Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-07-18
PEOPLES CONCERNED
TODECIDE BIG ISSUES
How to Make Versailles Terms Stick iffs
IT
Face Of Possible Upheavals, Allies .,
Great Problem. %

German government may be the sig-s.
nal for the German radicals to usher,r
in their proposed moves for the esq
Establishment of strictly proletarianan
government in Germany. 1t is pretty
well known that should the RussiansTs
win Poland. as they are in imminent
prospect of doing. the radicals OF
Germany quickly would join hands
with the Russians in the common ef-
fort to sovietize the whole of central.
Europe. its'a
The allies, as I pointed out last>
Sunday. are menaced by this. The
danger is indicated by the fact that;
Great Britain has forwarded to Mos
cow request that an armistice be-.
arranged between soviet Russia and .
Poland. II peace can be effected be-
tween the Moscow government and,
all those sections of Russia lying to-
the westward. which. after the armi-
stice. declared their independence.
the future of Poland may not only
maintained against Russia and Ger"
man cooperation in future yearssSi
That. at least, is the allied view
point. S
Army Action L. Alternative. Sn
| To maintain the peace and safety ofat
western Europe there is but one other
lalternative-that Of sending great al ~
| lied armies to the assistance of Po-as
| land. The physical burdens of such
maneuver, not to speak of sentiments
| in various allied countries againstne
such step. would mitigate against it's
success. The allies consequently aress
attempting to WOO the bolsheviks and ~
/ lull them into complacency through
the promise of renewal of trade rela-i
tions with the rest of the world. al
ways, however. with the strict. proviso
that the bolshevist shall refrain from
attempts to propagandize the world
and seek TO establish world soviet .
confederation over which Moscow 81
would rule.
L In I'll ~
eral unscrupulousness of both LcninsvE
and TrotSky in the perpetuation of
4 their fearful gospels. a breakdown Off
allied policy as to Russia eventuallyox
is practically certain.
Even should the allies gain an ar--si
mIstice in the nick of time TO save
Poland. there is grave doubt that the
allied policy of maintaining Poland sxrl
the great bulwark between soviet.
Russia and western Europe or pre-
lNenting future coalition of Geymanys,s
and Russia would fail for the simple -
reason that the allies have alienated" 70
! Poland by their failure to grant vital~
aid at moment when Poland's very
life is at stake. Polish sentiment isoS
extremely bitter toward the allies al
the moment and not until France and
England go to great lengths will thiste
sentiment ever change. =, 40
Fate Rests on Old Diplomaey.
Upon the fiimsy promises, upon de-
layed and somewhat WORKOUT brandso
or diplomacy the fate of Poland isar
said to rest today.
Breakdown of attempts to lull the; N
merciless reds by soft-spoken trade "a
and commercial platitudes will leave
the military course open to the aliess,
if they would materially assist Pos.
land. Any allied attempt to sendfc
great armies to Poland not only viii N
be hIndered, but these forces would
be placed in immediate peril should
Germany become a revolutionaryoh
The maintenance of allied armies on
the Polish front without immediatesh
and speedy communication lines
Germans undoubtedly would serious.
ly. if not effectively. object through
strikes and other weapons, would be-
Ia practical impossibility. So il may 3
Foch takes things into his own hands :
the allies will go to great lengths To-;
appease the bolsheviks by peaceab1e
means. In fact, it would not be surs ~
prising to see certain of the larger. :,
European governments barter witt"
the devil to save their own souls .ande2
| recognize for the time being the boil
shevik government Any such action.
however, would be with the possibleni
idea in view of SO adjusting internal
financial and economic situations &soe
| to be ready for the time of eventual .
open combat with bolshevism in its
physical forms. to prevent overthrostfse
| OF existing institutions. n 10
Allies Immediate Problem.
| But that is an issue to be met later
| The immediate problem before the at3m
lies is how to make the terms of tAs-,r
treaty of Versailles stick. With the
red menace looming more and morehs
| in the eastern sections of Europe. -.
| full enforcement is exceedingly
| problematical. Particularly would thisas
\ be true should the reds of Germany. 4.
| reinforced by the Russians in eastefnA'
| Prussia, move toward the west.
| Any such union of radical forces
\ would Immediately start the fires of
| revolution in Germany, where witlS
reduced armies the German governs.
| ment could do little or nothing toward e.,
repression of bolshevist-infected in
duStrial regions OF the country. sr1fi