Evening star., 1921-12-24
ARMS ENV0ySFACE
FURTHER STRUGGLE
Important Problems Remain
to Be Dealt, With Before
End Is in Sight.
BY PAUL SCOTT MOwRER.


After six hard-driven weeks of ne
gotiation, the end of the Washington
conference Is not yet in sight. I'M
portant problems have been dealt
with, important problems are peihs
dealt with, important problems re-
main to be dealt with.
We are still in the midst of hard
diplomatic struggle. That the con-
ference will succeed" Is generally
taken for granted Some OF the re, re-
suits can already be foreseen. Inc
others are still obscure.
The orientation given the negotla-
tions by American initiative was
such that. up to the present the ei-
forts of the American deiegatioh
have been devoted almost enureiy ~
two principal aims-the Limitation or
the plan laid down by Chairman
Hughes, and the abrogation OF the
Anglo Japanese alliance. The latter
OF these aims has already peen AZ
tained, and the former, despite tne
French ratio dispute. seems IN ralr
way to attainment s,op but .ne pf'os os
paid has been the subordination OF
ali other issues, including the far
eastern question.
In an International conference OF
this kind a delegation cannot very
well have more than two ,prlnc.pai
objectives To come to an unue
standing regarding the Anglo-Japa-
nese alliance was essential. AS be,
tween the far eastern question anu
the naval limitation plan the Uniteo
states chose to concentrate upon lie
latter, partly because OF the e1lEe.ne
difficulty of the former. party tor tor
reasons Of world peace and parity ior
- TIT
Auxlo-Japanese Action.
The abrogation Of the Anglo o. apa pa
American delegates by the suostitu.
tinn therefor Of four-power pact
whose signatories agree TO CONFER ~
case of disputes arising from the,s
insuiar possessions in the Paclhc Ch
it's face this pact Is gooo oai W.
from the American point OF view. we
nhtain something we wanted very
much-the abrogation OF the Ansto-
Iananese alliance-and We give noun
ing which we would not nave oeslteu
anyway-that is. promise 10 ceh .sa
in case Of disputes. Ihe teHt ~ ~
uact. however. is vague. and "retneI
ar not there are to be read INTO, II
moral obligations Of this or fhat ma
ture denends upon it's lnterpretatioii.
Other things being equal, there Is
scarcely a doubt that this pact Is
good thing for the Cnneo StA's ;.a
Despite the fact that the Unlted
states has less intrinsic reason to de-
sire naval limitation than any otner
mower. the fight to put through the
American plan has been hard one.
The exclusion of the French ana lta'-
ian ratios from the original deoate was
unfortunte and has led to much un-
uansssarv had feeling The conference
is now paying in delay and difhcnitles
for this defect Of procedure. Never
theless. the American plan. IN the
main, will probably, be adopted; me
United States will have OBTAINED IRON,
Britain an admission of the principal
of equality as between the BRUSH ana
American navies-no slight concession
and the administration will be able
to show the American people a saving
of expense without any real diminutlon
AZ the defensive strength of the Amer
lean Navy.
situation In Far East.
The net result. however. of the
four-power pact. and of our scrappfns
Of capital ships. and Of our promise
not to fortify Guam or to strengthen
the fortifications of the Philippines.
ix To make offensive action in Asiatic
waters practically impossible for US.
We remain supreme in american
waters. but Japan's supremacy in FAR
eastern waters can no longer ne chai-
lensed. This will make for better re-
Iations between Japan and the United
states hut il leaves us only diplomacy
and moral pressure as means or
action in far eastern questions HOW
far these two agents. unsupported by
a threat of force. will prove effective
remains to be seen.
Principles affecting the far eastern
question have been adopted, rev
administrative details give promise of
hetterment and China will apparently
obtain a somewhat conditional evacu-
alton of Shantung by the japanese
Japan's political hold upon Manchurla,
however, will apparently not be
weakened. Manchuria. strategically.
dominates China, and so long as Japan
can remain there Japan will probably
dominate China.
The principal problem now confront
ing the American delegates in this
connection is how to draft the pro-
nosed nine-power treaty in such way
as not to recognize the status quo in
Manchuria. and at the same time, to
set in gradual motion moral and diplo-
matte forces which will ultimately
render Japan's grip upon China unten-
able.
Siberian Question.
The Siberian question. which. owing
to the pledges given by us to Russia
in 1917, clearly involves our national
honor, has not yet been taken up. No
body wants it to be taken up except
the United States. Our delegates in
tend that it shall be taken up. and
while it is doubtful if we would go so
far as to wreck the conference in
order to get Japan out of Vladivostok
and the Sakhalin district, we intend
at least to get some kind of declara-
tior adopted by the conference which
will insure future. if not immediate,
justice to Russia.
The famous mandate question has
been divided in two-islands north of
the equator and islands south. The
former has practically been settled
between Japan and the United States.
A treaty is being drafted whereby
the United States recognizes the
Japanese mandate over Yap. on con-
ditfons similar to those drawn up by
the league of nations. Without join
ing the league the United States OBJ
tains the full benefits of membership
and bit more in this particular in
stance. The inundated islands south
of the equator will have to be discuss
ed between the United States and
Britain. No great difficulty is antici-
pated.
Probable Results.
When the conference is over it will
seemingly have signed one four-power
treaty on Pacific isla fids and the alb
rogation of the Anglo-Japanese allf-
ance; one nine-power treaty on China;
one fve-power treaty for the limita
tion Of naval armament; two treaties,
one regarding mandates north of the
equator in the Pacific, the other re-
1afa