The Birmingham age-herald., 1921-05-02

made was right and wise and even i'm m' perative. When he found that he was failing he summed up his effort in the emphatic declaration:
 But, Mir President, it is the logic, the memorable logic, of the situation"
 Yes" said the President, that would be all right except for one thing"
 What is that?" asked the man in dead ly earnest. His sense of humor was un- happily deficient.
 The President smiled, and then said quietly, but conclusively:
 There is no such thing as logic"
 And the President was right in the par ticular instance under discussion. There must be no such thing as logic if logic is to be an obstacle to doing the big and brave and daring thing in time ot emergency, or to doing the commohe sense, practical thing.
 But there are hard facts, and these nard facts constituted the logistics of the navy-such facts as had to do with Qli and coal and beef and bread and sup plies of every kind.
 An army goes on it's belly" navy on its logistics, They both mean the same thing. The navy term is more ele- gant, if less understandable.
 In 1917 we did send over a division or powerful battleshps under command ot Admiral Rodman which served with the British grand fleet to the end of the war and the surrender of the German fieee' Their splendid service won the admlra- tion of their British comrades but these battleships were coal burners and dlo not interfere with logistics as the send ing of the entire fleet would have done.
 Our main reason, then, for refralnihg from sending the whole of the Atlantic fleet to the North sea was because the all lied powers and the operating depart ment of the American navy agreed that the utilization of the tonnage 1t would re- ouire in order to keep it supplied with oil and coal and food was not 1ustifled py any chance there might be for sudden sally of the German fleet. It was very difficult to supply fuel oil enough for the British fleet Our destroyers and our biggest battleships were oil burners. TO send them over would have added to the fuel problem.
 TONNAGE THE GREAT NEED
 Tonnage was in those critical days des- perately needed for the transportation or troops and of supplies to sustain ana muntion the troops. Everything else that could be spared had to be sacri1lceo to this supreme need. The allied armies and navies were dependent upon provi- sions which we must send. To have sent any considerable part of the Atlantic fleet overseas would have meant depict ing the scant enough tonnage aVailapie for the forces already in the war zone This, it was thought would be unwise.
 logistics kept the fleet at home during the first months of the war but there was another thought in mind also when it was suggested that we send over ail our vessels. This was no selfish consld- eration It grew out of the feeling that if through any accident in fog or storm German battleshiups or battle cruisers should evade the vigilance of the Britlsh fleet and make their way into the AL lantic the only force the world could LOOK to for protection was our Atlantic rect
 If the Germans had possessed the nerve and daring to make dash for tas open sea; if they had preferred to risk destruction and death rather than accept the humiliation of surrender. think 1t IS quite possible that enough of their fast battle cruisers could have broken through to play havoc before they were over hauled and sunk In such event the presence of the Atlantic fleet. upengaged and ready for instant action, would haze been the hope and comfort of our allies and the nroof of our good judgment
 GERMANS LACK AUDACITY
 After our troops began crossing the Atlantic in large numbers there was always the .risk tha- German cruise.'S would appear suddenly, attacking anc SlnNalg l16nSDUItS. i-oOiNiiie ps'NAN f-S'' find it difficult to believe that the Ger mans did not attempt to do this thins' Had they succeeded in even one or two cases it would have meant much 10 them. They lacked the audacity.
 As things obviously approacned a climax and victory hung in the balance in 1918, I felt the possibility of a ool1 venture by the German navy was so great that it must be considered mos. seriously It seemed to me that the Germans were likely to make one spieE- did dash in a risk-everything effort l. win the war.
 | dispatched divislv1 of dreadnaughts overseas under the command Of Admra' T. S. Rodgers, with specific instructions to be vigilant for the appearance ot any possible German cruiser and, at all ha@- ards. ito give protection, to the American troop transports.
 The British fleet and Admiral Rod mans division were based on Scapa MIGHT HAVE SUNK THOUSANDS
 If the miracle of escape had happened one German raider, free and In the vicinity of Brest, could have sunk troop ships with thousands of men before II could have been sunk. unless powerful dreadnaughts stood between the trans norfs and danger So Admiral Rodgers