davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-03-02
By Samuel Crowther

ing plants they were probably in as much
danger as the men in the trenches-ai-
though they chose the muntion work to
avoid the army. There is nothing heroic
about the English mlnition worker; he took
what seemed to he the better Of two bad
alternatives.
The increases in wages have been very
great, but on the whole they have, by no
means, reached the American scale; skilled
machinists, or engineers, as they call them
here, will get up to about 70 cents an hour
| have heard of no higher. For similar
work our mon would get about 90 cents. I'm
actual production per dollar are far
ahead on all kinds Of ropctityc work, but on
general work it is very difficult to deter
mine the facts, for American labor had fall
ell to low state of efficiency with the war
If VIC had any general advantage, our very
rapid rate of labor turnover probably over
balanced it; the ordinary run Of English
strikes do not produce as much waste as
docs the frequent Job shifting Of the Amer
lean worker That is a point whore only
observation can be relied upon, for exactly
comparable performances are impossible.
The war taught the worker ono big thing
that without him the country can func-
ton neither in war nor peace Speakers kept
telling him that IN order TO spur him on TO
greater cNcrtion. lie took his position dur
ing the war. Now that a Kind of peace is
here he is equally determined to have a
place in society and to be able to rear his
family in some kind of comfort. That is a
perfectly reasonable desire, and have
found no section OF the English public
which is not i'll agreement with him.
But the rub, as usual, comes with the
"how' of it all. Tho first thing up was the
restoration Of prc-war labor conditions No
body wants those conditions back again.
l he employer does not want them, because
he secs that he must increase production
and rapidity Of capital turnover if he is TO
regain a grip on foreign markets; this he
cannot do with rules limiting output. The
worker does not want a return to long hours
and low wages. The compromise was sourht
to be effected by cutting the week down TO
forty seven hours and throwing away out
put limiting rules The employers and the
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-03-02

workers and profit for the capitalists, am
against it; if it means efficiency and hu-
manity combined, l favor the development
hear talk about proft~sharing schemes,
but if they come let them be real copartner-
ships, and not like some purely stock ven
lures giving working people IS and man
ayers and chiefs e10O'
The workshops of England have had shop
stewards for many years. l know one shop
that had q steward twenty years ago. But
1t is only lately that they have acquired
power. The workers in a shop comprised
many unions and they expected to deal
with the employer as unions: but there
we're certain questions in which the whole
shop was concerned and which did not
come within union purvicw, such, for in
stance, sanitary matters TO form a
medium between the employer and the
whole body Of the employed, the men elect
cd representative known as the shop
steward. In large shops they had stew
ards for each department sometimes a
body of twenty or thirty stewardship
small shops had single steward Some of
tho unions recognized that these stewards,
representing the workers as a whole and
not merely the unions, were possible
menace to unionism, but other unions took
them in either officially or unoficjally. Rut
they served such useful purpose that grad
ually they spread and day they have
great influence
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-03-02
By William l.. MCPHERSON

