The Washington herald., 1922-02-05
RUSSIAS EXECUTIVE EADS ADMIT IMPOSSIBLE BOL SEA

Continsed FROM Poee Tsoo.
her right to hold large portions OF
Chinese territory and she will keep
her soldiers there. as she has kept
them in the past. She came to
Washington determined 20 stay in
China, to evade any attempt to
turn her out and she hSs pursued
her policy to the, end.
whst FeIlsws AssuapIenf
But IL one accepts the assumption
that war in the Far East now he-
comes certain. what then shall one
say of the other circumstances Of
the Washington conference. Of the
several treaties and agreements?
What shall one say Of the lifuita-
tion of naval armaments and IT
the treaty of association which We
have made. with Japan. in company
with France and Britain? Iocs the
fact that the conditions in the Far
East remain T1s.1ble have a bear
ing upon Amer scas opinion IN the
matter Of the several treaties:
Insofar as the agreement limit
ing naval strength the question as
fairly debatabie, II Is Iaest.on
Of national pCiicy pure ana SIM
pie. we nave 10 dus"tT q SahSaN
question: Do we dceirc 10 use our
reet to aid China OF Russia or both
in war again Japan? IL we do then
It is the heisd, of folly 10 consent
to the terms of tie fve-power
treaty, which SO reduces our heet
and so abolishes our naval bases
that we cannot make any naval
effort on behalf Of these two couI-
tries. In effect this treaty repre-
sents a retreat from the Western
Pacific. we deprive ourselves Of the
power to protect China or threaten
Japan.
But our representative in the
peace conference, probably with
perfect accuracy, have interpreted
American sentiment as absolutely
opposed to any war in the racinc
on behalf OF any nation or against
any nation, precisely as long as no
nation directly assails US m or
own homelands or IusElar posses
sions. And Japan is Undertaking,
in return for our disarmament and
/ think in perfect good faith. TO
guarantee not to attack US, not 20
attack us in our insulsr posses
sions. where. alone she could at
tack US. We are resigning tue
power to attack her, she is re-
nouncing all intention OF attacking
US, and, since the British remain \
Pacific naval power, no one can be-
lIeve she will venture to attack US.
shape Arms on Policy.
Your army and navy, after all.
although it is terribly hard to make
this elementary truth understood,
= g. mi =
icy. II We mean to protect China
again Japan. then We must not limit
our navy or leave Guam and the
Philippines unfortihed, rather we
must redouble our pace in construc-
tion and fortify both bases. Int we
do not want to do anything OF the
sort We want simply to have the
ships to defend our own Pacific
Coast, and we are prepared to rely
upon our arrangement with the
British and the japanese, quite
reasonably, 1 think. to insure our
security in Guam and in the Phil
ippines.
In view of this American senti-
ment. correctly gagged by Mr.
Hughes and his associates, ! think,
there is small reason for criticising
the treaty limiting naval strength,
despite the fact that war in the
Far East is assured. We don't want
to participate in the war: we don't
believe we have interests sufficient
to warrant participation. therefore
we resign the power to participate.
For myself. the consent TO waive
sovereignty in the matter Of forti-
fcations is humilisting; it has here
tofore been the concomitant Of de.
feat. invariably. To argue that we
have renounced the right to fortify
the Great Lakes by feet or our Ca
madam border by forts. is not TO cite
, a parallel. for that agreement was
/ reciprocal. while in the present case
neither Japan nor Britain renounces
the right to fortify any island that
has the relative strategic value of
Gaum.
But II We are retiring from the
Pacific, west of the Hawaiian
/ Islands, and we are: il We are re-
nouncing the power to participate
/ in an Asistic quarrel, and We are,
and IL the American people in large
ma jority advocate such a retreat
and it is fair TO assume that they
do, then there is small ground for
protest We shall not be attacked
feel certain, either by the Japa-
nese or by the British. as a result
OF not fortifying Guam or the Phil
ippines. and we do not mean TO at
/ tack. Therefore. policy and arma-
mont are harmonized, which. after
! all. represents the aim Of wise
craftsmanship.
Documents DoyetsiL
When one comes to the four.
! power treaty. covering the regions
of the Pacific. however. the situs
tion is a little less clear. In so far
as that treaty pledges US not &c
attack any one of the three powers
/ who are signatory to the treaty
/ this document falls in quite nat.
urally with the flve-power treaty
which logically and historically II
| precedes. We agree not to ATTACK
| each other. and we get rid of 4
| private treaty of alliance. which
| would hinder and complicate. And
/ one may hope. in addition TO dispos.
| ing of the Anglo-Jspanese treaty
we shall also get rid OF the similar
Franco-Japsnese treaty by some
| method and in some document.
But the fourpower treaty also
provides for the conference and
/ consultation of the four nations in
case one is threatened. To be sure
| the geographical circumstances OF
/ the treaty seem clearly defined
and | assume that the Japanese
! mainland will be excluded. yet
| supposing that in the future Japan
/ is menaced by a Chinese attack OF
Russian attack. just what inter.