Missouri Valley times. [volume] (Missouri Valley, Iowa) 1874-1931, 1920-01-08

quest OF Russia ana, II possible. pre-.
vent German attack on Italy. or in
the Near East. the allies sought to
maintain the offensive on the western
front as far as their diminished
strength and morale would permit.
Notwithstanding these allied attacks
on the western front. the immense
gains by the German armies in the
east. eliminating at Riga on Sept. 8.
precipitated the collapse of Russia.
The following months, the Australians
with German assistance-surprised the
Italians and broke through the lines at
Caporetto. driving the Italian armies
back to the Piave river. infiicting loss
Of 100000 men. 100000 rifles. 5000
guns. and enormous stores. This seri-
Gus crisis compelled the withdrawal of
ten French and British divisions from
the western front to Italy. The Ger
man situation ON all other theaters was
so favorable that as early as Noyem-
Der they began the movement of divi-
sions toward the western front. II
needed. her divisions could he with
drawn from the italian front before
the French and British dared recall
their divisions.
AT 6rst the allies could hardly hope
for large American army. Marshal
Joffre during his visit to America had
made special request that combat
division be sent at once TO Europe az
visual evidence Of our purpose to par
ticipate actively in the war. and also
asked for engineer regiments and other
special service units.
The arrival Of the first division and
the parade of certain of its elements In
Paris on July caused great enthusi-
asm. and for the time being French
morale was stimulated. Still. allied
apprehension was deep-senled and ma.
terial assistance was imperative.
Outlook Dark for 1918.
A review of the situation showed
that with Russia 'out of the war the
central powers would be able 10 release
large number of divisions for service
elsewhere, and that during the spring
and summer of 1918. without interfer-
Ing with the status quo at Suloniki,
they could concentrate on the western
front a force much stronger than that
OF the allies. In view OF this II was
represented to the war department In
December MS of the utmost Importance
thai the allied preparations be expe-
diled.
My conclusion was that, although
the morale of the German people and
of the armies was better than ii had
been for two years. only an untoward
combination of circumstances could
give the enemy decisive victory be.
fore American support as recommend
ed could be made effective, provided
the allies secured unity of action.
However. situation might arise which
would necessitate the temporary use Of
all American troops In the units Of our
allies for the defensive, hut nothing in
the situation justified the relinquish-
ment OF our firm purpose to form our
own army under our own flag.
While the Germans were practicing
for open warfare and concentrating
their most aggressive personnel In
shock divisions. the training of the
allies was still limited to trench war
fare. AS our troops were being trained
for open warfare. there was every rea-
son why we could not allow them to he
scattered among our allies. even by III.
visions. much less as requirements, ex-
cept by pressure of sheer necessity.
Any sort of permanent nmalgamatlon
would lrrevocably commit Americas
fortunes to the hands of the allies.
Moreover. ii was obvious that the lack
Of hOmogeneity would render these
mixed divisions difficult TO maneuver
and almost certain to break up under
stress of defeat, with the consequent
mutual recriminatfOn.
Again. there was no doubt that the
realization by the German people that
independent American divisions corps
or armies were in the field with deter
mined purpose would he a severe blow
to German morale and prestige. II was
also certain that an early appearance
of the larger American units on the
front would he most beneficial to the
morale Of the allies themselves.
/ Accordingly, the first division. OF
! Jan. 10. 1918. took over sector NORTH
of Toul; the twenty-siXth division went
to the Scissors front early in Febru
airy; the forty-seronh division entered
! the line near Lunevllle. Feb. 81. ant
the second division near verdun
March Is. Meanwhile. the first arm!
corps headquarters. Major Gen. Hunter
l.iggett commanding. was organized Al
Neufchateau on Jan 90. and the plul
to create an independent American sec
tor on the Lorraine front was takini
shape.
This was the situation when tn,
great German offensive was Launched
| on March 81. 1918.
Figured on Fl Divisions.
The war department planned a
earIy as July. 1917. to send TO Franc
nv June Is. 1915 twpnty-One division
Of the then strength OF 100000 mel
each. together will, auxiliary and re
placement troops. making a total O
some G5O.OOO men While The number
fell short of my recommendation q
July 6. 1917 which contemplated a
least l.OO0.OOD men by May 1918.
should he borne In mind that tn
main factor in the problem WAS tn
amount of shipping to become avail
4 able for military purposes. IN wh,c
! must he included tonnage required 4
supply the allies with steel, coal an
food.