Evening star., 1920-01-18

! Secretary Lansing delivered nm
| the United States and the DeclnIAft
| photograph are, from right tn left,
! ridge Long, assistant secretary OF q
point which would defeat the objective
| of the enemy and thus insure victory
| of the common cause as a whole.
Tactics Which Were Required.
Submarines attacked almost ex-
clusively merchant vessels, thus cutting
| off supplies essential to armies. This
! was their correct mission, and they
wisely avoided conflict with allied naval
vessels. 1t was, therefore, our mission
| to adopt such tactics as to force the
submarine into contact with the allies
military vessels, while protecting the
submarine craft in such numbers that
| the. submarines could not reach their
prey without encountering them. IL was
| for this reason that it was continuously
ugred that everything be sent, not only
destroyers, which are pre-eminently the
best anti-submarine craft, Dut also
yachts gunboats, tugs, etc.-in fact. any
craft that could steam across the ocean
or be towed across.
1T is quite true that there were
many naval activities outside of the
eastern Atlantic, such as in the Car
ribbean, south Atlantic, Pacific and
Asiatic waters. But, considering the
rapidity with which at the time in
question We were losing the war in
the submarine zone. these forces were
of little importance-practica none
as regards ultimate success. A great
deal of unnecessary eRort was ex-
pended in those areas. 1t was re-
tha%
| not afford to continue the loss of mer-
chantmen at the rate then being sus-
tanned. 81
1T was realized, of course. that II a
considerable number of anti ubma-
rine vessels was not kept on our
coast there would be risk of public
criticism, which in time Of war must
be based upon inadequate information.
because to inform the public would
be to inform the enemy. But strong
ly advised that this risk be accepted
that we should not be Influenced in
our war measures by the possibility
Of such adverse criticisms; that the
situation made it imperative that
every possible means be used to de-
lfeat the enemy as speedily as possi-
lble regardless of other considerations.
and thus save many valuable lives.
Slowly Built Up STAN.
department to supply him with ade-
Quate aid in London in the early
stages of the war, Admiral Sims con-
tinued:
"As it gradually became apparent
that support in this matter need not
be expected. began slowly build
ing up a staff by detaching officers
from some Of the ships. This was of
course, regrettable, as many Of the
ships were at that time short Of ON
of the whole force becoming inef-
fective through the rapidly growing
and essential administration work
getting beyond the capacity Of a
headquarters force. Ultimately this
force consisted of about sixty regular
listed men and clerical force for the
administration, supply and operation
of widely dispersed forces Of about
[ 370 ships Of all classes, 5000 officers
finally, I believe. tacitly recognized
| by the department. but not until near
| the end of the war, when a few Off
| cefs were sent for staff duty.
IF it had been recognized from the
| beginning as we'll as the necessity of
| forces. there can be o doubt that the
] end of the war would have been
hastened and hundreds Of thousands
| of tons of shipping and many lives
1T needs little explanation to un-
| derstand what I and my single aid
| were up against.
| IF the department realized these
| conditions. it is made clear by the
(, records that 1t was not Influenced by
| them. The correspondence shows
| that I was trying to get the depart
ment to understand that I was con-
! fronted with an impossible task
that it was actually physically impos-
! sible for me and one aid to carry on
| efficiently the necessary operation of
the forces. let alone complying with
! the departments demands for the de-
tails Of information concerning all
(! the various claims of the allies, the
! details of all methods and appliances
| used, etc. All this, not to mention
the details reuired concerning new
| construction. new types OF vessels,
| new methods of gunfire, etc.
''- a word. it would hardly be Dos
sible to conceive of a more complete
| misunderstanding by the department
of the actual situation that confront
ed me on the other side, particularly
during the critical period Of the war"
Lack OF Information.
THE department frequently omitted
to keep it's naval representative,
abroad Informed Of it's plans, inten-
tions. and sometimes even the move.
ment Of forces in the European area
and there was at times embarrass.
ment caused by the lack Of general
Information concerning the Nayy't
Iactivities in other areas, such as the
south Atlantic. Pacific, etc. AS for
eign forces and shipping were also
Operating in those areas. it was EN-.
Ibarrassing not to be able to answer
lin conference with the allies, al
Questions concerning our actual nava
activities. as well as prospective
plans. the carrying out of which
would necessarily influence alliet
lplans.
1T requires no imagination to un-
lderstand the great embarrassment OF
my position. 1t was, of course, i'm
possible even to attempt any explana.
ton of the evident fact that the al
lies were not receiving the easily
possible naval support in ships and
that / was not receiving adequate as
sistance in personnel.
Apart from the resulting lack OF
co ordination. 1t was very difloult-
I fear sometimes impossible-to avoit
the impression conveyed there to tht
head OF the allied navies that I VA
, not being supported or was not "
the confidence of the department. ~
Delays and confusion were caQ