New-York tribune., 1921-03-13
Apply Salisbury
Idea to Turkey,
Says Venizelos
Greek Statesman Recalls
Principle That Chris
tians, Once Freed From
Islam, Must Remain So
Upholds Work of Athens
Kemalists Not Defeated Be-
cause Allies Have Not
Given Hellenes a Chance

LONDON, Feb. 2S-M. Venizelos,
before leaving London for Paris, gave
an interview to a representative of
The Daily Telegraph. ain the course
Of the conversation" says the CORE
spondent, 81. remarked that recent
happenings in Greece had tended to
revive in England some of it's old
Turcophilism.
"I will not. offend your memory or
| that of. your readers interposed M.
Vcnizelos, by recalling the late Lord
Salisbury's memorable but hackneyed
epigram about having backed the wrong
horse in the shape of the former Turk
ish Empire. But l would remind You
of another less familiar, though far
thoughtful British statesman. This
ives after the Turco- Hellenic War of
1897, which ended so disastrously for
ourselves. The then victorious Turkey
was hankering after the remuneration
of her lost provinces. But Lord Sails
bury affirmed against her pretensions,
as n cardinal principle of British policy
and devotion to civilization, that ne
Christian population once freed from
the Ottoman yoke could ever be re-
placed under Ottoman rule. 1t may be
not untimely to refer to this historic
and statesmanlike pronouncement.'
II inquired of M. Venizelos whether
he had received any direct informal ;on
regarding the condition of the Greek
army in Asia Minor during the last
few days.
"'As a matter of fact, have not
replied the former Premier, and added
smilingly, but l can refer you to the
British military and other representa-
tiUoc ft,o Tho,y 1,r
we'll how our army stands, and what to
think of the canards recently circu-
lated in Constantinople and elsewhere,
alleging sweeping victories by the KEN
alists! For my own part am CONF
dent that the Greek army rem mains what
it was-that is to say, the principal
guarantee of the fruits Of the Allied
victory over Turkey Without the
Greek army the Allies could never have
imposed their peace terms upon Tur
key.
Criticizcs Allied Delay
"'The Nationalist movement in Ana
tola was not let loose when and be-
cause the Greeks landed at Smyrna, as
is sometimes supposed. Had the Allies
not decided to send us to Smyrna we
should have demobiized in Novemb ber.
1919, as soon as peace with Bulgaria
had been concluded. The real cause of
the troubles in Anatola is that, al
though the armistice with the Turks
was arranged in the autumn of 1878, it
was not until February, 1920, that the
Supreme Council began to discuss the
| question of the final terms to the Porte,
the delay having been due to the hopes
entertained by the Allied statesmen
that President Wilson would obtain
Americas acceptance Of mandate in
the Near East.
"'But, had the Creek army not
landed at Smyrna in the meantime, can
any one imagine that the Turks would
have tamely acquiesced in the loss of
so many provinces, including Syria; in
the establishment of the Inter Allied
control of the Straits and of all their
financial resources in the restoration
and strengthening of the capitulations
abrogated upon Germany's advice dur
ing the war; in ths disappearance of
their navy and the disarmament of
their regular army in toto, beyond a
contingentsof Is, 900 men, without artil-
lery, IS an adjunct of the proposed in
ternational gendarmerie
Points to Greek Services
"'But for the Greek army, would
the Turks have assented to the COM
plete demiitarization of the eastern
shores of the Sea of Marmora and the
Asiatic approaches to the straits :?
Would they even have assented to the
setting up of Allied spheres of eco
nomic influence? In a word. without
the Greek army there could have been
no peace at all in the East, not even
partial one. Indeed, unless the great
democracies of the West had been will
ing in that case to send large eXpedi
tionary forces to the East, they would
have had no choice but to pass under
the caudine forks of Mustapha Kemal,
and to accept peace not of victory
but of defeat. | do not feel am guilty
of any exaggeration in advancing this
proposition
"'But there is a consideration which
you may think transcends all those |
have Just mentioned in connection with
the services rendered by the Greek
army to the Allied cause. the cause of
civilization generally There is the
fate of the Armenians, and of Armeni-
an independence; there is the fate of
the /Christian minorities, which, under
thei terms of the Treaty of Sevres it
self, will still be left under Turkish
rule, 100000 Christians. Who, un-
less it be the Greek army, can guar
antee the due execution by the Turks
of their pledges to the Allies in re-
spect of the rights and security of
who, unless it be the Greek army, could
guarantee the maintenance, of Arme-
nian independence, once that indepen-
dence was an established fact? The
rArmenan tragedy is pitiful enough as
it is. What would it be if the Greek
army were withdrawn from Asia Minor?
Just ponder that!'
Cites Foch's Estimate
"At this iuncture put to NJ. Venice
los one of the favorite arguments of
the Revisionists / asked: But can
Greece keep a huge army, regard be-
ing had for her population and re-
sources, on perpetual war footing
at and around Smyrna"
"'lt has been estimated by Marshal
Foch and his colleagues of the
Versailles Military Council said NJ.
Vcnizclos, that not more than three
divisions would be required to main
tain the Greek zone proper in Asia
Minor. And this force we could pro-
vide even after the reduction of our
army to it's normal peace establish
ment. consisting of two annual levies
of recruits, to which there should be
added the new and magnificent Ionian
legion ofs26,000 volunteers. The divi
sions we are now employing in excess
of the formations regarded as ade-
quate by the Allied military experts
we are employing, not for the defense
of our own zone, but for the protec-
tion of the Allied interests generally,
e. g. in the approaches to the Straits
%l,N NJ