The New York herald., 1921-02-06
FRANK H. sIMoNDs.

"A must be described as the Second
Conference of Paris (almost as inn
portant in certain phases as the f1rst), II
is essential to recognize that this Second
Conference like its famous predecessor
actually settled nothing. The best that one
can accurately say is that it laid down GER
tain methods of settlement But these are
subject to later discussion and amend
lnent, both during the forthcoming confer
ence with the Germans and during con-
ferences which must be had with other
nations possibly including the United
states, all of which will obviously be con-
cerned over the new circumstance, the tax
on exports.
The truth of the matter is that at Paris
In 1921 as in 1919 the representatives of
The nations who participated in the debate
were hopelessly handicapped by the pot-
ical situations in their own countries.
BRAND just succeeding to power in France,
was compelled to make a showing in de-
fence of the French thesis that the sum
total of reparations should not be fixed in
advance of some accurate knowledge of
the capacity of Germany to pay. Lloyd
George was equally driven by the demand
IN Great Britain, where suffering due to
unemployment is intense. that the total of
in reopening the German market
Since neither Lloyd George nor BRAND
was in a position to recede a transaction
was inevitable, and this transaction like
ail other compromises, postpones rather
than promotes settlement And what is
true of reparations is true also of disarm-
ament The French thesis that Germany
must be compelled to disarm was accepted
by Lloyd George, but the British view that
No A.aG IL ~ k,yr
moment because. of German failure up to
date was similarly accepted by BRAND
accordingly new time limit with the
usual failures for compliance was fixed the
date being July !, the penalties further oc-
civation of German territory
Reparations and New Time Limit
UItimatum to Germany
But for the moment reparations and not
security is the mores important question We
have had during and since the Paris Con-
ference world wide demand that the Ger
mans be told what they had TO pay. One OF
the severest indie tments OF the original Paris
Conference was based upon its failure to
fix the sum total Of reparations; but this was
always impossible for two reasons one
British and the other French. Just before
the Paris Conference Lloyd George conducted
a general election in Britain on the issue Of
making Germany pay ton for ton. shilling
for shilling" and the campaign slogan was
Hang the Kaiser" The French public had
also been assured by its statesmen that Ger
many could and would pay the costs OF the
war.
BY the time Lloyd George reached Paris
he had already felt the reaction in his own
country, due TO the growing recognition that
Germany could not pay anything like what
ayn far nd l1ad baa
the figure stated by George on the advice 0f
British financiers). At Paris he encountered
the members of the American financial dele
cation, who agreed that Germany could not
pay a capital sum of above 81, 900 .000, ,0Uv.
and the further American insistence that un-
der the terms of the armistice, based on the
fourteen points, Germany was not bound to
pay, except for the actual destruction of
property, devastation and submarine costs in
word
George was bound by his campaign
promises, Clemenceau by the demands of his
country; both We're therefore agreed to leave
The sum unixed, as the sole way out Of
their dilemma. The representatives OF the
United States. after a vigorous battle, ac-
cepted this decision. Actually there was no
escape from 1t, since we were not ourselves
asking for any indemnity and finally be-
cause the repayment of the loans we had
upon the payment by Germany to our Eu-
ropean associates of very large sums.
After Paris the United States disappeared
from the discussion. Great Britain, under
the influence of Keynes and others, rapidly
moved toward the view that what was essen
tial was not the imposition of vast sums
Of indemnity on Germany, but rather the
prompt fixing of n reasonable sum and the
equally prompt resumption Of business. In
a word Great Britain concluded that in point
Of fact Germany would not pay much, could
only be compelled to pay largely by the con-
tinuance of something like war conditions
and the consequent further proongation OF
economic prostraton in all of Europe.
Step by step. then. Britain moved from
the position of George in the election
Of 1918 TO a position of extreme moderation.
I'm France the evolution was quite the
contrary. No German economic restoration
could affect France. The reopening of Ger
markets and the dependent markets
~ Middle Europe meant little or nothing to
France. BY contrast, the sole manner In
which France could extricate herself from
impending financial ruin was by compelling
Germany to pay largely. The Treaty of
Versailles was regarded by the mass OF
Frenchmen as giving France too little and
there developed a passionate determination
10 insist that what had been promised By
that document should be paid to the last
centime
France and Great Britain
Hold Different Views of Germany
We have had, .nen, for two years these
iyxn totally nnnooffa datofnn,,notv ,xot,,.r 80.