davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
Brifain's Long
Indulgence

Balm realized--long after it was too
late-that German sea power had been
only peace-time fction-a matter of in
diligence on the part of Great Britain
The British were exceedingly tolerant Of
German rivalry. This "folly," as Ballin
called it, was not due to any real con-
sideration for Germany. 1t was only
phase of British f-complacency. The
average British merchant had no aver
sion to using German freight carriers. He
was willing to buy cheaper German
goods and sell them at home and abroad
under his own labnls There was no
consciousness at all in Great Britain of
a German peril The British public
still put implicit faith in the diplomacy
of Beaconsheld, the cardinal principle of
which was to combat the influence and
ambitions of Russia. German ambitions
were not taken seriously
The self-deception Of many British
Statesmen about German purposes was
extraordinary. Even down to August,
1914, leaders like Lord Haldane and
Sir Edward Grey seemed unable to i'm
agine that Germany would not alone pro-
woke European war, but would draw
Great Britain into it. 1t was because
of this singular fatuity that the British
had to enter the war so deplorably un-
prepared.
The Kaiser and his advisers may have
had some cause to think that British
politicians would continue complacent
while Germany was building up pow
erful navy in addition to a prosperous
merchant marine. But they misread his
tory and misjudged the British char
acter when they assumed that Great
Britain would ever tolerate the use Of
the German navy to destroy the French
feet and to seize the French Channel
ports. Such a challenge to their own
naval superiority in Western European
waters the British people would GER.
tainly meet, whatever their pacifist
politicians thought. SO the creation of
German navy strong enough to de-
stroy French seapower inevitably paved
the way to war with Great Britain
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
The Surrender
Off Scotland

But this author, characteristicallv
obsequious, automatically gids the pill
by adding: "The World War affords in
controvertible proof that Germany must
for all time to come maintain her claim
to sea power. We need not at present
discuss by what means this aim is to be
achieved"
Empty and melancholy words, Hard
iy more than a year after they were
written the greater part of the German
high seas fleet was steaming across
the North Sea to surrender to the AL
lies, and the German U-boats, the onlv
units in the German navy which were
able to keep the seas and to inhict real
losses on the enemy, were being turned
over en- naasse to the victors The Ger
man navy struck its flag in November.
1918, without even fighting to save ap-
pearances. 1t was a fitting end to a
preposterous military experiment.
But no one in Germany ever foresaw
the tragic ceremony off the Firth Of
Forth. The strategists of the General
Staff, who should have subordinated
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
Herr BaIlin'S
Confession

More than ever | must admit that
every increase in our wealth. every sue
cess of our enterprises in the years pre-
cedng the war, were due to our relations
with the British Empire It's ports, it's
dominions and its coloQes were largely
opened to our fleets and our merchants
| have often been astonished at that
generosity, which I even regarded as
folly. Can one suppose that we shall
ever restore those old relations?
Owe aspire to recover our overseas
commerce. On that prospect we build the
fondest hopes. But how can we recover
it in the face Of Anglo Saxon unity,
which hates, and ought to hate, our very
presence? Do our imbeciles of chauvin-
lists take account Of the fact that we
haven't even a port where our ships can
dock or where they can receive a friend
ly greeting?
"Dover Falmouth and Southampton,
Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria, Alden,
the Persian Gulf, Bombay, Colombo,
Singapore and Hongkong - what are
they? English arsenals, naval bases,
coaling stations, docks where we shall
not even dare to show our faces, if Eng
land forbids us to do SO.
at is the same all around the CONT
nent of Africa. 1t is the same in the West
Indies. 1t is the same in the Pacific We
have not single coaling station, not a
single dock, where we can repair our
vessels
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26

everything to securing Germany's Con-
tlnental position, were silent while Ad-
mlral Won Tirpitz pursued for two dec
AIDES or more his task of fitting Ger
many for that future" on the seas of
which William II had boasted.
Tirptz was, in a military sense, Ger
many's chief evil genius A promoter
and politician rather than seaman. he
worked for his own glorification and
that of his caste. He won the conf
dence of the pan Germans and the Junk
ers, who saw in his schemes ONLY an
other easy way of boosting German
military expenditures He spent mill
ions of marks organizing navy leagues
IN the interior Of the empire and car
rylng back-district delegations to Ham
burg and Bremen, where they were
feted and infected with the big navy
propaganda. He had the support of the
big industrials and the exporting in
terests and became in time one of the
"uncrowncd kings of the Prussian
state, like Krupp, Thyssen, Heyde-
brand, Ballin and Rathenau.
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
Submarine
LaWfeSSI1ess

