Imperial Valley press., 1919-04-18

lSCllUlHutu IIO11l d ITGNIOuS lSSIp1
Administrative Functions OF the
Council.
The remaining functions Of the Ex-
ecutive Council are of a somewhat
routine character 1t regulates j is
own procedure Cart. IV), chooses
the secretary general, whose duties
are clerical Cart. W; apparently it
supervises the trade in arms with the
countries in which the control of the
traffic is necessary in the common
interest Cart. XVIID; appoints bu-
reaus and committees with advisory
powers (Arts. TX, XIX, ky; and is
to control international administra-
tive bureaus, such as that of the
Postal Union and the many others
that have since been established for
common convenience Cart. XXID.
The Body of Delegates.
The functions of the Body of Dele
gates are still less extensive, con-
sisting almost entirely of the discus
sion of matters within the sphere of
action Of the League. The only cases
apart from the regulation of it's
own pfocedure-where it is given
power to mack binding decisions, are
the selection of the four countries,
which, in addition to the five chief
powers, are to have seats in the
Executive Council; and the case
where matter in dispute between
two states is referred to the body
for inquiry, in which case its recon-
mendation has the same effect as if
made by the Executive Council.
The Nature of the League.
This analysis of the plan for a
League set forth in the Covenant
cf Paris shows how closely it re-
sembles the sketch of the minimum
essentials of such a League in the
opening of this address. 1t shows
also that the fear of super-sover
eign body, to which we are asked to
sacrifice our independence, is the
creation of an overheated magma
ton. If we assume that the Cove
nant means what it says, and not
something wholly different, no organ
of the League has any authority to
give commands to this country that
need give US moments anxiety. The
only substantial powers that any
such body is to possess, beyond maxi
ing recommendations which we may
follow or not as we think right, are
derived from a unanimous decision
IN an international dispute, and from
the right to forbid an increase in ar
maments or to direct the duties of
a mandate in case we first agree to
the reduction of armaments, or to
the assumption of the mandate.
1t is sometimes asked, if the au-
thority of the organs of the League
is so insignificant, where is its eff
ficiency in preventing war? The an
swer is that it lies in the obligations
assumed under the Covenant direct
ly by, the several members of the
League; and this is both the most
effective and least adventurous meth
cd of preventing way. There are in
fact two possible forms of League
for this purpose.
And, mind you, let me say here,
that | am not in the least concerned
with, and take no interest in, the
question whose plan this is. | do |
not care a rush whether this plan was
drawn up by a citizen of the. United |
States OF of England or of France
or of Spain or of Japan or of Italy, |
or anyone else. The question is, |
is it a good plan for US to adopt? |
think that we merely befog the
issue 'and raise passion by asking
whose plan it was.
In the plan projected in the Cove
nant, the obligations of the members
are precisely defined, and their treaty
rights and duties arise automatically |
on the outbreak OF war-any other
action recommended after consulta-
tion being voluntary.
The other form of League to pre-
vent war would be one where the
members should agree to comply with
the directions Of some international
body, and in that case the obligation
of the members to act would not