davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Grand Forks herald., 1919-12-17
J I ||''VO | | / BAD ! WRECKS | / K
IN MINNESOTA: !;
MANY INJURED
One |t' Train Leaves Track
And Five Cars Are Car
ried Int, Ditch. 4.
Second Section of Train !
Runs Headon. Into An
other Near Eyota.

Sanborn, Mimi. Dec. 17.-An east
bound Northwestern passenger train
Jumped the tracks n&ar here this
FORENOON. Twenty-one persons were
injured. several seriously. No one
was killed. sF1ve cars rolled down
the embankment. 7 {
The baggage car was first to leave
dor OF tho train with the exception
Of the last Sleeper from the rails.
The baggage car, three day coaches
and one sleeper rolled down a 20
foot embankment. The train was go
Ing around q curve when theN acci-
dent took place.
The injured were taken on spe-
ena eaai = train to Tracy. MINI conduc-
jured. w. Van Horn, ;baggageman,
was buried under pile Of debris and
was rescued with difficulty.
Taken to Tracy.
Tracy, Mimi. Dec. 17.-Four Of
the injured in the Chicago and North
western passenger train wreck near
Sanborn. were brought here shortly
Van Horn. winona, baggageman.
shoulder dissqcated; Charles Richard
son, Winona, conductor, scalp
wounds and bruises; Stanford Pease,
Brookfnsa. 8. D.. bruised. and Mr..
Frobesk. Sleepy Eye, cuts and
bruises.
The: men who were brought here
said they could tell very little Of how
the accident happened. Tho train
was travelling with two engines pull
ing 1t and was making good time aft
er leaving Sanborn. After the cars
left the track the roadbed was torn
up in such manner that it was I'M
possible to tell whether It was a
broken rail or spread In the rails
which caused the cars. to leave the
track. Others OF the twenty-one who
suffered injuries were left at hos
pital at Springfield.
The Injured.
n
Grand Forks herald., 1919-12-17

4, 3 Springfield. Mo-. ..lsud', clancy
had . shade the better Of Harry
Krdhn In ten rounds. b Il H; ssssss !
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-26
Haig Did His Part " ell

Petain's success was demonstrated
at the Somme in the following
March, when French divisions
checke. the great Ludendorf drive
before Amiens. At the same time
Petain was substituted for Nivelle
Foch became chief of staff and
steadily grew in influence until he
occupied in the following April the
position of generalissimo, held brief
ly by Nivelle with disastrous conse-
Quences. Nivelle, after his failure,
was sent to Africa, where, so far as
| know. he still commands the
French forces in that tranquil col.
ony.
One word as to Haig. In accord
ance with the agreed plan he az
tackled on April 9, a week before
Nivelle won a real, if local, success
performing all that was required OF
him and being definitively checked,
as had been foreseen, in the Dous'
Plain on April 16.
His main operation for 1917 was
to take place in Flanders. Because
of Nivelle's failure he was CON-
PEELED to make two more costly ana
useless attacks upon the Germans III
the Douai Plain, losing exceeding?
heavily, and this enforced extension
Of his Artois battle made necessary
by French failure completely up
set his Flanders program aho
contributed materially to the gnasus
failure of that operation tire.
months later when TIE Germans nSo
been able to get reserves from kus'
STA and the weather turned out pau
British hostility TO unity OF CON-
mand, which was revealed later, sh'
was severely censured in AmerlcS'
as elsewhere, was in no small meas'
ure the natural consequence OF NV
Nivelle episode Actually hs'e'
whose part was to be relatively HI
nor. won a far more considerapa
success than Nivelle, and continue.
the battle after his own plans csi'e'
for a termination of the strugs'"
(coryright 1879. by The Mcclure NV
paper Syndicatel
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-26

