The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1921-12-03

anese claims for a TO- per cent.
ratio were characterized as very
extravagant" in view Of the exist
ing strength Of her feet. In real
ity, it was said, that figure would
represent an increase Of II per cent.
in the present japanese nava!
power while the strength OF
! Great Britain and the United
| States remained stationary.
If a race is to be stopped at a
given point, all of the competitors
/ must stop together, it was said. One
Of them can not expect to run an
| other ten years after the others
have stopped. Yet it is a fact that
| the Japanese before the subcom-
| n1ittee. if not before the commit
tee of the conference or the con-
ference itself, have urged that ia
pan be permitted under an agree
J ment reached by conference call
ed to limit naval armament to con-
! struct tonnage which would add II
per cent. to her navy before stop
| ping building.
Vice Admiral Kato's contention
| for 70 per cent. has been actually
presented at the meetings Of ns-
val experts. Whether it was pre-
sented by authority Of the Japa-
nese delegation is doubtful but it
! was recalled by American officials
/! tonight that Admiral Baron Kato
a member Of the delegation, had
formally announced to the press
at the outset of the conference the
Japanese purpose to seek slight
ly higher tonnage" than the Hughes
plan contemplated for Japan in the
"5-5-3" ratio or the list of ships
to be retained. In support Of the
American view, now finality so far
as the American delegation is con-
| cerned, it was revealed today that
if the strength Of the American
and Japanese fleets were calculat-
ed in terms Of ships now in COM
| mission, plus keels Of capital ships
already laid down, the ratio would
be 100 to As against Japan. If the
rule was applied so as to add 20
commission capital craft and keels
laid down, ships on which money
had already been expended for ma
terial, the ratio would be 100 to 55.
If the comparison was made on
the basis of completion of ships
building in addition to ships ahoat,
if, in other words, ship 90 per
cent. complete was taken as fifth
of ship, ship so per cent. COM
pleted as half a ship and so on.
the ratio would be 1G0 to 40 An
other suggestion from japanese
sources that the comparison should
be made on the basis Of ships in
commission alone was instantly re-
jected by the American delegation.
That would mean that the United
States would not only scrap all
the ships upon which more than
$685.. .000.0 900 has been spent, but
would not be allowed to count that
expenditure in estimating her na
val strength
Still another comparison suggest
ed was that all predreadnoughts
less than 20 years old Of either
navy be included in the list regard
less OF the fact that almost al Of
them are now in reserve and ready
for the scrap heap. That calcula-
ton would have made the ratio 100
to 80 against Japan. As 4 modi-
flcation. it was suggested that pre-
Greadnoughts more htan 90 years
old be included and this would
work out at 100 to 80.
SO from any point Of view the
Japanese experts have been able
to approach the question. the
American GO per cent ratio offer
allows Japan greater proportion
ate strength than she now has and
| is held to be both liberal and
outside estimate" Of japanese ma
val power 1t has been embodied
in the 3d." proposal Which was
| authoritativcly asserted to have
been accepted by the British dele
CATION even though it means re-
duct!on OF British proportionate
strength 20 per cent at the end of
! the ten year holiday. And any at
tack on that ratio. it was added.
with the full weight of the Amer
| ican delegation as sponsor for the
statement, is to be regarded only
as an attack on the fundamental
principle Of the whole plan of ma