New-York tribune., 1921-12-25
Chief Obstacle to Disarmament
Is Removed BY Strategy of u. S.
Great Britain and Japan Both Agree to Scrap Pact
That Omtlived Its Usefulness, Yet Constituted
Greatest Peace Menace

When Mr.. Hughes went into the con-
ference he carried with him the fore.
knowledge that the United States would
accept no alliance and the desire that
nothing that should even remotei iy
suggest an alliance be- made.
But Mr.. Hughes's position was din
cult. It was quite as difficult as that
Of Mr.. Wilson at Paris, because, like
Mr.. Wilson, he had declared in ad-
vance for something. Mr.. Wilson had
declared for the League OF Nations
Mr.. Hughes had indicated that, from
the American point Of view, the con
ference would be failure If the Anglo
japanese alliance were not eliminated.
And the chief trouble in all interna-
tional gatherings is that no nation can
get something for nothing. 1t was
written in advance, therefore, chat Mr.
Hughes would have to pay, and the
real question was what the SUM Of his
payments would be.
We know the answer now. The four
party treaty covering the "rcgions OF
the Pacific" represents exactly the
price which Mr.. Hughes and his gov
ernment were forced TO pay for the
elimination of the Anglo-Japanese alli-
sncc. The effort to suggest that this
four-party treaty has any resemblance
TO the treaty OF insurance Mr.. Wilson
gave France is idle. What is true,
however, is that both treaties repre-
sent compensation paid by our repre-
sentatives to obtain their way in other
directions.
The situation which had to be COW
cred was the necessity that the Brit
ism should get something which would
satisfy their Japanese allies and thus
honorably scquit them OF the debt
which they ack: .wlcdged as owing to
their Japanese ally. The United States
was troubled about the Angio-Japanese
alliance. this the British recognized,
although they universally asserted that
American anxiety was unfounded and
the alliance rather guaranty of Sc
curity than a menace OF attack. But
| the Japanese professed to be equally
disturbed over the menace which was
disclosed in the expansion of the
American navy and the expression Of
American feeling over japanese policy
alike in the Pacific islands and in
| China.
Some Kind of Insurance
Needed to Satisfy Japan
To satisfy Japan there had to be
found some form of insurance. Tha,
insurance could not be had in a treaty
of actual alliance, since the fate of tho
tripartite agreement guaranteeing
France well demonstrated the fact that
the United States Senate would not
consent to foreign cntanglements OF
commitments. What had to be discoy.
cred then was some negative under.
taking; that is, some solemn anG
binding agreement on the part Of the
United States not to do something, anc
that something was obviously to at.
tack Japan
All the debate seems to hav,
conferred here. Mr.. Hughes and his as
sociates put all their cards upon ths
table, as they had to do. They sale
IN substance that they desired tn,
elimination of the Anglo-5apanes
alliance, and they met The suggestion
that three-party alliance be sub
stituted with the square assertion tha
any such compromise was out Of tn,
question, because it would not suryiv
the attack Of the United States Senate
The maximum Of possibility, from thei
point of view, was some agrec.aent b,
the United States which would silenc
all Japanese apprehensions of Ameri
can interference.
The maximum Of possibility from tn
American side, the largest price tn
American representatives could pa
for the elimination Of the Anglo
Japanese alliance, was thus compre
hcnded in some form of self-denyin
ordinance, some kind of undertaken
which did not commit the United State
to support the japanese in war or i
peace, which did not involve the US
, or the threat of the use Of force unde
any circumstances. Both the Britis
and the Japanese hoped for more
argued for more, but bowed in the en-
to the fact that the consent of thei
American associates in conference T.
more would doom the treaty in tn
United States Senate.
The British would have been glad l.
substitute an American British treat
for the Anglo-Japanesc alliance, thi
went without saying, for The Japanes
alliance carried with it perils an,
problems for the empire. But, sine
this was out of the question, their pur
pose was to make any Anglo Japanese
American agreement as solid and def
mite as possible. The Japanese wer
similarly practical. They appreciate
the fact that the Anglo-Japanese ALI
ance had lost it's vitality, that ii,
British would under no ciYcums stanc
support Japan against America an
would almost certainly fight on tn
American side in case Of war.
Japanese Found Themselves
) With Treaty Of Little Value