New-York tribune., 1920-01-18

Navy Department did not send hir
any aid until July, 1917, when thrc
moro officers were sent to him. H
had asked for at least the staff
destroyer fiotilla commander woul
have in time of peace, but was toll
there were no officers available. h
II was trying to get the department
to understand that I was confronte,
with a physically impossible. task i
! had but one aide" said Admira
Sims, The term not available shoul,
have been applied to other activities o
vastly less Importance than the com
mand of American naval forces in IN,
war zone"
The admiral's letter set forth de
tailed information on the Navy De
partment's action on request an,
recommendations. 1t read in part az
follows:
Reviews Naval Lessons
Upon the conclusion of the war i,
which large naval forces have bee,
engaged, and after sufficient tim,
mas elapsed to permit of a careful
estimate of the manner in which tn,
war was conducted, it is of the frs
Importance that the lessons to be de-
rived from this experience be recorded
in order that they may serve as
guide in future wars
This is especially true of nava
war OF such peculiar character that
the experience Of former wars was oil
little assistance in determining the
proper policy and in developing the
unusual tactics that were rendered
necessary by the numbers, geographic
cal position and resources OF the coun-
tries involved, and by the enemy's
method of submarine attack upon
merchant shipping in disregard of the
tenets of international law and of the
laws of humanity.
I'm this respect it is particularly
important that a just estimate be
made of the errors of policy, tactics,
strategy and administration that were
committed by our navy.
Points Out Serious Errors
ut is to this end that I submit the
following account of what appear to
me to be the most serious of these
errors and the circumstances that led
up to them, followed by a brief sum-
mary of the lessons to be derived
thercfrom.
"This is not presented solely from
the viewpoint of the COMMANDER OF
our relatively small naval forces in
Europe. but specifically as a result of
the experience necessarily gained in
the unusual and very responsible posi-
tion of the Navy Departments repre-
sentative in the naval council of the
Allies where only all Allied plans and
policies could be continuously dis
cussed and where only all essential in
formation, both current and general,
was at all times available
I'm the latter part of March, 1917,
IN response to request from the
American Ambas sador in London, ex-
pressing the desire Of the British gov
ernment that a naval officer of high
rank be sent to secure the closer CO.
operation which our navy had suggest
ed, l was ordered abroad on barely
forty-eight hours notice.
Warned Against British
"Brief orders were delivered to me
verbally in Washington. No formal in
structions or statement of the Navy
plans or policy were re-
ceived at that time, though I received
the following explicit admonition:
Don't let the British pull the wool
over your eyes. 1t is none of our busi-
ness pulling their chestnuts out of the
FIRE. We would as soon fight the Brit
ism as the Germans.
II assumed that my mission was to
confer with the heads of the Allied
navies to learn the actual situation
and to discuss means for naval CO.
operation in case the United States de-
clared war against the Central Powers.
A lieutenant commander accompanied
me as aide. We were directed not to
take uniforms and to travel under as
sumed names. / expected to return and
supplement my cables by reporting the
situation in person. l had no idea that
would be designated to command the I
naval forces in Europe in case of war.
Il arrived in Liverpool on April 8
and in London on April TO-, 1917. and /
vent Immediately to the Admiralty !
where the naval situation was fully ex-
planned by responsible officials. This (
explanation showed that the Navy De-
partment did not understand the Sc
riousness of the submarine situation:
that its information was very incomplete
and inaccurate. This was due to the
scope of it's intelligence
service, very few naval officers having
been sent to Europe before we entered |
he war.
Germans Winning in April
"a review of the cables sent to the |
department. in April, 1917, show that
ne situation was very serious and that
tho enemy was rapidly winning the !
war by the destruction of merchant
shipping. Throughout the following
year numerous cables and letters of
the most urgent possible character were
sent. with the object of impressng on
the department the vital necessity of
our maximum effort being exerted in
European waters with the least pos
eible delay, but without producing the
desired result
attention was frequently invited to
the fact that the shipping was being
sunk much faster than it was being
built, and that it waas a matter Of
simple arithmetical calculation to de-
termine when the Allies would have to
sue Tor peace II the rate of loss con-
tinued
ut may be well to state here that the
delays in taking action and the lack of
support, involving the efficiency of the
united states naval assistance in the
war, can be fully understood only
through an examination of the com,
municatlons exchanged between the de-
partment and the naval HEADQUARTERS
abroad
For some reason which has never
been explained the Navy Department
during the first six months of the war
faied to put into actual practice n
whole-hearted policy of cooperation
with the Allies--a policy required for
the winning of the war with the least
possible delay.
The headquarters in Europe was not