New-York tribune., 1919-08-01
7 he

~ TX: In your issue or July ~ there ap-
y pears communication from one sign
ing himself "Brigadier General, N. G.,
N. Y" The general" asks for "the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth"
regarding the massacre" at Montfaucon.
may not be able to tell the whole truth.
as / was but captain Of a machine gun
company in the regiment which captured
the position. However, I was at the regi-
mental P. c.. during most of the action and
have fairly good idea of what was going
on. Perhaps the general" will be inter
ested in knowing what | observed 1t is a
bit different than ho has stated.
Here is about the way it happened
Montfaucon, considered by many of the
French officers an impregnable position,
in the sector assigned to the 18th Diyi-
sion and, more particularly, the 313th In
fantry. AS I recall the artillery "time-
table," our barrage was due to fall on
Montfaucon along about noon Of the 26th-
perhaps earlier. The shell fire was sched-
uled to smother that position for one half
hour. The other positions and strong
points were to be treated to lesser doses
from five to fifteen minutes each. This
barrage, of course, was all in addition to
the heavy fire which had been going on
for several hours on Montfaucon and all the
less important positions.
Stopped to Reorganise
An obstinate machine gun nest delayed
our advance, SO that were not able to
keep up with the barrage. 1t must have
been about noon when we reached a line
about kilometre and a half short of the
town. With US at that time were, | should
say, about eight French tanks. believe
the general" states there were no tanks
We were somewhat disorganzed, due to
our having been pushing through woods
and remains of woods, and at this point the
advance stopped in order that we might re-
organize. Some time in the afternoon-per-
haps it was o'clock--we received orders
to attack, rather to continue the attack
There some difficulty in getting the CO.
operation Of the French tanks, but finally
they moved out and we all advanced toward
Montfaucon. One tank waddled out into
the open and was promptly hit by Boche
seventy seven Another tank rolled over
into shell hole The remaining ones fired
a few rounds of 37-mimetre shells and
retired. Some said it was time for supper
others claimed to be out of gasolene-"pas
de petrole." At any rate the tanks were
through for the day.
In the open field our men were meeting
heavy machine gun fire. The advance was
halted and the men dug in. There was
very little artillery fire either from our
guns or those of the Boche. The casualties at
that time were not particularly heavy
Certa My there was nothing that could be
called massacre" The town was not
taken that afternoon Again the general"
seems to have been msnformcd.
Orer Five Miles 4,cay
I should say that one very good reason
why we did not have the support of our
artillery at that time was that the lighter
guns-thc scvcnty-fves-were in all prob
ability having their own troubles in NOV
ing forward. 1t was bad enough for men
to get through the mass of shell holes
trenches and wire. 1t must have been next
to impossible for artillery to cross that
ground. Bear in mind, Montfaucon was
over five miles from the gun positions of
that morning!
The next morning, with some artillery
support we advanced and captured Mont
faucon. Even then there was no "mas-
sacre" There was hard fighting; there
were casualties. But there were no blum
ders or evidence of incompetency, stupidity
and ignorance the part Of those higher
up" as the general" would have one believe.
Who were the officers "higher up? Forst
came Colonel Claude B. Sweczey, command
ing the 313th Infantry. His only fault
was in his insistence in being out where
hS ,l,o+
encourage his men. Next higher was Briga-