The Logan Republican. [volume] (Logan, Utah) 1902-1924, 1919-06-19
WILSON'S INSULTS TO THE SENATE

not have committed greater DluilueTS
than he has been guilty of in the last
eight months. His defenders in the SEN
ate must be on the verge of despair. NO
matter how CALAMITY and energetically
they battle for him he invariably make
false move that places new and almost
intolerable burdens upon him.
No President ever did anything so stu
bid in a political sense as did President
Wilson. when, just before the November
election, he declared that Republicans
must not be elected because they could
not be trusted in office during the war
That mistake brought swift rebuke, for
his party lost at the polls. Since then the
President has gone blindly from one
blunder to another.
Had he been animated by truly states
manlike spirit he would have had the full
text of the peace treaty in the hands OF
every senator at the opening Of congress.
In extenuation of his failure to do this 1t
was announced that he had agreed with
Lloyd George and Clemenceau not to
make the treaty public until it should be
signed or rejected by the Germans. 1t
was feeble plea, inasmuch as there was
no compelling reason why ne should nave
entered into such an agreement, but har-
div had the state department made It's
announcement than the dispatches in
formed us that Lloyd George and Glenn
enceau had been willing to publish the
treaty but had acceded to the Presidents
request to keep it secret. While the
President was mounting his maximum
about "open covenants openly arrived at,
he was whispering to the British and
French premiers that they would greatly
favor him if they agreed to suppress the
very treaty itself until he gave the word
for its release.
There was special reason why ne
should have made the full text public as
soon as it was presented to the Germans.
He had included in it the covenant for the
League of Nations, a covenant which was
to alter the whole aspect of information
al relations. 1t was something new in his
tory and the President had insisted that
it. must be incorporated in the treaty.
Therefore he should have given the sem
ate chance to cons der the covenant sep
arately from the treaty so that in the
course of the negotiations they could
amend it before the Germans attached
their signatures. 1t would have paved the
way for an agreement with the senate
that would have made the early ratifica-
ton of the treaty possible.
The President, however, wished to
keep the senate in the dark until the Ger
mans signed Why? He had boasted
that he would so Intervene the Govern
ant and the treaty that the senate could
not disentangle them. To make his boast
good he was compelled to keep the text
of the treaty out of the hands of the SEN
ators, for, if he had given it to them, they
could have proposed amendments and
thus frustrated his plan. Morevor, by
preventing an agreement with the senate
he would have APP official issued should
the senators reject his covenant. He
could cry out that the senate had nullified
all his efforts at Paris. He could pose as
a martyr and go to the country for in
dorsement An agreement with the SEN
ate would have taken away all his am
munition.
Nor did the contingency that the Ger
mans might reject the treaty Justify his
course. The covenant of the League of
Nations would remain even after reiec-
ton. 1t was the covenant rather than
the treaty that called for. change. The
treaty, relating as it did to boundaries
and Preparations was, for the most part,