New-York tribune., 1921-12-22
Denies Treaty
Binds u. S. TO
Protect Japan
tcontinusd from paus ono

less vital defect is the assumption that
Japan, OH account OF her insular char
acter. has an exceptional and favored
position in the treaty. The second and
completely destructive element in the
argument is that Article II imposes any
obligations involving the use Of troops
and ships.
There is, in fact. nothing in the
treaty that differentiates Japan TO her
! special advantage as signatory from
the other powers. The fact that she
IS insular and in the Pacific gives her
deep interest in peace in that ocean
but has not the slightest bearing upon
her obligations to others or their obli-
cations to her in any important sense.
A "Possessor" and Possession"
There is, no doubt, opportunity 70,
ACADEMIC discussion over the diff
terence between "possessor" and E
possession" One may say that il
Japan is a "possessor" she cannot at
the same time and in the same rels-
tlon be q possession" One ingenious
commentator has attempted to solve the
problem b. the brilliant observation
that because His Majesty the Emperor
OF Japan is personally named in the
treaty as the source from which the
japanese ipotentiaries derive THEN
authority Japan may be regarded as
his rnajesty's "insular possession The
same reasoning would make the Presi-
dent of the United States the personal
possessor of islands in the Pacific.
If it were Great Britain that were in
question and a treaty had been siqned
regarding "insular possessions in the
Atlantic Ocean" it is probable that that
country, although both an insular and
an Atlantic power. would be classed as
an "lnsular possession."
But in truth a debate on this sub
.iect would be as Improbable as it is un-
necessary. The delegates who framed
it was intended TO consider Japan as
belonging to the category Of "insular
possessions and insular dominions" in
SO far as the effect of Article
| II of the treaty is. concerned. Only
Japan herself is now said to feel in
clined to different opinion, for the
classification would seem to place her
the category OF less selt-rellant in
/ sular groups and TO rank her as a
quasi l-protectorate Of the other powers
1t is possible, therefore, that, at Japan's
own request, her insular character
will not be emphasized and the inter
/
cially changed.
The truth is that, materially, Japan
has nothing to lose by being re-
garded as "possessor" rather than as a
possession" A dispassionatc exam
ination of the terms of the treaty viii
establish this statement
Ordinance of Self-Deniat
It cannot, OF course, be held that
6yts Ia ne
OF the qualities of an alliance, mill
tary or non-military, or that it creates
any obligation having relation to pro-
lection OF partnership as respects
other powers. 1t is essentially an
ordinance Of self-denial on the part Of
all the signatories, and is nothing
more. They agree to "respect" one
anothers rights, for that is the evident
meaning Of the less precise expression
"their rights" If they keep this
pledge there will be no war between
them; at least, there will be none until
questions of right that cannot be
settled by diplomacy have been con-
sidered III joint conference, which is a
very satisfactory guarantee that armed
conflicts between them will he
avoided
It is important not TO lose sight OF
the fact that the whole scope Of this
treaty is limited to rights in relation
to insular possessions and insular do
minions in the region Of the Pacific
| Ocean, 1t is not an agreement cover
ing the territory OF the signatory
powers in their totality or in relation
TO anything beyond the limits speci-
fed. Any of these countries might be
at war elsewhere, even with one an
other, without calling into operation
4lo1 .to1, - 4.
as rights in the Pacific We're not af-
fected. If any Of these countries were
at war, either with one another or with
other countries, it is improbable any
of thsm would wish to comp]icete the
situation by disturbing their relations
with other powers in the Pacific with
which they were at peace, and it would
be impossible for them to do so unless
they were possessed OF great naval
strength. 1t is also evident that vic
tory in the Pacific would not he likely
to be worth its cost to any European
power that could hope to gain it. The
danger, therefore. of European quar-
rels being transferred to the Pacific
Ocean if this treaty is concluded is
very slight. In effect, Article is vir-
! tually the whole OF the treaty, and
! dedicates the Pacific Ocean to peace by
understanding.
1 1t is, however, toward Article II that
hostile criticism is mainly directed,
and it is upon the slender engagement
which is there undertaken that the de-
nunciation of the treaty SIS military
alliance wholly depends.
''If the said rights are threatened by
the aggressive action of any other
power" certain prescribed course is
to be pursued. If that course were
meant in any case to be, war, the treaty
Should plainly say SO. 1t says nothing
of the kind. The Anglo-J apanese alli-
ance, on the other hand, plainly prom
ised military aid. ''lf by reason OF an
rnprovoked attack or aggressive action.
wherever arising, on the part Of any
other power or powers, either of the
high contracting parties shall be in
volved in war in defense of its terri-
torlal rights or special interest men
toned in the preamble of this sgree-
! inent.' runs the Anglo Japanese treaty
+ OF alliance, "the other high CONTRACTING o
! party will at once come to the assist
snce OF it's ally and will conduct the
war IN common and make peace in mu-
susl agreement with it,"
Ifis Is the way Il treaty OF military
alliance is written. That is the way II
has TO be written if it il TO be de-
pended upon. No INTELLIGENT iiDlo-
MnslRt would accent snvth;nc. lass *h.r