New-York tribune., 1920-09-07
German Naval Strategy

German Naval Strategy
From the German point of view
one of the saddest facts of the great
war was the complete inactivity to
which the kaiser's much advertised
German navy was condemned dur
ing the greater part of the struggle.
Psychologically, at least, the navy
meant more to the Germans than
even their army, for while they we're
accustomed to take military superb
orlty for granted, they were as self
conscious of their new-fangled navy
as child is of new toy.
A partial explanation of how and
why this great expectation failed is
furnished by the memoirs of the
erstwhile chief of the German ad-
miralty staff, Admiral Pohl, post
humously published by his widow.
Throughout the volume Admiral
Pohl. complains Of the meddling Of
army headquarters and the Kaiser
in naval matters. He charges that
the strategy Of the Grand Fleet was
consistently subordinated to the ne
cessities of land warfare. Pohl says
this meddling accounts for the fail
ure of the fleet to strike blow at
England in the decisive first three
weeks of the struggle. He illustrates
the Kaiser's attitude toward the
navy in letter to the admiral in
command, Won Ingenohl, dated Lux
emburg, September 13, 1914:
81 should like to inform you that
after August 28 (the day of Beattys
successful raid on the Blight of He'll
goland) l had great difficulty in re-
straining our All-Highest Lord from
imposing further limitations upon
your initiative. In his desire
to preserve the fleet he proposed
that, before embarking upon any
capital action, you should telegraph
to him for permission. Such an
order would have made it impossible
for you to turn favorable chances to
good account. The order has not
been issued"
On October 2 the Kaiser once
more explicitly reserved to himself
complete discretion over the fleet.
The chief reason for this "meddling,"
Of course, was Gas we learn from
the memoirs of Grand Admiral Won
Tirpitz) the temporary ascendancy
Of the Bethmann-Hollweg party,
which at that time still hoped
against hope that it would be pos
sible to reach an agreement with
England which would put British
power out Of the combat. Hollweg,
therefore, insisted that direct attacks
on the English fleet or coast should
be avoided
In February, 1915, Admiral Pohl
succeeded Won Ingenohl in command
of the fleet, and thenceforth his COM
plants were chiefly directed against
the alleged inferior quality Of his
fighting craft. He says hardly day
passed without accident to one or
more Of the ships. On March 16,
1915, he writes in disgust:
This fleet is queer sort of fam
lily. There is always something
wrong, now with one and then the
other Of them. One may consider
ones self lucky when one has got
all of them together"
These laments must be viewed in
the light of the Tirpitz memoirs.
Admiral Pohl was one Of the leaders
Of the anti-Tirpitz party, and his
references to the inefficiency of the
fighting units were intended to dis
credit the Grand Admiral. That the
German craft were, in fact, of ex-
cellent fighting quality is attested by
no less an authority than Admiral
Jellicoe, who had good opportunity
for observation in and after the bat
tie Of Jutland.
The revelations Of Admiral Pohl
are interesting, but must be taken
at their face value. What they
really reveal is not altogether novel
the fact that during the first
months Of the war German naval