New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1920-03-28

cal power won by our soldiers on
the battle field, because Of the moral
prestige earned by our relief work
ers, and in Europe the work of
Hoover certainly measured up to
that Of Pershing, the United States
is able to speak with no little au-
thority, and its opinions, in part at
least, can be enforced because Of
the financial, moral and military
strength behind them.
We Can Be Arbiters
Thus, with influence and with eff
feet, we may choose for ourselves
the role of arbiter Of the whole
settlement Of world peace. Or we
may elect to become the supporters
Of one Of the several plans for world
rehabilitation proposed by other ma
tions, by the British or the French,
for example. The only other course
open to US is to refrain from either
Of the foregoing policies, and aside
from certain incidental interventions
on behalf Of peoples or principles,
where the need is obvious or our
national interest compelling, pursue
a policy which has been described
as splendid isolation" when in favor
and as BRUTAL egoism" when I'M
popular.
Now, examining each Of these
three possibilities in detail, what Is
the merit and weakness Of each? To
take the first role: We may with
propriety, since our participation
has been asked by Europe, condition
our entrance into world arrange
ments and Heterogeneous, that is,
the use Of our great and wellnigh
indispensable financial resources,
upon the agreement Of European ma
tions to adopt certain principles and
apply these principles in accordance
with our views Of the necessary bases
Of real world settlement.
But to adopt this course would
almost inevitably mean that we
should, in fact, have to use our
financial resources as club by
which to compel certain nations to
sacrifice not merely those acquisi4
tons made as result Of the war,
which might fairly be described as
profits, but also those other acqui-
sitions which represent for them
matters of security and proper
PREPARATION.
We might, therefore, have to ask
Of the British that they surrender
German colonies and at least frac-
ton Of German shipping at the
same moment we ask the French to
reduce their demands in the matter
Of indemnity and withdraw their
veto to the union Of Austria with
Germany. In the same order Of
reasoning, we might have to ask the
Poles to forego their claims upon
Upper Silesia, while we should in
evitably continue to insist that
Italy give way to the Jugo-Slavs in
the matter Of Fiume.
| All Musf Sacrifice
In making these demands the sole
purpose which would animate the
J United States would patiently be the
desire to abolish an economic chaos,
resulting from the terms Of peace
and by insuring the economic re-
Mobilization Of Germany exercise the
Bolshevist devil. But, obviously, we
could not ask any one nation to
make all the sacrifices. The ships
taken from the Germans by the
British are certainly as useful an
element In economic rehabilitation as
the French Saar seizures, while the
German colonies are no moro and
no less Justly taken from Germany
than other territories seized by
other nations, and at least one of
the colonies, German East Africa
might easily become useful elc-
ment in German economic develop.
ment.
Still, to make a simultaneous de-
mand upon Britain, France, Italy
and Poland to give up not alone
elements in their own scheme Of
national recuperation, but also cir
cumstances in their own conception
Of national security. would be mere.
ly to arouse instant and violent pro.
test in London, Paris, Rome and
Warsaw. We have all seen exactly
what was the result Of the Presf-
dents demand that the italian
people moderate their demands to
the extent Of permitting Jugo-Slavia
access to the sea.
| Only by the drastic exercise of
our financial weapon could we hope
or expect to force concessions from
the British or the French in matters
| like the colonies or the ,,n;on If