The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1919-10-16
Germany Wanted Freedom to
Invade Serbia.

Bethmann's and Berchtold's policy
of invasion Of Serbia rested on the eX-
pectation that E~nglandS love or peace
shown during the last years, would go
so far that II 1t came to the WORST
she would either force the car to re-
! fuse his traditional patronage OF the
Balkan state or risk a continental war
without British help. The German poll
| ticians lacked the ability to compre-
bend that such an act would cut
| through the very sinew OF the English
| entente policy. 80
England was accomplishing our political
| and commercial enlightenment, because
Of the fact that her relations with
France and Russia did not rest on a
formal alliance but on q irlenuiy unae
standing, every act OF 10
ward Germany was accompanied by UNI
mistakable signs of allegiance toward
During the very days of the visit Of
the British fleet at kiel in June, IsL4'
the British ambassador in st. Peters
burg, Buchanan, had published a newly
made Russian British marine conVen-
ton providing for the joint maneuVers
OF battleships of the two nations,
The amiable wife of the Brltlsn
squadron chief, Lady Warrender, a type
OF those Anglo-Saxon political women
whom we scarcely know in Germany,
was very uncomfortable when ! pointed
out to her with gentle irony tnat II
would be of utmost Importance TO US
In case of war whether RUSSIAN any
English squadrons operated singiy or
combined, and that 1t could be easily
misunderstood IL such ideas were given
too much prominence at this time. She
called Buchanan a duffer.. Whether she
was right or not, his act shoulo nave
put us on our guard.
Rethmann and Jagow did not de-
sire world war but they failed to com
prehend that as ~nationalities, while tne
central powers on the one mana sue-
gested a peaceful solution OF the ques.
ton. on the other hand they did not
shrink from world war. They chung
10 the conviction that the conflict couid
he localized during the recoverable
laws until sthe war forces inside the
entente, 80 grossly underestimated by
them, had been set aflame.,
The effect was now produced that
French Chauvinism m Pan-SlaVic ex-
ASPIRATION had increased in the same
measure that English desire Tor wal
had lessened. But England checked the
war-making forces only so long as II
was not too Instantaneous to her
When Serbia's answer was not mega
tive as had been expected, and Grey
| interviewed, Bethmann-HoIweg lacked
the instinct to comprehend the ne"
situation.
conception of the possibility of securing
eagerly desired peace by a nervous War
readiness which was merely a weak de-
fusion. These politicians VINO never
wished to draw the sword and VINO;
unfortunately, as 1t has turned out, alu
not know how to WELD it. thought they
might threaten by means OF uncertain
warlike measures which they themselves
did not take seriously:
editors Note: This sounds like a
straight admission that Germany mace
eakh,,lltpu huff und wQa pQllnd }
Considered Invasion of Hol-
land.
The short range of the political vision
of these men was astonishing. On July
20, the secretary of state, Won Jagowl
declared to a Representative Of the nava.
Alliance against the double alliance
England would probably not Join. ia
gov had the following novel Idea Of
how to strengthen England's leaning
toward neutrality:
To threaten the English with the i'm
Z mediate occupation of Holland II Eng
land should declare wal on us.
Naturally such a threat would only
be bluff. The next day, after consult
ing the ministry of marine, | informeC
Jagow hat such a bluff would be. TIL
surest means Of driving England t
war.
Editors Note; Why then did Ger
many doubt that the invasion OF Bel
GUM would force England to war?)
But Iagow thought he could make AZ
Impression on England by an energeti,
gesture, Just as naively as a few
. months earlier he had deceived tn,
French ambassador as TO Germany's de
sire of possessing Belgian colonies.
mr. The thought of war was not takei
!. seriously in Berlin, Each department
A. Ian The other in the dark as to wha
-, II was doing. In the single case o
~ the mobilization department 1t wa
ey necessary only to press n button to sc
!. the machinery smoothly TO work. hu
n there was no plan for combined actio1
e. in case Of q world catastrophe. At tn
end OF July, 1914. we found ourselve
Sc IN a state OF confusion and that wit
Az a talent on the whole not equal to tn
~ British gift for improVising methods.
WI In spite OF these suicidal proofs G
ny our love of peace, the secrecy of GU
policy In July, 1917. which had all tn
IN appearance OF war instigation made
~ possible for the world TO be convince
,u OF our guilt.
From an abundance OF isolated symp
AZ toms some try to reason that the worl
q war could not nav been avoided,
es consider this point of view erroneous
nd AS | already stated in 1904, every oc
No casion which could give our enemie
= a pretext for war against us shout
IN be avoided because through war W
". could not get at England. and conse