Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-20

! of peace. based on the status quo ante,
and in case of a favorable outcome of
the war, a program of settlement in
accordance with the ideas I repre-
sented No mention was made of any
remuneration whatever. This import
ant document was first known TO the
secretaries of state and G.H.Q. on
February 5. 1918.
'Verdict Grave But Confident"
While kings and councillors were
discussing affairs at Homburg. Cen
eral Won ARR the field marshal and II
held a consultation on the situation. |
We had occupied the Siegfried line, |
and were expecting the great Anril |
offensive. l considered the British
lattack imminent The result of the |
submarine campaign IN March had
been good. and the ministry OF the
interior began to build high hopes
upon it, The Importance of America |
was given due weight.
II Our verdict on the situation was
grave but confident; We hoped to re-
pulse the entente attacks in the near
future, but for the rest had to await
the results of the submarine campaign
land the developments of events in
Russia.
General Won Arr had similar hopes
LOT the AAOi'Ni
added that, in consequence of lack of
raw materials and of the heavy de-
mands on man power. the Austro-
Hungarian army could only fight on
until the winter There was no diff
ference of opinion as to the necessity
for prosecuting the war for the pres
ent with the utmost energy. lt was
impossible to foresee how events
might have developed by the winter.
About midday there was consulta-
ton between the German Imperial
chancellor, Count Czernin. the field
marshal, General Won ARR and my
self. The chancellor asked me before
the discussion began whether /
thought the time had come to make a
move for peace. / could only answer
that the entente were about to make
an immense effort. and that did not
think the moment favorable from the
military point of view. The question
was not further discussed, even in con-
nection with the Russian revolution.
Asked 10 Give Up Alsacc.
Count Czernin, proposed that in or
der to obtain an early peace We should
give Alsaee-Lorraine to France. Aus
trla- Hungary was to hand over Gala
cha to Po and and, support the union
of Poland and Germany. AT this mo-
ment our meeting with the, two states
men, which had lasted about ten min
utes. was interrupted. The chancellor
: and Count Czernin were summoned &c
q the two emperors This ended the
II Official part of the imperial meeting
I as far as / was concerned. In the
afternoon was received by the EN-.
lperor Charles.
After lunch Count Czernin explained
his views to me in a private conVersa-
ton. He based his, wish for peace
upon the internal condition of the
:, Dual monarchy. l had no reason tc
y CONCEAL my personal opinion Aftel
all. / was the son of my Fatherland
and had perfect right to express
IL what | thought. | told Count Czernir
that he ought to lead the peoples OF
II the Dual monarchy more firmly ano
raise their morale. He replied that this
y was impossible. | then turned to his
proposals. His Polish project seemed
to me very dubious. What would Po-
lands attitude toward it be? What
effect would it have on our eastern
provinces? / was all the more aston
ID ished at his whole scheme, as Austro.
Hungarian policy on Warsaw showed
no signs of honest concern about Ger.
man interests. The Polish project was
quite indefinite; the surrender of AL
y sace-Lorraine to France, however, pre-
lie sented a perfectly clear issue of which
re in my opinion, there could be no ques-
" ton as long as We We're not beaten
n Would Not Confess Weakness.
n Every nation stands or falls by its
honor. All German parties--even the
)r independent socialists-Were united
~ in regarding Alsace-L Lorraine as Ger
&c man, and in considering it q point Of
lie honor for us to fight to the utmost
UT in defense of this possession. Any
Or authority, whether civil or military
rs which failed to recognize this would
al have been rightly swept away by in
re dignant public opinion.
rs Our situation was certainly serious
+. but we were still capable of putting VI
re a stiff fight; we only needed the will
ar to do So The surrender of Alsace-
Lorraine would have been an oper
confession of weakness, and would
lie have been condemned as such even b,
well-meaning people. At that time
g. Their was no need for such sacri
t. flee. 1t might confidently be expected
lie that the entente would see nothing
H. in all these proposals but a trap or &
81 confession of military defeat tina
would make them raise their demand.
MT considerably.
wv Count Czernin could give no def
NJ mite answer to my inquiry as to wheth
tn err the entente would really be salts
I'd fled with the surrender of Alsace-Lor
ut raine. He expressed views of thu
ly gravest kind on Germany's interna
be conditions. He must have been ii
II possession of excellent information.
ar This closed our interview. Coun
Czernin did not again mention thu
IL separation of Galicia from the Aus
lie, Itrian empire. though he continued TO
In some time to urge that Roumani;
he should be included in Austria Hun
garys sphere of influence, and tn
to least, including Poland, in that of Ger
ry many These were broad and clea
X CONGRATULATIONS with which Oh. q
II, could only agree They were record
es, ed in the Kreuznach agreement o
of May II and Is.
ut Feared Break With Austria.
he Soon afterwards, however. Coun
IL. Czernin supported the Austro-Polisl
eir, solution with great energy and skill
lie land thus revealed the real character o
his country. For Austria to renounc
Poland would have produced disas
as trous effects in the monarchy. TIL
he prestige of the young emperor wa
IT. also at stage 1t was obviously Coun
to Czernin's intention to GUST us in Pc
"a land as we'll as in Roumania.
The Austro- Polish situation entaile
grave dangers for Prussia and Ger
in many. The field marshal and feare
- that it meant the breakup of tn