Catoctin clarion. [volume] (Mechanicstown, Md.) 1871-1940, 1920-01-22
American subalterns' Trick Kept
Five German Divisions on
/: - s'r'~ the Qui viye. &c e.
ENEMY DECEIVED BY RADIO
Telephone Squad Also Conducted Mls
leading satlonS fSr German !.
80 tistsnsrs' BENEFIT - Staff -
Worked Overtime on Game
Of camoufiaae.

great allied offensive was at its
height from Switzerland to the sea.
An imaginary army, conceived by a
handful Of American junior officers,
was thrown into the field" overnight,
and for days five crack German divi-
'sions just east Of verduD, in the
Etain region, were kept on their toes,
momentarily expecting an attack
which never came.
At dinner table in. a Coblenz cafe
overlooking the Rhine an American In.
telligence officer recently told the
story of the creation Of the mythical
TX army" as it was called. 1t ap-
pears that the Germans were expect
ing an attack In the Etain sector at
any time, and the Americans knew 1t :;
but at that stage Of the game the First
American army was devoting its ener.
gies to driving the enemy out Of the
Argonne forest and the hill country on
either side. So the mythical army was
created, In preference to real diver
sion, requiring many men, to convince
the German commander that 1t would
not be wise to weaken the Etain front
for the benefit of the Meuse-Argonne
front.
Commanded by Captain.
Five fresh divisions had been placed
by the Germans on the Etain line.
These constituted their last and finest
reservoir Of available divisions. The
Americans realized that the minute
the Germans decided that this was not
a danger point any or all Of the five
divisions could be withdrawn, re-
placed by exhausted and fragmentary
divisions 1. coming from the battle
fronts. and that the appearance OF the
fresh troops in the line west OF the
.Merse would have tremendous effect
on the American offensive.
The. "X army" was assigned to
front from Bezonvaux to Fresnes.
From the morning of October % until
Just before the armistice this army
"functioned." Capt. Charles H. Matz
Of Hubbard Woods, Ill.,, was command.
err In chief; Capt. William H. Dear
den Of Springfield, Mass, and Wash
ington, D. c., was chief Of staff; Lieut..
John III. Graham of Lexington. Va,
was chief Of troop movements" Capt.
o. w. Neidert was In charge Of Gil.
or administration, and Lieut.. H. I.
Griswold of Old Lynn, Conn. was
chief of artillery. The staff Of the *
army were all members Of the In
teIligenee section Of the First army.
and, Of course, before beginning oper-
atoms, had obtained the consent OF
their chief, Col. Wiley Howell.
The wireless and the telephone were
freely, used to convince the Germans
that the Americans were prepared for
an attack in the Etain sector. To
make sure that the Germans would
DE able to "break into" the code used,
the, Americans furnished them with
satisfactory key.
Funetloned Until End. 4
One wireless station Of the TX
army" was established In a clump of
woods near Verdun and was called
...headquarters of the X army" This
station functioned until the end Of the
game. all 'orders" for the army going
out from this place by wireless. Soon
after the station began working the
Germans located it's. whereabouts and
frequently shelled the woods and VI
cinity. apparently In hope Of breaking
up the radio of the latest Of annoy
ances. The "X army" also had port
able radio station. which moved about
and represented itself at different
station every day or two.
The first message from the tx
army" headquarters was a general
dispatch to all wireless stations in the
army area tnope Of which actually en-
.sted) :. In the new code OF course. d.
recting that none Of the. stations an
swer or make use Of their sending In
struments, for fear OF the enemy locat-
Ing them. but that they be on the
alert at fixed hours to receive mes.
sages. The effect was to convince the
Germans that large number of wire
tess stations had been set up and to
advise them or the hours when the en-
envy infercepting stations should be
on the alert for the American mes
sages. - ..,....,, 80; i ,l.,~.. 81 aBs
This was Followed by a series Of
messages designed TO Indicate that the
,ax army" was preparing sfor full
.6edged operation. In. order. to inform
The, enemy, Of the geographical limits
or the sector Of the sss.'x army, many
messages were directed to imaginary
officers ut existing towns on the Etain
front a ,5 re .
4, : Wireless Works Night and Day. a
Meanwhile the rowing wireless sta.
ton was working. overtime eday and
night. 1t began sending out MESA ges
In Sthe Fres1es sector and trying to
give the impression tibet Il was sew
erai stations at, widely separated los
cations, One message IN psrticular
was peculiarly designed to fadd to the
enemy's suspicion or the approa ching
trouble-an imperative demand for 200
!. copies more additional Of tine CONTAINS
sheet. "plan directeur. map" This
could only be Interpreted by the Ger
mans, the Americans agreed, as prepa.
ration for coming drive ON the Briey
from center.
In addition to the wireless the "x
army" also had In operation. ON the
front between Bezonaux and Fresnes,
a telephone squads careless squad
which set M tslenhone Hta5iQne hefe
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