Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-21

iAS Abl a9 hAlAl4li JIA41l tlNii- ''ttA'A
foresee everything pointed to the
western front as the scene Of our chief
defensive fighting in 1917 although
It severe struggle was also going on
in the east. Direct cooperation with
the Austro-Hungarian high command
was not so necessary as il had been
during the campaign against Rumania
after the command on the eastern
front had been recognized in a less
complicated form.
The supreme importance of the
western theater Of war now demanded
the presence there of the commander
in-chief, 1 suggested Spa or Kreuz-
mach as the new headquarters. Spa
was rejected; Kreuznach was partic
ularly suitable. as many of the cables
to the front passed near the town, and
it had suitable hotel and other &C.
commodations. orders We're accord
ingly given for general headquarters
to be established at KreuZnach. Nun
ster am Stein and Bingen, and the
second fortnight of February was
contemplated as the time when the
transfer should take place
The Austro- Hungarian high COM
mand was transferred to Baden, near
Vienna
The submarine cruiser campaign
opened on February /, 1917, and as
soon as it became evident that the
troops that had been concentrated on
the frontiers of Holland and Den
mark TO meet a possible attack from
these quarters, would not be required,
these forces and their staffs, which
had been held in reserve for this pur-
pose, We're liberated for use on the
western front
Serious Situation All Around
Forced Retirement in France.
In the west a continuation of the
British attack on the Somme, perhaps
extending TO the north, had to be
reckoned with. II was possible that
this would be accomplished by o
French offensive between Rove and
Noyon. but the probabilities were that
France would choose our Soissons-
Rheims Argonne front for attack as
she had done in the autumn Of 1915.
The entente would thus have gained
a strategic advantage by pressing on
both flanks of the salient we had
pushed into French territory. II was
impossible to foresee which part of
the front the French would select.
They might cause q diversion at Roye,
and reports also pointed to the posi-
bility Of an offensive on the Lorraine
front and Sundgau upper Alsace),
where We had made very little prog
ress toward the consolidation of our
lines.
We had always been conscious Of a
certain weakness in this sector, as
local engagements were to he expect
ed here and it was only with diff
Guilty that we could bring IN rein
forcements Verdun was also occa-
sionally mentioned, rs the French
were always in a position to open an
attack at this point, Lastly, an ex-
tension of the British offensive toward
the north was indicated.
Puzzled Over Coming Attacks.
Consequently We had to be prepared
to offer a stubborn resistance at any
point along our whole front. It was
impossible to tell what was going to
happen.
There was no doubt about the CON
tinuation of the struggle on the Izonzo
front. This was Italy's goal At
lacks were more than likely in Mace
donia and on the Vardar, and certain
in Turkey, Palestine and Bagdad.
In the east I anticipated an attack
on the Austro- Hungarian troops in the
southern section of the front A sud-
den Russian advance in the direction
ON Mttau (near Riga) at the end of
January alarmed both ourselves and
the commander-in-chi on the east
ern front. It was, however, stemmed
by reserves, which We're rapidly
brought up
1t was not yet possible TO foresee
when the great offensive would take
place. On the eastern front il was
scarcely to be expected before April.
The big Russian advance in the spring
Of 1916 began in March, and was con-
siderably hampered by the bad wealth
er and the condition of the ground.
1t was unlikely that the Russians
would repeat this attempt so early in
the year. 1t was also possible that
the entente would accordingly post
pOne their offensive in the vest The
situation on the Somme. however. was
so tense that we had to be prepared
for an earlier attack.
Reason for Great Retreat.
The general situation made it nee
essary for us to postpone the struggle
in the west as long as possible, in
order to allow the submarine cam
paign time to produce decisive results
Tactical reasons and a shortage of
dllIlluIllllbil DlONlNtu duulliOlltii Itd-
sons for delay At the same time it
was necessary to shorten our front in
order to secure q more favora BILE
grouping of our forces and create
larger reserves.
In France and Belgium we had 1874
divisions facing 100 divisions, some of
which were considerably stronger
than ours. In view of our extensive
front, this was an exceedingly unfa-
vorabIe balance of forces. Moreover,
we had on certain sectors of our line
to endeavor to avoid strong enemy at
tacks as long as possible, by prevent
ing our adversaries from concentrat-
ing strong forces in front of them. At
the same time we secured positions in
which weaker divisions, wearied by
fighting, could be employed.
These considerations, taken in close
connection with the opening of the
submarine campaign. led to the de-
cision to straighten our front by with
/ drawing to the Siegfried line DIETER
known as the Hindenburg line), which
was to he in a condition of defense by
the beginning of March, and method
| ically to carry out the work of demo-
| lition over an area of Is kilometers