Evening star., 1921-10-24

ber 1916. we had eight tanks. and on
the day of the armiStice 400. Final
ly. let me emphasize the point that
this production for the needs of the
French army did not exhaust our
manufacturing capacity, for we fur
nlShed our various allies with 1000
guns. 1868 aeroplanes and 400 tanks.
Thus. after three and a half years of
war and invasion. we were able to
lend the splendid American Army that
assistance without which their entry
into action might have been indefi-
nitely delayed. Not to mention the
$500 officers. the twenty-five inStrUc
tion camps and the $4,000 hospital
beds placed at their disposal We fur
nished the Americans with 1000 guns.
1000 aeroplanes. 240 tanks.
Kept Her Force Up.
On the day of the armiStice. of the
United States Army's war material
then in line, France had manufac-
tured 100 per cent of the 15s, 100 per
cent Of the 155s. howitzers: 100 per
cent of the tanks, 81 Per cent of the
guns. All of the 65.OOO.000 rounds of
15 and 1855 shells used by the Ameri-
can artillery came from French fac
tories OF the 14.000,000 tons of sup
plies which they used in Europe, half,
or 100000, came from France.
Such was our material contribution.
What of our contribution in man
power? Despite her low birth rate
France did not hesitate before the
mortality of war andy means of 4
Spartan system of mobiliZation--al-
ways kept her forces up to the maxi
mum.
3.1S1.000 men in August 1914.
4.9lS.OO0 men in July, 1915.
4.671.O00 men in July. 1915
4.32I.O00 men in September, 1917.
4.143.O0O men in November. 1918.
In November. 1918. we had 362 900
more men In line than in 1914. and
yet our losses from the beginning
had been 2,594.000 men-1.36i. 900
killed. 100000 severely wounded and
100000 prisoners. Throughout the
war we bore the hrunt of the enc
my's attacks on the western front.
We held three -fourths of this front
up to the spring of 1877. At that time
two German divisions, the French
army eighty-two. Our lines. reduced
about this time by fifty kilometers..
was increased by another eighty kilo-
meters after the German push on Gen.
; Coughs army in March, 1918.
Germans Maintained Density.
Up to the war of movement in 1918.
the German army always maintained
its maximum density on the western
November. 1914. 1.456 battalions out
of 2,316 in February, 1917-and it was
always the French sector that bore
the brunt of the burden on the west
ern front. If, for example. taking
the first thirty-five months of the war
august. 1914. to August. 1910 and
the number of enemy battalions in
Zine. we figure the total German
strength depioyed as four on the
Belgian front. it was eight on the
British fsont. twenty-five on the Rus
sian front and thirty-five on the
French front.
I have told our industrial effort and
our human sacrifice. There remains
the story of our French genius. / am
not one of those smallminded
, Frenchmen who believe that. in order
to be great, France must needs be
! ungrateful. I have always said that
France could not have won without
her allies. And 1 have always count
ed on our allies sense of justice to
recognize that without France they
could not have waged the war. Have
I not the fright to add that besides
her contribution in war material and
her contribution in man power.
France made the splendid contribu-
surprises was pregnant with it's own
lesson. SUCCESS came to those who
from this lesson were able to un-
riddle their course of action.
No Cut-and-Dried Doctrine.
No cnt- -and-dried doctrine stood the
test of events. The doctrine of the
war shaped itself from day to day in
the turmoil of accumulated happen
ings. reserving the crown of victory
to him who could coordinate its ever
changing demands. But whether for
artillery-strategic plans. barrage
fire plunging fire. liaison, .range-fnd-
ing. signaling; whether for infantry
transformati .n of equipment. special
,, ization of missions. organization OF
terrain. accompanying aviation. ac-
celeration o. reliefs. Attacks by in
; filtration: passage througlrthe lines
defense by withdrawal to second line
positions-F>rance during the whole
war was the laboratory of the pow
ers. Nothing was more natural; for
Under the cruel stress of defeat We
! had more deeply studied these prob
lems How could one not recall that
it was a French mind that conceived
and carried out the strategic plan
which led to final victory; that sub
stituted for local and intermittent at
tacks which had wasted both sides
for four years the general and con-
tinuous attack along the whole front?
How could one not write here the
name of Marshal Foch? Won kluck