Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-06

Men,, because the lllle Oh tHe llFsl
ammunition from the war office In
the form of ammunition trains, which
myself distributed daily among the
armies. l was always hearing what
they required. and knew how little l
could give them. Mine was indeed a
sad and harassing task.
The situation on the western front
gave cause for greater anxiety than |
had anticipated, but at that time
did not realize it's full significance. 1t
was just as we'll Otherwise l should
never have had the courage to take
the important decision TO transfer still
more divisions from the heavily-en-
gagged western front to the eastern,
in order to recover the initiative there
and deal Rumania decisive blow.
Verdun Fight Dropped.
The field marshal and l intended,
as soon as conditions allowed, to so
to the western front to see for our
selves how matters really stood there.
Our task was to organize a sitter de-
Tense and advise generally. But be-
fore we went there some divisions
were got ready for Rumania, and H.
the momentous order for the cessa-
ton of the offensive at Verdun.
On the Italian front. too. the situa-
ton had become worse. General Won
Conrad said that the army had al
ready protected the frontier for one
and a quarter years. and would con-
tinue to do so. More he could not
say. This in itself was not particu-
larly cheering.
In this death-grapple Germany and
her allies had been cut off from the
world by a monstrous conspiracy, and
thrown back upon their own resour-
ces; they were facing the great mill
tary powers of Europe, who had the
whole world at their disposal
After the failure of the first great
blow against France in 1914 there had
been no change in the situation, and
Field Marshal Won Moltke's prophetic
words of May, 1890. had become a
fact:
IF the war, which for more than
ten years had been hanging over our
heads like the sword of Damocles-if
this war ever comes, it duration and
end cannot be foretold. The greatest
powers of Europe will oppose one an
other armed as they have never been
before. Not one of them could be so
completely overthrown in one or two
campaigns that it would be compelled
to admit defeat and declare its readi-
ness to accept the hard conditions
that peace would mean without rising
again to renew the struggle within
year. 1t might be a seven, it might
be thirty years war. :"
Felt Superiority of Allies.
The longer the war lasted the more
acutely we felt the overwhelming SUI
perority of the enemy in numbers
and war material.
On our side the first two years had
exacted a heavy toll; the flower of
our fighting strength lay under the
sod. But the army was still strong
and resolute, and had been able to
preserve or liberate not only the from
tiers. of the fatherland, but also those
of its allies in the European theater
Only on the eastern front had we
now suffered a reverse, and that be-
cause the fighting power of the Aus
tro- Hungarian army was still on the
decline.
We had succeeded in calling a halt
to our retreat there. We were to re-
tain our power to do so. but it de-
manded further German help. Aus
tria- Hungary continued to be a drain
on German blood and German war in
dustries.
The same was true of Bulgaria and
Turkey, although the demand for
troops was not so great, but their
concern was for money, military
equipment and transport material
Germans had to help everywhere We
did so. in many cases without the
necessary return.
Whole Burden on Germany.
The burden on US was certainly di-
rectly relieved by our allies. Without
them the war would have been I'M
thinkable: they did their share vail
antly, but considered they had nat
ural right to approach us with con-
slant succession of demands, al
though their efforts in no way
equalled ours. The longer the war
lasted the more detrimental must
these constant allied claims on Ger
many become to the Quadruple alli-
ance as a whole. The whole gigantic
burden of this war lay on our
shoulders.
We had six illions at the front
against ten millions of the enemy.
The equipment of the entente armies
WIN war HtdleTldl ndu Deen carried
out on scale hitherto unknown. The
battle of the Somme showed us every
day how great was the advantage of
the enemy in this respect.
When we added to this the hatred
and immense determination of the en-
tente, their starvation blockade. or
and their mischievous
any lying propaganda, which was So
dangerous for u.s. 1t was quite obvious
that our victory was inconceivable I'M
less Germany and her allies threw
into the scale everything they had,
both in man-power and industrial re-
sources, and unless every man who
went to the front took with him from
home a resolute faith in victory and
an unshakable conviction that the
German army must conquer for the
sake of the fatherland The soldier
on the battlefield, who endures the
most terrible strain that any man can
stands, in his hour of need.
in dire want of this moral reinforce
ment from home, to enable him to
stand firm and hold out at the front.
Demands More Man-power.
In the situation in which the field
and / found ourselves. and in
view of our whole conception of the
character of this war and the enemy's
determination to destroy ,s. we con-
sidered 1t essential to develop the eco
nomic, physical and moral strength