Bisbee daily review., 1919-08-10

luilln HIS uuIy lO Ju0 uJInOSJ. II this is done the enemy's attack win be shattered"
 It will be seen from this order that the enemy judged correctly our in tentions, first to cut the Longuyon Sedan railroad line, and secondly, to harass and if possibye discontinue the exploitation of the Briey iron mines. Concerning the first, General vOn der MaTwitZ says that the railroad line is the main line of communication of the western army. He further says that the possession of the Briey iron mines is a great factor in the steel production of Germany. These two were of prime importance to Ger many's success in the war. Her en- tire defensive system in northern France was based on this great rail- way system since by this means she had always been able to shift troops quickly from one front to another. In modern warfare the success of any defense depends to a great extent upon this ability for rapid move, ment.
 Held Four-Fifths Europe's Iron.
 The Briey iron basin contains four fifths of all the iron ore in Contin- ental Europe. In the remaining fifth there must be included the ore in Sweden, Russia and other regions. It follows, therefore, that Germany to be successful must hold on to and be able to use this iron basin. The loss of it would have meant a speedy end to the war.
 It is readily seen, therefore, that of all sectors of the Western front that which the Americans were to attack was to the enemy the most important and the most vital. The strategists on the side of the Allies knew that the war would be won when the Longuyon Sedan railroad had been cut and that the cutting of this line would soon force the enemy Lo give up his hold on the Briey iron basin. That is to say, if the enemy had not signed the armistice he would have been forced in the new attack plan ned for November 14th to surrender internationally On November 11th, the date the armistice was signed, this railroad line was already cut and American and French troops were massed for the new attack which would have isolated Metz. Our in- telligence reported that the enemy had only one fresh division on the entire western front with which to block our attack.
 Huns Used 46 Divisions in Vain.
 From September 26th to November 11th the enemy used 46 different di- visions in the line againts us. Of these, 13 were engaged a second time and two a third time. Of these 46 divisions 15 were first class shock divisions, so that the enemy threw in against us one third of his total forces in France. On the front west of the Mouse 15 German divisions were engaged from the local reserve. Twenty-three diviisons came from fronts, IT from the French front, five from the American line and one from the British front. East of the Mouse as far as Fresnes, or to the eastern limit of the First Army sector, six teen enemy divisions were engaged from the local reserve and three from the French front.
 Looking at these statistics in an- other way, we see that only four enemy divisions were withdrawn to the French front, one division was withdrawn because of the Austrian armistice and four went to the other American front. Twenty-seven divi- sions went back to the local reserve. These figures show conclusively the value of our attack to our Allies of fensive in Champagne and in the north
 Another reason why the American attack was of vital importance to the Germans was that it threatened one of the two main arteries of supply leading from Germany into France. In order to safeguard the troops op- posing the French and British armies it was imperative for General von der Marwitz to hold his positions, doubly so because reduced man-power was compelling the German high com mand to shorten it's front and the only way to shorten the front was to swing the entire line in a northeast erly direction on von der Marwitz's army as a pivot If this pivot should crumble before the line had been swung back the German armies faced disaster. Every Branch Rear Service Exhausted
 Allied experts have figured that on the German side a division was not entirely withdrawn from the line un- til it had total losses of 5000. This rule had heretofore been followed closely but in the last few weeks of the Meuse-Argonne battle there was no attempt to keep the German troops in sufficient reserve and everything was thrown in without regard to for mer standards. There were evidences os early as last May that the Ger mans were beginning to suffer from lack of man-power. A specialist in the French army predicted three months before the time when the Germans put in their class of 1920 that such a move would be made This class began to appear in the front lines in october but strict or ders had been issued by Ludendorfi to withdraw these young men and keep them at the recruit depots as they were to hvae been used, being AL. f1aI nf