Atlanta tri-weekly journal. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1920-19??, 1921-12-06
ARMS CONF E:P!ENCE
IN SERIOUS TANCLE
BY PAUL SCOTT MOWRER
(Spocial Dispatch to The Journal and the On
nn.ro Daily NnWs-CnnYright. 1921

washington COIll0IcIlCS Illus AloOAA Al
a serious tangle. There is deadlock
in the naval limitation question and
there are signs Of snarls ahead in
the Far Eastern question. 1t 1t IN
teresting to inquire how and in what
conditions this tangle has come
about.
The fundamental policy announced
by Chairman Hughes short time
before the conference opened was
that if the other powers concerned
would Join with us in a satisfactory
solution Of the Far Eastern questions
we would consent to a reduction or
naval ornaments. Apparently I'M
der pressure Of public opinion this
policy seems to have undergone
modification. The United States
opened the conference with a full
declaration of naval limitation pol
lev, and thereby deliberately threw
the Far Eastern question into the
BACKGROUND. At the same time NE
favorable reaction of American luo-
lie opinion to the disarmament plan
was so strong that it has seemed to
show no interest in the Far Eastern
question and at the same time to
have put pressure on the delegation
to try to secure naval reduction
even at q sacrifice.
The result has been to completely
change the diplomatic position OF
the United States. Instead or Bit
ain and Japan it is the United States
which seems to be begging for naval
reduction. We are told that the con-
ference must succeed and that there
fore we must be moderate-espec1al
ly in the Far Eastern question in
which American opinion does not
seem to have backed up the tradi-
tional American policy with any real
energy.
How Things Work Out
Even now there are strong ele-
ments Of American opinion which
think that whether Japan's rat1o is
6-10 or ITO is matter OF 1ndiffer-
ence, so long as we get cut In ma
vies and which are thus backing up
Japan against their own country.
The fear was expressed in these dis
patches Immediately after Chairman
Hughes opening speech that in start
ing off public opinion on the disarma-
ment idea So vigorously we were
releasing forces which we could not
subsequently control; and that in be-
ginning with hard and fast naval
plan we were cutting all possible
middle ound away from under our
feet, so that we should thenceforth
have to be either extremely firm or
extremely moderate. This Is how
things are working out. The visit
ing delegations with the exception
of the Chinese, are pressing us to
be extremely moderate, and what
course our delegates intend to pur-
sue under the circumstances is not
yet clear.
The original assumption of the
United States, in summoning the
conference, was apparently that we
should place any one who semed to
be blocking the proposed agreement
in a position of unpleasant isolation.
At present, it is by no means certain
that it is not the United States which
is being isolated. The Japanese say
they did not want to come here in
the first place, that we refused to
tell them in advance what the con-
ference was about, that we started
it off by laying down a concrete ma
val plan, and that we now say to
them they must accept this plan.
just as it stands. or take the onus
Of wrecking the conference. They
object to this proceeding. They claim
a right to hold out for what they
believe they are entitled 10 without
taking any onus whatever. Some Of
the Europeans apparently sympa-
thize with them.
Ideal Situation for Britain
The United States, in inviting
Italy and France to the conference
gave itself to enlist the diplomatic
support of these two countries in
both the naval question and the Far
Eastern question. Instead it has
deliberately allowed them to be ell
bowed aside from the main discus
sion into a secondary circle, where
their attitude is one Of disinterested
curiosity. Both France and Italy
came here prepared to talk business.
The United States has not cared to
talk to France in a practical way
about it's army nor to Italy in a
practical way about the economic
matters which principally concern it.
The result is that the main brunt
Of the negotiations is being borne
Britain and Japan.
This is almost an ideal situation
for Britain, Japan's ally. It is what
David Lloyd George expected and
hoped for, and now that it has de-
veloped, press dispatches announce
that he is coming over. The dead
lock in the naval question now and
in the Far Eastern question pres
A1xy to- hat
United States. This gives Britain
a chance to play the grateful role
Of mediator. At present Britain is
supporting the United States in the
naval question against Japan. 1t
is to be fully expected that in re-
turn for this Service" Britain will
presently turn around and beg us
to be "sensible" and moderate" and
recognize Japan's Especial rights"
in Manchuria and eastern inner Mon
golia.
So far the United States has held
firm, it has not weakened one iota
in the naval question, and the first
sign of it's having weakened in the
Far Eastern question is the decision
that Japan and China shall take up
the Shantung question between them
instead of before the whole confer
ence. Even this Shantung proce-
dure does not prejudice the future.
But it is easy to foresee that the
amount Of pressure which will pres
emily be brought up on our dele
gates to make concessions to Japan
in the Far East will be enormous.
Lena NJ, T. Clarke.