Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-10-26

ed organizer. OF the 80 divisions the
first II could be ready by May.
The ententes war industry was eX-
tending. The United States had been
added to the number of their con-
tractors Although at first we were
able to hinder the export of war ma
terials from America by social means,
this could not have a lasting effect
In our great struggle this action on
the part of the United States could
only be interpreted by US as evidence
of favoritism toward our enemies Her
behavior reused feelings of the great
est bitterness in us.
1t was to be expected that the Ger
man offensive against Russia would
give rise to enemy attacks on the
western front for her relief. The
critical engagements in May near La
Bassee and Arras. which gave US SO
much anxiety, illustrate the RESPONSE
bility assumed by CHIC. when they
risked a decisive battle in the east
Mackensen Breaks Front.
In the early hours of May General
Won Maekensen, in well prepared
attack brilliantly carried out by the
troops, broke through the Russian
front on the middle Dunajec. During
the next few days the second and
third Russian lines were taken. After
this the Russians withdrew from Hun
gary northWards over the ridge of the
Carpathians. Hungary was freed from
the enemy and the Austrian army
greatly relieved.
1t was high time. for at this time
Italy entered the war.
Her army numbered over 100000
men besides the numerous formations
in second line which were not intend
ed to take part in the fighting imme-
dately. This was an enormous &C
cession of strength to the entente.
BY September the total strength of
the Italian front-line troops had al
ready increased to 900, 900 men.
General Won Mackensen pressed for
ward increasingly in the direction of
Jaroslav on the San and stormed the
bridgehead on May Is. The neighbor-
ing Austrian armies linked up on
either side of the advancing German
troops and the German southern army
also attacked and gained ground to
the north beyond Stryi. At the begin
ming of June Przemysl was again
wrested from the Russians.
North of the upper Vistula the Rus
slams abandoned the Nida and with
drew toward the Vistula. General Won
Woyrsch was able, in midMay. to
advance as far as Kielce while keep
ing his left wing in position.
EnciPcling Plans Fail.
The Russian armies between the
Carpathians and the Pilica had thus
been obliged to abandon their posi-
lions and lost heavily in so doing. But
speaking generally, the allies We're on
ly able to follow up with frontal at
tacks, although they made desperate
endeavors to effect local encircling
movements, and more particularly to
fall on the western flank of the Rus
sian Carpathian army.
An attempt at an enveloping
movement made by the right wing of
the Austrian army in the Bukovina
was frustrated; 1t was not strong
enough, and ended IN a withdrawal
before enemy pressure.
The difficulty of keeping up COM
munications with the rear stopped the
advance on the San for time. These
difficulties were overcome early in
June, and the attack was resumed,
The heaviest fighting always fell to
the German troops. On June % Lem
berg was recovered. and soon after
WdluS INdbd fuShd was SlOTIleu, anu
the Russians were forced to retreat
still further toward the Bug. They
were simultaneously continuing their
retreat down the Vistula in the direc-
ton of Lublin- Ivangorod.
Lacks Troops for Attack.
At LotZen we had, of course, watch.
ed the progress of events in Galicia
with the greatest anxiety. and never
| ceased to make plans. aiming at more
| active support of the operations
against Russia. At the moment our
forces were seriously reduced. But
the Russian forces on our front, espe-
cially in front of the 9Th army, had
weakened.
The enemy had also withdrawn
troops for Galicia from the southern
frontier of West and East Prussia
They had moved troops from the
front facing the 10th army to Lithua-
MIA when we invaded that province.
The enemy front, therefore, was thin
ner all along the line. We had also
withdrawn a good many troops by
degrees and surrendered them for the
operations in the southeast.
We should be able to do so more
as time went on, but with such an
enormously long front there had to be
limit to the process. Our positions
had, at any rate, to be manned suffi-
GENTLY to permit of the relief of each
individual soldier. 1t was not until
June, when general headquarters as
signed some newly formed Land
sturm regiments to us, that we were
able to think of preparing divisions
for our own offensive operations.
More effective support of General
Won Mackensen's operations would be
forthcoming when we ourselves were
able to initiate an extensive movement
against the enemy. This was impos-
sible on the fronts occupied by the
9Th army Gin the bend of the Vistula
west of Warsaw, Gallwitz's army de-
tachment (north of Warsaw below
the East Prussian frontier). and the
Sth and 10th armies Cat the eastern
end of East Prussia, and was only
practicable north of the Nienlen in
Luthuania and Courland.
March Into Lithuania.
At the end of March and beginning
Of April we had received from the
western front the 3rd cavalry division
and the Bavarian cavalry division and
these had been sent to Gumbiennen,
as the left wing of the 10th army was
still very weak These two divisions
and the 9Th cavalry division. which
was already stationed north of the
Pregel, were to advance into Lithuania
and Courland at the end OF April, sup