Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-21

firmly established than we had been
along our previous extended line. The
tactical measures of the enemy had
been frustrated. He was no longer
able TO attack in the same directions
as before. The country we had trav-
ersed was devastated. and in order to
carry on war there a certain amount
Of restoration was essential Before
an attack could be launched over it an
infinite amount of road and bridge
building would have to be done.
The enemy, therefore, established
himself in relatively slight strength
in front of our new line. We, for our
part, could now thin on. our forces
by taking away whole divisions.
We had completely achieved the OBJ
ject of the Alberich program, which
was to reach and occupy the Siegfried
line. 1t stood us in good stead for
some considerable time. The retreat
had been well worth while.
Indeed all our commanders wished
that the Germany army had possessed
many another Siegfried line, with its
concrete dugouts. for the conduct of
the war during 1913 would then have
been easier. The labor required for
their construction. however, was not
ultimately gave way before the tanks,
which We're able to overcome the
greatest obstacles.
Called Huns; Admits Reason.
We had to put up with the fact that
the entente turned our exceedingly
thorough demolition of the territory
and dispersal Of the population to ac-
count, in order once more to call us
Huns, and to play the organ of their
propaganda with all the STOPS pulled
out ONE CANNOT BLAME THEM.
Nevertheless. we had acted in ac-
cordance with the laws of warfare.
and had not even gone as far as the
belligerents in the American civil war.
During our retreat in Poland in 1914
we had spared the country as far as
possible. for there, on account of the
vast distances, ] had set all my hopes
on the destruction of the railways
But in the present case the area evac-
mated was so small that the country
had to be more severely handled
In Poland we were able to leave the
inhabitants of enemy territory alone,
here both humanity and prudence de-
manded that we should drive them
out. ought we to have left them to
perish in the devastated districts?
In all the measures we took, the
exigencies of war alone proved the de-
cisive factor. Otherwise the dictates
of humanity We're obeyed as far as
possible. We. were too powerful to
wish to increase the suffering of 9TH
ers by unjustifiable harshness and
spite. This was the case not only here
but everywhere. We only acted with
severity where military security de-
manded tin matters of contre-
espionage. y
published by special arrangement
with the Mcclure Newspaper Syndi-
cate. Copyrights reserved. Copy.
righted in Great Britain by Hutchin-
son & Co. and the London Times in
Spain by Messrs. SEEK and Bariel in
Italy by Fratelli Treves. in Canada
and Australia. All rights reserved for
France. Belgium, Holland, Russia and
the Scandinavian countries.)
Frances great offensive in 1917,
the failure of which led to the dis
grace of General Nivelle and the fall
of the Painleve cabinet, was due to
the fact that the Germans knew in
advance where the blow was to fall
and had made all preparations to
meet it. Failure of Marshal Haig to
press an advantage he had gained
earlier gave the Germans a chance to
pit their strength against the French.
These are high points of Ludendorff
tomorrow.