The New York herald., 1921-03-06
Reviewed by WADE CHANCE.

Had not General Townshend spent
eighteen months in Turkish captivity
following his surrender at Kut-al- AL
mara in Mesopotamia i'm May. 1916.
this very important story OF his might
not have been given to the world. It
is not only a graphic account of one
of the most dramatic campaigns of the
late war and history of the longest
siege ever endured by British arms
and the longest in history since the
days of Dutch William and Mary and
of Marlborough-bu includes a com
plete and able discussion OF military
strategy such as the war has not yet
produced.
General Townshend's account. and
the no less remarkable history of the
Dardanelles expedition by General Sir
Ian Hamilton. well illustrate the Brit
ish method of reviewing her mistakes
before the world. which America might
well initiate. Throughout the contest
Great Britain blunders and muddles,
but ever carries on. All her forces
Parliament. the Cabinet, the press and
every individual soldier and sailor
unite in preserving a calm and reticent
front to the enemy. revealing nothing
which might inform or hearten. But
when war is over she spreads the rec
ord Of her doings before the world in
its every detail, not only of her brill
liant successes but Of her failures:
not only to inspire but to guide future
generations
There Is a certain resemblance in
the two accounts named, for both
campaigns illustrate the Inadequate
support received from the home Gov
ernment, absorbed in the chief theatre
OF action on the western front and to
better enact this tremendous drama.
neglecting these flank attacks against
turkey and treating them as side
SHOWS. But in reading such records
as these, classed among the British
failures. we might well ask what
might then be the successes of such
generals In more grateful fields with
proper support 1t is such records
that constitute the glory Of England.s
greatness. And as William Watson
says, "the facile conqueror" NAV be
less great than ''he. who. wounded,
sore sinks foiled, but fighting
evermore."
General Townshend called from In
dia to command an Inadequate force
Tor the conquest OF Mesopotamia and
the capture of Bagdad, was promised
ample reenforcements, which never
came. But with never more than ten
thousand fighting men, only one-third
OF them being British. the others being
indian troops, he conquered 300 miles
OF Turkish territory. won three bat
ties against greatly superior forces.
and then entrenched himself at Kut.
on the Tigris River, holding on for
five months before surrenderinc 10
the enemy. But as success is ever "a
the follower" Generals Maude and
Allenoy. with superior forces. were en-
aoied to take easily the country which
Townshend had been able to hold
while awaiting their arrival.
At the battle of Ctesiphon he de.
feated n Turkish army of $4,000 and
suffered a loss OF one-half of his
$500 bayonets, leaving him with 1000
fighting men-and $500 killed and
wounded. He still held his position
against the Turks, reinforced by a
| fresh army under Kali Pasha. until he
made his great retreat, ninety miles TO
Kut, and did not leave a single
wounded man nor a gun. but took with
him l,500 prisoners. Then with his
weakened forces he held the Turkish
host at bay until his men were dying
OF starvation twenty a day, and de-
spairing of rcenforcements. finally sur
rendered at the order OF the Govern
ment.
Gen. Townshend gives the Turk
credit Tor being clean fighter, strong
I'm defence but unable to stand bayonet
attack. He blames the German staff
officers cooperating with the Turkish
command for tho cruel and harsh
treatment accorded to his heroic army
during captivity. 1t was the Germans
evident desire to humiliate British
arms in the eyes Of all Asia Minor.
His whole treatment OF the art OF
war should be Invaluable to all mill
tary men. He gives the six great
fundamental principles OF war as es-
tablished by Napoleon. and followed
by Calusewitz, the great Moltke. and
more recently by Foch, namely:
a. The principal objective OF strategy.
b. Economy OF force.
c. The mass.
d. The strategic offensive.
c. Rapidity Of economy of direction.
T. Security.
He shows that Napoleon lost only
when he violated these principles.
especially when he separated his forces
or failed to attack with his principal
mass on the encmy's weakest point.
which Is generally his line OF COM
munications. He thus quotes Ma
poleon:
All the great captains OF antiquity
and those who have later marched In
their footsteps have only done great
deeds by conforming TO the principles.
My greatest successes have been at
tributed to luck and my revcrses 70 my
faults, but II wrote my campaigns
one would be very astonished TO see
that In every case ! exercised my
Faculties In order to conform to the
principles of war (st. Helena. 1S16)."
And again, Foch:
The principles OF war arc always
the same. IL matters nothing whether
your soldier Is on his feet I'm the open.