davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10

will ask them for their assistance and
place again in their hands the sword
which, in fatal blind confidence, they
put aside a few minutes too soon.
The heritage of men like Clause
WITT. Moltke and Schlieffen falls to
the German nation in general and to
German youth in particular. 1t is the
purpose of this book to awaken in our
youth appreciation of such valuable
asset"
Capt. Ritter discusses in detail the
many mistakes the Prussian generals
made in the Austro-Prussian war of
1866 and the Franco-Prussian war of
1S7o-1S71. principally their concentra-
ton of forces during the march to the
front and by forming small battle
fronts, thus throwing away oppor-
tunities of outfanking, surrounding
and destroying the Austrian and
French armies. The author remarks
THE Prussian generals adhered to
the opinions they had drawn from the
often misinterpreted Napoleonic pre-
cepts and from the observations of
the maneuvers of a long period of
peace. They did not know
anything of the battles of humiliation,
of encircling or pursuing the enemy
or of like Dreams One opponent
occupies position the other opponent,
whose force is larger by one or two
battalions. attacks. The defeated party
withdraws. the victor does not
hamper the defeated and turns to the
problems of the next day"
famous battles of Koeniggraetz in
consequence of which Austria sued for
peace in 1866, and of Sedan, which re-
suited in the capture of Emperor Ma
poleon III. and the overthrow of the
French monarchy, were won by the
Prussians not because of superior but
in spite of poor leadership. The book
continues:
Comparing the average tactical
Staff and the army leaders, who had
gone through the school of the Gen.
eral Staff, of 1914 on the one side, and
of 1866 and 1870 on the other. we are
justified in saying that of the three
foremost shortcomings of the latter
period-namely the strategy Of deep
columns previous to and during align
ment as well as on the battle fields,
together with the lack of thanking
operations. lack of war intelligence
and finally tactics disregarding tech
nical developments and Typographical
difficulties-the first named had con-
siderably decreased. though Moltke's
(meaning the older Moltke of 1870
fame) and Schlieffens unparalleled
instructions did not bear the fruits
they so richly deserved.
"Schlieffen's precept was that, while
columns are advancing side by side,
an attacked or strongly resisted force
cannot be better assisted than by con-
tinuing the advance in the scheduled
direction, thereby getting to the flank
or even the rear of, and threatening
with humiliation the opponent fight
ing the neighboring group OF the own
army This rule was lost sight of
time and again; German leaders
marched in the direction of the thun-
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10

strength in lifting heavy load he
struck his chest and said:
How can / keep strength In this
body when never feed 1t meat? That
Is the trouble of all OF us of my class.
The paper money we get is never
enough. because prices always rise be-
yond our wages. Last year 1 earned
500 marks a week. Now / earn 1900,
but they buy less than ever. and never
do l eat meat. 1t costs 16S marks for
a pork chop. A suit Of clothing costs
5000 marks One egg is marks.
Milk for the children-how can we
buy when a pint costs 100 marks? 1t
is pretty hard for us now. 1t is going
to be harder. because the mark will
drop down like autumn leaves. In
this coming winter there will be bad
times and trouble. We shan't starve
without struggle"
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10

GUM to the amount Of million tons
weekly from England. Prices are soar
ing far beyond the scale Of wages
paid and the workers are already on
short rations. The trade unions Of
Germany are already pressing for a
new scale OF wages beyond the pos
sibilitiy of payment except by n new
flood of paper money, which would
send the mark down again.
The German people," said one of
these officials OF the Deutsche Bank,
have been orderly, industrious and
patient For a time just after the
armistice many of them we're infected
with spirit OF revolution and Bolshe-
vism. 1t was natural after all their
sufferings in that criminal war. But
very quickly their old instincts OF or
der and discipline reasserted them
selves; they went back to work, hop
ing TO be paid back by a decent re-
ward of labor, by a fair measure Of
comfort, by a sense of security and
peace. They were willing to bear
heavy burdens as the price of defeat
and as an insurance of the future
peace OF Europe.
But what will happen II this
winter, afte. real hardships already,
they find themselves hungry. without
warmth and light In their homes, with
no reward for their labor except slave
hours and burdens beyond human en-
durance? Hungry men get fierce
There is no reason or sanity among
men who see their women weaken
ing and their children without milk
Unless respite is given to Germany
the red flag will fly in Berlin and this
country which was the western bull
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10

