New-York tribune., 1919-10-04
What the Fall Votes Mean

The votes on the Fall amendments
dispose of the theory that the peace
treaty can be ratified as it stands. These
amendments, as we pointed out yester-
day, were open to the objection that they
were too rigidly drawn and left the
United States no latitude whatever in
participating in the work Of the vari-
Gus referendum, boundary, river inter
naturalization and other minor peace
commissions. They were also subject to
the criticism that, as textual changes,
they would have to be subipitted for ap-
proval to all the signatory powers
The purpose of the amendments can be
much better accomplished through a
reservation retaining to the United
States the right to withdraw at discre-
tlon from the labors Of these commits
sions.
A number of Senator's who voted in
the negative yesterday announced that
they would support a reservation of that
kind. And the minimum vote cast for
any of the Fall amendments was more
than a third of the quorum voting. This
shows concusively that the opponents
of unconditional ratification are strong
enough to force notifications, if the
treaty is not to fail.
1t is apparent that the Sign here"
campaign has broken down. The Senate
knows this If they were left to them
selves the Senators could easily reach a
compromise acceptable to a tw0-thirds
majority. There are enough votes in
sight now to pass five, six or possibly
seven reservations which will thorough
ly AmerlcaniZe the league covenant and
will also record the American attitude
toward the Shantung settlement. And
after these reservations are attached.
probably four-hfths Of the Senate will
vote for the treaty.
1t is now the part of sensible states
manship to work for an agreement of
this sort. On the Democratic side of
the Senate there are perhaps fifteen or
seventeen unconditional ratficationists
There are a few Republicans who would
be glad to see the treaty rejected
whether it is modified or not. But the
great majority, composed of both Demo-
Gratis and Republicans, is convinced that
reservations are inevitable, and will sup
port them, both because they will i'm
prove the contract from our national
point of view and because it is now idle
to talk Of ratification without them.
The President has admitted with re-
gard to three Of the proposed reserva-
tions-those covering withdrawal from
the league, the Monroe Doctrine and
domestic questions-that they do not
conflict with his own Interpretation of
the covenant and the treaty. In the case
OF the reservation to Article X he con-
ceded on August 19 that it harmonized
with his own view Of our legal and moral
obligations, though he said later at Salt
Lake City that it "cuts out the heart Of
the covenant" A reservation as to equal
lty of representation would accord with
the Presidents doctrine that the British
Empire Is and must remain in league
affairs "diplomatic unit" A reserva-
ton on Shantung would express the be-
lief OF the United States that full SOW
erelgnty over and control of the penin-
sula and its ports and railroads ought
to revert to China. A reservation on our
participation in the work Of the German
peace commissions would only regular
lze the action Of our government if it
should at any time decide to let that
participatlOn lanSe
These reservations, to become effective,
would not have to be submitted to all
the slgnatory powers The United States
would undoubtedly be satisfied if Great
Britain, France, Japan and Italv ac-
cepted them. So long as the powers rep
resented permanently on the council
subscribe to Americas Interpretation of
her obligations the assent of the other
powers is unessential. And if it is true
as the advocates Of unconditional rati6-
cation assert, that the nations Of Europe
and Asia would regard the league as
a failure If the United States did not 90
INTO 1T. we are already in a most favor
aDle pOSitOn to enter on our own terms
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