New-York tribune., 1921-11-06
The Coming c difference
tceus.nuou from pass ONE,

(coutHuca from pass erel
bten shown, he declared. that any ur-
gent reason had arisen for departure
ffem it Lord Lansdownc refused to
|ppblsh documents regarding the ne
gotiations, declaring that "thc treaty
SPOKE for itself" The question y $,
he said, whether the alliance was de-
sirable and the price paid for it rea-
scnahlc. Japan could hold her own in
combat with single power, but IL she
we're attacked by more than ono she
would be in imminent peril"
Sir Campbell -Bannerman took the
same view as Lord Spencer, holding
that no sufficient cause had been shown
for an engagement "that exposed Great
Britain to far more serious risks thar
Japan would be likely to incur"
The treaty was, of course, almost
openly directed against Russia and in
cidentally against Germany. To Japan
it gave free hand In China and Corea;
to Great Britain q chance to let Japan
weaken her supposed enemy, Russia, by
war already imminent. without inter
ference, and thus to afford 8 new pro-
lection TO India. MIR. Norman contended
that for an advantage, SO indirect, and
even 30 Hypothetical, it was not worth
while TO "tie British policy hard and
fast to the wheels of Japanese policy"
How much British policy accelerated
The wheels of Japanese policy is made
plain by the loan of IS 100000 to Japan
By London on October Z, 1902, and the
naval expansion scheme OF Japan
which it rendered possible with bud
get of ss,7oo,ooo.
In 1908 the plea Of Corea that the
Japanese demand for the opening of
the port of Wi-ju could not be granted
because of Russia's object ons was
treated as Irrelevant" and by October
of that year the non-evacuation OF
Manchuria by Russia heralded the COM
ing conflict.
At the conclusion Of the Russo
Japanese War, in August, 1908, Great
Britain did, indeed, see Russia, regarded
ss her rival for the possession Of India,
weakened and humiliated without cost
to herself, and could even boast that
in the recent war she had maintained
perfect neutrality" but it was Japan
alone that really srohted by the war
in which Great Britain had enabled
her, by the menace of her own inter-
ference, to isolate her enemy.
Absolute Character
To Military Alliance
When, on August IL, 1905, renewal
of the alliance was signed it was soon
perceived that it was not a mere pro-
longation Of the old agreement. In
February, 1904, Corea had accepted Jap
snese nominees as advisers in the de-
partments of Finance and Foreign At
fairs, and her diplomatic and consular
representatives were replaced by Jap
anese officials. Corea having been al
ready virtually annexed by Japan, there
was in this renewal of the alliance no
more talk of Corean Independence -
/ 1t was only China now whose "integ-
rity and Independence" were to be "pro-
tected." But the really importan.
change was the absolute character that
was now given to the military alliance
The new agreement provided that, in
case Of an unprovoked attack, "wher-
ever arising, on the part of any other
p.wer or powers, either contracting
party should be involved in war, the
other will come to it's assistance and
will conduct the war in common
Although Russia was defeated, she
was not destroyed, and Great Britain
now explicitly demanded and received
from japan, in exchange for permission
tor that country to exercise it's WI in
Corea, the recognition of Great Brit
aims right to take such measures as
she might deem necessary to secure
her Indian frontier. From this time
on the alliance became compact fo,
the defense and extension of both en-
rires. Japan proceeded formally tc
annex Corea, and Great Britain chal
,enged China's suzerainty over Tibet
which she represented to be threatened
by the advance of Russia. Thus the