The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1919-10-14
Berlin's Dual Aim.

CONSEQUENTLY lTOI1 Tic bGklHllUA,
Berlin chung to the double aim of urging
on hesitant Austria to prompt and en-
ergetic action on the one hand, and
of 'localizing" the conflict on the other.
In case the Serbian answer was un-
satisfactory, as was expected, Austria
was to insist upon reparation by march
ing into Serbia and Bulgaria was to be
allowed to take part in the military OPP
creations. At the same time everything
possible was to be done to prevent h
spread of this circumscrlbed Balkan
war.
l have alerady described how the Ber-
lin foreign office was aware of the fact
that the entente had urged Belgrade to
yield and how on July 25, 1914, Serbia
accepted the Austrian demands In the
main, and proposed to negotiate certain
clauses. Even in the face Of this Beth
mann Hollweg persisted In the fanclful
dream that on no account would the
entente fight over the Serbian question.
At this time ! was in Tarasp. My i'm
| mediate wish was to return to Berlin,
but the chancellor, over the telephone,
requested me to remain where l was
on the grounds that my return to duty
4 would only make the situation more
acute. I knew that to return without
authority would not do at that time,
and despite my instructive feeling that
the situation was more acute than those
in power suspected, inc my Tears that
slumbering England might be aroused
to -. a desire Sor : f f0T Tay: | Io Tsmsihs NV az inf t@.
nation regarding developments came
chiefly through the foreign office,
whose reports almost convinced me that
no one Of the great powers would be
willing to take the responsibility OF
starting a world war.
We had for years been accustomed to
such periods Of tension in Europe, and
nothing had ever come from them, Bue-
low had always remained master OF the
situation and armed conflict had been
avoided. II was the further straininE
of the situation after the delivery of
the ultimatum, and especially the news
of the return of our fleet to home wa
ters that determined me, on advice from
my own bureau, to return to Berlin
without orders. l arrived there July ~.
EDITORS Note.-Light is shed on this
attitude of the chancellor by the re-
Won Persius, the German naval expert.
He states that at the outbreak OF the
war there already was a cabal composed
OF members of the reichstag mill
tary commanders to overthrow the poll
cies of Won Tirpitz, the latters naval
program not suiting them from imam
cial considerations. Though Ilrpltz
does not openly say so, the inference Is
drawn that the chancellor was a party
to this.)
I then learned that both Hollweg and
Sir Edward Grey had made mediatory
proposals. In fairness TO the ~chancel-
Tor I must say that although he mis-
managed the situation badly, his sin
| cere wish was for peace. He had re-
/ newed negotiations with Russia which
| had been at a standstill owing to q mis-
| understanding on the part OF Russia
and he had sought to restrain Vienna
/ after the refusal of the Serbian an
T. swer and finally had drawn UP a me-
| diatory proposal which defined the mill
| tsry occupation of Serbia as merely a
| temporary guarantee of the fulfiliment
| of the pledges subscribed to by Serbia.
Germany's Error Brought War
Flow then, with so much honest en-
| deavor in the interest OF peace, was
that peace brokenr
war came because of Germany's fun
| damentally erroneous belief in the en-
| tante's desire for peace at all costs, par
ticularly in the case q England, which
ishment of Serbia could be made a
purely local matter.
The continuance of these false beliefs
weakened our diplomacy which was al
ready puerile.
on the day before ! reached Berlin,
been received from Sir Edward Grey
suggesting that England. Germany
France and Italy should combine to
undertake mediation Of the Serbian
question. The chancellor failed to rec
ognize the opportunity this offered, Just
as he had failed to recognize the value
of the Serbian answer.
Editors Note.-Sir Edward Grey on
July 26 cabfed an identical note to Sir
F. BERTHE, British ambassador at Paris;
Sir H. Rumbold, who was sounding the
German and Russian chancellories at
that time, and Sir r; Rodd, British am
bassador at Rome. in which he asked
whether the various foreign ministers
would be willing to Join France, Italy,
Germany and Great Britain to confer In
London and discover an ISSUE. which
would prevent complications. He add
ed that pressure he should be brought tc
hear to prevent military operations
nending The result of the conference. Ir
separate cablegram to Ambassador
Rertie. Grew placed special stress or
the French position. saying 1T is i'm
portant to know If France will abide by
the suggested action OF the four powers
If necessary.)
regard to the English conference pro.
possls because experience had showr
that Germany was always at a dis
advantage in a conference of the powerj
because of England's maritime suprem
acy which could always be counted upoi
to sway the opinions Of the other con
ferees,
At this moment, however, the Euro
pean "~Arcopagus." as Bethmann Gale,
it, should not have been refused. /
presented the only possibility Of stil
avoiding a world war. The chancello
could have accepted Grey's proposal Of
the condition that Austria be pernitte,
TO exact a pledge from Serbia, to whicl
condition on July so. Grey exprasse.
u htpaeaif willing IN accaJa InRfaad =