New-York tribune., 1921-12-02
He Contends That When This
Naval Outpost Is Mem
toned 'Nigger' Will Come
Out of Pacific sWoodpile'
offers Two Explanations
Discusses Probability of Feel
ing in Nippon Causing Up
set in Conference Hopes
BY Frank II. Simonds

from the start what was the real fac
in the strategy of the Pacific" Thi,
comment from one of the delegate.
representing European nation at tn,
conference fairly we'll summarizes on,
current view of the present deadlock
over the naval ratios, which is the out
standing circumstance of the confer
ence at the present hour.
There are, OF course, two explana
tions OF the Japanese attitude. Th,
simpler is based upon the assumption
that the Japanese actually mean wha
they say and are conducting an oper
offensive TO retain or obtain a create,
proportlonate strength for their feet
Those who hold this view mainta;r
that we are seeing the hand of thu
naval and military group who contro
Japanese policy and are stalking nj
upon the present issue.
Enc second explanation. more in.
volved, but also more commonly ac
cepted, is that the naval demonstration
masks the real objective and that thi.
real objective is either single and d.
rected toward obtaining the eIim;no
ton OF existing fortifications and the
promise not to build again on Guam OF
oouoie. and includes with the (,,1an
proposition the insurance of Japaness
position in Manchuria.
A Single Menace"
OF course. from the Japanese nava
point OF view, Guam is the single
menace. Unless our position there is
transformed and we construct a frs
class naval base, we can neither defsnl
the Philippines nor strike at Japan II
case OF war. Without the Guam bass
we are powerless west of the Hawaiiar
Islands Guam is the true key to the
Pacific situation and the real pricf
Japan might demand for accepting on,
hgures as to naval ratios.
FOR our naval men, at least. Guam is
me niger in the woodpilc," althoupI
me Manchurian issue, which 7 shall
dwell upon presently, has its lmpor
sance
Whether or not we accept the ars1
explanation gwen, it is plain .hai
there is ste adily mounting danger
iaat, Whatever the intention originally
me Japanese contention over the nava
ratio may easily become serious. Ever,
one remembers the. case of Fiunoe q,
the Paris conference. Az the outse,
Italian claims, based upon the Treaty
OF London. were not taken very ser,-
ausly-especially By Americans But ar
intense domestic propaganda in Italy
so reused Italian national senti,nen;
that when Mr.. Wilson appealed over
eriando's head, Italy responded with 8
passionate revolt against the American
nosition which totally transformed the
situation.
Now it is clear that it will take yer,
Attle to invest the naval issue with g
patriotic character in Japan and make
the issue in Washington one between
America and Japan, make it appear E
dispute in which national prestige i.
involved In that case a recession by
Japan becomes almost unthinkable anc
the consequences must be grave in the
extreme.
National Honor"
Moreover, it is plain that every day
That this debate continues increases the
danger that Japanese popular ano
patriotic sentiment will be enlisted
Thus it might be wholly possible tina;
. position originally taken for trading
purposes would become position which
national honor required should be held
Therefore deiay-every hour and every
day Of delay-in settling this question
adds to the danger and diminishes the
chance that settlement can be reached
BY Japanese surrender based upof
any Japanese bargain elsewhere.
Nov. as to the second explanation
Japan yesterday showed quite clearl.
that she would concede nothing of i'm
portance in Manchuria and was dis
posed TO dispute Shantung sharply. al
though by contrast she was willing tt
weld materially in the case of ,Chin'
proper and of Siberia But, pending ,
favorable settlement in the Far East
what would be more natural than tina
she would hold fast to her naval con
tentions as her basis for bargaining?
OF course, the truth is that th'
Japanese policy is based upon th'
realization that failure of the Wash
ington conference would be a disaste
for all the Western nations, to who
she owes nothing, and might prove ;
serious factor in the next American
election. Three years ago Japan sue
cessfully blackmailed President Wilson
into the Shantung concession after thu
German delegates had set out for Yer
sailes and the whole Paris edifce O
peace was at stake.
Power to Produce Failure
What then is more natural than tina
Japan should again follow her forme
tactics? Success or failure at Wash
ington turns upon the arrival or non
arrival at agreement upon naval limi
tation and upon naval holiday. Japa'
has the power to produce failure. Sh,
also wants something-the elimination
Of Guam. She may, too, want furthe
assurances as to her position in Man
churia. Therefore let those who re
quire Japanese assent to their program
pa in the coin Japan needs.
You sum the thing up pretty &c
curately when you say that the Unitet
States needs success for its Wash
ington conference; the British desir,
to help visibly to such success, and
finally, success or failure hangs upo,
the decision of Japan. If Japan breaks
this is automatic. But Japan has n,
direct interest in the success of tn,
gathering-her interest is in what sh,
can make in this marketplacc of tn,
world.
But obviously. even if Japan only
put up the naval quibble for tradins
purposes, she cannot long maintain il
without having to stand by her con
tentlon to maintain her prestige. Thi.
Is the danger. Therefore every sign
and portent points to decision. rea
decision, within three days, with tht
obvious certainty that all delay spell.
danger. We have, in fact, reached thu
supreme crisis of the Washington con