Norwich bulletin., 1921-12-15

The premier said the introduction Of | amendments 10 the treaty would Und6u'bt- | edly wreck the agreemnt, and that unless the question of cntering into the agree ment was seriously chall' nse1 it wou- q b. a waste of the time of the house to enter ] into a defense of it.
 MT. Lloyd Ge-rge said there were
 many peculiarly Irish difficulties. Ire lands geographica l strategic position
 was analogous to that of no other do minion. Every other dominion had it's
 war debt and pensions, he added, and if ! that had nvt been Geal with the Irish | alone would have come out of the war un- taxed.
 He said was there also the difficulty
 arising from deeply-rooted rahsious ani- mosities exaggerated that fears 1 had to be dealt with as facts. He said
 one f the greatest uestions was the pre- l liminary position of North Ireland which had wrecked every proposed settlement
 before the present one.
 ] With reference o t'1e question of al,egi- | ance to the crown. whi w~s quest oned
 in the house, he said he would reply fu 1 later. contenting himssll snoN with the
 statement that there had ben conoletc
 acceptance oi allegiance to the British
 crown, acceptance of membership la the | empire and acce-tance of common citi zenship. Alluding to the question Of do- minion status. MT. Lr-yd George declared l if full and complete dominion status had been conferred Ireland would have had power to raise any army or navy she lik- ed. and he instanced the fact that Sco- | land during the war raise 70O,0gO m'n How could Great Britain have puIsied policy cf disarmament at home and abroad if Ireland had been thus able to raise possibly half million men, he ask ed.
 That was an international objection
 Besides, If Ireland had been entitleI
 raise large forces northern Ireland wculC have been driven to initiate the south in it's own protection. It was under such lmenacing circumstances that conflict were likely to arise, and it was desir-
 able in the interests of the empire, the
 world and Ireland itself that there should be limitation At the same time tt was 1 impossible to leave the government r. | sponsible for law and order without
 certain number of armed f2rces, and the limit was sa+ rot heyord what was need
 ed for this purpose.
 In justifymg the naval provisions Of the
 treaty, the premier argued that the eX-
 Derience of the late war had shown how
 vital Ireland was to the security of the
 United Kingdom Therefore, he ctn-
 tended, it was impossible to allow an or
 dinary dominion status to operate, al though he agreed that Ireland would nev- . CT be likely to raise a formidable fleet The provisions of the treaty however. do no mean that we do not contemplate tha' , Ireland should not later take her share in
 the defence O. these isles and her co1ss by defending it and helping to defend
 ours" he continued 'We should wei
 ] 4t- 9,,,-t V7r1TT yr-al-
 come the cooperation of the dominons Maintaining that the government had stood by it's pleCge not 10 coerce Ulster p the prime minister explained that that - had not preciuded them from trying f l persuade Ulster to enter a nall-Ireland P parliament The Ulster leaders them selves had often spoken of the unity of r Ireland as the ultimate ideal. The gov
 ernment would not have hcon iuetified ir i breaking the conference up by refusing Q discuss an aIl-Ireand parliament. l Abiding to Listers opinion on the re Q tentfon of her existing status with z f change in the boundaries, he asserted that e Ulster desired to set up a model govern ment and as an undoubted majority o the people of two of the northern coun Q ties would prefer to be with their south - ern neighbors, Ulster would have trouble
 at her own doors, which would complicat'
 the whole of her machinery.
 The boundary commission, he pointed @ out would consist of a representative O
 the northern government. one from tn
 Irish Free State and a chairman alp
 pointed by the British government, anc
 he added. I've shall ta'-n care to secur v the voice of the ablest men we can get. ~ Dealing with the me hods of rutting tn s | agreement into o0nrat'o7 ho said ther 4 were two ways of dealing with the n. ,+ essary interregnum-th first, a statu - quo, which would be undesirable. There ,a fore 1t was proposed that a provisiona To government be established until such tim
 as a responsible government could be ar
 ranged, when the crown forces wou
 be withdrawn.
 le Replying to criticisms that the agree .. ment was a surrender the prime minis y ter asked was 1t to be considered that n 'e rebellion could be settled by pacif E. means.
 10 If the terms are good" he continued 's -are we never to negotiate with rebels 'u Tn the present case who else oo"ld " have negotiated with?"
 ln The commons were the last authority Id the world to maintain that argument, be h. cause they owed their greatest rights an h. privileges to concessions made to sueces IS sive rebellions. The most ruthless rc h' precision of an Irish instruction, declal
 cd the premier, was effected by t7 II greatest English rebel h history, leadfl 'n an army of rebels on behalf of a reb, at government to crush Irishmen who ha 9i rallied to their legitimate sovereign. nc There were difficulties In connectio
 with the rebellion in Ireland, which whe F onacame to disentangle them, 1t would | r. better not to too much about The san at ,av7fe 1uytth ord to ar settlement with Canada, and the bill wa " called the rebels reward bf1l but he brought talf million valiant men to tr
 aid of Great Brita n fin her greatest stru, he gle.
 e Therefore" exclaimed MT. Lloy e. George, T did not shrink from this se ci tlement,"
 on Peplying to a suggestion that the se 'n tlernent might have been made ye, 'L' ago, he argued at length that state sn nHnslip consisted not merely in the wi