Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-10-26
NvE[lE 1917 FAILURE
! IS GIVEN NEW VERSION
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Eanise his transport. before he pushed
on to the Belgian frontier.
U-Boat and Russia.
The new ministry had now to con-
slider the advisability of permitting
any offensive. but the Russian revolu-
tion had made some operation neces-
sary alike to help Russia. still ap-
parently an ally, to prevent a with
drawal of German troops from the
Russian front for use against Italy.
which actually did occur in the fall
with the resulting disaster of Capo-
retto. Finally the submarine cam
paign was becoming so grave q peril
that 1t threatened to win the war un-
less military success could retrieve
naval failure.
The ministry, was satisfied that Nj
velle's grandiose plan could not sue
coed. but II inclined to favor lesser
q, offensive. with limited detectives, an
kattack which should be carefully
planned and thus incur small losses,
while infiicting heavy casualties upon
the enemy and achieving useful gains
Conceivably the initial attack might
result in Nivelle's break through. If it
did. well and good, then the operation
mlSnt De eXDdnueu. lnlS WAS tiC
program of the government. AS for
NiveIle he heard all warnings, mill
tary and civilian. with contempt He
believed in supreme victory. AT the
moment of attack he showed the gov
eminent maps. which 1 have seen.
called for an opening advance of
eight miles. and this optimism did not
desert him, when $4,000 French dead
and 500 yards of gain were the total
profit of the first day of the offensive
\ therefore. the prospect of great VIC
tory had vanished long before the &C
tual attack on April 16. 1917. On the
mechanical and technical sides the
promise was even more dismal.
Nivelle undertook to expand Petain's
method, applied to four or Ave miles
of enemy front, into an attack on
front ten times as broad. and he was
not able to deal with SO vast prob
lem. comparable with that which was
a year later. His armies were thus
inadequately trained and the ways OF
communication were insufficient. Whlie
the medical service broke down.
Other Aids to Disaster.
There were three other circum-
stances which contributed to the &C
tual disaster, the weather, the Jolly
of the command in the 5th Army and
at least, to weather conditions which
Nnade air observation impossible.
yAs to the first circumstance. the
winter of 1917 was one of the rough
est in half a century and the month
of April was time OF snow ana
storm The weather during the pc
Rod of the actual battle was so bad
that It was impossible for the infan-
try to follow the barrage of the ar
tillery. The rapid fire guns. machine
guns and even the small arms of the
soldiers were completely put out OF
service. The infantry threw away all
it's burdens. the black troops. which
had shown their value as shock units
on a score of fields, lost three quar-
tiers of their value because of the
temperature.
The second circumstance. the impru-
dence in the 5th Army. amounted to
the presentation of the enemy with
the French plans Three days before
the battle a sergeant, carrying orders
of operation indicating In detail the
dispositions for the attack by three
corps and the Russians upon Fort
BIimont. was killed and his dispatch
bag captured. Thus warned. the en-
envy reinforced the threatened points
and subsequent French attack did not
result in the gain of foot. while the
loss of the 7th Corps alone was $4,000
men in four days. This blunder was
duly reported to the French COM
mahder, and 1t should have led to the
Of the enterprise.
Finally. the artillery preparation
was done very badly. Ten days of
bombardment resulted in insufficient
reduction Of enemy works. Weather
conditions contributed to this failure.
but the chief cause was lack of NUM-
tons for so vast a front. itself based
upon strong natural obstacles multi
piled by skillful engineers.
Whole Enterprise Doomed.
In the face IF all these circum-
stances and confronting an almost I'M
believable anarchy existing in the
high command, but with an army
fired by the recent German retreats,
knowing that their commander ex-
1 pected to break the German line. MI
%yelle. still mistaken, announced that
he expected to succeed on the Craonne
plateau. This announcement was
made to the government after, the
first attack-that on st. Quentin-had
been made on April IA and had COM
pletely failed, thus booming the whole
enterprise. Nevertheless, fixing his
attack for the morning of the 18th.
Nivelle repeated his familiar forecast
that he would arrive in Laon at dawn
on the 18th. and that his cavalry
would reach La Fere by sunset on the
same day. Brimont was to be taken
!. in five hours by that development
from the north of which the Germans
had been SO completely forewarned.
Therefore. just one week after the
British had brilliantly launched their
offensive on Vimy Ridge. but at the
precise moment when their advance
had been pinned down. Nivelle
armies of 'Mangin Mazel left their
trenches at 6 o'clock in the morning.
in the midst OF a tempest of snow,
rain and wind. The aviation could
not function. the artillery was de-
pendent entirely upon ground obser-
walton. 1t was in vain that the
trench mortars destroyed practically
everywhere the FIRST enemy line. An
actual telescoping occurred with the
received and executed the order to
die on it's first line rather than yield.
German Defense,
Warned long in advance. the Ger
mans had no less than four lines.
with a depth of eight miles. These
machine guns. hidden in the innu-
merable grottOes and caverns of the
porous cliffs. The French artillery
did not completely dominate the stu
alton, as all the INSTRUCTIONS of the
high command had demanded. The
tanks. in gallant attack near Fon-
tavert. which was designed to clear
the gap between Craonne plateau and
Rrimont nowhere reached the third
. for a great forward leap. This con-
I'm sion nf RI