The New York herald. [volume] (New York, N.Y.) 1920-1924, 1920-12-18

even when their ships were seriously
hammered"
When Beatty and Jeilicoe finally
around to go southwark again there
was confusion. They came up
twelve minutes sooner than expected,
resulting In a confused deployment
manoeuvre in the course of which one
whole British battle squadron was cut
OF from it's objective because of inter-
vention by It's own battle cruisers be-
tween 1t and the enemy.
Up to this time Jellicoe admits, the
Germans had by far the best OF 1t. THE
disturbing feature OF the battle cruiser
actions" the report states. was the fact
that five German battle cruisers engage
ing six British vessels OF the same class.
supported after the first twenty minutes,
although at great range. by fire from
four battleships OF the Queen Elizabeth
class, were yet able to sink the Queen
Mary and the interchangeable"
He attributes this to the indifferent
deck and turret arnor of the British
cruisers, and the unexpected speed of
the Germans. whose vessels although
officially designed as having a speed of
twenty and one-half knots, ouSsteamed
the Queen Elizabeth class supposedly
uOiIlB twenty-five hnOLS. II Wd6 dt ILLS
juncture that the grand fleet came up
under the confused conditions men
toned, and no sooner had they deployed
than the Germans turned off fiinging
back a supposed torpedo attack under
O. smoke screen.
Jellicoe then gave another OF his mucn
criticized orders He turned off to avoid
torpedoes instead of turning in. and al
though this. he says. was In pursuance
of carefully worked out plans for meet
ing such a contingency, and although
ne did avoid a score or more torpedoes
whose wakes became visible. he lost nj
teen precious minutes during which the
enemy drew away as the light grew less
II was at this junctuTe that Beatty
again appealed to have the battleships
follow In with him. There was some
further delay in communicating the
order to the King George ", and when
that vessel attempted to follow Beatty
It was too late.
Up to this time the Germans had the
advantage due to their better use Of
signals, the fact that the light favored
them slightly and because of their ex-
cellent gunfire and speed. Here began
the second phase Of the battle when Jel-
licoe should have shattered them-and
they got away.
to cut off the head German column,
while Jellicoe bore down between them
and their base. But Jellicoe himself adj
mits the superiority Of the night work
OF the German fleet. Their signals and
means Of Identification were admirable"
he says. while ours were almost nil"
The screen Of destroyers which Jelli-
coe dropped astern to meet every con-
tingency In the event the Germans at
-Ax.sl ,t.l tka.
function, but the Germans SO jammed
the air with their own wireless that
when the destroyer Faulkner reported
the presence Of the German cruisers the
message never registered with the flag
ship.
The main body OF the German fleet
crossed Jellicoe's rear, while the other
body apparently crossed Beatty's rear,
and when dawn came at In the morn
ing they successfully reentered the mine
fields, and both British commanders
were compelled to give up hopes of COM
pleting the task they had hardly begun
the night before.
"One feature" said the report, was
the large number of torpedoes crossing
our line without effect. except on the
Marlborough. All were avoided by skill
full handling except that single one"
The Marlborough lodged seven torpedoes
before being struck
As to the German losses the report
stated: II estimate the enemy losses in
vessels sunk as three battle cruisers.
two battleships, one vessel of the Pom
mern class, two light cruisers and three
destroyers. and as severely damaged two
battle cruisers and several light cruisers
and destroyers."
Answering criticisms that he should
have continued the battle when he had
the Germans at a disadvantage at night
fall Admiral Je,liooe said: II rejected
at once the idea of a night action be-
tween heavy ships as leading to possible
disaster, owing, first, to the presence of
torpedo craft in such large numbers, and,
second. the impossibility of distinguish
Ing between our own and the enemy
ships. and, further. that the result OF a
night action under modern conditions
must always be very largely matter
Of pure chance"