Evening star., 1923-11-04

should the Russians start through
Aatvia' Poland Immediately would
spring to arms and another great
test OF strength would come to pass.
In this case there is extreme doubt
1 that even the Poles could stay the
march Of the Russians as they did
In their war Of three years ago, in
asmuch as Russian armies are of
tougher texture than the disorgan-
| izeo masses that initiated a vaingIo-
rious march upon Warsaw, only to
De turned to ignominious retreat un-
der co-ordinated Polish attacks. The
RUSSIAN army is said to number s0o,-
ooo. Inere Is more likelihood that
through regional organization Trot-
SKY can command another million in
case war actually is ushered in.
Russia has millions of men who
served In the armies during the world
| war and through military training
and propaganda work at home a vast
| NUMBER nave been converted to
4 soviet ideas. AS a consequence they
could be marshaled into soviet armies
wfthuot fear OF treachery some-
thing that did not exist a few years
back' when old-time czarist, leaders
laid plans for the army and were
spied upon constantly by civilian
comrades"
| Ready for Mobile Warfare.
The present soviet army is we'll
omcered, we'll disciplined, and. dis
patches indicate, ready for any con-
tingenoy. preferably hard fight. The
one weakness OF the army is it's lack
OF artillery and airplanes, but in
every other respect 1t is sufficient to
answer present purposes. there being
at least 25o.o0o Cossack troops. CIV
Ing red forces a degree of mobility.
Owing to the extremely long from
| tier over which they might be forced
| to operate the soviet army Is in good
position to wage this brand of open
warfare, It not being believed under
| any contingency that 1t would settle
| down Into test of strength along
| given lines as along tho western
'front.' during the world war. It is
known that with the aid OF German
| interests thousands Of airplanes have
been built and are building In Russia
and In case Of conflict this branch OF
the service might offer a surprise.
Poland. the logical buffer of any
soviet move. has been STRENGTHENED
through the instrumentality Of the
French. who are extensively and de-
fensively allied with Warsaw. If the
Russ strike the Poles it is tatamount
to striking the French. The Poles
have been organized and are strong
in every branch Of military science,
thanks to the large loans made to the
Poles by the French and the use OF
French equipment which has been
supplied In tremendous quantities.
The Poles are ready for any continE.
ency or any kind Of warfare. but it is
believed that the force Of sheer num-
bers which the soviet, through per-
fected organization could muster,
might counterbalance the Poles ad-
vantage in modern implements Of de-
struction.
Any Conflict Would Spread.
But at no juncture can 1t be sur
missed that any conflict along the east
ern frontiers of Europe would be con-
fined to the Russians and the Poles.
It possibly would include the small
states of Latvia. Lithuania and Es-
thonia. The instant the Russ strike
II they do strike-messages will 90
poste-hasto from Warsaw, to the capi-
tails OF the little entente and possibly
from Paris also. demanding that the
smaller powers to the south OF Po-
land act In the defense of tho French
interests to the east Rumania,
Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia, fear
ing at all times Russian incursion,
the former country particularly. un-
doubtedly would heed the request of
France and strike possibly at the
Ukraine through Bessarabia. In
which case the soviet would become
involved along the whole eastern
European front. 1t Is not believed
that Russian leaders in Moscow,
knowing the danger Of such eventual
ity, would dare initiate any quarrel
unless they are adequately prepared
to meet the resistance OF all of
Frances allies. The brunt of the
fighting, however, is very likely to
occur, If conflict comes, on the Pol
ish frontier. for the soviet purpose is
purported to be quick blow through
Poland to gain junction with Ger
manic Comrades" reported ready tc
show their hands once Russians push
ahead.
One Link I'm Campaign.
In some circles. however. there IS
less inclination to believe that the So
Wet armies are in earnest. It is
thought, possibly, present maneuvers
art but blur In order to influence
France In the German reparations sit
uation. Knowing the French desire
to see complete German disintegra-
ton. a thing not desired by the Rus
SLAMS az long as Germany can be pre-.
served for potential soviet control.
the Russians may believe that threat
eped military operation would cause
the French to desist In efforts de-
signed to separate Germany. a thing
which England has insisted would
the chances OF soviet contro,
in Germany. This line Of reasoning
however, Is considered far-fetched By
close students Of the situation, who
believe that II the soviet actually Il
troops on tho eastern frontsi,
Is but link In we'll planned cam
paign to seixe the first advantage n.
spreading the gospel OF bolshevisn,>
into central Europe.