The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1919-11-09


the most successful of them was prac-
ticed by American forces in the
Meuse-Argonne battle last fall when
the last great allied offensive was
at its height from Switzerland to the
sea. An imaginary army conceived by
b handful of American Junior officers
was thrown into the field" over night
and for days five crack German divi-
sions Just east of Verdun in the Etain
region were kept on their toes mo-
tnentarily expecting an attack which
never materialized.
At dinner table In a Coblenz cafe.
overlooking the Rhine, an American
Intelligence officer recently told the
letory of the creation of the Mythical
tx army" as it was called. 1t appears
that the Germans were expecting an
lattack in the Etain sector at any time,
land the Americans knew it; but at
that phase of the game the First Unit
ed States army was devoting its ener-
gies to driving the enemy out OF the
lArgonne forest and the hill country on
teither side. So the mythical army
was created, in preference to real
ldiversion, requiring many men, to con-
Vince the German commander that 1T
Iwould not be wise to weaken the Etain
lgonne front where a desperate battle
was proceeding.
Five fresh divisions had been placed
lby the Germans on the Etain line.
IThese constituted their last and finest
RESERVOIR of available divisions. The
fAmericans realized that the minute
1.-The Germans decided that this was
mot a danger point, any or all Of the
live divisions could be withdrawn. re-
placed by exhausted and fragmentary
Edivisions coming from the battle fronts
and that the appearance of the fresh
sfroops in line west of the Mouse would
nave q tremendous effect on the
American offensive.
The tx army" was assigned to
front from Bezonvaux to Fresnes.
From the morning of October % until
Just previous to the armistice this
army "functioned". Captain Charles
H. Matz, of Hubbard Woods, ILL.,, was
commander -in-chief. Captain William
FL. Dearden, of Springfield. Mass, and
Washington d. C. was chief of staff.
Lieutenant John III. Graham of Lex
ington Va was chief of troop move
ments"; Captain o. w. Neidert was in
charge of Gil or administration; and
Lieutenant H. T: Griswold. of Old
The staff of the x army were all
members of the intelligence section of
the first army and of course. before
beginning operations, had secured the
consent of their chief, Colonel Dilley
Howell.
The wireless and the telephone We're
freely used to convince the Germans
that the Americans were preparing for
an attack In the Etain sector. To
make sure that the Germans would be
able to ''break into" the code used
the American furnished them with a
satisfactory key.
One wireless station of the X army.
was established in clump of woods
near verdun and was christened
headquarters of the X army" This
etation functioned until the end of the
game. all ORDERS TO the army going
out from this place by wireless. Soon
after the station began working the
Germans located its whereabouts and
frequently shelled the woods and vi
entity. apparently in hopes of break
ing up the radio of this latest Of an
noyances.
The X army also had a portable
radio station. which moved about
and represented itself as a different
station every day or two.
The sector in which the x army was
at work was directly under command
of the Thirty-third French corps. and
the rowing wireless station caused con-
siderable excitement among the French
corps, and the rowing soldiers as II
sent messages to make the enemy be-
lieve that several fresh American dt-
divions had moved into the area. The
French unaware of the plans of the
* army staff. at times thought the
Americans had lost all sense of rea-
son and on several occasions so re-
ported the wireless plants.
The first message from the X army
headquarters was a general despatch
TO all wireless stations in the army
area (none of which actually existed)
In the new code. of course. directing
that none OF the stations answer or
make any use Of their sending instru-
ments, for fear of the enemy locating
them but TO be on the alert at fixed
hours TO receive messages. The effect
large number of wireless stations must
have been up and to advise them of
the hours when the enemy intercepting
stations should be on the alert for
the American messages.
This was followed by a series OF
messages designed to indicate that the
x army was preparing for a full fledg-
ed operation. In order to inform the
enemy of the geographical limits of
the sector OF the x army, many mes
sages We're directed to imaginary Of
Ulcers at existing towns on the Etain
front.
Meanwhile the rowing wireless was
working overtime day and night 1t
began sending out messages in the
Fresnes sector and trying to give the
impression that 1t was several stations
at widely separated locations. One
message IL particular was peculiarly
designed to add to the enemy's sus-
picion OF the approaching trouble
an imperative demand for 200 copies