davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02

ing either the German right wing or the
German left wing. He was trying to
crush the Marine salient by breaking
through operation on the west side.
Won Freytag- Loringhoven claims that
the Germans won Gamma victory over
the Russians at Tannenberg in 1914 and
over the Rumanians at Hermannstadt in
1916. But they never realized Count
Schlieffen's pet idea in the West. By
coming south through Belgium in Au-
gust, 1914, the younger Won Moltke hoped
to enevlop the French left wing east of
Paris. His simultaneous operation on the
Nancy front was intended to shake loose
and envelop the French right wing, rest
ing on the Lorraine border. Then the
French armies would have had to retreat
in disorder south Of the Seine and west
of the Mouse. Paris would have fallen
and all the eastern frontier would have
been cleared
But through a fatal miscalcuaton of
the strength and fighting quality of the
French armies all these plans went awry
Instead Of enveloping the French left to
the east Of Paris the German armies in
that region were themselves threatened
with development by Maunoury's flank
ing movement out of the capital. Won
Kluck saved the German Western armies
by'a quick shift Of front. But a German
retreat to the Aisne had become inevi-
table. Meanwhile the attack on Nancy
had ended in fiasco.
Schlieffen's strategy broke down COM
pletely. This was not the younger Won
Moltke's fault, although he was quickly
made the Kaiser's scapegoat. He suf-
fered for the shortcomings of Others
Yet if his dismissal had been coinci-
dent with a radical change in German
military policy, it would have been en-
tirely justified. 1t would have indicated
that there we're minds at German head
quarters capable Of reading the signs in
the military armament.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02
The Verdun
Failure

Inc Verdun campaign was an unrelieved
failure. 1t cost Won Falkenhayn several
hundred thousand casualties. 1t depleted
his precious strategic reserve. 1t gave
France new sense of security, and it
did not delay by week the anticipated
Allied offensive in Artois and Picardy.
Falkenhayn was dsgraced. linden
burg was promoted to be Chief of Staff.
and Germany returned to a patient de-
fensve in the West. For second time
the pressure of circumstances called
Germany east. The defeat at Verdun
had stirred the Russians to action. The
Brusiloff offensive of 1916 was at hand.
and Rumania was showing signs of ioin
ing the Entente.
Brusiloff won some notable victories
over the Austro- Hungarans in Volhynia,
Galicia and Bukowina. Tens of thou
sands of disaffected Czecho-Slovak and
South Slav troops threw down their
arms and surrendered to the Russians.
Considerable territory was recovered.
But when German achievements ar
rived the Russian armies were halted 1t
was Russia's last flash of offensive
strength. Treachery inside the govern
ment at Petrograd now began to ag-
gravate the difficulties of the armies in
the field
Rumania came into the war in the fall
Of 1916-relying on Russian promises,
which were never to be fulfilled. The
Germans were prepared to crush this
small, exposed Balkan state. A concen-
trio attack from Pennsylvania, Serbia
and Bulgaria soon cleared all of Wal
lachia. Bucharest fell-hardly six weeks
after war was declared.
Here again the military, political and
economic possibilities Of an exploitation of
the East front were startingly demon
strated. Germany could fight and win on
that front almost with one hand tied be-
hind her back. Rumana became a new
source of food, oil and other war sup
plies. And the vast, inert, exhausted
Muscovite empire was now on the point
of breaking up
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02
No Leader
In Sight

