New-York tribune., 1919-07-19
The Beginning Of Victory

thrilled by the news OF fOcnS S prlIIlanC
counter offensive on the west side of the
Aisne-Marne salient. It was as COM
plete surprise to the Allied publics as
it was to Ludendorff. Yet it was not
sudden improvisation. No modern Of
fensive can be. 1t was the product of
month of planning-the fruition Of an
idea which must have come to the Allied
generalssimo when he saw how easily
the German fourth offensive--that south
from Lassigny-had been halted by
Mangin's counter attack on June II.
Foch had been preparing to stop the
fifth German offensive, which, according
to all indications, would be launched east
and west of Rheims. At the same time
he had got ready to take the offensive
himself, whether Ludendorf attacked or
not In June he withdrew from Flan-
ders the eight French divisions which
he had sent north in April to help check
requested Field Marshal Haig to send
four British divisions to the Somme
which were transferred to Gouraud, east
of Rheims. On July 13 he asked Haig
to let him use these four British replace
ment divisions on the Aisne-Marne front.
They didn't arrive to take part in the
battle Of July 18. But two Of them were
used, after July 90 on the east side of the
salient, and the other two took part, on
July %, in the fighting south of Sois-
sons, which loosened Ludendorff's hold
on that city.
The 1st American Division was
brought down from the Amiens sector,
where it had captured Cantigny, and was
assigned to General Mangins army,
transferred from the Compiegne-M Mont
didier area. The I'd and Sd Ameri-
can divisions were already in line
on both sides of Chateau Thierry, with
the 26th supporting them. For his
offensive Foch also drew literally on
the rest of the American Expeditionary
Force. Altogether nine American divi-
sions took part in the reduction Of the
Aisne-Marne salient-the LIST, I'd, Sd and
4th of the regulars; the 26th, 28th, 32d
and 42d of the National Guard, and the
77th of the new army.
Foch had two powerful armies on the
Soissons-C Chateau Thierry line - Man
gins on the north and Degouttes on the
south. Extending east below the Marne
was a third army, under de Mitry.
By July f8 the fifth German offensive
had failed completely. Foch had dis
counted that failure and was ready to
strike. The very fact that he intended
to strike was sufficient evidence that the
turning point of the war had come, for
Germany's sole hope of victory lay in.
continuingato hold the offensive and to
force decision in France before the
American reinforcement could be ef-
Y fectively utilized
Foch was ever keen to fight on the Of
fensive. Field Marshal French tells in
his book, "1914," how even in the dark
days OF the Flanders campaign of 1914
Foch was always repeating his favorite
exhortation: "Attaque! Attaque! At
taque. He knew what enormous ad-
Vantagcs accrued to the side possessing
the offensive.
He didn't try to recover it prema-
turely, however, as he might have done
by attacking the south side of the Mont
didser salient at the end of the first
Ludendorf drive. He hadn't at tina.
time sufficient strategic reserve. But
he was resolved to seize the offensive az
soon as the first favorable opportunity
presented itself, as it did when Luden-
dorf entangled himself in the Aisne-
Marine salient and then failed to enlarge
! " the east by taking Rheims, Epcrnay
and Chalons-sur-M -Marnc
July 1S will remain one Of the most
memorable anniversarie Of the great
var. 1t marked the beginning Of the
Aiiied campaign of yictory-~that re-
markable exhibition Of clcan-cut strateny
and clockwork cooperation on an enor-
nous scale which threw into the shadow
the imposing German achievements in
Poland In 1915, Kumania in 1913 and
Italy Ia 1917 Il Vas the effort which