Atlanta semi-weekly journal. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1898-1920, 1919-07-11
II the Germans Had. Stuck ~
To Their Trenches in 1913

Gradually we are getting perspective on
the war, so that we can view what is in the
light Of what might have been. When the
Germans sprang from their trenches on the
clustering 21st of March, 1913 and launched
the most terrific drive of the entire con-
fict it was commonly expected that at least
three years more would be needed to end
the war. This was upon the assumption that
the British and French would withstand the
assault until American forces arrived in suf-
1cient numbers to turn the tide. But there
were observers, and they were in no wise
chronic pessimists, who then gravely doubted
that the allies could save Paris and the
channel ports. AS for the Americans reach
ing the front in decisive strength earlier
than 1919 or 1920, even the most sanguine
were altogether dubious. It was presumed,
accordingly, that the war would run we'll
into the spring or summer of 1921, il not
still further. For, reasoned the forecasters,
after the enemy's offensive is broken and after
he is driven back to the Rhine, then will
come the hardest and costliest if not the long
est tug of all-that of beating him to sur
render on his own soil.
Looking back from the vantage point of
the present, however, we can see that the
very events which in the spring of 1918
threatened to prolong the war helped to fore
shorten it. Suppose the Germans had not
come out of their trenches. Suppose that
instead Of sacrificing hundreds upon hundreds
Of thousands of their men in desperate Iunge
for a decision, they had settled back into
positions doubly fortified and conserved their
strength for the allied onset. In the winter of
1918, and indeed, up to the laundering
prelude Of the great Hindenburg drive, this
was just what they were generally expected
to do. Urgent considerations turned them
to the contrary course: their morale was
weakening at home and it was none too
strong at the front; moreover, they reasoned
that if ever they were to deal an aN-telling
ha hnf11
arrived. Yet, as we now know, there was
a. substantial element of German military
opinion that stood out against that drive and
urged concentration of the empires utmost
resources upon powerful defense. What
probably would have been the consequence
had that counsel prevailed?
|, Prophecy after the event is, for the most
part, the idlest of pastimes. But it takes no
oracle to tell us that if the Germans had
stuck to their trenches, the war would have
cost us vastly more than it did in treasure
and blood At last, no doubt, they would
have suffered a defeat as overwhelming as
that which actually befe11 them; but that
| it would have come much later than the au-
tumn of 1918 seems altogether likely. Say
it would have taken two years longer to crush
| the armies of the HohenzoIern on their own
| side of the Rhine-and two years is con-
sentative estimate. Think what the toll to
| civilization would have been! Those two
years probably would have proved heavier
and darker than all the preceding four They
would have cost the United States, one au-
thority reckons, fifty billions of dollars and
at least million lives. They would have
left France broken and bare that decades
would have been needed for her rehabiita-
ton. They would have left Britain wel-nigh
beggared. They would have left humanity
almost in despair. But in venturng their
| all upon the spring offensive of 1918, the
Germans forced the crisis in which America
did the impossible and in which the war was
won and closed