The Omaha morning bee., 1924-02-28

but the word itself is a little
|GNEKNI misleading. 1t was not, for
example, the kind Of a rev.
olution Adams horse trader wanted.
1t was a political revolution only, by
which the form of government, but
not that of society or law, was
changed. It necessitated a war. but
IL we think of that war as one for in
dependent national existence OF the
American colonies we shall have a
clearer understanding of its charac-
ter.
That 1t retained that character was
owing to the advanced state of the
political education of the leaders who
conducted 1t. They were not theor-
lists or spectators. The people they
led We're not a mob rising against So
cial oppression. Even their political
oppression was perhaps not clearly
apparent to the common view of the
times. Lord Mansfield told the Brit
ish parliament that the Americans
were not more oppressed than were
the people of Manchester. and in
legal sense he was right; neither
were represented in parliament.
The Americans, when they resisted
the king, were asserting no new
rights such as ''the rights Of man"
about which the French political
Spectators taught their followers to
talk. The Americans had a back
ground of $50 years OF orderly con-
stitutional government. and fought to
keep institutions as old as the French
kingship. Their leaders were neither
political philosophers nor demagogues
such as, in turn, led the French peo-
Pile in revolt, but were solid, prac-
tical, experienced men of public a.
fairs. People and leaders fought TO
assert and preserve principles of Eng
lish law and government that had
been violated by the king-a king.
the English historian Lecky declares.
who had committed acts as unconsti-
tutional as any that had led Charles
to the scaffold.
These are the reasons the American
revolution. considered as such. was
the mildest in history, II we except
the English revolution OF 1889. which
was accomplished by only show of
force. No law and no institution was
subverted: society suffered wrench:
the objective was attained, and no
other was sought. when the govern
ment Of the colonies was transferred
w
Yet there was one lesson in govern
ment the Americans had not yet
learned when the war began. Their
experience with the crown had made
them afraid Of two things-executive
authority and standing armies. Their
institutions worked best. they be-
lieved, when locally administered.
Self government. as interpreted by
the colonies. meant the government
Of each colony by itself and for itself.
The United States OF America referred
to In the Declaration of Independence
were 1s Independent and sovereign
states united only for the purpose Of
defense. and that loosely. They would
not hear ofsa standing army and each
colony relied on its militia. They
were not n nation, and they were
without common executive govern
ment. and until the last year OF the
war they continued their common
defense without one. II they had
central government at all up TO the
time the articles of confederation
went into effect in 1881 1t was Wash
ington and his army rather than the
Continental congress.
As result OF this weakness. the
congressional support of the war was
failure from the first. Congress
could raise no revenue of its own
authority and enlist no force not vol
unfairly furnished by the states. The
Continental army. as organized in
1775. consisted of 10 companies OF
riflemen raised in Virginia, Maryland
and Pennsylvania. New England al
ready was in arms. The most con.
gress could do was TO recommend ito
the inhabitants Of the United States
colonies" that they form companies
of militia for Incorporation into this
force. Commissions were scattered
broadcast; anybody who could raise
company OF SO men could be cap
tain. and anybody who could raise
5000 could be a colonel When Wash
ington took command at Boston he
found the terms Of service Of every
unit in his force would expire within
six months. This defect of the mill
tary system. which was a direct result
Of the defect OF civil power. was
chiefly responsible for the prolonga-
ton OF the war and many Of its mill
tary disasters. Throughout 1875 con-
gress steadily refused to extend any
terms of enlistment beyond 177c
As n result of this policy. against
which Washington protested from the
first. the armies melted almost as
fast as organized. washington's bat
ties were fought for the most part
with small nucleus OF continental
troops and with such reinforcements
OF militia as he could gather on short
notice from the immediate vicinity.
The militia was opposed 10 serving
outside the state in which Il was