New Ulm review. (New Ulm, Brown County, Minn.) 1892-1961, 1921-09-28

Rteries but even they have too much
|sense to introduce solvent into the loose
structure Of our Empire.
Even when it formed an ineligible
link in our world system, the japanese
alliance was always something Of an ac-
cident and excrescence. It sprang from
the acute sense Of our dangerous isola-
ton, which came over us during the Boer
War, when we realized how nearly a
continental coalition had been formed
against us. At one moment. an Anglo
German Japanese alliance was a. possible
h lily under discussion. We next realized
that Germany would not join US Sin any
pact aimed at Russia. Then, as we de-
layed to accept the overtures from Japan,
she forced our hand by coquetting for al
liances in st. Petersburg and Paris. We
had a double purpose in concluding this
always unpopular connection. First OF all
it kept Japan from linking herself up with
our rivals, and secondly it served US as
an indirect means Of weakening and OPP
posing Russia From both standpoints
BIT justified itself, and it proved itself
adaptable as the years went on, and Ger
many succeeded Russia as our principal
rival. To the mind of the plain man, it
mo longer has a justification or even a
meaning. We need no naval ally in the
Far East or anywhere on the high seas.
] am the last person formed by Nature
to guess with success at the present
thoughts of Downing Street. AS | try
to pierce the verbiage Of the semi official
explanations, I detect no strong positive
reason for renewal, but rather a certain
Inertia. To break with the old system is
always difficult. Fresh thinking and fresh
methods are never welcome to the Official
mind. There is moreover, a genuine
dread Of what Japan might do, if she felt
herself affronted. So long as Downing
Street has her tied to the alliance, her
course, it thinks, will be more or less
and practicable. It is, not
SO easy. to say what she would DO It she
were left to her own devices. She did
conclude during the war a none too
Straightforward secret treaty Of alliance
and reinsurance with Tsarist Russia.
There are documents they may be for
geries- which even disclose coquettings
with Germany. To be sure there are no
visible temptations Of this kind lying
around today. Neither Moscow nor Ber-
lin will turn to Toxic at present. But
who can feel sure of the temptations tea
years hence? That, / think, is the main
Il line Of the reasoning which leads Down
ing Street to desire the renewal of the
Alliance, albeit in a modified and even
|emasculated form. It thinks additionally
in terms Of a Balance of Power, and IN
the Pacific as elsewhere, the. consecrated
British reading Of that sdetestable doc
trine, inclines it to ally itself with the
weaker Power. 5s.faf
In estimating the attitude Of the Bri-
fish Foreign Office, it is important to take
account of a popularity from which IN
some degree all diplomatists seem to suf-
fer. 1t is their foible to believe that
they can exert sWeetening moral IN
fuence upon allies. 1t is a naive vanity,
and | presume it is part of the duty
of allied ambassadors, in their intercourse
with allied foreign secretaries, to en-
courage it and even to play upon it. Sir
Edward Grey, as he then was, held the
sincere conviction that during the Entente
he was slowly and tactfully permeating
the Empire Of the Tsars with his own
mild liberalism. In the most anxious
hours Of our recent association with
France over the affairs of Europe, the
same conviction Of its own ability to ra-
date light into the darker places Of an
ally's mind, has sustained the Foreign
Office. do not doubt that Lord Curzon
like his predecessors cherished a similar
view of his relation to Japan. If one
talks to an official person about the &C
tual working Of that alliance the rape
of Korea, the absorption Of Manchuria,
the grabbing of Shantung, the occupation
Of Eastern Siberia, he will answer sadly
that it is certainly depressing, but ha