The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1919-12-16


 proved themselves equal to any troops in Europe. As early as June g and again on July 10 at Bombon, I had very strongly urged that our best di- visions be concentrated under Ameri- can command if possible, for use as striking force against the NIarne salient. Although the prevailing view among the Allies was that American units were suitable only for the de- fensive, and that at all events they could be used to better advantage under Allied command, the sugges- ton was accepted in principle, and my estimate of their offensive fight ing qualities was soon put to the test.''
 Although his suggestion was not accepted, American forces found glory in the action which was under
 taken. At Chateau-Thierry, when the Germans first advanced, the Sd
 division commander reported:
 Although the rush of the German troops overwhelmed some of the front-ltne positions, causing the in- fantry and machine-gun companies to suffer, in some cases a 50 per cent. loss, no German soldier crossed the road from FOssoy to Crezancy, except as a prisoner of war, and by noon
 of the following day (JuIy 16) there were no Germans in the foreground of the Third Division sector except the dead.
 "On this occasion,~ General Persh- ing added, "a single regiment of the Sd division wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals.
 It prevented the crossing at certain points on its front, while on either flank the Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counter-attacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.
 Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed here and on the field of Soissons by the 1st and 2d df- visions, the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the allies. # ''ThS force of American arms had been brought to bear in time tc 1 enable the last offensive of the enemy l to be crushed"
 Organization of the 1st American army and preparations for its maider eftort-the elimination of the St Mi. hIel salient was now taken up. Again I it was proposed that American troop: l reinforce the French for the opera. | tion but Pershing again objected: H: | explains:
 The plan suggested for the Ameri. 1 can participation in these operations 1 Wses not acceptable to me because i l would require the immediate separa. l tion of the recently formed Firs 1 American Army into several groups 1 mainly to assist French armies. Thi. 1 was directly contrary to the principle l of forming a distinct American army l for which my contention had been in. | sistent. An enormous amount O. 1 preparations had already been made i in construction looking to the use ant 1 supply of our armies on a particular | front. The inherent disinclination o- i our troops to serve under allied com. 1 manders would have grown anC l American morale would have suffer. l ed. My position was stated quite l clearly that the strategical employ ment of the First Army as uni ] would be undertaken where desired l but its disruption to carry out thes5 proposals would not be entertained. "A further conference at Marsha 1 Foch's headquarters was held on Sep l tember 2, at which General Petair
 was present. After discussion the ques ! ton of employing the American army 1 as a unit was conceded. All the Allied
 armies were to be employed in a con verging action. The British armies supported by the left of the F'rencf 1 armies, were to pursue the attack il 1 the direction of Cambrai; the center
 of the French armies, west O. 1 Rheims, would continue the actions
 already begun, to drive the enemy 1 beyond the Aisne; and the American | army, supported by the right of the | French armies, would direct it's at
 tack on Sedan and Mezieres.
 Tt should be recorded that al 1 though this general offensive wa: | fully outlined at the conference n< 1 one present expressed the opinior l that the final victory could be wor
 in 1918. In fact, it was believed b. | the French high command that thf ] Meuse-Argonne attack could not bt
 pushed much beyond Montfaucon be fore the arrival of winter would force
 a cessation of operations.
 l 'The choice betwen the two sectors
 that east of the Aisne including the 1 Argonne Forest, or the Champagne | sector, was left to me. In my opinion
 no other Allied troops had the morale
 or the offensive spirit to overcome | successfully the difficulties to be me
 in the Meuse-Argonne sector and oul
 plans and installations had been pre-
 pared for an expansion of operation.
 in that direction
 ''The salient had been held by the 1 Germans since September, 1914 I | covered the most sensitive section O. 1 the enemy's position on the Westerr Front; namely, the Mezieres-Se
 Metz Railroad and the Briey Iror | Basin; if threatened the entire region l between Verdun and Nancy, and in | terrupted the main rail line from 1 Paris to the east. It's primary l strength lay in the natural defensive | features of the terrain itself. The 1 western face of the salient extended
 along the rugged, heavily wooded 1 eastern heights of the Mouse; the 1 the southern face followed the neigh ts l of the Mouse for 8 l1ilometers to the l east and then crossed the plain of the l Woevre, including within the German | lines the detached heights of Loup. | mont and Montsec which dominated l the plain and afforded the enemy un.
 usual facilities for observation The ] enemy had reinforced the position. 1 by every artificial means during 2 l period of four years"
 l ''The operation was carried out witt
 entire precision,'' the general con- l