Edgefield advertiser. [volume] (Edgefield, S.C.) 1836-current, 1919-06-11
Longstreet at Gettysburg.

In looking over the "reminiscences
of the Civil War" by Gen John B.
Gordon, he says that Gen. Longstreet
was slow in making the attack on the
morning of July End, and that Gen.
Lee had ordered Longstreet to open
the battle at sunrise and it was two
o'clock before Gen. Longstreet could
be found, and that Gen. Lee was
wondering what had become of his
"war-horse." Gordon lays all the
blame on Longstreet's "tardiness,"
as he calls it, in not having his First
Army Corps on the field in time.
Now, I do not like to take issue
against a dead man, but in this case
will, and with gloves off. Gen. Cor
don waited until Gen. Lee died before
bringing this false statement against
Gen. Longstreet The truth of the
matter is, Gen. Gordon never did like
Lees -"war-horse," he was very jeal-
Gus of him, which all the army officers
knew. This was not the first time
that Gen. Gordon tried to snatch the
"roses" from Longstreet.
Listen what Gen. Lee says after
this great battle: eff l had listened to
Gen. Longstreet, things would have
been different at Gettysburg" That
is matter of history.
Now, Pm going to come down to
brass tacks. was on that march with
Gen. Longstreet. Gordon was not a
long that night before the battle. On
the evening of July 1st, Longstreet's
command left Chambersburg about
o'clock, perhaps it was 5 o'clock,
and marched all night, reaching Get
tysburg alittle while before day light.
My brigade (Kershaw's), halted in a
swamp and remained there until a.
bout gray-dawn. We were then moved
back and forth, up and down the line
some three or four times. At last we
halted and were told to be ready to
move at a moments notice.
By this time the sun was about at
the tops of the trees. Nov', mark you,
Gen. Gordon says that Longstreet
could not be found until midday,
July End.
At sunrise, maybe a little after,
Gen. Lee and Gen. Longstreet, with
three or four of their staff, rode by
some thirty yards in rear of the then,
line of battle, "boot-to-boot." Gen.
Lee knew just where Gen. Longstreet
was before daylight of that morning,
and he knew that Longstreet was
ready for the fray. AS l have stated,
Gen. Gordon waited until Gen. Lees
death to bring these charges against
the greatest fighter in the army, SIM
ply because he did not like Gen.
Longstreet, because he commanded
the First Army Corps and stood in
rank next to Lee. 1t was universally
acknowledged in the First Army
Corps that if Gen. Lee had hard
nut to crack, he always called for his
"war-horse" to crack it and he never
failed. No, Gen. Longstreet was not
tardy on any battle field.
There was a kind of intuition a
mong the soldiers OF ,sohgsCreels
corps that after all the other Troops
had made their long marches, tuggei
at the fanks of the enemy, threa.en-
ed his rear, and all display OF strate-
gy and generalship failed, then when
the hard, stubborn, decisive blow
was to be struck, the troops of the
First Army Corps were called upon
to strike it. Gen. Longstreet had in
formed Gen. Lee at the outset: "My
corps is as solid as rock-a great
rock. 1 will strike the blow and win
if the other troops gather the fruits
of the victory"
How confident the "Old War
Horse" was in the solidity and cour-
age of his troops, and soon his seven
teen thousand men were to be pitted
against the whole army of the Po-
tomac. Still, no battle was ever con-
sidered decisive till Longstreet, with
his cool, steady head, his heart of
steel and troops, who acknowledged
no superior .:or scarcely equal, in an
cient or modern times, in endurance
and courage, had measured strength
with the enemy. l repeat again what
Gen. Lee had to say after this battle,
his words, and they are historic: eff
had listened to Gen. Longstreet's