The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1919-12-16

! tailing her supply of coal or iron, | would have a decisive effect in fore ing a withdrawal of German troops from northern France. The military and economic situation of the enemy, ! therefore, indicated Lorraine as the | field promising the most fruitful re- suits for the employment of our ar mies.''
 American arms drew first blood, l the report shows, at Passchendaele l Ridge. Nov. 6-1O, 1917 when the 11th 1 engineers joined the British in a sue ! cessfuI attack which was part of d general operation designed ito hinder 1 the German conquest of Russia and
 to prevent, if possible, an attack on Italy, or in the near east"
 1 So afterward, however, came the i collapse of Russia. and the Italian 1 debacIe at Caporetto, with the result 1 that the enemy's legions began to 1 gather thickly in France. Allied com i manders viewed the situation with 1 frank apprehension, General Persh- i ing's report indicates. and the l pressure for an accelerated movement ! of American divisions was felt from ! all sides. At the same time came the l suggestion that American units be I brigaded with French and British in 1 order that no time be wasted in 1 training. In this connection, the gen 1 eraI reports:
 My conclusion was that, although l the morale of the German people and i of the armies was better than it had i been for two years, only an untoward l combination of circumstances could | give the enemy a decisive victory be-
 fore American support as recom- 1 mended could be made effective, pro- l yided the Allies secured unity of ac- l ton. However, a situation might arise l which would necessitate the tempor- | ary use of all American troops in the
 units of our Allies for the defensive,
 but nothing in the situation justified | the relinquishment of our firm pur- l pose to form our own Army under
 our own flag.
 While the Germans were practic- 1 ing for open warfare and concentrat- 1 ing their most aggressive personnel
 in shock divisions, the training of the
 Allies was still limited to trench war
 fare. As our troops were being train 1 ed for open warfare, there was every l reason why we could not allow them l to be scattered among our Allies, | even by divisions, much less as re- l placements, except by pressure of 1 sheer necessity. Any sort of perman- 1 ent amalganation would irrevocably l commit Americas fortunes to the 1 hands of the Allies. Moreover it was 1 obvious that the lack of homogeneity 1 would render these mixed divisions 1 difficult to maneuver and almost cer- | tain to break up under stress of de- i feat, with the consequent mutual re- 1 crimination. Again, there was no 1 doubt that the realization by the i German people that independent American divisions, corps, or armies i were in the field with determined d 1 purpose would be a severe blow to | German morale and prestige.''
 1 General Pershing had refused utter | 1y to drop his plan for a single American army, acting under it's own 1 flag, but consented, because of the | existing emergency, to lend the com l bat divisions at hand to help stem
 the German offensive of 1918 which, | the allied war council foresaw may | very quickly place the allied armies in
 a serious situation
 The German rush developed as ex- pected, the report shows, but the | enemy's success was far greater than
 had been feared: At Amiens, the | British were driven in on a 4O-kilo- | meter front; between the Disc and Berry -Bac, the French lost 50 kilo- | meters on a 35-kilometer front in 4 CayS. Ana 11nmedlately the Germans , utilized the Marne "as a defensive flank and the advance was directed
 toward Paris
 ''The gravity of the situation" the l report says, led to the famous orders for holding up all supply and troop
 shipments except infantry and ma l chine gun units" General Foch who
 was now made generalissimo esti- mated that 100 American divisions
 would be necessary for Allied victory. General Pershing at this time was
 recommending that his troops be | used to smash the Marne pocket
 into which the Germans had thrust | themselves. He says:
 "The Murne salient was inherent ! y weak and offered an opportunity for a counter offensive that was
 obvious. If successful. such an op-
 eration would afford immediate re- lief to the Allied defense, would re-
 move the threat sagainst Paris, and | free the Paris-Nancy Railroad. But, | more important that all else, it would
 restore the morale of the Allies and 1 remove the profound depression and fear then existing. Up to this time 1 our units had been put in here and