Richmond daily register. (Richmond, Madison County, Ky.) 1917-1978, 1920-01-30

the maintenance of the property for
the use of the public imposed by law
and its charter upon the Richmond
and Lexington Turnpike Company,
the original owner.
1t is not perceived that the provis-
ions of what is known as the Free
Turnpike Act confined the right of the
Richmond and Lexington Turnpike
Company to dispose of the bridge and
appurtences to the counties of Madi-
son and Fayette or either, as held by
the Circuit Judge. Section of the
KY. States provides:
"When the entire turnpike purchas-
ed by fiscal court like wholly within
the county by which the same is pur-
chased the transfer of title shall be
made as provided in section seven, and
thereupon, the charter, franchise, and
so FORTH, of any such turnpike or
gravel road shall be at once dissolved
and terminated, but when any portion
of any turnpike, which lies in more
than one county, is purchased as here
in authorized, the little to such part
so purchased shall be conveyed to the
county purchasing it in the manner
before recited, and such tranfer shall
in no wise affect the charter OF privi-
lcges or franchises of any turnpike
road company so selling such portion.
as to the remainder Of the turnpike of
such company. But as to the part
so sold the charter shall be and be-
come terminated, and the company
shall be at once released from any and
all responsibility concerning such por-
ton under its charter or the laws of
the state"
1t is patent from the language of
this Statute that a sale of a turnpike,
other appuitenant corporate property
or franchises of the company owning
it, may be made in fragments. In
other words, by its provisions the
county may purchase Or acquire by
proceedings any part of
a turnpike lying in it's limits, and by
It's further provisions the part not pur-
chased remains the property of the
turnpike company, to hold or assign
or sell to purchaser of its selection
other than the county. The Clays Fer
ry Bridge and approaches although
essential to the use of the turnpike
and in that sense parts of it, were not
purchased by the counties of Madison
or Fayette or acquired by condemna-
ton proceeding, but retained by the
turnpike company, which had the
right to continue to operate them OF
sell the same to the defendant to-
gethcr with the franchise to collect
tolls for the use by the public of the
bridge; and manifestly, of the right
to charge and collect tolls for the use
Of the bridge exists, the public can
have no interest in whether it is cXeT-
cised by the original owner Of the pro-
perty or the defendant.
AS insisted for defendant, the
bridge would be mere Junk" without
the right to the owner to charge and
collect tolls for its use by the travel
ling public, and such light is a fran
chisc valuable as property and can be
assigned OF sold. If, as has been re-
pcatedIy held in this jurisdiction, a
FERRY right is franchise which can
be assigned or sod the same is true
Of n franchise to operate a toll bridge.
Dufour VS.. Stacey, 80 Kv., 1888; Willis
rs. Calhoun, 145 KY, 1906; Trustees of
Maysville VS.. Boone, J. J. Mar, 227.
In Louisville VS.. Cumberland II. &
r. Co, 224 U. s. GAO, it was held that
the city Of Louisville could not inter
fere with the right of the Cumberland
Telephone Company to exercise Il
franchise which had been granted by
the city to the Ohio Valley Telephone
Company and sold by the latter COM
nany to the Cumberland Company;
the. opinion, among other things, de-
nlarin" that whether such a franchise
be called an incorporeal hereditament,
an interest in land, an easement OF
right of way, it is property and "bc-
ing property, it was taxable, alien
able and transferable; and, as pro-
perty, passed to the Cumberland Telc-
phone and Telegraph Company under
the express provision Of the Kentucky
Statutes (Scction 562), which as of
force in 1900 declared that the coEso'i-
dating company should be vested with
all the property, business assets, and
Affects Of the Constituent companies
without deed or transfer, and bound
for all their contracts and liabilities "
The authorities cited seem to bc
conclusive of the question under con-
sideration, and, if SO, it follows that
the injunction issued in this case
should net have been granted. There
fore the motion of the defendant to
dissolve it is sustained and the in
junction dissolved.
The cases of Breathitt Co., VS.. Ham
monds, $50 Ky. SOP, and city of Pine
vile VS.. Pineville Bridge Co., 179 KY
375, relied on by plaintiffs, are not in
point, as in neither case did the
bridge company have statutory au-
thority or corporate fran
chise to operate "a bridge
or charge tolls for it's use. The
conclusion arrived at upon the main
question considered, rendered unneces-
sary the decision of other questions
raised by the defendant in the case.
Chief Justice Carroll and Judge
Thomas sat with me in vacation in
the consideration of the motion and
both concur IN the conclusions ex-
pressed in the opinion. The other
Judges of the Court of Appeals were
absent when the motion was passed
on, but Judges Hurt and Sampson
having heard the opinion read, also
concur therein.
Fol Plaintiffs-O. p Jackson, Rich