New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1921-08-16
llhood will 50 10 a vote tosday,
should be dafeated.


Taken at their face, the exchanges
between Messrs. Lloyd George and
De Valera expose deadlock in the
Irish settlement negotiations. The
British offers were Of any kind of
self-government that did not imply
complete secession and of recogni-
ton of one or two Irelands, accord
ing as the two parts {neither being
allowed to coerce the other) should
freely determine.
Not yet willing to accept, these
terms as a whole, De Valera, as a
bargainer, of course, rejected them
altogether. Not yet ready to con-
cede self-determination to Ulster,
naturally he is indisposed to with
draw the claim to Independence and
thus to anger the extremists among
his following.
The sticking point now, as hereto
fore, is obviously Ulster. The refusal
of independence is not, it may be
assumed, tho serious impedimen., If
modMs givendi with northern Ire
land could be arranged a settlement
would probably not long be delayed.
This conclusion is supported by
the supplementary statements of
both General SHUTS and Sir James
Craig, the Ulster Prime Minister
particularly by that of the eminent
South African. Having had the adj
vantage of participating in the con-
fidential discussions as the warm
friend of all parties, General SHUTS
shows what he deems important by
devoting the greater part of his
letter to the Ulster issue. Were
this disposed of other differences, he
indicates, would be composed with
ease.
1t is not difficult to discover to
which side the judgment of General
SHUTS inclines, He in effect appeals
to De Valera to yield. He almost be-
seeches him. With respect to prin-
ciple he does not see how southern
Ireland can deny to northern Ireland
an autonomy she demands for her
self. With respect to probabilities
he suggests, if the southern Irish
government succeeds, that time will
be on it's side and work toward bring
ing Ulster into an all-Irish union.
Finally with respect to possibilities,
if coercion is not to be applied (and
De Valera disclains any purpose of
employing it), he does not see by
what means Ulster can be induced to
come in now. r.
Whether or not the present dead
lock is resolved, the Irish negotia-
tons have done good in America by
simplifying the issues. There has
been happy subsistence of emotion.
A sensible American, as a citizen
of a country which endured the sac
rifices of four years of war in
opposition to secession, understands
why others oppose secession. Nor is
he able to see if south Ireland is
entitled to autonomy why northern
Ireland is not. The tide of Amer
Jean opinion started to flow against
Sim Feinism when it began to
break windows here. No ebb has
come as De Valera has struggled
to make Roadway against the in
exorable logic of the SHUTS argu-
ment. The scandal of collecting
funds in this country to wage
war against another friendly coun~
try will scarcely be repeated.
That De Valera intends to re-
light in ireland the fires of mid
night war may be doubted. The good
people of Ireland do not want an
archy again, nor do the Irish over
seas. Even the Sim Fem extremists
know that if they revive terrorism
the world will know who is re-
sponsible. The former alibi was
weak, but it satisfied some; the next
time there cannot of course be an
alibi.