The Washington herald., 1919-11-30
JAPAN MAY FIGHT LONE HAND
IN SIBERIA AGAINST THE. REDS
Great Britain Not Expected to Stay in Battle
Where Good Money Follows
Bad So Freely.

in diplomatic circles. Japan may pre-.
fer to put her own armies into the
field against them.
II within a short time Japan en-
| cages. alone, in war in Siberia
against the Bolsheviks, after the Kol.
chak forces have been so beaten that
they become insignificant. will not the
prize of victory be Siberia itself? And
how would Washington view the
prospects of Japan reinforced by
| Siberia with its untold and untapped
natural wealth, greater than that OF
+, America-a Siberia linked to Japan
by a narrow sea between made i'm
pregDable against naval action, as
| naval experts admit the submarine
and mine could make it?
Japan at present has a cIearly-de.
fined Russian program. IL IL unlike
the British or French or American
programs in its clarity. and also in
that for Japan 1t is OF the first i'm.
portance. while the other allies can
and do frequently change their minds
without feeling that they are imperil-
ling vital interests OF their own.
German "Bugaboor SIN Haunts.
Japan, I am told. is out for two
utngs. She wants a strong govern
ment in Russia. that will prevent the
country from falling into the hands
OF Germany: at the same time Japan
desires to control the strategic rail-
! ways in Siberia that might be used
either by a revivified Russia or an
aggressive Germany advancing
/ through Russia, for an attack upon
Japan.
The two points of this program
were lucidly explained by my in
formant. Answering the question,
why must Japan have a strong
Russia?" he said:
When war broke out, Russia
and Japan had buried their differ
ences and were in apparent COM
plete harmony. Eastern projects
were forgotten by Russia in face
of greater menace in Europe, SO
Japan was friendly to Russia and
up to the time of interver ton con-
/ tinued to be friendly. The Russian
revolution, however, gave japan a
new viewpoint.
"A defeated Russia, split up in
an inextricable mass of splintered
states. made japan feel that her
plans were threatened with defeat.
Japanese policy required a strong
and united Russia as buffer
against German penetration into
China and the Far East. Moreover,
Japan fears that a disunited and
broken Russia will fall an easy
prey to a strong Germany, and Ger
many might succeed to Russia's in
terests on the Pacific. Continued
anarchy and disunion might even
drive Russia to accept a German
protcctorate.
Believes In Intervention.
These considerations led Japan
to Intervention. What she hopes
ITO accomplish is stated, from jana
nese sources, as follows: Interven-
tion Is to provide Russians with a
broad platform and a center of
power around which all patriots
whatever their past party connec-
tions, may join hands for the re-
establishment of new united
fatherland.' The Bolsheviki are to
be excluded from power, because
they exist upon spoliation and con.
fscation. In other words, Russia Il
a sick man and the allies must fur
nish the physician and the medi.
SAhC " SuhC thC potiCht, WHctHef
the patient wants them or not. And
IL the allies now won't, presumably
Japan will feel 1t her duty to do sc
alone.
"Other reasons for intervention
the Japanese found in the need fol
Russian military aid. and the de-
sire for her cooperation as a ma.
ton in the after-war settlement,
though these are now obsolete. The
new Russia must serve as a sup.
port for an independent Poland. fol
Czecho-Slovakia and the Jugo-
Slavs, say the Japanese, who are
| interested in these states as buffer.
against the spread of German
power towards the Northwestern
provinces of China. Russia and ia.
pan have contiguous frontiers. and
disintegrated Russia Is held in
Toxic to be a menace to Japan's
peace. safety and development.
But perhaps the decisive reason
why Japan wants a strong Russia Is
not openly avowed in Toxic, or dis.
cussed by any other allied govern
ments in public. 1t lies in a secret
treaty or 1915 between the two coun.
tries, providing that neither Japar
nor Russia will be q party to any
Arrangement or political combination
directed against the other. The two
powers pledged themselves. in case
the territorial rights or special inter-
ests of either In the Far East are
threatened. to take counsel together
for safeguarding and defending those
rights and interests. The agreement
is not unlike the Anglo-Japanese al.
In some respects. But It's real
purpose was In the partition Of China.
This agreement strengthened ia.
pans position In the Far East greatly.
II rendered more easily her exploita.