Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-07-29
Americans at st. Mihiel.

=
American Army. ii another 5fsId st
Separations in the Waesre, sc carried
out its f1rst attack on q large scale
and, between September - and Is.
completely reduced the salient Of st.
IThe LIST American Army was
formed July 81. It's task was to dis.
engage the Paris-Nancy line of COM
immigration by. clearing the st. Mihiel
saltent. The Army consisted of four.
teen divisions. eight in firsts Zine; six
IN second.s This was th6 drstsreal.in-
sse epts Mn american operation Paul
What were the results obtained .be-
tween the 25th of September and the
end OF the first period Of the battle?
Ine enemy, was compelled to eYac.
uate nearly the whole Of the ground
he had won In 1913. He was disor-
ganixed. worn out. tired. and incapa-
sive. In order. to escape. from this
Intending .battle. which was exhausts
Ing him, he sought TO take refuge IN
positions which he believed to be i'm.
preenable and in the shelter Of which
ne hoped to be able to .rsorganizs,
This was an imperative necessity for
the enemy for. from July Is to Sep
TENDER rs he had thrown into battle
1853 divisions. Of which seventy-five
had been engaged two or three times.
From August 81 to September Q
against theeBritish alone OF these
fourteenazwere ins line, while the re-
naming. twenty-four were drawn
irom the reserves eleven of them
coming from Flanders and q similar
number from the Disc Rheims front.
Retreat Becomes Imminent.
The imminence Of this retreat and
the enemy;s inpossibility to carry out
counter offensive had been brought
to- the notice Of the allied high com.
mand az early as August "a, through
the medium OF report from the in
G. II. O.. which concluded as follows:
+, The enemy appears to have decided
to fall back. preparatory to taking I'M
position, tor the bad season of the
year. on 9 solidly established and or
ganized line. It viii Be. necessary for
him to carry, out. At the same time,
the reorganization Of his units. which
have been worn down, much more
than he had .foreseen, and for the re.
pair Of which the resources provided
are ar insuahcient. IN. these circumE
condition to launch counter Offensive
of any Importance. unless the armies
OF the entente allow him the respite
necessary to install himself trans;
gully in the defensive positions
he succeed In doing this he could not
resume the initiative Of attack, except
under conditions much less favorable
than In the past, and with reserves Of
rela!lvey lesser Importance and Of
Counter Offensive Out of Question.
B A German document. dated Angus.
that it was impossible for the German
high command to pass to the counter
~The high command has expressed
Its thanks. TOR. tho prompt end accu-
rate explanations Of the defensive
battle that have appeared in the Ger
man ana neutral press. Although the
man counter offensive, which has been
repeated by the press with . praise
worthy object. is very propitious as .
means for favorably Influencing pub
lie opinion, the high command has
| nevertheless made it known that an
ticipations OF this kind appear to be
at present inopportune. Indispensa-
Die as II may De to keep the enemy In
apprehension OF fresh attacks. and In
state OF uncertainty "a to our plans,
we are asked. nevertheless. to refrain
from such predictions, in order that
the decisions OF the high command
may not be affected thereby" >
| On September rs. according to the
daily statement furnished by the
French intelligence department, the
enemy still had xty-eight divisions
In reserve. but only tweuty-one Of
these were fresh divisions. while for
ty had been reoonsidered,. ana the re-
mainder had barely been relieved. In
spite OF the fact that the front had
been reduced by nearly 1875 miles, the
4+eaSny- ives Obliged 10 kssp,iR .ljas~the
ssnre number of divisions s ON 5ti1s
us. owing to the fact that the number
OF electives In each division and theiE
lighting value ware less. Furthar, b
had succeeded In preserving even
'these e4ectiyes only hy hraakias "