The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1922-10-18
CHAPTER XII.
md ns the War and My AhdlcatInn.

Ind q. the War and My Abdlcatlon
Few days after August \, 1918.
I summoned a crthyn council, In
ordcr TO get a clear conception OF
,bs mtuation and TO draw therefrom
the necessary conclusions upon
which to base the policy to he fol
l,,,ed by Count Hertling. The chief
military command approved the idea
That the imperial chancellor should
keep In sight the possibility Of get
ing into closer touch with the
enemy, hut laid stress on the neces-
sity OF first occupying the Siegfriod
line and there thoroughly beating
on the foe, and on the fact that
negotiations must not begin before
this occurred. Thereupon | directed
that the chancellor get into COM
uunlcation with n neutral power
the Nctherlands--in order TO asCer-
tain whether Il was ready TO UNDER
take such a step toward mediation.
What rendered the contemplated
action through Dutch channels very
difficult was that Austria could not
be brought to "A definite agreement
but continually postponed the dec
aratiOn which had been requested
,of her Even n verbal agreement
given to me by the Emperor Charles
MAS dlltINblu hhfH UA MN ullutl
Burlan's influence.
The Dutch government had al
ready been informed by me and had
signified its readiness to act. Mean
while, Austria. without notifying us,
made her first separate peace offer.
which set the ball rolling The
Emperor Charles had indeed got
into touch secretly with the entente
and had long since resolved to
abandon us. lie acted according 70
the plan which he had explained
thus to his encourage. When | go
TO the Germans, | agree to every
thing they say. and when | return
home, l do whatever | please"
Thus 1t happened that my gov
eminent and | were constantly de-
ceiyed by actions in Vienna, with
out being able to do anything against
a since from there we constantly
received tho hint: "If you make
things hard for US we shall leave
You In the lurch: in other words
our army will no longer fight by
your side" In view OF our situation
such action on Austria's part had 20
he avoided in any way possible, both
on military and political grounds.
The detection OF Hungary and
Austria brought crisis upon us
Had Emperor Charles kept control
OF his nerve for three weeks longer,
many things would have turned out
differently. But Andrassy---as he
himself admitted---had been negoti-
ating for long time in Switzerland,
behind our backs, with the entente.
Thus Emperor Charles believed that
he would assure himself of good
treatment at the hands of the en-
tente.
After our1ailure OF August 8. Cen
oral Ludendorff had declared that
he could no longer guarantee a mill
tary victory. Therefore. the prepara-
ton OF peace negotiations was neces-
sary. Since diplomacy had not sue
ceeded In initiating any promising
negotiations ana the military situa-
ton lad become even worse In the
meantime, on account OF revolution
ary agitation, Ludendorff, on the
twentieth of September. demanded
that preparation be made for an
armistice instead of for peace nego-
tlations.
Movement for Abdication.
Al this critical time strong move
ment began at home in favor OF set
ting up new government for the
now necessary termination OF the
war. I could not ignore this move
ment. since the old government, dur
Ing the seven weeks from August
TO the end Of September. had not
managed to initiate peace negotia-
uons Offering any hope of success.
Meanwhile. General Won Gallwitz
and General Won Mudra. summoned
from the front, appeared before me,
Inoy gave a picture of the inner sit To-