The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-09-14
Ludendor Says General Byng Upset Whole Plans

17th Army front was that the enemy in the Cambria re-entrant was not cut off, nor could the opposition to the End Army be indirectly reduced The latter had ben obliged to rely on its | own unaided efforts, and had, there desirable from the point of view of | assisting the 17th And so again Crown Prince Rupprecht's group could | not gain ground between Croisilles and Peronne to the extent that had been | originally intended.
 On March 25 the 17th and 2nd armies
 had passed far beyond the line Ba
 paume-Combles. fighting hard all the
 way, the 18th Amry had taken Nesle l and met with but little resistance. | The I7th Army was already exhausted; !; | 1t had lost too heavily on the 21st and
 22nd, apparently because 1t had fought | in too dense formation. The End Army
 was fresher but was already complain ing of the old shell-holes. It could get no farther than Albert. Its left
 wing had been more delayed by having | to cross the Somme than by the enemy. The 18th Army was still full of fight
 and confidence; on the 27th 1t took
 Montdidier. Soon the enemy formed
 a fresh front north of the Somme, which
 was sure toebe difficult to overcome
 HAD TO CHANGE PLANS l ! emy's resistance seemed weaker. The original idea of the battle had
 to be modified, and the main weight ] of the attack vigorously directed on
 that point. I still hoped we should get through to open warfare. and kept | 1t in view in my instructions to the
 armies. But the 17th Army could not get on the End and 18th were still 1 gaining ground. I continued my ef- ] forts towards reinforcing the left wing , of the 2nd Army, and to direct it and the 18th on Amiens.
 The enemy's line was not becoming denser, and in places they were even | attacking themselves while our armies were no longer strong enough to over 1 shift of French forces westward which i coQntered the plans of Ludendorff at 1 this point) The ammunition was not sufficient. and supply became difficult.
 The repair of roads and railways was
 taking too long, in spit of all our pre- i parations.
 1 After thoroughly deplenishing ann
 intuition the 18th Army attacked be- l tween Montdidier and Noyon on the 1 S0th March. On April the End Army
 and the right wing of the 18th at
 tackled at Albert and south of the Somme towards Amiens.
 1 These actions were indecisive. It |
 resistance was beyond our strength.
 We must not get drawn into battle 1 of exhaustion. This would accord
 neither with the stragetical nor the
 tactical situation. In agreement with
 the commanders concerned. G. H. a. had to take the extremely difficult de-
 cision to abandon the attack on Amiens
 for good.
 BRILLIANT FEAT" HE SAYS | The Entente now attacked Albert
 and southeast of Amiens in discon- | nected sort of way and achieved noth- | ing. On the 24th April, after careful preparations the End Army made another attempt with the aid of tanks, to improve it's position at Villers-Bre | tonneux; 1t got ahead we'll, but was unable to hold what 1t gained. | The front between Albert and Mont didier only settled down gradually From time to time fighting broke out | again, and the situation remained per- | manently doubtful. The other parts ! of the new front, towards Arras and Noyon. became quiet much more 1 quickly.
 1 The battle was over by April 4. It was a brilliant feat, and will ever be so regarded in history. What the English and French had not succeeded in doing we had accomplished, and l that in the fourth year of the war. I StIdSetlCdlly we ndQ ACHleNcu WHAl l the events of the 23rd. 24th and 25th I had encouraged us to hope for. That we had also failed to take Amiens, 1 which would have rendered communi- ! cation between the enemy's forces astride the Somme exceedingly diff I cult, was specially disappointing. Long
 range bombardment of the railway es- tablishments of Amiens was by no means an equivalent
 FOUND FOOD AND STOPPED However. our troops had beaten the French and English and proved them selves superior. That they did not
 achieve all the success that was pos
 sible was due, not only to their re-
 duced fighting value, but, above all, i to their not being in all cases under the firm control of their officers. They
 had been checked by finding provisions. and valuable time had thus been lost. Generally speaking. our tactics had proved sound. What had happened in the 17th Army did not necessitate any l fundamental changes, although some lessons needed more drastic applica- ton. Above all, the infantry must be more extended. At many places machinegun posts had given us an un-
 due amount of trouble and so caused
 delay. The infantry groups had often
 baan lacking in initiative, and their CO.,
 operation with the companion arms had often failed.
 The troops had found special diff culty in recognizing themselves for defence at the conclusion of the at , tack, and particularly in recognizing when no further success was to be gained by continuing the attack.
 All troops. especially mounted troops had suffered heavily from bombing from hostile airmen. (Americnn flyers with both British and French forces had a brilliant share In this work of
 bombing and so helped hold up the drive.)
 SITUATION NOT FAVORABLE It was as yet too early to give a final opinion on the strategical situa- vorable. How G. H. c. was to deal with it later on could not yet be de- termined, as we were still in the first stages of the operations.
 The Avre bridge-head Ca narrow hold the Germans had on the south bank of the Avre southeast of Amiens. The French afterwards administered sharp defeat on troops exposed here with the river at their backs.) was a special difficulty in the tactical sense.
 The advisability of giving 1t up was
 discussed. But as this would have shown the enemy that we had given up any further attack on Amiens we kept it.
 The new front had now to be forti- fled. Some of the played-out divisions
 were relieved by fresh ones from quiet fronts, the less tired ones were left in the line Eyerywhere the greatest at-