The Birmingham age-herald., 1923-02-10

Like the captain of football team the baseball manager quickly dis covers the weak spots in the enemy s lineup. If he doesn't then he is not much of manager. Being aware of these spots the trick is in waiting for the exact moment to spring something that will double-cross the particular player and throw the op- position off its balance. It is not at all necessary to cross the whole op- posing team. That would be out of the question, anyway.
 Fool One of 'Em
 All you need is to fool just one player-or maybe two. One such move will often throw a monkey wrench into the whole machinery of the opposition.
 Take. for instance, the elaborate and concentrated efforts we made during the 1922 series to cross Babe Ruth. We knew that he had weak ness, because we had watched him for long time. We also knew that he was in a slump and little down. spirited as result of being unable to hit during the last few games of the regular season.
 Our purpose was to cross Ruth-to center on that-and thereby affect the morale of the whole Yank team. By succeeding in this their whole plan was disrupted. If they were not disrupted the Tanks were at least disturbed so much mentally that they were off balance. An important cog had broken.
 Suppose Babe Hit One
 Can you imagine what would have happened if Ruth had hit a home run lis first time at bat? Can you realize what an effect that would have had on the morale of our team-also Of the Tanks? I thought I understood. I was determined that it should not happen. We worked on that point hard.
 A manager must take into consid- eration those psychological possibili- ties. Believe me, psychology plays an important part In baseball.
 To illustrate the thoroughness of our efforts, aiming at that particular spot. Ruth did not get more than three balls during the entire series that he expected. Every one of our pitchers opposed him. If he looked for slow one, invariably he would pected fast ono he would get a completely at sea.
 Another thing: Having observed the Tanks very closely. had a pretty good idea of the runners who were headstrong and those who might be overcareful. We didn't miss it far. Of five players that I figured we might catch on that chok of throw from the outfield to Bancroft, we caught three-Meusel, Pipp and Schang.
 Critical Plays
 All of these plays came at critical stages The choke-off play. as I have explained before, is trick of throw ing the ball to the shortstop instead of to the plate when single is made to the outfield with a runner on sec ond and there is no chance to catch him. Ordinarily the batter seeing this throw start in from the outfield, as If to go to the plate or third, will keep right on past first and make second Our play was designed to choke these off. Bancroft catches the ball and, instead of throwing to the plate. losses it to second. You all saw the play, very likely.
 The point I make is that we ex- pected to catch Schang, Meusel or Pipp on that play sometime during the series as well as two others. The result shows that our aim at cer- tain spot had been accurate. On an overcareful player, we would not have made this play. If, in that last game. for instance, Schang had held first instead of running on to second the final result might have been en- tirely different.
 Bugs Knew His stuff
 To give you another illustration When Bugs Raymond, pitching for the Cubs, was at the top of his form, he used to cause the Giants all kinds of trouble. That splitter of his was most difficult to hit. Don't make any mistake about Bugs being a great pitcher He knew all the tricks
 We knew, though. that he did not