davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1919-03-06

Enthusiastically secondlng the pro-
pcsal by Glenn Brown, president Oh
the Washington Society Of the FINE
Arts. for a memorial park OF sIatCly
oaks to commemorate the Washing
ton boys who fought and died IN
france, DR.. T. wayland Vaughan oil
the Smithsonian Institution, and active
member Of the Fine Arts Society de-
cIares it is the most fitting plan yet
suggested.
Il am absolutely opposed to the loea
Of A memorial arch. DR.. Vaughan eA-
pIained. Large monumental struc-
lures are not successful either from
the standpoint OF conveying an idea
or appealing to the sentiments. ASIDE
from the Washington Monument
there is only one memorial in the en-
tire city which ever appealed to nay
sentiment in any way. That is tae
memorial to Frank Millet and Major
Archie Butts. just back Of the White
house. That simple, UnpretentlouS
little memorial seems somehow to eX-
press the feeling it was intended to
perpetuate, while the other monu-
ments and memorials in the city leaVe
the onlooker cold and unimpressed.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30

General Won Woyrsch took the
western bridgehead of Ivangorod. and
on July rs crossed the Nistula to the
north OF this point under the enemys
nose and was heavily attacked. |
thought this crossing very hazard
GUS. Tactically It succeeded, but IL
did not alter the general strategic
situation.
The Russians facing the Ninth
army Withdrew from the outer de-
lenses of Warsaw. and early in
August from Warsaw itself.
On August 5ib the Ninth army oc-
eupied the capital Of Poland. This
army CMackensen had been brought
from Galicia to command ~ was
taken out Of our command and placed
under the direct orders Of general
headquarters. Field Marshal Prince
Leopold Of Bavaria was nj the same
time put in command mt Woyrsc"'s
detachment.
No doubt general headquarters had
their own reasons for thus reorgan-
izing the command. but IL did not
simplify matters for me, especially
as the lines of communication of the
Ninth army remained under our con-
troll. The movements of the Ninth
and Twelfth armies were very close
iy related. General headquarters
were far too busy for me to venture
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30
o trouble them with such details.

10 trouble them with such details.
The capture of Warsaw gave us
special satisfaction. We had fought
so hard for IL in the autumn Of 1914.
In that campaign were laid the
foundations OF the present successes,
OF which the occupation of Warsaw
was the sign and symbol.
During the following days Field
Marshal Prince Leopold OF Bavaria 8
army group crossed the Nistula be-
tween Ivangorod and Warsaw on a
wide front. Once again general head.
quarters attempted to effect an on
veioping movement by directing this
detachment straight on Brest-Litovsk
more than 100 miles eastward. whilst
strong Russian forces were still north
of Lublin. But In vain: the Russians
got away. Whilst Field Marshal
Mackensen was struggling toward
Brest.Litovsk. Prince Leopold's group
was advanced to the Bug below the
fortress.
After the crossing OF the Narrow by
the Twelfth army at the end OF July.
General Won Gallwitz had cast his
eyes due south toward the Bug. AS
had feared and General Won Call
WITT had also thought possible. these
hopes were not fulfilled. Somewhere
about the 10th. the Twelfth army re-
ceived instructions to march east.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30
COULD NOT
HELP EXHAUSTION

What vehicles we had we're prin.
cipally employed in bringing up am.
munition. In attack our exhausted In.
fantry required more support from
the artillery the futher east they got.
As the distances increased. the diff.
Guilty In bringing up ammunition in
creased proportionately. Thus the
movement slowed down and lost its
sting.
After the conclusion OF peace with
Russia. n highly-plaeed Russian of.
ficer told me he had never been able
to understand why we had not push.
ed on with greater vigor. as II we
had the Russian army would have
gone 10 pieces. Officers and men did
everything In their power 30 bring
about that result. but when perfect
discipline. the greatest enthusiasm
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30
4MPEROR'S FAV0RTE PLANNED
STRATEGY Baking LUDENDORFF

