Iowa County democrat. [volume] (Mineral Point, Wis.) 1877-1938, 1920-01-29


by France and Great Britain.
"Signed FOCH.
''MILNER.
"PERSHING."
Raised Delicate Questions.
The various proposals during these
conferences regarding priority Of ship
ment, often very insistent, raised ques-
tons that were not only most difficult
but most delicate. On the one hand,
there was a critical situation which
must be met by immediate action,
while, on the other hand, any priority
accorded a particular arm necessarily
postponed the formation of distinc-
tive American fighting force and the
means to supply it. Such force was,
in my opinion, absolutely necessary to
win the war. A few of the allied rep
resentatives became convinced that the
American services of supply should not
be neglected but should be developed
in the common interest. The success
of our divisions during May and June
demonstrated fully that it was not
necessary to draft Americans under
foreign flags in order to utilize Amer
lean manhood most effectively.
When. on March 81, 1918, the Ger
man army on the western front began
it's series of offensives, it was by far
the most formidable force the world
had ever seen. In fighting men and
guns it had a great superiority, but
this was of less Importance than the
advantage in morale, in experience. in
training for mobile warfare. and in
unity of command. Ever since the COL
lapse of the Russian armies and the
crisis on the italian from in the fail
of 1917 German ar1HipS ore hen" -
sonohIod and troinnd f0r no 'rs.> =
paign which was to end the war before
Americas effort could be brought to
bear. Germany's best troops, her most
successful generals and all the expert
ence gained in three years Of war were
modified for the supreme effort.
The first blow fell on the right Of
the British armies, including the juno
ton of the British and French forces.
Only the prompt cooperation of the
French and British general headquar-
tiers stemmed the tide. The reason for
this objective was obvious, and strik-
ingly illustrated the necessity for hav-
ing some one with sufficient authority
over all the allied armies to meet such
an emergency.
Reserves Were Lacking.
The lack of complete cooperation
among the allies on the western front
had been appreciated and the question
of preparation to meet a crisis had
already received attention by the SUI
preme war council. A plan had been
adopted by which each of the allies
would furnish a certain number of d.
visions for a general reserve to be I'M
der the direction of the military repre-
sentatives of the supreme war council,
of which Gen. Foch was then the
senior member. But when the time
came to meet the German offensive in
March these reserves were not found
available and the plan failed.
The situation resulted in a con-
ference for the immediate considera-
ton of the question of having an al
lied commander in chief. After much
discussion, during which my view IA
voring such action was clearly stated,
an agreement was reached and Gen
eral Foch was selected. His appoint
ment as such was made April and
was approved for the United States
by the president on April 16.
The grave crisis precipitated by the
first German offensive caused me to
make hurried visit to General Foch's
headquarters at Bombon, during which
all our combatant forces were placed
at his disposal. The acceptance of
this offer meant the dispersion of our
troops along the allied front and a
consequent delay in building up dis
tinctive American force in Lorraine,
but the serious situation of the allies
demanded this divergence from our
plans.
On March 81 approximately 100000
American troops had reached France.
Four combat divisions. equivalent in