The Washington herald., 1922-01-22

and presses as the expression OF in
ternational idealism and moral ele-
walton.
The Frenchman on the ether
hand sees British policy from the
other angle. He sees that IL he
does the things which Great
Britain requires Of him Britain will
proht. Germany will gain, and he
will unquestionably lose both d.
rectly and indirectly. He per-
ceives that Great Britain was will
ing to discuss the subject of an
alliance With France only when
France had successfully main
tained in Washington the right to
preserve both its army and it's
navy at a strength fixed by French
statesmen. He perceives that the
submarine issue in Washington led
to the offer of alliance in Cannes.
and he perceives with equal clarity
that no alliance was offered during
all the period between the Paris
conference and the present gath
ering at Washington when France
was making concessions.
America suffers.
Now the question = which must
come TO every American mind is:
What have We TO do with all this
mess? The United States would
be advantaged, materially advan-
tagged. IL the markets of Europe
were restored. Our chief difficulty
now grows put of the inability of
Europe to buy from us those
things which we produce in guam
titles adequate for export Those
who produce cotton, wheat. cattle
and a variety Of other things in
| the United States cannot dispose
| OF them and they suffer as a con-
sequence. And this suffering will
continue until Europe regains its
old purchasing power, thing
which cannot happen until eco
nomic order follows political pros
tration.
But what can the United States
do to promote economic order In
| Europe? This is the question
which must be faced and answered
before we send representatives to
Genoa IL We shall decide to send
such representatives. There is a
wholly mistaken idea in this coun-
try and even in Congress that the
United States can dictate policies
for European application by reso-
lutions put through the Senate or
the House. There is an idea that
because Europe owes US large sums
we can dictate to those European
| countries which are our debtors
how large shall be their armies,
and what the character and extent
| of their navies. The truth, OF
course, is that unless We mean TO
use our ships and our armies TO
| collect the debts owed us - Eu-
rope we have no power whatever
| in the premises. And the only
reason we are today treated with
consideration even when we resort
to these resolutions is the hope
and expectation in Europe that we
will ultimately consent to cancel
European debts.
Cannes IL Dilemma.
II is a fact that Congress has
NOT the smallest intention OF can
| ceiling these debts. II is a fact
that the people of the United
States in their present temper
would rise in indignant protest II
Congress should undertake TO per
init such a cancellation. But II Is
no less true that IL we go 70
! Genoa or anywhere else and seek
|
| or Italy or even upon smaller
| states while insisting upon the
PAYMENT by these states of what
| thew owe us we shall accomplish
nothing, Our presence at Genoa
will mean to every European coun-
try a portent of debt cancellation
unless we expressly exclude thls
question from the agenda, ana u
We do exclude it our presence VIII
have little significance and our rep
resentatives only nominal IN
| fluence.
Those best Informed in our pres
o,t national administration believe
that tn. coming OF Poincare TO power
"a a good thing. They believe tha'
poincsre will adopt etreme measures
seward Germany and these measures
,,iII fail and that. following the fali-
mr. Of Poincare. France will turn 10
wore reasonable leaders and orlns
herself into line with American ana
Rritish idea. about the German rep
\ q srations. This Is obviously possiole'
narbans IL is likely. On the other
hand a is by no means impossioie
that France feeling that Germany can
nav at least a part, a larger part than
she means to nay. will resort to use
81 that force which lies In her hanos
and can be exerted without let or
hindrance on the part OF Europe or
m. rest of the world. And IL France
docs that, then the economic restora-
tion SO essential in view OF British
necessities and Italian interests VIII
he long postponed IL not actually pre-
vented.
Mistake Material for Moral.
In dealing with France both the
United states and Great Britain seem
70 me to make the essential mistake
of regarding their material interests
ss moral factors and Of expecting the
French to take a similar view. The
real trouble lies in the fact that
mutual confidence was destroyed al
Paris as a consequence OF the re1ec-
tion by the United States Of the Paris
agreement. We pledged ourselves to
give France an alliance Of protecuon
and France abandoned her claims TO
the Rhine. Then we repudisted our
promise and left France bound by
hers. Again and again since then
French claims in regard to repara-
tions have received the sanction and
Endorsement OF European conferences,
but no sooner has France settled
down to the belief that she had at
last reached the minimum of what
she could expect from Germany than
her associates have started out with
new campaign further to reduce
this reperation figure. And the result
has been the successive crash OF the
several prime ministers who have
guided French politics and without
exception have sought TO preserve