The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1920-04-11


I'm our own naval circles, that my
principal task was to command in
person certain naval forces afloat.
The fact is that this was really no
part Of my job during the war. The
game in which several great nations
were involved for four years was a
game involving organized direction
and cooperation. It is improbable
that any one nation could have won
the naval war: that was a task which
demanded not only that we should all
exert our fullest energies, but that, so
far as it was humanity possible we
SHOULD exert them as a un.s.
Ii was the duty of the Uni.e1 States
above all nations to manifest this
spirit We had entered the war
late; we had entered it in a condition
OF unpreparedness; our naval forces.
when compared TO those which had
been assembled by the Allies were
small; we had not been engaged for
three years combating an enemy
using new weapons and methods of
naval warfare. 1t was unlikely
that we could make original
contributions to the .Alliel effort; in
deed, we early did so; yet it was nat
ura1 to suppose that the navies which
had been combating the submarines so
long unders TODD that game better than
we did, and il was our duty to assist
them in this work. rather than to op-
crate Independently.
We Had TO Become Part of an Estab-
Ished System.
Indeed, this question as to whether
any particular one of our methods
might be better or might be worse
than Great Britain's was not a prac-
teal one. The point was that the
British navy had developed its own
methods of working and that it was a
great going concern" The crisis was
so pressing that we simply did not
have time to create a separate force
of our own; the most cursory exam
nation Of conditions convinced me
that we could hope to accomplish
something worth while only by play
ing the game as it was then being
played, and that any attempt to lay
down new rules of our own would in
evitably decrease the effectiveness of
our CO. operation. and perhaps result
in losing sthe war. We can even adj
nit. for the sake of the argument,
that the Americans might have Gre
ated a better organization than the
British, but the question of improv-
ing on their methods, or of not i'm
proving on them. was a point that was
not worth considering; long before we
could have developed an efficient in
dependent machine the war would have
come to an end
1t was thus our duty to take things
as they were. TO plunge Immediately
into the conflict. and to make every
ship and every man tell in the most
effective way and in the shortest pos
sible time. Therefore l decided that
pose of this war, virtually a part of
the Allied navies; to place at the dis
posal Of the Allies our ships TO re-
enforce the weak part of their lines
TO ignore such secondary conditions as
, national pride. naval prestige and per-
sona1 ambitions; and to subordinate
every other consideration TO that of
defeating the Hun. / have already
described how in distributing our sub
cffasers, 1 practically placed them at
the disposal of the Allied Council:
and this represents the policy that
was followed in all similar matters.
London's Advantages.
The naval high commands were 10
Gated at Washington, London, Paris,
and Rome Necessarily London was
the headquarters of the naval war.
Events which had long preceded the
European conflict had made this
choice inevitable. The maritime de-
velopment of four centuries had pre-
pared London for the role which she
was now called upon 10 play. From
All over the world naval and maritime
information flowed TO this great cap
ital as though in obedience to the law
of gravity. Even in peace times Lon
don knew where every ship in the world
was at any particular time. All other
machinery for handling this great mass
OF detail was necessarily accumulated
in this great city. Lloyds the world
headquarters for merchant shipping,
had now become practically part OF
the British Admiralty.
In this war the matter of informa-
ton and communications were SUI
premely important. Every decision
that was made and every order that
was issued even those that were the
least consequential, rested upon COM
plete information which was obtain
able in time TO be useful in London.
could not have made my headquarters
In Washington. or Paris. or Rome be-
cause these cities could not have fur
0ished the military information which