The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1916-1920, 1919-01-28


ment between Great Britain and japan
the equator would form the limit OF
Japanese extension south.
This therefore would confirm the
Japanese in their possession and ad-
ministration of the Marshall and Caro-
line Islands. These islands, several
hundred In number consist for the
main part of the little coral atolls and
are in way the dust OF the Pacific
Ocean. What advantage, asks Aus
tralia, can Japan be seeking in the
possession Of territories where there Is
practically no Japanese population at
all from the point OF view OF the mar
ket which produces very little for eN-
port purposes? The strategic impor-
tance OF these two groups OF islands
has with the outgrowth OF possibilities
Of the submarine become considerable
indeed
How Americans View 1t.
The American point OF view-and
America is interested not only as re-
cards the Panama Canal but also the
Philippines-is that the Imperial GOV
eminent should take over the whoIe or
the German colonies In the Pacinc, both
those in the north and south Pacihc,
and administer them under the league
of nations The British Imperial attitude
would seem to be they are more or less
bound by agreements with Japan to
Inn
Marshall islands and the rest of the
German colonies become direct pos
sessions of the Dominions. The question
is one the Peace Conference will be
able to settle and IL Is not anticipated
that on colonial matters there will be
any great trouble.
The prevailing impression to-day
among the delegates to the Peace Con-
ference-those intimately acquainted
with its workings--is one of chastened
hope rather than unqualified confidence.
In quarters that fairly may be
called influential there is Il strong feel
ing that the faulty organization OF the
Peace Conference must be amended and
that the tendency to conceive the con-
ference as the special preserve OF the
great Powers, unless checked. may ar
feet seriously the value of the work done
by the grand committee.
the evident truth that the Views and
interests OF the great Powers must pre-
vail, but all resent the suggestion that
tho grand committee has only to make
decisions without consultation with them
and that they must then accept them
unchanged. There is reason to believe
this--that the procedure SO unpleasantly
prominent In Saturdays sitting In the
future will be modified and the minor
Powers consulted formally and in
formally.
Doctrine May be Tempered.
The extreme doctrine enunciated by
Premier Clemenceau may thus be tenn
pered In practice, even IL not publicly
qualified at the next plenary sitting.
In this way the danger may be obvi-
ated Of the division OF the conference
into groups Of great and small Powers
and the delegates of the small Powers
may lose the sense OF injustice under
which they are now sTnarting.
While this difficulty Is likely to be
overcome, other dificulties arising out
of the principal proposal may prove
less tractable. 1t n obvious that the
Bolsheviki are disposed to use the meet
ing Of the allied representatives on
Princes island or elsewhere mainly for
vious that all anti -Bolshevik factors in
Esthonia Lithuania, Poland. Bohemia,
Ukraine and Siberia are discouraged by
the allied decision to meet the Boil
sheviki.
The principal danger appears now in
Poland. Information supplied by a
competent authority recently returned
from Warsaw goes to prove that unless
the Allies support Poland promptly by
sending adequate supplies OF food and
transporting thither the Polish division
in France commanded by Gen. Haller
the situation may get out of hand before
the end OF February. 1t seems uncertain
whether the Princes Island proposal Is
regarded by the allied Governments as
suspendlng all measures Of relief for
the friends OF the Allies on the borders
Of Russia II so 1t must he regarded
as a frankly Bolshevik measure. II not
measures OF support and relief should
be pushed forward.
Polish Leaders Hampercd.
Gen Pilsudski and those who cooper
ate with him are now concentrating
their efforts against the peril which men
aces Poland from the East. They are
hampered by the deliberate tactics OF
the German armies. which, retiring west
ward, form screen behind which Boil
shevik forces are free to advance with
out knowledge OF their movements reach
ting Warsaw. II Is suggested that Mar
shall Foch should insist upon the Ger
man armies in the East handing over
their arms to the Poles. or upon the
transfer to Poland OF a portion OF the
war material accumulated by Gen. Won
Mackensen. But above all II is neoes-
sary that there should be an end to the
applicable delay in despatching Gen.
Haller's forces to Poland
Another urgent requirement Is the
establishment OF a regular air service
between France. Prague. Warsaw.
Agram, Belgrade and Bucharest. to
render available full Information of
what is happening In Central and South
eastern Europe.
Policy Toward Germany.
The policy to be adopted toward Ger
many must naturally he considered from
a different angle. While It is recog-
nized by even the most prudent advocate
of the league that the real league must
in due course include Germany. opinion
IS quickening to the danger of Ger
many trying to secure through tho
league what she failed to gain by mill
tary means.
It 10 remembered that the conversion
Of official Germany and all great parties
except the Minority and Independent
Socialists. to the idea Of the league be-
gan when victory became doubtful and
deepened as the possibility OF victory
vanished. The league IL now rightly
conceived as having a double function
a political function in promoting peace
which interests defeated Germany least ,