Decorah public opinion., 1922-04-26
JUDGE TAYLOkS
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY

Will carefully notice these elements
of murder in the first degree. 1t is
not enough that the fatal shot was
fired wilfully, but the killing must
have been done wilfully and purpose
ly; that is, the fatal shot must have
been fired with the specific intent in
the mind of the defendant at the
time to destroy life. The killing
must also have been premeditated;
that is, the fatal shot must have
been fired in pursuance of prior
intention to take life. But the law
does not require that such intention
should have existed for any parti-
cular length of time; a short time
would be sufficient. The killing must
also have been deliberate; that is,
the fatal shot and its consequences
must have been cody considered and
weighed by the defendant bel the
purpose to kill was fully fol d in
the mind, and, finally, the fai shot
must have been fired with llice
aforethought.
The depravity of mind and heart,
the want of respect for human life,
known in law as malice aforethought,
is not defined in the abstract with
any precision. 1t is best understo cd
by considering the unlawful act from
which the law presumes its existence
and presence in the mind.
If the fatal shot was fired with
the specific intent in the mind to
kill, the law presumes, in the alb
sence of evidence to the contrary,
that it was done with malice afore-
thought.
Par. 13. 1t must not be inferred
from what has been said that there
can be no malice aforethought ex-
cept where there is a specific intent
to take life. If the fatal shot was
fired not with the specific intent to
take life, but only with the intent
to wound or inflict great bodily in
jury, the law will still presume, in
the absence of proof to the contrary,
that the killing was done with malice
aforethought, but in that case, the
crime would be murder in the second
degree.
Par. Ia. If the fatal shot was fired
without malice aforethought the crime
is not murder but manslaughter. If for
example, the fatal shot was fired
from the sudden transport of passion
or heat of blood, upon reasonable
provocation, and without malice, then
the crime is manslaughter and not
murder.
Par. Is. In considering the ques-
| tion of the intent with which the
fatal shot was fired, you will bear in
mind that every rational person is
presumed TO intepd the natural, usual
and probable consequences of his
voluntary and deliberate acts. II
one voluntarily uses a deadly wea-
pom in a manner which he knows to
be calculated to destroy the life OF
another, and death results, it will be
presumed, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that such result was
| intended.
Par. 16. A deadly weapon may be
defined as one likely to produce
death or great bodily injury, and, ir
determining whether or not an as.
sault was made by the defendant
upon Irene Van Brocklin with g
deadly weapon, you will consider al
the evidence bearing upon the sub
ject' and determine therefrom the
nature, size and character of the fire
arm with which the shot was fired
the manner of its use, the part Of
the body struck and whether the
use of the weapon might be danger
Gus to life or not.
Par. II. All of the testimony il
this case is what is known as cir
cumstantial evidence. Circumstantia
evidence is that which tends to estab
lish a fact or facts, from which i
may be reasonably and logically de
duced that the main or ultimate fact
exists which is thus sought to b.
proved. In order however, to war
rant a conviction on circumstantia
evidence alone, the facts proved mus
not only be consistent with the gull
of the accused, but they must also b,
inconsistent with any rational theor.
of his innocence.
Par. IS. You are also instructed
that to warrant conviction on cir
cumstantial evidence alone, each fac
in the chain of circumstances nee
: essary to be established to prove tn
guilt of the accused must be provel
by comeptent evidence beyond a rea
sonable doubt, and all the facts an
circumstances necessary to prov
, guilt must be connected with eac
other and with the main fact sough
to be proved; and all the circum
stances taken together, must be o
conclusive nature, leading to
satisfactory conclusion and producin
moral certainty that the Grim
charged was committed, and that ac
cused committed it. 1t is not suffici
ent that they coincide with and ren
der probable the guilt of the accused
! but they must exclude every othe
reasonable hypothesis.
Par. 10. You are instructed ths
circumstantantia evidence is to b
regarded by the jury in all case
/; When it is strong and satisfactor!
,, the jury should so consider it, ne
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