The fundamental idea of German mill
tary policy-the crushing of France
having proved illusory, a soldier of the
quality of Frederick the Great, or Napo-
leon or the elder Moltke would have dis
carded it, But Germany had no such
soldier. The Kaiser was military in.
competent. Worse than that, he was sur
rounded by generals without genius. He
could remove the younger Won Moltke.
But he could replace him only with a
Won Falkenhayn, a Won Hindenburg or a
Ludendorff.
DR.. Million says that the younger
Moltke had no responsibility for the plan
of operations which went to wreck at the
Marine. Won Freytag- Loringhoven says
the same thing. The plan was a legacy
from the days Of Count Schlieffen. the
elder Won Moltke's successor as Chief of
the General Staff.
Count Schlieffen was the chief pro-
ponent in Germany of the strategy Of
double development" He wrote a work
called Gamma" in which he illustrated
from Hannibal's victory the working out
of his own theories. Schlieffen believed
in retaining the enemy's centre, or even
yielding to him a little there, while out
thanking and inclosing him on both wings
a victory OF the Gamma type, he held. was
the only sort which would insure the an
inhalation Of an opponent.
Foch illustrated the Canine theory tao
tlcally and locally at the Second Battle
OF the Marine, when he encouraged the
Germans to push south of the river. be-
tween Chateau Thierry and Dormans
and also to move up the Marine Valley
toward Epernay, while he was preparing
TO strike their right wing between Cha
teau Thierry and Scissors and their left
wing between Dormans and Rheims. But.
OF course, Foch had no idea of enyelop.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02
Marine Defeat
Caused Confusion

Yet, as a matter of fact, the most
striking feature of German strategy
throughout the war was its lack of clar-
ity and unifcation. German conceptions
were confused by the huge initial fail
ure at the Marine The effects of that
confusion were never eradicated
1t was fairly clear after the Marine
and Flanders campaigns of 1914 that
German victory was not to be achieved
in the West. The forces there were too
evenly balanced. The speedy introduction
of trench warfare also tended to enforce
a condition Of barren deadlock on the
Western front. Germany's true field of
military exploitation therefore lay in the
East. Circumstances drove her there
in the spring of 1915. Her easiest and
most fruitful victories were won there.
The opening up of Russia, Rumania,
Serbia, the Caucasus and Persia offered
her splendid opportunity to offset the
economic injury done her by the Allied
blockade.
But she would not pursue her Eastern
campaigns to their logical conclusion.
contenting herself at the same time with
strict defensive in the West. Her
Leneral Staff seemed unable to throw
off the spell Of the elder Won Moltke's
achievements in 1870-1871. What he
had done the younger Won Moltke, Won
Falkenhayn and Ludendorff all hankered
TO do. The first failed at the Marne in
1914; the second failed at Verdun in
1916; the third failed at the Marine in
1918.
Won Moltke the younger was less
bIameworthy than the others. He had
no opportunity 10 amend his theories in
the light Of experience. The other two
had ample opportunity to do 80. But,
one and all, they sought to make the
conduct OF the war conform to fixed, pre-
conceived strategic notions instead Of
letting their gtrategy be determined by
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02
Chief Quartermaster General Ludendorf

victory. That is only after the event
wisdom-and a poor quality of it in the
bargain. Germany came much nearer
winning the war on many later occasions
than she did at the eliminating moment
of her first rush into France
The depression among the German lead
ers was psychological. They saw great
military gamble go wrong when, on the
basis of their fallacious deductions from
the elder Won Moltke's victory over the
French in 1870, it should have been sue
cessful. They were amazed and hisheart-
ened. They tried to cover over their de-
feat with childish Misrepresentation
They excised all reference to the Marine
from their communicates They refused
to face the results of the Marine cam
paign honestly
Yet, on it's face, the Marine was a warn
ing that the fundamental conception Of
German military policy was unsound.
The German staff, still living in glorious
memories of 1870-1S71, had grossly I'M
dervalued the power of France. 1t had
had 10 pay dlsconcertlng penalty Tor
that error. Lieutenant General Baron
Won Freytag- Loringhoven admitted the
truth in 1917 when he wrote: "The Ger
man offensive at the beginning Of Sep
TENDER, 1914, was not powerful enough
to overthrow the enemy" But if the
Germans could not hope to overthrow the
enemy in September, 1914, when Ger
many's completer preparedness told more
heavily in her favor than it could ever
tell again, what reasonable hope of vic
tory lay in continuation of the Western
offensive?
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02
The ineIaSfiC
German Mind

