Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-28


the Reichstag on the 9th February
before the Russian Revolution In
utter disregard of the destructive in
! tentions of the enemy, the idea of
peace by reconciliation made ever
greater progress among the German
| people. 1t was swallowed most eagerly
by those who feared the effects of VIC
| tory on their political aspirations.
! During May and June a number of
| delegates, with facilities from the
/ government undertook journeys to
| Stockholm Austria Hungary and
/ Switzerland. We walked into the traps
| of the Entente. | was against these
| journeys and so was the Commander
| in-Chief in the Marches. The EN-
/ peror decided in favor of them and
the deputies of the General Staff in
Berlin had to prepare the passports.
Count Czernin also sent the Socialist
leaders of Austria Hungary to Stock
holm.
From these. supported by the Rus
sian Revolution. the laboring classes
| of the hostile states were to be called
upon to proclaim and carry out the
reconciliation of mankind. These
endeavors revealed woeful ignorance
of human nature, and certainly took no
/ account of the spirit of the enemy ma
tons, nor of our own; they did, how
ever, in some cases pursue decidedly
revolutionary objects. 49,
| No impression was produced on the
enemy, but with us and in Austria the
| fighting spirit was weakened more and
more. Confidence in our strength was
! lost Government allowed the con-
| duct of affairs to slip more and more
| from its grasp; and the worst of it
! 4 L.
T! people as whole, but to certain
groups which, throughout their his
| tory, had always displayed critical and
| never constructive faculties.
"HeIots' Peace Was on its Way
These assemblies and all the talk of
| peace by understanding suited the En-
| tente very well. They disclosed our
state of mind. But, with a clear idea
of national feeling, they allowed no
Socialist leaders to go to the meetings
and declined to be bound in any way.
They pursued quite different aims
In the summer of 1917 the French
| Premier, Ribot, expressed his coun-
try's intention of destroying Germany
so clearly that no misunderstanding
was possible without deliberate self
deception. No one with the slightest
sence of reality could doubt that for
lilt IIHleille an llle Dedulllul CATCH
words were mere window dressing. in
tended to deceive the multitude, and
to give might the appearance of right
The government, the ReiChstag and
most of the people took it all for Cos
pei. In the Reichstag, for the first
time in the war. Socialist representa-
| tives openly threatened revolution.
The ''helots' peace" (of which the I'm
perial Chancellor spoke to G.. II. c.
about this time), which would come if
we gave in before the enemy felt any
inclination to peace, was on its way
The high command observed the
great spiritual decline with increas-
ing anxiety, and in view of the uncom-
promising attitude of the enemy gov
ernments felt bound to draw attention
to the harm that was being done to the
people and the army, especially in
Berlin, More than once the Field Mar
shall reported to His Majesty how
greatly G. Fl, @. missed the support of
the Imperial Chancellor. We had
urged the latter far more frequently
to strengthen the war-spirit of the
nation
Marshall Warns Chancellor
On June 10, 1917, Field Marshall
Won Hindenburg wrote to him as fol-
lows to warn him against the view
that the war would be over that au-
tumn at the latest:
These dongers (of submarine war;
farce are undoubtedly recognized by
clear-thinking people among our en-
emies. If In spite of this they advo-
cate continuation of the war it is be-
cause they expect the collapse of Ger
many and her allies to take place be-
fore their own.
: lp Of fD 1,,.;,,
about this victory on land, but they
rely for more on economic and politi-
cal causes. such as food difficulties
shortage of raw materials, disunion,
discomfort and the supremacy of the
German Radical Social Democracy
They base this eXpection on the wan
ing of our power of resistance at
home, the growth of international sem
timents, the state of our food supply,
and the longing for peace to which we
unfortunately give expression so often.
A revival of our internal strength
would be the the most potent means
of persuading our enemies of the fulfil
ity of prolonsing the war until their
means of existence are in danger of
q destruction. On the other hand, every
complaint of disappointed hopes, every
sign of exhaustion and longing for
any talk of the alleged impossibility
of standing another winter campaign,
| can only have the effect of prolonging
| the war.
The wording of the Chancelors re-
| ply, dated June IS, revealed extraor-
| binary depression. His way OF think
| ing differed from ours. He could find
no way out of the situation. and still
less could he summon up the energy
to act He was afard of that "helots'
| peace" but talked about a peace by
understanding. although he consider
| ed England $ readiness for peace to be
the necessary condition of getting
| LLOYD George to agree to it.
| However, his view of internal con-
| ditions soon became more hopeful, as
| we may see from a telegram to the
! emperor Of July 5.
! In the meanwhile. on June 81. the
| field marshal had himself written to
| the emperor:
sour greatest anxiety at this mo-