The Washington times., 1922-10-01

Isolation Doubtful State.
More than that, the association
Of the treaty Is less equivocal than
the association proposed in Docu.
ment No. 2. The external association
mentioned in Document No. 2 had
neither the honesty of complete isola.
tion-a questionable advantage in
these days of warning nationalities
when 1t is not too easy for a small
nation 10 stand rigidly alone-nor the
strength Of free partnership satisfy
ing the different partners. Such ex.
ternal association was not practical
politics.
"De Valera and Childers labored
long over the framing Of an oath
which they knew had to be incorpor'
ated in any agreement that would be
acceptable to Great Britain. Their
first essay read as follows:
That for the purposes Of the as
sociation, Ireland shall recognize his
Britannia majesty as head Of the as
sociation.
Here surely is recognition as pre-.
else as that given in the treaty, but
1t met with such disapproval that De
Valera and Childers shelved 1t in IA
vor of another. namely:
II do swear to bear true faith and
allegiance to the constitution Of Ire
land and to the treaty OF association
OF Ireland with the British common
wealth Of nations and 10 recognize
the King of Great Britain as head
of the associated states.
This alternative oath was dis
NJ e..
weary days-in private sessions
De Valera attempted to explain that
the King of Great Britain might
fairly be regarded as a managing
director-a mere name in common
usage these days when industrial
concerns are almagamating and en-
tering into agreements.
The Kings Position.
THE King OF Great Britain would
thus occupy the same relative posi-
tion towards the associated states as
managing dj"ector occupies to-
ward associated businesses. Now. a
ma naging direCtoc is one whO man
ages and directs.
Whatever the practical value OF
royal prerogatives. no modern Demo
cratic nation is managed and directed
by one ruler. This talk of manag-
ing director was as nonsensical ;Ls
1t was dishonest.
"Throughout the Childers docu-
ment Document No. p there are
dangerous friction spots, which OBJ
viously were to be avoided by any
one with Ireland's interest at heart.
Ireland, being the weaker nation.
could not fail to suffer II a mislead-
ing clause had to be interpreted.
AS for the defense clauses, l have
already told how De Valera and
Childers gave way to England on
the only point that really mattered
agreement not to build submarines
1T would not do for them to say
submarines would be Of no use to
US. Childers, with his experience in
the royal navy, knows better. /
cannot believe De Valera Is so ig-
norant as not to know better. II he
believes what l have told him more
than once he does know better.
Document Dishonest.
But without going into tiresome
details, l want to state again that
from beginning to end this document
Is for the most part q repetition OF
The treaty-with only such slight
verbal alterations as no one but a
factionist would have thought II
worth while to have risked wrecking
the treaty for.
"As an improvement on the treaty,
Document No. 2 is not honest. 1t
may be more dictatorial in language,
but 1t does not contain in principle
a greater reconciliation with Irish
national aspirations.
1T merely ought to attach a fresh