The New York herald., 1921-11-21
tration treaty which the United State
Senate had rendered inoperative.

tration treaty which the United States
Senate had rendered imperative.
Consequently the Anglo-Japanese AL
lance has not contained any anti-Amer-
lean implication since September, 1914.
Whether or not this fact was ever Off
cially intimated to the United States l
do not know. Possibly the British Gov
ernment, then absorbed in the conduct of
the war, omitted to inform the State
Department 1t may also have imagined
that the British conviction as to the inn
possibility of armed hostility on the part
of the British Empire against the United
States, which Japan shared in 1911. was
sufficiently shared by the American Gov
ernment to render notification super
| fuous.
! Should Convince Americans.
The foregoing considerations ought to
dispose of any suggestions that, under
the alliance, the nations OF the British
Empire could or would be called upon to
| fight against the United States. But
American objections to the alliance are
based also upon the contention that 1t
has emboldened Japan to make encroach-
ments on China, and to put forward her
famous twenty-one demands, which she
would never have done had her position
not been strengthened by allied rela-
tions with Great Britain.
! This contention may or may not be
valid in practice. Technically it is in
contestable that any Japanese action di-
rected against the welfare and integrity
Of China is contrary to the letter and
| spirit Of the alliance. But it is also true
that. at the recent conference of the
dominion and British Prime Ministers
| at London, the majority did not favor
the abrogation of the alliance, which, as
interpreted by the Lord Chancellor, was
held to renew itself automatically from
year to year unless denounced.
Into this somewhat blurred situation
came President Harding's invitation to
the Washington conference. Though its
significance was not Immediately per-
ceived in British official quarters, the
consciousness that any practical scheme
for the limitation of naval arrnaments
must involve consideration Of Far East
ern problems gradually grew. and rem
dered Imperative a definition of the in
terests and attitudes Of the self-govern-
ing nations that form the British COM
monwealth.
For the British delegation to the
Washington conference ! have no title
or pretention to speak. What may be
am certain, on the strength of extensive
inquiry and investigation during recent
months. that the majority of the peoples,
| If not the majority of the governments,
| of the British Empire now regard a
continuance of the -Anglo-Japanese alli-
ance as inexpedient.
Arguments In Japan's Case.
The facts OF the case are very simple.
| If, as there is reason to hope and be-
lieve. the policy of Japan in the Far
| East is peaceful and directed toward CO.
| operation with other civilized Powers
for the purpose of safeguarding and
restoring China to her rightful position
in the world such a policy can now be
carried out as well without the alliance
as with it.
| II. on the contrary. the policy OF Japan
should be unwisely dominated by ag-
gressive or militarist tendencies. such as
would be likely to produce conflict with
the United States, it would be physi-
cally impossible for some portions of the
British Empire not to side against
Japan And when any portion of the
| British Empire is compelled by consid-
erations OF it's own welfare and security
to take definite stand the whole
British Empire is necessarily involved.
! In the one event therefore the Anglo
Japanese alliance is superfluous In the
other IL is worse than futile. Regard
for Japan, where this situation is un-
dorstood, no less than regard for British
honor, demands that the alliance should
be abrogated.
| Unless the Washington conference
achieves success 1t will leave the situa-
| tion in the Far East, and OF the world
generally, worse than if it had never
been convened. If it is to succeed in
fullest measure there must be the ut
most attainable clearness in the posi-
tions and policies OF the Powers attend
II. Save in regard to the limitation Of
armaments-which may in theory be ar
ranged Independently OF an understand
ing upon the Pacific problems-the sue
cess Of the conference will depend upon
the constructive good will Of the various
| Powers toward the greatest Asiatic peo-
ple the Chinese. The leading delegates
| to the conference are not without hope
| that Japan may prove to be as helpful
in this respect as any other Power
Japan's Reply Analysed.
The Official definition OF her attitude
| by Admiral Baron Kato in the COM
mittce on Pacific and Far Eastern ques-
tions was therefore eagerly awaited. Sat-
isfaction with its general tone Is some
what qualified by its suggestion that
the conference can only attempt to adj
just China's foreign relations leaving
her domestic situation to be worked out
by the Chinese themselves: and by the
statement that japan would regret the
undue protraction Of the discussions by
detailed examination OF innumerable
minor matters"
IL Is unquestionable that many promi-
nent Chinese, who would presumably
take part In working out the domestic
situation OF their country. are subject
TO Japanese control. Some indication
that Japan Is not aiming at the perpetu-
alton Of undue influence In Chinese do
nestle affairs, and some more precise
definition Of what 'innumerable minor
affairs" may be, would tend to remove
suspicious OF which the persistence
might seriously detract from the use
fulness OF the conference.
But if suspicion is to be dispelled in
all directions, the policy of the British
Empire must be at least as clear as
that OF any o.her Power. This IL cannot
be until the Anglo-Japanese alliance
which, under conditions now obsolete
rendered notable services TO the world
at large, Is relegated to the domain OF
history. If this Is done. as spon-
taneous expression of British policy, the
way will be open for understandings OF
more general nature on which a larger
system OF International cooperation in
the Far East could be based.
n