Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-22
BY General Frlch Imdcndorgf.

, front, and had discussed the situatio
with the command of the groups {
armies and the army commanders, q
we'll as with the general In charge Z
the most dangerous positions; and W
had exchanged views on tactics. TIL
group OF armies under the Crow
Prince Rupprecht and the Germa
crown prince were strengthened wit
divisions, artillery and munitions, an
We're provided with everything neees
sary for successful defense. Wher
help was desired / gave it to the bes
of my ability.
British Blow Staggering.
The 9Th army wanted to make
| rectification of its line b. means of
| local advance at Souchez, between
! Lens and Arras, and prepared to carr
/ it out at the beginning of April.
! had no doubt that a great British of
| fensive was imminent az Arras. Tn,
/ operation at Souchez was abandoned
! begged the command of the groul
! of armies to bring up their reserves
nearer to the line in the era of tn,
| 9Th army. The last attacks at Verdul
! in October and December had con
! firmed the old adage that the RICH
| place for reserves is close to the firms
line. The tactics of a defensive battle
demanded that, in many places on tn,
front under attack, counter-attack di
visions should be held in readiness il
the second line to meet and throw
back the enemy if he broke through
the first line.
The divisions which constituted the
second and third waves were indeed
moved up by the 9Th army. but or
the Sth were not close enough up
On the 9th, after short but extraor-
dinarily intense artillery preparation
our army encountered d powerful at
tack, led by tanks, on both sides OF
the Scarpe (east of Arras). Several
of our advanced positions were over
come. The neighboring divisions
which stood firm suffered heavy
losses.
The enemy succeeded before noon
in reaching our battery positions and
seizing heights which dominated the
country far to the east The counter
attacking divisions were not there to
throw the enemy back, only portions
of the troops could be brought uD by
motor transport
He Was Deeply Depressed.
The situation was extremely criti-
cal and might have had far-reaching
and serious consequences if the enc
my had pushed further forward. But
the British contented themselves with
their great success and did not con-
tinue the attack, at least not on
April 3.
on that day / celebrated my birth
cay at Kreu2nach. | had looked for
ward to the expected offensive with
confidence, and was now deeply de-
pressed. Was this destined to be the
result of all our care and trouble dur
ing the past half-year? Had our prin-
ciples of defensive tactics proved false,
and if so. what was to be done?
l was not at the time able to get
clear view of all the details of the
battle. l sent for officers who had
taken part in the conflict in the front
line, and by means of conversations
with them and telephone communiea-
tions gained the impression that the
principles laid down by CHIC. were
sound. But the whole art of leader
ship lines in applying them correctly.
Moreover, a division had failed here
which had previously enjoyed high
reputation.
The battle of Arras on April 3 was
a bad beginning for the decisive
struggle of this year. April 10 and the
following days were critical. The con-
sequences of a break through Of ~
to ! 8 kilometers IS to 10 miles) wide
and six or more kilometers q miles)
deep are not easy to meet In view
of the heavy losses in men, guns and
ammunition resulting from such a
break through, colossal efforts are
needed to make good the damage.
1t was the business of CHG to-
provide reserves on a large scale. But
it was absolutely Impossible, with the
troops at our disposal, and in view of
the military situation, to have sec
ond division Immediately behind every
division that might possibly fall out
Hard to Form New line.
A day like April threw all CAL
culations to the winds. Many days
had to pass before a new line could
really be formed and consolidated.
The end of the crisis, even if the
roops were available, depended very
largely, as it generally does in such
cases, on whether the enemy. after
MS first victory would attack again,
ind by further success aggravate the
Of forming a new line. Our
position having been weakened such
iictories were to be won only too
EASILY.
The British attacked again at the
anne spot from the 10th onward in
great strength but not really on a |
grand scale. They extended their Of |
ensive on both sides. especially to |
he south. as far as Bullecourt. On
he 18th they took Monchy, and dur |
ng the following night we evacuated |
vimy ridge. (The Canadians took
Vimy by a charge after tremendous |
)ombardmentD April 20 and 20 and |
Nay were again days of severe fight |
ng, and in the intervals sharp local |
took place. The battles
we launched minor coun- |
er-attacks, which were successful, |
)ut also suffered slight losses of ter |
'itory here and there
The commandments chief of the |
It'll army, General Won Falkenhau-
len, whose chief of staff was Colonel |
ron Loszberg, was very energetic in |
organizing the defense of the new
positions, and was supported in his
Efforts by the commands of the groups
If armies and by CHIC. A further
to the Wotan position,
which was still under construction,
hough contemplated for time by