Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-11-28
By General Erich Ludendorff.

/ deeply regretted the events which
took place in Germany in the spring
and summer of 1917, as / did all other
/ manifestations of weakness. They
were bound TO react unfavOrably on
our conduct of the war, and therefore
/ on the subsequent peace.
j Looking back, | can see that our
decline obviously began With the out
/ break Of the Revo ution in Russia
! Tho government was oppressed on
( the one hand by the fear that it might
! spread to Germany. and on the other
by the knowledge Of their inability to
| revive the resolution and war-Iike
! ardor of the people waning as they
We're through the combination Of in
/ Vulnerable circumstances. No doubt
our precarious military position and
! later, the want of success achieved in
/ the submarine war. of which some
| people had unfortunately been too
/ confident, made it more difficult to
rouse our energy. II was obvious that
! ii suffered from these causes.
But after all, owing to the collapse
! of Russia, our position in the summer
| of 1917 was better than that of the
| Entente. We were justified in being
| hopeful. But there were other rea-
/ nOIlo III buI HlJll lAlil hNtilllF- nc
! government lacked the resolution to
/ deal energetically with abuses. And
| behind it there was the Reichstag
with no united will in part sincerely
| anxious about our future, in part
merely striving for power from selfish
| reasons.
On April Z, there was published a
decree by his Majesty on the fran
] chise. l only heard of it after publ
| cation. Neither the Emperor nor the
| Imperial Chancellor, Won Bethmann,
! ever spoke to RE about internal af-
! fairs Nor was it my business to
/ originate discussions on these sub
! iects as internal politics had nothing
! to do with me.
The connection between the fran
| chise decree and the Russian Revolu-
ton was too obvious. That was what
made it so ill-adyised If a change
in the franchise was necessary--as it
doubtless vast should have been
made before the war, at the latest in
August, 1914. with a grand geste, as
the free gift of a strong Government,
Worst of all, the government now
made the Crown the center of politi-
cal discussion. instead of keeping it
clear of party strife. Besides, apart
from a small section this step pleased
only the enemy, who probably grasped
the reason for it with gusto. At every
step the government should have
considered its probable effect on the
enemy, as well as at home.
Effort to Fend Off Revolt Ad-
vCrtiscd German Weakness
During the war home politics should
have been dominated and directed by
consideration of the effect on the en-
envy, The greater the prominence
given to questions of internal politics,
the lower the warlike ardor of the
nation will sink. Any statesman
should know that.
The DEGREES Of 18th of April and
18th July disclosed our weakness to
the enemy and revealed our fear of
revolution. The enemy must have said
to himself that there is no smoke
without fire, and confagration is
therefore possible Revolution will
come. He must therefore have con-
cluded that he had only to hold out
and fan the flame to attain his object
revolution in Germany and her ulti-
mate destruction.
The effect of the April decree at
home was very much what it was
abroad. The revolutionary elements
perceived the governments anxiety
and became more eXacting Their
reply was the strikes of the second
half of April. They were an echo of
the Russian Revolution, and proved
how dreadful was the lack Of SYM
pathy with the fighting men at the
front, They also showed to what eX-
tent the mass of the workers had
ecaped from the control of their
leaders.
The decree produced no soothing
effect as the government had hoped
1t was too late for that, and the gov
eminent itself was too weak and too
incapable of producing anything new
from its own resources.
Navy Shaken by Agitation
The people We're not much affected
by the Prussian franchise; only a few
politicians and newspapers took a
lively interest in it, Unfortunately 1t
proved an instrument to widen the
split at home and intensity the secret
agitation. No one in the army took
any interest in the question. The
navy, which was nearer home and not
engaged in active operations. is said
to have been less apathetic.
The thought of elections in time of
war only filled me with anxiety. They
were bound to reduce our strength still
further. | also considered an election
to be an injustice towards the soldier
at the front who could, of course. ac-
cording to the ideas prevalent at that
time, take no part in it. | was drawn
into the party conflict by partisans
and opponents of the right to vote, all
though I never expressed my opinion
on the matter in public. | often spoke
1 l.. a l. ....t., $50.