Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1920-07-03
BERNSTORFF TRIES
TO SQUARE HIMSELF
my Three Years in America, y
Enjoys Apologiq--Other
War-Bred Books

my Three Years in America is both
apologize and apology, that is, state 4;
ment Of deeds In the illumination ana
Interpretation of defined philosophy
of action, and explanation, either miti :
eating. defensive or aggressive: at Is
the story of the diplomacy of Count
Bernstorff, ambassador Of the German
empire to the United states in the
| troubled period of the world war that
led to the participation Of the Amer
lean people on the side Of democracy
and freedom arainst the frightful form,
of autocracy and militnrism symbol1Hed
! in the epithet Prussianism. Just pun
lished in Berlin under. the tue
deutschland und Amerika: Emmin
| Erinnerungen aus dem fuenfjahrigen
Kriege. Won Graf Johann. Hcinricn
| Bernstorff." the salient and significant
parts have been speedily and excellently
translated for the use Of Americans, VINO
will find this volume Of marked value
in understanding the entry Of the. coun-
| try into the conflict against kaiserism
and Indispensable for any thorough
study of the diplomacy and statesman
ship of the war.
As might be expected, Count Bern
storff is slSilful in his literary chiaro-
scuro, for he is finished diplomatic
artist, but it is only fair to say that
! he Is not any too partial to his own
side in the distribution of light and
shade. Naturally enough, he endeavors
10 nut the best construction on his own
activities and actions, and this often
lnpcessitatps the telling of whole truth
that hits the German high command
and the Wilhplmstrasse hard. The fact
Is that the Imperial German amoas.
sador was in an unenvlable posltlon at
4. n l.
Washington. just as Bethmann h"il-
veg and his successor were IN Berhn I;
for the militarists, the advocates OF
frightfulness. were firm in the saddle'
IittIe or no consideration was paid to
civilians and diplomats except TO De
utilized for camoufage, smoke screen
or strategic purposes. or to e&tricate
Ccrrorv on occasion. from precarlous
nIiehts into which the Tirpitz ana
Tndendorff leadership led II. After ms
return to Berlin the envoy was not re-
co;yed hv the emperor for fully two
months. and had TO pay an unlnvited
cali on Ludpndorff. His account OF
this meeting is interesting as showing
his own attitude toward America anu
the disregard in which his dlspa'cnes
were held:
General Ludendorff greeted me with
these words: :;
"you wanted to make peace in
America. You thought you were nm
ished."
/ answered:
"Not that. but did want to make
peace before we were finished
Thereupon the general said:
but we didn't want to. But then
il would have been understandable II
YOU had believed we We're finished.
| Your instructions, which l read now
and then, permitted the inference
| In the course Of the conversation
| General Ludcndorff asked me II ana
\ when. in my opinion, the Americans
would intervene powerfully.
| answered that in year great
American army was to be expected
in France. an army that would DC
organized with comparative ease.
/ The general replied that then we
| had plenty Of time to END tne war.
| because in three months the l oonSS
\ would force England to make peace.
| He had received absolutely trustwor-
| thy information on that point.
] Rernstorff proves again and agaii
: tho American contention that this coun
/, try was forced into war to maintain IT
national self respect. This dcmonstra
| tion runs throughout the discussion
from the German diplomatic stand
noint. OF the Lusitania. Arabic ant
Sussex sinkings. In one passage he put
| his finger directly on the reason that hi
Diplomacy was thwarted by the mill
tarists at Berlin:
II was our fate that all our most
! i,nportent decisions in the war were
based on military and not on political
| considerations. The director OF the
foreign Office knew that my policy in
Washington was the same as his In
Rerlin, but Herr Won Jagow often
l could not inform me in time because
he did not himself know whether his
views would prevail.
Bernstorff's own view, so far as on
| can gather it. was that Germany ia
| no chance of a decisive winning atte
the first battle Of tho Marne. He be
| liqycd that the Entente could not at
rain a victorious decision Unaided by tn
T"nitcd states. Therefore his strnteg
was 10 keep the United States out {
! the world conflict and TO speed up
: peacc based on the military and econom'
stolpmatc. His major principles an
nursuits were the eXertion OF pressni
n sct American opinion against Il
british blockade, which, as is we
n known. adversely affected our trade an
n mails; prevention at all costs OF Amer
" loan re. enforcement Of the Allies
70 Francc and Flanders. and terminatio
~ tho war in the field before Amer1C
would be forced into military participa
ZION ms the result Of Schrecklichkeit ar
unrestricted U-boat warfare. This las
H. yviIl he remembered. was the Wilson
inn roIicv In the first half OF the wa
tbo nolicy that led to the President ~
eIoction on the slogan, "He kept us OF
Z OF the war.
:, The faulty and the folly OF the NIL
O taristic Junkers resulted In iatal la'
n Of co operation, even OF sympathE' D'
tween the high command and the an
bassador to America and his prihclpa
in the foreign office. The result v
know-America' entry. the crushing
. tbe kaiser's legions, and for ultimatnr
! tha armistice Of November II, W.
leading to the peace Of Versailles
II must not be thought that Borr
storfF expresses distaste or detestano
for % the philosophy of Rernhardi {
Troitscbke He IL too indoctrinate
ard coste ridden a Prussian for tina
Pmt II Is evident that he was farth'
sooing and more common sensible tha
q his military colleagues. lie realize
I" from his close up position, the pow,
- and prestige Of America, and knew h
= notional spirit here. He believed
,Iorjrg safe and in salvaging whatev
| rouId be held before too heavy, sa'
rifce had been made and befor" tC
bigh a price for peace must nece'
.arily be demanded. He disclaims ar
Al