New-York tribune., 1920-01-11
BY Frank H. simonds

BY Frank II. Simonds
Washington, D. c..
"NHE next few days, which will
mark the anniversary Of the
first session Of the Confer.
ence of Paris, acquire new
interest as consequence Of two
facts: first, after a year practically
nothing Of the work of the peace
conference has yet been translated
into actual peace; second, there is
in at least one quarter, in the So
called Liberal" group, growing
demand for another world assem-
blage, not alone to complete the
work Of the first, but to undo much
Of the rather meagre achievement
Of the first gathering.
OF this demand we are bound to
hear much in the future, and it is
therefore not inappropriate at this
time to examine the world situation
with a view to answering the obvi-
Gus question: Is there any present
possibility that a new world con-
ference would achieve more than
the old? Has the failure Of the
first, conceding the failure, con-
tributed much to making the sue
cess Of the second likely?
Now, we have to answer at the
outset one preliminary question.
Assuming that the Paris Conference
failed, or, to put it less emphatically,
in so far as it did fail, what were
the causes? For unless the causes
are understood and also recognized
as having been eliminated, q second
conference obviously would be a
waste of precious time and new
contribution to world disorder.
Looked at squarely, the failure
of the Paris Conference, so far as
it failed, was the result Of the alb
sence Of two essential details,
namely, unity Of command and COM
munity Of purpose. For nearly four
years of the war itself we failed to
defeat the German, because he had
unity Of command, and we,s the
Western nations, had separate ar
mics, divergent policies and wholly
different war purposes.
The Benefit of Defeat
In 1918, when LudendorR routed
the 5th British Army, the first and
greatest benefit Of his victory was
the bestowal upon his enemy of that
unity Of command without which
we should have infallibly lost the
war. Only central direction saved
US from the supreme disaster in the
next few months, when the Germans
first defeated the British in Flan-
ders and then overwhelmed British
and French divisions on the French
front along the Chemin des Danes.
Nor would it have been possible
to win the war in 1918 if the su-
preme chief had not been able to
settle the question Of objective and
call upon Pktain, Pershing, Haig,
King Albert and General Diaz for
such troops as he needed, such at
tacks as were required in one sec
tor or another to bring about the
general dislocation Of German ar
mics. There were no longer French,
British or American campaigns. We
Americans joined hands with the
French Of Mangin to make the
counter offensive Of July 1S, while
the Italians and moro Americans
were In the repulse Of the German
offensive Of July Is; when We
grew weary, British troops replaced
ours, near scissors, while PRESENT.,
other divisions Of ours supplied re.
serves to British and French com
manders on the road to victory but
lacking reberves.
In September we at last had ons
cause, one army, one commander
And in November we had victory
complete. decisive; the enemy sur
rendered. Now, within reasonable
limits, similar unity Of purpose ane
OF command was necessary at Paris
To restore peace we had the forc<
which had won the war, and the vic
tory which we had achieved pre-
sented us with tho authority and thu
prestige essential to our task.
But from the very outset of ths
peace conference there were lacking