, 1923-03-17

ing to attempt to remedy them, other than to agree
l." the funding of the British debt to us. 1t ap.i
parently has been the policy of this government
to keep its hands off Europe entirely, and this
policy has been followed on the theory that the DO
litical troubles of Europe have no interest for us.
Many Americans deny this, and feel that the re.
construction of Europe is of vital Importance to
us. 1t is probably fair to say that the situation
in the Ruhr today is partly attributable TO our
policy of inaction since the armisticc. Had we
applied ourselves officially to the reparation prob
lens from the beginning it is unlikely that the
French would have been compelled to take the
steps which they have taken. Had We been willing
to cooperate in the reconstruction of Europe, in
stead of remaining entirely aloof, there can be little
doubt that the economic problems would today
be nearer to solution.
But whatever the United States might have
done before the advance of the French into the
Ruhr today We find ourselves practically helpless.
France took this step only after every other at
tempt to force Germany TO pay had failed. Through
subterfuge and deceit Germany had succeeded in
avoiding her obligations. France was virtually
compelled to take this step. And in so doing she
has the overwhelming sympathy and support of
the people of the United States. There is, more
over, an undercurrent feeling of satisfaction that
Germany is being brought to her knees, where she
belongs, and this by the French on German soil.
"How successful France will be in collecting
any substantial part of what is due her is now
extremely doubtful. Unless the German people
consent to work for the French this is impossible.
The German government has decreed a policy of
passive resistance, in the hope that eventually
England and the United States will be forced to
inervene against France. Even without such in
tervention the desperation of the Germans seems
to be such that they think it is better to go down
to ruin rather than do the bidding of the French.
1.-THE longer Germany resists the more it reduces
her capacity TO pay and the less chance France
has of collecting reparations. But even if this
Rh nnn hos ann nc ts r,pnnn AltAIn D
France has no alternative but to remain. If she
admits failure and withdraws empy-handed Ger
many has won the war. If she remains, by con-
trolling the industrial region of her enemy. she at
least can prevent German from attacking again.
just as ut the Paris conference, separations for
damage done to her by Germany and security
against another assault are the corner stones of
French policy. If she has failed to obtain repa-
%rations, France can still secure herself, and the
which she has been compelled in all Justification
to adopt. As Simonds has said: AS the siege of
Germany proceeds the capacity of Germany to pay
automatically declines, while as the capacity to
pay declines the necessity for France to pay her.
self in security, where she cannot pay herself in
Preparations, mounts. : r = If the French have
failed in attaining their original objective, it lies
within their power to attain a secondary objective
namely, the destruction of Germany, politically
and economically. The success of the German re
sistance TO their primary purpose well-nigh COM
pels the French to strive for the alternative"
under these circumstances what can the United
States do? Whatever influence we could have
hsCA OAiiNAis bAC NhhS mas SOhC ~ NASh We "
any other nation can persuade France to with
draw from the Ruhr. Mediation has been pro-
posed, but mediation is impossible unless the coun-l
tries which are at odds are willing to have a me
diator, which they are not. An economic con-
ference has been proposed, but of what avail is
an economic conference when the predominant
question is political? England is rightly alarmed
at the thought of the economic consequences of
the destruction of Germany, and England today
still has a vague and faint hope that the United
States somehow will intervene. The wish is UNI
doubtedly father to the thought, for it is impossible
to see how any intervention is possible. What
right or justification has the United States at
this late date to interfere without the consent of
the parties in a very momentous political issue be
tween England and Germany on one side and
France on the other? 70 Intervention is possible
without taking sides with Germany against France
for such intervention would mean opposition to
the fixed determination of France to remain in the
Ruhr. This L do not believe the American people
will tolerate. The sympathy with France is too
real, the memories of her sacrifices still too fresh,
and our sense of justice too keen for US to desert
her now and to deny her what she is clearly en-
titled to. l do not believe that the American peo-l
pie will allow Germany to escape the consequences
of her own acts, first of vandalism and then of
fraud at the expense of France. Even if the re-
suit of non-interference by us is the ruin of Ger
many, and thus q serious obstacle in the economic
recovery of Europe and a vital blow to Englands
trade, it seems to me that now we have no other
course. If this be true, then, would not the at
mosphere be cleared by an official declaration to-
this effect made at the earliest opportunity? Such
a declaration would dispel any encouragement
given to Germany by our silence, and by the with
drawal of our troops it would leave England free
TO work out her salvation unhampered by false
hopes, and finally, it would give heart to France