Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-06-22
FEAR OF NEW WAR
ACTUATES BELGIUM
France, Too, Believed Get
ting Ready for Attack
by Germany.
by FRANK H. sIMoNDs.

cessful termina tien of a Franco-Bel-
CLAN military convention give unmis-
taxable evidence that the two neigh
bors most menaced by Germany are
taking no chances and losing no time
In preparing for a new German at
! tack. Moreover. the territorial re-
| auctions which Germany has suffered
as consequence of the war ma
terially. diminish the numerical su-
| perierity enjoyed by the kalser's
armies six years ago.
BY tho treaty of Versailles Bel
GUM emerged from her position of
guaranteed impotence. The events of
| ity was mere figure of speech 1t
demonstrated that Belgium would
| have to take proper precautions to
| defend herself. Had Belgium In 1914
possessed an army as large In pro-
portion to her population and as well
! trained as Switzerland 1t may be
| questioned whether the Germans
| would have ventured on the Belgian
| boulevard.
Belgium Had 100000 In 1914.
/ But in 1914 the field army of Bel
gium amounted to only 100000 in a
population of $500, 600. while Switzer-
! land was able to call twice as many
| troops with less imam nan the pop
| ulation. France and Belgium to-
gether mobilized 1.150.000 in time for
the opening campaign, which result
| ed in the defeats at the frontiers and
| the victories at the Marine and the
User. Germany sent against France
and Belgium rather more than
100000 in the first rush and several
hundred thousand more during the
weeks following the Marine. The diff
ference between the two armies was
in part bridged by the British. who
engaged 10000 at Mons, 1900 at the
by.t crisis of the battle Of Ypres
Belgium, then. had an establish
ment too small, given her dangers
and the French strength, which rep
sibility In addition. the Belgian
army acted independently and. fol-
lowing Belgian policy, retired. not
upon the allied armies, but away
from them upon Antwerp. after the
fall of Liege. This, in part. made
sible and in the end almost resulted
in the capture of the Belgian army,
which just barely escaped from Ant
werp.
Any new military convention with
France would necessarily assume two
things, a material increase in the Bel
gian army and coordination OF
French and Belgian plans. Beyond all
question the Belgian army could be
doubled in strength. and thus french
and Belgian armies would nave at
least strength of 1,250,o00 upon
mobilization BY contrast Germany,
with a population of 6S.o0O,OO0 in
1914, has not more than $4,000 0O TO-
day, and will fall to 5S.000.O00 II the
plebiscite in upper Silesia IS won by
the Poles. Since Germany will have
to keep troops in the east to watch
the Poles, it may be doubted II she
can hope to have any advantage OF
numbers in the west, even II the
British stay out
Germany Weaker ON Rhine.
But the strategical condition has
also greatly changed in the west. Ger
man military establishments have
been pushed back beyond the Rhine
and all the Notifications on potn
banks of the river destroyed More
over, the French have regained Metz.
Strasbourg and Thionville, with their
strong forts while French and not !
German representatives now operate
the Luxembourg railways. during tne
next two decades at the least, that
is until the allies have evacuated the |
ieft hank of the Rhine and the Ger
mans have time to build new 1orti- !!
fications "a course forbidden by the
treaty. of Versailles), German mopl-
lization will have to take place east
of the Rhine and the first snock rhusl
come near the river, that is Tar IN
side German territory 10
Holding Metz and Thionville, with
their network of railways ana hlsh-
ways as center, with Llege anu
Stras bourg on their TANKS, the French. !
with the Belgians, Will De IN IA
different position from that they held
six wears ago. French armies VIII
mobilize in strict conjunction with
Relgian and concentrate behind the !
Rhine. the Sarre. the Ours and the |
highlands east of Liege in the very |
first days of the war. Moreover, the
Releians in acquiring Eupen and Nal
medy have taken from the Germans |
those railroads, prepared by the Ger
mans years in advance for the great l
drive through Belgium toward Paris.
French Colonials, Million.
France and Belgium will still be |
unable to match numbers with the
Germans. but there is the French CO. |
lonial empire which supplied full
million of soldiers in the last war and |
will be capable of making FAR larger |
contribution in the future. for the CO.
lonials have fully proven their value !!
as shock troops, and the French plan |
greatly to expand their native forces
in the near future. Therefore on the |
numerical side there is little chance !
that Germany can Immediately estab-
lish any decisive advantage or nope
ed war of attrition like that which |
finally accomplished her own ruin in |
1918.
Acting in close cooperation. ia |!
vored by a greatly improved strategic !
situation. due to the extension of both |
French and Belgian frontiers and the |
transfer of Luxembourg from the Ger |
man to the French influence, there !
seems to be no reason why Belgium
and France should not be able to stop |
the next German attack between the |
Rhine and their own frontiers. even
if it is able to pass the Rhine. More |
over, in such conflict the Polish |
army would be certain to attack in |
East Prussia and Pomerania. as the |
Russians did in 1914. so Germany |
would be again faced with war on !
two fronts, nor would she have any |
such advantage in preparation as gave |
her the first successes in 1914.
England PrOblematicaI.
What Britain would do remains
problematical. The British have not
vet agreed to stand by France in case
Of a new German attack. Their prom |