The daily star-mirror. (Moscow, Idaho) 1911-1939, 1921-12-28

win the war, then at least bad Ger
| the conclusion announced by Lieut.
Gen. Sir G. NJ. w. MacDonogh, now
adjutant general of the British army
but during the war director of military
intelligence, in an address before the
Royal Artillery Institution at Wool
| witch.
"Germany'S intelligence failed her
from the very beginning of the cam
paign,' he began. 1T grossly overes-
timated the time Russia would require
to mobilize her armies. The Germans
calculated that Russia could not adj
vance in force before the middle Of
September, 1914. and consequently that
there would be six weeks available to
defeat the enemy on the western front
before it became necessary to turn to
the east
THE intelligence Of the Germans re-
garding the western front was equally
faulty Little or nothing was known
by them of the movements Of the Brit
ish eXpeditionary force. When Won
Kluck reached Mons he was surprised
to find the British in possession, for he
had been told by his intelligence SER
vice that there was no enemy within
fifty miles of the place.
fought to Have Known"
II would not like to say that the
Germans ought to have known many
things which subsequent events
showed they did not know, but l do
say they ought to have known more
about them; and the failure of Ger
many to win the war during its first
few weeks was directly due to the
Of its intelligence SER
vice.
The German intelligence failed in
1914; the British intelligence sue
ceeded in 1918. You will remember
Lord Allenby's great campaign in
Palestine in that year and you may
have wondered at the audacity of his
operations. 1t is true that in war
you cannot expect really great sue
less unless you are prepared to take
risks, but these risks must be reason |
able ones. To the unintiated it may |
something's have appeared that Lord
Allenby's were not reasonable That, |
however, was not the case because
Lord AllenDy knew from his intelli-
renee every disposition and move
nent of the enemy. Every one Of his
opponents cards was known to him,
md he was consequently able to play
lis own hand with the most perfect
assurance. In those circumstances
'ictory was certain"
However, in the middle of this
ulOgy of the British military intelli-
ence service, General MacDonogh
topped long enough to say a few I'M
ind words, without mentioning
ames, of intelligence officers who
alked too much.
1.-THE public has often been RECALLED
18th stories of the British secret SER
ice," he said. "That service has one
reat value-to act as test Of reti-
ence of those connected with it;
nd l much regret that many dis
ngushed men have failed when that
sst was applied to them. All l in
end to say of the secret service is
lat its essence is secrecy, and the
SIS said about it the better.
A Trick That Failed.
During the later part of the first
attle of Ypres l received from Lord
itchener the most circumstantial re-
)rts of the despatch and arrival of
erman reinforcements on the west
n front. Those reports emanated
ON Amsterdam and created much /
arm and dependency in London /
hen Lord Kitchener communicated |
EN- to the cabinet without having Y
EN- first properly verified
II well remember Mr.. Asquith COM :
6 to my Office at st. Omer and my 4
Hing the prime minister that | felt \.
re they had come direct from the X
srman general staff that their OBJ Il
ct was to conceal the withdrawal Il
larger masses of German troops i
om Flanders to Poland; and l was L
lie to assure Mr.. Asquith from in Il
ntrovertible evidence in my possess ! If
N that the battle was practically E