The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-09-23

iety concerning the Eighteenth army and the right wing of the Ninth Con the south flank of the Amiens pocket) The enemy could not attack every where
 July 19 was critical day, but 1t passed fairly satisfactorily.
 In the neighborhood of Soissons the enemy made no appreciable progress. Further south, it is true, he crossed the Solssons-Hartennes road, but toward evening he was thrown back by a mighty massed attack of the Twentieth infantry division. This saved the sit uation there. Southwest of Hartennes the enemy gained more ground, but was unable to achieve anything decisive.
 American attacks in the south, in the direction of Chateau-Thierry, broke down, as on the previous day Enemy attacks south of the Marne be- tween the Marne and the Ardre. col lapsed again and again. Local fight ing took place in Champagne also On the whole, the situation was much more favorable Even the rem nants of the troops who had allowed themselves to be surprised on the 18th had generally speaking. recovered and fought well on the 18th.
 On the 20th the Fifth infantry divi- SlOn WOulu De dNdllaDle southwest or Soissons and the new divisions in line on the Ourcq.
 EXPLAINS FOCH'S SURPRISE
 I inquired into the reasons for our failure on the 1/h. ThLs men no longer believed in the possibility of an att tack. divisional commander with whom 1 was acquainted told me that he had been to the front lines on the 17th, and had seen not the slightest sign of activity on the part of the en- emy.
 As a matter of fact, the French troops only received the order to at tack few hours before they came up. Information which was coming through to our lines until immediately before the battle began no longer reached us.
 The rapid movement of the numer- ous fast tankD in the .high-standing corn increased the effect of the sur prise. To all this must be added the diminished strength of the divisions, the result partly of influenza and partly of the monotonous diet. In the sector into which the two weak divi- sions had been put there had been somewhat of luIl nfter the earlier battles. All these things helped to beighten the effect of the enemy sur prise. When it had worn off on the 10th the troops held well.
 The fact that particular divisions had not yet distributed their artillery in depth was of the greatest significance. Once more they were too intent on fol- lowing up the attack. This was very laudable in its way, but tactically un- sound in their position.
 The result of the surprise had been an over-hasty throwing in of reserves,
 WITHDRAWS OVER MARINE
 The battle between the Aisne and | l. ! so the left wing of the Ninth army south of the Aisne. was again put under the command of the Seventh
 At the points of greatest pressure south of SoiSSons and southwest of Rheims, we were, on the whole, sue cessful in repulsing, on the goth and 21st, strong enemy massed attacks. in which tanks were again employed in large numbers.
 The withdrawal of the troops south of the Marne to the northern bank took place during the night of the 20th-21st and was effected in exam plary order. The fact that the French had not attacked here on the goth helped considerably. Their thrust early on the 21st found everything all ready evacuated.
 Following the withdrawal of the Ger man troops from the south to the north bank of the Marne, we straight ened our lines between the Ourcq and the Marne and between the Marne ana the Ardre, to secure local improvements in our positions.
 On the 22d there was a Hull in the fighting. The enemy thrust was definitely held up. The crisis had ter minated in our favor. G. H. Q. was at this time faced with momentous de- cisions.
 The situation of the Seventh army in the Marne salient wns grave, not only on account of the unfavOrabIe shape of the front, but also because of the communications. Transport movement between the Aisne and the Vesle val leys had been rendered unsafe. The railway curve east of Soissons was ex- posed to the effective fire of long range guns. The line in course of construc- tion at high pressure further to the east was not yet ready and was in any case only makeshift. The other means of communication were useless for moving troops. NEW TROOPS COME UP TIRED
 Achievements for the Seventh army had therefore to be detrained in the Aisne valley or further north, and so were tired even before they reached the front. The necessity for continued