The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1919-07-21

Co.,, of Philadelphia.)
 MT. Roots letter to MT. Lodge raises two questions that will bear discussion. He suggests reservations instead of amendments in the ratif1- cation, and says that they need not
 and will not delay the going into eff
 feet of the treaty of peace. He says
 that many precedents justify this view. This statement needs analysis
 in order to understand it and its
 weight.
 A treaty is a contract. The minds of the contracting parties must meet 1 before it becomes binding on either. One party cannot change the contract
 after the other has agreed to it, and
 bind the other party to the change.
 without the others acquiescenca in it-
 Strictly speaking, a reservation in the
 gnsent of the Senate to a signed
 treaty. thought the reservation be
 g-5,y one Of interpretation, must be
 -Jrcurred in by the other party if the
 ~eservation to to play any future
 part in construing the treaty. Other
 iSa, the reservation Is merely an in
 iectiVe expression of opinion by the
 nate. This was the case in the
 spanish treaty, where, after ratthca-
 -.un, the Senate passed a resolution l as to what is meant by the ratifca-
 tion. The Supreme Court held that it | had no effect in construing the treaty. | The ordinary procedure in treaty
 making is first the drafting and sign
 ing Of the treaty by the plenipoten-
 tiaries of the contracting govern
 ments. The signed duplicates of the
 treaty are referred back to the
 Governments, to be ratified by them.
 These notifications are then ex-
 changed between the contracting
 governments, and each government
 makes known, in its own way, the
 treaty thus agreed to. It is in the
 procedure of exchanging the ratiica-
 tions that such reservations as MT.
 Root speaks of are acquiesced in and
 become party of the treaty. If tho
 ratification of the United States, for
 instance, contains a reservation to
 which the Government receiving il
 makes no objection, it may be held
 to acquiesce in the reservation con tained in the ratification of the
 United States, and thus to agree to
 make it part of the treaty.
 There is no real distinction in prfn- | ciple between reservations and amendments; but important amend
 ments are not usually incorporated in l treaties in this easy, silent and sum- mary way. The nation receiving a | reservation in a ratification would !
 and conference if the reservation
 changes materially the obligations of 1 the parties to the treaty. The pre- 1 cedents to which Mir Root refers
 therefore, are not important in de-
 ciding the question which his letter , raises as to Article x, because the ! question in each case always is i whether the reservation or amend ment is so important that the other TfFv, ! without question. If they do not, 1 then negotiations must be resumed
 and the delay which Mir. Root seeks ! to avoid must occar. The issue, 1 therefore. is whether the other na- ] tions in receiving ratification of the . United States containing reserva- | ton refusing to consent to Article x, i and striking it out of the obligations
 of the United States under the treaty. 1 would accept the ratification, without 1 demanding, as they would have the
 right further negotiations before | consenting to this change.
 | The anxiety of France to strength | en her defense against Germany, ap- 1 parent throughout the proceedings | of the conference, indicates that she I would ask further conference. Her i representatives 1abored to secure a | provision in the League covenant | | t1onal police force would be constant | iy under arms and under a general l staff, to act instantly in defense of
 League members subject to unpro-
 voked attack. More than this, she secured the promise of MT. Wilson and MT. Lloyd George to present to | thelr respective governments a l special defensive treaty securing the | instant action of England and the ' T. in nf
 voked attack of Germany. We can l reasonably surmise. therefore, that 1 France would seriously object to | eliminating an article furnishing her some defense against such attack, | however short it may fall of her 1 earnestly expressed wish. | Moreover, other and smaller na- tions would probably object The importance of the article in the
 whole plan of the League is manifest. It is the inducement by which the weaker nations are brought into a League. The fact that the United l States, with its great prestige, it's dis l interestedness and its moral influence, | as well the military potentiality, | Is under the obligation of Article x, | constitutes the great cautionary and | miratory effect of that article, rnak- l ing it powerful an agency in re- | straining wars of conquest If the | United States is to back out of the | article, the League will be weaken ed. | The nations, great and small, in- | terested in the League, therefore. will not be likely to pass over such an amendment lightly, but will nat urally insist on re-examination of | the whole covenant when its char acter is thus materially changed. MT Roots argument that we should l refuse consent to Article x because | ome of our foreign born citizens nay object to our helping to disci- l line their native countries under he Article is a curious one in view the lessons of the war just ended. Ve probably had more natives from 1ermany than from any other coun- in our citizenship when we went war with Germany. Nothing came ,der more bitter condemnation than cir hxntanat ted citiZeueptp and their