The Washington herald., 1922-02-05
Years of War Prophesied !
AS Result Of Jap Policy

probation will this sonrerenee ana
consultation provision have thenf
This is the all Important ouestisng.
Remember that In 1sof Ft9hct
and Great Britain made q regional
agreement; Il was designed to pre-
vent war between France ana
Britain, Il had mainly TO do with
Africa and its chief provisions ap-
piled TO Egypt and Morocco. ret
hefore the ink on the document
was fairly dried this agreement
had led to Ehat dramatic episode
Of Tangiers and Great Britain
found herself on the brink OF war
with Germany. Moreover. ten yesrs
later, when the world wsr ,did-,
come. the agreement OF lsot repre-.
sented the real claim Of France
upon. Britain.
Had the agreement covering the
region of the Pacific been open TO
all parties having Pacific interests.
ITO China, to Russia. TO Holland. as
well as TO Great Britain, France.
Japan and the United StateA, the
situation would have been far diff
ferent But under the four-power
| treaty we are entering into special
relations with one party to a war,
which is now almost inevitablaL
Moreover. the fact that wer1ars
bound by an agreement, however
simple. to Japan and have no such
agreement with Russia and China.
gives Japan the chance to exploit
this agreement as she did Ne
Anglo-Japanese alliance in the
years during and since the world
war.
1t is the fact that japanese
policy makes war almost inescsp-
able in the Far East, not the Ian
guage or the four-power pact
which seems to me to make for
danger. One Of the chief arSu-
ments used against the league of
nations and one Of the most valid
arguments was that Germany and
Russia were excluded from its
membership and therefore that It
was an alliance TO perpetuste vic
tory not to promote peace, but in
the four-power treaty we exclude
| three nations, all Of whom have
islands in the Pacific and Two OF
whom must one day soon be in
volved in war with Japan.
Admit that we shall escape be-
ing dragged into any war, that the
Senate, as IL now plans, will APP
pend a reservation like that IL af-
fixed TO Article Y. there is a further
] lOOgSCNASA- AAAhOukn We dTt re-
nouncing the power and the task
of defending China, obedient, let us
agree TO national sentiment and
having regard for enlightened self
interest, We still have interests in
China. We shall suffer much loss
Of prestige anyway. but what IL
China sees US entering an ar
rsngement with her chief foe, while
refusing TO permit her join in this
agreement, which is publicly and
probably quite accurately described
as no more than a self-denyinS
ordinance? -7''
Chinese May See Betrayal.
Germany saw in the Anglo-French
agreement Of 1904 made chiefly Ia
liquidste African disputes and hsy-
ing no European connot2tion, the
first step in an encirclins policy.
Will not China see in the four
eower pact final evidence OF tha
association Of all the Western ma
items to despoil her; will not our
membership seem to her q nnsl be-
traysl and drive her to SSTne new
fury against all foreigners which
will have consequences far more
serious than the Boxer Rebellion
May il not involve US in the AsiatiS
mess in the one way we can b
involved. namely to protect the
lives and property OF our nation
ais?
The mere presence OF Holland n
this Pacific pact, since Holland,
like ourselves. has no interest Ja
the mainland Of Asia, might hsya
done something to remove this sus-
picion. Granted that Russia could
not now be admitted. place might
have been left TO her. ASSUMING
even that China were at the
moment. too divided to be avail
able, the mere provision that when
the present temporary situation
Tassed. Chinese representation
should be permitted. Chinese par
ticipation made possible. might
have helped remedy this appsreEt
defect
!, The four-power treaty is not IN
any proper sense an alliance, all
though as experienced a statesman
as Niscount Grey OF Fslloden has
so named it in a recent speech. I
Eravely doubt IL VIC shall ever be
dragged into a Sino-Japsnese or
Russo-Japanese war because We
have signed It. But there remains
the question OF exactly what its cf-
feet will be upon US. upon China
our relations with China and our
prestige in China, il We enter into
compact with Japan. unmistak-
ably the agEressor in Asia and GER
tain in no distant time to have to
fight to maintain this position
: taken in defisnc Of all our nations
Of international right and justice.
Frsnkne,s Was Called For.
None Of these doubts would have
arisen IL Japan had come to Wash
E inEton prepared 10 share frankly in
the making Of a stable equilibrium
in the Far East. They arise now,
not out of the language or the in
! tent of the four-power treaty. it.
self. but out of the conditions
which must now prevail in the Far
:Rst. Often IL is more importan,
what kind of nation you make a
treaty with than what kind OF a
: treaty you make. The present
; problem is all here, the real line or
criticism of the four-power trcatv
, seems to me to be found here.
! Since Japan would not get out OF
China, was il not important, vital
, that China should be permitted
sooner or later to be a signatory
: TO the treaty which covered Pa.
cifc questions. IL only that she
might not seem to be isolated and
! We to be even remotely associated
with her oppressor?
Copyright 1874