, 1922-12-17

TO whether they should 20 Or stay.
The Turks could probably have done
to them in March. 1921. jus. whn,
they DID later to ths Greeks. The
Italian problem was 10 withdraw with
as much dignity As night be. and 70
gain some material eompensau3a II
possible.
The secret Turkish-Italian treaty
signed In London in March u LIS,
year has not been published. ~. its
man details are fairly common know
ledge. Il Is Thoroughly sordid. Italy
agreed to get out Of Turkey and to
help Turkey regain Smyrna ard
ra-ace. n provision by no means Ills.
agreeable. inc they must b. taken
from h strong new Greece. There
were also arrangements for conces-
sions and for the joint operation OF
Turkish n Italian capital in de-
veioping certain Of the Otto
man empire. AS n result Italy left
NNN GAAA7N1n AAANAAAAtr IN AQaAlA at
the mercy OF the Turks and left be-
hind. incidentally. important stores OF
ammunition. Thus KemaI and his
associates disposed OF one enemy and
were the stronger In facing France.
"clicia hnd fallen to France as her
sphere under the sevres treaty, and
the position OF the French army there
was not unlike the position OF the
Italian in Adalia. hi ground could
not be held without fighting. and
Franco had no stomach for n Turkish
war. Germany seemed to her the
most formidable enemy. and she con-
centrated her military On
the Rhine. Like Italy. she was glad
to withdraw from Asia Minor on
terms which would not greatly impair
Aer prestige. She. too. signed a treaty.
with tho Kemnlist government in
March OF last year. the treaty OF An.
CORA; and its terms. too, are secret.
but are fairly well known. France re.
tained certain concessions in cilicia
and in other districts. but withdrew
her forces N agreed not to fight the
Turks further.
Thus France n Italy broke up the
Entente. They ceased to cooperate
with Great Britain. They dlsregarded
the pact of London, wherein they had
agreed to make no separate peace
with an enemy. The ymade separate
treaties with Turkey. still an enemy.
Now tho Turks were ready for
Greece. It may not be amiss for me
to say at this juncture that / fore
warned Venizetos. during the Versa.
lilies conference. OF what was to come.
and set down hat conversation pretty
fully in my book. Can in a Lifetime"
1 told him then that the Greeks were
mistaken in posting an army In smy-
rna; that the new Turkish leaders at.
tached great Importance to this port.
slnce they had lost their other ports
on the Mediterranean. and that l felt
certain they would fight for 1t. I re-
minded him that even then the Turks
had forbidden their own people to en-
poly Crooks and had insisted that
American firms should not use Greek
workmen to collect the ~Ilcorice root;
and 1 told him that, aside from the
difficulty Of governing Smyrna from
Athens with Co~nstantinople between
them, his people could I'll afford the
heavy burden of a war with Turkey.
"venizelos listened patiently to me
and admitted that he had acted too
hastily. but said hat to withdraw
would admit military. and court po-
litlcal defeat. He said that the mon
archists were plotting constantly
against him; and 1 gathered from
other things he said hat the pressure
OF Greek financiers had compelled him
to make his demands for Smyrna and
Thraco as well as to attempt to carry
out the occupation of those districts.
THE CONFLICT came. as I had fore
seen. but its outcome was more fate
full than n one could nave guessed.
When the French Withdrew from
cilicia they left behind large ammuni-
ton dumps and Quantities of machine
guns. with other material of war.
These, with the supplies obtained