The New York herald., 1922-09-03


his own special domain. and he had no
desire TO see remarks by his future
sovereign on them which ran counter to
his policy. He replied: IF we give
assurances of our peaceful intentions.
and II IL transpires that one word has
been said to the effect that the General
staff was right in advising us last
autumn to smash Russia's power, we
destroy the belief of our ally in our
trustworthiness. and that would be even
more disastrous than war;
But 1t is obvious that II was much
more important in the Chancellor's view
to ascertain his future rulers real atti-
tude to war and peace than TO squabble
with him about marginal notes. Was he
more inclined toward war or peace?
That was the question for him as Chan
cellor. Bismarck's letter of the 5th OF
May. 1888. is a masterpiece OF diplo-
matte education. Referring to the mar
ginal note supporting the General Staffs
advice, he writes
In all human probability the de-
cision as to war and peace will lie ex-
clusively In your Imperial Majestys
hands before many months are out.
This fact lends every indication which
comes from your Imperial Highnesss
direction on this subject an Importance
your Imperial Highnesss marginal
notes on the official papers of the For
eign Office unnoticed. We should never
succeed in smashing Russia's military
power so completely as, for instance
we did that of France in 1870. But what
would be the results of a war against
Russia, even IL we were victorious? We
should have for the future a second
France. ready to utilize every favora-
BILE opportunity to attack US, and we
| should have the two strongest Powers
| on the Continent. after Germany, as our
| natural enemies in crcfy war"
He was also not of the opinion that
the sooner the war comes, the better.
| The Chancellor obviously overlooked
the intent Of the second note. "Quite
right" which is n refusal to consider
the idea of preventive" war. in order
to force declaration from his future
ruler as to his attitude to war in gen.
cral.
In his reply Of the 10th of May. pub
| lished in Bismarcks Thoughts and
Memories" (Vol. 81. William III confesses
that he is convinced adherent of Bis
! marck's peaceful policy. His not quite
| right was more his real opinion than
| his "Yes." Bismarck thus acquired the
certainty that he could carry on his old
policy under the new regime. His aim.
which he carried out for another two
years with undeniable success as to
avoid all European wars. The Crown
| Prince also found II advisable to change
the opinions expressed in his 'ominous"
marginal notes.
Inevitable Conflicts.
| Bismarcx's object was achieved, and
| yet it is impossible that anyone who
reads the young princes reply can avoid
gaining the impression that the self
conscious tone which he adopts. from
which it is plain that he considers his
opinion as valuable as that of the Chan
cellor. is an indication of future and in
evitablc conflicts of opinion.
Scarcely two years went by and the
cid Chancellor and the young ruler were
at loggerheads. The emperor had at
| tanned such stature that he thought
| he could reach over the head of the
| greatest statesman of the century. The
| factors which brought matters to head
were not only differences in feeling on
social policy but also "imponderabilia'
In. foreign policy. The most important,
| however. was the increase in the sense
| OF his own power which led the emperor
| TO step out from the shadow OF the
great Chancellor into the full glare OF
| the monday sun.
A personal note OF the Emperor hurt
| the Chancellor's feelings more than the
| opposition of the sovereign on various
matters. because it threw an unfounded
suspicion on his most cherished pre-
serve. the management of the Foreign
Office Reports had been received from
Herr Raffauf, the German consul at
Kieff, concerning Russian armaments.
These reports were received on the 18th
| of March and on the 10th Bismarck sent