The Connecticut labor news., 1922-03-17
-Why-What For!

precedentS to justify them III the is suing of labor injunctions. How then did they beget these precedents or acquire the authority?
 The question is natural one, and the answer illustrative of the policy of our American courts. AS they d1d not find precedents in the English courts, or those of any other civilized country, they made them, like Topsy, they just grew up" As the Constl- tuition and the law gave them no al- thority, they boldly assumed 1t. This Is what every official, judicial or quasi judicial functionary, has done when usurping power which has no basis for 1t either in the Constitution or in the law.
 The condition thus created by the decrees of our equity courts in con nection with industrial disputes has given rise to the growing resentment against government by injunction. While this term is expressive and comprehensive, we prefer to apply another which is as comprehensive and perhaps more truly descriptive government by judicial conscience.' v The equity judge not being governed by common or statutory law but be- ing guided wholly by his "consci- ence," issues orders which are binding upon all who come within its notice, disobedience of these edicts being punishable by contempt of court, which deprives the accused of trial by jury, and leaves the judges con science" free to act as the legislator, prosecutor, judge and jury, free to pass upon the facts and determine the punishment.
 The eqhity courts are governed by private and uncontrolled discretion, private because the judges con science" is his guide, and uncontrolled discretion because the power, author ity and limitations of the equity court it is claimed, have not been dehned by the Constitution, or the statutory and common law, though many of the nations ablest lawyers contend strenuously the very contrary.
 Lord Camden, one of England $ greatest thinkers and legal authorl- ties, said in connection with this:
 "The discretion of a judge is
 the law of tyrants; it is always
 unknown: it is different in diff
 ferent men; it is casual and de-
 ponds upon constitution, temper
 and passion. In the best it is
 OLI1II1CS CApIl(CS An lLAC "OASS IL 10
 every vice, folly and passion to
 which human nature is liable"
 The truth of Lord Camden's opin- ion grows upon us as we examine what American courts of equity have done when guided by their "consci- ence" and acting with uncontrolled discretion.
 First Injunction by State Court ....@. Issued in 1888.
 The first injunction issued in Amer ica was by a Massachusetts court in the case of Sherry vs. Perkins, in 1888 The court restrained the strik- CTS from "the act of displaying ban nerS with devices as means of threats and intimidation to prevent persons from entering into, or con- tinuing in the employment of the plaintiffs" In issuing this injunction, Judge Allen quoted the Springhead Spinning Company vs. Riley, which, fourteen years previously, had been set aside by the Lord Chancellor of England upon the ground that an equity court could not act, and had no jurisdiction in such cases.
 But a precedent had been establish cd for state courts to follow, just as a precedent had been established for federal courts in the cases referred to in a previous article.
 The opening had ben widened for the further exercise of judicial "con- science" and as the years have passed, trade-unionists have been en- joined among many other acts from in any way mentioning the fact that a strike existed; from striking or con tinuing to remain on strike; from in any way publicly discussing a specific industrial dispute; from paying strike benefits; from endeavoring to organ ize the .unorganized; from applying the discipline of the laws which the members themselves had made; from resisting the employers effort to de- stroy the union through the introduc- ton of non-union men i'll the plant, the discharge of members of the union, or compelling all of the em- ployes to sign contracts specifying that they should withdraw from the union and become a member of no union fvhile in the firms employ.
 Courts Have Restrained Almost
 Every Normal Activity.
 In fact, practically everything which trade-unionists have done to protect their organizations from be- ing destroyed by employers, or in connection with an industrial dispute resulting in a strike has been re- strained by some courts of equity.
 These decrees emanating from the judicial "conscience" have met with vigorous opposition on the part of some of the country's greatest state and federal judges, who have pointed out the unjust, the unconstltutlonai and un-American character of the restraining orders.
 The American. precedents which courts of equity use to justify their injunctions are opposed by a large volume of American decisions which vigorously condemn the precedents which are cited by the injunction granting judge. The precedeJts which have accumulated are so numerous and SO contradictory and conflicting, that the equity court today can find an ample number of decisions which 4L ;,,J~a deci6incr that he