The Washington times., 1924-08-28
HUGHES MADE.
DAWES Plan
POSSIBLE
Move to Bring Europe's Chaos
to End Originated In
Secretary's Policies
By WILLIAM HARD.

The Dawes report was not bolt
out Of the blue. It's technical re
commentators were the accumula,
tion and development Of recon.
mendations already made by a long
Mne of technical experts, European
and American.
The diplomatic situation which
made tho report possible was the
result Of a long series Of diplomatic
efforts, including basically many by
Mr. Hughes.
The contemporary story of the
Dawes report, now making so much
noise in this campaign, is unintel.
Hgible except through the story Oi
the protracted international en-.
beavers, shared by many men OF
CMany nations, which preceded it.
Jeered BY British.
Almost as soon as Mr.. Hughes be.
Eame Secretary Of State he directed
Rowland w. Boyden to attend the
meetings Of the Reparation Com.
mission at Paris as an unofficial
observer.
Our British friends jeered at that
indebtedness. They also rebuked
hs for holding ourselves aloof from
The world in our great riches.
Mr.. Hughes refrained from pub
9icly pointing out to them that he
was merely copying the policy which
In similar circumstances they them
eelves pursued on the continent Of
Europe one hundred years ago, after
khe Napoleonic wars.
The great continental powers held
conferences at Troppesu and Lai.
bach to compose Europe. The Brit
Ssh were represented by Lord Stew.
art. His instructions, however, pre-.
Eisely told him that he was to at
tend not officially but only as an
observer.
George Canning, British foreign
minister, outrightly said: EFT is not
by incessant meddling with domes-
bic squabbles in other countries
that the influence of Great Britain
as to be maintained"
Other Nations Resentful.
The other countries were deeply
kesentful. They accused Britain Of
holding itself aloof from the world
In its great riches. The Car d.
Fectly said: "The British Empire,
now at the zenith of riches and
civilization, appears for the moment
to be engulfed by its own prosper
1ty.".
What the Car thought then about
the British, the British proceeded
to think about ussand our repara-
ton commission unofficial observer
In 1921.
Meanwhile, the very motives
which led Great Britain to that sort
of policy in 1921 led the United
States to that same sort of policy
precisely one hundred years later.
Those motives grew, and grew
out of a fear that the worlds most
powerful country, if it intervenes
too directly in the affairs of other
countries, may find itself ulti
mately accused of being an arbitrary
despot and may find itself hated
by the countries against which its
decisions have gone and may thus
not merely dissipate its influence
but also give rise to fresh inter.
national hatreds and controversies
Erroneous or exact, this point OF
view kept Mr.. Hughes steadily
swimming in the wake Of George
Canning.
Appeal By Germany.
In April of 1921 the German gov
eminent asked the United States
to mediate the PREPARATION question
and to Elk the sum to be paid by
Germany"
On the very next day Mr.. Hughes
promptly said mo-"
He added, however, that II the
German government would formu
late proposals regarding reparation
the United States Government would
consider transmitting those pro
posals to the allies.
Three days later the German gov
4rnment made a reply which ha:
virtually escaped all public notice
and recollection in America.
In that reply there was the germ
Df the Dawes report. The German
government suggested that there
should be an international commit
tee of experts to determine Ger
manys capacity to pay.
It suggested that there should bt
an international loan to Germany. I
also suggested that the total repa
ration figure should be twelve bill
lion five hundred million dollars
which in fact is approximately tn,
Figure on which the Dawes report
essentially proceeds.
In other words. the German offel
OF April. 1921, contained and out
lined the method by which tn,
recent conference at London wa.
able to be uccessful-namely, tn,
method Of relying on report b.
expertS-and 1t also contained ant
outlined certain important inciden
tai features Of that success.
Allies Unsatisfied.
Nevertheless at that moment tn,
proposal was not satisfactory {,
the allies. Mr.. Hughes, therefore
did not transmit 1t to them.
he had consented to transmit Il
he might at that time have an
tagonized the allies beyond all hop
OF subsequent cooperation witt
them. Such, at any rate, is tn
defense made of his policy. H
told the German government tina
It had not brought forward q;
basis for discussion acceptable t
the allied governments" and theI
he proceeded to wait for the dawl
Of a day of clearer vision in Europe
He waited till the fall OF 1929
He then ventured to suggest t
representatives of Britain and o
France the idea of a committee o
According to Mr.. Lloyd Georg
experts.
this suggestion evoked from Britain
and France no answer at all.
Mr.. Hughes then made his ia
nous speech at New Haven in De
cember Of 1922. In 1t he publicl,