Evening star., 1921-12-24

THE EVENING ST
from it a moral effect on which they
based their hopes. In fact, nobody
could have forgotten the propaganda
launched at the beginning of ls15
with all the mighty and willy means
| of German propaganda. 1t aimed al
most exclusively at a moral effect.
1t was only later on that they took
into consideration the materialF re-
suits which could be surely secured
by submarine attacks against COM
| mercial fleets and that they enlarg-
ed progressively their acts of piracy.
If it was undeniable that Germany
had misused the submarines against
commercial fleets beyond all criti-
cism. could one contend that 1t would
have been impossible for her to act
otherwise?
All Weapons Misused.
Moreover. had not the Germans mis-
used. and to excess. practically all
their other weapons?
In the first place one could not
deny that they might have avoided
attacks against neutral ships, and
| not have torpedoed passenger ships
without warning, especially hospital
ships.
have been materially lessened; but
they would certainly have gained
from a moral viewpoint and the Ger
! man submarines would not have lost
the respect of the civilized world.
And then, was it not permissible to
think that war against the enemy
commercial ships could have been
waged differently? Suppose. for in
| stance, that meeting a merchant ship
| submarine advised her that she
would be DESTROYED as soon as Sc,
curity for the crew was assured
either by proximity to the shore or
| by means of relief. 1t would pre-
| scribe route to the ship and bring
/ it to . safe place. where it would sink
\ 1t after having moved the crew.
! That was merely d Supposition and
| he would not attempt here to formu-
| late 4 doctrine. but the delegates
would find in it a thought similar
| to that which guided the sailors OF
| other days. when they were making
| a prize and taking it to port, or un-
| the enemy.
Question of Law.
! 1t might be said that the submarine
| was exposed to great risks. but were
not the frigates and the corsaires OF
| other days exposed to great risks in
similar operations? How many OF
! them had perished either in the de-
| y
| had been unable to escape the at
tacks of their enemies in the course
of the coyage?
| Certainly the fruits of submarine
warfare would have been smaller il
they had been obliged to confine
warfare. But it was impossible tc
claim that there would have beer
none.
| He knew very we'll that to sink a
ship even while saving the lives OF
those on beard was a questionable
act and might be inadmissible. Tha,
was a question CT law which ough,
to be settled by combining such
actions to the cases where 1t was
absolutely necessary.
| In passing he would call their at.
tention to the fact that the crue'
use to which the Germans had put
their submarines was not confined tc
this type of vessel Merchant YES
sells had been seized and. in order tc
| turn them into cruisers. they nae
been Immediately armed. Their crews
were retained aboard and forced t6
take part in naval actions. This
practice while less inhuman thar
that inflicted on the crews that were
abandoned on the high seas, was
nevertheless indefensible.
Propose. Set Of Rules.
1t followed from this that the ac.
tivities of submarines against mer'
chant vessels should be confined
within limits that would render theil
use legitimate. A proper set of rule:
ought to be drawn up with this OBJ
ject in view. They should be adopted
whenever they undertook revision
Of the rules for applying interna
tional law, which it was imperative
should be revised not only as ap'
piled to submarines, but with re
oil fa a
war.
| Submarine activity against tht
ienemy's merchant fleet might be very
effective. No one had been able t.
listen without great emotion as Lore
Lice recalled the hours of anguis'
| that ali those who had held the
guidance of affairs during the wal
had known and lived through. wheI
Great Britain. together at times witt
France, was threatened with beinf
deprived of the supplies which were
Indispensable, not merely for con
tinuing the struggle, but to keel
the nation alive.
That was the conservation of tn
power of the submarine when eX
erted to the full extent of its de
structive possibilities. without re
gard for the limits imposed by tn
most rudimentary principles o
humanity and respect for Information
lal law. Submarine activity, within
the limits fixed by these considera
tions which should remain sacred t.
honorable opponents. against enem.
transports and conveys could still b.
of great Importance. 1t could be IN
cluded among the legitimate meth
DDS of warfare as a useful factor
especially for nations which did no
have powerful navy.
Weapon for Small Navy.
In this connection another consid
Grafton occurred to him. 1t was sal,
that the submarine could never b
kept from bursting through the mora
barrier which should limit its activi
ties. 1t would always yield to tn
Temptation to make unrestricted US
of all it's powers. Lord Lee had kind
ly paid the submarine officers AM
crews of all navies the compliment o
stating that he believed them in
capable of the acts imputed to tn
German submarines. All naval mel
would be grateful to him. But tn
honorable first lord feared that Off
GERS and men might be confronted b,
formal orders from their govern
ments. which might be driven b.
danger into the weakness of ISSUING
such orders. He did not think an.
government would risk hereafte
incurring such responsibility
He though. besides that if eve
a nation were to again be ca
pable of making such an error. i
would not hesitate to commit ana
logous excesses with other means
for example, with air forces whicl
could fill the world with even create
horrors.
Against the possibility of a govern
! ment erring to such point. all meas
! ures taken by the conference woul(
/ be in vain. A submarine was usefu
for fighting war fleets. 1t was usefu
for fighting merchant marines. TIL,
opinion of the French delegation wa
| that it was especially the weapon O