davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-12-05
STEEL AND IRON
SHOW WEAKNESS
Rails and Pipe Noted as Ex-
ception-Large Order
for Copper.

NEW YORK, December THE steel
market displays q weak tone, aside
from some steadiness in rails and
pipe. with demand very slow. More
independent companies have reduced
their prices to a basis with the Steel
Corporation and quotations are more
nearly normal than for many months
Lower prices have not helped BUSH
ness, however. and in some cases in
dependent mills are going on short
time. Plates, shapes and bars are all
lower. while wire il very weak and
some of the finished products are SELL
ing even with the raw material.
Pig iron is also weak because of
poor demand and continued reselling
at concessions. Some of the furnaces
are trying to meet this competition,
but find little business. Cancellations
are being receivedy and most of the
business n in thesway of filling old
Europe Blass for topper.
It IL reported that about million
pounds Of copper have been sold by
shipment at $3.50. delivery to Euro.
pean consumers. The larger agencies
have not met this figure, however, and
rather better feeling was reported
toward the end of the week, with the
1f.tcAI Uu6iS SCHcTdHy
for deliveries during the first quarter.
Cuftailment continues. and it is esti-
mated that the smelter output OF the
country Is now little over 95,00o.ooo
pouhds per month, while exports are
running smaller. with prospects of a
further decrease. owing to recent re-
ductir in the production of Mexico
and SO dth America.
Tin is somewhat steadief, following
price reductions early in the week. as
sellers are not pressing goods on ac-
count of, the Improvement in London
and Straits.
Lead Dreps, Zine Easier.
Lead prices dropped to 5ls cents by
leading producers, with offerings as
lew as ~ in the open market. Buy
ers show more interest in the decline.
Zinc was easier early in the week,
but improved on better demand,
chiefly from galvaniEers, for Deeefn-
beriMafch shipment. Despite the
large stocks on hand, there is little
pressure to sell. and further cuftail-
ment is noted. 1t is expected that an
nual production will fall to 100000
tons.
Anthony was unchanged through
the week, with little business re-
ported.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-12-05

avenue northwests rent reduced from
$65 70 5000 q month. Agnes fvey,
Edward e. Jordan OF apartment No.
2. 1921 T street forthwest. rent re-
duced from SIS to $5S q month.
Gardner & Dent, Inca defendant.
Mary c. PittmAn OF apartment No.
1891. the Chaushont. 1855 / street
northwest, rent reduced from $50 to
PENDANT.
Thomas J. w. Brown Of apartment
No. sos Willard Courts, 1916 nth
street northwest: rent reduced from
$72.50 to SIS a month. Union Realty
Corporation, defendant.
Mary A. Mason Of 1sil / street
northwest; rent reduced from $S5 to
$50 month. Allan E. Walker 4 Co.
denied possession of premises.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-12-05
NEW YORK COFFEE.

NEW YORK, December 4.-The
market for coffee futures lost a few
points Of its recent rally during to-
days trading. There appeared to be
little pressure and general business
was quiet. but after opening at a
decline of I to 4 points active months
sold about to 10 points below last
nights close. with March touching
7,3+. The general list showed a net
decline Of 8 to IL points.
Spot coffee quiet; Rio Is, Z; Santos
~, i0a18A. Victoria shippers were
said to be asking $50 for coffees
which were previously offered at $40
American credits. but otherwise little
change was reported In the cost and
freight situation.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-12-05
"WHIsKY" WAS WATER.

SAN FRANCISCO, December A.
Investigation by customs authorities
Of q shipment OF whisky billed at ap-
proximately $4,000 from this city to
shanghai revealed the barrels were
filled with coiored water. The ship
ment was being loaded when the gov
eminent officials halted 1t. and ex-
amined each Of the twenty seven
barrels In the lot. Arrests are ex-
pected.
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-12-05
NEW YORK DRY GOODS.

