New-York tribune., 1920-03-25

1t help the morale over there or ovef
here to do that? Criticism made with
out. full knowledge and thought is apt
to be unjust"
The witness refused to be shaken in
his main testimony and called attention
to the fact that the letter was written
to Sims year after the events about
which he was testifying.
With reference to the failure Of the
department head to appreciate the need
Tor adequate measures to prepare the
navy for the war emergency the wit
ness said:
For many months prior to February
l, l9l7, our agents in Germany were
reporting on the situation there. They
gave us fairly accurate information Of
Germany's intention to carry on unre-
stricted attacks on merchant shipping.
but the department even then failed to
take steps to get the fleet ready for
war. AS matter Of fact, the dread
n,oughts did not 60 to the yards for
tins work until summer--many weeks
after the declaration of war.
On February /. 1917, Germany an
nounced her campaign of unrestricted
submarine warfare. At that time the
country practically gave up hope Of
avcrtlng war and certainly then as
never before there was. the necessity
of at least preparing plans for a war
against Germany. But, although | was
in the office of the chief of naval opera
tlons and would have known of them,
ala not hear of any such plans"
No Campaign Outlined
Referring to the general campaign
of operations which had been approved
by Admiral Benson, but which Secre-
tary Daniels delayed approving, Cap
tain Laning said:
Had the department approved that
plan, or even authorized Admiral Ben
son to go ahead with it the various
parts Of the department would have
been Informed as to what their mis-
slons were and could have proceeded
to carry them out. Without such
plan no one knew what to do. The
Bureau Of Ordnance was forced to
order material for all kinds of projects
whether or not such projects might be
feasible in the war.
The Bureau of Supplies and Ac-
counts had no information on which to
,ase purchase of supplies and was
.orced to buy not what would actually |
&c. needed, but what they guessed they
night possibly. be called on for. The
3ureau of Navigation had no idea of |
What they should do as to providing
personnel. Every bureau and everv Of |
ice was in a similar predicament.
LAS nearly as I can recall, it was
bout July /, 1917, before any we'll de-
med antl-submarine plan was ap-
'roved. About that time the Secretary
nd approve the suggestions submitted |
" the board on devices and plans con-
ected with submarine warfare and in
tructed the bureaus to take steps to
AIRY them out. That, I believe, was
he first really definite plan the bu-
eaus were given, but it was not until
hen, about three months after the
'ar started that the bureaus had even
hat much of war program to
York on"
The Fletcher court of inquiry is ex-
ectcd to be in session two weeks. It
composed Of Rear Admirals W. L,
ogers, j. H. Oliver and J. A. Hooger-
ertf, with Captain X. M. Bennett serv-
'g as judge advocate. Fletcher will
e represented by counsel, including
arpenter, retired Marine Corps Off
sr, and Commander j. M. Poyer re-
red naval officer, and Attorney Guy
ason. Admiral Sims will nave as
'unsel Captain N. C. Twinning, who
'rved AS his chief Of staff, and Can
lin Ridley Mclean.
The inquiry is to be made with ref
'ence to the following: "Whether
'e forces under the command of Rear
dmiral Fletcher were organized and
oerated so inefficiently, particularly
18th the reference to safety in escort
e army transports, as to warrant the
of the United States naval
'rces IN European waters arriving at
!e conclusion that Rear Admiral
letcher was so unsatisfactory in in
itiative and judgment that he should
longer be intrusted with the com
and" N1-