The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1920-12-12

dstrust of the League of Nations II the
league is to guarantee European frontiers.
to employ troops of the nations belonging
to enforce plebiscites II 1t Is to be the
executive of the alliance which defeated Ger
many. If it is to be In addition the machinery
by which the will of the victors, France,
Great Britain and Italy. is to be imposed
upon the Baltic the Adriatic and the Aegean,
obviously the United States is not, and can
not be, concerned.
We here touch upon the underlying source
of trouble in the whole question, the inter-
mixture Of the questions of war and of peace
making after war with those other questions
which are fundamental. At Geneva, as at
Paris, France. Italy and Great Britain fought
for specific advantages, sought to make OF
the League Of Nations a valuable machine in
preserving and expanding their benefits
under the treaties of Paris and their gains
resulting from German defeat. While the
question of Armenia was raised as a prob
lem in humanitarian service II was actually
no more than detail in the great game that
France and Britain are playing in the Near
East.
Equally obvious Is the fact that Anglo
French-Italian policy in Greece, however
sound so far as their interests are concerned,
is not in the least an American concern.
Most Americans will sympathize with Ven
patriot, but few Americans will feel that the
question of Constantine's return to the
throne which will be decided on the basis
of Anglo French interests. Is one which has
immediate concern for America Even in the
case of Lithuania, specifically raised at
Geneva, We know that while the issue is
between the Poles and the Lithuanians,
ostensibly. it is in fact between the French
and the British, who have rival policies on
the Baltic quite as much along the
Aegean.
Many Reasons Are Apparent
For the u. S. to Enter Discussion
In sum. it seems to me that the progress
of events at Geneva very clearly demon
strated that there is a wide field for inter-
national discussion and action designed to
make war less possible in which the United
States has every reason. moral and material,
for desiring to enter. And II seems equally
clear that such entrance does not in the
smallest degree involve us In any interna-
tional complications, risk our own sover-
eighty or infringe upon that of any other
country. Nor does it call for any departure
from our traditional policy, for we have in
variably participated in the Hague confer
ences which were wholly analogous. .
To fortify and enhance the prestige OF the
Hague Tribunal or of any similar interna-
tional court which shall replace it, to write
or rewrite international law dealing with
questions which are war breeders. to con-
slider with other nations methods for avoid
ing competitions in ornaments. to express
American opinions and to defend American
rights and policies in such international con-
ferences, all of these things seem not only
useful but necessary. So far Geneva has
contributed to strengthening the hands of
those who advocate some kind of interna-
tional association.
On the other hand events at Geneva have
demonstrated the manifest danger resulting
from the intermixture of a thing so tenn