Evening star., 1920-02-15
The Victory at Sea z ~ Azs:;:r s::s::

"HE greatest advantage which the
new listening devices of our
Navy had over those of other
navies was that they could more
efficiently determine not only the sound,
but also the direction from which 1t
came.
After this demonstration Capt. Leigh,
who had been sent to Europe to confer
with the allied admiralties and to tes,
the American detection devices when
they were In actual uses, visited several
British naval stations. consulting with
the British officers. explaining our sound
detection devices and testing the new
appliances in all kinds of conditions.
Tho net result Of his trip was a gen.
eral reversal Of opinion on the value Of
this method Of hunting submarines. The
British admiralty ordered from the
United States large quantities Of the
American mechanisms, and also began
manufacturing them in England.
\ 4
About the time that it was shown that
th.se listening devices would probably
have great practical value. the first
''subchasers'' were delivered at New
London. Conn. AS originally planned
the subchaser type represented ono Of
the misconceptions Of the war. At the
beginning most naval officers believed
that the limitations Of the submarine
were such that 1t could not operate far
from coastal waters. Hardly any one.
except q few experienced submarine Off.
GERS, had regarded 1t as possible that
these small boats would successfully at
tack vessels upon the high seas or re.
main for any extended period away from
their base. High authorities condemned
them.
This Is hard to- realize, now that we
know so we'll the offensive possible.
ties Of submarines. but we have am
pie evidence as to what former opin-
ions were. For example, distin-
guished naval writer says that at that
time 1.-The view OF the majority Of
admirals and captains probably was
that submersible craft We're just
marvellous toys. good for circus per-
formances in carefully selected places
in fine weather. He adds that GER
tain very prominent naval men Of
great experience declared that the
submarine could Operate only by day in
fair weather; that it was practically
useless In misty weather." that it had to
come to the surface to fire Its tor
pedo: that It's crowning defect lay in
its want OF habitability": that "a
weeks peace maneuvers got to the
bottom Of the health OF oflcres and
Oan" nd that tho high the
chances COT successful attack) will be
few. and submarines will require for
their existence parent ships"
The first triumph OF Otto Weddin-
gen. that Of sinking the Cressy. the
Hogue. and tho Aboukir. did not
change this conviction, for these
three warships had been sunk in
comparatively restricted waters un-
der conditions which were very fa-
vorable to the submarine.
II was not until the Audacious went
to the bottom off the northwest coast
Of ireland, many hundreds OF miles
from any German submarine base.
that the possibilities of this new
weapon were partially understood;
for II was clear that the Audaclous
had been sunk by mine, and that
that mine must have been laid by q
submarine. Even then many doubted
the ability Of the U-boats to operate
successfully In the open sea west.
ward q the British Isles. Therefore
tho subchaser was designed to fight
the submarine In restricted waters;
Great Britain and France ordered
moro than 500 smaller (S0-foot) YES.
sells Of this type. or Of approximately
this type. built in the United states;
and. on our declaration of war, the
United States began building several
hundred of a somewhat larger type
(the 110-foot chaser) with the idea
OF using them as patrol boats near
the harb0r and coastal waters Of our
own country. '.,
Long before these vessels were fin
ished. however. 1t became apparent that
Germany could not engage In any Sc
rious. extensive campaign on this
side: II was also evident that the
subchaser had little value In convoy
work: and we were all rather doubt-
ful as to just what use we could
make Of them. The subchaser thus
became something of joke. and the
shipbuilding yards, which were con-
stantly pressed by the department