Every evening, Wilmington daily commercial., 1921-05-02
TELLS WHY ATLANTIC
FLEET WAS NOT SENT
INTO THE WAR ZONE
Continued from page l

what is thats aSkeu thc hi'h h'
deadly earnest. Ills sense of humor was
unhappily deficient
The President smiled and then SAID
quietly but conclusively:
There is no such thins as logic.
And the President was right in the
particular instance under discussion.
There must be no such thing as logic IL
logic is to be an obstacle TO. doing the
big and brave and daring thing In
time of emergency. or To doing the com
munplace. practical thing.
But there are hard facts, and these
hard facts constituted the logistics of
the navy-such facts as had to do with
oil and coal and beef and bread and
supplies of every kind.
An army goes on its belly, navy
on its logistics. They both mean the
same thing. The navy term is more
elegant. if less understandable.
In 1917 we did send over a division OF
powerful battleships under command OF
Admiral Rodman. which served with
the British grand fleet to the end OF
the war and the surrender of the Ger
man fleet Their splendid service Won
the admiration Of their British COM
rades. but these hattleships were coal
burners and did not interfere Win
logics as the sending of the entire fieet
would have done.
our main reason. then for refraining
from sending the whole of the Atlantlc
flect L. the North sea was because the
allied powers and the operating depart
ment Of the American navy agreed that
the utilization Of the tonnage i WouN
require in order L. Keep ii supplied with
oil and coal and food was not juSuhcd
In any chance there might he for a sud
don sally of the German fleet. II was
,cr,. difrult Ia supply fuel oil enough
flr the Eritish ncct. cur dcstroy"rS
and our biggest hattleships We're oil
,,irncrs To send them over would have
Idcd t. the fuel problem
Tonnage the Great Need.
Tonnage was in those critical days
desperately needed for the transporta-
;,, Il troops aud 81 supplies to sustain
aud munitiou the troops. Everything
- that could he spared had 70 he
strritired - this supreme need The
liicd armies and navies were dependent
upon provisions which We must send.
To have sent any considerable part "t
In, Atlantic tiecJ overseas would have
meant depicting the scant enough ton
mage available for III. forces already
N the war zone. This. i was thought.
would be uuwise.
LoEis:ics kept the fleet At homc dur
ing the first months IL thc War. but
there was another thought in mind al
50 when il was suggested that Wc send
over All our vessels This vas no sol
fsn considcra iiou. L grew ont q the
feeling that il through any accident IN
log OF storm German battleships pr
haftle cruisers should tNade thc vigil
anc, Il the British fleet and make
aci, wav ihtu The Ataut5, the only
force TIL. world could louk ~ fer proc
lection waS our Atlantic fcrt.
II the Germans had possess q ne
rel-y, and da.lnE ta max, ! dash for
.a, open so i they had preferred
rs -.s> destru, ;len and death rather
Than accep, tn, humiliation af sur
render. ! think il IS quito ross Pile that
raouEh n their fast battle cruisers could
Aa4, broken through - play havoc
1..f.r, hey were overhauled and sunk
la sach even; the presence of the At
.,rtc feet. unengaged and ready for
instant action would have boon the
nape and comfort of our allies and
.h, proof of eur good Judgment
German> Lacking in Audacity.
After our troops began crossing the
.tAntsr III large numbers ther, was
aWays ;hc rlSk that German cruisers,
WOULD appear suddenly. attacking and
>.nktnE transports. Looking back nov
fnd i difficult 70 believe that the
Germans did not attemp; 10 d. his
-hirc. Had they succeeded in even one
- tUa cases il would haNo meant much
IL .hcm They lacked the audariry
A. .h.ncs obviously approar rhed a
o1maN and victory hung in he balance
IA 1915. I fc., the possibility 81 q bold
,.rtur. by the German navy was So
area: that = mus; be considered most
SERIOUSLY. L seemed - M chac thv
Germans were likely - MAKE one Splen-
sd dash in risk everything effort 70
win the Wal
DISPATCHED division Of dread
n4uchts overseas under the command
~ Admaril T :. Rodgers. with specific
.nstructions 10 be vigilant for the ap-
l.earance Of any possible German cruis-
-. and. AZ ali hazards. 10 give protec-
non To- the American troop transports
The British fleet and Admiral Rod
mans division were based or Scapa
How.
Might Have Sunk Thousands.
IL the miracle OF escape DdQ happened
one German raider. free, and IN the
vicinity Of Brest, could have sunk troop
ships with thousa nds Of men before il
could have been sunk. unless powerful
dreadnaugh's stood between the trans
ports and danger. So Admiral Rodgers
division was based on Bantry bay. il
position TO intercept.
II we had failed 10 take this precau
,iau and an enemy cruiser had el1ldef
the blockade. what would have been my
condemnation? Had we though such {
neglect or error OF judgment lost th'
lives Of any Of our men I could not have
forgiven myself, and the country woulC
not have forgiven me.
But tho Germans We're too prudent 4
~ kc this venture. Under like ciUcum
stances. ! believe, sooner than max,
possible an ignominious surrender. sucl
a. W. witnessed At Scapa Flow the meI
81 the American navy or the British
navy would have died in the resolve I,
~ least 20 down IN ne las dash agains
tho enemy.
Question of Rank.
There was a minol difficulty whicl
was involved IN the proposal 10 sen,
Admiral Mayo and the Atlantic feet t,
the North sea. ! mention il only to as
sert emphaucally that if consideration
~ naval strategy, cOnsidera tions affect
ing the common interests, had made j