Shoshone journal. [volume] (Shoshone, Idaho) 1884-1931, 1920-01-02

under way. and by the midsummer
of 1917 the final collapse of that gov
ernment was almost certain.
The relatively low strength Of the
German forces on the western front
led the allies, with much confidence.
to attempt a decision on this front {;
but the losses were very heavy and
the effort signally failed. The failure
caused a serious reaction, especially
on French morale. both in the army
and throughout the country. and at
tempts to carry out extensive or COM
bined operations were indefinitely sus-
pended.
Sank Millions of Tons.
In the five months ending June 30
German submarines had accomplished
the destruction of more than 3,250.000
tons of allied shipping. During three
years Germany had seen practically ali
her offensives except Verdun crowned
with success. Her battle lines were
held on foreign soil and she had with
stood every allied attack since the
Marne The German general staff
could now foresee the complete elm
ination of Russia, the possibility Of de-
tearing liaIy before the end Of the
yeal and finally, the campaign Of 1918
against Tie French and British on the
western rrunt which might terminate
the war.
lr cannot L. said that German hopes
of fnal V.ciury were extravaga CANT,
elfher as Vi.'wrd AZ that time or as
viewed IL llin gh' OF history. Finan-
,Ial problems nf ne allies were difi-
cult. Supplies we're becoming exhaust
..d aud their armies had suffered tre-
uenduu> lusses. Discouragement ex-
listed not only among the civil popula-
ton but throughout the armies as well
Such was the allied morale that,
although their superiority on the west
ern front during the last half of 1916
and during 1917 amounted to 20 per
cent, only local attacks could be under
taken, and their effect proved wholly
insufficient against the German de-
fense. Allied resources in man power
at home were low and there was little
prospect of materially increasing their
armed strength. even in the face of the
probability of having practically the
whole military strength OF the Central
Powers against them in the spring Of
1918.
This was the state of affairs that ex
listed when we entered the war. While .
our action gave the allies much encour-
agement. yet this was temporary. and .
a review of conditions made it appar
ent that America must make a supreme
material effort as soon as possible. /
After duly considering the tonnage pos
Sibiliiies cabled the following to
on July 6, 1917:
"Plans should contemplate sending
over at least 100000 men by next
May" a general organization project.
covering as far as possible the person
mel of all combat, staff and admins
trative units, was forwarded to Wash
ington on July IL. In this stated:
Needed 1000, 900 Men.
"It is evident that a force OF about
| 100000 is the smallest unit which in
modern war will be a complete. we'll
and Independent lighting or
sanization. However. it must be
equally clear that the adoption OF this
;ize force as a basis of study should !
sot be construed as representing the 3;
maximum force which should be sent
o or which will be needed In France.
{ is taken as the force which may be
expected to reach France in time for
n offensive in 1918. and as a unit and :
asis of organization. Plans for the I
uture should be based. especially in I
eference to the manufacture OF artil- c
cry. aviation and other material. on q
hree times this force. e., at least {
,O00. 600 men"
Resolved on an Offensive.
Before developing plans for line of +,
ii was necessary TO is
ecide upon the probable sector OF the C
'ont for the eventual employment OF b
istinctlve American force. our mis- 1
on was Offensive and It was essential "
make plans for striking the enemy =
here a definite military decision w
,uld be gained. While the allied 2
mics had endeavored to maintain the m
feusive. the British in order to guard in
e channel ports. were committed to o.
,erations in Flanders and the French w
the portion of the front protecting a.
lris. Both lacked troops to operate
Sewhere on a large scale co
To the east the great fortified dis to
let east OF verdun and around Metz de
fContin,,e5 ia nae,a threeO