The Washington herald., 1921-05-08
EEKS ECONOMIC BASIS FOR DISCUSSION OF PREPARATIONS

iShed the export tax feature. Actu-
ally they offered to pay s12.500. .ooo.-
900 as compared with $4,000, 900. 900
which the reparations commission
later settled upon as the final sum of
indebtedness.
But in making an offer represent
ing approximately a third of the
allied figure, the Germans sur.
rounded their proposal with a null
titude of conditions They seemed
to indicate that the allies, IL they
accepted the German offer. would
surrender all their powers of en-
including the occupation
of German territory, as fixed by the
treaty of Versailles. In addition.
they were bound to break the terms
of the Upper Silesian plebiscite pro-
vision, which obligated them to give
to Poland such districts in Upper
Silesia as voted for Polish annexa-
ton. And at the recent election
practically all the mineral regions
had voted for Poland.
Provided Lohger Period.
Many Americans were doubtless
deceived by the German statement
which announced that the Germans
had promised to paw 200.000.000. 900
gold marks as against 228,0o0. .000.-
600 demanded at London, that Us
$4,000, 100000 as against s56,0o0s-
100000. In reality Berlin had only
offered to pay a capital sum of S12,-
5OO,o00,000 as compared with s21,-
600. 100000. 1t had arrived at the
larger total by providing that the
amortization of the $12.500. 900, 900
should he extended over sixty or
even eighty years. as compared with
forty-two years. as fixed at London
This proposal was the more aston
ishing. as at London Simons had
protested against the forty-two-
year period as amounting to the
enslavement of the German people
over long years. Yet he now SOL
emnly proposed to double the term
Of years.
Asked 4 Per Cent Loan.
Still another condition was an
international loan, guaranteed by
Germany. but to be issued at 4 per
cent at the moment when money
was to be had on far better security
| only at s per cent or even at a
higher rate. But no single detail
is worth emphasizing, because the
| main difficulty lay in the size of the
sum proposed and the conditions at
tached. which meant so far as they
| were intelligible at all, the scrap
ping of the treaty OF Versailles.
When received. with all the diplo-
| matte fiction OF "informality," these
terms were transmitted to Geddes
and Jusserapd, the British and
French ambassadors. and somewhat
later to the 'Belgian and Italian
Both the British, and French am
bassadors frankly told Mr.. Hughes
at the outset. that they regarded
these proposals as totally unaccept-
able. but necessarily must consult
their governments before making a
fnal statement.
Made Public in Berlin.
Meantime the Germans. with
| characteristic courtesy published
| the proposals. giving their publica'
| iton all the advantage OF emphasis
| laid upon various points and se'
at work their propaganda factories
the world over. In making this
publication the Germans gravelS
| embarrassed the American govern
ment and removed from the whole
discussion the slightest character OF
secrecy. The result was inevitable
| Instead of any private discussions
the British and French prime min
| listers. the latter at once. the for
mer, after discussion with Berlin
over the meaning of certain pas
saCes, pronounced the proposals to-
| tally unacceptable and so Informed
Mr. Hughes. Similarly emphatic
statement came from the Belgians
wihel the italian view. although
4 Hn'
character.
Pushes It's Propaganda.
Meantime German propaganda
| took up it's work. From Berlin came
| the repeated suggestion that thu
| United Sattes should suggest any
| appropriate notifications and Ger
many would consent to accept these
| suggestions of the United States
| This was followed by the inaccurate
| statement that the United State!
was actually making such sugges
| ti1ns. 4 statement which obtained
credence momentarily. both in Lon
don and Paris.
Mr.. Hughes was now in the actua
presence OF the danger which HI
had foreseen. the danger that Ger
man failure to make reasonable
proposition might leave him in thu
lurch and that at home and abroad
he might seem to be serving only ;
| German end. And this danger wa
temporarily accentuated by the ap
pare mt difference in opinion betweel
Paris and London as to the question
of whether the German proposal
unsatisfactory in itself. could be tn
basis for new discussions.
| German Motives in Question.
Having thus recounted the prog
ress of the American operation. i
remains necessary to look for
moment at the European aspect
What. after an.6s the true difficult,
in the case of reparations? Is
inability for political reasons, a
Mr.. Hughes course would seem t
imply he believed, to arrive at
fixation of a reasonable sum? Or j
it the fact that Germany having n
intention of paying any sum is en-
deavoring to use the United State
to divide her enemies and thus ar
rive at her own destination, whicl
is escape from all payment?
Moreover, II, as is suggested as
write these lines. Germany ends b.
surrendering at discretion. will tn
surrender advantage the French an,
Belgians in any respect, since Their
still remains the problem of collec
tion. If the problem turns on fixinl
a fair and equitable reparation
total, then the American interven
tion might succeed.
Has Dehed Treaty Terms.
But II the question is one of col
lection and of taking guarantee
against collections then we face