New-York tribune., 1920-05-08
The Polish OtH9ensiue
By Frank II. Simonds
Copyright. 1920, New York Tribune Inc

n. l4rary men as the representatives of
he old order, as the direct agents Of
Czarism, largely explained their failure.
In the second place, Poland has a real
army, estimated at 100000 trained men,
and not too badly equipped with the en-
glnes of war. 1t is immeasurably su-
perior to Bolshevist armies, it has some
officers of real merit, and it has derived
from the Western allies a very consid-
cradle stock of war material. That the
Bolshevists can muster a force anything
like as formidable seems incredible.
Danger in the West
Poland's real danger must come from
the West, where the nations which are
eager to get back to trading relations
with the Russians will hardly be pleased
to see new war breaking out in the
| east of Europe. A sweeping Polish vic
tory, moreover, would mean All ire
| slstible demand on the part of the Poles
for their frontiers of 1772; that is, for
the line of the Dnieper River in the cast.
as we'll as for some sort of SOVEREIGNTY
over Lithuania.
The peace conference has fixed nice.
comfortable boundaries for Poland
These boundaries do not in the least
correspond with Polish wishes, Polish
traditions, Polish rights. The only rea-
son that they might be accepted would
be found in Polish weakness. But if
Polish armies sweep the Russians out
of their pathway and begin a march
toward Moscow, then there is an end of
the argument of weakness. Poland will
no longer be a suppliant; she can i'm
pose terms on Russia, and the Western
nations may go hang
A Poland of at least forty millions of
people-that is, with state equal in
population to France and exceeding
Italy in area-is thus by no means an
impossible outcome of the present situa-
ton. Nor is such a Poland likely to
look with resignation upon any new Ger
man effort to regain Posen and West
Prussia or to retain Upper Silesia. The
Poles and the Germans are hereditary
enemies. Nothing can change this.
Therefore Poland, if she can obtain Sc
curity in the East, is bound to turn
west again to face her one implacab1e
enemy
French Backing
All this falls in admirably with
French policy. France naturally well
comes the rise of strong Poland on
the eastern side of Germany, bound in
the nature of things to be French ally.
bound to have similar policies so far as
Germany Is concerned, and certain to be
an influential member of the new Eu-
ropean concert, or discord, as the case
may be. Italy and England, on the con-
trary, do not favor Poland (although the
Italian opposition is not nearly so pro-
nounced as the British) partly because
they have other views in the matter of
Russia, partly because neither would
like to see France obtain so useful and
powerful partner.
In any event, the Polish episode is one
more example of the attempt to estab-
lish frontiers by the mere study of maps
and the application of straight lines to
these maps. To-day the Poles not only
hold more than twice as much territory
as was awarded to them by Paris, but
claim at least third more. Nor do
their claims extend beyond what was
once theirs. Again the truth is revealed
that national units may be liberated, but
controlling them after liberation is
about as difficult as permanently exer-
cising the same sort of direction over
children risen to the age of maturity
and the station Of voters on their own
hook.