Evening star., 1921-12-25

with regard to their field Of action
and to their habitableness; in other
words, they were too small Tor ef-
flcient use, and Italy is indebted to
the cooperation of French and Brit
ish submarines for having been able
successfully to meet the situation.
Since the armistice Italy has de-
molished as many as thirty suoma-
rines: she Is actually left with forty
three units in active service and rour
under construction, the total amount
ing to 20.250 tons.
Only Ten Units Useful.
Only ten of the first units may be
considered Of any utility. since they
are of more than 200 tons displace-
ment; the others will have to be sue
cessively replaced.
Although our naval technical au-
thorities believe that the allotment
Of submarine tonnage should not nee
essarily be proportionate to that OF
capital ships. and that the quota OF
responding to the American proposal
Of a tonnage of 175,000 in capital
ships, is not SUFFICIENT, the Italian del
egation is ready. in the interest OF
reduction of armament, to accept TINS
amount, under the condition OF parity
with France.
The principle of parity has been
fully accepted by France and / take
this occasion to observe that the
friendly attitude of our allied nation
will greatly contribute to Strengthen
the cordial relations Of friendship be-
tween France and Italy which consti-
tute one Of the principal guarantees
of peace in Europe.
I'VE are convinced on the other
hand that Mr.. Hughes. in considering
the particular conditions which have
pointed out. will have no difficulty In
agreeing that the total tonnage OF
Italian submarines shall be fixed at
the above mentioned limit of 3l,50o
tons, on the condition. il is well un-
derstood, that the same limits be ac-
cepted by the neighboring nation.
Concerning this point we have pre-
else and categorical instructions from
our government.
Hanihara Explains Japan's Views.
Mr.. Hanihara then said the Japa-
nese delegation had been profoundly
Impressed by the able and powerful
British colleagues against submarines,
which 1t had been not only prlVl-
lege but an inspiration to listen to.
And yet the Japanese delegation was
unable. he had to confess. to con-
vince itself that the submarine was
for defense.
The Japanese delegation hoped that
ii had made clear, at the time when
the provisional agreement was reach
ed between the United States. Great
Britain and Japan on the question
ceptance by Japan of the ratio OF
5-5-3 meant for Japan considerable
sacrifice. Yet because of her desire
to contribute toward the achievement
Of the great object for which the
conference had been called Japan
finally accepted the said ratio under
various great difficulties. In the same
manner Japan was prepared to accept
the same ratio in regard to sub
marines That would have given
Japan $4,000 tons. So far as Japan
is concerned this figure was consid :
cred as the minimum amount OF sub
marine tonnage with which the in
sular position of Japan could be
adequately defended
The new proposal was to allow the
United States and Great Britain
sc. 900 tons each. while France. Italy
and Japan were to maintain the
status quo in regard to their respec-
tive submarine tonnage. In other
words, under this new plan. Japan
would be allowed to have only $1,000
tons. That was considered by the
Japanese delegation to be wholly in
adequate for Japan's defensive pur-
poses.
The Japanese delegation, therefore
felt constrained to insist upon the
assignment of the tonnage proposed
in the original American project
l. e.. $4,000 tons of submarines.
Without wishing for moment to
debate or to call in question any
part of the arguments so ably and SO
eloquently presented by the various
delegates, Mr. Hanihara hoped that
he might be permitted to point out
that this demand on the part of Japan
was actuated solely by consideration
of defense. Japan was geographically
evident to all that her submarines
could not constitute a menace against
any nation.
French Await Instructions.
Mr.. Sarraut stated that, in view
Of the fact that the new American
| proposal contemplated a conside IA BILE
reduction in the submarine tonnage
which appeared necessary to the
French government. the French dele
await instruction.
Mr.. Balfour then said that as the
committee appeared to be at the end
of their days program he would like
to ask the chairman and his colleagues
whether technical examination should
tons and :he measurement Of tonnage
He had been brought to make this
suggestion by a discovery. made some
what late E the day. that although
there had been much talk of tons.
! different rations did not always mean
IL e same thing. The United States had
one method of measurement, the British
another tie French a third. the Italians
fourth and the Japanese a fifth. He
did not say that it mattered very much
! in ordinary circumstances which system
| of tonnage was employed: but now that
; international arrangements were being
made for the future he thought it EN-.
| inently desirable and almost indis.
pensable to settle two questions:
First. to decide the system Of meas
urement of tons for incorporation in
! the treaty. and. second. to adopt q
system which could be measured
without difficulty: above all. without
any international misunderstanding
as to its precise meaning. Nothing
could be more unfortunate than q
controversy arising as to what tor
was intended. how the measurement,
! was to be made and as to whether
| the measurement had been properly
and honestly reached. He suggested
this question might with advantage
be referred to a technical expert
Although he believed that this matter
was outside the range of thought OF
the ordinary naval officer, vet he be.
lieved that among the various dele
cations people could be found whit
could reach q proper conclusion.
This would be a fitting corollary tc
| the labors of the conference which
in many respects had already beer
/ brought to a satisfactory conclusion
| Whether the total tonnage should b.
a multiple of that of the largest shiy
! he did not venture to say, but ht
| thought all would agree that to es'