New-York tribune., 1921-05-23
Lloyd Georges Error

Lloyd George said In the interview
qualifying his recent Upper Silesian
speech that his Polish program had
practically the unanimous support of
American public opinion. That is not
the case. The New York Times
showed the other day that he was
mistaken on this point. 1t is hardly
necessary to argue that American
opinion doesn't look with favor on
the sacrifice of Polish interests in
Upper Silesia to German interests.
Lloyd Georges anti-Polish policy
at Paris and since has worked injus-
tice to Poland and, unfortunately,
obstructed fair peace settlement.
In the first place, it has run counter
to the promises made to the Poles
and embodied in general way in
one of President Wilson's Fourteen
Points. All this unhappy Silesian
aftermath, involving grave d1ssen-
sions among the Allies, is due to the
British Prenlier's success in revers-
ing the unanimous findings of the
Polish boundary commission. The
commission, the representative of
Great Britain asserting, recommend
ed the allotment to Poland of Danzig,
most of Posen and the eastern Sec
tion of Upper Silesia. When Lloyd
George objected to the cession of
Danzig the British member of the
commission presented brief refut-
ing his superior's arguments. Presi-
dent Wilson'S surrender on Danzig
was most unfortunate. 1t was de-
plored by his expert advisers.
Both Professor Lord, the chief of
the Polish Division of the American
Peace Commission, and DR.. Isaiah
Bowman, the chief territorial spe-
cialists have shown in the chapters
they contributed to Colonel Houses
book, What Really Happened at
Paris, how little sympathy they had
with Lloyd Georges efforts to whittle
away Poland's security.
An appendix to that volume con-
tains the answer made by Professor
Lord to the following question asked
him at the Philadelphia Academy of
. Music on December II, 1920: "Per-
sonally, do you believe that the set
tlement Of the Polish question was
the fairest to Poland that could have
been reached?" The answer was:
81 am going to speak very frankly
and say no. Personally, feel that
the Danzig problem was a very grave
one and one of vital interest to
Poland. The new arrangement about
Danzig now has been reduced to the
form of definite treaty, which was
signed just the other day, and it
whittles away some of the rights
which the peace treaty seemed to
have assured to Poland. 1t leaves
the control of the port of Danzig in
the hands of mixed commission,
made up of two Poles, two Danzigers
and one neutral, so that Poland will
not have secure and effective control
of her one and only port. How badly
she needs secure control was shown
last summer when I was in Danzig.
At that moment Poland was fighting
for her life against the Bolsheviki.
The only means by which war sup
plies from the outside world could
come to her was through Danzig, but,
owing to the hostility of the Danzig
Germans, and, I might add, of the
British High Commissioner, the port
Of Danzig was closed to Polish muni-
tions in the very heat of the strug-
gle. If matters had not been settled
by General Weygand's splendid vic
tory near Warsaw that situation at
Danzig might have cost Poland her
very existence. Furthermore, the
feeling shown by the Danzigers at
present is just as bad as can be i'm
agined. The Poles in the CITY are
mobbed not infrequently. In short, 1
think the new arrangement is work
ing very badly"
Withholding Danzig has crippled
the new Polish state. Withholding
the eastern section of Upper Silesia
would still further reduce it's re-
sources and economic independence
yet the Lloyd George policy aims at
restoring to Germany as much of
PIPER silesia as possible, leaving the
Poles much less thar an impartial
territorial commission had unani-
! rnously assigned to them.
: This is a 'peace-without-victory''
program which cannot appeal to
Americans generally. Poland is one
Of the keystones in the new scheme
of European defense against German
aggression and the union of imperi-
aIistic Germany with Red Russia,
She should be strengthened, not