Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-02-13
JELL|COE TELLS
Of NAVAL BATTLE:
WITH HUN FLEET
Germans Had Superiority in
Light Vessels and Torpe-
does out Were Out Maneu-
Vered, Says British Admiral
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10y AoRAiNe JOURNAL SPECIAL LEASED wIsEl
London, Feb. 12.-The dangers to
which the British grand fleet short
of cruisers destroyers and with de-
fenseless bases, was exposed during
the first two and one half years of
the war owing to the German use of
submarines, mines and torpedoes, is
described in a book written by Ad-
miral Niscount Jcllicoe. former COM
mander of the fleet, and published to-
day, covering the activities of 1914-16.
Admiral Jcllicoe points out chat the
German high seas fleet possessed
lightweight destroyers, compared
with fortytwo for the grand fleet,
and reveals that owing to the sub
marine menace the grand fleet in the
fall of 1914 moved from Tough Swilly
and only returned to the North sea
when the anchorage in Seaoa Flow
became reasonably safe.
Neither IN October, 1914, nor in
May 1916, Admiral Jellicoe says, did
the British margin of superiority
iustifying him in disregarding the
enemy's torpedo fire.
The situation gradually improved
after 1856, especially as the light
cruiser and destroyer forces with the
grand fleet increased steadily after
the battle of Jutland. considerably re-
ducing the danger of successful tor
pedo attack while the inclusion of
class X submarines made it probable
that the enemy would suffer more
severely from submarine attack than
the British Regarding 1918, Admiral
Jellicoe says
THE position was assured and we
could have afforded to take risks
which in 1916 would have been most
unwise. If the German fleet had
come out of battle. a terrible punish
ment awaited Them
One-third of the admirals book is
devoted to the battle of Jutland In
summing UP the lessons of the battle
Admiral Jellicoe dwells upon "the
danger involved in leaving too much
to chance in fleet action because our
fleet was the one and only factor vital
to the existence of the empire, and,
indeed to the allied cause.
I'VE had no reserve outside the
battle fleet which could in any way
replace it in the event of disaster or
even should its margin of superiority
be eliminated"
Admiral Jellicoe says he knew that
his ships We're inadequately protected
with armor compared to the German
vessels of the battle cruiser type,
while the German fleet in the battle
of Jutland was far better off in the
number of destroyers. In addition,
the Germans possessed "a most eff
ficient armor piercing she'll" The
admiral continues
When the battle fleets approached
there was a difference of reckoning
between the British fleet and the bat
4 Il IL.
cruisers having been engaged for sew
eral hours and having repeatedly
altered their course. Hence, instead
Of being encountered right ahead, the
enemy appeared on the starboard
bow"
Instant action was necessary, the
admiral says, and he decided to de-
ploy on the port wing division, thus
compelling the Germans to turn off to
starhoa"d to avoid being crossed. This
maneuver, which has been described
as mastery by reviewers, threw the
enemy into complete confusion. The
German commander in chief realized
that his only hope lay in escape,
profiting by his superiority in tor
pedo craft. low visibility, the APP
proach of darkness and the proximity
of his bases and mine fields.
The enemy at this period fired hun
dreds of torpedoes, as German Off
GERS since have stated, Admiral Jel-
licoe continues, and although the
Germans were in the gravest peril,
the position of the grand fleet itself
was menaced by determined torpedo
attacks in thick weather. But the
British fleet by turning it's battle line
four times during the action, the ad-
miral says, got clear of the torpedoes
which We're racing toward the British
ships, and defeated the tactics upon
which the Germans based their hopes.
Admiral Jellicoe pays tribute to the
skill of his captains in handling their
ships and avoiding torpedoes and col
lisions, while keeping their positions.
Admiral Jellicoe explains why he
did not seek night action and refers
to the more powerful German search
lights, the superiority of the enemy
destroyers and the greater number Of
torpedo tubes fitted in the enemy
ships, giving the enemy an opportun-
ity of scoring heavily at the outset Of
an action, the result of which would
always be matter of chance.
After estimating the relative
strength of the two fleets early in the
war, Admiral Jellicoe expresses sur
prise that the Germans were so eau
tious. and says:
IF this country in the future de-
cides to rely for safety against raids
or invasion on the fleet alone, it is
essential that we possess a consider
ably greater margin of superiority
over a possible enemy in all classes
of vessels than we did in August,
1914"