The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-10-13
THE BIRMINGHAM AGEHERAIB, MONDAY OCTOBER i8, 1919


 
 war, we would have insisted on Austria Hungsry's improving her armaments. Her railway communications, which were totally inadequate, would also nave been extended. Our neglect in that respect, in any case, great mistake. The %riple Alliance was only political union, while the Franco Russian alliance was of definitely military character, and this constituted great advantage to our enemies.
 Even our arrangements with Austria Hungary in the event of joint war were of the poorest General Count von Schlieffen always feared a breach of faith, which indeed actually occurred. A scheme of mutual operations existed only in the toughest outlines.
 The deployment of the Austro-Hun- garian armies on the further side or the River San was justified only if they felt themselves superior to the Russian army without outside help, as many Austro-Hungarian officers believed or if we cross the River Narew sim ultaneously with strong forces. But this we were not in a position to do, as the last army bill had not granted us the three extra army corps for which the general staff had hoped. CONDEMNS ITALY'S WAR ACTS we now had also f0 make up the western front for Itnly's defalcatiOn. According to former mili- tary engagements with Italy, three Ital- ian army corps and two cavalry dfvi- sions were to help in Alsace, whilst the main body of the army, minus the coast defence forces, were to be assembled on the Franco-Italian frontier. Simultane- ousIy, the fleet was to endenvor to cut France off from her colonies in North Africa.
 These arrangements were in force for some time-but subsequently, lapsed. Then at the express wish of General Polio, chief of the Italian general staff. these plans were once more worked at
 General Peilio died in the summer of 1S14--shortly before the outbreak of war. There was not the least neces- sfty for France to leave even . single soldier on her southeast frcntier; she could employ every soldier against ms. for she knew perfectly well that Italy would not come into the war on our side.
 Our former ally thus did us untold harm. Her attitude toward England was not to be misunderstood. Animosity certainly existed between Italy and Austria-Hungary, but although this was of long standing, it did not prevent Italy entering into an alliance with us and Austria-Hungary. This alliance brought Italy many advantages, and we naturally expected that she would feel under an obligation to us.
 A healthy national egotism Is easy to understand, and is found in every na- ton. But there are certian ethical laws which must not be violated, and that is precisely what Italy did. So she can not complain of the adverse criticism we leveled at her during the four years of war.
 NEAR MANIPULATION
 The Eighth army at this time could quite easily have sent some corps to the western front. I do not know whether the idea was ever considered by general headquarters. or whether the situation of the Austro-H Hungarian army made it out of the question.
 The latter, as I now realize, was unfortunately retreating, completely de- feated, across the San with terrible losses. The Russians were following them up. A Russian invasion of Mo ravia and then Upper Silesia seemed possible. The ro-Hungarian army would have to be supported if 1t were not to be annihilated.
 An advance of the Eighth army across the Narew, the operation which had tember, would now have been useless Help must be sent immediately and could not be too powerful. We were not able to reinforce the western front
 Tn the instructions which I received at Insterburg on the evening of the 14th it was stated that two corps of the Eighth army were to form from the southern army in Upper Silesia. This looked like nothing more than de- fensive measure: at any rate, it would be quite inadequate to restore the sit- uation in Galicia- We had not merely to hold the enemy in cheek; lwo had to act.
 Accordingly, in a conversation over the telephone. suggested, both to gen. eral headquarters and General von Moltke himself, that tho whole of the Eighth army should be sent to Upper Silesia and Posen under General von Hindenburg, who had just been put in command.
 HINDENBURG USED HIS PLANS
 In spite of the danger that Russia would bring up fresh forces in further attempt to invade the unfortunate prov ince of East Prussia, only weak forces should be left for it's protection certainly hoped that such an invasion operations arrangements had been made to streng then and extend the defences of Lotzen and tho Lakes.
 We not only insisted that a scheme should be drawn up, but that the work should be put in hand at once. The Angerapp line was also to be fortified These measures were the effect of the altered situation, and subsequently proved to have been thoroughly justi- fled.
 General von Moltke promised that my suggestion should be considered, and gave me short account of the sudden change in the situation on the western front Up to that time we had only heard rumors of it. General von Moltke was deeply moved by the state of af- fairs in the west.
 Tint was my last official conversa- tion with this remarkable man. He had a keen grip of military affafrx, and could handle . great plant of cam psign with extraordinary mastery. But he lacked vixor and his ineIinn- tiOns were mere pacficist than warlike. can recall many of my interviews with him.
 At the beginning of the war his health had been seriously affected by to cures at Carlsbad, which he under went within a period of few months
 At this time the war minister, Gener- al von Falkenhayn, began to direct op- erations.
 On the evening of September If Il took leave of General von Hindenburg and of my comrades. I did not find it easy to leave the commander in chief and the staff after two victorious bat