The Butler weekly times and the Bates County record. (Butler, Mo.) 1918-1950, 1920-02-05
c~aHt.lurd tH"n .lanta~g -

an .}aHltar% -
TAip'ly. T!.p 'act= reaction ara M
our troops al Fn0'i"3'.. WIS e%lremel
yio'cnt H''I "plGfrnttE he n'ils deter
mined at Hll costs tD counteruct til
mos t'Hcrllonl effect The America
- hHd produced For three day
trHted on our position and counter
attack succeeded c0lIntcr-attack Tn
Desperate efforts OF lhr Germans CAV,
the fighting at CNnii@ny Il secmn:
tactical Importance entirely out o
proportion 10 the Numbers involved.
The third German offensive. on Nh!
-. against the French on the AiSnt
soon developed Il desperate sulalior
for the allies. The Second division
WAS hastily diverted Ia the vicinity o!
Meaux ON May 81. and early on the
morning of June | was deployed
across the ChHtru,l.Thirrry-P Paris road
near COMMUNICATIONS in a gap in
the French line. where it stopped the
German advance on Paris AZ the
same time the partially trained Third
division Was placed III French dis
poSa to hold the crossings Of the
Marine. and its motorized machinc-glln
battalion succeeded in rrachin. Cha
teau Thcrry in time to assist in sue
coSsfuly defending that river cross.
ing.
The enemy having been halted, the
Second division commenced a series
of vigorous attacks on June which
resulted in the capture of Bellra,l
woods after very severe fighting. The
village of RourpSclIcS was taken soon
after. and on July VauX was cap.
turcd. In these operations the Sec
onh division met with most desperate
resistance by Germany'S best troops.
Our Second corps, under Maj. Gen.
George W. -Read had been organized
for the command of the ten divisions
with the British. which were held
back in training areas or assigned to
secOnd-line defenScs After conSllta-
ton with Field Marshal Haig on June
3 five American divisions were re-
|ieved from the British area to sup
port the French.
The Narne salient was inherently
weak and offered an opportunity for
4 counter offensive that was obvious
If successful such an operation would
afford immediate relief to the allied
defense, would remove the threat
against Paris and free the Paris
Nancy railroad. But more important
han all else it would restore the mo-
ale of the allies and remove the pro-
ound depression and fear then exist
ng.
Up to this time our units had been
,ut in here and there at critical points
Is emergency troops to stop the ter
ific German advance. In every trial,
on the defensive or offensive,
hey had proved themselves equal to
my troops in Europe. AS early as
'unc %. and again on July 10 at Bonn.
ION had very strongly urged that |
'ur best divisions he concentrated. |
nder American command. if possible.
or use as a striking force against |
he Marine salient. Although the pre-.
ailing view among the allies was
hat American units were suitable |
My for the defensive. and that at all
vents they could he used to better.
dvantage under allied command. the
digestion was accepted in principle.
Citing qualities was soon put to the
Est.
The enemy had encouraged his sol.
Iers to believe that the July Is at
lex would conclude the war with a
erman peace. Although he made elab-
rate plans for the operation, he failed
conceal fully his intentions. and the
ont of attack was suspected at least
ne week ahead. On the Champagne
ont the actual hour for the assault
as known and the enemy was checked
18th heavy losses. The F0rty-second
vision entered the line near SOmme
y Immediately. and five Of Its infan.
y battalions and all Of its artillery
ecame engaged. Southwest Of Rheims
I'D along the Marine to the east Of
the Germans were
first somewhat successful. a pene-
alton Of eight kil0meters beyond the
yer being effected against the French
to the right of our Third
vision. The following quotation
eHn-the report Of the commanding +
.neral gives the result Of the fighting
, his front:
although the rush Of the German
oops overwhelmed some Of the 'front.'
Ne positions, causing the infantry aud IL