The Minnesota fiery cross. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1924-19??, 1924-03-07

port, and the attempt to suppress all
private schools in Oregon.
This noisy and pestiferous crew,
however, do not represent either the
great body of the Khan or it's nation
al leadership. They are apparently
tolerated, as such are always tolerat-
ed in new political movements, for
the sake of their votes. 1t was their
presence in the Progressive party, /
believe, which led Roosevelt to coin
the label "lunatic fringe" Certain
ly hoboes as we'll.
In fact, there are many other ways
in which the ku niux Khan move
ment resembles the Progressive par
ty. 1t contains about the same basic
elements of partly dissatisfied and
partly idealistic middle class folks,
as we'll as the same fringes. Its
gatherings give the same appear
ance and feeling. 1t is strong in about
the same parts of the country, and
it sings Onward Christian Soldiers
just as indefatigably as the Bull
Moosers did. 1t has much of the
same naive, inexperienced, youthful
vigor.
All these conditions in the mem
bership limit not only the pro-
gramme of the Khan in politics, but
also the demands it may make on
candidates, bosses or men in office
Its political record so far shows that
it has very largely respected these
limits. 1t can seldom nominate it's
own man, for example, as that would
aid one party or the other. 1t can
not pick the men whom it is going
to support on any party basis, but
only on the basis of their ability and
willingness to support the Khan pro-
gramme, and their general fitness.
The church-going quality of most
Klansmen makes personal character
unusually important for candidates
in Khan territory, and is likely to
enforce more than usually decent ad-
ministration from officials. 1t also
gives the Khan political morality
rather above the average, which is
no very great praise. There are
cases, of course, as in other similar
movements, when very decent citi-
zens overlook all other qualifications
in a candidate except his support of
their pet ideas. This has caused
some curious situations, like those in
the Anti-Saloon League campaigns
where the churches have united be-
hind men who were complete scala
wags except for their willingness to
vote for prohibition.
The Khan very naturally will sup
port Klansmen where possible, but
it has often refused to do this and
has even voted for non-Klansmen Tin
at least one case for anti-Klan mani
when it thought them better, even
against Klan members. But / have
learned of no case where it gave
support to a man who was not ma
tive, white, Protestant. 1t takes
pains to see that there is at least
one such in every race.
When the Khan does move in poll
tics, that is when it takes hand in
the selection or election of candi-
dates or influencing officials, it
brings to bear a pressure such as al
most no other organization, even one
Of the great parties, can apply. All
its organized unity, all its ability to
strike suddenly and in the dark, all
its secret information and it's ter
rorism, are more effective here than
in ordinary life, for politicians are
by nature a very timid tribe. The
Khan, too, can use not only this stun
ming political battle ak; it can add
to that the whole social and econ
omic power described in the last
article. Political bosses, 1t is true,
often use similar additional means
of coercing candidates and officials,
but few are ever able to do 1t with a
tithe Of the force, and none Of them
with the demoralizing terrorism that
the Khan commands.
In politics, as In boycotting, the
Khan claims no actual control over
It's members. II does not officially
tell them how to vote, any more
than II tells them TO withhold trade
from business man. 1t merely gives
them information, sometimes advice,
and they are "free to act upon Il as
they see fit" II also "educates" them
as to the desirability of acting on
this information and advice.
| asked DIR, Evans how far the