Evening star., 1924-09-04
TEN: YEARS AGO
BY FRANK 4. SIMONDS.

shots were fired in the battle Of the
Marne, which ragged for the next
four days and reached a decision on
September 8, when the western Ger
man armies began to retreat, al
though not all the Kaisers various
armies actually retired until Sep
tember 12. Including the, opera
tions both east and west of Metz, and
they constitute a complete whole.
this first battle Of the Marne was
the greatest struggle in human his
tory, alike in numbers engaged and
in extent of territory covered by the
battle fronts. 1t was also the de-
cisive battle of the war so far as
German victory was concerned, for 1t
brought about the Illustration OF all
German ante-war strategic concep-
tions and abolished the hope OF a
swift decision over France and then
transfer of German troops from
west to east and the conquest of
Russia
The German plan of operations was
at once simple and grandiose. 1t
was planned to mobilize 70 infantry
and IL cavalry divisions for the first
shock, supported by six infantry di-
visions as army reserve. or this
vast host nine infantry and one cav
airy division were to be used in the
tack, while 20 infantry and 10 cav
airy divisions were to be employed
in the west together with the six
divisions OF infantry to constitute
the general army reserve.
X X
These 20 divisions were to be divid-
ed into six great armies. five to be
used west and one east Of Metz. hav-
ing respectively 81 infantry and seven
cavalry divisions and l6 infantry and
three cavalry divisions. The army east
of MetX was to meet and beat the
great French Offensive which was to
break out south of Metz and seek to
penetrate Alsace-Lorraine between
Metz and Strasbourg. Three armies
were to constitute the right and oper-
ating force and to advance through
Belgium and. turning south, envelop
the allied flank, and they were to con-
tain no less than "a infantry divisions
and practically all of the cavalry
available in the west. Two armies,
containing 20 divisions. were to MAIN
tain Connection between Metz and the
three armies constituting the striking
right flank.
To meet this gigantic force the
French mobilized ~ infantry and 10
cavalry divisions, the British six IN
fantry and one cavalry division and
the Belgians six infantry divisions
plus a small cavalry detachment. Thus
for the first shock the allies would
oppose 80 infantry and IL cavalry
divisions to 70 infantry and 10 caval-
ry divisions. In addition the French
had 81 reserve divisions which would
arrive ultimately at the firing line
and would then give the allies Sc In
fantry divisions against 76 German.
but the French reserve divisions were
not regarded as ready for Immediate
use, and the Germans had thus the
opening advantage in numbers.
\
French strategy envisaged n thrust
into Lorraine with 13 infantry divi-
sions, which would encounter 16
German, a thrust northwest of Metz
with Is infantry divisions, which
would encounter 90 German, while
10 French divisions and 6 British,
together with 6 Belgian would un-
dertake to hold back and dispose of
the German troops coming through
Belgium, between Givet and Brus
sells. Theoretically, 90 allied divisions
would encounter 81 German, but the
disparity was increased by the fact
that only British divisions arrived
in time. while the Belgian were
driven into Antwerp and contained
by German divisions. Thus at the
first shock 80 German divisions fell
upon British and 10 French-32
against IA.
In the opening battles the French
attack in Lorraine was broken and
transformed into rapid retreat in
the battle of Morhange- -Sarrebourg
The French advance. northwest of
Metz, met with similar disaster in
the battle of the Ardennes, and the
Anglo French armies in the west
were beaten at Charleroi and Mons,
and forced into a headlong flight to
escape development and destruction.
By August %, the situation had ar
rived which the Germans had fore
seen and the French defeat seemed
ineScapable.
X X
At this critical juncture the Ger
mans made two capital mistakes
which cost them the battle of the