Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-05-12
Confidential CabIegram Sent
Admiral Sims Is Read to
Senate Committee.
POINTED TO OBJECTIONS
TO AGGRESSIVE PLANS
Secretary Daniels Declares U. S.
Commander Was Hypnotized by
British Influence.

A confidential cablegram from Presi-
dent Wilson to Rear Admiral Sims in
London, sent during the war. was
read to the Senate naval investigating
committee today by Secretary Dam
ieis. 1t expressed surprise that the
British admiralty had failed to use
Great Britain's great naval super
iority" effectively against the sub
marines and called on Admiral Sims
on independent thought" and with
out regard to Judgments of any one
on that side of the water
The admiralty was "helpless to the
point Of panic" in the face of the sub
marine situation. the message said.
Every plan we suggest they re-
5ect for some reason of prudence MIR.
Wilson added. In my view this is
not . time for prudence, but for bold
ness even at the cost Of great loss"
In conclusion President Wilson
asked Admiral Sims to advise him as
he would give advice 'if you were
running a navy of your own"
Daniels. who presented the Presi-
dents message in connection with his
answer to Sims charges against the
Navy Departments conduct Of the
war; "ua,;,;.s was "a long telegram n,. OF gen
miralty was doing"
Text Of President's Message.
President Wilson's message to Sims
follows:
"From the beginning of the war,
have been greatly surprised at the
: failure of the British admiralty to
use Great Britain's great naval su-
periority in an effective way. In the
emergency they are helpless to the
point. Of panic. =
Every plan we suggest they reject
Tor some reason Of prudence. In my
view. this is not time for prudence.
but for boldness. even at the cost of
great losses.
In most of your dispatches you
hayesqujte properly advised US of the
sort Of aid and cooperation desired
from US by the admiralty. The trou-
bic is that their plans and methods
!. dsshot seem to US efiicacious. would
be very much obliged to you il you
Would report to me. conf1dentially. Of
course. exactly what the admiralty
has been doing and what they have
accomplished, and. added to the re-
port, your own comments and sugges-
tions.~based upon independent thought
of the whole situation. without regard
to the judgments Of any one on that
side of the water.
The admiralty was very slow to
adopt the protection of convoy and
it is not now. l Judge, (protecting)
conveys. on adequate scale within the
danger zone. seeming to keep small
craft with the grand fleet. The alb
sence OF craft for convoy is even
than on the English coast and in the
chsnnel. l do not see how the neces-
sary military supplies and supplies Of
food and fuel oil are to be delivered
at British ports in any other way
within the next few months than un-
der adequate convoy. There will
presently not be ships or tankers
enough and our shipbuilding plans
may not begin to yield important re-
suits in less than eighteen months.
Il believe that you will keep these
instructions absolutely and entirely to
yourself, and that you will give me-
such advice as you would give If you
were handling and il you were run
ming a navy of your own"
Quotes From Sims. Letter.
Mr.. Daniels also read letter from
Admiral Sims to former Ambassador
Page at London. written August :,
1917. which in part said:
In this connection / have a sug-
Eestion to make. l have received
word. practically directly from thel
President. that he was much dis
pleased with my reply to his cable
gram: that it did not change his
opinion at all; that he regards me as
owned by the admiralty and SO pro-
British that he seriously considered
the advisability OF replacing me by
some other officer"
Admiral Sims reply to the Presi-
dent told also of plans for a combined
sea and land attack TO turn the Ger
man right flank and cut off Zeebrugpe
as provisioning base. Mr.. Daniels
said.
That was the kind of bold and an.
dacious' thing the President and the
Navy Department had been urging
from our entrance into the war" de-
clared the Secretary. but even then
Admiral Sims said, II had not been
definitely decided on by the war
council, though the daring and sue
ressful attack on Zeebrugse came
much later. 1t might have been a
very different story If 1t had been un-
dertaken earlier when the Navy De-
partment was urging some such bold
plan, all of which Admiral Sims
thought .Impracticable' when urged by
the Navy Department."
Held scheme Impraeticable.
Admiral Sims told the President he
had been shown studies OF the de-
partments plan to prevent the egress
of submarines. Mr.. Daniels said, and
that he considered the scheme i'm
practicable.
He evidently sought to discredit
the Navy Departments plans by say
ing that these same suggestions and
many similar ones had been made
by people Of all classes since the
beginning Of the war" said Mr.. Dam
iels. Instead of accepting the de-
partments suggestions Of great Of
fensive plans. or originating some
plan that promised to stop the egress
of German submarines. his mind was
closed to the above and, as many
other extracts show. to every plan
looking to the great offensive, which
in the fall of 1918 was the most ef-
fective foe OF the submarine"
Sims cable to the President sug-
gested that the proper policy to pur-
sue was to adopt the recommends
tions he had made to the Navy De-
partment. most of which had beer
decided upon and put in operation
before Admiral Sims suggested them,
Secretary Daniels declared
HE added" the Secretary con-
tinued. that we should adopt an or
ganization similar in all respects tc
the British squadron. and virtually
transfer all naval authority to hi.
headquarters. in LONDON. He was
careful not to say. though he re.
garded the Queenstown base and sur.
roundings as the critical area thai
as rapidly as American destroyer.
arrived the British destroyers were
removed fo another area alYhouuk