The Chattanooga news. [volume] (Chattanooga, Tenn.) 1891-1939, 1919-09-08
Bethman-Ho1lweg Precipitated War
Won p His Memoirs Declar Germany Was Forced Into War
Prematmey and Then Und ertakes to Fix Responsibility

speak, was already leader in naval
methods. We soon realized that
either we would have to build more
ships ourselves or permit others to
use our ideas. so we chose to build.
Although, when the world war broke
out, the period of England's tactical
torpor and vague maneuvering was
long past, we even, at that time, were
superior to the British in the quality
of our ships as well as our tactical
performances. However, they were
still numerically superior in spite OF
our efforts in building a navy.
| / consider that these years COM
prised my best work for Germany
They were devoted to developing the
navy, its methods and maneuvers and
to inspiring the fleet with an unsur-
passed military standard. But, as
with all the other German leaders,
the tactical, strategical part of my
| life work lacks the stamp of crown
ing success.
Criticizes Lack of Courage in
German lie aders.
! At the beginning of the war, the
unfounded prestige of the British
fleet robbed the man then at the head
low our fleet to strike for victory at
a moment when it had the best
| chance of success,
Thus England won a psychological
naval victory at the beginning of the
war without firing a shot.
The sea fight off the coast of Jut-
land (battle of the Skagerrak) might
have changed the face of the world S
history If it could have been fought
to a finish. 1t was interrupted by
nightfall.
The bitterest fate which befell the
German fleet and me was the fact that
| was not permitted to sail with the
fleet to take part in that battle.
The battle of the Skagerrak was the
climax of our belated efforts to COM
pete with England on the sea. Our. en-
deavors were always concentrated in
developing the army, and the eyes OF
the German masses were for the hrst
time opened to the necessity for the
construction of fleet after the jane
son raid took place.
The telegram from the Boer president.
Kruger, following this raid. and asking
for German support, fell like bolt
from the blue. These established rela-
tons between the South African re-
public and Germany, revealed by this
telegram, resulted in a great outburst
of hate, envy and rage against Ger
many in England.
The German public opinion at this
time applauded the Kruger telegram.
In the years following, this telegram
was a nucleus for repeated wordy wars
against England l consider that this
telegram as well as all subsequent
provocations of England were regret
able and dangerous. This attitude on
trayed a complete lack Of comprehen-
sion of England, of her power, and of
her weaknesses. This still more i'm
periled our attempt to create an ade-
quate navy, in itself difficult because
delayed. However, this was an oppor-
tune time to use our best efforts to
develop sea power and bald an ade-
quate navy since England, because OF
her isolated position and her own diff
culties with the Beers. then was so
preoccupied that she was not likely to
observe our endeavors.
These developments were all reflected
in the events during the first months
of the world war.
AS in previous years, my advice as to
the conduct of the war was consistently
rejected From the first, l made every
effort to convince Bethmann Hollweg
that England was our principal enemy
and that land victories for Germany
were futile unless England should be
beaten on the sea.
had no previous knowledge of
Schrieffen's plan of attacking France
through Belgium and directly attribute
that its failure resulted from the war
office not having foreseen and provided
for the military requirements which
were bound to be the consequences of
this attempt at a gigantic outflanking
movement.
Two More Army Corps Needed.
In both 1911 and 1912 l recommended
the addition of two army corps to the
German forces. l now believe, and
German grand headquarters Endorsed
this opinion. that If these two army
corps had been added when l urged it,
the war against France would have been
won in 1914. l was perpetually warn
ing the German military leaders against
under-r rating the British army. At the
outbreak OF the war l again took pains
to warn the chief of the general staff
against thinking too lightly of these
British troops which army. so to speak.
consisted entirely of sergeants. He
answered.:
We will arrest them"
l further insisted 10 Won Moltke. in
1914, on the Importance of getting to
Calais and severing British commune
cations, but Won Falkenhayn, then chief