The broad ax., 1922-07-08

~'NASNs eNNo AAbhA VI a(LAou
against the municipality. in which any
such injury is inflicted. to any per
son so suffering such damage or in
jury. ,and to certain dependents Of a
person lynched by the mob. In other
words, the act penalties not only per
sons composing the mob but the city
wherein it does violence. IN this re-
speet the act is both remedial and
penal; remedial so far as it provides
for compensation to the injured par.
ties. and penal so far as It renders
the city responsible for the results Of
mob violence.
Such an act is a police regulation,
and should, Of course. be construed
with reference to effecting its object
which, among other things, is to hold
community responsible for the ef-
fects of mob violence within It. 1t is
said in County of Allegheny v. Glib
son, % Pa. ST. 3o7, 4lS. where the
subject is ably discussed, that the
theory upon which penalizing a mu-
nicipality in such a case is based, is
that with proper vigilance acts oi
violence may be and ought to be pre-
vented, and that a political subdi-
vision of the state should be held re-
sponsible for the public peace and
protection to life and property from
mob violence.
1--WE fail to see in the act a purpose
to limit its provisions in case Of
lynching to a dependent of the par
ticular person lynched. The result oil
lynching is no less serious to COM
munity. or persons affected, whether
the mob expends its violence on a
particular party against whom its
purposes vengeance, or some innocent
bystander. The instances are not
few where mobs have taken into
their own hands the punishment OF
one who was unquestionably guilty OF
the crime which provoked the assem-
blage. But can it be said that the
dependent of such criminal is more
entitled to consideration and compen-
sation, so far as the act is remedial in
its nature, than dependent of an in
nocent party, or that the purpose OF
the act, the suppression of mob vio-
lence, will be conserved IN one case
and not in the other? We think the
restrictive construction of the act by
the city's counsel in this respect, is
not in harmony with its manifest pur-
pose to impose responsibility upon
the community itself for mob violence
of that character.
"The contention of defendant in
error is that the phrase such other
person. in section 5, should be car
ried back to section l for its antece-
dent. Such strict construction would
leave the words or persons imme-
diately following, with doubtful ref
erence, and if given to the same words
in section 4, would limit the felony
to damaging the property of, or in
juring the particular person against
whom the mob had assembled for
violence and none other. 1t would be
strange, indeed, if such a construc-
ton should prevail when the follow
ing part of section gives the right
of action against the county or city
for such damage or injury to any per-
son so suffering damage to property
or personal injury. 1t must be ad-
mitted that less cumbersome phrase
ology might have been employed.
But as such other person. referred
to in section 4, is a party whose
property or person is injured, and the
same phrase in section 5 refers to a
person 1ynched,' it is manifest the
two phrases can not refer to the same
person. While the language is some
what ambiguous it should be inter
preted with reference to the intent
and purpose of the act. If the word
other in section 5, which seems to
have no logical connection, be treated
as surplusage, the construction of the
section is simple and conforms to
that contended for by plaintiff in er-
ror. In fact its ambiguity is empha-
sized when considered in connection
with the same word in the relative
clause following it, to-wit, upon any
other person who shall hereafter suf-
fer death by lynching at the hands of
a mob
"Such a construction is also in
conformity with the elementary prin-
ciple that a person must be held to
intend the natural consequences of his
act and that, therefore, the victim Of
mob violence may be said to be the
object of the unlawful purpose of its
assemblage
an an action brought under a SINH
lar law to recover against a county
for the lynehing of one Mitchell, in
Commissioners Of Champaign Co. etc.
v. Church, Admir-, etc, 81 Ohio St.
Rep. 3l8 348. the jury were charged
that the lynching did not raise pre-
sumption of law that the mob assem-
bled with that intent The court held