The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1916-1920, 1919-09-23


under the covenant; (c) that our right
OF withdrawal is dependent upon giving
two years notice of our intention to
withdraw.
IF we are under no legal or moral
duty to fulfil our obligations under the
| league before Withdrawing neither are
we under any obligation to give twenty
| four months notice. for that Is merely
one OF the obligations of the league.
"If the doctrine announced Is sound II
Is difficult to understand why any nation
might not at any time repndiate all its
obligations under the league and declare
none of them either legally or morally
binding except as 1t may see At to re-
gard them as binding upon the faith or
| the conscience OF the Withdrawing ma
tion.'
| IF the right to withdraw without
| having fulfilled the obligations under
! tho league Is circumscribed by only the
restraining influence of the public opin-
/ ion of the world then truly the entire
chain Of the league so carefully welded
| together may be broken at any moment
without any notice Whatsoever by the
| withdrawal of any one or dozen ma
! tons. even though they have not full
! filed their obligations under the league
| or their international obligations. All
/ this may be done without mourning any
other penalty than the restraining in
! fuence Of the public opinion of the
world.
'Tn my humble Judgment the con-
struction contended for is unsound.
But IL II be sound, and II II be the
view of the President. then 1t should
be plainly written into the document.
ct venture the assertion that the pro-
ponents Of the league will lift their
hands in horror and their voices in
protest against an amendment which
shall clearly express the right of each
nation to decide for itself whether It
has fulfilled its international obligations
and its obligations under the league.
and thereupon to withdraw without the
! let or hindrance and without the deci-
sion Of either the council or the assem-
bly,.
Further Powers OF Assembly.
"The Assembly has the power to elect
! four of the nine members of the Coun-
Gil and thus make that body subservient
| to its will.
AS previously stated there are five
permanent members of the Council.
namely, the representatives of the Brit
ISL Empire, France, Italy, Japan and
the United States. There are four tenn
porary or removable members The tenn
| porary members are the representatives
OF Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain
1t is expressly stated that These four
members of the league shall be selected
Gas members OF the counciD by the AS
sembly from time to time in its discre-
ton. (article W..
THE article continues: Until the ap-
poihtment of the representatives of the
four members of the league first selected
by the assembly representatives of Bel
GUM, Brazil, Greece and Spain shall be
members of the council.
THE question at once arises by what
vote does the assembly act in electing
members of the council. Here again we
are confronted with Article " If the
election of the four members of the
council can be regarded as a decision
by the council, then the vote must be
unanimous for Article w., which gives
the power of election, falls to specify
the kind of vote which shall be given
in order to result In an election.
| Could Not he Ousted.
IF tho election requires unanimous
vote, then the absurd result follows that
although Belgium, Brazil, Greece and
Spain are only named as temporary
members of the council. and although 1t
is expressly provided that the four tenn
porary members of the council shall
be selected by the Assembly from time
to time in Its discretion, nevertheless
the four temporary members when they
have once been installed can never be
ousted This Is so because no one of
these nations would voluntarily relin-
quish it's place upon the council, and it
could not be ousted from that place so
long as It refuses to consent to it's own
removal by joining in a unanimous vote
to select another state as its successor.
/ Accordingly, II the unanimous vote
rule applies, then each of these States so
named as temporary members of the
|, council are in fact seated there forever.
This construction would force the con-
clusion that the language inserted in
; Article ", These four members of the
league shall be selected by the assembly
from time to time. in its discretion Is
a mere fraud put upon the world.
Upon the other hand, il the election
can be regarded as a matter of pro-
cedure, which I think Is the better view.
then the assembly may proceed by a ma
jority vote It follows that a simple
majority of the assembly can easily
dominate the council, for the power to
elect at will four out of the nine men,
bers of the council can be easily so EN-
ployed as to result in a complete con-
troll.
"A simple illustration will suffice. 1t
| is inconcelNaDle tnat the majority or the
assembly should unite in electing four
members of the council unless making a
| part of that majority and probably di-
recting its action would be found one or
two great States, already represented
: among the permanent members Of the
council. In that event the election of
. four additional members would assure
a ma jority, and in the event that all OF
the five nations permanently repre-
scented on the council were to act in &C.
. cord in the election of the four tenn
porary members they could In this way
Gust nations from the council which re-
fused to be subservient to their will and
elect in their stead others that would
Join them In some desired unanimous
decision.
1.-THE statement just made will be al
once met by the claim that in thai
event the United States would not be-
harmed. because the result referred L
would only be brought about with hei
ton, however, will show that circum
stances might arise in which the power
. of the assembly could be employed tC
deprive us of a fair decision by the
council in matters vital TO our interests
b In Event of Controversy.
, Assume that a controversy between
, the United States and Great Britain Ia
. impending and that the four temporary
!, members of the council are friendly %
: the United States. whereas France
italy and JaDan beinR unItad wifi,