The Butler weekly times and the Bates County record. (Butler, Mo.) 1918-1950, 1920-01-15

me0dCeO central tCdnCe, prOtcCtcu tnc
most exposed portion Of the Germsn
line of communications. that between
Metz and Sedan, and covered the
Briey iron region, from which the en-
iron required for munitions and ma
terial The coal fields east of Metz
were also covered by these same de-
lenses. A deep advance east Of Metz.
or the capture Of the I'riey region. by
threatening the invasion Of rich. Ger
man territory in the Moseile valley
and the Saar BASIN. thus curtailing
her supply Of goal or iron. would Lave
a decisive effect in forcing a with
drawal of German troops from north
ern France. The military and eco
nomic siluatoh of the enemy. there
fore. in(iicatedN Lorraine as the field
promising the most fruitful results for
the employment of our armies.
The complexity Of trench life had
enormously increased the tonnage OF
supplies required by troops. Not only
was 1t question of providing food.
but enormous quantities Of munitions
and material were needed. Upon the
railroads of France fell the burden OF
meeting the heavy demands of the
3,5OO.OOO allied combatants then en-
gagged. If the American army was to
have an independent and flexible syS-
TEN II could not use the lines behind
the British-Belgium front nor those
in rear of the French front covering
Paris.
Chose the Southern Ports.
The problem confronting the Amer
ican cXpedi,i"nary forces was then to
superii,po>e its rail communications
on those Of France where there would
be the least possible disturbance to
the arteries of supply of the two great
allied armies already IN the field. The
lines selected. therefore. were those
leading from the comparatively I'M
used South Atlantic ports of France
to the northeast. where it was heliev-
ed the American armies could be EN-
ployed to the best advantage.
For all practical purposes the Amer
lean eXpeditionary forces were based
on the American continent. Three thou
sand miles of ocean to cross, with the
growing submarine menace confront
ing us. the quantity of ship tonnage
that would lie available then I'M
known. and line Of communications
by land 400 miles long from French
ports to our probable front presented
difficulties that seemed almost inSur'
m0untable as compared with those OF
our allies.
In providing for the storage and dis.
tributiOn of reserve supplies an al
lOwance Of 45 days in the base Sec
tons was planned. with 81 days in the
Intermediate section, and - days in
the advance section. After the safe
ty of our sea transport was practical
Nv assured. this was reduced to q total
of As duys. distributed propOrtionate-
~. When the armiStice was signed all
projects for construction had been
completed and supplies We're on hand
to meet the needs OF 2,O(M.WN men,
while further plans for necessary con-
struction and for the supply Of an ad.
ditional 2,OOO.OOO were well under
way.
Our Own Fighting Doctrine.
A similar scheme was adopted in
August, 1917. for our armies, in which
the Importance of teaching through
out our forces sound fighting doc
trine of our own was emphasized. 1t
provided for troop training in all units
up to include divisions. Corps cen
tiers of instruction for nOncommission-
ed officers and unit commanders OF
all arms were established. The army
and corps schools graduated 1880
noncOmmisSiOned officers and 1916
officers.
Pending the organization and devel-
Opment of our own schools. a large
number of our officers were sent to
centers. of instruction of the allied
armies. The training of our earlier
divisions was begun in close associ-
alton with the French divisions. under
conditions set forth in the following
paragraph on divisional training:,
"Trench warfare naturally given
prominence to the defensive as Op-
posed to the offensive. To guard
against this. the basis Of instruction
should be essentially the offensive
both in spirit and In practice. The
defensive is accepted only to prepare
e.. r,,t,,,o oAfou -
The long period Of trench warfare
had-so impressed itself upon the
French and British that they had al
most entirely dispensed with training
for open warfare. It was to avoid
this result In our army and to encour-
age the offensive spirit that the fol-
lowing was published in October. 1917:
"The above methods to be employed
must remain or become distinctly our
own.
"All instruction must contemplate
the assumption of a vigorous often
sive. This purpose will be empha-
sized iii every phase Of training until
It becomes a settled habit Of thought.
81 NM N