Richmond times-dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1914-current, 1922-12-24

SIR Douglas liaig's command. 1916
~ ny George a. Il. Dcwar. assisted
by Lieutenant Colonel j. II. Boras-
'oh' I. b.. las set out in Il preparatory
chapter recalling briefly certain
significant cvents'' which occurred
during tho period covered by Sir
Douglas IIaigs Command OF the
British Army Of the Western front.
Tho majority Of these are cmpha-
; H!zed at greater length In Chapter
j. containing a preliminary survey
OF british leadership In France from
December 1916. to November. 1918:
while In very many places through
ont the two volumes Ia which the
matter OF his book Is contained tho
author again and again asks the
reader. says the London Times. 70
pause and mediate on the truth and
Importance Of the points herein spc-
cihCally raised.
The method adopted implies that
b. the British public. ana to an even
greater extent b. our French Allies.
scant justice has been done TO the
: leadership OF Sir Douglas IIa!E dur
Ing the last three tremendous years
or tho war: tina, not only has a doubt
e1iHtcd--or perhaps II would be more
correct 10 cay that ignorance has
prevailed 70 his loyalty TO his
French colleagues. h/l that sufficient
credit has never ben given 10 tho
Cumnaudcr-I Chief FOR his share IN
tho conception OF the great opera
lions which provided successes at the
moment when such were greatly
needed. or which led directly TO the
ultimate victory OF the Western
Powers. Finally the author repeat
eddy calls attention TO Lloyd Georges
intcrvcut!ous, not merely IN the
realms OF strategy from which. In
duccd In the broad sense, the states
man can never under 81 modern demo
critic regime he wholly divorced. but
his intery"nt.ous In purely military
plans an decorations.
Relations With Toch.
AS TO the hrst point, We arc in
vtcd in the preliminary chapter 10
.Lntirc during II. N.rduu battle
"IIatr promptly oao's Jonrc all the
aid which the latter had asked for
week earlier; that "Haig is ready 70
take over more Inc, attack strongly
Wherever !, Ia practicable. and. II
necessary. send som" % his divisions
t. rc-cufofoc tho French. Jofr" OK
ricHs.s his prat!t ldc and declares
tina, this aid enables him TO recon
.tltutc IN. French reserves. Tn"
Whole incident" wo ARE b,dLcn TO OBJ
nerve, ''ls characteristics OF tho Clut
lAisyu and spirit OF co'nradcship and
consideration which exists between
jour, ana iIa!g throughout 1916
Then. as an example of the rcla-
lions between liaig and Foch, the
author % tho book reminds Va mat
OF duly u, i"iH,
I'orh calls for british aid, ~ ne
rNuccts "A s;roUE German attack on
his front, By July Il iialg and his
staT havc conceded what Foch asks
Ior-thc PROMPT assistance AZ "iEht
nritish divisions. Tho War Cabinet
a, home. however, disNatche Cen
erai smut- TO CLIP, asking Would
/, NOT be we'll 20 appeal 10 IL" hr!'-
fish Go.crnmcnt in these c.rcum
Stances liaig AT once declines this
offer and takes all responsibility on
hmsci: and ON July - the Germans
attack The French front.
such Instances OF Hays loyalty TO
MS colleagues are multiplied IN INC
Two volumes but surely such loyalty
or comrade ship is a military quality
IN, upssessiom OF which not even hiA
kcenczt and most unfricndiy critics
III such there behave ever denied
to the commander o, oar armies IN
France. and Indeed such insIstcuce
docs no, seem To DO in any way
called for.
For tho second plain,-that sum
}, cicnt credit has not been accorded
to sir Douglas iaig and his s"n"r-
diutte commanders for thcir shai"
IN tho overthrow OF German military
row,,-therc is probably more ioun-
daiion. AS the author puts it,
The campaIus In the main seat o,
war. The SKIN and sound strategy OF
IT'S direction there by iaig ana has
colleagues at G.iiQ. and his army
commanders have not been under
stood as they should be by a great
many people, otherwise, dwelling Tar
more on their grand work ana the
wonderful triumph and blessing or
British arms. we should largely have
escaped the bl!gh,ing pessim!sm and
Ills which soon followed victory
IN proof OF the truth OF this. and
Of tho saYnclty and true perception
Of tho needs OF each situation as II
arose cv.nccd by IIaig. MIR. Dewar
quotes many Instances may sut-
fee here 10 quote two only. I'm
Anril. 1917 Nivclle strongly
opposed Ha!c's decision ;hat we must
capturc Niny Ridge To make our po-
sition secure in the Battle OF -Arras.
and etc. that ila.G wisely insisted.
- and that. ultimately, Neville had 10
,givc way" with the good results we
all know. Again, on August s. 1918.
in the Rattle Of Anlens.-
This is the FIRST OF the great and
decisive series OF Br!tisn operations,
all of which were conceived and
worked out BY British leadership.
This truth has been slurred over or
suppressed by those who. combining
folly and fais"hood. choose to repre-
cent that until the British Command
(, erin chief and his colleagues were
taken over and inspired by French
genius they We're strategicaily inert.
Cabinet interference.
Among many of our countrymcn--
among even some OF them who count
themselves as students OF the war
there Is "a disposition TO belittle the
share English generals and STATS had
in the final German overthrow: and
this book was we'll worth publishing
If for the one purpose alone OF cx-
!. ploding tho ny;h that thanks to
unity OF command French genius.
being at lcuSth given its chance,
waved its wand and forthwith made
up for years OF Indifferent British
Ecncralship and a scnseless policy
OF attrition"
AS TO the charge of Cabinet. and
especially Of Lloyd Georges iutcrfcr-
ence In military plans and operations