Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-08-10

not wish Japan to have the power to
act, without the consent Of China, as
the representative Of China at the
conference.
my reply to these various SUCCESS
tions was refusal to accept them.
One of the reasons was that to re-
store our rights to US through Japan
was an illogical thing. We were par
Elephants at the peace conference.
Why deal with US through q middle
man? Was it not apparent that ia
pan, by arranging this. wished to pose
before the most important interna-
tional gathering that the world ever
had seen as the agent for the trans
action of China's foreign affairs?
That would establish an international
habit which would have it's effect
upon the future.
my second reason for refusing in
direct restitution to us Of the rights
which had been usurped by Germany
and then taken from her was that
this procedure would amount to con-
armation of the treaties of 1915 for
the abrogation of which China had
presented formal demands to the
peace conference.
'"The situation Is not understood
here. The American administration
evidently feels that If Japan once for
mally agrees to return to Kiaochow to
China the thing is as good as done.
AS matter of fact. we attach no i'm
2ortance whatsoever to an agreement
Of the sort"
I now asked my distinguished Chi
rese friend what action the Amer
lean Senate should take in order to
be exactly fair to China.
II believe" was the reply. "that the
United States government. or the
United States Senate. in ratifying the
peace treaty, should make a reserva-
ton as regards the three Shantung
articles, 156. 1877 and 1853. and require
that review and redecision Of the
whole question in accord with China's
right be the first business Of the
league of nations. Indeed. may say
that China as q whole believes that
the situation as 1t stands Is otherwise
sufficient reason for the rejection of
the treaty by any Of the powers. In
less this reservation and this require
ment are made and accepted the Sen.
ate Of the United States, IL it refused
to ratify upon this ground alone. In
our conviction. E. would be upheld BY
future history.
Occupation Of Kiaochow did not
make Germany dangerous to the
United States. But the transfer Of
these positions to Japan Is very
different matter. Kiaehow II Of
Immense strateglcal and commercial
value to contiguous Japan, while to
far-away Germany It was Of little
value. In case of war in the far east
Japan always could land troops at
Kiaochow.
"And 1t is curious that Britain seems
to forget the possession of these advan.
tages threatens the British strateTetic
fear at WI Hell Wei. Personally, l won
der how the Australians and New Zeal
anders feel about this matter. Shan
tung and the German Pacific islands
Especially the Carolines) were Japan's
war aims. The acquisition Of these
aims was not warfare against Germany,
but. in truth, against Britain and the
United States.
Another point which / must make:
Where are the Chinese oil fields? Shan
tung adjoins Shansai province, where is
China's richest treasure Of petroleum.
But now, II China wishes to develop
this, she must export it through Shan
tung under Japanese control"
lis there any point with regard to
this matter which should be brought
especially to the attention Of the Ameri-
can people, rather than to the attention
of the American Senator" I inquired.
Certainly" said Mr.. Quo. EVERY
American business man who Is directly
or remotely connected with the export
trade should stop to consider the fact
that the decision at Paris certainly will
tend to operate against the American
'open-door policy in China. Already
the situation is destroying Americas
Chinese business, to the loss of the
Americans and the distress Of the Chi
nese. Last year both the Standard OIL
Company and the American Tobacco
Company were compelled to close the
doors of their establishments in China.