The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1922-09-23

toute sa grandeur n'etait apres tout
rien d'autre que Ton employee gu fonc-
tlonnalre. LIE moment GU il refusan
d'agir scion Tes ordes, il fallait lie
remover. Moi pour ma part je me
suis toujours mefie de lui, Ell je ne lui
al jamais cru I'm mot de &c quill faisait
SAVIOR GU me disait lui-meme, car
Jetais sur ct savais quill me .blaguait
tout lie temps. Pour les rapports entire
nous deux, mon cher Guillaume-(this
was the first time that the Car so ad-
dressed me)-la chute du Prince aura
les meilleures consequences, la mefi-
ance disparaitra J'ai confidence en-
Toi. Tu neux te fier a Mos
81 understand perfectly Thy line of
action; the Prince, with all his great
ness, was, after all, merely Thy en-
ploye or official AS soon as he refused
to follow Thy orders. it was necessary
to dismiss him. As for Me, l always
distrusted him, and / never believed a
word of what he had told me or said to
Me himself, for | was sure and knew
that he was hoaxing Me all the time.
AS TO the relations between US two, my
dear William, the downfall of the Prince
VIII have the best Of results: distrusst
will disappear. l have confidence in
| Thee. Thou canst trust Me"
| l Immediately wrote down this i'm.
/ portant talk at the time it occurred.
am objective enough to ask myself to
what extent the courtesy of one ruler
to another and possibly, in addition
the satisfaction at the elimination of a
statesman of Bismarck's Importance
can have influenced the Car, con
sciously or unconsciously, in making
the aforementioned statement. Prince
Bismarck's belief in the Cars trust ii
him was, subjectively, undoubtedly
genuine; and, moreover, there can be
no doubt as to the esteem in which
Alexander III. held Bismarck's ability
as a statesman.
In any event, the Car remained true
to his word up to the day of his death
This, to be sure, did little to change
Russia's general policy, but Germany
at least, was safe from an attack from
that quarter. The Straightforward
character of Alexander III. guaranteed
this-it became otherwise under hi
weak son.
Whatever ones attitude may be to
ward Bismarck's Russian policy, on,
thing must be acknowledged: thu
Prince, despite the congress of Berlin
and the rapprochement of France t
Russia, was able to avoid serious friC
ton. That is equivalent to sayinj
that, reckoning from the time of tn
Berlin congress, he played superio
diplomatic and statesmanlike game TO
II years 1878-1S9O).
Germany as Peacemaker.
One must also lay stress upon tn
, fact that it was German statesmal
i who in 1878, prevented a general wal
even at the cost of weakening the rels
lions of Germany to Russia, in tn
, justified belief that he would succeed
being a statesman of genius who kney
exactly what he was aiming at, i
Strengthening these relations one
more, or, at least, in avoiding conflict
, after he had overcome the crisi
! threatening al Europe.
r He succeeded in doing that for l
t years and his successors at the hell
5 of the ship of state succeeded in d.
Y ing likewise for "a more years.
2 When / was a Prince l purposel
i held aloof from party politics, concel
Y trating my entire attention upon m
/ duties in the different army branche
| to which | was assigned. This afforC
: ed me satisfaction and filled up m
! whole life. For this reason l avoided
, while l was Prince of Prussia, all a
i, tempts to drag me into party acti'
f tiles. Often enough endeavors wel
5 made, under the cloak of Harmless
r functions, teas and the like, to ensnal
+ me into political circles or for ele