Bisbee daily review., 1919-06-22
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF NTELLLGENCE SECTION.
US. KNEW BIG HUN DRIVE FAILED FEW DAYS AFTER START

the intelligence section of the army must not only be able to warn it's forces in reasonable time of an im- pending attack, but that they were able to tell the probable form fin which the attack will come, as was done in this case The results ob. tained from this information show the value and accuracy of the infor- nation furnished by the section so on April l the intelligence section sent summary of the situation as it stood on that day which l will quote in part:
 How Huns Greatest Drive Failed
 Therefore, on April 1, we find the enemy, after a remarkable initial success, in an operation we'll thought out and well executed in its pre- liminary stages, failing in the ac- complishment of the ultimate objec- tive, to-wit: The separation or de- struction of one or the other of the allied armies. For when we consider that of total of 192 German divi- sions on the western front S1 of them have been identified in this battle zone, and have participated in more or less severe fighting, it becomes clear that the results obtained are out of all proportion to the number of troops engaged. The question of supply furthermore, while not insur- mountable, is by no means easy. The enemy is now therefore committed to the task of defeating the allied arm ie sby further attacks which can now be anticipated and met, for, through failing to defect the French re- serves, they have permitted the allies to concentrate fresh troops without using them up piecemeal. Subsequent operations of attrition may result in further gains of territory, but. what ever the outcome may prove to be, the impetus, resulting from the break through the western front, appears to have been expended without having accomplished the second and third desired results. From now on, there fore, the battle may be expected to gradually resume once more the char acteristics of a Verdun or duel, un- less the allies. in turn. are able by counter-offensive to break the new German lines and to force the enemy to retreat to his original position"
 To be able to say on April 1, that the German offensive begun on March 21, had failed in its main ob- ject when the German penetration had reached the line Montdidier-Al- bert in front of Amiens. furnishes a good example of an accurate esti- mate and appreciation of the situa- tion such as is required to be furn- ished the commander by the intelli- gence section. This was written by Colonel Conger and was. of course, based on exact knowledge of the forces involved on both sides.
 Secret Service and Espionage
 Of the work of the secret service division, naturally very little can be said It has two departments, one charged with the policy regarding counter-espionage and the other re- garding the policy of espionage. Both departments work harmoniously with both the British and French secret services. The counterespionage in the zone of the interior of France, in- cluding the ports of France at which American troops or American civi- Hans land, Is under the intelligence section of the general staff of the service of supply. The work done in the ports and in the interior of France is in close cooperation with the British and French services of the interior. The duty of protecting our troops in the zone of advance from spies and preventing circula- ton of spies in the zones occupied by our troops is a function of the divi sion, the policy only being directed from G. H. Q.
 German Artillery Located by Gun
 Flashes
 Finding the range or location of the German artillery by it's flash and sound is entirely a development of this war. A check has been made since the armistice of the location of German batteries which were secur- ed by our sound and flash stations previous to the St. Mihiel attack. The accuracy as shown by this check of the previous locations. shows that this service attained a remarkably high degree of efficiency. There was one position held by a German bat tery on the ridge of HattoaCAatel which was giving us a great deal Of trouble although 12 miles distant and it evidently was very well concealed as the airplane photographs did not showa battery location in that vi- cinity. The flash and sound ranging oAo4so.. x,,o, ordoraa to 1Ocoto fnso