The Lamar register., 1919-12-31

htauVudftefS al BOinDOn. uuIIuS Which
all our cofubatsnt forces were placed
al his disposal The acceptance of
this offer meant the dispersion of our
troops along the allied front and q
consequent delay In building up n dis
tinctive American force in Lorraine,
but the serious situation of the allies
demanded this divergence from our
plans.
on March 81 approximately 100000
American troops had reached France
Four combat divisions. equivalent in
strength To eight French or British
divisions. were available.
Took cantisny Heights.
On April % the First division re
iIeved two French divisions on the
front near Montdider and on May 2s
captured the important observation
stations ON the heights of Cantigny
with splendid dash. French artillery
aviation. tanks and flame ihrowers
aided in the attack. but most of this
French assistance was withdrawn he
fore the completion OF the operation
in order to meet the enemy's new Of
fenslve launched May 81 TO Chateau
Thierry. The enemy reaction against
our troops at Cantigny was extremely
violent. and apparently he was deter
mined at all costs to cOuntersct the
most excellent effect the American
success had produced For three days
his guns of all callbers We're concen-
truted on our position and counter
a-tack succeeded cOunter-attack. The
desperate efforts of the Germans gave
the lighting AT Cantigny seeming
tactical Importance entirely out of
proportion to the numbers Involved.
The third German offensive. OH May
%. againsr the French on the A sne
soon developed II desperate situation
for the allies. The Second division
was hastily diverted to the vicinity OF
Meaux on May 81. and early on the
morning Of June was deployed
across the Chateau-Thierry-P road
near Montreuil-aux-Lions in u gap In
the French line. where II stopped the
German advance on Paris. At the
same time the partially trained Third
division WAS placed at French dis
posal to hold the crossings Of the
Marne, and its motorized machine-gun
battalion succeeded In reaching Cha
teau Thierry In time to assist In sue
defending that river cross
ing.
The enemy having been halted. the
Second division commenced q series
of vigorous attacks on June 4 which
resulted In the capture OF Belleau
woods after very severe fighting. The
OF Bouresches was taken soon
after. and on July ! vaux was cap
tured In these operations the Sec
ond division met with most desperate
resistance by Germnny's best troops.
our Second corps. under Mai. Gen.
George w Read. had been organized
for the command OF the ten divisions
with the British. which were held
back In training areas or assigned to
secOnd-lIne defenses. After consulta-
ton with Field Marshal Haig on June
3 Ave American divisions were re-
lieved from the British area TO sup
port the French.
The Marne salient was inherently
weak and offered an opportunity for
y counter-offenslve that was obvious
r. successful such an operation would
nfTord Immediate relief 10 rhe allied
defense would remove the threat
against Paris and free the Paris
Nancy railroad. But. more Important
fhnn all else Il would restore the mo
rate Of the allies and remove the pro-
found depression and fear then exist
Ing
I'p to this time our units had been
put in here and there st critical points
~ emergency troops to stop th.- ter
rifle German advance. In every trial
ou the defensive or Offensive.
they had proved themselves equal 10
any troops in Europe. A. early ss
June %. and again on July 10 al Bonn
bon had very strongly urged that
p,ir hest divisions he concentrated
under American command. II possible
for use ms a striking force against
he Marine salient. Although the pre-
sniiiur view among the allies was
It"' Nrierlcan units wer" suitnhlr
,r:ly FOR the defensive, and that at all
events they could be used to better
advantage under allied command. the
was accepted in principle.
and my estimate OF their offensive
lighting qualities was soon put to the
est.
The enemy had encouraged his SOL
liers to believe that the July l5 at