The Washington times., 1922-09-25
PEACE TREATY
MOST IRELAND
COULD OBTAIN
Collins Satisfied Failure Would
Have Attended Demands for
Greater Concessions.

"N'eoct SOuWS OOOh oOtctU JO ITO
historic interest, lOithout prejudice
for or against either side of the
conflicting Irish elements.
Its historic interest lies in the
fact that Mr.. Collins 1orOte ten
articles for The Washington Times,
already published, and intended to
write book, bat finding himself
too preOccupied as head of the pro-
Visional Irish government to do the
book, he took Mr.. Talbot Nth him
in his travels so that the book could
be compiled from his otOa notes.
His untimety death makes this the
only official narrative that can be
published as michael Collins Olon
Story"
Copyright. 1922. New York Americsn.)
Chapter Is, Section 2.
Continuing his statement to me
analyzing the conditions that led
TO the signing Of the peace treaty
with England, Michael Collins said:
Our acceptance of the truce, our
consenting TO negotiate-yes, and in
the same sense. our signing of the
"
existed the element of duress.
Had we been able to do tive
should have whipped England deci.
sively-and then the treaty negotia
tions would have been conducted
in Dublin, and we should have been
n conqueror nation, announcing
terms of surrender TO a vanquished
foe. The only rea son that did not
happen was because we could not
make 1t happen! What good end is
to be served by pretending other.
wise?
No Personal Duress.
Il dwell on this point because
in many quarters this charge of
duress has been interpreted to
mean that we plenipotentiaries were
subjected to personal duress OF
course. this is nonsense. Obviously
there was not, and could not have
been any personal duress.
But the unfortunate impression
that individual members of our
delegation were directly threatened
has found Judgment in the minds
of men not conversant with the
fundamental rules OF conduct of
negotiations between two sove-
reign states.
"Of frankness there was plenty.
Plain speaking was TO our liking.
And there was little of subtlety
and drawing of fine distinctions.
Meantime. however, the weeks
dragged along. and we could see
small chance OF arriving at any
possible agreement.
Time after time-duly reported
in the world press-we adjourned
the conference, and went back to
our colleagues in Dublin-with
nothing that was encouraging to
report.
Document No. =.
1T was during the first OF these
return visits that DeValera brought
forward the first rough draft Of
what later came 10 be the 'Mysteri.
Gus Document No. q Its right
TO the title lay in the fact that
IL was not of DeValeras Compos
ition.
Put forward by him as his
alternative to the proposed treaty.
1t was. In fact, the work OF Frs
kline Childers. had little diff
Guilty in guessing the identity Of
the author as soon as | read IT.
Domin ionism tinged every line Of
this production. No lrishman who
understood the tradition and the
history Of ireland would have
thought or written of his country s
aspirations in the terms used in
this document.
Under the terms of this doCu'
ment. ireland, by our own free
offer, was to be represented at the
imperial conference. Thus our
status would have been taken from
n constitutional resolution passed
at an imperial conference.
Compromise Fails.
'It was quite clear that the
outlook Of the author OF the doCu'
ment was bounded entirely by the
BUT DE VALERA WAS INSIST
ENT THAT WE CARRY THE AL
TERNATIVE PROPOSAL BACK
TO LONDON AND THERE SUB
NIT 1T AS OUR IRREDUCIBLE
MINIMUM!
I'VE did so. The English dele.
gates turned II down flatly.
I'VE brought II back to Dublin.
and It was revised and amended
and again we took 1t TO Downing
street. Again it was turned down,
| And again we returned TO De
Valera with the twice.rejected docu
ment. But third time revisions
and amendments were made, and
third time we presented ourselves
in London with the Childers com
promise.
when Mr.. Lloyd George let us
understand that further repetitions
OF this kind could mean only the
final breaking up Of the conference
we shelved Document No. 2
shelved 1t for once and all, as we
thought But that was an error.
A Mother Country"
Meantime | had come to have
what / believed-and believe-was
clear understanding Of the basic
facts of the situation. And when
the opportunity arose made 1t
quite clear to the British represen'
tatives that my stand was different
from that Of the author of the
thrice-rejected proposals.
Il stated that Ireland was a
mother country, with the duties and
responsibilities and feelings and de-
votions OF a mother country. This
simple statement had more effect
on the British delegates than all
the arguments about dominion sta