The Washington herald., 1921-08-21

eral Sugar Refining Company that
"the bubble in the sugar market
Secretary of the Treasury, and that
circumstances seeing. 20 have &C.
casiOncd misgivin:ss on your Sid3 rs
to some arrangements being
reached which would not be suffi-
GENTLY in the interests of the
United States Now that apprehen-
sion may or may not be well
grounded. That is a point ! am not
attempting to determine any more
that l am concerned in questioning
the feeling of your country that the
matter is one where Congress
should determine tho details and
not the Secretary of the Treasury.
Customary British Procedure.
All I am concerned in pointing
out is that were the positions re-
versed. that is TO say. were we now
considering the funding of a debt
from you to us and not from US to
you, our plan would be to leave al
most everything to the Cabinet of
the day, and especially to the chan
cellor of the eXchequer. Now, of
course, it may be that your system
is the right one and ours is the
wrong one. All that / want to make
perfectly clear is that from our point
OF view ii is as natural to suppose
that the details should be, thrashed
out by your Executive as II is evil
4 IDENTIFY natural for you to feel that
the matter IS one strictly for Con-
| gress. Therefore. my point at this
stage is that while you as the cred
| itcr country, have the right to deter
mine mode of procedures right we
| should certainly not question-Great
Britain's first idea that the matter
might be settled through discus
| sions with your Executive should
not be regarded as justifying any
suspicion of motives but simply as
! the natural outcome of our own
methods of procedure.
The Controlling Considerations
Now as to the debt itself To
state the views not only of financial
| London, but. as I fully believe, of
| Downing Streetalso. 1t is about the
simplest task which could be imas
med. We simply look for and know
that we shall receive from the
I,
but the word generous" is en-
ployed not in the phiIanthropic but
in the business sense of the word.
Those who consider this matter will.
We believe, be guided by a simple
recognition of the following facts:
the purpose for which the loan was
incurred; the ability of the debtor
to make prompt payment: the effect
the two nations concerned.
AS regards the first of these mat
ters the points will not be in dis
pute. They are fresh in the memory.
Loyal support at a critical moment
on the one hand by Great Britain of
| her European allies in the great
war, only equalled on the other hand
| by equally prompt and loyal re-
Spouse on the part of the govern
| ment Of the United States in enabl-
ing Great Britain to give this sup
port. while the fact that the whole
of the money borrowed was spent
in the United STATES will also be
borne in mind Here again not SEN
timent but business principles will
affect the weight which attaches 10
these matters. Just as if a loan
were being raised afresh today,
America would be influenced quite
considerably in the matter by
whether tine entire proceeds OF the
loan were % be spent in the United
States or whether they were to be
used in some ether direction. Then
as regards he ability of the debtor
it will be remembered that I am
referring now entirely to Great
Britain-to make ultimate payment
there can. of course, be no question.
albeit considerable sacrifice and in
convenience on the part of the Brit
ish community, may be oceasioned.
Depreciation of Sterling q Factor.
As regards the method and man
ner of the payment, however, some
rough, index at all events of the
position is to be found in the de-
probation in sterling as measured
in American currency. Not only
does the position Of the American
exchange on London reflect in some
measure the economic damage
which we have suffered by the war,
but 1t also, Of course, in cumulative
fashion, registers, the dificulty of
making payments in dollar cur
rency until there has been a fuller
return of our trade activity and
especially In, our export trade In
this matter I am inclined to think
that so far from the United States
being inclined to press Great Brit
ain as to the, size of immediate
payments the tendency may be
rather in the other direction, and
that Great Britain: II she Is wise,
will herself be eager not only in
resuming payments as quickly as
possible, but in doing so. on the
largest possible scale consistent
with her abilityN to duly meet her.
engagements. And that fact
brings us to the third poiht 1 have
mentioned. namely, the effect of the
terms of settlement upon the two
nations concerned.
While 1t IL true that the theory
Of pressing debtor nation acts
as boomerang upon the creditor