Pullman herald. [volume] (Pullman, W.T. [Wash.]) 1888-1989, 1920-01-23
.Pershing's Story
CONTINUED from last week.

The problem confronting the Amer
lean expeditionary forces was then "a
SuperimpoSe its rail communications
| on those of France where there would
be the least possible disturbance ~
the arteries of supply of the two great
allied armies already In the field. The
lines selected, therefore, were thoss
leading from the comparatively un.
used South Atlantic ports Of France
to the northeast, where It was belev-
ed the American armies could be EN-
plOyed to the best advantage,
For all practical purposes the Amer.
lean expeditionary forces were based
on the American continent. Three thou
sand miles of ocean to cross, with the
growing submarine menace confront
ing us, the quantity of ship tonnage
that would be available then I'M
known, and line of communications
by land 400 miles long from French
ports to our probable front presented
difficulties that seemed almost insur-
mOuntable as compared with those of
our allies.
In providing for the storage and dis
tribution of reserve supplies an al
lowance OF AS days in the base sec
tons was planned, with 30 days in the
intermediate section. and Il days in
the advance section. After the safe
ty of our sea transport was practical
ly assured this was reduced to total
of As days, distributed proportiOnate-
ly. When the armistice was signed all
projects for construction had been
completed and supplies were on hand
to meet the needs of 100000 men,
while further plans for necessary con-
struction and for the supply of an ad-
ditional 100000 were we'll under
way.
Our Own Fighting Doctrine.
similar scheme was adopted in
August, 1917, for our armies, in which
the Importance of teaching through
out our forces a sound fighting doc
trine of our own was emphasized 1t
provided for troop training in all units
up to include divisions Corps cen
tiers of instruction for noncommission-
ed officers and unit commanders of
all arms were established. The army
and corps schools graduated 1880
noncommissioned officers and 1876
officers
Pending the organization and devel-
Opment of our own schools, a large
number of our officers were sent to
centers of instruction of the allied
armies. The training of our earlier
divisions was begun in close associ-
alton with the French divisions, under
conditions set forth in the following
paragraph on divisional training:
Trench warfare naturally given
prominence to the defensive as OPP
posed to the offensive. To guard
against this, the basis of instruction
should be essentially the offensive
both in spirit and in practice. The
defensive is accepted only to prepare
for future offensive"
The long period of trench warfare
had so impressed itself upon the
French and British that they had al
most entirely dispensed with training
for open warfare. 1t was to avoid
this result in our army and to encour-
age the offensive spirit that the fol,
lowing was published in October 1917:
THE above methods TO be employed
must remain or become distinctly our
own.
"All instruction must contemplate
the assumption of vigorous often
sive. This purpose will be empha-
sized in every phase of training until
1t becomes a settled habit of thought.
1.-THE rifle and the bayonet are the
principal weapons of the infantry sol
der. He will be trained to a high
degree of skill as a marksman. both
on the target range and in field firing.
An aggressive spirit must be devel-
oped until The soldier feels himself. as
bayonet fighter. invincibe IN battle.
"All officers and soldiers should real
ize that AT no time in our history has
discipline been so important therefore
discipline of the highest order must be
eXacted at all times. The standards
for the American army will be those of
West Point. The rigid attention, up
right bearing, attention TO detail. I'M
complaining obedience to instructions
required of the cadet will be required
of every officer and soldier of our
armies in France"
Unfortunately many divisions did
not receive the requisite amount of
systematic training before leaving the
states and complete preparation of
such units for battle was thus often
seriously delayed.