The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1919-10-19

| plenty OF submarines winch cOulo
make this voyage. and the strategy
| of the situation. in April and May
| 1917. demanded that a move of this
| kind be made. The predominant ele-
| ment in the submarine defense. as
| have pointed out, was the destroyer
! The only way in which the United
States could Immediately and effect
| lively help the British navy was by
sending our whole destroyer flotilla
! and all our light surface craft at
| once. 1t was Germany's part. there
fore, to resort to every manoeuvre that
would keep our destroyer force on
this side of the Atlantic. Such q
performance might be expected to
startle our peaceful American popu
iatfon and start public cry for pro-
lection that might force our govern
ment to keep all anti-submarine craft
in our own waters. expected Germa-
ny to do this Immediately, and eau
toned our naval authorities at Wash
ington not to be deceived. / pointed
out that Germany could accomplish
practically nothing by sporadic at
tacks on American shipping in Amer
lean waters; that, indeed. IL we could
induce the German admiralty to con-
centrate all its submarine efforts on
the American coasts, and leave free
the Irish Sea and the English Chan
mel, the. war would be practically won
for the Allies. Yet these facts were
not apparent to the popular mind in
1917. and 1 shall always think that
Germany made a great mistake in
not sending submarines to the Ameri-
can coast Immediately on our decla-
ration of war, instead of waiting until
nlru ut fI,aN
would have started a public demand
for protection which the Washington
authorities might have had great diff
ficulty in resisting, and which might
have actually kept our destroyer fleet
In American waters. to the great det-
riment of the Allied cause. Germany
evidently refrained from doing so for
reasons which I have already indica-
ted-a desire to play gently with the
United States, and in that way to de-
lay our military preparations and win
the war without coming into bloody
conflict with the American people.
There were others who thought It
unwise to expose any part of our fleet
to the dangers OF the European con-
test; their fear was that, if the Allies
should be defeated, we would then
need all our naval forces to protect
the American coast This point of
view, of course, was short sighted and
absurd. Clearly our national policy
demanded that we should exert all
the force we could assemble to make
certain a German defeat
The best way to fight Germany was
not to wait until she had vanauisbed
the Allies. but to join hands with them
in combined effort to beat her down.
RI ln
| take the offensive; to make certain
j that Germany could not attack us at
home by destroying her naval power
in European waters
The Vital Waters West and South or
Ireland.
The fact is that no nation was ever
placed in so tragical a position as
Great Britain in the spring and early
summer or 1917. And think that his
] tory records few spectacles more hero
| &c than that of the great British navy.
| fighting this hideous and cowardly
form of warfare in half a dozen places
/. with pitifully inadequate forces. bur
| with an undaunted spirit that re-
! NAMED firm even against the fearful
| odds which I have described. What
an opportunity for America, And II
was perfectly apparent what wa
| should do. We should Immediately
place all available anti-submarira
craft In those waters west and south
Of Ireland, the headquarters of the
shipping which meant life or death
| to the Allied cause.-the area which
| England. because of the almost end
! less demands on her navy in other
fields, was unable to protect.
| / spent my first four DAYS In Lon
don collecting all possible data:
had no desire to alarm Washington
| unwarrantably. yet also believed that
should be derefict did I not present
the Facts precisely as they were. I.
| therefore. consulted practically every
one who could give me essential de-
tails and wrote a cable despatch. fill
| ing four fools cap pages. which fur-
nisned Washington it's first detailed
] account Of the cause on which we hal
j embarked. In this work / had the full
| cooperation of our Ambassador in
London, Mr.. Walter Hines Page. Mr..
RACES whole heart and mind were
bound up in the Allied cause; he was
| Jealous that his country would play
worthily its part in this great crisis
In history; and he worked unsparing-
! ~ with me to get the facts before the
Washington Administration.