Evening star., 1924-09-14
(Continued from First Page.)

The weakness of the group of states
Is financial: most of the nations are
deeply in debt to Britain and 1t Is
beyond the resources of France TO
finance the reconstruction in these
countries. France herself has des-
perate need of debt settlement with
Britain-and the United States-and
any policy of European hegemony,
assuming that France desired to
adopt it. would lead to fiscal bank
ruptcy Immediately.
Poincare was overthrow in France
because there was the conviction that
ne was at least in appearance pur-
suing an aggressive and uncompro-
missing foreign policy. In so far as
foreign relations influenced his fall
1t was due perhaps more to his man
ner than to his method. more to the
appearance of his policy than to the
reality. Herriot came to power oe-
cause it was felt that without sur
rendering what was vital he might
show a spirit of conciliation which
would lessen world criticisms and
perhaps obtain greater concessions
abroad.
Must Protect French Rights
But Herriot could not and cannot
make vital concessions. He could
agree in London to arbitration of the
question of German default. that is.
he could agree that an impartial jury
should decide whether Germany had
wilfully defaulted or not, but he
could not surrender French right to
act alone if the default were thus
established. At Geneva he can accept
the principle of arbitration. but he can
not in the smallest degree consent to
notifications of French power to pro-
tect her own security, save as he is
lh1 To OH TO IN nn Sat q n
tees.
1t was quite manifest to all after
Macdonald and Herriot had spoken
at Geneva that there was no imme-
diate prospect of any solution of the
pending question. Solution was i'm
possible because there was no basis
of accommodation. France advocated
a system of guarantees as between
nations as long as there was any
question that any great power would
disregard the decisions of the arbi-
trail board or ignore them and go
ahead. as Germany did in 1914. Bri-
tain wanted no guarantee because she
argued that these would in the end
defeat the arbitration system by
building up rival groups Of powers.
Like American Position.
But you must see the realities as
contrasted with the eloquence. What
tne bTItlSn dcludiy "dHteu was
some system which would not carry
with it any responsibility for them
10 maintain the peace of Europe or
support any country wantonIy at
tackled, unless their own safety and
prosperity were directly involved.
They did not want to be committed
in advance to an abstract principle.
but to retain their freedom of action
at the critical moment. They did
not want to be bound to France, for
example. in case of war unless at
the moment war threatened British
interests and dictated British support
of France. And Americans must per-
ceive that this. in substance. was
the American objection of the cove
nant of the league to Article X.
They must also recognize that Brit
ish policy was Influenced very ma
terially by the fact that the British
Empire includes Canada, Australia
and South Africa, which, from geo.
graphical reasons, share the Amer
lean point of view with respect OF
European entanglements.
By contrast, what the French
wanted was some guarantee that If
Germany did attack them. then they
would be sure of British support
not after delays. as in 1914. for no
Frenchman will ever forget those
atrocious days between August l and
4, "nen BrlllSn purpose remained OU-
scure, but automatically. In a word,
they want British alliance as an
insurance against German transtor-
nation of any arbitration agreement
into new scrap of paper. Ihey
want to know that Britain Will come
just as soon as Germany starts to
attack and they want Germany and
the world to know. believing that
this would in face restrain Germany.
nd hnt countries hut
supporting views based upon materia
interest and geographical situation.
Where Vital Interests Conflict.
At bottom the divergence between
British and French views rests upon
the wholly legitimate anxiety of the
former to escape being dragged into
struggle not vital to their inter-
ests. into a war, indeed. which may
be fatal to their existence. based as
it is upon foreign trade. by virtue
of a contract, of a guarantee which
would leave them in some measure
at the mercy OF French policy. The
French, on their side, are just as
eager to avoid a condition of help
lessnesS due to their adoption of a
system of arbitration in good faith,
which would not be adopted by Ger
many and thus would leave them In
a position of isolation and helpless
ness in case of German attack.
The conflict is not between selfish
ness and idealism, or between mill
tarism and pacifism. 1t is between
policies based upon geographical
immunity from invasion and geograph-
ical liability to invasion. 1t is the in
evitable shock between the views
and interests of an island state and
continental states. 1t is not, more
over, the collision between France
and Britain. but between Britain and
every continental state now menaced
by invasion because of the past, pres
ent and very possibly future pur-
pose of it's neighbors.
England was dragged into the last
war, so Ramsay Macdonald and mil
lions of his countrymen believe, be-
cause of British obligations of honor
to France. Now those who at present
control British policy seek to insure
that Britain shall not be SO involved
In European engagements as to be
dragged into new war given the ruin
incident to the last so far as Britain
was concerned. The risk for Britain is
up to the treaty of arbitration, but the
necessity for Britain to live up to some
treaty of guarantee.
Mennced by Invasion Threat.
But for France, Belgium, Rumania,
Poland. Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia,
the risk is all the other way They
can be invaded. they have been in
vaded. and they are today facing in
Germany a great political group which
proclaims openly the purpose to re-
store the old conditions of Europe,
territorialiy and otherwise. If they
accept the British solution, and the
Germans presently repeat the 1914 per-
formance, then they are automatically