Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1920-05-13
Says Admiral Evi-
IDENTITY Closed His Mind to
Every Plan Looking to the
Offensive in 1918,
PRESIDENT ASKED HIM
FOR DETAILED REPORT 7
Commander Asked for Ad-
vice by Wilson, But Came
Back With a Message Full
of GeneraIitieS, Charge,

Washington, May lI-Ine ven
of secrecy behind which the
American navy operated during
the war was lifted further today by
Secretary Daniels.
Continuing his testimony before
the senate committee investigating
Rear Admiral Sims charges that
the navy failed to cooperate fully
with the allies, the secretary read
confidential cablegram sent to
Admiral Sims at London on July 4,
1917, by Pres dent Wilson. In II,
the president said that in the pres
euce of the submarine emergency
the British admiralty was help
less almost to the point of panic,
and asked the admiral to submit 4
report based upon independent
thought of the whole situation,
without regard to the Judgment Of
anyone or that side of the water.
Presidents Cahlcgram.
The cablegram follows;
From the beginning of the war,
| ! have been greatly surprised at
! the failure of the British Admiralty
to use Great Britain's great naval
superiority in an effective way.
In the presence of the present
submarine emergency they are
| helpless to the point of panic.
Every plan we suggest they re-
| iect for some reason OF prudence
! In my view this is not "A time for
prudence, but for boldness even at
| the cost of great losses,
In most of your dispatches you
have quite properly advised us OF
the sort of aid and cooperation
desired from us by the admiralty.
| The trouble is that their plans and
methods do not seem to us effica-
cious. would be very much
obliged to you If you would report
| to me, cunfidentially. of course.
| exactly what the admiralty has
been doing and what they have ac-
complished, and, added to the re-
| port your own comments and sug-
gestons, based upon independent
| thought of the whole situation,
without regard to the judgments of
anyone on that side of the water.
"The admiralty was very slow to
| ADOPT lne plplttl4oH VI NNiN'N . "''N'
# is not now / judge tprotecting)
Convoys on adequate scale WITHIN
the danger zone, seeming to Keep
small craft with the grand fleet.
The absence of craft for convoy IL
even more apparent on the French
coast than on the English coast and
in the channel. | do not see how
the necessary military supplies ana
SUPPLIES of food and fuel oil are TO
be delivered at British ports in
any other way within the next few
months than under ADEQUATE con-
yoy There will presently not be
ships or tankers enough and our
shipbuilding plans may not begin
to yield important results in less
than eighteen months.
II believe that you VIII keep
these instructions absolutely and
entirely to yourself and that you
will give me such advice as You
would give if you were handlina
and il YOU were running a navy ol
your own
Sought TO Discrcdit Plans.
Admiral Sims response, Mr.
Daniels testified, was "a long tele-
| gram OF ReneFdltitS VI WildI NV
British admiralty was doing In
this connection, Mr.. Daniels read to
the committee a personal letter
from the admiral to Ambassador
Page at London, on August 7, 1911
Secretary Daniels said that the
Iadmirals reply 20 the president
! suggested that the proper policy to
pursue was to adopt the recon-
mendations he had made to the
navy department, most of when
the witness testified, had been put
, Into operation before the admlra
| suggested them.
The naval secretary told the
committee that Admiral Sims II
his reply evidently had sought tc
discredt the navy department
plans and that, instead of accept
? ing the departments suggestion OF
: great offensive plans or original
ing some plan that promised t'
st0p the egress of German subma'
rines" Admiral Sims had closed MS
, mind to every plan looking to tht
great offensive which In the fal
of 1918 was the most effective Toe
lof the submarine"