Greenbrier independent. [volume] (Lewisburg, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1980, 1920-01-30

ihiciTS. Lie SllclhS Tcactloll against
our troops at CantiEny WAS extremely
violent, and apparently lie was deter
mined ut all costs to cO,lnteract the
most excellent effect the American
success had produced. For three days
his guns of all calibcrS were concen-
tratcd On our position and counter
attack succeeded counter-attack. Tie
desperate efforts OF the Germans gave
the fighting at Cnntigny seeming
tactical importance entirely out OF
proportion to the numbers involved.
The third German offensive. on May
%. against the French on the tsnc
soon developed II desperate situation
for the allies. The Second division
was hastily diverted to the vicinity OF
Meanx on May 81. and early on the
morning of June I was dcployed
across the Chatcau-Thierry-Par road
near Montreuil-auX-Lion in II gap In
the French line. where it stopped the
German advance on Paris. Al the
same time the partially trained Third
division was placed at French dis
poSal To hold the crossings OF The
Marine, and Us motorized machinr--un
battalion succeeded in reaching t'Ir-
tcau Thierry In time Ia assist in sue
co>SfullN defending that river cross
ing.
The enemy having been halted. the
Second division commenced Il series
of vigorous attacks OH June I which
resulted in the capture of Bcllcau
woods after very severe Fighting. The
village OF BoureScheS was taken soon
after. and on July l VauX WAS cap
t,lred. In these operations the Sec
Ond division met with most desperate
resistance by Germanys best troops.
Our Second corps. under Maj. Gen.
George ". Read. had been organized
for the command of the ten divisions
with the British. which were held
back in trimming areas or assigned to
secOnd-line dcfenseS. After consulta-
ton with Field Marshal Haig on June
3 five American divisions were re-
licred from the British area to SUM-
port the French.
The Marine salient was Inherently
weak and offered an opportunity for
n counter offensive that was obvious.
If successful such an operation would
afford immediate relief to the allied
dcfePse. would remove the threat
against Paris and free the Paris
Nancy railroad. But, more important
than all else. 1t would restore the mo-
rale OF the allies and remove the pro
found depression and fe0r then exist
ing.
Up to this time our units had been
put in here and there at critical points
as emergency troops to stop the ter
rife German advance. In every trial.
whether on the defensive or offensive,
they had proved themselves equal TO
any troops In Europe. As early as
June %. and again on July 1O' ut Bonn
bon ] had very strongly urged that
our best divisions be concentrated.
nnder American command if possible.
for use as a striking force against
the Marine salient. Although the pre-
vailing view among the allies was
that American units were suitable
only for the defensive, and that ut all
events they could be used to better
advantage under allied command, tho
suggestion WAS accepted in principle.
ana my estimate of their offensive
lighting qualities was soon put to the
test.
The enemy had encouraged his sol
dierS TO believe that the July II at
tack would conclude the war with q
German peace. Although he made elah-
crate plans for the operation. he failed
10 conceal fully his intentions, and the
front of attack was suspected at least
one week ahead. On the Champagne
front the actual hour Tor the assault
was known and the enemy was checked
with heavy losses. The Forty.second
division entered the line near Somme
~ immediately, ana five nf its infan.
try bHttalionS and all of It's artillery
became engaged. Southwest Of Rheims
and along the Marine TO the east 6f
Chatcau-Thicrry the Germans were
ut first somewhat successful, pene.
tration of eight kiloinctcrs beyond the
river being effected against the French
Immediately 10 the right Of our Third
division. The following quotation
from the report Of the commanding
general gives the result Of the fighting
ON his front:
None Crossed but Prisoners.
although the rush Of the German
troops overwhelmed some OF the front
line positions, causing the infantry and
innchnc gun companies 80 suffer. in