Arizona republican., 1919-01-02

decision, permitted Mir. Johnson to | make a statement explaining his posi- l tion and granted an appeal.
 In submitting the case to the Su- preme court, the defense argued that under the decision of Judge Mechem, the filing of a libel suit during a po lltlcal campaign automatically would stop all further criticism of the pain tiff, under penalty for contempt, and would thus abrogate the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press.
 Attorney General Harry L. Patton, who appeared before the supreme court for the state, held that the pub llcatlon of the article complained of, held Judge Mechem up to contempt and ridicule, and was plainly contempt of court.
 Attorney Makes Statement
 Herbert D. Mason, formerly of New York city, who appeared as special 1 counsel for MT. Johnson before the su preme court, issued the following statement reviewing the courts decl- sion:
 'The decision in the New Mexican | contempt case ought to do much to clear up many points concerning the freedom of the press and the law of contempt of court. It's clear recog- milton of the freedom of the press. guarantees of state and federal con | stltutlons, as contrasted with the con- | tempt power of courts; it's holding that | every construction and presumption l must be made in favor of the good | faith and innocent intent of one who 1 crlticlzes the court: and it's holding | that a judge cannot use contempt | powers to redress private grievances, l furnish some much needed definition of the strict limitations upon the ex- t:rcfse of the contempt powers by courts, as well as some equally needed definition of the rights of citizens to express their opinions concerning the judiciary, under their free press and free speech guarantees
 There has been altogether too much confusion as to the limitations for contempt Jurisdiction. The present decision goes far in clearing this up. While adhering to the rule, that criti- cism calculated to obstruct the course of justice may be punished as for d contempt of court the court holds that cases of constructive contempt are criminal proceedings, and that
 therefore, the information, the au- thority of the court, the weight of the 1 evidence Gncluding all conflicts in presumption and proof), and the ir- | regularity of the proceedings are gov erned by the rules of criminal law The information must be strictly con- Strued as well as the article alleged to be contemptous, and the court further says the defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. the same as a de- fendant in a criminal case. There are no presumptions taken against him, but the presumptions are all in his favor
 Judge Clears Up Law
 This is a wide departure from the attitude of those courts which seem to have presumed that their critics were guilty, and to have thrown upon them the burden of proving the innocence I of their intent. Certainly, in contempt proceedings, where the offended judge sits substantially as accuser, judge and executioner, the rule announced in Judge Holloman's opinion is much more consonant with free press and free speech guarantees.
 The court holds, in addition. that where a publication is not contemptous on its face, the defendants sworn de- nial of contemptous purpose will be taken as conclusive. and the defendant discharged. in the absence of the defin- ite pleading and proof by the state that the publication tended to obstruct jus lce. This is, in effect, a disavowal of the theory of some courts. that judges may convict on their 'intuitive knowledge in such cases, and without pleading and proof of the facts and circumstances relied upon.
 Tn line with these holdings the court also holds that a defendant charged with contemptuous criticism IS , entitled to every construction consis, ent with innocence of wrongful intent,