Evening star., 1924-07-04
The forthcoming Con-
ference of Premiers
and the u. S.
BY FRANK HI, SIMONDS.


domestic political circumstances. the
decision of the Coolidge administra-
ton to be represented officially at
the forthcoming conference of allied
premiers is an event of first impor-
tance for Europe, 1t may even supply
just the added weight necessary to
bring about ultimate German ac
ceptance of the Dawes report.
Moreover, this large result will flow
rather from our presence than from
anything that Am mbassador Kellogg
may say or do.
Actually our going to the London
conference enormously fortifies the
case for the German cabinet, which
mas been fighting desperately with it's
nationallstic opponents for the use
basis Of discussion. German necessity
Is obvious; while the currency situa-
tlon has been momentarily stabilized
about the rentemark, the equilibrium
ls highly unstable. To get the wheels
OF industry and commerce going
again, Germany must have a foreign
loan and have it soon. She can get
| 1T only from Britain and America.
PROVISION for such loan is therefore
| Tor Berlin the most attractive feature
OF the Dawes plan.
Manifestly, IL the loan could be had
| without adoption Of the Dawes plan,
Stresemann would have little real
| chance to defeat the Nationalists. But
with Britain and France again in
substantial agreement and with the
United States giving clear evidence
o. Its approval Of the plan, both Of
fcially' and Vnofficially, the solid
truth for the Germans is that there is
no money to be had while the Dawes
plan Is not adopted and put into
operation.
The moral effect of the decision to
be represented in London must then
be very considerable and have most
weight with the Industrial magnates
of Germany. whose decision must, in
| the end, settle the matter, for if they
refuse to support Nationalistic OBJ
structon, then this obstruction can
not endure; Already the American
| been emphasized by Stresemann and
| others. Now their words have strik-
| ing American confirmation.
meantime the victory of Herriot in
quent actions, notably his declaration
OF a readiness to evacuate the Ruhr
when Germany actually complies with
the provisions of the Dawes report
ana not when she has made payments,
as Po1ncare had intended, and his fur.
ther consent to the amnesty and re-
patriation of the Ruhr exiles. has de-
prtved the Nationalists of their he ct
grievances and their best arguments.
ana at the same time, met the most
Britain. "
For the first time since the making
or the treaty Of Versailles there has
oeen something like teamwork he
tha t%een me liberal, or more exactly
| ana the allied governments. Both
Herriot and Macdonald. by their
words and by thier deeds, have sun
pIed sound arguments for the Ger
man moderates and for the Strese-
mann Marx cabinet, with which e.
| meet the arguments and demands Of
tne 1unkers. of the Ludendorfr-Tir-
pitA-Hltier group. Now, at last. the
Ierman moderates have an alterna.
tive 10 present their public
| slowly, very slowly, but very sure-
iy there is taking place a new an
proach Of the allied countries and
puolcs to common ideas and common
action. And this agreement no long
er takes the form or has the ap-
pearance of military or political
founded upon the ideas of the
Dawes plan itself, which is the first
|
| war history.
A rapprochement between Britain
and France has actually taken place.
"A limited but significant evidence of
| willingness to participate in Euro
pean adjustments-econo not po-
litical lis disclosed in our consent to
| sit at London And in the imme-
| the possibility Of something like a
repprochement between allied and
German governments and interests.
| 1t still lies within the realm of pos
| sibility, at least; that the German Ma
tionalists will be able to upset the
| most promising effort at reconstruc-
ton since the close of the war. The
situation. while hopeful. remains
filled with dangers But what does
seem unlikely is that any German
maneuver can again divide the
allies and separate America from her
wartime partners, for all are now
| united on the platform of the Dawes
plan. For the first time the allies
don confe renee, meet Germany with a
plan prepared and with common
accord on that plan.
~ \
Germany can get money, the evac-
uation OF the Ruhr, admission to the
league of nations and a place on the
council with little delay. if she ac-
cepts the Dawes plan, but she can
get nothing otherwise, either in Lon
don or in New York, and she cannot
hope to enlist any British or Ameri-
can aid or sympathy in the matter of
the Ruhr occupation IL she declines
to take the easy and. indeed, the sim
gle path leading to the liberation of
her Rhine regions.
If you stop and think, you will re-
call that hitherto France and Britain
have never been able to carry COM
mon purposes to or from any con-
ference since 1919. Each meeting has
and purposes. And the result has
been deadlock. Germany has been
faced with vague and conflicting de-
mands, because London and Paris
were in complete disagreement. All
this is over now, at least for the
moment. If Germany declines to ac-
cept what is now ASKED of her, Lon
don will not blame Paris nor Paris
London, and the United States will
not attribute European chaos to in
terallied jealousies. Germany will
stand forth again before the world as
the real menace to peace, the single
obstacle to adjustment, the RESPONSE
bility will be here and her isolation
will be very complete.
Thus Americas consent to 20 to
London, while 1t really carries little
or no responsibility and requires
practically no action, constitutes a
moral contribution of inestimable
value at the present critical moment.
| 1t may just turn the trick.
Copyright, 1924
Dian nRopo1 +o So1~o