Evening star., 1920-01-17


staff if I had but one aid the let
| ter said 'It would be hard to con-
ceive of a more complete misunder-
| standing than existed at the Navy
Department regarding what / was
confronted with.
When Gen. Pershing arrived in
France. he was accompanied by a
| nucleus staff of more than eghty
officers. The term not available
tivities of vastly less Importance
than the command of American naval
forces in the war zone" Admiral
Sims said.
Benson Cables Sims.
Admiral William S. Benson. former
chief of operations. cabled Admiral
Sims that there was much discussion
in the United States regarding his
complaints about not receiving aid
from the Navy Department. and told
him to send a strong statement" of
the situation, the letter said.
although war with Germany had
been imminent for many months,
there was no policy formulated in ad-
vance. SO far as the commander in
European waters was informed" Ad-
miral Sims letter said, "and no policy
was announced until three months
after war was declared"
Admiral Sims Letter.
summary of Admiral Sims let
ter follows:
The above brief account of the
manner in which our naval operations
were conducted clearly shows that the
following grave errors were commit
ted in violation of the fundamental
military principles; and it is mani
testify desirable that such violations
should be avoided in the future:
Il. Although war with Germany
ho6 i'm, airn f<v- he,
prior to it's declaration, there was
nevertheless no mature plan devel-
oped or Navy policy adopted in prep
aration for war in SO far as it's COM
mander in Europe was informed.
'2 The. Navy Department did not
after war was declared-at least not
to it's representative and the COM
mander of the forces in Europe.
''3. The Navy Department did not
enter Fundamentally into the cam
paign for many months after we de-
clared war. thus putting great strain
upon the morale of the fighting
forces in the war area by decreasing
their confidence in their leaders
"a. The outbreak of hostilities found
many important naval units widely
dispersed and in need of repairs be-
fore they could be sent to the critical
area. Destroyers arriving in the war
zone had been cruising extensively off
our seaboard and in the Caribbean,
| and when war was declared were
rushed through brief and inadequate
preparation for distant service.
Principle Violated.
IS. During the most critical months
of the enemy's submarine cam
paign against the allied lines OF
3. communication the department violat-
ed the fundamental strategical prin-
ciple of concentration of maximum
! force in the critical area of the con-
fict.
&c. The departments representative
with the allied admiralty was not sup
! ported during the most critical months
of the war. either by the adequate
personnel or by the adequate forces
that could have been supplied.
"7 The departments commander
in the critical area of hostilities was
never allowed to select his principal
subordinateS, and was not even con-
, suited as to their assignment. A
fundamental principle of the art of
command is herein involved.
IS. The Navy Department made and
acted upon decisions concerning oper-
ations that were being conducted
5000 miles away when conditions
, were such that full information could
not have been in it's possession. thus
violating an essential precept of war
fare that some decisions necessarily
depend upon complete information.
"COuld Not BE Carried Out"
80. Instead of relying upon the
/ judgment of those who had had actual
/ war experience in this peculiar war
! fare the Navy Department, though
| lacking not only this experience, but
also lacking adequate information
. concerning it, insisted upon a num-
| Der of plans that could not be carried
| out.
40. Many of the departments ac-
| tions SO strongly implied a conviction
! that it was the most competent to
| make decisions concerning operations
| in the war zone that the result was
| an impression that it lacked conf
| dence in the judgment of it's repre-
| sentative on the council of the allies
! and it's responsible commander in the
! field
| "Should Indicate Confdence.o
1T is fundamental principle that
every action on the part of superior
authorities should indicate confidence
in subordinates. If such confidence is
Hacking it should Immediately be re-
stored by ruthlessly changing the
subordinate.
I'll. To interfere with the COM
mander in the field or afloat is one
| of the most common temptations to
the government-and is generally
disa strous.- Influence of Sea
Power Upon History, Mahan.
The Navy Department did not re-
sist this temptation. and it's frequent
violation of this principle was the
most dangerous error committed dur
ing the naval war"
"Especially Flngrnn Case Cited.
In his testimony yesterday afternoon
/ Admiral Sims said that only 2IS
recommendations out of 440 were not
changed by the department He went
into detail as to several cases. citing
as especially f1agrant" that of Com
mander J. w. Babcock. his persona
, Continued on Page 2. Column 10