Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1924-11-27
BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY FACES
: CRISES IN EGYPTIAN DISPUTE
Policy of Deuolution Broken Do,Un, at Least Tenn.
porarily-Disruption Ouer Vide Area
Threatens.
BY FRANK H. sIMoNDs.

| BY FRANK H. SIMONDs.
| The new Egyptian crisis which is
| filling the foreign dispatches at the
present moment must be viewed from
| two different angles. 1t Is, primarily,
fresh and fearful disclosure of the
situation in Egypt at the moment.
| situation which has been developing
| ever since the World War. Again. 1t
| is one more revelation of the diff
Guilty, II not the impossibilty. of CIV
ing practical application to the Brit
ish policy of devo1ution. q policy
which Is encountering similar OBJ
stacles in India, in the Irak and, for
that matter, In Ireland
| In the crisis Of the war the Brit
| ish took the decisive step OF proclaim
ing a protectorate in Egypt as a de-
! tail in breaking the connection be-
! tween Egypt and Turkey, as Britain
! was at war with the latter country.
| This proclamation of protectorate
| was the eliminating step in the long
series which began with the lombard
ment of Alexandria in 1885 and in
| cluded the campaign to Khartum of
! Kitchener and the famous Fashoda
crisis with France.
Having destroyed the Turkish
shadow of claim upon Egypt by the
war and having also liQuidated
| French claims by surrendering Brit
| ish claims in Morocco. the British
seemed in 1918 at last to have their
| hands free in Egypt, where they had
not alone the great interests incident
| to the economic development of the
/ country in recent years, but also the
vital stake represented by the SueZ
! Canal. one of the main links in the
, chain of communications binding the
| United Kingdom alike with India and
the Far East.
| Encountered Two Tides.
| Unhappily the British encountered
! in Egypt not alone the rising tide of
Nationalism, but also that of Mo-
| hammedan sentiment Almost from
| the start the protectorate proved I'M
workable and the stress of circum-
| stances led the British very quickly
| to renounce IL and to substitute for
| ii system not wholly unlike that
set up by us in Cuba, namely. the be-
stowal of domestic independence
limited by control over foreign rela-
| tons.
! But in making this large conces-
sion to Egypt the British were In no
mind to abandon their own control of
the Egyptian Sudan-that is. the re-
gions OF the Upper Nile, above the
Cataracts, which had been lost to
Egypt in the Mahdi rebellion and
conquered by Anglo Egyptian armies
in Kitchener's famous Khartom cam
paign. While Egypt was a protec-
torate of Britain a condominium was
possible. but once Egypt was free
| and demanded absolute control of
the Sudan the situation changed.
Meantime infinite harm was done to
British prestige and influence in the
Near East by the unsuccessful sup
port Lloyd George gave the Greeks in
the war which terminated with the
expulsion of the Greek armies from
Asia Minor and for a moment threat
ened to involve the British in a war
with Turkey. BY supporting the
Greeks, the British aroused the hos
tility of the whole Mohammedan
world; by yielding to the Turk, they
sacrificed their prestige to fatal
extent.
Egypt Quick to Act.
Egypt, now freed from the protec-
| torate. began campaign to obtain
the Sudan, a campaign which COM
bined violence with ordinary pro-
cedure and led to a number of crises.
Just before Macdonald fell he had
carried on negotiation with Tag
houl Pasha in London and had firmly
repulsed Egyptian demands. The
recent tragedy is one more detail in
the controversy and the murder of
the Sirdar. the commander OF the
| Egyptian forces the latest expression
of the purpose of the Egyptian Ma
tionalists.
AS consequence of this murder
the question now arises whether
Britain will reverse her policy of
devolution and retire in large meas
ure from Egypt. only keeping such
foothold as might insure the pro-
lection of the Suez Canal and the pos
session of the Sudan, or continue in
a pathway which has SO far failed
to bring about any satisfactory ad-
justment. Indeed. the question is
raised whether there Is any COM
promise between policy OF absolute
control and one of complete evacua-
ton. Moreover, the Egyptian problem
differs only immeasurably from the
much larger Indian question. In
both cases the British have sought to
bestow upon the natives a varying
measure Of political independence.
But in both cases the concessions
actually made have resulted rather In
| a stimulation of the desire for COM
plete freedom and absolute control
of their own affairs than any better
relations with the British or any
even momentary allaying of bitter
ness.
Force May Cow Egyptians.
The show of force and firmness
which has marked the first moves Of
the new Tory government may have
their effect and the Egyptians may
be cowed. But it is at least just as
possible that they may provoke an
explosion and an explosion might
easily make necessary the dispatch
of a large army and something like
the reconquest of Egypt. Nor would
the trouble be confined to Egypt, be-
cause the question of religion might
lead to an extension Of the trouble
to Palestine and Mesopotamia, while
beyond there is always India.
Actually then British imperial at
fairs have reached a real crisis. AT
least temporarily a policy of devolu-
ton has broken down and British
concessions have brought not better
feeling but worse. not contentment
but multiplied demands. The double
pressure of nationalism and Mo-
hammedanism have threatened the
disruption of all the British estab-
Iishments between Suez and Singa-
pore. The belief has grown in and
out of Britain that as result Of the
exhaustion of the war the British
people were unwilling to fight to re-
tain their colonies or protectorates
and this conviction has spurred the
| EorptianS, the Arabs and the In