South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1919-12-14

concentrating most aggressive personnel IN
shock divisions training allies was
trench warfare AS troops being trained
for open warfare there every why could
allow them be scattered allies.
by divisions, much less requirements except by
pressure necessity. Any permanent
amalgamauon would irrevocably commit Americas
fortunes to the hands of the allies. Moreover
obvious that the lack OF homegeneity would render
these mixed divisions difficult almost
certain 70 break under stress OF defeat with tho
consequent mutual recrmination. Again. there
doubt that the realization by the German people
that independent American divisions corps armies
the field with determined purpose would
severe blow to German morale and prestige"
Gen. Pershing had refused utterly drop his plan
for single American army. acting under its hag
but consented because of the existing emergency
lend the combat divisions at hand to help the
German offensive OF 1918 which the allied council
fc-esaw may very quickly place the allied armies in
serious situation"
ENEMY SUCCESS GREAT.
The German rush developed as expected. the report
shows the enemy's success was far greater than
had been feared At Amiens, the British were driven
in 4o-kiIometer front; between Disc Berry
au-Rao, the French lost SO Kilometres S5-kilo-
meter front in 4 days And Immediately the Germans
utilized the Marine "as defensive flank and the ad-
was directed toward Paris"
The gravity OF the situation" the report says
to the famous orders for holding up all supply and
troop shipments except infantry and machine
units" Gen. Foch who was now made generalssino
estimated that 100 American divisions would
sary for allied victory
PERSJIINes'S SUGGESTION.
Gen. Pershing at this time recommending that
his troops be used smash the Marine pocket into
which the Germans had thrust themselves He says:
The Marine salient inherently and offered
opportunity for a offensive that OBJ
vious II successful. such operation would afford
immediate relief the allied defense would
the threat against Paris. free the Paris-Nancy
railroad. But. important than else. would
the morale OF the allies and remove the pro-
found depression then existing. Up this
timc units had been put in here there cri
cal points emergency troops stop the terrific
advance In every trial. whether the defensive
offensive they had proved themselves equal
troops in Europe As early June % and again
July 10 Bombon. had very strongly urged that
best divisions be concentrated under American
mand If possible. for a striking force against
the Marine salient Although the prevailing view
among the allies that American units suitable
only for the defensive they could
used 10 better advantage under allied command the
suggestion accepted principle and my estimate
OF their offensive lighting qualities was soon put to the
test"
AMERICAN SUCCESS.
Although his suggestion not accepted. American
found glory in the action undertaken.
Chateau Thierry when the Germans first advanced,
the third division commander reported:
Although the rush the German troops
infantry machine-gun companies to suffer in some
so percent loss German soldier crossed the
road from FossOy to crezaney prisoner OF