was gone. They We're dese.+.,
troops; no camoutiage, in reports y.
ground gained, could disguise from
these veterans the fact that h.r;n-
set out for Laon and La Fere 49,.
had actually arrived only at tho ca.
ond and third lines of their foe
10000 Dead in To-Day Figh,
AS to losses: On May IS N;vsu.
made a remarkable statement r. ~.
Minister OF War of his casua,+;..
between April 16 and 25. There;r
he cited the number Of the da,d
whose deaths had been witnessed h.
at least two personals 15.5O0 ors
gave as missing 10000, but ONLY
5000 of these 10000 were afterward
reported as prisoners; so, in fact
the killed in the ten days firht,nc
amounted to 10000, while the otber
casualties approximated 10000. Tho
total loss was thus close to 1O00oo
Against this terrible butchers hill,
Nivelle could show only minor gains
which nowhere imperilled the main
fighting position of his foes; and the
capture of $4,000 prisoners. ITS can.
non. Alp machine guns and 11a
trench mortarss
Nivelle's grand offensive, then. had
failed, and it was necessary for
the British to prolong their costly
and useless battle for many DAYS ia
relieve the strain upon the beaten
French army, in which now, for the
first time, certain signs of demoral.
ization began to appear Meantime
the government IN Paris had been
more and more alarmed by the size
OF the casualty lists; by the ever
increasing protests from the officers:
by the unmistakable decentralization
in the fighting forces, which was
shown when veteran regiments,
which had participated victoriously
and gloriously in score of strug-
giles, declined to advance, and the
Minister Of War was called upon to
sign death warrants of French SOL
diers who refused to be murdered in
the hopeless gamble of Nivelle.
In the first two weeks of May
there was then real crisis. in which
Nivelle, having lost the confidence Of
the government, his neutenants, his
soldiers, still continued the hope
less enterprise of breaking the Ger
man line, until at last, on May Is,
he was summarily removed and
Petain was called upon to undertake
the task of restoring the French
army, as he had been called upon
little more than year earlier to
save the situation at Verdun after
blunders had permitted the Germans
to take Douamont and almost over
run the last defensive position east
of the Meuse River.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-26

enemy with the French plans. Three
days before the battle a sergeant.
carrying orders Of operation indi-
eating in detail the dispositions for
the attack by three corps and the
Russians upon Fort Brimont, was
killed and his dispatch bag captured.
Thus warned, the enemy reinforced
the threatened points, and subse-
Guent French attack did not result in
the gain of a foot, while the loss of
the 9TH Corps alone was 5000 men
in four days. This hlunder was duly
reported to the French commander,
and it should have led to the aban-
donment of the enterprise.
Artillery Preparation
Finally, the artillery preparation
was done very badly; ten days of
bombardment resulted in INSULT
cient reduction Of enemy works.
Weather conditions contributed to
this failure, but the chief cause was
lack of munitions for so vast a
front, itself based upon strong nat
ural obstacles multiplied by skillful
engineers.
In the face of all these circum-
stances and confronting an almost
unbelievable anarchy existing in the
high command-but with an army
fired by the recent German retreats
knowing that their commander
expected to break the German line,
Nivelle, still mistaken, announced
that he expected to succeed on the
Craonne Plateau. This announce
ment was made to the government
after the first attacll-that on st.
Quentin-had been made on April
Ia and had completely failed, thus
booming the whole enterprise.
Nevertheless, fixing his attack for
the morning of the 18th, Nivelle re-
peated his familiar forecast that
he would arrive in Laon at dawn on
the 18th and that his cavalry would
reach La Fere by sunset on the
same day. Brimont was to be taken
in five hours by that development
from the north of which the Ger
mans had been so completely fore
warned
Therefore, just one week after
the British had brilliantly launched
their offensive on Vimy Ridge, but
at the precise moment when their
advance had been pinned down,
Nivelle launched his waiting armies.
The armies of Mangin and Mazel
left their trenches at 6 O'Clock in
the morning in the midst of a
tempest of snow. rain and wind. The
aviation could not function, the ar
tillery was dependent entirely upon
ground observation. 1t was in vain
that the trench mortars destroyed
practically everywhere the first
enemy line. An actual telescoping
occurred with the mass of the Ger
man army, which had received and
executed the order to die on its
first line rather than yield
Warned long in advance, the Ger
mans had no fewer than four lines,
with depth of eight miles. These
lines were literally stuffed with light
machine guns, hidden in the innu-
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-26
German Retreat Skillful