NEW YORK. December 4-The dry.
goods market was more stable today,
with continuous buying. at low price
levels apparently spreading. Cotton
guods were steadier and cotton yarns
Q,tiet. BurlSps were dull. but knit
goods showed Increased activity. The
wool foods trsde awaited action IN
Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-12-05
$50 FIRST $50
MORTGAGE NOTES

Secured on District Of Columbia homes. in sums
Of 81 80 to $4,000 Money. like sugar. Is a
commodity. subject to rise and tall. accOfdih4
to supply and demand. INVEST NOW-At The
peak. BE assured OF 81 for 90 month";. Title,
Insurance aid tax papers furnished. interest
RENTED the day due.
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01
Berlin Knew, However, Who
the Real Master Was at
General Headquarters

such self-sacrifice at once imperative.
and also hopeless.
Ludendorff had sounder idoo,
about Russia than most of the cbe-
German leaders. He wanted n a..
the border states as recruit;,,
grounds for soldiers and lahororg
But the German and Austrian statss
men were concerned only about mar.
titioning them. He distrusted ~.
policy of fomenting Bolshey;st -o,
olution in Russia proper, and wonll
have been glad to make terms With d,
conservative government. Ike Ko
rensky's, or the government which
might have resulted if Kornllor had
displaced Kerenaky. IN 1918 ba
favored combining with the Den Cos.
sacks and the Jkrainians, seizir9
Moscow and over.hyowre Leaine.
But the Berlin politicians had -bei.
way, with the result tha. onlv Fi,-
land became a real ally Of Germa7v
and Lenine and Trotzky. though BRO
Tossing friendship, sent agents an3
funds into Germany 70 foment
proletariat revolution.
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01
The Field Marshal Got the Glory
But His Subordinate
Did the Work

visage. The German populace re-
sponded to an atavistic instinct when
they rushed to drive gold and silver
nails into monstrous wooden images
Of him before which they worshiped.
Ludendorff, on the other hand, was
a highly trained General Staff Of
ficer. Before the war he had been
picked for assignment to the Military
Operations Division. He fell into
6isfavor with the civil government
in 1912 by strongly insisting on add
ing three more divisions to the stand
ing army. when the last increase in
its strength was authorized by the
Reichstag. He was thereupon de-
tached from General Staff headquar-
ters in Berlin aud sent on garrison
duty.
He was also a commoner. 1t is
evident that the Kaiser disliked him.
Admiral Won Tirpitz says SO bluntly
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01
Relations With Falkenhayn

Falkenhayn was more of a cour-
tier and a politician than a soldier.
He evidently disliked Ludendortf.
The latter speaks considerably of
Moltke, although he accuses him of
being a "pacifst.' Of Falkenhayn
he has nothing good to say. The
animosity Of Grand Headquarters
toward Ludendorff was exhibited in
the arrangements for the great East
ern offensive Of 1915. In the winter
months Ludendorff had won the bril-
liant victory of the Masurian Lakes.
But, in spite of that, Hindenhurg
was consigned to a minor role in the
East. Mackensen received an indie
pendent command and won the battle
of the Dunajec. Later Prince Luit-
pold of Bavaria was sent to Poland
to take over another group Of
armies. Hindenburg remained in
charge only of the inactive northern
wing
Ludendorff had suggested an en-
velopment operation from East Prus-
sla, with kovno as the objective A
success there would have trapped
most Of the Grand Duke Nicholas's
forces on the Vistula front. But
falkenhayn stood out for frontal
attack in Galicia. This succeeded,
but brought about no development.
The Russian armies retreated out of
the Polish salient. A vast territory
was overrun and several hundred
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01

with him and not with the Field
Narshal. There is no mention in
-hese two big volumes of any act of
initiative on Hindenburg's part, ex-
'cept one. Ludendorff says that
every document to be presented to
the Field Marshal for signature had
first to be countersigned by himself.
A painful accident happened in
October, 1918. A proclamation to
the troops denouncing one of the
Wilson notes which preceded the
armistice was Inadvertently signed
first by Hindenburg. Ludendorfr
countersigned it and a few copies of
it got out. This proclamation was
made the basis of demand by the
Kaiser for Ludendorff's resignation,
not for Hindenburg's. Berlin knew
we'll enough who was the real mas
ter at General Headquarters.
So did Ludendorff, for that mat
ter, He says, perhaps carelessly,
discussing a difference he had with
Chancellor Hertling in January,
1918, when the Chancellor was try
ing to prevent the High Command
from debating terms to Lenine and
Trotzky at Brest-Litovsk:
"Unfortunately, in public, the
government did not state sufficiently
clearly and emphatically that it, and
not General Ludendorf, was in
supreme command"
Again, after Bethmann-H Hollweg's
fall, to which he contributed, he re-
ports that many people urged him
to become Chancellor, thus round
ing out his dictatorship. But he
felt that he already had more than
enough to do and dreaded having to
come into close contact with the
democratic" factions in the Reichs-
tag
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01
How Germany Lost

