Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1921-03-23
Wednesday, March %, 1921.
VISION BUT NOT THE GRASP

VISION BUT NOT THE GRASP
What eX-Secretary of State Lam
sing writes respecting the peace con-
ference, regardless of the viewpoint
must conclusively establish the fact
that there were grounds for genuine
apprehension; that the opposition to
President Wilson's attitude had well
founded reasons other than political.
In other words Americans of high
purpose and patriotic motive were
warranted in questioning the wisdom
Of his work Wilson was not the vic
tim of political chicanery, not mar
tyred by political machination. Rath-
or he was not equal to the task he
undertook and was incapable of US
ing such assistance as was available,
with the result that nobly conceived
enterprise fell short of consumma-
ton.
Mr. Lansing essays n difficult task
but one is impressed by his effort to
present hisl views in an impartial
spirit. though it is plain that he was
in many ways at odds with the Pres
ident. beginning with opposition to
The Presidents plan for attending the
conference. In his article in the last.
issue of the Saturday Evening Post
ic admits: Il may have drawn
erroneous conclusions and may
therefore be wrong in my judgments"
II is very evident that he was not
given the confidence nor afforded the
opportunities his position warranted
It is equally clear, in view of the high
c9ard entertained in this country Of
Secretary Lansing's excellent judg
,ncHi and knowledge of diplomacy
that any apprehension he may have
telt would naturally excite apprehen-
ion among those leaders here, who
properly would rely for their opinions
might be learned. And though ad-
mttedly Il discreet official it is to be
presumed his misgivings could not be
concealed.
1t is apparent that the wonderful
reception accorded the President had
= profound effect on him. Lansing
says of it: 1t was a reception which
might have turned the head of a man
lar less responsive than the President
4" public applause, and have given
him an exalted opinion of his own
power Of accomplishment and of his
individual responsibility to mankind.
i is fair. think, to assume that this
VAS the effect on the President. It
was the natural one
1t is easy TO understand that Wood
row Wilson, what with the great du-
lies thrust upon him at the close of
The war. had little opportunity to for
mulate definite program in detail,
hut it should not be easy to under
stand why he did not have it done.
Facts that are incontrovertible cor
roborate Lansing's statement that:
There was no directing head to the
american commission to formulate a
plan, TO organize the work and to is
sue definite instructions" The result
was inevitable when the other inter-
'sted parties did this. Great Britain
taking the lead. The leadership of
the conference passed from the hands
OF Wilson to theirs. a humiliating
predicament for which the President
was directly responsible.
1t is furthermore made apparent
that the President was deceived into
attributing to other representatives
at the conference the high motives
with which he approached the solu-
ton and finally when undeceived. he
had lost the direction of affairs he
should have retained and sacrificed
much that he should have insisted on
that he might secure the covenant.
One reads with sense of chagrin:
IF the President had inf1exiblv de-
manded that no terms should be writ
ten into the treaty which were not
wholly just he would have gone far
toward accomplishing the purpose of
his mission to Europe And if he had
also advocated a plan for a League
of Nations which was not open to the
charge of establishing a supernation-
al authority, vested to all intents and
purposes in an oligarchy of the Great
Powers, he would have been ac-
claimed the greatest statesman on
earth"
Out Of los murders in Philadelphia