The New York herald., 1922-11-06
Continued from First Page.

Senator'S that the President talked
most pacifically, as II inclined to
peace and that Ashurst was afraid
that he would commit the country 20
peace" so afraid that he wanted all
the pressure possible brought to bear
ON the President by other Senator'S.
At any rate, the note when it came
had no pacifism in 1t, and the Presi-
dent gained the unanimous approval
of the country and the Allies.
| It all was a week ago. Ger
many came 1ack with an acceptance
OF Oh. Pros 7cnt's terms-a super
at least-hence the
.ua. Oinet yesterday. This
was ug, "I do not know what
to do. j ust ask your advice. may
have made a mistake In not properly
safeguarding what said before. What
do you think should be done?"
| This general query was followed by
long silence, which ! broke by say
ing that Germany would do anything
he said.
what should I say?" he asked.
THAT we would not treat until Ger
many was across the Rhine"
This he thought impossible.
/ Then Others took a hand. Wilson
said the Allies should be consulted.
Houston thought there was no real re-
form inside Germany. McAdoo made
long talk favoring an armistice on
terms fixed by the military authorities.
Strangely enough, Burleson. who had
voted against all our stiff action over
the Lusitania and has pleaded for the
Germans steadily. was most belligerent
in his talk. He was ferocious-so
much so that thought he was trying
to make the President react against
any stiff note-for he knows the Presi-
dent well. and knows that any kind of
strong. bloodthlrsty talk drives him
into the cellar of pacifism.
One OF the things McAdoo said was
that we could not financially sustain
the war for two years. He was for an
armistice that would compel Germany
to keep the peace. military superiority
recognized by Germany. with Foch,
Haig, and Pershing right on top of
them all the time. Secretary Wilson
came back with his suggestion that
the Allies be consulted. Then Baker
wrote "A couple of pages outlining the
rform of such note suggesting an
armistice. / said that this should be
sent to our partners" in the war,
without giving 1t to the world. that
we were in a confidential relation to
France and England. that they were
in danger Of troubles at homo, possible
revolution. and II the President with
I 4 q Il IL.
armistice which they would not think
wise to grant, or which couldn't be
granted the sending Of such n mos
sage into the world would be coercing
them. The President said that they
needed to DO coerced, that they were
getting TO a point whore they were
reaching out for more than they should
have In justice. l pointed out the
position in which the President would
be IL he proposed an armistice which
they (the Allies) would not grant. lie
said that this would be left 90 their
military men, and they would prac-
tically decide the outcome Of the war
by the terms OF tho armistice, which
might include leaving all heavy guns
behind, and putting Metz, Strassburg
&c, I'm the hands OF the Allies until
peace was declared.
suggested that Germany might
not know what tho Presidents terms
were 70 courland. &C.. that this was
not Invaded territory He replied
that they evidently did. as they now
were considering methods OF getting
out OF the -Litovsk treaty. He
said ho was afraid OF Bolshevlsm In
Europe, and tho Kaiser was needed TO
keep II down--to keep some order. He
really seemed alarmed that the time
would some soon when there would be
no possibility OF saving Germany from
the Germans. This was new note
TO me.
lie asked Secretary Wilson IL the
press really represented the sentiment
of the country as 20 unconditional sur
render Wilson said ~ did He said
that the press was brutal In demand
ing all kinds OF punishment for the
Germans. including tho hanging OF the
Kaiser. At the end OF the meeting
which lasted nearly two hours. he
asked 10 be relieved OF departmental
matters as he was unable 70 think
1 longer. i wrote summary or the
position no took and read II after
Cabinet meeting to Houston and will
son, who agreed. II follows:
II they (the Allies) ask you (the
Presldent), "Are you satisfied that we
can get terms that will be satisfactory
10 us without unconditional surren-
der?'
You will answer. "Yes--through the
terms of the armisIce."
by an armistice can you make sure
that all the fourteen propositions will
be effectively sustained, so that mill
tarism and imperialism will chd7"
yes. because we Will be masters Of
tho situation and VIII remain In n 20
sition of 'supremacy Until Germany