Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-11

The only conclusion ] could come
to about Bulgaria was that it would
| remain faithful to as as long as all
went well with us. But if the pros
tpeets Of victory diminished, or still
worse, if we suffered failure. then
things were bound TO turn out just as
in fact they have.
Why should there be any difference
between the character of nations and
that of men? Il could believe in the
| steadfastness of the Bulgarian army
| for just so long as I could believe in
the faith of the Bulgarian nation)
Turkey Hay Army on Paper.
Turkey was faithful to the alliance
but at the end of its strength; whether
through its own fault or that of others
was immaterial Its man power was
greatly reduced and the army existed
to a certain extent only on paper
Palestine was sure to fall an easy prey
| to England unless the troops there
were reinforced Turkeys disintegra-
ton was bound to produce political
results over wide area. and must
therefore, be prevented, even though
| the decision of the war might be
brought about elsewhere.
| In Germany the national spirit APP
| peared to be better than with our
! allies; nevertheless, it had sunk very
| low. and feeling had become worse.
| | must admit l formed too favorable
an estimate of our remaining energy.
| ] hoped that the recruiting question
would be put in order.
| The army had come VIGOROUSLY
| through 1917; but ii had become APP
parently that the holding of the west
ern front purely by defensive could
no longer be counted on, in view of
| the enormous quantity of material of
all kinds which the entente had now
at their disposal. Even where tactical
conditions had been absolutely normal
and by no means so untavorable as
in the struggle for the Wytschaete
salient or Laffaux Corner. we had lost
ground and suffered heavily.
Feared Attack by Allies.
These losses had indeed been greater
than we had incurred in well-con-
Quoted attacks. The enormous ma
terial resources of the enemy had
given his attack a considerable pre-
ponderance over our defence and this
condition would become more and
more apparent os our infantry approx
imated more nearly in character to a
militia, as our best men became cas-
ualties, and as discipline declined.
1t was also to be expected that the
enemy would learn from past battles;
he would probably attack on a broad
front, as in the double battle of the
Aisne and Champagne in April and
May, 1917, and aim at surprise. This
he would be able to do by employing
vast quantities of stores and equip
ment. These attacks would doubtless
make far greater demands on us than
any that had gone before
The troops had borne the continuous
defensive with uncommon difficulty.
6kulkers were already numerous. They
reappeared as soon as the battle was
over, and It had become quite COM
mon for divisions which came out of
action with desperately low affectives
to be considerably stronger after only
few days.
Against the power of the hostile
weapons the troops no longer dis
played their old stubbornness in de-
fence; they thought with horror of
fresh defensive battles and longed for
the war of movement. In this the
Germans had achieved brilliant sue
cess in 'Roumania, Eastern Galicia,
italy, and at Cambria, and had once
more proved their superiority, al
though their staying power was no
longer what it had been in 1914.
Had to Rouse His Army.
There had been incidents, too,
which indicated. that their cohesion
was no longer the same. As they were
depressed by defence their spirits
arose in the offensive. The Interests
OF the army were best served by the
offensive; indefense it was bound
gradually to succumb to the ever-in-
creasing hostile superiority in men and
material.
This feeling was shared by every
body. In the west Il wanted the at
tack, and after Russia's collapse ex-
pected it with the most intense relief.
Such was the feeling of the troops
about attack and defence. 1t amounted
to a definite conviction which pos
sessed them completely that nothing
but an attack could win the war. Many
generals among them the most dis
tinguished, spoke in the same strain.
Naturally [ did not allow myself to
he influenced by this feeling my sense
of responsibility was far too great.
alone had to make the decisive pro-
posal; of that / remained conscious
The wishes of tue troops
and commanders merely indicated
what the army felt regarding its own
strength and weakness.
The condition of our allies and of
ourselves, and that of the army. ALI
called for an attack that would bring
about an early decision. 4
Only Chance in the West. i
This was only possible on the west-l
ern front. All that had gone before
20 Of
creating a situation that would make
it a feasible operation. Until now
this situation had not arisen. We had
been able to strike a blow at Italy
with six or seven divisions, but for
the western front that was not suf-'
ficient force. set aside all idea of
in Macedonia or Italy. All
that mattered was to get together
troops for an attack in the I
west.
For this we needed enormous ma
tetial resources and strong troops,l
who, with their leaders. had beenll
trained for the attack If this could
be effected in time we could-indeed, |
we rnust-attack, The attack is the /
strongest form of combaz it alone is
decisive; military history proves it on
every page. 1t Is the symbol of SUI
periority. Delay could only serve the |
enemy, since he was expecting rein
That the attack in the west wouldl
be one of the most difficult operations
in history / was perfectly sure, and l !
did not hide the fact. The German
nation, too. would have to give all 1t
had. The greater the lack of men, the l
stronger must be its will. the more
the work of the government H
n the service of the war. III
MuSf Cfr.in (Af her ErOrtfs