New-York tribune., 1920-01-18

explained to Washington, none were
sent until October 1917, the letter saws.
when five arrived in Ireland, with seven
more in January and February, 1918.
he said the situation became so crit
zeal late in April. 1917, that he. ap-
pealed to President Wilson, "and on
May 3, 1917, the first definite informa-
tion was received of the departments 8
intention to send more than six de-
stroyers, that ultimately thirty-six and
two. repair ships would be sent"
Although the department was early
told of the value of tugs in Bleaching
and sa!vaging torpedoed ships-whicf
could then be repaired and made avail
anie IN short order-a year after this
nation had entered the war only four
tugs had been sent, and two of these
nad been specifically allocated to Italy.
Nine were eventually sent, but none,
Admiral Sims says, until April %, 1918.
Caused Great Emparrassment'
"The> department" he says, "caused
serious embarrassment and delays in
putting into effect the convoy system,
which was the most important of ali
the measures used in defeating the
submarine war against Allied ship
ping" He ~said the department was
repeatedly assured the American coast
was safe without advance information
being sent to this country, and that
Wneh SUBMARINES did start across the
Atlantic Washington was informed and
often their exact destination, where
they were to lay mines," etc, was
given.
MY dispatches" the letter goes on,
Showed that with all possible empha-
sis tried to induce the department to
view the campaign as whole; to con-
slider our naval forces as but one rela-
lively small item of an Allied naval
team; that our mission was the protec-
tion of all Allied lines of communica-
tlon, and not the United States lines
OF communication alone; that, particn-
larly in the early part of our campaign,
the strictly United States lines of com
munication as compared with Allied
lines were inconsiderabe; that it was
quite possible to give our relatively
small commerce quite superior protec- (
tion at the expense of losing the war
by denying essential protection to the |
vastly greater Allied commerce upon
which the success Of our common cause
chiefly depended.
Opposes Safety First"
"There was naturally a strong incli-
nation on the part of the various
powers, including the United States, to
resist this policy in favor of dispo-
sition of forces that would afford
superior protection to their respective
commercial vessels.
"War is always a dangerous game
operations conducted by sew
eral Allied powers should never be
based upon a policy of safety first as
regards the interests of any particular
ally. This is especially true where
success depends upon the /, maximum
possible protection being given to the
Allied commerce as whole.
"As the possession of adequate ship
ping was an imperative requirement in
this war, it follows that the essential
policy was to pool all submarine
forces and use them to the best posi-
bic advantage for the protection of all
shipping, regardless of the flag that
it happened to be under. AS the win
ming Of the war was the paramount
object and as our ant-submarine forces
and those of the Allies were always
inadequate, and as 1t was consequently
impossible to prevent a certain amount
was to reduce the combined loss of Al
led shipping below point which would
defeat the objective of the enemy. and
thus insure victory of the common
cause as a whole"
Admiral Sims says he repeatedly ex- {
blamed that if the submarines could
oe shifted in their operations to the
:oast of the United States it would
oe greatly to the advantage of the AL
led cause, that he urged the sending
If every possible sort Of craft to Eu- I
here, and that much useless effort was
expended in chasing submarines in the t
Caribbean, South Atlantic, Asiatic and S
Pacific waters. He said it was realized ]
hat if considerable number of anti {
;pbDrarine vessels were not kept in {
home waters there would be risk of
public criticism. '
Advised Risk Be Taken /
"But," the letter continued, "I
trongly advised that this risk be ac-
epted, that we should not be in
'ucnced in our war measures by the i
possibility Of such adverse criticism; b
hat the situation made it imperative v
hat every possible means be used to s
efeat the enemy as speedily as pos
bie, regardless of other considera- q
ions. and thus save many valuable 7
ives" 9
Admiral Sims laid stress on his ef !,
orts to obtain a staff from the depart I,
nent, particularly during the first four n
nonths OF the war when the strain was \
sreat and the campaign against sub il
narlnes and the protection of troop S
hips was being worked out
Summing up his efforts along this !,
inc, detailing many Of the things with O
vhlch such staff Lust deal, he said. 4
in a word, it would hardly be possible S
o conceive Of a more complete mis- 81
understanding by the department. of {
ne actual situation tnat confronted me O
IN the other side, particularly during 4
he critical period of the war r.
The department frequently omitted .