Bisbee daily review., 1919-08-10
ARG0NNE GREATEST GLORY TOU 5.
CContinued From Page Fivel

the Freya Stellung, that the Ameri- can army launched it's attack. All these lines of defense followed the heights. depending on the natural strength of the positions on which they were built. The Hindenburg, Hagen and Kriemhilde Stellungs were the principal lines of defense; the others were local lines destined to defend particular positions. The principal lines above-named were solidly concreted and wired-the lat est word in defensive warfare as eX perience since 1914 had taught it.
 Was crux of All Hun Operations
 One may ask why the German de- fensive system was constructed in this way. The answer is very simple. To win the war Germany must have undisturbed access to the inexhaust- ible coal fields of northern France and Belgium as well as to the iron mines of Lorraine and therefore she had to build her defenses so as to cover these territories. In addition she had to- protect the great double track Gin places four track) railroad line running from Lille to Metz along the Franco-Belsian frontier. This IAnt was dS pOA I<iAlb NO AACA eiS CANAACA the coal or iron fields for the req son that by it she could move rapidly large numbers of troops from one front to another. This ability to- shift troops and supplies by interior railway lines was responsible more than anything else for Germany's early successes, both in offense and defense. In other words from mili-i oF cfr foo success depended on the Lille-Metz railway line and her economic sue cess on the coal fields of Belgium and France and the iron field of LOT raine- Without either one or the other she was doomed to defeat.
 This main transversal line of com munication, was fed in the north by the immense railroad system running through Liege and in the south by the lines running through Luxemburg. Owing to the topography these are the main arteries running into France from the north and northeast and 1t was through these' two main arteries that all troops and all supplies came into France.
 Foe Forced to Shorten Line
 When the lack of man-power com pelledi the German high command to envisage the approaching necessity of a shortening of the line-and this lack of man-power became evident in May, 191S,-the question of carrying out successfully this shortening of the line became all important. Ow- ing to the fact that the territory of Holland juts southward into Belgium close to Liege the great percentage of German troops in France must re- treat by the southern artery above described. Therefore the German army must necessarily hold to the last in order to guarantee the sue cessful withdrawal of trooPsA further west and north Tn fact, the Mouse Argonne front was the hinge on which the entire German retreat swung and being the hinge it was solidly fortified to resist all attacks.
 It is a source of great pride to the American army and its chiefs that we were given the honor of attacking this point in the German line, which, we knew, would be more solidly held and more desperately defended than any other. Marshal Foch paid us the compliment of giving us the most difficult and perhaps the most un- grateful task in the great offensive that continued almost without inter- ruption from July 18th to the signing of the armistice. By continually pounding on the system of fortifica- tions lying between the Argonne and the Mouse the American army was first able to lessen the enemy's re- sistance on the French and British fronts and secondly, our perseverance was crowned with the greatest sue cess hoped for When we succeeded in bringing the great main commun- eating line under fire of our light guns the enemy had to withdraw be- yond the Mouse. Only then did he see disaster staring him in the face. To slave off this disaster he signed the terms of the armistice.
 The Battle From the Enemy's Side.
 It is very evident from all informa- ton obtained that the German high command knew of our preparations for an attack on a large scale. The Germans Air Service and Information Service had warned them that we were making preparations for a big attack but because of the fact, that we had only two weeks before re- uuCtu lut Ob. SdllChL lnCy DC- lieved that our principal effort would be directed against Metz. Orders captured Sept. 26th showed that the enemy was preparing to meet an American attack east of the Mouse and he therefore had massed large forces to protect the Briey iron basin and the Metx area.
 The importance to the Germans of holding the line from the Argonne to the Mouse is no better shown than in the following secret order of General von der Marwitz, commanding the Fifth Army, which was captured.
 Secret Order of General Won Der Marwitz, Commanding the German Fifth Army, Dated September 18th.
 According to information in our hands the enemy intends to attack the Fifth Army east of the Mouse in order to reach Longuyon. The ob-