The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1922-01-29
Many Difficulties Swept
Aside at Washington
sut, Woman Writer Says, Most Practical and
Ideal Plan Of World Peace Is the League
OF Nations, Still at Work. *
Ry IDA M. TARRELL

nston conference? There are people
who think Il should be by the things
that Il did not undertake to do. The
conference was Indicted In Washing
ton In January by q league Of peo-
pie Of considerable ability who de-
clared that II had not lessened the
chance Of war by fraction of 1
per cent The reason they gave for
this verdict was that Il had not taken
Up the causes Of India, Corea- the
Far Eastern Republic. Persia, the
Philippines. Hayti. the Republic OF
Mount Lebanon"
Il 10 certain that the world Is
going to have no quiet until these
troubled countries are satisfied But
they are not the only problems to be
solved. Mr.. Hughes named a con-
siderable number on his agenda- Is
an international conference to be de-
clared o farce because II rejects one
set Of problems instead of another.
and believes Il more practical to give
exclusive attention to one side OF the
globe than to the entire surface?
You could not persuade Mr.. Hughes
md his colleagues that any other
policy than that Of one thing at q
time would contribute a Traction Of
per cent? 20 the peace OF the
earth. They believe the block system
IS the only practical one for setting
the world Alright
They lay Il out something like this:
let us clean up the Pacific. then
We can disarm. Having disarmed. We
can lend q hand In the next most dis
tressed and troublesome block
France. Central Europe-Russia- Hav-
~
q time, then possibly we may con-
sider an association of nations-but
not now" So convinced was Mr..
Hughes Of the soundness Of his sys-
tenn that he threw out one Of the
chief subjects. on his agenda-the
Limitation Of land armament-when
he discovered he must leave his block
the Pacinc-and pass into Europe
IL II was considered.
The only system q man can sue
cessfuily handle 10 that In which he
has faith.-the only fair way to Judge
what he does a by what he under
takes to do-not what you would like
him to undertake. Measured by the
method II adopted and the limitations
Il set for itself, how does the con-
ference come out7
] began my observations on the
conference with a quarrel with the
agenda- Putting the. problem Of the
limitation OF armament before the
settlement of the difficulties or threats
Of dificulties In the Pacific, which
were keeping the countries concerned
in arms. looked Illogical It proved
good psychology. The naval program
stirred the imagination of the coun-
try. became at once something ire
mendously Desirable real move to-
wards peaces. When England and
Japan at once agreed Il became pos
sible and practical. II they agreed.
why then-it must be the difficulties
could be settled which many had
doubted. The conference thus az the
start gained what Il needed most,
popular faith that II meant to do
a concrete tangible thing. The propo-
sition that England, the United States.
Japan, France and Italy should adopt
4 naval ratio of 5-5-3, 171-125 and
agree not to build for ten years, was
q big. substantial, stirring fact. To
have them accept. as they have.
II Is the FIRST time big powers have
ever said scrap" have ever been
actually eager for . naval holiday.
Submarine II Crippled.
The fact that neither the subma-
r.ne nor the auxiliary craft are to
be limited In tonnage, as the orig
inal program proposed, II disap-
pointing. still Does not upset the
achievement. The submarine comes
out Of the conference unlimited In
number but crippled In Its field of
action Merchant ships are forbid
den IL on penalty of piracy. That
will not In the thick of war pre-
vent merchant ships being destroyed
but IL will take the heart out of
the business. outiawry helps II II
does not prohibit. There IL COM
gard to tbs tonnage Of auxiliary
craft for at least their size Is
limited-to 10000 tons-and their
guns to eight inches, and that Is a
fairly satisfactory substitute for
the original proposal.
In spite of the changes, cutting
and trimming. the naval program
remains something which the coun-
try wants. something which II feels
to be . blow at war as well a. .
relief to Its tax burdens.
II the naval program could stand
on its own feet. IL alone would
make the conference . brilliant
success, but Il cannot It was no
sooner raised to its feet than It's
makers had to rush Il with props.
The FIRST was . policy IN regard, to
China The reason was clear
enough. Unless the nations at the
conference could. agree among
themselves on q method Of assist
ing In the development Of China,
which would prevent any one of
them taking an unfair advantage
Of the others, there was sure to be
quarrefs sooner or later and they
would need their ships. Unless they
could AZ on q policy under which
not only they each had q fair
chance but nations outside-not At
the eonference-but likely in the
future to desire to invest In China
were not Disseminated against
they would need their ships. They
would surely need them, too, one
Of these days IL they did not sat-
isfy China that what they agreed
upon was as good for her as for
them
Rect Al Fsur Principles.
Mr.. Root hurried In with his four
rrinciplea Mr.. Hughes outlined his
nine-power pact. which was to as
sent to the principles and the prac-
teal applications Of them which
were 70 be worked out
But the naval program had to
have another prop before Il could
proceed II was not worth the
paper tt was written on unless
England and Japan agreed to II.
They agreed In principle At the
start but In practice they could and