Pueblo chieftain., 1921-11-20
By MARK SULLIVAN

Washington, D. c., Nov. 19.-The
heart OF what is going on today In the
closed conference on limitation OF
armaments lies in the Anglo-Ja5anese
alliance, and that. in turn, lies in the
question which OF the two main SUD
iects of the conference. as a whole 10 TO
be decided first-the question of arma-
ment or the far eastern question.
The best way to ciarify this situa-
tion as 1t lies on the table in front OF
the delegates is to recall some incl
dents not generally known which came
up during the weeks preceding the con
ference. In the Informal ana CONF,
Dental negotiations which preceueu
the formal issuance of the invi.a.ro. i,5cn
to the conference there IS some evidence
that Americas original thought was
merely for IL conference to discuss
armament. When the British rece1Veu
this informal suggestion they replied py
saying that far eastern problems were
closely connected with disarmament
and that they would like to have pre-
limiuary conference, to be shared in by
Japan, Great Britain. and the United
States for the discussion OF far eastern
problems.
At the time the motive of this sug-
gestion was little misunderstood, to
the disadvantage of the British. lt
was thought that this WAS an effort
on Great Britain's part to make agree
ments about the far east a preliminary
cOnOltlOn 10 dpoul
ment. 1t was also thought that ~
would not seem courteous or proper TO
the other nations invited to the main
conference to first hold preliminary
conference. participated In only by a
few of the nations invited to the main
one.
For these reasons America rejected
Great Britain's suggestion of a pre-
liminary conference. At the time there
was some danger of misunderstanding
of motives of the two nations. In point
of fact however, Great Britains sug-
gestion arose out OF wholly accidental
circumstances and did not have the
meaning ascribed to 1t. 1t happened
that at the time Great Britain received
tho invitation there was In London a
meeting OF the Dominion PremSrs, IN
ciudiug those from Australia and New
Zealand. The latter gentlemen made
the point that 1t would be inconvenient
for them to attend a conference In NO.
vember. and that they would like to
have n preliminary conference IN
America. covering the question In whicn
thcy were most overwhelmingly.
the far east-at time when they
could attend 1t on their way back to
their homes.
That is nearly all there was to the
British suggestion. It ought to be said,
Great Britain's idea that the far east
ern agreement should come first. When
the formal agenda were issued. with
armament first on the list of subjects,
messages came out OF Great Britain ex-
pressing some disturbance. In fact,
however. the putting OF armament first
, on tho list by America had no more
meaning than the mere fact that In IN
alphabetical order "A" comes before
'F~'. When the conference opened
Saturday Secretary Hughes showed
some consciousness of this difference OF
approach. and said that while the point
WAS not very material. It seemed to
him most desirable to take up first the
subject about which the peoples OF the
world are most disturbed.
As the situation stands today
America Is In the position of urs.
inis settlement OF armament
frst. Out Of the settlement on
armament flows naturally by i'm
plication the disposition OF the Anglo
Japanese alliance 1t is obvious that
where maximum limit of armament
is fixed for each nation that limit
would not apply II any two nations
within the agreement should have an
alliance. which. in effect, adds ths
armament OF one to tho other. The
British see clearly that tho adoption OF
the Hughes program, or any close var
iation of Il. would automatically call
for the elimination OF the Anglo-Japan-
ESQ alliance.
II is safe to infer that this Is not
wholly agreeable to the British. Their
stronger wish would be to take up first
uve~tions OF tho far east. II |. prob-
ably safe to say that tho British pro-