The Washington times., 1922-09-22
BY HAYDEN TALBOT.
Copyright. 1899. New York American.
CHAPTER IL. Section 2.

Copyught, 1bEZ, New YORK American'
CHAPTER IL. Section ?.
Continuing his statement to me
concerning the negotiations with
Lloyd George and the British Gov
ernment. Michael Collins said:
What seemed to me TO be oui
chief concern was so to make out
moves that Britain would be oh
hged TO give us the maximum limit
OF freedom. And from the outset
was convinced that that maximum
limit would be lounded by associh
ton with the British Empire.
II anticipated what subsequently
turned to be the fact. Britain mus,
represent TO us that the Northeast
would never acquit see in more, whilt
representing to them that in sucf
settlement they would be pre-
serving that which they professec
10 have at heart, the sentimental III
with the nation to which they wer'
supposed to be attached.
I'm those preliminary confer
ences, a few OF US held that any
settlement which did not include the
possibility Of united Ireland
which was not predicated on the Nv
ing truth. THAT EVERY lR!Si
MAN IL FIRST AN lRlSHMAN
WITH RIGHTS THE SAME AZ
THOSE OF EVEF OTHER IRISH
MAN-would be unacceptable to US
Must Be United.
'It was not SO much the Partition
Act itself that mattered-it was ar
even more formidable legacy tha'
England would leave us, PARTl
TION OF VIEW. That is :here
and II has to be dealt with. 1t Il
for us, to whom union is an article
of our national faith, to deal witt
IL.
For the most part De Valera-a'
flrst-seemed to be in accord VIII
the views voiced by Griffith ant
me. As little by little Childer'
wormed his way into our councils
however. De Valera's attitude grad
ually changed.
From beginning to end Stack anc
Brugha were unqualif edly hostile tC
the whole idea OF entering into nego
tiations with England. Yet for
long time we had all been agreed or
the fundamental wisdom Of no coer
cion for Ulster. Likewise we were
one in our conviction that a dividet
Ireland could never be free Ireland
1T was-and. more's the pity. Il
still is-this serious internal prob
lem which led some Of us to argue
for the attainment Of the final steps
Of freedom by evolution rather thar
by force. II we could obtain sub
stant!al freedom by consenting Il
association with the British Empire
II would at least give us time tC
teach the northeast to revolve in the
Irish orbit and to get out OF the Orbit
OF Great Britain.
Valera's Attitude.
I'VE held that in acquiescing in q
peace which would admittedly in
volve some postponement OF oui
national sentiment-by agreeing tC
some association Of our Ir sh natior
with the British nations-we would
be going a long way toward meeting
the sentiment of the northeast in 1t:
supposed attachment to England.
Against these counsels the un
compromising Republ cans raised W
the objection that by consenting Il
bargain with England before sh'
recognized the republic, we should
be letting the republic down. Blu
de Valera himself pointed to the fac
that this was not an issue to b,
argued then.
Lloyd George had already mad,
II clear that no such recognition
would be granted. Furthermore, 1
was pointed out that were the Irist
republic a recognized fact. we SHOULD
hav TO use our resources TO coerc,
northeast Ulster into submission
None Of the conferees was prepared
TO snonsor such a course of action.
I'VE had long since concluded tina
coercion-even IL II succeeded-coulC
never have the lasting effects which
conversion on our side. and acqui
escence on theirs. would produce.
Strong Position.
Our position at this time. as 1
appeared to me. was one of create
strength than ever before in the his
tory Of Ireland under English rule
From the English viewpo.n
peace with Ireland had become ;
necessity to the British cab net. Al
ready Mr.. Lloyd George-in July
1921-rad made a peace Offering 4
De Valera. That offer had not beei
acceptable to the Irish people.
Referring to 1t, Mr.. Churchill, Il
Dundee, in September of the sam
year, had said:
"' this offer is put for
ward, not as the offer of a. part,
government confronted by a formid
able opposition and anxious to hnr
gain for the Irish vote, but with tn
united sanction OF both the his ori
parties in the State. and ind sed, al
parties. II is a national offer
Undoubtedly II was a national OF
for-representing English necessit,
to put herself right with world op II
ion. II had at last become essert:a
that England find a way Of peac
with Ireland ora good case TO
further and what unquestionabl