New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1919-11-23
Afterthoughts

Senator Hitchcock says he is
strongly in favor of compromise
now. Why wasn't he strongly in
favor of it when the treaty was
before the Senate in committee of
the VIII Die and compromise was in
order nd thoroughly practicable?
The Nebraska Senator expresses a
regret strangely at odds with his
attitude during the long treaty
struggle.
What was the main obstacle to an
agreement on form of ratification
which could have been supported by
sixty-four Senators? Looking back
most fair minded men will agree
that it was Mr.. Hitchcock or the
principal whose agent he was.
Nearly every member of the mild
reservationist group has testified
that the Democratic leader wouldn't
discuss compromise with them. He
took the stand originally that rati-
fcation should be unconditional. He
banked on the success of President
Wilson'S appeal to the nation.
Many Republicans, opposed to
sending the treaty back to the peace
conference. joined in defeating
amendments. These Republicans
were also willing to join with Mr..
Hitchcock in holding the reserva-
tons down to minimum and civ
ing them a conciliatory tone. With
their aid rejection of the preamble
could have been secured. In August,
or even in September, he could have
formed an alliance with the mild
reservationists to control the parlia
mentary situation and to present a
ratification resolution which would
have had the support of majority,
perhaps of a two-thirds majority.
But, under orders, he persistently
refused to show his hand. What
was the limit of concession on the
reservation to Article X? Mr.. Hitch
cock was impenetrable on that point.
He finally offered a substitute for
the committee reservation which diff
Tered from the committee text only
IN phrasing. But he wouldn't admit
that he would vote for ratification
If his substitute were accepted.
The position of the minority
throughout was elusive. That was
due to the fact that Mr.. Hitchcock
and his followers were not acting on
their own responsibility as Senators,
but were following instructions from
the White House. They were not
free agents, qualified as such to go
into conference with the Republican
mild reservationists. Anything they
did on their own account was likely
to be countermanded by the Presi-
dent The mild reservationists were
soon made to realize that they
couldn't negotiate on even terms
with the minority. They could COM
nit themselves definitely on any
proposition, but Mr.. Hitchcock
couldn't. So they turned inevitably
10 the strong Republican reserva
@~Onists to effect their compromises
The minority was thus compelled by
Its own ineffective leadership to take
the resolution of ratification as i
: was perfected or leave it.
Mr.. Hitchcock now talks of com
promise. But the majority of thu
friends of the treaty have put them
selves clearly on record. The mi
norlty has not. 1t must expect t.
concede more than it would hav'
mad to concede in the earlier stage
OF the discussions. An agreemen
need not be despaired of. Yet it cal
De obtained only if the minority free
itself from dependence on outsid
Judgments. Until the Democrat
Senators begin to speak and act TO
themselves there will be little hop
OF that union of forces which vii
make ratification possible.