South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1921-12-01
"BIG THREE"
CAN'T AGREE
ON 6-6-S NAVY
Experts Unable TO Reach Ac-
cord on the Basis of Cal
culation.
Continued from page one)

j
American method OF calculation and
I the "5-5-3" ratio. not insisting upon
/ a "1O-10-7" ratio instead. This was
based on the definite conclusion OF
the British and American experts
I that the Japanese naval officers had
/ been unable 70 show any sound
claim 10 a seventy percent status on
I the basis OF figures they have been
I able 20 present There was expecta-
ton. however. that 20 any offer by
the japanese group 70 accept the
"5-5-3 ratio" would be coupled a
condition as 20 an agreement on
naval bases in the Pacific. That
question has not been injected into
the conference as yet in any form.
Quit Where They Start.
AS a matter Of fact, the sub-com-
mittee Of naval experts quit where
they started at the capital ship
ratio. II is known that in two weeks
I OF technical discussion they have
not touched upon any other point
involved in the American plan Of
limitation. All such items as the 10
year holiday. submarines, proper
tional allotments of tonnage in
auxiliary craft Of various kinds and
the like were deferred until the
capital ship ratio problem was solv-
ed. The conference on limitation Of
armament still stands tonight so far
as it's major objective-the naval
! agreement-goes at that point.
In japanese circles urgent pleas
TO support the japanese claim for
20 per cent ratio were put forward,
but they were based almost wholly
on questions OF national security and
not upon claims as to presen strength
of the two navies. The only COM
pilation Of figures presented TO sup
. port the 10 per cent estimate was
that already authoritatively rejected
by the American delegation, eXclu-
sion OF all ships under construction
from the calculation and inclusion by
Japan Of pre-dreadnaughts more
than 90 years old.
While there was no vote taken to-
day in the sub -committee Of experts,
the British and American groups
were In full accord that the Japan
csc proposal was not sound and that
> Il constituted a question OF policy
I
that ended the experts deliberations
for they were charged only with ex-
animation OF facts. not with the
shaping Of policies. The delegations
, alone may formulate these and the
matter went back 20 them.
For the American delegation. the
, situation was described authoritat-
lively as an agreement of the experts
as 70 points OF differences. These
i.clude minor questions relating to
percentage OF completion OF ships
under construction. whether battle
slips over 20 years old can be in
cluded in estimates Of strength Of
modern navies and similar points
\ All Of these. in the American view,
are minor because they are questions
OF fact and can be resolved beyond
disagreement.
= Point of Difference.
The major point of difference,
however. the japanese proposal to
disregard ships under construction
in calculating naval strength, Is
: viewed as a matter of policy and a
z suggestion that is not open 10 debate
o so far as the United States is con-
= cerned. Neither the American gov
e eminent nor the American people
e will consent. it was stated, 10 scrap
?. Is capital ships averaging so per
n cent complete and upon which more
than S33O.0OO,OOO has been paid out
4 as the equivalent Of Japan's four
K new ships 10 be scrapped- The
a enormous sacrifice the United States
e has offered 10 make. it was stated
: officially. must be reflected in the
u fleet ratio 10 be established with
= Japan There was said to be nc
l. room for argument on that point
u on every possible basis of calcu.
i lation considered by the experts ia
pan could show not even the 60 pei
II cent ratio proposed for her in the
n American plan. The application OF
O. the capital ships-tonnage measure.
ment 20 fix the ratio itself is a wide
, concession TO Japan, II is said. II
existing auxiliary craft were included
in the computation on any basis
from total naval tonnage. the inclu-
sion OF any selected particular type
r OF ships in addition 10 capital ships
L she would have far less than a 81
d per cent ratio. The United state:
d has an overwhelming prepOnderanct
l. in all auxiliary craft yet sought nc
z advantage IN the agreement from
e that fact, il was said. on the high
&c est ratio Japan could be allowed by
: the figures presented that include
g ships under construction, her ratio
q was 50 per cent. and TO reach thai
70 she would be permitted 10 include
two old pre-dreadnaughts more thar
e 20 years old while the United States
e would discard the old ships over p
d years old.
y Various tabulations were gone
e over by the experts and in every
:, case Japan's ratio fell below 60 PEI
cent. To meet this condition the
l. Japanese put forward their sugges
n lions tina. only ships afiOat be count
n eG in estimating naval strength since
= in that way alone could their esti
e nate OF 20 per cent be attained.
Both American and British ex
perts baked at this. and final re
casting OF the tabulations by I'll,
Japanese. presented Wednesday
u added nothing 20 the situation as &
/ had already shaped itself. so IN,
n subcommittee quit 20 await instruc
II tons from the delegates The hea,
II OF each expert group SO reported Z,
n the chief OF his delegation.
Admiral Baron Kato, active leade
- OF the japanese delegation. refuse,
N tonight TO throw any light on wha
< his group planned 20 do. In view
d. OF the authoritative statement from
i the American delegation. that tn