The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-12-02

unite for the regeneration of the coun- try.
 The peasants and the middle class found themselves exposed, unarmed, to violation by their oppressors and fell a prey to anarchist disruption. Who knows when, if ever, they will recover their vitality? We can see no signs of it, and merely to hope for it seems almost dangerous self-deception.
 Possibly, like many people in Ger many in the spring of 1919. they looked upon bolshevism with fatalistic aequ- nlmity as an inevitable doom which must of itself produce salvation. That is cowardly thought, and in Russia 1t had terrible consequences. Salvation from Bolshevism is not to be found in looking on and doing nothing, but in strong and wise action, accurate gaug- ing of the enemy's strength and weak ness and also in far-sighted economic reforms which would have been inn perative after the war in any event From October, 1917, on, bolshevism in Russia obtained an ever firmer hold
 ERRED IN SENDING LEVINE I could not doubt that the disintegra- tion of the Russian army and nation involved an extraordinary risk for Ger many and Austria Hungary All the greater was my anxiety when ll
  ernment and theirs.
 By sending Lenine to Russia our gov ernment had moreover, assumed great responsibility. From a military point of view his journey was justified, for Russia had to be laid low. But our government should have seen to it that we also were not otsinyolved in her. fall. The events in Russia gave me nc cause for complete satisfaction. They considerably eased the military situa- tion, but elements of the greatest dan ger still remained
 As early as the summer I had drafted the armistice conditions. They were based on the desire to come to an un- derstanding with Russia, for the needs of the war demanded peace in the east, The fundamental idea of the armi- stice was to cease hostilities on the lines which each army held a the time I demanded no cession of territory or surrender of arms The conditions contained nothing that might make the armistice or the future peace more diff ficult. The draft was submitted to the imperial government and the allied headquarters and was agreed to. Minor changes involved no alteration in prin. ciple.
 It was agreed with the imperial gov ernment that if the armistice was ne- gotiated between the contending arm ies the conduct was to be in the hands of general headquarters, assisted by z representative of the imperial chancel- Tor. The latter agreed to include a representative of general headquarters in thu commission to be appointed for the peace negotiations he was, of course, to be the subordinate. not the equal, of the chancellor's plenipoten- tiary.
 I had everything ready in case the Russians should make advances. By November the Russian army was so far corroded by bolshevism that gen eral headquarters could seriously think of weakening the eastern front in or then about 80 divisions there. one-t third of our whole force.
 COULD TAKE TROOPS AWAY
 now proposed, that the Austro-Hun- garian troops should take over a larger part of the line. We discussed with their headquarters and with the commander -in-chief in the east how we could set free the greatest number of German troops on the fronts in Pennsylvania (Siebenburgen). the Bu- kovina and Eastern Galicia- General von Arg also agreed to send Austro- Hungarian troops from Italy to the east.
 These meaures would. of course, be carried out only in the somewhat re- mote future. But it was necessary to make preparation now, so that all movements might be completed by the coming spring. the decisive period for us. Otherwise the scheme would have been impracticable owing to the bad condition of the railways and the critical state of transport in the occu- pied territory and Germany. But con ditions in Russia prevented our taking too drastic decisions as yet
 MOVES THE ARMY WEST
 From the end of November onward troop trains were necessarily passing from east to west. It was no longer case of replacing tried divisions in the west by fresh ones. but of really adding to the number of combatants in the west
 The training of the troops in the east for the western conditions was pushed on. and the same was done in Rumania.
 The idea of making an attack in France in 1918 occupied many of our generals as early as November. myself perhaps most of all. I therefore eagerly awaited the day when the Rus- sian government would ask for an armistice. At the front numerous local truces were made in November. Larger and larger formations made overtures to us, and already individual Russian armies made proposals for ceasfng hos tilities. Peace negotiations were at tempted to Dvinsk (Dunaburg), but came to nothing. In some. places armi- stices were denounced. It was a con fusing picture. half peace. half war.
 On November 26 the Russian com mander in chief People's Commissarv rv Krylenko, inquired by wireless whether we were prepared to conclude an armi- stice. We agreed. On December the Russian delegates crossed the German Hines. Negotiations beg&a withoue de- Fay at Brest-Litovsk. where the com hander-in-chief in the east still had