The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-10-09
OPPOSED PLAN TO GO BACK


 Army was proposing to evacnate the whole country east of the yistula; only tho fortresses were to retain their var Sarrisons and he defended.
 The Eighth Army had no doubt adopt ed this play in the expectation of a speedy decision in the west when East Prussia could be reconquered with the help of endorsements from the west, and the invading Army driven back. This scheme had often been practised by Count won Schieffen in strategical manoeuvres. If the assumption was correct, the decision of the Eighth Army to spare itself for later operations was sound.
 But it did not allow for the realities of war, nor did it take into account the immense responsibility of expos- ing part of ones country to invasion. The amount of suffering inflicted on countries from the actual theatre of opc tiOns, even under the most humane conditions of warfare, has once more been brought home to humanity by this world war.
 As events were shaping, retreat be- hind the Nistula would have spelt ruin. We should not have been able to hold the Nistula line against the numerical superior forces of the Rus sians. and it would certainly have been i'm possible for us to support the Aus trian Army in September; it's collapse would then have followed as a matter of course The situation, as I found it. was indeed very serious. but after all the problem was not insoluble.
 FOUND STRONG ARMY
 At my request. orders were immedi- ately sent to the east front fixing the retreat of the main body of the Eighth Army for the 23rd inst. The First Re serve corps. the l7th Army corps and the main reserve of the Konigsberg garrison were to have a rest. The First A. C.. was not to be detrained at Goss- lershaussen, but near General von Scholte's position, somewhere east of Deutscn- Eylau (45 miles south of west of Allenstein). Any available troops from the garrisons of Thorn, Kuhn, Graudenz and Marienburg. were to go to Strasburg and Lautenberg (20 miles apart near the Polish border about 65 miles southwest of Alenstein). These garrisons were composed only of Landwehr and Landsturm formations.
 Thus. in the southwest part of East Prussia Con front of about 75 to 100 miles, as shown by Gen. Ludendorff's account of positions). a strong army was formed, which could undertake an offensive, while the northern group either continued its retreat in south westerly direction, or could be brought
 
 action against the Narew Army. Of course an actual decision as to the plan to be adopted could only be given on the spot The Russians could not be driven off without fresh engagement.
 No staff officer would miss such chance of turning to good advantage the fact that their two armies were separated from each other.
 PROUD MEMORY OF THE KAISER
 I also reported to His Majesty the Emperor. His Majesty, who was very calm, spoke seriously of the eastern situation, and deeply regretted that part of the German Fatherland should suffer invasion by the enemy. He was mindful of the sufferinss of his people. The Kaiser decorated me with the order Pour le Merite. which had been award ed me for my work at Liege. and spoke appreciativeiy of me All my life this will be q proud. if sad memory.
 At nine o'clock in the evening l left Coblenz in a special train for the eastern front.
 Shortly before my departure I learn ed that General von Hindenburg had ac- cepted the post of Commanderi in Chief, and would board the train q Hanover at four o'clock in the morning.
 The General was the station at Hanover, and I reported to him. It wns the first time we had met All other versions belong to the realm of