New-York tribune., 1920-02-10

The refusal Of tho Jugo-Slavs to ac-
| cept what amounts to an ultimatum
served upon them by Britain and
France in the matter Of Fiume and
the whole Adriatic dispute is q natural
and logical consequence Of the course
Of President Wilson in dealing with
this difficult problem in the Paris Con-
ference. It is one moro example, of
the weakness Of principles Of abstract
justice unaccomplished by any effective
force.
President Wilson's decision in the
matter OF Fiume was just, his conclu-
sion that the terms Of the Secret Treaty
Of London made between the British
French and Russians, on the one hand,
and Italy on the other, made with the
express purpose Of enlisting Italy in
the war, were inequitable, so far as
they deprived Slavs of the right of
self determination and placed in Ital-
ian hands territories which were clear
ly Croat and Serb, was inescapable
So also was his opposition to the in
clusion Of Fiume within the frontiers
of Italy, which would put the Italians
in possession Of the single satisfactory
sea gate for Jugo-Slav commerce.
BY Words Alone
But 1t was one thing to decide on
the merits Of the dispute. it was an
other to undertake to fortify Slav de-
termination by words alone. Once Mr.
Wilson had declared against the Italian
claims 1t was certain that this en-
couragement would lead the Slavs
themselves to stand firm for their
rights. President Wilson's course was
calculated to remove all readiness Oh
the part OF the Belgrade government
70 compromise. Indeed, any compro-
mise would fatally weaken the Jugo-
Slav unity, for the Slovenes and the
Croats would hold such a surrender Of
their interests by the Belgrade gov
ernment as a demonstration Of the
weakness Of any union with the Serbs.
Moreover, when Britain and France,
honestly anxious to aid the Jugo-Slavs.
so far as WAS possible, but bound to
reckon with the Italian case, both be-
cause Of their signature attached to
the Treaty Of London and because Of
the general European situation, un-
dertook to find basis for agreement,
the course Of the President, in de-
/ r ~ hn -
rangement, still further fortified the
Slavs in their determination to main
tain their rights.
sentiment Of tho Adriatic oues-
ton would have been possible at Paris
months ago, if the President had been
willing to accept any compromise based
upon the European facts or if he had
been prepared to support the Jugo-
Slav claims, which he had recognized
as just in his public utterances. But
any compromise would have meant the
invasion Of the principles he had ad-
vocated, any employment Of force, how
ever, removed from military or naval
circumstances, would have meant an
international incident.
4 Year Of Chaos
President Wilson would do neither
one thing nor the other. Having pro
claimed policy, which was just, hav-
ing advocated principles which were
beyond debate, he relied upon the prin-
ciples to do the fighting and he de-
clined both to give force to the prin-
ciples and to permit any compromise
which would eliminate the ugly inter
national crisis at the expense Of the
principles.
The result has been nearly yea,
Of chaos. Even compromise which
LETT scars would not havs provoked
more animosif3 between thu South.rr