New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1921-08-21

HE leaders of the Communist
n regime in Russia, from Lenine
d down, readily admit to-day
- that they are ready to give up
almost any part of their economic sys-
,sm or even of their economic theory in
arder to preserve their political power.
:, the course Of the last few months
they have given up steadily. one
after another, their economic tenets.
serapping one after another the
achievements" of the Soviet economic
system. At the same time they have
hesp strengthening their grip on the
,olisical Institutions Of the country.
Gathering into their hands all the pos
sible threads of political authority.
When the Bolsheviki conducted their
urcpaganda against the provisional
eovernment in 1917 their principal &C.
eusstion against the government of
Eerensky was that, to the extent to
xaich it was professedly Socialistic,
i; failed TO effect any OF the economic
reforms demanded by the Socialist doc
.rine. The accusations which the lead
ers Of the Russian Soviet regime have
made against the Socialist parties of
Western Europe which have acquired
governmental authority. as in Germany,
Poland, Austria, etc., have been on
precisely the same grounds Of sacri-
fcing economic reform to political ex-
igeucy
In every pronunciamento issued by
the Communist leadership of Russia
The Justification offered for such &C
eompaniments of the Soviet regime as
the terror and the abrogation of all
civic liberties has been on the ground
that these privations are the sacrifices
.1acted by the transitional period to a
better economic order. 1t would seem
logical, therefore, that with an acknowl-
edgement of the failure and collapse
Of the Communist economic expert
nentation there should also come a
sSl84 N-oA-A-AS VI Vic POlltlCdi autHOElLX
by those who continue to hold it. AS
matter of fact, however. we see a
process which is the exact reverse Of
this.
Soviet Officialdom Based
On Imperial Bureaucracy
The explanation is not difficult to
f,r n,~;r1 ,4e voa~, - ~
Soviet regime has come to represent
condition, which is by no means novel,
but none the less interesting, in which
new group IN governmental power
aecomes identified with the institution
dpower itself. In the course of it's
sassence the Soviet regime has built
pa tremendously numerous Official
dom, new bureaucracy, constructed
On the basis Of the old imperial bu-
Fsaucracy, both from the point of view
Of essential method and, to some ex-
tent Of the actual personnel. And
there is very important reflection Of
this condition in the leadership Of the
Communist party, which, by virtue Of
the hlerarchical organiza ton Of the So
net regime, is the real ruling power
IN Russia.
There are two distinct elements in
this leadership, the older and the
younger. Generally speaking, the older
element consists Of those leaders who
we're responsible for the direction Of
ne overthrow Of the provisional gov
esnnent and the establishment Of the
soviet regime. There is no doubt that
among these men there is a very con-
siderable percentage Of fanatics, who
want power as an instrument for carry
'ng out their doctrines; others among
'hsm want power as q means Of salts
'ylng their personal interests.
Inc younger element consists of
'aose individuals who joined the Com
a1nis< ranks after the overthrow
u the proyisional government and
axse gained the confidence of the older
sisments BIZ their devotion to the cause
v oommanisn. Among these there is
I'd almost negligible percentage Of IA
asses; an overwhelming majority Of
'asm have been recruited from the
'saks Of the new bureaucracy or from
.as same sources as those which have
.a'aizned the personnel Of the new
Bureaucracy. For them political power
. q guaranty 81 their position Of
rssoge and afluence. Their personal
invests and the Com unist doctrines
A~Fs become Identified for these ele-
~%aes 50 far as the continuation of the
~S'.ss regime itsclf is concerned And
- '@f as the rank and file Of the new
T<aszocraey il concerned, the disap-
Sss1zs'ee Of ire Soviet regime would
..s~n very serioez personal loss to
ea'' 1or, as ne shall see later, the
'z'mf has soe iai reasons for treat
- ~ Bureaucracy, civil and military,
s's,a'rdinzFily veil.
me soYiet Bureaucracy is charac-
M'@sa By shfes definite features-its
<sasive numbers. its inefciency and
Is dishone.ty.
s' year 10 pesroGrad one out Of
s'1 tour aa1itE in the population Of
s''y was . government official and
''s'sf pDt II eyery four vas col
- ia9a nearly the whole 'rnale
szs'@s''n If Inc city Was part Of the
~. w oareaaeraey Or II the army. In
~ ~" sae situation was still worse.