The Fayette falcon. (Somerville, Tenn.) 190?-current, 1920-01-09
BY BRUCE cLAeETT,
Assistant to Director General Of Rail-
roads.


have the thought that the people
of the United States would IKE to
know how their coal supply was han
died during the six weeks strike Of BIZ
luminous coal miners, which has lust
come TO an end. This was the nrst ma
tion-wide coal strike the country ever
experienced and therefore the prob
lens arising were novel. Necessarily,
during the continuance Of the strike,
the exact stacks on hand could not be
made public at all times, although as
TO all vital facts. the public seems TO
have been kept fully informed day by
day. Uncle San set up his own coal
pile as soon as the strike began and
kept replenishing 1t from the mines
which continued to work, but mean
while the pile was being diminished
more rapidly than new supplies were
coming in, and before long II became
a question Of keeping people warm
rather than what industries should be
continued Had the strike continued
much longer many industries would
have had to shut down and people
thrown out of work, but on the re-
stricted basis to which the country
finally came and with the part-time
production obtained undoubtedly the
nation could have carried on" for
weeks longer, If not months.
Strike Anticipated.
Several weeks before the coal strike
began on November / its coming was
plainly apparent, and therefore the
director general Of railroads, Walker
d. Hines, consulted with all the re-
gional directors of railroads and the
principal members of his staff. and
decided that If the strike came 1t would
be the job of the railroad administra-
ton to make the coal produced go as
far as possible. After thorough dis
cussion the plan was adopted Of allow
ing all coal mined up to the time Of the
strike proceed as billed to consignees
on the idea that once the strike actu-
ally began the railroads could look
after their own and the emergency
needs Of the country by taking over
coal actually on the rails at that time.
Through this method foreslghted con;
sumers were placed In position to
store up. The alternative method
would have been for the railroads to
have begun to buy coal early In prepa-
ration for the strike, thus keeping such
coal out Of normal channels.
Prior to the strike very careful
survey Of stocks on hand, both Of rail-
roads, industries and individuals Gas
far as possible) was conducted so that
the railroad administration went into
the strike with as accurate knowledge
of the coal situation throughout the
country as was obtainable. The adj
ministration's original survey. on No
vember / showed 22,0O0,0O0 tons Of BIZ
luminous coal on wheels and In rail-
road storage subject to distribution
under the administrator supervision.
To this was added the daily produc-
ton which totaled 1S,S00,000 tons In
November, and of the aggregate the
stocks still available for the country's
protection on December /, 12,300.000
tons aud on December s, 11,475,000
tons.
Prior to the strike orders were Is
sued by the railroad administration
to give preference to coal loading, and
this naturally resulted In hardship on
some industries. The result was how
ever, that In the week ended October
Is a total Of 13,200,O00 tons of coal
was produced and moved In the United
States, this constituting record for
the country. 1t took hard work by
everyone concerned to distribute this
enormous amount of coal. Once the
strike was on, the production never
reached 30 per cent of normal. with
the result shown above, viz, that In
addition to using the production every
day. the stored coal In possession Of
the railroads was depleted In the six