Pullman herald. [volume] (Pullman, W.T. [Wash.]) 1888-1989, 1920-01-16

| while the Russian revolution was well
under way, and by the midsummer
OF 1917 the final collapse of that gov
eminent was almost certain.
The relatively low strength of the
German forces on the western front
led the allies, with much confidence,
| to attempt a decision on this front;
but the losses were very heavy and
| the effort sgnally failed. The failure
caused a serious reaction, especially
on French morale, both in the army
and throughout the country, and at
| tempts to carry out extensive or COM
| bined operations were indefinitely sus-
! pended.
Sank Millions of Tons.
In the five months ending June 80
German submarines had accomplished
! the destruction of more than 3,250,000
tons of allied shipping. During three
! years Germany had seen practically all
her otfensives except Yerdun crowned
with success. Her battle lines were
held on foreign soil and she had with
stood every allied attack since the
! Marine. The German general staff
| could now foreSee the complete elm
ination of Russia, the possibility of de-
feating Italy before the end of the
| year and, finally, the campaign of 1918
against the French and British on the
! western front which might terminate
! the war.
1t cannot be said that German hopes
! Of final victory were extravagant,
either as viewed at that time or as
viewed in the light of history. Finan-
cial problems of the allies were diff
cult. supplies were becoming exhaust
! ed and their armies had suffered ire
mendous losses. Encouragement ex-
listed not only among the civil pOpula-
| ton but throughout the armies as we'll.
Such was the allied morale that,
| although their superiority on the west
ern front during the last half of 1916
and during 1917 amounted to 20 per
cent, only local attacks could be under
taken, and their effect proved wholly
insufficient against the German de-
Tense. Allied resources in man power
prospect of materially increasing their
armed strength, even in the face of the
probability of having practically the
whole military strength of the Central
Powers against them in the spring of
1918.
This was the state of affairs that ex-
listed when we entered the war. While
our action gave the allies much encOur-
agement, yet this was temporary, and
review of conditions made it appar
ent that America must make supreme
material effort as soon as possible.
After duly considering the tonnage pos
sibilitles | cabled the following to
Washington on July 6, 1917:
"PlanS should contemplate sending
over at least 100000 men by next
May" A general organization project,
covering as far as possible the person
mel of all combat, staff and admins
trative units, was forwarded to Wash.
ington on July II. In this stated:
Needed 1,ooo, 900 Men.
st Is evident that a force of about
100000 is the smallest unit which In
modern war will be complete, we'll
balanced and independent fighting or
ganization. However, 1t must be
equally clear that the adoption of this
size force as q basis OF study should
not be construed as representing the
maximum force which should be sent
| to or which will be needed In France.
! It Is taken as the force which may be
expected to reach France in time for
an offensive in 1918. and as unit and
basis of organization. Plans for the
future should be based. especially ID
reference to the manufacture of artil-
lery. aviation and other material on
three times this force. e., al least
3.OOOOOO men"
Resolved on an Offensive.
Before developing plans for line of
communications II was necessary TO
decide upon the probable sector of the
front for the eventual employment of
| distinctive American force. Our mis-
sion was offensive and it was essential
! to make plans for striking the enemy
where n definite military decision
could be gained. While the allied
armies had cndeavored to maintain the
offensive. The British, In order to guard
the channel ports. were committed TO
| operations. III Flanders and the French
| to the rnrinn of the front protecting
Paris. Goth lacked troops to operate
| elsewhere on 2 large scale
10 the east the great fortified dis