The New York herald., 1921-12-18
Warns France of Unfavor-
able Effect of Demand
for Large Tonnage.
MAY ALLEVIATE SYMPATHY
Might Put Brakes on Moves
for American Aid and CO.
operation in Europe.
Ry wIcKHAM sTEED,
Editor Of London Times.

Editor OF London Times.
Copyrfgse. fyct. by United Netrs.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 1.-THE agrees
ment of the United States, the British
Empire and Japan on the naval ratio
was announced here late on Thursday
evening. AS foreshadowed IN my mes
sage Friday, It allows japan to re-
tain the battleship Mutsu on the 5-5-3
tasis, leaves the United States two
capital ships of the Maryland class
and provides for the building of two
new capital ships for the British navy.
The new British ships will not be
super-Hoods. Instead of the $4,000
tons displacement contemplated for
the super-Hoods. the new ships will
displace only $4,000 tons net, plus 1000
tons for anti-submarine blisters.
The advantages OF this course are
obvious. While the completion of the
super-Hoods would have given the Brit
ish navy two battleships theoretically
able to blow out of the water any other
ship afloat. it would have locked up
ship tonnage in two huge units. It
would. moreover, have seemed to show
disposition on the part of the British
delegates TO avail themselves of the re-
adjustment entailed by Japans retention
of the Mutsu to build vessels of a
greater size than the $4,000 tons limit
fixed as the maximum for the eventual
replacement of superannuated vessels
BY adopting the $4,000 or $4,000 ton
limit at this stage the British navy
conforms In advance with the spirit of
the limitation plan.
Saves Japanese Pride.
Though the retention of the Mutsu
100000 tons) by Japan and of two
Marylands Of approximately $4,000 tons
each by the United States will place
the British navy in relatively weaker
position until the new British capital
ships are completed, the situation is re-
garded with equanimity by the British
naval experts.
1t Is certainly regrettable that Japa-
nese fnsistence on the retention of the
nutsu should have necessitated a read
justment of the original plan. 1t Is
obviously inconsistent for the Powers to
continue TO spend large sums on bat
tleships which they sincerely hope never
20 use. But the life of nations, as of
individuals. is compounded of illoglcali-
ties. The present arrangement at least
avoids wounding the national pride of
the Japanese In their newest warship
On the other hand. Japanese success in
securing, by a process of bargaining,
changes in the original scheme may en-
courage other Powers to advance less
acceptable claims.
The American n-British-Japanese ratio
depends upon a suitable agreement with
France and Italy as to their capital
ships. Discussion of a basis for this
agreement began in the Naval Armament
Committee Immediately after the ac-
ceptance of the three Power ratio. The
French delegates are understood to have
claimed for France an eventual capital
ship tonnage by no means inferior to
that of Japan. Insistence upon this de-
mand might create a delicate situation.
The effect upon American public opin-
ion OF any French insistence on an ex-
cessive ratio of capital ship strength
was sufficiently foreshadowed in yes
terday's message. 1t would probably
ALLEVIATE American sympathies from
France. and neutralize the efforts of
working TO prepare the way for Ameri-
can economic cooperation with Europe.
It is very important that the conditions
under which such cooperation Is likely
alone to be possible should be under
stood on the other side OF the Atlantic
People Must BE Convinced.
However much the American Admins
tration. with the support OF prominent
bankers. and even of the bulk of pub
lie opinion on the Atlantic seaboard, may
favor such cooperation. no effective ac-
ton will be possible until the people
os the United States as a whole per-
ceive that It would be advantageous or
at least not disadvantageous to them.
This they do not yet perceive. There
fore efforts to induce the United States
Executive to promote or accept forth
with an international economic confer
cnce on a basis similar to that Of the
present washington conference are GER
tain to fall
The failure of such efforts would
retard indefinitely any American official
cooperation with Europe. The same ef-
feet, IN n lesser degree. might be pro-
duced were suspicion 10 spread in this
country that the Improvement in the
international rates Of exchange that ap-
uears TO be one indirect consequence
OF the Washington conference were be-
ing utilized by European financiers or
international flnanciers, or by persons
reputed TO be susceptible TO their In
fuence for arbitrage speculation on a
large scale