New-York tribune., 1920-12-08
Mastodons of the Sea
Time When Battlcship Must Yield
10 Submarine Not Far Off

''N ".' A'"ttcS'HP INuSL lcld
to Submarine Not Far Off
10 the Editor of The Tribune.
Sir: In the discussion over naval
weapons appearing in The Tribune. bv
"Quarterdeck" and others, there is not
overmuch on the question of command
OF the sea. The advocates of capital
snlps have always insisted that such
command is essential to our interests
and is not to be gained save bv fleets
of big ships. 1t is manifest that we
may impose our will upon any possible
enemy if only we can Outright him in
the place he chooses, or when we can
force him to fight. That point may be
at long distance from where we live.
Our weapons must be as powerful as
his and must have fuel-radius and sea-
endurance sufficient to reach that
point. The big-ship enthusiasts think
no other type has those essential stra-
tegical qualities.
The submarine undoubtedly has fuel
radius and sea-endurance to q super
lative degree. Their Diesel engines are
the most economical motive power
known. They are built with large tank
capacity, and since their defense does
not depend upon speed they can be
loaded down with large stores of fuel.
Some have been built with fuel radius
Of 10000 miles.
Moreover, submarines have long sea
eNGurarCn. cor,o Lo,,o hoo,, oo,4;,,,o,c1~.
at sea for four mouths. Bad weather
has no terrors for them. A large, we'll
found submarine can cross an ocean.
fight several weeks and come home
again. No other ship can do that
none other has such a splendid combi-
nation of strategic qualities.
Furthermore, it must be noted that
no other war vessel can operate con-
tinuously without support. The sub
marine can play an absolutely lone
hand. This is because her defensive
power, which lies simply in conceal
ment in the ocean, is unique in that it
is unnAuenced by speed or the Of
fensive power Of self or comrades. Dur
ing the war the best brains and energy
Of the Allies were expended on inven-
tions to compromise this defense. The
numerous listening" devices put in
service were an aid, but were by no
means what defeated the German sub
marines. They were overpowered by
enormous numbers Of enemies. Since
the war these new devices, which at
times locate submerged boat, have
been installed in submarines, greatly
increasing their offensive power. They
help at least as much as they hamper
the submarine.
Critics of the submarine question
its powers Of offcnse against war
vessels. The effective results of the
German submarines as employed against
shipping is still fresh in our minds and
it is we'll known that such was the
main job given them. Their attacks on
men-of-war were only incidental, but
Notwithstanding this fact, more Allied
warships were lost to them than from
all other combined causes This fact
is not generally known because the
:,
over a long period, did not have the
publicity that attached to the battles
between fleets. Similarly shrouded in
silence are the results obtained by
the Allied submarines. Everything
about submarines partakcs of conceal
mcnt, and it is not surprising that few
know that the British submarines cost
the enemy more large surface war YES
sells than did the British capital ships.
All this was done under early develop
mcnt Of the submarine. 1t will be most
surprising if future development does
not graft a more powerful offensive on
weapon which inherently possesses
such superior defensive and strategical
qualities.
In any comparison the question of
dollars should enter. First cost of sub
marines is about tho same per ton as
other war ships. But they don't be-
come so rapidly out Of date, they wear
we'll and their running costs are very
low. In view Of their war value for
coast defense, or for carrying the fight
to the enemy, submarines at the pres
cnt day seem the best investment of all
The time may not actually have arrived,
but seems near, when the mastodon
capital ship will become luxury to
be afforded only by the nation with
money to burn. U. C. B.
New York, Dec a, 1920