Greenbrier independent. [volume] (Lewisburg, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1980, 1920-01-30
ana launched hot later than scptcm.


On the night of September II the
troops of the first army We're deployed
In position. On the southern face OF
the salient WINS the first corps. Ma
J"r General Liggett commanding. with
the cighty-Sccond. nlnctieth. fifth and
second divisions in line. extending
from the MoSclle westward.
On its left was the fourth corps
Mali. Gen. Joseph r. Dickman com
mandinE. with the eighty-ninth. forty
second and first divisions. tho left OF
this corps being opposite Montsec.
Ihesc two army corps were to deliver
the principal attack. the line pivotin:
on the center division or the first
corps. The first division on the left
of the fourth corps. was charged with
the double mission OF covering its own
flank while advancing some twenty
ki!ometerS due north toward the heart
or the salient. where it was to make
contact. with the troops of the fifth
corps.
On the western face Of the salient
lay the fifth corps. Maj. Gen. George
II. Cameron commanding. with The
twcnty-SiNth division. fifteenth French
Colonial division and the fourth d.
vision in line, from Mouilly west to
Les Eparges and north to Wantron-
vile. OF these three divisions the
twenty-Sixth alone was to make n
deep advance directed southwark to-
ward Ni2neullcS. The French division
was to nuke short progression to
the edge OF the heights i'm order to
cover the left of the twenty-sixth.
Tho fourth division was not 10 nd-
vance.
In the center between our fourth
ami ffth army corps. was the second
French Colonial corps. Maj. Gen. +. J..
Eiondiat commanding. covering front
OF 40 kilomctcrs with three small
French divisions. These troops were
TO follow up the retirement Of the en-
envy from the tip Of the salient.
At dawn on Sept. IL. after four hours
OF violent artillery fire of preparation.
and accompanied ny small tanks, the
infantry Of the first and fourth corps
advanced. The infantry OF the fifth
corps commenced its advance mt S q.
m. The operation was carried out with
entire precision. Just after daylight
on Sept. 13 elements OF the first and
twenty-sixth divisions made junction
near Hattonchatel and NiSneulles,
eighteen kilomcters northeast of st.
Mihicl. The rapitlity with which our
divisions advanced overwhelmed the
enemy and all detectives were reached
by the afternoon of Sept. Is. We CAP
tured nearly 10000 prisoners. 4-43 guns
and large stores OF material and sup
plies. The energy and Swiftncss with
which the operation was carried out
enabled us to smother opposition to
such an extent that we suffered less
than 1000 casualties duriu" the actual
period of the advance.
The material results Of the victory
achieved were very important. An
American army was an ACCOMPLISHED
fact. aud the enemy had felt its power
No form OF propaganda could over
come the depressing effect on the
morale of the enemy Of this demon
stration of our ability to organize n
large American force and drive it sue
cessfuIly through his dcfenses. It gave
our troops implicit confidence In their
superiority and raised their morale to
the highest pitch. FOr the first time
wire entanglcmeniS ceased to be re.
Sarded as impossible barriers and
open warfare training, which had been
so urgently insisted upon, proved to be
the correct doctrine. Our divisions
concluded the attack with such small
losses and in such high spirits that
without the usual rest they were i'm
mediately available for employment In
heavy fighting in Il new ihcater Of op-
eratiOn$. The strength OF the first
army in this battle totalcd approxi-
mately 100000 mei. OF whom about
10000 were French.
immovabie Since 1914.
The Meuse-Argonne front had been
practically stabilized I'm September
1914, and, except for minor fluctuations
during the German attacks on Verdun
In 1916 and the French counter often.
sive In August, 1917, remained I'M
changed until the American advance In
1913. The net result of the four years
struggle on this ground was n German
defensive system Of unusual depth and
strength and Il wide zone Of utter dev,
astatiOn. itself Il serious Sbstacle TO
offensive operations.
The stratcgical Importance Of this
portion Of the line was second to
none on the western front. All SUD.
plies aud excavations Of the German
pendent upon two great railway sys-
tems--onc In the north, passing through
Liege, while the other In the south,
with lines coming from Luxembourg,
Thionville and Metz. had rs It's vital
section the line Curignan-ScdanMcz-
ieres. No other important lines were
available 10 the enemy. rs tho noun