Greenbrier independent. [volume] (Lewisburg, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1980, 1920-01-23

line OF communications. that between
Metz and Sedan, and covered the
bi.cE iron region. from which the en-
envy obtained the greater part Of the
iron required for munitions and ma.
teriai. The coal fields east Of Metz
were also covered by these Sarne de.
lenses. deep advance east OF Metz.
or the capture OF the Eriey region. by
th'raienin. the invasion Of rich Ger
man territory I'm the MoSelle valley
anu the Saar basin. thus curtailing
her supply OF coal or iron. would have
decisive effect In forcing 4 with
drawnl Of German troops from north.
ern France. The military and eco
monte situation OF the enemy. there
fore. indicated Lorraine us the field
promising the most fruitful results for
the employment OF our armies.
The compleXity Of trench life had
enormously increased the tonnage OF
supplies required by troops. No, only
was IT a-questnn OF providing food.
out enormous quantities of munitions
anu material We're needed. Upon the
railroads OF France fell the burden OF
meeting the heavy demands Of the
3,3oO.oOO allied combatants then en-
gagged. Ii the American army was to
nave an independent aud flexible sys-
TEN 1t could not use the lines behind
the British-Eelgium front nor those
III rear of the French front covering
Paris.
Chose the Southern Ports.
The problem confronting the Amer
lean eNpeditionary forces WAS then to
Saperimpose its rail communications
on those OF France where there would
be the least possible disturbance to
the arteries Of supply Of the two great
allied armies already in the field The
lines selected. therefore. were those
leading from the comparatively un-
used South Atlantic ports OF France
10 the northeast. where IT was bellcv-
cd the American armies could he en-
ploycd 70 the hest advantage.
For all practical purposes the Amer.
lean eNpeditlonary forces were based
on the American continent. Three thou
sand miles of ocean to cross, with the
growing submarine menace confront
ing us. the quantity of ship tonnage
that would be available then un-
known, and line of communications
by land 400 miles long from French
ports to our probable front presented
difficulties that seemed almost insur-
mountablc as compared With those Of
our allies.
In providing for the storage and dis
tributiOn Of reserve supplies an al
lowance of 45 days in the base sec
tons WAS planned. with 30 days in the
intermediate section. and - days In
the advance section. After the safe
ty of our sea transport was practical
~ assured. this was reduced TO n total
of 40 days. distributed proportiunate-
~ When the armisdce was signed all
projects for construction had been
completed and supplies were on hand
to meet the needs of 2,OOO.GOO men.
while further plans for necessary con.
struction and for the supply OF an ad.
ditional 100000 were we'll under
way.
Our Own Fighting Doctrine.
4 similar scheme was adopted in
August. 1917, for our armies, In which
the Importance of teaching through
out our forces sound fighting doc
trlne Of our own was emphasized. 1t
provided for troop training in ali units
UP to include divisions. Corps CEN
tiers Of instruction for noncOmmission-
ed officers and unit commanders Of
oil arms were established. The army
and corps schools graduated 1880
noncommissioned officers and 1876
officers.
Pending tho organization and dcvel.
opn,ent Of our own schools. Il large
number OF our officers were sent to
centcrS Of instruction Of the allied
armies. The training Of our earlier
divisions was begun in close associ-
alton with the French divisions, under
conditions set forth In the following
paragraph on divisional training:
"Trench warfare naturally given
prominence to the defensive as op-
posed to the offensive. To guard
against this. the basis OF instruction
should be essentially the offensive
both in spirit and In practice. The
defensive Is accepted only to prepare
for future offensive"
The long period Of trench warfare
had so Impressed itself upon the
French and British that they had al
most entirely dispensed with training
for omen warfare If woS tn ayni1
this result in our army and to encour-
age the offensive spirit that the fol-
lowing was published in October. 1917 ::
"The above methods to be employed
must remain or become distinctly our
own.
"All instruction must contemplate
the assumption Of a vigorous often
sive. This purpose will be empha-
sized in every phase Of training until