The sun., 1919-05-03

hiHthry uefeat, as MI. KELLOGG IN
sists the dearest thinkers in Germany
admit.
'of this" he says, "four factors IN,
morale are now prominently mentioned
In Germany--the proof OF the existence
OF strong allied reserves by the counter
attack Of July, the crush ng defeat OF
August In which seven crack divisions
were permanently ruined, the bitter
realisation Of the quantity and quail ty OF
the American troops in France, the dis
illusionment of tho German soldier with
and the rapid development OF revolution
airy tendencies in the soldiers in the
occupied areas Of France and Belgium
behind the fighting line"
Food Enough for Eight Months.
Mr.. Kellogg denies that the defeat was
due to the collapse of the home front"
There was food enough for Germany to
carry on for eight or nine months more.
The home front was firm on the day the
armistice was appealed for. though lack
OF food and coal played as large a part
as lack OF food in the WEAKNESS which
the home people were stu supporting.
The revolution. he contends, followed
rather than caused the defeat.
Mr. Kellogg's belier IN the ability Of
the present Government to go through
with the peace programme by no means
implies unqualified endorsement Of the
group as whole.
Observation OF the ebert Govern
ment." he says, leads to little respect
for its quality, policies or authority.
From the standpoint Of the internal
restoration of Germany and from the
standpoint Of her future external rela-
tons to the world the Ebert Govern
ment is committing four mistakes of
policyI'
BY using Bolshevism as a threat
against the outside world ii Is encour-
aging the scourge within Germany. It
IL pretending that the lack of raw ma
terials and food are the only obstacles
TO Germany's commerci1l resuscitation,
though In fact the relations between
capital and labor arc tar more grave,
and all officials of the Government pri-
vately admit that Industrial conditions
will not be much better after the food
and materials are got in. 1t Is delib-
erately creating an idea Of revenge
against the Entente, putting the events
Of the war and armistice In a false light
| and misinterpreting the Wilsonian four
teen points. And 1t Is continuing the
mistaken diplomacy Of the old regime
with Bernstorn at the head Of the For
eign Office.
Imperialism VS.. Idealism.
These conditions he attributes to the
makeup of the Government, in which
the majority Socialists, Centrists and
Democrats are compromised, the Social
lists SO committed to the policies of the
| old regime that they dare not break
away lest they lose the support of the
other parties.
Hence. he says. the Government en-
cours ges the belief that all of Germany's
| misfortupes are due to outside causes,
that all the indefensible acts of the old
crowd had to be" and that the present
Germany should not be punished for
them.
The struggle" he says, ''is between
the old Imperialism and the new IDEAL
ism and between capital and labor on
! the lines Of traditional socialism. aside
from Bolshevism. Neither problem will
| be solved until the old frame OF mind
| with it's opportunism. sophistry and I'M
moral pragmatism is replaced by. clari-
fed point Of view that expresses itself
in moral regeneration radiatng from
| the individual to the very periphery Of
society. The German State cannot be
| saved from the outside. It must be re-
created from within. Pessimists like
Muhlon have hope only In the noxt gen.
| GRAFTON. But even optinists realize
| that every German must be born again"
In addition to lack OF food and raw
materials, Mr.. Kellogg gives the I'M
willingness to work on the part OF Ger
| man labor as the dominant factor in the
industrial situation. Demobilized SOL
| diers, losing all social consciousness
brutalized by barbaric methods of war
fare and regarding themselves as the
a nf 70
hand. Workmen who have been driven
at high pressure throughout the war arc
physically and temperamentally incapa-
BILE Of sustained effort. In addition TO
all OF which the socialist Government
| encouraging the animosity against the
cspitalistic classes, removes all stimulus
| TO work where the workmen suspect that
their efforts go only TO swell the profits
| Of their employers and not to better
their own conditions.
Character Permanently Impaired.
1t Is only the politician. says Mr.. Kel-
logg, who believes that fed and suppl ed
with raw materials the German again
| will pitch in like the thrifty and in
dustrious individual he used to be. The
| best informed social scientists and the
/ labor leaders themselves believe that
the war has had a permanently i'm
pairing effect upon the German indus
| trial character
Nevertheless Mr.. Kellogg advocates
that food and raw materials be sup
piled Germany on the theory that the
sooner the nation is put to the test
and turns one way or the other that
4 better will the world be by having
at least definite instead Of a nebulous
problem to struggle with.
His report shows the striking de-
moralization of the railroads and tie
essential industries according to the
German Governments own figures. In
January 1919 the depleted rail euip
| ment handled but 4S per cent. Of the
cars handled in prewar periods -..is is
due to the lack of repair material. And
repair material cannot be turned out
without the production OF coal, which
In turn cannot be turned out without
adequate rail facilities. The indispen-
sable raw materials which Germany must
| import for the reconstruction of her rail
! system are placed by Mr.. Kellogg as at
| 5000 tons OF cotton, 1000 tons of rubber,
| 10000 tons OF copper. 1000 tons OF tin,
500 tons of nickel, and 1000 tons Of
asbestos.
Coal Poorer In Quality.
Coal available, he shows, has dropped
OFT very badly in the high grades, though
! an increase in the so-called brown coal
has to some extent Offset this tonnage
but not in calorific quantity. The cost
| or coal has increased about 800 per cent
The serious aspect OF this is in the in
ability OF Germany to export coal in re-