davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1919-10-08

getting tired ot The ring inactivity
here and viii welcome the coming u
the ebony huei boxers 10 this c.'N.
Since leaving Tulsa. Thompson
and Langford have boxed several
good men and have emerged sue
crssful from each encounter RccoE-
nizod As Two Of the leading. negro
hcayywcights Ia the game and wl'H
the memory Of that great battle %
August. their next scrap here shou -
doe one of unusual interest Charles
Swiurharl manager ~ ThompHon.
wired Promoter Machon that he and
his charge Will ho iu Tulsa within
a few days to start training sam
Iangfori and Manager Howard are
due later.
The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1919-10-08


Two base hiis. Gruh. Duncan. Rue
Ihcr Weaver % Icl-Ch. Three
base hlt~-NCHlc Stolen bn-,~-phu,
bert. iRth, Sshalk, IIcbold SnCrt
fiO' hlts--kcrr. bhubCrt Sacrifice
nl--E Collins Double pihys-Itousl
to Grnh. jackson "a S'hnlk. Ius,
berg 10 4. collins Ia Ghndil. Itnu-h
to Itnih; kopf Ia Itnih I'ft or
hui.C~--t tlnuinnHti. 4. Chicago, \
IIn-cs on balI---DH Kerr. CKopf
GrohD of Hucthcr, tNchnlk ,
IIi~bcrgl off ring. t,Incksou, Gnn.
IN licbuld IIlis--Du Ructhcr. Il
la five inninR- none ont Ia ~iSih
off Ring. In fiNc. innings iIit b,
plt"hrr-Hy Irrr. tt"nshi struck
out--hy Kerr, tGr"h Itngl m
Ring. : (SchnIk. irlsChl Losing
pitchcr---Iilng. Inipirc-"-li'hn~ be
hind piaicb Quiglcy NJ first, \ailin NJ
second Rigicr nt third
Time 90
The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1919-10-08
BLOOD Transmission Saves life.

Special 10 The World
PONCA CITY, oct THE re-
turn OF Mrs ". J Mckee today
from oklahoma city revealed the
fact that she had recently given up
r quart Of blood TO save the lie OF
her sister. Miss ola Sectin who has
been an In an oklahoma city hos
pIal for some tlm" with anacma
Attending physicians announced that
trausfusou of blood was necessary
.and Mrs Mckee volunteered 10 furn
ish g.
The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1919-10-08

Invite Hanson To Oklahoma CitN
Special ~ Tho World
OKLAHOMA CITY. oct -pu
Hanson. oN mayor ~ Seattle Wash.
has been invited to open the cham
hor uf commerce lunch room hcrr
October 20 with a speech
The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1919-10-08

tNl'NGp Weaver popped Tex
rs lylg1ur tftf went for douIlc
when ka.s Hn3 Duncan PLAYED an
N.Ihnu-u. Gt1'un l,t Jackson sIu.
r.yI 90 center scoring Weave
Ir.-yh lru'.cd 20 the center field
crowd JheN,un scoring THIS "a.
,nuuah ~ Eru'har lui llrg rc.
The Morning Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Okla.) 1919-1927, 1919-10-08

| brst Ring issued two passes In tho
! tighih bat was saved hy u sptrklir;
| double play lliahorg lined 10 ocu-
Ter. but Houah anne IN on the dead
| run and caught The ball or hH
IrhucstringH and doubled jackson ne-
| fore hc could ruturu to second base.
ln their shuro ~ mis- inning the
| Rods got man on third after two
we're out Nctlc got his thlri hit
of the game. u single To loft Hari-
! den grounded to Kerr, WHO became
| confused I'm throwing the hull and
| Nonlr went on TO third while the
I RED catcher was safe ut FIRST Ring
, forced Nnriden moment later.
ending the round
In the tenth Weaver doubled and
| JnckSon slngled, sending Weaver 20
| third and The handful ~ chicago
| rootcrs put up shout iandll re-
Spondrd with n single 10 center
| which sent Weaver home with what
| proved 10 be the winning run Jack
son took second on the play Nls
| hcrg linel io kouf ana Jackson WAS
! doubled or second
The last cffurt OF hc Rod legs was
hrirf ana Intellectual Euu~h went
out Collins to Gtndll. Duncan foul,d
by the collins -Gandil route
Pitching selections Tor the seventh
game ~ the worlds series scheduled
for Ncdland field tomorrow. were
shrouded I'm uncertainty tonight but
Il was gcncJplly believed that Man
.Hgcr GIragon ~ the SpN would send
Eddie Cirottc. although beaten
twice against tho Urds in n deter
mined effort 20 again turn The tide
or defeat
Snllcc or Iuauc
slim" Spurc. who defeated the
SoN to . in 'hc second game ~ the
series. probably will be Manager
Murnn'y pitching choice although he
may decide go give Luuue, the cuban
twlrlcr. chance Co face the Chicl
Eoans Slllcc was hatied hard in the
second game the SuN getting 40 hits.
but only succeeded in scoring two
runs
"Todays game wnsaa hearthroak
pr FOR tho Rods 90 ln-c.' said Mann
Err Moran tonight I'VE should have
won % hair a dozen Times Hpt the
strain OF the worlds series Us begin
ming tn tell un my players and they
were hii uun"r,d Rot they viii
regain themselves tomorrow and
wind ~ up
kerr pitched nctirr bah than
either Hucthrr or Ring llc demon
susird his Eumoncss when he
pitched himself out pf couple of
light places agJ got sumo crrntic
support if is possible that I shall
start Sul'rv against the SuN towor
row"
THE SoN have hi' their winning
stride and tHfhsuvN ffrH#trIHHa pIN.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19

