Free trader-journal. (Ottawa, Ill.) 1916-1920, 1919-12-03
MYTHICAL 'xARMY'
. HELPED VICTORY
American Subalterns' Trick Kept
Five German Divisions on
the Qui vive.
ENEMY Deceived BY RADIO
Telephone Squad Also Conducted Mis-.
O. leading Conversations for German
Listeners Benefit -- STAFF
Worked Overtime on Game
OF Camouflage.

With the American Forces in Ger
many.--Tricks of the game of war are
coming to hight from time to time as
each side tells its story one of the
most successful Of them was practiced
by American forces IN the Meuse.Ar.
gonne battle last fail, when the last
great allied offensive was at its
height from Switzerland to the sea.
An imaginary army. conceived by Il
handful of American Junior officers
was thrown into the field" overnight
and for days five crack German divi-
sions just east Of Vcrdun, in the
Etaln region, were kept on their toes,
momentarlly expecting an attack
which never came.
At dinner table in Coblonz cafe
overlooking the Rhine an American in
telllgenee officer recently told the
story of the creation of the mythical
~ army as ii was called. 1t APP
pears that the Germans were expect
ing an attack In the Etain sector at
any time and the Americans knew it ;
but Mt that stage of the game the First
American army was devoting it's ener-
gies to driving the enemy out of the
Argonne forest and the hin country on
either side So the mythical army was
created, in preference to Il real diver
sion, requiring many men, TO convince
the German commander that ii would
not be wise To weaken the Etain front
for the benefit of the Meuse- Argonne
front.
Commanded by Captain.
Five fresh divisions had been placed
by the Germans on the Etan line.
These constituted their last and finest
reservoir of available divisions. The
Americans realized that the minute
the Germans decided that this WAS not
a danger point any or al of HE fVe
divisions could he WithIrl"n, re-
ptaced by exhausted and flagmentatN
divisions coming from III" battle
fronts, and that the appearance Of the
fresh troops in the line west Of the
Meuse would have n tremendous effect
on the American offensive.
The tx army" was assigned to
front from Bezonvnux to Frc~nes.
From the morning of October - until
lust before the armisticc this army
.functoned." Capt. Charles IL Matt
of Hubbard Woods, Ill. was command
or in chief; Capt. William H. Dear
den of Springfield. Mass" ana Wash
ington. y. C., was chief Of staff Lieut..
John N. Graham Of Lexington, Va,
was chief OF troop movements; capt,
q. w. Neidcrt was in charge OF G-l,
or administration. and Lieut.. ii. L.
Griswold of Old Lynn, Conn, was
chief of artillery. The staff Of the TX
army" were all members of the IN
telligence section of the First army
and, of course before beginning oper-
ations. had obtained the consent OF
their chief Col. Wiley Howell
The wireless and the telephone were
freely used to convince the Germans
that the Americans were prepared tor
an attack in the Etain sector. 10
make sure that the Germans would
be able to "hreak into the code used,
the Americans furnished them with
satisfactory key.
Functoned Until End.
One wireless station of the TX
army" was established in cIulnp OF
woods near Nerdun and was called
headquarters of the X army This
station functioned until the end Of the
game, all "orders" for the army going
out from this place by wireless. Soon
after the station began working the
Germans located its whereabouts ana
frequently shelled the woods and Vi
entity, apparently in hope of breaking
up the radio of the latest of annoy
ances. The "X army also had port
able radio station. which moved about
and represented itself at a different
station every day or two
The first message from the ~
army" headquarters was general
dispatch to all wireless stations in the
army area (none of which actually eX-
jStcd). in the new code of course di-
recting that none of the stations an
swer or make use of their sending in
struments. for fear of the enemy |ocat-
ing them, but that they be on the
alert at fixed hours to receive mes
Sages. The effect was to convince the
Germans that large number OF wire
less stations had been set UP ana TO
advise them of the hours when the on
envy intcrcepting stations should b"
on the alert for the American lnes-
Snges.
This was followed by Il series Of
messages DESIGNED "a indicate that tho