Bisbee daily review., 1920-01-18
SIMS ARRA|GNS
 NAVAL METHOD
(Continued From Page one)

eyes" and that the United States
 would as soon fight the British
 as the Germans..
 Who issued these orders was rot ozrought out during the nearing. Eut Admiral Sims said afterwards the statement had been made to him by "a high official"
 introduction of the letter prompt. ca Chairman Hale, Republican, Maine 10 announce that he would ask the full naval committee Monday to au. thorize his subcommittee to make a wider inquiry or to appoint another subcommittee tC investigate the con. duct of the war by the navy depart. ment.
 In statement relative to Admiral Sims letter. Secretary Daniels said he had referred it to the general board with directions 10 give consid. eratlon to it and to all other .colnmu. nlcations directed to the department concerning the lessons of the war" Shove Errors.
 The letter declares it important as a guide in future wars that "a just estimate be made of the. errors of poEcy, tactics, strategy and admin lstratlon that were committed by our navy and adds that it is for that purpose that the most serious of these errors are summ arized. Then follows the recital of the officers as- signed to London 'on barely AS hours notice" in March, 1917. and shis state. ment regards his instructions:
 "srief orders were delivered to
 me verbally in Washington. No
 formal instructions or statement of the navy departments plan or
 policy were received at that time. though received the follov,ino
 explicit admonition: Don't let
 the British pull the wool over
 your eyes. lt is none of our bust
 ness pulling their chestnuts out
 ot the fire. We would as soon
 right the British as the Ger
 mans"
 The letter contained more than IO0O words and was written January l. Admiral Sims read it today at the request Of Chairman Hale. Ii re- viewed Admiral Sims experiences and said that at the time he left Tor Europe, he had no idea that he was to command American naval forces abroad in event of war. then impending.
 As soon as he arrived in London. tue letter. said, Admiral Sims realized mat the navy department did not comprehend the seriousness of 1he submarine menace, due to the insuf. flcient scope of the American intel. ligence service.
 A review of the cables sent to the navy department in April. l9I7."I me letter said, "shews that the situa- ton was very serious and that the enemy was rapidly winning the war oy the destruction of merchant shin ping. Throughout the following year numerous cables and letters of the most urgent possible character Were sent with the object of imo1essiEg on the department the vital necessity of our maximum effort being exerted Tn European waters with the Ieasc possible delay, but without produc ing the desired result"
 The navy department was repeat edly told, the letter said, that it was a matter of simple arithmeiical cal culation to determine that the allies must lost the war if the rate of ship loss continued.
 
 been explained Admiral Sims wrote. "the navy department, during at least the first six months of the war. | Tailed to put into actual practice a | whole-hearted policy of cooperation With the allies-Ta policy required for winning the war with the least pns- sible delay"
 Had No Policy.
 The letter charged that not until | July, 1917, did the navy department outline a policy of naval cooperation with the allies.
 "As usual in such cases" it con- tinued. the policy was mechanically sound, but that it was not carried out by the department is shown by the fact that for ten months after it's receipt l was urgently recommendine an increase of forces-still trying to convince the department that the war was in the east Atlantic. that the ? United States naval front was off the European coast and not off the United States coast"
 Admiral Sims letter declared that he was much embarrassed in his re- lations with other allied commanders by reason of the fact that, although. after an allied naval conference, it was recommended on July 21, 1917. that four coal burning American bat fleships be sent to guard the English channel against German cruiser raids. there was long delay before the re- quest was even acknowledged and finally it was refused. Tn the fol lowing November, the letter said. he chief of naval operations arrived in Europe with Col. Houses mission and immediately thereafter cabled in- structions to send the battleships. . Two to six months could have been saved, Admiral Sims declared if he could have appeared in person daily m Washington, as little attention was paid to his cabeld recommendations. "The recommendations of the navy apartments representative based ipon conferences with the allied com q r1. T !