Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1924-08-30

NuCStlOll VI iIlultlS llOW CQuuI1y II
earning capacity can be secured be-
This problem, he added, arose
primarily from conditions resulting
! from the World War and foremost
| among the causes responsible, he
declared, was unregulated produc-
| ton. Figures were cited to show
the increase in acreage over pre-
war years, attention was called to
| the increase in taxes, the possibili-
ties of extension of farming was dis
| cussed and then Mr.. Dawes launch
I ed into an explanation of the
! agricultural farm aid plan.
The mere fact that it is now
| possible to consider this question
when the industry is not in the
trough of depression, as it was sixty
! days ago, has it's great advantages"
| stacles to the gaining of perspective
| which immersion in immediate crisis
| always involves. In fact, there
never was a better opportunity
presented for the proper considera-
| ton of constructive measures
relative to an industry that exists
| at present, when a terrible expert
ence, with its lessons, is so recent
| and the demonstration of the ulti-
| mate effects of economic law is at
the same time before our eyes.
1T is, however. one of the funda-
mental characteristics of human ma
ture to be much more concerned
with getting out of trouble, than,
when once out of it, to keep from
getting in again.
This we must guard against or the
opportunity NAV be lost.
''Thn nocition outlined h1y Tho
ponents of agricultural relief is
evidence that they regard properly
the protective tariff and restricted
immigration more as moral justi-
fication of the demands for agri-
cultural relief than as the cause of
the recent depression.
This is natural. for in the ten
year pre-war period. the surplus OF
the farmers products as at present,
was sold in the world market and
he bought in a protected market.
Our policy of protection in no
way eliminates the operation of the
law of supply and demand within
our own borders. but simply limits
supply from abroad below a certain
price level determined by the import
duty.
THAT the protective tariff was
somewhat lower then than that now
in existence was because it was suf
| flcient to give labor and manufactur-
ing their American market. AT
that time, (before the war;, the
/ manufacturing costs of production
in Germany had not been lessened
by the decrease in the wages OF
labor there, caused by the degrade
ton of the mark. Initiation in other
European currencies had not then
in Europe. The lower tariff then
prevented ruinous foreign COMPETE
| ton as the Fordney tariff does now.
CAS- to restricted immigration,
considering the two periods of be-
| fore the war and since the war, the
difference in the number of immi-
grants is not yet such as to be d real
factor in the difference in labor
costs. Other reasons have operated
| there. including the proper organiza-
ton of labor for it's own protection.
Fair consideration of all ele-
ments in the situation leads on to
| the conclusion that the great under
lying cause for the recent de-
preston in agriculture has been the
conditions resulting from the world
war.
1.-THE recent situation in American
| industry considered by itself, is
somewhat analogous to the European
| situation in industrNkXt the incep-
| ton of the work of the expert COM
! mittee on reparations. So great was
the necessity for the settlement with
Europe facing the abyss that almost
any plan upon which the expert
committee could have unanimously
agreed might have been temporarily
accepted for It then compelled
Europe for the first time, to think
| in alternatives
Even an unavoidable plan. adopt
! ed unanimously. at least might have
| provided the basis of a temporary
| economic peace. But If, Influenced
! by nationalistic or political con-
| siderationa, there had been drawn
| an unavoidable plan, because that
! was the easiest-because upon its
! basis the nationalistic demagogues
| of the different countries would have
been placated--the peace upon which
Europe is about to enter would have
| been temporary, and the chaos which
J would have come as a result of the
inevitable failure of such a plan
| probably would have marked the be-
| ginning of new dark age for that
, continent and it's civilization.
| The worst calamity that could
iidpptil " dRFlEuILuTp at
| this time is the adoption o" IAN I'M
workable plan.
1.-The difference between an
economic and an unwise political
settlement of what is to be done for
American agriculture. through new
| legislation. us the difference between
success and failure. There must be
most careful consideration of the
application of economic principles,
and also close calculation of the
probable effectiveness of any pro-
posed remedy.
THE immediate political ext
| gencies Of the great political parties
in this campaign would be settled IL
they could make the American agri-
culturalists believe in the fuifillment
of an unfulfillable promise. But
this must not be made a matter of
political exigency 1t must be con-
sidered without prejudice and from
every standpoint.
after two years of discussion
upon this subject, as extensive as
] was ever devoted In the United