El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1920-01-17
SIMS TOLD To
WATCH BRITAIN

ais to commanding officers who lost
ships. senator Pittman read letter
from admiral Gleaves, who com
manded the cruiser and transport
plimentinE Capt Graham OF the
transport Finland which was tor
pedoed but saved. and recommending
HIM for a distinguished service
medal. senator Pittman said this let
ter and others proved that some
naval officers did not agree with ao-
miral Sims.
Admiral sims's letter said the fol-
lowing grave errors" were com
mitted BY the navy department IN
violation OF the fundamental mill
tary principles:
Although war with Germany
had been imminent for many months
prior TO its declaration, there was
nevertheless no mature plan devel-
oped or navy policy adopted IN
preparation for war in so Tar as its
commander in Europe was informed
The navy department did not
announce a policy until three months
after war was declared-at least not
TO its representative and the COM
mander OF the forces in Europe.
strain On Morale.
"3-The navy department did not
enter whole heartedly into the cam
paign for many months after we de-
clared war, thus putting a great
strain upon the morale OF the fight I
creasing their. confidence in their 1
leaders
"4-The outbreak Of hostiIities /
found many important naval units .
widely dispersed. and in need Of re- Z
pairs before they could be sent TO I
the critical area Destroyers arriv- I
ing in the war zone had been cruls- /
INC AL Of Hnrra nd
In the caribbean and when war was 4
declared. were rushed through a D
brief and inadequate preparation for +
distant service.
"5-DurinE the most critical T,
months OF the enemy's submarine I
campaign against the allied lines Of .
communication the department vio-
ated the fundamental strategical
principle OF concentration OF maxi
mum force in the critical area Of the
conflict.
"6-The departments representa-
i've with the allied admiralty was
lot supported during the most criti-
al months OF the war. either by the
adequate personnel or by the ade-
luate forces that could have been
iupplied-
Commanders Not Consulted.
THE departments commander
n the critical area of hosrilities was
lever allowed TO select his principal
and was not even con 4
iulted as 10 their assignment A I,
fundamental principle OF the art OF
Command is herein involved
"6-The navy department made Z
md acted upon decisions concerning Il
Iperstions that we're being con-
ucted 5000 miles away when condi-
ions were such that full informa-
ion could not have been in its pos
ession, thus violating an essential
RECEIPT OF warfare that some decis-
ons OF warfare that some COM
.lete Information.
s-Iustead Of relying upon the
Judgment OF those who had had ac-
ual war experience in this peculiar
Tarfare, the navy department,
hOugh lacking not only this expert
nee. bit also lacking adequate in
concerning it. insisted up
4 a number OF plans that could not
e carried out
"1O.-Many Of the departments &C
OnE 50 strongly implied a conyic-
on that IL was the most competent
} make decisions concerning opera
on in the war Zona that the result
as an impression that il lacked !
in the Judgment OF its
representative on the council Of the
lies and its responsible commander
! the field
1t IS fundamental principle that
very action on the part OF superior
should Indicate conf
ence IN subordinztes. II such con-
dence is lacking it should i'm
ledateiy be restored BY ruthlessly
Ranging the subordinate
Disastrous Influence.
Ito interfere with the com
lander in the field or afloat is one
Z the most common temptations 70
be EoTerume ut-and is generally \
isastrDus The navy department
ID not resist this temptation and its
requent violation Of this principle
as the most dangerous error com
lifted during the. naval war"
The admiral also read \ letter