The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1919-05-24

ish army would have been to surrender
or be driven into the sea
pondcred long and deeply on the
situation. and finally arrived at the fol-
lowing conclusion:
IF the eneIny's threats against Ipres
and the User were not strongly met BY
corresponding offensive move. then n
break through az some point in that
! neighborhood by the Germans was a
! practical certainty. and the seaboard
would be theirs.
On the other hand, although from the
south of ipreS TO La BaSsce the Stua-
! ton would remain very prccarious. /
/ conceived that X might be possible to
hold on till support could arrive.
! Since the solution of the problem. as
! presented TO my mind. resolved itself
into a balance of certain disaster against
! u disaster which. although much greater
! in degree, was still not Il certainty. | de-
r termined TO guard against tho former;
and on the evening of the 10th | sent
for Sir Douglas lIaig and gave him his
! instructions.
1 explained the situation rs clearly as
possible and showed him on the map
where and how We thought the enemy s
! troops were distribu: cd. l said that at
! tho moment I did not think there was
much more shan the Third German Re
serve Corps. with possibly ono or, two
| divisions attached. between Ostcnd and
Mentn. but that all reports pointed to
an early arrival of strong reinforce
| mcnts from the center and east Of Bel
GUM.
I pointed out to Haig how much i'm
| portarcc l attached Ia the clearing of
Ostrnd and Brugrs before these rein
| forccm"nis could arrive. I snid hoped
| that with the assistance uf tho French
and Belgian troops on the north and
Rawlinso7 on his right flank he would
| be able TO effect this object and perhaps
with luck throw the enemy back on
| Client. l told him that this was what
| I particularly wanted to bring about
| but that he would have 10 be guided by
the course Of events. informed hin,
Of wilson's visit to Foch on the 18th
and Fochs promise that hc would
| strongly support us on the north.
! Orders were then issued tu the First
Corps of which the following Is a sum-
! mary
Tho First Corps will advance via
| Thourout with the object Of capturing
Brugcs. II this is proved to be feasible
! and successful every cndcavor must be
| made 10 turn the encmyS flank and
drive him back to Client. The situation.
however. is very uncertain. and IN the
| first instance 1t is only possible to
direct the First Corps with it's right OF,
the line Gprcs- Roulcrs. Should the
! forces Of the enemy. reported In he NOV
ing west between IsnEhcm and Courtrai
sriously menace tho Fourth Corps. il is
| left 10 the discretion of tho commander
OF the First Corps to lend this corps
such assistance AS may be necessary.
1t had been arranged by the Admir-
atty that some battlcsiiips were 20 be
held in readiness at Dover to cooperate
with our MOVEMENTS on the north coast
| should opportunity offer.
My advanced headquarters were now
established ut Baillnul an long dir
cussion | had there on the 10th with
| Iultcncy and Smith-DorTicn showed tE>l
our front south Of Mcnin was being still
more severely pressed.
An attempt by tho Fourth Corps 10 ad-
vance on Mcnn ended in failure.
Tho Germans wore also fairly active
! in tho north. They pushed back DE- MI
rvs French cavarIry corps toward Sthd'
On and warren and heavily attacked tho
! Rrlgians nj Nicurort but our allies hello
I their ground we'll.
iCon.inucd Monday.