The Birmingham age-herald., 1921-11-13

| was ApitEtA ui0Ci tue NEJS tEf ttto tA the venue statute.
 Common Law Holding
 At the common law, from a very early period. it was held that a pros ecution for criminal libel would lie i in any county or local jurisdiction in which the libel was circulated-ap- parently upon the theory that every tfresh publication was a fresh crime. l-odgers on Sander and Libel 18th ed)s pp. 4e7-469; Newell vs. Sander and Libel t3d ed,). pp. 2ss; 1 Bishop on C. Law. the edl, 136, 142, l29: note to State vs. Huston. (S. D.) 5 Ann. Gas. 3S2 And 1t seems to have l been generally held that mailing llibelous matter constitutes a publica- tion both in the juri sdiction where It is mailed and in that where 1t is re- ceived by the addressee, and may therefore support an action or prose cution in either jurisdiction.--13 Am, & Eng. Ency. Law t2d ed.) ft1a; Destys Am. & Eng. Grim. Law, 472' 14s (B).
 Three old common law principles undoubtedly had their origin in re iation to the single acts Of individ- uals, in a primitive society, and can not, either as a matter of principle or common sense be applied without
  modern newspapers.
 It is not clear from the older au- thorities whether an action or prose cution could be maintained separate 1 ly and simultaneously. and prosecuted to judgment, for every separate pub- 1licatlon of the same libel, or in every Jurisdiction where it was circulated. If every separate publication of the identical libel is indeed a separate of- fense, there is no escape from the con- clusion that separate actions ana prosecutions may be simultaneously maintained in every jurisdiction. As declared by District Judge Anderson in U. S vs. Smith, Ira Fed. (Ind-) 227, where the identical question was presented in a case of criminal libel there Is no middle ground" If every copy of a newspaper separately de- | livered is a distinct offense, then a | daily newspaper with a circulation of 100000 is guilty of that many crimes or civil offenses as the result 1 of single issue. But. sensible of the injustice and absurdity of such a result. as applied to newspapers, the majority of tho Missouri court In Julian vs. K. C. Star Co, supra, held that, regardless of the number of papers simultaneously or success
 
 l and circulated in other counties, there was but one publication-one
 utterance-and though some of the i papers did not reach their destination as soon as others, yet they all ema- | mated from one act and all consti- tuted but one libel. if libel at all" It is difficult to see how single cause of action, complete at one place, and fully accrued. can subsequently, | accrue" in another place, or in many places, for the purpose of ac- quiring a new venue, and yet without being a new and distinct cause of ac- tion--unless, of course, the statute Is to be construed as meaning that the same cause of action re-accrues wher- ever it's operation may be extended and results in additional damage or hurt But that would be the accrual of additional damage merely, and not the accrual of a cause of action, as we shall show later on.
 | If the mailing of copies of libeious newspapers from the county of their primary publication into other coun- ties amounts to a republication mere | ly-and no other theory seems avail able--then the law is well settled that the repetition or republication of the 1 identical libel is not new cause Of |
 be maintained, but Is merely an az gravation of the pre-existing cause, and in proper cases may tend to show actual malice.-- Murray vs. Galbraith, ] S6 Ark. 50, 109 s. W. 1o11, 126 Am. St. Rep. 107S; Galligan vs. Sun, Etc. Co, 25 Misc. Rep. 355, 54 N. Y. Supp. 471; Enos vs. Enos, 135 N. Y. SOS, 5S
 N E. 123; 25 Cyc. 4si.
 We have examined the rules of the | common law, and reviewed some or
 the more modern decisions, the gen- eral aspects and reasoning of which 1 seem pertinent to the question here
 presented for decision; but those
 rules and authorities are useful only for comparison and analogy, and can
 not be accepted as authoritative
 guides.
 AIabama Law of Venue | What we have to determine IS, not 1 what was the common law of venue l in libel suits, but what is the statu- tory law of venue in Alabama, as pre- | scribed by section 61f2 of the Code: "A foreign or domestic corporation | may be sued in any county in which | it does business by agent; but Gll actions for personal injuries must be brought in the county where the in- | jury occurred. or in the county where | | tion does business by agent in the l county of plaintiffs residence"
 1 1. It is clear that the word "in- | jury"-in the Latin, fnturia--in the phrase where the injury occurred,' is used in it's proper legal sense Of | wrong, importing of course wrong | ful act or omission. Damage, the re- suit of the wrongful act-technically | called the damnum-is a correlative | term of wholly distinct meaning and application. The significance of the terms-"injury" and 'damage"-is ! sharply contrasted in the familiar le- | gal phrase, damnum absque injuris and injuria sine damno-West Vir- | ginia Trans. Co. vs. Standard Oil Co, 1 50 W. Va. 611, 40 s. E. 591, 56 l.. R. A. 8O4, SS Am. St. Rep. S95; Brown l vs. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.), 2e2, | 2s5.
 The meaning we accord to injury in section 6112 Is made clearer by a | consideration of 6110. which Is a gen. eral venue statute, and which author ! izes the bringing of non-contractual I personal actions either in the county of the defendants residence, 'or in the county in which the act or omis- sion complained of may have been done, or may have occurred" Ger tdinly, Tn oudctinS thS iaetoi ee~ei1ii t6112). the legislature did not intend
 to change the basis of venue In tort
 actions only against corporate de- | wrongful act was done or occurred to | the county. or any county in which
 the resulting damage occurred, and | to thereby effect so vital change in
 actioins only against corporate de- fendants. and for personal injuries
 only.
 It results that, under Section 6112.
 the venue in this action must be laid