The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1919-06-04
FRENCH AND JOFFRE
CONTINUED Prom Page One.)


rs. Operations toward Ostend-Hoe-
bruggr. though important. arc. for inc
moment. secondary. and IN my OPINION
should follow rather than prcr"d" tn"
principal action, VIZ. the COLLECTION 't
reserves.
ITO resume:
tai To brat tho enemy IT Is ice
cSearv To HAY" reserves.
tb) These reserves can only com"
from tho north. as british rem
forc"m"n's set them FREQ.
(D The GERMAN menace. not
vain thing. makes ii necessary I"
collect these reserves in the short
est possible time.
(d) TIL" main object VIZ. the de-
feat If tho enemy. makes II n"crS-
sary Ia delay the offensive toward
Ostcnd 10 cbrugg".'
always disagreed with these views,
and remain convinced that my plans
should hav" been accepted ana tried.
will only add as further argument
against cnbarkinE upon operations IN
other theatres of war. that our military
forces M that time. and for al least
fifteen months aftcrward. were not sur
fiCient tn Cnab" us Ia carry on great
operations In moro than ono theatre
with the necessary power and energy
required for suCccss. They could only
have resulted in what actually happ"n"'l
IN 1918. VIZ. III" strics nf fenhlr ana on
the whole unsuccessful attempts 10
break through Tn" German I'm" IN
France. and an absolute failure. COM
polling withdrawal of our troops, in
the Dardanclles.
have dealt al perhaps wcarisorTc
al. 1n rot pip nj In 1l.I y,
and the problems which presented them
selves for solution after the clos" Of
IN" first battles of Yprcs. 1t has beer
necessary TO do So in order That my
c"untrymcn may understand tn" stua-
tion as it actually existed at The TIM.
and that they may appreciate what
seemed to IN" conclusive reasons why
greater progress was not made in 1913
Divided rOunScls lead To half meas
urCS and indcCisirc action. such CHun'
soils have always had, and always VIE
have. the most deterrent and disadvar-
iagcOus effect on any vigorous prOscCu.
ton Of p war. great nr small
For the plan skctchrd out in tho last
chapter a certain amount OF naval co.
operation WIS secured TIL" Admiralty
were always strongly In favor Of my
original proposal and did not at all like
the half hearted operation which JoffrC
was substituting for il. They urged
with grrdt force and reason that thf
risks run by the ships in cooperation or
the BcI9ian coast were lncrnasihsly
great. owing To the powerful fortified
tons erected by the Germans and tho
presence Of enemy submarines ut Tee
bruCSc. While, therefore, those risk:
might we'll he run in support Of real
| strenuous and powerful cndcavor Il
! wrench the coast limo from the enemy!
grasp, tho Admiralty fnlt that the navy
could not afford TO saCrific" strength II
! hanging about day after day exposed u
! such risk in the sole hope OF rendering
some slight help TO an attack which hac
! no great or decisive ohjert in view. II
nroof Of this ! quote thr following t"lT
grams whi,h were received from IN" "a
miralty. ON December 20, 1910. the!
wired rs follows:
we arc receiving almost daily ~
QUESTS from tho French for naval sup
rort on tho Belgian coast. We regret W.
are unable 10 comply. Tho small yes
scls nv themselves cannot face the new
shore batteries and It Is not justiflabi
to expose hattlcships to 80 bHrarfne per
| liz unlcss To support land attack Is O
primary importance.
"If such an attack is delivered. al
| the support in my nFnorandum LOT
wardcd to you through Secretary o
State for War will of course be afford
cd. l would be glad If you would e1
plain this to General Eoch. "a It u
painful to the officers concerned to max
repeated rcfusals"
A previous wire had arrived on tn
18th, the last few lines OF which ran a
| follows:
1T is not justiffable to expoae Majes
tie to Submarine risks unless 10 suppor
a real movement, IN vfttch ease ever.
fisk win be run and ample support pro
v.ded"
having was received: ,.,
WIN you please put us In communi