New-York tribune., 1920-06-22
Belgium and the Next War
By Frank H. Siimonds

Reports alike from Paris and from
Brussels of the approach of success
full termination of a Franco Belgian
military convention give unmistaka Bile
evidence that the two neighbors most
menaced by Germany are taking no
chances and losing no time in pre-
pairing for new German attack More
over the territorial reductions which
Germany has suffered as a consequence
of the war materially diminish the
numerical superiority enjoyed by the
kalser's armies six years ago
By the Treaty of Versailles Belgium
emerged from her position of guaran-
teed impotence. The events of Au-
gust, 1914, proved that her neutrality
was mere figure of Speech it dem
onstrated that Belgium would have
to take proper precautions to defend
herself. Had Belgium in 1914 pos
sessed an army as large in proportion
to her population and as we'll trained
as Switzerland's, it may be questioned
whether the Germans would have ven
tured on the Belgian boulevard
Belgium in 1914
But in 1914 the field army of Bel
GUM amounted to only 100000 in
population Of 100000, while Switzer-
land was able to call twice as many
troops with less than half the popula-
ton. France and Belgium together mob
ilized 1,150000 in time for the Opening
campaign, which resulted in the de-
feats at the frontiers and the victories
at the Marne and the User. Germany
sent against France and Belgium
rather more than 100000 in the first
rush and several hundred thousand
more during the weeks following the
Marne. The difference between the two
armies was in part bridged by the Brit
ish, who engaged 10000 at Mons, 120,-
600 at the Marine and had used above
10000 by the crisis of the Battle of
Ypres.
Belgium, then, had an establishment
too small, given her dangers and the
French strength, which represented
maximum of French possibility. In
addition the Belgian army acted inde-
pendently and, following Belgian policy.
retired not upon the Allied armies. but
away from them upon Antwerp after
the fall of Licgc. This, in pant, made
the German victory of Charleroi pos
CT 1, nd in bo
the capture of the Belgian army, which
just barely escaped from Antwerp
Joint Strategy
Any new military convention with
France would necessarily assume tao
things: material increase in the
Belgian army and coordination of
French and Belgian plans. Beyond all
question the Belgian army could be
doubled in strength and thus French
and Belgian armies would have at least
a strength of 100000 upon mobiliza-
ton. BY contrast Germany, with
population of 6s,0OO0o0 in 1914. has
not more than 6O,OOO,0O0 to-day and
will fall to 5S,0OO,O0O if the plebiscite
in Upper Silesia is won by the Poles
Since Germany will have to keep
troops in the East to watch the Poles,
it may be doubted if sho can hope
to have any advantage of numbers in
the west, even if the British stay out
But the stratcgical condition has
also greatly changed in the West Ger
man military establishments have been
pushed back beyond the Rhine and all
he fortif'cations on both banks of the
'lver destroyed. Moreover the French
ave regained Metz, Strasbourg and
lhionville, with their strong forts.
While French, and not German. reptc-
entatives now operate the Luxembourg i