davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star., 1921-12-04
LLOYD GEORGE-The Man and His Times
By Philip Kerr
(His Secretary, 1917-1o2lD

districts for herself and then make proposal OF
her own for substituting lump sum arrange
ment for the complicated provisions of the treaty
This accepted.
There was more difficulty about the Polish
question From the start Lloyd George had been
uneasy about Poland He staggered at the
magnitude of her claims AS he said to NJ. Pade-
reu,skf on one occasion. Poland has the most
difficult task in Europe. She has natural frcsi-
tiers. She has Russia on one side and Germany
on the other One-third at least of her population
is non-Polish. She has trained statesmen or
administrators 1t is essential. if she is to sur
vive, that she should pursue friendly and peace
full policy toward all her neighbors. and limit her
frontiers to those areas wherein she has a racial
majority" He had accepted the proposal of a
Polish corridor to the because there was a
clear Polish majority all the way. But he had
refused to incorporate Danzg. with its great Ger
man majority, in Poland. for he believed that 1t
would make a Polish-German feud inevitable
whereas If Danzig were separated from Germany
but left autonomous. its Overwhelming interest
the natural port of Poland would rapidly bind its
fortunes and its sympathies to that country
X X X
should not be transferred Poland by the treaty.
but that there should be plebiscite to determine
its future He had come to be very doubtful
whether the population really wanted to go TO
Poland; he supremely anxious to avoid an
irreconcilable Policeman feud, and he felt that
in doubtful case of this kind settlement would
be accepted final that not based upon the
expressed views of the inhabitants themselves.
Both Wilson and Clemenceau were against him,
but in the end he prevailed. and the subsequent
plebiscite has proved that his insight sub
stantially correct.
The final decisions of the allies were conveyed
to the German delegation IN a document setting
forth the allied view of the peace settlement. and
the German government given five days in
which to signify their decision to sign the amend
ed draft These were days of great suspense
The allies were prepared. but not at all to
march to Berlin to enforce their terms, and when
the telegram of acceptance arrived. while the coun-
Gil of fonr discussing Of the other
treaties. it promptly broke up in relief, and all
Paris gave itself to rejoicing.
The foundations Of the new Europe had been
definitely laid
Copyright, 1891 BY the Mcclure Newspaper Syndicate,
NEXT SUNDAYs The Peacs Confsrsnce-Italy
Russia and the Far East
Evening star., 1921-12-04

because most delegations bent on getting
press support and communicated every bit Of news
each could get favorable to its own case to friendly
newspaper Bitter controversies had begun to
arise between parties in public, and statesmen
were complaining that negotiation was becoming
impossible because garbled and one-sided accounts
of proceedings were becoming public and creating
insuperable difficulties for them with public opin-
ion in their own countries. The peace conference
in danger Of becoming tower Of Babel
X X X
Lloyd Georges practical mind grasped the sit
uation at once. He that unless some body
made itself responsible for taking decisions the
conference would fail. His first step therefore.
was to propose that the drafting Of the peace
treaty should be undertaken by NJ. Clemenceau,
President Wilson, Signor Orlando and himself
the heads of the four leading powers and each.
as head of his own government in position to
make responsible decisions quickly. He further
proposed that this body should meet in private
house. without the medley Of secretaries and
diplomats which thronged the meetings Of the
council of ten and deliberate in private, aHnounc
ing its conclusions as they were reached.
The others agreed, and came into being the
famous council Of four, which met every morning
and afternoon in President Wilson's study and
framed the treaty of peace.
Lloyd Georges second step was to retire for
long week end to Fontainebleau with few ad-
visers and friends. He saw that If the council Of
four to get on rapidly with its work 1t must
have some plan Of the peace settlement as whole
pied with the work of the committee Of the league
Of nations, and knew little Of Europe. M. Ciemen-
ceau thinking mainly of the future Of France, was
putting forward solutions which were. incompatible
with the lasting peace of Europe. as with all the
other allies Sgnor Orlando was concentrated on
the problem of the Adriatic. 1t was clearly up to-
Lloyd George to give lead. So in the hotel at
Fontainsbleau, in room whose windows looked
across to the steps Of the palace where Napeoeon,
his abdcation had taken leave Of his Old Guard,
Lloyd George drew up a general plan Of the peace.
\ X X
After many hours of deliberations. the results
were embodied in a document which he afterward
circulated to his colleagues In 1t Lloyd George
made an earnest plea for moderation and the long
view. What mattered in his judgment was q set
tlement which would last, because 1t contained
no provocation to a fresh war. Almost every
previous war had grown out Of an earlier peace
in which the victor, intoxicated by the exaltation
Of the moment. had ignored reason and justice.
Germany and her allies must be sternly treated
Evening star., 1921-12-04

