davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26
HEAVILY PACKED WITH TINT.

But the / est thing abour these mines was that
re-. we're packed We 200 POUNDS of T T,
instead Of the fifty or a nunc-sd the German
commander thought Moreover. they were .x-
piocsd not merely by contact. but by vessel
Doking her nose against any point of caple
saa. reached between the mine and its buoy,
whether the buoy was hidden or not Again.
tscr with the buoy exploded the :--....e: and
OF course. contact with the :.,ne itself set 1t
off the mines being constructed that blow
0: fist would explode These were the
latest invenrons IN mfnfn- were devised
ana constructed under the supervision OF
United States Navy. The American Navy also
lsic ABOUT eighty per cent of the great barrage.
much or the work besEg done under fire from
the German ships or German raiders.
The barrage deep that no submarine
vt constructed could dive under q --''hout, be
ing crushed by the terrific water pressure.
Statistics at the United States Navy headauar-
ters give the known -srnklngs by the mine bar
thesi must have been badly -amaged. tns
be:..- estInass ss,. ~ the NUMBER cf exploded
mines ana the calculated movements OF the
submarines from Zeebrusge snc Heiigoiand.
Coming TO the submarines nsturaI enemy
the destroyers-the German officer was asked
what his experience had been with them.
The destToyefs." he replied. were DANGER
Gus for green nervous shippers but expert
enced shippers who kept their Heads could get
sway from them without much difficulty The
one great MISTAKE that the destroyers made
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26

~, y. =, -
i ~ 'lf2s"a'es 70 4''"cK awning snort OF
battle cruiser hey are smnn msre motor
boais hut wun tremenuous sne.,t--runn,ne NJ.
ta,.an ,,,r, IL.
' ~ - h'Ns an ho"f 'hey
are io"-eniit SHADED very much IKE the back
of whae. rney TOOK like summarizes uut
more Iike wasns Ih.v .,tra ~ , -.
~ ,, ~, '' ''''''
e' nave th'eeh-Ioot skeleton
depth charse resi- extending out from stern
hut much further out than on the d.strov.r, IN
Comparison vito the length OF, the rraft rnesa
e. M BIS must run close M to tneIr quarry
spin around ana drob the u.pTh charye rro,,,
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26
MISSED NORTH SEA BAkRAcE.

Well" he answered evasiveIy q. do NOT
know for certainty that suDmsrlnes were
destroyed. but l cannot or mis-. OF
course. we a. .kn=a tLe -.pproxunate IoeA ,ions
Of the miLe fields: naturally we're cautious
whec approaching them. 4 lever heard u afe,
submarines bei-- DESTROYED IN these canues
But at various times could see buoys which,
when disturbed by violent wave action. ex-
ploded the mines. all had to do in order
to avoid all DANCE of the mines was to change
course and avoid humping tloy.
Here is where the Allies made a big mistake
These mines were too small. estimated that
tie charge was not more Than 100 pounds of
y T. II that much Three submarines that 1
know of. including of my own. were m
jured by these mines. but all three reached port.
The explosion that hit me fire In the
battery room. destroyed the batteries and 1
could not sabmerge. Nevertheless reached
wiiheimshaven the surface. using my
Diesels. This good luck. however. wss due
largely to the fact that heavy Scotch raist
prevailed at the time.
'Of course. the mine fields did gssat damage
to the submarines. but do not believe tnern to
be the ultimate answer to the submarine cam
paigh unless you iay them by the million.
Eaturany, the Uc2.-1: vf these mine :.=ids
must be in obvious lotalitIes or II they are
hidden. they must soon pc ,:iscov cred Then
u is easy 10 asoie then py picking your way
carefully.
so Ear az know did not have any knowi-
edge of the principles upon which :hese Amer
ican mines Tor-.a. or the mine fields. until
some umk after the armstice. Then some of
the mines. which ev:uently had broken adrift
siorm. washed up the Norwegian
coast"
BY these statements the German cornmsnder
made 1T quite clear that the German intelligence
officers hsd very little knowietgs OF one OF :he
biss est Jobs that heS been done during che
war-tne construction OF barrage Of mines
stretching from the coas, OF Scotland to the
coast of Norway. The barrage contained some
thing like 1900 mines. 1t twenty miles
wAe and more than half q mile deep. that
nothing could get through 1t unless perhaps It
would be pare Of whole feet which would
have to sacrifice possibly fifty q sr:srec
ships 10 make big enough mole throaxn 70
allow the oth.-s to follow sarety.
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26

