The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-10-23

received instructions to march with the right wing up the Bug, on the west, it was in the rear of the Sth army. l which was advancing on either side of the Narew against Lomza. l en- deavored to maintain this echelon as the advance progressed in order to make use of the possibilities of mutual cooperation on the Hanks. But by de- grees the two armies came up level with the inner wings on the Ostro- lenka-Lopy railway. South of the Bug
 Field Marshal Prince Leopold's army group had moved forward to core spond.
 On August 9 Lomza was taken from | the southwest. For some time past we had had squadron of bombing aero-
 planes at our disposal in East Prussia The forts in which an enemy corps oI army staff had its quarters were often | bombed. Splendid results had been re- l ported; but when I was able to have ] the damage inspected it was impossible | to verify it. In the interests of the l troops I was glad of this. as they were ! able to use the forts as billets. It was | only later that our bombs became ef- fective, when the airmen took more in 1 terest in bombing work.
 | As the advance progressed it became
 evident that Mackenscn's and Prince
 
 north, and thus forcing the 12th and Sth armies to the left.
 DIVIDED COMMAND HURTFUL (This trouble and confusion of the armies was caused by division Of com mand after the beginning of the battle due to the dispute between Ludendorff and Falkenhayn. Mackensen and Prince Leopold were made independent of Hindenburg and Ludendorff and
 were evidently conducting their ad-
 vance to suit themselves, thus ham, pering the other armies.)
 On August IS Marshal vor Mackensen had arrived before Brest- Litovsk; Prince Leopold was approach ing the Bialowiese Forest, and the 12th army Bialystok, the e/ former seat oi the excellent Prussian administration of New East Prussia at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 18th centuries
 The 8th army pressed forward to- ward Grodno in the narrow space be- tween Bailystok and the Narew, so as to capture Osowiec from the south This fortress was invested on August 22. We had intended, earlier in the war, taking it from the east and north yet we took it from the south. Such is war.
 In the latter days of August both armies continued the advance in a
 more northeasterly direction beyond the Bialystok- -Osowiec line, the 18th army marching north of Wolkowysk, and the Sth army on Grodno.
 Both these armies, therefore, were gradually losing touch, tactically, with after the investment of Brest-LitOvsk on August 25-26 marched on toward Pinsk and Baranvici.
 By degrees they came within the sphere of the operations which were in preparation further north
 At the beginning of September. the Sth and 1zth armies reached the region of Grodno, southeast thereof. In a fortnights time or so they were to be at Lida, north of the Nieman. About eight weeks would then have elapsed since the offensive started.
 HE COULD HAVE DONE BETTER
 During this operation the 18th army had had to make wide detour to the south. How much better would it have been if, instead of this movement, an attack on the Lomza- -Grodno line had been possible. That could not be done. But an operation to the north of Grodno, combined with the taking of Kovno. would have reached this point much more quickly and easily. and have been far more effective if it had been carried out in full strength. even as late as the first fortnight in August.
 Gle thus undertakes to point out how much better the Germans would have fared had they accepted his original plan for the sweep through Kovno.)
 For a time it looked as though G. H. Q. wished to suspend the advance in the East. They transferred large portions of Field Marshal von Macken- sen's army, and later of the 18th and sth armies too, to the west and south Hungary. But they allowed the opera tfons which had been begun after the taking of kOvnO and our advance in Lithuania and Courland to take their course.
 Mackensen afterwards swept through Serbia in conjunction with the Bulga- rians, who found in the disaster to Rus sia the opportunity to enter the war on what they thought would be the sideD
 The storming of Kovno was an in trepid stroke. In order to accom- plish it troops had to be withdrawn from the center and right wing of the 10th army which already held very long front Only thus were we able to concentrate a comparatively strong force for the attack west of Kovno.
 The commander-in-ch chief in the east and General von Eichhorn made them selves responsible for this strain on the rest If their front The general had