New-York tribune., 1921-03-17

1e Is not Too much to say that
battle feet cannot be ready for war,
nor can It hope to win In battle against
a feet that Is properly trained, unless
1t Is kept busy month after month
and year after year IN up-to-dato ma
neuvers and tactical exercises at sea
in time Of peace. Thee should be no
let-up to this work if victory is to be
assured. Every emergency should be
anticipated, If possible, and every cap
tain and division commander should be
so "indoctrinated"-so completely fa-
nilar with the general battle ideas of
the commander in chief-that all will
quickly adjust themselves to unexpected
situations, and never fail to cooperate
in carrying out his plans of attack and
defense. II is q wonderful school OF
organization and discipline, in which
the safety Of nation may be at stake.
The Lesson Of Tsushinsa
From the study Of recent naval wars
we find ample proof Of the vital neces-
sity Of drilling a feet in practical sea
tactics in time Of pcace--years before
the battle begins.
When Japan precipitated the war
against Russia the Russian feet In the
East was caught mapping. 1t was not
united, as 1t should have been, during
the months when hostilities were plain
ly threatening. The main force was
at Port Arthur, squadron was at
Vladivostok, and a division was In
Corean waters. These three fragments
had never been properly mobilized and
drilled as unit in anticipation Of war.
There was no battle plan. The Rus
sian forces, had they been united and
properly drilled, would have been equal
or superior to the Japanese feet, and
they would have had fair chance in
battle. But they were divided and un-
trained as a fighting machine, and the
Japanese destroyed them in detail.
Following the destruction or block
| ade of their Far East fleet, the Rus
sian Admiralty sent Admiral Rodjest-
vensky with another unframed feet
from the Baltic to meet the united and
veteran naval forces Of Japan. The
fleets met at Tsushima and the second
Russian feet was destroyed. It's doom
WAS sealed before the battle began.
The story waS told and the result pre-
dicted by two Russian officers during
tho cruise of Rodjestvensky's feet
from the Baltic to Tsushimx. One of
these officers declared that chaos
reigned IN the Russian navy; that
there was no cooperation; that the
Navy Department was incompetent;
that their feet had had no war ma
neuvcrs whatever and that the appear
ance Of the Japanese Aeet found the
Russian SO unprepared in tactical exer-
cises and their initial deployment for
battle was SO clumsily performed that
the result Of tho engagement was fore
told. On the other hand the Japanese
fleet had been continuously under Ad-
miral Togo's command for years and
was drilled to the minute. As logical
result Togo advanced to the attack
with perfect confidence and calmly ma
neuvered his feet across the head OF
the Russian column with such deadly
skill that Rodjestvensky's force was
soon disorganized. disrupted and it's
fragments beaten in detail Organisa-
tion, concentration Of force and sk!llful
training for months before the battle
gave overwhelming victory to the jap
anese when the two fleets met The
result was inevitable.
From the pathetic story Of the Rus
sian officer Pilotovski, written before
the battle, We can picture the utter lack
OF morale and the complete hopeless
ness that prevailed among the ofacera