The Richmond Virginian. (Richmond, Va.) 1910-1920, 1919-01-08
LIE GERMANY'S

LII GtRmANI'S
CONTINUED from Page One.)
to give warning against under-esti
mating the enemy and over-estinat
ing our own power. were inuzzled II
every way.
Despite all the obstacles and tn,
sharpest restriction, this writer ha.
unsweryingly endeavored to tell ths
truth.
+ Naturally, this was possible mos
of the time only between the lines
and thus much rem aimed hidden I'd
the eyes of those whose perspective
twas not properly get to look for the
many tricks of deception.
What are the facts In Noven' Der
1914. we had a little over million
| tons OF naval shipping as awAkmSt IRE
I; British. $500. oaa tors Tire German :,
material was inferior 70 .kre E-ssAsH
| thanks to the mistakes GO Tpzs TSr-
pit1. Oar ships OF the EG-e, hattie
ships and cruisers. were es s~saaais.-
displacement thar THE FsrftsSA- sAey
were less powerfully armed and ras-
seSsed less speed
HUN FLEET INTERIOR.
III one corn pares the strength Of she
two fleets and remembers .ha. shs
E-Ssfar Baltic feet of .saasa tons
/ was. ny to Russia's collapse. 70 hs
counted on the enemys side-she
French naval forces were for the
greater part arrested in the Mediter-
rsnean By she Austrian feet--ft is
ch CT that our Zee, had slim, chances.
In spite Of this, The rere~nei of our.
T. ~ has. AZ far as was possibie with
the Inefficient material and IN the cir
curstances made an extraordinary
record. With very few exceptions.
the Officers and men stood the irving
test brilliantly.
On nearly every occasion our de-
feats were traceabie 10 the Won Tir-
pitz's wrong building policy.
Luck With Huns.
IN the Skagerak battle our feet
was saved from disaster by three
things: (. The clever leadership Of
Admirs' scheer. 2. IN. clumsy hand.
| ling Of the English feet by Admiral
Sir John Jeliieoe. 3. The low visi-
hilty
Ha5 the weather beer clear and
! had the opponent had q determined
/ leader. the outcome of that battle
would have been, for us. destruction.
| The British guns ~ so much
powerful range than our own. would
have shot our feebly armed vessels
ITO cinders. but. DESPITE the fortune
that smiled uron US, the losses which
our fleet suffered were tremendous
and on June ], 1915. 1t was clear 10
every one who knew the actual condi-
tons, that that battle would and must
remain the only one. This. in fact has
been frankly admitted by the compe-
tent authorities.
Tirpitz drew no lessons from the
events OF the war COMMANDMENTS OF
T-boats and torpedo boats were con
tinually clamoring for bigger guns
vainly the airship commanders com
planned that their motors were con
Ietantly breaking down ard that the,
must nave better ones manufactured
by firms other than those favored by
the marine administration. Vaink
cam m anders urged that THEIR
lCEEWS WE'RE BEING GRIMM
| ALLY SENT TO THEIR DEATH
Tirpitz remained deaf. even in the
face OF Weddiren's feat with tho va
asrnna All. rides he was being hesiesad
With the demand TO drop everything
else. to build o0y u-boats. He would
NOT listen to II. Thus. under him and
under his successor CapeIle, number.
less valuable workers we're until Oc-
tober l, 1917, employed In building
| useless big fighting ships which could
never be put In the service during the
war.
| Conferred ON r-Roata
| Al last. on October /. 1917, Reich
stag deputies like Struwe and Cothein
succeeded In gaining the ear of the
army commandment those or the
| marine ministry. The result was an
order To discontinue the construction
| OF dreadnoughts and mattle cruisers.
| Meantime the material for U-hoat
!
that. in order to keep up building SUBJ
marines. ships OF the line and other
essels had to be taken to pieces.
| Thus. in 1918, our High Seas fleet,
as far as big fighting ships were con-
eerned. consisted only of the dread
noughts, the line ships of the Nassau Il.
ti:eiissoiaHd, kaiseF and Mafkgraf
classes and aefew battle cruisers.
With the putting out OF commission
or all the other creations Of Won
Tirpitz, IL was thus admitted that
these "creations" is, ali ships
which Tirpitz had built during his
jtncumbency In office, iS37-laI6. at
tho cost OF untold miilions--were use,
'ess. were incapable of fighting Brit
ish ships.
An Empty Promise.
Now as for the U-boats. Submarine
warfare on merchant ships was de-
SAfAs VII anu GfEll uAT6ELIICIhQ warfare.
and the people were assured, hy i'm
perial decree and other utterances,
that England must. within the brief
Est span OF time, surrender. starved
into submission
But the weapon that would have
been necessary for that sort OF war;
fare was virtually non existent Nor
was IL created to any extent during
the war. Capelie, too. built only a
very limited number OF Ii-boats.
THOSE he ordered would have been
ready for action In 1919 and 1890.
To complete a large U-boat Of some
500 tons required at first, roughly, "a
months. later thirty months and more,
The smaller boats of between 1877 and
z2s7 tons were sometimes completed
within months. HIT official utter
ances were forever abiding to the
tremendous numbers Of u-boats we
were supposed tn POSSESS and 1t was
asserted the losses were many times
replaced by new craft
Tina. was not true.