The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1919-05-24
BATTLE: OF YPRES
tcoutsurod Prom Page Two-)

caothes The scenes In the streets wero
extraordinary. Some Of the men seemed
to have gone mad with either rage or
fear. Women rushed to and FRO.
screaming. with babies in their arms.
Close to the lookout post where l was
st.nding, a priest in his altar vestments
dashed out Of q church with the sacred
vessels in his aims and tore in panic
down the street IN front Of me. followed
BY 1arge numbers Of his flock a great
deal Of damage was done to the town.
and there were many casualties among
the civilians
By October ls tho First Corps under
Ha3x WAS fully concentrated IN the
northern theatre
The Second division was in the area
Popcringhe - BoeSchete - StcenFooEoe,
The First division between St Omcr and
Cas5el
On this day Ihad to take>a very grave
decision and shall Try and recall inc
working OF my mind at tho time and Inc
The manner In which the problem l mad
10 solve presented itself to me
On October 10 and II. when COM
nnenced opcratdorS IN tho northern thea-
tre Srtth tho British forces, was as
have said decidedly optimistic as TO the
possibility Of carrying out n strong OF
fensive eastward Foch was equally
confident and we both thought our con-
certed plans promised well.
NV reason for forming this opinion
WAS in the first place based upon my
talks with Toch who had already oecn
On the spot for several days no hau
been able to firm some estimate or mo
eperrys strength between AITas and tho
pea. Hc considered that the Germans
Ppere In no condition to stem oeter-
mined advance BY US. Reports nao
reached mo Of large transfers or Ger
man troops from this theatre 10 ul0
Aisne and south OF That river. fnch cA-
pressed himself as well ssuHlco WIN
tbe progress already made by his own
sTTny particularly the cavalry on his
northern flank.
But L Ind Other and moro tangible rea-
SONG for hope and confidence Between
~. I'm and 18th the cavalry and tho
Tvhtrd Corps had gnined important vic
tories and rnaHo- splendid advances Dur
tnp these days It did not appear that
Rawlinson IN tho north, was ever heaV-
M, nressed. The Second Cops had mace
ccrfatr progrcss though have always
thpueht. In regard to them. thai moro
,,txfIs have <boen lone had they been ol-
rected with more determination ana Vls-
IN. Germans themselves certainty
+bouxtt 80. We intercepted a wireless
n,ezsaeo sent by general Won der Mar-
vttx commanding the Fourth German
c,tza4ry corps, who il wiring to the
commander of tho Sixth German army
commented upon the weakness OF tho
second corpe attack and tho ease WIN
vf1&.h ha bad been able to withstand IL
After tho 18th, however. tho result OF
NV own observations and the reports
continued to receive OF the enemys con
st1nt1y increasing strength ell along inc
rtne caused mo ennety end induced mo
70 eend tho syressago ] ,hapo mentioned
to FocA IA,
alton 10 the,north- Although 10 reports
had reached us Of any great concentra-
ton of the enemy there had much rca-
son 70 fear that troops wcre being moved
exst ACROSS Belgium 30 reinforce MN.
1be Trench troops on tho User wero not
numerous and they included many ter
rttortals. while the Bea9SMns were com
nletaly tired out. On tho right or the
Reirtaps. as far as Merdn, there were
only tho Third caEnfy and Seventh in
fautry divisions, both (which stood in
need of rest and reft-
Ours was a tremendously long linc 70
guard with 80 few troops available. II
the enemy hroie through tho left flank
an the British would DO turned. tho
Belgians and tho French troops with
them would Do cut or and the scacoast
towns would oe gone
When looked further south the pros
pect was no better. The enemy was
daily, and almost hourly. getting strong
er in front OF our line, which was held
BY the cavalry and by the Second and
Third CORPS. Tho endurance OF these
troops had been heavily taxed. and J
had practically no reserves. Moreover.
they were extended on q front much too
wide for their numbers. especially north
Of the I4ys.
BAD as q complete break through by
the enemy in the north would have h"nn,
n wedge driven through our lines south
of Mcnin would have "ntailcd still more
disastrous consequences.
In a message which | received from
de Maudhuy on the 18th H. expressed
great fear that the Germans were in
tent on attacking between US and finally
separating. Had they emphasized this
the eventual, alternatives before the Brit