The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1921-11-27

! hughes own Wow hat bccn set forth
again ana again that In tnci iong
process OF. the adjustment OF inter.
national relations ono could proceed
only step 10y step, and a first step
was necessary. Such first step NO
conceived 20 be the Limitation of
naval urinamcuis. aud from that
step he believed we might progress
safely and surely.
Tho view OF Europe Ia totally an.
icrent Tho Washington conference
/ Will seem 10 Europe as great a fail.
ure as the Paris conference did To
the United states. Tho Limitation
/ OF naval strength will not even In
/ tcrest the French or the Italians.
while German Cynlcism ia already
unmistakablc. The American no
ton that wars are caused by nrma .
| mcnts finds no European echo.
Moreover, Europe knows that our
| people have not yet understood that
there will bc no great reduction In
taxation or expenditure In consc-
quence Of the limitation OF naval
| programs. We shall avoid the huge
! Increase In naval expenditures
which would follow competition In
huilding bat that Is the single prac-
tical benefit.
Europeans Dissatisfied.
America sees the world disnrmed
Europe secs those dangers which
constitute for IL the causes OF war
undimiuished and unaffected. Eu-
rope hoped that the Washington
conference would be marked by an
Amcrcan return to active particl-
patton in world affairs and in Eu-
Iropean affairs. Europe now recog-
, ni2es that the Washington confer
cnce Will mark further retreat:
that We are sull moving away from
Europe, not toward it.
| have never sharcds the Wow OF
Mr.. Wells. and many other English
writer's who moro or less belong to
his school OF thought. that tho
Washington conference could prove
Ia turning point either In world his
tory or In American relations TO
Europe. But there is no mistak.
ing the fact that this hope or dc
lusion supplied the dominating cIc-
ment In the thought OF most. II not
all, of the journalists who came
here from abroad Not all Of them
have perceived the fallacy which
moved them deeply but none or
them can permanently escape tho
realization that the United states
has once more cluded the effort 20
entangle her. or, II one chooses 20
view IL otherwise, has remained deaf
TO the appeals coming TO II from
European shores.
What Hughes Believes In.
Mr.. Hughes believes that If the
great powers were to begin TO dis
arm on sea they will presently agree
Go begin 20 dlsarm on land. that IN
fact the habit Of agreeing will grow
and expand until step by step. We
arrive at n peaceful world. All h =
policy and all his course I'm this con-
ference We're prodlCated upon this
faith. In this view he is IN agree
mcnt with the mass OF the American
people who are even more willing
than the secretary OF state to believe
that the Limitation OF armaments
means peace,
But when the conference has ad-
journed after fixing the ratio OF
naval strength and describing the
number OF ships 90 be scrappcd nnc
the length OF time I'm which the gov
crnments' shipyards of the world
shall be idle, there will remain all
the major questions TO be settled
and the grievous danger today is
that the American people will be-
deluded, as no other people can be.
into the belief that war has been
made less likely by the Washington
conference.
A war between the United
States ana Japan has been made
less likely because we have re-
tired from the far east. We have
resigned the power To COerCc ia
pan and thus To protect China.
The exercise Of such power would
have led To war. The abandon
ment of such power Will lead tO
japanese aggression or II VIII lead
10 n modification OF Japan policy
toward China precisely ms Japan
chooses and wills.
The agreement With Great Brit
Ian TO limit shipbnlldIng immcdi-
atcly saves the British from tho
necessity Of financial Outlays
which they cannot safely under
take or the resignation of the po-
siciOn of first sea power, which
they have occupied for centuries
MI things considered we have
agreed In the one way that we
could io leave Great Britain Sub
Stantlally the first sea power OF
the world for the Immediate fu-
turc at least, There never was
any danger Of war with Great
Britain. ONLY the most stupid Of
all policies could have led ia u
competition In shipbuilding. Nh1t
remains 10 bc seen II whether as
result of our resignation of su-
prcmaCy ON thc sea which was
within our grasp Angio-Amcricdn
relations viii improve or WOrNnIl.
In sum, the practical result nT
the Washington conference, VIII
he reduction In naval programs
and therefore the pruning Oi ma
val estimates. The taxpayers viii
not pay less, hut they VIII NOT
have 10 pay more. Tut the COndl-
tlOns of war and peace viii remain
the same in the world except Ia 50
far as the Washington conference
may have succeeded or may have
failed i'm promoting fricndlicr
spirit between the countries repre-
sentcd there. This II the fact. To
bchcVc otherwise H. Ia invite an
other awakening such as followed
the adjournment of the Paris CON
ference.
a failure the Washington confer
once will not bo In any obvious and
direct way such as might have been
feared before the first Rnssion,
Nothing like a rapture has ever been
even conceivable. Most Of the clash
es which have occupied space in the
newspapers have been at least semi
u