Iowa County democrat. [volume] (Mineral Point, Wis.) 1877-1938, 1920-01-22

while the Russian revolution was we'll
under way, and by the midsummer
of 1917 the final collapse of that gov.
eminent was almost certain.
The relatively low strength of the
German forces on the western front
led the allies, with much confidence,
to attempt a decision on this front +;
but the losses were very heavy and
the effort signally failed. The failure
caused a serious reaction, especially
on French morale, both in the army
and throughout the country, and at
tempts to carry out extensive or com
bined operations were Indefinitely sus-
pended.
Sank Millions Of Tons.
In the five months ending June 30
German submarines had accomplished
the destruction of more than 3,25O,OOO
tons of allied shipping. During three
years Germany had seer practically all
her offensives except Verdun crowned
with success. Her battle lines were
uGIu vi lOIClSu SO1l III Lax a =
stood every allied attack since the
Marine. The German general staff
could now foresee the complete elm
ination of Russia, the possibility of de-
feating Italy before the end Of the
year and, finally, the campaign of 1918
against the French and British on the
western front which might terminate
the war.
It cannot be said that German hopes
of final victory were e~xtravagant,
either as viewed at that time or as
viewed in the light of history. Finan'
cial problems of the allies were diff
cult, supplies were becoming exhaust
ed and their armies had suffered ire
mendous losses. Encouragement ex-
listed not only among the civil popula-
ton but throughout the armies as we'll.
Such was the allied morale that.
although their superiority on the west
ern front during the last half of 1916
and during 1917 amounted to 20 per
cent, only local attacks could be under
taken, and their effect proved wholly
insufficient against the German de-
Tense. Allied resources in man power
at home were low and there was little
prospect Of materially increasing their
armed strength, even in the face of the
probability of having practically the
whole military strength of the Central
Powers against them in the spring of
1913.
This was the state of affairs that ex.
listed when we entered the war. While
our action gave the allies much encour-
agement, yet this vas temporary, and
a review of conditions made it appar-
ent that America must make a supreme
material effort as soon as possible.
After duly considering the tonnage pos
sibilities 1 cabled the following to
Washington on July 6, 1917:
"Plans should contemplate sending
over at least 100000 men by next
May" A general organization project,
covering as far as possible the person
mel of all combat, staff and admins
trative units, was forwarded to Wash
ington on July H.. Ia this l stated:
Needed 100000 Men.
"It is evident that a force of about
100000 is the smallest unit which in
modern war will be a complete. we'll
balanced and independent fighting or
ganizatiOn. However, it must be
equally clear that the adoption Of this
size force as a basis Of study should
not be construed as representing the
maximum force which should be sent
to or which will be needed in France.
1t is taken as the force which may be
expected to reach France In time for
an offensive in 1913. and as a unit and
basis of organization. Plans for the
future should be based, especially in
reference to the manufacture of artil-
lery. aviation and other material. on
three times this force-i. e., at least
100000 men,"
Resolved on an Offensive.
Before developing plans for a line of
communications it was necessary to
decide upon the probable sector of the
front for the eventual employment Of a
distinctive American force. Dur mis-.
sion was offensive and it was essential
to make plans for striking the enemy
where a definite military decision
could be gained. While the allied
armies had endeavored to maintain the
offensive. the British. in order to guard
the channel ports. were committed to
operations in Flanders and the French
to the portion of the front protecting
Paris. Both lacked troops to operate
elsewhere on a large scale.
To the east the great fortified dis
trict east of Verdun and around Metz