davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The Grenada sentinel. [volume] (Grenada, Miss.) 1868-1955, 1919-03-21
Al LIST.

In presence Of Statute Section
1916 Code 1906, | herewith submit
for publication the following list OF
DELINQUENT Polls for the fical year
1918.
W. II. CROWDER
Sheriff and Tax Collector of Gre
NADIA County State of Mississippi.
The Grenada sentinel. [volume] (Grenada, Miss.) 1868-1955, 1919-03-21
w. III. CROWDER

1918.
W. H. CROWDER
Sheriff and Tax Collector of Gre
NADIA County State of Mississippi
Akin Charlie; Allen Mitchell
Applewhite Charlie; Branch Walter
Bradberry Sam; Burt Aaron
Bland John; Bradberry Albert
Booker Randall; Blanford Tom
Booker John; Brown Jim
Brown Dan; BOstic r. S.
Beck ice; Bradberry John
Beard Mack; Bostic j. S.
CritZ w. P; Cobb H. r.
Cunningham G.. W.; Cain Rufus
Cummings Garfield; Craig Crawford
Clark Henry; Crowder VIM.
Grain Willie; Cummings Tom
Dumas VIM; Dickson Jack
Dunn Needle; Easily E.
Evans Will; Eesly Fred
Evans Sam; Fredrickson H.
Fox BraXton; Forest Beard
Fullilove, jim; Fitzgerald BaScoml
Fletcher Joe; Fitzgerald Augusta
Fulilove Mack; Forest Nose
Fox Robert; GOlliday William
Gilmore Nathan; Hemphill G. T.
Harper F. H.; Herley F. j.
Hamer Bob; Hawkins Columbus
Harris Buster; Hard Solomon
Hardiman Davis; Harris Green
Harris Will; Inman Surry
jackson John; Jones Ed
Johnson Ollie; Jiles Sam
Jones John; Jones Sandy
Jenkins Alfonzo; Johnson PreStiS
jackson Lacy; Jefferson Emmett
Kilgore Green; Ed Key
Lain r. W; Lamar w. L..
Leonard Preston; Lay Henry
Large Tom; Lofts Jessie
Leonard Rowland; Lee Will
Lewis Van Dorm; Leonard Willard
Moore T. H.; Martin S. O.
Maiett. Jack; headers f.. A. Jr..
Mitchell James; hurry John
Murphy Ed; Merritt Ed
Moreland John: Montgomery Will
Mckee +. B.; Mcfarland Buster
Mccain Luther; McDuff Henry
MsGce Joe; McClain Ed
McKoskill Dock; Niece Clarence
Nash Albert; Newsom Jake
Nash Green; Nash Ernest
Pendergrass J. w; Pope II. T.
Plumber William; Pratt William
Palmer William; Perry Guy
Pernell Alex; Perry Robert
Pryor viii; Pryor James
Pullman Gus; Pettibone Gilbert
Price Cicero; Perry John
Rosemond Steve; Ringo Ed
Riley Estelle; Randolph Tom
Riley Emmett; Rily Richard
Savage J. c.; Shippy J. M.
Stokes Henry; Soffon jeff
Sigh Lewis; Shaw Sylaster
Shaw Gilbert; Shelly Ed
Saulter David; Shaw Kendall
Sykes Floyd; Shegog John
Spencer Oliver; Saulter Tom =.
Starks Will; Suggs W. l..
Smith jim; Smith Russell
Sellers Braddock; Smith Jessie
Shipp Lawrence; Smith Henderson
Stepney Ernest; Thomas John
Thomas James; Thomas George
Turner E. J.;LTaylor Lead
Taylor Jack; Unger George
Wallace Monroe; Watson Monroe
White Henry Jr.; Wiley Richard
Winter Sam; Washington Peter {.
William Will; Vince Bob
Weathers Mathew; Wright Arthur
Weathers Edward; Weathers James
Wilbourn Robt.; Wood Scott
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19
The Political Problem,

