Evening star., 1919-11-16
BY FRANK H. SIMONDs.

essary action of the Senate will have
| to be followed by the adoption of some
! orderly and reasoned foreign policy
on the part of the United States. AS
| it stands there seems no chance that
the pending treaty will be amended,
but all signs point either to its adop-
ton with such reservations as give 1t
an entirely different character from
that designed at Paris, or to its re-
| lection and the immediate proclama-
ton of a separate peace with Ger
many.
| With the domestic political circum-
stances of this situation 1 have no de-
sire to deal at this time, but of the ex-
| ternal consequences, which will be
very considerable, it seems to me
| worth while to make some analysis.
In the first place, it must be clear that
the character of the debate and the
| extent of the opposition to the deci-
sions of Paris which has developed in
completely, change the view of Eu-
rope as to the value of the treaty it
self and as to the relation of America
| to Europe.
| 1 have tried many times in my let
| ters from Paris, and since l returned,
| to emphasize the fact that the league
| Of nations and all the details in the
! treaty of Versailles. which were writ
| ten in as natural consequences or the
acceptance of the league of nations
| idea, owed their existence to Presi-
dent Wilson and to the universal as
sumption in Europe that in demand
! ing the creation of a league of ma
ho praoidant Snnka for the
United States, which was. itself,
united in favor of such a world or
ganization.
League Largely British.
1t is true that most of the actual ma
chinery. and the larger part of the
form of the league of nations were
British contributions. Mr.. Wilson car
ried to Europe not complete system,
but merely a fixed determination to
bring about the creation of league
of nations. Lord Robert Cecil and
Gen. SHUTS were, in fact, in a large
measure the authors of the provisions
written into the treaty of Versailles
to create league Of nations.
| On the other hand. had President
British would not have presented it at
Paris. There was no spontaneous or
widespread support of the idea in
Britain before President Wilson went
I 10 PdrlS, nor was tneTe ever d Allic
when British support of the idea was
not. in the main, the result of de-
sire to support American wishes in
Paris. so far as they made an appeal
to British interests and would help for
the extension of Anglo-American
at Paris. advocated for example. a
permanent alliance between Britain,
France and the United States. or any
other form of world association com
l ~ tich cot of nd l.
mate self-interest, it would have had
unhesitating support. The British
were merely bound. in their own view,
to stand with America and to support
American desires at Paris. In TINS TN
conception there was more than sell
ifishness and not a little honest graft
tude for American aid, together with
an extension of what had been Brit
ish policy for several decades. namely.
to foster American friendship and
seek American association in world
affairs.
But it is a mistake to believe that
! for a league of nations, for the idea
! or the principle. there was general
J or considerable support in Great Brit
ain. The British government official
ly supported and the British nation.
| SO far as it actually advocated a
! league of nations. acted upon the set
tied conviction that the league of ma
Z, tions represented the desire and the
4
Mr.. Wilson at any stage of proceed
| ing abandoned the idea, it would
have been discarded by the British
| without delay. In a word, it repre-
! sented for them the demand of ma
| ton which they desired to please and
| constituted the sort of demand which
| they could support without difficulty.
/, Little Sympathy for League.
| Bv contrast neither the French
! nor the Italians, in point of fact not
! one of the considerable nations allied
| with Great Britain and associated
! with the United States, had the small
est sympathy with the idea of a league
! of nations. 1t was opposed by the
| French and the Italians because 1T
! Immediately. confiicted with what both
| peoples regarded as their own legiti-
mate security; it deprived them OF
! safeguards, territorial and otherwise,
which the victory over Germany 9TH
| erwise placed in their hands.
| But France was forced to surrender
! it's opposition because of the support
assured to Mr.. Wilson from the out
set by Great Britain. and Italy was
temporarily dragged along. never,
however, with the smallest real en-
thusiasm. Clemenceau. finding that
Lloyd George purposed to back the
President, was constrained to follow
a similar policy, although he came to
| it far less readily than his British
| ally, and was never able to carry
| with him any large fraction OF his fei-
| low countrymen.
| Yet the ultimate French oeclsion'
| like the immediate British resolve.
/ was founded upon an appreciation
of the new position occupied by the
United States in the world, it's tre-
mendous power. its gigantic resources.
Unless these resources were to De
turned against France, unless france,
| well nigh ruined by the war. was to
| be deprived of American aid, it was
inevitable that French statesmen in
the Paris conference should accept
| American demands. And for the
French, like the British. the league of
nations was accepted as the express
sion of the we'll nigh unanimous will
of the American people, as the Presi-
dent was welcomed as the uncha1-
lenged spokesman of his nation.
America be pleased" was the watch
word of the Paris conference. and
accepting the league of nations was
believed to be the sole method of sat-
isfying the American people.
| 1 wish I could make clear the ex-
act situation at Paris, because it is
so essential in order to understand
/ the new situation in Europe to rec
osnize the fact of last winter and
| spring For the league of nations
1
| ropean support. Such support as
| there was came entirely from British
sources. and it was. in the main, due
| to a recognition that any such league
| of nations as had been outlined would,
| in the end. fnfallibly develop into an
| iApelo-American alliance. AS far as
! France and Italy were concerned
there was open hostility. honest pa
| triotic apprehension. Accepting the
| idea represented to Frenchmen one
! 10