El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1919-12-02
y JOHN LLOYD B4LDERsTON.


By JOHN LLOYD b-1LDEHsI0N.
I policy ana leave Siberia. or con-
time 10 play lone hand, with
or without the Americans.
In the opinion Of a well-informe1
diplomatist, formerly a secretary OF
legation iu the far east whose views
7 au permitted 10 quote below. ia
pan cannot and viii not accept the
British decision. IL conflicts VITA
her own Russian policy, which she
regards as vital 10 her existence. Ac-
cordiDglv, Japan in any case, VIII
continue TO hac' up Kolchaz. or his
successors, 10 prevent TIE holshevists
from seizing Siberia; and IL holshe-
vik victories continue, IL IS freely
admitted here in diplomatic circles.
Japan may prefer 20 put her own
armies into the field against them
Speculation Rife.
Whether the American forces
across the Pacific viii be withdrawn
OF reinforced under the new coudi-
tons likely to arise are alternatives
OF speculation here II Washington
takes the British view that the use
Of force against the soviet govern.
ment has proved mistake and or
ders American troops home from 81
IBERIA, how viii America Ike the
probable japanese policy2
II within a short time Japan en-
cages alone. in g war in siberia
against the bolsheviks, after the kol-
chak forces have been so beaten that
they become insignificant, viii not
the prize OF victory be Siberia itselL-
And how would Warrington
view the prospects Of Japan
reinforced by Siberia with its
untold and untarped natural
wealth, greater than that Of
America-n SIberfu linked to ia
pan by a narrow sea between
n
notion. Is naval experts admit
the submarine and mine could
make its
Enough has been said TO show that
the breakdown of interallied action
against the boIshevIki may render
very difficult the tulfiliment OF
American policy in the east-if we
have a policy. But before Americans
become excited about japanese poll
cies they should know what those
policies are, and / propose 70 OUT
line here what my Well-informec
friend believes these 70 be-
CIearIy-DeHned Program.
Japan at present has q clearly-de-
fined Russian program Il is unlike
the British or French or American
PROGRAMS IN its clarity, and also IN
thar for Japan e Is OF the first I'M
nortance, while the other allies can
and do frequently change their minds
perlling vital interests OF their own
Japan, , an told, f. out for two
things. She wants n strong gov
eminent IN Russia that vii pre-
vent the country from falling
into the hands Of Germanys NJ
the sama time Japan desires 70
control the strategic railways In
siberia that might be used either
by 4 reviVified Russia OF an az
gressiFe Germany udVuuciuE
through Russia, for an attack
upon Japan
The two points OF TINS proEis an
were lucidly explained by my m
formsnt. Answering the Quesdon,
why must Japan have a strong Rus
siaT he said:
when war broke ont Russia and
Japan had buried their differences
and were in apparent complete mar
monv. Eastern projects were 4Qr-
rottsn BY Russia in the face OF the
greater menace in Europe, 50 japan
was friendly TO Russia and Up %
the time Of Intervention continued
70 be friendly.
plans Threatened.
"A defeated Russia, split Up IN
an eEtricable mass OF sDllnteree
states. made Japan feel that her plans
we're threatened with defeat This
led Japan 70 Intervention what sne
hopes to accomplish IS stated. from
Tananese sources, as follows. inter
renffon is 70 provide Russians with
broad platform and a center q
nouer around which al patriots
tons. may Join hands for the re-es-
tabhshment Of a new united latner-
land
Perhaps the decisive reason why
Janan wants a strong Russia Is not
openly avowed IN Toxic OF discussed
D. al
public Il lies IN a secret treaty OF
1915 between the two countries, pro-
vidinE that rsither Japan nor RUS
sia will be a party 70 any arrange
ment OF political combination direct
ed against the other
'fThe two powers pledged mem
selves, In case the territorial
rights or special interests Of
either IN the far east are threat
rued. 10 take counsel together for
safeguarding and defending those
rights and interests The agree-
meut g. not unlike the AHslo-
Tauauese alliance IN some re-
Euects. hut its real purpose was
the partition OF China
asThfz agreement strengthened ia
mans position IN the FAR east greatly
Ii rendered more easy her eNploita-
zion OF China by doing away Wiz
Russian opposition. British ana
american Influence in China. II RUS
Fia had survived, also might nave
been rurtaIled BY the understanding
Between the two old enemies
Very Important
eFor japan. this 1915 treaty q q
such paramount Importance tnat -
f- rsafv TO risk all the dangers or
fntervention e she can restore 70
Russia a government that VIII rec
orrfve II and car out its terms"
These plausible reasons Why Japan
wants g strong Russia - Determines
On the second point Japan wan =
control Of the strategic railways IN
siberia 90 that she may be forever