New-York tribune., 1920-06-14

from London or TOXIC as to their in
tentions. remarkable discretion of
silence has been preserved. expiainable
only by a combination Of two assump-
tions; First, that each is waiting for
/ the other to make the first sign Sec
ond that both are waiting for the pres
to settle to the point where the future
may be forecast at least family.
The treaty provides that it is to be
binding until either party gives n
/ years notice of desire for release, but
it is inconceivable that the alliance
will remain in force merely by default
of silence. The conditions that gave
! birth to the treaty and made it a
logical and advantageous contract for
both sides have all been changed. In
1911 China was still monarchy, not
yet torn by internal dissension and ca
the verge of governmental bankruptcy.
Russia was still an aggressive i'm
perialistic power with unconcealed de-
signs in the Far East. an active menace
to Japan in the Pacific and Great
Britain in India. Germany was be-
coming an increasingly strong factor
in China.
War Liquidated Situation
Japan was not yet the paramount
power in China. holding much of its
territory and welding an almost de-
clslve influence in its internal affairs.
SIBERIA was not yet under occupation
OF Japanese troops. America was not
yet one of the ma jor voices in world
politics. The league of nations did noc
exist, even in skeleton The World
War liQuidated the situation in the
East as we'll as in the West.
The Anglo-Japanese alliance as it
stands is a dead letter The conditions
out of which it arose and to which it
was meant to apply no longer exist.
If 1t is to be prolonged, if it is to have
any meaning, it must be on a basis
that has some reference to fact. The
treaty must be rcdrafted on q clean
slst~-lf 1t is to be drafted at ALL
Interests Conflict in China.
The second factor to be considered
in the question of the future of the
alliance is, then, the changed position
OF Japan in China. 1t is here that the
alliance has become an incongruity
Much as has been said about the frc-
ton between japanese and Americans
in the Far East, and it would be use
less to deny that such friction exists
to an alarming extent, the real clash
or interests, at least in China, is be-
tween British and Japanese 1t is
British interests that stand to suffer
most from Japanese encroachments, be-
cause the British stake is largest.
Every extension of Japanese domina
ton closes another channel to British
trade. Chinese customs statistics for the
| last five years are eloquent testimony
1t is in the British sphere of influence
the Yangtse Valley, that Japan has
made some of its deepest penetrations
! particularly around Hankow.
On broader grounds there is even
less community of interest between the
two powers. Britain's aims in China
are not Japans aims; the two are
radically opposed. Britain's designs in
emma never have been primarily politi-
cal. Even granting that Japan's are
not, they are so firmly based on the
minimum of preferential position and
on economic domination, if not contiul
that their furtherance is blow to
every other nations interests
Pact No Advantage to Britain
So long as Britain is allied with
Japan it must shoulder at least moral
responsibility for acts such as the
twentyone demands, which we're in
! provisions Of the alliance, for not ONLY
/ did Japan not consult the British For
! eign Office, but it even sought to con.
ceal that such demands had been made
as is now matter of record. And such
acts initiate as much against Britain
as against China or any other power
For Britain to support such aims. even
indirectly as an ally. is to back Japan
against itself. 1t is to deny itself ever
the right OF opposition.
For Britain, then, there does not
appear to be any positive advantage
in a continuance Of the alliance; GER
talnly. there is no need. 1t has little
to gain, much to lose. If it is to re-
main party to the alliance with any
benefit to itself it must make exal,
tions.
If the object of the alliance is to be
the preservation of China's integrit,
then there must be specific pledges
from Japan that Japan will not agar
lay the knife to China's throat. a.
1t did with the twenty-one demands
that it viii not undermine China's in
dependence by fomenting discorC
within China, by underwriting it.
militarists and in exchange extortine
concessions that put China in vas
saiage. There must be such concret,
tokens of good faith as complete with
drawal at once from Shantung ant
P>'A
Japanese troops have no legal rights
If the alliance is to guarantee tn,
maintenance of the open door, thel
Japan must begin by taking off H.
lock in south Manchura, the Laotunj
Peninsula and along the Chimes,
Eastern Railway.
Russian Menace Lifted
If the alliance is to protect the spc
clal interests Of the two powers, Japa,
must define in detail what it construe
| as its special interests in China.
If the alliance is to preserve th
peace of all eastern Asia. then Japa,
must set a definite date for its with
drawal from Siberia, as we'll as stat
more definitely than it has the pur
poses of its occupation after the with
drawal of the Allied and America,
torces. 1t must, in short, abandon
It's grandiose dream of continental con
quest.
Whether the alliance is worth tha
| price to Japan now is questionable
| For Japan too there is no positive nee,
tor an ally in the Far East Its menac
also las been lifted in the elimination
| of Russia. Otherwise it has no poten
tlal rival in Asia It's only other pos
| s.blc menace is America. And arains
that Great Britain has ALREADY refuse
to aid If Ru. lit4lo Io,b+ /; r,. 49,.