"HESE Interesting revelations ~ete made
BY the FORMER captsin - rhe ,ierma n
i submarine Ut7I In ap interview thaf was
sntamed th7ouEh the courtesy OF COM
mauder in the United States Navy aftathsd Il
the Arnistiee Commission as interareier. II is
believed TO be the rlrst interview with u-boat
commander since the beginning OF the war.
wits she Dossiple esesDtien O. the .alSs with the
Deutschiand's Skipper Snen lat craft came to
America three wears ago. Hestrictions forbid
the publication OF the German captains name,
sut am permitted to state that this captain
commanded not only the u-1. afterwards sur-
rendered TO me Grand Fleet but Was q, various
umes In charge os ynrss other summarizes: that
in the four underse.s boats he made twenty
seven voyages. all in the :-isn sea; that he was
decorated with nf the aigsest orders BE-
stnwed upon susmarine commanders: that he
ooesss ne never sank or even s.tacke1 hos.
pitai ship. ana further. mat -SsloiEs are
vel, known 10 the intelligencs ofTicers Of both
the American and British navies-
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26
R0MBERS FINISHED TWENTY.

~Our shippers were not apprehensivs -
nhe aircraft alone. because encounters haA
demonstrated pretty thoroughly that it was
practically impossible .or airpiane TO score
. direct b.. ..th :aA limited number Of bombs
carried. Moreove-. - .--pedoes were s-nan
that nothing but direct hit a suoma anne
could do much damage. ] never heard of q
single case where any real damage was oone
.by .strplznes to .submarines"
Navy siera and men OF the bombing bases
en- the Flanders coast know that ui> O-5ost
skipper is far rrc-: .ecsrect in his rafarmation
regarding this phase Or the suDmarIse warfare.
The records OF the United States Navy azc -
ths British Admiralty viii grove even to .h;s
efficers satisfaction. that something around
twenty submarines were destroyed or padiy
damaged by airpIanes alone. The American.
British and French seapisne Tiers aIor~ the
Englisrs Channel, French. English. Scotch anc
Irish coasts made the waters dangerous for
submarines that toward the close tina war
sven the few r-ooats left at ZeebruYge were
compelled to confine their operations 10 . sna:,
part of the North Sea. The iox OF the sub
marine commander at Za.br=sge. found after
tie British has driven the Germans ou. sf that
port. showed that toward the close or the war
the submarine sortes from TIA: base hardly
averaged four trips a week. many seapans
attacks made on the Ger-.san submarines
reportsd out in tho North Sea. and at least two
s,nkinss weas eredired to American 0omoers
.. the DunicirK station And these men
wee somewhat Handicapped in their worE De-
cause OF IRcK OF suitable pisnes AT any rate It
n knoTn oefiniss'v that toward the eose Of
hostihtes the submarines seldom moved down
me English cnannei. although any day you
could cross ana see from one 10 hundred
vessels. with munitions eonyoys galore. moving
An long atI7ngs with no escorf At All
Navy nisrs are esnAzsG that the German
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26
TONNAGE. U-BoAT wATcHwoRD.

