The Washington herald., 1919-08-31
BY JOHN l.. BALDERsTON.

By JOHN l.. BALDERSTON.
Why are our troops fighting in
Siberia? Why were Americans sen.
to ArChangel? What is the policy
of the allies in Russia: These ques-
tions puzzle millions Of Americans
They have not been answered ade-
quateIy by Washington; statements
that we went in to save the Czecho-
Slovaks. or to make Russia safe for
the constituent assembly. may have
been advisable at the time they were
made, but were misleading to put it
mildly.
Washington remains mute on the
fundamentals of the mysterious and
terrible Russian problem. but from
allied sources the facts have been
made available. We went into
Russia as military measure
against Germany. and for no other
reason. And since the war with
Germany ended, contradictory state
ments about further S1lied purposes
have been made because the London
and Paris cabinets could not make
up their minds whether to stay in
Russia. or get out. Their soldiers
have made up their minds for them
ana they are getting out.
Alone with Japs.
This leaves ourselves and the Japs
on Russian soil: by the time the Ice
closes the Murmansk coast every
British soldier will have been with
drawn. The last French soldier Of
the line has already departed from
the Ukraine. though many French
missions remain in nOn-Bolshevlk
territory. By a summary of the al
lied Russian policy up to the present
1t viii be made clear that our gov
ernmert is apparently left high and
dry. without policy. If it has a
policy, the secret is one the writer
has not been able to fathom.
There is no longer ground for
misstatements concerning the origl-
nal allied intervention at the be-
ginning of 1913 The invasion Of
allied troops was not against thu
BOlshevfks, 1t was against the
Germans. Before and after the BOl-
sheviks made peace al Brest-
Litovsk. Germany feverishly trans
ferred the best units of the Slstern
armies from the east to the west
fronts. The great blow that fell
upon the British in March. Luden-
dorf's desperate bid for victory,
was known by the allies to be in
preparation. Germany felt herself
safe in the east. having squared the
BoIsheviks. and it seemed to the al
lied STATS that every fighting divi-
sion from Russia and Rumania
would make its appearance in
Flanders and France during the
crucial spring campaign.
Strategic Move.
Then Marshal Foch. Clemenceau
and Lloyd George. concerted a plan
for Russian Intervention. That plan
was a brilliant and most success
ful bit of strategy. despite the dif-
hcuIties in which it landed Us after
Germany was defeated.
Germany had eiEhty-four divi-
sions on the east front when peace
was made with Lenine and Trotsky.
and knew that she had nothing to
fear from the BolsheEik govern.
ment. While those divisions were
being rushed across the fatherland
to the west front in the winter ana
early spring, the allies entered into
relations with the anti Bolshevik
Centers in Russia. Every anti-Bol-
shevik group anywhere that prom
ised to fight was assured it would
get arms and help.
These measures were taken. not
as against a socialist" government,
but against a government that had
made peace with the common enemy
nd made possible the enemy's COM
plete victory unless warlike activi-
ty was stirred up in the east The
allies knew. and Germany knew.
that not all Russia, but only part
of Russia, was behind the Bolshevik
surrender. The allied chiefs cor
rectly figured that if the anti-Bol-
shevik forces could be supported
and kept moving. Germany would
be forced to stop Withdrawing
troops for the western hattlehelds.
Held on Fifty Divisions.
This is exactly what happened. From
the day that Germany learned of the
Decentralization of the allies at Arch
angel-and care was taken that Ber-
lin should hear of it as soon as pos
sible-the east to west movement
stopped. Fighting with their backs
to the WALL throughout that terrible
spring, when the allies struggled for
time while Americans came up.
French and British soldiers were
spared the onslaught of so or more
German divisions that were held in
the east to cope with a possible re-
newal of the Russian war.
Nearly everyone of those 30 divisions
would have come west by summer had
the allies not sent troops into Russia
and organized the anti Bolshevik
forces. That statement has been
made since the armistice by German
apologists for their defeat. No other
justification is needed for allied inter-
vention in Russia in the winter of
1sl7-1slS. 1t was a matter of life or
death for the allied cause.
The immediate object of the allies
in Russis-to overthrow, with the help
of disaffected Russians, the Bolshevik
government and reconstitute the east
ern front against Germany-failed.
But the larger objective was attained
Germany could not afford to assume
that the Bolsheviks would succeed in
holding out; she could not leave her
frontiers open to the invasion that
would have followed Bolshevik down
fall. And so those 80 German divi-
sions remained in the east until the
end of the war.
Thus Russian Intervention proved it.