The Washington herald., 1922-06-04
By FRANK H. SIMONDS.

Since the ending Of the Genoa con-
ference there have been many conn
parisons made between this meet
ing in the Italian city and the still
recent Washington conference. All
the commentators, both at home
and abroad. have agreed in the
fact that Washington was, meas
urably at least, success, while
Genoa, despite all the post-morten
camoufiage, was failure. But
from this point Of departure, end
less conclusions have been reached,
arguments have been adduced TO
demonstrate that had the method
of Washington been employed at
Genoa success would have fol-
lowed.
Here, of course, the whole case
breaks down. 1t is plain that not
even the Washington method could
have saved the Genoa conference.
Indeed what is rather the case had
there been any real attempt to ap-
ply the Washington method there
would have been no Genoa con-
ference. One of the greatest fal-
lacies of all the crop that apA
peared after our own conference
was the idea that a new method
ndu Dttn " uSoA
oldest of international diseases.
America In Drivers Seat.
The success at Washington, SO
far as success was attained lay
in the existence of certain facts
which were recognized. At the
bottom was the fact that the
United States had adopted a naval
program, which, II actually car
ried out. would give US the su-
premacy on the water. Great
Britain could not afford to keep
pace with us. given the burdens
resulting from the war. Japan
had never pretended to keep pace
with us, but was destined to fall
further and further behind since
she could not compete with us,
given her smaller financial re-
sources.
We then stood in the prospective
position of the first sea power in
the world. Nothing could stop US
unless We chose Of our volition to
forego our possibility. But 1t was
fact that the American people
saw no need for so great a navy
and were increasingly hostile to
the vast expenditures which were
necessarily required. Thus, while
Great Britain and Japan had every
reason to desire that there should
be a Limitation of armament since
without such Limitation they were
sure to be outclassed, American
public sentiment was opposed to
meeting the costs of sea su-
premacy.
Desire to Fix Limit.
The three great sea powers then
had a common desire to fix a limit
to naval construction. There was
no rivalry of a serious sort, no
recent recollection of aggression.
Since we could, II we chose. out
strip the other two. we sat in the
drivers seat. but in advance we
were prepared to resign this ex-
pensive glory. Now, when there
had been a series of private ex-
changes between these three gov
ernments which disclosed a COM
mon agreement nothing was more
simple than to call a public con-
ference to put It IN writing.
Insofar as naval strength was con-
cerned, there was, moreover. at the
conference itself only very minor diff
ferences of opinion as between the
three sea powers. The Japanese held
out for the Mutsu and got it, but
the ratios were maintained. by adding
extra tonnage to Britain and Amer
lea. A great deal of noise was made
over the question. but 1t was really
a minor matter. What was Of more
moment, was the political question in
the Pacific.
Built to Meet U. s. Policy.
The japanese navy was deliberately
constructed to meet an American
policy. More or less definitely we had
taken on the role of the protector
of China. We had, with one or two
notable exceptions. insisted on GER
tain things upon the continent Of
Asia and our insistence meant that
one day. II We adhered to such prin-
ciples. we should have to fight Japan.
For that day, Japan was preparing.
What Great Britain desired was
to put a limit upon sea strength.
which would leave her equal in
strength. rather than be outdistanced
as would be the case had we COM
pleted our program. What Japan
desired was to abolish the menace
to her our increasing naval strength
- oNiAAN POilCy CdEIlCu- u
do this she had to work for a con-
dition in which our fleet would be
eliminated as an offensive force in
those waters where she was vitality
interested, namely in the China seas
Sought Limit to Area.
What Japan sought in reality was
not a Limitation in the tonnage Of
capital ships. but limitation in the
area within which our fleet could
operate. She achieved this end by
means Of the four-power Pacific
treaty. under the terms of which we
agree not to add to the fortificatjons
OF the Philippines or erect forts on
Guam. In other words we agreed to
such conditions as make 1t impossible
for US to send our fleet beyond the
Hawaiian Islands.
But the United States as a people
were unwilling either to pay the costs
of wrestling sea supremacy from the
British or of supporting a policy in
the Far East which envisaged an in
evitable war with Japan. So agree
ment was easily had upon the ques-
ton Of the Pacific. These two sacri-
hces, the one to the British. the other
to Japan. insured the success of the
Washington conference. But one
must note that it was a case of
bargain pure and simple.
Desires Easily Hnrmonized.
So far Washington was a success
because all three sea powers had
purposes and desires which were
easily harmonized and tended to-
ward common end. That this was
the case was carefully ascertained
In advance and prepared for. Great
Britain. which had already prospec-
lively drnnnad q A. = 80