New-York tribune., 1921-03-06

FRONT u9l4-ls1S) BY Herbert How
land rs.ir Sargent irss' lieutenane colonel. S
Clurg Co, Chicago.
HIS monograph is written by
an American army officer, who
has devoted many years to the
study Of military strategy. and
who served during the last year of
the great war in the War Plans Divi-
sion of our General Staff It shows
breadth and independence of view rot
often noted in American military com
ment. Colonel Sargent had previously
produced two books on the Napoleonic
campaigns and. one on the campaign of
Santiago de Cuba, in which he partici-
pated. He has digested Moltke and
Foch, as we'll as Clausewitz. But he is
not intiridated by mere authority. He
expresses his own opinions, with de-
cision and confidence.
The author explains the strategy of
the Western Front from 1914 to 1915
strategy, for the most part, of check
mate in fixed and unturnable positions.
/ But the main conclusion drawn is that
the Western Front was not the one on
which decision should have been
sought. Colonel Sargent Is, in fact,
convinced Fastener. He thinks that
the Germans made tremendous m s.
take in not taking the offensive in the
East in August, 1914, instead Of rush
ing into France. He holds that the
Allies made a similar mistake in not
carrying the war into the Balkans as
soon as they were ready for a real Of
fensive.
The French may not be blamed so
much for this failure, for to them the
defense Of their own soil was the
primary consideration. But with their
strategic sense blunted by the Ger
man occupation of the northern prov
inces, the direction of the war on the
Allied side became unbalanced and
hesitating. It remained SO up to the
spring of 1918. The greatest Entente
opportunity was frittered away in the
half-hearted Gallipol venture. On
this point Colonel Sargent says justly:
iOLi LAtC ICE mining Jig NAbNA tlAt
strategical center Of the whole thea
ter of war lay between the Black and
Egean seas, in the vicinity of Con-
stantinople. The Dardanelles, tae Sea
of Marmora, the Bosporus, the Balkans
from Salonica to Constantinople, these
we're the vital points, and if the Allies
could have won an early victory in
this region the first important step
toward winning the war would have
been accomplished"
Later on, after submarine warfare
in the Mediterranean developed, ton
mage shortage and transport difficult
ties might have proved a formidable
obstacle to large scale operations in
the Balkans. But, as Colonel Sargent
shows, the Balkans we're always the
most vulnerable spot in the line held
by the Teuton allies, and it was the
Bulgarian debacle, more than anything
else, which led Ludendortf at the end
Of September, 1918, to inform the gov
ernment in Berlin that it must seek
I Hn HE1IllSL LICG lllllHculdtCly Ia AhSl4-
| orandum submitted to the war plans
divisions OF the general staff on August
26, 1918, republished in this work,
Colonel Sargent, in fact, strongly ad-
vised extending the American effort to
the East, where alone, he held, d1r
cision could be obtained with mini
mum Of cost The memorandum was
ignored, apparently because General
Pershing was all for fighting it out
with the Germans in France.
The author gives Foch due credit for
the extraordinary energy OF his west
ern offensive after July 18, 1918 Yet
he believes that the Germans could
have held the Mouse and the Rhine we'll
into 1919 if the southern Teuton front
hadn't collapsed. He says again; sit
is the deliberate opinion of the writer
that had there been no break in the
Balkans and had the campaign con-
tinued during the spring and summer
of 1919, 100000 Americans sent to the
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