What they demanded was an oriental
ton with which they were familiar-a
policy bequeathed to them by some sup
posed military superman like the elder
MoltAe or Schieffen or Won Tirpitz, and
stamped with the seal of his oracular au-
thority. The supreme test of military
operation in German eyes is not whether
it was adapted to the actual require
ments or potentialties of a situation,
but whether it was or was not executed
according to specifications prepared long
IN advance-in other words, whether it
was or was not what the German military
writers call "planmassig." And this
passion for adhering to routine, to the
tradition of General Staff infallibility
and the formulas of the past-manifested
tacticaly in a slavish employment of
close formation infantry attacks all
through the earlier period of the war
again and again prevented Germany
from reapirg the full advantages of her
strategical freedom and of her unchal-
lenged superiority on the Eastern front.
Germany began the war, of course,
with an all embracing scheme of strate-
gy. The German public had long &C.
cepted the legend of the elder Won
Moltke's sending word to General Staff
Headquarters in Berlin when France
was tricked into declaring war on Ger
many in 1870: open drawer so and So"
That legend had basis of truth. Moltke
he elder had carefully planned the in
yazior of Alsace- Lorraine, and under the
simpler conditions Of warfare which ex-
listed in 1870 he was able to conduct his
campaign with an appearance of mar
vellous provision. He defeated Bazaine
and MacMahon according to schedule,
captured their armies and reduced
France to helplessness.
Motke the younger, when Germany de-
clared war on France in 1914, may also
have given orders to open a similar
drawer in one of the General Staff's
cabinets But he was not to have his
way SO easily with France. After going
on swimmingly for five weeks his cam
paign for Paris collapsed His armies
were defeated, through gross strategical
blunders at the Battle of the Marine.
After short secondary campaign in
Flanders, which also failed in the
large sense, the Germans were thrown
back on the defensive on the Western
front-a defensive which was to last, ex-
cept for the Verdun episode, from De-
cember, 1914, until March, 1918. All
German strategical preconceptions were
thus shattered before the war had fairly
begun.
After the First Marine there was a
period of extraordinary depression at
German Grand Headquarters. The for
nler Grown Prince of Prussia was re-
Gently quoted as saying that in his opin-
ION the Marine ended Germany's hopes of
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02
Revolution
In Russia

The Russian revolution arrived. With
dramatic swiftness the empire persisted:
the Duma government rose and fell:
Kerensky succeeded and sanctioned the
brief and ineffective Korniloff offensive
in Bukowina and Galicia and then fell
himself. Russia now disappeared as a
military factor. Had Germany held off
on her unrestricted submarine campaign
she would practically have won the war
by the end of 1917. Russia lay open
for partition. AS the farce-tragedy of
Brest-Litovsk was to prove, no obstacle
existed any longer to German penetra-
ton as far as the Urals, into the eau
casus and into Persia. The road was
open from Berlin to Bokhara and Herat.
But the Germans were never able to
consolidate their empire in the East,
Ludendorff had loaded himself down with
other burdens. Having dragged America
into the war, it was now incumbent on
him to go west and conquer Italy, France
and Great Britain before American man
power should begin to flow across the
Atlantic
He struck at Italy first, winning, in
November, 1917, the great victory of
Caporetto-one of the completest of the
war. Italy was thrown roughly back
on the defensive, losing nearly all
Venetia, about 100000 prisoners snd
probably more than 1000 guns. Only
the approach of bad weather saGad
Venice. Italy didn't recover from this
blow for many months.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02
War Fought
Itself

Economically and financially, the war
fought itself. 1t soon got beyond con-
troll of those who may have believed in
the beginning that they would be able to
direct it or to set bounds to it. 1t was
too vast an enterprise to be shaped by
any government or group of govern
ments. 1t plunged along to its conclu-
sion in it's own ponderous way, smash
ing all forecasts and calculations.
This is true to large extent of the
military conduct of the war as we'll as
of its economic conduct. No General
Staff was prepared for what actually
happened when the huge armies Of the
twentieth CONTEMPLATION under arms.
in reality-clashed in the field under
revolutionized conditions of warfare.
No General Staff fought the war as it
had planned to fight it. After the first
two months none even saw very clearly
what was ahead. By reason of its i'm
mensity, the war mastered the strate-
gists ard developed it's own strategy.
Both tactically and strategically it had
to find itself
Germany was immensely better pre-
pared for the struggle than her oppo-
nents were She was able to seize the
offensive at the outset, and, from the
point of view of grand strategy, she re-
tanned it until the contest was in it's last
stages. AS the aggressor and as the
most highly organized military state in
Europe, she should have been able, if
any belligerent was, to reduce her STRAIT
egy to the simplest and clearest terms
Having freedom of action, interior lines
and choice of operating fronts, she
might reasonably have been expected to
formulate and pursue a sharply defined
and consistent military policy.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02
1t Never Realized the Limitations of
Germany's Continental
Position
BY William l.. Mcpherson
Copyright, 1919, New York Tribune Inc

