The Washington herald., 1922-09-26

| promised, as an accomplished fac,
and henceforth the central point II
their internationhl relations Con.
sciously, then, ne British had, In
the mass. turned their .bacNs upon
Europe and exchanged q French for
an American alliance. -
It was the confident British ex-
pectation that when the league OF
nations organized ana assembled for
its first session. British and Amer
lean representatives acting In COM
mon would control this body. and
be able to direct world affatrs,
amending the Versailles treaty, re-
ducing reparationss In word .soins
anything and everything which
might seem to them advantageous
II was this conception OF the league
OF nations which gave Il the only
wide popularity which It ever had
in Britain.
" = Amusement Of Britain.
Everyone can see. however, the
complete British amazement and
disappointment which resulted from
the American rejection OF the league
OF nations. the American refusal to
Join Britain in the three-power
treaty guaranteeing the integrity
and security of France and in our
unmistakabie determination to
avoid any kind of alliance or
lpertnershipy intsrnationafly valid,
whether with Britain, France or
with the nations which were now
members Of the league Of nations.
The whole edifce of British for
eign policy the whole belief and
desire off, the mass of the people
was shaken. Quite characteristical-
ly the British were slow in ,accebt-
ing the fact. I suppose II 10 no
exaggeration to say that the de-
cisions which have come with such
regularity since 1919 and have
shown American determination to
Keep out Of European entangle-
ments to be steadily Increasing In
Intensity, are still regarded in many
English quarters as inconclusiye,
| Lloyd George himself expected
Mr.. Wilson's success. He was even
betrayed into several indiscreet
revelations of partisanship during
the Senate fight, which were the re-
suit OF his serene confidence in the
ultimate success of his Paris asso
ciate. When the President was
beaten In the Senate and the fight
transferred to the political arcns,
many. many Engiishmen ciung to
the conviction that what had been
rejected by the Senate would be ac-
cepted by the people.
| Even when the people. by a T.
100000 majority defeated the
Democratic candidate who had
openly accepted the league as the
chief issue Of campaign and adopted
for himself the role of standard
bearer for Mr.. Wilson's cause, there
remained not a few more or less
prominent Britons who still be-
lieved that the popular emotion was
transient and due to a variety of
causes and that sooner or later, ano
probably with little delay, Amer
lea would return to the idea of the
British alliance. either within or
without the league of nations, and
pending that time British enthu-
siasm for the league was visibly put
on ice. 1t was not the league but
the American partnership in the
league which was mainly desired.
Saw Hope Nm Farley Here.
The Washington conference, .
year ago. was hailed in London as
sign that the long expected mo-
ment was at hand. Instantly Brit
ish statesmsnship seized upon the
American invitation. 1t was i'm
mediately welcome because the
question of American naval compe-
tition had to be settled and if the
American building program were to
be carried out, then automatically
the British supremacy would be a
/ n mi
penses were undertaken which were
beyond all reasonable possibility.
But, important as this item was,
1t was subordinated to the larger
question of bringing back the
United States to Europe--not nee
essarily to Geneva. The British
had abandoned the French for the
American partnership and they
were quite as ready to drop the
league of Mr.. Wilson for any sort
of an association, which Mr.. Hard
ing might advocate. Underlying
all else in British policy so far as
Washington was concerned was the
revival Of the idea of an Anglo
American partnership.
When the naval item had been
disposed of the British hand was
| shown. There was first the pro-
posal to turn the Washington con-
ference into financial meeting,
where the European situation. rep
arations and inter-allied debts
might be considered, the British
reckoning not incorrectly that at
least in reparations we should stand
with them and not too absurdly cal
culating that Mr.. Hughes might
follow his naval bombshell, by
which we resigned potential naval
supremacy by another which would
announce our readiness to cancel
war obligations on certain terms.
which would be easy for the British.
Failing in this respect the next
venture was the invitation to
Genoa. Had We accepted this the
British would have felt that their
long waiting had been not in vain
and that after all America was
coming back, for they again reck-
oned that at Genoa they would
have our support. But instead came
the blunt refusal on our part to go
to Genoa and the widespread re-
sentiment in this country of the
British Soviet policy. Indeed to
British horror It became plain that
in this affair we inclined to French
rather than British views. Our
later refusal to go to The Hague
terminated this experiment.
Balfour Note Considered,
Finally we come to the Balfour
note, the last test of American SEN
timent and the final investigation
of the possibility of an Anglo
American partnership. This Bal
four note. moreover, instead OF
eliciting American sympathy and
stimulating American generosity, had