New-York tribune., 1920-10-21
By w. H. Williams

.
OF the Wabash Railwoy Company
FOR more than two decades. from the
commencement of the fall in tho my
chasing power of money to the tenn
pofafy appropriation Of their owners
oy taking their properties into Fed
e'ai possession under the war power
'hae' IS, from 1895 to the end cf 1917
the practice of public regulation Of
American railways had no parallel in
industrlal history unless in the order
of the masters of Egvnt to the 49, 49,
scendants Of Abraham to make bricks
Muhout beng supplied with necessary
raw materials: Go therefore now. and
work; TOR there shall no straw be
gwen you, vet shall ye deliver the
,ale OF bricks" exodus, V, l6). Amonp
tne sharpest and most immediate les,
sons OF the great war. was the fatuitv
y, sucn policy. imperative adjust
menus IN wages and prices. causing
vast increases in inevitable expenses
t oL operation, could not be delayed. but
me system OF rate regulation pr6wed
700 rigid to provide revenues ont Of
whlcn these increases could he mot
Unable promptly to amend the recula-
i've system In the direction of. clas-
.,cily' the government was forced to
we only alternative, the COSTLY and
dangerous device of taking over the
transportation system and meeting def
lcits out of the public purse.
Inc transportation act of 1920 is
evidence OF a determination to correct
former errors and hereafter TO allow
the railway industry living wage. At
the beginning of operations under the
revised policy the railways are con.
lronted' during period in which the
capital requirements of substantially
an departments of industry and in all
parts of the world are enormous and
pressing, as evidenced by great and
rapid increases in rates of interest, bv
the necessity of financing DEVELOPMENT
whcln must be carried on at a very
nlgh cost level and maturities of exist
ing Obligations that must be refunded
at Increased rates of interest.
fortunately, the Congress has to
some extent recognized the urgency of
this situation and has placed at the
dlsposaI of the Interstate Commerce
Commls ssGn nds sion ion "revolving fund" of
S3OO,OOO,O 900 out of which allotments,
hereafter to be returned with interest,
are now being made by the commission,
largely on the advice OF men Of extern
sive experience in the railway and
financial fields. The aggregate of this
fund is obviously far below the total
that must be expended within short
t.tae, and it is unquestionabla ;hat the
can upon private investors, which must
be made sufficiently attractive to COM
pete with demands from other sources,
including public borrowers who are
able to pledge the power of taxation,
VIII be for large amounts.
Economy of Capital
!
ket, present and prospective, renders
economy of capital even more essential
than in the past Railway demands
must not be augmented to provide for
additional facilities in any case in
which those existing can be made to
&c the work. Nothing is better estab-
hshed than that prior to Federal con-
troll abuses III railway practice, at
tributable to favors extended to ship
pers largely under compulsion from
public auth ority, but at the expense
of efficiency, had accumulated to an
extent which multiplied the number of
freight cars, the units and tractive
power of locomotives, and the miles
of main track, side tracks and terminal
tracks required in the public service.
Principally, these abuses consisted in
the light loading and detention of
freight cars, their primary effect being
~ IolilPcI VIZ acquisition OIL more cars
than, with efficient handling, the traffic
movement would have required. Idle
cars require trackage space; lightly
Loaded cars require more trains and
longer trains; more and longer trains
require more motive power. To the end
Of 1917, the railways were never able
to obtain adequate results from the
great mechanical progress involved in
the increases in the capacity of their
cars, motive power and track and ter
m;nal structurcs.
Car movement in 1916 averaged 26.9
miles per car per day; in 1919 the aver
age was only 23.1 miles Increasing
the average of 1919 to that of 1916
would have had the same effect in in
creasng capacity to move freight as
an addition Of 339, 900 cars The
slightest consideration must show that
it is far better to obtain car capacity
by augmented efficiency than by aug
mented expenditure Similarly, partly
by persuasion and partly by positive
cAertions of authority, shippers were
induced, in 1918, to load freight cars
to 65.56 per cent of their marked capac-
ity (the real capacity is about 10 per
cent greater), as against 53.47 per cent
in 1915. To expedite movement to 269
miles per day and obtain loading to
The III