New-York tribune., 1922-02-20
Harding Is Advised That
Reservation of Right
10 For,ify Philippines
and Guam Nullihes Pact
concessions Made
BY Japan Involved
Change Also W ould Mean
Huge Expenditure for
" arship Base and Forts
By Carter Field

WASHINGTON. Feb 19.-Rescrva-
t1ons to the naval treaty along the line
hlntcd by Senator Hiram Johnson's in
curry made IN the Senate last week as
to Paciiic Notifications would nullify
the whole armament Limitation idea
close advisers Of the President dc
cared tonight. Senator Johnson's m
curry was why the United States had
agreed not to fortify the Philippines
and Guam. and whether the net result
did not leave the United States at a
disadvantage
President Harding has manifested,
on almost every other point ggested,
an attitude that it was up to the Sen
ate TO determine whether there should
be reservations to the treaties or not.
although he left no doubt that in his
own opinion no reservations were nee
essary. This is especially true since
the drafting Of the supplement to the
tour-power treaty excluding the home
islands Of Japan from the scope of the
fcur-powcr pact.
Johnson's Objection Vital
A reservation along the lines of the
johnson inquiry. however, would re-
serve for the United States the right
TO fortfy, during the life Of the treaty,
tho Philippines and Guam, and also the
rlght to establish naval bases there
In return for the surrender of. the
right TO fortify the Philippines and
Guam and to esta ablsh naval bases
there Japan gave up the right to for
tlfy the Pcscadores Islands, which COM
mand The trade route from the Philip
pines up to China, Formosa and other
islands, the fortfication of which might
threaten American interests in the Far
East
While this was reciprocal idea,
which carries with it the saving of
hundreds of millions Of dollars to both
nations in Che long run, provided, of
course, that Congress ever would have
appropriated the funds for the estab-
lshment of proper naval base at
Guam, and the proposed additional for
tihcations there and in the Philippines,
this was not the only bargain wrapped
up in this agreement.
Basis of Ratio Acceptance
The acceptance by Japan Of the 5-5-3
naval ratio WAS predicated on an agree
ment by the United States not TO in
crease her military preparations in the
Far East. 1t was at the nsistence of
Japan that the agreement on fortifca
tons in the western Pacific was IN
cluded in the naval treaty, and not put
in separate treaty, or even in the
four power Pacific treaty.
The Japanese diplomats made no cor
cealmcnt Of the fact that they we're
willing to give up the claim of Nippon
for ratio of 7 to 10 as COMPARED
with the fleets Of the United States or
Britain only if what was regarded by
many Japanese as hostile preparation
against them were discontinued in the
Philippines and Guam. They professed
entire Willingness to agree to a treaty
binding them to respect American pos
sessions which was done in the four
power Pacific treaty but they wanted
to be able to go home to Japan and
tell their people that in agreeing to
cut the ratio of the Japanese Navy to p
point one-seventh below what had been
preached as the minimum of safety in
Japan for more than ten years they
had also removed the American menace
to the south Of them
L. S. Surrendered Nothing
Military and naval experts here for
the most part, in private conversations,
say that this country really surren-
dered nothing in making the conces-
sions, when certain factors are consid-
cred. In the first place. no one in
Washington believes that for some
years to come an appropriation could
have been obtained from Congress for
a naval base in Guam. The Navy De-
partment has been attempting to get
ty years, and has made no apparent
progress.
On the contrary. the present Con
gress. very obviously, is less inclined
toward liberality for military prepared
ness than any Congress since the Span
lSh- American War. Secretary of War
Weeks is now pleading with it not to
re 'uce the army much below 10000
men, while Secretary of the Navy
DENLY is pleading that the personnel
of the navy should not be reduced be-