The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-10

transport from England Go France.
which traffic could also bc directly
attacked
CREWS FROM OLDEST
NAVY CRAFT
The number % submarines IN com
mission was sufficient for the work.
and our admiralty was also 81 the
opinion that construction. II q was
pressed ON 20 the utmost would
amply cover losses, In 1916. after
submarine warfare had really been
abandoned la principle. construction
had not been pressed on very vigor'
0usly The question Of crows could.
Il was thought he solved. They
would have TO be drawn mainly
from tho second line fleet which
consisted % the oldest ships. but
the other vessels also would have
20 release officers and engineers IN
the prime OF their service years.
The surface fleet was not. OF
course. 20 fan below certain
standard % strength, II had TO be-
maintained at sufficient level. In
the face % the enemy forces, which
were constantly increasing thru new
construction. and might be further
strengthened by tho adhesion ~ the
Americans, 10 assist IN the mhiute-
narce OF the rSpmarinc campaign
Il had the duty OF insursng the pas
sage ~ the submarines thru the en-.
emy mine fields II remained, In
fact. sufficiently formidable 60
thwart every attempt OF the enemy
10 interrupt sea traffic In the Baltic.
The chief Of the naval staff also
hoped that tho declaration Of uufe'
strlcted warfare would have a deter
rent effect on neutral shipping.
which had up 10 then been % great
assistance TO tho entente. lie was
quite convinced % the necessity for
the strongest support on this point
from political quarters. which proved
In the event to be something lack
ing
The amount OF shipping necessary
FOR the transport ~ troops from
America TO France and for the sup
ply Of rcinforcements was discussed
Our navy rsckoncd that the frclgh,
AhAtf kftlANffA ARA WV NAAtAH sfhAN -
an army with baggage and rein
forcemeuis amounted to five Brit.
lsh register tons per man. This 80
innate was confirmed by our ex-
perlence In the attack on oesci IN
the autumn Of 1917. II would thus
be necessary. In order 20 transport
| Loco 600 American soldiers In a rea-
sonabie time. 10 employ 5000 900
tons Of shipping space Such a
quantity Of shipping. In view Of the
necessity Of maintaining supplies TO
the western powers. could no; be
spared even temporarily.
The economic value Of the cam.
paigu was the subject OF varying
/ opinion In our government The
ministry 81 the interior gradually
came round land this Only after the
campaign had bcgun) to a high
view Of It's value. and the chancei.
/ Tor adopted this view also.
With my knowledge Of the mill.
tary situation and my firm views
as 10 the determination % the en-
envy. I did not accept literally the
estimates OF our admiralty as %
the probable effects Of unrestricted
submarine warfare. knew. more.
over. that questions OF transport
and Of economies generally are very
difficult 20 decide
did. however, think u safe IN
reckon that u would have decis-
I've effect within ~ months: that Is
to say. before America could throw
her new formations into the scale.
In hoped that. with the measures
already taken and to be taken. we
could hold out for this period on
land. assuming that the submarine
campaign produced sufficient dis
turbance Of the enemy's economy 90
reduce their industrial output OF
war material and cut down substan
TALLY their shipments OF munitions
to France For the first few months
I attributed the greatest importance
10 the latter point
was greatly impressed with tho
seriousness Of the position by a
tour which I took OF the western
front In the middle OF December
with a view to reviewing the whole
situation. and telegraphed my views
To Berlin: at that time | had al
ready abandoned hope Of any sue
cess from our offer Of peace. In a
long discussion on the 23d OF De
cember the field marshal expressed
adoption Of unrestricted submarine