The New York herald., 1921-02-13

sem-political view. In these chapters he sets
forth the belief of Hindenburg and Luden-
dorff that the German army achieved an
unbroken series of victories in the field, but
that the war was lost by the failure of the
morale of the people at home. He shows the
difference between the present and former
times, due to the facilities for conmunica-
ton. I'm the days of Frederick the Great
the army was to a certain extent foreign
body OF state. and even in its outward forms
war seemed to be no business Of the whole
nation. The citizen was never touched by
the fortunes Of war except where the enemy
invaded the country. The state Of public
opinion at home and the nations tendency
to dependency could not however. affect
the army directly as there was only loose
connection between II and the mass of the
nation. and there were practically no letters
to and from the soldiers in the field. 1t is
quite otherwise to-day. The spirit and feel
ings Of the public at home reach the souls
of the troops In millions of letters and
strengthen or shake their will to victory and
their soldierly confidence. Thus the nation
at home Is largely responsible for the spirit
of the men in the field. and therefore For
military efficiency Of the army" He dwells
upon the Importance OF discipline, the neces-
s.ty for the officers ito cultivate this senti-
ment Of soldierly self-confidence and keeping
the troops alive TO their own high calling"
The non-commissioned officers must be "the
standard bearers OF soldieriy pride. Yet the
cornerstone from every point Of view is the
reg,mental commanding officer. What the
c. O. Is that will the regiment be-" And
lastly. we must consider the influence which
the commander In chief may have upon the
whole army There are subtle
threads woven between the commander in
chief and his subordinates. They cannot
be seen. but they work with wonderful
power" And he cites the cases of Frederick
and Napoleon. who were worshipped by their
men even after Napoleon had brought about
"the catastrophe of 1912 and the disaster of
Leipzig"
AS to the relations between the civil and
military power he emphatically asserts-so
contrary to the practice and the public
opinion in English speaking countrfes--that
the civil Government must always be "in
agreement with the Supreme Command.
1t must conform to their wishes entirely and
give up any idea Of taking any step without
consulting them. Diplomacy npst there
fore confne itself TO preparing the way for
military Victories and exploiting them, but
only in accordance with instructions TO be
0ivcn By the military awthoYitics'' 0talics by
the author). He then states the necessity for
having military and political functions COM
bined in one person." and cites the case OF
Frederick the Great to the detriment Of q
nameless ruler in the world war. As "a
when, and IL, peace is to be made. "only the
soldier IL In a position to judge. Not the
least Of the causes of Germany's downfall is
the fact that this simple rule was not Oh
served
Finally ne makes the amazing statement:
"fn the Judgment Of history we shall have
the glory OF having pursued an absolutely
honorable policy and carried out the ethical
teaching OF Christianity. In the political
sphere. however. we have been outrageously
deceived" On reading this one cannot but
bark back to the words he wrote In 1911:
"The dispute as TO what Is right is decided
by the arbitrament OF war. War gives 4
biolosically Just decision. since It's decisions
rest on the very nature Of thinss.' He Their
said that 0ermany's future was World Do
mInion or Downfall" II has turned out TO be
Downfall by the arbitrament OF war. and by
his own doctrine Germany's Downfall was
right
THE WAR OF THE FUTURE. IN THE
LIGHT OF THE LESSONS OF THE
WORLD WAR BY Gen! Won Bernhard
author Of Germany and tho Next War" &C
TRANSLATED by r A. Holt. o. ~ r. New
York. ID. Appleton q Co, 1921.