New-York tribune., 1920-05-12
MIR. Wilson'S Sea Strategy

The publication of the Presidents
speech to the officers Of the Atlantic
feet reveals Mr. Wilson in new
role. Those who have tried to in
terpret Mr.. Wilson's character have
maintained that he did not concern
himself with the military aspects of
the war, but only with its political,
moral and universal aspects. His
active participation in the opera
tions aof the eXpeditionary army in
France is supposed to have ended
with the appointment Of General
Pershing as commander in chief.
Nothing heretofore had been dis
closed to show that he sought to i'm
pose any strategic policy on Secre-
tary Daniels and Admiral Benson.
The address to the feet officers,
however, opens new perspectives.
The President enlisted, it appears,
among the amateur strategists.
"America,' he says, "is the prize
amateur nation. When it
comes to doing new things and doing
them we'll | will back the amateur
against the professional every time.
He knows so little about it that he is
fool enough to do the right thing
Mr.. Wilson didn't shrink, appar-
emily, from conducting war in the
way he conducted politics-that is,
III the emotional and literary man
ner. At least he didn't shrink from
talking about conducting it that
way. His remarks had Churchill
liam, possibly a Nelsonian, flavor.
He favored digging the rats out of
their holes' and then closing the
holes. He suggested destroying the
German submarine bases, even if
half of the British and American
navies had to be sacrificed in the
process.
There is something that moves
the imagination in this point of
view. Maybe the war could have
been won sooner if the British and
American navies had made a COM
bined attack on the German naval
bases. Maybe it couldn't have been.
Earlier in the war Lord Fisher
evolved an original project for fore
] n ~ I,,to )nJt !
landing an Allied army on the Ger
man coast He thought that such
an expedition would bring better re-
suits than the attempt to force the
Dardanelles and capture Constanti-
nople. No one could say confidently
at that time what would work or
wouldn't work under conditions
which were then vague and unde-
termined.
The British Admiralty turned
down Fishers plan. And there is
nothing to indicate that President
Wilson'S plan was ever considered,
except as a literary curiosity, by
y
even our own Navy Department.
In the spring and summer of 1917
the navy was operating under the
policy outlined in Admiral Benson's
dispatch to Admiral Sims. That was
to hold the American fleet intact and
not risk any losses in battle. Ad-
mlral Benson wrote that the fleet
must be protected against risk and
casualties in order to be kept in
readiness for postwar eventualities.
The British Admiralty would not
hazard its fleet because it wished to
protect the British islands against
the chance of successful German
raid. Our Navy Department went
further. AS Admiral Benson wrote:
while a successful termination of
the present war must always be the
first Allied aim and will probably
result in diminished tension through
out the world, the future position of
the United States must in no way be
jeopardized by any disintegration of
our main fighting fleet"
This program was adhered to
throughout the war. The Presi
dents speech had no effect on Ameri