Pine Bluff daily graphic., 1919-12-14

Nslng Of the allleS was St1ll K led to trench warfare. As our ~ASs were being trained for t& warfare, there was every req ,Iwhy we could not allow them
 f g scattered among our allies M by divisions, much less as Placements, except by pressure ,kheer necessity. Any sort of Mianent amalgamation would ]kyocably commit Americas S aanes to the hands of the al- " Moreover it was obvious 1.-the lack of homogeneity would
 Yer these mixed divisions dlffl- M to maneuver and almost cer- Nt to break up under stress of Kat, with the consequent mu-
 Y recrimination. Agaln, there
 M no doubt that the realization
 he German people that inde- 'ent American divisions, corps,
 rmies were in the field with
 k aEmined purpose would be se- Is blow to German morale and A.tige."
 yaneral Pershing had refused Fly to drop his plan for a sin army, acting under
 flag, but consented, becaus. Mhe existing emergency, to lent \ combat divisions at hand to HS stem the German offensive l8918, which, the allied coun- 3oresaw may very quickly sse the allied armies in a seri. 5Asituation."
 9s The Marne Salient.
 lpe German rush developed as SHcted, the report shows, but the Qfys success was far greater
 E had been feared. At Amlens,
 2 British were driven in 40- hneter front; between the Disc M MBerry-au-Bac, the French lost &Eilometers on a 35-kilometer
 aIt in four days. And imme-
 Rely the Germans utilized the aSne "as a defensive flank and
 advance was directed toward tEs."
 she gravity of the situation,' |ireport says, lied to the famous Hrs for holding up all suppl HH troop shipments except "in. Hsry and machine gun units. gIeneral Pershing at this time Rs recommending that his troops [!zsed to smash the Marne pock-
 ynto which the German S had list themselves. He says: lrhe Marne salient was inher- Ky weak and offered an oppor- Ny for a counter-offensive that
 K obvious. If successful, such apperation would afford imme- Sse relief to the allied defense,
 Qd remove the threat against Ns, and free the Paris-Nancy Toad. But, more important Ea all else, it would restore the Tale of the allies and remov E profound depression and fear la existing. Up to this time E units had been put in here x there at critical points as Urgency troops to stop the ter |s German advance. In every |l, whether the defensive or of ISive, they had proved them les equal to any troops in Flu k. As early as June 23 and lin on July 10 at Mombon, had N strongly urged that our best Esions be concentrated under gerican command if possible use as a striking force fnst the Marne salient. AL ] the prevailing view among Eallies was that American units fe suitable only for the de- hive, and that at all events F could be used to better ad- Rage under allied command, the
 gestion was accepted in prin- |e, and my estimate of their knsive fighting qualities was h put to the test"
 kltho his suggestion was not epted, American forces found k.y in the action which was un- kaken. At Chateau-Thierry kn the Germans first advanced third division commander re- ted:
 Lines Held Fast.
 EAltho the rush of the German bps overwhelmed some of the |nt line positions, causing the |sntry and machine gun compa- B to suffer, in some cases a 50 cent loss, no German soldier |ssed the road from Fossoy to Ezancy, except as a prisoner of E, and by noon of the following E (July 16) there were no Ger hs in the foreground of the Ed division sector except the |d.
 On this occasion," General Eshlng added, "a single regi- ht of the third division wrote of the most brilliant pages in military annal. It prevented crossing at certain points on front, while on either flank Germans who had gained a ting pressed forward. Our n, firing in three directions 6 the German attacks with Inter attacks at critical point. } succeeded in throwing two rman divisions into complete Illusion, capturing 600 prison. Due to the magnificent dash power displayed here and on field of Soissons by our last ond divisions the tida of x.,,,.