The Leavenworth echo. [volume] (Leavenworth, Wash.) 1904-current, 1920-01-16

Up tn this time our units had been
put In here and there at critical points
as emergency troops to stop the ter
rife German advance. In every trial,
whether on the defensive or offensive,
they had proved themselves equal to
any troops In Europe. As early as
June %. and again on July 10 at Bonn
bon | had very strongly urged that
our best divisions be concentrated
under American command If possible
for use as n striking force AGAINST
the Marine salient. Although the pre-
vailing view anon" the allies was
that American units wore suitable
only for the defensive. and that at MI
events they could Toe used to better
advantage under allied command the
suggestion was accepted in principle.
and my estimate ot their offensive
fighting qualities was soon puJ to the
test
The enemy had encouraged his sol
dierS To believe that the July L. nj
tack would conclude the war with
German peace Although ne made clab
crate plans for the operation. hc failed
I" c""''"I iu''N MS 'il''Il''"lN' "H" 'I''
lroh' ol attack was suspected al IeaS'
one week ahtad en- the CHAMPAGNE
front the actual hour for The assault
was known and the enemy was checked
WIN heaNN losses. HE FortN'Nerond
division entered the line near Somme
Ply Immediately. and five of its iufan.
try hattalions and all of its artillery
became engaged. Southwest of Rheims
and along the Marine to the east of
Chatoau-Thierry the Germans were
at first somewhat successful, a pene
tratlon of eight kilomcters beyond the
river being effected against the French
Immediately to the right of our Third
division. The following quotation
from the report Of the commanding
general gives the result of the lighting
on his front:
None Crossed but Prisoners
"Althouph thc rash Of tbe German
troops overwhelmed some Of tho front
line positions. causing tbe infantry and
machine gun compontes to suffer IN
some cases n 40 ner cent loss M Ger.
man SoIdiers crnSsed tho rood from
Fossoy 70 Crpznncy nvcnnt a. nris.
oner Of war and hy mon Tho following
dav fIuIv 1e, thor. ,,oro no ,,,,.,no',s
In tho forecro,,nd of tho rrh;rd di,is,o,,
sector evcnnt rho dcodn
ON This ncc,.fo, - sir,rIo ro,i,nont
of tho rbir,r di,isio, ,,.r,,to ,r,, or tho
most brilliant nor.,. IN am, ,,i1i,,ry
annals II n,o,.o,,tod rho or,...i,,,, ot
CONTAIN noi,ts an &c fror+ u.,,iIo an
aitbor n,nl, tho cor,,,rs n.ho had
ooinod - footiu,, ,ro.sod coru.ord Our
mon frinc, Tn fhroo ecctiors mot tho
Carn,on otto,l,s win, oourtor ot,ocl,e
of critical noints and ,nocoodod in
tbrowirc two co,.,,or ,t,.isi,,, into
connlo+n confusion oo,,turinr eco
nrisonors
Tba eo1ectIon NV tho C.ormone ot
tho c,homnorno sector and tho coet-
arn and sorthern f,cos of ,ho Norma
nocl,at an which to mako tboir ofron.
sivo uos fortrnot, f,r ,b,, o11io, &c :.
favored the launching of the counter.
attac, olreodv MANNED Thnra rere
now over | oOO.OOo American lroops in
France, which provided a considerable
force of reserves. Every American di-
vision with any sort of training was
made available for use in a counter.
offensive.
General Petain's initial plan for the
counter-attacks involved the entire
western face Of The Marine salient.
The First and Second American divi-
sionS with the First French Moroccan