Evening star., 1921-11-16
Distance From Base Would
Make Conflict Too
Impractical.
WOULD HAVE HIGH COST
Maintainence of Line Of Supplies
Over 5,CCO Miles of Ocean
Seen as Difficult.
NY JUNlUs Il. WOOD.


military authorities to be so great
that such a conflict Is practically I'M
possible To them any Suggestion
that a navy 60 per cent OF the size VI
the American Navy is not sunclen'
for Japan's defense seems TO ishore
entirely the conditions which must De
faced in waging such a war IheS
ayen 90 so far a. to contend that an
even smaller navy is capable or ae-
Tending the island empire..fr any
attack across the Pacific. America is
equally impregnabie from any attack
FROM Asia. - ,.
tain elements who frequently boast
that "America can whip Japan any
time trouble starts to nave IL sus
gested that the facts are entlreiS ~
the contrary. However, that Is tns
opinion of most of the it.;iities autHHii
who have studied the possibiiitiess
from the standpoint of strategy anu
resources Circumstances Inlsht I'M
prove Americas chances, out a
almost any possible conditions. Iapan
would have an lnsurhounea in
that part of the world. rms au-
vantage should more than conlpeh-
safe for the handicap Of navy os
SO per cent the size or itS oppolssu., ~,
Despite this. many IN japan y, ne
To see an impending danger from the
fact that the Navy of the Chiteo
States is larger than theirs.
Attack On Coast FeOlhardy.
Nobodv who has seriously consid-
cred the subject believes that tne
Japanese navy would attempt an :ena
Cagement off the coast OF the Cni.eu
States. With 50 per cent I'D 80,
wonld be even farther removed from
ths realms Of possibility. Their navy
nrobably would he able to dispose "a
the American Asiatic Meet coiie
tion of Anticipated and oareiS ~
worthy craft. and TO captu.e ~
pbiIinnines and Guam. without much
trouhle unless our fleet diverted thei1
from that venture. Their navy coula
even make a try for the capture ol
the Hawaiian Islands under 'I hn
conditions. That: however, woueu sap Nc
as far as it could go without gam.
Hing against almost sure rate that
II would never return to japan.
In case of war between the TWO
nations. practically all naval autnoli-
ties believe that the decisive eng
mapt would occur near Japan. ~
reach there. the American fleet wouio
he obliged to steam some 5,ooo miles.
II might use either or all of the three
islands as a base. In tnat case es
supplies of coal, oil, 1000, taaet LII ~
and other necessities would nave ~
he TRANSPORTED to the island passes.
ne ne raaI base would be the Pacific
coast, and the line OF connuniS"'tW Whs
would stretch across the ocean M
lessons learned in me tas ~ iine If
communications across the At,an.iS
with the protection of the conlplheu
british and American naVles gives a.
idea of the difficulties OF mainIain!isas
Longer not lime impossibie sfbHs it would be ex-
tremelv difficult. and the expense
would he almost prohibit1Ve even "
the wealthiest nation in the ~orid.
Fleet Near Base StronEest. y
So far as the fighting situation is
concerned. the American Navy "ou,u
reach the battle area. wlndeu isolt a.
the long race. IN dme rrrone a and the
Jananese fleet met it within ioo miles
of the Japanese base. with the result
which would have been .oreson
conclusian if the Russian meet nau
heeu the best in the Woriu. Ciluel
such conditions the nee. "ttv ,hnrsb its
fresh from it's base. even tnousn ~"
atreneth is only to . for IT'S oppo-
nant has all the odds in it's favor. ac-
cording to naval authorities. :.
Japan has repeatedly stated that IL
desires nothing more mo, ;,s tnah NATIONAL "a de-.
fense In the opinion of the amer
;can experts, one so per cent the size
of the American or BRUSH naEles Is
Sufficient for that purpose. Also &C
cording to their calculatlohS. an
American navy IS 2-3 per cent larger
than Japan's navy would hesitate to
si.k an engagement in Japanese wa
tars and therefore cannot be consld-
cred an offensive weapon against
Janan. Under the 3-5 ratio they class
the American Navy as one lot oe1en-
s;ye purnoses only. Other factors are
sited as justifying the size Of the,
American Navy.
However. their calculations may be
uudrly pessimistic and the Japanese
navy might be defeated in probably
the only naval engagement OF a war
Such an outcome would still leave
the submarines and various other war
craft to be accounted for and the vic
torious fleet would be harassed by
them as it returned to its nearest
base to repair it's damages from the
fight. Nor would the war be won ny
single naval battle, or by ships hover
ing off the coast. The problem of
maintaining the long line of COM
munications would continue. increas-
ing by leaps and bounds as troops
were TRANSPORTED. If America ever
gets into such position her resources
will he strained to the utmost and she
will be an impoverished victor. :
Guam HarkOr Small.
Guam is frequently mentioned as a
possible naval base which might
play an important part in Pacific
strategy At present Guam might
be "a base for limited number of
warships so far as supplies are con-
cerned, but it could not protect them
from attack by an enemy. Its pres
ent harbor with anchOrages for less
than a dozen first-ciass naval ships.
is not even a protection against
rough weather. In times of severe
storms. ships in the harbor must
weigh anchor and put out to sea.
The Yosemite was blown on the reef
during a storm, this natures break
water of coral being the only pro-
lection for the harbor.
Plans for the Improvement OF Port
Apra contemplate the dredging of
new harbor inside of second and
inner reef and construction OF con-
crete breakwater with gates that can
be closed against submarines. The
new harbor would be about one and
Aone-half miles in diameter and it
would be necessary to construct piers
to provide berths for a fleet. The
plans are quite simple but the cost
is more elaborate.
Economic Weapons Most Powerful.
In case of trouble between Japan
and America it is hardly probable that
any considerable land invasion would
follow the defeat of either country's
navy. The expense of carrying the
war to a conclusion by that conven-
tional method would be prohibitive.
The victorious fleet would be free to
drive the defeated country's shipping
from the seas. though the loser could
follow the same tactices with its
raiders and submarines which escaped
frsm the battle. With commercial
ruin staring it in. the face, one nation
might sue for. peace. :.