The West Virginian. [volume] (Fairmont, W. Va.) 1914-1974, 1919-06-23

amended draft, however. there has been in
corporated declaration in these words:
Nothing In this Covenant shall be deemed to
AFFECT the validity OF International engage
ments such as treaties of arbitration, or re-
gional understandings like the Monroe Doc
trine, for securing the maintenance of peace"
Thus there would appear to be no design TO
oppose the efforts of the United States to pro-
tect, from any form of external aggression; any
other state Of the. American hemisphere. Nor
is II reasonable to suppose that the League
would take part in such a work until the aid
was invoked by the United States Again. IL
seems unlikely that the League would inter-
fere with pressure brought TO bear by the Unit
ed States to prevent the voluntary transfer of
American territory to any non-American state.
OF course IL is possible that the restraint
imposed by the United States under cover OF
the Monroe Doctrine might be protested
against by another state, on the ground that
1t was an unfair application OF the Monroe doc
trine, and an unreasonable restraint upon the
exercise of political independence. In such
case the aid OF the League might be in fact
evoked as a check upon the United States.
Such situation might perhaps be anticipated.
II the United States should exert its strength
to restrain from wrong-doing any OF its south
ern neighbors. Thus. a question for your con-
sideration is, what would be the response Of
the League to such protest or complaint. or
conversely would the League be disposed to
impede the United States in its effort to estab-
lish, even by force. conditions, of stable gov
eminent in countries subject to chronic dis
order or unable to respond faithfully to their
international obligations / offer no opinion
on this matter It should be noted. however,
that this Question would not arise with respect
to states which, under existing treaties, enjoy
in varying degree the protection of the United
States
Generally speaking, the Covenant directly
forbids the several members of the League to
commit those acts of aggression which the
United States, by virtue of the Monroe Doc
trine, asserts the right to oppose when direct
ed against American states Respect for the
Covenant would, therefore. appear greatly to
diminish the burden now assumed by the Unit
ed States, by simply minimizing the likelihood
thatthere would be occasion for American in
reference.
Another grave question presents itself in
this connection. What obligation does the
Covenant impose upor the United States as
guarantor of the territorial integrity and poll
itical independence of countries outside Of and
perhaps remote from the American continents?
Would the United States, through the normal
operation of the League, be called upon to
send armed forces to check hostilites in the
Balkans, or Manchuria, or South Africa? The
Covenant itself sheds no light on this matter.
The council, as has been noted, is to advise upon
the means by which the obligation Of guar
antor is to be fulfilled. 1t seems reasonable to
believe that that body would be highly reluc-
tant to recommend that a state remote from
the zone of hoshlities, and having no terri
torial possessions near them, be summoned to
diate vicinity of the conflict or threatened con-
hict should prove inadequate. 1t Is not under
stood, moreover tina. the council ia given more
than advisory power In such a matter; and 1t
must be recalled that, save under specified cir
cumstances, its decisions require the unani-
nous consent OF the members of the League
represented at its meeting.
In case, however, of grave conflict involy-
ing several states, and beyond the control of
the powers near ct hand, the United States
might he expected take n part. t-s.-f
It should be observed that the guarantees OF
territorial integrity and political independence
Of members of the League are applicable solely
to external aggression. The Covenant contains
no undertaking burdened the contracting par
ties with the duty to assist in depressing revo-
luton or in defending government against
internal disorder. Thus the United States would
not find itself obligated to help any other
power to retain supremacy over all of its ex-
listing possessions in case the Inhabitants of
any one of them sought by force of arms to
gain independence
fundamental principle Of international
law demands respect for the political indie
pendence of every well ordered state by all
other countries. Definite recognition of this
obligation in the Covenant of the LesIue
would appear, therefore, to be a generally sta
bilizing influence; for it would tend to mini
mize the danger of capricious Intervention on
loose grounds by individual states, and possi-
bly, thereby assure fresh protection for com
mercial and economic relationships of an in
ternational character.
The potential benefits to the United States of the lie
Nations are immense. Ifhe League fails we shall
arm. It is conceivable that in time, perhaps within
decade after the date of the peace treaty. we
e to have an army as large as that Germany mainta
he outbreak of the war, and navy as great as {
tain's. That would mean billions annually in taxes
lie form Of compulsory military service. 1t might
Dive fundamental change in our national character
S. With the League none Of these things would be
ny. But we cannot have the League without pu
ethins into it in the way of trust and by assuming
is burdens The real question before the country.
;, is are the American people big enough intellect
spiritually to keep the torch of human liberty adv
or are they, for the sake of fancied security. "
act does moi exist willing to settle down like some
bet behind wall fabricated out of tradition
lerican isolation which never did exist except in
way that has no application in world organize
one is IN which we now live.
There ought not to be much doubt about how p.
. were capable of seeing clearly the proper cour.
time the Louisiana purchase was an issue, and who
finch from the expanson which followed the Sp,