Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-12-14
RaMr and SeIf-Sacrifice Pre-
vented Enemy From Con-
tinuing Until 1919.
COMMANDER OF 4. E. F.
ENC
aREP0RTS TO Mr.. BAKER
Submits Detailed Account of Amer
hnican Army's Operations in
ls1S-
fe6, France From 1917.

made 1t Impossible Tor the enemy 10
maintain the struggle until 1912 is
contained in the report of Gen. Perish =
ing ito Secretary Baker of the War
Department.
While not specifically making the
sthrement that the American troops
really won the war. Gen. Pershine
strongly intimates that such was the
case
Despite the lack of proper equip
mefft. which at times was soreIv need
ed4-especially an adequate number of
afSpfanes-the Yank forces. in addi-
ti1p to stimulating the morale of the
r6Dps of the allies. blazed a trail of
glory which ultimately spelled vic
tory for righteousness and humilia-
tiol. for the kaiser's forces.
TWENTY-FIVE American and four
Frepch divisions" says Gen. PERISH
ling had engaged and decisively
ioaAten forty-seven German divisions.
representing IS per cent of the
eneny's entire divisional strength on
the western front. Of the enemy di-
visions twenty had been drawn from
the French front and one from the
British front. OF the TWENTY-FIVE
AftfsFican divisions twelve had at
various times during this period
tSeptember rs to November IL, 1879
beer engaged on other fronts than
IourOwn. The first army had suffer- ed
a less of about 1900 in killed and
wounded: it had captured $4,000
prisoners. SAT cannon. 5000 machine
guns and large quantities of ma
teffal'
- Appeal for Armistice.
| With the SSiAefican Army holding
the heights dominating Sedan. the re-
pert safd.a and the German line of
cations definitely sundered.
'FeDgn1zIps that nothing but cessa-
ton. OF FESTIVITIES could save his
armies from conn lete disaster the en-
stsss cSosss Ser s." '''e'A'e a''H'
Cen. ershpg report follows in de-
tan fha .gTowth of the American
OVERSEAS Tf9teeS from the date of his
depsrtVFe Witk;a small staff. May Is
100000 men: Every step of organi-
zaffen, every conference with the al
Hed generals and the important de-
cisio1v5ffa Ghed are recorded.
Inc document, comprising PAM
phleS q hoss 100 pages. or IS. 900 words.
IS divided INTO three sections: Pc
riod of Organization Operations
and Supply, Co-ordinations and Ad-
miniStTation."
sum mariziag the military situation
whieASkSSsedsi in the spring of 1917,
wH*8f1tAs Emitted States aligned itself
with the allies. Gen. Pershing said:
In tRenfFe months ending June 80,
1d7, ~Sefn1an subnhar ines hnd ac-
complished the destruction of more
than 3.250,000 tons of allied shipping.
Qurfte tAree yeas Germ ny had s,--n
praf theHlSI all her offensives except
NH5Asfn 56fewhed with success Her
bA&tfG vi nes- were held on foreign soil
apM AAeI ha4 withstood every attack
si4eei thea5Marne. The German gen.
erAE setHf could foresee now the COM
q48tS ehAsHation of Russia, the DOS
siEgf9e ofsdefeating Italy before the
eEdref the year and, finally. the cam
pa5sT of 1SfS against the French and
R4dtish:en she western front, which
n5izh discriminate the war.
Financial Problems DimcuIt.
jpeqqaalz problems of the allies
Wze etaifa@t, supplies were becoming
e4Haustetfa and their armies had suf-
fSfS0 tgefn endous losses. Discourage
nH&4t asxstnd not only among the civil
phbubStips-zbut throughout the armies
aSYoS1rs
within one month of his arrival Gen.
Pex$Ains recommended definitely that
100000 men should be in France be-
fore MaxS19lS, il being evident that
"a force0f one million is the small
est unit which in modern war will be
complete, we'll balanced ard 1nde-
pendeot, fighting organization" Plans
for thassuture, the recommendation
added. Should be based on three times
this fpgce.'
ThS. general was equally specific in
choosing the ground for American OPP
CATIONS. He says:
-Four emission was offensive, and II
Nas essential to make plans for strik-
Hg the enemy where a definite mill
ry DECISION could be gained While
Re allied armies had endeavored to
Haintain the offensive, the British. ia
4der~ guard the channel ports.
Xere cbmmftted to operations in
HanderSsand the French to the por-
Qpn of the front protecting Paris.
pth lacked troops to operate else
The5e on a large scale.
~ the east the great fortified dis
t&ict east of Verdun and around Metz
nenAcee central France protected the
4oSf s$posed portion of the German
ne OF coInmunications-tha between
Aetz andS Sedan-and covered the
Ffey iron region. from which the
enemy obtained tbs greater part of
material The coal fields east of Metz
also were covered by these same de-
lenses. A deep advance east of Metz.
or the capture of the Briey region,
German territory in the MoseIle val
ley and the Saaf basin. thus curtaiI-
ing her supply of coal or iron. would
have decisive effect in forcing a
withdrawal of German troops from
northern. France. The military and
economic situation of the enemy,
therefore. indicated Lorraine as the
field promising the most fruitful re-
suits: for the employment of our
armies"
engineers Drew First Blood.
American arms drew first blood, the
REPORT shows. at Passchendaele ridge,
November $40, 1917, when the 11th
En- ineers Joined the British in a sue
cessful attack which was part of a
general operation desi gned ito hinder
the German conquest of Russia and
to prevent. if possible. an attack on
Italy, or in the near east"
So afterward, however, came the
collapse of Russia and the italian
dSbecle at Caporetto. with the result
mat the enemy's legions began to
gather thicklv in France Allied com
nhanders viewed the situation with
ffank apprehension, Gen. Pershing's
rfport indicates. and the pressure for
accelerated movement of American
divisions was felt from all sides. At
the same time came the suggestion
that American units be brigaded with
Hrench and British in order that no
time be wasted in training. In this
Q4nnection the general reports:
fMy conclusion was that. although
tie morale of the German people and
Of the armies was better than it had
been for two years, only an untoward
cembination of circumstances could
ave the enemy decisive vic
tery before American support, as
recommended. could be made eff
flctve, provided the allies Sc
cbred unity of action. However, q
SITUATION might arise which would
n4cessitate the temporary use of all
American troops in the units Of our
allies for the defensive, but nothing
il the situation justified the relin-
enlistment of our firm purpose to
fyrm our own Army under our own
n4g.
Limited to Trench Warfare.
6While the Germans were practic-
I'M Tor open warfare and concentrat.