Evening star., 1924-03-23
The True Story of
!, Woodrow Wilson
| BY DAVID LAWRENCE.
By DAVID l. LAWRENCE.

chief of staff in Washington. can tes-
tify to the free hand given them in
the discharge of their duties. 1t was
a policy that helped to win the war,
though it. brought about plenty OF
friction between the Executive and
Congress.
Appeal for Democratic Congress.
The maneuvers of the republicans
issue an appeal for a democratic Con-
gress. Although Mr.. Wilson outlined
his famous fourteen points in jan
nary 1918, no dissent was heard in
Congress. Senator Lodge did not ex-
press his opposition until the follow
ing August, when he made a speech in
the Senate, which Mr.. Wilson feared
would give the impression abroad of
disunity in American councils. On
september 81 Representative +. H.
Gillett, acting floor leader for the re-
publicans, made a speech to the
House insisting that republican
Congress should be elected. Repre-
sentative Fess of Ohio, in accepting
on the same day the Craftsmanship of
the republican congressional cam
paign committee. announced his pur-
pose to work for the election of a
republican Congress. Ou October 23,
the two former Presidents of the
United States, Taft and Roosevelt
both republicans, united in a joint
appeal TO the voters of the state of
Michigan to support Truman H. New
berry. who was the republican nomi-
nee for the United States Senate in
opposition to Henry Ford, who was
then running on the democratic
ticket.
Then former President Roosevelt
sent an identical telegram to SEN
ators Lodge, Poindexter and Hiram
Johnson, which was published Oh
the morning of October %. Mr.
Roosevelt said:
of the American people the Senate
VIII declare against the adoption in
their entirety of the fourteen points
of President Wilson's address of last
January as Offering basis for a
peace satisfactory to the United
States"
The colonel added that the four
teen points were "thoroughly mis-
chievous" and. if made the basis of
peace, such a peace would rep
resent not the unconditional Surren-
der of Germany, but the conditional
surrender of the United States"
Challenge to Leadership.
President Wilson regarded this as
a challenge to his leadership. The
Germans had already appealed for
peace, and on October IL had prom
ised that the fourteen points would
be accepted as a basis for peace dis
cussion. Under the circumstances
the Roosevelt teiegrams aggravated
Mr.. Wilson and made him apprehen-
hot h. 4 "a L
support from the republicans in max
ing peace. The next day, October 26,
he issued his appeal to the American
people for democratic Congress to
support his peace program.
Mr.. Wilson was accused during the
months of September and October of
getting ready to make soft peace"
and his political opponents encour-
aged the formation of unconditional
surrender clubs" throughout the
country. These clubs were Superf1u-
Gus to all who knew the facts. for
President Wilson had placed entire
confidence in Marshal Foch, COM
mander-in-chief of the allied armies,
who was to fix the military terms of
the truce. Mr.. Wilson did not at
tempt to participate in the making
of the armistice terms by the naval
and military high command of the
allied forces. 1t was not he who
suggested that his previous addresses
should be made the basis of peace
course. And the allies, with proper
reservations. accepted the German
peace proposal, and the armistice was
duly signed.
sensed in America. Indeed, Mr.. Will
son for several months had been Civ
ing attention to the questions that
would arise at tn epeace table and
had expected that Col. House, who
went abroad during 1917, would as
sist in the arrangements for peace.
Mr.. Wilson anticipated political op-
position to his peace program. AL
though he was partisan enough to
wish to see the democratic party con-
the other hand, of winning a vote of
confidence so that he might go to the
peace conference with the united
support of the nation behind him. Mr..
Congress, made in October, 1918, was
a shock to many republicans, who de-
clined to read the text of what Mr..
Wilson had said in his appeal, but
accepted the inference, in short, as
meaning that he did not credit the
republicans with their proper share
in winning the war. The President
had said explicitly that he did not
question the patriotism of his op-
ponents. This was lost, however, in
which followed mis- appeal for
democratic Congress.
Sought War Aims Agreement.
But if Woodrow Wilson had his
troubles on this side of the Atlantic
with the national politicians, he had
even more sources of worry with the
international politicians. All through
the war President Wilson had sought
in vain to get an explicit agreement
on the war aims of the allied and as
sociated powers. Except for the vague
general phrases which served their
purpose in raising the hopes of the
German people as we'll as the hopes
of the allied countries, there was no
definite understanding. Mr.. Wilson's
diplomatic exchange of notes with
the British, French and Italian ~Jv-
ernments during the months of Sep
tember and October were notable eff
forts to commit the allies to peace
without rancor and a peace that
would not SOW the seeds of another
war. Mr.. Wilson strove for a peace
without selfishneSs.
Men like Prime Minister Lloyd
George of Great Britain, Premier
Clemenceau of France and Premier
Orlando of Italy were not as ready