New-York tribune., 1922-07-02


point Of view. no.
The Chairman-was It's personnel
adequate
Admiral Benson-No.
The Chairman-Were all the ships
ready
Admiral Benson-They were ready
as far As-no, they were not all
The chairman-were they fully
manned.
Admiral Benson-Thsy were not
The Chairman-was the navy
mobilizedl
Admiral Benson-rt was not
The above testimony does not stand
alone. Many Of Mr.. Daniels's own wit
nesses were forced TO confess to tho
same effect.
Admiral Benson was Secretary
Daniels's star witness FOR the defense
and with reference 20 this testimony
the report Of tho Senate committee
before which IL was heard. says;
A few minutes after the presenta-
.ior Of the above testimony tho tabu
lntiors were introduced, showing tnat
on Aprn 6. 1917, about two-thirds OF
tho vessels Of the feet required
material repairs essential for war
service" amounting 70 an average OF
ef,v-six DAYS per vessel, and that
nearly nine-tonths Of the feet was
incompletcly manned. having on the
average but 81 per cent OF their war
I.r .rA
.arv demonstrated violently IN spite
of the fact that the detailed figures
used in the compilation came from
the Navy Department itself.
The evidence refers not 20 May. 1913
bu. 20 April, 1917, two years after the
sinking Of the Lusitania. Can 1t be
that the hustle Of naval activity that
Mr. Daniels describes was imaginary :
II can; II was.
ooh" said Admiral Mexican, one OF
Secretary Daniels's assistants IN the
Navy Department. ~ do not think that
the Secretary or ever said Preparing
the country for war;
But this attitude was not common 70
the majority Of our naval officers. Ad-
miral Fiske was forced {" resign as
aid for naval operations because he
insisted upon preparedness. As Admi-
raj Fullam stated:
: wish 20 testify 10 the high char
acter. zeal and ability Of all Of these
officers and 70 the belief that every
one OF them wished 20 prepare the
navy for war and did their best 20
thnt end. But their hands were tied.
They were helpless. for the simple
reason that il was not the policy OF
the Navy Department 10 actively
prepare or even encourage prepara-
tions for war during the years De-
tween 1913 and March, 1917. As
result Of this policy Of indifference
the navy WAS not ready for war IN
anv ct-organization. material
or porsonncl. This was not the fault
OF naval officers or chiefs OF bureaus
They all did their duty.
As regards the cumbersome system
Of naval aides" which Mr.. Daniels
abolished. the reference is, OF course
70 tho organization recommended by
tho Mehan- Moody Commission. Not
oven one OF NJ. Danicls's own wit
nesses supported him in this view
roscphus Daniels is the only man VINO
agreed with the Secretary Of the Navy
on that point. Admiral Mayo said
Quoting from the report OF the senate
In my opinion, the faulty orga MA "a
.ion Of the Navy Department ana 'ne
absence Of definite foreign policy'
except that Of strict nou,raHty' "cl'
tho urinary causes Of failure 70 pre-
parc the entire navy for war,
After definite policies ana pIahs
vcrc definitely settled upon. aitei
money was appropriated, and after
tho bureaus voluntarily co-ordinatcn
with the Chief Of Naval Operations;
the work was pushed with energy ana
vicor The accomplishments were
excellont. Bat our delay in prepara-
lion did no doubt delay our assist
ance 10 the Allies az critical time
and IL such conditions regarding our
preparation for war exist IN the iu-
ture, may result in disaster
The report Of the Senate committee
after quoting this. goes on 20 say;
This resulted in Admiral Mayo be-
ING asked 10 submit n detailed writ
ton statement on the organization OF
tho navy and similar statements were
sough. and obtained from the former
Assistant Secretary Of the Navy.
Hon. Franklin u. Roosevelt and
many officers. To review and com
pare and 20 draw detailed doduc-
tions from these very interesting and
diversified statements would be
very lengthy matter and outside OF
the scope o. this report. l. may be
sad, however, that almost all OF
these statements on TIE organization
Of the navy pointed 20 serious
faults Of n more or less fundamental
nature. On the other hand. many
quite different points Of view were
expressed as 10 the remedial steps 10
be takcn.
From this Il would appear that one
o. the most important lessons Of the
war is that the organization of the
navy is not a. good as II reasonably
night be and that a careful investi-
CATION into this whole subject should
be made.
We therefore recommend that
commission be appointed by the Presi-
dent TO consider the question Of the
organization Of the Navy Depart
ment and the changes recommended
by officers OF tho navy In tho course
OF thls !nvss.. .gatioA esd 10 recon
mend 70 tho Congress eaeh changes,
II any. IN the Ssid organization as II
shall deem advisable,
We further recommend that the