Pueblo chieftain., 1921-01-26

action in Siberia he had hoped that
Japan would determine the strength
of her force after taking the powers
into her confidence, but instead of liv-
ing up to the International agreement
she had dispatched the disproportion-
ately large number of $4,000 men, ere
ating u misapprehenson abroad as to
Japans aims. Then. contrary to gen.
eral expectations, Japan had with
drawn only partially when the repa-
triation of the Czecho- Slovaks in ST.
IBERIA had been effected.
Likewise, in 1919, continued Niscount
Kato. the Japanese troops in Siberia
had been reinforced on the ground
that such action was imperative to
the maintenance of peace, the safe
guarding of Japan against Korean
outlaws and the prevention of bolshc
vik predominance. The ever changing
explanations, he asserted, had proved
the absence of II fixed policy.
When America withdrew" the op
position leader declared Japan should
have followed suit If she really de-
sired to respect the spirit of joint ac-
tion and really had in view at the
time it was decided to send an eXpe-
ditionary force, the facilitation of the
Czecho Slovak Withdrawal The Amer
lean Withdrawal virtually deprived ia
pan of justification for the further
maintenance of troops in Siberia"
Viscount Kato asked why, if Japan
had stationed troops at Khaharovsk
and Chita for the maintenance of pol
itical stability as had been explained,
she withdrew from these points at Il
time whom the political conditions were
equally menacing.
Everything" he said, points to the
conclusion that the stationing of troops
in Siberia had nothing to do with poll
eical conditions there"
He pOiptcl that tho ma iOrity pf
the Japanese citizens in Vladivostok
were engaged in. military work, occa-
stoned by the presence of the troops
and declared tho army. therefore. was
not there for the purpose of protecting
Japanese nationals. Complete evacua-
ton, he said, would mean that Japan
would not be left open to the accusa-
tion that she was harboring militarst
ambitions.
Japan" concluded Viscount Kato.
may be well advised to leave the af-
fairs of foreign nations to the foreign
ers. unless her own interests are SER
iously menaccd. Siberia may yet DO
far from political agreement Internal
~, and the maintenance there of q
Japanese army is fraught with every
danger"
Premier Hara in his reply declared
that Japan wanted to ovacudtc Siber-
ia completely when the Czecho- -Slovaks
typographical situation had prevented
this while many of the Russians were
anxious for the Japanese to remain.
Thus the withdrawal was delayed"
said the premier. but not because of
political ambitions. The government
decided that the troops would be re-
moved as soon as political stability
was>restored. Otherwise the japanese
residents would suffer. After the Nj
Solaievsk affair, the Trans Baikal
troops were withdrawn but those in
NladivostolS were retained after Japan
had received tho assent of the powers
They viii be withdrawn as soon as a
proper Russian government is cstab-
lishcd.
"Bolshevism is spreading overwhclm-
ingly and may reach japanese terri
tory. Tho government is aware of the
utility of trying to check Bolshcvism
with bayonets and realizes II cannot
prevent dscontented Koreans from
becoming tainted with such doctrine"
Niscount Katos rejoindcr was that
Premier Hara's reply was far from
satisfactory"
iSaron Sakatani, former finance min
isNer in speech which followed de
clared that as a result of the war, all
the Russian rights in Manchuria, and
Mongolia, should como to Japan. He
asked IL the government intended to |
secure these. from the powers.
Tho diet took an adjournment after |
this address.