Shoshone journal. [volume] (Shoshone, Idaho) 1884-1931, 1920-01-02


ground on our front, in order
TO make more rapid retirements far
Their west and withdraw his forces
from northern France before the inter-
ruption Of his railroad cOmmunica-
lions through Sedan.
We were confronted at this time
by an insuAlciency of replacement to
build up exhausted divisions. We still
had two divisions with the British and
two with the French. review of the
situation, American and allied, espe-
cially as to our own resources in men
for the next two months, convinced
me that the attack of the First army
and the allied armies farther west
should he pushed to the limit But
if the First army was to continue its
aggressive tactics, our divisions then
with the French must be recalled and
requirements must be obtained by
breaking up newly arrived divisions.
IN discussing the withdrawal of our
divisions from the French with Mar
shall Foch AMI General Petain on Oc-
tober 10 the former expressed his ap-
probation of the fact that the First
army was striking the pivot of the
German withdrawal. and also held the
view thar the allied attack should
continue. General Petain agreed that
the American divisions with the
French were essential to us if we
were to maintain our battle against
the German pivot. The French were,
however, straining every nerve to keep
I'D their attacks, and before those d.
visions with the French had been re-
leased it became necessary for us to
send the Thirty-seventh and Ninety
first divisions from the First army to
assist the Sixth French army in Elan
ders.
First Army Of 1000, 900.
At this time the First army was
holding a front Of more than 120 kilo- |
meters; its strength exceeded 1000 |
900 men; it was engaged in the most /
desperate battle Of our history, and /
the burden of command was too heavy
for a Single commander and staff
-
of our front extending from Port-sur-
Seille, east of the Moselle, to Fresnes-
en-WOevre, southeast of Verdun, was
to the newly constituted
Second army with Lieut.. Gen. Robert
L. Billiard in command under whom
It began preparations for the extern
sion of operations to the east in the
direction of Briey and Metz On DC
-ober lG the command Of the First
army was transferred to Lieut.. Gen.
Hunter Liggett, and my advance head
quarters was established at Ligny-en-
Barrels, from which the command of
he group of American armies was ex-
rcised.
Summarizing the material results
which had been attained by the First
rmy by the end of October, we had
net an increasing number of Ger
nany's best divisions. rising from 20
n line and reserve on September %
o 81 on October 81; the enemy's elab-
rately prepared positions, including
he Hindenburg line, In our front had
cen broken; the almost impossible
.rgonne forest was in our hands: an
dvance of 21 kilometers had been eff
acted; $4,000 prisoners. $40 cannon,
900 machine guns and a mass of ma
.rial captured; and the great railway .
rtery through Carignan to Sedan was
Ow seriously threatened.
On the morning Of November l I
lree army corps were in line between {
ie Mouse river and the Bots de Bour- I
,gne Preceded by two hours of VIC
Mt artillery preparation the infantry I
lvanced, closely followed by accom- /
lnying guns" {
BY nightfall the Fifth corps In the !
inter-. had realized ar advance of al c
ost nine kilometers to the 6OiS de I
Fole. and had completed the cap Il
re of the heights of Barricourt r
lille the Third corps, on the right v
d captured Ancreville and Ande 0
me. Our troops had broken through
e enemy's last defense, captured his
tillery positions and had precipi
ed a retreat Of the German forces on
out to be isolated in the forest IN
nth of Grandpre. ''
The following day the advance con
-