Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-10-04


would stand like one man, determined
and ready to sacrifice for their coun-
try all the mighty strength that still
to them.
Whether France herself, bled white
and suffering worse than we We're,
would remain in the field for long
after her territory was evacuated,
was also doubtful. In any case, our
position was not so bad that We could
have justified capitulation to our
people or our descendants; on the
other hand, we plainly must sue for
peace if peace could be had.
He and Hindenburg Agree.
I had slowly come to this fateful
and now felt bound and
eager to act upon it, whatever Others
might say, who were not so well in
formed as to the military situation as
! was. In all the great decisions Of
this war | have followed my own
views with a full sense Of my own
That l should be all
the more abused and held responsible
for every misfortune / knew well. but
considerations could not
weigh with me in the matter.
At O'clock on the afternoon of
DbplciIibtI 10 L went uOWl u lIlG 1Ielu
marshaps room, which was one floor
below mine. ! explained TO him my
views as to q peace offer and request
for armistice. The position could only
grow worse, on account of the Balkan
position, even If we held our ground
in the west Our one task now was
to act clearly and firmly. without de-
lay.
frhn fsn1A al IN
with emotion. He answered that he
had intended to say the same to me
in the evening; that he had considered
the whole situation carefully and
the step necessary.
We were also at one in the view
that the armistice conditions would
have to provide for controlled and
orderly evacuation of the occupied
territory and the possible resumption
of hostilities on our own borders
From the military point of view, the
first was a tremendous admission We
did not consider any abandonment of
territory in the east, thinking that the
entente would be fully conscious of
the dangers threatening them as well
as ourselves from Bolshevism.
Buried Dearest Hopes
The field marshal and l parted with
a strong handshake, like men who
have buried their dearest hopes, and
who are resolved to hold together in
their hardest trials as they have held
together in success. Our names were
associated with the greatest victories
of the world war. and we now shared
the conviction that 1t was our duty to
sacrifice our names to ensure the step
being taken that we had done every
thing humanity possible to avoid.
The lines of the discussion to be
held with Secretary Won Hintze had
been settled even in detail at my con-
with the field marshal The
discussion took place at 10 o'clock in
the morning of the goth, at the Hotel
Colonel Heye being pres
emit.
After the usual courtesies the Sec
rotary began at once to explain the
political situation at home, without
referring to international matters. He
described the position of Count Won
Hertling as so shaken that he could
not remain any longer in office. and
even his own position, he stated, was
by no means secure.
The domestic position was such that
4 complete change of system, and the
formation of a parliamentary ministry
IN Berlin, was essential. He even
spoke of the possibility of a revolu-
ton.
Did Not Like the Delay.
Up to this moment l had assumed
hat G.H.Q. would have to discuss the
further steps that 1t thought necessary
with the existing chancellor and sec
rotary for foreign affairs. A change
IN these offices at this moment would
Of necessity bring delay. confusion
and disadvantage. With such deep
changes a government is bound to
lose continuity and the grip of bust
ness for a time.
To whatever conclusion his majesty
might come, of course, the govern
ment would remain to CHG; the
government. however changed, it |
might be in form or personnel The
incoming ministers would be fully
of the responsibility they
would bear if they took office in the
existing situation. CHIC would have
% urge its views upon the new gov
eminent just as it would have done |
IN the old, and would have to ensure.
4 an honorable armistice were really |
that the army did not suf- |
,er by reason of the change Of govern |
nent.
In spite of my objections Won Hintze !
regarded change of our whole sys-
EN- of government as essential. He /
lid not think it would be difficult to
carry out. was unable to form any
riews as to this as l was not au crurant /
IF affairs in Berlin.
The Secretary further informed us
that the, proposal to approach the
lueen,,of Holland had not been car
lied out. and that no other steps had |
been taken toward securing peace, |
Nothing positive. thus. had been done. |
Tell Kaiser Of Decision.
AfterN this explanation the field
marshal and / explained the military
position and our views as to the arm +;
stice conditions. Won Hintze thought
he best course was to approach Pres |
dent Wilson with proposal for an
and peace. The Swiss am
IN Washington had again
spoken to our government of Wilson's
nigh ideals.
1t was clear, of course, that COM
With Paris and London
via Washington were bound to work |
slowly. and that an armistice could
not be secured by such means at a /
notice, but only after a
apse of time The field marshal and
We're quite in agreement with what
Won Hintze said. and We fully agreed