The Washington herald., 1922-08-27
By FRANK H. SIMoNDS.

W nat, IN us largest meaning Is
the significance of the Anglo
French disagreement IN the recent
conference of London? This ques-
tion Is being asked the world over
at the present moment and nowhere
more frequently than in the United
States.
To answer IL one has to concede,
at first that London marked the
end of period. the period when
European history was dominated
by Great Britain and France. For
after the London episode no one can
seriously believe that there remains
AN Anglo-French partnership. 1t
was not what happened at this
latest of the thirteen post-bellum
pow-wows. which was responsible
for the termination of an associa-
tion. Rather one might say what
happened served to demonstrate the
fact that alliance was over.
Change In Viewpoints.
At the bottom the explanation
for the ending OF this International
marriage of two world powers
must be sought in the change in
point of view Of the high contract
ing parties. The Anglo-French en-
tente had its origin in the common
peril which each of the two coun-
tries felt in the later policies of
Germany. British arrangements
with Japan In the Far East, with
France and subsequently with
Russia in Europe. all either in their
origin or development related to
the deliberate challenge to Britain
which was disclosed in the upbuild-
ing of the German war fleet.
In a word. in 1904. when a Tory
ministry. headed by Lord Balfour
as he reminded the Washington
conference 4 few months ago began
conversations with France, which
were continued and expanded until
the world war broke. France and
Britain had as an underlying basis
Of agreement the common convic-
ton that Germany was plotting
the ruin OF each. 1t needed no in
volved explanation to make clear
either to the British or the French
publics in 1905. for example. the
year of the Kaiser's descent upon
Tangier. that German foreign
policy aimed at the separation of
Britain and France and the de-
structiOn of each.
Eighteen years later. however
that is at the present hour. what
is the situation? French policy. in
its larger aspects. remains un-
changed France still regards Ger
many as a potential enemy. The
man in office and the man in the
street are equally convinced that
Germany will renew her attack
hat h. II
b will succeed. provided France
makes two blunders-first. that Of
alIowRg Germany to reconstruct
her military machine. and second.
that of permitting Germany. by
evading payment of the costs Of
French reconstruction to put upon
French shoulders the staggering
burCfen Of the costs of the war.
For France the British arrange
ment to be attractive must hold out
The same inducements as the agree
ment OF 1904 did. namely moral IL
not legal assurance of military aid
in case of attack and physical as
well as moral support in the solu-
fion of the later problem of max
fnS Germany pay.
b No Longer Fears Attack.
y
has no further reason for dreadinc
German attack. The German
navy has ceased to exist, German
. coast defenses have been demol-
ished. German colonies have passed
to other hands. mainly British, even
= the German merchant marine Is
largely nonexistent. Therefore
British policy has no further inter
Ill 20 NO
restrain Germany. to prevent or 70
q defeat an attack.
Moreover, having ceased to be a
potential enemy. Germany becomes
b once more a customer Not only a
customer. but under certain circum-
= stances, a rival commercially. And
both as a customer and as a po'
tential rival. Germany is affected
- by French policy. II France un-
dertakes by force to compel Ger
man payment, IL France insists
i. upon payments Germany cannot OF
will not make. then the result is
the collapse Of German exchange
due to the German maneuver IN
face of French policy.
Affects British Trade.
The collapse Of German exchange
has two consequences for the Brit
ish; first It prevents them selling
- in German markets. second it ena-
bIes the Germans to undersell them
IN all other markets. In addition
-, German conditions having their ef'
feet on many adjoining nations, Bril-
tain suffers correspondingly and
her suffering is measured by an
unemployment army numbering al
one time as high as 100000 and
- stiIl above 100000.
A simple way to present th'
British and French cases is to say
that each has a devastated area
THAT of France represented by the
Germans during the war. that o.
Britain by an unemployment in th'
~post-war period The French in
sist that Germany shall pay for the
reconstruction Of their destroyed
provinces; the British demand thai
French policy toward German,
shall be go modified as to enable
British workmen to resume their
%a5ors.
One Wants Trade, other Cash.