Indiana daily times., 1921-05-02
BY JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Former Secretary Of the Navy


Copyright, 1921. by John f. Ollie.
Copyright by National Newspaper SerV-
Ice Copyright In Great Britain, Canada
and throughout France. All rights re-
served including translation into foreign
languages, including the Scandinavian.
Unauthorized reprinting for any purpose
forbidden.
''Why don't you send Admiral
Mayo and the powerful Atlantic
feet into the war zope?" men asked
me during the war-statesmen, naval
officers, civilians.
Men still ask me why didn't send
Mayo and his dreadnaughts to the
North Sea.
Probably the man who was most
interested IN the answer to this Ques-
ton was Admiral Mayo himself.
He wanted to go. He wanted a chance
70 meet the Germans. He could think
Of all sorts Of arguments why he, should
be allowed TO take his feet and lie in
wait for the enemy somewhere in the
North Sea, and every time he thought of
new one, he offered 1t.
Il was a question upon which there
Nv own first inclination was to dis
patch our whole fleet. except a few yes
sells necessary for coast patrol, to wa
ters where the chance for a fight was
more promising than on this side Of
ths ocean.
BLOCKED BY
LoGISTICS.
But against this inclination. and in an
gxer to Admiral 8Iayo's persuasion arose
a very definite and substantial argu-
ment-
"Logistics"
The naval and military readers will
the force OF the argument. Possibly
my civilian readers may be a little puz-
zled. It is reasonable enough to suppose
that the word "logistics" refers TO logic,
and SO to some weII-considered strategy
or tactics. Commonly it does have ref
erence TO logic. and. in its particular use
by naval experts, to what might be
termed the logic Of hard facts.
Before defining It further, and showing
its application to the problems we are
considering let me tell little story sug
gested to me by this mention Of logic.
A prominent and influential man was
one day trying to persuade President
Wilson that a certain proposition he had
made was right and wise and even i'm
perative. When he found that he was
falling he summed up his effort in the
emphatic declaration:
But, Mr.. President 1t is the logic, the
inexorable logic, OF the situation"
Yes" said the President, that would
be all right except for one thing"
What is that?" asked the man in
deadly earnest. His sense Of humor was
unhappny deficient.
NO SUCH THING
AS LOGIC.
The President smiled, and then said
quietly, but conclusively:
There is no such thing as logic"
And the President was right in the
particular instance under discussion.
There must be no such thing as logic If
logic is to be an obstacle to doing the
big and brave and daring thing in a time
Of emergency, or to doing the common
sense, practical thing.
But there are hard facts, and these
hard facts constituted the logistics OF
the Navy-such facts as had to do with
oil and coal and beef and bread and
supplies Of every kind.
An army "goes on its belly" q navy
on its logistics. They both mean the
same thing. The Navy term is more ele-
CANT, If less understandable.
In 1917 we did send over a division OF
powerful battleships under command Of
Admiral Rodman, which served with the
British grand fleet to the end Of the war
and the surrender of the German fleet.
Their splendid service won the admira-
tion of their British comrades, but these
battIeships were coal burners and did
not interfere with logistics as the send
ing of the entire fleet would have done.
Our main reason, then, for refraining
from sending the whole of the Atlantic
fleet to the North Sea was because the
allied powers and the operating depart
ment of the American Navy agreed that
the utilization Of the tonnage it would
require in order to keep it supplied with
oil and coal and food was not Justified
by any chance there might be for
sudden sally of the German fleet. 1t was
very difficult to supply fuel oil enough
for the British fleet. Our destroyers and
our biggest battleships were oil burners
To send them over would have added to
the fuel problem.
TONNAGE THE
GREAT NEED.
Tonnage was in those critical days
desperately needed for the transportation
of troops and of supplies to sustain and
munitiOn the troops. Everything else
that could be spared had to be sacrificed
TO this supreme need. The allied armies
and navies were dependent upon provi-
sions which we must send. To have sent
any considerable part of the Atlantic
feet overseas would have meant depict
ing the scant enough tonnage available
for the forces already in the war zone.
This. it was thought, would be unwise.
Logistics kept he feet at home during
the first months of the war, but there
was another thought in mind also when
it was suggested that We send over all
our vessels. This was no selfish consid-
Grafton. 1t grew out OF the feeling that
if through any accident in fog or storm
German battleships or battle cruisers
should evade the vigilance of the British
feet and make thafr v-av info tba Atlantic