The Birmingham age-herald., 1921-05-07

THE BIRMINGHAM AGI | are called problems" and on February 10 l addressed this letter to the gen eral board:
 "February 10, 1917. "To The General Board,
 subject: Solution of Problem.
 q The department desires the gen eral board to consider the following problem and submit its solution as soon as practicable:
 PROBLEM "General Situation-Condition as at present except that war with Germany is declared.
 special situation--The allies do no; desire our battleship force at present.
 "Required-Naval estimate of the situation;
 -'First. as to the grand strategy de rnanded by the situations.
 Second. as to disposition of battle ship force.
 Third, as to the method of assisting in maintaining communications with Europe, including scheme for coop eration with allies.
 "Fourth. as to the methods of driv ing submarines from the sea. Assume Mobilization of all naval { vessels and possibility of mobilizing merchant vessels as required,
 'JOSEPHUS DANIELS"
 The board made a careful study Of ! the whole situation, and a week later i made report covering all the mat | ters set forth. and sent 1t to me. with i the following note of transmittal; pROPTEM IS SOLVED
 General Board, Navy Department, washington, February 17, 1917. "To: Secretary of the Navy,
 Subject: Solution of Problem, Black.
 "Reference (a) Navy Department Confidential Letter of February 10, | 1917.
 the general board submits herewith problem and solution based upon the general and special situations describ- ed in the navy departments instruc- l tions. CHARLES J. BADGER"
 Such care was taken to keep this document from anyone except the sec retary and the office of naval opera tions that even the general board re- tained no duplicate of it. After being submitted to me for approval, it was turned over to the chief of naval op-
 
 proved were in their custody. They were familiar with their provisions and drafted the necessary orders for carrying them into effect. But plans were so carefully safeguarded that only those directly concerned were all lowed to see them.
 And yet in spite of all our precau- tions, the document containing the general boards Solution of Problem. 1 Black" was gone!
 l The most thorough search failed to l find any trace of it.
 ! How long had 1t been missing? No one could answer.
 NOT STOLEN BY GERMAN SPY 1 The newspapers hinted that it had been stolen by some German spy Such was the obvious suspicion. The sug- gestion that 1t might have been stolen by some German spy was given nn | credence in the department. Nothing is so carefully guarded as war plans. and so far as we know the Germans never got hold of any of ours, although early in the war number of things ! occurred which made us wonder how, much they did know. For example: | Movements of vessels and orders re- lating thereto were known only to the few officials in the navy department who issued the orders and to the men on the vessels. Great pains were taken to prevent the Germans from learning about the first destroyers sent over They sailed under sealed orders, and until he was 50 miles at l sea and broke the seal, not even the commander of the flotilla knew it's l destination.
 Yet the day before the division ar rived, German submarines, for the l first time in months, sowed mines all 1 across the entrance to Queenstown. and the German papers printed the news of our destroyers' arrival before it was published in England or America. | The latter is more easily accounted for, as it was several days before we announced that they had reached 8 1 British port, but the mine laying led many to- believe that the enemy had in some way, learned they were com l ing.
 When our first troop convoys went to Europe they were attacked far out at sea, and Admiral Sims cabled that it was practically certain that the enemy knew positions of the first rendezvous and accordingly sent submarine to in- tercept before junction with destroyers. !" l Though Sims afterward discounted the idea that the conveys were attacked, he was excited enough about it at the time. l for he sent me two cablegrams about it in three days. l GERMANS "DOPED IT OUT" l But whatever the Germans might have learned about our ship movements on the other side, I am confident that they did not get any information from this side 1 of the Atlantic. The navy had control of all radio. every cable message was scanned and even the destroyer and transport captains did not know their | a inn oI f sea. My own opinion is that the Ger mans, who knew of General Pershing arrival in England, which occurred the day after our first conveys sailed, in ferred that troops were being dispatched and merely "doped out the probable