New-York tribune., 1920-04-25

+ AAAIduA 1ASI ACASOu uIoN0SoCO
the broad outlines of Allied and
German military policy. His
present work "A Short History of the
Great War" (Putnams) explains the
individual campaigns in more detail
and gives q short account Of the wars
diplomatic background and Of the
events which led up to Americas par
ticipation. Like its predecessor, it is
characterized by lucidity. precision and
simplicity. It is admirably calculated
to clear up and crystallize the some
what hazy conceptions of the reade.
whose knowledge of the war is based
upon newspaper accounts and a more
or less indiscriminate browsing among
war books.
The author treats the major oper-
ations Of the war in chapters whose
average length is ten to fifteen pages.
In these chapters he presents vivid and
succinct pictures Of the separate bat
ties and campaigns without ever losing
sight Of the unity of the war as
whole. He points out that the Allied
military and diplomatic blunders, de-
spite their seriousness, were more than
counterbalanced by the arrogant reck-
lessness which caused the German milf
tary leaders to stake the great and se-
cure Central European empire which
they had built up in the spring Of 1917
upon tho doubtful chance Of crushing
England by the unrestricted use Of the
submarine weapon. Mr.. Mcpherson
analyses tho German submarine policy
In tho following paragraph:
"What Germany could not accomplish
through her surface navy or auxiliary
commerce destroyers she began to think
Of accomplishing through her subma-
rines. That thought was her undoing.
The theory of submarine blockade
which she developed became eventually
the keystone Of. her naval and mill
tary policy. 1t clouded her vision and
perverted her true military aims. 1t
forced the United States into the war.
More than anything else-more than
everything else-it dragged Germany
down to defeat"
The folly, the superfluousness Of sub
marine frightfulness from the stand
point Of Germany's own interests was
abundantly demonstrated by the course
of events in 1917 and 1918. After
brusilof's offensive in 1916 Russia
sank into practical impotence as mill
tary power. The radical trend of the
revolution completed the disintegra-
tion which had been powerfully initi-
ated by the slaughter Of her best Of
hcers and men, the exhaustion of her
munitions and the undue strain placed
upon her slender industrial resources
during the early years of the war.
There was serious slump in French
morale in 1917, due to the heavy losses
which had been sustained and to the
apparent impossiblity of driving the
Germans from French soil. With
America out of the war it is unlikely
that France and England would have
been able to stand off the terrific Of
fensives which Germany would have
launched with the help of her troops
from the Eastern front. Without re-
sorting to her undersea weapon Ger
many might have attained CONT
mental hegemony even more complete
than Napoleon's. Fortunately for the
world and for civilization, the madness
which is always closely allied with
overweening and unrestrained ambition
prompted Germany to drive the United
States into the war, with the result !
that her whole imperialistic structure
came crashing down in ruins.
The author dispels many misconcep-
tions in his excellent chapter about the
Marne and what preceded it, He shows
that Joffre committed several serious
tactical blunders at the opening of the
campaign by undertaking i'll consid-
cred ofensives at the eastern end Of
his line and ignoring the formidable
menace Of the German thrust through
Belgium. The French general re-
deemed his mistakes to some extent bv
his cool retreat and his successful re-
pulse of the Germans at the Marine.
But France was terribly crippled by