New-York tribune., 1921-12-23

which had forbidden Germany to con-
struct submarines, whether for mill
tary or mercantile purposes.
Were we to assume, Lord Lee con-
tinued, that Germany was always to
be bad and the other powers were al
ways to be good? Was there to be $50
rule for Germany and another rule for
he was not casting any reflection on
asy nation, and least of all on the Of
iicers and men Of the submarine fleets.
These men were the pick of their serv-
ices, gallant and high-minded men, but
they were obliged to obey orders, and
experience had shown that occasionally
governments could go MAD. The view
Of The British Empire delegation, there
fore, was that the only proper course
was the abolition of submarines. Their
limitation was not sufficient. His OBJ
lection to limitation was that sub
marine feet could SO very rapidly be
expanded in time OF war.
Submarines could only be built il
the industry were kept alive and a per-
sonnel could only be provided if a
trained nucleus existed. Hence it was
only by means OF abolition that this
menace to the mercantile marine of the
world could be got rid of. He had said
earlier in his remarks that the British
Empire delegation were animated by
no selfish motives. At the same time
it would be foolish not to recognize
that Great Britain was the nation most
exposed to the menace Of tho subma-
rine. So long as submarine warfare
continued it would be the greatest
menace to the food supplies on which
our country was dependent.
British Food Supply Limited
"The British, people lived in 8
crowded island whose soil only pro-
duced two-ifths Of its supply of food.
For the remaining three-fifths they re-
lied upon sea communications. On an
average only seven weeks stocks were
maintained in the country. BY far the
greatest anxiety which the British
government had felt during the war
was to prevent the reserves Of food
falling to zero. Was it surprising,
therefore, if, with danger in front
BRAND had so eloquently explained
France was subject, the British people
protested against weapon which was
the negation Of humanity and civiliza-
| tion itself?
"Thcre were some people who said
| il was this vulnerabilty Of Great Brit
| ain which justified the retention of the
submarine, since it was by these means
alone that the British Empire could be
| stricken down. The late war had
shown, however, that the British En-
plre was not easily stricken down, aud
| II war should ever come again he i'm.
aglned that means would be found fol
our country to save itself from starva-
ton. But it might be claimed IL the
U-boat had begun it's operations earlier
or had had better luck the result might
have been different. To this he would
reply that the British navy had con.
stituted almost the keystone Of the
Allied arch; but for the British navy
France would have been ruined, Bel
gium would have been overrun, anc
even the United States of America
self-contained, self-supporting, with
vast resources, would have been impo
tent to intervene, and might have hat
to abandon it's army and all that it hac
in France or else to make humiliatina
peace.
Selfish Motives Denied
"That would not have been q disag.
ter to Great Britain alone. That was
why he resented the idea which had
been published in & pay of the press
that the abolition of submarines was
merely selfish and unworthy design
IL had been suggested that the condi-
tons Of the late war might never recur
Could France be sure Of this? Could
France run the risk of disaster to
her near neighbor and only certain
rally II the situation of 1914 were ever
reproduced? 1t was necessary to take
long views in this matter and the Brit,
lsh Empire delegation believed that
thcy were fighting the battle not only
OF the Allied and associated powers but
OF the whole civilized world in adyo.
eating the abolition of the subm arine.
he felt sure that some one would
ask, How can VIC feel sure that il we
abolish submarines other powers who
are not represented here will not pro.
ceed with the building of submarines ?
The same question might be asked az
to other classes OF craft mentioned in
the American scheme. He found it
impossible to believe that other pow
ers would set themselves against the
! opinion OF tho rest of the civilized
world regarding this particular weapon
| n, however, the great naval powers
/ should at some future date find them
selves exposed to piracy by the action
OF some smaller power. surely they
would ind the means of bringing
Nemesis to the transgressor. World
/ OPINION was very powerful weapon,
ana certainly some means would be
found by which the great naval pow
crs could protect themselves If neces.
! sary.
| Defense From Submarines Costly
! IT was said that submarines we're .
cheap method of warfare, Surely this
| conference did net desire TO make war
+! cheap! When war had been cheap il
] had bcen almost continuous. He hcped