The New York herald., 1922-09-17
Failure to Pre-
pare for a Long War and
the Remoteness Of til e
High Command Blamed
by Capt. Ritter for the
Collapse

tons could be started in earnest, Both
parties had based their plans on an un-
known quantity. namely, on the power
OF resistance OF the Belgian army and
fortresses. As the Germans enjoyed
an enormous numerical preponderance
over the Belgian army. the outcome Of
the Held operations on the Belgian
frontier was settled beforehand There
success or failure OF the plans Of oper-
alton OF each side depended on the
power Of resistance Of tho Belgian
fortresses Of Liege and Namur exclu-
sive'y.
9he outcome showed that the Ger
man estimate Of the defensive valuS
OF the Belgian army and OF the
fortress OF Liege was correct, provided
the defenders were not given time to
improve their positions. Old estab-
lished views had to be cast aside. Th
Germans might not wait until they he 4
taken up the positions assigned /
them. not even until the troops as
signed to the march through Belgium
had been mobilized. The thrust had
to be made few hours after the state
Of war had been proclaimed.
"And Ldege was taken. Through the
gap thus created flooded the First and
Second Germany armies. On August
IS the northern wing Of the German
army advanced rapidly around its
pivotal point, namely, the fortress Of
Metz. without encountering any con-
siderable resistance until it reached
the Sambre- Meuse sector.
Germans Had Secured
Initiative In Field
mot until that very day did the
French shock troops advance in tho
direction Of Mulhausen, Saarburg and
Moerchingen on the one hand, and
Luxembourg and Neufchateau. on the
other. Before they could achieve any
thing those French troops had to over
come the resistance OF the German
field army and fortresses. The Ger
mans. doubtless, had secured the initi-
ative regarding the military opera
tions.
"The French High Command mani
testify comprehended that bitter truth
and acted accordingly. Resoluteiv
they gave up their already broken
down plans Of operation and did their
best to shift the center Of gravity of
the allied forces to the north in an
attempt to break through the German
front between Metz and Namur.
ION its northeastern wing the Fifth
French Army was in a serious posi-
tion and exposed to the danger of
flank and rear attacks. The Third
German Army advanced In the direc-
ton Of Hirson. The German High
Command had not placed the Third
Army under the command Of the
Second Army. but It had left 1t to the
free will Of the two army commands
to make agreements as to coopera-
tion.' Accordingly. the command OF
the Second Army advised the COM
mand Of the Third Army that the
Second Army was going to begin the
attack across the Sambre on August
23 and asked the Third Army for re-
lieving cooperation and even offered
to open to the Third Army the roads
across the Meuse.' IL necessary. Under
such circumstances the Third Army
did not deem 1t advisable to advance
rapidly.
1.-THE Second Army was certainly
right when 1t made use of fine tao
tical opportunity by attacking on
August %. without waiting for the
arrival Of the First Army. The enemy
would hardly have complacently wait
ed to be encircled. But the Third
Army should have been led 30 that 1t
could make the thrust in the flank and
rear OF the enemy before 1t was too
late AS matters stood, the enemy.
who was attacked on the front only.
was able to break Off the engagement
before the Third German Army had
crossed the Meuse.
Practically defeated. but strategi-
cally not restricted as to the direction
of his retreat the enemy avoided, the
/ seemingly impending Cann@ lin
which the Roman army was destroyed
by Hannibal In the Second Punio
War;. In other words, the battle Of
destruction the opportunity of which
good luck had offered the German
High Command in the Maubeuge-
Givet sector.
Schliefen's Plan Might
Have Been Realized
"If the Fifth French Army and the
English expeditionary forces had
been destroyed In the bend OF the
Sambre and Meuse, Schlieffen's plan
of surrounding the remainder OF the
French army between Paris and the
German Swiss frontier would have
been realized without any doubt. The
French would have been outfianked
by the German front to the extent Of
the width of thYne armies. namely the