New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1920-08-15

("The March on Paris and
the Battle of the Marine.
1917; Longmans, Green &
Coz differs from most of the contro-
versial literature of the war, in that
it was written before Germany's de-
feat was clearly Indicated 1t was
completed on February 8, 1918, and the
author says that the technical part of
1T Is based on memorandum drawn up
by the chief of staff of the First Army
in the winter of 1914-15. Won Kluck
was obliged to write circumspectly and
he had no opportunity to reply direct
ly to the reflections on his generalship
made after the war by Won Bilow,
commander Of the German Second
Army; Won Hansen, commander of
the German Third Army, and others.
Blame on Won Kluck
Won Kluck was retired in 1915, evil
IDENTIFY having been made a scapegoat
for the failure of the first Marine cam
paigp. In that campaign the First
Army had the leading role. 1t was on
the right end of the German line pivot
ing on Metz and wheeling through Bel
GUM and northern France to envelop
the French and British armies. Kluck's
task was facilitated by the faulty con-
centration of the French, which ig-
nored the peril of an envelopment
through Belgium. In his great wheel,
which carried him from Liege, through
Brussels, to the outskirts of Paris and
then toward the Seine, he encountered
little opposition. He couldn't envelop
the British Expeditionary Army be-
cause Field Marshal French prudently
retreated at top speed. General Smith
Dorrien played into Won Klucks hands
when he halted with the Second British
Corps to fight the battle of lie Cateau.
But in spite, Of that blunder, made
against French's orders, the British
escaped the German trap.
The weakness and fuidity of the
Allied defense on Joffre's exposed left
flank really deranged the execution of
the plan bequeathed to Moltke the
younger by Count Schleffen. Won
Kluck got ahead so fast with the First
Army that the Second Army couldn't
keep up with him. When, therefore. the
Notifications OF Paris were reached,
when an development of the French
left became impossible and the Schlief-
fen plan had to be modified into a
breaking through operation against
!,
ton was such that he couldn't well
use his army merely as a shield to
cover the TANKS of the Second and
Third armies. At any rate, he didn't
use it effectively for that purpose.
When he was attacked on his own flank
and rear by Maunoury, he pulled back
two of his army corps which had been
cooperating with Won Bulow, and thus
helped to distend and dislocatc Won
Bulows front. which was eventually
broken by Foch
A Born Fighter
Won Kluck was a fighter by tempera-
ment and impatient Of direction. He
resented the General Staff's original
order subordinating the First Army to
the Second. He was very critical of
decisions coming from the high COM
mand at Luxembourg. Thus, after the
idea of driving the French in south
easterly direction from Paris was
adopted, a message was sent TO Won
Kluck during the night of September
2-3 which gave him this specific in
struction:
"The First Army will follow Ell
echelon behind the Second Army and
will be, responsible for the flank pro-
lection of the armies
Won Kluck says that he thought this
project of driving the French south
east would be difficult and risky
undertaking."
He reported to Luxembourg on Sep
TENDER that it would be impossible
for the First Army to follow en- echelon
behind the Second and that, instead,
he had ordered it to continue its ad-
vance.
Neither Won Kluck nor German Cen
.u,zx