The New York herald., 1921-11-27

New York EeraId Bureau,
Berlin, Nov. IL.
Gen. Eric Ludendorff, in his latest
book, War and Politics." utters his
contempt for pacifism and looks for
ward to life of wars. 1t Is the un
changed Ludendorff who writes:
"The word annihilation must not be
taken literally. Armies can be ami
hilated but only in the rarest cases of
the pre-war era could the entire forces
of great military State be destroyed
by one blow. The sum Of defeats un-
dermines an army; if then the will Of
the people Is broken the one side be-
comes defenceless. That is what hap
pened to us. while we still stood on
enemy territory undefeated in the bat
tlefield. Perhaps il we had been vic
torious on July Is. 1918, the will of
our enemies might have been broken"
This note runs through the book.
Germany was not beaten on the battle
front, and 1t Is from the political mis-
takes that Germany must profit II she
is to win the next war. He maintains
Germany was overcome by the failure
on the home front, which in turn was
due. first, to the effects of enemy pro-
paganda; and. secondly. to the failure
of the politicians (and principally of
the late Won Bethmann Hollweg) in fall
ing to counteract it and to give the
necessary support to the army leaders.
The concluding chapters of the book
are devoted once more to emphasizing
the soldiers point of view, that of mill
tary efficiency and preparedness. the
cultivation of racial and national pride
the need of national unity and the
abolition of the international pacifstic,
defaitist" mode of thought of the Ger
man people. Ludendorff comments as
follows upon France in the last chapter
after reviewing the benefits and disad-
vantages that have accrued to America
England and Japan by the display OF
strength which Germany was forced to
manifest:
France is master In central Europe.
1t bases its might upon the strongest
army in the world and upon the fight
| ing powers of the new states created
in central Europe, chief of which are
Poland and Czecho- Slovailia. 1t lies
across the trade routes of England and
constitutes. with central Europe at its
back, and in conjunction with the United
States, a far more formidable opponent
for England than ever Germany could
have been, even IL France must reckon
/ with the hostility of Italy"
The book closes with an appeal to
the German people to recognize realities
and to draw strength and faith from
belief in themselves, in their destiny and
in the creative power of work
A number of peace feelers and over
lures Of which the general public knows
little or nothing are mentioned by Gen.
Ludendorff. One involves the effort of
the steel and coal magnate Hugo
SHINES to bring about the Japanese al
lance, OF which so much was hoped In
1917
Overtures to Russia I'm 1913.
The General declares that the military
authorities knew nothing OF Germany's
attempt to enter into negotiations with
Russia in 1915:
"We were merely aware that Stuer-
mer. the Russian Premier, who was ap-
pointed on February 8, 1916. was sup
posed to be favorable to peace and also
that Hugo SHINES had had a conversa-
tion with the Japanese Ambassador In
Stockholm in the spring of 1916. Hugo
SHINES had previously applied to the
then commander In chief of the army
in the east and had been encouraged to
carry out his intention. A later
attempt to bring about separate peace
with Russia through NJ Rizo1, the Bull
gar1an Minister IN Beriln, remained lu-
| tile.
THE step taken by the Car about
the end of February, 1917. to come to
peace understanding with Count
Czernin came to naught. This very
likely led to the dethronement OF the
Czar on March 16. This step, too. be-
came known to the supreme army COM
mand only subsequently"
| The real war aims Of the German
army are nakcdly stated and defended.
| Ludendorff denies that the terms of the
Supreme Army Command were in any
sense unalterable they were merly to
serve as guides to the political authori-
ties as determined by military interests
and the welfare of the German people.
''ft was obvious that these war OBJ
jectives could be maintained only in &C
cordance with the war situation which
| gave rise 20 the conclusion OF peace" he
writes. "The war goals OF the Supreme
Army Command were never intended to
form the basis OF negotiations They
exercised no influence upon the war
] measures OF the S. A c.. nor did they