The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1919-09-22
GrOIUing Need Of Federal Budget Desabiy Adapting Budget System to Our Govern
 Finances.


 grows out of their ability to create new peers who would swamp a nos tile majority in the House of Lords. Rather than have this happen, the Lords commonly yield any point on which the Prime Minister is inzie&- ent No English King since George III. has eNerted any real influence on English legislation. and a king who would today attempt to do so would ibe driven from the throne George ILL was able to do this chiefly by con- trolling elections to the House of Commons. No English sovereign since Queen Anne has ever attended Cabinet meeting. The House of Com mons is absolute in its control over the Crown, and a ministry whose measures are amended or voted down by the House of Commons is obliged either to resign at once or else to dissolve the House of Com- mons and call for a new election, and then to resign if the newly elected House will not support its measures.
 In practice, however. this complete dependence of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet upon the House of Commons has cone to mean that the House of Commons is largely plastic in the hands of the Cabinet as long as the Cabinet remains in power. If the Cabinet must resign or dissolve Parliament, in case the Commons amend Legislation, and if no Iegis- lation of which the Cabir~t disag- proves can be passed without the resignation of the Cabinet or the dis solution of the House. the power of the House to amend bills or to pass nf f7f+ 4s lessened. Few members of a sitting House desire to go to the expense of a new election, and few members of a majority party care to have their leaders thrown out of office. There is, moreover, a long standing rule of the Canadian Parliament, that no pro- posal to vote money shall he enter t7ined except when recommended by the Crown, f. e., the ministry. The ] power of individual members, there fore, is greatly curtailed, and most members of the House of Commons are reduced to the insignificant posi- tiOn of voting as their aders direct. Under these conditions, a Chancel- Tor of the Exechequer, as long as his methods meet the approval of the Prime Minister, is in a position to dominate financial legislation. He
  the Cabinet, granting or withholding the appropriations they desire, and he may force his will respecting fin anciaI legislation upon the House of Commons as long as hi5 ministry stays in power.
 American Division of Powers.
 Under our American system of di- vision of powers, no such concentrat- ed responsibility is possible. The President, unlike the English King, has real independent power. The Cabine1 members are responsible to the President, and are not responsi- bIe to tho House of Representatives or to the Senate. The American Cab inet has no way of cOercing Congress. Members of Congress hold their seats for fixed periods, and have no fear of dissolution and new elections in case they break with the administration. Individual members feel that they represent their own localities, and are responsible to the people of their own States or districts rather than to the party to which they belong. in case a difference arises. Division of responsibility therefore among at least three parties is inevitable. The Executive the Senate and the House remain independent and coequal, and there must be at least three parties to the making of every American bud get.
 None the less, a very much greater concentration of responsibility than now exists is possible. As the Prersi- dent may dismiss any Cabinet mem- ber and choose a new one to replace him, subject to a lightly exercised control by the Senate over the ap- pOintment of a new Cabinet member, he may, if he chooses to do so, con- trol the estimates of the various de- partments, or even compel the var ious departments to submit their es- tima tes for approval to the Secretary of the Treasury before transmitting them to Congress. Congressional leg islation providing for this, of provid- ing for a modified form of it, which would leave some independence to such departments as War and Navy, is perfectly feasible In any case, no constitutional changes would be re- quired to concentrate all department tai requests for funds in the hands of the President or the Secretary of the Treasury, and so to unify the plans presented by the executive de- partments to the Congress. Some steps in this direction have already been taken.
 In Congress. it would be possible to unify responsibility in each house, placing it all in the hands of a single budget committee of the House of Representatives and budget commit tee of the Senate. Such a committee in the House of Representatives, for example, would replace the Commit tee on Ways and Means which ham dles revenue measures, and replace the Committee on Appropriations which presents measures handling a part only of the appropriations, and the other seven committees of the House which bring in special appro- priation bills. Similarly in the Senate, the Financial Committee concerned with revenues, the Committee on Ap- propriations, and the Committee on Commerce concerned with river and harbor appropriations, could be con- solidated, in their financial functions, or replaced by a single budget com mittee As the Constitution itself re- quires that all money measures shall originate in the House of Represen- tatives the Senate Budget Commit tee, however free it might be in mak ing amendments, would be obliged to start out with the measure passed by the House as a framework.
 It would be possible also to re- quire the House Budget Committee