Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-10
By GEN. ERICH Won LUDENDoRFF

in particular on the question of the
expediency of adopting unrestricted
warfare.
After our victories IN Rumania, the
supreme army command did not ex-
pect that either Holland or Denmark
would enter the war against us. II
was, however, unwise to take any
risks. The unrestricted campaign
could obviously, not be instituted be-
fore the Rumanian campaign was al
an end and our troops there had re-
turned home and arrived on the west
ern and eastern fronts, 1t was soon
clear that this would not be the case
before the beginning of February.
1t also seemed plain that we should
have to hold our, hands to see whether
any success would be achieved by any
intervention by President Wilson, on
the lines on which our government
had invited 1t in September, or by our
own offer of peace. If the end of the
war should appear to be in sight,
submarine warfare on the lines pro-
posed would be unnecessary. There
was really no room for doubt The
result of our efforts for peace would
be sure to be known by the end Of
December or early in January, and
this too seemed TO point to the be-
ginning of February as the date for
opening the unrestricted campaign, if
this should prove necessary
Calculated Americas War Power.
The government had by now lost its
earlier anxiety as to the attitude of
Holland and Denmark, and none was
felt, as to Switzerland, Spain. Sweden
or Norway. On the other hand 1t
thought it very probable that the
United States would join in the war
against us.
The supreme army command had to
take into account, in dealing with the
military situation, the views thus ex-
pressed In the responsible quarters 1t
would involve an addition to the
armed forces of the entente of five or
six divisions in the first year after
America entered the war and later on,
If the submarine war did not have
decisive effect. serious, indeed a vital
Increase in the strength Of the enemy.
1t could not be doubted that Amer
lea, II she came into the war, would
army herself in the same way that
England had done, and that the en-
tente would lead the United States
from one energetic step to another. II
''e'Nb i'N"SNtIt HO SVliOhS lear siS u
any increased output OF munitions in
the states, as they were already work.
ing with all their mightNfor the en-
tente.
The chief of the naval staff, a
friend of the chancellor. but at the
same time warm partisan of the un-
restricted submarine war. was conf
dent that the campaign would have
decisive results within six months. The
loss of freight space and the reduc-
ton of oversee imports would produce
economic difficulties in England that
would render a continuance of the war
In forming this view he did not rely
merely on his own professional iudg-
ment, but was supported by the opin-
ions of distinguished German econo-
mlsts, The shortage OF, shipping would
cut down the transport of munitions
and in particular the transport from
England to France. which traffic could
also be directly attacked.
Crews from Oldest Navy, Craft.
The number of submarines in COM
mission was sufficient for the work,
and our admiralty was also of thei
opinion that construction, if It was
pressed on to the utmost, would amply
cover losses. In 1916 after submarine
warfare had really been abandoned in
construction had not been
pressed ot very vigorously. The ques- |
lion of crews could. it was thought, be
solved They would have TO be drawn