Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-10-08

| the commandment -chief in the east.
| No decision could be taken as to
evaCuating the Ukraine. the necessary
preliminary discussions not having
yet taken place. and the question be
/ ing one quite impossible to settle out
! of hand. Count Roedern wanted to
abandon the Ukraine. as the civil pop
ulation got little benefit from it.
| Secretary Solf mentioned the great
wealth of the Ukraine, and desired
also that it should be retained on hu-
manitarian grounds. / could not look
| at the question from any other point
of view than that Of Germany's ad-
vantage.
Secretary Won Wadow brought no
/ Enlightenment, but enlightenment was
essential. and | begged the chancellor
! to have the question eXhaustively eX-
amined. G. H. 9. had occupied the
/ Ukraine in February in agreement
with the government, the latter being
then fully convinced of the absolute
necessity for the step, not merely to
! avert the danger of Bolshevism, but
also to secure the supply Of the quad
! ripple alliance
In the summer Austria Hungary
had only been kept alive with the help
! VI the l MULTI. w Ill btluldIlS lldu
| obtained from the country cattle and
| horses, and much raw material, even
| if we had not the corn we expected.
! The war was not over. Rumania 5
| harvest was a complete failure. BY
| early threshing we had again had to
! mortgage our future. We and our
allies had to look somewhere for adj
ditional foodstuffs. and the Ukraine
was the only possible source. Without
this aid there would be a severe crisis
! in the early summer of 1919.
Troops Needed in East.
! The government never cleared up
| this question of the value of the
| Ukraine in the autumn of 1918. Had
we evacuated at this stage. which
would have taken US a considerable
| period of time. we should have grad
ually released ten divisions which
were not really fit for the line. The
advantage would not have been equal
! to the disadvantages that we should
| have brought upon ourselves by evao-
uation.
| am confident that not a man too
many was kept in the east.
! We now turned to discuss the vital
question: How much could and would
| the people still give to the army :?
| Everything else depended on this.
| had hoped that the government would
| have been clear on this point.
/ The new minister of war General
| Groner) gave me a more optimistic
account of the prospects for rein
| forcements than l had hitherto re-
ceived. He estimated a figure of
100000 men. l could not check his
| figures.
I was very greatly impressed by the
statement that 100000 to 100000 men
| We're Immediately available to be sent
into the army. Why had they not
! been sent sooner? I said: IF l have
I these reinforcements now / can face
the future with confidence, but I must
! have them Immediately" The minis
! ter promised not to lose a day.
Scheidcmann Is Gloomy.
I now turned to the question OF
morale at home and in the army.
expressed myself as I have so often
done in this book l emphasized that
! the army at this moment above al
was in need of support.
The chancellor requested the three
parliamentary secretaries of state to
4 give their views.
Secretary Grober did not speak