Missouri Valley times. [volume] (Missouri Valley, Iowa) 1874-1931, 1920-01-08

paig1 which was to end the war before
Americas effort could be brought to
bear. Germany's best troops, her most
successful generals and all the expert.
ence gained in three years of war were
Modified for the supreme effort.
The first blow fell on the right Of
the British armies. including the juno.
ton of the British aud French forceA
Only the prompt cooperation of tbs
FrenclI and British general headquar
ters sIemned the tide. Tie reason for
this objective was obvious. and strk-
ingly illustrated the necessity for hav-
Ing some one with sufficient authority
over all the allied armies to meet such
an emergency.
Reserves Were Lacking.
The lack of complete cooperation
among The allies on the western front
had been appreciated and the question
of preparation to meet crisis had
already received attention by the SUI
prelne war council. A plan had been
adopted by which each OF the allies
would furnish a certain number of d.
visions for a general reserve to be nn-
der the direction Of the military repro
sentatives of the supreme war council.
of which Gen. Foch was then the
senior member. But when the tims
came to meet the German offensive in
March these reserves were not found
available and the plan failed.
The situation resulted in con-
ference for the immediate considera-
ton OF the question Of having an al
lied commander In chief. After much
discussion. during which my view fa.
voring such action was clearly stated
an agreement was reached and Cen
eral Foch was selected. His appont-
menf as such was made April 3 and
was approved for the United States
by the president on April 16.
The grave crisis precipitated by the
first German offensive caused me 10
make Il hurried visit to General Foch's
headquarters at Bombon, during which
all our combatant forces were placed
al his disposal. The acceptance OF
this offer meant the dispersion Of our
troops along the allied front and
consequent delay In building up dis.
tinctive American force in Lorraine,
but the serious situation of the allies
demanded this divergence from our
plans.
On March q approximately 100000
American troops had reached France.
Four combat divisions. equivalent in
strength to eight French or British
divisions, were available.
Took cantigny Heights.
On April % the First division re-
lieved two French divisions on the
front near Montdidier and OH May %
captured the important observation
stations on the heights of Canligny
with splendid dash. French artillery.
aviation, tanks and fame throwers
aided in the attack. but most of this
French assistance was withdrawn be-
fore the completion of the operation
IN order to meet the enemy's new Of
fensive launched May q to Chateau
Thierry. The enemy reaction against
our troops at Cantigny was extremely
violent. and apparently he was deter
mined at all costs to counterfeit the
most excellent effect the American
success had produced. For three days
his guns Of all calibers were concern
trated on our position and counter
4attack succeeded counter-attack. The
desperate efforts of the Germans gave
the fighting at Cantigny seeming
tactical Importance entirely out Of
proportion to the numbers involved.
The third German offensive. on May
; q. against the French on the AIsne
soon developed desperate situation
for the allies. The Second division
was hastily diverted to the vicinity of
Mraux on May 81, and early on the
morning of June ! was deployel
across the Chateau-Thierry-Pa road
3 near NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. In gap In
the French line. where II stopped the
German advance Cd Paris. AT the
z same time the partially trained Third
: division was placed at French dig
posal to hold the crossings OF the
{ Marine. and its motorized machine-gun
battalion succeeded In reaching Cha
y teau Thierry in time to assist in sue
: cessfuIly defending that river cross
D ing.
I The enemy having been halted. the
n Second division commenced u series
Y of vigorous attacks on June which
d resulted in the capture Of Belleau
woods after very severe fighting. The
village of BOuresches was taken soon
after and on July Vaux was cap
tured. In these operations the Sec
ond division met with most desperate
/. resistance bys Germany's best troops
), Our Second corps, under Maj. Gen.
:. George W. Read, had been organized
/, for the command of the ten divisions
with the British, which were held
h back in training areas or assigned to
serond-line defenses. After consulta.
y tion with Field Marshal Haig on June
. five American divisions were re-
. lteved from the British area to sup
- port the French.
The Marine salient was Inherently
weak and offered an opportunity fol
. counter-offensive that was obvious
- If successful such an operation woult
:, afford immediate relief to the allied
:, defense, would remove the threa
;. against Paris and free the Paris
!, Nancy railroad. But, more importan
=, than all else, 1t would restore the mo
- rale of the allies and remove the pro
found depression and fear then exist
ing.
!. Up to this time our units had beer
nut in here and there at critical point