Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-02-12
Gradual Improvement.

Neither in October, 1914, nor in May
1916, Admiral Jellicoe says. did the
British margin of superiority justify
him in disregarding the enemy's tor
pedo fire. The situation gradually inn
proved after 1916, especially as the
light cruiser and destroyer forces
with the grand feet increased stead
iiy after the battle of Jutland, consid :
erabiy reducing the danger of sue
cessful torpedo attack, while the in
clusion of class K submarines made 1T
probable that the enemy would suffer
more severely from submarine attack
than the British.
Regarding 1918, Admiral Jellicoe
says:
stThe position was assured and we
could have afforded to take risks
which in 1915 would have been most
unwise. If the German fleet had come
out to battle, terrible punishment
awaited Them
One third of the admirafs book is
devoted to the battle of Jutland. In
summing up the lessons of the battle,
Admiral Jellicoe dwells upon "the dam
ger involved in leaving too much to
chance in fieet action because our fleet
was the one and only factor vital to
the existence of the empire and. in
deed, to the allied cause"
Had No Reserve.
: 1--WE had no reserve outside the bat
tie fleet which could IN anyway re-
place It ia the event sof disaster eor
even should it's margin OF supefforfty
be eliminated" the admiral continues.
Admiral Jeliicoe says he knew that
his ships were inadequately protected
with armor compared to the German
vessels Of the battle cruiser type, while
. n <>< TT
land was far better off in the number
of destroyers In addition the Ger
mans possessed "a most efficient ar
she'll" The admiral con-
tinues:
when the battle fleets approached
there was difference of reckoning
between the British battle fleet and
the battle cruiser squadrons, due to
the cruisers having been engaged for.
altered their course. Hence, instead
of being encountered right ahead. the
enemy appeared on the starboard
bow"
Instant action was necessary, the
admiral says. and he decided to de-
ploy on the port wing division. this
compelling the Germans to turn off
to starboard to avoid being crossed.
This maneuver, which has been de-
seribed as mastery by reviewers,
threw the enemy into complete con-
fusion. The German commander-in-
chief realized that his only hope lay
in escape. profiting by his superiority
in torpedo craft, low visibility, the
approach of darkness and the prox-
unity Of his bases and mine fields.
German Tactics Failed.
The enemy at this period fired hun
drA nf n 4. H.
GERS have since stated, Admiral Jelli-
eoe continues, and although the Ger
mans We're in the gravest rerii, the
position of the grand feet itself was
mer. aced by determined torpedo at
tack. in thick weather. But the Brit
ish feet by turning it's battle,Iine four
timer. during the action, the admiral
says, got clear of the torpedoes
which were racing toward the British
ships, and defeated the tactics upon
which the Germans based their hopes.
Admiral Jellicoe pays tribute to the
skill of his captains in handling their
ships and avoiding torpedoes and col
Iisions while keeping their positions
Admiral Je1licOe explains why he
did not seek night action. and refers
to the more powerful German search
lights. the superiority of the enemy
in destroyers and the greater number
of torpedo tubes fitted in the enemy
ships, giving the enemy an opportun-
ity of scoring heavily at the outset
of an action, the result of which
would always be matter of chance
After estimating the relative
strength of the two fleets early in
the war, Admiral Jeliicoe expresses
surprise that the Germans were so
cautious. and says:
..ff this country in the future de-
cides to rely for safety against raids
or inyasions on the feet alone. it is
essential that we possess a consider
ably greater margin of superiority
over a possible enemy in all classes
of vessels than we did in August,