Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-02-20

Especial Gable Dispatch)
London, Feb. 19.-Among the many
highly interesting disclosures in Ad-
miral Viscount Jellicoes book. The
Grand Fleet" published this week by
Cassell, it Is shown that one of the
chief factors of Influence in the dis
position of the fleet throughout the
war was the possibility of invasion.
On this topic Admiral Jellicoe says:
"Sueh a move was not likely in the
earliest days of the war. when the
nights We're comparatively short and
the expeditionary force had not left
the country. II is also probable that
the enemy had then few troops to
spare for that purpose. Chances be-
came greater as We alenuded the coun-
tiy OF fne1 .asfss t55..7sti. .tfi,4is sin ptircr
respects were more favorable
"In October and November 1914,
I held and expressed the opinion that
if raids were attempted. landings
would probably be effected in the
rivers of the east coast. the entrances
TO which were either unprotected or
inadequately protected.
Ready to Sink Ships on Coast.
"a beach landing on our east coast
can only he carried out in fine
weather. Chances of encountering
favorable conditions on arrival off the
coast. are not great, and I always
doubted if the attempt would be made.
In our rivers opportunities are greater
and are not dependent upon fine
weather.
u suggested to the admiralty that
the simple preventive in this case was
to place merchant ships IN position
ready to be sunk across the channels,
which are narrow and shallow, the
ships being fitted with explosive
charges below ready to blow out the
bottoms IN case of necessity. ! men
toned the names of certain retired
naval officers who. I felt certain.
would make all necessary preparations
in a very few days. / believe my pro-
posals were carried out"
Great anxiety was felt by the ad
miral for the safety of the grand fleet
when it first made Scapa Flow in the
Orkney islands its chief base. This
feeling is indicated in his description
of events Immediately following the
report of the sighting of an enemy
periscope within the harbor
"All the ships present were ordered
to raise steam with dispatch and to
prepare for a torpedo attack and
small craft, such as drifters. steam
boats, motor boats and yachts, which
had steam ready and which could be
collected, were at once organized in
detachments to steam up and down
the lines at high speed and outside
the fleet with the view of confusing
the submarine and endeavoring to
ram her, if sighted.
Fleet Got Out at U-bOat Alarm.
"Colliers and storeships that had
steam ready were directed to weigh
anchor and go alongside the battle
ships that were not fitted with torpedo
nets. in order to act as a form of pro-
lection against torpedoes fired at
these valuable vessels All ships in the
outer lines were directed to burn
searchlights, to locate and confuse the
submarine.
about $40 y. m. the Drake re-
ported a submarine in sight from that
ship, thus confirming earlier reports.
The fleet was directed to weigh an
chor by divisions as soon as steam
was ready, and proceed to sea. BY
p. m. the weather was exceedingly
thick inside the harbor and consider
able difficulty was experienced in get
ting the fleet out, as at this time there
were no navigation facilities of any
sort for leaving the harbor at night
or in thick weather, but BY IL p. m.
all the ships had left the harbor with
out accident and, although there was
dense fog outside. the fleet cleared
Pentland successfully.
mo trace was found of the subma-
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