The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1921-12-25
CA PAID FOR DEATH OF ANGLO-JAP ALLIANCE

cumstance must be kept in mind in
all Of this discussion which is bound
to come now In and out of the Unit
ed States senate. You cant take
the treaty without tho speech and
read into II all sorts OF meanings,
which the senator from Massachus-
etts deliberately read out OF II
without doing violence to interna-
tional precedent and practice.
Japan Got Guarantee.
Much has been made. too, out OF
the fact that whereas the treaty's
field of application Is extended to
cover all OF Japan, homeland and
colonies alike, it does not apply to
the homeland OF any one OF the
other countries. why this unilater-
al character? obviously because
Japan asked and reoplyed, az
part OF her payment for dropping
the Anglo-Japanese alliance this
guarantee that the United states
would not attack her. None OF tho
other nations asked such "A guar
antee. Instead we asked that the
Angio-Japanese treaty be dropped
and were willing In return for Jap
anese consent 10 give this further
pledge OF friendliness.
Most OF the mlsapprehension
which existed and exists over the
four-party treaty arises from the
failure to appreciate its real pur-
pose. In the minds OF the public
IL is an agreement designed to make
peace and having no other meaning.
But In point Of fact II is special
treaty designed for a special pur-
pose, namely to get rid OF the
AnElo-Japanesc treaty To be sure
Il is not less a contribution To peace,
for the United States regarded the
AnRlo-Japancse treaty as a menace
to peace In the Paciac and the
elimination of this treaty AZ the
prerequisite step to all constitution
OF peace.
Obviously naval Disarmament and
naval holiday were alike impossible
while Britain and Japan, two OF the
three great sea powers were united
in an alliance. II may be that the
present government was unduly
alarmed over the dangers flowing
from the Japanese association with
the British. although this is by no
means certain, given the Use made
by the Japanese of this alliance as
a cover FOR their designs In China.
! But In any event the moment Mr.
Harding and Mr.. Hughes accepted
the lDIlAlNll thbbFHNlNll Allhl AlfN
call a conference Ia Washington
consider far eastern questions. toll
lowing their own request that the
Anglo-JaUIncse alliance be dropped,
some form of substitute agreement
was made inevitable.
Hcnccforth the single question
for our representatives wns 10
keep such AN agreement within
the spirit and tradition of our
foreign policy and within the
very restricted limits within
which IL might bc possible To en-
list sufficient support In the Unit
ed States to achieve ratification.
And the real battle of the first
month Of the conference was not
over naval ratios, although 10
seemed 80, IL wns not even over
Chinese questions, although they
occupied far more attention In the
public press: IL was almost cxcius-
lively over the Angio-Japanesc al
lance and the possible substitute
therefor. The proof OF this lies In
the fact that whereas four weeks
were consumed In reaching agree
mcnt over the fonr-party treaty,
announcement of Angio-JapaDcsc-
| American accord over all naval
issues came within three days att
or the question Of the treaties
was settled.
The four-party treaty is then the
logical and inevitable consequence
of the word sent by Washington to
London last summer that the re-
newai of the Anglo-Japanese al
lance would be "A disagreeable cir
cumstance from an American point
of view, official as well as public.
All else has followed naturally the
conference, the various proposals
advanced by the three countries. the
Interpretation of the treaty by Sem
ator Lodge. Had we not been al
lowed to make this interpretation,
our representatives would never
have signed Il and all interpreta-
tions which go beyond the specifi-
cations of the Lodge speech do Nio-
lence TO the fact.
What confuses the public is that
IL believed peace in the Pacific
would result from naval agree
mcnt whereas the American gov
crnment believed that the menace
10 ace lay in the Anglo-Japanese
and realized that no naval
H. tent was even remotely con-
&C.. able while that alliance stood
But our government could not make
It's position clear publicly, without
induiging in criticism both OF the
which would have prevented any
accord and stirred up endless bad
feeling, that might, i'm fact have
prevented not promoted peace.
Thus the four-par1y agreement
came somewhat as surprise TO :he
public, which was thinking almost
exclusively In terms of naval llmi-
tation and found itself measurabiy
hewildered by the treaty, the rea-
sons for which It only vaguely COM
pretended. These reasons I have
;ried 10 set forth briefly and they
will obtain greater and wider pub
licity as the discussion of the work
OF the conference necessarily fol-
lows the termination Of TIE sessions
and precedcs the ratification by the
United States senate.
Copyright 1921 by the Mcclure News.
paper Syndicate.D