The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-12-11


 itary measures. Hoping that the prom
 ised change in the Rumanian govern
 ment would result in the removal of
 their king. I omitted to demand the
 complete disarmament of the Rumanian
 army. Emperor Charles was reported
 to have rem arked In this crisis: -This
 is the time when kings must stand to-
 gether.')
 AUSTRIA BALKED MACKENSEN
 These circumstances were responsible
 for those half measures in the negotia-
 tions with Rumania which afterward
 characterized tho peace itself
 The conduct of the negotiations was
 first entrusted to Field Marshal von
 Mackensen, who soon found himself everywhere impeded by Austria-Hun-
 gary The military situation demanded that here. too. we should see clearly
 whether we should have to fight again
 or would obtain peace. The new gov
 ernment was formed, but in no way
 corresponded with our interests, and so all through February the negotia- tons made no progress
 On February 24 the diplomats took
 over the conduct of affairs, and more and more obviously it fell into the hands of Count Czernin. Secretary of State von Kuhlmann did not take the prominent place which our prestige, our cooperation in the defeat of Rumania and our military situation warranted. General von Arg Che Austrian chief of staff) might not care whether peace was made today or tomorrow. not so the German general headquarters. l often requested the imperial chancellor to have the proceedings accelerated, and. I gave instructions in the same sense to General Hell. chief of the gen eral staff at von Mackensen's head quarters. who also represented general headquarters.
 HIS DRASTIC PLANS FAILED I had expected that, in view of our extremely strong military position since we could attack them from all sides-my insistence would lead to our 1 dealing drastically with the Ruman- | fans. But the imperial government | thought fit to reply to my demand by giving way This simple fact illus trates the Fundamental difference be- tween the ideas of the government and my own.
 1 On March the preliminary peace of Buftea was concluded; it's terms were l embodied in the treaty of Bukarest. By l the end of March the negotiations were l more or less completed.
 The Dobrudja difficulty was not set
 fled. The Turks. who had helped to
 conquer it, demanded from the Bull I garians, who wanted the whole of it. n
 compensation in the form of the re-
 turn of the territory west of Adrian opie and east of the Maritza. which
 they had ceded in 1914. l thought the Turkish demand just and reasonable. | In spite of many proposals for media l ton on the part of the diplomats, the l two states could not agrec.
 l The southern part. nearly up to the 1 navoda-Constanza railway, was given to the Bulgarians; the northern part became the common property of 1 the quadruple alliance. But the allies agreed to keep open the Constanza
 route for Rumanian commerce. This i was proposed by Radoslaavoff himself; what induced him to do it I do not know. The result of this half measure 1 was unfortunate; it embittered the Bull garians without satisfying the Turks HUNGARY WON HER POINT l Under pressure from Count Czernin Rumania agreed to considerable ces- I sions of territory to Hungary General l Hell was repeatedly instructed to op- pose them, but could effect nothing. Rumania was allowed to obtain a firm footing in Bessarabia.
 According to the military terms. Ru- mania was to demobilize and reduce l her army and hand oyer portion of it's military equipment to be guarded by the allies The French military mis- sion was to be sent away through Rus sia. But Rumania was left in posses sion Of Moldavia. even as regards mili- tary control. and was allowed to keep few mobile divisions for the occu- patton of Bessarabia. Germany and Austria Hungary retained the right of occupying Wallachia with six divisions. of which four were to be German. Field Marshal von Mackensen remained in Wallachia as administrator until the ratification of peace.
 The economic arrangements with Eumania did not secure what l had hoped for. The conditions impos ed were not particularly severa.
 Besides the supply of oil and grain. the navigation of the Danube was very important. I hoped to secure advan- fages of the Bnvnrian Lloyd. The at- titudc of Austria- Hungarin in this re- spcct was again typical, but so was uuired nlI the vigilance of the director of railways at general headquarters to obtain even tolerable security for Ger man interests the Danube.
 MEMORIES DISTASTEFUL TO HIM The question of the dynasty was no more settled than was that of allow ing the ambassadors of the entente 10 remain a Jassy Everything remained as it was. At Jassy the old infrigues against us continued. We had left the entente a citadel there. Only the Ru- manian politicians who were hostile to us were sent to Switzerland so that they could work against us the more effectively TNe Rumanian people were to institute proceedings against Bra tianu & Co. the. instigators of the war; that was a farce.
 The remembrance of those Bucharest negotiations is distasteful to me. On May [. 1918. the treaty was at last signed The diplomats allowed us to hope that they would pursue the ques- ton of the dynasty further. The peace was never ratified, for the defection of Bulgaria changed the situation in Ru-
 mania at a blow, and showed how our pc ace with her was inadequate for this world war
 That peace was also denounced in Germany as ssa peace of violence" so permeated was popular thought by hos kHu-