The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1921-12-21
TOPEKA STATE JOURNAL
Information Bureau
FREDERIC j. HAsKIN, Director,
Washington, D. o.
HOW THE PACT, WAS MADE.

D
Japanese -Alliance', is the way one
acute observer characteriZes the four
power pact which now stands as the
great achievement of the conference
Tt is said by those who know tho
inside workings of the conference to
represent real triumph for American
diplomacy. Not a real triumph was
difficult in the circumstances. The
American delegation had all OF the
best cards IN its hands and in order to
win it's chief detectives it had but to
use ordinary horse sense and stand
firm. That is a good deal more than
American diplomacy has generally
done.
That the four-power pact does rep
resent a long step toward the accom-
plishment of the chief American OBJ
jectiVes in the conference seems to be
the consensus of the best-infOrmed
opinion. The only unfavorable
opinion comes from certain irreconcil-
ables in the senate, who are opposed
to any form of agreement with for
eign nations.
The old phrase "entangling alli-
ances'' viii not apply to this new
agreement however, for it is in no
sense an alliance. 1t does not bind
us or seek to bind u.s. to any action,
offensive or defensive, nor does it
bind any OF the other contracting par
ties to such action. 1t is merely an
agreement to talk things over in case
of trouble, and a further statement
that the insular possessions of the
powers concerned shall remain as
they are. This means for US chiefly
that our position in the Philippines is
not to be a matter of dispute.
The agreement is thus seen, on its
positive side, to amount to very little.
It expresses an intention to talk things
over in a pacific spirit and that is
ab0at all. The significance of the
instrument is that it completely super
sedes the AnglO-Japanese alliance and
that it signifies the acquiescence of
those two powers in the American
point of view.
The British Plan.
1t seems to be generally recognized
now that the British delegation came
to the conference to perpetuate the
Anglo-Japanese alliance If it could do
SO without antagonizing the United
States. Japan, of course, came with
the intention of keeping the alliance
in effect if possible. Japan had every
thing to gain by the alliance and
everything to lose by it's abrogation.
The advantages of the alliance to
Great Britain were not SO obvious.
1t was suggested in a previous Has
kin Letter that perhaps the chief rea-
son why Britain wanted the alliance
was because she shared with Japan
a desire to check the spread OF re-
publican ideals in the Orient. 1t has
also been pointed out that for great
many years the gist of the diplomacy
of Great Britain, as the strongest sea-
power. has been to combine with the
third Strongest against the second
strongest.
Whatever the motive may have
been, British press propaganda in the
earIv stages Of the conference was all
nf alliance
said that this campaign was stopped
when the Americans served notice on
the British that the renewal of the al
lance would on no account be toler-
ated. Lloyd George is said to have
been the one who made the sudden
a agreement of the delegates, after a
long stalematc, possible. He is said
to have cabled the British delegation
to abandon all efforts either for a re-
newal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance
or for a tripartite alliance including
the United States. The present four
power pact was then quickly ar
ranged. 1t represents an explicit rec
ognition on the part of Great Britain
that the American point of view must
prevail in the Pacific.
The agreement does not touch the
question of China. 1t therefore leaves
the Chinese question as the chief re-
naming question before the confer
ence, and the only BONG of conten-
ton.
Where China Stands.
Almost everything that China asked
of the conference has been granted
"in principle" and almost nothing has
been granted in fact, It now remains
to be seen how much the United States
can win for China in the committees
which will decide the details of her
status. For the United States stands
now, as she has always stood, as the
champion and defender of China. In
the past her defense has been inef-
fectua1. She proclaimed the open
door principle, and then allowed ia
pan and all of the principal powers
to extract concessions from the Chi
nese government, make agreements
about China and establish spheres of
influence which have made the open
door policy a laughing stock. Mean
time, American capital has not been
altogether behindhand in exploiting
China by the concession method.
So far our professions of high dis
interested friendship for China have
amounted to the announcement of
policy which we could not enforce,
and few small favors such as not
collecting the Boxer indemnity.
The conference. so far, has done
little to remedy this situation, but it
has opened the way for us. AS long
as the Anglo-Japanese alliance lasted,
we were powerless in China. Now
that is out of the way. In addition,
the powers have agreed to a read
judication of all of the concessions
and spheres of influence they hold
in China. The table is cleared to
give China a new deal. 1t remains
to be seen just what it will amount
to. So far she has got her postof-
fees promised back to her, and a
statement that extra -territoriality will
be abolished at some time in the fu-
ture. Nothing substantial has been
granted.
Perhaps the two most difficult ques-
tions are those Of Japan's occupancy
of Shantung and her position in Man
churia. The United States must and
will press for China's rights in Shan
tung, because it is largely by her ac-
ton that Japan has obtained her pres
ent foothold there Japan's position
in Manehuria is q more difficult prob
lem. Both of these will be discussed
in future Haskin letters.