The Washington times., 1921-11-13
By ADMIRAL FISKE---:
ness Some Exceedingly Powerful Nation Should Come Our Assist
ance Seems IT, War With JAPAN We Should Wholly Fail"
Says Officer Who Points Out How Easy Would BE for the Nppones
to Take the Philippines and Draw Our Navy the Far East for Battle

TO Take the PhAipp1
IN HERE are SO many overwhelm-
ing reasons why America and
Japan should continue on their
present terms Of cordial friendship.
that any discussion ~ to which
would prevail in a hypothetical war
between them can have IN academic
interest only. 1t does have an
academic interest, however. and fur
thermors. It supplies the best method
for bringing out some Of the most
important factors in ths~situatiop.
AZ to tho relative ornaments OF
the two nations 1t IL we'll known that
the Japanese army IL tremendously
superior to ours in the numbers OF
officers and men in the regular
service and In the essentials Of &C
tual preparedness.
1t is also we'll known that our navy
is superior, at present to the japanese
in tho number and size Of its ships
and guns: but there seems to be
some ground for thinking that the
Japanese navy may be at least equal
to ours in efficiency from the tact
that Congress- has refused the ap-
preparations necessary to provide our
navy with aircraft. and from the
further fact that the japanese army
IL supposed to bs the most efficient
in the world. and that there u no
reason for thinking that the Jap.
aness navy Il less efficient than the
japanese army.
WOULD BE HARD no
LAND JAPANESE ARMIES.
But even II we should grant that
the japanese army II immsasurably
superior to ours, and that the Jap.
aness navy II equal to ours. We can
ses at . glance that her army could
not operate successfully in the
United States. unless 1t could DO
actually landed there: and that It
could not b landed there, unless
her navy could first secure the COM
mand of the sea and of tho air near
the point of landing.
We can also see that the japanese
navy would operate, on our coast
against our navy at such an enor-
nous disadvantage. because Of its
great distance from home bases, that
II could not possibly secure COM
mand of the sea and the air. except
in the highly improbable contin-
gsncy of possessing some new
weapons that we know not Of.
We may. however. dismiss the
idea that the japanese would even
attempt to send, IN expedition to
attack a place 1000 miles from their
home; because. by simply captur-
ing the Philippine Islands, they
could force US to send out an expe-
dition 1000 miles from our home,
to recapturs- them.
I first became familiar with the
difficulties Of recapturins them.
when I was a member Of tho gen
sral board Of tho navy. and head
Of the committee on war plans. That
was In 1910 and 1911. In 1913, 1914.
and 1915. became much moro a.
miliar with them when was aide
for operations. or. a. II u now
called. chief Of naval operations. .
position analogous to that Of chief
Of staff Of Vhs army.
MANY DIFFICULTIES LOOM
IN SUPPLYING FLEETS.
The difficulties were mainly log
istical:" that Is the difficulties were
mainly those connected with keeping
the fleet supplied with the necessary
coal. oil and other things Of daily
need. while on the way out and
after they had arrived
We were able to prepare . fairiy
good logistical plan, though an sx.
ceedingly expensive one. for getting
tho feet out. Tho main difficulties
WOE0 III securing y BukAiCicuk Huiu-
Der of golfers and oil carriers Of the
necessary speed and capacity to as
sure tho receipt BY tho feet OF SUI
noient fuel. and ensure the ability
OF the golfers and oil carriers
themselves 70 make the trip out and
back.
But, further than this. W could
prepare no plans whatever; because
no human mind could foresee what
would happen to the fleet. after It
had reached the vicinity Of the
Philippines. All We could sec with
our mental eyes was a fleet of
United States naval chips and aux
iliaries. rolling from side to side in
tho ocean somewhere near the
Philippine Island. all dressed UP
and no place to go"
HOSTILE SUBMARINES
WOULD MENACE. INVADERS.
Where could they go?. The Phil