The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-10-22

were stormed on July 49, Ostroienka
was taken on August 4, and thus the
crossing of the Narew on wide front
was secured. (The Germans Wer now
across the Niemen on a 4o-mile line'1
| Other forces moved against Sieroc ana
Segershe (north of the Narew about
| Is miles north of Warsaw, so that as
soon as these works were taken, Novo
Georgievsk (the strong fort guarding
Warsaw could be cut off from the
northeast
The Russians offered stubborn re-
sistance everywhere and suffered very
heavy losses.
| The 9th army and General Won
Woyrsch's detachment had also gone
| forward in the Polish bend of the Wis
! tula. Woyrsch's detachment had
beaten the Russians on the llshahha
and near Radon, occupied Radom on
| July 10, and forced the Russians 10 re-
treat behind the vistula AS conse-
| ouence of this on July 81 the Russians
| north of the Pilica also retreated be-
! hind the Vistula and the outer de-
| fences of Warsaw. The 9Th army.
| which was still weak, now advanced
to the attack of this position Their
| further mission was to cut OF Novo
Georgievsk from the south.
Between the upper Bug and the Wis
tula the allied armies gained further
ground to the north in successive front
1
| al attacks.
Far from the great battlefield in
Poland the Nieman army had also
started an offensive in the middle OF
July and made great progress east
ward.
1 time had come to initiate the move
4 ment I had recommended, movement
on the lower Nieman against Kovno
followed by an attack in full force II
the rear of the Russian armies IN
troops could be taken from Woyrschi
detachment and the 9Th, 18th ana Sti
armies.
We had delays quite long enough
already. The taking Of Kovno woulf
, take time, and the Russian retreat II
II Galicia was already far advanced. bu
, IT seemed still possible to achieve grea
things. at any rate, something bigge
than could be affected by the opera
{ lions then in progress. THESE coui
end in nothing more than pur
I frontal west-eaSt retirement VI
enemy.
General headquarters stuck to thel
uoint OF view, and still preferred shei
movement over the Vistula and Narew
3 We were not allowed to weaken u
armies engaged in that operation 10
: the benefit of the 10th and Niene
. armies. Whether our general stal
for reasons connected with the gener.
Y military situation, mo- longer wished
|, embark upon such an extensive an
far-reachine plan as that we had sue
e gexted. it is impossible for me 20 say.
h The 9TH 18th and Sth armies con
0 tinued to advance on the same me
as before and in the strength se..lo
nv general headquarters Prepara
: tions for the attack of Novo Geprg
q ievsk we're begun. At the same tim
+ we decided to take Kovno ana TN
3 Niemen army continue its attacks
e all went we'll
4 A. had expected, the operations q
d the allied armies i'm Poland to the eea
of the vistula meant purely
q uressure ON the enemy ana incesseh
9 fighting. Repeated efforts to enveio
= The Russians ended in failure. II
!, Russiau armies were certainly kept Q
the move, but they escaped
they frequently made fierce counter
attacks with strong forces, and agar
and again took advantage OF the man
marshy areas In the heishool noou !.
rivers and streams to rally and ofre
prolonged resistance.
Owing TO the continuous movemef
for many weeks on bad roads an
generally speaking. in bad weatner. III
strain on our troops was tremenoou
Clothing and boots were In rags an
tatters. Supply was difficult IL wa
IAlmOSt lmDOSSlDlc " AiIf0 Di@-~S' - -
Russians systematically destroyed
burned stores and villages. they droS
the cattle before them and left thel
to die on the high road.
The population which they carrie
off with them were driven into u
swamps at the sides Of the road
they blocked the way. Many scene
in the Russian campaign have pes
indelibly imprinted on my memory.
The supply and transport condition
became more unfavorable from day
day especially with the 18th arm
which was getting further and furth'
away from its railhead. Communic'
lions with the rear were improved y
the Sth army after the capture.
Iomza-Osowiec. 1t was then possipi
but still very difficult, to send suppl
from that side.
COULD NOT HELP EXHAUSTIO
What vehicles we had were pri
cipally employed in bringing up an
munition In attack our exhausted u
fantry required more support from u
artillery the further east they got
1.-The distances increased. the difficult
lin bringing up ammunition increas'
proportionately. Thus the moveme
slowed down and lost its sting
No. -