But Tirpitz was to involve Germany
IN still more costly military blunders.
his surface fleet was swept from the
ocean in the first months of the war.
He found accidentally in the submarine
an offensive weapon worth vastly more
than his battleships and cruisers. Yet
the use he made Of the U-boat was
senseless and disastrous. Smarting at
the failure of his surface vessels to
hold the seas, he resolved to drive all
other surface shipping off them. 1t was
grandiose idea. Had Tirpitz succeed
ed he would have won the war He
would have won the war equally if he
had been able to carry through his
original plan to create a surface navv
strong enough to cope with Great Brit
aims.
But both these ideas were fallacious.
And the failure Of the second scheme
entalled more fatal consequences than
the failure of the first one. Germany
still had chance to win a European
war after Great Britain had Joined
France and Russia But she had no
chance at all to win a world war into
which she had dogged the United States
by persisting in her unrestricted U-boat
operations. Tirpitz had his sufficient
warning of the perils of high sea mur
der when he sank the Lusitania and
raised moral and legal issue with the
United States. But nothing could deter
him. Ee had become more than ever
visionary and q gambler. So, after
contemptuously parleying for nearly
two years with Washington, he began
war of piracy against all neutral shin
ping. This madness arrayed against
Germany power even more formidable
than Great Britain When reluctant
America was converted into a belliger
ent Germany's last chance of victory
disappeared.
The German public was slow to recog
nl2e the fatal effects of Won Tirpitz's
naval policy. But long befQre the end
of the war the Kaiser found it advisable
to make a show of sacrificing him to
popular discomfort He was sidetracked
though the continuing effects of his
blunders could not be sidetracked.
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
"Der Tag"
ln1pudenCe

If Germany intended to be a real sea
power she would therefore have to count
on locking horns, sooner or later, with
the British. The officers of the German
fleet knew this. They had their toast,
Der Tag" meaning the day when they
expected to take Great Brtan's meas
ure on the seas. That sort of thing was
magnificently impudent But it was
not war A competent general staff
would have vetoed as fantastic and sui
cidal the proposition to take Great Brit
ain on as an additional enemy. And
such veto should have stood, whatever
its effect on the Kaiscr's inflated naval
and colonial programme.
But after the elder Moltke's death
German military policy became con-
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
No Famine
In Germany

Reports of alarming food shortages
in the Central states filled the Allied
press in 1915, 1916 and 1917. They
were gross eXaggerations, intended to
keep up the spirit of the Allied publics.
After 1917 people ceased to put any
faith in them. Hunger would not have
brought Germany to her knees in the
fall Of 1913 or broken the Teuton CO.
alitioD if American man power had not
arrived in Europe and the German ar
mics had not been decisively beaten in
Champagne, Picardy, Artois and Flan-
ders.
The Allied blockade failed to starve
Germany into submission, although it
caused the enemy much annoyance and
discomfort. Allied sea power was also
unequal in preventing the attainment
of what should have been Germany's
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
Giving Hostages
To Fortune

What the, Kaiser and his advisers
could not see was that their overseas
expansion ran counter to true German
military policy. If Germany was going
TO pursue the Prussian tradition of mill
eary conquest, her energies should have
been concentrated for use along the lines
OF least resistance. Her natural enemies
were France and Russia Eastern and
Middle Europe were marked out bv nat.
ure for Teuton exploitation. To seek
power and territory beyond the seas was
only to give unnecessary hostages to
fortune. For Germany could not expect
20 become a great colonizing nation. tn
maintain worldwide carving trade
and, above all, TO build first class navy.
without exciting the distrust and hos
tihty Of Great Britain. And in a Euro-
pean war in which Great Britain sided
with Germany's enemies the latter's
colonies would fall, her foreign trade
would be suppressed and her navy would
De either blockaded or extinguished.
oversea expansion could not but
weaken Gcrmany's military position. II
necessarily introduced and stimulated
pacifist tendencies within militar;stic
state The more intelligent and practical
leaders in the upbuilding of the German
merchant marine could not but realize
that Cermany's future on the seas de-
pended absolutely on the retention Of
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
Tirpitz the
Promoter

