The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-12-04
BIND BELGIUM TO GERMANY

luunu III these DeltS, pOlH III I U4dHu and near Briey, did not influence me, That these measures were insufficient by themselves but would have to be supplemented by, elaborate military de- fences in time of peace was obvious. | Whatever we might do, the security of these two sources of strength would | be inadequate. and it was therefore imperative to insure the reliable pro- lection of the industrial area of Vest l phalia and the Lower Rhine.
 1 had beeocme acquainted with it's importance as a peace and war indus | try when acting as regimental com mander at Dusseldorf, and now again , as first quartermastef general The only possible conclusion was 1 that Belgium must on no account he allowed to become hostile nrea of ldepioyment. It's neutrality \ constd- cred to be mere phantom on which
 no practical man would rely. We must insure that its economic interests be- 1 came isientical with those of Germany, with which it was already united by strong commercial ties.
 % It was to remain an independent
 state in which the Flemings also should enjoy their rights. The viola tion of this ancient Germanic race is another of the enormities }of human history For the first few years con
 sidered it would be necessary to mnin- tain German army of occupation
 The Mouse at LieEe coulG only be given up, if mt all. after Belgium had costa- pIeted its economic union with Ger many and. in accordance with it's rea'
 interests, taken its place on our side NOT SEEKING NAVAL BASES The idea of German naval bases on the coast of Flanders did not appeal to me It mad, not been thought out and was not the outcome of definite | military policy. I wrote as follows: 'We would only become quite secure, i. e., as regards the industrial area of the Lower Rhine. Especially if the channel tunnel scheme Is executed, by occupyina the whole of Belgium and establishing our army on the coast of Flanders This object is unattainable
 tt present.
 ''The question is whether we should continue the war for the sake of achieving it. In my opinion we ought to do so if the English keep strip of French territory. e. g.. Calais. If coast of Flanders is not sufficient reason for us to prolong the war through the winter. The retention of Calais by England . was at that time discussed in my pres ence more than .once that is why mentioned it.
 thouga4 it important to bring
 Luxemburg into closef relationship to the empire.
 When we had arranged matters in the west more or less in the manner indicated we should have achieved what was necessary fl. that quarter for Germany's military and economic se- curfty.
 In the east the whole German iron tier was as unfavorable as possible, not only on account of the Upper Silesian coal field. The campaign of 1914 had shown the difficulty of hold ing the country east of the Vistula'
 East Prussia. after it's severe suffering,
 was certainly entitled to a protective belt.
 The Polish re-entrant had proved
 exceedingly detrimental to our defense. The full force of this disadvantage
 had again been felt in the autumn of
 1914 when Grand Duke Nicholas struck
 his great blow at the Prussian frontier.
 To eliminate the danger altogether by
 territorial acquisitions appeared i'm :
 possible. It was, however. strategical-
 between Danzic and Thorn towards the
 south and to provide a protective belt
 for the Upper Silesian coal field
 Thedesired union with Courlaud and
 I.ithuania would not improve the iron
 tier. But. once we had secured the
 protective belt east or the Vistula in
 the south and the widening of the neck
 on the south side of Thorn, a good
 deal could be made good by completing
 the railway system. Courland and
 Lithuanian would improve our food
 supply in case we should. in a future
 war, have to rely once more on our
 own resources