Atlanta tri-weekly journal. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1920-19??, 1922-02-16

ION the evening Of the oath, short.
ly after leaving Spa for Berlin, there
was brought to me the following
y proclamation already signed by the
field marshal which expressed the
views prevailing at general head
quarters on the third Wilson note. It
appeared essential that general head
quarters in its dealings with Berlin
should take up definite stand &c
the note in order to eliminate it's III
effects on the army. gram
to the army ran thus:
For the information Of all troops:
Wilson says in his answer that he is
ready to propose to his allies that
they should enter into armistice ne
gotiations, but that the apnistice
must render Germany so defenseless
that she cannot take up arms again.
He will only negotiate with Ger
many for peace If she concludes all
the demands of Americas allies as to
the internal constitutional arrange
ments Of Germany; otherwise, there
is no choice but unconditional sur.
render.
WILSON'S answer is demand for
unconditional surrender. 1t is thus
unacceptable to us soldiers. 1t
proves that our enemies desire for
our destruction, which let loose the
war in 1914, still exists undimin-
ished. It proves, further. that our
enemies use the phrase peace of JUS
tice' merely to deceive us and break
our resistance. Wilson's answer can
thus be nothing for us soldiers but
a challenge to continue our resist
ance with all our strength.
Z toe I'm
sacrifices will achieve the rupture OF
the German front, then they will be
ready for peace which will make the
future of our country safe for the
broad masses of our people.
"At the front, Oct. "a, 10 pm. "
Dismissed by Kaiser
This proclamation, which was
signed by Field Marshal Won linden
berg, was later signed by Luden-
dorff. It resulted in the kaiser's i'm
mediate orders for a special confer
ence, at which both Of these OFF,
Gals were dismissed from the i'm
perial German army.
Won Tirpitz, in his memoirs, laid
stress on the effect Of the Wilson
submarine notes. Ludendorff de-
clares in his book that the evil
son propaganda" that found root
in Berlin and finally grew there,
eventually convinced the German
people that it was not they them
selves, but the government and mil
itarism that thu United States was
warning against. This was tho seed
of dlssension that ruined German
morale at home.
Tirpitz declared that the begin
ming of the end came when, in an
swer to the presidents Sussex note,
1--WE showed the world that we were
going down before America
Probably the most enlightening
chapter of either book is that con-
tanning Tirpitzs contention that the
influence of the Wilson submarine
notes resulted in Japan's stronger
and more active alliance with the
allies. In this connection Won Tir-
pitz says:
'Only the transmitting to Germa-
ny of The threatening notes OF Rres-
ident Wilson. when he inveighed
against my submarine campaign
during the latter stages Of the war.
prevented Japan from coming to us
in a great Germap-Japanese alliance,
: which would have ended the war at
once"
The pvertures of the pope, in Au-
gust. 1p17, W ne rejected, aud again
the attention Of the world was ar
rest, by the mastery leadership Of
| the American president. C'o August
| Is, 1877, addressed the following
letter to the president with refer
eflce to the offers of peace made by
| Pope Plus:
The White House. Washing
ton, 16 August, 1917.
/ do not believe that the pro-
posals the pope has submitted
should lead us into a statement
as to the terms of peace beyond
that which the president has al
ready given expression to in his
address in the senate and in his
Russian note. In these two docu- =.