Evening star., 1920-01-18

1
that four coal-burning American bat
| tleships be sent to guard the Elngiisl
/ channel against German cruiser raids
| there was long delay before the re
| quest was even acknowledged, ant
finally it was. refused. In the follow
| ing November, the letter said tn,
| chief of naval operations arrived il
| Europe with the Col House mission
| and Immediately thereafter cabled in
structions to send the battleships
! Two to six months could have beer
| saved Admiral Sims declared. if h
| in Washington, as little attention
| was paid to his cabled recommenda
| tionS.
PRINCIPLES of Warfare Violated.
"The Recommendations of the Navy
Departments representative. baset
upon conferences with the allied COM
! manderS, should have been accepted
and Immediately acted upon, the let
ter said. and characterized the Navy
! Departments policy in this respect a:
j a violation of the fundamental prin.
ciples of warfare. which continued
! throughout the war. Admiral Sim:
declared that failure to heed his early
plea that destroyers and light craft
be hurried and to assign him an!
, SAff officers except tie aid who ac-
Sompanied him abroad. which contin-
| ued for four months, caused him seri-
! Gus difficulty.
| The only information received uI
| to April 20. 1917. was that six destroy
ers would be sent" Admiral Sims said
| The situation was then so very criti-
cal that l appealed to the American Il
ambassador in London. who sent a
most urgent message to the PreSi-
! dent. and on May 3. 1917, the first
definite information was received OF
| the departments intention to send
| more than six destroyers. and that
ultimately thirty-six. and two repair
ships would be sent
Too great a desire to protect the
coast of the United States at the inn
minent risk of losing the war was
manifested by the Navy Department
the letter declared
Assurance From Allies.
'The department was repeatedly
assured that the allies at all times
had remarkably accurate informa-
ton as to the movements of sub
marines" Admiral Sims said. land
that it was practically certain that
they could not reach our coast. or
even leave European waters. without
advance information being supplied
the letter said. Subsequent events
proved this assurance 60 De correct.
No submarines visited our coast until
May. 1918, and the department was
in all cases informed when they
started across and often as to their
exact destination.
II tried to induce the department
to view the campaign as whole; to
consider our naval forces as one rela-
lively small item of an allied naval
team. that our mission was the pro-
lection of all allies lines Of commu-
nication. and not the United States
to <xf ,14 tSo%
was quite possible to give our rela-
lively small commerce quite superior
protection at the expense Of losing
the war by denying essential protec-
tion to the vastly greater allied COM
merce upon which the success of the
common cause chiefly depended"
Enticing of German submarines to
the coast of the United States would
have been greatly to the advantage
Of the allied cause, even though
American shipping suffered more
heavily thereby. Admiral Sims said
he told the department, urging that
every vessel capable of steaming
zone. Risk of public Condemnation of
such a course based on inaccurate in
formation and fear. would have been
la negligible factor. the letter declared.
Aids "Net Avrllable.-
When he asked for more aids he
was told they were mot available"
Admiral Sims said. adding that the
term mot available" should have
been applied to any other naval ac-
tivity than the direction Of American
naval forces in European waters He
contrasted with Gen. Pershing's orig
inal staff of fifty officers his own one
aid
Apart from the resulting lack of
cooperation, it was very difficult
/ fear at times impossible. ADMIRAL
Sims declared, ''to avoid the impress
sion conveyed thereby to the heads Of
the allied navies that 1 was not being
supported or was not in the conf
dence of the authorities.
"At no time during the war was
permitted to select my subordinate
flag commanders and but very few OF
my subordinates."
When the House naval committee
asked for complaints he had made,
Admiral Sims said he received a ca
blegram from Admiral Benson. chief
of operations. telling him that a
strong, positive statement" was high
ly desirable. Knowing that this re-
ply must become public information.
and that any criticism therein would
give aid and encouragement to the
enemy, Admiral Sims said he framed
an answer on the basis that those at
the front must take what those at
home send.
Recapitulating his criticisms. Ad-
miral Sims in his letter said: "Ad-
miral Mahan had described interfer-
ence with the commander in the field
or afloat as one of the most common
temptations to the government
THE Navy Department" he added
did not resist this temptation. and
it's frequent violation of this principle
was the most dangerous error COM
mitted during the war"
SuEgestiOns From British.
Certain suggestions were made by
the British admiralty as to uses OF
our forces in the campaign" said Ad-
miral Sims. For example. in April
my should attempt raid in the chan
mel with heavy force and get away
before he could be intercepted by a
force from the Grand fleet. the near
est base of which was at Rosyth, neal
Edinburgh. Accordingly. the admi-
rally suggested that suqadron OF
our battleships be based on Brest OIL
in the channel. No reply was made
to this suggestion. Also. the value
of submarines in the campaign wai
first explained April IS. 1917. None
was sent until October, 1917, when
five arrived in Ireland. followed BY
seven more in January and February
l1918
Most earnest requests were made
| for tugs because of the urgent need
| for them in the submarine zone. These
requests fully explained how many tor
pedoed ships could have been beached
and salvaged II these tugs had been
available. Experience had shown tina,
such vessels could be repaired and put
| in service again in short time-a very
| short time compared to that required
| to build new ships-thus resulting in
! a great saving of tonnage.
"A year after we entered the war
| but four tugs had been sent and two
J of these were specifically allocated te
| Italy by the department. Nine more
were eventually cent at various times