might obtain In order to strengthen
the enemy's inclination 10 peace by
means Of Isropaganda- Col Won Haef-
ten had drawn up a memoir on the
subject. which I sent TO the imperial
chancellor. who apparently passed II
to the foreign Office. Nothing OF i'm
portance was done.
The imperial chancellor WAS per
fectly acquainted with our intention
OF attacking in the west. II was the
reason why We insisted on the diplo-
matte negotiations In the east being
accelerated. and why we had decided
10 denounce the armistlce with Rus
STA. He knew the enormous impor'
lance we attached TO this offensive.
Further. had him informed OF the
date 1t was 10 begin.
Germany could only make the enc
my inclined 10 peace by fighting. II
was FIRST Of all necessary TO shake
tho position OF Lloyd George and
Clemenceau by military victory.
Before that was done peace was not
10 be thought Of. All the world. in.
Guiding the entente. knew we were
going 20 attack in the west. Glenn.
enceau declared himself decisively. I
think on March s. In favor Of con
unuing tho war. In spite az event
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
War Editor of New York World
Explains Failure of Hun Plans

got only to the British second
line. the barraEe went ahead Of
the assaultlnR wave and the
men lay down without protcc.
ton and wer. shot to pieces.
Gen. Sir Julian Byng smashed
the Ludendorff scheme In four
days. when, as Ludendorff says.
the 18th army was exhausted.
Meanwhile the 18th army had
broken thru Gen. Coughs weak
British sth army and flowed
into the devastated region, In
order To keep the alignment the
north wing OF Coughs army
and the south wing Of Byng's
army made slow retirement in
order furnishing the Germans
on all the way and setting
themselves tight near the west.
ern edge OF the devastated dis.
tric,.
Then Ludcndorff changed his
whole plan. The 18th army was
not badly battered and he made
II the main striking force. try.
ing to push far enough to cut
the main lines Of communica.
ton between the French and
British armies. That was the
object Of his push toward
Amiens. past Montdidier and
southwark. Here the trap OF
devastation he had laid for his
enemies proved fatal TO him. He
could not get up supplies fast
enough ana the French moved
from the east and the British
from the moth and closed the
gap. leaving him. as he admits
In a strategic position By no
means favorable
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
18TH ARMY BADLY
BATTERED

on March % there was little
change on the 18th army front. but
the Second. being firmly in hand and
led with energy. defeated the enemy
and pressed on. The 18th gained a
considerable amount OF ground. The
nth appeared to give its various
tactical groups too much latitude;
but for this action OF the different
formations was too inter-depcndent
q. II. q. took steps to get the gen.
cral direction OF the fighting taken
more firusy in hand.
The result OF the situation on the
nth army front was that the enemy
In the Cambria re-entrant was not
cut off. nor could the opposition to
the Second army be indirectly re-
duccd. The later had been obliged TO
rely on It's own unaided efforts. and
had, therefore. not got ahead 80 fast
as was desirable from the point OF
view OF assisting the nth. And so
again Crown Prince RIpprecht's
group could not gain ground between
Croisillcs and Pcronne TO the ex.
tent that had been originally intend.
cd.
ON March Is the 18th and Second
armies had passed far beyond the
line Bapaume- Combles. Fighting
hard all the way. the 18th army had
taken Neslc and met with but little
resistance. The 18th army was al.
ready exhausted: IL had lost too heav-
lily on the 2lst and ssnd. apparently
because II had fought In too dense
formation. The Second army was
frcshcr. but WIS already complain.
ing Of the old shcIl-holes. II could
get no farther than Albert. Its left
wing had been more delayed by haV.
Ing to cross the Somme than by the
enemy.
The 18th army was stlll fun OF
fight and confidence: on the 21th IL
took Montdidier Soon the enemy
formed n fresh front north of the
Somme. which was sure to be diff.
cult To overcome
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
BY EUGENE J. YOUNG

