Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1920-01-25

concurrence tOr Udu the scales dropped
from the navys eyes?) the best naval
opinion" decided that there was
pressing need for both ba tile cruisers
and scout cruisers. and this decision
came after Great Britain had six bat
tie cruisers and about a score or more
scout cruisers in her fleet. and with
as many more building or authorized.
As further proof tina. Congress
will cheerfully follow the best naval
opinion" if it can recognize it out OF
the great volume of opinions given it,
in 1916. five battle cruisers and six
scout cruisers were added. Unfortu-
nately the eXigencies of a war on the
sea. which demanded the rapid build
ing of type to fight the submarine,
has delayed the building of these es-
sential war ships. The battle cruisers
have not been begun and only three OF
the scout cruisers keels have been
laid
The general BOARD in its recent re-
port recommended one battle cruiser
ten scout cruisers and five hOtilla
leaders 1t has this to say upon the
use of the scout cruiser in the late
war:
Great Britain found this type
(scout cruiser) of vessel very neces-
sary in connection with the operation
of her fleet in the North sea. Such be-
ing the case. we have far greater need
for these vessels. as it is not likely
that any operations in which our fleet
may engage would be confined or linn
tied to an area as small as the North
sea-
In the battle of Jutland fought May
81 1916. Admirals Jellicoe and
Beatty had twenty-siX scout cruisers,
fourteen with the battle cruiser fleet
and twelve with the battle fleet. The
rest OF the scout cruisers were on de-
tached duty of vital Importance and
did not get into the action.
Battle Formation.
The battle cruiser fleet under Ad-
miral Beatty began the action. The
li3ht cruiser squadrons (scout cruis-
p. from the Lion (Beatty's fiagship).
Ships spread on a line of direction
E. n. E. and w. S. w. five miles
apart The screen consisted of
eleven scout cruisers. The remaining
three were aiding the destroyers to
screen the battle cruisers from close
submarine attack and were near the
big ships.
The first report of enemy vessels |
was received from the Galatea (scout |
crulser). the flagship of Commodore |
E. 5. Alexander-Si Sinclair. command
ing the first light cruiser squadron. |
who at 2:s0 pm. sighted two enemy |
vessels to the Z. S. E." At 2:35 pm
the same vessel reported large /
amount of smoke, as from a fleet. !
The light cruiser screen then spread I!
10 the eastward. developing the en-
one squadron came in at high speed |
toward the battle cruisers and formed !;
4 screen ahead of them.
BY means of his scout cruisers both |
Beatty and Jellicoe maintained touch /
With the enemy and forced it to fight. |
Visibility was low. and without the |
scout cruiser squadrons it would |
have been quite impossible for the /!
grand fleet to have brought the en- I
emy to action. Darkness alone pre-. |
vented a decision.
Many substitutes for scout cruisers |
have been proposed. The dirigible, |
the aeroplane ship, submarines and |
The destroyer. Under certain condi- |
lions these auxiliaries can locate and |
report the enemy's position. but there |
are many duties performed effective |
" by the scout cruiser impossible for |
he above types. A dirigible cannot |
ocate a fleet when visibility is low
without great danger to itself. In !!
he battle of Jutland the Engadine. |
seaplane carrier, sent up one plane. !
lifficult. The seaplane did not sue |
ICED in sighting either the enemy bat |
lie cruisers or his battle fleet.
The submarine of even twenty |
Knots speed could not have secuted !
IN such an action. for the battle /
knots. while the battle fleet maintain !
I'd twenty. Submarines would have /;
been left far in the rear.
The destroyer has neither the sea |
nor the heavy weather |
'peed to scout and can be readily sunk /,
by a scout cruiser if. encountered in !
even moderately rough weather.
The results at Jutland showed that !
for effective work not less than ten |
knots excess speed over the fleets |
battle speed is necessary for a scout |
cruiser.
In the isolated case of a slow-mov-
ing fleet. carrying with it large |
train of transports and auxiliaries. |
such as might be launched against US i
with the object of invasion, subma-
rine scouts would be most useful and
could obtain their information with
out the necessity of fighting for it as
would a scout. This case is only one
Of many that are possible in war.
Secure Best Opinion.
Inasmuch as the Navy and not Con-
gress must be held responsible for
past mistakes. and through its mis-
takes will be the severest sufferer, 1t
is only fair to the Navy to grant it
the right to contain within itself
sure vehicle by which Congress may
obtain the best naval opinion on all
naval professional matters.
The War College. now a highly hon.
ored institution where the art of ma
val war is studied and taught to all
naval officers, must never again be-
come an isolated and discredited seat
of learning. The executive and ad-
organs of the naval es-
ia blishment must not lose sight of the
ultimate object of navy, and that
to be successful in war the only meth
cd is conscientious and progressive
study of the art Of naval war. basing
all decisions upon the fundamental
uncovered by such studies.
The ten scout cruisers already au-
thoriZed by Congress are to be ad-
vanced types. Their displacement is
TO be 100 tons. with speed of thir-
ty-five knots. They will burn oil and
be driven by turbines with reduction
gear. They will carry battery of
nine siX-inch. 35-caliber guns. two
three-inch anti-aircraft guns and two
twenty-one-inch torpedo tubes.
These ten vessels will be most useful
and will in a measure give to the
battle fleet that security which it now
sorely lacks.
1t is not nearly enough however.
and our battle fleet in 1923. when all
vessels authorized are completed. con-
and six battle cruisers. will feel at
most insecure from possible raids of
enemy battle cruisers. destroyers and
submarines, and will frequently find
itself unable to obtain reliable infor-
nation upon which to base essential