Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-10-26

AS this great operation for the lib
Grafton of northern France could not
succeed without the full cooperation
of the British. Haig consented that
Nivelle should exercise supreme COM
mand over the British as we'll as the
French armies. with the single limi
tation that when the battle had ter
minated-and Haig was to decide
this point-full freedom of command
should return to the British field
marshal. In the first hours of this
exercise of command Nivelle got into
difficulties because of the brusQue-
ness of his orders to the British, but
the incident was later politely for
gotten.
Upon the British quite as much as
the French Nivelle made a great i'm
preston. 1t Is not true that British
influence had contributed to his ap-
pointment. The selection was entire
ly a French matter. Still, his mother
had been English. and he spoke the
language with a certain fuency
much exaggerated at the time. His
success with the British was due
rather to his manner, to the dis
tinction of his bearing, to the plausi-
bility Of his statements. Thus he car
ried the British with him, and Haig.
after preliminary objections, willing
1y and Loyalty enlisted as a subordi-
nate in Nivelle's campaign. More
over, for Nivelle himself Haig ac-
quired real admiration, and to those
who talked with him in this period.
he spoke of Nivelle's fighting spirit
in words of unqualified praise.
Nivelle's Indiscretions.
No sooner had Nivelle taken COM
mand than the very firmness of his
faith in the success of his plan led
him to amazing and fatal indiscre-
tions. By January his orders outlin-
ing his great strategic conception
had been issued and transmitted down
to the very commanders of compa-
MES. BY February every village in
France. no matter how small. knew
of the coming of the spring offensive
and knew that 1t would be directed
against the Craonne plateau; what
they knew the Germans were equally
prompt to discover. Preserving a GER
tain element of common sense. Nj
velle first invited Petain to command
a group of armies whose mission 1t
was to storm the Craonne plateau.
Petain promptly pointed out the dis
between the task and the
resources. He did not believe the great
plan would succeed; he said SO. and.
as a result, one of his three armies
was taken from his command and
given to Micheler, Petain was thence
forth ignored.
Meantime conditions changed. The
revolution broke out. 1t be.
came clear that Russia was out of
the war for the time being. This col
lapse brought paralysis to the Italian
offensive. which was planned to coin
eide with the attack on the western
front since it was clear that Italy
would now have to bear the weight of
Austrian troops which would be
from the Russian to the
Venetian front. Joffre's original con-
ception. which fixed November 16,
1915, as the day for launching his or
included as an essential con-
dition attacks by the Russians and by
the Italians. Nivelle's plan had pre-
the same element, but now
the Russians and the Italians were out
of the reckoning.
More than this, in the first days OF
February the Germans suddenly be-
gan their great retreat. Slowly at
first. rapidly later. they drew out OF
evacuated precisely those lines
against which a great offensive might
have been launched with some hope
of success.
On March 4. before the German re-
treat had become general or consid-
cradle. Franchet d'Esperey appealed
to Niyelle for permission to attack
at once as the enemy was about to re-
treat. Nivelle answered on March =
after a three-day delay-that a Ger
man retreat was inconceivable since
the Germans had 80 strongly fortineo
their positions surrounding Roye;
but on the day after the Nivelle dis
patch reached Franchet d'Esperey the
Germans were out of Roye. There
after followed the retreat and pursuit
until the Germans were well behind
the Hindenburg line.
Result of German Retreat.
Instead of an attack in circum-
stances that Nivelle had planned,
Franchet dEsperey's armies now
found themselves beyond the glacis OF
desert twenty-five miles in width.
which was destitute of all means OF
communication confronting position,
to attack which would nvoive
and the employment of formidable
artillery, which could not be brought
nm for many weeks owing to the DE-
struction of the roads.
The great Nivelle plan had been
comprehended in two formidable
thrusts across the rear of the Ger
mans in positions from the somme
near Peronne to Rheims. but the Ger
mans. by retiring. had thus avoided
one Of the two converging thrusts.
Niyelle had envisaged attacks from
two sides of a square and on one slde
an attack was henceforth Impossible.
This was not all. In addition. the
Germans had reinforced their posi-
tions on the Craonne plateau so that
where there had been two lines In
December there were four In FeDru-
ary. as Micheler had reported. iney
had concentrated their artillery
elaborated the caverns and grottos on
the Aisne heights. multiplied their
concrete works and created an almost
impreenable position. At the same
time they were working on their Hin
denburg line.
Nivelle's Hopes Vanish.
Thus, by the middle of March. such
chance of success as there had been
for the Nivelle plan had vanished.
The broad front had been narrowed
by more than half, the remaining half
lad been sown with new defenses and
German reserves released by the Rus
sian revolution were already begin
ming to pour westward. Meantime,
while the chances of success were
thus rapidly disappearing. circum-
stances had combined to create ex-
pectations out of all proportion to
the remaining possibilities. The sre-
treat of the Germans, actually one OF
the most skillful pieces OF strategy In
the whole war. was represented to
the French army and the french pup
lie as a flight-as the beginning OF
the end-aud the French soldiers were
in a white heat of excitement. At the
precise moment when the high COM
, mand save for Nivelle and his imme-
date following was unanimously con-
WINGED of the impracticability of the
great plan, the army was filled with
an optimism as dangerous as 1t was
tremendous Nivelle and the common
soldiers expeeted a supreme victory
but the generals and even the lower
officers recognized the likelihood of a