The sun., 1919-11-03
Americas Need for Munition
Programme.

Colonel ]. II. BURNS Of the United
States Army Ordnance Department
published recently in the Field Artil-
lerp Journal comprehensive and
thoroughgoing article entitled THE
Munitions Problem" which deserves
the earnest consideration of all legis-
lators who desire to have the United
States prepare itself intelligently for
the protection Of it's possessions
against attack. 1t Is an exposure in
temperate language of our weakness
In munitions before the war and a
plea based on intimate knowledge for
the establishment Of system under
the operation of which the United
States shall not again be caught as
It was when 1t entered the war, lack
ing not only munitions but without
any definite idea as to what was
needed and how 1t should be pro-
duced.
Conditions which existed at the be-
ginning Of the war were deplorable,
according to Colonel BURNS. Designs
Of field artillery and ammunition had
not kept pace with contemporaneous
developments. Adopted and proved
designs of the heavier types OF guns
and ammunition which were part Of
the mobile artillery programme did
not exist" Consequently there were
no stocks of the heavier guns and
ammunition, scarcely enough guns and
ammunition Of the adopted types to
supply the army as 1t was. The coast
artillery was in better shape, but for
the air service and for trench war
fare weapons mo designs, stocks
or manufacturing facilities existed"
OF rifles and pistols for the infantry
and cavalry We had good designs, but
for machine guns no satisfactory de-
sign had been adopted. Generally de-
signs were built up on theory, accord
ing to Colonel BURNS, without atten-
ton to raw material supplies. Thus
INT was the adopted shell filler for
mobile artillery ammunition, in spite
Of the fact that the country was pro
duoing practically no toluol.
These facts have been somewhat oh.
scured in the public mind because our
immediate necessity was to win the
war, and the war was won. But II
was won with munitions procured
from British and French reserves.
BY the autumn of 1913 we had built
up a munition organization which
would have, supplied our armies rea.
sonably in the spring of 1919 with
what they needed. In short, sit took
us practically two years to develop
munitions to such an extent that we
could begin to supply our armies
Our munhon power was a year be
hind our man power.
But throughout the war the pro
gramme of requirements was uncer
tain, unbalanced and generally ex
cessive, and finally reached a point
where 1t would undoubtedly have
been absolutely impossible of fulfil
ment even though the entire resources
of the country were utilized for moth
ing else"
How can such unpreparedness and
such dangerous uncertainty be pre-
vented In the future?
Colonel BURNS says that there ha,
not heretofore been proper coopera
tion between the producers of weapon.
and ammunition and the users OF
the weapons and ammunition. The
Ordnance Department had too few
officers, most Of whom had mo rea,
idea of the problems" involved II
using what they supplied. The user
of weapons and ammunition had nc
conception Of the problems Of the
producers of munitions. There wa.
no friendly coordination with tn,
Ordnance Department covering cues
tons Of design, manufacture ant
issue Of fighting material. The Gen
eral STAFF had no representative OF
the Ordnance Department among it,