New-York tribune., 1921-03-27
'ares the Secrets of Wilson's "Open Diplomacy"
'Suddenness, Not Promptness,
Always Marked His Decisions
Wilson's Unpreparedness to Take Up Work of Peace
Conference Attributed to Procrastnation; ssIim-
orous, Yielded Shantung to Japan Unnerved

others discovered that he had set his
heart on accomplishing one minor OBJ
to get the covenant into
the treaty, whether the latter was pro-
visional or definitive, and to keep Ar
ticle X intact. These two things meant
little or nothing to them. But for yield
ing on them they exacted what would
probably have seemed to the President,
if he had stayed in Washington, pre-
posterous price.
Yet he paid that price for nothing, so
far as getting his own people to approve
his work was concerned. His abnormal
sense of self-suficiency and his impa-
tience OF opposition stirred him to chal-
lenge an opposition at home which easily
could have been quieted by a little ur-
banity and tact. The President pointed
ly ignored the Senate and the majority
in the new Congress in conducting peace
negotiations. This he had the legal
right to do. But this incivility led to
natural resentment The President, as
Mr.. Lansing points out, took this re-
sentiment as personal, as was his wont.
ropolitan Opera House speech early in
March to thrust the covenant down the
Senate's throat The country didn t
realize at that time the full significance
of the threat. 1t thought that The Pres
ident meant merely to intertwine the
covenant with the treaty and then ex-
ercise ordinary political pressAre to COM
pei ratification as a means of restoring
peace. But he had something very diff
ferent in mind, as Mr.. Lansing now dis
closes.
Peace Negotiations Entirely
A Personal Matter With Wilson
As late as March 10, 1919, Mr.. vii.
son was subject to the delusion thai
he could sign preliminary treaty Of
peace at Paris, embodying the cove
nant, and then treat it as a modus
vivendi, not requiring submission t.
the Senate. In that way the League
of Nations, as he had designed it
would get a long start as a going
concern before the defnitive treaty
could be negotiated. The Senate woult
thus be left sputtering.
When the President. after his re-
turn to Paris, advanced this extraor.
dinary theory to Mr.. Lansing the lat
ter told him that it was entirely fal
lacious-that whatever the documen
was to be called, whether armistice
agreement, protocol or modus viyendi
/ it would be treaty and would have :,
go to the Senate.
'If," Mr.. Lansing remarked, 1--WE
change the status from war to peace, i,
has to be by ratified treaty. There is
no other way save by joint resolution
of Congress"
The President was deeply perturbed
He wouldn't take the Secretary's judg-
ment as final. Other lawyers we're con-
suited. Thomas W. Gregory, the re-
tiring Attorney General, happened to
be III Paris. 1t was not until he con-
firmed Mr.. Lansing's opinion that the
President gave up the idea of getting
p treaty into operation without the
approval Of Congress.
Mr.. Lansing describes his chief mot
Iou J,y,+ ,c~,
ingly and with manifest displeasure
to legal limitations" He also says
that the President labored at Paris un-
der an "obsession as to the League Of
Nations" His whole conduct there is
viewed by mis- ex-Secretary of State as
erratic egocentric, tinged with pride Of
opinion and personal prepossessions
at was entirely personal matter with
him"-meaning the egotiations-Mr
Lansing wrote in recent article in The
Saturday Evening Post. He negotiated
in his own title-of himself, by himself
and for himself imagined that no.
body at home could successfully question
his work. That is why, primarily, his
craftsmanship failed and the Senate
and the country were compelled to re-
ject the document which he brought
back.
1t is Mr.. Lansing's desire to disso-
ciate himself as far as may be from
the Presidents record at the confer
ence. He does SO completely, at least
to the extent of showing how and why