The Washington herald., 1921-11-20

portion of British Far Eastern pol
Icy, would not only have = pro
found effect upon japanese plans
but go far to meet the apprehen-
sions of our own naval Authorities.
Reduction of American sea srenErn
while the defense of the indefens-
ible Philippines is one of the duties
fessional opposition
Primaey so1ndIy BaseA
Looking at the disarmament
question from the broader aspect
once more, 1t is plain why there is
the soundest Of reasons for giving
it the first place. And this reason
is found in the fact that statesmen
of the world will in this feld have
only to preach to the converted.
The domestic situation. social as
well as financial of the three great
powers really concerned. namely,
Britain, Japan and the United
States, Is such that popular opin-
ion not only favors but demands
that relief from taxation which
can only be found in armament hol-
days.
Now it is not equally true that
in the United States and in Brit
ain the public grasps the meaning
and the dangers OF the Far East
ern question. For the principles
of the open door" and the "integ-
rity of China" there is. as 1 have
pointed out frequently. no such
popular understanding as there is
for the policy of the Limitation of
armaments. The very principles
are difficult of translation. hard to
make clear to masses of people and
having at bottom some of the same
inherent weakness as marked the
fourteen points at Paris.
And the aftermath of the Paris
conference proved that there was
little profit in legislation which
sought revolutions and transforma-
tions for which the public of vari-
Gus nations were not in the least
prepared. Disarmament, or limita-
tion OF armaments Is a fact which
the world public has grasped, a
fact. IN Mr.. Hughes's sense. The
Far Eastern question is a problem,
grave, certain to have serious con-
oANSA oNAShs OuN as yet pIODlern
for which no acceptable solution
exists in the minds of the people
Of Japan or the United States
Therefore. Mr. Hughes begins with
naval armaments. And this begin
ming insures agreement on the first
matter in hand. which will certain
ly permit the discussion OF other
questions In a better spirit.
After Arms, Far East.
Accepting. then. as almost newt
able, now, in view of what has al
ready happened. that the Washing
ton conference will make progress,
great and almost undreamed of
progress in the direction of the
limitation of naval armaments,
what then is the second promise?
Obviously we must deal with the
Far Eastern question. Limitation
OF armaments will reduce taxation.
improve local and domestic condi-
tions, 1t will tend to prevent unrest
at home but II will not and cannot
prevent war. Yet II is we'll to per-
eeive at once that question so
complicated and involved as the Far
Eastern cannot be solved at a sin
gle world conference. We are not
going to solve the problem and we
shall probably settle only a few of
Its many dangerous interrogations.
Perhaps the greatest gain that
might be made here. would be the
creation of that kind of spirit
which would aid nightly in solu-
tions in the future and at other
conferences, for there must be other
conferences. perhaps one at Toxic,
to continue what was begun in
Washington.
Now in the Far Eastern discus
sion. which must come, all will de-
rend upon the manner in which the
American case is presented and the
degree to which we are d sclosed as
seeking adjustment, not striving to
impose abstract principles. And nv
Judgment is that the first real step
will be the hxation on the map of
that unit which will henceforth be
called China for the purposes of in
ternational agreement. THIS China
will, believe, include the eighteen
provinces, but recognize paramount
economic and perhaps political priv
ileges to Japan In Manchuria.
shantnng Is Difficult.
As to the eighteen provinces, with
the possibility of some exception in
the matter of Shantung, 1 believe
We shall see the United States, Bri-
tain and Japan, which are most con-
cerned, able to reach an agreement
which will include the reaffirmation
OF the prime Piles of the integrity Of
China and the open door Shantung
viii raise difficulties and precipi-
tate debates, II may be that Japan
VIII be able to maintain their claim
TO special privileges SO far as the
railway Is concerned.
At all events, aside from the prob
lens presented by the Shantung
Railroad and certain mines, II seems
to me not only entirely possible,
but quite likely that the United
States. Great Britain and Japan may
be able to find some practicable for
mula which will contain a mutual
recognition of equal rights of all
AS against them, IL seems to me,
Japan may expect to receive from
the United States and Great Britain
definite recognition of special inter-
ssts in the Manchurian area VIII 'ch
will constitute Aconopnfc confroI and