The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1920-12-18

specio. Gable to THE NEW YoaK HERALD.
Coby-ioht. 1920, bv THE NEW York HERALD.
New York Herald Bureau,l
London, Dec. II.
II was luck as much as anything
sse which enabled the German High
Seas fleet to get out from under Jut-
land before Admiral Jellicoe could
reach it. This much seems evident
from the 500 page record OF dispatches,
orders and reports which constitute
The official Vecord of the great naval
battle which the Admiralty finally
made public to-day
It was the loss in crowded ether OF
3 wireless message from the destroyer
Faulkner to Jellicoe which enabled
Admiral Won Scheer to slip in north
ward OF the British fleet and take shell
ter in the mine fields under cover of
"A brief darkness in the night.
The Faulkner sighted the German
feet and reported to Admiral .Jellicoe,
but Jellicoe never got the message
again at a critical moment in the fight,
lghen the Germans were finally turning
way Vice Admiral Beatty, command
ing the battle cruiser squadron. in press
ing after the enemy, did not signal Jei-
iicoc, Follow me. We've got them
cold" as had been reported. The text
of the famous message as II Is now re-
yealed is Urgent Submit van OF bat
tleships should follow battle cruisers.
We can then cut or the whole OF the
enemys battle fleet"
10 Precious Minutes Lost.
But delays In communication cost six
teen precious minutes. so that when the
King George ", the leading battleship.
lid turn TO follow Beatty not only the
enemy but Beatty had been lost to view.
Experts nave not yet had time to
lnalyze carefully the huge disconnected
mass of matter dumped upon the public,
but according to those who have read
Il through, there are no sensational rev.
Citations and nothing that Is likely finally
to settle the much disputed question as
70 who was the real victor In the great
est naval conflict of history.
The unvarnished account seems to
have convinced all lay readers that It is
a fact that the Germans made the best
of the situations presented. Although
soiled in the object of sortie against
he British Grand Fleet, they inflicted
more damage than they received and
succeeded IN returning home when the
Weight of the British metal around them
should have crushed them. On the other
hand, the Germans received such Sc
we're lesson that they never ventured
forth again.
One critic to-day says that Jellicoe's
allure to follow and crush the German
,leet prolonged the war. was responsible
Tor an undecisive peace and fathered
3olshevism in Russia, for IL the fleet had
oeen crushed the way would have been
opened to the Baltic. and the Russian
armies, whose weight Ludendorff con-
,esses was a serious menace, would have
been strengthened.
Another critic says that the pounding
ne Germans received at Jutland faith
red the Kiel mutinies, which ultimately
I'd to the collapse of the German mill
airy machine two years later.
JelIicoe's Ships Incidental.
50 far as the subjects under contro-
ersy go, Beatty clearly seems to have
:arried on the actual fight. while Jel-
icoe's ships were really only inciden-
ally engaged for the briefest moment.
Gavh, however, Accord to to-day's
'evelations, succeeded ia carrying out
heir predetermined parts in the battle
Jians, Beatty's working out we'll while
lellicoes turned out badly. Further
aore. there Is not yet conclusive evil
lence which merits the assertion that
me brltlSn SLIPS WtEG OppOscu Dy buO-
marines While the Germans insist
hey had no submarines actually in the
battle, Jellicoe admits that IL was fear
OF the submarines which dictated move
,nents at two critical junctures which
we're largely responsible for the escape
Of the Germans.
Jeliicoe makes no attempt to gloss
over these facts. but the record shows
that his judgment, based on facts in
ais possession at the time, was justi-
ded
The narrative Of the great naval bat
lie may be summarized as follows in
the light of the Admiral's own reports
previously published and those which
are now first revealed and In the light
Of criticisms which have been levelled at
him.
Jellicoes and Beatty's fleets left
scapa Flow, In the Orkeney Islands.
and Rossyth, on the Forth, upon news
from the Admiralty that the German
fleet was going out to sea. They fol-
lowed a predetermined plan by which
Beatty went ahead to scout. Jcllicoe
does not answer the criticism that he
moved his fleet too slowly and thereby
did not meet Beatty far enough south.
re testifies that Beatty carried out mis-
duties perfectly.
The fact that the feet moved out
under Admiralty orders IL new. Jeliicoe's
report previously published indicating
that the feet had only gone out In the
course Of n usual movement Another
striking theme all through the papers Is
the remarkable confusion In which the
system Of communication, coordination
and even the positions OF various ships
at times were tumbled UP. Jellicoe pays
a tribute TO the effective use the Ger
mans made of their own wireless in the
meanwhile
II seems that he and his fleet followed
the predetermined plan with results that
might have been expected when actual
events varied slightly from the theory
upon which the plan was based.
Beatty is described as having estab-
lished touch with the enemy In perfect
form and as having carried out perfectly
the manoeuvre OF turning the fleeing
enemy, thus bringing the German feet
In touch with Che British main feet.
Criticism Of Beatty's loss OF the Queen
Mary and another ship when turning is
explained by Jellicoes frank tribute to
the excellence OF the gunnery and the
unexpected speed Of the German fleet.
They got on their targets first. within
Two minutes after they had started
firing" .,le report reads. land when we
got our fire effective the Germans dem
onstrated that thoy could still ngh.