Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-10-26
.NIVELLE 1917 FAILURE
IS GIVEN NEW VERSION
Germany Retreat and Indiscreet Attacks
: of French General Broug int Chaos
to Pretentious Plans.
BY FRANK III. sIMONDs.

u
president of the council, and
thus prime minister of France. and
had been minister of war in the
Ribot cabinet and minister of inven-
lions in the BRAND cabinet. made a
sensational statement of the truth
concerning the Nivelie failure of 1917.
which resulted in the temporary dis
organization of the French army. the
summary removal of Nivelle and a
long political and military contro-
versy.
1t was alleged by Nivelle's friends
and the story was published first in
America-that French politicians had
become panic-stricken at the losses
incurred by Nivelle in the first two
days of his operations. and that these
politicians. members of the French
chamber of deputies, succeeded in
having the attack stopped and Nj
velle removed at the precise moment
when the German lines were crum-
bling and a supreme victory was in
sight. 1t was further argued that
Nivelle was handicapped by some
failure ofASir Douglas Haig, the Brit
ish commander-in-ch chief, to cooper
ate with the French.
The story was probably the most
sensational in the whole history of
military operations during the war.
Consequently. when I went to France
last winter I sought eagerly to hnd
out exactly what had occurred. AS
Douglas Haig, the story seemed in
herently inaccurate, because in Feb
ruary, 1917, / lunched with the Brit
ish chief at his old headquarters. at
Montreuil-sur-Mer. and at, that time
he spoke of Nivelle, who had only
recently taken over command. with
real enthusiasm and in tones which
revealed his entire sympathy with
Niveile's known determination to
abandon Joffre's "nibbling" and un-
dertake a really aggressive cam
paign.
Examined Secret Documents.
Through the courtesy of certain
French friends I was able to make
careful and satisfactory examination
Of the still secret documents and
facts in the Nivelle case and to talk
with men who were both INFORMED
and entirely reliable The results OF
the investigation. which are no lon
ger subject to restraint. since NJ:
Painleve and NJ. BRAND have opened
the subject in the French parliament.
L now present to my readers. and my
impression is that they have never
hitherto been printed in full either In
the United States or France.
The circumstances which led to Nj
velle's selection were unusual. 1t
had become clear that Joffre must go,
following the comparative failure OF
that Somme campaign OF 1916. on
which BRAND, who. as prime minis
ter, supported Joffre against attack.
had depended to supply the necessary
victory and to restore Jonre's shaken
prestige. The natural choice was Pc
tain, and the world not unreasonably
expected that the savior of Verdun
would succeed the victor OF the Marne.
But getting rid of Joffre was no easy
matter. The ministry was exceed
ingly fearful about it. and to replace
Joffre by Petain meant to add insult
to injury, for Chantilly, that is
French GsH. @. had seen the rise of
the new man with natural II censur-
able. heartburnings. The removal of
Joffre promised to be far easier. if
the selection of a successor did not
put Petais, in his old chiefs place.
Peta:h Like Gen. Sherman.
In addition, Petain. despite his great
qualities, has more than a suggestion
about him of our own Gen. Sherman.
He has q sharp tongue and, despite
his habitua1 taciturnity has said
things about politicians, French and
foreign. and about soldiers. French
and allied, which are not unlike the
famous and caustic comment of Gle
menceau, himself. With the French
politicians he was SO unpopular, that
1t was easy for BRAND to pass over
him and difficult to choose him!
Next to Petain- Foch seemed to the
outside world the logical choice. He
TAG hySNv at HnV An
ant in the Marine: he had won the battle
of the User and had commanded the
French troops in the then recent battle
of the Somrne. But while the British
and the outside world counted the
Somme a victory. France counted 1t a
check and after the battle Foch's great
army had been broken up and Foch had
been assigned to task which was little
more than a disguised disgrace.
In April. 1917, exactly year before
he assumed supreme command Of all
the allied armies. he was engaged In
making plans to resist hypothetical
German invasion through Switzerland.
and Paris reported that he was COM
plete1y used up. exhausted mentally and
physically by his great E-bors
Aside from Foch and Petain, Nivelle
was, perhaps, the logical man. He had
served with distinction under Petain at
Verdun and had succeeded him when
Petain was promoted to command a
group of armies. While he commanded
at Verdun the two successful operations
which retook the forts had been made,
although they had, in reality. been PLAN
ned by Petain.
There was, in addition. the belief,
wholly correct, that the coming of Nj
eelle to the supreme command would
rrean more aggressive action, while Pc
tain was known to be hostile to any
great and expensive CANDLES.
Nivelle Remarkable Figure.
With the politicians Nivelle was popu-
lar To the statesmen of Britain as
well as of France he outlined stupen-
dous conceptions with coldness OF
manner and a calmness which capti-
be regarded as one Of the remarkable
figures Of the conflict He brought to
British and French rulers. moreover.sa
colossal plan, with a guarantee Of in
evitable success, at the precise moment
when immediate and decisive military
victory had become a matter OF life and
death because Of the submarine situa-
ton.
At Verdun Nivelle Rad seen Petain
accomplish striking results by carefully
calculated estimates of the true relation
between the forces available and the
possibilities of the situation; in other
words, by limited operations designed
to reach local detectives Nivelle now
proposed to repeat on front between
j,teims and Arras WI at Petain had done
on a three or four mile front on the
Mouse Heights. When he came to Paris
for the first time he told his amazed
hearers the question was not one OF
short distances: that IL his plans were
put in operation. the question. and the
sole question, would be whether the
Germans would halt ct the Mouse OF
tho Kline.