Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-28

the case of the Flanders and Somme
battles. We had, in addition to other
supplies, to send W immense quanu-
ties of ammunition and other war ma
terials. The railway communications
behind the lines could not cope with
all this. Motor transport and rolling
stock that would have made good this
deficiency were not available.
We should have continued to be
very seriously handicapped In our
struggle with an enemy who had the
best imaginable communication at his
disposal.
That our strategic position in this
salient was a critical one went with
out saying. Every enemy success at
Scissors or on the Ardre would nave
the most far-reaching consequences.
1t would not be possible to hold the
salient permanently. and a new attack
on Rheims seemed hopeless.
sent officers, among them General
Won Loszberg. to the fighting front,
to report on the position. The COM
manders and troops at scissors were
obviously under the impression of the
battles of the 18th, and the feeding
of the troops was everywhere de-
scrfbed as very difficult. From tao
teal point of view the forward zone
system had not proved success in
these battles involving retreats, for its
evacuation too easily caused disorder
in the main line of resistance imme-
diately behind it.
Decided on New Retreat.
The descriptions given to CHS
confirmed us in our resolution. TO
which we had come in the evening or
the 22nd, to withdraw the troops on
the night of the 26th-27th of July
from the Marine to the Fere-en-Tar-
denois-Ville on Tardenois line. With
that end in view l was naturally in
constant touch with the army group
of the German crown prince and the
18th army.
Only a short stand was to be made
on the line indicated The enemy
would renew his massed attacks. We
had to make them very expensive for
him, We had in view withdrawal
behind the Vesle Of straight line be-
tween scissors and Rheims in the be-
ginning of August, but before this
could be carried out, the salient south
of the Vesle, and especially the Vesle
valley itself, had first to be cleared.
The masses of stores accumulated
there were absolutely vital to us. Our
front contracted as our retreat pro-
ceeded. We thereby accumulated re-
serves, but so did our enemy. who
could use them for attacks else
where.
The serious weakening of the 18th
army and of the right wing of the
9th least of Amiens) could now no
longer be justified. 1t had to be made
good by reinforcements These could
only be drawn from the army group
of Crown Prince Rupprecht.
Gives Up Flanders Dream.
The offensive in Flanders could not
bring a rapid and decisive success.
According TO all indications, the enc
my was ready for it. If he avoided
the attack. as ne had done east of
Rheims, we should be unable to force
a decision. If he stood firm. his nu-
merous reserves were in a position to
hold us up, as they had done on June
ii and II in the direction of the
Compiegne.
CLIO, therefore decided to aban-
don this defensive. The sRupprecht
army group was to stand on the de-
fensive and surrender reserves to re-
inforce the 18th. 9th and 7th armies;
this it was quite capable of doing. The
necessary orders were issued. l had
as yet no idea how, if at all, We should
he able to recover the initiative after
taking up the Vesle position.
The army group of Duke Albrecht
was instructed to submit plans of an
attack on its front. CHG, suspended
it's instructions as regards the use OF
the forward zone on the front OF the
eth and 18th armies, and also for any
future retrments.
ON the 23rd there was again an ex-
tremely vigorous attack, which on the
whole. was successfully repulsed along
the whole front. During the next few
days there were only local attacks,
which failed everywhere.
.a PcnnsyIvanians Attack.
In the night of the 26th the with
drawal of the front north of the Marine
was accomplished according to plan
and in perfect order. In the next few
DAYS General Foch made further vio-
lent but unsuccessful attacks which
cost us the loss of some small strips
of high ground, northwest of Fere en-
Tardenois.
According to reports from the troops
the enemy had suffered bloody losses.
(The Pennsylvania troops We're en-
gagged here.) OF course very heavy
demands were made on us. too. AS
had been the case in previous defen-
siye battles, constant relief by new
divisions was continually necessary.
The evacuation of the salient went
on steadily, thanks to the splendid or
ganization of the army group of the
German crown prince and of the LIST
and 18th armies. The second railway
line was now completed and made the
work considerably easier.
In the night of the list and End of
August the front was withdrawn be-
hind the Vesle, where troops in hastily
prepared positions were ready for the
enemy. The enemy followed close on
our heels, and made sharp attack on
the line of the Vesle, He was every
where repulsed. Our defensive battle
of indictment between the Marine and
the Vesle was at an end.
The battle was brilliant achieve
ment on the part of the leaders and
men concerned. The shadow cast by
the events of July Is had passed
After that day. in spite of the heavy
demands made upon him, the German
soldier had fought well, and felt him
self better man than his enemy. In
some divisions there had certainly
been unpleasant revelations. Among
other things. Subsequently received
report which threw a very grave
light on the spirit of one of these divi-
sions. I sent it to the 7th army for
further inquiry.
His Losses Very Heavy.
As In every other engagement the
losses we had suffered since July II
had been very heavy; July IS and tht
defensive battles arising with 1t had
in particular been very expensive, al.
though rya sot our wollnded hack anC