New-York tribune., 1920-01-15
For a Unified Russia
A Plea Opposing the Policy of
a Gordon Sunitaire
TO the Editor Of The Tr;huna

10 the Editor Of The Tribune.
Sir: The editorial in Sundays
Tribune entitled "The Marches of
Europe" gives rise to some further
speculations as to Allied policy toward
Russia. There can be little doubt that
If the national anti-Bolshcvik move
ments in Russia, the movements which
represented our Allies in the war and
which voiced the sentiments of the
mass Of the Russian people, both with
in and without the territory controlled
by the sovets, had been promptly and
adequately supported by the Allies a
year ago, the Bolshevik tyranny in
Moscow would have been quickly over
thrown and Europe spared great
menace. 1t should have been realized
that the Bolsheviks held the lines of
communication and the military sup
plies left over from the great war,
and that the national movements.
starting on the fringe of Russia, no
matter what the number Of volunteers
or how great their patriotic en-
thusiasm, could not hope to succeed
without assistance in munitions and
supplies. 1t was not a question of
form of government or political views,
since 1t was clear that these national
movements did not contemplate any
restoration Of the old regime, al
though the pro-Bolshevist propagan-
dists sought to undermine these move
ments by representing them as re-
storers Of czarism.
AS pointed out in your editorial, the
failure of these national movements
has precipitated situation that
threatens Europe with another war.
The question Is by what means this
menace can be met. You seem to
adopt the point Of view of M. Gle
menccau, and advocate supporting the
little border states as sort of
Gordon sanitaire to hold the Bolshevik
forces within bounds. You also make
Ia strong plea for the recognition of
their independence.
To many students of European poll
tics, however, this policy presents
many drawbacks and dangers. In the
first place, 1t seems like egging on
some weak little states that are worn
out from long-continued warfare and
whose governments are unstable to do
our fighting for US. Furthermore. it
must be remembered that the Boil
sheviki In Russia, although exercising
autocratic authority by terror, are in
small minority, and that the anti
Bolshevik Russians in Russia feel
strongly that this Allied policy is di-
rected against the unity of Russia and
toward disme bcrment that will weak
en- Russia in the future. While hating
the Bolshevik authorities themselves,
they are, nevertheless, inclined to sup
port them, actuated by strong national
feeling. 1t is probable, indeed, that
this policy will tend to strengthen
rather than weaken the Bolsheyik
power. Rather is it better policy
to declare in the first place that we
will have no dealings whatsoever with
the present Bolshevik regime in Rus.
sia, and at the same time indicate our
desire for reestablishment of a united
Russia. This would weaken Lenine
Trotzky & Co. and strengthen the
opposition within Russia. that op.
position which is most likely to prove
solution of the Russian problem.
There can be little doubt that when
Russia comes back into her own as
powerful European state, as is Ger.
tain to be the case. she will not sub.
nit to being cut off from the Baltic
CT from the Black Sea by newl,
erected states carved out Of her forme,
TERRITORY. The separatist feeling ane