Every evening, Wilmington daily commercial., 1921-10-13

do the particular work in question |
The case, In the particular for which |
II was cited, turns on the construc-
ton OF Section 1O4 of the Charter. the |
Court of Appeals holding that, though |
the language In the second sentence
| OF the section requiring advertising
for proposals waB general In its APP
plication to all contracts on behalf OF
the city, yet tho first sentence of the |
section, limiting the class OF contracts
to those made or let by authority OF
the Common Council" restricted the
meaning OF the general language TO
contracts made by the Council only.
The Guidet case seems 20 be TO the
same effect.
These cases are manifcstly not per-
tinent to the question before me. II
the ordinance OF 1870 were n charter
provision, and so worded az to ex-
plicitly, or by necessary implication,
apply to contracts made by The Coun-
Gil only, then the New York cases
would be of value. But such is not
the situation
/ am not prepared TO hold that be-
cause the Legislature named the par
ticular agency through which the city
/
paid fire department. therefore IL Ia TO
be inferred that such agency could not
be regulated In anywise by such an
ordinance OF Council as that referred
to. IL this were tho sole reason adj
vanced. / should hold against IT, TO
do otherwise, would attach too much
Significance to tho mere act of desig-
mating an agency for the city. The
more sensible view is that the Legis-
lature, in creating offices 'or depart
.nents for the city. intends that such
new officer and department shall fan
lharmoniously into the general scheme
OF the municipal law properly appll-
cable to them. II such is not the case
In any particular instance. then the
reason therefor must be sought else
where.
lis there. therefore. anything else
in section which indicates legis-
lative intent, that, in setting up the
new fire department, the provisions
: OF the ordinance of 1870 should not
operate upon the Department OF Pub
lie safety? This brings me TO a con-
sideration OF the second contention
made by the City Solicitor.
The section authorizes the new de-
partment ito take over for public use,
by purchase. compromise, condemna-
! ton as hereinafter provided, or other
wise" the real and personal property
of the existing volunteer fire compan-
: ies, together with such other prop
erty as may be necessary, at such
0 price or prices az may be determined
y In any of the above proceedings. OF
\ agreed upon hy the Department OF
] Public Safety in agreements to pur-
: chase the same" etc.
$ Manifestly, as 10 the specific prop
|, erty of the existing companies, which
y are volunteer companies. the ordi.
! nance OF 1870 can have no application
. because in the purchase OF these there
can be no opportunity for the receiv.
$ ing of competitive bids. But the sec.
7 ton does not stop with the naming OF
this property OF the volunteer com.
e panies. II authorizes the acquisition
i of such other property as may b,
Z necessary. The fire hose, engines anC
Y trucks, the purchase OF which hai
! been restrained, do not belong to any
: OF the existing companies. They fal
s. in the category OF such other prop.
n erty as may he necessary"
: How shall such other property b,
= acquired? The ordinance, II applicabl,
/ says only after publicly inviting bid
: and then only from the lowest bidder
n The Act OF the General Assembly says
by purchase. compromise, condemna
e ton, or otherwise; at such price OF
y prices as may be determined in an!
y Of the above ways. or agreed upon b!
g the Department Of Public Safety Il
Q agreements to purchase the same.
y The language OF the legislative &c
n can hardly be more general in IL
/ terms Every conceivable manner o
ie arriving at the price is authorized
II the price is to be ascertained onl,
"a as result OF publicly inviting propo
&c sails and ascertaining the lowest bid
ie der, II is difficult to understand VIII
/ the Legislature employed the languag
'r IL did. The department may fix tn
= price by compromise. or by agree
4 ments to purchase. 1t seems NANTES
that the General Assembly intende
ie that the new department should.
.e acquiring the necessary property 10
Is its establishment, be permitted to re
~ ceive the advantage Of negotiation an
I bargaining. Yet such advantage coul
I not be secured. IL the rigid require
iu ments Of the ordinance were to be oh
d served.
re 1t seems to the court, therefor
j. that there is a conflict between til
er Legislative viii OF the State, as es
o pressed in section Of the Act of ii
o Legislative will Of the city as express
r ed In the ordinance of 1870 The latt,
1. g.
N, The solicitor for the complainan
hu advances the suggestion that the
cll was not fun conflict, for. he content
Ie ed, 1t might well be that the ord
p nance could stand to the extent of r
'e- quiring that proposals be publicly il
ny vited, and the benefit Of negotiate
ier as, It was claimed, was contemplat,
az by section 8, at the same time 8
ie- cured by the departments bargai
"a ing with the lowest bidder Indeed,
IT. was also suggested that the ordinan
l's might prevail to the extent of requi
an ing that bids be publicly invited, b
ne disregarded In the matter of awar
IA ing the contract to the lowest bidd
sty in case II would be more TO the inte
lr- est OF the city to do so.
Ter These suggestions are not sour
ho If bids are invited and the lowest bi
m der ascertained, IL is not to be expeC
m ed that he would be responsive
.pt bargaining or compromising at lo'
py er price than his bid. The Legisl
ture surely - not contemplate su
no a possibility when ii employed I
nd language it did in section 8. And, Il
rt- the ordinance cannot be divided in
ra- operation. If a proposed purcha
wo must be after publicly inviting bi,
me it must also be from the lowest bi
7or der. Once the ordinance is applicab
'rK II operates to the fullest extent, al
rt- .ha h,ds inx,ttad tba rortract ,an,,