The New York herald., 1921-05-08

States might presently react against ap-
parent aid to Germany given by the State
Department. Mr.. Hughes determined to risk
all these dangers with the firm conviction
that his real feelings would not in the end
/be mistaken and the end sought was worth
the risk
AS to the French point of view the Adj
ministration was less clear. II recognized
that on the surface of things France APP
peared united in the determination to have
done with German evasion. bad faith. down.
right dishonesty that France meant TO seize
upon the default of May ] as warrant for
occupation of the Ruhr and the acquisition
of guarantees of a material sort, which
might insure German compliance, but at the
least would provide France with some meas
ure of reparation, whereas, up to date, none
had been obtained.
But one is bound TO mote that there eX-
listed in the State Department under Presi-
dent Harding there had in the American
delegation which went to Paris under Presi
dent Wilson. a suspicion that under the sur
face there were elements in France which
opposed military action and would be glad
to see the reparations. affair settled without
appeal to Foch. ! do not think / eXaggerate
when / say that the Administration placed
considerable reliance upon such information
and despite outward appearances doubted
the domination of Poincare and believed that
BRAND would be glad to be saved,by Ameri-
can intervention. The point is capital
Easier to Anaiyze Grear Britain
Because of Material Interests
Finally, what of Great Britain? Here the
State Department was on firmer ground. 1t
recognized that Great Britain was anxious
to avoid any military action. 1t perceived
that there was great opposition to such
action in many political circles in the United
Kingdom and that in addition, there were
obvious selfish and material interests which
made II only natural that the British should
not wish to the French seated in the
Ruhr and masters of the best coal deposits
of Europe.
But Lloyd George had passed his word to
Briand in London. Moreover. Lloyd George
was aware that if BRAND yielded on this
question he might fall and be succeeded by
Poincare. And with Poincare military action
would be inevitable and Great Britain would
be compelled to choose between seeing
France act alone, thus losing all influence
ara power of restraint and rather abjectly
following the French lead. Would not Great
Britain, then, welcome an American gesture
which would have it's effect in restraining
France and, at the same time measurably
absolve Lloyd George from his promise to
BRAND?
In sum, the Administration tabled upon
the assumption that the reparations problem
was one which belonged in the domain OF
economics and had been consistently be-
devilled by political complications. 1t be-
heved that the political conditions were such
that the Germans could not even if thew had
wished to do 1t, make direct proposition to
their European foes which would be ac
ceptable. because of the domestic political
situation in Germany, but that under Ameri-
can influence Simons and his associates
might be able to make such a proposal. Con-
vinced that aid from the United States wouId
De obtainable only if she went 10 the limit
OIL possibility, perhaps Germany might
come through with an offer which might
serve as the basis of fresh discussions
AS to the French, the Administration
peueved that BRAND could face Foch and
Polncare, could take a high stand against
military action, provided it was disclosed
mat such action would offend the United
states, when through the United States
Germany had made a proposal which was
worthy of consideration. The State Depart
ment thought that ii detected two elements
IN French opinion one which demanded pay
nent or punishment, a second which was
not Interested IN payment but sought
through punishment to put Germany our
Oh the running for a generation or two at
the least II hoped to strengthen the hands
OF the former and block the course OF the
latter.
Secretary Hughes's Note Did Nor