The Wilson times. [volume] (Wilson, N.C.) 1896-19??, 1921-12-30
DISTURBING. SUBJECT
DISTURBING SUBJECT
The Proposals of Definite Ra.
tios for Auxiliary Craft as
Wa. Advanced by the Amer
leans for Battleships Might
Have Meant Earlier Solving
of Things.
(By David Lawrence


Copyright, 1921. by the Daily
Times.)
Washington, Dec. 2S.--Shall the
submarine which wrought such havoc
in the European war be the means Of
wrecking the concord of the major
powers at the Washington confer
|ence?
For days the nations gathered here
have wrestled with the question in
vain. Some delegates despair of any
settlement Of tha matter at this con-
ference and suggest q new meeting
Of more nations to discuss submar-
ines, Others insist that more patience
will achieve an agreement.
The trouble lies chiefly in the
abandonment of the formula used at
the outset, namely agreeing on q
principle that should govern naval
strength before discussing each kind
Of craft. II Mr.. Hughes had not in
sisted on applying that idea to the
question of battleships, the confer
ense would have been unable to reach
any agreement on larger craft either.
Mr.. Hughes declared that national
need was too vague and indefinite
rule. to apply and that existing
strength could alone be used in try
ing to effect a compromise Of ma
tional viewpoints.
There is still another principle,
namely. the relationship Of the sub
marine and light cruiser to the bat
tleship as a technical unit for the
naval experts have always had plenty
Of ratios determining how many sub
destroyers, cruisers and aux
iliary craft should be proportioned to
each battleship fleet.
But Great Britain started out by
insisting that all submarines be
abolished. America refused to accept
that view point. So did France and
Japan. Much argument was used as
to the defensive value Of the sub
marine and emphasis was laid upon
national needs" again. The confu-
sion OF these two principles led the
powers further and further astray
until Mr.. Hughes again tried COM
promise by proposing definite ratios
Of submarine tonnage. France op-
poses on the ground Of national
needs.
When the history OF this confer
ence comes to be written it will be
found that the failure Of the Amer
ican proposals at the outset to in
clude definite ratios for auxiliary
craft had as much to do with the pro-
longation Of the conference and pos
sibly its last-minute failures as any
other factor. BY contrast. the initia-
tive Of the American delegation In
establishing 'deanite ratios for the
battleships stands out as proof of
what might have been done If the
program had been all inclusive.
The British don't want any sub.
marines built but would agree to co.
900 tons. On the other hand talk of
postponing the issue until another
and larger conference could be called
in which smaller nations would be
included has only served to accen-
tuate the British view that If no
agreement is reached they must be
permitted to build submarines with
out limit. In a race between Great
Britain and France. the latter would
be hopelessly behind as neither the
funds nor the materials are available
for extensive submarine programs.
America, too, would be at liberty
to build countless numbers Of sub
marines.
While today the submarine situa.
ton looks hopeless, 1t really need
mot be regarded in that light for the
pressure Of the British and Ameri.
cans can be applied IN such fashion
a. TO- ol~compel an agreement in the
end. But II the ratio OF submarines
lcsatsaasA a pam !,