Evening star., 1922-04-11
U. S. JE0PARD|zED
" IN CUTTING NAVY,
SAYS MR.. HUGHES
Secretary of State Declares
Country Could Not Main
tain 5-5-3 Ratio.
REFLECTION ON PARLEY
TO REDUCE PERSONNEL

Sees Danger of Lessening Prestige
of America if Proposals Are
Carried Out.
Reduction of the naval ratio of the
United States below that provided Tor
by the naval treaty would put the Sc
curity of the country in jeopardy
Secretary Hughes OF the Department
of States said, among other things
in a letter transmitted today to Rep
resentative Rogers, republican, OF
Massachusetts,.
He urged against any such reduc-
tion in personnel as proposed in the
to the House. While he said that he
could not express an expert opinion
on this point. he said that before
writing the letter he had conferred
with the experts who were advisers
al the arms conference, and they had
advised him that the Navy could not
maintain the 5-5-3 ratio under the
proposed personnel reduction.
1t would be reflection on the
work of the conference and most
less than the ratio allowed in the
treaty. he said, and 1t is important
that the defined policy should be
agreed to. Any less will lower the
prestige of the United States at fu-
ture conferences. he said.
To have asked for less at the con-
ference. he continued, would have
been indefensible. and it is likewise
so now to attempt to lower the ratio
by falling to provide the necessary
personnel.
Text of Letter.
The Secretary of States letter fol-
lows:
Il have received your letter request
ing my opinion as to the proposed re-
duction from the present enlisted
personnel of the United States Navy
YOU write to me because of my rela-
tion to the recent conference on
limitation of armament and to the
negotiation of the naval treaty which
mage with respect to the United
States. Great Britain and Japan in
the ratio of 5-5-2.
Under this treaty the United States
capital ships. You say that you are
advised by the Navy Department that
the proposed reduction in personnel
will mean that not exceeding twelve
Cdplldl SHIPS CdH Dc hSpl III CoiHiiiS-
sion. AS to this I am not qualified to
express an expert opinion. but have
questioned the naval experts with
when the American delegates con-
and whom we found both accurate
and in sympathy with the principle
of limitation by agreement, and I am
advised that the proposed number of
enlisted men is far below the number
required to maintain our Navy upon
the basis contemplated by the treaty.
Accepting this statement of fact, the
only question would seem to be
whether our Navy should be reduced
below the treaty standard by a pro-
vision of personnel inadequate to
maintain it.
Should Maintain Treaty.
ITO this question I think there can
he but one answer. I strongly believe
that it would be most injurious to
the interests of the United States not
to maintain fully the standard of the
treaty.
From whatever point of view it is
considered. the question of appropri-
ate naval strength is relative one.
1t was recognized in calling the re-
cent conference that the only sound
basis for effecting a reduction in
naval armament was through an
agreement among the naval powers
which would fix suitable limitations
for their respective navies in relation
to each other. In the invitation to
the conference it was said that there
seemed to be no ground to expect the
hating of the increasing outlays for
naval armament unless the powers
factory basis for an agreement to ef-
feet their Imitation Apparently this
was the view of Congress when in
the naval appropriation bill. ap-
proved July IL. 1921, it expressed the
opinion that there should be an un
derstanding or agreement between the
governments of the United States.
Great Britain and Japan with respect
TO their building programs.
What was the purpose of the con-
ference if it was deemed to be wise
policy to cut the Navy irrespective
of an agreement with the other pow
ers? The ratification of the confer
ence treaties is important, but it is
which they defined should be adhered
to. By agreement of the naval
powers construction programs were
. virtually abandoned and limitations
We're fixed. 1t would be truly ex-
traordinary. and a manifest reflec-
tion upon the work of the conference,
if the Navy, of the United States were
reduced below the standard thus
established.
Impresses Seriousness.
The American delegates were able
to effect an agreement in this diff
cult ana important uldlteT UeCduSc
they asked for limitations in pro-
portion to existing naval strength.
y very large reduction was thus ef-
fected while national security was
left unimpaired. To alter that re-
lation would be very serious matter
for the United States, both impair
ing it's prestige and putting it's
security in jeopardy.
The American delegates deemed it
to be essential that they should
stand inf1exibly for the ratio shown
by existing strength and thus they
insisted upon a replacement schedule
which would give equality with
Great Britain and ratio of So with
Japan. This result was achieved.
We should have taken a wholly in
defensible position had we asked for
less. But of what avail are this
labor and success If the Navy is not
kept up to an agreed standard?
II have been speaking of existing
conditions. but what of the future?
Upon what basis is the United States
TO enter future negotiations on the
subject of naval armament? Are we
to impair our existing relative
strength and accept an inferior posi-
tion? / should suppose that such a
proposition would require only to be
stated, and that no one would defend
conference, which has had such graf
flying results, has shown that reduc-
tion can be effected by agreement.
We have reduced our Navy, but we
have kept our place. Great sums
have been saved through the agreed
reductions, but to cut under the
agreement itself would be likely to
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