The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-11-28
October was to prove another enor
nous burden for us.
HEAVY BLOWS BY BRITISH

October was to prove another enor-
| nous burden for us.
| HEAVY BLOWS BY BRITISH
| After a period of profound quiet in
the west which led some to hope that
the battle of Flanders was over, an
other terrific assault was made on
our lines on September 20 The third
bloody act of the battle had begun.
The main force OF the attack was
directed against the Passchendaele-
| Gheluvelt line northeast and south
east of Ypres). Obviously the English
were trying to gain the high ground
between Ypres and the Roulers- Menin
line, which affords an extensive view
| in both directions. These heights were
also exceptionally important for us. as
| they afforded US ground observation
| posts and a certain amount of cover
| from hostile view.
The enemy's onslaught on the goth
was successful which proved the SUI
| periority of the attack over the de-
Tense It's strength did not consist in
| the tanks: we found them inconven-
| lent, but put them out of action all
| the same. The power of the attack lay
| in the artillery, and in the fact that
| ours did not do enough damage to the
| hostile infantry as they were assem-
| bling. and above all, at the actual
| time of the assault.
Another English attack on the 21st
| was repulsed; but the 26th proved
| day of heavy fighting, accompanied by
every circumstance that could cause
us loss. We might be able TO stand
| the loss of ground, but the reduction
| of our fighting strength was again all
! the heavier. Once more we were in
volved in a terrific struggle in the
| wesA and had to prepare for a con-
tinuation of the attacks on many parts
of the front.
NO JOY FOR MANY A DAY
October came, and with it one of the
hardest months of the war. The world
at large-which began in my mmedi-
ate neighborhood-saw only Tarnopol,
1 Czernovitz& Riga, and later Osel, Udine,
the Taglis ,ento and the Piave. 1t did
not see mE anxiety, nor my deep sym
pathy witi1 -he suffering of our troops
! in the west. Ny head was in the east
and italy, my heart on the western
front. My will had to bring head and
heart together. / had not known what
joy meant for many a long day.
The actions in the third battle of
Flanders mad presented the same set
piece characteristics as those in the
second and the fighting at Verdun.
The depth of penetration was limited
so as to secure immunity from our
counter attacks, and the latter were
then broken up by the massed fire of
artillery.
After each attack l discussed the
tactical phenomena with General Won
Kuhl and Colonel Won Loszberg, some
times at the front. sometimes on the
4 telephone. This time | again went to
Flanders in order to talk over the
same questions with officers who had
taken part in the fighting. Our defen-
siye tactics had to be developed fur
Their, somehow or other We were all
agreed On that.
dropped BIG COUNTER BLOWS
The only thing was, it was so in
finitely difficult to hit on the right
remedy. We could only proceed by
careful experiment. The proposals of
the officers on the spot tended rather
in the direction of our former tactics,
they amounted to slight, but only a
slight. reinforcement of our front lines,
and the abandonment of the counter
attack by the counter-attack divisions
local counter-attacks being substituted
for this.
These local attacks were to be made
by division in the second line, to be
brought close up and spread over a
wide front, before the enemys attack
began. So, whilesth front line was to
be held rather more denseIy once more.
in order to gain in power, the whole
battlefield was to be given more depth
than ever. General headquarters would
thus, generally speaking, have to pro-
vide second division for every fight
ing division in the front line, an un-
heard of expenditure of force.
| That the employment of a second
division in rear of practically every
one in the front would increase the
power of the defense was a simple
sum in arithmetic. But the second
sum was equally simple; that our lines
on other fronts would have to be
lthinned out even more than they had
been hitherto. I would see what /
could do.
GAVE WAY TO COMMANDERS
| l agreed to the tactical changes. al
| though misgivings were expressed
| among my staff at this departure from
the defensive battle" thought I
ought to give way to the experience Of
officers at the front.
Another tactical detail which was
| emphasized everywhere was the value
of ground observation for artillery.
Only by that means could the attack
| Ing hostile infantry be annihilated. par
| ticularly after penetrating our front.
| or fire be concentrated on decisive
points of the battlefield
! As to the tanks. opinion was calm;
they were not thought particularly
dangerous. purposely made use Of
] the expression tank fright" but the
| officers from the front would not adj
nit there was any such thing.
4 I need not say that from the first
the Fourth army was as well supplied
as possible with artillery. ammunition.
aircraft and other weapons: and Col
onel Won Loszberg. who always wanted
lot, was in the end satisfied with his
army group and with me.
The officers in the west followed the
eastern and Italian operations with
over increasing anxiety.
| Early in October the artillery action
revived, and on the I'd and Sd artil-
lery engagements OF great violence
took place. The infantry battle com
/ menced on the morning OF the 4th. 1t
was extraordinarily severe, and again
/ We only came through 1t with enor-
nous loss.
/ 1t was evident that the idea OF hold
ing the front line more densely, adopted
at my last visit to the front in Sep
tember. was not the remedy / now
followed my own Judgment without