The Lexington intelligencer. [volume] (Lexington, Mo.) 1901-1949, 1920-01-09

In order to hinder the enemy's con-
quest Of Russia and, If possible. pre-
vent a German attack on Italy. or In
the Near East, the allies sought to
maintain the offensive on the western
front as far as their diminished
strength and morale would permit.
Notwithstanding these allied attacks
on the western front. the immense
gains by the German srmies in the
east. eliminating at Riga on Sept. s.
precipitated the collapse Of Russia.
The following months, the Au%striaDs-
with German assIstance-surprised the
Italians and broke through the lines at
CaporettO, driving the Italian armies
back TO the Piave river, inflicting a loss
Of 100000 men. 100000 rifles, 1900
guns, and enormous stores. This seri-
u crisis compelled the withdrawal Of
ten French and British divisions from
the western front to Italy. The Ger
man situation on all other theaters vas
so favorable that as early as Novem.
Der they began the movement of dlvi-
sions toward the western front. II
needed. her divisions could be with
drawn from the Italian front before
the French and British dared recall
their divisions.
At first the allies could hardly hope
for a large American army. Marshal
Joffre during his visit to America had
made special request that a combat
division be sent at once TO Europe as
visual evidence Of our purpose to par
ticlpate actively In the war. and also
asked for engineer regiments and other
special service units.
The arrival of the first division and
the parade Of certain Of its elements in
Paris on July 4 caused great enthusI-
asm and for the time being French
morale was stimulated. Still. allied
apprehension was deep-seated and ma
terial assistance was imperative.
Outlook Dark for 1918.
q review of the situation showed
that with Russia out Of the war the
central powers would be able to release
a large number Of divisions for service
elsewhere. and that during the spring
and summer Of 1918, without interior.
Ing with the status quo at Saloniki,
they could concentrate on the western
front a force much stronger than that
OF the allies. In view of this 1t was
represented TO the war department in
December as OF the utmost Importance
that the allied preparations be expe'
dited.
My conclusion was that. although
the morale Of the German people and
Of the armies was better than it had
been for two years, only az untoward
combination Of circumstances could
give the enemy a decisive victory be
fore American support as recommend
ed could be made effective. provided
the allies secured unity Of action
However. q situation might arise whicl
would necessitata the temporary use o
all American troops in the units Of on
allies for the defensive. but nothing Il
the situation justified the relinQulsh
ment of u firm purpose TO form on
own army under CUR own flag.
While the Germans were practicinI
for open warfare and concentrating
their most aggressive personnel Il
shock divisions, the training Of tn
allies was still limited to trench war
fare. AS our troops were being traineI
for open warfare, there was every rea
son why we could not allow them to b
scattered among our allies. ever by dl
visions. much less as requirements, ex
cept by pressure OF sheer necessity
Any sort OF permanent %Hmalgamatiol
would ~irrevocably commit America
fortunes TO the hands OF the allies
Moreover. Il was obvious that the lacl
Of hOmOgenelty would render thesN
mixed divisions difficult to maneuye
and almost certain TO break up nnde
stress of defeat. with the consequen
mutual recrimInation-
Again. there was no doubt that tn
realization by the German people tina
Independent American divisions. corps
or armies were in the field with deter
mined purpose would be a severe bloy
to German morale and prestige. II wa
also certain that an early appearance
OF the larger American units on th
from wonld he most beneficial TO IN
morale of the allies themselves.
Accordingly, the first division. oil
Jan. 10. 1918. took over a sector nortl
OF Toul; the twenty-sixth division wen
10 the Scissors front early In Fehru
airy; the ~forty-second division enterel
the line e a LunevIlle. Feb. Il. ant
the second division near Verdur
March IS. Meanwhile. the first arm.
corps headquarters, Major Gen. Hunte
Liggett commanding. was organized a
N~eufchateau on Jan, 20. and the plal
to create an independent American sec
tor on the Lorraine front was takinI
shape.
This was the situation when III
great German offensive was Launches
on March 81. 1918
Figured on q Divisions.
The war department planned a
early as July, 1917. to send to Franc
by June IS. 1918, t~wenty=One division
OF the then strength OF 10000 me