New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-12-07
1.-THE Great Powers Have No AL
tentative But to Give
Up the Fight

o"'ASA, Se'S'' Vi'ul'iS liz q ulOIo CON-
plete failure than that which pre-
coded. On the initiative of the
French Prime Minister, the western
nations sought first to erect that
'amous c)rdon sanitaire so much
discussed in recent months; that is,
they undertook, by putting a certain
number of small Allied garrisons in
'ital spots, like Archangel and
Odessa, and by lending their aid to
he Poles, Firms, Lithuanians, etc.,
70 erect wall separating the Boil
shevists from western Europe. One
fatal detail of this plan was to per-
NIT the German army of occupation
to remain in the Baltic provinces
pending the creation Of an Allied
army to relieve it.
Combined with this policy was an
effort to give effective military aid
to the several Russian leaders who
had never submitted to the Bolshe-
visit rule and were making a gallant
if hopeless fight against it. These
armies were commanded by Deni-
kline and Kolchak, while Petlura, in
the Ukraine, offered another rock on
which to build.
Unhappily, the problem at once
became complicated. The border
races, which were essential to the
whole scheme, were perfectly ready
to supply men and give their terri
tory to be used for the base of the
various expeditions against the Bol-
shevists. but they demanded in ad-
vance that the Russians who were
IN revolt against the Bolshevists,
Kolchak and Denikine, and later
Yudenitch, should agree that when
the Bolshevists had been defeated
the victorious Russian anti Bolshe-
visits should recognize the independ-
ence of Finland, the Baltic states,
Lithuania and Poland and the Ru-
manian annexation OF Bessarabia.
Pledge Withheld
The demand was not only reason
able, but obviously necessary. If
by virtue Of the assistance Of the
order races the Bolshevists were
beaten and new elements obtained
control Of Russia, that is, if Russia
were restored to anything approach
ing sane and patriotic hands, then
it would become a strong nation
again and the small neighboring
races might find themselves doomed
to lose their own newly acquired
freedom.
But exactly this pledge neither
Denikine nor Kolchak would give.
Both insisted that it must be for the
new Russian constituent assembly
to decide, that they themselves
could not consent in advance to the
mutilation of Russia Such re-
fusal had foundation Of reason,
because they were fighting to save
Russia and they would lose much
of their strength with the small but
valuable group of patriots if they
consented to the surrender Of Rus
sian territory.
The same was true in the matter
of the Ukraine. This state had been
created at Brest-Litovsk by the Ger
mans and Austrians. 1t had served
German purposes we'll, supplying
the armies of the Central Powers
with foodstuffs, without which they
would have fallen early in 1918.
1t was thus suspect, on the Allied
side. But, on the other hand, it was
anti Bolshevist, and if the great
powers were ready to guarantee its
independence might have been as
useful to the Allies as it had been
to the Germans.
But the Ukrainian question in
volved new difficulties. The Rus
slams, Denikine and Kolchak would
under no consideration consent to
the separation of the Ukraine from
Russia--a far greater weakening of
Russia than the loss of the border
tribes. In addition, the Ukrainians
and the Poles were secular foes and
the Ukrainians had already begun
war against the Poles for the pcs
session Of Eastern Galicia.
Thus the distracted Allies were
in this position: They could only
obtain the aid Of the border races,
which was essential to any resist
ance to the Bolshevists, by guaran-
teeing the future independence of
these border states. But to guar
antee this was to ALLEVIATE the Rus
sian elements actually in arms
against the Ro1Shevists IN odd;