Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-10-08

In his answer to our second note,
| Wilson gave us nothing; he did not
even tell us whether the entente took
! its stand on the Fourteen Points. He
demanded, however, the suspension of
the submarine war campaign. stigma
tized our conduct of the war in the
west as a violation of international
| law, and once again sought in obscure
| phrases to moddle with intimate ques-
! tons of our domestic politics.
| No doubt was any longer possible as
to the intentions of our enemies, or
as to the predominating influence of
| Clemenceau and Lloyd George. Will
son was not prepared to stand against
| the comprehensive claims of France
and England.
We had heavy decisions to take. We
stood now clearly before the question,
were We to surrender Internationally
| to the entente, or was the government
! to call on the people to fight a last
| fight of despair? We had to return
a firm and dignified reply to the note,
| and to emphasize once more our hon
orable anxiety for an armstice. but
at the same time to maintain warmly
the honor of our brave army. We
could not allow ourselves to be de-
! prived of our submarine weapon, for
! this would amount to equalization.
The note was discussed on October
| II at a meeting of the war cabinet in
Berlin. Colonel Heye and / were pres
ent. | had also requested General
| Hoffman, to attend. On this very
day the 18th army was fighting a
| desperate battle at the front.
'Lnck May Come Gcrmany's Way"
He Answered the Chancellor.
The chancellor again asked a num-
Der of questions, and, turning to me,
made a statement to the following eff
| feet: That new note had arrived
| from Wilson. containing an increase
| in his demands: that Wilson had
plainly been placed in a difficult posi-
| ton through pressure from external
( influences; that he apparently hoped
that we would give him the opportu-
nifty to continue negotiating with US
and to overcome the opposition of the
"neverendians. In order to reply to
| the note it was necessary to under
stand quite clearly the military posi-
ton.
/ had a different view as to the
statements of the enemy, and could
see nothing but their intention to de-
stroy us.
To the many questions that were
put to me, I took up in general the
following position;
Already on a previous occasion
! have been asked a number of ques-
lions to which 1t is impossible to give
J precise answers.
"War is not a sum in arithmetic,
| There are in war many probabilities
and improbabilties What will actu-
+, ally happen no man knows. When we
went to East Prussia in August. 1914
and the orders We're given for the
| battle of Tannenberg, even then none
knew how things would so. or wheth-
er Rennenkampf would or would not
move. He did not move, and we won
the battle. Part of war is luck. and
! luck may come Germany's way again
II can only tell you my convictions
For what I tell YOU the responsibility
is mine and has been mine for -four
/ long, weary years"
/ Troops Badly Corrupted.
| In particular the question was dis
cussed whether by transferring from
east to west all our divisions. or even
n part of them, the front could he SC
strengthened that we could hold out
/, for long time. To deal with this