The citizen. [volume] (Berea, Ky.) 1899-1958, 1919-01-30
THE TRAGEDY OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
Professor LeVant Dodge
v. The Terms of Peace

The above topic is far too broad
10 be carefully considered in one
short article. We can merely indi-
cate the general principles which
are likely 10 guide the Peace Com
missioners, now in session at YER
sailles, close TO Paris. The details,
some Of them Of the greatest I'M
portance, are likely TO require a
longer time for thorough discussion
than most people have supposed.
Some single questions, sure TO arise,
may well occupy our thought
through an entire Citizen article.
In regard TO these it is not likely
that the joint commission will reach
decision without careful investi-
cation and protracted debate. IL is
quite possible that on certain points
there may be permanent disagree
ment Hence the ground for feeling
that the months before us may be
full of issues "a critical as those of
the years just past.
The first impression of many may
be that the road TO the framing OF
the terms Of peace will be an easy
one, because of the completeness of
the victory. When war is a drawn
game, neither side admitting defeat,
there is a likelihood that each party
will make such claims at the peace
table as shall cause a clash at every
point, and consequent long delays.
In our second war with Great Bri-
tain, from 1912 TO 1915, there was
not anything approaching what is
called in warfare a decision" In
deciding the terms of peace the
Commissioners omitted all reference
to the questions which were the
chief cause of the war. But in the
present case there is no doubt as TO
the decisiveness of the result. The
terms Of the preliminary armistice
leave one party 10 the war helpless.
II is not expected that their repre-
sentatives will even have seats at
the green table, at least not until
their conquerors shall have decided
what penalties TO impose. Why,
then, should il be difficult to reach
a conclusion, if one side is TO have
its own sweet way?
The Entente allies have been re-
enforced. from time TO time, until
twenty independent nations are in
cluded. Many of these are COM
. paratively small and weak. But
, they have their several interests
and claims, in some cases conflict
ing sharply with each other. In
fact these conflicts, in certain in
stances, are of such moment as to
= furnish greater cause for war be-
, tween the states Immediately con-
E cerned, than the differences whici
9 often have led nations into morta
combat. These rival claims arr
+ brought into being by the new cir
. cumstances which will exist wheT
certain universally conceded de-
9 cisions are made. And so the jus
a and fair decision of some. questions
I will give rise TO still more Difficult
e ones. These will not be fully stated
: in this article. Another count
= in the complicated state of affairs
i is the fact that most of the indie
. pendent powers on the one side ar,
{ not legally at war with all of thos'
y on the other side. The United State
II has never declared war against Tur
7. key or Bulgaria. Others of our so
a called allies, both in the old worl'
q end in the new, are similarly sit
', uated. All of the almost inflnity o
Il claims, on the part Of all the nation
o interested, must be disposed of be
u fore peace can be called concluded
. The task on hand thus is complicat
"a ed. far beyond all precedent. Be
Il sides this, il is "in the air" that tn
o work now TO be done is not simpl.
II TO terminate the present war, bu
re to make such arrangements as pro
!, baby to prevent any future wal
Right here is TO be found the mos
=, difficult part of the problem. Tn
case is somewhat simplifled by tn
!, fact that five nations: Great Britain
70 France, the United States, Italy, an
70 Japan, are reckoned as the "Grea
u Powers" whose decision, if they ca
y reach one, will have to be accepte
% by their minor allies, as fully an
"a certainly as Germany and her Allie
a must accept whatever terms are ac
q cording by the victors.
Is There remains one significant fac
o to be named, before proceeding I
- the consideration Of any concret
70 question. IL is that, contrary to a
"a former expectations, this treat
IA is TO stand out alone as one whic
IG shall have in view the permanen
10 well-being of all the various coun
u tries concerned, and, more than tina
= the present and future interests Q