New-York tribune., 1920-08-01
By Frank Fl. Simonds

by Frank II. Simonds
~ EYOND all else the collapse
Of Poland represents. aside
0 from the Bolshevist phase, 4
triumph for British policy,
and defeat for French. AS I have
pointed out many times in these ar
ticles, it was the hope Of French
craftsmanship to erect in Europe
three Slav states, Poland, Jugo-
Savia and Czecho-Slovakia, which
in alliance with France might pre-
serve the balance of power in Eu-
rope against a new German aggres-
sion. In such an alliance France
would naturally have occupied the
predominant role and, for the first
time since the Franco -Prussian War,
France would have obtained posi-
tion of independence. if not of
ascendancy on the Continent.
British policy sought to prevent
the liberation of French policy with
the very obvious apprehension that
France, thus strengthened, might
become again a world power in the
old sense-that Is, rival of Britain,
not alone in the Near East, where
the Syrian question has from the
moment of the armistice continued to
poison Anglo-French relations, but
on the Continent of Europe. In a
word, it was British purpose to pre-
vent France from becoming too
strong as a consequence Of the VIC
tory over Germany and the tempo
rary elimination of the German as
factor in the European situation.
Americas Position
The battle over Poland was one of
the sharpest in the Paris Conference,
and in it America was led into the
rather humilating situation Of act
ing as a catspaw to the British
policy. A strong Poland meant a
strong Franco-Polish alliance. A
weak Poland in the nature of things
meant continuation of French de-
pendency upon the British. France
fought for the Polish cause, not
alone from sympathy, which was
very real, nevertheless, but also from
policy.
As for the British, at all times and
under all circumstances Lloyd George
opposed Poland He did not merely
stand out against Polish expansion
into the regions which had been Po-
lands territory before the partition
of 1772, regions in which Polish con-
cesn was political and strategic and
her claims, however strong historic
ally, were ethnically weak, but his
opposition was just as emphatic
where, as in Upper Silesia, there was
rot question as to the predoIninance
Of fPolish tongue and race.
70 take parallel, which must
leap to notice: the claims Of Greece
in1Western Asia Minor, sound as
they aye and deserving of recogni-
tion, arc not stronger ethnologically
than those of the Poles in Eastern
Galicia; they are not, save in small
areas, as strong as those of the Poles
in Upper Silesia. But, whereas Brit
ish policy is served in the advance
of the Greeks in their ancient estates
beyond the Agean, British policy Is,
at.least in the opinion Of those who
guide it, injured by Polish expansion
in similar fashion. Thus in Asia
Minor British policy is one thing
and in Lithuania and White Russia it
is ,another, where exactly the same
moral issue is involved.
Lloyd George Insistens
Poland was sacrificed, then, not
as Americans at Paris and since have
been led to believe, because Of Polish
refusal to abide by the appropriate
Fourteen Points, but because it was
profitable from the British point Of
view to insist upon rigid appllca-
ton Of these principles in Eastern
Europe, but not In Western Asia.
Moreover, It will be recalled that
Lloyd George was even moro insist
ent than President Wilson ON using
tho Wilson doctrine against the
Poles.
SO much for the fact Of Poland,
which emphasize here because so
many Americans have failed to see
in Poland, as in Syria, and, in truth,
all over Europe, Asia and Africa,
the so-called American ideas have
not been invoked or applied as mat
ters Of principle, but purely and
simply as they were advantageous to
British interests.
But. the fact Of Polish collapse