The Lamar register., 1919-12-31

tlonhrN forces.
ave recognize that the combatant
troops TO be dispatched In July may
have to include troops which have had
insufficient training. hut we consider
the present emergency is such as to
Justify a temporary and exceptional
departure by the United States from
sound principles OF training. especially
n a similar course is being followed
by France and Great Britain.
Signed FOCH.
"MILNER.
"PERsHING."
Raised Delicate Questions.
The various proposals during these
conferences regarding priority OF ship
ment. often very insistent. raised ques-
tions that were not only most difficult
hut most delicate. On the one hand,
there was a critical situation which
must he met by immediate action.
while. on the other hand, any priority
accorded particular arm necessarily
postponed the formation of a distinc-
tive American fighting force and the
means to supply II. Such force WAS,
10 my opinion. absolutely necessary TO
win the war. few OF the allied rep
resentatives became convinced that the
American services OF supply should not
be neglected but should he developed
In the common interest. The success
OF our divisions during May and June
demonstrated fully that II was not
necessary to draft Americans under
foreign flags In order TO utilize Amer
lcnn manhood most effectively.
When. on March 81. 1918. the Ger
man army on the western front began
its series OF offensives. II was by far
the most formidable force the world
had ever seen. In fighting men and
guns IL had a great superiority. but
this was of less importance than the
advantage In morale. In experience. in
training for mobile warfare, and in
unity Of command. Ever since the col
lapse Of the Russian armies and the
crisis on the Italian front In the fall
of 1917. German armies were being as
sembled and trained for the great cam
paigp which was to end the war before
Americas effort could be brought to
bear. Germany's best troops, her most
successful generals and all the expert
ence gained In three years of war were
mobillzed for the supreme effort.
The first blow fell on the right OF
the British armies. Including the juno
tlon OF the British and French forces.
Only the prompt cooperation Of the
French aud BRUSH general headquar-
tiers stemmed the tide. The reason for
this objective was obvious. and strik-
ingly illustrated the necessity for hav-
Ing some one with sufficient authority
over all the allied armies to meet such
an emergency.
Reserves Were Lacking.
The lack of complete co-operntion
among the allies on the western front
had been appreciated and the question
Of preparation to meet a crisis had
already received attention by the su-
preme war council. A plan had been
adopted by which each of the allies
would furnish a certain number of d.
visions for a general reserve to be un-
der the direction of the military repre-
sentatlves of the supreme war council,
of which Gen. Foch was then the
senior member. But when the time
came to meet the German offensive In
March these reserves were not found
available and the plan failed.
The situation resulted In a coz
ference for the immediate considera'
tion Of the question of having an al
lied commander In .chlef. After much
discussion, during which my view ia
voring such action was clearly stated
an agreement was reached and Gen.
erxl Foch was selected. His appoint
ment as such was made April and
was approved for the United States
by the president on April 10.
The grave crisis precipitsted by the