The contact OF diplomacy with STRAIT
egy has always been one of tho most
important prerequisites of victory.
The German diplomacy Of 1870 has done
everything to insure victory for Ger
man strategy 1t had secured the neu-
trality of Russia In It's rear and the
neutrality Of Austria on its flank Tho
German diplomacy before the World
War had done everything to place Ger
man strategy in a most unfavorable po-
sition. Instead of preserving intact the
combination of the Dual Alliance
against the Triple Alliance. Wilhelm s
tireless policies brought about a sit
uation where German military STRAIT
egy oo~A.nu confronted with combina-
tion OF twenty-three states, and as u
result this strategy lost out.
During sae early stages OF the civil
war in Russia the anti Bolshevlst forces
wcro scattered on eleven fronts. Aside
from that, these forces were disunited.
thanks to their various and conflicting
historic and national programmes. 1t
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19

possible political ground for the carry
ing out Of their plan. Before the
launching Of the campaign against
Moscow the military situation of the
anti Bolshevik forces was similarly
bad. They were scattered on eleven
different fronts, between which there
were wedged In the forces Of the Reds.
Between the Esthonian front, opposite
Petrograd, and the Lettonian front.
near Riga, a stretch of 21O kilometres
was occupied by the Bolsheviki; a
space Of 120 kilometres, between the
Lettonian front and the Lithuanian,
near Kovno, was in the possession Of
the Reds; another distance OF about
100 versts between the Lithuanian and
Polish fronts, near Wilma. 10 versts
between the fronts of Poland and the
Ukraine and about 800 versts between
the Ukrainian front and the front Of
General Denikine-all Of Southern
Russia-were occupied by the Boil
sheviki
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19
Shooing the general the

moderate Socialists. Aside from that
an understanding was also arrived at
with several nationalist groups.
While the anti-Bolshevist forces were
thus facilitating the aim Of their
strategy the Bolsheviki were doing all
in their power to Increase the number
Of their adversaries and to render un-
attainable the purposes Of their
strategy From the very beginning of
the civil war the Bolsheviki have re-
fused to recognize the Esthonion, Let
fish, Lithuanian, Georgian, Kuban and
Tartar governments, and have thus
created for themselves q number of
fighting fronts. They maintained an
aggressive attitude toward Poland,
Finland and Rumania; they have re-
fused to recognize the government Of
Siberia, and, thanks to the Brest-
Litovsk treaty, have aroused against
themselves the enmity of the Allies.
Thus, the diplomacy Of the Bolshevik
became responsible for their present
difficult strategic position, for the iron
ring which is at present inclosing
Bolshevist Russia on line $4,000
kilometres long. Just now, after a
year and a half OF hard and unsuc-
cessful fighting, the BolsheviN are
beginning to recognize their errors
Only now, when the armies of Denikine
are within 200 miles Of Moscow. have
Red emissaries begun to fly between
Moscow and Esthonia, Finland, Poland,
Lithuania, Rumania and Ukraine, bear
Ing offers Of peace. and Tschitcherin
is ceaselessly sending out radiograms
to the whole world begging for peace.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19
The Opposing Sides

mus at present series of circum-
stances define and point out the very
favorable strategic position of the main
army of General Denikine on tho ono
hand and the serious disorder among
the Bolshevist forces caused bv prava
political and military errors on the
other. From the attached man tho
reader may observe that the arnv Of
Denlklne occupied, up to the early DAYS
OF October, in the south of Russia a
wide space Of about $50 miles betwean
the Volga and Dnieper rivers. The
main forces of Denikine's army-the
army of the Don-are located in the
centre, between Orel and Voroniesh.
upon front of about 220 miles.
The distance between Denikine's
main forces and Moscow is approx
mately 210 miles. Upon this road the
troops Of Denikine would have to
traverse the remaining part of the
Province of Orel, the Province Of Tula
and from there into the region Of
Moscow. 1t can be therefore seen that
the main theatre Of military oparations
represents a comparatively small dis
trict about 200 miles in width. and in
this territory the decisive battle for
Moscow is destined to take place. Four
railroads leading into Moscow traverse
this district, and consequently each
fifty miles Of the territory to be COW
cred can be served by a railroad of
Its own. The defensive position of the
Bolsheviki is bound, therefore. to be
not an easy one. They have to hold by
full force all the four directions with
out knowing which Of the four courses
may be chosen by their adversaries for
the delivery of the main blow and
where they should concentrate their
major forces.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19
Defending a Flank

