Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-10

The field marshal and myself had
both spoken against the proposal for
unrestricted submarine warfare on
August 80. 1916. expressing the view
that the time was not yet ripe for it.
Chancellor Won Bethmann stated this
quite clearly at the time. and added
that thenceforth the decision to carry
on the submarine warfare in the form
of "blockaded area" fightinging would
depend on the declaration Of the field
marshall that is to say, unrestricted
warfare was to start when the field
marshal wished II to start.
The chancellor spoke to the same
effect in the reichstag on Septem-
Der 2Sth.
The question of the expediency Of
the submarine campaign had, mean
While, led to grave differences of
opinion among the political parties,
and had excited unusual passions
While the parties of the right (the
1unkers) were enthusiastically in favor
of its adoption, the left (the socialists)
which was more in touch with the
government, was equally strongly OPP
posed
Won Bethmann's statement for the
first time brought the supreme army
command into the field of politics to
support the government, This I re-
GREETED deeply. and in my view the
statement should not have been made,
The supreme army command had
consistently held aloof from all
political activity and had no wish to,
alter its policy in this respect, so that
the political excitement created by Won
Bethmann's stem was all the more EN-,
barrassing to the field marshal and
myself. Nevertheless, the supreme
army command came. in fact, more
and more to be regarded as response
bic for the adoption or non-adoption
of the unrestricted submarine warfare,
AT the beginning of October we had
discussed the question of adopting this
weapon with tho chief of the naval
staff. In the course of the CORE
spondence with the chancellor on the
matter, We again urged him on Octo-
Der 9Th to settle the question of re-
sponsibility He replied on the 9Th,
with the statement that the decision
really lay with the emperor, as the
war lord of the empire. but that it
was also question of foreign policy
owing to its effect on neutrals; the
chancellor ACCORDINGLY was, constitu-
tionally, the only person responsible,
GIN So'iu iioi diiSltI the DuTuen
any one else; but the attitude of the
field marshal to the matter would
naturally have the greatest weight
with him.
This standpoint was unexception-
able. The field marshal was not in
position to take any of the chancellors
responsibility, and had never even
thought of doing so; I quite agreed
with him. The chancellors declara-
ton was, however, substantial
change of front when compared to his
earlier statements, which had been
made on the assumption that we were
opposed o,the submarine warfare. q
U-Boat Warfare Held I'm Until
Neutrals Could Be Coerced
In October, 1915. submarine cruiser
warfare began. ships being stopped
ond searched, This met with some
success, and had a disturbing effect
on the economic situation of the
enemy This success spoke well for
the submarine weapon. but the
enemy's defensive measures against
our boats We're soon improved, and re-
suits fell off considerably.
In estimating the economic effects
of the Various forms of submarine
warfare we We're compelled to rely on
the Judgment of the chief Of the ma
val staff and the chancellor The
supreme army command was IN con-
slant communication with both these |
authorities on the whole matter, and