The Butler weekly times and the Bates County record. (Butler, Mo.) 1918-1950, 1920-01-22

IL oi,ir; Ia hinder the cnemy> con-
quest Of ku->j; and il possible. pre-
,oie q Gellunr attack ON Italy. or in
tlr Near East. the allies sought to
ua;r.t:,ii the offensive uu the western
fr"h' - far as their diminished
>tr.U-''l uuI u'"r;iIr W"u'd permit.
Nn1Nith>rllnIln. these allied attacks
Oh IN" western front, IN" iInn'lS"
gains hN the German armies in the
east eliminating at Riga ON Sept. s.
preciB.t;itrd the collapse OF RUSSIA.
Tho. fullnNin. months. the .\uStrians-
with German assistance surprised the
Italians and broke through the lines at
EapUrVttU. tlrivin" the ita'i:ln armies
bach to the i'avr RIVER. int'irtln2 IL loss
OF 100000 men. Gm.Mn rifles. 5000
guns, and enormous stores. This Scrl-
Gus crisis compelled the withdrawal OF
ten French ana British divisions from
the western front to Italy. The Ger.
man situation on all other theaters was
so favorable that as early as Novem-
Der they began the movement of dlvl-
Sions toward the western front. II
needed, her divisions could he with
drawn from the Italian front before
the French and British dared recall
their divisions.
At first the allies could hardly hope
for a large American army. Marshal
Joffre during his visit to America had
made special request that II combat
division he sent at once to Europe as
visual evidence of our pufp"sc t" par
ticipate actively in the wVr. and also
asked for engineer regiments and other
special service units.
The arrival Of the first division ana
the parade If certain of its elements IN
Paris on july caused great entl'lsl-
aS1n and for thu time hein" French
tnorulr WAS stimulated. Still, allied
apprehension was leep-seatcd and ma.
ceral assistance was imperative.
Outlook Dark for. 1918.
A rrvirN of the situation showed
thar with Russia out OF the war The
central powers would be able to release
a large uumi,rr of divisions for service
elsewhere. and that during the spring
and summer of 1918. without inlerfer-
ing with the status quo at Saloniki.
they could concentrate on the western
front a fore" much stronger than that
of the allies. In view OF TINS II was
represented to the war department IN
December a> of the utmost Importance
that The allied preparations be eXpe-
dit-d.
Nix conclusion was that, although
the morale of the German people ana
of the armies was better shan il had
been for two years. only an unt"wartI
combination of circumstances could
give the enemy II decisive victory be-
fore American support as recommends
ed could be ulnde effective. provided
the ;,iieS secured unity of actl"n.
However. !. situation might arise which
would neceSSitate the temporary use or
all American troops in the units of our
allies for the defensive. but nothing in
lhe situation justified the relinquish-
ment of our tirr; purpose t" form our
own army under our own flag.
While the e. 'r.ilnns were practicins
for omen warfare and concentrating
their most aggressive personnel in
shock divisions. the training of the
allies was still limited to trench war
fare AS our troops were being trained
for open warfare. there was every rea-
son why we could not allow them to be
scattered among our allies, even by d.
,tsions, much less as requirements. ex-
cept by pressure of sheer necessity.
Any sort of permanent amalgamati0n
would irrevocably commit Americas
fortunes to the hands Of the allies.
It was obvious that the lack
OF homoEeneity would render these
mixed divisions difficult to maneuver
and almost certain to break up under
stress Of defeat, with the consequent
mutual recrim!natIon.
Again, there was no doubt that the
realization by the German people that
independent American divisions. corps,
or armies were In the field with deter
mined purpose would be a severe 0iow
tn German morale and prestige. It was
also certain that an early appearance
Of the larger American units on the
front would be most beneficial to the
morale of the allies themselves.
Accordingly, the first division. On
Jan. 10, 1913. took over q sector north
Of Toui: the twenty-sixth division went
70 the Solssoos front early In Febn.
sey: Tie 6oety-seeood division entered
~ H. near Lsnsvilla, rso. q. 81
1 - Dosn1 livlates nsnr teee