The Washington herald., 1922-02-12


As the first American conference
49, shs recent international meet
ing mas a unique place In nis.ory'
a. maTkLvho can doubt it?-a
.,.g- ~ our own as well as IN
1Torld history. But when one comes
20 counpare or contrast II with the
sreat conferences of the last cen
tury- with Vienna, with Berlin, WIN
an. paris conference which nQui-
dat.d-or sought to hquidate-tne
world war, one perceiyes at once
that the Washington conferences
was both less significant and less
innortant-ft was restricted In its
deld. IL was limited in its resuits'
seeking TO do but two things 70
deal with but two situations II
found itself halted after materiai
advance in handling one
Program Modest.
Actually we undertook relstiNe
w modest program. We sought 10
nut a term to Anglo-American ma
val competition. which was futile
ana expensiye into the bargain ana
also to Japanese-American distrust
ana worse in the Pacific which had
No basis in reason. Both OF these
things We accomplished. All things
considered there Is. after the sign
ing OF the four-party and the nve-
marty treaties, the one dealing WIN
m. regions of the Pacific, the other
with the limitation OF naval
strength, not the smallest reason
why Britain. the United states or
Japan should either fight or COM
pete in naval construction
So much is solid achievement
There was some danger, real dan
unr Of COLLISION,
fhers was a present fact of Anglo
American naval competition. But
there was no underlying reason Tor
war between japan and the United
states and there was not the re-
hottest reason for Anglo-Amerlcan
naval competition. japan mistrust-
ed our purposes in the Far East
we suspected Japanese menace 10
our own coasts and insular possess
sIons and we saw in the Anglo
Japanese alliance a cause TO- ahA-
iety and annoyance.
But it Is essential to perceive tnat
underlying the whole situation IN
the Far East and the naval SITUATION
there was a fundamental absence OF
cause for war or for rivalry Inc
achievement in Washington was the
application of ordinary common
sense to a situation which was not
without danger, was indeed capable
of becoming dangerously aggra-
waited. That the situation was fun
damentally sound. however. was
disclosed by the fact that the three
great powers could deaI-with il and
dispose Of It
Now when one passes from the
agreements between the three great
sea-powers both over naval strength
and over Pacific dominions to the
questions affecting the mainland Of
Ashland for that matter the main
land Of Europe, as we'll as the
means and methods OF future war
fare, il is clear that one passes from
the domain of fact to ths region OF
speculation. We have not disposed
of the Chinese questions. the Sibe-
Tian questions. the controversy over
ene submarine-which is a detail in
European differences of opinion.
In point of fact. although nine
men out of ten probably believe the
contrary, we have not even estab-
lished a ratio of strength in the
matter of capital ships-for you
will search the five-power treaty in
vain for any mention of ratio. What
is written, there Is that for a period
Of ten years capital ships are not
to be built by the signatories, that
Immediately there will be a reduc-
ton in the naval strength OF GER
tain fleets and a practical cessation
OF all programs.
Now IL you please to take the
American view this means that the
seapowers have accepted for a
time, for all time, a certain rela-
tive rating of power on the sea.
But IL you take the European view
IL is something quite different. To
the European mind, to the Con-
tinental European mind, the fact
disclosed in the Washington trea-
ties is Just this: Naval warfare is
in a transitory stage, hattleships
are going out, aircraft and perhaps
submarines are coming in. But no
one quite knows what will develop
In the next ten years. In addition,
all European nations are financial
embarrassed. none can AFFORD to
build oattleships, even il II were
a sure investment. as Il emphatic
ally Is not.
Having set forth these facts the
European would conclude that the
logical course to follow was to de-
clare truce In building. to wait
for time. during which science
would progress and finance i'm
prove. Ten years from now new
situations may develop. But, and I
am trying to emphasize the fact,
even In accepting the truce in the
building OF battleships, France does
not accept a ratio. she does not
consent to rank LIS against 5-5-3l
for Britain, the United States and
Japan, respectively. This is not the
French view at all, what she does
Is to agree not to construct more
than a certain tonnage in eapftal
Ships during the next fifteen years.
and that is all.
You may calculate that ten wears
from now, when the naval holiday
ends, fifteen years from now, when
the treaty expires. the world will
have abandoned its present or its
past ideas of war. 1t may be so.
But this is again a speculation.
You may. also, with equal Justice.
calculate then when Europe recov-
ers from the exhaustion of the
moment. It will start TO build
navies again. 1t may even do II
before fifteen years have passed,
fo- u has kept its hands free in
submarines ana In auxiliary shfps.
The point Is that you cannot now
decide whether Europe has agreed
10 limitation Of armament SO far
as IL has agreed. from exhaustion
dne to financial condition or as a