The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1921-12-24

= Continued from Page One.
impossible to claim that there
wesld have been none.
Submarine activity against the
e3pasy's merchant fleet might be
Wy effective. No one had been able
t61isten without great emotion as
Lord lee recalled the hours of an
guish that al those who had held
the guidance Of affairs during the
war had known and lived through.
when Great Britain, together at
tinlessxith France, was threatened
wivsr1sbeing deprived of the supplies
which were indispensable not mere
~ for-continuing the struggle, but
to keep the nation alive.
:. Caused Vast Damage.
That was the power of the sub
ma ssne- when exerted to the full ex-
test of its destructive possibilities,
WITHOUT regard for the limits I'm
pdsed by the most documentary prln-
cfNees of humanity and respect for
International law. Submarine activ-
itsSwithin the limits fixed by these
considerations which should remain
ssered to honorable opponents,
AGAINST enemy transports and COR
voSs could still be of great import
arA 1t could be included among
tF legitimate methods of warfare
aska useful factor, especially for ma
tl6ns which did not have powerful
ESgy.
x.To sum up. in Judging the sub
mArjne, 1t should not be considered
at4he time of the war, and above
sNssat that precise moment of the
wsr when It was at the heighth of
m n .
the and looking somewhat toward
th4sfuture. As is the case with every
nsS weapon, It first came upon its
adSersaries when they were with
oif~ sufficient defense and caused
vSSt damage. Yet from now on, as
Iscsi Lee emphasized. its power
wsuld be greatly limited; the risks
on destruction which II must run
eve become very numerous With
ost. going as far as the first lord
inSfeehng that the submarine has
BECOME ineffective against its foes,
issis possible to think that the
stS1ggle against the submarine may
nav be carried on under conditions
cenparable to that of any action
befween war ships.
VI have set forth the views of
the-French navy relative to the sup
pression of submarines. 1 have still
WORD to say on the importance OF
The number of submarines.
sThe figures which have been laid
beiere the committee have empha-
sirsd the paramount consideration
WHICH must guide it in forming an
oplnion.
Has Not Same Figures.
ssLord Lee has stated that the
Germans constructed 800 submarines
am that generally they had only ten
otthem in active service at sea at
any one time. This would Indicate
that the proposals for submarines to
RECONSTRUCTED must be estimated on
hssis considerably larger than that
employed in fixing the number Of
these little boats that 1t is thought
necessary to use.
Sin truth, We have not quite the
ssfae figures We have estimated that
onFan average one can figure that
the, Germans had possessed so to
lat completed submarines which are
stb in existence. OF this number
they were able to keep about is or
29sat sea at once. And the reduction
thus noted from the number of exist
irts submarines to the number in
ccrdition to use was due to two
causes: the need to allow the crews
forrest. and the need of maintenance
ofNthese small boats on which the
wear and tear was terrific, making
constant repairs necessary
" Balfour Makes Reply.
air. Balfour in reply, said:
SiI think. that while Admiral De
Ban condemned, as We should all ex-
pect him to condemn. the inhumane
useof the submarine against defense
less merchant ships. il was the ac-
ton of submarines upon merchant
shops which he regards as on the
whole the most important use to
w&eh that weapon of maritime war
fare can be put. l admit that there
are other purposes to which he al
lufed. and / will come to them in
a 1moment Let me ask upon this
QUESTION of the destruction Of COM
nArre on the high seas by means OF
submarines is there any man who has
hstened to this debate. is there any
ms1 who knows what occurred in
the late war is there any man who
KNOWS what must occur in the course
ofeany future war, who doubts that
N Sebmarines are sent on their dan
gspus and difficult mission on the
nlHh sedS-One or the most 0lnCull
ana most dangerous as we'll as one
ofSthe most disagreeable tasks which
esr be imposed upon a sailor-it is
foE something more important than
the remote chance Of destroying some
Wet guarded and efficient ship Of
ws and that il they are once let
loose to deal with merchantmen II Is
Incredible that in the stress of war
their powers will not be abused in
thf- future as they have been so
grossly abused in the past.
FfIt is vain to dwell upon the
fact, an absolutely undeniable fact,
that the submarine Is a useful scout
that the submarines. especially. II
not solely. in the early stages Of
the war. did destroy a few unguard-
ed and careless ships of war. and
that the submarine will undoubtedly
impose upon any attacking forces a
aegree OF caution and an amount of
lrecaution which no doubt the at
ukIng forces would gladly welcome
0nited states Has No Fear.
Is il not in the minds of all of
IN who followed the course of ma
vat warfare that the British ships
bombarded hour after hour the
Fk5nish coast at Zeebrugge, which
was full of submarines. il / remem-
Der rightly. The British ships bonn
barded Zeebrugge. and not on one
single occasion did a single subma-
rines destroy or injure a single Brit
isA-ship.
TAKE the case of the Darda-
nsnes. We lay opposite the OAR