The sun., 1919-10-26

But the terrible wealth of fire from
| the ravines around Juvigny, where ar
| tillery could not reach the German
machine-g -gunners amid the trees, stopped
the attack, and no progress was made
| that day. t....
The Americans, with bitterness in
| their hearts and determined TO Vindi-
| cato themselves as shock troops, at
| tackled again in the following AFTER
noon, and, although their left was
held back owing to their, neighbors'
inability to move forward, they finally
reached the village by passing 1t on
one side and then entering from the
/ rear.
The fourth day saw the Americans
supported by the artillery Of the Moroc-
| can Division, once more press on. This
| time the Germans gave way under the
| tremendous strain, and at In the eve
ming the Americans were In Terny Sorny.
| The Moroccans followed them into line
, and made one of the most spectacular
attacks Of the war In face OF terrific fire.
Slowly the German opposition was worn
down, and the Germans, evacuating
| their positions on the Vesle. gave the
Americans there the opportunity to
movo forward.
Early in August the Thirty-third Di-
vision again found itself fighting by the
side of the Australians on the Somme.
This time 1t was in the region of Chipilly
A new chapter in the history Of the
American forces now opened. The Amer
| leans had always offered their troops,
whatever their experience or training, to
the allied high command with willing
ness and freedom from conditions that
proved particularly happy for the Allies.
IrvyN- wa1 N1A ~
| In the shortest possible time by the only
way possible-decisive victory.
Arguments by the Americans.
II the opportunity came they were
| ready to fling all into the furnace.
| Losses did not appall them; they argued
| that a short war, even II costly. Is less
costly than a long war of attrition. They
| were right, and in conformity with this
policy offered their all to the Allies. But
they nevertheless desired to create from
| out of their large mass Of men in Europe
an army command, and to direct and
control. SO far as It should prove ex-
pedlent to direct and control. the opera
tions of such an army.
The scheme put forward by the French
| command that they should distribute
their troops throughout the whole front
and fight as individual units under va
rious British and French army commands
had not the slightest attraction for
| them. If an emergency demanded the
placing OF one, or several, American d.
| visions under such commands for a short
| action, they were willing to conform
with the Allies desires; but they could
not agree to the whole OF the American
| troops being transferred anywhere at
the will of others.
| General Pershing interpreted this SEN
| timent Of the American people and the
! American army OF the allied high com
mand; and after tho various corps had
| been established he started on the work
of forming an army.
| The Americans, in accordance with
their line of communications. were chief
ly to be found en- masse in the sector
| extending roughly south from Pont a
Mousson, on the Moselle river. 1t was
natural. therefore, that the St Mihiel sa-
| lient, formed in 1914. should beckon to
| them as requiring reduction preliminary
! to further assault on the stronghold of
Metz, but particularly on the iron mines
of Briey, from which the German army
was deriving tremendous benefits.
U. Q. Troops Prepare Assault.
| The attack was at last decided upon.
and the First army. under General
|
the best of the American divisions for
the assault.
Every possible preparation was made
| for the attack. The towns behind the
lines became Americanized with signs,
clubs and troops. On the night OF Sep
tember IL everything was ready for the
mornings drive.
The American Eighty Nine
| tieth, Fifth, Second, Eishty-ninth, For
/ ~.
| drive in the southern line of the salient,
while the French Colonial corps. facing
the bend at st. Mihiel itself. were to
stir the Germans with raids and then
follow behind when the salient was
| closed.
On the northern extremity OF the
salient the Twenty-siXth and Fourth
American Divisions, together with the
Fifteenth French Colonial Division. were
under the Fifth American Army Corps.
to drive in the northern edge, and finally
meet the southern American divisions
across the salient
The whole salient, IL defended stub
bornly, would demand the utmost efforts
to reduce. Les Bnarges, in the north.
was the name that French troops spoke
of with bitter memories. while the
French attacks around st. Mihiel itself
had been driven of with heavy losses.
Now It was the Americans turn.
With abundant troops. with all the
guarantees for success in the way OF
! assembled artillery. they advanced at
8 In the morning on September 12. fol-
lowing five hours artillery preparation
The Germans were only lightly holding
the salient, expecting at any moment to
evacuate II, and when the Americans
heralded their attack such divisions as
could be moved were hurriedly ordered
| to leave the area. But so impeaous was
the American attack, so well did the
plans work in action, that the Americans
broke through the German defences,
and bringing confusion around Thiau-
court, which the Second Division cap
tured on the first day, took prisoners
the very men who had been ordered to
leave.
L. =. Troops Capture $4,000.
The Germans had decided not to de-
fend the salient but they had no inten-
tion OF losing any prisoners. Yet nearly
$4,000 Germans fell into the Americans
hands, haul that was as unexpected as
1t was satisfactory.
| Early the next morning the salient
was closed by the meeting Of the First
and Twenty-sxth divisions at Vigneulles.
and St Mihiel was in French hands.
Gen. Pershing, with Marshal Petain and
Mr.. Baker, the Secretary of War, Wis
tied 1t during the day, and were all re-
ceiVed with great enthusiasm by the
! freed people.
Even before the lines had become sta
bilized after the st. Mihel drive the
Americans, with their characteristic
| reStleSSueSS. were nrPna ring IN STRIKE Z n