Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-10-14

entering another world to come into |
this depressing atmosphere after
Liege and the rapid advance in the
west But things soon changed. and
the general atmosphere improved.
No Long Prepared Plan.
Major Valdivia, the distinguished
Spanish military attache during the
war asked me on his first visit to
headquarters in Posen in October,
1914, whether the battle of Tannen
berg had been fought according to a
long conceived and prepared plan. !
could only answer that it had not He
was greatly surprised for, like most
people, he had taken it for granted.
(The story circulated by German
propaganda, after the battle, when
IHindenburg was being made the ma
tional hero, was that this general for
years spent much of his time among
the East PrUssian lakes, and was so
| obsessed with his plans for CAM
paigns then that he was forced into
retirement. Finally. as the story was
! told, in the moment of desperation he
was called back to use his knowledge
and save the country; when he
brought forth one of his long made
plans and won the victory)
be made a long time ahead, Battles
in war of positions demand similar
treatment, but the rapid succession of
events in a war of movement bring
about equally rapid changes in COM
mander's views and impressions. He
has to be guided by feeling, intuition,
Thus the military science becomes an
art, and the soldier a strategist.
Gradually, during the period from
August "a to 2G, the battle plan took
shape in all it's details. The great
question was whether it would really
be possible to withdraw the LIST re-
serve corps and the nth army corps
from their positions facing Rennen-
kampf, so as to unite them with other
units of the Sth army, for action
against the Narew army,
How RennenkamDf Helped.
81 It depended solely on Rennenkamp
himself, for if he knew how to make
the most of his success at Gumbinne1
land advance quickly, MY PLAN
WOULD BE UNWORKABLE. Thel
there would be no alternative but t.
withdraw the LIST reserve corps am
the nth army corps in more south
westerly direction towards Wormdlt
$50 miles west of north of Allensteln
while the other part of the Sth arm
held up the Narew army, in the nope
with luck. of defeating it somehow.
The idea of a stiff defense of som
line east of the Vistula, if necessar!
also entered into our calculations.
We discovered by degrees that Rer
nenkampf was advancing only slowl'
The two army corp could therefor
be gradually DETECTED in their retire
ment through the BertenhAein-Gel
dauen line, in sharp southerly diret
: ton to Bischofsburg-N eidenburg.
Next, the 18th army corps protecte
by the LIST cavalry division and the /
reserve corps, was moved south VI
SchippenbeiI to Bischofsstein. A
soon as it had passed behind the l.
reserve corps and on the 26th az
yanced from Bischofstein to Bischof'
burg. the list army corps itself move
south Of Schippenbeil, IN the directio
= of Seeburg.
Normal war strength of Germa
army corps at the beginning of Il
war was reckened at 10000 men. bl
since the LIST reserve corps and 1T
a army corps had passed through sever
. fighting their number was doubles
much smaller. Their movement frol
in front of Remembrance placed the
on the right flank of Samsonoff
Narew army, at the nearest poil
about twenty miles north of east
y Allenstein))
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