The Richmond Virginian. (Richmond, Va.) 1910-1920, 1919-04-10
ONLY MILITARY CAUSES
DEFEATED THE B0CHE

London, April IA recent issue
of the Frankfurter Zeitung gives
prominence to an important article by
IA certain Major Paulus--the first
plain admission by German military
writer that the German armies were
beaten in the field last Autumn. and
that there can be no question what
ever of attributing the German COL
lapse to any but military causes.
1t has not sufficiently been appre-
ciated that this is the real issue In
German affairs, that II is the real is
sue which German politicians of al
most every color are seeking to avoid.
and that the course of German In
ternai developments and German
policy very largely depends upon the
question whether the truth can be
hammered into the German people
German conservatives say that the
military collapse was due to the
Revolution. other parties say that 1t
was due TO the blockade; almost oil
parties rely upon the fact that the al
lies offered to make peace on terms
instead of pressing the military defeat
to the point OF unconditional surren-
der. Thus the whole future is mon
aced by the legend Of the indicated
German army.
Major Pauius begins from the fact
that when Ludendorn. at the end Of
September. called upon Prince Max
of Baden to ask for an armistice. the
German army was retreating to Z
line Antwerp Brussels Diedenhofen-
Metz.
He proceeds to demonstrate that
from the moment when Ludendorn
was forced to retire to an Antwerp
Metx iine he Was beaten. and hnally
beaten The truth was that the limo
Ostend- Retms- Pofnt-A- Moueson. with
its shoulder" at Reims. was 4 com
promise front. resulting from the fall
ure OF the original German attack In
1914 and the incomplete success OF
Joffreis countar-atfack. Just Hike
Cadorna's position on the Isonxo. the
line held for years and did not show
its weakness until the enemy had SUI
ficient strength seriously to menace
the flank
Paulus thinks that the LudendorfY
offensive OF March-Jufy, 1913. had 4
preventive character. In any case It's
strategic effect was finished when
Ludendorff had no moro troops to
throw In. When this situation arose
it was not the fault OF the people at
dorff offensive was lost the situation
OF 1914 REQUIRED. and now Laden
dorm had no alternative 70 the appeal
for an armistfce.
1t Is an entire mistake to suppose
that the line from Antwerp to Nets
could have been held. Neither flank
was secure. In the north the Dutch
froptier left no room for any retreat
which would not be q catastrophe.
In the center verdun provided 4 POSI-.
tive invitation to break through the
German line. The line from Disden-
hofen to Metz was already outnanked
when the st. Mihtel bend was lost.
The whole southern front WAS a
mountain front. full of disadvantages
and also much too close to the Rhine
TO be held stubbornly without risk Of
system did mot serve for adequate
movement 8ofsreinforcements to any
threatened point
'Ludendorzf the politician proved
stronger than LudcndorR the military
commander" said Major PAulus. His
strategy staked everything in favor
OF a PanGerman policy Of conquest.
That was the hour of Ludendorff's
fate and end. and the hour Of his guilt
Ludendorff would have done best to
employ those 100000 soldiers
against the Macedonian menace to
Austria and Bulgaria, or to employ
them on the western front is a que3-
ton OF secondary importance. In any
case, Ludendorn failed at this decisive
hour because he missed the only op-
portunity which the fortune Of the
moment threw into his lap OF secur-
ing in all circumstances the military
success which had been his hitherto.
His strategic movement on Brest-
I.itovsk was wrong. and such mis-
takes are, according to Clausewitx and
Moltke, in most cases irreparable"
Paulus declares that Ludenrnrfs