Tombstone epitaph., 1920-03-28


 evidence presented which comes with, in the rule as laid down hy the su- thori;ies. 1t must be passed upon ss any other defense. and 1t may bc said in passing that in this case. though 1t may have aroused great public interest. no different rule ob. tains than in case of less impor- tance. It stands exactly in the same position and should be considered in the same manner as a case where one obscure citizen is charged with Kidnapping another equally obscure. and in which no public interest has been manifested and no animosities engendered. Ordinarily the question here involved is one of fact to be de- termined by the jury -
 This. of course. mus: be taken to mean that where there is evidence tending to establish such justification its weight and sufficiency are for the jury. and the court may pass up- on it as a matter of law only where evidence is wholly wanting and may exclude proof of a given state O. l facts only when that. state of facts could not in any event warrant the interposition of this plea.
 The crime involved in this case may therefore consist either in for cibly taking a person out of the state into another state, or from an- other state into this. and no distinc- ton Is made between the two acts that constitute the particular offense. If it were lawful to forcibly seize person suspected or accused of crime and bring him from another state into the state where the crime is alleged to have been committed. and such purpose would relieve those committing the seizure from crimin- al responsibility, the distinction urg- ed by the state would be well taken But where the offense is precisely the same and the object of the seiz- ure in no way relieves the act from criminality. it can make no differ ence and can in no way milita;e against the force of the authority cited. Commonwealth vs. Blodgett is therefore a direct authority in sup port of the view that the question of necessity is one for the jury.
 "it was urged with great earnest ness by one of the counsel for the state that, conceding for the sake of the argument. the right to arrest the persons claimed to have been Kidnapped and to place them under restraint CT in confinement, as a mat ter of law there could he no neces- sity for removing them outside the state 1t is difficult to differentia,e between different parts of the trans action. Indeed, under the circuUi- stances shown by the evidence intro duced on behalf of the state and that rrroposed to be introduced by the defendant, the whole transaction may be regarded as one act. As was said in one of the cases cited by the state. "in this case the arrest of the woman and her conveyance into Plac- Ter County and there placing her in the house of China Molly, constitute one continuous act, and for the pur- pose of determining the intention of i the defendant when he made the ar rest or at any other time when he had the woman in custody, it is pro- per to look at the entire transaction as one act, from its beginning to its lconsummation.55 People vs. Flick. supra). The offer Of proof made by the defendant asserts that the cir cumstances gave rise to the necessi- ty to not cnly remove the parties deported to the ball park, but to re- I move them such a distance as would avoid the threatened danger. Ths somewhat fanciful suggestion of coun- sei for the state that the persons Icaptured might have been required so construct for themselves a place Of J confinement within the limits of this county is not entitled to serious consideration. No authority exists in law to rec,ire any such action on the part 1 a person arrested. Un- doubtediy the rule of necessfty Is enc that can arise only on rare oc-