New-York tribune., 1920-01-18

infrequently left in ignorance of the
departments policies, plans for opera
tions Of the United States forces anc
It's intended action upon my many dis
patches. Not until July 10, 1917, die
the Navy Department outline a policy
as regards naval cooperation with the
Allies in cable quoting a letter te
the State Department.
Policy Not Carried Out
"As usual in such cases, the policy
thus set forth was accidentally sound
| but that it was not carried out or was
not understood by the department Is
shown by the fact that for ten months
after it's receipt l was still urgently
recommending an increase Of forces
still trying to convince the depart
ment that the war was in the Eastern
Atlantic, that the United States naval
front was off the European coast and
not off the United States coast; that
it was there only that the naval enemy
that United States shipping, let alone
Allied shippins, could be protected with
the maximum efficiency.
"A review of the dispatches makes
it apparent that the department did
not accept my reports and recon-
mendations with the seriousness that
the critical situation demanded. There
are many instances that. illustrate this.
One that may be cited is a case of our
battleships that were requested as re-
Inducements Of the Grand Fleet.
Following conference with Ad
mral Jellicoe, then First Sea Lord or
Chief of Naval Operations of the
British Admiralty, and Admiral Beatty
the Commander in Chief of the Grand
Fleet, it was strongly recommended on
July 21, 1917, that four of our coal
burning battleships be sent at once.
There was great delay before there
was even an acknowledgment of this
request This naturally subjected me
to much embarrassment. The request,
though repeated, was finally refused.
Ships Sailed Four Months Late
'In the following November the chief
of naval operations arrived in England
with the Colonel House mission, and
after discussing this question of the
necessity of sending our battleships
with the same officials with whom
had discussed it, he cabled at once
recommending that they be sent. The
result was that it was over four months
after the original request (November
28) that the four ships sailed from the
United States
"This is but one of number of ex-
amples of similar kind, and strik-
ingly illustrates the nature of the de-
lays caused by the departments in
sistence upon trying to understand the
intricate details of rapidly changing
conditions 5000 miles away. AS it was
of course a physical impossible to
keep the department fully and accu-
rately informed. and as the depart
ment insisted upon making decisions
concerning both the disposition and
forces, the inevitable result was un-
sound decisions and in some cases long
delays before the department was in
duced to accept the original recon-
mendations that were based upon ex-
haustive discussions Of the actual con-
ditions with the heads of the Allied
navies
Delay Continues Through War
Judging from the actions that were
inally taken, after extensive cabled
and written communications, and after
long delays, it is apparent
hat If could have appeared daily in
Washington to explain fully my recon-
nendations and the discussions before II
he conferences upon which they were
'ased, they undoubtedly would have
'een carried out from two to six
months earlier The point is that if
he department considered there was
my one in Washington to form just
conclusions, he should have been
'ent to Europe for that purpose:
'ut, failing this. the recommendations
# the Navy DEPARTMENTS representa-
i've, based upon conferences with the
Allied commanders, should have been
u,c;cepted and Immediately acted on
The action of the department in this
aspect was violation of a funda-
mental principal of warfare-see Ma
IAN or any authority--and it was con- r.
inuous throughout the war. It added !
'reatly to the burden of my work.
There was great delay and reluc-
ance in accepting the indisputable
acts, which should have been apparent
o any one-that the critical sea area s
vas in the eastern Atlantic in the So {
allied submarine war zone; that the
ubmarlre campaign would be critical J
nd could affect the ultimate decision
i the war only in that area. This at
Itude in Washington greatly slowed {
he sending of the necessary assistance {
no necessarily resulted in prolonging
he war.
Could Not Keep Informed
1T would seem to be self-evdent
nat the department could not possibly
ave kept completely informed in de-
all by cable code messages of the !,
'ctual situation in the war zone, and
OF the rapidly changing
during the critical period ]
u the war In the summer Of 1917"
Caused Dangerous Delays
Continuing, Admiral Sims said tha.
his was physical impossibility dur
ng all the most critical period and the
,est that could be done was to keen
he department informed in a general
way OF decisions. Explanations we're
made by letter where the department :
'ld rot approve" "The result" he
'ods, was. of course, long embarrass-
ng and dangerous DELAYS"