Evening star., 1924-03-18

much stretch of the imagination to
understand how distressing might
allies if the United States had been
eliminated from Germany's thoughts
so far as submarine operations were
concerned, and if the German navy
had been turned loose to sink With
out trace everything in sight.
Command of Sea Essential.
Could the United States have trans
ported an army of 100000 men to
Europe if the British navy had not
secured command of the seas? And
would the British navy have achieved
such mastery of the submarines If
those two years had not been vouclf
safed them in which to develop means
OF defense against the submarine?
The military tactician and the naval
strategist will have to answer those
questions dispassionately, but any one
who knew the truth about submarine
;; warfare during 1916 must admit that
that had the Germans started Il year
carrier on unrestricted submarine
warfare the whole course of events
might have been changed, or at least
United States would not have been
able so quickly to transport its forces
to Europe. So the Wilson policy did
/ have the effect of postponing the Ger
mans submarine warfare campaign
until past the time when it could win
the war
Looking back over the neutrality
period which preceded the entry of
the United States into the war. the
whole may be divided into three dis
tinct epochs:
First, there was the time when Mr.
| Wilson believed the war would come
a n nd
a careful balancing of diplomatic
notes against Germany on the one
hand and the allies on the other hand
the legal record of neutrality might
be scrupulously kept.
The second stage dates from the
sinking of the Lusitania and continues
through several months during which
sharp toned notes were exchanged
with Germany with reference to sub
marine warfare.
The third. the last period. was that
in which the United States hoped
against hope that Americas entry
preparations were made by both the
Army and Navy for the inevitable.
An Inventory for War.
1t was early in 1916 when Mr. Will
son realized that if he were to con-
tinue to threaten Germany effectively
he must make some signs of war
pre- eparation. He called upon the Sec
retary of the Navy and the Secretary
of War to ta.:e inventory of the state
of the American fighting resources
and Congress passed law creating
Council of National Defense. To Col.
Rooseve1tS way of thinking, not
enough preparation had been made;
but when war did break it was ap-
parent thai all the suggestions made.
including those of Mr.. Roosevelt for
an Army twice or three times the size
of the then existing forces. was only d
drop in the bucket compared to the
huge forces needed to wage the battle
in Europe. Among the opponents of
Mr.. Wilson who were far-sighted and
wanted him to prepare for war. not a
single plan suggested provided for an
Army of even one-twentieth the size
of that which was finally mobilized
by the United States.
The first epoch in the neutrality
ended with the resignation OF Sec
retary Bryan. Up to that time Mr..
Wilson had given the impression that
prepa ra tions for war on the part OF
the United States would be mIscon-
Strued abroad as an intention on the
part of the United States to engage
in the conflict, whereas the best as
surance of continued neutrality was
the introduction of no unusual items
in the military or naval budget. The
so-called pacifiSt element was pleased
with Mr.. Wilson's statements made in
December 1914. The commitments. =.
made by the President in that direc-
ton kept William jennings Bryan in
the cabinet as a warm supporter of
Mr.. Wilson's foreign policy.
War Spirit Kfndled.
The sinking of the Lustania in
May. 1915, began to work a change
in the Presidents mind. He knew
that the war spirit had not yet been
kindled in the United States and he
was confirmed in that feeling by
newspapers large and small from
coast to coast. 1t is a singular thing
that while a few people on the east
ern seaboard were clamoring for war.
a careful examination of the edito-
rials showed that out of 1000 com
piled by telegraph in the three days
after the Lusitania was sunk less
than one-half dozen indicated be-
lief that war should be declared.
Opinion was also unanimous that the
situation called for diplomacy and an
effective expression of American feel
ing. with the hint, of course, that if
satisfaction could not be secured the
American people would be behind the
President in whatever course he
should formulate.
Reading the letters of Ambassador
Page in London on the reaction of
European opinion to President Will
sons underwriting. one is convinced
that the true state Of mind on this
side of the Atlantic was not accu-
rately portrayed to those on the other
side of the vast ocean-for America
was not yet ready to go to war in
May. 1915.
During that month of May, how
ever, there developed in Woodrow
Wilson a feeling that moral force
upon which he had been relying
might some day be exhausted and
that in it's place there might have to
be substituted the use of physical
force.
Copyright 1924. by the George H. Doran
Company in the United States Canada. South
America World publication rights reserved
by Current News Features. Incorporated.)
(TomOrrow's chapter will tell why
Bryan resigned rs Secretary of State.)