The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1919-10-27

lious endeaVors for peace we're rus
trated, and how finally by the Mexico
telegram he was forced into an tmpos-
sible situation, you would have Consid-
cred very seriously as 10 whether II
would be advisable, from a military
and political point OF view, to an |
nounce and commence the unrestricted
submarine war without giving Wilson
the opportunity Of backing out with de
cency,"
In my reply Of July %, 1917, l said:
4 wish to express the conviction n a
the intended reichstag declaration does
not seem advisable to me as regards
either home or foreign policy. Even II
we took the view nat we ought, by a
cessation of the submarine war, 10 come
as quickly as possible to an understand
ing with Wilson. It seemed to me from
a purely business standpoint a mistake
at the same time to depreCate the Ell
feet Of the submarine war before the
whole world and to whine for peace,
Editors Note-The relchstag decia-
ration to which Won Tirptiz refers prob
ably was the so-called peace proclama-
tom declaring that Germany sought
a peace Of Justce,)
las YOU know on Feb 4, 1915, a sur
prise was sprung upon me by the dec
l~aration of the submarine war with re-
gard to method and time. The surprise
was the greater because on IAN, -
the then chancellor and I had agreed
TO q temporary postpohement OF the
submarine wa. After We had ho%-
| ever communicated this military deci-
sion to the world, and that with a Ger
Ia n flourish OF trumpets, we were
bound to stand to 1t.
by our continual and for thN mos
part undignificd yielding t. the Insult
/ ing procedure OF Wilson we made his
position an issue by which he was
to stand.
Il will not here enter into the awk-
| ward and unfortunate n in whica
We treated the Sussex case, In the
spring of 1916 the United States would
I OF have declared war upon us. The
deliberations at that time in congress
tiUve this. Then was the given tire
to conduct the Unrestricted submarine
warfare. We, as we'll as our allies, hal
still a considerable degree of reserve
economic strength. AS Wilson's election
was impending, he also was unable 20
declare war. The submarine war re-
auired time to produce Its full erect.
We still had time at our disposal AMI
would therefore have been able TO make
greater conces sions TO neutral naFi-
cation than later seemed possible o
q Csc IN authority.
"in fact on Feb. 1 OF that year WI
were already on the verge OF a great
precipice. Added to this there were the
-eiowing British defensive measures
against submarines.
"You mention the conveys In yoni
letter. But the conveys only became
effective after the acquisition OF a great
number OF destroyers. To acquire these
we gave England the necessary time az
well as for an effective arming OF hei
entire merchant fleet and the takint
Of a number of other counter measures
Naturally 1t was not possible before
hand to fix the exact rate at which
these counter measures would ounte
balance our production OF U-boats bu'
It was perfectly obvious that suct
counter balancing might be possible
Therefore from an economic. politica
and military point OF view II was
mistake to postpone the U-boat wa
in 1916. / was strengthened in thii
conviction because as you know ! neVe
underestimated the Intervention o
America in the war.
but although ! must, because OF IL
|; tardy commencement, regard the pres
! ent conduct OF the U-boat war a
| doubtful of success, it Is my firm con
viction that now, after we AVE de
= clared the submarine war, nothing re
mains but for us to continue 1t wit
! indomitable energy until England !
l forced to give us a peace which wi
be the basis for the restoration of GU
economic conditions and an assured pc
e sltion in the world.
II also believe that we can still gal
Q such a result by a war against enem
y tonnage though II will be more Difficult
e and take longer than it would previousl
= have done"