Ludendorff seldom minimized his
power. except to escape the conse-
quences Of his mistakes. But it Is
necessary for him to minimize it in
order to divide with others respon-
sibility for the fatal decision TO re-
sumo unrestricted submarine war
fare. He and Hindenburg opposed
such a renewal when they took over
the High Command, late in the sum-
mer Of 1916. The illegal use of the
submarine was definitely suspended
in April, 1916, by the German reply
to President Wilson's Sussex note.
The United States had threatened
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01
Verdu1n and Runaauia

Verdun avenged Ludendorf.
Falkenhayn used up his last credit
there, Ludendorff doesn't rub in
Falkenhayns failure vindictively
He says that from the strategical
point Of view, Verdun as the point
OF attack was we'll chosen" But he
adds that the initial success was in
sufficiently exploited and that the
offensive should have been broken
off Immediately it began to assume
the character of a battle Of attri-
tion'-that is, late in March or
early in April.
Falkenhayn, after his removal as
chief Of staff, was let down with a
command in the offensive against
Rumania, under LudendorN's direc-
tions. The latter hardly mentions
his work on the Balkan front. Mack
ensen was soon put over him and
thereafter he vanished from the
scene Ludendorff consistently
praises Mackcnsen. He says, how
ever, thar the Bulgarian campaign
would have been far more decisive
if the Teuton left wing had origi-
nally penetrated Moldavia, taking
the Rumanian armies in Walla-
CHA in the rear. This ambitious
plan couldn't be carried through be
cause of the poor fighting quality of
the Austrian First Army, under
Archduke Charles, which was sta
toned east of Falkenhayn's Ninth
Army, toward the Moldavian from
tier.
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01
endorffs Book Proves Hindenburg Was Fi@urehea

with a great show of personal con-
slderation. He says:
For four years the Field Marshal
and worked like one man, in the
most perfect harmony. The
Field Marshal permitted me to share
his glory. At the celebration Of his
seventeen birthday, on October 2,
1917, be expressed this sentiment in
particularly touching words. {.
Our strategical and tactical views
were in complete agreement, and
harmonious and confident co0pera-
ton was the natural result. After
discussion with my assistants I used
to lay my ideas for the initiation and
conduct of all operations briefly and
concisely before the Field Marshal.
l have the satisfaction of knowing
that from Tannenberg to my rcsig-
nation in October. 1913, he alaoays
agreed avith my vieacs and approved
my draft orders."
Any one without an insight into
the German character, with its un-
bounded respect for mere appear
ance Of authority and for the HER
archy Of birth and rank, would think
these phrases subtly ironic. Prob
ably they are sincere.
The Real Master
But Ludendortf's gratitude for
being allowed to share the Field
Marshal's glory didn't blind him to
the fact that the zeal power lay
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01
LudendorH as 1actician

Ludendorff's book indicates that
he took keen interest in tactics
and was quick to utilize experience
IN varying them. He greatly modi-
fed the German defensive on the
Western front in the fall Of 1916
and winter of 1917. His many in
genious adaptations to meet cond-
tions caused by the gre wing power
Of the offensive, due to the massing
Of heavy guns and the introduction
Of tanks, had enabled the Germans
to hold that front successfully all
through 1917. He was wise enough
also to order the retirement to the
Siegfried or Hindenburg line in
March, 1917. His discussions Of
tact;cs are always enlightening. The
Allies borroweda his methods later,
as they had had to initiate the
original German defense for fixed
positions in 1915.
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01

thousand prisoners were taken. But
no decision against Russia was
achieved.
General Won Hoffman,, one of the
ablest of Ludendorff' lieutenants,
said at the close of the war that
the Eastern campaign Of 1915 failed
in the large sense because Of Falken-
hayn's poor judgment in not direct
ing the main attack against Kovno,
instead of Lemberg and Warsaw.
Had the northern development been
tried, he held, peace Of surrender
could have been forced on Russia
by the end of 1915. Ludendorf
doesn't criticize Falkenhayn so
bluntly, but indicates a substantial
agreement with HoFmann's view.
Discussing his dissatisfaction with
the minor role assigned him in 1915,
he says:
although we had not the same
free hand IN conducting the opera
tions of the summer campaign Of
1915 as in previous campaigns, but
followed the plans laid down by
instructions Of General Headquar-
ters, there still remained an enor-
nous amount Of work for me to do,
and the necessity Of forming and
executing number Of decisions,
both great ard small. Added to
this were differences of opinion with
General Won Falkenllayn, such as are
only too likely to occur between
men of independent views, but which
made it more than ever incumbent
on me to carry out most punctili-
ously the plans Of General Head
quarters, which we're opposed to
mine, rather than my own or those
that conceded with mine"
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01
The Russian Problem

