The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-10-18

trated ready TO advance between
wiilenbcrg and Aiienrteln front.
Only small forces were left behind
for tho defense OF tho frontier near
soidau. Thcy were 70 advance Into
Poland In the direction Of Mlawa.
An soon as the troops had been do
pioyed. we intcndcd TO attack Rem.
nenkampf on . wide front between
tho river Pregci and Lake Mausr.
while cnvciopinw his left wing be
You'd Lotxen us miles south Of the
upper end OF Lake Maucrl and far
Their south. The task delegated ID
our outcrmost southern wing was 10
guard the army from attack from
Aukustovo and osowiec. opposite the
southeast corner OF East Prussia and
20 and 50 miles from fctxon. whore
hostile reinforeemenss were expect.
ed. Tho concentrated Eighth army
was 10 fight In three wroups from
the river Prcgel 10 Lake Mnucr. east
OF Isotxen and In the direction Of
1.yck tso miles southeast Of I.otxen).
HIs ARMY
READY TO MARCH
Al tho beginning OF September the
following units were up ready TO I'D.
vance;
The garrisons Of the vissuiA
fortrcss~~. near Soldau.
Won der Goitx's iandwehr al.
vision. near Neidenburx.
Third reserve division and
First army oorps. near Wlien.
berg. ortclsburg. First cavalry
brigade west OF johannesburg.
Seventeenth army corps. Pam
enhcim.
Twensic,h. Eleventh army
corps. and First reserve corps. In
and on both sides Of Aiicnstcln.
Guard reserve corps coming up
from Eihing towards the lower
course OF the river TsAssargc.
Eighth cavalry division Cd
vancinx In the direction Of
The First cavalry division.
minus one cavalry brigade. wns
sfili occupying its positions
facin gthe Nscmcn army. II was
also 20 advance via Iotren.
The main konixrberw reserve
holding the line of tho Dc.rns
tthe first defense line Of the
konig~b~rg fortresa.
The main posen reserve ana the
Count Won Brcdow IAndwehr al.
vision wcrc being brought Up. but
did not arrive In time for the battle.
Tho advance against Rsnnen.
karnprs army began on September 4.
On the 7th. the Guard reserve
corps. the First reserve corps. the
Eleventh and Twsntisth army corps
cntrenchcd position in front of the
enemy limos at Wchiau <3eriauen,
Nordcnburg-AneerburR. between the
river Prcgci and Lake Maucr. and
attacked during the following days
according 10 plan.
The engAgesuenes. particularly
these Of the Twcueissh army csspa
did not 70 wcll for M. The Rus
SLAMS made powerful ceunterst
tack. The enemy positions wevs
strong and cleveriy constructed, and
We should never have got the upper
hand Of them with the arms and
ammunitisn 1t or dispsaal. hal u
not bern thss the projccsed enveiop
ing movement mar 1Dtsen and ths
fortified chain Of lakes was begin
ming 70 have ~ effect
FLANK ATTACK
GOES BADLY
Even east Of Losxsn. which had
held out bravcly against enemy At
tacks an this time. things did moi
look promising. Tho Seventeenth
army corps ana the First and Eighth
cavalry divisions. which had "a
vanced from tho fortress. only made
slow progress northeast Of the lakes
on September . and 3. They ha<
some very hard fighting around
Krugiauken and Posscssern taboui
10 miles northeast Of IIotxenl
The First army corps. which had
pressed forward from Nikolaikcr
and johannesburg GO and 10 miles
south Of Lotzenl had to b deflcctct
sharply north from the east side Of
the lake line. BY this movement u
secured moro room for the Seven
tenth army corps by the evening
Of the sth. Tho Third reserve al
vision. with Won der Ooits's Land
wehr division behind II. was stili ad
vancing In me Biaila-I.yck direction
taiong the southeastern corner o,
Fest Prussia). On September . 4
had already encountered the enemy
In very superior force near Bialla-
The army command would have
liked the right wing TO be stronger
and . division Of the Twentieth
army corps, west Of the iakes, hat
been kept ready to BE- placed ut oui
disposal But this division had TO b.
returned to the corps. The front OF
50 kilometers. on which tho fou,
corps attacked tho enemy. was Ger
tainiy too long. Further. the staff
Of the Guard reserve corps feared q
Russian attack. and had therefore
concentrated its unit.
Tho north wing had to stand firm
on the Pregel. otherwise the Eighth
Army might be outflanksd there. The
attack Of the snveioping wing mus,
be stronger than had originally
been calculated. We had TO wait and
see whether our main attack would
be the decisive factor here. we
could only DO everything IN our
power to ensure the result for which
we were striving.
MAIN RUSSIAN
LINE RETIRES
On the morning Of September II
we received the decisive news tina,
during the night Of the 9th the
enemy had given way before the
Firts reserve corps to the north Of
Gerdauen--probably in consequence
Of the continuous attacks of the First
and Twenty-seventh army corps
making the enveloping movement tc
the SOUTH. 1t was said that this
corps had coupled their position
and intended to march on.
The rejoicing at headquarters can