Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-02-20


than once what l thought was the
shortest time in which the passage
/ could be made,
During the day the weather at
Scapa. which had been bad in the
morning, gradually became worse Ky
| afternoon it was blowing a gale from
the northeast | discussed with my
staff which route on the west or lee
side would be safest. ana finally de-
cided that the Hampshire should
pass close in shore. and not take the
alternative route of passing further
| to westward near the Sule Skerry
! lighthouse.
"About p. m. Lord Kitchner pro-
ceeded on board the Hampshire. ac-
| companied by his staff About D. m.
Capt. Saville, commanding the Hamp-
shire, ordered two destroyers hack To
| Scapa, as they We're unable to face
the heavy seas at the speed of the
| Hampshire. Between 1870 and 7:45
the Hampshire struck mine, about
one and one-half miles off shore. be-
tween Brough of Rircay and War
| wick Head. She sank in fifteen min
utes bow first.
The incident was witnessed by
observers on shore. and a telephone
| message was sent to the vice admiral
commanding the Orkneys and Shet-
lands that the cruiser was i'm diff
culties. He at once ordered out pa
troll vessels and informed me. with
the result that destroyers We're sent
to the scene immediately
Kitchcner's Last Moments.
Evidence from the few survivors
of the Hampshire showed that Lord
Kitchener was below when the ship
| W. Afc
ed him on deck Captain Saville was
heard to give directions from the
bridge that boat be prepared for
Lord Kitchener and his staff Lord
Kitchener was seen subsequently on
deck but was not seen after the ship
sank.
Weather conditions prevented any
boats being hoisted out or lowered
although four boats floated clear as
| the Hampshire foundered. The scene
of the disaster was searched during
the night by destroyers and patrol
craft, but the only survivors were
twelve men who drifted ashore on
raft. Many bodies We're picked up
! by the searching vessels and many
drifted ashore The body of Lord
Kitchener Was not recovered
My own sorrow for the incident
was overwhelming There was at
first doubt in the minds of some peo-
pie as to whether the loss of the
| Hampshire was due to a mine or sub
marine; but these doubts were set at
rest by sweeping operations which
were undertaken as soon as the
weather permitted
They resulted in the discovery of
moored mines of the type laid in
southern waters by enemy subma-
rines, these mines being easily dis
tinguished from those laid by surface
vessels
Jellicoe ON Jutiand Fight.
Prefacing his description of the Bat
tie of Jutland. Admiral Jellicoe points
out that not only were the German
ships better protected than the Brit
ish, but they had a delay action fuse.
which, combined with their highly eff
ficient armor-piercing proiectiles, in
sured the bursting of their shells in
side the armor of the British ships
| instead of outside or while passing
through the armor, as was the case
| with British shells of that date fired
against the thick German armor.
The German ships We're also less
vulnerable to underwater attack, it
being a rare thing for British capital
! ships to survive when mined or tor
]
/ being struck by more than one tor
! pedo Were able to get back to port.
Describing the battle, he says:
| AT 6:Ol y. m, Immediately on
/ sighting the Lion. a signal was made
| to Sir David Beatty, inquiring the !
position of the enemy's battle fleet !
! This signal was repeated at 6:10 and !
at G:14, he signalled: Have sighted
enemy's battle fleet bearing south. |
southwest
This report gave me the first in.
formation on which ] could take eff |
/ fective action for deplOyment. The |
first definite information received on
board the fleet flagship of the posi-
ton of the enemy's battle fleet did |
not, therefore, come IN until 6:14 d. I
M, and the position given placed it 80 |
degrees before the starboard beam of |
the Iron Duke, or SO degrees before
the starboard beam of the Marl-
borough and apparently in close prov |
unity.
There was no time to lose. as there
was evident danger of the starboard
wing column of the battle fleet being
engaged by the whole German battle
fleet before deployment could be eff
fected. So at GIG p. m. a signal was
made to the battle fleet to form i'm
me OF Daltle on the port wing column
on course southeast by east, it being
assumed that the course of the enemy
was approximately the same as that
of our battle cruisers
Mancuvcrs in Battle Explained.
Speed was at the same time re-
duced to fourteen knots, to admit of
our battle cruisers passing ahead of
the battle fleet, as there was danger
of the fire of the battle fleet being
blanlteted by them
During the short interval that
elapsed since the first flashes and the
sound of gunfire events crowded fast
on board the Iron Duke The, ques- i
ton of most urgent importance be-
fore me had been the direction and
the manner of deployment. As evil
dence accumulated that the enemys
battle fleet was on our starboard side
but on bearing we'll before the
beam of the Iron Duke, the point for
decision was whether to form the
line of battle on the starboard or on
the port wing column. My first and
natural imnulse was to form on the
starboard wing column. in order to
bring the fleet into action at the
earliest possible moment; but it be-
came increasingly apparent, both from
the sound of gunfire and from reports
from the Lion and the Barham that
the German high sea fleet was in such