The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1919-06-21

Will England, SupposinG British IN
,o-os,s ore impcrilcd IN Persia. Afghan
istan or Thtbet. refarin from intervening
and address itself 10 the League or Ma
tons?
Will il call III its international aroitra-
| ton court to settle revolt In Egyp'
| India or South Africa?
But are not Indians. Arabians kar.
| frs and Beers human beings. and by inc
| law of nations with equal rights!
Are the English and Americans propos-
! ing to da away with their navies ana
disarm? They have nothing OF the Sort
,, in mind. They regard themselves ratha
"a the strong arms Of the League OF Ma
! tons. the world Entente. called by oes'
, tiny to maintain law and order in tha
! world. tho effective guarantors. by their
own strength. OF the peace Organization
! The world war has resulted just as
! foresaw and predicted. in hegemony,
! world domination OF tho Anglo-SaxonS
! We should recognize this fact, even
though at present il is IN the gulse OF
! a League Of Nations. Its shepherd
song is Rule Britannia" If we do not
J submit TO the decisions or Its Arcopa-
gus, then we have new world war.
! All the rest is moro idNalistic twad-
! die, Nevertheless. England needs US a.
a countcrpoice to France and Russia
1t needs US as customer for its mcr-
| chandise.
Before the war we were the best pat
! rons that British business had. The prln-
! cipal cause Of mutual distrust was our
navy, which drove England into the
arms Of France and Russia
That is done away with. Our colonies
are lost Our foreign trade is annihil-
ated.
/ II VIC were on the point OF a full agree
ment with England before the war. in
spite Of our fleet. our colonies. and our
commercial rivalrics. what reason have
We TO suppose now that our fleet. our
, colonies and our commercial rivalries
have practically disappeared forever.
tho hatred OF the people across the chan
mel will survive indefinitely?
We must be aware. however. that II
will take some time before the old at
tltude Of mind towards US rcvives. Tho
rc-cstablishment Of good relations will
be settled improbably in the future,
and England. consequence. has
nothing more to fear at this sensitive
point. But an all-powerful Spain. Franco
or Russia would be as uncomfortable to
England as German mastery on tho con-
tlncnt. This principle has guided all
England's traditional colonial policies.
it's war against Philip II. Louns XVI
and Nv the French republic, Napoleon
I and Nicholas I.
The other political factor which we
must take into account Is. as I have al
ready said. Russia. assuming that II re-
assemblies itself into federal gov
! eminent
Pismarck's' principle. Back to back
! with Russia" was very apt Unfor-
tunatcly. ne disreSardcd IT from the
time Of the Berlin congress. This error
! of policy persisted and developed as time
went on.
In 1890 he was sptneing back toward
; Russia. He never took the Triple al
lance as seriously as some. 1t was
rather one Of his caprices-an evil ca
price OF a giant. Bismarck wanted to
rheckmatc CiortShokof more than he dad
Russia. Our cStrangemcnt from Russia
was tho carolina! failure OF his era
During the period Immediately pre-
rrding tho war-that epoch Of diplo-
matte brainlcssness-this error, rather
than our neglect Of England. prcclpitat-
cd the world catastrophe. return 70
tasks Of our future foreign policy. This
should be n cordial understanding rather
than an alliance
Every alliance. even q defensive one,
assumes some common enemy. II is dir
| Getty against n third power. This atti-
! tudc Of opposition invariably extends 70
things which were not originally the
purpose OF the alliance.
Any alliance with Russia would mean
an agreement directed against England
1t Is \ W idcly entertained error that
cordial relations with Russia would nee:
essarily moan hostility to England and
that we arc compelled in a way to choose
between Russia and England.
Quite tho reverse.
An agreement between England and
Grmany will be facilitated BY good re-
lationS with Russia, II W" try TO dis,
burden Russia Of its difficulties. instead
81 endearoring to mlslcad as We did be,
in Asia and tn" Orient.
, II is true that the recent friendship
between Russia and England was oui
work. II was the result Of a comrhor
| irritation Of those countries with US. The
RuSsianFrcnCh alliance was equally s
. consequence Of the Berlin congress anC
. tn" renewal OF IN" Triple Alliance after
dcnOuncing the reinsurance treaty. W.
}. must bear in mind. however. that il viii
not be as easy to r"cstablish good rela
: tons with the Russia of today as +
I would have been with the Russia OF thu
TsarS. viii h was constantly appealing
= 10 us: Give up Austria and We Will Civ
up France
I We have succeeded in making our
. selves thoroughly hated in that countr!
also. and therefore. shall have to permi
under it5 protection.
Charles Rivet for many years repres
9 entatlN" of Tens in PctrOgrad. conclude:
= his interesting book. lie Denier Roman
, OF. with this rcmark: May we have sue
cceded il this book in giving at least
: glimpse OF the Russia that was and ha!
DISAPPEARED forever in order TO make i
5 obvious that the adversnrics Of German,
I are gong TO gain by the fall OF the las
. ! Romanof'
When Russia was profoundly excitct
In consequence OF the foolish mission o
g l.:man Won Saunders. and the Frencl
II press was actively pouring oil upon tn
: fire. Mr.. Sazonofr said to me: Whatcve
: you may do. sir, you will not ernbroil u
with Germany Mr.. Rivet adds. But 1
was precisely Germany that took 1t upo,
= herself in 1918 to do what the excellen
o Mr.. Sszonon thought could not be done
T We have nothing 10 fear from RuSsi
a and never have had.
= The so-called PanSlayism and tn
. Moscow imperialism wcrc directed
against Austr'aHunGary. Turkey. Per
, sla Central Asia. China and Japan, an
not againsc us. except SO far as W
3 throw ourselves In frunt of Austria
x Hungary and Turkey. On the contrary
tn" political situation affords a sur
i basis for agreement and friendship be
tween ourselves and Russia.
The Polish question. which we oul
selves brought INTO the world By erect
s ing buffer state between ourselves an
/ an entirely imaginary Russian threat
: thinking that thereby We would insur
II the gratitude Of the Poles undoubte
& presents ono Of the very difficult. II 40
Il tho most difficult. problem which on
fnr ~ u