New-York tribune., 1920-08-30
The Marne and The VistuLa
By Frank II. Simonds

The unmistakable resemblance of
the results of the recent battle of the
Vistula to those of the First Battle of
the Marne have led to not few at
tempts to establish between the two q
stragetic resemblance. On the whole.
however, it is clear that there are diff
ferences almost as great as the sim
ilarities.
Tho Marne campaign, on the Ger
man side, was dominated by the
Schlieffen conception of bringing off
in northern France something resem-
bling Hannibals achievement at the
Battle of Gamma. The two wings of
the German host, one advancing
through Belgium, the other through
Lorraine, were to envelop the Allied
armies, surround and capture them.
The essential detail was the superior
lty in German numbers obtained by
the incorporation of reserves with ac-
tive formations. 1t was failure to
foresee this which led to French mis-
fortunes, because only by such an ex-
preston of numbers were the Germans
able to extend their front far enough
west to envelop the British and French
in Belgium.
Nevertheless, Joffres retreat enabled
the western armies of the Allies to es-
cape from one arm of the German en-
brace, while French victories in Lor-
raine definitely arrested the other
arm. By the end of August Moltke
was forced to recognize that envelop-
ment was no longer possible, and he
sought to substitute a double move
ment attack upon Paris by the armies
Of Kluck and Btilow and on the French
center by those of Hausen and Wlr-
temberg.
But Kluck, deliberately disobeying
Moltke's orders, adventured south of
the Marne and opened his flank to
French troops in Paris. In doing this
he was still adhering to the original
"Canna" conception. This Kluck
maneuver opened the way for the
French thrust out of Paris by Mau-
noury's army, but Kluck, perceiving
the peril, reacted with amazing swift
ness and promptly checked the Maui
noury attack upon his flank. Unhap-
PLY for him, however, to stop Maui
noury he had to remove all his masses
from the British front and open gap,
into which the British pressed with de-
clsive consequence by September 8.
Now, when one turns to the Boshe-
visit strategy, it is plain that there is
more than suggestion of German.
The whole Russian operation was COM
pretended in double thrust on both
fanks-toward Warsaw in the north,
toward Lemberg in the south. 1t is
clear, too, that the Poles, like the
French, misjudged the direction of
the main thrust and concentrated their
best troops, not covering their capital,
but in Galicia, which corresponds to
Lorraine in 1914
AS result the northern forces of
the Poles were overwhelmed and the
Bolshevists rushed in upon Warsaw.
Unlike the Germans, too, they were
able to extend their front. Thus, while
kluck was not able to reach tho Seine
west of Paris and cut off the capital
from the coast, the Bolshevists did
penetrate the Danzig corridor and cut
the Danzig railway. Warsaw was thus
momentarily isolated from the outside
world
Precisely as Joffre drew upon his
Lorraine armies, to reconsttute his
Paris flank. the Poles now drew upon
their Galician armies. In each case a
counter offensive was intended, but in
the Polish case the attack was deliv-
cred, not, as at the Marne, against the
right, but the left flank of the forces
facing the capital. Maunoury in 1914
actually employed the Schlicffen ma
neuver against the Germans, but Pill
sudski, obviously advised by Weygand.