The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1921-11-10

intemperance of part of our press
feared as early as 1917 a menace to
the peace of Europe. 1t was In 1917
that Mr.. Balfour in two speeches
energetically repudiated the idea OF
elf-governing Rhine state which
NJ. Aristide BRAND had suggested
the preceding January in a confiden-
tial letter to NJ. Paul Cambon, French.
am bassador at London. The British
minister of foreign affairs had de-
MED that an agreement between the
allies had ever contemplated the crea-
tion of Independent states on the left
bank of the Rhine. Such a solu-
tion,' he added, has never entered
into the policy of the British govern
ment.' Mr.. Lloyd George. for his
part had often repeated: I'VE must
not create another Alsace- Lorraine"
He also said: THE strongest impress
sion made upon me by my first visit
to Paris was the statue of Strass-
burg yelled in mourning. DO not
let us make 1t possible for Germany
TO erect a similar statue" Speeches
and remarks revealed under varying
forms, a fear from which the British
government had never freed itself.
Echoes of Fear
The first conversations brought us
ecnOeS OF TINS rear. II was unTe-
servedly admitted that we needed
guarantees. But the means Proposed
by US caused alarm. All talk of sep
aration between Germany and the
left bank, of military occupation of
the latter, of participation in this oc-
cupation, was extremely repugnant to
our allies. And, from the outset,
they emphasized the fact that other
securities were possible. such as dis
armament of Germany; the League
of Nations; if need be. the complete
demilitarization of the left bank OF
the Rhine.
1t was towards the beginning of
March that the serious discussion be-
gan. President Wilson is. at the mo-
ment, on the ocean en- route for
France, Mr.. Lloyd George has just re-
turned to Paris. 1t is decided to pre-
pare the work of the heads of gov
ernments by a conference of three.
| represent France, Mr. Philip Kerr,
Great Britain, and Doctor Mezes, the
United States. / explain verbally, in
all details the Frech, proposals. AS
my explanation proceeds, l become
conscious of the psychological barrier
just mentioned. / am offered a
strengthening of the disarmament
clauses. / am offered a reinforce
ment of those dealing with demili-
| tarization. As soon as | return to
the question of occupation, opposi-
\ ton becomes more marked.
Mr.. Mezes says little. These eight
hours of discussion are a dialogue be-
tween Mr. Kerr and myself, and it IL
evident that though the voice of HE
chief secretary 1t is the British
prime minister himself who-~fnvis-
/ ible but present--speaks with some
reserve at the first meeting. more
emphatically at the second. 1t is
| impossible, he says, for England to
participate in such an occupation. So
also, 1t would cause deep regret II
| France sought to undertake 1t alone
Tardien's Reply
l reply. l recall that the Rhine
landers are not Prussians. l show
Z, that the French proposal excluding
anne-Ations is the reverse of impe,
realistic; that the control of the
League of Nations gives every facil,
| ity for evolution: that France, after
such unparalleled sufferings, has q
right to insist upon the acceptance
Of the methods Of her choice. Public
opinion is hostile? Public opinion
must be enlightened. 1t has alread,
learned much during the war. ant
first of all this, that France is the
sentinel of the overseas democracies
| Besides in defaul. of occupation
what guarantee is there that the
treaty will be fulfilled? And l ad
ded:
"Ycu say that England does no
| like English troops to be used ava,
| from home. 1t is question of fact
England has always had troops IL
India and Egypt. Why? Because
she knows that her frontier Is not a