The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1922-09-10
ERE LIEUTENANT COLONEL LOST THE WAR GERMANY,
SAYS MILITARY HISTORIAN MEMBER OF THE GENERAL STA

ton of other arms, was overestimatioi
OF the effectiveness of the German in
fantry fire."
I'm 1914. the same reckless sacri
fices were made as in 1870. While
the evil consequences of such tactic
did not prove fatal In 1870. becaus
that war lasted only nine months ane
the Germans enjoyed a great numeri
cal superiority. the flower of tn,
army. which shad been sacrificed 3,
Anticipated tactics to conservativ,
ideas in 1914, was much missed during
the last years Of the world war;"
Blind Obedience Led to
Costly Losses in Mer
Peace instruction and drill of the
| German army aimed at suppressing in
| dividuality and at making a mere ma
| chine out of the private and non COM
missioned officer, who had to execute
orders blindly and who were trained to
attack and advance without utilizing
available cover. Such tactics agreed
with the German character, but proved
fatal in the long run because of excess
sive losses. On the other hand, the
French soldier was encouraged to use
his own judgment and utilize any op-
portunity of keeping out of the view
and the bullets Of the enemy.
THE German army manual pro-
claimed as an axiom that the field ar
tillery while in action ought not to re-
sort to camouflage of any kind but
must occupy open or 'half-covered
positions for the sake Of mobility. The
French field artillery was carefully
trained in the art of camouflage and
keeping out of sight.
From sad experience in the Franco
Prussian war the French knew of the
moral effect Of artillery fire on the
enehhy and took 1t into consideration.
In his book L'Artillerie de Champagne
which was approved by the French
Ministry of War, Lieutenant Colonel
Paloque says Of the moral effect of ar
tillery fire on infantry: La, pinfanterie
eprouve, avant de sly engager, le sem
iment que lie terrain a parcourir. balaye
par les feux enemis, est trop danger
oux pour qu'on puisse s'aventurer;
clio s'arrete. hesitante ct s'abrite avant
d'avoir souffert.' $50 has the infantry.
before 1t engages itself the feeling that
the territory which must be traversed
under the fire of the enemy is too dan
gerous to take risk, hesitatingly the
infantry stops and seeks shelter before
it has suffered.) French manuals speak
of the 'peur du shrapnep (fear of the
shrapneD which would prevent or re-
duce the effectiveness Of the employ
ment of infantry. The official German
manuals as well as oral instructions
utterly failed to consider the important
factor of mponderabilities.
after the Entente offensive of
autumn, 1915. had failed in spite Of,
immense sacrifices in blood the Allies
decided to conserve their men and
substitute machines for soldiers as far
as possible. The Western Powers were
always quicker to comprehend and
comply with the technical demands of
warfare than the German leaders in
their extreme conservatism. So the
French and English made preparations
to shatter the German front by over
whelming artillery fire and the en-
ployment of other mechanical devices
and to blaze for their fresh troops a
road to victory. But it was not until
1918 that they understood that results
could be obtained the sooner the wider
the front was that was subjected to
such 'crdshing process When the
Allies in the battle of the Somme
smashed the German front in width
OF thirty kilometers and advanced
twelve kilometers they lost the fruits
of victory because Of their failure to
press home their success in trench
warfare by field operations proper.
But the German High Command finally
admitted that it's tactics were anti
quated in the face of modern technical
progress.
Ludendorf Brought
Progressive Spirit
1T was good luck for the German
army that then General Ludendorff,
that genius in the realm of organiza-
ton, entered the High Command of the
German. army, into which he injected
the spirit of military progressiveness.
ITO remedy the technical defects
was up to the home organization; to
improve tactics was the duty of the
General Staff. Theories regarded as
axioms up to then, were thrown over
board. Under the new rules the de-
Tense was to be mobile. no longer
rigid. To save men positions were to
be evacuated when to defend them
would have meant too severe losses
from the enemy's artillery fire. But
the evacuation was scheduled to be
only temporary, for the duration of
the devastating artillery fire. or, in
other words. not longer than TO the
beginning of the attack by the infan-
try. At the end Of the ensuing in
fantry battle the defenders were ex-
pected to occupy their old positions.
THE deeper the wedge the enemy