Indiana daily times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1914-1922, 1921-05-03
BY JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Former Secretary Of the Navy.
ARTICLE 10.

Former Secretary of the Navy.
ARTICLE 19.
After every war one can look back
and see that somewhere there was
lack of foresight, somewhere there
was wanting vision translated into
action, somewhere there was failure
to grasp a new and daring plan
which might have turned defeat into
victory or have hastened the day OF
peace.
When one reflects upon the zeal,
courage and success Of the British
navy in freeing the seven seas from
German traffic, one is filed with ad-
miration for its spirit and achieve
ments. But it made mistakes, as we,
and all the other navies, did.
Over on this side Of the ocean what
was our chief naval error?
It was that we lacked the foresight IN
1876. largely because We did not have
the information which was kept from
neutrals, to concentrate upon the build
ing OF destroyers to the exclusion OF
larger ships. To be sure, we were util-
izing before the United States entered
the war every available facility for the
building Of destroyers.
MORE DEsTROYERs
WERE NEEDED.
The great three-year program pro-
posed by me in 1915 and voted by Con-
gress in 1915 embraced fifty destroyers
- rr,a- II
with sixteen capital ships and ten scout
cruisers.
Looking back upon that program, It
is clear now, taking advantage Of what
we learned during the war, that II would
have been wiser to have delayed con
tracing for so many capital ships, and
built hundreds OF destroyers, the craft
most effective against submarines. Our
ship construction program during the
war included approximately a thousand
vessels. This in addition to the 1,54T
ships converted for naval purposes.
There was no delay in pressing work
on destroyers. Immediately after Con-
gress authorized the three year program,
contracts were made for the twenty au-
thorlzed the first year, as well as fo-
twenty-seven submarines, four battle
ships, four battle cruisers and other yes
sells. In March, 1917, before we entered
the war. as soon as funds were avail
able, twenty-four more were ordered; ad-
ditionaI orders were given as rapidly
as the contracts could be placed and by
the middle Of October we were building
or had contracted for 27O.
ALL RECORDS
WE'RE BROKEN
Millions had 10 be spent for new IA
ciliies 20 build them-enlargement Of
old shipyards, building Of giant new
plants It was 4 great job, but we broke
all records in rapid construction when
we struck our gait. The House Naval
Committee, after thorough investigation,
said in its report made March 4. 1918:
When 1t came to building additional
destroyers, especially those Of the large
program, 1t was found that the ship
building facilities Of the country were
fully absorbed with the vessels then un-
der construction and 1t would be neces-
sary to create new facilities. The plans
adopted required more than doubling the
capacity available last summer for build
ing destroyers, and that capacity was
materially greater than before the war.
In spite Of speed in construction, these
vessels are not being snghted in work
manship or appliances"
EXPERTS DIDN'T
SEE IT.
Looking back, wished every day dur
ing the war that when we began the big
naval expansion, in 1915, we had asked
Congress for the money to build 300 de
stroyers at that time. By concentration
IN 1856 we would brave had most of
them ready in the first months of the
war. II is a fact, however, that no naval
expert and nobody in Congress suggested
emitting the capital ships and pushing
the big destroyer program we began IN
the stress Of war.
Across the seas what was the great
naval error Of our alliesl
Some Of the ablest writer's declare that
IL was the tactics of Admiral JellicOe at
the battle Of Jutland.
The admiral had written a most inter
esting bOoE undertaking to show that his
method of fighting the battle was right,
when all the conditions are considered.
The admiral is a brave and learned Of
fcer, and a gentleman of charm and real
stuff, but he made the mistake Of his life
hyhen he wrote his story of the grand
feet.
CONFESSION AND
AVOIDANCE"
read it on my way TO Europe in
March, 1919. and began it with a feel
ing that Admiral JellicOe had been
harshly and unjustly treated by the crit
les. But, when I had read the last chap
ter, my feeling was the same as that of
q distinguished Britisher whom l met a
few weeks later and who said to me:
For his own reputation Jellicoe ought
not 70 have written that book. At the
best It is a plea of confession and avoid
anee."
The basis for this opinion lies in the
fact that the admiral charges his failure
to win a decisive victory to the super
iorfty Of the Germans in certain material
(and to the low visibility that pre-
vailed; whereas the admiralty had told
the world that In this very material Great
Britain excelled all other natiOns-and
JellicOe had directed it's material di-
vision.
Commander Bellairs, NJ. P, may be too
severe in his criticism of Admiral Jelli-
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