The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1921-11-06

by no one In this country. a war
winch no considerable body OF
American citizens az yet conceive 10
be possible. tninknblc.
lt would he "A simple matter fer
the United States and japan. sit-
ting at table, or Japan and the
tnitcd states sitting at table with
other Great Powers to .rcaCh nu
adjustment which would eliminate
the danger of war, the immediate
danger anyway, the cHcntuai lnns
ger probably provided the obicC-
tive of the conference were to-
avoid war. ! assume that Il Is
automatic tiat neither nation de-
Strcs war. But II H. not 80 sim-
pic Whcn one nation sets out to
establish principles regarded by
the other ~ tnimlcal, not alone
To It's interests hut even to iis
CxLTCnCc.
Three years ago, on the eve of
the Paris conference there were not
a Few astute observers who perceived
That there was II very grav0 peril
Incident to the fact that the confer
ence was condemned TO pursue two
objcctivcs. the making OF peace with
conquered nations and the ere
alton OF aa world association 10
make war impossible for, the future.
On the horns al this dilemma the
conference failed, II made u peace
or vlctary as II was bound to do, but
that peace made. the hope tof recon
ciliation for the future had Vanished
Now. at Washington. two obiec-
tlVes are again sought We arc not
approaching the Far Eastern ques-
tioW with the idea Of making the
best possible adjustment compatible
xsylI h.. D.
ciplc OF the Limitation Of armamcnts
on the contrary we are demanding
that our view OF the right solution
In the Far East shall be accepted
az condition anteCedent to disarma-
mcnt. We are asking Japan and the
rest OF the world To accept our prin-
ciplcs, our point. three this time in
stead Of fourteen, as the sole basis
OF noace and the incidental limita-
ton Of ornaments.
To my mind the danger Is all here
and the danger is very real A de-
oade ago II was impossible to per-
suade the mass or British people or
for that matter the majority Of the
British cabinet that Germany meant
what she said. that II the British
pdrpo9e to preserve the "staus quo"
in the world adhered to. I'm the end
war would result. Today II is equally
impossible TO obtain "A hearing for
the review that japan, whatever
che nav he Willing
to make to avoid war which she
does not seek and, after the German
experience must regard with appre-
honslon. will. nevertheless choose
battle rather than surrender II
pressed too far.
Much reliance is placed upon the
existence Of a liberal ihrty In, Japan
and an apparent growing weariness
with ~ chauvinism OF the military
party But similar reliance was
placed upon a similar element in
Germany. which Just as certainly ex-
sted. The trouble was that in 1914
he men in control of Germany were
lble to unity all elements by present
ng the situation as an attack upon
Germany, by picturing the war
which was actually made inSGer-
many as In reality a war Of defense.
And'today, as everyone In the elight-
,st degree familiar with Japan
Inows. exactly the same propaganda
) being carried on Ia Japan. present
ng American policy as an assault
Ipon Japan.
And no one can ever forget that
he situation as between Japan and
he United States is terribly compli-
'ated by the race issue which newt
lhly creates a suspicion and re-
'entment in the breast Of every Jap
lpese.
To the public. Ia the American
public. the Washington conference
Is, as It's official title asserts, "A con-
ference Ia discuss the Limitation of
armamcnts. But to the official
world and To the japanese IL is n
conference to discuss the limita-
tiOn of Japanese ambition In the
far east. All limitation of arma-
nScId IL expressly declared 10 br
contingent upon the restriction Of
Japancsc purposes. But the re-
striction of Japanese purposes
may entail war, is sure 10 entail
war II the restriction is pushed he
yond u certain limit This limit /
moreover falls far short of the
total viDdication of the twin prin-
Clpics of the open door and the in
tegrity of China.