Evening star., 1922-02-19

CnaumOnC INlukS DeSdH u uuHt.
A quick survey of the situation dis
closed that among the hundred other
things needed were especially trained
officers, code and cipher experts,
chemists skilled In the development
Of secret inks and Interpreters to
cial material like propaganda dis
tributing balloons and supplies and
money for special purposes.
The work at the front in this
branch of the service is known ss
combat intelligence" and among a
few Of Its duties one found aerial
reconnaissance and photography.
radio interception, listening In sets"
for use on enemy telephone lines
sound-rangfng apparatus to deter
mfne the position of hostile guns.
raids made by daring patrols in
order to capture prisoners SO as to
learn their regiment or corps. and
skilled cross-examiners, men who
could elicit pieces Of information that
when made into a mosaic gave the
desired picture. Not alone did (B-2)
play its part simply as it related
to our forces. It rendered valuable
aid to the allies and contributed to
the store Of Information which very
materially guided Gen. Foch in max
ing his decisions. It has been mat
ter OF speculation and wonder to
many Just how it was that Gen. Foch
knew when and where to strike his
decisive blows. It was through the
intelligence section of the allied
armies that he was supplied with
the information. A case in point
was describ ID by Gen. Churchhill, who
said:
1.-THE allied Intelligence service had
known for two weeks that the Ger
mans were planning an attack in
Champagne. with Chalons-sur- Marne
as their objective. If it had been
successful the whole allied line would
have crumbled. On the afternoon Of
July II. 1918. additional information
brought by scouts and aerial OBJ
servers indicated that the zero hour
(time Of attack) was approaching.
In the evening Gen. Foch ordered a
raid, which procured the last item Of
information-the German attack was
to be launched at midnight. Nine
picked German divisions struck and
failed to overwhelm three French and
one American division, because the
allies knew exactly what was going
to happen and when it was going to
happen. This German check was
Gen. Foch's opportunity, the oppor-
| tunity Of the civilized world. On the
: 18th he began the offensive which
brought Germany to her knees. With
Chalons- sur -Marne lost victory would
have been impossible. Allied military
! intelligence saved Chalons and gave
Foch his chance"
In the early days Of United States
participation in the war on the west
erp front (G-2) scored a signal sue
cess. A partly trained division had
been contemptuously referred to by
the German high command as an un-
organized mob of amateur fighters.
The German officers, in order to sur
prise and strike terror to the hearts
of the Americans, ordered that one OF
their famous shock battalions. known
/ as a "traveling circus" be placed op-
posite the partly trained soldiers. A
non on-commissioned officer but lately
| trained to the work was on duty at
listening post and by means Of a
"listenins-in SET managed to inter.
| cent some phrases that to him were
most Suspicious. This information
combined with other details secured
BY intelligence patrols and observers
| convinced the regimental intelligence
omcer that the travelling circus" had
r,anned its attack for midnight