Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-05-25

bad arisen against the chief Of stafr.
The reason for this latter feeling IL
somewhat inexp1icable: fDr Cen. March
Is not only an able officer, but he was
the chief Of star under wIcse rule, the
reorganization Of the War Department
was in great part Conducted. although
rot by him begun, and without that re-
lost.
\ The bureau system, under which
the department was operating up to
December, 1917. has proved wholly in
adequate to the task OF raising,
training, equipping and supplying the
enormous armies which the threat
ened German successes forced upon
the United States. Civilian commits
sions organized for war production
the Council of National Defense, food
commission, coal commission. War
Industries Board. chipping board
all as operated had failed to func-
ton with one another. and then sud
SO slightly advertised that 1t was
scarcely observed. The great, reor-
ganization came in the War Depart
ment, and it was in no small measure
due to the efforts OF Gen. March and
Of Maj. Gen. Goethals, the latter in
charge of Army supply Gen. Cocktails
was made acting auartermaster gen
eraI in December, 1917, and Gen.
March returned from. France and as
sumed office March 2, 1919. 1t Is not
to be supposed that they effected the
great reforms in the department OF
military peratfons and supply OF
the Army without opposition Of the
bitterest type. Without the support
Ct the President the War Department
would have crumpled and disinte-
grated under the strain. While the
reorganization of Army supply was
left in the main to Gen. Cocktails
Gen. March devoted the greatest at
tary operations and to the general
reorganization Of the entire department.
The object was simple: The difference
to be overcome were many. and only TO
be overcome by methods that at times
seemed ruthless; but he rescued the de-
partment from chaos The reorsaniza-
ton was far rom, completed when the
armistice was signed: it was far from
perfect in the eyes OF those VINO had
worked hardest to accomplish it. The
fact remains that the department was
completely made over and made into a
machine that at least would function.
It was accomplished under fire" and it
saved the Army and the department
from, utter failure.
Congress cannot afford for any rea-
son whatever to overlook the facts
any more than it can afford to neglect
workable in times of war. and hence
II Is worthless for use when there IL
mot state of war, since, tt war
should again break out, it would again
be necessary to give up the. worthless
system and go back to one that gives
results. If by any chance Congress
should permit a return to the nation al
defense act without providing that
the present or an improved stan sys-
tenn of Army control be retained, all
the good work of the staff would be
undone, at least as far as development
of q rational system of Army orgaEf-
nation is concerned. 1t is extremely
doubtful whether one person in twen-
ty srasps to any extent the impor-
lance Of this change, or the courage
and force that the men who made 1t
exercised. Therefore, no feeling Of
. personal nature should stand in the
way Of careful study of what the
chief of staff has contributed to the
success Of the reorganization that
spelled the difference between success
and failure; nor can 1t be made toe
plain that they had not fully accom-
plished their work at the time the
armistfce was signed. They had not