One of Lloyd Georges stiffest fights at the
conference the disarmament of Germany
NJ. Clemenceau and Marshal Foch wanted to re-
duce Germany's army to 100000. to be raised an
nually by conscrption. Lloyd George refused to
agree. He pointed out that to permit Germany
to do this would be to give her 100000 young
men in ten years.
Lloyd Georges determination to impose the
voluntary system Germany based upon
far-sighted view. He believed that once the habit
of conscription was broken in Germany Austria,
Hungary and Bulgaria, no democratic government
would reimpose it unless there was serious for
eign danger provocation. He further believed
that If the central powers had nothing but small
voluntary armies the alarm in the neighboring
countries would gradually die away, and public
opinion, especially under financial pressure. would
gradually insist a general reduction of tarma-
ment. Wilson agreed with Lloyd George Foch
and Clemenceau then insisted reducing the
German army to 100000 because long-term vol
untary army could be highly trained to be
rapidly expansible in event of war. Lloyd George
thought the figure too small but agreed to the
compromise, and conscription abolished from
the enemy states.
And so. gradually. the treaty completed
On May Z, 1919, the first draft was presented to
the Germans in the dining hall of the Hotel
Trianon, at Versailles. the home Of the supreme
council during the war. It was dramatic scene
far more dramatic than the spectacular signature
of the treaty in the hall Of mirrors few weeks
the Germans had met face to face, and the ten
sion in the air Brockendorn Rantzau entered
the room and faced the grim line of the allied
statesmen, and later when he sat to read his pro-
test Of Germany's innocence in the great war, was
palpable fog
The German reply to the draft made a consid-
erable impression upon Lloyd George. He felt
that while each item of the treaty was justifable
in itself the cumulative effect very heavy,
perhaps was greater than any honest German
government could undertake to fulfill. After
sultation with his cabinet therefore, he proposed
to his colleagues certain notifications.
The most important of these concerned the
duration Of the occupation, reparation and the
Polish-German frontier. On the matter of the
occupation he could make headway. In the
case of <reparation he thought that serious
tempt should be made to arrive at agreed set
tlement 1t was out of the question to do SO at
the moment. Lloyd George. therefore. proposed
that Germany should be given period in which
she should be allowed to examine the devastated
Evening star., 1921-12-04

