Evening star., 1924-11-02

% CtffmunlSt who. taking their in
sn'r IONS and orders from Moscow.
world overturn the whole Germa n
governmental edifice. destroying alike
r,'',''hEcan and monachial institu-
tionS This election was the direct
outcome for the Ruhr Gtrugele. and it
was also the consequence, the cumu-
lative result Of five years of ch"os.
Nevertheless. the reaction did not
quite Drev"il Although the Com
muniSts and the Nationalists gained a
large number Of seats. there remained
A scanty majority FOR the Modarates
the Democrats. CentriSts and Social
lists, who with certain minor groups
were able to carry on a government
But this government could not endure
long, because, with the Socialists re-
fuslng office. 1t was actually a cap
tive of the party which supplied the
votes but declined responsibility. To
endure it had in the end either to
make real coalition with the Social
lists or with the Nation Lists or with
both, and thus obtain q sustaiuin2 g
majority.
Situation Outside Improves.
In the meantime e.showever. tn" sit
uatlon in the outside world had at
last begun to improve. MacDonald
had come to power in Britain with
new ideas and with undisguised
friendliness to Germany. Herriot
had overturned Poincare and the
Dawes report had opened a way to
rescue economic Germany from the
despairing situation into which she
had fallen. Acceptance of the Dawes
report by the Germans insured a
moratorium for a period of years
loans from the outside and the evac-
uation of the Ruhr. with the con-
ccmttant restoration to German con-
troll of her industrial estate in her
greatest coal and iron districts.
But cou'd the existing Reichsta G
be persuaded to accept the Dawes
report? This was the problem. Ger
tainly votes could be obtained for
all of necessary laws to put the plan
in operation, for which only a ma
jority was required. but there was
one proposal which called for a con-
stitutional amendment and required
a two-thirds vote, and this was OBJ
tainabfe only if considerable num-
Der of Nationalist votes were forth
coming. And the Nationalists at
once declared themselves against the
Dawes report.
Meantime every sort of secret at
tempt was being made to establish
the MarX-Stresemann government.
"HOSe were
all reactionary, but whose political
judgment correctly informed him
that Germany must accept the Dawes
plan or come to complete economic
chaos as well as political isolation,
strove to persuade the NationaiistS
to accept the plan and made such ac-
ceptance the single condition to a
reorganization of the cabinet and the
admission of three or four Ma
tionalists as members.
Nationalists Reject Dawes Plan.
But the Nationalists in the May
campaign had taken the field against
the Dawes plan and were SO COM
plctely committed that they shrank
from any reversal of position. More
over, quite patiently, If the Dawes
plan were adopted and worked,
then with the restoration Of economic
prosperity they would lose their
best argument for the overthrow of
the republic. Therefore. they re-
jected all the overtures and up to
the moment of the final vote on the
Dawes plan in the Reichstag main-
tanned their hostile attitude.
In the meantime, however, a change
was taking place in German condi-
tions and in the German state OF
mind The adoption of the renten-
mark and the cessation of imitation
had brought about comparative sta
bility in price and measurably or
derby economic condition. Not only
was this improvement general, but
the Dawes plan offered the promise
that it would be permanent, and big
business began to rally to the prof.
ect, as did public sentiment. Rela-
tions with France also improved as
a result of the Herriot policy, and
the conference of London in Midsum-
mer not only saw the first appearance
of Germans as equals in an inter
national conference since the wara but
also resulted in a French pledge te
evacuate the Ruhr in a year and to
begin evacuation at once, while it in
sured the almost immediate cessation
of Franco-Belgian economic exploita-
tion of this region.
Dawes Plan Offers Relief.
Thus the Dawes plan offered Ger
many sure relief from the Ruhr oc-
cupation, a considerable foreign loan
and in reality it gave her promise OF
both economic and political security
together with a considerable period OF
rest from reparation payments in
money. 1t had become. then, as Sec
retary Hughes is said to have de-
clared in Berlin, the single road to
safety, the one way to consolidate the
situation at home and to avoid iso-
lating British and American public
opinion, thus fatally. depriving Ger
many of the necessary financial aiG
from both countries. If Germany re.
jected the Dawes plan, she would
find herself again isolated, while
France, having escaped from her DO.
sition of international unpopularity
would be free to deal with Germany
as she might decide.
In the end the Nationalists climbed
down and gave the necessary votes
to put all the legislation for the
Dawes plan through, but their resist
ance had been SO obstinate that their
surrender was ignominious and they
suffered an enormous loss of prestige
Moreover, since the French at once
began the evacuation of the Ruhr
while the foreign loans were put
through, all classes in Germany be-
gan to have very solid reasons for a
new optimism. The Reichstag of May
1924 had been elected in a mood Of
passion and despair, but the situa-
ton in October was manifestly diff
fereut.
Opposition Loses Point.
Nevertheless, after, as before, the
vote in the Reichstag the National.
lists remained obdurate. The Count de
Chambord had lost the French throne
so years earlier because he had re-
fused to accept the tricolor although
Henry " had made the far, greater
concession which he. expressed in the
immortal phrase Paris is worth q
mass" What now became interesting
to discover and remains SO Is whether
the Nationalists missed their chance
to overthrow the republic by reject.
ing the Dawes plan.
The refusal of the Nationalists te
join in any coalition which would
have the character Of a ministry rep.
resenting all shades of German opin.
inn IsaHe of course thu Counnnrsnisfc G