Atlanta tri-weekly journal. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1920-19??, 1924-04-22
WatchfuI Waiting Policy Is
Explained by Historian,
Neutrality Proved Big Help
to Allied Powers
BY DAVID LAWRENCE

BY DAVID LAWRENCE
Copyright, 1924, by the George H. Dorian
company in the United States, Canada, South
America. World publication rights reserved
by Current News Features, Incorpora ted.)
CHAPTER xxIII
TIME general public did not know
that Mr.. Wilson was so set
upon making a move for
peace during the summer of 1915
that he actually framed peace pro-
posals. He was dissuaded from max
ing a peace offer, however, because
of the belief that such a step might
be considered as political-it might
be interpreted, it seemed, as a ges-
ture intended to improve his own
chances for reelection and it might
be construed abroad as without Sc
cism certain to issue from political
opponents.
So Mr.. Wilson delayed his peace
move until after the campaign and
sent the note after he had been
elected, November, 1916, in the hope
that his position would carry even
greater weight because of q triumph
at the polls.
But it was peace Mr.. Wilson was
thinking about in December, 1915,
aud January, 1917. When it became
evident, however, that the fortunes
Of war were turning against the al
lies, that the Germans were plan
ming a big drive, that the extremists
in Germany We're gaining the upper
hand and that submarine warfare
without restraint was to be sane
tioned-then did Mr.. Wilson begin to
There was a time in the early days
of 1917 when he thought that the
dismissal of the German ambassa-
dor would be sufficient warning to
Germany that the United States
must not be offended by further dep
relations on the high seas and he
called in the author one day to ask
him if the activities of the German
ambassad dor Is noted by the newspa.
permen had reached the point where
they were compromising America s
neutrality. 1t was true that the
1GIIIldu dIIlDdSSduOI COlluuCLcu
propa ganda, did all he could to in
fluence American opinion in favor
Of Germany, but the author told the
president that he did not believe the
German ambassador was doing any
more than some Of the other ambas-
sadors Of the allied world in their
efforts to influence American opin-
ion during the presidential cam
paign.
Hoped for Early Peace
The German proclamation of I'M
restricted submarine warfare gave
the United States ample justifica-
ton not only for the dismissal of
Count Won Bernstorff, the German
ambassador, but the Forthcoming
declaration Of war against the I'm
perial German government. The tide
of battle wa going against the al.
les and again Mr.. Wilson hoped that
America might be able by the very
fact of her entering the war to force
peace Al an early date. 1t was for
this reason that the president gave
himself over utterly to the persecu-
ton OF the war recommending at the
very outset universal CONSUMPTION
and the extension of large loans, ma
terials and supplies to the allies. BY
this he hoped to break down the
German morale.
Critics have risen to say that the
United States should have gone to
war when the Lusitania was sunk
all Europe still thinks, no doubt, that
the two years OF neutrality We're due
to Vacillation, INDIGESTION or even
) H.,
for hesitation, was Que entirely to
his belief that the United States
must enter the war, II at all, with
a united public opinion. So far as
politics were concerned, he knew
that the American people would
surely re-e1ect him in 1916 if he We're
commander-in-chief of their forces
during the war. He knew he would
gain politically if America entered
the war during 1916-for it had been
an old political saying that 1.-The
American people never swap horses
in midstream."
The evidence Is all against the Eu-
ropean idea that the United States
withheld it's forces from use because
Of an Indifference to the issues and
fundamentals Of the conflict abroad.
American public opinion alone was
Mr.. Wilson's guide and he recon-
mended q, declara ton Of war only
when he was convinced that the YER
dict was unanimous. From an alto
gether different viewpoint, however,
it is possible to prove that the neu-
trality of the United States, far from
being q disadvantage to the allies,
was an asset of immeasurabla value.
The German historians who know
the truth about Won Tirpitz's plans
for unrestricted submarine warfare
as outlined in the latter part of 1914
are convinced that only the influ-
ence Of the conservative element in
the German foreign office, namely,
the diplomats instead of the mill
tarists, prevented the earlier adOp-
ton of unrestrained warfare.
Checked Germans Two Years
Mr.. Wilson's writing held the
Germans at bay in the sense that
they did not proclaim unrestricted
warfare for at least two years. And
the losses in tonnage which the AL
lies suffered during the first few
years was so serious and alarming
that it doesn't require much stretch
of the imagination to understand
how distressing might have been the
turn of affairs for the allies IL the
United States had been eliminated
from Germany's thoughts SO far as
submarine operations were concerned
and il the German navy had been
turned loose to sink without trace
everything in sight.
Could the United States have
an army Of 100000 men
to Europe if the British navy had
not secured command Of the seas?
And would the British navy have
achieved such mastery OF the sub
marines If those two years had not
been vouchsafed them in which to