Having concentrated his main forces
on the narrow front between Orel and
Voroniesh Denikine has brought up
for the defence Of his right flank
the Caucasian army of General Wran-
gel This army Is located between the
region Of the Volga and Voroniesh.
It's right wing is secured by the forti-
fication of Tzaritzin and by the wide
water flow of the lower Volge. Lastly.
on his left Denikine has the army Of
General Brerov, which occupies the
Kiev territory. This army comes in
contact with the Polish troops west of
Chernigov. Thus the main forces head
ed for Moscow are placed in the centre
and are supported on the right and left
flanks by the armies of Generals
Wrangel and Bredov respectively.
While the force Of the blow in this
territory is being directed from the
south northward, the Bolsheviki are
threatened a. the same time in the
west from six other fronts, from TWO
fronts in the north, and they are COM
pelled to hold back the renewed often
sive movement of Kolchak in the east.
Aside from that they are forced TO
defend themselves in Turke stan, In the
southeast, and to guard the Turkestan
Railway, as st is from that territory
that they are able to supply them
selves with cotton, SO immensely i'm
portant for them, and with other valu-
able products.
OF their more than 500 900 men the
Bolsheviki have not concentrated their
chief forces against Denikine. Pre-
vlously they have had on this from
SIX armies. comprising about $4,000
men. At present they have transferred
to this line the Ukrainian group of
about 10000 men and some units from
the eastern and western fronts. This
concentration is still continuing, and
It is possible that the Bolsheviki will
be able to bring by their total forces
on this front to 100000 men. The re-
naming Rolshevist tr,Neps are com
PEELED to remain on the Polish front
10000 men; to oppose the armies of
udenlch, the Esthonians, the Iotts and
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19
The Principal Front

OF these numerous fronts the front
OF General Denikine has become the
principal battle line. The fate of the
entire civil war is being decided on
this front, just as the fate of the
World War was decided not in Russia
or Galicia, but in the French theatre of
military operations. That is precisely
the reason why the partial successes
of the Bolsheviki on the Kolchak front
have no important significance. The
kolchak front, which until last spring
was the most important anti Bolsheyist
front, is at present Of considerably less
Importance. The following facts clearly
support this position:
l. Denikine is only 200 miles from
Moscow (near OrioD, while Kolchak is
1900 miles from there.
: 2. Denikine's army is supported by
the south of Russia, with population
of 100000 persons, while Kolchak Is
leaning only upon the 100000 popula-
ton of Siberia.
3. Kolchak has only one railroad in
his rear, while Denikine has network
Of ten railways.
q. The southern province. OF Russia
consist Of rich grain, coal and indus
trial regions, with the excellent ports
Of the Black Sea, while Siberia. though
rich in resources. is poorly developed
industrially, with few cities, and Its
ports, on the Yellow Sea. are several
thousand miles away from the front
s. The troops Of Denikine arc In
close touch with the Allies, via Poland
and Rumania, while Kolchak can COM
municate with the Allies only by way
Of the ocean and tho extremely long
Siberian road.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19

occupation of Kiev by Denikine. That
eliminated the formation of solid
front against the Bolsheviki, from the
Baltic Sea TO the Caspian. The Boil
sheviki have through these operations
lost the principal advantage of their
former position, which permitted them
to concentrate all their masses in the
centre while having their adversaries
scattered on eleven disunited fronts, a
position which was giving them the OPP
portunity to overwhelm, by the sheer
superiority OF their masses. each Of
their opponents individually. At pres
ent, however, they have to reckon with
a united front from the Baltic to the
Caspian Sea, lined up by armies under
unified command We know by this
time that the Allied successes in the
world war have only begun to become
eItcLlFo d4t6E the COMMAND was
placed in the hands Of Marshal Foch.
Tho great Importance of the unihcation
Of the anti Bolshevik forces can be in
ferred by analogy with that decisive
act of the Allies.
Indeed, that moment marks the be-
ginning of the forward march of the
main army Of Denikine upon Moscow
1t was then that Denikine uttered his
terse, laconic order: Neither to the
right nor to the left. but straight upon
Moscow"
But 1t was not only the 'skilful oper-
ations Of the anti Bolshevist forces that
were responsible for these successes. Il
is beyond doubt that the political and
military errors Of the Bolsheviki have
contributed materially toward them.
Among these errors the greatest one
was the major offensive undertaken by
them against Admiral Kochak. This
campaign upon the endless stretches
of Siberia was analogous in it's design
and execution to the historic Napol-
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19
The Fortified Line

