Evening journal., 1919-03-26
The End and The Means
From The Nation }

by calling It a direct primary" This
It may be, too. which viii foist this
alliance-constract upon the people OF
the United states. by calling it the
league OF nations"
An equally insidious and undoubtedly
more powerful appeal Is made by this
covenant also TO the spirit Of easy op-
portuhism. Compromise Is the rule OF
the world. Suppose 10 Is not all one
wants. still, It Is something. and per-
haps one should support il more or less
on faith in its being a start in the right
direction. But that IS precisely what Il
is not II has no quality or character
istio which essentially differentiates Il
from treaties that have hitherto bound
the Europeah states into competitive
and predatory groups. The war has
made the liberal spirit impatient Of
/ opporunism and compromise II all
the cost and sacrifice involved IN a
struggle 10 make the world safe for
/ democracy" have purchased nothing
better than a rescript Of old treaties,
If il has not brought about the prac-
! tical affirmation Of a single essential
democratic principle. we canhot see any
place for opportunism in Judgment.
| Faith, under such circumstances, IS not
faith, but indolent. shirking credulity.
we have never discussed the proposed
! alliance-cOntract from the nationalist
point Of view, for those aspects OF 10
are sure TO be quite fully set forth by
others. We agree with J. A. HObson
/ that "for. America IL would be an en-
tangling alliance" and as such subver-
sive Of our best traditions-and indeed,
as President Wilson himself admitted.
subversive Of certain elements Of our
Independent sovereignty. These may be
valuable or not; we think they are far
too valuable 10 surrender. What in
terests US especially, however, Is the
kind OF hands into which they are pro-
posed TO be surrendered: and we ind
the terms Of the covenant far from
reassuring. Any proposal TO surrender
them into the hands Of group Of gem
tlemen like those assembled at the Paris
conference. for instance. 10 permit them
to serve the purposes ard carry out
the motives which the Lloyd Georges.
Clemenceaus, 0rlandos. Balfours, Lam.
sings and Sazonovs have exhibited with
unfailing regularity, throughout their
course Of public life. appears to US alb
solutely inadmissible. But we are con-
tent 10 leave this view OF the covenant
10 Senator Knox and his associates,
knowing that they will say everything
for it that can be said. We concern
ourselves by preference with that
special view Of the covenant which may
perhaps without prejudice be called
the liberal view-and that without any
inflated pretensions 10 being an organ
Of liberal opinion. We are simply in
the very considerable number Of those
whom President Wilson, by keeping up
his perpetual semblance Of hitting the
right nail on the head without ever
really doing it, has bemocked and de-
luded: and in all we shall 1nd TO say
about the league covenant. we speak
only for ourselves and such Of this
humber as agree with us.
The. first half-dozen OF the fourteen
points" were calculated to raise liberal
hopes and stimulate liberal enthusiasm
above measure. Understood for what
they meant in the plain natural sense
Of language-and not for whatever Mr..
Wilson's subsequent CLOSES might
make them mean-they coud reasonably
be accepted, and by many were accept
ed, as a definite statement OF the pur-
poses for which the Allies were fight
ing-the purposes for which the United
States, at least. was certainly flghting
Open diplomacy; freedom Of the seas;
freedom Of trade: disarmament; the
principle Of self-determihation; and the
rights OF small nations-such was Mr.
Wilson's lofty bid for the liberals