Evening star., 1924-08-24
BY FRANK III. SIMONDs.

phase. IN tne opening sessions
agreement was reached upon
rather complicated system by which
the question of whether or not Ger
many was in willful default should
be left to final settlement by spe
cial arbitral board. The addition of
an American member to the repara-
tions commission also automatically
deprived France of the control she
had hitherto exercised in this body
as a consequence of American retire
ment from Europe, a control which
was obviously fortuitous and wholly
unforeseen when the treaty of Ver-
SallleS was made.
Thus, as consequence of these
notifications, the British were afford
ed larger degree of opportunity to
subject any French policy of coer-
cion based upon German recalci-
trancy to the acid test of justifica-
ton. France had gone into the Ruhr
in 1923 following the decision of the
reparat:ons commission, three out of
the four nations that is, France.
Belgium and Italy-voting affirma
lively that Germany was in willful
default. Both Belgium and Italy
had concurred in the legality of the
action. and Belgium had participated
In fact.
Opportunity for Appeal.
then deprive France of the power to
act individually again. because she
had not acted individually in the
Ruhr instance; it merely gave the
British, in case they were again in
the minority as they were in 1923,
an opportunity to appeal to an arbi-
tration board, and it added an Amer
lean member to the commission. an
addition which would not, however,
have affected the 1923 situation even
had there been such an American rep
resentative and had he voted with the
British.
On the other hand. France sue
ceeded in preserving her position of
1928 in that her freedom to act as
She chose, once there had been de-
cision by the arbitral board that Ger
many was in willful default was not
impaired. Moreover. she obtained the
right to have a decision by arbitra-
tion of certain questions which might
aris> during the operation of the
Dawes report.
When the Germans came to Lon
don, then, they were confronted by
two states of fact. The French had
retained the right-or what they as
serted to be = right-to occupy Ger
man territory in case of new de-
fault, and in addition they were actu-
any III liIC IhUIlI Will TIE beiS ldHS
and had asserted that they purposed
to remain there until Germany had
given full and sufficient proof of her
purpose to arply the Dawes report
honestly and completely.
Germans Show Good Sensr.
Quite wisely the Germans, who in
all but perhaps the very final days
certa inly displayed sound judgment
and good sense hitherto lacking in
all their international contracts of
the past ten years, determined to
make their main effort to get the
French out of the Ruhr at once.
Thus you see that while in the Brit
ish phase of the conference the main
effort had been by the British to pre-
vent a new occupation of the Ruhr in
the future, in the German phase the
contest was to procure immediate
evacuation.
The Germans said, in effect: 1--WE
VIII accept the Dawes report, heavy
as are it's burdenS-impoSsibly heavy
we think-provided our mere formal
acceptance shall be the signal for
immediate evacuation of the Ruhr."
The French said: I'VE will agree to
the Dawes report, heavy as are the
sacrifices it demands of us in the way
or reduction of our reparations
claims, but we will not agree to
withdrawal from the Ruhr until the
Germans have demonstrated that
they mean to carry out the Dawes
program and not to give a formal
assent merely to procure evacuation
and then revert to the old tactics of
evasion and default"
Complicated by Politics.
The struggle then turned on when
the evacuation should be complete
Should the last French or Belgian
soldier be out of the Ruhr in three
months, six or twelve? But the de-
bate was terribly complicated by the
political situation alike in Berlin and
Paris. In the German Parliament the
opposition was sufficiently strong to
defeat, if it chose, the measures which
1t was necessary to pass to put the
Dawes plan into operation. And this
opposition, composed of the extreme
Nationalists, announced in advance
that 1t was prepared to defeat these
measures If immediate evacuation of
the Ruhr were not pledged at London
In the French Parliament not only
was the Herriot ministry not over
strong in the Chamber, but it was ia
tally weak in the Senate and had to
recognize the fact that If it agreed in
London to an evacuation of the Ruhr
in advance of German compliance
with the Dawes report, it might find
itself in minority and be forced to
resign. Herriot had announced in ad-
vance that the French evacuation of
the Ruhr would be complete within a
year from the application of the
Dawes report; observers in Paris were
agreed that this represented the mini
mum of time he could safely ask for
occupation.
Two Governments in Peril.
The French and German parlia-
mentary situation being what it was,
the British and American conferees,
together with the Italian and the Bel
gian, had always to reckon with this
alternative, they might support the
Germans and bring about the fall of
Herriot, who by yielding would be
fatally compromised, or they might
support the French and in the end
see the Marx combina-
tjop &c down to defeat and be re-
placed by extremists. Would they
work to establish Poincare in France
or Tirpitz and Ludendorff in Ger
many? There was the dilemma.
The French case, which was the
Belgian also, was quite simple. The
French argued thus: I'VE occupied
the Ruhr after Germany had been
duly pronounced in default, and in
willful default, by the reparations
commission. Our occupation was met
by a passive resistance designed by
the Germans to enable them to escape
from all reparations. as they freely
proclaimed. The battle Of the Ruhr
was fought and won, like the battle
of the Marne, and in the former the
Germans lost the reparations war as
in the latter they lost the World
War. We are all here now with the
Dawes report in hand because the
Ruhr operation brought Germany to
the point of recognizing that she