Cwar Editor OF the New York World
One OF tho most amazing chapters
IN Ludcndorff's revelations OF inner
war secrets reveals great quarrel
among the army chiefs In isis.
rirpiz had given some Indication
OF the intrigue carried on by the
extreme military class OF Germany
20 break the hold OF Chancellor
BethmsnpH and commit the
i. rountry to more drastic policies than
he would indorsc. The submarine
people OF Germany were To be organ.
ixed on strict military lines. The
lunkers wanted real blood and
iron" a<lministra ton. such IA Ris-
marck had given. and resented the
ooncillatory attitude Of Rethmann at
homo and abroad. 80 they wanted
Hlndenburg. then the idol OF the
German people. put In the chancei
lorship and Ludendorff made chief
} Of the army to drili the people.
N Results OF this intrigue are shown
Nv Iadendorff Bethmann. fiattercr
fof the kaiser. and General Falken-
hayn. long one OF his intlmates and
then chief OF the great general STAFF.
were able 10 sway the ruler. Evi.
IDENTIFY fearing further success OF
Hindenburg and Ludendorff would
endangcr their power they set out
to hamper the Eastern commanders
land get for themselves whatever
.crcdit might come from the defeat
81 Russia. They deeply Inundated
l4udendorff by overturnlng his STRAIT.
egy and making Maekensen and
Leopold independent OF him. and he
plainly shows his bitterness.
The kaiser's favorites baked one
VI the greatest strategic strokes OF
All time: gave up chance for "a vic.
tory that would have eclipsed any.
thing accomplished in any German
campaign In the war: in fact. vetoed
rcai chance for an early triumph
for Germany. IL was lucky for the
allies that the court cabai had Its
way. for Ludcndorff. gambler of
gamblers In the war game. was play
Ing for stakes that would make his
\ winnings at Tannenbcrg and the
Ma n lakes look puny. lie was
/ lain Mt the complete smashing OF
Hhe ain Russian army. and he
mid I, have accomplished u.
hackensen's advance In Caiicia
had left the Russian army in Poland
In highly dangerous pocket This
pocket was about zoo miles deep.
measuring from the positions In front
OF Warsaw eastward 10 n line run.
ming north and south between the
essternmost point OF the German ief,
wing near Kovno 10 the Austrian and
German forces northeas, OF Lemherg
Both north and south the Russians
were in peril OF a thanking attack
at right angles to their main front.
The outlet from this pocket might
Seem wide enough for safety. for II
was about 325 miles from German
wing to wing. But right In the rear
o. the Russians were the grea;
Pripet marshes. almost leo miles
across. penetrated by only one trunk
railroad and BY few roads. and at
this time OF year almost impassable.
ON either side Of this obstacle ran
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30
GREAT FORTRESS
CUT OFF

In the meantime Sieroc and Seger-
she had fallen. also Donnie: Novo
Georgievsk had been cut off from all
sides. The capture OF this fortress
was entrusted by the field marshal
to General Won Beseler. The troops
of the Ninth and Twelfth armies
investing Novo Georgievsk were
placed under his command. He also
received considerable number OF the
heaviest Austro-Hungarian how.
tiers.
The plans for the capture OF Novo
Georgievsk, the direction OF the
Eighth and Tenth armies. the attack
on kovno and the situation In
Lithuania and Courland made fur
Their great demands on myself and
my staff. Altho we had not had
the same free hand In conducting the
operations Of the summer campaign
Of 1915 as In previous campaigns.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30

ecanzsnssisn countrie.
The withdrawal Of the Russian
! fFunt In Galicie. however painful u
Twas for them. did not result In any
)necinive military victory. They
Withdrew. fighting all the way, just
n far ~ we could venture 10 sd
vance. having regard to our com
munirasions. They were not yet
fighting on their own soil. and until
that stage had been reached they
ruuld afford 10 abandon large areas.
Mereover. In these frontal engage
memfs our losses were not inconsidsr-
sbl<.
II remained to be seen whether
other plans would not hold out better
prospects. We could add nine or 10
divisions to Gallwitz's detachment
(north OF Warsaw. which had now
developed into the Twelfth army, for
4 concentrated offensive In the d.
erection OF the Lower Narcw. but we
had no great hopes Of this. IL was
TO be assumed with certainty that the
Russians. at the best. would offer
resistance. and then withdraw az
they had done in Galicia.
In theory the operations which we
had contemplated after the winter
campaign seemed more promising;
that IL. press forward along the
Osowiec-Grodho line. and perhaps
Also past Lomza- t5uch blow
would he directed from the south
east corner Of East Prussia 70 the
rear OF Warsaw and the Vistula po-
sitionsJ
such a movement might have had
Iecfsive results. II was by far the
shortest way TO the rear OF the Rus.
nan forces which were retreating
from East Galicia between the Wis
lula and the Bug. We reconnoitred
the syamps on either side OF Osowiec
m the hope Of finding some way
ACROSS. but. az we had foreseen, the
results were unsatisfactory. The
condition Of the ground put all
thought OF crossing there out OF the
question.
we had TO reckon on strong resist
.uce ON the Osowicc-G rodno line, q
very strong tactical position in itself
and presumably strongly held. We
could not expect to overcome this re
distance and the other difficulties
which lay before ms. II was with the
deepest regret that felt myself un-
able 10 agree to such an offensive,
even 1t tho suggestion OF general
headquarters.
Every operation further TO the
north Increased the distance from
the decisive point southeast OF
Crodno. This disadvantage would
have To be counteracted by speed. 80.
pecialIy II the rate OF the enemy re.
treat was accelerated. In that case
the enemy flank was more and more
likely 10 be found in the direction
OF wilma, Minsk. a big German adj
vance between Grodno Kovno would
not be sufficiently effective in itself.
We should find ourselves In a cul
de sac.
II seemed more advisable, In the
first instance, to take Kovno by a
direct attack Of the Tenth army
from the west, and simultaneous
enveIoping movement by the Niemen
army from the north. Since this
fortress had fallen, the corner stone
Of the Russian defense on the Me
man. the road 10 wilma. and to the
rear Of the Russian forces, would be
open. They would then have 10 re-
treat with all possible speed.
II the Nieman army ana the Tenth
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30
HEAVY FORCE
CONCENTRATED

