The New York herald., 1921-02-06


ably diminish, probably enormously, the
value of her exports by comforting large
discriminatory advantages upon all compel
tors.
Finally, what position would all neutral
nations take in the face of such provision,
which would increase for them the costs .f
all the products of Germany which they de
sire to buy in Germany? For Great Britain
the benefit Is obvious 1t gives the British
an advantage over the Germans in the whole
of the markets of Central Europe which
must suffice to meet the German advantage in
position.
New Plan Likely to Fail
Owing to Resistance of Germany
In sum- it seems to me- despite the opti-
mistic reports and comments of the first m1-
ments, the results of the Paris Conference
must be accepted as inconsiderable. Politi-
cal circumstances have once more triumphed
over economic necessities and we have
further postponement of the actual agree
ment upon a basis for reconstruction.
On the side of security, France gets In
return a specific demand for present action
in the face of existing and long continued
failure on the German part postponement
of all action for many months, with the pro-
vision that, ii Germany continues to fail
then action may be taken as France wishes
occupation of German territory, &c. But
this merely means that Lloyd George has
succeeded in staving off French action now.
When July comes, nothing is more certain
than that new British objections will be
raised, for fresh French advances into Ger
many have grave economic perils which
concern British manufacturers and working
men, for whom the German market is 4
vital element.
At Paris in 1921, as in 1919. there has been
n deadlock between French and British
views. From this deadlock has resulted a
compromise which successfully blocks the
policies of both France and Great Britain
and leaves the main question of German
reconstruction and of European return to
business just about where it was at the out
set. The proposed extension of the TIM
limit on payment of reparations from thirty
TO forty-two years, the added circumstance
of the tax on exports. these merely demon
strate that the return to- peace conditions
is just as far off now as before. The dilemma
does not change. If Germany is to pay that
irreducible minimum of all that she ought
to pay, she must be kept under active mill
tary supervision for almost half a century
That supervision carries with 1t all sorts OF
present evils and the certain stimulation OF
German desire for revenge.
Yet II is not less clear that unless she is
compelled, Germany will pay nothing and
from her under the immediate threat of
military action. Recall that even under such
threat she has evaded the provisions of the
Treaty of Versailles which require her dis
armament. To-day Bavaria has more troops
under arms than the Treaty of Versailles
authorizes all Germany to maintain and the
Berlin Government confesses it's inability t.
enforce the treaty terms against Bavaria
How, then, shall one enforce financial pro-
vic inst and fe
reasonable debate on this point. involve the
economic and even the political servitude of
the whole German people for period as
long that which separated Sedan from
the First Marne?
Four Weeks From Present
World Will Know Germanys Decision
The Treaty of Versailles fixed May 1, 1921
as the date on which Germany should learn
the total of her Indebtedness. On
February l of this year the figure remains
unfixed. And 1t cannot be fixed until Ger
man experts meet allied at Brussels four
weeks hence. When this meeting takes
place German resistance is bound to be de
termined, and Germany will have ground on
which, technically at least, to make her
resistance.
Moreover. unless all signs fail, Brands
achievement in this second conference al
Paris will hardly meet with unqualified APP
proval in the French Parliament The i'm
mediate crisis in French finance is indescrib-
ably acute, yet under the terms of the
present plan France will receive next to no
aid to meet the crisis, for Belgium has a
priority claim upon the first German pay
ments. which will practically exhaust the
returns of the instalments of 1921 and 1922
and leave France unrelieved,
Underlying all the calculations in Europe
has been and is the notion that once Ger
many has agreed to pay fixed sum and
has issued bonds for the capital sum ($25.-
900 000,0 900 I'm the present calculation), the
United States will consent to buy these
bonds, not the Government, but the invest
ing public. But does any one in the United
States believe any such thing? Obviously
States Government will consent to accep,
these German bonds repayment for the
loans made TO the European nations during
the war? Certainly not Less now thar
ever, given the uncertainties. which the
Paris Conference has only served to in
crease.
Like the first. the second Paris Conference
must be held a failure so far as there was
expected of il n settlement, something de
finitive, plan of liquidatng the war. We
have seen, since the Paris Conference, one
International gathering after another. Spa
Hythe, Brussels. San Reno. &c; each OF
these has adjourned leaving the main
questions TO be settled at new meet
ing. Now the Paris Conference has ad
journed and handed on its problems TO a