Indiana daily times. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1914-1922, 1920-01-19
NAVAL PROBE
TO BE ASKED ON
SIMS CHARGES
Told Not to Let British 'Pull
Wool" Over Eyes He Tells
Senate Committee.
SHORT HELP FOR WEEKS

WASHINGTON, Jan. ia com
plete investigation of the manage
ment of the navy during the war
will be asked as a result of dis
closures Saturday by Admiral Will
liam T. Sims, testifying before a SEN
ate subcommittee regarding awards
and decorations, members of the
subcommittee stated.
Statements by Sims that he had been
left in London, along with one aide, for
four months after America entered the
war and that his parting orders had been
not to let the British pull the wool over
his eyes" so aroused republican mem
bers Of the Hale subcommittee that Sen
ator Mccormick. Illinois, announced that
they would go to the full committee to
get additional authority to make a
sweeping Investigation
When Admiral Sims had finished read
ing his sensational report, Chairman Hale
of the subcommittee announced that he
would ask Chairman Page of the full
committee to call a special meeting of
the senate naval affairs committee on
Monday to discuss a method of making
thorough investigation of the entire con
duct of the navy.
In his report Sims charged that al
though war had been imminent for
months before it was declared, no plan
or policy or preparation had been made
by the navy department; that it would
not announce a policy for three months
after war was declared that it did not
enter the war whole -heartedly" for some
time; that commanding officers In the
critical zone were not allowed to select
their important subordinates; that the
navy department acted in cases where It
could not have been in possession Of full
information; that It did not rely on the
Judgment of experienced men in insist
ing on plans that could not be carried
out.
Regarding the instructions he received
just prior to sailing for Europe, Admiral
Sims stated:
I'm the latter part Of March, 1917. in
response to a request from the American
ambassador in London expressing the
desire Of the British government that a
naval officer of high rank be sent to
secure the closer cooperation which our
navy department had suggested, l was
ordered abroad on barely forty eight
hours notice.
"The brief orders were delivered to me
verbally in Washington. No formal in
structions or statement of the navy de-
partments plans or policy were received
at that time, though I received the fol
lowing explicit admonition: Don't let
the British pull the wool over your eyes
1t is none of our business pulling their
chestnuts out of the fire. We would as
soon fight the British as the Germans
Sims charges in detail follow
1. Although war with Germany had
been imminent for many months prior to
its declaration, there was nevertheless no
mature plan developed or naval policy
adopted in preparation for war, insofar
as its commander in Europe was in
formed
3 The navy department did not an
nounce a policy until three months after
war was declared-at least not to its rep
respentative and the commander of the
forces in Europe.
g. The navy department did not enter
wholeheartedly into the campaign for
Aany months after we declared war,
thus putting a great strain upon the
morale of the fighting forces in the war
area by decreasing their confidence in
their leaders. ~~~-.
q. The outbreak of hostilities found
many important naval units widely dis
persed and in need of repairs before they
stIoyers arriving in the war zone had
been cruising extensively off our sed-
board and in the Caribbean and wien
war was declared were rushed through
a brief and inadequate preparation for
distant service.
20. During the most critical months Of
the enemys submarine campaign against
the allied lines of communication the
department violated the fundamental
strategical principle of concentration of
maximum force IN the critical area Of
the conflict.
Sc The departments representative
with the allied admiralty was not sup
ported during the most critical months of
the war, either by the adequate personnel
or by the adequate forces that could
have been supplied.
81. The departments commando rim the
critical area of hostilities was never al
lowed to select his principal subordi-
mates and was not even consulted as to
their assignment A fundamental princi-
pie Of the art Of command is here in
volved.
'8. The navy department made and act
ed upon decisions concerning operations
that were being conducted 5000 miles
away when the conditions were such that
full information could not have been in
it's possession, thus violating an essen
tial precept Of warfare that sound de-
cision necessarily depends upon complete
information.
FAILED TO RELY
ON EXPERIENCE.
80. Instead Of relying upon the judg-
ment Of those who had actual war ex-
perience in this peculiar warfare the
navy department, though lacking not
only this experience but also lacking ade-
quate information concerning this war
fare, insisted upon a number of plans
that could not be carried out.
10 Many of the departments actions
SO strongly implied a conviction that it