Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-08

When the field marshal and l ar
rived at Pless (the kaiser's headquart-
ers, August 20, 1850, the question
was just being mooted of the estab-
lishment of a single command for the
Quadruple alliance in all tactical and
strategical matters. | warmly advo-
Gated it ana had the pleasure of seeing
it carried out. The final decision lay
with his majesty, who gave permission
to the field marshal to do everything
by order of his majesty"
In practice the actual control was
limited; we had no definite knowl-
edge of the quality of our allies
troops and were thus unable, for eX-
ample, to direct that only so many
troops should be retained on Austria's
italian frontier. In practice we gen
orally came TO some mutual arrange
ment, but the directions issued by the
German CHIC, carried with them a
certain authority which proved to be
of great utility.
The field marshal and l had, ac-
cordingly the conduct of operations
in the west. and in the east as far as
the Dobrudja in the south. With re-
gard to the Rumanian campaign. it
was necessary to come to an arrange
ment with our allies, and in particu-
lar with Austria Hungary. The Aus
tro- Hungarian headquarters staff in
Teschen had under it's command the
army group of the Archduke Charles
Gin Galicia) and the troops that were
now moving into Pennsylvania. They
depended, however, so largely on the
measures we ourselves were about to
take, that the assumption of the sin
gle command by our CHIC. made no
difference whatever in fact.
The Italian and Albanian fronts
were the exclusive sphere of General
Won Conrad. ,...
Conditions in Macedonia, Bulgaria
and Turkey demanded our closest at
tention, but we could not have the
final voice there.
One result of the establishment OF
the single command was that the gen
eral staffs of the various allies had
| recourse to us whenever disagree
ments broke out between them. In
| Balkan questions, the Bulgar CHG
was very reluctant to have any direct
dealing with Turkey or Austria Hun
gary. while the latter, in its turn, pre-
| ferred to deal with us rather than
with Bulgaria.
Kaiser Could Decide Policies, But
Had No Executive Powers.
|
preme war lord. In him resided the
ultimate authority over the army and
navy The commanders-in chief OF
the land and sea forces were respon-
sihle TO him.
Subject to his majesty's, pleasure
the chief of the general staff of the
field army had full control of the
direction of operations Decisions OF
the first Importance required his maj
! esty's approval. He had no executive
authority. The emperor was thus the
head of the general aaff.
4 The chief of the naval staff, as the
director of operations at sea, had the
same status as the chief of the gen
eral staff in the field. As regards sucf
; operations he had the same right,
; and duties The general staff and tht
naval staff have always worked wei
together.
The governors general in Brussels
and Warsaw We're directly responsible
to his majesty. and took their direc
tons from the chancellor in matters
of policy. In military questions the,
took directions from G.H.Q.-on ont
, occasion it proved necessary to Obtain
an order from his majesty when W.
wanted some horses from the WARSAW
government.