Evening star., 1921-03-25
L1NSZVG BARES REASONS FOR SPLIT
WITH WILSON OVER WORLD ISSUES
Japan Forced
Shanhng
Clause.
Er-SecretarySpeahsof Of
BlackmaiI and Co.
ercion of Toxic.

gestions. irritated by opposition. and
seemingly suspicious of the Secre-
tary's views after November IL, 1918,
when Mr.. Lansing incurred his dis
pleasure by urging him not to go to
Paris personally.
Mr.. Lansing discusses the testimony
of William c. Bullitt before the Sem
ate foreign relations committee. Mr..
Bullitt quoted Mr.. Lansing as saying
that if the American people under
stood what the treaty let them in
for they would defeat it. Mr.. Bullitt
entirely changed the meaning of what
had been said to him in Paris, Mr..
Lansing declares. The President at
this time was campaigning for the
league of nations in the west, and Mr..
Lansing autographed to MN; onerlnS
to explain the interview with Bullitt,
but he says the President never an
swered his telegram.
Because of the pressing need of
peace. Secretary Lansing, despite his
differepces with Mr.. Wilson. continued
to favor ratification of the treaty and
covenant without reservations. This
he did as long as there was chance
to secure an early peace by this
method.
Some of the high-spots of Mr.. Lam
sings book are shown in the follow
ing textual extracts:
I cannot but feel that my open op-
position to his attending the confer
ence was considered by the Preside mt
to be an unwarranted meddling with
his personal affairs and was none OF
my business"
X X
HE (Mr. WILSON, said with great
candor and emphasis that he did not
intend to have lawyers drafting the
treaty OF peace. The Presidents
sweeping disapproval of members Of
the legal profession participating in
It, h
I believe was. intended to be notice to
me that my counsel was unwelcome."
Zone may infer that the President
was disposed to employ the general
longing for peace as means of ex-
erting pressure on the delegates in
Paris and on their governments to
accept his plan for a league"
The President having in the re-
port Con the league of nations) de-
clared the American policy, his COM
missioned representatives were bound
to acGuiesce in his decision. what
auiescence or resignation was the
choice"
II think that it is not unjust to say
that President Wilson was stronger
in his hatreds than in his friendships.
He seemed to lack the ability to for
give one who had in any way Of
Tended him or opposed him."
X X
'The time given to the formula ton
OF the covenant Of the league Of ma
tions and the determination that it
should have first place in the nego-
tiations caused such. delay in the
proceedings and prevented a speedy
restoration of peace. Denial of this is
useless. 1t is too manifest to require
proof or argument to support it,"
y X X
= TT is fair to assume that he had no
program prepared and was unwili-
ing to have any one else make
Deft the American commission without
a chart marking out the course which
they were to pursue in the negotia-
tions and apparently without a pilot
who knew the channel"
X \
HE was not disposed to discuss
matters with the American commits
mission as a whole or even to an
nounce to them his decisions unless
tss do so. He easily fell into the
practice of seeing men separately and
of keeping secret the knowledge ac-
quired, as well as the effect of this
knowledge on his views and purposes.
*.* +
But for secrecy I firmly believe
that there would have been no
'F'iume affair"
"If to the increasing secretiveness
of the proceedings of the controlling
bodies of the peace conference are add
ed the intrigues and personal bar