Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-16
Nv GEN. ERICH Won LUDENDoRFT

ton in the use of material at home
! as g. e.. by the limitation of traffic
/ Similar steps were taken N the occu-
pied districts. The limitations, which
were impracticabIe, and, indeed, I'M
possible Of fun realization under the
then conditions, had ultimately TO be
carried into effect under the oppres-
sive armistice conditions and the rev.
| olution.
| 1t may be realized how strained the
| transport situation was at thus tlme
when | state that powder and eXplo-
sive factories, on which everything
depended. were at a standstill for days
on end There was coal to be had,
but the railways could not bring 1t
| to them Things became so bad that
| had to have daily reports on the
supplies to the powder factories.
Unity Lacking in Germany.
The existence of the various Ger
man railway administrations made the
problem essentially more dltflcutt,
We suffered for not having achieved
greater unity prior to the war, ana
for not having insisted on all the
states keeping to the same standards.
Bavaria, for example. had consldefa-
bly fewer heavy locomotives per XII
ometre than Prussia. and the spare
parts required by the two countries
4 were different A great deal could
have been done to improve matters
4 without any alteration of the impeflal
constitution.
TRANSPORT difficulties were also in
creased by the fact that there was no
iunity of control or management OF
Icanal and river navigation. Up to
this time it had not been developed
lin accordance with what was urgently
necessary, and these arrears had to ne
made good. A special inland water
transport department was established
and at my request the admiralty as
sisted us by recruiting the necessary
. men.
Transport conditions. which had
been very bad in the winter OF l9lo-
III. improved later They were Sc
verely strained in the winter of 1917
lis, but not so badly as in The spring,
The minister of labor for his part
!. made every effort to do whatever was
necessary to meet the situation
Coal and Iron Show Power.
Coal and iron are the basis or all
4, war industry. We We're able to m
prove our position considerably, even
lin our dealings with the neutrals, ny
, means of the Longwy and Briey basin
/
T of the wary the Belgian coal fields,
and parts of the coal areas of North
ern France and of Poland. which lat
ter we managed Jointly with Austria
Hungary. We began to develop coal
, in northeast Serbia and attempted TO
t stimulate Turkey to make better
, use of her deposits.
We gave our allies coal and re-
eeived in return nothing but ignite
, from Austria Hungary for SaXony and
II Bavaria. In return for coal and IRON
neutral countries gave us, among
Iother things. foodstuffs and money tc
| improve our exchange besides horses
, Thus did coal and iron show then
+ power. .5#s. H.m
The shortage of coal at home be
Y came considerably more acute IN the
r winter of 19t6-17; it had serious
/ effect on morale and called for strong
7 measures. The coal supply in Ger
: many was not properly controlled aht
{ the output had fallen. wv
| proposed to the chancellor in Feb
Q ruary, 1917, the appointment OF
: special coal commissioner Minin'
t PRIV Councillor StutZ was the flrs
q nerson who succeeded in bringing or
q dor into the coal question. or, at an
(. rate in overcoming the creates
causes of friction. and achieving
4 fair compromise between the demand
4 for coal for domestic fuel for ltgh
n md power, for agriculture and indus
I try. for the railways and the navy
0 Dared Not weaken Army.
Il found IL very difficult in May an
It June. 1917, when still suffering tror
7, the great impression made upon m
h Nv the great entente offensive III tn
7 west aud the extraordinary losse
Is which this caused us, to weaken tn
Iarmy further by releasing fifty thou
& sand workmen at his request. Tn
n should he remem bered while readin
n the history of that period.
u I must emphasize once more IN
ID fact that such a weakening or III
army laid on the supreme army con
is mand a greater duty than ever 70 u
J. men in the fighting line, to contiho
IN necessarily pressing for the mcfea'
70 of labor output. and the eeltef en-
ut ployment of man. power in German
N The army never recovered the me
G. thus released and labor output eve
fell off considerably. That was,
course, q heavy blow to u.s.
le Iron was not so plentiful as Goa
ID 1t was difficult to turn out sufflclel
in quantities of steel. especially OF hai
IS, steel, We obtained large quantiti
e. of iron ore from Sweden and eve
" the ores at Poti in Transcaucls
I'D were of vital Importance to US. Scra
ne too was needed for steel productio
We removed it from the occupl'
re districts in large quantities. MANY
o. factory building had to be saeritlet
d. to our war industry. under the pre-
n sure of the blockade and the necess
G. ties of the war, in order to furnish 0
nd iron for the steel of our weapons al
ne ammunition
n Besides coal, iron and steel, the m
rs, terial for submarines, lorries and al
e, craft and lubricants created some
mt our gravest problems,
rs, For lubricants wo had to rely
Austria Hungary and Rumania.
ed the former country could not supp
eri enough oil. and every effort for ST.
toll ficient increases in her OUTPUT faile
dis! the Rumanian oil was of decisive il
n Eportance But even when we had II
he'll source the question of rolling sto
nd remained very serious. and imped
in both the carrying on of the war a.
lot life at home. In 1918 the stocks
enl the Caucasus promised better tim
ng In our then economic condition, o
home production of benzol conld \
be substantially increased. Besid
ms benzoI was not suitable for subn
ms. rines and aircraft.
iysl When, towards the end of the w
IAN we did decide to Supply benEoi !
nd our aircraft, this was done solely
lr- account of the shortage of petrol, a
IA in the face of the certainty that
thy were thereby reducing the fight
nut capacity of our airmen and increasi
H. H. nt. .