Wausau pilot. [volume] (Wausau, Wis.) 1896-1940, 1919-12-23
PERSHINC MAKES
REPORT ON ARMY
Praises Courage and Ability of
American Arms in Great
War.
TELLS HOW YANKEES FOUGHT
Their Spirit of Determination Made
1t Impossible for the Enemy to
Maintain the Struggle Longer,
He Declares.

Washington, Dec. 16.-General Per-
shing, in his special report to Secre-
tary Baker on the operations of the
American army in France. says in eff
feet, although not in terms, that the
American army won the war.
1T was the spirit of determination
animating every American soldier"
says General Pershing, referring to the
Meuse-Argonne battle. that made 1t
Impossible for the enemy to maintain
the struggle until 1919"
twenty-five American and four
French divisions" says General Per-
shing, ''had engaged and decisively
beaten AZ German divisions, represent
ing % per cent of the enemy's entire
divisional strength on the western
front. OF the % American divisions,
II had at various times during this
period (September 90 to November
IL. 1879, been engaged on other
fronts than our own. The First army
had suffered loss Of about III, 900 in
killed and wounded; it had captured
10000 prisoners, S47 cannon, 5000 ma
chine guns, and large quantities of ma
terial."
With the American army holding the
heights dominating Sedan, the report
said, and the German line of communi-
cations definitely sundered, the enemy
recognizing that nothing but cessa-
ton of hOstilities could save his armies
from complete disaster. appealed for
an immediate armistice November
81"
Within one month of his arrival
General Pershing recommended def
nitely that 100000 men should be in
France before May, 1918, it being evil
dent that "a force of 100000 is the
smallest unit which in modern war will
be complete, well balanced. and in
dependent fighting organization" Plans
for the future, the recommendation
added, should be based on three times
this force"
The general was equally specific in
choosing the ground for American op-
eratiOns. He says:
sour mission was offensive, and it
was essential to make plans. for strik-
ing the enemy where definite military
decision could be gained. While the
allied armies had endeavored to main
tain the offensive, the British in. order
10 guard the channel ports, were
committed to operations in Flanders
and the French to the portion of the
front protecting Paris. Both lacked
troops TO operate elsewhere on a large
scale.
'To the east the great fortified dis
trict east of Verdun and around Metz
menaced France. protected the most
exposed portion of the German line
of communications. that between Metz
and Sedan, and covered the Briey iron
region, from which the enemy OBJ
tanned the greater part of the iron
required for munitions and material
The coal fields east of Metz were also
covered by these same defenses. A
deep advance east of Metz, or the cap
ture of the Briey region, by threaten
ing the invasion of rich German terri
tory in the MoSelle valley and the Saar
basin. thus curtailing her supply of
coal or iron. Would have a decisive
effect in forcing withdrawal of Ger
man troops from northern France. The
military and economic situation of the
enemy, therefore, indicated Lorraine as
the field promising the most fruitful
results for the employment of our
armies"
American arms drew first blood, the
report shows. at Passchendaele ridge,
November 6-10, 1917 when the
Eleventh engineers Joined the British
in a successful attack, which was part
of general operation designed ito
hinder the German conquest of Rus
sia and to prevent, if possible, an at
tack on Italy, or the near East"