South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1919-12-14
BY VI ALEXANDER GUTCHKOFI

party. war president OF the Third /
5umA minister OF the first Rus
sian revolutionary government and /
probably the ablest party poliu-
clan his country has produced. As
he has been in closer personal .
-ontact than any other man with
the commanders of the forces op-
Grating against the Red govern |
nent. and also with the entente
statesmen who are supporting
their efforts his opinions have spe- .
al value at the present moment.
AZ would be idle TO deny that many
81 nay Influential countrymen have
lost faith in the earnestness and sin
cerity Of the entente opposition 20
Bolshevisn. and I have heard very
bitter words from them with regard
90 the part which Great Britain
has recently played in our affairs.
But I always ask them where we
should have been without British
assistance
AIy own view is that the days OF
Bolshevism are numbered, and that
next spring at the latest, we shall
witness it's downfall
our cause is prospecting best on
the southern front, where "a serious
setback Is no longer 10 be feared.
cen. Denikin's Southern Army is
now a well organized, stable, and
efficient hghting force. That its adj
vent is really welcomed by the pop
uIation in the territory occupied by
10 is clear from the experience of
KharkoH. where 10000 volunteers
fiocked to It's standard. Gen. Deni-
kin is thus freed from the disagree
able necessity Of having to resort TO
CONSUMPTION. which is always an un-
popular measure. There were we'll
founded hopes that ne would sue
coed in reaching Moscow this year,
but they are no longer very strong.
He has now 20 fight against geogra-
phicaI and climate conditions, which
are much more formidable than the
BOlshevik generalship. Until the
spring operati, MS Will be possible
only along the lines of roads. and
sweeping cavalry movements will b
out of question. Moreover, the vast
distance in the region of the
wrecked railways, which II is impos-
sible to repair render the work OF
supply very difficult
KoIchak Has Peasant Army.
Admiral KOlChak's position is not
nearly so promising. Ills army S
essentially a peasant one, and more
subject to disintegrating influences
than that Of Denikin. He is also
short OF officers. However, his ST
tuation seems TO have improved
somewhat recently, and. Of course,
he constitutes an important factor
i'm the general military problem. The
Archangel front is. for the present,
purely secondary and defensive
one. and would acquire primary
significance only I'm connection with
decided success elsewhere.
That brings me to the most COM
picatcd and predetermined features
OF the present situation, the opera
lions of the northern and northeast
ern fronts The idea OF forming "a
northern front was worked out on
lenikin's staff. As a result of con-
situations with our military chiefs
and the statesmen of the entente
fourfold plan was evolved. 1t would
ne inopportune 10 state where its
various constituents originated, but
they were as follows.
/. The supply of arms and equip
ment. which was eventually taken
over by Great Britain.
.. Food. both for the army and
for tho liberated population. for
which the Americans made them
selves responsible.
8. An anti Bolshevik coalition of
The Baltic states. which was 20 group
itself round the northern army.
4. The recruiting OF troops among
two million Russian soldiers in the
prisoners camps of the Central En-
pire.
Judcnitch's Chances.
The first OF these four desiderata
lis only now in process Of fun rea-
Iization. and il may be said that
the numbers and strength Of Jude
pitch's army are limited only 10y the
successful advance on Petrograd he
When he commenced his recent un-
successful advasCe on Petrograd he
had more than twice the number of
well-trained and high-spirited troops
than he was actually able 90 put
into the fghtng line. The lacking
equipment is, however. now arriv-
Ing. and il is possible that he may
make a second attack with much
better chances Of success. Foodstuns
were also concentrated by the Amer
leans in convenient harbors. but the
quantity was not sufficient, and they
have now nearly ali been consumed.
Owning 20 local political complca-
tions the coalition OF the Baltic
states was but imperfecuy realized.
and its future effectiveness viii de
pend largely on immediate develop
ments in that region The proposal
10 recruit troops in the prisoners
camps had 10 encounte IA good deal
or dIuerence OF opinion. II was
thought IN some quarters that IL
would be dangerous TO rely on these
men. who had long been subject 20
tne demoralizing influences OF prison
life. and had also, 10 some extent
been exposed 10 German propagan-
da. In the end. it was decided 20
t.L. vi, osH -faF action ia 1ha prison