The Washington herald., 1921-05-08

covery the world over. But II is
patent that this relief Will only
c,,ae Germany accepts this sum.
which in any event Will be Ereauf
in excess of anything which she ha-s
yet proposed, and gets back to lie
task OF Paying, which must con-
su'ne a generation at the least pos
sible estimate.
But what IL Germany does not do
thls-if she follows the course she
has pursued with respect to dis
armament? Then at no distant date
we shall come right back to the
same Question of enforcement, Of
the occupation of the Ruhr, which
was proposed by the French at
Paris and vetoed by the British and
Americans.
French Rely on Coercion.
And even IL we, with British sup
port, prevent the French now, now
| can we again intervene if the Ger
mans once more prove the French
TO have been correct, as they have
similarly demonstrated French ac-
curacy in every casa before and
since the signing OF the treaty OF
Versailles?
1ne TenCn say HIldl Nho SiiS "os
! to compel the Germans 10 pay is to
| lay hold Of Germany, it's coal sup
plies, and use them as a weapon OF
| coercion. The Americans and The
British dislike such a step because
| il would obviously risk further dis
locat ton of the business of the
world, and would be a step away
! from ''normalcy."
Hughes is working to avoid this
| by getting a German proposal which
| is reasonable and possible. although
both the British and the French eX-
perts assert the London figure is
! possible. But getting the sum fixed
| is obviously only half the struggle.
! There remains the task OF getting
it paid. and If we prevent the
French from taking their guaran-
tees We assume moral If not mate
rial responsibility IL payment Is not
forthcoming.
National Interests Differ.
This Is a further factor, that one
must recognize. The interests OF
the several European nations which
were allied against Germany diner
| widely. For France, it Is a mat
ter of life and death. financially
speaking. to get reparations and
to get not less than the sum fixed
at London. A smaller sum means
fiscal bankruptcy. For Belgium, the
stake is only slightly less. But
the Italian share in the indemnity
Is small, less than a fifth of the
FreAch, while the British are &C
tually more interested in getting
the market of Central Europe set
tied than in collecting German in.
IDENTITIES.
Thus Italy and Britain are mos
likely to welcome American inter.
vention, while Belgium and France
must view this Intervention with
profound apprehension, precisely
because it carries with II the GER
tainty OF the further reduction OF
Franco-Belgian receipts under the
reparations payments.
Risk Division of Allies.
We run the risk. then, of divid
ing the allies, which would serv,
a German end, quite obviously. w,
also run a second danger, not les'
obvious, namely, of forcing Franc
to act alone. which might give t
her action an even more danger
Gus character.
Lastly, and the point is of su
preme Importance; we cannot G.
very far without assuming respon
sibilities. Europe knows that Il
would be a great triumph for Nj
Harding and his administration l.
achieve even an apparent settle
ment of the European tangle. II
this respect his position Is pre-
: cisely that % Mr.. Wilson at Paris
| and we all know that Mr.. wilso
: was forced to pay for his leagu
Of nations.
Settlement would Help U. 8.
In the second place, It isJ plai
that a settlement would be OF grea
financial benefit to the Unite
States, but since 1t must be reach
ed, IL at all, by the reduction {
European claims against German,
Europe will certainly expect us I
to pay our share. And even IL tn
sum of reparations were fixed, w
should still have to face the cues
tion of the collection. with the sam
uncertain elements of German eva
sion and French impatience,, base
upon French rights and necessitie
(Copyright, 1871. BY Mcclure Nevspa pe,
: syndieats.l