Evening star., 1921-12-25

The official statements issued at the
close of the fourth and nftn 3olnt
meetings of the committee on liml-
tation of armament and the subcom-
mittee on naval limitation, follow:
Fourth Joint Meeting.
The fourth joint meeting of the
committee on limitation of armament
and the subcommittee on naval limi-
tation was held in the Pan American
Union building at IL am, December
"a, 1921. Continuing the discussion of
the abolition of the submarine, Mr.
Sarraut said:
! Our eminent and venerated col
league. Mr.. Balfour, replying yester
day to Admiral de- Bon statement
which, in my opinion. was so substah-
tial and convincing, gave us ne"
opportunity for respecting the elo
quence and the emotion of the terms
which a mind like his always SO
easily finds to express the inspira-
tionS OF his thought. l thank MN,
personally, for having given me that
rare pleasure in which the regret one
feels at meeting opposition lmmeal-
ately gives way to admiration for
ones adversary. l regret the use OF
such word as adversary, which mas
a displeasing sound as 1T comes TO
my ears; for, as a matter OF fact' the
fifst Impulse of my thought as rise
to reply to MIR. Balfour. is to think
of the last words of his speech and 10
approve with all my heart and all my
reason of the dignity and the serenity
ward to the future destiny of his
great country. On this point ne
knows how completely I share ms
faith and his conviction. My country.
more than any other-Mr. Baiiour
knows this--desires for Great Britain
the continuation of the power ana
security which France regards as one
of the essential guarantees OF the
peace of the world and of the fu-
ture of civilization. France would pc
the last to forget how greatly the
heroism and the tenacity OF her
mighty ally contributed to bring
about the final decision which saved
the liberty of mankind: and in me
effort thus made by England we
know also what part was prayed py
this splendid British navy which;
so much to make victory certain.
II wish to bear these sentiments IN
mind in replying to Mr.. Balfour and
particularly to the argument ad
hominam." which he addressed 10
France. as to Italy with the object OF
demonstrating the danger that might
be created by the position taken on
the subma rine question. If l rightly
understood. Mr.. Balfour said: Be :
ware. you may be the first victims OF
your attitude. You know what Eng
land has been enabled to do for you
with the aid of it's navy: this help ran
great risk of being impaired by the
action of the German submarines.
Let US suppose that the situation at
the time of the last war should recur,
as has been suggested by Mr.. BRAND !:
suppose that the former allies OF
France again come to her assistance
(as Mr.. Balfour said he hoped they
would -do); the efficiency of their
help might be impaired by the re-
sumption of that submarine campaign
which the attitude of France would
have helped to render possible by its
unwillingness to abolish the sub
marines.
Uses BalfOur's Argument.
"such, indeed. is Mr.. Balfour's line
of reasoning: I believe that I have
not understated it and that I have
exactly reproduced it. l might re-
mark that in reality the danger con-
templated by NJ. BRAND is the same
as that which Mr. Balfour himself
has called the very great insecurity
from the land side But I agree also
with him that the peril may extend to
the sea, and far from putting aside
this supposition. I hasten to accept II
because it will still further strengthen
our contention.
lat this point ] will borrow from
Mr.. Balfour himself the argument in
answer to his reasoning. In fact. Mr..
Balfour in pointing out to us the event.
ual danger of maintaining the subma-
rines. has laid it down that countries
which have maritime shores which have
access to the sea may take advantage
of this situation to gather together a
force of submarines representing con-
siderable aggressive strength for use
against their neighbors or against otner
countries. Herein lies the very danger,
as pointed out by MIR. Balfour himsef.
which we fear and which we wish TO
avoid 1t is suggested that We give up
the idea of retaining submarines: but
are all the powers possessing meets OF
submarines equally anxious to support
such a decision? There are five powers
here: sometimes called the big three,
sometimes big two we can reach de.
cision as far as we ourselves are con-
cerned but what will the other coun-
tries do? Who can assure US that they
will submit and follow our example?
And then what will happen if they con-
tinue to build submarines. either for
their own use or for some one else?
In what sort of situation would We find
ourselves if, per adventure. war were
TO break out? We would have given
up submarines and might be confronted
with great submarine forces which other
nations would have constructed. retain
ed or ceded to enemy powers.
lnlS Is tHt tNculudhtS iiuSt
be faced. Will any one tell me that
it is fantastic? The countries I have
in mind which are not represented
here. and which will therefore pre-
serve their freedom of action and
their submarine forces-what way
have you of persuading them or of
forcing them to follow our example?
Great Britain's Efforts.
Great Britain has tried persuasion
without success These attempts
were made in the deliberations pre-
liminary to the peace treaty, during
which Great Britain expressed the
wish that the use of submarines be
forbidden, as well as in the discus
sions which brought the matter up
twice. if l am not mistaken, before
the league of nations. The other
countries concerned refused to ac-
cept the British proposals. There
was nothing surprising in this; it
goes to prove that these suggestions
came up against a sentiment which
CDErYAT NOTTrEc