Evening star., 1920-01-30
CLEMENCEAUFALL
PARTLY RECALLS
ROOSEVELT IN 1912
Why "Tiger" Lost and What
Is Expected of New
Regime.
BY FRANK H. sIMONDs.

Two questions naturally INTEREST the
| Washington world as result of the
unexpected political developments in
France. These questions are: First
why was Clemenceau defeated. and,
second. what will the new "crew"
! do?
! The defeat of Clemenceau suggests
me american parallel of the defeat OF
| theodore Roosevelt in the republican
national convention of 1912. AT the
| election polls Roosevelt was the
cholce of the republican voters. but
| IN the convention his fate was de-
cided by precisely those politicians
who had been his enemies in the past
and who suffered most at his hands.
| At Versailles Clemenceau's candl-
dacy was passed upon by body made
! up in large part of those men. who
had been his political and personal
| opponents for half a century. Descha-
| mel has borne the marks of Clemen-
ceaus own sword on his own face, and
| there are not a few others VINO pear
| Clemenceau's stamp, physical or YER
bal. Nowhere else could Clemenceau
have been so weak.
| u. s. Delay Hurt Clemenceau.
But there was a second feature. had
! the United States Senate ratified the
! treaty of alliance with Great Britain
| and France, for the guarantee of the
French frontier against Germany, Gle
| menceau would have been triumph
antly elected. even at Versatile. The
| fatal circumstances which cost him
the election, was the widespread feel
ing that he had failed to obtain from
the British and from the Americans
those guarantees which were essentlal
| to French safety. There was feeling
that he had been unduly plant in the
pressure of Lloyd George ana fresl-
dent Wilson, and that as conse-
quence France had Jared less well
in the peace conference than was her
due.
T., AS to the Crew." it is essential to
recognize at the outset that the most
powerful tide in French affairs is now
running in the conservative direction
In Great Britain and in Italy iapor
and socialist parties are respectively
gaining in number and in influence
but in France. as in the onlteo States'
the exact opposite is the case.
i Sane Policy Expected.
In the new administration the man
elected president could hardly have
more influence than his Immediate
predecessor. Deschanel will not be as
important a figure as Millerand, who
succeeds Clemenceau, and 1t is worth
noting was Clemenceaus own selec-
ton. From a Millerand ministry we
may expect a sane domestic policy,
i the absence of anti-clerica! passion,
which might do fatal injury to the
French cause in Alsace-Lorralne we
may expect an earnest and lntelllgent
/ attempt to rescue France, by encour-
/ aging French men to go back 10
/ everyday work.
( But it is idle to suppose that we
shall have any less determined ao-
/ vocacy of French interests, or less
/ aggressive assertion of French pollcy
than we have had during the rule OF
4 Clemenceau. There is no blinking tne
fact that the mass of Frenchmen feel
that France has come out OF the war
on the whole very badly, tnat grave
mistakes have been made, which must
be cured In word, the new min.
istry and the new president elected
may be expected to adopt strons
national program and assert an IN
dependence of allies which Clemeh-
Il ceau never ventured to indulge IN.
/ Bolshevism and socialism were oe-
| cidedly defeated in France in the last
| election; nationalism and conserVa-
| tism were victors. The new president
and the new ministry represent the
| antitheSis of lnternatlonaiituu anu
| radicalism.
| Clemenceau's Weakness Explained.
| Clemenceau's weakness in his own
country grew out of the fact that
while the nation recognized the mag
! nitude of his services during the war
| conceded that he saved the nation ana
| the allied cause. they believed that IN
! the peace conference he failed from
/ the French point of view. because ne
/ yielded too completely to British and
i American influences. More than all
else, this explains his defeat for presi-
dent; since it was felt that as presl-
dent he would. because of his pres
tige and personality, continue to ex-
ercise decisive influence upon
French relations with foreign nations.
AS to Clemenceau himself there can
be no mistaking the fact that he is
glad to lay down the great burden.
He was candidate for the presidency
only because his associates assured
him it was a patriotic duty, ana from
the outset he stipulated that he would
accept election only if it were by ac-
clamation No Frenchman in all the
long and brilliant history of the ma
tion has deserved more of his country
in enduring old gratitude and affec-
ton: but although this is the case,
and despite the fact that petty po-
litical policies contributed to his de-
nized that the ultimate explanation
of the defeat will be found in the
French belief that Clemenceau was
jless successful in making peace than
in making war. and that French in
terests demanded a new and more
vigorous hand.
We shall therefore have to expect
il not any sudden break with the re-
j cent past, a steadily increasing vigor
] in the maintenance of French inter-
] ests against British ideas. and even
against American policies. If Presi-
dent Wilson shall again exercise the
influence and defend the purposes of
, his past campaign.
copyrighted, 1920. by the Mcclure Newspaper
i Syndicate)