The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1921-12-25


the pledge of the United States to
submit any difference arising over
Pacific issues to q conference be-
tween all four parties to the treaty
and the equally valuable promise
that In case Japan Is otherwise
threatened. that all four snaH COM
municate with each other fully and
frankly to arrive NJ an understand
ing as to the most eficient meas
ures TO be taken jointly or sepa-
rateiy to meet the exigencies Of the
particular situation.
First and last a great deal has
been spoken and written aDout th's
last provision. Article III OF the
treaty. Does II constitute an al
lance? Does It not imply q moral
II not q legal undertaking. II
seems to me that but for . single
circumstance this question would
have to have an Affirmative answer.
But this circumstance ! sall-impor-
tant. II is found In the words or
Senator Lodge in explaining the
treaty. which were as follows:
There is no provision for the use
OF force to carry out any terms OF
the agreement and no military or
naval sanction turks anywhere in
the background or under cover OF
these plain and direct clauses.
For the purposes of international
procedure the speech of Senator
Lodge Is a part of the treaty. 80 far
as the United States is concerned
Since his Interpretation was accept
cd by the nations present and con-
cerned. II will not be possible for
any one of them in the future 10
seek 10 read into the language OF
the document any meaning at va
rance with the Interpretation Civ
en- by him in his speech and this
circumstance must be kept in mind
in all this discussion which is
bound to come now In and out Of the
United states Senate. You can't take
the treaty without the speech and
read into 1t all sorts cf meanings,
which the Senator from Massachu-
setts deliberately read out OF 1t.
without doing violence to interna-
tional precedent and practice.
Wanted japanese Assent
Much has been made, too. out OF
the fact that whereas the treaty's
field of application is extended to
cover all OF Japan. homeland and
colonies alike. It does not apply 70
the homeland OF any one OF the 9TH
er three countries. Why this uni
lateral character. Obviously be-
a part OF her payment for dropping
the Anglo-Japanese alliance this
guarantee that the United States
would not attack her. None OF the
other nations asked such a guar
antee. Instead we asked that the
Anglo-Japanese treaty be dropped
and were willing In return for
Japanese consent TO give this fur
Their pledge of friendliness
| Most of the Interpretation
which existed and exists over the
four-party treaty arises from the
failure to appreciate its real pur-
pose. In the minds OF the public
II Is an agreement designed to
make peace and having no other
meaning. But in point of fact II
is a special treaty designed for a
special purpose. namely to get
rid OF the Anglo-Japanese treaty
as q menace to peace in the Paci-
nc and the elimination OF this
treaty as the prerequisite step to
all constitution of peace
Obviously naval disarmament and
naval holiday were alike impossi-
BILE while Britain and Japan. two
of the three great sea powers were
united in an alliance. 1t may be
that the present American govern
ment was unduly alarmed over the
dangers flowing from the Japanese
association with the British. al
though this is by no means certain,
given the use made by the Japanese
OF this alliance as a cover for their
designs in China. But in any event
the moment Mr.. Harding and Mr..
Hughes accepted the British sug-
gestion that they call a conference
in Washington to consider Far
Eastern questions. following their
own request that the Anglo-Japa-
nese alliance be dropped. some form
OF substitute agreement was made
inevita BILE.
Alliance Real Contention.
Henceforth the single question
for our representatives was to keep
such an agreement within the spirit
and tradition OF our foreign policy
and within the very restricted linn
its within which II might be posi-
BILE TO enlist sufficient support in
the United States to achieve ratin-
cation. And the real battle of the
first month OF the conference was
not over naval battles, although ii
seemed so, il was not even over
Chinese questions, although they oc-
cupied far more attention in the
public press, IL was almost ex-
clusively over the Anglo-Japanese
alliance and the possible substitute
therefor. The proof of this lies In
the fact that whereas four weeks
were consumed in reaching agree
ment over the four-party treaty
announcement of Anglo-Japanese.
American accord over all naval
issues came within three days after
the question OF the treaties wa.
settled.
The four-party treaty is, then
the logical and Inevitable conse.
quence of the word sent by Wash
ington to London last summer that
the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance would be a disagreeable
circumstance from an American
point OF view. official as well as
public. All else has followed nat
urally, the conference, the variou.
proposals advanced by the thre'
countries. the four-party treat,
and. circumstance never to b