Bisbee daily review., 1919-01-02
SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS PRESS
 IN LIBEL SUIT

Continued iroE: Page one)
 antees of state and federal constitu-
 tions as entrusted with the contempt
 power of courts, its holding that
 every construction and presumption
 must be made in favor of the good
 faith and innocent intent of one who
 criticizes the court, and its holding
 that a judge cannot use contempt
 powers to redress private grievances,
 furnish some much needed definition
 of the strict limitations upon the ex-
 ercise of the contempt powers by
 courts as well as some equally needeI
 definition of the right of citizens to
 express their opinions concerning the
 judiciary under their free press and
 free speech guarantees. There has
 been altogether too much confusion
 as to the limitations of contempt
 jurisdiction. The present decision goes far in clearing this up. While adhereing to the rule that criticism calculated to obstruct the course of justice may be punished as for con- tempt of court, the court holds that cases of constructive contempt are criminal proceedings, and that. there fore, the information, the authority of the court. the weight of the evi- dence Gncluding all conflicts in pre- sumption and prOof) and the irregu- larity of the proceedings are gov erned by the rule of criminal law. The information must be strictly con strued as we'll as the article alleged nd hn further says the defendant is pre- sumed to be innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt. the same as a defendant in d criminal case. There are no presumptions taken against him, but the presump tions are all in his favor
 This is a wide departure from the attitude of those courts which seem to have presumed that their critics | were guilty and to have thrown upon | them the burden of proving the inno- | cence of their intent. Certainly in proceedings, where the offended judge sits substantially as accuser, judge and eXecutioner. the | rule announced in Judge Holloman's | opinion is much more consonant with | free press and free speech guarantees. |
 "The court holds. in addition, that where a publication is not contemptu ous on its face the defendants sworn denial of cOntemptuOus purpose will be taken as conclusive and the de- fendant discharged, in the absence of the definite pleading and proof by the state that the publication tended to obstruct justice. This is. in effect, a disavowal of the theory of some courts that judges may convict on their intuitiye knowledge in such cases. and without pleading and proof of the facts and circumstances relied upon.
 ''In line with these holdings the court also holds that a defendant charged with cOntemptuous criticism Is entitled to every construction con sistent with innocence of wrongful in- tent. saying in considering the prob able effect of the publication. every fair and reasonable inference ron sistent with the theory of the defend ants innocence should be indulged.' This rule is emphasized by the court m its statement that it is merely de- ,laratory of primary principle of law and necessarily appli- able to the case al bar.
 The court also holds that judges nay not redress their private griev inces by contempt proceedings, but nay resort only to the kinds of relief open to the private citizen. As to this, he court says that contempt powers Ire not to be used as a means of per iOnaI protection not accorded Co other and further says if in his I., capacity judge is criti- | .ized or libeled his recourse is the ,ame as that afforded any private -itizen. unless it is shown that the ibel tended tO Obstruct the orderly curse of justice in some pending case pr that il tended tU embarrass Che udge in the discharge of judicial l