The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1919-11-09

whether it would be possible for eight
merchant ships, with a speed which
varied perhaps two knots, to keep, sta
ton in line ahead Chat is, in single
file or column) 500 yards apart, and
sail in two columns down the channel
1T would be absolutely impossible 8
the ten masters replied almost in a
chorus
Lack of Trained Merchant Captains
A discouraging fact, they said, was
that many of the ablest merchant cap
tains had gone into the navy, and that
many of those who had replaced them
could not be depended on to handle
their ships in such a formation.
I'VE have so few competent deck Of
ficers that the captain would have to
be on the bridge the whole twenty
four hours" they said, and the diff
Guilty was not only with the bridge
but with the engine-room. In order to
keep the ships constantly the same
distance apart it would be necessary
accurately to regulate their speed: the
battleships could do this because they
had certain elaborate devices for tim
ing the revolutions of the engines
which the merchant vessels lacked
The poor quality of the coal which
they were obtaining would also make
it difficult to maintain a regular
speed.
Admiral Jellicoe then asked the
masters whether they could sail in
twos or threes and keep station.
Two might do it but three would
$ be too many was the discoura gins
vedict. But the masters were posi-
tive that even two merchantmen could
not safely keep station abreast in the
night time without lights; two such
vessels would have to sail in single
file the leading ship showing stern
light. The masters emphasized theC
conviction that they preperred to sail
alone, each ship for herself, and to let
each one take its chances of getting
into port.
Difficulty in Overcoming Opposition.
And there the matter rested. I had
the opportunity of discussing the con-
voy system with several merchant
captains, and in these discussions they
simply echoed the views which had
been expressed at this formal confer
ence. I do not believe that British
naval officers came in contact with a
single merchant master who favored
the convoy at that time. They were
not doubtful about the idea;> they We're
/
captains are a magnificent body of
lseamen; their first thought was to
lserve their country and the allied
cause; their attitude in this matter
was not obstinacy; it simply resulted
from their sincere conviction that the
tconvoy system would entail greater
shipping losses than were then being
inflicted by the German submarines.
| Many naval officers at that time
shared this same view. They opposed
the convoy not only on these grounds;
its Introduction would mean immedi-
ately cutting down the tonnage fifteen
or twenty per cent, because of the
time and in the slower average speed
which they could make; many ship
owners and directors of steamship
companies expressed the same opin-
ions. They also objected to the con-
voy on the ground that it would cause
considerable delay which would be
consumed in assembling the ships and
awaiting escorts and hence loss OF
earnings. Yet the attitude of the
merchant marines had not entirely
eliminated the convoy from considera-
ton. At the time l arrived the pro-
posaI was still being discussed: the
rate at which the Germans were sink
Ing merchantmen made this inevitable.
And there seemed to be two schools
among allied naval men-one OPP
to the convoy. and the other insist
that it should be given a trial. The
convoy had one irresistible attraction
for the officer expert which seemed to
counterbalance all the objections
which We're urged against it. It's
adoption would mean taking the often
sive against the German submarines.
The, essential defect OF the patrol sys-
tenn, as it was then conducted, was
that it was primarily a defensive
measure Fac destroyer cruised
IN an assigned area. ready to assist
vessels in distress, escort ships
through her own square" and, Incl
dentally. attack a submarine when OPP
portunity offered. But the mere fact
that a destroyer was patroling par
ticular area meant only, as already ex-
planned, that the submarine had oc-
casionally to sink out of sight until
submarine proceeded to operate when
ever a destroyer was NOT in sight and
this was necessarily most of the time.
for the submarine zone was such a big
place and the allied destroyer fleet
was so pitifuIIy small that il was i'm
possible to cover it effectively. Under
these conditions there were very few
encounters between destroyers and
submarines, at least in the waters
south and west of ireland, for the sub
marines took all precautions against
getting close enough to be sighted by
the destroyers.
Yet the British and French navies