The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1921-11-27

The Conference Objective.
Here, then. since Mr.. Hughes de-
hberately chose TO make IL so was
the sole objective of the Washing
ton conference. No one can mis-
take this fact, even though it's i'm
portance may be exaggerated or i'm
properly minimized For better or
for worse Mr.. Hughes decided we
should talk ships, and ships will be
the subject alike of the conference
and OF the tangible agreements that
emerge.
Now one has to appreciate in es-
tlmating the situation ayaotlv the
problem TO be faced. The United
States has undertaken to give mp IL
not actual supremacy on the high
seas the exercise of that power in
disputahly hers, which would have
made her In a short space OF years
beyond challenge on the eastern and
western oceans.
We have given up that power,
potential II not actual, without com.
pensatlon. Did we desire compen-
@tlon? That question res aims to be
debated hereafter. In substance we
have said TO Great Britain. still the
greatest sea power, but by conse.
quence of the extent and expense
OF the last war unable 10 retain that
position In competition with us: I'VE
are willing to concede you tempo
rafy superiority Nnd permanent
equality provided you Will agree to
common program preceded by a
lO-year holiday" The British have
accepted the proposal. Not only
were they bound 70 accept 1t. but II
represents for them an unmistak.
able victory in that 1t saves them
RON a losing race.
We have said 10 Japan: "Ac-
cept our standards OF relative
strength on the high seas and
Substantially the Japanese in aC-
cept our standards because for them
sea power Is defensive and not Of
tenAve, and the more our fleets are
reduced and the more British fleets
are reduced the safer Japan is not
alone from attack by our feet or the
british fleet, out also from chal-
ienRe as she applies her policy on
we Asiatlc continent. Thus Japan,
too' mas won n victory in the naval
discussion
What About Uncle Sam?
=, NOW, what OF the United States?
we fundamentally have agreed TO
resign supremacy upon the seas of
1he world at time when no nation
ana no two nations could challenge
us hhd we chosen to adopt the old
nlltlsh ratio OF building against the
tNo naval powers nearest to us But
~ reslgning this power no one can
nnIlstake the fact that Mr.. Hughes
mas followed the wishes of his lcl-
10" countrymen. We had no desire
people TO dominate the high
seas NJ the risk OF eventual conflict
ana M the price Of enormously eX-
paha'ng naval budgets. We have
s.1tn up something we didn't want,
speaking for tho mass OF the Amer
lean people.
=, NOW, the first practical question
u,.at must be asked In whether the
limitation Of naval armamcnts rep
,esohts "a gain for the peace of the
u'lu' As l have pointed out often
nOu-h m preceding articles, the
a.ys'l'h OF armaments has precious
In'le 10 do with the causes of war
rs an American delusion that the
sAIslence Of armed forces or the
puValence of armed ships brings
az. wars are caused by totally
tats' Cht factors, They are precipi-
tos teu ny the conflict of rival aspira-
s, Sous or conceptions or interests
Stuhb me peoples OF the world. The
49,. III Nht German Inlnd OF
~ 'sIH hopes and certain fears was
nv o lactor which was responsible for
~ limiting the armed strength
TIE world at sea. Mr.. Hughes
nas not directly reduced the
hangers OF war. Snch cnntribu-
uoii as has been made or will bc
made Is indirect. Certainly II
an International conference can
m,Pt In Washington and de-
great questions and sepa-
ac uitcr amicnblc discussion
iaNlhg set their signatures to a
oument which witnesses To In
irrational concord the gain
nusl hc clear. The gain, how
u'f' Is not consequence of
ue document signed, but of the
ahhg cnRendered during the
c,tc c,eoatc and testified to by the
snaracter Of the document.
u,n or which throws us back
~ the second phase of the
9ston conference. the far