Evening star., 1921-11-23
j, s. FACING FIGHT:
To DEFEND POLICY
PROPOSED IN EAST
Lead in Navy Reduction In
terpreted as Taking Away
Our Best Card.
MOVEMENT BY NATIONS
AT PERSUASION HINTED
Europe, Recognizing Japan as Pow.
er, Believed Ready to Favor
General" Scheme.
BY PAUL SCOTT MOWRER.

BY PAUL SCOTT MOWRER.
A subtle movement of the gravest
Importance has been started by a
number of foreign delegations to
persuade the United States to become
extremely moderate and conciliatory
in its far eastern policy. The con-
ference, these delegations argue.
must be made a success. And to
succeed, it must keep largely to gen.
eral principles, so far as the oriental
question is concerned. These prin-
ciples. moreover. must apply only to
the future, not to the past; for to at
tempt to use them to reopen set
tied questions" would be to wreck
the conference, it is argued.
This is, of course, primarily the
thesis of Japan. But it seems to be
backed by Britain. and to some ex-
tent by France and Italy. All of the
European powers are sympathetic
with the United States and desire to
preserve Americas friendship. But
they see that Japan has become
really strong power, to oppose whom
would require material means Of
which they do not dispose. and to
anger whom would perhaps endanger
their own positions and possessions
See Strongest Card Lost.
The European powers and Japan
not only want the United States to
abandon its original firm attitude. it is
hinted, but they believe the United
States is already in a situation where
it cannot do otherwise. The one great
means Of pressure which the United
States held over Japan and Britain,
they believe, was its ability to out
strip them in the race of naval arma-
ment. Their surprise, when Secretary
conference, laid down plan for scrap
ping half the American fleet, was due
perhaps less to the unusual procedure
than to what seemed to them the
throwing away by the United States
OF Its strongest card.
Beholding the wave of emotional
approval which Immediately swept the
United states. they jumped to the con-
clusion that 1t would be very hard,
henceforth. for the American delega-
tion to refuse to sign naval limita-
ton agreement. regardless of what
might be done in the far eastern ques-
tion. Their original understanding Of
the American position was that if q
settlement. satisfactory to the United
States, Of the far eastern question
could not be reached, the United States
would continue to build ships. This
was the one thing they We're afraid of.
Now. however, all has changed, they
think.
Delegates Doubly Bound.
The American delegation is doubly
bound-flrst. by having strong de-
mand in America for naval reduction,
at almost any cost; and. second, by
the obvious desire of the republican
administration to. make the confer
ence a success, not only for humani-
tartan, but also for party reasons. In
these circumstances it will be rela-
lively easy, they estimate, for Japan
and Britain, both Of whom desire
naval Limitation. at least as much as
the United States does, to persuade
the American delegation to be satis-
ned with a success" in naval reduc-
tion, and to limit the far eastern set
tlement to an enunciation Of princi-
pies, which harm no one.
This program is perhaps tempting,
but from the American viewpoint it is
open to serious criticism. The far
eastern situation to which the United
States has repeatedly made diplo-
matte objection, is not a matter of the
future, but of the past and the pres
ent. With British influence predomi-
nant in Tibet, with Russian soviet
troops in Mongolia, with the Japanese
established in eastern Siberia, Man
CI4v
bound hand and foot by all sorts of
treaties and agreements, to talk of
applying principles only in the future
is to use empty words.
China Would BE MANNED.
Unless come of the powers con-
cerned are willing to march a con-
siderable distance backward, China
will be permanently crippled. A
mere acceptance of principles would
amount to a recognition of the status
quo in the far east, which in turn
would practically amount to an
abandonment by the United States of
it's whole far eastern policy. And
this is exactly what some Of the
powers now represented in Washing
ton most desire.
There is reason to believe, how
ever, that the Interpretation given
by foreign delegates to Secretary
Hughes diplomacy and to the state
of American public opinion is some-
what misguided. American opinion
has stood behind it's government in
far eastern matters in the past, and
it will probably continue to do 50.
whenever the occasion arises. despite
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