Pueblo chieftain., 1921-11-14

and cruising radius are those from
which the size OF ships is determined,
Probably the 5000 ton limitation
would make impossible any ship car
ryins heavier batteries than eight
l6-inch weapons.
II is to be noted tina, in the Amer
lean scheme nc data as to new ships
laid down as requirements would be
required to be fui nishcd by the power
planning the ship to the other two
but the tonnage and the dates of con-
tract, keceI laying. completion and de-
siructiou OF the ship displaced No
attempt is made to limit tho design OF
tho vessels. batteries speed. fuel ca
pncity or other military characterist-
les beyond the 35.evo ton maximum
figure.
In outlining the plans for all the
auxiliary craft that make up modern
fleets. care WIS taken TO exclude from
the limitations existing TONNAGE in
monitors OF. purely coast .dcfonsc v,s-
sells and in supply ships. tugs. and the
like.
There would be no necessity to dis
pose OF any excess OF these craft as
they would not weigh much In the
scale of the reduced main fleets
Otherwise with the exception of air
craft. the five to three ratio as be-
tween the strength OF tho British and
American fleets and tnat OF Japan.
would apply all down the line. 1t is
an exact establishment OF this lin. OF
relative naval strength. that has been
worked out.
The figure may he ,i=niacant. Naval
officers always have contcndcd that
II would require two 60 one prcpond-
crance of forces 10 carry hattic to
japan. across the Pacific IL the at
tncking power lacked basu@ well out
toward that side because OF tho Dos
sibiltiy OF accidents TO ships, niiho n
nearby base might quickly have re-
httcd them. Hero Is where tn. great
Importance OF naval bases la the Pa
ciiic. not touched ON by Mr.. Hughes
hes On the five to tire. ratio OF
naval strength. officers lay that pre-
pondcraucc would not Ice available to
Great Britain or the United States.
1T would take Joint forccH to furnish
drains and divided command experts
think three to oi.- prcpond.rancc
necessary to max. certain the result.
Another element Of the American
program yet to lie explained Is the
statement as to the inverse ratio inn
portance of the merchant marine,
compared to naval strength main
tanned by any power. That means
that as the size OF tho naval force goes
down. the possibilities OF turnIn.; nrr-
chant vessels into wIrsnIps by mount
ing guns on their decks go up
With few lighting ships to meet.
armed merchantmcn would be them
selves fighting craft. ready for battle
with ships Of their kiuI. II all navies
were scrappcd, Great Britain would
have an overwhelming propondcrance
in potential naval strength due to her
.o.coo.o0o tons OF cargo and passenger
steamers as against the merchant
fleets OF the United States and Japan.
Apparently the American delegation
was influenced by some such consid-
GRAFTON us this In roaching the figures
as to size of navics to bc maintained
ON a non-competitivc basis IL pro-
posed. Plans to be worked out In rules
to govern convertabiilty of merchant
tonnage for war will have to do with
reinforcing decks to carry the weight
of guns, prohibition OF eun-cmplace-
ments on steamers, restrictions as
to material fabricated for quick in
stallation on the ships to mako them
over Into war craft. IT seems likely
that the American naval experts have
well advanced ideas on this matter
TO be put forward later. II agreement
on strictly naval limitation seems
probable.