Iowa County democrat. [volume] (Mineral Point, Wis.) 1877-1938, 1920-02-05
GEN, PERSH|NC'S OWN STORY
OF OPERATIONS OF AMERICAN
TROOPS IN THE WORLD WAR
Emergency Had Passed.

Amiens salient in August had gained
such an advantage that it was ap-
parent that the emergency, which JUS
titled the dispersion of our divisions,
had passed. The moment was prOpi-
tious for assembling our divisions. The
formation Of the army In the Chateau
Thierry region and its early transfer
to the sector of the Woevre, which
was to extend from Nomeny, east Of
the Moselle, to north Of ST. Mihiel, was
therefore decided upon by Marshal
Foch and myself On Aug. 9, and the de-
tails were arranged with Gen. Petain
later on the same day.
At BombOn, on July "a, there was
conference of all commanders in chief
for the purpose of considering allied
operations. Each presented proposals
for the employment Of the armies I'M
der his command and these formed
the basis of future cooperation Of
the allies. 1t was emphatically deter
mined that the allied attitude should
be to maintain the offensive. AS the
first operation of the American army
the reduction of the salient of st.
Mihiel was to be undertaken as soon
as the necessary troops and material
could be made available.
On Aug 20, further discussion with
Marshal Foch was held at my head
quarters at Ligny-en-B arrois. At this
meeting it was proposed by Marshal
Foch that the general operations as
far as the American army was con-
cerned should be carried out IN detail
by:
(a) An attack between the Mouse
and the Argonne by the Second French
army, reinforced by from four to six
American divisions.
I'D A French-American attack, ex
tending from the Argonne west to the
Souain road, to be executed on the
right by an American army astride
the Aisne and on the left by the
Fourth French army.
To carry out these attacks the ten
to eleven American divisions suggested
for the st. Mihiel operation and the
four to six for the Second French army
would leave eight to ten divisions for
an American army on the Aisne. 1t
was proposed that the st. Mihiel op-
Grafton should be initiated on Sept. 10
and the other two on Sept. Is and 20,
respectively.
The plan suggested for the Amer
lean participation in these operations
was not acceptable to me, because it
would require the immediate separa-
ton of the recently formed first Amer
lean army into several groups, main
directly contrary to the principle of
forming a distinct American army, for
which my contention had been insist
ent. An enormous amount of prepara-
fion had already been made in con-
etruction of Eoads, railroads, regulat-
ing stations and other installations
looking to the use and supply Of our
armies on a particular front. The in
herent Discrimination Of our troops to
serve under allied commanders would
have grown and American morale
would have suffered. My position was
stated quite clearly, that the strate-
gical employment of the first army as
a unit would be undertaken where de-
sired, but it's disruption to carry out
these proposals would not be enter
tanned.
An American Army.
A further conference at Marshal
Foch's headquarters was held on Sep
TENDER 2 at which General Petain
was present. After discuss on. the
question Of employing the American
army as 6 unit was conceded. All the
allied armies were to be employed in
\ converging action.
1t should be recorded that although
this general offensive was fully out
lined at the conference no one present
expressed the opinion that the final
victory could be won in 1918 In fact,
1t was believed by the Meuse-Argonne
attack could not be pushed much be-
yOrd Monfaucon before the arrival Of
winter would force cessation of op-
erations.
The choice between the two sectors,
that east of the Aisne including the
-Argonne forest, or the Champagne
sector, was left to me. In my opinion,
no other allied troops had the morale
-or the offensive spirit to overcome
successfully the difficulties to be met
In the Meuse-Argonne sector. and our
plans and installations had been pre-
pared for an expansion of operations
In that direction. So the MeuSe-Ar-
come front was chosen. The entire
sector Of $50 kilometers of front ex-
tending from Port-sur-Seille, east of
the Moselle. west to include the Ar
gonne forest, was accordingly placed
under my command, including all
French divisions then in that zone.
The first American army was to pro-
coed with the st. Nfihiel operation,
after which the operation between the
MeuSe and the western edge of the
Argonne forest was to be prepared
and launched not later than Septem-