New-York tribune., 1921-12-23
Presents Tonnage Figures
Amount
OF new
building
psrniitte6
In proportion.

Lord Lee said he felt bound to say
that II seemed to him very strange to
put before conference on the limits
ton of naval armaments proposals de-
signed to foster and increa 9 the typo
of war vessels which. according to the
British view, was open TO more otjec-
tion than surface capital ships. More
over, it would be q certain consequence
if submarines were retained, that the
powers which possessed large nlercan-
tile marines would be compelled TO IN
crease the numbers cf their anti-sub-
marine craft. This would give but lit
tie relief to the ovef-burdened tax
payer and would provide scant COM
Tort for those who wished to abolish
war and ts make it less inhumane.
Total Abolition Demanded
erhe view OF the British government
and the British Empire delegation was
that what was required was not merely
restrictions on submarines, but their
total and final abolition. In explaining
this position he wished to make clear
that the British delegation had TO un-
worthy or selfish motives. He would
iirst Ike TO reply in advance, since this
might be his only opportunity OF doing
SO. to the arguments of the friends OF
tho submarine. He understood their
irst contention TO be that the sub
marine was the legitimata weapon OF
the weaker powers and was an etfec-
tive and economical means OF defense
Tor an extensive coastllnc ana lor
maritime communications. Both these
staudpoints could be contested on tech
nical grounds and as he would snow
verc clearly disproved by recent his
an exposed coastline it would of course
desire to defend it against lombard
ment or the Decentralization OF mlli-
tary force. , 4,..n.
fore, how such attacks were conducted
in modern warfare. The reply was that
thev were conducted by powerfully
armed, swift-moving vessels fully
equipped TO resist submarine attack.
TO escort and protect the conveys OF
military transports. There was no
branch Of naval research which had
more closely engaged the attention OF
experts than the countef-oHensiSe
against the submarine. He was giving
away no secrets when he stated that
the methods Of detection. OF location,
as well as of destruction OF sub
marines, had progressed SO much. fur
ther than the offensive power of the
submarines themselves that the latter
had now already reduced value
against modern surface warshlps'
This, however. was bringing him into
somewhat technical subjects
German Failures Cited
During the late war Germany had
concentrated her efforts ON the use OF
the U-boat and had built UP the most
formidable submarine fleet that the
world had ever seen up to the present
time. He believed that Germany had
employed no less than S75 U-boats OF
270000 tons in the aggregate. Or
these no less than 2o3 had been sunk.
"What had the U-boats accomplished
in legitimate naval warfare? 1t was
almost insignificant. In the early part
OF the war few obsoiescent SHIPS,
which sometimes were not taking proper
precautions, had been sunk, but the
British grand feet throughout the war
had not been affected; not one single
ship had been sunk or hit by the ac-
tion OF submarines whether at sea or
in harbor. Our light cruisers. had
swept through all parts of the North
Sea, and whenever that sea had been
clear of mine fields had gone where
they wished, undeterred by the SUD-
marine.
"Submarines had not prevented the
passage Of troops across the sea-. NO
less than l5,000,000 Drgcfsh troops had
crossed or recrossed the English Chan
mel during the war, and not one man
had been lost from che action Of sub
marines except on board hospital ships,
which, in the twentieth century, it had
been deemed would be immune from
the attacks OF submarines and, there
fore, had not been escorted. during
the late, months Of the war some q
100000 United States troops had been
brought across the Atlantic and the
submarine had proved equally power
less in their cases. In fact, the
U-hoat, whether considered as an oil,
feusive or defensive weapon against
any sort of organized naval force, hae
proved almost contemplate.
Also Futile for Defense
sit had been maintained that sub
marines were useful for the defense O
coast lines and communications Will
colonies. He gathered from the press
that this was one of the arguments
used and so it would have to be exam
ined. If the argument was sound, ant
il submarines were essential for this
purpose, there WAS no country which
would need them SO much as the Brit.
ish Empire, which possessed coast
line which, without. wishing to boast
he believed was almost as large as that
of all the five powers present at this
conference put together, and the length
of which WAS four times the circum-
ference Of the globe, and which, in
addition, had the longest trade routes
OF any country TO protect. 1t was
partly because our experience had
shown that they were not effective for
this purpose that we were ready to
abandon submarines,
"The late war had made it abun-
dainty clear that the greatest peril to
maritime communications was the sub
marine, and that peril was specially
great TO country which did not pos
sess command of the sea on the sur
face. Hence, it WAS to the interest OF
any such power to get rid of this ter
rible menace. And in this connection
it must be remembered that the sub
marine was of no value as defense
to be used against submarines. 1t was
against merchant ships alone that they
achieved real success.
ut would be as we'll to recall what
Tho German submarine deet had accom-
plished against mercantile marines. No
less than IL 100000 tons of shipping
had been sunk. of Ia value Of $1,1o0,-
100000. apart from their cargocs. Over
10000 non-combatants, men, women
and children. had been drowned. 1t
was true that this action had been I'M
dertaken in violation of all laws, both
human and divine. The German ex-
cuss for 1t had been its effectiveness.
They had used the same argument as
in the case Of poison gas, which had