The diamond drill. (Crystal Falls, Iron County, Mich.) 1887-1996, 1920-01-10

while the Russian revolution was well
under way. and by the midsummer
OF 1917 the final collapse Of that gov
eminent was almost certain.
The relatively low strength OF the
German forces on the western front
led the allies, with much confidence.
| 20 attempt decision on this front (:
but the losses were very heavy and
the effort signslly failed. The fasure
caused a serious reaction, especially
on French morale, both In the army
and throughout the country. and at
tempts TO carry out extensive or com
I bined operations were indefinitely sus-
pended.
Sank Millions Of Tons.
In the Ave months ending June 30
German submarines had accomplished
the destruction OF more than $3.50 600
tons OF allied shipping. During three
years Germany had seen practically all
her offensiyes except yerdun crowned
/ with success. Her battle lines were
held OF foreign soil and she had with
Marine. The German general stan
could now foresee the complete elm
inatlon OF Russia, the possibility of lie
| featiag Italy before the end of the
year and. finally, the campaign OF 1918
against the French and British on the
western front which might terminate
| the war.
1t cannot Ice said that German hopes
| OF final victory were extravagant,
either as viewed at that time or rs
viewed III the light OF history. l'inan-
cial problems OF the allies were DIM
ed and their armies had suffered ire
mendonS losses. Discouragenient cx-
listed not only among the civil popula-
tion hut throughout the armies rs well.
Such was the allied morale that.
although their superiority on the west
crn f4out during the last half of 1916
and during 1917 amounted 10 20 per
cent. only local attacks could be UNDER
taken and their effect proved wholly
insufficient against the German de-
Tense. Allied resources IN man power
az home were low and there was little
prospect OF materially increasing their
armed strength. evea in the face OF the
probability OF having practically the
whole military strength or the Central
Powers against them IN the spring OF
1918.
This was the state OF affairs that OK.
faf her.
our action gave the allies much cncour-
agement, yet this was temporary, and
review of conditions made IL nppar-
ent that America must make supreme
material effort as soon as possible
After duly considering the tonnage pos
sfbilities cabled the following TO
Washington on July 6. 1917:
plans should contemplate sending
over IN least 100000 men 10y next
May" A general organization project,
covering rs FAR as possible tile person
mel OF all combat. stan AMI admins
tratlve units. was forwarded fo Wash
ington on July ~. la This stated:
Needed 1000. ooe Men.
1T is evident thar force OF about
100000 Is the smallest unit which in
modern war will be complete. we'll
balanced and independent fighting or
ganization. However. u must be
equally clear tha: The adoption Of this
size force as basis OF study should
not be construed as representing the
maximum force which should be sent
to or which win be- needed IN France.
II Is taken as the force which may be
expected 90 reach France IN time for
an offensive IA 1918. and as unit and
basis Of organization. Plans for the
future should he based. especially IN
reference 90 the manufacture OF artil-
; lery. aviation and other material. ON
three times this f0rce-i. g., M lcast
{ 100000 men"
Resolved on an Offensive.
Before developing plans FOR liue Of
communications II was necessary go
decide upon the probable sector az The
front for The eventual employment of q
distinctive American force cur mis-.
sion was Offensive and ~ was essential
to make nlans for striking the enemy
where definite military decision
could be gained While the allied
armies athcndenyored 20 maintain the
offensive. the british. In order Ia guard
tho channel ports, we're committed 10
operations IN Flanders aud The French
20 The portion ~ the front protecting
Paris Both lacked troops TO operate
elsewhere on large scale.
To the east the great fortified dis-
trtct esst ef verduo and around Mstv