The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10

drove into the German lines, the
stronger and more energetic resis
lance was to be offered. Therefore
the defenders of our positions had tC
be placed In such a way as to increase
the resistance of our lines in proper
ton to the enemys advance. The
zone of defense was substituted for
the line of defense: the fight had to
be conducted so as to force the larger
losses on the enemy. There was not
any longer a standing order to hold
territory under any circumstances and
at any price. Such a stubborn de-
tense was considered justified only In
case evacuation, in the long run
would have caused greater losses to
the Germans than the enemy would
have suffered by storming the posi-
tions.
Extensive use Of mechanical de-
vices had to be resorted to in order
to save our own men and to crush the
fighting power Of the enemy. Thus
cannon became the chief defensive
weapon even before the enemy started
an attack, in so far as the German
artillery directed an offensive fire
against the enemy, while the latter re-
stricted his own activities to the en-
ploymePt Of mechanical devices.
Infantry Must Finish
Repeiling Mass Attack
when the infantry attack began,
machine guns--the infantry machines
were chiefly relied upon for the de-
Tense though they were supported by
artillery fire. The machine gun nests
were located chessboardlike, but in
wider lines the farther back they
were from the front so that an I'M
interrupted shower Of lead could be
poured on, and weaken the attacking
and advancing enemy. from all direc-
tons. But the final decision rested
with the man, according to an i'm
mutable law. When the defensive ma
chimes had destroyed the attack by a
gnawing process, the counter-attack
of the defenders had to drive the at
tackers back. All the machines could
do was to hamper and restrict the
progress Of the enemy: only men were
able to regain evacuated territory.
also the fertilization Of positions
underwent a change. On account Of
the indescribably quick fire of the
machine guns it was not necessary to
hurl showers of bullets against the at
tackers from a great distance. A few
dozen meters was sufficient. 1t was
not longer necessary to build the first
line trenches on the front slopes of
hills. where the defenders had good
view of the enemy. but, on the other
hand, could be easily located and
placed under fire by the allied artil-
lery: and the front trenches were
located on the rear slopes.
THE new defensive tactics came up
to expectations in the battles Of the
Aisne and in the Champagne in April,
1917, after it had not been properly
applied against the English spring
offensive. 1917. The defense with ma
masses in such an effective way that
not only the attacks failed. but also
their originator, Nivelle, the then
French Commander-in-Ch known
as 'buveur de sang (drinker OF
blood. was relieved of his position.
In the ensuing big battles, the enemy
adapted himself to the new German
defensive tactics. The increasing clev-
which the German counter
attacks were made by our units
from the reserve company to the re-
serve division-prevented the enemy
from breaking through our lines in
one forceful attack.
During the winter of 1917-191S. the
defensive tactics. in which
the Germans had become virtuosos,
had to give way to offensive tactics.
The infantry had to cast away former
principles. On account
OF technical improvements the ma
chine, instead of. the individual in
was the most effective
factor of rifle fire. The defense relied
chiefly on machine guns, against
which the infantry could not any
longer prevail. The infantryman be-
came a hand to hand fighter.
German High Command
Thought Tanks Harmless
"A dark spot in the matter of arm