Bisbee daily review., 1919-06-22

sition over wooded and difficult ter rain: in organizing and holding the terrain captured.
 The movement of the larger unit to the zone of attack began. on August P. To within about 40 kilameters of the front, the marching was done in the daytime. From there on all move ments were executed at night or in the early morning fog. The routes which were visible from Russian bal looms were studied with care and the advancing columns were forbidden to use them.
 In the expected offensive on the French front, operations of an analog ous nature would have to be consid cred, but the operations might be carried out on much larger scale and with greater speed because of the railroad systems available, where by foot marches could be combined with transport by railroad and trucks.
 Such an operation of crossing a river 400 meters wide can have a chance of success only if the enemy occupies the opposite shore with but small force, or if he is surprised by the attack. It was important therefore to observe the utmost se- crecy in regard to the operation. In this case every precaution was ob- served by the Germans.
 The orders captured indicate the precaution taken to avoid the atten- tion of the enemy. to the concentra- tion of the attacking force. These precautions included the avoidance of noticeable increase in traffic during the day, and the removal of all marks of Identification, such as shoulder straps and inscriptions on vehicles. As a matter of fact, the concentration which was affected behind the front was not suspected by the Russian general staff.
 The operation was completely sue cessful and the losses insignificant. The procedure followed by General von Hutier could not be carried out in all of it's details on the western front, and would have to be modified to suit the extent of the operations planned, the organization of our DO. sitions, and, finally the high degree of training and organization which the Germans would find opposed to him. But the principles upon which these operations were based, con forming as they do to actual exper. fence gained during the war. might be used against us and are as fol lows:
 Main Principles of Offensive
 1. An attempt at surprise by con cealment of the point of attack up to the last minute, by the rapidity and absolute secrecy of concentration and by the employment of some new method, such as new kind of gas.
 2. Powerful methods of execution, of great violence and short duration. The artillery preparation was violent and of short duration, as it was be- fore the battle of Galicia, Verdun and Tolmino.
 3. Preparatory fire by great number of guns devoted exclusively to counter-battery work.
 4. Piercing of the line by an at tack on a limited objective (the di, visions selected to break through the line at Riga had a fixed objective. and in case of an easy advance, an eventual objective).
 1 5. Immediate action on the part of the divisions of the second and third lines in reinforcing the divisions which had broken through the Rus sian lines.
 A week later it was learned that the attack of March 21 would follow very closely along the lines of the operations against Riga. This illus trates very we'll the principle that