Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-12

| Like other combatant forces, they
We're a destructive arm in the great
battle on land. This, indeed, became
their main object. and the aerial COM
| bat was only means of attaining it.
| For the advance of the infantry in
! the offensive battle the concentrated
| preparation by massed artillery was
most important. 1t was necessary to
bring up twenty to thirty batteries,
about one hundred guns, to each
| kilometer eleven hundred yards) of
front to be attacked. No man had
ever credited such figures before; still
less had anyone ever thought of the
quantities of ammunition hurled on
! the enemy.
These were indeed massed effectsl
| And vet the battle area was so vast
that even these quantities Of steel did.
not destroy all life; the infantry al
ways found far too much to do.
These masses of guns and ammuni-
| ton had TO be got up close to the fore
most lines; only then could they en-
gage targets far behind the enemys
front line without having to change
position as the battle progressed. AT
the same time they had to be COW
cred from view. both from the front
and from the air.
| SubNtu
In these positions in the open 1t
was not intended to fight an artillery
duel for days on end; both guns and
ammunition would have been annihi-
lated Nor was it possible to range,
as we used to do; this would have
attracted the enemy's attention. and
the artillery action would have started
before the battle itself under condi-
tons unfavorable to us.
J We had therefore. to discover some
| means of dealing with the situation,
and insure an adequate effect without
ranging During the defensive bat
ties we had already endeavored to do
without constantly checking the bar
rage The errors of the day (due to
wind and atmospheric density, as
well as to the gun errors (due to size
of chamber caused by wear, and other
changes in the bore and carriage),
were permanently determined and al
lowed for when firing.
A system was now most carefully
elaborated. The artillery meterologi-
cal service was regulated on a general
plan in combination with the general
commanding the air forces In this
way all batteries could be informed of
the errors of the day with the least
possible delay. All guns were tested
for individual errors behind the front
In this way it was possible to deter
mine, by means of simple tables for
any gun at any time, howTmuch should
be added to, or subtraeted from, the
normal elevation for any target. II
was, of course. necessary condition
that ranges were accurately meas
ured. Faultless maps. trigonometrical
and typographical determination OF
all battery zero points on the ground,
and the greatest care in marking tar
gets on the maps, as determined by
second-ranging, field survey and aerial
photography-these were the neces-
sary preliminaries, and an enormous
work it was.
The new procedure was strongly OBJ
iected to, especially by some of the
senior gunners. But It had to be
adopted, nevertheless, and fulfilled all
expectations.
Gas to Stop Allied Guns.
The training and instruction of the
troops in the new method was en-
trusted to Captain Pulkowsky who
carried out his duties with great en-
ergy and skill.
At the shortest ranges the effect
of the artillery was to be supple
mented by trench mortars.
General headquarters intended that
after a short artillery bombardment,
lasting only few hours. the infantry,
which was to be held IN readiness in
the forward positions. should advance
to the assault.
This short storm OF fire was ex-
! pected to neutralize the e'.emy's ar
| tillery by means of gas. which spread
over great areas. and keep his In
fantry in their dugouts
| At the beginning of the infantry
assault the artillery while continuing
to keep down that of the enemy, was
to put down barrage in front of the
infantry and then pave the way for it
+! like a gigantic roller.
The infantry had to keep close up TO
this wall of projectiles, and did so
with admirable determination The
enemy, who came out of his dugouts
when the barrage had passed. was
now attacked by our infantry, assisted
| by auxiliary or companion" arms,
under the protection Of our artillery.
| 1t was evident that the closer the
| infantry could keep to the barrage,
the less time the enemy had to leave
| his dugouts and the more chance there
was of surprising him in them. Con-
| sequently the barrage must not adj
vance faster than the infantry could
| follow. The pace had to be fixed be-
forehand, for, in spite Of hard think
| ing and experiments, It had been i'm
| possible to discover any means of
controlling the barrage.
Slow Pace Set For Infantry.
The nature and state of the ground
| had also to be considered, as regards
their effect on the advance of the in
fantry, and the consequent pace of
the barrage. Stronger lines required
more prolonged bombardment, and
the parrage had to dwell on them
longer. So it came about that an adj
vance of one kilometer eleven hun
dred yards) required as much as one
hour.
1t was always great misfortune
If the barrage got ahead; the attack
was then held UP only too easily. 1t
could not be brought back again with
out great loss of time, and the infan
try suffered losses which 1t was the
duty of all commanders to avoid.
AS the range increased the barrage |
became thinner. as the shorter range |
guns dropped out and finally, beyond
extreme range, it ceased and the in |
fantry lost its protection. By this |
time some artillery must be already
in action in more forward positions,
from which to support the further adj
vance. In spite of all auxiliary arms
and its infantry guns" the infantry |
could not do without 1t.
What form the fighting would take
when the infantry emerged from the