The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-11-17
THE BIRMINGHAM AGEHERAID MONDAY, NOVEMBER II, 1919

would be settled, with Headquarters in
KetheL before the French attack on the
group of armies under the German
| crown Prince was opened The troops
had mad Two extra months for rest and
RAINING as aresult of the successful
carrying out of the AlbeFieh programme
/ tine retreat of the Hindenburg line).
Ihey had certainly gained considerably
IN strength, but in the group of armies
under the Crown Prince Rupprecht
mere We're still some divisions that re-
quired rest.
Training was suspended. Some OF
1he new formation were already being
employed in quiet sectors of the line
liners mad only just come into use as
endorsements Divisions from Rou-
mania had arrived in Belgium.
e. H Q. had also exchanged divi-
slons unfit for the western front for
good Fighting forces from the east
although this necessarily involved a
weakening of our defences there.
GERMANY SENDS SUPPLIES
Fhe consolidation of the front was
pushed on. The labor which had been
liberated by the occupation of the Sieg-
Irled line was employed behind those
sectors where attack was anticipated,
and the completion of the support and
rearward trenches had to be accelerat-
ne supply OF munitions mad I'M
| proved, the increase being due to the
diminished consumption during several
months. reserve had been created.
which gave a certain security as long
as the battles east and west did not
last too long. Then Hindenburg pro-
gramme gradually became practicable,
and the further supply of munitions
was ensured.
| (The Hindenburg programme was the
beginning of Ludendorff's practical
| dictatorship. He took over control of
the manufacture of munitions and min
ing and militarized the whole industrial
organization of Germany,)
| G. II. Q. began to reckon on the great
Entente offensive in France Macedonia
and on the Isonzo for the middle of
April. From Kreuznach. whittier we
had moved at the end of February, /
mad often visited the western front, and
had discussed the situation with the
command of the groups of armies and
the army commanders as we'll as with
the general in charge of the most dan
Gerous positions; and we had exchanged
views on tactics. The group of armies
under the Crown Prince Rupprecht and
! the German Crown Prince were
strengthened with divisions, artillery
and munitions, and were provided with
everything necessary for successful de-
fence. Where help was desired I gave
it to the best of my ability.
BRITISH BLOW STAGGERING
| The 9Th army wanted to make
rectification of its line by means of a
local advance at Souchez between Lens
and Arras. and prepared to carry 1t
out at the beginning of April. | had no
doubt that a great British offensive
was imminent at Arras. The operation
at Souchez was abandoned.
| I begged the command of the group
or armies to bring up their reserves
nearer to the line in the area of the
| 9Th army. The last attacks at Verdun
in October and December had confirmed
the old adage that right place for
reserves is close to the firing line. The
tactics of a defensive battle demanded
| that, in many places on the front UNI
der attack, counter-attack divisions
should be held in readiness in the sec
ond line to meet the throw back the
enemy if he broke through the first
| line.
! The divisions which constituted the
second and third waves were indeed
moved up by the 9Th army. but on the
/ Sth were not close enough up. On the
| 9th, after a short but extraordinarily
| intense artillery preparation, our army
encountered a powerful attack, led by
/ tanks, on both sides of the Scrape (east
of Arras). Several of our advanced
positions were overcome. The neigh
| boring divisions which stood firm suf-
! fered heavy losses.
| The enemy succeeded before noon in
/ reaching our battery positions and
| selling heights which dominated the
country far to the east The counter
attacking divisions were not there to
throw the enemy back, only portions
! Of the troops could be brought up by
motor transport.
HE WAS DEEPLY IMPRESSED
| The situation was extremely criti-
cal, and might have had far-reaching
and serious consequences If the enemy
had pushed further forward. But the
British contented themselves with their
great success and did not continue the
attack. at least not on April. -.
! On that day 1 celebrated my BIRTH
day at Kreuznach. l had looked for
ward to the expected offensive with
| confidence, and was now deeply de-
pressed. Was this destined to be the
result of all our care and trouble dur
| ing the past half-year. Had our prin-
ciples of defensive tactics proved false
and if so what was to be done?
was not at the time able to get a
clear view of all the details of the
/ battle. I sent for officers who had
taken part in the conflict in the front
| line, and by means of conversati tons
with them had telephoni, communica-
tions gained the impression that the
principles laid down by G. II. O. were
sound. But the whole art of leadership
lies in applying them correctly. More
over, a division had failed here which
| had previously enjoyed a high reputa-
| ton
| The battle of Arras on April 9 was a
bad beginning for the decisive struggle
of this year. April 10 and the follow
! ing days were critical The conse-
quences of a break through of ~ to Is
Kilometres Is to 10 miles) wide and
or more kilometres a miles) deep are
not easy to meet In view of the
heavy losses in men, guns and ammuni-
| ton resulting from such break
through. colossal efforts are needed
to make good the damage.
| 1t was the business of G. II. Q. to
provide reserves on a large scale. But
it was absolutely impossible. with the
troops at our disposal and in view of
the military situation, to have a second
division Immediately behind every divi-
sion that might possibly fall out.
HAD TO FORM NEW LINE
A day like April 8 threw all calcu-
lations to the winds. Many days had
to pass before a new line could really
be formed and consolidated The end
of the crisis, even If the troops were
available, depended very largely, as
it generally does in such cases, on
whether the enemy, after his first
victory would attack again, and by
further success aggravate the diff I,
Guilty of forming a new line. Our posi- !
tion having been weakened, such vic |
tories were to be won only too easily.