The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1919-08-19
INTERPRETING

training Is to be until we have peace
not only, but until we know how
peace is to be sustained, whether by
the arms of single nations or by the
concert Of all the great peoples. And
there is more than that difficulty in
volved The vast surplus properties of
the army include not food and cloth
ing merely, whose sale will affect nor
NAL production, but great manufacture
ing establishments also which should
be restored to their former uses, great
stores of machine tools, and all sorts
of merchandise which must lie idle un-
til peace and military policy are def
nitely determined. By the same tok-
en- there can be no properly studied
national budget until then.
other Nations Busy
The nations that ratify the treaty,
such as Great Britain, Belgium and
France, will be in a position to lay
their plans for controlling the markets
of central Europe without co-opera-
ton from US, if we do not presently
act. We have no consular agents, no
trade representatives there to look
after our interests.
There are large areas Of Europe
whose future will lie uncertain and
questionable until their people know
the final settlements of peace and the
forces which are to administer and
sustain it.
Without determinate markets our
production cannot proceed with intelli-
gence or confidence. There can be no
sterilization of wages because there
can be no settled conditions of en-
ployment. There can be no easy or
normal Industrial credits, because
there can be no confident or perman-
ent rivival of business.
But will not weary you with obvi.
Gus examples. I will only venture to
repeat that every element of normal
life amongst us depends upon and a
waits the ratification of the treaty of
peace: and also that we cannot afford
to lose single summers day by not
doing all that we can to mitigate the
winters suffering which, unless we
find means to prevent it, may prove
disastrous to large portion of the
world, and may, at its worst, bring
upon Europe conditions even more
terrible than those wrought by the
war itself.
Article X is in no respect of doubtful
meaning when read in the light of
the covenant as a whole. The council
of the league can only advise on
the means by which the obligations of
that great article are to be given eff.
feet to. Unless the United States is
party TO the policy or action in
question, her own affirmative vote in
the council is necessary before any
advice can be given, for a unanimous
vote Of the council is required. If she
| is party, the trouble is hers anyhow
and the unanimous vote Of the council
! is only advice in any case. Each gov
eminent is free to reject 1t if ii
pleases Nothing could have been
more clear to the conference than the
right of our congress under our con
stitution to exercise it's Independent
/ judgment in all matters Of peace and
war. No attempt was made to ques
ton the limit of that right.
The United States will, indeed, I'm
dertake Article 10 to respect anc
preserve as against external aggres
listing political independence of al
gagement constitutes very grave anc
solemn moral obligation. But it is {
moral not a legal obligation, anc
to put it's own Interpretation upon i
in all cases that call for action. 1t i:
binding in conscience only, not in law
Backbone Of Covenant.
Article X seems to me to constitute
the very backbone Of the whole cove
nant. Without it the league would be
hardly more than an Influential de
batting society.
"a o
in public debate and In private confer
ence, that interpretations Of the sense
in which the United States accepts
the engagements Of the covenan
should be embodied in the instrument
of ratification. There can be no rea
sonable objection to such interpreta
tons accompanying the act of ratifica
ton provided they do not form a par
of the formal ratification itself
Most of the interpretations which
have been suggested to me embed,
what seems to me the plain meaning
Of the instrument itself But if suci
interpretations should constitute ;
part Of the formal resolution of rati
fication long delays would be the in
evitable consequence. inasmuch as al
the many governments concerned
would have to accept. in effect, tn,
language of the senate as the Ian
guage Of the treaty before ratification
would be complete.
The assent Of the German essembl,
at Weimar would have to be obtained
among the rest, and I must frank,
say that I could only with the creates
reluctance approach that assembl.
for permission to read the treaty as W.
understand 1t and as those who framed
1t quite certainly understood it.
Others Would Follow
II the United States were to qualif
the document in any way. moreover