The sun., 1919-10-26

the counter drive Of Marshal Foch and
the renewed energy OF all the allied
troops had reversed the whole war sit
uation. The two main arteries of retreat
that were in the possession of the Ger
mans were the one through Liege from
Lille in the north and the other Though
Metz and Luxemburg in the south. Be-
tween came the Ardennes forest behind
the Chemin des Danes.
The two termini of these retreating
lines were strongly fortified by system
Of defence to the south Of Lille at one
point and extending from the fortiflca-
tions of Metz at the other. Connecting
them ran the Lille-Metz railroad. pass
ing through Mezieres, Sedan, Montmedy
and Longuyon. which the Germans had
In some places built up to the extent of
four tracks, and by which they had been
enabled to move troops from one front
to another with facility that was never
enjoyed by the Allies on the outer side
Of the ring
To cut this railroad, then. was Of first
Importance to the Allies, since II would
considerably lessen the value Of the man
power Of Germany, and at the same time
threaten the orderliness of any German
retreat to second line running from
Belgium, near Brussels, through Lux
emburg to Metz. But first in import
ance came the railways around Sedan
and Montmedy. The pivot of q whole
German retreat, swinging back through
Belgium, was here.'
If the pivot gave way before a COM
plete evacuation had taken place in
the north disaster would result. Then,
again, the Briey iron fields would have
to be given up, and as four-hfths Of the
iron ore of continental Europe was de-
rived from these fields, 1t can be
imagined how vital 1t was to the enemy
TO defend the pivot with all his power.
1t was this pivot that the Americans
set out to attack. and eventually, after
bitter struggle, succeeded in breaking.
U 8. Men Send Wireless Bats.
The Germans believed that the Amer
leans would attack east of the Meuse,
IN the direction OF the Meuse as an ex-
ploitation of the st. Mihiel success.
Some very clever and ingenious wireless
messages, sent out by a fictitious army
commander in charge of phantom
American army to the east of Verdun.
all of which were tapped by the German
wireless service and decoded. and which
resulted in q sudden growth of anxious
information seeking raids on that front
mind, Hence the order issued by Gen.
Won der MarwitZ. commanding the Fiji
teenth German Army. Dated Sept. Is,
1918. II read:
According to information in our
hands the enemy intends to attack the
Fifth Army east of the Meuse in order
/" reach Longuyon.
"The objective of this attack is the
cutting of the railroad line Longuyon-
Sedan. which is the main line Of COM
munication of the western army. Fur
thermore, the enemy hopes to compel
us to discontinue the exploitation OF the
iron mines of Briey. the possession OF
which is a great factor in our steel pro-
duction. The Fifth Army once again
may have to bear the brunt of the
fighting Of the coming weeks, on which
the security of the fatherland may de-
pend
The fate of q large proportion OF the
western front. perhaps of the nation.
depends on the firm holding of the Ver-
dun frVnt. The fatherland believes that
every commander and every soldier real
ICES the greatness Of his task and that
every one will fulfil his duty to the ut
most. If this is done the enemy's at
tack will be shattered
He, while attributing the attack to the
east of the Meuse Unsteady OF the west
correctly OWNED the Allies intention
and emphasized the importance OF frus-
trating those intentions. The story OF
the Argonne- Meuse drive Is the story OF
this desire unfulhlled
The day that the ST Mihiel salient
was closed the Americans began, under
the thickest of cloaks of secrecy, TO
hurry their artillery and reserve divi-
sions to the sector to the west OF Nerdun
Time was of the utmost Importance. for
delay rips off disguise and blows to be
successful must be in rapid succession.
The Americans, however. with the
energy characteristic of the people
erected hospitals, built prison cages, inn
proved railroads, mended roads and
transported all the troops and material
of war to the new sector in an amaz-
ingly short time.
Hard Task Faced by U 8. Men.
The Americans. however, were faced
with task such as few armies in the
history OF any war were Called upon to
face. The Meuse-Argonne sector,
though the scene of desperate fighting
from time to time, particularly during
the battles for Verdun and the French
attempt to capture the Argonne forest
in 1915, had for a long spell lived In
that quietude which the French. with
wise regard to the necessity for pre-
serving what they could of shattered
France. had no intention OF disturbing.
The consequence was that no light
railroads to the front lines ready for
an advance had been built. and the
road communication still depended upon
the only direct artery. the Cermont-
Vsrennes highway, and the lateral road
from Verdun, through Dombasle to st.
Menehould. A more poorly supplied
sector for communications It would
have been impossible to find on the
whole western front.
The Americans, too. had never seen
the sector before. Not one inch OF the
around was known to them. At the
last moment they endeavored TO sur
mount some of the difficulties of COM
muniodtion, but they were forced IN
trust to what could be done after the
offensive had started and the linden
burg line. facing their whole front, had
been pierced.
To this sector the Americans trans
ported a whole army, which, entering
the line only the night before the at
Gck, went over the top In the morning.
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