New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1921-07-25
Belief Held at Washington Is
Conversations of Hughes
and Shitlehara Will Have
Favorable Effect ut Toxic
Nippon Tactics Analysed
Harding Is Aware of Ways
of Mikado's Diplomats
From, Senate Experience
BY Carter Field

ance OF the invitation to the confer
ence on armament limitation, Pacific
and Far Eastern questions will be re-
ceived from Japan.
Ambassador Shidehara has made it
clear to his government, following the
numerous conferences he has held with
Secretary of State Hughes, that Japan
by entering the conference does not
bind herself in any way to accept any
conclusions the conference may reach.
This Is not, Of course, special dis
pensation for the benefit of Japan. Sc
far as that is concerned, the American
delegates will not be able to bind this
country, nor will those of any other gov
eminent have any such extraordinary
power. In each instance the nome gov
eminent will have the opportunity to
study the results and take such action
as they may deem appropriate.
Nothing to Lose
The logic used by Secretary Hughes
in his discussions with Ambassador
Shidehara has been that Japan could
not possibly lose anything by entering
the conference, and that it is unnees-
| sary for Japan to attempt to protect
herself in advance against any partic-
ular thing being discussed.
The Japanese, according to the best
opinion obtainable here, understand all
this thoroughly and, therefore, there is
the conference without reservations
and give the conference the chance
every one wants it to have to get some
where in reducing armament taxation
burdens.
But the Japanese are using their
normal publicity methods in the mean
time, it is believed, and are sending up
several trial balloons with q view to
finding out how public sentiment is
running in the United States and in
the other countries involved Also
Japan would like the reactions of the
various governments to such ideas as
discussed, since these questions were
Settled" by the Versailles Treaty.
Japan knows perfectly we'll, as has
been frequently pointed out, that moth
ing was settled for the United States
by the Versailles Treaty. 1t did not
even establish technical peace between
this government and Germany. AS far
IS zap is concerned, also, the Yer
sailles Treaty recognized that this
country, as one of the Allied and asso-
ciated powers, was entitled to one
fifth interest in the German overseas
possessions, of which zap was one, and
of which the Marshall and Caroline
islands are others.
Shantung Problem
The Shantung issue is entirely dis
tinct from the mandates in that no
territory was coded to Japan in Shan
! %or &c
which Germany had in that province
There is some interest here in the Jap
anese statements that she does not
want this issue discussed at the con-
| ference, in view of the fact that on
several occasions statements have been
made by Japanese officials, beginning
at the Versailles peace conference, that
the Japanese would give Shantung back
to China.
There has been some disposition here
to sympathize with the Chinese in THEN
on Shantung as a result of the recent
obvious disinclination of Japan to have
this question again discussed by an in
ternational gathering. This feeling is
! held even among those who at the
time of the peace treaty fight insisted
that Japan's promise should be accept.
ed at face value.
When in the Senate President Har
ding not only voted for the reservation
which, refused this governments ap
prevail to the transfer of the German
concessions to Japan, which reserva
ton commanded q very large majorit,
in the Senate, but he voted also prior
to that for textual amendments to thu
treaty which would have given tn,
German concessions back to China o.
have eliminated the Shantung section
from the treaty.
Sided With Democrats
Indeed, these amendments would
have been adopted-one Of them, O
course, not both--had it not been tina
the small group Of mild reservations
7 Republican Senators, with which MI
E Harding was never affiliated. feare,
any textual amendment would nullif
ratification. They joined with the ma
ing them down.
All OF this naturally is well know
to the Japanese Foreign Office. But
always consummate traders in diplo
macy, they want to see just how niue
advantage they can have conceded Their
before they promise to join in tn
armament limitation conference. Know
!. ing that President Harding is yer
: anxious to have the thing succeed an
remembering how much Presiden
Wilson was willing to concede ther
l when he feared that his particula
hobby--the League of Nations-was er
dangered, they ure wondering if Pres
dent Harding can be forced to max
concessions if the danger of failure t
his international project is limited.
President Harding sat as a membe
; OF the Foreign Relations Committee an
heard the sad story of Presider
y Wilson's surrender to the Japanes
, when he feared Japan would not ioi
the League of Nations unless Shantun
were dealt with as they desired by til
peace conference. President Hardin
. was obviously interestd at the tim
q when Secretary of State Lansing state
3 his own belief that the Japanese wei
h tluffing and that they would hay
: come into the league even if deprive
Of the concessions they desired i
Shantung.
Y That Lansing Agreement
J, President Harding has not foreotte
!, that, nor has he forgotten the amaz,
d ment of the Senators at the bland il
y nocence with which Mr.. Lansing in IL
q lshii-Lansing agreement agreed |
words which Mr.. Lansing thought onl
stated an obvious fact, but which
Japan and China were used as thoup
they meant the approval of this govern
y ment for ending the open door policy !
e China in favor of japan.
= So the Administration is not beir
discouraged by these trial balloon
which are being sent up every other dr.
in Toxic. Secretary Hughes has bee