For the first time the commander seemed
evasive. He certainty was not as frank as ne
had been heretofore.
The German Government" he responded.
"hao definite information that certain HOSPITAL
ships oad carFied war material ana personnel
otherstban sounded or nospiiai corps
y myself never sttacKen a hospital snip Or
'even'aflcnpted to goelose to one. although they
represent tounage. Ano II was tonnage thar
we were after. An the U-boat comm nders mad
orders to sink.aii the maximum tonnage possi-
oio In fact. ali orders ana Instructions were
mere repetitions TO arter tonnage. All re-
wards. decorstIons. distinctions-ever,t thing IN
fHrt-~as based on tonnage sunk. 1onna ge
t"hnhg.. tonnage was drummed into US night
ana DAY The obvious result OF these orders
a'd TINS system was that the u boats sank the
tofnaEe that was easiest TO get.
IN tins connection. after the convoy system
mao heen developed the American troopships
we're 80 very thoroughly protected that we sim
ply hsd TO leave them alone. Time and again
We hiEnted them and would have made an
Aitaek had II not been for the very powerful
escort ate
"EatMsliy. would have been glad to get a
troopship- did everything possible to ap-
proach close enough TO put out a torpedo or
two. But could not. We found that after the
conveying had become carefully worked OUT
we had a better chance to ger the ships as
they were returning to America These as
every one Knows. we're not conveyed back Or
rather they were conveyed only short dis
tanee away from England and then turned
loose on their own. or course, the A lies had
10 use SO many destr0yers and cruisers WATCH
ing the conveys and bringing them In that they
could not spare sufficient numbers of ships TO
provide large convoys on the way back
with tonnage as the great objective II we
could have sunk more ships than could have
been buiit In three four months It would
have had a disastrous effect on the most i'm
portant lines OF communications OF the Allies
the lines Of munitions. supplies and men COM
ing from America 1t might. not have Kept
down the steady flow of troops to Enrope
because of their more careful protection, but
IL certainly would have cut down the food
transports to England before the haFvests and
when Great Britain was In her worst plight
for food. Certainly II would have chopped off
these enormous supplies. for the troops In north-
ern France and Belgium.
I'VE knew. naturally. that after the u.gen,
call had gone to America to send troops at ali
costs the actual campaign of the British navy
against the submarines had to be relaxed 10
devote more energy to the conveying. That
added to the risk OF attempting to sink a loaded
troop transport. so we were compelled TO take
the only alternative. of laying for the ships az
they were returning to America NOT so heavily
escorted"
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26
PLUNGING AWAY FROM DEATH.

81 made that mistake myself on the u-7l 4
had been following a convoy the surface
at full spee5 for apout two hours. ! dived ts
soon as / delivered the attack. The escortii,g
destroyer attacked and | went down to teo
r-eat depth During my long to get ,H.o
position for the attack the exhaust pipe ms d
become so hot that when I went far down /
took in water to such extent that had to
come to the surface Immediately. When 4
came up the destroyer driving at four bells
in the opposite direction. She did not notice DIe.
although she fairly close hand. There
mist over us at the time. few SET
onds enough to save me-"
what effect had the depth charges on. the
morale of the crew." the captain was asked.
Experienced as well inexperienced crews
got panicky at first" he replied. but they set
tied down considerably after two three
attacks. But they never got seasoned do
troops that have been under fire repsa tedy.
The dread of what was going to happen after
the first depth charge heard always
than if the depth charges kept pop
ping. When the men heard great number go
off they always felt safe. for 1t generally meant
that the destroyers were pretty near the end
of their supply. There Is vast difference
between being under fire land and being
under fire under water. Even IL you are
wounded land you have chance, but
II the submarine is wounded ii is finished
and badly finished
'"One of our U-boat skippers that know
hbited fatal bravado. He used to allow the
~hydrophone man-the only one 10 the submarine
who.can hear a depth charge when 1t explodes
at distance--to sing out every time depth
charge went off The whirring OF the motors
prevents the other men from hearing II unless
1t il close. The skipper made notches
the swAb handle for every ex plosion.
"All that is left Of that submarine Is the
swab handle. now in the possession of the fian-
Gee of the submarine commander. The SUBJ
marine made cruise from which II never
TeturDed-nor did the commander return either
probably too many marks the swab
handle"
Here the captain made remark that indi-
Gated fully how ignorant were the German in
teigence officers of the American Navy. He
said
1.-THE Allies used depth charges OF only two
sizes-sO and 100 pounds. They should have
been much larger"
The depth charges Of the destroyers the
Eagle bubmarine destroyers. the motor
launches. or m. LIS" the coastal motor boats e
or &c. NJ. B.s." were all 300 pounds In weight
Almost any of these small craft carried enough
4 T aboard TO blow up the lower part OF New
York city II exploded AT once.
What your most narrowing experi-
snceY the submarine commander was asked
One thing really got my nerve" he Sespond-
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26

