New-York tribune., 1922-03-05
Effects of two 30O-pound bombs strik-
iaa the forward deck, and third
,tnk;ne near the starboard end Of
the Alabon,o's bridge.

the Aiabo77,u's bridge.
HE time has come to anticipate the III
evitable in our naval policy There is
every proof mat the life of the pres
l. ent dreadnought is at least limited to
ten years 1t is already established hat battle
sSp armadas and large armies can no longer
cos the ocean to attack or invade a first
class power if the latter is defended by eff
fcent submarines, air forces and mines. The
risk would be too great. The expense of such
an undertaking would be prohibitive.
The ten-year holiday prescribed by the
Washington conference gives US an oppor-
tunty to review wisely the naval situation and
readjast our plans and policies. During these
ten years the officers of the navy-and the
army as well--should free their minds of
preiudicss and bring to the solution of this
great national problem concentration of
professional ability and practical skill that
will place the United States ahead Of, not be-
hind other nations.
Subsequent to the year 1914 three distinct
naval doctrines have been urged by prominent
naval officers and interested students the
world over:
Tie battleship doctrine-that the dread
aought is now and will remain the backbone
Of the fleet that it constitutes the true meas
ufe q naval p0Wer; tliat il Commands ihe
sea IN short, that it is necessary to the
lie OF nation, to the protection of it's COM
nlerce and to the winning of the next naval
war.
1.-The anti-battleshp doctrine proclaim
ing that the dreadnought is already doomed
" submarines, air forces and mines; that it
uiu not command the sea" in the World War;
.nat 1t commanded the surface of the North
9. 'a-ho'hlng more, as stated by Admiral
siAs' mat 1t did not and could not save Eng
l@'o from starvation; that geography, not the
a'a'lu fleet, blockaded the German fleet; thaJ
'iie 0laho Fleet could not have blockaded any
o'Aef hrst class power than Germany: that no
value meet, however strong, can blockade
france, the Cnited States, Japan or anv other
COUNTRY with an extensive sea coast. especiallv
III overseas war; that battleships can never
,e '"ie'y approach coast; that air forces
-. peeh ADDED to the enemies of the battle
st', s'lip SINCE The World WARM short, that the
DN'''eSllp can neither blockade the coast of a
,'"i ~ "e'ehoor nor cross the seas to attack q
a''"N' power; that England was saved and the
"oh simply because she was anchored
- s''oS uerf1any's exits to the sea and the COM
sA'eu haVles of the world were allied with her
hss.' s.,''. the German submarine fleet; that the
NM. ..'s'p cannot protect commerce, because it
s.. remain at all times near it's base and be
''aIsly protected against attack.
H. Inc 0hfee -plane-navy doctrine, to which
H. "-,.ef humbly subscribes, appears to be
A.. oale and sensible policy during this
-. ~ chahge; that the battleship, as at pres
III. uS'Sisheo' IS too expensive and too vulner-
'as 10 survive the modern weapons that
H. usiag perfected and arrayed against it;
~, =. us activities are already circumscribed
.aa narrow limits; that new form of
a..s a's' snip will ultimately replace the present
i, ssaoagnt; ,sss that the airplane carrier, with
sr~ s''ery OF bombing and torpedo planes, may
s..,is 'he place Of the dreadnought as the
4Oohe OF the fleet; that the carrier and the
p..s s'aae are not yet fully developed, but their
..,. ..saess and power will doubtless be de-
oon. 'eo Within the next ten years; that the
No.. NJ OF the submarine was conclusively
s.'. .su IN the World War, and that it must
s.s1 sa as vitally important element in
.,s, war, even with the restrictions i'm
49, S upon it as a commerce destroyer by the
NJ. ss OF the Washington conference. In
~, words, the three plane doctrine con-
- .he principle that we should not "swap
q. 10y IN the middle of the streanl.' During
-, scn-year holiday we should fully utilize,
nv sua1e and develop naval weapons above the
ace on the surface and beneath the sur
:" the sea. We must have all of them.
h., ~ 1913 Admiral Sir Percy Scott, of the
.sa sa navy, opposed the building Of more
eesaps and strongly urged the building
s.scfaft ssafa and submarines. In 1914 he wrote
ne London Times as follows: