Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-11
BY GEN. ERICH Won 1uDENDoRTF

question why the submarine war did
not conquer the entente. England's
economic situation was eased by the
| increased agricultural production, and
this delayed the effect of the SUBJ
marine war.
| Whether the construction of new
| shipping in the entente was greater
! than had originally been assumed and
it thus received still further stimula-
ton, l cannot decide. But IL was of
decisive Importance that the entente
had had time in two years of war to
adapt its economic life to the circum-
stances and to perfect its means of
defence.
Excuses Nays Optimism.
But" says the Economist" of
September Z, 1918, "the fleet with
American aid certainly mastered the
submarine danger and greatly reduced
it's efficiency"
| In war 1t Is even harder to see into
when conditions are so complicated as
| in this case. These conditions were
not perceived by the enemy either.
This explains why our navy did hot
obtain an absolutely clear view of all
| the determining factors. It's respon-
sible heads worked and calculated
though by October. 1918. the subma-
rines had not decided the war. their
achievements nevertheless were of
great influence.
1T was the greatest danger that
England ever faced" says the Morn
| ing Post" of the 3rd of October, 1918.
1t would also be mistake to UNDER
estimate its effect on the whole eco
nomic life of the entente. and to dis
regard the extent to which II eased the
strain on the western front. 1t Will be
the task Of history to clear UP these
questions and to pursue this eompli-
Gated problem further.
The achievements of our submarine
crews will remain heroic deedsfor all
time, and the country and the navy
may be proud of them.
Sccptical About U-Boats.
About New Year, 1918, the opinion
of the navy was as optimistic as ever.
| had. however, become more sceptical
and felt obliged to count on the new
American formations beginning to ar
rive in the spring of 1918. In what
numbers they would appear could not
he foreseen; but it might be taken as
certain that they would not balance
the loss of Russia; further. the della
tive strengths would be more in our
favor in the spring than in the late
summer and autumn, unless indeed We
had by then gained great victory.
In the late autumn, 1917. HI, Q. was
confronted by the decisive question:
Should it utilize the favorable condl-
lions of the spring to strike great
blow in the west, or should 1t dellb-
erately restrict itself to the defensive
and only make subsidiary attacks,
save in Macedonia or Italy?
The quadruple alliance was only
held together by the hope OF victory
ty tho Geii1ans.
The Austro-Hungarian army was
worn out: it had lost 100000 prison.
ers; ii was short of recruits: It's
fighting value was slight though
against italy 1t had on the whole SUI
feed II Russia actually dropped out
we night fore that the army would
continue equal to the task that fell TO-
it. Whether 1t could spare forces for
other objects was doubtful. re
Feared Collapse OF Austria. 81
In 1917 we had already received an
intimation from the imperial and royal
government that the army could only
so on fighting for limited period; we