The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1919-01-24
TWO VIEWS OF BOLSHEVISM
From The Republic How to Propagate Bolshevism.

mean 10 destroy the react1O naNeS. They have already been struck mad. They are aware that a great menace 10 their interests has been unloosed upon the world: Bolshevism. What means are they proposing for keep ing 1t under control? Force; but where in history do they discover a doctrine suppressed by force? Kill the Bolsheviki, urges ex-President Taft. We are doing 1t, and the more we kill, the more of them there are. Keep supplies away from Russia and starve BoIshevism out; so less viz orous spoken reactionaries advise. But you starve fifty other Russians to every Bolshevik; and any starv- ing man is a potential Rolshevik.
 Well. Russia is bad job, anyway, sigh the reactionaries. Down to the present we have only made matters worse, but perhaps if we had used more force, killed more Bolshevik, applied starvation more vigorously, we might have succeeded. We'll see what can be done along that line in the future. And if we fail, Russia is remote; perhaps we can localize the plague. Will not an embargo on Russian propalgandists Russian rev. olutionary literature, quarantine US satisfactorily It might, if Bolshe vism were an infection. But every body ought to know by this time that it is not. Like scurvy and pe!l- agra, 1t has chiefly 10 do with de- fective nutrition. Therefore it can't be kept away by quarantine.
 There Is not the remotest chance that Bolshevism can win over more than a minute fraction of those class es that have reason to consider their present economic and political status tolerable and their prospects good. Trotzkys logic can command the allegiance only of the disinherited. Now, this is one of the most curious facts in the history of social poll tics: At the very moment when the reactionary is racking his brains for devices to check the spread of Trot- zky's logic he Is revolving plans for turning over to TrotZky's influence a whole great nation of the disinher- tied. That Is not the way he puts it to himself. Tn his mind of water tight compartments he concelves that those plans have nothing 10 do with
 
 plans for levying stupendous indem- rlties upon Germany, and the re- acGonaries reason about them in terms of punitive justice, of the ex- pediency of keeping Germany per manently weak. in war and industry, of the relief to the Allied taxpayer that would follow the transfer of the major part of the war charges to Germany. These are all good re- acuonary reasons; but the policy they arc meant to support can be judged only by its effects. Taking the economic condition of Germany as 1t is, how will an indemnity policy affect 1t, and what will be the reac- ton upon German political life ? Those are the tests that a conserva- tive common sense would apply to all Indemnity proposals.
 What the economic condition of Germany was before the war is fair ly well agreed upon among statis- ticlans. The aggregate wealth, pri- vate and public, can not have been less :han seyenty-fve billions of doi- lars; it may have approached one hundred billions. The aggregate pri- vate income fell between ten billions end twelve. The war has increased the private wealth of the German people by indefinite billions of war bonds-mortgages upon the pre-ex- 1sting tangible wealth. It has re- duced the tangible wealth enormous ly through five years of excessive wear and tear In terms of real pur- chasing power the aggregate income of Germany must have been reduced by one-fifth or more. and the aggre- gate capital .n as large proportion.
 From tho pre-war income of ten or twelve billions we must deduct the minimum of subsistence of 65,O00, coo people If we desire to arrive al the surplus which ailments cOnserva- tism which offers hope to the am bilious and keeps them aloof from the revolutionary spirit. Perhaps that surplus amounted to five bil- lions before the war. It can hardly exceed four billions now. That i: interest on an indemnity of eighty lillions or two o-thirds of the cos that the Allies have incurred ir fighting the war.
 Thus if we levied upon Germany only two-thirds of the indemnity that even responsible statesmen arc claiming, we should have stripped the land of all surplus income for aI indefinite period, since German in dustry could not fail to decay stil further under the eNaction of tribute For an indefinite period there would be no recipients of rents, interest profits. no favored class of high sal aried men among the Germans. Al would be proletarians, laboring in cessantly for their daily bread. Ger many would represent a vast lectur, hall for TrotZky, where no on would hiss With all the surplu income that corresponds with prop erty income syphoned out for alieI benefit, would a single German b disposed to dispute the maxim Property is robbery? Of course, w should have our army of occupatio in Germany. We might instruct then to shoot Trotzky and his kind wher ever they appeared. Much would profit us Their blood would cry ou that property Is also murder.
 Perhaps, then, we had better h somewhat more modest in our in demnity demands: How about fort billions, which would leave, say, tw billions of surplus income. to stiffe the structure of German societ against Bolshevist attacks? Or twen ,.-p,,IJ IaaNp