San Antonio light. [volume] (San Antonio, Tex.) 1911-1993, 1923-01-07

special OdDle 10 Inc san AuIOulO LlSDI
and the Chicago Daily News.
.- Copyright. 1928.
Paris, Jan. 6.-In France the publ
cation of the British reparations plan
has produced profound establishment.
According to a statement by high
French authority, hitherto the French
people have attributed most of the
Franco-British disagreements to the
former British prime minister and An
drew Bonar Laws advent as the head of
the British ministry inspired immense
hope. But Bonar Laws plan appears to
be only slightly different from that Of
bis predecessor. 1t represents, therefore,
not the changing policy Of single indi-
vidual but the continuing policy of u
nation, and French opinion hencefOrth
will be unable to distinguish between
the British people and the British gov
eminent.
British Policy Unchanged.
The Franco British controversy in
wolves the basic policy of the two cOun-
tries. From the beginning of the Paris
peace negotiations the British policy
began to appear, and still SO appears,
do IuuulStAll " anu
ready to take all precautions against
the rising power of France. Moreover,
first Lloyd-George and then Bonar Law
have merely continued in new terms
Britain's traditional policy - that of
Pitt in the eighteenth century and OF
Canning, PalmerSton anG Salisbury, III
the MISUNDERSTANDING. 80
British supremacy, which was exer-
cised uninterruptedly on the European
continent from the defeat of Louis XIV
to the world war, has been based on
this so-called policy of Equilibrium,
which in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries opposed British to French
power and in the twentieth century OPP
posed the Franco-British entente TO the
German power. Present day Great
Britain fears the growth of French
power as much as did the old Britain
of old. 1t is this political principle
rather than economic consideration
which causes Great Britain's hostility
to the French plans in the Ruhr ba-
--r- The French Position.
! French opposition to British views is
founded upon equally strong reasons
! Not only DO industrial reason oblige
French to demand payments from Ger
many, but there are political reasons, as
WELL France, which from 1871 to 1914
] lived in fear of irremediable defeat
considers that only a strict execution
of the treaty of Versailles can guaran-
tee its future security. According to
the French, only a firm application of
the treaty will convince Germany of
it's defeat and so bring about new
spirit.
Everything has tended to show that
I this execution of the treaty cannot be
expected from Germany's good will. The
coming of q resigned and repentant Ger
many is a myth. Nothing but con-
. straint or a threat thereof can pro-
] duce results. Thus there is a funda-
! mental divergence between the French
and British views, but for the time
. being the two countries nevertheless
] have predominant interests in conrInu-
ing collaboration in certain respects.
> Great Britain has too many troubles in
/ the Near East, India, Egypt ana Ire
J land, not to mention economic troubles,
\ TO enter upon a~policy of open opposi-
tion to France. Similarly, France too,
( is too greatly weakened by the war and
} too embarrassed financially TO do any
think but seek a compromise.
Want America Neutral.
n 1t is nevertheless to be feared that in
ethe long run this fundamental differ
ence will increase rather than diminish.
Some French diplomats feared that aft
J err the end of the war Great Britain
kwould be tempted to take advantage of
Frances difficult position to reduce
? this country TO a sort of British satel-
blite and hoped, accordingly, that the
limited States would continue in col
Elaboration with France and Great
Britain so as to re-establish the bal
lance. Statesmen here, in the inter-
tcst of civilization, assert this view but
+they add that the American return to
Regeneration must not be too long de-
1900 Moreover, if the United States
intends TO be really useful, say the
French, it must appear as an impartial
friend and not merely as a protagonist
Of the Anglo-Saxon bloc.