The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1920-01-04


Three days afterward a badly injured
U-ooat put in at Carthagena, Spain
/ and was interned for the rest of the
war Thus another submarine was
as good as sunk. The Lydonia. a
yacht of 500 tons. in conjunction with
the British ship Basilisk, sank another
i U-boat in the western Mediterranean
This experience illustrates the doubt
that enshrouded all such operations
1T was not until three months after
tine Lydonia engagement took place
that the Admiralty discovered that the
isubmarine had been destroyed and
Mccullough, U. S. N. for a decora-
ton.
Thus from the first day that this
method of conveying ships was adopt
ed it was an unqualified success in de-
feating the submarine campaign. BY
August /, 1917, more than 10000 ships
had been conveyed, with losses of only
one-half of l per cent Up to that
same date not a single shin which
had left North American ports in con-
yoy had been lost. BY August 18th,
PSI ships had been sent in convoy
from North American ports, and OF
these only one had fallen a prey to
the submarines. The convoy gave few
( opportunities for encounters with sub
marines. I have already said that the
great value of this system as a pro-
lection to shipping was that ii com
1 PEELED the underwater boats to fight
their deadliest enemies, the destroyers
/ every time they tried to sink merchant
ships in convoy, and they did not at
/. tempt THIS often on account of the
danger. There were destroyer COM
open sea, conveying huge aggregations
of cargo vessels, without even once
seeing a submarine. To a great ex-
tent the convoy system did its work
in the same way that the grand fleet
performed its Indispensable service
! silently, unobtrusively, making no
dramatic bids for popular favor, and
| industriously plodding on, day after
day and month after month. All this
time the world had its eyes fixed upon
! the stirring events OF the Western
| Front. almost unconscious of the ex-
iiStence of the forces that made those
+ land operations possible. Yet a few
/ statistics eloquently disclose the part
played by the convoy system in win
ming the war. In the latter months of
the struggle from OF to OF per cent of
Allied shipping sailed in conveys. The
losses in these conveys were less than
] 1 per cent And this figure does not
include the ships lost after the dis
persal Of the convoys; in conveys ac-
ltuallv under destroyer escort the losses
were less than one-haf of 1 per cent
| Military experts would term the con-
/, voy system a defensive-offensive meas
ire BY this they mean that II was
| method of taking a defensive position
in order to force the enemy 10 meet
YOU and give you an opportunity Tor
| the offensive. 1t is an old saying that
| the best defensive measure is a vlgor-
Gus offensive one. Unfortunately, ow-
ing 10 he fact that the Allies had not
prepared for the kind Of warfare which
| the Germans saw fit to employ against
them. we could rot conduct purely OF
fensive operations; that is, we could
not employ our anti-submarine FORCES
exclusively in the effort to destroy the
s,,9,.,aariaes. I'D TO the time of the
arnoistice. despite all the assistance
rendered to the navies by the best
scientific brains of the world, no sure
means had been found to keeping track
of the submarine once he suemergeu-
The convoy system was, therefore our
onlv method of bringing him into ac-
ton. lay stress on TINS point anu
reiterate it because many critics kept
Insisting during the war-and their
voices are still heard-that the con-
vov system was purely defensive or
passive method of opposing the SUD
ma fne. and was, therefore, not SOUND
tactics. It is quite true that We hao
to defend our shipping in order 10 Win
the war, but it is wrong to assume
that the method adopted to accom-
piish this protection was purely oe-
fensive and passive one
Work of British Conveys.
AS my main purpose is to describe
the work of the American navy L nave
said little in the above about the ac-
tivitfes of the British navy in convoy
inc merchant ships But we should
not leave this>subject with false per-
spective. When the war ended we had
seventy-nine destroyers in European
waters. while Great Britain had about
400. These included those assigned TO
the grand fleet. to the Harwich force,
to the Dover patrol, to Gibraltar ana
the Mediterranean, and other places,
NAM of which were but incidentally
making war on the submarines AS to
minor ships, trawlers, sloeps. Q-hoats,
Yachts. drifters, tugs. and the other
MISCELLANEOUS types used in this work
the discrepancy was even greater. In
absolute figures our effort thus seems
small one when compared with that
of our great ally. In tonnage Of mer-
chant ships conveyed the work of the
British navy was far greater than
ours. Yet the effort which we con-
tributed was Indispensable to the sue
cess that was attained. For, judging
from the Situation before we entered
the war, and knowing the inadequacy
OF the total Allied anti-submarine
7rd orFa rcd
seems hardly possible that. without the
assistance of the United States navy.
the vital lines OF communication of
the armies in the field could have
been kept open. the civil populations
Of Great Britain sIInnlisd with food