Missouri Valley times. [volume] (Missouri Valley, Iowa) 1874-1931, 1920-01-08


.menased central France, protected the
most exposed portion Of the German
line Of communications that between
Metz and Sedan. and covered the
Brley iron region. from which the en-
envy obtained the greater part Of the
iron required for munitions and ma.
terial. The coal fields east Of Metz
were also covered by these same de-
lenses. A deep advance east Of Metz,
or the capture Of the Briey region. BY
threatening the invasion Of rich Ger
man territory In the Moselle valley
and the Saar basin. thus curtailing
her supply of coal or iron. would have
q decisive effect In forcing with
drawal Of German troops from north
ern France. The military and eco
n0mic situation Of the enemy. there.
fore. indicated Lorraine as the Geld
promising the most fruitful results for
the employment of our armies.
The completely of trench life had
enormously increased the tonnage Of
supplies required by troops. Not only
was 1t question of providing food.
but enormous quantities of munitions
and material were needed. Upon the
railroads of France fell the burden OF
meeting the heavy demands of the
100000 allied combatants then en-
gagged. IL the American army was to
have an independent and flexible sys-
TEN 1t could not use the lines behind
the British Belgium front nor those
In rear of the French front covering
Paris.
Chose the Southern Ports.
The problem confronting the Amer
lean expeditionary forces was then to
superimpose its rail communications
on those Of France where there would
be the least possible disturbance to
the arteries Of supply of the two great
allied armies already In the field. The
lines selected. therefore, were those
leading from the comparatively un-
used South Atlantic ports of France
to the northeast. where 1t was believ-
ed the American armies could he en-
plOyed to the best advantage.
For all practical purposes the Amer.
lean expeditionary forces were based
on the American continent. Three thou
sand miles of ocean to cross. with the
growing submarine menace confront
ing US. the quantity of ship tonnage
that would be available then un.
known, and line of communications
by land 400 miles long from French
ports to our probable front presented
difficulties that seemed almost insur-
our allies.
In providing for the storage and dis
tribution of reserve supplies an al.
lowance of As days in the base Sec
lions was planned, with 80 days In the
intermediate section. and IS days in
the advance section. After the safe
ty of our sea transport was practical
~ assured, this was reduced to total
Of As days. distributed proportionate.
~. When the armistice was signed all
projects for construction had been
completed and supplies were on hand
to meet the needs of 100000 men
while further plans for necessary con.
struction and for the supply of an ad.
ditional 100000 were we'll under
way.
Our Own Fighting Doctrine.
A similar scheme was adopted In
August. 1917, for our armies. In which
the Importance Of teaching through
out our forces sound fighting doc
trine Of our own was emphasized. I,
provided for troop training in all units
up to include divisions. Corps cen
tiers of instruction for noncommission
ed officers and unit commanders Of
all arms were established. The arm,
and corps schools graduated 2l33t
noncommissioned officers and 13,91t
officers.
Pending the organization and devel
opment of our own schools, larg,
number of our officers were sent t,
centers of instruction Of the alliet
armies. The training of our earle
divisions was begun In close associ
alton with the French divisions, unde
conditions SET forth In the following
paragraph on divisional training:
Trench warfare naturally givel
prominence to the defensive as op
posed to the offensive. To guar
against this. the basis Of instruction
should be essentially the offensiv
both in spirit and in practice. TIL
defensive is accepted only to prepar
for future offensive"
The long period of trench warfar
had so Impressed itself upon tn
French aud British that they had al
most entirely dispensed with trainin
for open warfare. 1t was to avoi,
this result In our army and to encour
age the offensive spirit that the fol
lowing was published in October 1917
"The above methods to be employs
must remain or become distinctly GU
own.
"All instruction must cOntemDlat
the assumption of vigorous offer
sive. This purpose will be emphs
sized in every phase Of training unit
1t becomes settled habit of though
"The rifle and the bayonet are til
principal weapons of the Infantry SO
der. He will be trained to hig
degree of skill as marksman. bot
on the target range and In field frin;
An aggressive spirit must he deve
oped until the soldier feels himself. q
a bayonet fighter. invincible In battle.
"All officers and soldiers should rea