New-York tribune., 1920-03-13
Sims Charges
Daniels Chung
To Idle Plans
Months Wasted, He Says,
Over Schemes Made by
Those Who apparently
Never Had Even SeenSea''
Delay Alarmed Jellicoe
Admiral Declares Secretary
Tried to Change Convoy
System After Adoption

"xO7V ne 4 T10HV9S NJ UUSHtN1tOW 6uT60U
WASHINGTON, March 12.-All dur
ing the early months of Americas par
ticipation in the war, when the Allied
governments were pressing the United
States to cooperate in the establishment
OF the convoy system, Secretary Dam
iels was experimenting with various
substitute schemes for independent use
of the American navy, Admiral Sims
to-day told the Hale committee.
$50 impracticable were some of these
schemes" the admiral told the COM
mittee, "that l was forced to conclude
that they were devised by some one
who had never been to sea, or never
had seen the sea. The British and
French navies had adopted the convoy
system and it was daily demonstrating
its worth, yet manifestly it could not
attain It's maximum efficiency without
American cooperation, or until all
Allied shipping, American included,
should be treated as a whole. 1t was
the issue Of the war at the moment.
ut is very difficult for me to convey
to you the atmosphere which existed
at that time, and the real state of
desperation in which l found myself
almost daily during those early months
OF the war. 1t should be noted that
the cause of this was not single mat
ter, such as the failure to act on my
convoy recommendations, but that in a
dozen different matters, at the same
time, l WIS faced with the same sit
uation, always hoping from day to day
that the department finally would real
lze the situation and either accept my
recommendations or send over some
DC dy IN whose Judgment they could
trust.
Recommendations Adopted
And l again wish to reiterate that
there is no question as to whether
these recommendations were RIGHT.
The fact remains that they were Writ
TALLY all adopted in the end"
Sharing the anxieties Of the Ameri
can force commander over these DELAYS.
admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord of the
british Admiralty, the witness testi
TED, sent to him on July II, 1917, the
lo!loWlng communication:
Il am very much disturbed about the
convoy question. AS you know, we are
making great efforts to get it going,
put 1T is quite impossible to organize
the system unless we know absolutely
what vessels are available as escorts
through the submarine zone, and we
cannot know this unless the whole
system Of sailings from ports abroad
to British and French waters is or
gained some way ahead, and by some
way ahead l mean that we should
know at least fortnight before ships
requiring escort leave ports on the
other side, the reason being that con-
voys have to be arranged about three
weeks ahead
AT the present time we have ar
ranged four distinct convoys-namely.
two from Hampton Roads every eight
days, one from Canadian waters every
elght days and one from New York
every eight days.
"Ihe f1rst three of these conveys are
escorted through the submarine zone
by British sloops or destroyers, but we
are absolutely dependent upon United
States destroyers for the convoy com
ing from New York. Therefore we
must be certain Of having eleven
United States destroyers for this sole
duty. DO you think you can guarantee
that we shall have these destroyers,
and that you can inform your govern
ment that you have given the guar
anty?
Course Notice Needed
"The next step that will be neces-
sary will be to make it perfectly clear
to the United States Navy Board that
they must give fortnight's notice be-
fore it is proposed to sail ships reouir
ing escort in anything but the small
est numbers. We have. for instance,
been Informed within the last few davs
OF troops being sent over in two White
Star liners, of hospital unit coming
over in another vessel and of four
ships with valuable government car
goes, all requiring escort, and we re-
ceived notice as the ships were sailing
II think the matter is so important
that ! would suggest to you the de-
of wiring at once to say that
1t is essential that we should be given
notice Immediately of any proposed
sailings within the next fortnight
Otherwise, fear that we may be faced
with great difficulties"
Sims showed from the correspond
ence that followed with the Navy De-
partment that it was not until August
that the department finally came
around to approve his recommends
tions, as worked out in detail with the
British Admiralty, and which first had
been laid before Secretary Daniels on
May l of that same year. Even then
as he showed by subsequent CORE