AS We have seen, the main opera
tions, the decisive battle for Moscow.
will have to take place on the small
front between Oriol and voroniesh,
where the Bolsheviki have concentrated
their main forces. Nevertheless, the
operations directed along and up
the Nolga have no less important sig
nificance. In this territory the Boz
| sheviki are also afraid of blow
from Denikine, as such stroke would
cut them off from the Volga, the Ural.
Turkestan and Siberia and would de-
prive them of their chief sources of
bread, cotton, orc aud other raw mate
rails.
The Bolsheviki are, IN view of this
menace, therefore compelled to defend
two principal avenues of attack upon
them: the one leading upon Moscow and
the other upward the River Volga.
There is q distance Of 600 kilometres
between these lines, and the Bolsheviki
are forced to scatter their forces upon
this tremendous distance, without
knowing wherefrom the main attack
will be delivered at them and whers
they, accordingly. should concentrate
their forces. This Is still more per-
picking In view of the fact, as we have
pointed out already. that there are
four railroads leading toward the Mos
cow district alone, and even on that
front the Bolsheviki cannot be sure as
to which of these Denikine may choose
for his blow
All these factors compel the Bolshe-
wiki TO adopt a policy of small midi
vidual actions. Here they are attack
ing Tzaritzin, on the Volga, but Deni-
kline is at the same time storming
Kiev, 700 kilometres west of them.
Thereupon they shift their forces to
Kiev, but the city had already fallen,
and Denikine is meanwhile attacking
Kursk They find that Kursk is capt
ured and that Denikine is in front of
Voroniesh.
Just at present the fighting is as
Stunning q more obstinate character.
The explanation to this may be found
not only in the fact that the Bolsheviki
have now concentrated in the direction
to Moscow their major forces, but also
because they have at present fortified
big stretch of front. for several hum
Fdred kilometres-the Saratov-T ambovs
Elietzk- Orioi line. Apparently It is on
this line, which is crossed in the rear
by three railroads. that the Bolsheviki
viii attempt to halt the victorious
march Of the volunteer army Of Gem
eral Denikine
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19

now, having resumed the offensive, he
has already retaken Tobolsk. The
Poles have captured Minsk, Bobruisk.
Borisov and Dvinsk, and have crossed
the Western Dvina. The Let's have
taken Riga, and Denikine himself has
moved up to q point 200 miles from
Moscow.
Lastly. and that Is most important,
many signs indicate that the morale
OF the Bolshevist troops is breaking
down and that their rear is badly dis
organized. This can be seen from the
tact that the Cossacks under General
Mamontov were able to raid 800 kilo-
metres Of the Bolshevist rear for an
entire month, to destroy their depots.
to ruin their lines of communication
and to fill them with CONSERVATION
Could any one think it possible during
o-'~ >S"AHS "a Vic ldSg WAT 1Or de-
tachment of German cavalry to turn
up, say at Nice or Bordeaux, and to
raid there with immunity for an en-
tire month"; 1t is pretty certain that
such an adventurous band would have
been quickly rounded up and placed
behind prisoners stockades.
Such raids are not known 70 msl,tarv
history, and since they do take place
In tho course Of the present struggle
with the Bolsheviki they are ELOQUENT
testimony to the validity Of the asser-
ton that the Bolsheyist troops are far
from what the Bolsheviki would bava
US believe they are. No matter how
dapper their appearance, 1t is onlv too
clear that they belong to that type Of
soldlery concerning which General
Washington once said that "to denend
on such troops is like leaning on a
broken reed"
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19
Foreign Ne1Us and Comment
Light on the Civil War in Russia

oeeame. therefore, necessary before un-
dertaking campaign against Moscow
to unite upon one common platform
the various political and national as
pirations, just as the Allies have uni
tied the different twenty-three states in
the name Of one common purpose-the
struggle against Germany This step
was Of paramount Importance, and 1t
can be said that the failures Of the
first year and a half Of the civil war
from the end Of 1917 to the spring of
1919-were due to the absence of
united military and political front. the
lack Of unified command and the alb
sence OF programme uniting all
parties and nationalities.
The realization of these military and
political aims was begun in the spring
of the current year, and at present this
problem Is, to certain degree. solved.
Complete liaison was established be-
tween the fronts Of Kolchak, Denikine,
the Polish front, the Udenich front near
Petrograd and the Archangel and Muir
mansk fronts. After the occupation Of
Kiev by Denikine his troops became
united With thu Polish front near the
Pinsk lowlands. Lastly, there have
taken place series Of agreements be-
tween the Russian political parties,
from the conservative parties to the
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19
From a Handful

