The Washington herald., 1921-12-02
NAVY SOLUTION
LIKELY TODAY
BY BIG THREE
Hughes, Balfour and Ka-
to May Reconcile Ex-
perts' Views on Ratio.

Whether the naval ratio to be en-
forced after an agreement by the
present armament conference shall
be 10-10-6, or 10-10-7, so far as the
United States, Great Britain and
Japan are concerned. continues the
| chief business before the confer
ence. The Big Three" Hughes,
Balfour and Kato. individually are
studying the written reports of
their experts, who said that they
cannot reconcile their divergent
views. Their reasons have been
written out Each of the three
delegates now are digesting the sug-
gestions of their experts. They
have not yet met as a special COM
mittee of the entire committee on
Limitation of naval armaments since
their experts reached the impasse.
In fact, despite reports to the con-
trary. they have conferred only once,
and that was when they passed on
the general proposals to the ex-
perts for study and report
The big Three" hope to get to-
gether today. They will do so, 1t
was said last night, II the time
can be spared for that purpose. 1t
is considered very likely that they
will be able to meet this afternoon
and then the men who are to recon
cile expert views with international
policies will have an opportunity to
hnd out exactly where they stand.
Agreement Believed Certain.
Although it is admitted that
there is a complete deadlock on
the part of the naval experts the
feeling still is uppermost in con-
ference circles that there will be
an agreement on the naval pro-
gram. In this connection Admiral
kato last night positively denied
the cabled report from Tokyo that
the Japanese delegation had been
Instructed to stand out for the 20
per cent ratio even though to do
so broke up the conference The
baron declared specifically that he
had received no such instruction
and at the same time explained
that the delegation is in constan,
touch with Tokyo regarding confer
ence developments.
Japnn's Definite Purpose.
This prompt denial was accepted
IN conference circles as indicating
that the Japanese still have a def
mite purpose in their procedure and
that they do not intend to accept
show down until they are ready
Tor 1t. And this was accepted as
an excellent reason for the feel
ing Of optimism in conference quar-
ters that in the end Japan will ac-
cept the 10-10-6 ratio.
discussing this. one of the Hit
ish delegation said yesterday: J
You must remember that there
are three distinct factors here. First
there is the conference. Then come
the committees of the conference.
Ihen come the committees of ex-
perts. After that, of course, there
are minor organizations.
=. Now there can be no complete
sagreement until the conference
mas demonstrated that fact and
packed up and gone home. The
naval program was passed up by
e 1ne experts who sent it to the
Big Three committee. This COM
rHttee now is struggling with the
proolem. But even If they failed OF
agreement the entire conference
would be left as court of last
/ -hAN III lndl DOUy are Qele-
cations with no immediate interes,
IN the program who are very i'm
portant because of the influence
they possess"
-Must BE Agreement
Another of the chief delegates,
who has taken only a minor par,
to date. but whose opinions are lis
tened to with the keenest atten-
tlon by his colleagues. went even
farther:
There must be an agreement -
he said. but it Is idle to expect
Japan to yield on a cardinal point
at this time. You have a game that
Americans play. known as stud
poker. The ace in the hole is the
feature of that game. Now, Japan
Is in the position right now of a
player with an ace in the hole
There are many vital problems still
facing the conference. Manchuria,
Shantung, spheres of influence in
Siberia, mandated islands, and such
matters. still remain to be settled.
Japan is most vitality interested in
all of these. Her delegation must
support their position and make a
minimum of concessions. Her meth
DDS of diplomacy are of the old
school. What she has to concede
she desires to concede on a trad
ing basis. And If she is given an
indorsement, even though ii is more
or less of a passive character, of
her so-called treaty rights, she may
be depended on to make real con-
cessions on the naval program at
the end. After all. 1t now is an
parent that certain decisions must
be reached here, as they were at
Paris. at the expense of China. Ex-
isting treaties must be respected.
Whether they were secured by force
or by blackmail is not the uues-