The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1919-10-12

We're attacked and sunk in 1917 created
the impression that their guns afforded
some protection. But this was policy
on Germany's part. She expected, as
have said, to win the war loYg before
the United States could play an effec-
tive part in it. She was therefore re-
framing from any unnecessary acts
that would still further embitter the
American people against her. She was
also playing up to the pacifist elements
in our country, in order to keep us
from using against her such forces as
we already had at hand. The reason
IAmerfcan armed merchantmen were not
| seriously attacked; I have already
shown how easily Germany could sink
them when She tried. Besides the chief
argument against relying upon armed
ships was that this was defensive
measure, whereas the extremely grave
situation we were then facing demand
ed the most energetic offensive meth
DDS. Yet the arming of merchant ships
was justified as a minor measure. tt
accomplished one end-it forced the
submarine to submerge and to use tor
1 pedoes instead of gunfire. This in it
self was a great gain. because the
Germans much preferred to sink ships
with projectiles than with torpedoes,
for their supply Of these latter missiles
Il
was limited.
Mines and Patrols, Two Days of
/ Fighting U-Roats.
In April, 1917, the British navy was
fighting the submarine mainly in two
| ways; 1t was constantly sowing mines
off the entrance to the submarine ba ses,
| such as Ostend and Zeebrugge, and in
the Heligoland neutrality-suspicious. that
| accomplished little, for the Germans
swept them up almost as fast as they
were planted; and it was patrollipg
| the submarine infested area with
anti-subrnarine craft. The Admiralty
was depending almost exclusively
upon this patrol yet this. the only
means which then seemed to hold
forth much promise of defeating the
submarine, was making little prog
ress.
For this patrol the navy was i'm
pressing into service Ill available de- |
stroyers, yachts, trawlers, sea going |
tugs. and other light vessels-almost |
! anything which could carry wire |
| less, a gun, and depth charges. AT |
| this time the vessel chiefly used was |
the destroyer. The naval war had |
demonstrated that the submarine
could not successfully Battle with the |
destroyer; that any U-boat which came
of this alert and speedy little sur
face ship ran great risk of being |
sunk This is the fundamental fact |
which regulated the whole anti-siib-
marine campaign. The destruction |
of the submarine was highly prob |
able in case the destroyer could get |
a fair chance at her. 1t is evident. /
therefore, that a proper German STRAIT |
egy would consist in so disposing its |
submarines that they could conduct |
their operations with the minimum |
risk of meeting their most effective
enemies, while a properly conceived !
Allied strategy would consist in so |
controlling the situation that the sub !
marines. would have constantly to |
meet them Frankness compels me |
to say that. in the early part of 1917, /
the Germans had the upper hand in
this strategic game; that Is, they |
were so dominating the campaign that
they were constantly attacking AL
lied shipping without having to meet
the Allied destroyers, while the AL
lied destroyers' were dispensing their |
energies over the wide waste OF wa
tiers. But the facts in the situation |
and not any particularly superior
skill on the part of the German navy,
gave the submarine this advantage
The British were most heroically
struggling against the difficulties I'M
posed by the mighty task which they
had assumed. The British navy, like /
all other navies, was utterly unpre-
pared for this type OF warfare. and
thus, in 1917. 1t woefully lacked the
surface. vessels in the numbers which
were demanded, not only for the ordf-
nary purposes of its fleet, but for
meeting the submarine warfare as l
well.
The problem which proved so en-
barra ssing can be stated In the sim
pie terms of arithmetic. Everything
reduced itself to the question of de-
stroyers. In April, 1917. the British
navy had in commission about 200 |
of this indispensable type Of war
ship: many of them. were old and
others had been pretty badly worn
and weakened by three years OF par
ticularly racking service. 1t was the
problem Of the Admiralty to place
these destroyers In those fields where
they could best serve the. Allied
cause. The one fact that apparently
rose superior to all others was that
a fIotilia of at least 100 destroyers
must be continuously be kept with !
the Grand Fleet, ready to go into
action at moments notice. The /
whole strategy Of German naval OPP
crationa as wen az British centred /
upon this destroyer situation, since II i
was chiefly the destroyer which could
defeat the submarine campaign,
German Policy Of Defeating De-
stroyers.
1t was therefore the part Of wis