Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-08-08
j. s. DECLARATION
OF ATTITUDE ON
POLAND EXPECTED
Warsaw Communication Re-
ceived Here Sets Forth
Situation.

Announcement by the United States
government of it's attitude toward
the Polish Russian conflict is expect
ed to follow the receipt of com
munication which has been sent to
this government from Warsaw setting
forth the situation as it now exists
A declaration of moral support of
Poland, with an extension of credits
to that country to permit it to pur-
chase surplus war material from the
United States. is expected in some
quarters To this might be added
a warning to soviet Russia that this
Their extension of it's military opera
tons beyond the Russian border:
Military aid for Poland is not beyond
the bounds of possibility, but this
would be considered only after all
other means had failed.
Views Already Exchanged.
Views already are being inter-
changed between this country and
France and England as to how the
situation may best be met, but this
government is not yet committed to
any program.
Official Washington is almost as
much concerned over the situation in
southwestern Asia as in conditions
around Warsaw, as the bolshevik
drive now threatens the Persian CAPT
tai, Teheran- Appearances indicate
the Russian forces are making an
effort to upset the British and French
rule in the near east.
John /. Caldwell, American minister
to Persia, who notified the State De-
partment that the Persians were pre-
pairing to evacuate Teheran, has been
granted permission to remove the Amer
lean legation from that city. The Amer
lean consul at Tabriz also has been au-
thoHzed to move.
Omeials Watch Developments
Government officials continued today
to watch developments in Poland. where,
according to official advices received
yesterday, the situation had slightly i'm
proved.
With the threatened political and eco
nomic collapse of Poland and reaction of
similar gravity anticipated in states ad-
jScent to the new republic, officials de-
scribe the situation as approaching a
point where self-interest would prompt
the United States to take action.
The view was expected that the
threat of a notification of the victory
over Germany was contained in the
understanding said to exist between
soviet Russia and Germany, and that
this offered sufficient provocation for
action by the United States. These
officials took the position that as a
power associated with the allies in the
occupation of the Rhineland. the
United States maintained very evil
dent interest in the preservation of
the victory, although it had not rati-
fed as yet the treaty of Versailles.
U. 5. Troops May Aid.
Military authorities suggested that
the brigade destined for Silesia and
detained in Germany If now sent to
Silesia might steady not only Poland
but CZechoSiovakia and Germany The
complete strangulation of Poland by
the cutting of the Danzig corridor by
the bolshevik army, these officers
added, was grave eventuality which
the presence of American troops in
that area might possibly avert.
So long as the bolsheviki are able
to exercise complete censorship over
all communications in soviet Russia
little promise was seen by some Of
hcials of the success of a note of
warning to the soviet government
The Russians for whom such a note
would be designed with a. view to
arraying them against the soviet gov
eminent would be those people whom
1t would never reach, it was said.