The evening herald. (Klamath Falls, Or.) 1906-1942, 1920-01-30
BOARD REPORTS
ON AUTOMATIC
TRAIN CONTROL

4 WASHINGTON, ID. c.. Jan. So
After investigation lasting more
than one year. during which many
actual tests on railroads were made,
the automatic train control COM
mittee of the United States Railroad
Administration has reported to
Walker D. Hines, director general
railroads, through w. I. Tyler,
director of the division of operation,
that on lines of heavy traffic, fully
equipped with automatic block sig
nails, ,'the use of train control de-
vices is desirable, but that the rela-
tive merits of the various types of
automatic train control cannot be
determined until further tests have
been made. And also that more ex-
tended service tests. Including COM
Z plete reports of performances. are
necessary before decision can be
reached on the availability for gem
eral practical use CT any OF the de-
vices that have been brought to the
attention of the committee.
The committee recommended that
ii. or a similar committee, be con-
tinued to the end of the federal con-
troll and that at the termination OF
federal control the work of the c1m-
mittee should be continued under the
American Railroad association, with
a representative of the bureau of
safety of the Interstate Commerce
commission on the committee. The
committee also recommended that
arrangements be made by the rail-
read administration or by the Ameri-
can Railroad association after the
termination of federal control for
the further practical test. under rules
that may be adopted by the commit
tee. of such devices as may be avail
able for that purpose. In its report
the committee. without implying en-
dorsement, found II appliances as
available for further test.
Train control devices will not
prevent collisions due to brake
failures, which are infrequent and
comprise only a small percentage OF
such accidents" said the report OF
the committee. Failure of signals
to perform their functions is com.
parativeiy rare occurrence. TRACK
circuit control block signal systems
are SO designed that when any part
fails the signal should display the
] stop indication. In some cases ol
. failure. however. the signal indi'
: Gates proceed" even though 1,
should indicate caution or stop
Such failures. known as false
clear" failures. contain serious ele'
ment of danger, but their infre.
| quency makes the possibility of col.
. lisions from this cause exceedinly
remote.
collisions due to failure of EN-.
ployes to comply with rules Of the
roads are large proportion of the
total number reported and many OF
these could not have been prevented
: by an automatic train control de-
!. vice.
Automatic train control devices
may be expected to prevent only such
accidents as are due to the failure
of employees to observe, understand
and obey signal indications. Failure
to see or understand signals may be
due to smoke, fog, snow, absence OF
the night signal Indications. COM
plexity in the scheme of indication
unfamiliarity of the engineman with
the route over which the train II
!, running, the division of his atten.
a tion. or his physical incapacity, etc
g Failure to obey signal indications
! that are seen and understood are
! rare and include only those cases
3 where enginemen, in their anxiety t
2 make time, take chances, or where
they use poor judgment in the in
terpretation OF rules which permi
them TO exercise some discretion.
Statistics show that most of tn,
. collisions which have occurred OF
tracks protected by track circui
control signals are due to the cause
above enumerated.
There appears to be a popula
misconception as to the number O
fatalities that might be prevented b.
automatic train control devices
Statistics show that train collision
have been the cause of less than si
per cent df the fatalities to persons
other than trespassers. occurring OF
the railroads of the United States II
the hve and one-half years endinI
December 81, 1918.