The Washington herald., 1922-09-19

pared to make things easy for
Britain by cancelling British debts
to us,
In the November conference, then.
the British will have to use their
claims upon their allies as a basis
for obtaining a reduction of the
claims upon Germany and chiefly OF
the French claims. Now. in the
first place, there is not the smallest
objection on the French part to
writing off precisely as many shill-
ings of money owed them by Ger
many as Britain will write off Of
French money owed her. In the
second place there is no French OBJ
lection to a British renunciation Of
the $1,000. 900. 900 which is the Brit
ish share in the total OF German
| reparations. Such transactions
would at once eliminate nearly half
OF the whole figure. assuming that
Belgium and Italy would also make
| cancellations to the amount repre-
sented by British cancellations Of
their own Indebtedness.
Owes U. $. $4,000 .0oO, 900.
But this reduction would not
meet the necessities. Assuming that
German liabilities were left at
$17. 7.000. 900. 900. 1t is still a fact that
the majority OF competent witnesses
agree that Germany cannot pay
more than $l2.500, 100000. whereas
the French claims. after cancella-
tions to balance the British can
cellations. would still exceed this
total materially.
France would still be in the po-
sition of having expended $1,000
| 900. 900, of owing the United States
nearly $4,000 100000 and of having
a portion of the reconstruction
work to pay for even II German
payments In kind were as large as
anyone could reasonably expect. It
is at this point that a clash between
British and French policy must be
expected, again, for the British are
certain to insist upon French conces-
sions and a material reduction Of
French claims.
On the whole. however. 1t seems to
me that II Germany were actually
| living UP to the Lubersac-Stinnes
agreement. six months hence French
concessions in the matter OF the sum
total Of reparations would be not only
possible but likely. IL 1t were not for
single circumstance. Lloyd George
has a fixed determination to use Brit
ish control of the French financial
situation, that Is to employ his power
OF cancellation to compel France to
meet British ideas OF disarmament
He Is likely to attach to any proposal
of British cancellation Of French in
debtedness certain conditions which
neither Poincare nor any other
Frenchman can for a long time to
come agree to. Here after all will be
the central point in the next Anglo
French battle.
Dispatches from London and Paris
alike demonstrate that the French
public is at last awakening to the fact
that there must be a reduction of the
sum of reparations II there is to be
any payment. Always. however. an
antecedent condition to such reduc-
ton with French consent has been
the evidence Of good faith on the Ger
man side. The Lubersac-Stinnes
agreement does actually suggest such
good faith; If it is lived up to 1t will
do much to quiet French resentment
and suspicion.
France still Suspicious.
But whether the Lubersac-Stinnes
agreement is carried out or not,
France will continue to suspect Ger
many of planning revenge and until
that suspicion is vanished all effort in
London to reduce French armies
will be without avail. Ultimately
each maneuver will be met with
the stock response that France
will reduce provided Britain offers
hard and fast treaty Of alliance
| against any later German attack.
Lloyd George would like to use
the British financial concessions
as means to obtain political
end. but the French will not see
in the disarmament maneuver any
thing but the political. They will
reduce their armies IL they have
the military guarantee of a Brit
| ish alliance and not otherwise
They will reduce their claims
against Germany. but not otherwise.
If Britain agrees to cancel France
may very well agree to reduction
beyond the total of the British
cancellation. but not until the first
move has been made by the Brit
ish.
So far in the great duel between
Poincare and Lloyd George all the
real advantage has lain with the
Frenchman. His cousse brought
to nothing all the elaborate plans
of Lloyd George for the Genoa con-
ference. His stand On reparations
and allied debts led Lloyd George
into the supreme miscalculation of
the Balfour note, which not only
wrecked the London conference
but alienated American opinion to
an extent which is now appreciated
in Britain.
British Prompted Proposal.
Unquestionably the compromise
adopted by the reparations COM
mission and accepted by Poincare
represents British quite as much
as Belgian effort. Not impossibly
the SHINES proposal also repre-
sents in some measure British
prompting and it is a gain. or, more
exactly, a fortunate escape for
George that the failure of London
was not followed by a French mill
itary march across the Rhine. But
postponement does not in the least
remedy the situation, that relief
which is vital to British prosper
ity must now be sought by an
agreement with France and agree
ment is conditional upon conces-
sions.
George has. in a word, either to
eat the words of ths Balfour note
or make some theatrical demon
stration which will distract atteu-