The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1920-06-26

states rom $11 per Captld In 11SlJ to s225 per capita in 1920. Italy's per capita indebtedness new stands about four times as much as at the | beginning ef the wafi that ef France seven times as if4uel4j that of Great Britain, eleven times aS maeht that of the United tSates, twenty times as much, and that of Germany, forty four times as much per capita as at the beginning ef.the war.
 Most of these enormous debts ae- cumulated, during the war are 'tin- ternal"-that Is, they are owed te the people of the respective governments which created the debts. In pfe-war times, borrowing by nations frequent 1y extended to the people of other countries, but as the countries whose people were in a position to loan money on governmental securities were in nearly every case participants in the recent war, the opportunity for borrowing ''abread'' practically ter minated In the early years of the war, and, as a consequence, the gov ernment were compelled to draw practically all of their borrowings from their own people, though Rus sia did in the opening years of the war barrefv considerable from other countries, especially Great Britain and France, whose people already held large amounts of Russian pre-war securities. It has been estimated that Russian securities amounting to about 1-2 billion dollars are now held in France and about 5-4 billion dol lars in Great Britain; just how much of these are of the pre-war variety cannot be accurately determined, though of course all of those included in this discussion are pre-Bolshevik. While Great Britain loaned about $s, 900, 100000 to certain of her colo nies and her allies, and the United States, as is we'll known, loaned $10,- 00O, GOO, 900 to her allies in Europe, the bulk of the $21o,00o, 100000 of money added to the national debts of the world since the beginning of the war has been drawn from the people of the respective governments making the loans-from the owners of large fortunes, the active capital ists, the investors, those engaged in the industries and commerce, and also in a much larger degree than usual from the masses, including even those of extremely limited in- comes, who not infrequently "skimp- ed'' to help their country in the great struggle which appealed to their loyalty and pride of nationality. The percentage of populations thus
 
 of the war was far larger in the great struggle of 1913-1S than in any earlier war.
 Full F'ace Value Seldom Received
 The European loans of this war.
 like most of those created on former occasions, have not, as already stated supplied to the borrowers, the gov ernments, the full amount of capital which they have promised to return to those who made the loans. In a large proportion of the loans of the countries participating in the war, the securities issued were, as already stated. sold at less than their face value or par, the chief exceptions to this rule being the United States, Australia and Canada, though in the last mentioned only one or two loans were issued at slightly less than their face value. In Great Britain two loans were issued at 95 per cent of their face value, one at approximate ly S5.- In France nearly all of the securities issued were at considerably less than par, ranging from 96 down
 to about 70 per cent of their face value;- In Russia, the rate of most of the loans issued down to April, 1917, was at about 95; Italy, from
 97 down to ST; Germany, in nearly
 all the loans 9S per cent of the face value; in Austria and in Hungary, in
 which the loans were made by the respective governments and not
 jointly, the rates ranged from 97
 down to about 91; and to the extent thus indicated the European govern
 ments are now paying interest on sums materially larger than that which they realized from the sale of their securities, and must, when the bonds are redeemed, pay the full face value as against the reduced amount which they accepted for their securi- ties under the stress of their needs when they were respectively issued This habit, however, of issuing gov ernmental securities at less than their | face value is not peculiar to the re- cent war, having obtained on many l former occasions in certain of the | European countries upon the theory | that by selling the bonds at less than l their face value they were able tc | place them al a lower rate of interest | than they would be compelled to pay 1 if their full face value was demand l ed. ~
 Debts Largely Owed at Home As to the future of the enormous 1 indebtedness now existing, and eS | pecially that added during the recen l war, it may be said that the large | | for interest and principal will be 1T nearly all cases paid to the citizen:
 of the country paying the same, the l sums collected from the citizens ant | business organizations by taxation be l ing again paid out within the same country and in some cases to tht
 same individuals as holders of the se
 curities, while the holders of the SC | curities in question may reasonabl! | expect that, with the progress of de fation and return to a more stable | currency, the purchasing power ans | therefore value of the moneys il | which the securities are finally to b, l redeemed will be materially greate | than that in which they were bought As to the future of the debts O | the countries which have since tn l war been divided into many smalle political organiza tions, or the share o
 their respective debts which will b. assigned to the population of the pol | itica1 divisions created from their re