The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1919-10-25
VON TIRPITZ STORY
GERMAN DEFEAT
tConunued From Previous Issus.)

Continued From Previous Issus.)
1t must be admitted that in respect to
the submarine question Austria began
py showing more starch than did we.
IN the Ancona case in December, 1915,
she scored a distinct victory over Will
son, but the policy Of the German for
eIgn office shortly made her hedge,
About this same time a change was
taking place In the attitude of our mill
tary administration toward the subma-
fine question. The army fronts we're
paralyzed and a decision OF the war
was becoming more and more remote.
Frobably at the request of the army
chiefs, a conference on the question, was
held in the wal office Dec. 80, 1915,
and Jan. 5. 1916.
Gen. Won Faikenhayn stated that now
that Bulgaria had declared herself on
cur side he would consent to unrestrict-
cd submarine warfare If the navy would
guarantee success.
~Falkenhayn's stated reason for pre-
viously supporting the chancellor's stand
against U-boat warfare in the autumn
Of 1915 was that In consequence of
statements from the foreign office he
feared that such action would prevent
Bulgaria from joining us. Communica-
tons from Bulgarian officials deny this
most emphatically.
At the war office conference l rec
commended, instead OF the former wal
zone, a blockade decree of some sort
and that we should not recommence sub
marine activities until March. Falken-
hayn, HoltZendorff and the minister of
war, Wild Won Hohenborn, were fully
agreed with me. II was believed by all
that If VIC resumed submarine warfare
without the restrictions which formerly
hampered us, England's resistance
would probablysbe broken in six months
at the most, The American danger was
recognized. but ii was argued that II
by the autumn of 1916 a peace favor
able to Germany had not been reached.
hope would disappear of any settle
ment which would permit Germany to
resume, or possibly even to win back
In the decades to come the commercial
and economic position which had been
hers.
A memorial em%bodying these ideas
was submitted to a number Of German
economic' bodies and all agreed that the
only chance for Germany was the i'm
mediate reopening Of unrestricted sub
marine warfare.
Falkenhayn's position was summed up
in the following words to Capt. Widen
mann, detailed by me to confer with
him at headquarters as to the proposed
campaign:
fight till a decision Is come to, The
decision lies In the possession Of Bel
GUM. II we give up Belgium we are
lost. | have decided for the subma-
rlne war and reckon decidedly on its
being carried out. I will support 1t
with all my power and put II through"
on Feb. 20, 1915, In Wilhelmshaven,
I had the opportunity to tell his ma
jesty that | heard with qualification
that a serious wal against English ton
mage was to be undertaken. He init
mated that such was the case, New
ertheless the U-boat campaign was
again delayed n in protest | rendered
March II. To save the face Of the
government ] ascribed illness as the
reason for my action,
Admiral Won Cappelle was my success
or. In the summer of 1915 he had beer
decidedly in favor Of the U-boat war
Before entering office, however, he hat
to pledge himself to support the chan.
cellor in all naval political questions.
On March "a, 1915, the French steam
er Sussex was torpedoed. To a uues-
ton from the United States an auswel
was sent before the arrival of a repor
from the U-boat commander in ques.
ton, stating hat the German govern
ment could not but suppose that tn,
damage done to the Sussex was to b.
ascribed to another cause than the at
a Of a German submarine.
Later, however, the communicate
came that the Sussex had been torpe,
doed by one Of our U-boats. Accord
ing TO the statement Of the PARTICULAR,
experienced and circumspect subna
rine commander, the steamer was paint
ed like a battleship and a large humble
of English troops In uniform were OF
deck.
Therefore the commander Of tn,
U-boat believed that he was not onl,
morally but technically in tho right.
Americas Knockout Note.