New-York tribune., 1922-01-08

justification FOR publishing this
book IS that It describes the
climbing Of a soldier from the bottom
to the top OF the military ladder, and
even In this feat there Is nothing re-
markable beyond the fact that it hap
pens to be the first Of Its kind in tho
annals of the British army"
The authors story OF his unprece-
dented rise makes interesting reading
and throws much light on the condi-
tions In the British service rs he saw
them at close range from the old Alder
ehot cavalry barrack room up to the
Office of chief Of the Imperial General
staff. Trooper Robertson showed ex-
traordinary eagerness to master tho
trade Of soldering from tho moment
he took the queens shilling, at Worces-
ter. on November 13, 1877. There were
few privates Of his type in the old
British army, composed, as 1t was, il
those days, of what he calls "old SOL
d;ers"-men who made the service a
livelihood and often brought their
wives and children in tho garrison
quarters The average officer Of that
period gave moro time to sport and
amusements than he did to study, and
Robertson, whom once he got his COM
mission, in 1883, had pretty smooth
sailing because OF his natural aptitude
and his zeal for self-improvement
through hard work. He served in In
dia, mastered many languages, showed
a liking for the information cervice and
was finally assigned to the staff in Lon
don. He became successively head of the
Foreign Intelligence section Of the War
Office, mmandant Of the War College
and Director of Military Training. When
the great war came in 1914 he was
ready for it.
On Western Front
He began his field service as Quar-
termaster General Of the Expedition
airy Force and in January. 1915. he be-
came chief Of the general staff OF that
force, under Field Marshal French. In
December, 1916, he was promoted to
be chief Of the Imperial General Staff
in London. remaining in that post un-
til February, 1918. when Lloyd George
crowded him out
There are. therefore, many other
Qualifications for this volume than the
one noted in the preface. Field Marshal
Robertson was in close touch with AL
lied military policy for more than two
years. He could throw much more
light on the development Of that policy
or negation Of policy-than he has
done in this narrative. 1t is unfortu-
OF war history that he decided, as he
tells US, "to avoid old controversies
connected with the supreme direction
of the war, and which occur to q
greater or less extent in all wars.
Such q discussion, the author holds,
"would only bore the ordinary reader
This is dubious assumption. A full
expos sition OF the causes OF the friction
with Lloyd George which cost him his
place would make sensational reading
,erhsps, AMI also be Of great historical
value
Robertson, having served with French
and Haig on the front in France, was a
pronounced "Westerner" in strategy
tic believed implicitly in beating the
enemy where he was strongest. He
forgot that. in coalition war, fought
on many fronts and involving intri-
cate political as we'll as military con-
sideration., it may be the best strategy
\ to attack the enemy at his weakest
rcint He dcridcs the Allied Eastern
= camp paigns. Yet it is u fact that the
Quadruple Alliance went to pieces af-
ter Alenby's and Franchet d'Esperey's
victories in the East. German morale
collapsed when Turkey and Bulgaria
we're beaten; for the thing that civilian
Germany dreaded most was the carry
ing of the war from any direction into
German territory.
Allied Military Control
lloyd George, as a civilian, sickened
Of the wasteful war Of attrition In
France. He felt that worth while mill.
tary successes in other fields could be
achieved at much smaller cost The
Palestine campaign was his pet project
Robertson had no use for Eastern
"sideshows," as he called them. When
he openly criticized Lloyd Georges Pal
estfne project at an Allied council IN
Paris early in 1918 q break between
the two men became inevitable.
It has been the general impression
that Robertson was removed mainly be-
cause ne opposed unif1cation Of Allied
military control he was strongly
against the creation at Rapallo in No
venlber. 1917, of q supreme war coun'
al. composed Of the Prime Minister
andE one other minister Of each Of the
major Allied powers, with an adjunct
committee Of military advisers. He
was equally against the development Of
this plan later in Paris by which the
military advisers became an executive
committee, with Foch 1T its head, en-
powered, nominally at least, to create
and have exclusive direction Of an Al
lied "strategical reserve"
Robertson says that Gin setting up
the council the real object of the min
woe ~,~oL 81 1rovs1A z.