Arrogant, lmperious and narrow
minded, he bestrode Germany like an
uncouth colossus. A neutral traveller
gave this glimpse of him in the latter
part of the war A train ovcrcrowdea
with women, children and wounded sol
dlers is travelling from one German
town to another. The disabled and suf-
ferlng pack the compartments and the
alsles At one stopping place spa
clous, locked compartment is opened
and Won Tirpitz issues alone-obese.
whlskered, gorgeously uniformed and
baughtily rigid. What was the comfort
of any one else on that train comnared
with his comfort?
Tirpitz had his secret naval appro-
prlatlons and his secret building pro-
gramme. But there are no inviolablc
secrets in a matter like naval construc-
ton. The German navy, as planned by
him, was soon to overtakc and mass
every other navy, except Great Brit
aims. The British government remained
apathetIc for a long time. But the
point was eventually reached when the
British standard of naval superiority
"a fleet equal to that of any two other
powers-was threatened bv German
construction
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26

fused and unstable The Kaiser's er-
ratio influence was all-pervasive He
was an enthusiastic yachtsman He
was big stockholder in the Ham
burg-American and North German
Lloyd companies. He wanted to create
a tinsel colonial empire. He was eager
to pose as war lord on the quarterdecks
of battleships as we'll as at the head of
divisions and armies. There is nothing
to show that the general staff tried seri-
ously to dissuade him from his mad ad-
venture on the high seas-an advent
ure which could only dissipate German
resources and weaken Germany's high
ly advantageous military position
The military leaders humored the
whims of the All Highest, whether from
choice or from necessity.
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
Bismarck Disdained
Oversee Empire

The illusion of German sea power took
root in the brains of the post-Bis-
marckians The Great Chancellor al
ways trod the solid ground. He cared
nothing for oversee colonies. He en-
couraged France to go into Tuns in
1881. He was glad to see the French COM
mitted to policy of colonial expansion
in Northern Africa He believed that
the acquisition of Tunis would help to
reconcile France to the loss of Alsace-
Lorraine. He also foresaw that the eX-
tension of French power on the southern
coast of the Mediterranean would in
cense Italy and drive her into an al
lance with Germany and Austra-H Hun
gary. But for himself he coveted no
colonial establishments no place in
the sum for Germany beyond the limits
of the European continent
William II brusquely elbowed Bis
marck off the stage and broke melo-
dramatically with all the Bismarckian
traditions. With q showman's instincts
he turned to new ideas Of imperial policy.
Sea power was one of these. Germany
was to enter the race for overseas trade
and dominions She was to have great
merchant marine, great navy and new
found African and Asiatic colonies.
German industry, making enormous
strides under the protection of a semi
socialized government, responded eagerly
to the new foreign programme. Ger
many. producing cheaply had goods to
sell, and a subsidized German merchant
marine sprang up to carry them to all
parts Of the world. Dependencies were
acquired in regions not yet preempted
by other colonlzing powers. The German
flag was raised over the Cameroons,
German West Africa, Togoland, German
East Africa, New Guinea, Samoa, Kiao-
chau and the Marshall Islands. France
was badgered into surrendering a part
OF French West Africa in return for
quitclaim in Morocco. The creation of a
modern navy followed the rapid and
profitable development of the two great
German sea transportation companies
the Hamburg American and North Ger
man Lloyd
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
Afraid to Cross
The Kaiser

Within the High Command, as With
in every other governmental BODY,
there was no true freedom of opinion.
Only as late as 1917 did German mill
tary experts begin to feel little free
dom in discussing the gigantic blunder
OF German naval policy. In his DE
ductions from the World War" pub
lished in that year of German military
good fortune, Lieutenant General Baron
Won Freytag Loringhoven, deputy chief
of the German General Staff, INDUCES
IN these cautiously skeptical reflections:
This is not the place to examine
how far, in view of the all too rapid
growth of her trade, world politics and
world economics may have been prema-
ture IN the case of Germany, inasmuch
as our continental position was still bv
no means assured. Here Rancke's words
are applicable: Who can control cir
cumstances, calculate future events.
govern the surging of the elements? ."
This is veiled way of saying that
William lis venture in sea power was a
disastrous misjudgment. Won Frevtag-
Loringhoven also says: CAS- the result
OF our geographical position it will al
ways remain our task to form a lust es
innate of the opposing demands Of
world economics in the narrower sense
and of oversee and Continental poll
tics"
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
Outside N ahan's
Theory

