The Lakeland evening telegram. (Lakeland, Fla.) 1911-1922, 1922-03-08
Political System Actu-
ated By Peace In Pacif-
ic Was Declared In the
Senate Today Follow
ing Termination of An
glo-Japanese Alliance

Washington, March determination
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and
substitution of political system actu-
ated by peace in the Pacific was de-
clared in the Senate today by Senator
Lodge; of Massachusetts, the Repub-
lican leader, and a member of the
American arms delegation as "the
main purpose" of the four power Pa
cific treaty.
THE Anglo-Japanese arrangement"
Senator Lodge declared. was regard
ed by the delegation as the most dam
gerous element in this governments
relations with the far east" He as
serted that if the four-power pact with
its clause abrogating the alliance
failed, the naval limitation agreement
also would be endangered resulting in
failure of the conference"
mo entailing commitments are con-
tanned in the treaty" he asserted, land
no provisions contrary to American
traditions" He characterized it as
only an experiment" but added that
it was one that must succeed if the
United States is to make good it's pro-
fes3ed desires to take the lead in
guiding the world toward peace"
Declaring he desired to tell the
Senate with entire frankness the mo-
tives which actuated the American
delegation" Mr. Lodge said:
For month and more before the
conference met the American delega-
tion was in session almost every day.
We tried to determine and mark out
the course which the American dele
cation, with whom rested the respon-
sibility of initiating all the work of
the conference, should follow. The
delegation was in complete accord as
to the policies to be pursued The
shadow of politics or of personal feel
ing never entered for moment upon
our deliberations.
I'VE were clearly of the opinion
that there lay before us three great
0biectives, three dominant purposes to
be attained. One was the termination
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance The
next was an agreement between the
five principal allied and associated
powers seated at the table for reduc-
tion of naval armaments. The third
was to accomplish all that was pos
sible to aid China in such ways as to
help her in the establishment of
free and Independent government and
particularly to secure the restoration
of the great province of Shantung to
the Chinese empire to which it right
fully belonged
I'VE succeeded before the close of
the conference in attaining all the OBJ
jects. The treaty now before us ter
inmates the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
Personally, | believe that it involves
the United States in no obligation ex-
cept to meet with the other signatories
and consult in case of any controversy
arising or in case of aggression by
some outside power not a signatory.
1T is not necessary for me to go
into detail as to the reasons for my
opinion as to the great importance of
this single achievement 1t is sufficient
to say that in my judgment the Anglo
Japanese alliance was the most dan
gerouS element in our relations with
the far east and with the Pacific. Wars
come from suspicious which develop
into hatreds and hatreds which de-
veiop into war. The Anglo-Japanese
alliance caused growing feeling of
suspicion not only in the United States
but in Canada. On the other side it
tended to give background to Japan
which encouraged the war spirit and
large preparations both by land and
sea. for future conflict. It immobolized
England and prevented the exercise
, Of her influence in the east because
OF peace, and peace is distinctly in
her interest in that great region. That
menace to peace is removed by the
four-power treaty.
II have already shown the total
difference which exists between this
treaty and the Anglo-Japanese
treaty. Far from taking the place of
the other. this treaty simply enabled
England and Australia and New Zea-
land to take part in terminating the
alliance.
THE removal OF the anglo-Japanese
alliance, which is complete, created
the situation in which 1t was possible
to bring about an agreement for the
reduction of naval armament While
that alliance existed a reduction of
naval armament was difficult If not
impracticable.
Senators should bear in mind that
the defeat of the four-power treaty
would endanger the treaty for the lin
itation of naval armament and the
failure OF the national treaty would
failure OF the national treaty would ut
We must not forget the close relation
between the two treaties. The defeat
Of the four-power treaty would mean
the failure of the conference. Let
there be no illusion on that point"
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