New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1920-07-04

in China, say; Ching, has a right to
be consulted on whether it agrees to
such privileges.
The same question arose over the
Lansing Ishii agreement Of 1917, when
the United States recognized that be-
cause territorial propinquity creates
special relations between countries"
Japan has special interests in China"
whatever that may mean. At that
time, or rather after that agreement
was given out, China protested be-
cause it had not been consulted. And
it is difficult to challenge it's position.
What earthly right, as the Chinese see
it, did America have to concede any
Especial interest" in China to Japan
or any other country? What right did
it have to give anything Chinese to
Japan or any other country without
China's consent?
China is taking the same position
now, only more emphatlcally and CIV
ing its notice in advance. 1t is assert
ing, in short, its sovereignty. coun-
try that can be disposed of by other
powers as they see fit, no matter what
the disposal may be, is no longer a
sovereign state. 1t is vassal.
Principle Challenged
Great Britain and Japan may guar
antee China's integrity now. They
or two other powers may make q
treaty ten years from now apportion-
ing China to each other. 1t is the
precedent that counts, the principle,
and not the actual text Of the indi-
vidual treaty. China cannot let the
principle go unchallenged any longer.
There is something anomalous in the
situation, of course, because in actual
fact China is not really a sovereign
state. So long as so many of its ports
are held by foreign powers and citizens
Of other countries have the right Of
extra territoriality and foreign troops
are quartered at the legations in its
very capital, it is not in full really
sovereign. But its legal sovereignty
always has been recognized by the
foreign powers and the alterations of
territory always have been made in
emergencies, are nearly all of them
temporary leases and have been made
ostensibly in punishment for certain
acts on its part. In international law
it is sovereign state.
Also it is anomalous that while
China's own government is engaged in
forwarding Japanese aggression in
China as far as possible and sacrifice
ing Chinese sovereignty to a menacing
extent the Chinese government also
should protest to Great Britain against
the conclusion of any treaty with
Japan on the ground that it's right of
sovereignty is affected. But as the
Chinese see it, as we'll as most foreign.
ers here, the present condition is
transitory. 1t is an exigency of inter
nal Chinese politics, only the con-
toOnOr0rN mon Of ,o,.
manent i'll Of political corruption. The
essential point is that China's SOW
ereignty be preserved intact and that
no further presidents be laid for a
menace to its independence; the prin>
clple, in other words
Established in New Position
Nor is this altogether an academic
consideration. There is no doubt here
that Japan is pressing Great Britain
for recognition of it's paramountcy in
China along the same lines as it
wrested from America in the lansing
lcshll agreement-or as it thought it
wrested in that agreement.
Possibly Great Britain NAV be
moved to yield out of considerations
affecting other parts of the empire,
however much against it's will. If so
it is important that China assert it's
right to be heard before Britain does
make concessions at China's expense
purely out of its own interests. Now
that China has, it will have ground for
disputing in international law the car
rying out of any such concession when
1T comes to the test. In any event, by
its assertion China has established
Tor itself new position.