New-York tribune., 1921-11-06

proteclon or emma WAS translated
into Anglo-Japanese control of China.
On July Is, 1911, at the second re-
vision OF the treaty or alliance, fur
Their modification was made, with the
evident Intention of allaying the ap-
prchenSion Of the United States that
the alliance was no longer directed
against Russia, since the Anglo Rus
sian entente of 1907, the original rea-
son for the alliance, had disappeared,
and that it was in reality menace to
tbs United States. In this last re-
vision, therefore, it was provided that,
should either party make general
arbitration treaty with third power,
that parry should not be bound by the
treaty of alliance to go to war with
such third power.
This last qualification Of the Anglo
Japanese Alliance has been urged as
evidence that in no case could this
compact affect unfavorably the inter
ests of the United States, much less in
any way involve Great Britain in a war
with this country. A little reflection
will show how inadequate this preten-
tlon is as safeguard to the United
| States, and especially as an evidence
OF British friendship for America.
Ambiguity Created
In Regard to u. S.
If the treaty really intends to sx-
clude the United States from the pos
sible enemies against which the al
lance is directed, why does it not
distinctly say so instead of creating an
ambiguity in the Interpretation of the
treaty? Can it be pretended that this
reserve is designed to spare the feel
ings Of other powers by not explicitly
naming the United States? If this
reference is indisputable, why not use
the name? If it is open to other inter
pretations. how can it give satisfaction
to the United States?
That the Interpretation is doubtful
is evident from several considerable
The treaty of arbitration that was in
process Of negotiation in 1911 was
never ratified and. therefore, does not
exist The peace commission treaty
between the United States and Great
Britain of September. 1914, is not an
arbitration treaty, the design being not
arbitration but Cancellation.
Great resentment was felt in japan
when the British government notified
that country that the British govern
ment would regard the peace commits
sion treaty as equivalent to a general
treaty of arbitration" and that, in the
event of a conflict between the United
States of America and Japan, Great
Britain would not hold herself bound
to go to the assistance of Japan. But
what is the value to Japan of such a
treaty as that? Against whom is the
alliance binding? Against whom is 1t
now directed? Russia has ceased to
be formidable military power. Ger
many has been driven from China and
the Pacific. There appears to exist
no power likely to be hostile to either
Japan or Great Britain in the Fa,
East, provided they do not themselves
become aggressive.
But if general arbitration treaties
can take the rlacc of alliances, or con.
stltute reason for absolving a con.
tractant from military obligations, WHY
not substitute such general arbitra
tion treaty for the alliance, including
in it all the powers interested in the
Pacific? That would not be an ALI
ance; but it would, in the judgment o1
Great Britain, be sufficient arrange
ment to absolve 8 nation from the obi
cations Of an alliance, since Grea
Britain has declared itself thus alb
solved so far as the United States il
concerned. The question not unnat
urally arises, Does Japan regard tn.
alliance as in full force with the quail
fication Great Britain places upon he
obligation "to come to her assistanc
and conduct the war in common"
Might not Great Britain, wishing il
some case to enforce the Obligations O
Japan, be morally compelled to recog
nize the obligation she has solemnl
taken rather than to press the passing
qualification for the purpose of al,ay
ing the apprehensions of the Unite
States?
But supposing that the exemption
rom hostility alleged to be enter