New-York tribune., 1920-03-01

IL, two weeks ahead of time. every
ELEVATOR on the Atlantic coast was
hAel and there were 6616 loaded cars
o. food awaiting ships. The railroad
s9mlnistratlon was able to write the
Aiiles letter warning them that if
they did not move the food from the
seaooard more rapidly it might be nee
essary to declare freight embargo on
food for Europe. From that time on
there was never day when there wa q
not food for our allies awaiting shin
ment,
No Political Plums Awarded
The third basis for iudp;ng Aho
operation of Federal control is by COM
parison with that of private owners.
Inc elements for this kind Of judr-
ment are most unsatisfactory. In the
hrst place, the roads were operated bv
the same personnel, the same execu-
tives, as when under private control.
SO there was little if any of the de-
s,ruct've effect of making political
piums out of railroad Jobs, and the ex-
pertinent avoided one of the most seri-
Gus weaknesses that could be\expectcd
to develop out of government owner
snip In the second place, there are
the heavy losses due not only to war
purpose but to war conditions-the
withdrawing of thousands of the
most efficient to fight or work in
France. the cost of materials and the
| impossibility of getting many of them
ali handlcaps on the administration
that would have fallen as we'll on pri-
vate operation and that already were
showing their effects III decreased cf-
iiclency OF private operation at the
time the government took over the
roads. There was also the great dis
turbance of traffic due to war condi-
tions. the sdetracking of much profit
able business to let the troop and mu-
| nitlons trains go by, the slump that
followed the armistice, and the very
| heavy slump due to the steel and coal
strikes. All these things make any
comparison between government opera
ton and that Of the private companies
| before 1918 subject to modification, ac-
cording to individual bias, and leave
! much ground for debate.
Nevertheless, there are certain
things which seem to have been estab-
lished by the Federal control expert
ment, certain advantages and disad-
vantages which have deve oped from
centralized operation. All these things
have a direct bearing on the question
of government ownership and. since it
will be much under discussion for
some time, are worth reviewing.
Question of Federal Control
Foremost is a matter OF opinion.
Two things are notable about the opin-
ion regarding the Federal control Ad-
hitting that it has been success,
/ viewed strictly as a war measure, most
! railroad men are inclined to believe
that private operation would have done
i hptth,. if IL Ho.A hco,, +,1 ~,
freedom from restrictions, obligations
to the pubic, priority orders. and SO
forth, which the government took unto
itself. They also admit, quite gen.
! orally, thai the centralization de-
veloped certain advantages which it
will be we'll to keep, and which they
are going to try to keep as far as pos
sible, but they deny that 1T provides
any argument for government owner,
ship
There is very little difference from
this opinion among members of the
railroad administration. They are
divided on whether the private owners
could have done better, but agree that
there was no chance to get the neces.
sary freedom except through Federal
control. They believe that the success
of the administration from the war
winning point of view has been great.
uty DCiicNS tEGj tICS nave luauSu-
rated reforms of the highest value and
claim success for the venture as a
whole But among them there is very
little sentiment, indeed, for govern
ment ownership as a permanent thing.
In comparing Federal operation with
that of the private owners, the figures
to DE used are those of the "test
period" the three years ended July 81,
1917. The Federal control act guar
anteed the carriers an annual income
equal TO that of the average annual in
come for this period On this basis,
and taking the accounting method used
by the Bureau of Railway Economics,
the figures are as foliows:
During the two years of 1918 and
1919 the roads failed to make even
their operating expenses for two
months, and made a total of S1,206,-
o12,0 600 over expenses. The standard
, $3.50 1920 000 leaving a deficit OF $6O4,-
| los, S,000-earnings for the two years
were that much lower than normal pri-
vate earnings. Figures for the two
months of this year are not yet COM
plete.
Cause of Deficit
The cause of the deficit, of course,
was increased expenses, and chiefly in
creased wages. Rate increases averag-
ing almost 80 per c1t gave the gov
ernment an operating revenue for 1919
that was lS4,230,244, as agail st
average private earnings Of s., ,671 ,6Go,~
$50 for the test period, an increase OF
! $1,S12 ,569 1862. But about $l,10O, ,0O0,-
600 OF this was eaten up by the wage
increases. Increases of from Is per
cent to 100 per cent in the billion-dol
lar accounts for maintenance Of way
and equipment were more than enough
! to swallow the rest.
The government, too, had to bear the
weight of the heavy slumps in traffic
following the armistice and caused by
the strikes last fall. These cannot be
measured exactly, but it is notable
that the deficit jumped from $7,000,-
600 in October, 1918, the month before
the armistice, to $45 100000 in Decem-
ber, the month that followed it, and
that there was another jump from a
deficit of $17,O0O,0O0 in October, be.
fore the coal strike period, to $61,0O0,-
900 in November and $60,000000 ir
December. 1t is these considerations
and others like them, which make the
balance sheet a poor measure of the
I success of the government control
though Congress will still have to ap.
propriate at least $436,322,SS5 to close
the account.
The nent article auiU deal aOith the
boadJ;no nf f,o fir a,,,Jo, tho uouern