Atlanta tri-weekly journal. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1920-19??, 1921-12-22

The PURPOSE and the PouOer
of the Four-Nation Pact
wv HILE the Senate 'Irreconcilables
M who did the League Covenant to
death have virtually disbanded I'M
der the rising sun of public opinion, their
darksome spirit survives in Senator Borah
The Four-Power pact, he contends, is mill
tary alliance, committing the United States
to grave entanglements and hazards. Article
Two of this pact he likens to clause OF
the now superseded Anglo-J apanese treaty.
which provided that eff by reason of unpro-
yoked attack or aggressive action, whenever
arising, on the part of any Power or POW
ers, either high contracting party should De
involved in war in defense of its territorial
rights or special interests the otner
high contracting party will at once come TO
the assistance of it's ally and Will conouct
the war in common and make peace in mu-
tual agreement with it, No better rebuttal
Of the Idaho Senator's strained construction
could be wished than Article Two itself,
which, with it's preceding provision, runs
thus:
eff there should develop between
any of the high contracting parties
controversy arising out of any Pacific
question and involving their said rights
which is not satisfactorily settled by
diplomacy and is likely to affect the
harmonious accord now happily subslst-
ing between them,. they shall invite the
high contracting parties to joint con-
ference to which the whole subject will
be referred for consideration and ad-
justment
".Article g If the said rights are
threatened by the aggressive action OF
any other power the high contracting
parties shall communicate with one an
other fully and frankly in order to ar
rive at an understanding as to the most
efficient measures to be taken, jointly
and separately, to meet the exigencies of
the particular situation. "
Here the obvious purpose is conference
and cooperation in the interest OF peace,
rather than alliance in the cause of war, even
war of defense. 1t was with the latter end
in view that the Anglo-Japanese compact
was designed. It is with a broader vision
and in a more constructive spirit that the
United States, Great Britain, France and
Japan enter into their ten-year agreement
for preserving peace in the Pacific. They
assume, and quite reasonably, that if dur
~g that period they maintain concord
among themselves, they will be more than
likely to maintain it, severally and Jointly,
with others. If the Pacific, commonly re-
garded as the international danger zone of
the years ahead, is kept free from conflict,
that of itself will be a mighty influence for
peace throughout the world. Hence the four
nations most concerned and most able to
control the trend of events, covenant with
one another, first to submit their own con-
troversies to joint conferences, and secondly
to confer jointly with view to averting
trouble if any of their number be threatened
by /'the aggressive action of any other
Power"
In the latter as in the former instance the
purpose is to accomplish by negotiation
what so ,ften in the past has been left to
the red arbitrament of arms. The Four
Power treaty contains nothing equivalent to
the now Cancelled Anglo-Japanese contract
that in certain circumstances the one ma
tion will at once come to the assistance OF
it's ally, and will conduct the war in COM
mon and make mutual peace in agreement
with it, Instead, there is the provision
that if one of the four nations be menaced
by aggression aga nst it's rights, there shall
be a joint conference of them all, with
view to preventing both the wrong and the
hostilities which might ensue. In this g
military alliance?" Is it not in truth dis
tinctly moral alliance, the whole intent
and spirit of which are to make military
action unnecessary? Grant that there rests
upon each of the contracting parties moral
obligation to SUPPORT, with whatever meas,
ures might be needful, any m .mber of the
group whose rights in the Pacific might be
challenged. This does not commit the
United States, nor the others, to military
procedure save insofar as the several gov.
ernments concerned would authorize such
procedure.
That is to say, if there should come q
question of whether we should go to war in
support of the alliance, the answer would
lie then Where it lies now, in the will Of
Congress. Only if the peoples representa-
tives decided to muster this nations mill
tary snews to the needs and aim of the
alliance could it be done That they would
so decide if the situation and the principle
involved so required, there can be no doubt,
America has ever stood true to her princi
pies, and .eaven forbid that she should ever
prove recreant to them. But the considera
tioI. of presen. moment is that our military
obligations to the alliance will be only what
Congress- acting under the exigencies of the
particula" case, may see fit to make them
In no sense are we committing ourselves tC
the 'unpathed waters and undreamet
shores" which a fearsomely fanciful schoo
Of statesmen would conjuIe up.
But the prime purpose and the probable
functionng of the new treaty lies, not amid
battleships and armies, but around the con
ference table. It is first of all treaty, moi
for cooperation in case of war, but for co
operation to avert war The Anglo-Japanest
alliance looked mainly to what would occur