Evening star., 1921-12-29


pared. and he rejoiced that they were
prepared. to accept the ratio whic.
gave them 1850 tons of capital
ships. lie. was glad that the French
government had accepted that all-lm-
portaut part of the American pro-
gram, and he agreed that If nothing
else was done by the conference In
reference to naval dlSartn;,.1'.'., s:'L
scheme already in sight with regard
to the limitation of capital ships dld
immensely relieve the burden of ar
mament upon an overburdened world
He did not feel himself that the sac
,sitica on the part of France was In
itself of an overwhelmin character.
even as regards capital ships, for ne
thought that if the naval strength OF
a nation WIS to be estimated in re-
lation to the naval strength of other
nations, it would be found that the
relative strength Of France under the
arrangement already accepted as re-
CARDS capital ships would be IN
creased. He did not begrudge her
that increase; he rejoiced in it.
ANXIETY Caused.
But when he turned from the mat
ter of capital ships to the matter or
other craft he confessed that very
different picture met the eye. Ihe
French proposed to increase the num-
ber OF submarines threefold. IL they
carried out that intention 1t was evil
dent that they would not only be equal
to the other two greatest naval pow
crs. America and Britain. In point OF
tonnage, but that they would have
! very much larger proportion of sub
marines of a newer type than either
, of them. lie understood the subma-
rine was still in process of develop
ment: it was still adding to its powers
OF offeusc. and each new model was
an Improvement on the capacity OF It's
predecessors for commerce destruc-
ton. Thus it was certain that When
that program was carried out the
French quota of submarines would ex-
ceed that of any other power in the
world. 1t had further to be noted
that their French colleagues accom-
panied their view of the necessity of
submarines with the announcement
that they intended greatly to increase
the tonnage of their auxiliary craft.
i 1t must be acknowledged that this
constituted a somewhat singular con-
| tribution to the labors of a confer
! ence called for the diminution of ar
| malnent! Considered in conjunction
| with the refusal Of the French dele
cation to discuss land armament, this
/ position must cause anxiety and dis
appoin tment to those who had come
| to the conference with high hopes re-
| garding the limitation of naval ar
mament. Furthermore. it had to be
J observed that the pleasure derived
| from the agreement with regard to
| the limitation of capital ships was
| subject to a qualification. He under
stood that the French intended to be-
! gin replac cling ships in 1927.
Menace to Britain.
| This seemed to be a serious inter
ference with the proposal for ten
year naval holidays, but that was
only a small part of the anxiety and
| disappointment which the French
program had created in his mind.
! They had now come forward with
great building program of sub
! marines and auxiliary craft. He was
perfectly unable to conceive how
that could be regarded as defensive
! policy. If submarines Were to be
! used as strictly military weapon.
i in the manner contemplated by the
| American advisory committee. how
came il that 4 fleet of capital ships
/ limited TO 1I5,000 IONS required
! 10000 tons of submarines TO scout
! for it and protec. it? And if 10000
| qureG for feet of 175.00O tons OF
! capital ships, how many submarines
| would America and Britain require to
! build to assist their fleets of 500.0oo
! tonS.< IT was perfectly obvious that
! the proposed 10000 tons of sub
marines were intended to destroy
/ commerce. They could not be in-
i tended for any other purpose. 1t
! therefore appeared that, at moment
when we were all assembled to dis
cuss the limitation of armament. we
were asked to agree to their increase,
| and that a country which did not
desire to be among the first three
naval powers in the world proposed
nevertheless to build instruments Of
warfare to an extent
! cheney to those legitimately required
by any other fleet in the world. We
! should therefore have the melancholy
spectacle of a conference called for
! the limitation of armaments result
| ing in a vast increase in the very
! weapon which the most civilized ele-
| ments in all civilized countries con-
demned. For the moment he need
say no more. The whole of this con-
f, troversy would again come up be-
| fore the public conference. For this
occasion he reserved himself.
He must, however, dwell shortly on
the effect which the French declaration
of naval policy must inevitably pro-
! duce upon British opinion. 1t was per-
j fectly clear that il at our very gates
a fleet of 10000 tons of submarines
100000 tons of which were to be of the
/ newest type) was to be constructed. no
I limitation of any kind on auxiliary
vessels capable of dealing with subma-
rines could be admitted by the govern
ment which he represented. Public
notices had now been given in the most
f. formal tanner that this great feet was
| to be built on the shores nearest to
| Britain, and 1t would necessarily be a
very great menace to her. He had no
doubt If the occasion ever arose. that
Britain would be equal to 1t, but it was
on condition that we reserved the full
right of Britain to build any auxiliary
craft which she considered necessary
| to deal with the situation.
schanzer Expresses Regret.
| Senator Schanzer said: I'VE do not
dispute the Importance of an accord
/ with respect to capital ships, but we
cannot do more than to express our
, deep regret that it Is not possible to
arrive at an arrangement concerning
auxiliary boats and submarines.
In the absence of an agreement
concerning the limitation Of the latter
, naval forces, it is but natural that
; each nation should retain full liberty
! of action. At the same time it is i'm
possible not to realize that the alb
Sence of such an agreement will give
! new impetus to the competition Of
| naval armament respecting auxiliary
! craft and submarines which can only
have a most unfortunate effect on the
finances of the countries interested. 1t
| Is not our intention to discuss what
France considers necessary for her ma
| tional security, but we will not attempt
to. hide that the naval program an
| nounced by France is one which gives
! US serious preoccupations from the
point Of view of the economic sacri-
| fees which may follow for Italy as
| we'll as from the point Of view of the
political consequences which it might
| produce. This Is all the more true be-
cause the solution OF the land arma-
ment problem has been deferred
| The chairman said he gathered from
what had been said that it was not
deemed practicable to reach an agree
| ment on the basis suggested by his