New-York tribune., 1922-01-17
No Soviet Recognition
By Means Of America S Participation
in Genoa Conference

III NcuOd \OnlcTcnCc
( To the Editor Of The Tribune.
Sir: ~lf the United States. by the in
direct path Of participating in the pro-
posed Genoa conference. to which the
Soviet government is to be party,
thereby grants practical recognition to
that government it will become a party
TO one Of the greatest crimes in his
tory and will have reversed the policy
which has been consistently followed
by two administrations with the ap-
proval of the American people.
Political recognition of the Soviet
means first the stabii2ation Of the rule
OF usurping minority which has al
ready brought a great nation to utter
ruin. Second, it means the comforting
of legal title to stolen goods The con-
fiscated wealth OF Russia. And what
is to be gained by such an immoral
course assuming that national inter
est is considered the criterion? What
consideration for full recognition can
be offered by the Soviet government? i?
Assumption of the national debts of
the various creditor nations may be of
fered-as a final inducement and as
last resort. But what does this amount
to-? Virtually nothing, and less than
nothing to the nations interested. The
rreSoviet claims of England and
France against Russia arc roughly S4.-
O0O,0O0,000, respectively; that Of the
United States only about $170,000,000
Whatever government is to be the per-
mancnt one in Russia, it must sooner
or later recognize and assume these
debts-at least in theory. so here the
Soviet government has nothing more to
offer than any government which
seems likely to succeed It.
True. the assumption of the debts on
paper would be immediate and superior
IN point of time. But how about the
payment? That depends upon the Sc.
curity, which consists Cd Of the pro-
ductlvc power Of the Russian people,
which under Soviet rule has proved
insufficient for selfsupport, but which
under any civilized and honest govern
ment would be enormous; (2) the
natural resources of Russia, both those
which are uNdevclopcd and those which
have become unproductivc by reason Of
the complete economic failure of Boil
shcvism. If the Soviet regime is rec
ognized, what would be the availability
Of these natural resources as security
for the creditor nations There is
every reason to believe that it would be
practically nil--that they would have
practically vanished.
1t is matter Of common KNOWLEDGE
that for a period Of several wears
numerous sales and conditional sales of
rich concessions to private interests
have been made by Lcnine and Trotzky.
the consideration usually being the
recognition Of their government by the
great powers. Of these concessions
the kamchatka deal with w. B. Van
derllp is only an example, How many
more deals of similar kind in all
probability have been made in this
country by Ambassador" Martens and
ms successor; in England by Kane
ncff and Krassin; in Germany by Radek
or other Soviet agents?
In effect, recognition Of the Soviet
government will validate the titles Of
private spectators in the stolen wealth
of Russia and will mean the scrious
impairment not only Of the security of
the creditor states, but the permanent
despollment Of the Russian people, who
would become economically enslavcd
for all time.
FRANCIS II. KINNTCUTT
New York, Jan. ID, 1929.