New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1921-08-21

RUSSIA FROM iii AMERICAN EN-
BASSY. BY David R. Francis. Pub
lshed by Charles Scribner's Sons. $3.50.
"@ HE Russian Revolution has
been viewed from many angles.
R We have had the impressions
of journalists, professors, bust
tionists (disillusioned and otherwise) },
and nondescript travellers Now for
mer Ambassador Francis tells US, large
y on the basis of his own official re-
ports and private letters from Petro-
grad, just how the shifting currents of
Russian political life appeared from
the vantage point of the American EN-
bassy.
The author was in a position to OBJ
serve and compare the workings of the
Czarist, Kerensky and Bolshevik re-
gimes. He arrived in Russia in the
spring of 1916, and left few days be-
fore the signing of the armistice. His
confidential reports to the State De-
partment, many of which are included
in the present volume, cast interesting
light upon the pro-German intrigues
of certain faction of court reaction
aries, headed by the Czarina, which
preceded the downfall of the Romanoff
dynasty. Mr.. Francis reproduces a
large part Of Miliukov's fiery speech,
in which he accused Premier Sturmer
of accepting German bribes
At first the author processes unal-
Logged satisfaction with the March revo-
luton. He looks upon it as a guaranty
that the court intrigues for separate
peace will be stopped and that Russia
will prosecute the war vigorously. How
ever, a disquieting factor soon makes
itself felt in the situation. So-called
councils of workmen's and soldiers dep
uties spring up all over the country
under the leadership of radical agita-
tors who demand immediate peace and
socialistic innovations. The masses
of the people are apparently inclined
to follow these councils, or Soviets.
and to reject the patriotic and con-
servative counsels of ministers like
Miliukov and Goutchkov.
Mr.. Francis's dispatches and letters
during the summer of 1917 reflect his
constantly growing anxiety about the
possible effect of the radical agitation
upon Russia's continued participation
IN the war. He gives Kerensky credit
for acting as a sort of brake upon
the more extreme aspirations of the
revolution by using his influence with
the masses in the direction of order and
restraint. However, he feels that
herensky was too weak man for his
job. Lenine and Trotzky should have
been shot after the July riots. in the
authors opinion. Mr. Francis is also
convinced that Kerensky made a griev
Gus mistake in not finding some basis
for cooperation with General Kornilov.
The guiding principle of Mr. Franciss
diplomacy, as he repeatedly declares.
was to preserve Russia as an effective
partner of the Allied powers in the
war against Germany He felt that the
critical situation mot only justified
but demanded activities on my part to
assist the Russian government to keep
the Russian armies fighting, which
under ordinary circumstances would
have been not only unusual but i'm
proper for an ambassador to under
take"
After the downfall of the Kerenskv
government he was apparently willing
for short time even to cooperate with
the Bosheviki in the struggle against
Germany. The State Department. how
ever, rejected his suggestion that a
changed policy toward the Soviet
regime might be- advisable. As time
went on he became quite disillusioned
with the Bolshevik government, and as
early as the spring of 1918 he is an
advocate of Allied intervention.
Going to Archangel at the time when
British, French and American troops
landed there, he played an important
part in directing American policy in
Russia and in smoothing out the re-
peated differences which cropned I'M