The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1919-05-23

tho western channel ports been IN Ger
man ccupation the horrors Of these ar
raids would have been multiplied an
hundredfold-
1t is only necessary to add that during
the war heavy artillery succeeded IN
making effective practice at ranges
greater than the distance between Calais
and Dover.
think it Is reasonable to deducn from,
this argument that the stakes for which
We wcre playing at the great battle Of
Ypres were nothing less than the safety
indeed the very e1istenc-of the
British empire.
Now. the Germans had two distinct
opportunities OF bringing about such q
situation as I have contemplated:
Cd To reinforce their tight much
sooner than they did. even though by so
doing they had to make slight and un-
i'm portant sacrifices elsewhere. and to
take up line of catrenchrnents resting
on the sea at Dieppe, whence they could
have run their trenches east and Joined
up with their main line before Do Cas-
telnau's flank movement could possibly
have developed.
(e) BY successfully attacking The
British and French forces to the east Of
Ypres and driving them back to the sea.
This latter alternative, as We know, Is
what they actually attempted which
mighty effort, together with our sue
cessful and prolonged resistance, con-
stituted the first battle Of Ypres
No one who has done me the honor Of
rcaling this book so far can suppose
that I did not realize this danger
l am free to confess. however. that on
October Is. 1914. the day upon which ]
date the opening OF the battle Of Yprcs.
] thought the danger was past ! be-
licved that the enemy had exhausted his
strength in the great bid he had made
TO smash our armies on the Marne and
TO capture Paris. The fine successes
gained by the cavalry and the Third
corps did much to coufirm these impress
slons on my mind.
l could not bring myself to suppose
for one moment that with such resource
80 as the Germans afterwards showed
that they had at this time in reserve,
they could hav" let slip such an oppor-
tunity as We afforded them by q long
delay on tn" Alsrc and our perilous dis
regard Of III" danger On the north. One
Of ehoir purtshments will be the corrod-
Ing contemplating of tn" ifs and
butts" OF their stupersiuus gamble.
In my i.rrrrSt heart l did not expect
I should have TO fight a great defensive
hnttl"- All my dispositions were made
with tn idea of carrying out effectively
the combined offensive which was con-
certcd between Foch and myself.
There was only ono reservation in my
mind. and that concerned the danger OF
leaving a. rTLp anywhere in our long line.
or Of faihn;; 20 XIV" n sufficiently close
support 10 tn" weary but most gallant
army of n" King of tn" RnlEians. AS
: will presently b" shown. had to nun .
terrible risk to safeguard against this
danger. but hold that the risk was
Justified.
Many nc Napol"on's graf cam paigns
/, developed in y totally unexpected man
n,.r. quit" dfferru. from his Original
conception. hut h. always claimed that
his constant success WAS duo 10 tho IN
it!al correct direction and impulsrH whici
h" always impaired 70 his armies. Tol'
Stoy states that tn" only directions mr.
cavc NJ Eorodino. tlir" IN nuri-r. w"r
r"v"r carried out. | hav" not verified
III" great Russian nrv..liSt"S SfntrmcnL
hut I may VOL b" tru". History relates
I thHt n tho J"r:t campaign Of lSS6. NJ
ptle"f. in thr'-. days. mad" three "rron'
"nuS calculations Of N" FrlIsS Ians' do
ipgS.
ON tho 10Th" says Hamlry, in hrs
"0p"ratinrs Of War" a. Thought 1I0h"n,
! lohe WAS about Ia attack him: nH ihI
, nth also he JUDGED :ilal IN" F-rISSinls
were Concentrating ON ';"ra: and on r1'
18TH ~. fniStn"k Hu.i"tl"hc'S army fol
| tho tn" .rmiir" rru>Sian force. sim. hts
! plan. nla,lr IN th's" suggestions, was. in
! INC niair quite Suithhl" To tho actual cir
| cumStanceS. And that Is tx mostly the
case. was owing to the right direction