Evening star., 1920-03-14

dence Of the underlying peril
of the United States in Europe
commitments than. that which
Is supplied by the present tangle OF
European policies. Partly as a conse-
quence of the course of the United
States Senate, in delaying action on
the treaty, but far more as a result
Of the natural developments OF Euro
pean policy, the alliance which defeat
ed Germany has collapsed. If French,
Italian and British statesmen con-
tinue to meet in London it is none the
less true that their decisions have no
longer any real weight behind him:
they are unenforceable and are not
infrequently rejected by the people
iE whose names the statesmen assume
to speak.
1t is essential to understand the rea-
son for this collapse: il is not a col
lapse which would have been perma-
nently or even long avoided IL the
Senate had, with or even without the
proposed reservations, adopted the
treaty of Versailles. many months ago.
1t is a collapse which was the inevi-
table consequence of the lack OF po-
lice power to enforce decisions which
required police power to enforce.
The American conception of a peace
of justice, universally accepted and
self administrative. requiring neither
armies nor economic blockades, expir-
| ed in the early period of the peace
conference. when it became clear
sumption was incorrect and that there
was no unit of justice. no common
currency of International right, which
all peoples would accept
British Idea Revived.
The British conception then began
to operate. 1t was the view of British
statesmen that the hour had come for
| partnership between the Anglo Sax
| on pepoles. A full partnership, but a
partnership in which. by reason of ex-
perience and familiarity with world
anairs: Great Britain would long exer-
else the larger influence. Together
| the United States and Britain were to
enforce upon the world a settlement
Of the war which would be eminentIy
just. Together we were to compel the
french to abandon the Rhine barrier
| the Italians to give up their Adratic as
| pirations. Where these exceeded rea-
son we were to force the Poles to ac-
| cept restricted boundaries: we were to
compel the Ruma and the Jugo-
slavs to admit our right to interfere
in their domestic affairs on behalf of
! minorities.
| mo dS. III eHeCC. imposing upOn
/ the world an Anglo-Saxon hegemony,
| 1t was to assert and maintain the
! right to act as the court Of last re-
| sort In every case where the dis
! putes OF other countries led to world
! disorders. Unconsciously Mr. Wilson
| drifted from his original conception
to this second and British conception
In the course of the peace conference
| Thus. again and again We see him
| speaking, with the support of Brit
ain and Of the United States in for
| bidding other nations to realize their
| aspirations. His recent Fiume utter
| ance is only one of many such declar-
| ations. Together the President and
| Lloyd George deprived Poland of he,
| own sea gate. ordered Rumania te
| surrender portion Of the Banat
vetoed French demands to annex the
Sarre basin.
| Why Plan Fell Through.
But this Anglo-Saxon negemony II
its turn fell through for two rea
Senate declined to ratify the treaty
| which in reality put this form Of
| world control into effect. and second
because the whole world cried ou,
! against the scheme itself. The world
| protest was based upon the fact thai
while the Anglo-Saxon partnership
refused to recognize French, Italian
Polish and Rumanian aspirations, il
| conceded British claims without de-
bate. Wherever the fourteen points
| ran afoul of a British policy the
! fourteen points were suspended, as in
| Of the German colonies, of the "sepa-
ration allowances" But these prin-
ciples. which were notrefused against
the British, were rigidly applied tc
! continental questions.
/ Had the United States Senate ac-
| <1,4 fv nf a
agreed to the AngloSaxon domina-
| tion of the world by Anglo-American
! partnership, the continental unrest
would have been for the time, fruit
| less. because no continental nation OF
| group of nations was strong enough
| to hold out against Anglo-American
| power-power mainly economic and
| therefore almost exclusively in Amer
| lean hands for the moment at least
| It must be quite clear what will be
the effect of an American decision to
return to Europe. instantly British h
shape of the Anglo-Saxon partnership
Speaking with us-not impossible for
us-the British will be able to clothe
their policies with authority. We and
| the British together will be the mas
ters Of the world for certain time
at least.
! But there is an obvious danger.
Sooner or later the continent may
begin to develop it's own system. The
! French may long stand with the
Anglo-Saxons, but every other nation
on the continent will unquestionably
| find ultimate or immediate cause for
hostility So far the Anglo-American
course at Paris has earned for both
nations. and for the United States
particularly. the hostility of all our
old enemies, who see the treaty of
peace as an Anglo-Saxon document
destroying the German rival, and of
the Poles, the Rumanians. the Greeks,
not to-mention the Russians. bolshe-