The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-09-10
THE BIRMINGHAM AGEHERALD WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER

defensive with uncommon difficulty
 Skulkers were already numerous. They reappeared ms soon the battle was over, and it had become quite com mon for divisions which came out of action with desperately low effectives to be considerably stronger after only
 a few days.
 Against the power of the hostile weapons the troops no longer displayed their old stubbornness in defense; they { thought with horror of fresh defensive battles and longed for the war of move
 ment In this the Germans had achieved brilliant success in Rumania, Eastern Galicia, Italy and at Cambrai, and had once more proved their superiority, all
 though their staying power was no longer what 1t had been in 1914. HAD TO ROUSE HIS ARMY There had been incidents, too, which indicated that their cohesion was no
 longer the same. As they were de- pressed by defense their spirits arose in the offensive. The interests of the army were best served by the offen- sive; in defense it was bound gradually to succumb to the ever-increasing hos tile superiority in men and material This feeling was shared by every body. In the west it wanted the at tack, and after Russia's collapse ex-
 
 1 Such WIS the feeling of the troops bout attack and defense. It amounted to l definite conviction which possessed l them completely that nothing but an l attack could win the war. Many gem erals, among them the most distin- guished, spoke in the same strain. Naturally, I did not allow myself to [ be influenced by this feeling; my sense of responsibility was far too great. I IAy bad fo lyo hn 6ani nicixy al; of that I remained conscious
 throughout. The wishes of the troops | and commanders merely indicated what | the army felt regarding it's own 1 strength and weakness.
 The condition of our allies and of
 ourselves, and that of the army, all
 called for attack that would bring
 about early decision.
 ONLY CHANGE IN THE WEST | This WIS only possible on the western front. All that had gone before was
 merely a means to the one end of ere
 ating a situation that would make it
 a feasible operation. Until now this sit-
 uation had not arisen. We had been | able to strike blow at Italy with six
 or seven divisions, but for the western front this was not a sufficient force 1 set aside all idea of attacking in | Macedonia or Italy. All that mattered was to get together enough troops | for an attack in the west.
 1 For this we needed enormous material
 resources and strong troops, who, with
 their leaders, had been trained for the l attack. If this could be effected in | time, we could-indeed, we must-at- | tack. The attack is the strongest form 1 of combat; it alone is decisive; mili l tary history proves it on every page
 It is the symbol of superiority. Delay could only serve the enemy, since he
 was expecting endorsements. That the attack in the west would
 he one of the most difficult operations
 in history I was perfectly sure, and did not hide the fact. The German
 had. The greater the lack of men, the | stronger must be it's will, the more en : | ergetic the work of the government In the service of the war.
 MUST STRIP OTHER FRONTS l General Headquarters would, as in the days of Tannenberg, have to get | together for the decisive moment ev-
 cry man that could be spared from the
 various theaters. We could never be
 too strong. On the other hand, it
 would not do to forget that the Euro
 pean fronts are most intimately con
 nected. A failure in Italy, in Mace donia, or in the east, might check our operations in the west
 l It was not necessary to leave Ger
 man troops on the Italian front, and
 preparations were made for their de
 parture about the New Year. We re-
 tained only certain interest in tn military resources of the occupied DOT. tions of Italy which then passed under Aus t r o-Hungarian administration From the Russo -Rumanian front, in spite of the objections of the Bulga- rians, we moved Bulgarian troops to Macedonia, in order to relieve 8 few German formations.
 The move from Galicia and the Bulk ovina to France and Belgium was ar ranged for, and a decision as to the troops to be removed from the eastern front and the Balkan peninsula became necessary.
 Published by special arrangement with the Mcclure Newspaper Syndi-
 cate. Copyrighted, 1919. by Harper and Brothers All rights reserved Copyrighted in Great Britain by Hutch inson and company and the London Times, in Spain by Messrs. Seix and Bariel, in Italy by Fratelli Treves ir Canada and Australia. All rights re- served for France, Belgium, Holland Russia and the Scandinvian countries)) In the next article General Luden- dorff reveals. how he prepared his men and artillery for their great surprise
 attack on the British. He also ex. plains why he could not provide tank, to nid his men.
 COMING PARADE CuTEE TnDTC nE