New-York tribune., 1920-03-12

information on departments decision
"In reply the Navy Department
cabled me on August 20 their refusal
to approve this recommendation, az
follows:
"'Replying to your No. 2ss, United
States believes that the strategic sit
uation necessitates keeping battleship
fore consider the suggestion of sending
q part Of it across. The logic Of the
situation would prevent the entire force
going over except In case Of extreme
necessity. Tho department desires that
you discuss the situation with Admiral
Mayo upon arrival.
".ADMIRAL BENSON"
Sims followed this with letter to
Benson, dated September !, in which
he said in part:
"No man can tell what the outcome
of this war will be. But whatever the
outcome proves to be we must at the
end find ourselves in position which
can be justified on sound military prin-
ciples. Can we afford to have history
record that the Allies asked for rein
forcements and that we declined to
send them?"
Benson Sought Plan of Action
Admiral Benson replied, September
"a, as follows:
eve are not willing to send a por-
tion Of the battleship force and do not
intend to unless very much stronger
arguments are produced than have 80
far been set forth. 1t has been sur
prise and disappointment that no defi-
mite plan Of operation of the combined
forces Of the Allied naval powers has
been taken up and decided upon long
ere this. I consider this most urgent,
and it certainly should be done at the
earliest possible date, and If nothing
can be done this fall or winter prepa-
rations should be actively under way
to carry out some definite plan Of
operation as soon as the spring of 1918
opens"
1t was following this, in November,
that Admiral Benson arrived in London
for conference with the British Ad-
mlralty. Benson was at once ap-
preached by the British, according to
Sims, on the matter Of the American
dreadnought decision. and within a
few hours" was convinced and sent q
cable back to Washington, dated No
vember 8, indorsing the recommends
ton which Sims had made several
months previous.
Sims traced his experience in trying
to get the department. to comply with
his request, ndorsed by the Allied
naval authorities, that American sub
marines be sent across to assist in
the antl-submarine campaign and as
scouts for oonvoys. He had FIRST pro-
posed this as far back as April 10, 1917,
but on June % specifically recon-
mended that all available submarines
be sent.
This was followed by similar mes
sages on July 13 and Id, the one of
July 13 urging that some submarines
be sent to the Azores.
II received no reply to any of these
recommendations" said Sims.
When Admiral Mayo, commander in
chief of the Atlantic feet, arrived in
August for conference with the Brit
ish officials, Sims said, the matter was
taken up with him, and he Immediately
wired Washington indorsing the recon-
mendation.
At the end of October, Sims testi
fed, five submarines Of the X class
arrived at the Azores, approximately six
months after he had first called the
attention of the department to the
value of submarines and anti subma-
rine craft. Five submarines of the L
class did not arrive at Berehaven until
the end Of January, Or six months after
he had specifically recommended in
July that they be sent
With regard to tugs, Sims showed
that the delay was almost year after
he first called for them, explaining that
had they been on hand they could have
made possible the salvaging of num-
bers of merchants ships, struck by
enemy torpedoes, that did not sink for
hours after being hit, but COULD not be
towed to port for Jack Of tugs. From
April IA, 1917, to August of that year,
he testified, he sent twelve messages on
the subject which we're never answered.
The only explanation he ever received
for the failure to act was that illegal
technicality" prevented the depart
ment from Communicating tugs.