Little Falls herald. [volume] (Little Falls, Morrison County, Minn.) 1889-1950, 1920-02-06
PERSHINC'S STORY I D
COMMANDER IN CHIEF SUBMITS
SPECIAL REPORT TO SECRE-
TARY BAKER
FOCH ADMITTED ALLIES ..
WE'RE FACING DEFEAT
ATTACK ON JULY 10 COMPELLED
A GENERAL RETREAT AND COL
LAPSE OF GERMAN MILITARY
POWER.
CONTINUED from Last Week)
Reserves Were Lacking.

Reserves Were Lacking.
The lack of complete cooperation
among the allies on the western front
had been appreciated and the question
of preparation to meet crisis had
already received attention by the SUI
preme war council. A plan had been
adopted by which each Of the allies
would furnish a certain number of di-
visions for a general reserve to be un-
der the direction of the military repre-
sentatfves of the supreme war council,
of which Gen. Foch was then the
senior member. But when the time
came to meet the German offensive in
March these reserves were not found
available and the plan failed.
The situation resulted in a con-
ference for the immediate considera-
ton of the question Of having an al
lied commander in chief. After much
discussion, during which my view ia
vOring such action was clearly stated,
an agreement was reached and Gen.
eral FOch was selected. His appoint
ment as such was made April 3 and
was approved for the United States
by the president on April 16
The grave crisis precipitated by the
first German offensive caused me to
make hurried visit to General Foch's
headquarters at Bombon, during which
all our combatant forces were placed
at his disposal. The acceptance of
this offer meant the dispersion of our
troops along the allied front and q
consequent delay in building up dis
tinctive American force in Lorraine,
but the serious situation of the allies
demanded this divergence from our
plans.
On March 81 approximately 100000
American troops had reached France
Four combat divisions, equivalent in
strength to eight French or British
divisions. were available.
Took cantigny Heights.
On April Is the First division re-
lfeved two French divisions on the
front near MOntdidier and on May %
captured the important observation
stations on the heights of Cantigny
with splendid dash. French artillery,
aviation, tanks and fame throwers
aided in the attack, but most of this
French assistance was withdrawn be-
| fore the completion of the operation
In order to meet the enemy's new Of
fensive launched May q to Chateau
Thierry. The enemy reaction against
our troops at Cantigny was extremely
violent, and apparently he was deter
mined at all costs to cOunteract the
most excellent effect the American
success had produced. For three days
his guns Of all calibers were concen-
trated on our position and counter
attack succeeded counter-attack. The
desperate efforts Of the Germans gave
the fighting at Cantigny seeming
tactical Importance entirely out of
proportion to the numbers involved.
The third German offensive, on May
~, against the French on the Aisne
soon developed a desperate situation
for the allies. The Second division
was hastily diverted to the vicinity Of
Meaux on May 81, and early on the
morning of June 1 was deployed
across the Acknowledgements road
near NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. in a. gap in
the French line. where it stopped the
German advance on Paris. At the
same time the partially trained Third
division was placed at French dis
posal to hold the crossings of the
Marine, and it's motorized machine-gun
battalion succeeded in reaching Cha
teau Thierry in time to assist in sue
cessfully defending that river cross
ing.
The enemy having been halted, the
Second division commenced series
Of vigorous attacks on June which
resulted in the capture of Belleau
woods after very severe fighting. The
village of Bouresches was taken soon
after, and on July 1 Vaux was cap
tured. In these operations the Sec
ond division met with most desperate
resistance by Germany's best troops.
Our Second corps, under Maj. Gen.
George w. Read, had been organized
for the command of the ten divisions
with the British, which were held
back in training areas or assigned to
second-line defenses. After consulta-
ton with Field Marshal Haig on June
five American divisions were re-
lieved from the British area to sup
port the French.
The Marine salient was inherently
weak and offered an opportunity for
4 counter offensive that was obvious.
If successful such an operation would
afford immediate relief to the allied
defense, would remove the threat
against Paris and free the Paris
Nancy railroad. But, more important
than all else, it would restore the mo-
rale of the allies and remove the pro-
found depression and fear then exist
ing.
Up to this time our units had been
put in here and there at critical points
as emergency troops to stop the ter:
rific German advance. In every trial.
whether on the defensive or offensive,
thev had nrovo6 thomSo1vos ocrol +o