The Washington herald., 1919-08-31
US CONFRONTS CRISIS IN .....'.....
SIBERIAN INTERVENTION
Nation, With Exception of the War,
Says Balderston

self the best possible strategy; it is
not often in war that a movement car
be undertaken which must bring IA
yorable results whether it succeeds OF
fails. But why. it will be asked wa!
the world befooled with fairy tale.
about CzechO-Slovaks and the Iik,
during the spring and summer of 1918?
, Why were not the true objects o.
Russian intervention revealed and
criticism stiied?
/ For two reasons. allied public opn-
ion was very jumpy. in the Judgment
OF its masters. just before and after
the mighty March offensive 1t would
never do to let the people know that
a war in the East against the .Bolshe-
viks, and, hence. against Germans. was
really a desperate expedient 70 take
I pressure of the armies in France No
doubt the generals and politicians
were wrong in not taking the public
into their confidence, but So they rea-
soned
And. n the second place. the hypoc-
risy OF the official statements, the cir
culatton of the astounding myth about
the Odyssey of the Czecho-Slovaks,
were due to the United States Presi-
dent Wilson was extremely reluctant
to sanction intervention. which. he
! felt, and said. during the winter OF
1917 and spring of 1918. would be a
denial of everything America was
fighting for. He foresaw. doubtless.
the rival economic claims that would
be set up after allied invasion. the
Japanese complicat. Ions; he did not
understand allied leaders told me at
the time, that unless those fifty Ger
man divisions were held in the East
by hook or crook the war would be
lost
Worlds Greatest Lie.
! Then some genius invented the most
wonderful fake. the most colossal lie,
in the history of the modern world.
Backed by all the resources OF allied
, propaganda, this Czecho-Slovak myth
waxed nightly. and before 1t was
done growing some of the very men
who had helped invent it believed that
civilization must save 10000 brave al
lies who were struggling to reach the
sea, surrounded by hordes of German
| prisoners and Bolsheviks. The facts,
now amply documented, are simple and
unromantiC
It will take but a short paragraph
to kill" the CZecho-Slovak thriller.
| II is true that the Bohemians. with
| arms given them by the Kerensky
/ government, started across Siberia to
! take shit at Vyadivostok for the
! western front. The rest is fiction,
| There were no armies Of German pris-
! oners. nor were there masses of Boil
| shevtk troops desperately determined
to prevent this reinforcement from
reaching the enemies of their German
friends. 1t was matter of indiffer-
once to Lenine what went on in the
/ west and the sooner the Czcchs got
! out Of the country the better he would
have been pleased. The professed
| aims OF those British ad French mas
| ter minds who started the classic fake
! was to have the Czechs to fight IN
! the west; their real aim was to get
/ allied troops sent into Siberia, turn the
Czechs around, and set them to fight
| ing Bolsheviks. The BoTsheviks at no
! time wanted to fight the Czechs: they
were always and are now willing to
! give the Czechs free passage home by
any route desired.
Gave q. s. Prete1t to Enter.
But the Czecho-SIovak myth gave
| President Wilson, who was evidently
| completely taken in. his excuse for
| intervention. Our participation in ST.
| bern, 1t was officially announced. was
! to save the Czecho- -Slovaks, and
! hearty were the chuckles in London
and Paris over the Presidential pro-
nouncement
| So much for the war period. What
ever childish pretexts were alleged for
! intervention in Russia, it must never
! be forgotten that the move was sound,
| and necessary to save the war in the
| west. 1t was not the Czechs, not Boil
! shevik atrocities. not love for consti-
tutional government not-as our own
| Bolshevlks say-a capitalist desire for
| exploitation, that led the allies into
| Russia 1t was necessary to compel
| Germany to maintain an army on the
( east front. She was so compelled: less
| than jO,OOo entente troops by stiffcning
up disaffected elements immobilized
/ fifty German divisions and did much
to win the war.
! When Germany laid down her arms,
/ allied Intervention in Russia entered
on a new phase. Promises had been
made to Denikinfi to the Siberian gov
eminent, to the North Russian gov
ernment. that the allies would sun
port them. All the anti-Bolshevik
governments in Russian territory
owed their existences to allied help
and promises. Our pledges were that
If our Russian friends would help us
against the Bolsheviks, and so against
the Germans, we would help them.
Without such promises the allies
could not have obtained Russian aid.
French Troops in Mutiny.
But the war ended suddenly in the
autumn and the promises we had
made became very embarra ssing We
no longer desired to fight the Bolshe.
viks; on the other hand how could
we abandon to massacre and pillage
those people and towns we had incit-
ed to revolt? This problem has been,
and is. Of the utmost perplexity. It is
true that the Bolsheviks have Of
fered. In a wireless that the French
British censorships suppressed. TO
make peace with the allies on terms
OF complete immunity for anti-Bol-
sheVik Russia. But while l think the
allies were wrong to suppress such an
offer. they undoubtedly have reasons
to suspect the good faith Of any such
pledge. Certainly IN North Russia.