Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-25

work in many parts of the army, with
al its serious consequences, was as
ncomprehensible to me as the dlsln-
egration of the nation which revealed
tself in such a surprising fashion on
November 8, was to millions OF Ger
mans !
| communicated my anxiety again
md again TO those gentlemen VINO,
with me. were called upon to diagnose
.hese symptoms and provide remedy.
But | spoke to deaf ears. The Ger
man nation. itself not without CUNT,
nas now to pay the penalty with its
very life.
Demands Cannon Fodder.
The question of reserves was a con-
slant anxiety to us. / had the oppor-
tunity of impressing on his majesty
he gravity of the situation. The de-
sire had been expressed that the So
called Asiatic contingent should be re- |
so that Jerusalem might be
retaken. whereas. taking into consid-
aration the question of our reserves,
had agreed with Enver upon a reduc-
ton of the German troops and had
the dispatch of more men
to Palestine.
The supreme command had again
the imperial chancellor
with those old demands OF the au-
tumns of 1916 and 1917 for an IN
crease of the quota of recruits, SEM
Colonel Bauer to the meetings calIea
i'm Berlin to consider the matter. but
I'VE found that we were without the
necessary support of the war ministry
AT the end of June discussions on all
the above mentioned questions were
resumed at Spa between the Imperial
the field marshal, the war
ministers and myself
referred to the conferences IN
Berlin with Colonel Bauer, and once
more emphasized as gravely as | could
the necessity of obtaining adequate
reserves of adopting the most severe
measures against strikers ana oe-
serters in the homeland, and above
all of encouraging in the people oe-
termination to fight. with regard 10
which | again drew attention TO the
dangerous Influence of a section OF
onr press, enemy propaganda and Boil
shevism.
cabinet Gives No Men.
smoke my mind on these points tar
wore often than | have recorded III
these nages. once more | was prom
ised a great deal The situation now
ever remained unchanged. do not
know whether those gentlemen
thought that my reports were eXag-
gerated or that they were merely the
frlit of my "militarism.' Neither
wnuld the war office accede to my
request for a general conference OF
employers and employees. to come 10
an understanding with regard 10 the
necessity of drawing upon the eA-
empted men.
Meantime tried again to exploit our
success in order to further the peace
movement in enemy countries An
other memorandum on this subJect was
sent to the imperial chancellor. On
Hume 10, he sent for Colonel Won f1dei-
ten. After long consultation the es-
sentials of such propaganda were ue-
cided on. Vice Chancellor Won Payers
in particular showed a livery interest,"
in these questions. During the us
cussions at Spa j again begged the
imperial chancellor to appoint MN
lister FOR propaganda. Beyond TINS
we did not refer to the prospects Oh
peace.
In view of Clemenceau's speeches.,
we were COIllDtll6u, III my CpAH1S't'
continue the war or submit to humllia-
tion. / must assume that the respon-
sible statesmen held the same view,
for even though l always hoped for
success, they could have had no doubt
of the gravity of my views of the sit
uation.
In may and June Colonel Won Haef-
ten, quite in accord with my views,
urged the foreign office to make a
declaration concerning
Belgium. Secretary of State Won kuhi-
mann, however. declined to take any
initiative in the matter. He was well
aware of the impossibility of any
exchange of ideas with the enemy
governments. So much he frankly
and openly stated.
on June "a. basing his remarks on
speech of Mr.. Asquith's on May Is,
in favor of peace. he spoke in the
reichstag to the following effect:
"As long as every opening is ac-
eepted by the other side as a peace
offensive, as a trap as untrustworthy,
as calculated to SOW dissension be-
tween the allies, and so long as every
advance is violently denounced by the
opponents of, rapproehement, 1t is
impossible to, foresee how any eX-'
change of ideas that might lead up to
peace is to be brought about"
The imperial chancellor adopted
the same attitude in his speech OF
July IL. He gave expression to our
constant readiness for peace. but so
long as the enemys will to destruction
persisted we must carry on; though
as soon as the enemy evinced any Sc
rious inclination to pave the way 10
peace we should at once prepare 10,
meet him.
Il may also tell you that this point
of view is not confined to myself, but
is shared by the leaders OF the army
for they are not carrying on the war
for it's own sake. but. told me. so soon
as an earnest desire for peace shows
itself on the other side. we must not
be behindhand."
The imperial chancellor has accu-i
rately represented the view of the
field marshal and myself.
When l now reflect on the possibil7
ity and prospect of peace move, had
it been undertaken by the govern
ment, 1 am firmly convinced that we
should have been granted an armistice
and peace only on the conditions that
we are now compelled to accept. We
should not have taken upon ourselves
this responsibility, as indeed in Octo=
her we ought not to have done. de-
spite the gravity of our situation.
Whetheratiwas right lorllwrepg ~ my