Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-19

Scissors, a strong forest and hill re-
gion from which attacks could be di-
rected at the flank of the army in the
devastated region or the flank of the
| Chemin des Danes position. This
position was used effectively by Mar
shall Foch later when he began his
drives against the Germans.)
Ignores Feat Of Americans.
The center of the 18th army adj
vanced to the south as far as the
Marne. Its left wing and the right
of the LIST army, which had, as in
| tended, prolonged the attack on the
| left towards Rheims, pushed ahead
| between the Marine and the Vesle to-
wards the wooded heights OF Rheims
where they soon encountered resist
ance too stiff to be overcome.
The right wing of the 18th army
gained ground, between the Aisne and
| the Marine, southwest of Scissors and
as far as the eastern edge of the forest
of Villers- Cotterets. and captured
Chateau Thierry. General Foch
| concentrated strong reserves south
west of Rheims and near scissors,
with which he made fruitless counter
attacks which subsequently extended
these operations that the Americans
stopped the advance on Paris and beat
| back the German tide)
Early in June we stopped our adj
vance. CHIC. did not intend to at
tack further except between the Aisne
and the forest of Villers-Cotterets,
southwest of SCISSORS. We wanted
to gain, more ground, to the westward
on account of the railway which leads
from the Aisne valley east of scissors
into that of the Vesle and affords
tactical support to the attack of the
18th army on the line of Montdidier-
Noyon
superior" to Our Troops.
In spite of a few unavoidable tenn
porary crisis, our troops remained
masters of the situation both in attack
and defense They proved themselves
superior to both the English and the
French, even when their opponents
were assisted by tanks At Chateau
Thierry, Americans who had been q
long time in France had bravely at
tackled our thinly-held fronts; but they
were unskillful'y led, attacked in
dense masses, and failed. Here, too,
our men felt themselves superior. (Six
German divisions of q strength of
about 10000 each faced the portions
of two American divisions which
fought at Chateau Thierry at this
time. An American division including
auxiliaries numbered about $4,000
menu
Our tactics had proved sound in
every way. our losses compared with
those of the enemy and the large num-
Der of prisoners, though In themselves
t,t, n fnh In,
the cessation of the attack did not
take place early enough at all points.
Here and there 1t was continued where
defense was already indicated With
a few exceptions the troops had every
where displayed good conduct and
endurance.
On the whole the impression had
been very favorable The group of
the German crown prince had gained
great tactical victory in the often
sive. The enemy had been forced to
put in more of his reserves than the
troops we had expended Paris once
more received the impression of de-
feat, and many inhabitaHts left the
city.
"Tigcr" Disappoints Hun.
In the session Of the chamber early
in June. which I awaited with inter-
est, there appeared, indeed, no access
of weakness. Clemenceau's words
were full of pride and exemplary
strength: 1--WE are now giving ground
but We shall never surrender" I'VE
shall be victorious, If the public au-
thorities are equal to their task" II
fight before Paris; l shall fight in
Paris; l shall fight behind Paris"
Remember the fate Of Theirs and
Gambetta; I do not long for the diff
cult and thankless task of Thiers.''
Even after this second great defeat
in one year the entente was not yet
ready for peace.
It was a strategical disadvantage TO
us that we had been unable to take
Rheims and push our armies further
forward in this area into the noun
tain country. The supply of the center
of the 18th army was thereby restricted
to the broad gauge railway which
leads from the valley of the Aisne
east of Scissors, into that of theVesle.
In order to render the traffic with
out accidents the construction of a
second curve to connect the two val
lcys further to the eastward, was or
dered. 1t was not possible to put in
other broad-gauge sections south of
the Aisne, as the country was so diff
cult.
From Iaon broad gauge line ran
direct to Scissors via Anizy. The
tunnel north of the town. between the
Asne and the Ailette, had been blown
up and had to be repaired. One metre |
gauge line and sundry light railways
led towards the left wing of the It'll
army and the right wing of the fst,
and they afforded great relief; but
they had first to be extended across |
the two trench systems before they
could be connected up to those already |
in our possession.
The unfavorable railway COM
threw great strain on |
our mechanical transport, which again |
made the fuel situation serious.
Had to Put Off Attack.
On June / as intended, our attack |
had already been extended to the west |
as far as the junction of the Ailette |
and the Aisne. The transfer of the /
artillery had been carried |
out smoothly. The fighting took us |
in the trench system which /
we had abandoned in March, 1917.
1T was intended that the 18th army I
should attack on June 18th between |
and Noyon. the It'll to at |
tack at the same time southwest of
scissors. At "a conference early In
June at 18th army headquarters
ID salqirS on ssuaa stslotg
pvre do nfiRs qvf swd etcs rffr ~