New Ulm review., 1922-03-15
(The 3Neao Repubhc.)
Conference as a Method OF Inter-
national Legislation.

1t Is an open SeCIeL CllelCa III plopooiiiso
European Congress in which Germany
and Russia would sit as equals among
equals, the British Premier was very
much influenced by the. example and the
lessons of the Washington gathering. Ihe
performance at Washington confirmed MS
conviction as to the value and necessity
of conference in bringing about interrla-
tional adjustments For centuries gov
ernments had, of course, used conferences
as the INDISPENSABLE method OF framing
treaties of peace at the end OF wars, but
in these instances the deciding influence
in debating the terms OF the treaty was
not free negotiation among the con-
ferees which ended in general conviction
and consent, but the comparative military
strength of the several belligerents at the
end of the war. The conference translated
into political terms the achievements OF
force. The Washington Conference, on
the other hand, was not in a position to
register verdict previously rendered by
military victory or stalemate. President
Harding called it in order to remove by
negotiation causes of international frlc-
ton which might subsequently develop
into war. It's authors hoped to accom-
plish by public discussion and agreement
among the governments with interests
in the Far East the kind of political
change which had usually needed war for
it's accomplishment. They attained a
measure of success, and their success
fired Mr.. Lloyd George with the desire
to @emulate their example. Europe like
the Far East was busily accumulating
snarl of aninosities, misunderstanding,
quarrels and convictions Of mutual IN
compatibility which unless they were
disentangled by agreement were certain
to provoke a renewed war. Could not
Great Britain accomplish in Europe by
the method of conference the measure OF
political readjustment which the American
government had begun to accomplish
in the Far East?
Considerations of this kind, we have
sound reason for believing, persuaded Mr..
Lloyd George to propose the Genoa
Conference. 1t was a brave and perhaps
a salutary idea;~ but he encountered one
serious difficulty in carrying it out. The
American government was IN stronger
position to bestoW upon a Far Eastern
Conference the kind of reality which might
enable it to accomplish by discussion and
agreement really fruitful political changes
than the British government was with
respect to Europe. If legislation about
the Far Eastern disagreen1ents were left
to the verdict of war, victory or defeat
would depend upon a preponderance OF
naval power. The American government
occupied with respect to naval power a
position more advantageous than either
Japan or Great Britain combined, and it
had a good chance, if it had preferred
and insisted, of debating by force or by
a combination of force or diplomacy the
kind of legislation which it's rulers pre-
ferred. It adopted precisely the opposite
course. 1t not only submitted the dis
agreements to the verdict Of a conference,
but it began the conference by renouncing
it's potential superiority of naval power
and by proposing a limitation OF naval
armaments which prohibited any one
member Of the naval triumvirate from
forcing it's will upon the other. This act
of military self denial gave the. necessary
vitality to the conference as conference.
It extinguished the possibility of obtain
ing settlement in the Far East favorable
to America as the result of war
But in the case Of the European snarl
Great Britain does not occupy a suffii-
GENTLY strong position to follow the Ameri-
can example with respect to the Far.
East. Whenever war again overtakes
Europe, the most Immediately dangerous,
if not the ultimately decisive, weapon of
victory will be a preponderant army ra-
ther than preponderant navy, and France
rather than Great Britain possesses the
preponderant army. The British gov
ernment can not, consequently, begin a
European conference with an act Of re-
nunciation as edifying as the American
prologue to the Washington Conference.
IA iaI, Ic+o, ~. 41,,t