The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-11-29

east of Riga, opposite strong enemy
position. Helped by various superior
commands. General Won Hutier. COM
handing the Eighth army, and his
chief of staff. General Won Ssuber-
zweig, had made very thorough prep
arations. The passage was successful
The Russians hao evacuated the
bridgehead on the left bank in time
and with few exceptions offered but
slight resistance here also.
l breathed again when the blow had
at last fallen. We soon halted the
Eighty army. and behind the furthest
point of its advance ii at once set
shortest line between the Dvina and
about fortifying a position on the
the Gulf of Riga.
Two divisions left Immediately for
the. western front in order to relieve
others for Italy. we eastern front
had to send considerable forces there.
! IN spite of our intention to strike.~at
Italy and the extremely critical sttua-
ton in the west, where fighting might
flame up again at any moment, the
commander in chief in the east still
retained a certain surplus in order TO
keep Russia busy. 1t was poor sub
stitute for the offensive in Moldavia,
but still better than nothing.
IT, after the event. l am charged with
dispersion of force. l must put up with
it. Things do not siways work &C
cording TO plan-and L achieved my
object.
Apart from the lack of vigor shown
by the troops, the defect of the Austro-
Hungarian offensive from the Tyrol in
1916 had been that the forces with
which it was undertaken were too
weak for the point at which it was
made. and that the army on the Isonzo
did not attack at the same time.
From a military point of view it was
tempting to daily once more with
| these ideas and possibilities, but in
September, 1917. had to base our plan
of campaign on the fact that the Aus
! tro-Hungarian armies were very ex-
| hausted at the moment and that Ger
! many could not spare more than six or
| eight divisions. With such forces an
attack from the Tyrol would have
! been absurd. They could only achieve
results by striking at point where
| the enemy was particularly weak and
not expecting attack.
| If. furthermore. the selected point
admitted n strategic exploitation OF
! the break through. as had been the
| case in Eastern Galicia, every immedi-
| ate requirement would be met. Fur
| Their DEVELOPMENTS would have to be
| left to careful preparation and the de-
| cision of arms
1
male was suitable for attack, although
the difficulties of the ground seemed
| almost insdrm ountables and the COM
munications on the Austrian side were
| as bad as could be imagined, But this
Italians themselve were not expecting
| to be attacked there, and were hold
ing the line with weak forces. If we
| succeeded in. surprising them ant
bursting over the mountains north Of
| Cividale toward Udine the Italian line
| on the Isonzo would totter.
| SCHEME FOR BLOW AT ITALY
! We could now begin to consider the
| operation itEelf. The warmest sup
porter of the plan was Lieutenant Col
| onel Wetzell 1t was first necessary
| to determine whether the attack or
| this front was possible at all, and il
so, how it could be made. With the
! consent of General Won ARR, General
Kraft Won Delimers who was
| then chief of the general staff in the
army group of Duke Albrecht, and
! Major Egeiherr Won Willisen were or
! dereI~ to reconnoitre the ground.
| Their report showed the attack to
! be feasible. and formed the basis OF
! further decisions by G. H. Q. l now
! gave myself up completely to this new
| great task.
| General Won Kraft and Major vor
! Willisen had also made some excellent
| suggestions for the equipment of the
| troops. On this subject G.. II. Q. al
/ once communicated with the Austrian
| general. headquarters. who were asked
particularly to provide pack transport
and mountain artillery for the German
| formations.
| Both before and during the war the
| German army was often in difficulties
| for want of mountain artillery, and q
| certain amount was provided But oil
| course what we had was insufficient
! for this campaign. Austria Hungary
/ was perfecSas well able to help, and
| there was no reason why we should
! always provide everything ourselves
TOOK HIS WHOLE ATTENTION
The selection of the troops was mos
| important. The first to be chosen were
units like the Alpine corps. which ha6
! gained experience in mountain warfare
| in the Carpathians and were suitably
I =