Catoctin clarion. [volume] (Mechanicstown, Md.) 1871-1940, 1919-05-22


in Minds of German seamen That
They Might Snatch Victory Over
Grand Fleet and Overthrow Allied
Sea Power-Beatty and Hood Alb.
solved Of overrashness and JeIIleoe
Of Undue Caution.
The controversy about the battle OF
Jutland will not be set at rest by the
revelations which have been made by
he principal persons concerned, writes
Capt. Charles N. Robinson in New
York Herald. There are omissions
from his book, as Lord Jellicoe admits,
and his critics are bound to make
the most of this circumstance.
1t had been suggested by those who
prOfessed to be dissatisfied with the
material results Of the action that
Beatty and Hood, the battle cruiser
leaders, showed oyerrashness. and Jel-
licoe and Jorram, in the battle squad
cons, undue caution. To the former
cause was attributed the heavy losses
on the British side; and to the latter
the fact that the enemy were not Sc
verely held and thoroughly beaten.
The candid disclosures of the com:
mander in chief, however, provide evil
dence that in neither case was there
ground for this criticism.
The action was fought from first to
last on the lines laid down in the bat
tie orders for the fleet, which We're
prepared at Scapa after exhaustive ex-
ercises at sea, and which were known
and seemingly acquiesced In by all
the officers who would be responsible
for executing them. From the bat
tie instructions given on page of
Lord Jellicoe's book 1t is clear that
Beatty and Hood, although they were
given free hand to carry out their
general instructions, were told that the
primary function of the battle cruisers
in action was "the destruction of the
similar enemy vessels If present, and,
after their destruction or la their alb
sence, to attack the van Of the enemy's
fleet. Prior to action their duty was
defined as giving information as to the
. enemy's battle fleet, while denying SIM
liar information to the enemy"
Clearly, this absolves Admiral
Beatty and the late Admiral Hood Of
the charge referred to, since when the
interchangeable, Queen Mary and Irwin.
chile were lost, they were either at
lacking enemy battle cruisers or OBJ
tanning information OF the enemy's bat.
tie fleet. The British losses, includ-
ing that of the flagship Of Admiral
Hood himself, were not the outcome of
any rashness, but as it Is also shown
In this book, to shortcomings in the
protective features Of cruiser designs.
The necessity for caution in the
early years of the war is abundantly
proved by the long list of deficiencies,
some of them Of startling nature,
set forth in Lord Jellicoe's volume.
All things considered, and when the
margin of superiority was what 1t was,
1t would have been hard to Justify the
taking Of unnecessary hazards by the
commander In chief, seeing that the al.
lied hope of victory In the struggle
rested entirely on the continued exist
ance and efficiency of the grand fleet.
That fleet was the "all in ALL" not only
IF Britain, but of the allied powers.
No Preeedents to Follow.
In regard also to the criticism which
mas been made of the turning move
ments of the fleet in deployment, and
when maneuvering to evade torpedo
attack, it cannot be forgotten that all
,actics of battle before Jutland with
oI Df
ong-range torpedoes and submarines.
we're tentative and experimental.
There were no presidents, or body OF
experience, for the British command.
ars to look to for guidance, and they
lad to base their judgment chiefly on
the lessons of their own practices and
exercises in waters limited by the en-.
,my's mines and torpedoes. There
should be borne in mind, too, the per.
lis to which the feet was exposed
while preparing for battle, and the
difficulties to be overcome in the as
sembly and direction of such huge
force 1t is significant that the ad-
miral notes that during the engage
ment his chief of staff, Admiral
"This is all going according to ex'
pectation."
From the frank admissions of Lord
Jellicoe, and his vivid narrative of the
movements of the forces, many edify.
ing lessons will be extracted by naval
men in all countries. But, so far as
the Battle of Jutland is concerned, the
main conclusion seems to be that II
was the conditions of time, place and
weather which prevented the British
forces from obtaining victory as de-
cisive in regard to material as 1t was
in regard to the morale of the enemy.
The battle destroyed any lingering
hope in the minds of the German sea.
men that they might snatch victory
over the grand fleet and overthrow the
allied sea power and it's influence on
the naval struggle was therefore final
and complete, m spite of the disad-
vantages under which the British sea.
men went into action.