New-York tribune., 1920-12-13
MIR. Daniels's Annual Report

WHO nave SuppVA CCu AAS Nio@ooAO ONS
reign, a futile attempt at SELF
defense!
On tho first page Mr.. Daniels
quotes from the Presidents address
at St. Louis in February, 1915:
'tThe American navy ought, in my
judgment, to be incomparably the
most adequate navy in the world"
Whatever the President may have
meant by these words, Mr.. Daniels
refused to permit the navy to pre-
pare for war between 1914 and 1917.
Imagine "the most adequate navy in
the world" unready for war in or
ganization, personnel and material!
Of what avait then, is 'adequacy"?
On Page 2 Mr.. Daniels admits:
"The emergency of war early in 1917
compelled concentration on the build
ing Of anti-submar1ne craft to COM
bat Germany's ruthless U-boat war
ware. AS result we now
have more than 300 modern Destroy
ers." In other words, he had given
no thought, during three years of
submarine warfare, to the type Of
craft we would most need! And
then, when war was upon US, he
completely changed our building pro-
gram! Mr.. Daniels fails to tell US
that he so delayed the building con-
tracts that only eight of these 500
destroyers got into the avar! He was
too late-always too late! True, we
now have 800 destroyers-twice as
many as we need Scores Of them
are rusting at our docks. We have
no men to man them. And yet the
General Board told Mr.. Daniels in
1914 that "ships without men are
like so many masses of steel, useless
for purposes Of war, and leading
only to a false sense of national
security" He ignored the General
Board! He wasted hundreds of
millions!
Mr.. Daniels lauds himself for ad-
vocating disarmament in 1913, and
he still ciings to the League Of Ma
tons as our only hope. Having re-
fused to enter the league, he cries
aloud that we must spend $3.50, ,000,-
900 on the navy this year as pen
atty for not taking his advice! Be
fore the war he would have dis
armed, he would not prepare, he
would spend nothing. After the war
he would arm, he would prepare, he
would spend billionsl Comment il
withheld.
In persistent defiance of Admiral
Mahan's immortal principles Of
strategy, M Daniels asserts that
no policy "has soundcr military
basis" than the division of the
United States feet! And in the same
breath he insists that the navy l.
not strong enough in attIeships
Not strong enough, and yet he
divides it and imporils the nation
Can he learn nothing?
1t is pleasing to find one lone wise
suggestion in the maze Of Nj. Dan.
iels's awful blunderings. He urge
Bureau Of Aviation at the Navy
Department. This is vital to mod
ern three plane navy. Our surface
and submarine forces are we'll devel
oped. Our air force is fatally weak
Immediate action Is demanded by the
navy.
Whatever may be the ultimate or
ganization of the nations aviation
forces, there can be no surrender Of
the principle that the navy's all
force, composed, as it will be. OF
raft differing radically from those
of the army and the civil branch, an(
forming component part Of oaN
s'eao three plane feet, must be under
the direct control of the Navy De
: partment and of the commander il
chief. The navy will gladly co0rdi
1 nate with other services to proven
duplication and extravaganza; bu
the operation, tactics and st1ntegY o
y the Macy mast not be hampered b.
outside gove7mmemtal forces.
s In 1913 Admiral Fiske strongl,
= advised Mr.. Daniels to organize
Bureau of Aeronautics. He refused
: AS a result we went into the Worl,
). War with little squad of forty-fiv
4 naval aviators! Had he takel
8 Fiske's advice we would have had
: strong force to bomb German base
u in 1917 and the Bureau of Aviation
: would now exist as part of ou
0 fleet. Mr.. Daniels is just sever
years too late-always too late!
But in the final pages of his repor
d Mr.. Daniels caps the climax O
= ignorance by opposing the reorgani
n zation Of the Navy Department
G The evidence against him on thi
I point is overwhelming. During fort
: years the bureau system has bec1
5 condemned by Presidents, Secre