The New York herald., 1921-11-14
BATTLESHIP LIMIT
PERMANENT, ISPLAN
Continued from First Pnge.

Continued from First Pnge.
| Far East Questions, consisting Of the
heads OF the delegations Of all nine OF
/ the nations holding seats in the con-
! ference.
| During the afternoon tho American
! Advisory Committee of Twenty-one also
will meet and Chairman Sutherland Will
announce the personnel Of the six sub
! committees. the creation OF which has
| been authorized to facilitate the han
ding of special subjects.
So far as battleship tonnage goes IN
/ the retained fleets, the American and
British forces would be about the same.
around 100000, and that of Japan just
under 300.0 This links up directly
with Mr.. Hughes's suggestion as to a
| replacement programme. based on fixed
tonnage for each Power. to apply only
after ten years of no building of any
kind. Then. under the American pro-
posal. Great Britain would be allowed to
maintain up to 100000 tons in capital
ships, the United States the same and
Japan 100000.
| 1t means also taat Japan would stand
! thereafter at a fixed ratio OF three to
| five in naval strength in comparison to
! the other two fleets. II was not clear
tonight how that would be viewed
! finally by Japan.
Would Limit Size of Ships.
The American replacement plan pro-
poses to limit future capital ships to S5.-
900 tons. Taken in connection with the
tonnage allotinents, that would mean
main fleets Of fourteen capital craft each
for Great Britain and the United states
and eight for Japan. provided all are
built up to the limit OF size.
The heaviest tonnage OF capital craft
so far planned is understood to be In
connection with Japan's projected bat
tie cruisers. said TO reach $4,000 tons.
Such ships and also such vessels as the
six new battleships and six battle cruis-
ers the United States is building, all
well over 10000 tonners, would be pro-
hibited.,
Limitations in size strike at vital
elements in naval ccustruc' ION. The fac
tors OF guns and 9rmor weight, speed
and cruising radius are those Fl ON
which the size of 7hips is determined.
Probably the 5000 ron limitation would
make impossible ony snip carrying
heavier batteries tran eight sixteen inch
We 'pons.
it is TO be noted that In the Arrcrf-
can scheme no data as 10 new ships
laid down as repiacemerts would be
required to be furnlshed ly the Power
planning the ship to TIL other two.
except the tonnage ard the dates of
contract, keel laying. completion and
destruction OF the ship displaced. No
attempt is made 20 limit the design of
the vessels. batteries. speed. fuel capac-
ity or other military characteristics be-
yond the $4,000 ton maximum figure.
In outlining the plans for all auxil-
larry craft care was taken to exclude
from tho limitations existing tonnage
In monitors. or purely coast defence
vessels and in supply and other train
ships, tugs and tho like. There would
be no necessity to dispose OF an excess
OF these craft any Power might have,
as they would not weigh much in the
scale OF the reduced main fleets other
wise, with the exception OF aircraft, the
flve TO three ratio as between the
strength of the British and American
fleets and that Of Japan would apply
all down the line. 1t IL an exact estab-
lishment of this line of relative naval
strength that has lsben worked out.
Importance of NavnI Bases.
off1cers always have contendcd that It
would require two 10 one pre-
ponderance OF forces TO carry battle 10
/ Japan across the Pacific, IL the at
taclSing Power lacked bases we'll out
toward that side. because OF the possi-
bllity OF accidents 20 ships which would
put them out OF action as total losses.
although q nearby base might quickly
have rented them for the front line.
Here is whero the great Importance
Of naval bases In the Pacific. not touched
upon by Mr.. Hughes lies. on the five
to three rstio OF naval strength. officers
say that prcponderancc would not bo
available 20 Great Britain or 20 the
United states. 1t would take joint forces
to furnish the ships and then. because
OF double trains and divided command,
experts think a three to one pre-
ponderance necessary to make certain
the result.
Another element OF the American pro-
gramme. yet 70 be explained. Is the
statement as 60 the inverse ratio" i'm
portance of the merchant marine, COM
pared 20 the naval strength maintained
by any Power. Thst ni~ans that as the
size OF tho naval force COOS down the
possibilities Of turning merchant ves-
sells into warshipg by mounting guns on
their decks go up. With few fighting
ships 20 meet. armed merchantmen
would be themselves fighting craft, ready
for battle with ships OF their kind. II
ali navies were scrapped. Great Britain
would have an overwhelmingly pre-
ponderance in, potential naval strength
! due 60 her twenty million tons OF cargo
and passenger vessels, as against the
merchant fleets OF the United states and
| Japan.