Grand Forks herald. [volume] (Grand Forks, N.D.) 1916-1955, 1921-12-21

wEDNEsDAY EVENING. 81, 1921.
THE SUBMARINE N WAR.
From the opening of the arms conference the
British delegation has taken a strong position i'll
favor Of the abolition Of the submarine as an in
stru'nehtality of war. In the plan submitted by
Secretary Hughes, neither submarines nor air
planes were included nor was mention made of the
use Of poison gas, another subject which is one of
intense interest, and upon which there will prob"
ably be extended discussions. Two reasons for the
omission Of these particular items existed. One
was that there was a common understanding that
the primary object to be attained was the limita-
ton of naval strength and major vessels Of war. The
other vast the difficulty, and in fact, the impossible
iW, Of applying to these items rules as definite as
those which could be made concerning major yes
sells. and Of having from the outset, the assurance
that those rules would be observed even against the
inclination Of the contracting parties. Battleships
are immense structures which cannot be built sec
retly. They require large and weli-equipped ship
yards which can exist only at certain places, the
locality Of which is well known. and whenever a ma
ton begins the construction OF a battleship every
other nation is necessarily aware of that. fact. Sub
marines could be constructed by the hundreds in
almost perfect secrecy should any nation desire to
embark upon that enterprise.
AS to the %propriety or the possibility of elm
mating the submarine from warfare there is a good
deal of doubt. 1t is stated in press dispatches that
while the British delegates are prepared to continue
their arguments in favor OF the total elimination of
the submarine they do not expect that this will be
done. What they do hope for, is to secure the
adoption of very rigid rules with reference to the
use Of this weapon, and to limit as much as may be
the tonnage Of each nation in this form.
There has always been an open question as to
whether Or ~ il 4; possible to use the submarine
in war M manner consistent with the ordinary
considerations Of humanity and at the same time in
such a manner as to make it sufficiently effective to
warrant its use. The submarine, no matter how
well constructed, and some of the latter ones have
been large and comparatively heavy, is necessarily
a trail craft as compared with the surface vessel.
The problem. of balancing its weight and the weight
u Its contents against the weight of the water
which 1t dlsplaces is one requiring exceedingly del
lcate adjustments, and it is essential that in the con-
%struction, every pound Of weight possible shall be
saved. and the time will probably never come when
submarines will vie in strength with the ordinary
ocean craft. For this reason, the submarine when
visible is exceedingly vulnerable, and it is almost as
vulnerable when out of sight provided its position
ran be ascerta1ned. In order to destroy one OF
charge of high explosive exploded within a short
distance OF a submarine is capable Of injuring and
ven OF destroying the craft because of the shock
communicated through the water. 1t is necessary,
therefore, for the submarine when on the offensive,
10 act quickly. Its torpedo must be dispatched al
most on the instant and the submarine itself must
disappear, or a shot will put it out OF commission.
The ordinary vessel has an opportunity to deter
mine with some degree of certainty the character OF
me craft which 1t assails before making its attack,
ana III this way, there is no need for it to attack
passenger vessels or other vessels out of the war
like class.
In the late war, the Germans set the example
and followed it Of attacking unfortunately every
tlhiing which carried an allied flag. The sinking Of
The Lusltanla with its hundreds Of passengers was
absolutely without excuse. 1t was an act Of de-
liberation planned for some time in advance, and
carried out with devilish effectiveness. The Ger
4 mans did not in that case make the excuse that
their commander was unable to distinguish the
character Of the ship. He knew it we'll, for the
Lusitania was the ship for which he had been living
III wait. But IN many other cases, the excuse was
offered that it was impossible to ascertain with GER
ttainty Just what the character of the attacked ship
on Al allied craft on pain of going to the bottom
Under the alleged necessity which the Germans
said governed their actions.
me difficulty did and does exist. The Ger
mans disposed Ct i BY attacking everything in
women and children. Allied writers maintain that
the only proper course in such cases was for the
Sserfnahs 70 abstain from attacking provided that
tney did not know that the vessel which they were
attacsking was a vessel OF war. This, Of course, is
lpe only humane attitude to take, but to adopt it
means the very decided limitation of the effective
nessst the submarine. Whether with these l;r1i-
tatigHss observed the submarine may still Be ehec.
Iive enough g warrant its use on a considerable
sea- sM ~ sone 81 tne knotty problems Of naval war
The prospect seems to be that an attempt viii
pe. inads to limit both the number and size of the
Submarines and to provide iii i more definite form
tssti. nov exists rules for their use IN warfare.
1pubtless something may BE accomplished IS this
ffhe. but fhe possibility sof secret Construction ii
SSttbfnarine&@of any size remains, and We nave Ala
ths stact that III the late war, one nation did see 81
AL sbsndc1 xhs consideration of humanity ana NJ
.sss 3ss ssbnsarisss promiseuously ID spite of AZ