Greenbrier independent. [volume] (Lewisburg, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1980, 1920-01-23

vent German attack on Italy. ar in
the Near East. the allies sought 70
maintain the offensive Oh the western
front as far as their diminished
strength and morale would permit.
Notwithstanding these allied attacks
on The western front. the iln,nru>r
gains by the German armies in the
east. eliminating AT Riga on Sept. =.
preciDitated the collapse Of RUSSIA.
The following months. the AuStrians---
with German Observation-Disclosures the
Italians and broke through the lines At
Caporetto. driving the Italian armies
back To the Piave river. inflictiug II loss
OF $4,000 men. GO0.0OO rifles. 3OUO
guns. and enormous stores. This seri-
Gus crisis compelled the withdrawal Of
reu French and British divisions from
the western front to ltaly. The Ger
nan situation on all other thcatcrs was
so favorable that rs early as Novein-
Oersthcy began the movement Of dIvi-
SI0nS toward the western front If
needed. her divisions cuuld he with
drawn from the Italian front before
the French and British dared recall
their divisions.
AT first the allies could hardly hope
for large American army. Marshal
Joffre during his visit To America had
made special request that u combat
DIVISION he sent ut once to Europe as
visual evidence IF our purpose to par
ticipate actively IN the war. ami also
asked for engineer regiments and other
special service units.
The arrival Of the first division and
the parade Of certain of its elements in
Paris on July 4 caused great cnthusi-
asm. and for the time being French
morale was stimulated. Still allied
apprehension was dccp-seated and ma.
terial assistance was imperative.
Outlook Dark for 1918.
"A review OF the situation showed
that with Russia out OF the war the
central powers would be able to release
! large number Of divisions for service
elsewhere. and that during the spring
and summer Of 1918. without intcrfcr-
Ing with the status quo at SalOniki,
they could concentrate OH the western
front force much stronger than that
OF the allies. In view Of this it was
represented to the war department IN
December rs Of the utmost Importance
that the allied preparations be expo
dited.
My conclusion was that, although
the morale OF the German people and
OF the armies was better than it had
been for two years. only an untoward
combination OF circumstances could
lao uic;x- .;,t,
fore American support as recommend
cd could be made effective provided
the allies secured unity of action.
However. Il situation might arise which
would necesSitate the temporary use of
all American troops in the units Of our
| allies for the defensive. but nothing In
| the situation justified the relinQuiSh-
mcnt of our firm purpose to form our
| own army under our own flag.
While the Germans were practiclns
| for open warfare and concentrating
their most aggressive personnel in
| shock divisions, the training Of the
! allies was still limited to trench war
| fare. AS our troops were being trained
| for open warfare. there was every rea-
| son why we could not allow them to be
| scattered among our allies. even by di.
visions. much less rs requirements, ex-
| cept by pressure Of sheer necessity.
| Any sort Of permanent umalgamation
would irrevOcably commit Americas
fortunes to the hands Of the ahies
| Moreover. II was obvious that the lack
| Of hOmOgeneity would render these
| mixed divisions difficult to maneuver
and almost certain TO break up under
! stress OF defeat. with the consequent
| mutual rcci'ilniDatOn
Again. there was no doubt that the
realization by the German people that
independent American divisions, corps,
| or armies were In the field with deter
mined purpose would be q severe blow
! to German morale and prestige. 1t was
also certain that an early appearance
| of the larger American units on the
| front would he most beneficial to the
morale OF the allies themselves.
Accordingly, the first division. on
Jan. 10. 1913, took over q sector north
Of Toul the twenty-siXth division went
to the scissors front early in Febru.
! ary the fOrtysecond division entered
the line near Lunevile. Feb. 81. and
the second division near Verdun,
March Is. Meanwhile, the first army
corps headquarters, Major Gen. Hunter
| Llggett commanding. was organized at
Neufchatcau on Jan. 20, and the plan
to create an independent American sec
tor on the Lorraine front was taking
! shape.
This was the situation when the
great German offensive was launched
on March 81, 1918.
Figured on 81 Divisions.
The war department planned MS
early rs July. 1917, to send to France