New-York tribune., 1919-11-23
March Exploits Lessons
u. S. Learned i'm War

which is adequate to efficient formula
ton and execution of military pro-
gam which will require a definite and
effective articulation of the War De-
partment with all the agencies involved
in the mobilization of the industries,
activities, utilities and resources of the
nation. am convinced that without
properly organized and efiicie =.
General Staff charged with the respon-
sibiity for, and empowered with the
authority to formulate and to execute,
the army program, it will, in any fu-
ture war, as in this and in every other
war in our history. be impossible for
the activities of the various agencies,
services and bureaus of the War De-
partment to be controlled and directed,
with promptness and effectiveness, to
the attainment of the common end 1t
can be stated without qualification
that the success of an army in mod
ern war is impossible without such
General Staff"
General March likens the whole wax
to one colossal battle between entire
nations rather than armies, with the
period of combat years rather than
hours.
Only the determination, the valor
and the sacrifices of our Allies
throughout the terrible period of
ordeal by BATTLE" he continues, "made
it possible for US to furnish the final
reserve which, with its impctuous
vigor and it's irresistible force enabled
the Allied arm yto pass from the de-
fensive to the offensive and made pas
sible an early and decisive victory"
Changes in Warfare Discussed
Dealing with the remarkable
changes in the practices, methods and
material of warfare, General March
says:
"These changes have been, to a
large degree, due to development of
services which have been made neces-
sary as the result of the concentra-
tion of the best technical and military
skill of the world upon the application
to military purposes of the most re-
cent engineering and scientific de-
velopments. Tie remarkable develop
ment in aeroplanes, tanks, motor
transport, railroad artillery. cater
pillars, trench mortars. machine guns,
gas warfare. radio and sound and flash
ranging apparatus, and photography
have modified in many respects the
details and conditions of warfare, and
have made pos sible operations of an
unprecedented magnitude.
In the Mcuse -Argcnre battle the
American expenditure OF artillery am
munition is estimated at more than
100000 rounds; in the battle of
Gettysburg, the Union army expended
less than 40 600 rounds.
Thus the development of motor
transport has rendered practicable
expenditures of artillery and machine
cally limited only by the production
Of ho
country. In all of these Developments
the contribution of the American en-
Glneers has been conspicuoNs the
Liberty twelve-cylinder aeropane en-
CINE, the Browning machine gun, and
the American gas-w rfarc equipment
are noteworthy examples.
"lmportant as has been the effect of
these mechanical developments and
special services, their true value has
been an auxiliaries to the infantry
Nothing in this war has changed the
fact that it is now, as always hereto
fcre, the infantry with rife and
bayonet that, in the final analysis.
mast bear the brunt of the assault and
carry it on to victory. The war has
taught the necessity of the apprecia-
tion by ell officers of the nterdepen-
derce OF all arms of the service in
battle. They are to fight together;
they must be trained and taught to-
Gether if the common knowledge of
the powers and limitations of each
arm, and the mutual confidence with
out which efficient team work in battle
IS impossible, is to be attained
Small Posts Out of Date
"The important lesson to be learned
IN this connection is that reasonable
efficiency in peace time training for
war can never be secured until the
present system of small isolated bat
TALON and company posts which is a
relic of the days Of Indian fighting is
replaced by system which enables
entire divisions to be trained toge the y
and to be consolidate ed frequently for
the man0uvers of larger units
"The war has shown that the Ameri-
can ideas of the training of the soldier
were sound and that the American
trained soldier has no SUPERIOR 1t has
also shown that the principles under
lying the instruction in our service
schools for officers are sound. The re-
suts attained both in staff work and
in the command and leading of troops
in combat are remarkable in view of
/ the fact that opportunities for the
! training of officers in the actual COM
mand of or in the actual performance