Gunnison news-champion., 1920-01-09

while the Russian revolution was well
under way. and BY the midsummer
Of 1917 the 0nai collapse Of that gov.
erpment was almost certain.
The relatively low strength Of the
German forces on the western front
led the allies. with much confidence.
to attempt q decision on this front:
but the losses were very heavy and
the effort signally failed. The failure
caused Q serious reaction. especially
on French morale. both 10 the army
and throughout the country. and At
tempts to carry out extensive or COM
bined operations were indefinitely sus-
pended.
Sank MIIIIons Of Tens.
In the ave months ending June %
German submarines had accomplished
the destruction Of more than $3.50. 900
tons Of allied shipping. During three
years Germany had seen practically all
her eRensives except verdun crowned
with success. Her battle lines were
held on foreign soil and she had with
stood every allied attack since the
Marne. The German general STAG
could now foresee the complete elm
ination Of Russia. the possibility Of de-
feating Italy before the end Of the
year and. finally. the campaign Of 1918
against the French and British on the
western front which might terminate
the war.
IL n..,ns ~ ..t.s ehst N>rrr.r hov,>~
Of dnai victory were extravagnnt,
either as viewed at that time or ~
viewed In the light Of history. Finan-
cial problems Of the allies were DIM
cult. supplies were becoming exhaust.
ed and their armies had suffered trs.
mendous Losses. Discouragement a.
listed not only among the civil popula.
ton but throughout the armies ~ well
Such was the allied morale that.
although their superiority on the west.
ern front during the last half Of 1915
and during 1917 amounted to 20 per
cent, only local attacks could be under
taken, and their effect proved wholly
insufficient against the German Dc.
fense. Allied resources In man power
at home were low and there was little
prospect Of materially incrsasins their
armed strength, even In the fhcs Of the
probability Of having practically the
whole military strength Of the Central
Powers against them in the spring q
1914
This was the stAts Of Affairs that ex.
listed when Ne entered the war. While
our action gave the allies much eoceurs
asement. yst this was Temporary. and
q review Of couditisas made It appaf.
ent that America must make supreme
material effort ~ soon - possible.
After duly Considering the tonnage Pc.
abilities cahlsd the following -
washingteu o. July 9. 1917:
"Plans should contemplate sendins
over At least 100000 men By next
Nay" 4 general organisation projset,
covering ~ far ~ possible the person-
ael of Ill combat. stan end adminis.
trative units. was forwarded to Wash
ington on July II. In this stated:
NssSsS 100000 Msr.
TT u evident that Q force Of about
100000 10 the smallest unit which in
modern var will BE- . complete. well
balanced and independpnt Aghting OF.
g1nixation. However. Il must b
equally clear that the adoption Of tAis
die force ~ q basis Of study should
not Be construed % representing the
maximum force which should be sent
to OF which will be needed In France.
Il 10 taken ~ the force which may b
expected to reach France IN dine for
IN ofReadve IN 1918. and - Q unit and
basis ef crganixation. Plans fer TIE
future should b based. especially IN
rsference to ths manufacture q arttl-
lery. aviation and other material. %
tAree times this foree- Q. at least
100000 men.
Aseelved IN IN oneneive.
Before develeping plans fer Q lins ef
eomDunicatioos II was necessary -
decide upon the probable sector Of tAs
front for the eventual employment Of Q
listinctivs Americas force. Our mis-
slou WAS oRensive and lt WAS essential
70 make plans for striking tie enemy
where q de1nlts military decision
could - eAined while the allied
armies had eaAesvored b maiDtAin tAe
sIsnsive. tie Dt1tish. b order 10 gaara
~ eAanasl pertA Wse es0nitted -
opesat1eos d Hlandess anl tie treneA
- IL PORTION u ~ fsuat pevtoes1ne
Para Dsth lacke0 noeps = epsfafs
e1ssWAese . laEUs scale.
n ~ east ~ great 6eet1oe1 -.
nset sast ce vsrdun as1 azssn1 ~