Evening star., 1924-08-10
BY FRANK H. SIMoNDs.

possible, so far as these nations are
concerned, the application of the
Dawes program, it is essential to re-
call once more the enduring state
of mind of the two great peoples.
the fixed ideas which dominated their
leaders and their policies.
On the one hand from 1920 on-
ward the British were convinced
that at the back of the French mind
was prevailing and predominating
fear of Germany, which would, in the
end, drive the French to disregard all
question of reparations when they
saw Germany. under the operation Of
the Dawes plan, regaining economic
and political strength That France
would take advantage of a real or
even a fictitious failure of Germany
to comply with the terms of the
agreement thrust French troops into
the Ruhr again and bring about the
economic ruin of Germany, this was
the British apprehension.
Eneh Suspicious of Other.
The French. on the contrary. were
convinced that once the Dawes re-
port had been translated into action
and the economic recovery Of Ger
many was assured, the British would
both be unconcerned with a failure
of Germany to pay reparations and
directly interested in seeing that Ger
man production was not stimulated to
the point of becoming menace to
British exports. In other words, the
French feared that for selfish rea-
sons the British would oppose any
effort of France to get reparations at
the risk of disturbing economic con-
dtions, just as the British were afraid
the French would seek security by
crippling Germany without regard
to British commercial and financial
interests .-
The problem at London--the prob
lem at all the previous conferences
has been to find way to reconcile
the mutually conflicting interests and
the equal distrust of the two peo-
pies and their leaders. How was it
possible to deal with the realities as
opposed to imaginary dangers? For
t.is apparent that just as it was pos
sible that France might take ad
vantage of a mere pretext to invade
Germay again and upset the eco
nomic recovery, because this eno-
nomic recovery seemed to threaten
French safety, so 1t was equally pos
sible, to say the least, that Germany
might take advantage of the British
opposition to all coercion to repeat
its previous campaign to evade all
reparations. That part of the French
apprehension which was real and
based upon experience had to be met;
the legitimate right of France to get
reparations and to resort to some
form of coercion il ,willful evasion
were repeated. was undehiable.
Entitled to Insurance.
And it was1just as apparent that
the British were entitled, particular
ly as they were to find much of the
money to finance the German recov-
cry with, to insurance against any
deliberate Intervention of France
which was based not upon real and
willful German evasion, but upon
French, fears stimulated by the re-
covery of Germany under the Dawes
plan. Two legitimate interests de-
served protection, two natural sus-
picions had to be laid, France had to
be deprived of the chance of un-
warranted Intervention, Britain had
to be prevented from defending Ger
man evasion in order to avoid French
Intervention.
Now if you look at the intricate and
puxziing compromises which were u1-
timately arrived at you will perceive
that, shorn of all their encumbering
details, they come down to this: Where
and when the quarrel between French
and British interests becomes acute,
I,A hat
German default is willful and obvious
or French allegations of such default
are unwarranted, then it is to be left
to boards of arbitration, and. in fact,
to the decision of American citizens
acting unofficially, to settle the issue.
Herriot's Hands Tied.
France went to London determined
to keep the right to intervene, which
had permitted the occupation of the
Ruhr, undisturbed. Herriot found
himself compelled to pledge in ad-
vance of the excursion that he would
not sacrifice the French right of in
dependent action in case there was
wiliful German default, and he was
equally pledged to retain the right
to the reparations commission, in
which France was able to cast the
deciding vote to determine; the fact
of German default ..--s
Britain at London sought to estab-
lish as right the principle that no
single nation could intervene, no mat
ter what the state Of fact, and that the
decision as to German default would
be transferred from the reparations
commission to a new commission. in
which not French but British infiu-
ence would predominant, The Eng
lish were opposed to Intervention, to
any occupation of the Ruhr under any
circumstances. They wanted to put
an end to the, whole process of coer-
cion by force, by. military action.
r. Now the one thing that is apparent
is that neither of the two countries
could possibly have its own way-Her-
riot could no more give in to MacDon-
aid than Macdonald to Herriot.a This
was the situation which had in the past
ended in the failure of conference
after conference and most notably Of
the conference of Genoa, which
wrecked Lloyd George. and that Of
Paris, which preceded the occupation
Of the. Ruhr and made it inevitable.
1t was the danger OF such a deadlock
which from the outset made the Lon
don conference at once interesting
and difYicult.
The problem of the politicians, too,
was made more difficult still by the
presence and participation of. the
representatives of International
finance. Americans and Britons were
bound in any event to find the bulk