The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1919-05-23
Quantities ARE NAMED FOR THE
ENTERTAINMENT DE- THE E|CHT|ETH

given TO tn" movements ut the outset
The preliminary conditions OF Il cam
pl:.,n seldom offer more Than thFcT or
four alternatives: an attack ny tn" center
~ either Hank. ur SUM. combination oil
Ih"s" If III" emmy has mad" such taIS''
i!lSpISitIuu$ ~. "a render ui" ol these A.
tcInal ives decidedly IN" best. TN" S''t--
'rLl VIII" has tn" faculty IL CHOOSING IL
thereby prov dos IN the best possible
,rav for AL subsequent contingencies. ~
rlrnt impulse once given to an army II
is in a position To turn "v"uts not cal
rulatrG IN or miSr;LirGlatcd. - adEan-
taS,c."
The designation OF the place where
any great battle has taken place. and III"
limits Of tim" within whj"h il has lasted
wcra formerly much n"r" easily ""-
fined than now.
In my first dispatch reporting IN" do
tails of III" battle "t Spr"S. | think II
was described as Tho Eattic Of iprs-
Nrmenticrcs' and. strictly Sr"hkfnS'
that really would have been NOR, cor
rect.
have mentioned this in order to'drnW
attention 10 tho fact that. although tn"
most critical point throughout mis- nv
ING line Of hattie was cast 81 the l"Wn
nf ynrcs vet tho battl" which was gwen
that narlnr was fought on front or many
miles extending from ia" sea at Mott
port to tho Hcthun'-l.iliH-Canal Con
t!nuous and heavy fighting went on Tor
days all along this line.
At the beginning Of IN" opcral''''N
! which am abou, to narrat" my Plans
wcrr based generally On the ae''e'"'''
which I had come 10 with Foch on 'h'
1oth instant. Nothing had occurred, s."
far. to raise any great doubts IN my
~
ing the offensive which we had aTanG-
ri m nut in movement. At the TIM"
of the arrival Of tho First Corps re"
d,vs later. increasing opposition had
made itself felt all along the Allied
rront in thc north. and reports reached
us OF q powerful offensive enemy
! towards Yprcs and the is', ii conS'-
ouence Of this. my appreciation or the
situation was that I should have 70
mako a very momcntous decision DC
tvccn two most perilous alternatives
But, for the moment OF any rate rat
con,Dlcte confidence. l met the Corps
commanders at klazcorouck. and. IN ac-
Icord,nco with tho plans which Foch
| and l had agreed upon. directed them as
! follows:
Tho Second Corps on the right was
ord Tered TO continue IN its present dlrec-
ton, making ground TO tho east.
The Third Corps was to advance ana
make good the River Lys between AT
N cnticres and Sailfy-sur-Yys. and TO en-,
deayor TO gain touch with the Secon-
Corps
The cavalry under Anenny were nc
make good the river towards Ncnln.. anc
then. II possible. to sweep round tos th'
north and northeast
Rawlinson was to move with hts gh
on Cpurtrai, keeping generally level VII.
tho Third Corps IN the subsequent al
vance should that prove possible: ntt
cavalry under Bytng were to move te
the north Of him
had told Rawr1nson that, While con
forming to the general move east n
must keep an eye on tho cnenys de
tachments known to be at BruGes AM
Rou(ers. I told him I would deal VIII
these later my means OF the4Frst Corps
but for the moment his heft required
careful watching
In carrying out these oroers sor1'
progress was made, and tho troops
reached the following lines by Midnight
Second Corps-Givenchy
see-Pont du Hem
Third Cor7S-Neig hbnrhood OF Salty
| Tho remaining parts of the fme wcr'
lrrpch IN tho Same position as before,
| Continued Saturday,.