The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-11-16

+ an extension of the British offensive
toward the north was indicated.
PUZZLED OVER ATTACK
/ Consequently we had to be prepared
to offer a stubborn resistance at any
point along our whole front 1t was
impossible to tell what was going to
happen.
There was no doubt about the con-
| tlnuatlon of the struggle on the Izonzo
front. Trieste was Italys goal At
tacks were more than likely in Mace
donia and on the Vardar, and certain
IN Turkey, Palestine and Bagdad
In the east / anticipated an attack
on the Austro Hungarian troops in the
southern section of the front. sud
den Russian advance in the direction
OF Mittau (near Riga) at the end of
January alarmed both ourselves and the
! -in-chief on the eastern
front. 1t was, however, stemmed by
reserves, which were rapidly brought
up.
| 1t was not yet possible to foresee
when the great offensive would take
place. On the eastern front it was
scarcely to be expected before April.
The big Russian advance in the spring
| of 1915 began in March, and was con-
slderably hampered by the bad weather
and the condition of the ground. 1t
was unlikely that the Russians would
repeat this attempt so early in the
year. 1t was also possible that the
Entente would accordingly postpone
their offensive in the west. The situa-
ton on the Somme, however, was so
tense that we had to be prepared 1,I
an earlier attack
fEASONS FOR GREAT RETREAT
me general situation made it, neces-
Aol US 70 postpone the struggle in
G
10 allow the submarine camnaign 49,
20 produce decisive results Tactioa1
reasons and shortage of ammnnitias,
pios.aed additional reasons for delav
AZ the same time it was necessarv -
shorten our front in order to secure
more favorable grouping of our forces
ana create larger reserves.
In. France and Belgium we bsa *.
alvisions facing 100 divisions, some ~
when were considerably stronger tban
ours' IN view of our extensive front
.his was exceedingly unfayorah1a
palance of forces. Moreover. we had
on certain sectors of our line to en-
70 avoid strong enemy attacks
as long as possible, by preventive go
aaversaries from concentrating sfron
iorces In front of them At the san,e
time we secured positions in wbinh
weaker divisions, wearied by fighting
could be employed
nese representations, taken in close
so,.nso'ion with the opening of the sub
marine campaign. led to the decisjor
to straighten our front by witbdrawina
70 the Sefgfried line DIETER known ?
the Hindenburg line), which was to 10
IN a condition of defense nv the ~
ginning of March. and metbodjcaI1,,
to carry out the work of demolition over
an area Of Is kilometers in breadth
In front of our new positions.
FIVE WEEKS OF DESTRUCTION
Under the rubric "Alberich. the
group OF armies under the Grown
Prince Rupprecht had worked out
programme for the work of clearance
and demolition. which was To be snraad
over fiver'weeks If an attack on the
part OF the enemy made it necessary
we could at any moment interrupt this
programme and begin our retreat.
Our first object was to avoid a battle
our second to effect the salvage Of ali
our raw material of war and technica1
and other equipment that was NOT
actually built into the position. and
'tnally the destruction of all high roads.
0luages towns, and wells, so Is to pre-
vent the enemy establishing himself in
orce in the near future in front OF our
new positions. Poisoning of the wells
was forbidden.
The decision to retreat was not
reached without painful struggle. It |
implied confession of weakness bound !
70 raise the morale OF the enemy and |
io"er our own But as it was neces- /
sary for military reasons we had no |
choice; It had to be carried out
The field-marshal and the Kaiser I
gave their consent. On February the |
order was given to carry out "AIberich"
according to plan. The first Albrich !
day was February g. The retreat was
TO begin on March It, but under enemy |
pressure might start at any EARLIER |
date. This would however, have In
vofved great loss of material. not to