The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1919-10-13
Chancellor Had Whole Say in
War Plans.

However, because the chief OF The
general staff, the minister Of war, the
chief of the admiralty staff and my.
Felf were kept away from Berlin dur
ness was m~onopolized by the chancellor,
who. having no experience himself OF
the great European world, was unable
TO estimate correctly the value of his
collaborators In the foreign office. The
chancellor, Mt any rate, did not write
to me for advice. The events OF that
ply, and particularly Germany's part In
them, have been 10 so completely ex-
posed by a series Of partly official pub
LEGATIONS, that 1t does not seem TO me
to be In Germany's interests any longer
for me to conceal my opinion.
Editors Note--Prince Lichnowsky
revealed during the war the diplomatic
secrets as he knew them when he was
ambassador to London, and following
the overthrow of the imperial German
government, Herr Karl Kautsky was
delegated as official ransacker OF the
Wilhelmstrasse archives TO give to the
then-a Weakened German people the in.
| side story OF German diplomacy. hits
he did TO the accompaniment Of full
publicity
As early as July II the Berlin foreign
office was convinced that the entente
had advised Belgrade TO give way
though learned this some years aft.
erward, In this the chancellor had ths
means whereby TO unite the knot. ell
drew, however, from the assumption
that the entente did not want war
the short sighted conclusion that Aus,
tris could probably force an entranc,
Into Serbia regardless Of the entente
and without ~endangering the peace o
the world. ! knew nothing Of the en-,
tente having advised Belgrade to keoJ
peace, as was optimlstically assumed
In the Wilhelmstrasse at this time. i
strikes me as peculiar today that tn,
entente has not been able TO bring for,
ward conclusive documents proving III
Intervention In Belgrade In the interest
Of peace.
The Serbian murder, indeed, coult
not be well countenanced by any civil
llzed state. When I received that com
munication In Tarasp, my first impress
sion was that this ultimatum was un
acceptable TO the Serbians, and nigh
easily lead to n world war. ! neve
believed In the possibility OF ~iocalizinI
the AustroAS Serbian passage-at-arms
with regard to Russia. any more tina
had any faith In England's n~eutralit,
In O. continental war. wrote to m,
deputy In this sense, and recommends,
an agreement with the czar hits suE
gestion had 10 effect. saw that III
danger ~ the situation lay particular
IN LIC luCt Una fINB lhilu lOTHltu VI
final link In the entente chain. II wa
only the clumslness Of our policy whic
brought the Russian military party
the top, and made It possible for III
, Russian minister of war, Gen. Souklom
hinoff, to deceive the car.
Russia certainly had no right TO max
war out OF the chastisement OF Be
grade, but the danger that poworf,
Russian influences might demand a wa
> out not TO have been underestimate
We convinced, even before the Au,
trian -uitimatum. that the war party
Petrograd could be held In check II v
treated the czar In confidence wherein
: 4 we acted too directly, then we migt
almost certainly reckon that Englan
: would let loose q world wal In COZ
: formity with the e~entury-old politics
tradition Of the fnaintenance OF a col
~tinental balance OF power"
. Admiral Warned Prince Henr