The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1924-05-05
REPORT SHOWS
WEAKNESS Of
NAVY
U. S. Fleet Now Utterly Use-
less for Modern Conflict,
Says Admiral FuIlann
BY w. j. FULLAM,
Rear Admiral. U. 3. Navy. retired.
Copyright. 1924. by Cosmopolitan

L
In the Carribeen Sea, declares that
our submarine force is a complete
failure; that the naval air forces
are totally inadequate; that we are
sadly deficient in cruisers and
flotilla leaders; that our anti-air-
craft batteries are insufficient; that
we have too few mines OF modern
type; that several Of our coal burn
Ing battleships are in bad condi-
ton and should be Immediately
converted to oil burners; that our
single make-shift air.plane carrier,
though worked to the limit Of its
capacity, il pitifully weak; and to
cap the climax Of our complete I'M
readiness for modern war upon the
sea, tho indispensable auxiliartes Of
the fleet are so lamentably slow In
speed that they could not keep up
with the fleet. which was for this
reason compelled to cruise at
snails pace-ten knots an hour!
A more vivid and complete pic.
ture OF naval helplessness, six years
after the armistice, could not be
painted.
Picture Is Not New.
And yet in this lurid and graphic
account Of our pathetic weakness on
the sea--Our almost total lack Of
modern naval weapons-there is
nothing new, nothing whatever. 1t
Is plain statement Of facts that
have been perfectly well known to
wide awake naval officers since the
armiStice In 1913. Any intelligent
layman who has read Of the record
Of submarines in the world war,
and who occasionally notes the
astounding development in air navi-
cation as to its practical application
to war on land and sea, can readily
understand that air forces above and
submarine forces beneath our sur
face fleet, working in cooperation
with each other and with the ships
on the surface are vital to the sue
cess OF our navy in modern war.
And any naval officer who cannot
see this Is not only professionally
deaf and dumb-he 10 hopelessly
blind.
| And it logically follows from this
statement that there Is nothing
sensational in the commander-in-
chiefs report except perhaps in the
pleasing and quite unexpected fact
that an admiral Of high rank and
In active official position in the
navy should have suddenly emerged
| from the depths Of the dense con-
eervatism and obstinacy that have
ruled our naval policies during the
past six years. and thus have
tardily opened the window Of our
naval dungeon to the light Of a
modern naval era.
A brief retrospect Is necessary to
prove, incontestably, that there is
nothing new or startling in the re-
port nor in the recent pronounce
ments Of naval experts" concern
Ing the deficiencies Of our fleet.
In the fall of 1919 and con-
tinuously during the year 1920 the
writer called attention to the need
of "three plane navy"--a surface
fleet, with strong air forces above
and powerful submarines beneath
il. In February, 1891, in the ex-
piring days of the Wilson admin
lstration, the writer was summoned
before the Naval Committee of the
Senate where all these arguments
were plainly stated, and supported
by facts that were logically incon-
testable. Admiral Fiske and Ad-
miral Sims made the same general
statement before the committee Of
the House of Representatives-all
this before the present Administra-
tino came into power.
Arguments Ignored,
But the Navy Department and
the General Board ignored these
arguments. The Naval committee
turned them down. The Chief of
Naval Operations-the present Com
manderin- Chief--following the De.
partments policy struck six mod
ern submarines from the Naval Bill
to get money for one lone Air
Plane carrier! This was robbing
Peter to pay Paul. 1t was a naval
tragedy! We needed both. We got
neither.
The navy suffered other tortures.
The advocates of air power sought
to prove the importance of this new
weapon. They were opposed and
derided when they proposed to bomb
the German ships. Naval officers
and the Department pooh-poohed
the idea. Secretary of the Navy,
Daniels. illustrating the bold and
audacious" attitude that character
lied his war activities declared con-
ltemptuously that he would be will
ing to take command of the "Ost-
/ fr.asland" and let General Mitchell
bomb the ship to his hearts con-
tent! The subsequent fate of the
Ostfriesland when she was attacked
is well-known.
Once more let us repeat there is
nothing new, nothing startling, moth
ing sensational in the report from
the fleet nor in recent statements
of naval experts" a four-year-old
song has been pulled from the 1lsty
pile Of naval records" and placed
on the monograph. That Is oil!
Let us hope that those who refused
to listen to it in 1920 and 1921 may
take the cotton out Of their ears
In 1924! If they do tho navy will
survive.
Remedy Is Simple.
The remedy Is perfectly simple.
II is the same in 1924 that it was
in 1918, 1919, 1920, and in 1921.
The prescription written in every
one Of those years Is in all respects
suitable today--modernize the navy!
Supply new weapons. Build fifty
new submarines. Complete Our two
airplane carriers at once, and build
more Of them. Supply the fleet With
a dominating air force Convert all
our battleships to oil burners.
The available money must he
wisely spent. II we fool away
money on turret guns we, may not
get the money necessary fol- a cloud
of airplanes to command the air,
4 And II we lose command OF the air
our fleet is defeated-guns or M