The Lamar register., 1919-12-31

m oHfiSlNt IN ltlS, huu no q u"'' ""'
basis of organization. Plans for the
future should be based. especially In
reference to the manufacture Of artil-
lery. aviation and other material. on
three times this fOrCe--i. e., al least
3.OOOO0O men,
Resolved on an offensive.
Before developing plans for line of
communications II was necessary TO
decide upon the probable sector of the
front for the eveniual employment OF
distinctive American force. our mis-
sion was offensive and II was essential
to make plans for striking the enemy
where definite military decision
could he gained. While the allied
armies had cndeavored to maintain the
offensive, the British, in order TO guard
the channel ports. were committed to
operations in Flanders and the French
to the portion of the front protecting
Paris. Both lacked troops to operate
elsewhere on n large scale.
To the east the great fortified dis
trici east of Verdun and around Metz
menaced central France protected the
most exposed portion of the German
line of communications, that between
Metz and Sedan, and covered the
Brley iron region. from which the en-
emy obtained the greater part Of the
iron required for munitions and ma
terial. The coal fields east of Metz
were also covered by these same de-
fenses. A deep advance east OF Metz.
or the capture of the Briey region. by
threatening the invasion of rich Ger
man territory in the Moselle valley
and the Saar basin. thus curtailing
her supply Of coal or Iron. would have
a decisive effect In forcing with
drawal of German troops from north
ern France. The military and eco
nomic situation OF the enemy, there
fore. indicated Lorraine as the field
promising the most fruitful results for
the employment OF our armies.
The complexity OF trench life had
enormously increased the tonnage OF
supplies required by troops. Not only
was It a question OF providing food.
but enormous quantities OF munitions
and material were needed. Upon the
railroads OF France fell the burden of
meeting the heavy demands OF the
3.5O0.oOO allied combatants then en-
gagged IL the American army WAS to
have an Independent and flexible sys-
ten II could not use the lines behind
the British Belgium front nor those
In rear of the French front covering
Paris.
Chose the Southern Ports.
The problem confronting the Amer
lean expeditionary forces was then TO
slperimpose lis rail coIpmunica tions
ON those of France where there would
be the least possible disturbance 70
the arteries Of supply Of the two great
allied armies already in the field. The
lines selected therefore. were those
leading from the comparatively un-
used South Atlantic ports of France
TO the northeast. where 1t was bellev-
ed the American armies could he EN-
ployed to the best advantage.
For all practical purposes the Amer
lean expeditionary forces were based
on the American continent. Three thou
sand miles Of ocean to cross, with the
growing submarine menace confront
ing us. the quantity OF ship tonnage
that would be available then un-
known. and n line of communications
by land 400 miles long from French
ports to our probable front presented
difficulties that seemed almost insur-
mountable as compared with those OF
our allies.
In providing for the storage and dis
tribution OF reserve supplies an al
lOwance OF 45 days In the base sec
tions was planned, with 30 days In the
intermediate section, and ID days In
the advance section. After the safe
ty OF our sea transport was practical
ly assured. this was reduced TO q total
II As days, distributed proportionste-
ly. When the srmistice was signed all
projects for construction had been
completed and supplies were on hand
10 meet the needs OF 2,OcOOOO men.
while further plans for necessary con-
structlon and for the supply Of an sd-
ditional 100000 were well under
way.
Our Own Fighting Doctrine.
similar scheme was adopted in
August 1917. for our armies, in which
the Importance Of teaching through
out our forces q sound fighting doc
trine OF our own was emphasized. II
provided for troop training In all units