New Britain herald. [microfilm reel] (New Britain, Conn.) 1890-1976, 1919-03-20

cannot afterward be exceeded without |
the permission of the council Cart. |
Wild In this case the covenant for
bldS member Of the league to in |
crease Its armament without the APP |
prevail of the council, but only after
the member has specially and volun- !
'arlly consented to a general plan OF
reduction.
Not Obliged to Accept Mandatory.
The third case is that of manda-
tory FOR backward people. The degree
or authority, control or administration
70 De exercised by the mandatory
state Is to be explicitly defined in
each case by the Executive Council in
special act or charter Cart. XIX
1t mas been asserted that a state Sc
lected as mandatory presumably
by the Executive Council, although
inns Is not expressly stately, is I'M
der an obligation to accept. I can
ma IN the covenant no provision to
tnat erect expressed or implied: nor
would such an obliga ton appear rea-
sonaole. To suppose that the repre-
sentatives of France. Italy, the United
states or any other of the fourteen
states on the committee intended that
If the council should select their
NoNiA'iS 90 II1dlQdtOFy 10 tdhe SII1I66
OF Russia it would be obliged to &C
cept, seems to me in the highest de-
gree improbable, and the same thing
Is true of less difficult mandates. 1t
ls a general principle that in any doc
ument an intention, not expressed and
IN itself irrational, is not to be i'm
pned. No doubt a spirit OF fairness
would prevent a nation, engaged with
others in a, common effort for human
welfare, from, Sinking all burdens it
has not expressly agreed to assume:
but that Is a very different thing from
an obligation to accept any burden
| that may be thrust upon it. The mat
ter should, of course, be made per-
| fectly clear in the final draft.
| The principle of manufactures
seems to me highly meritorious 1t
has I understand, two objects, one to
| prevent maltreatment of the native
! population, and the other to prevent
! a selfish monopoly of products that
| may be essential to the industry and
| prosperity of the world. For both
these purposes there is clearly q, right
of collective supervision and control.
at least by all the nations that have
! taken part in the conquest of the col
| onies and territories concerned. If
Germany and her allies had not been
| beaten these possessions would not
| have been permanently captured; and
| every nation that helped to win the
/ war helped to conquer them There
! fore we, as one of those nations that
| helped to acquire them, have a right,
and have no less duty. to see that
they are properly administered; and
there is no need of making a bugbear
of it.
| THE functions of the body of dele
gates are still less extensive, consist
ing aim ost entirely of the discussion
| of matter within the sphere of action
| of the league. The only cases-apar TT
from the regulation Of it's own pro-
| cedure--where it is given power to
make binding decisions, are the Sc
| lection Of the four countries which.
, in addition to the five chief powers,
are to have seats in the executive
council: and the case where a mat
ter in dispute between two states is
| referred to the body for inquiry, in
which case it's recomm endation has
the same effect as if made by the cx-
ecutve council.
No Super Sovereignty.
This analysis of the plan for a
league set forth in the Covenant Of
Paris shows how closely it resem bles
the sketch of the minimum essentials
, of such a league in the opening Of
this address, 1t shows also that the
fear of a super-sovereign body, to
which we are asked to sacrifice our
, | independence, is the creation of an
overheated imagination. If we ASSUME
that the covenant means what it says,
and not something wholly different,
no organ of the league has any auth
GRITTY to give commands to this coun-
try that need give us moments
anxiety. The only substantial powers
/ that any such body is to possess, be-
f yond making recomm endations which
] we may follow or not, as we think
Q right, are derived from a unanim Gus
= decision in an international dispute,
= and from the right to forbid an in
] crease In ornaments or to direct the
r duties of mandate in case we first
. agree to the reduction of ornaments,
g Or to the assumption of the manda tie.
Il It is sometimes asked, if the auth
d ! GRITTY of the organs Of the league is
. SO insignificant where is it's efficiency
in preventing war? The answer is
that it lies in the obligations assum ed
under the covenant directly by the
several members of the league; and
g ! this is both the most effective and
- least adventurous method Of prevent
q ing war.
- This misunderstanding of the ma
I, | ture of the league proposed, and of
a the functions of its organs is the
foundation OF the most of the objec-
= tons raised against the covenant. If
It the United states is not subject to the
h orders Of the executive council, or
t under any obligation to adopt it's rec
| ommen dations it Is senseless to talk
: of our being ruled by a body in which
: we have only one vote out of nine.
q The onnnnentS of the leagIIe set LID