New-York tribune., 1920-03-14
Operations on the West Front
Treated as One Single
Great Battle

Tho second and broader form. is
III tho operations Of the last fou
and . half years are regarded as
single continuous campaign, ther
can be recognised In them the sam
general features and the same nee
essary stages which, between force
Of equal strength, have marked al
tho conclusive battles Of history"
Hmg develops this ingenious sue
gsstion by comparing the campaigns
OF tho Marne and of Flanders !,
1914 to the opening skirmishes Of s
battle. This phase ended in Decem
Der. 1914, with the complete aban.
douinsnt Of the war OF movement fo,
the war Of rigid positions (trencl
wsrfArs).
Tho Second Phase
The second phase-<haa Of tn.
war Of rigid POSITIONS -- lasted
through 1915 and 1919, and through
a part al 1917. although in 1917
tho zsvasaon toward semt-opsu war
faro wss alxeady undsr way. These
three ysa1s saw <hs barron theory
OF as4ritien exploited to the Utmost,
In 1919 ssmiopen warfare be-
came tho x1a1s and was followed bv
Esvivsl o3 tho real war Of move
ment This last phase ended In
Allied victory, due, az as generally
admitted now, to tho vast Increase
in the Allied strategic reserve caused
BY tho arrival Of tho American
armies. But the parallel which
Field Marshal Haig has constructed.
and especially his insistence on the
efficacy Of the attrition policy, leads
him to exclude from view the de-
'fsfve factor in Germanys defeat
he renewal Of Unrestricted sub
marine warfare In February, 1917.
Witch forced American Intervention.
His argument therefore eliminates
n this very dubious conclusion,
TN a battle Joined and decided
IN the course Of a few days OF hours,
there Is no risk that the lay OBJ
server will seek to distinguish tho
eliminating operations BY which VIC
tory IL seized and exploited from tho
stages by which It has
been made possible and determined.
II tho whole operations Of the pres
emf war arc regarded In correct psy-
spective tho victories Of the summer
and autumn Of 1918 viii be seen 70
he ~ directly dependent upon tho
two years Of stubbern f,ghtina that
preceded them"
Beyond Foreseeing
A battle generally disoloses some
plan, some grasp Of a situation. on !
The part Of the commander fighting
t. He 10 able to 1nfuse Some unity
nto his designs. But in a war
'pread ovsr four years and a quar-
'er, fought under novel conditions.
involving masses never before put
n battle front, a war Of nations.
loe OF armies, who could expect the
'eneral staffs to have forecast it's
lswelopment or to have laid more
han tho vaguest plans for control
ing 1ts progress?
In tho preface to "The Strategy
i the Great War; said:
"This war differed from all other
wars. IL was fought on a scale tran
scending experience. Its devslop-
mont could not be foreseen by the
general stats which were CHARGED
with conducting It, Many new and
disturbing factors entered into it.
The strategy on both sides was con-
fused and empirical. Novel condi-
tions IN the feld also reyolutionixed
tactics. The old balance between the
offensive and the defensive was de-
ranged. It had to travel around in
circle 70 reSstablish itself. The
war. by its worry immensity, overrode
the stratsgists. 1t worked out its
own strategy and its own tactics"
Tradition Offended
Such a view necessarily gives UNI
rage to those brought up in the
tradition that strategical practice is
. 1mmutable as strategical princi-