The Idaho Republican. [volume] (Blackfoot, Idaho) 1904-1932, 1920-05-21
.BELClANS KEPT
ALLIES INFORMED
Espionage Corps Under
Direction of Princess
Done Good Work
BY FORBES W. FAIRBAIRN

<LONDON.--Details Of the famous
Belgian espionage corps, which rem
dered incalculable service to the al
lies during the war, have just been
given to Universal Service.
How Princess de la Croy, member
OF one OF the most famous families
in Belgium, courageously took
charge and directed the activities Of
the organization, has hitherto been
unrevealed.
Throughout almost the whole war
this organization, composed Of Bel
gian patriots, followed the move
ments of the German troop trains in
Belgium and kept the allied generals
in continuous touch with the ilispo-
sition of the enemy's troops.
These agents were volunteers and
received no remuneration whatever
for their work. They were estab-
lished at various spots on the two
main lateral railroads which the
Germans possessed in Belgium, and
supplied the following particulars
about all trains: Direction in which
the train was travelling, number and
name of regiment on train. any par
ticulars of artillery on train, iden-
tification of the division to which
the train belonged.
The work required unceasing Wig
ilance, because Of the uncertainty of
the troop train schedules, and the
train watchers" position was none
too comfortable. Germany did not
deal lightly with allied patriots
found within her borders, as many
of the flamboyant notices issued by
the German governors of Belgian
towns testify. ..
On one occasion the activities of
the entire organization were detailed
to the Germans by a traitor and for
a time its operations were entirely
suspended. The Princess de la Croy,
howeve. worked increasingly to
gather the scattered remnants of her
band together and in marvelously
short time the system was rapidly re-
established and in working order.
Members of the society who lived
constantly in the shadow of death
by firing squad revealed to the
allied commanders daily the German
system of troop movements by rail
together with the principal entrain-
ing and detraining stations.
1t was discovered that to move
division and its artillery from one
part of the western front to another
required from forty to fifty trains
and took at least four days; to move
a division from the eastern to the
western front required from sixty to
eighty trains and took at least nine
troop trains in times of greatest
stress was half an hour. This meant
that the allied general staff was
able to calculate exactly how fast the
Inducements, and with these facts
and the additional particulars fur
nished fro mday to day it was pos
sible for the intelligence staff to
trace the movement of any German
division by rail. "a
1t was through information sup
piled by the Belgian secret service
that the allies were informed of the
arrival of the German divisions from
the eastern front after the Russian
debacle. The information was so
complete that it detailed the identity
of the divisions and the part of the
front on which they were concentrat-
ing. such knowledge was an inval-
liable indication of enemy intentions
and any change of plans was invari-
ably indicated by vigorous movement
by rail.
The preparations of the Germans
of their offensive in March, 1918,
was the most marvellous and admira-
BILE lesson in troop concentration
that the war produced OF the forty
divisions that were ready for action
March Fl on the st. Quentin front,
many "A been identified before by
their movement by the Belgian pa
triots. Some of the divisions came
from the eastern front, quieter parts
of the French front and from Bel
GUM. The rest of the divisions had
been with great care moved from
many miles distant by road, some
marching hundreds of miles, having
started weeks before "the day."
AS movement by road is almost
impossible to follow accurately, the
German staff displayed great cum
ming in using this method for con-
centration. The massing for the Lys
offensive under Won Squast was car
ried out in much the same way, and
his fatal persistence and wastage of
precious man power in this effort is
considered by many to have ulti-
mately proved the undoing of Ger
many.
Many Of the divisions moved to his
command were traced as having been
transferred from Prince Rupprecht |
Of Bayaria's group of armies which |
had achieved such admirable success
In the south. Won Squasht's attempt |
10 reach the channel ports proved to
be utterly fruitless after the first |