New Ulm review., 1922-02-22
(The New Republac.)
Salvation By Conference.

Q0It aSSuIdICSE " sPtA1 poeS lily e1StA1AiA'As
tration is unfolding its foreign policy.
The President and his secretary OF State
propose and are seeking available methods
of using the economic power and political
prestige of the United States for the bene-
fit of appeasement and recovery IN all
parts of the world, but for many reasons
they are obliged to go slow. American
public opinion is still reluctantyto take.
many risks or to assume many presponsl-
bilties abroad, particularly~ IN Europe;
and in certain parts of the world the
malady is SO unmanageable that at pres
ent an outside physician can do no more
than offer pious advice which the patient
is too sick to accept. The adminlstra-
ton began with naval disarmament as the
immediate object and the Far East as
the first subject of its political healing.
Navies and China were matters in which
the American people were directly in
terested and in relation to which Amerl-
can leadership had a good chance OF
being accepted, but the President never
intended to stop at this point. He has
proposed from the beginning, if he were
successful in substituting conference for
war as an agency ofI Far Eastern silegisla-
ton, to extend the, method to other prob
lens and regions. -
He has intended for many months
ultimately to call a general conference.
But the announcement of this intention
on November 23rd, instead of at the end
Of the present Conference as was origi-
nally intended, is rendered possible by
the appearance of one new condition in
the complex of international politics and
it is rendered extremely desirable by the
intrusion of another. It is rendered pos
sible by the fact that the administration
considers the success, from its point OF
view, of the present Conference practical
ly assured. It would not dare to launch
the new ambitious project, if there was
any danger of the laundering of the first
more modest vessel Of its own contrlvance.
But even though the prosperity of it's
first project seems assured, it would still
have possessed sound reasons for delaying
the announcement until it's success was
publicly admitted and confirmed, were it
not for another less agreeable piece Of
news. Its very success in beginning the
limitation of naval armaments and in in
Producing a little order into, the Far East
intensified the political malady of Europe
France, in the person of NJ. BRAND, de-
clared that she preferred isolation to the
taking Of any share in the limitation of
land armaments. Great Britain, in the
person of Mr.. Curzon, warned France that
the preference for isolation might involve
disaster. The long smouldering hostility
between the two countries jumped to the
surface and it threatened to render a
larger conference which would deal with
land armament and the problem of Europe
abortive before it started. If the project
were to have any chance of success, the
administration had to announce its in
tention unequivocally and without further
delay. ..ns a~ > .
The significance of proposing a new
association of nations at the very moment
when France insisted on disassoriating
herself from the movement towards ap-
peasement is clear enough. In less Of
fensive but more emphatic way the Amer
lean government repeated the i British
Foreign Minister'S warning to France.
It declared it's intention of trying to sub
stitute conference for armament and war
as the means of international adjustment
in Europe as we'll as the Far East, of
including the defeated as we'll as the vic.
torious nations within the embrace Of
conference and it's benefcent authority.
If it's proposal should succeed what would
be the result? It would bring into exist
tence. an association of nations whose
unanimous decisions, even though they
were not backed up by military force,
would possess overwhelming moral au-
thority. Any nation which would not
conform and whose nonconformity was
based upon belief in armament rather
than conference as an agency Of inter-
national legislation, would do so at its
peril. Its isolation would be ignoble and
Jo I'd T4 .r1c,111 bnooyl1n