Evening star., 1920-11-28
GREECE FACES LOSS
BY RESTORING KING
Allied Ill Will May Even React in Terri
torial Curtailment-Financial and
Economic Aid Doomed.

ceive little considera ton in any Of the
adjustments which are certain to come
in the one-time Turkish regions-ad-
Justments made necessary by the march
ments
The allies have counted upon Greece
| IN return for the awards made her, to
act as the allies outpost in Turkey
and have depended upon Greece to
stand as a bulwark against not only
Turkish incursions but revival Of
Germanic aspirations in southeastern
Europe. With Constantine on the
throne and the whole court a camp
ing-out place for the refugees Of the
is little for the allies to expect in the
| way OF aid in keeping the balance
OF power in Europe swinging to the
side OF peace and advancement.
me worst thing that can happen to
| Greece is for the allies to isolate her
politically. financially and economically,
and 1t would appear. II French express
| sion is criterion. that this will be the
procedure in case the Grecian people
decide they would rather have Constan-
! tine than some other parsonage upon the
throne. And though Greece may have
been given much by various treaties
Greece may find it increasingly difflcult
| to retain that which she has, inasmuch
as it already is reported the Grecian
army is honeycombed by sedition due to
] vS'Ai0SaASS ACdbht5o Events Oh the next
/ f.W weeks, in so far as the whole future
Eof Europe is concerned. are bound to be
Interesting. for not with present condi-
| tions prevailing can there be certainty
| as to the final complexion, territorially
Ind politically. of the southeastern Sec
ton OF the continent.
Disarmament to Wait.
That thee shall be no disarmament
until the eastern European situation
grows better is the reported decision of
the league of nations committee consid-
ering the question in Geneva. Outside
Of the distrust which several Of the
smaller nations have for each other,
there is one reason for the perpetua-
ton Of large standing armies in the
| east. and that is the bolshevist danger
AS time goes on, and particularly since
/ the defeat Of Gen. Wrangel, the bolshe-
| visit menace cannot be minimized
Though the bolshevist leaders once
looked az If they were tottering. it must
| be admitted that at the moment they
are strong and are diligently striving to
perfect plans to strike allied nations in
case France and Britain persistently re-
fuse TO recognize the bolshevik regime
There is dissent, however, from Ler,in's
| opinions. and if dispatches are to be
| believed there is a strong sentiment
/ among the ultra-radicals to perpetuate
(; the policy of bolshevizing the world
This element is even menace to Lenin
! and Trotsky, who have come more and
| more to the realization that their politi-
| cal doctrines must be tinctured with
practical international politics IL they
are to perpetuate themselves or their
| doctrines.
| However, the bolshevist leaders
| pnpfinna fn mako ,;kl,
| the defeat Of Gen. Wrangel undoubt-
| edly will turn their attention to In
| dia, Asia and the whole of the regions
Of the near east. They control the
within their grip. Bolshevik armies
are to be sent to the Indian frontier
| undoubtedly with the hope of STIR
ring trouble for Great Britain. Like
wise, unless halted either by Moscow
or the force of allied military might
! they may press into Turkey, Meso-
potamia and even to the doors of Con-
, stantinople itself. where, il this ar.
tually is accomplished. they might
force the allies not only to recornize
! the soviet regime but force resTmn.
tion of trade.
Why Reds Desire Trade.
That the soviet leaders would rath-
er trade with the allies than anv.
thing else at the moment is unoues.
ktioned, for two reasons: First, Rus
sia may be able to advance faster
with the assistance of outside prod .
ucts and second. through the medium
of trade relations bolshevist doctrines
may be disseminated with greater
ease and at less expense than II pres
ent barriers continue
i But the future attitude of. Greece
may eventuate in a course diametri-
cally opposed to the allies present
policy in the near east and bring
military action of far-reaching char
acter before the whole situation
clears: One thing may be expected,
and that Is England never will sit
idle and permit boishevist incur
sions into India without striking, and
striking hard. but the blows may
como too late unless there is rapid
specialization of policy in regard to
Turkey and the near east. and this
policy must be co-ordinated through
allied cooperation. And this is only
possible by the removal Of present
prejudices grounded upon contradic-
tory economic and financial ambitions.