The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1922-01-01

London nearly week before and
had been a matter OF common
knowledge in British Journalistic
quarters for many days.
Meantime the situation was be-
coming complicated. Many newr-
papers with an obvious desire to de-
fend the treaty and clear recOllec-
tion or the senate fight over the
league OF nations announced quite
boldly that the treaty did not apply
to the mainland of Japan. Several
senators defending the treaty against
.ncipient attacks from the irrecon-
ciliablrs did the same. All this an
tedated the admission of the state
department and all these volunteer
champions found themselves In an
embarrassing position when Mr..
Hughes' explanation a week after
the event proved them mistaken.
And Then
Tho next step was sensational.
In response to question asked at tho
regular session with correspondents,
which Is a part OF the weekly caien-
dar Of the president, MIR. Harding
asserted that as he read the four
mainland of Japan, After that the
/ fat was In the first--the first real
sensation Of the conference had
come. All over Washington the
news spread that the president had
interpreted the treaty in just the OPP
posIte fashion from that employed
| by the secretary OF state who had
negotiated 1t.
a few hours later, OF course, the
president issued his statement. He
did not withdraw his own interpre-
tation. he merely announced that his
secretary of state had given the
l 10 10 s,,t.
| tatlon, that he. the president, did
not oppose that Interpretation and
knew that the treaty had been nego-
tiated and signed in this sense. but
after the president spoke then the
demonstration on Capitol hill, which
had been totally unimpressive took
on an entirely different character
and in all quarters there was heard
talk about the need OF amending tho
treaty.
Now | have dwelt upon all OF
these circumstances for q very sim
pie reason. Before the conference
there was very widespread talk
about open sessions. All informed
people knew that there could not be
open sessions. that In public as in
private business, that is In dealings
between nations as In transactions
between iudividuals, a certain meas
ure of secrecy is not only advisable
but positively necessary. What was
recognized by all who had the Paris
conference in mind was that the sue
ess or failure of tho conference
might easily turn upon the extent &c
which the people were kept in touch
not with the details but with the
reality.
Despite all the oceans OF ink
which have been spilled over the
fact that the four-powcr treaty
applies to the mainland of Japan.
the point seems to be trivial be-
Causc there Is nothing In the four
power treaty which involves force,
guarantee or commitment beyond
the promise TO respect the rights
of others ana talk over any
threat to these rights, whether
coming from within the four
power group or from without.
After all. the iOur-power treaty
Is only kind OF cloud dropped
conveniently. ns the ancient god
dcsscs used to drop clouds over
} their Heroes I'm trouble, to permit
the removal of the AnGlo-Japa-
ncsc treaty.
What has produced all the
trouble, just as nj Paris, is the fact
, that for many long weeks the
American people were left totally
In the dark as to what was going
on between their representatives
, and those of other nations. No
, one expected n front seat at the
sessions or "a stcnOgraphiC record
of the conversations between Ba-
ron Kato, Mr.. Balfour and Mr..
Hughes. when they were drafting
the four-poWcr treaty. But what
the American people did desire. IL
/ would seem, was to know from
their own, not the British or Jap
, aucsc press agents. that treaty
was being negotiated, why there
, was need of such treaty and,
when the text of the treaty was
published. what was included and
what WIS included from its pur-
view.
MIR. Wilson went to Europe talk
ing about open covenants Openly
/ arrived at" and after Paris th'
phrase became bitter term OF re
proach. The secrecy OF Paris de
feated the results of Paris in M
United States, quite as much az th'
, facts which were included In tn
I league OF nations and in the treat
OF versailles generally. And IN
l evil Of the thing lived after the figh
r. was over and the league buried b,
. the senate There was created In IN,
{ United States an indefinite amour
Z ( suspicion ab,lt oil tnternalonA
% conferences and sessions.
. Therefore. IL was matter Of
! life and death for those who were
- charged with carrying the WASH
10 lngton conference through to sue
G cess 10 avoid providing for this
potential suspicion any basis for
p real action. Instead, In the mat
% ter of the fOur~powcr treaty there
r. has been more secrecy than there
( was at Paris---and / was at Paris
, and say this thing deliberately
aud without qualification. Aud
y IhiI secrecy. utterly unnecessary
r secrecy, has led to IA crisis which
4 at least mOmcntarily graVcly in
I jurcd the standing OF the confer
% cnCc In the eyes OF the American
{ people.
e And after the mistake was made
: after the consent Of the American
{ delegates TO the Interpretation Of IN
D treaty which included the JapaneS
. mainland was finally dragged out
D che same policy OF silence ana sc
creCy was maintained. one Coul,
learn from British sources that Nj
a Balfour had proposed this thing
4 from japanese sources that BarOi
r kato had opposed It. From bot
. sources one could learn that IN
a American representatives had ac
I lcepted il. But from first to las
al