The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-18

ers and staff officers. ms well as for
juniors. down TO tho group com
mandera. whose functions were no
important a factor In success. Mark
ed activity became apparent thru.
out the army. IL commenced with
recruit training and ended In cxer-
cises by formations or all arms. or
on tho ranges. The barrnge WAS
praeticed with live ammunition and
the infantry trained 10 follow close
behind IL.
Now. as ever. all commanders ~
garded improved discipline as the
foundation of our army and ~ all
success, II was rated the more highly
when IL was realised that tho home
influence on the army was bad. as
in peace. special importance was at
ached to individual training; excr.
ciacs were seldom carried out by
large forces OF all arms
Just as In the previous year every.
thing had been done 20 train the
army for defensive fighting. The
country IL indebted 10 the work Of
the officers and the wcllthoughto out
scheme OF training for the fact that
our losses In killed and wounded. tho
very great. were much less than
those OF the enemy.
According 60 rough estimate,
England snd France have lost far
more than two million killed aud
Russia as many. Taking half the
Russian casualties ms having oc-
CURED ON our front. which II prob
had far more than three million lin.
cd ~ compared with two million Ger
mans.
have included those killed on
other fronts. both our own and the
onemy's. This makes the proportion
we know. the more favorable viii Il
turn out 90 be. These numbers are
terribly high. but they prove that We
tried 20 fulfit our responsibilities to
wards the troops.
In preparing for attack we did not
forget defense. AS counter attacks
were 10 90 expected. The principles
OF defense were retained; wc only
laid greater stress on anti.Ank meas.
ures. Both In attack and defense the
auxiliary arms served this purpose
also. In the artillery. especially In
the case OF field guns and ilgtI
trench fnortara. training In direct
individual fire at tanks was eonsid
erred Of decisive importance.
The allotment OF srecial ammuni.
ton TO the heavy machine guns
was Increased more extensively. Ex-
pcriments a. destroying tanks with
multiple grenadcs were carried out
and all experiences gained In fight
ing them was communicated 10 the
troops. whose opinions were called
for
Our positions were examined as 70
their liability 20 attack by tanka.
traps and stops were made. bar
ricadcs consfructcd. mines put down
and anu-t1rk suns ddg In at many
points Naturally. the extent Of thers
defensive measures largely depended
upon the available labor and the
views Of the troops az 10 the hleii
hood 81 tank attack.
The war ministry kept us inform
I'd Of the progress in the manu-
faeture Of anti tank weapons. which
was pushed ON increasingly.
Once fnors spent much time ca
tho frcnt. ard In active Interchange
OF IDEAS with tho various army head.
quarters on tho tactics Of offensive
fighting. and en- tho attack itaclf.
Many proposals. and counter pro
poaais. many pros and cons were
lalc briore me. I can still recall the
discussions about the harrago and
the advanced xcne.
TROOPS SLOW
IN LEARNING
As was my duty. had To give the
ultimate de~isfon Tho tactical rrfu.