New-York tribune., 1920-02-08


pooling Of all the debts Of the Allied
and associated powers and then that
the total should be reapportioned on
the basis Of the existing wealth Of
the several countries and the COM
parative sacrifice in men and In
money made by these nations in the
war.
Would Have Relieved France
The result of such a reapportion-
ment obviously would have been to
reduce the French debt. very greatly,
since France had made the largest
sacrifice during the war, and was,
both by reason of her size and her
wounds incident to German invasion,
much weaker than Great Britain or
he United States. The larger part
It the French Indebtedness would In
mis- fashion have been shifted to the
houlders Of the United States. This
was one of several: French proposals
which found little support in Amer
ican quarters and was accordingly
cropped, despite French disappoint-
rient.
But there Is a British proposal
.Ehch amounts to the same thing
md is now being put forward by
many Engljshmen and newspapers,
notably by Maynard Keynes, one Of
the British financial representatives
at Paris, who left the conference be
cause of his disapproyal of the eco
nomic terms, and who has embodied
his views in book which has excited
much comment on both sides of the
Atlantic.
Mr.. Keynes's thesis, that of M.
Ribot in a slightly new form, and
the general European thesis, is that
the United States should consent to
cancel the $10,O00,000.0O0 which it
loaned to the nations associated with
1t in the recent struggle. This is
the British proposal, which is put
forward in many other forms, and
Mr.. Keynes's statement is only in
teresting as it provides a concise
statement Of the general notion.
In this book Mr.. Keynes points out
that Europe owes the United States
$4,000, 100000, that this sum rep
resents our loans to our associates,
but that Great Britain has also
loaned S8,700,000,00O and France a
little short of $2,0o0,00O, 900. Great
Britain owes us outright $4,000, ,O0O,-
600. The effect of our canceling our
loans would be to enable Britain to
cancel hers. To be sure, what she
owes us is only half Of what Europe
owes her, but Mr.. Keynes correctly
points out that since the larger share
of the British loans is to Russia.
Italy and the smaller states, whose
finances are difficult, no wise fnan-
cier would estimate the present or
even the future value Of the British
loans at more than 80 per cent.
Accordingly, Britain would by our
forgiveness and hers acquiesce in q
mere bookkeeping transaction. She
would actually stand where she did
before the two operations. neither
richer nor poorer. France, by con-
trast, would gain $500, 900, 900 In
round figures as a result Of the can
collation. by the United States and by
Britain Of the loans made to her and
by her Of Italian Indebtedness. Italy
would gain $4,000, ,0oo, 900, Belgium
rather less than 81 100000, 900; the
figures for the other countries would
be trifling.
Two things would be accomplished
by this transaction: the financial
problems Of the French and the
Italians would be enormously light
cned, and the possibility Of quarrels
between the European nations which
fought Germany growing out Of the
hopeless inter1nixture Of debts would
be abolished. Otherwise resentment
by the French at their obligations
to Britain, Of Italy over her debt to
France and Britain, Of all Europe
over their debts to the United States
seems to Mr.. Keynes inevitable.
Nov. vaas + TIA European Idea