The weekly Alaska citizen., 1920-01-19
rEkohlvL, lv SrEClAL kEPUkl, SAYS SANlERICAN ARMY WON WAR:
 OPERATIONS GIVEN IN DETAIL

vent, Il posSlDle, all attack on ltal!' or in the near east"
 So aiterwaru, however, came the collapse ot Russia and the Italian de bacle at Caporetto, with the result that the enemy's legions began to gather thickly in France. Allied com manders viewed the situation with frank apprehension, General Persh- ing report indicates, and the pres sure for an accelerated movement ol American divisions was felt from all sides. At the same time came the suggestion that American units be brigaded with French and British in order that no time be wasted in train ing In this connection, the general reports:
 My conclusion was that, altho the morale of the German people and ot the armies was better than 1t hau been for two years, only an untoward combination ot circumstances could be made effective, provided the allies secured unity of action. However. situation might arise which would necesstate the temporary use or all American troops in the units of our allies for the defensive, but nothing in the situation justified the relinQuisn- ment of our firm purpose to form our own army under our own flag.
 While the Germans were practic ing for open warfare and concentrat- ing their most aggressive personnel in shock divisions, the training of the allies was still limited to trench war fare. As our troops were being train ed for open warfare, there was every reason why We could not allow them to be scattered among our allies. even by divisions, much less as re- placements, except by pressure o; sheer necessity. Any sort of perma- nent amalgamation would irrevocably commit Americas fortunes to the hands of the allies. Moreover 1t was obvious that the lack of homogeneity would render these mixed divisions tain to break up under stress of de- feat, with the consequent mutual re- elimination. Again, there was no doubt that the realization by the Ger man people that independent Ameri can divisions, corps, or armies were in the field with determined purpose would be a severe blow to German morale and prestige"
 General Pershing had refused ut terly to drop his plan for single American army, acting army, acting under it's own flag, but consented, because of the existing emergency, to lend the combat divisions at md to he stem the German offersive o: forsaw may very quickly place the allied armies in serious situation. l pected, the report shows, but the en- emy's success was tar greater than had been feared. At Amiens, the Brit. ish were driven in on 10Kllometer front; between the Disc and Berry-au- Bac, the French lost o0 Kilometers on a 35-kilometer front in I days. And immediately the Germans utilized the Marne "a3 a defensive flank and the advance was directed toward Paris"
 The gravity of the si.CatiOn," the report s..ys, lied to the fanou' orders for holdi Is ui all supply and troop shipments except infantry and ma chine gun units." General Foch, who was no. nude gene.alissimo esti- mated .hat 100 Amerlc,l divisions would be u"t essary for ai,ied victory"
 Genera' Pershing at this time was recommending that his troops be used to smasn ile Marne pocket into which the Germans had thrust themselves He says:
 "The Marne salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunity for a counteroffensive that was obvious. If successful, such an operation would afford immediate relief to the allied defense, would remove the threat against Paris, free the Paris-Nancy railroad. But, more important than all else, 1t would restore the morale of the allies and remove the profound depression and fear then existing Up to this time our units had been put in here and there at critical points as emergency troops to stop the terri fic German advance. In every trial whether on the defensive or offensive, they had proved themselves equal to any troops in Europe. AS early as June 23 and again on July 10 at Bom- bon, l had very strongly urged that our best divisions be concentrated under American command if possible, for use as striking force against the Marne salient. Altho the pre- vailing view among the allies was that American units were suitable only for the defensive and that at all