Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-07-21

as definitely fixed to take place. and
that consequently on the east of
Reims the enemy's effort would ex-
tend in continuous fashion from La
Pompelle to Massiges.
The daily table relating to the
strength of the German reserves
showed that these consisted of sixty
two fresh divisions. The various in
dications gathered by the intelligence
department show that the launching
of the attack might be regarded as
imminent and must occur before July
Is. Informed on the general situa-
ton of the adversary's forces, their
distribution and the manner in which
they must be employed, the allied
high command was able to take all
the necessary measures: 1t not only
gave the tactical directions necessary
to bring about the failure of the at
tack .tself, but it took the strategical
measures necessary to compel the
enemy to renounce his offensives and
to fall back merely to the parry.
This the allied command was in a
position to do-although the enemy
believed that it no longer had the
poWer-and, above all, had begun
making preparations to do, by having
given all the subordinate command
ers to understand, since the month
of June. that it was necessary to OBJ
tain ascendancy over the Germans
and that the time for offensive action
had come.
Americans Prove Valor.
The way for these proposed often
sives already had been prepared by
certain successful local operations.
me French army had had the reas-
surlng experience of having side by
side with it several young American
divisions, which, on the south of the
River Ourcq, fighting intermixed with
the French, had given abundant
proofs of their valor and their dar-
ing. The French, therefore, awaited
with confidence the enemys renewed
assault. They knew they would be
able to bring him to standstill
again, but they also had PRESENT.
ment that this time more would be
asked of them. and that they would
be called upon very shortly to make
their supreme effort, which they
showed themselves joyously ready to
do. The French high command de-
cided that the drive on Rheims" of
fered the allies a favorable opportu-
nifty for recovering the offensive
Germans in Tight Place.
The attack by the right wing of the
place between Rheims and Jaulgonne
on the eastern, southeastern and
southern faces of the gigantic "pock-
ct which had been formed by the
front between the Rivers Aisne and
Marine. 1t will be remembered that,
at the beginning Of July, about forty
German divisions occupied this enor-
nous salient. Now the revictualing Of
this mass of men depended on one
single railroad-the line which ran
through Giugnicourt, Miss-sur-Aisne
and Tardenois. To the east
and the southeast of scissors this line
lay at only fifteen kilometers Qess
than nine and one-half miles) from
the front, SO that if it fell into our
possession, or even came effectively
under the fire of our guns, the con-
tinued existence Of the German armies
in the Chateau Thierry salient would
become impossible.
Furthermore, as early as the first
days of July, the allied high command
decided to carry out a counteroffen-
sive on the front between the Aisne
and the Ourcq. 1t was also decided to
combine with this a second attack on
the other face of the Chateau Thierry
salient, in such a way as to close the
mouth Of this pocket or at least to
compel the enemy to evacuate it. II
the enemy did not attack first, the
east face of the pocket was to be at
tackled by the 5th Army; in the con-
trary event, the latter would resist.