The diamond drill. (Crystal Falls, Iron County, Mich.) 1887-1996, 1920-01-10

menaced central France. protected the
most exposed portion of the German
line OF communications. that between
Metz and Sedan. and covered the
Briey iron region, from which the en-
envy obtained the greater part OF the
iron required for munitions and ma
terial. The coal fields east OF Metz
were also covered by these same de-
lenses. A deep advance east OF Metz.
or the capture OF the Briey region, by
threatening the invasion OF rich Ger
man territory In the Moselle valley
and the Saar basin. thus curtalling
her supply OF coal or iron. would have
decisive effect In forcing with
drawal OF German troops from north
ern France. The military and eco
nomic situation OF the enemy. there
fore. indicated Lorraine as the field
promising the most fruitful results for
the employment OF our armies.
The complexity of trench life had
enormously Increased the tonnage OF
supplies required by troops. Not only
Was IL question OF providing food.
but enormous quantities OF munitions
and material We're needed. Upon the
railroads OF France fell the burden of
meeting the heavy demands OF the
3.500.0 600 allied confbatants then en-
gagged IT the American army was 10
have an independent and flexible sys-
TEN II could not use the lines behind
the BrItish-Belgium front nor those
in rear OF the French front covering
Paris
Chose the Southern Ports.
The problem confronting the Amer.
lean expeditlonary forces was then 10
superlmpose its rail communications
on those OF France where there would
he the teast possible disturbance 10
the arteries Of supply OF the two great
allied armies already In the field. The
lines selected, therefore, were those
leading from the comparatively un.
used South Atlantic ports of France
To the northeast, where IL was bsliev-
ployed 10 the best advantage.
For all practical purposes the Amer
lean expediiionary forces were based
on the American continent. Three thou
sand miles OF ocean 10 cross. with the
growing submarine menace confront
ing us. the quantity of ship tonnage
that would he available then I'M
known, and line OF communications
by land 400 miles long from French
ports To our probable front presented
difficulties that seemed. almost insur-
mountable as compared with those OF
our allies
In providing for the storage and dis
trihutlon of reserve supplies an al
lowance OF - days IN the base sec
tlons was planned, with 30 days In the
intermediate section, and Is days In
the advance section. After the safe
~ OF our sea transport was practical
~ assured. this was reduced Ia a total
az IS days. distributed proportsonate-
~. when the armistice was signed all
projects for construction had heen
completed and supplies were on hand
TO meet the needs OF 2,OOO.OO0 men.
while further plans for necessary con-
struction and for the supply ot an adj
dltional 2,0O0.0o0 were well under
way.
Our Own Fighting Doctrine.
A similar scheme was adopted in
August, 1917, for our armies. in which
the Importance OF teaching through
out our forces sound fgning doe
trlnc OF our own was emphasized. IL
provided for troop training in all units
up TO include divisions. Corps cen
tiers of instruction for noncommisslon-
cd officers and unit commanders of
all arms were established. The army
and corps schools graduated 2i.330
officers and 1876
officers.
Pending the organization aud devel-
opment OF our own schools, large
number of our officers were sent 10
centers Of instruction Of the allied
armies. The training OF our earlier
divisions Was begun in close associ-
alton with the French divisions. under
conditions set forth in the following
on divisional training:
"Trcnch warfare naturally given
prominence to the defensive as OPP
posed to the offensive. To guard
against this the basis ~ instruction
should be essentially the offensive
both In spirit and IN practice. The
defensive Is accepted only to prepare
for future offensive"
The long period OF trench warfWc
had so impressed Itself upon De
French and British that they had al-
most entirely dispensed with training
FOR open warfare. II was 10 avoid
this result la our army and 20 cncour
age the offensive spirit that the fol-
lowing was published IN October. 1917;
"'rhe above methods 70 he employed
must remain or become distinctly our
own.
"Ail instruction must contemplate
the aSSumptiOn Of vigorous often.