New-York tribune., 1920-11-09
The Case for Bdftleships

10 the Editor Of The Tribune.
Sir: The article by Quarterback
printed on the editorial page of The
Tribune of November under the
above title is so incorrect in it's state
ments and thu conclusions drawn are
so dangerous to tie future safety of
the country that It deserves immediate
answer and rchuttal
In the article in question it is as
serted that "air power viii inevitably
force change in battleship design;
that aviation and submarines are
sounding the ultimate doom OF the
5attlcship'; that because of the de-
yeloprert of uirplanes and submarines
"the United States can never be sue
ccssfully attacked in the future by
ary combination of powers from over
seas" and that "thc danger Of invasion
is no more"
Such assertions cannot go unchal-
lenged. Admiral Taylor, chief con-
structor of tine navy, in an article in
The Franklin Institute, reprinted in
the October, 1920, number of the Pro-
oeedings of the United States Naval
Institute, in which he discusses the
design Of war vessels as affected by
the World War, states:
There has been nothing startling or
revolutionary brought about by the ex-
pcfcnce of ffty-one months of war
There has mainly resulted an intensive
Development Of each of the accepted types
which existed Il: the outbreak of the war
and which the results of many years
Of study, experiment and practice in all
of the great naTies Of the world 1t is
true that some new types have appeared
but with exception namely. aircraft
carrers-they have been of minor I'M
portance when measured by the cost and
time required for production
Submarines played no direct part in
this Battle of Jutlandl, and it is re-
liably established that neither fleet was
accompanied by submarines nor were any
submarines even within striking distance
Of the scene of action.
Similarly, aircraft played no part in
the action.
Admiral Taylor, in discussing the
general phases OF" the w,r, states that
the outstanding feature of the war at
sea was The submarine campaign and
the methods adopted to combat it.
again quote from his article:
Although the submarine was through
out the war something Of disappoint-
ment in the actual results which it OBJ
tained in iniiicting loss or damage on the
fighting ships of the enemy. It's indirect
effect the freedom Of the action of the
main fighting fleets was SO considerable
that the problem Of the development of
the so-cacd feet submarine is still with
Us and must be solved largely from theo-
re;ical and engineering considerations.
rather than from direct experience in
action.
The submarine is essentially an instlu-
ment of stealth Once detected it must
take refuge in the depths, where for any
design as yet known, its offensive powers
become nil, and to the depth charge or
explosive bomb developed during the war
1t is exceedingly vulnerable In other
words once detected and accurately located
submarine is at the mercy OF surface
vessel. While the submarine may bo given
offensive features TO enable il to deal in
some fashion wi,n the surface vessel from
beneath the surface, the submarine is cs-
scntialy Vulnerable and if l may 70
to-day and probably viii be for many
years to come, but could not he relied
upon as the main feature Of navy.