Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-10-07

line (the Hindenburg line) would
have held for much longer.
Already in the fighting at the be-
ginning of october to the north of st.
Quentin we had been gradually forced
out of the position at many spots but
we had, generally speaking, kept the
line. We had not even completed the
evacuation of the ground IN front of
the Hermann line.
The retirements were carried out
smoothly. On the 10th already the
enemy attacked the new positions and
was beaten off on the 1lth. to the
northeast of Cambria, he had local
success against the 18th army, which
was prevented from extending. During
the days following up to the 18th,
there was new fighting on the front
of the End and 17th armies, which
on the whole were successful for us.
As a result of the withdrawal of the
4th army behind the Lys. we were
now compelled to withdraw the 9Th
and 177th armies behind the Sche'dt
into the Hermann line. On the 18th
the 9Th army still stood to the west
of Lille and was to evacuate the town
on the night of the 18th. Further to
the south the right wing of the 18th,
and later the whole of that army, had
to conform to this movement.
Shakes Up His Armies.
II had been decided that in the
event of the occupation of the Her
mann line the Boehn army group was
to be withdrawn. It's front had now
become too narrow, and did not con-
tain sufficient reserve strength. (Von
Boehn was put in command of the
armies from scissors to Arras after
the defeat on the Marine pushing in
between the crown princes)
The End army now fell under the
Rupprecht army group, and the 18th
under that of the German crown
prince. In this group the 9Th army
was taken over by the 18th. Here, too.
especially having regard to the ar
rangement of rear communications,
there was no longer room for separ-
ate army.
General Won Carlowitz took COM
mand of the End army and General
Won Marwitz received that of the 5th
army near Verdun. His chief of staff
was Lieut.. Colonel Wetzell, who had
hitherto acted as my assistant. spe-
cial group II. @. was established for
too, it had proved undesira BILE to bur
den a group II. @. with the command
of an army.
The necessity to ecenomize forces
had led, at the end of September, to
the German crown princes army
group abandoning the Laffaux salient
which had caused us many losses
and withdrawing to the position be-
hind the Oise-Aisne canal, which we
had occupied after the disastrous en-
gagement of October %. 1917.
(The heavy losses he mentions were
mostly caused by Michigan and other
troops from the middle northwest.
who stormed the almost impregnable
heights north of Soissons)
Americans Crush Division.
On the End of October, as had been
arranged, the left wing of the 18th and
the right wing of the LIST army fell
back to the position from which the
attack of May 81. 1918. had started.
Unfortunately, before this move
ment was carried out, one division
was. wholly unexpectedly. crushed on
the heights northeast of Fismes.
The center of the 7th army held
the Chemin DIES Danes firmly, in the
face of many enemy attacks
ut was Americans who swept north
east of Fismes and crushed the divi-
sion.)
The defensive battle in Champagne
and on the Mause. on either side Of