New-York tribune., 1920-09-16
England and The Souiets
By William English Walling

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they are based on the "guaranties
exacted from q defeated nation against
a repetition Of the act of aggression"
The British press comments Of all
shades Of opinion approved. Poland was
the aggressor, Poland had been decisive
ly and finally beaten. Poland must
henceforth remain defenseless against
Soviet threats or attacks, except for
such support as she could rely on from
the great powers! But what was that
support? British opinion backed Lloyd
George again when he said that all
practicable support would be given if
the independence of Poland were "seri
ously menaced"-thus assuming that
neither the existence of Soviet Russia
as a neighbor nor the presence of her
victorious armies in defeated Poland
was serious menace to Polish indc-
pcndence. Finally, when the Soviet
armistce terms were published, demand
impotence in the face Of the Bolshevist
peril, British opinion still held that
Polish independence was not seriously
menaced and that the terms were rea-
sonable! Why? Because Poland could
rely absolutely upon British and other
protection only in case her independence
were seriously menaced!
Sorict Faith
Since British opinion and govern
mental policy crystallized in this form,
two events have happened. British
opinion, with practical unanimity-
even The London Times and Post
agreeing-held that the Minsk negotia-
tions were to be the test of Bolshevist
good faith. Warsaw being on the verg"
Of capture, the Soviets added a clause
to their armistice terms, which they
hoped would Sovietizc Poland, by de-
manding militia composed exclusive
ly of workingmen. This, then, was
apparently the final blow needed to
destroy British belief in Bolshevist
good faith Not at all. British opinion
again supported Lloyd George in de-
clar;ng that if this clause were not
withdrawn the Bolshevists would be
convicted of bad faith. Later, when
Warsaw was saved and the Soviet ar
mics defeated, the Soviets withdrew
this new clause. Now, as Lloyd
Georges own organ, The Chronicle,
admits, "it is one thing to act in good
faith and another to act in bad faith
and then abandon the attempt under
pressure The Soviets did far worse
than that. If they are to be success
fully negotiated with, it must be pos
sibc to bank not only on their good
faith, but also on their moderation
But when, under defeat, they repeated
the armistice terms of conquerors,
withdrawing only the one new clause
and leaving some fifteen others, they
were really taking much more ag-
gressive position"
With this foundation for British
policy and opinion, are we to wonder
at the continued arrogance and ag-
gressiveness either of the Russian So
viets or of the British Council of Ac-
ton? Lloyd George does not miscon-
ceivc the nature of the Soviet regime
in Russia and he realizes the impor-
tance of "its threat to bring the world
to destruction" either the Bolshc-
visit threat to the British empire in the
East, their monopoly of Russia's grains
and raw materials or a mixture of
these and similar factors have led
him to the view that Great Britain
is forced to compromise. This is un-
doubtedly the feeling of the British
pubic-asde from the Council of Ac-
ton.