The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1919-10-15
War Declaration a Mistake.

l urged that in the ultimatum to the
we again emphasize the fact that
iull accord seemed imminent. and that
favorable mediation was already in
progress. The chancellor was greatly
p E OUT oy this suggestion, and de-
clared that this statement had been
made repeatedly, and that Russia's re-
ply had been to mobilize,
~ nave often thought since then that
me kaiser might have done well to send
someone to st. Petersburg, although
me most capable man for the mission,
Son alntze. was then in Mexico, 1
V positive knowledge that the ezar
hlmself fully believed that neither Ger
many nor Russia, but only the other
powers, could gain anything by our
mutual destruction. 1t may be that l
overestimated the power of the czar,
and underestimate Pan-Slavism, but
relying more upon my feelings than
upon my reason, / urged the insertion
or a peace-furthering paragraph in the
ultimatum. 1t would at least have put
the responsibility for what followed
more fully upon our enemies.
On Aug. l l learned, at the bundles
rat conference, that a declaration Of
war had followed our ultimatum to
Russia. We here lost an opportunity
to put to diplomatic advantage the fact
OF u being on the military defensive
against Russia, by not not leaving it
TO Russia to declare war. We should
not have inflamed the ''moujik" with
the conviction that the kaiser meant to
attack the white car. We also should
have remembered that our alliance with
Rumania n with Italy had been
drawn up by Prince Bismarck for de-
fensive purposes. Both states were
under obligation to assist us If France
or Russian should attack us. By our
declaration of war against Russia we
formally gave Rumania the right of de-
sorting us In war, as later we gave
Italy byfour declaration of war against
Editors Note-This statement is a
full admission h Germany's claims
that Rumanfa and italy were false to
their treaties are ~unfounded. 1t is
evident that in 3 similar situation Ger
many would have severed her alliance
II 1t had seemed to be to her advan-
tage.)
1 had the impression at the time that
we were proceeding in a foolhardy man.
ner and that our operations were alb
solutely unconsidered. ! was intensely
reluctant that we, who In reality were
the attacked, should, because of the
lawyers In the foreign office, bear the
odium before the world of being the
aggressors. especially as we could not
intend marching into Russia.
Editors Note-Von Tirpitz's logic is
rather peculiar. 1t appears that II Ger
many. had been able to carry the at
tack into Russia he would have had no
scruples about declaring wary
/ therefore asked the chancellor why
it was necessary to declare war at the
same moment we ordered the mobiliza-
ton. He replied, 1t was necessary be-
cause the army chiefs intended at once
to send troops across the frontier. This
! answer astonished me, because at the
most it could only be a question of
l YofroIC Tttf IN AlAan 1o,pt pANlE,,ar ~,
was SO nervous 1t was impossible even
to speak to him. ! car see him now
wringing his hands as he cried out over
and I'VE again that it was necessary
to declare war.
When I asked Moltke how far the
desire to send troops over the frontier
had necessitated our declaration of war
he told me that there had been no in
t%entlon Of Immediately crossing the
frontier.
why we were the first to declare war.
1t probably was due to extreme con-
scientiousness which forbade us even to
defend ourselves without first making
a formal declaration. Outside Germany
this train Of thought cannot be COM
pretended.
Editors Note-In the light of Ger
man atrocities, breeches of information
al law and disregard of the rights of
iShtl uIo pbNh " blANNiiNNAit eiPS"AP u
dicrous. 1t is probable that Won Tir-
pitt wrote 1t for home consumption and
never expected any but a German to
take it ~seriously.)
In the afternoon of Aug. ! I wal
summoned to be present at the imperial
signing of the declaration Of war, but
owing to a block of traffic I arrived
too late for the formal ceremony. l
learned, however, that the formal ac-
ceptance of the declaration by Russia
had not yet been received, n | even
then urged the sending of a concilia-
tory telegram in the hope that there
was still time to save peace before the
Russians accepted our declaration.
In view Of Moltke's statement that
not even patrols would cross the bor-
der for several days, | asked whether
actual hostilities were to be opened
without the Russian acceptance of our
declaration. / pointed out that there
was no need for us to appear the ag-
gressor.
This question was set aside by a
telegram from L~ichnowsky, German
ambassador to Great Britain, which
gave us the impetus for a last effort
toward peace. In this situation Gheart-
lily supported the chancellor - an
swered him in the affirmative When he
asked me whether we could promise
England not to attack the French
coast.
However, 1t presently appeared that
Lichnowsky had been the victim of a
| misunderstanding and our assurance Of
our not attacking the French coast was
of no avail.
Invasion of Belgium Planned.
During the night of Aug. 1-Aug. :.
our dispute over the declaration Of war
was repeated, this time In respect to
France. The chancellor was of the
opinion hat we must at once declare
wal on France as we intended march
ing through Belgium. / remarked that
| still failed to understand our declara-
ton of war or Russia at the same time
as our mobilization order, and that
could see no reason for declaring war
on France until we marched into France
itself.
| referred TO reports from the am
bassador in London according. to which
the marching through Belgium would
be the immediate cause OF war with
England n | touched on the posi-
htltV of the army hpip0 ob1n ~ oE,n