der of guns BY relieving pressure on
brothers-in-arms by such tactics they
lost the ripening fruits of strategy.
"On August rs, 1914, for instance,
the Second Army was tempted by the
First Army to give the latter tactical
assistance, thereby missing an oppor-
tunity for fruitful operations. And
again, when the Third Army, on Au-
gust 20. was called by the Second
Army and the Fourth Army to come
to their assistance near Hirson and
Sedan respectively. the command of
the Third Army hesitated for quite a
while which call to heed. and finally
decided to help the Fourth Army
1T would have been the proper
thing not to accede to either of the
two requests but to march straight
ahead in the direction of Rheims with
increased speed. By such strategy
the Fourth Army would have gained
a lead which would have forced the
enemy to give up resistance and, fur
thermore, offered an opportunity to at
tack the French forces fighting the
Second or Fourth Army. in accord
ance with the situation as a whole.
But the command of the Third Army
acted contrary to the precepts of
Schlieffen, which, perhaps. had been
overemphasized in peace time. The
pursuit that would have overtaken
the French was left undone. Once
more an ordinary victory was won.
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10

world. Perhaps 1t Is not widespread.
/ believe the German people on the
whole, apart from the crazy minority,
which Is still dangerous, desire to pro-
duce as much as any people in the
world who have suffered the agony of
war, but agree with the little official
of the Deutsche Bank that hungry
men get fierce. And If Germany gets
hungry her people will turn from
hopes of seeing any way of escape,
even through blood and fire.
The German people themselves, as
/ have found during a visit to Berlin.
are honestly convinced that an i'm
mense catastrophe lies ahead of them
unless they get immediate and con-
siderable relief. They believe the very
foundation of social life and security
will crash IL France is allowed to carry
out her threats OF infiicting new pen
alties and selling the sources of her
industrial energies. have found deep
pessimism among people of humble
life, such as laborers and hotel walters.
railway men and shop assistants.
AS yet Germany is not so hungry as
the station porter. as a nation, and
doubtless II IL only in her cities where
they have to stint and scrape that they
don't eat meat. One doesn't see any
outward sign. Berlin these summer
months Is city thronged with folk
afraid of the future when they think
about II. but not thinking much of
troubles ahead. spending what money
they have In the present to amusc
themselves while It lasts.
/ explained last week that ii is folly
for them to save their money in
spirit of thrift because 1000 marks In
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10
Searching Analysis Of Weaknesses
and Blunders on Both Sides Is Con-
tanned in Capt. Ritter's Book, Which
Is Acclaimed as the Best on the
Subject

publication English OF
the best book about the p
des the World war
Lepsc By ofcer OF the General Sfa1
leaders,
intimate
q
In himself H. Ritter,
attached the General stag OF
the SeUenth ARM
to papers
points mistakes which wcH
the made
had
the
nd undereStmdted the
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10

conditions of the individual who chung
to the salary of an active officer or
was after an increased pension. For
the fact that reports were retouched
the General Staff cared only in so far
as there was danger of impairing the
fighting power of the war machine.
For such was the case 'Corriger la
fortune Ito correct the fortune)
during rifle and gun practice under
assumed war conditions and during
other military exercises on which tao
teal rules were to be based, de-
served punishment, irrespective of how
seldom it was done. for 1t caused seri
Gus tactical mistakes.
During the war that system was
still more serious offence. But what
had taken root during many years of
peace could not be suddenly eradicated
after the outbreak of the war. The
reports on the fighting value of the
individual divisions. which had to be
submitted to the Highest Command in
regular intervals, meant to many a
commander a serious temptation to
use more roseate colors than was JUS
titled by the cold facts. And when
ever the temptation had been over
come the subconscious desire not to
spoil the picture which had had a
long standing caused many an 'ex-
hausted' and tired to be struck out
on the long road which the report had
to travel from the command Of the di-
vision via the commands of the army
corps and army groups to the High
Command. Consequently, the High
Command lacked one of the most es-
sential foundations OF real warfare.
namely the pure truth as to the con-
ditions of the troops, which ought to
have been reported no matter how Bit
ter and painful it would have been
to the reporting officer.
Throughout the corps of German
officers the morale of the soldiers was
considered of too great Importance.
while technical improvements were
neglected. To no other special assign
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10
BY Sir PHILIP GIBBS.
ssscial Cable to THr New York HERALD.

