New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-12-14

coma the depressing effect on the
morale Of the enemy Of this demonstra-
ton Of our ability to organize large
American force and drive it success
fully through his defenses. 1t gave
our troops implicit confidence in their
superiority and raised their morale
to the highest pitch. For the first time
garded as impa ssable barriers. and open
warfare training, which had been so
urgently insisted upon, proved to be
the correct doctrine. Our divisions
concluded the attack with such small
losses and in such Nigh spirits that
without the usual rest they were i'm
mediately available for employment in
heavy fighting in O new theater of op-
erations. The strength of the First
Army in this battle totaled approx
mately 100000 men, of whom about
10000 were French"
Without pausing to recuperate the
now veteran divisions, Pershing swung
them to the east and prepared for the
portance Of which he beloved to be
Second to mono on the Western
'front.'" for SHOULD this system (of
supply through edan-Mezieres] be cut
before the enemy could withdraw his
forces through the narrow neck be-
tween Mezisrcs and the Dutch frontier,
the ruin Of his armies in France and
Belgium would be complete"
Front deliberately Fortified
The entire frontal zone was "elab-
orately fortified" consisting of practi-
cally continuous series of positions
twenty kilometers or more in depth
and strengthened, moreover, by the
natural features Of the terrain. The
story of the hand-to-hand struggle
which ensued is told dispassonately
by the report, which says continuous
fighting was maintained along the en-
tire battle 'front.'" with "the enemy
contesting every foot Of our front, "
but by the end Of October 1.-The enemy''s
deliberately prepared positions, includ
ing the Hindcnburg Line. in our front
had been broken; the almost impassa-
bic Argonne Forest was in our hands;
an advance Of twenty-one kilometers
had been effected, 1850 prisoners, 370
cannon, 900 machine guns and mass
Of material captured: and the great
railway artery through Carignan to
Sedan was now seriously threatencd."
With the enemy gradually breaking
| before him, Pershing found that his
own reserves were beginning to show
the effects of the terrific attrition
After careful review Of the situation,
the report recites that the decision
on the theory that the enemy divisions
were suffering even more.
"Once q German division was en-
gagged in the fight it was practically
impossible to effect its relief" the
general says.
Batter Way to Sedan
From November / to three Ameri-
can army corps battered their way to
Sedan, and, to quote the official record
"By the 7th the right of the Sd Corps
had exploited its river crossing to a
distance of ten kilometers east of the
Mouse, completely ejecting the enemy
from the wooded heights and driving
him out into the swampy plain of the
Woevre; the 9Th and 1st corps had
reached the line of the Meuse River
along their respective fronts, and the
left Of the latter corps held the heights
dominating Sedan, the ategical goal
of the Meuse-Argonne operation, forty.
one kilometers from our point of de-
parture on November l. We had cut
tions. Recognizing that nothing but q
cessation Of hostilities could save his
armies from complete disaster he ap-
| pealed for an immediate armistice on
November 6.
Meanwhile, general plans had been
prepared for the further employment
of American forces in an advance be-
tween the Mouse and the Moselle, to be
directed toward Longwy by the 1st
Army, while the I'd Army was to as
sumo the offensive toward the Briey
Iron Basin. Orders directing the pre-
paratory local operations involved in
this enterprise were issued on Novem-
Der 5.
Between the 7th and 10th of Novem-
b"r the Sd Corns continued it's advance