The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1919-04-28
BY ADOLF GRABOwsKY.
(Editor Das Neuo Deutsch1ond.)
CTransIated from ''Das Neue Deut-
 schIand.")
Considerations Peculiar to Germany


 l. Germany is called by the great spiritual and intellectual traditions of its past to cooperate in the work of cultural imperialism. It must take care not to seem to desire any sort of hegemony. The fellowship of all civilized States (kulturstaaten) Is fundamental principle of the League of Nations. If the Entente people in the intoxfcation of victory are now disposed to fall back into the old style imperialism, Germany must show them a better way.
 German Imperialism ought never to have been anything but cultural. In its present condition of political impotence Germany cannot possibly exercise any influence upon the world except of a moral kind. ..... Its great task now Is to make Cultur- al Imperialism no longer a mere in strument of policy, no longer a weap- on in the hand of the weaker, but the expression of Germany's inner voca- ton. Germany will thus not only follow a. policy which Is honest and veracious, as Is required by the prin- ciple above stated, but find the way back to It's true self
 8. Germany must show itself a State whose new social arrangem ents are worthy to serve as a model to the world. It must win the world by the fierce of example. All over the world the eyes of workers and employers rrust turn to Germany as a pattern State,
 l. But just institutions are noth- ing without the free spirit. Too long we have been the land of mere or EanizatiOns and institutions
 5. Our lack of the free spirit caused us to oscillate between the pride of power on the one hand and servility on the other In foreign politics we either pursued Pan-Ger- man dreams of world dominance or we ran funkey-wise after other na- tions. We must attain true nation al dignity CWurde)
 $. The free spirit means the dele ton of militarism. Militarism is noth- ing but pride of power in those who rule and servIlity in those who obey. IF Prussian- German ulilftarism our apostasy from the honest traditions of the German spirit Is embodied more consplcuously than in anything else.
 '. The analogue of rnilitarism in civil administration is bueaucratism. By bureaucratic methods we did not succeed in forcing through out Welt politik under the old-styIe imperial ism; still less will such methods avail in the new age.
 S. NIilitarlsn and bureaucratism do not try to enter into other men by psychological understanding; they put the power to command In the place of ability to convince. Our de- fective psychological knowledge of afh 1JN oA tuseness in dealing with foreign na- tions, are due to our milftarism and tureaucratism We must learn the psychology of peoples (VoIkerpsy- chologie.)
 The Relation of Germany to Foreign Powers.
 1. Germany must be ready to en- l ter the League of Nations, but must also be prepared for the eventuaIity ] of the League failing to come into l existence or turning out to be a mere [ League of the Entente Powers, from | which Germany is indefinitely ex cluded.
 2. Germany will seek close friend | ly relations with those peoples who 1 sympathize with its cultural policy. But it must not count on an alliance with any other Power. Separate all 1 dances are incompatible with the l idea of the League of Nations, and 1 Germany especially must take care that this principle is not contravened i in practice. Supposing the League l fails to come about, Germany on ac- i count of it's importance will not be regarded by any Power as an ally l at all worth having (nicht bundnis- fahig) in the near future. A BOI- 1 shevist Germany might indeed form an alliance with Bolshevist Russia, 1 but that would be a disastrous con- summation, not to be wished. 8. If Russia throws off Bolshev- | ism, its economic needs will draw 1t ] to the side of the Entente. Russia will become a, Federal State, so that We must not regard separate political action on the part of the Ukraine, | for instance, ss a possibility in the l future. A consequence of the En- l tente's helping Russia. to economic : productiveness will be that the oppo- sition of Slav to German will be deep ened, especially since Poland would be able to get on quite happily with a non-Bolshevist Russia. Again, the aggressive Slavism of the Slav- na- | tionaliNes formerly under Austria 1 Hungary will have an unfavorable effect upon the relations between the SlaV world and Germany. Russia, 1 therefore, for any period that can be foreseen, must be ruled out as @ pos- sible friend for Germany.
 1. Neithe- can we count on close relations with France. France, hay ing got the Alsace-Lorraine question settled to he~ satisfaction, will ad- vance further claims to German ter | rtsory, either in the form of annexa- tion or in that of a protectorate. The 1 idea of the Rhenish Confederation l separates us from France. 1 5. We have nothing to offer Japan in our present impotence. After the collapse of Russia, Japan is altogeth- CT in England's power.
 1 6. The Power with which 1t would be easiest for us to get on is the l United States. Their imaginative Ideals are akin to ours. They---tn spite of numerous capitalist counter infiuences-strive, as a young nation, tc redeem he world by establishing social justice.
 2. In the second place, after the ! United States, we have to consider the chances of a partnership with England. It was a blunder to em- 1 phasize, as we did, our opposition to