The Mankato free press. [volume] (Mankato, Blue Earth County, Minn.) 1879-1924, 1919-12-26

On. 6ecemi,sr IsEf3anugyz
!, In his special report 20 EedsI
Baker: ON the operations o. fla
San army in france. says ID nffecf.
ga not I'm terms that the Americanl

t.--. 4. - =
IN so'uitf, fayb Geii1aI i'ersb,ngi
Q, rinH 70 the MeuEeA.Afgonnc" Df,1ff \
mat Hit'e II impOSsi dc tor the cnrt
maintain the struggle until 1879
- i WchtN tHo American ana rren,
visions" Gays General Pershinr "h,
ngaged and deci:ivciy helten Ga7.i,.s''.
German divisions. representing 25 nc
ent cl the enemy's entire diyision
Tehsih on the western front OF III
1einy divisions, 20'had been drawn fro1
we french 'front.' and one from, the Brit
~ font. OF the % American diyis,o,
had ut various times during this ne,
"a iSept 20 to NOV. II, 1879 been err
ICED on other, fronts than our own. Tn
HI 49, army ma suffered loss OF abou
F,etO. In killed and wounded; Il ha,
spturcd $4,000 prisoner, Si7 cannon
s. material"
Mlih me Ameucan army holding tn
lights dominating Sedan the repori
= id. and the German l,ne of com ,n,ln,
tio3s definitely suhdered ''recognizint
Eat nothing but cessation of hosxilitie
,uid save his armies from complete dis
SER ne Appealed for an Immaculate ~
General Pershing's report follows in de-
: " 'he 1growth OF rho 1,rner'~ln os,r.s.
forces from the date of his departure
=. s.naii stafi, aiay ~. 1917. unit
numbered mese than 2000.C0U men
Every step of organization, every con
erencc With the allied generals and tn
Important decisions reached are rec
,rded.
lie document. comprising a pamphlet
I about 100 pages. or $4,000 worn
hvided into three sections:/ Period of
Organization" Operations" ano ''Sur
'iy. Combinations and Administration"
7hich exi-ted in the spring of 1917, wher
ne United states aligned Itself with In,
lilies. General Pershng said:
In the five months ending June 80,
~. German submarines had acco a.
aished the destruction of more than g.
10000 tons of allied silipping During
lrce years Germany had seen practical
all hher offonsives except Verdun
rowned with success. Her nattie Iine
E"re. held On foreign soil and she had
vithstood every attack since the Marine.
ne German general STAFF could foresee
NV the complete. elimination of Russia
he possibility of defeating Italy Isfcre
We end OF the year, and finally. the cam
-N OF 1918 against the French and
British on the western front when
ter pinate the war.
Financial problems of the allies were
iilicUft. supplies We're becoming ex-
aus'ed and their armies had suffered
tremendous losses. Discouragement ex-
gted not only among the civil popula-
ion but throughout the armies as we'll"
Within one month of his arrival Gen.
Tal Fershing recommended definitely
hat 1,O00.00V mon shou.o pe ~ "a
)efore May, 1918. il being evident that
"a force of one million Is the smallest
init which in modern war will be
omplete. well-balanced Gnu inoepeiuni,-
ighting organization Plans for the flu
ure. the recommendation added. should
De based on three times this force"
The general was equally specific in
hocsing the ground tor American op-
ratiors. He says:-
"Ouf mis9lon< was offensive and II was
ssential to make plans for striking the
neInS where definite military decision
olld be gained While the allied ar
mics had endeavored TO maintain the Of Z
ensiyc. the British. in order to guard
he channelA ports were copr,uls,-s,
pcrations in Flanders and the French
20 tac pGrtiea CT the trent protecting
Paris. Both Sacked troops to- operate
elsewhere on a large scale
ITO the east the great fortified dis
riot east of verdYn an9 around Metz
1enaced central Francey protected the
most exposed PORTION OF tn German .. Z
II communications, that between Metz
nd ,Sedap, and covered the Briey iron
egion, from which tile enemy obtained
he greater part Of the iron required
or munitions and material. The coal
eds east of Metz were also covered by
hese same defenses. \ deep advance
asst of Metz. or the capture of the Briey
egion, ly threatening the invasion of
ich German tcrritory IN the Aioscite- var
ey and the Saar basin. thur curtailing
Ter supply of coal or iron would have n
herman troops from northern France.
rhe military and economic situation OF
he enemy. therefore. ipdicated Iorra'eN
3 the FIELD promising the most fruitful
MICS.
American arms drew first blood the
'eport shows. at Passchendele Ridge,
Nov. clio, 1917 when the 1tth E,gireers
which was part of a general operation
'esiGned Ito hinder the Germon conquest
# Russia and TO prevent, IL possible. an,
tack on Italy, or in the near east"
So aftorward,- however carrie t6e COL
apse of Russia and the Itdlian debacle |
Il Caporetto. with the result that the |
neTys legionf began to gather thickly |
n France. Allied commanders viewed !
he situation with frank apprehension, |
lereral Pershing's report indicates. and !
he pressure for an accelerated move
uont OF American divisions was felt |
rom all sides. At the same time came |
he suggestion that American units be |
,rigaded with French and British i'm or |
Ter that no time be wasted in training. |
N thi5 connection the general reports:
My conclusion was that, although the /
Morale OF the German people and of the |
rmics was better than it had been for /
wo years, only an untoward combina-
ion OF circumstances could give the enc
ny Il decisive Victory before American |
upaort as recommended could be made /
Elective. provided the allies secured uni
rise which would necessitate the tenn
'orary use of all american troops in the I
lnits of our allies for the defensive. huc |
lothing in the situation justified the re-
Of our firm purpose to fof.n
ur own army under cur own flag
while thc->Tsermans were practicing
or open warfare and concentrating their
nest aggressive personnel in sh, elk aI-
isionS. the training of the allies was /
till limited to trerch warfare. As our
roops were Icing trained for open var
are. there was every reason why W.
ould net allow them to be scattered |
mong our allies, even by divisions much
ass as requirements. except by pressure
4 sheer necessity. Any sort OF perma-
Ont amalgamation would irrevoeaby
omrnit Americas fortunes to the hands
the allies. Moreover IL was obvious |
hat the lack Of ho-nogeneity woui rem
er these mixed divisions difficult foI
almost certain TO break
p under stress of defeat with the COW
mutual recrimination. Again.
here was no doubt that the realiza ton
v the German people that independent
Iuerican divisions. corps. or armies.
iere in the field with determined purpose
,culd be severe blow to German inot-
le and prestige" 81
General Pershing had refused utterly
D drop his plan for single American
Tnly, acting under ~ own flrg but cor
ented, because, OF the existing emer-
ency. TO lend the combat divisions at
and to helm stem tho German offensive
{ 1918 which. the .nil'od war councA
oresaw may very quickly place the al
cd armies I'm seriouG situation