Every evening, Wilmington daily commercial., 1922-06-03

But I'm spite OF the French de-
nnnds events were inexorabiy work.
ng against them. IL was utterly
10 maintain the hugo
llied armies. Lloyd George felt that
10 could hold UP demobilization only
Il great political risk 90 himself. ~
or Wilson, he was for getting the
Doys homo "as fast as ships could
AIRY them" Even Clemenccau (but
not Foch) was worried by the popu-
ar demand in France that tho war
weary veterans be released.
The struggle came to head on
Feb. IL, three days before the Prosl-
dent sailed It was n direct clash
over the renewal Of the armistice ION
Feb. 16.) Clemenceau wanted new
terms, which were in effect rep3rs-
tions. imposed at the armistice; no
wanted the renewal 10 be for another
month: he wanted the allied armies
maintained. Wilson demanded that
the final military and naval terms
be drawn up and presented 20 the
Germans. 90 that Germany could he
disarmed at once and completely,
and the allied armies Immediately
demobllzed. But Clemenceau fairly
ragged az this, charged Wilson with
putting the question IN an academic,
theoretical and doctrinal light" said
"he knew the Germans" and that
tho only safety lay IN keeping up an
army 10 intimidate them
BslfoUr as Wilson Supporter.
Here Balfour came strongly to the
support of the President and pres
ented resolutions providing that the
armistlCe should be renewed prac-
tically on tho former terms. for an
! indefinite period. and that the final
military and naval terms be imme-
diately drawn up IN the form OF a
preliminary treaty and presented 70
tho Germans
This was directly opposed 70 Glenn
enceau's demands. but IN tho after
noon session OF that day he ac-
lcepted II.
Wilson had thus won his conten-
tions. There was 10 be 4 prellmln-
sry treaty containing tho military.
naval and air terms. This was 10 bs
worked out by n committee of mill
tary experts while he was away in
America.
When President Wilson sailed out
Of Brest harbor for America on that
wlntry February day (fhe 15th) with
tho guns booming from tho ancient
French forts and French marines AZ
salute along tho walls. he had reason
enough 70 feel triumphant lie was
on his way homeward with the hard
won constitution % q new world
league--the essential element If tho
American program---in his pocket
II had been unanimously accepted.
81 tho open conference the day be-
fore. by all tine nations lie was
carrying II back to present 10 his
own people.
Confersncc's First Month.
The first month Of the Peace Con-
ference. from Jan. u to Feb. IS, had
been remarkable one. At its be-
ginning. n = previous chapters have
shown. the tide seemed to be settling
heavily against Wilson and the
American conception Of the settle
ments. There had been y world
wide slump IN ideaIisms." The old
order" had come into the conferences
at Paris quite confident of itself
But the President, by a series ol
bold and skilful strokes. had
snatched the reips OF leadership. hat
brought the American program
strongly into the foreground an'
during n large part Of the time tn
League OF Nations Commission
shared the spotlight" of the world
interest with the Councils Ok tn
Quai d'Orsay. And. finally, he ha
won. decisively. in the two grea
central purposes for which he ha
come to Europe.
First. ne had secured. on Jan. o
the unanimous acceptance ot wha
he considered the key Of the Who'll
settlement"-that the League c
Nations be made AN integral part q
the general treaty Of peace"
Second-IIe had secured. on Eel
Il. the unanimous acceptance Of
covenant that reasonably satsae
the American purposes.
1t had been hard fight: IN spit
of the greatest difficulties an
against tremendous odds the Amer
can program: the new order" ;
the President was fond Of calling
seemed to be winning. As p matt,
Of fact, the President was safe on I
point: the real battles were get
come.
of None of the Allies Satisfied.
ION Although the President could "a
ing with satisfaction. that there hi
been unanimous agreement"
both Of his great central proposal
as a matter Of fact. none Of q
- Allies was satisfied. They felt tn
they had been beaten: they were di
ex- contented with the results. They Sd
lble no way, according % the Presiden
)uld program, TO get what they real
cad wanted; the security they thoug
and they needed: the territorial a
economic ambitions they hoped
ug- realize under the secret treaties.
ky No sooner. then, had the Pre-
1ere dent sailed away than the gates we
rom opened for great flood OF dissat
.Eht faction-which soon crystalized il
for a remarkable diplomatic intrigue.
any, His absence at this time was pre-
ltrol ably inevitable; nevertheless. IL y
E of dangerous. 1t left the forces Of
ssia. new order" without effective z,
sing eralship; it gave opportunity for
mis- the elements that We're against h
bout and against settlements on
for American basis. 10 get their brea
and 70 reconstruct their positions, 10
be gin powerful counter-moveme
use IL the President had remained
were Paris straight along 70 carry
sued ward his offensive, TO "cOnsolid