New-York tribune., 1921-11-20


standard Of production as best they
could, but hid their crops. Whereupon
the Soviet authorities established their
system of espionage through the So
called committees Of the poor, and the
policy of forced requisition of food.
Realizing that their crops would be
taken from them, the peasants ceased
to produce any moro than was neces-
sary to meet their personal needs. The
Bolsheviki soon discovered their pre-
dicament. In June, 1919, Lenine told
the Soviet Congress in Moscow that
it was necessary to make peace with
the peasants, and abolish the commit
tees Of the poor. They were abolished,
but 1t was too late. The destruction of
the mir and the organizations Of the
masses and the consequent peasant
opposition to Bolshevik rule are the
real cause of starvation In Russia
But whatever the cause, one thing is
obvious: 1t cannot be true that Russia
is starving and is at the same time
able to meet the shortage Of food in
western Europe.
Then why, it will be asked, have the
Allied statesmen until very recently
used Russia's mythical stores of pro-
vision as an argument for the lifting
of the blockade? Because the En-
tente statesmen could not explain to
their constituents that the real reason
for the blockade--the danger of Boil
shevik epidemic in Europe-had dis
appeared, and that the Allied nations
were getting ready for the revival of
commerce. The continuance Of the
blockade was fast becoming an absurd
| ity, it was beginning to affect their
own interests. They are by this time
convinced that the Soviet autocracy
| has derived aid and comfort from the
| blockade, inasmuch as it has been in
strumental in beguiling the Russian
people and diverting its attention from
the real issuc-Bolshevik incompe-
tence. Finding that under present
conditions the lifting Of the blockade
would serve their own national inter-
ests and aid the people Of Russia in
its struggle with Bolshevism, the En-
tente statesmen have decided upon it's
removal. But in order to satisfy pub
lie opinion, which might interpret the
move as a concession to Bolshevism,
Allied Craftsmanship had so long as it
was possible concealed the issue by
bringing forward the worlds need of
Russias supplies. Hence the much
advertised quantities Of food in starv-
ing Russia.
But whatever dictated the various
changes in Entente policy toward
Russia hitherto present conditions de-
mand definite and honest position.
This is the crucial moment when the
Allied statesmen have it in their
power to make either friend OF
enemy of the Russian people. To sat-
isfy any nations ambitions by con-
ceding the general scheme for the
dismemberment Of Russia might be
profitable as an immediate expedient,
but it will not elicit the good will
OF the Russian people. The disinte-
grafton of Russia, even If it were pos
sible Of accomplishment, would be at
tended by very serious dangers to the
peace Of Europe. For it is one thing
to tear q nation apart and quite an
other to keep it apart. Tho history of
Poland itself proves the futility of
such undertaking. If Poland, after
centuries Of obliteration, could rise
again what possibility is there of de-
stroying nation like Russia? "The
Russian soil is made for unity; nowhere
| do we find so vast an area so thor
oughly homogeneous" This was the
judgment Of Leroy Beaulieu a genera
tion ago. The truth Of Leroy Beau
lieu's observation must be apparent to
every one with . knowledge of Russian
conditions. Russia is homogeneous,
and if divided can only be kept apart
by continuous turmoil such as rends
| her now.
| 1t is inconceivable that the Entente
nations should desire to prolong the
present misery in Russia. For the
sake Of peace of Europe and the En-
tente's own good the Allies must re-
tain the friendship Of the Russian ma
ticn and not force an alliance between
Russia and Germany and possibly
Japan. Aladdin's lamp Is at present in
the possession Of Allied statesmanship
in Washington and they can wish for
either united, democratic, friendly
Russia or make of hyg the instrument
! tor future wars and slntold misery.