Evening star., 1924-05-25

hensible and natural that Russia
should herself have taken all neces-
sary precautions in order to avoid
storm that threatened burst suddenly
on her borders. The measure. more
| over, to which she had recourse was
mot in itself disquieting. As Herr
Won Bethmann- Hollweg himself re-
| marked in a telegram sent two days
previously to his ambassador at Vienna
| tGerman documents No. $3.50, Russian
| mobilization did not at all mean war,
as would have been the case in west
| ern Europe; in 1918, for instance, the
armies of the czar had remained mo-
| blllZed on the frontier for months
| without any actual conflict ensuing.
4, There was. therefore, no justifica-
tlon Tor the measure unusual in every
| way, constituted by the delivery of
the note brought by the Count Pour
| tales to nj. Sazonov in the middle of
the night of July 81 to August 1. 1t
can only be explained by a predeter-
| mined intention on the part of Ger
| many to provoke complications
within a few short hours of the
| expiration of the time limit sent
to NJ Sazonov, and although no new
| iact had interviewed in the mean
| time, Germany declared war upon
| Russia German documents No. 542)
without even attempting to give any
| explanation of that step, which was
in formal contradiction with the
| terms of its preceding note: without
| than the grave and imminent dan
ger resulting from the Russian gen
| eral mobilization: without consider
ing how ridiculous. how odious. it
| was for the most powerful military
| empire in the world, supported by
| A Al Dr.
garia, to consider itself as being
| threatened, because a huge but de-
bilitated country like Russia was
mobilizing; without realizing the
paradoXical position in which she
| placed herself in thus flying to arms
in order to help the dual monarchy
which was still technically at peace
and was to remain so for several days
| longer, for it was only August s
that the Vienna cabinet finally made
up it's mind, and then only after
urgent and repeated appeals from it's
| impatient ally austrian diplomatic
documents III, Nos. 1873, 1873; German
documents Nos. S14, $50, S75), to
| break with Russia.
THE facts we have just recorded.
| and which cannot be doubted since
they are all based upon German or
Austrian official documents. might ap-
| pear sufficiently conclusive in them
| selves to render further belated dis
|
| bility in the world war absolutely
superfiuous.
Report OF NJ. Isvolsky.
| German propaganda has made
much of certain reports by NJ.
Isvolsky, which were published in
| the Russia Black Book. French di-
plomacy is held to have, as far back
as in 1912, by rashly pledging the
word of France in respect of the
| 'casus foederis' with Russia,
encouraged the secret activities (?)
| of the cars minister at Paris. NJ.
Isvolsky, and to have thus given
| Russia courage to stand back of
| Serbia in 1914.
! THE truth is that in 1912, antici-
pating complications in the Near East,
NJ. Isvolsky approached the French
| government in order to ascertain to
what extent Russia could depend upon
her ally. Even the documents pre-
sented in the Black Book prove that NJ.
Poincare did not give Russia a free
hand.
He simply promised Russia dip
lomatic support in case of GER
tain complications in the Bulkans,
| but he made it clear that a 'casus
| foederiS' would be constituted only
in the case that a conflict with
Austria would lead to an armed in
tervention on the part of Germany
(Black Book. y. $3.50. NJ. Isvolsky,
on November Is. 1912, wrote:
lit is quite understood that
France would come in. he on. Poin-
care) said to me, in the clearly de-
fined event of the occurrence of the
"casus foederis," provided for in the
alliance, that is to say, should Germany
afford Austria her military support
against Russia (Black Book. p. 346).
when all is said and done. the re-
proach brought against NJ. Pon-
| care is that he declared that after
| being in existence for more than
| twenty years Franco Prussian al
lance had lost none of it's strength.
There is a Legend of the Black
Book but it is easy to destroy it. That
the Black Book should nevertheless
figure prominently in the German Ii
| brary of propaganda is not at all sur
prising, considering the evident collusion
| between that work and the Germa n
] White Book The conclusions drawn
| from them are. however, too far-fetched
to seriously impress anybody and to
shift the responsibility from Germany S
shoulders There it should and will rest
| forever"