The Richmond Virginian. (Richmond, Va.) 1910-1920, 1919-09-09
GREAT BRITAIN MUST
HAVE SEA FORCE
BY ARTHUR POLEN.
Zone Of the most Authoritative naval
Writers in Great Br1tninl

4
writer's in Greas Britain).
i London, Sept. 6.--The last naval
estimates before the war amounted
I TO 1857 .50oo.ooo; the first after the
war to 3746.0oo,o00. No ono OF
course. supposed for an instant that
| this indicated the proposed scale OF
Great Britain's peace establishment
! ly no official statement has been
made to indicate how much II due
, to war commitments and how much
a permanent change.
We do not know the government'a
estimate either OF the scale OF naval
force or the sort Of naval force this
country will need in the future. But
our expenditure must be got down to
the lowest possible point compatible
with safety. Is 1t possible to analyze
the present straget'c position and 20
form some Judgment of the naval
strength we shall need?
In the years just before the war
we were virtually building against
Germany alone. And had the de-
claration of war been delayed until
the autumn Of 1915 our superiority
would have been considerable. Had
the Turkish battleships building in
England been delivered In July 1914
and some excuse found for bringing
tHc AuSITldIl pAlLlSSthPb " Alcts tiiS
grand fleets margin OF superiority
would have been small indeed. And
our naval strength outside of battle
ships was, as we all know now. woe
fully inadequate.
The war taught us one or two
lessons we must neither forget nor
| misapply. Every one has 1t by heart
now that we underestimate the
value both of small craft and of I'M
derwater craft. Let us see to 1t that
we do not swing to the opposite ex-
treme and forget that battleships
must always remain the chief con-
stituents OF sea power.
The other lesson Is that the fleets
of our allies may prove far more for
midable on paper than on the ocean
| The battleship strength OF France,
| Italy and Russia was almost useless
to us and the American battle squad
ron Joined us only after the German
/ battleship had been destroyed by de-
m oralization.
| IT, then, we seek a formula from
the past for framing our naval policy
we should begin by tabulating the
naval strength of all possible enemies.
Enemies Have No Strength.
! Our late enemies have no naval
strength at all. Our old feeling about
ignoring the United States as possible
| opponents not only remains, but is far
stronger than it was. And 1t is to all
of US quite inconceivable that, even
without a league OF nations. Great
Britain, France and Italy should eve,
go to war among themselves.
! In short, II we apply the circum
stances of the present to the prin-
ciples on which we have been brough,
up we are led to the disconcerting
! conclusion that there is a real diff
ficulty In establishing a case for keep
| ing up any navy at all. This, OF
only stated part Of the case. and il
does not complete 1t to say that there
are certain police duties which must
be performed at sea. for there is
really no reason why the American
navy should not discharge these
| functions just as efficiently as our
own.
The justification of our maintain
ing the navy is based upon ourselves
as parts of a scattered empire. the
security of our sea communication II
just--no more and no lesa-a frs
condition of our national life.
No one who ever lived through
the year 1917 can over say this Sc
curity can ever be made certain. Blu
such certainty as can be obtained
follows from the possession and the
right use, of adequate naval forces
It snund IKE . paradox. hut it |.
Just the plain truth to say. therefore
that IL every other country in the
world gave up sea force altogether
it would sti1l be impossible for Great
Britain to follow their example.
We must then have navy strong
to secure the nations and the enl'
tpire's communication. All men woule
agree in eliminating the United States
as a source OF naval danger. Fol
the rest it is invidious TO particular
ize But 1t Is self evident that thu
strength Of other navies must still
afford a measure o! strength to ours