New-York tribune., 1922-07-02
Sims Calls Daniels War Book
misleading and Dangerous
Rear Admiral in a Causic Attack Strips Many Laures
From Claims of Former Chief Opposition to
Convoy System Is Charged

shall scc-but that Lloyd George and
President Wilson and our ordnance
officers did not regard IL MS impos-
siblc." "The naval administration" he
continues. had faith in the idea and
urged i, ngain and again until it was
adopted"
II Is difficult 70 sec what advantage
Il 20 be derived unless it be to add
touch OF mclodrama 10 truly magnih-
cent feat that needs no such cmbcl-
lishmcnt from giving so distorted ON
account. Th, proposal mine days after
this country entered the war" was q
memorandum hy Commander Fullin-
wider on anti-submarinc warfare. i is
true that be referred 90 mine barraccs,
bu, in these terms:
All measures FOR scaling ports or
channels present the difficulty that
the Germans have 90 extensively
mined their waters and have such
supervision and control thereof a1
% render such measures almost. i
not entirely. impfacticahlc.
IL is possibe, however. 20 ostab-
lsh mine barriers IN zones ~ de-
tancc from tho German consi. prac-
tcallv sealing up the North Sea.
This will require between 'oO'VVV
and 100000 mines.
How strongly tho naval administfa-
ton urged it again and again may be
Judged from tho following cablcgrnm
sent bv Admiral Benson from Lon
don headquarters:
(Cablcgram sont November 3,
1917. Opnav Washington. Serial
40. 1871. Bal. Very sccrct.)
1871. Your 925. From Benson.
Nv under tanling with Secretary
and Operation was that no decision
on mine barrier project would be
made until after had arrived nero
and discussed subject with Admiral
Jellicoc and Admiral Sims.
Tho date Of this cable is seven
months after we entered tho war. Up
to this time no mine barraGc had been
possible, as | had stated, simply be-
cause the type Of mine which ultimate
lv made the barrage q success had not
vet been invented. It 81 possible that
Mr.. Daniels has forgotten this. Ger
tainly he knew it in 1918, for on page
Is Of his annual report Of that year
will be found these words:
The plan 10 close the North Sea
and thereby deny enemy submarines
free access 20 the Atlantic from Ger
man bases had It's inception IN The
Bureau Of Ordnance IN April, l9lh
Immediately following the entrance
Of the United states into the war.
Al this time there had not been de-
voloped anywhere typc oi mlne
suitable for the Scotland-Norway
line. whercon the depths OF water
are as great as 900 feet and whore
prohibitive number Of mines u the
then existing type would have been
required 20 mine this Inc from tho
surface 20 4 depth Of 2op TO 900 iect.
notwithstanding the possibility Of a
,reachcrous memory, that does not cx-
cuse so misleading description in
book b. a man who held so high a
public Office. The public does not ex-
pect TO find in such a book statements
so widely at variance with tho facts.
Daniels Is Quoted az
Opposed 10 Conveying
Nor are these the only serious mis-
statements In his description OF tho
convoy, By his fulsome praise OF Ar.
Wilson's alleged early interest In It's
adoption, Mr. Daniels allows the i'm
prcssion 70 be conveyed that he, o.
course. was an equally ardent sup
porter Of the convoy system. Tie was
not. In the June, 1922, issue Of the
Worlds Work on page 2i7, letter
Of Franklin X. Lanes contains this
account Of what occurred at Cabinet
meeting:
Daniels said we must not convoy
that would be dangerous. CIhink
OF Secretary Of the Navy talking
Of dangcr'
Such testimony needs no reinforce
mcnt. but IN order 20 show how long
the Navy Departments opposition %
tho convoy system continued u So
necessary only 90 add this cable from
the Navy Department, which reached
London headquarters o. late as June
20, 1917:
"In regard TO convoy. consider
American vessels having armed
guards are safer when sailing indc-
pendently."
In his chapter on the naval reserves,
entitled Making Sailors Out Of Lands
men" Mr. Daniels begins:
Half million men md thirty
thousand officers were enlisted and
trained By the United States Navy
in eighteen months. No navy in the
world has over had 20 largo per-
sonnel or ever attempted 70 raise
and train so large sea force In 20
brief a time"
This is all very eloquent. It is oil
very true. There is no misrcpresenta-
..on here, but there Is very serious
omission: Mr Daniels forgot 70 tell
us how we got these roserves-forgot
10 state how strenuously he opposed
enlisting any reserves. Captain L. c.
Palmer. who was chief Of the Bureau Of
Navigation in charge o. personnel dur
ing the war, told the astonishing story
cfore the Senate Naval Committee,
and this story deserves 20 be repeated.
The following are extracts: