Greenbrier independent. [volume] (Lewisburg, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1980, 1919-05-30

has imposed upon Europe his four
teen points. which have become the
basis Of the peace settlement. De-
spite many compromises, some large
and some insignificant. each question
has been settled in such fashion as
TO be accepted by him as satisfying
his original programme. But many
of the settlements have been in fact
no more than postponment OF So
luton for considerable number of
years as. for example, the Saar coal
region question will only be decided
by plebiscite Ii years hence. and
one could multiply't the number OF il
Illustrations of this sort. Moreover. in
the case OF Poland, the solution ar
rived at is Of such a precarious ma
ture That Poand. unsuStained by the
League of Nations. which has Gre
ated the Polish frontiers, could not
maintain herself against Germany.
Up to Us.
Now. having thus imposed in a
very large measure an American
settlement upon Europe. having COM
PEELED each of the nations OF Europe
against Germany to surrender its own
views. Mr.. Wilson has logically and
naturally recognized the need of sup
plying to these associates-or rather.
TO the one peculiarly imperiled,
F'rance-~a measure of security to re-
place those surrendered at his de-
mand in the interest of the League of
Nations.
To put the thing simply: Mr.. Will
son conceived that if France should
occupy the left bank of the Rhine
permanently, which alone would en-
able France. unassisted, to defend
herself against German attack, if
France should annex the Saar coal
region, which would alone insure
compensation for French material
losses during the war, these two ac-
tons might create new cause for
war in Europe which would make
the League of Nations no more than
an empty dream, as impotent as
The Hague tribunal, when Germany
should become strong again. There
fore, Mr.. Wilson demanded-insisted
on, and obtained the support of the
British for his demand-that France
should annex no German territory
save her own lost provinces. To
this demand the French complied,
but Oh their side they argued with
equal justice that four times within
a century, twice at least totally un-
provoked by any French acton, Ger
man armies has invaded France,
bringing ruin with them. They pre-
scented the unquestioned military
opinion of Marshal Foch that France
alone could only defend herself
against Germany on the line Of the
Rhine. They pointed out that Ger
many might consent to lay aside her
old ideals and become a civilized ma
ton, but that it was equally possible
that Germany might return to her
cid pursuits Of power and world do
and that if Germany should
do this after France had retired
from the Rhine, in obedience to Mr..
Wilson's demand, the result would
be ruin for France, if France had to
bear the burden of attack alone.
France in Exposed Position.
In this situation, therefore, the
British and Americans were bound to
take heed of the French contention.
1t was unfair, it was impossible, to
ask France to sacrifice her own Sc
curitiy-on the mere hope that the
League of Nations might prove what
all men hoped it would be, but few
men were able to believe it would
be. The United States, with 5000
miles OF sea separating 1t from Eu-
rope, Great Britain, with the channel
fOrbidding invasion, could not ask
France, with an open frontier to-
wards the Germans, to refrain from
giving this frontier its strongest pos
Sible form in the interests OF the
Anglo-Saxon experiment, which was
the League of Nations, without CIV
ing to France any assurance that if
the experiment did not work the to-
tai cost would not be paid by France,
that German armies would not again
come down to the very outskirts of
Paris before real aid arrived.
Moreover, second consideration
had Importance. The view is still
strongly held in Europe that had
Germany believed in the crisis Of
1914 that Great Britain would enter
the war If she attacked France or
invaded Belgium, she would not have
begun the war. Certainly the results
OF the conflict have demonstrated
that the entrance of Great Britain
promptly and of the United States
ultimately into the struggle made
German victory impossible, and re-
suited in the present crushing dis
aster. Therefore, it is believed and
argued that were Germany convinced
in advance that an attack upon
France would mean a new war with
Great Britain and the United States,
she would not venture upon such a