The Donaldsonville chief., 1922-10-28
COULD HAVE PREVENTED WAR.
The Kaiser of Germany Had the
Power But Did Not Use 1t.

The Kaiser of Germany Had the
Power But Did Not Use 1t.
The following interesting editorial
aiken from a recent issue OF the New
York Times throws some light upon
The attitude and acts of VIM. Hohen-
Zollern, former Kaiser of Germany,
during the days which Immediately
preceded the world war:
''In today's installment of his mem
oirs the former German En-
peror gives such account as he
sees fit Of the circumstances
connected with the outbreak OF
he war. What he tells is very
scanty and not always accurate,
out coming from this source it is Of
considerable interest if of little i'm
)ortance. 1t adds nothing to the
history of the war, but good deal
% the material for historical judg-
nent of William Hohenzollern. =.
''It is not to be wondered at that
lis explanations, like those of most
German apologists, are generally be
;ide the point. Evidence is adduced
o show that there was plentiful ma
erial for war in the Europe OF
1914, as everybody knew at the time;
but the Germans are not convincing
n what they say about the actual oc-
urrences which made the possibility
L reality. Our documentary informa-
ton as to what went on in the last
weeks of 1914 is not SO full as it
might be, but there is a good deal of
lt-enough to warrant a judgment
which is not likely to be overthrown
hy later disclosures.
"Whatever the strength Of the
elements in Germany which wanted
war for commercial or political rea
sons, Or which preferred to trust to
military force in which Germany ad
mittedly excelled, rather than to
diplomacy in which Germany's weak
ness was obvious, for the attainment
of the national ends, it can hardly be
doubted that the crime Of the German
government was greatly aggravated
by its incompetence. To cite par
allel from the statutes of this state,
it is assault in the second degree to
point loaded weapon at somebody
with whom you are arguing; but if
you pull the trigger and shoot him it
Immediately becomes felonious as
sault in the first degree. The Ger
mans willed only a second-degree as
sault, but when their bluff failed to
scare off the Russians they knew no
other way out than to pull the trig-
ger. Thus what began as an effort
to repeat, on larger scale, the diplo-
matte triumph of 1909 led to a war
which apparently nobody in the Ger
man government positively wanted at
the outset, but of the successful out
come of which they were so confident
that they decided to take chance.
'From the evidence now at hand,
the one man who must bear the guilt
of the war above all others is Count
Berchtold, the Austro Hungarian
foreign minister, and with him his
supporters and instigators such as
General Conrad Won Hoetzendorff
and Count Forgoch. They were sure
that the big brother in Berlin would
protect them; as an irritated German
statesman wrote during the crisis,
they were busily rattling another
mans saber. The famous Russian
mobilization gave the Germans a use
tul excuse for home consumption, but
1t did not make war inevitable. 1t
was apparently the outcome of hurry,
excitement and alarm which in turn
operated on other hurried, excited
and alarmed personages in Berlin who
thought that the simplest way out
was to leave the decision to the Ger
man army. But the great fault of
the Germans was not then but earlier,
when Kaiser and Chancellor, having
that the army and navy
were ready, and having convinced
themselves that Russia and France
were too weak to offer resistance.
told the Austrians to go the limit and
De sure that Germany would back
them up.
Very little appears from Williams
own narrative as to his personal share
in all this, but the German documents
already published show that during
all the decisive period he was prod
ding the Austrians on, and assuring
them when they showed signs Of
weakening that he would see them
through. Whether or not war was
inevitable on July 81, it could GER
talnly have been avoided at any time
up to July 28, and without sacrificing
the great diplomatic victory for the
Central Powers which the Serbian
answer to the ultimatum implied
William himself thought so when he
hrst read the reply, but immediately |
afterWard concluded that the Austrian
army must have a satisfaction of
nonor' On that day, July 27, he had
= better opportunity even than he had |
mad on July to keeo the Austrians
within bounds. He had the oppor
unity and the power, but did not use
It: Il he had said no, there would