The labor standard., 1919-08-15
any way to prevent open finishing

shops from securing hats in the rough from union making shops, when union finishing shops were ade- uuately supplied. They made no defi- mite threats to McLachlan, but his act ion was due to a knowledge of the power of the unions, should they see fit to do so, to embarrass him in car rying on his factory and his fear of their so doing. On the other hand, there was no rule of the unions re- quiring union shops making hats to give preference to union shops finish ing hats, although such a purpose forbidding a union finishing shop to use the union label unless all parts
 of the hats were made in union shops.
 "These facts present two fundamen-
 tai questions of law. Is it legally jus tiiable for the unions to require that
 union shops making hats should pre- fer, in their deliveries, union finishing
 shops, at time when the latter were
 unable to secure an adequate supply
 of 'hats in rough?' And, if that ques-
 tion is answered in the affirmative,
 could they put that requirement into
 effect when the result would be to
 compel the making shop to violate
 contractural obligation already in-
 cured to make deliveries to an open
 finishing shop? One of the primary
 purposes of trade unionism must be to
 secure for their members the oppor-
 tunity to labor, even when the effect
 is to prevent workmen not members
 of the union from securing employ
 ment. Had this controversy arisen
 in a shop which both made and fin
 ished hats, and where all the workmen
 were members of one union, and had
 the cause of it been that the shop at
 current prices were selling to out
 siders That's in the rough, when it had
 a demand for all the finished product it could supply, with the result that certain finishers were deprived of work, think no court would say that the union was not legally justified in demanding a cessation of outside sales, until it's own members were sup piled with work.
 "Under the somewhat peculiar situ- ation in the hatters' trade, I think the same considerations must govern this case. The workmen, in both making and finishing, are bound together by joint interests and affiliated into one organization; the trade is one trade, each process one step toward the pro- duction of one article of trade. Though the immediate effort is to give the union manufacturer preference over the non-union, the ultimate pur- pose of securing work for all the mem- bers of the union redeems the situa- tion. I have no hesitance in answer ing the first question in the affirma- tive.
 ''In the welter of decisions concern ing the liability of one who causes an- other to break his contract with third party, there is no clearly defined way, and, in proceeding such as this, than follow his own convictions. | think broad line of distinction may be drawn between those cases where the breaking of the contract is the real end sought and those where such a result is an incident in the accom- plishment of some other purpose; and that this controversy falls clearly within the latter class. It seems to me that the better reason lies with those courts which hold that, in such cases, the result accomplished is not the test; but the question is, is that result legally justifable; and, in ref erence to this controversy, legal jus tifcation requires that the conduct producing the breach must be in good faith intended, and reasonably adapt ed, to produce legitimate end. See Connors V. Connolly, 86 Conn. 647, 649. Take this case:
 "A and B are manufacturers of the same article, and both are under con- tract to make deliveries to their cus- toners; both have an insufficient amount of raw material at hand, and c has the only available supply; is under moral obligations to A for past | favors, and A uses this fact to bring 1 pressure to bear upon c to secure a l in the delivery of the raw material to himself, knowing that 1 thereby B will be prevented from full filling his contractural obligations. Here A causes a breach of B's con- tractural obligations, but he could not, in reason, be held legally liable for so doing. This supposititious case is, of | course, one step removed from the one bring out the fact that something more must appear, to fasten legal lia- blllty upon a person who causes another to break his contract, than the | mere fact that his conduct produces that result.
 At the basis of the conflict of in- terests lies, I think, the principle of | an equilibrium of opportunity; that in a free state the liberty of each is cir only by the necessity of giving to all others an equality of op- portunlty. Existing contractural rights between two persons are defi- nite and the courts have found it easy to seize upon them in the effort to draw the line as to permitted activi- ties of third persons; but as to third | persons, it is difficult to see how much rights materially differ from others not so clearly defined, as, in the SUD- posltltlous case above, the right of A 1 to the benefit of the good will secured 1 by him by past favors. The law, no doubt, should not permit unjustifable interference by third parties with con- tractural rights, any more than it should permit unjustifable interfer- ence, by islanders, and the like, with C's good will to A or unjustifable in- terference with workman's oppor- tunlty to secure employment. But, on the other hand, it should recognize that all these rights may be limited by the justifable interference of third