Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-13

! regimental officers. 1t was evidently
not easy for the troops to adopt the
necessary open formations. we
urgently needed every moment of the
time, right up to the middle of March,
which was available for training.
During January and February the
| divisions in the west that were ill
| tended for the attack were. taken out
| of the line, some of them were re-
placed by those that had come from
other theaters. From this time on
they had to devote themselves en-
| tirely to training and equipment.
| We were unable to equip all divi-
sions equally with stores and horses,
and had in the beginning to confine
ourselves to those who were destined
| to open the attack. Similar action
was taken in regard to the artillery,
heavy artillery, trench mortars, etc.
| The horses of the shock divisions
We're given extra forage rations.
General headquarters regretted that
the distinction between attack and
trench" divisions became established
in the army. We tried to eradicate
| it, without being able to alter the
situation which gave rise to it.
More Troops Than Allies.
In the meantime we had gradually
got up everything that could be
| thought of as required for the attack.
Some divisions We're still on their way
| from the east
We hoped that the forces that We
We're collecting from all quarters
would enable us to attack on con-
| tinuous front of over thirty miles
alloting twenty to thirty batteries,
with trench mortars, to each kilometer
| eleven hundred yards) of front. BY
| thinning out at suitable places we
could extent the front still more.
We had at that time twenty-five to
| thirty divisions more than the enemy
on the whole western front. But
this was not the actual measure of our
superiority, which was reduced by the
numerous specialist arms and terrific
| rial troops of the enemy, of which we
had not such large numbers. Even so,
| our superiority, was greater than 1t
had ever been and afforded prospects
of success. We thought of carrying
out the attack with fifty or sixty di-
visions. In order to effect this the
corresponding weakening of other
parts of the western front was un-
avoidable.
| General headquarters had also ap-
preached Austro- Hungary. The latter
had sent batteries, but unfortunately
with so small an amount of ainmuni-
ton that the actual reinforcement did
not amunt to much. Austro- Hungar-
ian divisions were not available. Their
strengths were too low. and did not
increase again until several hundred
thousand men returned from captivity
| in Russia. The removal of German
troops from the Italian and eastern
fronts, where they had held a very
considerable portion of the line. made
heavier demands on the Austrian
troops, in spite of the altered sit-
| uation.
Turkish Corps Wasted.
| General headquarters would very
much have liked to bring the Turkish
| 18th corps over to the western front,
but the poor condition of the Turkish
army induced 1t to send the corps to
| Turkey, l regretted this afterwards.
Enver now had eyes only for the
Caucasus and therefore sent 1t to
Batum, where it wasted its time doing
| nothing. 1t would have been more
useful in the west
Bulgaria wanted Its troops on the