Evening star., 1921-05-03
By JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Former Secretary Of the Navy.

ARTICLE 10.
After every war one can look back
and see that somewhere there was
lack of foresight, somewhere there
was wanting vision translated into
action; somewhere there was a fail
ure to grasp a new and daring plan
which might have turned defeat into
victory or have FASTENED the day Of
peace.
When one reflects upon the zeal,
courage and success of the British
navy in freeing the seven seas from
German traffic one is filled with ad-
miration for it's spirit and achieve
ments. But it made miSta kes, as
we. and all the other navies. did.
Over on this side of the ocean what
was our chief naval error?
1t was that we lacked the foresight
in 191516. largely because we did
not have the information which was
kept from neutrals, to concentrate
upon building destroyerS to the eN-
clusion of larger ships. To be sure.
we were utilizing. before the United
States entered the war, every avail
able facility for building destroyers.
More Destroyers Needed.
The great three-year program pro-
posed by me in 1915 and voted by
Congress in 1916 embraced fifty de-
stroyerS to be constructed in three
years, along with sixteen capital
ships and ten scout cruisers.
Looking back upon that program
it is clear now, taking advantage of
what we learned during the war, that
it would have been wiser to have de-
layed contracting for so many capital
ships. and built hundreds of destroy
erS, the craft most effective against
submarines. Our ship construction
ha tnP Ind a1 a n
rroximately thousand vessels. This
was in addition to the 1.547 ships
converted for naval purposes.
There was no delay in pressing
work on destroyers. Immediately
after Congress authorized the three
for the twenty authorized the first
year, as we'll as for twenty-seven
submarines. four battleships, four
battle cruisers and other vessels. In
March. 1917, before we entered the
war, as soon as funds We're avala
Bile. twenty-four more were ordered:
additional orders were given as rap
idly as the contracts could be placed,
and by the middle of October we were
building or had contracted for 27O.
All Records Broken.
Millions had to be spent for new
facilities to build them-enlargem
of old shpyards, building of giant
new pldntS. IL was d great Jop, DuL
we broke all records in rapid con-
struction when we struck our gait.
The House naval committee, after
thorough investigation. said in it's
report made March 4. 1918:
when it came to building addition
al destroyers. especially those of the
large program. it was found that the
shipbuilding facilities of the coun-
try were fully absorbed with the yes
sells then under construction, and it
would be necessary to create new ia
cilities. The plans adopted required
more than doubling the capacity
available last summer for building
destroyers, and that capacity was
materially greater than before the
war In spite of speed in construc
ton, these vessels are not being
Sighted in workmanship or appli-
anceS."
Experts Didn't See 1t.
Looking back, I wished every day
during the war that when we began
the big naval expansion in 1915 we
had asked Congress for money to
build 800 destroyers at that time. BY
concentration in 1856, we would
have had most of them ready in the
first months of the war. 1t is a fact,
nobody in Congress suggested omit
ting the capital ships and pushing the
big destroyer program we began in
the stress of war.
Across the seas, what was the great
naval error of our allies?
Some of the ablest writer's declare
that it was the tactics OF Admiral
Jellicoe at the battle of Jutland.
The admiral has written a most