The Lamar register., 1919-12-31

side OF the allies. undertook promls-
Ing offensive against Austria. The Brit
lsh and French armies attacked along
the Somme. Germany quickly returned
TO the defensive in the west. and in
September Initiated a campaign In the
east which. before the close of 1915,
proved unfortunate for Russia as well
as Roumania.
Spring Of 1s17-Retaining on the
eastern front the forces considered
sufficient for the tnal conquest Of Rus
sia, Germany prepared to aid Austria
In an offensive against Italy. Mean
while the Russian revolution was well
under way. and by the midsummer
Of 1917 the final collapse of that gov
srnment was almost certain.
The relatively low strength of the
German fore on the western front
led the allies. with much confidence,
to attempt a decision on this front
but the losses were very heavy and
the effort signally failed. The failure
caused q serious reaction. especially
on French morale. both in the army
and throughout the country. and at
tempts TO carry out extensive or com
bined operations were indefinitely sus-
pended.
Sank Millions Of Tons.
In the hve months ending June 30
German submarines had accomplished
the destruction OF more than 3,25O.OOO
tons of allied shipping. During three
years Germany had seen practically all
her ofYensives except verdun crowned
with success. Her battle lines were
held On foreign soil and she had with
Marne. The German general stan
could now foresee the complete elm
ination OF Russia, the possibility OF de-
feating Italy before the end OF the
year and. finally. the campaign of 1918
against the French und British on the
western front which might terminate
the war
II cannot be said that German hopes
Of final Victory were extravagant.
either as viewed at that time or as
viewed In the light Of history. Finan-
clal problems OF the allies were diff
cult. supplies were becoming exhaust.
ed md their armies had suffered tire
mendous losses. Dlscourngement eX-
listed not only among the civil popula-
tion but throughout the armies as well.
Such was the allied morale that.
although their superiority on the west
ern front during the last half Of 1916
and during 1917 amounted to 20 per
cent. only local attacks could be under
taken. and their effect proved wholly
insufficient against the German de-
tense. Allied resources In man power
at home were low and there was little
prospect Of materially increasing their
armed strength. even in the face Of the
probability Of having practically the
whole military strength OF the Central
Powers against them in the spring Of
1918
This was the state Of affairs that OK.
listed when we entered the war. While
our action gave the allies much eucour-
ngemeui. get this was temporary. and
81 review nf conditions made 1t appar
eni thnt America must make supreme
material effort a. soon rs possible.
After duly considering the tonnage pos
sihilitieS ! cahled the following tn
Washington nn July &. 1917:
'rlans should contemplate sending
over ~ least 1,OOO00o men 10y next
May" general organization project.
covering as far ~ possible the person
mel or all combat. staT and admins
trative units. was forwarded tp Wash
Ington on July II. In this stated:
Needed ,ooo, 900 Men.
1T is evident that force OF about
100000 is the smallest unit which in
modern war will he a complete, we'll
balanced and independent fighting nr-
ganization. However. II must be
equally clear that the adoption Of this
size force as basis of study should
not be construed as representing the
maximum force which should be sent
to or which will be pssded In France.