Little Falls herald. [volume] (Little Falls, Morrison County, Minn.) 1889-1950, 1920-01-30
Continued from page three

Continued from page three
lne1Aced central France, protected the
U naost exposed portion OF the German
II II line IL q communic atoms, that between
q let1 and Sedan. and covered tho
Il Brtey iron region, from which the en-
aelny obtained the greater part Of tho
u Iron required for munitions and ma
leerial The coal fields east of Nets
\; We're also covered by these same de-
q lenses en- A deep advance east Of Nets,
L: az the capture Of the Briey region, by
threatening the invasion Of rich Ger,
N man territory in the Moselle valley
4 and the Saar basin, thus curtailing
u her supply Of coal or iron, would have
H. decisive effect in forcing a with
II drawal Of German troops from north
q ern France. The military and eco
/ nomic situation Of the enemy, there
. fore, indicated Lorraine as the field
promising the most fruitful results for
the employment Of our armies.
The completely of trench life had
enormously increased the tonnage of
supplies required by troops. Not only
was 1t a question Of providing food,
/ but enormous quantities of munitions
and material were needed. Upon the
railroads of France fell the burden of
meeting the heavy demands Of the
4 S.5OO.OOO allied combatants then en-
l. gagged. If the American army was to
have an Independent and flexible sys-
tenn It could not use the lines behind
the British-B Belgium front nor those
in rear Of the French front covering
Paris.
:, Chose the Southern Ports.
The problem confronting the Amer
. lean expeditionary forces was then to
euperimpose its rail communications
on those Of France where there would
be the least possible disturbance to
the arteries Of supply Of the two great
allied armies already in the field. The
lines selected, therefore, were those
leading from the comparatively un-
used South Atlantic ports of France
to the northeast, where It was believ-
ed the American armies could be en-
ployed to the best advantage.
For all practical purposes the Amer
lean expeditionary forces were based
on the American continent. Three thou
sand miles Of ocean to cross, with the
growing submarine menace confront
Ing us, the quantity of ship tonnage
that would be available then un-
known, and line Of communications
by land 400 miles long from French
ports to our probable front presented
difficulties that seemed almost insur-
mountable as compared with those of
our allies.
In providing for the storage and dis
trfbutfon Of reserve supplies an al
loWance Of 40 days in the base Sec
tons was planned, with 80 days in the
intermediate section. and Is days in
the advance section. After the safe
ty Of our sea transport was practical
ly assured, this was reduced to total
OF As days, distributed proportionate-
ly. When the armistice was signed all
projects for construction had been
completed and supplies were on hand
to meet the needs of 100000 men,
while further plans for necessary con-
struction and for the supply of an adj
ditionals 100000 were well under
way.
Our Own Fighting Doctrine.
A similar scheme was adopted in
August, 1917, for our armies, in which
the Importance of teaching through
out our forces a sound fighting doc
trine Of our own was emphasized. 1t
provided for troop training in all units
up to include divisions. Corps CEN
tiers of instruction for noncommission-
ed officers and unit commanders of
all arms were established. The army
and corps schools graduated 1880
noncommissioned officers and 1915
officers.
Pending the organization and devel-
opment of our own schools, a large
number Of our officers were sent to
centers Of instruction of the allied
armies. The training Of our earlier
divisions was begun in close associ-
alton with the French divisions, under
conditions set forth in the following
paragraph on divisional training:
"Trench warfare naturally given
prominence to the defensive as op-
posed to the offensive. To guard
against this! the basis of instruction
should be essentially the offensive
both in spirit and in practice. The
defensive Is accepted only to prepare
for future offensive
The long period Of trench warfare
had so impressed itself upon the
French and British that they had al
most entirely dispensed with training
5 for open warfare. It was to avoid
this result in our army and to encour-
age the offensive spirit that the fol-
lowing was published in October, 1917:
1.-THE above methods to be employed