The Washington herald., 1921-12-28
POLITICAL PACT
SOUGHT BY FRANCE,
SIMONDS' OPINION
Submarine Dispute Only
Incidental to Euro
pean Policy.

Continued from Page One
could be easier or simpler than a
French recession here and a prompt
agreement upon the question of
ton or limitation of French naval
strength generally. But the reduc-
! ton or Limitation of French naval
strength Is conditional upon the
, position the British take upon
other problems OF vital interest to
France.
There you have the situation.
The French mission here expects a
message from their own govern
ment which will cover their course
today. They do not believe that
the general liquidation of Anglo
French matters can be achieved
soon enough to permit the Issuance
OF release orders from Paris in
twenty-four or forty-eight hours.
Hence they expect that Paris will
suggest that the whole matter Of
submarine and secondary arma-
ment be left over to another con-
ference a year or two hence.
General Agreement Sought.
In this period of delay France
and Great Britain may be expected
to reach a general agreement pre-
cisely like that agreement of 1904,
which followed the Fashoda cpl
sode and led to an Anglo French
entente. Paris newspapers and
French statesmen like NJ. Poincare
have been clamoring for such a
general liquidation for many
months. 1t nearly arrived once,
but was defeated at the last mo-
ment. 1t must come, from the
French point of view, before there
can be any specific agreement on
naval strength, save in battleships,
which the French regard as obso-
lete weapons, doomed to disappear.
Now, looking at the situation from
the American angle, the fact is
plain that there is no apparent way
that the United States can influence
the French action. French public
opinion backs its government in
seeking a settlement with Great
Britain which will give France Sc
curity and measurable certainty of
German reparations. French min
listers conceive lat the one way
to get sucA a guarantee is to re-
tain liberty of action in naval con-
struction until there is ssch an
agreement on the British part.
They have chosen this line and it
is perfectly idle for Mr.. Hughes or
anyone else to endeavor to per
suade the French people over the
heads OF the French ministers.
Asks L. =. sympathy.
In taking this line France obvi-
.ously risks weakening her position
before the American people. at least
they are willing to take the risk
in America rather than Europe.
Prom their point of view the first
necessity for France is a for
t;GcatiOn OF the French situa-
tiOn in Europe. Therefore. the
French say that the best thing that
can now be done about submarines,
provided Britain does not take the
French view in Europe, is to avoid
pressing the issue with disastrous
consequences for the present con-
ference. and leave the matter for
another conference after the Anglo
French bargain is made
Political combinations are noto-
r-pusIy snort-lived. 1t is always
conceivable that Paris. which on
saturday thought the way 1 have
Indicated may have changed Its
Washington concede this POSSIBLE
ity. although they think it unlikely
fq the extreme; but, barring this
element Of political accident, they
say quite frankly that they believe
tat no settlement on the subma-
rfue will be reached. and they ar
.rc that postponement alone can
.r-gveut injury in the conference.
Mere Counters in Game.
Tue fact that the American gov
,rumcnt has steadily inclined more
and more to the British view of the
srbmarines docs not affect the
French. They are not thinking of
srbmarincs as submarines. but as
,aunters in the great game they
arc playing with the British for
tlcir own security in Europe. If
the British meet their views they
will accept any ratio of submarines
that may he named in the general
contract. but, pending the arrival
or the contract; pending the set
Element Of the POLITICAL issues. they
are not prepared % discuss subma =
rines, and place their claim for
tonnage at a prohibitive figure sim
ply to discourage discussion.
As for the British, their play is
obvious. II they can persuade the
Americans to use pressure, and such
pressure avails to break down the
French resistance, then when Lloyd
George and BRAND meet at Cannes
one card will be lacking in BRANDS
hand. and. therefore, Lloyd George
will have an easier and more COM
Portable time. But, successful as
the British have been in winning
American approval, there is no sign
vet that this American approval has
added sufficient strength to the
British position here to persuade
the French to yield. On the con-
trary. they seem to have dug in.
Rival Policies the Issue.
But the naive American should
see the thing as il is. The battle
is not over the submarine. but over
the rival European policies of
France and Great Britain. : 1t is
being played in Washington, to be
sure, but 1t is being played for
European stakes. 1t is a game CEN
turtles old. and both sides have been
at it without sensible interruption
ever since modern Europe took
form. Both sides are eagerly en-
deavoring to make II appear a bat
tie in support of American princf-
Dles, but while the skirmish is going
on in Washington, every European
knows the battle will be fought in
Cannes.