Evening star., 1921-04-18
BY JOsEPHUS DANIELS,
Former Secretary OF the Navy.
ARTICLE ".


ARTICLE v.
The Navy prepared for action in
April, 1916, for war seemed almost as
imminent then as it did the next year.
When President Wilson sent his Sus-
sex note to Germany, declaring that
relations would be broken If ruthless
submarine warfare was not stopped.
we made all plans to mobilize the
fleet Nothing could show more clear
ly the critical situation than the steps
the Navy took to meet it.
My mobilization order Of April 27,
1916, shows that twenty-nine of thir-
ty-two battleships were ready for i'm
mediate action, and that one Of the
remaining three would be ready in
three weeks time.
! The corresponding table for the de-
stroyer force showed that out of for
ty-nine destroyers, forty-two were
| Immediately available. and that three
of the remaining seven would be
available within thirty days.
The sinking of the Sussex was the
biggest jolt which had come to the
peaceful hopes of Washington since
the sinking of the Lusitania. 1t so
plainly disregarded the American po-
sition as defined in the Presidents S
\
ignored. Either Germany must repu--
diate the Sussex incident as typical Of
a policy. or continued relations would
be impossible.
1t was about this time, think. al
though I do not recall the exact date,
upon the extreme gravity of the situa-
ton. said to US solemnly: II hope
that those Of US who believe in prayer
will ask divine guidance"
Those who know him best (and most
people know his reticence about his
deep was his anxiety when he spoke
thus to his official family.
Wilson Reads Ultimatum.
The Sussex was torpedoed March "a.
When all facts were in the possession
Of the State Department, and no sat-
isfactory explanation had come from
Berlin. the President called US to-
gether to read to us the ultimatum
which he had prepared to serve upon
Germany.
Let me recall the significant words
in that ultimatum. They have been
forgotten in the overwhelming sub
sequent events. but they were words
date into war as surely as did the
diplomatic rupture Of 1917. had not
Germany seen well to withdraw tenn
porarily from her utterly intolerable
and unpermissible position.
Here are the Presidents plain
words:
'1f it is still the purpose of the i'm
perial government to prosecute re-
lentless and indiscriminate warfare
against vessels of commerce by the
use of submarines. without regard to
what the government of the United
indisputable rules of international
law and the universally recognized
dictates of humanity, the government
OF the United States is at last forced
to the conclusion that there is but one
course to pursue Unless the imperial
government should now Immediately
declare and effect an abandonment Of
its present methods of submarine
warfare against passenger and
freight-carrying vessels, the govern
ment Of the United States can have
no choice but to sever diplomatic re-
lations with the German empire alto
gether."
Rest Hopes on C-Boat.
When we listened to the reading of
these words and realized what they
meant and thetremendous possible.
ties they implied, every one Of US was
profoundly moved, and there were
some. of optimistic temperament. who
hoped that this firm threat of Ameri-
can action would result in a COM
plete abandonment of Germany's
warfare on merchant shipping, but
there were others who held no such
nope. The latter were convinced that
Germany relied too greatly upon her
C-boat weapon to allow it to be re-
stricted in striking power for any
great length Of time.
The end of the submarine, as the
decisive weapon Germany regarded it
at that time, / shall narrate later.
Some temporary concession she might
make. but where separate need or
tempting opportunity appealed to her,
there seemed no reason to doubt that
Won Tirpitz would forget all pledges
and undertakings and strike wherever
he could do most damage.
There werethose, indeed, who doubt
ed II Germany would make even a
temporary concession, and I think all
felt that the possibility Of war brood
ed over US with darkenipg shadows
when we left the White House with
the knowledge that Americas ulti-
matum was on it's way to Berlin.
Order for Mobilization.
My own apprehensions that rela-
tions might be broken OF induced me
to take immediate steps to have the
fleet in readiness. The Navy Depart
ment made complete plans for mo-
bilization. and April 81, approved the
order. and it was forthwith sent to
every ship. 1t was accompanied by
the mobilization sheets. showing when
each battleship and destroyer would
be available for service. The text Of
the mobilization order follows:
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, April 81. 1915.
Confidential.
From: Chief of naval operations.
To
Subject: Mobilization plan.
l. The following order has this
day been approved by the Secretary
Of the Navy:
II. In case Of mobilization for war
in the Atlantic the organization Of
the naval forces will be as indicated
in the mobilization sheets published
from time to time by the depart
ment
g. Plans win be developed by all
the officers concerned for execution
upon the receipt of the order to mob
ilize.
"s. The order to mobilize when re-
ceived will be construed as an order
to take all necessary action for the
rapid assembly of ships at the rem
devious in all respects ready for war
r. The rendezvous is designated
as Chesapeake bay. 2. Copies Of
herewith"
Ready for Emergency.