The Ocala evening star., 1920-01-09
MYTHICAL 'xARmY
HELPED VICTORY
American SubaIterns' Trick Kept
Five German Divisions on
the Qui Vive.
ENEMY DECEIVED BY RADIO
Telephone Squad Also Conducted Mis-
leading Conversations for German
Listeners Benefit - Staff
Worked Overtime on Game
of CamoufIage.

With the American Forces in Ger
many.-Tricks Of the game of war are
coming to light from time to time as
each side tells it's story. One of the
most successful of them was practiced
by American forces in the Meuse-Ar-
gOnne battle last fall, when the last
great allied offensive was at it's
height, from Switzerland to the sea.
An imaginary army, conceived by
handful of American junior officers,
was thrown into the field" overnight,
and for days five crack German divi-
siOnS just east of Verdun, in the
Etain region, were kept on their toes,
mOmentarily expecting an attack
which never came.
At dinner table in a Coblenz cafe
overlooking the Rhine an American in
telligence officer recently told the
story of the creation of the mythical
tx army" as it was called. 1t ap-
pears that the Germans were expect
ing an attack in the Etain sector at
any time, and the Americans knew it ;
but at that stage of the game the First
American army was devoting its ener-
gies to driving the enemy out Of the
Argonne forest and the hill country on
either side. SO the mythical army was
created, in preference to real diver
sion, requiring many men, to convince
the German commander that it would
not be wise TO weaken the Etain front
for the benefit of the Meuse-Argonne
front.
Commanded by Captain.
Five fresh divisions had been placed
by the Germans on the Etain line.
These constituted their last and finest
reservoir of available divisions. The
Americans realized that the minute
The Germans decided that this was not
a danger point any or all of the five
divisions could be withdrawn, re-
placed by exhausted and fragmentary
divisions coming from the battle
fronts, and that the appearance of the
fresh troops in the line west of the
Meuse would have a tremendous effect
on the American offensive.
The "X army" was assigned to
front from Bezonvaux to Fresnes.
From the morning of October % until
just before the armistice this army
''functioned" Capt Charles III. MatZ
of Hubbard Woods, ILL.,, was command
er in chief; Capt William III. Dear
den of Springfield, Mass, and Wash
ingtOn, d. c., was chief of staff; Lieut..
John H Graham of Lexington, Va,
was chief of troop movements" ;" Capt.
O. w. Neidert was in charge of GIL,
II
Griswold of Old Lynn, Conn, was
chief of artillery. The staff of the tx
army" were all members of the in
telIigence section of the First army,
and, of course, before beginning oper-
ations, had obtained the consent Of
their chief, Col. Wiley Howell.
The wireless and the telephone were
freely used to convince the Germans
that the Americans were prepared for
an attack in the Etain sector. To
make sure that the Germans would
be able to "break into'' the code used,
the Americans furnished them with a
satisfactory key.
Functioned Until End.
One wireless station of the "X
army was established in a clump of
woods near Verdun and was called
headquarters of the X army" This
station functioned until the end of the
game, all orders" for the army going
out from this place by wireless. Soon
after the station began working the
Germans located its whereabouts and
frequently shelled the woods and vi
cinity, apparently in hope of breaking
up the radio of the latest of annoy
ances. The "X army" also had port
able radio station, which moved about
and represented itself at a different
station every day or two.
The first message from the "X
army" headquarters was a general
dispatch to all wireless stations in the
army area (none of which actually ex-
isted), in the new code of course, di-
recting that none of the stations an
swer or make use of their sending in
struments, for fear of the enemy locat-
ing them, but that they be on the
alert at fixed hours to receive mes
sages. The effect was to convince the
Germans that a large number of wire