The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1916-1920, 1919-10-15
MS PERSISTENT AGGRESSONS SHOWN TO MENACE WORLDS PEACE

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take such steps AZ may DO necessary
OF course, falling to receive assistance
from others, the chinese Government
had to yield. although parts Of group
hve, against which the foreign outcry
had been loudest and the acceptance Of
which would practically make China q
mere subject province, China refused TO
accept While now Japan IL urging that
America accept her unwritten promise
regarding Shantung, we should keep
carefully in mind the facts Just mei,-
| toned. Japans chief argument, and the
argument that has apparently been most
frequently accepted by America, Is that
China finally signed the treaty, although
under pressure. and that she must abide
by her decision. Japan 10 now endsav-
oring TO bring pressure upon the present
Chinese Government to enter into SINH
lar negotiations with her reeardinr the
conditions under which shantuns is to
be returned. She wants China to sign
the award OF the treaty putting all Ger
man claims and more into Japanese
hands Does the history Of the twenty
one demands justify Americans now in
trusting Japan, even though President
Wilson says he trusts themf
1T is worth while for Americans 10
note that at the time OF the twenty-one
demands the American Government had
on May 16, 1915, sent a note To both
Japan and China and formally notified
both Governments that It cannot recog-
nice any agreement or undertaking
which has been entered into or which
may be entered into between the Gov
ernmens of China and Japan impairing
n tV-ao to f-t.A -
and it's citizens in China The political
or territorial integrity of the Republic
OF China or the international policy
commonly known as the open door policy
still stands. Apparently from the public
statements of the Japanese Government,
that country attempts now to interpret
the treaty as recognizing also the
twenty-one demands, but President Will
son specifically states that he did
nothing at Paris to weaken the force of
this reservation Of May, 1918, regarding
the demanda
Pekfn Appeals to Paris.
China, having failed to check Japan's
aggression. next attempted to make pro-
vision for a seat at the Paris confer
ence, hoping that there at least she
might receive Justice.
Shih-k'ai had hoped that the Chinese
might capture Tsingtao rather than to
attempt to maintain neutrality or to
limit military operations wherever Japan
was concerned. Next he proposed to
send troops to participate in the cap
ture of Tsingtao, urging that all moves
in Chinese territory by Japan be dis
couraged. Again in August, 1915, he
proposed to join the Allies. but the
British Minister discouraged him. On
October 80, acting on the suggestion of
one Of his foreign advisers. he took UP
the question again, discussing 1t with
the American, Russian and French
Legations AT this time the matter was
given some consideration. The United
States being still neutral could take no
formal action. The American Minister
personally sympathized with the move
ment, and doubtless the American Gov
eminent would have welcomed It,
The matter went so far that the rep
resentatives of Great Britain. France
and Russia on November 20. 1915. met
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in
Toxic, Viscount Ishii. They suggested
that China become an ally. Viscount
Ishii objected The reports of the inter-
view from various sources agree that
Viscount Ishii summed up his objections
to the effect that Japan's interests in
China were paramount and that she
must maintain q Arm hand regarding
them. However, Japan could not view
without apprehension the prospect OF
large Chinese army such as would be
required II China were to Join actively
in the war. Nor could Japan view with
out uneasiness a moral awakening OF
400, 900. 900 Chinese such as would be
brought about by the participation OF
the war In Millard's account of the
interview he phrases part of the oojec-
ton thus:
"'Nor could Japan fail to regard with
uneasiness a liberation Of the economic
activities of a nation of 400,000,000
people
"Such as would be brought about by
the war. Americans should ponder
well this statement.
when America broke Off official rela-
tions with Germany, February. 1917,
she invited neutrals to sever diplomatic
relations with Germany. In Pekin the
American Minister reached prompt
decision with China. Great Britain.
France, Russia and Italy. while ap-
parently favorably impressed by the
suggestion, did not urge 1t strongly.
The Japanese Minister in private inter-
view with the President said that China
would run a great risk by Joining
America inasmuch as the action OF the
United States probably would not be
effective in the war. and that while that
country had frequently expressed her
sympathy with China, she had really
done little for her. II was very doubt
full whether the Allies could defeat Ger
many. 1t was much safer for China
TO rely upon Japan since there would
doubtless be harmonious action between
Japan and China In the war, and Japan
could then protect China. The Minister
also presented the same argument to
Chinas Prime Minister. Under the CHI
cumstances the Chinese Government
hesitated until the American Minister In
reply to questions of the Chinese stated
that while he had no official instructions
on account of the cables being out OF
order. he would assume the respon-
sibility of saying that In his judgment
assistance would be given 10 the Chinese
to recover Shantung at the Peace Con-
ference. On the basis of that assur-
ance China, over the protest of Japai,.
accepted Americas invitation and
severed diplomatic relations. The
United States Government never repu-
dated the action OF our Minister, and
China later entered the war believing
that she was promised Americas SUI
port at the Peace Conference.
stirred to New Action.
These activities of China aroused Ja-
pan to new action. The terrific German
drive was anticipated with the greatest
anxiety While America would, in all
probability. come into the war, It seemed
unlikely that her troops could become
seriously effective before the spring OF
1919, and 1t might then be too late.