Pullman herald. [volume] (Pullman, W.T. [Wash.]) 1888-1989, 1920-03-19

- ~" WV great railway Sys
.eips-one In the north. passing through
hege' while the other IN the south
win lines coming from pmhnrp
KNOXVILLE and Metz, had - IFS WITH,
section the line Carlgnan.Sedon.N MOI
'eres. No other important lines were
aVaiiaole to the enemy, as the moun.
famous masses Of the Ardennps mods
the construction of east and west lines
through that region impracticabIe
Begin Victorious Advance.
On the night of September 25 the
nine divisions to lead In the attack
were deployed between the Meuse
river and the western edge of the Ar.
come forest. On the right was the
lh'rd corps, Major General Bullard
commanding. with the Thirty-thIrd
Elghtieth and Fourth divisions In line :
next came the Fifth corps. Major Gen.
eral Cameron commanding, with the
Seventy-ninth, Thirty-seventb and
Ninety-frst divisions; on the left was
the First corps, Major General Liggett
commanding, with the Thrty-fifth,
Twenty eighth and Seventy-seventh d.
vision. Each corps had one division 10
reserve and the army held three divi-
sions as a general reserve. About
2,7OO guns. 1S9 small tanks. 142
manned by Americans, and S21 air.
planes. GOA manned by Americans,
were concentrated to support the at
tack OF the infantry. We thus had a
superiority in guns and aviation, and
the enemy had no tanks
Following three hours of violent ar.
tlliery fire of preparation the infan.
try advanced at 80 a. m. on Septem-
Der 26 accompanied by tanks. Dur
Ing the first two days of the attack. be-
fore the enemy was able to bring up
his reserves, our troops made steady
progress through the network Of the
defenses. Montfaucon was held tena-
ciously by the enemy and was not cap
tured until noon of the second day.
The attack continued without in
terruption, meeting six new divisions
which the enemy threw into first line
before September %. He developed
powerful machine gun defense sup
ported by heavy artillery fire, and
made frequent counter-attacks with
fresh troops, particularly on the
front Of the Twenty eighth and Thirty.
fifth divisions. These divisions had
taken Varennes, Cheppy, Baulny and
Charpentry, and the line was within
two kilometers of Apremont. We were
no longer engaged In a maneuver for
the pinching out of a salient, but were
necessarily committed, generally speak
Ing to direct frontal attack against
strong, hostile positions fully manned
by determined enemy.
At 5 80 a. M, October 4, the gen.
eral attack was renewed. The enemy
divisions on the front from FresneS-en-
WOevre to the Argonne had increased
from ten In first line to sixteen, and
The lighting was desperate and only
small advances were realized. except
by the first division on the right of
the First corps.
On the 7th the First corps, with the
Eighty-second division added. launched
draw attention from the movement
east Of the Meuse and at the same
time outflank the German position in
the Argonne. The following day the
Seventeenth French corps, Major Gen
eral Claudel commanding, initiated Its
attack east of the Mouse against the
exact point on which the German
armies must pivot In order to with
draw from northern France. The
troops encountered elaborate fortifi-
cations and stubborn resistance, but
by nightfall had realized an advance
of six kilometers to line well within
the Bots de Consenvoye, and lnclud-
Ing the villages Of Beaumont and
Haumont.
Foe Fought stubbornIy.
Continuous fighting was maintained
along our entire battle front, with es-
pecial success on the extreme left
where the capture of the greater part
of the Argonne forest was completed
Inc enemy cOuleSleu every lpot VI
ground on our front. in order
to make more rapid retirements far
Their west and withdraw his forces
from northern France before the inter
rupt'on of his railroad communica-
lions through Sedan.
We were confronted at this time
by an insufficiency of replacement TO
build up exhausted divisions. We stii'
had two divisions with the British and
two with the French. A review Of the
situation. American and allied. espe-
cially as TO our own resources In men
for the next two months. convinced
me that the attack OF the First army
and the allied armies farther west
should be pushed to the limit But
If the First army was TO continue Its
aggressive tactics. our divisions then
with the French must be recalled and
replacements must be obtained by
breaking up newly arrived divisions.
In discussing the withdrawal of our
divisions from the French with Mar
shall Foch and General Petain on Oc-