Evening star., 1919-10-05
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Continued from Third Pase.)
ularly in the night time. And from
this point the distance to the trade
routes south and west of ireland was
| relatively short one.
Didn't Travel in Shoals.
| Yet, terribly destructive as these
U-boats were, the number operating
| simultaneously in this and other fields
| was never very large. The extent to
which the waters were infested with
German submarines was another par
| ticularly ludicrous and particularly
prevalent misrepresentation. Merchant
| vessels constantly reported having
been assailed by Submarines in
shoals" and most civilians still be-
fiotillas. like schools Of fish. There
! is hardly an American doughboy who
did not see at least a dozen subma-
rines on his way across the Atlantic:
every streak Of suds caused by a
"tide rip and every swimming por-
the wake of a torpedo; every bit OF
drfftwood, in the fervid imagination
of transatlantic voyagers, assumed
the shape of a periscope.
The fact is that. with few excep-
tions, we knew every time German
submarine SUNK lroH It's pdbe Hito
the ocean The allied secret service
was immeasurably superior to that
Of the Germans pay particular
tribute to the British naval intelli-
gence department in saying this. We
always knew how many submarines
the Germans had and where they
were; we always knew how many
they were building. where they were
building them, their essential char
acterfstics and the stage of progress
which they had reached at a particu-
lar time.
Not Easy to Oct Out.
It was not the simplest thing in
the world to get q submarine out OF
its base. The allies were constantly
laying mines at these outlets, and
before the U-hoat could safely make
it's exit elaborate sweeping opera
a squadron of nine or ten surface
ships, operating for several hours, to
get a submarine out Of its base and
started on it's journey. So we always
knew when one came out, ana we
knew not only that, but We knew
which one it was, and we often pos
sessed the name of it's commander
and other valuable details. Moreover,
we knew where it went and we Kept
charts, on which we plotted from
day to day the voyage OF each par
ticular submarine. .
"Why didn't you sink 1t them" 10
the question usually asked when l
make this stateme nt-a question
which, as I shall show. merely re-
fleets the ignorance which prevafis
everywhere on the underlying facts OF
submarine warfare:
Now in this densely packed shipping
area, extending, say. from the north
of Ireland to Brest, there were sell
dom more than eight or ten subma-
rines operating at any one time. The
largest number / had record Of was
fifteen; but this was EXCEPTIONAL: the
usual number was four. six. eight. or
perhaps ten.
Reports Grossly Exaggerated.
We estimated that the conveys and
troopships brought in reports OF
sighting about 800 submarines for
every submarine actually in the field.
We also estimated that, for every
hundred submarines which the Ger.
mans possessed. they could keep only
ten or a dozen at work in the open
sea. The rest were on their way to
the hunting ground, or returning. or
in port being rented and resupplied
Could Germany have kept. let US say,
fifty submarines constantly at work
on the great shipping routes in the
winter and spring Of 1917--before we
had learned how to handle the sit-
uation-nothfng could have prevented
her from winning the war. Instead
gle month she would have sunk g.
900, 900 or 100000 tons. The fact is
that Germany, with all he'd micro
scopfc preparations for war, neglected
to provide herself with the one in
strumentality with which she might
have won it! E.
This circumstance, that 50 few sub
marines could accomplish such de-
structive results, shows how formida-
BILE was the problem which we faced.
Germany could do this, of course. be-
cause the restricted field in which
she was able to operate was SO con-
stantly and SO densely infested with
valuable shipping.
Hunted in other Fields.
In the above I have been describing
the operations Of the U-boats In the
great area to the west And south OF
ireland. But there were other hunt
ing fields. particularly on the east
coast of England, In the area extend
ing from Harwich to Newcastle. This
was the headquarters of a great trade
between Ine Nortu SSA ports ol Gu6
land and Norway and Sweden. con-
sisting Of essential products like lum-
Der and many Manufactured articles.
Every four days convoy OF from
forty to sixty ships left this region
for Scandinavia: use the word "con-
voy," but the operation was a con
voy only in the sense that the ships
sailed ia punches, for the navy wat
unable to provide them with an Ade.
quate escort-seldom more than ono
or two destroyers. or a few yachts OF
trawlers. Smaller types Of ,1lss snn,
Skager Rack and constantly preyet
upon this coastal shipping.
These submarines differed from tn,
U-boats in that they were smaller. o.
about $50 and 400 tons, and in tina
| they also carried mines, which the,
were constantly laying. They wert
much handler than the larger types
they could rush out much more quick
| ly from their bases and get back, AND
! they did an immense amount of dam
age to this coastal trade. The valui
of the shipping sunk. Of course, die
not compare with the losses which
Transatlantic routes, but the problem
was a serious one, because the sup.
plies which these ships brought ove1
were essential to military operations
Big U-Boats Of Little Use.
| Besides these two types-the d.
boats and the U3s and UCs--the Ger.
mans had another type OF submarine
| tho great ocean cruisers. These ship
were as long as small surface