The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-12-12

sisk. It was intended to make use of the ships captured in Sebastopol so far as we could provide crew for then.
 The occupation of this extensive ter ritory had led to fresh conflicts with bolshevik bands and troops. In most cases they were driven off without trouble. After the advance was stopped the commander-in-chief in the east had agreed upon a line of demarcation with the soviet government
 It was significant of this government thnt it often accused our troops of not respecting this line, while we had re- ports from our commander-in-chieft thnt bolshevik bands had raided the terri tory which our troops were to protect. Unfortunately the foreign office ap- peared to believe bOlshevik lies sooner than our statements.
 After a good deal of discussion with
 the Austrian headquarters at Baden our respective spheres of interest in the Uk
 raine were settled. On this, the quar- termaster general effected an agree
 ment with Austria Hungary, and the
 exploitation of the supplies was regu- lated Afterward. however, in view of the way Austria Hungary had been
 seizing our supplies, this agreement had
 to be modified. so that we undertook
 the collecting of supplies in the whole of the Ukraine and their distribution.
 This was only an expedient. unfortu
 nately necessary one. in order to es
 tablish practical working system.
 HAD A CONFUSED SYSTEM The German military and civil au-
 thorities found ample scope for their | activities. I followed everything with
 great attention, since general headquar- ters was principally interested in the rnc al 1,uI s.1,lN h,d | taken over the army group at Kieff | the government was represented by l Ambassador von Mumm. The collec- 1 tion of supplies was in the hands of the | imperial office (Reichswirtschaft- | samt).
 A more confused and many-headed | organization it was impossible to imag4
 inc find it was all due to Berlin's un- { fortunate attitude toward ''militarism." as well as to it's own 'bureaucratism" and hidebound methods.
 1 As was to be expected. the new gov ernment of the Ukraine had proved in-
 capable either of settling the unrest in l the country or of delivering grain to us. This government disappeared from 1 the scene, and Hetman Skoropadski as- | sumed control.
 While at the end of April and early
 in May I was occupied with important
 work connected with the operations fin the west, I received through the em- peror's military cabinet telegram | from the imperial chancellor to the em- | peror, complaining in strong terms of
 the s'militarist, attitude of the group
 headquarters at I<ieff and requesting 1 his majesty to remedy it. The military | cabinet had informed the imperial | chancellor that his majesty proposed 1 that in the first instance the whole epi- ] sode should be investigated by means
 of a joint inquiry by the authorities concerned.
 DENIES MILITARISM'S FAULT | I looked forward to this with satis- 1 faction, for was firmly convinced that l by probing the matter to the bottom,
 and eliminating all gossip and preju- | dice, we should once more find there
 was nothing in the whole affair. In this case we did not even reach the conference stage, for it was soon made | clear that the field marshal and the 1 ambassador had personally worked well l together. So. as it happened, ''mili- l tarism' had had nothing to do with it. l What actually occurred was that l during the course of events general
 had dealt somewhat harshly with for
 mer member of the government, whose conduct had betrayed highly doubt ! lul attlJuQe IOWafQ GcTHdn interests. But the whole business left bitter
 taste behind Ionly mention this incl dent because it was characteristic of | the feeling in Berlin.
 l (The incident of which he makes light was the overturning of the Ukraine parliament and cabinet by German i troops and the establishment of Skoro- I padski as dictator.)
 i They were always ready there to go 1 against, instead of with, us It was | though more important to consider cer- l tain political interests than practical 1 requirements. even though the latter, l like Field Marshal von Eichhorn's care | for agriculture, was of the greatest
 consequence to our subsistence. It was | particularly regrettable that without hearing the other side the war minis l ter had sided with the government. iiSKOROPADSkI AIDED INVADERS | Hetman Skoropadski turned out to | be a man With whom it was possible ! to work well. He was determined to maintain order in the country, and to | meet us as far as possible. I made his l acquaintance later and formed a very /, good impression of him. He was never superficial. but penetrated to the bot tom of everything
 General headquarters could not he otherwise. than. satisfied. with. the change of government at Kieff, ms il was favorable to the prosecution of the | war. I anticipated being nblc to in. 4 crease our armies nnd our food supply l and the raising of new Ukrainian for. | nation was actually commenced. This
 of course. required time and brough us no immediate relief. The German l troops that were in the Ukraine were urgently needed by the group for pro. ! lection against the bolsheviks and SC. l curing the economic exploitation of tht country Whenever we wanted to re- duce them it complained that they were
 not strong enough.
 The imperial economic office pur sued a peace time policy in the Ukraine ! which anticipated a state of affairs that did not yet exist: to that no one could object, provided that with tho more limited economic policy the pure ly military motive. for which pleaded was not thereby excluded. In It's nee6 Austria Hungary had taken drastic
 measures, and. although. it did not gel anything like what Count Czernin, ear sary the supplies it drew from the Uk raine, combined with our assistance undoubtedly saved Austria and it, army from starvation.
 | GREAT HELP FROM UKRAINE Only the most urgent needs. how | ever were satisfied. and even then wt did not receive the bread grain an6
 forage so urgently required to revive the strength of our people at home Still, the Ukraine did help Germany h