The Washington herald., 1921-03-13
All Berlin Foreign Policy
Since Armistice Direct
ed Toward Showing
Fatherland's Trade I'm.
portance and Separat-
ing France and Britain
From United States.

From United States.
the treaty are fuiniled-and are ther
to be withdrawn. But Germany has
already violated many of the terms,
beyond all debate or discussion.
Henceforth, the allied troops may
as a consequence. remain on the
Rhine indefinitely. And given the
present and the certain future spirit
of Germany. French troops will stas
on the Rhine. unless, perchance
they advance to the Elbe or the
Spree.
But this means a prolongation OF
some. IL not all. of the conditions
Of war. 1t means interruption to
the flow OF trade and commerce. 1t
means a never-hidden threat Of re-
sort to military weapons IL German
policy continues to invite military
Intervention by deliberate and CAL
sulated evasion OF the terms of tn.
treaty Of peace.
| We are only a>iittle more than a
year away from the time when the
treaty of Versailles became cffee-
tive, and already we have had two
allied military demonstrations.
| Uncertaintles of Future.
! What is the use of calculating g
upon a future, even reasonably re-
[ mote, in which real order and busi-
ness stability will arrive, IL one
nation deliberately adopts a policy
which insures ever-increasing crises
and periodical resort to military
force, or at the least to the threat
of military operations. which is only
Q little less disturbing to world mar
kets? What can be the hope Of real
return OF peace as long as Germany
CANDLES on the world desire for
peace as strong enough to enable
her now to escape from the obliga-
tions incurred by her conduct of the
war and tomorrow, having escaped,
having shifted the burden Of pay
ing for the war from the backs Of
her own people to those of her
neighbors, to seek to abolish the
political and territorial consequences
by one more war. better planned
this time?
And II we see what German pol
icy is and what 1t is to be for the
future, through the events at Lon
don. Is It not necessary to per-
ceive also what allied policy. above
all. what French policy, will be?
Is IT not manifest that, granted
German effort to divide France from
Britain fails, as 1t has SO far failed
and seems likely to continue to fail,
conceded that the similar effort to
embroil the United States fails. a
day will come when 1t will seem
to the whole world. outside Of Ger
many, no longer worth while to re-
strain the French. provided such
restraint could be exerted?
Blind Spot On Beche Mind.
| l do not believe that Germany
will be more successful in the fu-
ture than in the recent past in di-
viding her enemies and thus achiev-
ing her purpose, In the last analy-
sis there Is a lbiind spot In. the
German mind which always insures
disaster to German designs. Over
and over again during the war
above all in the critical days when
the war was just becoming ines
capable, that German blind spot
was disclosed.
The German capacity for reunit-
ing divided allies by some stroke
| OF supreme folly has patiently not
been reduced by the experiences of
the war itself. And in the end, IL
seems likely that a new German
blunder will have the old familiar
consequences
There never was a better chance
for Germany. by skill. by a little
| real comprehension of the exact
situation in the world, to compel
Ger conquerors to modify their
terms. to put the French in a po-
sition of having either to diminish
their demands, based upon justice
as they are, or lose British and
perhaps American support There
never was q finer chance to exploit
the war WEAKNESS of the world and
the general desire to get back to
business and have done with all
that the war had meant.
Chances Thrown Away.
But, given ALI these initial ad-
vantages. the German has again
thrown them away. because he could
not perceive realities. Lloyd George
would, under certain circumstances,
have almost ineluctably been
brought to plead Germany's case,
but, as 1t stands, his past efforts
to moderate the demands of his
French allies seem today no more
than evidences of his own misap-
prehension of German facts.
Yet, accepting as probable the
recurring failure Of each of the
later German efforts to escape by
intrigue. manipulation, manoeuvre,
1t is not less patent that the end
or all such campaigns must some
Day be actual Intervention of armed
force, the resumption of the old war
and the prosecution of that war to
its logical conclusion, which must
be the real defeat Of Germany. 1t
is not peace. but a form of warfare
stretching Indefinitely into the fu-
ture, which present German policy
portends. $500. .-.- -,
And in the end such a policy can
only lead to French action with or
without allied assistance.
The next time a real or an ap-
parent opportunity arrives, we shall
look for a new German defiance,
while all the time We must expect
German propaganda manoeuxrine
IN Great Britain and in the 6nited
States.
Sooner or later the end of all thi,
campaign will come with a new
French military operation. That
operation. in my Judgment, will
carry with 1t the real ruin of the
Germany which we know now much
changed. but still, in considerable
measure the Germany of 1914. I'm
less every sign fails the French will
not Indefinitely submit to the pres
ent German tactics nor will their
allies or former associates alway.
nave any argument to intarpose