The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-12-13

able to live, much less carry on the
war. without Rumania's grain and oil"
he admits
Another crisis came in 1917. He did
not see how the situation was to be
saved for Germany unless the U-boats
could do il. He admits that only the
revolution in Russia the intrigues of
the bolsheviki and the collapse of the
Russian army averted complete defeat.
LEARNED OF FRENCH PLANS
Luck also played its part on the
west front in 1917 The Germans
learned OF the plans for the great
French offensive against the Chemin-
des- Danes and were able to prepare
for it. How they learned is a matter
OF contention. Ludendorfr says they
captured an army order in a small at
tack that gave him the clue Various
persons are now being punished by
France for their part in the German
underground system which extended
from Paris to German headquarters
through Switzerland; and many
Frenchmen thoroughly believe the Sc
cret OF the 1917 drive went by this
route from highly, placed officials Of
radical leanings.
1t was German luck also that held
back Marshal Haig three times in 1917,
WneH ne naQ .COmpleIetN pTOhCu tue
German line. but did not press his, adj
vantage. In each case-at Arras in
April, at Messines in June, and AT
Cambria in November-the Germans
lacked reserves. and Ludendorff won
ders why the British did not do what
he would have done-open the gaps
as widely as possible and roll up the
enemy line
Coming to 1918 Ludendorf reveals
the progressive dissolution OF the Ger
man war machine. His great drives
were gigantic gamble, made with the
hope that he would be able to force
Lloyd George and Clemenceau. into a
peaceful frame of mind before the
Americans could arrive in sufficient
force.
ALL ATTACKS WENT WRONG
His reasons for this gamble he plain
~ states Austria Bulgaria and Tur-
key were on the point of, collapse. Only
a great victory would hold them in line
Germany was seething with revolution
airy sentiment and the morale of the
army had been seriously affected. He
did not believe his troops would stand
on the defensive and he had to adopt
the offensive in order to renew their
fighting spirit.
With a blunt frankness that is as
lOnlSH1nE lie Clients UP many Ol Tue
mysteries of his campaign. the great
greatest military effort in the history of
mankind. with scarcely an attempt at
excuplation he shows himself driven
by circumstances to do things he knew
were strategically unwise, and makes
no bones of admitting that every at
tack he started went wrong.
From the first his chief idea was to
get to the channel ports as far as
Boulogne. There he would cut the
British off from their short communi :
cations across the channel and force
them to send their supply ships on
longer journeys on the open sea, where
the U-boats would have a better
chance to get them He would also es-
tablish new bases for the raiders; and
could bring Eondon under fire of the
new big guns that were used against
Paris. Always his mind was on this
plan, and at no time was he able tAput
it into execution.
THE AMERICAN DANGER
First the. American danger upset
him. Our war machine after many de-
lays, was getting into operation and our
legions were pouring across the ocean.
Before long they would be coming into
the battle line. Ludendorff must strike
and weaken the British and French be-
So he could not wait for the mud of
Flanders to dry and had to pick bat
tleground over which he could move in
the early spring. He was forced to
choose Picardy, even though his ad :
vance would lead him into the district
he had devastated, terrain over which
he could not advance rapidly. 81
This drive. he frankly explains, went
awry, and the results hampered all his
subsequent efforts. His scheme was to
break through south of Arras skirt the
northern end of the devastated region
and reach the rear of the British army
in Flanders. Two other armies to the
southwark were merely to support his
attack
The artillery Of the Arras army blum
dered; the barrage went ahead Of the in
fantry: within three days this army was
exhausted" oy the terrible pounding
given by Byng and had really accom-
plished nothing. The supporting army
broke through at St. Quentin and, push-
ing west and south, drew the force Of the
that when the French and British closed
the gap Luderdorff found himself in the
great Amiens pocket, '4in a strategetical
situation by no means favorable
| LACKED TROOPS FOR FLANDERS
This pocket heightened his lines and
forced to the front troops that otherwise
he might have used in Flanders 1t also
compelled him t. attack near La Fere to
straighten out the long and exposed south
flank
Thus, when the mud dried and ne was
able TO try his Flanders drive in April he
could not bring to bear sufficient forces
The storm troops he had prepared through
the winter were too weary and battered
to be available without rest and he hal
to rely largely on the second class men
in line. He broke through the Portuguese
division west OF Lille and made big
hole. hut could not rush forward with SUI
ficient swiftness, and Foch rounded him
up in another pocket reaching into the
lowlands of the Lys.
This failure brought formidable CON-
centration Of the allies Ia Flanders and
Picardy. He was forced to do something
Ito draw the French southwark before he
could take up his main plan again. So he
made the feint toward Paris across the
OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES. He admits he had
no idea of striking for the French capital
and had no design Of going even as far
as the Marine.
|ONE ARMY FAST: OTHER SLOW
Again his plans went wrong. One OF his
armies found the going easier than he
had expected, swept across the Aisne and
the vesle down to the Marine, and was