The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1920-10-26
TOPEKA STATE JOURNAL
Information Bureau
FREDERIC j. HAsKIN. Director.
Washington, d. @.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS.
The Surprise of 1919.

lncluQlng the HepuDhCdu CdnuAudles
went to bed believing that the Repub-
licans had won and woke up to find
that the reverse was the case.
All of the Republicans and many
of the Democrats seemed TO believe
that it was a Republican year, and
the whole strategy of the Republican
assumption that the Republicans
would surely win, provided they did
not commit any\egregious blunder.
The rift in the Republican ranks
caused by the detection of Roosevelt
four years before, had been ostensibly
healed. Roosevelt had lunched with
Hughes, the Republican candidate,
and had emerged with the announce
ment that he and Hughes were in
complete accord. All of the Republic
can papers announced that the Grand
Old party was once more 1laWless
unit in the battle for righteousness and
prosperity. Democratic and independ-
emit organs, however, did not fail to
remark that the Republican platform
of 1916 bore no resemblance whatever
to that of the Progressives in 1917,
and that good many Progressive
leaders were not obviously following
their late champion back into the fold
Roosevelt was cartooned as the prodi-
gal son returning home bringing his
own fatted bull moose calf with him,
and the said calf was pictured as
small and reluctant creature. Ger
tainly it was not the husky animal
that had caused so much commotton
four years before.
A Say-Nothing Campaign.
The Hughes campaign was distin-
guished by its remarkably negative
character. Never, in, fact, has such
another non-eommittal campaign been
conducted in this country, unless the
present year be considered as break
ing all previous records in that direc-
ton. Mr.. Hughes announced that he
was for undiluted Americanism, but
| both he and his supporters refrained
| from any exact definition of that
quality. He also announced himself
as in favor of very conservative
view of the presidential office, stating
that in his opinion the president was
merely the administrative head of the
government and not the leader. of his
party. He advocated a higheH tariff
| as necessary for the interests of labor,
but indicated that the making of this
tariff was up to congress and not to
him.
= The reasoning on the part of Repub-
| lican leaders which lay back of this
non committal campaign is not hard
| to guess, nor was it then employed Tor
the first or for the last time. 1t was
/ a fact admitted by all that Wilson had
raised up host of antagonisms
against himself. The prO-Germans
were against him because he had writ
ten rather sharp notes to Germany,
and the red-rag patriots and pro-alltes
were incensed that he had not de-
clared war on Germany. The Irish
were more or less peeved about his at
/ titude toward Ireland, and the Catho-
lies did not like his Mexican policy.
The professional politicians who
manage campaigns doubtless argued
/ leo hi RI n
tight and let these animosities beat
| the Democrats. 1t was not necessary,
| they reasoned, for their candidate to
| take any very positive stand, and 1t
was imperatively necessary that ne
should not provoke any antagonisms
on his own account He was chosen
| as a man of high character and fine
record whom no one had anything
| against and the big idea was to keep
him thus unsullied. Hence he was put
in a glass case of conservatism; ana
set to blowing pretty soap bubbles of
platitude and generalization, while Mr..
| Wilson and his supporters went about
the country hurting hard bricks OF
fact about what they had done and
| what they were going to do.
Arc Voters Intelligent?
This Republican campaign was
based upon an idea which is in direct
discord with the theory of Democratic
government, and has often proved TO
| be in direct accord with the facts. of
| it. The theory is that the American
voter is a person of independent Judg-
ment and good sense who votes always
| in obedience to those qualities. The
fact has often appeared to be that he
| is blinded by personal prejudice. and
votes according to his emotion of the
moment, throwing cool judgment to
the winds.
| In this case the prejudice theory did
I 90 OWL RI
| som at least offered a definite state
ment of aims. and intentions, while
| Hughes offered nothing but opposition
| to Wilson and the pleas OF party loy-
atty. No one haN ever decided exactly
what happened, but it might be said
| that when the smoke cleared away,
the Republican party was found pros
| trate on the field with the tracks OF
| the independent voters all about It.
In California. which was the decisive
state in the election. the voting was SO
| Independent and the tickets were sc
lrheavily and variously scratched that
lit took a long time to count the vote
hand many minor errors were made.
n What happened in California has
always been regarded as a mystery
Senator Hiram Johnson. running on
the Republican ticket and ostensibly
supporting Hughes, carried it for him
self by a. colossal majority. Yet it gave
a majority to Wilson for President
Some hazarded the guess that the in
dependent and progressive element
back of johnson was not wholly salts
fled with Hughes campaign. Thai
progressive vote which Roosevelt led
back to the fold did not seem to be
as large as it had been when he led
it away in 1912 The West. which
| had given Roosevelt most of his votes
in 1912 was what carried the day for
Wilson in 1916 The result seemed to
confirm what had been indicated four
Wears before-that there is really q
body Of Independent and thinking vot-
ers in the country who will not travel
in partisan leading strings, but will
follow g leader of either party if they
think he is offering something definite
Labor Makes Political Progress.
Next to this emergence of an in
dependent vote, perhaps the most in
lteresting thing was the participation OF
labor in the campaign 1t will be re-
that in 1QnQ r