tWar Editor Of the New York
WORLDLY
One OF the great mysteries Of
the war has been: Why did
Ludendorff make his great
plunge in March. 1918. 10 re.
capture the district ne had so
thoroiy devastated the year be-
fore7 He had laid 1, waste 80
that the allies could no, ad.
vance across IL against him
without tremendous expendi.
ture Of energy and without be-
ing constantly exposed TO oh
servation. Then why take the
handicap upon himself7
Ludendorf himself clears the
mystery in his description of
the March attack printed here.
with. The map illustrates how
his plans went awry.
As he has explained In previ-
our articles. the battle-ground
was not the one he would have
chosen had he been free to
wait. He wanted. TO strike for
the channel ports UP to Calais.
both to shorten his line and to
reach the British lines OF com
munication. Flanders mud
deep and sticky vetoed this
scheme until April. and the
American legions were coming
70 fast he had TO strike In
March.
The only ground over which
he could move 80 early was the
high terrain between Arras and
Ia Fere. So here he concen-
trated the three armies OF more
than 40, 900 chosen troops. His
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
SAW NO CHANCE
OF PEACE

At that moment ! could not possi-
bly, believe in Just peace. Up I'll
now tho enemy had invariably reject.
ed a peace by understanding. Should
we. in the actual situation. have OF.
fcred him Alsace.Lorraine. parts Of
the province OF Posen and an indem.
nity7
crhis observation In a reply 10 Ger.
man critics who have charged we
could have avoided the great siaugh.
ter OF 1913 by offering reasonable
terms OF restitution to the cntente.)
Nor did tho imperial government
mention tho possibility Of peace.
Secretary OF State Won Kuhlmann.
who was supposed to DO conducting
the whole OF our foreign policy. was
first ut Brcst and then at Bucharest.
Neither he nor the imperial chan.
cellor had been able To open up any
negotiations which might have led 10
peace without further lighting.
They probably continued their en-.
deavors in that direction. in spite OF
tho entcnte's refusal OF the Invitation
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19

therefore proposed TO take Avcsnes
as tho quarters Of tho augmented
operations branch. From thcrc we
could easily reach all parts Of the
front by car. I intended to see q
great deal for myself, and 10 send my
staff officers 10 the scenes Of inpor
tant events. In order to obtain Inn
pressions ut first hand.
On March is the field marshal and
| went to Avcsncs with the augment
cd operations branch. Our offices
there were not good. everything
VAS very crampcd, but y had 70 do
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
GENERAL Won LUDENDORFF GIVES EXPLANATI0
WHY BIG PUSH FABLE
Germans Planned to Break Thru
Rear of British Flanders Army

badly shook the aIe did
and
10 4nien Wa a.
perform task and
southern uaa merely Them
But dead attacking
badly exhausted His southo" broke rI ana nas
The the
adnunsu abonnon" by omeaufa orable'
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19

Tho government never informed me
OF these events. tho 1t must have
known OF them.
I am all the moro surprised TINT IL
did not contradict the rumor that n
peace would have been arranged In
March II had not insisted on attack.
ing. I personally requested the Inn
perial chancellor and the vice chan.
ceIlcr 10 do 50. They both Of them
refrained. without ever giving me
any reason for IL.
Early in March general headquar-
ters left Kreuznach. where 1t had
been Tor moro than a year.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19

nth army was northwest Of
Cambria. his End army south.
west Of Cambria and his 18th
army on both sides OF ST
Quentin.
Planned Pincsrx Move
The 18th and right wing of
the End faced the narrowcst
part of the devastated region.
II was 20 these that the chief
task was assigned. The End
was 10 strike southward be.
tween Crolseiles and Moeuvrss
and cut In behind the British
on the strong hin position TO
the west of Cambria. which had
been the scene Of British sue.
cess And almost immediate Brit.
ish reverse the year before.
The north wing Of the end
army was to smash into the
south OF this position and com.
plete a pincers movement that
would have cut n big hole In
the British line.
This done the two armies
were then 10 move directly
west between Croiaelies and
Peronne. Soon the 18th would
be past the devastated region
and out in the open striking
for the rear OF the British main
armies concentrated In T'laud
ers. The End and the 18th
armies were merely to support
this movement, qua riding
against its interruption from
the south.
Smashed by Byng
What happened was precisely
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
FEARED DELAY
or ASSAULT

