The New York herald., 1922-09-17

H0to tho Gern,dn General Staff
erred IN not preparing for long scor
and hoto the remoteness of the High
Command, trying to direct operations
from Coblents, intertered NTH Ger
man saccess IN the summer OF 1914
Is told In the follotoing narrative.
This IS the second instdIlment of
Capt. II. Ritter's "Reuie,o OF the
World War;" aohich considers the fail
ures and successes OF the opposing
armies soith singular impdrtiaIity.
1t has been spoken of IN Germany as
"the best book about the aodr." Capt.
Ritter 1OGs attached to the General
Staff Of the SeUcnth Germon Army.
.t"HE German General STAFF
had not made preparations
for long war. Thereby 1t
placed everything on one single throw.
namely. the irresistible advance Of the
German army because Of it's superior
ity as to morale, drill and leadership.
1.-THE foundation OF that hope was
not very strong. The estimate Of
those factors of the fighting value Of
the opposing armies, which could be
exactly calculated, was generally COR
rect and unprejudiced. But as far as
the quality OF leadership was con-
cerned. the individuality Of the leader.
which was Of deciding influence, was
incalculable. AS that fact was well
known 1t was necessary to prepare for
a long war.
mo such preparations were made,
just as no measures were taken to
preserve q sufficient number of active
the new formations organized in the
course OF the war. The disadvantage
resulting from using up the active off,
GERS too soon in the war is generally
understood and need not be argued.
Likewise, the army administration
had failed to accumulate sufficient
stores OF ammunition. In that respect
contributing causes were insufficient
utilization Of the experiences Of the
Russian-Japanese war and ignorance
as to the technical possibilities Of
modern army equipment. BY the way.
the same mistake was made by our
enemies"
Did Not Expect England
To Remain Neutral
The author. at whose disposal were
official military documents. denies that
the Berlin Government, in the diplo-
matte negotiations preceding the fate
full first day Of August, 1914, assumed
at any time that Great Britain would
remain neutral. or Italy, as member
of the Triple Alliance. would fight on
the side Of the Central Powers In case
OF European conflict. Capt. Ritter
goes on:
"The situation was very well under
stood. The General Staff did not. as
1t has been so often accused, harbor
any illusions regarding England's neu-
trality or Italy's loyalty to her allies.
1T was certain that Germany would
have to fight on two fronts.
"The thrust against the western
Powers had to aim at quick decision
In consideration OF the slowly arising
Russian danger. Schlieffen's battle
of destruction was a bitter necessity.
There arises the question what OPP
erations were liable to lead to the
quickest and surest destruction Of the
western enemies. Count Schlieffen's g
aims were outfanking operations on
both wings, or at least one wing. Con-
sidering the Vosges and the difficult
character Of the adjoining territory
to the north. which was spotted with
extremely strong fortiflcations along
the French frontier, it was decided to
seek q decision on the northern wing.
Supported was that decision by the
fact that the Rhenish-We Westphalian in
dustrial (Ruhr) district had to be
placed outside the sphere of danger.
As long as the French northern wing
was to be looked for on the southern
corner of Luxembourg there was pos
sibility of outfianking operations
through the territory south of the tip
| of Maastricht (the tip Of Maastricht
belongs TO the Netherlands. South OF
| ii is Belgian territory. through which
the Germans marched in August 1914,
in violation OF Belgian neutrality.
I'm case the enemy's front. as was
probable, extended into southern Bel
gium the German decisive wing at the
| first meeting with the enemy would
execute an attack on the left wing
OF the enemy. from which attack In
case of a favorable decision a thrust
against the flank or rear of the op-
posing forces could result because of
the arched form OF the enemy's front.
| Germany had immediately to march
through Belgium IL she was not willing
to give away the only trump card In
her hands, and to. make the best OF
her superiority over France as long as
II existed.
THE loss Of moral prestige Germany
suffered In consequence of the viola
ton OF Belgian neutrality is undenia-
BILE. As the march through Belgium
was n matter OF life and death the
political authorities had to accept the
decision Of the General Staff.
Thinks Clever Diplomats
Could Have Pleaded Defense
Competent diplomats would have
been able TO make 1t appear that Ger
many was attacked. AS matters
stand, might is right. That our enemies
(the author means since Germany lost
the war) make use of their might Is
ignoble, but IL is a wise policy
Operations on the western front