Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1924-11-21

within the concluding paragraph or
the sub-c1ause, that if an employee
when injured had co-existent con-
tracts of service, done ar different
times in the ordinary working
hours" the wages from these count
as though earned in the employment
at which he was working at the time
of the accident, in computing COM
pensation.
This was .exceptionable error Be
cause the concurrent" paragraph
refers to instances where the total
earnings were from different employ
ers for substantially the period OF
one year Immediately preceding the
injury, and not where the earnings
for that space came from but one OF
the employers, though the accident
arose out of and in the course OF the
contract of longest length.
"Sub-clause (c) affords guide by
which the compensation for this de-
pendent might be estimated were
the record sufficient in its detail 10
supply all the elements for comput-
ing an award. Why this sub-clause
rules the situation and wherein the
record is lacking are subjects broad
er in their compass or extent than
rescript limits are long. The opinion
deals with them. Sufficient is 1t Tor
the present to say, that, IN dlstlnc-
ton from the merely mathematical
computation which the other sup-
clauses define, (c) calls for the eHer-
else of Judgment and discretion upon
evidentially established facts, IN
mindfulness of the idea beneath the
statute, that of compensation TOT iosS
of capacity to earn guaged by actual
earnings in the ordinary WORKING
hours.
In the Cumberland county case -
leo DiPietro VS. Abraham Modes, the
annaaI is dismissed ana the decree
below affirmed with additional costs.
The rescript, which was drawn py
Associate Justice Scott Wilson o.
Portland, is as follows:
ON an appeal in equity transcript
of all the evidence must be TRANSMIT
ted to this court. a ea1lure 10 com :.
nlv with this we'll established rule OF
equity practice requires that the ap-
peal be dismissed.
In n bill to enforce mechanic
lien, the plaintiff alleged in the nrst
! paragraph that he furnished certain
| labor and materials by virtue Oh
! contract with the defendant who was
the owner of the premises, but in the
count annexed to the bill, it appears
| that the labor and materials, Tor
which the lien is claimed. We're FUR
! nished under at least two separate
| and independent contracts.
HELD: That the only purpose or
| the allegations contained in the first
| paragraph is to show that the con-
| tract, under which the labor and ma :
| terials were furnished. was direct
| with the owner, in compliance with
sec. 35, chap. SO, r. s., and that it
required no compliance with sec. 81,
| chap. SO, r. S., to preserve the Lien.
That the second paragraph with
the account annexed appraised the de-
PENDANT that the labor and materials
We're furnished under two or more
contracts and the amendments al
lowed over the objection of the de-
| PENDANT went no farther than to rem
| der more specific what already ap-
| peared in the account annexed and
| were not essential to the admission
| of the evidence offered by the plain
| tiff.
| Appeal dismissed. Decree below
affirmed with additional costs.
| Received Nov 20. 1924
Compensation Case
! In the Cumberland county case of
Roberts vs. The Portland Rendering
| Company the appeal of the respond
| ents is dismissed and the decree be
| low affirmed.
The rescript. which was drawn by
! associate Justice Scott Wilson OF
| Portland, is as follows:
! Where the only access to manu-
featuring plant from. the public
! streets is over the land of another by
a right of way in which the employer
has right of passage for all persons
| having business with it and for its
| employees in going to ard from their
work, an injury received by any en-
ploye while on his way home from
his work and while passing along
such right of way may be said to
have arisen out of and in the course
of his employment.
The period of employment within
! the meaning of the compensation
act does not begin and end with the
actual work the employee was en-
ployed to do. but covers the period
between his entering his employers
premises a reasonable time before
beginning his days work, and his
ledYing the premises within rea-
sonable time after his days work is
finished, and during the usual lunch
hour, he being in n place where he
reasonably may be in connection
with his duties or entering or leav-
ing the premises by any way he may
reasonably select.
Appeal dismissed. Decree below
affirmed with additional costs.
Received November 20, 1924.