And yet, our artillery relied on gas
for its effect and that was depend.
ent on the direction and strength OF
the wind. had TO rely on the fore
cast submitted 20 me at IL a. IN. by
my meteorologist. Lieutenant DIT
Schmaus Up iii the morning OF the
Goth strength and direction were by
no means very favorable: indeed. II
seemed almost necessary To put Oft
the attack. That would have been
very herd TO do
SO was very anxious TO nee " hat
sort of report | should get. II
was not str,kingly favorable but Il
did indicate that the attack was pos.
siblc. At ~ noon the army groups
were told that the program would b..
carried out. Now IL could no longer
be stopped. Everything must run
its course
g. II. @. senior commanders and
troops had all done their duty. The
II was In tn hrnds Of fgtc; I'M
favorable wind d'm'nis d t,;c Effect.
ivtness Of thr gus. fog impeoed and
retarded our movcmi nis and pre-
vented our sup rlor training and
leadership from r2gp'ng It's full re.
ward. This was the predominant
opinion about the fog. but few
thought II an advantage.
on the 2lst. just before 4 n. m.
tho battle began with "A tremendous
crash on a front of 45 miles. between
croisilles and La Fere. AS regards
tho gecond and 18th armies (the cen
ter and southern forces) the hours
had been fixed by higher authority
for the main operations; the nth
army, which was fighting by itself,
was left more latitude. Within these
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19

We had chosen the place because tho
18th army headquarters had been
there. and the telephone communicar
tons only needed slight additions
Our mess was at first very I'm.
pleasant; later on we found IN orc
agreeable rooms. We rationed tho
owners and fitted the place up with
furniture from Spa. To stay in those
rooms and have our meals there was
a relaxation we all needed.
His majesty came the next day.
He lived In his court train. which
was side-trackod In . neighborins
station "a ,an,,,,,,,,u,,,
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
SECRET PEACE
FElcI.ERS

Col. Won Hacften had Just been
visiting foreign countries. In order 10
discuss questions relating 10 propa'
ganda. Without my knowledge. he
established communication with a
subject OF ono OF the enemy coun-
tries. who was acquainted with the
objects and Intentions Of the authori'
ties In London and Washington. and
made mo verbal report on the sub
ject
Tho terms then demanded Of us
were 30 severe that only defeated
Germany could have acceded 10 them.
The colonel further Informed me
that tho then Reichstag deputy, Con
rad Hauszmann. who mas since con
firmed this statement, and Herr Max
Warburg Hamburg had also tried 10
negotiate peace. but WITHOUT success.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
FOUND FOOD
AND STOPPED

However. our troops had beaten
the French and English and proved
themselves superior. That they did
not achieve an the success that was
possible was due. not only TO their
reduced fighting value, but, above
all. TO their not being In all cases
under the firm control Of their Of.
ficers. They had been checked by
finding provisions and valuable time
had thus been lost.
Generally speaking. our tactics had
proved sound. what had happened
In the 18th army did not necessitate
any fundamental changes, aitho
some lessons needed more drastic
application. Above all. the infantry
must be more extended. At many
places machine gun posts had given
us an undue amount OF trouble and
so caused delay. The infantry groups
had often been lacking In initiative,
and their cooperation with the com.
panion arms had often failed.
The troops had found special diff
Guilty in reorganizing themselves for
defense at the conclusion OF the at
tack. and particularly in recognizing
when no further success was to be
gained by continuing the attack.
All troops. especially mounted
troops. had suffered heavily from
bombing from hostile airrnen. (Amer.
lean flyers with both the British and
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
HAD TO CHANGE
HIS PLANS

In the direction OF Amiens the en-
emy's resistance seemed weaker.
The original idea OF the battle had
to he modified. and the main weight
OF the attack vigorously directed on
that point. still hoped we should
get thru to open warfare. and kept
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19

TO Brcst II WIS their duty to spare
the people and army further night.
ing. II possible. Count IIertling's dec
laration OF February Is. In which he
took his stand on President Wilson's
four tsic) points OF February IL. had
met with no response from the en-
sant~
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
ARRANGED FOR
RETIREsfENTS

