Evening star., 1920-06-27

foreign comment upon the
platform and ticket adopted at
Chicago inevitably awakens vivid
Unmistakably the same
illusions and the same anxieties pre-
vail now as then. but with marked
differences. Sixteen months ago those
who represented the government, the
cabinets in Paris and in London Were,
so far as President Wilson was con-
cerned. more royalst than the king.
Today it is plain that in Paris and
in London the keen edge of this emo
tion has worn off. In American poll
tics Europe has become at least neu-
trail again.
One of the things never compre-
hensible in America was the COM
plete failure of European statesmen
to recognize the limitations of the
presidential mandate, to comprehend
that decisions taken by the President
were, in the nature of things because
of our Constitution. no more than
preliminary decisions. requiring the
assent of the Senate to validate them.
Conference Goes Democratic.
Very early in the conference Europe
went democratic" 1t accepted the
Presidents mandate as absolute. 1t
decided to disregard the ever-in-
creasing warnings that were coming
from America. To give a specific ex-
ample: Judson Welliver. a well known
Washington correspondent. was send
ing'to the Echo de Paris a daily dis
patch, which more or less completely
Ia nf 1,a oci-
ton to the President in the United
States Senate. But early in the
game. and at the request of members
OF the Presidents party. these dis
patches were suppressed in the office
of the Echo de Paris. The same
from Washington. Moreover corre-
spondents of republican newspapers
were measurably treated as enemies:
not in any discourteous fashion, but
with consummate politeness. they
were more or less excluded from the
condolences of foreign statesmen.
In sum, Europe not only made up
its mind that President Wilson was
the United States. but it proceeded
with increasing earnestness to make
such contribution as it could to
strengthen the President at home
Before the conference had completed
it's labors, Clemenceau, Lloyd George
and Wilson had become more like
members of a single cabinet than
representatives of separate govern
ments.
But. apart from the question of
the future. the problem of the i'm
mediate present made democrats of
all European premiers - England,
France and Italy, Poland, Rumania
and Greece-all the states. big and
little, had programs. None of these
programs could in any measure be
hostile. The first step was to obtain
recognition for their programs. In
this the British were totally success
full. because they were the first to
appreciate and apply the policy of ac-
cepting the President as the authentic
voice of America
British Skill Marvellous.
In all history of international con-
ferences 1 doubt if there was ever
such consummate skill displayed by
any diplomats as by the British at
the fact that practically all the great
prizes fell to the British without any
real dispute. The collapse of Napoleon
did not add as much in territory or
influence to the British empire as the
defeat of the kaiser.
AS the conference proceeded the
British idea of an Anglo-American
partnership in world control grew
apace. Actually the treay of YER
sailles was no more than contract
of partnership between the United
States and Great Britain. the purpose
of the association was the gradiose
work of world regulation. At the end
of the conference the British believed
that they had arranged close alli-
ance between the United States and
Great Britain which would last. but
they knew that they had obtained in
the conference far more on the mate
rial side than they had hoped for.
French Fared Less Well.
The French case was quite different.
France did not in reality seek more
material objectives than Britain. Her
share of the German colonies was In
significant, in asking Alsace-Lorralne
she was only reclaiming stolen prop
erty, the same was true OF almost
half of the Kamerun. Her Syrian as
ed in Justice and in history as Brit
ish claims in MeSopotamia. Her de-
mand for security on the Rhine was
not in excess of the British demand
for security on the sea.
But in the opening days of the con-
ference the French openly opposed
some of the Presidents principles and
frankly sought the amendment OF
Others. AS consequence french
claims Jared far less wei than Brit
ish and Lloyd George was able 10
pocket nearly a million square miles
of German territory without american
nrotest. while France had to be con-
tented with gains minor by comparl-
SON and, as in the case or the Sarre'
further restricted by plebiscite conol-
tionS. , ..
Thus at the outset the French were
outgeneraled. They looked ior Pri.ist'
support against ~the President ana
thew encountered the British opposl-
tion wherever they collided with tne
President. Still the F'rencn We're coli.
pelled to face the truth Angi :
can assistance was vital so tnere was
a gradual shift In goVernnieiul.ai il ~ po
lev At the same time that the maSs
of the French people became hostlle
70 the President, feeling his lack Oh
sympathy with their purposes, Sleiii
enceau and his associates poWeu "
the Presidents power. Ihe le"aru loi
this tardy compliance was a one for Sc
milton of the French demand ior tI .
curity. a recognition contained IN .le
treaty. of insurance pIedgins
f1nited States and Great Britain 10 oe
fend France, if Germany shoulo at
tack again.
Italy and Smaller Nations.
Nv contrast Italy did not at any
time surrender. She mas seeis
traatv with Britain and France as
snr;ny her of certain things which
s,eara like the treaty itself, obnoxious
to the President. On this treaty she
stood, and to her disappointment an ana
wratb discovered that President Will
son was able to enlist British and
French support for his proposals. Ae-
cordingly italy left the conference,
and the italian problems have not yet
been settled. In the French case only
the people became anti-Wilson, While
the Government took the opposite
course. In Italy people and govern
ment went together and unhappily
hacame not merely anti-wilson, but
measura bly anti-American.
mLa CO NO Was true of Rumania and