The Birmingham age-herald., 1919-12-14
THE BIRMINGHAM AGEHERALD SUNDAY DECEMBER

troops overwhelmed some of the front line positions, causing the infantry and ma chine gun companies to suffer, in some cases a 50 per cent loss, no German sol- dier crossed the road from Fossoy to Crezancy, except as a prisoner of war, i6) there were no Germans in, the fore ground of the Third division sector ex- cept the dead.
 '.On this occasion,'' General Pershng added, "a single regiment of the Third division wrote one of the most brilliant pages in cur military annals. It pre- vented the crossing at certain points on it's front, while on either flank the Ger mans who had gained footing pressed forward. Our men, firing in three direc- t;ons, met the German attacks with counter attacks at critical points and suc- ceeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.
 Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed here and on the field of Soissons by our First and Second diyi- sions the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the allies
 "The force of American arms had been
 brought to bear in time to enable the last offensive of the enemy to be crushed"
 WANTED MEN KEPT TOGETHER
 
 army and preparations for it's maiden ef-
 fort-the elimination of the St, Mihiel salient was now taken up. Again it was proposed that American troops reinforce
 the French for the operation, but Per shing again objected. He explains: "The plan suggested for the American participation in these operations was not acceptable to me because it would re- auire the immediate separation of the recently formed First American army into several groups, mainly to assist French armies This was directly con- trary to the principle of forming dis tinct American army, for which my con- 1 tention had been insistent An enormous ! amount of preparation had already been made in construction of roads. railroads,
 regulating stations and other installa- 1 tions looking to the use and supply of 1 our armies on a particular front The i inherent disinclination of our troops to
 serve under allied commanders would
 have grown and American morale would
 have suffered. My position was stated quite clearly that the strategical
 would be undertaken where desired, but j, it's disruption to carry out these pro- | posals would not be entertained "A further conference at Marshal ! Foch's headuuarters was held on Septem- 1 ber 2, at which General Petain was pres- ent. After discussion the question of em- ploying the American army as unit was conceded All the allied armies were to be employed in converging action.
 The British armies, supported by the left l of the French armies were to pursue the attack in the direction of Cambrai; the i center of the French armies, west of 1 Rheims would continue the actions al ready begun to drive the enemy beyond the Aisne; and the American army, SUD- fn9 rNxr41 41,n -frrhf nf hn nh rrTnfn would direct it's attack on Sedan and Mezieres.
 NO ONE SAW EARLY VICTORY sIt should be recorded that although this general offensive was fully outlined at the conference, no one present ex-
 pressed the opinion that the final victory could be won in 1918 Tn fact, it was believed by the French high command that the Meuse-Argonne attack could not
 be pushed much beyond Montfaucon be- fore the arrival of winter would force a cessation of operations.
 "The choice between the two ssectors, that east of the Aisne, including the Ar gonne forest, or the Champagne sector. was left to me. Tn my opinion, no other allied troops had the morale Or the off, fensive spirit to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met in the Mouse Argonne sector and our plans and install lations had been prepared for an expan- sion of operations in that direction. ''The salient had been held by the Ger ! mans since September, 1914 It covered the most sensitive section of the enemys position on the western front, namely, | the Mezieres- Sedan Metz railroad and the Briey Iron basin; it threatened the en-
 tire region between Verdun and Nancy
 and interrupted the main rail line from | Paris to the east. Its primary strength 1 lay in the natural defensive features of 1 the terrain itself The western face of | the salient extended along the rugged heavily wooded eastern heights of the Meuse the southern face followed the | heights of the Mouse for eight kilometers