The herald and news. [volume] (Newberry S.C.) 1903-1937, 1919-04-18

Battie Destroyed Any Lingering Hope
in Minds Of German Seamen That
They Might Snatch Victory Over
Grand Fleet and Overthrow Allied
Sea Power-Beatty and Hood Ab.
solved of overrashness and Jellicoe
of Undue Caution.
The controversy about the battle Of
Jutland will not be set at rest by the
revelations which have been made by
the principal persons concerned, writes
Capt. Charles N. Robinson in New
York Herald. There are omissions
arom his book. as Lord Jellicoe admits
and his critics are bound to make
the most of this circumstance.
It had been suggested by those who
professed to be dissatisfied with the
material results Of the action that
Beatty and Hood, the battle cruiser
leaders, showed overraShness, and Jel
4icoe and Jorram, in the battle squad
r0ns, undue caution. To the former
cause was attributed the heavy losses
on the British side; and to the latte,
the fact that the enemy were not Sc
verely held and thoroughly beaten
The candid disclosures of the com
mander in chief, however, provide evi
?dence that in neither case was there
ground for this criticism.
The action was fought from first tt
aast on the lines laid down in the bat
lle orders fer the fleet, which were
Hepared at Scapa after exhaustive ex
fses at sea, and which were knOwR
ano seemingly acquiesced in by al
the officers who would be responsible
for executing them. From the bat
tie instructions given on page OF
Lord Jellicoe's. book it is clear that
Beatty and Hood, although they were
given q free hand to carry out theii
general instructions, were told that the
primary function of the battle cruiser.
In action was 'the destruction Of thu
similar enemy vessels if present, and
after their destruction or in their ab
sence, to attack the van Of the enemy's
aeet. Prior to action their duty was
(: zsefiaed as giving information as to the
~nemy's battle fleet, while denying sim
alar informatton to the enemy"
(. Clearly; this absolves Admiral
beatty and the late Admiral Hood OF
sShe charge referred to, since when the
Andefatigable, Queen Mary and Irwin
ecible were lost. they were either at.
etacking enemy battle cruisers or OBJ
saaining information of the enemy's bat
stle fleet. The British losses, includ.
ing that Of the flagship of Admiral
flood himself, were not the outcome'of
any rashness. but, as it is also shown
dn this book, to shortcomings in the
protective features of cruiser designs.
The necessity. for caution in the
early years of the war is abundantly
lreyed by the long list Of deficiencies,
some of them of a startling nature,
sset forth in Lord Jellicoe's volume.
All things considered, and when the
margin of superiority was what it was,
1t would have been hard to justify the
taking of unnecessary hazards by the
commander in chief, seeing that the al
slied hope of victory in the struggle
rested entirely on the continued exist
ence and efficiency Of the grand fleet.
That fleet was the call in ALL" not only
of Britain, but Of the allied powers.
No Precedents to Follow.
In regard also to the criticism which
has been made Of the turning move
nents of the fleet in deployment, and
when maneuvering to evade torpedo
7nttack, it cannot be forgotten that all
tactics of battle before Jutland with
the new material Of war, including
long-range torpedoes and submarines,
were tentative and experimental.
There were no precedents. or body Of
/. experience, for the British command
ers ito look to for guidance, and they
hadfte base their judgment chiefly on
the lessons of their own practices and
exercises in waters limited by the en-
semy's mines, and torpedoes. There
should be borne in mind. too, the per-
lis to which the fleet was exposed
while preparing for battle. and the
{ difficulties to be overcome in the as
sembly and direction Of such a huge
force. 1t is significant that the ad-
niral notes that during the engage
ment his chief Of staff, Admiral
Charles Maiden, remarked to him:
This * ill going according to eS-
oeeSsr. on"
rom the frank admissions of Lord
Jel!icoe, and his vivid narrative OF the
movements of the forces, many edify-
Eine lessons will be extracted by naval
: u,en in all countries. But, so far as
the Battle of Jutland is concerned, the
main conclusion seems to be that it
u4as the conditions of time, place and
weather which prevented the British
sGsprces from obtaining victory as de-
~,~.,r1 tn pnoforia1 as ii WAS