The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1922-02-19

BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.
In the case OF Genoa II is no exag-
reratlon TO say that tho American
sdmirlstration was taken by sur
nrisc in the matter of the proposal
made at Cannes for new confer
ence. In preparing the way for the
recent Washington conference the
United states government long in
advance OF the proposed date con-
Quoted an exchange OF views with
All the countries concerned. Desir.
ing TO have a conference, recogniz-
ing what questions must be con-
sdered at such gathering, MIR.
Hughes began by conversations in
dlcating American views and asking
the European views.
Now, in the case OF the Genoa
conference, President Harding and
Mr.. Hughes both obtained their first
notice Of such a proposal by reading
Of Il In the newspapers. Although
It was patent that American pres
ence at the Genoa conference was
desired, although IL was clear that
in the view OF Mr.. Lloyd George and
NJ. BRAND alike American presence
was essential to success. not the
least consideration was shown to the
United States in the matter.
Therefore, the United States
was bound to conclude and did
conclude that the agreement at
Cannes calling the Genoa confer
ence represented desperate
maneuyer OF three prime minis
tiers, Lloyd George, BRAND and
Bonomi, who saw their domestic
political situations exceedingly
embarrassed and sought at one
time 10 fortify themselves and
placate their parliaments by call
ing a new conference.
In the American opinion the pro-
posals for this conference were the
product of a sudden determination
rather than a carefully measured
plan. The fact that both NJ. BRAND
and Signor Bonomi subsequently fell
demonstrates pretty clearly to the
American mind the origin OF the
proposal for the Genoa conference.
The American government still feels.
II not indignant, at least surprised
that its views and its conditions
should bave been totally ignored
alike in the decision to hold a con-
ference and in the agreement upon
the agenda OF that conference, and
1t feels quite as strongly that the
agenda itself gives very little prom
iss Of useful results.
That Treaty Fight.
Now, turning to the American as
pect of the question of the Genoa
conference the situation IS this: We
have Just completed the Washington
conference, which has successfully
dealt with the question of naval
armaments. But the treaties which
have been agreed upon in recent ses-
sons are now before the United
States senate. 1t is true that at the
moment when they reached the SEN
ate there was every indication that
they would be ratified. But 1t was
equally true that prior to ratifica-
ton there was, and is certain to be,
considerable fight. There is an OPP
position in the senate which. IL not
numerically strong, includes some of
the best fighters. To ratify the
treaties, TOO, 1t will be necessary to
enlist democratic votes.
In this situation tho Harding ad-
ministration feels that 1t is a mis-
fortune that the Genoa conference
should have been called so precipl-
lately and that an effort should
have been made TO involve it in a
new conference before the results of
the previous conference have been
established by the action of the
United states senate. 1t Is quite OBJ
Nous today that II a Genoa confer
ence were proceeding concomi-
lantly with a senate debate upon the
Washington treaties, incidents and
episodes at Genoa might tend to give
strength TO the opposition 10 the
washington treaties, and that what
was gained here might be lost with
out compensating advantage derived
from tho Genoa meeting.
II follows then that the United
states government has welcomed the
course taken by NJ. Poincare In urg-
ing a three months postponement OF
me Genoa conference, The United
states government does not desire to
participate in any new conference
until the debate in the United States
senate over the Washington treaties
terminated. 1t is not hostile 10
sueh a conference, 1t recognizes that
uhder certain circumstances such a
conference might lead TO very useful
Iesults, but II does feel for itself that
such conference Is premature, and
as write these lines the determine
able.
=, There Is a second obstacle from
.he American point of view. The
shied states government does not
yehe'e the time has arrived 10 sit
uown ut n table for q general dis
yussion with the representatives OF
n,ussia, IL sees in such a general
discussion under such clrcum-
Ahees an actual recognition OF
ie existing Russian regime and
Shuonhtlon OF all that has been
uohe ny that regime. 1t recog-
niLes that there Is I'm the United
aus very profound opposition
any such fraternlzation with
sshevism. II appreciates the
t mat this opposition might
ySvVInpiicate the debate over the
Washington treaties and might
materially restrict the usefulness
american participation I'm any
International conference.
oNoW, on the positive side there il
nvre clear recognition of the ulti-
,iaIe necessity for a new interna-
ANAL conference, a conference ia
ma' with the economic condition OF
I; world. Sooner or later the
nI.ted states government expects 70
it.EElpate in such a conference, but
n,e neHeVes very emphatically that "a
bs,eeu such conference mus,
/, ~ very restricted agenda. And
fa, ueHeV's cutie as strongly that cer-
W., thlhgs must stlll happen in the
in aip 10 open the eyes of the people
a" countries to the actual facts.
soo Farley Bound 20 Come.
sooner or later an international
l. al