New-York tribune., 1921-02-20
ITlstsa Likely
.ToBe Ireland's 5
Peace Maker
acceptance of Partition Act
Is Expected to Bring Sinn
Feiners Into More Recep-
i've, Conciliatory Mood
Farley Probable Soon
demand Republican Army
Surrender Arms One of
Chief Barriers to Truce
E,o,, Tbs TrIeuue's Europson Bureaa

4 nuBLIN, Feb. 12.-The opinion Is
x4d.ly held here that, bad as are the
.,..nects for an Irish settlement in
a. immediate future, they will be de-
.Issdly brighter few weeks or two
months hence.
} rtis felt that the making Of settle
nsn. involves, first Of all, a truce.
yobody in Ireland disputes that nego-
II estiops cannot be begun in an atmos-
II ,b,re charged with the passion on
rBjch outrage and refusal feed and
breed. The final agreement between
England and Ireland must follow this
truce.
II truce at the present moment seems
unlikely. The British government has
laid down two conditions, neither of
which Sim Fein is at all likely to ac-
esps One is that the Irish Republican
II Army should surrender its arms. To
II his demand the leaders OF militant
II Sim Fein reply that they cannot call
H apon their followers to make such q
II surrender without reciprocal guaran-
/ lies against q forcible violation of a
h truce, to Ireland's disadvantage. The
II utmost concession that they are will
II ing to offer would take the form of an
II assurance that arms, if retained, would
II rot be used during the period Of the
II truce, and perhaps that they should
be surrendered at the conclusion of q
4 fnal settlement.
DISAGREE Over Amuastv
A similar argument from the Sim
Fein point Of view applies to the Brit
ISL governments refusal to grant an
amnesty TO certain much wanted mem
h bers of Dali Eireann. Here the Sim
Fem case is in the first place that an
amnesty is not wanted for one side
\ alone, since the outrages of extrem-
ists have been matched by the excesses g
Of Crown forces; and, in the next place,
H that the militant members of the Dali
TO whom the government refuses to
accord safe-conduct are precisely those
4 members whose authority is needed
\ 70 enforce the terms of any truce ar
anged.
Illogical as it may seem-but Ireland
is land of paradoxes-the prosnects
Of settlement are brighter than those
Of truce. One post-dates them two
or three months because by that time
the government of Ireland act will
have been brought into operation. The
act Is going to lead to a remarkable
situation. Chief Secretary Green.
wood's confidence notwithstanding
here is not the smallest likelihood
that Sim Fein will work the act and
elect the southern Parliament unless
be for the purpose of redeclaring
the Irish republic-or that any other
party will try TO bring that Parliament
INTO existence. On the other hand,
lnlonlst Ulster has accepted the act
md IS making active preparations to
'et the northern Parliament working.
1cept taat the traditional positions
are reTersec. the question Of Irish
-ll-Sovernnent seems at first sight ro
Lave advanced no nearer toward g final
answer. How is this topsy-turvy sit
4atlon going to help matters?
Ulster May Repair B;under
The act may lead to final settle
nent in very different way from any
hing which its authors had in view.
The fact of its acceptance by Unionist
Il Ulster must repair automatically the
i 0lunder in political tactics which was
H made by the leaders of the former Ma
aona!ist party and continued by the
| leaders, Of the Sim Fein party who
H succeeded them. listers old position
h was that If it could it would prevent
h nome rule for any part of Ireland; or
mat 1t would make its own terms for
\ accepting 1t. The Nationalists re-
Il piea: Down with Ulster. Ulster has
h 10 rights" when all the time they
III ar-fo o.aAf a
\ 1SIe NgIe settlement they must give the
h ulster Unionlsts special rights and
H safeguards. This conflict of battle
yt Lles. largely fictitious led to what
II I1samen call partition" as q term to
H 1pfess what is TO them detestable
\ ,aaiag-that is. cutting off a part of
4 I@tef from the rest of Ireland and
H Gy,hg !. separate treatment
h D9s listers position is now made
Il so sAso and secure, and cannot be modi-
/ he'd except by listers own free viii.
| oS'er Is thus relieved of any fear of
Il coercion. 1t has intrenched itself in a
h soatmandlng tactical position which
L ssOmpels Nationalist Ireland at last to
"sa' the Ulster problem seriously.
h North Still Unsatisfied
h Ulster, though secure, is by no means
h SaHaned 1t never wanted partition
n lAsept as weapon wherewith to kill
a,;a asae rule and now that it has its par
II ;.Iuh ;.in the more it sees of it the less
II ,.Aes IT. It's most far-seeing leaders
H t.Ts sgS very well that Ireland is essen
II s,h! I':! sn economic unit which cannot
SSslarliy be cut into parts without
II Iraage TO that productive past which
II n. o 70 large extent on the credit OF
h s otner. Moreover, in one of it's
II ;ssss s;, cities, Derry, and in two Of its
II Is ~ rrs9uhues, Tyrone and Fermanagh, II
II Jsr W against the very awkward prob
v,a,;s. ,% y an irredentist population which
fN.'sses a. naturally toward the rest
=" ,mnssOnalist Ireland.
Il snoaer user - still less satisfied with the
f Nm 's&i clauses Of the act, which sets
f ls,.s sa extravagant system involving
T NO expenditure for which there is
II nssquate provision while control OF
II An u' Is retained at Westminster
Il fos. umonlst Ulster realizes that, after
Il conrs.. more months of violence and
Il viii utVioience in the South, England
= sasio.ae TO make settlement with
! reSvaaiist Ireland in which far more
II disvus disnas financial terms will be an in
q ss.psasable fact. Ulster will want to
y 0N. G tne benefit of those terms.
i inS s ioresees, then, a situation aris.
II lsSa ~ which representatives of Eng.
\ ksIs,SS SSnionist Ulster and Nationalist
I. an Will sit down quietly round 8
a ~ 80 and work out a EnaI saf&Iarrcp;