New-York tribune., 1920-02-28


terms of the treaty to continue that
occupation indefinitely If the Germans
do not make good their treaty pledges
Therefore, France must prolong the oc-
cupation. She no longer can count on
the American guaranty; the British
was contingent upon the American and,
therefore, has disappeared with it.
So the situation comes down to this:
Through President Wilson we persuaded
France to give up her demand for Sc
curity. We persuaded her by promis-
ing her our army and navy, with those
of the British, if the Germans took ad-
vantage of the absence Of the Rhine bar
rier to attack France again, and we
agreed she should stay on the Rhine in
definitely. supported by our troops and
British troops. if Germany did not full
fill the conditions Of peace. Germany
has not fulfilled the conditions and does
not mean to. Therefore, the French
armies must stay. and will stay. and the
portion of the Treaty Of Versailles reg
ulating this situation. goes into the
discard with much else.
In this state of affairs the American
people are not free to criticize French
action, to accuse France Of imperialism
or chauvinism, because we have failed
to make good our promise to give France
security to which she was entitled
Moreover, we have consented that the
British should have that same degree of
security. obtained by the destruction OF
the German feet and the possession of
the German colonies.
The Rhine Barrier
The only course open to tho United
States. if it desires to prevent French
occupation OF the Rhine barrier, Is the
prompt ratification of the Anglo
French-Amerlcan treaty and the consti
tuition Of an expeditionary army capa-
BILE of supporting French forces i'm
mediately if the Germans attack
France, and we must, in addition. ioin
the French in insisting upon German
performance of the treaty terms, so far
as France Is concerned, notably In the
matter Of coal. Nor can the British
take any other course.
But If we are not prepared to do this,
despite the Presidents promise. then
we must withdraw our opposition to
French occupation Of the Rhine bar
rier and accept this as matter Of
course. following upon our own failure
to ratify the treaty of guarantees. OF
course, this will not undo the harm
done, because we have given support to
the German resistance to French pol
icy, just as by the Presidents action
in the matter Of the Adriatic compro-
mise we have encouraged the Jugo-
Slavs to resist all proposals looking to
settlement of the Fiume dispute
which have any chance Of prevailing.
What We Face
The Rhine and Adriatic questions
raise again. and in the clearest possible
fashion, the issues Of American policy
HAA SOA~P0. W. CAuuOL continue TO pre-
vent settlements in Europe, however
unsatisfactory to the Presidents prin-
ciples or to the country's notion Of alb
stract Justice. without undertaking GER
tain obvious and really considerable
responsibilities. We must, in a word,
be prepared to support the Jugo- -Slavs
by force of arms against the Italians
and the French by similar weapons, or
we must announce our dissociation
with European questions, and by that
announcement withdraw our fatal op
position to any settlement.
Even this will not undo the harm
done, either in the French or the Jueo-
Siav case. For, except for US, the
French would have the Rhine barrier
as matter Of right and the Juro.
Slavs would be led to . compromise.