Through 1917, while the subma-
rlne campaign was slackening in eff
fectiveness and Russia, in revolution,
was drawing out of the contest,
Ludendorff must have reflected
repeatedly on the tragic blunder of
the renewal Of unrestricted subra-
rine warfare. Germany was now
winning the war in the East without
effort. Why had he conjured up an
other enemy who might prevent
either q draw or a favorable decision
in the West? All through this pc
riod he RACES at the weakness of
Germany's allies and the shortcom-
ings of the civilian government. He
forced Bethmann-Hollweg out of
Office. But he got in exchange only
Michaelis and Hertling-who still
tried to placate democratic sentiment
at home and sought to hold aloot
from him as thiniy disguised mill
tary dictator. His constant com
plant is that the government and
the people wouldn't go to the ex-
treme limit Of self sacrifice in sup
porting the war. He never recalls
the fact that his own folly had made
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01

that he was no longer averss to run
ming amuck against all shipping,
neutral as we'll as enemy. The
Chancellor became alarmed and
tried to reassert his own power and
responsibility in the matter, since
C-boat warfare, owing to its effect
on neutrals, involved question of
diplomatic as well as Of purely mill
tary policy.
After the conquest of Rumania
Ludendorff's prestige greatly in
creased. He now dropped the pre-
tence that Denmark and Holland
might invade Germany. The United
States was still the only power
likely to resent a withdrawal of the
guarantees contained in the Sussex
agreement. Ludendortf foresaw this
possibility; anybody but blind man
could foresee it. But he resolved to
take a chance. A breach with the
United States, he argued, "would in
volve an addition to the armed
forces Of the Entente of five or six
divisions in the first year after the
United States entered the war"
Further than that his calculations
didn't go, apparently, although in
his book he adds that "later on, it
the submarine war did not have
decisive effect" there would be "a
serious, indeed a vital, increase in
the strength of the enemy"
That was an afterthought, un-
doubtedly, for Ludendorff seems to
have yielded too easily to the SAN
Culne representations of Admiral
Holtzendorff. The Field Marshal told
the Chancellor that a renewal of un-
restricted warfare was Essential" !"
The Chancellor made protest,
again claiming joint responsibility
for decision. Ludendortf, through
Hindenburg, insisted that the ques-
ton had become one of military pol
icy, and gave notice that he would
aDrool m tka X aicar
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01

to break OFF diplomatic relations
with Germany if U-boat operations
against passenger ships like the
Sussex were continued.
No other nation had made SINH
lar threat. Yet LudendorR disin-
genuously intimates that fear of
conflict with the United States had
nothing to do with the prudent pol
.cy which he and Hindenburg adopt
ed just after they assumed general
command
Chancellor Rethmann-H Hollwcg was
strongly opposed to the submarine
gamble. lie was being pressed by
Tirpitz, one of his most vigorous
enemies, and even by Holtzendorff,
chief of the naval staff, who was his
personal friend, to abandon the pol
icy outlined in the Sussex corre-
spondence. He sought support from
the new chief of staff, and got it.
But LudenGorff says, discussing the
decision reached in the conference
on August 80, 1916:
"Only with extreme regret could
we refuse to pronounce in favor of
unrestricted submarine warfare, on
the ground that in the opinion of
the Chancellor it might possibly
lead to war with Denmark and Hol-
land"
This was ridiculous subterfuge.
Denmark and Holland had no war
like intentions. Ludendorff adds:
eve had not man to spare to
protect ourselves against these
states, and, even if their armies
we're unaccustomed to war, they
were in position to invade Ger
many and give US our deathblow.'
Denmark and Holland were treat
ed as formidable military powers.
The United States was dismissed as
a negligible quantity.
Bethmann-Hollweg was delighted
at getting the backing of the new
war chiefs. He greatly strength
ened his own position by announc-
ing in the Reichstag on September
%, 1916, that thenceforth any re-
sumption of unrestricted U-boat
warfare would depend on the deci-
sion Of the Field Marshal-that is,
on Ludendorff's decision. He hoped
that Ludendorf would remain firm
in the belief that war with Amer
ica should be avoided at all costs.
If LudendorfF had had the sagacity
to support that policy to the end
Germany probably would have been
able to bring the war to draw
victory for hereafter Russia de-
serted the Allies.
Ludendorff thought that Beth
mann-Hollweg had taken advantage
of him by making Hindenburg the
final judge as to the expediency Of
ruthless submarine campaign.
Out of resentment or under pres
sure from the U-boat extremists he
soon changed front considerably
and gave Hollvec reason 10 believe
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01
The Decision at Pless

