The New York herald., 1922-12-15

! Bonar Law said that Germany was
near an economic collapse that only
the stabilization OF the mark could
avert. Asserting that the destruc-
| tion Of Germany's middle classes has
resulted in the wiping out OF her
internal debt he said: IF the Ger
mans ever do recover they will be
free from that terrible burden OF
! internal debt that falls on us" He
gave a gloomy picture of Great Brit
aims industrial future should Ger
many and Europe fail to respond to
economic stimulus. England was
hurdened with heavy taxation, clog
| ging industry and producing ap-
palling idleness among her wage
earners. AS to allied debts he made
known that his Government still
stood by the Balfour program of an
! all around cancellation-Great Brit
ain surrendering her share of rep
arations.
Holds Club over France.
While Mr.. Bonar Law failed 10 de-
\ fine in explicit terms separate French
7 action In the Rhineland as rupture
4 of the Entente. he fiourished per-
haps a more formidable weapon. In
tying UP cancellation of interallied
debts with "a final settlement OF
reparations." he is generally under
stood to mean that If France persists
! in isolated action-in the Ruhr or
otherwise-which Britain believes
will lead to the ruin of Germany.
[ Britain will insist that France pay
her debts to the British and that will
lead to the reputation and bank
ruptcy OF France. In other words, Mr..
Bonar Law is considered TO have tried
\ TO turn from the war state of mind.
! and to express the problem in terms
of present and pressing economics.
/ Whatever the fate of the political
/ and military entente between France
and England they will IKE different
economic paths if France insists upon
| isola ted punitive action against Ger
many.
Mr.. Bonar Laws Speech.
/ Prime Minister BDuhT Law SpNtNh
! follows in full
I must point out to The House
! that there must be greater freedom
/ in discussing this and similar ques-
tions on the part OF the honorable
I members than can possibly he taken
/ by me. / shall try to give as COM
plete an answer as | can to the
1 questions, though in the circum-
stances II is impossible to give cate
gorical replies to them. The best
way | can deal with the matter, |
/ think, is to consider the position as
/ Il presents Itself to France and our
selves
The French. as i7deed we did also
at one time. had great hopes in re-
| gard TO the amount of money they
would get from Germany. They
| have built upon these hopes to the
/ extent that the financial system of
| France is based upon receiving a
very large sum from Germany. It
| is right that we should look at this
/ question from the point Of view as
to how it strikes our Allies.
Germany undertook TO pay
! large amount. and almost nothing
has been paid. The French say:
1--WE have had conference after con-
ference. and the result in every case
has been that I'm one form or an
other we have been given what Is
equivalent TO a moratorium. At
the end OF the moratorium we find
we are In worse position for get
ting anything from Germany than
we were before" That is the
French view The French view also
IS that this result Is largely due TO
/ deliberate action by Germany. What
| follows? There Is not the smallest
doubt that the fact the German
/ Government has allowed this tre-
mendous imitation to take place has
had the effect in itself of making 1t
impossible to meet any claims for
reparations. The French go fur
ther and say this was deliberately
done by Germany.
Different View From French.
Honestly, cannot myself take
that view and this Is the reason:
II Is perfectly true that by that
method OF passive resistance they
can avoid forever paying any In
demnity, but IL only means what is
very like suicide for Germany. 7
can hardly believe that any sane
Government would deliberately
adopt that course. In support of
the French view. however is the
fact that this imitation has enabled