Evening star., 1921-12-23

Ths "S Srnres az regard submarines
are as follows:
Tabulates Submarine Tonnage.
Amt. of new
building
pprmitte
under the
Existing American American
tonnage proposals. proposals
,.;, S,, 81 I'M 0Un G5Ot
,nIs.u p;.; So ,ln SOHn g.50
80 q, ,W $4,000 II S0I
France .......... 1880 In proper In proper ,
Italy ,...... 1880 In proper In proper
tion. tion.
He felt bound to say that it seemed
to him very strange to put before a
conference on the limitation OF naNai
armament proposals designed TO los
ter and increase the type or war YES
sells which, according to the British
view, was open to more objection
than surface capital ships. Moreover
il would be a certain consequence. II
submarines were retained. that the
powers which possessed large mer-
camille marines would be competed to
increase the numbers of their anu
submarine craft. This would give but
little relief to the overburdened tax
payer. and would provide scant com
fort to those who wished to abolish
war and to make it less lnhumane
The view of the British government
and the British empire delegation was
that what was required was not
merely restrictions on submarines
but their total and final abolition. In
explaining the position he wished TO
make clear that the British delega-
lion had no unworthy or SelfiSh mo-
tives. He would first like to reply in
avance. since this might be his only
opportunity of doing so. to the argu-
ments Of the friends of the subma
rine. He understood their first con-
,ention to be that the submarine was
the legitimate weapon of the weaker
powers. and was an effective and eco
nomical means of defense for an eX-
tensive coast line and for maritime
communications. Both these stand
points could be contested on technical
grounds. and, as he would show. were
clearly disproved by recent history
If some weak country possessed an
exposed coast line, it would of course
desire to defend it against lombard
ment or the diSem barkation of a
military force.
1t was necessary to ask. therefore
how such attacks were conducted in
modern warfare. The reply was that
they were conducted by powerfully
armed. swift-moving vessels fully
equipped to resist submarine attack
to escort and protect the conveys of
military transports There was no
branch of naval research which had
experts than the counter-offensive
against the submarine. He was Civ
ing away no secrets when he stated
that the methods of detection. of To-
cation. as we'll as of destruction of
submarines had progressed so much
further than the offensive power of
the submarines themselves, that the
latter had now already a reduced val
ue again modern surface warships
This. however, was bringing him into
somewhat technical subjects. During
the late war Germany had roncen-
tratcd her efforts on the use of the
t-boat and had built up the most for
mIdable submarine fleet that the
world had ever seen up to the pres
ent time. He believed that Germany
had employed no less than 375 U-boats
of 100000 tons in the aggregate. OF
these no less than 2Os had been sunk.
What had these U-boats accomplished
in legitimate naval warfare? 1t was
almost insignificant
Weak Against warships,
In the early part of the war a few
obsolescent ships. which sometimes
were not taking proper precautions,
had been sunk. but the British grand
fleet throughout the war had not
been affected: not one single shin had
been sunk or hit by the action of
submarines, whether at sea or in har-
Dor. Our light cruisers had swept
through all parts of the North sea,
and, wherever that sea had been cIea r
OF minefields. had gone where they
wished. undeterred by the submarine
Submarines had not prevented the
passage of troops across the sea, No
less than 15.000.000 British troops had
crossed and rccrossed the English
channel during the war. and not one
man had been lost from the action of
submarines except on board hosnjtal
N he
tury. it had been deemed would be
immune from the attacks of subma-
rines. and therefore had not been es-
corted. During the later months of
the war some 100000 United States
troops had been brought across the
Atlantic, and the submarine had
proved equally powerless in their
case. In fact. the U-boat, whether
considered as an offensive or defen-
sive weapon against any sort of or
ganiZed naval force. had proved al
most contemptihle.
1t had been maintained that sub
marines Were useful for the defense
of coast lines and communications
with colonies. He gathered from the
press that this was one of the ar
guments used. and so it would have
to be examined. II the argument was
sound, and if submarines were es-
sentfal for this purpose. there was no
country which would need them so
much as the British empire, which
possessed coast line which. without
wishing to boast, he believed was al
most as large as that of ALI the five
powers present at this conference put
together. and the length of which was
four times the circumference of the
globe, and which, in addition, had
the longest trade routes of any coun-
Z try to protect. 1t was partly because
our experience had shown that they
were not effective for this purpose
that we were ready to abandon sub
marines.
The late war had made it abundant
ly clear that the greatest peril to
maritime communications was the
submarine. and that peril was spe-
cially great to a country which did
not possess command of the sea on
the surface. Hence, it was to the in
terest OF any such power to get rid
of this terrible menace. And in this
connection it must be remembered
that the submarine was Of no value
as a defense to be used against sub
marines. 1t was against merchant
ships alone that they achieved real
success.
100000 Tons Sunk.
It would be as we'll to recall what
the German submarine fleet had ac-
complished against mercantile ma
rines. No less than 100000 tons of
. shipping had been sunk. of z value of
s1,100. .ot0, 900, apart from their car
goes. Over 10000 non-combatants,
ifN