Evening star., 1921-12-24

be dismissed. If you impose too mar
row limit on submarine tonnage.
submarine science. What you would
accomplish on the one hand you
would undo on the other.
ITO draw conclusion from the
foregoing. ! think that We cannot
| reasonably limit submarine tonnage
since We have before us an entirely
new weapon concerning which no
one of us can foresee the possible
transformation and growth, perhaps
in the near future.
a menace to no one. first. because l
think no one here can consider that
any one of us could become the en-
enemy of-any other, and, secondly. be-
cause we can agree, in mutual con-
fidence, to keep each other informed
of our future constructions-you
wish absolutely to fix a limit to
submarine tonnage. l believe that
10000 tons is the absolute minimum
| for all the navies who may want to
have a submarine force"
Mr.. BalfOur's Statement.
Mr.. BalfOur said:
'Since the very remarkable state
ment of the anti-submarine case
, made by Lord Lee there have been
made two notable contributions to
which you, Mr.. Chairman. read out
yesterday, composed by the sub
committee of the advisory committee
and passed by them. The other was
the speech of the gallant admiral
who has just sat down. rather
could have heard that speech before
they drew up their report. They had
reached the conclusion that the de-
struction of commerce by submarines
was not the proper business or the
main business of submarines, as they
were under the impression that reg
ulations could prevent what they
considered and what anybody must
consider the most inhumane employ
| ment OF this particular weapon of
war: but had they heard the speech
to which we have just listened they
would have seen, l think, that while
Admiral De Bon condemned as we
/ should all expect him to condemn.
| the inhumane use of the submarine
| against defenseless merchant ships.
merchant ships which he regards as
| on the whole the most important use
to which that weapon of maritime
warfare can be put.
"I admit that there are other pur-
poses to which he alluded, and l
! will come to them in moment. Let
me ask upon this question of the
! destruction of commerce on the high
seas by means of submarines. is
there any man who has listened to
|
/ knows what occurred in the late war.
is there any man who knows what
! must occur in the course of any
| future war who doubts that if sub
| marines are sent on their dangerous
/ and difficult mission on the high
! seaS-nne of the most difficult and
most dangerous as well as one OF
| the most disagreeable tasks which
| can be- imposed upon a sailOr-lt is
for something more important than
| the remote chance of Destroying some
well guarded and efficient ship Of
| loose to deal with merchantment
| it is incredible that in the stress OF
war their powers will not be abused
| in the future as they have been
so grossly abused in the past? 1t
| is vain to dwell upon. the fact. an
absolutely undeniable fact. that the
submarine ista useful scout. that the
! subnfsrines especially. if not solely,
! in the early stages of war, did de-
stroy a few unguarded and careless
| ships of war, and that the submarine
I will undoubtedly impose upon any
attackir forces a degree Of caution
and al. amount of precaution which
no DOUBT the attacking forces would
gladly welcome.
Destroyers Of Commerce.
THE main object they serve is
clear. from Admiral De Bons own
speech-the destruction OF commerce
| myself. that if it was thoroughly con-
sidered by the advisory committee. the
| conclusion they did come to would
not be so very remote from that which
has impressed itself Upon the British
delegation. Now. l do not in the
least. nor unduly minimize the
utility Of submarines for genuine war
purposes, but l cannot help thinking
that Admiral De Bon has exaggerated
hf no
error in supposing that the immunity
from attack enjoyed by the German
coasts was. in the least degree. due
to their submarines. l speak with
subject and l can assure him that In
that respect he is under some misap-
prehension. Neither do believe thai
you will find that submarines on the
den attack by ship of war upon an
, undefended coast town-that is, be-
lieve. one of the objects which the
Italian delegation think can be per
formed by submarines: but / very very
able from time to time, without much
difficulty to send a swift ship over the
| North sea to throw a few shells into
an undefended port and seek safety
That cost some suffering and de-
istruction. but upon the question
whether the cost of the damage done
by shell against an undefended
town is greater than the cost or a
shell itself. i have heard some hign
authorities throw doubt. l can tell
imy colleagues around this table that
III remember one particular case in
which an attack of that Kind was
made upon an open town on the east
coast of England where there was
submarine: but it takes some time
for a submarine to get ready, it takes
some time for it to submerge, II
takes some time to get up to much
swifter surface vessel. and, thougn
the submarine did its best, the ag-
gressor was far away safely over the
idone, either in the way of protection
or revenge.
Minfmized as Weapon.
"Is it not in the minds of all Of us
iwho followed the course of naval
warfare that the British ships bonn
ibarded hour after hour the Flemish
coast at Zeebrugge, which was full
of submarines. if l remember right,
lly? The British ships bombarded
Zeebrugge and not on one single oc-
jcasion did a single submarine destroy
OF injure single British snip; iake
1.-The case of the Dardanelles. We lay
lopposite the Dardanelles, in the most
iperilous circumstances you could well
conceive, month after month, with
submarines prowling around, seek.
ling whats they could destroy. What
they destroyed was quite insignifi-
cant, ifi remember rightly II SUB
sibie for ships to lie more or less in
the open opposite the Dardanelles
AGAINST a well-guarded fleet. it is
lyery difficult for me to believe that
lthey are going to prove, unless
jchanges occur, very ehclent weapon
lin maritime warfare.
"I do not wish to dwell upon that
| aa,,aS1 do nat think as / have al