Evening star., 1920-01-04

the usual depth charges. Three days
aflerwsrd a badly damaged U-boat
put in at Cartagena. Spain. and was
internea for the rest OF the war.
Thus another submarine was as good
as sunk. The Lydonia. yacht Of
SEQ tons. In conjunction with the
British ship Basilisk. sank another
I'-boat in the western Mediterra-
mean. This experience illustrates the
doubt that enshreuded all such op-
eratiOnS. for il WAS not until three
months after the LydOnia engage
mcnt took place that the admiralty
discovered that the submarine had
been destroyed and recommended
Commander Richard r. Mccullough
u. s. n. Tor decoration.
Thus from the first day that this
method OF convoy ing ships WAS adopt
ed 1t was an unqualified success in de-
feating the submarine campaign. BY
August /. 1917. more than 10.eoe ships
had been conveyed. with losses of only
one-half of I per cent. Up 10 that
same date not single ship which had
left North American ports in convoy
had been lost. Ey August II, 26l
ships had been sent in convoy from
North American ports, and of these
only one had fallen prey to the sub
marines. The convoy gave few eppor-
tunities for encounters with sub
marines. l have already said that the
great value Of this system as pro-
lection to shipping was that it COM
PEELED the underwater boats to fight
their deadliest enemies. the destroyers.
every time they tried to sink mer
chant ships in convoy. and they did
not attempt this often on account of
the danger. There were destroyer
commanders who spent months upon
the open sea. conveying huge aggre-
cations Of cargo vessels, without even
once seeing a submarine.
To a great extent the convoy system
did it's work I'm the same way that the
grand fleet performed its indispensable
service--siiently. un0btrusiveiy. max
ing nc dramatic bids for popular favor.
and industriousiy piodding on. day
&A AtOt 10y 0hu itOffth AAtCT IiOhth AL
this time the world had it's eyes fixed
upon the stirring events Of the west
ern front. almost unconscious of the
existence OF the forces that made those
land operations possible. Yet few
statistics eloqueDtly disclose the part
played by the convey system in win
ming the war. La the latter months of
the struggle from ninety-oRe to ninety
two per cent OF allied shipping sailed
in coRv0Ys. The losses la these con-
voys were less than l per cent. And
this dgure does not include the ships
lost after the dispersal OF the con-
voys: In conveys actually under de-
than one-half o. 1 per cent Mill
tary experts would term the convoy
system a defensiYe-offensive measure.
By this they mean that it was a
method of taking defensive position
in order to force the enemy to meet
You and give you AN opportunity FOR
the offensive. 1t is an old saying that
the best defensive measure is a vi.or
GUS offensive one.
Unfortunately. owing to the fact
that the allies had not prepared for
the kind OF warfare which the Ger
mans saw ht to employ, aga,pst them.
We could not; cond vet sspeeAy offens,
sive operation--thati Isl sse. rGould net
employ our. enti-Hibna2i5aess ssforces
exclusively in the effort fte destroy
the submarines. Up to the time Of
the armistice. despite all tae assist
ance rendered to the navies by the
best scientific brains of the world,
no sure means had been found of
keeping track of the submarine once
he submerged. The convoy system
was. therefore, our only method OF
bringing him into action. lay stress
on this point and reiterate it because
many critics kept insisting during the
WAr-and their voices are still heard
that the convoy system was purely
n defensive or passive method OF
opposing the submarine. and was,
therefore, not sound tactics. 1t is
quite true that we had to defend
our shipping in order to win the
war. but it is wrong to assume that
the method adopted to accomplish