Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-10-27
American Intelligence Officers
Reveal How Germans Were
Led Astray By Mythical
Armies and Fake Messages.
icy MORNING ,ous al SPECIAL LEASED w,Hs,

visions just east of Verdun in ths
Etain region were kept on their toes
momentarily expecting an attack
which never matarialized.
At a dinner table in a Coblenz cafe
overlooking the Rhine, an American
intelligence offic ar recentle told tn
story of the creation Of the mythical
army as it was called. 1t ap-
Tears that the Gecmans we've eXpeet-
ing an attack in the Etain sector nj
any time and the Americans knew #,
hut at that phase of the game the
First United States army was deyot .
ing it's energies TO driving the enemy
cut of the Argonne forest and the hII
country on either side. So the myth
cal army was created. in preference to
q real division, requiring many men,
II convince the German commander
that it would not be wise to weaken
the Etain front to the benefit of the
Neuse- Argonne front where a desper-
ate battle was proceeding.
Five fresh divisions had been
placed by the Germans on the Etain
line. These constituted their last and
fiEest reservoir of available divisions.
The Americans realized that the min
Ute the Germans decided that this
was not a danger point, any or all Of
the five divisions could be Withdrawn,
replaced by exhausted and fragment
airy divisions coming from the battle
fronts, and that the appearance of the
fresh troops in line west of the Mouse
would have a tremendous effect on
the American offensive.
Germans Furnished With key"
The * army was assigned to q
front from BezonvauX to Fresnes.
From the morning of October 20 until
just previous to the armistice this
army 'functioned." Captain Charles
II. Matz, Of Hubbard Woods, H. was
ccmmander-in-chi Captain William
II. Dearden, of Springfield, Mass, and
Washington, d. c., was chief Of staff
Lieutenant John Fl. Graham, of Lex
ington, Va, was chief of troop
movements" Captain O. w. Neidert
was in charge of G-1, or adminstra-
ton, and Lieutenant II, T. Griswold,
of Old Lynn, Conn. was chief of ar
tillery The staff of the army were
all members Of the intelligence section
Of the First army and of course, be-
fore beginning operations, had seeur-
ed the consent of their chief, Colonel
Wiley Howell
The wireless and the telephone
were freely used to convince the Ger
mans that the Americans We're pre-
pairing for an attack in the Etain see
tor. TO make sure that the Germans
would be able to break into" the code
used the Americans furnished them
with a satisfactory key
One wireless station, of the X army.
was established in d clump of woods
near Verdun and was christened
headquarters Of the X army" This
station functioned until the end Of
the game, all orders" to the army
Toing out from this place by wireless.
Soon after the station began working
the Germans located its whereabouts
and frequently she1led the woods
and vicinity apparently in hopes Of
breaking up the radio of this latest
of annoyances.
The x army also had a portable
radio station, which moved about and
presented itself as different sta
tion every dav or two.
The sector in which the x army was
at work was directly under command
Of the Thirty-third French corps. and
the rowing wireless station caused
considerable excitement among the
French soldiers as it sent messages
to make the enemy believe that sew
moved into the area. The French un-
aware of the plans of the X army
staff at times thought the Americans
had lost all sense of reason and on
several occasions so reported the
wireless plants
Fake Wireless Stations.
The first message from the X army
headquarters was a general dispatch
to all wireless stations in the army
area (none Of which actually eXisted) |
in the new code. Of course, directing
that none Of the stations answer or
make amy use of their sending in
struh1ents, for fear of the enemy To-
eating them but to be of the alert at
fixed hours to- receive messages. The |
effect was to warm the Germans that |
a large number of wireless stations
must have been set up and to advise |
them of the hours Wnen the enemy /
intercepting stadd1s should be on /
the alert for the American messages. I
This was followed by a series of !
messages designed, to indicate that tho
army was preparing for a full 7
fledged operation. In order to inform
the enemy Of the geographical limits
of the sector Of the X army, many /
messages were directed TO Imaginary
officers at existing towns on the Etainl
front
Meantime the rowing wireless sta
ton was working overtime day and |
night. 1t began sending out messages
in the E'rcsnes sector and trying to
give the impression that it was several
stations at widely separated locations.
one message in particularly was pc
culIarly designed to add to the enc
mys suspicion of the approaching
trouble--an imperative demand for
200 copies more additional of the Con-
fans sheet, "Plan Directeur Map"
This could only be interpreted by the
Germans, the Americans agreed, as
preparation for coming drive on the
Briey iron center
careless Telephone Squad.
In addition to the wireless the x
army also had in operation, on the
front between BeZonvaux and Fresnes.
a telephone squad careless squad
which set up telephone stations here
and there and sent messages and
talked shop and gossiped at night
about the arrival of some old friend
from America with such and such an
outfit
The y army telephone squad took
no chances that the Germans might
not hear the conversations the Amer
leans desired them to record. They
deliberately grounded their wires. so /
the enemy could .'listen in" and
craWled out into no mans land in the
darkness and hooked one of the
American wires over onto German