The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1920-04-25

which had ever been adopted by any
navy L detached from all other duties
five officers, Captain F. H. Schofield.
Captain H. E. Yarneu (who exchanged |
places afterward with Captain L Nc
Nance of the Plans Section of the
Navy Department.. and Colonel r. III.
Dunlap (of the Marines who was sue
ceeded by Colonel l.. McC. Little, when /
ordered to command regiment of ma
rine in France. These men made it /
their business to advice the Comman-
der in Chief son any questions that |
might arise. We were graduates of the |
Naval War College at Newport, and |
they applied to the consideration of !
war problems the lessons which they |
had learned at that Institution.
Work of the Planning Section.
The business of the Planning Sec
ton was to make studies of particular |
problems, to prepare plans for future |
operations and also to criticize fully |
the organization and methods which
were already in existence. The mere
fact that these men had no admins
trative duties and that they could
| therefore devote all their time to sur
veying our operations, discovering mis-
takes, and suggesting better ways of
doing things. as well the fact that
they were themselves scholarly stu
dents of naval warfare, made their
1abors exceedingly valuable. I gave
them the utmost freedom in finding
fault with the existing regime; there
was no department and no office, from
that of the Commander in Chief down,
upon whose activities they were not at
liberty to submit the fullest and the
! fv.ova nrfc be
done in a better way, we certainly
wanted to know il.
{ Whenever any specific problem OF
/ importance came up, it was always
/ submitted to these men for a report
The value of such a report depended
upon the information available, and it
was the business of the Intelligence
Department of the staff to supply
this. If the desired information was
not in their files. or the files of the
Allied Admiralities, or was not up to
date, it was their duty to obtain it at
once. The point is that the Planning
Section had no other duties beyond
rendering a decision, based upon a
careful analysis of the facts bearing
upon the case, which they submitted in
writing.
There was no phase of. the naval war
fare upon which, the officers of the
Planning Section did not give us re-
lports. One of their favorite methods
was to place themselves in the posi-
ton of the Germans and to decide
how. if they were directing German
naval operations, they would Illustrate
the tactics of the Allies. Their records
tcontain detailed descriptions OF how
merchant ships could be sunk by sub
marines, and these methods, our Off
hal
provement over those used by the
lGermans. Indeed, / think that many
of these reports, had they fallen into
the hands of the Germans, would have
been found by them exceedingly use
full. There was general impression,
in our own navy, as well as in the
British, that most of the German sub
marine commanders landed their boats
Iunskillfully and obtained inadequate
results. All these documents were
given 70 the responsible men in our
forces, as well as to the British, and
had considerable influence upon op-
erations. The British also established a
planning Section which worked har-
Imoniously with our own.
Specializing on German Attack.
A subject upon which our Planning
Section like to speculate was the pos
sible sortie of the German fleet. The
possibility OF a great naval engage
ment filled the mind of most naval Of
Ulcers; and, after he had sent five of
of our battleships to reinforce Admiral
Beattys squadron, this topic became
even more interesting TO American
naval men. Would the Germans ever
come out? What had they to gain or
lose by such an undertaking? What
were their chances of victory? Where
would the engagement be fought, and
what part would the several elements
of modern warfare play in il, mines,
submarines, battle cruisers, airplanes,
dirigibles and destroyers. These were
among the questions with which the
Planning Section busted itself, and this
Iproblem, like many others, they ap-
preached fro mthe German standpoint.
} They placed themselves in the position
} of the German High Command. and
lpeered into the Grand Fleet, lookin Z
for a weakness which, If they were
Germans, they might turn to account
| in a general engagement. The only
uaaL Snof our PLANNING SaPtinp pCuiId