Wausau pilot. [volume] (Wausau, Wis.) 1896-1940, 1920-10-12

enemy or to launch an attack. Their ports
on warm water" always open to trade
SebastopOl is only 200 miles from Constantinople
The allies have in the near east large mlitar!
stores as Lloyd George announced in his speecf
to the house of commons. The sOvets, in theii
various proposals to restore relations with Grea
Britain, have insisted upon surrender of Wransei :
forces, thus admitting the correctness OF tie
British prime minister's characterization OF
Wrangel'S movements as "fUrmidable. Further
more, the Communist central committee in Moscow
elegraphed to all its branches on July 10 of this
year:
Ills (Wrangel's9 offensive has already caused
the soviet republic great difficulties Each success
of the general, the most modest one deprivea
Soviet Russia Of great quantities of grain coal and
oil, and spells spread of starvation, deSHtutlon
lack of fuel and destruction of transport. The
Communist party should understand that liquida
ton Of General Wranges undertaking is an ali
solute necessity for Soviet Russia"
AS fighting force the new army will depend
mainly on the Cossacks. 1t Denikines failure
to hold the allegiance of these warriors. coupled
with endless dssenson behind his lines among hif
politicians. that wrecked his hopes of overthrow.
ing the soviet.
Wrangels arrangement with the COssacks al
lows for their complete independence in their do
nestle and civil affairs. According TO agree
ment made on April 10 OF this year the Hetman OF
the Don Cossacks recognizes Wrange as highest
military chief In return for this autonomy and
Wrangel agrees to consult the Hetman on all ne
gotiati0ns with foreign powers on questions per.
tanning TO Cossack troops and territories,
Thus Wrangel begins by avoiding the great mis-
take of Denikine He seeks cooperation of ALI
foes of the bOlshevik but not domination over
them.
MY slogan is" he said, with whomsoever you
please, but for Russia"
He has before him the lesson of the SCATTERING
of Denikine's hopes, in whose campaigns he played
brilliant part. What The causes of that failure
WERE he himself has put thus:
Summing them up, it may be said that strategy
was sacrificed to politics, and those politics
no good at all. Instead of uniting all the forces
that made it their aim to combat boshevism. and
instead of pursuing one Russian policy, without
any party affiliations there was Volunteer army
policy. sort of private politics whose leaders saw
in all that did not bear the stamp of the Volunteer
army enemies of Russia They fought the bolshe
Wiki and they fought the Ukrainians, Georgians
and Azerbaijans. And it would not have taken
much to have started war with the Cossacks, too
who composed half of our army and with their
blood cemented the connection with the regular
troops on the battlefield sSs~a
The territories of the Cossacks were engulfed
in the sweep of the Red armies toward the Cauca.
sus They represent still, however, according TO
their spokesman in Paris, V. A. Kharlamov. a
force of several scores of thousands" of fighting
men. *.,-.se- ..44.-~'
AS for the attitude of the Cossacks toward boil
shevist rule, NJ Kharlamov says:
The democracy of Europe should remember
this: The Cossacks are unable to accept the So
Wet regime they are organically Incapable of be.
coming Communists The Cossacks are IN their
overwhelming majority thrifty farmers There is
no such thing Cossack proletariat in existence
The Cossack is by nature indivdualist. holding
very dear his personal liberty. Not in vain did
to defend their freedom. their rights and liberties
with all their might