Copyright, 1919, Ne'o Yo,k Tribune Inc.
TNHERE was no "Miraclo Of the
Marnc' The first battle of
H. that name bulks large in the his
tory of the war because Of the
dramatic glamour and moral value of
natural tendency to rhapsodizc about it.
1t has been frequently classified as one
of the decisive battles of the world
along with Marathon, Chalons, Poiticrs,
Waterloo and Gettysburg.
Yet VIC see now that it was not dc
cisivc in any sense. 1t was battle Of
arrest. 1t merely postponed a decision.
1t did not break the German hold on
France. For after the retreat to the
Aisnc the German armies still threat
cncd Paris. They were to remain on
French soil for more than four years,
TO reach and pass The Marine again, and
to penetrate once more almost to
Amicns. Paris escaped bombardment
in 1914. But the German heavy guns
were almost in a position to destroy it
in June and July, 1913.
The victory of September SO re-
stored a situation which the French
General Staff had almost allowed to
get beyond its control. Jof1res strategy
in the first weeks of the war proved in
effective. He adhered firmly to tho
idea that the Germans would not come
through Belgium rapidly or in great
force. He concentrated the great part
Of his available strength on the I.or-
rainc Asacc front and held the Belgian
frontier lightly. His plan was, appar-
emily, to match Il German attack
through Belgium with Il French advance
toward the Rhine. lie sent north only
ono army, the Fifth, under Lanrcznc.
to hold the triangle from Dinnnt down
tho Mcuse to Namur, and thence west
to Chnrlcro 1t was supported on the
left by n part Of the British expedition
airy army. These Allied forces were
never able to make II junction with tho
belgian army, which was driven north
from Brussels in the direction Of Ant
wcrp. They were also far inferior In
numbers to the three armies &c Won
k!uck, Won BuIow and Won llnuaen.
which were rapidly moving wcst
through Belgium.
Jofrc expected TO relieve the pressure
on his own weak left wing by striking
ut the German left wing from the
southern edge Of Belgium down to the
Swiss border. Possibly he never OK
pected the Germans to get through Bel
GUM within month. He therefore
developed general offensive against
the German left, beginning in southern
Alsace. An army from Belfort pushed
across the border, taking Altkrch on
August 8. The next day it occupied
Muihousc. 1t was promptly expelled
from Mulhouse by the Germans. This
city was rctaken by General Pau on Au-
gust 10. But the second upper Alsaco
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-03-02

sion that it was on the verge of a rep
clifton Of The elder Won Moltke's easv
successes in 1870
Overconfdencc made the German
General Staff incautious 1t had no
thought of a renewal Of the French Of
fenslve 1t allowed the German col
umns to outtravel their heavier artil-
lcry and their transport. The Ger
mans were marching away from their
bases. The French were retiring tow
ard theirs. Nor did the German staff
appear to be aware that from Sep
TENDER | on the stratogcal situation
was changing rapidly in favor Of the
French.
The development which Won Klucl
and Won BUIow were charged with
executing was. feasible enough so
long as the Allied left wing remained
"in the air it did remain so while the
British were north Of the Oisc. Won
kIucks right then overreached the AL
lied left. His outposts entered Amiens.
Most of his troops came down to the
Disc crossings to the west of Compiegne.
There were no Allied troops in that
region to stop them.
But when they approached the forti
fled zone Of Paris conditions altered,
The German right wing armies could
not invest Paris. For the German OBJ
jcctivc was not Paris, but the French
armies. They could not isolate or mask
Paris by passing around it on the west.
Won kluck's army was not large enough
Tor such an operation. lie may have
thought that Paris would be evacuated
by It's garrison, as it had been bv
the French government. When he
reached the northeastern outskirts Of the
capital and found no sign Of evacuation
nc conceived the idea Of merely skirt.
ing Paris and turning southeast in pur-
suit of the British, who had ictreatcd
across the Grand NORM to II position
below Coulommcrs. Possibly he ex
pcctcd to occupy Paris after tho Allies
had been driven south of the Seine.
The painfully meagrc French bule-
tins in The last days Of August and the
closed nm uninterrupted retreat. Sedan
Day was ut hand. The world looked
forward TO another Sedan Yet it was
becoming apparent even then that tho
German development movement had
failed.
The German First Army had, in fact,
been placed in what Jollre described in
an order issued by him on September
a as "a foolhardy position" 1t had
entered the French trap. 1t was exposed
to an attack out of Paris by an army
whose presence in that neighborhood the
German staff did not suspect. Jofrre had
organized the Sixth French Army, trans
1errlng Maunoury from the Army of Lor
ralne to command it. This force was
massed behind the Paris Notifications.
1t advanced east of Meaux on September
to attack Won Kluck's flank and rear.
Another new army had been created
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-03-02
LONDON, February 20

