Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-08-03


cause Lloyd George stood behind Will
son and both squarely indicated that
IL France insisted upon this frontier
she would have to maintain 1t without
a guarantee OF British or American
support. BY contrast, both Lloyd
George and Wilson pledged, so far as
they could, British and American sup
port, a defensive alliance, IL France
would forego what the greatest SOL
der in the world-himself a French
antee of future military security.
Contradictory Criticisms.
In America a certain fraction of so.
called liberals are accustomed to as
sert that Clemenceau's unpopularity
at home grew out of his championship
of imperialistic aspirations. In point
of view, bitter as are the socialists,
hostile as they have at all times been.
they are no more hostile or more Bit
ter than that considerable body of
Frenchmen who felt that In falling to
obtain the Rhine frontier. and in TAX
ing in exchange more or less unsub-
stantial pledges of future assistance
ceau betrayed the country he had
saved.
Left 70 himself. Clemenceau would
probably not even have asked the
odTTe pdSlu lHeTe COuiu HcNcf NC ~
French statesman more impatient of
imperialistic and chauvinistic pur-
noses than the man who had upset his
own ministry only few years before
rather than refrain from assailing De-
classe for that minister's policy,
which had almost led to war with
Germany at the Tangier time. But
had Clemenceau failed to obtain eco
nomic rights for France in the Sarre
basin 1t is doubtful IL his ministry
could have survived.
The outcry of the socialist wing In
the French parliament bver the Sarre
basin and other details in the peace
treaty Is in the main merely the use
Of pretext to assail an enemy. Not
a few Of those socialists who are to-
day receiving American applause be-
cause Of their criticisms OF the treaty
of Versailles, were open or secret sup
porters Of Caillaux and advocates OF
surrender peace with Germany when
were ready to make any sacrifice to
get peace. They were proclaiming
from one end of France to the other
that the war was lost. They were de-
featists. and at least associated with
them were traitors. With them Glenn
enceau would have nothing to do at
the beginning. Against the unpa-
triotic and the cowardly he waged q
battle almost as important for the al
lied victory as those Foch fought on
the battlefield.
But Clemenceau, having lost the
support of the socialists by continuing
the war to victory, also lost the sup
port of the conservatives OF the
Frenchmen who accepted the dictum
of Foch rather than the parchment OF
the president and the prime minister,
by yielding to America and Britain in
the matter of the Rhine frontier. IT
is one of the oldest circumstances OF
the present situation that Clemerceau
uh ha hn1d cihlo a hnJia for
the weakness Of his defense of French
claims, while abroad, by certain fac
tions OF public opinion. he and his
country are still being criticized for
the magnitude of their gains.
Clemenceau's Real Failure.
But above-aIl else Ciemenceau has
steadily lost ground in France because
his government has been unable to re-
organise France, to start the French
people at the business Of life again.
The task was colossal. It is tmpos-
sible Immediately to rebuild devastat-
ed regions French troops had stiil 70
Other French troops, which from Rus
STA to Syria had been employed during
the war, could not Immediately be re-
called and were employed in an at
tempt to defeat bolshevism in many
. places. glo+
France asked of Clemenceau that he
first make peace at once, obtaining Ia
that peace for his country security
and indemnity. and following this
peace that there should be a prompt
rehabilitation of the French armies
and q return Of the men who had left
their homes nearly fiye years before
and thereafter remained almost con-
stantly in the army.
On the other hand, no one win blame
Clemenceau for the delays in the
peace conference. Nevertheless those
delays prevented the rehabilitation Of
the French army, postponed the re-
turn of the Frenchmen to work, pro-
longed the period OF suspense and un-
settlement which had very evil conse-
quences in France. 8,r,
On the other hand, only the most
unqualified admirer of the tiger would
venture to assert that his domestic
peculiar problems of restoration In
France, had been more or less an
abysmal failure. His cabinet was, on
the whole, a cabinet Of nobodies. II
was a cabinet dominated by one big
man committed to a gigantic task.
When that task was accomplished, In
the nature Of things, the prime min
lister and his aids were unsuited for the
new labor. nF
France in Bad Plight enh
AS a result we have had in France
shortness Of food, terrific expansion Of
prices, weak and fumbling financial
policy and, above all. a failure to do
bringing assistance to the victims Of
the devastated regions. The domestic,
the financial and the restoration poll
cies Of Clemenceau and his cabinet have
been in the main a complete and CO.
lossal failure and have resulted in ever
increasing domestic unrest.
Plainly this was inevitable. Clemen-
ceau himself was over eighty. His
efforts in the war had been tremendous.
and on him fell the enormous burdens
due to the fact that he represented the
government in the country in which the
conference was held. Moreover, early
in the conference he was severely
wounded by an assassin's bullet. It is.
easy to understand. but 1t is impossible
to deny, the Clemenceau failures.
Nor must one forget the fact that this
old man, In many ways the greatest
civilian figure Of the whole war; had
been for more than sixty years fight
ing in French politics single-handed.
He counted more enemies than any
other Frenchman. He glorified in the
savageness Of the phrases by which he
however much these opponents may
have been forced by the very circum-
stances Of the war to refrain from at
lacking Ciemenceau before Itle VIC
tory was won. no such prohibition sue
ceeded the German surrender.
Finally Clemenceau's decision to yield
to Anglo-American policy in the matter
of the Rhine frontier, was followed by
similar acceptance of the policy of
Mr.. Wilson and Lloyd George in the
case of Italy. There were and there
remain many thousands OF well in
formed Frenchmen who believe that
sound French policy in the peace con-
ference would have been comprehend
ed in an insistence upon obtaining the