The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1922-10-18

1
to resist him had crossed the Bos
phorus, passed into Thrace and oc'
cupied Constantinople. Do you
think he would have stopped in
eastern Thrace? Who would have
stopped him from going into wes-
tern Thrace and possibly passing
into Salonika. You know what
that would have nleant-war. And
the war of 1914 practically began
in the Balkans.
81 think it was right that be-
fore the Turkish army should have
been allowed to cross into Europe
with the flush of victory, with, the
blood of Smyrna on its hands. it
should have had time to cool, and
that we should have guarantees
that they would give protection for
the minorities in Europe. That is
all we did. We are pledged to
shield these people.
'.I am told it was not our busi-
ness. Fam sorry to say that Liber-
ais had been pleading that it was
none of our business to interfere
between the Turks and their vic
tins. What business is it of Brit
ain's?. was the question; if the
Turk insists leave him alone. Let
him cross the straits: let him cross
to Constantinople-a free road and
a fairway to the shambles."
That was not the old Liberal
policy. It was not the policy GER
tainly thar it is brought up in. 1t
was not that f. was taught in my
youth-that Englishmen, Scotch
men and Welchmen should every
morning repeat reverently the lit
any of the cynic. Am 1 my broth
er's keeper?' That Great Britain
should face the world with the
brand of Cain upon her brow
Near Eastren Policy
The prime minister continued his
lengthy defense of the government;
Near Eastern policy by laying par
ticular stress upon the resistance
+ to the French policy toward Mus.
tapha Kemal Pasha.
Suppose we had followed meek
ly behind France he continued
"The Kennalist forces would have
been at Chanak. The next thing
that would have happened woulo
have been. the crossing of the
straits. Gallipoli was held by
very weak Senegalese battalion witt
orders not to fire upon the Turks
Both sides of the straits would have
been in the Kemalist hands.
"Do you think you would have
got them out? You would have gone
to the peace conference and said
VIII you please get away from
Chanak and Gallipoli.' And Kema
would have said; No, we will guar
antee the straits to you"
'sour critics say: Why didn'
tyou have an understanding with
+ your allies?' We did and only {
few weeks ago we received a mes
sage from the French government
| that if the Greeks or Turks invaded
the neutral zone. they would' have
Ito be resisted; by force. We ac
cepted that and thought they mean
it. How were we to believ1that
was intended for only one side?
Dealing with the recent criticism
| by Lord Grey on the government
foreign policy. the premier said:
cit is not easy in the realms o
| foreign affairs to secure agreemen
and to secure results. Lord Gre.
knows that. Take 1914. His FRO
| posals were admirable. His tempe
/; to agree with Mr.. Asquith was @
the best. But he was not the kais
er.s adviser. and he had no influ
ence over the German genera
staff. They had their own ambi
:, tions. They had their Nown ideas
It is just possible that the languas'
/; less direct or that the languas'
more direct, language more EN-
| phatic raight have stopped it but j
/ is easy to be wise after the event
{ Il am not criticising. I'm onl.
pointing out that 1t was the, great
lest. most caIamitous diplomatic fail
ure the world has eyer seens -ant
! that it was due to conditions owe
!: which Lord Grey had no control
He therefore ought 20 be charitabl,
with others.
Take the whole Of the incident
/ of that period. Lord Grey sough
to make peace in the Balkans. h
made peace. That peace didn'
{; stand the jolting of the tr2sn tina
carried it from London to the Bal
kans. It fell to. pieces before i
reached Sofa.
''That wasn't his fault. The plal
was good, the intentions were ex
ceilent. but there were factor
which he could not control"
/ After his lengthy defense of tn
governments policies, both domes
tic and foreign. Lloyd George sait
that several times he had tried t.
persuade others to take the pre-
miership He continued:
My course is clear one. I viii
support with all my might an:
government that devotes itself ant
Ilends its energy to the task will
single nlindedness. fearlessness am
resolution. provided they do no
embark upon measures. whicl
w u d inflict permanent in
:iuries on the country, whethe
! these measures be- reactionary o
revolutionary. That does not meal