Her case fell outside the scope of
Admiral Mahan's theory that sea power
is the necessary adjunct of empire She
needed merely enough warships to keep
control of the Baltic and to assist her
land operations against the Baltic PROV
inces, Finland and the Petrograd dis
trlct. The Baltic was closed by mines
against the British fleet The Black
Sea was closed by the Dardanelles forts.
Germany could therefore proceed in
the East without any fear of hostile in
reference from Allied sea power.
Many writer's have asserted that AL
lied sea power defeated Germany. But
this claim entirely overlooks what the
Germans went out of their way to do
to defeat themselves 1t is true that
control Of the sea made possible the
transportation Of the American armies
to France; and American man power
turned the scale in land fighting against
Germany. But Germany would never
have been obliged to fight the United
States if she had had the sagacity to
pursue military policy dictated by her
own strategical necessities and limita.
tons
The blockade, conducted with ever in
creasing rigor, greatly hampered the
Teuton allies. But they had no reason
to expect anything different And they
were in nothing like the desperate stu
alton in which the Confederate states
found themselves from 1861 to 1865.
Germany was self-supporting, so far as
the manufacture Of war material was
concerned. She had enough for her
purposes. There was shortage in food
after 1915. But the Teuton people were
never near the starvation point The
armies were always sufficiently sup
Piled and lost nothing in fighting power
by reason of shortened rations. And
Germany constantly extended her terri
torial conquests, finally getting posses
sion of the rich grain lands of Rumania
and the Ukraine.
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
BuiIded for
Defeat, Not Victory

But Germany entered the war with no
clear idea of using the strength of her u
boat squadrons as an offset to the weak
ness of her surface feet. The develop
ment of the submarine was an after
thought. Tirpitz lavished hundreds OF
millions of marks on battleships and bat
tie cruisers. With these he intended to
make the North Sea a German lake-jus-
tifying the nomenclature of the old geo.
graphers, who used to call it the German
Ocean.
He overlooked the fact that in surface
sea fighting under modern conditions IN
feriority is fatal. A weaker army, fa-
vored by accidents of position, may easily
defeat stronger army But on the sea
there is no advantage of position The
inferior squadron or fleet rarely wins and
is always lucky to escape destruction. on
Jutland the German navy was clearly
beaten, though low visibility conditions
allowed it to slink back to port. It's next
appearance in the open was for the pur-
pose of surrendering.
Tirpitz had builded for defeat, not for
victory. His naval policy was radically
wrong. Sea power.i long, slow growth.
And of all the belligerent nations of the
first rank Germany was the least quail
fed in military sense to engage in
war at sea. Her future lay elsewhere
And she would probably have made it Sc
cure if she had only followed from the
beginning the modest but adequate naval
policy of Austria Hungary, her Lightly
esteemed neighbor and ally.
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
Sea Power Didn't Win War; Futile Dream of Sea
Surrender Of German Fleet Fitt;nc
Climax OF Mistaken Naval
Policy

ence to Herr Won Bethmann-H Hollweg ap-
plies still better to Herr Won Tirpitz: /
believe that never has minister done
his country graver injury than he"
Germany lost the war, therefore, be-
cause she had handicapped herself with
naval power and then misemployed it.
Had she had no navy or only a moder-
ate sized coast defence navy she might
not have had to fight Great Britain at
all. She certainly would never have
had to fight the United States And
since her true field of conquest was in
Eastern and Southeastern Europe, The
lack of navy could have made no DIFF
ference whatever in her offensive
strength
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
British Suspicion
Aroused

