Norwich bulletin., 1920-03-31
MAYO DIFFERS
 WITH ADMIRAL SIMS

Washington, March 30s-Faulty or ganization in the navy department and absence of definite foreign policy, except that of strict neutrality, opp erateds to prevent preparation of the entire navy for the war, Rear Admiral Mayo, commander of the Atlantic feet during the " orld war. declared today before the senaet naval Investigating committee. The active fleet itself, however, was never better prepared he said, then when war was declared.
 Admiral Mayo, who was Rear Ad- miral Sims immediate superior. tech nically at least, during the war, took issue with some of the statements made by that officer in his indictment of the departments conduct of the war. To the charge that no adequate plan for cooperation with allied na- vies had been made in advance, he answered that the office of chief of operations had been created onlX in 1915 and was not comprehensive enough to get the best possible re suits: but that, without 1t. conditions would have been chaotic.
 The navy was as well prepared for
 war in 1917 as were theS British, French and Italian navies in 1914, Admiral Mayo asserted, adding that it would have been better prepared thad the operations bureau been created sooner.
 Admiral Mayo did not agree with Admiral Sims contention that every available destroyer and anti-sub- marine craft should have been sent abroad when war was declared. He said that it was imperative that some 1 destroyers be kept with the Atlantic fleet
 Pointing out the necessity for a ;staynlv defined foreign policy, Ad- miral Mayo said that the ramed forces l of a nation were merely the instru- ments to support national policies. 1 The navy department, he argued, was responsible for the efficiency of the service only to the extent of congress
 sienal provisions, and he added that II l took more than a yea TOT two to build tup navy adequate to. great emer- :. I.gency.
 ,sThe differences of oninion as to l what constitutes an adequate navy can I Be. traced to our lack of a definite for { yeign : policy" he said. .sThe remedy for this condition lies outside the navy I fdepartment, but it is vital to tht tquestiou at issue.
 The organization of the navy de- .I partment before and during the war and now. is unsatisfactory, Adnira l Mayo said "So long as the presen x OfEdHlAdtftIl .SAiSto. lC @ SOiAN4AioSSi
 .the maximum efficiency either il id dpreparation for war, in. the conduct Q
 war or in economical development 0 I the navy in peace. cannot be attained EIn the present organization respons si5 2 hii;ty for rhes readiness of the navy fo <. war cannot be placed anywhere bu J with the secretary Of the navy. wh. s must co-srdinate thirteen offices I9 Dbards and bureaus
 The chief sof maya !. operations Ad
 Isiiral Afayo said, should be given nor authority and wider latitude and thei
 he held to account for lack of efieien
 Admiral Mayo said he was not kep
 Informed of changes in policies as flee :, fceFamander. nor properly consulte !. Eswith. regard to developments in tn Il western Atlantic during the war. tha ! units of. his command. were detache : and directed from the department in , astead of Aeing left under his direction that authority was so centralized i i, | the department that the principle ( . ssuh-division of responsibility wa , neglected. that he was not sent abroa 4 to direct operations there as he recon n1erded. and that the department re q fused to send all available battleshir . abroad in the spring and summer ( 2 siS to prepare for an expected 'Ia. . hope" drive by the German fleet. Thi oneration was ordered by the enen, high command, he said but the lo' z morale of the German crews made ] ' impossible of accomplishment.