New-York tribune., 1921-11-14
not clear tonight how that would final
ly be viAved hv lamar

not clear tonight how that would final
~ be viewed by Japan.
The American replacement plan pro-
poses to limit future capital ships to
$4,000 tons. Taken in connection with
the tonnage ailotmcnts, that woulG mean
main fleets Of fourteen capital craft for
Great Britain and the United States
ana eight Tor Japan, provided all are
built up to the limit of size.
The heaviest tonnage of capital craft
so far planned Is understood to be in
connection with JapAn's projected battle
cruisers, said to reach $4,000 TONS Such
ships and also such vessels as the six
new battleships and six battle cruisers
| the United States is building, all we'll
over <0,000-tonners, would be prohibited.
Limitations in size strike at vital
elements in naval construction. The
factors of guns and armor weight, speed
and cruising radius are those from
which the size of ships is determined.
Probably the 35,000.ton limitation
would make impossible any ship carry
ing. heavier batteries than eight 16-
inch weapons,
Naval Data Asked
~ is to be noted that in the Amer
lcan scheme no data as to new ships
laid down as replacements would be
required to be furnished by the power
planning the ship to the other two, but
the. tonnage and the dates of contract,
keel laying, completion and destruction
Of the ship displaced. No attempt Is
made to limit the design Of the vessels.
batteries, speed, fuel capacity or other
military characteristics beyond the
IS, 5,0N0-ton maximum figure.
In outlining the plans for all the
auxiliary craft that make up modern
fleets, care was taken to exclude from
the limitations existing tonnage in
monitors. or purely coast defense YES.
sells, and in supply and other train ships
tugs and the like. There would be no
necessity to dispose of any excess of
these craft any power might have, as
they would. not weigh much in the scale
of the reduced main fleets. Otherwise.
with the exception of aircraft, the five
to three ratio as between the strength
OF the British and American fleets and
that OF Japan, would apply ali down the
line. 1t Is an exact establishment of
this line Of relative naval strength
that has been worked out
The figure may be significant. Naval
officers always have contended that it
would require two to one preponder-
ance of forces to carry battle to Japan
across the Pacific if the attacking
that side. because of the possibility of
accidents to ships which would put
them out Of action as total losses, al
though nearby base might quickly
have rehtted them for the front line
Here is where the great Importance Of
naval bases in the Pacific, not touched
upon by Mr.. Hughes, lies.
On the to ratio of naval strength.
officers say, that preponderance would
not be available to Great Britain or
to the United States. 1t would take
Joint forces to furnish the ships and
then, because of double trains and di-
vided command, experts think 3 to
preponderance necessary to make
certain the result.
Merchant Marine Issue
Another element of the American
program, yet to be explained, is the
statement as to the "inverse ratio, i'm
portance Of the merchant marine. COM
pared to the naval strength maintained
by any power. That means that as the
size of the naval force goes down the
possibilities of turning merchant YES
sells into warships by mounting guns
on their decks GO up. With few fight
ing ships 20 meet. armed Tnercbantmen
/ would be themselves lighting craft,
ready for battle with ships Of their
kind. If all navies were scrapped,
Great Britain. would have an over
| whelming preponderance in potential
naval strength, due to her 10000, 600
tons of cargo and passenger steamers.
as against the merchant fleets Of the
United States and Japan.
Apparently, the American delegation
was Influenced by some such con-
sideration as this In reaching the
| figures as to size Of navies to be main
| tained on the none competitive basis it
proposed.
The plans to be worked out into
rules to govern convertibility of mer-