The retreat of the Germans, ac-
tually one of the most skillful pieces
of strategy in the whole war, was
represented to the French army and
the French public as a flight-as
the beginning of the end-and the
French soldiers were in d white
teat of excitement At the precise
moment when the high command,
save for Nivellc and his immediate
following, was unanimously con-
vlnccd of the impracticability of the
great plan, the army was filled with
an optimism as dangerous as it was
tremendous. Nivelle and the COM
mon soldiers expected supreme
victory, but the generals, and even
the lower officers, recognized the
Likelihood Of a check, with even
greater losses than those of the
Somme and with consequences to
the morale Of the army beyond
estimate.
From all these officers there now
began to flow protests and at this
moment the BRAND Cabinet fell.
In the Ribot Cabinet, which sue
ceeded NJ Panleve, the new Min
lister of War promptly discovered
the chaos existing in the army The
relations between Nivclle and his
subordinates were strained; these
subordnates had lost confidence in
their commander. Yet amidst this
anarchy Nivelle's assurance had
grown beyond belief.
The new ministry had now to
consider the advisability Of permit
ting any offensive, but the Russian
revolution had made some operation
necessary alike to help Russia, still
apparently an ally, and to prevent
{ withdrawal Of German troops
from the Russian front for use
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-26
General Robert Georges. NiueNe

against Italy, which actually did oc-
cur in the fall, with the resulting
disaster of Caporetto. Finally, the
submarine campaign was becoming
SO grave peril that it threatened
to win the war unless military sue
cess could retrieve naval failure.
The ministry was satisfied that
Nivelle's grandiose plan could not
succeed, but it inclined to favor a
lesser offensive, with limited object
ives, an attack which should be care
fully planned and thus incur small
losses while inflicting heavy casual
ties upon the enemy and achieving
useful gains. Conceivably the initial
attack might result in Nivelle's
break through; if it did, we'll and
good; then the operation might be
expanded. This was the programme
OF the governemnt.
AS for Nivelle, he heard all warn
ings, military and civilian, with con-
tempt; he believed in supreme vic
tory. At the moment of attack he
showed the government maps, which
| have seen, calling for an opening
advance of eight miles. and this op-
timism did not desert him when
$4,000 French dead and 500 yards of
gain were the total profit of the first
day of the offensive.
On the strategic and tactical sides,
therefore, the prospect of a great
victory had vanished long before the
actual attack on April 16, 1917. On
the mechanical and technical sides
the promise was even more dismal.
Nivelle undertook to expand Petain's
method, applied to four or five miles
of enemy front, into an attack on a
front ten times as broad, and he was
not able to deal with so vast prob
lem, comparable with that which was
successfully handled by Ludendorff
year later. His armies were thus
lnadequately trained and the WAYS
of communication were insufficient.
while the medical service broke down.
Weather Was Against Allies
There were three other circum-
stances which contributed to the
actual disaster-the weather, the
folly Of the command in the Fifth
Army and the failure of artillery,
due in part at least to weather con-
ditlons which made air observation
impossible
AS to the first circumstance. the
winter Of 1917 was one of the
toughest in half century and the
month of April was time of snow
and storm. The weather during the
period of the actual battle was so
bad that it was impossible for the
infantry to follow the barrage of
the artillery; the rapid-fre guns,
machine guns and even the small
arms of the soldiers were completely
put out of service. The infantry
threw away all its burdens; the
black troops, which had shown their
value as shock units on a score of
fields, lost three-quarters of their
value because Of the temperature.
The second circumstance, the i'm
prudence in the Fifth Army.
! amounted to the presentation Of the
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-26

avoided one of the two converting
thrusts. Nivelle had envisaged at
tacks from two sides of square, and
On one side an attack was henceforth
impossible.
This was not all In addition, the
Germans had reinforced their posi-
tons on the Craonne Plateau so that
where there had been two lines in
December there we're four in Feb
ruary, as Micheler had reported.
They had concentrated their artil-
lery, elaborated the caverns and
grottoes on the Aisne heights, multi
piled their concrete works and
created an almost impregnable posi-
ton. At the same time they were
working on their Hindenburg line.
Thus, by the middle of March
such chance Of success as there had
been for the Nivelle plan had van
ished. The broad front had been
narrowed by more than half, the
remaining half had been sown with
new defenses, and German reserves
released by the Russian revolution
were already beginning to pour
westward. Meantime, while the
chances of success were thus rapidly
disappearing, circumstances had
combined to create expectations out
of all proportion to the remaining
possibilities.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-26

