Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-11-23

! more exactly. territorial. detectives
in Arab regions, as well as upon the
fourteen points.
Not unnaturally the British SYM
pathized with their Arab allies, while
American sympathy was in a meas
ure enlisted as a consequence of the
opinions of American educators and
missionaries in Syria, notably those
from the American College at Beirut.
But it was manifest from the start
that whatever the British motives, the
French were bound to oppose any so
luton which excluded them from
Syria and. in fact, transformed the
whole Arab world into a British pro-
tectorate.
! French Interests Considerable.
/ French interests in Beirut and in
Syrian hinterland were very consid-
cradle. France from the days of the
crusades had remained the power eX-
ercising protectors rights over the
Syrian Christians, notably in the Leb-
anon and there was strong Franco
phile party in certain districts of
Syria. France. having borne the bur
den of the battle in Europe, naturally
objected to seeing the British carry
off the great colonial gains. the fruits
of British battles, to be sure, but of
battles fought by British troops. who
could not have been spared from the
western front had France not sup
piled the main bulk of troops in Eu-
rope.
1t would be inaccurate to say that
the quarrels which ensued in Paris
and supplied one of the most danger
Gus elements in the whole situation,
grew out of intentional bad faith on
the British part. Rather. they were the
natural outcome of the situation
which had developed. But it was not
| less clear that if the Arabians; who
had British sympathy and a degree OF
support and were able to enlist not q
little American sympathy. were able
to realize their aspirations, France
would suffer and Britain would gain
UNNECESSARILY. In reality France
would be crowded out of Syria by the
British as she had been crowded out
of Egypt a generation before, and all
Arabia. new and old, become, In 1act'
a British sphere of influence.
In the end a sort of moduS Vivendl
was agreed upon and at the present
moment Gen. Gouraud the victor Of the
battle Of Champagne in July, 1913. and
until recently commanding the troops IN
sace-Lorraine, has just embarked to
take over the command Of French troops
who will hold Beirut and the sea coast to
Alexandretta, in conformity with the
| Anglo-French treaty, but Will not at
tempt to occupy the inland cities OF
Aleppo and Damascus until the Arab
iquestion has been cleared up by direct
negotiation with the Arabs. AS for the
British they remain in occupation of
Jerusalem, Bagdad and the regions south
O: Syria, taken curing the war.
Arrangement Cannot Last.
But it must be clear that this tenn
porary arrangement cannot last Either
| the British and the French will have
| to agree to an absolute partition of the
Arab lands. with an inevitable conflict
| with the Arabs themselves or they will
F.! have to consent to an evacuation OF all
| but the seacoast towns, of Beirut for
| the French and Basra for the British
and the joint recognition of great. in
dependent Arab state extending from
the Armenian highlands to the Indian
ocean and from the Mediterranean to
Persia. Even this latter solution would
hardly last, for the British would be
menaced in Egypt. by the rise Of any
real Arab state.
So much for the Arab problem. But
the French sphere of influence not mere
ly includes Arab territory, but extends
northward from the Gulf of Alexan-
dretta and Cilician plain, claimed by the
Armenians as essential to the new Ar
menia, but also between Sivas and
Diabekr affects regions which have
hitherto been regarded as belonging to
any Armenian state. which might be
created.
| Thus. if the United States undertook
| an Armenian mandate, it would find
itself at once called upon to insist
upon French evacuation of Armenian
lands, and, if it accepted Armenian
l claims to Adana and the Cilician