Eagle River review. [volume] (Eagle River, Wis.) 1890-1927, 1922-11-02
MAY DROP FRANCE
FROM The PACTS
PLAN OF THE UNITED STATES
IF RATIFICATION is MUCH
LONGER DELAYED.
OTHERS ARE HOLDING BACK
America, Britain and Japan May AS
sumo Responsibilities Alone-Wash-
ington Especially Interested in the
Four-PoWer Pacific Treaty.
BIZ JAMES p HoRNApAY

BY JAMES P. HORNADAY
Z. Washington. Should France fail to
ratify the seven treaties agreed on by
the Washington arms conference, the
United States would move to save the
treaties by dropping the French gov
eminent from the agreements. Under
the program that is being quietly con-
sidered Italy would also be eliminated
should she withhold ratification. Bel
GUM, the Netherlands and Portugal,
should they in the end stand With
France and Italy against ratlflcatlon'
would likewise be dropped.
Officially the government is not even
intimating that it is considering the
/ question as to what would be done
about the treaties in case all the gov
ernments that are parties to them
should fail to accept them-and 1t
should be understood that not one of
them can go into effect until all the
governments that are parties to them
have ratified them. The State Depart
ment is still clinging to the hope that
France will ratify.
Myron T. Herrick, United States
ambassador to France, who spent most
of the summer in America, has gone
back to his post with special instiuc-
| tions to get at the bottom of the treaty
situation if possible and let his gov
eminent have all the facts. The
French parliament reconvened a few
days ago and the feeling here in adj
ministration quarters is that unless it
makes some definite move toward rat
| ification of the treaties within the next
few weeks, antagonism that may de-
feat ratification altogether may be ac-
copied as a fact.
Cannot Apply Pressure.
Some criticism is being voiced be-
cause it is asserted the United States
government is not bringing pressure
to bear on France. The answer which
the authorities make to this criticism
is that any attempt to apply pressure
would in all probability offend France
and make the fate of the treaties more
uncertain.
Rather than see the work of the
Washington conference become a to-
tai failure this government would un-
doubtedly propose, should France fail
to ratify, that in the case of treaty
number one, the treaty between the
United States, Great Britain, France,
Italy and Japan limiting naval arma-
ment, the United States, Great Britain
| cih hi &c
set forth in this treaty. Thus this
treaty would become three-poWer
pact instead Of a five-power pact as it
now stands. Japan, it is understood
here, has already privately expressed
a willingness to enter into this three
power arrangement and it is assumed
that Great Britain would acquiesce. II
a Encouragement of this kind should
be made the three great naval powers
would, it is asserted, in all probability
be willing to assume the responsible
ties set forth in treaty number two
signed by the five powers relating to
the use of submarines and noxious
gases in warfare.
The United States is more keenly
interested in the four-power treaty
signed by the United States, Great
Britain, France and Italy, relating to
the insular possessions and insular do
minions of these governments in the
Pacific ocean, than IN the naval treaty.
The treaty limiting naval armament
has been more widely discussed and
APPARENT the popular view is that
| it is regarded as first among the trea-
ties, but this is not the case.
Importance of Four-Power Pact.
Through the four-power treaty an
attempt was made to heal situation
in the Orient which threatened to lead
to war between the United States and
Japan. = The original proposal before
the arms conference was to make this
three-power treaty with the United
| States, Great Britain and Japan par
ties to it. France was taken in largely
as a matter of courtesy. Involved in
the fate Of this treaty is the fate Of
the Anglo-Japanese agreement or
| treaty, which binds Great Britain to
come to the assistance of Japan should
that country be menaced by another
power. The Anglo-Japanese agree
ment expired last year, but under a
provision Of the agreement it runs un-
til denounced by one side or the other
or until superseded by some other
agreement. SO if the Horsepower treaty
should fail, the AngIo-Japanese agree
ment would be in full force and effect.
The United States looks upon this
outcome with keen apprehension and
for this reason, if for no other, would
undoubtedly seek to have the four
! power treaty made three-power
treaty in case France should fail to
ratify. The other conference treaties
numbers four, five, six and seven are
not Of such great Importance, but
the United States would regard them
| as worth saving. Number four is
merely a declaration accompanying
the four-power treaty defining more
specifically the islands to which the
treaty applies. Number five is also a
supplement to the four-power treaty
containing definitions, while number
six and seven are nine-power treaties
Social Success.
Someone has said Social success is