In accordance with the instructions
from general headquarters. prepare.
tons for the crossing of the Narew
were now begun on an extensive
scale. Not only the Twelfth army.
but the right wing OF the Eighth
army also were got into position. so
that the Twelfth army should ad
vance between the Vistula and the
Schkwa with Pultusk. Roshan az their
objective, and the Eighth army
should reach the river between the
Schkwa and the mouth OF the Piasa
General Won Gallwitz decided TO
make his opening move on either side
of Prasnysz go miles north OF War.
saw. In preparation for the attack
we had concentrated. especially In
the area OF the Twelfth army. what
was then for the Eastern front. a
very large amount OF heavy artillery.
n.udendorffs description OF the
forces involved shows Callwitz had
upward OF 100000 men for this
drive.)
Both armies began the attack on
July 10. Thanks to tho careful Or
gapization by tho army headquarters
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30

with the right wing moving up the
Bug. In this way il came into close
touch with the Eighth army, which,
after the fall OF Ostrolenka on
August 5. had gained more ground
on the southern bank of the Narew.
and was now advancing with Lomza
as its objective
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30
HE IL AGAIN
OvERRtI.ED

fhF from INC great bAtIrftetd IN
Poland. the Nlemen army had also
started an offensive IN the middle Of
July and made great progress east
ward.
! was now quite convinced that the
time had come TO initiate the move.
ment I had recommended. a move
msnt on the Lower Nirmen against
kovno. followed By an attack In fun
force In the rear Of tho Russian
armies. The troops could be taken
from Woyrsch's detachment and the
Ninth. Twelfth and Eighth armies.
We had delays quite long enough
already. The taking Of kovno would
take time and the Russian retreat
IN Gaiicia was already FAR advanced
But II seemed stu possible 20 achieve
great things. at any rate. something
bigger than could be effected by the
operations then in progress These
could end IN nothing more than
pure frontal west.cast retirement Of
the enemy.
General headquarters stuck 10
their point Of view and still preferred
their movement over the Nistula and
>arew. We were not allowed TO
weaken the armies engaged In that
operation for the benefit Of the Tenth
and Niemen armies. Whether eur
general staff. for reasons connected
with the general military situation,
no longer wished to embark upon
such nm extensive and far reaching
plan as that we had suggested. II IL
impossible for me To say.
The Ninth. Twelfth and Eighth
armies continued 20 advance on the
strength settled BY general head.
quarters. Preparations for the at.
tack on Novo Georglevsk were he
gun. At the same time we decided
10 take Kovno. and the Niemen army
continue its attacks IL all went we'll
A. ! had expected. the operations
Of the allied armies In Poland 60 the
east Of the NistuIa meant purely
frontal pressure ON the enemy and In.
cesssnt fighting. Repeated efforts 10
enveiop the Russians ended In a fail.
urr. The Russian armies were Ger.
tainIy kept on the move. but they es.
capped.
They frequently made fierce
counter attacks with strong forces,
and again took advantage OF the
many marshy areas in the neighbor.
hood Of rivers and streams 20 rally
and offer prolonged resistance.
Owing TO the continuous movement
for many weeks on bad roads and.
generally speaking. IN bad weather.
the strain on our troops was ire
mendous. Clothing and boots were
In rags and tatters. Supply was
difficult II was almost impossible
to find billets. as the Russians sys.
tematicalIy destroyed or burned
stores and villages. They drove the
cattle before them and left them TO
die on the high road.
The population which they carried
off with them were driven into the
swamps at the sides OF the road IL
they blocked the way. Many scenes
in the Russian campaign have been
indeiibly imprinted on my memory.
The supply and transport con.
dtions became moro unfavorable
from day TO day. especially with the
Twelfth army. which was getting
further and fupther away from it's
railhcad. Communications with the
rear were improved for the Eighth
army after the capture Of Lomza.
Osowiec. II was then possible, but
stll very difficult. 10 send supplies
from that side.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30

