The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1919-10-27
Wilson Lost Faith in German
PohcY

This calculation, however, had only
2 limited application and should not
nave been allowed to become dogmatic.
The old fundamental mistake In our
government Of keeping the separate de-
partments in the dark as to the stu
alton OF the whole was to my mind re-
sponsible for the fresh launching of
the submarine war at such a time that
II interrupted pending diplomatic nego-
Wilson felt his confidence in the Ger
man policy shaken at this sudden and
complete change in the course of nego-
tiations. 1t was a parallel case to many
others Of which we had been guilty, in
Guiding the slap in the face 10 the car
which was constituted by the Polish
proclamation, but at this late stage OF
the war 1t almost amounted to the final
loss OF our capacity for International
negotiations.
The bill was soon paid by the German
nation as a whole and by the Hohen-
zollern dynasty in particular.
II was a misfortune that the sub
marine war was conducted by a states
man who was fundamentally averse
to it.
When, at last, we staked all on this
one venture the first requirement was
that all military, naval, political, per-
sonal and technical means should be
employed to further il. FThesnavy ought
to have set aside every other task and
to have assigned all available hands
and appliances to the building of yards
for the construction Of submarines and
motors.
The army should have provided work
men. Politics should have been a com
plement to the war, Diplomacy should
not have stood looking on, but should
have supported our military forces with
all zeal.
Instead of that, concessions were
made to European neutrals which
weakened the effect of the submarine
war and from a technical and military
point of view robbed it of that intense
concentration which alone, at this ad'
vanced stage, could have secured thu
requisite efficiency.
leave it an open question as e
whether, after my resignation, thu
building of new submarines continued
at as great a speed as was humanl,
possible. Decisive, however, was tn,
increase In enemy defensive measures
which exceeded all our fears, Englan,
entered upon the var unprepared 70
the submarine danger. As soon as shu
recognized the seriousness of this dan
ger she, with America, concentrated a.
her efforts and energies on the creation
Of defensive measures n weapons
The defense increased at a rate ia
greater than that with which we coul
build U-boats.
NC discussion OF the U-Doat QueSlIOI
would be complete without mention O
some Of the most important factors i
Submarine defense.
The placing OF 5000 guns wit
trained gun crews on merchant ships
thus changing them into battleships
the systematic patrolling Of the seas b
airships, airplanes and ships; the eS
~tensive use of submarine acoustic ar
Iparatus; the construction of destroyer
lU-boat traps and water bombs; the lay
ing of defensive distractions such Z
U-boat nets and mines; direct measure
IN such as trebling the output of America
ty %shipyards; the speedy construction
s. cargo vessels; the greatest possib
storing Of provisions; the developme
of the enemy intelligence service; Il
fitting up and training of conveys, ar
I'D finally the continually growing pressu
on neutrals which at last ended wi
the absorption of their tonnage; G
"a helped to defeat the submarine war.
Sa In consequence OF these measures Il
n' individual U-boat was reduced to on
fifth Of her former efficacy, Then, to
later on, many thousands Of newly co
n structed U-boat destroyers operat
TO against us. .
ial In 1916 our U-boats could still pli
o. havoc among the enemy merchant shi
like wolves among sheep; later tn
had to fight regular battles. A wo
a. OF destruction had become a dangero
operation with heavy casualties.