Ellsworth American. [volume] (Ellsworth, Me.) 1855-current, 1922-03-15

other than the benefits that it en-
joys in common with the rest of the
State. There must be some sort OF
proportion between the benefit and
the burden.
Different courts agreeing as to the
correctness of the above stated
principle have precribedN different
tests to determine whether it is
violated.
Is the statute "palpably arbitrary
and plain abuse?" (Houck VS.
Drainage District U. S. supreme
court 60 L. Ed. 273.) '1ndefensibly
i unfair?" cleveland VS.. Trip 13 r
L., 62.) "a fragrant misuse of legis-
lative power" t234 Mass. 621. }
"Unreasonably disproportionate? ?"
(Hamilton vs.. Portland Pier Site
district 112 At. $500 These differ.
ing phrases are identical in mean,
ing.
Although it is we'll settled that
the powers Of the Legislature are alb
solute except as limited by the con-
stitution either expressly or by
necessary implication (Laughlin VS.
Portland Ill Me. 4S9) it would too
|
cuss in detail the article or articles
of the constitution that such I'M
reasonable disproportion would vio-
late. 1t would contravene the spirit
of fairness and equality that
throughout pervades our fundamen-
tai law
(See Maine constitution article /,
secs. and 81. Art. 8, sec. and
the 18th amendment to the federal
constitution.)
Suffice it to say that law impos-
ing upon a taxing district burden
of taxation "indefensibly unfair" "a
plain abuse" "a fragrant misuse of
legislative power" or to use the
milder but substantially equiva-
lent language of the Maine court,
"unreasonably disproportionate to
benefits" would be held unconsti-
tutional and acts under it enjoined.
Otherwise not.
The constitution of course does
not require taxation to be exactly
proportionate to benefits. Such re-
quirement would paralyze the tax
ing power.
Turning to the case at bar and ap-
plying the above principles, no plain
abuse of fragrant misuse of legisla-
tive power appears. No unreason-
able disproportion of burden and
benefit is shown. The legislature
determined that the county of Han
cock would be benefited by the pro-
posed bridge in a greater degree
than the rest of the State, and the
district in greater degree than the
rest of the county. It's decision is
not so plainly, palpably and
flagrantly erroneous as to overcome
thepresumption of constitutionality
and justify the interposition of the
Court.
The petitioners cite and rely upon
Dyer VS.. Pennington 70 Me. SIS.
In that case the Pennington Village
Corporation having voted to raise
$35, to aid railroad was by the
courts injunction restrained from so
doing. l think that the reasoning of
the opinion in the Dyer case has not
been fully approved by later cases.
The decision however was undoubt-
eddy correct. The tax burden and
local benefit were unreasonably dis
proportionate. Other distinctions
between that case and the present
appear in Mayo VS.. Fire Co. SO Me.
sos.
There is no difference in principle
between the present case and that of
the Portland Pier Site district which
was required by legislative act to
pay more than its equal share of the
cost of establishing a public pier.
Nor is any difference in principle
perceived between this case and the
law requiring towns to maintain
public roads. In the absence of
proof of unreasonable disproportion
an injunction will not on this ground
be granted.
1t is further said that no public
notice was given Of the meeting of
the bridge board whereat the bridge
was determined to be required by
public convenience and necessity"
We have already seen that public
notice was not made necessary by
the terms of the act. 1t is commended
not expressly or implicitly required,
the legislative act is unconditional
because violative Of the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitu-
ton which guarantees that no
pCIoOuS shall Uo OopTlVou OIL prop
erty without due process of law"
This point cannot be sustained
If the legislature had itself deter
mined the necessity Of the, public
work as was done in the case of the
Portland Pier Site district no notice
to taxpayers would have been re-
quired. The "due process" clause of
the constitution does not apply to
an act of the legislature creating a
taxing district. 1t was not made es-
sential by the conditional require
ment that the fact Of necessity b,
determined by board.
"But the legislature has the power
to determine, by the statute impos-
ing the tax, what lands, which might
be benefited by the improvement, are
in fact benefited; and if it does so,
it's determination is conclusive upon
the owners and the courts, and the
owners have no right to be heard
upon the question whether their
lands are benefited or not, but only