New-York tribune., 1921-12-08

lnese are the powers that are deter
mined by the decision to be made by
Ulster. If Ulster joins with the rest
OF ireland, almost all the federal pow
ers over the area of Ulster will be ex-
ercised by the Irish Free State. which
Will then include Ulster. The Irish
Free State will have the right to leg
islate for Ulster RS for the rest of
Ireland. Broadly, the Parliament at
Dublin will act toward Ulster as Con-
gress acts toward Alabama or Massa~
chusetts. If, however, Ulster decides
to stand out of the Irish Free State
the Parliament at Dublin will have no
authority whatever over Ulster, even
in federal matters.
Then federal affairs of Ulster viii be
managed as at present by the Imperial
Parliament at Westminster, and to the
Imperial Parliament Ulster will con-
tinue to send her members In other
words, the Parliament at Dublin will
be of federal status. The Parliament
at Belfast will be of provincial
status. 1t is only through Dublin that
Ulster can arrive ut dominion au-
tonomy.
The difficulty of treating Ulster as a
separate unit is enormous. Take what
is called in Great Britain a private
bill"--that is, measure dealing with
some railway or other public service.
Many Irish railways will run through
or link up with both the legislative
areas. If the Irish Free State includes
all Ireland these railways can apply tc
one authority when they want legisla-
ton. But if Ireland is divided there
will have to be negotiations between
the Parliament at Dublin and the
Parliament at Belfast, or even with the
Imperial Parliament at Westminster
Several private bills will be needed to
accomplish one object, and as the cost
of such legislation falls on the com
panies it will be a burden very seri-
ously resented.
Separation Demand Strategic
Of course, there are those who have
always believed that the demand in Ul-
ster for exclusion has been in sense
insincere. 1t was not so much that Ul-
ster wanted to be cut off from the rest
Of Ireland as that she wanted to pre-
vent the rest of Ireland securing the
status of an independent dominion. In
other words, the demand fer a separate
Ulster was strategic. 1t was pressed
in order to wreck Home Rule, and
having decided to pass Home Ruiz over
listers head Great Britain may find
that Ulster will have lost the motive
which has hitherto led her to talk
about secession. Ulster has suffered
severely from the Sim Fein boycott
Her business interests have found that
politics is a great obstacle to good
trade. 1t is obviously desired by the
King and by the whole empire that Ul-
throughout as meaning the Prote stant
area within Ulster-should join in the
general reconciliation. Immense pres
sure will be brought to bear on Belfast
in this direction.
Sure to Accept Some Time
My belief is that if Ulster bows be-
fore this public opinion we shall hear
less and less of the Parliament at Bel
fast. II the reason for it was strate-
gle and the strategy has been super
seded, the Parliament may find that it
has less and less actual work to do
Convenience will dictate a simplifca-
tion of Legislative machinery. The
wilder partisans will be succeeded by
practical statesmen. Controversies will
die down as the common task of gov
erning one island energies. There will
be no difficulty at all in modifying the
details of this general settlement as
circumstances from time to time sug-
gest. The scheme is more flexible in
this respect than, let US say. the
American Constitution, which can only
be amended after great and prolonged
effort. Inevitably, it will be found
that more and more power will gravi-
tate to Dublin. 1t must be so. And
even if Ulster stands out and goes
her own way next spring, we may ex-
pect that the logic of events win lead
her, surely if slowly, to accept the in
evitable fact that her life is one with
the Life of al her Irish comratriots