El Nuevo mexicano., 1919-02-13
WAS
SUPER IOR
ON SEAS
Had All Best of 1t
Early In War Says
Jellicoe
JUTLAND BATTLE
WELL HANDLED
Commander Points to
Need Of Stronger
British Fleet


--
(By Leased Wire TO New Mexlcan.)
London, Feb. f2.-The dangers Il
which the British grand fleet shori
Of cruisers, destroyers and with de
~fenseless bases, was exposed during
the first two and one-half years Of
war owing to the German use Of sub
marines, mines and torpedoes, is de-
scribed in a book written by Admiral
Viscount Jellicoe, former commander
Of the fleet and published today, cover
ing the activities Of 19f416.
Admiral Jellicoe points out that the
German high seas fleet possessed 8S
~destroyers, compared with 40 of the
grand fleet, and reveals that owing to
the submarine menace the grand fleet
in the fall Of 1914 moved from Tough
Swiftly and only returned to the North
Sea when the anchorage in Scapa
Flow became reasonably safe. Neither
in October, 1914, nor in May, 1916,
Admiral Jelicoe says, did the British
margin of superiority justify him in
disregarding the enemy's torpedo fire.
The situation gradually improved
after 1916, especially as the light
cruiser and destroyer forces with the
grand fleet increased steadily after
the battle Of Jutland, considerably re.
ducing the danger of successful tor
pedo attack, while the inclusion Of
class K submarines made 1t probable
that the enemy would suffer more Sc
verely from submarine attack thar
the British.
Regarding 1918, Admiral Jellicoe
says:
THE position was assured and We
could have afforded to take risks
which in 1916 would have been most
unwise. If the German fleet had
come out to battle, a terrible punish
ment awaited them
The Jutland Battle.
One-third of the admiral's book Ii
devoted to the battle of Jutland. In
summing up the lessons Of the battle
Admiral Jellicoe dwelIs upon "the
danger involved in leaving toe much
to chance in fleet action because ouI
fleet was the one and only factor Wit
al to the existence Of the empire, and.
indeed, to the allied cause.
I'VE had no reserve outside the bat,
tie fleet which could in any way re
place it in the event of disaster, OF
even should its margin Of superiority
be eliminated"
Admiral Jellicoe says he knew that
his ships were inadequately protected
with armor compared to the German
vessels OF the battle cruiser type
while the German fleet in the battle
OF Jntland was far better off In the
number Of destroyers. In addition
the Germans possessed "a most eff
cient armor piercing she'll"
The admiral continues;
when the battle fleets approached
there was a difference Of reckoning
between the British battle fleet and
the battle cruiser squadron, due to
the cruisers having been engaged for
several hours and having repeatedly
altered their course. Hence instead
Of being encountered right ahead, the
enemy appeared on the starboard
bow"
Instant action was necessary, the
admiral says, and he decided to de.
pldy on the port wing division, thus
compelling the Germans to turn off
to starboard to avoid being crossed.
This monoeuyer which has been de-
scribed as mastery by reviewers,
threw the enemy into complete con-
fusion. The German commander in
chief realized that his only hope lay
in escape, profiting by his superiority
in torpedo craft, low visibility, the ap-
proach Of darkness and the proximity
of his bases and mine fields.
The enemy at this period fired hum
dreds OF ~torpedoes, as German officers
since have stated, Admiral Jellicoe
continues, and although the Germans
were in the grayest peril, the position
OF the grand fleet itself was menaced
by determined torpedo attacks in thick
weather. But the. British fleet by
ing the action, the Admiral says, got
clear Of the torpedoes which were
racing toward the British ships and
defeated the tactics upon which the
Germans based their hopes. Admiral
Jellicoe pays tribute to the skill of
his captains In handling their ships
and avoiding torpedoes and collisions,
while keeping their positions.
Admiral JelIicoe explains why he
did not seek night action and refers
to the more powerful German search
lights, the superiority OF the enemy
in destroyers and the greater number
Of torpedo tubes fitted in the enemy
ships, giving the enemy an opportuni-
ty Of scoring heavily at the outset
Of an action, the result Of which would
~ ~