Evening star., 1921-02-20

been in the main fighting ships of a
Eeet from the ancient galley period to
the present time and the strength of
navieS has always been based upon
the number and power of it's ships of
the fighting line-that is, of it's bat
tleships.
types change as advance is made
in the mechanical arts and sciences
and In invention: but the general
principle of concentration of power in
! ships that can take and keep the sea
at all times and in all weathers. that
can deliver and receive the heaviest
bioWs and that can overcome the
strongest ships that may be brought
against them will continue as long as
navieS exist
The rapid progress during the last
hai1 century in naval construction and
maritime inventions. in motive power
ordnance and armor- in torpcdoes, ex-
plosives and accessories, has so in
creased the power and consequent
cost of battleships as to make their
acquisition and maintenance finan-
cial burden of first Importance to any
nation. however rich. Naturally. any
which appears to offer less expen-
sire, shorter road to victory. is most
attractive and generally finds enthu-
siastic supporters.
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HIT will be found. on analysis, that
the arguments against the ex-
2ensive capital ship are based upon
ina <old fallacy that war can be
cheapiy won by hitting, lodging and
cunning. This belief is usually .ad.
sanced by the weaker opponent. VINO
sndeavors to substitute surprise. ruse
And stratagem for powerful, knock
'ut blows. At times it influences
stronger nations who see. or hone
they see, some short, and more eco
nomical road to success, due to new
tnventions;tfa that afforded by the
slower normal advance in naval
methods and material.
Time and again the naval policy
of maritime nations has been in-
duenced by these: arguments. Reli-
ance upon speed and commerce de-
stroying had it's day. until it became
evident that speed without punch was
insufficient to win a war
I'm the early SOS. when the auto
mobile torpedo began to develop as a
weapon of fair accuracy. the imme-
date doom of the battleship was
prophesied. A single torpedo launch
ed from boat costing lees than
100000 was to destroy a battleship
costing millions. The answer to this
soon came in increased underwater
protection. torpedo defense batteries
and in the larger. faster, better arm
ed and more costly torpedo boat de-
stroyer. which drove the smaller tor
pedo vessel from the sea and took
permanent place in the auxiliary
forces of the feet at enhanced cost
to its construction and maintenance.
Much was expected in the late war
<.f v1e fn ct rrnI Irsl lIn<l 10
of torpedo boat destroyers that would
launch flock of torpedoes against
the capital ships in battle formation
with fatal effect. AT the battle of
Jutlard. wher these tactics were tried
out, they failed. Several ships were
hit. but not destroyed. The British
battleship Marlborough, after being
torpedoed remained in the line and
got safely back to port. The Ger.
man ship Seydlitz had the same ex-
perience. Only one ship. of an older
type, the Pommern. is reported TO
have been sunk. and that at night and
after the battle. Nothing was ac-
complished in the battle in the way
of destruction Of capital ships by tor
pedoes, though great numbers were
launched. Destroyer met destroyer.
light cruiser, and the battleships held
their place in the line. The most seri-
Gus damage 10 tnc SlipS III lHlS Ddttle
was due to the great gun.
THE fast light cruiser. raider, COM
merce destroyer, were again tried out
in the world war. The Won Spec
squadron the Emden and few other
vessels of similar types. brought
certain amonnt OF distinction to the
German navy. but as the German bat
tie feet could not support them they
eventually succumbed to superior
British forces which commanded the
sea. Speed and lodging again failed.
To-day the opponents of the battle
ship are basing their arguments upon
the present and prospective. especial
ly the prospective. development of
submarines and aircraft. 1t is the
old battle of words over again-like
that OF the torpedo against the big
ship. the gun against armor. speed
Ne are asked to accept hopes for ac-
compli shment.
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UDURING the late war. the subma-
rine. a new weapon never be-
fore tried in war. received enormous
development. Its employment against
certain types Of vessels. particularly
slow, unprotected merchant vessels,
was entirely unexpected. The subma-
rine is the most successful weapon in
itS quantities OF conce3 lment and sur
prise yet advanced. 1t CAME very
near winning the war for Germany.
But. AZ always. necessity and inven-
ton combined found means to meet
the menace and reduce it to con-
troiIable limits.
THE successful employment Of the
destroyer and other speedy vessels
with their depth bombs. the motor
boat with it's listening devices. sub
marine against submarine. developed
defense against submarine attack
to a point where it was succe ssfully
met. 1t took long time. but again
surprise and lodging failed.
"The capital ship survived this per
haps the most serious danger to
which it has yet been exposed. and
further improvements in underwater
protection as we'll as In other ways
have greatly minimized 1t. AS mat :.
ter of fact throushou, 4he war,