Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-10-02

points which had Neen raised in the
previous discussions of which he
| might be unaware.
| We laid stress, for example. in the
| interests of our economical and mill
/ tary policy. on the necessity of rail-
way alliance with Poland, and of in
| surfing safe communication through
Poland to Russia.
Wanted to Tic Up Poland.
l considered it essential, too, that
| the fulfillment of Polands obligations
should be more closely secured in some
, way, for l could not overcome my
DISTRICT of that country, Wilma had
| formerly been promised to the Lithu-
anians by the chancellor 1t was to be
feared that the would very naturally
regard the cession to Poland as a
breach of faith It was a matter for
the foreign office to take steps 10
avoid the disadvantages resulting
| therefrom.
With regard to Lithuania, even
after this serious mutilation. / was
| still of the same opinion, and empha-
sized the necessity of attaching it as a
self governing state to Germany or
| Prussia through personal union. Torn
| from it's context, this minute was used
| in the reichstag to convict me of mud
died political thought.
The story of it's origin is simple, but
! 1t is not clear how it came to be pur-
| Joined from the foreign office Plans
should be followed as long as possible,
provided damage in other directions
does not result therefrom. which there
was in this case no ground to fear
In this instance the policy of the for
eign office was sound, and my posi-
ton quite correct.
From the same point OF view we
were at that time in favor of the for
nation of Baltic state and the set
Element of the question of the Finnish
throne according to Finland's desires.
(fhe kaisers brother-in-law had been
put on the Finninsh throne)
Wanted to Crush Rumania.
Conditions in Rumania were also
discussed with Secretary Won Hintze.
The obvious military superiority of
the entente had strongly affected the
government in Jassy, which was en-
tirely under the influence of the en-
tente ambassador. Their attitude to
us became cooler and cooler; the
weakness of the Bucharest peace
made itself felt now.
In agreement with Secretary Won
Hntze, CHG seriously considered
the inauguration of q new campaign
against Rumania with the troops that
had been released from the east for
the west.
General Won ARR promised his sup
port, provided the Emperor Charles
would agree. but. in spite of the mill
tary necessity for this step, the latter
refused to sanction any special pres
sure on Rumanla.
We therefore renounced the idea of
taking military measures, and the
troops were ordered to their original
destination in the west. In the end,
however. they had to be sent to Ser
bia. Later on. Austria Hungary itself
suggested armed intervention in Ru-
mania, but by that time 1t was too
late.
Meanwhile Admiral Won Holtzen-
dorff, who had developed severe
heart disease, had resigned. and Adj |
miral Scheer became chief of the
navy staff. He was an unusually clear |
man. capable of swift deci-
sions. | got in touch with him as /,
soon as possible in Spa. and talked |!
over with him the situation IN the |
west and the submarine campaign.
The evacuation of our submarine |
base at ~Bruges might soon become I
Admiral Scheer did not /
think that this would have a decisive |
influence on the submarine campaign,
as the vessels already had to travel /
from Flanders round the north of
being no longer able to enter
the Channel OF course he did not
welcome the necessity for massing
submarines on our German coasts.
Could Not Spare Men.
He thought. too. that submarine
building could be speeded up and
better result obtained He asked me 4
to assist him in the matter. saying he II
needed more workmen to turn out Il
more submarines L explained that H
G @. was not in q position to sup 1
ply them, and could only agree to re-
lease a certain number of specially
trained engineers and skilled hands.
This only involved few men.
These discussions lasted into Octo-
Der, The situation had assumed an
grave aspect. Neverthe-
ess gave instructions for the release
If these men. This order also led to i
public controversy. The /
command could not give in
until the sword should be wrested
rom it's hand. There was no heed Il
% abandon any desirable political
inns, or to forego any useful supplies
If material, until absolutely compelled Il
81 necessity.
In spite of all the difficulties, of II
which was only too well aware, was
lot the man to throw up the sponge |
and / held strongly to
he opinion that the stronger we were
n the field the better our position
would be in any peace negotiations. II
/ had introduced change on my |
taft; l found Colonel Heye an older
assistant, and placed him in control |
# several departments that previously II
lad stood under my immediate SUI II
,ervisions Their reports went to him. i
tut | reserved to myself decisions of Il
II
Denies He Was a Dictator.
What had gene through would II
cave no man unmarked l had been II
ppointed to CHIC, not to make Il
,eace, but to, win the war, and had |
bought of nothing else. Like Glenn
nceau and Lloyd George. had want
d 70 call UP the entire nation, but