Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-12-14

/ | december 10, or you Will Do !
| subject to penalties provided in
| the revenue act.
| the usual rest they were Immediately
available for employment in heavy
| fighting in a new theater of opera
| lions. The strength Of the list Army
| in this battle totaled ately
| 100000 men, Of whom about 10000 were
Without pausing to recuperate the
now veteran divisions. Pershing
swung them to the east and prepared
them for the Meuse-Argonne drive,
| the strategic Importance of which he
| western 'front.'" for should this sys-
tenn (of supply through Sedan Me-
Zieres) be cut before the enemy could
withdraw his forces through the mar
row neck between Mezieres and the
Dutch frontier. the ruin of his armies
| in France and Belgium would be COM
| plete.'
The entire frontal zone was "elab-
| orately fortified" consisting Of prac-
| tically a continuous series of posi-
lions twenty kilometeB or more in
depth and strengthened. moreover,
terrain. The story of the hand-to-
| hand struggle which ensued is told
dispassionately by the report. which
says continuous fighting was main
tanned along the entire battle front"
with 'the enemy contesting every
foot of our front" but by the end of
October 1.-The enemy's deliberately
prepared positions, including the Hin
denburg line, in our front had been
broken; the almost impossible Ar
gonne forest was in our hands; an
advance Of twenty one kilometers had
been effected; 1850 prisoners. $40
cannon. 1000 machine guns and a
mass Of material captured; and the
great railway artery through Carie-
nan to Sedan was now seriously
threatened"
Enemy Divisions Worst Sufferers.
With the enemy gradually breaking
before him, Pershing found that his
the effects Of the terrific attrition.
After a careful review Of the situation
the report recites that the decision to
continue the attack" was reached on
the theory that the enemy divisions
were suffering even more.
Once a German division was en-
gagged in the fight it was practically
impossible to effect its relief" the
general says.
From November 1 to three Ameri-
can Army corps battered their way to
Sedan and, to quote the official record:
BY the 9TH the right of the Sd
Corps had exploited it's river crossi:i e
to distance of ten kilometers east
of the Mouse, completely ejecting the
enemy from the wooded heights and
driving him out into the swampy plain
of the Woevre; the 9th and LIST Corps
had reached the line of the Mouse
river along their respective fronts,
and the left of the latter corps held
the heights dominating Sedan, the
strategical goal Of the Meuse- Argonne
operation, forty-one kilometers from
our point of departure on November
1. We had cut the enemy's main line
of communications. Recognizing that
nothing but a cessation Of hostilities
could save his armies from complete
disaster, he appealed for an immedi-
ate armistice on November 6.
Meanwhile general plans had been
prepared for the further employment
of American forces in an advance be-
tween the Mouse and the Moselle, to
be directed toward Longwy by the LIST
Army, while the I'd Army was to as
sumo the offensive toward the Briey
iron basin. Orders directing the pre-
paratory local operations involved in
this enterprise were issued on Novem-
| Der 5.
Message Told Of Retreat.
Between the 7th and 10th of No
! vember the Sd Corps continued its adj
vance eastward to Remoiville, while
the 18th French Corps on its right.
with the 10Th. 26th and S1st American
divisions, and two French divisions,
hold on the heights east of the Meuse.
At 9 pm. on November appropriate
orders were sent to the 1st and I'd
armies in accordance with the follow
ing telegram from Marshal Foch to
the commander Of each of the allied
armies:
1.-THE enemy. disorganized by our re-
peated attacks, retreats along the en-
tire front.
expedite our movements.
IT appeal to the energy and the
initiative of the commanders-in-chi ef
and of their armies to make decisive
the results obtained.
I'm consequence of the foregoing
instructions, our I'd Army pressed
the night of the 10-11th and the rporc-
ing of the 18th the 5th Corps, in the
LIST Army, forced a crossing of the
Meuse east of Beaumont and gained the
commanding heights within the re-
entrant of the river. thus completing
At 6 am. on the 18th notification was
received from Marshal Foch's head
quarters that the armistice had been
signed and that hostilities would cease
at IL am. Preparatory measures had
already been taken to insure the
prompt transmission to the troops of
the announcement of an armistice."
Ordnance Task Dimcult.
Under the headings Of ordnance.
aviation and tanks, Cen Pershing
gives some frst-hand information of
the actual equipment OF the Army
with those much discussed implements
and shows the extent to which America
was compelled to rely on the allies.
He says:
Our entry into the war found us
with few of the auxiliaries necessary
for its conduct in the modern sense.
The task Of the ordnance department
in supplying artillery was especially
difficult. In order to meet our require
ments as rapidly as possible, we ac-
copied the offer Of the French govern
ment to supply us with the artillery
equipment of 75's, 155-mm. howitzers
and 1855 q. P. F. guns from their own
factories for 80 divisions. The wisdom
by the fact that, although we soon
tbegan the manufacture of these classes
Of guns at home. there were no guns
of American manufacture Of the cali
bers mentioned on our front at the
date of the armistice. The only guns
of these types produced at home which
reached France before the cessation
of hostilities were one hundred and
nine 75-mm. guns. In addition, twenty
four 8-inch howitzers from the United
States reached our front and were
in use when the armiStice was signed.
Eight 14-inch naval guns of American
mounts. and most of these were sue
cessfully employed on the Meuse-
Argonne front under the efficient direc-
tion of Admiral Plunkett of the NAVY