The Brattleboro daily reformer. (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1913-1955, 1921-12-02
Want Agreement on Limita-
ton of Notifications
In Pacific
AMERICANS WANT
DISARMAMENT FIRST
Still They DO Not Fear Fertilization
Issue-Have Not Developed Those in
Paeifc-NO Recognition of Sentiment
in Serapping BattIeships.
BY DAVID LAWRENCE
Especial Dispatch to The Reformer)
COpYright 1921.

present naval strength on basis of five
for Great Britain, five for the United
States and three for Japan
This correspondent has had an oppor-
tunity to examine the official correspon
dence passing between Japan and the
United States in the secret sessions
wherein the American navy explains inl
detail the method by which the 5-5-3 ra
ito was fixed. 1t is an open and shut
case. The formula used takes account
first of the Japanese estimate of herI
own strength based upon the tonnage
figures she furnished, and also takes into
account every contention made by the
japanese and works out finally to a o.
SO every time 1t is a plain piece of
arithmetic and the quaudary of all who
have had a chance to learn how the
American program was worked ont is
what possible objection the japanese
have to its acceptance. ..a-. @
Tie conclusion being generally reached,
partly from things the japanese them
selves are saving and partly from the
hints they let fall in the secret sessions,
is that the Japanese are getting ready
to agree absolutely TO the American es-
innate of existing naval strength but
are planning to condition their accept
ance upon another agreement with re-
spect to foTtiEcations and naval bases in
1.-THE Pacific This question has heretofore
not been raised by the Japanese in the
official conferences, though in the meet
ings with the press the japanese dele
gates have emphasized the Importance
Of Notifications.
No Fear of Notifications
The. American delegation does not fear.
the introduction of the fertilization prob5
lem, though of course it will hardly wish.
TO explore that cOntroScTs al field until.
a definite understanding has been.
reached on the basis of the original.
Hughes program CONCERNING limitation.
and reduction of vessels ailoat as well
as under construction. a
When fortiheations are considered, the
view of the American delegation will be
found to be most generous. The Japa-
nese cannot contend that the bases of
the United States in the Pacific are of
any value, among naval experts say, il
the Hughes program of reduced strength.
goes into effect. s4
What the Japanese want is n promise
that tlte-t-rrit ed--tates will not build
mp her present Notifications or add new
bases. This pledge probably would be
Forthcoming if reciprocated by the Jap
anese. tsI
No Effective Bases Now
Naval bases bear q distinct relation
ship TO naval strength if they are suf-
iicIentlv near the scene of possible naval
operations. If the United States were
to conduct an offensive war against ia
pan, the naval base at Cayite in the
Philippines would have to be much more
effective, it Is cOntended by the Ameri-
can experts, than il is at present and
the very fact that it has not been re-en-
| forced, the Americans contend is proof
| of the pacific intentions of the United
States The fertilization of Guam. how
/ ever, is considered by America as more
| of q defense of Hawaii than an out post
/ for offense though, to be sure, the Amer
/ lean view Is that the Japanese them
selves know of how little value are the
present facilities at Guam.
The trouble is the japanese have not
/ vet made clear what is it they do want
/ If they agree. as seems inevitable, to the
5-5-3 ratio. The American delegates have
explained of course that the japanese
4 are not eager to take into account YES
1 sells under construction OF course if
1 these are eliminated the 5-5-3 ratio
1 would be disturbed but the American
i contention is that a vessel on which
/ money has been spent is to that extent
\ a part of country 5 ''eXisting naval
\ strength. First the japanese con-
4 tended that pTe-dreadnaughts need not
be excluded even though more than 20
1 wears old. America 5 experts included
Il them and still came to a $50 result.
The representatives of the United
| States went still further and included
the Mutsu in the Japanese estimate of
her own strength as a partly completed
vessel and still reached a 5-5-3 conclu-
sion The japanese for sentimental rea :
sons want to keep the Mutsu as she is
eS per cent complete but the United
States has battleship of similar
| strength also nearly completed and the
original proposal to scrap everything
under construction still stands Score
tarv Hughes is arguing that if once the
rrincple is violated the whole structure
/ Of the American proposals is broken
down.
United States Loses 1880, 100000
He insists that the vessels under con-
struction must be counted in any ratio
and must be scrapped. The United
States has spent $3.50, 900 already Oh
ships in the process Of building and the
American delegation has told the Japa
nese that the public opinion of this
country would not cOuntenance the loss
! of such a large sum of money Unless ia,
!. pan was willing also to accent every,
thing they were building Insother words
the sentimental fondness of Japan fol
the Mutsu is largely counterbakanced by
a sentimental fondness for the 1890 900,
OO0salready spent by America