Great Falls tribune. [volume] (Great Falls, Mont.) 1921-current, 1921-09-18
THE word authoritative can more
j surely be applied to Ambassador

TUE word authoritative can more
j surely be applied to Ambassador
Francis's book on Russia than
to any other SO far published on the
subject. 1t IL made up mainly Of his
private letters and official dispatches.
AS they were written at the time, he
cannot be suspected Of any failure of
memory. The official dispatches, Of
course, are accurate and conclusive, SO
far as they 60, and are lively and gra-
phic as well, because of his personal
knowledge of the men at Washington
to whom he reported. They are,
therefore, more free and easy than the
dispatches of some ambassadors, says
the New York Times. But in the pri-
vate letter to his family and friends he
let himself go completely, and the re-
suit is as interesting story as has
been written about the revolutions
none the less interesting because the
reader knows that this time he is hear
ing facts from the inside.
As an example of what is meant by
INSIDE facts. Governor Francis reveals
TOR the first time that the so-called
Milyukov, or cadet, ministry, came near
being overthrown, according to its own
belief, within week after the car
was overthrow, though it actually
righted itself and lasted until the july
revolution. The ambassador found this
out through a call on Goutchkov, the
minister of war, on March 10. 1917.
He found Gloutchkov in conference
with delegates from the soviet. but he
came out in nervous state, and the
ambassador asked him If recognition by
the United States would help the pro-
vislonal government. Gloutchkov re-
piled with "alacrity" that it would, and
asked 1t it could be done BY the follow
ing day. Mr.. Francis replied that he
did not expect reply to his cable mes
sage requesting recognition until the
I'd or 23d. with much agitation he
expressed doubt as to whether the pro-
visional government could survive until
that time"
Trouble Over G. o. No. 4.
The trouble was over the famous
General Order No. l to the army, de-
noting all the officers, giving the sol
diers' organizations the power of elect
ing their successors, aboishing the ga
lutte, and generally wrecking discipline.
The government had not sent this or
der out or knew anything about it. It
was sent out by the soviet, then only
few days old. Nevertheless, the gov
eminent dared not retract it. The
monarchists were not yet demoralised
and were In a position to start coun-
ter-revolution il the soviet and provis-
ional government should come to blows
This situation continued to grow
worse along the same lines. The soy
let in the beginning was not so radical
as it afterward became, and in fact did
not become the body of extremists we
have come to know until. months lat
er, Lenin and Trotzky got control Of
it. But the soviet insisted from the
first on going along, side by side with
the ministry, as co-equal part Of the
government, a sort OF lower house,
fast becoming an upper one. This con-
dition of affairs. as Ambassador Fran
cs graphically shows, led to the resig-
nation, in disgust. Of minister after
minister, and ultimately to the July
revolution.
BoIshevIks First Attempt.
That was the first attempt Of the
Bolsheviki to seize the government. and
to have fled to Kronstadt, disguised
as a sailor and Trotzky was arrest
ed while 45O Bolsheviki lost their lives
as against 20 Cossacks. But it was a
Pyrrhic victory. Lvov, the president,
resigned and Kerensky's power became
supreme. Ambassador Francis ex-
presses the deliberate opinion that the
government showed great weakness in
not executing Lenin and Trotzky when
it crushed the revolt. He said SO at
the time to Minister of Foreign Affairs,
On this point he says:
Drastic action might have precipi-
fated the revnllfinn which took place |