New-York tribune., 1920-03-15
The Three Fleets
Our Navy Must Fight on Surface,
Bclop Surface and in Air

To the Editor of The Tribune.
Sir: Toward the close of your ex
celent editorial on Secretary Daniels'
naval programs in your issue Of Marcf
8 you say:
Putting considerations OF world poll
tics aside what have the lessons OF the
war actually taught with respect to fu-
ture naval corstruction7 That Is
question which Mr.. Daniels didn't meet
clearly In his exposition. Lord FIshe,
has been saying that tho old monster
surface ships belong to the past. In his
view warfare at wli be conducted
hereafter largely by submcrsibes and
by aircraft.
Having as a background years of
familiarity with all of Admiral Mahan' s
twenty-five volumes, I have followed
vanced by the proponents of submarine
and aerial naval warfare. The leaders
of both schools are eminent naval of
ficers possessed Of all the qualities that
that connotes. Admiral Fiske, with his
torpedoplane of 1912, is the progcnitor
of aerial naval warfare, as he was of
the naval telescope sight and Of the
range finder. Admiral Lord Fisher is
the sponsor of the mammoth submer-
sible, as he was Of the battle-cruiser
But the positive authority with which
each can support the just claims OF his
new method of naval warfare is likely
to confuse the public mind and lead us
to perilous omissions.
If we except mines or torpedoes laid
or launched from surface craft, naval
warfare before 1914 was fought on but
one level-the surface of the sea. Our
recent war came to be fought on three
levels-in the suhsurface of the sea.
on the surface of the sea as hereto
fore and In the suprasurface of the sea
that Is, in the air.
1t is inconceivable that the greatest
submersible attainable should not have
to sacrifice offensive and defensive ar
mament, cruising radius and speed in
comparison to battleships in order to
realize the distinctive quality Of sub
mersibles-invisibility, though not in
audlbility-in executing strategic
movements and low visibility in COM
bat. We should remember that sub
mersibles, contrary to expectations,
were seldom effective against properly
protected battleships in the recent war.
The outstanding strategic and tao
tlcal advantage of airplanes is the ex-
tremely high speed at which they can
carry out major OR minor movements
over both land and water But
this advantage is obtained at very
great sacrifice of offensive and de-
ienslve armament accompanied with a
great curtailment Of cruising radius or
ability long to sustain independent ac-
ton ever great distances. And, as in
the case of submersibles, few properly
protected capital ships were seriously
damaged by aircraft in the late war;
Offensive warfare under the surface
or in the air is still in a rudimentary
state. And for that very reason
defensive warfare from the surface
against the subsurface OF the air level
ls in correspondingly undeveloped
state. 1t would be pure conjecture to
attempt to forecast the extent to
which both the offensive and the de-
fensiye Of each of the three levels NAV
be developed or the relative controls
that warfare proper to any one level
may come to have on that of the other
two levels.
One thing, however, seems certain
1t would be the height of folly to
abandon the ability to command the
surface by surface navy merely hs-
cause some expect that the subsurface
or the air will come to command the
surface. Indeed, there are reasons.
somewhat technical, that point to the
command of the surface as being es-
sential to subsurface or air effective
ness in the intercontinental wars of
the future.
In view of the entirely indetermi-
nate state of subsurface and aerial
naval warfare, and in view of their
relations to surface fleets, the con-
cIusion seems unavoidable that surface
fleets should be maintained as the
malnstay of naval power. Let US not
cast aside proved weapon for one of
novel type, even though the latter
gives promise of becoming ultimately
more effective. But that is not to saw
that we should not press forward in
developing as rapidly as possible the
most effective types of submersib)es
and aircraft. This done, in all prob
ability we shall find that in order to
have naval command we cannot relv on
but one type of feet, as we did before
1914, but must have three commanding
fieets-that of the subsurface, that of
the surface and that of the air. all
supporting each other.
WILLIAM HOWARD GARDINER
New York, March 10, 1920