Evening star., 1924-07-11
MEDICAL SERVICE
BETTERMENT |SA|M|
Lessons Cleaned From War
Compiled in Britain-AH.
Powers to Benefit.
DEFECTS POINTED OUT
Editors Deal Frankly With Short
oomings Developed in
Army.
DEFECTS POINTED OUT
By the Associated Press

6y the Associated Press
LONDON, July 11.-Lessons from
sins of omission and otherwise in the
medical services during the war, have
been compiled into an eleven volume
edition of the Official Medical History
of the Great War, recently issued
They should furnish the basis for the
reorganization of the medical staffs
of the forces of the great powers on
level with modern science, say the
editors of this volumnous work.
The books deal frankly with the
tactical and strategical errors of the
medical service in the war, notably
in areas typical of middle eastern
conditions. No attempt has been
made to gloss these errors The lack
of cooperation between the comba t.
ant and medical staffs is frequently
noted, and it is in this that the edi-
tors find the greatest lesson.
Closer Unison Needed.
Although in some respects faulty
administration was factor in the
breakdown of the medical services in
the DardanelleS, Mesopotamia and
East Africa, the chief lesson to be
learned from the study of these cam
paigns, say the editors, is the need
of close liaiSon between the medl-
cal administration and the general
staff from the outset, and clear and
definite preparations before the cam
patgn is begun to meet all possible
contingencies. Too often in the last
war the medical service was found
medical staffs had no clear idea of
what was to be expected of them, or
the possible extent of the campaign
upon which they were engaged.
The DardanelleS operations were an
example, it is shown, of the necessity
for esta ablishing large general hospi-
tails near the scene of operations and
for providing a sufficient number of
steamers and small craft for the
evacuation of sick and wounded when
the fighting takes place on or near
water.
In Macedonia the dominant feature
was warfare in mountainous country
or in river valleys, the hotbeds OF
malaria. In this sector the percent
age of hospital beds to the numbers
of troops reached the largest proper
tion, that of one in three. Malaria
was rampant here and, while the
medical service was handicapped by
lack of scientific knowledge, it also
failed to protect the troops by a
lack of proper equipment on the spot
Unused to Modern Appliances.
The medical administration in
Mesopotamia during the early period
of the campaign was dulled by many
years of economy practicing in peace
time in India. This explains why the
ambulance wagons and cars, hospital
steamers and other equipment pro-
vided for the services in France were
rot even asked for by the headquar-
ters of the Indian expeditionary
force. They were unaccustomed to
their use.
The most deplorable inefficiency
was in the actions for the relief of
Kut-elAmara. At that action the
medical service found itself with only
fourteen sections of field ambulances,
instead of the authorized thirty.
When the operations toward kut
were started no strenuous efforts had
been made to reinforce the medical
units or to prepare a plan for the
evacuation of the sick and wounded.
The battles of Shaikh Saad, Wadi and
Hanna still remain a nightmare to
those who took part in them. The
wounded lay out overnight, and many
died from exposure. Those collected
could not be properly housed or
treated. They were evacuated to the
base on any available boat and ar
rangements at Basra for the disem-
barkation of the reinforcing divisions
were defective. When the divisions
arrived large conveys of sick and
wounded were coming down the
TigriS. The steamers met at BaSra
men wandered about in mud trying
to find their way to new camps at
Makina and Magil from vague di-
rections given them by other over
worked officers.