Evening star., 1921-11-10
CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XIV.
THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE.
The left bank of the Rhine was one
Of the main issues Of the peace con-
ference. 1t brought out more clearly
more seriously than any other, the
difference in national psychology. the
difficulty that governments and pso-
Pies have in understanding one an
other. albeit they are loyal allies,
united by victory and by sacrifice. The
occupation of the left bank of the
Rhine and of the bridgeheads was for
us French both an Indispensable
guarantee for the enforcement of the
against invasion such as had oc-
Cured twice in fifty years. To others,
associated though they were heart
and soul in our perils of the past and
future, but interpreting history In
a different light, this occupation. no
seemed unjustifiable, useless and dan
gerous.
Stressed by Marshal Foch.
AS early as November. 1918, Marshal
Foch on purely military grounds had
addressed note to M. Clemenceau,
laying stress on the necessity OF
making the Rhine the western from
tier of Germany. On January 10 fol-
lowing. in second note. which he
handed to the commanders-in-chi Of
the allied armies, Marshal Foch had
developed his arguments and summed
them UP in the following conclusion:
Marshal Won MOltke placed the mill
tary frontier of Germany at the Rhine
and at the end of one of his papers
writes: There can be no doubt about
the ordinary strength of our theater
of operations on the Rhine. One thing
only could endanger it-a premature
offensive by us on the left bank with
insufficient forces" And elsewhere he
states: "The main line of defense OF
Prussia against France Is the Khine
with it's fortresses. This line Is SO
strong that it is far from recurring
all the forces of the monarchy"
Today this situation is reversed in
favor Of coalition. The coalition can
not renounce its advantages, cannot
relinouish its buckler of defense In
that region-the Rhine-without serl-
ously compromising its future: The
"Wacht am Rhein" must be Its slogan.
Frontier Of Germans.
Henceforth the Rhine must be the
western frontier Of the German pee.
pies. Germany must be deprived of
all access to or military utilization
of it-that is to say, Of all territorlal
sovereignty on the left bank Of this
river-in a word. of every facility 10
reach by sudden invasion, as in 1914,
of Belgium and Luxemburg. the
shores Of the North sea and threaten
England: to move around France S
natural defenses, the Rhine and the
Meuse; to conquer her northern
regions and approach that of Paris:
The Rhine, a military frontier IN
ntp,fn f1n
peace, which is the aim OF coalition
offers no territorial advantage to any
country. There is no question, in
deed, of annexing the left bank OF
the Rhine, of increasing the territory
of France or of Belgium, but simply
common barrier of security essential
to the society of democratic nations.
There Is no question of intrusting
the Kuardianship. Of this common bar
rier to any one power, but OF assur-
ing by the moral and materiai SUP up
defense of their lives and futures by
forbidding Germany, once for all. TO
carry war and her spirit OF DONNA
ton across the river. : :
Function to Fix Status.
OF course, it will be the function
Of the peace treaty to fix the status
of the Inhabitants of the left bank
Of the Rhine not included frontieys with'n 'ne
The Rhine policy advocated by
France had from the beginning been
misunderstood by the British min
listers. There where France saw an
essential guarantee-a guarantee OF
George and his colleagues, obsessed
by memories of Napoleon and by the
intemperance of part of our press,
feared as early as 1917 menace to
the peace of Europe. 1t was in 1917
snsrseticaily snsr ah Hep repudiated % the idea Of
self lf-governing Rhine state which N.
Aristide BRAND had suggested the
preceding January in confidential
letter to NJ Paul Cambon, French am
bassador at London. The British min.
that an agreement between the allies
had ever contemplated the creation Of
independent states on the left bank
Of the Rhine. Such 2 solution" he
added, has never entered into the
Ms. RIef lloyd ssorse. Tor his part: had
another Alsace-Lorraine" He also
said: "Fhe strongest impression made
upon me by my first visit ITO Paris
was the statue Of strassoarE veiied IN n
possible for Germany to erect a SINH
lar statue" Speeches and remarks
revealed, under varying forms, fear
from which the British government
had never freed itself.
Echoes of Fear.
The first converse tions brought us
echoes Of this fear. It was unre-
servedly admitted that we needed
guarantees. But the means proposed
by us caused alarm. All talk OF SEP
aration between Germany and the left
bank, Of military occupation of the
latter, OF participation in this occu-
patton: vas extremely. repugnant to
emphasized the fact that other securi-
ties were possible, such as disarma-
ment Of Germany; the league Of na-
tions; II need be, the complete de-
milttarization OF the left bank Of the
II was toward the beginning OF
March that the serious discussion be.
gan. President Wilson is, at the mo.
ment, on the ocean en- route fol
France. Mr.. Lloyd George. has just
returned to Paris. It is decided te
prepare the work Sg Of the Sa heads Of Of
three. ! represent France, Mr.. Philip
Kerr. Great Britain, and DR.. Mezes
the United States. explain YER
bally, in all details; the French pro-
posals. AS my explanation proceeds
become conscious Sof the psycholog-
offered q Strengthening. Of the dis
armament clauses. I am offered q
reinforcement Of those dealing with
demilitarization. AS soon as I return
to tho question of occupation oppo-
sition becomes more marked.
EiSht Heurs OF Dialogue.
M. MsSes says little. These eiEi,t
hours OF discussion are . dialogue
between Mr.. Kerr and myself, and II
ie evident that through the voice OF
his chief secretary T. 10 the British
prime minister himself who-invts-
ible. but present-speaks with some