Arizona republican., 1921-08-07

States there would be nothing for Japan to do but to come in
 It doesn't now look easy. The British have lately shown disposition to hesitancy according to the dispatches of yesterday and on the same day we learn that the Japanese rather more than doubtful of the results any conference looking to the future peace of the world.
 Though Japan stood to lose more than any other nation In any agreement that might be reached. necessarily Involving national sacrifices of ter rtory or influence it appears that it is Britain that holds the key. Great Britain is evidently not ready yet to it.. We doubt very much whether in America there is a unanimous Sentiment in favor of using it.
 Though questions apparently more difficult and complex than disarmament limitation of ar1na- ment. especially questions relating to the Pacific, were proposed, believe that the seeming simple one of armament is the rock against which the pres idents proposal has been brought up.
 We do not suppose any ordinarily sensible man believed that a disarmament agreement could be reached or that of three nations parties to the proposed conference. wanted complete disarma- ment Certainly none of them expected anything of the sort they were feverishly proceeding with their naval programs at ruinous expense
 But to ordinarily sensible men the limitation of armament seemed easy But when we come to think of it, is it really easier than total disarmament? If disarmament would leave nation helpless against any unforeseen contingency. would not a limitation of armament so agreed upon leave it relatively helpless?
 The proposition for disarmament or limitation Fests upon two theories, the saving of the expense of armament and the reducing of the power of na- tions to make war. And thereby is reduced the power of nation to defend itself in case of war is in the first theory that we as individuals are the more interested it Is with the second that we as nation are the more concerned.
 Any reduction of armament that might be agreed upon' II not reached by the unanimous vote of the powers concerned. would be fixed by a majority of them and each nation would have in mind it's own security against attack were exactly similarly situated and were equally naturally defended. such an agreement might be easily reached pro- vided none of the parties entertained any aggressive designs.
 But Japan. Great Britain and the United States are not in the same boat It has the policy of Great Britain. which depends upon the whole world for food and raw materials to support it's manu 1actures to maintain navy equal in strength to any naval combination that might be brought against 1t That constituted the British idea of naval acy which destroyed by the rapid growth of the German navy. A combination of fthe French and German navies or of the German and American navies would have imperi1ed the British emnire 1nere would have been longer British control of the seas. Perhaps in few years the German navy alone would have disputed British control
 The old British theory of the necessity of control was reiterated last Thursday by Winston Churchill in his reasons why Great Britain was ahout to r. place four obsolete batteships.
 It is difficult nations to commit their fortrr.. to any agreement the future Treaties are said 10 be sacred as morally binding conracts between well meaning individuals. But a treaty which re- stricts nation is apt to be worn away by chafinp when the government which negotiated it has passed away. The treaty be assured of integrity only while the governments which assened to it are still III existence Treaties of lesser moment. commercial treaties etc, stand for years and some for genera tions only because the act of breaking them would be more costly than the permitting of them to re- main so that when they dissolved 1t Is done by mutual consent
 No combination of nations is certain of perpetu- ity; it cannot be that it will exist for even stated period Many have been formed for mutual protection and sometimes for aggression. But when the interests of begin to conflict with those Of another, change of government in either of the parties usually brings the breaking up the entente the alliance.
 Large numbers of nations unite for a common purpose; world confederation is formed For time all works we'll but later time comes when rroups have new common interests and the whole is broken up into groups and unexpected as the figures of the kaleidoscope.
 4So oo1pl GIedt Britain, the United States Japan have full faith in the sincerity of one an other; that is, in the present governments of one another But none of them can see into the future and one cannot trust where he cannot see.
 One of the arguments against the League of Nations was that it might easily be provocative of war instead of guaranty Of peace. party nation should sometime find itself embarrassed and chafed by the bonds which united it. Certainly if it had reached the stage of disarmament proposal it would have found the same difficulties which have lately arisen to obsruct the of President Harding
 We hope that some way may be found: that an agreement of some may be reached which will render war less imminent and the preparation for war less burdensome to the people of America and the world
 It is evident though that there is distrustfulness in both Great Britain and Japannot dstrustfulness Of the present American government but of the future and perhaps of present conditions in Europe and the Pacific.