year ago the group Of officers who
were defending the city Of Stavropol
against an overwhelming force had
only eight cartridges TO each rife. To-
day this handful OF volunteers has be-
come the powerful army of Denikine,
supported by millions of population
and approaching closely TO the gates
of Russia's ancient capital, Moscow.
When an army is compelled TO seek
cover behind fortihcations il signifies
that this army is already afraid Of it's
adversary, and they who fear cannot
conquer, for they are. in the words Of
one military writer. already beaten in
their hearts There are, indeed, al
ready multitude Of signs that the
morale Of the Bolshevi1 forces Is
very low, and that these troops, who
were forced into their present service.
are fighting without spirit aad are sur
rendering by the thousands Concern
ing the political and strategical
slQes Of the situation, We have already
seen how favorably they have been
working themselves out for the OPP
ponents Of the Bolsheviki and now ad-
versely they were affecting The latter
That is why, in so far as 1t Is ID
general possible TO forecast the trend
OF military events on the basis Of
given environs, We have right to
say that al evaluation Of conditions
leads one 20 the conviction that the
collapse Of the Bolsheviki is in
evitable. Moscow must fall automati-
cally under the blow of Denikine, just as
kiev, hharkov. Odessa, Eketerinoslav,
kherson, Poitava. Kursk and Voro-
mesh have fallen.
The isolation OF the Bolshev!h had
borne in It's very inception the I'M
minencs Of their doom. History
knows many instances where armies
surrounded on al sides have for
time succeeded in delivering attacks
and even winning victories But these
attempts have invariably ended in a
catastrophe. Frederick The Great. dur
ing the Seven Years War, continual
to win one battle after another
Napoleon in 1914, surrounded on all
sides by the allied nations, adnainis-
tered continually one defeat after the
other upon their armies. The Ger
mans, surrounded by an iron ring dur
ing the last war, also had been wiz
ming victories.
The Bolshcviki, similarly isolated,
have occupied during ths last year
the Ukraine and have had successes
agains. Kolchak. But we know, never
theless, that Frederick wound up in
disaster. that Napoleon had to capitu-
late and the allied nations entered
Paris and that the finale OF the Ger
man victories in the great war wa.
their complete collapse
Such are the inexorable lessons Of
history, and to-day the successes os
Denikine only substantiate once mora
the forecast that the military strength
of Lenine will be strangled in the
same steel ring that crushed Fred
erick, Napoleon and Wilhelm.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19
By Colonel K. Shumsky

T<RoM the very early DAVIS Of
n the civil war in Russia the
IN Bolsheviki have undertaken
colossal task-to retain under
their domination all the territories of
Russia; In the east, west, north and
south, IN Europe as we'll as in Asia.
Thanks to this ambition their from. Ia
terribly long and extends at present
tor approximately $4,000 kilometers.
The history Of warfare knows not of
such other front. It exceeds from
seven to eight times in length the late
Russian front during the World War.
and is about fifteen or sixteen times
longer than the main front of that war.
the Allied front In France. Upon sucb
front, many times greater than all
the front of the World War, the Boil
shevlki have engaged an army many
times smaller-about $4,000 men In
the active units and about 100000 In
, half-trained reserves, poorly disci-
plined, often without rifles and with
out officers.
Thus while the Bolshevist front is
about fifteen times longer than the
m aip fvor% - 49, y,&. "A
on this front are about five or six
times less numerous. Their forces are.
therefore, necessarily thinly dis
tributed along the fighting lines and
their positions are equally vulnerable.
This explains the indecisive nature Of
their temporary successes; they lack
sufficient forces to follow up and to
develop q victory, to utilize 1t in full.
even when such victory falls to their
tot. Instead Of concentrated massinp
Of troops on their fronts we see everv
where only thin forces incapable Of
striking strong, decisive blow.
On this tremendous $4,000 kilometer
fighting line the Bolsheviki have eleven
fronts-Archangel, Murmansk, the Rus
sian front Of Udenich west of petro-
grad, the Esthonian, the Lettonian, the
Lithuanian, the Polish. the Ukrainian,
The front of General Denikine, the
Turkestan and the Siberian front of
Admiral Kolchak.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-19

comic Russian campaign. Under the
most favorable circumstances this cam
paign could have resulted only in the
defeat of Kolchak, but not in the de-
struction Of his army, as in the rear of
his forces there stretched an immense
territory toward which he could have
retired 70 halt and reform. It meant.
therefore, only a dissipation Of force.
without the chance of obtaining de-
cisive results In the mean time while
the Bolsheviki were entangled in ST.
IBERIA Denikine, who was cornered In
the Caucasus during spring, leaning
only upon a 100000 population. has
succeeded in occupying the entire south
Of Russia.
The Prussian General Staff, in an
official book Of the war of 1870, have
stated that errors committed in the de-
ploying of forces in the primary stages
OF war have q deciding significance,
and cannot, as rule, be rectified even
toward the end of the war" The Boil.
sheviki, after the loss Of Hurst, 29o
miles from Rosnow, admitted In ono Of
their radiograms that they "havs not
attached, In Its time, proper importance
to the southern front" In other words.
they havs distributed theiY forces
wrongly It tho very beginning Of the
campaign They have concentrated