The Washington herald., 1919-09-24

haps also be admitted 10 the Peace
Conference; and for this case Japan
must Be certain that an the allies
would. with full emphasis, champion
Japan's rights to Shantung and the
occupied territories in the South Sea
Without this certainty. japanese pub
lie opinion would not approve 1t II the
japanese government drew China, too.
into the war. Krupenskfs impression
was that without the firm promise to
Japan OF Shantung and the islands
north OF the Equator. China's entry
into the war cannot be counted on.
onicially. Chinas wavering Is explain
ed by the indecision Of its President
and with the need OF securing for
itself advantages in the matter or
customs tarir and Boxer indemnity.
which then are also guaranteed.
But all recognizable symptoms and
Indications speak for the belief that
at that time, in the time before
China's declaration of war and Amer
ica's armament. the allied powers in
secret agreements had recognized
Japan as heir to the German rights
and privileges In Shantung and the
South Sea- Still, in March, had Mo-
tono urged and pressed Krupenski
" - EAPio bCLhfChCuk w uhAiOSl
important" matter; TIN in June he
could say to PariiameA that despite
the new principle Of peace with
out annexation Japan had nothing
to fear about Tsingtau and the is
lands. nor in revolutionary Russia
could either the people or the Duma.
and least Of all the government. be
seduced into . separate peace with
Germany. Tho supplying Of arms
and ammunition, the plan to create
on Chinese soil a great arsenal and
armory are means for TIE japanese
to secure to themselves the power
over China's military forces.
Japan to Control China.
These means appear necessary to
Minister Motono. He has demanded
the recognition of q special posi-
ton" of Japan in China, and said. &C.
cording to the Lansing-Ishii agree
ment. that thereby would not only
be made an end to German intrigues
seeking to sow new enmity between
the United States and Japan, but at
the same time prove to the Chinese
that they need place no hopes on
an Americo-Japanese controversy.
The reality Of these opposing
interests Krupenski nevertheless
foresaw: Japan, so he wrote TO
Petrograd in October, ls17. demands
at bottom the control over China's
international relations, and will
permit no other power to take a
single step in China without IT'S
permission. When he expressed the
opinion that the concepts special
position" and special interests"
would perhaps be interpreted diff
ferently in Washington than in
Tokyo. Japan intimated that in such
a case Japan would have stronger
means Of power for backing up It's
United States.
And when the executive commit
tee of the Russian Workers and
Soldiers Soviets demanded the re-
turn of all colonies to Germany as
one Of the main points of the fu-
ture peace treaty. the answer came
from all parties and press prov
inces of Japan: Never will we give
back Shantung and the islands"
Looking ost for Capitalists.
So perceptible. as in the secret re-
ports made public by the Bolsheviki,
too. is Japan's wish to be on a good
footing with the Russia of Miliukon
ana heTenShl, 100, every TepOEl tndL
the Petrosrad government has given
Americans concessions in Siberia ana
Sakhalin makes Japanese public opin-
ion SO nervous that Russophilism Is
endangered and even the diplomati-
cally cautious Motono brusquely says
to Russia's ambassador that for par
ticipation in the mines in the coast
province and on Sakhalin. II foreign
ers are at all considered, only Jap
anese capitalists are to be taken in.
1t is to be assumed that after these
events of the past years Nippon will
voluntarily withdraw from its breast
works In China? And II, despite all
secret agreements, sufficient means OF
pressure were applicable. sore spots
on the skin and bitterness in the soul
would remain behind. 1mperialistic
and expansive Russia is no more; and
Japan has. naturally, declined to fur
nish troops to Kolchak for its resto-
ration.
But as a militarily strong ally too