Great Falls tribune. [volume] (Great Falls, Mont.) 1921-current, 1921-11-10
CHAPTER XIV.
The Left Bank Of the Rhine.

The left bank of the Rhine was one
| of the main issues of the peace confer
enee. 1t brought out more clearly.
| more seriously than any other, the diff
ference in national psychology, the diff
ficuity that governments and peoples
have in understanding one another, al
belt they are loyal allies, united by
victory and by sacrifice. The occupa-
ton of the left bank of the Rhine and
of the bridegheads was for US French
both an indispensable guarantee for
the enforcement of the peace. and a
necessary assurance against invasion
such as had occurred twice in 80 years.
10 others, associated though they were
/ heart and soul in our perils of the past
and future. but Interpreting history in
different light. this occupation, no
matter what its form of duration, seem
ed unjustifiable, useless and dangerous.
As early as November, 1918. Marshal
Foeh on purely military grounds had
addressed a note to NJ Clemenceau.
laying stress on the necessity of max
ing the Rhine the. western frontier of
Germany. On January 10 following,
in second note which he handed to
the commander in chief of the allied
armies, Marshal Foch had developed
his arguments and summed them up in
the following conclusions:
Only One Danger
Marshal Won Moltke placed the mill
tary frontier of Germany at the Rhine
and at the end of one of his papers
writes: There can be no doubt about
the ordinary strength of our theater
Of operations on, the Rhine.
One thing only could endanger it
premature offensive by us on the left
bank with insufficient forces And
elsewhere he states: THE main line
of defense of Prussia against France
is the Rhine with its fortresses. This
line is so strong that it is far from re-
quiring all the forces of the monarchy"
Today this situation is reversed in
favor of coalition. The coalition can
not renounce its advantages, cannot
relinquish its buckler of defense in that
Rhine-without seriously
compromising its future. The '.Wacht
am Rhein' must be its slogan.
Henceforth the Rhine must be the
western frontier of the German peoples.
Germany must be deprived of all ac-
cess to or military utilization of it,
that is to say. Of all territorial sover-
eighty on the left bank of this river
in a word, of every facility to reach
by sudden invasion, as in 1914, of Bel
GUM and Luxemburg, the shores of the
North sea and threaten England; to
move around Frances natural defenses.
the Rhine and the Meuse: to conquer
her northern regions and approach that
Of Paris.
No Territorial Advantage
The Rhine. military frontier in
iispensable for the maintenance Of
peace, which is the aim of coalition,
offers no territorial advantage to any
If annexing the left bank of the Rhine,
,f increasing the territory of France
,r Of Belgium but simply one Of main,
.aining on the Rhine the common bar
rier OF security essential to the soci-
ETY. of democratic nations. There is
40 question Of entrusting the guardian
ship OF this common barrier to any one
cover, but Of assuring by the moral
md material support Of all the demo-
,ratic powers the defense of their lines
and futures by forbidding Germany.
pnce for all, to carry war and her
spirit Of domination across the river
OF course it will be the function Of
The peace treaty to fix the status Of
Rhine not included within the French
md Belgian frontiers.
The Rhine policy advocated By
France had from the beginning been
BY the British ministers.
There where France saw need of an es-
,ential guarantee--a guarantee Of exc
.ution and Of security--Mr. Lloyd
George and his colleagues, observed by
Of Napoleon and by the in
temperance OF part Of our press. feared
is early as 1917 menace to the peace
4 Europe.
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