that The pery presence OF aircraft forced the
Germans 10 abandon attacks on foopships
ana 10 attempt to obtain some sort OF pTse
BY seeking empty, scanfiiy conveyed return
ine ships. Nt4
Fourth, and perhaps most .pifai OF all. that
.he German submarines Dyacfice OF coming
TO the surface OF the ocean every night at
the same hon, ana sending on wireieSs in
struct,ons mas more paiuabie 10 the ARies
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26

than a BLAZING beacon to shipnrecked crew
This perv custom persisted in Hifh character.
isfic Tenfoa stabbornness seafea the doom
Of many a submarine. ana IL enabled the
Allies 10 send a DESTROYER fiotiila ahead Gf a
coapoy. drum The submarines out Of the
picinify and route fhe sreatea noopships
.htoneh the danger cone with Lffie fear. n
mas MOI unta The time OF The 0msfice fhat .
the Germans reaiised then ,most fafat error.
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26
CAPTAIN OF U-BOAT NO. II MAKES FULL CONFESSION

Gsymany's camnaisa OF srbs,aflas hlghr.
tatness faied lafeeiy because o. the nr
toTds ignorance o. four psrp piai iastS.--
fusf. thar the depth charges asea ev ,he
4ihed SnhT7orae ,Rate's mere from three 20
81, nmes as powerful as ihe Germans ,hopsh;
Second thar 81, wesks before the @HrSf,fs
ue> Sisned the Aa,eS had nuf INTO ass aeg'
dcrh ohWee system nherebr tiro bnnbs
pe,s erniodsd simultaneously al 9;ifese7f
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26

aerfhs msfeaa oi only one depth as. .nye-
polsiv. Ihcr bursi at 50 and $50 feet max
ire complete ande, water b9rage from
n'hfch n a'as impossible 10 ESCAPE unless a
c,eff dired 10 ahoa, ESQ tsei, ana ten OF them
coi'ta aithAana The terrific pressure OF The
aaie, SO fGf beiou the surface
7tDa. tsa ne AA,ed aerial patrol, any
neniea br saae''caa patneipafioa had SO
saakea the morale oi the Submarine sktppers
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26
UNDERsEA WAR MADE HOPELESS

Allied naval commanders point out that the
German was working a futile line here. BY
this time the United States shippin. programme
was coming along fast. It mad passed the point
where It need even think about German sink
ings. 1t was floating .-"re tonnage than the
Germans had been ape to sink In the hey-day
of their underhand warfare Moreover tho
later type of vessels were much smaller than
the average OF those that were I'm service This
meant that soon there would be probably twice
as many ships carrying the same number OF
troops. The consequence was that Germany to
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26
ROLLING A SUB TO DEATH.

