Evening star., 1924-08-09
SPAIN HARDPUT
TO HOLD MOROCCO
Nation Eager for Withdrawal
of Some 0utposts and Re-
duction of Taxes.
BY OLIVER FOX.
Correspondence Of The Star and tho Chicag
Daily News

BY OLIVER FOX.
Correspondence Of The star and tho Chicago
| Daily News.
MADRID, Spain. July 26.-The most
| remarkable incident In Gen. Primo de
Rivera's political life before the coup
d'etat of last September IS was the
occasion when, while military gov
| erner of Cadiz during tho great war,
he put aside his functions and ad-
| dressed his fellow-countrymen in a
| speech which has been summed up as
| follows:
'Ceuta for Gibraltar and the devil
take the rest of Morocco" (meaning
the Spanish protectorate zone).
| This plain speaking lost Gen. Primo
de Rivera his governorship. Never
theless, a few years later he returned
| to the charge, rising on his bench in
the Senate to proclaim the same doc
trine.
| Gen. Primo de Rivera Is still sem
| ator. though he has closed down both
| chambers OF the Cortes. His second
speech cost him the most coveted
Spanish command, that of the Madrid
| military district, the captaincy gem
| Catalonia he found the lever his ir-
repressible energy at the service of
patriotism was looking for. and the
army revolt at Barcelona brought
about the dictatorship.
Moroccan Protectorate Very Costly.
Gen. Primo de Rivera has now been
the supreme master OF Spain more
than nine months without disclosing
his thoughts with regard to the Mo-
roccan problem. except by repeatedly
affirming that things cannot remain
as they are" and acknowledging that
posed by the protectorate on Spain
| is out of all proportion.
Since 1903 Spain has spent $780,
100000 in her protectorate, all ex-
cept a very small percentage in shot
| shell and military equipment. This
huge expenditure has upset Spanish
| finances and prevented economic de-
velopment at home. Spain maintains
$4,000 men across the straits, garri-
| and at water points, besides the large
| regular garrisons at Melilla, Ceuta
| and Laraiche. These garrisons hold
| the tribes In submission at the east
end and western ends of the protec-
| torate. The Rifr is still rebellious to
all authority. A good deal of expense
might be cut out by abandoning mil
| itary campaigns in the Riff, but di-
minishing the garrisons in the occu-
tribes Is another question.
Cen. Primo de Rivera has boldly
advocated withdrawal from Africa
provided compensation could be OBJ
compensation? spain's refusal def
| nitely to sign the Tangier convention
| seemed an indication that the direc-
| torate was out for a bargain.
Demand for Territory UnsaccessfuI.
! The demand put forth for an extern
sion of Spain's suzerainty within a
radius of some miles around Melilla
and Ceuta (Which fortresses form
part of national soil and are quite
separate, enthusiastically, from the
| protectorate) met with non-success.
The sultan (France) would not part
| ing to enable her to insist. The rea-
| son she gave for desiring an enlarge-
| ment of territory was that Ceuta and
| Melilla were cramped for want of
4 space to enlarge and that the sites
| for future town water supplies would
be outside the jurisdiction of the au-
thorities of these towns.
Although there is good water in
the Gurugu Mountains, rising directly
| behind Melilla, that city has never
dared tap the sources and water has
to be brought from Malaga in a tank
steamer. Some water rights may now
| be graned by the sultan, but that Is
| the limit of the concessions obtained
| by the pretense of unwillingness to
sign the Tangier convention, which
has now been ratified.
| 1t is now semi officially announced
that the Spanish army will shortly
be ordered to withdraw from a great
number of the advanced posts in the
| eastern (Melilla) zone and that Spain
will make no further attempt to pen
citrate the Riff region. This seems to
be the plan of the directorate for the
| moment: To sit down in solidly es-
| tablished positions and leave the
| warlike tribes alone. An economy
for the budget of more than &2o.ooo,-
| 600 will thus be effected every year.
| If carried out, this common-sense
policy would be acceptable to the
| Spanish nation, to which the direc-
torate would have rendered the most
signal service by Tightening the bur-
den in Morocco. with consequences
that may be far-reaching.
Great Value OF Ceuta.
1t is generally accepted that the
signature Of the Tangier convention
removed the knottiest problem in the
eier Spain suffered a grievous disap-
pointment. In interviews with for
eign press representatives, neither
the king nor Gen. Primo de Rivera
has hidden his resentment; whien Gauts Is
could be made with far less expendi-
/ ture and in q shorter time an incom-
parably better harbor than Tang1er.
| Will Spain make q DlQ LOT the u dniS
| OF the Tangler-Fez-and-be rail-
way by building Ceuta harbor and
railway line to connect up with the
trunk line at Alcazar? This is Sc
| cret Of the future which may be In
| nuenced by other considerations.
| 1t is known that the British au-
| thorities have doubts as to the fu-
ture military value Of Gibraltar. Ex-
| pert opinion has been declared In
favor Of Ceuta as submarine base.
In the light of these considerations
| "Ceuta for Gibraltar" takes a quite
| different complication and might
prove a business proposition, The re,
| coyery Of Gibraltar for Spain Wouid
be hailed as one of the greatest trl-
umphs of nacionalismo. The king
under whose reign such an event
took place would go down to history
Won on the other hand, "Gib" stands for
so much in the traditions Of the Brit
lish empire that its cession, even TOT
an advantageous exchange, wouid pe
| disnrted by many. Nevertheless IL is
fact that while Gibraltar's impor-
tance in the eys Of Spain grows rather
| than lessons as time passes, lts utlI-
Iity to Great Britain is being olmln-
fished by the progress or mooern
armament, taken in conjunction with
the dominating heights on the Span
ish mainland
Deaths Reported.