New-York tribune., 1922-03-27
a Backward Industry

The coal industry IN the United
States is a victim Of uneconomic de-
velopment. The hefundamental troubles
with it are that it has been expanded
too recklessly, that it is oVermanned
and must therefore be operated
irregularly and that faulty system
of distribution accentuates the en-
harrassments arising from seasonal
fluctuations of supply and demand
Abnormal war needs put the in
dustry for time on what might
paradoXically be called normal
basis. Consumption rose to now
heights. Wages were doubled. Yet
there was no shortage of mine labor
The number Of men at work was
practically the same. In 1918 6l5,-
600 men were employed in the soft
coal field, against 5S3, 500 in 1914--
an increase of 31,500 But in the
anthracite field there was decrease
of 32.000-from 10000 to l47,000
There is usually big surplusage Of
labor at the mines, and this accounts
Ior the restriction of working hours
and working days. If the miners
worked forty-four hours a week they
would swamp the coal market
In 1917 the working days num-
bered 285 and in 1919 293. But in
1920, a flush coal year with peak war
prices, there were only 23O working
days on the average. In 1921 the
average is estimated to have been
only 40 days.
The soft coal industry is capable
of turning out 750.o00,000 tons
year. But the country's demand is
put at no more than 55OO00.O00 tons,
In Pennsylvania alone one thousand
new mines are reported to have been
opened in 1920. But the mines can
not run up to capacity. The opera
tors don't want them to do so, and
the miners don't, either Both sides
prefer restricted operation, for only
through restricted operation can
wages and prices be maintained.
There are other uneconomic phases
Of the industry Most of the farm
er's crops can be stored and distrib-
uted at leisure. Coal can also be
stored. But it has been the custom
to avoid storage and to deliver coal
direct from the mine to the coal car.
Distribution is largely a hand-to-
mouth affair and the uncertainties of
car supply affect it seriously. When
railroad traffic is exceptionally light,
as at present, there are enough cars
in service But if railroad traffic
should revive there would not be
enough cars. The effects of the GOV
ernment's repressive railroad policy
have thus directly aggravated CON
ditions in the coal industry.
The railroads are the biggest
users Of coal. To meet doubled fuel
prices coal freight rates have been
doubled This puts an additional
charge on all the other consumers.
The high domestic price of coal has
also destroyed the coal export trade.
English coal is beginning to be ex-
ported for use on the Atlantic sea
board The domestic coal market
could be stabilized if there We're an
outlet abroad for The surplus coal
product. Then labor could be more
steadily employed and operators
would not need to restrict output in
order to keep up prices artiicially.
Eut TO secure this result the present
vicious uneconomic circle would have
10 be broken. We should have TO
produce coal on cost basis, permit
ting competition with other coal-pro-
ducing countries. j..
The coal problem is, therefore. not
simply one of satisfying a conflict of
interest between miners and opera
tors. The industry as a whole is on
the wrong track. 1t is primitively
organized and shiftlessly directed.
The trouble goes very deep. The
real task ahead of us is to modernize
the industry and bring it into line
with other economically grounded
and efficiently operated American in
CuStries.