The Hartford republican. (Hartford, Ky.) 18??-1926, 1919-04-11
A GERMAN OFFICER
Tells OF HUN DEFEAT
German Pride In War a
Draw Punctured By
Major

/ OF tne Frank1urter Leltung gives
prominence to an important article by
certain Major Paulus-the first
plain admission by a German military
writer that the German armies we're
beaten in the field last autumn. and
that there can be no question what
ever attributing the German collapse
to any but military causes.
II has not been sufficiently appre-
ciated that this is the real issue in
German affairs, that IL is the real is
sue which German politicians of al
most every color are seeking to avoid,
and that the course of German inter-
nal Developments and German poll
cy very largely depends upon the
question whether the truth can be
hammered into the German people
German Conservatives say that the
military collapse was due to the revo-
luton; other parties say that it was
due to the blockade; almost all par
ties rely upon the fact that the allies
offered to make peace on terms in
stead of pressing the military defeat
TO the point of unconditional surren-
der. Thus the whole future is men
aced by the legend of the indicated
German army.
Begins at Beginning.
Major Paulus begins from the fact
that when Ludendorff, at the end of
September, called upon Prince Max
of Baden to ask for an armistice, the
German army was retreating to line
Antwerp-Brussels-D iedenhofen-Metz
He proceeds to demonstrate that
from the moment when Ludendorff
was forced to retire to an Antwerp
Metz line he was beaten, land finally
beaten" The truth was that the line
.Ostend-Reims-Po int-a-M ousson, with
its shoulder" at Rheims, was COM
romise front, resulting from the fail
ure of the original German attack in
1914 and the incomplete success of
Jeffre's counter-attack. Just like Ca
dorna's position on the lsonzo, the
line held for years and did not show
its weakness until the enemy had suf-
ficient strength seriously to menace
the flank.
Paulus thinks that the Ludendorff
offensive of March-July, 1918, had a
preventive character In any case
CT au;o affact u-a, 6,icbad r,l,an I =,
tegic effect was finished when Lu-
Idendorff had no more troops to throw
in, When this situation arose it was
not the fault of the people at home in
Germany. When the Ludendorff Of
fensive was lost the situation of 1914
required, and now Ludendorff had no
alternative to the appeal for an
armistice.
II is an entire mistake to suppose
that the line from Antwerp to Metz
could have been held. Neither flank
was secure. In the North the Dutch
frontier left no room for any retreat
which would not be a catastrophe. In
the center Verdun provided a posi-
tive invitation to break through the
German line. The line from Dieden-
hofen to Metz was already outflank-
ed when the StMihiel bend was lost.
The whole southern front was
mountain front, full of disadvantages
and also much too close to the Rhine
to be held stubbornly without risk
of catastrophe. Above all, the rail-
way system did not serve for ade-
quate movement of reinforcements to
any threatened part.
"Ludendorff the politician proved
stronger than Ludendorff the militia
ry commander" said Major Paulus
His strategy staked everything in
favor of a pan-German policy of con-
quest That was the hour of Luden-
dorff's fate and end, and the hour of
his guilt and the guilt of William ii.
Whether LudendOrff would have
done best 10 employ those 1900, goo
soldiers against the Macedonian men
ace to Austria and Bulgaria, or to en-
ploy them on the western front is a
question of secondary importance.
Where Ludendorff Failed.
I'm any case, Ludendorff failed at
this decisive hour because ne missed
the only opportunity which the for
une of the moment threw into his lap
of securing in all circumstances the |
military success which had been his
hitherto, His strategic movement on
Brest-Litovsk was wrong, and such |
mistakes are, according to Clausewitz
and Moltke, in most cases irrepara-
BILE"
Paulus declares that Ludendorff |
and the kaiser, owing to insufficient !
ability or will" are entirely |
responsible for the German disaster.
He adds:
I'VE need not discuss the question
whether just such a defeat was not |
the indispensable condition which |