The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1922-01-22
Gaze Too Much to Great Britain:
POincdre Expected to Fall Also,
Then France viii Be Reasonable

She can accomplish In reality only
I one thing. She can produce chaos
/ IN Germany which may retard Ger
/ man recovery and thus long post d.
/ pone the day when France has to
/ rear the consequences of German
/ strength.
/ From the point OF view NJ many
/ Americans France seems to stand
/ with a pistol at tho head nf the
/ world. Such was the common in
/ terprctation Of her action I'm the
/ matter of the submarine u the
4 washington conference. what is
/ not 50 clearly perceived In America
ls the fact that the world appears
. 10 the FrcnChmhu to demand that
/ his country which made the largest
sacrifice proportlonate to her pom
/ ulation and her wealth in the com
/ mon fight against tho German shall
| make the largest sacrifices now to
| ward the rehabilitation Of Germany
/ 10 the profit Of her less severely
/ shaken allies
The French gesture is described
| ms one ~ blackmail and the French
/ policy as one of holdup. And such
/ Interpretations have obviously done
I much To weaKen the French posi-
| tion, particularly In the United
| states. Yet the difficulty IN dear
/ ing with the whole situation
/ squaroly lies IN the fact that moral
/ and material interests are inoxtri-
/ cahly tangled. The Englishman sees
| the Frenchman promoting economic
/ paralysis In Germany and unem-
/ plOvment In Great Britain for selfish
reasons, yet he believed that his
/ own policy. which sees the economic
! rehabilitation Of Germany and OF
] Europe represents the last word In
/ ethical politics His own plan FOR
I world reconstruction he advocates
/ aud presses as the expression OF in
/ ternatiOnal idealism and moral ele-
/ walton.
! French See the other Angle.
! The FrcnChman, on the other
| hand, sees British policy from the
! other angle. He sees that II he does
/ the things which Great Britain re-
/ quires Of him Britain will profit
Germany will gain and he viii un.
/ questionably lose both directly and
I indirectly. lie percoivcs that Great
/ Britain was willing TO discuss the
subject Of an alliance with France
only when France had successfully
maintained In Washington the right
to preserve both its army and its
navy at a strength fixed by French
statesmen. He perccives that the
submarine issue in Washington led
to the offer Of alliance in Cannes
and he perCeiVes with equal clarity
that no alliance was offered during
the period between the Paris con-
ference ,and the present gathering
| at Washington when France was
making concessions.
Now the question which must
come to every American mind Is:
What have we tn do with all this
mess? The United States would
be adyant2gcd, materially advan-
/ tagged. IL the markets of Europe
were restored. Our chief difficulty
now grows out of the inability OF
/ Europe to buy from us those
| things which we produce in guam
titles adequate for export. Those
who produce cotton, wheat. cat
tie and variety Of other things
In the United States cannot dis
pose of them and they suffer as
II consequence. And this suffer
ing VIII continue until Europe re-
gains It's old purchasing power. n
thing which cannot happen until
economic order follows political
prOstration.
But what can the United states
do to promote economic order in
Europe? This Is the question which
must be faced and answered before
we send representatives to Genoa, IL
We decide to send such repeaenta .
tives. There IL a wholly mistaken
idea In this country and even In
congress that the United States can
dictate policies for European appli-
cation by resolutions but through
the senate or the house. There IL
an idea that because Europe owes
us large sums We can dictate to
those European countries which are
our debtors how large shall be their