Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-07-21

owing to the lapse of time necessary
/ to obtain and transmit the informa-
ton.
Armies of Crown Prince.
AS an instance we may take the sit
uation on September % of the group
of armies commanded by the German
crown prince.
An official document shows that they
were composed at that date Of forty
nine divisions, of which thirty-two
were in line, four in support and thir-
teen in reserve. The daily table drawn
up by the French intelligence depart
ment gave the situation of these ar
mics as follows: September 22-
Forty-eight divisions (thirty-one in
lime. four in support, thirteen in re-
!serve). September 25-Forty-five di-
visions (thirty-one in line, three In
support, eleven in reserve).
report Indicating the probable inten-
Itions of the enemy. Finally maps
lwere periodically prepared with Ia
bles showing on the one hand me
number of enemy divisions in line
which it had become necessary to re-
liieye lin view of the length of time
lin which they had been engaged in
lbattIe) and. on the other. the mum :
lber Of divisions still available to
furnish this relief.
The allied high command was there
fore in a position to know at any mo-
Ement the strength of the German
army. to watch from day to day IT'S
losses and to make its decisions ac-
Icordingly.
the German army was estimated oy
the allied intelligence department to
tbe az follows: Total divisions. 2O7;
lao in line, II in reserve, OF when 81
were fresh, Is were reconstructed
and 20 were worn out.
Enemy Prepares New Attacks.
Az to the intentions of the enemy.
lthase were vet little known. The most
probable hypothesis appeared TO De
THAT he would attack on the British
front. and that this attack would not
take place before the beginning OF
July.
Inroyed that this attack had really
been contemplated by the enemy. but
that he relinquished the idea at the
end Of June.
One order in particular. dated May
80. said: 1.-THE projected attack In the
direction of Doullens -Amiens is about
to be carried out. Preparations should
be commenced Immediately"
This order indicated that the attack
would be known under the conven-
ItionaI name Of 'Neu-Michael." The
act that the attack which began on
March FL was known to the Germans
under the name of Michael" there
fore leaves no possible doubt; the
IGerman command had the intention of
renewing in June the attack whs:s
they made in Picardy in March, and
with the same Overwhelmingly, the
Iseparation of the Franco-British
forces.
From the beginning Of July infor-
NATION began to become more precise
and it became clear that two enemy
attacks were probable. one on the
British front, in the region Of Lille,
and the other on the French front, in
champagne. The following orders is
sued by the general commanding the
German 4th Army prove that the en-
lemy had the intention of attacking in
Flanders in July:
/. order dated June 90: 1.-THE chief
of the general staff has given orders
memorandum on the economic meas
ures to be taken in connection with
the wegebau' operations (booty.
exploitation of conquered territory.
protection of cultivated ground
.. Order dated July 10: I'm order to
mask the projected offensive, the term
'Flandernschut' will be used on and
after July Is, instead OF 'Wegebau.
8. Order dated July IL: I'm order
that the observations made in the
course of the 'Wegebau' operations
may be embodied in the reports as
soon as possible and at once be made
use of by all concerned. papers must
be classed under the following head
ings: (a) knowledge obtained in the
course Of the attack. CD Lessons to
be drawn from the execution of the
grand attack"
In addition to these the two orders
QUOTED further on concerning the
suppression Of this offensive, prove
implicitly that it was to have taken
place.
Plan for outflanking Rheims.
BY July 10, from the ensemble of
the Information it had gathered the
intelligence department was in po-
sition to inform the high command
that the enemy's principal attack
would take place in Champagne. The
lines OF the attack were very plainly
set forth as follows:
(a) West of Rheims: attack on the
Vrigny bend of the river. bv wav Of
both banks Of the Marne. in the zen
eral direction of Epernay.
| (b) East of Rheims: attack on the
Suippe-Massiges front, in the gen.
eral direction of Chalons.
Rheims was not to be attacked d.
rectly. but to be outfanked on the
east and west.
Time for Offensive Comss.
l