Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-10-06

faction the way in which we brought
ourselves ever nearer to our own
ruin. on October II the second note
to America was despatched.
All over the world the talk of
peace reconciliation. with its idealistic
catchwords, died suddenly down. That
was after all not surprising, for the
press of the world was following the
hints of the enemy propaganda, which
was itself abandoning the use of the
phrase. The entente had achieved its
object by the use of the word, and
could now throw off the mask and
work for peace of force.
In Germany, too. the word took
more modest place The men who
hitherto preached the doctrine, and
had represented a peace of justice and
Cancellation as perfectly possible and
easy of achievement. had not now the
moral courage to confess that they
were mistaken as to the enemy's in
tentions; that they had led the people
astray and brought them to their ruin.
They were. or some of them were,
| ready to speak in thoroughly un-Ger-
man language OF Wilson's fourteen
| points as peace of justice.
So far had we trodden the path of
disgrace already.
Openly Attack LidenGorff
They began a strong agitation
| against myself alleging that | had
now bv undue haste in the armistice
offer, brought the people to new mis-
! fortunes, after previously making all
peace impossible by the extravaganza
of my demands. Thus did they d-
rect the anger of the people and the
army against me.
If all those who had previously
! talked of the ?eace OF reconciliation
/ had spoken OF the war and the terrors
| of defeat; had they seconded my eff
| forts to bring out the last strength
of the people and keep them morally
equal to the fight, then l should never
have needed to ask for an armistice.
| The time will come when this is clear
! ly seen,
On the 18th of October the second
note to America was despatched.
In those days ! went quietly for
| ward on my difficult way When it
| became clear to me, later after the
receipt of the second Wilson note. that
Wilson could not or did not wish to
prevail, but that Clemenceau and
Lloyd George would have their way.
and that We were to be enslaved, then
| certainly thought it was time to
translate words to deeds and not TO
rest content with empty speeches.
! | expected from Prince Max and his
government a fulfillment of their pro
! LESSONS once they and the country
| realized that they stood at the grave
of all their hopes of a peace by under
standing
Should Have Pinned Cabinet.
1t may be that | should have acted
more wisely and cleverly, if had def
| initely put to the government at the
| beginning Of october the question
which it would have ultimately to de-
eide Win the people fight on for
| honor's sake, and will the government
call up the last man and stir the peo-
| pie again to a real and sacred enthu-
siasm? | still believe today that an
appeal to the people at that time
would have met with sufficient sue
cess.
| Prince Max was of the opinion that
1t would have been more advantageous
to have sent the note off about week
later, after first publishing a detailed
/ program of our war aims, making
clear to the world our agreement with
the principles of President Wilson and
our readiness to make heavy sacrifices
I n
ciples.
| We had already, on. October E. placea
ourselves on the ground of Wilson's
principles. What else was to be done
| later?
The fact that I, coming without
coming into the public eye. succeeded
IN moving the chancellor to swift and
energetic action. after all the time
since the middle of August had
elapsed without anything being done
dld nothing to inture the general posi-
ton. On the other hand, the open
mention of the fact that G.H.Q had
desired the armistice and had pressed
for 1t did as much damage, if not
more, than the distorted reports of
! Major Baron Won dem Busehe's
| speech
Could Not Deceive Allies,
Do Prince Max and his supporters
really believe that if the step had
been taken in the middle OF October
ut would have been regarded as due
solely TO motives of noble humanity
land as such would have received a
/ friendly welcome from the entente?
The enemy's point of view was alto
gether too material and self-inter-
esteu Tor TINS. They were also much
| They had as good a view of the
military position as our G.H.Q. Thev
knew the conditions in the German
army and in Germany as well as thew
knew the weakness of the Austro-
Hungarian army in Italy and the no.
sition in Austria Hungary itself. From
the statements of the Numerous Ger
man prisoners they took, who often
SAID far too much. they must have
hal clear indication of the weak
strength of our battalions and of the
number of battalions that we had had
to break up Equally little can they
have been ignorant of the poor moral
of the troops and the people.
From Berlin they heard everything
Ihey anticipated our collapse with the
same certainty as they had anticipated
that of Bulgaria
An offer of peace without an offer.
of armistice would also have no
effect whatever on the enem-- deter
mination to DESTROY us. That IS madei
plain by the fate of our earlier offers,
which were treated by the entente as
insincere and dishonorable. and by the
result of Count Bur.an's step. In view
| of the attitude OF the enemy. an offer.
Eof armistice alone could convince
them of our real desire for peace,
Only an offer Of armistics would