New-York tribune., 1920-05-09

sues existed, the part of wisdom woult
be to negotiate. And in all probability
China would.
But there are such issues, whole
ramltication of them. The Shantune
queton has become test case, ma
tional symbol. Out of it there spranp
up last summer and autumn the wave
OF nationalism that swept over the
whole country in the form of student
organizations, patriotic societies, pro
vlnclal alliances and the like and ex-
pressed itself in school strikes and the
antl-Japanesc boycott. Shantung now
has become matter of sentiment
rather than Of reason.
Poular opinion--rather the opinion
of that small minority of the Chinese
people that is educated enough to have
an opinion on foreign questions or to
know that fore gn questions exists
unanimous and resolute against any
parleying whatever on the subject 1t
SIMPLY wants Shantung back. 1t is in
TOO emotional state to argue out cold
ly. logically and legally how that can
be accomplished.
Moreover, the nationalistic wave is
less negative antagOnism to Japan
than positive desire to rid the coun-
try of the present government, partly
because it is militarstc and corruut,
!
fluence of the Japanese Now, there is
no doubt that the government-that is,
the Cabinet ministers. the officials gen
orally and the military men behind
them-wants to negotiate with Japan
over Shantung. Its members have said
so, though none too openly. And as
| much for that reason as for sentimental
reasons poular opinion is opposed to
negotiations.
Want KiaochOw Returned
The position of the government and
the officials is that the great desidera-
is no other practicable way except ne
gotiation. And for that contention
strong case can be made. On purely
logical considerations it is perhaps the
strongest case. But there is q deep
rooted conviction on the part of the
people that the government officials
want to negotiate because they are un-
der Japanese influence, and would profit
thereby financially and politically.
There Is an equally strong conviction
that IT the government did negotiate
it could not be trusted to carry out
the negotiations in China's interests.
That opinion is thoroughly sound.
There are few here so unsophisticated
as to believe that the delegates ap-
pointed by those who now have the
power OF appointment would do any
thing except compliantly accede to
every, Japanese condition. Kiaochow
would be eturned-nominally and in
the SHE'LL Everything in Shantung
worth keeping would be kept by Japan
except the name. And that is the chief
reason, all academic considerations
aside, why it is wisest for China not
to negotiate
The blame for such settlement. Of
course, would be not on the Japanese.
who were able to drive Il bargain favor
able to Japan, but on the Chinese. who
were willing to betray their country.
Exactly as the blame for the encroach
ments Japan has been able TO make on
Chlnese territory in recent years rests
no H1t SO much on the Japanese as on the
chinese IN official places, who have been
willing to stll their country's riches
Tor their own political and financial
enhancement. That fact, just in pass
ing, must always be borne in mind in
any consideration of the Far Eastern
SITUATION. 1t is easy TO throw mud at
Japan, but that is only half the story.
Government in DileAma
lhere is this extraordinary situation.
then: The lawfully constituted Chinese
government has decided in favor of
ihegotlatlons; 1t seeks every means to
ihaqsufate dnnh5 them, and dare not. Beyond
doubt 1T dare not. Daily there is a
mood of kilograms from all parts of
inc country demanding that the matter
oe dropped. Daily delegations come
from Shantung and other provinces 70
present the views of innumerable or
ganizations: Demonstrations have been
mace IN all large cities. The press,
even the non-Liberal press, advises
against negotiations. Blunt warning
mas been gwen that protest may be
carried to extremes of violence il Tho
goTernment does negotiate.
Inc government therefore IL in 3,
ollemma. 1t cannot answer the Jan
anese note accepting the offer Of cop-
terence. 1t does not want to ansuar
rejecting the offer-chieny because tbat
would bring down on its head the
wrath or the pro-Japanese militarists.
~ cannot answer at all And no
other poilcy is even in view. The mat
Ter IS simply standing in stslemate-
IN the meantime japan still bas
Islngtao and the outlying regions and
~ sun mas its troops along the rail
way from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu. thronph
the heart of Shantung. And il mev
eventually be able to make the n]ea ~
ITS allies that it has had to keen them
because China would not take them
back. ''No '"e'l
~, But the plea will be specious in part
mere Is something more than senti-
ment on the side Of those who opnose
negotiauons. If Japan merely wants
TO give back the territory, what need
IS there for negotiations? 1t can mere
~ Withdraw its troops. China can
move ITS administrative officers in with
IN 1orty-elght hours. What is there to
negotiate unless Japan wants to re-.
tam preferential rights to all that ia
OF value in the territory or comnensas
tlon elsewhere? 'pN'''"
Public Opinion Is Strong
In that connection it may be pointed
out that Japan has never vet made
sIralght-out unequivocal pledge of com
plete withdrawal Furthermore. there
Is TO be said on the side of the Chinese
mat by negotiating they would forfeit
the moral position they gained by NOT
signing the peace treaty, the stand they
.ook and the notice they gave that they
could not De party to other powers
nanlalhg their territory about with or
wlthout their consent Certainly To
negotiate and thereby recopnize tha
treaty, after having refused to sien Il
Is to be guilty of inconsistency.
IN any case, it is necessary for West |
ern peoples to realize the force of tbe |
issues underlying what Is on the sur
n In 81