staff and the excellent spirit OF the
troops II was entirely successful.
General Won Gallwitx's divisions
gained ground. got right into the
encmy'a system OF defenses, and con
tinued 60 press forward. ON the
18TH. after heavy fighting. n strong
rear guard position was stormed.
and by the 18th the Narew had been
reached. while the right wing had
arrived northwest OF Move Geor-
gievsk. crhe line was now from rs
TO IS miles north OF Warsaw. an ad'
vance OF about so miles In two daysl
SAW THE BATTLE
BEGIN
The field marshal and | were pres.
battle OF the 18th and tsth. we were
most favorabiy impressed by both
leaders and troops. The Twelfth
army like the Eleventh army In
West Galicia. had gained a great deal
OF ground In the first attack,
On the Narcw. - had been the
case on the san, a pause In the opor'
atoms now cnsued. pultusk and
Roshan were stormed on July %.
ostrolcnka was taken on August 4,
and thus the crossing OF the Narcw
on a wide front was secured. trhe
Germans were now across the Me.
men ON a t0.mile llnel other forces
moved against Sioroc and Segershe
north OF Narcw about Is miles north
OF Warsaw. 40 that as soon as these
works were taken. Noyo Georgievsk
(thc strong fort guarding warSawl
could be cut OFF from the north.
east.
The Russians offered stubborn re.
slstancs everywhere and suffered
very heavy losses.
The Ninth army and General Won
WoyrHch's detachment had also gone
forward In the Polish bend Of the Wis.
tula. Noyrsch's detachment had
beaten the Russians on the llshanka
and near Radon. occupied Radon on
July 10. and forced the Russians 10
retreat behind the Nistuia. As a con.
sequence OF this on July 81 the Rus.
slams north OF the f'illca also retreat.
ed behind the vlstula and the outer
drfcnsea OF Warsaw. Tho Ninth
army. which was Htill weak, now adj
vaneed to the attack OF this position.
Their further mission was 90 cut off
Move Georgleesk from the south
Between the Upper Hug and the
vistula the allied armies gained fur
Their ground 10 the north in success.
s!yc frontal attacks.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30

Club breakfast at the Butler start
ing at 10 cents. Satisfaction ~
sured.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30
my THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS"
BY Gen. Eric Won Ludendorff


and
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30

All the world believes that Luden.
dorff and Hindenburg were In full
command OF the great German drive
against the Russians in the summer
OF 1915. They were supposed TO be
paramount on the Eastern front
Ludendorff reveals. however. that
they had a big row with the chief OF
the great general staff. General fnlk'
enhayn. close favorite of tho
kaiser: that L.udendorff's battle plans
were vetoed by the kaiser. and that
soon after the advance began they
were even deprived OF command OF
two of the German armies engaged.
Mackensen. who had broken the
Russian army In GalIcia. was made
independent OF them. and Prince
Leopold OF Bavaria was also given a
separate command.
Tirplfx has thrown a sideiIght on
this state OF affairs. A great intrigue
had been under way TO make linden
burg chancellor and Ludendorff chief
OF STAFF. Even the kaiserin had been
enlisted In the effort 20 upset Beth
-fioiiwcg and the inner court
circle. Humiliation OF the command.
ers In the East was the answer Of
the kaiscrs favorites They made
Ludendorff follow their strategy in.
stead OF his own. lie obeycd orders
but he makes no bones Of saying the
Falkenhayn strategy was immensely
costly to Germany and OF insisting
that his own plan would have been
much more coatly TO Russia.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30
ARMIES TAKEN
FROM HIM

