Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-25

cellor in Berlin. He desired peace,
but only hand in hand with Germany,
He must he given the tribute of praise
that he was loyal
At the same time he held earnestly
and with uncommon ability the brief
for the double monarchy. In dealing
with hi. imperial master he showed
calmness and firmness,
| Nevertheless, he save his authority
! to the PARDON to the Czechs, and to
! the onlperor's uncertain policy toward
the subject peoples. HO remained IN
office. although he did not approve
OF the pardon. and although this step,
symptom as it was of The impending
collapse of the double monarchy, was
bound to make peace more difficult,
and to strengthen the hopes Of the
entente Ton victory
No Dictator, He Of;cn said.
Personally l had d great liking for
the count and took no little pleasure
in his conversation, but he unfortu
lpately was too ready to repeat the
| WilheImstrasse gossip about my die
! tatOrsllip," | often explained TO him
how unfomded his suppcsition was
Austria Hungary was constantly dis
cussing the early conc usion of peace,
Thus. about the middle of April
| 1917) the Emperor Charles in q let
ter addressed to his majesty, dealt
with the possibility of having to make
great sacrifices in order to obtain it.
The dangers of an International rev.
olution Were described in great detail
and the urgent need for such a peace
deduced from i.
These aud similar letters were
| handed by his majesty to the imperial
chancellor to answer. The field mar
shall and | had to comment upon
them from the military point Of view
and the chief OF the naval staff from
the naval. OF course. we said, as in
duty bound. what we thought was
right; how our comments were made
use of was the business of the i'm
perial chancellor, In this instance his
ideas coincided with ours and witt
those of the chief of the naval staff
Early in May the chancellor repreC
: to the effect that. considering the
great hopes the entente had at the
moment. both of the succcss Of then
offensive and Of the e-establishmeni
of Russia our efforts would be doom
ed to absolute failure if we made our
readiness for peace too obvious. /
! WUulNA AAhtl Wy blNlNN. WV .NN't'ANtA l'N'
crs appear hope essly exhausted ant
thereby make the enemy intensity
his efforts. AT the moment peace
was only obtainablc by submitting Il
the will of our enemies, but that EtnC
of peace the people would neither
understand nor permit.
Hopes Pinned on Russia.
Conditions in Russia had so far de
veloped favorably for us. In tina
country the demand for peace wa
] becoming more and more iasistent
| Our difficult task was TO follow thu
process of development and disinte
| grafton in Russia with the closest at
ltention, hasten it if we could, ant
deal with any approaches from tina
quarter in such a way that aetna
peace negotiations might follow Pos
Isibly such negotiations might then be
come the prelude of a general peace
This constituted the official rept
to the Emperor Charles letter.
u on many other occasions Coun
Czernin pressed for peace. He con
tinued to advocate the surrender o
German territory to France, out h
was never able to say whether tn
Iontente was inclined for peace. o
whether any tangible method of at
tanning it had presented itself. Coun
Czernin would surely have told US
he had discovered it,
IN his speech of December y, 1915
he discussed the questions of war an
peace at great length presumab,
merely in order to show that he IA
l seen disaster coming. That is an un
productive occupation.
\ Pessimists are always clever peo
II nlo NAfhop tho ayi1 dav q rIiUpC tpp
! are gaped at for their wisdom, TIL
mob offers them incense--and to II
self at the same time. The mob ha
! always anticipated disaster. If it doe
mot come then the pessimists and tn
mob are more satisfied than ever )
/ they both enjoy themselves, ANYHOW
1.-THE Mob Lacks Judgment"
Men Of action are not so fortunate
they are only right when they ar
succ essful. Then the mob cheer
, them. But If they are not successful
| or, worse, meet with disaster. tn
same mob stones them, Pessimist
and the mob do not ask what the
themselves, or the men of action hay
done to avert disaster. The mob lack
| Judgment and cannot be expected
ask.
i But | am surprised to find Cour
i Czernin behaving in the same wa!
Has he really fairly told himself an
the world what he actually did.
the situation in which he found hin
self. to avoid losing the war, and S
save his own and his allies countrit
I from disaster and shame?
unfortunately Count Czernin ONT
!, ted to inform us earlier of those fac
h which did not come TO my knowlede
, until I read his speech. He said:
ION several occasions our represeT
[ tatives got into touch with those {
!, the entente, but unfortunately tines
i feelerS never got to the stage of COZ
! crete proposals We frequently ia
4 The i'm preston that we should be alb
J to make a separate peace without Gel
many, but we were never informed {
the definite conditions on which Gel
many, on her side. might have pcac
Above ALL we were never told tht
| Germany would be allowed to retail
! the possessions she held before II
J, war, AS the entente nevt
, declared their willingness to negotla
with Germany that had no desil
5 for CONQUEST, but Kept reiteratir
! their desire to destroy Germany, "
were forced into defensive war O
/, Germany behalf and our role in Be-
!, lin was made amazingly difficult.
: ThaSn wnrde if SpoEen nar1in