Omaha daily bee., 1919-04-15
Truth About the S5M
Kansas Civ Star,

Kansas City Star
! The chronicle of the 3sth division. by Mr.
| Clair Kenamore, staff correspondent of the ST.
| Louis Post-Dispatch, abundantly bears out Gov
| ernor Aliens charges that the 35th did not have
proper artillery support in the battle of the
| Argonne.
Who was responsible for this condition, and
| whether blame attaches for it, has not been es-
| tablished. The facts, however. are as Governor
| Allen set them forth.
Mr. Kenamore's statement is detailed and
| specific at every point. Nine divisions were in
army that ever entered battle The artillery
preparation began at 2:3O, on the morning. of
| September 20, with 1900 guns in action. More
than 10000 shells were fired that day by the d.
visiona1 artillery of the 35th. At $50 that morn
ing the .3sth went over the top. preceded by a
tack had got beyond effective support from the
barrage, and bad roads made the task of bring
ing up the guns exceedingly difficult. Only one
battery OF the 10th regiment got into position
again that day.
Virtually after a. M that day the infantry
had no artillery support" Mr.. Kenamore
writes. His explanation of the trouble is vivid:
"The ground over which the guns had to
move had been virtually No Mans Land for
years and was soggy and full OF rank weeds
At every little creek or ditcch the wheels sank
the horses of mounted details were put into
harness to move the guns, but there was not
much progress made"
The situation was so bad at the end of the
first day that General Traub had decided to
delay the attack the next morning until $50 to
permit the artillery to get up. But about mid
night orders came from the corps headquarters
to start at $780, The other divisions were to at
tack at that time, and the corps command did
not wish break to be made in the line by
AAta fha nor Nf %hn A~r1 n1x "a
eral Traub, in command of the 35th, changed his
orders to $780, Mr.. Kenamore writes:
General Traub knew that he would have no
artillery to support the attack at the early hour.
Nothing was farther from his desire than to lose
troops or to. sacrifice men. but he did not feel
that he was justified in taking the matter in his
own hands and delaying the hour for the attack
to $780,"
At the time for the advance only one bat
talon of field artillery was in position. Four
teen could have been used, Mr.. Kenamore says
The result was the attack was made without
the barrage support. The losses were 50 great
that by 10 o'clock the regimental commanders
had stopped it and ordered the men to dig in
But the corps command was taking no excuses.
Pressure came to headquarters of the 35th and
at $3.50 p. m. another advance was ordered to
bring the division up to its eight companions
in the line.
Only 1900 shells were thrown that day by
the divisional artillery against 10000 the day be-
fore. The division paid the penalty in heavy
casualties.
This account fits in we'll with the general
description of the battle given by Col. Frederick
Palmer, chief censor in his series of articles in
Golfers Palmer says we were unprepared for
the offensive, not merely the 35th, but all the
division We had been expecting to make our
big push in the spring and were accommodating
equipment for it. Then Foch discovered that the
German line was cracking and decided on great
advance along the whole front to wind up the
war in 1918 Pershing consented, although he
was short of every sort OF equipment
In effect according to Colonel Palmer, we
took heavy losses last autumn, as the price of
winning the war in 1918 instead of 1919.
The same explanation may apply to the
management of the 35th in the battle of the
Argonne. Possibly it was necessary to sacri-
fee it in order to maintain the advance of the
nine divisions. If that were really necessary
the fathers and mothers of the boys who were
sent in without artillery support will accept the
sacrifice as part of the inevitable cost of vic
tory. Possibly General Traub should have at
there should be delay all along the line to- give
his artillery time to get up. Possibly he did try
and did not succeed. We. do not know. Mr.
Kenamore seems to imply that he accepted
them modified. He writes: General Traub's
conception of the duty of divisional commander
is to obey the orders he receives from corps or
army commanders"
People are not unreasonable. They are ready
to accept the explanation that the losses were
necessary to win the war; that in the long run
it was better to make the sacrifices and win in
1918 than to let the agony go over into 1919,
when the equipment would be ready.
But what they do resent is the constant
evasion by the War department. The depart
ment, instead of being frank, insists that there
we're no mistakes; that there was ample equip
ment; that everything was as it should have
been
Even General Traub, on his recent visit to
Kansas City, gave picture of perfect battle.
There was never time, he said, when the d.
vision was without artillery support. That may
have been true so far as the heavy artillery was
concerned. But the men were stopped almost
in their tracks the second day through lack OF
divisional artillery. In the light of Mr. Kena-
more's chronicle and of Colonel Palmers &C
count of what happened to the 35th, the gen.
erals statement was lacking in candor.
This policy of covering up makes Americans
resentful. They can forgive mistakes. They
cannot forgive Misrepresentation. What they
ask first of ALL is that the War department be
square with them-as it has not been.
Sublime Proof of Mothers Love.
Baltimore American; A pathetic sacrifice Of
fered was that of woman in Troy who wanted
har %o e,rb%