sseciaI Cable TO THE New YORK HERALD.
LONDON, Sept. ?.
~ TO serious mind in Europe now
IN undertakes the gravity of the
increasing economic collapse
OF Germany. It is still regarded with
the greatest alarm by business men
us well as politicians in England.
Even in France and Belgium II is
acknowledged by many people / have
lately met that Germany must be
saved at all costs from going so deep
in the pit as Austria, though opin-
ions differ as to her present condi-
tions and az to the cause Of her finan-
cial distress.
Among people OF exalted ranks there
Is undisguised fear of tragic happen
ings in the coming winter. In an in
terview I had with two OF the most
important officials of the Deutsche
bank this fear was frankly expressed
urcn an emotion which broke down
the usual reserve OF such men. They
received me in one waiting room Of
that vast palace OF finance. which oc-
cupies n great block in Berlin and
symbolizes By its splendor and spa
ciousncss tho building of modern Ger
many with all its wealth and power
before the war.
CHANGING out of the window / saw
the broad streets of Berlin, the high
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10

ment were there fewer applications
than to the Academy of Military Tech
nology, which was commonly known
as the 'Locksmith Academy a term
that shows that the German officer
considers 1t somewhat beneath his dig
nifty to study engineering. The fact
that the Overwhelming majority Of the
officers thought SO little Of technology
is the best evidence that the leaders
of the army harbored the same view.
Otherwise, the leaders would have
brought about change of views, as
they could have done.
From lack of technology must
spring incorrect judgment as to the
effect that may be obtained through
the use of the various arms and
weapons, a mistake that must be of
disadvantage when 1t comes to esti-
mating the fighting power of the
enemy. The tactics of the German in
fantry in 1870 was unfavorably influ-
enced by such delusions; but, flushed
with victory. the Germans failed after
wards to admit their shortcomings or
to take remedial measures.
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10
Says Germany Will Fight
Next Time on More Eq6aI Terms

He spoke of war again and laughed
when he said Germany has fought too
many enemies at the same time. One
day, he said. Germany will recruit
Russians and train them with Ger
man officers. Then they would fight
on more equal terms. France forces
us to that idea. She will give us no
hope in peace" Standing up there in
the darkness listening to this mans
words | had an uneasy feeling that he
was not speaking for himself alone.
but expressing ideas OF masses of men
like himself, the workingmen of Ger
many.
His last thought for the peace of the
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10

roofs and sculptured figures of many
palaces and mansions. This city on
which l gazed Is built of solid granite
more worthy OF great civilization
based on worldwide trade and pro-
digious energy in science. labor and
military power. which seemed to lift
its pride above all challenge OF rivalry.
Yet was conscious in that room Of
the Deutsche Bank that all that Ger
man civilization meant in trade power
pride. material progress. knowledge
art and industry was slipping down
great pit like a mighty ship torpedoed
at the engine room.
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10
Knowledge of Weapons
Important Success Factor

THE conditions of 1870 existed still
in 1914. Numerous attacks. especially
those Of the User in the latter part Of
autumn, 1914, were as faulty as the
attack of August Is, 1870 Zone of the
battles of Metz and sprang from the
same source. namely differentiation
of the effectiveness Of the enemy's
weapons and inability to understand
the limitations Of an infantry attack.
Too low an estimate of the effective
ness of the enemy's fire was re-
sponsible for the close formation
OF the German infantry lines in
action. At the bottom of that for
nation. designed to beat down the
enemy infantry by rife and machine
gun fire, irrespective of the coopera-
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10
Fears of Insolvency
As Mark Falls Rapidly

