The Washington herald., 1922-09-05

operation to assist Germany by an
attack upon Poland would insure
Rumanian action along the Dniester.
Moreover, II France goes into Ger
many, It 10 mot open to question
that Belgian troops viii march with
French.
But since Germany has deliberate
IN adopted a policy of evasion OF
payment by imitation and by other
devices and as q consequences has
now arrived at point where her
present inability ITO meet obliga-
tons 10 undeniabie. France must
either resign herself to fiscal ruin.
by reason of, German failure and
TO n consequent elimination as a
great power, since she will be over
whelmed with the burden Of war
reconstruction or take such action
as will enable. her to collect some-
thing. however small and At the
same time escape the perils of
German recuperation.
Aimed at Destruction.
One OF the designs of German war
policy was SO to deal with France
that she would never be able 10
oppose Germany again. The des-
truction OF French Industry was
Systematically conducted to this end
and IL France has to bear the costs
of reconstruction. while Germany
escapes and presently comes back,
Germany will. within certain limits,
have won the war. She Will have
been victorious absolutely. so far
as France is concerned. and can In
the future take her revenge upon
a France no longer capable OF re-
sistance.
II, on the contrary. France goes
into Germany now, she will hardly
escape fiscal ruin. but Germany will
not only be ruined fscally. but also
economically and politically. Thus
France. however. had her own state.
and will not have to face the i'm
mediate peril of a Germany, freed
of war burdens and eager and able
to reverse the decision of the world
war and regain her old position in
Europe and in the world.
This was the real problem at
Paris, but British policy there was
misled by the presence Of Mr.. Will
son and by the apparent intention
Of the United States to remain In
Europe. The British staked every
thing upon continuing American as
sistance and deliberately exchanged
French for American friendship.
They calculated upon a community
OF ideas as between Britain and the
United states and upon a resulting
financial strength which would re-
strain France. At the same time.
by the Anglo-French- American
treaty of guarantee. French Sc.
curity was to be assured and
French financial difficulties were to
be met by loans and by cancella-
tions of debts.
Mt.,.L. 4, p.,,.x
The vltai mistake Oh Britisn
pollcy mas Iaih IN tne Ialu,e 20
secosnILe lna, our w'n"Ia" ~ "as
nai an1 'has 'ne suo'n oi ou.
IN n",.,.s % IN, .
ene
. 1919 ~p
a. 80
many a.
nu ieo n.,.,ss .Ic.-
i.n s,,,. VI .s .
ns, "out ."e i.aS
W haAe 'e
u,, ,,,t.
- -
n une s Isl. ~ sr,a asau. 80
peIe' enoIt , "
n.e
- y. 'n nH,e -.
." 1.,s -
W., .asu,, an,s 80 -,
.,e .";, sr,es,;, ,,1s
he so cemented that American sun
port for British European policies
would be gained and Franco-Amer-
ican friendship SO impaired that
France would stand isolated when
she went to the next European
conference.
What England hoped to accom-
plish at Washington was to arouse
American sentiment against the
French army and enlist American
financial strength to exert pressure
upon France to reduce her army.
This was the supreme stake at
Washington and. for a moment, the
British thought they had succeed
ed, although they were grievously
disappointed when the question OF
land forces was pigeonholed. 1t
was while he believed America was
persuaded that Lloyd George laid
his plans for Genoa. Mr.. Hughes
refusal to 60 to Genoa was. in re-
ality KNOCK k-out" for Lloyd
George, particularly when II coin
cided with the disappearance of
BRAND and the arrival of Poincare.
1t was a defeat on the east and the
west fronts at the same moment.