Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-07-27
Army and Navy News

| bound to follow from the people he had
| offended
! There has been some uncertainty as
to the exact relation between Gen.
| GoethalS and Gen. March, but the best
opinion now is that Gen. March sup
ported the radical moves which Gen.
Goethals was making to secure efficiency
| in the supply and Transportation de-
partments. Those changes involved the
removal from the great supply bureaus
of the War Department of many of the
powers which they had held a long time
and tenaciously to operating divisions
under the supervision Of the general
staff. 1t was a necessary measure, but
rot popular. 1t is now accepted that
Gen. March approved the changes of
Gen. Goethals and backed him up in
making them, even to the extent of dis
penSing with the services of Charles
Eiseman. who had supervision over the
purchase of clothing, and who was
known to be close to the Secretary of
War.
But it was not in support of Gen.
Goethals that Gen. March rendered the
service which entities him to considera-
ton from the country.
A supply officer of the Army saw al a
French port the unloading OF :: trans
port early in the war. He saw the
stevedors dropping into the hold q
great unloading net. 1t brought out in
one haul and dropped on the wharf pro-
visions. ammunition. clothing and Signal
Corps stuff. The officer asked why they
We're not separated in the unloading.
and was told that orders We're to get
the stuff out and send the ship back
fast as the Lord would let them. He
inquired what was done with the pile OF
cargo dumped on the dock. 1t was
separated, they said, and sent to the
depots; all the bureaus had depots eX-
cept the engineers. who were in charge,
and they had all their stuff sent forward
where they wanted it.
That incident is illustrative of the
condition of the whole Army organiza-
ton when Gen. March was made chief
of staff. The organization was composed
of several bureaus, each well equipped
for its particular purpose, but without
cohesion or cooperation and with no
power. except that of the Secretary. to
function their individual operations with
one another. In other words, the War
Department where the most highly CEN
tralized authority was needed for the
accomplishment of the enormous activi-
ties that war on top of us and for eX-
istence involved, was soviet in its char
acter and system.
The department had been unfortunate
in its selection of chiefs of staff. Gen.
Scott held the office when war was de-
clared. He was an experienced fighter
but inexperienced in great army or
ganization. almost at the age of retire
ment. His successor was a man of I'M
USUAL literary dDliltS, anu HIS iHClSlNe
reports brought him into official promi-
hence. He was soon ordered abroad
and the office placed in charge of an
acting chief who lacked both authority
and force to create a staff capable ~
co-ordinating the efforts of the War De-
partment to the one end of raising an
army. clothing. eQuipping, feeding,
transporting and supplying it in all re-
spects.
1t was not until the Senate military
committee forced upon the administra-
ton of the Army the need of such CO.
ordination that it took any steps what
ever to secure that end. The first step,
in December, 1917, was to put Gen.
Goethals in unhampered charge of sup
ply and transportation. and to recall
Gen. March from Europe, make him
chief of staff and give him authority to
reorganize the department on a more
modern, scientific and efficient basis.
Hampered until the passage of the
Overman act by lack of legal power to
make some of the more radical changes
that were imperatively needed, deprived
of the assistance of most of the expert
enced staff officers, who had obtained
foreign duty. his progress to the goal of
real organization was impeded in more
ways than can be told. Only man
strong enough to make enemies could
hope to succeed in his trying position.
There is no doubt that he could make
the enemies, but there is equally no
doubt that he did make a general staff
that would operate and that he was the
personal force that reorganized the War
so that it at last did func-
tion.
Neither he nor those who know him
assert that the organization is either
complete or satisfactory. 1t was like
the rest Of the war preparation,
makeshift rather than a system; but
such as it was, it was the basis of a
reconstructed War Department, and it
was only the merciless force that Gen.
March built behind it that made the
machine operate.
The militia bureau has given out some
of the paragraphs of the National Guard
REGULATE s n
National Guard Is They refer to
r,:4x the period Of
SnoAs enlist m e t 4,
which was formerly the same as in the
Regular Army-three years in the active
Army and three years in the reserve.
The enlistment period Of the guard is