The daily times., 1921-12-29
(By David Lawrence

(By David Lawrence
Copyright, 1921, by the Daily
Times.)
Washington, Dec. 28.-Shall the
submarine which wrought such havoc
in the European war be the means of
wrecking the concord Of the major
lpowers at the Washington confer
Ience?
For days the nations gathered here
have wrestled with the question in
vain. Some delegates despair of any
settlement of the matter at this con-
ference and suggest new meeting
of more nations to discuss submar-
ines Others insist that more patience
will achieve an agreement.
The trouble lies chiefly in the
abandonment Of the formula used at
| the outset, namely agreeing on
principle that should govern naval
strength before discussing each kind
of craft. If Mr.. Hughes had not in
sisted on applying that idea to the
Question Of battleships, the confer
ence would have been unable to reach
any agreement on larger craft either.
Mr.. Hughes declared that national
need was too vague and indefinite a
rule to apply and that existing
strength could alone be used in try
ing to effect a compromise of ma
Itional viewpoints.
There is still another principle,
namely, the relationship of the SUBJ
marine and light cruiser to the bat
tleship as a technical unit for the
naval experts have always had plenty
of ratios determining how many sub
marines, destroyers, cruisers and aux
Hilary craft should be proportioned to
each battleship fleet.
But Great Britain started out by
insisting that all submarines be
abolished. America refused to accept
that view point So did France and
Japan. Much argument was used as
Ito the defensive value Of the sub
marine and emphasis was laid upon
national needs" again. The confu-
Ision of these two principles led the
lpowers further and further astray
until Mr.. Hughes again tried COM
|promise by proposing definite ratios
; Iof submarine tonnage. France op-
poses on the ground of national
needs.
When the history of this confer
ience comes to be written it will be
found that the failure of the Amer
;. lican proposals at the outset to in
lclude definite ratios for auxiliary
lcraft had as much to do with the pro-
llongation of the conference and pos
sibly its iast-minute failures as any
lother factor. By contrast, the initia-
tive of the American delegation in
Establishing definite ratios for the
battleships stands out as proof of
what might have been done if the
lprogram. had been all inclusive.
The. British don't want any sub
marines built but would agree to co.
600 tons. On the other hand talk of
!postponing the issue until another
and larger conference could be called
Included has only served to accen-
tuate the British view that if no
Iagreement is reached they must be
permitted to build submarines with
5 Iout limit. In a race between Great
= britain and France, the Latter would
be hopelessly behind as neither the
T funds nor the materials are available
: for extensive submarine programs.
s America, too, would be at liberty
. to build countless numbers of sub
marines.
While today the submarine situa-
tion looks hopeless, it really need
not be regarded in that light for the
ipressure of the British and Amerf'
b cans can be applied in such fashion
as to compel an agreement in the
l. end. But if the ratio of submarine.
(Continued on Page Six