The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1919-10-25

MANY submarines rs In 1917 they WtoulH
have been more effective, our polltica'
leaders could not grasp the simple run
that tho important question was NOT
how many submarines we had but now
MANY ships we could sink. BY waiting
Until 1917 to resume the warfare we
permitted our enemies to 80 perlect
their defenses against submarines tnat
our then larger number was not 30 CT
feCtiyc.
In reading the wal diaries Of the sub
marine commanders OF 1917 one ser
,et slip the very richest of prizes " Is
certain thai on every trip that year
hey could have achieved five 20 SIX
times as much AZ in a corresponding
cruise in 1917. In the following diary
for instance, Capt, Steinbrink whose
mission was to determine what couid
actually be lone by a submarine under
he restrictions imposed, wrote;
"July-August, 19t6-On account Of the
weather being very unfayorable for n
torpedo attack we could only remain
at the mouth of the Seine four days,
as long as wind n sea rendered pos
sible our not being seen. During that
time from a distance OF three 70 elght
nautical miles the iugoing traffic was
watched by day and night and every
steamer possible was approached in Or
5er 10 ascertain Its character IRON tne
closest possible point.
I'm all, Al approaches were made 10
steamers in daylight with our torpedoes
ready to fire. None OF these steamers
transport vessels.
six steamers were seen at dawn:
| Thev were from 1900 to 5000 tons and
| showed no lights. They were painted
| slack with gray or brown superstruc-
| ture and showed no flags. Every one
II them was accompanied by a destroy
| or without lights or by one or Two
armed fishing steamers.
INV firm belief is that these were
.hips conveying troops or important ma
terial but rs | did not find my conylc-
tons confirmed by the signs ordered TO
be observed-troops in great umbers,
| ordnance or transport parks, sentry
| posts on deck-l was not in a position
| to attack these steamers.
This showed the imnossibility Of Sc
| riously interfering with the transport
service Of English troops into France.
The intention Of the undertaking was
| to ascertain whether under the existing
| regulations, l. e., only to conduct a
| mercantile war under prize regulations
| and to torpedo without warning only
vessels ascertained with certainty to he
troon Sims. IL would be impossible to
hamper the transports for the English
army in France which was the most
| important TASK LOT thS navy ol tho
We were helpless against the trans
norts without the right to torpedo all
vesqe,s passing between England aud
France with the exception OF hospital
ships,
II ia obvious 10 what a degree our
II boats might have Influenced the H.
euo of the Somme battle, But apart
from such single questions, those who
we're clear that this war would decide
The destiny Of the German people. could
NOT read such reports on the Gripping
OF our best weapon without the deep
est emotion.
our attitude in the spring Of 1916 said
tn the whole world with the exception
Of some of our diplomats and demo-
crats. germany Is going down"
svnopsis of Next lnstalment--Re-
rawed submarine activity illustrates
automatic negotiations with the United
states Military administration doubts
ahilitv TO hold out through winter Of
f0i7-1ets and urges D-hoat campaign,
cavs Wilson's loss Of confidence In Ger
noan motley destroyed her capacity for
F,rther nternati o nal negotiations,
American soldiers took Germany by sur
prisp and turned scale on western front.
Mexico telegram forces wilson 10 main
tain His stand. Declares herman blum
dars responsible for America plunging
MO war contrary TO her own Interests,
u Ito Be C~ontinued.l