New-York tribune., 1921-02-13

shores with their protecting cruisers.
But there was another contributing
factor in the solution of the problem
OF quick transportation. "Nor should
the ship control committee be forgot
ten This committee, headed by P. A.
y Franklin, was charged with loading
the cargoes and quick turn-arounds of
the vessels. The services of Mr.. Frank
lin and his assistants are part Of the
history of war transportation and sup
ply" To quote the expression Of Gem
| eral Shanks: "Our great embarkation
service was of threefold character
the navy, the army and the ship CON
troll committee
1t is important, however, to note st
this point that, in addition to the fine
work of Admiral Gleaves, General
Shanks and Mr., Franklin in starting
the troops from the American coast,
and the duty of Admiral Gleaves in in
etructing the personnel in their pre-
caueionary measures in the handling
Of so many ships sailing in company
! across the Atlantic, it was necessary
to provide for the safe conduct of
these immense fotillas through the
vitality important part of the work in
getting our troops safely on French
soil was attended to in the Convoy
room" at the British Admiralty, where
a member of Admiral Sims's staff was
In constant attendance to designate the
sailing dates and routes of all conveys
and to fix the points Of rendezvous
with the escorting forces that would
protect the helpless transports in pass-
ing through the submarine zone. Thus
the work on the American and Euro
pean coasts was splendidly coordinat-
ed. 1t was in the British Admiralty
that the approximate whereabouts of
every German submarine was known
and plotted on chart. This informa-
| tion was manifestly essential to the
safe transport of our troops.
Turned Over Convoy
1t is also pertinent, in the story Of
the army and navy triumph, to briefly
refer to one more fact that is outside
Admiral Gleaves's narrative-the origi-
nal assignment of the transport service
| TO the navy. 1t is well known that in
time of peace the army transports are
commanded and directed by the War
Department. But it appears that Cap
tain Laning, U. S. N, on duty in the
| Navy Department when war was de-
mand and direction of all transports
should be transferred to the navy. It
is curious fact that his recommenda-
tion was not promptly and favorab bly,
acted on by the Navy Department and,
feeling that it was of vital Importance,
| Captain Laning sent mem orandum on
the subject to Colonel Palmer, a mem
ber of General Pershing's staff, with the
result that General Pershing, General
Bliss and all army officers Immediately
decided, broadmindedly, that the job
properly belonged to the navy! In
this manner the transport service was
really forced upon dilatory Navy
Department! 1t was striking in
stance Of patriotic and sensible action
by the army in cooperating with the
navy. "The army and navy forever!"
Admiral Gleaves's book is enlivened
by stories and accounts of the adven-
lures of ships and personnel that en-
ccuntered German submarines. These
alone furnish proud record. There
is nothing finer in naval annals than
the conduct Of Lieutenant Whitemarsh
ord the crew of the Dwinsk, adrift for
ten days in an open boat five hundred
miles from port
Admiral Gleaves very properly gives
the statistics as to the number of men
transported by American and foreign
ships. American ships transported Do
per cent, British ships 40 per cent, and
I the remainder were taken over by other
/ foreign vessels.
Aside from attacks upon FIVE trans
ports during their return voyage and
a few gun battles between our armed
merchantmen and German submarines
there were few encounters at sea. The
first expedition with General Pershins
and his detachment appears to have
been attacked, but there were no cas-
ualties.
1t can now be asserted that the Ger
mans made no determined attempt tx
sink our transports, nor even to attacl
the immense conveys that carried tw,
million men to France. In fact, the,
were careful to avoid needless encoun
ters with our destroyers and escortini
ships except when circumstances wer,
most favorable or when they wer,
cornered For this reason they largel.
limited their attacks to The returning
transports, which were not so strongl.
guarded.
Avoided Transports
The reason for the failure to attacl
our war vessels and transports Is sim
pie. U-hoat captains were rewarded
and bemedaled ON the basis of ths
amount of tonnage they sent to th
bottom. Their one mission was t
starve England. It was important
therefore, to make every shot and ever.
torpedo count by attacking helpless
cargo vessels. To attack our fighting
~; ;,,n baua jafa,ta,