The diamond drill. (Crystal Falls, Iron County, Mich.) 1887-1996, 1920-01-17


for the employment OF the armies un-
der his command and these formed
the basis OF future cooperation Of
the allies. 1t was emphatically deter
mined that the allied attitude should
be TO maintain the offensive. As the
frst operation Of the American army.
the reduction OF the salient Of st.
MIhiel was to be undertaken as soon
as the necessary troops and material
could be made available.
On Aug. 20. further discussion with
Marshal Foch was held at my head
quarters at Ligny-en-Barrols. At this
meeting II was proposed by Marshal
Foch that the general opHations as
far as the American army was con-
cerned should be carried out In detail
by:
(a) An attack between the Mouse
and the Argonne by the Second French
army. reinforced by from four to six
American divisions.
(b) A French-American attack. ex-
tending from the Argonne west TO the
Souain road. to be executed on the
the Aisne and on the left by the
Fourth French army.
To carry out these attacks the ten
10 eleven American divisions suggested
for the ST. Mihiel operation and the
four 20 six for the Second French army
would leave eight to ten divisions for
an American army on the Aisne. II
hn
Grafton should be Initiated on Sept. 10
and the other two on Sept. 10 and 20.
respectively.
The plan suggested for the Amer
lean participation In these operations
was not acceptable 10 me. because II
would require the immediate separa-
ton OF the recently formed first Amer
lean army into several groups. main
ly to assist French armies. This was
directly contrary to the principle OF
forming distinct American army. for
which my contention had been insist
ent. An enormous amount OF prepara-
ton had already been made In con-
struction OF roads. railroads. regulat-
ing stations and other installations
looking to the use and supply OF our
armies on a particular front. The In
herent dissemination OF our troops TO
serve under allied commanders would
have grown and American morale
would have suffered. My position was
stated quite clearly. that the strate-
gical employment OF the first army as
a unit would be undertaken where de-
sired. but It's disruption 10 carry out
these proposals would not be enter
tanned.
An American Army.
A further conference at Marshal
Foch's headquarters was held on Sep
tember at which General Petain
was present. After discussion. the
question OF employing the American
army as unit was conceded. All tho
allied armies were to be employed In
a converging action.
II should be recorded that although
this general offensive was fully out
lined at the conference no one present
expressed the opinion that the final
victory could be won I'm 1913. In fact.
II was believed by the Meuse-Argonne
attack could not be pushed much be-
yond Monfaucon before the arrival OF
winter would force cessation OF OPP
erations.
The choice between the two sectors.
that east OF the Aisne. including the
Argonne forest. or the Champagne
sector. was left to me. In my opinion.
no other allied troops had the morale
or the offensive spirit 10 overcome
successfully the difficulties TO be met
In the Meuse-Argonne sector. and our
plans and installations had been pre-
pared for an expansion OF operations
In that direction. So the Meuse-Ar-
gonne front was chosen. The entire
sector Of $50 kilometers OF front ex-
tending from Port-sur-Seille. east Of
the Mosele. west TO include the Ar
gonne forest. was accordingly placed
under my command. including all
French divisions then In that zone.
The first American army was TO pro-
coed with the ST. Mfhiel operation,
after which the operation between the
Meuse and the western edge OF the
: Argonne forest was to be prepared
and launched not later than Septem-
Der 25
On the night OF September IL the
troops Of the first army were deployed
I'm position. On the southern face OF
the salient was The first corps. Ma
jor General Llggett commanding, with
the eighty-second ninetieth. fifth and
second divisions in line. extending
from the Moselle westward.
On It's left wns the fourth corps,
Mai Gen. Joseph T. Dickman COM
handing. with the eIghty-nInth. forty
second and first divisions, the left OF
this corps being opposite Montsec.
These two army corps were TO deliver
the principal attack, the line pivoting
on the center division OF the first
corps. The 1rst division on the left
| OF the fourth corps. was charged with