Evening star., 1920-01-18

x
adress on Ameficanism to the bureau
n Of Independence to emphasize HIS
illfam McNeir, chief OF the bureau OF
lte; Secretary Lansing and Wilbur C
by the departments Leahng directly
from Washington by European naval
officials in Europe, without using Its
own representatives there to inves-
tigate conditions at the front, discuss
all details with the allied navies and
thus Co ordinate effort.
Action on Naval BASES.
For example. on May 8, without
previous explanation, the department
announced it's intention to establish
naval bases at Bordeaux and Brest,
although on May it had been in
formed of the results of confer
ence with the French naval authorl-
ties and their agreement that our
forces should remain concentrated at
that time in the area Of greatest en-
emy activity.
caused by the dealing with repre-
sentatives of foreign countries sta
toned in America who made inde-
pendent and strenuous demands for
ships, coal and. other supplies, etc,
without reference to the demands or
necessities Of others The depart
ment thus ignored its own repre-
sentative. who was manifestiy abroad
for the paramount purpose OF :nveSti-
eating the details of all such re-
ferences with the allied navies, their
relative merits, and particularly their
relation to the ecessities of the anti
submarine campaign.
'I realized, OF course, that correct
policy would have placed a heavy re-
nu&e.tk, hlrf Inn.
possible to decide such questions eff
GENTLY and rapidly without access to
all the Information, and without oppor-
tunity for personal conferences, either
this policy should have been adopted or
else the person or persons in Washing
such matters from a distance should
have been transferred permanently to
headquarters in Europe, where personal
contact, all available information and
continuous conferences would have been
possible.
lnsfstenee ON New Plans.
There was insistence by the Navy
Department upon finding new naval
plans-a royal road to victory-such
as blockading the enemies ports.
The objection to radically new plans
was that, the situation was critical
striking quickly with all available
forces. This inMstence assumed tina.
the departm ent, incompletely inform
ed as it necessarily was, and without
previous experience in the war, was
more competent to decide upon prac-
tica1 plans than their own represen-
tatives in continuous conference with
the leaders of the allied navies, who
had nearly three years experience.
This attitude was maintained until
n hn nd to
Atlantic fleet and the chief of naval
operations had visited Europe and
learned something Of the situation.
During the first year of the war
the department refused to permit me
to enroll In the naval reserve capable
Americans who had special knowledge
and who offered their services. Many
of these men possessed special Eu-
ropean experience which could not be
obtained at home. Some of them felt
SO impelled to do their part that they
actually returned to the United States
in order that they might be enrolled
there.
Throughout the war the depart-
ment refused to trust to my discre-
ton in the promotion Of reserve Of
hcers. both for gallantry in action
with the enemy and for conspicuous
ability. Many of these officers were
performing services the value OF
which was out of all proportion to
the rank they held, and were far
Junior to the corresponding officers Of
allied services with whom they neces-
sarily worked.
This was not only a grave in|ns-
tice to these fine men. but this policy
deprived me of the great adyanta 90
of increasing the morale of nv forces
by prompt rewards; instead 1t Obliged
me to assume the attitude of indif-
ference to their demonstrated inertia
thus inevitably decreasing their
morale.
Message From Secretary.
I'm the course Of time. in the ninth
month after our entry into war. the
lack of support referred to above, par
ticu1arly in respect Of the lack Of
adequate personnel for necessary
stan dusies aDrTad Tad. became known in
my attention by the following cable
message from the Secretary of the
Navy to me:
":At House committee hearing Of
conduct of Navy. Representative Brit
ton said: II would like to have COP
les Of complaints which have come
from Admiral Sims on the other side I"
If you desire to make statement OF
action OF department in reference to
sending and supplying force under
your command Sinco war began please
send in code
ALSO a cable from the chief OF op-
erations reached me as follows:
Effort being made to create i'm
preston you have been hampered by
failure Of Navy Department to meet
your request for various things, par
ticularly personnel. feel tha. a
strong. positive statement from you
on this subject is highly desirable >
This was signed Benson
"I was thus confronted with q
situation, not uncommon in warfare,
that demanded decision that no
military commander should hesitate
to make-that is. such a decision as
would be most likely, while avoiding
conflict. to advance the common
cause through the loyal support Of
superior authority by making the
best Of existing conditions, no matter
how unsatisfactory. AS the subject
was ono the public discussion Of
which in Congress would have sup
piled valuable information to the en-
emy, not to mention Increasing his
morale and decreasing that Of our
own lighting forces. II was mani
testify desirable that II should be dis
couraged. and particularly that no
information should be supplied that
.Siii y