The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1922-03-26
By FRANK H. sIMoNDs.


when, theoretically at least, Europe
Is approaching an international
conference of the utmost import
ance 1t would be impossible to ex-
aggerate the incoherence, confusion
and ,scepticism encountered on all
sides. Is there to be a conference
at all? Can any conference have
serious results? These questions
are asked everywhere. In the
meanwhile. the conference having
been called, the machinery goes on
grinding. but behind the scenes in
stead OF preparation Is chaos,
Three circumstances explain the
situation. First, the refusal of the
United States to attend has from
the European view deprived the
Genoa conference of its main
chance OF succeeding. IL the
United States will not come, how
can real economic reconstruction In
the world begin, since the United
states possesses resources without
which nothing Is possible?
secondly, the political crisis In
Great Britain grows worse Instead
Of better. Lloyd George Is mani
testify losing strength; perhaps even
before this article Is printed he will
ventton of Lloyd George, il had no
other real friend in any govern
ment. and 1t represented the flnaI
effort for redress on his home front
by success in a foreign field. The
idea of meeting the -Bolshevists.
dear to his heart, is repulsive to
that OF a majority of the Tories
who. must take office IL he dis
appea=s-and II he goes what VIII
the Tories do?
France Wants No Politics.
Then there is France never ia
NOrable to the Genoa idea, COM
mltted to 1t by BRAND. but having
Overthrown BRAND because Of &C.
noa-and golf. Today after many
hesttations NJ. POincare permits II
to be know that he will not go.
More, it is suggested that France
send no figure of Importance, no
political leader, only financial eX-
peFts. Thus IL any attempt is made
toEturn the conference into a po-
litical affair. France is out of IT..
because she will have only financial
experts present.
Underlying all else in the French
poltion is hostility to meeting the
BOsshevists. No Frenchman can
understand the curious Lloyd Geor-
gian idea which from P=inkipo to
Genoa has remained constant, L
desire TO get at close grips around
the same table with the Red Rus
sian revoiuttonists. On the Rus
sign question, France and the
U1Ited States are quite close to-
sekher; so are the United States
ana Great Britain. save for a GER
taip red fringe. But Lloyd George
has so far overborne British
opRhion.
Thus with Genoa in allegiance and
acute political questions uppermost
evsrywhere, it Is impossible to do
moe than discuss these domestic
conditions, and I shall try now to
present something of the contempt
raEy French state OF mind.
60 take the political situation
1rst: when BRAND fell after
cannes there was a general Ameri-
can conviction that Brands resig-
natt7n had been a clever political
stf6ke that had placed Poincare In
, an impossible situation and made
= inevitable his own return to power
after no great delay.
AS has turned out, however,
FrShd's strategy has not been IN
the least successful. In recent
weeks Brands influence and popu-
IaSy have declined very greatly.
M1s and more the failure Of
Fr1nce at Washington is being APP
preclated in France and the re-
sponsibility for failure is being
chSLged to BRAND. His were fatal
misoalculations.- Despite all warn
inRs, he went to America convinced
that, so tense was the Anglo-Amer-
liz - IL
ths role Of arbitrator. Instead he
pIayed-Or his country played-the
pset of the victim, or, more exactly,
inrsad Of being the hero of the
pisce. France was the villain. This
fact Is being slowly grasped in
French political circles.
PoIncare seems Secure.
B1isnd then ceased to be a pres
er6ior even potential menace to
Poincare, and aside from BRAND he
had no serious rival. But Poln-
care, and aside from BRAND he nau
naS serious rival. But Poincare's
stRhgth by no means lies in
Brands weakness alone. 1t is not
ins1he least negative. BRAND. star
no Bet. but as one EnElishma.I told
mS4t the foreign office when Poin-
ARE was prime minister. the
French chamber had wanted him
for. many months and, having got
him. the chamber is satisfied for
- first time. Allowing for acct
depts. which play 4 great part in
French ministries, the PoIncare
ministry would seem assured a long
ICNe of power.
Now there was second Ameri-
IAN concept which seems today in
accurate. To the American mind
POinCare represented extrem C
FrInch militarism. Chauvinism. He
wss not only the exponent Of the
UIF German idea of force but he
was the incarnation Of the idea of
nIds fashioned secret diplomacy. Yet
thH same Poincare has in recent
Lays adopted the method of Presi-
deHt Harding and Secretary Hughes
aud subjected himself to the cor
BOndents. which means little less
than a revolution. for anyone who
knew the old Quail d'Orsay.
The impression of Poincare as a
swashbuCkling. militaristic kind Of
fcRw and this impression had
wide currency in the United States
is one Of the oldest cases of mis-
apurehensiOn in the world. In real
ftvs Poincare is slow. precise,
pIodding man, with little gift for
eIoduence or power In enlistinE
4 personal support. He is Intelligent.
has markedly legal mind. but has
a soIdness which, with many other
characteristics, makes one compare
him with Mr.. Hughes. At least he
ia not more militaristic than our
SaAetary of State and is perhaps