The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1922-01-08

ish that alliance. When 1t was
framed Mr.. Hughes asked and the
British and Japanese agreed that
France should be admitted to the
agreement. but France was invited
to enter an arrangement already
almost, IL not wholly, completed,
and as an act of favor. not as a
question OF right. This was an
error, arousing French resentment
but in no sense determining French
action.
French "CardD Gains Value.
Still the French perceived that
while Great Britain and the United
States had both refused France an
alliance TO cover her in Europe.
they had now agreed to give Japan
something in Asiatic waters, which
at least was to take the place of a
definite treaty OF alliance. because
both wished to get rid Of something
that Japan possessed. namely. the
Anglo-Japanese alliance. Thus an
even greater value was added to the
French card, which was the sub
marine.
When the four-power treaty was
out OF the way the naval ratios
question came up seriously and Mr..
Hughes was astounded to encounter
a French demand for an allotment
Of ten battleships. He had treated
France and Italy with singularly
little consideration both while the
four-power treaty was going on
and later when the question Of
naval ratio was discussed between
Japan, Great Britain and the Ueitsd
States. He had waited until these
three powers had agreed and thsn
served notice upon the French and,
tne feaiians O Wnxe-enese Shfe9
great powers believed the two
smaller nations should have.
But the French battleship pro-
posal was not serious. Mr.. Hughes
had announced that the strength
allotted to the three larger nations
In submarines and light cruisers
should be based upon their strength
in capital ships. and France, seek
ing to establish a claim for many
submarines and light cruisers. had
merely put in the ten battleship
proposal to get high rating in the
other branches. She didn't want
ten battleships, but she emphat-
ically did want a ten-battleship
ratio in submarines and in cruisers.
Having brushed aside the French
battleship claim. which was merely
formal. Mr.. Hughes now proceeded
to make the one really fatal blum
der. Our naval advisers had recon-
mended that the submarine should
be a real element in our defensive
system. and Mr.. Hughes had adopted
their view in his opening speech on
November IL. Our advisory COM
mittee. appointed to assist our dele
gates in the conference. had by a
unanimous vote adopted a report
strongly supporting the submarine
item in the American defense list
In a word. America had declared for
the submarine in large doses and
on American arguments.
Lost Situation Control.
At the very outset Mr.. Balfour
had asked on British behalf and for
obvious British reasons that the
submarine be banned, and under
the British argument Mr.. Hughes
weakened, began to give ground.
proposed great reductions in the
submarine strength and leaned
toward the absolute British position
that the submarine should be abol-
ished. At this point he lost all
control of the situation. Hence
forth he had no influence with the
French. and could have none.
From the French point of view
the United States had declared for
the submarine and asked for a
strength of 10000 tons. France had
employed the American arguments
in defending the submarine and.
while waving her claims on the
battleship matter. had asked for a
similar strength in submarines. But
Mr.. Hughes. succumbing to British
argument. had shifted his ground,
abandoned the submarine and stood
with the British in antagonism to
the French position.
What followed was inevitable.
The French had reserved their
rights in submarines as a weapon
in their European debate with the
British. They had no intention of
building submarines. but they did
mean to use their power to build
submarines as a card in their
reckonings with the British. They
had based their case on the state
ments to Mr.. Hughes. the argu-
ments of our naval advisors and
the report Of our advisory commit
tee. But Mr.. Hughes had strapped
all these and gone over to the
British horse. foot and dragon.
Thus the French perceived that
they had been outmaneuvered: that
they had now to choose between in
viting American disapproval and
surendering their best card in
their British affair. The French
people for their part now saw the
conference as become a wholly
British affair. They saw American
newspapers full OF British propa-
ganda denouncing France and they
saw that II they gave up the sub
marine they would not get an alli-
ance IN return. even the sort of tslli-
ance Japan got as a substitute for
the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and
when they came to face Britain in
Europe they would be poorer by
the loss of their best card
You had then something like
Continued ON pnoe Tbrrc