The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-09-17

First armies from the line Anizy
southwest of Laon)-south of
Berry -au-Bac, in the direction of
| Soissons-Fismes-Rei
g. Prolongation of the attacks,
to the right. across the Ailette to-
wards the Disc, and to the left as
far as Reims
8. Attack by the Eighteenth ar
my west of the Disc, with its prin-
| cipal effort towards Compiegne.
! PLAN WAS TO WEAKEN FOES
front was impossible, as a part OF
the artillery employed in the attack
! on March 81 had to remain for defense
( with the group of Crown Prince Rup-
| precht.
How IA rthe attack would take ms
| could not be foretold. L hoped 1t would
/ lead to such an expenditure of force
\ on the part of the enemy would en-
able us to resume the attack on Flnnd-
| ers.
The group of Crown Prince Rup-
| precht was to remain purely on the
defensive although it was also to make
preparations for a real attack in Fland-
| ers, and, by way of feint. along its
whole front 1t was to be expected
| that in the coming period of rest its
divisions which had suffered and be-
come reduced in the fighting in March
and April, would recover and increase
again by getting back men who had
been wounded. and by the arrival of
something in the shape of reinforce
ments.
Should the enemy be obliged to en-
ploy considerable force against the
group of the German crown prince,
then a continuation of the offensive in
Flanders would be the proper opera
ton
On other parts of the western front
also, where it was not intended to at
tack, preparations were to be con-
tinued.
HAD OFFICERS STAY BEHIND \
1 hoped that the sense of duty and
determination of the army were still
strong enough to overcome the nu-
merous adverse influences. The loss
of many officers of senior and medium
rank during the last actions was bound
to make matters worse. as the very
young new officers suffered from their
natural defects. 1t was much the
same as regards experienced non-com-
mssioned officers.
We had reached such pitch that
before an action units detailed a re-
serve of leaders, who did not take part
in the fighting, in order that, there
might be some leaders left mt the end
OF 1t. German prisoners at that time
complained that their officers remained
behind in attacks).
It was necessary to instruct the
troops according to the tactical lessons
gained in the last fighting. These
were, more extended formations for in
fantry, greater Importance to be at
tached to the "soft-spot" tactics
(known to the allies as "filtering
through" at weak spots in line), bet
ter cooperation between groups and
companion arms, and between infantry
and artillery.
The Twenty eighth division and de-
tachments of the Third jaeger battalion,
troops that had had a particularly
thorough tactical training, were moved
to the neighborhood of Avesnes. The
details were discussed and practiced
with them, and then demonstrated to
large number of senior officers. in
Guiding most of the army commanders
and many corps commanders. In this
way recent experience was quickly
placed within reach of the whole army.
LONG SHOTS HARRASS FOES
All armies were specially instructed
to devote particular care to men and
horses in rest. Troops in the line could,
of course. not be spared as I should
have wished. Those in the new po-
sitions had a hard time; but the enc
my was no better off, although in
many places, particularly as regards
our troops on the old Somme battle
field, his billets were better than ours.
That was unavoidable. But we tried
to make up for it by bombarding many
places with long-range. guns and
bombing
In addition TO improvements in dis
cipline. much attention was paid to
vigorous training in rear of the whole
army, and in many parts of the actual
front.
The equipment Of the troops was
completed. Each infantry company,
which had hitherto had four light ma
chine guns, now received a fifth, as
we'll as improved rifle grenades. Ma
chine guns were issued to supply col
against aircraft, and the equipment of
the artillery with them was gradually
completed.
The first anti-tank rifles came In,
they were effective. hut unfortunately
very heavy and took two men to work
them; SO that meant the loss Of one
fffleman.
The mems rations. were sufficient,
but very inferior to those of the enc
my. Grazing turned out to be ia
vorable: the horses found enough to
eat and gained strength, but there was
not much corn. Health had SO far been
good. The first cases of influenza ap-
peared, but the medical officers CLASH
fled them as slight.
In the middle Of May we commenced
to concentrate the troops who were to
break through over the Chemin des
Danes. The preliminary work was
completed up to time. The artillery
was brought into action according to
Colonel Bruchmuller's proposals. which
were also adopted as regards the pre-
paratory artillery fire. cit was Col
the artillery for the breaks through at
and April).
BLAMES GERMAN GENERAL
I frequently visited the army COM
manders concerned and was most ia
vorably impressed.
On May 81 the attack began between
vauxillon and Lapignuel. OncS more
1t proved a brilliant success. had
thought we should only succeed in
reaching the neighborhood of Scissors
and Fismes. BY the second and third
days these detectives had in places been
left far behind.
We had gained ground especially be-
Beyond Fismes. not SO much beyond
scissors.
It was most reErettable that one
headquarters did not perceive the ia
vorable situation at Scissors, and that
we did not push ahead with the same
energy as at Fismes, although 1t would
ntf