Atlanta tri-weekly journal. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1920-19??, 1923-07-26
FRANCES RECONSTRUCTION
WORK IN DEVASTATED AREA
EXCEEDING EXPECTATIONS
People Turn Attention to.
Germany's ReCuperative
Power as Their Own Prob
lens Near Solution
BY DAVID LAWRENCE
Especial Cable to The JoGrnal.)
(CnpYriCh+. 1927

Copyright, 1929
PARIS, July --c.-F'rance has sue
| ceeded beyond her own expectations
in the matter of reconstruction. The
| latest data available hardly can de-
| scribe the extent Of the undertaking.
| For instance, nearly $4,000 factories
were destroyed, but in the last five
years fully 10000 have been recon
| structed in their stead. About 742, 900
| homes were damaged or destroyed,
| and $50, 900 have been built or COM
| pletely replaced. The population of
the devastated areas is 100000 below
| the pre-War census, but revenues
gathered from these regions have
| climbed from 100000 francs in 1919
to 2,000.OO0,000 francs in 1922, and
| this year will amount to 5000, 000,-
900 francs or approximately $176,-
100000 annually, according to the
present rate of exchange.
This is a mervelous showing, and
| it is putting cheer into the French
| people. But there is a striking les
son In the progress that has been
made. 1t makes the French trifle
| more conservative in their estimates
| of the cost of repair, and also makes
in another five years. Rebuilding is
not so difficult as it seemed, and
| German has no devastated areas
to worry about.
In other words can anybody truly
estimate the capacity of 100000
French people to produce revenue
more accurately than he can esti-
mate the capacity of $4,000, 900 Ger
| mans? 1t goes to the heart of the
whole PREPARATIONS problem and ex-
plains better than anything else why
| the French are shy about commits
sions TO investigate facts or estimate
| the sums Germany can pay.
Suspicious of Bankers
The French have their suspicious
about international bankers who are
eager to float German loan. The
| French say the bankers naturally
want to reduce Germany's budget
as much as possible so investors
| will more readily see the likelihood
| of German redemption of bonds that
| have to be issued. So also the
| French are inclined to regard both
| the British and American govern
ment viewpoints as prompted by a
desire to get German trade, as an
| international loan would surely as
nance the German purchasing power
Bankers outside of France are in
| sisting that Germany cannot pay as
much as France wants. Each ma
| ton has its own conjecture about
| the future. And the French say
| that any commission, such as Unit
| ed States Secretary of State Hughes
| proposed, would only have to make
u
anyone tell the future of a private
| business? Can anyone say what the
crops will be in any particular
year? How can any ---"erts esti-
mate Germany's paying capacity
| during the next twenty-five years?
| The French insist that the repara-
| tons commission was created for
| the very purpose of altering from
| time to time the amount of the Ger
man indemnity as conditions
| changed, but the French have the
majority on the reparations commits
sion because italy and Belgium vote
! with France as against Great
| Britain.
| The whole maneuVer of the Brit
| ish has been to set up another COM
| mission wherein the French will
| be compelled to make sacrifices.
| And the point of the matter is, they
do not see. the need of sacrifices.
| but believe Germany can pay ulti'
| mately more than anyone dreams
| today. The French do not want
any ''facts" from experts, II the
| latter merely gives estimates, and
| that is what they would have to do.
The French would rather take
chance on developments and see
what the German recuperative pow
| er yields each year.
Will Hold Ruhr
Meanwhile, the French have
| every intention of holding on to the
Ruhr. 1t is the one guarantee they
| think will be effective. France
| must think OF the day when Ger
| many, having so far recovered as
| to pay perhaps half of the indem-
| nifty, may be strong enoHeh to re-
pudiate the remainder and challenge
| Froroe to collect the rest If she
| dares What the French think they
| can do by holding the Ruhr lndefl-
| nitely is to keep Germany weak
| enough militarily to prevent another
war because the Ruhr is Germany's
arsenaD and yet stimulate the Ger
| mans to produce as much revenue
as possible annually to pay off the
war debt. and thus get France out
| of the Ruhr.
The French can wait and will
wait a. hundred years if necessary.
| They are in no hurry about letting
go of the Ruhr. All this does not
| help British trade interests, or the
commerce of the rest Of the world,
but it's playing safe" for France,
and being endowed with strong
| nationalism, born Of recent expe-
riences in depending upon other ma
tons for security, the French feel
that they must look out for French