The Monroe journal., 1922-02-03
THE REAL PURPOSE
OF THE CONFERENCE
President Harding Had in Mind
the Question of Arms and
World Conditions
TWO FOLD ADJUSTMENT
Naval Competition Eliminated-Brit-
ain for First Time in History
Consents to Equal Strength
by Frank II. Simmonds

by Frank III. Simmonds
Washington, Feb. While GER
tain minor details remain TO be ad-
iusted and another plenary session
will be needed TO close up the con-
ference, the session of today in real
ity terminated the work and there
fore calls for some preliminary ex-
aminations of the tasks accomplished
and the success or failure of the con-
ference itself. viewed in the light of
what had been expected.
What, after all, was the main pur-
pose of the Washington conference?
II was two-fold. In summoning the
representatives of the various ma
tions President Harding had in mind
two distinct sets of problems. There
was the immediate question of arms
and policies in the Pacific affecting
the United States directly; there was
in addition the question OF the world
conditions as affected by the world
armaments.
To deal with the first question,
there was in the Pacific an unmis-
taxable rivalry growing up between
Japan and the United States an
antagonism which expressed itself
alike in increasing naval armament
and in growing tension. This situa-
tion was, moreover, accentuated by
the existence of an Anglo-Japanese
alliance. Allied to il, too, was the
problem of Anglo-American naval
competition. only indirectly related
to the fortunes of the Pacific. Since
these problems could not be separat-
ed, a single settlement has to be
found.
Four-Power Treaty
What then is the solution? First
of all, we have, as is logical, ar
rived al political adjustment,
two-fold political adjustment. BY
a four-power treaty, France being
included at the request of Mr..
Hughes. we have agreed with Brit
ain and with Japan TO respect terri
torial rights throughout the region
OF the Pacific ocean and TO confer
in case of differences between any
of the four powers or in case OF
differences between one of the four
powers and another nation not sig
natory to the treaty. In the Sec
ond place. and relying upon this
guarantee of mutual respect the
United States has consented TO re-
nounce the right TO fortify all its
insular possessions west of Hawaii,
including the Aleution islands, Guam,
the Philippines and Samoa.
This means in fact that the United
States has retired its naval frontier
TO the longitude of Hawaii, but our
sacrifice is accompanied by similar,
it not quite as considerable, con-
cessions on the part of Japan and
Great Britain and is based upon
the treaty of guarantee which |
have already mentioned.
In addition we have agreed with
the other two Pacific powers to a
relative strength of battleships. that
is in fighting fleets, which eliminates
all present competition in that arm,
which at the moment represents the
weapon of offense. Thus we have
eliminated the element of naval COM
petition, not alone between Japan
and the United States but also be-
tween ourselves, and Britain for the
first time in her history has consent
ed to recognize equality of fighting
strength in another great power.
France and Italy on their part have
also accepted ratios which cores
pond with their present strength.
In sum, then We have achieved in
naval strength and insular posses
sions a stable balance not alone
IN the Pacafic but also in the At
iantic, so far as offensive warships
are concerned. We have achieved
this by designations which we an
nounced in advance We were prepar-
ed to make, both in actual ship tom
age and rights to fortfy. And this
result is written into those treaties
which have been described as the
four-powel and fve-power pacts.
Target of Criticism
Criticism in the United States so
far has been concentrated upon the
four-power treaty exclusively and
upon that portion of the treaty
which seemed TO carry with ii COM
mitments with respect to France,
Japan and Great Britain in grant
ing questions. On this issue much
debate in the senate is promised
and many reser; ;ions are proposed.
but if one accept the statement
made by The negotiators them
selves, that the treaty carries no
such obligations, and If one con-
ceiye thai as It finally emerges from
the senate it will be fortified in this
respect, then il is quite plain that
by conference we have abolished
peril in the Pacific without going be-
yond the limit imposed by our own
traditions
In so far as naval armament il
concerned, the failure of the con-
ference, and the failure is not
chargeable to American represent
tiyes, covers all lines of war eraf.
save only battleships. The simpl,
fact has been that 1t was not poss
BILE for France and Great Britai
in advance Of this conference u
reach such political adjustment