The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1919-05-02

at least five. army corps and two or
| three cavalry divisions will move against
| the French frontier southwest on a
! great line between Brussels and GiVct.
The First French corps IS now at
: Dinant. one infantry and one cavalry bri-
i gadc opposing the group OF German
; corps south Of the Mouse. +
The Tenth and Third dprps are on
| rhc line Rcthcl-Thun. sokth Of the
! Sambrc. The Eighteenth CORPS is NOV
| ing up on the left Of tho Tenth and
Third.
six or seven reserve French divisions
are intrcnched on line reaching from
/ Dunkirk on the coast. through Cambrai
| and 1.h Capcllc 10 Hirson.
The Belgian army is intrcuched on
| line running northeast and southwest
| through Louvaln."
| Ny general instructions were then
| communicated to corps commanders as
! follows:
when our concentration is complete.
! 1t is intended that we should operate on
! the left Of the French Fifth army. the
! Eighteenth corps being on our right.
! The French cavalry corps Of three d.
visions will he on our left and in touch
! with the Belgians
AS a preliminary TO this. we shall
! take UP an area north of the Sambre, and
on Monday the heads Of the allied COL
umns should be on the line Mone-Givet
with the cavalry on the outer flank
Should the German attack develop
| in the manner expected, VIC shall advance
! on the general line Mons -Dinnnt to meet
/ it."
During these first Gays while our con-
| ccntratiun was in course Of completion.
rode about = great deal among the
| troops. which were generally on-thc move
10 take up their billets or doing prac-
| ticc route marches. I had an excellent
opportunity Of observing the physique
! and general appearance Of the men
Many OF tho rcScrvists NJ first bore
traces oil the civilian life which they had
! just left. and presented an anxious. tired
! appearance. but it was wonderful To OBJ
serve tho almost hourly Improvement
! which tool; place among them l know
that. under the supervision and influence
Of the magnificent body Of Officers and
nnn-commissoncd officers which be-
lonEcG TO the First Expcdit!onary force.
NIL the rcscrvists, even those who had
! been for years away from the colors.
| would. before going under fire. regain
| Ia the full the splendid military vigor.
determination and spirit which has 1T all
| times been so marked IL characteristic OF
British soldiers in The field
! I received 4. pressing request from tho
King Of the RrlElans To visit His Males
" at his Headquarters at l.ouvaIn: but
tho Immediate course Of the operations
prevented mo from doing so.
The opening phases Of the hattie OF
Mons did not commence until the morn
ing Of Saturday. August 81. Up 70 that
time. so far as the British forces were
q Cove f.pn
operations had complete possession OF
our minds. During the days which inter
vrncd Ihad frequent meetings and dis
cussions with the corps and cavalry COM
mandcrs. The intcllisHnce reports which
constantly arrived and tho results OF
cavalry ond aircraft "Reminiscences,
only confirmed the previous appreciation
OF the situation and left no doubt as to
tho direction OF the German advance;
but nothing came 10 hand which led us to
forsee the crushing superiority OF
strength which actually confronted US
on Sunday, August 20.
This was our first practical experience
In the use Of aircraft for reconnaissance
purposes, It cannot be said that IN these
early days OF the fighting tho cavalry
entirely abandoned that role On the
contrary they furnished me with much
useful information.
Tho number OF our airplancs was then
limited. and their powers OF observation
were not 80 developed or 80 accurate as
they afterwurd became. Nevertheless,
they kept close touch with the enemy,
and their reports proved Of the greatest
value.
While at this time, na have said, air.
craft did not altogether replace cavalry
ca regards tho gaining and collection Of
information. yct, hy working together a.
thoy did, tho two erma gained much
mora accurate and voluminous know
ledge Of the situation. IT was indeed,
the timely warning they saHe which
chiefly enabled mo to mako speedy dis.
positions 10 svnst danger; and disaster.
Thnns can be ltttis- doubt, tn6seA skAAt!