The Bamberg herald. [volume] (Bamberg, S.C.) 1891-1972, 1919-04-24

had it not been for the tanks. Many
machine gun nests were also de-
stroyed by the tanks; while their de-
votion to their duty was clearly evil
denced by their numerous casualties.
Liaison.
ca Agents. The prescribed agents
were employed but as a general rule
were of no great value. Unless the
Haison agent has copy of the opera
! ton order of his unit and under
stands it fully; and unless he has
some independent means of transpor-
Itation either for himself or messen-
gers. his field of usefulness Will be
quite limited. At each headquarters
also a separate phone in a separate
room. if possible, should be provided
| for liaisOn agents so as not to tax
the operations phone. Liaison agents
should not be allowed to conSregate
in the room devoted to operations.
OBJ Means. The telephone when
working was the most satisfactory
means of communication. During the
operation telephones were established
as far down as regiments, and in
some instances to battalions. Great
difficulty was experienced in keeping
lines open as the wires were fire.
quently broken by tanks as we'll as by
shell fire.
Wireless worked very we'll but was
very slow to some degree, at least to
the time necessary for encoding and
DECIDING. Wireless messages must be
short and concise.
Only very small number of mo-
torcycles and bicycles were available
thus necessitating wasteful use of
runners.
No mounted messengers were avail
able although they could have been
used to good advantage down as far
as regiments at least.
Runners, as usual, were used ex-
tensively. Relay posts were estab-
lished between brigades and regi-
ments, and between regiments and
battalions. Within the battalions,
even this means of communication
failed at times due to runners getting
lost in the fog.
Visual signalling was not practic-
able on account of the heavy fog.
| Ammunition. Each soldier carried
l220 rounds of rifle ammunition and
two Mills No. % grenades. In addi-
ton, each regiment carried distribu-
ted among it's personnel 900 No. 27
smoke bombs and 1850 red ground
flares. This amount proved ample
for the operation. Smoke bombs were
found to be very useful in clearing
out dugouts. Ammunition for the
division machine gun units was sup
piled direct from the division dump
to machine gun units. For the 90
guns employed in barrage work, L.
|24S,000 rounds of ammunition was
supplied, all of which was fired with
the exception of 10000 rounds.
Rations. Each soldier carried on
his person one special assault ration
in addition to the iron ration.
Through the medium of the well or
ganized and co-ordinated system of
supply, hot food in hot food contain
ers was served to troops on the firing
line on the evening of the battle.
These rations contained fresh meat,
which is a most difficult component to
handle On the battlefield. The work
of the supply department in this re-
gard is all the more meritorious when
it is considered: that it was necessary
to transport these supplies entirely
by horse transport through rain, mud
and fog over single road which was
also used by ammunition columns,
ambulances, troops and all forms of
transportation to and from the bat
tie line; and subject as we'll to con-
stant shelling.
Examination of Wounded.
Medical. 1t is believed the evacua-
tion of the wounded during this oper-
alton was as nearly perfect as posi-
BILE under the existing circumstances.
Coincident with the advance of the
troops, aid stations and ambulance
posts were rushed forward. At ap-
proximately one hour after zero the
first cases began to appear at the ad-
vanced dressing station, having been
brought by ambulances from the aid
posts. A half an hour later cases
began to appear at the walking
wounded station. Evacuation was
quick and continuous to the aid sta
tion and from the aid station to the
cf pofuith % p6ino tho