Norwich bulletin., 1920-09-02

Temporary injunction against the city of Norwich and in favor of the drivers of public service autmobiles was granted by Judge George E. Hinman of the superior court in a decision he handed down in a suit brought by the jitney drivers.
 The Injunction is against the resolution passed by the common council to discon- tinue Rose alley as parking place for the jitneys, against the section of the new traffic ordinance establishing H. cense fee, and against the so-called "ex- clusion'' ordinance which would pre- vent the jitneys from doing business on certain streets in the central part of the city. However, there is no injunction now against the ordinance that. locates public jitney stands. The other claims for injunctive relief, applying to other sections of the new city ordinance, are found to be without merit
 In the languange of his finding Judge Hinman indicates that the new ordin- ance was lame in the exclusion" section because this was not the establishing of traffic routes" within the meaning of section 30 of the motor vehicle law of 1919 He rules that the power of muni- cpality to fix traffic routes cannot be exercised merely along the line of exclu- sion. but that there must be fixing of routes.
 In conformity with this line of reason ing it seems apparent that the city can make an effective exclusion. ordin- ance by drawing it up in such form as to fix traffic routes and not merely to ex- clude the iitneys from certain streets
 Judsc Hinman's Finding.
 memorandum of finding:
 
 the public vehicle stands mentioned in the resolution passed August 5, 1920, and set forth in paragraph 6 of the complaint, of said resolution is attacked by the plaintiffs on the ground that any such discontinuance or other amendment of section 15 of the ordinance of November 3. 1919. must be by ordinance instead of resolution. The power given municipali- ties by section 30, chapter 233 public acts of 1919. to establish stands for public service motor vehicles may be exercises by ordinance only and the powers granted to the city by section IS of its charter are to enact ordinances relating to traf- fic and the use of streets. An ordinance may be amended only by ordinance or a resolution passed with all the formali- ties and published in the same manner as a ordinance. (Dillon Municipal Corpora ton, chapter 571).
 The discontinuance of stands designat- ed in said ordinance is-notwithstanding the attempted creation of the right to dis continue same by said ordinance. It is not claimed that said resolution was pass. ed and published in the same manner as an ordinance, and it is therefore ineffec. tive. Hense enforcement of said attempt ed discontinuance of the stands mention ed in said resolution should. so far a: i enforcement depends on said resolution | be enjoined. The amendment of sai( section when said ordinance becomes ef fective. does not appear to be unreason able as to the location ad extent of tht | public stands therein designated and 1t! enforcement will not now be enjoined. The ordinance set forth as sub-divi siop (b) in paragraph 10 of the com plaint purports, from language employt | in section thereof, to provide for Ii cense Ito receive passengers for hire and the requirements of such licens would probably be permissible as to pub lie service motor vehicles under the de cision in State. vs. Scheidler, 91 Conn 234 The ordinance, in it's entirity, how