Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-02-16
Calls Reflection
on Crozier Unjust.

A SAeSA ton conSid-
cradle adverse criticism of the bureau
of ordnance. results have shown that
the course of Gen. Crozier. then chief
of that department, was brilliant and
that it was due to his foresight ana
organizing ability that these results
We're attained.
The great outcry then was against
chan ing the standard of the military
rife; but the fact is that through the
course he adopted the Army was
well supplied with a rifle far superior
to the British Enfield which he was
urged to adopt with rush. That
course made possible the standardiza-
ton of ali small arm -amnlunition for
rife and machine gun, with the re-
suit that on the day the armistice
was signed the bureau of ordnance
had sent TO France more than two
billion cartridges for use in these
weapons and of shortage there was
never heard anything more than talk
There was a shortage Of automatic
boards so required to enable the men
and plants that were ready to produce
them to do more pressing work for
the government.
Many thought that Gen. Crozier was
taking a great risk when he con,
Browning machine gun-heavies and
lights; but in the end the Z. S. forces
were supplied with what has proved
unquestionably to be the very best
machine gun brought out in this
war. In the meantime through
purchase of the best machine guns
used by the allies. No American
troops went into action without an
adequate supply of the best man
killer of the war.
So effective did the light Browning,
the automatic" prove to be. that il
lis officially reported that in the later
fighting the troops would throw away
any other kind of light machine gun
for this weapon.
The fact is that while others then
could not be taken into the secret
Gen CroZier had been familiar with
the Browning guns for several years
/; knew their wonderful simplicity and
was convinced thoroughly that they
would come through" in quantity
production, which they did.
II is quite true that the ordnance
department did not produce any artiI-
lery that was in actual service
against the central powers; and it is
equally true that United States troops
were never short OF artillery for use
in action. Gen. Crozier had repeated
~ informed Congress that ii was i'm
possible with the government faci1i-
ties to produce guns in large numbers
uHOeT many months, ana TN reply OF
Congress was that the ordnance de-
partment must give no contracts for
ordnance to any civilian concerns,
with the result that when war did
come the national arsenais Were I'M
equal to the task of making guns for
an army OF a million men, and the
only private concerns that could as
/ sist the government We're MidvaIe
/ taken over by the Navy, and Beth
lehern.
ne
ton there was belief prevalent that
all that was required TO produce the
French 75s and other guns in this
| country was to receive from the
French their designs and the secret
of their recuperator. But there were
two elements in the secret of their
| gun-recoil system. One was the exact
/ nature of the device; and that they
| could and did give. The other element
\ was of a different nature; it was a
| system OF manufacture, the result
| of half a century OF training. That
| system required delicate and cornpii-
Gated machinery. That system could
| be operated only by body OF highly
/ gifted artisans trained from youth to
| the special work. Such body could
/ not be found elsewhere in the world
, certainly not on this side the Atlantic
/ In four years, with captured French
! guns in possession. Germany could
| not reproduce single one of the SUI
! perjor French Yecuperators
1 But that was not the worst The
regular Army had. despite two years
warning through war impending, been
kept on a strictly peaceful basis; and
/ Gen Cro2ier had not been permitted
; to expand the organization of the
| ordnance department to meet the ire
1 ulendous responsibility of threatened
| war production. All the officers of his
/ department sought foreign service;
! and he was left with ninety-six Of
! fcers to form the nucleus of the or
| ssanization which he had rapidly 10
+ expand 10 more than 1000 officers and
/ an army of assistants. Most of the
pew officers were civilians. placed in
! uniforms; and it is not surprising
/ that he could not in a few months
| make OF them a smooth running ma
| chine.
In this connection the senator from
1 New Jersey should have recalled that
! the War Department during this
period was not running at all; that
there was a steady effort to turn over
production for the Army to the Coun-
| ell of National Defense; and that
there was no organization whatever
of the production resources of the
country.
Since It was Impossible to obtain
artillery m this country the obvious
thing to do was to boy re where IL
could be bought: ana Gen Crozier
turned 10 France ard England. both
o. which countries v ere eaacf - oo-
~ ~. " q