The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-09-22


sons at its principal objective, and we
organized the 9th army and the right
wing of the 7th accordingly.
Originally the attack of the Army
Group of the German Crown Prince
was to be carried out on July -, but,
in order to make thorough prepare
tions possible, it had unfortunately to
be postponed until the fifteenth. On
the eleventh or twelfth, while the pre-
parations were in full swing, desert
er brought news that big tank Of
fensive from the forest of Villers-Co
terets was imminent, and this report
gave us additional reason to re-ex-
anime and perfect our defensive meas
ureS.
LINE WAS STRONGLY HELD
At the critical point, southwest IF
scissors (where the Americans made
their deepest advance July 49, we had
placed a division that had fought with
special success in the east, and which
had always met the demands made upon
it in the west.
This division had not taken part in
the May battles, and was therefore as
much rested as could be given to any
division. In this respect, at any rate,
we were no worse off than, the enemy.
Further south two divisions, not
fully rested, and whose battalion
required, held that space along the
front that was usually allotted to one
division only. The other divisions were
good trench-divisiOns, and held nor
NAL divisional fronts; a few were kept
behind the lines as reserves.
The fertilization of our positions was
of course, not far advanced; high corn
INSTRUCTED the view in front of and
still more within them. Influenza was
mr. h1rt moi her
anywhere alse along the front. The
attack that had been announced never
took place, and / hoped that the news
would have thoroughly aroused the
men.
The army group of the German Crown
Prince emphasized the necessity of the
organization in depth of all our defen-
sive fronts.
I was always in touch with the
headquarters of the armies detailed
for the attack. Above all. / was anx-
ious to know if in their opinion, or in
that of the troops the enemy had any
knowledge of our preparations. They
thought not, and only on the Marine
was the artillery fire more lively.
PRISONERS TOLD HIS PLANS
I had especially pointed out that no
recommending was to be carried out on
the southern bank of the Marine, but
ficer swan over and was captured. AS
we found out after the battle, he gave
away much information to the enemy.
Acting officers of the heavy artillery,
who fell into the hands of the enemy
on the Ardre, acted in the same way.
In some places the Entente made raids
and took prisoners, but do not know
what information was gained in this
way.
1t is also a fact that an attack on
Rheims was discussed in the most ir-
responsible way throughout Germany.
and to my great regret it was only
later that that l received many letters
from home on the subject Wireless
messages sent out by the enemy after
the battle also plainly indicated that
they had early information of our play.
Within the army itself it was very diff
ficult to keep the secret, as the very
concentration of heavy artillery and
every attack, revealed our intentions.
In spite of long considerations, we
had been unable to think of any other
way We clearly realized how cumber-
Gus was the method of attack, and
made all efforts to deceive the enemy
as to our Intentions; everything pos
sible was done in this direction.
Postal prohibitions were useless,
there were so many channels connect
ing US with him, and l could not stop
leave, which, after all. is the only con-