The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1922-03-19
People Urged to Back Harding 81
Plan for Big Merchant Marine

plan OF creating an adequate American
merchant marine by measures providing
for ship subsidies.
There Is no question Of the necessity
for developing an American merchant
marine ut least equal to the merchant
marine Of any other country.
America has assumed the leadership
Of the world in industry, and the de-
STABILITY Of possessing an American
merchant marine to distribute American
products through the world and to de-
vel0p to the utmost new markets for
them il apparent to everyone.
A now and vital need for an American
merchant marine, however, has arisen
with the proposed new treaties Of al
lance and agreements to limit naval
construction.
The theory Of these agreements Is
that the United States should be
allowed navy equal to that Of Great
Britain. But the actual sea power Of
Great Britain, the actual naval force
available in time Of war, is the navy Of
Great Britain plus the convertible
merchant marine. -
In fact, It Is easily conceivable that
the actual battleships Of Great Britain
might not in time Of war equal in i'm
portance the immense convertible mer!
chant marine which Great Britain has
developed and is always further de-
veloping.
Certainly the actual naval vessels OF
Great Britain plus her convertible mer-
chant marine-her auxiliary navy
give her q sea power double that Of the
United States under present conditions
And when we add to this the sea
power Of Great Britain's ally, Japan,
which consists Of formidable navy
plus formidable convertible merchant
marine, we see how dangerously inferior
the United States Is with a naval de-
Tense limited to its purely naval vessels.
To express the situation in figures
similar to those which have been used
in the international naval agreement
let US place the actual British naval
strength at five plus q convertible mer-
chant marine equalling another FIVE.
Let us then place the Japanese navy
at the figure three, plus convertible
merchant marine equalling another
three.
The total of these units Of sea power
would then sum up ten for Great
Britain, six for Japan, and sixteen for
the Anglo Japanese Alliance
To oppose this combination, or even
to oppose one of these nations indi-
vidually, the United States has an
actual naval force equal to five units,
and q convertible merchant marine
barely equal to one unit.
So that under present conditions the
fighting force of the United States
naval power plus merchant ships con-
vertible into an auxiliary navy-is prac-
tically no greater than that Of Japan,
not much more than half that Of Eng
land, and only little more than third
that Of the Anglo Japanese Alliance.
The Importance of merchant marine,
therefore, for the United States now
becomes much more than commercial.
It is vital matter Of adequate naval
defense.
The proportion Of naval defense
patronizingly permitted to the United
States by Great Britain is wholly in
adequate in the face Of the Anglo
Japanese Alliance.
But it becomes fearfully insufficient
In the absence of q convertible merchant
marine at least equal to that of Great
Britain. The question, therefore, before
the country is not whether we should
have an adequate merchant marine. All
patriotic citizens, Democratic or Repub-
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