Evening star., 1924-03-18
CHAPTER XIII.
My President Wilson Did Not Rec
0mmend War in 1915 and 1916.
How Neutrality Helped the Allies

Why President Wilson Did Not Rec
Ommend War in 1918 and 1915.
How Neutrality Helped the Allies,
The general public did not know
that Mr.. Wilson was SO set upon max
ing a move for peace during the sum-
ncr of 1916 that he actually framed
peace proposals. He was dissuaded
from making a peace offer, however,
because of the belief that such a step
might be considered as political-it
,uight be interpreted 1t seemed as a
gesture intended to improve his own
chances for re- election and it might
be construed abroad as without seri-
GUS purpose because of the criticism
certain to issue from political oppo-
nents.
SO Mr.. Wilson delayed his peace
move until after the campaign and
sent the note after he had been
elected, November, 1916, in the hope
that his position would carry even
.Srcater weight because of n triumph
1T the polls.
But it was peace Mr.. Wilson was
thinking about in December. 1916, and
dent however, that the fortunes of
war were turning against the allies,
that the Germans were planning a
big drive. that the eXtrepists in Ger
many were gaining the upper hand
and that submarine warfare with
out restraint was to be sanctioned
then did Mr.. Wilson begin to resign
himself to- the inevitable.
Activities of German Envoy.
There was time in the early days
OF 1917 when he thought that the dis
missal of the German ambassador
would be sufficient warning to Ger
many that the United States must
not be offended by farther depreda-
tions on the high seas and he called
in the author one day to ask him if
the activities of the German ambassa-
dor as noted by the newspaper men
bad reached the point where they
were compromising Americas neu-
tralty. 1t was true that the Ger
man ambassador conducted a propa
ganda. did all he could to influence
American opinion in favor of Ger
many. but the author told the Presi-.
dent that he did not believe the Ger
man ambassador was doing any more
than some of the other ambassadors
of the allied world in their efforts
10 influence American opinion during
the presidential campaign.
The German proclamation OF unre-
stricted submarine warfare gave the
United States ample justification not
only for the dismissal of Count Won
Bernstorff, the German ambassador.
but the forthcoming declaration Of
war against the imperial German gov
ernment. The tide of battle was
going against the allies and again
Mr.. Wilson hoped that America might
be able by the very fact Of her en-
an early date. 1t was for this reason
that the President gave himself over
utterly to the persecution of the war.
recommending at the very outset uni
versai conscription and the extension
of large loans, materials and supplies
to the allies. BY this he hoped to
break down the German morale.
Wanted United Public Opinion.
Critics have risen to say that the
United States should have gone to
war when the Lusitania was sunk
all Europe still thinks. no doubt. thu
the two years of neutrality were due
to vacillation, indecision or even
timidity. But Mr.. Wilson's reason for
hesitation was due entirely to his
hclicf that the United States must
enter the war, if at all, with united
public opinion. So far as politics
Wore concerned. he knew that the
a metfcan people would surely re-elect
him in 1916 if he were comma ander-fn-
chief of their forces during the war.
He knew he would gain politically if
-\ne RIGA entered the war during 1916
for it had been an old political say
ing that the American people never
swap horses in midstream."
The evidence is all against the
European idea that the United States
withheld its forces from use because
OF an indifference to the issues and
funda damentals of the conflict abroad
american public opinion alone was
Mr.. Wilson's guide, and he recon-
mended declaration of war only
when he was convinced that the ver-
diet was unanimous. From an alto
gcther different viewpoint, however,
it is possible to prove that the neu-
trality of the United States, far from
being disadvantage to the allies,
was an asset of immeasurable value.
The German historians who know the
truth about Won Tirpitzs plans for
unrestricted submarine warfare as
outlined in the latter part of 1914 are
convinced that only the influence of
the conservative element in the Ger
man foreign office-namely, the dip
lomats instead of the militarists--pre-
vented the earlier adoption of unre-
strain submarine warfare. Mr.. Will
sons note writing held the Germans
at bay in the sense that they did not