The New York herald., 1921-02-13

Naval strategsts also critcise the failure
of the American delegates at the Versailles
peace conference to secure naval stations for
the United States in the Pacific south of the
equator. They call attention to the fact that
the operation of the American feet in the
Pacific and the transshipment of supplies
would be largely through the Panama Canal.
They point out that the possession Of naval
bases in the southern Pacific would enable
the American fleet to reach the Philippine
Islands by a southern route through Torres
Strait between New Guinea and Australia,
and through the Banda Sea- reaching the
Philippines either through the strait be
tween Molukka Island and the Celebes OF
between the Celebes and Borneo. traversing
a region the Japanese could not reach with
their subsea or service boat raiders
These same strategists point out that the
only naval base which the United States
now possesses In the southern Pacific u
that located in the Samoan Islands. They
believe that when the peace treaty was
negotiated the French would have yielded
a station to the United States in the Mar
quesas Islands, which are the nearest land
point to the Panama Canal. distance OF
1000 miles.
The United States would then possess an
other base at Samoa, a distance OF 1900
miles from the Marquesas. II is also be-
ieved that the American peace delegates
could have secured station In some of the
German islands allocated to Australia, thus
giving the United States four stepping stones
or bases between Panama and the Philip
pine Islands by the southern route They
maintain this would have added materially
to the security Of the United States in its
relation to the problems Of the Pacific Ocean.
Instead OF this. all the German islands outll
OF the equator were allocated to Australia
without any reservations whatever. They
include:
German New Guinea, Kaiser wilhelmland
the Bismarck Archipelago, the Admiralty
Islands, Neu Pommern (New Britain), Neu
Mechlenberg New IrelandD and the German
Solomon Islands.
AS the situation now stands. the Pacific
islands have been divided up among the
two greatest Powers with which the United
States might in the future become en-
broiled, without this Government having
attained single advantage in the dstribu
ton.
2 Naval strategists see a ray of hope in this
situation in the event of war with Japan.
They point out that in the event of such
a war. with Germany retaining control Of
her former islands, and compelled to remain
neutral in the conflict. the islands would be
of no value to either Power. With Japan In
control provided the American navy is
strong enough, some of these islands might
be seized and used as a base either for
offensive operations against Japan or for
the protection of the Philippines.
Opposed to this hopeful view is that OF
certain pessimistic international authorities
who call attention to the fact that American
operations against the former German
islands would be regarded offensive oper-
ations against the League OF Nations, from
which Japan has secured the islands as a
mandate.
II is acknowledged that nothing can be
done now by this Government to minimize
the disastrous effects TO this country in
CURED in the gathering up OF the Pacific
islands. The wholesale distribution of these
Islands can be regarded only in sad retro
spcct. with the exception OF the case OF the
island of Yap.