Gunnison news-champion., 1920-01-09

I11l.-.-J1 .--0l7-'1. ~ q -
y esoR = han1w - eamvb -
O0ese - 19an1A - r peos1baA ~
ssoe Q 091sa sftnek = lealy. - -
-, Near - ~ alnn o1ns1f -
0a1ataia ~ s9sasive - IL westsg1
Aust - o. 80 sAals Calninlaos1
se1UagtA 81 aeeale wssl1 pssnst
NeevttAsfasdlae these allie1 attneks
- II wsstsss frest the inneass
piaD - ~ German armies b tAe
east eulnlast1ng q Riga q 0sVt. Z
usecip,taesd De collapse e Rsssaa.
TAe fslIsving Deaths. De Austrians-
With 0esuan assiseance-suspsised the
Italians and broke through tie lines ss
Caporette. dFivins ths Italian armies
back 10 the Piavs riysf. inaicting lers
of $4,000 oea. 100000 ri1es. 1000
guns. and eoormous storea This seri-
ous cfisis compelled the withdrawal Of
ten Preach and British divisions from
the western front to Italy. The Ger
man situation on all other theaten was
% favorable that a. early ~ Novem-
Der they began the movement Of divi-
sions toward the western front II
needed. her divisions could Be With
drawn from the Italian front before
the French and British dared recall
their divisions.
AZ nrst the allies could hardly, hope
for . large American army. Marshal
Joirre during his visit to America had
made special request that q combat
0ivision be sent at once to Europe a.
visual evidence Of our purpose to par
ticipate actively In the war. and also
asked for engineer regiments and other
special service units.
The arrival Of the drst division and
the parade Of certain Of its elements In
Paris on July = caused great enthusi-
asm. and for the time being French
morale was stimulated. Stu. allied
apprehension was deep-seated and ma.
terial assistance was imperative.
outissk DARK fer tStA
A review Of the situation showed
that with Russia out Of the war the
central powers would be able to release
Q large number Of divisions for service
elsewhere. and that during the spring
and summer Of 1918. without interfer-
Ing with the status quo at Saloniki.
they could concentrate on the western
front Q force much stronger than that
Of the allies. In view Of this II was
represented to the war department 10
December a. Of the utmost importance
that the allied preparations be expe-
dited.
Ny conclusion was that. although
the morale Of the German people and
Of the armies was better than Il had
been for two years. only an untoward
combination Of circumstances could
give the enemy . decisive victory be-
fore American support as recommend
ed could be made effective. provided
the allies secured unity Of action.
However. q situation might arise which
would necessitate the temporary use Of
all American troops In the units Of our
allies for the defensive, but nothing ip
the situation Justified the relinquish-
.nenf Of our hfm purpose to form our
own army under our own dag.
While the Germans were practicing
for open warfare and concentrating
their most aggressive personnel In
shock divisions. the training Of the
allies was still limited to trench war
fare. A. our troops were being trained
for open warfare. there was every rea-
son why we could not allow them to b
scattered among our allies. even BY di.
visions, much less a. requirements, ex.
cspt By pressure Of sheer necessity.
Any sort Of permanent smalgamation
would irrevocably commit Americas
fortunes to the hands Of the allies.
Moreover. II was obvious that the lack
e homogenelty would render these
mixed divisions dimcult to maneuver
and almost certain to break up under
stress Of defeat. with the consequent
mutual recrimihation.
Again. there was no doubt that the
realization BY the German people that
independent American divisions. corps,
or armies we're IN the Geld with deter
mined purpose would b severe blow
70 German morale and prestige. Il was
also certain that an early appearance
Ct the larger American units on the
ffpat would b most beneficial to the
morale of the allies themselves.
Accordingly. the drst division. on
Jan. 10. 1915. took over sector north
oe Toul: the twenty-sixth division went
70 ths Soissons front early In rsbru-
an; the foety-second division entered
the line near Luneville. Feb. n, and
he secoad division near verdun.
March 1A Meanwhile, the 6rst army
cseps headquarters, Major Gen. Hunter
Lsgstt commanding. was organised at
Neufchatsau on Jan. 20. and the plan
70 create IN Independent American Sec
toe On The Lorraine front was taking
shape.