Evening star., 1923-07-07
England and the Entente.


Anxiety on the score of Great Brit
aims possible withdrawal from the en-.
tente in the matter of German repara-
tions is probably inspired more by
dread of the evils to flow from such
separation than by reckoning of the
real likelihood of that action. In other
words. such a move is so feared that
il seems now imminent, whereas, in
point of fact, the ills almost certain to
flow from a breach are calculated to
prevent it.
1t would seem that the particular
point of dissatisfaction in London just
now lies in the fact that France in
sists upon stating her case verbally
through her ambassador, instead OF
committing it to writing in formal
statement. The French case has been
stated repeatedly. and there would ap-
pear to be no strong reason why 1t
should be stated again. But the Brit
ish government insists, and is inclined
to be particular about the matter of
The statement.
If Great Britain withdraws from the
entente-which. would be the effect of
the action reported to be in contempla-
tion-and deals directly with Germany
in the matter of reparations she as
sumes very grave responsibility.
This would affect the interests Of not
only France and Belgium. but Of Italy
as well. and of the other nations
which formed the great association
opposed to the central powers during
the war. The interests of Belgium and
France in this matter are the heaviest.
Those countries We're most seriously
damaged by the Germans in the course
Of their four years of occupation.
Their reparation needs are the most
urgent. They are now in the Ruhr
because. as they contend. Germany
has defaulted in payments and is
making no sincere effort q; the salts
faction of her obligations.
The passive resistance maintained
by Germany as a matter of fixed
policy has become an active resistance
through sabotage of various kinds.
Trains are derailed lives are taken,
indu strial equipment is destroyed. 1t
is expected that the German chancel-
lor will in a formal manner disavow
this active campaign in order to
strengthen the" policy of passive re-
sistance But such a. disavowal will
not improve the situation. 1t will not
cause the French and Belgians to
withdraw from the Ruhr, nor will 1t
contribute any assurance of payment.
Separate negotiations between Great
Britain and Germany would be. in eff.
feet, an abandonment OF the treaty of
Versailles. 1t would leave the Bel
gians and the French free to pursue
their own course. 1t would encourage
Germany to further resistance Of one
sort or another. 1t would probably
lead to increased pressure by France
and Belgium. 1t might lead to war.
And in case Of war Great Britain
would be in a most embarrassing and
difficult position. far more so than
France and Belgium. For she would
be unable, short of absolute treachery
TO the obligations she incurred when
she entered the war in 1914. to take
any part in such a war calculated to
weaken the efforts of France and Bel
gium to obtain justice.
These considerations will probably
prevail at London. A breach precipi-
tated by insistence upon a written
tion of often-stated principles by
France will surely not be carried to
the point of break that would leave
England exposed to condemnation by
the nations of the world allied in the
four years fight against German ag-
gression and the four and a half years
fight for German reparation.