Evening star., 1924-05-11
BY FRANK HI. SIMONDS.
seems possible now to forecast
with reasonable accuracy that

most certain to be put into operation
and that any clash which can be ex-
pected will come after the application
. and not before.
The decisive gesture, that gesture
which at all times was bound to be
decisive, has come from the British
Prime minister. The declaration of
Ramsay Macdonald to his own Welsh
constituents that so far from seeking
the isolation of France it was the
precise thing which he desired to
avoid, and his appeal for Anglo
French cooperation mark complete
and final break between the Lloyd
Georgian and so-called liberal"
school Of thought and the present
premier.
Underlying all the criticism of
France which has been in general
circulation both in Great Britain and
in America in all the years since the
Paris conference has been the double
assumption that the French position
was inherently wrong and that by
some curious process of isolation
France could be subjected to the CO.
ercion of the popular sentiment of the
world at large and thus brought to
heel.
Lloyd George Policy Fails.
This was the last phase of British
foreign policy under Lloyd George
and 1T went down to final disaster at
Genoa two years ago when the Brit
ish prime minister discovered that, so
far from achieving the isolation of
France, the combination of his
avowed policy and the sudden publi-
cation of the German Russian treaty
at Rapallo had consolidated around
France the smaller central European
states. notably Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia and Rumania.
Genoa represented something like
an open break between France and
Great Britain and the consequences
were disclosed when Turkey, in part
through French and Italian encour-
agement, succeeded in breaking the
military strength Of the Greek forces
in Asia Minor and came back to the
straits with a victorious and intran-
sisent army. The Lloyd George pol
icy having led Britain to the edge of
q new war in which she was almost
certain to find herself alone, its au-
thor was overthrown and the Bonar
Law tory cabinet succeeded the Lloyd
George coalition.
Hard on this came the occupation
Of the Ruhr, which was an inevitable
consequence of the divergence Of
British and French policy and of the
French resentment at Lloyd George
methods. Bonar Law, himself dy-
ing man, had striven to prevent the
occupation, but failing saw quite
clearly that short of a war with
France, which was unthinkable, moth
ing could be done to procure French
evacuation. Britain merely stood
aside, declined to participate and in
due course Of time challenged the
legality of the occupation.
False Hopes in Baldwin.
Baldwin succeeded Bonar Law.
Curzon in the foreign Office strove
earnestly to get Germany to make
proper peace proposals, but failed.
And the Ruhr war continued until it
ended through the collapse of Ger
many, which had wrecked her cur
rency and shaken her economic ma
chine in the hopeless practice of
passive resistance. Finally Germany
was forced to surrender uncordi-
tionally. Meantime the visit of Stan
ley Baldwin to Poincare in Paris had
for a moment suggested an improve
ment of Franco-British relations, but
the hope had come to nothing.
Then Baldwin went to defeat over
the tariff proposal and the general
election which followed his appeal to
the country suddenly took the control
of foreign affairs out of the hands
of the Tories, who had been divided
between friendliness with France and
opposition to the whole French pro-
gram. Like all the other heirs of
Lloyd George. Ramsay Macdonald in
herited a gravely compromised situa-
tion.
Measured by the past record Of the
Labor party and even judged by some
of his own statements, Macdonald
seemed bound almost at once to an
taronize the French. A duel between
Poincare and Macdonald, even fiercer
than that which had ended in the fall
Of Lloyd George, seemed inescapable.
But no sooner had he taken office
than Macdonald turned not to Ber-
lin. but to Paris and began that
series of gestures which, in the brief
period Of four months. have certainly
totally transformed the atmosphere
of discussions between these two
countries.
French Are Recognized.
Now the interesting and significant
fact about the Macdonald policy SO
far. was and is the recognition on
the part OF the Labor prime minis
ter Of the fact that France could not
he coerced and did occupy position
from which she must be either turned
o,t by force or by persuasion; and
nersuasion involved concessions to
the fundamental French demands,
above all to the French insistence
tbat-having taken guarantees and
sanctions as a result of willful Ger
man default--she would not relin-
o,,ish them until such time as she
was insured against the consequences
of any new German default.
Mr.. Macdonald, in his York ad-
6ress seemed to indicate that Britain
,,,ouId not consent to any preparation
in advance against German default.
H-bis speech was interpreted in Paris
rs meaning that Britain would insist
that German good faith be assumed
and French transfer of actual possess
sion Of German industries in the