Evening star., 1920-02-21
BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.

achieved all that she could hope to
achieve. All the profit for her in the
war which Germany had provoked
was found in the destruction of the
German naval power. the elimination
of the German merchant marine COM
petition. the possession of the German
colonies and thus. in sum. the eliml-
nation of Germany as commercial
rival.
All this having been accomplished
in war and by victory. the British
had no longer any reason to fear
Germany and no necessity to max
hard terms with the vanquished.
Germany. disarmed and bankrupt.
could not build new fleets 20 challenge
British sea power for many long
year to come: German industry GRIP
pleu, if not ruined, and German mar
kets abroad lost. the way was open
for Britain to occupy these markets
AS far as Italy was concerned her
war with Germany had only been an
incident in her long struggle with
the Hapsburg monarchy to redeem
her fellow Latins in Trieste and the
Trentino She had row acquired the
Alps as far as the Brenner and her
natural frontiers from Albania to the
Swiss frontier; she had no further
grievance against Germany, no long
standing feud. She preferred to see
German Austria joined to Germany
BILE opportunity for a late reintegra-
tion of the Hapsburg monarchy Reai
Italian interests now We're aHected
not by German or Austrian circum-
stances. but by southern Siav aspl-
rations which had French and Brit
ish support, and thus the itailans
were separated by an Adriatic issue
from their old allies and found no
surviving cause for dispute with
Germany.
France Wants Protection.
The case of France by contrast was
totally different. The end OF the
war had not brought to France the
same profit which it had bestowed
upon Britain or liquidated Franco
German causes for dispute, as it had
France was financially
were assured, and. granted that Ger
MANY was incapable of rebuilding her
naval power briefly and menaclns
Britain. there was still an OBVIOUS
possibility that she could repeat the
Prrssian achievement OF lslS anu re-
organizing her armies, assaIi France.
French policy therefore, had 10
seek in Europe the creation of coun-
to German strength. II
sought them in Poland and among
thte Jugoslavs. These two new states,
with a combined population equal 10
that of Germany and with the prom
ise of military strength in the future
would on the one hand add to the
FRENCH army the sufficient strength
to meet German numbers. ana on the
other block the way to German eN
Dansion to the south or German ex-
ploitation of Russia. ::
But Britain was not in the least IN
terested in this. She had little SYM
nathy for Poland and less interest
The rise of a strong Poland, at the ex-
pense of Germany and with the III
eyit able consequence OF arousins HSr
man resentment and hostiilty she
viewed with actual disapproval. Her
own sea control remaining absolute,
no return of German military strength
could menace her and she was no
longer thinking in terms OF frencn
security. Thus at the precise moment
when the French were urging Inc
strengthening of POLAND the Britlsn n
to the rather vague notion OIL piacat-
ing Germany.
Resentment Of Italy.
Az for the Italians. they saw French
sunnort of Jugoslav aspirations with
resentment, which was carried to the
extent of actual anti-French policy.
The more the French urged the exten :
sion of Jugoslav territories. aipell
in accordance with the principles OF
came the Italians, until in the end the
gulf between France and Italy became
and remains tremendous.
Now it is clear that if any conference
is to be preserved, if the anti-German
alliance which has become the doml-
nant factor in European arairs, is not
to give way to new set of alliances.
German and French, there must be
some harmonizing of the views of the
three nations. France, Great Britain
and Italy. And this harmonlZing can
only proceed from the common recog-
milton that while Great Britain and
italy have by the outcome of the war
realized all their legitimate desires
for security, France has been left ex-
nosad to new German attack, and
French policy is. therefore condemned
to continue to seek by direct support
OF Poland and Jugoslavia and by in
direct efforts to retard German reor-
ganZatiOn--to protect france Dy Keep
ing Germany weak.
Sees selfish Move.
If Great Britain is to have any real
right to urge 4 modification of French
policy, this justification must be
coupled with a clear and specific guar
antee of readiness to support France
Immediately and unqualifiedly in case
of new German attack. There is
something intolerably selfish in the
present clamor of so-called liberal
journals and publicists in Britain that
there shall be sweeping modification
of the terms of the recent treaty
with the obvious insistence that the
costs of the modification shall all be
taxed against the French.
There is justice in the contention
that there must be new and wiser
policy adopted toward Germany If the
economic recovery from the war in
and out of Germany is to be prompt
or even possible. But today the sug-
gestions to this end which come from
Britain urge that the French shall
surrender their Sarre valley acQuisi-
tions, reduce their reparations de-
mands and include the proposal that
the United States shall forgive Europe
the $4,000, 100000 owed to US. But
there is no suggestion that Britain
should release portion of the Ger
man shipping taken in return for the
submarine campaign, concession
which would contribute fully as much
to German recovery as the retention
of the Sarre regions. Nor is there any
proposal to permit Germany to take
hack any of her colonies-German
East Africa, for example-which have
come to Britain.
"Singularly Unjust"
do not mean that 1 think such con-
cessions should be made. but me rel y
that If Britain is to insist upon max
ing the peace more tolerable for Ger
many in the interests of world peace
and prosperity. it is singularly unjust
that she should look to the United