The mark had fallen to 1900 to the
dollar that day. There was a panic
on the exchange. Foreign delegates
from France and England were sit
ting in room a few blocks away
examining into Government declara-
lions of insolvency. And these two
officials Of the Deutsche Bank were
confessing to me their fears of ir-
retrievable ruin and great misery
among their people unless the Allies
granted an immediate moratorium and
long loan. They explained their fears
candidly.
The frightful downfall OF the mark
would mean that Germany could no
longer buy foreign grain. which feeds
the people to the amount of at least
30 per cent. Of their needs. They could
no longer buy foreign coal. which now
has practically replaced the coal de-
liveries made to France and TO Bel
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10
Official Reports CoIored
To Make Pleasant Reading

Another weak spot of the German
army, and OF most of the other armies,
must be mentioned here: a certain in
clination to color reports. No front
officer will deny it's existence. There
was a tendency to hide shortcomings
as much as possible and to set the
troops in the best light under any cir
cumstances. The real motive, no
doubt. was assiduity. In some in
stances 1t sprang from the financial
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10
Could Have EquaIed
Success OF Airplane Gun

THE German High Command con-
tinued to despise the new weapon.
Otherwise 1t would have been possible
to construct a tank as efficient as the
airplane gun which was likewise in
vented during the war. Because the
tank was considered of minor impor-
lance by the German High Command
the potential constructive forces OF
German private industry were not util-
lied. 1t was much too late when the
engineers Of private industry were en-
listed. But when 1t was done. excellent
tanks of the types 'Oberschlesien' and
'Thyssen' were built. Mass production
could be started in 1919 (the year fol-
lowing the armistice). If that had
been done sooner the German attacks
on the western front (meaning In
1879 would have had different re-
suits.
THE often repeated excuse that all
the steel produced was consumed by
the ammunition factories and the navy
yards is not well founded. The navy
should have been restricted to steel
necessary to build submarines. Build
ing of battleships and battle cruisers
was hardly as important as production
of tanks. The quantity Of steel used
in 1917 in the construction Of the
battleships Bayern. Hindenburg and
Mackensen would have been sufficient
to manufacture several hundred tanks.
IL used for the building of tanks. for
which, it was alleged 1t was not avail
able. the steel would have been of
greater service than in the battle
ships, the first cruise of which was to
.Scapa Flow to be informed there"
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10
The Kaiser's Interference in Weaken
ing the German Right Wing De-
stroyed,, the Author Thinks, the
Chance Of Crushing France Before
the Russians Were Ready

private industry. At first the German
High Command saw in the tank a mere
toy which. If deprived of it's effects
on the morale. was a harmless
monster. The German soldiers, with
their strong nerves. 1t was said, would
treat the tanks as the ancient Ger
mans had treated the lions let loose
against them by the Romans, those
lions having been beaten to death
with clubs without much ado by the
ancestors of the present day Germans.
The efficiency Of the tank. which is
to-day universally recognized, was
pushed aside with the stereotyped
phrase of 'tank-fear' as late as sum-
mer, 1918.
That was technical atavism pure
and simple and a fatefu1 return to the
pre-war antipathy against technical
progress. When the German tanks
which were, 1t is true, not very well
built-were inspected by the military
authorities the High Command consid-
cred them armored ammunition
trucks, while our enemies used the
tanks as armored batteries designed
to cooperate with the infantry, or as
armored machine gun nests.
After the open formation Of the
German defense lines In 1917 had
shown that no artillery fire, no matter
how powerful and devastating, could
destroy or put out of action every ma
chine gun Of the opposing forces. and
that, on the other hand, attacking in
fantry was held up or at least severely
punished even by a small number OF
machine guns. the engineers Of the
Allies, with clear vision, understood
that the efficiency Of weapon that
could not be destroyed had to be re-
duced by other means. AS the Ger
man machine gun could not be silenced
they had to armor their front line at
hackers Thus the machine gun was
the mother of the tank.
"As long as the German High Com
mand did not intend to take the Of
fensive in the western theater Of war
1t was the proper thing to care more
for defensive measures against the
tank than for the production of that
weapon. But when, in the middle Of
1917, 1t became more and more prob
able that the Germans had to give up
the defensive for the offensive, the
creation of tank troops had to be
pushed with the greatest earnestness,
the more SO because the liberal use of
tanks enables the attacker to dispense
with nearly all artillery preparation,
and thereby offers an ideal opportun-
ity to launch surprise attack, as was
proved in the November battle or Cam
brai
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10

