Atlanta tri-weekly journal. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1920-19??, 1922-01-17
u. S. MAY WITHDRAW ALL
ARMY MEN FROM RHINE

government to keep at least a
skeleton force in Germany as a
symbol of solidarity among the al
lies and associates in the war, and
as an indication of the feeling in
this country that Germany should
pay for the damages of the war
as far as she is able to do so.
But if the new French policy is
to be one of ruthlessness toward
Germany and of obstruction to the
general plans for the economic re-
construction Of Europe; in other
words, if France is to bring about
her own isolation and act indie
pendently of her allies, then the
United States will be quick to show
it's disapproval of this course by
terminating American participation
in the Rhineland occupation, ana
the last hope of bringing America
into the reparations commission will
have vanished.
One of the important factors in
probable early determination by
Washington to withdraw entirely
from the Rhine is the claim by rep
resentatives of the new order in
France that the treaty Of Versailles
gives to- France the privilege of
maintaining her troops on the Rhine
far beyond the fifteen-year limit act
ually specified in the text of the
pact.
It is contended that the treaty
provides that the Rhineland shall
be occupied for fifteen years, and
that the troops shall then be with
drawn, provided Germany has full
filled all her obligations under the
treaty."
That section of French public
opinion which believes in using the
iron hand on Germany while she is
down calls attention to the fact that
the original reparations payments
assessed against Germany cover a
period of more than thirty years,
and that this means the troops must
remain on the Rhine for at least
that length of time. Otherwise, it
is argued, Germany might default.
It will be recalled that the French
delegation at Versailles stood out al
| most to the very end of the negotia-
tions for pushing the German from
tier permanently back to the Rhine,
so that France might have the nat
ural barrier of the river for her
further protection from German ag-
gresSion. This demand Of France
was given up only when President
Wilson and Lloyd George agreed to
and signed the threepoWer treaty
| under which the United States and
Great Britain pledgd themselves to
come Immediately to the defense of
France in the event of an unprovok-
ed attack by Germany.
This treaty of defensive co-opera-
ton failed of ratification both in
London and in Washington. There
fore, the section of French opinion
which seems once more to be in the
saddle, contends that France must
revert to her original claims and
must occupy the left bank of the
kline for unlimited years to come
under the technicality of the treaty
which gives France herself the right
to say when Germany has fulfilled
all the obligations of the treaty
signed in the gilded palace of Yer
sailles.
To the Washington government,
however, 1t is lncomprehensible that
france can reach a deliberate de-
clslon to cut adrift from Great Brit
am ana through strong headedness
attempt to deal with Germany alone.
Such course Enthusiastically would
y" III lush on the side
or Germany and France would be
left in an unfcrtunate Position.
In any attempt to bring even an
approximate return to normal in
Europe England must be accepted as
the leade- in such an effort. France
cannot ignore the dominance of
| Great Britain at this time. Llovd
George still is the big man of E,I-
rope and France has no one at this
Tune to cope with him.
I France further must realize that
since the Wa hington conference
and since the Irish settlement, the
bonds Of frien, ship bet cen Great
Britain and the United States haye
been UNNECESSARILY STRENGTHENED
and tat in any European in1broglir
involving France and Great Britai,,
a er1can sympathy may easily be
swung to the English-speaking peo.
pies. NV
France has indeed become a world
problem, in which the United States
has political as well as economic in.
terest.