The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1919-08-20

meaning when read in the light Of the
covenant as Z whole. The council Of the
league can only advise upon" the
means by which the obligations Of thai
great article are to be given effect 70.
Unless the United States Is . party to
the policy or action in question her own
affirmative vote In the council 10 neces.
sary before any advice can be given. FOE
n unanimous vote Of the council Is re-
CURED. II she is a party, teh trouble II
hers anyhow. And the unanimous vote
Of the council is only advice in any case.
Each government is free to reject il
if il plcases. Nothing could have been
! made moro clear to the conference than
tho right Of our congress under our con-
stitution TO exercise It's independent
judgment in all matters Of peace and
war No attempt was made to question
or limit that right The United States
will indeed undertake under article x
ITO respect and preserve a. against ex>
ternal aggression the territorial integ-
rty and existing political Independence
OF all members Of tho league" and the
engagement constitutes very grave
and solemn obligation. But II 10 Q NOR
al. not a legal. obligation. and leaves
our congress absolutely FREE to put !ts
own Interpretation upon Il In all cases
that call for action. 1t 10 binding IN
conscience only, not In law.
Article y seems TO me to constitute
the very backbone Of the whole cove
nant. Without it the league would be
hardly more than an influential debat-
ing society.
1t has several times been suggested
in public rebate and in private confer
cnce. that interpretations Of tho sense
in wAich the United States accepts the
engagements Of the covenant should be
embodied in tho instrument Of ratificA-
ton There can be no reasonable OBJ
lection TO such interpretations accom-.
ranying the act Of ratification proctded
they do not form a part Of the normal
ratification itself. Most Of the inter-
, prctations which have been suggested
embody what seems to me the plain
meaning Of the instrument ITSELF But
il such interpretations should constitute
a part Of tho formal resolution Of rat.-
fication. long delays would be the In.
cvi,ablc consequence inasmuch as all
the many governments concerned would
have to accept. in effect the language
Of the senate as the language Of tho
treaty before ratification would be COM
plctr. The assent Of the German as
S"mbly at Wcimar would have to be OBJ
tanned among the rest, and l must
frankly say that l could only with tho
greatest reluctance approach that as,
sembIy for permission to read the treaty
as we understand II. and as those who
framed 1t quite certainly understand II.
If tho United states were to qualify the
document in any way. moreover. l am
confident from what know OF the many
conferences and debates which accom-.
ranicd the formulation Of the treaty
that our example would be Immediately
br followed in many quarters, In somo
INSTANCES with very serious RESERVATIONS.
and that the meaning and operative
force Of the treaty you'd presently De
cloudod from one end OF Its clauses 10
tho other.
Pardon me. Mr.. Chairman, II have
been entirely unrcserved and plan
spoken IN speaking Of the great matters
We all have so much at heart. II eS-
cusc is needed. trust that the critical
situation Of affairs may serve as my
justification. Those Issues that mani
testify hang upon the conclusions OF tho
senate with regard to peace and upon
the time Of it's action arc so grave ana
so clearly insusccptibIc OF being thrust
on one side. or postponed that nave
felt II necessary in tho public interest
to mako this urgent plea ana 10 MAKO
il as simply and as unrcserVedly AZ pos
sible.