Rock Island Argus. (Rock Island, Ill.) 1893-1920, 1920-01-17
DON'T LET BRITISH Pull
lROOL OVER YOUR EYES, = IS
Order SIMS CLAIMS HECOT'
American Commander Also Charges That He Was
Given No Support at Washington for Ten
Months After Fleet Was Abroad.

washington, Jan. 17.-Rear Ad-
miral Sims told the senate commit
tse Investigating naval awards to-
day that when he was ordered to
England. in March, 1917, just be-
fore the United States entered the
var. he was instructed by the navy
dspsrtment mot to let the British
mil the wool oyer your eyes," and
that "we would Just as soon fight
he British as the central powers"
Had Nos Cooperation.
The admiral also charged that
American naval headquarters In
London did not receive cooperation
rom the navy department and that
the department did not arrive at
any decided plan Of action until 10
months after he arrived In London.
he added that at was 10 months be-
fore we really came to the aid OF the
allies or acted ON their recommend
atoms"
s LClltI N0AIIGD NuAA SCs
Admiral Sims testimony was in
the form of a letter to Secretary
Daniels, entitled Some Naval Les
sons OF the Great War;" which Mr.
Daniels received several days ago.
The letter criticized the department
for attempting to administer the de-
tails Of action by the American
naval forces overseas and alleged
that the department demanded that
II be permitted to pass fully on all
plans, even those regarding action
against the enemy.
Admiral Sims letter said the fol-
lowing grave errors" were COM
mttted by the navy department in
yielation Of the fundamental mill
tasy principles.
4. Although war with Germany
"a Aheen, imminent for many
mouths prior to its declaration,
there was nevertheless no mature
plan developed or navy policy
adopted in preparation for war. in
sofar as its commander in Europe
was informed.
"2. The navy department did not
announce a policy until three
months after war was declared
at least not to its representative
and the commander of the forces
In Europe.
Put Strain on Morale.
"3. The navy department did
not enter whole-heartedly into the
campaign for many months after
we declared war, thus putting strain
upon the morale Of the fighting
forces in the war area by decreas-
ing their confidence In their lead
ers.
=. The outbreak of hostilities
found many important naval units
widely dispersed, and in need of
repairs before they could be sent
to the critical area DestrOyers ar
riving in the war zone had been
cruising extensively off our sea-
board and in the caribbean and
when war was declared, were rush
ed through a brief and inadequate
Preparation for distant service.
Did Not Concentrate.
IS. During the most critical
months Of the enemy's submarine
campaign against the allied lines
Of communication, the department
violated the fundamental strategical
principle Of concentration of maxi
mum force in the critical area Of
the conflict.
Is. The departments represent
aave with the allied admiralty was
not supported during the most crit
ical months of the war.
Y. The departments command
er In the critical area of hostilities
was never allowed to select his
principal subordinates and was not
even consulted as to their assign
ment A fundamental principle Of
tne art Of command Is herein In
volved.
=. The navy department made
snd acted upon decisions, concern.
ms operations that were being con-
Quoted 5000 miles away, when con.
aiucrs were such that full informa.
uon could not have been in its pos.
session, thus violating an essential
precept Of warfare that some de-
Ssions necessarily depend upon
complete information.
Proposed tho Impossible.
=. Instead OF relying upon tht
!aosment Of those who hid had
s0uat experience in this peculial
ssriare. the navy department in
slsted upon a number Of plans tha
couid not be carried out.
Az. Many Of the department.
ssuons 20 strongly implied q con
Nuon that It was the most com
asent to make decisions concern
.as operations in the war zone tha
~ result was IN impression tha
= Acked confidence In the 1udg
nsnt Ok its representative on th,
ouncil OF the allies and its re
sponsioie Commander in the field.
lust Have CsnaAenee.
~. u is . fundamental principl,
sua. esery action on the part /
oapsl'os authorities should indicatl
.onnoence In subordinates. Il sucl
confidence Il ,.nhfu~ a. .h~,,l1 a.