The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-09-21
LuderdorH Tells of Dramatic
Fall of Won KuehImanr, ir,1918

: 3
us from forming new military front.
/ This / recognized On general grounds
! l held such a policy to be short sighted,
as it was bound in the long run TO
strengthen the whole bolshevist move
ment.
That could only do us harm; and
regarded it as the duty of our govern
ment to guard against such an eventu-
ality, not only on military grounds, but
also, and indeed more urgently, from
4 the purely political point of view. Dr'
iHelfferich regarded this as quite posi-
tble The position of the government was
Icertainly difficult, but they had only
themselves to thank for it. They as
sured me that their policy reflected
public opinion Sn Germany.
! Here, again. | was compelled to be-
! neve that consideration for tendencies
of internal politics was impeding the
effective prosecution of the war As for
! our military position. we could easlly
have made rapid attack on Petro-
! grad with the troops we had in the
east With the help of the Don Cos
sacks we could also have attacked in
the direction of Moscow This would
have been far better than merely de-
! Tending a long line, which absorbed
more troops than would have been re-
| quired for a short advance. besides I'M
Jsnerving the troops whose spirits would
! tions.
! We could have deposed the Soviet
| government, which was thoroughly hos
/ tile to us, and given help to other au-
thorities in Russia which were not
working against us%but indeed anxious
! to cooperate with US. This would have
been a success of great Importance to
the general conduct of the war
IF. some other government were es-
tablished in Russia, it would almost GER
tanly have been possible to come to
some compromise with it over the peace
of Brest whereas, in dealing with the
bolshevists, a simple abandonment or
the treaty without any idea as to how
matters would develop, would have been
the same kind of payment in advance
policy as were all the ideas about
peace of understanding" so long as
the enemy would accept no such peace
Our government remained wholly ig-
norant of the underground activities of
the bolsheviks, whom they regarded, or
wished to regard, shonest. They en-
tered into further negotiations with
them over those points of the treaty
which had not been cleared up. Moth
ing, not even the unavensed murder of
our ambassador mt Moscow, shook their
faith. They walked straight into the
trap set by the bolsheviks, while stimuli
taneousIy showing distrnst OF ali other
tendencies in Russia.
The bolshevist government was very
accommodating; it granted the German
demands with regard to Esthonia and
Liyonia, conceded the independence of
/ Georgia, agreed to pay an indemnity
/ by installments, and held out prospects
OF the delivery of raw material includ
ing oil, from Baku. Later on, the first
installments of the indemnity were ac-
| tually paid as agreed, rather to my
I .
| in the bolshevists vert so far that they
actually wanted to supply arms and
ammunition to Herr Joffe. The gentle
man who brought from the foreign Of
| flee the document dealing with the
matter remarked to me: This material
, remains in Germany, and Joffe will use
| it against us here"
AT the conference in Spa, when our
| Georgian policy was being discussed
the imperial chancellor agreed to send
Colonel Won Kress, who had returned
to Germany from the Palestine front, to
T1ff1s as his representative, with an
escort of one or two companies. 1t had
become essential for us to show a
stronger hand in this district not mere
ly because we hoped to secure som e
military assistance from that quarter,
but also in order to obtain raw ma =
terials Germany and Turkey were
then clashing over control of the riches
of the Caucasus).
could NOT RELY ON TURK Ely"
That we could not rely on Turkey in
the matter had been once again demon
strated by her conduct in Batum, where
she claimed the right to retain all the
stocks for herself. We could only ex-
pect to get out from Baku if we hrlned
ourselves.
The shortage of fuel mt home, and
the difficulties of our winter fighting.
MI hal -,fH
were only too firmly impressed on my
memory. After the attack on the Sew
enth army, the nrmy's reserves of fuel
had also run out, and we felt the short
age keenly. OIL was needed for the
Ukraine railways also.
The director of railways had to solve
the problem of tank ships | was highly
disguised when the bolshevists. simply
in order to 'injure US, sank the Elbruz
the largest tank steamer in the BLACK
sea, at Novorossisk
The crucial question. of course, was
how we were to get to Baku Here,
again. consideration for the soviet
government prevented us from acting
firmly or rapidly, and the first event
of Importance was that the English
from Enseli crossed the Caspian sea at
the beginning of August and took pos
session of the town.
Their occupation of Baku, which was
\ oHly rendered possible by the compile q
inactivity of the Turks in North Per-
STA, was serious blow to Us BY this
move the English came into closer
touch with the volunteer army in the
kuban district. but, on the other hand.
at Baku they were within our reach,
An attack upon them. involving only
small force, seemed possible. G. H.
set about preparing a blow against
them. with the cooperation of Nuri' 5
troops, and sent a brigade of cavalry
and fe wbattalions to Tiflis. The
question of the transport of troops had
| not yet been settled, when the situa-
tioa in Bulgaria compelled us to send
the troops to Rumania.
| "NO 'NAPOLEONIC DREAMS"
In the east I went only so far as
In my view was absolutely demanded
by our military position and economic
needs. 1 had no NapOleOnic dreams
of world conquest. The anxious strur-
gle in which 1 was so deeply engaged
left me time to pursue fantastic
schemes.
| wanted no territory in the Ukraine
or Caucasus my only object was to
procure the supplies that were so urg-
emily needed for our bare maintenance
and the prosecution of the war. /
hoped also. now that we had succeede |
in breaking the blockade at this point.
to improve our economic position. and
thus to raise our physical strength and
morale
l wished to make whatsuse was pos
sible of the manpower of these dis
tricts, partly by direct recruiting, but
on larger scale and with greater
prospect of success. through enlistia =