The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1919-10-05

cruising period depended upon it's sup
ply of torpedoes. A submarine re-
turned to it's base only after it had
exhausted it's supply of these destruc-
tive missiles; if it should shoot them
all in twenty four hours, then sin
gle day would end that particular
cruise; IL the torpedoes lasted month,
then the submarine stayed out for that
length of time. Bases on the Irish
coast would have been useful only in
case they could replenish the torpe-
does, and this was obviously an inn
possibility No, there was not the
slightest mystery concerning the bases
of the U-boats When the Germans
captured the city of Bruges in Bel
] GUM they transformed it into sub
marine base; here many of the u
boats were built, and here facilities
Were provided for docking, repairing
and supplying them. Bruges was thus
one of the main headquarters for the
destructive campaign waged against
British commerce. Bruges itself is an
inland town, but from 1t two canals
extend, one to Ostend and the other
to Zeebrugge, and. in this way the
interior submarine base formed the
apex of a triangle. 1t was by way
of these canals. that the U-boats
reached the open sea.
| Once in the English channel the
submarines had their choice of two
routes to the hunting grounds off the
west and south of Ireland. A large
number made the apparently unneces-
isarily long detour across the North
sea and around Scotland, going through
4 the Fair island passage between the
| Orkney and the Shetland islands. along
OF inn
made landfall. and so around the
west coast of Ireland. This looks like
a long and difficult trip. yet the time
/ was not entirely wasted, for the u
F, boats, as the map of sinlxings shows.
usually gathered in several vessels on
i the way. But the U-boats had a much
shorter alternative route to the hunt
ing fields. And here / must correct
another widely prevailing misappre-
!, hension.
| Newspaper readers heard much,
while the war was going on, of the
barrage across the English channel,
from Dover to Calais, and the belief
was general that this obstruction kept
the U-Boats from passing through.
This was not SO. The surface crossing
for troops and supplies did work per-
fectly from the beginning. but the
mines, nets, and other distractions
that were intended to prevent the pas
sage of submarines did not do so. AS
1 a matter of fact the British navy
knew little about mines in 1914; IL had
always rather despised them as the
weapons of the weaker power" and
its mine barrage at the channel cross
ing was not successful A large part
of it was carried away by the strong
tide and storms, and the mines were
dafeNfiUa a o,,d
growths, attaching themselves to their
prongs, made many of them harmless
In 1918, under Admiral Sir Roger
Reyes, this barrage was reconstructed
with new type of mine and became.
in fact, an effective barrier; but in the
spring of 1917, the German U-boats had
little difficulty in slipping through.
particularly in the night time. And
from this point the distance to the
trade routes south and west of Ire
land was relatively a short one.
Yet terribly destructive as these
U-boats were, the number operating
simultaneously in this and other fields
was never very large. The extent to
. which the waters were infested with
German submarines was another par
ticularly ludicrous and particularly
prevalent Misrepresentation. Merchant
vessels constantly reported having
. been assailed by submarines in soals. .
and most civilians still believe that
they sailed together in fIotfIlas. like
schools of fish. There is hardly an
American doughboy who did not see at
: least dozen submarines on his way
across the Atlantic; every streak OF
|, suds caused by a tide rip" and every
swimming porpoise was immediately
/. mistaken for the wake of torpedo :
every bit of driftwood. in the fervid
imagination Of trans Atlantic voyag-
! lers, assumed the shape of a periscope
2 The fact is that, with few exceptions
5 we knew every time a German sub
. marine skunk from its base into the
! ocean, The allied secret service was
: UNNECESSARILY superior to that Of the
4 lGermans-I pay particular tribute to
the British naval intelligence depart
ment in saying this We always knew
4 how many submarines the ssermans
r had and where they were; we always
: knew they were building them, their
essential characteristics, and the stage
q Of progress which shey had reached a,
. q uarffcular time