Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-10

mainly from the second-line fleet
which consisted of the oldest ships
| but the other vessels also would have
the prime of their service years.
The surface fleet was not, of course
| to release Officers and engineers in
to fall below certain standard OF
strength. 1t had to be maintained al
a sufficient level, in the[face of the
enemy forces. which were constantly
increasing through new construction
and might be further strengthened by
the adhesion of the Americans. to
assist in the maintenance of the sub
marine campaign. 1t had the duty of
lnsuring the passage of the stub
marines through the enemy mine
fields 1t remained, in fact, sufficient
ly formidable to thwart every attempt
of the enemy to interrupt sea traffic
in the Battle.
The chief of the naval staff also
hoped that the declaration of unre-
strlcted warfare would have a deter
rent effect on neutral shipping, which
had up to then been of great assist
ance to the entente. He was quite
W Vi tiiG hCN6Soliy lOI tHt
strongest support on this point from
political quarters, which proved in the
event to be something lacking.
The amount of shipping necessary
for the transport of troops from
America to France and for the supply
Of reinforeements was discussed Our
navy reckoned that the freight space
required for the transport of an army
with baggage and retnfcrcements
amounted to five British register tons
per man. This estimate was confirmed
by our experience in the attack on
Oesel in the autumn of 1917. 1t would
thus be necessary, in order to trans
port l.00O.OO0 American soldiers in a
reasonable time, to employ 5000, 900
tons Of shipping space. Such guam
tty OF shipping, in view of the neces-
sary of maintaining supplies to the
western powers, could not be spared
even temporarily.
Cabinet Minister Converted.
The economic value of the campaign
was the subject Of varying opinion in
our government. The ministry of the
interior gradually came round (and
this only after the campaign had be-
gum to a high view of its value. and
the chancellor adopted this view also.
With my knowledge OF the military
situation and my firm views as to the
determination of the enemy, | did not
accept literally the estimates of our
admiralty as to the probable effects of
unrestricted submarine warfare; ri
Knew, moreover, that questions of
transport and of economics generally
are very difficult to decide.
| did. however, think it safe to
reckon that it would have a decisive
effect within twelve months; that is
to say. before America could throw
her new formations into the scale |
hoped that. with the measures already
taken and to be taken, we could hold
out for this period on land, assuming
that the submarine campaign pro-
duced sufficient disturbance of the
enemy's economy to reduce their in |
dustrial output of war material and
cut down substantially their shipments
OF munitions to France. For the first
few months | attributed the greatest
Importance to the latter point,
was greatly impressed with the |
seriousness of the position by a tour
which | took of the western front in |
the middle of December, with a view |
to reviewing the whole. situation and |
teleeraphed my views to Berlin; att
thatN tine had already abandoned !
hope of any success from orr offer of |
peace In long discussion on thel
23d of December the field marshal ex-
the chancellor his view that