San Antonio light. [volume] (San Antonio, Tex.) 1911-1993, 1923-08-08
By PAUL SCOTT MOwRFR.

British rivalry for control OF the
Mediterranean.)
Paris. France, Aug S.-The straits
of Gibraltar, for control of which rival
nv between Great Britain and France
has been revived by the supposed de-
cline in the military worth of Gibraltar
and by the French ambition to obtain
Tangiers. form the western gateway TO
the Mediterranean and separate Eu-
rope from Africa It point where the
two continents are thought once 10
have been geographically connected.
Along shores. throughout their 40
miles of length, the straits are bor-
dercd by rough mountains. At the
eastern end two of tlese mountains
Gibraltar on the European side and
the Sierra Bullones on the African
were supposed by the ancients-who
called them Calpe and tbyla. the pill
lars of Hercules-to have been fixed
there as landmarks by the demigods.
but the rest of the ordering crags
are scarcely less elevated. In width
the misty waters of tie straits vary.
Twenty-seven and half miles wide
between Cape Trafalgar and Cape
Spartel. at the western eXtremit.', they
narrow gradually. then open 10 twelve
and half miles between Gibraltar
and punta Santa Catalina, at the
eastern extremity.
Position Strong-FOrces Weak.
Except at two places. the bordering
territory. on both the European and
African sides. is Spanish. Shore de-
lenses. established at almost any point
on the narrow part of the channel,
could interrupt the pfssage of ships.
Spain. moreover, has al admirable nat
ural harbor at Cadiz. some twenty
miles north of Trafalgar. and has n
port and fortress at Ceuta, opposite
Gibraltar. on the African side.
Theoretically. therefore, Spain ought
TO be able TO control the straits. But
whether it could do so practically is
an open question. Spain has no navy
to speak of and no powerful air force.
The value of its artillery is dubious,
and its capacity for careful organiza-
ton and coordination is VIGOROUSLY
low The port OF Cadiz is lamentably
undeveloped. Cueta is said TO be well
fortified. but there is reason to doubt
the adaptation of these Notifications
TO modern conditions. Because of its
position on the straits. Spain would
doubtless be an invaluable ally to some
greater naval power which might wish
to close the Mediterranean or 10 keep
il open. but it is questionable whether
alone the Spanish have either the will
or the ability to control the straits
against any of the great powers.
1t is chiefly SPANS weakness and
Indifference which gives such impor-
tance TO the two natural harbors on
the straits. which are not Spanish
Gibraltar and Tangiers.
The Weakness of Gibraltar.
Gibraltar. British since 1904. is n
rocky promontory, two and half miles
long. separated from the Spanish
mainland by a neck of low ground. 1T
is the very image" as Trackeray
wrote. "of an enormous lion. crouched
between the Atlantic and the Medi-
terranean. and set. there to guard the
passage for its British MISTRESS II
commands the eastern entrance TO the
straits and dominates the fine bay of
Algeciras. on which its own port
works have been constructed. 1t is
perhaps the most famous fortress and
naval base in the world. and in the
past. has successfully withstood sew
eral memorable sieges. chief of which
was that undertaken by the Spanish
and Frencl. during. and ii support of
the American war of independence.
Gibraltar. however. is said to be no
| longer the impregnable citadel il
| proved to be $50 years ago. In the
first place. longrange guns make its
harbor and its bare rocky sides vulner-
able not only from the Spanish heights,
just across the narrow bay of Algeci-
ras. but also from the heights on the
African side. twelve or fourteen miles
away. In the second place. the lack
Of ground space makes the storing OF
coal and oil supplies in adequate
quantities for modern warships in
creasingly difficult. All food supplies
have to be brought from elsewhere,
and there is scarcely am fresh water.
Finally. its means of defense against
airplanes attacking the harbor. or sub
| marines operating in the straits. are
probably slight, owing once more TO
the narrowness of its territory.
Possibilities Cf Tangiers.
To proclaim. as some have. that
Gibraltar is obsolete. is certainly 10
exaggerate. In alliance with Spain it
| would still be admirable. With Spain
| neutral. and against an adversary hav-
ing no bases in the neigbborhood. il
would be of great utility. Even against
Spain alone. it might be held, unless
| the Spanish were to re"eal more mill
iary efficiency than is generally expec-
ted of them. But against Spain and a
great power. or even with Spain neu-
traI against a power ike France. hay'
ing naval and air bases not far away,
il might well prove mediocre. The
British know these possibilities better
than any one else. and in private con-
yerSation readily admit them.
1t is precisely the presumed decline
in the effectiveness of Gibraltar. COM
bined with the presumed inability of
Spain TO exercise the control theoret-
icallv hers. which now causes all eyes
in the western Mediterranean-not
only French and Spanish. but British
as well-to be fixed on the town and
bay of Tangiers, the international
port of Morocco. good natural har-
Dor. at the western entrance TO the
straits on the African side, % miles
across from Trafalgar.