New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1921-07-18

save sufficient merchant tonnage from
nance and supplying of the civil popu-
latons and armies Of the Allies, thus
preventing their defeat by starvation.
and (2) to help bring about such
safety of maritime transportation that
an adequate increment Of American
troops, essential for military prepon-
derance and victory, could be trans
Ported with their supplies and in time
to forestal military defeat.
"In short, defensive actions might
be postponed at the risk of relatively
unimportant damage to American
coastal interests; but offensive naval
action had to be taken against the
submarines in time to prevent the col
lapse of the Allies by starvation and
in time to enable the American eX
peditionary forces to arrive at the
battle front before the Allies should
be overwhelmed"
Constant Delays Condemned
The report sets forth the early
advocacy of the convoy system by
Rear Admiral Sims, the delay of the
department in following his recon-
mendations and the delay of Secretary
Daniels in ordering anti-submarine
craft sent to the war zone. 1t stresses,
too, the failure of Mr.. Daniels to send
American battleships abroad as recon-
mended by Rear Admiral Sims until
after months of delay and tells in de-
to meet his demands and recommends
tons. The majority report in this
connection says:
eve find that the conclusion seems
unavoidable that by failure to provide
Rear Admiral Sims with assistance,
even remotely approximating the mag
nitude, intricacy and responsibility of
the duties put upon him, Secretary
Daniels not only seems to have put
upon Rear Admiral Sims a task almost
beyond human capacity, but that he
evidently made it impossible for Rear
Admiral Sims to perform his highly
important duties with anything ap
proximating the thoroughness that was
called for by the naval and military
interests of the United States and of
the Allies.
eve find that whereas Secretary
Daniels had failed to have the navy
even approximately prepared for war,
and had failed to have the condition.
ing of Immediately useful anti-sub-
marine forces given full priority over
forces not Immediately needed after
we entered the war, and had failed to
use due expedition in sending to the
war those forces, such as anti-sub-
marine craft, battleships and subma-
rines, that were called for there by
proper professional authority and were
essentially available in the United
States, Secretary Daniels showed either
that he was sadly lacking in proper ap-
probation of the military value of time
or that he, for some other purpose did
not give proper weight to the profession
al opinion of those naval officers, such
as the general board, the British and
French naval officers in Washington
and Rear Admiral Sims, who were all
u-ging immediate offensive action in
maximum force in the critical war
zone.
1--WE find that whereas Secretary
centrate available forces in the critical
war zone, but had held them out Of
the critical zone and had contemplated
scattering them to minor theaters, he
either failed to appreciate the basic
military principle of concentration Of
effort, or, for some other purpose, he
chose not to act as suggested by those
Of his professional advisers who
recommended concentration"
Daniels's Charges Unwarrarted
IL ID ICuliU Clidb tIC atleRGClOQS OF
Mr.. Daniels that Rear Admiral Sims
lacked vision" as to the North Sea
mine barrage and delayed it six
months are "unwarranted by the
facts"
The fact that the recommendation
of Rear Admiral Sims were eventually
put into practice and worked out to
the great benefit of the Allies cause is
brought out.
The majority report further says:
We find that naval facts brought
to light make unavoidable the con-
clusion that upon our entry into the
war Secretary Daniels had prevented
the United States Navy from immedi-
ately taking aggressive action in
torce against the German submarines
and had imposed upon the navy
stay at-home, purely self-defensive
and aggressive policy.
We recall that it was but four
months before we entered the war that
President Wilson had officially stated
to the world his inability to differ
entlate between the detectives of the
two groups Of belligerents. Indeed, as
late as January %, 1917, he had de-
clared his desire for peace without
victory The conclusion seems inevi- |
table, therefore, that with such recent
n RI en- h.