The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1922-02-20

Solution OF the financial pro
suits of the coming internationa
ference will be held in the king.
portunity to express Frances POSI-
tion. He was given this opportu-
nifty on the ninth day of the con-
ference. The speech he made was
to the effect that France Is still
in fear and in danger from both
Germany and Russia and that for
that reason France could not con-
sent to consider the reduction OF
her army.
Refuses to Cut Army.
This was blow to the confer
ence, but america received 1t with
generous tolerance. There was no
feeling on the part of America
against France for DakJng this
portion of the conference a neces-
sary failure. We did not agree with
BRAND that France was in danger
or that she had Justification for her
fear, but we did agree that France
might nevertheless have this fear.
AS H. G. Wells expressed it, The
delegates said There, there to, NJ.
BRAND as soothingly as possible,
but did not really believe France Is
IN danger"
We accepted this blow to the con-
ference and continued to feel kind
ly. when some of the British said
unkind things about Brands
speech the American newspapers
defended BRAND. We took il for
granted that with land armament
dismissed from the agenda France.
n
willing to come along" and CO.
operate.
Obstructs Navy Program.
But when we came to the sub
ject which was the very heart of
the conference. namely the naval
holiday. America was startled and
dismayed to find that France was
disposed to be an obstructionist.
She claimed the right to build ten
capital ships of $4,000 tons each.
No one was more disturbed than
Mr.. Hughes. As he expressed IL,
with pointed irony. This confer
ence was called for the Limitation
of armament, not for the expan-
sion of armament" As Mr.. Hughes
further expressed it in a cable mes
sage to M. BRAND. The attitude OF
France will determine the success
or failure" of the conference.
Upon the receipt of this imperative
message from Mr.. Hughes, NJ.
BRAND backed down.
But upon the American partici-
pants in the conference. and upon
the American public generally, this
second action of Frances was re-
ceived with much less tolerance
than hnr first aaffnn N Iii No
consideration of land armament i'm
possible. 1t was this incident that
caused the beginning of hostile
feeling toward France on the part
of America. The motive uni
versally ascribed to the French for
their threat about capital ships was
that 1t was not in good faith. that
they did not have the money to builo
these capital ships. nor the inten-
ton to build them. but that they
made the threat as one sts toward
building up a trading Mint with
Great Britain through which, with
other things, they could cause Great
Britain to agree to make an alli-
ance with them as regards Eu-
ropean matters.
Motive is. of course, a field in
which IL is most difficult to be GER
tain. What a mans motives are is
a thing wholly within the bound
aries of his own skull. Neverthe-
less. the attributing of this motive
to the French was so universal, and
included such well-informed per-
sons. that 7 think We may take 1t
for granted that the motive was
there.
France In Secondary Role.
At the same time let us consider
what may be said for the French
in extenuation. The three big navy
nstions-Great Britain. America,
and Japan-were making an agree
ment which treated themselves as
the primary parties concerned. and
almost as il they were the only
parties concerned. They were as
signing to France a position in the
naval world which was low. 1t was
in class apart.
Now. II Is true that the existing
French navy is small, but from the
French point of view this smallness
of their present navy is temporary
and is due to conditions for which
France is entitled to sympathy. At
the beginning of the war France
ceased to build ships. All her avail
able man power was thrown on the
battlefront and into making NUM-
tions. Further. there was a kind of
informal understanding between
France and Great Britain to the eff
feet that France should exert all Of
her force on land and leave Great
Britain to take care % the sea. The
result was that while France stood
still or went backward in naval
h.
Britain and the United States and
Japan all greatly stimulated their
shipbuilding and came out of the
war in the primacy which at the
conference they adopted as some
thing fixed and permanent. These
facts need only to be stated to show
how France may have been reluc-
tant to consent to accept for the
future the naval status which she
now has.
Balks Submarine Issue.
The third point at which France
assumed the role Of trouble-maker
was when the submarine question
came up. The original Hughes plan
sanctioned the submarine and as
signed to Great Britain $4,000 tons,
to the United States the same, to
Japan $4,000 tons, and TO France the
amount OF submarine tonnage she
now has, which is about 10000 tons
But by the time the conference ac-
tually got around to considering the
submarine there had been a revul-
sion OF feeling. Great Britain had
announced that she wanted to go
further than the Hughes plan and
outlaw the submarine altogether. In
America. also, during the first six