New-York tribune., 1921-05-01


Wilson rs we'll as Clemenceau. since
he holds that they all co6perated ably
and sincerely and, guided by the same
high vision, differed only as to methods
end details.
But since the French believe that
Lloyd George and Wilson deprived
them Of the military protection agas~st
Germany which they need and denied
them the sanctions on which the an
forcement Of the treaty depends, this
broadening Of the authors functions
as an apologist often embarrasses him.
He giosses over the effects of Wilson'S
snsagonism to French policy. But in
Lloyd Georges case he finds scape-
goat in J. NJ. Keynes, whom he excori-
atcs as malignant backstairs adviser,
poisoning the mind of an impression
able chief.
Let US see how nj. Tardieu meets the
various criticisms of the Council of
Three and it's work. Two Of these con-
Germ its methods. The first is the
secrecy which enshroudcd the operation
Of the Big Three and the censorship on
news and comment concerning them.
The author regrets both these blunders
and says Clemenceau was in no way
responsible for them.
Lloyd George and Wilson supposed
secrecy. M. Tardieu discloses that as
early as January 15, 1919, President
Wilson, although representing = coun-
try in which censorship had been
abolished Immediately following the
axmistice, asks that the French censor
ship should be exercised not only over
ths French newspapers, but also over
dispatches sent to foreign newspapers"
The other criticism Of methods con-
cerned the failure Of the conference to
draft quickly q provisional peace set
tlemept on broad lines, leaving details
to be worked out in permanent treaty.
M. Tardieu says that Mr.. Wilson in
sisted on single treaty. But, as Mr..
Lansing has shown, this was only after
the President had discovered that he
couldn't withhold q provisional draft
containing the League Of Nations cove
nant from the Senate on the ground
that it was merely y modus vivendi.
The vital French objections to the
treaty are that 1t didn't secure the
Rhine barrier which Foch asked for
and which Clemenceau himself was long
anxious to secure.
British and American opposition led
the French delegates to trade the Rhine
barrier for insurance treaties with
Great Britain and the United States.
These tresties were hardly worth the
paper they were written on. Gle
mencesu or Tardieu could easily have
found that out by consulting Mr.. Ian
sing, who wrote the French-American
draft, much against his will, OF any
other well-informed American.
Tardieu makes the claim that the
French obtained in the Versaillea
treaty concessions intended to discount
the failure Of the insurance conven-
tions. French opinion, however, doesn't I
see it that way. The primary object of
French policy should have been to sup
port Foch's contentious to the end, for
most Frenchmen realize now that mill
tary security is more essential to
France than even money reparation
from Germany.
| On rcparations France took an I. O.
U. with an uncertain total, the process
Of collecting which involved risks run
ming far into the future. Clemenceau
and Klots were largely responsible for
this, for they fought against an imme-
diate lump sum determination. The evil
consequences Of this policy soon be-
came apparent. The reimbursement
which France expected has been
steadily shrinking. She has been
obliged to reckon from month to month
with the changing policies Of other AL
lied governments and with German
obstruction. She may even have to 60
alone to Berlin and Munich to collect
her dues.
NJ. Tardieu says that France has SUI
fered solely from the non-execution Of
the treaty. He blames the Millerand
and BRAND governments for not en-
forcing it. But how could they enforce
| it, hampered as they nave been with q
legacy which compels them to negotiate
new settlements all the time as the
orientation Of other Allied governments
changes? France and Great Britain
drifted far apart in 1920. German ar
rogance has brought them nearer to-
gether again. But there is no assurance
in the treaty Of efficient Joint Allied
action over long series of years.
Clemenceau tnougnt he had cast ap
anchor to windward by helping to es-
tablish = League Of Nations. That an
Choir is now useless to France. M. Tar
dieu mildly upbraids the United States
Senate for not ratifyihg the covenant,
yet his long stay here should have
made him familiar enough with Ameri-
can conditions to distrust the repre-
sentative character Of Mr.. Wilson's
activities 1T Paris.
France doesn't greatly regret the
failure Of the League. But it has
right to complain Of too easy accept
ance by the French delegates Of q
leadership in the conference which wss
destined to make the treaty unaccept-
able to the United States.