New-York tribune., 1920-03-14

and exhaustion stopped the offensive
in November. But its strategical
purpose was accomplished. For Lu.
dendorn had realized that he could
no longer afford to stay on In the
shattered Noyon salient, and during
the winter months he prepared to
evacuate it and retire to the newly
constructed Hindenburs line.
The Somme was q substantial AL
led victory, although its results
didn't become apparent until the
spring of 1917. Yet Haig's report
ignored this direct strategical affect
of the operation and only claimed
the achievement Of objectives Of q
general character.
The Somme
Tho Somms. Of course, did relieve
German pressure on Verdun. But
Falkenhayn had lost e. Battle Of
Verdun before the Battle of the
Somme began. Tho Allied Western
offensive Of 1915 didn't prevent Ger
many from reSstablishing the Aus
tro-Hungarian front, broken by
Brusilof's attacks. Nor did it hin
der the Germans from crushing Ru-
mania and entering Bucharest. 1t
did wear down the German Western
armies. But the British and French
losses probably exceeded the German
losses. As IN experiment. in attri-
ton its vslus was doubtful. It is
counted as q successful Allied opera-
ton solely because It produced m
effect-or after ef1ect-of genuine
strateg4cal consequence: tho Ger
man retreat to tho Hindenburg
line.
The policy Of wearing out" on
the West front recommended itself
to tho Allies in 1915 and 1919 be-
cause they had then a great pre-
ponderance in crude man power. But
in 1917, when it was manifest that
the revolution was going to liquidate
Russia's partnership in tho Entente,
the Allied preponderance quickly
vanished. But for Germany's folly
in goading the United States into
taking up arms, the European
struggle would have been practically
equalized in the fall Of 1917 and
military probabilities would have
pointed TO draw-practicalIy a vic
tory for Germany, because she had
SO big a margin of territorial gains
to bargain with.
American Aid
Americas aid could arrive only
very slowly; and in the interval. the
Western Allies would be at disad-
vantage. A policy Of continued ac-
tivity in 1917, therefore, involved
the risk Of overstraining British and
French resources before the Ameri-
can reinforcement became avail
able. The British and French COM
mAnds were greatly heartened, how
ever, by the Hindenbure retreat. !
They dreamed Of another breakinp-
through operation on a great scale.
Nivelle, who had succeeded Joffre
at the head Of tho French armies.
had an extraordinarily saneuine
temperament. He had 1nisintsrpret-
ed LudendorR's very sensible retire
ment. He had also overestimated
the progress made toward a return
Of the war Of movement. He per
'uaded the French and tho British
governments that the time was rine
% break the German line, and to
5rive the enemy out Of France and
Belgium.
. He started out in the spring of
81 IRON tne Aisne Valley, expect
ng to reach Laon in two or three
lays. His plans went aniss. and {
hough he made some local gains {
ne'r cost was exorbitant. His :
Whole conception was unsound and ]
ne French government soon dis
'laced him in favor Of Petain. Dur.
ng the rest Of 1917 the French
ought warily and sparinely. a. tho
trategic situation and their own in
ernal difficulties required them to
TO- But the British continued to
ound away at the Germans from,
april until December.
When Nivelle Failed
Field Marshal Haig doesn't de-
crlbe his 1917 campaign as a second
ilase OF the wearing out battle
ne f1rst part Of it, the Battle Of Ar
rs, was intended to dovetail into Nj.
elle's break-through toward Laon-
'lvelle having failed completely. The
iritish attack continued into lime
local operation, mainly hec.,,..