The New York herald., 1921-11-27

based wholly upon the principle that In
the history Of the nations might means
right and that ones own nation means
everything TO one.
MANY circumstances accelerated this
fatal predisposition of ours and OBJ
scured our vision. We learned to think
in terms OF things instead OF terms of
persons; we were idealistic enthusiasts
instead OF men acquainted with harsh
realities"
Ludendorff's book, like most OF the
post-bellum books of the German politi-
cal and military leaders. is in part a
justification OF his own theories, acts
and opinions and an attack upon those
of his opponents. The greatest OF these
was Won Bethmann- Hollweg, to whom
he ascribes all the evils that have be-
fallen Germany. the curse OF the waver-
ing. doubling. pacifstic philosopher
statesman. a type no other nation bent
upon preserving its rights and its liber-
ties could afford to breed. Hero we
have the great antithesis between two
oe the dominant currents of the German
spirit, clear expression of the duality
of the German soul--the clash between
the thinker and the soldier. the man OF
thought and the man of action, the in
elusive citizen of the world and the ex-
elusive nationalist. When Won Beth
mann Hollwegs second volume of
Memoirs" appears we shall have the
other side of the story.
Iudendorffs pays a great deal OF
attention to the principles of Clausewitz,
and even restates these in a new form
in the light OF the experiences OF the
world war, as, for example:
THE dictum. war is the continuation
of a policy by other means should
read:
war is foreign policy by other
means" and it must be complemented
by this clause. the truth of which shall
yet be proved: National policy as a
whole must be made to serve war"
Ludendorn again and again points out
that the Allies acted upon these purely
military principles. while Germany per-
mitted herself to be weakened without
and within by the vain hope of inter
nationalism, as formulated by her
Socialists-and never recognized by the
Socialists of other lands.
The first chapters are devoted TO a
historical resuHe of the period of En-
peror William l. and Bismarck and the
First Supreme Army Command under
Gen. Won Moltke. which was In power
when the war began. Ludendorffs s
analysis and summary of what Won
Moltke's leadership brought about, as
well as his criticism of the Second
Supreme Army Command under Won
Falkenhayn. are of intense interest As
an example OF the weakening influence
OF Hollweg's policies. Luden-
dorff writes:
"Soon voices became loud IN the navy
and these energetically demanded that
the fleet be utilized in battle. Once
moro governmental policy interfered In
a fatal and decisive manner. The I'm
perial Chancellor did not wish to irritate
England by dragging In the navy. He
still believed that England was ready to
withdraw as soon as possible from the
war with Germany and that she was
keeping back her fleet so as not to bring
about any decision which would make
for tho prolongation of the war;
He was. therefore, of the opinion
that we must conduct ourselves in the
same way so as to give England an
opportunity Of bringing about peace, and
It was in this direction that he worked
1t Is difficult to conceive OF worse
misinterpretation of the political aims of
England and OF the nature and form OF
the war, which had just begun. nor of
a more unfortunate interference OF
politics in the conduct Of war"