The Lamar register., 1919-12-31
mutual recriminatIon.

indenendent American niNisons' cotPs'
or armies. were in the field with deter.
mined purnose would he a severe blow
m German morale and prestige. II was
also certain thai an early appearance
of the larger American units On the
fropt would be mosI beneficial to the
morale of rh- allies themselves.
Accordingly. the first division. on
Ian 10 1918. took over u sector north
of Toul the twenty-sixrh division went
to the Soissons front early in Febru-
ary; the forty-second division entered
the line near Luneville. Feb. Fl. and
the second division near Verdun.
March is. Meanwhile. the hrst army
CORDS headquarters Major Gen. Hunter
LLggett commanding. was organized Al
Neufchateau on Jan. 20. and the plan
TO create an Independent American sec
tor on the Lorraine front was taking
shape.
This was the situation when the
great German offensive was launched
on March 81. 1918.
Figured on 81 Divisions.
The war department planned as
early as July 1917. to send to France
nv June 10. 1918. twenty-oDe divisions
Of the then strength OF 10000 men
each. together with auxiliary and re-
placement troops making a total OF
some G5O.0OO men. While the numbers
fell short of my recommendation of
July 8. 1917. which contemplated Al
least 100000 men by May. 1918. II
should he horne In mind that the
H.. 81 hA
amount Of shipping to become avail
able for military purposes. in which
must he included tonnage required to
supply the allies with steel. coal and
food
On Dec 2. 1917. an estimate OF the
situation WAS cabled to the war depart
ment with the following recommends
tion:
..In view of these conditions. II 10
OF the utmost importance to the allied
cause that we move swiftly. The
minimum number OF troops We should
plan to have In France by the end Of
June Is four army corps Of twenty-four
divisions in addition to troops for serv-
Ice OF the rear This figure Is given
as the lowest we should think Of and
Is placed no higher because the limit
Of available transportation would not
seem tn wnrlnnf IL.
"A study of transportation facili-
ties shows sufficient American ton
mage To bring over this number OF
troops. but TO do so there must be q
reduction In the tonnage allotted to
other than army needs. The use Of
shipping for commercial purposes
must lie curtaiied as much as posi-.
bile. The allies are very weak and
We must come To their relief this year.
1918. The year after may be too late.
II Is very doubtful II they can hold
on until 1919 unless we give them .
tot Of support this year. II Is there
fore strongly recommended that Q
complete readjustnent of transporta-
tion be made and that the needs OF
the war department as set forth above
be regarded as Immediate"
In the latter part Of January joint
note No. IL. presented by the military
representatives with the supreme war
council. was approved by the council.
This note concluded that France would
be safe during 1918 only under certain
conditions. namely:
THAT the strength Of the British
and French troops In France are con-
tinuousiy kept up to their present
total strength and that they receive
the expected re-enforcements Of not
less than two American divisions per
month"
The 6rst German offensive Of 1918.
beginning March 81. overran all r.
sistance during the initial period Of
the attack. The offensive made such
lnroads upon French and British re-
serves thst defeat stared them 10 the
face unless the new American troops
should prove more Immediately
available than even the most optimis-
tic had dared to hope. On March
27 the military representatives with
the supreme war council prepared
their Joint uote No. IS. This note re-
peated the previously quoted state
ment from joint note No. II. and
continued:
"The battle which is developing At
the present moment In France. and
which can extend to the other thea
ters of operations. may very quickly
place the allied armies In 4 serisus
situation from the point of view OF q.