The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1919-10-19
formulating Naval Policy
OF the United States
How Plan to Utilize Destroyers as Patrol Was
Unfeasible- Worried Over U-Boat Sit
uatiOn- Necessity of Protecting Shipping
Lanes East and South of Ireland

Germany attacked our hospital
lps IN order to make us escort them
Fth destroyers, and thereby divert
hese destroyers from the anti-sub-
tlrine campaign. And, Of course,
igland had to do this. Had the An
o-saxon mind resembled the Ger
Flnic we should probably have ac-
pied the logic of the situation. and
I'VE refused to be diverted from the
eat strategic purpose which meant
inning the war-that is. protecting
Fsrchant shipping; we should. there
re, have left the hospital ships to
cir fate, justifying ourselves by the
rnciple Of the larger good. But the
Irish and American mind does not
rurk that way; 1t was impossible for
10 leave sick and wounded men as
rsy to submarines. Therefore, after
ntsiving the German warning, backed
% as 1t was. by the actual destruc-
n OF unprotected hospital ships. we
gan providing them with destroyer
ports. This greatly embarrassed us
the anti-submarine campaign, for at
t1es, especially during the big drives.
fs had a large number of hospital
lips to protect. AS soon as We adopt
this policy, Germany. having at
|e!ned her end. which was to keep the
|Fstroyers out of the submarine area,
Popped attacking sick and wounded
|fldiers
Not only was the British navy at
PAT time safeguarding the liberties of
|fankind at sea, but its army I'm France
las doing its share in safeguarding
Esm on land. And the fact that Brit
n had to support this mighty army
its part In making British shipping
times almost the free play of the
Esrman submarines. For next in
f1portance to maintaining the Brit
IL Grand Fleet intact It was nee
Essary to keep secure the channe
crossing. Over this little strip
oi water went the men and tn,
Isuppues from England to Franc,
hat kept the German army at bay; t,
lave suspended this line of commu
ication, even for a brief period, woul'
lave meant that the Germans woul
lave captured Paris, overrun tn
hole Of France. and ended the wal
least the war on land. In tn
ourse OF four years Great Britat
ransported about 100000 troop
icross the channel, without the los
single man. She accomplishe
Als only by constantly using fifty o
Ity destroyers, and other light sur
ace craft, based on Harwich. as es
orts for the transports. But this wa
,ot the only responsibility of the kin
nat rested on the already overbur
ened British shoulders. There wa
mother part of the seas in which, fo
TACTICAL and political reasons, tn
british destroyer fleet had to do pro
eetive duty. This was the Mediterra
an. Here lay not only the trad
nutes TO the east, but also the line
supply TO Italy, to Egypt, to Pales
ne and to Mesopotamia-
cutting off Italy's food and material
'0uld simply have meant that Ital
Oald have to withdraw from the wa
ae German and Austrian subma
ass, escaping from Austria's Adriati
.'Fs' were constantly assailing TIL
snmerce. Moreover, the success {
German submarine campaign
use waters would have meant ths
Allies would have to abandon til
e0hlki expedition, which would hay
: the Central Powers absolute mas
o. the Balkans and the MIDI
This created an addition;
an upon the anti-submarine era,
ne British navy.
"ot Enough Destroyers TO Go
Around.
:. the British navy It was thus
-, OF choice what areas she woul
80 70 protect with her destroye
~ the one thing that was painful
s.sp@Eent was that she could nc
n~.aetorily safeguard all the dar
Aes With the inadequate fore
n. VT disposal. certain aeras must h
a. pen TO the U-boats; and, TO de
4 cA ones was simply matte
s,a---11iielng the several confiictin
ss' In April, 1917. the Admira