New-York tribune., 1921-11-20


cepted the position Of the weaker part
ner, hers was not to reason why.
This attitude Is important because
it will help to an understanding of
French psychology concerning her pres
ent relations with Poland. Her status
has changed, to be sure, also her atti-
tude. She has come out Of the World
War victorious. But she cannot expect
as much sympathy for her chosen asso-
ciates as for herself. Nor can she any
longer escape responsibility for the
follies they are permitted to perpetrate
In the name of a buffer state. Yet,
whether or not one approves the
French attitude toward Russia during
tho last three years, it is.well to re-
member that victory has not removed
the shadow of fear from her. Because
OF the fear France, as she contemplate d
Russia in the grasp Of the Soviet au-
tocracy with no sign of relief, finally
yielded tc the idea of the SANITARY
GORDON So long as France was ex-
pecting succor from union with Rus
sia, she held out for united Russia.
Once she abandoned the idea of part
ncrship with Russia and put her trust
IN Poland this ceased to be a necessity.
On the contrary, she saw at once that
her new alliance would be meaningless
in the presence of united Russia.
The moment France put her faith in
q IL DoI IL
matically assented to the disintegra-
tion of Russia for the aggrandizement
of Poland. Having taken the leap the
rest was quite simple. 1t must have
become commonplace to every French
man that the Polish buffer state would
be built on sand so soon as a powerful
Russian blast was permitted to strike
it. At the present moment France be-
lieves that she can bride the northern
wind, or, rather, that Poland can do it
for her.
Thus in her overpowering anxiety
to safeguard her national interests
against Germany France has added
Russia to her antagonists. True to
precedent, having made her choice of
an ally, she has consented to full ac-
quiescence. This would explain the
entire attitude of Poland and her first
peace terms to Russia, which were in
direct opposition to the decisions Of
the peace conference.
Poland, not satisfied with demanding
nine Russian provinces in addition to
the territory she had received from the
peace conference. further demanded
| that Russia Indemnity Poland for the
devastation of lands and industries
caused by the overunning Of Poland by
the Russian armies since 1914" That
is to say, Russia was to pay for the
privilege of having helped to make the
to task for not using her influence on
behalf Of q more liberal system in Rus
sia must remember that SO formidable
was her fear that she not even dard
to protest against the flirtations which
the Russian autocrarcy carried on with
the very enemy against whose aggres-
sions Russia was pledged to protect
France. Nicholas IFS friendship with
William II went as far as the Potsdan
Agreement (1910), wherein the two
monarchs were pledged mot to belong
to any combination of powers formed
Polish nation possible.
Questions Entente Policy
If Red Rule Is Overthrow
Consider the folly Of the unconscious
able favoring Of Poland or any othe,
government at the expense of Russia
This would only be short-sighted sur.
render TO an immediate aim. It is an.
| parent to all thinking men that Russis
cannot remain in the grip of Bolshevil
rule much longer. She must and will
throw off the monster that is tn,
cause of her present misery and humil
iation. Under these conditions wha
would be the result of any concession,
that the Soviet government might b,
compelled to make? Assume that i,
order to retain power a bit longe,
Lenine would accept any terms. viii
IT not become obligatory on the En-
tente powers to maintain the Sovie
oligarchy In power, so that they nigh
retain the advantage of the siniste,
1 peace7 1t cannot escape Allied states
men that In the event Of change o.
government IN Russia that government
cannot respect the agrements-suicida
for Russia-that the Bolsheviki ma,
enter into. What will be the Entent.
attitude then? Are the Allies prepared
to force upon the Russian nation Boil
shevik-made peace?
Entente policy toward Russia ha.
been shaped by France and England
Tho sstitude Of France, as wa have
seen. although guided by purely ma
ticnal interests, is on the whole obvi
ous-above board. Always mindful o.
her peculiar geographical position an<
her peculiar danger, France held out
Tor united Russia until she bscam.
convinced Of Russia's complete col
lapse and her inability to servo France
Then she accepted the alternative. til,
disintegration of Russia and the az
grandizement Of Poland. So tha
French policy has not been so vacil
, lating or SO confused as we usual,
assert.
The British position is great dea