Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-01-25


past opinions OF naval men
II is Impossible for this to bt
otherwise. In the last analysis
therefore. the Navy itself must ac-
ccpt the opprobrium of our unoal-
snced feet. True. Congress is the
final arbiter as to the numbers an6
types of ships TO be authorized; yet
each year that body has sought
through committee hearings. the best
naval opinions available before hnal-
ly acting.
The general board of the Navy in
It's latest report to the Secretary ol
the Navy. discussing the composition
OF the fleet. said:
The United States Navy is very
deficient in scout cruisers. These
vessels are highly necessary TO make
up well balanced fleet, and its sue
cessful operation would depend very
greatly upon the use of such YES
sells"
The above excerpt of the general
boards report tells only half the
story. The Navy is not very def
Gent in scout cruisers. for that i'm
plies the existence of such vessels IN
The fleet, The Navy has no SCOUT
cruisers at an worthy of the name.
In 1904. fifteen years ago. Congress
1uthorised three scout cruisers-the
birmingham. Chester and Salem
They were commissioned in l9oe'
Their displacement is $3.50 tons; the'r
battery comprises five-inch and three
inch guns. and their speed went!
four knots. They use coal only.
England Has 30 Light Cruisers.
Great Britain has. according to the
1atest reports available. seventy iSnt
cruisers or scout cruisers Inc as
placement of these vessels rahS-ns
from 3 500 to 5.400 tons. The SloWest
has a speed of twenty-five ana one
half knots: the fastest over tnlrty-
Two knots Forty-nine of this numoer
nae oil as fuel. while twenty-one use
both coal and oil. All but seventeen
we're finished since 1917. Thirty our
were laid down after England GU"
tered the war ;.rs
our three small scout oS
burning coal. have neither the speed
ar the endurance to fulfill the duties
If scouts for a fast fleet. AS mat
fer of fact. they are being used az tnis
moment in the capacity OF nouns
leaders. type of warShlp oeNeioPSu
hv Great Britain during tne war
General board describes this type III
&c ranort in the following words:
The f,otilla leader. which IS su !,
,.erdestroyer, is new type OF VeSsei
reyeIoped during the recehI We
THESE vessels are used to Iead notIlids
az destroyers in action Being idrs
than destroyers (our latest destroyers
are of 1880 tons displacemenD, they
carry the essential facilities for no
fila commander. They are oetter
touipped for signaling and range mo
ing. carry a heavier battery tive S.
irch high velocity guns against iour
four-inch in the latest br''.ss
radio equipment than destroyer
Their speed is the same as Destroy
or. about thirty-five knots
II is evident enough that our three
obsolete scout cruisers cannot IN war
perform either the duty of scout
nor Vet that of a fiotiIla leader. Be-
ing handicapped by ten knots less
speed than a destroyer. they could not
Keen in front of the flotilla- as they
must do to be useful. They can, how
ever. carry the essential facilities
for a fiotilla commander. and mat Is
the end of their war usefulness
Great Britain, even with the menace
O. the German navy to arouse in her
the desire for well balanced meet
seemed to have neglected TO Duiio sun-
Gent scout cruisers On the ootoreah
Of the war Admiral Jellicoe with the
hattie fleet found himself at Scapa very
deficient. although there were thirty
SIX scout cruisers in commission ne
had only eight. the remainder were
elsewhere upon most important duties.
ard completed thirty-four scout cruisers.
Congress. rejecting the best available
naval opinion held for many years 10 a
policy of building only those warsnip
types that are capable OF heavy hlttins
and able to resist heavy oiow-sne pat
tieship AS a corollary to this decision,
il also authorized destroyers and sub
marines because with their tOrpedoes
they also might be classed as heaVy
hitters All other auxiliaries. including
scout cruisers. were seduiousiy omitteo
from. Congress- building program
From whence came this best avail
bic naval opinion an opinion that
for many years Congress followed and
in consequence no battle cruisers nor
scout cruisers were authorized
a war between nations, powerful on
tue sea, will unerringly crystalline opin-
Jon upon the weapons most useful Must
We wait until war is declared to nnd
out how we'll our feet is balanced for
taking part in fleet action:
Imaginary War Fought.
Away back in the sos Admirais
Luce and Mahan then a commander)
were instrumental in establishing a
naval war college for the purpose OF
studying war on the sea Appreciate
Ing that war could not be started
merely to permit a study of il. the
war college used for its purpose an
Imaginary war. To the students at
the college TINS DlOOQleSS ana mex
J,.nsiVe war was quite as useful as a
real war to bring out the relative
values of warship types. 1t was called
war on the chart" Any type of YES
sci could be used. Every feature of
war and battle was present except
the wholesale expenditure of treasure.
and there were no casualties to per-
sonnet Ships were sunk one minute
aud were ready to take part again in
the war the next. From these imag-
iuary wars the War College. as early
sS 1908. saw the urgent need of battle
cruisers. and even earlier :he need
of scout cruisers.
Strange as il may seem, the navy
as Il whole did not accept these
studies and opinions of the war col
the war college was theoretical and
rot practical While the navy at sea
carried out maneuvers requiring much
skill and often fTaught with grave
dangers to both ships and men. the
.iiicers at The War Co'lc,<e eiI.-- sed in
many great wars with proba BILE enc
mieS-on the chart.
The conservatism of the high rank
ing sea going officers finally began
- give way in 1s13-14, and then every
one seemed suddenly to see "as
through glass darkly." the great inn
p"-tance OF the Naval War oliege as
= perma 0cut and authoritative insti-
t~tioH for the purpose of tea ching the
at OF naval war.
lust about this time by striking