Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-26

a new world order, and make the
! thoughts and feelings of the nations
| more ready for u peace of justice and
roconci iation. The armistice and
peace conditions certainly point the
other way In any case. all the time l
! was first quartermaster-g general the
world had not yet changed.
| The supreme command took the
same view as President Wilson, who
| supported his demand for a great
! American naval program with the
/ words he should think it senseless for
/ America to adjust her naval program
to future world policy since the lat
| ter had not yet been decided.
! In November, 1918, the president
of the soldiers council of the Attn
army wrote; ns
Some people may think that the
revolution can be built up on IDEAS.
| Those who are at the front must
agree that the wurldpolicy of the
entente at the present time is infected
| by materialism."
The astonished world, its ideals
shattered. now perceives this clearly,
| The German people has been misled,
and is now paying for its delusion
with its life.
World Ideals Are Shattered; Ger
many Pays With Her Life.
These were enormous tasks for the
! country The homeland was not only
| the basis on which our military power
rested, and which must therefore be
carefully safeguaWed; it was the life
giving source which had to be kept
clear, lest it lose anything of that vir-
tue wherewith it steeled the nerves
and renewed the strength of the army
| and navy. The nation was in need of
that inner spiritual strength which
alone enabled it to reinforce the army
and navy.
The powers of the nation and of the
armed forces were so intermingled
! that it was Impossible to separate
them. The fighting efficiency of the
force before the enemy depended abb
solutely upon that of the people at
home. That meant that at home every
one must work and live for the war
in way that had never been known
before 1t was the duty of the gov
eminent, and especially the imperial
chancellor, to direct and foster that
spirit
Upon this minister devolved an
other important war task: the direc-
ton of operations against the enemy's
home fronts. Should Germany neg
lect to use this powerful weapon. the
effects of which she daily experienced
in her own body? Should we not at
tack the morale of our enemies in
the same way as they were unfor-
tunately, so successfully, attacking
ours?
This contest had first to be trans
ferred to neutral countries and thence
into hostile territory. But Germany
always lacked one mighty means of
propaganda: starvation of the enemy
peoples nv blockade.
Peace BY Relentless War.
The government had great prob
lens to solve if the war was to be
brought to a successful conclusion.
No greater demand has ever been
made on a German government than
to place the united strength of the
German people at the disposal of the
emperor in order to secure victory in
the field and carry on the war against
the spirit and morale of the enemy
nations.
Thus the action and conduct of the
government attained decisive import
anoe. This means that government,
reichstag and people must devote
themselves utterly to the idea of war
That was the only way; the power to
wage war had its source at home and
found its expression at the front
The, great aim of peace could only
be attained by relentless prosecution
of the war, therefore, the government
at the same time paved the way for
peace, their noble and immediate
goal.
Soon after we were summoned to
assume the supreme command. and
had time to consider the situation In
all its bearings, The field marshal and
laid our views as to the require
ments of the army and navy before
the imperial chancellor and discussed
the problems which they raised for
the country We called upon him to
cooperate in prosecuting the war and
were buoyed up with hope in spite OF
the menacing aspect of the situation.
The government had welcomed our
appointment to the supreme COM
mand. We met them with frank con-
fidence. Soon, however, two schools
of thought, represented by their views
and ours, began to come into conflict.
This divergence of view was a great
disappointment to us arsl vastly in
creased our burden.
Lloyd George n Better Master.
In Berlin they were unable to ac-
cept our opinion as to the necessity
Of certain war measures. or TO steel
their wills to the point of maenep~-
ing the whole nation and directing its
life and thought to the single idea of
war and victory. The great democra-
cies of the entente achieved this,
With an iron will Gambetta in 1870
II, and Clemenceau and Lloyd George
in this war, enrolled their peoples in
the service of victory. Our govern
ment failed to recognize this inflexible
purpose. and the definite intention OF
the entente to destroy us. They should
never have doubted it,
Instead of concentrating all our re-
sources and using them TO the utmost
in order to achieve peace on the bat
tlefeld, as the very nature of war
demands, the authorities in. Berlin fol-
lowed a different path: they talked
more and more about reconciliation
and understanding, without giving our
own people strong warlike impetus
at the same time.
In Berlin thew balieVed or deceived