The Butler weekly times and the Bates County record. (Butler, Mo.) 1918-1950, 1920-02-12
CONTINUED from last week.

ja) An attack between the Mouse
and the Argonne by the Second French
army, reinforced by from four to six
American divisions.
(b) A F'rench-American attack, ex-
tending from the Arsonne west TO the
Souain road. to be executed on the
right by an American army astride
the Aisne and on the left by the
Fourth French army.
To carry out these attacks the ten
to eleven American divisions suggested
for the st. MihieI operation and the
four to six for the Second French army
would leave eight to ten divisions for
an American army on the Aisne. 1t
was proposed that the st. Mihiel op'
GRAFTON should be initiated on Sept. ~
and the other two on Sept. Is and 20.
respectively.
The plan suggested for the Amer.
lean participation In these operations
was not acceptable to me. because 1t
would require tl,e immediate separa-
tion Of the recently formed first Amer
lean army into several groups, main
" to assist French armies. This was
directly contrary to the principle OF
forming a distinct American army, for
which my contention had been insist
emf. An enormous amount Of prepare
tion had already been made In con-
struction Of roads. railroads, regulat'
ing stations and other installations
looking to the use and supply Of our
armies on particular front. The In
herent disinclination of our troops to
serve under allied commanders would
have grown and American morale
would have suffered. My position was
stated quite clearly, that the strate-
gical employment of the first army as
a unit would be undertaken where de-
sired. but its disruption to carry out
these proposals would not be enter
tanned.
An American Army.
A further conference at Marshal
Foch's headquarters was held on Sep
tember at which General Petain
was present. After discussion. the
question of employing the American
army as a unit was conceded. All the
allied armies we're to I've employed. In
a converging action.
It should be recorded that although
this general offensive was fully out
lined at the conference no one present
expressed the opinion that the final
victory could be won in 1918. In fact.
It was believed by the Meuse-Argonne
attack could not be pushed much be-
You'd Monfaucon before the arrival OF
winter would force cessation of op'
eratiOns.
The choice between the two sectors.
that east of the Aisne. including the
ArgOnpe forest. or the Champagne
sector. was left to me. In my opinion.
no other allied troops had the morale
or the offensive spirit to overcome
successfully the difficulties to he met
In the Meuse-ArgOnne sector. and our
plans and Installations had been pre-
pared for an expansion Of operations
In that direction. So the Meuse-Ar'
come front was chosen. The entire
sector of $50 kilometers Of front ex-
tending from Port-sur-Setlle, east OF
the Moselle, west tn include the Ar
gonne forest. was accordingly placed
under my command. Including all
French divisions then In that zone.
The 6rst American army was to pro-
coed with the St. Mihiel operation.
after which the operation between the
Meuse and the western edge OF the
Argonne forest was to be prepared
and launched not later than Septem'
Der Is.
On the night Of September II the
troops of the first army were deplOyed
in position. On the southern face OF
the salient was the first corps. Ma
jor General Liggett commanding. win
the eighty second ninetieth. fifth ana
second divisions In line. extending
from the Moselle westward. :.
On its left was the fourth corps.
Mai. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman COM
handing. with. the eighty-ninth. forty.
second and 6Fst- dirisions.-the1eft-o
this corps heing opposite -Mehtsee'
These two army corps were to deliver
the principal attack. the line pivotfng
on the center division Of the hrst
corps. The first division on the left
of the fourth corps. was charged with
the double mission Of covering its own
flank while advancing some twenty
kilometers due north toward the heart
Of the salient, where II was to make
contact With the troops Of the NTH