Arizona republican., 1921-12-20
The French on the Sea

A persistence by the French delegates to the limitation of conference in their efforts to dis the naval ratio agreed upon by Japan Great Britain United States in the circums tances will aIienate a lot of the worlds good will. The ratio preserves Frances naval well Italy's and Italy is content. but will content if exception is made providing for the building of a strong French navy.
 Frances debt incurred in the world war is not paid and cannot be paid for many years. That coun- is obligated to Great Britain and the United States in vast and arrangements being made considered for the funding Of the allied debt which has laid a great burden upon the American people which win bear it with less patience in the face of large expenditures by France for a navy at time when other countries abler to afford such an penditure than France trying reduce expendi- lures their navies, and which will be pre- vented from doing if the attitude of the French delegation is maintained. At the same time the American people will be the insistent that France prepare to meet it's financial obligation and the pending funding plan will be made the difficult
 Beside stronger French navy would be either unnecessary useless. There only three naval powers. all friendly, which France would need to fear. Germany, the arch enemy, has no navy and have none; Russia has and other power than Italy has which could compete with France in the Mediterranean And if France should increase her navy there the Italian would also be in- creased, that these countries would become involved in another neck-and- meek race which neither of them could afford. Out such pittng. against the other, the of their navies against each other would be unlikely event.
 But supposing that in the of a generation or a decade the friendness which exists between France and one Of the three great naval powers should be succeeded by unfriendlness war; sup pose that France should find itself in conflict with Great Britain of what avail would be the naval pro- gram which it's delegation is insisting?
 Or suppose unthnkable event should involve France with the United States, the inter- of France and Japan in the Far East should coliide-how would such navy France is planning it? In either of these three events the French navy would be strong enough only to court destruction.
 We could sympathize with the reluctance with which Japan accepted the 5-5-3 rato There doubt of Japan's genuine apprehension. But no believe that France entertains genuine fear of its defensive position that believes that such navy s she would build would be suf fcient defense the against either of the three great maritime powers Hers is only a vainglorious inspiration By the way, though that has nothing with the present question, France, whatever the numerical strength of her navies, has always been weak on sea, the victim in turn of the English, the Dutch and the Spaniards.
 The work of the conference had proceeded with such surprising smoothness and rapidity that only few days7ago it was predicted that it would be fn- ished by the end of the year with gratifying results than the sanguine had anticipated. Not only had substantial limitation been agreed upon but such conciliatory spirit had been developed aat a great hope of permanent peace had been in- spired Now there this obstacle thrown in by an insignificant naval power which threatens not only the limitation program but the spirit of the conference.