Great Britain finally protested and
began negotiations with Germany for a
mutual limitation of building pro
grammes. The German Admiralty
backed and filled, protesting innocencc
of any intention to challenge British
sea power. But no limitation agree
ment was ever reached. Thereafter
Great Britain and Germany became no.
tentlal enemies. However tinped with
pacifism the Asquith- Haldane- Grew gov
ernment might be, however slight at
tentlon it might pay to Lord Roberts's
appeals for military preparation, Brit
lsh dlstrust of German naval ambitions
had been aroused. Tirpitz had made it
impossible for Great Britain to remain
spectator in any European war which
Germany should precipitate.
German indignation when Great Brit
ain joined France and Russia in 1914
was therefore petulant and insincere.
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26

primary strategical aim. That was Tho
conquest and absorption of Russia
The Allied fleets faltered at the Dsr
danelles in March, 1915. The Black So.
was never entered by French and British
warships until after the armistice w.s
signed.
Control of the sea enabled the Allies
to deliver war material to the Russian
armies through Kola, Archangel ava
Vladlvostok. But the difficulties of land
transportation from these ports to tba
eastern fighting front had still to bs
overcome. They were successfully over
come only for short period in 1916
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
Captain PerSius's S
Verdict

Even naval officers and critics turned
against him. Captain Persius was the
falrest and most competent of the Ger
man writers on naval affairs. He had
been booster of the big navy idea
and of unrestricted submarine warfare.
But he was finally disilusioned enough
TO write IN the "Berliner Tageblatt'
Herr Won Tirpitz may be assured that
all attempts to cover over his guilt will
mlserably fail. The German people will
some day have a clear understanding Of
the situation and then it will realize
that the phrase which Kammerherr Won
Oldenberg-J g-Janutschau used with refer
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26

The violation of Belgian neutrality fur
nished the Asquith government with a
welcome moral issue on which to re-
verse it's own policy of sluggish non
concern. But even without the Bel
gian perfdy Great Britain would have
been obliged to enter the war Her
own security compelled her to accept
the opportunity offered to end the grow
ing menace of German naval power.
New-York tribune., 1919-01-26
Secondary Effects
OF Blockade

Won Freytag- -LOrlnghoven saws verr
justly of the military effects of tb.
blockade:
Inc consequences of the blockade to
which the Central Powers were sinh.
Jected made themselves felt at once Al
though we have succeeded by our own
might in developing and carrying on our
economic life during the war. none tbo
less the disadvantages of our econor;.
position in the world have made Them.
selves felt all the time. They alone ey.
PLAIN the fact that new opportunities %
resistance constantly revealed themselves
to our opponents, because the sea was
open to them and that victories which
formerly would have been absolutely do.
clsive and the conquest of whole king
doms still brought us no nearer IN
peace. Thus was Russia able to recover
from the severe defeats of the summer
of 1915, and to attack once more in the
following year with newly equipped
armies''
But Brusiloff's Galician offensive Of
1916 was the last flash in the pan Of
Russian fighting power Allied control
of the sea could not check the Russian
dlslntegration. 1t could not prevent the
elimination of Russia as a belligerent
And to hold Russia in line was the chief
ann of Entente strategy, until the United
States came in to replace Russia. Sea
power was therefore an important con-
trlbutlng element to Allied strength. But
1t could never have decided the war in
the Entente's favor if the war had re-
tanned its strictly European character.
The development of the submarine has
greatly complicated the problem of the
sea strategists. There is some talk among
them of trying to get the Paris peace
conference to pat ban on the sub
marine But it would be Just as reason
able to try to put a prohibition on the
use of long distance guns of the Big
Bertha" type, or of bombing airplanes.
All these instruments of destruction rem
der more or less precarious the guaran-
tees thrown about the lives Of non-com-
batants by the rules of civilized war as
they existed before 1914 But the char
acter of war itself has changed. 1t has
become more terrible. 1t has now been
so intensified as to obscure the old dis
tinctions between combatants and non-
combatants. Armies no longer fight
armies; nations fight nations.
If wars are to continue it would be
against human nature and against all
military experience to expect bellgerents
to forego the use of any of the means Of
destroying the power of the enemy which
this war has developed So the U-boats
will undoubtedly remain a highly dis
turbing factor in naval warfare and sur
face fleets will have to fight for existence
against the giant submarines of the
future. This wars effects on sea power
will probably be more revolutionary than
its effects on land power. The weaker
sea powers may be benefited, relatively
at the expense of the stronger.