teeing her against aggression because it would
give her the security she desired and because it
would make for the peace and stability of Europe.
The negotiations were long and dfmcult
Clemenceau very unyielding and he was more
moderate than most of those behind him. He
suggested to Wilson ffteen-year occupation OF
the Rhineland partial solution. Wilson ac-
cepted this. Lloyd George was very doubtful. as
it seemed to leave the fundamental question in
doubt, but, the other two were agreed, he ac-
cepted 1t in the modified form embodied in the
treaty. Sill France was not satisfied and 1t was
not until the allied occupation of the Rhneland
provinces, as security for the enforcement Of the
treaty, had been combined with an Anglo-Ameri-
can treaty of guarantee, that an agreement could
be reached.
X X X X
The second great difficulty concerned repara-
ton The ravaged allied peoples were demanding
with unanimous voice that Germany. whose gov
ernment had provoked the war and whose country
was undamaged, should make full reparation for
the damage she had done. But statesmen and
experts. when they came to examine this ques-
tion saw that Germany could not possibly pay
anything like what public opinion required. There
was also a dispute as to the meaning of the words
in which, under the negotiations for armistice,
Germany undertook to pay compensation for all
damage done to the allied peoples through her
aggression by land. air and sea- Cemenceau was
for a maximum indemnity, but more con-
cerned that France should have a priority. The
rest of the allies resisted this because they knew
certainly limited, and that priority for one ally
inevitably meant that she got everything and the
rest got nothing. President Wilson in favor
of requiring from Germany what his financial
perts thought 1t was her reasonable capacity to
pay. Lloyd George was for demanding from Ger
many the maximum which any expert opinion
thought she could pay. He put that figure him.
self at between five and six billion pounds But
his real conviction throughout that it was
impossible to arrive at any final decision at that
time. Allied public opinion was still very ex-
cited. Nobody could tell what the conditions would
be>after the war, or what Germanys real capacity
would be. He thought the only solution was to
make Germany undertake to pay a maximum fig
ure and leave an expert body, the reparation COM
mission, to scale 1t down circumstances
quired and the reality Of the postwar situation
became clear.
X X
compromise was finally reached which really
satisfied nobody, and which, we shall see. was
reopened even before the treaty was signed. =
Evening star., 1921-12-04

A NY forecast as to the results
~ Of the Washington confer
~ ence would be not only idle,
but impossible.
I do not even think 1t advisable
to indicate the chronological order
in which the various problems un-
der discussion will be submitted
to the conference, or to attempt a
guess at their solution. I have
taken an active part in so many
international reunions, and have
myself presided over SO many. that
have'full knowledge Of the diff
culties to be overcome.
1t is Indispensable for the United
States. besides being its sincere
wish and hope, that the Washing
ton conference should prove sue
cess. By the treaty Of Versailles
and by the whole system of trea-
ties resulting therefrom, Wilson.
though completely in good faith.
contributed powerfully toward the
disorganization Of Europe and the
present crisis in the United States.
And now the great American
democracy, which disposes of i'm
mense resources, feels not only the
need. but the necessity of a big
international success. The Wash
ington conference must prove
truly and wholly subservient to
. the cause of peace.
No real peace treaties were
as Clemenceau himself bluntly
said, which enabled the conquerors
to continue the war and to carry
it into the enemy's country. We
shall have to discuss peace and not
future wars at Washington. We
must also find some means Of ex-
changing our views and ideas on
the great problems Of liberty,
democracy and justice and on the
principles of nationality and self
decision without blushing too un-
comfortably when we. mention
them.
1 do not propose to suggest the
solution Of the various problems
under discussion. but may 1 put
down a few questions?
l.. The treaty Of Versailles and
the treaties of Saint -Germain- en-
Laye, Trianon, Sevres and Veuilly
with Germany. Austria. Hungary.
Turkey and Bulgaria were the
negation, pure and simple. Of those
very principles which had been
proclaimed during the war by the
entente, and are in glaring con-
trast with the fourteen points
which President Wilson. made the
slogan OF the American people en-
tering the war. The United States
has not sanctioned those treaties.
Nevertheless. it continues to as
sumo and accept a certain respon-
sibility. even though in an attenu-
ated degree, by allowing it's repre-
sentatives to sit on the board of
international commissions and in
giving its approval to this or that
What is the situation actually re-
sulting from this state Of things?
And by what means is it proposed
to give it a logical solution?
2. The treaties, without the
slightest necessity. inflicted form
of moral isolation through several
states or newly-founded states on
thirty. millions of Germans. Prus-
SLAMS and Magyars. Before 1914
Europe had only one Alsace-Lor-
raine, an unextinguishable flame of
justifiable hatred and rancor. and
only one Austria-Hungary, the
cause Of irrepressible and chronic
Evening star., 1921-12-04