forces and circumstances disclosing
themselves as the struggle progressed.
Germany never developed a military
leader who was in the true sense an
opportunist. And in an inexact and
predetermined art like war opportunism is
the outlet of genius.
The great fault of the German mill
tary mind is its rigidity. 1t cannot re-
adjust itself readily to unforeseen condi-
tons. 1t cannot reverse itself with sup
pleness when a fundamental misconcep-
ton has to be rectifed. Thus in this
never able to rid themselves of their
fatal decisions about the value of Ger
man sea power.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02
urkey's
Entrance

Turkeys entry into the war had also
greatly extended Germany's military op-
portunities in the East The barring of
the Dardaneles and Turkeys successful
defence of Gallipoli had dashed Allied
expectations of connecting up the Rus
sian and Western fronts. With almost
no help from Germany Turkey had iso-
lated Russia, thus insuring the latter's
eventual collapse. But Turkey needed to
be reinforced and to be supplied with
munitions. A corridor from Berlin TO
Constantinople had to be cut through
the Balkans
Every military consideration now COM
PEELED concentration of Germanv's
main effort in the East. So, on Nav Dav.
1915, Hindenburg and Mackensen began
their great drive against the Russians in
Gallcia and Poland. In four months
they had cleared Galicia, Poland Cour-
land, part of Lithuania and all of Bu
kowlna Then Mackensen turned south.
Bulgaria joined the Central Alliance.
Serbia, Montenegro and Albania were
overrun, Rumania was cut off and Tur-
key was linked up securely with the new
German Mitteleuropa.
NO other German campaign showed
results comparable in a military and no.
iltlcal sense with this one. In a single
summer Germany had changed the face
OF Europe-and at cost SO small as to
be almost negligible. She was on the
true road to the only sort of empire
which was within the scope of her mill
tafy resources-toward true solidifica-
ton OF her Continental position. By De-
cember, 1915, she was in a condition
either to ask or to grant peace assuring
her supremacy in Europe
Hlndenburg, who had been the operat-
ing chief on the Eastern front, became
the idol of the German people. They
hastened to erect huge wooden images of
HIM and drive them full of gold and sill
YER nails-a primitive Germanic method
OF dedication. In this they obeyed a
sound instinct. Hindenburg stood above
all things for an Eastern military policy.
His fame was the outgrowth Of the nat
ural trend of the war
But the German military mind was
unconvinced. Won Falkenhayn. Won
Moltke's successor, was Westerner bv
prediction. He conceived the idea Of
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02
LudendOrf'S
Gamble

Next came the great drive Of 1918 in
Northern France. On this Ludendorff
staked everything that Germany had left.
There is reason to think that linden
burg dissented from his colleagues wiz
all-lose-all policy, and that William II
was inclined to agree with Hindenburg.
1t will always remain a question
whether Germany did not still have a
chance in the spring of 1918 to fight the
war to draw by standing on the de-
fensive in France, while attempting to
develop Finland, the Ukraine, Poland,
Lithuania, the Baltic provinces and pos
sibly even Rumania, Bessarabia and the
Crimea into military assets.
Certainly, if she had continued on the
defensive Germany could not have lost
the war in 1918-perhaps not in 1879.
The Allies were bound to remain gravely
handicapped so long as they continued
to renounce the advantages of unity of
command. And Allied unity of command
would hardly have come if Ludendorff
had not broken the British line west Of
st. Quentin last March and nearly de-
stroyed the British Fifth Army.
Ludendorff's offensive in France
forced the selection of Foeh as the
Allied generalissimo and vastly ac-
CELEBRATED the transportation of Ameri-
can troops to Europe. Without Foch and
without the American reinforcement the
oboh
more progress on the Western front in
1913 than they had made in 1917.
But Ludendorff was dogmatist and
gambler. He insisted on having his
way and had it. BY his errors of tactics
as we'll as of strategy he quickly
wrecked the great German military es-
Enlistment.
Yet long before the Second Marine
German political and military obtuse-
ness had fumbled away all chance Of
victory. The Germans never learned the
lesson of the First Marine. They could
have won their war in Eastern Europe.
Instead, they wanted to win it on the
sea and in Western Europe. What the
First Marine, Verdun and the first sub
marine campaign had already proved,
the Second Marine and the second subma-
rine campaign only proved over again.
1t was never within the s-,pe of Teuton
resources to conquer tns world. And
the resources which wor.d have sufficed
to conquer Eastern Europe were wasted
in trying to reduce Paris and suhjugats
France.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02

