The daily Gate City and constitution-Democrat. (Keokuk, Iowa) 1916-1922, 1920-01-17
NAVY INVESTIGATION
WILL BE THOROUGH
Continued from page ID \

business pulling their chestnuts out of
the fire. We would as soon fight the
British as the Germans.
Sims charges in detail follow:
"1.-Although war with Germany
had been imminent for many months
prior to its declaration, there was
nevertheless no mature plan devel-
oped or naval policy adopted in
preparation for war insofar as its
commander in Europe was informed.
"2.-The navy department did not
announce a policy until three months
after war was declared-at least not
TO it's representative and the COM
mander of the forces in Europe.
, "3.-The navy department did not
enter whole heartedly into the cam
paign for many months after we de-
clared war, thus putting great strain
upon the morale OF the fighting forces
in the war area by decreasing their
confluence in their leaders. -
"AThe outbreak OF hostilities
found many important naval units
widely disposed and in need of re-
pairs before they could be sent to
the critical area. Destroyers arriving
In the war zone had been cruising ex.
tensiyely off our seabord and in the
Caribbean, and when war was de-
clared were rushed through a brief
and Inadequate preparation for dis
tant service.
"5-During the most critical
months Of the enemy's submarine
campaign against the allied lines Of
communicat ton, the department vio-
lated the fundamental strategical
principle Of concentration Of maxi
mum force in the critical area Of the
conflict.
"6-The departments representa-
tive with the allied admiralty was
not supported during the most crit
zeal months of the war, either by the
adequate personnel Or by the ade-
quate forces that could have been
supplied.
1.-THE departments commander
in the critical area Of hostilities was
never allowed to select his principal
subordinates, and was not even con-
suited as to their assignments. A
fundamental principle Of the art OF
command is here involved.
"S-The navy department made
and acted upon decisions concerning
operations that were being conducted
8 900 miles away when the condi-
lions were such that full information
could not have been in It's possession,
thus violating an essential precept of
warfare that sound decision neces-
sarily depends upon complete infor-
nation.
"9-Instead of relying upon the
judgment Of those who had had actual
war experience in this peculiar war
fare the navy department, though lack.
ing not only this experience, but also
lacking adequate information con-
corning it, insisted upon a number of
plans that COULD not be carried out.
"10-Many OF the departments ac-
tons SO strongly implied a conviction
that 1t was the most competent to
make decisions concerning operations
in the zone that the result was an inn
preston that it lacked confidence in
the judgm ent of its representative
on the councils of the allies and its
responsible commander in the field.
1t is a fundamental principle that
every action on the part Of superior
should indicate confidence
in subordinates. If such Is lacking it
should Ibe Immediately restored by
changing the subordinates. |
Tito interfere with the COM
mander in the field or afloat is one of !.
the most common temptations to the /,
is generally disas-
n