The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-12-08


 ---------------- state? They and their people could only gain enormously in strength and resolution by witnessing such a spec tacle. How necessary must peace be to Germany when she literally ran af- ter such people and put up with open propaganda against her and her army.
 This was bound to be the effect in every neutral and enemy country. How could the entente leaders, above all men like Clemenceau and Lloyd George. be afraid of peace when we allowed ourselves to be treated thus by un- armed Russian anarchists? They would cease to feel any anxiety and come to the conclusion that they ran no risk from us at all. How that would affect the peace feeling among such enemies there could be no doubt.
 BAD EFFECT ON THE ARMY
 Nor did the soldier at the front un- derstand all this talk that went on for weeks on end. seemed to serve no practical object and produce no tangi- ble result. What he had achieved at the expense of his last ounce Of strength, and fin n thousand forms of distress and danger, he naturally wished to see utilized with energy and to good purpose.
 And what was here at stake was the first peace, the result of which was awaited with no less interest at the front than it was at home. Surely we must at last take some decisive steps. That alone would clear matters up, both at home and abroad.
 In the meantime it had become evil dent that Trotzky did not represent the whole of Russia, not to mention Ru- mania On January 12 delegates ar rived at Brest from the Ukraine, and took up a position completely opposed to the bolsheviks. They were sup ported mainly by General Hoffmann and gave the representatives of the quadruple alliance an opportunity of opening separate negotiations. These were of a practical nature, and were not lost in the mists of fantastic proj- ects which take centuries to work out. if they are ever worked out at all.
 FOUND TROTZKY TOO AGILE
 On January 30 negotiations with Trotzky were resumed at Brest-
 Now began a most curious situation. for everything was ordered in accord ance with his ideas.
 However, the diplomats themselves seemed to perceive that discussions with him let to no result Secretary of State von Kuhlmann and Count Czer- min proceeded to interrupt the negotia- tions and were back in Berlin on Feb ruary 4. Discussion with the Ukraine was continued on the principle that 1T bound itself to supply Austria-Hun- gary and Germany with large quantl- ties of grain in return for which It was to receive a favorable frontier against nf ChOlm In addition, Austria-Hungary prom ised to create an Ukrainian crown-land in Eastern Galicia-
 In order to discuss the situation with Herr von Kuhlmann and Count Czer- min had also gone to Berlin early Tn February. At our interviews on the 4th and 5th I received from the for mer a promise that he would break with Trotzky 24 hours after signing the peace with the Ukraine. From all I heard I was confirmed in my impression that bolshevik Rus sia did not really want peace at all It had set it's hopes on the entente and on the gradual. spread of the revolution in Germany, and did not believe we would take any action.
 BIG STRIKES IN GERMANY
 Their hopes must have been con- flrmeQ DY the SI1lheS WHICH LII OhO Oo | in this connection in Berlin at the end of January, 1918, against the will of prominent labor leaders So close. even, was the connection between a part of our labor movement and the bolshe- viks.
 The men at the head of It. and the most influential part of the socialist press, both of whom afterward opposed the bolsheviks, had not yet recognized that fact. At that time, it is true, the object was still to combat the com mon enemy, the established authority, and thus consciously or otherwise to undermine the foundations of the country. When afterward this object was attained and these people had themselves become the masters, the spark they had started had become a devouring fire.
 At the discussion in Berlin Count Czernin explained the reasons which had led him to agree to a peace with the Ukraine which was undoubtedly disadvantageous to the dual monarchy, and might be expected to arouse strong opposition from Poland. For this req son he requested us to keep the polit- ical settlement more or less secret AUSTRIA HAD TO HAVE FOOD He said the food situation in Aus trin-Hungary was so bad that. owing to the ever-decreasing supply from Ru- mania, they must starve unless they obtained corn from the Ukraine. The Austrian director of supplies, General Lnndwehr, supplemented this statement
 with details about the army, and asked me If I could help.
 As. in spite of our own very seri- ous situation, Herr von Waldow thought we could still help to limited extent, I could raise no objection. What then heard appeared to me most seri- ous. and must have made deep inn pression on the other gentlemen who had to deal with these matters. Another matter we discussed was the old Austro- Polish solution. This time I was more of listener. To my satis- faction the Secretaries of State von Stein and Count von Rodern, as we'll as several other gentlemen, opposed it on economic grounds The protective belt was unimportant.
 The Austro-Hungarian ambassador,