Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-19
GERMANY D|DN' 7
DESIRE WAR, SAYS
vON H|NDENBURC
Huns Defensive Strength Was
As Unfavorable As Possible
From the Start, Is Field
MarShaPS Claim,

Berlin, Nov Is tby the Associated
Press Field Marshal Won linden
burg declared before the sub-eommit-
tee of the national assembly investi-
eating war responsibility Il know
with absolute certainty that neither
| the people, the kaiser nor the govern
ment desired war, for the government
knew better than others Germany's
| tremendously difficult position in a
war against the entente"
Germany's defensive strength, said
| the field marshal, was as unfavorable
as possible from the start. 1t might
| be left to history to decide why Ger
many's peace policy had failed.
IF the military authorities pre-
| pared for the possibility of an una
voidable war" continued Won Hinden-
| burg that was only its duty towards
1 the nation. If there had been solid,
united cooperation between army and
| homeland we could have attained vic
tory.
"While the enemy. Notwithstanding
| his superiority, all parties were united
| even more firmly in the determination
to be victorious with us, although we
| were numerically inferior, interests at
home made their influence felt, and
this state of affairs led to the breaking
of the win to victory"
Defends U-bcat Warfare.
In all great decisions Ludendorff
and himself were of one mind; they
had worked in full accord from Au-
gust 80, 1916. to the end he asserted.
1--WE considered unrestricted sub
marine war imperative Immediately
we entered the supreme command"
oil cl, 1
came we could no longer permit our
gallant soldiers to be bombarded with
American ammunition and their
wives and children starved by the
| blockade The U-boat war was the
| only means to oppose these condi-
| tions.
Won Hindenburg and Ludendorff
| found, the corridors leading to the
committee room crowded to the doors
with admirers and others. who by
divers means had secured admission.
Deputy Gothein, president of the
sub committee held a reception and
thanked the field marshal, who re-
piled that he was glad to come be-
cause 1t was his duty, especially to
appear with my true comrade.'
IL Asked Six Questions.
The suh-eomWittee had prepared
fsfsts ,szesssshss alI - a44.d Been submit
ted to Won Hndenbdrg on Saturday, to
enable him to study them and pre-
pare his answers.
First-From what time did the
upper army leadership consider
sharpened submarine war unavoidable
and for what reasons?
Second--Did the army leadership
know of reasons against the subma-
rines and the opening of submarine
warfare from the declarations of I'm
der ?secretaries of State Daniel and
Albert? Why did the army leadership
consider these declarations against
submarine war as no longer sound?
Third-Why did the army leader
ship accept as in the telegram of Won
Hindenburg, December %. 1916. to
Chancellor Won Bethmann-H Hollweg,
the statement that the Wilson peace
was called forth by England and not
agree to the peace proposal made by
the imperial leaders.
Fourth--Was the army leadership
familiar with the various details of
President Wilson's acton, especially
on January .. 1917, as the decision to
begin U-hoat war was taken?
Were the reports from Bernstorff
during the period December 81 to
January familiar.
Fifth--Did the army leadership as
sumo that England could be compell-
ed to peace at the latest in july 1917,
as contained in the memorandum of
the admiralty staff?
Sixth--General Ludendorff assumes
in his book that on January 20, in
conversation from headquarters with
the government. that delay in the sub
marine war had not been demanded,
while Chancellor Won Bethmann- Holl-
veg in his statement before the sub
committee declared that he had made
such demand. How is this CONTRA
diction to be explained?
Declines to Answer Separately.
Chairman Gothein tried to get Won
Hindenburg to answer the questions
separately, but he declared that he
must mix them up. The questions
were read. The second was by far the
most interesting for it embodied long
cable reports of Secretaries Haniel
and Albert from America, under date
of 1916. describing as experts what
the effect of the submarine war would
be. These reports were unusually
clear in their warning.
Haniels report was read first. In
it he said America, despite its busi-
ness sense and its English and to some
extent French ties, was at heart sem
timental, and that numberless Amer
leans with whom he had talked were
agreed that If Germany began Uboat
warfare they would go to war where
as If Germany ceased it they would
compel England to remove the block
ade. Any relaxation of Germany's
PROMISES made in 1916 meant war