Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1921-07-29
DECISION REVERSED
IN BALDWIN CASE
State Superintendent Finds
Little Rock Principal
Entitled to Pay
NOTICE INSUFFICIENT
Members of School Board Admit
Never Having Visited School
During Sessions

The action of the Thurston county
superintendent of schools on approx
ing the dismissal of r. ]. Baldwin as
teacher by the school board in the
Rochester district, has been reversed
by Mrs. Josephine Corliss Preston,
state superintendent of public in
struction. Mrs. Preston's reasons for
the reversal are in full in the follow
ing order.
The appellant was employed by
contract to teach in the schools of
the district for term of nine school
months, commencing on the sixth
day of September, 1920. On Janu-
airy %, 1921, the board of directors
met at the close of a social gather
ing of the school, summoned Mr..
Baldwin before them, and demanded
his resignation. Prior to that even
| ing the directors had not cOntem-
plated holding the meeting. Mr.. Bald
win was given no notice until the
meeting was called. No written
charges were preferred. The grounds
for asking his resignation, as stated
in the minutes of the meeting and
as testified to by the directors at the
hearing before the county superin-
tendent. were that he was unable
to control the school, had failed to
secure the cooperation of pupils or
parents and that his instruction in
the school room was almost a total
failure" Mr.. Baldwin testified that
no charges were made against him,
save that he was advised that the
! county superintendent had expressed
an opinion that he was incompetent;
that one pupil had been allowed to
drop out; that another pupil had
dropped out because of inability to
get along with Mr.. Baldwin; that the
directors did not like his personality,
and that attendance had fallen off
during his period of service. He
also testified that he did not know
that the meeting was hearing, and
that he had prepared no defense. His
testimony on these matters was corr
roborated by that of his wife, who
was the only person in attendance at
the meeting other than himself and
the three directors.
1t appears that before this meeting
Mr.. Baldwin had met with the board
on two different occasions when the
suspension of certain pupils was dis
cussed. These prior meetings appear
to have been open to- the public, and
to have been attended by the sus-
pended pupils, their parents, and
other persons. But 1t does not ap-
pear that the dismissal of Mr.. Bald
win was considered.
Members of the board admitted
that they had never visited his school
room during session of school and
that they had no first hand know
ledge of his ability as teacher.
There was much evidence present.
ed before the county superintendent
on the issues of his ability as in
structor, his control of the school,
the justification of his dismissal of
certain pupils, his cooperation with
teachers and members Of the COM
munity, and the attendance record
of his scholl during the period of his
service as compared with previous
record.
On January 20, 1921, appellant
was served with notice of his dis
charge. Thereafter he notified the
board that he did not consider the
meeting of the 2Sth hearing, and
demanded that if they had any
charges to prefer against him, they
should be preferred in writing, and
that he should have an opportunity
to meet them and be heard before the
board. No further hearing was held,
and he was prevented from continu
ing his teaching by member of the
board, though he presented himself
at the DulldlnS on the uay IOllOWlnS
his discharge and endeavored to as
sumo control of his class as teacher.
Upon the argument, appellant con-
tended that the hearing before the
county superintendent might deter
mine only the question whether the
appellant was legally dismissed by
the purported discharge of the board,
and at that time. For the respond
ent it was contended that the hearing
before the county superintendent was
to be entirely de novo. and that the
superintendent might go outside of
the record and determine from the
evidence presented whether the board
had sufficient grounds. We believe
that that issue is fairly presented by
the facts.
Section 44S1, Rem. & Bal. Code,
provides in part as follows:
"Eypry hoard of directors unless