The Idaho Republican. [volume] (Blackfoot, Idaho) 1904-1932, 1919-05-06

1T WsHuS OF oerman Seamen In1
They Might Snatch Victory Owe
Grand Fleet and Overthrow Allie,
Sea Power-Beatty and Hood Al
solved Of ovefrashness and JeIlIeo,
Of Undue Caution.
The controversy about the battle O.
Jutland will not be set at rest by tn,
revelations which have been made b.
the principal persons concerned, write.
Capt. Charles N. Robinson in New
York Herald. There are omissions
from his book, as Lord Jellicoe admits
and his critics are bound tn make
the most Of this circumstance.
1t had been suggested by those who
professed to he dissatisfied with the
material results of the action that
Beatty and Hood, the battle cruiser
leaders, showed ovefrashness, md Jel.
licoe and Jorram, in the battle squad.
rons, undue caution. To the former
cause was attributed the heavy losses
on, the British side; and to the latter
the fact that the enemy were not Sc
verely held and thoroughly beaten.
The candid disclosures of the COM
mander in chief, however, provide evil
dence that in neither case was there
ground for this criticism.
The action was fought from first to
last on the lines laid down In the bat
tie orders for the feet, which were
prepared at Scapa after exhaustive ex-
ercises at sea, and which were known
and seemingly acquiesced in by all
the officers who would be responsible
for executing them. From the bat
tie instructions given on page of
Lord Jellicoe's book 1t is clear that
Beatty and Hood, although they We're
given free hand to carry out their
general instructions, were told that the
primary function of the battle cruisers
in action was "the destruction of the
similar enemy vessels If present, and,
after their destruction or in their abb
sence, to attack the van of the enemy's
fleet. Prior to action their duty was
defined as giving information as to the
encny's battle fleet, while denying sim
liar information to the enemy"
Clearly, this absolves Admiral
Beatty and the late Admiral Hood Of
the charge referred to, since when the
Indefatigable, Queen Mary and Irwin
chile were lost, they were either at
lacking enemy. battle cruisers or OBJ
taining information of the enemy's bat
tie fleet. The British losses, includ-
ing that Of the flagship of Admiral
Hood himself, were not the outcome Of
any rashness, but, as It is also shown
In this book, to shortcomings in the
protective features Of cruiser designs.
The necessity for caution in the ]
early years Of the war is abundantly
proved by the long list Of deficiencies,
some of them of q startling nature,
set forth in Lord Jellicoe's volume.
All things considered, and when the
margin Of superiority was what It was,
1t would have been hard to justify the
taking of unnecessary hazards by the
in chief, seeing that the al
lied hope Of victory in the struggle
rested entirely on the continued exist
ence and efficiency Of the grand fleet.
That feet was the "all In ALL" not only |
Of Britain, but Of the allied powers.
No Preeedents to Follow.
In regard also to the criticism which
has been made Of the turning move
ments Of the fleet in deployment, and
when maneuvering to evade torpedo
attack, it cannot be forgotten that all
tactics Of battle before Jutland with
he new material Of war, including
ong-range torpedoes and submarines,
we're tentative and experimental.
There were no precedents, or body Of
experience, for the British command
RS to look to for guidance, and they
lad to base their judgment chiefly on
he lessons Of their own practices and
Exercises in waters limited by the en-
my's mines and torpedoes. There
h0uld be borne in mind, too, the per-
Is to which the feet was exposed
While preparing for battle, and the
ifficulties to be overcome in the as
emily and direction Of such huge
orce. 1t is significant that the adj
niral notes that during the engage
nent his chief of staff, Admiral
)harles Madden, remarked to him:
This is all going according to ex-
From the frank admissions Of Lord
ellicoe, and his vivid narrative Of the
lovements Of the forces, many edify-
lg lessons will be extracted by naval
zen in all countries. But, SO far az
ne Battle Of Jutland Is concerned, the
lain conclusion seems to be that It
as the conditions of time. place and
Gather which prevented the British
'rces from obtaining victory as de-
sive In regard to material as 1t was
regard to the morale Of the enemy.
ne battle destroyed any lingering
ope In the minds Of the German sea-
en- that they might snatch a victory
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