Rock Island Argus. (Rock Island, Ill.) 1893-1920, 1919-10-29


the legislative and executive
branches of a sovereign nation.
Do Not Want to Interfere.
They do not want to be burdened
by a transference OF sovereignty.
They do not wish to establish any
precedent whereby it might be as
sumed that foreign governments
can dictate Just how any nation
shall choose its representatives In
the League of Nations. They do
not want to be involved in any con-
stitutional controversy that may
arise as to the power Of the presi-
dent Of the United States under the
constitution to conduct the foreign
relations of the United States or
the power of the congress by an
act Of ratification to insist that
both houses of congress instead OF
the senate alone must approve OF
presidential appointments to a
league of nations.
Can Not Reverse Stand.
As to the reservation, moreover,
which would place the United
States on record as Withholding its
assent to those provisions OF the
ueace treaty that relate TO the
Shantung settlement, the attitude
of Japan for instance can well be
understood. She could not accept
a reservation affirming the rlght oil
the United States to withhold Is
assent without being placed in the
position OF condemning the settle
men. herself. Similarly, France,
Great Britain and Italy signed
treaties with Japan pledging them
selves to support her views on
Shantung and those countries have
already through their parliaments
formally given their assent to the
Shantung settlement. They could
not reverse themselves.
On the other hand, If the foreign
governments we're not required TO
express themselves formally as ac-
cepting or rejecting the reserva-
tons proposed by the United States
senate. it would be possible for
America to withhold her asset
while Great Britain, France and
Italy and even Japan made no COM
ment whatsoever, thus leaving the
United States free to bring the
matter up in future meetings 81
league of nations without embar-
rassment.
Don't Want In L. s. Dispute.
Foreign governments plainly do
not wish to become involved in
American political controversies.
They are fully informed from day
to day concerning the contest going
on in the American senate and thev
- 1rvfea IL
ing in public that could be con
strued as leaning toward the eXecu-
tive or legislative branches OF the
government of the United States.
Hardly any of them, for instance,
would object to reservation spe-
cifcly stating what the Monroe
Doctrine is or how it should be APP
piled. They recognize it is an
American doctrine and therefore as
capable of Interpretation only by
the United States but they would
not in advance commit themselves
to an absolute acceptance of any
Interpretation whatsoever which
may hereafter be expressed by the
United States That, they say,
would be signing a blank check.
They. too, must hold themselves
free to accept or reject in diplo-
matte controversies that might
arise from any extension by the
United States government of its
powers over other sovereign gov
ernments who may be members OF
the league, il such an extension is
an exaggerated notion of what the
Monroe Doctrine originally con-
n
stood as meaning.
Fear ReOpenlng of Treaty.
Foreign governments will accept
some reservations but they would
prefer that America in ratifying the
treaty refrain from asking the
powers to approve her points spe-
officially. They fear that the door
might be opened to reservations
sought in their own countries
where the treaty has already been
ratified but where opposition pa
ties would seibe the opportunity to
reopen the whole business. Ameri-
can reservations if modified in
scope and IL stripped of the pre-
ambIe requiring direct assent by
the principal powers will be the
subject of exchanges between the
principal powers, but they would
under such circumstances voice
any disapproval, but would tacitly
accept the senate reservations Dy
the act of receiving the United
States into the League of Nations
and by an exchange of Publications
which would mean that they legally
held that the United States had