Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-10-26


plan for later intensive exploitation
by Duchesne's army pressing through
the gap between Craonne and Bri'
mont had crumbled into dust. Gain!
had been made, certainly not negligi
BILE: yet. given the glowing forecasts
Of the commander-in-ch II is cas-,
to understand the extent Of the disil-
lusionment alike of the government,
and Of the French people. And pub.
lie opinion held responsible for thil
establishment that commander who
had produced 1t by the grandeur Of
his conception.
AS to the offensive itself. having
ture. Nivelle. on the 18th, although
he subsequently declared that he haG
stopped 1t absolutely at noon. direct.
ed Mangin and Masel to shift theil
attack to the northeast, and go on
and. in accordance with the Original
launched against Moronvillers. Sc.
we're fighting continued over the next
four days, fighting which increased
the casualties. already great. and re-
suited only in small rectif1cations OF
the line. the most considerable OF
salient and the elimination both OF
the German bridgehead south Of the
Aisne and the position about the
dismantled fort Of Condo, from which
the Germans had swept the valley OF
the Aisne east and west with en-
filading fire.
Nivelle that it was now necessary to
give up the fight. In this letter
Micheler pointed out that there were
only four divisions of Infantry availa-
BILE in the reserves of the three
armies combined, to deliver the at
tack which would achieve that pro-
nh ,I
expected. This letter Is an interest
ing document, in view of the later
statement of Nivelle's champions that
new French armies were ready to
enter the fight Micheler. in his let
ter. proposed, also. that local opera
lions should be resumed on April 80,
which should include an attack upon
Brimont still later on. In accordance
with this suggestion of Micheler. on
April % there was considered, and
decided in principle. the question of
an energetic resumption of the gen.
eral battle in the form Of partial
offensives-designed to gain both the
craonne plateau. in order to uncover
Laon. and the heights Of Moronvillers,
to unlock Rheims.
In point of fact. despite the later
lighting. which included the taking
of the Moronvillers heights, but was
marked by new failure at Brimont.
April Is. In ten days Of terrible
struggle the French army had been
checked after a slight advance, in
considerable by comparison with the
British progress before Arras; its
fighting spirit had been broken; the
soldiers recognized that they had
been thrown against positions I'M
shaken by artillery preparations; their
in their commander in
chief was gone. They were defeated
troops: no camouflage in reports Of
ground gained could disguise from
these veterans the fact that. having
set out for Laon and La Fere. they
ond and third lines of their foe.
Losses Were Heavy.
As to losses. on May IS Nivelle made
a remarkable statement to the min
lister of war of his casualties be-
tween April 1s and IS. Therein he
cited the number of the dead-whose
deaths had been witnessed by at least
two people-as 1880. and gave as
10000, but only 5000 of these
10000 were afterward reported as
the ten days fighting amounted to
5000. while the other casualties ap-
proximated 10000. The total loss was
thus close to 100000.
Against this terrible butchers bill
could show only minor gains.
which nowhere imperiled the main
position of his foes-capture
of $4,000 prisoners. IFS cannon. 412
machine guns and 11s trench mortars.
Nivelles grand offensive then had
failed and it was necessary for the
British to prolong their costly and
useless battle for many days to re-
lieve the strain upon the beaten
II, 81
first time, certain signs of demorali-
cation began to appear. Meantime the
in Paris had been more
and more alarmed by the size OF the
casualty lists, by the ever increasing
protests from officers: by the unmts-
taxable Decentralization in the fight
ing forces, which was shown when
veteran regiments, which had partici-
pated VIGOROUSLY and g1orfously IN a.
score of struggles. declined to ad-
vance and the minister of war was
called upon to sign death warrants or
French soldiers who refused to be
in the hopeless gamble OF
Petain Called Backs
In the first two weeks Of May there
was then q real crises. in which
having lost the confidence OF
his soldiers, still continued on the
hopeless enterprise of breaking the
German line. until at last, on May 10,
he was summarily removed and Petain
was called upon to undertake the task
Of restoring the French army, as he
had been called upon little more than
4 year earlier to save the situation at
the Germans to take Douaumont and
almost overfun the last defensive po-
sition east of the Mouse river.
Petain's success was demonstrated
at the Somme In the following March,
when French divisions checked the
great Ludendorff drive before Amiens.
At the same time Petain was substi-
tuted for Nivellet Foch became chief
Of staff and steadily grew in influence.
until he occupied in the following
April the position Of generalissimo,
held briefly by Nivelle with disas-
trous consequences. Nivelle, after his
failure, was sent to Africa, where, so
far as I know. he still commands the
French forces In that tranquil colony.
One word as to Haig. In accordance
with the agreed plan. he attacked on
April 9, a week before Nivelle won a
real. il local. success, performing all
that was required of him and being
definitely checked. as had been fore
seen. in the Douai plain on April Is.
take place in Flanders. Because of
Nivelle's failure he was compelled to
make two more costly and useless at
tacks upon the Germans in the Douai
plain. losing exceedingly heavily. and
his enforced extension of his Artois
battle. made necessary by French fail
ure, completely upset his Flanders
program and contributed materially
to the CHASTITY failure of that opera
ton three months later. when the Ger
mans had been able to get reserves
from Russia and the weather had
turned bad.
British hostility to unity of COM
mand, which was revealed later and
was severely censured in America. az
was in no small measure