Operations continued In accordance
with the plans of the general starr.
AT the end OF July Cholm and Luoiin
fell into our hands. Further east we
were not making much progress. and
thus gave the Russians time TO with
draw troops from the salient we were
making In their line and send them
south to form a new front.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30

and the most strenuous efforts on
the part OF every individual cannot
stave off the stage of exhaustion, the
will of the commander is equally
powcrless.
The lines OF communication became
longer and longer; they far exceeded
the one hundred and twenty kiio-
meters go miles) which we had re-
garded as the extreme limit. the en-
tente were better off during their DIG
attacks In the summer of 1918. Ihey
had numerous railway connections
running direct from behind their
front line and were able to bring
up their enormous supply OF mum
tons continuously and thus support
their infantry effectively. Motor
transport enabled the infantry to re-
cuperate in good. well-furnished
billets, and return to the line again
and again with renewed vigor.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30

army could receive even small rein
forcements az the right moment and
be supplied with sufficient transport
IL was to be hoped that they could
fall on the northern flank OF the re.
treating host. win wilma. with such
force that the summer campaign Of
1915 would end in a decisive defeat
OF the Russian armies. Tho harder
we pressed our advance from East
Galicia into the area east Of the Bug
the more likely were we 10 achieve
this success.
KAISER REPEATS
HIS PLANS
The attack on Kovno was faclii.
tated by the fact that our line had
been so far advanced that II was
possible to bring our heaviest artil-
iery into position.
The preparations for the opera.
lions against kovno were Just about
to be begun when his majesty coin
manded me and the field marshal
to 70 10 Possn for July I. Here. at
the suggestion Of the chief Of the
general staff. and after having heard
the field msrshaI's proposals. the
kaiser decided that the Polish often.
sive should be continued, and. In par.
ticular. that the Twelfth army
should break thru the enemy line
facing them. and push ON to the
Narew. while the Ninth army and
General Won Woyrsch should advance
toward the vistuls.
Our general staff believed that In
these operations part Of the Russian
forces still in the bend OF the Vistula
could be annihiiated. I had 10 keep
my views 10 myself and hope that
the movement wanted would be
carried out when General Won Gall.
witt had reached the Narrow, and
found that he also could only make
progress by means OF frontal attacks.
I thought that even then there would
still be time to put 1t into execu-
ton.
The advance Of our line in
Lithuania and Couriand by the
troops already there might serve az
favorable introduction 10 the op.
GRAFTON. But we had to abandon any
idea Of getting the reinforccmcnts
hitherto carmsrked for Courland and
f.kfne I<oyno
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30

but followed the plans laid down by
instructions OF general headquarters.
there still remained an enormous
amount of work for me to do. and
the necessity of forming and ex-
ecuting a number Of decisions. both
great and small.
Added to this there were differ
ences Of opinion with General won
Falkenhayn. such rs are only too
likely to occur between men Of indie
pendent views. but which made Il
more than ever incumbent ON me to
carry out most punctiIiously the
plans Of general headquarters, which
were opposed to mine. rather than
my own or those that conceded with
mine.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-30

the supply lines OF the Russians. al
ready dangerously congested by the
necessities OF the army of about l.
100000 which the grand duke had on
the Polish front A drive from the
south, 90 the east OF the River nus,
could have cut the main trunk line
and roads by a gain OF 80 miles. To
the north drive OF i75 miles thru
kovno. Wilma and the country west
OF Minsk would cut all the remaining
outlets.
That was the great scheme Of
Iudondorff, II was repetition on
n colossal scale OF the strategy that
had destroyed two Russian armies In
the battles OF Tanncnberg and the
Mazurian lakes. IL was the sort OF
thing he had tried against the British
in 1918. when he sought 90 drive
them against the sea.
II was risky. lie had TO fling his
left wing far out in the north and
IL might be caught between the Rus.
SLAMS rctrcating and relief forces
coming from the Riga district. Yet
the Russian right wing had been
weakened to send forces 20 the south
and there was good chance Of sue
cess. AT any rate. he could have
made the Russian retreat much more
prcclpltate and the German booty
much larger and the German losses
probably much smaller than they
were in the cautious advance Inn
posed on him by the general staff.
This drive aimed at cnveloping the
Russians by marching across lines
north of Warsaw. where they were
strongest and best prepared. II fall.
ed and the Russians got away 10
form new lines against which the sx.
hausted Germans threw themselves
in vain.