Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1919-01-02

baker and wholesale grocer. considered
1t wise to accumulate large stocks
This remarkably active buying was
largely based on an entirely eXcusanie
misunderstanding of the actual condi,
tions. In the first place, 1t was assumed
that the farmer would not sci except
ing in sparing way as he had peen 10
ing previously, and moreover, was
enormously supposed that ne move
ment from the interior would be greatly
restricted by continued scarcity OF
freight cars and engines. In some de-
gree this proved to be q costly mlstake
on the part of nearly all buyers because
ii was speedily discovered that the
farmer was selling as fast, II not more
so. than he ever had done in the past
and also II turned out that under GOV,
ernment control the supply or cars anu
engines had been increased with anaz-
ing rapidity. AS a natural result, tne
movement OF wheat from the West to
the mills and elevators speedily became
overwhelmingly heavy. and therefore
millers were able to ship Hour 10 the
buyer with at least double the freedom
expected Temporarily this was wit
messed with qualification by practically
every one, but almost Immediately
thereafter the buyers became dismayed,
as it was found that the flour came so
fast and in such large quantities that
tneN were oN'i NhNi'lN'' 50
other words, such q large quantity ar
rived in few weeks as to cause serious
congestion at all terminals, and so fast
was the accumulation that buyers were
totally unable to take the flour away
from the docks with anything like the
promptness necessary
The Railway Problem
Their distress and anxiety we're
largely augmented by the fact that the
4 I,.,l,, ,ictr rat i'm
the cars being emptied almost imme-
diately on arrival Therefore the -four
could not be distributed among the va
rious buyers, even half fast enough 10
II therefore became necessary either to
put large quantities In store at heavy
expense or to resell the flour when a
buyer could be found by making mate
rial concessions. In other words, many
resales we're made at a discount of ap-
proximately 81 per barrel This big
loss was a decidedly heavy blow to the
members Of the trade generally. as they
had been led to buy So freely partly on
the assumption that the fixing of the
minimum price on wheat and four by
the administration was tantamount to a
guarantee against noteworthy loss.
But before ,ong. and after Germany
had also surrendered. they were much
relieved to find that their alarm had
been in measure unwarranted. AS a
matter of fact. IT was found that in
stead of depression buoyancy prevailed,
which was owing to the discovery that
they had entirely underestmated export
requirements. In other words. they had
not been awake to the fact that there
were millions of hungry or almost fam
ished people I'm all parts of the Conti-
nent that had TO he fed a s soon as the
war ended. This was especially true OF
people in the north of France and in
Belgium. recently occupied by the Ger
man army, II also soon became evi-
dent that a near famine obtained. not
only in enemy countries, but in neutral
countries. and also to some extent in
Russia. 1t soon became known that
this meant continued heavy exports
from this country as fast as vessels
could be provided.
One result was that the food admin
istration Immediately contracted for
many million bushels of wheat and sew
eral million barrels or riour. which were
moved from the West to the seaboa rd
with the greatest possible speed AS a
consequence the exports, not only OF
wheat and flour, but also of rye. from
Gulf and Atlantic ports to E,tIrope dur
ing the fall and early winter were oi
huge dimensions. Meanwhile. farmers
deliveries at interior points diminished
sharply. and especially in winter whea,
territory, which confirmed reports tina,
nearly all farmers had already mar
keted the bulk of their surplus As z
result of those Developments the visible
supply soon began TO diminish. being
reduced about "a 5000 900 bushels in three
weeks.
AS a natural result of the elimination
OF tradlng IN wheat futures and the fix.
ing or an offcial minimum price. together
with various other restrictions bv In,
1ood administration. speculative or hedg,
trading was almost wholly diverted IL
corn. nut even this trading was also
greatly hampered for a long time h,
various restrictions, resulting mainl,
from war developments. For example
operators in January contracts in chi
Cago We're soon stopped by the Board o'
Trade because of fear of serious Compli
cations. primarily growing out of IN.
scarcity of contract grades. In Other
words, it ives exceedingly cold virtual,
all over the West, and conSeulIentl, ,
farmers were making unprecedented,
small deliveries to country stations
Their unwillngness to sell was by M
means surprising, partly in view of tn,
fact that coal was so scarce that they
were obliged to burn corn instead. and
furthermore they were eager to feet
freely to hogs and cattle because of the
remarkable scarcity of meats and tn,
huge requirements In the country and in
Europe.
Therefore. members Of the trade en-.
deavored numerous times to induce the
directors of the Board of Trade to raise
the minimum price--sl.2S in Chicago
but the directors did not consider il
wise, partly because Of opposition on the
part, of the food adm stration Vir.
tually all conservative members of the
trade agreed that SIPS was too low in
view of the fact that corn on farms had
a feeding value of over $1.3O as a result
of the active demand for livestock The
movement from the interior to large
primary markets throughout the country
was also greatly hindered by the heavy
snow blanket and by the great scarcit,
of freight cars, AS consequence the
Governors of several States made Wig,
orous efforts to obtain more cars to move
grain.