The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1919-06-09

WIS laid down as our HIHI'ii"'
mcnts 10 carry on the Wal
prospcc, of success:
REQUIRED output Of Ammunitio"'
90 49, 5G(25 II. E)
S-poundCr. 1..'.''' 'DN"e II ~
4I-inch howitZer. ...-.... 4uN0'
6-inCh hOwitZCr. .-..-... SoN ~ NJ
6O-pUundCr. .--...'- II Ll
A. inch gun. ........' N ~
6-Inch gun. .-..''' N L
o inch hOWitZcr. ........ l-'"' 49,
r, w,s exnlaircd that this output was
r.ccc,,ry for n pcrlod of actlE" opti"
lions ard should be continued even W.
,nc , lull MI a reserve of thrc" VI to"'
,i,ncs tho amount laid down IN war
Establishments had been accumuIa.eu.
this request there was n" rcPis
January 10. The War oiticc 'n.n
cIincd 10 work up TO more IMAM 'W',ts
rounds day and refused a r'queS' '''
fifty percent of high EXPLOSIVES
This amazing attitude nj i noo.
chi time compelled me I" cons'u'' ~
,"i 'L ,, 49,, srvcral members Of the
government and tho public also ME-
hn ADVISED Of this deplorable apa'nE'
w.birr ir long continued, meant the ue
Structiun of our army.
7, this letter from the war oll''c @
January 10 which ] have alrcad! H'N
. IA.
toned an estimate was attachcd OF gu,
rccoin,s which we might rely upon "r
to and including the mon'h VI
.rris estimate was far below our re-
ouircmcnts while the actual l'''ip,'
fell far short of Il. The a''"a' surY III,
IN May proved to be less thah CIV,
Of rho war office estimate wiz" -
IN, only one ever furnished i"r o..
guidance such failure maze
impossiblc To mako any r'i'aNlc
c,st of the condition of tho ammun t,on
,.,,,,,, oI any particular date. TINS
Of uncertainty rendered the lpr-
,,,,I,tion Of plans for cooperating WIN
,ba French most difficult, If not lInPos-
sblc.
0,r;,c tho winter Of l91i-l5 1t was
rorcr ,n accumulate some small reserve
~ ammunition. but during tins per'"u
nh our efforts in this direction were oi
no oyan because the number OF rouriS
nor cirhtccn-poundCr gun ihrousno-'
This noriod fell to less than nNc'
had serious miSgirings mat TUE
moral, of the army was becoming al
rectcd hv this first long and weary WIZ
tor Of inactivity in the trenches ana |"
rcndcr the defense cffcctir" II was n'c'
cssarv 10 undertake an offensive opcrf-
ton.
Early in March n small reserve OF
ammunition had been accumula'eu' a:u
tho hattie Of Ncuvc Chapel" was louE"1
and won. Had proper steps ocen 'a ol
TO increase the supply wh"n my n's'
strong appeals were sent III uuil'h -
tcmbcr 1914. TN" offensive "P' I,a
commenced SO successfully AT NeHNc
Ch,nc,lc might have been much furtnr1
dcvcloned, and. indeed possibly nav
,o1 n r,eat and important results. bu'
tho battle had 10 nc broken OIL a''et
,bree davs' fighting because W" Wcr.
brought 10 4 standstill through want Oh
ammunition.
Immediately afterward I again ad
drcesed the strongest representation
couId franc to the war Office. oees,"
Tint his maicstys government miEn' "
informed that. IL their Object was w
drive the enemy off French and Bclei"n
territory during 1918 no progress '~
ward this objective could nc oplai'''u
unrcss and until the supply OF artillery
ammunition should enable the army 10
engage in sustained operations Inc
only official reply which ] received 10
this letter was an Injunction 10 use INC
utmost economy, but private le'tc''
dated March l6. was addressed by ."
lanes Wolfe Murray To SIT vivian,
Robertson who was then my ch'ci Vi
etorf This letter was said TO have occn
dic,otc5 nv the secretary Of state, AID
its contents limited very strongly thal
a., ;nnrcssion prevailed at the war or
fico thar we were wasting ammuniti -
Tho uperatious at Ncure Chapcuc
used IN all our available resources, ana
II became necessary TO restore 'hcW u!
rcyerting to q strictly defensive atu-
tude.
II was. moreover. very clear that th'
Germans had early realized that tHo
war was to be one calling Tor ColoSSa'
sunnlies of munitions. Supplies. indScn'
upon such stupendous scale as me
world had never before dreamed Oh ana
they also realized tho vital necessity LOT
heavy artillery. They began WIN "''
inferior field gun. and they never SLY
ned 10 remedy this defect. but direclco
nil their energies from the hrst 10 ac-
vclop!ng their heavy artillery. Nhlle
,bcir total proportion OF guns 10 oayo
nets was fully maintained. the proper
tion of field guns to bayonets was re-
duccd End all heavy guns enormously
increased Each month the development
of heavy artillery became more acceh-
tuatcd. until, toward tho late spring OF
1915, tho greater number OF project les
fired .bv the Germans. whenever opera
,iOnS Of any imporian Wer" NhN'hS
nlocc wCrn Of 50 and upward. lhi-
was IN dc rcnSc as we'll ms in attack. ana
by this means tho enemy endcaV"rcd I'd
shattcr the morale Of m" attackers. as
well as TO inflinct very heavy caSual,l Us.
The necessity for Efca' prep'hdcr-
ancc Of heavy artillery also was recog-
n;Zcd by tho French long before our
War Office could be persuaded t" move
| in that direction. From carly IN inc
| war they aimed at obtaining one hcaNH
| gun Of G-inch caIibrC and upward Toy
! every field gun they held. without r'duc-
! ing the proportion To bayon"tS OF the
! 1ottcr which obtains in the French
! Army. To meet these requirements IN"
French were taking guns from their ola
/ war shins and coas; d"f"nC" ships. and
! straining every merry" I" get guns or
! heavy Calibrc into the field.
! In May. 1915. tn" proportion OF heid
| TO heavy guns above 6-lnCh CalIhr" in
! tho French Army had but scv"ntY-"hc
! guns altogether above 6-rnCh ralihr".
! against !. il6 below il. and no ad"Tua'"
| stems Whatever had vet been taken '"
! bring tho proportion NOR" nearly 10 IN"
| rcoui-rmcnt. Of modern warfare. The
! supply Of trench guns ana m"r'arS'
! with thor ammunition. hand Grcnau'S
! and other most necessary munitions or
! war. was almost negligible. nor was
! thcrc any active rrnhlcms calling Tor
) tho nrrI;cation Of modern science w
! tho character Of warfare that had de-
4