The Washington herald., 1922-09-26
Has Britain Set European
Trap for us? Asks Simonds
Actions Since Versailles Show Disposition to
Draw America Into Overseas Az
fairs, He Says.

Wen as in latent resources. They
appreciated the enormous expansion
In our financial strength and influ-
ence. they saw. too, the accidental
development of our fleet to- tie
point where It was patent that, sif
we chose. we might become Brit
aims successor as the first naval
power Of the planet.
I do not think. anyone can accu-
rately evalnate the material ana
the sentimental considerations which
combined to produce in Britain this
enormous enthusiasm for the Amer
lean alliance. for the American
partnership. for the reunion of the
two branches OF the family sepa.
rated by, an unfortunate feud nearly
a century and a half earlier. It
would be totally Inaccurate to say
that the thing was merely calculd-
tion. 1t would probably be equally
incorrect to say 1t was lacking In
elements of calculation, in certain
quarters.
Golden Hour for Americans.
The fact was that popular feel
ing and political considerations
combined to make an AngIo-Amer-
lean partnersip totally desirable and
to the effort to bring about such an
alliance statesmanship and indi-
vidual effort bent themselves with
equal energy. You had only to he
in London or Paris in. the drst
months Of 1s1s-that is, during the
peace conference, to feel this al
feost universal tpush. toward the
American arrangement-and 1t was
for>obvious reasons the golden hour
for Americans in the British Isles.
There were, 1t must be said, not
a few. mainly belonging to the
Tory camp, who saw this American
policy develop with keen apprehen-
sion. They felt that partnership
with America meant the sacrifice
of considerable independence, they
felt, rather vaguely, that such a
partnership would not'i any event,
even II II were psssible, prove q
one-sided aair and they felt that
the United States was certain to
prove a dangerous and perhaps a
domineering partner, or they felt
that in the end no" such alliance
was even feasible given traditional
American racial antipathies to the
British.
This group, therefore advocated
remaining loyal to the French al
lance. making peace with little re-
gard for the demands of Mr.. Will
son and perpetuating the Anglo
French alliance which had been
sealed In blood in the recent strug-
gle. Such an alliance these men
believed would insure the continued
control OF Europe and in the ad-
ministration OF such a partnership
they believed II would be easier to
do business with the France Of
Clemenceau than with the United
States Of Mr.. Wilson.
There were others, of which the
late Lord Northcliffe was only the
most conspicuous, who advocated
the American partnership with the
greatest enthusiasm. but with
equal earnestness insisted on the
preservation OF the Anglo French
alliance which had won the war.
These Englishmen advocated the
closest possible association between
the United States and Great Britain,
But at the same time and with
honorable concern for the recent
past, opposed any substitution of
NHS ShANCu SNoNN5 AoT WHICH
might amount to a desertion of the
ally of the past four terrible years.
an ally whose faithfulness had
never been open to question.
Lloyd George's Maneuver~.
Lloyd George. with characteristic
adroitness undertook at Paris to
maneuver between the two groups.
He gave every encouragement to
the advisers who advocated the
American alliance. but he avoided
an open break with France Thus
he was able to use President will
son to restrain French aspirations
on the Rhine, but he stood with
Clemenceau against Wilson in put
ting the sum of reparations at an
impossible figure, because only by
such imitation, only by including
war pensions, in fact, could he OBJ
tain any considerable share for his
own country.
When French ambitions in Syria
conflicted with British Near East
ern purposes. Lloyd George endeav-
ored by invoking Mr.. Wilson's
principles and by employing Amer
lean prestige to coerce France into
abandoning all of her claims in the
Syrian hinterland and making way
for that Arab state which Britain
was planning to set up with, an
Arab princeling of her own. the
Emir Feisal. as the nominal SOW
ereign.
In the main. however. Llo!-
George deliberately sacrificed the
French entente at Paris and step by
step sought to prepare the way for
the transfer of British political af-
fections from France to the United
States. He was pushed along q
course, which he was by no means
wholly reluctant to travel by the
Liberal element, which were in
stinctively and -traditionally hostile
to France and had been before the
war friendly to Germany.
By the time the Paris conference
had come to an end the policy had
been established in the British mind.
And this policy meant an Anglo
American alliance, which function
ing in the league of nations would
dominate that body. Moreover. the
doctrine of the mutual cancellation
of loans had been framed in the
Paris conference, where Keynes. its
later parent by adoption. had cham
pioned 1t and found cause for be-
lieving that it could be translated
into fact.
What the British had in mind in
this respect. as events later devel
oped, or perhaps more exactly what
they came to have In mind as events
developed, was that the United
States should cancel the British
loan. and that the United States and
Britain in partnership. should use
their control of their recent allies,
through the debts owed by the allies
to them to force European settlp