Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-21
Five Weeks of Destruction.

! in breadth in front Of our new posi-
] ton
Five Weeks of Destruction.
! Under the rubric "Alberlch' the
/ group of armies under the Grown
! Prince Rupprecht had worked out u
program for the work Of clearance
and demolition, which was to be
l spread over five weeks If an attack
On the part of the enemy made II nee
| essary we could at any moment inter-
rupt this program and begin our re-
treat.
Our first object was to avoid bat
! lie: our second, to effect the salvage
/ of all our raw material of war and
/ technical and other equipment that
was not actually built into the posi-
/ ton, and finally the destruction of all
/ high roads. villages towns and wells,
/ so as to prevent the enemy establish
| ing himself in force in the near future
! in front of our new position. Poison
! ing of the wells was forbidden,
| The decision to retreat was not
] reached without a painful struggle.
I 1t implied q confession of weakness
| bound to raise the morale of the enc
my and lower our own. But as it was
necessary, for military reasons. we
]
out.
The field marshal and the kaiser
gave their consent On February 4
the order was given to carry out
"Alberich" according to plan. The
first Alberich day was February 8.
The retreat was to begin on March
10, but under enemy pressure might
start at any earlier date. This would,
however. have involved great loss of
material, not to mention the partial
abandonment of the work of demoli-
ton.
Orders to Mislcad People.
AT the same time Lieut. Colonel
Nicolai received instructions to mis-
lead the enemy by furnishing them
with special news lie and Colonel
Won Haeften had so to influence the
home and neutral press that no ink
ling of the intentions above described
should be given. I myself personally
informed the chancellor of our
scheme
The Alberich program was carried
out according to plan. 1t was sue
cessful in every detail Many treas
ures of art We're removed from the
zone we We're eyacuating, and in ac-
cordance with the terms of the Hague
convention stored in places of safety
in the occupied territory. The fact
that much property belonging to the
Inhabitants was destroyed was TO be
deplored, but it could not be helped.
The bulk of the population was
driven eastward only a small proper
ton being collected in certain plates,
such as Noyon, Ham and Nesle, and
provided with rations for several days
and left behind. On the one hand it
was desirable not to make a present
to the enemy of too much fresh
strength in the form OF recruits and
laborers, and on the other we wanted
to foist on him as many mouths TO
! feed as possible.
Feared Allies Would Attack.
on the Somme front fighting with
the British had never quite come to a
standStill. At the beginning OF March
signs were not wanting that the bait
tie north of the Somme might break
out afresh South of Rove, too, French
preparations for attack became ever
more conspicuous. Whether the atti-
tude Of both armies was the OF come
of the measures we had taken it is
| impossible to say.
1t was a severe strain on the nerves
of the local commanders to keen. in
spite of everything. to the date orig
| inally fixed upon for the retreat TO
| begin. In the event this did not prove
entirely practicable, as in the north
! from about the 18th. and in the south
| from about the 18Th, minor modifica-
| tons of the line were effected in order
| to evade the attack, which seemed
| every day more and more imminent
! The great retreat began on March
I 16, according to plan and was carried
| through without break in a few
| stages of moderate length. The object
of CLIO. was in general to avoid bat
| tie and to allow the troops time TO
prepare the Siegfried line before the
enemy reached If in superior force.
! Some Of the divisions in reserve at
the time were ordered to the new po-
sition; in other places divisions had
to remain at their places in the front
| line.
Only south of St Quentin was the
| enemy to be attacked after crossing
| the Somme and the Crozat canal; this
was done, but the attack was not car
ried out with sufficient energy. Its
| success was not conspicuous.
| Counter Blow Not Possible.
! The group of armies were under the
! Crown Prince Rupprecht and we at
lG.HQ. had weighed the possibility of
|
whole of the Siegfried line, for we
should have liked to wipe out our
confession of weakness b. great
| tactical success. The condition and
numbers of our troops, however were
such that it was impossible for us to
throw in sufficient forces to guaran-
tee a real victory on battlefield rem
dered impossible, and CHG. had,
| therefore, for better or worse. to give
up the idea of great counter-attack.
The entente armies followed closely
on the heels of our retiring forces,
and tried to make out that our retreat
was great success for themselves.
But the press had been so cleverly
and effectively manipulated that they
did not succeed. AS matter of fact
they had not gained any military
triumph. Thanks also to the false in
telligence we had circulated they had
not even interfered with our work of
demolition and clearance. The whole
movement was brilliant achievement
on the part of both commanders and
troops, and is evidence of the careful
foresight and work of the German
general staff.
i We were now more compactly and