The Telegraph-courier. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1888-1946, 1920-05-20
aTHE YALoR oF IGNoRANCE.'

The YALOR OF IJNOElAlNOA1'
From unparalleled negligence in permitting
the nation to drift along through two years
and half Of world war with no move toward
adequate preparedness, Mr.. Wilson went to the
other extreme of recklessness when the UnlIed
States finally had thrown in her lot on the sloe
Of the allies He was for rushing headlong at
the enemy, and risking the success OF the whole
allied cause in the vain hope Of subdulng the
submarine menace. In speech to the of1lcers
Of the Atlantic feet in August, 1917, now made
public for the first time by Secretary Daniels,
the President advocated a naval strategy Wnlcn
if it had been followed, would have brought I'M
mediate disaster to our arms and won the war
for Germany in few weeks.
Mr.. Wilson entertained the conviction that it
the German submarine bases could be destroy
ed, the war would be won by the allies. He favor
ed an attack upon these bases by the combined
fleets Of England and the United States. Il am
willing" said the President to Admiral Mayo
and his fleet of officers ito sacrifice half OF the
navy Great Britain and we together have to
crush that nest because if we crush it, the war
Is won" With what grim smiles Mayo and the
other naval officers have greeted that state
ment. They knew that if the submarine men
ace was stopped at a cost Of half OF the allied
feet the war would be won by Germany, and
not the allies With the English grand fleet
reduced one half the German fleet could have
defeated it with ease, and from that date con-
troll of the seas would have passed from Eng
land to Germany. Thenceforth not an Ameri-
can soldier could have been transported to
Europe, and not ton of supplies could have
been sent across the seas. England, likewise,
would have been isolated from her armies
across the channel The defeat Of the land
forces of allies would have been assured, to be
RAPIDLY followed by the invasion of England,
and later Of the United States. Mr.. Wilson's
advice was nothing less than suicidal.
True to the spirit which prompted the warm
inc to Admiral Sims not to let the British pull
the wool over his eyes, the President similarly
sought to instill in the minds of the command
ers of the Atlantic fleet distrust for the British,
with whom they we're about to cooperate IN
the subjugation of Germany. Every time we
have suggested anything to the British admir-
atty" declared Mr. Wilson, the reply has come
back that virtually amounted to this, that it
had never been done that way and felt like
9aying, Well, nothing was ever done so system
atically as nothing is being done now There
fore | should like to see something unusual
happen something that was never done before. 4
Tn other words, the President urged his hearers
to abandon every principle Of naval strategy
that had been irlstilled into them at Annapolis,
at the naval war college, and throughout their
entire experience in our sea forces, and do
Something unusual"
The Presidents aspersions on the conduct of
the British grand fleet only proves the Grass
ignorance Of a man who, through the fortunes
of politics, had been made commander-in-chief
Of the navy 1t is true that it is fundamental
naval strategy in war to meet and defeat the
enemy, but it is recognized as suicidal to seek
out the enemy when they are protected behind
land batteries and submarine mines. That was
the situation in Europe. To have sent the grand
fleet against the guns of Helgoland, Ostend, or
Zeebrugge, would have courted instant disaster
to the allied cause. Through the constant
guard maintained by the English and Ameri-
can battleships the German fleet was rendered
impotent, and the transport of troops and sup
plies to Europe made possible. The allied fleet
did little fighting, but it controlled the seas,
without which Germany inevitably would have
come forth the victor.