The Lexington intelligencer. [volume] (Lexington, Mo.) 1901-1949, 1920-01-09

mile the Russian revolution WAS well
under way. and by the midsummer
OF 1917 the fnaI collapse OF that gov
eminent was almost certain.
The relatively low strength OF the
German forces ON the western front
led the allies. with much confidence,
to attempt Il decision on this front ;
bur the losses were very heavy and
the effort slgnally failed. The failure
caused = serious reaction. especially
on French morale. both Ia the army
and throughout the country. and at
tempts TO carry Out extensive or com.
bined Operations were indefinitely sus-
pended.
sank Millions " Tons.
In The 1--WE months ending June 80
German submarines had accomplished
the destruction Of more than 3.25O.OOO
tons Of allied shipping. During three
years Germany had seen practically all
her OffensiSes except ,verdup crowned
with success. Her battle lines were
held on foreign soil and she had with
stood every allied attack since the
Marne. She German general staff
could aow foresee the complete elm.
Inatlon OF russia, the possibility Of de-
featlay Italy before the end OF the
year and. finally, the campaign OF 1918
ngainst the French and British ON the
western front which might terminate
the war.
II cannot be said that German hopes
OF nnal victory were extrnyagant.
either as viewed at that dine or MS
Viewed In the light OF history. Finan-
cial problems OF the allies were dlHi-
cult. supplies were becoming exhaust.
ed and their armies had suffered ire
mendous losses. Dlscouragement ex-
listed not only among the civil popula-
zion hui throughout the armies as well.
Such was the allied morHle thai,
although their superiority on the west.
ern front during the last hnlf of 1919
and during 1917 amounted 10 ~ per
cent, only local attacks could be under
taken and their effect proYei wholly
Insufficient ngninst the Gerinan de.
Tense. Allied resources In mau power
at home were low and there was little
prospect o. materially ~increaSing their
armed strength. even In fhe face Of the
probability OF having practically The
whole military strength OF the Central
Powers against them In the spring Of
1918.
This was the STATE OF Affairs that ex
listed when we entered the war. While
our action gave the allies much encOur-
agement. yet this was temporary and
a review OF conditions made Il appar-
emf thar America mast make a supreme
material effort as soon as possible
After duly considering the tonnage pos.
siblllues l. cabled the following 70
Washington on July G. 1915
"Plans should contemplate sending
over at least l.Oou.O0O men by nexI
May" A general organization project
covering as far as possible the person.
mel OF all combat staff ana admins
trat!ye units, was forwarded to Wash.
,lngton on July II. In this ] stated:
Needed 100000 Men.
1T Is evident that q force Of about
1,C0aOOO is the smallest unit which In
modern war Will be a complete. well
balanced and Independent lighting or.
ganlzntlon. However. II must be
equally clear that the adoption OF this
size fierce as o basis OF study should
not be construed as representing the
maximum force which should be seni
10 or which win be needed in France,
II is taken as the force which may be
expected TO reach France In time for
an offensive in 1918. and as g unit and
basis OF organization. Plans for the
futufe should be based. especially IN
REFERENCE TO the manufacture OF artll.
lery. aviation and other material. on
three times this ~force--i. e.. At least
100000 men,
hsssssss on ~ Offensive.
Before developing plans for q line Of
communication II was necessary Ia
decide upon the ~nrobable. sector Of II,
front Tor the eventual employment OF q
distinctive American force. Our mis-
sion WAS ofensive and n was essential
TO make plans for striking the enemy
Ehere a definite military decision
could be ralneL While the allied
armies hAd e~ndeasorad ia malntaln the
Offensive. the BrltlshS In order To- guard
the channel ports wese commlt;ed "a
operations 10 FLINDERS and the French
70 The porflnn a. the front protecting
nrIs noih lacked ,rnops 70 operate
elsewhere on a large scols.
10 the tnel me srept iortIfS1 On
rrfss east ~ yssaua anu ssonnl Mtsi