The Hartford republican. (Hartford, Ky.) 18??-1926, 1920-10-15

tronage staggering to the magma
ton. He consulted but very few
Never in the history of the Presiden-
cy has there been such seclusion from
Congressional and Senatorial confer
ence and association He neither had,
nor sought, that information which
comes by absorption through fire.
quent contact with those charged
with the coordinate legislative
branches of the government. When
in his opinion he needed legislation
to strengthen his hand, he asked
for it and he did not brook refusal
and crisis made his demand impera-
tive. He did not tolerate argument.
He wished to hear no facts inconsis-
tent with the theory of his conclu-
sion. He would have about him only
those who agreed in advance.
/ THE government of the United
States is a great business organiza-
ton, which cannot be carried on by
the will of one man. Good executive
management requires that the Chief
shall select as his main subordinates
men in whose ability, judgment. and
loyalty he has such confidence that
he can entrust to them all his pow
ers in the fields respectively assigned
! to them, with the sole limitation that,
when they think they need his coun-
sci or guidance, they will consult him.
Unless he thus delegates his powers.
they cannot be exercised efficiently
and with needed dispatch. If he holds
his chief subordinates in leash so that
p they are to do nothing important un-
til they consult him, speedy and eff
fective governmental action becomes
impossible Every important decision
in which time is the essence Of utility
and accomplishment must then be de-
layed until the Chief shall be con-
suited, shall have an opportunity to
ascertain the facts, and make up his
mind and decide. 1t is impossible,
even in time of peace, for the Chief
Executive to know enough to decide
rightly ana promptly the multi
tudinOus questions arising in the gov
ernment. His heads of departments
and other principal subordinates
must have independent discretion to
decide for themselves what he ought
to see and what they mast finally
dispose of without consulting him.
In time of war the necessity for such
a rule of administration is even more
imperative.
"Mr. Wilson's retention of authori-
ty was at variance with this sound
executive policy. He must hold all
the rtins. He could not trust any
one 20 act for him. The result was
seen in the exasperating delays in the
preparations for the war, in the many
makeshfit devices to put off the ne
cessity for final decision, and in the
method by which policies were form
ed, not by executive leadership, but
by pressure of events and public opin-
ion which pushed his administration
into them.
at was the American people, with
their enormous capacity for energetic
action, who won this war. By APP
pointment of merely advisory COM
mittees without any power, to assist
his mediocre executive officers, Mr..
Wilson thought he could use the men
who had made America famous for
genius in organization and executive
accomplishment. 1t was the public
pressure, arising after many failures
D land heart-breaking delays, which
brought these capable captains of
railroads and industries into every
zone of governmental activity, and
finally led TO their securing power
enough to do the things which had
to be done and to achieve the results
of which Americans are so proud.
The war was won not thru the leader
ship of Mr.. Wilson, but in spite of
the fundamentally wrong principle
on which he grudgingly delegated the
powers vested in him by the Consti
tuition and by the most liberal war
legislation.
This same purpose to direct per-
sonally important action of all kilis
explains Mr.. Wilson's apparent indif-
ference TO the special fitness of many
of his appointees to fill the offices
for which he chose them. II was only
necessary that they should be loyal
to him and subscribe to his views to