The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-09-13

bout Ypres and Arras, in front of the st., as far as Verdun; the weakest part l of that town the enemy line had been That was difficult if it was being con- ducted by one group only; every in- tervention was only too apt to become mere interference from above. It was desirable to make the fullest possible use of the resources of the group of the German corwn prince, and this was facilitated by the organization adopted
 Moreover it was n personal satis- faction to the field marshal and my self. since the strategicaI situation re- qufred it. that his imperial highness the crown prince, would take part in the first great offensive battle in the west. Though profoundly loyal to my king, I am an independent mar and no quOrtier.
 FEINTS BY OTHER ARMIES
 The possibility of broadening the at tack on the north towards Arras and on the south towards the left bank Of the Disc, was anticipated.
 Feints and preparations for further attack were made:
 Between Ypres and Lens. by the group of Crown Prince Rupprecht;
 By the German crown prince proun. particularly between Rheims and the Argonne;
 By the newly formed group of von Gallwitz, on the old battlefields of Yer dun;
 By the group of Duke Albrecht, be- tween Saarburg in Lorraine and Ste Marie aux Mines and also in the Sund gau (upper Alsace).
 The group of General von Gallwitz was formed because that of the Ger man crown prince had now been ex- tended towards St. Quentin, and could no longer properly attend to affairs at Verdun as well. General von Gall witz was in immediate command of his own Third army, as well as army detachment "C."
 The headquarters of the German southern army in Galicia. under Gen. eral von Bothmer, joined the army group of Duke Albrecht, and was put Tn the line in Lorraine as the Nine teenth army headquarters; the chief of the staff was Cononel von Hemmer, who had alrady greatly distinguished him. self in similar position in the east.
 A army headquarters took over the sector Saarburg-St. Marieaux- Mines
 ARRANGED FOR EXPERIMENTS
 All fronts maintained their defensive arrangements in case the enemy should
 
 intended to retire in that case
 Work had been carried on along these lines according to programme and with the greatest devotion from the middle or January. By the beginning of Feb ruary the attack was fixed to com mence on March 21, although the situa- tfOn in the east was still quiet obscure The military situation. however, made decision imperative. Later on we could always make changes. but we would be unable to make fresh start.
 The work of the army headquarters. the quartermaster general, the intend ant general, the director of railways ana the officers of my immediate staff all fitted in admirably. I was able to satisfy myself of that when I visited the front. On these occasions I discussed all relevant questions, adjusted diffi- culties and helped.
 The chiefs of the staff at the army ana group headquaiter gave me short verbal reports on the ground. the dis tribution of the troops, the artillery combat and the state of the prepara- tons. In my remarks I laid the great est stress on the cooperation between the inner wings of the Seventeenth and second armies of Crown Prince Rup- prechts group, so as to ensure the Cambrai re-entrant being cut off as So much depended upon it. and it seemed tc me that the Seventeenth ar my was beginning to 'cok to the west little to soon.
 FITTED LIKE CLOCK WORK
 we discussed the cooperation Of the two army groups on the boundary be tween the Second and the Eighteenth armies. The preparations were carried out as intended. Work was carried on everywhere with confidence and with out losing sight of the object All ar engagements fitted in like clockwork. It was certain that the armies would be ready for battle on the day.
 I considered it necessary to take ad- vantage of such success as we might obtain in order to strenxthen the enc- my's inclination to peace by means of propaganda. Colonel von Haeften had drawn up . memoir the subject, which sent to the imperial chancellor, who apparently passed it to the foreign 1 office. Nothing of importance was done.
 The imperial chancellor was perfectly 1 acquainted with our intention of at- | tacking in the west. It was the reason why we insisted on the diplomatic ne- gotiations in the east being accelerated. l and why we had decided to denounce l the armistice with Russia. He knew the enormous importance we attached to 1 this offensive. Further. had him in- formed of the date it was to begin.
 Germany could only make the ene- my inclined to peace by fighting. It was first of all necessary to shake the i, position of Lloyd George and Clem- 1 enceau by a military victory. Be- | fore that was done peace was not tc | be thought of. All the world, includ- | ing the entente, knew we were going to attack in the west Clemenceau | declared himself decisively, think on | the 9th of March, in favor of continu- ] ing the war in spite of events in the I east and in spite of our imminent at- tack.
 At that moment could not possibly