The New York herald., 1921-02-13

Giving on the country 1t was one OF
Napoleons favorte maxAms and one OF
the main causes Of his brilliant success in
Italy in 1896 and in the Jena campaign Of
1906 that an army should dispense In order
to subsist and concentrate in order to fight
This principle was partially followed in 1870.
It is no longer within the range Of possi-
blities. "Only very fertile regions are In q
position to keep a modern mass army go
ing for short time it's require
ments must be supplied from home" Sec
ond as to transportation: IA complicated
network Of roads and railways as well as an
enormous amount Of rolling stock will be
needed to solve the supply problem. :.
In view OF the enormous size of the modern
theatre of war and the masses which have to
be moved backwards and forwards over
great distances, IL Is impossible to carry
out such movements on foot. 1t is
therefore absolutely necessary to carry out
all strategic movements of troops by rail II
at all feasible. A developed road and
railway system which would be equal to
these requirements Is certainly not to be
found in any part Of the world. 1t Is thus
essential to construct new railways and
roads and keep them continually In order.
This. however, means great swarms OF labor
troops. and these in turn increase the mass
of the armies and the demands for food and
other military supplies. while at the same
time requiring giant apparatus OF ad-
ministrative authorities and officials so that
the mpedimenta of modern army has be-
come simply colossal" Third as to "the in
fiuence which the mass way has had. and
was bound to have. on the tactical value OF
the troops themselves" If the war lasts for
a long time and the men of the peace estab-
lishment gradually disappear as the result
OF death and wounds the tactical level of all
regiments regulars as well as new forma-
tions. tends gradually TO become the same.
Death in battle is ever tearing
bloody gaps in the ranks. and usually car
ries Off the best and most capable officers
b. The same Is true Of the non-com-
rnissioned officers. who In ordinary circum-
stances are the sheet anchor OF the unit
The author then discusses, under the head
OF Military Technics" "the multiplication
and Improvement Of weapons (which form
the starting pom for all changes In tactics"
and shows the "far reaching effect of modern
fire effect" (Which the Germans had not an
ticipated). the increased Importance Of ar
tillery and the use OF what used to be called
.siege guns" OF heavy calibre and enormous
range I'm ordinary field operations the lnven-
ton of the artillery 'barrage." OF directing
the fire OF artillery by means of airplanes.
the use of trench mortars. Of high explosive
shells with delayed action fuses and of fight
ing aircraft not only with aircraft but from
the earth with aircraft guns having cleva-
tions up to s5 degrees.
Many Illuminating Chapters
On the Technique of War
It Ia impossible within the limits OF this
review TO follow the author through all his
successive chapters on the tactics OF the
various arms. the principles OF the offensive,
the attack and the defence. the Importance
of taking and holding the initiative. the
method OF conducting a modern battle and
the rules governing trench warfare and open
warfare. All Of these chapters arc rnost IL
Illuminating, and they display the sarnc sound
Judgment. clarity OF expression and concise
ness OF statement which characterixc the
first chapter. from which such ample ex-
tracts have already been made.
There are two chapters. however. under
the titles OF "The Sources OF Power" and
THE influence OF Politics and Economics T"
in which the author returns once more to the