Evening star., 1921-12-23

piopei course was tne aDOlltlon OF
| submarines. Their limitation was not
| sufficient. His objection to limitation
was that a submarine fleet could so
very rapidly be expanded in time of
war submarines could only be built
| II the industry were kept alive, and a
| personnel could only be provided if a
| trained nucleus existed. Hence it was
| only by means of abolition that this
menace to the mercantile marine of
| the world could be got rid of. He had
SAID earlier in his remarks that the
! British empire delegation were ami
| mated by no selfish motives. At the
| same time it would be foolish not to
! recognize that Great Britain was the
nation most exposed to the menace of
! the submarine. So long as submarine
| warfare continued it would be the
, greatest menace to the food supplies
| on which our country was dependent.
The British people lived in a crowded
! island, whose soiEonly produced two
| f1fths of its supply of food. For the
remaining three-fifths they relied
upon sea communications. On an
average only seven weeks stocks
were maintained in the country.
Worried Over Food.
BY far the greatest anxiety which
the British government had felt dur
| ing the war was to prevent the re-
serves of food falling to zero. Was
/ it surprising. therefore, if. with a dan
ger in front of them as great as any
to which NJ. BRAND had so eloquently
| explained France was subject. the
| British people protested against a
| weapon which was the negation of
| humanity and civilization itself?
! There were some people who said it
was this vulnerability Of Great Brit
ain which justified the retention Of
| the submarine. since it was by these
| means alone that the British empire
could be stricken Gown. The late
4 ii oh NO. hof fka
, British empire was not easily stricken
| down. and il war should ever come
| again he imagined that means would
| be found for that country to save it
| self from starvation.
| But it might be claimed if the
| U-boat had begun its operations ear
lier or ha4 had better luck. the result
| might have been different. To this he
would reply that the British navy had
, constituted almost the keystone of the
| allied arch; but for the British navy
Franco would have been ruined. Bel
| gium would have oeen overrun. and
| even the United States of America,
self-contained. self-supporting. with
| vast resources, would have been i'm
potent to intervene. and might have
had to abandon it's army and all that
| it had in France, or else to make a
humiliating peace. That would not
have been a disaster to Great Britain
| alone. That was why he resented the
4
part of the press, that the abolition of
Submarines was merely a selfish and
unworthy design.
| 1t had been suggested that the con-
ditionS of the late war might never
recur Could France be sure of this?
Could France run the risk of a dis
laster to her near neighbor, and only
certain ally. If the situation of 1914
were ever reproduced? 1t was neces-
sary to take long views in this mat
| ter. and the British empire delega-
ton believed that they were fighting
associated powers. but of the whole
civilized world in advocating the abo-
lition of the submarine.
| Sees Acquiescence of Others.
! He felt sure that some one would
TASK. How can we feel sure that if
We abolish submarines other powers
| who are not represented here Will
| not proceed with the building of sub
| marines? The same question might
be asked as to other classes of craft
mentioned in the American scheme.
He found it impossible to believe that
| other powers would set themselves
against the opinion of the rest of the
civilized world regarding this par
ticuluar weapon. If. however, the
future date find themselves exposed to
piracy by the action of some smaller
power, surely they would find the
means of bringing Nemesis to the
| transgressor! World opinion was a
very powerful weapon, and certainly
some means would be found by which
| the great naval powers could pro-
tect themselves, if necessary.
f, 1t was said that submarines were
cheap method of warfare. Surely this
conference did not desire to make war
cheap: When war had been cheap it
7 had
! hoped the submarine would not be
, defended. because it would be a wea-
pom within the reach of all. 1t might
/ perhaps be cheap for the aggressor,
but 1t was not so for the victim. The
average number of German subma-
rines at sea simultaneously during
the late war had not been more than
nine or ten. but Great Britain had to
maintain an average of no less than
5000 anti-submarine surface craft in
order to deal with these. 1t could be
form of war for the defender.
The British delegation were anx
| ious to contribute toward the ideals
| of the present conference They de-
| sired not only limitation of arma-
! ment. but also a Limitation Of ex-
| penditures. which constituted SO
That was why Great Britain, which
had the tradition of possessing the
greatest navy, had welcomed the
proposals for curbing capital ships.
What should we gain. however, If
this competition were merely trans
much and meanwhile the submarines
f, threatened our very life and ex-
istence. But if the submarine were
abolished we could accept, with
modifications in detail, practically
in regard to the Tightening of these
burdens.
Submarine No By-Product.
Lord Lee said he was not Impress
ed with the argument that because
! it was found impossible to deal ef-
| fecti"ely with poison gas or air
! bomos, which were by-products Of
! essential industries. we could not
| deal with the submarine. The sub
| marine wes not a by-product of any
| industry. but was essentially an Of
| fensive weapon. He therefore said
| that it could be. and therefore ought
to be. abolished 1t was a weapon of
murder and piracy and the drowning
of non-combatants. 1t had been
used to sink passenger ships, cargo
| ships and even hospital ships. Tech
nically, the submarine WAS SO con-
structed that 1t could aot be utilised
| to rescue even women and children
from sinking ships, That was why
he hoped that the conference would
| not give it Il new lease of life.
He had endeavored to state frank
ly that the submarine was only to a
limited exten ia weapon Of defense
and that for offence 1t was only
| really valuable when used against
/ merchant ships. and that it consti-
tuted tho greatest peril to which the
mercantile marine Of the world was
it was useless. but merely inehicisnt.