New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-11-23

Vic dIInISClce ana 10 the conference
Of Paris. Instead of having before
ii the Turkish problem, complicated
only by secret treaties not vet put
into actual operation, as was the
case at Paris, the London confer
ence will have to deal with situa-
tons created by the partial applica-
ton Of the secret treaties. It
will also have to deal with the con-
sequences Of a rapid extension of
rivalry and bad feeling between all
the associated and allied powers in
Turkey.
To explain this situation it will be
necessary first Of all to go back to
the secret treaties. Early in the war
the British made a treaty with the
Arabs (who constitute the mass of
the population in the Turkish EN-
pire south Of the highlands Of Ana
tolia and Armenia in the regions
from the Gulf Of Alexandretta
southwark along the seacoast) by
which Britain pledged herself, sub
ject to a recognition of French in
terests, to aid in the restoration of
an Arab state which should include
Aleppo, Bagdad and Damascus and,
in general, Syria and Mesopotamia.
Spheres Of Influence
At later time France and Great
Britain made a treaty which d.
vided this same area into spheres Of
influence. Both countries recog-
nized the possible creation Of an
autonomous Palestine, between the
sea and the Jordan, while Britain
agreed the French should have as a
sphere of political and economic in
f1uence the regions north of a line
drawn from the vicinity Of Tyre on
the Mediterranean to Tekrit on the
Tigris and extending in the north
from the Gulf of Alexandretta to
Sivas and Diabekr in the Armenian
highlands. Other concessions were
made to Russia, but these no longer
have value, as result of the Rus
sian collapse.
Finally, when Italy entered the
war, the same Treaty Of London
which assigned Trieste and a por-
ton of Dalmatia to the Italians
gave them third region of eco
nomic and political activity extend
ing westward along the coast Of
Anatolia from the French sphere
and including the port and district
Of Adalia. 1t was, moreover, stipu-
lated that if French and British
spheres were increased the Italians
might claim similar expansion
An arab State
Now, the spirit of the first treaty,
that with the Arabs, was that there
should be ,re-created a great, more
or less independent, Arab state,
occupying all Of the old Turkish
territory south Of Armenia and Ana
tolia and under the control Of the
King Of the Hedjaz, whose own state
was before the war limited to a
small area about the holy cities of
Mecca and Medina on the Red Sea
littoral. This treaty was designed
to enlist the Arabs in a revolt
against the Turks and to assure to
British armies operating from Egypt
and India, in Palestine and Mesopo-
tamia, necessary Arab assistance.
This object was achieved; the
Arabs rendered invaluable assist
ance both to Maude and to Allenby
and made possible the decisive VIC
tory of the latter on the Plain of
Armageddon which broke Turkish
power. But once the victory was
assured the Arabs, relying upon
British promises, demanded that
they should be permitted to occupy
the whole Of the Arab-inhabited
regions and set their faces reso-
lutely against the creation OF any
French protectorate.
II was 70 assure this solution that