New-York tribune., 1921-11-14
Navy Cut Held
Assurance II. S.
/. Will Not Attack
Would Not Be Able 10 Carry
War to Islands Without
Battle Cruisers. Which
Other Powers Will Have
Limitation Permanent
Review of Plans Reveals
Form of Promise Given
TO British and Japanese

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 (By The As
sociated Press AS interested Of
icials of the nations represented here
at the armament conference studied in
greater detail to-day the reduction
proposals offered by Secretary Hughes
yesterday, naval experts saw in them
new significance. They constitute
definite assurance that the United
States Is determined never to take Of
fensive action against either of the
two island powers, Japan or Great
Britain. ...............
Naval experts pointed out to-day
that the Hughes plan eventually will
limit the United States to battleships
and prevent her having battle cruisers,
while these weapons, Indispensable to
the raiding of commerce, will still be
syailable to the other two great sea
powers. This they regard very
definite assurance that America, as
President Harding told the conference,
comes to the discussion with no selfish
purpose to serve.
More Than Ten-Year Holiday
Apparently the Hughes project ia
fsr more than ten-year naval holiday,
coupled with immediate heavy reduc-
tion of the fleets of the three powers.
Beyond that is q third suggestion,
uing agreement to limit the size of the
battle fleets permanently. That is
what Mr.. Hughes's naval replacement
plan really amounts to.
In naming the ships to which each
main battle feet would be cut if the
American plan for imm mediate reduction
was accepted, Secretary Hughes'si
statement shows that Great. Britain
and the United States would be on an
exact equality in the number of battle
ships, but the British would retain in
addition four battle cruisers. The pro-
posed Japanese fleet would be COM
posed of six battleships and four bat
tie cruisers, whie the United States
would be content with battleships
alone 80 AfE5
Battle cruisers would be invaluable,
perhaps vital, to successful prosecu-
ton of naval war across the Pacific,
it was Eaid. s
In the proposal that the other two
powers retain battle cruiser squadrons
also, these observers saw a possible
concrete expression of American rec
ognition of the necessities in naval
forces Of those countries; of American
willingness Shxts they should proYecute
legitimate ventures over The world re-
=, employ for protection of those routes
NAVAL craft they thought best suited
for the need. AS 8 continental power,
/ although asserting in this proposal the
{: right to an equal footing with any ma
/ ton on the seas, the United States
:! might not necessarily need battle cruis
ers as the other powers feel they do, it
WAS said.
a. Would Decide Battle Cruiser Issue
At any rate, the American proposal
has made fiat proposition in regard
to battle cruisers, which it was thought
might be very difficult of treatment at
the conference. 1t remains to be seen
what Japan and Great Britain think
about it, but long step toward agree
ment on that question has been taken,
naval folk believe.
Tomorrow technical advisers of the
various delegations will give further
study to the American proposal under
which tonnage figures in capital ships
for the three powers for immediate re-
ductions would be: Great Britain, 604,-
45o; United States, 5Oo,65o, and Japan,
299,700. The list of ships to be re-
tanned by each shows that the British
preponderance over the United States
Is practically all In her four battle
cruisers. In that way, apparently, the
American group worked out Mr..
Hughes's general statement as to the
necessity of having regard "to the ex-
listing naval strength of the powers
concerned"
So far as battleship tonnage goes in
the retained fleets, the American and
British forces would be about the same,
around 100000, and that of Japan just
under 100000. This links up directly
with Mr.. Hughes's suggestion as to a
replacement program, based on fixed
tonnage for each power, to apply only
after ten years of no building of any
kind. Then, under the American pro-
posal, Great Britain would be allowed
to maintain up to 100000 tons in capi-
tai ships, the United States the same,
and Japan 0000.
In other words, after ten years, the
British fleet must be brought down to
the same tonnage basis as the American,
while the Japanese would remain sub
stantially where it was at the time
of the first reduction. Apparently it
is expected that the British strength
would be reduced sufficiently by attri-
tion--the wearing out OF ships during
the ten~year period.
Statistics as to Gun Power
Statistics as to the gun power Of the
three fleets to be retained under the
reduction program show that the
United States and Japan would have
one ship each mounting eight 16-inch
rifles.
Great Britain would have ten ships
carrying total of eighty 15-inch
rifles, one carrying ten 14-inch guns,
and her other seven ships would be
armed with the British 1875 guns, used
by neither of the other powers. She
would have seventy Of these afoat.
( The United States, in addition to
the 16-inch gun ship, the Maryland,
iust commissioned, would have eight
sships carrying twelve 14-inch guns
each; four carrying ten 14-inch each;
two carrying twelve 12-inch each, and
-four carrying ten 12-inch each. Japan,
in addition to her one 16-inch gun ship,
would have afioat forty-eight 14-inch
guns and twelve 12-inch on her battle
i; II Ii .ixach lar