first invited Petain to command
group Of armies whose mission it
was to storm the Craonne Plateau.
Petain promptly pointed out the dis
proportion between the task and the
resources. He did not believe the
great plan would succeed; he said
so, and as result one Of his three
armies was taken from his COM
mand and given to Micheler. Petain
was thenceforth ignored.
The Russian Collapse
Meantime conditions changed.
The Russian revolution broke out.
1t became clear that Russia was out
of the war for the time being. This
collapse brought paralysis to the
Italian offensive, which was planned
to coincide with the attack on the
Western front, since it was clear
that Italy would now have to bear
the weight of Austrian troops
which would be transferred from
the Russian to the Venetian front.
Jotfre's original conception, which
fixed November 16, 1916, as the day
for launching his offensive, included
as an essential condition attacks by
the Russians and by the Italians
Nivelles plan had presupposed the
same element, but now the Russians
and the Italians were out of the
reckoning
More than this, in the first days of
February the Germans suddenly be-
gan their great retreat. Slowly at
first, rapidly later, they drew out Of
their positions on the Somme. They
evacuated precisely those lines
against which great offensive
might have been launched with some
hope of success.
On March 4, before the German
retreat had become general or con-
siderable, General Franchet d'Espe-
rey appealed to Nivele for permis-
sion to attack at once, as the enemy,
was about to retreat. Nivellc an
swercd on March latter Il three
day delay that q German retreat
was uncomfortable since the Germans
had so strongly fortified their posi-
tons surrounding Roye; but on the
day after the Nivelle dispatch
reached d'Espercy the Germans were
ont Of Roye. Thereafter followed
the retreat and pursuit until the
Germans we're we'll behind the Hin
deuburg. line.
Instead Of an attack in circum-
stanes that Nivellc had planned,
Franchet d'Espercy's armies now
found themselves beyond the glacis
Of desert twenty-five miles in width
which was destitute Of all means of
communication confronting posi-
ton, to attack which would involve
months Of preliminary preparation
and the employment of formidable
artillery which could not be brought
up for many weeks owing to the de-
struction Of the roads.
The great Nivelle plan had been
comprehended in two formidable
thrusts across the rear of the Ger
mans in positions from the Somme
near Perrone to Rheims, but the
Germans, by retiring, had thus
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-26
Germans Well Prepared

The machine guns had not been
completely destroyed anywhere by
artillery reparation, and precisely
this machine gun fire, after the first
hours, stopped the advance and
broke the spirit of the best fighting
forces of the French army. Some
thousands of these guns, we'll used
and well placed, thus proved suffi-
cient to check in full cry the for
ward sweep Of many thousands OF
veteran infantry soldiers confident
of victory, and Americans will find
food for reflection when they recall
that, little more than a year later,
in the great battle of the Meuse-
Argonne, their own soldiers, with
even less adequate artillery support,
wrestled with these same machine
gun problems and suffered casual
ties we'll in excess of those which
suff1ced to destroy the French of
fensive.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-26
ruth About the Failure of Nivele's 1917 Offensive
Successor of Petain Not Hand;
capped by Any Blunder :
of General Haig's ] ;

merable grottos and caverns of the
porous cliffs. The French armies
were compelled to halt after the
first hours, and the unforeseen
pause damned and blocked every
thing behind-organNed for great
forward leap. This congestion and
confusion of every sort still further
aggravated the disappointment and
establishment consequent upon
sharp check. All official records of
the operations Of the 10th and 18th
of April in both French armies re-
veal with truly tragic monotony the
essential fact that the complete
check Of the French attack was
everywhere due to the multiplied
use of enemy machine guns which
Rad survived inadequate lombard
ment.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-26
Plans Crumble 10 Dust

