Evening star., 1924-09-21

agreement, is another striking evil
dence of the steady effort on the part
of the German people to escape from
that confession of guilt which, under
duress, they accepted in ratifying the
treaty of Versailles. Actually, OF
course, Stresemann and Marx have
done no more than throw out the as
sertion Of German innocene as a SOP
to the Nationalists, who desire to
make acceptance of the I4sndon
agreement conditional upon this ac-
knoWledgment by the allieS-Some-
thing totally out of the realm of
reason.
ct the German resentment of this
indictment has grown rather than
diminished with the years which have
followed the outbreak of the war
ana one must recognize at once that
there is no human chance that the
tferman people will ever believe the
World War was the result of unique
German guilt. The assertion that Ger
many was attacked is repeated with
eVer-increasing earneStness by masses
OF Germans, even when the old in
ventions of French airplane attacks
upon Nuremberg in advance of hos
tillties and declarations of war have
been dismissed.
Light Shed on Guilt.
What the Germans say now is that
they were not solely guilty and.
above all, that the war was not the
result OF a deliberate German plan.
In word, they repeat the Kaiser
formula-"We have not willed this
war 1t is interesting, therefore, at
this time to glance for moment at
the mountain of evidence which had
piled up in the archives and else
where since the close of the great
struggle and sheds light upon the
W inn n in FOL
coming of the storm.
At the outset one may say quite
fairly, 1t seems to me, that the whole
assumption that the German leaders
at grand Potsdam conference on or
about July deliberately and care
fully planned the struggle falls to
the ground. There is nothing to sug-
gest that the German responsibility
extends to such reconciliation. On
the contrary, one is compelled to con-
Clude that, in SO far as the war was
premeditated. the guilt is exclusively
Austrian, and Count Berchtold and
the Austrian militarists were the
criminals.
The evidence all tends to prove that
when the archduke was assassinated
Berchtold and the Austrian govern
ment generally saw in the crime the
chance to carry out a policy of as
sault upon Serbia which had long
been planned and was only postponed
in 1913, after the Balkan wars, be-
cause of Italian and German veto
that is, because Austria's partners in
the triple alliance declined to be
towed after Vienna into a struggle.
Giolitti has testified to the Austrian
demand for aid in such war in 1913.
Used Aged Franz Joseph.
What Vienna did in 1914 was TO
n ha
send an autograph letter to Berlin,
calling attention to the crime of
Serajevo, indicating the significance
for Austria of the Serbian menace
and asking Germany to support her
ally, always on the assumption that
Serbia was directly responsible for
the murder: that, in fact, the plot
was hatched in Belgrade. Promptly
Berchtold'S agents informed him that
there was nothing to connect Serbia
with the crime, but he suppressed
this vital fact during all the critical
days which followed.
German responsibility begins when
Berlin, the Kaiser and his ministers
gave to Austria what amounted to a
blank check. They agreed TO stand
behind Austria in Furnishing Serbia.
even though such castigation should
provoke Russian Intervention and
that Intervention led to war. Ger
many's ally, Austria. appealed for
support, asked for permission to go
ahead, got it and went ahead. More
over, without the permission it is
probable Vienna would have drawn
back, as it had a year before.
The blindness of the German En-
peror and his ministers goes beyond
conception, since it was always ap-
parent that Russia would in the last
analysis stand behind Serbia and
that French support of Russia was
assured under the terms of the
Franco Russian alliance. What is
plain is that Berlin did not believe
Petrograd would go the limit, ex-
pected backdown, since Russian was
not yet ready to fight, but did take
the risk in giving Berchtold his free
hand.
Approved Austrian UItimntum.
Once this permission was given, al
ways based on the assumption Of
Serbian guilt and Russian incitation,
the Germans. with incredible light
ness of spirit, dismissed the matter
and left Berchtold to go ahead with
his plan, which presently took the
world by surprise with the ultima tum
to Serbia, issued on July %. but trans
mitted to Berlin one or two days be-
fore. Berlin, too, approved the ulti-
matum. Nor did its support waver
when, on July 25, Russia announced
she would stand behind Serbia, while
Austria declared war on Serbia and
both Austria and Russia began par
1ia1 notifications.
1t is only on the night of July %
that Berlin is really alarmed. At
last it perceives that general con-
Migration is in sight, and it does, in
Enthusiastically emphatic terms, advise
Austria to heargen to proposals of
TOT 10 WI
ing to run a risk of war between
Russia and France on the one hand
and the triple alliance on the other
as a consequence of Austrian punish
ment of a Serbia responsible for the
Serajevo crime and secretly plotting
the destruction of Austria, but Ger
many was patiently unwilling to en-
gage in a general war, and on July 29
was, after a week of fatal support
of the blank check, bestirring herself
to forward the efforts of Sir Edward
Grey.
Diplomacy Pushed Aside.
All examination of the evidence
supports the conclusion that on July
30 diplomacy might still have averted
the catastrophe had diplomacy alone
been in control But it was not. The
soIdiers were beginning to take
charge. Austria and Russia had been
mobilizing in part since July 26, and
the conditions Of Europe in 1914 were
such that mobilization almost inevi-
tably meant war, for this simple rea-
son-that If the French and Russians
were able to complete their mobiliza-
tion concomitantly with the Germans
and Austrians, they would have de-
cisive advantage in numbers. There
for, all German plans were based
nnon a. swift and successful attack