Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1920-03-30
Editorial Comment
When Josephus Guarded the Spoon
(New York Tribune.)

(New York Tribune)
Secretary Daniels and Admiral Ben
son once meditated doing tie right
thing. To be sure, they intended doing
it at the wrong time; but one can let
that pass in e!ation over discovering
the twins were not always who'll,
wrong.
On July 10. 1917, after acceding TO the
dispatch abroad Of minor fighting
forces for anti-subr:arine work, the de-
partment announced
Its unwillingness as a matter OF
policy TO separate any division from
the main feet for service abroad.
although it is willing to send the en-
tire batt,eship fleet abroad to act
as united but cooperating unit
when the emergency is deemed to
warrant it,
Since time immemorial the popular
belief has been that the way for navy
to defend the coasts of a country is to
mount close guard over them, using its
ships as floating forts. Since time i'm
memorial nava. experts have held that
the best way to guard the coasts of a
country is to destroy the enemy fleet as
far from the coast a possible
<hCIl-ii al hdiici Il1SItloiiS an early itls
stance. During the Pe!oponnesian War
the enemies Of Athens were provisional
from Sicily. The Athenians decided.
therefore. to send their great naval
forces against the island Then arose
Hermocrates before the popular assem-
bly, of ancient Syracuse and pleaded
with his fellow citizens to sail forth to
point the Athenian fleet must pass
and destroy the enemy there. But the
assembly kept TIL, feet at home and suf-
fered a long and costly siege by the
AthenianS in consequence. The aband-
onment of the coast defense" theory
lies at the root Of Britain's naval power,
but it has taken centuries of instruction
to make the British people see the truth.
Not until Fishers day was there com
plete concentration.
Suppose that fleet of - enemy bat
tleships were about to attack us at some
unknown point. To carry out the
coast defense" theory we should divide
our fleet of IS capital ships into. say,
four parts and assign one to Boston,
one to New York, one to the Chesapeake
and one to New Orleans. Each squad
ron would be without instant support
from the others and would have only
its own strength of seven ships to op-
pose the concentrated 20 ships of the
enemy. The enemy would overwhelm
one squadron of seven and deal like
wise with each succeeding squadron as
it came to the rescue, or seek each
squadron out separately and sink it.
Then our enemy could bring over. his
transports unmolested. Coast Defense
vessels protect against individual raid
ers. but are no defense against con-
centrated attack.
The dispatch Of July 10. 1917, shows
that Secretary Daniels and Admiral
battle fleet abroad. This evidences a
realization that holding it here for
coast defense would be futile. But
Daniels and Benson proposed to do this
right thing only when the emergency
is deemed to warrant it'-that is, they
proposed to keep our battle fleet over
here and out of the war until an emer-
gency, such as the breaking loose of
the German fleet. had made the pres
manifestly imperative. They would not
send the fleet over to prevent a German
eruption, but only when the "emergen.
cy' of such an eruption had occurred.
Oh stable door and empty stall.
Daniels and Benson. in A. d. 1917, are
clearly outranked as naval strategists
by Hermocrates. in B. c. 413, for the
latter proposed to put out instantly to
sea with all the ships we have in readi-
ness" Judged by the Hemocrates
standard. Daniels and Benson are some
q centuries behind the times.