The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1922-10-21

order always to be able to defect at
tention from inner troubles to foreign
olfflculties; to have safety valve as
an outlet for the passions that might
lead to trouble at home.
| Another point was that Russia,s
enormous demand for loans was met
almost exclusively by France; more
than twenty billions of French gold
francs found their way to Russia, and
France had voice, to some extent. in
determining now tney should be ex-
pended. As result, it became entire
ly matter of expenditure on strategic
measures and preparations for war.
Inc golden chain of the French bill
lions not only bound Russia to France
financially, but made Russia serve the
French idea of revenge.
Purpose of "EncircIement."
| Thus England, France and Russia
had, though for different reasons, an
aim in common, viz: to overth row
Germany. England wished to do so for
commercialpolitical reasons, France
on account of her policy of revenge,
Russia because she was a satellite of
France and also for reasons of internal
politics and because she wished to
reach the southern sea. These three
great nations, therefore, were bound
to act together. The union of these
ambitions in a common course of ac-
ton, duly planned, is what we call the
policy of enlightenment.
Added to all this there was also the
gentleman's agreement which has only
recently come to light and has already
been thoroughly discussed in the "Ho-
henlohe" chapter; concerning this
agreement | knew absolutely nothing
during my reign, and the German For
elgn Otflce was only specifically and
unreliably informed.
When | learned of it, l Immediately
sought information about it from Herr
Won Bethmann. He wrote me a rather
puzzllng letter to the effect that there
was surely something about it among
the documents of the Foreign Office:
that the German Ambassador at that
time in Washington, Won Holleben. had
made some confidential report on il.
to be sure, but had not given his
source of information, wherefore the
Foreign Office had not attached any
Importance to the matter and had not
reported further on it to me. Hence
the said agreement had actually no in
fluence upon Germany's policy, but it
constitutes supplementary proof that
the Anglo-Saxon world as far back as
1897 had combined against US, and
thereby explains a number of obstacles
encountered by Germany in her for
eign policy. 1t also explains Americas
attitude in the war.
We were quite well acquainted, on
q nfI IN,, \
dale, its foundations and purposes,
and 1t decfsively influenced the course
of our policy.
In view of the grouping of England,
france and Russia-three very strong
poWers-only one political course lay
open to Germany, the threat of decid-
ing Germany's future by force of arms
must be avoided until we had secured
for ourselves such an economic, mill
tary, naval and national-poIitical posi-
ton in the world as to make it seem
advisable to our opponents to refrain
from risking decision by arms and
to yield US the share in the appor-
Torment and management of the
world to which our ability entitled US
We neither desired nor were we en-
titled to jeopardize our hard-won well
fare.
The aims of the Entente could be at
tanned only through a war, those of
Germany only without a war, 1t is
necessary to hold fast to this basic
idea; it is of more decisive value than
all accessory matters. Hence | shall
not go into detail here, nor take I'D
Belgian or other reports, nor the tele-
grams sent just before the outbreak of
war. The thorough treatment of these
details lies in the domain of research.
In Germany our situation was cor.
rectly understood, and we acted ac-
cordingly.
Sought EngIand's Friendship.
Taking up once more our relations
with England, we did everything in
our power to bring about a reapproch-
ment; we consented to the demand for
limitation of naval construction, as II
have shown in my report of Haldane's
visit TO Berlin. l went so far as to try
TO utilize my family connections. But
In vain The actions of King Edward
VII. are explained by the simple fact
that he was an Englishman and was
trying to bring to realization the plans
of his government. Maybe the pol |
ltlcal ambitions of the king, who did |
not begin to reign until well along in
years, contributed to this.
We certainly did all that was posi- |
bic to meet England half way, but it |
was useless, because the German ex-
port figures showed an increase; nat |
urally we could not limit our world /
in order to satisfy England /
That would have been asking too
much.
As regards our policy toward Eng
and, we have been much blamed for
having refus ~ the offer of an alliance
made US by Chamberlain. the English
Colonial Minister, toward the close of
he '90s. This matter, however, was
sar different in character, on closer H