Evening star., 1919-10-12

BUSINESS or the oil SITUATION ~ e""'
time. Orders have just been given
to use three-fifths speed. except In
case of emergency" 1 reported to
Washington on June 20. referring to
the scarcity of oil. This simply
means that the enemy is winning the
war" 1t was lucky for us that the
Germans knew nothing about the
scarcity of this indispensable fuel.
Had they been aware of it they would
have taken pains to see that the
grand fleet was constantly steaming
at sea, and in this way they might I
so have exhausted its oil supplies as
possibly to threaten the actual COM /
mand Of the surface. Fortunately
for the cause OF civilization, there
We're certain important facts that
the German secret service did not
learn.
X X X
But this oil shortness made 1t i'm
possible that the American North
Atlantic fleet should move into Euro
pean waters. at least at that time.
Since most oil supplies were brought
from America, we could not have
fueled our superdreadnaughts in
Europe in the spring and summer of
1917.
Moreover. had we sent all our big
ships to England we should have
been obliged to keep our destroyers
constantly stationed with them ready
for great sea action: this would
have completely fallen in with Ger ;
man plans, for then these destroyers
could not have been used against her
submarines. The British did. indeed.
request that we send Ave coal-burn- .
ing ships to reinforce her fleet and
give her that preponderance which
made Its ascendancy absolutely Sc
cure, and these ships were subse-
quently sent; but England could not
have made provision for our greatest
dreadnaughts. the oil burners. Indeed.
our big ships served the allied cause
better stationed on this side than
they would have served it had they
been located at European base.
They provided a reserve for the Brit
ish fleet, precisely as our armies In
France provided reserve for the
allied armies, and meanwhile their
destroyer escorts could be sent to
the submarine zone, to participate in
the anti-submarine campaign. In
American waters these big ships could
be kept in prime condition; here they
had an open, free sea for training,
and here they could also be used to
break in the thousands of new men
needed for the new ships constructed
during the war.
1 early took the stand that our
forces should be considered chiefly in
the light OF reinforcements to the al
lied navies, and that, ignoring all
question of national pride and even
what at first might superficially seem
to be national interest, we should
exert such offensive power as we pos
sessed in the way that would best
assist the allies in defeating the sut-
marine. Englands naval resources
were much greater than ours; in the
nature of the case we could not ex-
pect to maintain overseas anywhere
near the number Of ships which Eng
land had assembled; it should be our
policy. therefore. to use such avail
able units as we possessed to strength
en- the weak spots in the allied line
There were those who believed that
national dignity required that we
should build up an Independent navy
in European waters and operate it as
a distinct American unit. But that,
maintained, was not the way to win
the war. Had we adopted this course
we should still have been construct
ing naval bases and perfecting an or
ganization when the armistice was
signed; indeed, the idea of operating
Independently of the allied fleet was
not for a moment to be considered.
There were others in America who
thought that 1t was unwise to put
any part of our feet in European
waters, in view of the dangers that
might assail us on our own coast.
AA X y.
There was every expectation that
Germany would send submarines to
the western Atlantic, where they
could prey upon our shipping and
possibly lombard our ports; she had