The Washington herald., 1920-02-17

I
proposer of 1t was not, honest, and
would not lay his cards upon the
table, we received another lesson In
international morality, and in this
| instance Mr. Balfour, the British
4 minister of foreign affairs, and Mr..
lViviani, the French minister of for
| eign Affairs, with whose war pur-
poses we had become in the mean
time associated, were our teachers.
They came to America to ask for
the sinews of war. They came to
confer upon the great victory drive
that we thought was to save civili-
zation. They saw our once peace
full country transformed into an
armed camp. They saw our Treas
Jury pouring out into European war
chests the stored up treasures Of
American toll. They said many
pleasant and appreciated things, but
they also. like Bernstorff. a few
wooks before. saw mo need of ad-
hitting the United States into all
the negotiations" They did not put
all their cards on the table any more
than did the German chancellor
In both instances the practice was
the same-secret agreements Sc
cretly arrived. at. Happily the doc
trine of London and the purpose of
PsFIs Berlin. were different from those in
Admitted Big Aid.
These gentlemen accepted our aid,
admired our energy and praised the
spirit of our youth. Privately. they
said, 1t was particularly noble Of
us to come in at the very moment
when admittedly the outlook for the
lentente powers was dark But they
did not say that the agreements
fthey had already entered upon, with
the saving excuse that they were
war measures and consented to un-
der the whip of military disaster. or
the agreements as to the territorial
spoils they were later to enter upon.
with no excuse at all that I can
think of, were absolutely antag-
onistic to the policies which 'the
President had announced, which
Congress had sanctioned and which
their respective governments had
formally accepted as the guiding
policy of the war. While calling
upon us to restore Alsace and to
correct the crime Of Poland. while
calling upon us for the men and the
resources that could alone make vic.
tory possible. they did not admit
that they had pledged their coun-
tries resources and their scored
honor to the crime of guaranteeing
Shantung to Japan. or of robbing
another and most deserving ally by
. giving Italy a number of Dalmatian
islands and a very ample foothold
; on the Dalmatian coast, which does
: not belong to Italy. much less to
those who are giving it to her.
Germans Liberal.
Indeed. when you come to contrast
the practice of Viviani and OF Bal
four to the preaching of Bernstorff
it would look as though the Ger
mans. in theory at least. were more
liberal toward us than was the
Frenchman and the Englishman in
actual practice. Bernstorff saw mo
need of admitting the United States
into all the negotiations" while
England and France and Italy ex-
, cluded us from all knowledge of the
plans and the policies they had en-
/, tered upon as concerns Europe
Asia and Africa. And yet. We alone
by our participation in the wal
made the realization of these plans
. covenanted in secret treaties pos
, sible. We cheerfully paid the bill
! in blood and treasure. and our boys
died in the belief that they were
, fighting a war to end war. The
things that we were really uncon.
, sciously Sighting for. or at least a
good number OF them. according ,to
the unchallenged statements OF
, President Wilson and Mr.. Lansing
, before the Senate committee. were
first communicated to us a month
. after the Peace Conference assem-
bled in Paris: that is. in February
l.
, tice.
, Pledges Caused Trouble.
l In so far as the Peace Confer
I ence came to shipwreck, il failed
Z not because the noble ideals of tnt
President. but because of the preda-
tory pledges the allies had mutu-
: ally exchanged, in the dark days be-
[ fore America entered the World
1 War with the strength to secure a
: decision and with a noble basis for
a world settlement. We do not
: know what happened in the secret
2 conference in London, and we dc
= not know what the secret protocols
= contain that have been adopted by
( the Peace Conference since our
withdrawal from its deliberations
b. Perhaps we have no right to know
) since we withdrew. Perhaps, even
l had we remained. the old policy in
! word from Berlin, in practice from
; Paris and London would have pre-
walled. and there would have been
no need to admit the United States
into all the negotiations" but we
= shauld bear in mind that it is quite
| possible arrangements were reached
: in this secret conference as danger
! ous to the peace of the werld as i.
hn to Nf n
+, some of the decisions may have been
/ communicated to us, or are to be
t 1t is still the practice of European
diplomacy not to communicate "al
/. the negotiations to the United
? States" But. of course, later on
, we shall have to face the conse-
, lquences OF these agreements, how
, lever i'll advised and disastrous they
Z may turn out. That is apparently
: our sole, our inescapable role.