Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1919-02-12
Admiral Jellicoe Reveals
Weakness of Tonnage
and Equipment
U.BOAT HAD WHIP HAND
Grand Fleet Never Sure of
Victory Till 1916, He
Says in Book
By the Associated Press

LONDON, req. lS.-lne dangers 10
which the British grand feet, short of
cruisers, destroyers and with defense
less bases, was exposed during the first
two and half years of the war, owing
to the German use of submarines, mines
and torpedoes, is described in a book
written by Admiral Viscount Jellicoe,
who was commander of the feet The
book, published today, covers the naval
activities of 1914-16.
Admiral Jellicoe says that the German
high seas fleet possessed eighty-eight
destroyers. compared with forty-two for
the grand fleet, and reveals that, owing
to the submarine menace. the grand
fleet in the autumn of 1914 moved from
Lough Swilly and returned to the North
Sea only when the anchorage In Scapa
Flow became reasonably safe.
Neither in October, 1914, nor in May,
1876 Admiral Jellicoe says, did the
British margin of superiority justify, him
in disregarding Ishe enemy's torpedo fire.
Improvement After 1915
The situation gradually improved
after 1916, especially as the light cruiser
and destroyer forces with the grand
fleet increased steadily after the battle
of Jutland, considerably reducing the
rdanger of successful torpedo attack, and
the Inclusion of Glass X submarines
made 1t probable the enemy would suffer
more severely from submarine attack
than the British. Regarding 1918, Ad-
miral Jellicoe says:
THE position was assured and we
4 could have afforded to take risks which,
& in 1916, would have been most unwise.
If the German fleet had come out to
battle terrible punishment awaited
< them"
One-third of the book is devoted to the
3 Battle of Jutland. Admiral Jellicoe
dwels on "the danger involved in leav-
ing too much to chance in fleet action"
: and emphasized the lack of reserve to
replace losses in the event Of disaster
Cites German Superior Strength
Admiral Jellicoe says the German
fbattle cruisers had better armor, many
more destroyers, more torpedoes and "a
most efficient armor-piercng she'll"
Describing the battle, he refers to the
separation of the British battle fleet
from the battle cruiser squadrons. due
to the cruisers having been engaged
several hours, with repeated change, of
course, with the consequence that instead
}, of encountering the enemy right ahead,
4 the Grand Fleet raised the foe on the
sstarboard bow.
Admiral Jellicoe deployed on the port
wing division, thus compelling the Ger
mans to turn off to starboard to avoid
being crossed. This maneuver, des-
lcribed as mastery by reviewers, threw
the enemy into complete confusion. The
herman commander-in-chief. profting
by his superiority in torpedo craft, low
Visibility approaching darkness and the
proximity of his bases and mine fields.
ESCAPED. .-
The enemy at this period fired hun
dreds of torpedoes. as German officers
since have stated, Admiral Jellicoe con-
,tinues, and although the Germans were
lin the gravest peril, the position of the
:, Grand Fleet itself was menaced by de-
,term'ned torpedo attacks in thick
weather.
Changed Battle Line Four Times
!; But the British fleet, by turning its
battle line four times in the action, the
admiral says, got clear of the torpedoes
racing toward the British ships.
Admiral Jellicoe explains that he did
not seek night action because the Ger
mans had more powerful searchlights,
superiority in destroyers and greater
number of torpedo tubes fitted in the
T.emy ships.
/yAfter estimating the relative strength
I OF the two fleets early in the war. Ad-
Ymiral Jellicoe expresses amazement that
the Germans were SO c$utious, and says:
IF this country, in the future, de-
cided to rely for safety against raids
or invasion on the fleet alone, 1t is es-
sential that we possess a considerably
greater margin of superiority over a
possible enemy In all classes Of vessels
! than we did in August. 1914"