The Bismarck tribune. [volume] (Bismarck, N.D.) 1916-current, 1923-08-14
URGE STRONG.
AIR FORCES
IN PANAMA
Recommended in Official Cri-
tique After Observing
Spring Maneuvers
ENEMY" SEIZED BASE
Experiments with Submarine
and Air Crafts Show
Possibilities

means of Strengthening the defenscs
of the Panama Canal are suggested
in an official Navy Department criti-
que. prepared as result Of study
of last springs maneuvers in Pana-
ma Bay.
The weaknesses of the present
canal Notifications, the memorandum
said. include the improper grouping
of defense artillery, the lack of suf-
ficicnt air force in the Canal Zone,
and the susceptibility Of certain vital
parts Of the waterway to air bombs.
1t is suggested also that the defend
ing fleet should be balanced by the
study should be made of the posi-
bility of obtaining BY treaty the right
to establish aircraft bases at certain
unnamed points on foreign soil near
by.
In the spring maneuvers, the
enemy fleet from across the Pacific
discarded any plan to attack the canal
directly, but succeeded in Selling a
base at Port Culebra, Costa Rica,
from which it was in q position to
send out an air fleet against the
little strip of United States terri
tory.
"In drawing up their estimates"
says the critique, both commanders
considered the possibility of blocking
the canal by an attack in force on the
Pacific side defenses and locks. Blue
(the United States defense fleet COM
mander) rejected this idea as i'm
probable on the part of Black (the
enemy fleet commander) because
the heavy Notifications would keep
his ships at bay and even should he
reduce these which is unlikely he
would still have, in all probability,
mine field. submarine entrance
guard, and an air attack to over
come"
BLACK rejected this course be-
cause, to destroy the closet locks by
bombarfment, or by torpedoes, ships
would first have to destroy the
enemy sea forces, run the gauntlet
Of the mines and submarines in Pan
anna Bay and even after this were
done, shore batteries would still keep
our forces at range of $4,000 yards
at which distance destruction of the
locks by bombardment is hardly pos
sible.
"Both the Black and Blue Com
manders estimated that the best
chance for Black to accomplish his
mission was to bomb the vital parts
by means of airplanes."
This situation, coupled with other
facts developed during the maneuv-
crs. led the naval experts to reach
rather definite decisions as to the
future needs of national defense in
that quarter. The official critique
concludes as follows:
"Ssome of the benefits to be gain
cd from this problem can be sum-
married in certain conclusions as fol-
lows:
There are certain we'll defined
weaknesses in the Panama Canal de-
fenses-these are:
susceptibility Of certain vital
parts to damage by bombs carried by
aircraft.
Grouping of the coast defense ar
tillery too close together to prevent
attacking vessels which have once
gained control of the sea and air
from reaching positions that will per-
nit firing on the Miraflores locks.
Lack of sufficient aircraft in canal
defenses to insure immunity from at
tack by enemy bombers should base
be obtained within striking distance.
"The necessity for more complete
liaison between the army and navy
forces, especially in communications,
information concerning enemy forces,
and means for recognizing same.
THE necessity for dissemination
of information to our own forces.
Where information is necessary or
desirable in order that our own forces
may act intelligently this informa-
ton must be disseminated even at
the risk of enemy obtaining it,
"Thc need for improving our fleet
communications, both radio and Wis
ual.
"The necessity for balancing our
fleet by the addition Of:
"(a) Scouting cruisers.
"(b) Destroyer leaders.
"The necessity for having a sus-
tnincd speed of at least twelve knots
for:
"(a) Fleet submarines.
"(b) All auxiliaries that will ac-
company the fleet.
THE necessity for more maneuvers
of this nature for fleet training.
The necessity Of denying to any
possible enemy a base within air
craft striking distance Of tkg' canal.
"The desirabi1ity of studying the
question Of establishing by suitable
treaties. aircraft base or bases at
points within striking distance of the
canal.
"The necessity for looking ahead
IS to the probable and possible de-
velopmcnts in submarines and air.
craft. The performance Of our eigh-
seen seaplanes in making the long
rip from Hampton Roads to the
'snal zone and then two days after
Irrival, all Of them being on the
couting line looking for the enemy,
md the performances Of our submar-
mes in making the 5000 mile trip
rom San Diego 70 the canal zone
INVOLVING nearly three weeks 1t sea,
hows the possibiiity Of : future
nemy, no matter who Il might be,
ein1 eble TO bring 70 orr. shores both Il
& 1bfcss and submarine forces from
istanceb hsretofors c0nStdsred -im-I