Montpelier examiner. [volume] (Montpelier, Idaho) 1895-1937, 1920-10-08

an enemy or To launch an attack. Their ports
are ON warn water" always open 20 Ia1e'
Sebastopol is only 200 miles from Constantlnopie'
The allies have in the near east large mhltary
stores as Lloyd George announced in his speech
to the house of commons. The soviets, IN tnelL
various proposals to restore relations with Great
Britain, have insisted upon surrender OF Nransei
forces, thus admitting the correctness OF the
British prime minister's Characterization OF
Wrangel's movements as formidable" Further
more, the Communist central committee IN MOSCOW
telegraphed to ali its branches July 10 OF tnis
years
His (Wrangels) offensive has already caused
the soviet republic great difficulties Each success
of the general, even the most modest one, deprves
Soviet Russia of great quantities of grain, coal anu
oil, and spells spread Of starvation. desttution
lack OF fuel and destruction OF transport. Inc
Communist party should understand that nQuida-
ton Of General Wrangel's undertaking is an aO-
solute necessity for Soviet Russia"
AS lighting force the new army will depend
mainly on the Cossacks. 1t was Denikines failure
to hold the allegiance of these warriors, coupled
with endless dissension behind his lines among his
politicians that wrecked his hopes of overthrow
ing the soviet.
Wrangels arrangement with the Cossacks ale
lows for their complete independence in their do
nestle and civil affairs. According to an agree
ment made on April 13 Of this year the Hetman OF
the Don Cossacks recognizes Wrangel as highest
military chief In return for this autonomy and
vs.
gotiations with foreign powers on questions per
tanning to Cossack troops and territories.
Thus Wrangel begins by avoiding the great mis-
take of Deniline. He seeks cooperation of all
foes of the bolsheviki, but not domination over
them.
my slogan is" he said, "with whomsoever you
please, but for Russia"
He has before him the lesson of the shattering
of Denikine's hopes, in whose campaigns he played
q brilliant part What the causes OF that failure
were, he himself has put thus:
Summing them up, 1t may be said that strategy
was sacrificed to politics, and those politics were
no good at ALL Instead of uniting all the forces
that made It their aim to combat bOlshevism and
instead OF pursuing one Russian policy, without
any party affiliations, there was Volunteer army
policy, sort of private politics whose leaders saw
in all that did not bear the stamp Of the Volunteer
army enemies Of Russia. They fought the boisha-
Wiki. and they fought the Ukrainians Georgians
and Azerbaijans. And 1t would not have taken
much to have started war with the Cossacks too
who composed half of our army and with their
blood cemented the connection with the regular
troops on the battlefield"
The territories of the Cossacks were engnlfed
In the sweep of the Red armies toward the Cauca-
sus They represent still, however, according TO
their spokesman In Paris, " A. Kharlan1ov a
force of several scores of thousands' of lighting
men.
AS for the attitude Of the Cossacks toward bol-
shevist rule. n Kharlamov says:
1.-THE democracy OF Europe should remember
this: The Cossacks are unable to accent The so
Wet regime; they are organically Incapable of be-
coming Communists The Cossacks are In their
overwhelming majority thrifty farmers. There il
no such thing Cossaek proletariat in existence
The Cossack Is by nature individualist, holding
very dear his personal liberty. Not in vain ara
the revolution affect the Cossacks They are going
to defend their freedom their rights and liberties
with all their might"