Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-06-15
PART AMERICA PLAYED
AT CHATEAU THIERRY
Erroneous Views Corrected Better Esti-
mate of Value of Operations Pos
sible Year After Campaign

of the whole Chateau Thicrry salient
inevitable. As the German retreat be-
gan other American divisions were
brought into action. The AID (Rainbow)
Division, which had shared in the sue
cessful defense of the line east of
Rheims, replaced the Goth Division. The
2Sth relieved the French division and
the 3lst relieved the Sd. Finally the
18th came into action when the general
retreat had reached the Nesle very
| early in August. just as the operation
came to a standstill. This is the fourth
phase of Chateau Thierry.
IL remains now to estimate accurately
the value of the American participation.
II will he seen ut the outset that
Chateau Thierry itself is very mis-
leading name. unless one applies IL to
the whole salient between the Aisne and
, the Marine. created by the German VIC
tory on the Chemin des Danes OF Nav
"a, since, save for the action OF the Sd
Division through its machine-gun de-
tachment on June l, no fighting took
place in the immediate vicinity of
Chateau Thierry itself. The fighting of
the I'd Division in and about Belleau
wood was six or eight miles away from
Chateau Thierry. while Foch's main
f., thrust in his great counter offensive
took place nearly thirty miles north OF
Chateau ThieIry. on the eastern edge Of
The forest of Nillers Cotterets
When the I'd and Sd Divisions arrived.
1 on June ]. the great German advance
was almost at an end. The victorious
F., Germans had been advancing for six
days They had outrun their artillery
and their supplies. The best proof that
the advance was about at an end r.
found in the fact that the Americans
were never attacked on the lines they
took up. save the Sd Division par
t'cipated in the general German Often
Sive six weeks later.
1t is therefore inaccurate fo assert
that the intervention of the I'd Division
| on the Chateau Thierry road or the Sd
Division south of Chateau Thierry saved
Paris, stopped the great German drive
or did more at the moment than TO sup
port and to relieve the exhausted French
divisions and conceivably halt the Ger
mans a mile or two short of the position
they might have reached before they
were compelled to abandon their adj
vance.
! Belleau Wood Action Brilliant.
OF the fighting at Belleau wood, the
truth is that ii was brilliant, magnih-
cent, but a highly localized affair, in
which the marines and the 9th and 21st
Infantry gave a splendid indication OF
the fighting qualities Of our new troops.
The capture OF Belleau wood did not
materially change the situation. nor did
1t supply a vantage point of any par
ticular value in the later offensive.
Seen as a local engagement fought for
limited objective. it possesses merit
which should make Beleau wood and
the villages of Bouresches and Naux
places CT American pilgrimage for many
years. The best proof of the intensity
of the fighting is shown by the fact that
the I'd Division lost 1850 killed, S,22s
wounded and eSS missing-that is. nearly
10000 out of fighting strength of about
%. 000-in six weeks. 1t is glorious page
in American military history, this
Belleau wood engagement. but il Is easy
TO exaggerate its relative Importance. ?
| OF the contribution Of the Sd Division
south of the Marine. it is sufficient to-
say that it was useful addition to the
general resistance of the allies, but Ii
was itself detail in secondary circum-,
stance of the enormous battle. The
German success or failure in the whole
operation depended upon breaking the
French line between Rheims and the
Argonne. French resistance was predi-
| Gated on defeating this attack. The
French were prepared to give up more
/ ground than they did south of the Marine
| if necessary. After the German defeat
+, between Rheims and the Argonne the
great counter offensive OF July IS
promptly forced a German retreat south
of the Marine.
1t remains to consider the fourth,
phase-that of July 1S-ann the share of
the Americans in this turning point OF
the campaign and of the war On this
score We may say at once that no Of
fensive would have been possible hads
American troops not been available.
since Foch had no other reserve. We
may say also that he would probably
not have risked this great gamble even
with American troops had they not al
ready in previous fighting at the
Chateau Thierry salient revealed quail
ties which gave him confidence in Them
which was not mistaken. In the counter
offensive more French than American
troops were used. and it developed
British and Italian troops also were
used but many of the French troops
which were employed, particularly in
the first days, could not have been put
in had not the American troops replaced
them in other sectors of the front. =
Americas Two Contributions.
We did two things. then. We sup
piled Foch with a strategic reserve
which enabled him to make his great
counter offensive. both by contributing
four divisions to that attack and by
releasing French divisions whose places
were taken by other divisions of the re-
serve.
In that attack the LIST and Cd Divisions.
fighting on either side of the French.
Moroccan division. the best shock un:t
of the French army, surpassed all eN--
Il
southwest of scissors out of the forest
of Viliers. Cotteret the Germans were
competed to abandon the Chateau
Thierry salient, they lost the initiative,
which they never recovered during the
war and they began the retrosrade
movement which carried them to The
French frontier before the arsntst!ce,
and was stifi Il; progress then.
To sum up. Chateau Thierry. SO FAR
as it WAS q decisive phase Of the war,
h.a n
began on July is and ended In the first ,
days of August, when the Germans had
retired behind the Velse In the opening
phases of this battle four American d.
visions, the LIST, the I'd. the Sd and the
42d, had already played useful parts IN
the defeat Of the German offensive of
July Is. Three more divisions. the 2Sth. +,
the 32d and at the end the 18th, were
used. These nine American divisions. .
amounting to something more than
200. 900 men. gave decisive weight to
Foch's supreme stroke. They fought
under French army and corps COM (
manders. tine strategy was French, bus
without them there could have been nos
offensive. and had they not fought mag.
the offensive might have.
failed 10.
have found in France, as in America,
4 general notion that in some fashion ors'
other the marines saved Paris in the.
June fighting in the Belleau wood en-
eageInent. generally described as the, :
battle OF Chateau Thierry. Already
and Chateau Thierry under the impress. :
sion tina. on this ground American
troops saved Paris and the WAL.
This is the legend of Chateau Thlerry.,.
It finds no support either in tie records
nor in the opinions ~ Americans in :
high command. On the other hand.
have found a general lack of apprecia-
ton of the really stupendous and de-.