Justice required it, and stern treatment of the
aggressor was necessary as deterrent to nations
thinking of falling to the militarist lure But
there most be nothing in the treaty which would
drive Germany her colleagues either into boil
shevism immediate road of escape. or into
preparing for eventful fresh war to right the
wrong. It would be fatal to dismember Germany
or hand German majorities over to other races
such as the Poles The guiding principle of the
peace should be that peoples should be allotted to
their netherlands, and that this human consfdera-
tion should have precedence considerations OF
strategy and economics. And secondary principle
should be that reparaton obligations should not
extend beyond the generation that made the war
Lloyd George then went on to deal with the
league Of nations In his judgment 1t was essen
tial, II the league was to be success, that the
great powers should show their confidence In 1t
by entering into agreement which would pre-
vent competition in armament between
them. 1t was idle to impose disarmament on Ger
many If the allies were to start arming against
one another, and he, therefore. proposed that the
allies should embody in the peace some general
arrangement about their own armament which
would show that they had eschewed mutual
rivalry.
This memorandum received the general ap-
proval of President Wilson. but it provoked
caustic rejoinder from Clemenceau, who con-
trasted the security and advantage which Britain
had gained by the destruction Of the German navy
with the position of France.
Security, indeed, was the thing which occupied
the first position in the whole mind of France
Twice in fifty years had Germany ravaged France
and these wars were but the last of series
stretching back far into history. How was France
with a population of 39000.000 as against Ger
many's 60.0oo,000. to be secure for the future!
One party in France wanted the annexation to
France of the whole of Germany up to the Rhine
another wanted the separation of the Rhine prov
inces from Germany under International guaran-
tee. The military leaders declared emphaticany
that France could only be defended on the Rhine
and that that river must be the strategic If not
the political. frontier of France Lloyd George
in accord with Wilson, was absolutely against the
annexation or partition of Germany In any shape
or form. He that it Inevitably meant both
another war, in which Germany would endeavor
to recover her lost population, and disaster for
France, because when Germany did attempt to re-
cover her unity the opinion of the world would
justify her in the attempt. But he felt deeply
for France, and .he therefore. proposed that the
allies should take the responsibility Of guaran-
Evening star., 1921-12-04
Association of Nations Proposal
Acclaimed, Though Not Unopposed

by the arms conference to do a lot
of preliminary work in anticipation
of the coming to grips Of the two
parties in the ensuing session and
the political campaign. You don't
hear much about them in the news
papers. but they are busy nevertheless.
To the republicans the future pre-
sents but one propositions: they must
carry the House next November or
face terrific handicap for the ensu-
ing two years until the approach Of
the presidential campaign. Before
the democrats stands the alluring
possibility of giving this body-blow
to the opposition and thereafter to
gather impetus for the possible
Knockout. There are lively times
ahead. or all signs fail.
+ y r
Pretty soon. now. begin to look out
for talk about democratic candidates
for the presidency in 1924. There will
be no such speculation about the
republican candidate. President Hard
ing will be renominated as a matter
Of course.
But in the democratic party it is
different. In the recent change in
the democratic national committee
chairmanship. in which Cordell Hull
was elevated to that post, the ground
work was laid for reorganizing Of
democratic lines looking forward to
the nomination.
1t is a clear field and fair fight.
William G. McAdoo is regarded as
the outstanding figure against whom
all other aspirants for the nomination
must contend. His friends are at this
moment working for him. In demo-
cratic political circles the outlook is
regarded as "the field against
McAdoo."
But he will not get the nomination
without a fight. It will be not alone
a contest against him, it Is said by
the politicians. but also a struggle
between two schools Of thought in
the democratic party.
Copyright. 1921. BY The Washington Star.)
Evening star., 1921-12-04

