The daily Alaska citizen., 1919-11-01

arc on a parity in one rc~pcrt-born ar, isolated from the main body of continents United States and must be served in oo.., or in war. by steamships.
 This conclusion. of course. is based m inc assumption that Canada would remain neutral. and in this connection, the Time. wishes to say it discusses this matter as of course does General McAndrcv. aca- demicalIy and without reference to any thing save the relative importance of tn, the two bases from military and uara viewpoint.
 Alaska has this advantage, however while considering the question of i,oIa, tion-m enemy fleet could render n Amer icm army in the Hawaiian Islands helpless without firing a shot merely by command ing its communications with the Pacific coast. Moreover, were hostile forces laud ed on the island, these troops could be very effectively backed up by the guns of the enemy fleet.
 On the other hand, an American division in Alaska operating over ruggcG territory with which 1t was intimately ac quaintcd, and served. if only to q moderate degree, by previously established interior bases, could stand off an army sever" times as large as itself
 Now as to the relative advantages m enemy would obtain thru occupation o' Hawaii and of Alaska.
 An enemy fleet scizing Hawaii would obtain a basc-and little else. Coal an, oil would have to be transported for ii oyer thousands of miles of open sea, the carriers being subject to attack cmouto by AmFri can commerce dcstroyc1s based on Puget Sound and Alaskan points.
 An enemy fleet occupying Aa~u would find at its hand both coal aud oil Unless wells were wrecked and mines flood ed, a very considerable proportion of al fuel required could be obtained in the COG cupied territory"
 Moreover, an enemy force, military ol naval, based on Hawaii always would opcn ate at a disadvantage, because its northcr} lines of communication would be very cIoso to American naval bases on Puget Sound and in Alaska.
 On the other hand, an enemy force .tc |cupying Alaska and procccding thence 'southward would safeguard its lines of sup |ply as it advanced
 In point of fact, the nearer the enemy force approached the coast of contiucut0 United States the greater would be the dc gree of protection afforded its transports
 In order to reach these enemy ship. American naval craft would be compeIIrC to steam far north from San Francisco ol l Hawaii, or, in the case of Puget Sound Would have to cut their way thru the foes fighting fleet in order to reach them,
 Reversing the picture, it must be ap parent that no American commander, mili tary or naval, would base his operations ol Hawaii if in position to utilize Alaska fo Operations in the North Pacific.
 The whole theory of American maya strategy is to obtain close contact with tht enemy in the shortest possible space of time and maintain it constantly. No American admiral would place several hundred ad ditional miles between himself and a foe by retreating to Hawaii so long as he could !depend upon bases in Alaska and on Puge Sound.
 Similarly, no general commanding al |expeditionary force would expose his troop ships to added danger of attack by sending them on needlessly long voyage across the