New-York tribune., 1921-06-05

| -~& Wal u iIlan OIL many person
aiities, a character confused
both by official attributons
and popular legends. There was frs
the conventional Prussian soldier. vet
eran of the wars of 1866 and 1s70-'71
long occupied with general staff work
retired as general at his own request
and recalled to active service when the
great war broke.
This officer, previously of very mod
crate distinction, rose to eminence in
the very first month of the war; became
field marshal, bulked larger as the
struggle went on, took command Of the
Eastern front, was promoted to con-
troll of all the German armies and re-
mained in control of them as chief of
the great general staff until the armis-
tice.
But on what evidence of personal
capacity and accomplishment was his
promotion based? 1t was known that
| he had attached to himself an alter
ego, General Ludendorff, to whose
enormous energy and fertility most of
the conceptions of the Hindenburgian
military policy were due. One mind
worked through the other, apparently
to the entire satisfaction of both. Thus
arose dual personality, the fame of
whose achievements accrued to Hin
denburg, the ranking though silent
partner in as strange combination
of minds and wills as military history
has ever known.
Finally there is the Hinaenburg of
popular imagination-a man, a symbol,
a barbarous demi-god whose monstrous
wooden image the populace of Ger
many worshipped and idolatrously
drove gold, silver and iron nails into
it at SO much per drive. 1t was this
deity in which Germany saw reflected
the ancient and ruthless military ira
dition of the Germanic tribes.
Which was the real Hindenburg Z?
Are all equally unreal? 1t is hard to
tell exactly, and the Field MarshaPs
two volumes don't help the investiga-
tion much. Negatively, at least, they
confirm the theory that Ludendorff
was the driving power in the collabora-
ton and was gratefully recognized as
such by his nominal superior.
Ludendorff frankly describes his re-
lationship to Hindenburg when he wrote
in his first publication after the war:
After discussion with my assistants
| used to lay my ideas for the initia-
tlon and conduct Of all operations
briefly and concisely before the Field
Marshal. l have the satisfaction of
knowing that from Tanhenberg to my
resignation in October, 1913, he always
agreed with my views and approved
my draft ORDERS"
1t is curious circumstance that the
only Hindenburg order which Luden-
dorff didn't prepare or indorse in ad-
vance was the one which the Kaiser
used as pretext for forcing the First
Quartermaster Generals resignation
an order suggesting opposition to ac-
ceptance of the demand embodied in one
of President Wilson's armistice tele-
grams.
Hindenburg corroborates Ludendorff
passively when he admits: "After I
had learned the work of General Lu-
dendorff, and that was soon, realized
that one of my great tasks was, as far
as possible, to give free scope to the
intellectual powers, the almost super
human capacity for work and untiring
resolution of my chief of staff, and, if
necessary, to clear the way for him.
the way in which our common desires
and our common goal pointed" He
says also, significantly: "His Uuden-
dorf's) influence inspired every one,
and no one could escape it without
running the risk of finding himself off
the common path"
Why was the way never cleared for
Ludendorff to be in name as we'll as
fact the chief of the general staff?
Ilrpltz says that the Kaiser never
liked Hindepburg's associate, which is
clear also from some of Ludendorff's
own remarks. Hindenburg looked the
sub-war lord part better and his semi
delflcation had progressed so far that
1T might have been dangerous for the
government to lay rude hands on
popular superstition.
From the military point of view Hin
denburg's book faithfully echoes all of
Ludendortf's previously published
views. About the only conflict notice.
able is over the result of the battle Of
Chateau Thierry. Ludendorff had said:
at Chateau Thierry. They had attacked
had been long time in France had
bravely attacked our thinly held fronts.
but they were unskillfully led, attacked
In dense masses, and failed"
Hindenburg is little less grudging.
He writes: "We made the acquaintance
of her (America's) first trained troops
at Chauteu-Thierry. They had attacked
US there and proved themselves clum-
silly but firmly led. They had taken our
weak units by surprise, thanks to
their numerical superiority
Hindenburg was pronounced
fastener" and expresses the sound
view that Falkenhayn made a grave
blunder in not pressing the attack on
Russia in 1915 and 1916. That was Ger
q n nyy'c haC