Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1919-09-17

.
out, you have water on the brain. Ii
difficult. The repair of roads and
railways was taking too long, in spite
of all our preparations.
After thoroughly replenishing am
munition the 18th army attacked pe-
tween Montdidier and Noyon on the5
30th of March,. On April the 2nd
army and the right wing of the 18TH
attacked at Albert and south OF the
Somme towards Amiensr
These actions were indecisive. 1t
twas an established fact that the en-.
emy's resistance was beyond our
strength. We must not drawn INTO
a battle of exhaustion. This would
accord neither with the strategieal
nor the tactical situation. In agree
ment with the commanders concerned
G.H.Q. had to take the extremely Diff
ficult decision to abandon the attack
on Amens for good.
.Brilliant Feat He Says.
a The entente now attacked at Albert
and southeast of Amiens in dis
connected sort of wav,a and achieved
nothing. On the Gath of April after
lcareful preparation. the End army
made another attempt, with the aid OF
| tanks, to improve Its position at
| Vulers- Bretonneux; it, got ahead Wen,
| but was unable to hold what 1t gained.
The front between Albert and Mont
didier only settled down gradually
| From, time to time fighting broke out
Iaeain, and the situation remained per-
manently doubtful. The other parts
| of the new front, towards Arras and
| Noyon, became quiet much more
| quickly. -
The battle was over by April 4. 1t.
| was a brilliant feat and will ever be
| so regarded in history. What the
English and French had not succeeded
lin doing we had accomplished. and
THAT in the fourth year of the war.
i Strategically we had achieved what
the events of the 23rd. Gath and 25th
lhad encouraged us to hope for. That
we had also failed to take Amiens,
which would have rendered COM
/ munication between the enemys
forces astride the Somme exceedingly
difficult, was specially disappointing
lIIong range -bombardment of the rail-
! way establishments or Amiens was by
no means an equivalent.
Found Food and Stopped.
However, our troops had beaten the
| French and English and proved them
selves superior. That they did not
achieve all the success that was pos
sible was due. not only to their re-
duced fighting value, but, above all,
to their not being in all cases under
the firm control of their officers. They
had been checked by finding provi-
sions, and valuable time had thus
been lost
!. Generally speaking our tactics had
hannnnad
I the 18th army did not<necessitate any
i | Fundamental changes, although some
lessons needed more drastic applica-
r ZION. Above all, the infantry must
be more extended. At many places
e machine gun posts had given us an
S undue amount of trouble and so caused
DELAY. The infantry groups had often
Y been laesking in initiative, and then
e cooperation with the companion arms
3 had often failed.
The troops had found special diff
Guilty in reorganizing themselves. fol-
defense at the conclusion of the at.
tack, and particularly In recognizing
Q when no further success was to bt
gained by continuing the attack.
g All troops, especially mounted
troops, had suffered heavily from
bombing from hostile airInen Gam:
I
e French forces had a brilliant share III
!, this work of bombing and so helped
J thold un the driye) s4
! 1t was as yet too early to give {
{ final opinion on the strategical situa.
2 ton; in itself it was by no means ia
! vorable. How CHIC. was to deal will
$ it later on could not vet be deter
5 mined, as we We're still in the frs
4 stages of the operations.
Z The Avre ,bridge-head Ga marrow
hold the Germans had on the soutl
bank of the Avre southeast of Amiens
e The French afterwards administered
IA sharp defeat on the troops exposed
! here with the river at their backs.
9 was a special difficulty in the tactica
g sense The ACCESSIBILITY of giving /
n up was discussed. But as this woult
!, have shown the enemy that We hat
5 given up any further attack on Amien
II we kept it,
n The new front had now to. beforti
p fled Some of the played-out divi
+ sions were relieved by fresh ones from
u quiet fronts. the less tired ones wer'
left in the line, Everywhere the great
est attention and care was bestowet
e on completing the communications Il
q rear. For the main operations twas
n however, of the highest importanc
to take back troops that were n
{ longer required In the new line TO
n rest. training and improving their dis
e cipline. We had to collect reserve
2. for further operations and to repe
Is possible counter-attacks which coule
! however, for the present be only Q
n local character.
e The troops of the End army wer
le particularly handicapped by havin
stuck fast in the western edge of tn
d Somme battlefield. They could fin
Y real rest only to the east of our start
y ling line, although in the country the
ie had traversed numerous English hi
I camps had fallen into our hands un
damaged (The region of which n
complains was that devastated by hi
lie in the great German retreat OF 1917.
OurSlosses were not inconsiderahle
d we had been, fighting with large nun
1t bers for long time. The percentas
IN in the nth army was too high, tn
ID losses in officers had been heav
pt | throughout But besides rich boot.
le we had taken some 10000 unwount
OF ed prisoners. and in addition the er
IN emy's battle casualties had been heav.
ri We could. expect to get back many {
ftlthe slightly wounded within a reason