The Birmingham age-herald., 1921-11-13

' ANdNt tue fOubt3 QA us FGSIutuEHt which Is likewise the residence of l the defendant, and where the first | publication Is made, and pick from ! the IA counties one where the citi-
 zenship is such that. to his mind
 indicates practical results in his | suit. "%
 We can give to this statute a req sonable construction and one which | violates no constitutional mandates.
 Every letter of the statute can be en- | forced, by saying. under the admitted
 facts of this case, the cause of ac- | ton accrued in Jakson county. where it stands admitted that the paper containing the article alleged to be | libelous was first published. Or If | the first publication be in some other county, let the action be brought there. Had we not better read into l this statute words (which) would be 1 consonant with a reasonable con- struction, than read into 1t. as first above indicated, words which make | it abhorrent to reason, right, justice and fair play?
 | Whilst the law broadly stated says that each publication constitutes a cause of action, yet the courts | hold, as was admitted in the argu ment of the case and In respondents brief, that but one suit can be>brought on the same iibelous publication, no matter in how many places, or at how many times 1t is published, i. G. | given to the reading public.
 l ''The extent of the publication may | be shown to enhance the damage and the suit thereby draws 10 itself all alleged causes of action, and makes of them all the cause of action mentioned by the staute. The courts | have made this rule of law, because | to permit a great multiplicity of suits for the one libelous~ article would be to shock the sense of jus tice and right.
 Then why not, In the interest Of a construction of this statute, which would compert with justice and right, say that the cause of action mentioned therein, in cases of libel. means the cause of action accruins by the first publication of the article? We believe that we should so con- strue this staute, and for that reason | this suit should have been brought in Jackson county and not else where"
 | Louisiana Case
 In State vs. Moore, shpra, under a ! constitutional provision requiring that all criminal trials shall take | place in the parish in which the of l
 Munroe, c. J., dissenting. that >the printing and publication of a crlmi- nally nbelous newspaper in New Or l leans, though it was from there | mailed to and circulated in other i parishes was an offense committed | in New Orleans, and was not indict- able and triable in any other parish. 1 We quote from the opinion of O'NeilI. J., the following extract. the reason
 n ref txr6f nh fa mt tf. fI,o tion before us:
 "The learned district attorney says 1 In his brief that a verdict of the Twenty Fourth judicial district court 1 in and for the parish of East Felici- ana, on the bills of indictment or in- formation in this case, would free the | defendants from prosecution on the same libelous matter in any other ju- risdiction or in any other court ot | this state. That admission Is an ac- knowledgement of the correctness of the. proposition that only one offense was committed, If the article com plained of was libelous. by the pub lication of the article in the Times | Picayune, no matter how many par ishes or jurisdictions the paper cir l culated in. If what Daniel D. Moore l did was complete offense. and con- | stituted only one offense, it was cer- 1 tainly committed in the city of New | Orleans. If the fact that bundle of copies of the Times Picayune, con- taining the alleged libelous article, was sent to the parish of East Feii- | cina conferred Jurisdiction upon the district court of that parish to try the alleged offender for what he did
 in the city of New Orleans, it must
 be upon the theory that the sending of the bundle of papers to the parish of East Feliciana constituted an of fense in that parish. If that be true.
 the sending of another bundle of
 newspapers to the parish of Rapsdes | constituted another offense in that parish, and the sending of another
 bundle of the newspapers to the par ish of Plaquemine constituted another distinct offense there: and, on the same principle, the sending of each | newspaper to each individual sub scriber or purchaser was a distinct l offense. It would lead to the anoma- lous proposition that as many distinct offenses were committed in as many different Jurisdictions, by what Dan-
 iel D. Moore did in the city of New Orleans, as there were copies of the
 newspaper containing the alleged li-
 belous article; that what Daniel D.
 Moore did in the city of New Orleans
 was multiplied into so many thous- | ands of offenses on his part as there
 were subscribers and purchasers and | readers of that issue of the Times
 Picayune. To say that a prosecu ton
 and conviction by court having ju-
 risdiction in any parish where one
 of the newspapers found it's way
 would protect the defendant from
 prosecution in any other parish does
 not answer the constitutional re-
 quirement that he shall be tried for what he did in the parish where the | offense was committed and In no
 other parish"
 It is true, as pointed out by counsel for appellee, that in the later case Of Vicknair vs Daily Times Pub. Co, Ia.) sl South. 534, In an action for civil libel, 1t was said that the case of State vs. Moore, supra, "can have no application to civil actfon:" and it was held that the circulation of its libelous newspapers, by It's own agents, in the parish of Jefferson, though published in New Orleans, laid the venue of the action in Jefferson. It Is clear, however. that the vicknair case does not impugn the reasoning or conclusion of the Moore case: for 1t Is grounded upon a venue statute which authorizes the bringing of an action for damages against a cor | poration Tin the parish where such damage is done, or trespass com mitted,' and the court evidently con- strued the word damage" as meaning damnum in its proper sense of hurt, so that the locus of the hurt, done directly by the defendant, became the locus of the action
 Decision in Kentucky
 In the case of Louisville Press Go. vs. >Tennelly, 109 Ky. 761, under a statutory provision that every action for inujry to character must be