San Antonio light. [volume] (San Antonio, Tex.) 1911-1993, 1923-09-16
GERMANY'S LATEST OFFER

mann, has made another proposition
: to France. Not directly or formally, it
@scems, but by general assertion to the
world. Germany, said the chancellor
lin a recent public speech, is now ready
.sto give France "real guarantees in order
Ito secure the freedom of the Ruhr."
s Whether by "real' Herr Stresemann
implies that guarantees formerly Offered
were not bona fide, or means that the
French definition of guarantees unneces-
sssarily exacting though he regards it as
being, will be met, dispatches reporting
sshis speech do not say. However, those
.--dispatches afford no definite ground for
1.-THE expectation that France will jump
Eat Gern1any's offer.
< Like former offers. this one seems to
: have string tied to it. What the Ger
mans are trying to do, apparently, IS
to devise guarantees so highly satisfac-
France as to=cenvince her that
it, will be no longer necessary for her
|. to remain in the Ruhr. 1t is doubtful
s'iif France can be so convinced. If she
! pursues the course upon which she seems
/ to have set out, she would remain in
| the Ruhr regardless of any guarantees
! that the Germans might be able to give
her. For her distrust OF the Germans
could hardly be improved upon.
h Yet France laid a predicate for further
mere guaranty offers when she rejected
the first that Germany made. In. fact,
from the outset the Germans have been
"kidded along" in the hope that they
might nd themselves of the incubus in
kthe Ruhr if they would only offer a
krsufficient" guaranty of payment. Al
though France has never said, in so
/ many words, that she would never
evacuate the Ruhr until she had been
fully paid, her general attitude has in
Dictated that it was her determination to
hold that region in pawn until the last
mark of her claim had been collected.
+ To the unprejudiced observer, who is
fnot obsessed by the inordinate suspicion
l that inspires the French, Germany's Of
{ fer to mortgage private property as Sc
| curity for payment of the debt to France
seems fair enough. But unless France
adopts more reasonable policy than she
hfs thus far seemed disposed to pursue
to the last ditch, this offer may be ex-
pected to go the way Of its predecessors.
why shouldn't Germany offer "real
guarantees" not contingent upon
Frances withdrawal from the Ruhr
For two reasons, perhaps. First, the
presence of French troops in the Ruhr is
adverse to Germany's internal interests
even apart from any consideration Of
PREPARATIONS. The French military is q
Disturbing element; it makes for unrest
arnong the people of Germany-they
Cannot get down to work with alier
rzskmasters at their elbows. So, thc
Ruhr occupation, designed by France t.
hasten payment of reparations, is phys
ical and psychological hindrance to tina
project.
The second possible reason for Ger
inany's insistence upon evacuation of tn
Ruhr as a prerequisite to payment i
that she is no less suspicious of Franc
than France is of her. Germany fears
apparently, that Frances motives in til
4sahr go beyond mere reparations; tina
II she began to meet old reparations de
mands, new ones would be presented, an
that If she did not meet the new one
1.-THE French might hold the Ruhr in PEI
+petuity.
Thus has suspicion wrought in Et
nope tangle such as America, with he
tdirectness of method and simplicity an