Richmond times-dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1914-current, 1919-09-18
Should the President Compromise

Should the President Compromise?
TT is becoming more and moro evident that
the Senate will not Internationally ratify
the treaty of peace with Germany: that it
will insist upon certain qualifications; that
1t will lay down Il series of reservations. and
that it will even try to make amendments
TO the text of the document. But amend
| ments are unlikely, and fiat rejection OF the
pact now appears to be out OF the question
II only remains for the Senate to enact it's
reservations, assuming Of course, that a fair
majority Of its members can agree upon the
substance of these conditions.
President Wilson has taken an uncom-
promising stand against any amendments
and against any conditions that may be writ
ten into the ratification resolution itself. TO
his mind either course would be unfortunate
for the country and the world. and might
even prove fatal to the treaty 1t might kill
on the league of nations at blow anu
might necessitate the negotiation of a scpa-
rate treaty OF peace with Germany.
But the Presidents appeals appear to have
been in vain. His urging in Washington has
not moved the opposition and his campaign
ing across the continent has not beaten down
the groups of Senators who are bent upon
defeating the objects Of the President The
practical situation is this: The Senate. that
is, an apparent majority of that body, is pre-
pared 10 make series OF reservations if an
agreement among the Senator's upon such
reservations is possible. They are prepared
to abandon the scheme for the outright rcjec-
ton of the treaty and even for te1tual amend
ments to il. In other words. the Senate OPP
position, as it appears on the surface. sur
renders upon every proposition except that
of reservations.
Assuming that the votes are available to
write these reservations into the ratification
resolution the question is, would the Presi-
dent be justified in treating with his oppo-
nents in an effort to have a potent voice in
the framing of these conditions? Would he
or could he afford TO surrender upon one
point, 10 body of Senators who may be
minded to surrender on two points? In other
words, should the President compromise at
all with the opposition in the hope of salvag-
ing as much as possible for bad situation,
or stand pat and allow the treaty TO be so
mutilated that our war associates would not
recognize it?
ii would seem TO be the part OF good policy
TO enter upon such a compromise. if il turns
out that the Senate is packed against the
treaty and that IL left unrestfained, it will
strike a fatal blow at the heart OF the docu-
ment. 1t cannot be doubted that the Presi-
dent could influence the Senate to large
extent in the direction OF midness, il he
chose 10 make overtures toward a compro-
mise, and IL he were willing to give the op-
position an opportunity to retreat with
honor"
The President already has made it known
that he would not object to interpretations
OF the treaty, provided such interpret tions
we're not incorporated in the ratifying reso-
luton. This was bid his part, for an
agreement with the Senate. but a bid that
was fatty rejected. The opposing Senators
want all interpretations reservations and
conditions written into the ratification meas
irc itself. The President has difficult ques-
ton To answer in this situation