The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1922-02-12


,ngton, with Genoa in full view the
idea OF isolation breaks down, tn,
idea OF complete or even of incom
nlete separation from Europe az.
fairs disappears. Indeed the his
tory OF our own conference beside
the Potomac serves to illustrate how
inextricably tho European and
American affairs are intermingled
for, when we sought TO arrive at ar
agreement in the Pacific and ad.
tustment of naval weapons, We
found ourselves suddenly face 70
face with European controversies
which barred the road of progress
Farley Holds Unique Place.
As the first American conference
then the recent international meet
ig has q unique place in history, Il
marks--who can doubt TIA stage
IN our own, as we'll as in world his.
tory. But when one comes TO COM
pare or contrast II with the grea,
conferences Of the last century, with
Vienna, with Berlin, with the Paris
conference which liquidated-or
sought to liquidate--the world war
one perceives at once that the
Washington conference was both
less significant and less important
was A'0AlA'NIu III lAN lltlus IL WIS
limited in its results. Seeking 10
do but two things, TO deal with but
two situations. II found itself halted
after material advance in handling
sne.
Actually we undertook a relatively
modest program. We sought to put
term to Anglo-American naval
competition, which was futile and
expensive into the bargain and also
to japanese American distrust and
worse in the Pacific which had no
basis in reason. Both of these
things we accomplished. All things
considered there is, after the signing
Of the four party and the five party
treaties, the one dealing with the
regions OF the Pacific, the other with
the limitation of naval strength, not
the smallest reason why Britain, the
United States or Japan should either
fight or compete in naval construc-
tlon.
Was Danger Of Collision.
SO much is solid achievement.
There was some danger, real danger
OK japanese American collision,
there was a present fact of Anglo
American naval competition. But
there was no underlying reason for
war between Japan and the United
states and there was not the re-
motest reason for Anglo American
naval competition. Japan mistrust- =
cd our purposes in the far east, we
suspected Japanese menace TO our
own coasts and insular possessions
and we saw in the Anglo-Japanese
tlhance q cause for anxiety and an
noyanCe.
fa aG.U
tnat underlying the whole stun
uon III the far east and the naval
situation there was fundamental ,
absence OF cause for war or for
rivalry. The achievement I'm
Washington was the application
OF ordinary common sense TO n
atnation which was not without
oangcr, was indeed capable OF be-
D1nnlhg dangerously aggravated.
! mat the situation was funda-
mentally sound however was dis
eioseu Dy the fact that the three
sreat powers could deal with it
and dispose OF 1t.
Now when one passes from the
agreements between the three great
eea-powers. both over naval strength
anu over Pacific dominions to the
tueNlons affecting the mainland OF
ia-and Tor that matter the main
sS tu OF europe, as well as the means
% alu methods of future warfare, 1t is
raai that one passes from the do
,Ia! a!h OF fact to the region OF spec-
,ha 0n, on We have not disposed OF
ao nhlnese questions. the Siberian
tueslons, the controversy over the
pDnnarlne-which is n detail in
european differences of opinion.
', No Ratio Established.
NJ, point OF fact, although nine
men men out of ten probably believe the
NS,ohhIafy we have not even estab.
rna., a ratio OF strength in the
atgr saar OF capital ships-for you will
: oa vsin the five power treaty IN
is n 40. ior any mention of ratio. What
M zen there is that for a period
he ~ tni Years capital ships are not "a
maui SuIIL ny the signatories, that i'm.
IN tateiy there will be a reduction
fla.,LhF me naval strength of certain
all nraa anu practical cessation OF
NoW 1t you please 10 take the
american view this means tba, ,bC
"a "a powers have ACCENTED To- -, q
ra.1' ,ue' Tor all time, a certain relative
vahg OF power on the sea Rnt n
aora 0r .ake the European view n /,
Enrllhg quite different. To The
FHroopean mind, to the continental
in.gIpean In mind. the fact diacloseG
tbi.." i"S Washington treaties Is iusi
torv Noval warfare is In a transl.
airSrs sage, va battleshlps are going out
CONT and perhaps submarines ar,
wba. m But no one quite know,
yesr VIII develop in the neYt IN
natie In addition, ali Enronaar
none ls ~ are financially embarrassed
\ even :, ,an n afford to build battlesbins
II Is not. sure investment, as
Euronanng set forth these facts IN,
lorics,' 'ehs would conclude thai In,
clare la' course to follow was 10 de-,
for a truce in building, TO wal
wouId ume. during which sclenc,
provo provo progress aud finance i'm
situatjonsi ZEN years from now, new
am 9ns 1 may develop. But, nnC
even .rylns to emphasize the aot
buis,n accepting the truce in In,
NOT Jug OF battleships. France doe
cos,an. accept a ratio. she does no
for TO rank l.75 against 5-5-:
ana pFltain, the United states
NOT ,Ssspen' respectively. This /,