money may buy perha ~ o-,y soc
marks worth Thursday. and purchas-
ing value dwindles like snow in spring
time One sees therefore in Berlin
much spending, not only by the new
rich and the profteering, of whom
there are many. but by the great mass
of middle class folk who formerly made
thrift the first law OF family life. That
is demoralizing to any nation, and Ger
many is losing one virtue that was
hers.
More Suffering in England;
More Laughter in Germany
AS yet think the bulk of the people
haven't been pinched by the odd turn
OF the screw. There is more suffering
in England than in Germany. There
is more laughter In Germany than In
England. Their social way of life is
more compensation at less cost. But
H. seemed almost certain to them that
all their present state Is on shifting
sands that industry and the whole
structure OF civilization will have a
landslide IL it gets one more push from
Fate or France. There Is a party in
France determined to give them that
push IL II can. but there Is also. |
am certain very large number Of in
telligent moderate minded men In
France who realize the peru Of such a
policy and won't support Il II is i'm
possible to prophecy whether this mod
crate influence will act as restraining
force. but am bound TO add that !
think the worst will happen to Ger
many and the rest Of Europe unless
the United States intervenes as a
balancing power.
Germany ia on the edge Of a great
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10

TIME world war has been lost by
Germany. The victors have
= placed a heavy burden on the
miserable nation. The public is
eager to know what were the
causes of the outcome. The famous
problem OF guilt" will not be treated
here for a sober verdict cannot be
reached at the present time of pas
sion and prejudice. Later generations
with clear vision and free of the infiu-
ence of partisanship may be able to
arrive at fair judgment. Nowadays
we can say only this: The causes of
the unhappy result are to be found in
nearly every sphere of public and eco
nomic life of Germany. The states
man in charge of domestic or foreign
tartan. the common people as well as
the wealthy, and certainly also the
private soldier, ought to beat their
breasts and confess: "Pater, peccavi
Gather, / have sinned) during the
war and previously"
The author goes on to explain that
his book is designed to defend the
German Genera. Staff against I'M
founded adverse criticism. though he
admits that numerous mistakes were
made in carrying out the ambitious
plans of mobilization and tactical war
fare elaborated under the guidance of
the late Field Marshal Schlieffen.
Finally the preface says, "the
book pursues a practical aim. Con-
sidering the present military situation
in which Germany finds herself, and
the peace promising League of Ma
tons, many may believe 1t Is of no use
to direct the attention of Germany's
youth to military affairs.
Whether there will be future wars de-
ponds more on the economic interests
of the nations than on Ideals as the
history OF the world has proved.
Holy Alliance Began
Under Like Conditions
'In 1915 the Holy Alliance came
into existence under circumstances
similar to the League of Nations. That
alliance was created in the same
atmosphere of exhaustion and war
WEAKNESS. Just as the sovereignty
of the individual States was then in
compatible with such condition, just
as then distrust and secret egotism on
the part of the pillars of the Holy
Alliance injected into that alliance the
germ of decay, just so certain is it
that the League OF Nations OF 1918
will go to pieces because the only
guaranty of its existence, namely.
human race free Of weaknesses and
mistakes, is as non-existent to-day as
it was when the Holy Alliance was
created, century before.
Therefore. it will be of advantage
to the German people. while they are
manacled and down on the floor, to
make at least an attempt to preserve
and utilize the intellectual and moral
heritage of the great military past.
Maybe one of their recent enemies
The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10

Another instaIIment of Capt.
Ritter's book on how Germany
lost the World War will r.,
published by The New Yoik
Herald next Sunday.