Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-10
the adoption of Unrestricted submarine
warfare was essential
UindcnbuPo Makes a Demand

II
Our view of the matter had not
changed. The chancellor had his re-
sponsibilities TO bear, and we had ours
In telegram to Won Bethmann the
field marshal made his position clear
in the following words:
your eXcellency as chancellor can,
of course, claim the sole responsibility
but ! must clearly work. with all my
strength and with a full sense of my
responsibility, for the victorious end of
the war; to secure that everything is
done which | hold as proper for the
achievement of that end
That was the right and duty of the
supreme army command, Just as II
was the right and duty of the chan
cellor in this difficult and momentous
question, to support his own opinion
with all the prestige of high office.
If there were differences of opinion,
the decision lay with his majesty
AS it seemed probable that the an.
swer of the entente, both to our offer
of peace and to Wilson'S proposal for
Intervention, would be a refusal, the
chancellor came to Pless to discuss the
question as early as the end of Deem
Der, but nothing definite was then de-
eided,
Bethmann Hard to Commit.
The actual decision was arrived at
on the 9th of January after the re-
ceipt of the answer to our peace offer,
and in the certainty that a like reply
would be given to President Wilson,
at meeting presided over by his ma
jesty. The chief of the naval staff
expressed the views stated above; he
advised that the campaign would be
decisive in few months and urged
its adoption, The field marshal re-
ported our view of the situation, and
also advised its adoption.
The chancellor stated the effect that
the use of this weapon might have
upon neutrals. and in particular upon
the United States. He thought it pos
sible, and indeed probable, that the
United States would enter the war
and anticipated difficulties with re-
gard to the provisioning of Belgium
by the entente. He regarded our offer
OF peace as having failed; he saw no
other possibility of achieving peace,
not even by q new attempt on the
part of Wilson (the note of the 18th
of December had already failed); he
had no hope Of a separate peace; and
he did not anticipate any Improvement
in our position through the collapse of
one of our enemies, such as subSe-
quently happened in the case of Rus
sia.
The likelihood of this happening
would, of course, have altered the
whole situation. and would have had
the greatest weight IN the formation
Judgment as to our military position
of our opinions. The chancellor's
was the same as our own.
While we felt compelled resolutely
to draw the inevitable and serious
inference, and act on it, the chancel-
lor, as his nature was. remained un-
decided, but came to such conclusions
as: THE decision to embark on the
campaign depends on the effects
which are to be expected from 1t, I
and 'if the military authorities re-
gard it as essential. / am not in a
position to withstand them" and IF
success beckons, we must take the
step
Kaiser Orders Ruthiessness.
However, with full sense of his
political responsibility, the chancellor
did advise the adoption of the cam
paign, as did his majesty's other ad-
visers. The emperor fell in with their
views, and commanded that the cam
paign should open on the LIST OF FEB
ruary; hei directed, however, that time
should be given to neutral vessels In
the bloekaded area to leave 1t. and to
neutral vessels on their way TO the
area to complete their voyages.
The chancellor then prepared, in
cooperation with the chief of the
naval staff the notes to neutral pow
ers as to tie declaration of the block
ENnUIan6 11OnG the
west coast of France and in the Med
iterranean. These were to be delivered
on the 31st of January.
The chief If the naval staff gave
the detailed il structions for opera
lions in the blockade area. making
various concess'o ns to the wishes of
the foreign office in order to lesson
the danger of a rupture with Amer
lea We were, OF course, quite in ac-
cord with this.
The supreme army command on
its side took certain precautionary
measures in the northern army DIS
trict. in order TO be ready for all
eventualties. although the chancellor
had no anxiety as TO the attitude OF
Holland and Denmark.
The construction of defensive posi-
tons in Northern Schleswig had made |
good progress, and there was no need
10 do more than to reinforce the from
tier guard with a few cavalry. An
army corps staff was moved there
in order to accustom
itself to local conditions. on our
Dutch frontier the frontier troops
were grouped in divisional formation
and placed under an army corps staff
hat was stationed at Muenster.
The construction of defensive works
vas here much in arrears. Not
90 much hal been done. either. on
he Dutch Belgian frontier, owing to
shortage of men, Further defensive
measures We're merely worked out on
PAPER, and the troop released from
he operations in Rumania were to
AIRY them out only If necessity arose,
md were otherwise to be emp Dyed
IN the western front They We're IN
he first instance moved into Bel
,ium. f
General I.udendorff is best known {"
0 the world from his great offensive
n 1918. In the next installment he
ellis the reasons which led him to en-
er upon that enormous gamble in the
rope of winning before Aiuerca could
ring her strength to bear.
Notwithstanding his unwiIdy shape fH
nd short legs. the rhinoceros Is one
f the most agile of beasts A horse Il
nan can scarcely manage to overtake +
i'm. and in strength he is perhaps
by any animal IN the for Il
ST. In single combat no animal but
he elephant can stand w against