The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1921-11-24
TOPEKA STATE JOURNAL
Information Bureau
FREDERIC j. HASKN, Director,
Washington. D. @.
TOO EXPENSIVE no FIGHT.

TOO EXPENSIVE TO FIGHT.
Washington, D. c., Nov. 19--The
next world war, if it takes place, will
probably be won by the strongest ma
ton which succeeds in staying out of
it.
This consideration, which is based
upon the calculations of military ex-
perts concerning future wars, as well
as upon the obvious lessons of the one
just over is undoubtedly a powerful
force making for disarmament.
It is probable that each of the prin-
cipal nations, in the next few decades,
will strive for the Limitation of arma-
ment and the adjustment of interna-
tional relations in sucn a way that its
own liability to be embroiled in war
will be reduced to a minimum.
1t does not follow that this will al
ways make for international peace. 1t
probably will do so in a general way,
but it means that while each nation
will itself strive to keep out OF War,
it will often be of advantage to a
given nation to embroil it's chief COM
mercial rivals in war. For example,
some observers have commented up
on the fact that certain sections of the
French press dwell a great deal upon
the points which may produce antag-
onism between Great Britain and the
United States. 1t has been pointed out
that should the United States and
Great Britain ever engage in a war
without France being involved in any
way, at the end of that war France
would occupy a much stronger in
ternational position than she does now.
1t has been suggested that the French
government may not be wholly OBJ
livious to this fact. Whether it has
any influence on French policy or
not, it illustrates the point under con-
sideration.
The Case of England.
Another illustration has been
brought to light by discussions Of the
Anglo-Jap alliance. Whether this al
lance shall be renewed or not is one
of the crucial questions of the confer
ence. In the canvass of considerations
which probably affect British policy
in this regard it has been pointed out,
as a reason why Britain might wish
to discontinue the alliance, that in
case of war between Japan and the
United States, Great Britain could win
that war by staying out of it. 1t IS
stated that if Japan and the United
States fought for four years, during
the position of controlling financier
| center of the world, which has now
passed to the United States, and would
also greatly increase her commerce.
She would do this by selling goods and
| lending money to the beIligerentS, who
I
OF course Great Britain's relative gain
by staying out of the war is much
greater by reason of the fact that if
she went into it, she would lose Can
ada, and nothing she could gain would
repay her for that loss. But even
leaving Canada out of consideration,
Great Britain could gain only by stay
ing out of such war. The United
States would lose her International
leadership by such war, in all prob
ability, even if she won victory.
The same factors appear in all cal
culations that are made concerning
possible future wars. There are ma
tions which might gain by successful
war in certain circumstances, and
| these are noted to be the least enthu-
siastic for disarmament But, in gen.
eral, war no longer pays as a COM
mercial adventure.
You have only to look back a little
way to see that this fact marks a revo-
lutionary change in the basis of inter
| national policy. It is a commonplace
of political economy that nearly all
| modern wars have been fought for
commercial advantage. To be more
exact they have been fought to give
the foreign investors of a given coun-
try preferential right in exploiting
the natural resources of various parts
of the world and in selling manufac-
tured goods to various peoples. A ma
ton which has been successful in it's
wars in the past has gained thereby
new sources of raw material to exploit,
and new markets from which its COM
petitors were wholly or partly ex-
Guided. This advantage has resulted
| in an accumulation of wealth in the
| successful country. This wealth is all
ways in the hands of the relatively few
men who have money invested in for
eign trade and explorations. The COM
mon man, who works for wages or
I
! incidental gains by a successful war
while he always has to do the fighting
and also to pay the taxes. He is in
| duced to do these things by means OF
| speeches about patriotism, the national
| honor, the need for maintaining the
| greatness of his country, and so forth.
/ War Profits Wane.
Now two great changes have come
over the situation. In the first place,
the common man is becoming increas-
| ingIy hard to befool. He is not so
| easily excited about the national honor
and other pretexts for war as once ne
was. the change in this respect Is
| slight, but significant.
In the second place. war does not so
| obviously and surely pay profit, even
| to the investors for whose benetlt 1t is
! fought, as once it did Thus the bust
ness interests of France and England
have obviously not as a whole gained
! by the late war, altho they won 1t.
They gained new spheres of influ-
ence'' and "mandatories' full of oil.
| coal, forests and backward peoples
with money to spend, but they are too
/ crippled financially to make use OF
their prizes. Furthermore, they see
their business rivals in the United
States and Japan, which did not get
into the war far enough to get hurt
much, enjoying an immense advan-
| tage over them in money and men. A
nation which loses in war most of its
young men and most of it's money can
scarcely gain any prize that will re-
pay it; for it takes young men and
money to exploit the prize and hold it.
The British empire was built up by