On January 9, 1917, the step was
taken which made German defeat
certain. A council was held at
Pless, the Kaiser presiding Hin
denburg and Holtzendorff demanded
q return to the unrestricted use of
the submarine. Bethmann-H -Hollweg
was left without support. He
foundered about and finally said:
If the military authorities regard
it as essential, am not in a posi-
ton to withstand them"
SO the die was cast. Ludendorff's S
subsequent bitter attacks on the
civil government (his work is full
Of them) lose most Of their force in
'-iew of the fact that he overrode
the civilian authorities in order to
commit the colossal blunder to which,
above al others, Germany was ia
owe her defeat.
Ludendorff says that Bethmann-
Hollweg did actually advise" the
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01
The Eastern Campaigns

The Eastern Campaigns
Our War Department records
Tow that in fighting with the Ger
lans the American armies captured
3,079 prisoners and lost 4,4S4
risoners. Yet Ludendorff is unwill-
ing to give them credit for a single
successful engagement. He passes
over almost without notice the great
Argonne-Meuse offensive, in which
the American armies broke the Ger
man defense on the upper Meuse
and had nearly severed direct COM
munications between the northern
and southern German army group
when the Germans confessed defeat
by signing the armistice.
Ludendcrf is more candid in the
parts Of the book in which he
doesn't feel the need Of CLOSING
over his responsibility for Germany's S
failure. He tells the first complete
story Of the Tannenberg campaign
--lcng obscured by popular legends.
Tannenberg was successful Gamma
operation, after the Schlietfen
model. In order to envelop Sam
sonoff's army Ludendorf stripped
bare the German line confronting
Rennenkampf He took risks which
he probably would have taken except
against the Russians.
Samsonoff's center, facing west
southwest, was held, while his left
wing was completely turned ard his
communications toward Poland were
cut. The German forces drawn from
the Rennenkampf front then en-
circled his right wing and came up
in his rear Virtually an entire
Russian army was destroyed. Ninety
thousand prisoners were taken. Rem
nenkampf, a sluggish commander,
idn't lift a hand to extricate Sam
sonoff. "He need only have closed
With us and we would have been
beaten,' says Ludendorff But
against the Germans the Russians
were too poorly trained and poorly
led ever to have any chance in the
offensive.
Tannenberg made Hindenburg the
great German war hero. After elm.
mating Samsonoff Ludendorff turned
on Rennenkampf and drove him out
of East Prussia, capturing $4,000
prisoners. Thereafter, for long
time, fortune seemed to turn against
him. The two invasions Of Poland
in the fall and winter of 1914 were
only partial successes. The failure
to reach Warsaw excited much un-
favorable criticism at Grand Head
quarters in the West, where Falken-
hayn was now in charge. Won Tir-
pitz says that on one occasion the
Kaiser started East to denote Hin
Genburg and was prevented from
doing so only by the intercession of
the Kaiserin, who overlook him be-
fore he had carried out his purpose.
New-York tribune., 1920-02-01

submarine campaign. He did so be-
cause further resistance on his part
would have been futile. Austria
Hungary also approved it. But
Count Czernin stated in 1918 that
he, too, had given reluctant ad
herence only because he wanted to
avoid a quarrel with Germany.
Ludendorff says now that he
didn't "accept literally" the Admi-
ralty's glowing assurances as to the
efficacy of the new submarine cam
paign. But he told Czernin in 1917
that he had no doubts on that point.
He also confesses that he counted
On "a decisive effect within twelve
months" Yet within six months the
failure of the campaign was obvi-
Gus. Russia was about to take her
self out Of the war. Ludendorf had
invited in new enemy ten times
more powerful than Russia.
The authors chagrin at his fatal
miscalculation is scrupulouslv con-
cealed. He never acknowledges the
gravity Of his error. But his feel
irg is disclosed in his many sighting
references to the work of the Amer
lean armies on the Western front.
The only real military value he
sllows to the Americans is that by
'eplacing French and British troops
\ quiet sectors they released the
tier for active service.