New-York tribune., 1920-02-02


to apply that name to some of the
great constitutional struggles which
arose between the House Of Commons
and the executive authority in Great
| Britain in the days before tho question
had finally been settled in favor Of the
House Of Commons.
What. then, may we fairly expect
| from the United States in this great
crisis of world policy. for crisis, in
decd, it is? If the participation of the
united States was enormous helpful
In securing the victory in the critical
months Of 1913, its help will be even
more essential to secure stability in
peace. Without the United States the
present league of nations may become
little better than a league of the Allies
for armed self-defcnse against a re-
vival of Prussian militarism or against
a sinister sequel to 30 shcvism in
Russia. Bolshevism is despotism, and
despotisms have tendency to become
militaristlc, as the great French Revo-
luton proved. The great object Of the
league of nations is to prevent future
wars and to discourage from the be-
ginning the growth Of aggressive
armaments which would lead to war;
Should Operate at Once
''For this purpose it should operate
first years OF peace. to establish a rep
utation for Justice, moderation and
strength. Without the United States
it will have neither the overwhelming
physical nor moral force behind it that
it should have, or if it has the physical
force it Will not have the same degree
of moral force, for it will be prcdomi-
nantly European, and not world or
ganization, and it Will be tainted with
all the interracial jealousies of Europe.
With the United States in the league
Of nations war may be prevented and
armaments discouraged, and it Will not
be in the power of tho frctful nations
Of the world to disturb genuine peace.
Without the league Of nations The old
order of things will revive. the old
consequences will recur, there viii
again be some great catastrophe OF
var in which the United States viii
again find itself compelled to intervene
for the same reason and at no less nor
even greater cost than in 1917.
at would be mistake to suppose
that the American people are prepared
or wish to withdraw their influence IN
world affairs. Americans differ among
themselves as to whether they could or
ought TO have entered the war sooner
than they did. II is neither necessary
nor profitable for foreigners to discuss
tins point now. What is common to all
Americans and 60 all foreigners who
know the facts Is the unsetish, whole
hearted spirit in which the American
nation acted when it came into the war
The immediate adoption of compulsory
military service and, even more, the
millions and millions of households
over such a vast area, not by compul-
sion but by purely Voluntary action in
response to an appeal which had no
compulsion behind ii, is a remarkable
and even astonishing example Of ma
tional spirit and idealism
Should Enter Pact Willingly
"That spirit is still there. 1t is
as much a part of the nature and
possibilities of the American people
as any other characteristic. 1t is not
possible for such a spirit to play such
part as it did in the war and then
to relapse and be extinguishcd al
together. 1t would be a great mis-
take to suppose that because the citi-
zens of the United States wish to limit
their obligations shey therefore pro
pose to themselves to play small part
in the league of nations. II they enter
the league as willing partners with
limited obligations, it may we'll be that
American opinion and American action
inside the league viii be much more
fruitful than if they entered as q
reluctant partner. who felt that her
hand had been forced. 1t is in this
spirit, in this hope, and in this expecta-
tion that | think we should approach,
and are justified in approaching cen
sideration Of American reservations.
81 do not deny that some of them arc
material qualifications Of the league Of
nations as drawn up at Paris or that
they must be disappointing to those
who arc wish that covenant as it stands
and are even proud of it, but those who
have had the longest experience of po-
litlcal affairs, and especially OF treaties,
know best how often it happens that
difficulties which seem most form ida Bile
arise IN practice. think this is likely
to be particularly true in the working
OF the league of nations. The difficult
ties and dangers which the Americans
foresee in it will probably never arise
or be felt by them when they are once
in the league. And in the same way
the weakening and injury to the league
which some of its best friends appre-
hend from the American reservations
wculd not be felt in practice.
III the outcome OF the long contro-
cooperation in the league Of nations it
would be the greatest mistake to refuse
that cooperation because conditions arc
attached to it. and when that co0pcra.
ton is accepted let it not be accepted
IN a spirit OF pessimisn
THE most vital siderations are
that representatives should be ap-
pointed to the council of the league of
nations by all the nations That are
members Of the council; that these rep
spired by the ideals for which we
sentatives should be instructed and
supported in that same spirit OF equity
and freedom by the governments and
are now partners in peace. If that be
the spirit in which the council of the
league of nations deals with the bust
ness that comes before it, there need
be no fear that the representatives of
the United States on that council will
net take part in realizing the hopes
with which the league has been founded.
There is one particular reservation
winch must give rise to some difficulty
in Great Britain and self-governing do
mlnions. 1t is that which has reference
to the six British votes in the as
semby of the league of nations. The
governing dominions are full mem
bers of the league. They will admit
and Great Britain can admit no quail
hcaton whatever of that right. What
ever the self governing dominons may
be in the theory and the letter of the
constitution, they have in effect ceased