Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-24
By General Erich Ludendorff.

The western army was well pre-
pared Gin June, 1910, when events IN
the east reached a sudden crisis
Events turned out as we had expected.
The Russian revolution had weakened
the enemy's fighting strength. Ihe
! wish for peace seemed 20 be gaming
ground in Russia. but the attitude OF
the new Russian government and Oh
| the Russian people and army In TINS
matter was not united.
The minister of foreign affairs, Mil
iukoff, pressed for the continuation
| Of the war and the recasting of the
map Of Europe at the expense Of the
| Quadruple alliance. Other ministers
talked about a peace without annexa-
| tions. or indempities and the right of
nations to DIFFERENTIATION. But
they were all unanimous in demand
! ing adherence to the alliance with the
entente powers, and we had to reckon
| with their deliberate efforts to quell
! any desire for peace in Russia. Thefe
was not the faintest ground for eN-
| pecting any relaxation of their desire
! to annihilate us.
The attitude of the Russian troops
was in some places friendly, and we
| gladly met them half way. ON other
parts of the front active fighting con-
| tinued, but we kept as quiet as we
could In April and May, and right
into June the general military posi-
! ton was not such dis to encourage US
to seek greater activity on the east
ern front.
The government were also afraid
that an attack on our part might
check the disintegration of Russia. At
! the beginning of April events there
| were developing very rapidly.
Had to Conceal Real Victory to
| Avoid ROusing the Russians.
| Linsingen's group of armies car
ried out a local attack on a bridge
head on the Stockhod northeast OF
Ko4el which had survived the fight
ing of 1916 This was in itself an
important undertaking but the num-
her Of prisoners we took was so large
that even I was astonished. The inn
perial chancellor approached me with
the request to make as little as posi-
BILE of this success and | did as ne
asked though extremely unwillingly.
The troops who had carried out the
attack did not deserve to be passed
over in silence.
In the press our reserve about the
Stockhod battle gave rise to certain
amount of criticism. | understood
, this hut considered j. my duty TO
accede to the chancellors request in
!, order not to disturb in any way the
prospects of peace which at this mo-
| ment really were looming in view.
. G.H.Q forbade any further demon
T trations of force.
Trouble BY Kerensky.
. With Kerensky's holder activity IN
, MAY the great danger of the Russian
/ army being reorganized increased.
England France and the United States
spared no effort to achieve this OBJ
ject. In view of this frequent dis
] cussions took place at CHG. as to
/ whether a rapid attack on the eastern
front with troops that the command
er-in-chief there could furnish
strengthened by few divisions from
the west would not be better policy
than continuing to play the part OF
inactive spectators; for now the mo-
ment to level a blow at the Russian
2 army. while it was still in diminished
= strength
;. I did not concur with this idea, al
though the position in the west hat
improved. / was unwilling to do any
, thing, even in appearance, that nigh
= iniure a real prospect of peace, From
, a military point of view, too, this line
Of conduct was justified. because CIV
a cry revolution undermines and rot'
= the fighting strength of an army
r. | certainly wondered whether il
this case it were so, when on July
Il the first Russian attack took place
= in Galicia. The time OF tedious wait
s ing in the east was over and CHG
no longer had their hands tied. blu
were given full freedom of action.
Deserters Told of Plans.
!; The Russian offensive was planned
on a large scale. The attack was t
be made from the Riga bridgehead
!, at Dunaburg, on Lake Narotsch a
u Smorgon and to the south, and in tn
! whole OF Galicia, from the Tarnapol
II, Zborow -Lemberg railway as far as tn
= Carpathians. The center of actiol
y lay here in the south.
: The COMMUNICATIVE chief in the cas-
n was not unaware by the end of Jun
"a of the projected offensive. Numerou
:, deserters had kept him well informed
u and he took all the necessary defen
l. sive measures.
d To carry out the counter-attack h
= had planned he needed reinforcement
~ from the west. 1t is true that for tn
" moment things were quieter there
l. but it had to be assumed that fightin
l. would continue. Nevertheless, what
ever might happen there, CHG. wer
bound to exploit the opportunity Of
lie fered in the east.
lie In order. if it were by any near
J. possible, to come to n final reckonin
with Russia, and so gain a free han
IN on one side, six divisions We're set FIRE
re for the east. More was not possib.
=, at the moment. and it was only ver
= Eunwillinglv that the officers in con
= mand on the western front gave u
~ the divisions for the other front. The
were unable to grasp the magnitut
tof the undertaking.
Hoped For Big Operation.
" The most favorable point of attao
lie on the eastern front was near eros
n ing of the Dvina above Riga. or II
o. Zborow- Sereth- Niederung line in Ea
~ Galcia. From here an attempt mig
be made to envelop the southern pc
ton of the Russian army. and II W;
. the intention of the commanders
% chief to put this plan into action
n once. CHIC. was able to give
consent.
How the attack would turn out al
,,o whether it was to be regarded as
NC major operation, as I secretly hope
or merely as tactical counter-attac