Indiana daily times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1914-1922, 1922-02-02

100000 there was a deficit in railroad
operations of $216,0O0O0O. This does not
include water lines, American Railway
operations. Unthinking people urge this
deficit as conclusive evidence OF the fail
ure Of the railroad administration. It is,
OF course, 6 superficial and unfair 1udg-
ment, and it is not material to the Issue,
because 1t is a part of the war cost and,
like all war cost, 1t Is an expenditure for
which there Is no compensation but vic
tory. We gained the victory-a glorious
Victory-and there Is no use whining
imminent peril which faced the country
because Of the breakdown of the railroads
under private control, in 1916 as well as
in 1917, and reflect that the assertion OF
and transformed the railroad systems of
the country into a tremendous and eff
fective war machine, and that the total
cost of transportation for the war pur-
O00 and for the entire twenty six months
Of Federal control only STA 100000 on
Glass roads, 1t is infnitesimal as com
pared wit hthe total expenditures made
by the American people to win the war.
MEUSE-AKGONNE COST GREATER
THAN WHOLE RAIL DEFICIT.
Let me make a comparison. In the
bloody Meuse- Argonne offensive directed
by General Pershing in the fall Of 1918
it was necessary to keep up a continuous
about nineteen miles long The cost Of
the barrage in shot and shell and NUM-
tionS, including transportation, has been
cOnservatively estimated at $762. 445, 900.
This exceeds by $4S,O00,0O0 the entire def
icit or cost Of railroad transportation dur
ing the two years and two months OF
Federal control, which as stated by Mr..
Walker Il. Hines was $114,OO00O0 on
Glass | roads. In the brief period of If
teen days on nineteen mile front the
cost of the barrage was 1854, 145, 600, or
more than the entire cost of railroad
transportation In the year 1918. There Is
not shot, nor a shell, nor gun from
which they were fired, nor soldier who
was there to fire the gun, who could have
fought in that battle or have gained the
victory for his country, If railroad trans
portation in the year of 1913 had not
been made to function efficiently and
sufficiently by the Government OF the
United States; and yet no one complains
OF the expenditure of S256,000 600 for If
ten days artillery fire on nineteen
mile battle front in France, although 1t
may have been wholly wasted or the re-
suits flowing from it may have been in
consequential; and yet we find many ire
sponsible critics who allege that $780,
600, 900 expended for essential transporta-
ton for the war purpose is conclusive
evidence of waste and inefficiency.
The first question We have to consider
is whether or not 1t was necessary for
the Government to take over the rail
roads for the purposes of the war.
"In the fall of 1917 the inefficiency OF
the American railroads made them I'M
Intentionally but nevertheless actually the
strongest ally of the German Kaiser. The
collapse Of the railroads under the bur
den OF war traffic had almost cut the
line of comm unication between the Amer
lean Army at the front and it's base OF
supplies. The condition Of traffic, par
ticularly in the East, and the embargoes
on freight in all important centers, had
Oh EnAA .
complete congestion that the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Dec. I. 1917. felt