The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1921-12-24

they could destroy What they de-
stroyed was quite Insignificant If
l remember rightly. II submarines
could not render it impossible for
ships to lie more or less in the open
opposite the Dardanelles against a
well-guarded fleet. II is very diff
cult for me to believe that they
are going to prove. unless changes
occur, a very efficient weapon in
maritime warfare. do not wish
to dwell upon that because l do
not think, as 1 have already indi-
Gated, that it is the purely war
like use of the submarine which is
really before us now. The question
before US now is whether you are
going to encourage an instrument of
war which, IL il be encouraged-if.
indeed. it be permitted at all-will
undoubtedly be used in the illegiti-
mate destruction OF commerce. Now
whom is that going to injure? There
are two of the powers represented
here who, / think. have little or
nothing to fear or TO consider in
such a connection, and l do not
think either Japan or the United
States has anything whatever to
fear from that kind OF blockade
That is two out of the FIVE powers
here represented. How about the
three others? Take the case Of
Italy. Italy is not an island, but
for the purposes of this debate she
almost counts as an island. l re-
member the extreme difficulty we
had in supplying her even with The
minimum coal necessary to keep
her arsenals and manufactures GO
ing during the war. 1 doubt wheth-
er she could feed herself or supply
herself or continue as an efficient
lighting unit il she were really
blockaded. il her commerce were
cut off. which, please God, never
will be.
Itaiy's Five Neighbors.
Italy has five maritime neighbors
in the Mediterranean. 1 hope and
believe that peace, eternal peace,
will reign in those waters and in
those ancient homes of civilization.
But we are considering these mat
tiers from. as it were. the cold and
calculating point of view of a
member of general stan. He,
looking at it without any political
knowledge, without any foresight
as to the trend OF opinion, and
merely considering how nations are
situated, would say to Italy, You
have five neighbors, each one OF
which can, IL 1t desires it, blockade
your coast and make your position
untenable without having a single
surface ship
Now l will take the case of
France. France is nearly self-sup-
porting in point Of food, and France
has a great land frontier which
gives her access, directly and in
directly, to all the great markets
of the world.
The whole war turned upon the
possibility of keeping 6pen con:-
munications between Europe and
the United States Of America, Great
Britain and France, and on supply
ing Italy with the absolute relui-
sites of national life. That was the
most difficult problem of the war.
IF that war had been fought
without Great Britain, where are
the merchant ships and where are
the sailors and where are the fish,
ing folk that would have, manned
the only protection you had or
would have had against the absolute
blockade of your coast?
II do not know whether all my
friends round this table can speak
with equal confidence of their posi-
ton
schanxer Also Talks.
Mr.. Schanzer for Italy said:
Mr.. Balfour has recalled Eng
lands efficient aid for Italy's sup
plies during the war. wish in the
first place to express to the British
delegate, who represents his coun-
try with such q great authority.
Italy's sincere gratitude. We shall
never forget what England has
done. and Mr.. Balfour knows the
cordial friendship for England.
which is traditional amorg the
italian people and constitutes one
Of the surest bases OF all italian
policy.
Were we to decide today the
suppression of submarines we would
evidently be placing ourselves in a
dangerous condition Of manifest in
teriority in respect TO those states
which are not represented here and
which might continue to use sub
marines. The italian delegation be-
heves. therefore, that this problem
must be examined subsequently in
wider conference. For the pres
emit, however. one point il clear in
our minds and that is that the best
course would be to follow even In
this case the spirit of the American
proposal, and consequently to lin
Il the submarines to the measure
strictly necessary for the ends of
purely deensive naval policy.
In reply tn Mr.. BaIfour. Adrfra1