Greenbrier independent. [volume] (Lewisburg, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1980, 1920-01-23

while the Russian revolution WAS we'll
under way. and 10y the midsummer
OF lolI the final collapse Of that gov
ernmcnt was almost certain.
The relatively low strength OF the
German forces Oh the western from,
led the allies. with much confidence,
to attempt decision or this front:
out the losses were very heavy and
the effort signally failed. The failure
caused serious reaction. especially
on French morale. both in the army
| and throughout the country. and at
tempts 10 carry out extensive or COM
5ined operations We're indefinitely sus-
pended.
Sank Millions Of Tons.
In the five months ending June 30
German submarines had accomplished
the destruction OF more than 100000
tons of allied shipping. During three
years Germany had seen practically all
her offensiveS except Nertlun crowned
! with success. Her battle lines were
! held on foreign soil and she had with
! stood every allied attack since the
| Marine. The German general s1nR
| could now forcSee the complete elm
| nation of RUSSIA, the possibility OF de
| feating Italy before the end OF the
! year and, finally, the campaign Of 1918
9 against the French and British on the
western front which might terminate
| the war.
1t cannot be said that German hopes
| OF final victory were cXtravacunt,
either as viewed ut that time or ms
viewed In the light of history. Finan-
ciul problems of the allies were dill
cult. supplies were becoming exhaust
cd and their armies had suffered ire
nendouS losses. Discouragement ex-
listed not only among the civil popun-
tinn but throughout tho armies as well.
Such was the allied morale that,
although their superiority on the west
ern front durin. the last half Of 1916
and during 1917 amounted to 20 per
cent. only local attacks could be under
| taken. and their effect proved wholly
/ Insufficient against the German de-
Tense. Allied resources in man power
at home were low and there was little
prospect Of materially increasing their
armed strength. even in the face Of the
probability Of having practically the
whole military strength Of the Central
! Powers against them In the spring OF
1913.
This was the state OF affairs that ez.
| listed when we entered the war While
our action gave the allies much encour-
| agement, yet this was temporary. and
review Of conditions made 1t appar-
ent that America must make supreme
material effort as soon as POSSIBLE.
After duly considering the tonnage pos.
sibilities cabled the following TO
Washington Oh July 6. 1917:
"Plans should contemplate sending
over at least 100000 men by next
! May" general organization project,
covering as far as possible the person
| mel Of all combat, STAFF and admins
| trativc units, was forwarded TO Wash.
ingtOn on July II. In this stated:
Needed 1,oco,oo Men.
ut Is evident rhat force OF about
! 100000 Is the smallest unit which in
modern war will be a complete, we'll
balanced and independent lighting or.
! ganiZatiOn. However. II must he
equally clear that the adoption Of this
| size force as basis Of study should
! not be construed as representing the
maximum force which should he sent
to or which will be needed In France.
| II is taken rs the force which may be
expected to reach France In time for
nm offensive I'm 1913. and as unit and
basis Of organization. Plans for the
future should he based. especially iu
reference 10 the manufacture OF artiI.
lery. aviation and other material. on
three times this force--i. e" at least
5000, 600 men,"
Resolved on an Offensive.
Before developing plans for line Of
communications It was necessary to
decide upon the probable sector Of the
front for the eventual employment OF q
distinctive American force. Our mis-.
sion was offensive and It was essential
to make plans for striking the enemy
where definite military decision
could be gained. While the allied
armies had cndcavored To maintain the
offensive. the British, In order 10 guard
the channel ports. were committed to
operations IN Flanders and the French
to the portion Of the front protecting
Paris. Both lacked troops TO operate
elsewhere on large scale.
TO The east The great fortified dis
trict east Of Verdun and around Metz