Pueblo chieftain., 1921-12-19
BY FREDERIC ]. Haskin.

by FEeQerlC y. f1dShln.
Washington, d. c., Dec ia
shroud In which to bury the Anglo
Japanese Alliance" is the way one
acute observer characterizes the four
power pact which now stands as the
great achievement Of the conference.
1t Is said by those who know the in
side workings OF the conference to
represent real triumph for American
diplomacy. Not that real triumph
was difficult IN the circumstances. Tho
American delegation had all Of the best
cards in Its hands and In order to
win its chief objectves 1t had but
to use ordinary horse sense and stand
firm. That is good deal more than
American diplomacy has generally
done.
That the four-power pact does repre-
sent long step toward the accomp-
lishment Of the chief American object
Ives In the conference seems to be the
consensus OF tho best Informed opin-
ion. The only unfavorable opinion
comes from certain irreconcilables in
the Senate. who are opposed to any
form Of agreement with foreign ma
tions.
The old phase "entangling alliances'
will not apply to this new agreement,
however. for II is in no sense an al
lance. 1t does not bind US. or seek to
bin3 us. to any action, offensive or
defensive. nor does 1t bind any of the
ton. It is merely an agreement to
talk things over In case OF trouble,
and a further statement that the in
sular possessions of the powers con-
cerned shall remain as they are. This
means for us chiefly that our position
In the Philippines IL not to be n matter
OF dispute.
The agreement II thus seen. on its
positive side. to amount to very little.
y expresses an intention to talk
things over In a pacific spirit and that
is about all. The real Significance of
the instrument Is that II completely
supersedes the Anglo-Japanese Al
lance and that II signifies the ac-
quisccnce OF those two powers in the
American point OF view.
THE BRITISH PLAN
II means to be geenrally recognized
now that the British delegation came to
the conference 20 pcrpctuate the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance II II could do so
without antngonizins the United
the intention Of keeping tho alliance
in effect II possible, japan had
everything to gain by the alliance and
everything to lose by its abroga ton.
The advantages of the alliance to
Great Britain were not so obvious.
II was suggested in a previous Has
kin letter that perhaps the chief rca-
son why Britain wanted the alliance
was because she shared with japan a
derise to check the spread of republic
an ideals in tho Orient. 1t has also
been pointed out that for a great many
years the gist OF the diplomacy of
Great Britain, as tho strongest sea
power. has been to combine with the
third-strongcst against tho second
strongest.
Whatever the motive may have
been, British press propaganda In the
early stages Of tho conference was all
for a renewal OF the alliance. 1t Is
said that this campaign was stopped
when the Americans served notice on
the British that tho renewal OF the
alliance would on no account be toll
Grated Lloyd George Is said to have
been the ono who made tho sudden
agreement Of the delegates. after a
Ions stalcmato. possible. He Is said to
have cabled the British delegation to
abandon all efforts either for re-
ncwal OF tho Anglo-Jspanese Alliance,
or for n tripartito alliance including
the United States. Tho present four
power pact was then quickly arranged