Shoshone journal. [volume] (Shoshone, Idaho) 1884-1931, 1920-01-02

sucCessful generals ana an TIE exp IT,
ance gained 10 three years Of Wai we're
l,olilized for HE supreme effort.
The hrsr blow fcn on the right Of
The British armies. including fhe june
lion of the British and French forces.
OaIy the prompt cooperation of he
French and Brush general headquar-
ters sfemmed the tide. The reason Tor
this objective was obvious. and ~'r's-
mgly illustrated the necessity for haY-
lna some one with sufficient autAo1iy
over an th- allied armies to meet such
an emergency.
Reserves Were Lacking
The hack of complete co-oferation
among tie allies on the western front
had been appreciated and Tie question
of preparation TO meet crisis had
already received attention By the SUI
preme war council. A plan had been
adopted by which each of the allies
would furnish q certain number OF d.
visions for a general reserve 70 be I'M
der u z direction Of the military repre-
sentatives Of the supreme war council
Of which Gen. Foch was then The
senior member. But when the time
came to meet the German offensive 10
March these reserves were not found
available AMI the plan failed.
The situation resulted in a con
ference for the immediate considera-
ton Of the question of having an al
lied commander In chief. After much
discussion. during which my view IA
voring such action was clearly stated.
an agreement was reached and Gen
eral Foch was selected. His appoint
ment as such was made April ana
was approved for the United States
by the president on April l6
The grave crisis precipitated by the
first German offensive caused me to
make hurried visit to General Foch's
headquarters at Bombon, during which
all our combatant forces were placed
at his disposal. The acceptance Of
this offer meant the dispersion OF our
troops along the allied front and a
consequent delay In building up dis
tinctive American force in Lorraine
but the serious situation Of the allies
demanded this divergence from our
plans.
On March 81 approximately 3OOWO
American troops had reached France.
Four combat divisions. equivalent in
strength to eight French or British
divisions, were available.
Took cantigny Heights.
On April % the First division re-
lieved two French divisions on the
front near Montdidier and on May IS
captured the important observation
stations on the heights of Cantigny
with splendid dash. French artillery.
aviation. tanks and fame throwers
aided in the attack. but most Of this
French assistance was withdrawn be-
fore the completion of the operation
in order to meet the enemy's new Of
fensive launched May p to Chateau
Thierry. The enemy reaction against
our troops at Cantigny was extremely
violent, and apparently he was deter
mined at all costs to ceunteract the
most excellent effect the American
success had produced. For three days
his guns of all calibers were concen-
trated on our position and counter
attack succeeded cOunter-attack. The
desperate efforts of the Germans gave
the fighting at Cantigny q seeming
tactical Importance entirely out or
to the numbers involved
The third German offensive, on May
q. against the French on the Aisne
soon developed a desperate situation
for the allies. The Second division
was hastily diverted to the vicinity OF
Meaux on May 81, and early on the
morning of June l was deployed
across the au-Thierry-Paris road
near MOntreuil-aux-Lions in gap In
the French line, where it stopped the
German advance on Paris. At the
same time the partially trained Third
division was placed at French dis
posaI TO hold the crossings OF the |
Marine. and its motorized machine-gun |
battalion succeeded in reaching Cha |
teau Thierry in time to assist in sue
cessfully defending that river cross
Ing.
The enemy having been halted, the |
Second division commenced a series |
of vigorous attacks on June which !
resulted in the capture of Belleau |
woods after very severe fighting. The
village of Bouresches was taken soon
after. and on July l Vaux was cap
tured. In these operations the Sec
ond division met with most desperate
by Germany's best troops.
Our Second corps. under Maj. Gen.
George W. Read, had been organized
FOR the command of the ten divisions
with the British. which were held
back in training areas or assigned to
defenses. After consulta-
ion with Field Marshal Haig on June
3 five American divisions were re-
ieved from the British area to sup
BORT the FRENCH.
The Marne salient was inherently
weak and offered an opportunity for
counter-Offensive that was obvious.
Z successful such an operation would
ford immediate relief to the allied