A~V-NbO->, ICulNuIt
ORDER to get the perspective on
English and Scotch labor it is ncces-
~ sary to know how it is organized and
also to bear in mind that trade union
ISM Is here political as we'll as q social
organization. Mr.. Gompers has been intent
in few Presidential elections, notably the
election of 1916, upon keeping labor out of
politics; an American union member votes
Just as he !ikes-he votes as a citizen and
not as worker. The English and the
Scotch vote workers and their union
leaders commonly hold some public Office.
! have talked with union leaders up and
down the country and l cannot now recall
a single Irregular" who WAS not either a
counsellor or member OF Parliament
So far SO good but now come the com
piexilies. England has somo 1883 unions
at this writing and viii probably have more
before this is printed. Their total mem
bershp is 5,2S7, 522, which represents a gain
OF about 100000 siuce the opening of the
war. There must be come trade which has
not union, but | cannot discover what it
is, unless it be the bank clerks-but they
are forming union. The women do not
belong to unions as yet, but the movement
IS under way for their organization.
Each of these unions is made up Of local.
district and national bodies, and there is a
loose central organization which roughly
corresponds to the American Federation of
Labor. but has none of its power or coher-
ence. The workers seem to prefer a certain
craft independence, but they formerly voted
more or less patlonal body in the Labor
party. But that party is now split up into
many sections, the chief Of which are the
Independent Labor party and the Socialist
Labor party-there are other subdivisions
which are not of Importance.
The regular Labor party, OF which Hon.
G. IT,. Roberts, NJ P, and the Hon. j. C.
tlynes, NJ p, may be called the leaders,
IN fact if not in name, stands for colec-
tive bargaining and the operation of indus
try through agreements between the en-
ployers and the employees, and is generally
constructive. In days gone by merely being
n labor man was supposed to be synonymous
with being radical, but in the present day
the old radical is hide bound conservative
as compared with the current radicals This
old line party was returned in the last cleo
tons in most sections over the other party
wings and has at least a nominal suprcm-
acy.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-03-02

engineers agreed 10 this; other industries,
such as the textiles, agreed to the short
week, but not to abandoning the limit on
output. But the engineers left number of
points open, the greatest of which was the
arrangement of the hours Under the old
conditions, and in most industries during
the war, the men started at a. M, had an
hour for breakfast at 9 a. M. an hour for
luncheon at | D. M. and then went on until
3 p. M, with an opportunity to stop for tea
IN the middle of the afternoon Under the
new week the employers asked that the men
breakfast at home and work from 1880 q
m. until II m. and from to 5 p. N. with
out break. The parties deadlocked on
this and a number of unions broke away
from the agreement, for the morning
"snack' hour is highly esteemed by the
workers. The piece workers insisted upon
revision Of their rates, so that they might
be able to make their usual amount Of
money in the shorter day. Then, the short
or day having come forward, other unions
demanded revisions of time without rodnc-
ton of wages, until now aeitations are
sweeping the country for hours that will
pun anywhere from thirty to forty-sovcn A
week. Instead of the cight-hour day being
goal it is now regarded as the absolute
maximum and matter of course The cn1-
ploycrs want tho cight-hour day aud intcn-
siNc labor; tho employees want day short
enough to give ample leisure and employ
mcnt for more mon the old limiting of
output, but in another form Here is the
position of some of the workers as told by
Ben Turner, president Of the Association Of
Textile Trades:
81 do not expect the output to be as much
IN forty-ive hours as in ffty-hvo and half.
do not want short hours for intense an
plication of labor, but for people to have
more leisure, pleasure and treasure than
they were thought worthy of before. If
we cannot get shorter hours by reason. we
Will get them in another way The wool
employers are anxious to return to pro
war methods; the workers had been led TO
look for new world but the old GOSPEL OF
greed and gain is again rearing it's head.
There IS a great cry for output; it
sounds we'll but if it means slavery for the
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-03-02

