The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1919-09-29
Kaiser Calls Victory Matter of
Nerves.

The kaiser kept talking about pet
theory OF his that victory was only q
matter of nerves, anyway. His idea
was that by working upon the nerves Of
our enemies we would make them be-
lieye they were beaten. that they would
believe the victory was ours. He said
that the nation which did not allow It's
nerves to be shaken, or the nerves OF
ITS leaders unstrung, was always the
victor.
And in the same breath he displayed
his own acute nervousness Sometimes
almost thought that his mind was
shaken. He dwelt upon trivial incidents
Of the battlefield which only increased
his lack of nervous stability. He should
not have been told Of such things.
After saying that we would win be-
cause the nerves OF our enemies would
not stand the strain, he began to talR
about what would happen II he should
break under the pressure. He was
worried about what we should do with
out. him. He must suppress his OWL
excitement, he said, and appear calm
In order to help the others.
Already he was out Of II from mill
tary point Of view, but what would
happen were his nerves to break, | did
not know. Such contingency adSnot
been taken into consideration In our
plans
In recently published statement,
Hindenberg stated that from the first
the German general staff, and not the
kaiser, was responsible for Germany s
military policies. Won Tirpitz seems to
agree with Hlndenberg on this one point
at least Editors Note.l
| have mentioned before his elation
over fall OF Antwerp. He spoke Of 1t con-
tinually and, at least when he was pres
ent, grand headquarters seemed to be
as much overjoyed as was he. While
we wasted time In what seemed almost
In the nature OF celebrations over every
victory. our enemies were straining ev-
cry muscle and every nerve to make
those victories costly to us, and Ia
take away their value If we won them,
Churchill himself was In Atwerp until
two days before the actual capitulation.
He was tearing all over the place in a
private car directing the defense and
urging everyone to resist to the last
solutely doomed did he leave and even
then he went into France to help boil
ster their lines there. incidentally
will mention that Admiral Won
Schroeder took me through Antwerp
after the city had fallen to U.S. The
endless wharves and warehouses showed
nothing but goods produced by German
gorged itself full on Germany and won
dered II we could keep the place.
To my mind the performances OF the
Emden were as great q splatter for re-
jpieing as the fall Of Antwerp, wheri
the garrison was permitted to escape
| But the kaiser, usually 80 proud OF the
achievements Of the navy, had been IN
| fluenced by Ballin, who decried the EN-
denis successes because they made the
English more bitter
(The German light cruiser Emden de-
stroyed % ally merchant vessels Will
cargoes worth SIC, 100000, and sank thu
Russian cruiser Jemtchug and a French
| OF Penang? The Australian cruiser
sydney drove her ashore at Cocos islanc
| In the Indian ocean Nov. ., 1914. A
part of her crew under Lieut.. Muecke
| who had been sent ashore to destroy
| the Cocos island wireless station, seizec
the schooner Ayesha, lying off the ISL
| and, and escaped. They made a RECORD
| for raiding on their own account anC
months afterward turned up at Turkish
headquarters In Damascus Editor''
| Note,)
To return to the attitude Of mind In
| Germany: Ballln's remarks about thu
| Emden were typical OF It. He may
| have been right when he said that l
would make the British more furious
| but Just the same I was delighted witt
| the record her crew made II that hat
been the spirit Of our commanders w
would not have been content with thu
victories we gained and we would mo-
have fallen into the habit of thinking
always about peace, We were too ready
| to relinquish our aims. As early al
November OF the first year Of the war
even the members OF our general stat
were beginning to express belief thal
we would not be- able to break through
| In the north and take Calais.
| A great deal OF the energy they wer'
| spending In futile air raids could hav'
been used to better advantage In de-
feating our enemies In the field. There
| was too much talk of how the Engllsl
| little pushing on to Calais,
argued always for war to the knife
| but was not in favor of frightful'
ness for Its own sake II did not have
| the effect on our enemies which th'
general staff believed II did. 1t was
wrong to bomb their cities with ma
chimes which threw only single bombs
When they struck and killed nothing
but old women they were odious ant
the people got used 70 them so that the,
| did not have any effect
When we exhibited such weak purpos,
IN the early months OF the war is l
any wonder that after four years Of con
| tending. not against our enemies alone
| but against vacilating policies at home
|
the end?
AS late as the fall OF 1918, had W,
been inspired by faith In our owl
strength and the will to do to the ut
most, we could have wrested from tn
entente decent peace, In october
1918, ! wrote to Prince Max OF Badel
| that Germany still had strength 4
make last desperate stand and shoy
her teeth to the victory flushed enem,
| with profit to our cause.
won Tirpit2 seems to have been ig
norant OF the fact that Prince Max wa
| appointed chancellor for the expires
purpose Of arranging peace as quickl,
as possible to stop the dissension in mil
itary and political Germany,--Ed
| Note,l
| But Prince Max's government reste'
| upon appallingly dishonest and antina
| tiona foundations. The submarin
| campaigns were abandoned absolutel,
and our capitulation began, 1t wa
| agreed that what these misguided lead
ers believed would be a peace OF iustic
must he accepted at once, Every homes
| thinking German who took exception {
| this view or expressed belief that tn
peace which the entente would Civ
| would not he one of Justice was accuses
Of treason and regarded as an outlaw.
Yet without the shadow OF doubt tn
| army and navy could have held GU
until spring when a real peace coul
have been negotiated Those were In
deed the darkest days of Germany
history when, although We were stl
fully capable OF making an offer, swor
IN hand, of just peace to our equal
war weary enemies, we rejected the op
nortunity and went down into chaos.
Better to Have Sought Peac,
Through England.
AS chairman OF the Fatherland part
al that time | wrote to the chancellor
II can think OF no worse peace tina
| that xxshi1b Will hn faeneA nnat, an