The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-09-13


 In the north the ground was difficult The condition of the Lys valley, west ot Lille. across which the main force of the attack would pass. depended to an extraordinary degree upon the sea- son and the weather; before the middle of April its possibility away from the roads was doubtful. That was very late. in view of the Americans.
 In the center the ground itself caused no difficulties, but further progress would be hampered by the crater-areas of the Somme battle.
 The attack at Nerdun would lead us into very hilly country
 These two attacks could take place at any time of year.
 Tactical conditions, therefore, favored the center sector; here the attack would strike the enemy's weakest point the ground offered no difficulties and it was feasible at all seasons
 WANTED TO CUT OFF BRITISH
 Strategically the northern attack had the advantage of a great, though linn ited. objective. It might enable us to shorten our front if we succeeded in capturing Calais and Boulogne The attack on Verdun might also lead to an improvement in our front though more of tactical nature The center attack seemed to lack any definite linn
 
 recting the main effort on the area be- tween Arras and Peronne. towards the coast If this blow succeeded the stra- tegic result might indeed he enormous as we should cut the bulk of the Eng fish army from the French; and crowd 1t up with its back to the sea.
 l favor the center attack; but was influenced by the time factor and by tactical considerations, first among 70 l-n of Whether this weakness would continue l could not know
 Tactics had to be considered before purely strategical objects; which it s futile to pursue unless tactical success is possible. A strategical plan which ignores the tactical factor is foredoom ed to failure. Of this the entente's attacks during the first three years of War afforded hume rous examples.
 After determining the divisions and other forces available for the attack, it was decided to strike between Croi- stiles, southeast of Arras. and Moer- 'res. and. emitting the Cambrai re- entrant (the strong position held by the British from which they might uake a counter attack) between Vii -Guslain and the Oise south of St Quentin. It was to be supported on US left by a subsidiary attack from La Fere
 INSISTED ON HAVING CONTROL The Seventeenth army therefore, had to make the attack on the line Croisil- les-Moeuvres. the 2d and 18th that be- tween Villers-Guislafn and La Fere. In this operation, the Seventeenth and Second were to take the weight off each other in turn, and with their inner wings cut off the enemy holding the Cambrai re-entrant, afterwards pushing through between Croisilles and Pe- rome. This advance was to be pro tected on the south flank by the Eight eenth army, in combination with the ex- treme left wing of the Second. The strength and equipment of these arr mics was adapted to their tasks
 For the decisive operation, the Sew enteenth and Second armies were to remain under the orders of the army group of Crown Prince Rupprecht. The Eighteenth army joined that of the Ger man crown prince.
 Remembering the November cam patgn in Poland in 1914 (when the Austrian command brought on defeat hy insisting on its own schemes) meant to exercise a far-reaching in- nuenee on the course of the battle.