The Washington herald., 1921-11-08
BY FRANK H. sIMoNDs.

BY FRANK H. sIMoNDs.
A T the moment OF the convoca-
n ton of the conference for the
u limitation Of armaments 1t
seems to me that the strongest reason
for legitimate optimism must be found
in the sentiment recently expressed to
me by the British Ambassador. He
said. II refuse to consider the possi-
bility Of failure because the conse-
quences of such failure would be so
appalling to the whole world"
This. after all. is the reason why,
when one has canvassed the great OBJ
stacles in the way Of achievement, one
must come back to faith in success
based on the appreciation Of the world
situation at this hour:
War the Alternative.
The failure Of the Washington con-
ference means war between the United
States and Japan. From this patent
truth there Is no escape and, given the
world situation. given the revelations
that the last war supplied Of what
modern war means to victor and van
quished alike. there can be few Ameri-
cans who believe that any difference
over abstract principles or over purely
material interests could supply war
rant for such a catastrophe. More
over. since the ruin incident to such
a war could not be limited to the
United States and Japan, the conflict
might easily prove the ruin Of our
civilization.
Now the central fact in the sit
uation is to be found in the posi-
ton which Japen has already nc
cupied in the Far East. II tho
United States is not prepared to
make substantial recognition of this
position, especially in Manchu-ia, no
solution is possible. From the Jap
anese point of view the paramount
necessity of Japan is assured access
to necessary raw materials, and this
assured access means no more ana
no less than the recognition that
in Manchuria, whatever the legal or
diplomatic fiction, Japan is and
must, in fact, remain as absolute
as France in Morocco.
Want No Divorce Scandal.
The second prerequisite to success
is the recognition on the part or
the United States that while the
alliance is unpopu-
lar in Great Britain and distrusted
in Japan, it is with the British a
point of honor not to denounce 1t.
unless some form of Anglo-Ameri-
can-Japanese association in China
is formed to replace it. To put the
thing badly. the British are pen
fectly willing to arrive at an
amicable separation from their Jap
anese ally, but are resolved not TO
be dragged through the publicity of
a divorce court at the behest Of a
third party, even If that third power
is the United States.
American diplomacy, which, in the
present instance means Mr.. Hughes,
primarily, will have to recognize at
the outset, as Mr.. Wilson failed to
recognize at. Paris, that, however
admirable and sound are abstract
principles, when nations sit around
the green table it is facts which
must be recognized. Nearly 100
years ago, when Canning was in
conversation with Russia over ques-
tions of principle with respect to
Greece, the Russian representative
made this significant comment: I'VE
are invited" wrote Nesselrode. Ito.
sanction a principle. We ask that
there be a recognition of the con-
sequences of this principle" Today
both Great Britain and Japan are
inviting Mr.. Hughes attention to
the consequences of the principles
which he has invoked.
Two Things to BE Done.
We must do two things, then.
First. in seeking to limit for the
future any extension of special
privileges in the Far East, which
means China, by every nation. we
must recognize largely and gener-
ously the special position which
Japan has acquired in Manchuria,
position Japan will never surrender
save after defeat in war Secondly.
we must recognize that the Anglo.
Japanese alliance, which ought to
be dissolved, whose dissolution the
British desire and the Japanese
hardly oppose, can only be achieved
by an agreement to substitute some
form of fAnglo-American-Japanese
association to assist China.
In the last analysis, the Washing
ton conference represents, aside
from the limitation of armaments
detail, a desire on the part of the
United States to establish certain
principles in the Far East. So far
il is on all fours with American
proposals at the Paris conference
save that Asia and not Europe is
concerned, But Enthusiastically the
United States has more Immediately
considerable interests at issue in the
Far East than in Europe and is di-
rectly threatened with war IL these
interests and similar interests OF
Japan are not reconciled.
. Our Policy to Thwart Japan.
. The grayest danger in the sftua-
tion lies in the fact that, precisely
as was the case in Great Britain
before 1914 with respect to Ger
many, there is now in the United
States, so far as Japan fs concerned,
no real appreciation of the exact
truth. However much disguised by
=