The Brattleboro daily reformer. (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1913-1955, 1921-04-25


fectly Valid.
By DAVID LAWRENCE.
Especial Despatch to The Reformer.)
Copyright 1921.
WASHINGTON. April 25.-Germany'
effort to get the United States to say
what amount would be fair and just as
war indemnity was not altogether of Ger
man origin for there is good reason to be
lieve that in countries other than France
the banking community has hoped the
American government would be able to
find a compromise between the extreme
views of France and Germany. But
President Harding and Secretary Hughes
turned down the German request for ar
bitration for an entirely different set of
reasons. 1t is true that the American
attitude toward PREPARATIONS is that the
amount first fixed was too much of a
burden and destroyed the incentive of the
Germans to work hard enough to pay their
bills. Yet back of any proposition which
introduces American argument or sug-
gestion is the greater factor of American
responsibility for the size of the indem-
nifty fixed.
\ Financial Trap.
If the United States had agreed to ar
bitrate. the American government might
! have been placed in a position of being
| morally required to accept German rep
! aratiOn bonds in exchange for some of the
! allied debts to the nited States. This.
/ American opinion has evidently looked
upon as a makeShift of doubtful value be
cause when the first suggestion about 1t
was made Washington showed a marked
GOODNESS toward that idea, as well as any
/ other which would tend to depreClate the
value of Americas foreign loans. The
! Harding administration officially terms
! these loans as "A most valued asset and
/ at a recent cabinet meeting the decision
was unanimous for rejecting any schemes
] Of cancellation either in whole or in part.
/ of course the entire question OF foreign
Indebtedness has always had direct
/ bearing on what amounts of money the
allies could collect from Germany. but
every effort to transfer British or French
obligations to the backs of the Germans
who are already overloaded with debt
/ has been officially squelched whether pre-
scented formally or informally through
! diplomatic or financial channels.
| The decision of the Harding admins
tration is also in line with the attitude
| assumed by the American commissioners
/ who advised President Wilson at the
peace conference. study was made in
/ formally Of the rcparatiOn question. but
Z
official opinion. It was felt that Amcica's
views would be presented at the repara-
ti0ns commission table. But that com
mission was unable to function as a com
! plete inStrumentality largely because the
! United States refused TO ratify the Yer
sailes treaty and league of nations which
| expressly provided for American mem
! bership. Technically, the allies ignored
the treaty when they endeavOred through
| the supreme council on which America
! ,&r1 -
/ the indemnity.
Will Have Part in Preparations.
| Official Washington does not doubt that
the United States will have something TO
say about the reparatiOn question but ia
! formally and unison with the allies.
! Americas views WI be expressed at the
next interallied conference and there is
/ every reason to believe that Washington
| Will urge a compromise ranging herself
| alongside Great Britain. 1t is not exactly
! the amount of the indemnity but the
method which has caused American opin-
! ion to drift away from the French view
| though it is insisted here that America in
no wise wishes to permit Germany to cs-
cape her responsibility to restore the re
| giOnS devastated and pay a just indem-
nifty. 1t all ranges around the question
| of what is fair and just and il also has
an important bearing on world econom-
! les for i'm the desire to punish Germany
| that the economic power of Germany
might be so weakened as to prevent her
/ from earning the money she owes the
| allies.
Wants More Discussion.
| Secretary Hughes's note was intended
| to show that the United States wants the
! Germans and the allies to get together
again and discuss the whole question once
more. The feeling here is that there is a
! change in the situation and that the Ger
mans now realize they must make such
! trifing counter proposals as they re-
Gently did, but must show n readiness to
| pay what they really can. If the Ger
mans had shown any sincerity in the
! last conference the allies would have
modified their original terms. Some dip
diplomats say frankly they believe Ger
many was waiting for the Harding admin
istratiOn to come into power and take
sides with the Germans. That hope. has
! been dispelled by the Hughes note and the
\ Germans realize their only hope for a
II square deal is in a conference in which
II America sits in as a diSpaSSionate obScrv-
er. Such a conference is inevitable and
there is high hope that Americas partici-
II patton in the conference will lead to a
settlement and prove again that the power
and influence of the United States in in
II ternatiOnal cooperation can be different
from the viewpoint of the 'irreconcil-
ibles" who shout 'entangling alliances
II whenever an international association of
any kind is mentioned