New-York tribune., 1920-08-30

whose relation to Foch suggests that
Of Berthier to Napoleon, broke through
between the Russian right and center
and advanced across the line of re-
treat of the Russian right flank, where
as Maunoury threatened the rear anc
communications of all the German
armies in France.
There resulted, as at the Marne, a
general dislocation of the enemy right
and center. The right was compelled
to retire precipitately, while the CEN
ter seems to have been crushed COM
pletely and was thus unable to prevent
the Polish occupation of all the terri
tory between the Bug and the Vistula.
and even the enormously important
Brest-Litovsk bridg.head, on the east
bank of the Bug. Only north of the
Bug, between the river and the Prus-
sian frontier, below Brest, were the
Russians able to hold on briefly and
make final effort to cut Poland off
from the sea.
Meantime, precisely as happened in
the Marne time, while Pilsudski was
weakening his Galician army to save
his capital, drawing troops from his
lett to his right and center, the Boil
shevists redoubled their attacks upon
his left, seeking to get Lemberg as
the Germans in 1914 strove to take
Nancy.
This effort is still in full swing as I
write these lines. But the military ef
tect, the loss of the Galician defenses.
would be far less than the conse-
quences Joffre would have suffered had
the Eastern barrier collapsed In Sep
tember, 1914.
Analogy with the Second Battle of the
the Marine is also more exact as to re-
Its than rs to details. Mangin's
thrust at the Scissors corner, in 1918
IN which American troops participated
glorlously, was again like Maunoury's
before Paris, an attack upon the flank
and thrust at the rear and communi-
cations of the German army fighting
tar to the south. But it was immedi-
ately successful, whereas Maunourv
was counter attacked and almost de-
feated by Kluck Mangin, on the other
hand, took much ground and large
numbers of prisoners, and continued 10
exercise pressure which could be
momentarily checked but never abol-
lshed. German retreat out of the
Marne salient was always inevitable
after the first hours of July 1s, 1918.
The first Marne arrested German in
vaslon and turned it back, but it did
not do more than defea. the first Ger
man bid for a decision in the West
Verdun and the three attacks of 1918
were still to come. BY contrast the
second Marne definitely deprived the
German of the initiative and started
the retreat which ended only with
surrender. In 1914 Joffre lacked the
reserves in men and in munitions 10
exploit his victory. In 1918 Foch had
both
Now, 1t is too soon to say the Battle
of the Vistula has combined the results
of both Marnes. 1t may, be too soon to
Russian power for the offensive. But.
on the other hand, it is manifest that
the Russian armies lack the cohesion
of the French and the British troops of
1914, the power which enabled the lat
ter to retreat for days and then sud
denly to react, the quality to which
kluck ascribes the German defeat at
the Marine and in the war. Disaster
which does not destroy troops of the
first class, competently commanded. is
often fatal in armies Of the sort which
the Bolshevists now possess.
Success by the Poles In resstabl,sh-
ing the line of the Bug and the Narew,
the reoccupation of Lomza and Ostro-
ienka, as we'll as Brest-Litovsk, will
at the least promise transformation
OF the conflict into a war of positions