The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1919-10-21
ToFEKA STATE JOURNAL
INFORM ALTON
BUREAU
FREDERIC J. HAEKIN, Dtrsc4sr.
wash1ngtaA. D. G
SHORT CUTS no PEACE.
washanea@. D. c

I ~
Amendment, reservation and resolu-
ton are three terms which we read in
the papers every day in connection
with the peace treaty and the League
| of Nations.
Whatever the merits of the treaty,
| it now seems certain that the senate is
not going to ratify it is it stands the
senate will either amend, reserve or
resolve. and the ultimate consumer
/ will have to wait for his peace until
| the statesmen get done making it.
! A pressing question of the moment.
I therefore, is how long it will take to
make a revised and improved peace.
by each of the several methods which
| have been proposed The whole world
is waiting for peace. or at least for
some formal statement that We are
! supposed to be at peace Many things
| are to begin with peace and many oth-
| ers are to end Ratification will make
an important date for almost every
/ one. We may disa gree radically with
| regard to the treaty, as to what should
| be included, but we are all agreed
| that the whole business should be
speedily concluded.
| 1t seems to be generally understood
, that to amend the peace treaty means
/ that it would have to be sent back to
| the peace conference at Paris, and
! that all of the signatory powers would
I have to consider it as amended and
| sign it again. No one denies that this
would be a long. slow process. Some
say that IL the treaty is thrown again
| into the tpOndeP0uS machinery or the
! conference it will never emerge, but
die there of hamilton and of old age.
| Nobody wants to delay peace any
! longer than ie absolutely necessary,
and that is why a great deal more
| support c'n be found in the senate for
reservations and resolutions than for
ame ndmentS.
! A resolution, of course, would be
simply a statement by the senate to
! the effect that it dissents from GER
, tain clauses in the treaty. 1t would
make the position of the senate clear,
| and that is all.
But what is a reservation? What
form would it take? How would it be
foreign powers? To what extent would
they recognize it, and be influenced
! by it? \
These questions were recently ad-
| dressed by a senator to an expert on
| irrational affairs. which shows that
| even some men in high places do not
understand the exact nature of a res
ervation when it refers to a peace
| treaty, and not to a place for keeping
Indians.
| The expert, in his reply. took the
| Shantung reservation as an example.
| This reservation is a statement to the
effect that the United States does not
assent to the clause In the treaty which
gives Japan the right to occupy the
i Shantung peninsula in China. This
statement would not be part of the
| treaty, but would simply be added as
an appendix. When this, and other
reservations, had been passed by the
| senate, the treaty could be signed by
| the United States without further de-
| lay.
The. reservations would then be
| turned over to, the state department..
1t would be the duty of the secretary
| of state. according to this expert to
address each of the signatory powers,
calling the attention of each to the
fact that the United States govern
ment, in signing the treaty of peace,
had made certain reservations
| To the great majority of the ma
tiQns whose representatives signed the
! treaty, any one reservation would not
| mean much. Most of them would re-
ply by simply acknowledging that the
action taken 7 the United States had
| been brought their attention. Some
might endorse this action. China for
| instance would probably endorse our
| Shantung reservation.
! The only other nations keenly in
terested in this Shantung reservation
| would be France, England and Japan
France and England, there is reason
| to believe, would not be greatly per-
| turbed or even displeased over such a
| reservation. But for diplomatic rea-
sons they could not endorse it. They
| would simply acknowledge our action
| in the matter.
What would Japan do? According
to the expert, Japan would be most
| unwilling to force an issue. The Jap
anese government would probably re-
ply that it had noted the action taken
| by the United States, and that It took
| its stand upon the treaty as drafted.
| What would have been accom-
plished then? Japan would not be
ousted from Shantung by this reserva-
ton No; but the whole world would
| have been notified that the United
/ states does not approve of the Jap
| anese occupancy of Shantung, that il
| stands for Chinese freedom and for
the open door policy.
The treaty gives Japan the right to
| occupy Shantung practically without
limit Japan gave only a verbal prom
Use to eYacuate after a certain length
OF timd. China has been unable to
obtain a copy of the minutes of the
| peace conference in which this verbal
assurance is supposed to be written.
| Neither has the United States senate
been able to obtain any copy of this
/ promise. The only thing which is
written in black and white before the
world is that Japan shall have Shan
tung. But If reservation is made
by the United States senate, then it
is also written where all may read
that the United States does not as
sent to that occupancy.
If Japan desires to hold Shantung
permanently. which is the contingency
against which 1t is desired to guard,
then putting her out would be mat
ter to which we would have to attend
later, in any case. The last few years
have clearly shown that even to the
most reputable powers. treaties are not
always binding. The important thing,
therefore. is to state our view with re-
gard to Shantung clearly. to the whole
world. SO that If it becomes necessary
to enforce this view, we can do it with
out violating our part in the treaty.
The adequacy of the reservation
method is indicated by the fact that
Thomas F.. Willard, a we'll known ex-
port on far eastern affairs, who is here