The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-18

now IN touch with tho reinforce
ments arriving further south.
would be able 10 make vigorous at
tack In any direction. Our lines
were very thin every where. tho the
two northern groups, which had
hitherto been separated by Lake
Mauer. had Joined up again. Tho
situation was extremely critical. and
the tension was great.
The troops had . fresh task before
them. Keeping In close touch with
each other. they had 10 pursue tho
enemy unccaaingiy by forced
marches. and attack him Whenever
he made . stand. At tho same time
they had 10 wait for tho cooperation
OF neishborinx columns before max.
Ing local enveioping movements. no
N TO minimize the losses.
GERMANS FIRED
ON GERMANS
The Seventeenth army corps. and
moro particularly the First army
corps on the extreme right. and tho
First and Eighth cavalry divisions.
had 70 strike again and again.
These movements did not turn out
quite ~ ] had hoped. Friend and
foe were difficult 10 distinguish Our
own columns occasionally fired ON
ono another. The troops made too
vigorous frontal attacks. and did not
await tho cooperation OF noighbor-
ing columns. but the most serious
difficulty was caused by tho fact
that on September IL the Eleventh
army corps thought II was being at
tackled by . very superior force
This was quite conceivable and had
10 be taken into account.
Under tho existing conditions a.
regards the strength OF tho two
forces. the front line required tho
close tactical support OF the enveiop-
Ing corps. We had therefore 20 de-
eide 10 bring tho Seventeenth and
First army corps further north than
was originally intended. After a few
hours tho belief Of the Eleventh
army corps proved to be unfoundcd
But the order had already bccn
given 20 tho envclopinR wing. Later.
this corps were again diverted 90
their ors&inAi route. but by then at
least half day had been lost
The Eighth army did magnificent
work. Tho whole advance. which
covered well over % miles In -four
days. was . brilliant march Of vic.
tory for these trpops. exhausted ~
they were BY continuous fighting
and strain OF every Kind. This ap-
piled more particularly 20 the orig.
inai units of the Eighth army: the
Guard relief corps and the Eleventh
army corps had fought vaiiAnsiy IN
the West nj Namur. but thsy had
certainly had nm easier time hitherto
GRAND DUKES
REllEF HALTED
Away from the main battlefield. the
Third reserve division. under their
energetic leader. General Won Nor.
zen. and won der 0oitxs LAndwchr
division had fought n very success
fui action against . superior force
near Bsaila on September 3, and then
beaten tho rcinforccmcnts which
were brought up. In 10 doing they
had removed a grave source OF dan
ger 70 the army fighting further
north.
General Won der Coitx was held up
outsidc Osowtec. General Won Nor.
zen took Augussovo and suwaiii
after heavy fighting. Tho intention
Of the Grand Duk. Nicholas TO 70
live the pressure on Rennenkampf
from that quarter was frustrated
On September - the battle was
practically over. Al . matter Of
fact. Rcnnenkampf does not seem TO
have ever intended q serious stand.
AZ any rate. be becnn his retreat
very early In the operations and
marched at night. Our airrncn did
certainly note the course OF some re-
treating columns. but their reports
were too vague. The Russian knew
how 70 conduct retreats and move
masses Of troops without using the
high roads.
During the whole Of the victortous
advance Of the Eighth army from
the ncighborhocd OF Ailenstein into
enemy territory. tho army headquar-
ters staff had followed ciose behind
the troops. ! have always insisted
that we should BE- In the closest
possible touch with both command.
ers and men. II was particularly
necessary for the purposes Of giving
orders and reoeivinG reports. ms
technical means of communication
ware stiIl detective.
USED RELAYS 10
SEND ORDERS
Telephone facilities In the province
Of East Prussia were very nicagcr.
some of the officials had formken
their posts. The wireless apparatus
rendered good service. but only the
cavalry and the army headquarters
staff possessed Il So I was Obliged
TO rely mainly on motorcars. and
relays Of staff officers.
The gentlemen Of the volunteer
motor corps did magnificent work an
dispatchridcrs. They accomplished
journeys which recalled the most
daring patrol work. I needed the
fcw airmen urgently for rcconnoiter-
ing. and could not spare them for
dispatch bearing. But In spite Of
the scanfy means of Communication,
we always succeeded In being well
informed and getting our orders thru
In good time.
! used the telephone . good deal
also. giving encouragement where Il
seemed advisable, and blaming In no
measured terms where the success
Of the whole operation required Il.
This personal Intercourse with the
commanding officers was useful. az
II afforded opportunities for per-
sonai contact and cooperation.
We made our headquarters in vari.
Gus places. Nordcnburg was the
first nlaca VIC cama IN which la A