The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1919-11-09

were not the only ones which at this
| time We're depending upon the patrol
Us protection against the subsurface
boat. The American navy was COM
hitting precisely the same error off
our Atlantic coast. As soon as con-
gress declared war against Germany
we expected that at least few of the
U-boats would cross the Atlantic and
attack American shipping: indeed,
many believed that some had already
crossed in anticipation of war; the
papers were filled with silly stories
about submarine bases" in Mexican.
waters, on the New England coast and
elsewhere; submarines were even re-
ported entering Long Island sound
nets We're stretched across the narrow:
to keep them out of New York harbor;
and our coasting vessels saw periscope!
and the wakes of torpedoes everywhere
from Maine to Florida. So prevalent
was this apprehension that, in the ear.
" days of the war. American destroy.
ers regularly patrolled our coast look.
ing for these far flung submarines. Yet
the idea of seeking them this way wai
absurd. Even had we known whert
the submarine was located there would
have been little likelihood that WI
could ever have sighted if, to say moth.
ing of getting near it. Suppose tina
we had learned that a German U-boal
was operating off Cape Cod; we nigh
have had the exact latitude and longi.
tude where she was expected to be a
a particular moment. Az the time thu
message was sent the submarine might
have been lying on. the surface ready
to attack a passing merchantmen. but
n A. Js4s.
stroyer could never have reached heI
quarry, for, as soon as the U-boat saw
the enemy approaching, she would
simply have ducked under the water
and remained there in perfect safety.
When all danger had passed she would
have bobbed up to the surface as
serenely as you please, and gone ahead
with her appointed task of sinking
merchant ships. One of the astonish-
ing things about this war was that
many of the naval officers OF all coun-
tries did not seem to understand, until
a very late date. how utterly futile il
vas to send anti-submarine surface
craft out into the wide ocean to at
tack or chase away submarines. The
thing TO do, of course, was to make
the submarines come to the anti-sub-
marine craft and fight in order TO get
merchantmen.
/ have made this point before. and
[ now repeat the explanation to en-
phasize that the patrol system was
necessarily unsuccessful, because it
made almost impossible any combats
with submarines and afforded very lit
tie protection to shipping. The ad-
vantage of the convoy system, as its
advocates now urge, was precisely
that it made such combats inevitable.
In other words. it meant offensive
warfare. 1t was proposed to surround
each convoy with a protecting screen
OF destroyers, precisely as in the case
OF the battle fleet. Any submarine
which attempted to torpedo a convoy
ed ship could therefore do so only in
waters that were infested with de-
stroyers. In order to get into position
to discharge its missile the submarine
would have to creep up close to the
rim that marked the circle of these
dtstroyers. Just as soon as the tor
pedo started on its course and the tell
tale wake appeared on the surface the
protecting ships would Immediately
begin sowing the waters with their
depth charges. Thus the Germans
would have to fight for every ship
which they attempted TO sink, instead
that We're free Of destroyers, as had
beer their privilege. The great
Of sailing ships through
aters that were completely protected
destroyers had been shown in the
IL lune zone which had been estab-
lis cross the channel from Dover
to Ca IS and from FoIkstone to
Boulogne. BY arranging ships in com
pact conveys and protecting them with
destroyers we would really create an
other immune zone of this kind,
The advantage of the convoy were
thus SO apparent that, despite the
pessimistic attitude of the merchant
captains, there were a number OF Of
ficers in the British navy who kept
insisting that il should be tried. In this
discussion I took my stand emphati-
cally on the side of this school From
the beginning I had believed in this
method of combating the U-boat war
fare. Certain early experiences had
led me 10 believe that the merchant
captains were wrong IN under-estf-
mating the quality OF their own sea
manship. It was my conviction that
these intelligent and hardy men did
not really know what splendid shin
handlers they Were In my discus
sions with them they disclosed and ex-
aggerated idea Of the seamanIy ability
of naval officers in manoeuyring their
large fleets. They attributed this TO
the superior training of the men and
to the special manoeuvrfng qua Htfes
Of the ships. f-.yarships are built so
that they can keep station, and turn at
any angle at moments notice. thev
would say. but We haven't any men
-, >>--r shias who can do these things