The New York herald., 1921-03-09
original communist party, would show
polling strength Of over 100000.
Chances of BoIshevlsm.


Chances of BoIshevIsm.
But no matter how many com
munist voters can be estimated, now
the Prussian elections are past, the
question really Is: Are these power
full enough to impose Bolshevism on
Germany? Could a group of even 20
per cent. OF the nations workers,
standing quite apart from the rest in
their creed, carry through a success
full revolution?
| In Russia even fewer succeeded.
But Russia Is not 10 be compared
with Germany. A German dictator
ship would not be over a majority Of
illiterate peasants, but over a polit-
ically schooled and acutely hostile
society, third of whose numbers
were workers. The real ally of Le-
nine and Trotzky-the apathy of the
masses-ls not waiting to cooperate
with Levy and Daumig in Germany.
This difference does not remove
the probability of an attempted revo-
luton. The sudden Importance which
the communists have gained makes IL.
| on the contrary. more than likely
that the effort has to be ventured.
The resignation of most German labor
sets off the Jealous and desperate
quality OF German communism, and
il is deliberately planning a revolu-
tion when the best political wisdom
among labor leaders is that failure is
sure TO follow. The plans are laid
the Rote Fahne regularly publishes
flaming appeals which an American
jury would condemn as reasonable,
and Herr Levy admits that he takes
orders from Moscow on even such a
point as whether he is to continue in
Office as chairman of the German
party
1t belongs to the daily routine in
Germany to read the exposures of
communist plots-just as it does to
read exposures in the radical press of
Orgesch and iunker conspiracies.
Thanks TO the bitterness of German
politics. much OF this evidence. from
both camps, is incontestably false.
But beyond doubt the leaders Of both
extremes have plans and equipment
and are only awaiting the opportune
hour
Revolution Ultimate ATM
1t lies in the narurc of the com
munist cause that n revolution must
eventually be tried. Moscow is as
sumed to have abandoned hopes of
realizing a reconstructive programme
in Russia without the cooperation of
the proletariatr in other lands, pri-
marily in Germany. And the Ger
man communist leaders who acquired
q following close to three millions by
adopting the revolution and the al
lance with Russia as their main aims
cannot keep the party intact without
attempting to realize these pledges.
The majority Of German workers
have no ears for Moscow temptations.
IF it came to choice between the
Hohenzollerns and the soviets," q
labor secretary in the Ruhr told me-
II would choose the Hohenzollerns
William H., despite his faults. gave
us social legislation superior to that
in other countries. and labor in Ger
many before the war was better off
than elsewhere" The speaker was
not socialist, but surely many
socialists would accept the same al
ternative.
The retirement of the majority
socialists from the government coali-
ton last autumn found this chief
labor body in great need of repairing
its political fences. The party had
practically no assets, and ii had in
calculable liabilities to show for its
two years experience with actual
power NoSke had thoroughly cs-
tianged radical labor by ruthless sup
preston, and no socialization, no net