Evening journal., 1919-08-19

comparable Rgreemsnt anywhers else
In existence or IN contemplation but
only because it was thought best To
avoid the appearance Of dealing In such
document with the policy Of single
nation. Absolutely nothing Is conceal
ed In the phrase.
"wlth regard 10 domestic questions,
Article XVI. Of the covenant expressly
| provides that. II In case OF any dispute
arising between members Of The league
tho matter involved IL claimed by one
OF the parties and Is found by the
council TO arise out Of matter which
by international law IL solely within
tho domestic jurisdiction OF that party,
tho council shall 90 report, and shall
mRks no recommendation AZ 10 lts set
uemont' Tho United States was by no
means tho only government Interested
In tho explicit adoption OF this pro-
vision, and there Ia no doubt IN the
mind OF any authoritative student Of
international law that such matters as
immigration. tariffs and naturalization
arc lncontostably domestic questions
with which no international body
could deal without expressed authority
questions was undertaken because 20
undertake It. even by sample. would
have involved the danger Of seeming 10
exclude those not mentioned.
The right OF any sovereign State 10
withdraw had been taken for granted,
but no objection was made TO making
Il explicit. Indeed. so soon as the
views expressed at tho White House
conferences were laid before the COM
mission II was at once conceded that It
was best not 10 leave the answer 20
20 important question 10 inference.
No proposal was mado 10 set up any
tribunal TO pass Judgment upon the
question whether q Withdrawing ma
tlon had in fact fulfilled 'all It's Inter
national obligations and ell its obllga-
tons under the covenant II was
recognized that that question must be
LETT 10 be resolved by the conscience
OF the nation proposing 10 withdraw;
and ] must say II did not seem to me
worth while 10 propose that the article
be made more explicit because / knew
that the United States would never
Itself propose 10 withdraw from the
league II It's conscience was not en-
tirely clear as to the fulflllment OF all
It's international obligations. 10 has
never failed to fulall them and never
Will.
ARTICLE Y Is in no respect OF doubt
ful meaning when read In the light OF
the covenant as a whole The council
OF the league can only advise upon
the means by which the obligations OF
that great article are 10 be given enect
10. Unless the United states is a party
10 the policy or action in question, her
own affirmative vote In the council IS
necessary before any advice can be
given. for a unanimous vote or the
council is required. II she Is a party
the trouble Is hers anyhows. And the
unanimous vote OF the council is only
advice in any case. Each government
is free 10 reject It II 10 plesses. Moth
ing could have been made more clear
N the conference than the right OF our
Congress under our constitution 10 eX-
ercIse Is independence In ell matters
~ peace and war. No attempt was
made 10 question or limit that right.
The United States will, indeed, under
take under Article Y 10 respect ana
preserve against external aggression
ihe territorial integrity and existing
political independence OF the league
and that engagement constitutes a
very grave and solemn obligation. But
it Is a moral. not legal, oDllgalloh
and leaves our Congress absolutely free
10 put its own Interpretation upon u
In an cases that call for action. IL
binding in conscience only. not In law.
ARTICLE Y seems to me TO constitute
the very backbone Of the whole cove
nant. Without it the league would
hardly be more than an influential de-
batting society.
at has several times been suggested.
in public debate and in private confer
ence. that interpretations OF the sense
in which the United states accepts the
engagements OF the covenant should be
embodied in the instrument OF ratiil-
cation. There can be no reasonable OBJ
lection 10 such interpretations accom-
panylng the act OF ratification provided
they do not form a part OF the ratlfica-
lion itself. Most OF the interpretations
which have been suggested 10 me en-
body what seems 10 me the plain mean
ing OF the instrument itself. But II
such Interpretation should constitute a
mart Of the formal resolution OF ratifl-
cation. long delays would be the In
evitable consequence, inasmueh as all
the many Governments concerned
would have 10 accept, in effect, the Ian
Qrage OF the Senate as the language OF
the treaty before ratification would be
complete. The assent OF the German
assembly al Weimar would have 70 be
obtained among the rest, and / must
frankly say that I could only with the
greatest reluctance approach that as
sembly for permission TO read the !
treaty as we understand n and as those |
who framed II quite certainly under !
stood it. II the United States were to |
qualify the document In any way. |
moreover. am confident from what ] |
know OF the many conferences and de- /
bates which accompanied the formula |
tion Of the treaty that our example |
would Immediately be followed IN |
many quarters. In many Instances with |
very serious reservations and that the |
meaning and operative force OF the |
treaty would presently be clouded from |
one end OF its clauses to the other
Pardon me, Mr. Chairman, n | have /
been entirely unreserved and plain
spoken In speaking OF the great mat
ters we all have so much at heart. II
excuse is needed trust that the critical
situation Of affairs may serve as my
The issues that manifest
ly hang upon the conclusion of the
Senate with regard 10 peace and upon
The time Of It's action are so grave and
30 clearly insusceptible OF being thrust
On one side or postponed that have
Telt it necessary in the public interest
b. .,,i,o ti,ta urgent n1ea and n make