The Leavenworth echo. [volume] (Leavenworth, Wash.) 1904-current, 1920-01-16
THE LEAVENWORTH ECHO

necessary To draft Americans under
foreign flags in order tu utilize Amer
lean manhood most effectively.
When. on March II 1918. the Ger
man army on the western front began
its series of offrnSycS. it was by far
the most Formidable force the world
had ever seen. In fighting men and
guns it had n great superiority. hut
this was Of less importance than lie
advantage in morale in experience. in
training for mobile warfare. and in
unity of command Ever since the col
lapse of the Russian armies and he
crisis on the Italian front in the fail
of 1917. German armies were hcin. as
semblcd and trained for The great cam
paign which was to end the war before
Americas effort could be brought to
hear Gcrmany's best troops, her most
successful generals and all the expert
enCe gained in three years of war were
mobilized for the supreme effort.
The first blow fell on the right OF
ton of the British ana French forces.
Only the prompt cooperation of the
French aud British general headquar-
tiers stcmmed the tide. The reason for
this objective was obvious, and strik.
ingly illustrated the necessity for hav-
Ing some one with sufficient authority
over all the allied armies to meet such
ali emergency.
Reserves Were Lacking.
The lack of complete cooperation
among the allies GA the western front
had been appreciated and the question
of preparation to meet a crisis had
already received attention by the SUI
preme war council plan had been
adopted by which each of the allies
would furnish a certain number of di-
visions for Il general reserve to be I'M
der the direction of he military repre-
sentatives of the supreme war council,
of which Gen. Foch was then the
senior member. But when the time
came to meet the German offensive in
March these reserves were not found
available and the plan failed.
The situation resulted in con
ference for the immediate considera
ton of the question of having an al
lied commander in chief. After much
discussion, during which my view ia
voring such action was clearly stated,
an agreement was reached and Gen
eral Foch was selected. His appoint
was approved for the United States
by the president on April l6
The grave crisis precipitated by the
first German offensive caused me to
make a hurried visit to General Foch's
headquarters ut Bombon, during which
all our combatant forces were placed
at his disposal. The acceptance Of
this offer meant the dispersion of our
troops along the allied front and a
consequent delay in building up a dis
tinctive American force in Lorraine,
but the serious situation of the allies
demanded this divergence from our
plans.
On March 81 approximately 100000
American troops had reached France.
Four combat divisions, equivalent in
strength to eight French or British
divisions. were available.
Took Cantieny Heights.
On April % the First division re.
lieved two French divisions on the
front near Montddicr and on May 2S
captured the important observation
stations on the heights of CantignI
with splendid dash. French artillery.
aviation, tanks and flame throwers
aided in the attack. but most of this
French assistance was withdrawn be
fore the completion of the operation
in order to meet the enemy's new of
fensive launched May - to Chateau
Thierry. The enemy reaction against
our troops at Cantigny was extremely
violent. and apparently he was deter
mined at all costs to counteract the
most excellent effect the American
success had produced. For three days
his guns of all calibers We're c0ncen
trated on our position and counter
attack succeeded counterattack. The
desperate efforts of the Germans gave
the fighting at Cantigny seeming
tactical Importance entirely out Of
proportion to the numbers involved.
The third German offensive. on May
81, against the French on the Aisne
soon developed desperate situation
for the allies. The Second division
was hastily diverted To the vicinity OF
Meaux on May 81 and early on the
morning of June was deployed