The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-10-17

THE BIRMINGHAM AG
province. 1 had to make # impossible
for the Russians to use the mines for
long time. Military interests made
IL imperative.
destroyed the Rumanian oil fields even
more ruthlessly. Coal is of equal vital
Importance for wsging war.
As IL happened, the opinion OF
higher authority was taken, and IL
proved possible to modify the scheme OF
destruction somewhat.
POLES WERE NOT FRIENDLY
The attitude of the Polish inhabit-
ants of our frontier provinces was not
conciliatory. They were very reserved
and aloof No clear-sighted man could
have expected anything different.
In view of our inferiority in numbers,
it was very important for the approach
ing decision that we should draw on
the Prussian eastern fortresses and
the various attached corps under our
command for all such available troops
and war material as could be utilized
for active operations in the field. We
had made a start with this system as
far back as August, 1914. and in course
of time we were able to form as large
a number of divisions in the east out
of Landstrum, Landwehr and former
fortress troops as General Won Moltke
had at his disposal for the battle of
Koniggratz. Later these divisions
were given numbers. just like the ac-
tive divisions but this did not change
their special character.
OF course, the demands made on
these divisions, especially as regards
fighting and marching, were not the
same as those required of units com
posed of younger men; but in times OF
great stress it was often. impossible to
give them special treatment Ihess
troops did more than could reasonably
be expected Of them. They gaze OF
their best in defense of hearth and
home, wife and child.
MORE OLDER MEN DRAWN IN
The Eighth army, on the eastern
frontier of Prussia, had gradually been
able to form several Landwehr divi-
sions. From the garsSsons of the Wis.,
tula fortresses and the Landstrum
frontier defence corps had been formed.
comprising the Zastrow. corps, two d.
visions strong, which subsequently be-
came the 18th reserve corps. The for
tress of Thorn, which had its first main
reserve-the 35th reserve division-in
the line neat Czestochova, gradually
formed a new main reserve-known as
Won Dickhuth's corps This corps was
subsequently employed on the right
bank of the Vistula in the direction
of Plock. The main reserve of Thorn
was now Won Westerhagen's Land
sturm brigade which had been brought
up to the Bzura, and withdrawn to
wloclawek during the retreat of the
Ninth army.
The fortress of Posen also had given
us one main reserve, which had formed
part of General Frommefs corps, and
been brilliantly led by General Count
Won BredOw In the campaign in Poland.
His Landwehr had mo- field kitchens;
they attacked the Russians with the
idea of procuring some-and got them.
The fortress and province of Posen
now produced : further forces. The
Posen corps, which was concentrated
round Kalisz, was very strong diyi-
sion, and had been equipped with great
care
SOUGHT MANIPULATING BLOW
The more 1 thought about the pro-
blem ahead of us, and realized the spO-
sition and our fearful peril, the firmcr
was my resolution, II possible, to turn
the Cyestochova operations into an
overwhelming and annihilatiDg blow.
That alone could definitely save u.s.
1t was not enough to bring the enemy
merely to standstill. This idea was
not a sudden inspiration, but had been
slowly forming in my mind.
Such troops as the commander in
chief in the east could spare were as
sembled for the advance between
Wreschen and Thorn ION the north
western frontier of Poland). General
Won Conrad, with his soldierly insight
gave us all possible assistance.
The English army had been weakened
and could no longer fulfill the task of
covering the eastern frontier of East
Prussia. This army found operative
support, both in the newly constructed
positions, between Lakes Spifding and
Mauer and the fortified line of the
river Angerapp. The army successfully
surrendered it's ery-~exhausted 25th
reserve corps, of whose condition we
learned only later, and the First re-
serve corps, with the First and S6th
reserve divisions. These troops were
sent to Thorn, in the direction of the
Lodz-Wloclawek line.
HAD TO BE CAREFUL OF MEN
The commander of the Eighth army.
General Otto Won Below, had now to
husband his resources carefully in
order to be able to hold the positions
which he might have to occupy in an
emergency. 1t had to be done. even
through the performance of this task
made exceptional demands on both
commanders and men.
The Zastrow corps received orders -
hold fast at Soldau (S5 miles north of
Warsaw on the East Prussian line).
for the existence of the Eighth army
and the fate of East Prussia depended
on it.
1t would have been particularly USE
full if we could have strengthened this
front A strong attack from ,Mlawa
against the Narew front between Ros-
han and Pultusk (45 miles northeast Of
Warsaw would have been the most
effective support for the operations on
the left bank of the Vistula. But we
had to limit our aims, for the success
of the flank attack on the left bank
had to be assured. Otherwise our re-
sources would merely have been dis
sipated.
HAD TO BLUFF THE RUSSIANS
1t was as much as we could do II
we managed to strengthen Zastrow's
corps sufficiently for it to constitute
certain threat to north Poland. and
lead the enemy to believe. If only for
short time that an offensive here
was really intended. Strong Russian
forces were concentrated north of
Nowo Georgiewsk (25 miles northwest