Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-10-03

|
cross a high mountain range) the Bull
garian End and 3rd divisions offered
| no resistance; they simply surren-
dered the position. No other explana-
ton exists for the rapid advance of
, the entente troops over broken coun-
try, eminently suited for defense, hilly
| and even mountainous.
General Won Scholtz sought to bring
the BulGarians to stand on the sec
ond line by removing reserves up in
good time, but his hopes were not re-
allied, The End and Bird Bulgarian
divisions retreated, as if on definite
plan, without any show of resistance,
behind the Cerna in one direction and
behind the Nardar in another The
Bulgarian reserves. equal in strength
TO three German divisions, did not
fight at ALL
The German troops, which had re-
Gently been reinforced by battalions
from Rumania. could not close the
gap unaided. The northern descent to
the valley of the Vardar in the neigh
borhood of krivolac was open to the
entente. All further efforts to re-
organize and make stand failed. The
bulgarian army went home. Only
the Bulgarians incorporated in Ger
man forces between Lake Presba and
the Cerna behaved better for a time
Accuses U. S. Officials.
ON the 18th, or at the latest the
nth, General Lukow, in command of
the troops on the Struma, wired to the
Tsar (Ferdinand of Bulgaria) that he
must conclude an ar1nistice he could
not desert us publicly and throw him
self into the arms Of the entente too
soon.
few days after the 18th a secret
report of the French general staff fell
into my hands, which made it evident
that the French no longer expected
any resistance from the Bulgarian
army Entente propaganda and mon
oy and the United States representa-
tive, who had remained in Sofia. had
done their work. Gle again pays his
respects to Dominic |, Murphy, the
u. S. consul general, who sat tight
in Sofia" as Ludendorff puts it. de-
spite German protests He had great |
Influence with the Bulgarian cabinet |
in the crucial days and helped ar
range the armistice.)
In this instance again the entente |
had made a thoroughly good job of it, !
Possibly, too, Bolshevist influences |
rom Russia had crept in. Neither the
Isar nor our representative in Sofia
inew further of this. General Jekow
inew all about it, a few days before
he battle. which was known to he inn
'tnent he developed ear trouble, |
understand, and went to a clinic in
Jenna.
General Won scholtz and all the
Germans had done their utmost.
Where Germans We're in command !
he Bulgarian army held out. On the
fountain sector the Bulgarians re-
used to have German command
hey even went so far as to leave
divisional general there whom Gen
raj Won Scholz wished to have re-
loved because he did not trust him;
nd thev made numerous alterations +,
i personnel in that sector.
Denies He Broke Treaty.
The suggestion. put forward by the I
'ulgars to cloak their detection, that ,
was informed that soldiers councils ,
ad been formed among their troops, :
: untrue. 1t is equally untrue to say :
nat we had broken treaty obligation :
, leave six divisions on the Bulgarian Z
cont for this obligation was con- !
ned to the Serbian campaign of
915. q
When I came to CHG in August, +
BIG. there was about one division in q
Iacedonia The obligation must also :
ave lapsed on the formation of the
erman supreme military command 4
'r the quadruple alliance in Septem- /
err 1916. This supreme command y
Id not in any way neglect Bulgaria. Q
The forces opposed to each other Z
lere were of about equal strength IL
he Greek troops with the entente +
al had no military experience, and G
leir choice of sides was not based q
conviction. The Bulgarian army +
nd had long rest They had haq G
he opportunity to strengthen their
'rces, and ought rather to have help o
us in the west than to have sought .
d from us. .
We knew well that the Bulgarian =
my was, in fact, in bad state: but !,
ere was ground for the hone that il n
ould be able to withstand the attack r.
hich we expected, as. indeed, was :,
e case wherever the men were still v
Hing to fight. We anticipated, now q,
previously as did the German =,
Iiets in Bulgaria. partial failure. but h,
ala not expect the complete COL h
pse of their army. W
The rumors which had circulated in N,
fla, TO tho effect that the army :"
ould not continue fighting after
ptember 15 found only too terrible W
nfirmaion. We could not answer y
cry single cry for help. We had to "a,
sist that Bulgaria must do some G,
ing for herself, for otherwise we. "a
D, were lost In,
Bulgors Bribed. He SAYS. s,
1t made no difference whether our IT,
feat came in Macedonia or in the Ri
st. We Were not strong enough to RI
Id our line in the west and at the co
me time to establish in the Balkans
German front to replace the Bull leo
rian, as we should have had to do il di
were to hold that front in the long in
4. Va
The Bulgarian government did sgc
thing whatever to keen IN the fo
,rale of the troops and the popnla- m
n or to maintain discipline. They id