South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1921-05-05


Tonnage the Great Need
Tonnage was IN those critical
days desperately needed FOR the
transportation OF troops and Of
supplies 10 sustain and munitlon the
troops Everything else that could
be- spared had 20 be sacrificed 20
this supreme need The allied
armies and navies were dependent
upon provisions we must send Ta
have sent any considerable part of
the Atlantic feet overseas would
have meant depicting the scant
enough tonnage available for the
forces already In the war zone.
This 10 was thought. would be un-
wise.
Logistics kept the fleet at home
during the first months OF the war,
but there was anoths thought in
mind also when 70 was suggested
that we send over all our vessels.
This was no selfish consideration. II
grew out OF the feeling that II
through any accident In fog or storm
German battIeships or battle cruis-
ers should evade the vigilance Of the
British fleet and make their way in
10 the Atlantic the only force the
world could look 20 for protection
was our Atlantic fleet.
IF the Germans had possessed the
nerve and daring 20 make a dash for
the open sea: If they had prefer
red TO risk destruction and death
rather than accept the humiliation
~ q ar fs1~ 10
sible that enough of their fast battle
cruisers could have broken througS
to play havoc before they were over
hauled and sunk In such event the
presence OF the Atlantic fleet, would
have been the hope and comfort OF
our allies. and the proof OF our good
Judgment.
Germans lacking In AudaCity.
After our troops began crossing
the Atlantic in large numbers there
was always the risk that German
cruisers would appear suddenly, at
lacking and sinking transports
Looking back now / find it difficult
10 believe that the Germans did not
attempt 20 do this thing. Had they
succeeded in even one or two cases
IL would have meant much TO them
They lacked the audacity.
AS things obviously approached
climax and victory hung in the bal
ance in 1918. I felt the possibility
of a bold venture by the German
navy was so great that it must be
considered most seriously. It seem
ed to me that the Germans were
likely 10 make one splendid dash in
a risk-everything effort TO win the
war.
dispatched a division OF dread
naughts overseas under the com
mand Of Admiral T. s. Rodgers. with
specific instructions 10 be vigllant
for the appearance OF any possible
German cruiser. and. at all hazards.
to give protection 10 the American
troop transports.
The British fleet and Admiral Rod
mans division were based on Scapa
Flow.
Might Have sunk Thousands
II the miracle OF escape had hap
pened one German raider, free, and
in the vicinity OF Brest. could have
sunk troop ships with thousands of
men before II could have been sunk
unless powerful dreadnaughts stood
between the transports and danger.
So Admiral Rodgers division was
based on Bantry bay, in a position to
intercept.
If we had failed to take this pre-
caution. and an enemy cruiser had
eIuded the blockade, what would
have been my condemnation? Had
we through such "A neglect or error
Of judgment lost the lives Of any Of
our men 1 could not have forgiven
myself. and the country would not
have forgiven me.
But the Germans were too prudent
to make this venture. Under like
circumstances. 1 believe. sooner than
make possible an ignOminious sur
render. such as we witnessed at Cca-
pa Flow. the men Of the American
navy or the British navy would have
died in the resolve to at least go
down in the last dash against the
enemy.
Question OF Rank.
There was a minor difficulty which
was involved in the proposal to send
Admiral Mayo and the Atlantic fleet
TO the North sea. l mention II only
to assert emphatically that If consid-
eratiOns affecting the common inter
ests. had made il wise TO send Mayo
and his ships. this particular diff
Guilty would have been brushed aside
as a man ficks the ash from his
cigar.