The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-11-28

of the Flanders battle. 1t had cost us
heavily.
| The main French effort took place at
| Verdun on August 90 and 81. The F1ith
army was not surprised. AS had oeen
provided for weeks beforehand, certain
areas. such as the Talou ridge, were
| abandoned in time. The assault. when
was not accompanied by tanks, again
penetrated far into our positions
on the left bank, close to the Mouse
one division had failed, nor had we
! been fortunate on the right bank; ana
vet both here and in Flanders every
| thing possible had probably been done
! to avoid failure. The 2lst and 26tn
| also brought success to the enemy and
loss TO US. (By their blows the French
won back the larger part of the terri
tory east of the Mouse which they had
! lost in the Werdun battlesD
FRENCH AGAIN ABLE TO STRlkE
The French army was once more
| capable of the offensive. 1t had quick
! Nv overcome its depression. Just at
| this time the statesmen in Paris put
forward peace conditions which did not
accord with the military situation.
The costly August battles in FLANDERS
and at verdun imposed a heavy strain
on the western troops. In spite of all
the concrete protection they seemed
| more or less powerless under the enor-
nous weight of the enemy's artillery
| At some points they no longer dis
PLAYED that firmness which !, in com
! mon with the local commanders, had
! hoped for
The enemy contrived to adapt him
| self to our method of employing
counter attack divisions. There were
no more attacks with unlimited objec-
tive. such as General Nivelle had made
! in the Aisne- Champagne battle. He
was ready for our counter-attacks. and
| prepared for them by exercising re-
! straint in the exploitation of success
In other directions. of course. TINS
suited us very well.
I myself was being put to terrible
strain The state of affairs In the
west appeared to prevent the execu-
ton of our plans elsewhere. Our
| wastage had cen so high as to cause
grave misgiving. and had exceeded all
lexpectation. The attack on the Dvina
had TO be postponed repeatedly. In
deed it became a question whether
we could continue to bear the response
bility of retaining those divisions IN
the east.
CHIEFS OF STAFFS WORRIED
The Crown Prince was not alone n
his anxiety; several chiefs of staff OF
very cool Judgment shoot their heads
But in estimating the strength of our
enemies | always said to myself that
in this war the only alternatives were
! victory or defeat that their determine
ton to destroy us made any inter-
mediate solution impossible. In spite
OF all, I was convinced that the west
front would stand even more Datter
ing, though fate might have even
greater trials in store for 1t. rms was
another case where human wisdom
| failed.
General headquarters allowed the
| Dvina attack, from which 1t expected
] great results owing to the proximity
of Petrograd, to proceed although IL
] did not intend to push it very 1ar.
| From the purely strategical point Oh
view it was merely intended as means
to a whole Improvement or our posi-
ton which would enable us to econo-
, mize troops.
| The operations in the east continued
lin september. The bridgehead of
Jacobstadt (south of Riga was cap
| tured on the 21st by a powerful and
| we'll planned attack. 1t was to be roll
lowed by the capture of the Islands
| of Osel, Moon and Dago cat the mouth
of the Gulf of Riga. This would re-
| ouire one division and a brigade of
cyclists, which were temporarily with.
| drawn from the coast of Flanders.
The operation had beere in prepara-
| ton in conjunction with the navy
since the middle of September. At the
end of the month the fleet. transports
and landing force were ready at
! Libau. owing to unfavorable winds
) the execution of the landing was also
, delayed until the middle of October,
| The postponement of the operation
against Italy and the attack on the
! islands until the middle and end Of