INVASION came abruptly to an end when
The French were defeated further north
IN Lorraine and at Ncufchateau in
Southern Belgium.
The reverse at Neufchateau I'M
porilled the Fifth French Army hold
ing The right angle of Dinant- Namur-
Charlcroi. Won Iausen's army now
joined with Won Buow's and Won
Klucks in the swing to the west
through Belgium. The Allied left wing
the British on the outer edge of it
was overlapped, and the retreat to the
Marine began.
Joffre's reputation as soldier will
rest on the GOODNESS with which he faced
the results of his own miscalculations.
lie had to deal with a heart breaking
situation in the last days of August,
1914 But he didn't lose courage. lie
determined to repair his errors. lie
realized that he would have to surrender
at once considerable portion of north
ern France. lie saw that the German
advance couldn't we'll be halted short
OF Paris. Had he been a leader of in
ferior mould he would have done what
Ludendorff did after the second Marine.
lie would have organized defence on
the line of the Disc or the Somme-or
at the La Fere Laon-Rheims barrier.
lie showed his real quality by decid-
ing to put aside all halfway measures.
to allow the German envelopment move
mont tp r,,t, &c l..
battle until he could deliver it under
really favorable conditions. lie still had
the utmost faith in his armies and he
never gave over The idea Of renewing
The offensive. lie retreatcd with clear
strategic purpose in view, although the
pulled up German High Command
credited him merely with desire to
escape punishment.
Thus, he wrote on August %, when the
retirement began: "Thc proposed Of
ienBive movement not being possible.
Interior operations will be effected by
The addition of the 9TH and 9th Corps Of
the British and fresh forces taken from
our eastern area 80 as to form on our
lett mass copdbic Of tohiu1 the
oGcHoiee, while the other armies will
hold the attacks Of the enemy in check
Tor the time required
Again, on August q, he wrote to
General dc Langlc de Cary: 81 gee moth
ing against your remaining until to-
morrow, the 2Sth, in order to consoli-
date your success and show that our
withdrawal is purely strategic; but on
the 18th every one must retreat"
The Germans were unable to nm
dcrstand why the Allies didn't turn and
fight Won Kluck expected an OBJ
stnatc resistance on his front after
the battle Of Mons and Charleroi.
Instead, he had difficulty in keeping
in touch with the retreating Allied
forces. The German High Command
was thrown off its balance by the ap-
pearance of French and British disor
ganization. 1t jumped to the conclu-
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-03-02
tie Will Fight for Peace-Time Continuance Of War
Wages Ii NecessaryThis the Spirit Be-
hind the Present Strikes

trivial for a local strike, simply because the
strike was the only way that a demand
could be got before the owners
BY 1914 the antipathy Of the employed to
the employer was so great that British
industry was paiod to an unbelievable
degree, and was really threatened with OK
tnctlon in spite of the multtudnous agree
mcnts which were made only to be broken
by technicaitcs one side or the other
No one ever thought of approaching labor
problem on mutual basis; there was no
mutually and thore is none day. The
only basis was bargain and sale, with an
instrument drawn up 10 show the terms.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-03-02

the advantage of the Western Allies,
Germany counted on the Gamma which
Schlieffcn had planned But there was
to be in the west no German Gamma
no Sedan, no Vionvllc, Gravelotte or
st. Privat. France had not been lost.
But the world continued to think mis-
takenly that some impenetrable Mir
acle Of the Marine" had saved her.
In the military sense the German
High Command had bunged its initial
offensive OF the war only less startingly
than Joffre had bungled his. The Ger
mans remained Victors in a sense, having
acquired an immensely valuable foot
mold IN Belgium and France But they
suffered a tremendous loss in military
prestige Their offensive came to Grief
under circumstances so painful that by
common consent among the Germans
they were made the object of a conspir-
acy of silence
Won freytag Loringhoven says in his
deductions From the World War;
that the German High Command didn't
nave sufficient forces to carry through
Schletfen's development plan. He ar
CUES that another German army should
have been organized, "disposed in
echelon behind the German right wing"
That is to say, Won Kluck should have
been supported at the Marine by an adj
dltional German army which would
have taken care Of any attack coming
cast out of Paris Yet the German
High Command had many disengaQed
troops. The idea of using them to ex-
tend the German right never occurred
to it.
Moreover, Count Schlienens plan
also called for an development of tho
French right in Lorraine. This part Of
the programme never came to any-
thing lhc German armies on the Lor-
ranc border were defeated dccisivclv
by Dubail and dc Custclnau at the emma
time that the armies which had pivotcd
from Metz were being defeated between
Paris and Verdun
The Marine campaign showed Tint
the German military machine in 1914
was not what it was in iS70l7t. II
'ou'a crack on occasion. The Gcfmnna
had broken into Belgium and northern
France with extraordinary ease. But
they could not steam roller" their wav
to Paris, They would now have to fcha
to stay whore they were--to hold tho
line of the AIsne east to Verdun. and 10
extend that line up to the North Sea.
IN spite Of the check below the Marine
the German position in France in mid
September, 1914, was still advantageous
ana formidable. But in comparison
with what it might have been it seemed
fettered and unpromising The i'm
mense depression which prevailed at
German Grand Headquarters after the
retreat to the Aisne, and which fore
cast the younger Won Moltke's retire
ment' was a fair measure of the shock
TO German hopes involved in Joffre's
sensational come back" victory.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-03-02

