The New York herald., 1922-03-12

OF war with England, than the GER
tainty that France. should she undertake
any action against England, would in
turn, be attacked in the rear by Ger
man army million strong. America
would not be tempted to put into mill
tary practice the chauvinistic tendencies
Of her future government and her past
disagreements with England, unless
feeling assured of eventual French sup
port. England's foreign policy would
nave complete freedom of movement in
all directions. If once guaranteed by ade-
quate alliances against war menace
from French source. And even though
such alliance should be entered into for
the short period needed by England to
repair the Injuries suffered by her mari
time defenses-they would nevertheless
so II seems to me, be of the greatest
possible benefit 10 all peace loving ma
tions by reason OF the absolute certainty
OF peace during the period such alliances
were in force #
1T is not question OF who would be
the stronger in case Of war. but of the
prevention OF war Neither France nor
Russia would dare violate the peace
Of Europe II they had been officially in
formed beforehand that by so doing
they would have England as an as
sured and immediate enemy They
Wouiu piHy take the initiative IN tnl3
direction II they had reason to believe
that they could attack the peace loving
nations Of Europe one after the other
1t is my conviction that the peace of
Europe would be assured at least for
the duration of this publicly proclaimed
alliance, If II were understood that Eng
land would be protected by "A German
alliance in case Of a French attack. and
that Germany would be equally guar
anteed against French aggression by
an English alliance.
1T is a question as to whether an
open and parliamentary stand in favor
of this defensive alliance. in the interest
Of the maintainance of peace. would be
too great price to pay for the certain
ty OF knowing the peace OF Europe were
assured for a definite period
Anglo-German Treaty.
my idea IS this that If his Majesty
gives his consent, treaty should be con-
cluded between the English and German
Governments by the terms of which each
one obligates itself to come to the sup
port of the other in the event OF French
aggression against either during the next
one, two or three years-as may be
deemed best-and that this treaty should
be binding for the German Empire even
without the assent OF the Peichstag.
and should be laid before the English
Parliament for ratification. after which
the German Reichstag should be Off
cially informed thereof.
II believe that an open and manly
step in this direction would have a quiet
ing and paoifying effect not only upon
England and Germany. but would be felt
throughout Europe, and that thereby
the English Ministry would be conceded
the position Of being the guardian OF
world peace.
England. by reason of the preponder-
ance of her maritime position, needs
now, as she needed in the last century. a
continental alliance. and the necessity
has become still stronger by the enor-
nous growth of military armaments on
the Continent. Without this alliance.
and In view OF the present means Of
transportation. the possibility of a
French invasion OF England would only
be a question depending upon weather
contingencies, provocation and the mo-
mentary strength Of the fighting forces.
The existence OF an English German
alliance would make It impossible for
France to take any effective action
against England and at the same time
.c defend herself against a German in
vasion OF her eastern frontier.
able for England to carry her policy of
isolation SO far as to force all Conti-
mental Powers. among them Germany. to
make arrangements safeguarding their
future without counting upon England.
Should the conviction become definite
belief that this would be permanently
the case. then Germany would be faced
with the necessity OF looking out for her
own salvation in such International
agreements as could be entered into
without England. Such agreements. when
once entered upon. are not easy to aban-
don.
To Consult Salisbury.
For all these reasons. I beg Your Ex-
cellency to ask Lord Salisbury. in my
name, IL he considers II possible in the
interest of England and his own Govern
ment, to the stability OF which l attach
the highest Importance. to take up the
matter / have suggested by consulting
the Judgment of the most authoritative
OF his friends.
This Is in no way meant as mise
en- dcmeure. and should Lord Salisbury
negative the practicability OF my sug-
gestion as far as Engind Is concerned,
neither my confidence in his policy nor
lily ItISOtldl IHitnVsnlp LOT MN wDhiu
any way be Affected. My only wish Is
that we should examine the question to-
gether and see II by the plan suggested
for the bold and public recognition OF
the peace needs OF Europe and by par
liamentary representation. we should be
able TO ward off war. at least pro tenn
pore. and perhaps for longer period
Should Lord Salisbury deem II adj
visable to negative this plan, ! should
have the greatest confidence In his tudg
ment of what an English Minister con-
sders possible, and our personal rela-
tions would undergo no change. But |
believe that in the policy | have OUT
lined would be found just the impulse
needed. not only to guarantee the peace
OF Europe, but also to strengthen his
own position. provided he should decide
to take open and official action in Parlia-
ment along the lines | have indicated.
Before asking his Majesty for author
ity TO take this step. I should first like to
know Lord Salisbury's opinion in the
matter. as alone and not the Kaiser
could place myself In the position OF re-
cevlng a negative answer.
II do not expect an Immediate reply
to this letter. but am ready 10 wait any
length OF time Lord Salisbury may