New-York tribune., 1919-07-12
By William L. Mcpherson

by William l.. Mcpherson
An American edition of Mr. Nevin-
sons THE Dardanelles Campaign" il
highly welcome. 1t is the best booa
written on the ill-fated effort of tha
Entente powers to open the Straits and
take Constantinople. 1t is also, in full
ness and clearness of exposition and in
a certain sense of sympathetic nearness
to the events it deals with one of tha
most admirable books of the war
Mr.. Nevinson was himself an eva.
witness of much of the fighting in Gal
lipoli. He is saturated with the feel.
ing of military adventure which had
in it the most spacious possibilities
and failed SO narrowly and so traej.
cally-which saw so much heroic effort
expended with so little practical result
The campaign for Constantinople was
the one big strategic conception on ths
side of the Entente up to the time
Foch arrived Yet its Importance was
not appreciated until after it failed
Had it been successful it would have
linked up the Russian front with the
Allied front, and also brought all the
Balkan nations into the war against
Germany and Austria Hungary Il
would have accomplished the primary
aim of Entente strategy. Yet it was
treated in its time more or less as a
"side show. The "Western" school
had the ear of the military authori-
ties in LONDON and Paris and resources
] III
the spring Of 1915 which would nave
suffced many times over to clear the
Dardanelles and maroon the Turkish
armies in Asia Minor
The campaign from start TO finish
was a series of mishaps and miscalcu-
lations The landing on Gallipoli was
belated The fleet could have broken
through the Narrows had it continued
is attack on the forts a day longer.
Sari Bair Ridge could have been taken
and held il the Suvla Bay operation
had been properly pushed or if tbe
troops which actually got to the crest
had been supported as it was planned
TO support them.
Mr.. Nevinson tells The story Of these
mischances with profound sense Of
their pitiful fatality. The Allied SOL
dlers fought with superb heroism and
endured eNtraof ofdlnary hardShlps. Yet
their valor was futile. Few organi-
zations have ever surpassed the Anzac
divisions in soldierly efficiency, in spite
OF the fact that practically all their
officers were without professional mill
taIy experience. And the British regu-
lars were little behind the Anzacs in
fighting qualities. It is the continuing
tragedy of the wastage OF such supe-
rior material which The author accent
yates, Intentionally or not, in his NOV
ing account of operations, undertaken
again and again, without sufficient ar
tillery support ard with the prospect
always Of useless sacrifice
Mr.. Nevirson shows little bitterness.
however, in his judgments. He believed
heart and soul IL the Gallipoh CAM
paign and deplored its abandonment.
he Is an enthusiastic supporter Of Cen
eral Hamilton; yet he doesn't gloss
over the conditions which seemed to
so many others to pat CallipoI in the
category Of frustrated and hoodooed
enterprises.
be author seems to take it for
slH ated that the decision not to renew
tn ieet attack. after March lS, was
'ustliled by the Allies naval losses en-
that day Whea his book was written
he had not had access to the testimony
Of Ambassador Morgenthau TO the
effect that on March - the Anadolu
Hamidieh battery had only seventeen
armor-piercing shells left and that
Fort Kilid Bahr, Oh the other side of
the Narrows, had only ten.