New-York tribune., 1919-02-05

The Balance of Power

Ever since the President denounced
the principle of the balance of power
there has been much loose and ill-in-
formed comment on the subject. Many
have assumed that he spoke as an his
torian no less than as a statesman and
that study of the history OF the prin-
ciple would vindicate his attitude. But,
although he has written some interest
ing and valuable historical volumes, he
has never dealt, except casually, with
European historical questions, and his
authority on these is not comparable, of
course, with that of writer's like Profess
sor Oman, Mr.. Pollard and Mr.. Prothero
When NJ. Clemenceau said the other day
that he was not disposed to abandon the
principle of the balance of power he was
undoubtedly expressing view that has
wide currency in Europe; and he was
neither ignorant nor presumptuous in
doing so, still less "reactionary," as
some of Mr.. Wilson's admirers would
have us believe
The balance of power may not be an
especially happy phrase. 1t has two his
meaning was, in the words of Lawrence
that a sort Of international equilibrium
of forces had been established, and that
any state that attempted to destroy its
nice adjustments might be attacked by
others whose relative Importance would
carry out its projects" The newer
meaning is that no one state must be-
come SO powerful as to be constant
menace to its neighbors through its
schemes to dominate the world There
is, it will be seen, a considerable differ
ence between the two ideas.
These nice adjustments" were the
concern of European diplomacy for two
centuries. On three great occasions
they were made very carefully-the
Peace Of Westphalia, in 1913; the Peace
Of Utrecht, in 1713, and the Congress of
Vienna, in 1915. They failed because
they were too rigid and took little ac-
count of changing conditions. War has
again and again changed the face of the
map, but peace has shown that no map
can be made permanent. If, therefore,
the balance of power must be SO care
fully prescribed that quid pro quo for
every advantage gained by one nation
must be offered to the rest, the result
is a condition not of stable but Of un-
stable equilibrium. That is to saw. we
have constant diplomatic negotiations, if
not military interventions, perpetually
threatening conflicts on large scale.
The War of the Spanish Succession IL
mstrates how an imaginary peril may
bring about a needless struggle When
the allies endeavored to make the Arch
duke Charles King Of Spain in order to
prevent Philip V from uniting two
crowns in one person, if he succeeded
to the throne of France, they were, in
fact doing their best to create the evil
they feared. Charles became Emperor.
whereas Philip never became King Of
France. And Charles as Emperor and
King would have been more powerful
than Philip as King Of Spain and
France
On the other hand, the principle of the
balance of power, when it has operated to
form alliances against force threatening
TO the security of other nations, has un-.
deniably been Of considerable benefit to
the world. 1t restrained the overween
ing ambitions both of Louis XIV and of
Napoleon. In both cases, it may be re-
marked, Great Britain bore the chief
burden. William III, who was never
popular in England, risked much in per-
suading the English people against their
will that isolation was dangerous and
that 1t was national duty to fight on
the Continent for their island liberties.
Pitt was bitterly attacked for war
that cost England so MANY lives. Yet
both revealed the highest oreer Of states
naans1lp in insisting that it was the duty
OF England to save herself by saving
Europe. And in the war just ending
England has performed that duty with
stanch fidelity and courage
The Presidents opposition to the bal
ance Of power is doubtless prompted by
q consideration Of the evil effects which
/, have flowed from it under certain con-
ditions. Thus, the members Of the Con-
gresg OF Vienna we're undcniably SIN
eere In their purpose TO restore and pre-
serve peace. They took pains to pre-
vert, 70 far az they could, the unjust
aggrandizement Of any one nation. But
they made two serious mistakes. One
was In assuming that the relative power
Of nations could remain constant
guantity that the hard and fast lines
they laid down would or could endure
the stress Of legitimate national ambi-
tiong. The other was in alIotting terri
r