cision dictated by ordinary justice.
fair play and the desire to prevent
going to war about adjustable affairs.
X X X X
Whence comes the malign spirit
which is discernible in the atmos-
phere around the armament con-
ference intent upon frustrating it's
objects?
Some force potential for evil. in
visible. but whose effect is felt, seems
to be at work, to thwart and check
and distort. There seems to be a
hidden battery somewhere that is
surcharging the air with suspicious.
rumors, canards, gossip intended to
set the conferees by the ears-any-
thing to put sand into the machinery
and produce friction.
Secretary Hughes has his hands
full a great part of the time trying
to counteract these sinister influ-
ences. His own course is so vividly
in contrast. Out in the open all
the while. frank of speech and sin
cere as well, his purposes clearly and
definitely set forth. intent upon prog
ress, he has to stop and kick at
something that rushes out at his
heels.
X 4 X
whence comes the determined effort
to minimize the hope of success Of
the conference, except upon the hy-
pothesis that those engaged in 1t
started out with the preconceived
idea that failure is inevitable. and
they just cannot bear to see things
moving in a way to refute their
prophecies.
1t is not as if the conference were
a gathering of zealots. of fanatics,
intent upon proposing some fanciful
dream of altruism above everyday
comprehension or of mortal accom-
plishment. For this is no such
thing. President Harding and Secre-
tary Hughes warned against that at
the outset. pointing out that the i'm
possible would not be proposed and
that what was contemplated was
within the range of effectuation.
= X
1t may be, and possibly is true,
that among those approaching the
conference there were some who
were imbued with a strain Of old
world skepticism Of the amount of
good that might be effected. but in
dications are that it is rapidly disap-
pearing. Those who came to scof
are remaining to enthuse.
On one day each week, from re-
sponsible sources in every delega-
ton. in Washington, come express
sions of qualification in the progress
that is being made and Of confidence
in an eventual happy outcome which
will inure to the worlds benefit.
x* X
Tomorrow Congress resumes its
sessions, entering upon the long term
which will end no one knows when.
but the politicians hope before the
congressional elections come along
in November. And this suggestion
brings up a tender subject to several
hundred men in the House and to
many in one-third Of the Senate.
There are exceptions because some
of the solons are sure of renomina-
tion and election. while others are
certain of re-election-if renominated.
The first bridge for them to cross
will be denomination. There are loose
planks and shaky foundations in
some Of those bridges. In more than
one there are signs of a wash-out,
with the trestle-work already gone.
X X 4
The republican and democratic ma
tional committees are taking ad-
vantage of the smoke-screen raised
Evening star., 1921-12-04
V-The Peace Conference
Germany.

~ HE problem which presented Itself peIofo
the conference of Paris when it assembled
in January, 1919, was unprecedented III
history Never before had there been
,,,, IN which so many nations and SO large pro-
norton of mankind had been engaged and whlch
left behind 1t problems complex ana worlo-
embracing ..,
III. mass of business which came up for decision.
bare were about thirty belligerents on the allied
side there four on the enemy side' tnere
was Russia in the hands OF the bolsheVlKs' anu
there were the neutrals. The whole OF Europe was
in confusion. Austria-Hungary had disappeared
and four new states had taken her place. Rail-
ways were breaking down. Armies were demooil-
izing. Economic barriers were springing up
everywhere. Central Europe was on the verge OF
starvation and the Hoover organization was begin
ming to struggle desperately to distribute supplies.
How was a lasting settlement to be brought out
of this chaos?
When the conference assembled all the minor
powers claimed to take part as equals IN the oe-
Iberations. NJ Clemenceau. as president, squasneo
the idea at once. AS he said. when the world was
crumblins in ruins what mattered was decisions
not talk, and the decisions must be taken oy
small effective body, and that body must consist
of the leaders of great powers wnich nau oone
most to win the war. But even So the task was
appalling. Every power and every nationality
claimed to be heard by the council OF ten-con-
sisting of two representatives of America, France
the British empire itay ana Jspa-aiiu aieii
claim clearly could not be denied. So weeks were
spent and necessarily spent, In listening to the
arguments Of the various states and nationalities
- to the frontiers and securities and compensa-
ton they should be given when the peace terms
came to be laid down.
In the midst of this process both Lloyd George
and President Wilson had to go home Lloyd
(,eorse had to preside at series of cabinets which
decided the program of reconstructive legislation
20 be put through in Great Britain. President
Wilson had to 60 back to comply with certain pro-
visions of the American Constitution
They both returned in March. The process OF
hearing the arguments Of the peoples whose fate
was to be decided still going and the draft
ing of the final peace treaty had not begun. Great
publicity was being given to the deliberations OF
tha council Of ten-not SO much from official at-
counts which were stad and unilluminatins, but