The Washington herald., 1921-11-20


Remembering Paris and all that
the whole world suffered as a con-
tsequence OF the boundless eIpan-
sion OF expectation, one must feel
that Mr.. Hughes has already per-
formed a very great service in
bringing the discussion from the
clouds to the pavement In the open
ing hours. In the days which have
been marked by the beginning of
the conference 1 have encountered
Mr.. Hughes several times. the last
occasion was a few hours after he
had delivered his address at the
first session On each of these oc-
casions he has emphatically as
serted that the conference was to
have facts. to deal with facts and
the decisions to be reached would
be based upon facts.
Preliminaries vague.
Now, when one considers how
little reference there has been 70
facts in much of the discussion
which has preceded the conference.
when one realizes that the country
has been deluged by impossible
forecasts of what was to be done.
the service of the Secretary of
state is hardly to be exaggerated
the service of deflation. II is easy
TO understand why Europeans and
particularly the Europeans who
have come here still under the
shadow of conditions in their own
countries. should expect and hope
to see the agenda of the Washing
ton conference extended beyond
the narrow limits of questions
which after all must seem to the m
parochial. but Il is not less clear.
as Paris proved, that in this d.
rection lies ruin
In addition TO deflation there
was precision. For. many weeks
with increasing intensity the de-
bate has ragged over the relative
Importance OF Far Eastern and dis
armament issues. The people OF
the United States have seen the
conference as one for disarmament.
DESPITE the warnings OF their
statesmen that disarmament was
impossible. The administration has
held to the view that before dis
armament or limitation must come
the solution Of the Pacific prob
lens. The result has been the
stimulation OF pessinism and the
increase in the danger Of an Ameri-
can-Japanese conflict.
Pacific Made Secondary.
But at the opening session of
the conference Mr.. Hughes delib-
erately elected to make the ques-
tion of naval armament the chief
business OF the gathering. By his
own words he assigned the Far
Eastern issues to a relatively sub
ordinate place and as a consequence
the success or failure of the con-
ference itself will be measured
hsnceforth by the achievement In
the field OF armament Limitation
which in practice means in the de-
partment OF naval armament
This decision was a fitting an
swer to Japanese maneuVer
which Just preceded the first ses-
!, sion. BY this maneuver Admiral
Kato had at one time disclosed a
Japanese purpose to go far beyond
general expectation in the field of
naval reduction and also the evil
dent Japanese wish to make the
question of arms and not of Asia
the main business OF the conference.
Mr.. Hughes's opening program of
reduction was a startling answer
70 Kato, which, while permitting
the Japanese representative to hope
for success in the direction of
A Ia. pinned him down at once in
the matter OF naval holidays.
Arms and not Asia, then, will be
the conspicuous problem of the
conference and in that direction, II
seems to me lies the best promise
Of peace. Looking at the condi-
tions and circumstances of the con-
ference as they unfold themselves
in the first days Of the gathering,
what then are the reasonable ex-
pectations for results that the
world may hold?
May Seek Concessions.
First of all, a very substantial
reduction In the size Of the worlds
navies. even IL there be modinca-
tions OF Mr.. Hughes initial pro-
,posal. Doubtless in due time ia
nan will press for concessions on
our part which will envisage dis
mantlIng existing fortifcations and
refraining from further fortifying
in the Pacific, that is on the West
ern side. We may expect many
technical counter-propositions but
these will be only technical.
In the same way we may correct
ly infer. I think. that the broad
general lines of Mr.. Hughes propo-
sails were already foreseen by the
British. It may even turn out that
a British declaration in the matter
Of the Philippines will supplement
their previous announcement of a
purpose TO establish a naval base at
singapore. This declaration would.
in all probability take the form of
a proclamation of a British Far
Eastern policy which would COM
NIT British iseapower to the main
tenance Of the status quo in the
South Pacific. not as a detail in an
Anglo-American partnership. but as
a circumstance in British policy.
For obvious reasons Australia
and New Zealand would view with
unconcealed apprehension any Jap
anese advance southwark. such as
the Seizure OF the Philippines would
Involve For the British govern
ment to declare that the mainten-
ance of the Philippines under theii