The Brattleboro daily reformer. (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1913-1955, 1921-12-01
BY DAVID LAWRENCE.
Especial Dispatch to The Reformer.
Copyright 1921.

Copyright 1921
WASHINGTON, Dec. Though has
transpired within the last 4S hours to
warrant positive prediction that an
agreement will be reached within another
week on the program for a reduction of
naval armament and a naval shipbuild
ing holiday.
No longer is there worry about the out
come, prolonged as the debate may be
For the truth is the japanese hand has,
been disclosed. 1t is the hand of Old
World diplomacy which rarely accepts
lnything right off the bat, but considers it
carefully, asks for more, appears to be
deeply insistent on more concessions and
inally, with the gesture of generosity, re-
cedes in the interest of common agree
ment. .@F .s#t#
For several days TIE views of Baron
Hato. minister of marine. have been put in
one form or another, giving the impress
sion that Japan was adama mt in her de-
sire for higher ratio than the so-called
5-5-3. Now comes Prince Tokugawa. the
head Of the delegation, and in a talk with
newspaper men lays stress on the fact
shat Baron hato was expressing his per
sonal views.
Japan Cannot Stand Alone.
This, however, isn't the only basis for
the idea that Japan Is prepared To make
good her original acceptance of Secretary
Hughes program. There are other signs
beneath the surface which lead to the
conclusion that Japan has decided she can
not be responsible for the breaking up of
naval armament agreement which the
| whole world hailed so auSpiciously after
he opening session. Japan knows, in.
pther words, that Great Britain is. ready
| % accept and viii do so, and that even
France will not bubble over the subma-
inc tonnage figures but Will at the
psychological moment withdraw her re-
luest for modification. In the face of a
European and American entente, Japan
'annoI afford to stand alone She knows
he dangers which might eiIsue from too
| treat fnsistence on her own viewpoint.
She knows, for instance, that Secretary
| Hughes is not in bargaining mood and
| that II Japan means to alter the existing
strength of the American and Japanese
| navy there win be no naval holiday and
| 10 reduction of armament.
Very Fair to Japan.
The American delegation feels that tho
laval experts who have worked out the
altos of existing strength as between the
Japanese and American navy know What
hey are talking about and that if the
ruth We're acknowledged the ratio Of
I-J-3 is much more generous than a strict
Interpretation of existing strength really
'alls for. Feeling that way il is not sur
| DrisiHg that the Americans viii not coun-
enance n 10-10-7 ratio.
The conference is having its ups and
towns, its eyaSperating DELAYS and dis
engagements but. relatively speaking.
hey are infiniteSimal compared to the
multiplicity of differences which devpl-
lped at the Paris conference And the
Progress being made here. slow as il may
'eem 70 those anxious for quick results, Is
| 'apidity itself compared to tile Paris pro-
| sedure. ..-~
The most surprising thing aboat the
| Whole conference thus far is the fact that
Ear Eastern questions are being disposed
Il more quickly than most Far Eastern
| Experts ever dreamed. Perhaps this is
| BECAUSE the conference started ONT with
| tetinite principls and is simply trying to
| tpply them TO specific cases Perhaps ii is
BECAUSE Japan herself is not so much of
IN obstacle to agreement as some peonie
bought she would be. After all. X is
much more to the interest of Japan that
II agreement should be reached on Far
| Eastern questions than it is to any other
| lower here except possibly China For
| t Is evident to the Japanese that they
| an accomplish little by direct negJtia-
| ions with the Chinese because of the lat
| -ers dlstrust of everything japanese
Can't Dispose of All Questions.
/ Whatever Is settled there. therefore, is
90 much gained in the cause of Far East
| AEn peace. Many Of the questions on the
| program will of course not be disposed of
Washington but viii be left to some
| tribunal to decide. Yet start will be
| made on all of them. From the beginning
1 the attitude of Japan has been the KEY to
| The words success or failure" at this
| conference, but the Japanese have given
l evidence in more ways than. one TINT they
| viii not take the responsibility before rhe
| world of breaking up Of the Washington
| conference and placing themselves i'm a
| position OF moral isolation which would
L )e permanently injurious to Japanese
| plans for expansion. All agreements
reached are compromise and the Amer can
| government thought it would save time
| oy putting out a compromise at the first
| ;esSion. The Hughes naval program is
| not natiOnalistic but is worked out on a
lasls that is felt to be fair for all nations.
| that's why there will be no recessions
| The Japanese and British are fully ex-
! peeted to announce their complete accept