The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1919-03-26

| there is coming Bolshevik attack.
| We know that a great offensive is be-
| ing prepared by Bolshevists which
may at any moment break on Poland
| exactly as Ludendorffs gigantic often
/ sive broke on the British a year ago.
| We know, too, that there is not in
Poland, thanks to our own folly, any
| adequate power to resistance.
We have sacrificed our first line of
defense. We have not only sacrificed
| it, but we have risked the possibility
of seem our natural allies forced into
the ranks of the enemy. In this time,
what of Germany? The notion that
Germany could go over to Bolshevism
was held by the whole world to be
preposterous at the moment when
Germany abandoned the war. On two
seperate occasions since then the ele-
ments of order in Germany have sue
ceeded temporarily in restraining the
elements of disorder which borrowed
the colors and ideas of Bolshevism,
but for four months we have been I'M
treaty of peace with Germany. We
have continually held before the Ger
man people the extent of punishment
We have openly discussed, week after
week, the indemnity we intended to
take from them, the provinces we in
tended to deprive them of, the ships
we meant to seize, and we have incul-
Gated in the German mind the idea
that we proposed to destroy the fu-
ture of Germany; and, in the mean
time, we have done nothing.
Germany Awaits Punishment.
What has been the result? Had we
imposed on Germany in November
substantially the terms which we
mean to impose on her in April or
May or June, the German people
would have known the worst, have
been compelled to accept, and would
already be on the way to adjust them
selves to new conditions. The inner
ent sense of order and discipline in
the German people would have react
ed, as it has on two occasions already
against disorder, against Bolshevism.
Instead, there has been no chance for
the Germans themselves, because Ger
many has been kept for four months
in the position of criminal awaiting
what may be a death sentence. In
such a situation it is inconceivable
that any man would undertake to be-
gin plans for a new life.
The result is that we have trans
formed Germany by our course into
new material of exactly the sort that
Bolshevism feeds on, precisely as we
have deprived our natural allies along
the eastern fringes Of the elements
of hope and confidence. We have
performed a similar service to those
elemtns of order in Germany on whom
we must depend if we are to have in
demnity, on whom we must depend
if Germany is to be saved from Boil
shevism. And Germany must be
saved from Bolshevism, not primarily
on her own account, but because if
Bolshevism, sweeping over Russia
and Poland, enters Germany, passes
through it and arrives at the Rhine,
we shall have a situation which will
tax the resources of the western pow
ers to their utmost. We shall have
TO ask the war weary people of
France, of Italy and of Britain to
make a new war, more terrible than
all preceding war, because the Paris
conference has been unable to act
in time to prevent the storm from
arriving at the frontiers of western
Europe.
Lack of Common Policy.
This is the situation four months
after our military victory. One year
ago Germany surprised the allied
world by an offensive of a character
which had not been foreseen, and
very nearly won the war. This was
in March. In November the Germans
again surprised the allies by sur
render SO totally unexpected that the
allies had no common policy, had not
prepared a policy to put in operation
at the moment when Germany surren-
dered
All our difficulties, and they have
been enormous, have flowed from the
fact that we had no policy when the
Germans surrendered. 1t took Foch
from April until July to organize a
policy to meet German attack, and
such a policy could not have been
organized had there been no unity of
command. There has been no unity
of command in the Paris conference,
and as a consequence there has been
no policy as yet adopted to meet the