The Lamar register., 1919-12-31


French and British that they had al
most entirely dispensed with training
for opep warfare. II was 10 avoid
this result In our army and TO encour-
age the offensive spirit that the fol
lowing was published In October 1917:
THE above methods TO be employed
must remain or become distinctly our
own.
"All instruction must contemplate
the assumption OF vigorous often
Sve. This purpose will he empha
sized In every phase Of training until
il becomes settled habit of thought
The rifle and the bayonet are the
principal weapons Of the infantry sol
dier. He will be trained to high
degree Of skill as mark sman. both
on the target range and in field firing.
An aggressive spirit must he devei-
oped until the soldier feels himself a.
n bayonet hgbter invincible in bartle.
IAN officers and soldiers should real
ize that at no time in our history has
discipline been SO important therefore.
discipline OF the highest order must he
eNacted at all times. The standards
for the American army will be those of
West Point. The rigid attention. up
right hearing. attention TO detail nm
complaining obedience to instructions
required OF the cadet will he required
Of every officer and soldier Of our
armies in France"
Unfortunately many divisions did
not receive the requisite amount OF
Vnf hAf Ia~ ~t-Ip
states and complete preparation Of
such units for battle WIS thus often
seriously delayed.
In order TO hinder the enemy's con-
quest of Russia and. II possible. pre-
vent a German attack on Italy. or in
the Near East. the allies sought TO
maintain the offensive on the western
front as far as their diminished
strength and morale would permit.
Notwithstanding these allied attacks
on the western front. the immense
gains by the German armies In the
east, eliminating at Riga on Sept. 3.
preclpitated the collapse of Russia.
The following months. the Austrians-
with German assistance-surprise the
Italians and broke through the lines at
Caporetto. driving the Italian armies
back to the Piave river, infiicting . loss
OF 100000 men. 100000 rifles. 5000
guns. and enormous stores. This seri-
Gus crisis compelled the withdrawal OF
ten French and British divisions from
the western front to Italy. The Ger
man situation on all other thesters was
so favorable that as early as Novem-
Der they began the movement of divi-
tions toward the western front. IL
needed. her divisions could be with
drawn from the italian front before
the French and British dared recall
their divisions.
Al first the allies could hardly hope
for large American army. Marshal
Jofrre during his visit to America had
made special request that combat
division be sent at once to Europe as
visual evidence of our purpose to par
ticipatr actively in the war. and also
asked for engineer regiments aud other
special service units
The arrival OF the nrSt division and
the parade If certain Of its elemefHs in
Paris on July 4 caused great enihusi-
asn and for the time being Frenrh
morale was stimulated. sim. allied
apprehension was deep-seated and ma.
trrisl assistance was imperative.
Outlook Dark for 1918.
A review OF the situation showed
that with Russia out OF the war The
central powers would be able ro release
large number of divisions for service
elsewhere. and that during the spring
and summer of 1918. without inlerf-r-
ing with the status quo NJ SnlOniki.
they could concentrate Oh the western
front force much stronger than that
of the allies. In view of this II was
represented to the war department IN
December as Of the utmost importance
that the allied preparations he eNpe-
hited.
My conclusion was that. slthough
the morale of the German people aud
OF the armies was better than II had
been for two years, only an untownrd
combination Of circumstances could
give the enemy q decisive victory he
fore American support as recommend
eel could be made effective. provided
the allies secured unity Of action.
However. a situation might arise which
would necessItate the temporary Us" of
all American troops In the units Of our