South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1919-10-26
Handful of Ydnks
off New DiUiSion
OfHuns BY Trick

the game OF VIZ are COMING ~
light from time 20 time as each side
tells its story. One OF the most
successful OF them was practiced by
American forces IN tho Meuse-
Argonne battle last fall when the
last great allied offensive was at its
height from Switzerland 20 the sea
An imaginary army conceived by a
handful OF American junior officers
was thrown into the field" over
night and for days five crack Ger
man divisions just east OF Verdun
in the Etaih region were kept on
their toes momentarily expecting an
attack which never materializeo.
At a dinner table IN a Coblenz
cafe. overlooking the Rhine. an Am
erican intelligence officer recently
told tic story OF the creation OF the
mythical X army" as II was called.
II appears that the Germans were
expecting an attack IN the Etain
sector az any time. and the Amcri-
cans knew =: but az that phase o:
TIE game the First United States
army was oevctins it's energies to
driving the enemy out OF the Ar
gonns forext and the hill country
on either side. go the mythical army
was created. In preference to d real
diversion. requiring many men, to-
convince the German commander
thai II would not be wise 20 weaken
the Htaln front to the benscit OF
the Neuse- Argonne front where a
desperate battle was proceeding
Five Fresh Divisions.
Five frosh divisions had been
placed by the Germans on the Etain
line. These constituted their last
and finest reservOir OF available d.
Visions The Americans realized
that the minute the Germans de-
coed that this was not - danger
point any or all OF the five divisions
coUld be withdrawn. replaced by ex
hausted and fragmentary divisions
coming from the battle fronts. and
that the appearance Of the fresh
troops IN line west OF the Meuse
would have a tremendous effect on
the American offensive.
The TX army was assigned TO a
front from BeZOnvaux TO Fresnes.
From the morning OF oct. %
until just previous to the armistice
this army "functioned." Capt.
Charles H Matt Of Hubbard Woods.
H.. was commander in-Chief Capt
William II. Dearden. OF Springfield.
Mass, and Washington, ID. c., was
chief Of staff. Lieut. John II. era
ham. OF Lexington, Va, was chief
OF troop movements" Capt o. W.
Neidert was in charge Of G-1. or ad-
void. OF Old Lyme. Conn. was chief
OF artillery. The staff OF the X
army were all members OF the in
telligence section Of the First army
and OF course, before beginning op
erations. had secured the consent of
their chief. Col. Wiley Howell.
Use Wireless and Phone.
The wireless and the telephone
were freely used to convince the
Germans that the Americans were
preparing for an attack in the Etain
sector To make sure that the Ger
mans would be able 20 break into"
the code used the Americans furn-
ished them with a satisfactory key.
one wireless station. of the Y
army, was established in a clump of
woods near Verdun and was chris
tened headquarters of the Y
army" This station functiOned un-
iii the end OF the game, all orders"
To- the army going out from this
place by wireless Soon after the
station began working the Germans
located its whereabouts and fire.
quently sheHed the woods and vi
entity, apparently IN hopes of
breaking up the radio OF this latest
of annOyances.
The y army also had a portable
radio station, which moved about
and represented itself as a differ
emit station every day of two
French Were Excited.
The sector in which the y army
was at work was directly under the
command OF the Thirty-third
French corps. and the rowing wire
less station caused considerable eX-
element among the French soldiers
rs II sent messages 10 make the en-
any believe that several fresh Am
triCan divisions had moved into the
area The French. unaware OF the
X army staff, at times thought the
Americans AAaQ ANcl az oN.lloE VI ltd-
son and on several occasions so re
ported the wireless plants.
The first message from the Y
army headquarters was general
dispatch TO all wireless stations in
the army area tnone of which &C
tually existed) I'm the new code. of
course. directing that none Of the
stations answer or make any use
az their sending instruments. for
fear Of the enemy locating them.
blt TO be on the alert at fixed hours
90 receive messages. The effect was
10 warn the Germans that a large
number Of wireless stations must
have been set up and 10 advise them
Of the hours when the enemy in
tercopting stations should be on the
alert for the American messages
This was followed 10y series Of
ntessag es designed 10 indicate that
the y army was preparing for
full-fledEed operation. In order 10
inform the enemy OF the seograph-
heal limits o. the sector of Tie Y
army. many messages were directed
20 imaginary officers at existing
towns on the Etain front.
Wireless Works Overtime.