Omaha daily bee. (Omaha [Neb.]) 187?-1922, 1919-06-19
General French's Memoirs

| uEVEIUC ICfCCt 1HGWCOUS
London Times Synopsis of British Com
mander,s Review of War Experiences-In
Three Parts.
Lord French was told by Mr.. Haldane as
early as 1908 that in the event of war with
Germany he would be asked to take command
and he was asked to exercise his mind OH the
problems of this task, which he did to the lest
of his ability. 1t does not appear, oddly enough,
that he took any part in the military con-
versations that went on for many years be-
tween us and the French, and the council of
war. which he attended on August 5, the day
a singuarly open mind about what was to be
done. Two subjects were discussed what
should be the composition of the British ex-
peditionary force and, secondly. what should
be its point of concentration: There was an
idea" that one cavalry division and six divi-
obligation seems to have been very indefinite,
and it was eventually decided to keep two d.
visions at home and to send one cavalry and
four infantry divisions. Equally vague were
the arrangements about the point of concen-
tration, and it was decided to send for French
superior object to acquaint us with the plans
Of the French general staff Apparently all
that had been decided in the conversations that
had been going on for years was that we should
concentrate on the French left and detrain be-
tween Maubeuge and lie Cateau. Colonel
Huguet came from France on August 10, and
there followed debate whether these decisions,
vague as they were, should be revised or ad
hered to- Lord Kitchener thought our left would
be too exposed at Maubeuge and favored con-
centration farther back at Amiens. Sir Douglas
Haig suggested postponing any landing until
the campaign had actively opened and we could
see where army could be most effectively
employed. Had Haig's plan been adopted we
should undoubtedly have co-operated not with
the French, but the Belgian army, and, apart
from other objections, our landing in Flanders
Lord French supported the original plan of con-
centration at Maubeuge and his view prevailed.
The Prime Error
This uncertainty week after the war had
begun about these very fundamental questions
OF our strategy creates bad impression and
calls for great deal of explanation. One rea-
son given by Lord French is that we could
never get Belgium to say until the last moment
what she meant to do in the event of war. Yet
another reason-and it comes out over and over
again in the narratives that while we knew
that the Germans would invade Belgium we
never thought that they would come so far
west. A concentration at Maubeuge was mani
testify wrong if the Germans proposed to
invade by way of Brussels; it faced east, where
as the right direction should have been north.
Il had always thought that Germany would
violate Belgian neutrality, and in no such half
measure as by march through the Ardennes,
which was what our joint plans mainly con-
templated. | felt convinced that if ever she
took this drastic step, she would make the ut
most use of it to pour over the whole country
and outhank the allies.
"The principal source of the terrible anxiety
| felt took its root in the thought that we were
too much mentally committed to meet at
tack from the east instead of one which was
to come as it actually did, 1t treasured me,
however, to know that our actual dispositions
did not preclude the possibility of stemming
the first outburst of the storm so effectively
as to ward off any imminent danger which
might threaten northern France and the chan
mel ports"
The channel ports were, in fact, saved but
no thanks to these original dispositions, but to
the blunder of the German high command in
not occupying and holding them If we could
have counted on the enemy's committing this
colossal mistake and on the French winning the
battle of the Marine without US, there might
have been much to be said for Haigs idea Of
delaying landing until the Germans had COM
mitted themselves deeply into France.
British Tactics.
Lord French was appointed to the COM
mand on his South African record as a tacti-
clan, and he frankly admits that he had never
envsaged a war of fixed positions.
"All my thoughts all my prospective plans,
centrated upon war of movement and ma
neuver knew perfectly we'll that modern,
up-to-date inventions would materially influence
and modify our previous conceptions as to the
employment of the three arms respectively; but
had not realized that this process would work
in so drastic manner as to render all our pre-
conceived ideas of the method of tactical field
operations comparatively Ineffective and useless.
Judged by the course of events in the first three
weeks of the war, neither French German
generals were prepared for the complete trans
formation of all military ideas which the de-
velopment of the operations inevitably demon
strated to be imperative for waging war in
present conditions.
1T is easy to be wise after the event but l
can not help wondering why none of us realized
what the most modern rifle, the machine gun,
motor traction, the aeroplane, the wireless tel
egraphy would bring about. 1t seems so SIM
pie when judged by actual results The mod
ern rifle and machine gun add tenfold to the
relative power of the defense as against the at
tack This precudes the use of the old meth