The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1919-06-03

may rest assured that. as they become
available. fresh troops Will be sent to
YOU with the least possible delay 10
strengthen your forces as far as is prac-
iticahlc. Tho Twcnty-cighth Division
Inns already received orders 10 leave Tor
, France on the l4th instant"
! The telegram from the fipet lord or
the admiralty. dated January >. r"fcrred
to in the above memorandum. ran as
follows: THE battlcShip Formidable
was sunk this morning by a. submarine
in the channel. Information from all
quarters shows that The Germans are
steadily developing an important sup
marine base at ZcchruGGe. CnlcSs OPP
erationSs can he undertaken to clear the
coast and particularly 10 capture 'h's
place. II must he recognized that the
whole transportation of troops across
the channel will bescriously and increas-
iinrlv compromised. The admiralty are
Of the opinion that il would be possible
under cover Of ships to land large
| force at Zecbrugge in conjunction win
i,nv genuine forward movement along
1.-The shore to Ostcnd. They wish these
views. which they have so frequently
mt forward. 70 bc placed again before
Tho French commander. and hope they
NAV receive tho consideration Wncn
their urgency and importance require
, II will be seen from this that MT
Churchill was not in accord with inc
views expressed in Lord kitcheners
memorandum.
! Tho situation was we'll known TO the
| cabinet before the dispatch of Sir Ed
ward Grcy's telegram OF December y. IL
| Is clear that the points raised IN tho
! memorandum OF January were eA-
! cuscs used as a viel to screen the dis
! inclination Of the British government
TO taking firm stand against tho atm
tudc adopted by the French. But there
: was something more.
! Lord KitChCncr'S objections can be
easily answered. They may be generally
! stated thus:
l. That the seizure from the Germans
of this strip Of seacoast would not be
ar adequate return for the heavy losses
| likely TO be incurred in the operation.
| .. That the line then TO be held would
be unduly extended.
3. That the reinforcement Of the ad-
dtional troops demanded would only
be supplied at a considerable dislocation
i of the organization of the future rein
forcemcnts to be sent you"
4. That the supply Of gun ammuni-
ton on the scale demanded would be
impossible.
3. That embarking on such an enter
prise would prejudice our power OF re-
! sisting a possible German counter of
fensive m the Immediate future.
/ My answer TO Cd is this: Had we
! been in possession Of the Belgian coast
! line between Nicuport and the Dutch
! frontier in the early part Of 1915. and
| had we maintained it to the end Of the
/ war, the Germans would have been de-
! priyed in q great measure OF the power
! they have exercised throughout with
| such success 10 prosecute their subma-
| rine campaign. Any price we might
| have had to pay in the way OF losses
would have been we'll worth the object
| attained
In lesser degree this may be said
OF the enemy's aircraft enterprises.
claim that the naval history Of this war
clearly bears out my contention
AS to CD. the extent of the line 70 be
held would depend upon the degree Of
success attained by the operations. II
we had been able to make good our
advance from the left flank Coetween
| Newport and Dixmude) by means OF
powerful naval support from the sea,
! the lease We should have effected would
have been to clear the Germins out of
the triangle Newport Dixmude-Zee-
! brugga
| II the operation bad then to be sus-
! pended. We should have had to hold the
! line Dixmude-Zeebruggc instead Of Dix
| mude-Nicuport- In actual distance the
| former space Is about Doubt the latter.
| But our position at Zcebrugge would
have afforded large measure OF naval
| support, and the country TO the south
west OF that place lends itself to mum
| datons- This would have enabled us To
\
line in much less strength. Further. II
| was just in anticipation of such a ne
cessity that the extra troops were asked
| for
! lnasmuch. however. as such a sftua-
| lion would have forced upon the enemy
the necessity OF holding n dangerous
| and exposed salient which could be
| reached on the north side by our guns
from the fleet, 1t is more than possible
mat nc would have effected such a re-
urement as would have considerably
shortened our line.
| 90 This contention is disputed. hut
| even II IL were true. 1t is no sound mill
ltary argument against embarkinr on
an operation which promised such val
liable resuttA
90 There Is a complete answer -
this objection Some two or three
months later large train loads az am
munltlon-heavy, medium and light
passed bH the rear Of the army in
France en- route to Marseilles for shin
ment to the Dardanelles
(5) The best possible means Of ward.
ing OH an attack is to take a strong and
powerful initiative "''u
| cannot characterize these rcasons
ior rejecting my plans as other than H.
logical and feel sure they must really
nave appeared SO to their authors.
Pefhaps the true explanation which
underiay all this is to be found in The
following memorandum OF the war conn-
| eli or January 8. 1915. 1t runs as fol-
THE POSSIBILITY OF EMPLOYING
BRITISH FORCES IN A DIFFERENT
| THEATRE THAN THAT IN WHICH !
| THEY ARE NOW USED
| The Council considered carefully
your remarks on this subject in reply
to Lord Kitcheners letter, and came 10 !
the conclusion that certainly for the
present, the main theatre of operations
| for British forces should be alongside !
the French army, and that this should
! continue as long as France was liable TO
successful Invasion and required armed
| support. It was also realized that
should the offensive operations subse- |
| quently drive the Germans out Of France
and back to Germany British troops
| thought that, after another failure by !
| Germany to force the lines of defence
held by the French army and yours. the