The New York herald., 1922-09-17
Downfall of the Greek Pow
er in Asia Minor and the
Struggle for Constanti-
nople Are Likely to Have
Startling Consequences
By the Military Observer Of the Army and Navy Journal

/ the Mediterranean. fell largely into her
power. The easily defensible peninsula
| of Gallipoli thus constituted strategic
position Of greater Importance than
any other in Europe with the possible
exception of Gibraltar.
After the failure of the drive on
Angora In September. 1921. the Greek
army withdrew from its positions
| southwest of Angoraf and took up q
position covering the line Of the Bag
dad railway. The Turks followed ur
| the retirement Of the Greeks and took
up positions in contact with the Greek
lines. No important changes In the
relative dispositions of the troops took
place until July. 1922, when the Greeks
transferred $4,000 men from their Ana
tolian front to Thrace with a view to
threatening Constantinople. 1t was a
badly miscalculated move and proved
to be one of the principal causes of the
Greeks undoing.
From the termination of the Greek
drive on Angora until the commence
nent of the present offensive only
minor local engagements took place
between the two forces. Nevertheless,
conflict was constantly impending, and
Great Britain took strenuous measures
20 avert it. The first Of these meas
ures was the calling of tripartite
conference between Great Britain
France and Italy at Paris in March,
| 1922. None of the Powers partici-
pating In the Paris conference appear
| to have adhered to their agreement for
common action in the Near East !;
| France supported the Turkish de-
rnands, and after the Turkish refusal
of the armistice proposals Great Brit
ain took the position that the Greeks
should be upheld in their pretensions
to sovereignty over Ionia.
From the outset there were evident
number of superficial causes which
seemed to indicate the possibility Of
| Greek defeat.
Basically, their initial dispositions
for defense were faulty. The unity of
action Of their forces depended upon
maintaining the integrity of line of
communications paralleling at close
distance their fighting front, penetra-
ton of which at any point would re-
suit In the disruption of the army into
two separate forces incapable of CO.
l operating with each other. Such a
front could be protected only by an
active defense which would retain the
initiative by promptly launching an
attack against any hostile concentra-
/ ton which might be discovered. The
4 Greeks do not appear to have been
capable of conducting such a defense
Z pv,I kAfy- xf gx.fZ
pears. moreover. to have been extraor-
dinarily deficient. Their strength had
also been considerably weakened by
the transfer of about $4,000 men from
Anatolia to Thrace.
Greek Morale Damaged
by Internal RivaIries
But perhaps the most potent force
in the sapping of the Greek morale.
which after all was the fundamental
cause OF the reverses, lay in the in
ternal political schism created by the
rivalry between the Royalist and the
Venizelist elements. Ttlis rivalry had
become especially acute during the
formative period of the new Ionian
State. There were many evidences
oring to obtain political control of the
Ionian governmental machinery. prob
ably with economic detectives in view.
That international character OF mys-
terry, Sir Basil Zaharov-financier mu-
nitions maker, oil exploiter-the real
power for whom Venizelos serves as
the visible front-was especially active
in promoting this movement, and he
was largely press-agented as the pros
pective ruler of the territory.
This political schism was paralleled
by religious schism. the most recent
development in which was marked by
the election of the Venizelist, Metax-
axis, as patriarch Of the Greek Ortho-
dox Church and the declaration of the
invalidity of this election by the Greek
Government. These three figures-Sir
Basil Zaharov. venizelos and Metax-
akis--represent a financial, political
and religious trinity whose principal
objective Is the overthrow of Constan-
tine
The total strength OF the Greek army
in Asia Minor at the commencement
of the present campaign was 1000
men; of this number about $4,000 men
were in combat units. These numbers
do not include an indeterminate force
of Ionian volunteers raised to replace
the troops transferred to Thrace.
The total strength of the Turkish
army was estimated at 10000 men,
with combat strength of about 65, 900.
While this estimate was probably a
fairly accurate statement of the Turk
ish strength early in the year, IL seems
probable that the actual forces en-
ployed in the offensive were consider
ably stronger.
The Turkish plan OF. attack COM
rrised two principal features: main
attack on the Alum -Karahissar front.
designed TO cut the Bagdad railway
and thus sever the communications
between the Greek northern and south
ern groups this attack to be followed
by secondary offensive In the Ismid
sector directed against the Greek base
at Brusa.
Turks Took as Model
German Attacks of 1878
In preparing for the attack the Turks
pursued the method which has been
tho classic model for the attack OF a
stabilized intrenched position since the
German break-thrcugh of the British
front in Picardy on March 81. 1918.
BY night marches and concealment OF
the troops during the day ten infantry