New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1920-05-10
The Fall of Kiev

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The fall of Kiev has indicated
Pilsudski's strategy against the Boil
shevists. He had confidence in the
fighting quality Of the new Polish
armies, and realized more clearly
than many of his critics in Western
Europe the inefficiency of the Trotzky
military machine. Military repre-
sentatives Of the British govern
nent are said to have advised
strongly against a Polish offensive
in the Ukraine, on the ground that
success there was improbable and
that a reverse might be followed by
new Soviet attack further north.
Such apprehensions ignored the
fact that, after the manner of Lu-
dendorff, Trotzky had loudly adver-
tised a Soviet victory offensive in
the region west of Smolensk and
Mogilev, and that that effort had
completely failed. The Red armies
suffer from poor transport service
and weak staff organization. They
could defeat Denikine and Yude-
mitch, because neither Of these ALL
Russian leaders was at the head of a
disciplined, we'll equipped and de-
pendable force. The advantage in
morale and training was rather with
Trotzky's selected groups of mer-
cenaries. But these mercenaries
Let's, Chinese, Coreans and others
are inferior to the Poles in intelli-
gence and military skill. Though
they were hurried to the Kiev front
and evidently fought bravely there,
they could only delay for week or
more the inevitable Red retirement
beyond the Dnieper.
Pilsudski's political strategy has
been equally brilliant. Poland was
long at war with the Ukraine over
the disputed title to Eastern Ga
licia and the Province of Cholm.
But the resurgence Of Soviet power
after Denikine's collapse threatened
Ukrainia as we'll as Poland. Simon
Petlura, the Ukrainian nationalist
leader, was forced by the Soviet in
vaders to take refuge in Poland.
There he reached an understanding
with the Warsaw government, in ac-
cordance with which Ukrainian indie
pendence is to be reestablshed under
Polish protection.
The Ukrainian nationalists have
less to fear from Poland than from
Russia. And it is to the ADVANTAGE
of the Ukraine to enter into closer
economic and political relations with
Poland and with the Western DOW
ers which have revived the ancient
Polish state. If Pilsudski and the
Petlura group work in harmony, for
getting past differences, Lenine will
probably have to abandon all of
Southwestern Russia. He will be
busy enough defending Moscow.
If need be, Pilsudski could proba-
bly, take Moscow without very
great effort. Ludendorff says in his
book that he could have seized Mos
COW at almost any time in 1918.
using a few German and Austro-
Hungarian divisions in cooperation
with Ukrainians and Cossacks. The
Polish troops are much better than
any Ludendorff had in Russia after
the winter Of 1917-'1S. A Polish
march on Moscow through Smolensk
would involve no extraordinary DIFF
ficulties. But Pilsudsl1's immedi-
ate task will probably be to free the
Ukraine and to open communication
between Poland and the Black Sea.
In doing this he will contribute ma
terially toward stabilizing the Rus
Sian situation and forcing the Soviet
regime, or some regime which dis
places it, to sue for a reasonable
peace.