The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1919-06-02

trust YOU will realize how damnaole IL
will be II the enemy settles down FOR
the winter along lines which COMPRISE
difficulties. We must have him or the
Belgian coast even II We cannot recover
Calais. unkirk. or Ostcnd. There VIII
be continual alarms and greatly anoeo
Antwerp.
"I er getting old ships with heavy
guns ready. protected by barges WIN
nets against submarines. 90 as 10 o's-
pu,e the whole seaboard with him. On
the S1st instant the Revenge, with fouf
l3IS inch guns. can come into aCHoh
OF required and ! have a regular neet
of monitors now organized. which, they
all soy have hit the Germans hard TINS
su pport from the sea and there you VIII
geek, a fleet which is getting stronger
Very day.
IT you could gain passage OF To the
left. could give you overwhelming
support from the sea and there you VIII
have a flank which certainly they can
not turn. :.
In letter dated November e. AGAIN:
"s II you push your left flank
, along the sand dunes Of the shore -
/ Ostend and Zeebrugge, We would give
you 100 or 200 heavy guns from the sea
in absolutely devastating support foF
for or Ave miles inshore We could mako
you perfectly safe and superior. Here
at least. you have their flank IL S'u
care TO use It; and surely. the coast
strip. held and fed we'll with troops,
would clear the whole line out ABOUT
Dixmude and bend IL right back. IL II
did not clear II altogether.
"s In a few hours could nav"
Ostcnd or ZecbrugSe TO reinforce you
in a hard southeastward push. There Is
no limit to what could be done by the
extreme lcft-handed push and sweep
along the Dutch frontier.
"s In few hours I could have
fifty twelve-inch guns and seventy SIN
inch firing on the encmy's right ana
rear. II Is difficult for submarines 10
attack because Of the sand banks
! On December the first lord was ago n
/! nv guest at G. II. Q. We discussed the
situation and were completely in agree
mcnt as to the advisability OF my pro-
iccted costal advance and close cooper
alton with the fleet told him there
was fear Of disagreement win IN"
French and that political difficulties
would certainly arise. He said ne GA
not think that they were in9upcrablc.
and shortly after our conversation ne
| left for England. promising TO arrange
everything with the prime minister aho
Kitchener.
Then came his letter. dispatched on
December S. after he had seen his COL
leagues in the cabinet:
:" Kitchener agrees entirely
/ with your view. We held an immediate
, conference with the prime minister and
. Sir Edward Grey. and. rs the result.
4 ~. slA.p 10 hnI a
drafted. The admiralty atte ~ tho
greatest importance 10 the operation ana
will aid in every way. we are already
making the necessary preparations on
An extensive scale. Later l will let y"m
have very full and clear details. TIL"
i combination must be perfect.
"KitChcnnr proposes TO lot YOU have
! the Twcnty-sevrnth Division in time.
; hope YOU will continue IT,
prcss tho now plan hard. both here at
homo and on the French generals"
I quote in full Sir Edward Grcy's tel.
cgram, dated December 3, to Sir Francis
! Bcrtir at bordeaux:
The military situation points to the
/ advisability Of shortly taking steps 10
| prevent tho Germans withdrawing their
! best first line troops from the western
theatre for employment against Russia
| and replacing them by second rate
troops.
las some forward movement 10
achirv" this object may be decided m.
I desire 70 bring to IN" serious afcn-
tiun OF the French gov eminent the r'lJ
strong opinion held by his majesty
government that British troops should
be so placed IN The lin" rs I" advance
| along the con<t m Immediate ro-OpCTa-
/ ,io, With uur fleet and thus enable W.
if necessary. 10 lIHd further forces at