The Lexington intelligencer. [volume] (Lexington, Mo.) 1901-1949, 1920-01-09

inenaced central France. protected tue
most exposed portion Of the German
line Of communications, that between
Metz and Sedan. and covered the
Briey iron region. from which the en-
envy obtained the greater part Of the
iron required for munitions and ma
terlal. The coal fields east Of Metz
were also covered by these same de-
lenses. A deep advance east Of Metz,
or the capture Of the Brtey region, by
threatening the invasion Of rich Ger
man territory in the Moselle valley
and the Saar basin. thus curtaillng
her supply of coal or iron. would have
q decisive effect In forcing a with
drawal Of German troops from north
ern France. The military and eco
nomic situation of the enemy. there
fore, indicated Lorraine as the Geld
promising the most fruitful results for
the employment OF our armies.
The completely Of trench life had
enormously increased the tonnage of
supplies required by troops. Not only
was II q question Of providing food,
but enormous quantities OF munitions
and material were needed. Upon the
railroads Of France fell the burden Of
meeting the heavy demands OF the
3.500,0O0 allied combatants then en-
gagged. II the American army was to
have an independent and flexible sys-
ten II could not use the lines behind
the British Belgium front nor those
in real Of the French front covering
Paris.
Chose the Southern Ports.
The problem confronting the Amer
lean expe%ditionary forces was then to
superlmpose its rail- communications
on those Of France where there would
be the least possible disturbance to
the arteries OF supply Of the two great
allied armies already in the field. The
lines selected therefore. were those
leading from the comparatively un-
used South Atlantic ports OF France
to the northeast. where II was bellev-
ed the American armies could be EN-
ployed TO the bes: advantage.
For all practical purposes the Amer
lean expedltionary forces were based
IN the American continent. Three thou
sand miles Of ocean to cross with the
growing submarine menace confront.
ing us. the quantity Of ship tonnage
that would be available then I'M
known. and a line Of communications
by land 400 miles long from French
ports to our probable front presented
difficulties that seemed almost lnsur-
mountahle as compared with those Of
our allies.
In providing for the storage and dis
trihutlon OF reserve supplies an al
lowance OF 45 days In the base sec
tons was planned. with 80 days in the
intermediate section. and Is days IN
the advance section. After the safe.
ty OF our sea transport was practical
ly assured. this was reduced to . total
OF 40 days. distributed proportlonate,
ly. When the armistlce was signed all
projects for construction had been
completed and supplies were on hand
TO meet the needs Of 2.O00.0M men
while further plans for necessary ron.
%stractlon and for the supply Of an nd
ditional 2.OO0OO0 were well under
way.
Our Own Fighting Doctrine.
A similar scheme was adopted in
August. 1917. for our armies. In which
the Importance Of teaching through.
out our forces a sound fighting doc
trine Of our own was emphasized, II
provided for troop training In all units
up To include divisions, Corps cen.
tiers " instruction for uOncommisSion
ed officers and unit commanders Of
all arms were established. The army
and corps schools graduated 2l.33t
noncommissIoned officers and l3.01e
officers.
Pending the organization and devel.
0pmem Of our own schools. a large
number of our officers were sent tC
centers OF instruction Of the allied
armies. The training Of our earlier
divisions was begun In close associ-
alton with the French divisions, under
conditions set forth In the following
paragraph on divisional training:
Trench warfare naturally given
prominence to the defensive as op-
posed TO the offensive. To guard
against this. the basis Of instruction
should be essentially the offensive
both in spirit and In practice. The
defensive is accepted only to prepare
for future offensive"
The long period Of trench warfare
had so impressed itself upon the
French and British that they had al
mos, entirely dispensed with training
for open warfare. II was 10 avoid
this result in our army and to encour
age the offensive spirit that the FOL.
lowing was published In October. 1917,
~The above methods to be employed
must remalp or become distinctly our
own.
IAN instruction must contemplate
the assumption Of a vigorous often
sive. This purpose will be empha.
sized In every phase Of training unit.
It becomes a settled habit OF thought
The rifle and the bayonet are the