New-York tribune., 1919-10-26

A>AVOAAo "oot PSAlioPo, eiAC AOS ~ q l
man. He had served with distnc-
tion under Petain at Verdun and
had succeeded him when Petain was
promoted to command a group of
armies. While he commanded at
Verdun the two successful opera
tions which retook the forts had
been made, although they had, in
reality, been planned by Petain
Popular With Politicians
With the politicians Nivelle was
popular To the statesmen of
Britain as we'll as of France he
outlined stupendous conceptions
with coldness Of manner and a
calmness which captivated his au-
ditors. In all ways he must be re-
garded as one of the remarkable
figures Of the conflict. He brought
to British and French rulers, more
ever, colossal plan, with a guar
antee of inevitable success, at the
precise moment when immediate
and decisive military victory had
become a matter of life and death
because of the submarine situation.
At Verdun Nivelle had seen Pc
tain accomplish striking results by
carefully calculated estimates of the
true relation between the forces
available and the possibilities of
the situation; in other words, by
limited operations designed to reach
local objectives. Nivelle now pro-
posed to repeat on front between
Rheims and Arras what Petain had
done on three or four miles front
on the Meuse Heights. When he
came to Paris for the first time he
told his amazed hearers the ques-
tion was not one Of short distances.
that if his plans were put in opera
tion the question and the sole ques-
ton would be whether the Germans
would halt at the Meuse or the
Rhine.
Nivelle's plan envisaged gigantic
Sedan. Two groups of French ar
mies-one commanded by Franchet
d'Esperey, and operating west of
the Disc; the other led by Micheler,
and stretching along the Aisne-
were to advance east and north, re-
spectively, breaking the German
lines and enveloping vast German
forces, with consequent captures of
hundreds of thousands Of German
troops and innumerable cannon.
Western Front Objective
In Nivelle's conception the whole
western front was to be ruptured
and the war won. In his opening
conversations Nivelle told the fas-
cinated public men who were his
audience not merely that his armies
would arrive at Laon on the second
day, at dawn precisely, but also that
he had prepared a time table for
an advance to the Meuse. Twenty
four hours after the first attack had
been launched the exploitation
would begin and on the third day
war in the open, war Of movement,
would recommence.
AS this great operation for the
liberation Of Northern France could
not succeed without the full CO.
operation of the British, Haig con-
sented that Nivelle should exercise
supreme command over the British
as we'll as the French armies, with
the single limitation that when the
battle had terminated-ano Haie
was to decide this point-full free.
dom Of command should return tc
the British field marshal
Haig Praised Nivelle
Upon the British, quite as much
as the French, Nivelle made great
impression. 1t is not true that Brit
ish influence had contributed to his
appointment. The selection was
entirely French matter. Still hi.
mother had been English and hi
spoke the language with certain
fluency, much exaggerated at the
time. His success with the British
was due rather to his manner, tt
the distinction of his bearing, tt
the plausibility Of his statements
Thus he carried the British with
him and Haig, after preliminary OBJ
Jections, willingly and Loyalty en-
listed as subordinate in Nivelle'.
campaign. Moreover, for Nivell,
himself Haig acquired a real ud
. mlration, and to those who talked
with him in this period he spoke o1
Nivelle's fighting spirit in words OF
unqualified praise.
No sooner had Nivelle taken com
mand than the very firmness of hi.
faith in the success Of his plan lee
him to amazing and fatal indiscre
tions. BY January his orders out