem,
SO far as II affects the victorious
states. is exceedingly complicated. 1t
IS complicated by a whole variety of
questions and conditions. We must,
at the outset. then, perceive that the
| whole problem of the Limitation of
armarnents depends exactly upon the
relation of national problems to ma.
Ional armaments. Nations win main
tam armies in proportion to what
they conceive TO be their necessities
and the gravest difficulty will lie in
the appraisal of these necessities.
There are, however. three divisions
! IN which we may classify the prob
| lens; they are. European. Russian end
colonial. Broadly speaking, the ex-
PLANTATION Of the maintenance Of large
armies is to be found in the eXamina.
ton Of the relation OF these three ele-
ments to the several nations But the
difficulty again becomes evident that
no matter for what purpose an army
may be maintained. II has a direct re
| lation to the whole issue.
In order to make this situation
clear, let us start with the last OF
the divisions, the colonial problems
There are at the moment only two
large colonial states in the world
namely. Britain and France Both
moreover, find themselves in seriou:
d1fficulties requiring conSidera BILE mill
tary resources. Great Britain, while
maintaining in Europe a standins
army of but 155. 900. has In Inlia
alone 232. 900 troops, of which Il ,O0C
are British. France, while at the
moment maintaining $4,000 in Eu
rope, has in all Of her colonies 240.
600 soldiers, Of whom only 1000 are
/ french. When YOU consider the mum
Der OF troops the British have to main
tain in other colonies, in the Sudan
IN Mesopotamia, in Nigeria and else
iWhere-that is, native troops-it Is
patent that the sum total of British
troops and native troops under Brit
ish command will pass half million
Reduction at Home Doubted.
AS to the British troops maintained
in the British Isles-that is, the 155.
600. the old expeditionary arrny-it is
patent that no considerable reduc
ton Is to be expected The sum tota
is not much larger than our owr
small army. 1t represents the mini
mum compatible with the existence
OF any organized force. 1t Is, indeed
the irreducible minimum this side q
real and complete disarmament, which
Is out of the question for the present
On the French side q very large
reduction of the home or 1netropoIi
tan army is already in progress. Un
like the British Army, the French
Army Is based upon conscription, no
voluntary enlistment Thus the siz,
OF the army is fixed by the length
OF service. Before the war. wher
France had a three-year service law
she had about 700, 900 F'renchmen un
der arms. After the war the periot
was cut in half and she has now
slightly more than 400.0 900 But a new
reduction to one year is authorized anC
will shortly bring the metropolitan
army down to about 800, 900, or ap
proXimately twice the size of the simi
lar British home army
All things considered this 800 O0C
represents for France the irreducible
minimum also. short of real disarnla
ment or the adoption of the volun
tary system. AS long as France re
tains conscription-that is, the system
which trains ali citizens-one year is
the minimum period for such training
Thus at the outset 1t is clear that botf
France and Britain have arrived OF
are arriving at a voluntary limitation
which pretty closely approximates the
possible.
Colonial Case Differs.
But, on the other hand, neithe,
France nor Britain is likely to lister
to any discussion Of limitations which
would reduce their colonial establish
ments. because both countries are
facing problems which are certain tc
require more, rather than less
strength. With India steadily trouble
some, with Mesopotamia, Palestine
and Egypt actually menacing, the
British are not likely to consent tc
any diminution of native forces
trained by British officers anc
strengthened by British units, forces
which in India alone count 2S2 900, o,
almost as much as the whole French
colonial establishment. France, with
Syria and Morocco in eruption, is ir
the same state.
Yet, turning now to the European
aspect of the question, 1t Is plain al
once that the colonial aspect has a
direct reference. In the last war the
British moved troops from India te
Flanders and the French from all their
African colonies to. France. In case
of a supreme crisis in Europe, the
larger part of the French and much
of the British colonial establishments
could be sent to Europe, and thus
the actual strength OF both the Brit
ish and the French troops in Europe
must be reckoned on the basis OF
all of the European plus more than
half at least of the colonial forces.
Germany Relatively Weak.
Now for Germany. which is re-
I on ns Inn non ;eo<l