The Washington herald., 1922-02-13

normal and hardly possible for
them to be divided. No nation can
very we'll have any one Of the three
without having the other two. No
nation can have the naval suprema-
cy alone because II is a tax-con-
sumner. 1t must usually be accom-
panied by the financial and mer-
camille shipping supremacy which
Is the producer Of the taxation that
supports the navy. In. the same
way any nation which has the
financial and mercantile, shipping
supremacy is pretty sure to go on
and take the naval supremacy in
order to protect the other two.
Position OF America.
Normally, it is probable that the
United States would have gone
ahead, would have completed its
supremacy in mercantile shipping,
and would then have seized the
supremacy in naval strength. The
probability of our doing this was,
however, subject to serious qualifi.
cations There always was and
still is, a considerable section of
well Informed opinion which con-
sidered it doubtful whether the
United States would ever achieve
supremacy in mercantile shipping.
We are not naturally a shipping
nation. A nation does not naturally
take to the sea If 1t has other re-
sources within its borders on which
to eNpend its energy and growth.
With our great natural resources in
land, in mines. and otherwise, the
tendency would always be to use
our man power and our money in
developing them. We could only
become a great mercantile shipping
nation by a prodigious effort, ac-
companied by large government
subsidies.
Also there Is some doubt whether
We would have been willing to
spend the money necessary to make
US the greatest naval power in the
world. There. were many among
us, including some of our most re-
sponsible leaders, who believed
that it would be our proper course;
in fact. that was the avowed DUR
pose on the part of some of our
most responsible leaders now in
power. We had actually inaugu-
rated a naval construction program
greater than any other nation
had ever attempted. At the same
time there were many among US
who believed that this would be
mistake. and We need only recall
as recent time as last winter to
be convinced that there was a most
earnest movement within the
United States to avoid the colossal
expense and other handicaps in
herent in our becoming the posses
scr of the greatest naval power in
the world. Furthermore, it is al
ways, to be doubted whether Great
Britain. in spite OF her present ap-
parent financial weakness, would
have been willing to let any other
nation definitely and finally super
sede her as the greatest naval
power. Somehow or other. through
whatever sacrifices it might call
for. she would try to find a way to
keep her position as mistress o. the
seas.
Naval Supremacy Trusteed.
That was the situation at the
time the Washington conference be-
gan. This conference went directly
at the heart of this Question Of
been done by de results of the
Washington conference is that
naval supremacy, instead OF being
the possession of any one power, Is
trusted. SO to speak, in group OF
three nations, Great Britain and the
United States each having five
shares. and Japan being a Junior
partner with three shares. This
trusteeship, this partnership in
| MI T..
The adoption of II is the thing
which more than any other one fac
tor causes the Washington confer
ence to stand out as a distinct de-
parture in history. That it is a glad
escape from the alternative Of navai
competition cannot be doubted by
any one who wishes well to the
human race.
II we assume that this partner
ship in the position of mistress OF
the seas is to endure, and II is now
decreed to endure for the fifteen
years of the naval holiday at least,
then that leaves for consideration
the one other element in world
dominance, Of which the possession
is still in doubt-namely, suprem-
acy In mercantile shipping.
In this respect the Washington
| conference COIncS 70 an END with
Great Britain still outcIassing US.
It is true that we have a shipbuild-
ing plant which would enable us to
outclass Great Britain IL we de-
termined to do it and go at it by
main strength. During the present
period of depression, when there are
not cargoes for as many ships as
are already in existence, there Is no
incentive for us to build more Rut
the present depression will end. A
time will come when all the ships
now in existence will be in use and
when there will be a demand for
more.
Policy Question Of Future.
What werare to do in anticIpu-
tion of this future condition is now
one of the major questions of the
policy which President Harding
must determine. He is generally
believed to be strongly in favor or
the United States having a mer-
camille feet inferior to no other ma
ton on the sea. In public addresses
he has announced this policy. At
this very moment he has on his desk
a report from a group, of experts,
upon which he Is expected within a
few weeks to construct a policy and
announce It to Congress. The gem
eral expectation is that this policy
viii favor government aid to prf-
vately owned mercantile shipping
In a large way, and will look for