Greenbrier independent. [volume] (Lewisburg, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1980, 1920-01-30

teSn south vi the Ni..nr which was
reached by the Seventy-scvcuth um
Sept. I. Two days later the Third
corps was transferred tn the region
OIL Nerdun. the SeNenty.Sevcnth divi-
sion remaining in line on the AiSne riy-
er until Sept. II.
Inc Thirfy-Src"nd division. upon its
reilef from the battle ON the Nr.ir.
Joineu French corps north al Suis.
sons and attacked from Aug. 20 to
81. capturing Juvigny after some
particularly desperate fighting and
reaching the Chauny-SoiSsons road.
On the British front two regiments
OF the Thirty-third division partIci-
pated In an attack on Hamel. Juiy 4.
and again on Aug. . us an incident OF
the allied offensive against the Amiens
salient. One Of these regiments took
Gressaire wood and Chipilly ridge
capturing 700 prisoners and consider
able material.
Emergency Had Passed.
The counter ofiensivcs against the
Marine salient in July and against the
A1niens salient in August had gained
such IN advantage that 1t was ap-
parent that the emergency, which JUS
tilted the dispersion of our divisions.
had passed. The moment was propi-
tiouS for assembling our divisions. The
formation OF the army in the Chateau.
Th:erry region and its early transfer
to the sector OF the Wncvrc, which
WAS to extend from Nomrny. east Of
the MoSelle. to north Of st. Mihicl, was
therefore decided upon by Marshal
FOch ana myself on Aug. .. AMI the de-
tails were arranged with Gen. Pctain
later OH the same day.
At BOmbon. on July ~. there WAS a
conference Of all commanders in chief
for the purpose Of considering allied
operations. Each presented proposals
for the employment Of the armies un-
der his command and these formed
the basis of future cooperation OF
the allies. 1t was c!nphatically deter
mined that the allied attitude should
be to maintain the offensive. AS the
first operation Of the American army,
tho reduction OF the salient OF ST.
Mihiel was to be undertaken as soon
rs the necessary troops and material
could be made available.
On Aug. 20. Il further discussion with
Marshal Foch was held ut my head
quarters at LiSny-en-B Barrels. At this
meeting 1t was proposed by Marshal
Foch that the general operations us
far as the American army was con-
cerncd should be carried out in detail
by:
(O An attack between the MeuSe
and the Arsonne by the Second French
army. reinforced by from four to six
American divisions.
q, Oh \ French-Amcrican attack, en-
tending from the Argonne west to the
SOuain road, to be executed on the
right by an American army astride
the Aisne and on the left by the
Fourth French army r.
To carry out these attacks the ten
to eleven American divisions suggested
for the st. Mihiel operation and the
four to six for the Second French army
would leave eight to ten divisions for
an American army on the Aisne. II
was proposed that the st. Mihiel OPP
Grafton should be initiated on Sept. 10
md the other two on Sept. II and 20.
respectively.
The plan suggested for the Amer
lean participation in these operations
was not acceptable to Inc. because 1t
would require the immediate separa.
ton of the recently formed first Amer
lean army into several groups, main.
~ to assist French armies. This was
directly contrary to the principle of
forming Il distinct American army, for
which my contention had been insist
ent. An enormous amount of prcpara-
ton had already been made IN con-
: structiOn Of roads, railroads. recuIat-
ing stations and other installations
looking to the use and supply OF our
armies on particular front. The in
herent Discrimination OF our troops to
serve under allied commanders would
have grown and American morale
would have suffered. My position was
stated quite clearly, that the strate-
gical employment Of the first army as
n unit would be undertaken where de-
sired, but it's disruption to carry out
these proposals would not be enter
tanned.
An American Army.
A further conference at Marshal
Foch's headquarters was held OH Sep
tetiber 2 mt which General Petain
was present. After discussion. the
question of employing tho American
arr,y as Unit was conceded. All the
allied armies were to he employed In
81 convcrsing action.
1t should be recorded that although
this general offensive was fully out
lined at the conference no one present
expressed the opinion that the final
| victory could be won in 1918. In fact,
1t was believed by the McuSc-Argonne
ntinCk COlIll unt be nllshnl much be.