The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1920-06-13


Of destroying submarine than by pur-
suing them with destroyers, sloops
chasers, and other craft in the open
seas? It is hardly surprising that our
methods impressed certain of our crit
les as tedious and ill-conceived, and
that a mere glance at a small map OF
the North Sea suggested a far more
reasonable solution of the problem
The bases from which the German
submarines found their way to the
great centers of shipping were Ostend
and zeebrugge on the Belgian coast
and the harbor of Kiel in the Baltic
Sea- From all tslexe points the voyage
to the waters that lay west and south
of Ireland was long and difficult
one: in order to reach these hunting
grounds. the German craft had either
to pass through the Straits of Dover to
the south. or through the wide passage
way of the North Sea that stretched
between the Shetland Islands and Nor
way, and thence sail around the north
ern coast of Ireland. We necessarily
had little success in attempting to in
terfere with the U-boats while they
were making these lengthy open sea
voyages, but concentrated our efforts
on trying to oppose them after they
had reached the critical areas.
But a casual glance at the map con-
yinced many people that our procedure
was a mistake. And most newspapers
readers in these days were giving much
attention to this map. Many period
icals, published in Great Britain and
the United States, were fond of ex-
hibiting to their readers diagrams of
the North Sea; these diagrams con-
tanned one heavy black bar drawn
across the Straits of Dover and another
drawn across the northern passage
from Scotland to Norway. The accom-
panying printed matter informed the
public that these pictures illustrated
the one effective answer" to the sub
marine. The black bars of printers ink
represented barrages of mines and nets,
which, If they were once laid between
the indicated spots, would blow to
pieces any submarine which attempted
TO force a way across. Not a single Ger
man U-boat could therefore succeed in
getting out of the North Sea. All the
trans Atlantic ships which contained
the food supplies and war materials so
essential to Allied success, would thus
be able to land on the west coast of
England and France; the submarine
menace would automatically disappear
and the war on the sea would be won.
Unfortunately. it was not only the pic
torial artists employed on newspapers
and magazines who insisted that this
was the royal road to success. Plenty
OF naval men, in the United States and
in Europe, were constantly making the
contention, and statesmen in our own
eoutry and in Allied countries were
similarly fascinated by this program.
When l arrived i'm London, in April
1917, the great plant of combining the
submarines to their bases was every
where n lively topic of discussion.
There was not London club in which
the Admiralty was denounced for its
stuxeidity in not adopting such a per-
fectly obvious plan. The way to destroy
n swarm or hornets-such was the ia
vorite simile-was to annihilate them
In their nests. and not to hunt and at
tack them, one by one. after they had
escaped into the open. What the sit
uat1on needed was not a long and
wearisome campaign. involving UNI
limited new construction, to offset the
increasing losses of life and shipping,
and altogether too probable defeat in
the end, but swift and terrible blow,
which would end the submarine men
ace overnight.
"Dig Them Out"
The naval officers who expressed
fears that, under the shipping condi-
lions prevailing in 1917, such a brilliant
performance could not possibly be car
ried out in time to avoid defeat, mere
~ gained a reputation for timidity and
lack or resourcefulness. When the First
Lord of the Admiralty, Winston
Churchill in 1915, declared that the
British fleet would "dig the Germans
out OF their holes like rats. his re-
marks did not greatly impress naval
strategists, but they certainly sounded
a note which was popular in England.
One fact not generally known at that
time, demonstrated the futilitv of the
whole idea. Most newspapers critics as
sumed that the barrage from Dover 70
Calais was Keeping the suhna r;nes
out of the Channel. That the destroy
ers. aircraft. and other patrols were
safely escorting troop ships and other
vessels across the Channel was cot
of which the British public was iustly
proud. Yet 1t did not necessar,I,, Ell.
10y that the submarines could NOT ,,sa
Channel as passage way from
Dir German bases to their operat;ns,
,reas in the focus of Allied shinnins
routes. The mines and nets in tha
Channel. of which so much was printed
n the first three years of the war d;d
not offer an effective barrier to tba
.uhmarines. This was due to various
-easons too complicated for descrin- |
ion in an article of this brief nature. !
The unusually strong tides and rough