Evening star., 1924-11-30

1t seemed to be the state of mind of
the Navy team, probably developed by
the events of the previous part of the
season, that caused the Navy to play
the kind of game it did. Nothing else
could very well explain Il.
The Army had gone through fiSe
lot of contests with some brilliant
lIay against strong teams-two excel
lent contests with Notre Dame and
Yale 1t had in its lineup men of
long experience on the gridiron, men
who had ranked among the most
brilliant of gridiron stars before they
ever thought of entering West Point,
Navy knew Its Weakness.
Navy has gone through a mediocre
preliminary season. Not only mad It's
troubles in it's games with strong
teams, but even the apparently infe-
rior combinations gave 1t trouble.
And on top of that 1t went through a
Ia 1sge part of the schedule with sew
eral Of its best players kept out De-
cause of ineligibility.
The Az We is not telling much
about tn. game in one sense, but II
seems ne, assary to recount in order
to show the why of some OF the
Navy's Il .tics. In view of the per
sonnel of the two elevens. because OIL
the brillI. mt record of the Army as
compared TO the mediocre one OF the
Navy, II was only natural that the
Navy should feel its chances decided
" slim. that it was the under dog
and that to stand any chance of
snatch:ng victory from an eleven ap-
lsrently so much stronger 1t would
be compelled to get away from the
realm of conservative foot ball by
daring to do what others would not:
by the daring of their attack break
down the morale of their opponent.
And while no one. has any means
of knowing just what kind OF game
the Navy forces actually planned, IL
seems only logical to assume tha,
the plan was as mentioned. and tina
the plan had its inception in keen
minds which had considered every
possible chance of defeat and victory
from other angles and resolved to
take the one chance that seemed
open.
That proba bly, seemed a forlorn
hope to the minds which directed the
Navy's plan of battle. but If a for
lorn hope offered the one chance of
victory, better that than nothing
| Nothing else would explain the fact
| that from the first play of the game
! Il forward pass. while backed W
against its own goal line Immediately
after receiving the kick off, the Navy
continued to take such chances as
under other circumstances would
have made the hair OF the head coach
turn gray and have caused a 16-inch
gun to be pointed at the quarterback
Must Have Followed Plan.
In more direct words, had not that
desperate game the Navy played been
planned beforehand and had the sane
tion of the coaching staff, the Navy
quarterback would not have re-
manned in the game so seconds after
that first play. or word would have
gone out to him through a substitu-
tion in some other position that it
would be as much as his life was
worth to repeat the performance.
Navy received the kick off and on
its own 12-yard line il seemed that
punt to midfield was the conserva-
tive play. But the Navy was not out
to play conservative foot ball. With
a greater punter. Wood, against them
the Midshipmen- evidently thought
they had small chance In punting
duel and no opportunity to adyance
the ball, and certain TO be kept
backed up against their own goal line
unless they could rush the ball or get
tlc III way 10 lHe
die of the field before they punted.
And how could that be done better
than by doing the unexpected, than
by trying to catch the Army Off it's
balance. Certainly it could not be ac-
complished by piercing a closely
packed line of veterans with backs
playing close behind 1t. Therefore,
the forward pass on that first play,
the forward pass which Army inter-
cepted and which caused many an
ardent Navy supporter to wonder why