The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1922-01-24

|
ton, the army nucleus, about which can be built
ron short order sizable and efficient fighting
force Now this organization is threatened with
reduction and, the Kansas City Star points out
"Whoevcr is familiar with the history Of the mill
tary policy of the United States must view with
misgivings the determined efforts being made in
congress to reduce the regular army to a mere
police force"
This policy says the Star, opposed to every
lesson the nation has learned in war; has been
followed so often and at such cost that it seems
uncomfortable that Congress will repeat the folly.
"Washington's earnest plea for national
defense system based the lessons OF the Rcvolu-
ton was ignored and the Continental army
dlsoanded Eighty soldiers retained to guard
NStores, and as result before the formation
OF the Union it, was necessary to call the militia
into service to guard the frontiers.
How many Americans recall that in the
OF 1872 the government called $4,000 into
servicC All but $4,000 OF them were militia or
volunteers 1t was costly and ineffective army
and many OF its performances and lack OF per-
formance, we have preferred to forget But the
experience taught Congress nothing, and again
the coming OF peace the regular establishment
was reduced to 10000, with very imperfect staff
organization, and when in 1877, Gen. Jackson
called upon to subdue the Seminoles, "a miserable,
undisciplned bandtt of deluded Indians and fugi-
tive slaves, their whole strength when combined
not exceeding 1000 men (report of a Senate in
vestigating committee), force of nearly 1000
men had to be raised. 1t was on the result Of
this expedition that Gen. Emery Upton, whose
The Military Policy of the United States ought
to be more widely read by Americans, including
Representatives wrote: :. the greatest dangers
to which liberties have thus far been exposed
have occurred in time of war, not through the
presence, but for the want of a sufficient dis
cplincd army We had another with the
Scminoles nearly twenty years later, a that
lasted seven years, which Congress tried to fight
by calling for volunteers and inviting them to
furnish their clothing and horses. 1t was in
this that Gen. Scott bold enough to say
the volunteers were good, for which the poll
ticians got his job.
an the Mexican war the volunteer system
again relied upon, and owing to the expiration
of short-tme enlistments the armies of Gen. Tay-
lor and Gen. Scott were so constantly depleted
that although 100000 men were called into serv-
ice, Gen. Taylor went into his first action with
only 1900 troops. Gen. Scott had $4,000
upon any field, and entered the City of Mexico
with only 5000. After the Congress imme-
diatcy reduced the regular establishment to 10000
men,
Although at the close of the civil war the
United States had the most formidable army in
the world lit had called into the service altogether
$1,000 regulars and 2,6o634I volunteers and milta)
the regular MISUNDERSTANDING a slight tenn
porary increase while the French remained in
Mcxico-was rapidly rcduced-and, of course, when
the line is reduced the staff is sacrificed too
which it is we'll to remember. An army is capable
| of no greater expansion than is permitted by the
size and capacity of its staff organization. As
result of this policy, continued for generation,
the military establishment at the outbreak of the
| ted az IA
26o4o enlisted men, the smallest regular establish
| ment in proportion to population with which
we had entered upon
"Of unpreparedness for that war Capt.
| Charles D. Rhodes general staff Tin the Journal
| of the Military Service Institution), says were
without accurate maps and statsticay information
of our adversary's military resources; lacking in
| carefully formulated plans of mobilization, concen-
| tration and operation; without magazine rifles,
smokeess powder and breech-loading cannon for
the reserves and with themselves-the
peers of any soldiers earth in intelligence,
| bravery and military initiative but absolutely
! ignorant Of the serious phases of war.
Despite these lessons, the importance of which
| has been frequently impressed upon Congress and
| the country by military and statesmen con-
sidcrations of politics and socacd economy again
| arc being brought to bear to destroy the national
| defense organization. 1t must be remembered the
| National Guard, impressive IN hgurcS, is not an
army; it cannot be nodded into an army without
| trained officers, and the Federal government has
nothing to do with offering the State militia. 1t
is the staff organization of the regular army upon
| which we must rely for the expansion OF the
national defense in time Of war; and that organize
| ton will be sacrificed in any drastic reduction Of
the regular force. staff organization requisite
for force of 10000 men is in the best military
! opinion, essential to safety. To provide for less
will be to repeat a history which speaks more for
| the good luck of the United States in than
| for its prudence"
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