The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1919-05-20


cannot act difrerrntly.
The cnmElandrr-ir-chcf feels sure
that His ENc"ilrncy Marshal French Will
be- good enough Ia .Namlu"' this question
OF capital Importance with all the attcn-
tinr Il .ir$"rvr< ana vii! tnI" the n"c@s-
$ars action without which the SraFcst
Consequences must y" faced
TO sum lip the commandments
has che honor to submit I" HIS EAccll-
cncv NarSaitl French III" Following
points ON which he hcg$ His t.Nccliency
MAY ~. good enough To- give Il prompt
reply:
-. Transport Of tho Second Army
Cr,ps 10 tn" same area; HazcbroucS.
completed. the 9th.
-. Transport Of tho Third Corps to
the same area. completed the 18th.
IS. Lastly. and thus IL the essential
point, without which tho fate OF the
campaign may be compromised. the pos
sihility OF engaging the British divisions
in the north as they arrive. without
waiting for the British army 10 be con-
centrated.
The task Of the British army now IN
the general operations should. therefore.
be constantly to prolong the general line
as II detrains. in order to outtank the
PHcNlS SiO Sii3S ~ 1N'>- -~>>~
Belgian army
The support Of our Cavalry Corps o7-
Grating in the northern area will always
be given"
I answered thus:
Sir John French has duly received
His Excellencys note G9l for which ne
hogs to offer him his best thanks.
The arrangements therein proposed
are perfectly satisfactory, and the role
which the British Army Gun fulfill on
the left flank Of the Allied force WILL
Sir John French hopes and believes
tend best to the efficient progress OF the
campaign.
He can assure His E1cclleney Of the
very hest support Of the British Army
at all times, and. should necessity arise
the various units, as they arrive In the
now area, will on no account be heIo
back to await general concentration
If and when their immediate action Is
demanded by the exigenoies of the cam
paiEn.
Sir John FreAch would like to point
out particularly to His EHcellency that
the possibility Of his having to engage
his forces. unit by unit. before the en-
tire force Is concentrated. offers another
great reason why 1t IS most esscntfa
that the relief OF the First Army corps
from It's present position should De Ell
fected with the least possible delay
while feeling quite assured that HIS
ENcellency the commander in chtcf Will
do his utmost to effect thit. Sir John
French feels that it is most necessary
TO insist upon the vast Importance OF the
nresenc> Of an the British forces on the
left flank at the earliest possible mo-
meDt
His majesty's government feels great
anxiety as to the condition Of the for
tress Of Antwerp. the fall OF Whlch
stronghold would have far reaching con-
sequences. political, material and moral
Sir John French Is now in close daily
communication With the Belgian com
nandant Of the fortress. and II he can
daily assure him that there Is no delay
in a movement which must have the ul-
tiante effect Of relieving the SITUATION
a, Antwerp, so long as that place Is
able to hold out. It should prove grea1
encouragement to the garrison.
Sir John French will address another
note later to his e1cellency on the SUD-
ject Of the Indian divisions
"Sir John French wishes to can MS
eScellerncy's attention to the fact thar
the Second corps will not complete fts
detrainment until the evening Of the 9Th
inst and therefore Will not be ready TO
act until the 10th inst In his meTnor"
andprn his exceilency the commander IN
chief states as follows. referring to the
Second CORDS: This corps will have M
ishcd detraining on the 9Th and WILL Dc
ready to act on the 9Th
Antwerp fell on October 2. and wes
followed by the retirement Of the Bef-
gian army to the line OF the User.
The Seventh infantry and the Tnru
cavalry divisions were not placed under
NV orders until October 10. From tna1
! date however, will commence to
| chronicle their doings.
| spent some hours on October close
" examining the center Of the enenayNa
nosition on the Aisne. and arrived atthe
! conclusion that troops had certainly been
| u.ttdravn and that the Germans were
| weaker in strength. I was not more
| over auprehensive Of any great DIM
Guilty. in cfrccting our withdrawal from
the Aisne 'front.' and I prepared at once
| to carry out the arrangerFnrs ISaoe
| with Jonre.
! Ooeration orders were issued ordering
+bs Second corps. less the Sixteenth In
; 1antrv brigade, to withdraw during the
| niphts of October IL and 2-S and as-
! semble in the area Cuiry-HousseS.Ouich
| le-Chateau with q view to moving 70
| Point Ste. Mxence, twelve miles south-
west Of Compiegne. there to entraln TOT
the left. flank; the First and Th1ro corps
and First cavalry division to be Win
| drawn when opportunity occurred. Ine
second cavalry division and Nanteenth
infantry brigade to follow the Second
| corps: the First corps and Sixteenth In
| fantrv brigade to take over positions az
| ~. .,,noant hold by the Third division.
and the Third corps to take over toose
held by the Fifth division
7 certainly entertained sanguine hopea
AZ This time in spite Of the bad news
received as to the condition Of Antwerp,
and although such hopes were never TO
/ arzcd I still think they were Justlneo-
These optimistic antictpations were
grounded entirely upon the advance
which the Russians were then making
through Galicia and the splendid hghts
thcv had put up in East Prussia ano
| Poland. We estimated that they were
not far from Cracow. and II that lot
tress were taken and the Russians main
tanned their position looked forward &c
! q great reduction Of the German Iorces
| onnosed to Us on tho western front
| The Grand Duke Nicholas had proved
himself 10 DO a commander Of high conf>
age. energy and skill. and VIC al! hopec
| fo.. %, things from his leadership!
At this time we never had the falntes'
in, - ,u,. actual political SITUATION IN
Russia, and knew nothing Of the terrible
disscnsions and intrigues which were
destined TO nullify all the magnihecn'
self-sacrifice displayed by the RUSSIAN
troops and 20 ruin every attempt maos
IN. these great armies Of the east 10 as