Worcester Democrat and the ledger-enterprise. (Pocomoke City, Md.) 1921-1953, 1923-07-21

Poor Showing Of German Foreign Office
'From a political standpoint, the Ger
man foreign office made very poor
showing. They chose the moment to
declare war when the Triple Entente
was in perfect understanding; when
the, best they could hope from Italy
was neutrality, and when the violation
Of the neutrality Of Belgium would de-
stroy the last hope Of keeping Great
Britain out Of the war. On the other
hand. they forced Turkeys hand most
cleverly by sending the Goeben and
Breslau into Constantinople. A bet
ter instructed intelligence service for
England and France would have hit
upon this procedure as being at least
possible, and might have led to in
structions to Troubridge to follow
these ships through the Dardanelles.
destroy them at all costs, and control
the straits.
"But. in the realm Of psychology, the
German failure is most apparent. What
could be more stupid than Bethmann's
alIusion to the Belgian treaty as q
scrap Of paper or the sinking. Of
the Lusitania after the warning pub
lished In the New York papers. which
prevented a possible explanation that
the sinking was unauthorized; Of the
'Spurlos versenkt' message sent In
code that a child could decipher; or
the Mexican-Japanese message Of Zim.
hermann. offering to Mexico Texas
and California. while we were still
neutral and trying to keep out OF
war. It makes little difference in
psychology what justification exists for,
any action II It is calculated to produce
an ugly effel on the popular mind;
that effect Is a factor that must be
carefully weighed against any advan.
tages that may be gained.
"In the economic field the German
estimate was fundamentally unsound.
since, SO far as known at the time. sue
cess depended upon overwhelming vic
tory on land In short war. Sur
rounded by enemies, an economic
blockade was q certainty. The efi-
cheney Of the submarine as weapon
against commerce had vet to be dem.
onstrated, and with Great Britain's al.
most certain entry into the struggle.'a
long war was Inevitable"
Captain McNamee asserted that all
human action was based on informa-
ton, and whether one dealt with his
private business or with public affairs.
II his actions were not based on trust
worthy information he was playing o
game Of blind mans buff"
information 10 Vital.
o. N, 1.-The Office Of Naval Intelli-
gence-he said. Is merely a government
agency for supplying that information,
and he insisted that information re.
specting the probable intentions Of
other powers helped to maintain peace.
Military intelligence in time Of war or
combat intelligence, said Captain Nc
Nance, had this important difference
from intelligence covering political.
economic and psychological factors
it's value depended largely upon its
timely reception. "The facility OF COM
munication by airplane. radio and
WIRE" he said, "has SO Increased the
possibilities Of rapid strategic and
concentrations that combat in
formation to be Of use must anticipate
the enemy's dispositions sufficiently to
permit of counter measures"
Pointing out the manner In which
the intelligence problem Of the navy In
time Of war differed from that Of the
army, and declaring that the "check-
mating Of the aviator. spy or traitor
In our own ranks is the hardest prob
lem Of modern warfare" Captain Nc.
Nance asserted that navies, unlike
armies, operated largely in the realm
Of the unknown.
I'm time Of war, II naval In.
formation will be hard for the enemy
to secure. 1t will be equally hard for
us. This points to the necessity for
obtaining everything possible in ad-
vance OF war. When war comes It
will be too late. In addition, with an
efficient intelligence service, the coun.
try can. In time Of peace, save millions
of dollars In experimentation and
costly mistakes by knowledge Of the
results attained by friendly powers In
the solution Of similar problems
"For combat information preceding
and during a naval action the com.
mander In chief will be largely at the
mercy Of his intelligence service. He
may know In a general way the
enemy's strength in the theater of.war
and his possible intentions, but he viii
on the eve o. action find the situation
becoming hourly more confused by con.
flicting information-reports Of enemy
forces sighted by aircraft, by auxil-
iaries, by neutrals; false reports
broadcast by the enemy, some Of which
will purport to come from his own
ships.
"Amid all the confusion there must
sit near the admiral an intelligence
staff that can winnow the wheat from
the chat. Expert RADIO men may know
the wave lengths the tune. the idiosyn-
eracies and touch of the enemy's op-
orators. This sounds impossible. vet It.
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