The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1920-07-25
LAYING FOUNDATIONS

were not only constructing war YES
sells on scale which would soon
drive all the German submarines from
the sea. but they were building mer-
chant tonnage so rapidly that, in
March, 1918, more new tonnage was
being destroyed. Thus by this time
the Teutonic hopes of ending the war
by the submarine had utterly coll
lapsed; if the Germans were to win
the war at all, or even to obtain a
peace which would not bS disastrous,
some other programme must be
adopted quickly
Germany Turns Again to the Land.
Disheartened by their failure at
sea, the enemy therefore turned their
eyes once more toward the land. The
destruction of Russian military power
had given the German armies a great
numerical superiority over those of
the Allies. There seem little likeli-
hood that the French or the British,
after three years of frightfully Cruel
ling war, could add materially to their
forces. Thus, with the grouping of
the Powers such as existed in 1917
the Germans had a. tremendous adj
vantage on their side, for Russia,
which German statesmen for fifty
years had feared as a source of in
exhaustible man supply to her enc
mics, had disappeared as military
power. But a new element in the
situation now counter balanced this
temporary gain; that was the daily
increasing Importance of the United
States in the war.
The Germans, who in 1917 had de-
spised us as an enemy, immediate or
prospective, now despised US no
longer. The army, which they de-
clared could never be raised and
trained, was actually being raised and
trained by the millions. The nation
which their publicists had denounced
as lacking cohesion and public spirit
had adopted CONSUMPTION simultane-
ously with their declaration of war,
and the people whom the Germans
had affected to regard as devoted only,
to the pursuit of gain and pleasure
had manifested a unity of purpose
which they had never before dis
played, and had offered their lives,
their labors, and their wealth without
limit to the cause of the Allies. Up
to March, 1918, only a comparatively
small part of the American Army had
reached Europe, but the Germans had
already tested its fighting quality and
had learned to respect it. Yet all
these manifestations would not have
disturbed the Germanic calculations
except for one depressing fact Even
a nation of 1000, 000, 900 brave and en-
ergetic people, fully trained and
equipped for war is not a formidable
foe so long as an impossible waterly
gulf of three thousand miles sepa-
rates them from the field of battle.
For the greater part of 1917 the
German people believed that their
submarines could bar the progress of
the American armies. BY March,
1918, they had awakened from this
delusion Not only was an American
army, millions strong, in process of
formation, but the alarming truth
now dawned upon the Germanic mind
that they could be transported to
Europe.
Yet the situation, desperate as it
seemed, held forth one more hope. If
the German armies, which still great-
ly outnumbered the French and Brit
ish, could strike and win decisive
victory before the Americans could
arrive, then they might still force a
satisfactory peace. ut is a race be-
tween Ludendorff and Wilson" is the
terse and accurate way in which Lloyd
George summed up the situation. The
great blow fell on March 81, 1918; the
British and French met it with hero
ism, but it was quite evident that
they were fighting against terrible
odds. At this time Americas RAINY in
France numbered about 300,0 men;
it now became the business of the
American Navy, assisted by the Brit
ish, to transport the American troops
who could increase these forces suf-
ficiently to turn the balance in the
Allies favor.
The Nays Supreme Task.
The supreme hours for which all the
anti-submarine labors of the proceed
ing year were merely preliminary. had
f5et5f arrived. Since the close of the
ysssss sAeEa has esen much discussion
az Ige Part whiel the American Navy
psasa6 Ia bringing 1t to a successful
end Ever durag the war there was
come criticism Oh Sis point. There
We're two nae8 sg definite opin-
ions in the public mind upon this
question. One was that tie main
business of our war vessels was to |
the American soldierS to
France; the other emphasized the an j
discriminating warfare as its most ia |
portant duty. Any one would sup4I
pose, from the detached way in which
these two subjects have been dis
cussed, that the antisubmarine war
fare and the successful transportation
of troops were separate matters. An
impression apparently prevails chat,
at the beginning of the war, the
American Navy could have quietly de-
cided whether it would devote its en-
ergies to making warfare on the |
submarine or to conveying American
yet the absurdity of such a /
must be apparent to any
one who had read the foregoing |