Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-08-22
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MARYLAND and Virginia.
All Other States.
The Bolshevik Army.

A dispatch from Paris states that SIX
bolshevik divisions, consisting of from
10000 to 10000 men," are surrounded
by Polish forces between Sievie and
Brest -Litovsk. This gives a line on
the size of the divisions of the red
army and shows that they are much
smaller than those of the regular mil
itarS formations of the present day.
A full American division consists of
approximately 10000 men, or about as
many as are noted as comprising the
six red divisions now entrapped by
the Poles. This indicates that the
bolshevik army is reduced to skele-
ton formation. A division is unit
comprising two or more brigades, each
brigade containing two or more regi.
ments. When Pershing's LIST Division
of the American Army marched along
Pennsylvania avenue last year it num-
bered close to the 10000 point and six
such divisions would have comprised
roughly 100000 troops.
1t is probable that the bolshevik mil
itary organization is loose and dis
jointed. After the breakup in Rus
STA following the revolution against the
ear and the counter revolution of the
bolsheviki few months later in 1917,
the army almost literally went to
pieces. 1t was reorganized upon new
basis. Many of the units elected their
own officers. This plan, however, it
would seem has been changed, and
probably the bolshevik army is now
differed bys men chosen by the min
lister of war at Moscow, headed by
Trotsky. That some of these officers
are Germans has been often asserted,
but it is not established. There should
be no lack of material in Russia for
the formation of an efficient army.
Many hundreds of thousands of Rus
slams have had an extended experience
in war during the past six years. But
probably most Of the old army in 1914
has gone. The casualties suffered by it
were enormous and requirements were
constantly necessary in great numbers.
It was recently stated as result of
observations conducted by Poles that
the Russian plan of campaign was loose
and unscientifc, the columns advancing
almost independently and without any
assured lines of communication. There
has been, of course, a coordination Of
the forces, else the advance to within a
few miles of Warsaw could not have
been effected. Yet the ease with which
the Poles ON making their final stand
broke the Russian lines and turned
them back suggests that there was not
adequate cohesion of plan or action.
The question arises whether there is
something in the Russian temperament
that prevents really efficient military
organization. Early in the war masses
of the ears troops made remark
able advance upon the Germans and
for short time it appeared as though
the "steam roller we're going to crush
its way into Prussia. Hindenburg was
called from his retirement and put in
command in East Prussia and by a few
maneuvers led the Russian army into a
trap and almost annihilated it at the
Mazurian lakes. After that save for
another offensive some months later
in the center of the line the Russian
army was not an important factor in
the allied plan of campaign. In that
offensive the cars troops came close
to inficting staggering blow upon
the Germans, who were being caught
within the jaws of wise. But again
better maneuvering and organization
prevailed, the trap was evaded, and
what had promised to be telling Rus
sian blow was turned into a defeat.
Better generalship, supplied in part
by the French, has apparently counted
in the present campaign. Trotsky, it
would seem, has not as minister of war
effected that military organization that
the bolshevik government requires to
carry its propaganda by force west
ward.