The Washington times., 1919-01-13

80 r@~~--~AN~--A~@NAA ~ 0seNA .ysl
tight on Wieringen as long. as the
Dutch will let him.
I asked II as an informed German
officer he was not free to 90 back to
Germany. -''.-'-'- =
: Free enough" he answered, but
it would not do me any good. Ger
many would give me I'D quick enough
to the French. The present govern
ment was in such a koWtowing: boot
licking frame OF mind that tfeyswould
readily fulfill any demand made on
them by the entente, including the de-
mand for my head or my person.
Was Kings 'swIIIie Dear
"If I were alone and nobody else
was concerned could ten a whole lot
Of things. But I must be loyal to my
father, mustn't I? At heart I stin
feel like a Prussian officer and regard
my father as my Highest War Lord &"
The ex-prince asserted that he had
no hand or voice In starting the war.
He had been continuously sQueIched,
not allowed to have anything to say
in the imperial councils, and he had
been repeatedly told to mind his own
business. cess. -
When asked how he explained the
worlds opinion that he was one Of
the principal moving figures in pre-
cipitating the war. he answered: BE.
cause I was always in favor of q
strong army. King. Edwards Fin
keisungspolitik' was the real begin
ming Of the war. He told me-not
once but several times-that Britain
couldn't put up with Germany's tire
mendous economic and commercial
and that he intended to
isolate Germany and squeeze Ger
many hard.
king Edward didn't like my father,
but for some reason he liked me very
much. He used to call me Willie,
dear and talked freely and frankly
to me-" he continued.
"WOrIed For Peace
'T was at the seashore with my
family, playing tennis, flirting and
induIging in the other usual summer
Jastimes, when the news Of the MUIR
der of the Archduke Francis Ferdi-
nand came. l knew at once that that
meant world war. Unlike many 9TH
ers, knew that England would come
in. / knew the British character too
well to misjudge them.
after the first battle Of the Marine
T steadfastIy worked for peace, but
was baked by a military clique.
'Ludendorff was the driving power
of the war, and, as such, principally
responsible for its prolongation.
Before our great offensive reacted
in March, / knew we could not win.
And my Bavarian cousin prince
held the identical views
that did.
1.-THE highest leadership closet it's
eyes and ears to everything unpleaS
ant and believed only what il wanted
to believe. The highest leadership
went badly wrong about America, for
instance. II refused to believe that
there was a large American force iE
France and pooh-poOhed every report
to that effect.
Ignored Reports.
Before our offensive at Rheims in
July, ] reported to great headquar-
tiers. on the basis OF the reports of
the intelligence officers of my army
group, that there were forty Ameri-
can divisions in France. Great head
me:
Nonsense. Impossible. There are
only fourteen American divisions in
France. and five Of those are no good
and can't fight
I'm the same way the highest
leadership closed its eyes to the
truth about our own troops. II
wouldn't listen when l reported that
my divisions were worn out, tired,
used up, cut up. must be drawn out
OF the line. At great headquarters
they didn't want to know the truth.
Some OF my divisions were reduced
TO COO and 500 rifles. Think of that!
And I was ordered to keep them in
line,
Neither my father nor I would ever
have given orders to sink the Lusl-
tania, knowing that there were wom-
en- and children aboard. Ny father
and are gentlemen. after all"
1 asked the ex-prince why he left
his troops and fed to Holland. After
few seconds OF thought he an
swered:
Because our government Cmeaning
the Ebert gOvernment) had deposed
me from the command of my army
corps"