Atlanta tri-weekly journal. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1920-19??, 1921-09-13
First Battle of the Marine

TT is interesting to read the comment or
rather the recrimination with which
German war commentators and former
Field Generals of the Teutons are regal
ing the people of that still unhappy land
over the causes which led to the crushing
defeat of their armies early in the war when
they had hammered their way almost to the
gates of Paris. Each of the three leaders
involved In the debacle blames the others
for strategic errors which enabled Foch and
Maunoury and DEsperey to administer a
crushing defeat, throw back the whole bat
tie line and sta1emate the struggle until the
fresh units of the United States were thrown
into the fray to win decisive victory.
Hansen on the right, Kluck in the center
and Bulow on the left, all under the COM
mand of Moltke, planned to cross the Marne
widen the gap in allied ranks, roll half OF
the French forces up against the Swiss bor-
der, the other half toward the English chan
mel and enter Paris before Christmas. That
they failed is consolation enough for the al
lied nations today, but 1t is still probable
that from the mass of literature being print
ed on that great defeat Of the former En-
peror's forces there may come to light the
real cause of the failure, which was the
turning point in the war.
KIuck's army holding the center advanced
more rapidly than did that of Bulow and
Hansen, opposed by D'Esperey and Foch. He
crossed the Marine and marched nearly two
days before the phantom army Of Joffre,
led by Maunoury, fell upon his flanks and
almost cut him to pieces. In the meantime
he had transferred two army corps to Bulow
to enable him to Withstand increasing press
ure on his left He was caught with his
hoo fo Mari a isolated
recalled his men from Bulow to save the
remnants of his dwindling forces and this
created wide gap between the two Ger
man armies through which the British pour
ed steadily if not swiftly enough to accom-
plish the humiliation of the three armies
engaged there.
Moltke it seems, was not apprised of act
ual conditions and did not fully appreciate
the plight of his men until they had fallen
back and re-established themselves along
the Aisne, at which time the German war Of
fee announced that the move was strategic
and merely to reform their lines. Moltke,
son of the great general of the Prussian
campaign of 1870, attributed the defeat
later to the lack of liaison and to the
further fact that the Kaiser had withdrawn
two hundred thousand men from the west
ern front to meet the Russian hordes, a
danger probably more imaginary than real.
For this reasonable utterance, the German
General soon retired in disgrace to a post OF
minor Importance in the interior, while
Kluck, himself wounded in the battle, was
retired from his active command, only Blu
low staying in the fight in more than minor
role until the armistice.
All of these deposed men who figured
prominently in Germany's Gettysburg are
writing memoirs. Bulow says Kluck was to
blame for pushing too far ahead and Kluck
says Bulow was to blame for retreating too
precipitately when a slight advance would
have enabled him to have held the great
gains he had made to the nearest point to
Paris the Germans ever reached.
In the meantime it is being intimated that
Hindenburg's book will criticise the ALL
Highest War Lord for not taking the advice
of his military advisers and pushing a pom
derous right wing for the channel ports,
which undoubtedly would have gained Ger
many better peace than the one she OBJ
tanned by throwing military strategy to the
winds and driving straight for Paris 'To
eat that Christmas dinner"