New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-12-14

effort-the elimination Of the st.
Mihiel salient-was now taken up
Again 1t was proposed that American
troops reinforce the French for the
operation, but Pershing again object
cd: He explains:
"The plan suggested for the Ameri-
can participation In these operations
was not acceptable to me because 1t
would require the immediate sep
aration Of the recently formed
F FIR, American Army into sev-
French armies. This was directly con-
trary to the principle of forming dis
tinct American army, for which my
contention had been insistent. An
enormous amount of preparation had
already been made in construction of
roads, railroads, regulating stations
and other installations looking to the
use and supply Of our armies on q
particular front. The inherent disin-
clination of our troops to serve under
Allied commanders would have grown
and American morale would have suf-
fersd. My position was stated quite
ment Of the First Array 4a,a unit would
be undertaken where desired, but its
disruption to carry out these proposals
would not be entertained.
"A further conference at Marshal
Fech's headquarters was held on Sep
TENDER 2, at which General P6tain was
present. After discussion the question
Sf employing the American army az q
unit was conceded. All the Allied
armies were to be employed in a con-
ver9ing action. The British armies,
supported by the left of the French
armies, were to pursue the attack in
Ia ~ To
the French armies, west Of Rheims,
would continue the actions, already
begun, to drive the enemy beyond the
Aisne, and the American army, sup
ported by the right Of the French ar
mics, would direct its attack on Sedan
and M&ziares.
Victory in 1918 Unforeseen
ut should be recorded that although
this general offensive was fully out
lined at the conference, no one present
expressed the opinion that the final vic
tory could be won in 1918. In fact, it
was believed by the French high COM
mand that the Meuse-Argonnc attack
faucon before the arrival of winter
would force cessation of operations.
The choice between the two sectors
that east Of the Aisne, including the
Argonne Forest, or the Champagne sec
tor, was left to me. In my opinion no
other Allied troops had the morale or
the offensive spirit to overcome sue
cessfully the difficulties to be met in
the Meuse-Argonne sector, and our
plana and installations had been pre-
pared for an expansion Of operations
In that direction.
"The salient had been held by the
Germans since September, 1914. It
covered the most sensitive section Of
front, namel y--the Mezieres- Sedan.
Metz railroad and the Briey iron
basin; it threatened the entire region
between Verdun and Nancy and inter
rupted the main rail line from Paris
to the east. Its primary strength lay
in the natural defensive TEXTURES Of the
terrain itself. The western face of the
salient extended along the rugged
heavily wooded eastern heights Of the
Meuse; the southern face followed the
heights of the Mouse for eight kilome-
ters to the east and then crossed the
plain Of the Woevre, including within
the German lines the detached heights
of Loupmont and Montesec, which dom
mated the plain and afforded the enemy
unusual facilities for observation. The
enemy had reinforced the positions by
every artificial means during period
Of four years"
Enemy Overwhelmed
"The operation was carried out with
entire precision" the general continues.
"The rapidity Of our advance over
whelmed the enemy, who apparently
had started to withdraw some of his
elements from the tip Of the salient.
We captured $4,000 prisoners, 443 guns
and large stores.
"The material results of the victory
achieved were very important. An
American army was an accomplished
fact and the enemy had felt it's power.