New-York tribune., 1920-10-03

N cent history that few out
side of France will recall
the similar circumstances under
which Poincar6 and Millerand be-
came President Of France Yet when
the former exchanged the Presidency
of the council for that of the repub-
lie exactly the same discussion Of a
change in the power Of the Chief
Executive which Is now heard filled
the French press. Indeed, SO con-
vinced was Clemenceau that the cleo
tion of Poincare meant menace to
the republic, In the shape of d strong
man in the Elysee, that the Tiger"
failing In his effort to defeat Poin-
care, made a personal appeal to him,
which eliminated in a scene which
was memorably stormy.
Poincare had been called to be
Prime Minister at the moment when
all France reacted against the last
German aggression which preceded
the World War. Germany had sent
the Panther to Agadir, and Caillaux,
then Prime Minister, had retreated
before the German menace in fash
ion which reused all the latent
French patriotism. AS consequence
Caillaux fell and Poincare became
Prime Minister, associating with
himself ministry which contained
so many eminent French statesmen
As to acquire the name Of "All the
talents"
The Italian Incident
This Poincare ministry stood firm
against Germany, and little later
assumed stiff attitude In the face
Of the Italian seizure Of French pas
senger ships plying between Mar
seilles and Tunis. Italy, then at war
with Turkey, provoked French in
dignation, and the result w&s an in
cident which for the moment left
unhappy memories. Poincares sue
cess as Prime Minister led directly
to his election as President, and
with his accession there was a gen
eral belief that the Office would take
on an importance which it had never
had. BY comparison with the Presi-
dent of the United States, for exam
pie, the Chief Executive Of France
b but e minor figure, with social
rather than political duties, and pa
thetically without power.
1t cannot be said that Poincara
realized the expectations OF either
his enemies or his friends Certainly,
during the war he played an honor
able part, his influence, exercised
personally rather than as an Official,
contributing not little to the main
tenance of French morale; yet from
first to last he was overshadowed,
particularly during the ministry of
BRAND, while with the coming Of
Clemenceau he became no more than
a fgurehead. Since he has left Of
fee, moreover, Poincar6 has written
his bitter reflections on the subject
Of the Presidency, and fatty de-
clincd to become candidate for
second term unless the constitution
were amended.
Fearful Nf DictafOrs
France, with her long record Of
GfctatorB, with the evil memories Of
the overthrow of the First and then
Of tho Second Republic, has had no
desire to take risks with the strong
man In office. But now, with the
republic celebrating its fftieth an
nivcrsary this year and with the
achievement Of the war to Its credit,
thero seems to be little reason for
tho old prejudice. On the other
hand, ss che votes In the preliminary
session disclosed, the prejudice re-
mains, and It may be concluded that,
Millcrand will not find 1t easy to es-
cape from the chains which Presi-
dents Of the caliber Of Loubet and
Fallieres wore with little protest but
which Poincsr6 and not few Of his
predecessors found intolerably irk-
some.
Turning to MI1lerand himself, his
rise Is perhaps ons of the rnost ex-
traordinary in French history. Like
BRAND, ne began his political life
as Socialist and has steadily
marched away from the Left as he
has progressed. It is only a few
years since his consent to enter a
cabinet provoked tremendous bat
tie In the Socialist party, which led
to his expulsion. Yet, unlike BRAND,
his departure from the Socialist
party did not arouse personal as con-
trasted with political denunciation.
AS Minister of War in the bad
days which followed the Dreyfus
case and the passage of the law Of
separation, Millerand found the
French army literally "shot to
pieces" by political assaults. The
o~c.x~ I4co1f xx,c. sx-~r1 StAixx ~~-.-