The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-12-01

as Tar as this. My immediate object
 was to obtain the imperial ehancellor's consent to a pronounced pro-Lithuan-
 Ian policy Nothing definite resulted
 from this conference.
 On April 23 a second conference took
 place at Kreuznach- After the outbreak
 of the revolution Russia had made ex-
 tensive promises to the Lithuanians.
 Now even the imperial chancellor ad- mitted the necessity of formulating
 clear line of policy with regard to them.
 On April 30 general agreement was | reached to the effect that in the whole of the territory under the commander | in-chief in the east our action was to
 be based on the following principles. Every German was to receive favor
 able treatment but even the merest ap- pearance of forcible germanizaton. of which I had never approved. was to be avoided. The word "germanize" has
 always been abhorrent to me.
 The Bithuanians were to be won over 1 by all possible means, and the White Ruthenes in the northern district to be brought more in touch with them. | Tn consideration of the Poles the lat ter object was not to be pursued in the south.
 Polish propaganda was to be pre- vented. but without coming into con 1 fiiet with the policy of the governor l general of Warsaw by combating it in public.
 TROUBLED BY CATCH WORDS The enunciation of these principles did not finally commit the imperial government. but it did enable us to | follow q settled policy with regard to Inc Lthuanians, On May 30 the com mander-i -ehief in the east, in agree ment with the government, published a decree permitting the formation of Lithuanian confidential council, in which the Ldthuanians were to form the majority the other nationalities be- l ing represented by single members The confidential council was intended to be the official channel by which the wishes of the Lithuanians were to be communicated to the administration
 The general conditions made it more and more imperative clearly to define our intentions in the eastern territo- ries. The catchwoyds peace without annexations" and "self-determination of small nations" which had been in- vented by hostile propaganda, were likely to lead to a solution of the Lithuanian problem which would be detrimental to German interests. It opened the way for the Poles to be- come supreme in districts where they had not hitherto been so.
 On July 21 when the imperial chan eeller Dr. Michae1is, had just attained his exalted position, general headquar- ters approached the foreign office with the proposal to pursue policy of local nationalism in Courland and Lithu- ania. that in Lithuania being definitely Lithuanian in character. We made ott 0 rrv idaaS with regard to these two countries. In both of them Focal councils" were to be instituted.
 BALKED SCHEME. FOR KAISER On July 25 Secretary of State Zim- mermann agreed to our policy being initiated at once. Our success in Ga licia had cleared up the situation still further. The secretary of state merely dissuaded us, "in view of the impossi-
 bility of foreseeing the future" from "binding ourselves publicly, or even only mentally, to the definite project of a personal union." Later on, how
 ever, he declared that he "by no means intended definitely to decline that form of organization"
 When the government would publicly
 announce this policy was it's own af-
 fair: I was content with having ob-
 tained it's consent to a definite policy.
 expressed my satisfaction at our hay
 ing reached an agreement as to the inn
 mediate policy to be followed in the
 territory under the commander-in- chief in the east. The latter received instructions early in August with a
 view to the formation of focal coun cils"
 hoped that. with the necessary
 firmness and perseverance, we should attain our object and that by this ar rangement the Lithuanians would ob
 tain their rights better than by join ing either Russia or Poland. Compe- tent judges among them had perceived that they could only maintain their nationality with the aid of Germany, Among these were the clergy, whose superior intelligence, and tho fact that we had promoted the return of the
 bishop of Kovno, made them well dis posed toward us.
 The Lithuanian democracy believed in the power of the catchword self | eterminat tion," although, in the case of the mixed population of the coun- try, it could not possibly be applied with justice. Being tied up in political theories they did not see the Polish danger which actually menaces their land
 Gle refers to the refusal of the gov ernment set up by Germany to fall in with his schemes TRIED TO ROUSE BULGARS After the outburst of activity in Sep tember another period of quiet set in on the Macedonian front which was To last for some considerable time Cen eral von Scholtz was untiring in his efforts to train the Bulgarian troops and keep them fit for battle. All Ger man commands in Macedonia were working for the same end. The Bull garian general staff, however. as be- fore, took no interest in these impor- tant questions.
 Tn the meantime the entente had not slackened in their endeavors to secure the services of the royal Greek army. King Constantine had been deposed. and his son. Alexander. had succeeded him venizelos ruled the country. The Greek army 11ad been mobilized. but
 the formation Of troops fit for the bat tie line proceeded only slowly. Tn Palestine and Mesopotamia Turk ish affairs became steadily worse. Operations against Bagdad were to begin in the autumn of 1917 or the spring of 1918 start had heen made with the preparations. but in spite of the improvement in the traffic, which resulted from the opening of the tun- nels (through the Taurus mountains which completed the railroad from Con stantinople to Aleppol, little progress was made The service remained bad and irregular. The local commanders. however, believed that with the as sistance given them by our general staff they would be able to overcome all these difficulties. Tn .his they dis played too much confidence in the