The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1919-09-15
by EUGENE j. YOUNG
Var Editor of the New York World

by EUGENE j. YOUNG
War Editor of the New York World
Ludendorff admits that his drive be-
ginning March 81, had left him in
strategical situation by no means fav
orable" He had recaptured the region
he had 50 carefully devastated the
year before and not much else. Both
which were serious threats to the
great salient he had created
After the break in the British lines
the French rushed troops from Verdun
and the Champagne and made certain
of a hold on the forest region north of
Paris and the Massif of Lassigny,
southwest of Noyag. They also held
, part of the great st. Gobain forest
region to the southwark of La Fere.
From these strongholds they could
launch attacks against the long flank
of the German 18th army between
Montdidier and Noyon.
Ludendorff therefore, had to decide
at once on sacrifice of some of the
reserves of men and munitions he so
sorely needed. He had to drive the
/ French from the vicinity of La Fere
before they could gather troops for
counter attack. This he did, establish
ing a new front on the line of the diff
ficult Oise-Aisne canal, which tanks
could not readily cross. The effort as
French reports showed at the time was
costly
To the northward Byngs British
| army, although it's right wing had re-
| tired to keep the line with the beaten
| troops to the south, still held the hill
positions in the neighborhood of Arras
experience the year before what an
attack from Arras might mean, for the
that we could keep to the time pro-
posed, In order to go over all the pre-
liminary artillery work. Colonel Bruch-
muller had been sent to the Sixth army
AS early as July 1917, he had ar
| ranged the employment of the artillery
| in the break through East Galicia. and
! Mt the time of the attack in Marcn he
was artillery general at the Eighteenth
army headquarters, (This was the az
| my that broke through when othess
falAed.) His great knowledge and ca
! pacity his devotion to his profession
| and his army, and his military enthusi-
asm marked him out as one of the
most prominent soldiers of this war.
His suggestions had already formed the
| groundwork for the employment of the
| artillery on March 21.
! ONE REASON FOR FAILURE
| The artillery of the Eighteenth army
was completely imbued with his spirit.
| This, added to the fact that it struck
| the eakest point in the enemy's line,
| contributed greatly to the fine success
| of that army. The Seventeenth army,
! which, moreover, had the strongest
| enemy in front of it, worked on SINH
/ lar principles, but the vitalizing energy
| which emanated from Colonel Brush =
muller was lacking
This is another instance of the de-
cisive influence of personality on the
! course of events in war; as in life gen
| orally. Grand headquarters had not
only to reckon with the enemy. but also
with the personal qualities of the men
lwho were striving for the same object
| with the samedevotion.
| Colonel Bruchmuller inspected the
preliminary arrangements and reported
that all was in order. On the morn
ing of April g. the attack at first went
ahead very well. The reports which
came in up till noon were favorable
| This was a different birthday to the
one I had passed the year before. the
day of the heavy defeat at Arras.
| His majesty listened to the report
on the military situation at Avesnes
and stayed to lunch. He remembered
me in a few words, and also my two
dead sons. and presented me with an
iron statute of himself by Bentzner
3" '"0yE NINDRANCE
In the afternoon the attack seemed
to progress more slowly. The GROUND
was still soft in places and this made
it very difficult to bridge the enemy's
trench systems The direction of the
roads was not favorable to that of oul
q nd +h n 70 OH Of Nt
had employed had proved hindrance
1t took long time to get up guns ant
ammunition. The country was close
and this enabled the enemy's machine
gun posts to delay our infantry con.
siderably.
In the evening we were ADVANCING
toward Armentieres, had reached th'
Lys and were approaching the Lave
In the direction of Bethune we made
little progress. On the left, at Gil
venchv and Festubert. we were helc
up The result was not satisfactory
On April 10 the attack continued. blu
it only gained sufficient gGound~towart
Armentieres and across the Lys imme
| diately above Armentieres. Toward
Estaires, we did not penetrate fal
enough, but stuck fast in the Lys posi-
ton! towards the Lave also our pros
ress was but slight
The enemy's machine guns contin
ued to give our infantry muhc trouble
it should have grappled with them more
vigorously, as a general staff Officer
told me who had been sent up. Hut Il
wasted time looking for food.
The divisions fighting on this from
were not attack divisions in the asmt
sense as those that had gone into ac
| tion on the 21st of March. But OF
other battledfields the trench division.
did as good work as the so-called at,
tack divisions.
FRENCH DIVISIONS BALK HIM
On April II we took Armentieres. To,
ward Bailleul the rate of advance was
better; Merville also fell. The day be-
| fore the left wi q of the Enurfh rrs, =