Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-02


process was to break our front in the
direction of Sventsiany $50 miles
northeast of Vilna) by the two attacks
from the Vischniev-Norotch sector and
at Postavy. The front was wide and
well chosen. Our reserves would have
been insufficient to close up the gap.
Besides this. it was very difficult to
rush them up to the line. owing to the
bad railway connection with Lake Ma
rotch. The railway was in process OF
construction. If the gap were once
forced the rest would follow. The
way to Kovno would lie open.
The attacks on the northern portion
of our front were made from the
south of Lake Drysviaty, near Vidsy
(within 40 miles of Dvinsk, south
ward), and chiefly from the bridge
heads at Dvinsk and Jakobstadt.
From the 18th to the 21st of. March
the situation of the 10th army was
critical, and the numerical superiority
of the Russians overwhelming. On
the 21st they won a success on the
narrow lake sector which affected us
gravely, and even the attack west of
Postavy was only stemmed with diff
ficulty.
Roads Were BOttOmlesS.
The ground had become soft and in
that marshy country water collected
in ponds; the roads were literally bot
tomless. The reserves which we drew
from the 10th army could only make
slow progress from the Vilna-Dvinsk
railway by wading through the
swamps. Everyone was strung up to
the highest pitch of anxiety, wonder
ing what would happen next.
But the Russians. whose offensive
had led them into heavier ground
than we had, in and behind our posi-
tons, were exhausted. and when the
Russian offensive again reached its
highest pitch on March 26 we had
practically overcome the crisis.
The position of Scholtz's army
group of the Sth army was no less
difficult. Although holding a long
front, the "Leibhusaren" brigade was
compelled to defend itself at Vidsy
against the massed attacks of the enc
my. 1t achieved wonders. Further
north at Dvinsk the enemy made par
ticularly determined attacks. Divi-
sions of the Oldest classes fought with
the same sacrifice as the younger
comrades at their side.
The front was particularly thin at
but the West Prussian
regiments there did their duty.
The attacks of the enemy collapsed.
The Russian offensive was peteping
out by the end of March. AS had
been truly said. without exaggeration,
it had been choked in swamp and
blood" The losses suffered by the
Russians had been extraordinarily
heavy.
German Training Counts.
Our thin lines manned by we'll
trained and brave troops. with their
proper quota of officers. had tri-
over the massed attacks of
the badly-trained Russian army The
efforts of our troops had been very
strenuous owing to the swampy
ground and wet and cold weather.
The front of the commander-in-
chief in the east had survived its
first great defensive action.
One would expect such q defensive
battle to be less strain on the higher
command than an offensive, but in
reality it is much more nerve-racking.
The COMMUNICATIVE chief must content
himself with providing reserves at the
right time, but for this to be possible
the reserves must be available. That
IS a difficult matter when the COM
mand is forced to live from hand to
mouth, as we had to.
Further, it is not easy to make up |
one's mind to transfer reserves be- !
'ore the direction of the attack is |
Known with certainty, and yet it has
% be done, or they will arrive too late. |
Nor is it easy to expect the subordi-
tate commands to give up their re-
erves when they themselves antici-
)ate attack. But the cordial relations
which existed between Lieut. Colonel
Ioffmann and myself and the various
rmy commanders enabled us to settle
hese serious problems without fric-
ion. At the beginning of April things
uieted down.
First "Drumfire' in East.
On April %. in vigorous opera
ion, carefully prepared by powerful
the 10th army recaptured
he lost ground between Lake Nartcn
nd Lake Vischniev. 1t was the first
Engagement on the eastern front in
1hich we employed the artillery
Methods, which had now become Gus
omary in the west. The result was
God.
We reckoned on a continuation of
he great Russian offensive. The arm
IS were organized accordingly and re-
arves held in readiness. BY order of
H. Q. certain German divisions with
ne Austro-H Hungarian army were sent
, us. Later in May fresh attacks I
'om the Riga bridgeheads and the +;
egion of Smorgon seemed imminent. ;
Re took measures accordingly, and I
ven contemplated an offensive of our !
wn. But with the inadequate forces {
our disposal, this offensive could ,
My be local one at Riga. with the '
oject of removing that very incon-
enient bridgehead. Il
At the end of May his majesty Wis
ed us. The kaiser went over the
hole of the area controlled by the
in the east. The
ED marshal and / accompanied him. c
e also went to Mitau. I shall never Nv
rget how German everything SEEM I
there. Everyone who went for the v
rst time to these Baltic provinces
Id the same feeling--that here was
piece of their own native soil. c
The entente in May. 1916. were a
aiming powerful assault on their Ii
ost formidable enemy the German s
my. IN the west there was to be /.