Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-03-25

tons for the continuance of Warlike
measures.
American interests compel Amer.
lea to accent a naval burden equal
to that of Great Britain. and distri-
button would make that burden toe
great.
France wants distribution; all other
powers agree to the destruction of
the surrendered ships,
Final conclusions are thus stated!
Disposition of the German-Austrian
ships of war should be settled and in
! corpofated IN the peace treaty In or
der that the disposition may be car
ried out as agreed upon, this course
should be stated in the terms to be
submitted to Germany and Austria.
Subject Well Studied.
1t may not be amiss for me to add
two thoughts in concluding this dis
! patch. The first is that in viewing
the problems of naval disarmament
those who are making. the technical
studies have taken the arguments of
the strongest opponents to the plan of
destruction as the basis for their own
studies and their pleadings have been
! prepared after eXhaustice study of
! such arguments.
This method of reaching conclu-
sions accounts for the mention of
| Great Britain and Japan in the body
of the dispatch. The arguments of
| these two powers have been consid-
cred from the teachnical standpoint
and not in the nature of threats.
The second thought is that by the
| term destruction" is not necessarily
meant that the vessels must be sunk.
| They may be strapped and sold to
the highest bidders. with the proviso
that the ships be broken up and the
proceeds which may reach as high as
$5,O0O,000 may be applied to repara-
| ton account.
1t will be impossible to use the
vessels as cargo carriers because of
the style of their construction and
their enormous coal requirements.
Finally, it should be added that the
cogency of the American arguments
has gradually overcome opposition,
and the views as given herewith will
prevail.
A fifth point is that the United
states should not participate in the
distribution. America was proud to
enter the war with clean hands, and
will come out with empty hands. We
cannot stultify our position by accept
ing any or the spoils of war.
1t is essential that the United states
have navy as large as that of Great
Britain. The league of nations must
be strong enough to restrain, if neces-
sary its strongest member.
No international navy, made UP of
ships of heterogeneous types, whose
discipline would differ in training, in
language and command, could hope
to cope with the British fleet There
must exist in such an international
force a single unit, which, with the
assistance of the forces of the league,
would be able to enforcse the man
dates of the league against any power.
Have Faith in United States.
The United States has satisfied its
aims and may be relied upon to sup
port Loyalty the league of nations.
Nations of the world know this and
have faith in us. Should we ever
fail in our International obligations
there would exist the forces of the
league, with the fleet of Great Britain,
to apply the remedy.
Any distribution of the German
ships on the basis of losses or of ma
val effort in the war would give the
lions share to Great Britain, which
would mean that the American tax
payers would have ITO provide hun
dreds of million dollars to restore
equality of strength.
The seventh point in the argument
is that the German capital ships were
built for the special purpose of OPP
posing the British fleet. They are of
short steaming radius, built to fight
near home They have German guns,
German equipment, and they must de-
pend on German shops and yards for
requirements and upkeep. They
would be uneconomieai and inefficient
as part of any foreign navy.
Inferior i'm Type.
They are inferior in type to the later
British and American ships, and they
will soon be obsolete. Any country
that gets them will find the cost of
maintenance out of proportion to their
value. Great Britain alone might af-
ford to keep them as reinforcement
to her channel fleet. Thus she would
release modern types for operations
abroad.
The eighth point is that there are
but two great powers in the world
whose existence depends upon naval
strength. They are Great Britain and
Japan. In the past Great Britain
built with the main idea of keeping
safe superiority over the German
fleet.
The United States, in its desire toll
maintain the peace of the world and
to help all nations, must not forget
the necessity Of national safety. Ahyl
reduction of our relative naval
strength would weaken our influence
in world affairs and limit our ability
to serve the league of nations.
In considering the distribution of
the German and Austrian vessels
among the small powers the possibili-
ty must be borne in mind of naval I
alliance that would add these ships
to fleets opposed to u.s.
One Night Get All.
The ninth point is that II the Slistri-
button were made on an agreed basis.
among the participating powers there
would be no means of guaranteeing
that the recipients would not sell or
exchange these vessels, and thereby
effect a relative naval strength Of
states in manner not contemplated
in the distribution.
The tenth point contends that the
German and Austrian submarines
should not be distributed but de-
and the destruction should
apply not only to them but to all sub
marines in the world and future pos
session of submarines forbidden to ALL
the powers. 1t is held that they serve
no useful purpose in time of peace
and they are inferior to other craft in
time of war, except in their ability to
make traecherous attack on merchant
ships
Civilization demands that naval
nm h 10 al