New-York tribune., 1921-11-20
BY Manya Gordon Strunsky
~ USSIA viii bs sths invisible
IL guest" at the disarmament
confercncs In Washington.

&uost Nv S0e disarmament
conference In Washington.
Every statement will be
aware Of her powerful grip. Allied
policy toward Russia has been before
the tootlights Of world history since
the overthrow Of tho autocracy OF
Nicholas II in 1917. It has been a
huge spectacle, varied both in atmos.
phere and action; comprising naval and
military operations, conferences, con-
versations, missions, commissions and
all the other elements that so into the
making Of = successful international
show. Nevertheless, the audience re-
mains displeased. At no time during
these four years Of serious preoccu-
patton with Russia have the Allied
statesmen succeeded in retaining for
any considerable period the good will
or confidence of the thinking public.
A graph of the public's reactions
toward the different phases of the En-
tente Russian policy would have the
appearance of a very errstic fever
chart. For example: the Allied prom
ise to Kerensky in the summer OF 1917,
concerning the restatement of peace
terms, whipped up Liberal hopes to the
point of delirium. But Mr.. Bonar Laws
declaration In Parliament soon after
that the Entente intended to do moth
ing of the sort brought rise in tenn
perature among Conservatives and q
corresponding drop in the opposing
camp. And SO the fluctuations have
continued up to the time of writing,
without the slightest indication of
progress.
Discomfort with Entente statesman
ship upon this score is general. But
public opinion is mistaken in its i'm
preston that the Entente handling of
the Russian situation has been slipshod
and unintelligent. The error has been
a serious one.
Inability to comprehend the objective
OF Allied craftsmanship removed the
check that intelligent public opinion in
the United States and the associate
nations might have exercised. We are
not over-suspicious Of more stupidity.
Nevertheless, the situation made it
possible, as we shall see, for Mr.. Lloyd
George and other statesmen to make
use of this avowed confusion Of the
public mind to shift from side to side
and so obscure the real object which
remained constant
Public Mind Confused
AS to Policy Toward Russia
This is not meant as q reflection
upon Allied craftsmanship. The En-
tente did not purposely set out to con-
fuse the public as to its attitude to-
ward Russia. But the public eye was
focused upon the interests Of the Rus
sian people and for that reason lost
touch from the very beginning with the
objective of Entente statesmanship,
which was inspired by individual ma
tional interest rather than By good will
toward Russia.
In this sense even when an Allied
statesman made a stand for Russia,
the ultimate purpose was selfish
though justifably selfish.
This explains the difference between
Clemenceau and Lloyd George In early
1918. when Germany held out the
temptation Of a mutually advantageous
peace-at the expense of Russia. Lloyd
George was inclined to give ear. Glenn
enceau said "No." The British states
man was thinking of the British En-
pire. her commerce, her Indian posses
sions and how desirable weak Rus
sia might be. But France held the at
tention of Clemenceau. His unwilling
ness to accept the German offer cannot
be ascribed to his love for Russia, bu,
rather to French hate Of Germany.
weak Russia meant a stronger Ger
many, the very evil that bleeding
France was bent upon destroying. Mr
Walter Lippman, who cannot be &C
euscd' of an ardent admiration for M
Clemenceau's policies, has assured hi;
readers that the Premier's position a.
that time in regard to Russia make,
him great historic figure. However
the fact that NJ. Clemenceau was only
serving the best interests Of France
and by so doing benefited humanity
does not lessen the significance Of hi!
motives. His policy was logical con
tinuation of Franco-Russfan relation.
antedating the World War. An ele
mentary knowledge of the Franco Rus
sian alliance should not only clarity
this critical period in the history o.
the war, but should likewise explai1
the subsequent attitude Of France.
The defeat of France In 1870 an,
the establishment Of tho third republi
were directly responsible for th
Franco-Russian alliance. Repub1ica,
France, unhappy because Of her pre-
carious internal condition and dis
tracted by fear Of further Germal
aggression, sought protection in a.
allisnce with autocratic Russia. Alex
andcr III was no less conscious of tn
rising German power and consequent
welcomed the union with France. Th
need Of protection against Germa
aggression was the same for Franc
and Russia but their methods differe
vastly. The alliance concluded, Franc
retired to the position of the silen
partner. Bestowing On her autocratic