The Lexington intelligencer. [volume] (Lexington, Mo.) 1901-1949, 1920-01-09

successful generals and all the expert.
ence gained in three years OF war were
modified for the supreme effort.
The first blow tell on the right Of
the British armies. including the juno.
ton OF the British ard French forces.
Only the prompt cooperation Of the
French and British general beadquar.
tiers stemmed the tide. The reason for
this objective was obvious, and strik.
ingly ILLUSTRATED the necessity for hav-
Ing some one with sunicieut authority
over all the allied Armies to meet such
an emergency.
Deserves Were Lacking.
The hack Of complete cooperation
among the allies on the western front
had been appreciated and the question
Of preparation TO meet a crisis had
already received attention by the SUI
preme war council. A plan had been
adenseil BY which each Of the allies
would fursish q certain number Of d.
visiOt~ IN a sriicrai { IL nc iiii-
der The direction Of The military repre-
%sentatives Of the supreme war council.
Of which Gen. Foch was then the
senior member. But when Tie time
came To meet the German offensive In
March these reserves were moi found
available and The plan failed.
The situation resulted in a con.
ference fer the immediate considera.
ton OF the question Of having un al
He'd commander in chief. After much
discussion, during which my view ia
vorlng such action was clearly stated.
an agreement was reached and Gen
eral Foch was selected. His appoint
ment as such was made April 3 and
Vas approved for the United States
by the president on April 10.
The grave crisis precipltated hy the
FIRST German offensive caused me to
make a hurried visit to General Foch's
headquarters at 3Bombon. during which
all our combatant forces were placed
at his disposal. The acceptance Of
this offer meant the dispersion Of our
troops along the allied front and a
consequent delay in building up a dis.
tinctive American force in Lorraine,
but the sericus situation Of The allies
demanded this divergence from our
plans.
On March p approximately 100000.
American troops had reached France.
-Four combat divisions. equivalent 10
strength to eight French or British
divisions. were available.
Took cantigny Heights,
On April Is The First division re-
lieved two French divisions on the
front near Montdidier and on May %
captured the important observation
stations on the heights Of Caniigny
with splendid dash. French artillery
aviation. ranks and name throwers.
aided in the attack, but mosl Of this
French assistance was withdrawn be-
fore the completion Of the operation
in order to meet the enemy's new Of.
feiIsiyr iaunched Mny q 10 ChaIean;
Thierry. The enemy reaction against
u troops at cantigny was extremely
violent. and apparently he was deter,
mined at all costs TO counteraci the
most excellent effect the American
success had produced. For three days
his guns Of all calibers were concen.
trated on our position and counter
attack succeeded cOunter-attack The
desperate efforts OF the Germans gave
the fighting at Cantigny a seeming
tactical Importance entirely out Of
proportion TO the numbers involved.
The third German offensive. on May
"a, against the French on he Alsne
soon developed a desperate situation
for the allies. The Second division
was hastily diverted TO the vicinity Of
Meaux on May 81. and early on the
morning Of June I was deployed
across the Chateau-T hierry.Paris road
Montreuil-aux Lions In gap in
the French line. where II stopped the
German advance on Paris. Al the
iime the partially trained Third
division was placed AZ French dis.
posal TO hold the crossings OF the
harnr and us motorized machine-gun
succeeded In reaching Cha.
teau Thierry In time 10 assist In sue.
cessfully defending that river cross.
Ing.
The enemy having been halted. the
division. commenced a series
Of vigorous attacks on June 4 which
resulted in the capture Of BeIleau
after very severe lighting. The
Of Bouresches was taken soon
and on July vaux wis cap
tured. In these operations the Sec.
ond division met with most desperate
resistance 10y Germany's best troops.
Our Second corps. under Mai. Gen
W Read. had heen organized
for the command Of the ten divisions
with the British. which were held
back IN training areas or assigned 10
second. line dcienses. After conSiilta
hon with Field Mnrshal Haig on June
5 Eve American divisions we're re.
Iieved from the British area to sul
port the French,
The Marine salient was Inherently
weak and offered an opportunity for
} counter-nffenslve that WINS obvious.
II successful such an operation would
Afford immediate relief 20 the ALLIED
defense. would remove the threat
against Paris anil free the Paris.
railroad. But, more Important