New-York tribune., 1921-11-15
England Sees
Menace From
Minor Powers
tcontInuad from page sno)

larger or smaller than ship Of ap-
parently the same tonnage, reckoned
according to another scale.
The memorandum defines an agree
ment between three bowers only. the
United States. Great Britain and
Japan. 1t Is laid down that "the ton
mage allowance" of France and Italv
! is reserved for the later considera-
tion of The conference" In other
words, when the three powers have
come to terms the two remaining,
France and Italy, will be invited to
agree to those terms. Even so. moth
ing is said OF other nations, and the
! question arises whether the position,
in their respect is adequately safe
guarded. 1t is an aspect of the case
which will be taken up, especially in
Europe, by those who argue that final
d.sarmam ent can only come about
through some kind of league or associ-
alton of all states.
| So far as big battleships are con-
cerned, il may be taken for granted
that neither France nor Italy nor any
ten years begin to build these colossal
units. 1t is not in any minor navy
that uper-dreadnought is likely to
be discovered. II, however, battle
ships vanish from the high seas
smaller units, and especially sub
marines, become the more important
to strategy. A secondary power like
Portugal or Chile might harass COM
merce with naval forces containing no
| battleships at all or even. cruisers, but
only sublnersibles built and maintained
1T might be, far inland, up rivers
at small cost, whether in material or
personnel For Britain, close to
Europe, this Is a matter of prime i'm
portance.
Submarines Vital to England
The schedule reads: Cruisers, ho-
tilla leaders, destroyers, United State.
and Britain, 100000 tons apiece; Japan
! 270, 900. Submarines--United States and
Britain, $4,000 tons apiece, and Japan
$4,000 tons. Assuming that the three
powers were alone III the world, this
might be all right, but what would be
England's position If another power in
tons of submarines to her $4,000? There
is nothing in the agreement to prevent
this.
1t may be that one of the three
powers has to-day tonnage Of cruis.
ers, destroyers and submarines exceed
ing the above figures. The memoran.
dunn lays it down that such excess may
not be "replaced'' until scrapping has
reduced the tonnage to the stipulated
outside the signatory trio might be
actually launching new and powerful
auxiliary units of the above type while
Britain, in close proximity, was re-
stricted to diminishing force ot
rapidly obsolescing vessels. This is 6
point which must be considered. Nc
one supposes that a European natior
; like Norway would want to menace the
seas with submarines, but experience
submarines may almost starve out al
island population, dependent on foot
supplies from abroad.
Two factors tell the other way. NJ
restrictions whatever are put at pres
ent on aircraft, by which submarines
are often combated. And for the frs,
time there is recognition--partia bu,
none the less important---of the fa,
reaching principle that nations must
not arm one another: The memoran
dunn insists that the three powers mus,
not sell any naval units to anoths1
power-that scrapped ships must b,
really scrapped. Secondly, we read
, mo capital ship tonnage nor auxiliar,
combatant craft tonnage for foreign &C
count shall be constructed within tn.
lurlsdict1on of any one of the power.
party to this agreement during thu
term OF this agreement"
NO formula has ever struck deeper a,
the causes Of armament 1t means thai
government shipyards. are debarres
from executing foreign orders for al
, naval units. If Chile wants submarine,
she cannot get them from the Britt 81
, Empire, the United States or Japan
and so also for battleships, cruisers anf
destroyers.
British Shipyards Hard Hit
No provisions could be more yalu
aole, but we must not ignore "tht
howl" Shipping is depressed. Con
structlon Of mercantile marine ha,
slackened. In Britain there is much
unemployment, especially in the engi
neering trades. The condition that W.
must not build any combatiye craft fo,
any customer nation is doubtless 8
great. piece Of prohibition, but it will
be admitted that it hits Britain hard
The principle that munitions Of war
!. whether on sea or on land, must not bs
made matter Of sale and export be
tween nations is easily applied TO ships
because SHIPS cannot be smuggled Bu
/ the principle itself is universal. A.
Stunning proper inspection, it might be
~fPAAeu w kuHS ana even pOlSonOu!
chemicals. The memorandum begin,
with the simplest and most obyiou,
case.
There is obvious force in the Amer;
, can contention that If battleships dis
appear and cruisers and destroyers ar,
reduced in aggregate tonnage, the un
. armed but convertible merchantmen
becomes to that extent q more poten
!. factor in naval warfare. Britain ha.
preponderance of peaceful commerc.
on the ocean, and If there should b,
any way found whereby her liners aus
: cargo boats can be rendered impossibl,
to convert into transports and ligh
cruisers. by all means let it be done
During the war ! crossed the Atlanti,
on an armed merchantmen, the Baltic
and this year l again crossed the sam,
ocean in the same ship, which, how
7 ever, had been by that time entirel,
/ disarmed.
Are there any means Of constructin,
decks so that they cannot afterwar,
: be strengthened with concrete ant
other supports and thus turned int,
q