Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-07


we had, first Of all. to put matters
on a sound footing, even though the
Bulgarians might have to surrender
a little ground. They must accept the
inevitable We could not do every
thing with German troops; But G.
H.Q. gave as much help as the situa-
ton permitted
The German army headquarters
We're transferred from the Yardar to
the right wing. with "A view to secur-
ing correct tactical handling aud the
adoption of thorough measures for
the establishment of rear communi-
cations. German railway troops and
labor battalions had to take this work
into their own expert hands This
mountainous country was exceeding
| ly difficult and il took them many
months to do what should have been
done before the Florina offensive was
undertaken.
General Jekoff was the Bulgarian
commander-in-chie He was a loyal
supporter of the alliance. but did not
| possess those outstanding qualities
which are required of a leader in a
modern war Besides he lacked the
necessary training His character was
| irreproachable, but he had not suffi-
cient resolution. to remedy various
grave defects in the Bulgarian army.
He was entangled In narrow party
| politics and so forgot the war His
chief of staff at that time was Luz
| koff, a man of unsOund Judgment
and an intriguer who is responsible
for the misfortune of his country and
the Quadruple alliance
found it difficult to get clear
idea of the psychology of the Bulga-
rian people. They appeared to me to
have strong national feeling and to
be quite ready to fight for the posi-
ton of first power in the Balkans
Premier Radosavoff was Ger
manophile from inward conviction.
He stood and fell by the alliance, In
putting forward demands on Germany
and in his Greater Bulgarian policy,
he was exceedingly obstinate and gave
free rein to all agitation in that di-
rection, so that he could play off the
national wishes against us. But he
forgot that in so doing he was making
his own position very much more
difficult for peace negotiations, He
also did nothing to enlighten his peo-
pie about the necessity of the war
Perhaps he did not fully realize II
himself
The Tsaf of Bulgaria was Just as
firm q supporter of the alliance, He
was an uncommonly clever man. bu
lover of skillful diplomacy rather
than a man of action. He liked t
have several irons in the fire anC
thought he could always postpone
decisions. Thank to the great abii
ty with which he managed the Bulgar
z ians this had been good enough TO,
. peace time; but 1t was not enough II
war. | was particularly sorry tina
he was no soldier, and therefore dit
not exercise that influence over thu
army which his high position de
manded of him.
The Crown Prince Boris, excellent
ly trained by his father, was a thor
ough soldierly personality, and ma
ture beyond his years. He had
. clear understanding of military ne
cessities Our staffs in Bulgaria ant
| myself liked dealing with him. Thi
, people cannot find a better ruler.
The situation in Turkey had i'm
proved since the forces of the en-
tente evacuated the Gallipoli peninsu
la. It had now become possible TO
Enver Pasha to place some troops a
: the disposal of the German OH. @
, He realized, quite rightly. that as ia
as Turkey was concerned, the wa
7 would now be decided in othe
? theaters.
l In general the Turkish army wa
! exhausted To begin with, it had no
l recovered from the Balkan war be
3 fore it was involved in another. It
c wastage from disease and in actor
was continuously high. The trust
l worthy, brave Anatolian had vanish
ed from its ranks The unreliable
Arab auxiliaries were playing an in
creasingly important part everywhere
but especially in Mesopotamia an,
Palestine The forces were now be
' low their prouer strength. and tn
men were badly fed and still wors
equipped. The lack of efficient of
4 ficers was particularly felt,
f Liman Pasha (the German com
: mander in Turkey. relying on hi
: authority, endeavored again and agail
a to make his divisions into an efficien
o fighting instrument He did all tina
o could be done. When Turkish troop
n left his hands to come under Germa
4 leadership, in Galicia or against Ru
4 mania, for example, they behaved
n quite passably, and sometimes wei
n but when they were under a Turks
# command they soon forgot what Ger
man thoroughness had taught then
In sDite of my entreaties, Turke
e made no serious attempt to break wit
. her old policy towards the Arab
. In any case, perhaps it would hav
= been too late. English gold did tn
\ rest. The Arabs turned more an
. more against the Turks.
. At the beginning of September. En-
YER came to Pless. He was a Yer
i gifted man and made a notable an
: unusual impression on us. He wa
!. true friend of Germany and Their
i was bond of warm sympathy be
- tween us. He had real militar
~ instinct for the art of war. but h
- lacked both the knowledge of fir!
- principles and professional qualifics
VI tons. Nor had he received thol
70 ough training. His great militar
=, ability had no chance to develop,
n His sending Turkish troops to CT
"a licia and against the Rumaniai
~ proved his sound military judgmen
- On the other hand he was alwal
~ clamoring for war material on a sea
~ that could not possibly be supple
~ The majority of the available trail
ps to Turkey via Sofia We're used f
- coal, which was sent from Upper Sill
-, STA to Constantnople. Over and ov
~ again l begged Enver, the very distil