Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-03-17

prevent war In the world and realizes
vi course that excluded nations ar,
quite as likely TO make war as theil
own embers.
The covenant therefore declares
the concern of the league IN threat
ened war between nations. whether
members or not, and asserts its righ'
to take steps to prevent it. This dec.
laration is made plainly as the JUST.
fication for the Article XVII by which
a nation or nations not members OF
the league who threaten war are in
vited to become temporary members
of the league in order to enable them
! TO settle their disputes peaceahly as
! permanent members covenant to do
! These temporary members are visited
with the same penalties for acts which
would be by permanent members
| breaches of their covenants not TO
begin war. Thus the scope of the
! leagues action is extended to all ma
! tons
Whole World Involved.
This is the explanation and the
! purport of article III and article II.
| They involved the whole world in the
covenants Of the league not to make
war. They operate to defeat the for
| rival league of nations not admitted
as permanent members of this league
They unite the rest of the world
against such nations in any case of
war threatened by them.
There is no supreme court to con-
strue this covenant and bind the
| members, and each nation in de-
termining its own obligations and
action under it must construe it for
itself. Our duties under it are not to
be declared and enforced against us
by hostile tribunal or by one actu-
ated by different principles and spirit
from our own. Its whole strength is
to rest in an agreed Interpretation by
all. Its sanction must be in the good
sense of the covenanting nations, who
know that. in order that IL may hold
together and serve its purpose, they
must all be reasonable in their con-
struction. What rules of interpreta-
ton should and must we therefore
apply?
1.-The president and senate are to
ratify this covenant. if it be ratified,
by virtue of their constitutional
power to make treaties. This power,
as the supreme court has held,
enables them to bind the Unit
ed States to a contract with an
other nation on any subject mat
ter of treaties between nations,
subject to the limitation that the
treaty may not change the form of gov
eminent of the United States, without
the consent of the state. The making
of war, of embargoes, OF armament
and of arbitration are frequent sub
ject matter of treaties.
Mandates of the Constitution,
rr IA MT
however, confer on any body consti-
tuted by league of nations the pow
er and function to do anything for
the United States which is vested
by the federal constitution in con-
gress, the treaty making power of any
branch of the United States govern
ment. 1t therefore follows that when
ever the treaty making power binds
the United States to do anything It'll
must be done by that branch of that
government vested by the constitu-
ton with that function. A treaty may
bind the United States to make or not
make war in any specific contingency,
it may bind the United States to levy |
boycott, to limit it's armament to al
fixed amount, it may bind the Unit |
ed States to submit a difference or
class of differences to arbitration,
but the only way in which the United
States can perform the agreement is
for congress to fulfill the promise tot
declare and make war; for congress
to perform the obligation to levy a
boycott, for congress to fix or reduce
armament in accord with the contract,
and for the president and senate asi
the treaty making power to formulate
the issues to be arbitrated and agree
with the opposing nation on the char
acter of the court.
when the treaty provides that the
obligation arises upon breach of a
covenant and does not make the ques-
ton of the conclusively. deterIninable
by any body or tribunal, then it is for
congress itself to decide in good faith
whether or not the breach of the gov
eminent upon which the obligation
arises has in fact occurred, and find
ing that, it has to perform the obliga-
ton.
Entirely and Easily Conform"
These plain limitations upon the
federal treaty making power are
known to nations Of this conference,
and any treaty of the United States
is to be construed in the light of them.
Following these necessary rules of
construction, the provisions of the
covenant entirely and easily conforms
to the constitution of the United
States. They lose together that threat
ening and dangerous character and
effect which Senator Knox and 9TH
er critics would attach to them. They
delegate to nobody but our own fed
eral constitutional agencies the duty
of deciding in good faith what our
obligations under the, covenant are,
when they become immediate, the
means and method by
which they are to be performed and
the performance of them.
by the first article the action of
the high contracting parties under the
covenant are to be effected through
the instrumentality of a meeting of a
body of delegates representing the
high contracting parties, of meetings
at more frequent intervals of an ex-
ecutive council and Of a permanent
secretariat'
This means only that when the
high contracting parties wish to take
joint action, it is to be taken through
the fundamentally of a meeting of
delegates representing the high con-
tracing parties, of meetings at more
frequent intervals of an executive
council and of a permanent interna-
tional secretariat.'
This" means only that when the
high contracting parties wish to take
joint action, 1t is to be taken through
such meetings. This does not vest
these bodies with ppower, except as 1t