Evening star., 1919-12-28
NEW FOREIGN POLICY,
SIMONDS' SUGGESTION
Believes Unity In Command In Relations
Abroad May Be Real Secret of
Establishing Peace.
BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.

BN FRANK ii. SIMONDS.
~ ARELY in our history has the
- interposition of partisan politi-
cal considerations done more
immediate and permanent
harm than in the case of the present
debate over the ratification of the treaty
of Versailles in the Senate. In saying
not believe, that either the President and
his fellow democrats in the Senate or
the republican majority have been
mainly actuated by political consider
alton; the slightest examination of the
situation as it exists at the Naional
Capital reveals the fact that the diver
gencc goes far more deeply.
1t is true that two parties are rep
resented in the division in the Senate,
but it is no less true that neither party
has preserved a solid front and that,
on the whole, the defections from the
democratic side have been more con-
siderable than from the republican, SO
much so that one is far more nearly
accurate in describing the contest as one
between the President and the Senate
between the executive and the leglSla-
tive branches of government-than as
between parties or personalities.
Situation Is BumiliatinE.
The theory of the makers of the Con-
Stitution, who sought by imposing a
system of checks and balances and thus
maintaining an equilibrium between two
branches of government. however we'll
it has worked for a century and quar-
tor in n tn off nirc 1od MS
straight to one of the most humiliat-
ing and dangerous situations in foreign
relations which can be imagined.
What has actually happened has been
that the President. using powers un-
questionably within his grasp and right.
since no one has been able to cite
single legal objection to his cause. has
gone to Europe. In conference with the
representatives of other great nations
he has negotiated a treaty of peace.
speaking always in the name of the
country of which he was the chief exc
cutive and for which he possessed the
right to negotiate treaties. and that
treaty having been duly signed, has
been. at least temporarily rejected by
his own country.
This rejection has been accomplished
in the United States Senate. where the
majority of the senator's in rejecting
1t have acted within their rights and
in accordance with their constitu-
tional duties. We have then reached a
complete deadlock. and for several
months the restoration of peace in the
world has been postponed. to the very
great injury of all the world, because
of this deadlock.
AS the consequences of the deadlock
have been more and more clearly per-
ceived and felt, the President and the
Senate have been collectively de-
nounced in many quarters, while in
WI m I,yr dnn nf 1ov, 1-s-
been placed upon the President or
upon the majority of the Senate. as
this disposition of responsibility suit
ed the various critics.
European Situation Obvious.
By contrast the situation of the
European nations is obvious When
Clemenceau or Lloyd George acted for
their respective countries in Paris
they acted as the Representatives the
agents of the responsible majority in
the dominant legislative branch of the
French or British parliament. What
either of these ministers was under
taking for his country had to be
known by the commons or the cham
ber-that is. throughout the negotia-
tions both men had to preserve the
control of the majority or they would
nave fallen from power and disap-
peared from the conference automafi-
oally.
To take a concrete example: At
certain moment in the Paris confer
ence an influential faction in the
house of commons felt that the course
George was pursuing in certain uues-
tions Jeopardized Anglo-French rela-
tions and imperiled British inter-
eSts. AS a consequence a round
robin sort of document was framed
IN the house and duly transmitted to
fariS, and George, sensitive instantly
TO the peril. promptly modified his
policy to suit the circumstances. The
lesisiatlve branch was thus able to
make its will felt before a treaty had
been framed. not after. and Thus to
defend national interests. without
paralyZing the whole machinery of
the peace settlement
Warning Conveyed by S.,.,
Overs against this must be set tho
warning conveyed by the Senate in
another round robin" drafted in
March, as l recall. after the Presi-
dents brief visit to the United States
and setting forth the fact that the
shape which was in part retained
would not be accepted by the Senate.
Such warning the President could
and did disregard, because he was sat
isf1ed of the rectitude of his course
and confident that if he appealed to
compel the Senate to accept any
treaty which he had signed
We have, then. on this side of the
water machinery for negotiating
peace settlements. which can lead di-
rectly to a complete paralysis The
the fact that the President of the
United States can lawfully go to a
peace conference and there. in the
name of the United States, negotiate a
H.
reference from the legislative branch.
But. similarly, when this treaty has
been signed in the name of the coun-
try the legislative branch can re-
ject it.
ever. negotiate a new treaty. while
the President can. if he chooses, re-
ject any amendments to the treaty
and can refuse to accept any settle
ment which departs in any degree.
Means PostponinE Peace.
So far the single logical suggestion
of an escape from the deadlock comes
from Senator Lodge. who proposes to
carry the question to the people in
the next national election. But this
means postponing peace. SO far as we
are concerned. for whole year: POS
sibly more, for even after the e!ection
the President cannot be compelled to
act. and he holds Office until March 4,
1871. More than this, it means. with
drawing American influence from the
International field all through what
must be the most critical year OF all.
Any other proposal comes to mere
nonsense, since peace by concurrent
or ioint resolution leads back to the
President, beyond peradventure. while
il raises a whole multitude of ques-
lion and leaves to adjustment all OF
onr various outstanding litigations
with Germany. which would have to