Again the German commander showed ne wns
somewhat deficient In knowiedgs Of actual con-
ditions mere. Hentiand Firth proved the nuriai
ground for at least one submarine tnAf wes
trying to make its way out TO the Atlantic
Ocean "nd the Irisn Sea through this opening.
The close watch or submarine patrols. aircraft
and Garage across the English Channel and
the Tea' mine oarrage across the North sea
confined the submarines to the openings Or
tween Scotland and the Orkneyn and the Ork-
tsys and the Shetland isIanda The water Of
Ps=:;anu Firth rushes through at a speed Of
about fifteen miles an nour. rhe conrormation
OF the cotton Is such that a submarine must
Aeep stralsh, TO her course OF subject n.rseif to
the r.sk OF oens swung around In the swift
current with no room for manoeusring. How
msny submarines have met Destruction there
noi known. hut the batteship New FORK,
flagship OF Rear Admiral Hugh Rodinan. com.
ma nniug the f'ifth ttattle Squadron OF the
Grand Fleet. rolled one TO her deatn. This cpl.
sode occurred on October u. when the Amsn.
can battle squadron Was steaInins out into the
Athnuc Ocean In pursuit OF two German raia-
eTs that were reported 10 be ont after a ,iarss
convoy OF American troops. The episnde ts DE-
scribed IN the official report OF Admiral Rod
man TO Admiral Sims thns:-
The New YORK WA ieauine the division into
Pcnuand Firth. westerly course. mfd-channeL
Just as she was turning to the north waro with
r'sht rudGsr. hence stern swinging To port. q
heavy underwater blow was felt on our star
board quarter. followed Immediately by an
olner which hit the starboArd propeller. Tag-
ine everything INTO consideration, u ts my belief
ano that OF the Commanuer-in Chief (Admirai
Sir David Beatty ano other nigh OFFICERS OF
the Grand Fleet that when we changed our
course northward ann westward We crsssed
The track OF the submarine that she punched
us first with her bows and as she urirted we
struck her with two blades OF our starboard
propeller II is my opinion that we cut open
her bows. filled the forward compartment and
inflicted such injuries tnnt she Decn me unman-
ageanie and sank. We were In thirty fathorns
OF water. dent was found In the cotton corr
responding 10 thar made py a submarine
Admiral Rodnian.s report was approved oy n
COURT OF Inquiry.
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26
SPEAKS WITH BLUNT FRANxsEss.

With blunt frsnkness the captain of the U-u
summed up the entire submarins situation
thus
The war ended Just In time to save few
good U-noat skippers ane their entire crew.
from destruction We aad svng realized that il
We did not win a decisive result within the first
year Of Americas entry into the war our sub
marine campaign would never get beyond the
stage OF guerrilla warfare
Naturally one of the first questions asked of
the commander was
What anti-subnarine measures OF the United
States Navy or of the Allies proved the most
effectfye?"
That" he replied. .'depended entirely on the
experience. the skill and the daring of the indi-
slduai U-boat commander. The very best u
boat shippers could get away from almost
Gnfi-submarine measures that had been devised
up to two months previous to tho armistce-
Sst things were changing fa=t then believe
In possible to develop anti-snbInarine meas
sfes to such extent that the U-beats win
no longer be able to do enough damage to JUS
ufy the tremendous efforts required for an
effective undersea caTrs-slgn-
-At first all our sun.,s-..e commanders were
very snuei afraid OF the aircraft We had
heard that the United States would put forth
tremendous effort in tiis direction. We were
told. also. that she would supplement the de-
Troyer escort Of the troop conveys with large
aerial escorts.
we knew. of course. that would happen
when that situation was brought about And
this forced Into the nrm conclusion that il
We did not win decisive result with SUBJ
marines within the first year OF Americas
sntry into the submarine campaign
never would get beyond the stage of guerrilla
warfare.
'Bnf the great fleet OF airplanes from
America did not materialze Ane AFTER
fwo encounters with the airplanes our COM
@aAnders ceased to worry very much. The IN
experienced skippers. naturally. always feared
me aircraft and we're extremely cautious
Approaching conveys II any aerial scouts were
about They were afraid The aircraft would
sight the submarine and warn re convoy. The
asar that seapsue had spotted him and
Afsrned the trooosh;1s usually resulted In
eAs commander giving up the attack. They an
Sit that a singss saaplaze had much better
sAanee OF sighting them than had = dozen ships
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26

One Of Germany's Master Pirates
Tells Why the Submarine Cam
paign of FrightfliIness Failed
So Completely in War.
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1919-08-26
q. DELI EDWARDS.

