The diamond drill. (Crystal Falls, Iron County, Mich.) 1887-1996, 1920-01-10


IN order 10 hinder the enemy's ~
quest Of Russia and. n possible. pre-
vent German attack on Italy. or In
the Near East. the allies sought 10
maintain the offensive on the western
front as far as their diminished
strength and morale would permit.
Notwithstanding these allied attacks
on the western front. the immense
gains by the German armies IN the
east. eliminating AT Riga on Sept. 3.
precipitated the collapse OF Russia.
The following months. the Austrians--
with German assistance surprised the
Italians and broke through the lines at
Caporetto. driving the Italian armies
back to the Piave river. infiicting a loss
or 100000 men, 100000 rifles. 5000
guns, and enormous stores. This serI-
Gus crisis compelled the withdrawal Of
ten French and British divisions from
the western front to Italy. The Ger
man situation on all other theaters was
so favorable that as early as Novem-
her they began the movement OF dlvi-
sions toward the western front. II
needed her divisions could he with
drawn from the Italian front before
the French and British dared recall
their divisions
AT first the allies could hardly hope
for a large American army. Marshal
Joffre during his visit to America had
made special request that combat
division be sent at once 10 Europe as
visual evidence OF our purpose 10 par
ticipate actively In the war, and also
asked for engineer regiments and other
special service units.
The arrival of the first division and
the parade of certain ~ It's elements In
Paris on July caused great enthusi-
assn. and for the time being French
morale WAS stimulated. Still. allied
apprehension was deep-seated and ma
terial assistance was imperative.
Outlook Dark for 1918.
A review OF the situation showed
that with Russia out OF the war the
central powers would be able to release
large number OF divisions for service
elsewhere, and that during the spring
and summer Of 1918, without interfer-
Ing with the status quo at Saloniki.
they could concentrate on the western
front force much stronger than that
OF the allies. In view of this IL was
represented ~ the war department In
December ~ of the utmost Importance
that the allied preparations be expe-
dited.
My conclusion was that. although
the morale of the German people and
been for two years, only an mtoward
combination of circumstances could
give the enemy decisive victory he
fore American support AS recommend
ed could be made effective, provided
the allies secured unity of action.
However. " situation might arise WHICH
would necessltate the temporary use OF
all American troops Ia the units of our
allies for the defensive, hut nothing In
the situation justified the relInqulsh-
ment of our firm purpose TO form our
own army under our own fisg.
While the Germans were spractlcing
for open warfare and concentrating
their most aggressive personnel In
shock divisions. the training of the
allies was still limited 10 trench war
fare. As our troops were being trained
for open warfare there was every rc1-
son why we could not allow them to be
scattered among our allies. even by az
visions. much less as requirements. cx-
cept by pressure or sheer necessity.
ANY sort OF permanent alaalgamaiion
would irrevocably commit Americas
fortunes 10 the hands OF the allies.
Moreover. II was obvious that the lack
OF homogcneliy would rcuder these
mixed divisions difficult to maneuNer
and almost certain TO break up under
stress Of defeat. with the consequent
mutual rccrimination
Again. there was no doubt that the
realization by the German people that
independent American divisions, corps,
or armies were Ia the field with deter
mined purpose would be a severe blow
To German morale aud prestige. II was
also certain that an early appearance
~ the larger American units on the
front would he most beneficial 10 the
morale Of the allies themselves.
Accordingly. the first division. on
Jan 10 1918. took over u sector north
Of Tout tie iweDiy-sixth division went
10 The SolSsons framt early In Febru-
airy; The ruriy-Sec0nd division entered
the line near Ltneville. Feb. p, and
the SECOND division near Ncrdun.
March Is. Means bile, the FIRST army
corps headquarters Major Gen. Hunter
Llggeft commanding. was organized az
Nenfchatcm on Jan. 20. and The plan
10 create an lndcp ndent American Sec
tor on to- Lorra nc front was taking
shape.
This was the situation when the
great German offensive was launched
ON March u. 1915.
Figured on - Divisions.