The Mankato free press. [volume] (Mankato, Blue Earth County, Minn.) 1879-1924, 1920-05-14
DANIELS BARES SECRETS
REVEAL HISTORY OF NAVAL
POLICY DURING WAR
Messages Between Admiral Sims
And President Wilson Are
Made Public
Associated Press Dispatch


Washington, May ia confiden-
tial cablegram from President Wilson
to Rear Admiral Sims in London, sent
during the war. was read to the SEN
ate navaI investigating committee to-
day by Secretary Daniels II express
ed surprise that the British admiralty
had failed to use Great Britain's
great naval superiority effectively
against the submarines" and called
on Admiral Sims for comments and
suggestion based on independent
thought" and without regard to
judgments of any one on that side
of the water"
The admiralty was helpless to the
point of panic" in the face OF the
submarine situation. the message
said President Wilson's message to
Sims follows:
Calls For Comments
From the beginning of the war,
have been greatly surprised at the
failure of the British admiralty to use
Great Britain's great naval superior
ity in an effective way. In the pres
ence of the present submarine menace
they are helpless to the point of panic
Every plan we suggest they re-
ject for some reason of prudence. In
my view this is not time for prud-
ence but for boldness even at the cost
or great losses.
! In most of your dispatches you have
quite properly advised us of the sort
of aid and cooperation desired from
us by the admiralty. The trouble is
that their plans and methods do not
seem to us efficacious ! would be
very much obliged to you if you
would report to me conhdentlally, OF
course, exactly what the admiralty
has been doing and what they have
accomplished and, added to the re-
port, your own comments and sug-
gestions, based upon independent
thought of the whole situation, with
out regard to the judgments of any
one on that side Of the water"
Lacked Needed Conveys:
'The admiralty was very slow to
adopt the protection of conveys and
it is not now, l Judge, protecting con-
voys on adequate scale within the
danger zone, seeming to keep small
craft with the grand feet. The alb
sence of craft for convoy is even
more apparent on the French coast
than on the English coast and in the
channel: do not see how the neces..
sary military supplies and supplies OF
food and fuel oil are to be delivered
lat British ports in any other way with
in the next few months than under.
adequate convoy. There will present
LIZ not be ships or tankers enough and
4aur, slsin building plans may not bes
5 | gin to yield important resdfts IA Tess
\ than eighteen months.
: 81 believe that you will keep these
1 instructions absolutely and entirely to
q yourself and that you will give me
= such advice as you would give If you
y were handling and If you were run
: ming navy of your own"
Letter From Sims.
Mr.. Daniels also read letter from
, Admiral Sims to former Ambassador
, Page at London, written August Z.
1917, which in part said:
( "In this connection l have a sug-
gestion to make. | have received
= word, practically directly from the
: president that he was much displeas
, ed with my reply his cablegram
q that it did not change his opinion at
= all; that he regards me as owned by
r the admiralty and so pro British that
t he seriously considered the advisable
s ity of replacing me by some other Of
ficer."
- Admiral Sims reply to the presi-
> dent told also of plans for combined
n sea and land attack to turn the Ger
r man right flank and cut off Zeebrugge
: as a provisioning base, Mr.. Daniels
: said.
e Admiral Sims told the president he
g had been shown studies of the depart
ment TO prevent the eSreSS OF SUD-
$ marines, Mr.. Daniels said. and that he
considered the scheme impracticable.
S Sims cable to the president suggested
Y that the proper holicy to pursue was to
e to the department, Most of which had
= been decided upon and put in operation
: before Admiral Sims suggested them.
e Secretary Daniels declared.
a HE added" the secretary continued,
= that we should adopt an organization
t. similar in all respects to the British
|, squadron and virtually transfer all nav
e nj authority to his headquarters in Lon
don. He was careful not to say, though.
t ne regarded the Queenstown base and
n surroundings the critical area that as
n rapidly as American destroyers arrived
the British destroyers were removed to
another area, although he now makes
\ the preposterous statement that the
] failure to have more destroyers in that
critical area, 1--WE had forty three at that
time out of our total of fifty occasion
n ed the loss of 100000 lives and fifteen
billion dollars of money"
e Answer OF Sims.
4 The first was that the views he had
4 expressed were in all IAN Independent
: opinion based upon specific facts col
! Iected in the admiralty and other gov
q eminent departments"
S The second was as follows: Depend
e upon the fact, which 1 believe to DO
e true. that regardless of any future de-
support of the British navy. have
. been assured of this by important gov
L eminent officials
:, 1T would be interesting to know why
i their government officials assured him
. that regardless of future developments
, the United States can always count upon
= the support of the British navy" said
Mr.. Daniels.
Under British Influence.
e Admiral Sims was under the shell of
n influences that made him believe that the
British government could be depended
. upon more to take care of America than
that America should depend upon her
. own strong right arm" said Mr. DAN
t iels.
This attitude of acceptance of every
Thing suggested" he ADDED, "undoubt-
>. ledy accounts for his opposition to the
creation of an Independent American
army and his idea that American troops
sent abroad should be used as an annex
Ito the British army, quoting General
v Bliss recommending this policy When
q General Bliss read that Admiral Sims
I had quoted him as advocating such a
- l,policy he wrote at once to the secretary
of war declaring the truth to be ex-
Iactly the reverse" :.
Aid Society Meetinu.