The Brattleboro daily reformer. (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1913-1955, 1921-12-29
In DAVID LAWRENCE.

Especial Despatch to The Reformer.)
Copyright 1921.
WASHINGTON. Dee. 29.-Shal the.
submarine, which wrought such havoc in
the European war. be the means of
wrecking the concord of the major pow
ers at the Washington conference? -..
For days the nations gathered here
have wrestled with the question in vain,
Some delegates despair Of any settlement
of the matter at this conference and sug
gcSt a new meeting of more nations to
discuss submarines. Others insist that
patience win achieve an agreement. -
The trouble lies chiefly in the abandon
ment of the formula. used NJ the outset,
namely, agreeing on principle that
should govern naval strength before
discussing each kind of craft. If Mr..
Z Hughes had not insisted on applying that
idea to the question of battieShipS. the
conference would have been unable To
each any agreement on larger craft either.
Mr.. Hughes declared that national needs
! was too vague and indefinite a rule to
apply and that existing strength could
alone be used by trying to effect compro-
. mise OF national viewpoints.
There is still another principle, namely.
r. the relationship of the submarine and the
. light cruiser to the battleship a tech
already mad plenty OF ratios determining
now many submarines. deStroyerS, crulS-
e ers and auxiliary crafts should be proper
toned to each battieship fleet
When England Lest.
But Great Britain started out by in
Sisting that all submarines be abolished.
America refused to accept that viewpoint.
So did France and Japan. Much argu-
ment was used aS to the defensive value
l.1sl
upon national needs again. The cOnfU-
sion of these two principles led the pow
ers further and further astray until Mr..
Hughes again tried compromise by pro
posing definite ratios of submarines ton
mage. France opposes on the ground oI
national needs.
When the history of this conference
comes to be written it will be found that
b the failure of the American proposals AT
the outset To include definite ratios for
auxiliary craft had a. much to do with
the prolougation of the conference and
possibly its last minute failures a. any
other factor. by contrast the initiative
Of the American delegation in establishing
definite ratios for the battleShipS stands
out a. proof OF what might have been
done if the program had been all inclu-
~iVe
The British don't want any submarines
built. but would agree to 10000 tons. On
the other hand, talk of poStpOuiug the
issue until another and larger conference
could be called in which smaller nations
would be included has only served to ac-
centuate the British view that if no agree
ment is reached they must be permitted
to build submarines without limit. In a
race between Great BRIT, ana France.
the latter would be hopeleSSly behind as
neither the funds nor the materials are
available for extensive submarine pro
grams. America, too. would be at liberty
to build countless numbers of submarines.
Not Entirely Hopeless.
While today tie submarine situation
looks hopeless, it really need not be re
garded in that light for the pressure of
the British and Americans can be applied
in such fashion as to compel an agreement
in the end. But if the ratio of Subma-
rIneS cannot be settled. it also upsets all
calculation on other auxiliary craft. No
nation Will be content to build limited
number of light cruisers and destroyers
& if, on the other hand, the submarine is
unlimited. For the late war has shown
that deStrOyers and light cruisers are the
real weapons with which the submarine
can be fought effectively and the British
spokesman say plainly that if there is no
! limit on the cruisers that can be built or
/ their size il will not be long before the
cruiser cncrOaches in tonnage on the CAPT
tai ships and endangcrs the value of the
capital ship agreement
/ The French with characteristic skill in
! diplomacy now withdraw their conditions
/ in connection with the capital ship ratio
and accept the figures set forth irrespec-
| tive of whether there is an agreement or
/ disagreement on submarines and auXil-
/ iary craft. This looks to further bar
! gaining on auxiliaries.
! Temporarily the submarine issue is
shelyed in the hope that comprehensive
/ agreements can be made on the number
and size of other auxiliary craft, but the
conference VIII hardly confess failure on
! the submarine issue until the ratios That
j shall apply to every other kind of aux
iliary craft are extensively discussed.