The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1920-08-08

cruisers succeeded IN breaking into the
open sea. Even the most trivial pre-
cautions were taken by the transports
The soldiers and crews were not per-
i mitted to throw anything overheard
which might betray the course of a
convoy: the cooks refuse was dropped
at particular time and in a way that
would furnish no clew to lurking sub
i marine; even a tin can, If thrown into
| the sea, was first pierced with holes
to make sure that 1t would sink Any
one who struck a match at night in
| the danger zone attempts were made
/ TO this; and committed a punisha BILE
offense. 1t is thus apparent why the
| Germans never landed" a single one
| of our transports. The records show
only three or four cases in which even
those few efforts were feeble and in
effectuaL OF course, the boys all had
exciting experiences with phantom
submarines; indeed I don't suppose
that there is a single one of our more
than 100000 troops who has not en-
tertained his friends and relatives with
accounts of torpedo streaks and
schools of U-boats.
Submarines Left Transports Alone.
But the Germans made no concerted
campaign against our transports; fun
damental conditions, already described
rendered such an offensive hopeless;
and the skill with which our trans
port service was organized and con-
Quoted like wise dissuaded them.
have always believed that the German
Admiralty ordered their U-boat cap
tains to let the American transports
alone; or at least not to attack ex-
cept under very favorable circum-
stances, and this belief is rather con-
firmed by passage in General Luz
dendorffs memoirs. From our pre-
vious experience with the submarine
war" General Ludendorf writes, 81 ex-
pected strong forces of Americans to
come, but the rapidity with which they
actually did arrive proved surprising.
General Won Cramon, the German mill
tary plepipotentiary with the Imperial
and Royal Headquarters, often called
me up and asked me to assist in the
sinking of American troop ships; pub
lie opinion in Austria Hungary de-
manded it. Admiral Won Holtzendorff
could only reply that everything was
being done to reduce enemy tonnage
and to sink troop ships. It was not
possible to direct the submarine
against the troop ships exclusively.
They could approach the coast of
Europe anywhere between the north OF
England and Gibraltar, front of some
fourteen hundred nautical miles. 1t
was impossible effectively to close this
area by means of submarines. One
could have concentrated them only on
certain routes; but whether the troop
ships would choose the same time was
the question. AS soon as the enemy
heard of submarines anywhere, he
could always send the ships new or
ders by wireless and unload at,another
port. 1t was, therefore, not certain
that by this method we should meet
with a sufficient number of troop .
ships. The destruction of the enemy's !,
freight tonnage would then have been
only spasmodically, and
would have been set back in an I'M
desirable manner; and in that way the
submarine war would have become di-
verted from its original object The
submarine war with commerce was
therefore confined with all vigor pos
sible."
Apparently 1t became the policy of
he German Admiralty. as / have said.
20 concentrate their U-boats on mer-
chant shipping and leave the American
roop ships practically alone-at least :
hose bound to Europe. Unfortunate
y, however, at no time did we have |
enough destroyers to provide escorts I
or all of these transports as fast as /;
hey were unloaded and ready to re-
urn to America, but as time in the
turn around" was the all-important
in getting the troops
'ver, they were sent back through the
zone under the escort of
Irmed yachts, and occasionally not
iscorted at all. Under these condi-
ions the transports could be attacked
With much less risk, as was shown by
he fact that five were torpedoed,
hough of these happily only three
we're sunk.
German Chiefs Disappointed.
The position of the German naval &