Grand Forks herald. [volume] (Grand Forks, N.D.) 1916-1955, 1919-08-07
THE LEAGUE
As Seen ByzWilliam j.. McNally.

I by w 1lllam j. ~
swing. Azyictory for MI. Wilson meant
that the. Allied nations would be
weaned away from an o~ld-fashioned
alliance into e world league. A
defeat for Mr.. Wilson meant that
from her traditional isolation into q
disadvantageous and DANGEROUS ALI
ance. The game was one fraught with
INFINITE peril for the destiny of Amer
lea Represented the stakes.
T. The Point OF the Game.
The point Of which the diplomatic
struggle conferred was this:
Would the European alliance be q
harmless and inutile decoration upon
a true league Of nations OF would the
league OF nations be a harmless and
inutile decoration upon q rue Euro
pean alliance?
In the event that the first contin-
gency materialized the world directly,
and America indirectly. we're much
bettered as to position. In the event
lied the Entente gained a prodigous
asset for nothing, while America in
Cured a prodigous liability for
The point really at issue was wheth-
er Mr.. Wilson would swallow the
Clemenceau potion Of an alliance brew
with a league Of nations foam or
whether Clemenceau would swallow
the Wilsonian potion Of a league of
nations brew with a mere alliance
foam. That distinction spelled the diff
ference between prosperity n IA
lamity to America. It spelled the diff
ference between permanent immunity
and permanent insecurity. 1t spelled
the difference between placing Amer
lea at the service Of an International
ideal or placing America at the dis
posal Of q combination Of foreign
powers.
The publication Of the covenant Of
the league of nations, and subsequent
ly; the peace treaty, made it unmis-
takably clear in the end which con
testant had won out in the great in
tellectual poker game at Paris.
Mr.. Wilson was h~umiliatingly and
utterly beaten.
turned against Mr.. Wilson not because
he was beaten but because he insists
on maintaining the pitiful pretense
that he was not. The tragedy is not
to be found in the fact that he per-
sonally lost. 1t was hardly to be ex-
pected that he could win. The indi-
vidual phase of it is ar idle and SUI
perlatively unimportant matter. The
tragedy is to be discovered in the
fact that Mr.. Wilson now. in order
to uphold the threadhare pretense
that he personally won, is willing to
let that most precious of prizes, the
American destiny. pass into the con
troll of a European alliance. He is not
only willing to do that but he will
work to achieve that end.
Seen as Deadly Enemy.
To the Americans over here such an
attitude places the American Presi-
dent in the melancholy role Of a prob
ably unconscious but none the less
deadly enemy Of the interests of his
ewn nation. His personal pride in his
skill as a diplomatic player puts him
in a position, apparently, where he
would sacrifice Americas future. in or
der to maintain the fiction he held his
own at Paris.
The Americans over here differ from
the Americans at home in that they
see a little more realistically what q
European alliance would mean to the
United States. They know Europe. as
the Americans at home do not. And
that is why, they are infinitely lei
cised and alarmed over Americas pro-
posed entrance into these. dangerous
quicksands. Let no imagine that
the Americans over here were not. in
favor Of A. real league Of nations. So
far as I could see the majority OF
them we're. But they look upon the
subject Of an alliance with un%concealed
horror, and they see in the league as
it now exists nothing but a mask to
cover ar. alliance. How Mr.. Wilson
could have been SO completely Victim
lied in Paris Is a mystery that Amer
leans here are at loss to fathom.
The American people had lever CIV
en- Mr.. Wilson a command to take this
priceless inheritance beqeathed them
by Washington, had never. ordered him
to use it as the gambling stakes to
help him win the world peace he had
set himself upon. Z
AS 500 as it became obvious he
could not win, he should have risen
from the table, put the jewel back in
his vest pocket, quit the game cold.
and returend to America. OF course
such a move would have damaged his
own prestige. He would have to admit
that he could not beat the European
statesmen in his. own game Of diplom-
acy. He would have to agree with
his multitudinous enemies who had de-
tclared his trip a blunder from the out
set. But, at least such a course would
have saved the American destiny.
Couldn't Admit Failure.
But he lacked the courage to face
the world with the humiliating confess
sion that he could not win. He lacked
the courage to go back and tell the
American people he had failed. So he
let the priceless heritage, the Ameri-
a policy of Isolation, slip into the
hands Of the European Alliance, and
then went. further and endeavored to
camouf1a4e the issue by declaring that
instead heFhad placed It in the hands
Of an International directorate.
sg4fs5E g., ~
The peace treaty accomplished two
for q long time to come, at least.
as a military menace. And it also re-
made the. map Of Europe. In the first
OF these results America was directly
interested. In the second she was not.
America had entered the war to crush
the military menace existing in Ger
many But she had not entered the war
to remake the map Of Europe. That
was q sphere quite alien to the United
States: Such action on the part Of our
country represents nothing less than
international meddling..
It ts here that Americans in Europe
feel that they nave a message for
Americans back in the States. They
all accept as indisputably accurate the
following axiom:
Re-making Of the map Of Europe
has no effect upon the world-situation
except to multiply infinitely the causes
Of war.
They accept this al accurate because
they are on the ground and they see.
they, cannot mistake the signs and the