The New York herald., 1921-12-23

snip OF merchant VeSSelS only, pTONlutu
the surface craft does not sink These
ships. but these merchant vessels for
the most part remain In service; they
are not destroyed. The world does not
lose them. The object OF war on com
merce is not to destroy shipping, but to
deprive the enemy OF its use.
Submarine warfare on commerce, II
unlimited in character. Injuries the
enemy and greatly Injuries the world as
well. The world is so highly organized
and so dependent on ocean transporta-
ton that shipping is essential to liveli-
hood--without 1t vast populations would
starve.
"At present when war breaks out
belligerent vessels tend to transfer to
neutral flags and also TO fly false flags.
This hampers lawful warfare by sub
marines as, owing to their great diff
Guilty in making the proper visit and
search. it is thus impossible for them
TO prevent belligerent commerce from
going forward.
Results of U-Boat War.
THE net results of unlimited sub
marine warfare in the world war were
(a) Flagrant violations of international
law; (b) Destruction c. an enormous
amount Of wealth; (c) Unnecessary
loss of many innocent lives. and (d) To
draw into the war many neutrals.
Unlimited submarine warfare should
be ontlawed. Laws should be drawn UP
prescribing the methods of procedure of
submarines against merchant vessels.
both neutral and be.ligerent. These
rules should accord with the rules OBJ
served by surface craft. Laws should
also be made which prohibit the use of
false flags and offensive arming of mer-
chant vessels
The use Of false flags has already
ceased in land warfare. No one can
prevent an enemy from running
amuck,' but Immediately he does he
outlaws himself and invites sure defeat
by bringing down the wrath of the
world upon his head. If the submarine
is required to operate under the same
rule as combatant surface vessels no
objection can be raised as to its use
against merchant vessels. The individ-
ual captains of submarines are no more
likely to violate instructions from their
Government upon this point than are
captains of any other type of ship act
ing Independently.
Submarines Against Combatant Ships
Against enemy men of war the SUBJ
marine may be likened to the advance
guard on land which hides in tree o.
uses underbrush to conceal itself If
the infantry in its advance encounters
an ambuscade il suffers greatly. even
II 1t Is not totally annihilated. How
ever. an ambuscade is entirely legiti
mate. In the same fashion submarine
strikes the advancing enemy from con-
cealment and no nation cries out against
this form of attack as Illegal. It's navy
simply becomes more vigilant, moves
faster and uses its surface scouts to
protect itself.
Well Adapted for Mine Laying.
"The submarine carries the same
weapons as surface vessels. i. e. :or-
pedoes. mines and guns. There IS no
prohibition OF their use on surface Graf.
and there can be none on subma rines.
Submarines are particularly well adapted
to use mines and torpedoes. They can
approach to the desired spot without
being seen, lay their mines or discharer
their torpedoes and make their escape.
THE best defense against them Is
eternal vigilance and high speed. This
causes added fatigue to the personnel
and greater wear to the machinery. The
continual menace of submarines in the
vicinity may so wear down a feet that
when ii meets the enemy IL will he so
exhausted as to make its defeat a simple
matter.
"The submarine as a man-of-war has
very vital part to play. 1t mas come
to stay. II may strike without warming
against combatant vessels. as surface
ships may do also. but II must be re-.
CURED TO observe the prescribed rules os
surface craft when opposing merchant
men as at other times
| The submarine as scout-As
scout the submarine has great possbili-
ties. IT Is the one type OF vessel y BILE TO
proceed unsupported into distant enemy
| waters and maintain itself to observe
and report enemy movements. At pres
ent it's principal handicaps are poor
habitability and lack OF radio power to
transmit its information.
However, these may be overcome in
some degree in the future. Here, again,
the submarine has come to stay. It has
great value. a legitimate use, and no ma
ton can decry its employment in this
fashion"
u. $. Proposal Is Put In.
Then followed a statement of the pro-
posal of the United States for limitation
of naval armament so far as submarines
are concerned, as made at the opening
| session Of the conference.
The report then continued: "a nation
possessing great merchant marine. pro-
| tected by strong surface navy, quite
naturally does not desire the added
threat of submarine warfare brought
against it. This Is particularly the case
II that nation gains it's livelihood through
| overseas commerce. II the surface navy
of such a nation were required TO leave
Its home waters. it would be greatly to
its advantage IL the submarine threat
were removed.
This could be accomplished by limit
| Ing the size of the submarine so that IL
would be restricted to defensive opera
| ton In its own home waters. On the
other hand. IL nation has not large
merchant marine but is dependent upon
seaborne commerce from territory close
aboard 1t would be necessary to carry
war to her.
1T would be very natural for that ma
ton to desire large submarine force
to protect the approaches on the sea to
attack troop transports, supply ships,
&C., OF the enemy. Control OF the sur
face of the sea only by the attacking
| power would not eliminate IL from con-
slant exposure and loss by submarine
attacks.
Submarfnes' Aid TO 4. 8.
The United States would never de-
sire its navy to undertake unlimited
/ 4. IL.