New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1921-07-18

Il ~ ~ N ~ A|AQaLo1
Flags Daniels
CONTINUED from page ono)
der the Wilson Administration, strongly
intimates its belief that this policy if
persisted in might have meant German
victory. After going into this policy in
detail, the subcommittee, in the ma
jority report. has this to say:
"ln these circumstances it would
seem that the initial policy Of the Navy
Department, in that it was entirely
sclf-defensive and mona aggressive, and
in that it did not contemplate aggres-
sivc operations when the issue of the
naval war was in the balance, was en-
tirely inappropriate and mistaken. 1t
would seem that 1T adhered to this
mistaken polisy in important particu.
lars during the crisis of the naval war
and consequently that it invited defeat
and that it did not contribute as eff
fectively as it might have to as quick
winning of the war as might otherwise
have been possible. For these mis-
taken policies it would seem inevitable
that Secretary Daniels must be held
directly responsible, but under Presi-
dent Wilson. And it would seem that
all those who contributed to. forcing
the Navy Department to abandon the
initial policy Of Secretary Daniels di-
rectly contributed to the winning of
the war and saved the navy of the
United States from the otherwise in
evitable charge that it, had in fact
abstaned from active and detcrmina-
tive participation in the war-an alb
stention, it may be added, which might
well have brought about "a peace with
out victory if not German victory,
end the ultimate defeat of the United
States"
Much more of the majority report is
given over to a statement regarding the
policy of the Navy Department. Among
other things this statement says:
ut does not appear from the testi-
mony that any definite plan or policy
for aggressive naval operations in the
event Of war was permitted by the
Navy Department to become known to
the commander in chief of our Atlantic
fleet, Admiral II. T. Mayo"
When Wilson Played Congress
Detailing the testimony apropos of
this matter, the sub committee finds:
1.-The conclusion seems unavoidable
that up to April II, 1917, the fixed
policy of the Navy Department under
Secretary Daniels and President Wilson
was that the naval forces of the coun-
try should be kept at home for coast
patrol and defense and that the fleet
should be strictly conserved for such
eventualites as might come out of the
E',1rnnoop Rrt o[
spect such a policy may now seem
startling, it loses some of this quality
when it is recalled that only one month
before the above reviewed conference
took place President Wilson was anthe-
matizing Congress because it had
prevented him from putting the United
States in that state of armed neu-
trality' whereby he might have avoided
belligerent participation on either side
of the European war-at least until the
submarine campaign had run its dead
ly course without American offensive
intervention"
The majority report, going in great
detail into the question whether the
navy was ready for war April 6, 1917,
finds it was not. 1t quotes Admirals
Benson, Badger and Mexican and Cap
tain Pratt, all witnesses for Secretary
Daniels. as testifying "emphatically
that the navy was not ready for WAY
on April 6, 1917"
Daniels's Hardness Cited
The hardness of Secretary Daniels
in making concentrated war on the sub
marines in the critical war zone and
the fact Admiral Benson alone among
his advisers sustained him are
stressed by the majority report. The
fact that General Pershing was i'm
pressed with the need of a vigorous
submarine campaign is cited. In this
relation, the majority report in part
says:
1--WE find not only that Secretary
Daniels had been adequately advised
as to the critical state of affairs and
that there was practical unanimity |
among his professional advisers, eX-
trated offensive effort should be made /
Immediately against the submarines
in the critical war zone, but we find
that the general board backed up its
irsistent advice that 200 anti-submarine !
craft be sent to the critical war zone
Immediately by telling Secretary Dan
iels in detail that there were over 200
such craft available for such concen-
trated offensive anti-submarine effort
and over 1000 naval guns of from to
6-inch caliber available wherewith to
arm such craft as were unarmed.
''We find that this practical unanim-
ity of professional advice, excepting
that of Admiral Benson, coming from
separate and eminent naval authorities.
was founded on the realization that.
with the German surface fleets con-
fined by those of the Allies, Germany
could not do any great material dam.
age to the United States such as would
require great defensive efforts, but on
the contrary, the most important func-
ton the naval forces of the United
States could perform was Cd to help
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