The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1922-02-05


and the diverse relief organizations
sent by the United States to
stricken Austria have won our af-
lection and our trust.
In spite Of Wilson-for regret
to have to openly state that the
former President has not an ad.
mirer nor a friend left In all Aus
tria-wc look toward America as
to . guiding star Of destiny.
There are doubts in Austria a.
to whether Wilson came to grief
with his fourteen points" out Of
sheer inability. as the well-known
Englishman. Keynes asserts In his
book. or whether because he play
ed an unfair game. Today the
prevailing opinion throughout CEN
trail Europe Is that Wilson was
the ruin Of the central powers.
and that he 10 thus guilty Of the
utter economic shipwreck Of the
world. a calamity in which Amer
lea shares.
WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS.
When Wilson proclaimed his
fourteen points was the first to
explain to the statesmen then op-
ponents of America that they Of
fered q suitable basis for negotia-
tons. Wilson replied to my state
ment then in q speech containing
the following sentences:
Count Czernin seems to have q
clear understanding of the peace
foundations and does not obscure
their sense. He sees that an in
dependent Poland composed Of all
the undeniably Polish inhabitants,
Is q matter for European settle
ment and must be granted; fur
ther. that Belgium must be evac-
Nuated and restored. no matter what
sacrifices and concessions 1t may
involve; also that national desires
must be satisfied, even in his own
Z empire. In the common interests
of Europe and of humanity.
Though he is silent on certain
matters more closely connected
with the interests Of his allies than
with Austria Hungary. that is only
natural. because he feels COM
PEELED under the c:rcupstances to
defer to Germany and to Turkey.
Recognizing and agreeing with
the important principles in ques-
ton and the necessity Of convert
ing them into action. he, naturally
feels that Austria Hungary more
easily than Germany can concur
with the war aims expressed by
the United States. He would
probably have gone even further
had he not been constrained TO
consider the Austro Hungarian
alliance and the country's depend
ence on Germany"
SECRET MOVE REVEALED.
In the same speech the ex-
President went on to say:
Count Czernin's answer. refer
ring mainly to my speech on
February 8. il couched IN very
friendly terms. He sees in my
statements q sufficiently encour-
aging approach to the views Of his
own government to justify his be-
lief that they afford basis for q
thorough discussion Of the aims by
both governments"
Thereupon, I entered into direct
negotiations, ut that >time secret,
with Wilson, In order to put the
theory Of the fourteen points into
practice; that &. to set down, on
. basis q the fourteen points, tho
concessions Austria would mako
In regard to its new boundaries.
In the midst Of these negotiations
I was obliged to resign from office
and the conversations ended.
MOTE: This Is tho first in
dication ever made that Presi-
dent Wilson wds IN -communica-
ton Nth enemy Statesmen as
early as the spring Of 1918, re-
gardtng a possible drmistice.)
Half year later came the mill
tary defeat Of Germany, and the
Berlin government proposed q
peace to Wilson on the basis of his
fourteen points The President
accepted and the result was the
peace Of Versailles. a derision Of
the Wilson program. as Keynes
proves clearly, for the right Of
differentiation for defeated ma
tons was disregarded; the Ger
mans of northern Bohemia and
the Tyrol were annexed to states
Of alien nationality--the Hun
garians Of the Buat given to Ru-
mania, and the Germans Of Silesia
given to Poland. Nations were
pushed about Europe like chess
men on a board.
The, Versailles treaty consid-
cred the fourteen points, on which
the central empires agreed to
make peace, only as points to be
confradicted. And Wilson agreed.