The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1922-10-21

inspection, from what 1t was repre-
sented as being.
First, Chamberlain brought letter
with him from the English Premier,
/ Salisbury, TO Bullow, in which the Eng
/ fish Prime Minister declared that
| Chamberlain was dealing on his own
account only, that the English Cabinet
was not behind him. This, to be sure,
might have meant the adoption of a
course that was automatically permits
sible, giving the English Cabinet, a
free hand; but it turned out later, be
1T remarked, that the Liberal group in
England was at that time hostile to a
German-English alliance.
Nevertheless, in view of the fact
that there was a possibility that the
course adopted was a mere diplomatic
formality = that Chamberlain might
have been sent on ahead and complete
freedom of action retained for the
English Cabinet, which is a favorite
method in London-Prince Bullow,
with my consent, went thoroughly in
to the matter with Chamberlain.
1t transpired then that the English
German alliance was aimed unques-
tionably against Russia. Chamberlain
spoke directly about war to be waged
later by England and Germany against
Russia. Prince Bullow, in full agree
ment with me, declined politely but
emphatically thus to disturb the peace
of Europe. In so doing he was but
following the example of the great
Chancellor, for Prince Bismarck coined
the phrase myself have heard it re-
peatedly in the Bismarck family cir
Gle: Germany must never become
England's dagger on the European
continent"
So we did nothing further at that
time than to go straight ahead with
our policy, viz: we refused all agree
ments which might lead to a war
which was not based directly on the
defense of our native soil The re-
fusal of the Chamberlain offer is
proof of the German love OF peace.
AS to France, we sought to bring
about an endurable state of affairs.
This was difficult, for in French eyes,
we were the arch-enemy and it was
impossible for US to acquiesce in the
demands inspired by the policy of re-
venge. We settled the Morocco quar-
rel peacefully; no man of standing in
Germany entertained the idea of war
on account of Morocco. For the sake
of peace we allowed France at that
time to encroach upon the essentially
legitimate interests of Germany in
Morocco, strengthened as the French
were by the agreement concluded Sc
cretly with England as to mutual COM
pensation in Egypt and Morocco.
In the Algeciras Conference the out
line of the great war was already WISH
BILE. 1t is assuredly not pleasant to
be forced to retreat politically, as we
did in the Morocco matter, but Ger
many's policy subordinated everything
to the great cause of preserving the
peace of the world.
We tried to attain this end by cour-
tesy, which was partially resented L
recall the journey of my mother, the
Empress Frederick, to Paris, We ex-
pected tolerably good reception since
she was an English Princess and went,
as an artist, to be the guest of French
art. Twice l visited the Empress Eu-
gen1e-once from the Aldershot at her
castle of Peterborough, the other time
aboard her yacht, in Norwegian wat
ers, near Bergen. This was a piece of
polltness that seemed to me perfectly
natural, seeing that l happened to be
very near her. When the French Gen
eral Bonnal was in Berlin with sew
eral Officers, these gentlemen dined
with the Second Infantry Regiment
was present and toasted the French
army-something that was still out of
the ordinary but was done with the
best intentions. l brought French fe-
male and male artists to Germany. ALL
this sort of thing, of course, was a tri-
fle in the great game of politics, but
1t at least showed our goodwill
With regard to Russia, l went to the |
utmost trouble. My letters, published |
in the meantime, were naturally never
sent without the knowledge of the |
Imperial Chancellors, but always in
agreement with them and largely at |
their desire. Russia would doutless |
never have got into war with Ger
many under Alexander III, for he was
reliable. Gar Nicholas was weak and I