Norwich bulletin., 1921-11-14

the first reduction. Apparently it is ex pected. that the British strength would be reduced sufficiently by the wearing out of ships, during the ten year period.
 Gun Power of Fleets
 Statistics as to the gun power of the three fleet to be retained under the re- duction program show that the United that and Japan would have one ship each mounting eight sixteen inch rifles each.
 Great Britain would have ten ships car dying q total of eight 15-inch rifles; one carrying ten 14-inch guns and her other seven ships would be armed with the British 13.5 guns Ueal hv peithcr of the other pawers. She would have seventy of these ahoat.
 The United States in addition to the siyteen-inch gun ship, the Maryland, just commissioner, would have eight ships carrying twelve-4-inch guns each; four carrying ten 14-inch each Two carrying l2-inch each and four carrying ten 12-inch each. Japan. in addition 10 her one 16- inch gun ship would have forty-eight l4-inch guns and twelve 12-inch on her battleships and thirty-two 14-inch on her battle cruisers.
 iae :,,,res } .,r Illustrate that the British rreponG, race in the proposed immediate cut is embraced in her four battle cruisers as the gun power of the TWO battleship fleets would be different In makeup, but approximately the same. There is little doubt, however, that Amer can naval opinion would rank the Amer can battleship fleet as superior.
 In round terms. the American replace ment proposal means that under the agreement outlined, the fleets of the three powers in terms of capital should would stand approximately fourteen each for Great Britain and the United States and eight for Japan.
 The American claim to full equality with Great Britain is made in the replace ment suggestion and there has been no hint as yet that the British delegation will oppose it.
 IL means also that Japan would stand thereafter a a fixed ratio of three to five in naval strength in comparison to the other two fleets. It was not clear tonight. how they would finally be viewed by Japan.
 Limit Capital Ships to s5,OOO Tons
 The American replacement plan propos- es 10 limit future capital ships to 35, 900 tons. Taken in connection with the ton mage allotments, that would mean main fleets of ourteen capital craft each for Great Britain and the United States and eight for Japan, provided all are built up 10 the limit of size.
 The heaviest tonnage of capital craft so afr planned is understood to be in con- l nection with Japans projected battle cruisers said to reach 44.000 tons. Sucf 1 ships and also such vessels as the ix new ! battleships and six battle cruisers tho United States is building all well over | 10000 tonners, would be prohibited. Limitations in size at vital elements | in naval constructions. The factors ot ! guns and armor weight, speed asd cruis | ing radius are those from which the sizt | IS determined
 Probably the 35,00O ton limitatio, would make impossible any ship carryin. ! heavier batteries than eight sixteen incl weapons. It is to be noted that no at ! tempt is made to limit the design of tn vessels, batteries, speed, fuel capacity, O other military characters beyond tn S5,Oo0 ton maximum figure.
 In outlining the plans for all the auxil ] ;ary craft that make up modern fleets care was taken to exclude from limita tions existing tonnage in monitors, 0 purely coast defense vessels and in sun ply and other train ships, tugs and tn like. Otherwise, with the exception o aircraft. the five to three ratio as betwee the strength of the British and America fleets and that of Japan, would appl all down the line.
 The figure may be significant Nays officers always have contended that would require a two to one prepond cr2nce of forces to carry battle to Jana across the PaciIc, if the attacking DOW CT lacked bases well out toward the sid, because of the possibility of accidents f ships which would put them out of ac ton as total losses, although a nearb base might quickly have refitted them fo the front line. Here is where the grea importance of naval bases in the Pacif not touched upon by Mr Hughes lie, Another element of the American nrc gram, yet to be explained, is the stat ment as to the Inverse ratio" importsnc of the merchant marine, compared to th naval strength maintained by any powe That means that as the size of the nav, force goes down, the possibilities of turr | Ing merchant vessels into warships h
 mounting guns on their decks go up.
 all navies were scrapped, Great Britai
 would have an overwhelming preponde1
 lnce in potential naval strength due f
 her twenty million tons of cargo and pai
 senger steamers as against the mercba1
 fleets of the United States and Japan.
 Apparently, the American deIepatio
 ras influenced by some such consider; ton as this in reaching the figures as
 size of navies to be maintained on a nor competitive basis.
 The plans to be worked out into rul, 10 govern convertibility of merchant to,
 mage for war will have to do with rei,
 forcing decks to carry the weight of gun
 prohibition of actual gun emplacemen O nsteamers restrictions as to materi
 fabricated for quick installation on il
 ships to make them over into war crat
 It seems likely that the American nav
 experts have well advanced ideas on th
 matter to be put forward later, if agre ment "n strictly naval limitation seen , probable. ...t..4 .sS j-.s