Evening star., 1924-08-24
i. s. CHIEF BENEFICIARY
FROM THE DAWES PLAN
Bulk of Cash Payments to Be Made
by Germany to Find Their
Way to This Country.

our debtor and we shall not now LED
him go until he demonstrates that he
| means to pay and not evade. We will
fix date for evacuation, we will give
every assurance Of going II the Ger
| man performs, but here we stay until
he gives that proof"
How the Germans Felt.
The German on his part, proddeH
| from behind by his extremists. as
Herriot was by his, said: THE occu-
patton Of the Ruhr was illegal. it was
an act of war without justification
| under the treaty of Versailles. We
| cannot and we must not be put in the
situation of yielding to this act Of
| violence. We must be permitted to
| sign the Dawes agreement without
duress. France must confess to the
crime which was the Ruhr.'
You see, after all, it was In the
main matter of prestige. If France
| retired from the Ruhr before Ger
| many had complied. then the whole
| Ruhr operation might be made to
appear unnecessary, If not illegal. the
Dawes report would no longer appear
as a victory wrested from recalci-
| trant Germany by virtue of French
and Belgian sanctions, but, on the
contrary, the principle would be estab-
| lished that Germany could not be
| made to pay by force and had only
| consented to accept the Dawes plan
! when force was withdrawn. Thus,
even at the eleventh hour, the Ger
| man passive resistance to the Ruhr
| operation would triumph and the vic
| tory would be German and not
| French
Germany quite obviously, sought to
| establish the principle that she could
not be coerced, that it was illegal and
| physically impossible. If she pro-
! cured the agreement by France under
pressure from the United States.
| Great Britain and Italy to retire from
| the Ruhr before the Dawes plan went
| into operation, then she would emerge
morally the victor in all the naneu-
vers between 1919 and 1924. maneuvers
designed on her part to escape from
| the payment of reparations alto
gether. And knowing that the Brit
| ish government had always believed
and somewhat tardily proclaimed the
Ruhr operation to be illegal, the Ger
| mans not unreasonably hoped for
British support when the subject
| came to be debated at London.
Had Faith In NJ. Herriott.
This hope proved unfounded for the
simple reason that before the Ger
mans came to London Herriot had
won signal triumph, he had sue
ceeded in convincing his associates
of his good faith. honest intent and
extreme moderation; British, Ameri-
can and Italian representatives were
all convinced that the fall of Her
riot would be a disaster greater than
any catastrophe which might happen
in Germany and they were ready to
support the French premier IL the test
ever came, as come it was bound to.
Herriot, on his side, met the Ger
mans quite frankly. He at once Of
fered evacuation within the year. he
subsequently agreed to fix the date
in August, 1925. assuming the London
conference terminated its labors sue
cessfully, rather than two months
later when the Dawes report was
technically to go into operation. He
| offered minor concessions In the mat
ter OF the evacuation of certain cit
| les taken along with the Ruhr and to
| insure communications OF the occupy
ing force. OF course, he agreed to an
immediate termination OF the eco
| nomic exploitation by the allies.
which was a detail in the Dawes plan.
Beyond this, however, he said: II
Germany complies fully and promptly
with the Dawes arrangements I can,
in practice, hasten the evacuation.
At home 1 shall be politically secure
provided I can show that my recall
of French troops follows German
compliance, for it was merely to
obatin that compliance that the
troops were sent, but I can't safely
agree to withdraw these troops on a
day certain less than a year from
now without any supporting evidence
of German performance"
At Crisi. for . Week.
ho hn q n q
believed Herriot; that they were sat
isfied of his purpose to withdraw
| French troops; that they were con-
vinced he cherished no imperialistic
or annexationist ideas; but they had
to consider the possibility that Her
riot might disappear from office be-
| fore the French troops had been
| withdrawn and they had to consider
what they could say to German Ma
tionalists who refused to believe in
| Herriot and continued to proclaim
| that French purpose was to destroy
Germany and French refusal to
evacuate at once was proof of this.
Marx and Stresemann, enveloped in
this perplexity. produced crisis in
the London conference, which lasted
for nearly a full week and at mo-
ments seemed to warrant real pessi-
mism. Vainly they reached for some
"
| the French troops stay year and
insure their Immediate departure.
| Equally vainly they turned to the
| British and American representatives
| for aid. but by this time both Ameri-
can and British representatives were
| satisfied that Herriot had gone to
| the limit of his capacity and 1t was
wise policy on their part not to crowd
| him, particularly as he on one occa-
| sion pointed out to Macdonald that
| the question of evacuation lay outside
| the agenda of the conference and he
| was quite as free to raise the matter
of interallied debt
| So at last we had an agreement
based upon the pledge that within
year, assuming German Perform
ance, French and Belgian troops
would be withdrawn from the Ruhr,
with the assurance that If the Ger
mans hastened their compliance with
| the program there would be a con-
comitant fastening of the evacua-
| ton. On the whole. the Germans had
argued their case with ability and
sincerity; in their dealings with the
French there had been an absence
of bitterness on both sides, which
was Instructive, but in the final dis
cussion they found that there was a
perhaps unsuspected solidarity be-
tween the allies Of the war, and that
| not only was ii impossible to isolate
| the French, but that further insist
ence on their part would result in
4 their own isolation and place upon
their own shoulders the burden for
the failure at London.
Driven by National Necessity.
| And, like Erzberger at Rethondes,
nearly six years ago. when the armis-
tice was made, Marx and Stresemann
| at London were driven by the un-
mistakable national necessity; the
/ loans, which were q vital feature of
| the DaweS plan were the single door