The daily worker., 1924-10-06
CONTINUED form mage d


menace to the continuation Of the
rule Of the international capitalist
class.
1t is the stabilization of world cap.
italism thru the stabilization Of Ger
many that the imperialists of the vic.
: torious and vanquished countries aliRe
are after, regardless Of how these may
differ amongst themselves as to meth.
DDS.
The world supremacy Of the private
ownership Of capital, of the means of
production and exchange, the free
play of capitalism-this is the goal Of
the Dawes plan Witness the turn.
ing over Of the German railways to a
group Of capitalists
But an analysis Of the economic has.
Is and proposals Of the Dawes nlan
reveals the tmpossibility of the remov.
al OF these contradictions which have
proved the source of the revolutionary
crisis. We will examine the five most
glaring contradictions and the phases
OF conflict in the much-heralded
scheme to stabilize world capitalism.
Problem Of Payments.
1t is one thing to get reparations
from Germany and another to transfer
these payments to the Allied govern
ments, the spokesmen of the entente
imperialists.
Until the German marks can be con-
verted into foreign currencies. the
creditor capitalists will not have re-
ceived payment. Here the Dawes
plan is careful to point out that the
number Of marks that could be so
converted is to be determined by ex-
perience. The Dawes scheme does
not tell Of the total number of gold
marks Germany can pay 1t only tells
how many gold marks can be collected
In year and then avoids telling how
these marks are to be transferred as
payments to the Allies. 1t is patent
hat the real problem before the
Dawes committee was evaded rather
han solved.
The core Of the whole reparations
question is: In what form of com.
nodities can Germany pay repara-
Ions? In what form can the credi.
ors accept these payments without /,
isrupting their own industries and /,
ne productive and exchange systems
the rest of the capitalist countries?
There are only three ways in which /,
International payments can be made. ;.
'hese are in gold or currency the
ransfer Of securities, and the export =
I commodities.
Icdes- 4l----
worth mentioning as 4 a'medfhhh 6ff pay II
nent. Then the payment in currency {
n marks, is not feasible. To resort v
o the purchase Of sterling or francs I
With marks on large scale as it t
would occur here cannot but depre- i
late seriously German currency G
This means the undoing of the stabil- t
ty of German exchange and industry
which is a vital aim of the whole S
Dawes program.
On the heels of the collapse Of the
German currency would come vic.
ent rise in French and British and
,ther exchange. The effects of this
would be detrimental in may ways. A
urther transfer of marks would be
Useless. But the act of purchasing
marks would bring into the different !,
an increased supply of francs :
" sterling. Soon there would follow
| sharp fall of these currencies. Next /.
n order is a serious arrangement of !
production in these countries because
# the sharp fluctuations in currency :
Here again we have the negation OF !,
he very purpose of the Dawes pro
,ram-the stabilization Of capitalist
production and exchange in Germany
md the victorious creditor countries.
The trnsfer of securities would
,ring about the same effects as the
ransfer of currency except it would
10 at much slower pace. First, it is
rue, the price of German securities
would be enhanced. But in time the
,iling up of interest and dividends on
hese securities being transferred to :
he English and French would tend to
other payments. This would :
ring a collapse Of the currency mar
.ets. On the other hand, If these =
ividends were left to pile up in Ger. :
many, their interest would compound
nd precipitate crash. =
The investment of the Allies in Ger :
nan industries on large scale in or h
er to avoid this trap would lead them \
nto another economic complication of [
he first magnitude. First of all Ger.
nan taxes would effect them. Should
he Germans not tax these invest. +
nents they would cut down on their I
to pay. Then, of course, the e
LANCER of war and the consequent v
ack Of safety of such property must /
lot be overlooked Furthermore, to e
he extent that the reparations marks i
re expended in Germany or invested b
n German industries there is likely \
o be a slowing up of German exports a
"a reduction OF the export surplus, O