The Indianapolis times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1922-1965, 1923-09-15

that was an added reason for moving
wisely and cautiously. Instead of
which. every blunder and crudity was
committed of which a combination of
| fanaticism, vanity and temper was
capable.
The council managed to convey the
impression it had already taken sides
before it had even heard the parties.
What greater mistake could a trib-
unal commit if 1t wished to command
confidence? When a novel experiment
in adjudication has not yet estab-
lished it's influence, confidence is vital
to its continued existence. BY de.
meanor even more than by speech,
the British representative managed
to create the conviction in the Italian
mind that he had already come to
the conclusion Italy was in the wrong.
The comments Of the Italian press
were unanimous in their depreciation
Of the apparent prejudgment of the
case The effect was so bad It was
impossible for Signor Mussolini to
agree to refer the dispute to the de-
cision Of the League. even If he had
desired to do so.
Premature Discussion
Things were made much worse by
premature discussion. which was ar
ranged to take place in public, with
histrionic effects, to show up Italy's
attitude, and ostentatiously to put
her in wrong in the sight of the
civilized world The drama-together
with the demonstration from the
clique of league sympathizers who
congregate on these occasions-all IT.
ritated Italy to the point Of frenzy.
and the publicity made 1t impossible
for her to retreat from her uncom-
promising position. The movers in
this melodramatic display ought TO
have known that, had Signor Musso-
lini surrendered after this exhibition,
he would have been done for IN Italy.
The league ought never TO have
interviewed at all without prospect
ing the ground thoroughly before
| taking the first step. One Of three
things ought to have been assured by
the council before they committed
the prestige of the league.
l. 1t ought to have been ascertained
the arbitrament Of the league. Failing
satisfactory assurance on this point,
then the council ought. at any rate,
| to have been certain either that
| 2. The other powers-and notably
Britain and France-would have been
ready, in the event OF either of the
| disputants refusing to submit to the
! league, to enforce respect for the Gov
enant or. II agreement among the
powers was not practicable. then
8. That at least one power with
the requisite strength at its command
was prepared to take whatever meas
ures were necessary to force the re
| calcitrant to submit.
Short Of one OF these alternatives
It was madness to rush in. AS to No
l, Italy had made it clear that she
would have none Of the league. A,
to No. 2, the British representative
ought to have known that France
could not Just now afford TO quarre
with Italy. The Mussolini govern
ment knew that before they bonn
barded Corfu. The INVADERS Of the
Ruhr could not force the invaders Of
Corfu to take their case to Geneva
for decision. The retort would have
been too obvious; IF Greece, why not
Germany" Nj. Poincare did not mind
our quarrelling with Italy. L 1t toe
unkind to say that it suits HIM
Whether 1t is or not, am afraid il Is
true.
There was therefore nothing left out