New-York tribune., 1919-08-23


wanted to begin the, U-boat warfare
even if the United States would be
forced thereby to break with US; the
other wanted to accept President Will
sons policy and thus to reach a peace.
The fight between the two parties be-
ended with the defeat of the civilian
party through the declaration of an
restricted U-boat activity.
Civilian Party
Opposed Course
AS one of the men most actively in
volved in this struggle, I can assert
most positively that the German civil
ian policy was consistent throughout
in holding steadfastly to the same
course 1t did not, as many americans
still think, carry on negotiations mere
ly for the purpose of making prepara-
tions, meanwhile, for the U-boat war
fare. Neither did it hatch any "con-
spiracies" in America. The German
civil administration had no knowledge
whatever of the worst things that the
military-naval party put through over
ther; for example, like the mission of
Rintelen. The two cardinal sins with
which we are reproachcd under the
heading of "duplicity"-the dinner in
honor of Ambassador Gerard at the
Hotel Adlon and the Mexico dispatch
were not committed till the Berlin
civil administration had struck its sails
to the militaryna party. Like the
Astrologist in Faust" the German
government after that gave forth only
such declarations as were whispered
into its ear by the military-naval Me-
phisto. That moment was the cul-
minating point in the German tragedy
The intermediation inauguratcd pre-
cisely at that moment by Mr.. Wilson
was spoiled by our own fault. and the
war was lost All the attempt made
from Washington at the last moment
to change the decision at Berlin failed,
as is we'll known, owing to Technical
difficulties"
The gift in one rash moment spurned
In November, 1918, we expected that
Mr.. Wilson would guarantee to a Ger
many completely beaten what he had
voluntarily offered US in the winter of
1916-17. Whereas formerly our public
opinion had continually insulted Mr..
Wilson, he was now praised as the Mes
siah. Salvation was to come through
him. AS we had formerly underrated
his power, we now overrated it. The
disappointment that prevails among US
with the peace of Versailles is compre-
hensible. If we want, however, to come
into good relations with the United
States again We must not nurse anger
in our hearts, but endeavor, without
prejudice and prepossession, to un-
derstand the American policy of the
past few months.
The key to the apparent riddle is to
be found in the best of Mr.. Wilson's
speeches. In developing his peace pro-
gramme, in his speech of January %,
1917, the President said it was a pre-
requisite for realizing his ideal plans
for q league of nations that a peace
without victory be concluded. At that
time the two groups of powers still
confronted each other as equals. How
differently the world looked in October.
1913! Germany lay in the dust and
offered no further resistance. Through
that fact Mr.. Wilson lost all his power.
1t is not worth while arguing to-day
whether we could or should have Of
fered resistance during the armistce
or peace negotiations. By abandoning
all resistance we robbed Mr.. Wilson of
all authority against the overweening
demands of the victors. He had to
struggle alone and against his own al
lies, drunk with victory, who were su-
pcrior to him in their exact knowledge
of European affairs.
Mr.. Wilson could have achieved more
if he had not gone to Paris, where he
succumbed to the influence of the
milieu, and if he had not surrendered
at once the first of his fourteen points
In agreeing to secret negotiations he
lost his last support-public opinion
which called for real league of ma
tions and peace of justice. If Mr..
Wilson had relied for support upon the
opposition parties in the Allied coun-
tries, that would have been indeed a
policy of "0ectere 81 nequeo, Acheromta
movebo" Of |, cannot bend the will of
the gods, will move HELD; and the