The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1919-06-14
Name Misleading.

Name Misleading.
1t remains now to estimate accurate
ly the value of the American partici-
patton. IT will be seen at the outset
that Chateau Thierry itself is a very
misleading name, unless one applies it
to the whole salient between the Aisne
and the Marine created by the Ger
man victory on the Chemin des Danes,
Of May u, since, save for the action of
the Third division through its machine
gun detachment on June l. no fight
ing took place In the immediate vicini-
ty of Chateau Thierry Itself. The
fighting of the Second division in and
about Belleau Wood was six or eight
miles away from Chateau Thierry, while
Foch's main thrust in his great coun-
ter-offensiye took place nearly 80 miles
north of Chateau Thierry on the east
ern edge Of the forest of Villers Cot
terets.
When the Second and Third divisions
arrived on June !. the great German
advance was almost at an end. The
victorious Germans had been advancing
for six days. They had outrun their
artillery and their supplies, The best
proof that the advance was about at
an end is found in the fact that the
Americans were never attacked on the
lines they took up, save as the Third
division participated in the general Ger
mar offensive six weeks later.
1t is therefore inaccurate to assert
that the Intervention of the Second
the Third division south Of Chateau
Thierry saved Paris, stopped/t he great
German drive or did more at the mo-
ment than to support n relieve the
exhausted French divisions and con-
ceivably halt the Germans a mile or
tryN uhnrf ~ thn rpoiftOn fhou tniOhf
have reached before they were COM
PEELED to abandon their advance.
OF the fighting at Belleau wood, the
truth Is that 1t was brilliant, magni-
ficent, but a highly localized affair in
which the marines and the Ninth and
indication of the fighting qualities of
our new troops. The capture of Belleau
wood did not materially change the
situation, nor did 1t supply a vantage
point of any particular value, in the
later offensive. Seen as a local en-
gagemept fought for a limited objective,
it possesses merit which should make
Bouresches and Vul places of American
pilgrimage for years.
The best proof of the intensity Of the
fighting is shown by the fact that Of
the Second division lost 1850 killed,
1929 wounded and 28S missing-that is
nearly lU,VVU OUT VI d Lighting blI6HbtH |
of about 5000 in six weeks. 1t is a
glorious page in American military his
tory, this Belleau wood engagement,
but 1t is easy to exaggerate its rela-
tive Importance. |
OF the contribution of the Third
division south of the Marine, it is suf-
ficient to say that it was a useful addi- |
ton to the general resistance of the
allies, but 1t was itself a detail in
secondary circumstance of the enor-
nous battle. The German success or
failure in the whole operation depended
upon breaking the French line between
and the Argonne. French re-
was predicted on defeating this
attack. The French were prepared to
give up more ground than they did
south of the Marine II necessary. After
the German defeat between Rheims and
the Argonne, the great counter-offen-
sive Of July IS promptly forced a Ger
man retreat south of the Marine.
1t remains to consider the fourth
phase, that of July Is, and the share of
the Americans in this turning point Of
the campaign and of the war. On this
score we may say at once that no Of
would have been possible had
American troops not been available,
since Foch had no other reserve. We
say also that he would probably
not have risked this great gamble even
with American troops had they not
in previous fighting at the
Chateau Thierry salient, revealed quail
tiles which ave him confidence in them
which was not mistaken. In the
ter-offensive more French thar Ameri-
troops were used, and as it devel-
which were employed, particularly in
the first days, could not have been
put In had not the American troops
replaced them in other sectors of the
which enabled him to make his great
counter offensive, both by contributing
divisions to that attack and by
releasing French divisions whose places
were taken by other divisions OF the
In that attack. the First and Sec
ond divisions, fighting on either side
of the French-Moroccan division, the
best shock unit Of the French army,
surpassed all expectations. As a result
of this attack southwest of Scissors
out Of the forest of Villers Cotteret,
the Chateau Thierry salient, they lost
the initiative which they never recov-
cred during the war. and they began
the retrograde movement which car
ried them to the French frontier be-
fore the armistice, n was still in
tnen. |
To sum up, Chateau Thierry, so far
as 1t was a decisive phase of the war,
must be regarded as an action which
began on July Is. and ended in the
first days Of August, when the Ger
mans Ihad retired behind the Vesle. In
the opening phases of this battle, -four
American divisions, the First, the Sec
ond. the Third and the aga had all
ready played useful parts In the del
feat Of the German offensive Of July
Is. Three more divisions. the 2Sth, the
32d and at the end the 77th, were
used. These nine American divisions,
amounting to something more han 200,- |
900 men, gave decisive weight to Foch's
supreme stroke. They fought under
French army and corps commanders,
the strategy was French, but without
them there could have been 10 often
sive, and had they not fought magnifi-
Gently. the offensive might have failed.
l have found IN France as In Amer
lea a general notion that in some fash |
ion or other the marines saved Paris
in the June fighting In the Belleau
Wood engagement generally described
as the battle Of Chateau Thierry. AL |
ready many Americans go to 'Beileau
Word and Chateau Thierry under the
impression that on this ground Ameri-
-. s1@xzs ro.aNI Dnria AAA a. 80.