New-York tribune., 1921-11-30

would be, to say the least, somewhat
surprising. There Is apparently no
mystery about the matter. for any one
can obtain verification In the usuAl
books Of reference.
In the year 1892 when tho right to
replace obsolete ships comes into force
it would appear that Britain would be
allowed to lay about twelve keels for
vessels of the largest size and the
latest type. But the United States
would only he allowed to lay four keels.
build batslcship, this would mean
that in the year 1884 Britain would
have or might have twelve bAttlcships
OF the latest type to four such battle
ships owned by the United States--a
superiority in that year Of to /.
1t is perfectly true that in later
years the United States would be al
lowed to lay down keels which would
equalize matters by about the year
1910, but II the schedule continued
permanently there would arise in the
year 1852 exactly the same situation
as IN the year 1882, and once more in
1854 Britain's superiority in ships of
the largest type might be to /.
Twenty-Year Cycles Fixed
In other words, the naval schedule,
as announced, would result in cycles of
twenty years, at one period of which
there would be recurrent superiority
for Britain in vessels of the latest type.
1t is, perhaps, proof of diplomatic
good faith that this fact, of which ap-
parently there is no doubt, has been ar
rived at by British experts and at once
communicated with the utmost frank
ness to the other powers interested in
the limitation Of naval ornaments.
The Britain attitude is clear and ex-
plicit. For hundred years the Brit
ish navy has been far larger than the
American navy. Not once in that long
period has the British navy abused its
margin Of strength against the United
ish navy, as at Manila Bay, hes been
reckoned among the reserve forces be-
hind American diplomacy. A superior
tonnage for Britain in years to come
would be no moro a menace to the
United States than it has been IN years
past But the position Of Britain to-
day is that she does not want a navy
thus superior in effective tonnage to the
United States Navy. The standard that
Britain desires is the one power stand
ard--that is. equality with the United
States in any years of any decade. 1t
may be said that Britain would never
be so foolish as to build twelve battle
ships at once--that ten years hence
she might be wise enough to build no
hattleships at all. That may be likely
assumption, but what the conference
has to examine is a schedule of possi-
bilities. And in the view of many Brit
ish experts the scheduled as announced
might lay Great Britain under a sus-
picion of seeking a sudden excess of
naval strength.
Confidence of United States Vital
Confidence between herself and the
United States is worth more to Eng
land than any technical superiority at
a given moment on the high seas. 1t
is thus considered to be advisable to
suggest with great respect that the
Great Britain eartily-indeed, whole
heartedly- approves, should be so safe
guarded as to prevent periodic spasms
of feverish naval construction in any
country which may be a party to the
schedules. Sp
After all, you cannot discuss limi-
tation of naval armaments unless you
are ready also to discuss what is to
happen to dockyards. If a country may
have to face the possibility of laying
down twelve battleships all at once, it
follows that this country will be tempt
ed to maintain dockyards capable of
building twelve battleships all at once.
We might see dockyards maintained
for years in idleness on the chance that
they might come in useful at the criti-
cal moment in the cycle of twenty
years: In these circumstances the
question arises whether the naval holi-
day can be so defined as to permit the
continuous building Of not more than
onA battleship year by Great Britain
and the United States, with two battle.
ships in three years by Japan. This
would enable the three governments to
maintain only that limited capacity Of
construction in their dockyards.