New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1920-08-16
Half a League

drafted at Paris is its failure to pro-
vide adequately for the processes of
international justice which make for
peace. From this point of view the
existing league is but half a league,
and it can we'll be argued, looking
far ahead, that the half of the field
which it covers is by no means the
more important half. 1t offers only
a short cut to peace, and largely
ignores those slow and gradual proc
esses out of which alone can grow
the true sources of enduring peace.
This form which the league took
was an almost inevitable consequence
of the attempt to draft its covenant
in the shadow of great war, under
the compulsion of immediate neces-
sites. At that hour there was still
widely held the view of which Mr..
Wilson made himself the eloquent
spokcsman-that here and now an
end must be made of war and that
genuine superstate must be erected,
with the power and right of an inter-
national police to stop wars as they
began. The hope was natural one,
and the motives Of Mr.. Wilson and
those who shared lis view we're of
the highest.
AS soon as the actual drafting of
a covenant was undertaken it was
plain how far achievement must fall
short Of these hopes. The super
state, Of practical necessity, became
no more than permanent body for
diplomatic exchange between the
great powers, with each state pos
sessing veto power upon any de-
cision of moment. Article x was
the only section retaining the mark
Of President Wilson's original de-
sign, and it's incongruity with the
general structure and threat against
the essential liberalism of the league
have by now been generally conceded
There is great and unquestioned
merit in the ever-ready diplomatic
council of the league, in the habit
and outlook which such political
body will develop. But it is obvious
ly no sure preventive of wars. We
cordially agree with those who re-
greet that this country is not to-day
q member of the league. The league
would plainly be stronger and more
respected if we were in it. But it
seems to US folly, and perilous folly,
to conceive that such a war as that
between Poland and the Bolsheviki
must necessarily, or even probably,
have been prevented by a political
league at it's full strength. The league
offers no more than highly conven-
lent diplomatic method of uniting the
great nations in opposition to COM
mon enemy; it cannot command
unity, and therefore cannot offer any
certain hope Of decision and action
when confronted by so complex a
problem as that of the European
frontiers. Those who still cherish the
other view are deceiving themselves,
We conceive, precisely as President
Wilson deceives himself as to the
character Of his league and the po-
tency of Article X.
The effort to end wars once and
for all by this short cut having nee
essarily failed, what remains? Pre-
cisely those far moro tedious proc
esses of international law and Justice
which the Paris conference in its
impotence. almost wholly ignored.
Perhaps the most striking early
criticism of the league covenant as
drafted originally was the statement
Wy Mr.. Root that, in this vital mat
ter, it constituted actually a step
backward from the Hague treaties.
We think it was the common regret
of all Americans that Mr.. Roots
great talents were not utilized at
Paris. Had he been there it is alto
Sether likely that at least an effort
would have been made to complete
t4le league in this respect. Mr.. Root
did make very cogent criticism
upon this point from this country.
But in the haste and confusion of
Paris little was done.
Now, The Tribune conceives it to
be the largest obligation of the Re-
publican party, if successful, to COM
plete the League of Nations and sup
ply this missing half of function and
authority. Mr.. Root, as private
citizen, has already been called into
the labor Of constructing the court
provided for in the league covenant.
1t Is not an overstaten1ent to char
ecterize Mr.. Root as possessing the
ahlast living mind ynon this whole