81
molished all precedents. 1t re-
II suited in the most stupendous
outpouring Of human energy
ever known. All the standards by
which military and economic effort had
been measured in the past suddenly be-
came obsolete.
1t was commonplace among finan-
ciers before the war began that no Euro
pean conflict could last more than twelve
months without bankrupting the bel
ligerents. International finance was
supposed to hold the purse strings OF all
governments, and WAS expected to call a
halt in time on ruinous war expendi-
lures.
But in their widest dreams the finan.
<ial experts had never sensed what mod
ern industrial nations can do when they
plunge into war. Peoples fight nova
days. not merely armies The bellger-
ent nations put over 50,000,000 men in
the field and spent more than 000,-
0000 for war purposes. Once the pent-
up resources of the countries at war
we're unleashed all thought of anything
short of victory or exhaustion was aban-
doned The United States was in the
war only a little more than eighteen
months. Yet in that period it spent
$4,000 100000, including s1O,OOO,0OO,-
600 loaned to it's allies. Our total Civil
War debt was only about $3,O00000, 900.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02

HNHE Great War of 1914-1918 de-
molished all presidents. 1t re-
II suited in the most stupendous
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-02-02
ton Strategy Failed From Lack Of Vision and Clarit
Could Have Won the War in
East, but Elected TO Lose
1t Elsewhere

stabilizing the Eastern front and turning
west again. AT Grand Headquarters the
lure of Paris was still potent. All
through the winter of 1915-19l6 Won
Falkenhayn was busy preparing his
''breal through" on the Verdun front,
intended to destroy the morale of the
French and at the same time to antici-
pate and forestall the offensive on the
Somme which the British were nearly
ready to begin.
The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1919-10-10
STAMFORD HAS
 CHOSEN SITEFOR
 ITS HIGH SCHOOL
(SpeeiaI to The Timesl

Stratford; Oct. 1e-Nothing is too good for us, was the verdict express ed by the citizens of the town last evening when they met to select a school site. The town meeting, which was adjourned from two weeks ago to enable the school board to select several more sites, was called to or der by Chairman Carey at 8 o'clock. It had been found that the adjourn ed meeting could not legally purchase any other site than that specified in the original call and a second warn ing had been issued for special town meeting to be held at 8:3o last evening. After reading of the min utea, on motion, Chairman Carey de- ,clared the meeting adjourned and announced that the next town meet ing would be called to order at s:3O.
 During the 20 minute interval that epsued a number of the citizens en- tertained those present. Mayor Wellington was introduced and spoke briefly.
 At s:30 Town Clerk Lowell called the meeting to order, F. O. Rhoades was elected chairman. The school com- nfttee reported that they had three sites to recommend. First. the prop erty owned by the Beardsley estates Inc, and Chester Dunlap, fronting on North Parade and extending through to King street. Second. the property at Barnum avenue and King street fronting on Barnum avenue and run ming north on King street. Third, the Beden Benjamin property at Broad street and Beardsley lane. Preference was given by the committee to the Beardsley-Dunlap property.
 After considerable discussion it was voted to buy the Beardsley Dunlap tract, F. s. Beardsley, who was present, stated that he was willing to select one appraiser, the town to select another, they TWO to select a third and agreed to accept he price made by this committee. The site selected is by far the best and most