The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1921-10-30
America Is Only Power Able
To Challenge Japan's Arms
Assertion of Right to Interfere in Expansion of
Nippon in China Compared With British
Attitude Toward Germany at Algeciras.
BY FRANK H. sIMoNDs.

~
ference draws nearer nothing Is
more striking than the extent to
which the question of the actual
limitation of ornaments has be-
come subordinated to that Of the
Pacific. At first vaguely but now
with measurable clarity II Is per-
eeived that the question Of arma-
ment or disarmament must be dis
cussed not in the abstract but with
relation to the policy or policies
which the country means to pursue
with reference to the rest of the
world.
Cites Policy Of Britain
For example: Toward Germany,
Britain between 1904 and 1914 pur-
sued a policy resented by all Ger
mans and calculated to end in war.
1t was calculated to end in war be-
cause 1t involved the assertion Of
the principle that IL lay within
British rights to maintain the SUI
preme feet and to restrict German
expansion at the expense or
France, Belgium or Portugal.
But at precisely the same time
Britain. through Lord Haldane and
others, was eagerly seeking to per-
suade Germany to agree to a naval
holiday. This meant to the Ger
man no more and no less than that
Britain sought to force Germany to
recognize that her place in the sun
was subject to British regulation.
Roberts F0resaw War.
Lord Roberts was one of the few
far-sighted men in Britain who
perceived that the policy which
Britain was pursuing led straight
to war. He urged not disarma-
ment but national service. Yet the
very cabinet leaders who were sup
porting the policy which meant
war Joined in condemnation Of
Roberts for advocating preparation
for that war which they were max
ing certain by the policy which
they were following.
In the end the war came, but the
preparation was lacking and as a
consequence we had the fright
full shambles continuing from the
FIRST Battle of Ypres to the great
Somme offensive in 1915 and alb
sorbing the best and bravest OF
British youth collected under the
volunteer system.
Sea Supremacy the stake.
From the moment of the Algeci-
ras convention of 1914 onward
there were two possible policies for
+ British statesmanship, logically
possible. the one was TO prepare to
defend that position which Britain
had acquired by fighting over sew
eral centuries, that supremacy at
sea which was the very breath in
rha nostrils Of the nation, the
other was to resign this position
and accept the conditions which
would Inevitably flow from the
passing OF sea control.
Eut the British ministry OF the
day. the Liberal government, which
in the main directed British desti-
lies would do neither the one thing
, nor the other. They would not, for
obvious reasons, consent to resign
ona small fraction of British SUI
nrsmacy at sea and they would not
recognize that IL they did not do this
thew must prepare for an inevitable
war.
They deluded themselves and their
country into the notion that war was
unthinkabIe, that an arrangement
couId be arrived at with Germany
nv which Germany would accept the
british view of relative world posi-
lions and-in the end, arrived at war
unprepared physically while their ma
tIon was itself morally as wen as
materially unready.
Now II Is essential for Americans
70 recognize once for all that In
combining the question OF disarma-
ment with that Of the PACING, tns
Harding administration mas arrived
At something Of the same confusion
- Thought which fifteen years ago
riaaTIed British statesmanship. 1t Is
obvious that we, like every other
country, can only AFFORD to limit
arament. provided the policy or poll
cies which We pursue with respect Of
either nations involves no collision
and therefore leads to no confict-
Policies Cause of War.
Despite all the nonsense written
ara spoken to the contary, the cause
~ the world war was not excessive
armament, but the pursuit OF policies
IEhIch involved excessive and COM
petitive armament.
Rsfore the world war, since the
.truRzIe, It has been excessively
Jificult to persuade Englishmen that
their country pursued toward Ger
MANY a policy which inevitably LED
20 war. II has been difhcult because
the EngIIshman. from start to nnish.
Jvas convinced sea supremacy was q
necessity with him and sea power
only a luxury With the German and
he was further convinced that he
sought no advantage which involved
depriying the German Of any posses
zion. What he could not see-and
cannot-is that his supreme injury
10 the German was his calm assump-
zion that the German must accept
that place in the world which the
Rritisher has assigned to him.
Aimed to Overthrow Others.
All the injuries, wrongs, out
RACES which provoked the war were
German. The German made the
war in order to escape from the
,,Iaee in the world which had been
assigned to him by British concepI
lions. He was out to steal, to rob,
% throw down other nations and
exalt his own country. But as far
as the Englishman was concerned
a. was always impossible that he
should keep the German in the BRIT
ish-assigned place and escape con-
sict. Ire British had to face the
fact that he was. to the German
mind. seeking TO restrict the Ger
man future, to regulate the desti-
MES OF a great and proud empire,
aIthouEh In doing this thing he was
only providing for his own country
and indeed asserting his right to
live.
Now I dwell upon these circum-
80. k.o.naa havonA All 1..as