Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-09

dangerous additional strength was
given TO the enemy's numerical SUPER
lorlty tlate in 1870 by the eyer-in-
cfeaslng devotion of their industries to
war purposes. Far reaching restric-
IONS on labor We're passed into law in
entente countries, and accepted with
out serious protest; ample labor force
was available, and there was no short
age of raw material; the output per
man had not fallen and life, in short,
pursued its normal course
The seas of the world were open to
the entente. The United States was
now giving help on the largest scale,
ana breaking new ground. The
technical equipment of the entente
armies grew continually stronger and
more complete, reaching indeed an
unprecedentedly high level. This was
demonstrated with pitiless clarity on
the western front.
In the east too the campaign of 1916
had showed sensible increase in sup
ply, especially in ammunition. Russia
had to some extent established a war
industry of her own, in part in the
Donetz coal basin. and had greatly in
creased her output. Japan was steadily
giving better deliveries With the COM
pletion of the Thurman railway, and
the Improvement of the trans Siberian
line, an increased import from Japan,
America, England and France was
inevitable.
In every theater of war the entente
was able to add to her numerical
superiority an enormous additional
strength in every department of
technical supply. and to destroy our
troops on a still greater scale than had
been achieved on the Somme and at
Verdun.
Much could be done and had to be
done by our industries to increase our
strength. but plainly no little time
would elapse before any arrangements
to this end could be carried into eff
feet 1t was clear that our NUM-
ton factories. in spite of their inn
mense output and, however, many
workmen they might have, would
never be able to overtake the enemy
so long as the enormous industrial
areas of the latter continued to work
undisturbed under what were virtually
peace conditions. In the then cir
cumstances it seemed impossible to
achieve equality of forces.
With our sensible inferiority I'm
numbers and equipment, training for
ueltflsiNt WARFARE. DeCdhle more III
portant. 1t was obvious that our army
must be equipped, organized and
trained to the highest pitch. and
everything possible was done to
achieve this. We knew, however. only
too well that the enemy would soon
adapt himself to our new tactics. and
that our advantage was only tenn
porary.
The supreme army command had
to bear in mind that the enemy's great
superiority in men and material would
be even more painfully felt in 1917
than in 1916. 1t was plainly to be
feared that early in the year "Somme
fighting" would burst out In various
points on our fronts. and that even
our troops would not be able to with
stand such attacks indefinitely. espe-
cially of the enemy gave us no time
for rest and for the accumulation of
material.
Our position was unusually difficult,
and norway of escape was visible. We
could not contemplate an attack our
selves, having to keep our reserves
available for defense There was no
hope of collapse of any of the en-
tente powers. If the war lasted, our
defeat seemed Inevitable
Economically we were in highly
unfavorable position for war of ex-
haustion. There was weakness at
home, Questions Of the supply Of