New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1920-05-09

Game" (knopt), constitutes
first of all a scathing indictment of the
practical workings Of secret diplo-
macy. 1t constitutes in the second
place damaging criticism of the
quality of Sir Edward Grey's states
manship..
The author is peculiarly we'll quail
fed to undertake the task in hand. AS
veteran British statesman he has
! long been familiar with the atmos-
phere of the London Foreign Office
and with the trend of Continental poll
tics. At the same time, as he was not
connected with the government dur
ing the war, he does not labor under
the very human temptation to strain
the facts trif1e in order to clear his
own reputation. Moreover. he pos
sesses the calm. dispa ssionate, analyti-
cal cast of mind that is indispensable
for any serious and fruitful historical
analysis.
Earl Loreburn describes in detail
the gradual development of Anglo
cordale" initiated by Lord Lansdowne
into what was practically defensive
military alliance. This alliance, gradu-
ally cemented by secret and informal
military agreements, placed England
under an unacceptable moral obligation
to stand by France when the latter
country was attacked by Germany. And
1T was this alliance, not the violation
OF Belgian neutrality, he says, that
brought England into the war. On
August 1 Sir Edward Grey refused to
give the German Ambassador any as
surance that England would remain
neutral if Belgian neutrality were re-
spected. And on the following day he
promised naval aid to France This
aid obviously, could not have been
given without at least limited par
ticipation in the war. The German
u)timatum to Belgium was delivered on
the evening of August 2.
Lord Loreburn points out very con-
clusively the danger and weakness of
drifting into secret alliance. If Par
Lament had kept. in touch with the
negotiations between the French and
British Foreign Offices it could have
approved or disapproved the strength
ening of the bonds between the two
countries. Had it approved it certain
ly would have felt bound to take steps
to. remedy England's unpreparedness
to create an army able to take part
effectively in a Continental war. Be
ing ignorant of the obligations to
which the couptry was committed it
allowed matters to drift, with the re-
suit that isproportionate share of
the wars burdens was cast upon
France.
Moreover, Sir Edward Grey's lack
of frankness during the critical week
which preceded the outbreak of the
war, while actuated by very sincere
and laudable desire to preserve peace
had directly contrary effect, Lord
Loreburn declares. A plain statement
Of England's intention and obligation
to support France would quite posi-
hly have had restraining influence
Upon the German and Austrian jingoes
lard Loreburn does not share the
=. e".y that Germany wished to precip-
itate a European conflict. The German
and Austrian policy was inexcusably
arrogant and domineering. But the
author quotes from the British White
Book to show that there was per
ccptible slackening of Austria's bellig-
erence on the last two days of July
due presumably to pressure from Ber-
lin. What chance there was of bring
ing Germany to reason, according to
the author, would certainly have been
greatly enhanced if England had made
a clear, definite statement of her po-
s;tion, instead of keeping Doth Fgance
and Ge~ns'A : he. dark as to her