The Mankato free press. [volume] (Mankato, Blue Earth County, Minn.) 1879-1924, 1919-12-26
mash the Marine pocket into which
Germans had thrust themselves.

Germans had thrust themselves. He
ak aha o4easa ii ops. .IiI.ly ~
II MIR ltea.s. Z init N.Is vJslOus. >
II sceSsful, such afi opera. ioi would al
III ID l,nnediate. relief TO the ollied de
II use. would remove the thleat agains
II sis. and free tie pari9-Nancy rail-
II ID. But. moro important than ali e,st
Il Eould restore tho morale of the allie
Il h then existing. Up TO thiS time. on
| fts had been put in hero and there
| III remove the profound depression AM
| eitical points as emergency troops {,
| cry trial, whether on the defensive
| -. the terrific German advance. II
| ;ffensivc, they had proved themselve.
quail to any troops In Europe. AS earl
| ,1ne y and agaia ON July 10 Bonn
| N, had very slionkly urg,J .urar o.
ST divisions be concentrated undel
ncrican command il possible, for use
striking force against the Marine
i lent. Although the prevailing view
nong the allies was that A aerics
inits were suitable only for the defensv,
~ that at ali events they could be use
, bettcr advantage under allied CEN
I. -2nd the suggestion was accepted II
principle. and my estimate of their CT
ensive fighting qualities was soon pu
20 the tesh'
-, .,oL... his suggestion was not &c
opted. American forces found glory IL
Ne acjon which was undertaken. a
advanced. the Bird division commando
reported:
Aitnoagii the rush of the German
roops overwhelmed some of the fr0p'
ne' positions. causing the infantry and
pachipe gun companies to suner.
iOme cases fifty per cent loss, no Ger
nan soldier crossed the. road from Eos
~ to Crezancy. except as a prisoner
a~d ~. noon Of the following day
Gully 16) there were no Germans in tn
S,Us;roahd of the Third Division sector
gcept the dead.
ION this OCCASION" General Pershing
'dded,> "a single regiment of the 3rd al
vision wrote one OF the most brillian
ycnted,thc crossing at certain points o:
its front while oiS either flank the Ger
mans who had gained q footing prasse'
forward, Our, men. firing in three direc-
tons, met the German. attacks with
counter attacks ut critical points and
succeeded in throwing two German di-
visions into, complete confusion, captur-
ing Coz prieonera
"nwer, dis~iayed here and on the field
Scissors by pur First and Second divis
ions. the tide of war was definitely
turned in favor of the allies.
brought to bear in time 10 ienabie IA
last offensive of the enemy to be
crushed
Organization CT the LIST American arm,
I'D rrep1rat. fer its maiden effort
the eiimnalen OF the 81. Mihiei san
ont was now taken up Again it wa:
l1.oposed that American troops reinforce
the FRENCH Tor The operation but FER
shing again objected. He explains:
me pe,n iussested LOT tne american
IN these operations was MOI
acceptabe 70 me because IL would re-
cure inc imn1e1laie separation OF inc
Iecentiy fprmer hrsti American army int
rcverai sTonpl. manly TO assist Frenc:.
&c princ'pie OF FORMING distinct Amer-N
lcan army, Tor which my scontehuon nae
been .nsistent- An enormous amount OF
preparation had already been maze IN
OF roads. railroads: reguiat-
ne stations, and ether installations look
ms TO the use and supply OF our armies
IN q particular front. The inherent dis
pclipa uQns Of our troops 10 serve unae
el'ied confnnan2erf would havelgrewn and
american morale world have suffered
Wy rusitioil was stated quite clearly that
he Strategicai cmp'oynert OF the first
army as unit would be undertaken
where dcsireds but ~; disruption 10 car
~ out these f1oposals would not be en-
tcrtained-
"a fureicr conference at Marshal
toch's headquarters was held on Sep
,enbert ,, 1T which General Petain was
DrcSent.I After discussion the question |
II employing tho sAmerican army as |
init was conceded. -yAD the Allied armies |
we're tc be employed in a convergingS ac- |
ion. The British armie;. supported b, |
he left of the French armies, were to |
pursue the. attack in the direction OF |
ca.nl,'ai: the center of the French ar
4 los. west OF Rheims. would Continue |
he actions. already begun, to drive tht |
siISnIy beN uuu the Ais,le. and the Amer |
can army. supported by the right of |
he French armies. would direct its at |
aclS onFSedan and Mezieres.
1T should b: recorded that although |
his general offensive was fully outlined |
Il Ithe conference n6> one present ex- |
PRESSED the opinion that the final victory |
Gould be won in 1918. In fact, il was |
believed by the French high command |
hat the Meuse- Argonne attack gould noI |
20 pushed much beyond Montffucon be-
ore the arrival OF winter would force n
CESSATION of operations.
1.-THE choice between the two sectors. !
hat cast of the Aisne including the Ar
vas left to me. In my opinion, no
'ther allied troops had the morale or to
fensive spirit to overcome successfully
he difficulties to be .neVin the Meuse
trgonne sector and our plans and IN
had been prepared for an ex-
'ausion >ef operations in that direction.
The salient had been held by yne
Germans E.nce September, 1914. 1t COW
red the most sensitive section of the
neIny's position on the western front;
namely, the Mezieres- Sedan Metz rail
Dad and the NBriey iron basin: it threat
ned The entire region between Veriun
nd Nancy. and interrupted the main
slil line from Paris to the east. Its pri-