Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1919-12-14

| tam DTedk un unueT StTCSS VI ue
feat with the consequent mutua
| recrimination. Again. there was M
doubt that the realization by the Ger
man people that Independent Ameri
can divisions. corps or armies were
in the field with determined purpose
| would be a severe blow to German
! morale and prestige"
| Gen. Pershing had refused to droI
his plan for a single American Army
| acting under it's own flag, but con-
| scented, because of the existing emer'
gency, to lend the combat divisions
at hand to help stem the German
| offensive of 1918, which. the allied
war council foresaw. may very quick
ly place the allied armies in a serious
! situation"
The German rush developed as ex-
| pected. the report shows, but the
enemys success was far greater thar
had been feared. AT Amiens the
British were driven in on a forty
| klometer front: between the Disc anG
| Berry-au-Rac the French lost fifty
kilometers on thirty kflom eteI
| front in four days. And Immediately
,. the Germans utilized the Marine "as
a defensive flank and the advance was
| directed toward Paris"
The gravity of the situation" the
| report says. lied to the famous orders
for holding up all supply and troop
| shipments except infantry and ma
chine gun units" Gen. Foch, who was
now made generalissimo, estimated
| that 100 American divisions would be
necessary for allied victory.
Urged Marine Offensive.
Gen. Pershing at this time was rec
ommending that his troops be used to
smash the Marine pocket into which
the Germans had thrust themselves
He says:
"The Marine salient was inherently
| weak and offered an opportunity for
a counter offensive that was obvious
| If successful. such an operation would
afford immediate relief to the allied
defense. would remove the threat
against Paris and free the Paris-Nan-
cy railroad. But, more important
than all else. it would restore the
morale of the allies and remove the
profound depression and fear then ex-
listing. Up to this time our units had
been put in here and there at criti-
cal points as emergency troops to
stop the terrific German advance. In
every trial whether on the defensive
or offensive. they had proved them
selves equal to any troops in Europe
AS early as June %. and again on
July 10 at Bombon. had very strong
ly urged that our best divisions be
concentrated under American COM
mand if possible, for use as a strikin g
force against the Marine salient. AL
though the prevailing view among the
allies was that American units were
suitable only for the defensive, and
that at all events they could be used
to better advantage under allied COM
mand, the suggestion was accepted in
principle. and my estimate of their
offensive fighting qualities was soon
put to the test"
No German Soldier Crossed.
Although his suggestion was not
accepted, American forces found glory
in the action which was undertaken
At -Thierry, when the Ger
mans first advanced. the Sd Division
commander reported:
although the rush OF the German
troops overwhelmed some of the front
line positions. causing the infantry
and machine gun companies to suffer
in some cases, a so per cent loss, no
German soldier crossed the road from
Fossoy to Crezancy, except as pris-
oner Of war, and by noon Of the fol-
Germans in the foreground OF the 80
Division sector except the dead"
! ION this occasion" Gen. Pershine
added, "a single regiment of the Sd
Division wrote one of the most bril-.
! liant pages in our military annals. II
prevented the crossing at certain
points on it's front, while on either
flank the Germans who had gained a
footing pressed forward. Our men
firing in three directions, met the
German attacks with counter attacks
at critical points and succeeded in
throwing two German divisions into
complete confusion. capturing soc
prisoners.
Due to the magnificent dash and
power displayed here and on the field
of Scissors by our LIST and I'd divf-
sions. the tide of war was defnltely
turned in favor of the allies.
THE force of American arms had
been brought to bear in time to enable
the last offensive of the enemy to be
crushed"
Organization of the LIST American
Army and preparations for its maiden
, effort-the elimination Of the St Mihiel
salient-was now taken up. Again II
was proposed that American troops rein
force the French for the operation, but
Pershing again objected. He explains
Plan Not Acceptable.
'"The plan suggested for the American
participation in these operations was not
acceptable to me because it would re-
quire the immediate separation of the
recently formed LIST American Army
| into several groups, mainly to assist
French armies This was directly con-
! trary to the principle Of forming dis
! tinct American Army. for which my
contention had been insistent An enor-
nous amount of preparations had al
| ready been made in construction of
roads. railroads, regulating stations,
and other installations looking to the
use and supply of our armies on par
! ticular front. The inherent disinclina-
/ ton of our troops to serve under allied
; commanders would have grown and
American morale would have suffered
| My position was stated quite clearly
that the strategical employment Of the
LIST Army as unit would be under
| taken where desired, but its disruption
I to carry out these proposals would not
be entertained.
"A further conference at Marshal
! Foch's headquarters was held on Sep
TENDER 2. at which Gen. Petain was
present. After discussion the question
of employing the American Army as a
| unit was conceded. All the allied armies
| were to be employed in a converg1ng
action. The British armies. supported
by the left of the French armies, were
to pursue the attack in the direction OF
Cambria the center of the French
armies, west of Rheims. would continue
the actions, already begun, to drive the
enemy beyond the Aisne and the Amer
, lean Army, supported by the right OF
| the French armies, would direct its at
tack on Sedan and Mezieres.
Montfauc0n Thought Limit.
ut should be recorded that although
| this general offensive was fully outlined
| at the conference no one present ex-
pressed the opinion that the final vic
J tory would be won in 1918. In fact il
was believed by the French high COM
mand that the Meuse-Argonne attack
could not be pushed much beyond Mont
faucon before the arrival of winter
would force cessation of operations.
The choice between the two sec
tors, that east of the Aisne including
the Argonne forest, or the Champagne
sector. was left to me. In my OPINION
| no other allied troops had the morale
or the offensive spirit to overcome sue
cessfully the difficulties to be met in the