The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1921-11-27

eastern question. When the last
| document at the Washington con
ference is signed, the far eastern
question will remain menace to the
peace of the world unless such dec
larations OF policy toward China as
are embodied In the document, rep
resent the national will of the sIgn2-
tory powers.
A Wise Policy.
Putting the thing concretely. ia
pan Is going TO sign n great many
undertakings or affirm fidelity to a
large number OF principles. The
United States has abstained from
any effort to impose its views upon
Japan's far eastern views, Il Is ln-
derstood. Such abstention is wise
In my Judgment because in the last
analysis Il would require force to
impose these views and the people
OF the United States would not have
| fought for the integrity of China, ror
the open door, or for the dissolu-
tion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
Mr.. Hughes might possibly have
led the majority of the people of
this country TO a policy OF force I'm
the far east--of force invoked TO
protect China-hy a campaign OF
cduCati and long continued opcn
pan, Short OF the use OF force,
however, no settlement was possible
except insofar as It was voluntarily
consented to by Japan.
We have TO face the far cast
crn question as 10 is. In China,
In MnnChuria, i'm Mongolia. In
eastern Siberia Japan has done
certain things. They are neither
better nor worse than the great
Il
they have been done more re-
Gently and more Systematically.
To continue doing these things
means to destroy the indcpcnd-
cnce or China. IL means uiti-
matcly an attempt ON the part
of Japan to exercise complete
political dominion over the &C.
Icstial kingdom, now becoming
very planetary republic in
name at least.
II Japan continues to do those
things the far-eastorn question, 80
[ far from improving. Will worsen.
There is nothing In the agreement
that will De signed at Washington
which Will or can affect this fact.
. on the contrary, the limitation of
naval armamonts constitutes the
presentation 10 Japan OF a clear op-
I portunity to exploit China IL she
chooses, In agreeing TO the reduc-
/ ton of our naval program and the
scrapping of some of our best ships
we are agreeing TO give Japan a free
hand; and we are asking the Brit
/ ish similarly 10 abandon such re-
/ straint as they may have.
The Risk of Coercion.
After the program proposed by
/ Mr.. Hughes Is adoptod--and be
/ lieve that substantially II viii he
adoptod--noither Great Britain nor
ourselves separately or Jointly will
\ be In a position 10 venture to cocrCe
/ Japan, II Japanese policy follows the
pathway which it has followed in
recent years
[ This Is the risk II Is a plan risk.
II Is an unacceptable risk unless we
| are willing 10 bear tho consequence
/ Of competitive naval armament. a
consequence which represents In.
creased taxation and may lead 20
eventual war.
/ Eventually, the success or fail
urc Of the Washington conference,
so far as the far east Is concerned,
will depend entirely upon the al
recton which japanese policy takes
/ hereafter. No American should per
NIT himself To- be deluded into the
notion that any of the docuents TO
/ be signed as TO the far east has the
smallest value In itself or that there
remains the smallest chance OF It's
! enforcement after the program or
naval limitation has been adopted.
II depends upon Japan herself
I whether she will interpret her en-
gAgcmcnts undertaken here honor
ably or wisely. II she does, the
/ Washington conference will prove
landmark in the history of the
east IL she docs not, the WASH
ingtCn conference will he Il mean.
| inglcss gesture. IL may cvcn be
more than tha;=-a dangerous e.-
pertinent In disarmament since we
shall eventually have 20 arm
nga'n provided japanese aggrcs-
siOns take on u magnitude which
/ . ~'"s a menace To our own Sc
curity.
the American point or view
the opening speech of Mr.. Hughes