Arizona republican., 1919-10-21
By Frederic J. haskin

Amendment. reservation and resolution are three terms which we read in the papers every day in connection with the peace treaty and the league of nations.
 Whatever the merits of the treaty, if now seems certain that the senate Is not going to ratify it as it stands. The senate will either amend, reserve or resolve, and the ultimate consumer will have to wait for his peace until the statesmen gets done making 1t.
 A pressing question of the moment therefore, is how long it will take to make a revised and improved peace, by each of the several methods which have been proposed. The whole world is waiting for peace, or at least for some formal statement that we are supposed to be at peace. Many thingh are to begin with peace and many others are to end. Ratification will make an important date for almost everyone. We may disagree radically with regard to the treaty, as to what should be included, but we are all agreed that the whole business should be speedily concluded.
 It seems to be generally understood that to amend the peace treaty means
 
 the peace conference at Paris, and that all of the signatory powers would have to consider it as amended and sign it again. No one denies that this would be long, slow process. Some say that if the treaty is thrown again into the ponderous machinery of the conference it will never emerge, but die there of hamilton and of old age.
 Nobody wants to delay peace any longer than is absolutely necessary, and that is why a great deal more SUD- port can be found in the senate for reservations and resolutions than for amendments.
 A resolution, of course, would be simply statement by the senate to the effect that it dissents from certain clauses in the treaty. It would make the position of the senate clear, and that is all.
 But what is a reservation? What form would it take? How would it be brought officially to the attention of foreign powers? To what extent would they recognize it. and be influenced by 1t?
 These questions were recently ad- dressed by a senator to an expert on international affairs, which shows that even some men in high places do not understand the exact nature of a reservation when it refers to a peace treaty, and not to a place for keeping Indians.
 The expert, in his reply, took the Shantung reservation as an example. This reservation is statement to the effect that the United States does not assent to the clause in the treaty which gives Japan the right to occupy the Shantung peninsula in China. This statement would not be a part of the treaty, but would simply be added as an appendix When this, and other reservations, had been passed by the senate, the treaty could be signed by the United States without further de- lay.
 The reservations would then be turned over to the state department It would be the duty of the secretary of state, according to this expert, to address each of the signatory powers calling the attention of each of the fact that the United States govern ment, in signing the treaty of peace had made certain reservations.
 To the great majority of the nations whose representatives signed the treaty, any one reservation would moi mean much. Most of them would reply by simply acknowledging that the action taken by the United States had been brought to their attention. Some might endorse this action. China fol instance would probably endorse oul Shantung reservation.
 The only other nations keenly in. terested in this Shantung reservation would be France, England and Japan France and England, there is reason to believe, would not be greedy per. turbed or even displeased ovcr such ( reservation. But for diplomatic req. sons they could not endorse it. The, would simply acknowledge our actior in the matter.
 What would Japan do? According tt the expert, Japan would be most lIn willing to force an issue. The Japan ese government would probably repl, that it had noted the action taken b, the United States, and that it took it, stand upon the treaty as drafted.
 What would have been accomplishet then! Japan would not be busted iron Shantung by this reservation. No but the whole world would have bee, notified that the United States doe not approve of the Japanese occupanc, VI oi"hluilS, tHdL IL SIdndS Tor Chimes freedom and for the open door policy
 The treaty gives Japan the right t, occupy Shantung practically withou limit. Japan gave only a verbal prom ise to evacaute after a certain lengtl of time. China has been unable t obtain a copy of the minutes of tn peace conference in which this verba assurance is supposed to be written Neither has the United States senat been able to obtain any copy of thi