New-York tribune., 1920-09-26
By Frank II. Simonds

BY frank n. Simonds
T HERE must still be q few
n Americans who remember
A the declaration of Clemen-
ceau, at the moment when
Mr.. Wilson was setting out for
Paris, nearly two years ago,
a declaration which was, in fact, a
challenge. In substance this men,
orable utterance Of the "Tiger" was
that the system of alliances which
had resulted in the coalition, nSw
emerging victoriously from the
four years war, was to be preserved
in the treaty Of peace and after it.
1t was challenge issued in the face
Of the announcement that Mr.. Will
son was coming to Paris to establish
3 new world order.
Unfortunately Tor Clemenceau,
his challenge led to diplomatic re-
verse. Great Britain had deter
mined In advance to mold it's policy
at Paris to accord with American,
In so far as American purpose did
not conflict with vital British in
terests, as, for example, in the mat
ter Of the freedom Of the seas. {"
While Mr.. Wilson was still On the
seas, then, the British determined to
support his League of Nations, and
thus, at the decisive moment when
the peace conference opened, the
French Premier found himself iso-
lated. He had either to play '1one
hand" or conform to the policy
adopted by the two Anglo-Saxon
powers.
Caomenceau Compromised
Clemenceau conformed, not with
extreme grace at the outset, but
with q certain measure Of skill ia
the end. For the old idea of q Eu-
ropean league, made up of Britain,
France, Italy and the smaller and
newer states, Poland and Rumania,
for example, there was substituted
the new; but in accepting the
League of Nations Clemenceau gtip-
ulated and obtained Mr.. Wilson's
sanction for an Anglo-American-
French treaty Of insurance, which
was, in substance, q real alliance of
the old order, although it was more
or less disguised.
But in following Anglo-Saxon pol
icy at Paris Clemenceau was forced
to ALLEVIATE not only Italy but Bel
gium. Italy demanded that France
should support her ambitions in the
Adriatic; she offered France similar
support on the Rhine. Belgium de-
manded French support, not alone
IN the matter Of making Brussels the
headquarters Of the League of Ma
tions, but in the far more impor-
tant matter Of territorial rearrange-
ments with Holland, which should
give her free outlet by the Scheldt
and protected flank upon the
Meuse. Both Of these were vetoed
by the Anglo-Saxons, the Ameri-
cans, or, rather, President Wilson.
imperiously insisting upon Geneva,
while the British supported the
Dutch against the Belgians In the
question Of the Scheldt estuary.
French acquiescence in Anglo
Saxon policy also led to very acute
differences with Rumania, which
was IN itself a grave circumstances
for the French, for the Runaniaus
emerged from the war doubled In
population and area and become one
OK the important military and eco
nomie factors In the new Europa.
France thus lost the friendship Of
Italy and Rumania, two fellow Latin
countries; she suffered In Belgium
and even In Poland, where she modi-
fed hsr support Of the Poles to con-
form 10 British and American
wishes.
In sum, despite his preliminary
challenge, Clemenceau actually sub
mitted TO Anglo-Saxon and Wilson
Ian leanings, stalking all on obtain
ing for France the Anglo-American
guaranty Of the treaty Of insur-
anee, which not alone gave France
protection upon the Rhine, but as
sured her American and British aid
in the collection of her indemnities
due from Germany, indemnities
which were for France a matter of
life and death.
Wilson Failure a Disaster
But the failure Of President Will
son to obtain the ratification of the
Treaty Of Versailles in the United
States Senate, the popular revolt
against the Paris promises OF the
PRESIDENT, resulted in something an.
preaching real disaster for France
ne Anglo o-Amerirao trao4rv Ho1, H.,