New-York tribune., 1919-12-24

In the number of awards made but in
tie fact tnat the awards as issued to
omcers in number of instances are
not in accord with the re ative merit
OF the services performed by taem as
indicated by my recommendations. Of
ticers who were recommended for the
highest awards appear on the list as
FaN dg been accorded .ower awards and
vice versa.
SO. tt is mus. necessarily result in
serious discomfort and a sen se of in
justice. because there can necessarily
merits of the services of q number of
officers than the responsible command
ing officer of the organization in which
they are serving.
Insight Lacked by Board
"a. In fact. it must always be i'm
possible for a board or any other
out~ide authority SO to modify the es-
innate Of re ative merit of the SER
vices of officers in an organization, as
made by their immediate and active
superior in command. without inhct-
ing actual injustice-and this neces-
sarily defeats the whole object of in
stituting a system of awards for merit
n time of war.
IS. An example of the injustice re-
sufting from a failure to be guided by
such recommendations is shown by the
action taken upon the citations for
awards of the officers of my staff
abroad that were made in my letter to
the department of November 7, 1919.
In explanation Of the Importance of the
services of these officers, I stated as
follows: al individual duties afoat
are necessarily of secondary impor-
tance in comparison with the vital inn
portance of directing all operations
both ashore and afoat, in such man
ner as to in ure the success of the
whole. This success as a whole was
due to the work of these men. To
each was given the responsibility and
authority in his own department essen
tial to succcss in any large organiza-
ton, and they exercised tnis RESPONSE
bility with practically no direction from
nie-and to them belongs the credit
sc. OF the nineteen officers recon-
mended in that letter for the Dstin-
gushod Service Medal ony six were
accorded this decoration. and the re-
mainder we're accorded the navy cross.
"7. Not only were the recommended.
tions not complied with in thirteen of
these ca es, but--and this is the gist
of the matter-a number of officers in
the command, whose services were rela-
lively of less Importance and much
less in responsibility, were accorded
the highest award.
Error in Judging Service
"S. This seems to be due to an erro-
neous opinion as to the relative value
Of services at sea and in certain vitality
important positions ashore-and opln-
ion that duty in the latter positions
must necessarily be the least distin-
guished.
80. This is so serious misapprehe n
~.
IN awarding distinctions should be such
rs to have the effect Of clear i'm
pressing upon the service without pos
sibility of misunderstanding, tina. the
most important duty IN time OF war Is
that of planning and directing the mill
tary operations of the whole force
chat is, the function of superior leader
ship. The vital Importance of succe- s.
ful leadership, and the recognitions
which should follow, have no logical
relation to the positions, ashore or
afioat, from which such leadership
must be exercised.
40. In this connection it may be
we'll to cite. as an illustration, per
haps the most fragrant of all the cases
of mistakes as to the relative merits.
During the four most critical months
OF the submarine campaign that is,
rom April to Aug lst, 1911 was
allowed by the Navy Department the
assistance of but one comm .ssioned
officer. who necessarily performed the
duties of chief of staff, secretary, aid,
communication officer, INTEL eence Off
Ger, and all the otker numerous duties
of staff during that period.
III. In reports now on file at the
department | have stated that this one
officer drew up the convoy p.an under
which our troops were transported
safely to Europe, that he initiated
many of the most important tactical
and strategical measures governing the
operations of oar forces in Europe;
and that his very responsible services
were all OF the hig..est possible I'M
portance IN assuring our success.
Important Services Overlooked
"12 accordingly recommended him
for the d sting ylshed Service Medal.
The published list shows that he was
awarded the Navy Cross, whl.e 4 NUM-
Der Of officers under my command in
pos tons OF purely local responsi ibility,
whom | recommended for the II vs.
Gross, have been given the Distin-
Euished Service Medal.
. "13. There are other instances of a
simlar nature in the other branches
of the command. This is strikingly
illustrated BY the award of the Dis
tinguished Service Medal to a consid-
cradle number of officers in positions
Of very little respons bility, while four
Of the nine rear admirAls under my
Command, whom | recommended for
Distinguished Service Medals, in rec
ignition of having borne their heavy
responsibilities with conspicuous sue
eess, were accorded the lower award
of the Navy Cross.
"14. These instances are so typical
of the conditions in this respect
throughout all branches of the COM
mad that further examples are un-
Necessary But feel impelled to in
Hite attention to a special class of
awards which are the subject OF such
'service condemnation and r.dcule that
the effects upon the present ana 1uture
morale of the service must neccssar-
ily be deplorable to the last d gree
namely, the Distinguished Service Med
ais awarded to many, if not all, Of the
officers who were defeated in action or
whose ships were sunk or seriously
damaged by enemy submarines
~ Awards for Failures Opposed
"15. In the case of destroyers or
s0ther vessels that were successfully
I attacked by German submarines, no
F special distinctions were recommend
I ed in my reports These are typi al
+ examples not only of unsuccessful ac-
Z tions, but of failures to injure the
= enemy The victors in these actions