The sun., 1919-02-15

NoiuhhS VI spucc. IeTnhpS Wb GILL
Illustrate. what we mean by few
conspicuous examples.
/. Article s, which relates to a pro-
gramme of disarmament. provides that
an international and supernatural
body styled the Executive Council"
shall determine for tho consideration
and action Of the several Governments
what military equipment and arma-
ment Is fair and reasonable" These
Limits" the League Constitution con-
tinues, when adopted shall not be ex-
cceded without the permission Of the
Executive Council" But the Consti-
tuition Of the United States, which Is
still In force In this respect, vests in
the Congress Of the United States the
power to raise and support armies,
the power to provide and maintain a
navy, the power to make rules for the
government and regulation Of the land
and naval forces. These powers are
granted exclusively to Congress. Con-
gress cannot constitutionally divest It.
self of them. without an amendment
of the Constitution the President and
the Senate, the Governments treaty
makers, can no more engage Congress
to 20 to the Executive Council of
League of Nations for instruction as
to the reasonable size Of our arma-
ment and for permission, on the adj
vice of the permanent commission es-
tablshed by Article o. to extend our
armament when occasion requires
such extension. than they can snatch
from Congress the war Initiative and
lodge 1t in an international organi-
cation abroad.
.. Article Il engages the members
Of the League not TO SO to war with
out submitting the war quarrel either
to arbitration or to the Executive
Council for inquiry, and then waiting
three months after an award or a de-
cision is rendered. This Is an attempt
to apply the principle Of assuagement
by delay that distinguished the Bryan
treaties 1t would be neither more
nor less eff,caclous than such sys-
TEN of treaties But Article IL goes
further and engages every signatory
not even to resort to war against an
other member of the league when
that other member of the league COM
plies with the award of the arbltra
tors or the Recommendation of the
Executive Council The Constitution
Of the United States contains no
provision which enables Congress to
Iivest itself Of its exclusive and In
alienable power to declare war.
8. The same general remark seems
to us to apply to the provisions at
tempting to enforce the Leagues de-
cislons by economic pressure or retri-
button by tariff. OF course there can
be no constitutional objection to the
moral boycott: that needs no legis-
ation when individual public opinion
can be summoned to its support. But
not less distinctly than does the Con
stitutlon vest In Congress the war
declaring power. that instrument pro-
vides that all bills for raising reve.
nue-and bills for raising revenue
are the agents of economic pressure
shall originate in the House Of Rep
resentatives; not merely in the Con-
gress, but in the House of Represen-
tatives. 1t appears too plain to re-
quire argument that the removal to
the Executive Council of an interna-
tional organization Of the initiative
now belonging to the House OF Rep
reSentativcS cannot be affected by n
mere treaty without an amendment
Of the Constitution.
4. An even more striking illustra-
ton of the invasion of constitutional
strongholds may be found in Article
%. Therein it Is provided, amazing
as the statement may seem, that If
this nation becomes a member Of the
League it can make no valid treaty
or International engagement Of any
sort without registering the same
with the Secretary General of the
League. mo such treaty or liter
national engagement" says Article
%, shall he binding until so regis
tered" However desirable such
project may be In the interest of open
diplomacy, the fact remains that 1t
adds another process to the processes
described in the Constitution of the
United States and cannot become
matter of constitutional compact IN
til the Constitution is so amended as
to permit It's introduction.
These are few Of the features
OF the proposed Constitution Of the
League of Nations which will engage
the serious attention of even the most
hopeful friends OF the general meas
ure when it comes before the Senate
for ratification. They will doubtless
be discussed more fully and in entire
candor and frlendliness as opportu-
nifty occurs.
Meanwhile the question foremost In
the mind of THE SUN, as 1t must be
In the minds of all friends of peace
and all we'll wishers of any practical
scheme of war prevention. is whether
after the elimination Of provisions
requiring constitutional amendment
before they can he effective, the re-
maindpr of the plan which the presi-