Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-26

lawn mower, Whlcn snould pc even
the difficulties of our winter fighting,
with all their attendant inconveni-
ences. We're only too firmly impressed
on my memory. After the attack of
the Sth army. the army's reserves of
fuel had run out, and We felt the
shortage keenly. Oil was needed for
the Ukraine railways also.
The director of railways had to
solve the problem of tank ships.
was highly Disguised when the Boil
shevists, simply in order to injure us,
sank the Elbruz. the largest tank
steamer in the Black sea. at Novoros-
siisk.
The crucial question, of course was
how we were to get to Baku. Here,
again, consideration for the soviet gov
eminent prevented us from acting
firmly or rapidly. and the first event
of Importance was that the English
from Enseli crossed the Caspian sea
at the beginning Of August and took
possession of the town
Their occupation of Baku, which
was only rendered possible by the
complete inactivity of the Turks in
North Persia. was serious blow to
us. BY this move the English also
came into closer. touch with the volun-
teer army in the Kuban district, but,
on the other hand, at Baku they were
within our reach.
Ar attack upon them, involving
only a small force. seemed possible,
CHIC. set about preparing blow
against them, with the cooperation
of Nuri'S troops, and sent brigade
of cavalry and a few battallons 10
Tiflis. The question of the transport
of troops had not yet been settled'
when the situation IN BulRar!a com"
PEELED us to SEND the troops 10 hu-
mania.
mo Napoiconlc Dreams.
In the east l went only so iar as
in my view was apsolutely de1lahueu
by our military posltlon ana ecohofllc
needs. ! had no Napoleonle dreams
of world conquest. Inc ANXIOUS strug,
gle in which was so deeply ehsaseu
left me no time to pursue fantastlc
schemes.
/ wanted no territory IN the Ukraine
or Caucasus; my only op1ect was 70
procure the supplies that were 50
urgently needed for our pare main
tenance and the prosecution OF the
war. j hoped also, now that we naa
succeeded in breaking the plockaue
at this point, to improve our economic
position, and thus to raise our phNsi-
cal strength and morale
| wished to make what use was
possible of the man-poWer OF tnese
districts, partly by direct recruiting,
but on larger scale, and with greater
prospect of success. through enllstlng
In hnr for DlOVmpnt in GERMANY, SO
as to release men for the front l
pursued this course in all parts or
the east, and had hoped even OF op-
tanning direct recruits from the Ger
man population there,
We did not, however. work quickly
enough. The Sth army, at Riga, com
planned that the ministry OF war, IN
spite of all my persistence. had falled
to give any instructions in the matter.
1t was only to protect ana roster
German kultur that | went beyond
immediate military requirements ana
thought of the future. That dld not
involve any expenditure or military
strength. | wanted TO strengthen ana
consolidate German national spirit,
and thus increase its influence. some
of my acquaintances had placed sub
stantial sum of money at my disposal
for this end. I used it to support the
German national press in Austria.
I steadily furthered my pet scheme
of settling the isolated Germans scat
tered throughout Russia. side by side
with our soldiers in the eastern dis
tricts. In this matter | made myself
the advocate of Germanism against
the government. I rejected as fantas-
tic. however, such proposals as the
foundation of a German colonial state
on the Black sea.
Fail to Coerce Austria.
No progress had been made with
the solution of the Polish problem.
The Emperor Charles attitude varied
from time to time. Baron Burian, the
successor of Count Czernin, adhered
to the Austro- Polish solution (Which
involved an Austrian king for Poland)
Our government was still in the posi-
ton of not knowing its own mind,
1t was as uncertain on this point as
in the rest of It's eastern policy.
for al uac nnt fuEnn Tho TD1npr0r