The Washington herald., 1921-02-25
One inch of joy surmounts of grief a span,
Because to laugh is proper to the man.
-Rabelais.
Importance of Upper Silesia to Germany

and officials have repeatedly asserted not only
that any possibility of reparaton is contingent upon
the retention of Upper Silesia as a part of Ger
many, but also that the loss of this region would
bring about the collapse Of the entire structure of
Germany's economic productivity. That in case
the plebiscite, which may may not be held
sometime in March, goes against Germany, the CO.
hesion- OF German national economy will be de-
stroyed.
1t is, of course, advantageous for the Germans
to establish if possible that they must have Upper
Sesia if they to pay reparations or failing this
that the loss Of this region should be recompensed
by reduction of the indemnify There is no ques-
ton that this territory because of its coal deposits
Is OF great value to Germany, but an examination
of its former relation to the German Empire does
not bear out the claims of the Germans as to its
indispensability.
Even when considered in the light of the losses
which Germany has sustained in the cession of
Alsace Lorraine and the Saar it is certain that a
Polish victory in the Forthcoming plebiscitc would
not shave such dire results as are prophesied by
the German experts.
The chief source OF the wealth of Upper Silesia
Is the coal helds OF the total German coal produc
ton OF 100000 tons in 1913. Upper Silesia SUD-
phed 43,5ooooo or something over ~ per cent TAX
ing into consideration the loss of the Saar basin.
upper Shesia supplies more than one-fourth of the
entire German output.
Furthermore it is apparent that the importance
OF tins basin will increase time passes since il
estnnated that its coal reserves are considerably
greater than those OF the Ruhr the only other inn
portant coal reserve which Germany possesses.
The loss of Upper Silesia would involve loss
OF about one-haf OF Germany's coal reserves That
Is unqueStlonaby serious loss but from the noint
of view OF German economy the most important
question Is to what extent Germany is dependent
on this source OF supply
Under normal prewar conditions great deal
oil coal from this section was exported to Russia
ana austria Conditions in Germany were such
that. British and Westphaian coal were able 70
crowd out Siesan coal from the domestic market
and hence only slightly more than 2s per cent of
INC production was consumed in Germany A con-
siderable part OF the production over 45 per cent
was. consumed IN the regions of Upper and Lower
Sieaa
Present conditions, however are radically dif-
iereat from those OF the prcwar period when Upper
Shesian coal was forced out of the markets of
Eastern Germany and Berlin by the competition of
BrItsh and Ruhr coal Westphalian coal is now
being produced in much smaller quantities than
previously and large part of it is required for
DELIVERIES to France and Belgium
Conditions in England have greatly reduced
the production, and the arbitrary price of the Brit;
ish government combined with the high SHINING
rates have removed this coal from competition with
Upper Silesian coal This situation has naturalIv
increased the demand for Silesian coal in GERMANY
and so important is this source now that if Ger
many were wholly deprived OF it, she would fac. a
very serious crisis
Ii IS the contention of the allies that this
sSgency has been foreseen and provision has been
made in the treaty of Versailles by which Poland
agrees to permit for period of fifteen wears N.
expectation to Germany of the products of the
mines OF any part of Upper Siesia transferred to
Poland, ard these products shall be available for
sale to Germany on terms as favorable as are Of
fered for similar products under similar conditions
to purchasers in Poland in other countries
During this period there are to be no export
duties or other charges restrictions on exporta
tion 1t is believed that By the end of this period
the importation from England would be resumed.
and the production of the Westphalian fields would
be so increased that Germany would be in a posi-
ton to do without Upper Silesian, if necessary
The danger which has been pointed out bv
Keynes is that in case these mines were annex.d
to Poland, there would be no guarantee that Ger
many will receive definite amount of coal which
German industries actually require Without yio
latng the treaty the Poles could create serious
menace to German industry by selling enough coal
to Austria Czecho- Sovakia to cut down the
amount available for export to Germany.
Such situation obviously threatens the eco
nomic stability of Germany, and, unless provision
is made to render that situation impossible, there
might be good reason for failure to meet her obli
cations to the allies.
Another point in this connection is that in
event of strained relations between Poland and
Germany, it would lie within the power of the Poles
to bring about an economic crisis in Germany by
sudden abrogation of any agreement into which
they might have entered with Germany and the
llies.
Y would appear then that in case the plebiscite
results in victory for Poland, it is absolutely es-
seatsi that for period of at least fifteen years
Germany be assured of an unrestricted export of