Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1919-08-15
AFTER THE MEAT TRUST

Bolshevism.
AFTER THE MEAT TRUST
Trade Commission Exposes Methods
Of Combined Packers.
The Federal Trade Commission, in
it's report to President Wilson on the
packing industry. makes these specific
charges concerning the manner In
which the meat combination works
now:
/. That Swift & Co., Armour & Co.,
Morris & Co., Wilson & Co., Inc. and
the Cudahy Packing Company are In
an agreement for the division Of live
stock purchases throughout the United
States according to certain percent
ages.
That this national livestock division
is reinforced by local agreements
among the members Of the general
combination operating at each Of the
principal markets. as at Denver. where
Armour and Swift divide their lives
stock fifty fifty"
That these national and local live
stock purchase agreements constitute
a restraint of interstate commerce In
Tive animals and in the sale Of meats
and other animal products, sitting
competition among the Ave companies.
substantially controlling the prices to
be paid to livestock producers and the
prices to be charged to consumers OF
meat and other animal products and
giving the members Of the combination
unfair and illegal advantages over
actual and potential competitors.
9. That the five companies exchange
confidential information which Is not
made available to their competitors
and employ jointly paid agents to Sc
cure information which is used to con-
troll and manipulate livestock markets.
3. That the.fiye companies act collu-
sively. through their buyers in the
purchase of live stock, their specific
collusive activities embracing:
(a) Split shipments" purchases.
whereby, through the interchange Of
information, the split lots are made to
sell at the same price on different
markets regardless OF how many
packers are involved in marketing the
purchase.
(b) Part purchases" whereby two
or more packers join in purchasing the
live stock Of one shipper or producer.
each taking a part Of shipment at
the same price.
(c) Wiring on" whereby a shipper
who forwards his live stock from one
market to another for the purpose Of
securing a better price Is punished
regardless Of which packer he sells to
in tie second market.
(d) Making the daily market. where
by common live stock buying policy
for all the big packers at the principal
markets substantially controls the
basic prices to be paid throughout the
United States.
the big packers stay out Of the market
for one or more hours after the OPEN
ing for the purpose Of depressing
prices, is one Of the means in making
the market.
4. That Swift & Co.. Armour &
Co.. Morris & Co.. and Wilson & Co.,
Inc, through their subsidiary and con-
trolled companies in South America
combined with certain other COM
panies to restrict and control ship
ments of beef and other meats from
South America to the United States
and other countries.
S. That the five companies-Swift &
Co., Armour & Co., Morris & Co., VIII
son & Co., Inc, and the Cudahy Pack
ing Company-act collusively in the
sale Of fresh meat. their specific COL
lusive activities embracing:
(a) Exchange of information regard
| ing margins" realized in the sale OF
meat:
(b) Inspection Of one another's
stocks Of fresh meats, and
(c) Joint action in underselling in
dependent competitors by system OF
rotation, each of the members of the
combination in turn assuming the
burden Of cutting prices to the COM
petitor's customers.
| 6. That there is q joint combination
regarding funds expended under secret
control to influence public opinion and
government action. and thus to main
tam the power of their combination.
Z. That the agreements. understand
ings. and pools hereinbefore recited
are reinforced by the community Of in
terest among the five companies above
named through joint ownership, either
corporate or individual, Of variou:
enterprises. Two or more of the five
interests thus have joint ownership OF
representation in 10S concerns, as fal
as ascertained to July. 1918.