The sun., 1919-06-16
HAMILTON ON THE TREATY
MAKING POWER.
A Pertinent Passage From the States.
mans "Federallst" Writings.

mAkkN0 <OW 6Ns
A Pertinent Passage From the States
mans "Federallst" Writings.
To rHn EDITOR OF TIE suN--str: 4
great deal IL said as to any power thu
United States Senate may have n tn,
making Of treaties 1t IL not uncommon
to hear public men talk as IL the onl,
earthly thing that the United Statei
Senate has to do about a treaty IL 4
take II as Il is handed to them by tn,
Chief Executive and approve It.
In his day Alexander Hamilton knew
what the Constitution intended In lit
various grants Of powers to the executiv,
and legislative departments and he wen
to the trouble to explain to the peopl,
who were adopting the Constitution Il
this State what his ideas were. The
Federolist contains his views on tn,
treaty making power. which seem Il
indicate that his idea Of tho Constitu
ton was that II would give to tn,
Senate actual work to do in the making
OF treaty. In number Is Of tn,
FederdIst papers, written by Hamilton
he said:
The President 10 to have power, by
and with the advice and consent OF the
Senate to make, treaties. provided two
thirds OF the Senator's present concur"
Though this provision has been assailed
on different grounds. with no small de-
gree OF vehemence. scrupls not to de-
clare my arm persuasion that II IL one
of the best diSested and most unexeep-
tionabis parts of the plan. One ground
\ of objection Ii the trite topic OF the
>intsrmixture of powers. some contend
Ing that the President ought alone to
possess the prsrosative Of making
treaties: others that Il ought to have
been exclusively deposited In the Senate.
With regard TO the intermix-
ture of powers. shail rely upon the
explanations heretofore given of the
true sense OF the rule upon which that
objection 10 founded. and shall take It
Cor granted a. an inference from them
that the union OF the Executive with
the senate. IN the article Of treaties.
10 no infringement of that rule.
I venture to add that this particular
nature OF the power of making treaties
indicates q peculiar propristy in that
union. Though several writers on the
subject OF government place that power
yet this Is evidently an arbitrary dis
position, for IL We attend carefully TO
Its operation II will be found to par
take more of the legislative than the
executive character. though It does not
seem strictly to fall within the defni-
ton OF eithar. The essence OF the
legislative authority r. to enact laws. or.
in other words, to prescribe rules for
tho regulation Of society; while the
execution OF the laws ana the employ
msnt Of the common strength. either
for this purpose or for the common
defence. seem to comprise all the fune-
tions of the executive magistrate.
The power of making treaties Is
plainly neither the one nor the other
1t relates neither 20 the execution OF
the subsisting laws nor to tho enact
ment OF new ones; and still less TO the
exertton of the common strength. Its
objects are contracts with foreign ma
lions which have the force OF law but
derive II from the obligations of good
faith. They are not rules prescribed
by the sovereign to the subject but
agreements between sovereign and SOW
erstgn. The power in question seems,
therefore. TO form q distinct Depart
msnt, and to belong, properly. neither
to the legislative nor to the executive.
Tno Quautlob elAeWncfo uothhoo ~ IN
dispen sable to the management of for
eign negotiations point out the execu-
tive as the most Mt agent in those
transa ctions; while tho vast Importance
of the trust, and the operation of the
treaties as laws, plead strongly for tho
participation of the whole or a portion.
OF the legislative body In the ONCE OF
making them.
However proper or safe II may be In
governments. when the executive magis-
trate is an hereditary monarch. 70 COM
init to him the entire power OF making
treaties, II would be utterly unsafe and
improper TO intrust that power to an
elective ma gistrate Of four years oura-
ton. 1t has been remarked. upon another
occasion. and the remark 10 unduestfon-
ably just, that'an hereditary monarch.
though often the oppressor or his
people, has. personally, too much at
stake In the government 90 be in any
material danger of being corrupted by
foreign Powers; but that a man raised
from the station of q private citizen to
the rank OF chief magistrate. possessed
OF but q moderate or slender fortune
and looking forward to q period not very
remote when he may probably be
OBLIGED 10 return TO tho station from
which he was taken might sometimes
be under temptations which II wouio re-
ouirs superlative virtue to Withstand.
An avaricious man might be tempted
to bstray the interests OF the State for
the acquisition OF wealth.
An ambitious man might make his
own asgrandizement, by the aid OF .
foreign Power. the price of his trsaeh-
cry TO his constituents
The history OF human conduct does
not warrant that exalted opinion Of
human virtue. which would make It
wise In o nation to commit interests
of 30 delicate and momentous q kind
as those which concern Its intercourse
with the rest OF the world, to the sole
disposal OF q magistrate created and
eircumstaneed as would be a President
of the United States.
OF course the FederaHst did not deal
with the question Of the President of
the United States going abroad and in
secret session attempting to mako a
treaty without letting the Senate know
what he was doing. And. of course,
Alexander Hamilton had never heard
Of Colonel House and did not know that
he would be there and know all about
Il, even II the Senate be kept in the
dark. LUTHER b. LITTLE.