Evening star., 1924-11-30
BIZ FRANK Ii. SIMONDS.

va protocol and thus to adjourn the
proposed disarmament conference.
does not represent any purpose on
the part of the new British govern
ment to scrap this protocol, the fact
nevt rtheless remains that the whole
work of the recent Geneva session is
placed in jeopardy and the uncondi-
tional chances of ratification of the
protocol itself by Great Britain be-
come slight.
The truth is that the lates of the
various efforts to meet the situation
of the world and to find a method Of
guaranteeing peace has broken down
at the precise point which has seen
the collapse of all other similar at
temptS, namely, at the point where
provision Is made for some form of
international action against any ma
tion which Is the victim of an un-
provoked aggression.
Five years ago the United States
Senate was involved in the great bat
tie over the covenant of the League
of Nations, which was the single cir
cumstance in the treaty of Versailles
which excited American attention. In
that struggle the American ratifica-
ton of the treaty of Versailles was
ultimately denied, because the late
President Wilson refused to accept
reservations the net effect of which
States from any commitment to con-
tribute by arms or otherwise to the
maintenance of peace in the world
through the League of Nations.
viewed n. League OF Victors.
IN this initial phase OF the league
discussion the European nations con-
cerned did not take the league with
any degree OF seriousness. France.
for example, insisted upon separate
guarantee of Britain and the United
States as an insurance Of her own
security. Moreover, the continental
view Of the league at that moment
was that 1t had value solely as 1t
represented an alliance of the victors
of the recent struggle to guarantee
the results Of the victory.
The British view, as contrasted
with the continental. had been of an
Anglo American alliance, only nomi-
nally based upon the league, an al
lance which. operating through the
league, would enable these two
powers. by their superior strength
the continental nations that concep-
tion Of European reorganization
which might be called Anglo-Saxon
for want of a better definition. The
British idea was frankly that
America and England would be able
to restrain their recent allies from
militaristic policies while giving
them measurable protection in return.
The rejection OF the treaty by the
United States totally transformed the
whole British attitude toward the
league, since the chief attraction of
the league for Great Britain had
been its opportunity for association
with the United States. Once the
United States had withdrawn, the
r-fLI -
of the United States. which had been
that Of Britain in all the past.
namely, the avoidance of specific
foreign commitments. From that
moment to the present hour the
various British governments have all
evaded any specific commitment to
guarantee European peace, either by
direct contract with nations, such as
France and Belgium, or by indirect
guarantees through the medium of
the league.
Guarantee Unlikely Now.
At the close Of five years we have
reached a point where It is no longer
even conceivable that the British
government would undertake a d.
rect guarantee of the security of
France. such as was proposed in the
Paris treaty of insurance binding
France The Macdonald ministry,
which has just gone out of power,
made clear at Geneva that the maxi |
mum of possible British commitment
was a. pledge to take action in case
tho league itself witnessed an act of
aggression a on the part of any nation |
whatsoever. Yet it is precisely this |
commitment, implicit in the protocol,
which Is now to be held in allegiance
by the British request
Despite the fact, however, that in
both the United States and Great
Britain there has been the wholly
similar retreat from foreign entang-
1ements and guarantees, there has
been in both countries continued
agitation for disarmament. Both
countries have. in fact, demobilized
their own armies and reduced their
establishments to insignificant pro-
portions and they have. at the same
time. through the Washington con-
ference and in agreement with Japan,
France and Italy. limited their own
naval strength. At the same time they
have continued to agitate for the re-
ductlon Of European ornaments
In this agitation they have substan-
TALLY failed at all times because they
have been faced by a continental de-
mand that reduction of ornaments
q
that this reduction should not have
as it's consequence exposing the ma
tions which had reduced their armies
to an aggression. France, as the
spokesman for the continent, has
steadily maintained that the question
Of security must proceed that of disar-
mament and that the reduction of
armed forces must itself be condi-
tional upon the extent to which some
outside aid is assured to the nation
thus limiting its own resources of
defenses.
Separate Pacts Arranged
In addition, the continental nations,
while declining to reduce their ar
mics in conformity with American
and British notions, have made be-
tween themselves a number Of sepa-
rate contracts, ali defensive, which
have the effect of binding the part
ners to come to each others aid in
case Of attack. These agreements
have not been secret, they have been
made IN the open, but they constitute
alliances and in reality alliances
against certain nations, notably Ger
many and Russia, since these are the
countries which N nenace the future of
the contracting parties.
On. the whole, accepting various
limitations, British policy has been
based upon the assucption that two of
the main, obstacles to the preservation
of European peace were large stand
ing armies and special alliances.
Thus London has sought steadily to
avoid any entangling alliance on Its
own part and at the same time pre-
vent the formation of such alliances
by other countries. And it has con-
'comitantly striven to bring about