The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-11-04


 was the 4th army. under Field Marshal Duke Albrecht of wurtemberg. on the right wing of the army, and the 7th army. under Colonel-General von Schu- bert, between the two army groups. At first we decided to make no change in these arrangements, beyond putting the 'th army in the Crown Prince Rup- prechts group. and shortly afterwards forming special army group under the German Crown Prince.
 There were now only three great sections taking orders direct from c. H. Q. The wholesale reorganization of the west front could not be undertaken until there was a pause in the fight ing.
 FEARED OF FIGHTING POWER
 The loss of ground up to date ap- peared to me of little importance in itself. We could stand that; but the question how this, and the progress sive falling off of our fighting power, of which it was symptomatic, was 10 be prevented was of immense import ance. It was just as necessary to have clear idea of our fighting ca pacity as to know whether our tac- tical views were still sound The first was an easy matter, the second of ex- treme difficulty
 opinions vary as much in strategical and tactical as in political and econ omlc questions. It is just as difficult 10 carry conviction. The symptoms are recognized, but the underlying causes are the subject of controversy. In such circumstances a cure is a diff cult matter. The army is a very con- servative body. It was so in peace time and war made no difference.
 My mental picture of the fighting at Ferdun and on the Somme had to be painted a shade darker in view of what had just heard. The only relief in 1t was the heroism of our German men, who had suffered to the extreme limit of humane endurance for the sake of the Fatherland I cannot re- peat all the moving stories of the battle which I heard.
 GERMAN GUNS SILENCED
 began to realize what a task the Field Marshal and I had undertaken In our new spheres. and what a bur den we should lay on the leaders and troops in the west, if we drew on them still further for our offensive in the southwest.
 on the Somme the enemy's powerful arlilery, assisted by excellent aero N1f fOx,
 nous supplise of ammunition had Kept down our own fire and destroyed our artillery The defence of our in- lantry had become so flabby that the massed attacks of the enemy always succeeded. Not only did our morale suffer, but in addition to fearful wastage in killed and wounded, we lost a large number of prisoners and much material
 The most pressing demands of these o11icers were for an increase of artil- lery' Ammunition, airclaft and balloons. as well as larger and more punctuaI allotment of fresh divisions and other troops to make possible a better sys- tenn of reliefs. The breaking off of the attack on verdun made it easier to satisfy their wishes; but even there we had to reckon in the future with considerable wastage, if only on &C., count of the local conditions. It was possible that the French would them selves make an attack from the fort ress.
 HAD TO LEAVE WEAK SPOTS
 Verdun remained an open wasting sore. It would have been better to withdraw our positions out of the crater area.
 At that time I had not thorough grasp of the local difficulties of the irh t~
 the fortress still required the most consideratiin. but fn spite of that the 5th army would have to surrender a consideration, but in spite of that the aircraft
 The other armies would have to be dealt with still more ruthlessly. They would have to hold longer fronts and release divisions. artillery aircraft and balloons for the battle front. Weak spots would naturally result: but we should have to put up with this, if we intended to hold on the Somme. That was Imperative. as no rear lines had been prepared, G. H. Q. could at last count on a few new divisions, which were gradually got ready.
 Conditions on the battle front as re- gards artillery and air strength were bound gradually to improve, as the more rapid reinforcement recently in- troduced began to have effect; only the questions of munitions gave cause for anxiety, although I had already drawn heavily on other fronts.
 HOPED TO REST THE MEN
 It appeared possible. thanks to this better supply of divisions. that Rup- precht's army group would gradually be relieved of the necessity of living from hand to mouth. It was then to be hoped that a proper system of put ting in and taking out of divisions in sequence would result. had to attach the greatest importance to this, in con of the internal organization of the army and in the interests of the men, as supply. both for men and horses, was suffering.
 After G. H. Q. had given help in the matter. I firmly insisted that units should not be mixed up. Until then this had not been possible owing to force of circumstances. This special arrangement did not get rid of the necessity of continually relieving worn put divisions by others.
 A very essential. and, indeed. difficult md responsible task of my operations department was to have divisions al- ways ready which could immediately 'e made available for the Somme bat 1e- The condition of tho troops had Lo be accurately gauged. so that we sould arrange for their removal from a 1ufet front for service on more or less important sectors of the battle line.