The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1924-09-20


believe, because of the Payne-Aldrich
tariff law. OF course it will be said
that splitting of the party and can
didacy Of Theodore Roosevelt caused
defeat of President Taft. But back
of this was a great popular awaken
ing and certainly nothing contributed
so much to this awakening as blind
greed Of Republican party's mas
tiers in forcing the Payne-Aldrich law
through Congress.
The Republican party is going out
of power again this fall. after a
brief four-year term, because Of that
same blind greed, as revealed in an
other tariff law-the Fordney-Mc-
Cumber act.
Between these two enactments
there was another. the Underwood
tariff law, passed by a Democratic
Congress. I voted for it. Although
a Democratic measure it affords pro
lection, in the main, equivalent
to the difference in cost of produc-
ton at home and abroad. The Demo
Gratis abandoned their old theory of
a tariff for revenue only.
In fact, the Underwood bill con
tanned the essential element Of pro
lection. Effect of the Underwood
act was TO lower a vast number Of
tariff rates to a point within reason
and so TO remove excuse for exces-
sive prices on a vast number OF
American manufactured articles.
From standpoint of the average
American citizen, it was a distinct
Improvement over the iniquitous
Payne-AIdrich law.
Tariff Board
In doing my work upon the Under
wood tariff bill, as member of the
Senate finance committee. INhad the
benefit Of one concession wrung
from the standat parents Of the
Payne-Aldrich act. Night after
night, sometimes all night. while the
Payne-AIdrich bill was pending in
the Senate, the progressives sought
TO incorporate in that bad bill a pro-
vision for the creation of tariff
board. I had a separate bill for this
purpose. Finally we obtained, in a
five line amendment to the tariff
bill. authority for the creation Of
such a board by the President.
President Taft surprised the
authors of the bill by appointing a
first-class board, headed by Profess
sor Emery of Yale. The work per-
formed by this board and the experts
employed by it, during its all-too-
brief life. enabled students Of the
tariff TO approach their task from
something like a scientific basis.
But this tariff board died early in
the Democratic administration.
Funds to pay salaries were withheld
and it ceased to function. The ma
jority members. Democrats, OF the
finance committee. working on the
Underwood bill. obtained assistance
of old-time Treasury experts. So
did the minority, Republicans. who
were defending the Payne-Aldrich
schedules. I was in the not unusual
situation Of being neither OF the
majority nor the minority, so
asked for Sn expert myself William
Culbertson. later appointed TO the
present tariff commission and one
-
was assigned TO help me.
1t is hardly conceivable any group
Of party managers could have for
gotten the lesson given the Republic
ans following the enactment Of the
Payne-Aldrich law, but 1922 found
the Republican majority engaged in
passing the Fordney- McCumber bill.
Z in many respects an even worse
measure. II must be assumed that
they totally misinterpreted the land
slide which had swept them back
r into power in 1920. What they
should have seen was that the peo-
pie, being capable Of changing d
minority into a. 5000 majority in
four years, were quite capable Of
changing it back again in another
four years. Indeed the people didn t
wait four years in this instance;
they started sending standpat Sena-
tors and congressman home to stay
in the fall Of 1922.
And. indicative Of growing politi-
cal discernment. the people in this
1922 fall election did not swing the
political pendulum clear over TO the
other party. They began picking
their representative in Congress on
their individual measurements as
men and on the principles for which
they stood. The revolt of 1922 was
not blind revolt. 2
B.HdgeOned Through
But the interests behind the pres
ent tariff law bludgeoned it through.
1 know. as matter of fact, that the
party leaders did realize that, bar
ring a miracle, it would mean the
defeat Of the party in 1924 and the
end of the political lives of the men
responsible for the bill. What were
the interests SO powerful. then. that
they could compel the Republican
partys leaders to carry through
such a course? The answer should
be revealed by showing who has ben
Gifted b ythe Fordney-M cCumber
law
The steel trust, after one year of
operation under this tariff law,
showed, by it's own reports, $75,370.-
043 available as net profits for divi-
dends, after deducting estimated
taxes. including Federal income tax.
The corresponding net profits for the
previous year were S.4246S6. Earn
ings of the Bethlehem Steel Company
were increased $50 per cent per share
on common stock in 1923 and the
United States Steel Corporation
about the same.
The Dupont company earned Ss.43
per share Of common stock in 1922
and in 1928 increased this to $17.OS.
General Motors increased its earn
ings on common stock about rs per