Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-07-27

enemy, in order to leave him in
doubt as to our intentions.
| Army corps commanders of artillery
attached to the 4th Army must
Immediately withdraw all orders and
return them to the commander of ar
tiiiery for the army. The army corps
are responsible for the withdrawal
of the orders given by them in regard
to the offensive"
| Order issued by the commander of
the fpres groupment, dated July "a:
The Flandernschutz' attack is post
poned All field work must be sus-
pended, All munitions must be sent
to the rear"
Germans Go Across Marine
On July 10 the enemy's troops with
drew across the Marine On the eth.
before the unceasing attacks of the
French troops, they retired on the
Ourcq. and then. on the Sd and 4th
of August on the Vesle. His front,
instead of forming threatening
salient in the Champagne and Brie
country, had had to be brought back
TO the Aisne and the Nesle. The
| French reserves. far from being solely
employed in filling up the gaps in
! the front, had taken the counter
offensive. Only very small portion
of the British reseryes-two divisions
only-had taken part in the battle.
On the other hand. the reserves Of
the crown prince of Bavaria had had
| to come down from the region of
Lille at full speed toward the Aisue.
Lastly, while the German high com
mand had been compelled to aban-
don the offensive it had planned in
| Flanders. the armies of the entente
| assumed the initiative in new battle
which extended from the Disc to the
north sea.
On July is, then. the enemy's plan
was completely upset He began from
this date to find himself forced to
submit to the will of the allies. and
| he continued to submit to il from
that period until the armistice.
The Battle of Picardy.
The commander chief of the
allied armies thenceforward directed
his efforts to maintaining his mastery
over the German high command by
giving the enemy no respite that
would enable him to pull himself to-
gether and reconstitute his armies.
| With this end in view he ordered
and had carried out whole series
of separate attacks, following each
| other as rapidly and Unexpectedly as
possible, in order to increase pro-
gressively the disorganization of the
| enemy's armies and the confusion in
his high command, until such time
as he decided was suitable to bring
on the general offensive and. finally,
the attack that would overwhelm
the whole of the enemy's front
From July IL onward, realizing
that the enemy was keeping in line
between the North sea and the Disc
troops that were worn out, below
their normal strength and of poor
quality, the allied commander in chief
wanted" to take advantage without
delay of this enfeebled condition OF
his adversary by undertaking i'm
the attention of Field Marshal Sir
Douglas Haig to the Festhubert-
Robecq front, which was already
equipped for the contemplated Of
| fenslve, and where an attaik on the
| enemy would permit of the olsen
| gagement of the Bruay mining area
He proposed to combine with his ope-
ration simultaneous attack by the
| British 4th Army and the French LIST
Army on the Amiens salient, for the
purpose of disengaging the Paris
Amiens railway. Finally Marshal
Foch began his preparations with the
aid of the numberless resources of the
| American army, for the offensive that
| had for it's objective the reduction
Of the st. Mihiel salient.
| Attacks Follow Quickly.
| Thus. scarcely had the Marine coun-
| teroffensive been organized and
launched than three other operations
on large scale were in preparation.
On July "a, formally recognizing
| that the check to the fifth German of
| fensive had already been transformed
into defeat by the commemorative
| of the French 10th and 9Th armies. the
marshal commanding -in-chief called
| together the commanders in chief of
the allied armies and explained his
ideas to them. He based his views on
| the following considerations:
| Henceforth there would be equality
| in the number of combatants on both
| sides; on the allied side, superiority in
| the number of divisions in reserve
owing to the large number of German
! divisions engaged in the battle; in the
| near future, superiority in fresh re
serves; indisputable allied superiority
! in aviation material and tanks; pro-
gressive superiority in artillery, which
| would go on increasing; assurance of
an unlimited reserve of combatants,
| thanks to the American contribution.
| On the side of the enemy: Weak
ness. resulting from the fact that the
| Germans had been reduced, in effect,
! to the possession of only two armies
the one sacrificed to hold the front.
| while the other. the army of shock"
| already very much impaired. was ma
neuvering behind this fragile facade
| and no longer able to maintain its eff
! fectives, notwithstanding the excep-
| tional measures that had been re-
/ sorted to-
To all these consideration connected
with the fact that the factor of ma
| terial strength had changed sides had
| to be added the moral ascendancy re-
sulting from the ceaseless disappoint-
ments of the enemy, despite his enor-
nous sacrifices, since the beginning of
| the battle.
Allies Reach Turning Point
THE allied armies" added Marshal
Foch, have today reached the turn
i ing Of the road. In full battle they
4 have resumed the initiative of OPP
| erations. Their strength permits them
| to keep it, the principles of war de-
| mand that they shall do so. The
| moment has come to abandon the
general defensive attitude hitherto
| imposed by numerical inferiority and
pass to the offensive"
orders given for a series of indie
| pendent offensive actions, already in
preparation, and a forecast for the
| end of the summer. or the autumn,
| of an important offensive which it
was impossible for the moment to de-
| termine more precisely.
A local operation carried on on
July % on the west bank of the Avre
provided the French LIST Army with.
| base from which to start its Of
fensive, and on August 8 this army
| and the British 4th Army attacked
on a front of just over fifteen and a