Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-10-23

Measures we had taken on the Pol
ish frontier by the middle of Novem-
Der, 1914 Gncluding the transfer of
Austrian troops to the southern end
of the line). had resulted in certain
stiffening of the front, but we were
still too weak to deliver dig blow.
1t was natural that in this situation
II was natuarl that in this situation
west. / asked myself whether there
was any chance of obtaining a success
at Ypres or whether it would not be
better once and or all to restrict op-
erationS on the western front to a
defensive, and carrying out the con-
templated operations against Russia
with all our available forces. General
Won Conrad (the Austrian command
err had suggested this in November,
This point of view seemed to me
to be the right one. and | asked our
high command for reinforcements
from the west In addition to two
cavalry divisions. the despatch of fur
Their forces was contemplated but
| these arrived too late and at odd
! times.
Found Troops From the West
Hardly Fit for Hard Battle.
The operation on the flank could
| only attain a military decision if car
| ried out as a surprise, that Is. with
| speed, great concentration of force
and in conjunction with strong from
| tai attack. We dared not delay the
beginning of operations in the east
even If we had seen our way abso-
| lutely clear as regards reinforcements
on the 10th of November.
The troops which came from the
western front had suffered so heavily
in the fighting there that they were
really no more fit for battle than the
eastern troops. The complete tcon-
trast between the conditions in the
Polish theater of war and those in
the west must, necessarily, affect
them adversely at first.
on the question whether, in view
of tle achievements sent to us from
the west, something else could or
| should have been done, | cannot en-
press an opinion, without knowledge
of other factors. For that reason
am unwilling TO offer any criticism
have always held the view, even
when ! was a lecturer at the Kreigs-
kademise, that any criticism not
founded on actual knowledge, only
reflects on the critics.
Shortly after the arrival of vor
| Richthofen's cavalry corps, which
turned up just in time for the ad
vance. Won Hollen's cavalry corps ant
the End and 4th cavalry divisions ap
peared. They were attached to Zas
trow's corps (to the east of the Wis
tula, where a feint was to be medt
against Warsaw from the north).
Gets 225,00O More Troops.
Later, but only after the forward
movement had begun. the following
units were assigned to us: the 3rc
reserve corps, under General vot
Beseler, with the 5th and 9th reserve
divisions; the 18th army corps, under
General Won Fabeck, with the 26tl
infantry division the End army corps
under General Won Linsingen, with the
3rd and 4th inantry divisions. and thu
gath reserve corps, under General vor
Gerok, with the 47th and 4Sth re
serve divisions, cat full strength these
additional units would number more
than 1000 menu These were post
ed according to the requirements o.
the situation.
j The means at our disposal at the
!tIseginning of operations on the 10tf
Eof November were imperfect. but III
spite Of that. an attempt had to b,