The Washington herald., 1922-10-05

ence at the Golden Horn would he
slight and France and italy would
have the inside track.
British Attempt Fails.
But the British attempt to make
the Turkish affair q matter Of COM
mon concern failed completely. The
French were not prepared to Invite
attack in Syria and insurrection in
North Africa simply to insure Brit
ish domination at the Straits or -
prevent Turkish posse Of Ad-
rianople and Eastern Thrace. The
Italians were similarly resolved TO
avoid religious trouble in Tripnli
and saw with equanjmity a further
reduction of Greek territory on the
European continent.
1 Both France and italy were
1 agreed that the principle Of the
freedom of the Straits should be
maintained, but they totally dis
agreed with the British view Ct
how 1t should be maintained. They
saw that. II the defenses of the
Straits were demolished and Turkey
| forbidden to fort!fy. then the ErJt-
lsh fleet, supreme In Europe. would
in reality dominate the Straits. Ac-
| cordingly italy and France pre-
! ferred either Turkish occupa Il On
,, under certain guarantees or trans
fer to the league of nations, which
/ should have an. international garri-
! son assigned to itD orders for the
purpose of guarding the Straits.
Europe refused to lift a niger to
aid the British and the British ap-
a. TT
| somewhat chilling II perfectly po-
lite reception. Even in Great Brit
ain criticism OF the Lloyd George
policy, was quite general. But the
real fear IN all the British Empire
was not due 20 any exaggerated
| notion of the possibilities of TURK
lsh advance to the Straits. but to
apprehension of the effect upon .he
Mohammedan populations of the
empire of a British war with the
victorious Turk. returned to pres
! tige in Islam and trying to rescue
the holy places OF the Mohammedan
from Christian rule or control.
What was Immediately to be
feared was a rebellion in Mesopo-
tamia-the deliberate return OF the
Arabs to the Turkish lead. More
over. Kemal said with great direct
ness that British interference at
the Straits. interference with Turk
ish occupation of Constantinople
and Of Adrianople, would be met bv
Turkish activity In Mesopotamia.
In addition there was the never
absent dread of further disturb
ances among the Indian Mohamme-
dams, who have given many signs
of unrest in recent years.
VIII Not Mean General War.
The return of the Turks will not
mean a general war in Europe now.
for Europe. generally speaking. is
very little concerned about who
holds the region between the Bull
garian frontiers and the Aegean.
and It Is only a little more inter-
ested in who holds the Straits.
Most of Europe would much prefer
to see the Turk rather than the
Greek in Constantinople, although
the Greek claim is by all odds the
better and the choice is between
vilization and barbarism. because
Greek presence would mean British
control and would enable British
policy to exert pressure upon all
the states in the East and South of
Europe.
Had the British accepted Poin-
cares proposal Of an Anglo-French
alliance, then French troops would
have been compelled to march with
British now: but the British. fear
ing that the first call would orig
mate along the Rhine. rejected the
proposal and the first real conse-
quence has been the withdrawal on
French troops from the Asiatic
shore Of the Straits as the Turk
approached. II the British now de-
eide to fight 1t out. they will have
to fight alone: the scene OF the real
struggle may be along the Eu-
pirates. and not at the Golden
Horn.
IT, by contrast. the British finally
decide to accept the Turkish terms
they will have to consent to a loss
of prestige which passes anything
their whole history in the Near
East-and must face very grave
consequences in all their Moham-
medan regions. For the time be-
ing. too, they must expect to see
II TenCH 70 lCSscT utSItCs
Italian influence exceed their own
at the Sublime Porte.
But in using the Greek without
actually joining him in the fight
ing-without supplying divisions
and artillery. aviation and all the
rest of the necessities in modern
war. and above all in not sending
British soldiers-the British have
laid too heavy a burden upon their
ally and the result has been his
collapse. OF course the British
could not send troops without aban-
doning the fiction of the free states
and interallied control OF Constan-
tinople. But while seeking to main
tain a fiction, the fact has escaped
them.
Last French support.
British policy, too. has at last
been overtaken by the consequences
of its play with the dearest in
terests of its recent allies. Had
the British stood with the French
on the Rhine, they would have been
sure OF French support on the
Bosporus. But the present French
policy is the inevitable conse-
quence of Lloyd Georges various
maneuvers from the moment Of
the Paris conference onward and.
as / have said, 1t was over Syria
that the Anglo-French division be-
gan in the Paris conference.
No one would undertake to fore
cast what the results of the pres
ent affair may be for the British
Empire, or what effect they may
have upon the personal fortunes
of Lloyd George. But both for
the empire and for the premier the
Greek collapse and the Turkish ad-
vance constitute terrible defeats.