Pueblo chieftain., 1922-03-12

xoEAt0AhS tAoS VAoIus AOuAo AA0A boAl DS-
tween the possibilities OF two misun-
derata aiding with the United States)
II she retained the treaty. (with
Japan If she denounced the treaty;
and we have long come to the conclu-
eion that the only possible way out of
this impasse, the only possible way of
removing these suspicious and diff
culties, which are some OF the great
est obstancles to that condition Of GER
tain peace which Is the only tolerable
condition after all for civilized people
was that we should annul. merge. de-
stroy, as it were, this ancient and out
worn and unnecessary agreement and
replace it by something new, some
thing effective, which should embrace
all the powers concerned in the vast
area of the Pacific"
1t is impossible to read these words
OF Mr.. Balfour's without sympathtz-
ing with his position and Great Brit
aims. After all, the Anglo-Japanese
alliance had served a great purpose.
1t has insured the fact that Japan
should be ono of the Allies in tho war
against Germany. But for this
Anglo-Japanese alliance. Japan would
have been free, il she had chose, to
join hands with Germany in the recent
war. After all, a good deal of graft
tude Is due to an instrument which
has served so great a purpose.
VI.
1t is probably quite true that in the
Washington Conference, Hughes and
the American delegation might have
driven a harder bargain. We might
have insisted that Great Britain and
Japan should terminate their alliance
without any substitute from us. But
bargain driving was not a part of the
American program at the Conference.
To have driven a hard bargain on
this point might possibly have been
successful. We had the cards to win
such bargain, probably. II we had
chosen to take that attitude. But to
have done so would not have left the
sense of mutual accomm odation which
Is an essential part of that will for
peace" which the conference was call
ed to bring about. To have insisted
that Japan and Great Britain should
terminate their alliance for no better
reason than that America didn't like
ton, but arrogance.
VII.
If man were to dismiss partisan
considerations. II he were to act as IL
he alone were the responsible states
man of the United States, he would
probably vote to ratify the four power
treaty. Tho work OF the washington
Conference stands as a whole. 1t is
nowhere said among the treaties that
each is contingent on the other; and
do not know of any nation that has
said it will refuse to ratify the other
treaties II We refuse to ratify this par
ticular one. But everyone must realize
that II we reject one portion of tho
work of the Conference. we will be In
no position to reproach another nation
for rejecting other parts of II. This
is the view that probably will pre-
vail ultimately. But before tho four
power treaty Is ultimately ratified. the
= ill ,V,A
they will be justified in saying 1t.
They are asked by the Republicans to
sink their party advantage in the in
terest of 4 harmony which the Re
publicans themselves most flagrantly
flouted two years ago when It was
Mr.. Wilson's proposal OF a Leaguo OF
Nations that was under consideration.
1t is legitimate party strategy for the
Democrats now to dig up all that the
Republicans said two years ago
against entangling alliances The
Democrats SEQ Senator Lodge. who
was the foremost In bedeviilinE Will
son. now blandly asking tho Demo-
treaty which 10 the outcome Of con-
ference held under tho auspices OF a
Republican Administration. 1t IS
rather too much to ask the Democrats
to refrain from criticiein8 the secrecy
that attended tho negotiation of the
four-power treaty. when they recall
how fiercely the Republicans crit!-
clsed the secrecy that attended the
making Of the League of Nations.
But after the Democrats have taken
their satisfaction out OF the Rcpub-
licans generally. and out OF Lodge par
ticularly. probably enough of them
will give their votes to ratification
to mike 1t successful. In saying this,
It should be added that much depends
on the state of public feeling. II
there should be my considerable rc-
cession from tho present popular APP
proval of the treaties as a whole, II n
state of suspicion against tho four
power treaty should arise or be built
up. that would instantly reflect It.
self among senators who at best will
vote for ratification with personal
reservations. believing that they nrc
subordinatinR party advantage to tho
general international good.
Copyright. 1922. by the New York
Evening Post. Inc.)