The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1922-10-18
Detection of Austria Fatal
to German Cause, Ex-Kaiser
Says, Describing Last Days
BY WILHELM HoHENzoLLERN

BY WILHELM HOHENZoLLERN
A few days after August s, 1918,
summoned Crown Council, in order
TO get a clear conception of the stu
alton and to draw therefrom the nee
essary conclusions upon which to base
the policy to be followed by Count
Hertling. The Chief Military Com
mand approved the idea that the I'M
perial Chancellor should keep in sight
the possibility of getting into closer
touch with the enemy, but laid stress
on the necessity of first occupying the
Siegfried Line and there thoroughly
beating off the foe, and on the fact
that negotiations must not begin be-
fore this occurred. Thereupon / direct
ed that the Chancellor get into COM
munlcation with neutral power-the
Netherlands-in order to ascertain
whether it was ready to undertake
such step toward mediation.
What rendered the contemplated &C
lion through Dutch channels very diff
cult was that Austria could not be
brought to definite agreement, but
continually postponed the declaration
which had been requested of her. Even
verbal agreement given to me by the
Emperor Charles was afterward brok.
en- by him under Burian's influence.
The Dutch government had already
been informed by me and had signified
its readiness to act. Meanwhile, Aus
tria, without notifying US, made her
first seperate peace offer, which set
the ball rolling. The Emperor Charles
had indeed got into touch secretly with
the Entente and had long since re.
solved to abandon US. He acted &C
cording to the plan which he had ex
planned thus to his encourage: When
| go TO the Germans, | agree to every
thing they say, and when l return
home, do whatever | please"
Thus it happened that my govern
ment and | were constantly deceived
by actions in Vienna, without being
able to do anything against it, since
from there we constantly received the
hint: IF you make things hard fol
US, we shall leave you in the lurch
in other words, our army will no long
er fight by your side" In view OF
our situation, such action on Austria :
part had to be avoided in any way
possible, both on military and political
grounds
The detection of Hungary and Aus
tria brought a crisis upon US. Had
kept Vi LIE
nerves for three weeks longer, many
things would have turned out different
ly But Andrassy-as he himself ad
mitted- had been negotiating for a
long time in Switzerland, behind oul
backs, with the Entente. Thus EN-
peror Charles believed that he would
assure himself of good treatment al
the hands of the Entente.
ottr foiII1ra of Cen
eral Ludenorff had declared that he
could no longer guarantee a military
victory. Therefore, the preparation Of
peace negotiations was necessary
Since diplomacy had not succeeded in
initiating any promising negotiations
and the military situation had become
even worse in the meantime. on &C
count of revolutionary agitation, Lud
endorff, on the Goth of September, de
manded that preparations be made for
an armistice instead of for peace ne
gotiations.
Moment for Abdication
At this critical time a strong move
ment began at home in favor of set
ting up a new government for the now
necessary termination of the war.
could not ignore this movement, sincf
the old government, during the sever
weeks from August s to the end o
September, had not managed to in
itiate peace negotiations offering an.
hope of success.
Meanwhile, General Won Gallwitz ant
General Won Mudra, summoned from
the front, appeared before me. The.
gave a picture of the inner situation
of the army, laying due emphasis upol
the great number of shirkers behint
the front, the frequency of insubordin
alton, the displaying of the red fla!
upon trains filled with soldiers return
ing from furloughs at home and othe
similar phenomena.
The two generals considered tina
the principal cause of the bad condi
tions was to be sought in the unfavor
able influence exerted upon the sol
dfers by the spirit predominating be
hind the front and in the general de
sire for ending the fighting and gel
ting peace, which was spreading fron
the homeland along the lines of com
munication behind the front and wa
already becoming noticeable eve
among some of the troops at tn
front itself. The generals advance
the opinion that, owing to these rea:
ons, the army must Immediately
Withdrawn behind the Antwerp-Meus
line
On that same day | commando
Field Marshall Won Hindenburg by tie
ephone 10 effect as soon as possibl
the retreat to the Antwerp-Meus
line The falling back of the tireC
but nowhere decisively beaten arm,