Evening star., 1924-03-23
CHAPTER XVIII.

CHAPIER xviii.
When Politics Wasn't "AdjOurned."
What Influenced Nr. Wilson to Is
sue His Appeal for n Democratic
Congress i'm 19IS-His Troubles
With the European Politicians Mt
the Peace Table.
Outwardly politics was adjourned"
10 use Mr.. Wilson's own words. dur
ing the period beginning with the
declaration of war April Z, 1917, and
the armistice November II. 1918. but
the atmosphere inside Washington
was hardly less partisan than in
peace times. The country as whole
knew very little of the partisan war
1are going on at the National Capt.
1aI. Whether the course of the Presl-
don't provoked his opponents to dis
play of partisanship or whether they,
on the other hand, were unable to
permit 4 democratic President to
carry the 1aurels of a war in which
, r. publicanS as we'll as democrats
We're fighting. it is unnecessary and
futile to discuss. The fact remains
that Woodrow Wilson was conscious
Gf the partisanship on Capitol Hll
To furnish him with war cabinet.
lie was convinced that this was not
q constructive but a destructive move.
His theory was that most OF the plS
interests which had been selling ma
7crials to the allies before the tnlted
states entered the war sought
means of safeguarding their business
Ivy getting their own personnel into
governmental bureaus.
There never was any real lnten-
lion on MIR. Wilson'S part to ignore
The business interests of the country
hut in the prosecution OF the War ne
had two fundamental IDEAS ohe MaS
What men who had been the MAJ !
stay of the American Army kne"
more than civilians did about mill
larry matters while the practcal men
IN the United States Navy knew NOR {
than any outsiders about the como W. =
Of the fleet. President wilson gave d
free hand to Gen. Persnlns. he ne To
rebuked him or withheld support 10
the credit of Newton II. Baker ser
rary of War. may it also be salu M ma
lc backed UP Gen. PerShlnS on every
side.
Break i'm Advisory Bodies.
Ert the war was not merely a
u struggle of materials. Here MT.
Wilson floundered about expecting
ihe business interests OF the couh-
Try themselves to render the sup
mort to the officially accredited oooS
known as the council of national ae-
tense. In these advisory podles'
strangely enough. the first preakdo"h
occurred The business men coulo
hardly he blamed. They encountered
IN Washington n mesh of red tape
and antiquated regulations. Many OF
them accepted positions in the Army
and Navy only to find the question OF
liocipIine and rank 50 yeNatlous that
II stifled business initiative ana re-
pressed enterpr Use.
President Wilson's Shrewd maneuVer
in answering the cries Tor Il Wal
cabinet by demanding OF congress
the legal power to consolidate bureaus
and cut red tape right and lett was
one of the most important FACTORS IN
the efficient mobilization OF America 5
-asourceS The selection of Bernard
n Ba.ruch OF New York to be chair
man of the war industries board
marked the beginning OF an era OF
true CO. coordination. Vance Mccormlck
was put in charge of the war TRADE
hoard which dealt with the embargo
and administration OF the trading
with-thc- enemy act. DR.. Harry n.
Garfield u former colleague of Presi-
cent Wilson at Princeton, was placed
in charge of the fuel adminiStra ton.
Herbert Hoover won his place as food
administrator because of the Splen-
did work he had done on the Amer
5can Commission for the Relief of
belgium.
Wanted No Coalition Cabinet.
A. - 1ooI.. ox-o- tho lief pf rnan
whom Mr.. Wilson put into positions
OF responsibility during the war
there is no escaping the impression
that he followed not the rule of
marty, but the rule of personal trust
and personal loyalty. Early in the
conflict there was talk of coalition
cabinet similar to that which had
been established in Great Britain and
in other parliamentary governments
abroad. But Mr. Wilson would not
listen to it He said that coalition
cabinets meant constant wrangling
hnd political friction.
Throughout the government, how
ever, many republicans were appoint
I'd to positions of Importance and in
- general way no distinction as to
party was made. The Presidents
conception of his own responsibility
led him to select only those whom he
knew personally. With him loyalty
counted for more than a reputed
executive ability. Mr.. Wilson always
had a suspicion of the expert per Sc.
THE super efficient business man who
might be proposed as the most ca
pable man to administer a certain
job might be all that was claimed,
but Woodrow Wilson was a type Of
man who did not like to be disturbed
by thoughts that men in whom he
had reposed large powers might not
be loyal to him. And by loyal to him
was meant simply a, Willingness to
carry out the ideals and policies in
public Office which President Wilson
had set as his standard.
1t is interesting to note, however,
hat the President did not permit
this line of reasoning to interfere in
any way with the actual administra-
ton of the military or naval estab-
lishment. He did not dictate appoint
. snents 10 the general staff nor did he
question the activities of the naval
command. To him the uniform was
sacred and nobody in it could be 9TH
er than loyal to the best interests of
the government irrespective of party.
Men like Gen. Enoch Crowder, who
Lad administered the selective draft
act, and Gen. Peyton March, who was