New-York tribune., 1920-03-25

However obscure the German situa-
ton remains--and, with the mistakes
the outside world made in the case Of
Russia fresh in mind, easy and quick
peneralizations should be taboo--it is
at least clear that the upheaval is
almost certain to put new strain
upon the international association,
which still operates in the names Of
the victors of the World War and
through the machinery Of the league
Of nations.
Actually, Great Britain, France and
Italy are all that is left of the Paris
Conference. Upon them must devolve
the task of formulating policy in
the presence Of the newest German
revolution, but at no moment since the
war broke have the three nations been
as separated by new, as we'll as old
rivalries and jealousies and by totally
conflicting national interests.
British Policy Obuious
In the present situation British
policy is obvious. A strong Germany
has no terrors for Britain, now that
the German war fleet has been de-
stroyed, the commercial fleet seized
and the German colonies are in Brit
ish hands. British interests would
thus be best served by the restoration
Of order in Germany and by meas
ureable success Of the conservative
elements. Had Karp been successful
he would have enlisted quite as much
British sympathy as have Korniloff,
Denikine, and Kolchak in the case of
Russia.
In an economically restored Ger
many the British would find their best
customer now, as in the past, while q
decisive defeat for the socialistic ele-
ments would, on the whole, tall best
with the views of those now ruling
England. But all restoration in Ger
many is conditioned on degree of eco
nomic assistance from without and not
impossibly upon drastic modification
Of the terms of the Treaty of Yer
sailles. Such modification could only
be obtained at the expense of France
and Poland and would naturally take
the form of a reduction of the sums
to be paid by Germany to France in
the shape of reparations and of a SINH
lar reduction of the territorial claims
of both France and Poland, notably in
the Sarre Basin and in Upper Silcsia.
Added to this might be demand for
surrender by France Of the right of
veto, preventing Austria from Joining
with Germany.
Laly's Self-interest
1taly's policy is not less patiently
predicted upon self-interest. Italy has
acquired by the peace settlements all
of her old lrredenta, the crest of the
Alps at the Brenner Pass, which she
never claimed openly. The collapse of
the Hapsburg monarchy has removed
her hereditary enemy and if her dis
pute with the Jugo-Slavs remains un-
settled, she can afford to wait a more
favorable moment for final adjudica-
tion Italian policy now seeks to avoid
reconstitution Of Austria Hungary,
which would revive old dangers, there
fore the fusion between Austria and
Germany is approved by her. She
seeks to reduce the Slav influence in
Europe, which is bond of sympathy
between herself and Germany. whose
Polish and Czech neighbors are equally
hateful to the German.
Thus, Italy can we'll see the restora-
tion of Germany without misgivings.
A common anti-Slav policy will unite
both. Beyond this Italy is seeking
desperately to counter the influence
temporarily gained by France on the
Continent as a result of the collapse
of Germany. To this end she is con-
structing an alliance OF the Hun
garians, Rumanians and Bugarians to
balance the alliance of France and the
three Slav states of Poland, Czecho-
Slovakia and Jugo- Slavia. Instinctiye-
ly the Italian and Frenchman are
rivals, and recent events have accentu-
ated the old bitterness.
1t results, therefore, that Britain
and Italy, each serving its own leeiti-