The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-08-19

has never failed to fuinn them and
never will.
Article X In In no respect OF
doubtful meaning when read I'm the
light OF tho covenant an a whoie.
Tho council of the league can only
advise upon tho means by which
the obligation Of that great article
are 10 be given effect TO. Unless
the United States In party TO the
policy or action In question. her own
affirmative vote In the council Ia
neccsaary before any advice can be
given for n unanimous vote Of the
council In required II she in a
party the trouble In hers anyhow.
And the unanimous vote of the
council In only advice In any case.
Each government ia free TO reject II
II II pieascs.
Nothing could have been made
the right Of our congress. under our
constitution. 20 exercise It's inde-
pendcnco In all matters OF peace and
war. No attempt was made to qucs.
ton or limit that right The United
States will. indeed. undertake. under
Article X TO respect and preserve
rs against external aggression the
territorial integrity and existing 20.
iitical Independence OF the league
and that engagement constitutes a
very grave and solemn obligation.
But II In n moral. not n legal obii-
cation. and leaves our congress alb
solutely free 10 put Its own interpre.
tation upon :; in all cases that call
for action.
Article X seems 10 me 10 conssi
tute tho very backbone OF the whole
covenant Without II the league
would hardly be more than an infiu.
entail debating society.
1T has several times been sug.
gcsted. In public debate. and in pri.
vate conference. that interpret ations
OF tho sense In which the United
States accepts the engagements of
tho covenant should be embodied in
the instrument OF ratification. There
can be no reasonable objection TO
such interpretations accompanying
the act OF ratification provided they
do not form n part of the ratification
Itself"
Most Of the interpretations which
have been suggested to me embody
what seems TO me the plain mean.
ing OF the instrument itself But II
such Interpretation should constitute
part of the formal resolution OF
ratification long delays would be the
inevitable consequence. inasmuch as
all the many governments concerned
would have TO accept, in effect. the
language of the senate as tho Ian.
gusgo OF the treaty before ratifica.
ton would be complete. The assent
OF the German assembly ut weimar
would have TO be obtained, among
the rest, and l must frankly say that
could only with the greatest reiuc-
lance approach that assembly for
permission to read the treaty as we
understand II. and as those who
framed IL quito certainly under.
stood IL.
Opposes Reservations.
''If the United States were 10 dual.
~ es' ''~''fhN III MY way, more
over. / am confident from what I
know of the many conferences and
debates which accompanied the for.
mutation OF the treaty that our ex.
ample would immediately be fol.
lowed in many quarters, in many I'm.
stances with very serious reserva-
tons. and that the meaning and
operative force of the treaty would
presently be clouded from one end OF
Its clauses TO the other.
Pardon me, Mr.. Chairman. IL I
have been entirely unreserved and
plain spoken in speaking Of the great
matters we all have 80 much NJ
heart III excuse Ia needed I trust
that the critical situation of affairs
may serve as my Justification. The
issues that manifestly hang upon the
conclusion of the senate with regard
to peace and upon the time of ita
action are so grave and so clearly
insusceptible OF being thrust ON ono
side or postponed that have felt n
necessary In the public interest To
make this urgent plea and to make n
as simply and unreservcdly as nos.
siblc."
Weak mon brIieve Il, I,,rL, .s-