The Washington herald., 1920-10-31

Will Be Trained, Ohcered
And Ready for Immediate
Mobilization.
TO DEPEND ON SCHOOLS
Were al Germany's Mercy
In 1917 II Seas Open,
Says War Dept.

| tfAAdl AhE NhaN AASu NhAr so eNNh
open Germany coula have landed
force Of 1000. 900 neU on Amer
lean shores within six mon tbs after
war was declared. and that we
would have had practically n pthing
TO oppose it." the War DepsT ulent
yesterday announced a new policy
Of national defense.
such a condition" declares tn
department, must not be permitted
to occur again"
The new plan. II is stated ON
cially, provides for a trained per
sonneI sufficient to permit the mo-
biization Of 1000 900 men immedi-
ately upon a declaration OF war
So that this can be done IL is
1 first proposed TO provide through
army schools in time OF peace an
eligible list OF commanders and or
/ important STAFF officers so trained
that they shall be Immediately
available to take charge Of this i'm
mediate and complete mobilization
Of the first phase.
Depend on schools.
Upon the general service schools
states the War Department, rests
the responsibility TO produce COM
manders for higher units and the
principal stan officers for the larger
units And upon the special service
schools, and perhaps partially on the
general service schools. commanders
and stan officers for subordinate
units"
, While the War Department care
fully avoids revealing the identity
OF the nation II feels il will be
called upon TO meet IL intimstes
most strongly that it has a par
ticular nation in mind. II says:
The General STAFF has studied
this problem as its most important
work. II has reached certain den
mite conclusions which are taken as
the basis for the preparation Of
plans for the national defnse.
These conclusions are based upon
an estimate OF what a certain en-
envy or enemies might be able 10
accomplish at definite periods after
hostilities have been declared and
our plans for meeting successfully
such attempts are the basis for the
preparation OF our mobilization
plans.
Have Exhaustive Data
The studies have resulted in suf-
hcient data to determine with more
or less reliability the possible ef-
forts Of the most powerful possible
enemy and their intensity as func-
tiOn Uf the time reckoned from the
beginning OF hostilities.
Our plans for meeting such hos
tile efforts required in consequence
a corresponding increase in our
available forces: and these studies
h- 90
tion Of man power curve. showing
graphically the rate OF increase in
our organized forces required, taken
a a function Of the time reCkoned
from the beginning Of hostilities.'
The personnel OF the ranks is to
&c provided by:
First. The regular army Of sn-
proNimately So0.0Uu officers and men.
Second. The National Guard with
the increments up to and including
1924. approximately l25.000.
Third. organized reserves Of in
definite strength"
Plan Six Field Armies.
The first 1000. 600 men. il is stated.
are to be organized into SIX field
armies with the proper number ol
corps. divisions and auxiliary
troops" The plan also requires p,r-
. y
Tor subsequent mobilization All
things which canot be imDroNised ,n
reasonably short time after decIsrs-
tion Of war must therefore he pro-
Vided beforehand.
1t is also proposed by tho War
Department to provide reserve
equipment and supplies and an or
Eanization for mobilizinC the indus
tries OF the country according Q"
plans previously prepared to supply
the field forces with all manner uf
neCessarI,s before the reserve sup
plies are exhausted"
Having decided upon the supr0Ni-
mate strength Of the first mohrlizs-
ton" the War department states.
''our problem becomes more definite
las to the number OF officers that
must be provided for in time ~
peace. and this must form the basis
for development Of our school sls-
tenn
Many Omccrs Needed.
1T is not enough that the Infantry
School should produce enough quail
fed colonies TO command its own
regiments. il must qualify as many
OF its field officers and its captains
as possible for command OF reEi-
ments.
1t must also assist in the train
ing Of National Guard and reserve
/ officers for these purposes.
The army. as a result Of the war
and reorganization. is in a shattered
condition: officers are scarce. sC-
commodstions are poor, great
many new officers have to be taken
( in. Officers are trying TO get away
from the command with troops or
service with troops The policy OF
( the War Department will be to en-
courage officers in a desire for ssrv-
/ ice with troops"