New-York tribune., 1920-05-16
Peace Terms Have Not Been Com
piled With and the Allies
Can't Agree on Force

dismissed, would take up his tools,
accept the ideas and standards of
his neighbors, become as English as
the English, has broken down. The
German, in defeat as in war. re-
mains German, incomprehensible
and, on the whole, if not defiant, at
least by no means repentant.
Germany Is Unchanged
1t was an easy and a simple notion
that with defeat the bandage would
fall from German eyes, that our
enemy's wrath would turn against
his own leaders, that the German
would accept the Allied view of the
causes of the war, of the circum-
stances Of the war, would acknowl-
edge blood guilt for crimes which
shocked the Western world. But the
fact is that the German neither ac-
cepts the Western view nos, so far
as man can judge, ever will. He
has his own views of the causes, his
own convictions as to the character
of the war. He has "atrocities''
committed by his enemies to place
against their charges of crimes COM
mitted by his armies and leaders.
Thus mutual understanding be-
tween enemies has not been produced
by the Allied victory. The German
thinks about his enemies Just what
he thought of them in the beginning,
plus the evil opinions which he ac-
quired during the conflict. Mr.. Will
son was at all times seeking a "peace
of understanding" but it is about
time to recognize clearly that peace
of understanding is outside of the
possibilities. The German will not
see the war as we see it, and there
fore he will not accept our verdict as
a repentant sinner might.
New Germany Didn't Arise
Nor has any new Germany risen
from the ruin of the old regime, as
was confidently predicted. We have
no new names, no new ideas, no evil
dence Of transformation compare
bic with that France went through
when, on the news of Sedan, the |
tinsel Napoleonic structure was
swept away and the Third Republic
To be sure, the republic
was name rather than a fact, but
all that was vital and real in French
public life suddenly surged up in the
presence of supreme disaster and,
the war was irrevocably
lost, France was saved.
In the failure of new Germany
to emerge lies all the trouble of the
present situation. The way to begin
is to begin, but how can one begin?
France, justly apprehensive Of the
Germany which existed before the
war, and seeing the same men hold
ing the same places or lurking be-
hind the scenes patiently eager to
play the old parts, necessarily holds
to one theory about German policy.
Britain, seeing Germany more i'm
and it is amazing how
much clearer ones vision is when
one is out of range of the enemy's
guns, holds to another view. Italy
inclines to the British view, Belgium
to the French. The United States
has no views, officially, which can be
into fact.
Now, it is impossible for the Eng
llshnan to convince the Frenchman
that the German danger has been
because there is nothing
to prove that this view is correct and
much to controvert it. Nor is it pos
sible for the Frenchman to convince
the Englishman that Germany will
not always be exactly what she has
been from Bismarck's time onward.
For there is nothing in history to
prove that the ultimate result of the
war may not be the destruction of
German faith in violence as the most
method of national pro-
gression.
M Middle Crn,,,J