The Lamar register., 1919-12-31
General PERSHINd S REPORT
Continued from Page 81

u eaptuh2g Juvigny after some
pqrticularjy ossperate fghting and
reaching the ChS9ny-Soissons road.
On the British tgt two regiments
Of the Thirty-thirdt zion partici-
>patsd in an attack on 'h.-es.l, July 4.
y hgain on Aug 8 as an Inc ,ant of
Wlk1(l (lind offensive against the ~ ems
sno--.s T-of these regiments sok
the .iss-o. .snd Ch.pilly ridA
arss.a,rs weod consldef
able material
Emergency Had PAM
The counter ofrensives az st the
eMarne salient in July and aga bst the
AmIens salient In August had gained
such an advantage that it was ap-
parent that the emergency. which jus
titled the dispersion Of our divisions,
had passed. The moment was propi-
tious for assembling our divisions. The
formation OF the army in the Chateau.
Thierry region and Ms early transfer
to the sector of the Woevre, which
was to extend from Nomeny, east OF
the Moselle. to north Of st. Mihiel. was
therefore decided upon by Marshal
Foch and myself on Aug. 8. and the de-
tails were arranged with Gen. Petain
later on the same day.
At Bombon. on July "a. there was a
conference of all commanders in chief
for the purpose of considering allied
operations Each presented proposals
for the employment of the armies un-
der his command and these formed
the basis of future cooperation of
the allies. II was emphatically deter
mined that the allied attitude should
be to maintain the offensive. As the
first operation of the American army.
the reduction of the salient of st.
Mihiel was to be undertaken as soon
as the necessary troops and material
could be made available.
On Aug. 20. further discussion with
Marshal Foch was held at my head
quarters at Ligny-en-Barrois. At this
meeting II was proposed by Marshal
Foch that the general operations as
far as the American army was con
cerned should be carried out In detail
by:
(s) An attack between the Meuse
and the Argonne by the Second French
army, reinforced by from four to six
American divisions.
(b) Frencb-American attack, ex-
tending from the Argonne west to the
Souain road. to be executed on the
right by an American army astride
the Aisne and on the left by the
Fourth French army.
To carry out these attacks the ten
to eleven American divisions suggested
for the St. Mihiel operation and the
four to six for the Second French army
would leave eight to ten divisions for
an American army on the Aisne. II
was proposed that the ST. Mihiel op-
Grafton should be Initiated on Sept 10
and the other two on Sept. Is and 20.
respectively.
The plan suggested for the Amer
ican participation in these operations
was not acceptable to me. because II
would require the immediate separa-
tion Of the recently formed first Amer
lean army into several groups. main
Iy to assist French armies. This was
directly contrary to the principle Of
forming q distinct American army. for
which my contention had been Insist
ent. An enormous amount of prepara-
tion had already been made In con-
struction of roads. railroads, regulat-
ing stations and other installations
looking to the use and supply OF our
armies on a particular front. The in
herent dlsinclination of our troops to
serve under allied commanders would
have grown and American morale
would have suffered. Ny position was
stated quite clearly, that the strate-
gical employment Of the first army us
y unit would be undertaken where de
sired, but its disruption to carry out
these proposals would not he enter
tained.
An American Army.
A further conference at Marshal
Foch's headquarters was held on Sep
tember 2 at which General Petan
was present. After discussion. the
question Of employing the American
.rS;y as unit was concc,lcd Al fh,
allied armies were to be employed In
Q converging action.
1t should be recorded that although
this general offensive was fully out
lined at the conference no one present
expressed the opinion that the final
victory could be won In 1918. In fact.
Iii . ~ a