The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1921-11-18
JAPS
WANT U. s. IN
TRIPLE PACT
All Hands, However, Fear
Senate Would Not Ratify-
China Resents Interference
in Her Affairs.
MAY CAUSE DEADLOCK
BY MARK SULLIVAN


now directly at the heart of the arma-
ment conference. We are at the point
where the only possibility of deadlock
lies. II will not end in a deadlock
but the cause of real difference IS
there Specifically it looks like al
mere matter of procedure, but fund
amentally it goes to the foundations.
Your correspondent is familiar with
the point of view of all the delegates,
and a careful comparison of the varl-I
Gus positions reveals astonish1ngly lit
tie difference. Especially surprising
and hopeful is the slight difference
between what the United States wants
in the far east and what Japan and
Great Britain are willing 10 have done
there, provided it is done in the way
they regard as the only sound way.
Even as regards this one difference,
which is big and fundamental, the at
ttude of the powers concerned is so
tolerant, so disposed to make conces-
sions, and so intent upon success that
II cannot be predicted that this diff
ference endangers success. 1t is GER
tain, however that it does contain
elements of delay and uncertainty.
What He Would Say
If an Open-miEded American, with
a disposition to be fair, were to put
himself in the shoes of Great Britain
and Japan. and were to imagine him
self as the representative of those
two governments, talking informally
and reasonably to the American gov
ernment he probably would say
something like this:
We are entirely willing TO do
things in your way. if you strongly
wish it, and if you see no possibility
of adopting our way. But we should
like TO ask your reasonable considera-
ton of certain conditions that we can
not help having heavily on our minds
We are entirely willing to discard
the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but we
think that certain functions which that
alliance performs are necessary and
must be cared for by some one. We
think it would be dangerous to discard
that alliance without setting up a
substitute, and the substitute that
suggests itself to us is an alliance TAX
ing in the United States as well as
Japan and Great Britain.
Also we are entirely willing to ac-
cept your point of view about the
open door in China. But we respect
fully point out that a rigid adherence
and living up to the principle of the
open door would involve several
things which can only be handled
adequately by a continuing and func-
tioning institution. That institution
for keeping the door open in China
after it has been declared open should
be, we suggest, the same thing we
have suggested as a. successor to the
Anglo-Japanese alliance. Namely, a
tri-partite alliance, taking in the Unit
ed States, Great Britain and Japan
Friction in Far East.
We think that these things, namely
the discarding of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance and the agreement upon the
open door together with the setting
up of an institution to act as sub
stitute for the Anglo-Japanese alliance
and to maintain the open door in
China for the future. should precede
and be a condition of an agreement
limiting armament.
Most of the remaining causes OF
friction in the world of the sort that
lead to war are in the far east. You
yourself have did this in the invitation
of the conference We think these
causes of friction in the far east
should be discussed and settled, and
sent up for carrying out these agree
ments.
we think this should be done first
After this has been done we think il
will be possible TO arrive at an agree
ment about limitation of armament
such as will make us all feel more
comfortable about the future. We
think it will be possible to arrive al
an agreement about limitation of arm
ament such as will make us all fee
more comfortable about the future
We think. also, that if these causes
of friction in the far east are adC
auately cared for first. thereafter the
agreement to limit armament can &C
much further than it is possible T.
go safely as long as the far eastern
questions remain unsettled.
Certainly we think that at leas'
the two agreements. that is, the agree
ment 10 disarm and the agreement
about the far east. should go hand il
hand With eual earnestness W.
think that the far eastern question.
cannot be settled in such a way a;
to assure the world that they vii
remain settled in the future unless We
set up as part of the agreement az
institution to carry out these agree
ments for many years TO come.
Must Keep Door Open.
1T is of no use merely TO agree
upon the open door There must b.
continuously functioning institution
10 maintain that agreement-to keel
the door open after we make it open
For 20 years past we have all beel
agreeing about the open door in prin
eiple, but We have all been violating
it in practice. That will continue Il
20 on unless We set up an institution
in the shape of an alliance, or con
cert. of a consortium of the nation
concerned TO carry out the agreement
# we don't have this consortium O
alliance. We forsee that in the future
as in the past each nation will 2
ahead grabbing for itself. The bi
point of our position is the setting u
of such an alliance or consortium.
AT this point we ought to say tha
, we are apprehensive about your ser
ate We reDeat that ii is our yieN