The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-10-28

Further it is not easy to make M
ones mind to transfer reserves before
the direction of the attack is known
with certainty, and yet it has to be
done, or they will arrive too late Nor
is it easy to expect the subordinate
whem to t5s sys pn their seions
tack. Bet the cordial relations which
existed between Lieutenant Colonel
HOFFMAN and myself and the various
army commanders enabled US to settle
these serious problems without friction
to the general benefit of the army. At
the beginning of April things quieted
down.
FIRST "DRUMFIRE' IN EAST
On April 2S, in a vigorous operation.
carefully prepared by powerful artil-
lery, the Tenth army recaptured the
lost ground between Lake Narotch and
Lake Vischniev. IL was the first en-
sagement on the eastern front in which
we employed the artillery methods
which had now become customary in
the west. The result was good.
we reckoned on continuation of the
great Russian offensive. The armies
were organized accordingly and re-
serves held in readiness. BY order of
general headquarters, certain German
divisions with the Austro- Hungarian,
army were sent to US Later in May
fresh attacks from the Riga bridge
head and the region of Smorgon seemed
imminent. We took measures accord
ingly and even contemplated an often
sive of our own. But with the made
quate forces at our disposal, this of
fensive could only be a local one at
Riga, With the object of removing that
very inconvenient bridgehead
At the end of May his majesty visited
US. The Kaiser went over the whole of,
the area controlled by the commander
fn-chief in the east. The field mar
! shall and 1 accompanied him. We also
went to Mitau. I shall never forget
how German everything seemed there.
Everyone who went for the first time
to these Baltic provinces had the same
feeling, that here was piece of their
own native soil.
The entente in May, 1916. were plan
ming a powerful assault on their most
formidable enemy-the German army.
In the west there was to be the often
sive on the Somme. In the east the
Russians were to start an offensive
wfth Baranovice Ton the north edge of
the Pripet swamps, 800 miles southeast
of Riga), Slnorgon and Riga as its crit
ical points.
Their operations on the Austro Hun
garian front in the beginning of June,
in the region of Lutsk, Tarnopol and
on the Dniester, were more in the ma
ture of a demonstration. At first much
larger reserves were concentrated be-
hind the selected sectors of the German
front than in the Lutsky and Buko-
vina sectors.
ct was in this section, the southern
Part of the battle line. however that
General Brusiloff broke the Austrian
lines in June and captured over 200, 900
prisoners)
Russia's amazing victories over the
Austro-H hungarian troops reduced her to
abandon her proposed offensive against
| the front of the commander in-chief in
the east, except for the move in the di-
'ection of Baranovice, and concentrate
all her efforts against Austria Hun
gary. The more the German front
proved itself inviolable, the more eager
ly did the Russians turn from it to hurl
themselves against their weaker foe.
the Austro- Hungarian army. between
the Pripet and the Carpathians.
The front of the commander in chief
in the east was therefore denuded as
occasion required in order. to bolster
up the fronts further south very in
innate connection sprang up between
the tactical operations of the army
group under Field Marshal Prince Leo
pold of Bavaria and that of the COM
| mander in chief in the east, as. indeed,
between the whole German and Aus
tro Hungarian fronts.
(He refers to the situation created in
the east by the jealousy among the
German and Austrian army leaders. BY
decree of the Kaiser, Hindenburg and
L.udendorff had been confined to the
Northern end of the line, the ~Bavarian
E.-s,x IL L., L. T.. -
mand in the center and the Austrians
had theirs in the south. The new peril,
however compelled the Germans to
send troops south and was forcing the
headquarters together)
The revious arrangements between
the two general staffs had been good
enough for periods of inactivity, but
never contemplated such situation as
developed out of the Russian offensive.
1t was now imperative to act quickly.
Reference to the two general headquar-
tiers in Charleville German general
headquarters) or Pless (the kaiser's
| headquarters) and Teschen (the Aus
| trian headquarters) might mean loss
| of time that could never be recovered.
Even in the great March offensive
our laison system had ben found in
| convenient. We were only able to
! avoid friction because we always
! worked SO well with the army group
! of Field Marshall Prince Leopold of
| Bavaria and Woyrsch's group under his
! command.
| From that time the question of a
| single command had not been lost sight
| of. First, the proposal to put Prince
LeOpold's group under the command
| Of the conn ander-in-chfef In the east
| was frequently discussed. But whole
sale change-such as war IL constantly
calling fOr-wns what wns required
and that meant that the cOmamnder-in-
chief in the east would have to take
over the command Of the whole eastern
/, front from the Gulf of Riga to the
| CArpathians.
| But bitter experience was needed be-
| fore this change was effected. lrrele-
want matters that had nothing TO do
with the issue aggravated the problem
In the first place, the Austrian general
staff for reasons of so-called prestige,
| found it difficult to contemplate any
| Limitation of its tactical author
iity over the Austro- Hungarian troops
| In it's Interpretation of its powers u
tealously maintained the Austrian point
of view. of not Lifting Germany's miii-
tary predominahce become apparent
Germany. on the other hand. considered
military necessities and nothing else
"proud British navy'' for not forcing a
battle with the German fleet. He ad-
| mits. however. that the policy of the
latter was to keep close to its base AND
Rthat 1t was not allowed to go out and
| fight early In the. war. He also tells
OF the celebration Of the supposed vic
- II n