American eorrespondent. unattached.
Nth the Grand fleet ., the snrrendsr
Of the German High Seas Fleet and a,
the Belgian and British fronts.
El Imparcial. (San Juan, P.R.) 1918-197?, 1919-05-28
Informe del Mercado
q de Azucar y Cafe.

cafe, tocaron su mas alto nivel
desde el 1887 en- la semana pasa
da. Diciembre sc vendi0 a 1880
aunque subsecuentemcnte reacciG-
no casi 3 4 centavos pcr libra
habiendO hecho una gdnancia Ell
las ventas y cerrandose como a
1I2 centavo mas bajo. Es eviden-
te que ell alza ha sidO demasiado
rapida y la participation del pd-
blicO, Ell ell aumentO naturalmente
estimularon las activas fluctua--
clones. DebidO a la firmeza en-
ell Brasil, no hay ell acostumbrado
volumen de cambios Ell las ven
tas, que en- parte eXplica ell casi
perpendicular avance de las soma
mas recientes. Los avisos del Ca
BILE que nos comunica que la huel-
ga ell Santos tuvO sus efectOs dc
alza, asi como ultimos rumOres
del Brasil de que venderlan algu-
nos de sus valores de cafe 10 cual
ayud0 la reacci6n. Ell mercado
actual del cafe esta casi paraliza-
do pues los tostadoreS en- el in
terror estan renuentcs seguir ell
aumcnto en- los precios, especial
mente cuando Sc sienten que las
grandes existencias primitivas cs
tan con toda escasez. Sc slcn
te mas adn que Europa Ell su pre-
scnte bancarrOta no sera una gran
compradora despu6s de la paz.
Los precios por eXistencia siguen
nominalmcnte sin cambiarse a
unos % ccntavos por Santos is y
10 centavo por Rio rs.
El Imparcial. (San Juan, P.R.) 1918-197?, 1919-05-28

Del seiior Guillefmo Arroyo, Jc
fe de Distrito de la Policla Insu-
lar, cabo y guardias del puesto de
Salinas, solicitando, la aproba-
ci6n delProyecto de Ley del Sc
nado No. 81.
Del senor Jose Q. Rivera en-
union Mha fuerza de la Policia
del puesfo' de Patillas, hacienda
igual solicitud.
De. .seiior Domingo Quevedo
~ lihi6n del personal del
Pdcsto. de la Policia de Sabana
Grande, hacienda igual solicitud.
Del senor Miguel Martinez, Je-
fe y guardias del puesto de Ia
PoIicfas de Vega Baja, hacienda
igual solicitud.
Del seiior Juan Andres Massa
ri, de Maricao, hacienda igual so
licitud.
Del seIlor T. Santos, Jefe dc
Distrito del puesto de Policia dc
Santa Isabel, hacienda igual soil
-citud.
Del senor Francisco Ramirez
.Jefe de Distrito del puestO de PO
licfa de Ceiba, hacienda igual so
licitud. !.
Del Jefesde Distrito del puest(
El Imparcial. (San Juan, P.R.) 1918-197?, 1919-05-28
PETICIONES A LA CAMARA

de la Policia de FajardO, hacienda
igual solicitud.
Del senior J.. Nlnez, .Jefe de Dis
trito del puesto de la Policia de
Utuado, hacienda igual solicitud.
Del seilor Francisco Rodriguez,
de Juncos, hacienda igual so!ici-
tud.
De los seiiores Rafael Forteza,
e. Diaz Arana y otros vecinos de
Vega Baja, hacienda igual solici-
tud.
Del seiior Jose V. Gonzalez Ber
mudez, Jefe de Distrito de Poll
cla del puesto de Barros, hacien-
do igual solicitud.
Del senior Garcia Pi;Iero, a nom
bre de la POlicia del puesto de
Lola, hacienda igual sOlicitud.
Del sargentO Gle la Poilcla del
puesto de Jayuya, hacienda igual
sOlicitud.
Del selor +. Bfanco, Jefe dc
Distrito del puesto de Policla dc
Guayama, hacienda igual solici
tud.
De los senOres Nicanor NavedO
Jose r. Jimenez, Simeon Reyes, J
otros empleados del Manicomi(
Insular, solicitando aumento dt
! sueldO.