The Washington herald., 1922-02-12

matter of principle and in recog-
milton of what people are pleased
to call the presence Of q new spirit
in the world.
When one turns from armament
to the question of politics, II Is
clear that Washington has settled
nothing and could settle nothing.
We. our delegates, sometimes
helped but more often hampered by
the British, have done the best that
was possible for China, but that
best has necessarily left the situ-
alton only slightly improved. In
deed, China, itself, Is, in a condt-
ton which would make Far East
ern peace problematical, no matter
what had been done here, short Of
the complete eviction Of all outside
nations from Chinese soil and the
abandonment of the property and
interests which these nations there
hold.
The same Is true in Siberia Japan
has elected to stay there indefinitely.
II she actually stays there indefinite
ly, however there is not a single Far
Eastern expert who does not recognize
that another Russo-Japanese war Is
certain within a brief period OF time.
But what remedy had the Washing
ton conference, what resource had
Mr.. Hughes, short of a declaration
of war upon japan?
China has been promised Shantung
under conditions which are reason
able and in language which is un-
mistakable. II Japan stays it will
be an act OF bad faith beyond pallia-
ton, but for a certain number Of
years japan will keep strings upon
the Shantung Railway and have OPP
portunities which will tempt. And
since Japan has chosen to remain in
Manchuria and Siberia and Britain
in Kowloon and Hongkong, it Is
perfectly idle to argue that the Wash
ington conference has profoundly
transformed the Far Eastern situa-
tion. Let US agree that the situation
could not be transformed by con-
ference. that our representatives did
the maximum possible, certainly they
did their best. but the Far Eastern
situation grows out of the weakness
OF China and of Siberia-it will en-
dure as long a the weakness endures,
the new situation will begin with the
return of strength to Russia and the
rebirth OF China IL there be a rebirth.
Compare the Washington confer
ence with the Paris gathering and the
fact will be made clear. The Paris
conference could take certain Ger
man lands and distribute them be-
cause 1t had the physical force, but
when 1t came to deal with Russia,
with Poland, with Rumania, Il had
no force available. with Poland,
Rumania, with certain other states IL
could accomplish something by
persuasion. but in the end II was
forced to emit resolutions and tender
advice which led to nothing. could
lead to nothing because the condi-
tons prevented results. Since the
Poles would not resign Eastern
Galicia, the Rumanians abandon
Bessarabia. the Italians consent that
.Fiume become Slav, the Paris con-
ference could do nothing-and in the
matter Of the mainland of Asia, the
Washington conference has been in
the same fix.
One frequently hears the assertion
made, the Washington conference
was a success" OF course II was
success where success was possible,
out the maximum Of success was mar
rowly circumscribed. Three nations
wanted to reduce naval expenses ana
avoid competition in construction and
IN Pacific interests. Therefore nothing
was more inevitable than that thew
should strike a bargain, after each
side had done the necessary chauffeur
lng.N We wanted to get rid of the
Anglo-Japanese alliance, the jana
nese wanted to get rid of the real
or fancied threat OF American attack
from our insular bases, the British
wanted an Anglo-America. JAPANESE
arrangement. but fundamentally we
all wanted the same thing.
Failures Similar.
"here the Washington confer
ence failed was where the Paris
conference failed, where the Ber-
lin conference would have failed
II 1T had functioned in that direc-
ton which 1t VIGOROUSLY did not.
namely In attempting to reconcile
1rreconcilable points of view. Mr..
Wilson went to Europe with his
fourteen points imagining that
there was a new spirit in the
world which would bring the peo-
pies to drive their statesmen to
renounce old ways and abandon
old policies. The trouble was that
he did not recognize that most of
these old ways and policies rested
npon well-nfgh universal accepx-~
ance in the respective countries.
Vow just as often, either at Paris
or washington, as Mr.. Hughes or
MT Wilson undertook to act on
the assumption that there was a
new spirit in the world, each came
10 grief You hear a great deal
about the Japanese refusal to get
out Of Manchuria, but you hear
much less of Mr.. Balfour's refusal
to agree that Britain should retire
from Kowlopn, because Britain has
a better press in the United States.
but the principle is the same.
Take the Anglo-F French case. the
British argued and we accepted
their view, that the fact that the
German army had been limited.
Justified the demand that the
French army be similarly reduced.
But the British would not admit
that because the German navy had
been abolished, the British feet
should be brought down to the
strength of France or Italy.
Washington Motives better.
NO one would be cynical enough
to say that there was no Improve
ment in spirit at the Paris confar-
ence as contrasted with Vienna or
with Berlin. No one would argue
that at Washington a certain prog
ress was not marked in returning
stolen property. The map of Eu-
rope made at Versailles has. been
terribly condemned and I shall not
at this late date attempt to argue
that II Is not detective, but every
one must concede II renresenfs n