Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-12-23
BY FRANK II. SIMONDS.

as the treaty of Versailles is con-
cerned.
First: A general conviction that
some treaty will be ratified within
the next three months.
| Second: An unmistakable strength
| ening of the tone and feeling of the
| republican senators. who stood solidly
for reserVat tons, growing out of the
absence of any general or impressive
! public protest over the defeat of the
| treaty Il few weeks ago.
Third: The Improvement of the
health of the President himself. who
| is described as becoming more de-
termined in his insistence upon de-
feating reservations, notably those in
| cluded in Article Y, which he regards
! as fatal to the moral force of the
document negotiated by him in Paris.
On the surface of things the posi-
| ton of the Senate and of the Presi-
dent would seem to point to long
continued deadlock, but the reason
| that many observers expect rela-
| lively rapid accommodation of rival
views is found in the fact that many
| democratic observers. and republican
| testimony on this point is worthless,
| forecast larger democratic defec-
ton from the Presidents position in
the weeks following the Christmas
, holidays.
| Situation Is Clear.
| At bottom the Washington situation
| is very clear. On the one hand the
President stands firmly to his con-
ception of what the league of ma
| tons is to be. He remains in the
mood of his Paris utterances. He
| sees. none better and none more
clearly that such amendments, now
become reservations as are today the
lrreducible minimum of republican
and for that matter. minority demo-
1 oyaf 10 do, ,lr $-.1-
| heart of the ideal he had for the
| league of nations.
Despite illness and frankly con-
| coded disappointment at the failure
| of the country to give unmistakable
evidence of it's support of his ideal
| istic program, the President is by no
| means satisfied that this public fail
| ure is permanent, and as his strength
returns his disposition Ito fight it out
| on this line. if it takes Sall summer"
| is recognized and testified to by those
who should be nearest to him.
The Presidents mood and concep-
ton are very little appreciated
either in the country or even in
Washington. because in both places
the inside history of the Paris con-
ference is little known. The reserva
tions proposed have excited no wave
! the country has only vaguely and
dimly been informed of the actual
course of American policy in Paris.
But the President sees accurately
that. unimportant as the main reser-
vations. exclusive of the preamble
and certain other offensive details,
outwardly appear they actually go to
the very heart of the idea which he
champioped in Paris. To argue that
mere obstinacy and self-willed deter
mination dominate his course is. in
my judgment, to reason incorrectly.
The real truth is that the President
finds on the democratic as well as on
the republican side imperfect under
standing of the larger aspect of his
Paris program. the moral values
course He knows always what he
represented to be American desires
at Paris. what he described Amerl-
can idealism to be, and he knows, as
does every one who was in Paris,
that the treaty which could be rati-
fed now, with the reservations today
unacceptable, constitutes an actual re-
pudiation of that American policy he
voiced one year ago.
Presfdent's Underlying Iden.
Underlying all else in the Presi-
dents Paris course was the idea OF
American responsibility in world af-
fairs, the league of nations was only
a technical formulation of a new pol
icy. America, as lie and his asso-
ciates over and over again explained.
had broken with past isolation and
had come to Europe prepared to as
sumo burdens and responsibilities,
moral and material alike, provided the
actual peace terms conformed to
those fourteen points, which repre-
Sented in his mind American will, be-
cause, when he first uttered them.
nearly two years ago. they met with
universal acclaim within the United
States.
Now the spirit of all the Senate
reservations is absolutely contrary to
the Presidents own view of the real
and right spirit of America. The
reservations themselves the most rea-
sonable, hardly less than the most eX-
IRENE, openly limit, circumscribe,
practically abolish American respon-
sibility or concern with European and
world affairs. They reduce the treaty,
SO far as America is concerned, to
little more than formal assent to the
material terms imposed upon Ger
many and with these the President
was never much concerned. precisely
as, even during the war, his attention
was fixed upon the ordering of the
world, to the obtaining of new
constitution of world relations after
the struggle had terminated in Ger
man defeat.
Difference Is Fundamental.
1t is therefore a mistake. in my
judgment, 10 DISMISS the present con-
hict as merely partisan or wholly
personal. If political and human con-
Siderations enter into the affair, as
they manifestly do. there is some
thing far more important. there is a
real clash between two totally diff
ferent conceptions of American duties
in the world, both to herself and to
the rest of mankind. This is why COM
promise is so exceedingly difficult.
Any compromise, such as must be
made by the President, any conces-
sion which would lead to a useful and
must constitute for him surrender
of that ideal for which he fought in
Paris. to realize which, he went to
Paris.
On the. other hand. it is not mere OBJ
stinacy which animates the President,
| it is not less clear that it is not mere
partisanship which dominates the
course of many republicans. of some
democrats in the Senate. These men
differ absolutely from the President
! in their conception of the duties OF
America, of the role of America IN
| the world. They are honestly opposed
| to entering into such contracts as they
see in the treaty of Versailles as II
stands, they are unequiVocally OPP
posed to any undertaking by their
country of the mission the President
accepted for the nation at Paris
! Why Solution Is Coming.
Why in this situation is there
! Washington belief that the end Will
| come relatively soon? What is the
possible termination of an absolute
deadlock? The answer is plain. II
| the large majority of the democratic
senators still support the President In
his stand. Washington feels that they
| are becoming Influenced by the un-
| mistakable demand on the part OF the
nation for a restoration of peace; the
| ca pital recognizes that these democratic