The Washington herald., 1921-04-17

Nontfhucu lrum Euse IL MaAn oeShoasI
tions should have been fulfilled. Is
in sight, and Germany, lying nat on
the ground and refusing to move,
still insolently inquires-"What are
you going to do about it7'
80 this the French reply seems
fairly complete. France proposes,
for the time being. not general
occupation of Germany. which would
take millions of men and billions
of money, but a slightly extended
occupation of the Industrial areas Of
Germany. which will permit France
to control the Industrial life of Ger
many. To put the thing quite sue
cinctly, France Is going to take over
the powerhouse of the German In
dustrial plant. the question OF
whether Germany will have heat.
light and power and of the terms
under which she shall have them
will then rest with France.
Great Coal Areas.
The conditions are these: There
are in Germany three great coal
areas. From these Germany draws
not only her domestic supply, which
Is essential to the operation of all
of her own manufacturing and
transportation, but a very large item
on German export. These three coal
areas are the Ruhr, Upper Silesia
and the Sarre. Under the treaty OF
Versailles the Sarre has already
been turned over to the French for
fifteen years. at the least But, in
reality, this Is only minor source
Of supply, and the Sarre coal Is int
ferior, as compared with that of the
Ruhr and of the Upper Silesian,
mines.
II Germany should now suddenly
be deprived of all of the coal sup
plies coming from the Ruhr and
from Upper Silesia she would be
exactly in the situation Of an cleo
trio railway abruptly deprived of
power, through some disturbance in
the power house. Until the power
was turned on again the transporta>
tion system would be paralyzed.
And exactly this is the step the
French have in mind for the period
following promptly on May 1.
Opefation Twofold.
In practice the operation would
be 'twofold; that Is. there would
have to be two distinct actions. one
in Upper Silesia and the other in
the Ruhr. But as to Upper Silesia
the recent plebiscite has much sim
plified the situation. Not only were
allied troops placed in occupation
Of this district as an incident in the
election, but the results Of the cleo
ton were such as to warrant, or
rather compel the transfer of all of
the Upper Silesian coal area to Po-
land. While there was German
majority in the whole area, that is
the political division of Upper
Silesia. the Polish majority was de-
cisive in ten of sixteen counties
and in these counties are the coal
deposits
The French have only then to in
sist~upon the completion Of the set
tlement Of the Upper Silesian prob
lem, by the ALLEGATION to Poland of
the Polish districts of this former
German territory and. automati-
cally, Germany loses control Of
source of a little more than a third
Of her coal supplies Under the
terms Of the treaty Of Versailles,
Poland, on acquiring these coal
mines, would be bound to furnish
Germany with a certain quantity of
coal for a period OF years. But un-
til Germany complies with the
treaty, such provisions would hardly
be applied.
Can Continue Occupation.
Falling short of the ALLEGATION of
Upper Silesia to Poland outright; it
lies within the allied power to con-
tinue the occupation of the district
and this occupation. now carried
F,NNf ANg ct l.
troops would enable them to con-
troll the district and draw a customs
frontier across the Oder Valley from
Bohemia to Poland. which would
shut of all German supplies of coal
coming from the Upper Silesian
fields. In a word to deprive Ger
many of the Silesian coal does not
require the use Of any more troops
or the extension CT the area Of al
lied occupation. All that is ncces-
sary is to take full advantage Of
allied occupation. All that is neces-
sary is to take full advantage of
power already available. What is
even more interesting is that no ad-
ditional expense would be required.
Indeed. allied troops might now be
recalled and the whole affair turned
over to the Poles. a course that
would automatically follow the ac-
tual transfer of the Polish counties
to Poland. as the treaty intended.
AS to the Ruhr the problem Is a
little more difficult 1t would be nee
essary for the allies, and in practice
this means the French, to take over
some hundreds of square miles of
German territory, the most dcnsely
populated regions in all of Germany.
This would require a certain number
Of additional troops. not large
force. but perhaps 10000 or 1900.
With these troops in occupation, the
whole Of the Ruhr coal area would
pass under French control.
Transport Facilities.
The natural outlet Of the .Ruhr is
the water system which by canal
and river connects with the. Rhine
below Dusseldorf By the Rhine,
which Is now under allied supervi-
sion. the coal could be transported
cheaply and easily to the French
frontiers in Alsace. From the river
port of Strassburg II could be sent
on into France by the hfne-Marne
and Rhine-Rhone canals. Thus the
French could occupy. the Ruhr, work
the mines. transport the product in
quantities suficien: 20 meet French