New Mexico state record. (Santa Fe, N.M.) 1914-19??, 1920-10-08

great strength 10 VI ch
an enemy or to launch an attack. 1helr poru
are on warm water" always open 10 traue
Sebastopol is only 200 miles from Constantinopie
The allies have in the near east large mihtar!
stores, as Lloyd George announced IN his speeci
TO the house of commons. The sovlets, IN theii
various proposals to restore relations win UREA
Britain, have insisted upon surrender of Wrangeis
forces, thus admitting the correctness OF 'he
British prime minister's characterization Vi
Wrangel's movements as formidable" Further
more. the Communist central committee In Moscow
telegraphed to all its branches on July ~ OF TINS
year:
Ellis (Wrangels) offensive has already caused
the soviet republic great difficulties. Each success
OF the general, even the most modest one, depri'es
Soviet Russia of great quantities of grain, coal and
oil, and spells a spread of starvation, restitution
lack of fuel and destruction Of transport. Inc
Communist party should understand that a liqulda-
tion Of General Wrange's undertaking is an ap-
solute necessity for Soviet Russia"
AS n fighting force the new army Will depehu
mainly on The Cossacks. 1t was Denikine's failure
TO hold the allegiance of these warriors, coupled
with endless dissension behind his lines among MS
politicians, that wrecked his hopes of overthrow
ing the soviet.
Wrangel's arrangement with the COssacks al
lows for their complete independence in their do
nestle and civil affairs. According TO an agree
ment made on April - of this year the Hetman OF
the Don Cossacks recognizes Wrangel as highest
military chief in return for this autonomy ana
Wrangcl agrees to consult the Iletman on all ne
gotiations with foreign powers on questions per.
tanning 10 Cossack troops and territories.
Thus Wrangel begins by avoiding the great MIS-
take of Denikine. He seeks cooperation of all
foes of the bolsheviki, but not domination over
them.
My slogan is" he said, with whomsoever you
please, but for Russia"
He has before him the lesson of the shattering
of Denikine's hopes, In whose campaigns he played
a brilliant part. What The causes of that failure
were, he himself has put thus:
Summing them up, it may be said that strategy
was sacrificed to politics. and those politics we're
no good at all. Instead Of uniting all the forces
that made 1t their aim TO combat bolshevism, and
instead Of pursuing one Russian policy, without
any party affiliations, there was a Volunteer army
policy, a sort of private politics whose leaders saw
in all that did not bear the stamp of the Volunteer
army enemies of Russia. They fought the bolshe-
Wiki. and they fought the Ukrainians. G~eorgians
md Azerbaijans. And 1t would not have taken
much to have started war with the Cossacks, too,
who composed half of our army and with their
blood cemented the connection with the regular
troops on the battlefield"
The territories of the Cossacks were enguIfed
I'm the sweep of the Red armies toward the Cauca-
sus. They represent still. however. according to
,beir spokesman in Paris, V. A. Kharlamoy, a
force of several scores of thousands of fighting
men.
As for the attitude of the Cossacks toward boil
sheyist rule, NJ. Kharlamov says:
"The democracy of Europe should remember
This: The Cossacks are unable TO accept the So
Wet regime; they are organically incapable Of be-
coming Communists. The Cossacks are in their
overwhelming majority thrifty farmers. There is
no such thing as a Cossack proletariat in existence.
The Cossack Is by nature an individualist, holding
very dear his personal liberty. Not In vain did
the revolution affect the Cossacks. They are going
TO defend their freedom, their rights and liberties
with all their might"