Atlanta tri-weekly journal. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1920-19??, 1921-10-01
Breaking America Wings

deeply to be deplored. II we are ever to &C
quire an adequate air service for commerce,
let alone for national defense, there must be
steady encouragement Of aviation in all its
branches and Of the industries on which it is
bottomed. Should we wait until our needs
grow extensive or critical, trusting for due
knowledge and initiative to the stimulus OF
special demand, we shall be sadly outd1s-
tanced by forehanded nations and, in case of
emergency, stand at a dangerous disadvan-
tage.
Our lesson from the World War should be
warning enough against continued neglect OF
so vital matter. Seeing the imperative
need of aeronautic support for the American
expeditionary forces and also for contributing
to the kindred necessities Of the Allies, Con-
gress readily appropriated for this purpose
six hundred and forty million dollars to be-
gin with, and increased it by subsequent al
lowances Nor was there lack of admins
trative and engineering talent, and certainly
not OF jealous interest on the part Of those
having the work Immediately in hand. Much
has been said touching the failures of the air
program, and different critics have laid the
blame at different doors. But the least bias
ed and most competent observers are inclined
to think that the results accomplished were
highly creditable when compared with the
magnitude and difficulty Of the task and
with our unpreparedness. Unpreparedness
it was that caused most of the trouble in our
plans and efforts.
"The comprehensive inexperience of the
United States in the manufacture of aircraft
when we entered the war accounts Tor our
over-cOnfidence and for the heart-break1ng
delay in getting under way" This is the
statement Of Major H. M. Hickman, of the
United States Air Service. Writing from au-
thoritative knowledge, he adds. in Current
History: "Our advent into the war was at a
time when the development of special types or
aircraft for specific purposes was at It's
height. Planes which were considered ade-
quate one month were inadequate the next,
and the combatants were striving to 'outdo
each other in designs as we'll as in quantity
production. If we were to go into quantity
production, it was necessary to select engines
that would not become obsolete before they
could be produced. The same thing applied
in lesser degree to plane manufacture. Our
lack Of experienced aerOnaut1cal engineers
made it necessary to make Chinese copies
of both planes and engines Experienced
aeronautical engineers are naturally not nu-
merous in a country where aviation is regard
ed by Congressman and Senators as more OF
a curiosity than power for national strength
and progress. There were three erroneous
Hickman: "First, the idea that engine pro-
duction was harder to build up than plane
production; second, that the quantities OF
raw material needed were comparatively
small and would not conflict with demands
in other lines; and, third, that the manufac-
ture Of airplanes presented no special diff
culties which existing factories could not
meet" None of these misconceptions prob
ably would have prevailed, and in all llkel-
hood the difficulties and backsets resulting
49, I'D Ha1
aviation and it's attendant industries re-
ceived betimes fair portion Of the national
interest which their Importance merited.
"If these warning facts are now ignored,
what can be said in extenuation of future
failures? Aviation's vital bearing upon land
and sea defense is SO we'll attested that moth
ing further need be said in that regard. But
aside from its vast military and naval sig
nificance, its peace-time uses call for earnest
and generous consideration It's possibilities
in the mail service alone should enlist the
Governments heartiest concern. In Europe
the aerial transportation Of parcels and heav-
Ter freight as we'll as letters, has been de-
veloped to a point where 1t is SO profitable
and satisfactory that it's continued expansion
seems assured. With anything like due en-
couragement from the Government, Amer1-
can air service would go as vigorously for
ward.
But as yet we have no aeronautic policy
worth the name. The army air service OF
which the nation stood possessed at the close
of the war and which by now would have been
of high efficiency as we'll as large porpor-
lions, had it's personnel and its industrial ad-
juncts been maintained, was suffered to dis
integrate for lack of support from a Congress
whose pique against the Wilson administra-
ton would not yield even to manifest pa
triotic duty. In the winter of 1913 the serv-
ice included more than twenty-three thous-
and officers and upwards of two hundred
and forty thousand men. Within a twelve
month the number fell to some fifteen hun
dred officers and about twelve thousand men,
and continued to diminish. During the same
period the capital in the aircraft industry
shrank from one hundred million dollars to
a beggarly shadow of that sum, thus renew
ing one of the gravest handicaps to our war
time aeronautic efforts. In sharp contrast
with the governmental neglect which was
chiefly responsible for these sad declines,
England, France and Italy freely encouraged
civil aeronautics by the establishment of air
routes and terminals, by the development OF
air mail, and by the enactment of laws that
he1pfully regulated aerial traffic and made
it business Of recognized standing. Yet, in
America, birth1and of the airplane and re-
nowned for initiative and resourcefulness, the
great art and science and business oil avia-
ton have received but wretched aims at the
hands of Congress. Thus far, indeed, that
body has not even considered the drafting OF
an adequate aerial code.
Surely, future generations will wonder how
such indifference could be-" Not to develop
the nations air service is to bury Ale of the
richest talents ever entrusted to people; ic
| is to shut the door in the shining face of op-
portunity; ie is to break the wings where
with we may keep abreast of glorious forces
| in the worlds progress
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