New Britain herald. [microfilm reel] (New Britain, Conn.) 1890-1976, 1919-02-18
>G}LD NOT DIM GLORY or ARMY

, in one case those mistak es bring mere
| pecuniary loss and in the other the
| loss is expressed in human lives. But
the fundamental conditions of organ
| lzlng, supplying, training and lighting
a great army involve mistakes ana
| losses that are inherent in the thing
Itself and that no amount OF AGILITY
| and efficiency can reduce to proper
| tons that will not shock the un1n1tlat-
| ed.
War is waste in it's very nature.
! NO man can see Il battlefield or men
! in action without carrying away a
| heavy heart at the Wanton destruction
| Of it all l doubt if any great battle
| was fought in the late war without
a certain percentage of men killed
and wounded by their own fire. Never
a battle without inefficiency and stu
! plditN showing in spots Never one
without seeming cowardiCe here and
| there Never one without orders GO
ing wrong. 1t is a pell-mell scrirn-
mage business. One blunder by a sim
! gle regimental or battalion command
err may throw a whole ordered pla.l
into confusion and turn confidence
into doubt, courage into cowardice,
and victory into defeat [ recall one
English division that allowed the
sistance in the Cambria show, and
which a few months later near Beth
une stood like a stone wall against
Overwhelming numbers and upset the
entire enemy plan. These things are
occurring all the time in every army.
Personally, I believe that Aneri
can military efficiency has compared
most favorably with French, British
or German. l believe that our loss
has been less relatively to results &C
complished. No old country troops
possessed those Individual qualities of
new country troops which enaoled
them to retrieve errors or to press Oh
without definite orders from head
quarters far behind the line and lack
, ing full inform ton to make the most
of unexpected openings at the front.
But talk to any American subaltern
and he will promptly pick out the
! weak spots.
| Take the second battle Of the
| Marine in which the American per-
| Torrance was one of the most bril-
| liant chapters of the war--1n which
| there were many exploits as fine as
! Picket's charge up the hill at Gettys
, burg. If you will ask any young Off
: Ger the chances are that his story
wilt be one of failure in detail-the
! he is a battery commander he will
| dwell on the failure of the infantry to
! keep up with the gunfre, while the
/ infantrymen will beNail the slowness
! or unsureness of the artillery. A man
! in one division paints black the de-
! linquencies of some other division.
| And so on to the end of the chapter.
/ Men in the thick of it were close to
all these faults of detail and were not
in a position to see the whole plan
III owing grandly to victory.
1t is for these and similar reasons
that a congressional Investigation of
purely military matters might pro-
duce infinite mischief. IT would be
, linen Often there is a, good reason
for this always unpleasant process. IT
, may accomplish some much needed
and far-reaching reform. But there is
no such reason here. A great war
has been spendidly won through our
bringing to bear the magnificent re-
sources of America n a highly eff
cient way. On the general proposition
this is is not high praise. Malice orr
dcma goguery supported by the major
ity of congress could dig up no end Of
fault in detail and bespatter a shining
American record. It could embitter
the sorrow of every bereaved moth
er's heart 1t could becloud our
country's glory with doubt and suspi-
cion. But it could serve no worthy
and useful purpose.