South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1921-05-05

atty. Admiral Jellicoe felt that the
safety of the world depended upon
the ability of the British navy to pre-
vent the escape of the Germany
fleet TO the high seas. If he failed
i'm dashing after the enemy fleet ul-
der conditions he deemed adverse.
was it not due TO his long shore ex-
perience and his intense conviction
that he must, at all hazards pre-
serve British superiority in ships on
the sea?
On Shore Too Long.
remember some years ago that
certain naval officer, who stood
high in the service. went in conn.,
mand Of a battleship after three
years OF shore duty.
How is Capt. y getting on?"
I asked Admiral Fletcher. then COM
mander-in-cEief Of the fleet.
He has been on shore too long"
replied Admiral Fletcher. There is
but one way to be a successful, ready
and quick captain of a ship. and that
is to practice all the duties aflOat."
Afterward that officer, highly es-
teemed was plucled.
When the time came for the
United States navy to enter active
war service, even before the declara-
ton Of war, / gave the positions of
greatest importance afioat to men Of
the longest and latest experience at
sea-Nayo in command OF all our
forces at home and abroad; Rodman
in command of our dreadnaughts In
the North sea: Wilson first in charge
OF the patro. squadron and later in
command off the French coast. pro-
tecting our transports; Gleaves in
command of the cruiser and trans
port force, safeguarding and carry
| inE our soldiers overseas; ROdman
in command of dreadnaughts watch
/ ing for German raiders off the Brit
/ ish and French coasts. and others Of
long seagoing experience.
Greatest Error OF Allies.
What was the biggest naval error
of the war committed by the allies?
l think the answer is plain and
easily understood now by both ex-
pert and layman: II was the failure
TO erect. at the beginning Of subma-
rine warfare. back in 1914-15. eff
fectual barrages across the North
sea and the English channel. in the
! Mediterranean and at the entrance
\ TO the Adriatic sea. II efforts had
/ been directed 10 this end sinkings
bv submarines would have been
| greatly lessened and ended long be-
fore the combined naval forces were
equal 10 the big job of making U-boat
warfare unsafe.
The deeds OF the destroyers and
other naval craft glorify the world
war. But IL the day war was de-
clared. as the first naval offensive
in that area, the French and Brit
ish had made the channel from
Dover to Calais impossible OF pass
age by an enemy submarine that
would have ben supreme and effec-
tive strategy.
II barrages. such as we afterward
laid across the North sea. had been
erected there and across the straits
OF Otranto. the U-boats would have
been so hemmed in that Germany
would have realized early in the
struggle that she could not hope "a
win the war by their use. Millions
Of tons OF shipping would have been
saved. and il would have changed
the whole trend OF the war at sea
Errors i'm Plenty.
There were plenty Of errors-navy
and army-on both sides Of the At
lantic-errOrs made by able and pa
triotic men. as there always are.
some will ask. Why should errors
be discussed now that the war !:
over. and al the allied and asSo'
ciated powers did so we'll? Admiral
Beatty furnishes the answer in these
words:
we make many mistakes. and il
is our business today 20 see that the
lessons have been taken 10 heart
and that We shall not again be found