The Appeal. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. ;) 1889-19??, 1919-03-08
HUN navy CRAVEN
JELL|C0E SHOWS
British Officer Surprised by eau.
ton of Foe During First
of War.
GRAND FLEET IN DANGER
Short Of Cruisers, Destroyers and Had
DefenseIess Bases in Early Months
Of conflict-Describes Big Bat

London.-The dangers to which the
British grand fleet, short of cruisers,
destroyers and with defenseless bases,
was exposed during the first two and
one-half years of the war, owing to the
German use of Submarines, mines and
torpedoes, is described in book writ
ten by Admiral Viscount Jellicoe, for
mer commander Of the fleet, covering
the activities of 1914-16.
Admiral Jellicoe points out that the
German high seas feet possessed 88
destroyers, compared with ~ for the
grand fleet, and reveals that, owing to
the submarine menace, the grand fleet,
in the fall of 1914, moved from Tough
Swilly and only returned to the North
sea when the anchorage in Scapa Flow
became reasonably safe.
Neither in October, 1914, nor in May,
1916, Admiral Jellicoe says, did the
British margin Of superiority justify
him in disregarding the enemy's tor
pedo fire. The situation gradually i'm
proved after 1916, especially as the
light cruiser and destroyer forces with
the grand fleet Increased steadily after
the battle of Jutland, considerably re-
ducing the danger Of successful tor
pedo attack, while the inclusion Of
class X submarines made it probable
that the enemy would suffer more
severely from submarine attack than
the British.
Tables Are Turned.
Regarding 1918, Admiral Jellicoe
says:
''The position was assured and we
could have afforded to take risks which
in 1916 would have been unwise. If
the German fleet had come out to bat
tie, a terrible punishment awaited
them"
One-third of the admiral's book is
devoted to the battle Of Jutland. In
summing up the lessons Of the battle,
Admiral Jellicoe dwells upon "the dam
ger involved in leaving too much to
chance in fleet action, because our fleet
was the one and only factor vital to
the existence Of the empire, and, in
QeeQ, TO the allleQ cause.
eve had no reserve outside the bat
tie fleet which could in any way re-
place it in the event Of disaster or
even should its margin Of superiority
be eliminated" the admiral continues.
Admiral Jellicoe says he knew that
his ships were inadequately protected
with armor compared to the German
vessels Of the battle cruiser type,
while the German fleet in the battle
Of Jutland was far better off in the
number Of destroyers. In addition, the
Germans possessed "a most efficient
armor-piercing SHE'LL"
Describes Big Battle.
The admiral continues:
'When the battle fleets approached
there was a difference Of reckoning
between the British battle fleet and
the battle cruiser squadrons, due to
the cruisers having been engaged for
several hours and having repeatedly
altered their course. Hence, instead of
being encountered right ahead, the enc
my appeared on the starboard bow"
Instant action was necessary, the ad-
miral says, and he decided to dep1oy on
the port wing division, thus compelling
the Germans to turn off to starboard to
avoid being crossed. This maneuver,
which has been described as mastery
by reviewers, threw the enemy into
complete confusion. The German CON-
mander in chief realized that his only
hope lay in escape, profting by his
superiority in torpedo craft, low visi-
bility, the approach Of darkness and
the proximity Of his bases and mine
fields.
The enemy at this period fired hun
dreds Of torpedoes, as German officers
have since stated, Admiral Jellicoe con-
tinues, and although the Germans were
in the gravest peril, the position Of the
grand fleet itself was menaced by de-
termined torpedo attacks in thick
weather. But the British fleet by turn
ing it's battle line four times during
the action, the admiral says, got clear
Of the torpedoes, which were racing
toward the British ships, and defeated
the tactics upon which the Germans
based their hopes.
After estimating the relative strength
of the two fleets early in the war, Ad-
miral Jellicoe expresses surprise that
the Germans were so cautious and
says:
'If this country in the future de-
cided to rely for safety against raids
or invasion on the fleet alone, it is
essential that we possess a consider
ably greater margin of superiority over
a possible enemy in all classes Of yes.
sells than we did in Augnst 1914"