The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1916-1920, 1919-07-24

talneO IN tnlS treaty OF IN AllCle
10 thereof Is to be so construed as
/ to require the United States of
America to employ or to be called
upon by the members OF the league
to employ military force for the
purpose of fulfilling any obligation
under Article 10 until Congress
shall have passed appropriate legis-
lation pursuant to the powers re-
served to It under Article l of the
Constitution of the United States
with reference thereto.
Resolved. further. That in any
approval Of the treaty OF peace a
reservation by resolution should be
made that the covenant of the
League of Nations as now drafted
10 not to be interpreted
(a) As affecting or bringing
within the jurisdiction of the league
the traditional national policy OF
the United States known as the
Monroe Doctrine as 1t has been
from time to time asserted and
whereby for its own defence this
nation has regarded as an un-
friendly act any attempt by foreign
nations, whether by war or pur-
chase or by diplomatic intrigue, to
make territorial acquisitions or to
secure new strategic footholds upon
or near the Western Hemisphere,
or to secure political advantages in
the domestic affairs Of American
nations; or
(b) AS affecting or bringing un-
der the jurisdiction of the league
such domestic matters as the ad-
mission OF immigrants to this coun-
try. the regulation OF commerce, in
Guiding coastwise trade and trans
portation, or the fiscal policy, in
GLIDING tariff laws.
Hopes for Agreement.
The various suggestions Of reserya
Ions that are coming from Mr.. Taft art
'egarded not as affirmative proposals fol
eservations, but rather as suggestions
N which all sides might be able e
gree. In letter 10 Senator Spencer
MO- Mr.. Taft expressed the opinior
hat the Powers would probably agree
o some reservations, but that he him
elf did not deem them necessary. Never.
heless the fact that Mr.. Taft had taker
his position was accepted by the ad.
locates OF vigorous reservations as
tightly significant II more moderate
ttltude among The leagues leading ad.
oca tes.
The Taft proposals are n concession
'ut they are by no means sufficient
vas the way 4 Republican leader in the
senate stated II. THE fact Is that II
5 possible by reservation to put this
instrument into such shape that it,
atihcation will be safe and 7 know how
o draft the reservati lions to that end
'eyond that he would not express him.
elf
Two Letters From TAFT.
The Taft letters two in number
ated Ponte-a- Rio, Quebec, the summes
ome OF Mr.. Taft, under date of July
o. follow:
"My Dear Mr.. Hays: In what said
yesterday ! did not go over the various
interpretations and reservations, because
thought that in our previous COR
espondence they were sufficiently ex-
lained. ! think 1t wise. now that |
ave formulated them, after n good
cal OF thought, to take up my reasons
n detail for suggesting them.
speaking generally, I wish to EN-.
'hasize my conviction that the United
,tates Senate might we'll ratify the
resent treaty without any reservat ioni
II interpretations. l am confident that
he actual operation Of the treaty after
atification would bring about exactly
he same result as that which would BIZ
.ttained by the acceptance OF these In.
expectations and reservations,\ but II
GEMS to me to be the part of statesmen
o recognize the exigencies, personal
'artisan and political. Of situation IN
eeking to achieve real progress ane
eform.
The situation which confronts us now
n reference to the ratification of the
realty is one created by very serious
Mistakes OF policy committed by Mr.
Wilson. The partisan character of hi,
during the war togethel
vith his appeal to his countrymen Il
lect Democratic Congress in Novem
'er, 1918, created a condition of persona
md political antagonism toward hin
imong Republican leaders which wa
hared by majority of the American
'eople. This was shown in the result!
Il the election.
Notwithstanding this, Mr.. Wilson
persisted continuing the same partisan
of Republicans in dealing will
he highly important matter of settlin,
he results of the war. He selected {
In which the Republican,
lad no representation and in which Their,
we're no prominent. Americans of an,
cal experience and leadership OF publi
opinion. With such commission, hi
unusual course in going abroad himself
IS President, greatly emphasized tn
PERSONAL element in the framing of tn,
reaty and intensified the general ten
lency to oppose anything that he nigh
,ring home, because OF his apparen
Wish 10 dictate the policy of the worl,
md to monopolize the credit for it.
Il feel that some of the defects o
he League OF Nations are due to him
am confident that he prevented tn,
adoption of the plan OF the league 4
'nforce peace In respect to an interna
ional court and the settlement of Jus
iciable questions, This was, as I am ad
Used. In the English plan, but was stu
iiously omitted from the very satisfae
DRY American plan. His prelude,
against courts is well known. Articl,
x, think. Is due to him primary, be
,ause It is merely the embodiment o
he last Of his fourteen points. While /
anne from his suggestion. however /
,ulted the demand of the French 30 faI
Is 1t went, and l believe it to be nov
,he heart OF the league In tending 4
mite the forces OF the world in polio
iuty 20 suppress wars OF conquest
THE power of amendment. eontaine,
within the terms of the league, offer
hull opportunity to remedy the defect
" the league with reference to III
court and in other respects
rhe great point which supporters OF tn
League OF Nations now should seek |
he esta blishment of the basis upo
which. through amendment. the leagu
IAN be perfected. 1t Is absolutely neces
sary to retain Article X. in order t