under focb and assigned to the French
left centre
Maunoury's attack on Won Nluck's rear
guard left the German First Army in
peril. But it's commander cXtrcated itwith
remarkable skill. He had been caught
mapping. But he pulled free by daring
generaship. Leaving only a fraction
of his army confronting Sir John
French, he hurried the rest of it back
toward the Ourcq and succeeded in fight
ing Maunoury TO standstill On Sep
tembcr 8 he had bent Maunoury's left
wing back toward Paris. But the next
day he was in full retreat. His own
retrogradc movement had dislocated Won
Blllow's line, on his left. And Won
hulow's retirement opened the gap still
further east through which Foch drove
with part of the Ninth Army, causing
the defeat and hurried retirement of Won
Hansen
Having failed absolutely to envelop
the Allied left the German High Com
mand had tried "breaking through"
operation in the centre Here the action
of La Fore Champenoise was fought, in
which Foch, with help from d'Esperev.
held Oh grimly for four days against
German attacks, and on the fourth
turned and routed the enemy.
AS battle the first Marine has MANY
confusing features. 1t represented a
French counter offensive. Yet through
out the greater part Of it the French
fought on the defensive. Of the five
french armies only two were used TO
the llmlt~the Sixth and the Ninth. The
British hardly fought at all. On the
German side only two Of the five armies
Won klucks and Won lTauscn's. were
fullycngaged. Moreover. JofIrc'stacticol
plans were frustrated. An exceptional
opportunity was lost through lack Of
close cooperation between Mnunourv and
sir John French and by the latter's fail
ure to contain larger part of Won
klucks forces below the Marne. The
development which JolIrc attempted was
only II halfway euccess Faults in the
execution Of his orders prevented him
from taking advantage Of "the fool
hardy position Of the German First
Army.
The German armies on the right wing
retroated thirty miles or more. But
they were able to stop at the Aisne
and to make good their grip on north
ern France. This is the sort Of case
made out for the drawn battle view of
the Marine which was held by most Ger
man critics and by pro German neu-
trails, like the Swiss critic, Stegemann.
This view, however, fails to take into
account both the extraordinary moral
and the substantial military conse-
quences of the German defeat. The
Marine restored Allied confidence.
France and Great Britain needed time
to develop their strength. The German
failure in the Marine campaign pointed
to long war. And long war was to
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-03-02
"DiiufiOn" of
Labor

Shortly after the outbreak of the war the
unions agreed to suspend their rules to
permit unlimited output, the Introduction
of automatic machinery and the employment
of low-skill men upon high skill work, to-
gcthcr with women; this process Of using
machines and unskllcd attendants for work
that was formerly skilled is called "dilu-
ton Of labor, because instead of having
all skilled mon ON q job there would be
only one skilled man in charge of a number
Of low grade people The unions entered
these agreements with a fair amount Of
grace but largely because the government
offered service in the army as an allcrna-
tive. The promise was made that tho
workers would have all their old customs
Restored after the war and they were paid
higher wages than before As time went on
every union demand was met with grant
Of more money for the work. The laborcrs
were really drugged with money until now
they arc getting an average of probably
three times or more what they got before
the war, although the increases run most
unevenly, for great number of ablebodicd
men had to leave their old jobs, which we're
classed as unesscntal, and take up NUM-
tons work at lower pay Where they had
to leave home and family for distant NUM-
ton work they received separation allow
ances to help support their families, but in
the soldiers IN service, and in the shell load