The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1919-06-28

ONNeA0A1AA9
vately. But the result would almost
have been chaos, which
could not have failed to affect his |
own country. Moreover, and this point |
is capital, had the governments with
which he was dealing yielded to his |
his demands, they would just as in
fallibly have fallen Neither Lloyd
George nor Clemenceau could face
their publics and confess that the Ger
mans would escape paying up to the
last imaginable limit, the costs of the
war
II the people of France, Italy and
Britain we're ready to criticize their
ministries for quarrelling with the
president, for letting him go home be
fore the peace terms were agreed
upon, they were quite as prepared to
turn their ministries out, If these min
istries surrendered to the president in
matters which the people held of SUI
preme Importance, and these matters
were in the main financial. II the
| Socialists, who in France are not par
| ticularly important, continued to de-
nounce Clemenceau, because he held
out for the Sarre and certain financial
! terms, the whole Of the rest OF France,
| politically speaking, criticised and de-
nounced the French prime minister for
yielding too much in the Sarre and
elsewhere. and press campaigns were
/ openly waged against him on this
| ground
| Might Have Had Wreck.
Wreck, the president might have,
in all the difficult months when Boil
| shevism was marching westward and
internal misery and anarchy, growing
out OF the war, were supplying fresh
finder for Bolshevistic fires. But more
than this he could not do. His liberal
critics assert that he might have
drawn strength from the radicals of
Europe. but they do not recognize, as
| he had to, that such strength was
| slight and that the men with whom
he was debating terms, would be turn
ed out OF office If they conceded all
or most OF what he was asking them
TO coneede. It was always possible
| for Woodrow Wilson to become the
Bolshevist leader in Europe; he had
only to break with Lloyd George and
with Clemenceau to replace Lenine and
! Trotsky and unquestionably Bolshev-
! ism would have gained instead of de-
Ginning in the following months.
But the idea that Lloyd George, Or
lando or Clemenceau could have &C
cepted Mr.. Wilson's leadership and
! permitted him to settle the European
and Asiatic problems in accordance
with his own personal conceptions
rests upon the major fallacy that the
mass of the people of the countries
these men represented were them.
selves prepared to accept Mr.. Wilson's
ideas. Had this been the case all
would have been simple. But as Fl
uHe, the question of reparations, the
everlasting puzzle of Ireland, If you
please, well demonstrated, the major.
lty of the people were not willing and
their ministers having to choose be
tween losing the majority or the min.
orlty, chose to stand with the ma.
jority
Mr.. Wilson's gravest mistake, in
my Judgment, lay in his original mis-
apprehension of the real facts. He
thought, he believed, that there would
be peace of cancellations; he believed
the mass of the plain people of the
world were prepare to make any sac
r1tlce to bring this about, and he be
lleved that the Fourteen Points anc
the League of Nations would take
care OF everything. Not only did he
believe it, but he proclaimed the fac
and many people who heard him alst
believed it. Then, when it becam,
perfectly clear that Europe was still
Europe, and that no American solu
ton, based largely on a mixture o
) sublime faith and appalling unfamiliar
ity with the underlying facts, coult
or would be permitted to solve any
thing, he was attacked on all side
, by those who had accepted his orie
' inal statements.
! Questions UnsoIubIe.
!, The idea that such complicate,
j, questions as those presented by tn
! mixture of populations in central an
, eastern Europe can be settled as no
!, to inspire several of the races to fee
themselves wronged, with determ
/ nation to fight again, is patiently pre-
q posterous, and events are proving
: to be such. Mr.. Bonar Law said i
: the House of Commons the other da
that not less than twenty wars wer
4 going on in Europe at the moment
4 the Serbs and the Italians, the HUI
n garians and the Roumanians, the Pole
v and the Germans, will never joint
o accept any settlement of their boun,
n aries; the League of Nations cannt
q prevent conflicts which the victoriou
= alliance against Germany at this m
= ment is unable to halt; and behind a
l. else lies hidden the colossal problel
n of Russia, with an infinite number
apprehensions to be felt.
r Mr.. Wilson encouraged the ide
II that he could go to Europe and soly
N this problem, settle all these que
If tions. He undoubtedly believed tn
le and many of his followers believed
n also. Once in Europe he found tn;
b. all he could possibly accomplish We
d to get the best possible organizatie
S. of the League of Nations and hoI
1T that out of it would develop a methe
It for avoiding wars. Conceivably he
D. wrong again, in believing the Leagl
" of Nations can accomplish this, CO
s. ceivably he is right; this is a matt,
for years of controversy, but since /
encouraged the idea that the insolub
=. could be solved, he is now attacke
IL by those. who, not having had his e
,e perience, still believe in the efficien,
lie of his principles. and. that had tn,
r been applied, these same principl
e, would have solved everything.
C. But if the president is being {
Id tackled by one wing for having faile