The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-09-23

turned for endorsements
 Our infantry had not stood firm at all points, and in particular the division southwest of Soissons that had been considered so reliable had given way, The gap rapidly widened, especially to- wards Soissons. (American troops ad- vanced three to six miles and took 1000 prisoners and 90 guns.)
 Further south there were other deep dents in the line. The three divisions in reserve here, although not fresh and thrown into action piecemeal were able to hold the enemy up on the heights southwest of Soissons and to the west of Parcy-Tigny. as well as at the Sa- vieres bottom. con the edge of the Villers- -Cotterests forest). Between the Ourcq and the Marne the attacks were repulsed.
 The situation north of the Ourcq made withdrawal of the troops fight ing on the south bank necessary. They were closely followed up by the enemy.
 GUNS DELAYED ARRIVAL This was the condition of affairs hours of the afternoon in Avesnes Gle was at Prince Ruprecht's head quarters in Flanders when told of the American- french attack and hurried to his heaGuarters at Avesnes to con- suit Marshal Hindenburg.)
 We now had to deal with the heavy counter offensive by General FNoch against our sharp salient between Sois- sons and Rheims. English divisions were also taking part. The enemy of fensive was mainly directed on Sois- sons and southwest of Rheims down the Ardre. Foch's intention was clear ly to cut off this salient. On the Ardre Southwest of Rheims, where the Brit ish were engaged) the attack was re- pulsed, but toward Soissons it made consid erable progress. All counter measures that could be adopted were already under way.
 At the moment G. H. e. was unable to give any further help. The Fifth in- fantry division was being transported northeast of SOissons (from St. Quen- tin), but as enemy artillery soon began to shell the railway stations in that area, the troops were compelled to de- train in the AiIette valley. Their arr rival was, therefore, postponed, which was most incOnvenient.
 RUSHED MEN, NOT SUPPLIES
 The Twentieth infantry division could be concentrated at it's destination by the evening of the Nineteenth. Only the infantry could be brought up by lorries, without any horses or vehicles. Everything else was forced to march, and so the division was completely broken up, the infantry being left with no regular supplies. In the use of these divisions this point had always to be borne in mind. The divisions dispatched by the army group of the German crown prince could not arrive till later. They, too. arrived in lorries.
 For the rest, we could only await the further development of the situation. The troops the south bank of the Marne could not be bundled back at n moments notice. The order to retreat to the north bank on the night of the 2Oth-21st of July was not cancelled, to avoid cOnfusiOn.. It would not do for the troops to be unsettled. For this reason we had to prOlOng our Occupa- tiOn of ythe sector west of Chateau Thierry for n considerable time, in fact until we had evacuated the south bank of the Marne.
 A stand southwest of Soissons and on the Ardre was a necessary conse- quence. A crisis lay before us for the next few days, and until it was over no great strategical decisions could be