New-York tribune., 1920-02-27

Ian, lhey N"~au iS~"i w %ho SHite0
~.tes government that the Treaty of
,.,don was entered into in the spring
: 1915 at most critical and danger
-. moment of the war. In thus enter
no the war on the side of human free
,,m Italy made q condition that the
,,I;es should secure for her. as against
Austria Hungary. strategic frontiers
sh;eh would guarantee her in future
.ss;nst retention by the Central powers
= .be strategic command of the north
:, mains of Italy Had the Austro-
sss'a,earian Empire remained in exist
s.,e SIS the ally of Germany the pro-
sS;ors Of the Treaty ot London would
ave been sound. Relying upon the
s,,d of her Allies. Italy endured the
xar to the end.
Bound by Treaty of London
eshe has suffered a loss in killed of
..sr 500 600 men and in wounded of
.sree times that number, while her peo-
ne are burdened by crushing debt. 1t
Tss clearly impossible for her allies
"A declare at the end of the war that
Ser signatures to the treaty mean
retrllE bNN SSAak W tAt'SA "iiN N'oN
.hsv did not intend TO carry out their
Sond. They agreed with President
wilson that these circumstances, under
mich the Treaty Of London was con-
,frded. had been transformed By the
xsr itself The Austro- Hungarian En-
n;re had disappeared, and the menace
q Italy, against which the terms Of
he treaty were intended TO provide
ha1 largely diminished. They there
:srs entirely associated themselves
nth the efforts Of President Wilson to
,erot:s.e settlement between Italy
and Jugo- Savia which would be con-
sonsnt with the new conditions and
xhich was acceptable to both sides.
aut throughout these proposals they
never concealed rom him the fact that
,sev regarded themselves as bound by
he Treaty OF London in the event Of
voluntary agreement not being ar
dve6 at.
"The fact, therefore, that when they
made their proposals of January 90
hey Informed both the Italian and the
Iugo-Slav governments that in the
event ot their not being accepted they
would have no option but 20 allow the
Treaty Of London to come into force,
can have come "a no surprise, and was
indeed the obvious method Of bringing
his lone controversy to q close. They
Tould point out that this declaration
S rot. as tile American government
you'd appear to think, an ultimatum to
lugo-Siavla on behalf OF Italy.
Concerned Over Wilson Threat
"Urder the Treaty of London Italy
has had tc apandon Flume altogether
and hand L over TO JuCo- Siavia. This
sart OF the treaty Is as unacceptable
70 italians a is me transfer Of Dal-
mstia and the islands to Jugo- -Slavia,
The declaration. therefore, in regard
% the enforcement OF the treaty was
sa sttemp. TO promote prompt settle
sent o. t1is dangerous controversy by
gpiating out 20 both sides that if they
teglG not agree upon settlement.
gs.lea aftel .0ng negotiation seemed to
be q fair compromise between their
confictre views, the only alternative
was a. arrangement which was less
paatable o both.
FINALLY the governments of France
s,d Great Britain feel bound to reply
70 the general observations contained
It the latter part of the United States
n,morandum. They know we'll the sim
eerity OF President Wilson'S desire for
he establishment OF order, providing
Ttai guarantees against d repetition of
the terrible events of the last five
Years They are reluctant to believe
that the President can consider that
ihe notifications which they have
mace IN the memorandum OF December
can constitute in themselves justi-
feation for withdrawal from all fur
her cooperation with them in the at
.ar-rt IL hl,1 %b xrOrlG'c
affairs. They feel confident that the
explanations contained in this reply
will remove any MISUNDERSTANDING as
"a the nature OF the Adriatic proposals.
4 the same time, they are deeply con-
serned that the United States should
even contemplate the action 10 which
lhey goter.
"Qne OF -he principal difficulties en-
ccuntered by the heads OF governments
dar!ns tnc negotiations of peace was
nat OF reconciling treaty obligations
with national aspirations which had
changed or come into being since the
Date on which the treaties were signed.
It was obviously impossible TO ignore
ipese latter aspirations, many OF them
corn during the war, and formulated
With uneXampled clarity and elevation
b the President OF the United States
Hmself. Ii was equally clearly impos
able TO ignore treaties; in fact, the
var began IN order to enforce upon
iermany respect for the solemn treaty
she had made nearly eighty years be-
pre- in regard to the neutrality Of Bel
gum.
Task of Statesmen
"lt = the task of the statesmen of
the world to endeavor TO adjust ma
Honal aspirations and ideals. many Of
which are only transitory and ephem-
gal, with one another and with inter
national treaties. The difficulty of the
Rsk the patience required in order to
eject il successfully, the uselessness of
sndeavorlne to enforce preconceived
IDEAS on refractory material have been
Recognized by the one more clearly
'lan the other. and in his address at
Ie opening session of the peace con-
ierence he NJ. Clemenceau) pointed
Out how impossible it was to expect
Imperfect human beings and impe
lfct nations to agree at once upon
deal solutions He made it clear that
n his judgment the only course before
,he peace conference was to do the
pest 1t could in the circumstances and
% create machinery whereby improve
Rents and rectihcations could be effect
eu by reason and common sense under
ne authority of the league of ma
1ons, instead of by resort to war. Ac-
eprdlngly. not only was the league Of
nations established, but Article 8 was
specially inserted in the covenant,
providing that the assembly may from