Shoshone journal. [volume] (Shoshone, Idaho) 1884-1931, 1920-01-02

'"e 81 communications that between
Metz and Sedan. and covered the
Drey iron region. from which the en-
envy obtained the greater part Of the
IRON required for munitions and ma
'erlal. The coal fields east of Metz
were also covered by these same de
'ehNes. deep advance east of Metz
OF The capture Of the Briey region by
threatening the invasion Of rich Ger
ana the Saar basin. thus curia ling
her supply Of coal or iron. would have
decisive effect in forcing with
drawal of German troops from north
ern France The military and eco
nomic situation of the enemy there
fore. Indicated Lorraine as the field
promising the most fruitful results for
The employment of our armies.
The compexiy of trench life had
enormously Increased the tonnage of
supplies required 10y troops. Not only
was it question of provdins food.
but enormous quantities of munitions
and material were needed. Upon the
railroads of France fell the burden Of
meeting the heavy demands Of the
100000 allied cOmbatants then en-
gagged. If the American army was to
have an independent and flexible sys-
TEN it could not use the lines behind
the British Belgium front nor those
in rear of the French front covering
Paris.
Chose the Southern Ports.
The problem confronting the Amer
lean eXpeditionary forces was then to
superinpose its rail communications
on those of France where there would
be the least possible disturbance to
the arteries of supply of the two great
allied armies already In the field. The
lines selected. therefore, were those
leading from the comparatively un-
used South Atlantic ports of France
to the northeast. where 1t was believ-
ed the American armies could be en-
plOyed to the best advantage.
For all practical purposes the Amer
lean expedtiOnary forces were based
on the American continent. Three thou
sand miles of ocean to cross, with the
growing submarine menace confront
ing us, the quantity Of ship tonnage
that would be available then IN
known, and a line of communications
by land 400 miles long from French
ports to our probable front presented
difficulties that seemed almost insur-
mOuntable as compared with those OF
our allies.
In providing for the storage and dis
tributiOn of reserve supplies an al
lowance of 40 days in the base sec
tons was planned. with 80 days In the
intermediate section. and 10 days in
the advance section. After the safe
~ of our sea transport was practical
ly assured, this was reduced to total
of 45 days. distributed proportionate-
ly. When the armistice was signed all
projects for construction had been
completed and supplies were on hand
TO meet the needs of 100000 men,
while further plans for necessary con-
structlon and for the supply of an adj
ditional 100000 we're well under
way.
Our Own Fighting Doctrine.
A similar scheme was adopted in
August, 1917, for our armies. in which |
the Importance of teaching through
out our forces a sound fighting doc
Urine of our own was emphasized. II /
provided for troop training in all units
up to include divisions. Corps cen /
tiers of instruction for noncommissiOn- |
ed officers and unit commanders of /
all arms were established. The army /
and corps schools graduated 1880 /
officers and 1876 /
officers.
Pending The Organization and deyel- (
Opment of our own schools, large
number of our officers were sent to
centers of instruction of the allied
armies. The training of our earlier
divisions was begun in close associ-
alton with the French divisions, under
conditions set forth in the following
on divisional training:
Trench warfare naturally given
prominence to the defensive as OPP
DOSeu TO I0e Ole0SlNC. lO Sudi u
against this. the basis of instruction
should be essentially the offensive
both in spirit and In practice. The
defensive is accepted only to prepare
or future offensive"
The long period of trench warfare
had so impressed itself upon the
french and British that they had al
most entirely dispensed with training
or open warfare. 1t was to avoid
his result In our army and to encour-
Ige the offensive spirit that the fol-
owing was published in October, 1917:
"The above methods to be employed
must remain or become distinctly our
wn.
"All instruction must contemplate
he assumption Of a vigorous often
i've. This purpose win be empha-
lied In every phase of training until
/ becomes a settled habit Of thought.
1.-The rifle and the bayonet are the
principal weapons Of the infantry SOL
IL