The New York herald., 1921-08-21

has been dissolved after the peace treaty
Of Versailles. Consequently there are
no lists of the men who are to be taken
into consideration. 1t is uncertain
whether an appeal for volunteers would
have any satisfactory result. But even
IL one were 10 succeed In getting num-
ber OF men together Germany would
have no arms to equip such a force. All
appliances of the German industry to
produce weapons have been done away
with. The officers OF the old German
army are discharged and have taken up
other professions. The STATS are dis
solved.
Whilst In peace times under very IA
vorable general conditions the prepara-
tions for the mobilization OF an existing
| and we'll organized army took months
OF time II would be necessary now to
| form an army first and mobilize 1t at
the same time. Even II the Entente in
the face OF imminent danger were to
furnish arms. ammunition, requisites OF
war and .victuals for a new German
army. even then months at least would
be needed to get II ready. It must
| therefore, be taken into consiredaion
that the formation of a new German
army TO fight against Bolshevism cannot
be begun and realized in time. Apart
from this ii is aggravating that public
| opinion in Germany has not yet been
enlightened enough about the unavoid-
able necessity of a struggle with the
Bolshevism
| The defensive war against Bolshevism
| is difficult and it's success for any length
or time uncertain. The Bolsheviki do
not first attack bodies of troops who
stand opposite them in the defensive. In
the forces that stand opposite the Bob
shevih feelings og being uselessly ex-
posed TO the hardships of a campaign
arise and, what is more. their morals
viii suffer by continual inactivity But
II the strategic defensive against Boil
| shevist troops is partly led In tatically
oHensive way by single attacks, the sol
diers OF the Red Army generally retreat
before such attacks into positions fur
ther back without offering much resist
ance such single attacks come to a stop
quite automatically The force which
fights against the Bolsheviki cannot see
any use in this activity They get i'll
humored and susceptible of Bolshevist
propaganda.
While troops who stand opposite the
Bolshevild in the defensive often lose
great deal Of their inner value. the iBol-
sheviki on tho contrary under the press
ure OF an iron discipline are able to per-
severe for very long time. The splendid
| system OF espionage of the Soviet Gov
ernment within the Red Army has up 10
| now always prevented an effective coun-
ter propaganda among the troops of the,
Red Army. But If once the morals Of
the troops in the defensive are shaken,
then the Bolsheviki on their side pro-
/ ceed to the military offensive which in
most cases has brought about the final
success of the Soviet Government. An
army who knows only little about the
actual character of Bolshevisn is nat
urally more exposed to the Bolshevist
propaganda than one who knows the ef-
fect of Bolshevism for a longer space Of
time Anyway. experience has shown
that troops that faced Bolshevism for a
| longer time We're often decomposed un-
der the impression of Bolshevist delu-
sions and have rapidly broken down un-
der military ofensives of the Red
| armies.
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