The Leavenworth echo. [volume] (Leavenworth, Wash.) 1904-current, 1920-01-09

mcnaccd central France. protected the
most exposed portion of the German
line of communications. that between
Metz and Sedan. and covered the
Briey iron region. from which the en-
emy obtained the greater part of the
iron required for munitions and ma
terial. The coal fields east of Mefz
were also covered by these same de
lenses. A deep advance east of Metz
or the capture of the Brcy region. by
threatening the invasion of rich Ger
man territory in the MoSelle valley
ANA the Saar basin. thus curtailing
her supply of coal or iron. would have
decisive effect i'm forcing with
draWal of German troops from north
ern France. The military and eco
homie situation of the enemy. there
fore, indicated Lorraine aS the field
promising the most fruitful results for
the employment of cur armies.
The compleXity of trench life had
enormously increased the tonnage of
supplies required by troops. Not only
was 1t question of providing food.
but enormous quantities of munitions
and material We're needed. Upon the
railroads of France fell the burden Of
meeting the heavy demands of the
100000 allied comhatnnta then en-
gagged. If the American army was to
have an Independent and flexible Sys-
tenn it could not Use the lines behind
the British-Bclgum front nor those
IN rear of the French front covering
Paris.
Chose the Southern Ports.
The problem confronting the Amer
lean expeditionary forces was then TO
>UperimpoSe its rail communications
on those of France where there would
he the least possible disturbance to
lie arteries of supply of the two great
allied armies already in the field. The
lines selected. therefore, were those
leading from the comparatively I'M
used South Atlantic ports of France
lo the northeast, where it was believ-
I'D the American armies could be en-
ployed to the best advantage.
For all practical purposes the Amer
lean eNpcditiunary forces were based
ON the American continent. Three thou
sand miles of ocean to cross, with the
growing submarine menace confront
ing us, the quantity of ship tonnage
hat would be available then un-
known. and a line of communications
by land 400 miles long from French
ports to our probable front presented
difficulties that seemed almost insur-
mountahle rs compared with those of
our allies
In providing for the storage and dis
tributon Of reserve supplies an al
IowanCe of 45 days in the base sec
lions was planned, with 80 days in the
intermediate section. and 10 days in
The advance section. After the safe
~ of our sea transport was practical
~ assured this was reduced to a total
"t As days. distributed proportionate-
~. When the armistice was signed all
projects for construction had been
completed and supplies We're on hand
To meet the needs of 2.0O0oO0 men,
while further plans for necessary con
Struction and for the supply of an ad-
dttonal 100000 were well under
way.
Our Own Fighting Doctrine
A similar scheme was adopted in
August. 1871, for our armies. in which
the Importance of teaching through
out our forces sound tightn. doc
lrine of our own was emphasized. 1t
provided for troop training in all units
up to include divisions. Corps cen
lers of instruction for noncommiSsion-
ed officers and unit commanders OF
al arms were established. The army
and corps schools graduated 21.330
noncommissioned officers and 1876
officers.
Pending the organization and devci-
upment of our own schools, a large
number of our officers We're sent To
CenterS of instruction of the allied
armies. The training of our earlier
divisions WAS begun in close aSSoci-
alton with the French divisions. under
conditions set forth in the following
paragraph on divisional training:
"Trench warfare naturally given
prominence To The defensive rs 0p-
posed to the offensive To guard
against this, the basis Of instruction
should he essentially the offensive
both in spirit and in practice The
defensive is accepted only Ia prepare
for future offensive"
The long period Of trench warfare
had 81 impressed itself upon tn.
French and British that they had al
most entirely dispensed with training
for open warfare II MIS- 10 avoid
this result in our army and to rucuuI
age lhe offensive spirit that the fol
lowing WAS published in octohcr. 1911
"1hr above mcthndS Ia be employed
muSl remain or become distinctly our
own.
All Instruction must contemplate
the assumption Of vigorous often
Sive. This purpose viii be pnpha
sized ia every phase of trimming until
ii becomes settled habit Of Thought
The rilc and the haynnet are III,
principal weapons of the infantry sol
dier. lie viii he trained To high
degree of -l.iil as a mark Suuuu both