New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1920-07-11

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explain away his unfortunate
phrases. The Administration shifted
its ground and decided to emphasize
at least for purposes Of disputation
the principle laid down in the note
of February 10.
Bernstorff became alarmed when
the American note of May 10 was
sent, demanding a disavowal of the
act Of the submarine commander
who sank the Lusitania, and Ger
man reply arrived May %, justifying
the commander. He sought an inter
view with the President and came
away treasured. He had good rea-
son to be. He describes the inter-
view as follows:
II had long conversation with
the President and two Of his advis-
ers. Mr.. Wilson felt the position
acutely, and was animated solely by
desire to preserve peace. We both
realized that it was a question Of
gaining time, and succeeded in COM
ing to an agreement on the measures
to be taken to mitigate >the crisis.
We took the view that the isolation
OF Germany had given rise to an at
mosphere Of misunderstanding be-
tween her and the United States,
and that the establishment Of some
sort of personal relationship might
be expected to ease this tension.
therefore proposed that Mayer
Gerhardt, a member of the Privy
Council, who had accompanied DR..
Dernburg to America and was then
acting on behalf of the German Red
Cross, should at once 60 to Ger
many and report in person to the
government. Mr.. Wilson, for his
part, undertook that no final deci
sion should be taken until Meyer
Gerhardt had reported the results
OF his mission.
"At the end Of this interview 1 was
convinced in my own mind that
the President would never enter on
war with Germany: otherwise could
not conceive why he should have con-
Cured in my proposal, instead Of
breaking off relations at once. He
would, had he chosen the latter
hou no. A~... -
opinion more decidedly behind him
than it was later, at the time Of the
final breach. Not voice would have
been raised in opposition, except that
of the Secretary of State, Mr.. Bryan,
who. as it was, resigned his Office
on the ground that the exchange Of
notes threatened to involve the Unit
ed States in war and could not be
reconciled, therefore, with his own
pacific intentions"
a Sham Duel
If Mr.. Bryan had known what
Bernstorff knew he might have
withheld his resignation in all tran
guilty. The Lusitania correspond
ence was something of a sham duel.
The President told Bernstorff at the
June interview that he didn't Law
much stress on the legalistic aspects
of the case. He also mentioned the
fact that he was considering an at
tempt at mediation between the bel
ligerents. The American notes con-
tinued to demand disavowal of the
act of the submarine commander
who sank the Lusitania and assur-
ances for the future. Germany re.
fused disavowal, and kept secret
both from Bernstorff and from the
Washington government the fact
that restrictions had already been
put on the submarines. This move
represented a victory in German do
nestle politics of Bethmann-H ollwee
over Won Tirpitz. But Bethmann-
Hollweg didn't want to give what
Bernstorff calls can opportunity to
Mr.. Wilson to gain cheap triumph
over Germany in q verbal wrangla. =
The Lusitania case was never set
tied. There was ! tedious secret