Evening star., 1924-08-17

the Germans could take the field to-
day. or tomorrow. or next week, with
an army OF revanehe. counting any
where from 5000. 900 to 7.00O, 900 men,
oMcered by skillful. experienced leaders
1t has been said hereinbefore that
France does nothing anywhere or at any
time that has not the eventuality Of war
with Germany conspicuolsup in mind.
We Americans always speak OF the
French as logical and particularly
clear-thinking people. They insist their
anxieties with regard to Germany are
entirely logical and the fruit Of clear
and long-range thought on the subject.
One of the many prominent Frenchmen
to whom the present writer has spoken
in ParlS puts II this way: There are
only two parties in Germany. One that
wants war with France at once; an
other that wants war with France
as soon as possible" The same au-
| thority reminded his American inter-
| rogator that through all the vicissitudes
and changing fortunes Of German lib
erar politics during the past three or
four years, one figure has remained at
the head Of the department of war
Gen. Gessler. The Frenchman In Ques-
tion says this denotes that, though
Germany may change her tune in many
other directions, there is continuity Of
policy and personnel in at least one
direction, viz, the branch Of the gov
ernment that is making the country
ready for war
In this chronicler's days in Berlin, be-
fore the war, Admiral Won Tirpitz used
to be called "Tirpitz the Eternal" He
remained AT the Roichsmarineamt, pre-
pairing Germany for "the day" at sea,
year in and year out. no matter who
happened to be reichskanzler. So 1t is
with "Gessler the Eternal at Berlin
nowadays, the French say. He is there
and kept there for a purpose, and that
purpose, France Is morally certain, is
to maintain preparedness for a new
attack upon France. A Frenchman
laughs in your face if you argue that
Germany is liberal, democratic, incor-
| rightly pacifist, and militarily impotent,
besides.
Militarism Not Weaned.
In the United States an impression
took root in the Spring, when NJ.
Poincare's government fell and NJ.
Herriot was placed in power, that
France was tired of "militarism" and
| the 'imperialism" that the Poincare
program denoted. especially its Ger
| man policy. There seems little foun-
oation in fact for placing any such
construction upon Herriot's victory.
Poincare was ouSted from the pre-
,, miership on domestic tax issue. He
was anxious to refute the foreign
contention, hurled at France mainly
from Great Britain. that the French
were unwilling to tax themselves
for budget purposes and reconstruc-
ton necessities. The Frenchman has
an inherited hostility to direct tax
alton. 1t is practically unknown in
this country. 1t is as alien to the
French nature as protection is to the
British nature. Poincare, in conse-
quence, tunb1ed for almost precisely
the same reason that Baldwin fell
in Great Britain. Like Baldwin.
Poincare was advocating a revolu-
tionary fiscal change. France would
have none of it.
But the Poincare attitude toward
Germany, though its chief exponent
is out of Office, continues to dominate
and permeate France from end to
end. 1t dominates NJ. Herriot. He
would cease to be premier Of France
minutes after abandoning the Ruhr,
for example, or after relinQuishing by
so much as a hairs breadth the
stranglehold of Germany which
France exerts in the Rhineland and
in the Preparations Commission.
Americans are speedily enlightened
in France when they seek the cause
of this nationwide determination to
keep the ancient enemy shackled.
Tens of thousands of living French