South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1919-09-21

II almost gives one the shivers 10
read Rear-Admiral Sims account
Of the desperate straits in which he
found the allies because OF the Ger
man submarine campaign when he
went 20 England in April. 1917, 10
prepare for our navy's participation
in the war. The story. from the
admiraPs own pen. is now being
published I'm The Worlds Work,
and seems destined 20 cause a
readjustment OF our ideas as 10 the
relative importance OF ou- militia ~
and naval exertions in the struggle
OF nations.
Admiral Sims states that he was
fatty informed by Admiral Jelli-
coe, who was an Old personal
friend; by Lord Balfour, by King
George, and by others in a position
20 know, that the Germans were. at
that time, winning the war Jelli-
coe. a hard headed Briton. then viz
tually commander-in-c chief OF the
empires naval power, stated that
in his opinion the Huns would
force the United Kingdom TO sur
render within four or FIVE months
unless some means were found 70
check materially the sinking OF
merchant ships.
Some Of the Details of Sims rela-
ton Of the shipping situation in the
spring Of 1917 are astonishing read
ing. He says the press reports OF
that period were decidedly mislead-
\
three or four times as much ton
mage as was indicated by the state
ments given out 70 the public. Ger
man boasts OF that time were re-
garded as bluff, but whether or not
the boches really knew the truth,
their predictions OF a forced British
surrender did not so far disagree
with the statements secretly made
by English statesmen and naval ex-
perts 10 Admiral Sims.
Another story which he brands AS
false was that German submarines
were being taken wholesale; like
wise the statement, widely circulat-
ed, that many U-boat crews volun-
tarily surrendered TO the allies. This
report he says, was sent out TO i'm
pair German morale.
Nearly the whole world believed
during the early years of the war
that barrage Of steel nets or mines
was preventing German submarines
from invading the English channel
Sims says this was another fallacy
the original mine barrage placed in
those waters having proved inem-
cacious. Not until 1918 did a new
type OF mine make i possible TO bar
the undersea craft from entering
this front yard of Britain.
Neither did the submarines, as
generally supposed. rely on secret
bases on the Irish and Spanish
coasts. They depended, the ad-
miral says, on their home bases
ing radius was greater than gen
orally supposed. Some submarines
he says. crossed the Atlantic three
or four times without returning to
port.
The trouble with the British sys-
tenn of defense against the subma-
rine campaign was largely that
there were not enough destroyers
These craft were the most efficient
U-boat fighters, and the admiral
rather SCOTS at our arming OF mer-
chant ships, though admitting it
was not wholly useless. But Britain
did not have enough destoyers TO
supply all the demands. In the first
place, about 100 were retained with
the Grand Fleet-a necessary pre-
caution in case of a big naval bat
tie. Some so were used to convoy
transports 20 France-another alb
sOlute necessity. Another consider
able unit was helping the French
and Italians in the Mediterranean.
and at the time Of which Sims
writes, a contingent was being used
to protect hospital ships, which the
Huns were attacking for the very
purpose of drawing off destroyers
engaged in protecting merchant