New-York tribune., 1921-11-27
Farley Policy. !
Gives Uncurbed
Power to Toxic
America Predicates Course
Upon Faith in Nations;
Further Withdrawal From
European Affairs Is Seen

now recognizes that tho Washington
conference will mark a further re-
treat; that we are still moving away
from Europe, not toward it.
l have never shared the views of Mr..
Wells and many other English writers
who, more or less, belong to his school
of thought that the Washington con
ference could prove a turning point
either in world history or in American
relations to Europe. But there is no
mistaking the fact that this hope. or
delusion supplied the dominating ele-
ment in the thought of most, If no.
all, Of the journalists, who came here
from abroad. Not all of them have
perceived the fallacy which moved
them deeply, but none of them can per
manently escape the realization that
the United States has once more eluded
the effort to entangle her, or, if one
chooses to view it otherwise, has re-
mained deaf to the appeals coming to
it from European shores.
Hughes Course Predicated
On Faith in the World
Mr.. Hughes believes that if the
great powers agree to begin to disarm
on sea they will presently agree TO
begin to disarm on land; that in fact
the habit of agreeing will grow and
expand until, step by step, we arrive
at peaceful world. All his policy and
all his course in this conference were
predicated upon this faith. In this
view he is in agreement with the mass
Of the American people, who are even
more willing than the Secretary OF
State to believe that the limitation of
ornaments means peace.
But when the conference has ad-
journed after fixing the ratio of naval
strength and describing the number
of ships to be scrapped and the length
Of time in which the shipyards of
the worlds governments shall be idle
there will remain all the major ques-
tions to be settled, and the grievous
danger to-day Is that the American
people will be deluded, as no other
people can be, into the belief that war
has been made less likely by the Wash
ington conference.
A war between the United States and
Japan has been made less likely, be
cause we have retired from the Far
East. We have resigned the power to
coerce Japan and thus to protect
China precisely as Japan chooses and
would have led to war. The abandon
ment Of such power will lead to Japan
ese aggression, or it will lead to a
modification of Japanese policy toward
China presisely as Japan chooses and
Wills.
The agreement with Great Britain
to limit shipbuilding Immediately saves
the British from the necessity of
financial outlays which they cannot
safely undertake or the resignation
of the position of first sea power which
they have occupied for centuries. All
things considered, we have agreed in
the one way that we could to leave
Great Britain substantially the first sea
power Of the world for the immediate
future at least. There never was any
danger of war with Great Britain. Only
the most stupid of all policies could
have led to a competition in shipbuild-
ing. What remains to be seen is
whether as a result Of our resignation
Of supremacy on the sea, which was
within our grasp, Anglo-American re-
lations will improve or worsen.
Conditions of War and
Peace Will Remain Same
In sum, the practical result Of the
Washington conference will be re-
duction in naval programs, and there
fore the pruning Of naval estimates.
The taxpayers will not pay less, but
they will not have to pay more. But the
conditions of war and peace will re-
main the same in the world, except in
so far as the Washington conference
may have succeeded or may have failed
in promoting friendlier spirit be-
tween the countries represented there.
This is the fact. To believe otherwise
is to invite another awakening such rs
followed the adjournment of the Paris
conference.
A failure the Washington conference
will not be in any obvious and direct
way, such as might havs been feared
before the first session. Nothing like
a rupture has ever been even conceiv-
able. Most of the clashes which have
occupied space in the newspapers have
been at least semi imaginary and never
actually serious. 1t is almost to be
regretted that the desire on every side
to appear friendly has sometimes pre-
vented the pressing home OF points
which might usefully have been
adopted. Enthusiastically we shall have
many, conceivably too many, questions
postponed. Beyond all else it is miss
take to think of the Washington con-
ference as likely to settle anything.
1t has avoided some things which il
was advisable, desirable, necessary ia
avoid. At best it may prove a preluds
to better international relations and
new Judgment. At worst it is a novel
experiment.
Mr.. Wilson tried at Paris to do every.
thing at once. Mr.. Hughes at Wash