The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-12-14
Pershing ReUieURecordMade By American Arms in France

lies was still limited to trench war fare. As our troops were being trained for open warfare, there was every rea- son why we could not allow them to be scattered among our allies, even by divisions. much less as replacements, except by pressure of sheer necessity. Any sort of permanent amalgamation would irrevocably commit America's fortunes to the hands Of the allies Moreover, it was obvious that the lack of homogenity would render these mixed divisions difficult to maneuver and almost certain to break up under stress of defeat with the consequent mutual recrimination. Again, there was no doubt that the realization by the German people that independent American divisions. corps, or armies were in the field with determined pur- pose would be a severe blow to Ger man morale and prestige"
 General Pershing had refused ut terly to drop his plan for a single American army. acting under it's own flag. but consented. because of the ex- isting emergency. to lend the combat divisions at hand to help stem the Ger man offensive of 1918. which, the all lied war council foresaw 'may very quickly place the allied armies in serious situation"
 The German rush ceve1oped as ex- pected, the report shows. but the enemy's success was far greater than had been feared. At Amens. the Brit ish were driven in on 40-kilometer front; between the Disc and Berry au-Bac the French lost 50 kilometers on a S5kilometer front in four days, And immediately the Germans utilized the Marne Gas a defensive flank and the advance was directed toward Paris"
 "The gravity of the situation" the report says. lied to the famous orders for holding up all supply and troop shipments except infantry and ma chine gun units" General Foch who was now made generalissimo. esti- mated that 100 American divisions would be necessary for allied victory.
 TO SMASH MARINE POCKET
 General Pershing at this time was recommending that his troops be used to smash the Marne pocket into which the Germans had thrust themselves, He says:
 ''The Marne salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunity for a counter offensive that was obvious. If successful such an operation would afford immediate relief to the allied defense. would remove the threat against Paris and free the Paris Nancy railroad. But more important than all else. it would restore the morale of the allies and remove the profound depression and fear then existing. Up to this time our units had been put in here and there at critical points as emergency troops to stop the terrific German advance. In every trial whether on the defensive or offensive they had proved themselves equal to any troops in Europe. As early as June g, and again on July 10 at Bom- bon, I had very strongly urged that our best divisions be concentrated under American command. if possible. for use as striking force against the Marne salient. Although the prevail ing view among the allies was that American units were suitable only for the defensive, and that k all events they could be used to better advantage under allied command. the suggestion was accepted in principle and my esti- mate of their offensive fighting quail ities was soon put to the test"
 ACTION AT CHATEAU-THIERRY
 Although his suggestion was not ac- cepted, American forces found glory in the action which was undertaken, At Chateau Thierry when the Germans first advanced the Third division commander reported:
 Although the rush of the German