New-York tribune., 1920-03-07
~ RITISH craftsmanship has al
most always been distinguished
by flexible and open minded op-

to cherish vindEtive animosities and
by prudent disinclination to abuse the
fruits of victory. Lord Haldane is a
typical British statesman. Consequent
ly his analysis of British pre-war
policy in a collection of essays entitled,
Before the War" (Funk & Wagnalls),
while intensely interesting, is neither
extreme nor sensational in its view
point.
Viscount Haldane was Secretary of
State for War from 1905 to 1912 and
Lord High Chancellor from 1912 to
1915. So he has a certain degree of
personal interest in vindicating the
military and diplomatic policy of the
British government during the decade
which preceded the outbreak of the
great war. This policy has been at
tackled from contradictory standpoints
by pacifsts who felt that it was too
aggressive and by nationalists who felt
that it was not aggressive enough.
Lord Haldane practically ignores the
pacifsts, evidently feeling that the fall
lacy of their position has been suifi-
ciently demonstrated by the event. On
the other hand, he takes issue with the
professional soldiers who have CEN
sured the government for it's unpre-
paredness in the face of hostilities.
England Did Her Share
The author contends that England g
logical contribution to her own defense
and to the aid of her allies was her
mented this navy with huge peace
time army was, in his judgment, quite
impracticable. Only the grim COM
pelling emergency of war could move
the English people to abandon their
time-honored tradition and accept con-
scriptior. Moreover, France and Rus
sia possessed armies which, on paper,
should have been able to meet the Cen
tral powers on equal terms. Lord
Haldane felt that England would abun-
Gantly fulfill her obligations under the
Triple Entente by retaining her mas
terry Of the sea and by providing a
small but efficiently trained expe-
ditionary force, which could be mobi-
lized and sent to the Continent upon
very short notice. The chief defect in
this line of reasoning is its overesti-
mate of Russia's military potentialities.
The inability of the Cars poorly or
ganized and poorly equipped army to
contend with the Germans on anything
like equal terms cast disproportionatl
share Of the burden Of meeting the
Teutonic assault upon France in the
carly days of the war.
War Not Inevitable
Lord Haldane does not believe that the
war was inevitable, or that it was plotted
for years in advance by Germany. On
the contrary, he believes that hostilties
broke out as the result Of q series of
accidents, which were brought to a sim
lister climax by the reckless levity of a
few German and Austrian statesmen. In
his own words he does not look upon the
Germans as afflicted with "a double dose
of original sim" He feels, however, that
they were afflicted with fatally errone-
Gus conception of statecraft, which orig
mated with Frederick the Great, and re-
ceived practical application at the hands
of Bismarck. This conception was that
peace could be maintained by bullying
other nations into giving them what
they wanted Sooner or later such s
policy was certain to produce an explo
sion.
In the years before the war the au
thor went to Berlin on several occasions
in an effort to promote better relations
between England and Germany. He was
impressed by the lack of coordination
among the leading German officials. Th,
War Department and the Foreign Office
might pursue diametrically opposed
courses, and the Kaiser, despite the pop
ular illusion of his despotic power, was
not strong enough to control his min
listers and enforce settled and con
sistent policy. Lord Haldane vividl,
illustrates this point by discussing tn,
books of Bethmann- Hollweg and Vo1
Tirpitz and showing how the Chancellor
and the grand admiral were CONSTANT,
at cross purposes. incidentally, by thi
process of comparing the books, he ex
poses the fallacy cf Bethmann- Hollweg'
contention that Germany was threat
ened with encirclement, and was con
sequently forced to fight a defensive
war.
Believes in the League
Lord Haldane is convinced that il
the past special alliances were an in
dispensable means Of self-preservatio,
for European nations. But in tn
future he looks to league of nations
or. at least, to an entente of all tn
powers as a means Of preserving tn,
peace of the world. In regard to tn
proper future attitude of the Allie
toward the Central powers he says:
ut is not enough to tell German,
and Austria that if they behave wei
they will be admitted to the league o
nations. What really matters is tn
feeling and manner in which the in
vstation is given, and an obvious SINGER
ity in the desire that they should wor
with us as equals in common en-
dcavor to make the best of worl