New-York tribune., 1921-12-25

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other meaning. But in point Of fast
is special treaty designed for &
oial purpose, namely, 10 get rid os g.
Anglo-Japane5e treaty. To be sure
is not less a contribution TO peace =.
the United States regarded The Angs
japanese treaty as < menace "a mo-.
in the Pacific, and the eIimiI s1ioa =
this treaty as the pre-requis ten !,
ali constitution of pence.
Ang'o-JopaHese treaty
Obstacle to Disarmament
Obviously naval disarmament .na
naval holiday were alike iuposs;h,,
while Britain and JAPAN, two Of ~
three great sea powers. we're united :,
an alliance. 1t may be that the urss
ent American government was uns,lv
alarmed over the dangers flowing from
the japanese association with The Ri,
ish, although this is by TO means CO..
tain, given the use made b. ne Janso.
csc % this alliance as cover for 1bA;.
designs in China. Bu1 IN any event
the moment M. Harding and Hr
Hughes accepted the British sueees.
ton that they call conference -
Washington to cons. der Far Eastern
questions, following their own reuues.
that the Anglo-Japanese alliance :,
dropped, some form Of substitute
agreement was made irevitable.
Henceforth the single question for
our Representatives was TO .eep sacA
an agreement within the spirit and
tradition Of our foreign policy and
within the very restricted limits within
which it might be possible to enlist
sufficient support in The United States
to achieve ratification. And the real
battle Of the first month Of the con-
ference was not over naval ratios. al
though it seemed so; it was not even
over Chinese questions, although thev
occupied far more attention in the pub
Tic press-it was almost exclusively oyer
che Anglo-Japanese alliance and tn,
possible substitute therefor The proof
Of this lies in the fact that whereas
four weeks were consumed in reaching
an agreement over the iour-party
treaty, announcement Of Anglo-Jap-
anese-American accord over all naysl
issues came within three days after tho
question of the treaties was settled.
The fourparty treaty IS then the
logical and inevitable consequence q
the word sent by Washington TO Lon
don last summer that the renewal o.
the Anglo aSanese alliance would be
a disagreeable Circumstance from an
American point OF view, official as well
as public. All else has followed .na'
urally the conference, the various
proposals advanced by the three coun-
tries, the four-party treaty nd-a cir
cumstances never to be forgotten-tho
Interpretation of the treaty by Sens-
tor Lodge. Had we not been allowed
to make this Interpretation, our rep
resentatives would never have signed
it, and all interpretations which go
beyond the specifications of the Lodge
speech do violence to the fact.
What confuses the public is that it
believed peace in the Pacific would
result from a naval agreement where
as the American government believed
that the menace TO peace lay in the
Anglo japanese alliance and realize
that no naval agreement was even ye-
motely conceivable while that aliianee
stood. But our government could nss
make 3ss position clear publicly without
in>.Ji.ing in criticism both of the Brit
ia. tnd the japanese, criticism which
world have prevented any accord anc
stirred up endless had feeling that
might, in fact, have prevented, not pro
moted, peace.
Thus the four party agreement cane
somewhat as q surprise TO the public
which was thinking almost exclusively
in terms of naval limitation ana feunc
itself measurably bewildered by the
treaty, the reasons for when 1t only
vaguely con'prehe ded. These reasons
have tried to SIT forth briefly and
they will obtain geeater and wider pun
licity as the discussion OF the work o.
the conference NECESSARILY follows th'
termination Of the sessions and pre-
cedes the ratification by The Initer
States Senate
Copyright. 1929 BY Tire McC-ufs Nsr'
papar SyndlcAtel