South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1919-10-16

race war ships, but II can make such com
mand precarious and possibly doubtful. as
we have recently seen in the case OF Eng
land
A submarine cannot De blockaded in port
as can surface vessel The very existence
OF enemy submarines on the ocean increases
the distance between seaports by a factor
OF about ten per cent due 10 the necessity Of
ziGzagging. thus increasing by that factor
the fuel supply necessary.
With the full development OF an offensive
submarine such as Germany seemed on the
high road TO develop no nation will be able
to fully enjoy the command Of the sea which
its great surface fleet in days past would
have assured.
The most approved method OF attack
upon a submarine consists Of
fa) Locating the submarine when sub
merged by means OF listening devices de-
signed to make possible the hearing OF
submarines motive machinery at consid-
cradle distance away. say 1000 yards, and
locating its position by the intersection OF
two or more directing lines taken from as
many listening vessels. AS yet this is most
difficult and but little success was
achieved.
Cb) After approximately locating the sub
marines position under water. laying a
depth charge barrage about this position.
This method Of destroying the submarine IS
likewise most difficult When a depth
charge explodes under water It exerts pres
sure Of varying degrees within a cone
whose apex is the charge and the base a
circle on the surface OF the water OF size
varying with the depth OF the charge. The
greater the depth the smaller the circle.
The submarine to be damaged must have
some part of its hull within this cone. II
no part Of the submarine is within this
cone no pressure will be exerted upon the
hull.
1t will be seen, therefore that sub
marine despite all popular claim to great
vuInerability. cannot be destroyed so easily
as we have been led to imagine A vast
number Of surface vessels are required 70
account for n single submarine. Also the
offensive and defensive battery Of the most
improved submarine permits it to rise to
the surface and destroy its small pursuers
Submarine Force.
The United States bids fair TO become a
competitor for the carrying trade OF the
world. Its surface war fleet will never
in all probability he sufficient to protect
this great merchant fleet. In case OF war
with a nation possessing a vastly superior
navy the merchant ships Of the United
States must OF consequence remain off the
sea. while its enemy obtains the carrying
trade sacrificed. If the greater sea Power
considers the dangers OF the submarine
perhaps it will hesitate to go To war against
a nation with formidable submarine fleet
That submarine fleet may thus become a
most potent argument for the settlement
Of disputes by other means than war.
Attacks upon the enemy lines OF com
munication are considered most effective
war measure for a belligerent to make.
In future wars those vessels carrying con
traband or troops must be considered legiti-
mate objects OF under water OF above water
attack by submarines. Therefore such yes
sells will be given the character OF govern
ment vessels and will be virtually war
ships armed with guns and manned by
naval crews. The vessels Of the enemy
carrying only ncn-contraband or passen-
gers and neutral ships must be searched
ln' their character decided before attack.
These questions viii be decided doubtless
by international law in connection with the
use or submarines.
Germany attempted TO write her own law
on this subject. but it was so inhuman and
wicked that the civilized world rcvolted
against It. The submarine can fight only
in its own way and a nation possessing
a large submarine navy must see that this
new law does not put too great n handicap
uFon tho use OF that weapon OF defence.
The United States has submarine fleet
built or building Of about one hundred and
fifty effective vessels. The impetus Of the
war has provided the submarine bases ana
mother ships so vital to operate these
vessels.
The prostration OF the navy. due 70 re-
cent legislation. by which the available en-
listed force has been reduced TO about fifty
thousand men. has placed battle ships and
many Of our destroyers in A hopelessly
crippled condition.
DreadnOughts in the fleets cannot muster
more than forty to fifty per cent OF their
crews. while twenty-odd battle ships and
armored cruisers are tied up at navy yards
with scarcely ten per cent Of their compile
ments and al a time when the world is most
unsettled