Pullman herald. [volume] (Pullman, W.T. [Wash.]) 1888-1989, 1920-01-23

In order to hinder the enemy's con
quest of Russia and. If possible, pre-
vent a German attack on Italy. or il
the Near East the allies sought Il
maintain the offensive on the western
front as far as their diminished
! strength and morale would permit.
Notwithstanding these allied attacks
on the western front. the immense
/ gains by the German armies in the
east, eliminating at Riga on Sept. 3
precipitated the collapse of Russia
The following months. the Austrians-
with German assistance-surprised the
Italians and broke through the lines al
Caporetto driving the Italian armies
back to the Piave river. inflicting a loss
Of 100000 men. 100000 rifles. 1900
guns, and enormous stores. This seri-
Gus crisis compelled the withdrawal of
ten French and British divisions from
the western front to Italy. The Ger
man situation on all other theaters was
so favorable that as early as Novem-
Der they began the movement of divi-
sions toward the western front. If
needed, her divisions could be with
drawn from the Italian front before
the French and British dared recall
their divisions.
At first the allies could hardly hope
for a large American army. Marshal
Joffre during his visit TO America had
made special request that a combat
luis -, 20
visual evidence of our purpose to par
ticipate actively in the war, and also
asked for engineer regiments and other
special service units.
The arrival of the first division and
the parade Of certain of it's elements in
Paris on July caused great enthusi-
assn. and for the time being French
morale was stimulated. Still. allied
apprehension was deep-seated and ma
terial assistance was imperative.
Outlook Dark for 1918.
A review Of the situation showed
that with Russia out of the war the
central powers would be able to release
a large number of divisions for service
and summer of 1918, without interfer-
ing with the status quo at SalOniki,
they could concentrate on the western
front a force much stronger than that
of the allies. In view of this it was
represented to the war department in
December as Of the utmost Importance
that the allied preparations be eXpe-
dited.
My conclusion was that although
the morale of the German people and
of the armies was better than it had
been for two years, only an untoward
combination of circumstances could
give the enemy a decisive victory be-
fore American support as recommend
ed could be made effective, provided
the allies secured unity of action.
However. a situation might arise which
would necesstate the temporary use of
all American troops in the units of our
allies for the defensive. but nothing in
the situation justified the relinquish-
ment of our firm purpose to form our
own army under our own flag.
While the Germans were practicing
for open warfare and concentra ding
their most aggressive personnel in
shock divisions, the training of the
allies was still limited to trench war
fare. AS our troops were being trained
for open warfare, there was every rea-
son why we could not allow them to be
scattered among our allies, even by d.
visions. much less as requirements, ex-
cept by pressure of sheer necessity.
Any sort of permanent umalgamatiOn
would irreyocably commit Americas
fortunes to the hands of the allies.
Moreover, it was obvious that the lack
of homogeneity would render these
mixed divisions difficult to maneuver
and almost certain to break up under
stress of defeat with the consequent
mutual recrimnation.
Again, there was no doubt that the
realization by the German people that
independent American divisions. corps,
or armies were in the field with deter
mined purpose would be Il severe blow
TO German morale and prestige. 1t was
also certain that an early appearance
of the larger American units on the
front would be most beneficial to the
morale of the allies themselves.
Accordingly, the first division, on
Jan. 10, 1918, took over sector north
of Toul: the twenty-SiXth division went
to the scissors front early in Fehru-
airy; the forty-second division entered
the line near Luneville. Feb. 81, and
the second division near Verdun.
March Is. Meanwhile. the first army
corps headquarters Major Gen. Hunter
Llggett commanding. WAS organized at
Neulchateau on Jan. 20, and the plan
TO create an Independent American see
tor on the Lorraine front was taking
shape.
This was the situation when the
great German offensive was launched
on March 81, 1918.
Figured on p Divisions.