The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-11-19
THE BIRMINGHAM AGE-HERA1D WEDNESDAY NOVEMBER 49, 1919

THE BIRMINGHAM AC
preached me with the request to make
as little as possible of this success,
and l did as he asked, though extreme
carried out the attack did not deserve
! to be passed over in silence.
! In the press our reserve about the
! Stocked battle gave rise to certain
amount of criticism. | understood this,
but considered it my duty to accede
to the chancellor's request, in order
not to disturb in any way the pros
poets of peace, which at this moment
really were looming in view.
TROUBLED BY KERENShT
With Kerensky's holder activity in
| May the great danger of the Russian
army being reorganized increased.
England, France and the United states
spared no effort to achieve this OBJ
ject. In view of this frequent discus
sions took place at general headquar-
ters as TO whether rapid attack on
the eastern front with troops that the
COMMANDMENT hief there could furnish.
strengthened by a few divisions from
the west, would not be better policy
than continuing to play the part of in
active spectators: for now was the mo-
ment to level a blow at the Russian
army, while it was still in diminished
! strength.
I did not concur with this idea. al
! though the position in the west had
improved. l was unwilling to do any
thing. even in appearance. that might
injure real prospect of peace. From
military point of view, too, this line
: of conduct was justified, because every
revolution uudermines and rots the
fighting strength of an army.
| l certainly wondered whether in this
case it were so, when on July l the
! first Russian attack took place in
Galicia- The time of tedious waiting in
/ the east was over, and general head
quarters no longer had their hands tied,
but were given full freedom of action.
DESERTERS TOLD PLANS
The Russian offensive was planned
/ on a large scale. The attack was to be
made from the Riga bridgehead, at
Dunaburg. on Lake Narotsch, at Smor-
/ gon. and to the south. and in the whole
/ of Galicia, from the Tarnapol- Zborow-
Lemberg railway as far as the Car
pathians. The center OF action lay
here in the south
| The commander chief in the east
was not unaware by the end of June
of, the projected offensive Numerous
deserters had keut him well informed.
and he took all the necessary defensive
measures.
To carry out the counter attack he
had planned he needed reinforcements
from the west. 1t is true that for the
moment things were quieter there but
| it had to be assumed that fighting
would continue. Nevertheless, what
| ever might happen there. general head
quarters were bound to exploit the OPP
portunity offered in the east
In order il ii were by any means
possible. to come to a final resckoning
with Russia and so gain Tree hano
on one side, six divisions were set Tree
for the east. More was not possible at
the moment. and it was only very UNI
willingly that the officers in command
on the western front gave up the divi-
sions for the other front They were
unable to grasp the magnitude of the
undertaking.
HOPES FOR BIG OPERATION
The most favorable point of attack on
the eastern front was near a crossing
of the Dvna above Riga. or the Aborow-
Sereth- Niedderung line in East GAIL
cha From here an attempt might pc
made to envelop the southern portion
of the Russian army, and it was the in
tention of the commander in chief to
put this plan into action at once. Gen
eral Headquarters was able to give its
consent.
How the attack would turn out, and
whether 1t was to be regarded as a
or merely as a tactical counter-attack
and how the Russian and also the Aus
trian armies would fight, remained
questions whose solution I awaited
with the keenest suspense.
The Russian attack in East GaHcia
was made in close formation with
vast expenditure of munitions. 1t sue
lreeded against Austrian troops, but mol
againset German and Turkish. On July
, strong Russian forces broke through
the Austro- Hungarian line between
Zborow and Brshneshany Ca front OF
about 20 miles in the northeast corner
of Galicia) Austrian troops were de-
serting to the enemy in large numbers.
On July the commander-in-c chief had
to throw in substantial reserves to ease
the pressure. Further Russian attacks
collapsed.
The offensive against the southern
army began on July 4. The fierce
struggle lasted for several days and
ended with complete success for the
defense made by General Count Won
Bothmers army, which consisted al
most exclusively of German troops.
GERMANS JOIN IN A ROUT
South of the Dniester the Russian
attack against the Austrian Third army
on July and was completely sue
cessful. The Austrian trops gave way;
a German division which had but re-
Gently arrived lTicu 70 Sloii tho 49, S'-N
but was carried along by it. The Rus
SLAMS pressed forward to the Lomnitza
and occupied Kalusch Can advance OF
about Is miles,.
The position was critical for the com
mander- in chief. He had collected his
reserves for the intended counter at
tack between Zborow and the Sereth,
in the direction of Tarnopol and the
western divisions were being moved to
this area.
Just as in the spring the Archduke
KarPs front had to be strengthened be-
fore we could march on Rumania, 80
now the, commander in chief had to