The Lexington intelligencer. [volume] (Lexington, Mo.) 1901-1949, 1920-01-09

as the lowest we should think Of and
Is placed no higher because the limit
OF available transportation would not
seem 10 warrant il.
"A study of transportation faclli.
ties shows sufficient American tom
mage 70 bring over this number Of
troops. but TO do so there must be e
reduction in the tonnage allotted to
other than army neeis. The use OF
shipping for commercial purposes
must be curtailed as much as posi-
BILE. The allies are very weak and
We must come TO the r relief this year,
1915. The year after may be too late.
1t is very doubtful : they can hold
on until 1919 unless we give them a
lot of support fhis year. II Is there
fore strongly recommended that a
complete reimbursement of ~transpOrta-
tlop be made and that the needs of
the war department as set rorIh above
be regarded as immediate"
In the latter part Of January joint
note No. ~, presented by the military
representatives with the supreme war
council, wss approved by the council.
This note consulted that France would
be safe during 1918 only under certain
conditions. namely
THAT the strength of the British
and French troops In France are con-
tinuously kept up to their present
total strength and that they receive
the expected re-enfOrcements OF not
less than two American divisions per
month"
The first German offensive Of 1918.
beginning March 81. overran all re-
%sistance during the initial period Of
the attack. The offensive made such
Inroads upon French and British re-
serves that defeat stared them In the
face unless the new American troops
should prove more Immediately
available than even the most optlmis-
tic had dared 10 nope. On March
q the military representatives with
the supreme war council prepared
their joint note No. IS. This note re-
peafed the previously quoted state
ment from joint note No. IL. and
continued
"The battle which Is developing at
the present momen In France, and
which can extend 10 the other thea
tiers Of operations. may very quickly
4 place The allied armies In a serious
situation from the point Of view Of ef.
fectiyes.
THE military representatives are OF
the opinion that IT Is highly desirable
that the American government should
assist the allied armies as soon as
possible by permitting In principle the
Temporary service of American units
In allied army corps aad divisions.
Such e-enforcements must. however.
: be obtained from other units thnn
those american divisions which are
now operating with the French. and
= the units so temporarily employed must
eventually he returned 10 the Amerl
7 can army
j THE military representatives are 0i
: the opinion that from the present time
T In execution Of the foregoing, and I'M
I'll otherwise directed by the supreme
8 war council. only American infantry
3 and machine gun units. organized as
2 that government may decide. b.
brought TO France, and that all agree
ments or conventions hitherto made In
q conflct with this decision be modified
accordingly"
e Planned an American Army.
The secretary OF war, who was In
France ut the time; General Bliss, this
: American military representative with
I the supreme war council, and at once
: conferred on the terms of this note
! with the result that the secretary rec
commended 10 the president that joint
{ note No. IS be approved in the follow
T ing sense
"The purpose OF the American gov.
eminent Is to render the fullest co
operation and aid. and therefore the
. recommendation Of the military rep
I resentatives with regard to the pref.
; erential transportation Of American
: Infantry and machine gun units In
' the present emergency Is approved
$ Such units, when transported, will be
e under the direction OF the command,
e er in chief OF the American expedi
e tionary forces. and win be assigned
for training and use by him In bis dis
erection. He will use these and all
b other military forces Of the United
I States under his command In such
manner as to render the greatest mill
d tary assistance. keeping In mind al
4 ways the determination of this gov
eminent TO have It's varied military
y forces collected as speedily as theil
r training and the military situation per
I mits. into an independent American
army. acting in concert with tn,
armies OF Great Britain and France
6 and all arrangements made by hin
for their temporary training anC
service win be made with that end II
d view"
British Losses Heavy
The battle line IN the vicinity o
. Amiens had hardly stabilized when
4 on April 8. the Germans made anOth
: er successful attack against the Brit
I'll Ish lines on q front OF some 40 kilO
,oe.r. Ia thas vfclnffv AZ A ruanntiaro