The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1919-10-19

" nad decided to give the preference
to the Grand Fleet, the hospital ships.
the channel crossing and the Mediter-
ranean. practically in the order men
toned. 1t Is evident from the figures
given that all but about ten or a dozen
destroyers must have been used in the
three areas. 1t was for this reason
that the great zone of transatlantic
shipping, west and south of Ireland,
vitality important as it was, had to go
almost unprotected. Sometimes only
four or five destroyers were operating
In this great stretch of waters; I do
not think the number ever exceeded
fifteen. 1nasmuch as that represent
ed about the number Of German sub
marines in this same area, the stu
alton may strike the novice as not
particularly desperate. But, of course,
any such basis of comparison is alb
surd. The destroyers We're operating
on the surface in full view of the sub
marines; the submarines could sub
merge at any time and make them
selves invisible; herein we have the
reason why the contest was ridiculous
ly unequal But, above all other con-
siderations, the method Of warfare
adopted by the Allies against the u
boat was fundamentally wrong. The
circumstances which prevailed at that
time could accomplish practically
nothing. This pathetic little. fleet of
destroyers was based on Queenstown;
from this port the ships put forth and
patrolled in ill-spent fashion around
the English Channel and the waters
about Ireland in the hope that Ger
! man submarine would stick it's nose
above the waves. The central idea or
| the DESTROYER patrol is the one of hunt
ing. the destroyer could sink the sub
marine or drive it away from shipping
| If the submarine would only make It's
presence known, and the business OF
| the destroyer was to scury around IN
| the forlorn hope that it would do SO.
| Now this idea is sound enough if you
| can have enough destroyers. We Zig
ured that, to make the patrol system
i work with complete success, we should
/ have one destroyer for every
square mile. The area of the destroy
er patrol off Queenstown comprised
about $4,000 square miles; in other
words the complete protection OF the
transatlantic trade routes would
have taken about $4,000 destroyers!
And the British. as i have said. had
available anywhere from four to fiji
teen in this area
This destroyer flotilla being so small
Il is not surprising that the German
, submarines were making ducks and
!. brakes of it. The map of April sink
ings brings out an interesting fact:
numerous as these sinkings were, very
few merchantmen were torpedoed, In
} this month. at the entrance to the
irish Sea or in the English Channel
These were the narrow waters where
| shipping was massed. and where the
, little destroyer patrol was INTENDED
to operate. The German submarines
apparently avoided these waters, ana
made their attacks out in the open
sea. sometimes two and three hundred
5 miles west and south of Ireland. Their
{ purpose in doing this was to draw the
/ DESTROYER patrol out into the open sea
t and in that way cause it's dispersal
; And these tactics succeeded. There
, were six separate steamship lanes
by which the merchantmen approached
, the English Channel and the irish sea
l One day the submarines would attach
t along one of these lines; then the little
destroyer fleet would rush to this
scene of operations. Immediately tbs
Germans would depart and attack an
| other route two or three hundred
l miles away; then the destroyers would
: go pell nell for that location. Just as
they arrived, however. the U-boats
t would begin operating elsewhere; and
so it went, a game of hide and seek in
) which the advantages lay all on the
; side of the submarines. which pos
sessed that insuperable quality of in
: visibility, 1t really was case OF
: blind mans buff; the destroyer car
never see the enemy; the enemy could