The Washington herald., 1922-05-07

This. moreover, is what. every
European, every Continental Eu-
ropean perceives quite clearly.
Such a guarantee would. II accept
cd by France. tie French hands for
the present. but it would not les
sen German determination for re-
venge. Poland might resign East
ern Galicia. wilma. even Silesia, but
it would not reconcile Russia to
the loss of territories taken under
the treaty of Riga or persuade Ger
many to tolerate long the surren-
der of Posen and the Danzig corr
ridor.
1t is customary to say that the
treaty of Versailles sowed the
seeds of future wars. OF course IL
did, but what no one. ever suggests
is that there was no settlement
conceivable which would not have
done the same thing. Concede that
the Poles are entitled to freedom
and there are no frontiers which
you can give them. no territories
which you can assign them which
will not reduce the areas of Prus-
STA and Russia as they existed In
1914. The same is true of Ruman:a
and Hungary, it is true all over
Europe. Versailles may have been
bad or good. terrltorjally speaking.
but no one has suggested a substi-
tute settlement for which accept
I'ance on all sides could even be I'M
agined.
League Hope Failed.
Out of this situation, which was
quite as apparent at Paris as il is
at Genoa. developed two proposals,
the. league of nations with and
without the addition of force. The
French wanted to make the league
an association OF victorious powers
having the necessary military
power to guarantee the frontiers
lai., down in the new settlement.
The British and the American rep
resentatives saw in this only a
perpetuation of the old system of
alliances.
Yet to persuade the French to
agree to some of the American and
British conceptions was neces-
sary to give them the Angio-Amer-
lean guarantee, which was, after
all. only another form of alliance
and as such was rejected by Amer
lean public opinion and never laid
before the United States Senate.
The failure of the treaty of guar
antee. however, threw the situation
right back where 1t was at the
outset.
British Want Markets.
Most British and American opIn-
ION starts with the major assump-
tloin that If you reduced reparations
10 reasonable figure Germany
would pay and that il you abolished
armies, on reduced military strength
to the limits fixed for Germany in
the treaty of Versailles. thes danger
of war would be removed. But this
Is after all precisely the assumption
Frenchmen cannot accept. They be-
lieNe with as much reason and Just
as great sincerity that without force
Germany would not pay at all and
that If FRANCE were weak she would
be attacked.
British self-interest demands that
the German markets be restored.
French that Germany pay and absn-
don designs for revenge. The Brit
lsh hold French policy responsible
Tor world economic chaos, highly
costly to Britain. But the French
believe that the British would sacri-
nee French security and solYencv to
restore German markets. Both peo-
pies talk very earnestly about the
| higher morality of their personal
view, but at bottom interest and
morality run in parallel lines for
each nation.
EuxIish In Retfer pnsfffo-
The Englishman is far more for
tunate than the Frcnchman, because
the larger part of the world is in
terested in restoring the German
market. The FrenChman is less
/ lucky. because no one cares deepTy
whether France gets paid or not
save as matter of abstract justice
or of sentiment. The fact that the
German wrought his ruin on French
soiol makes the French case pecu-
liar The consequence is that France
is put in the position Of holding un
the procession. and those people.
who are adversely affected naturally
criticise the French
Nevertheless the Frenchman means
| 10 insist upon his claim. which ali
the world has acknowledged. both
IN the Versailles treaty and in
the various reparations agreeme
since. He also means to insist upon
helng protected either by guarantee
or by his own strength against a
new German sattack America ana
Britain are not willing to supply the
guarantee, but they are becomins
more and more insistent that France
should cease to block reconstruction,
Treaty Can't Aid.
Now. to remove French opposition
or obstruction, Mr.. Lloyd Georges
treaty of insurance has no value.
actually II gives France no lasting
security and 1t deprives France of
the power to exert military pressure
on Germany. II she does not nav. II
ooes not vest with any competent
body the power to exercise pressure,
If Germany resists: IL does NOT nro
vide any way to help French rights
to balance the power it takes away
from France in eliminating the pos
slbiSty of French occupation Of more
German soil.
An English or an Anglo-Amer-
lcan guarantee of French security
against another German attack
would have no value in case Ger
many refused to pay. unless pro-
VISION were made for joint mill
tary and naval action against
Germany in such an event. But
such an agreement would destroy
the purpose of the whole Genoa
performance, because It would
leave open the possibility OF
turther military operations and
thus miss stabilizing Europe.
Need German Guarantee.