Little Falls herald. [volume] (Little Falls, Morrison County, Minn.) 1889-1950, 1920-02-06

Continued from page three. z
allied armies were to be employed In
q converging action. IT.: &
It should be recorded that although
this general offensive was fully out
lined at the conference no one present
expressed the opinion that the final
victory could be won In 1913. In fact,
it was believed by the Meuse- Argonne
attack could not be pushed much be-
yond Monfaucon before the arrival of
winter would force a cessation Of op-
erations. .>-. -.
The choice between the two sectors,
that east Of the A1sne, including the
Argonne forest, or the Champagne
sector, was left to me. In my opinion.
no other allied troops had the morale
or the offensive spirit to overcome
successfully the difficulties to be met
in the Meuse-Argonne sector, and our
plans and installations had been pre-
pared for an expansion of operations
in that direction. So the Meuse-Ar-
COME front was chosen. The entire
sector of $50 kilometers of front ex-
tending from Port-sur-Seille, least of
the Moselle. west to include. the Ar
gonne forest, was accordingly placed
under my command, including all
French divisions then in that zone.
The first American army was to pro-
coed with the st. Mihiel operation,
after which the operation between the
Meuse and the western edge of the
Argonne forest was to be prepared
and launched not later than Septem-
Der Is.
On the night Of September II the
troops of the first army were deployed
in position. On the southern face Of
the salient was the first corps, Ma
jor General Liggett commanding, with
the eighty-second, ninetieth, fifth and
second divisions in line, extending
from the Moselle westward.
On it's left was the fourth corps,
Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman COM
manding, with the eighty-ninth, forty
second and first divisions, the left Of
this corps being opposite Montsec.
These two army corps were to deliver
the principal attack, the line pivoting
on the center division of the first
corps. The first division on the left
Of the fourth corps, was charged with
the double mission of covering it's own
flank while advancing some twenty
kilometers due north toward the heart
of the salient, where it was to make
contact with the troops Of the fifth
corps. -
On the western face of the salient
lay the fifth corps, Maj. Gen. George
III. Cameron commanding, with the
twenty-sixth division, fifteenth French
Colonial division and the fourth d.
vision in line, from Mouilly west to
Les Eparges and north to Wantron-
vile. OF these three divisions the
twenty-sixth alone was to make a
deep advance directed southwark to-
ward Vigneulles. The French division
was to make short progression to
the edge of the heights in order to
cover the left Of the twenty-sixth.
The fourth division was not to ad-
vance.
In the center between our fourth
and fifth army corps, was the second
French Colonial corps, Maj. Gen. E. j.
Blondlat commanding, covering front
of 40 kilometers with three small
French divisions. These troops were
to follow up the retirement of the en-
envy from the tip of the salient.
At dawn on Sept. IL, after four hours
Of violent artillery fire of preparation,
and accompanied by small tanks, the
infantry Of the first and fourth corps
advanced. The infantry of the fifth
corps commenced it's advance at 8 a.
M. The operation was carried out with
entire precision. Just after daylight
on Sept. 13 elements Of the first and
twenty-sixth divisions made junction
near Hattonchatel and Vigneulles,
eighteen kilometers northeast of ST..
Mihiel. The rapidity with which our
divisions advanced overwhelmed the
enemy and all detectives were reached
by the afternoon of Sept. -. We cap
tured nearly 10000 prisoners, 443 guns
and large stores Of material and sup
plies. The energy and swiftness with
which the operation was carried out
enabled us to smother opposition to
such an extent that we suffered less
than 1000 casualties during the actual
period of the advance.
The material results of the victory
achieved were very important. An
American army was an accomplished
fact, and the enemy had felt it's power.
No form Of propaganda could over
come the depressing effect on the
morale of the enemy of this demon
stration of our ability to organize a
large American force and drive it sue
cessfully through his defenses. It gave
our troops implicit confidence in their
superiority and raised their morale to
the highest pitch. For the first time
wire entahglements ceased to be re-
garded as impossible barriers and
open-warfare training, which had been
so urgently insisted upon, proved to be
the correct doctrine. Our divisions