Evening star., 1921-12-24

| it is difficult to appreciate the for
| midable effort which was necessary
to discover the Indispensable means
for destroying the submarine and to
execute them in the midst of so vio-
lent war. which had, up to that
time. absorbed all the vital energies
of the nations in the struggle upon
land.
Lack of Defensive Weapons.
However it may be. if this small
craft committed frightful depreda-
tiOns, it was not alone because the
use made of it was barbarous in, the
extreme, but largely because, during
many long months, there was almost
nothing with which it could be COM
bated.
tion was changed and when the armi-
! stice came the raVaSes of the sub
marine had been greatly lessened:
the monthly destruction of merchant
| ships scarcely exceeded. $4,000 tons
and the methods then in preparation
! for coping with the danger would
| have considerably reduced this, while
| the number of submarines destroyed
had been steadily increasing.
| To sum up, in judging the subma-
rine, it should not be considered at
the time of the war, and above all, at
that precise moment of the war when
| it was at the height of it's effective
ness, but more in perspective ana
looking somewhat toward the future
AS is the case with every new weapon.
! when they were without sufficient de-
fense and caused vast damage. Yet
fram now on, as Lord Lee emphasized.
ity power would be greatly limited;
! the risks of destruction which 1T must
run have become very numerous.
Lord in feeling that the submarine
| has become Ineffective against it's
foes, it is possible to think that The
struggle against the submarine mag
| now be carried on under conditions
tcomparable to that iof any action be-
| tween warships.
| Compared to Torpedo BOnt.
! a new phase has pecn reached in
the life of the submarine; 1t will hot
| be the last; there is no doubt that
further great progress Will be made in
two directions: in the power of attack
of the submarine, and in the efficiency
Of methods for combating ITS opc-
ationS.
| In order to establish certainty upon
this point. it is enough to recall the
case of the torpedo boat. Upon it's
appearance, this little craft was con-
sidered an instrument Of such power
of destruction. that in the view of
many distinguished naval men and
writers upon maritime subjects. the
hour of great battleshipS had struck:
to build them was no longer worth
while. The people in France who ia
vcred this decision formed large
and influential group. What would
have occurred if war had broken out
at the moment of this fever in favor
of torpedo boats? Evidently. ii use
had been made of them as ..rhitrarily
as of the submarine by the Gerrnans,
the damage caused by tn" torpedo
boats would perhaps have been less
tbut what was certain was that in
many respects the conditions sur
rounding them We're analogous to
those affecting submarines
However, the search for means to olD-
pose the torpedo boat was undertaken.
And now. not only had this small craft
ceased to be an object of special dread
but 1t had developed into the DESTROYER
or hotilla leader. and had been found to
be the greatest engine of war against
the submarine. In this way the instru-
ment of terror Of forty years ago had
shown itself to he an especially eff
cacious defender of humanity.
Points to Powerful Aircraft.
"Whc says that the same thing will
rot come to pass in the case of the
submarine? We note as menace which
impresses itself greatly upon our minds
the advent of powerful airships, whose
appearance each day strikes US as more
real and more imposing. We foresee
that they will be capable not only of at
tacks on land. at present almost ire
siStlble. but also of formidable under
takings far out at sea. In the course of
these struggles the airship can spread
gas over considerable area of the sea
paralyZlng large ships. possibly squad
ronS. Then will we not look forward
TO utilizing the protection of the sub
marine which. supplied with powerful
means against aircraft. may circle
around and guard the fleet? The ca
paclty of submerging would enable these
guardians temporarily to escape the
blows of the adversary in the air. This
4 YOU will say today is fanciful. Perhaps
the future will show what. the result
will be.
+ BE that as it may, the last war has
shown that hereafter the naval warfare
can be carried on simultaneously under
water, on the surface and in the air
| That is to say, we must for the moment,
consider the naval war of the future
from this angle. if this greatest of mis-
fortunes should. contrary TO the wishes
of all, some day occur.
These are actual facts. from which
there is no possible escape. None of
you would know how to undertake
to stop the progress of human in
senulty. 1t has taken possession of
the submarine domain. This is a
| fact which we are unable to prevent.
1t is very certain that the sub
marine. the only device by which man
has succeeded in navigating under
, water. cannot serve any industrial
purpose or peaceful aim. This char
acteristic it shares with the torpedo
boat and with most other weapons
Figures as Basis.
II have set forth the views of the
French navy relative to the suppress
sion OF submarines: l have still a
word to say on the importance of the
number of submarines
fpnrpS 10 n
before the committee have empha-
sized the paramount consideration
which must guide it in forming an
opinion.
Lord Lee has stated that the Ger
| mans constructed 800 submarines and
that generally they had only ten of
them in active service at sea at any
one time. This would indicate that
constructed must be estimated on a
basis considerably larger than that
employed in fixing the number of
these little boats that it is thought
'In truth. we have not quite the
same figures. We have estimated
that on an average one can figure
that the Germans had possessed
eighty to one hundred completed sub
marines which are still in existence
lOf this number they were able to
keep about fifteen or twenty at sea
at once. And the reduction thus
;noted from the number of existing
submarines to the number in condi-
ton to use was due to two causes:
the need to allow the crews to rest
and the need of maintenance of these
small boats on which the wear and
tear was terrific, making constant
irepairs necessary.
Sees Useless Force.
"The advisory committee, whose
perfectly clear, exact and precise re-
mort could he cnnsiderad as IN ax