The Washington herald., 1921-05-08

1alLn, oOWnrlBnL QlSnOhcSS, hhoN
France meant to seize upon the de-
fault of May / as a warrant Tor
of the Ruhr and the
of guarantees OF ma
terial sort. which might insure Ger
man compliance, but at the least
would provide France with some
measure Of reparation. whereas, up
to date, none had been obtained.
But one is bound to note that
there existed in the State Depart
men under President Harding. as
there had in the American delega-
ton which went to Paris under
President Wilson, a suspicion that
under the surface there were ele-
ments in France which opposed mill
itary action and would be glad to
see the reparations affair settled |
without appeal to Foch. l do not |
think I exaggerate when l say that |
the administration placed consid- |
cradle reliance upon such informa-
tion and despite outward appear
ances doubted the domination of |
Poincare and believed that BRAND |
would be glad to be saved by Amer
lean intervention. The point is cap
ital.
Knew br1tish Position.
Finally. what of Great Britain?
Here the State Department was on
firmer ground. 1t recognized that
Great Britain was anxious to avoid
any military action. 1t perceived
that there was great opposition to
such action in many political cir
cles in the United Kingdom and
that. in addition. there were OBJ
viOus selfish and material inter-
ests which made II only natural
that the British should not wish
to see the French seated in the Ruhr
and masters of the best coal de-
posits of Europe.
But Lloyd George had passed his
word to BRAND in London. More
over. Lloyd George was aware that
if BRAND yielded on this question
he might fall and be succeeded by
Poincare. And with Poincare, mill
tary action would be inevitable and
Great Britain would be compelled to
choose between seeing France act
alone. thus losing all influence and
power of restraint and rather alb
jeCtly following the French lead.
Would not Great Britain. then. well
come an American gesture which
would have its effect in restraining
France, and, at the same time.
measu-ably absolve Lloyd George
from his promise to BRAND.
Complicated by Politics.
In sum. the administration tabled
upon the assumption that the repa-
rations problem was one which be-
lcnged in the domain of economics
and had been consistently bedeviIed
by political complications. II be-
lieved the political conditions were
such that the Germans could not
even. if they had wished to do it.
make a direct proposition to their
European fees. which would be ac-
Ceptable. because of the domestic
political situation in Germany, but
that under American influence, ST.
mons and his associates might be
able to make such proposal. Con-
vince6 that aid from the United
states would be obtainable only if
she went to the limit of possibility.
Germany might come through"
with an offer which would serve as
the basis Of fresh discussions.
As to the French. the administra-
.tion believed that BRAND could face
FoCh and Poincare. could take a
high stand against military action.
provided il was disclosed that such
action would offend the United
states. when. through the United
states Germany had made a pro-
posaI which was worthy Of con-
sideratiOn.
Would Urge Payment.
The State Department thought
10 In
French opinion. one which demanded
payment or punishment. a second
which was not interested in pay
ment. but sought through punish
ment to put Germany out of the
running for generation or two. at
the least. It hoped to strengthen
the hands Of the former and block
tn" course of the latter
In the case of the British the
administration expected prompt
welcome in London for any course
which might hopefully open the way
to pOstponement OF military action
and reopening OF discussions 1t
assumed that since Britain was even
more interested than the United
states in restoring economic order
] in Europe and in fOrestalling any
new disturbances. British policy
would rally to America and act to
| restrain French impatience, provid-
| ed only Germany seized upon Mr.
Hughes proffered opening to make
a real proposal. something tangible
and solid.
Depended on PrOposaIs.
In the last analysis. however, all
depended upon what the Germans
would offer. II their offer were rea-
sonable, then the administration
could meet all criticism from all di-
rections with the evidence furnished
by the proposal itself. 1t did not
purpose to pass directly upon the
proposal. but reserving the fiction
of diplomatic rocedure to act infor-
mally and take no step until the
British. French, Italian, and Bel
gian governments had said they
were willing to receive the German
proposals, not as final. but as
basis for discussion. And obviously
the hope was that the German re-
| sponse would be such as to enable
the allied decision to be reached in
advance OF the decisive session Of
the supreme council of May 1. when
the German default would techni-
cally occur and action would be
| possible to cOerCe the defaulting
| nation.
Decides to Take Risks.
There were, / repeat, the gravest
sort of risks. but there was, too, an
American and n world interest of
transcendent Importance, and, with
that in mind. Mr.. Hughes and his
| associates decided to run the risks