Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-10-17

cooperation of neighboring columns.
But the most serious difficulty was
caused by the fact that on September
II the 18th army corps thought it
being attacking by very superior
force. This was quite conceivable
and had to be taken into account
Under the existing conditions as
regards the strength of the two forces,
the front line required the close tacti-
cal support of the enveloping corps.
We had therefore to decide to bring
the 18th and LIST army corps further
north than was originally intended.
After few hours the belief of the
18th army corps proved to be un-
founded, But the order had already
been given to the enveoplng wing.
Later the corns We're again diverted
to their original route, but by then at
least half a day had been lost
The 8th army did magnificent work
The whole advance, which covered
well over &c miles in four days. was
a brilliant march of victory for these
troops. exhausted as they were by
continuous fighting and strain of ev-
cry kind. This applied more partic-
ularly to the original units of the Sth
army; the Guard reserve corps and
the 18th army corps had fought vail
antly in the west at Namur but thew
had certainly had an easier time
hitherto
Grand Dukes Relief Halted.
Away from the main battlefield the
Bird reserve division, under their en-
ergetic leader. General Won Morgen,
and Won der Goltz's Landwehr divi-
sion had fought very successful ac-
ton against superior force near
Bialla on September s, and then beat
en- the reinforcements which were
brought up. In so doing they had re-
moved a grave source of danger to
the army fighting further north.
General Won der Goltz was held up
outside OsoWiec General Won Morgeu
took Augustovo and Suwalki after
heavy fighting The intention of the
Grand Duke Nicholas Ia relieve the
pressure on Rennenkampf from thar
quarter was frustrated.
On September 13 the battle was
practically over. As a matter of fact,
Rennenkampf does not seem to have
ever intended a serious stand. At any
rate, he began his retreat very early
in the operation and marched at
night Our airmen did certainly note
the course of some retreating columns
but their reports We're too vague. The
Russian knew how to conduct retreats
and move masses of troops without
using the high roads
During the whole of the victorious
advance of the Sth army from the
reighhorhood of Allenstein into enemy
territory, the army headquarters
staff had followed close behind the
troops. l have always insisted that
we should be in the closest possible
touch with both commanders and
men. 1t was particularly necessary
for the purposes of giving orders and
receiving reports as technical means
of communication We're still defec-
tive.
Used Relays to Send Orders.
Telephone faei tiles In the province
of East Prussia we're very meager.
Some of the officials had forsaken
their posts. The wireless apparatus
rendered good service. but only the
cavalry and the army headquarters
staff possessed it. So | was obliged
to rely mainly on motor cars and re-
lays of staff officers.
The gentlemen of the volunteer mo-
tor corps did magnificent work as dis
patch riders. They accomplished jour.
neys which recalled the most daring
patrol work. | needed the few air
men urgently for accommodating and
could not spare them for dispatch