The Washington times., 1923-02-18

British Imperialist
Endorses French
Invasion Of Ruhr

whether in spite of America having
failed to ratify the treaty, the Brit
ish government should have re-.
garded the treaty as being in force.
My own personal feeling is that
wish we could have shown the
French people in q more conspic-
uous manner than by preserving
an attitude of neutrality in the
Ruhr how deeply we sympathizo
with them and. how anxious we
are. that they should succeed In
forcing the profiteers OF the Ruhr
to disgorge some of their ill-gotten
wealth and at the same time COM
pei the German government to i'm.
pose aadequate taxes for reparatiOnS
and indemnity.
As to the other point of political
interest, Lausanne. We all know
on two points Of economic import.
ance but of comparatively small
political interest.
/ hope that when Ismet PAsha
has been to Angora and exp AIMED
the situation he will receive In
stfuctions to conclude an agree
m1ent.
The only danger is that hot-heads
Of the Angora government might
gain the ascendancY. But every
week and every month that passes
the AngOra government are feeling
the financial pinch growing tighter
and tighter. They know that the
only country which can render
them financial helD il Great Brit.
ain. There are many. no doubt,
heads who believe that having de-
feated the Greek army they could
inflict similar defeat upon the allies.
But all the Turks who know
Europe. and there are many, real
ize that it is an empty dream.
It is possible, and believe from
q military point of view, even de.
sirable that in the event of the Turks
reopening hostilities, the British
garrison at Constantinople and on
Ismidt Peninsula should be with.
drawn to Gallipoli. 1t would exhilar-
ate the Turks to regain possession
Of Ei1eir capital, and it would be COM
|paratively easy to do, but they should
1T the same time realize that the
British garrison would retire only to
Gallipoli. With the command Of the
sea behind them, they could hold
this for fifty years or more against
the Turks or anybody else.
We could, to a certain extent,
starve Turkey by cutting off Con-
stantinople from the Mediterranean.
Knowing the Turks as / do, from
residence OF more than seven years
in Constanldnople, / feel that with
drawal Of the French and Italians
from Chanak enormously enhanced
British prestige, while theirs had
sadly dwindled This feeling was
confirmed from many authoritative
sources.
To me it was never ineligible
why we ever went into Palestine,
and hope before long we shall see
our commitments both in Palestine
and Mesopotamia come to success
full end.
At the outbreak Of the war with
Turkey I held the post of viceroy of
India. was opposed in principle to
the dissemination Of British Indian
troops in Mesopotamia, China and
East Africa, instead Of devoting our
energies and strength to defeating
the Germans in France.
The occupation of Basra was,
however, in my opinion an advan.
tageous move, since it protected the
oil interests Of the British govern
ment and prevented the Turks in,
triguing with the tribal chiefs on the
shores of the Persian Gulf. 1t also
served as q blockade against Bagdad,
which from an economic point Of
view can be controlled with ease
from BaSra.
British prestige in Persia and
India depend on preventing the
Turks from acquiring a predominant
position in those waters. There was
additional risk, since the British
government had for naval purposes
| sunk large sum Of the taxpayers
money in Persian oil fields situated
in the Bakhtiari country near
Ahwaz.
We have placed an Arab chief upon
the throne at Bagdad, and he must
endeavor to hold his own with such
moral support as we can give him.
The only point where safeguards
are necessary is in protection of the
oil interests which the British gov
/ eminent now possesses.
When we regard the Ruhr and
the Near East, wide apart though
they may be, there is only one policy
which a sane Englishman can regard
as Of predominant importance, and
that is absolute unity Of front and
active cooperation with our friends
TO- No.