The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1919-10-29

With The American Forces in Ger many, Oct. 27.-(By The Associated Press) Tricks O the game of war are coming to light from time to time as each side tells it's story. One of the most successful of them was prac,iced by American forces in the Meuse-Argonne battle last fall when the last great Allied offensive was at it's height from Switzerland to the sea.
 An imtginary army conceived by handful of American junior officers was thrown into the field" over nigh. and for days five crack Ger man divisions just east of Nerdun in the Etain region were kept on their toes momeniar;ly expecting an attack which never materialized.
 At a dinner table in Coblenz cafe, overlooking the Rhine, an American intelligence officer recently told the story of the creation of tne mythical x army" as ii was called. It appears ghal the Germans were expecting an attack in the Etain sec tor al any time, and the Amer. cans knew it; but at that phase of t-e game the F'irss United States army was devoting it's energies to drivins the enemy out of the Argonne foresz and the hill country on either side. So the mythical army was created, il Ireeere1ce to a real diversion, re- curing many men, to convince the German commander that it woul not be wise to weaken the Etain front to the benefit of the Meuse-Ar- gonne front where a desperate battle was proceeding.
 Five fresh divisions had been placed by the Germans on the E lain line These constituted their last and finest reservoir of available di- visions The Americans realized that the minute the Germans decided that %nis was not a danger point any or all of the five divisions could be with drawn, replaced by exhausted and fragmentary divisions coming from the battle fronts, and that the ap- pearance of the fresh trC%ps in the line west of the Mouse would have a tremendous effect on the American offensive.
 The x. army" was assigned to a front from Bezonvaux to Fresnes. From the morning of October 23 until just previous to the armistice this army "functioned." Captain Charles H. Matz, of Hubbard Woods H., was commander-in-c chief Captain William H. Dearden, of Springfield. Mass, and Washington, D. C., was chief of staff Lieutenant John H. Graham, of Lexington, Va, was chief of troop movements; Captain O. w. Neidert was in charge of G-1, or administration; and Lieutenant H. T. Griswold, of Old Lyme, Conn.,, was chief of artillery. The staff of the 'eX army were all members of the inteIigence section of the First army and of course, before beginning op- erations, had secured the consent of their chief, Colonel Wiley Howell.
 The wireless and the telephone were freely used to convince the Ger mans that the Americans were pre- pairing an attack in the Etain sector. To make sure that the Germans would be able to "breal1 into" the code used the Americans furnished them with a satisfactory key.
 One wireless station, of the TX army" was established in a clump of woods near Verdun and was chirsten- ed Thea eadquarters of the x army" This station functioned until tE9 end of the game, all "orders" to the army going out from this place by wireless. Soon after the station be gan working the Germans located it's whereabouts and frequently shel1ed the woods and vicinity, apparently in hopes of breaking up the radio or this latest of annoyances.
 The "X army also had a portable radio station, which moved about and represented itself as a different sta ton every day or two.
 The sector in which the 'x army was at work was directly under com rnand of the LeSEty-Third French corps, and the rowing wireless sta ton caused considerable excitement among the French soldiers as 1t sent messages to make the enemy believe that several fresh American divisions had moved into the area. The French unaware of the plans of the "x army staff, at times thought the Americans had lost all sense of req son and on several occasions so re- ported the wireless plants.
 The first message from the "x army headquarters was a general despatch to all wireless stations in the army area (none of which actu- ally existed) in the new code, of course, directing that none of the sta tions answer or make use of their sending instruments, for fear of the enemy locating them but to be on the alert at fixed hours to receive mes sages The effect was to warn the Germans that a large number of