The New York herald., 1922-10-24

transit across State lines, Gloucester
Ferry Co. v. Pa. ia u. S. 1876.
Rhodes " Iowa, 10 u. S. 412. Louis
Vile & Nashville r. r. v. Cook Brew
ing Co., 223 U. S. 20. Danciger V.
Cooley, 24S u. S. 319. From this 1t
does not follow that the term trans
portation," as used in this statute,
implies delivery to another than the
person who carries the liquors. Sup
pose for example a parcel of liquor,
made after the amendment, and car
ried off to be laid away in cashe.
There can be no question, I believe
that two separate crimes would be
committed, manufacture" and trans
portation.'
Nor does 1t seem to me that the
18th and 14th sections of title III. OF
the prohibition act help the plaintiffs.
Under these carriers are required to
mark the consignor's and consignee's
names on the outside of all packages.
But it does not follow that a regula-
ton like this of one kind of trans
portation imputes to the word Itself
any of the conditions which it enacts.
In common use to transport means
to carry about. and l see no reason
why it should mean less in section III.
The law clearly intended by immobil-
izing liquor to make surreptitious traf-
fic in it impossible, and its policy
would as well cover movements which
might be incidental to. as those which
Immediately terminated in, delivery
to some one else.
The case of Street VS.. Lincoln Safe
Deposit Company. 254 U. S. IS, did
not decide anything to the contrary;
it turned upon the fact that the pos
session of the liquor in the leased room
and in the house were both lawful.
and that the movement from one to
the other could not be unlawful. To
apply it to the cases at bar Is to beg
the question, because the lawfulness
of the possession here depends upon
whether this is transportation under
the statute. The steamers have no
express warrant of law, as Street had.
for the possession of the liquor. l.
conclude therefore. that the carriage
in question Is Transportation"
The first point being thus disposed
Of, come to the seconds 1t is a very
plausible argument to say that ships
stores ought not to fall within the gen.
eral language of Section Ill. (Prohibi-
ton Act), so plausible indeed that for
three years 1t prevailed with the au-
thoritles charged with the enforcement
OF the statute. Their understanding
is not to be ignored in interpreting the
law itself. under well-settled canons.
Since 1893 II has been recognized
In the customs regulations of the
United States (Revised Statutes. Sec
tions 2795, 2796, 2797), that reason
able sea stores shall not be subject to
duty. While they must be manifested
and may not be excessive in guam
tity. as such they are not regarded as
entering into the commerce of the
country.
The plaintiffs say that. therefore,
when section III. of the national Pro-
hibition- act forbade generally the
transportation of liquors, II must be
read in the light of this statute and
the long usage under it. and that what
is not within the United States for
the purposes Of customs, ought not
to be so for purposes of prohibition.
In addition they urge that under the
maritime law 1t Is held that for most
purposes sea stores will be treated
as a part of the ship herself. II she
is not regarded as being within the
country. neither ought the accessories
to her voyage.
It Is. of course true that one should
not interpret statute, and least OF
all a Constitution, with the text in
one hand and dictionary in the
other and so courts have often held
in similar cases to these, Brown VS..
Drchesne. 10 How. 7s3. Taylor v.
U. s.. 207 T. S. 120. Scharrenburg
V. Dollar Steamship Co., 245 U. s.
122. Nevertheless. every one must
agree that the question is no more
than one of Interpretation, for in the
cases at bar Congress certainly might.
II II chose, prevent the entrance OF
any liquor whatever within the bor-
ders of the United States, not only
under the Eighteenth Amendment, but
indeed under It's power over foreign
commerce. It Is a question, therefore,
OF the implied limitations upon words
which literally in any event cover the
case
Grovan v. Walker. supra. and
Anchor Line VS.. Aldridge. supra.
plainly meant to adopt broad canon
for the Interpretation of the National
Prohibition Act, following the adno-
milton at the end of the first para
graph of section three. Effecting a
revolutionary reform in the habits of
the nation, the statute Is to be UNDER
stood as thorough-going In its intent
TO accomplish the results desired. II
did not specify the extent of its appli-
cation in. detail. but left that TO be
gathered from its occasion, and the
generality of the words used.
II intended to exercise once for all
the complete power OF Congress under
the amendment. and It's very want of
particularly is good index that II
meant to cover what II could. For
this reason II Is to be distinguished
from earlier local acts of the same
kind. as for example the Alaskan Pro-
hibitlon act, upon the language Of
section 20 on which the plaintiffs rely.
Indeed specification In the statute
might have defeated It's ends, on the
theory that what was omitted must be
taken as excluded. At least I cam
not read the two decisions cited with.
out supposing that II was In the fore
going scnee that the Supreme Court
meant section 3 TO be read.
Starting with that premise there
appears 20 me more reason for sup
posing that section TO cover these
ships stores than the transportation
there before the court | say this be-
cause IL was necessary to overrule
at least as much. II not more. TO reach
the result In those decisions, and es-
pecially because there were "a them
much stronger reasons 10 imply an