The Washington herald., 1921-11-10
By FRANK H. sIMoNDs.

In two preceding articles I have
discussed the obstacles in the path
way of success in the Washington
conference. These are discoverable
in the conflict of political policies
and in the existence of international
distrust. A difficulty even greater
lies in the popular conception that
the present international conference
can be an end or more than a be-
ginning.
The problem of the Pacific, which
we call the Far Eastern question,
Is as complicated and as difficult as
the other Eastern question which,
having kept Europe in an uprear
from the fall OF Napoleon to the
second Balkan war, ended by pre-
cipItating the supreme tragedy Of
the great war. Statesmanship. in
Europe totally failed to find any
way of arresting the disintegration
of Turkey or or compromising the
rival aspirations of the Great
Powers.
Two Possible Solutions.
Today we are confronted with a
situation growing out of the i'm
potence of China and the clash of
interests there of the United States,
Japan and Great Britain.
There are only two possible solu-
tions this side of war. One is, an
agreement between the three ma
tions to work together; the other
is, the deliberate renunciation by
the United States Of any policy in
the Far East which goes beyond
the defense of our territorial in
terests extending through Hawaii
and Guam to the Philippines. The
United States cannot have 1t both
ways. 1t cannot impose its views
or even maintain its rights in the
Far East by language alone.
Must See Need of Association.
1t can only serve its own interests
and the interests which it under
takes to champion by recognizing
the rights and interests of other
nations and by appreciating the
necessity of associating itself with
other nations in the creation and
observation of conditions conform
ing to these interests.
1t would be preposterous to
imagine that the present confer
ence, which still remains for the
mass of the American people a con-
ference for the Limitation Of arm
aments, can settle the Far East
ern question. 1t may discover
large area in which absolute agree
ment is possible. Beyond this 1t
ought to be able to avoid a clash
where views conflict If only by the
relegation of the issues thus raised
to committees OF commissions de-
stined to report to another confer
ence. For, in the very nature OF
things, there must be other con-
ferences.
May Find Way to Delay War.
The supreme value of the wash
inRton conference to the world at
the present day will not lie In the
Of a program OF dis
because only very In
disarmament can con-
result. 1t will not be
found in any final solution Of the
Far Eastern questions, because
there is no easy remedy for the
difficulties which have given rise to
the Far Eastern question.
What 1t may do, what IT must
do, is to disclose the statesmanship
of the world as responsive to the
popular demands and necessities of
all countries, discussing existing
dangers to peace, finding ways for
present break and
a future adjustment.
Peace Chief Motive.
The world in general cares very
little about the Pacific problem, but
in every part of the globe the
Washington conference Is viewed
with the utmost concern because
everywhere there is a dominating
desire TO see some sign of some
clear and unmistakable proof that
we are passing from an era of
chaos, international hatred and ever
national feuds into an
era in which peace and all the cir
and conditions of peace
will be restored,
Thoreau used to say that man
started out in the world to build a
palace and ended by throwing to-
gether a wood shed. After Paris
We have no further hope of the
palace. Even a wood shed would
be something now. Failure of
at Washington, fol-
lowing the ineptitude of statesman
ship at Paris, would go a long,
long way to setting in motion
again those forces Of. dissolution