Every evening, Wilmington daily commercial., 1922-01-21

~ N'SAi pnHsHt WIS HlWONt pre-
cipltated, as will be seen in tho re-
marks OF Lloyd George tsecret min
utes).
ADMIRAL BENSON pointed out
that any decision. except 10 sink the
ships, meant an increase OF arma-
ments.
Mr.. LLOYD GEORGE said no
could give Admiral Benson his pro-
posal Tor stopping the increase OF
armaments. and even bring about a
decrease, but he doubted IL the Ad-
niSal would accept ~. CThe pro-
posal nm American Admiral would
hnd unacceptable meant probebly a
proposal for reduction, keeping 10
existing proportions) The British
Government did not want these
ships and were ready to discuss
even the decrease or navies. pro-
yided oil would agree This. how
ever, was very big question.
He fully agreed that the French po-
sition in this matter ought 10 be
considered His idea was fha.
France should have some OF these
ships, and sink n corresponding
number OF old ships. or. II unwilling
to sink them, she might break them
up, which Admiral Hope told him
would be business proposition.
The French Position.
President Wilson then asked the
reason for the French objection to
the destruction Of the ships and
Admiral lie Bon replied:
ADMIRAL LIE BON said the req
son was. first. that by sinking the
SHIPS valuable property would be
DESTROYED and there would be an
increase in the general losses OF tho
war French public opinion was
strongly against this. A more espe-
clai reason was. however, that II tina
SHIPS were divided among the allied
ana associated powers IL would
mako considerable addition IN
the peace strength of thu French
Navy. During Ave years, owing 10
mo immense efforts OF French in
dustries In supplying the armies. u
ned NOT been possible to cornpIets
any capital ships. These srips
would be very useful TO show tbe
French flag and spread the national
influence In the world Franco,
naval strength vas greatly reduced.
especially as compared With o.h~y
nations. For no a1gres~fv. desires
of any kind, France did not want "a
lose this opportunity for repairing
her losses.
The result was possponeren, OF
the question OF disposal. which ua.
virtual victory OF the principIe n,
distribution as supported by the
French.
But the problem wa, strangely
taken out OF the hands OF the Peace
Conference and settled in another
way. On June ri the Germans who
still manned the ships at Scspa
Flow, by concerted action, them
selves opened the seacocks and sunk
most OF their own ships in the har-
Dor. The disposal OF those that re-
mained was a matter OF little con-
Germ. Lloyd George offered them
all to France to restrain Clemenceau
from making this and other incl
dents the occasion for new resor,
to force. They might make good
Frances naval war losses. bur all
prospect was destroyed OF consider
ably adding 70 her naval armament.
Thus II was the act Of the German,
in scuttling their ships. rather than
the decisions of the Peace Confer
ence. that prevented a considerable
increase. rather than a limita ton OF
naval armaments on the part OF the
allied powers. But GERMANY was
disarmed on sea, although not as
completely as on land. The treaty
allows her six battleships and six
light cruisers. with twelve Destroy
ers and twelve torpedo boats. These
have obviously no connection with
the maintenance OF internal order.
and can be intended only for ma
tional defense. Furthermore. Ger
many is allowed. under Article 1es.
10 retain all works of coast defense
not bearing the character of Offer
sive bases or menacing to the mas
sage into the Baltic. When Lansing
opposed the destruction of these
Lloyd George supported his argu-
ment of Germany's right 10 defend
herself.
Why did not the British exert
themselves to strip Germany on the
naval side as the French did on the
land side? It is probable that they
did not want TO lay her defenseless
TO France by sea. They no longer
feared Germany on the water. The
instruments of naval warfare cam
not be so readily improvised as
those Of land warfare. England
could feel sure of her superiority
on her element. but she had done
enough for France in giving her Sc
curity by land. The fleet left to
Germany was no menace to France.
but, together with the coast de-
lenses. might restrain her from
dominating Germany by sea. II anv
one was to do that, 1t must be
England.
But, II little actual progress was
made al the Peace Conference in
the matter of limiting naval arrna-
ment, the door was kept open for
future investigation and discussion
as in the case OF limitation OF land
armament, by the provision of
Articles VIII and TX OF the Cove
nant. While the only specific men
ton of naval armament in Article
VII Is the final clause providing for
publicity C'exchange OF full and
frank information as 10 the scale of
their armaments') regarding naval
as well as military programs. yet il
must be understood that the event.
ual limitation is intended to apply
to navies as well as armies. and the
permanent commission appointed al
the Rome meeting OF the Council In
May, 1920. was directed to make in
luiries regarding both naval and