New-York tribune., 1919-07-15
July Is. 1918

July Is, 1918
A year ago to-day Ludendorff began
his last offensive. 1t was forlorn hope,
though naturally nobody at German
Grand Headquarters looked at it in that
light. Ludendorff said not long ago
that the German military information
service was deplorably inefficient. The
information service had probably got
tired long before 1918 of trying to tell the
High Command things which the latter
didn't want to know. But, whatever the
quality Of his confidential reports from
the other side of the battle line, Lu-
dendorff could easily have figured out
for himself that since March 21 his
own resources had been declining, while
Allied man power had been steadily
mounting.
The first, second and third Luden-
dorff offensives succeeded because they
were surprises--surprises in the sense
that the Allied forces on the fronts
attacked were not prepared to meet
them and were also greatly outnum-
bered. The fourth offensive was no sur
prise. 1T met with a very moderate
success, since Foch had ample reserves
at hand with which to smother it.
There was no uncertainty about the
plans for the fifth offensive Foch knew
exactly when and where Ludendorff in
tended to attack. He had made elab-
crate preparations to hold the German
onrush. And if it was delayed he was
ready to launch a counter-offensve
against the exposed west side of the
AisneMarne salient.
1t is the first rule of warfare that the
offensive, having the choice Of the front
on which to operate, must develop
marked superiority in power and num-
bers. But no offensive in the last war
ran up against an opposition as alert
and adequate. as that which Ludendorff's
armies encountered on the long, wind
ing line between the Hand of Massiges
and Chateau Therry. Foch had
crowded this area with troops. He had
massed three armies on the threatened
front, and he had two more armies con-
centrated between Chateau Thierry and
Scissors. He was as strohg as Luden
dorff was in the front line and had
more reserves to draw on.
The German attack on July 5 was
therefore practically halted in it's tracks.
1t made progress only to che southwest
Of Rheims and below the Manifestations
in which Foch could we'll afford to re-
coil little so as to make the position
of the German forces in the Aisne-
Marne salient more difficult. After July
Is, in fact, the German main effort CEN
tired in the southeastern corner of the
quadrilateral below the Aisne and the
Vesle Ludendortf thus played Foch's
game, for when the counter offensive
on the Soissons-Chateau Thierry side
started on July 18 Ludendorff had not
only to recol there, but to draw back
from the south side Of the Marne and
from the pocket he had made on both
banks of the Marine toward Epernay.
Foch had realized the greatest good
fortune of a strategist.. The enemy's
plans were known to him. His own
plans were mystery to the enemy.
Ludendorff was striking in the dark.
Foch was employing his forces with the
utmost precision and certainty. The
hour for which he had waited had ar
rived, and there was nothing to prevent
. his snatching the offensive out of Lu
dendorff's hands and retaining it there
after.
When Ludendorff lost the offensive
he was beaten, for Germanys only
chance in July, 1918, was to overwhelm
the Allied forces and capture Paris be-
fore the strength Of the American re-
enforcement could be utilized.
year ago the future still looked
dark. Paris was under bombardment.
The power Of the German offensive was
unbroken. Yet it was on the verge of
breaking. The Allies had the man power
with which to win. They needed only
the faith and the intelligence to use it.
Foch's nomination to the supreme COM
mand had supplied the unified leader
ship whose lack had crippled the Allies
since 1914. And he had always had
faith in it's sublmest form.
A year ago to-day both his faith and
his leadership underwent the crucial
test. Thereafter Allied victory was
only matter of time and circumstance.
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DeHpeJ