The Chattanooga news. [volume] (Chattanooga, Tenn.) 1891-1939, 1919-09-08

| OF staff. thought otherwise, although
| Won der GoltZ Endorsed my opinion and
backed me up.
This, in my opinion. could only have
| been achieved by bringing out the High
| Seas fleet and not by a sweeping move
ment with light forces alone.
| Following the stand laade by our enc
mics which defeated our flanking move
, ment and halted our operations, Won
| Moltke was a doomed man, and the
reins OF the German army were trail
| ing on the ground. This reverse de-
since our carefully laid plan for the
| sudden invasion of France was de-
| feated. Won Moltke's successor did not
| give the impression of being master of
the task before him which, after the
stand made by the French in the first
battle of the Marine. grew limitless.
| The operations had now developed into
! a war of exhaustion. Up to this time
but one thought had dominated our
army-that it could not be stopped.
| The arresting Of our forward movement
| at the Marine was. a terrible blow to
! the army leaders and left them stunned
| and baffled as to the future.
| In war of exhaustion, thanks to the
/ naval supremacy of our enemies, their
superior numbers must become more
I and more effective. In spite of all our
early victories on land unparalleled for
| now found itself in a generally disad-
vantageous position. There is no ques-
ton that after the first battle of the
Marine the army leaders should have
learned anew, but here again the SUI
preme command failed to pursue the
great final aims.
Concentration Against England.
agree with Treitske In any war
there must be definite paramount
political aim on the attainment of which
: 1.
concentrated. The principal opponent
is the deciding factor in determining
this paramount aim. Partial victories
over secondary opponents are, at best.
only means to an end but are never
decisive in the ultimate result. Every
against England. She was our princi-
pal opponent and all our aims and
plans from the first should have been
directed against her.
Our leaders could not see that no
dividing up of the cars empire for
which our German diplomacy and Ger
man democrats were striving. could as
sist us in the ultimate outcome unless
we hit directly at our principal oppo-
nent, which was England, and which,
up to the time of our setback at the
Marine. had never been taken seriously
into the considerations of our military
leaders.
I lament that I was cried down as
a pessmist in the Lion dor hotel,
Gainesville, for saying:
There is no officer OF G. H. Q. who
does not believe the war will be ended
before April l, 1915, except the secre-
tary Of state for the navy
In England l was regarded as an
opponent whose isolation within the
German government was looked upon
with great qualification. In spite of this
prevalence of the uninteligent, con-
n T1t n In,
its position would not have become
dangerous had the chancellor gone hand
in hand with me. In August, 1914, l
said to the chancellor and Won Jagow:
Whatever we achieve against Russia
does not press upon England. Rather
forced us to fight on a front not corre-
spending to our political interests. The
German Russian war is very popular in
England. English statesmen are abso-
lutely determined to hold out to the
end. Our future can only be safe if
we harass England. 1t is absolutely
necessary to occupy Calais and Bou-
logne."
To this. the chancellor replied:
Il think we must limit ourselves In
the west, If successful there, to what
ever our armies attain, and hold those
positions and then turn our forces to
the east"
In August, 1914. the chancellor said
to n mutual acquaintance:
War with England is only thunder
storm which will soon blow over After
wards our relations will be better than
ever"
In the second installmeat Won Tir-
pitt deplores Rethmann- Hollweg's vacil-
lating policy toward England and dis
closes hitherto unknown facts about
Germanys plans for a conquest of
Russia and its hope then to come to
an understanding with England. The
second installment will be printed Mon
dnN }