New-York tribune., 1920-03-14
tory of War Told in Field Marshal Haig's Repo1
British Staff Kept Faith With
the Public and Described
Conditions as They Were

savagely by continuous contact IVA :
restricted territory.
Pounding the Germans
The British armies, aided BY ,,..
French divisions, delivered . =.
series Of locally successful .tt...''
The German defense had to end,,.
a pounding whose severity and !.
moralizing character Ludena.-.
frankly admits in his memoirs. b.
the German line held, and within -
months the Germans were s..s
again in the Lys Valley and N ~
outskirts Of Ypres.
Haig's losses in Flanders and Il.
necessity Of sending several dr..
sions to the Italian front in ",
venaber, 1917, had the unfortup,s
effect Of preventing a proper ~,
ploitatfon Of the striking Brit;k
success in Cambria. There S..
Julian Byng's Sd Army bnl..
clear through the German line brs
for lack Of reserves it couldn't fal
low up its advantage. II it h,s
done 80, "What would have b...
tho Judgment on the Italian cans
paign?" asks Ludendorff. Cambr,.
was tho great Allied opportunity on
the West front in 1917. But 4
came after the attrition of Am,
and Flanders had sapped BritM
fighting strength. And the lous
of 1917, not made good BY IN
home government, led, few months
later, to the great disaster wheb
overlook the 9Th British Army v.s.
Of St. Quentin.
Admission was made IN parl,.
ment by a spokesman for the eov.
ernment that Haig's report on h,
German offensive of 1918 was no,
printed in It's original form. BIT,
what was printed makes 1t elem
enough that the British armies n
France had dangerously EXTENDED
their lines to the south, in accord.
ance with an agreement with IL.
French government, and that 10,
lack Of reinforcements the divisions
had to be reduced from thirteen
battalions to ten battalions. One
of the inevitable consequences Of
the attrition policy Of 1917 was
thus lodged by the British War
Office and the way was opened for |
the destruction Of the weak 9Th
Army.
The Americans Arrive
The United States began to rush
troops to Europe only after this
blow had fallen. They arrived In
masses to constitute tho
strategic reserve, without who's.
presence Foch could hardly hays
stopped Ludendorff's mass drives q
1918 and undertaken his victonms
offensive. The American
armies saved the day on the Western
front. This timely reinforcement
vas the decisive factor in Allied
'uccess-not the Allied attrihoa
policy Of 1915 and 1917, for Che [
attrition policy would have fale
absolutely to guarantee victory y
france and Great Britain had been
eft to fight the war to 3 finish ud-
lided.
The war on the Entente side, N
act,. took on the character Of 'sut
'reat battle" only after Allied unit.
II command was achieved by ths
4ppointment Of Foch as generals.
imo. From that day on-Marehs
9, 191S-Allied strategy became e-
rdinated and effective. One mind
nd one authority could do whE
catered command had never been
quail to doing. 1t is to Haig's great
redit as soldier that in the Marth
risls he advised a unifcation a
'hich British opinion had loug
alked. In his introduction, Marshsl
och says Of this generous act q
elf lf-effacement:
och's Tribute IL
Was it not the insight of sn ss''
'erienced and enlightened cona'l |
nander which led him LHaigl to m
ervene, as he did. with hts own GOV
'rnment on March "a, 1913, and
With the Allied governments assem-
lied at Doullens on March rs, to the
md that the French and the British
rmies might at once be placed Hsassss
single command, even though 9lss
ersonal position should thesesy
uFer? In the events which FOLLOWED
Id he not prove that he was ab'ss
Ii anxious to anticipate and m9ssp ;
a perfect harmony with the genera
l!iied plan, framed by the new
upreme Commando On this poins