The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-09-24

additional divisions would become ne- cessary in order to strengthen the End Army, even if the enemy continued the offensive, and that was not certain. Besides our losses in prisoners had been so heavy that G. IT. e. was again faced with the necessity of breaking up more divisions to form reserves.
 Our reserves dwindled. Thc losses of the enemy, the other hand, had been extraordinarily small. The ball sncc of numbers had moved heavily against us; it was bound to become Increasingly unrnvorabie as more American troops came in. There was no hope of materially improving our position by a counter attack. Our only course, therefore. was to hold on.
 ADMITS ALLIES TOLD TRUTH
 We had to resign ourselves now to the prospect of a continuation of the enemy's offensive. Their success had been too easily gained Their wire less was jubilant and announced-and with truth--that the morale of the German Army was no longer what it had been. The enemy had also cap tured many documents of inestimable value to them. The Entente must have gained a clear idea of our difficulty in finding reserves, further reason why they should pursue the offensive without respite.
 The report of the Staff Officer I had sent to the battlefield as to the con- dition of those divisions which had met the first shock of the attack on the Sth perturbed me deeply. l sum- moned Divisional Commanders and of ficers from the line to Avesnes to dis cuss events with them in detail. I was told of deeds of glorious valor, | but also of behavior which, l openly l confess, I should not have thought pos sible in the German Army; whole bodies of our men had surrendered to single troopers, or isolated squadrons. Retiring troops, meeting fresh di-
 vision going braveiy into action, had
 shouted out things like "Blnckicg," and "You're prolonging the war;" express 1 sions that were to be heard again
 later.
 ! The officers in many places had lost i their influence. and allowed themselves
 to be swept along with the rest.
 BLAMES SPIRIT AT HOME | At a meeting of Prince Maxs War Cabinet in October Secretary Scheide-
 mann called my attention to DIvi-
 sional Report on the occurrences or August s, which contained similar un-
 happy stories. I was not acquainted | with this report, but was able to verify { it from my own knowledge.
 i A Battalion Commander from the l front, who came out with draft from l home shortly before August s, attribut- | ed this to the spirit of insubordina-
 tion and the atmosphere which the
 men brought back with them from home Everything I had feared. and
 of which had so often given warning,
 had here, in one place, become re-
 ality
 Our war machine was no longer ef-
 ficient. Our fighting power had suf- fered even though the great majority
 Of dixiG hPrOirallV The Sth of August put the decline
 of that fighting power be- ond all doubt, and in such situation, as re-
 gards reserves, I had no hope of find ing a strategic expedient whereby to turn the situation to our advantage. On the contrary, I became convinced that we were now without that safe foundation for the plans of G. H. Q. on
 which I had hitherto been able to build at least so far as this is possible in
 war.
 THE WAR MUST BE ENDED
 Leadership now assumed, ms then
 stated, the character of an irrespon-
 sible game of chance, thing | have
 always considered fatal. The fate of
 the German people was to me too high a stake.
 The war must be ended.
 The Sth of August opened the eyes
 of the staff on both sides, mine were
 certainly opened, and SO according to
 hds statement in the Daily Mall,
 were those of General Foch. The En'
 tente began the great offensive, the
 final battle of the world-war, and car ried it through with inceaSing Vlgor as our decline became more apparent considered it possible that the oc' currences since July 15 might have shaken the confidence of His Majesty , and the Field Marshal in me. Pos sibly, aIso, a fresh mind might be able
 to judge the situation from an un' prejudiced point of view. therefore
 earnestly requested the Field-Marshai $ to replace me if he no longer had fui : confidence in me, or if he considered ] it advisable for other reasons. He re l fused. , , also discussed my replacement witt the Chief of the Military Cabinet II case they had anything against me per s sonally. The Emperor gave me quit special proofs of his confidence s those days. I was deeply moved, bu
 remained anxious as to whether Hl n Majesty really read the whole situation = aright I have since been reassured t The Emperor told me later that afte y the failure of the July offensive am 0 after August s, he knew the war coui n no longer be won.
 The official report of the evening 0 e the Sth announced briefly that tn n enernv had penetrated our line Sout n of the Somme on a wide front. Tn d following morning General vol e Cramon rang me up at once fror k Baden. He informed me that my re
 port had caused great alarm in Vienna
 I could not leave him in any doubt 8
 l to the serious view l took Of the situa . ton. Nevertheless, he begged me t '- remember how determined the blum
 admission of defeat must affect ou n Allies. who placed all their hopes o = cermany This occurred again 0 . September ?.
 The impression made on our Alne y by the failure on the Western t'ron Q was great The Emperor Charles an = nounced his intention of coming to SD n in the middle of August.
 u Nothing was to be expected 1ror n Bulgaria. There the Radoslavoff Cap -S met. under the influence of events o $ the Western Front and the Treaty c , Bucharest, not to mention persona
 reasons. had been succeeded by Main e off. Malinoff was no friend of the Al l liance; some of his ministers wer e. openly against it and favorable to tn = Entente.
 't When later the Entente occupie V Bulgaria, although MalinoffA was dis 70 missed. they remained in office. Tn o Imperial Chancellor had to pass owe Ie the behavior of Malinoff's Ministry an ' invoke the assistance of the Tsar
 prevent a fresh orientation of polio. y The visit of few Bulgarians to Swits 'e erland also gave food for thought. Ths ~ too. we permitted.
 7, It was quite obvious that Bulgari a