New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1921-09-06
The Limitations Conference
British Comment the Washington Preliminary
Negotiations Crucial
(From Tho London T;mes)

The British government have &C.
cepted the formal invitation to the
Washington Disarmament Conference,
and it may be presumed that the prep
arations for the conference are now
we'll under way. We have urged from
the outset that the success of the con-
ference would depend upon the result
of the necessary preliminary conversa-
tons upon the main points at issue. A
satisfactory understanding in regard to
the Pacific questions which constitute
rivalry in naval ornaments is the sole
guaranty that will prevent the con-
ference at Washington from ending in
failure
There are difficulties in this question,
1t is true, and in a certain sense these
difficulties are crucial. Just as the
present condition of Russia is the chief
barrier to the establishment of real
peace in Europe, so the present cofidi-
ton of China is the most disturbing
factor of the situation in the Pacific.
To the existence Of important British
commercial interests in China the
Chinese Minister, Dr., Wellington Koo,
referred in his interesting speech to
Chinese students at Swanwick on Sat-
urday. But British interests in China
are not only commercial. They are
bound up with the great political in
terests of the British Dcminions in the
Pacific, and they are an important fac
tor in our relations both with Japan
ond with America. Yet up to the
present, except in so far as we have
supported the policy of the open door,
We have not developed reasoned and
wholly consistent policy in regard to
China. In view Of the Washington
conference it is incumbent upon as to
do so now. We have to define our ut.
tituds in regard to the views on China
rut forward by Japan on the one side
and the United States on the other.
a British Chino Policy
AS an ally of Japan and close
friend of the United States, Great
Britain is in particularly favorable
position to express view that may
serve as wise and fruitful COM.
promise. And this is of all moments
the most opportune for formulating
a thoroughly considered British view
in regard to the international status
of China. The question of Shantung,
we should consider, is chiefly a ques-
ton Of the moderate Interpretation Of
the. Treaty OF Versailles. The question
of those special interests" of Japan
in China which were referred to in
the Lansing-Ishii agreement could also,
we think. be interpreted in a sense
that would not infringe on the prin-
cinle of the open door or of the equal
interest Of ali the powers in the in
tegfity and the prosperity of China.
Japan, as China's near neighbor and as
participation in her culture, obviously
has a special interest in China, par
ticularly in Manchuria, and if this in
terest is developed along economic
lines and without any purpose Of
military domination it may result in
great benefit to China, to Japan her.
self and to all the powers for whom
the reconstruction, the prosperity and
the independence of China are matters
OF serious concern. Along these lines
the share of Great Britain in the prep
arations for the Washington confer
ence may be very profitable.
For US this is question of imperial
Importance. 1t possesses a special in
terest for our dominions in the Pacific,
and we are glad that Mr.. Hughes, tho
Prime Minister Of Australia. has ~