On the morning of April II, when
Nivelle's victorious troops should
have arrived at dawn under the walls
Of Laon, they were actually only a
few hundred yards from their start
ing place, holding with difficulty the
second line of the Germans. All
the plans for later intensive exploit
tation of Duchesne's army pressing
through the gap between Craonne
and Brimont had crumbled into dust.
Gains had been made, certainly not
negligible; yet, given the glowing
forecasts of the commander in chief,
it is easy to understand the extent
of the establishment alike of the
government and of the French peo-
pie. And public opinion held re-
sponsible for this disillusionment
that commander who had produced
it by the grandeur of his conception.
AS to the offensive itself: Having
failed to attain the expected rup-
ture, Nivelle on the 18th, although
he subsequently declared that he had
stopped it absolutely at noon, di-
rected Mangin and Mazel to Shift
their attack to the northeast and 20
on and in accordance with the orig
lnal plan Anthoine's Sixth Army was
launched against Moronvillers. Sc
we're fighting continued over the next
four days, fighting which increased
the casualties, already great, and re-
suited only in small notifications OF
the line, the most considerable of
which was the reduction of the
Nallly salient and the elimination
both OF the German ridgehead south
Of the Aisne and the position about
the dismantled fort of Condo, from
which the Germans had swept the
valley of the Aisne east and west
with enfilading fire.
On April 81 Micheler Informed
Nivelle that it was now necessary
to give up the fight. In this letter
Micheler pointed out that there We're
only four divisions Of infantry avail
able in the reserves of the three
armies coWbined to deliver the at
tack which would achieve that pros
pective rupture which Nivelle still
expected. This letter is an interest
ing document in view of the later
statement Of Nivelle's champions
that new French armies were ready
to enter the fight. Micheler in his
letter proposed also that local opera
tons should be resumed on April 30
which should include an attack upon
Brlmont still later on. In accord
ance with this suggestion of Mich
eler, on April % there was consid-
cred, and decided in principle the
question of an energetic resumption
OF the general battle in the form of
partial Observation-Disclosures to gain
both the Craonne Plateau. in order
to uncover Laon, and the heights of
Moronvillers, to unlock Rheims.
In point of fact, despite the later
fighting, which included the taking
of the Moronvillers heights but was
marked by new failure at Brimont,
the battle of Craonne was over on
April 25.
In ten days of terrible struggle
the French army had been checked
after a slight advance, inconsider-
able by comparison with the British
progress before Arras; its fighting
spirit had been broken, the soldiers
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-10-26
French Generals Plan to Crush
All West Front Known i'm
Advance by Foe
BY Frank n. Simonds

NPEAklNG in the French Cham
- Der the other day, M. Pain
~ leve, who preceded Clemen-
Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1919-12-04

in the third round of the national bill
| lard championship at the Parkway
| parlors last night.
Young Grcculeaf was having a difficult
| time TO get the worries under control
While Youthful Ralph was having
trouble, ancient Morris was making
points and the veteran soon was well out
in front.
Everything looked very lovely for
Norris. Things were not breaking for
the usually reliable Ralph. Doc Brill
the all around expert. took an extra
blink as he watched the great Green
leaf boot few easy ones. This an
| noyed the cue critic for he counted upon
Grecnleaf TO come through without ef-
fort.
But it looked like an off night. And
when a star is bad he is terrible. So
/, there was cause for the Brill uneasi
ness.
Then came the decisive ruling, the
scratch, and from that time on Green
leaf bounded forth, displayed his old
form and won in roll
Greenleaf displayed courage as well
as skill. lie took chances when cor
nered. Shortly after the Fink fail, Green
leaf was confronted with an almost i'm
possible shot. He made it but found
himself,in worse position. A safety play,
even did not look safe.
Suddenly he called out--"Seven ball
in the pocket
The large gathering gazed. This ball
was far out of reach and range. But to
the surprise of all, Greenleaf put over
one cushion bank, then a three ball
combination on the one shot for the
well earned point.
Greenleaf, according to Doc Brill, is
alot inn stA V,I
now than ever before. His exhibition
work was f1ashy but not consistent.
With a championship at stake, the
youthful wizard is devoting more time
to figuring out his shots, watching his
position more closely and really giving
thought TO the game.
Greenleaf has plenty of worthy com
petition and must show consistent form
to annex the cue crown.