Montgomery County sentinel. [volume] (Rockville, Md.) 1855-1974, 1919-12-26

this general offensive was fully outline,
at the conference, no one present express
ed the opinion that the final victory coulC
be won in 1918. In fact. it was believed
by the French high command that tn,
Meuse-Argonne attack could not be pushed
much beyond Montfaucon before the ar
rival of winter would force cessation Of
operations.
THE choice between the two sectors
that east of the Aisne. including the Ar
gonne Forest. or the Champagne sector
was left to me. In my opinion, no Other
Allied troops had the morale or the offen-
sive spirit to overcome successfully the
difficulties to be met in the Meuse-Argonne
sector and our plans and installations had
been prepared for an expansion of opera
tons in that direction.
THE salient had been held by the Ger
mans since September. 1914. 1t covered
the most sensitive section of the enemy s
position on the western front, namely. the
Mezieres-Sedan-Metz Railroad and the
Briey Iron Basin it threatened the entire
region between Verdun and Nancy, and
interrupted the main rail line from Paris
to the east. Its primary strength lay in
the natural defensive features Of the ter
rain itself. The western face of the salient
extended along the rugged, heavily wooded
eastern heights of the Mouse. The south
ern force followed the heights of the Mouse
for eight klometers to the east and then
crossed the plain of the Woevre, including
within the German lines the detached
heights of Loupmont and Montsec. which
dominated the plain and afforded the
enemy unusual facilities for observation.
The enemy had reinforced the positions
by every artificial means during period
Of four years.
10000 GERMANS CAPTURED.
THE operation was carried out with en-
tire precision" the General continues
1.-THE rapidity Of our advance overwhelmed
the enemy who, apparently. had started
to withdraw some of his elements from
the tip Of the salient. We captured 10, 900
prisoners. 443 guns and large stores.
THE material results Of the victory
achieved were very important. An Amer
lean army was an accomplished fact, and
the enemy had felt its power. No form
Of propaganda could overcome the de-
pressing effect on the morale Of the enemy
of this demonstration of our ability to
organize large American force and drive
it successfully through his defenses. II
gave our troops implicit confidence in their
superiority and raised their morale to the
highest pitch. For the first time wire
entanelements ceased to be regarded as
impossible barriers and open warfare train.
/ ing, which had been so urgently insist,
ed upon. proved to be the correct doctrine
Our divisions concluded the attack with
such small losses and in such high spirits
that without the usual rest they were imme
diately available for employment in heavy
fighting in a new theatre of operations
The strength of the First Army in this
battle totaled approximately 500, 900 men
of whom about 10000 were French.
Without pausine to recuperate the nov
veteran divisions. Pershine swung then
to the east and prepared for the Mouse
Argonne drive, the strategic Importance Of
which he believed to be second to none
on the western 'front.'" for should this
system (of supply through Sedan Mezieres)
be cut before the enemy could withdraw
his forces through the narrow neck be-
tween Mezeres and the Dutch frontier
the ruin of his armies in France and Bel
eium would be complete
FOUGHT WAY FooT BY FOoT.
! The entire frontal zone was deliberately
fortified" consisting of practically con-
tinuous series of positions 20 kilometers
or more in depth, and strengthened. more
over, by the natural features of the terrain
The story of the hand-to-hand struggle
which ensued is told dispassionately by
the report, which says continuous fighting
was maintained along the entire battle
front. with "the enemy contrasting every
foot of our front, but by the end of Octo-
Der the enemy's deliberately prepared
positions, including the Hindenbure line,
in our front had been broken; the almost
impossible Argonne forest was in our
hands an advance of II kilometers had
been effected; $4,000 prisoners, $40 can.
non. 1000 machine guns and a mass Of
material captured. and the great railway
srtery through Carignan to Sedan was now
seriously threatened"
With the enemy gradually breaking be-
fore him. Pershine found that his own re-
serves were beginning to show the effects
of the terrific attriton. After a careful
review Of the situation. the report recites
that the decision to continue the at
tack" was reached on the theory that the
enemy divisions were suffering even more.
Once a German division was engaged
in the fight it was practically impossible
to effect its relief" the General says.
From November to 6 three American
army corps battered their way to Sedar
and, to quote the official record:
ARMIsTIcE Or DISASTER.
by the 7th the right of the Third Corps
had exploited its river crossing to dis
lance of 10 kilometers east of the Mouse
completely ejecting the enemy from the
wooded heights and driving him out into
the swampy plain Of the Woevre; the
Fifth and First Corps had reached the line
Of the Mouse river along their respective
fronts and the left Of the latter corps held
the heights dominating Sedan, the strage-
eical goal Of the Meuse-Argonne operation
al kiometers from our point Of departure
on November /. We had cut the enemy'i
main line of communications Recoeniz
ing that nothing but cessation Of hos
tilites could save his armies from com
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