The Alaska daily empire., 1919-10-08
Unwise To Overlook Alaska
Seattle Times)


 Which is the important military or naval base of the United states-Hawaii or Alaska? of tha American Exneditiomarv Forces indicated bv his testimony last week 'before the House Military Affairs Committee that he considered Hawaii more vital
 He recommended the maintenance there of full division of troops, but urged the staoning of only small force in Alaska
 The thought inevitably must suggest itself to lay observers that the General has not kept in touch with developments in the Pacifc--that he still is viewing Far Western problems and possibilities in the light of circumstances obtaining during and i'm mediately after the with Spain.
 His recommendations challenge discussion of the relative importance in any American defense plan, of these advanced posts of American authority.
 In the first place, Hawaii and Alaska a parity in one respect-both are isolated from the main body of continental United States and must be served, in peace or in war; by steamships.
 This conclusion, of course, is based the as sumption that Canada would remain neutral and, in this matter, as of course does General McAndrew, mechanically and without reference to anything save the relative importance of the bases from mili- tary and naval viewpoint
 Alaska has this advantage, however while con- sidering the question of isoation-an enemy fleet could render an American army in the Hawaiian Islands helpless without firing shot merely by commanding its communications with the Pacific Coast. Moreover, hostile forces landed on the islands, these troops could be very effectively backed up by the guns of the enemy fleet.
 On the other hand, American division in Alas ka, operating over rugged territory with which it was intimately acquainted, and served, if only to moderate degree by previously established interior bases could off an army several times as large itself.
 Now as to the relative advantages enemy would obtain through occupation of Hawaii and of Alaska.
 An enemy fleet seizing Hawaii would obtain a base-and little else. Coal and oil would have to be transported for it thousands of open sea, the carriers being subject attack by American commerce desroyers based on Puget Sound and Alaskan points.
 An enemy fleet occupying Alaska would find at its hand both coal and oil. Unless wells were wrecked and mines flooded a very considerab ble proportion of all fuel required could be obtained in the occupied territory"
 Moreover an enemy force, military or naval based on Hawaii always would operate at dsad- vantage because its northerly lines of communica on Puget Sound and in Alaska
 On the other hand, an enemy force occupying Alaska and proceeding thence southward would safe guard its lines of supply as it advanced
 In point of fact the the enemy force ap- preached the cost of continental United States the it's transports.
 In order to reach these enemy ships American naval craft would be compelled to steam far north from San Francisco or Hawaii, or, in the case of tuget Sound, would have to cut their way through the foes fighting fleet in order to reach them
 Reversing the picture, it must be apparent that no American commander, military naval, would base 's his operations on Hawaii if in position to utilize Alaska for operations in the North Pacific
 The whole theory of American naval strategy is to obtain close contact with the enemy in the short est possible space of time and maintain it constantly No American admiral would place several hundred additional miles between himself and foe by bases in Alaska and on Puget Sound.
 Similarly mo geenral commanding expedtion- ay iorce would expose his roopships to added dan of attack by sending them on a needlesslv Iono voyage across the open if enabled dispatc cb them by shorter route, great part of which would run parallel to the coast and would be protected throughout this entire stretch by warships operating from nearby bases to the north south
 Is it possible that General McAndrew has over. looked the fact that the past fifteen years wit messed some remarkable developments in Alaska in cudlng the commencement of the Alaska railroad the discovery of oil and the opening of coal mines
 Certainly, 1T he will project his vision forward fifteen years ne Will observe few changes with re spect rawaiias strategic position but he vii, perceive instantly that economic development trade expansion and transportation improvement in Alaska Will present, at that time entirely new set ot facts for the consideration of and if necessary for utilization Iy American military and naval com manders.