The Lexington intelligencer. [volume] (Lexington, Mo.) 1901-1949, 1920-01-09

this general Offensive was July nut
lined at the conference no one present
expressed the opinion tina, the inal
victory could he 0 In 1918. In fact.
it was believed by the Mense-Argonne
attack could not be pushed much he
yond MonfaucOn before the arrival Of
winter would force a cessation Of OPP
erntions.
The choice between the " sectors.
thai east OF the Aisne. Including the
ArgOnne forest. or the Champagne
sector. was left to me, In NIX opinion.
40 other allied troops had the morale
or The offensive spirit TO overcome
successfully the difficulties 20 he mel
In Tile Meuse-Argonne sector, and our
plans and Installations had heen pre-
pared for an expansion OF operations
in that direction. So the MeuSe-Ar.
gonne front was chosen. The entire
sector Of $50 kilometers Of FROM ex-
tending from Port-sur-Sellle. euSI of
the Moselle. west TO include the Ar
gonne forest. was accordingly placed
under my command. including all
French divisions then In that
The first American army was 10 pro
coed with the st. Mihlel operation,
after which the ONeration between the
Meuse and the western edge Of The
Argonne forest was to be prepared
and launched not later than Scptem.
Der %.
On the night OF September II the
troops OF the first army were deplOyed
In position. On the southern face OF
the salient was the first corps. Ma
jOr General I.lggett commanding. with
the e~iehty-second. nineticth. afth and
second divisions in line. extending
from the MoseIle westward.
On It's left wal the fourth corps.
Mai. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman com
manding. with the ei~ghty-nInth. forty.
second and first divisions. the left Of
this corps being opposite MOntsec.
These two army corps we're to deliver
the principal attack, the line pivoting
on the center division OF the first
corps, The first division on the left
Of the fourth corps. was charged with
the double mission Of covering its own
flank while advancing some twenty
kllOmeters due n0rth toward the heart
OF the salient. where It was to make
contact with the troops Of the ffth
corps.
On the western face nf thu salient
lay the fifth corps. Mai, Gen. George
Il. Cameron commanding. with the
t~wenty-sixth division. fifteenth French
Colonial division and the fourtI, d.
vision In line. from MouilIy west to
Les Eparges and north to wantrou.
vile. OF these three divisions The
t~wenty-sixth alone was TO Nuke q
deep advance directed southwark 10.
ward vigneulles. The French division
was TO make a short progression to
the edge Of the heights In order 10
cover the left OF the t~wenty.sixth.
The fourth division was not to ad.
vance.
In the center between our .5umh
and NTH army corps. was the second
French Colonial corps. Maj. Gen. e. j.
Blondiat commanding. covering a front
of 40 kilometers with three small
French divisions. These troops were
10 !ellow M the retirement Of the en-.
envy from the tip OF the salient.
AZ dawn on Sept. II, after four hours
of Violent artillery fire OF preparation.
and accompanied by small tanks. the
infantry OF the FIRST and fourth corps
advanced. The infantry OF the nth
corps commenced It's advance AZ s II.
m. The operation vas carried out with
entire precision. Just after dayligh,
on Sept. IS elements OF the irs, aud
twenty-siAth divisions made a junction
near Hattonchatel and v~ignenlles,
eighteen kIlometers northeast or 81.
Mihiei. The rapidity with which our
divisions advanced overwhelmed the
enemy and all detectives were reached
by the afternoon OF Sept. IL. We can.
tured nearly 1900 prisoners. 44s guns
aud large stores Of material and sun.
piles The energy and swiftness with
which the operation was carried ont
enabled Us ia smother opposition "a
such an extent that we suffered less
than 1000 casualties during the actual
period Of the advance.
The material results Of the yIcterv
achieved were very important. An
American army was az accomplished
fact. and the enemy had felt It's power.
No FORM OF propaganda could over.
come the depressing effect on the
morale OF the enemy OF this demon.
straton Of u ability to organize
large American force and drive II sue.
cessfully through his defenses. II gave
our troops implicit confidence in their
superiority and raised their morale 10
the highest pitch. For the iirs, lima
wire enianglemeats ceased 10 he ra.
as impossible barriers ana
open-warfarr training. which had been
50 urgently insisted upon. proved 10 h.
the correct doctrine. Our divisions
the attack With such smsn
and In such high spirits ma,
without the usual rest thoy we're Inn.
medlately available for employment N
heavy lighting IN q now ,heater or On.
erations. The strength OF The ars,
IN this battle totaled approx.
mntely SDO.0m men. OF whom anon,
10000 we're French