The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1920-11-05

ldlH O1 T TdliCe 4OI LAS TeCOTu OI ltkS Knights of Columbus Lafayette-Metz pilgrimage.)
 The famous French marshal con- ducting the Knighst of Columbus orable visit to France, delivered this authoritative and intensely interesting account of the appalling battles of Verdun-which fort he commanded throughout it's defence:
 There is not a single point of this vast battlefield which today is not re- nowned. Wherever the eye may turn it meets with hills or valleys whose and to which heart moving memories will ever be attached.
 Thus, on an occasion like this when- I come 10 evoke some phases of the conflict engaged here to have this an- cient stronghold and with 1t France herself, and with France an entire civilization founded upon fra ternity and civic justice, my thoughts must, of necessity return filled with thankful admiration to the heroic defenders of Verdun.
 On this very spot, your own am bassador pronounced certain words grateful to French ears and which would like to recall to you: The walls of the fortress'' said he, ''wcre less firm than the French breasts that de- tended them." It is because the SOL diers of Verdun were worthy of such a eulogy as this, because their forti- tude has today become an eternal symbol, that I feel autnorized-1 who was called to the honor of command ing those who fought hereto briefly retrace some portion of their exploits.
 And why at Vcrdun?
 During the campaign of 1915 the Germans had maintained upon the western front a purely defensive atu- tude, while in Russia and in Servia. thanks to an imposing hume erical superiority their arms were able to ob tain an important gain of territory.
 But these eastern successes had not resulted in disarming the Russian ad- verSary with vast spaces behind him which gave margin to his retreat, nor had the German victories availed to discourage the Serbs who with in domita ble energy and patriotism were preparing to take their place once more upon the battle front in the ranks of the Franco-British forces in Salonica.
 Nevertheless Germany was in des- peratc need of a rapid decision of the conflict. Her people were impatient to have done with a war which en- tailed upon the civil population priva- tions of so serious a nature. The question naturally arose wheth- CT it would be more advisable to re double the attacks against Russia, or, on the contrary, transport the centre of offensive activities to the Franco British front.
 This second solution was the one eventually adopted, not only with a view of striking a final blow against l the most important of her adversarleS, i but also in order to avoid the danger 1 ous risk of engaging toward the east l in a too formidable enterprise which
 might cause a violent and perflous | offensive reaction upon the western front. For it must be remembered | that the operations recently under ] taken by the allies in Champagne had
 proved, thanks to the new methods | employed by the French command, a | rupture of the German fortified line | entailing most serious consequences l was no longer that an impossible con- | tingency.
 Thus, it having been admitted that | the future German offensive should be i made upon French soil it remained to | decide upon the ultimate point of at- tack. Was it to be Paris or the chan
 neI ports?
 l Such objectives as these, possessed l both material and moral advanta ges | of a kind to tempt aggressive strategy; 1 but, in spite of this, it was Verdur 1 which was eventually selected as the | object of the great German attack 1 Two motives doubtless contributed 1 largely to this choice: the presence o1 l commanded in the Verdun sector, an6 1 also, certain technical advantages ! which this terrain offered to offensive | action.
 | Powerfully equipped as he was, ou1 enemy benefited by all the assets | which an army occupying the arc of 2 | circle possesses over the rival force | which finds itself obliged to hold :
 In the enemy's opinion such a posi-
 ton should enable the German higf command to carry on a policy of wear
 ing out their foe with but sligh | losses to their own army, and thu: | bring the war to a successful close l They perhaps hoped with good luck 1 to be able to capture or throw int the Mouse large quantities of French oI tn in
 disadvantageous posture of those wht
 have river at their back. As for tht | far reaching moral effect of such z | victory, Germany felt well able tt
 create a general sentiment on the i'm
 portance of Verdun once that the at
 tack was launched. Cleverly organ
 ized propaganda would prepare pres
 and public to hail the fall of the bul
 wark of our ancient Lorraine Bis
 hopric as the very symbol of victory
 AS you know, the announcement O
 the coming French catastrophe wa
 spread by German agents over tn | length and breadth of the United States and the expected victory
 would, it was declared, lead to tn complete defeat of the allied cause ant bring about the immediate signatur
 It is this battle which I now de scribe.
 Lasting for many months; we foun' ourselves during the first phase, night
 
 succeeded nevertheless in reslsuni
 long enough to reach the turnln point; were able eventually to tax
 the offensive and to win on the yer
 ground where the enemy had hlnsei l provoked the combat. The frencl 5 general who commanded the region 0 , Verdun, that is to say the porCon o the front and rear formations com l prehended between Avocourt an
 Saint Mihiel, disposed in all put Q 5 nine divisions Two were on the lef
 hand bank of the river; two on tn
 Mouse heights, right bank facln , north; the rest in the plains Of tn t Woevre and in a more southerly dl rection on the northern angie or Tn Saint Mihiel salient To these nm = I divisions were soon to be addeo tW l divisions of the goth Army corp: f which the high command had mast l ened into the zone of Bar-ie,Duc f be detrained. The Germans had al
 ready lined. up in this sector. or eis
 held prepared to intervene 1mneal : ately twenty divisions.
 e In February the French front
 the left bank of the Mouse passed the vicinity of Vauquois. north or AVG i -fh