The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1919-11-01

point of view he regards the present moment as more favorable than a lat CT one. He quite agrees that we tn- form neither Italy nor Roumania of an eventual action against Serbia. On the other hand, Italy should at once be informed by Germany and by our Government of the intention of bring ing about the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance"
 War was actually decided upon at the Council of Ministers held at Vien- na on July ', the secret minutes of which are printed in M. Coos book It was presided over by the Foreign Minister, Count BerchtoId, who open ed the proceedings with a speech in which he said that the council had been called to deliberate on the meas ureS which should be employed to correct the inner political troubles that had arisen in Bosnia and Herze- govina in consequence of the catas- trophe of Sarajevo. To begin with, they must have a clear idea wheth- CT the moment had not come to rem der Serbia forever Innocuous by a display of force. Such a decisive stroke could not be delivered with out diplomatic preparations. Conse- quently he had got into touch with the German government. The discus sions in Berlin had led to a very sat- isfactory result, as both Kaiser Will helm and Herr Bethmann-Ho Hollweg had assured him of unconditional support They had still to reckon with Italy and ROumania, and here, in agreement with the Berlin Cabinet, he was of opinion that it would be best to act and to await any claims to compensation that might be put forward. It was quite clear to him that a passage of arms with Serbia might have war with Russia as it's consequence. But Russia was at pre- sent pursuing a policy which aimed at uniting the Balkan States with the object of playing them off against the monarchy when the moment seemed favorable. He was of the view that their situation must deteriorate in consequence of such a policy. The logical conclusion was that we must anticipate our opponents, and by prompt settlement with Serbia. A pro- cess was now developing in which it would be impossible to undo lat CT.
 The Hungarian M1nister-President, Count Tisza, whose reputation Is to some extent rehabilitated by these disclosures, was the only member of the Council to urge caution and mod eration. He said he would never agree to surprise attack on Serbia without preliminary diplomatic action, such as seemed to be contem plated, and, as was to be regretted, had been dis cussed in Berlin by Count Hoyos (bearer of the letter from Emperor Franz Josef, already mentioned), since, according to his opinion in this event Austria would stand very bad l ly in the eyes of Europe, and in all probability would have to count on l the hostility of the enti1e Balkan pen 1 insLIa with the exception Of Bulgaria. 1 He insisted that demands must be presented to Serbia, and recourse had l to an ultimatum only in case they were not fulfilled. These demands
 must be harsh, but not of such a character that it would be impossible | for Serbia to accept them. It waS, not 1 Germany's business to decide whether | Austria, should take action against | Serbia at that moment. Personally he was of the opinion that there was no | absolute necessity for the adhesion l of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance.
 The most promising possibilities of l successful diplomatic action in the 1 Balkans had been opened out.
 To this Count Berchto1d remarked
 that, whereas diplomatic successes
 against Serbia might temporarily
 raise the prestige of the monarchy,
 a permanent improvement of the sit l uatien was only to be secured by eI--
 ergetie action.
 l The Austrian Premier, Count Stu | ergk, said that, while it was not the 1 business of the German Government 1 to decide whether war was necessary or not. it should have great weight | In their decision that in the quarter | which they must regard as the most | trustworthy support of their policy in the Triple Alliance, the unreserved fidelity of the ally had been promis- ed, and moreover, after inquiries had been made immediate action had been advised, Count Tisza should consider | and realize the significance of the l circumstances that, by a policy of hesitation and werkness, they ran the
 risk of no longer being Sure of this 1 unreserved support of the German Empire at a late period. He also
 shared the opinion of the chairman
 that the situation could be in no way improved by diplomatic success. If,
 therefore, for international reasons
 the method of preliminary diplomatic
 action should be chosen, 1t must be
 with the firm intention that this ac-
 ton was to end in war.
 Herr Belinskf, the Joint Finance Minister, said he had never doubted
 that in the event of war Germany
 would stand by them. AS long age
 as November, 1912, they had received
 most binding assurances to this eff
 feet from Herr Tschtrsky (Germar
 Arnbassa dor at Vienna). If the Hun. l garian MiniSter-President were to sat
 isfy himself with a diplomatic success
 he would not be considering Bosnian
 interests. The Serb was only amend.
 ble to violence. A diplomatic succes: : would make no impression in Bosnia Austria's Evil Intentions.
 The War Minister General Kroba
 tin) took the view that a diplomatic
 success would be va1ueless. From the military standpoint he must empha size that 1t would be better to have war at once than at a later period With respect to the mode of ths commencement of war he must Ia! } stress on the fact that the two big gest wars of recent years-the Russo ! Japanese, as well as that in the Bal
 kans-had both been begun withou } the mobilization contemplated agains previous declaration of war. He wa | of the opinion that in advance onl, Serbia should be carried and tha f the general mobilization should b