New-York tribune., 1920-05-08


stance in the present Polish offensive
against the Russians is found in the
presence Of Ukrainians on the Polish
side of the firing line. Over many years
the Poles and the Ukrainians have been
separated by rival ambitions and terri
torial disputes. While Galicia was Aus
trian the PoIes-that is, the Austrian
Poles-ruled all Of it. and their rule was
bitterly resented by the Ukrainian mi
nority, which is a majority in east
ern Gallcia. When Austria collapsed,
the Ukrainans laid claim to eastern
Galicia, including Lemberg, besieged
the town and carried on a fair sized
war.
This war collapsed when the Ukrai-
mans were attacked in the rear by
Denikine's army, which, with fatal con-
sequences to itself, neglected the Boil
shevist enemy to punish the Ukrainian
separatsts. Denikinc, like Kolchak, was
a champion of the idea of Russian integ-
rity and hostile to all separatist move
ments, Polish, Lithuanian, Finnish and
Lettonian. With the collapse of the
Ukrainians. their leader, Petlura, fed
to Poland, Polish troops occupied east
ern Gal1cia, and the Supreme Council
awarded 1t to Poland under a compli-
Gated mandate system for a period of
years.
The Cholm Dispute
But back Of the Galician dispute was
the difference over the province Of
Cholm. Originally a part of Russian
Poland, it was separated from it by
Russian decree some years ago. A cer-
tain portion of the population is
Ukrainian, and when the Germans rec
ognized the Ukraine at Brest-Litovss
they sought to foment the bitterness be-
tween the Poles and the Ukrainians by
awarding Cholm to the Ukraine. When
Germany fell Cholm passed into Polish
hands, and the Polish claim to it was
recognized by the Paris Conference.
1t is fact Of real significance, then,
that the Ukrainians and the Poles have
sunk old and recent grievances and
struck hands to fight the Bolshevists.
But the fight goes beyond Bolshevism.
What Petiura is after is to create a state
wholly independent of Russia. Such
course pleases both the Poles and the
ukrainians because it greatly reduces
the peril for them which is transparent
ly inherent in any restoration of Rus
sia as great power. In accepting
Ukralnian assistance, in furthering
Ukrainian independence, Poland is, then,
acting with the instinct for self-pres-
ervation uppermost.
1t is easy to believe that, once VIC
tory is attained, the Poles and Ukra-
mans will quarrel again, for their terri
tories-that is, the regions having both
Polish and Ukrainiaa populations-ar
lneXtricably comminged, and Poland's
present claim to the frontier of 1772
really includes most, if not all. of the
Ukraine. To compromise the differences
will prove as difficult as composing the
disputes of the Greeks, Bulgarians and
Serbs in Macedonia,
Success in Russia
But it is rather to the Russian aspect
that public attention will turn now. So
far as one can perceive, the Poles, with
their allies, have been uniformly sue
cessful. They may, moreover, & far
in Russia. The difficulties of the armies
of Kolchak, Denikne and Yuderitch
nave not come mainly from without. but
from within. 1t has been the settled
belief Of military n,en that with a few
really solid divisions Yudenitch might
have got to Petrograd. yhat the mass
OF the Russian people regarded these