The Washington herald., 1922-08-20

tude Is generally assaiied all over
the world. But since most natiops
owe us money, we shall. a. con-
sequence OF the Balfour note pres
emily see our rapacity ranked with
French militarism In the worlQ
opinion. Only the Soerma NJ Who
owe US nothing - consequence
can. still preserve q friendly feel-
ing. but this must be affected by
the fact that our insistence upon
British payment and the consequent
British insistence upon continental
payment leads to continental In
sistence upon German payment.
Now that his insistence upon the
payment of wholly legal obliga-
tion has caused the American to
be held up to the scorn OF the world
as the offender responsible for the
present world tragedy. he can per-
haps sympathixe little with the
Frenchman, whose alleged mill
tarism has been made to serve q
similar purpose for more than three
years. Moreover, It 10 one of the
ironies of the situation that just
as we are inclined TO accept the
British Characterization of the
Frenchman as militaristic. he ID
inclined to accept the British por-
trait Of ourselves as grasping.i
|. Proposals Were . Bluff.
Detailed analysis Of the propo-
sails made at London is a waste of
time because none of the proposals
were seriously made, that Is. made
with any idea Of acceptance. The
occasion of the meeting was the
German demand for a long morato-
rum. Poincare proposed short
cessation of payments accompanied
by a variety of intricate interfer-
ence with German industry, which,
while designed to produce revenue
would hardly have done more than
continue the German disorganiza-
tion and extend allied intermixture
with German domestic affairs.
such a proposal carried, with II
the certainty that SO far from help
Ing British trade or reducing Ger
man competition. the paralysis OF
Germany's purchasing power and
the depreciation of the mark would
be increased. Naturally the British
rejected the Poincare proposal and
were supported by the Belgians
Italians. and Japanese. save only as
the Belgians endorsed the French
proposal to administer the Ruhr
industrially, an interesting excep-
tion. for II was the one definite and
clear cut proposal of control. which
seemed possible of realization.
Between the British and French
positions no compromise was pos
sible because the ends pursued
were Numerically opposed. France
wanted money Britain sought trade
and the elimination of disastrous
competition through deprecated
German currency. Therefore you
had a deadlock. foreshadowed, as
have said by the Balfour and Poin-
care notes. Indeed the deadlock
was so inevitable that the whole
proceedings in London had a per-
functory note. Even the familiar
| threats of a dissolution of the en-
tente fell upon deafened ears
Whatever else may be said of the
London conference, at least II Is a
fact that 1t played to the smallest
house since International affairs
have been dramatized by the con-
ference method.
| Hope for Party Here.
And after London, what? Oh.
viously one thing. a desperate and
| concerted effort in every capital In
Europe to promote another Wash.
| ington conference to deal with the
| economic and financial situation OF
the world. 1t is the last hope. Fail
| ing this It is dih1cult to see now
how there can be anything but q
| general crash on. the continent fol-
| lowed by French military opera
tions against Germany.
Such a Washington conference
moreover. opens. in the dream OF
every European statesman, with
| Mr.. Hughes presiding and deliver
| ing another "bombshell" which shall
| consist of a pledge that the United
| States will cancel all that Europe
owes us, provided Europe will can
eel all that is owed in the shape Of
interallied debts and agree to dras'
tic reductions in the sum of German
reparations. In addition the Brit
ish would expect US to assail ths
standing armies of France and the
other continental countries and
! complete the Limitation of nava
armaments by enforcing British
views as to submarines. now
adopted widely in the United
States.
A reward for such course
would be the praise of the worlt
and the chance to sit at the heat
| of the table. the chance Mr.. Wilson
seized at Paris. The price would
be cancellation. The London SEES
sions demonstrated that no Euro
pean statesman dared ask his owr
| country for sacrifice and on the
other hand that no statesman oil
| country desired a crash. Postpone
ment, then, was the best that couio
be hoped for. but postponemen'
with a clearly defined notion that
in the end America could be per
suaded.
Adopt waiting Policy.
Let US go back to Washington
has been the watchword in Euro
pean circles ever since the prelude
to Genoa. The British even wanted
to turn the Washington conference
into a financial and economic delib
Grafton. once the naval matters ha'
been disposed of. 1t Is perceived
now that there can be no Wash
ington conference of q satisfactory
sort until the Congressional elec
tions are over. But Europe will
try and wait, 1t can wait in a way
just as, long as there is hope OF
Ultimate solution and not day
/ longer.
Unless there IL a sudden crash
always possible. given the German
situation. Europe will now find
ways of postponiag decision
which,. without our participation
must be painful IN the extrems
until after the November baliotine