Evening star., 1924-05-04
FRANCE TO STAY ARMED
WITHOUT GUARANTEES
Differences of Opinion Between Paris,
Eng land and United States Are
Made Plain.

Inc that world opinion will persuade
the French to reduce their army, be-
cause world opinion has nothing to
do with the situation. The size of
the French army is determined by
the opinion of France, and as long
as French opinion remains what it
now is-that is. convinced of Ger
man purpose TO attack whenever
France is weak-French opinion will
support armament, no matter what the
rest of the world thinks This is equally
true of practically every European
country, all of which feel themselves in
any degree menaced.
Coercion Impossible.
But if French and continental
opinion cannot be persuaded by mere
arguments or affected by world
opinion-that is, by the opinion Of
nations which have no awkward and
menacing neighbors-it is equally
true that these opinions cannot be
modified by coercion. Since the con-
tinental nations are armed, coercion
would mean war, and nothing could
be more absurd that the notion of
a war made upon continental nations
by America and Great Britain to
compel disarmament Mr.. Hughes
pointed this truth out with obvious
justice during the Washington con-
ference.
Lloyd George, while he was still
prime minister, made desperate ef-
fort to meet the situation. Particu-
larly, at the Genoa conference he
sought to establish sense of secur-
ity by proposing mutual guaranty
treaties-that is, treaties by which
each nation recognized as final the
frontiers dividing it from its neigh
bors. But, unfortunately, this ingeni-
Gus proposal found little favor on the
continent, because Belgium had been
blessed with such a guaranty from
her German neighbor before 1914,
and recent memories bulked large.
Today nearly all the debates be-
tween France and Britain turn on
this single question of security. The
British insist that the French should
reduce their armies, limit their air
craft, abandon submarines, since all
these weapons should be used in war
and the two latter could be employed
against Britain. The French offer,
with very little hesitation, to reduce
their army, their aircraft, abandon
submarines provided the British will
join them in a treaty of alliance in
suring British aid to France in case
of German attack.
But my recent trip to England con-
WINGED me that British willingness to
give France any form of guaranty
against future German attack had
enormously diminished in recent
years and that no such guaranty
that is, no guaranty in the form ac-
ceptable to France-was at present
even conceivable, given existing Brit
ish sentiment. But felt just as sure,
after a similar stay in France, that
there was not the smallest chance
that the French would consent to re-
duce their armies without some guar
anty.
What you have, then, is substan-
tial, even an absolute, deadlock. II
the United States should now call
conference like the Washington
gathering to discuss land, air and
submarine limitations, almost from
the first day there would be an open
break between the Anglo-Saxon and
the continental European countries.
This deadlock would be absolute un-
less the Anglo-Saxon countries were
prepared to offer some form of COM
promise in the shape of a guarantee
1t could not be broken, for example,
by any proposal on the part of the
United States and Great Britain to
in
debts, nor could the threat of enforc-
ing existing terms avail
Chance in Dawes Report.
It is quite true, as President Cool
idge indicated, that if. the German
accepts the Dawes plan in good faith
If he puts it into operation, and haV-
ing put it into operation continues TO
carry it out, the European SITUATION
will improve, the danger of a German
attack upon France or upon Poland
will diminish. AS this reduction OF
danger takes place, it is certain that
france and Poland will reduce their
armies. But you must see that I'M"
reduction will always be based upon
the appraisal of the danger which
exists.
No European can quite understand
the American and British point OF
view in the matter of armament. He
simnIy concludes that because both
countries are geographically pro-
tected against invasion they nave
ba sed their moral estimates upon this
fact of immunity.
After Mr.. Coolidge had made his
"a
comment showed quite clearly that
the continental states were still
ready to reduce their standing
armies in return for an American
guarantee of assistance in case of
attack, but that they were totally un-
willing to reduce their armies on the
mere chance that this would insure
safety rather than invite attack, they
to run all the risks meantime. Any
inquiry at the appropriate foreign
offices of the continental countries
would, l venture to guess, disclose
survival of this point of view.
That is why Mr.. Coolidge's pro-
posa1 which was properly guarded
and showed no failure to appreciate
the obstacles which lay in the path
way, must, for the present at least,
be regarded as purely academic so
far as the continent is. concerned,
while certain to arouse great en-
thusiasm in Great Britain, which
| shares our immunity from invasieS
and our dislike of conscript armies
| If, however, MIR. Macdonald, in
| forthcoming conference with Nj.
Poincare, can reach some agreement
on the subject of British guarantees