All fronts maintained their defen-
sive arrangements. in case the enemy
should himself attack. In some
places it was intended TO retire in
that case.
Work had been carried on along
these lines according TO program and
with the greatest devotion from the
middle OF January. by the beginning
of February the attack was fixed to
commence ON March 81, altho the
situation In the east was still quite
obscure. The military situation. how
ever. made a decision imperative.
Later on we could always m a X e
changes, but we would be unable to
make fresh start
The work OF tho army headquar-
ters, tho quarterrnaster-g general. the
fntenaant. general. the director of rail-
ways and the officers of my immedi
ate staff all fitted in admirably.
was able TO satisfy myself OF that
when I visited the front On these
occasions discussed all relevant
questions. adjusted difficulties. and
helped
The chiefs of the staff at the army
and group headquarters gave me
short verbal reports on the ground.
the distribution OF tho troops. the
artillery combat, and the state OF the
preparations. In my remarks laid
the greatest stress on cooperation
between the inner wings OF the nth
and second armies Of Crown Prince
Rupprecbt's group. 80 as TO ensure
the Cambria re-entrant being cut of.
az 40 much depended upon II. and u
seemed 10 me that the 18th army was
beginning TO look 20 the west a little
100 soon.
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
FITTED LIKE
CLOCk-WORk

We discussed the cooperation Of
~1he two army groups on tho boun-
dairy between the second and the 18th
armies- The preparations were car
rfed out ms intended. Work was car.
ried on everywhere with confidence
and without losing sight 81 the oh
Jet All arrangements ftted IN like
eiock.work. ~ was certain that the
armies would be ready for battle on
the day.
I considered u necessary 10 take
Advantage Of such success a. We
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
-BRII.IIANT FEAT.
HE SAYS

The entente now attacked at Al.
bert and southeast of Amiens in n dis.
connected sort OF way and achieved
nothing. on the 24th OF April. after
careful preparation. the Second army
made another attempt with the aid
Of tanks. TO improve its position at
vIilers Bretonneux. IL got ahead
well. but was unable to hold what II
gained.
The front between Albert and
Montdidier only settled down gradu.
ally. From time to time fighting
broke out again, and the situation
remained permanently doubtful The
other parts OF the new front. to-
wards Arras and Noyon. became
quiet much more quickly.
The battle was over BY April 4. II
was a brilliant feat. and will ever be
80 regarded in history. What the
English and French had not succeed.
ed in doing we had accomplished,
and that In the fourth year OF the
war.
Stragetically we had achieved
what the events OF the 23rd, Gath
and 25th had encouraged us to hope
for. That we had also failed to take
Amiens. which would have rendered
communication between the enemy S
forces astride the Somme exceed.
ingly difficult, was specially disap-
pointing. Long range bombardment
OF the railway establishments of
Amiens was by no means an equiva-
lent
The Seattle star. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1899-1947, 1919-09-19
BAD CHECK
NEAR CAMBRIA

groups.
BAD CHECK
NEAR CAMBRaI
For about two hours the whole OF
our artillery engaged the enemy's
batteries. then most OF II WAS switch
ed on 20 trench bombardment. In
which the trench mortnrs also took
our fire-only n portion being left
on hostile batteries and special
polnts--was concentrated to form n
barrage. our infantry advanced TO
the assault
The 18th army, which had the
strongest enemy In front Of II. only
reached his second line. the barraEe
had gone far ahead: the infantry had
lost touch with H. u remained In
this position, sipg down. with no
artillery support.
During the Second army's attack.
the cooperation between the in
fantry and the artillery was better.
The infantry penetrated into the en-.
emy's second position.
with tho 18Th army everything
proceeded as intended. IL WAS max.
ing good progress.
rrhe situation thus created was al
most the reverse OF what Ludendorff
sought as he has explained his plans
in previous articles. The nth army.
which ran against Gen. Byng's de-
Tense northwest OF Cambria and WIS
stopped. had been ordered, in con
junction with the right wing OF the
Second army. TO surround the Hill po-
sitlons southwest OF Cambria and
then break thru north OF the dev.
astated region and into the rear OF
the British ARMIES concentrated In
Flanders. The left wing OF the Sec
ond army and the 18th army were 10
30 thru the devastated region and
support this thrust AS It happened.
the main blow intended for the de-
strucuon of the British was parted
and II was the supporting armies
which broke thru into the devastated
rtcfop