New-York tribune., 1922-10-29

political representatives Of tho French,
British, Italian and American govern
mcnts. with permanent staff OF mill
tary advisers. Such body was, per-
haps, we'll enough in it's way. IT
could plan and discuss, but 1t could
not insure unifcation on the battle
fronts. The Allied political leaders
were not yet ready sor a generalis-
simo. As substitute an Executive
War Board was attached to the War
Council. Foch was its chairman. The
three other members were Cadorna,
for Italy; Bliss, for the United States,
and Wilson. for Great Britain. This
war board was to have the right to
demand from each commander In chief
IN the feld certain number Of d.
visions. to be placed In a strategical
reserve. The uss Of this reserve was
to be controlled by the board and not
by the commanders.
Here was the same old defect of
divided authority. Haig and PAtain. in
fact, never contributed any divisions
to the strategical reserve. They made
an arrangement Of their own---a very
defective one-by which each would
! give a certain support to the other If
attacked. They practically nulliAed
the war boards plans for the employ
ment Of strategical reserve. The
Supreme Council then backed away. It
voted to reduce the reserve to shadow.
Foch then demanded the establishment
OF supreme command, with an inter-
| Allied staff. "He was heavily snubbed," )"
as Captain Peter e. Wrighs reports in
his "At the Supreme War Council"
| Wright was one Of It's secretaries.
"Clemenceau forbade Foch to argue
with Haig about his refusal to con.
tribute to the General Reserve. But
on March 10, before the Supreme War
Council separated, Foch, with his own
terrible and leonine vehemence Of
speech. warned the dismayed leaders Of
the alliance Of the coming disaster if
they persisted in divided command and
scattered reserves. This was six days
before the battle {the Germans break
through at st. Quentin)."
Why Supreme Power Was
Given to Marshal Foch
| The summoning Of Foch to the su-
preme command was due to Ludendorff
more than to anybody else. He smashed
the British Fifth Army and shattered
the Allies lines in the west The AL
He'd War Council was panic-stricken.
| Haig felt unequal to holding Amiens.
He telegraphed to Lloyd George on
| March "a to come over to France and
arrange for a single commander. The
Prime Minister sent Lord Miner In his
stead, and at Doulens, on March 2e,
Miner and Clemenceau picked Foch.
Captain Wright testihess
"When Clcmenceau took Foch aside
and offered him tho supreme command
he said to him, remembering the scene
in London a fortnight before: you
have now got the place you wanted
"Foch answered angrily: What do
you mean, Prime Minister? You give
me lost battle and you ask me. TO win
it. consent, and you think you are
making me present. l am disregard
Ing myself entirely when accept It.
"If his success In supreme command
gives the measure Of his genius his &C.
ceptance of 1t gives the measure Of his
magnanimity."
What does this leave Of Lloyd
Georges claim that he brought about a
result which was really forced on him
by the St. Quentin disaster?
Haig never got along with Lloyd
George. The latter had no confidence
in Haig's generalship. Yet he was
afraid to replace Haig. He was also re-
luctant to reinforce him in the winter
| Of 1918, when the British front in
France was being extended and the
| fighting lines were being thlnned. Haig
had to reduce the hattaliens In many
o. his divisions because he was SO short
Of requirements.
Campaign in Palestine
! Fascinated Lloyd George
/
| If Lloyd George had systematically
reinforced Haig in the winter Of 1918
he would not have had to make 8
scapegoat Of Cough and the Fifth
Army. But at that time he had his
mind fixed, 80 far as military policy
was concerned, on the Palestine cam
paign. Palestine fascinated him. He
sent British troops there, only to have
to withdraw them when the Luden
dorR drives began. He insisted In thu
| winter meetings Of the Supreme Wal
Council on great offensive FOL
Damascus, to begin in the spring. HI
| believed that the war could be endet
by striking down Turkey, the least
formidable enemy. He was an ex'
treme Fastener. But he didn't realize
that the real detectives Of the Eastern
school Of strategy were not Damascus
and Aleppo, but Constan.inopls and
/ the Danube.
| The Palestine campaign fitted in with
British imperial interests. It was a
helpful "side-show"--sspecially since
IL could be conducted almost exclu-
sively by Indian troops, not available
for use In Europe
1 NJ - a