The Washington herald., 1921-12-25

ana MS "oic AoiSce ~
pay for the elimination of the An
glo-Japanese alliance. The effort to
suggest that this four-party treaty
has any resemblance to the treaty
of insurance Mr.. Wilson gave
France Is idle. what is true, how
ever. is that both treaties represent
compensation paid by our repre-
sentatives to obtain their way in
other directions.
The situation which had to be
covered was the necessity that the
British should get something which
would satisfy their japanese allies
and thus honorably acquit them of
the debt which they acknowledged
as owing to their Japanese ally.
The United States was troubled
about the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
this the British recognized. al
though they universally asserted
that American anxiety was un-
founded and the alliance rather a
guarantee of security than a mem
ace OF attack. But the Japanese
professed to be equally disturbed
over the menace which was disclos-
cd in the expansion OF the Ameri-
can navy and the expression OF
feeling over Japanese poi-
icy alike in the Pacific Islands and
in China.
Sought Negative, Agreement
To satisfy Japan there had to be
found some form OF insurance. That
insurance could net be had in
treaty OF actual alliance since the
fate of the tripartIte agreement
guaranteeing France well demon
strated the fact that the United
States Senate would not consent TO
foreign entanglements or commit
ments. What had to be discovered
then was some negative undertake
ing. that is some solemn and bind
ing agreement on the part of the
United States not to do something
and that something was obviously
to attack Japan.
All the debate seems to have
conferred here. Mr.. Hughes and hrs
associates put an their cards upon
the table, as they had to do. They
said in substance that they desired
the elimination of the Anglo-Japan-
csc alliance and they met the sug-
gestion that a three-party alliance
be substituted with the square as
sertion that any such compromise
was out Of the question because IL
would not survive the attack of the
United States Senate. The maxi
mum of possibility, from their point
of view was some agreement by the
United States which would silence
all Japanese apprehensions of
American interference.
The maximum of possibility from
the American side. the largest price
the American representatives could
pay for the elimination of the An
glo-Japanese alliance was thus
comprehended In some form of self
denying ordinance, some kind of I'M
dertaking which did not commit
the United Sta>es to support the jap
anese in war or in peace, which did
not involve the use or the threat
OF the use Of force under any cir
cumstances. Both the British and
the Japanese hoped for more, ar
gued for more, but bowed in the
end to the fact that the consent of
their American associates in con-
ference to more, would doom tn.
treaty In the United states Sem
ate.
Wanted Pact Solid.
The British would have be.n
glad to substitute an American
British treaty for the Anglo-Japa-
nese alliance, this went without
saying, for the Japanese alliance
carried with IL perils and problem,
for the empire. But, since this was
out of the question, their purpose
was to make any Anglo-Japanese
American agreement as solid and
dehnite as possible. The JAPANESE
were similarly practical. They ap-
preciated the fact that the Anglo
Japanese alliance had lost tts vi
tally; that the British would un-
DER no circumstance support japan
against America, and would almost
certainly fight on the American
side in case OF war.
Thus the Japanese found them
selves with an alliance in being.
which had little present and no fu-
ture value, but was, while IL lasted.
of such great annoyance to their
American neighbors that this
neighbor was ready to pay to re-
move 1t. They found, too. that
their British ally, who desired the
removal OF the alliance. because IL
was a bar to Anglo-Amerfcan
WAS Oh the WnOie, pre-
pared to help his ally in obtaining
as good a price as possible, because
the British sought beyond all else
the closest possible association with
the Americans.
Now IL is in the light of all these
circumstances which have re-
capitulated that the four-power
pact must be considered, and, with
IL must be considered the speech
made by Senator Lodge in present.
ing II to the conference, for in
diplomatic usage this speech con-
stitutes an official and enduring
record of the American interpre-
tation Of this treaty. We are COM
mitted to nothing which is not
stated in that speech. because that
speech dehnitively establishes the
American Interpretation of the
treaty itself.
Fought Over Language.
Over the language of the agree
ment the battle was long and sharp.
To take single example: The last