The Butler weekly times and the Bates County record. (Butler, Mo.) 1918-1950, 1920-01-15

| while the Russian revolution was well
under way. and 10y the midsummer
| Of 1917 the final collapse OF that gov
ernmcnt was almost certain.
The relatively low strength of the
| GerMH; Forces on the western front
led the allies. with much confidence.
to attempt Il decision on this front;
| but the losses were very heavy and
the effort signally failed. The failure
caused u Sur'nii> reaction, especially
on French morale, both i'm the army
and throughout tn" country, and at
tcml,l< to carry oul extensive or com
biurd u,aru(innS were indefinitely Sis
pended
Sank Millions Of Tons.
In The five mouths endin; June 3O
Gcrmnt, submarines had accomplished
:he destruction of more than 3.2oO.UOO
tons of allied shipping. During three
years Germany had seen practically all
her offensive, except Verdun crowned
with success. Her battle lines were
held OF, foreign soil and she had with
stood every allied attack since the
Marine. The German general stan
could nOw fOreSee the complete elm
nation of Russia. the possibility Of de-
feating Italy before the end OF the
year and. finally, the campaign of 1913
against the French and British on the
western front which might terminate
the war.
1t cannot be said that German hopes
of final victory were cXtrnvasanl.
either as viewed at that time or as
viewed in the light of history. Finan-
cial problems of the allies were diff
cult. supplies were becoming exhaust
ed and their armies had suffered ire
menlous losses. Encouragement en-
listed not only among the civil popula-
ton but throughout the armies as well.
Such was the allied morale that,
although their superiority on the west
ern front during the last half of 1916
and during 1917 amounted to 20 per
cent, only local attacks could be under
taken. and their effect proved wholly
insufficient against the German de-
Tense Allied resources in man power
at home were low and there was little
prospect of. materially increaSin. their
armed strength, even in the face Of the
probability o. having practically the
whole military strength OF the Central
Powers against them in the spring Of
1918.
This was the state of affairs that ex.
listed when we entered the war. While
our action gave the allies much encOur-
agemcnt. yet this was temporary. and
review of conditions made 1t appar-
ent that America must make supreme
material effort as soon as possible.
After duly considering the tonnage pos
sibilitics I cabled the following to
Washington on July 6. 1917:
'Plaus should contemplate sending
over ut least 100000 men by next
May" general organization project.
covering as far as possible the person
mel Of all combat. staff and admins
trative units. was forwarded to Wash
ington on July II. In this I stated:
Needed 1000, 900 Men.
1T is evident that force Of about
100000 Is the smallest unit which in
modern war will be complete, we'll
balanced and Independent fighting or
ganization. However. It must be
equally clear that the adoption Of this
size force as a basis of study should
not be construed as representing the
maximum force which should be sent
to or which will be needed in France.
II Is taken as the force which may be
expected to reach France In time for
an offensive in 1918. and as unit and
basis Of organization. Plans for the
future should be based. especially in
reference to the manufacture Of artil-
lery, aviation and other material. on
three times this force. e.. at least
100000 men,"
| Resolved on an Offensive.
Before developing plans for line Of
communication It was necessary to
decide upon the probable sector Of. the
front for the eventual employment Of q
distinctive American force. Our mis-.
sion was offensive and It was essential
to make plans for striking the enemy
| where a definite military decision
could be gained the aiffsd
armies had cndeavored to maintain the
offensive. the British. in order to guard
the channel ports were committed to
operations In Flanders and the French
to the portion Of the front protecting
Paris. Both lacked troops to operate
elsewhere on . large scale.
TO the east the great fortified dis
kexict east Of verdun and around Nets