New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1921-07-24


20 send many soldiers across the sea.
INC Allies did not expect it nor desire
u. The expectation on both sides was
That our unrivalled industrial efficiency
would enable us to overwhelm tho foo
ana to win the victory through the
plomptness and the immensely of our
output of the machinery of war-ships.
alfpianes, rifles, artillery ammunition
and what not. These things, with a
comparatively small army would IL
was confidently believed assure a
speedy victory. Nor would that con-
fdence have been misplaced, if onlv
She expectation had been realized. Had
CUR industrial efficiency been what the
Allies supposed there would have been
no need Of more than small part of
tscse 100000 men going beyond the
sea. But it was observed that very
early in the war-after our entrance
the Allies changed their tone and be-
gan urging our sending Of men as the
supreme necessity; men, more men and
yet more men,
American on the Brink
Why was this change? The Allies
had sent their commissioners hither
and these had been disillusioned. They
he'd discovered what we, in fools
paradise, had ignored-all save "a few
clear-visioned souls, who were
straightway censured and punished for
telling the truth. They saw that for
three years America had stood upon
the brink of war, in constant danger
CO falling in and with practical GER
tainty of eventually falling in, and yet
mad not made the first move toward
providing herself with the machinery
that could save her if she fell in"
There had been no lack of warning.
Tbs President himself had been telling
his audiences again and again that the
world was on fire, the sparks falling
everywhere, and no one could tell
where the next blaze might not be
kindled. against that contingency it
would have been only common sense
* prepare" Yet we did not prepare.
"Instead of the attitude OF prudence
witch We might have expected we find
ar official Indifference that is not to
be explained" A single concrete eX-
ample: The first two years of the
var. before we enteredit, demonstrated
above all other things the Importance
oe aviation as a means Of war. Yet
we entered the war "almost as igno
liant OF the science of military aviation
as any tribe of South Sea Islanders"
So il came to pass that after we had
actually entered the war by declaration
il was necessary for us to have an in
dustrial revolution in the United States
before we could begin to fight That
revolution was effected The story OF
our transformation Of the arts of peace
into the arts OF war, Of our figuratively
beating plowshares into swords and
pruning hooks into spears, is one of the
most splendid and most impressive
in all our annals of high achievement,
and it is told in these volumes with un-
surpassed auth GRITTY, with encycloped c
detail, with generous appreciation and
with justifiaplc exuitation in the ulti-
mate success attained.
Guns Begin to Arrive
Yet that revolution was won only
after t-breaking struggles with
Official obstruction and delay. Another
example: Three weeks after the dec
la ration of war machine gun tests
began. IN ten days the board of army
experts unanimously agreed that the
Browning gun was in advance of any
thing the world knew, both in It's
effectiveness as weapon and in its
adaptability to rapid production" 1t
sent two of its members post haste to
the Secretary of War at Washington
with that report in order thai the
Ordnance Bureau might begin produc-
ton without an hours unnecessary
delay. The sequel came week or two
later in letter from the War Depart
ment saying in effect: Don't be in a
hurry. DON'T get excited. Go shoot
the gun some more" So it was four OF
l
five months later before the making OF
the guns in quantity really began, and
the result was that our first troops
abroad had to use obsolete guns fur
nished from the cast-off stock of the
Allies, who had at first looked to us te
provide arms not only for our owl
men. but also for their armies. This
sample incident is repeated here, no
because it is new, but because wher
the story was exploited at the time il
was largely attributed to partisan ant
nersonal animosity, while in this work
in form more severe than ever be
fore. il is free from even the least sus
melon of such a bias. And this, as
the authors declare, is by no means ar
isolated example. We all remember
that Senator Chamberlain in the midst
of such doings declared that "the mill
4arv establishment has almost stopped
functioning," and that the Presiden
retorted that his statement was "ar
astonishing and absolutely unjustitiabl'
= stortion of the truth" But here th'
bich Government official who of all mei
was perhaps best situated to know thu
facts demonstrates that Ill respect t.