Gunnison news-champion., 1920-01-09

~ = 80. = ~ = - u 49, +
0nAse1 essesal Hsaaes. Deseseeeo -
assf ezDssPa Deetiss e ~ osr1an
H. q eeA01nSess1sas. hat bstwoao
1esn and ssAa4. ed covered tAe
Bsiey iroa regiea. fren wkieA he e.
eny sbtaissd IL Unter Dass e IT,
iree required fer aunidsas anA ~
teriaL II csal aesds sast q Mees
were also covsred b. thsss sane T.
fenseA a dep advance east q Ast2
or the c,pturs Of the Briey regioa. ~
Threatening The invasloa e sicA 0es-
man territory u the Aoselle valley
and the Saar basin. thus eurtailing
her supply Of Goal or Iron. voald have
. decisive effect In forcing . With
drawai oe German troops from north-
eru France The military and eco
uomic situation Of the enemy. there
fore. tndicsfed Lorraine ~ the Geld
promising the most fruitful results for
the employment Of our armies.
The compiexity OF trench life had
enormously Increased the tonnage Of
supplies required BY troops. Not only
was II q question Of providing food
but enormous quantities Of munitions
and material were needed. Upon the
railroads OF France fell the burden Of
meeting the heavy demands Of the
3.5O0.O0O allied combatants then CO.
gagged. II the American army was to
have an independent and flexible sys-
TEN II could not use the lines behind
the British Belgium front nor those
in rear Of the French front covering
Paris.
chess the Southern PetA
The problem confronting the Amer
lean expeditionary forces was then to
>uperimpose Its rail Communications
on those Of France where there would
he the least possible disturbance to
the arteries Of supply Of the two great
allied armies already in the neld. The
lines selected. therefore. were those
leading from the comparatively un'
used South Atlantic ports Of France
TO the northeast. where Il was believ.
ed the American armies could be en-
ployed to the best advantage.
For all practical purposes the Amer
lean expeditionary forces were based
on the American continent. Three thou.
sand miles Of ocean to cross. with the
growing submarine menace confront
Ing -. the quantity Of ship tonnage
that would be available then IN
known. and Q line Of communications
BY land 400 miles long from French
ports to our probable front presented
difficulties that seemed almost insur-
mountable n compared with those Of
our allies.
In providing for the storage and dis
tributlon Of reserve supplies an al.
lowance Of Is days In the base rec.
tions was planned. with 80 days In the
intermediate section. and Is days In
the advance section. After the safe
ty Of our sea transport was practical
ly assured. this was reduced to total
Of IS days. distributed proportionate-
". When the armistice was signed all
projects for construction had been
completed and supplies were on hand
to meet the needs Of 100000 men.
while further plans for necessary con-
struction and for the supply Of an ad.
ditional 100000 were well under
way.
Our Own fIehtinS Deetrins.
A similar scheme was adopted IN
August, 1917. for our armies. In which
the Importance Of teaching through.
out our forces . sound fighting doc
trine Of our own was emphasized. II
provided for troop training In all units
up 70 include divisions. Corps CEN
ters Of instruction for noncommissi0n-
ed ofncers and unit commanders Of
all arms were established. The army
and corps schools graduated 1850
noncommlssioned ofncsrs and 13y0l6
0fncers. d.
Pending the organization and devel.
opment Of our own schools. Q large
number Of our o6lcers were sent to
centers Of instruction Of the allied
armies. The training Of our earlier
divisions was begun In cioas associ-
alton ><ith the French divisions. under
conditions set forth in the following
paragraph on divisional training:
~Trench warfare naturally given
prominence to the defensive o. op-
posed to the offensive. To guard
against this. the basis Of Instruction
should b essentially the offensive
both IN spirit and In practice. The
defensive II accepted only to prepare
for future offensive."
The long period Of trench warfare
had 20 impressed itself upon the
French and British that they had al
most entirely dispensed with training
for open warfare. II was 70 avoid
this result In our army and to encour-
age the Offensive spirit that the fol-
lowing was published In October. 1917 /:
THE above methods to b. employed
must remain or become distinctly our
own.
IAN instruction must contemplate
the assumption Of vigorous often
u