Atlanta tri-weekly journal. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1920-19??, 1920-08-05
The Size of the German Army
II the midst of a meeting Of radicals at
4 Munich it was suggested to the leading

r N the midst of meeting Of radicals at
Munich it was suggested to the leading
speaker that a general strike such as he
was advocating would bring bitter suffering
to women and children, and death TO many
1nnocents. Nothing daunted, the agitator
coolly replied that Gin fight to the finish by
the proletariat few thousand human lives
could claim no consideration; that the Home
Guard could easily be overcome; and that
the army fortunately was to be reduced to
one hundred thousand 1men"
This and like remarks by extreme So
cialists being quoted by the conserva-
tive German press in support of it's conten-
ton that if the army curtailment required
by the Allies is carried into effect, the ma
ton will be swept into terrible chaos. 1t
is not many months since the present Gov
eminent shook from serious revolts in di-
vers parts of the country; and the 1ntima-
ton is that other and graver disturbances
may come this winter. Poor nourishment
is telling upon the mentality of the people.
Burdensome and even crushing prices keep
their faces to the earth. Shortage Of raw
materials and lack Of credits for importing
them are said to hold numbers of indus
tries idle, and SO add unemployment to
the factors of discomfort In such an at
mcsphere infammatory notions, like those
the Russian Soviets are eager to propagate,
find it easy to strike light. The danger
Is they may start conflagration.
That the German Government should be
allowed military forces adequate to cope
with these contingencies cannot be denied:
Nor can the Allies be imagined as ignor-
| ing the reasonableness and rightness of this
| general claim; for without a Government
| capable of maintaining order and disposed
| to carry out contracts Germany will be not
| only an irreclaimable debtor in the matter
| of war indemnities but a menace beyond
measure. When it comes, however, to the
definite extent to which her claim for an
army shall be recognized, differences and
difficulties arise. The destruction Of ma
rauding Prussanism, which assuredly was a
salient purpose in the Allies high struggle
| and sacrifice, demands the destruction of
the vast military machine. To leave a
nucleus from which another group of Hin
denburgs and Ludendorffs could develop
another German juggernaut would, he ex-
tremely hazardous. Yet to leave the sober,
capable and constructive elements of the
country at the mercy of Red radcalism
would be no less inimica1 to Europe and to
the world than to Germany herself
The practical question thus becomes,
what numbers of soldiers will suffice for
the nations urgent domestic needs? The
Treaty of Versailles says one hundred thou
sand; the German Government says twice
as many. The Allied counselors have as
sumed perhaps that it would be better to
err on the side Of too few than too many,
inasmuch as outside forces could be sent
into Germany to deal with a volcano which
her own powers could not quench. That,
however, would be costly and precarious
mission. The all-important and undesirable
| thing now is that Germany shall work out