El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1921-01-12

. ana aLleEs EAeEENLa VIII De plUlLsueu m
l this column daily during the next several
/ months. Today's instaiment. continuing
I the general narrative, relates experiences
! on the Meuse-Argouue battle front
II Is suggested that readers clip these
/ articles each day and paste them IN scrap
/ books; they VIII not be reprinted and back
numbers cannot be supplied
/ NOVEMBER. /, 1918, the Germans
~ east Of Ferdun were still within
) miles Of the city on the line
I which had not changed in more than
I two years despite the constant pres
sure OF the French; this point was the
/ western pivot of the Saint AIihiel
movement and had not changed To-
cation then or since. On the east
{ side Of the Meuse. north and north
west Of Ferdm, the German lines were
within 9 miles Of the city. Between
I September 20. and October y French
and American troops holding that sec
tor east Of the Meuse and north of
Nerdun, had made repeated attacks
and had been repulsed again and
again, but during the month the
Americans had succeeded in doing
what the French had been unable to
do, and had pushed the Germans back
4 to miles and held them.
The main American attack all this
time since September % bad been pro-
ceeding in a nOrthwesterlv and north
eTly direction down the Meuse, west of
the river. Between September % and
November I, the American First army
on a narrow front, as has already been
described, had pushed the Germans
back a distance varying from 6 TO y
miles at a cost Of 100000 men in battle
casualties; the area thus recovered Is
mighty small on a map Of France. but
the fearful cost Of the recovery SUI
nciently indicates the character Of the
fighting and the quality OF the enemy's
resistance. Some parts Of the line had
swayed back and forth, places had
been taken and retal5eu several times.
The French on the west Of the Ameri-
can First army had had great difficulty
gaining ground or holding what they
gained, and the French line was re-
peatedly hurled back, the recession IN
some parts Of the line adjacent 70 the
American sector having been as much
as 3 TO miles.
These facts were known to very few,
outside of the higher commanders I
followed the French and American
eo1nmuniques closely and traced the
lines on my map each day, and diseov-
cred for myself what the eommuniques
never mentioned: the repeated recess
sions and losses Of ground; and I had
access to the casualty reports. Mean
while the secretary Of war at Wash
ington and the other authorities and
the press IN America were creating an
utterly false impression Of the opera
tons on the Meuse-Argonne front, that
misled the American public and did
deep injustice to the American armies
in the field; the official statements
were making out thct the advance was
proceeding smoothly with little loss,
and gave the impression that II was a
walkover for the Americans. with the
Germans in full retreat. That was Tar
from the truth; so far It had not been
a rear guard action for the Germans on
this front, but a continuous frontal
battle on lines It had been difficult to
bulge with all the American offensive.
power. Il is grossly unjust TO the
American army TO underrate the Ger
man resistance in this sector. The
casualties speak for themselves.
The advance of the Americans down
the west bank of the Meuse, coupled
with the failure Of the divisions on the
east bank Of the Neuse to advance
with them, had left the long flank OF
the advancing Americans on the west
bank uncovered and exposed not only
to artillery fire but 10 rifle and ma
chine gun fire from the Germans on the
east bank. Thus our flank became in
effect part of the front. Il was des-
tined to be still further greatly ex-
tended before the Meuse was TO be
crossed and the line rectified.
The station where / spent most of
nv time was thus 10 miles from the
nearest German lines, east of the Mouse
and north of Ferdun; y miles from the
German lines east Of Verdun; and Is
to Il miles from the American front
west Of the Meuse which became the
jump-off line for the renewed attack
beginning November /. We did not
know OF even suspect It then, but this
attack was TO be pressed through with
such vigor as to end the war II days
later.
The battle from November ! On
would be classed IN a military sense as
a rear guard action on the part Of the
Germans, but the fact remains that
they had determined 70 fight 70 the
death along this line with the best
divisions they had, withdrawing them
from IN front Of the French and British
further west, as It was vital 10 the
Germans, if they were to save any of 1
their armies in France, that they re- /
tsrd the American advance at this I
key-point as long as possible.
The entire battle on to the end was I
thus fought with desperation and reck- /
less sacrifice unsurpassed during the /
war, and the American exploits from |
start to finish were OF a hrillianee |
equal to anything the war had dis I
played on any front or IN any army. I
Owing to the official suppression Of the |
facts, the American First army never |
anything ike the credit tnat /
was due it for the splendid work 1t
did against the most powerful resis- 1
lance the best veteran divisions Of the
German army could make against it.
The American casualty lists were stiH
coming IN and being published in
America three and four months later,
and a part Of the truth finally pene-
trated the comprehension of the Ameri-
can people, but it remains Tor the
future historian to picture the battle as
it was, in all its fury, desperation, and
brilliant devotion to duty-on both
sides, be it said for none would be
quicker than the Americans on that
fiery front, TO give all due credit to
the Germans as fighters, game 70 the
end.
I had little opportunity to observe
at close range the operations during
these last days. Ny forward trips did
mot taxi me- m Hhr nnHrrn1 baH#la lines