The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1922-01-08

submarine.
Now. the real measure of the Brit
ish success automatically speaking,
lies in the fact that when the SUBJ
marine question came up for final
settlement, the press of the United
States were already playing the Brit
ish game. Mr.. Hughes and his asso-
ciates. Notwithstanding the position
they had taken in advance of the dis
cussion. Notwithstanding the unani-
nous report of the advisory COM
mittee. were already in the position
Of demanding that France accept the
British viewpoint, which had already
been adopted by themselves. after a
conversion SO rapid as to defy all
comparisons.
Thus, by superb management. the
British had brought the whole situa-
ton up to the point where the sue
cess of the American conference
turned on French surrender to a
British purpose. And il. by any
chance, France should refuse TO sur
render. despite the pressure eXerted
by an American press in which Brit
ish propa ganda had fourished for
! weeks. then, at least France would
lose her standing invAmerica. 1t was
deadly. an ultimate proof OF the
/ skill of British maneuvcr. In either
case Britain now won and France
lost.
various Influences Active.
France refused, as we all know
because she was more interested IN
blocking the British than in placat'
ing the American public opinion
which had been raised against her.
| Perhaps she was a little Influenced
| by the fact that in thus blockinf
the conference. she dealt return
blow for that which President Hard
\ ing's party had dealt France in
| throwing out the treaty of Yer
| sailles and the treaty of guarantee
| Perhaps she was a little Influenced
| by the storm of abuse and the tor
| rent of attack which had been lev
elled at her from American sources
But ] think, in the main, the French
played their game without emotion
coolly and with extreme calcula
ton.
| 1t was not the fault of the French
that the fortunes of the American
conference had been made to turf
about a stake in an Anglo-Frenci
dispute. Had their own diplomacy
been more adroit. perhaps this di
lemma might have been avoided
But IL had not been avoided. o
| two evils France had to choose on
and she unhesitatingly chose TO de
feat the British purpose 0nd keel
her hands free to deal with that Eu
ropean situation which was for he
matter of life and death. She fore
saw the storm that would breal
about her head and she accepted IL
She was lighting England and sh,
| kept her mind fixed upon the rea
matter in hand
II an American would understand
the thing. he must put aside all tn,
preconceived notions which mos
Americans have about the confer
| ence and about Europe generally
He must for the moknent dismis,
even the question Of right anC
wrong. remembering that rights anc
wrongs frequently change places a,
| one crosses frontiers. France IL
| lighting for her life after the dread
full experience OF rhe world war. Sc
is Britain. Both suffered 'terribI,
and II is not for any American e
say which has the greater claim e
outside aid. The fact Is that thu
views of each people, as to what i.
essential to future prosperity, ever
security. collide violently. The,
have been colliding for three years
The Washington conference is only
an incident in this struggle.
And this struggle is for each a.:
matter of life and death. Each see,
that American aid would be invai
liable, each dreams that il can per
suade the United States to play IL.
game against its antagonist. Boil
came here to do ii. But the Eng.
hshman won the rubber. He sold
his ideas to the American public. h.
enlisted the American representa-
tives, he persuaded Mr.. Hughes an,
his associates to drop the subma
rinc and to attempt to persuade tn,
Frcnchman to drop it. too. Where
| upon the Frenchman. helpless other
wise, refused to yield and the crasI
came.
Bargain WIN Issue.
Now the battlefield shifts to En-
rope. France and Britain will firb,
it out automatically abroad. The,
will maN their bargain. Tb,
British will give something m,
French will yield something. tn,
submarine will be removed as ;
basis for trading and then il viii
be possible to go on with the in.
terrupted program of Washington
We are not dealing with war q,
the danger of war. but with tw,
partners. who have fallen out nnC
nave got to find a new basis 70,
agreement.
There is danger that the situation
VIII be too long protracted. thai
france may be driven or led to us.
her weapons against Germany, be.
cause Germany. encouraged b,
Angio-Frencn disputes. will refuse
to pay. Until there is Anglo.
French agreement economic recon.
ssuction in the world will be post.
roned. TO the great injury of Britain
| ana 10. the material DISADVANTAGES n,
the United States. But there will
not he war between Great Britain
ana France or the danger of IL.
Inc pity is that our own diplo.
macy was not wise enough to pcr.
ceiVe that an Anglo French battle
was on the calepdar. that both par.
Ties were going to fight for our
| support, and that Mr.. Hughes wa.
not quick enough to appreciate tina,
III one party even seemed tn enlis,
our aid, then our influence over tho
other would instantly cease. An at.
tempt to coerce France, to persuad,
or push France to fall in with z
project We had adopted under Brit.
ism influence. pointed straight t.
disaster for the conference Anc