Norwich bulletin., 1920-03-06
RUssIA's RESOURCES AND THE WORLD.

The new endeayors on the part of the allied statesmen to formulate definite Russian policy are based on the conviction that neither the polit- ical nor the economic rehabilitation Of l Europe is possible without peace and l stability in Russia and without the l reopening of Russia's vast resources to | Europe and to the world, writes A. J. Sack, director of the Russian informa- ton bureau of the United States.
 Russia's part in European produe- ton in general and in tho production of foodstuffs in particular makes 1t clear that without Russia the eco-
 homie balance of Europe cannot be re- established. Russia's export of grains
 alone in 1913 amounted to $30,000, 900.
 Her export of foedstuffs in general
 amounted to about $500,000,000 yearly.
 To understand the importance of Rus
 sia's exports for Europe's economic
 life. it is sufficient to recall that just
 before the war of the s750, 00,000 of
 Russia's total exports, $21S,Q00r 900
 went to Germany, $154, 100000 to Great
 Britain, $90,000,000 to Holland, $47,- 900 ,o00 to France, $S2,000,000 to Italy, $31 ,0O0, 900 to Austria Hungary, s31,- 900 900 to Belgium and s17,000,000 to Denmark. Of all the European eoun- tries, er germany exported to Rus sia more than she received from Rus sia, her exports to Russia amounting yearly to s249,999,S ,S99. Great Britain 8
 exports to Russia amounted to s7s;- l 000, ,000 Hollands $10,000, 900, Frances
 s2S, ,o0o, ,o0O and Austria Hungary's l s16,000, 900.
 | So the importance of Russia's re-
 sources for the rehabilitation of the
 economic life of Europe is evident. 1 The question remains, however, l whether the new allied policy is able | to achieve it's aim, namely, the re- | opening of Russia's resources to Eu-
 rope. At the beginning the allied su- l preme council. while permitting the 1 reopening of trade with the Russian | co-operatives, emphasized at the same | time that this does not at all imply
 any change in the allied policy tow
 ards the bolshevist government. The | bolsheviki answered this move by an- | nouncing that the co-operatives are
 now under their full control and by | appointing the bolchevist agent, Max i'm Litvinoff, the plenipotentiary rep resentative of the co-operatives
 abroad. Tn an interview published ir
 the New York World of Feb. 22 Lenine longer exist, having been assimiiated
 
 Thus the intention of the supreme
 council to avoid dealings with the bol- sheviki while reopening trade witt Russia was frustrated, and now we set a further move on the part of the su. preme council, in it's declaration O Feb. 24, 1920, bringing it considerabl, nearer not only to peace but ovev to ; recognition of the bolshevilSi. Let II suppose that in the endeavor to re establish trade with Russia the allie would enter into dealings with the so :, called bolshevist government and evel go so far as to allow, in process o :. trade, the acceptance from the bolshe : wiki of the gold in their possession l What would he the practical results 0 the allied -bolchevist trade?
 l In this respect it is of interest t !, listen to gentleman who had an ex ] ceptional opportunity to observe close
 ly an experiment in trade with bol shevist Russia. This gentleman is N
 De Scavenius, the Danish minister . Russia, who recently returned fror : Moscow and thus described his ex [? periences in an interview printed r the New York Times of Feb. II, 1920. = "For more than year." NJ. D t | Scavenius said, i've were In commeI 6 cial relations with soviet Russia, an n I had an opportunity to learn muc V about conditions there. In 1917 an n 1918 only the Scandinavian countrit ;t had free access to soviet Russia. Tn: :. market was wide open to them; it ws e as if reserved for them. Yet we d e almost nothing. The great difficult $ was that there was no unity of pow, $ over affairs. Out of thousand a s tempts to trade one would be autho ss ized from Moscow. but the particuk h commune concerned would veto u ie authorization. All industry being n; le tionalized, as was all commerce. it W; >e necessary to treat always with u is commissaries. There was a frightf re amount of red tape.
 of Before anything worth while st done Russian goods must be gather, e. and carried to the ports. This pr in sents enormous difficulties, for t st soviet regime has never been able rs get hold of Russian products in bul y.l There is no doubt that the Russi; CT peasants have wheat There is al l. no doubt that they are hiding 1t. He K can it be got? The commissaries lfa e. tried often enough without success. us is necessary to make the peasant b w lieve that it Is to his interest to gi n- up his wheat; but anyone who kno1